

SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN OFFICIAL
DISCOURSE IN TURKEY IN POST-COLD WAR ERA

A Master's Thesis

by

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ABSTRACT

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Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has become a destination country for the human mobility of people who are not of 'Turkish descent and culture'. For the first time in the history of the Republic, Turkey has become a destination and not only a transit country. The thesis is interested in the changing official responses of the Republic to this transition. The question asked is whether and/or in what ways major human mobility cases to Turkey in the post-Cold War Era were securitized in the official discourse of the Republic. The cases that are focused on are the mobility of the 1989 Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria, and the Northern Iraqis in 1991, mobility from the post-Soviet countries and from the Central African countries since the early 1990s, and post-2011 Syrian human mobility. While examining this question, the thesis adopts the perspective of securitization theory and looks to see whether these human mobilities were portrayed as a threat to Turkey's national security or not.

Keywords: Migration, Securitization, Human Mobility, Copenhagen School, Paris School

ÖZET

SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI DÖNEMDE TÜRKİYE'DE RESMİ SÖYLEMDE GÖÇÜN GÜVENLİKLEŞTİRİLMESİ

Fişne Yavuz, Mehlika Ayşe

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Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinden bu yana Türkiye, 'Türk soyundan ve kültüründen' olmayan insanların insan hareketliliği için hedef ülke haline gelmiştir. Cumhuriyet tarihinde ilk kez Türkiye sadece bir geçiş ülkesi değil, aynı zamanda bir varış noktası haline gelmiştir. Bu tez, Cumhuriyetin bu geçişe değişen resmi tepkileri ile ilgilenmektedir. Tezin araştırma sorusu, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Türkiye'ye yönelik büyük insan hareketliliği vakalarının Cumhuriyet'in resmi söyleminde güvenlikleştirilip güvenlikleştirilmediği ve/veya hangi yollarla güvenlikleştirilmiştir. İncelenen vakalar, 1989 Bulgaristan Etnik Türklerinin ve 1991'de Kuzey Iraklıların hareketliliği, 1990'ların başından itibaren Sovyet sonrası ülkelerden ve Orta Afrika ülkelerinden gelen hareketlilik ve 2011 sonrası Suriye'den gelen hareketliliktir. Bu soruyu incelerken tez, güvenlikleştirme teorisi perspektifini benimsemekte ve bu insan hareketliliklerinin Türkiye'nin ulusal güvenliğine bir tehdit olarak gösterilip gösterilmediğini incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Göç, Güvenlikleştirme, İnsan Hareketliliği, Kopenhagen Ekolü, Paris Ekolü

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the formation of the modern Turkish Republic, the movements of human mobility from and to Turkey have preserved their significance in state policies. In the early period of the Turkish Republic, migration was used as a tool for nation-building and national integrity (İnce, 2012). Nationalist policies influenced the formation of migration policies in this period. From the formation of the Turkish Republic until the 1950s, while the Turkish and Muslim populations' human mobility to Turkey was encouraged, non-Turkish and non-Muslim populations' remaining in Anatolia were discouraged (İçduygu & Aksel, 2013: 170). In this period, state-generated influx of Muslim immigrants mostly from the Balkan countries came to Anatolia. In addition, a population exchange agreement with Greece was signed in 1923 which resulted in the departure of the 1.2 million Greeks living in Anatolia and the arrival of the 400,000 Rumelian Muslims (Aktar, 2000, as cited in İnce, 2012: 51).

The 'Settlement Law' was adopted in 1926 and the extensive version came into force in 1934. According to the law, those considered from 'Turkish origin and culture' were categorized either as *muhacir* (immigrant) or *mülteci* (refugee) based on whether they were being forced to come or not. If they came without being forced, they were considered 'muhacir', and if they were being forced, they were considered 'mülteci'. For these two categories of immigrants, migration and integration to

Turkey were facilitated. Legal transactions, such as the naturalization process, property ownership, had been simplified. On the contrary, as it was stated in the Article 2 of the law, the migration of those who did not meet the criteria of being from the 'Turkish origin and culture', was discouraged (Resmi Gazete, 21.7.1934).

Not only the migration of the Muslim- Turkish communities but also the migration of the communities who were deemed as bound to Turkish culture were allowed (İnce, 2012: 54). The influx of these communities to Anatolia was encouraged because it was seen as “strengthening the cohesion and homogeneity of the Turkish nation” (İnce, 2012: 50). To promote the growth of the post-war population of the newly established Turkish Republic and have a homogenized population were the main reasons behind the migration policy of the early period of the Turkish Republic.

The migration policy of the early periods of the Turkish Republic changed in the 1950s. This second period lasted until the 1980s. The main characteristic of the second period was the promotion of labour mobility of Turkish citizens to the Western European countries via state-sponsored labour agreements. Western European countries met their labour shortages through short-term labour migration agreements with less developed countries in the post-WWII era. For the less developed countries, these labour agreements were an opportunity to benefit from the remittance flow and decrease the unemployment rate. Beginning with the 1961 labour recruitment agreement with Germany, human mobility from Turkey started

and lasted until the 1971 oil crisis. After that, new locations such as the Middle East, North Africa and Australia have become targets of Turkey's labour emigrants (İçduygu & Aksel, 2013: 172).

Turkey's integration into the international migration regime happened in this second period through signing the UN Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol, two international treaties that determine the legal status of asylum seekers and refugees. Turkey is one of the first signatories to the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol. At the ratification process of the 1951 Convention, Turkey put geographical restrictions on whom it accepts as a refugee, and this geographical restriction is still in place.

Due to the geographical restriction, Turkey excludes non-Europeans from being recognized as refugees. Within this framework, 'Conventional' and 'non-Conventional' refugee categories were formed. If a person with a fulfilling condition of refugee status comes from European countries, they are referred to as a Conventional refugee. If a person comes outside of Europe, they are referred to as a non-Conventional refugee. Due to this distinction, only Conventional refugees could enjoy the rights provided by the Geneva Convention. The non-Conventional refugees (currently named as asylum seekers) could only enjoy little legal protection. The non-Conventional refugees are allowed temporary asylum until the UNHCR finalizes their resettlement to a third country.

The third period in Turkey's migration policy began in the 1980s. The characteristic of this period is the human mobility of so-called 'foreigners' to Turkey. Beginning with the 1980s, for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, migrants who are not of 'Turkish descent and culture' have started to migrate into Turkey for a variety of different reasons. The facilitating effect of globalization on the movement of people and economic and political turmoil in the region have been the main reasons behind this human mobility to Turkey. The common point of the human mobility cases in this third period is its irregularity. Most of the arrivals come either as irregular migrants or were drifted into irregularity by overstaying their visa. During this period, Turkey began to pursue a more active and strict migration policy targeting this irregularity (İçduygu, 2004: 91).

In this vein, the 1994 Asylum Regulation (hereafter: 1994 Regulation) was implemented. The 1994 Regulation stressed the necessity of registration to the Turkish authorities before applying to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (henceforth: UNHCR) for the refugee status. It put a two-tiered mechanism for asylum applications. To be able to apply for refugee status to the UNHCR, the asylum application request of the foreigner had to be approved by the Turkish authorities. After being given the asylum seeker status, registration and interview to the UNHCR for refugee status application could be made (Resmi Gazete, 30.11.1994). In addition, the 1994 Regulation put some strict measures in the case of the collective arrival of foreigners to the Turkish border. According to the 1994 Regulation, it was essential to stop population movements in the border and prevent

asylum seekers from crossing the border. But in the case of admissions into the country, the sheltering zones for the arrivals should be as close to the border as possible (Resmi Gazete, 30.11.1994).

During this period, human mobility to Turkey began with the influx of foreigners from Turkey's eastern neighbours. The first mass human mobility of 'foreigners' to Turkey was the influx of Iranian nationals following the 1979 regime change. Most of these Iranian migrants came for a temporary stay and left for Northern America or European countries (Kirişçi, 2008: 1). The cases of mass human mobility to Turkey peaked, especially with the end of the Cold War. From 1988 to 1993, Turkey received two major human mobility cases. First, a significant number of asylum seekers from Bulgaria and Iraq arrived in 1989 and 1991. And in addition to these asylums motivated human mobility cases, Turkey has become an attractive migration location for the nationals of the former Soviet Union. The economic turmoil in the Post-Soviet countries encouraged the nationals of these countries to migrate for work in more stable economies, and Turkey has become one of these countries.

The thesis is interested in the changing official responses of the Republic to the country's transition from a transit to a destination country. The question asked is whether and/or in what ways major human mobility cases to Turkey in the post-Cold War Era were securitized in the official discourse of the Republic. I use the term human mobility instead of migration due to the inclusiveness of the term. The cases

that are focused on are the mobility of the 1989 Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria, and the Northern Iraqis in 1991, mobility from the post-Soviet countries and from the Central African countries since the early 1990s, and post-2011 Syrian human mobility. While examining this question, the thesis adopts the perspective of securitization theory and looks to see whether these human mobilities were portrayed as a threat to Turkey's national security or not.

In order to answer the research question, it is necessary to define two concepts, namely: security and securitization. In the security studies literature, there is more than one conception of security. Traditional and critical security perspectives are the two approaches to security studies. The meaning and nature of security are the fundamental points to be debated over between these two approaches. The traditional approaches to security studies rest on varieties of realist theory, and in this approach, the state is privileged as the focus of the security studies. The characteristic of the traditional approaches to security studies is its conceptualization of security and threat. In traditional security studies, security is conceptualized as state security and threat is conceptualized as a military force. According to Walt, "security studies may be defined as the study of threat, use and control of military force" (1991: 212).

However, critical security studies refer to the different understanding of security. The critical security approaches to security studies are dissatisfied with the traditional conceptualization of security and threat. They have developed against the focus on

"safeguarding the core values of a state from military threats' ' (Krause & Williams, 1996: 230). They have pointed out the necessity to go beyond the traditional conceptualization of security and threat. They define security beyond the statist and militarist orthodoxies. They understand security beyond survival and focus on non-state referents.

Securitization theory shares the fundamental propositions of critical security approaches. Rather than conceptualization of threat as a military threat, the theory proposes that no issue 'essentially' is a threat. The securitization theory stresses the social construction of threats and focuses on the process of construction. The goal of the securitization theory is to reveal the mechanisms through which issues are framed as threats. Thus, the main question that the securitization theory has asked is "what makes something a security problem?" (Wæver, 1995: 52). The securitization literature has two distinct frameworks named "the logic of exception" and "logic of routine" or in terms of two schools, Copenhagen and Paris (Wæver, 2004: 3).

According to the Copenhagen School, security is defined as a 'speech act' or discursive construction. It means that it emphasizes the importance of discourse on security conceptualization. For the Copenhagen School, the placement of public issues as security issues is done through language in order to deal with them through exceptional measures. This existential framing of security issues enables a securitizing actor to propose moving particular issues beyond normal politics and

counter the constructed threat with exceptional measures. In this sense, securitization is seen as an extreme form of politicization that enables a securitizing actor to propose any public issue as a matter of security and deal with such issues beyond the limits of normal politics.

According to the Paris School, the concepts of security and insecurity are products of political acts by politicians and security professionals. The act of securitization is at the center of how the School defines security and insecurity. For the Paris School, securitization is a capacity to define, manage and control by security professionals and bureaucracies. It defines securitization as a technique of government that is used to increase and consolidate the authority and power of security professionals.

According to the Paris School, what empowers the process of securitization is the collection of routinized and patterned practices carried out by security professionals and bureaucrats.

Rather than the conceptualization of security as state security and the conceptualization of threat as a military threat, securitization theory goes beyond the conceptualizations of the traditional approach. The theory understands security beyond survival and focuses on non-state referents as well. It focuses on the mechanisms through which security is constructed and emphasizes the constructed nature of threats. Because the research question of the thesis focuses on how security

is constructed in the five major human mobility cases to Turkey in the Post-Cold War, it adopts the framework of securitization theory.

To analyse the research question, Chapter 2 will examine the security conceptions of Copenhagen and Paris Schools. Chapter 3 will look at the five major human mobility cases to Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era. The chapter is divided into five parts, and in each part, one of the cases of human mobility will be examined. In Chapter 4, an analysis of Turkey's response to these five major human mobility cases of the Post-Cold War Era will be given based on three questions: How security is defined, what is the 'referent object' in this security definition, and what is the way to attain the defined security in every five cases of the human mobility. In light of these four chapters, Chapter 5 will summarize the overall analysis and conclude the thesis.

CHAPTER 2

SECURITIZATION THEORY FROM THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL AND PARIS SCHOOL PERSPECTIVES

The securitization literature has two distinct frameworks named “the logic of exception” and “logic of routine” or in terms of schools as Copenhagen and Paris respectively. The main aim of Chapter 2 is to examine securitization theory from the perspectives of these two schools. This chapter is divided into two parts. In part one, the Copenhagen School will be analysed. In this part, the Copenhagen School’s conceptualization of security, and its emphasis of discourse in the securitization process will be explored. In part two of the Chapter, the Paris School will be analysed. In this part, the Paris School’s conceptualization of security, and its emphasis on the effect of the *field of security* in the securitization process will be explored.

1. The Copenhagen School Perspective: Securitization as a Speech Act

According to the Copenhagen School, securitization is a speech act in which a particular referent object is framed as existentially threatened to seek the audience's acceptance of a security framing of an issue so that it could be addressed through exceptional measures (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998: 23). For the Copenhagen School, transformation of public issues as a security issue is done through language. Security is defined as a speech act in which "the utterance *itself* is the act. By uttering security, [securitizing actor] moves particular development into a specific area" (Waever, 1995: 53).

The Copenhagen School associates security with survival in the face of existential threats. In this sense, the existential rhetoric of the speech act is an essential factor for securitization. The importance of existential rhetoric comes from the security concept's power. The Copenhagen School proposes that referring to a particular referent object within the context of security provides this object a sense of importance and necessitates the priority of dealing with whatever issue threatens this referent object. The main reason for the security concept's provision of importance and priority emanates from the presentation of an issue as a threat to the survival of a referent object (Waever, 1995: 51).

The existential rhetoric of the speech act is constructed upon the framing that if a threatening issue is not dealt with, this will lead to severe consequences for the referent object. It is this existential framing of security issues that enables a securitizing actor to propose moving particular issues beyond “normal politics” and counter this threat with “exceptional measures” (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). Thus, according to the Copenhagen School the main aim of a securitizing actor is to attain the audience’s acceptance in order to deal with a particular issue beyond the limits and restrictions of normal politics (Buzan et al., 1998: 25).

In this sense, securitization is a tool that enables a securitizing actor to deal with threats beyond the limits of normal politics. Because securitization enables a securitizing actor to move issues beyond the limits of normal politics, securitization is seen as an extreme form of politicization according to the Copenhagen School.

Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998: 24) propose that:

any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it does not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented an existential threat, requiring emergency measure and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure).

The Copenhagen School proposes that theoretically any public issue can be moved to the securitized realm of the spectrum by securitization which makes securitization an extreme form of politicization.

The *securitizing actor* is an agent "who securitizes issues by declaring particular *referent objects* as existentially threatened" (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). Accordingly, the *securitizing actor* is an agent capable of using the power of authority to frame issues as security issues. Political elites of a state have a priority to become *securitizing actors* (Wæver, 1995: 51). This does not mean that only the political elites of a state could employ securitizing moves. Other actors who would have sufficient authority in the eyes of the audience can also propose securitization. But those who hold institutional authority are privileged in articulating security. According to the Copenhagen School, "common players in this role are political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups" (Buzan et al., 1998: 40).

A *referent object* is an object that is portrayed by the *securitizing actor* as existentially threatened. Traditionally, state and nation are framed as the most common *referent objects* by securitizing actors. When a state is a *referent object* of a particular securitization move, the *securitizing actor* usually frames an existential threat to its survival or its sovereignty. When the *referent object* is a nation, the existential threat is usually framed as against the survival of its identity (Buzan et al., 1998: 36).

Although state and nation are the most common *referent objects* of the securitizing moves, a wide 'spectrum of possibilities' exists to be an object of the referent in a securitizing move. This possibility derives from the theory that the capability of any

issue to be a referent object in a particular securitizing move is in the hands of *securitizing actors*. However, in practice, attaining audience acceptance with some types of *referent objects* is easier (Buzan et al., 1998: 32).

According to the Copenhagen School, *the audience* is the one that a securitizing actor needs to seek acceptance of in order to finalize the securitizing move as a successful case of securitization. Whether an issue should be securitized or not is decided not only by the *securitizing actor* but also by the *audience*. (Buzan et al., 1998: 23).

According to the Copenhagen School, the emphasis on existential rhetoric as the defining features of security enables it to conduct a security analysis in a variety of different *sectors*. The Copenhagen School "places the survival of collective units and principles as the core of security studies," (Buzan et al., 1998: 33). For the Copenhagen School, "security is a generic term which means survival in the face of existential threats, and what constitutes an existential threat is not the same across different sectors" (Buzan et al., 1998: 27). The Copenhagen School identifies five different *sectors*, namely military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. *Sectors* are different contexts in which speech acts are constituted in order to highlight particular referent objects as threatened (Balzacq, Léonard, & Ruzicka, 2016: 502-3). In each of these *sectors*, there are units and values unique to the

particular *sector* and what is considered a threat, and the nature of survival varies across *sectors*.

The Copenhagen School theorizes that there are three conditions that *facilitate* the acceptance of a securitizing move as a successful case of securitization. These *facilitating conditions* are separated into two categories as internal and external. The internal aspect of facilitating conditions is about the linguistic features of the speech act, which refers to the way by which the speech act is constructed. The internal facilitating conditions for speech act are about following the form and grammar of security in which it should “include the existential threat, point of no return, and possible way out and sector-specific referent objects” (Buzan et al., 1998: 33).

The external facilitating conditions of securitization is related to the context of the speech acts and subdivided as actor- related and threat-related conditions (Buzan et al., 1998: 32). The actor related facilitating condition is about the social capacity of a securitizing actor, whether a securitizing actor has an authority to securitize a particular issue. In that regard, being in the position of authority by the audience is a facilitating condition for the securitizing actor to seek the audience's acceptance. The threat-related facilitating condition related to the feature of the alleged threats. The Copenhagen School proposes that it is more likely for the audience to grant acceptance if particular objects that [have historical connotations of the threat] are referred (Buzan et al., 1998: 33). In short, according to the Copenhagen School, there

is more possibility for a securitizing move to be accepted as securitization by the audience if it has the form and grammar of security, referring objects that have historical connotation of threat, and if the securitizing actor has the social capital to finalize securitizing move.

In summary, according to the Copenhagen School, the securitization process works as follows: There is a *referent object* deemed worthy of being protected by a *securitizing actor* against threats, and the *audience* is asked to authorize the securitizing actor's use of exceptional measures to address the threat by framing referent object as existentially threatened. This "existential" framing enables the securitizing actor to propose moving particular issues beyond "normal politics" and counter the constructed threat with exceptional measures. In this sense, for the Copenhagen School securitization is seen as an extreme form of politicization that enables a securitizing actor to propose any public issue as a matter of security and deal with such issue beyond the limits of normal politics.

2. The Paris School: Securitization as a Technique of Governmentality

The Paris School rejects the association of security with existentiality and issues of survival by proposing that such an association is limited in the sense that it overlooks the political dynamic of security. The association of security to the issues of survival induces the understanding of security as a positive thing and frames it in opposition

to insecurity. However, according to the Paris School, the concepts of security and insecurity have no normative value. As a social concept, security or insecurity has no 'essence'. Instead, it is power relations that determine what is considered as security or insecurity (Bigo, 2008a: 122).

For the Paris School, insecurity could not be seen as the opposite of security because the attempt to secure some groups always produces insecurity for others (Huysmann, 2006: 146). In contrast to the understanding of security as a public good, Paris School emphasizes the political aspect of security and theorizes that "security cannot be global and for all," because the act of securing some groups generate insecurity for other groups (Bigo, 2008a: 126) and "the way security is defined conditions what is considered as insecurity" (C.A.S.E Collective, 2006: 457).

According to the Paris School, there is also sacrifice aspect in security because "the determination of who needs to survive, be protected and from what, also supposes knowing who is sacrificed in this operation, hence security is also about sacrifice" (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008: 2) and what has been missing in traditional understandings of security according to Paris School is the emphasis on the political aspect on the determination of security issues. Following that, Paris School proposes that the question to be asked in security studies is not the question of 'what security means' rather what needs to be focused is 'what security does' (C.A.S.E Collective, 2006: 449).

According to the Paris School “security claim is not only a discursive practice- it is a mixture of discursive and non-discursive practices” (Bigo, 2008: 129). For the Paris School, understanding security claims as a discursive practice is insufficient, the non-discursive practices are also significant in the making of security claims. The security claim involves "practices, audiences, and contexts that enable and constrain the production of specific forms of governmentality" (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008: 6). For the Paris School, the securitization process is a result of the *field effect* rather than a result of an actor’s strategy. The result of the securitization process should be assessed beyond the will of an actor. In the assessment of the securitization process, the ‘*field effect*’ should be taken into consideration. Accordingly, “the result of [securitization] depends on the field-effect of many actors engaged in competitions for defining whose security is important, and of different audiences liable to accept or not that definition" (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008: 5).

For the Paris School, securitization is a capacity to define, manage and control, and the main emphasis of the School is on the security practices and routines performed by security professionals and bureaucracies (C.A.S.E Collective, 2006: 457). The Paris School has defined securitization with reference to the ‘technique of governmentality’ concept in which securitization is defined as one technique of governmentality used to increase and consolidate the authority and power of security professionals (Bigo, 2008a: 124).

According to the Paris School, securitization is a "political technology used as a mode of governmentality by diverse institutions to play with unease [and insecurity] to affirm their role as providers of protection and security and to mask some of their failures" (Bigo, 2002: 65). For the Paris School, the primary purpose of a securitization attempt is to strengthen the security professionals' legitimacy of dealing with these insecurity issues in the perception of the public (Bigo, 2008a: 124). In short, securitization is defined by the Paris School as a capacity to define, manage and control. It is referred to as a one technique of governmentality which is used by diverse institutions to play with unease. Rather than assessing the securitization process from the will of an actor, the Paris School emphasizes the importance of practices, audiences and contexts. According to the Paris School, the result of securitization is shaped by competitions of the actors involved in the *field of security*.

In the analysis of the determinant effect of security agencies, Bigo employs the concept of '*field of security*,' which refers to diverse groups and institutions, such as police, gendarmeries, information services which are authorized to define what security and insecurity are (Bigo, 2000: 344). According to the Paris School, four different features determine the '*field of security*.' The first feature, the "field of attraction", refers to the dynamic that the field of security fuses different perceptions and interests of the agents and homogenizes these interests and perceptions. The second feature, "the field of struggles", emphasizes the possibility of difference in how agents pursue their means in the field of security. While some actors may use

defensive means, some may use offensive means when to reach their aims. In this sense, it is "a field of struggles to conserve or transform the configuration of the field's forces" (Bigo, 2008b: 24). The third feature of the field of security, "the field of domination", refers to the domination of the field vis-a-vis other fields because the field of security "enables security professionals to make truth claims based on knowledge and know-how" (Bigo, 2008b: 23). The fourth and last feature of the security field, "transversal field", refers to the permeability of the boundaries of the security field. According to Paris School, the boundaries of the security field are not fixed, and it is open to change (Bigo, 2008b: 23).

For the Paris School when studying securitization, focusing on the "system of meaning [that the field of security] generates and the productive power of their practices is necessary " (C.A.S.E Collective, 2006: 458). Since security institutions determine the discourse of security, they have a determinant effect on the social construction of insecurity in a particular community. One of the significant factors that have an effect on the ability of security professionals to exercise 'securitization as a technique of governmentality' is related to their involvement in the process of 'social construction of fears' (Bigo, 2000: 323). Knowledge of these agencies has a determinant effect on the construction of fears among the public. Because security institutions hold the legitimacy to declare the characteristics of threat, what is considered insecurity in a particular community is related with the institutional knowledge that existed in the security field (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008: 5).

In addition to the importance of institutional knowledge in the construction of insecurity, also what security tool is used by security professionals and bureaucracies in response to curb particular instances affects the way of framing of issues (Huysmans, 2006: 8). Hence, through operating with specific security tools in practice, security professionals and bureaucracies structure particular issues and instances as insecurities and affect the social construction of fear and threat (Bigo, 2006: 49).

In summary, according to the Paris School, securitization is a capacity to define, manage and control by security professionals and bureaucracies. It conceptualizes securitization as one technique of governmentality which is used by security professionals to play with unease in order to enhance their role as providers of protection and security. By affecting the discourse of security through institutional knowledge and operating with specific security tools in practice, security professionals structure particular issues and instances and affect the social construction of fear and threat. Contrary to the Copenhagen School, the securitization process is not limited to speech acts for the Paris School. This process also involves practices, and the effects of the '*field of security*' that enable and constrain the production of specific securitization.

CHAPTER 3

FIVE MAJOR HUMAN MOBILITY CASES

The purpose of Chapter 3 is to examine the five major human mobility cases to Turkey in the post-Cold War period. The cases that will be examined are the mobility of the 1989 Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria, and the Northern Iraqis in 1991, mobility from the post-Soviet countries and from the Central African countries since the early 1990s, and post-2011 Syrian human mobility. The chapter is divided into five parts. In the first section of each part, the main objective is to provide general context of the human mobility case. In the second section, the main objective is to examine Turkey's response to the human mobility cases by looking at framing, legislative and practical responses.

1. The Human Mobility of The 1989 Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria

1.1 The Background

Starting from the early 1960s ethnic differences became a more significant reference point in Bulgaria which led to the increasing use of nationalistic terms for the Communist leadership when to legitimize authority (Höpken, 1997: 64). In this vein, in early 1980s, a new programme which was called as ‘‘National Revival Process’ had started to be implemented. The aim of the programme was stated as integrating the Turkish minority into the socialist society by disregarding the ethnic, religious, and cultural differences (Dimitrov, 2000: 7).

The implications of the new policy presented itself as several restrictions on the religious and cultural practices. In terms of religious practices, some of the local mosques were closed, and the practice of most of the Muslim rituals was forbidden (Vasileva, 1992: 350). In terms of cultural practices, speaking Turkish in the public sphere was banned and fines were introduced against it. Also the usage of Turkish names was forbidden and renaming campaigns which aimed to replace the Turkish names with Bulgarian-Slavic names were enforced. The villages that were populated mostly by the Turkish minority were inspected by the local civil servants and police forces to enforce the renaming campaign.

During these inspections members of the Turkish community organized demonstrations which turned into clashes with police forces. In these clashes, police

forces opened fire and caused some injuries and casualties among the Turkish community. With the increasing tensions, Turkey proposed a migration deal in February 1985, but it was rejected by Bulgaria stating that the issue was an internal affair of the country. Assimilation practices towards the Turkish minority continued in the following years even though it received international condemnation (Petkova, 2002: 47).

In mid-1989, in some villages, members of the Turkish minority organized protests and demanded their Turkish names back. During these protests, clashes with the police forces intensified and led to civilian casualties. The incidents between the protesters and police forces caused internal and international pressures on the regime. As a result of these pressures, Bulgarian Prime Minister Todor Jivkov made a statement that all Bulgarian citizens would receive tourist visas and asked Turkey to open its borders in May 1989. Following PM Jivkov's statement, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal made a statement declaring that the Turkish borders were open and would never be closed (Lütem, 1999: 9). These statements marked the beginning of a new official mobility wave and from 3 June to 21 August approximately 350,000 ethnic Turks of Bulgaria moved to Turkey (Vasileva, 1992: 349). Three months after opening, the Turkish border was closed to crossings at the end of August.

1.2 Turkey's Responses

Turkey's response to the mobility of ethnic Turks of Bulgaria¹ was shaped by emphasizing the ethnic similarity between them and the Turkish society and implementing practical and legislative changes to facilitate the integration process of the newcomers into the society. In terms of the framing of mobility, the distinctive feature of government officials' statements was their emphasis on the historical and ethnic commonalities between the Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria and Turkish citizens. One example of this is the employment of the term '*soydaşlar*' (kin). The government officials preferred to use the term of *soydaşlar* in the parliamentary speeches when referring Bulgarian Turks (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 16.6.1989; TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29.9.1989). In addition to that, they were referred to as 'citizens' in some of the speeches, even before conferring citizenship to Bulgarian Turks (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 7.06.1989).

The typical framing of the government officials in the parliamentary speeches was to describe the immigrants as 'kins' and sometimes 'citizens' who were victims of 'Bulgarian brutality' (*Bulgar mezalimi*) and had to escape to Turkey. The usage of the phrase 'Bulgarian brutality' was provided as a justification for the open border policy of the immigrants (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 7.6. 1989). Until the decision to

¹ The immigration and settlement policies of the Single Party Period of the Republic reveal that religion (Islam), language (Turkish), and ethnicity (being a Turk) were the necessary criteria to be the citizen of the new Republic. Thus, the immigration of non-Muslim Turks to Anatolia was problematic. While the facilitating practices were taken for the immigration of Muslim Turkish groups, complicating or preventive practices were taken for the immigration of non-Muslim Turkish groups. One example would be the decline of the immigration demand of Gagauz Turks (a group of Christianized Turks), while accepting the immigration demand of Pomaks (Bulgarian Muslims). For more on this issue see also. Çağaptay, S. (2002). *Kemalist Dönemde Göç ve İskân Politikaları: Türk Kimliği Üzerine Bir Çalışma*, *Toplum ve Bilim*, 93, 218-241; İnce, B. (2012) *Citizenship and Identity in Turkey: From Atatürk's Republic to the Present Day*. London: I.B Tauris & Co Ltd.

close the borders on 29 August 1989, the statements of the officials were that Turkey's borders always open to those 'kins' who want to come from Bulgaria and it is Turkey's duty to welcome these 'kins' who escaped from the 'Bulgarian brutality' (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 15.6.1989).

The amendments to the two laws were significant legislative developments related to the Turkey's response to the human mobility. The amendments were made to the laws with the stated aim of increasing the capacity to supply the needs of the Bulgarian Turks (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 7.6.1989). The first modified law was the 'Law no 3294 on Social Assistance and Solidarity'. This law was initially enacted to promote social funds for the citizens in need, but during the migration wave, the law was amended to encompass the people who migrate to Turkey. Thus, with the change social funds became available to be used for the necessities of Bulgarian Turks (Resmi Gazete, 4.7.1989). The Minister of Foreign Affairs Mesut Yilmaz stated that "3 billion Turkish liras were allocated from the 'Social Assistance Fund' for the needs of the 'kins'" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 7.6.1989).

Another modified law was the 'no 2510 Settlement Law', which remained in effect until 1994. At the beginning of the migration wave, the Turkish Parliament approved the additional clause to the 'Settlement Law' which stated that "the people who were enforced to emigrate from Bulgaria after the date of 1.1.1989 were accepted as

‘*muhacir*’ (immigrant) with the stated purpose to ease the process of legal transactions for these people” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 16.6.1989).

For the settlement of the immigrants, temporary shelters and communal houses were built in eight cities. Upon the arrival of the 1989 ethnic Turks of Bulgaria on the Turkish border, they were asked to fill a form asking if they had relatives who came in the previous immigration waves and could live with them or whether required government assistance instead. Based on these forms, those who need government assistance were settled initially in temporary shelters, and later they were settled in the cities. The immigrants who did not require government assistance were sent to the cities where their relatives lived. For them, monthly cash-based support for the rent and social expenses were provided (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 24.10.1989) and housing projects were developed (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 27.12.1989).

In the decision to where to settle, the qualifications of the immigrants were taken into consideration in order to ease the employment process. According to the parliamentary speech of the Minister of State Ercüment Konukman, those immigrants who worked in the industrial sector in Bulgaria were settled into the industrial cities in Turkey, and those immigrants who worked in the agriculture sector were settled into the agricultural cities (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29.9.1989). According to the parliamentary speech by the Minister of Labour and Social Security İmren Aykut, tax deductions for the employers who hire the immigrants were announced in order to promote their employment. In addition, as it is stated by her

“approximately one-third of the immigrants were hired” by the end of 1989 and some of these immigrants were employed in the public sector as teachers, medical staff, or in the agricultural industry (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 27.12.1989). Turkish literacy and training courses were organized in the cities where the Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria were settled, as the purpose is stated “to ease the adaptation process” of the immigrants (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29.9.1989). For the immigrants who wanted to continue their higher education, a new university exam was offered, and additional university quotas were provided (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29.9.1989).

Lastly, within three months after the end of the mobility, the naturalization policy for the Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria was implemented. According to the statistics provided by the Minister of Interior Abdülkadir Aksu, by the end of 1989, one-fifth of the 1989 Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria (approximately 30.000) were given Turkish citizenship (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 17.12.1989).

2. The Mobility of The 1991 Northern Iraqis

2.1 The Background

Turkey received one previous human mobility case from Iraq in 1988 before the 1991 mobility. The main emphasis will be on the 1991 mobility, but the 1988 human mobility case of the Iraqis will also be examined due to its impact on the latter.

The first mobility from Iraq into Turkey happened in 1988, when approximately 50,000 people were forced to come to the Turkish border. The mobility occurred following the end of the Iraq-Iran war. During the eight years-long war with Iran, some Kurdish groups took control of the cities Halabja and Hurmalin in the north-eastern of Iraq. To take back control of the cities and to penalize the Kurdish groups, Iraqi forces started a military operation on 17 March 1988. During the operations chemical weapons were used on the Halabja city, killing 5,000 people and forcing 70,000 to flee to the borders of Turkey and Iran (Malanczuk, 1991: 118). Starting on 28 August 1988, 50,000 people crossed Turkey's border in one week and settled into ten different temporary camps (Kaynak, 1992: 25). Later, the Iraqi government declared amnesty and issued guarantees for the lives of Kurdish refugees in the case of their return. However, only 14,000 of the Iraqis returned. By the beginning of 1991, approximately twenty thousand refugees of the 1988 mobility were still being housed in three different camps in Turkey (Kaynak, 1992: 25).

The 1991 mobility of the Northern Iraqis happened after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. On 2 August 1990, Iraqi troops annexed Kuwait and declared it as Iraqi territory. The occupation of Kuwait received international outrage. Several ultimatums demanding the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait were given to Iraq by the UN Security Council. Yet, Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait. On 17 January 1991, the coalition forces launched a military campaign, Operation Desert Storm. After one and half months, on 27 February 1991, Iraq agreed to withdraw from Kuwait. Following the defeat of the Iraqi army, domestic rebellions began in

Iraq in the Shiite dominated southern and Kurdish dominated north-eastern regions. The Iraqi forces quickly suppressed the southern insurgency. As the Iraqi troops advanced to suppress the northern rebellion in Kurdish dominated areas in late March 1991, two million Iraqi people, mainly Kurdish origin, started to flee from their homes to the mountainous region bordering Turkey, Iraq and Iran. The use of chemical weapons in the 1988 military operations had a strong effect on the 1991 refugees to flee from their homes. Nearly half a million of these Northern Iraqis gathered in the border regions of Turkey (Ihlamur-Öner, 2013: 195).

The 1991 mobility of Northern Iraqis was a rare incident both as an historical instance of human mobility and as an example of Turkey's response. As an incident, it was unexpected in scale and speed in which from late March to 5 April, in less than two weeks, approximately half a million Iraqis fled and gathered at the Turkish side of the border. It was the largest human mobility case Turkey had faced until the Post-2011 human mobility of the Syrians. The immigrants stayed on the Turkish side of the border in temporary camps for about three weeks, from the date Turkey agreed to open its border on 5 April to 24 April 1991. The extensive international coverage of the mobility resulted in the formation of a 'safe zone' in a short period to repatriate the immigrants in newly built camps in Northern Iraq.

2.1 Turkey's Response

Turkey's response to the 1991 mobility of the Northern Iraqis had two dimensions: seeking international support to respond, and pressuring for the creation of a 'safe zone' in order to repatriate the Northern Iraqis to the Iraqi territory.

At the beginning of the mobility, the government officials complained about the international community's stance against the previous case of 1988 in their parliamentary speeches. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemoçin stated that the international community had offered an insufficient amount of humanitarian assistance to the 1988 immigrants, the economic burden of the mobility had been left onto Turkey. In addition to these, he also claimed that only small proportions of 1988 Iraqi immigrants had been given a chance to be resettled by the European countries (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 03.04.1991). After reminding the unequal burden-sharing of the 1988 mobility, in response to the 1991 case, he stated that "the reason that forces these people from their homeland must be eliminated... and the tragedy must be stopped in place ... [for the immigrants] the right to live in their homeland should be ensured" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 03.04.1991).

As the number of immigrants increased, the creation of a 'safe zone' to settle the immigrants into camps in Iraq's territory was heavily promoted by Turkey as a solution. The Turkish President Turgut Özal invited the UN peacekeeping force to intervene and establish a safe zone in Northern Iraq, but initially a 'safe zone' was

not considered. On 5 April 1991, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 688, which stated that international peace and security are threatened and called Iraqi forces to end the repression and allow international organizations to address the needs of the immigrants. Turkey agreed to open its border after Resolution 688 and started to place the Northern Iraqis into the temporary camps located at the Turkish side of the border.

UN-led action was not an option due to the failure to take a unilateral decision in the Security Council. Instead, on 7 April 1991, with the European Community's support, US President Bush announced his support for the 'safe zone' and warned the Iraqi government not to engage in any military operation above the 36th parallel. The US-led 'Operation Provide Comfort' coalition forces were established to create a safe zone for Northern Iraqis in Iraqi territory and deter Iraqi forces from attacking them. On 23 April 1991, Iraqi forces signed an agreement issuing a guarantee of not entering the north of the 36th parallel. Starting from 24 April, approximately half a million immigrants who stayed in the border camps in the Turkish territory were brought to the safe zone (Kirişçi, 1996: 20).

In the parliamentary discussions of 1988 and 1991, the government officials emphasized Turkey's geographical restriction and non-obligation to accept immigrants from non-European countries. The temporary nature of the Northern Iraqis' stay in the country was emphasized. In response to a parliamentary question,

Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz stated that "the Iraqis are granted temporary and transit asylum only on the humanitarian grounds until they go to the third country" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 18.10.1988; TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 21.05.1991). Later in a parliamentary discussion, Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz stated that "If Turkey had accepted the Northern Iraqis who wanted to take refuge in Turkey due to the Gulf War by heeding the opposition's suggestions, today [it] would carry the burden of at least 1 million people" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 03.07.1991).

The Ministry of Defence Nevzat Ayaz stated at the parliamentary debate on status related questions and whether the remaining Northern Iraqis are considered to be naturalized that:

The remaining Northern Iraqis are given a residence permit as temporary shelter for six months. Those who have obtained a third-country visa at the end of temporary protection are allowed to exit to their destination countries, those who cannot are sent to the safe zone in Iraq. Northern Iraqis stay in Turkey only for humanitarian considerations, as such, their naturalization is out of the question (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 14.04.1992).

From the beginning of the mobility of 1991 Northern Iraqis, national security was defined as protecting the Turkish border from the entry of the Northern Iraqis as much as possible and calling for international support and burden share for the management of the mobility. Once the strategy of avoiding the Northern Iraqis to enter into the country did not become attainable due to international pressure, the strategy became settling the Northern Iraqis into the temporary border camps while

continuing to pressure for international intervention for the handling of the issue in order to repatriate the Northern Iraqis to the 'safe zone' in the Iraqi territory. Thus, the 1991 human mobility of Northern Iraqis was considered a threat to the national security of Turkey and the national security for this case was constructed as border security.

3. Human Mobility from the Post-Soviet Countries

3.1 The Background

The human mobility case from the Post-Soviet countries was started with the economic restructuring policies in these countries following the collapse of the centrally managed economies. The collapse of communist regimes caused citizens of these countries to emigrate because the collapse caused economic and political upheaval and weakened the resources previously provided by states. The lives of many citizens were negatively affected by these changes (Bloch, 2003: 3). The declining economic opportunities in the post-Soviet era encouraged many citizens to search for employment opportunities in other countries to earn a living (İçduygu, 2006: 7-8). The search for economic opportunities and the aim of saving money for a better standard of living continues to be the main reasons for Post-Soviet country nationals to move from their home countries. Turkey has become one of the destination countries since the 1990s and the number of the post-Soviet country nationals in Turkey has intensified in the 2000s. Higher wages and greater availability of work in the informal sector, liberal visa regulations, and Turkey's geographical proximity are given as the main pulling factors that make Turkey

appealing for the post- Soviet country nationals (İçduygu & Aksel 2015: 125).

Although the nationality of the post-Soviet immigrants has been changing parallel to the increased economic opportunities in their home countries, Turkey continues to be an appealing destination, especially for the nationals from poorer republics of the community of independent states (Şenses, 2016: 979).

The overwhelming majority of the Post- Soviet country nationals have come and returned to their home countries after they reached the amount of money they aimed to save. They have come to Turkey for economic purposes. They do not settle down in Turkey or seek to transit into Europe, they are labour migrants. The accessibility and availability of employment in informal sectors is the main driving factor for them to come. Among the post- Soviet labour migrants, only a small percentage have proper authorization to work in Turkey; most of them work informally. Textile, entertainment, healthcare and domestic work are the most common sectors that Post-Soviet labour migrants are engaged in (Kirişçi, 2008: 5). They can easily find employment in these sectors because they are seen as cheap, flexible and a more qualified labour force by the employers. They usually perform various tasks for less pay than the native workers (Özçürümez & Yetkin, 2014: 452).

Turkey's flexible visa regime towards post-Soviet countries has encouraged the labour migrants to come and work in Turkey. For the Post-Soviet countries' nationals, Turkey has granted short term visa exemptions. Most of the post-Soviet

country nationals have entered Turkey legally to benefit from the visa exemptions and participate in unregistered employment. In order to stay with legal status, a substantial number of these labour migrants move back and forth periodically to renew their visa exemption period (Gülçür & İlkaracan, 2002: 415). Due to these periodical visits, the case of the post-Soviet country nationals to Turkey is classified as a 'circular' mobility (Kirişçi, 2008: 3).

Official data regarding the number of post-Soviet country nationals working in Turkey is not available. The statistics only show arrivals and exits from particular post-Soviet countries. It includes several circular entries and does not report repeated entries by the same person (Kirişçi, 2008: 12). But unofficially the size of the human mobility case of post-Soviet country nationals to Turkey is estimated as ranging from "several hundred thousand to half a million" (İçduygu, 2006: 10). In terms of gender dynamics of mobility, females outnumber males. The reason for this situation is related to the availability of jobs. The sectors that post-Soviet country nationals can find work and are heavily concentrated are traditionally accepted as female niches (Eder, 2015: 133).

3.2 Turkey's Responses

Turkey's response to the human mobility of post-Soviet country nationals is shaped around its approach to the regularization of migrant workers and its visa regime

towards post-Soviet countries. Amendments were made in several legislations including the 'The law Concerning Work Permits for Foreigners (no.4817)' and the 'Turkish Citizenship Law'. The amendment to the former law was aimed to regulate foreign informal work, and the amendment to the latter law was aimed to control the process of naturalization by marriage.

'The Law Concerning Work Permits for Foreigners' (no. 4817) was drafted in 2003 and remained in effect until 2016. With the introduction of the law, the work permits' regulation system is centralized. The Ministry of Labour has become the sole authority to grant working permits. In the first version of the law, the initiative to take the working permit was left to the employer. The law enabled the employer to apply for a working permit before the arrival of a foreign employee. In the case of firing, the working permit of an employee would become invalid. In 2013, the 12th article of the law was amended. In the new version of the law, foreign employees can initiate the process of receiving a work permit. The amendment introduced the possibility for foreign employees to apply for a working permit directly to the Turkish Consulates in their country of origin. Also, the law increased the fines for informal employment in the case of being caught.

In the parliamentary discussions on the draft of the law, “preventing illegal foreigners from being illegally employed in jobs that are the right of our country's people” was stated by the government officials as the motivation to prepare the law.

The Minister of Labour and Social Security Murat Başesgioğlu stated with explicit reference to post-Soviet migrants that " the preference of foreign illegal workers as cheap labour causes unemployment of our citizens with the same qualifications and leads to losses in tax and insurance premiums which negatively affects the wage and union order of our country". After these statements the Minister emphasized the scattered legislative structure in the issuing working permits and states "to control the issue of foreign illegal workers, working permits should be collected in a single center, they should be inspected, and foreign illegal work should be deterred by the penal sanctions" and he states the aim of the law is to meet these ends (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 27. 02.2003).

In addition to these attempts of regularizing the irregular foreign workforce, the law no. 4817 also abolished 'The Law on the Specific Employment Conditions of Turkish Citizens in Turkey', according to which being employed in various professions was restricted exclusively to the Turkish citizens (Kaşka, 2005: 27). With the abolishment of the law, the lists of jobs a foreigner can legally be employed in was expanded. Being employed in domestic work, which is common for post- Soviet labour migrants, became legally possible.

Another legislative change in response to the mobility of post-Soviet country nationals was made to the 'Turkish Citizenship Law'. The amendment to Article 5 of the 'Turkish Citizenship Law' was made in June 2003. Before the amendment, a

foreign woman was able to obtain citizenship immediately after marrying a Turkish national. With the amendment, the right of a foreign woman to immediately obtain Turkish citizenship when she marries a Turkish man is abolished and a waiting period imposed. According to the new version of the law, a three years waiting period after the marriage is required for a foreign woman to initiate the naturalization process. The same procedure for naturalization by marriage applies to both the foreign woman and foreign man. In the parliamentary discussions of the issue, the amendment was presented as prohibiting the use of marriage as a means for foreign women to obtain Turkish citizenship. These marriages are defined as 'fake marriages', and post- Soviet female migrants are explicitly referred to as practicing 'fake marriages'. The justification of the amendment is stated as "the need to the control of those who enter our borders from the illegal immigration under the legal guise" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 30. 01. 2003).

The visa policy of Turkey for the nationals of post-Soviet countries has a significant implication for Turkey's response to the mobility from these countries. The developments concerning the visa regime were made as an amendment to the 'Law on Residence and Travel for Foreigners in Turkey'. With the amendment, the ordinary and official passport holders of the post-Soviet country nationals were given visa exemptions for a determined period. The determined time for visa exemptions varies. The minimum visa exemption period determined for a post- Soviet country national is 30 days, and the maximum visa exemption period is 90 days (see Table 1). Because of the differing terms of visa exemptions granted to the Post-Soviet

country nationals, it is a significant factor in Post- Soviet country nationals' choice to come to Turkey and it promotes participation in an unregistered employment.

However, in February 2012 through the amendment to the Law on Residence and Travel for Foreigners in Turkey (no. 5683), maximum stay regulation and 'equal-stay requirement' were imposed on foreigners with tourist visas. According to the new version of the law, a tourist visa holder can spend a maximum of 90 days in Turkey every six months without taking a residence permit. After 90 days, a foreigner has to exit Turkey and cannot re-enter before 90 days (Eder, 2015: 144). Similar to maximum stay regulation, equal- stay requirement is imposed by the Undersecretariat for Foreigners. According to the requirement, in the case of being caught, the overstayed migrant has to spend the amount of time they had overstayed outside Turkey.

From the legislative changes and practices responses, it is clear that Turkey promotes the entrance of the Post-Soviet country nationals but aims to control their duration of stay in the country. The visa exemption practices for the Post-Soviet countries, the abolishment of the restriction on lists of jobs exclusive to the Turkish citizens and facilitation of obtaining a working permit for foreign employees are the main practices that are implemented to promote the human mobility of Post-Soviet countries to Turkey. The abolishment of immediate naturalization by marriage practice for foreign women, and the imposition of maximum stay and equal stay

practices are the main practices that are implemented to control the duration of Post-Soviet country nationals' stay in the country. They 'promote the entrance but control the duration of stay' understanding of government officials is a strategy to find a balance between a possible economic benefit and societal insecurity.

Table 1: Turkish Visa Regime for post- Soviet Countries

Countries	Visa Regime
Belarus	Ordinary and official passport holders are exempted from visa for their travels up to 30 days. Total period of stay should be no longer than 90 days within 1 year.
Bulgaria	Diplomatic and service passport holders are exempted from visa for their travels up to 30 days. Ordinary passport holders are exempt from visa for their travels up to 90 days within 6 months starting from the first entry date.
Georgia	Ordinary and official passport holders are exempted from visa for their travels up to 90 days.
Kazakhstan	Ordinary and official passport holders are exempted from visa for their travels up to 30 days.
Kyrgyzstan	Ordinary and official passport holders are exempted from visa for their travels up to 90 days.

Moldova	Ordinary and official passport holders are exempted from visa for their travels up to 90 days within 180 days starting from the date of first entry.
Mongolia	Ordinary and official passport holders are exempt from visa up to 30 days for their touristic visits to Turkey.
Romania	Official and ordinary passport holders are exempted from visa for their travels with touristic purposes up to 90 days within 180 days starting from the first entry date.
Russian Federation	Ordinary passport holders are exempted from visa for their touristic and business travels up to 60 days . Service passport holders are exempted from visa up to 30 days on condition that not to exceed 90 days within any 180 days period. Diplomatic passport holders are exempted from visa for their travels up to 90 days.
Turkmenistan	Ordinary and official passport holders are exempt from visa requirements for their travels to Turkey up to 30 days.
Ukraine	Ukrainian nationals holding diplomatic and official/service passports are exempted from visa for their travels up to 90 days. Ordinary passport holders are exempted from visa for their travels up to 90 days. Citizens of Ukraine may also use their valid

	biometric identity cards during their travel to Turkey.
Uzbekistan	Diplomatic and ordinary passport holders are exempted from visa up to 90 days within any 180 day period. Other types of official passport holders are required to have a visa to enter Turkey.

Source: “Yabancıların Tabi Olduğu Vize Rejimi.” Web. See, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/yabancilarin-tabi-oldugu-vize-rejimi.tr.mfa> (February 20, 2021)

4. Human Mobility from the Central African Countries

4.1 The Background

The intra-regional and international human mobility continues to be a significant phenomenon for the African continent. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has identified the African continent's sub-Saharan region as having the most mobile population in the world. According to the IOM, the patterns of the African migration movements have been categorized under three categories. These are (1) transit migration through regions of relative proximity towards Europe, (2) irregular and clandestine migration movements towards Europe, and lastly (3) cross- border and internal migration towards prosperous regions within the continent (IOM, 2005).

While various reasons have been shown as a motivation for international migration from African countries, "the pull of opportunity and the push of abject poverty" is the main underlying factor behind the African continent's migration phenomenon (Adepoju, 2000: 383). The economic hardship and poverty in many African countries have triggered these countries' nationals to migrate for economic betterment. In addition to these economically motivated movements, the armed conflicts in various regions of the continent have forced large proportions of the population to take refuge in secure areas (Adepoju, 2000: 383). Migration has continued to be a survival strategy for African countries' nationals in response to economic and political turmoil in their countries.

The motivation for economic betterment and escaping from the armed conflict continues to be the two main factors for the human mobility from the Central African countries to Turkey. Turkey has been one of the destination countries since the 1990s. But the peak of mobility has been reached in the midst of the 2000s. The increased relationship between Turkey and the Central African countries (Lou De Clerk, 2015: 278) and the effects of the European Union's tightening policy of migration control (Yükseker & Brewer, 2011: 135) have made Turkey one of the destination countries.

As a result of increased interaction in economic and cultural areas and the diversion of the African migration towards the countries of relative proximity to the EU, the

nationals of the Central African countries continue to migrate into Turkey. Most of the immigrants have resided in İstanbul (Şaul, 2017: 134), and the status of them varies. Some of them are illegal immigrants who entered Turkey through being smuggled. Some of them entered Turkey legally with tourist visas and later became irregular immigrants by overstaying their visas. Some are short term visa holders, and some of them hold student or employment visas (Suter, 2017: 316).

The late 1990s is a significant period for Turkey's relations with the African continent. In 1998, Turkey accepted the 'Africa Action Plan', which symbolizes the starting point for Turkey's interest in the continent. The document proposed policy recommendations to develop a relationship with African countries in political, economic and cultural areas (Özkan & Akgün, 2010: 530). As a result of this development, the trade volume and cultural interaction between Turkey and African countries started to accelerate. The first immigrants of the late 1990s from the Central African countries were constituted from a small group of students and traders. The students came to Turkey with a scholarship from various international organizations to receive a university education and went back to their country of origin after receiving education (Şaul, 2017: 137).

In addition to the students, due to the increase in the economic relations, Turkey became one of the alternative countries for import for Central African countries. The traders started to visit Turkey to purchase specific consumer goods to sell back in

their countries. These visits of the traders and students have had a pioneering effect on the large scale of human mobility from Central African countries to Turkey. They disseminated necessary information such as the visa policy, the possibilities to earn money, places to stay, and contacts needed for the trip to the prospective immigrants in their countries.

Also, the late 90s and early 2000s were the periods in which the EU's tightening of the migration control policy has come to affect Turkey. Since the 1990s, the EU has been securitizing irregular migration. As a result of the tightening EU policy, migration towards Europe has become more difficult, and the migration flows have been diverted into the bordering countries of the EU. Turkey has become one of these countries. Turkey has been receiving African immigrants who are unable to enter into the EU. They have come to Turkey either with the hope of eventually being able to transit towards the EU or to work in Turkey instead (Yükseker & Brewer, 2011: 136).

Most of the African immigrants in Turkey are nationals of the various Central African countries. Ghana, Ethiopia, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal, Eritrea and Somalia are the top countries that most of the Central African migrants have come from.

The Central African immigrants in Turkey have a heterogeneous character in motivation to migrate. In terms of incentives to come to Turkey, they could be categorized under four categories: transit migrants, labour migrants, asylum seekers, and regular migrants (Brewer & Y kseker, 2006;  aul, 2013; De Clerck, Marie- Lou, 2015). These categories are interchangeable as the motivations of the migrants. For example, a migrant who comes to Turkey for transit to Europe may decide to settle and work in Turkey. A regular Central African migrant who comes to study could work in the informal sector during or after their study ( aul, 2013: 94).

Transit migrants have been diverted into Turkey while trying to reach Europe. For them, Turkey is the temporary destination to Europe. A significant number of these transit migrants enter Turkey legally with short term visas, and some enter illegally, especially through land borders. These migrants are coming to Turkey in hopes of eventually crossing into Europe, and for some, Turkey is the place to make enough money to make the transition. Through the process, some transit migrants get stuck in Turkey, abandon the aim of transit and decide to stay and work informally and become irregular labour migrants ( aul, 2013: 94).

Labourers come to Turkey for economic opportunities. The overwhelming majority come to stay temporarily and aim to return to their home countries after reaching the amount of money they aim to save. For them, mobility is a means to save money for better standards of living in their countries. Generally, they come legally with short

term tourist visas, participate in unregistered employment in the informal sector and overstay their visa. Being employed in textile and cargo sectors are the two most common jobs (Schapendonk, 2013: 2865).

Another motivation to come to Turkey is applying for refugee status. Central African immigrants who seek asylum come to Turkey to apply for refugee status to the UNHCR. Turkey provides the status of 'temporary asylum' to non-European applicants whose refugee status application to the UNHCR has been pending by the UN office in Turkey. The pending and settlement process, on average, takes more than five years. During this process, these asylum seekers have to reside in Turkey (De Clerck, 2015: 280).

Official data regarding the number of Central African nationals in Turkey is not available. The statistics only show arrivals from particular countries of the African continent. It is not sufficient to determine the range of Central African nationals residing in Turkey. Not all Central African nationals enter Turkey with valid documents, some are being smuggled or illegally entered through the borders. Also, what percentage of the legal entries overstay and continue to irregularly work is not possible to know. However, the gender dynamics of the migrants are known. Different from the post-Soviet country nationals, the Central African country nationals residing in Turkey are overwhelmingly male (Şaul, 2014: 143).

4.2 Turkey's Responses

The heterogeneous character of the Central African country nationals' motivations to come to Turkey has resulted in varying practices in Turkey's response. Turkey's response has been shaped around its visa regime towards Central African countries and its approaches to transit, and labour migration.

One factor shaping Turkey's response to the human mobility from the Central African countries is the issue of transit migrants and asylum seekers. The accession negotiations with the EU is important for how Turkey has approached these two groups of people. The concern over transit and irregular migration through the Mediterranean has increased within the EU since the beginning of the 1990s, which has resulted in tightening policies for migration control. Within this context, the policy of externalization has been implemented in addition to increasing patrols in sea and land borders (Yükseker & Brewer, 2011: 138).

The countries situated in proximity to the land and sea borders of the EU are defined as 'transit zones' countries. As part of the externalization policy, the EU has asked these 'transit zone' countries to prevent the transit and irregular migrants from reaching the Union. (Yükseker & Brewer, 2011: 138). Turkey is defined as one of the transit zone countries expected to restrain irregular migrants from reaching into the Union. This demand of the EU has particularly been emphasized throughout the accession negotiation process and has resulted in various consequences in general

Turkey's migration policy and, in particular, Turkey's response to the Central African human mobility.

Turkey's visa regime towards the Central African countries is a significant part of its response because most African migrants enter Turkey legally by obtaining short term visas. Unlike the practice of visa exemptions for a predetermined time acknowledged for the post-Soviet country nationals, the Central African countries' nationals were not granted short term visa exemptions. Both ordinary and official passport holders of the Central African countries have been required to take a visa to enter Turkey (see Table 2). The year 2005 is of significant importance in Turkey's response to the Central African mobility. In this year, Turkey's visa regime towards 48 sub-Saharan African countries was modified. Before 2005, the visa applications of the nationals of sub-Saharan African countries were directly being issued to the Turkish consulates in these countries. With the change, visa applications of these nationals must be approved by the Turkish Ministry of Interior before they are issued by the Turkish consulates. Thus, since 2005 Turkey has tightened its visa regime towards the Central African countries by establishing a two tiered mechanism to issue visas.

The development concerning asylum seekers, which relates with the response to the Central African mobility, happened in 2006. According to the regulation, the asylum seekers whose application is under evaluation by the UNHCR has been required to stay in 'satellite' cities till their application is finalized. The satellite cities are small

provincial cities across Turkey. During their stay in ‘satellite’ cities, these asylum seekers are obliged to report their presence regularly to the Foreigner’s Police departments. Throughout this compulsory residence, asylum seekers are given one-time cash assistance by the UNHCR and healthcare is provided in the case of emergency (Yükseker & Brewer, 2011: 37). Apart from that, asylum seekers have to meet their own needs.

Contrary to the strict responses to the asylum seeking motivations of the Central Africans, Turkey’s handling of the Central Africans coming with other motivations are more tolerant. Once a foreigner from the Central African countries enters into Turkey, the chances of being deported if in an irregular status is rare. Despite the physical visibility of Central Africans among the Turkish society, there are not any countries of the African continent listed in the ‘most common nationalities of the deterred irregular migrants’ statistics of the Migration Management Directorate (see Figure 1). Paradoxically, the physical visibility of the Central Africans could be the reason for this tolerant attitude. The physical visibility makes the human mobility of Central Africans relatively more manageable. The racial characteristics of the Central Africans may have enabled an easy transition in the handling strategy towards Central Africans.

Table 2: Turkish Visa Regime for Central African Countries

Country	Visa regime
Democratic Republic of Congo	Diplomatic passport holders are exempted from visa up to 90 days within any 180 days' period. Ordinary and service passport holders are required to have a visa to enter Turkey. Ordinary and service passport holders with a valid Schengen member or USA, UK, Ireland visa or residence permit, provided that certain conditions are fulfilled, may obtain 30-day single-entry e-visas via the website www.evisa.gov.tr .
Ethiopia	Ethiopian nationals holding diplomatic passports are exempted from visa for their travels up to 90 days. Official/service and ordinary passport holders are required to have a visa. These passport holders with a valid Schengen members or USA, UK, Ireland visa or residence permit may get their one month period single entry e-Visas via the website www.evisa.gov.tr
Ghana	Ordinary and official passport holders are required to have a visa to enter Turkey. These passport holders with a valid Schengen members or USA, UK, Ireland visa or residence permit may get their one month period single entry e-Visas via the website www.evisa.gov.tr .


Kenya	Citizens of Kenya holding diplomatic, official, service and special passports are exempted from visa for their travels and transit to/from Turkey up to 90 days within 180 days, starting from the first entry date. Ordinary passport holders can get their three-month period multi entry visas from Turkish diplomatic representations abroad. Ordinary passport holders with a valid Schengen members or USA, UK, Ireland visa or residence permit may get their one month period single entry e-Visas via the website www.evisa.gov.tr.
Nigeria	Ordinary, official/service passport holders are required to have a visa to enter Turkey. These passport holders with a valid Schengen member or USA, UK, Ireland visa or residence permit may get their single entry e-Visas valid for one-month e-Visas via the website www.evisa.gov.tr, provided that they meet certain conditions. Diplomatic passport holders are exempted from visa for their travels up to 90 days.

Senegal	Senegalese nationals holding diplomatic passports are exempted from visa for their travels up to 90 days. Official/service and ordinary passport holders are required to have a visa. Senegalese passport holders with a valid Schengen member or USA, UK, Ireland visa or residence permit may get their one month period single entry e-Visas via the website www.evisa.gov.tr.
Somalia	Ordinary and official passport holders are required to have a visa to enter Turkey. These passport holders with a valid Schengen members or USA, UK, Ireland visa or residence permit may get their one month period single entry e-Visas via the website www.evisa.gov.tr.
Sudan	Diplomatic passport holders are exempted from visa for their travels and transit to/from Turkey up to 90 days within 180 days, starting from the first entry date. Ordinary, service and special passport holders are required to have a visa to enter Turkey. These passport holders with a valid Schengen members or USA, UK, Ireland visa or residence permit may get their one month period single entry e-Visas via the website www.evisa.gov.tr

Source: “Yabancıların Tabi Olduğu Vize Rejimi.” Web. See,

<https://www.mfa.gov.tr/yabancilarin-tabi-oldugu-vize-rejimi.tr.mfa> (February 20, 2021)

Figure 1: Nationalities of the Deterred Irregular Migrants from 2014 to 2020



Source: “Düzensiz Göç .” Web. *Goc.gov.tr*. See, <https://www.goc.gov.tr/duzensiz-goc-istatistikler> (April 4, 2021)

5. The Post-2011 Mobility from Syria

5.1 The Background

In January 2011, with the impact of the uprisings in the region, anti-regime civil demonstrations began initially in the southern city of Dar’a, demanding the removal of the authoritarian rule and implementation of democratic reforms. The initial response of the Assad regime was repressing the civil protests with force. Because the protests were tried to be suppressed with force, citizens in other Syrian cities showed solidarity with the protesters around mid-March and started to organize demonstrations (Bhardwaj, 2012: 85). As protests spread in other cities, the regime forces practiced more brutal force to repress it. In mid-summer 2011, the daily

casualties intensified, and defections of the officials from the military increased. In June, the first organized armed opposition, Free Syrian Army, against the Assad regime was formed by the defected officials of the Syrian army. Over time, the group adopted the tactics of armed insurgency against the Assad regime.

With the involvement of the other groups, the initial conflict between the Assad regime and opposition forces turned into a humanitarian crisis. As a result of the crisis, a significant portion of Syrian citizens were internally displaced or had to refuge in the neighboring countries, especially into Iraq, Turkey, and Lebanon (Spyer, 2012: 5). The Syrian civil war leads to the most significant displacement of population and the worst humanitarian crises since the Second World War. According to the UNHCR statistics, 6.1 million people have been internally displaced within Syria, and 5.5 million people took refuge in third countries (2020).

For the Post-2011 Human Mobility from Syria, Turkey applied the relative open-door policy in which Syrians were allowed to enter into the country and provided with humanitarian aid. The first group of Syrians to flee from the increasing violence arrived in Turkey in April 2011. The arrivals of the Syrians intensified in the periods of 2013 to 2015 and 2016 to 2017. During this period, the border was closed occasionally for crossings. For the initial period, the incapacity of existing camps and preventing the sudden influx of a large number of people were given as reasons (Tuğral-Koca, 2015: 217). As the escalation near the border increased in 2015, the

border was closed for crossings from March to June. Similarly, when there was the possibility of a sudden influx of 60,000 Syrians in a short period in 2016, the initial response was to close the border but to meet the emergency needs of the people by building temporary makeshift camps across the border. 'Zero-point deliveries' have been made to these camps to meet the emergency necessities of Syrians (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016: 62).

As of May 2021, the total number of Syrians that arrived in Turkey as a result of the Syrian civil war was 3,670,717 (see Figure 2). While the 56,191 of these people resided in one of the remaining seven camps (see Table 3), 3,616,455 of them resided in cities across Turkey.

5.2 Turkey's Responses

Turkey's response to the mobility should be divided into three periods, from 2011 to 2013, from 2013 to 2016 and after 2016, because the process of the Post- 2011 human mobility of Syrians to Turkey is extensive.

The characteristic of the initial period was to frame the Syrian immigrants as 'guests' and emphasizing the temporariness of the situation. The development that has shaped Turkey's response to the Syrian migration movement from 2013 to 2016 was the Law on Foreigners and International Protection. Following the law's enactment, the lack

of legal status definition of Syrians has come to an end. The 'temporary protection status' with various rights and access to public services have been legally defined for them. Lastly, the significant developments impacting Turkey's response after 2016 were the signing the 'EU-Turkey Statement' and formation of the “Nationally Supported Voluntary Return Mechanism” following the Turkish military operations in the Syrian territories.

Initially, twenty- two temporary camps across the southern and south-eastern border provinces of Turkey were established. In addition to the Syrians residing in these temporary camps, some have resided in the cities, entering without a visa due to the 2009 visa exemption agreement. By the end of 2013 which is the year that the status of the Syrians was legalized, 220,000 Syrians were living in the camps whereas 700,000 of the migrants were living in the cities at their own expense, according to the conservative estimates (Kirişçi, 2014: 11).

From the initial stages of Syrian mobility in 2011 until the legal coverage as 'temporary protected foreigners' in 2013, Syrians were defined as 'guests' who have fled from the pressure of the Syrian regime and Turkey's admission was justified as an urgent response to the humanitarian crisis (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 05.12.2012). The government officials framed Turkey's position against the turmoil in Syria as standing against the 'cruelty' and opening the borders for the Syrians was framed as supporting those who see Turks as 'friends' and 'brothers'. About the turmoil in Syria, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that "The situation in Syria is a matter of

humanity and seeking the rights of a murdered innocent is a requirement of humanity, conscience, and the values we believe in" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 26.04.2012). About opening the border, Minister of National Defence İsmet Yılmaz stated that: "This country has always been an island of peace where the oppressed, the displaced take shelter. Our nation never refused anyone who came to its door, because it saw service to humanity as a service to God" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 02.10.2014). The total number of Syrian 'guests' residing in Turkey in 2013 was 224.655 (see Figure 2).

Until April 2013, there was no legal status for Syrians. Defining them as 'guests' did not allow them any legal rights and did not provide them an access to public services. With the introduction of the 'Law on Foreigners and International Protection (no.6458)' in 2013, the Syrians residing in Turkey are legally defined as 'temporary protected foreigners'. The status provided the right to access to limited public services. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection (law no.6458) is the first law introduced to regulate the procedures and principles related to the practices of migration and asylum (Sert, 2014: 164). With the enactment of the law, the 1994 Asylum Regulation was repealed (Resmi Gazete, 15.07.2018).

In Article 1 of the law, it is stated that the law comprises the international protection to be provided upon the individual protection requests of the foreigners and the temporary protection to be provided to the foreigners who come to Turkey collectively. Article 4 of the law prohibits sending anyone to a place where they will

be subjected to torture, inhuman treatment or life-threatening conditions (Resmi Gazete, 11.04.2013).

The law identifies three categories to be applied for international protection: 'refugee', 'conditional refugee' and 'secondary protection'. In line with Turkey's geographical limitation on the refugee status, the law identifies the refugee category of the international protection only for an applicant from 'European countries' (Article 61). The 'conditional refugee' status is identified as a foreign applicant identified as 'a non-European asylum seeker' in preceding 1994 Asylum Regulation. The 'secondary protection' status is identified as for an applicant who would not be qualified as either 'refugee' or 'conditional refugee', but could not return to the country of origin due to severe possibility to be subjected to torture, inhuman treatment or life-threatening condition (Article 63).

The Law also identifies temporary protection status, and in 2014 Temporary Protection Regulation was issued to detail the status. Article 1 of the Regulation defines who will benefit from temporary protection as "foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country they have left, come en masse to seek emergency and temporary protection..." (Resmi Gazete, 22.10.2014). According to the Regulation, those who acquired the temporary protection status are not deemed to obtain any of the three statuses of the international protection.

With the provisional article of the Regulation, the Post-2011 Syrians who have come to Turkey from 28 April 2011 have been taken under temporary protection. And even if they have applied for individual international protection already, their applications are not processed. Thus, The Post- 2011 Syrian migrants are excluded from the international resettlement program. As of May 2021, only the post- 2011 Syrian migrants have been given temporary protection status, and the number of them is given as 3.671.277 (see Figure 2).

Article 25 of the Regulation states that the temporary protection identity document provides the right of unlimited stay in Turkey, but it is not equivalent to the regular 'residence permit'. The duration under the temporary protection does not grant the right to apply either for a long-term residence permit or Turkish citizenship. Also, the Regulation states that Syrian migrants were not forcibly encamped but they were obliged to reside in a city where the Directorate of Migration Management has determined (Article 33) in order to keep the validity of their temporary protection identification.

Article 26 of the Temporary Protection Regulation further states that 'foreigners under temporary protection' are provided with the right to access to healthcare, education, apply for a work permit, social assistance, higher education and similar social services. The working permit is granted only for the province to which the foreigner is allowed to stay (Article 7), and quotas for workplaces to employ temporary protected foreigners are being put (Resmi Gazete, 15.01.2016).

Thus, post-2011 Syrian mobility was subjected to a separate legal and administrative framework, differing from the framework relating to the non-European migrants in Turkey. While Syrians have had a ‘temporary protection status’, other non-European migrants could only obtain conditional refugee status. The Regulation does not specify how long the temporary protection status is valid. The extension or the termination of the status is decided by the Presidential decree (Resmi Gazete, 22.10.2014).

The uncertainty about the duration of the temporary protection and not processing the international protection applications has left Syrians in a limbo about their future. The uncertainty about their future in Turkey and being blocked out from refugee status (in Turkey or the EU) has made them more vulnerable to exploitation. In addition, although obtaining a working permit is possible for Syrians in theory, in practice it is not attainable for the majority of the migrants. Thus, the majority of the Syrians work informally. This informality compels them to accept precarious employment conditions (Koca, 2016: 65). As a part of the precarious employment conditions, most Syrians lack healthy working conditions and are compelled to accept low wages and long working hours (Küçük, 2021:24).

After 2016, post-2011 human mobility of Syrians has become a significant tool in Turkey’s foreign policy. The residence of Syrians in the country has started to be

used as a bargaining chip in EU-Turkey relations and as a means of creating a sphere of influence in the turmoil areas of Syrian territory. One of the significant developments that impacted this period is ‘the EU-Turkey Deal’ following a summit in March 2016. The Deal is part of implementing the ‘joint action plan of 2015’ for migration control between the EU states and Turkey.

As part of the 2015 joint action plan, Turkey has agreed to take necessary measures to prevent new routes for illegal migrant crossing from Turkey to the EU, to increase cooperation with the EU and to improve the conditions of the Syrian migrants. The European Union has agreed to disburse 3 billion euro funds for the projects of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, to lift the visa requirements for Turkish citizens entering the Schengen Area by June 2016 and to resume the accession negotiations with Turkey (Heck& Hess, 2017: 44). With additional action points, ‘the EU- Turkey Statement’ was signed on 18 March 2016. According to ‘the EU- Turkey Statement’, the following points have been agreed upon:

irregular migrants coming from Turkey into Greek islands will be returned to Turkey and for every irregular Syrian migrant returned to Turkey another Syrian migrant will be resettled from Turkey to the EU; additional 3 billion euro up to the end of 2018 will be mobilized for the Facility for Refugees in Turkey; and the EU and Turkey reconfirmed to re-energize the accession process...and decided ... to open Chapter 33 (European Council, 2016).

In the signing of the statement, the European Union’s concern over irregular migration through the Mediterranean and its strict migration control policy had a

significant impact. Turkey has benefitted of having the Post-2011 Syrian migrants in the country both in receiving funds from the Union and its EU negotiation process.

Another significant development that has had an impact on Turkey's response after 2016 is the Turkish military operations in Syria (Mencutek, 2019: 30). Based on the authorization of the Turkish military force "... to ensure the maintenance of security against other possible risks such as mass migration," Turkey has conducted four military operations in Syria in 2016, 2018, 2019 and 2020. The authorization of the military force is given for the first time by the parliament in 2012 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 04.10.2012) and has been renewed every year since 2014 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 02.10.2014; 03.09.2015; 01.10.2016; 23.09.2017; 03.10.2018; 08.10.2019; 07.10.2020). As a justification of the necessity of extending the military pursuant in 2019, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that in a written statement expresses the motivation to establish a 'safe zone' in areas adjacent to the Turkish border and the reason to avoid new migration wave from the region is also given as to why the 'safe zone' is needed (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 08.10.2019).

As a result of the military operations, it is stated that in more than 11.000 square kilometers, a 'security corridor' has been formed and the next phase of the operations is stated as "to find security and stability in the area". To this end, 'stabilization projects' have been carried out in various sectors (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 07.10.2020). As an example of the 'stabilization projects', "Nationally Supported Voluntary Return Mechanism" has been established under the coordination of the

Directorate General of Migration Management. The purpose of the mechanism is stated as "aiming for irregular migrants to leave for their countries safely on a voluntary basis, and their reintegration is aimed through the in-kind and cash aids to be made upon their return to their countries" (Göç İdaresi, 2020). Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu states that within the scope of the ‘Voluntary Return Mechanism’, more than 360,000 Syrian migrants have returned (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 16.10.2019).

Turkey has established an area of influence in the conflicted regions of Syrian territory due to the military operations. And it aims to settle a significant number of Syrians to its area of influence in order to increase its power and influence over the Syrian conflict. In that regard, the ‘stabilization projects’ like the formation of ‘Voluntary Return Mechanism’ are aimed to create incentives among some of the Syrians to settle into those areas of influence.

Thus, for the period after 2016, it can be said that the residence of Syrians in the country have become a significant tool and bargaining chip in Turkey’s foreign policy. Being a leading country of residence for the Post-2011 Syrian human mobility has provided Turkey with an opportunity to improve its relations with the EU, to have access to the EU migration funds and to increase its influence over the Syrian conflict




Figure 2: The number of Syrian Migrants under Temporary Protection

Source: “Yıllara Göre Geçici Koruma Kapsamındaki Suriyeliler” Web. Goc.gov.tr. See, <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>

Table 3: Number of Syrian Resident Living in and Outside of The Camps

City	Number of residents Living in the Camp
Adana	19.373
Hatay	8.978
Kahramanmaraş	10.287
Kilis	8.432
Osmaniye	9.121
Total	56.191
Number of Syrian migrants living outside of the Camps	3.616.455

Source: “Geçici Koruma Kapsamındaki Suriyelilerin Geçici Barınma Merkezlerine Göre Dağılımı” Web. Goc.gov.tr. See, <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF TURKEY'S RESPONSES

The purpose of Chapter 4 is to analyze Turkey's response to the five major cases of human mobility. The analysis will be based on answers to three questions: How security is defined, what is the 'referent object', and how to attain the defined security for the reference object in every five cases of human mobility? Each case of human mobility will be analyzed in a separate section.

1. The Mobility of the 1989 Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria

In the human mobility case of the 1989 Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria, the answer to the question of how security was defined is integrating the ethnic Turks of Bulgaria into Turkish society. Thus, the 'referent object' of the defined security for this case of human mobility was the human security of the Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria. The ways to attain the defined security for this human mobility case were twofold about the discourse and practice. In terms of discourse, the emphasis was on the similarities between immigrants and the Turkish community to prevent the local Turkish community from adopting a reactionary stance toward Bulgarian Turks.

When the human mobility of the 1989 Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria is mentioned in the parliamentary speeches by the government officials, the words that have security connotations were not used. Instead, the words that have a positive connotation and implication of being part of society were selected. One example would be the employment of the word '*soydaşlar*' (kin). In parliamentary speeches of the government officials, the word '*soydaşlar*' was quite often in reference to the newcomers. Similarly, even before implementing the policy of conferring citizenship, the officials described the Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria as 'citizens' in some of the parliamentary speeches. Emphasizing the ethnic similarities of the Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria and framing them as 'kin' and 'citizens' was an attempt to make them be part of the local society and to avoid the possible negative reactions from the local Turkish society to the comings of the 1989 Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria.

In terms of practice, the way to attain the defined security for this case of human mobility was to facilitate the integration of the immigrants. To this end, legislative changes were made to the two laws and various practices were provided to the 1989 Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria. With the change to the 'Law on Social Assistance and Solidarity, social funds to meet the needs of the 1989 ethnic Turks of Bulgaria were increased. And with the additional clause to the 'Settlement Law', the Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria who were forced to emigrate after 1.1.1989 were accepted as '*muhacir*' (immigrants). Being accepted as '*muhacir*' (immigrant) facilitated some legal transactions such as property ownership and naturalization for the 1989 Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria. In addition to these legislative changes, housing projects, Turkish language courses, and naturalization opportunities were provided for the 1989 Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria. The legal and practical changes were aimed to facilitate the integration of Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria into Turkish society.

2. The Mobility of the 1991 Northern Iraqis

In the case of 1991 Northern Iraqis, the answer to how security was defined is at first as preventing the arrival of the Northern Iraqis to Turkey. But once this had not been possible and the border opened for the Northern Iraqis, the definition of security was changed as promoting the creation of a safe zone in the international arena to repatriate the Northern Iraqis into the safe zone. Thus, the 'referent object' of the defined security for this case of human mobility was the 'national security' of Turkey. National security, in this case, is understood as border security.

The way to attain the defined security for this case of human mobility was to seek international support to respond. At the beginning, Turkey did not allow the 1991 forced migrants of Northern Iraq to enter the country. Turkey's geographical restriction and non-obligation to accept refugees from non-European backgrounds had been emphasized. Instead, the intervention by the UN peacekeeping force to create a 'safe zone' and settling the 1991 Northern Iraqis into camps in Iraq's territory was heavily promoted by Turkey.

But establishing a 'safe zone' was not attained, and Turkey agreed to open its border after Resolution 688. After the settlement of the Northern Iraqis into the temporary border camps, Turkey continued to promote the establishment of a safe zone for repatriation. Only for a short period, the Northern Iraqis stayed in the Turkish border camps. Once coalition forces established a 'safe zone' in the border area of Northern Iraq, half a million refugees were repatriated.

3. The Mobility from post-Soviet Countries

In the human mobility case from post-Soviet countries, security is defined as promoting the economic development of Turkey by easing the entrance of the cheap labour from post-Soviet migrants and controlling the duration of their stay due to societal and moral concerns. The 'referent object' of the defined security for this case of human mobility is the social fabric of the Turkish society and Turkish economy. National security, in this case, is understood as promoting economic development by

benefitting from the labourforce of the Post- Soviet labourers but controlling their duration of stay in the country.

The way to attain security in this case of human mobility was portrayed as implementing practices that facilitate the entrance of post-Soviet migrants but controlling their duration of stay in Turkey. Because Post-Soviet migrants were seen as flexible, cheap and more qualified labour in some sectors, they were in demand by the employers. But there were moral and social concerns about the Post-Soviet female migrants in Turkish society. There is a stigma that they are morally seen as ‘degenerate’ and ‘inferior’ (Kaşka, 2005: 66). Due to this societal insecurity, the practices aiming to control their stay in the country are implemented.

Flexible visa regimes towards post-Soviet countries were implemented to facilitate the entrance of post-Soviet labour migrants. To this end, visa exemption and sticker visa applications for the post-Soviet countries are recognized. This facilitating visa regime is the significant promoting factor for the post-Soviet migrants to come for work.

In addition, amendments to the two laws were made. With the amendment to law no. 4817, the possibility to apply for a working permit directly to the Turkish Consulates is entitled to the migrants in their country of origin. Similarly, the lists of jobs a foreigner can legally be employed in is expanded, and the fines to be imposed on

unregistered employment in case of being caught have been increased. These changes are made to encourage migrant workers to obtain work permits before coming to Turkey. Because having a working permit both promotes post-Soviet labour to come and also ensures the duration of their stay to be controllable. In addition, to control the post-Soviet labour's period of stay in Turkey, 'maximum stay regulation' and 'equal-stay requirement' practices have been implemented for Turkey's visa regime toward post-Soviet countries. Due to these practices, the maximum period of stay for a post-Soviet national with a tourist visa exemption is three months every six months.

To discourage post-Soviet migrants from practising naturalization by marriage, complicated changes were made in implementing the practice. To this end, an amendment to the 'Turkish Citizenship Law' is made. With the amendment, the right of a foreign woman to immediately obtain Turkish citizenship when she marries a Turkish man is abolished and a waiting period imposed. The amendment is expressed as prohibiting marriage as a means for foreign women to obtain Turkish citizenship. Post-Soviet female migrants are explicitly referred to as practising 'fake marriages'. By imposing a waiting period, obtaining Turkish citizenship to have a residence in the country is complicated for the post-Soviet female migrants.

4. The Mobility from Central African Countries

In the human mobility case from the Central African Countries, there is no uniform definition of security. The answer to how security is defined varies according to the motivations to come to Turkey. The main motivations of the Central Africans include international protection applications, transit, or employment.

The definition of security towards the incentive of coming to Turkey to apply for international protection is clear, and it applies in particular to the Central African asylum seekers. For any non-European asylum seeker who comes to Turkey to apply for international protection to the UNHCR, security is defined as controlling the movement of asylum seekers within the country and obliging them to reside in remote locations from the irregular migration routes. Thus, the 'referent object' in this security definition is the societal security of Turkey. National security, in this case, is understood as preventing the free movement of 'asylum seeker applicants' within Turkey and make them reside away from the big cities of the country until their application is finalized.

The way to attain the defined security towards the incentive of coming to Turkey to apply for the international protection is implementing the practice that requires asylum seekers to stay in 'satellite cities' and obliging them to report their presence regularly to the Foreigner's Police departments until the UNHCR finalizes their application. Most satellite cities are small provinces in the inner Anatolia, and

asylum seekers should remain in these cities so as not to lose their international protection applications.

Differently, there is no clear definition of security for Central Africans that come to Turkey with the motivation of employment or transit. There is not a clear cut strategy for this kind of mobility as with post-Soviet human mobility. The mobility of Central Africans to Turkey is neither seen as an opportunity for economic development nor seen as a societal security threat. Thus, the 'promote the entrance but control the duration of stay' strategy is not valid in Turkey's response to the human mobility of Central Africans.

The features of mobility from the Central African countries are behind this attitude. First of all, the racial dynamic of Central African human mobility is significant. The racial difference between Turkish society and the Central Africans makes the physical appearance of the latter visible in Turkish society. This visibility makes the human mobility of Central African countries more manageable. It makes migrants vulnerable to be sent away from Turkey at any time.

Secondly, the sectors where Central Africans work are not as comprehensive as those where Post-Soviet labour migrants work. Mainly the Central Africans work either in textile and cargo businesses. The concentration of the Central African labour migrants in these two sectors makes their contribution to the Turkish economy less

significant compared to post-Soviet labour migrants. Thus, unlike the human mobility of the post-Soviet countries, the entrance from the Central African countries to Turkey are not promoted. To this end, the visa exemptions provided to the post-Soviet country nationals are not provided to the Central African country nationals. Both ordinary and official passport holders of the Central African countries were required to apply for a visa to enter Turkey. A two-tiered visa application mechanism has been brought to the Turkish visa regime towards the Central African countries.

Thirdly, unlike the insecurity of Turkish society of seeing the post-Soviet country immigrants as “morally degenerate” (Kaşka, 2005: 66), no insecurity is voiced to the Turkish society by the Central Africans. For this reason, it seems, the duration of Central Africans' stays in Turkey is not controlled. The implications of this practice are seen in the deportation rates of the Central African nationals. Any country from the African continent is not listed in 'Nationalities of the Deported Irregular Migrants' statistics. Deportation seems to be a rare practice for the Central African immigrants.

5. Post- 2011 Mobility from Syria

In the Post-2011 human mobility of Syrians, security is defined differently in discourse and practice. In the discourse of the government officials, the humanitarian crisis dimension of the forced migration and the hospitality of the Turkish nation are emphasized. Security is defined as protecting 'Syrian brothers and sisters from the

'brutality of the Assad regime' by allowing them to come into Turkey. In discourse, the 'referent object' for this case of human mobility is expressed as human security of Post-2011 Syrian migrants. However, rather than the human security of the Syrian migrants, security in practice is defined as ensuring the stay of the Syrian migrants in Turkey and taking advantage of this stay in the national and international areas. From the practical responses, the 'referent object' in this case of human mobility is the economy of Turkey. National security, in this case, is understood as promoting economic development by benefitting from the precarious employment conditions of the Syrian migrants, and using the residence of them in the country as a bargaining chip in Turkey's foreign policy.

The way to attain security in this case of human mobility is implementing practices to ease the residence of Syrian migrants in the country. In this vein, the "Law on Foreigners and International Protection" has been introduced, and Post-2011 Syrian migrants have been given temporary protection status. Although the 'temporary protection status' provides Syrian migrants with access to primary healthcare and education and allows them to apply for a working permit, it leaves the future of migrants uncertain. The duration under the temporary protection does not grant the right to apply for a long-term residence permit. How long the Syrian migrants are allowed to stay in Turkey under the protection of the status is uncertain. Also, the temporary protected Syrian migrants are prevented from leaving Turkey by applying for international protection. They could not leave Turkey for developed countries as in refugee status.

Also, even though, in theory, obtaining a working permit becomes possible for Syrian migrants with the temporary protection status, it is not attainable for the majority of migrants. Without having a working permit, most Syrians have to work informally in precarious employment conditions. Not having a working permit and any legal protection makes them open to the exploitation of the employers. They are seen as a cheap labour workforce and are usually offered to work in the least skilled jobs with fewer wages than their native counterparts (Koca, 2016: 65).

In terms of Turkey's foreign policy, the residence of Syrians in the country is used as a bargaining chip in Turkey's relations with the EU. In this vein, the 'EU-Turkey Deal' has been signed in 2016. According to the deal, Turkey has received migration funds from the Union. The EU accession negotiation process has been reenergized with the opening of the new chapter to control the irregular migrant crossing and ensure the stay of the Syrians in the country. Additionally, Turkey has gained an area of influence due to conducting military operations to the conflicting areas of Syrian territory. And by creating incentives for some Syrians to settle down in these areas, Turkey has aimed to increase its power in its areas of influence. This is the only aspect that is purely about national security defined in traditional terms.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Turkey has become one of the attractive countries for the major human mobility cases, especially with the end of the Cold War. For the first time in the history of the Republic, Turkey has become a destination country for the human mobility of foreigners who are not of 'Turkish descent and culture'. The thesis asked whether and/or in what ways major human mobility cases to Turkey in the post-Cold War Era were securitized in the official discourse of the Republic. The chapter clarified that while Copenhagen School emphasizes the importance of discourse on security conceptualization, for the Paris School security claim is not only a discursive practice- it is a mixture of discursive and non-discursive practices. Chapter 2, examined the Copenhagen and Paris Schools' central concepts and conceptualizations to lay out the theoretical backdrop of the thesis. Following this theoretical discussion, Chapter 3 examined the five major human mobility cases to Turkey in the post-Cold War Era by giving a brief background on the reasons and dynamics of each human mobility case and examining Turkey's response. The examination of Turkey's response to the cases of human mobility is based on showing the framing of the cases, and legislative and practical responses. Subsequently, in Chapter 4, an analysis of Turkey's responses was offered based on the answers to these three questions: How security is defined, what is the 'referent object' in this security definition, and the way to attain this definition of security.

Except for the human mobility from Central African countries, each mobility case was securitized. For the human mobility of the 1989 Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria, security was defined as integrating the Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria into Turkish society. The way to attain defined security was determined by emphasizing the ethnic similarities in the framing and implementing practices and legislative changes that facilitate integration.

For the human mobility of the 1991 Northern Iraqis, security was defined as avoiding the entrance of the Northern Iraqis into the Turkish border as long as possible and once it was not attainable, pressuring the international community to intervene and create a 'safe zone' to repatriate the Northern Iraqis into the Iraqi territory. Here, 'national security' was understood as protecting the border security of Turkey.

For human mobility from the Post-Soviet countries, security is defined as facilitating the entrance of the immigrants but controlling their duration of stay in Turkey. Here, 'national security' is understood as promoting economic development by benefitting the cheap labour workforce of the Post-Soviet migrants and avoiding their long-term stay in Turkey.

For the human mobility from the Central African countries, only for the asylum seekers, there is a clear definition of security. Contrary to these three cases of human mobility, for the human Mobility from the Central African countries, there is no

uniform definition of security. The security definition is clear only for the asylum seeking motivated Central Africans. For other motivations, the human mobility of Central Africans is not considered a security issue.

Finally, in post- 2011 mobility from Syria, 'national security' was understood as benefitting from the residence of the Syrians in the country in the domestic and international realm. Although in discourse, the referent object is given as human security of Syrians. In practice, the security is understood as promoting economic development through benefitting from the precarious employment conditions of the Syrian migrants and using the residence of the migrants in the country as a bargaining chip in Turkey's foreign policy.

In conclusion, among the five cases, only in the human mobility of the 1989 Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria, the 'referent object' of the defined security is 'human security of the immigrants. The 'referent object' of the defined security for the remaining three human mobility cases is Turkey's national security. However, national security is understood differently in each case.

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