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SAKARYA UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

ROLE OF THIRD STATES IN THE SOMALIA CASE

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PHD THESIS

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SAKARYA UNIVERSITY
SOCIAL SCIENCE INSTITUTE

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“This thesis was defended online on 06/08/2025 and was unanimously accepted by the jury members whose names are listed below”.

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PREFACE

This study analyzes the role of third states in the Somalia case, specifically focusing on the roles and interventions in the internal and external involvements of the Somalia conflicts. The study covering the period collapse of the central government from the colonial period, highlighting the roles and involvement of the international actors in the Somalia conflicts.

I would like to express my gratitude to Almighty Allah for his blessings and appreciation for his guidance in enabling the timely completion of this study, as well as my grateful appreciations and gratitude to my beloved family, who consistently provided support and encouragement during my journey. Your consistent support and motivation have been the basis of my success. Without your continuous passion and encouragement, I would not have attained my current position, and I appreciate your patience, prayers, and tireless backing. I would like deeply acknowledge to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Ertan EFEGİL, for his crucial advice, encouragement, and insightful remarks throughout this effort. His knowledge and moral backing have been crucial in shaping my research project, and I am appreciative of his direction. I also offer thanks to the members of my research project committees, Prof. Dr. İrfan KAYA ÜLGER, Prof. Dr. Cengiz DİNÇ and Dr. Öğr. Üyesi MURAT BAYAR and Assoc. Dr. Rıdvan KALAYCI for their support and creative suggestions, and I am very grateful to all. Ultimately, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) for their financial support, as well as to all lecturers at the Departments of International Relations at Sakarya University.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD	: Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı
AU	: African Union
AMISOM	: African Union Mission in Somalia
ATMIS	: African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
ASEAN	: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
FDLR	: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
DRC	: Democratic Republic of Congo
IGAD	: Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
ICU	: Islamic Courts Union
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFD	: Northern Frontier District
SNM	: Somali National Movements
SYL	: Somali Youth League
SPLM/A	: Sudan People's Liberation Movements/Army
TFG	: Transitional Federal Government
TIKA	: Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı
UN	: United Nations
UNMIL	: United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	: United Nations Mission in South Sudan
USC	: United Somali Congress

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ABSTRACT	
Title of Thesis: The Role of Third States In The Somalia Case	
Author of Thesis: Abdihakim Mohamed AHMED	
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ertan EFEGİL	
Accepted Date: 06/08/2025	Number of Pages: ix (pre-text) + 192 (main body)
This study analyzes the role of third states in the Somalia case, specifically examining both internal and external interventions in the conflict. The study examines the side effects of competition among major powers, particularly Western countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as some Arab nations like the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, which are transforming the region into a battleground for influence in the Somalia conflicts. The study employs a qualitative and descriptive approach that covers the period from the colonial period to the collapse of the central government in Somalia, emphasizing and highlighting the major external and internal factors and the roles of interventions. It also investigates the effects and roles of international actors and other groups, like the Al-Shabab Organization, on political changes. The findings suggest that the security and economic interests of both global and regional actors, forming a strategic axis that threatens local stability and reflects broader geopolitical dynamics, shape the conflicts in Somalia. Furthermore, the study concludes that these conflicts are not merely regional power struggles but also part of a larger global geopolitical restructuring.	
Keywords: Somalia Conflicts, international actor's roles, regional influence.	

ÖZET	
Başlık: Somali Meselesinde Üçüncü Devletlerin Rolü	
Yazar: Abdihakim Mohamed AHMED	
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Ertan EFEGİL	
Kabul Tarihi: 06/08/2025	Sayfa Sayısı: ix (ön kısım) +192 (ana kısım)
Bu çalışma, Somali örneğinde üçüncü devletlerin rolünü analiz etmekte ve özellikle çatışmaya yönelik hem iç hem de dış müdahaleleri incelemektedir. Çalışma, bölgeyi Somali çatışmalarında bir nüfuz mücadelesi alanına dönüştüren Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Birleşik Krallık gibi Batılı ülkeler ile Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri ve Katar gibi bazı Arap ülkeleri arasındaki büyük güç rekabetinin yan etkilerini incelemektedir. Çalışma, sömürge döneminden Somali'deki merkezi hükümetin çöküşüne kadar olan dönemi kapsayan nitel ve betimleyici bir yaklaşım benimsemekte ve başlıca dış ve iç faktörler ile müdahalelerin rollerini vurgulamaktadır. Ayrıca uluslararası aktörlerin ve Eş-Şebab terör örgütü gibi diğer grupların siyasi değişimler üzerindeki etkilerini ve rollerini de araştırmaktadır. Bulgular, yerel istikrarı tehdit eden ve daha geniş jeopolitik dinamikleri yansıtan stratejik bir eksen oluşturan hem küresel hem de bölgesel aktörlerin güvenlik ve ekonomik çıkarlarının Somali'deki çatışmaları şekillendirdiğini göstermektedir. Ayrıca çalışma, bu çatışmaların yalnızca bölgesel güç mücadeleleri değil, aynı zamanda daha geniş bir küresel jeopolitik yeniden yapılanmanın parçası olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.	
Anahtar Kelimeler: Somali Çatışmaları, Uluslararası Aktörlerin Roller, Bölgesel Etkiler	

INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, the world has battled intra-state conflicts, and these conflicts and wars have been recurring crises throughout the world. The two World Wars exemplified the notion of combat, with tens of thousands of people dead or wounded, and millions of people forced to migrate to their homes. Conflicts between nations became the norm in international politics from the onset of World War II, and remained so until the downfall of the Soviet Union. Conversely, it refers to hostilities between two or more groups within the internationally recognized boundaries of any state as civil wars or intrastate conflicts. Conflict may occur between the two parties, neither of which is endorsed or represented by the state government, and may involve both the government and a non-state actor. In contrast to interstate conflicts, intrastate conflicts are generally more violent, leading to a significantly higher civilian death toll. The post-Cold War era saw a rise in intra-state violence, especially in areas characterized by fragile governance and ethnic or religious conflicts. The disintegration of the bipolar international order was one of the elements that precipitated these conflicts. With the conclusion of the Cold War, the disintegration of the bipolar international system suppressed regional conflicts. The cessation of superpower backing for client states and the dissolution of the Cold War ideological paradigm left several nations susceptible to domestic pressures. Ethnic and religious tensions exacerbated many conflicts that arose post-1991. In several instances, authoritarian administrations repressed these distinctions and the subsequent fall-precipitating conflicts. In other cases, economic poverty and political dissatisfaction have worsened these conflicts. The fragility of state institutions has led to a difficult power vacuum, following the collapse of authoritarian governments. In several cases, the formed governments were weak and inadequate in delivering essential services and maintaining the rule of law. This enabled armed opposition forces to exploit the vacuum and challenge the state's legitimacy. Monetary challenges: Economic needs, particularly in developing countries, have substantially precipitated intra-state conflicts. Economic decline may exacerbate internal dissatisfaction and create new forms of conflict including competition for scarce resources. The international community has responded to these crises through peacekeeping operations, humanitarian aid, and diplomatic efforts to resolve the core

issues. Resolving intra-state issues requires continuous efforts from all stakeholders, including governments, civil society, and international organizations¹.




Figure 1: New and Recurring Conflicts Globally, 1946-2014

Source: Scott Gates, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, and Esther Trappeniers,

The interval from 1960 to 2020 was characterized by several different and persistent conflicts that profoundly influenced global politics, security, and human rights. The following are the significant wars that occurred during this time. A potential reason for the increasing return rate is that fewer civil conflicts concluded with a definitive military victory compared to the 1980s. In the 1980s, military achievements outnumbered peace settlements by a factor of seven but now exceeded peace agreements by a factor of five. Although advantageous, the infrequency of decisive victories in conflict indicates that the parameters of the new order remain fluid. Furthermore, this era has been characterized by numerous unique and frequent global conflicts that have profoundly influenced international politics, security, and human rights. These confrontations are marked by intricate dynamics, numerous participants and deeply rooted hatreds. The principal conflicts during this period included the Cold War, Korean War, Vietnam War, Arab-Israeli conflict, Balkan Wars, Afghanistan War, Iraq War, Syrian Civil War, the Israel-

¹ Gurr, T.r. (1993). *Minorities at risk: A global view of ethno political conflicts*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Palestine conflict, Kashmir conflict, Colombian conflict, and Somali conflict. These conflicts have had significant impacts on global politics and international security, and have contributed to cycles of poverty and instability in the affected regions. Addressing such conflicts remains a critical challenge for the international community². As figure two, the armed conflicts denote a scenario involving two or more factions engaged in violent struggles for power, territory, or resources. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), there were 56 ongoing armed conflicts in the world in 2020, with the majority being intrastate conflicts³. Certainly armed conflicts can take many forms, ranging from conventional warfare between the armed forces of two or more states to asymmetric conflicts between state and non-state actors, such as insurgencies or terrorist groups. The intrastate conflicts, or conflicts within a single state, have become increasingly common in recent years. These conflicts often stem from political, economic, or social grievances, such as discrimination, marginalization, and inequality. In many cases, they are fueled by the availability of small arms and light arms, which can be easily obtained and used by non-state actors. Armed conflicts can also have an important influence on the environment, damaging ecosystems and natural resources. For example, conflicts involving the extraction of natural resources such as oil or minerals can lead to environmental degradation and pollution.

²Gaddis, J. L. (2005). *The Korean War: A History*. Modern Library.

³Uppsala Conflict Data Program. (2021). Armed Conflict. Retrieved from https://ucdp.uu.se/#/explorer/armed_conflict.




Figure 2: Armed Conflict Data Trends

Source: Regional distribution and total number of armed conflicts.

According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the number of ongoing violent conflicts rose from 41 in 2014 to 50 in 2015. This was mostly because the Islamic State (IS) took over new land in twelve countries. The India-Pakistan issue is the only one of the 50 ongoing wars between the two states. The rest were fought within states and were about government (19), land (29), or both, but violence in armed conflicts was still much lower than it was during the Cold War. This is partly because the international community has developed better ways to deal with violence. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the period from 2006 to 2015 saw 331 armed conflicts in 146 countries worldwide⁴. These conflicts ranged from low-intensity clashes to large-scale wars with varying degrees of intensity, duration, and geographic scope. A notable trend during this period was a decline in the number of high-intensity conflicts, defined as conflicts that resulted in more than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. In 2006, there were 11 high-intensity conflicts worldwide, but by 2015, the number had fallen to just four. However, it is worth noting that many of the conflicts during this period received relatively little attention from the international media. For example, UCDP data show that the majority of armed conflicts during this period occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, with relatively few conflicts occurring in Europe or North America. Overall, the UCDP data suggest that armed conflict remains a persistent problem worldwide, with significant human, social,

⁴ *Armed conflict data trends. (n.d.). SIPRI.* <https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2016/06>

and economic costs. However, the data also show some positive trends in recent years, including a reduction in the number of conflict-related fatalities⁵.

The Somalia Case as an Intra-State Conflict

Somalia has been in a state of conflict over the last three decades with ongoing violence, political instability, and humanitarian crises. This conflict has had devastating consequences for the people of Somalia, including displacement, poverty, and loss of life. Certainly, the conflict in Somalia has been ongoing since the downfall of the central government in 1991, and has been characterized by violence, political instability, and humanitarian crises. This conflict has been fueled by multiple factors including clan rivalries, political corruption, poverty, and regional and international interventions. For instance, many people perished in the war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977, and intra-state conflicts in Somalia claimed a greater number of lives. Meanwhile, conflicts took a new direction when international actors were involved. Since achieving its nominal independence from European domination in 1960, Somalia's political fortunes fluctuated violently. The political good luck that united Somaliland and Somalia in 1960 and the subsequent ambitions to expand the resulting Somali republic to include the entire country and other Somali-speaking people from the Horn of Africa region are represented by five stars on the Somali national flag. However, unanticipated political setbacks have led to such nationalist dreams. The nation's internal divisions exploded in retaliation due to the sudden reversal of external and internal involvement. For a very long time, members of the Somali community have oppressed and brutalized one another, despite being the most homogeneous region in Africa (Laitin, 1976). The Somali conflicts did not start suddenly or for no apparent reason, and the historical, social, and political processes that interacted with one another have created Somalia's current political and socioeconomic framework. Examining the underlying processes or reasons that have led to the multifaceted and protracted character of the conflict is crucial to gaining a thorough understanding of the conflict and its implications for peacekeeping efforts in Somalia. The Somalia case is often cited as a classic example of an intra-state conflict and is characterized by multiple

⁵ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute . (n.d.). *Armed conflict data trends. In SIPRI Yearbook 2026: Armaments , disarmaments and internaional security.*

armed groups struggling for power and control of territory within the country and terrorist organizations, with the central government struggling to exert its authority and maintain law and order. In addition, other factors contribute to the conflict in Somalia, such as the country's long history of political instability and state failure. Somalia has been without a functioning central government since 1991, when President Siyad Barre was overthrown, and the country descended into chaos and violence. The conflict in Somalia has also been fueled by ethnic and clan rivalries as well as competition for resources such as land, water, and livestock. Furthermore, external actors have played a significant role in the conflict, with various countries, regional organizations, and non-state actors providing support to different armed groups. Overall, the Somalia case serves as a complex and challenging example of intra-state conflict, highlighting the complex interplay of internal and external factors that can contribute to such conflicts⁶.




Figure 3: The Internal and External Actor's Involvements for the Somalia Conflicts

Source: United Nations Security Council. (2021-2022). Resolution. S/RES/2628.

The above The figure was illustrates the internal and external actors for the Somalia conflicts and also shows the numerous connections that highlight the contradictions and

⁶Minority Rights Group. (2025, March 11). *Somalia - Minority rights group*. <https://minorityrights.org/country/somalia>.

cooperation between different groups or countries in the Somali conflict and also the USA, and the EU, as well as those in the Horn of Africa and the governing authority of Somalia is centrally positioned, concentrating on stability and mitigating threats, including Al-Shabaab. Adjacent organizations, including AMISOM, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Uganda, and Eritrea, are crucial in the involvement of actors and assisting the TF-GS. Al-Shabab, a terrorist organization, presents a considerable danger to Somalia and the surrounding region, and its affiliations with Al-Qaeda organizations exacerbate the region's security concerns.

According to AM Farah, Federalism in Somalia encounters numerous challenges, notably the disjointed clan system, which inherently does not justify federalism, as it fails to correlate tribes with ethnicities and nationalities, as observed in federal states globally, and because Somali clans are not geographically segregated, with no region exclusively designated for a single clan. Somalia has confronted the problem of terrorism, which has appeared as a major source of instability and has hindered people from securely selecting their political systems throughout the nation (Farah, 2024). The Somaliland area advocates for independence and is reluctant to play a central role in addressing the political problem in Somalia, despite ongoing discussions between the two sides that have not yet hit an impasse in seeking a mutually agreeable political settlement. Furthermore, the financial resources necessary for the federal systems are inadequate. The problem lies not in federalism per se but rather in its misapplication, akin to the errors committed by earlier Somali administrations when they implemented a centralized system. Critics argue that the government in Mogadishu is adopting a centralized strategy that seeks to dominate all political and economic matters in the entire country in violation of the federal constitution, which allocates tasks between federal and state authorities, while simultaneously acting as sovereign countries, formulating foreign and defense policies in clear violation of the constitution and national laws (Madar, 2024).

Somalia experienced a multiparty democratic system shortly after its independence at the start of its political governance. In his book "The First African Democracy," Professor Abdi Ismail Samatar contends that Somalia was the first African nation to undergo a peaceful transition of power on the continent. From 1960 to 1969, the country had democratic civilian governance. Samatar mentions Somalia's first president, Adem Abdullahi Osman, with his prime minister, Abdirizak Haji Hussein (1964-1967), whose

periods were characterized by commitment to the constitution and the division of authorities and duties. It argues that these two individuals exemplify the first African democracy that provides statesman-like leadership in Africa. The democratic civilian government persisted until 1969, when General Mohamed Siyad Barre orchestrated a military coup. A military coup organized by General Mohamed Siyad Barre took place, resulting in his 21-year dictatorship over Somalia from 1969 to 1991. The military promptly nullified the Constitution, dissolved elected institutions, and arrested political leaders. The military rationalized its takeover of authority by asserting that it intended to deal with corruption and tribal discord, arguments often used by other military coups throughout Africa. Nonetheless, Siyad Barre built a totalitarian system that culminated in the same afflictions for which the military rationalized the termination of civilian governance, including corruption, nepotism, and tribalism. The dissolution of democracy, restriction of liberties, and imposition of authoritarian governance were regressions for the Somali political framework⁷.

On the other side, there are international interventions for the Somalia conflicts, and mostly the two neighboring countries that have mostly interfered in the internal conflicts in Somalia are Kenya and Ethiopia. The border conflicts between Kenya and Somalia, which involves a long land border and an undefined maritime border, is one of the most prominent conflicts in East Africa. These complexities have led to ongoing tensions between neighboring countries. Disputes over these borders, particularly maritime ones, have drawn the attention of international courts due to their resistance to bilateral and regional solution. This resistance has resulted in the breaking of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and has nearly escalated to the point of conflict (Harefa & Astuti, 2025).

According to the René Brosius, the boundary issue stems from the colonial period, when the two countries inherited unmarked and ambiguous boundaries, like other colonies in Africa and the developing world. Britain spanned from Somalia through Kenya to contemporary Uganda primarily to regulate the sources of the Nile. British dominion over Somaliland lasted from 1884 to 1895, concluding in 1926 when Britain relinquished certain territories in Kismayo, next to Kenya, as well as the northern portion of the

⁷ I. Samatar , Aden A. Osman of Somalia and Abdirazak H. Hussen were the first Democrats from Africa. (Bloomington: Indiana University press, 2016).

Jubaland region, to Italy in recognition of its assistance during World War I. Subsequently, Kenya was established as a British colony, including the northeastern area populated by Somalis. This was a dilemma for the British because of the widespread availability of weaponry and the region's commitment to the Islamic faith. Nonetheless, the British effectively established their dominance over the area and enacted the "Hinterland Act" to restrict the proliferation of arms and avert assaults by Ethiopian soldiers near the border. During this period, the British delineated boundaries as approximate separations between Kenya and Somalia, disregarding the mobility of individuals and their interwoven tribe and clan relationships. This method led to the successful isolation of the northeastern area, widely known by the abbreviation NFD (Northern Frontier District)⁸.

Importance and Scope of the Study

This research is to investigate the involvement of third parties in intrastate conflicts in Somalia. This study contributes to the existing literature by analyzing the involvements of the Al-Shabab organization in direct negotiations with the Somalia administrations and investigates the effects and influences of international actors on possible political progress. The study also highlights the positive or negative for the neighboring countries of the country if stability is achieved for the coming future. The study analyzes Turkey's role as a key NATO ally, equipped with advanced sophisticated weapons, which positions it uniquely within influential regional dynamics. The study also focuses on the causes of conflicts in Somalia, examining the main internal and external actors involved, such as warlords, Al-Shabab organizations, clan leaders, and regional states, along with the strategies they primarily use to achieve their goals. The research also investigates relations among these actors and the wider consequences for the stability of the region.

Research Questions and objectives

The study investigates the roles of international actors in shaping the potential future perspectives of Somalia, with particular emphasis on the involvement and participation of the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and regional organizations such as

⁸ Robert Brosius, "Somalia vs. Kenya – The maritime border dispute – *africanlegalstudies.blog*. April 10, 2021, <https://africanlegalstudies.blog/2021/04/10/somalia-vs-kenya-the-maritime-border-dispute>.

the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Ethiopia, Kenya, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey. The study aims to analyze the international actors' impacts on political progress related to local stakeholders like clan leaders, the Al-Shabab organization, warlords, and regional governments and evaluate the allegations of their involvement in the regional peace and possible benefits for the neighboring countries in Somalia.

Hypothesis

The important geopolitical position of Somalia compels the ongoing engagement of significant international and regional players, which is influencing the structure of the country's intrastate conflicts and affecting initiatives to promote peace.

Structures of the Thesis

This study is divided into five chapters, the first chapter present the conceptual framework, theoretical foundations, and research methodology, it focuses on the rise of intra-state conflict post-Cold War and examines the international actors affecting conflicts within states in Somalia. The chapter outlines the different methods used by international actors to settle these conflicts in the country providing a theoretical framework to improve subsequent analysis. These methods include prevention conflicts, UN peacekeeping operations, and deploying foreign troops. Other peacekeeping operations include negotiations and mediation during conflicts, peace enforcement, diplomacy, economic sanctions, and peace building, as outlined in the theoretical framework and discussed to enhance understudying for the international actors replies for the Somalia's conflict.

The second chapter analyzes the conflict in relation to Somalia's historical background. The Somali people are a mixed population of Arab and African descent, predominantly practicing Islam, and are closely connected to other societies in the Horn of Africa. Intra-state conflict in Somalia arises from a combination of factors, including resource scarcity, struggles for control, land-related disputes caused by population growth, relocation, and clan disagreements. These conflicts have progressed through several stages, including pre-conflict, escalation, transitional, stabilization, and post-conflict reconstruction. This chapter examines the root causes of these intra-state conflicts and identifies the key actors

involved, such as clan militias, businesspersons, religious leaders, and the Al-Shabaab terrorist organization, all of whom play significant roles in Somalia's ongoing conflicts.

The second chapter is based on an analysis of the conflict in relation to the historical background of Somalia. The Somali people are a mixed-race population of Arabs and Africans, who predominantly practice Islam. They are closely linked to other societies in the Horns of Africa. Intra-state conflict in Somalia, which is caused by a mix of factors, including the lack of resources and control, as well as land-living conflicts caused by population growth, relocation, and clan disagreements, is a major factor in the development of conflict. Intra-state conflict in Somalia led to many stages of conflict, including pre-conflict and escalation stages, which are discussed in this chapter, transitional stage, stabilization stage, and post-conflict reconstruction stage; the root causes of the intra-state conflicts; and lastly, it also discusses the actors in the intra-state conflicts, such as clan rebels, businesspersons, religious leaders, and Al-Shabab terrorist organizations involved in the Somali conflicts.

The third chapter discusses the roles of international actors in the Somali conflict. The actors involved in this situation include countries, international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and individuals with significant influence. This chapter examines Somalia's exceptional geopolitical location in relation to international and regional powers, which has paved the way for new and diverse forms of international involvement. The participation of regional powers in Somalia's conflicts has been significant, and there are ongoing interventions addressing internal conflicts within the country. This chapter highlights many neighboring countries, such as Ethiopia and Kenya, and their interventions, as well as the involvement of international actors. It also discusses the roles, interventions, and influences of Western countries, some Arab countries, and other related countries.

The fourth chapter focuses on Turkey-Somalia relations, examining both historical roots and future opportunities. This section also discusses Turkey's historical role, locally and internationally, in connecting various early civilizations in the ancient world. Turkey has articulated a foreign policy aimed at becoming a significant player in international affairs, seeking to achieve its objectives by leveraging global opportunities. Additionally, this

chapter explores Turkey's influence on external strategy in East Africa, its efforts to strengthen security and economic ties with Somalia, trade opportunities between the two countries, and the role of Turkish diplomatic mediation in Somalia's internal conflicts.

The chapter five or last chapter of this study is Evaluations and Conclusions. This chapter discusses the findings of the previous chapters in light of their analyses, focusing on the influence of international actors in Somalia through a theoretical approach. It presents conclusions that primarily highlight the roles of international actors in Somalia's conflicts, as well as conflict prevention and peacekeeping efforts, and examines the involvement of Al-Shabaab organization in these internal conflicts.



CHAPTER I: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, THEORY AND RESEARCH METHOD

1.1. Conceptual Framework and Theory

1.2. Definition of the Intra-State Conflict

According to Hofmann, Intra-state conflict is a distinct kind of conflict that occurs inside the boundaries of only one state or country. It involves a contentious relationship between the state government and a non-governmental organization, usually representing a specific group or faction within the community. Intra-state conflicts frequently emerge as a result of ethnic, religious, political, or social difficulties. These conflicts can take on various manifestations, including rallies, riots, civil wars, or insurgencies. These conflicts have serious consequences for the stability, governance, and overall welfare of the state and its people, frequently leading to bloodshed, violations of human rights, relocation of the local people, and financial instability (Bodea & Elbadawi, 2007). Intra-state conflict is a elaborate events that can have wide-ranging effects on individuals, communities, and entire regions. Understanding the causes and dynamics of intra-state conflict is a critical issue for policymakers, scholars, and other stakeholders who seek to prevent or mitigate such conflicts. Identity is one of the main reasons that leads to conflict within a state. This can based on racial, religious, language, or national identity. When different groups feel that their identities are criticized, ignored, or threatened, it can lead to intrastate conflict. Economic variations, political issues, and competition for resources like land or water are some of the other reason that can lead to intrastate conflict within a country. Most of the time, conflict within a state happens when social and political systems collapse. This can create a power vacuum and make it easier for violence and unrest to take place. Weak or corrupt governance, for example, can create suitable conditions that make it easier for armed groups to gain power and legitimacy while a lack of effective conflict resolution mechanisms can make it difficult to resolve disputes peacefully. On the other hand, preventing and resolving intra-state conflict involves a multifaceted approach that addresses the underlying causes of conflict, promotes dialogue and reconciliation between different groups, and strengthens official institutions and governance structures. This can involve a range of initiatives from economic development and social programs

to peacekeeping and security measures⁹. Understanding these conflicts involves considering the specific context, historical factors, and underlying grievances within a country or region. This examination is essential to comprehending the complexities of the conflict and developing suitable strategies for resolution and peacebuilding. It requires observing the social, political, economic, and cultural dynamics of the conflict areas, as well as investigating past events and historical legacies that have influenced the current situation. Identifying the root reasons and grievances that fuel the conflict is crucial, including issues like discrimination, marginalization, economic inequality, and political omission.

In the framework of several theories of International Relations, within the context of intra-state conflicts, Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism each give different points of view on the factors that lead to and the dynamics of such conflicts. The viewpoints of Realism, liberalism, and Marxism are unique when it comes to intra-state conflicts. Realism emphasizes power and self-interest, seeing conflicts as a manifestation of the anarchic structure of the international system, where nations engage in competition for power and resources. Liberalism prioritizes addressing complaints arising from social, economic, or political inequality by pushing for inclusive institutions, democracy, and conflict resolution processes. Marxism perceives the intra-state conflicts as a result of class struggle and the inherent contradictions in capitalist systems. It promotes revolutionary transformation to deal with the unequal allocation of resources, land, and money within a state (Jian, 2007). The majority of these ideas suggest that the underlying reasons for these conflicts are mostly rooted in disparities in resources, social marginalization, and feelings of detachment. The intra-state conflicts, which refer to conflicts inside nations, are posing an increasingly significant danger to regional and global stabilities. Modern theories of intrastate conflict review traditional and current conceptions of revolution and instability, highlighting the significance of economic shortages in enabling racial, ethnic, and nationalistic intrastate conflict¹⁰.

⁹ Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Understanding civil war: Evidence and analysis. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48(6), 793-814. Carment, D., & Samy, Y. (2003).

¹⁰ The Study of Modern Intrastate War, “*E- International Relations*, February 3, 2011, <https://www.e-ir.info/2011/02/03/the-study-of-modern-intrastate-war/>.

1.3. Factors and dynamics that affect the intra-state conflicts

To understand intra-state conflicts, it is also necessary to look at all of the complex dynamics and factors that affect how they start, how they get worse, and how they might end. When analyzing conflicts within states, these key factors and variables are frequently considered.¹¹

Root causes, such as conflicts over government and political power-sharing, racial and religious conflicts, economic inequality, and old disagreements, are very important in creating suitable conditions for intra-state conflicts. Actions that set off conflicts could turn them into full-blown conflicts. These include instability in politics, protests, and financial issues.

External factors, such as regional and international actors can have an impact on the orientations of the intra-state conflicts. When neighboring countries, international organizations, or foreign powers get involved, it can either make the situation worse or make it easier to solve.

With the framework of Institutional factors, institutions like the state's ability to maintain order and provide basic services, and legal and judicial institutions affect the resolution of the conflicts. Negotiation, dialogue, peacekeeping, and mediation are essential instruments for intra-state conflict resolution.

Concerning social and cultural factors, civil society organizations, the media, and society all play a part in shaping the social and cultural background in which conflicts develop. When it comes to preventing future conflicts and restoring long-term stability, nothing is more important than post-conflict reconstruction efforts that prioritize reconciliation, infrastructure rebuilding, and development.

An explanation of the factors that affect intra-state conflicts is a critical issue around the world violent clashes between various factions within a single state or country are defined as intra-state conflicts, also referred to as civil wars or internal conflicts. These confrontations frequently result in catastrophic outcomes, causing extensive human

¹¹ Sidik Yurdusev, "Article Title, " *Tetikik*, no. 3(2023): 43-68, <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/tetikik/issue/76579/1274756>

misery, economic volatility, and political chaos. Gaining insight into the factors that pave the way for the emergence of conflicts inside a state is essential for policymakers and scholars aiming to prevent and handle such conflicts and important to seek or examine the primary variables that contribute to this occurrence. Encompassing political, economic, social, and historical issues.

a) Political Factors

Political concerns are major contributing factors to the occurrence of the intra-state conflicts. State fragility or governance failure frequently results in the deterioration of institutions and the incapacity to deliver crucial public services to the population. The absence of governance can lead to discontent and unhappiness among the public, especially among underprivileged groups, who are disproportionately impacted. Inadequate governance can weaken the enforcement of laws, diminish confidence in institutions, and foster a state of disorder, potentially leading to the escalation of conflicts (Rudolfson, 2017). To effectively prevent and resolve these conflicts, it is essential to have a solid understanding of these political variables and to take action to address them. The promotion of political processes that are both inclusive and transparent, the strengthening of governance institutions, the fight against corruption, and the guaranteeing of the preservation of civil liberties and human rights are all components of this system. For example, Somalia has had long-lasting internal conflicts, mostly driven by political causes such as the inadequacy and fragility of the state. The disintegration of the central government in 1991 created a vacuum of authority, which subsequently gave rise to many armed groups and clan-based militias competing for dominance. The presence of state fragility, which is well defined by inadequate governance, institutions, and the rule of law, has played a role in the ongoing wars in Somalia (Kaldor, 2013).

b) Socioeconomic Factors.

Socioeconomic factors, such as poverty, inequality, and economic grievances, are major contributors to the escalation of conflicts within a country. High levels of poverty and inequality create an atmosphere for social discontent and animosity, as marginalized and disadvantaged factions perceive themselves as excluded from the benefits of economic progress. Armed groups or rebels might take advantage of this feeling of unfairness and lack of resources to gain support and enlist individuals who are disenchanted with the

current socioeconomic circumstances and to reduce intra-state conflicts, policymakers should address socioeconomic factors by implementing social safety nets and providing targeted aid for disadvantaged communities. Social safety nets are policies and initiatives that safeguard low-income people and families. Cash transfers, social insurance, subsidized healthcare, and education are examples of safety nets. Poverty, inequality, and economic dissatisfaction escalate the intra-state conflicts (Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2000).

c) Religious and ethnic divisions.

Ethnic and religious divisions have a key role in causing conflicts within a state. These divisions may emerge due to profound historical, cultural, and social disparities among various ethnic or religious factions within a country. These differences often appear as tensions, rivalries, and hostilities, which have the potential to grow into violent conflicts if not adequately resolved. An essential cause fueling ethnic and religious conflicts is the presence of intolerant behaviors and laws that selectively discriminate against certain groups based on their ethnic or religious affiliation. Discrimination manifests in several ways, including disparities in resource allocation, restricted political participation, and deprivation of fundamental rights and opportunities (Panchen & Gorelick, 2016). External factors, like global interests or the spread of radical beliefs, can also make ethnic and spiritual divisions worse. People from outside of ethnic or religious groups may try to use these divisions between groups for their own political or ideological purposes. This external influence can make communities even more divided and make conflicts worse. For example, Nigeria has seen religious conflicts, namely between the mostly Muslim north and the predominantly Christian south. The Boko Haram insurgency, initiated in 2009, has shown that it has religious roots, as the organization endeavors to build an Islamic state and specifically targets Christians and moderate secular Muslims (Forest, 2012).

d) International and Regional Factors.

Various regional and international factors can substantially influence the emergence and duration of intra-state conflicts. International factors can encompass cross-border conflicts, regional power struggles, and the participation of international actors in the internal affairs of a state. Regional power struggles can significantly influence intra-state

conflicts as well. Regional powers can possess conflicting interests or engage in geopolitical rivalries, leading them to support various factions or groups within a state affected by conflict (Siniver, 2024). Additionally, external factors, such as geopolitical interests or the influence of extremist ideologies, can intensify ethnic and religious divisions. External actors may manipulate or support ethnic or religious communities to exploit these divisions for their own political or ideological agendas, taking into consideration international and regional factors. The involvement of international actors can exacerbate divisions among communities and escalate the conflicts. For example, a horrible conflict led to the nation of South Sudan declaring itself independent in 2011. However, international and local factors led to the emergency for internal conflict within the country. Long-standing ethnic divisions in South Sudan contribute to the conflict. Political power struggles and resource competition are aggravating factors in the conflict, which primarily involves Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups. Internal and external actors have exploited these ethnic divisions. International factors have negatively influenced the South Sudan conflict. Sudan and Uganda, the neighbors, have supported different conflicting groups. Sudan was accused of advocating the South Sudanese rebels, while Uganda has supported President Salva Kiir militarily (De Waal, 2014).

e) Environmental Factors

Resource scarcity, including limited access to essential resources such as water, land, and minerals, can contribute to the emergence of intra-state conflicts. In addition, the effects of climate change, such as extreme weather events, rising sea levels, and changing rainfall patterns, can exacerbate tensions and lead to conflicts over scarce resources. Furthermore, environmental degradation, such as deforestation, pollution, and habitat destruction, may affect livelihoods and fuel social unrest, potentially escalating into intra-state conflicts. Competition for limited resources, such as water and land, is a significant factor contributing to intra-state conflicts. Climate change-induced disruptions to livelihoods can be a contributing factor to social tensions and conflicts within a state. Environmental degradation is one of the factors that contribute to intra-state conflicts, as it undermines the well-being of communities and has the potential to fuel social unrest. It is important to note that environmental factors do not directly cause conflicts but can act as supporters or worsen issues (Homer-Dixon, 2010).

In conclusion, many factors contribute to the creation of intra-state conflicts. Some of these factors include political and socioeconomic factors, as well as ethnic and religious differences, regional and international factors, and environmental factors. This list is by no means complete. In reality, more factors might play a role in the emergence and intensification of these conflicts. Additional factors might lead to conflicts within states.

1.4. The Stages of the Conflict

The conflict can be broken down into five distinct stages, each of which characterized by a different level of intensity between the parties involved. The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research has classified the conflict into five stages: dispute, non-violent crisis, violent crisis, limited war, and eventual war. **Dispute:** A dispute happens when two or more people have different ideas and beliefs that seem to go against each other. Both sides need to have intellectual capacity and a clear vision. Communication is very important, and it can be done directly or with the help of someone else. Compromise, negotiation, or reaching a consensus might be necessary to resolve a political disagreement. A dispute is a unique matter or disagreement involving multiple parties involved in a conflict. The main point of disagreement might include several issues such as territorial conflicts, resource distribution, political power sharing, self-determination, or concerns relating to identity and discrimination. The argument often acts as the cause of the conflict and may go through many phases, such as underlying tensions, escalation, violence, negotiation or mediation, and settlement or change. It is essential to resolve the issue in order to successfully address the underlying causes of the conflict and achieve long-lasting peace (Coleman, 2006).

Intensity	Terminology	Level of violence	Intensity class
1	Dispute	Non-violent conflicts	Low intensity
2	Non-violent violent crisis		
3	Violent crisis	Violent conflicts	Medium intensity
4	Limited W.		High intensity
5	War		

Figure 4: The Internal/External Actor's Involvements for the Somalia Conflicts

Sources: Methodology of the Heidelberg conflicts research.

Conflict intensity refers to the level of emotional, psychological, and physical strain experienced in a conflict situation. The statement illustrates the intensity of the parties' convictions on their views, interests, and requirements, as well as their willingness to make concessions or to collaborate.

Non-violent crisis: A non-violent crisis is a phase in a conflict characterized by an increase in tensions and disagreements but without the involvement of physical force or violence. It generally involves violent conflicts, disputes, or disagreements, yet the parties involved avoid using violence as a method of resolving their differences. Alternatively, they may use a variety of non-violent strategies. Non-violent crises frequently seek to interfere with the existing state of affairs, promote consciousness, and pursue peaceful resolutions to conflicts using non-aggressive methods.

Violent crisis: A violent crisis refers to a stage in a conflict where the use of physical force or violence becomes prevalent. It is characterized by escalated aggression, hostility, and the direct application of force by one or more parties involved. Violent crises often involve acts such as armed confrontations, riots, physical assaults, bombings, or other destructive actions. The use of violence in a crisis can lead to severe consequences, including loss of life, destruction of property, and increased suffering for those involved. Resolving a violent crisis usually requires significant efforts to de-escalate the tensions,

establish security, and address the primary bases of the conflict. Effectively resolve a violent crisis, it is necessary to make substantial efforts to reduce conflicts, implement safety precautions, and deal with the root causes of the conflict.

Limited War: The limited war stage involves the use of force, typically through military means, but with a limited scope. Limited wars encompass minor conflicts such as battles, territorial disputes, or indirect conflicts involving foreign support for opposing factions. While restricted conflicts may have lower levels of violence than full-scale wars, they still pose significant risks and can lead to severe humanitarian and political results.

War: A war is an act of violence that involves the use of armed forces, taking place either between different countries or within a country among different groups. It encompasses military operations on land, sea, and air and involves involvement in warfare and a state of armed conflict. Causes of war can vary from conflicts over land to clashes in beliefs or competition for valuable resources. The phenomenon results in significant human despair, leading to both military and civilian deaths, as well as the destruction of property and the collapse of economies.

As results, diplomatic negotiations and international cooperation are essential in endeavors to prevent conflict and foster peace. Nevertheless, the attainment of enduring peace continues to be difficult due to a multitude of conflicting interests, deeply rooted grievances, and intricate geopolitical dynamics. Every conflict is unique, and some factors can affect how it progresses through these stages, including the nature of the issues at hand, the behavior of the parties involved, the involvement of outside parties, and the effectiveness of mediation and diplomacy. Gaining comprehension of these phases may support the investigation and control of conflicts. However, it is crucial to bear in mind that conflict dynamics might be exceedingly complex and uncertain, demanding careful investigation and customized strategies for settlement and administration¹².

First of all the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIK) says that conflicts can be broken down into two groups: violent conflicts and nonviolent conflicts.¹³

¹² Definitions, D. N., Theories of conflict (Hawai: University of Hawai'i, (1973).

¹³Conflict Barometer2022,"Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2022, <https://hiik.de/conflict-barometer/current-version/?lang=en>

Violent conflicts: When people, groups, or states use physical force, violence, or armed battle, they are in a violent conflict. People often get hurt, property destroyed, and lives are lost in these kinds of fights. Wars, armed rebellions, terrorism, racial or religious tensions, and violence tied to organized crime are all examples of the violent conflicts. Usually, the violent conflicts cannot be solved without help from the government, security forces, or foreign groups. This help could come in the form of talks, peace deals, or military action.

Nonviolent conflicts: There is no direct bloodshed or armed fighting in nonviolent conflicts, which also called calm conflicts. Instead, they are characterized by conflicts, altercations, or peaceful solutions to issues. There are many levels of nonviolent conflict from disagreements between individuals to disagreements in communities and even issues at the national level. Strikes, riots, civil rights organizations, boycotts, and calm talks are all examples of nonviolent fights. Most of the time, nonviolent problems can be solved through talks, peaceful settlement, cooperation, or the court system.

To sum up, each intra-state conflict is unique, so any comprehensive analysis of these factors must consider these opinions. Because every conflict is different and the factors at play interact in complex ways, this perspective is critical for creating effective strategies for prevention, management, and resolution¹⁴. Intra-state conflicts, or internal conflicts within a single state's territorial boundaries, have become a prominent type of conflict in recent times. Non-state actors, such as militias and warlords, often use significant influence in these conflicts, working in conjunction with armed groups representing the state. These actors motivate grievances or political aspirations that are insufficiently resolved by the government, advocating for specific ethnic, religious, or regional concerns, or contesting the power of the state itself. They can vary from loosely organized militias to more tightly knit insurgent or rebel groups. Weak state institutions or governance also contribute to the involvement of non-state actors. When the government fails to ensure security, provide essential services, or uphold the legal system, non-state actors may intervene to talk about the gaps in the conflicts. They can create separate systems of governing, exercise authority over nearby regions, or utilize resources

¹⁴ Sidik Yurdusev, "Article Title, " *Tetikik*, no. 3(2023): 43-68, <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/tetikik/issue/76579/1274756>

to their advantage. The participation of non-state actors in intra-state conflicts can be influenced by global and regional dynamics, with international actors providing assistance and weaponry to advance their objectives or create instability in competing nations. This particular kind of conflict is mostly localized inside the boundaries of the state; however, it can extend outside these limits if not effectively addressed promptly, perhaps evolving into a full-scale conflict. Since the mid-21st century, there has been a notable rise in intra-state wars. However, during the Cold War, there was a sudden upwelling in these conflicts worldwide, often exhibiting significant inter-state conflict characteristics. Consequently, the United Nations occasionally intervened by deploying its peacekeeping forces to de-escalate tensions and mitigate the inter-state dimensions of these intra-state conflicts.

According to Wallenstein and Stoltenberg's research on the changing dynamics of conflicts, there has been a notable shift in the proportion of inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Although inter-state conflicts have not entirely vanished, there has been a noticeable transition towards intra-state conflicts in recent years. According to the authors, the international system has been instrumental in preventing interstate confrontations (Wallenstein & Sollenberg, 1996). They assert that the system, comprising global standards, organizations, and diplomatic endeavors, has been mostly effective in maintaining tranquility and preventing significant disputes among independent nations. The achievement may be attributed to several sources. First, the researchers underscore the significance of international norms and values that prohibit belligerent conduct among nations. The international community has broadly accepted and internalized norms such as territorial integrity, respect for sovereignty, and also the restriction of the use of force. The establishment of this common understanding provides a structure in which governments may peacefully address their disagreements and prevent the need for violent confrontation. Furthermore, Wallenstein and Sollenberg emphasize the significance of international institutions in the prevention of conflicts. The organizations such as the United Nations (UN), regional organizations, and multilateral accords provide forums for governments to engage in communication, negotiation, and mediation. These techniques provide nonviolent options for dealing with complaints and settling disputes using diplomatic methods. Moreover, they propose that the growing interconnection and interdependence among nations have influenced the decrease of the conflicts. The process

of globalization, which involves the integration of economies and the expansion of international commerce, has generated shared interests and motivations for governments to collaborate instead of resorting to military conflicts. Due to the increased expenses and potential dangers involved in conflicts, governments are now pursuing non-violent methods to resolve their disagreements (Lund, 1996). Although the international system has effectively discouraged fighting between states, it nonetheless faces ongoing difficulties and tensions. Emerging causes of conflict, such as ethnic or religious tensions, shortages of resources, or ideological disparities, can intensify intra-state conflicts. In addition, the researchers recognize that the efficacy of the international system in preventing conflicts between states may differ depending on the particular circumstances and the parties involved. In the twenty-first century, some highly aggressive confrontations have taken place exclusively within the boundaries of individual states, or, in other words, intra-state conflicts alternatively referred to as internal or civil conflicts, denote violent confrontations that transpire only within the territorial limits of a singular state or country. In contrast to inter-state conflicts, which involve violent actions between distinct states, intra-state conflicts encompass a range of parties, factions, or communities within a specific state. These conflicts frequently emerge because of intricate political, social, economic, or ethnic elements and can lead to significant humanitarian effects. For example, the intra-state conflict in Somalia has been a major concern for many years, marked by political instability, widespread violence, and the lack of a stable central government. This long-standing conflict has seen the involvement of multiple factions and has led to significant humanitarian challenges for the nation's population. The origins of Somalia's intra-state conflict can be attributed to the downfall of former President Siyad Barre in 1991, leading to the fragmentation of governmental institutions and the rise of numerous armed factions struggling for control and resources. The armed factions, which encompass clan militias and warlords, have engaged in conflicts due to disputes over geographical dominance, political advantage, and economic stakes, resulting in prolonged violence and instability. The conflict in Somalia, particularly between the national government and the Islamist group Al-Shabaab, stands out as one of the country's most prominent struggles. Al-Shabab group, affiliated with Al-Qaeda aims to establish a strict form of Islamic governance in Somalia. This group has conducted various attacks, including suicide bombings, assassinations, and assaults on government entities and the

African Union peacekeeping forces. The clash with Al-Shabaab has caused considerable harm to Somali civilians, leading to displacement and hindering the delivery of humanitarian aid. International actors and regional dynamics have also influenced the intra-state conflict in Somalia. Neighboring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia have intervened at different times, supporting various factions and pursuing their strategic interests. The involvement of these regional players has intensified the conflict and made reaching a sustainable peace agreement more difficult (*Minding the Gap*, 2016).

1.5. Directly Fighting Groups Involved In The Intra-State Conflicts.

An intra-state conflict occurs within a single country and involves internal concerns. As a significance of these conflicts, several armed groups that follow a variety of ideologies, objectives, and reasons for their existence frequently arise during intra-state conflict. Depending on the geography and conditions, the particular groups that are engaged in conflicts that occur inside a state might vary considerably. These groups can be classified into some types and may include:

Government Forces: The government-recognized military and security forces have a big impact on intrastate conflicts. This encompasses the military, including the army, air force, navy, and other paramilitary or security forces.

Rebel or Insurgent Groups: Rebel or insurgent groups, which are non-state armed organizations, often evolve in intra-state conflicts to oppose and destabilize the government's authority, sometimes seeking to overthrow it. Political, ethnic, religious, or ideological motives may be the driving force behind these organizations.

Militias groups: Militias groups refer to non-professional and sometimes irregular armed formations that function independently or in conjunction with government forces. They might be related to certain communities, ethnic backgrounds, or political groups.

Terrorist Organizations: Certain intra-state conflicts include the involvement of terrorist organizations that use violence and intimidation to achieve political or ideological objectives. These organizations can attack both government troops and civilians.

Paramilitary Groups: Paramilitary organizations refer to partially militarized organizations that function in conjunction with or assist government troops. They operate

either with government approval or on their own, frequently with a specific objective or loyalty in mind.

Foreign Intervention Forces: Foreign intervention forces may interfere in an intra-state conflict, either via the involvement of foreign governments or multinational coalitions. This engagement might manifest as direct either military intervention or assistance provided to one faction involved in the conflict.

Criminal Organizations: criminal organizations: In specific situations of conflict, criminal groups may use the disorder to participate in operations such as smuggling, extortion, or other illegal ventures. Their participation could increase the complicated nature of the security issue.


Ethnic or Sectarian Militias: In conflicts that involve significant ethnic or religious divisions, armed factions may organize themselves based on these disparities. These militias often attempt to protect or promote the goals of certain ethnic or religious groups.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is an example of a nation in Africa that has seen intra-state conflict. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been affected by a series of conflicts involving several armed organizations, rebel factions, and troops from the government. Political disagreements, competition for natural resources, and ethnic tensions are just a few factors that have exacerbated the conflicts. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has included conventional fighting, guerrilla tactics, and the activities of militias and armed groupings, including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). The conflict has been influenced by foreign interference, as neighboring nations and regional groups have been actively involved (Kisangani, 2003). Intra-State Conflicts and the Role of International Actors, Intra-state conflicts refer to situations when armed parties or factions inside a single state dispute power or responsibility based on ethnic, religious, or political disagreements. The role of the contributions of international actors in these conflicts is complicated and may have a substantial influence on whether they are resolved or prolonged. International actors often participate in mediation and diplomacy, offering an impartial forum for discussions and promoting interaction among opposing parties. Additionally, they may provide humanitarian aid to mitigate the distress of impacted communities. Furthermore, international actors can enforce sanctions or

restrictions on factions that are fighting, putting pressure on them and restricting their access to resources. International actors may assume the role of military intervention, either by direct involvement or by providing indirect assistance. Peacekeeping missions are deployed to preserve peace, safeguard people, and assist in rebuilding efforts after a conflict. International actors may also contribute to efforts to improve the ability and structure of organizations to improve governance and solve the underlying reasons behind the conflict. The successful outcome of foreign players' engagement relies on the specific conditions and dynamics of each conflict, along with the legality and neutrality of their acts (Paris, 2004). Here are some ways international actors may have an impact on intra-state conflicts

- a. Mediation and diplomacy, International actors, such as regional organizations, neighboring nations, or global institutions, have the potential to have significant influence by mediating and promoting communication between opposing factions. They can provide an impartial forum for discussions, promote actions that foster trust, and facilitate the negotiation of peace accords. Mediation endeavors often include diplomatic efforts, bridge diplomacy, and the mobilization of peacekeeping troops to oversee ceasefires and provide security during the peace process.
- b. Humanitarian Assistance, such as humanitarian organizations and governments that provide financial support, often provide relief and support to communities impacted by intra-state conflicts. They may provide food, medical supplies, housing, and many types of humanitarian assistance that reduce the needs of citizens trapped during conflict. Humanitarian aid can reduce the consequences of the conflict and solve urgent requirements, but it might unintentionally prolong conflicts if not supported with efforts to resolve the root causes.
- c. Sanctions and embargoes are measures used by international actors to exert influence on opposing sides. These measures involve imposing economic restrictions and prohibiting the trade of weapons between one or more parties participating in the conflict. The purpose of these actions is to apply pressure, limit access to resources, and interfere with the capacity to maintain the conflict. Individual government or international organizations such as the United Nations may implement sanctions and embargoes, although their ability to settle disputes is a matter of debate.

- d. Peacekeeping Operations, foreign actors often deploy peacekeeping operations to areas of conflict with the explicit agreement of the relevant parties. Peacekeepers are primarily responsible for upholding peace and security, overseeing ceasefires, enabling the distribution of humanitarian assistance, and assisting in the rehabilitation of areas affected by violence (Fortna, 2004). Peacekeeping operations play a crucial role in stabilizing conditions, establishing a favorable situation for peace discussions, and safeguarding civilians. However, they encounter difficulties such as restricted mandates, resource limitations, and complicated political circumstances. Another very important point is military intervention, in some circumstances; international organizations may use military intervention to address problems in intra-state conflicts. This could appear as either direct military involvement or assistance provided to one faction involved in the conflict (Licklider, 1995). The rationales for military intervention might vary, including humanitarian considerations, regional stabilization, or geopolitical demands. Even so, military interventions are a subject of debate because of their potential for unexpected outcomes, such as harm to civilians, expansion of the conflict, and an outbreak of prolonged unrest.
- e. International actors can help with enhancing their skills and capabilities, as well as establishing and strengthening the organizations and systems, in societies that have experienced conflict. They may provide support in sectors such as governance, rule of law, security sector reform, and economic growth. The objective of all of these efforts is to enhance the capacity of state institutions, encourage effective administration, facilitate the process of reconciliation, and solve the underlying features that have led to the conflicts (Salmon, 2020).



Maps 1: Conflict Based On the Global Peace Index

Sources: Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP).Global Peace Index (2007–2016)

The Global Peace Index (GPI), created by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), is a yearly study that serves as the foremost indicator of international conflicts and global peacefulness worldwide. The study examines data from 163 nations to analyze developments regarding peace and conflict, the economic impact of conflict, and the progress toward achieving the United Nations' development objectives. Overall, global peace declined during the last year, although there are some positive aspects to consider. The number of peaceful nations rose by 81, while the number of violent nations rose by 79. The 2016 GPI report indicated a more rapid decline in equality and peace compared to the previous year (0.53%), mostly attribute to a rise in terrorism and political instability. This occurred even though a greater number of nations saw an increase in peacefulness compared to those that did not.

The involvement of international actors in disputes within inter-state conflicts is complicated, with positive as well as negative consequences. Whether or not these efforts are successful will depend on a number of things, such as the openness to dialogue from both sides, the credibility and objectivity of the international actors, the dynamics of the region, and the reasons for the conflict. Every conflict is unique, demanding a careful evaluation of the suitable involvement of international actors based on individual

circumstances. Their involvement may include a variety of activities, including mediation, diplomacy, humanitarian aid, sanctions, peacekeeping missions, and infrastructure development. Nevertheless, international actors have difficulties and limitations when it comes to settling disagreements inside a state because of varying interests, few resources, and complex political dynamics. It is of the highest significance to achieve a balance between involvement and respect for sovereignty while also solving the underlying causes and establishing a durable peace. The effectiveness of foreign actors' engagement ultimately depends on their detailed comprehension of the conflict's unique circumstances and the cooperative efforts of all parties concerned. In Somalia, international actors have had significant impacts via their involvement in mediation and diplomacy, the provision of humanitarian aid, the implementation of sanctions and bans, the deployment of peacekeeping missions, and the irregular use of military force. Regional organizations, neighboring governments, and international actors have intervened and supported discussions about resolving the conflict (Menkhaus, 2013). Donor countries and humanitarian organizations have helped make people's lives better. To put pressure on people and stop the spread of arms, it is important to use sanctions and bans, if applicable.

Peacekeeping missions have played a crucial role in achieving stability within the nation and facilitating political processes. Regional actors have used military action as a means to resolve security problems. However, to achieve enduring peace and stability in Somalia, it is necessary to implement comprehensive strategies that handle the political, economic, and social aspects while actively engaging Somali stakeholders.

Despite certain improvements, Somalia continues to face complex difficulties in international operations. Al-Shabab, a terrorist organization, persists in conducting military operations in the southern parts. The issue is extra complicated by the disagreements between regional leaders and the government. The international actors, including AMISOM, have tried to stabilize Somalia and provide assistance to the central government. Nevertheless, Al-Shabab continues to pose a substantial menace, executing assaults and exerting authority over some regions. The presence of tensions between the central government and regional leaders contributes to the existing issues.

In successfully addressing the problem effectively, it is important to adopt a comprehensive approach that prioritizes security, political reconciliation, and economic growth. Sustained global collaboration and assistance are crucial for ensuring Somalia's enduring peace and development.

1.6. Intra-state conflict resolution strategies use international actors.

It is actual important to know the strategy that international actors use for intra-state conflict, and International actors frequently utilize several tactics to tackle intra-state conflict. Although using different aspects of the government's resources, such as military and police forces, has traditionally been a popular strategy, its efficacy has diminished due to the complicated and deeply ingrained nature of contemporary conflicts. As a result, participants in international affairs are placing more emphasis on diplomatic endeavors, mediation, peacekeeping operations, and fostering discussion among opposing factions. Humanitarian aid and development assistance are employed to tackle fundamental complaints and foster enduring stability. To achieve conflict resolution, it is often required to employ a comprehensive strategy that includes both forceful and non-forceful strategies. International actors use multiple strategies, such as diplomacy, mediation, peacekeeping, sanctions, humanitarian aid, capacity development, transitional justice, and reconciliation, to deal with and resolve intra-state conflicts. These techniques include diplomatic efforts and discussions to promote conversation and comprehension, the use of mediators to facilitate communication and bridge gaps, and the deployment of peacekeeping troops or, in severe cases, peace enforcement measures to bring back stability. Economic penalties are enforced to apply pressure on parties to alter their conduct, while humanitarian aid focuses on addressing urgent needs and cultivating circumstances conducive to peace. International actors prioritize capacity development and institutional assistance to improve governance and resolve the underlying causes of violence. Transitional justice and reconciliation efforts aim to establish responsibility and facilitate the process of healing. The achievement of these systems is dependent upon the specific conditions and the ability of opposing parties to participate in those conflict resolutions (Elmi & Barise, 2006).

1.7. Theoretical Framework

1.7.1. Involvement of International Actors in the Intra-State Conflicts

The participation of external entities in intra-state conflicts is a complex and diverse occurrence. Intra-state conflicts are conflicts that occurs inside the boundaries of a single country. Political, ethnic, religious, or territorial disputes are frequently present in these conflicts and involve multiple parties.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has seen significant engagement from international actors such as the United Nations; however, endeavors to achieve a settlement have been fruitless. Since 1947, the United Nations has been actively engaged in peacekeeping operations and engaging in political diplomacy. The United States has engaged in mediation efforts, notably during the unsuccessful Camp David Summit in 2000. The intricate nature of the conflicts, including historical, geographical, and political factors, makes the task of finding a resolution difficult. Notwithstanding global efforts, a durable solution has not been attained. Nevertheless, while some conflicts persist without resolution, there have been cases where peacebuilding programs have achieved success. Every conflict needs customized strategies to effectively handle its own dynamics. Various international actors, including governments, intergovernmental organizations, and non-state groups, have the potential to engage in these disputes via diverse means. Some of the key factors are included.

Diplomatic Mediation: International actors, including regional organizations and individual countries, use diplomatic mediation as a useful tool to encourage fruitful discussion and peaceful resolutions between groups involved in the conflicts. The groups can offer a platform that is neutral and unbiased, where all parties involved can engage in constructive dialogue. Lebanon-Israel Ceasefire in example, during the Israel-Lebanon conflict in 2006, the UN brokered a ceasefire agreement known as the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. The resolution called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and the deployment of a strengthened UN peacekeeping force (UNIFIL) in southern Lebanon. The United Nations (UN) has been actively engaged in facilitating peaceful resolutions to conflicts in different regions, such as the Middle East and Africa (Makdisi, 2011).

Operations of Peacekeeping: International actors can dispatch peacekeeping operations to regions impacted by the conflict. The UN Security Council typically approves of these missions, which involve mobilizing the armed forces, law enforcement officials, and civilians to uphold peace and security, protect civilians, and facilitate the implementation of peace agreements. Peacekeeping operations have been deployed in many intra-state conflicts, including those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan (Aguilar, 2021).

Economic and Humanitarian supports: International institutions often provide financial and humanitarian assistance to reduce the consequences of conflicts within a country for the affected people. This support might include financial resources for the implementation of economic development projects, the provision of relief to alleviate suffering among people, and undertaking efforts to rebuild and rehabilitate areas affected by the conflicts. International institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, together with individual donor nations, have a crucial role in providing financial and technical assistance. The countries of Syria and Somalia have experienced long-lasting hostilities, political instability, and humanitarian crises. As a result, foreign entities have stepped in to provide economic and humanitarian aid to meet the needs of the impacted people (Chilaka, 2023). The World Bank has been actively involved in Somalia, providing financial aid and supporting development initiatives. The World Bank has provided funding for programs in several sectors, such as infrastructure development, etc.

Economic sanctions and trade barriers: International actors have the authority to enforce financial sanctions or weapons restrictions on parties engaged in conflicts within a single state. The purpose of these measures is to influence the warring parties by limiting their access to resources or compelling them to adhere to international standards and agreements. The United Nations and regional entities such as the European Union have enforced sanctions in different instances of intra-state conflicts, such as those occurring in Iran and South Sudan (Escribà-Folch, 2010).

Support for non-state actors: International actors offer political recognition, legitimacy, and military assistance to non-state actors engaged in intrastate conflicts. International legal frameworks, such as the UN arms embargoes, may cause controversy and govern this assistance (Haaß, 2010). Although it seeks to bolster the capacities of non-state

actors, its objectives are subject to the influence of humanitarian concerns, ideology, and geopolitics. The issue of support provision is a subject of contention owing to the potential ramifications it may have on the dynamics of conflicts and the stability of regions. Diverse factors and international standards influence the legality and legitimacy of such support, which is a contentious issue within the international community. The international actors have witnessed their involvement in intrastate conflict. Some were unsuccessful, but others adjusted the direction of conflict resolution and finally succeeded; unsuccessful peacebuilding efforts are comparable to the Syrian conflicts. The Syrian conflict has evolved into a multidimensional and disastrous humanitarian crisis, regardless of the considerable number of international attempts and humanitarian interventions, such as peace negotiations led by the United Nations. The Assad regime's brutality and foreign interventions, which are the main causes of the conflict, have gone unaddressed, leading to the prolonged plight of millions (Aldamen, 2025).

Finally, it is not easy for international actors to get involved in fighting within states. Intra-state conflicts happen when people with different goals are in the same state. There are different ways for international actors, like states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-state groups, to get engaged, because of strategic objectives or concerns about national security, governments may help the people involved, directly or indirectly. The primary objective of intergovernmental groups is to keep the peace, negotiate, and help people in need. Non-state players help them by providing emergency aid, speaking out, and mediating. Their participation in a conflict can have both disadvantage and advantage effects on it.

Realism and neorealism are major theories in the field of international relations that provide distinct viewpoints on the dynamics of state interactions within the global system. Realism, originating from the works of ancient Greek historian Thucydides and contemporary theorist Stephen Waltz, emphasizes the role of states as the main participants in international affairs. Realists contend that states are motivated by self-interest, power, and the quest for security.

Realists argue that the absence of a central authority in the global system, resulting in a chaotic nature, drives states to prioritize their survival and security. They consider war and the utilization of power to be fundamental matters in the field of international affairs.

Realists assert that states are essentially driven by power and strive to optimize their interests, frequently to the detriment of neighboring states (Waltz, 1996). Conversely, neorealism, advocated by Kenneth Waltz, focuses on systemic approaches and the structural limitations that influence the conduct of states. Neorealists contend that the configuration of the global system, which is marked by a lack of central authority, has a significant impact on the actions and results of states. They concentrate on how the power dynamics between states are impacted by the distribution of power among them (Kunz, 1948).

Normally, realism emphasizes security, power, and the self-interest of governments. Applying this idea to Somalia, the government's fall in 1991 created a vacuum in power, resulting in the absence of a centralized government to manage the nation and Warlords, clan militias, and organizations like Al-Shabab engaged in conflict to attain power and ensure their own existence. Neighbor governments and international actors interfered to safeguard their strategic interests and national security. The persistent conflict demonstrates that participants prefer power to principles or collaboration. In Somalia, inadequate systems facilitated the ascendancy of violent factions. Realism elucidates the rationale for the competition among various organizations and nations, as opposed to collaboration. The competition for resources, territory, and influence fuels a significant portion of the unrest. Regional conflicts are influenced by the security and power aspirations of each party. Realism elucidates the persistence of war and the challenges inherent in attaining stability (Abdullah, 2021).

There is another crucial theory: the theory of liberalism and it prioritizes collaboration, global institutions, and the promotion of peace. The Somalia government collapsed in 1991, resulting in turmoil and bloodshed. Regional and world organizations intervened to facilitate the restoration of normality. The African Union (AU) sent UNITED NATIONS organizations' soldiers to assist Somali military forces. The United Nations (UN) facilitated humanitarian assistance and encouraged discussions about politics. The Intergovernmental Authority on Progress facilitated peace negotiations among various Somali groups. Initiatives to establish a centralized government embody liberal principles of collaborative governance. Civil society groups sought to reconstruct neighborhoods and facilitate education. Global collaborations facilitated the organization of elections and

the fortification of institutions. Liberalism demonstrates that collaboration, discourse, and institutions may mitigate conflict and facilitate Somalia's journey towards stability (Ssereo, 2003).

By applying these viewpoints to the third state's involvement in the intra-state conflicts in Somalia, it can analyze the situation using both realist and liberal frameworks. Realists would probably prioritize self-interest and immediate benefits in their thinking. They would contend that states participating in Somalia would largely do so to promote their own security or strategic goals, such as securing access to resources or fighting competitor powers. Realists would additionally emphasize the possibility of competition and conflict among these intervening powers, as they all want to take full advantage of their power and influence. Conversely, liberals would approach the situation from a distinct perspective. Their main focus would be on ensuring both collective security and individual liberties. Advocates would contend that the intervention of states in Somalia might be reasonable on the grounds of fostering stability, safeguarding human rights, and upholding global standards. Liberals prioritize the significance of multilateral cooperation and international institutions in tackling the issues in Somalia, to establish a more peaceful and equitable global (Cowhey, 1978). Realism and neorealism offer unique viewpoints on international relations, recognizing that aspects of both realism and liberalism may be present in the analysis of every international issue. Furthermore, alternative theoretical viewpoints provide useful insights. Realism prioritizes the pursuit of personal interests and power, whereas neorealism emphasizes the importance of systemic techniques. On the other hand, liberalism places weight on both collective security and individual liberties. Realists place a higher importance on self-interest once evaluating the role of third party organizations in Somalia. They see invasion or interventions as being motivated by power and security worries. On the other hand, liberals prioritize the importance of human rights, communal security, and collaboration across borders. Gaining a comprehensive understanding of the complicated nature of the Somalia issue and international relations as a whole is contingent upon taking into account a variety of perspectives.

1.8. Actors involved in the Intra-State Conflict

In the intra-state conflict, there is a fighting between different groups. Different groups work with and against the government. People in general are affected, and there may be political groups in the country that make things even worse. Another country or group from outside the country might step in and help one side or the other. People want to assist those who are in need, and the news has an impact on how they perceive the situation. There are more moving parts in the battle because these groups are working together. The below groups involved in intra-state conflict might differ significantly depending on the scenario.

The State actors: State actors are the national government or governmental entities that have direct involvement in the conflict. This encompasses the governing regime and its political leadership, together with diverse sectors of the government, such as the armed forces, intelligence organizations, and law enforcement agencies. State actors possess the necessary power and resources to exercise dominance over the region and people impacted by the conflict. Multiple factions are engaged in a conflict within a single nation (R. Powell, 2012). Some factions support and/or oppose the government. The general populace is affected, and there may exist political factions inside the nation that exacerbate the situation. There is a possibility that other nations or international organizations may intervene and assist either party. Individuals are endeavoring to assist individuals who have sustained injuries, while the media exerts influence on people's perceptions of the situation. The conflict is more intricate due to the collaboration of all these factions.

The Non-state actors: Non-state actors refer to entities that lack governmental affiliation yet have substantial influence in the dispute (Bird, 2021). It can be classified into many categories, including:

Rebel groups: These armed groupings actively resist the government and aim to undermine or topple its power. Political, ethnic, religious, or ideological factors may be the driving forces behind the rebel groups. They often work inside designated territories or communities intending to acquire dominion over land or resources.

Armed militias: Militias are usually non-state armed formations that are structured and supplied for warfare. They may arise either as a reaction to the war or due to ethnic or sectarian tensions. Militias exhibit a range of organizational structures and may associate themselves with certain communities or political groupings.

Terrorist organizations: Occasionally, terrorist groups may be engaged in an intra-state struggle. These non-governmental entities use violence, coercion, and terror to attain political, religious, or ideological goals. They often focus on non-combatants and may possess international affiliations or ambitions.

Paramilitary forces: Paramilitary forces refer to semi-official or unauthorized armed formations that function in conjunction with or provide assistance to the government's security services. They have the possible to have a considerable influence on the fight by providing additional personnel, information, or specialized proficiencies.

The International actors: Various international actors can influence the dynamics of a conflict within a single state. These entities may encompass a range of stakeholders, including foreign governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), regional alliances, and multinational corporations etc.

- ✓ Neighboring nations: Neighboring states may have a direct interest in the war owing to their geographical closeness, ethnic or religious relations, or concerns over spillover consequences such as an increase in refugees or cross-border violence. They may assist one or multiple parties engaged in the conflict or prioritize their ambitions.
- ✓ Regional organizations: Regional organizations such as the African Union or the European Union may participate in conflict settlement efforts, provide humanitarian aid, or enforce sanctions to tackle the conflict. They may contribute to the facilitation of discussions, the conduct of peacekeeping operations, and the enforcement of agreements for peace.
- ✓ International powers: Influential international powers may possess strategic, economic, or geopolitical objectives in the conflict-affected area. These powers have the potential to provide diplomatic, military, or financial assistance to particular parties participating in the conflict, either to further their interests or to contribute to stability and peace (Pearlman & Cunningham, 2012).

The intra-state conflicts involve military conflicts that occur in a state and include organized groups. Those involved actors in these conflicts can display a broad range of variation and difficulty, and their reasons might vary significantly. Theories help us understand and analyze the complicated dynamics of intra-state conflicts for example South Sudan. The conflict in South Sudan was marked by the involvement of the Sudanese government, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) rebel group, and deep-rooted ethnic divisions, notably between the Dinka and Nuer communities. The conflict in South Sudan, involving the government of Sudan, has prompted international intervention from regional bodies and the subsequent establishment of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The primary objective of these interventions is to mediate peace and restore stability in the region. The conflict in South Sudan became worse with the presence of various militias and inter-ethnic tensions, which added further complexity to the already tense situation. Ultimately, the conflict in South Sudan erupted because of the government of Sudan's refusal to grant independence to the region in 2011. This has caused the challenges of post-independence governance and nation-building, as ongoing tensions and internal divisions keep affecting the nation.




Figure 5: Deaths in Intrastate Conflicts

Sources: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 2022

Based on statistics provided by the Uppsala Conflict Statistics Program (UCDP) and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), the number of deaths in conflicts inside a single state, including both fighters and civilians killed in conflict, has fluctuated throughout time. The graphic displays the fatality count in domestic conflicts across multiple countries (Pettersson & Eck, 2018). In 1989, the death toll in conflict between states was very limited, with nations such as Georgia, Ghana, and Nepal seeing less than 2,000 fatalities. Nevertheless, there has been a gradual rise in the rate of death in several nations throughout history. In countries such as Iraq, Uganda, and Ukraine, the highest number of killings in internal conflicts occurred over certain years. The graphic depicts the data from 2022, which reveals that intrastate conflicts resulted in almost 12,000 fatalities. It is crucial to acknowledge that this statistic includes losses from both military personnel and non-combatant civilians because of the continuing internal disputes during that specific year (Davies et al., 2023).

1.9. Conflict Resolution Strategies Method

Conflict resolution refers to the systematic method of settling conflicts or disagreements that arise between one or more parties. These objectives may be achieved via a range of strategies, including negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and litigation. The objective of conflict resolution is to identify a mutually agreeable settlement that effectively answers the interests of all parties concerned. Efficient conflict resolution has the potential to enhance communication and comprehension, avert the escalation of conflicts, and result in more results that are favorable.

1.10. Conflict Transformation Strategy

A conflict transformation strategy comprises an integrated method for effectively and consistently addressing and resolving conflicts. It goes beyond conventional conflict management strategies that concentrate on controlling or restraining confrontations and rather seeks to change the fundamental origins and dynamics of the conflict. The conflict transformation method realizes that conflicts are complex, multifaceted, and deeply entrenched in fundamental problems such as power disparities, inequality, and grievances based on identity. The process encompasses inclusive discourse, equitable distribution of power, socio-economic advancement, reform of the security system, reconciliation, and

foreign assistance. The technique is designed to address fundamental factors, create confidence, and identify shared interests among a wide range of participants. Political changes provide fair and equal representation, while socio-economic progress decreases complaints and frustrations. Security sector reform guarantees unbiased safeguarding and preserves the principles of legal governance. Reconciliation strategies aim to redress previous violations and foster the process of restoration and recovery. International support includes the provision of mediation, diplomatic endeavors, and financial assistance (Paffenholz, 2014).

International law is crucial in the resolution of conflicts between states. International treaties and conventions provide a structured system for settling conflicts and dealing with matters such as human rights and the use of military power. Efficient conflict resolution in the context of international actors involves a profound comprehension of the fundamental problems, along with the capacity to identify mutually agreeable resolutions that adequately respond to the needs and fears of all concerned parties. International actors use a variety of approaches to conflict resolution in order to manage conflicts and promote peaceful resolutions. Here are some approaches that are often used:

Negotiation: Negotiation refers to the act of participating in direct discussion between two or more parties to attain a mutually agreeable resolution. Negotiation includes the sharing of information and concepts, together with the formulation of proposals and counter-proposals, to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution that addresses the requirements and concerns of all involved parties. Discussions may occur at several levels, ranging from informal dialogues among leaders to official peace discussions. The negotiation examples of international actors include:

The Nuclear deal of Iran, officially called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was established in 2015 via negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 nations (the, United Kingdom, United States, France, Germany, China and Russia). The discussions were conducted to address apprehensions over Iran's nuclear program. Consequently, an agreement was reached that set restrictions on Iran's nuclear operations in exchange for the relief of sanctions (Mills, 2023).

The Abuja Peace Talks, which took place in Abuja, Nigeria, during the early 2000s, organized to resolve the Second Congo War, commonly referred to as the Great War of

Africa. The negotiations included a diverse range of participants, including the governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and many African countries, rebel parties, and foreign mediators. The discussions culminated in the signature of the Pretoria Agreement in 2002, representing a historic movement towards peace and the formation of a transitional administration in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Koko, 2007).

The Paris Peace Accords, signed in 1973, marked the culmination of discussions between the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front. These accords effectively terminated direct U.S. engagement in the Vietnam War and created a cease-fire. The agreements resulted in the removal of U.S. military forces from Vietnam and a cessation of hostilities between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Nevertheless, the peace that established by the Paris Peace Accords was simple, as conflicts between North and South Vietnam began again in 1975, resulting in the collapse of Saigon and the reunification of Vietnam under communist governance (de Klein, 1973). However, the Paris Peace Accords continue to serve as a crucial historical indication of international diplomatic efforts to resolve a complicated and prolonged conflict. These accords also represented a major turning point in the Vietnam Conflict as they marked an end to direct U.S. intervention. It is essential to keep in mind that negotiation is a fluid process, and the results might change based on several different aspects. Both practice and experience are necessary for the development and improvement of abilities that are effective in negotiating.

Mediation (Third parties): mediation is a dispute resolution technique that employs a neutral third party, also referred to as a mediator, to enable communication between the involved parties and assist them in achieving an agreement on terms. The mediator avoids imposing a resolution but rather assists the parties in identifying their interests and concerns, as well as exploring various possibilities for resolving the conflict. Mediation may be used either in combination with discussions or as an independent strategy.

During the phase of resolving conflicts, a variety of diverse and intricate peace activities put into action. This stage focuses on uncovering the underlying reasons behind the main issue while also clarifying the requirements and wishes of the parties involved. In order to achieve successful outcomes, the mediator has to put significant effort into developing

strategies and methods that specifically tailored to the unique context and dynamics of the situation (Efegil, 2015). The negotiation examples of international actors include:

The Cyprus conflict relates to the ongoing disagreement between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots about the sovereignty of the island of Cyprus. During the 1970s and 1980s, the United Nations exerted substantial influence in its efforts to mediate the conflict and assist discussions between Greece and Turkey, as well as the primary populations in Cyprus. The Green Line has divided the island, giving the Turkish Cypriots control over the northern portion and the Greek Cypriots control over the southern portion. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) deployed to oversee the cessation of conflict and maintain stability inside the demilitarized area. Despite the tireless efforts of the mediators and the following discussions, a complete mediation of the Cyprus conflicts has proven to be unachievable. Several peace conferences and diplomatic efforts have occurred over the years, including the Annan Plan in 2004, but a mutually agreeable resolution remains elusive (Aksu, 2003).

The conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea originated due to a territorial dispute about the Ras Doumeira region and the Doumeira Islands. The United Nations and the African Union spearheaded mediation efforts to facilitate conversation and talks between the two nations. In 2018, Djibouti and Eritrea reached a significant milestone in their relationship by agreeing to get involved in mediation and continue the normalization of their relationships peacefully resolve their conflicts. This included the resumption of diplomatic communication, the removal of military troops from the disputed region, and the creation of a collaborative group to deal with the remaining border issues (Frank, 2015). The mediators attempted to reduce tensions, restore diplomatic channels, and organize a collaborative group to deal with the unresolved border issues. The mediation process has been essential in moderating tensions and promoting involvement between Djibouti and Eritrea, thus strengthening regional stability in the Horn of Africa. Mediation is a very successful approach for resolving conflicts since it enables interaction between the parties involved and facilitates the development of a peaceful solution that takes into consideration their respective interests. Mediation involves the presence of a proficient and impartial mediator who can effectively enable communication, assist the involved parties in recognizing their interests, and establish an environment characterized by confidence and collaboration.

Arbitration: Arbitration is a way of resolving conflicts in which a neutral third person, known as the arbitrator, renders a legally enforceable judgment. The parties concerned agree to abide by the arbitrator's ruling, and the procedure often kept secret. It functions as a more efficient and less formal substitute for litigation. It often used on a global scale for resolving economic disputes, dependent upon the parties' willingness to accept the procedure and its final decision. The main characteristics of this process are the voluntary level of involvement, the unbiased performance of the arbitrator, the ability to change the procedures, privacy, the final and compulsory nature of the judgment, as well as the possibility of minimizing time and expenses. The Arbitration examples of international actors include:

The establishment of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was one of the actions taken to address the challenging connection between the the Islamic Republic of Iran and United States of America following the November 1979 hostage crisis at the United States Embassy in Tehran and the subsequent freezing of Iranian assets by the United States of America. The Government of Algeria acted as an intermediary in the pursuit of a solution that was agreeable to all parties involved. After thorough consultation with both governments about the actions they were ready to take to end the problem, the government of Algeria documented these pledges in two declarations on January 19, 1981. Iran and the United States both agreed to abide by the "General Declaration" and the "Claims Settlement Declaration," which are generally referred to as the "Algiers Declarations (Amin, 1983).

Litigation: Litigation is a method of settling disputes by initiating legal proceedings before an international court or tribunal. It's often used as a last resort when other techniques for resolving conflicts are unsuccessful. During the litigation process, the parties concerns to give the chance to submit their views to an impartial judge or panel of judges. The judge or panel then makes a judgment based on the facts and applicable legal concepts that presented. This judgment has legal authority and may enforced via punitive measures such as monetary fines or incarceration. Litigation includes administrative or regulatory procedures for establishing legal rights and dealing with conflicts. The examples of Litigation for the international actors include: The International Court of Justice (ICJ) serves as the primary judicial body of the United Nations (UN). The International Court of Justice resolves interstate legal conflicts and offers expert advice

on legal inquiries presented to it by the United Nations and its specialized organizations. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has successfully adjudicated disputes on matters such as the legality of nuclear weapons, the demarcation of maritime boundaries, and territorial conflicts. The International Court of Justice situated in The Hague, Netherlands, and founded in 1945. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) encompasses United Nations member nations and, in certain cases, non-member governments that willingly acknowledge its authority. The judgments it makes have a legally obligatory effect on the parties concerned. The ICJ operates independently from other international courts, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), which specifically concentrates on the prosecution of people for grave offenses (E. J. Powell, 2016).

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) participated in resolving legal issues between Somalia and Kenya. Both nations were engaged in a maritime boundary conflict over a section of the Indian Ocean rich in oil and gas reserves. In 2014, Somalia began legal proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) intending to revise the maritime border between the two nations. On the other hand, Kenya rejected the authority of the ICJ and advocated for a negotiated resolution instead. In 2022, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its decision, which defined a new maritime border between Somalia and Kenya. This case highlights the use of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a platform for resolving the territorial dispute between Somalia and Kenya (Mullins, 2021). Litigation is a prolonged and costly procedure, although it enables the involved parties to have a neutral mediator render a decision on their disagreement, taking into account the evidence and the applicable legal principles. Nevertheless, it may not be suitable for all categories of conflicts and it may not maintain the relationships between the involved parties.

Peacekeeping: Peacekeeping is a conflict resolution strategy that involves deploying international peacekeeping troops to a conflict region to oversee a ceasefire, safeguard people, and aid in the implementation of a peace accord. Peacekeeping forces consist of troops, police officers, and civilian staff from different nations. International organizations like the United Nations (UN) or regional bodies like the African Union are in charge of authorizing and supervising them. The main goals of peacekeeping operations are to observe and oversee the conclusion of conflicts, provide support in

ensuring the fulfillment of peace accords, safeguard people, bolster the political procedure, and contribute to the reconstruction and advancement of communities affected by the conflict. The United Nations has a crucial role in granting approval and organizing peacekeeping operations. The primary responsibility of the UN Security Council is to provide authorization for the deployment of peacekeeping troops and establish clear directives for their missions.

Regional organizations like the African Union, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union, and others also participate in peacekeeping activities within their locations. The Peacekeeping examples of international actors include, The UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) created in 2007 to safeguard civilians and facilitate the carrying out of a peace accord in both the Central African Republic and Chad. Nevertheless, MINURCAT's mission ended on December 31, 2010, in response to a request made by the Chadian government. The government confirmed its commitment to taking on full responsibility for safeguarding citizens under its authority. This judgment taken under Security Council Resolution 1923 (2010). The conclusion of MINURCAT's mandate signified the transfer of duties to the Chadian government. Throughout its operational duration, MINURCAT played a crucial role in protecting the rights and security of civilians, maintaining the principles of legal governance, and establishing peace at a regional level in both the Central African Republic and Chad (Karlsrud, 2014).

In another example in 2011, the African Union (AU) deployed the African Union Mission in South Sudan (AMISOM) to assist in maintaining peace and security in the recently established nation. The mission of AMISOM included the tasks of safeguarding civilians, overseeing ceasefires, providing humanitarian assistance, and supporting the peace process. AMISOM encountered substantial obstacles because of the outbreak of extreme violence in 2013, which included political and ethnic conflicts. The mission had an important function in safeguarding people, expediting humanitarian operations, and promoting diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. In 2021, AMISOM changed and became the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which signifies the collaborative efforts of the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN). UNMISS maintains its primary objective of promoting peace, safeguarding civilians, and facilitating political activities. The African Union's engagement in South Sudan via

AMISOM indicates its dedication to fostering peace and security in Africa and resolving conflicts via regional cooperation (Yaw Tchie & Kumalo, 2023).

Sanctions: Sanctions are a set of economic actions that may imposed on a country or group to put pressure on them to modify their behavior or fulfill international responsibilities. Sanctions include a range of actions, including restrictions on trade, financial penalties, and travel constraints. Sanctions are crucial in global politics and trade, acting as effective instruments to shape and prohibit certain actions. Specifically, governments or international organizations enforce economic sanctions to limit trade and financial operations with certain persons, organizations, or states. Sanctions are often imposed for dealing with a range of issues, such as violations of human rights, the spread of nuclear weapons, the funding of terrorism, or acts of aggression. The use of sanctions by governments and international actors aims to exert an influence on the conduct of the organizations or nations targeted and encourage respect for international standards and regulations (La Rosa, 2008).

The sanctions from international actors include those from the European Union, which has imposed strong and unique penalties on Russia in response to its military actions against Ukraine that started in February 2022 and its illegal takeover of Ukraine's Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions; these sanctions include banning the export of weapons, freezing the assets of certain Russian people and organizations, and limiting the export of specific goods and technology (Kanapiyanova, 2023). The success or failure of sanctions is dependent upon several circumstances, including the durability of the targeting organizations, regional dynamics, and the availability of other sources of support. Hence, the goals that were established may always gained by the implementation of sanctions. Furthermore, sanctions can apply pressure on relationships between nations and develop tensions among countries in the international community, especially when there are differences in their implementation or the possible humanitarian impact they may have. Sanctions may serve as a powerful tool for influencing a change in the actions of a nation or group. However, they can also have negative effects on the targeting organization and the entire global community. Sanctions may result in substantial humanitarian impacts since they influence both the economy and individuals' way of life subsistence.

Humanitarian intervention: Humanitarian intervention refers to the use of military force or other forms of intervention by one state or group of states to protect individuals or populations from serious human rights abuses or humanitarian disasters. Humanitarian intervention is a strategy for resolving conflicts that include the deployment of armed forces to safeguard human rights. Military intervention is typically a final option, guided by the principle of "responsibility to protect" (R2P). This principle asserts that sovereignty is not a privilege but a responsibility and that states are obligated to safeguard their population from large-scale atrocities like genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity as a whole. Humanitarian intervention is a concept that highlights the significance of safeguarding human rights and emphasizes the duty of the international ACTORS to take action when nations fail to protect their citizens from large-scale acts of violence. The Humanitarian intervention examples of international actors include:

(Levitt, 1998)_Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), During the 1990s, ECOWAS initiated the establishment of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to intervene in the civil conflict that was taking place in Liberia. The primary objective of ECOMOG was to reinstate tranquility, safeguard civilian populations, and uphold the implementation of ceasefires. The intervention had a substantial impact on reducing violence and establishing circumstances conducive to a peaceful conclusion. Over time, ECOMOG transformed and became the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which maintained its role in promoting peacebuilding and national reconciliation. The intervention in Liberia illustrates the dedication of both regional and international actors to resolving crises and protecting people in Africa. This highlights the significance of regional organizations such as ECOWAS in implementing proactive strategies to ensure peace and stability throughout the continent (Levitt, 1998). Humanitarian intervention, although capable of safeguarding civilians and halting human rights violations, may also have adverse outcomes, including civilian deaths, population relocation, and the destabilization of the nation. Additionally, it requires a mandate from the United Nations Security Council, or a collaboration of nations, along with a specific aim and a well-defined plan for withdrawal.

1.11. The Conflict Prevention Strategies (Avoiding Conflict)

Conflict prevention strategies is a diplomatic strategy that focuses on identifying and resolving potential causes of violent conflict before they evolve into widespread violence. It encompasses a variety of actions and approaches used in the discipline of peacebuilding to predict and avoid the factors that can encourage violence.

The objective of conflict prevention is to deal with the underlying causes of disputes, alleviate tensions, and foster peaceful outcomes. The main priority is quickly identifying and intervening in problems while also advocating for open discussion, diplomacy, and mediation to prevent conflicts from worsening. Conflict prevention measures may be adopted at several levels, including the international level, regional, national, and local levels. The following are significant international actors engaged in conflict prevention

The United Nations: The United Nations (UN) has a primary function in the prevention of conflicts and the establishment of peace. The United Nations employs specialized organizations, such as the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Department of Political and Rebuilding Affairs (DPPA) to carry out early warning and conflict analysis, promote diplomatic discussions, and provide assistance in post-conflict rebuilding activities. The United Nations deploys peacekeeping operations comprised of military, police, and civilian troops to preserve peace and security in areas afflicted by violence. In addition, the United Nations offers support to nations after hostilities, with a particular emphasis on promoting effective government, upholding legal principles, fostering economic growth, and addressing social and political difficulties. The United Nations provides technical knowledge, capacity development, and humanitarian aid to regions impacted by conflicts via its specialized agencies and programs. In general, the United Nations' efforts try to solve the root causes of conflicts, encourage peaceful settlements, and strengthen sustainable peace on a global level (Unit, 1995).

Regional organizations: Regional organizations such as the European Union (EU), African Union (AU), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Organization of American States (OAS) have a crucial function in preventing conflicts within their respective areas. These organizations employ distinct frameworks, such as the Peace and Security Council in the African Union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union, the Inter-American Democratic Charter in the

Organization of American States, and the ASEAN Political-Security Community in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, to foster dialogue, solve conflicts, and facilitate cooperation within their respective regions. These organizations use various strategies, such as early warning systems, peace support activities, and diplomatic efforts, to deal with possible causes of violence. Their objective is to maintain peace, stability, and security in their particular areas through their activities (Barnett, 1995).

Non-governmental organizations: Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like the International Crisis Group, Centre for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), and Search for Common Ground play an active role in conflict prevention by doing research, advocating for change, and implementing programs directly in the affected areas. They engage in cooperation with local communities, governments, and foreign actors to detect possible catalysts of conflict and adopt proactive actions. The primary objective of the International Crisis Group is to engage in research and provide policy suggestions aimed at preventing and resolving conflicts. CIVIC's primary objective is to safeguard civilians in areas affected by armed conflict and mitigate any potential damage inflicted against them. These non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a crucial role in preventing conflicts by tackling the underlying causes, establishing systems to detect potential conflicts in advance, and advocating for peaceful settlements (Carment & Schnabel, 2004). Academic and research institutes, donor nations, mediators, and facilitators are additional international organizations involved in conflict prevention, playing a vital role. These international groups interact, synchronize their efforts, and use their capabilities to avoid conflicts and eliminate possible causes for widespread violence. They contribute to the avoidance of armed disputes and the promotion of maintaining peace and stability by using diplomatic strategies, early warning systems, mediations, capacity building, and development efforts.

1.12. Research Methodology

1.12.1 Research problem

The fundamental purpose of this research is to understand how both local and international actors influence the dynamics of the war within Somalia's state. Despite the protracted war in Somalia spanning many decades, there exists a dearth of comprehensive

research on the impact of regional and international interventions on conflict outcomes, processes of peacebuilding, and political and economic development. This study aims to address this gap by analyzing the roles, strategies, and interactions of key stakeholders, including Al-Shabab, clan leaders, neighboring countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya, Turkey, the African Union, the United Nations, Western countries like the USA and the UK, and several Arab states.

1.12.2 Research Design

This research study applies the qualitative research and descriptive research design, which is suitable for investigating multipart, political, social, and historical events. The descriptive method offers a systematic account of the conflict, including its phases, origins, principal participants, and efforts to promote peace. The investigation technique is used to provide a comprehensive, contextual understanding of the crisis in Somalia and the impact of foreign players. This design facilitates a thorough and nuanced comprehension of the conflict mechanisms.

1.12.3 Qualitative research

The goal of qualitative research is to obtain knowledge of the strategies, motives, tactics, and interactions of the individuals participating in the war in Somalia. Additionally, qualitative research seeks to investigate the viewpoints and influences of these international actors on the dynamics of peace and conflict for the situations in Somalia. This methodology facilitates the identification of trends, patterns, and interactions amongst participants. It facilitates a comprehensive understanding of political and social processes. The study examines internal entities such as Al-Shabab organization, clan leaders, and warlords. It also takes into account foreign entities, such as Turkey, adjacent nations, Western powers, and Arab states, and Qualitative research offers a comprehensive, detailed understanding of the situation. It facilitates a thorough comprehension of Somalia's intricate reality.

1.12.4 Descriptive research design

The descriptive research offers a systematic and comprehensive account of the conflict. It delineates the phases of the struggle, from its inception to contemporary events. The research investigates the fundamental factors, including clan conflicts, political

instability, and economic difficulties. Principal entities, including clan leaders, the Al-Shabab organization, international forces, and warlords, are delineated and examined and also The study also scrutinizes efforts to foster peace and tactics, thereby enabling a comprehensive understanding of the conflict environment.

1.12.5 Case study Approach

The case study method offers a relevant and comprehensive examination of Somalia as a singular, concentrated instance. It enables the examination of connections among internal players and foreign stakeholders throughout the period. This method underscores the influence of global and regional initiatives on the crisis's progression. It offers perspectives into the intricate interactions of political, social, and security elements influencing the situation in Somalia. Eventually, it allows the study to derive significant findings for the roles and consequences of various players in conflict and peacekeeping cycles. These studies use a case study methodology to provide a comprehensive analysis of Somalia's intra-state conflict. Somalia is designated since it exemplifies the intricate influence of third states in determining peacekeeping and conflicting dynamics. The study emphasizes the impact of external actors, including Ethiopia, Turkey, Kenya, and Arab states, on security, political, and economic growth in Somalia. The case study facilitates contextual and comprehensive examination, connecting theory to actual occurrences. It elucidates the distinctive relationship between internal players and outside actors in the Somali conflicts.

1.12.6 Data collection

This research utilizes secondary information sources to analyze Somalia's intrastate conflicts and foreign engagement, as well as these sources include scholarly work that offers historical and political backgrounds. Reports from the United Nations, the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and other organizations provide reliable data on interventions and efforts to maintain peace. Public declarations and documents of policy from the participating countries highlight their responsibilities and goals. Reputable research institutions provide timely information and assessments. This methodology guarantees a thorough and dependable comprehension of

the dispute. It facilitates a comprehensive evaluation of both external and internal stakeholders.

1.12.7 Data Analysis

The research employs both thematic and content analysis to identify patterns, topics, and relationships between the actors. It analyzes the functions and tactics of both external and internal participants in Somalia's conflicts. A comparison approach is used to comprehend the interactions among these players and the approaches demonstrate the impact of international participation on reconciliation and conflict resolution. It clarifies the impact of neighboring states like Ethiopia and Kenya and other international actors. The study examines the influence of the Al-Shabab organization and regional groups on the ongoing conflict. It offers a clear comprehension of the conflict dynamics and the relationships among actors.

1.12.8 Scope and limitations

This research examines the involvement of various internal entities, such as clan leaders, warlords, and the Al-Shabab organization, along with international actors like the UK, USA, Qatar, and Turkey, as well as neighboring countries including Ethiopia and Kenya. The study is constrained by the limited access to primary data due to security and logistical obstacles. Secondary sources may have biases that might influence the information presented. Personal reports are rare, making some aspects more challenging for verification. Notwithstanding these obstacles, the research offers a comprehensive qualitative investigation. It clarifies the manner in which various actors influence the conflict. The study provides a comprehensive grasp of the conflict dynamics in Somalia.

1.12.9. Ethical Consideration

The research adheres to rigorous ethical norms consistently. It guarantees impartiality in the presentation of knowledge to all participants. Confidentiality has been maintained for crucial conflict-related information. The study demonstrates awareness of political, cultural, and historical circumstances, and any sources are properly verified for trustworthiness and reputation. The research prevents the exaggeration of occurrences or participation. Ultimately, it ensures that the study is precise, equitable, and impartial.

1.13. Conclusion

The chapter largely emphasizes the conceptual framework, theory, and research method. It outlined the qualitative, descriptive, and case study methodologies. The chapter analyzed the functions and tactics of internal entities like Al-Shabaab, clan leaders, and warlords and also The analysis also included the participation of foreign players, including Turkey, bordering regions, Western governments, and Arab countries. The chapter clarified the methodology used for the collection and analysis of data derived from secondary sources. The study's scope and limits were examined. Ethical factors, such as impartiality, secrecy, and trustworthiness, were also examined. The chapter offers a framework for a detailed analysis of the war. It establishes the foundation for the subsequent chapter on Somalia's background history and conflict dynamics. It provides a robust basis for comprehending the impact of many stakeholders on both conflict and peace. In addition, this chapter has presented an important discovery for intrastate conflicts. Intrastate Conflicts is defined strong conflicts that occur inside the geographical bounds of a single state and feature non-state actors, such as militias and warlords, collaborating with armed organizations representing the state. These actors are motivated lingering grudges or political ambitions, promoting special issues related to ethnicity, religion, or area, or questioning the state's authority. They vary from weakly structured militias to highly structured insurgent or rebel forces. An important discovery of this chapter is the theoretical framework for analyzing intra-state conflicts and exploring their advantages and disadvantages. Furthermore, it has emphasized the significance of the international actors' participation in peacebuilding activities in these conflicts by examining appropriate case revisions. The chapter has examined the reasons why the international community becomes involved in Interstate conflicts inside a country, specifically looking at the tactics used by major global powers and international organizations to reduce these conflicts.

The chapter also examines the factors that give rise to intra-state conflicts, often known as civil wars or internal conflicts. These disputes lead to devastating consequences, such as widespread human misery, economic volatility, and political upheaval. In addition, the chapter explores the involvement of foreign actors or third parties in conflict within states. International actors have a multifaceted and important impact on these conflicts, either facilitating their settlement or extending their duration. Their roles include mediating and

engaging in diplomacy, offering a neutral platform for debate, and encouraging interaction between conflicting parties. In addition, international organizations may provide humanitarian assistance to reduce the misery experienced by impacted populations. In addition, they can enforce sanctions or limitations on violent groups by imposing pressure and restricting their ability to get resources. International actors use a range of conflict resolution tactics, such as diplomacy, mediation, peacekeeping, sanctions, humanitarian assistance, capacity building, judiciary reform, and reconciliation, to effectively deal with and settle intra-state conflicts. In addition, the chapter explores conflict prevention as a diplomatic approach that aims to detect and resolve possible causes of violent conflict before they grow into widespread violence. Conflict prevention involves a variety of activities and strategies in the peacebuilding area, to predict and reduce conditions that might lead to violence.

Finally, the chapter highlights the importance of conflict mapping, which is a great technique for gaining a thorough knowledge of diverse and dynamic conflicts that include multiple actors, issues, and emotions. Conflict mapping facilitates the identification of the main elements of a disagreement, visualizes their interrelationships, and provides insights into the underlying causes and dynamics of the conflict. It enables the identification of common interests, possibilities for finding a middle ground, and chances for growth and change. In lastly, this chapter offers an in-depth study of the theoretical viewpoint on inter-state conflicts, including their origins, progression, and the involvement of global organizations in resolving conflicts. The given perspectives and analyses improve comprehension of these conflicts and offer vital assistance for successful conflict management and peacebuilding activities.

CHAPTER II: ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN THE CONFLICT

2.1. Introduction

Somalia positioned in the Horn of Africa and bordered by Kenya to the southwest, Djibouti to the northwest and Ethiopia to the west. The eastern end has a coastline that borders the Indian Ocean, giving access to important maritime lines. The country's strategic location has traditionally influenced its foreign relations with its neighboring countries and determined its place in the regional politics and trading. Somalia experienced political instability and violence after gaining its independence in 1960. President Mohamed Siyad Barre gained power in 1969 through a nonviolent coup, founding the Somali Democratic Republic. The Barre's government supported the Soviet Union and implemented scientific socialism, leading to economic collapse and political anarchy (Warsame, 2012). Since clan-based rebel groups controlled by warlords and politicians overthrew the military administration led by General Siyad Barre in 1991, the lack of a functioning government in Somalia may recognized to the influence of warlords pursuing personal interests, power struggle, and economic goals. The Somali civil war has undergone multiple phases, ending in the downfall of Siyad Barre's dictatorship, which marked the end of the initial stage of the conflict. The initial indications of this war emerged shortly after Barre's rise to power. Therefore, this battle did not immediately emerge but instead gradually evolved throughout time. This makes me wonder why some Western countries have quickly called Somalia a failed state since the collapse of the government, even though it was a failure from the start. Even though they knew what was going on, they kept quiet for long periods, ignoring everything from violations and corruption to working with the ruling government.

Geographical Map in Somalia

Somalia and its sovereignty have become the latest victims of intensified regional geopolitical competition that arose after the 2011 Arab Uprising. If not addressed, this rivalry for political, economic, and military dominance exacerbates instability and disunity in Somalia, situated at the gates of the Red Sea, further destabilizing an already precarious state,

which might yield extensive repercussions that transcend the wider Middle East and its critical gates for the world economy¹⁵.



Maps 2: Clan Militias and Warlords Controls

Source: Center for Security Policy Studies, Regional Rivalries and Instability in Somalia, (2020)

The presence of these variables has hindered the rebel forces' ability to form a government that is inclusive and capable of effectively addressing the social, economic, and political abuses that are linked to the military rule. Mostly after the collapse of the central government, clan militias and warlords controlled the regions, but in recent years, the federal government of Somalia has controlled some of the southern parts. The southern regions of Somalia are under the control of Al-Shabab groups. As a result, the country's prolonged civil war began. Clan militias and warlords battled for control of resources and power throughout the country's anarchy. Most tribes and clans were involved in this never-ending struggle for control of resources and power. The conflict in Somalia progressed through many stages, resulting in the deaths of many Somalis, prompting many to seek refugees in other nations for safety and stability. The people of Somalia suffered years of brutality and persecution at the hands of their people. They faced challenging and severe situations under both democratic and military governments.

¹⁵ https://cps.gmu.edu/2020/05/04/regional-rivalries-and-instability-in-somalia/?utm_source=openai.

During the democratic period from 1960 to 1969, independence and newly constituted state institutions did not live up to the people's aspirations. Poverty rose as security declined. State institutions are characterized by corruption, nepotism, and cronyism. The situation worsened after the military regime took power in October 1969. The Siyad Barre's government used indiscriminate killing, village burning, and torture to control the situation, and armed factions employed similar tactics. The war and its related causes resulted in the damage of thousands of Somalis' lives, while many were internally and externally displaced. In addition, the military dictatorship gained powerful control in October 1969, worsening the situation. The Siyad Barre's regime used indiscriminate murder, town flaming, and torture as methods of maintaining its power. The conflict and its associated causes the deaths of thousands of Somalis and the displacement of many more, both inside and outside the country.

In Somalia's conflict goes back to the colonial periods. France, Britain, and Italy, as colonial powers, fragmented the regions inhabited by Somalis into five parts. France claimed the Northern coast, now known as the Republic of Djibouti. Britain took control of two regions, the British Somaliland and the Northern territory of Kenya. Italy colonized the Italian Somaliland, and the remaining area captured by Ethiopia, now referred to as the Somali region of Ethiopia. The breakdown of central authority led to the fragmentation of the Somali state into several areas governed by clan-based militias and warlords. The groups battled hard for control over resources, territory, and political influence. The lack of a functional governing body and the increase in armed organizations led to a power vacuum, enabling extremist Islamist groups like Al-Shabaab to rise and become a major security concern in the area. Many international actors, such as the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), and regional organizations, have participated in peacekeeping and state-building initiatives in Somalia. The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) has been important in assisting the federal government's efforts to fight Al-Shabaab and bring stability to the state. The intra-state conflict in Somalia is complex, including local, regional, and international actors. Clan conflicts, resource competitiveness, governmental disintegration, and international interventions have all played effective roles in the complexity and duration of the struggle. To achieve enduring peace in Somalia, it is essential to address the root

causes and create equitable government, reconciliation, and socio-economic growth (Ahanonu & Mbah, 2025).

In this chapter, the intrastate conflict in Somalia will be analyzing, considering the conceptual framework, theoretical approach, and research methodology discussed in the preceding chapters. This chapter will analyze the involvement of foreign actors in the Somalia intrastate conflict and the underlying causes of the conflict. It will also address the ongoing existence of the armed conflict or the lack of success in past peacemaking efforts, also will analyzing how can the Somali intra-state conflict be managed, and ensuring that all sides are aware of their expectations and demands. Following the discussion, there will be some concept exploration and planning for the future, with a focus on finding a fair resolution to the Somali conflict.

2.2 .Historical Background of Somalia

The Somali people are a mixed-race population of Arabs and Africans who predominantly practice Islam. They are closely related to other ethnicities in the Horn of Africa. The Somali community is mostly homogenous, with minor populations of Arabs, Bantus, and Baravans. Somalis possess a heterogeneous ethnic assemblage that is structured into tribes and clans, which are formed based on ancestral affiliations. Cattle ranching has traditionally been the mainstay of the Somali economy, with agriculture also playing a considerable role. Somalia was partitioned among the colonial powers, with Great Britain acquiring two portions and France, Italy, and Ethiopia splitting the remaining three. Somalis fought separation and colonialism via military conflict, Sayid Mohammed led a significant insurgency against Great Britain from 1899 until 1921, while other factions fought against France, Italy, and Ethiopia in other regions of Somalia. Founded in 1943, the Somali Youth League (SYL) became a notable organization at that time (Abuhakema & Carmichael, 2010). After the end of colonization, Somalia had a prolonged era of intra-state conflict, marked by violent struggles for power and resources, as well as the remaining effects of centuries of colonial and dictatorial rule. These factors influenced the complex nature of the country. The Somalia colonial history marked by the arbitrary and artificial European boundaries that were enforced in the region. The borders were drawn without taking into account the cultural, social, or ethnic background of the region, resulting in the separation of communities and families, who also lost their customary

grazing pastures. This has significant consequences for Somalia's pastoral economy since nomadic populations rely on access to pasturelands for their survival. The division led to internal conflicts over the management and use of natural resources, particularly arable land and water supplies. Tribalism and sub-clannism became increasingly prominent, exacerbating conflicts between groups fighting for scarce resources. These conflicts often resulted in violent conflicts between individuals seeking to get limited resources, such as fertile land and water. Challenging needs for assets and political power led to conflict among clans as they sought to acquire political advantage at the individual level (Besteman, 1996).

Somali people have always lived in decentralized and equal societies organized around clan-based social structures. These interactions with the state system have been complex and temporary, creating the perception of temporary governments. Many Somalis see the government as important and have made efforts to create solidarity and rebuild institutions. Measures centered on peace, reconciliation, and state building have recently been successful in achieving political stability and security normalization. Despite being small in number, some individuals in Somalia are working towards establishing an inclusive political system, supporting the country's institutions, and addressing the root causes of its destabilizing violence (Samatar, 1992).




Figure 6: Fatalities Caused by conflicts in Somalia

Sources: Graph depicting the number of fatalities in Somalia, 2000-2017

The figure illustrates the relationship between the severity of conflicts, as defined by the number of fatalities and conflict events, and the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Somalia. The emphasis is on pivotal events that have had a significant influence on the country's conflict dynamics and humanitarian status. An important event shown in the figure is the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which caused a significant increase in conflict severity and therefore led to a larger number of casualties in battles and internally displaced persons (IDPs). After obtaining independence, as mentioned earlier in 1960, Somalia has seen persistent problems that have hindered its progress and stability. The country has seen political instability characterized by revolutions, military coups, and extended civil conflicts, resulting in its present state of chaos. After gaining independence, Somalia attempted to establish a democratic system but was unable to form a reliable administration. In 1969, Major General Siyad Barre orchestrated a military coup after the assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke. President Siyad Barre set up a socialist military dictatorship and governed with strict authority for twenty years (Lewis I. M., 1963). Under the Barre's leadership, Somalia experienced political unrest, human rights violations, and weak economic governance. The Barre's regime in Somalia was characterized by stringent control and suppression of dissent, leading to widespread popular dissatisfaction. A civil war erupted in 1991 between clan-based factions and opponents of the Barre's regime. The conflict included bloody battles, inter-clan conflicts, and the breakdown of governmental control. Eventually, President Siyad Barre lost his position of authority, creating an unruly and chaotic atmosphere. Somaliland, located in northern Somalia, proclaimed independence amid its ongoing insecurity in Somalia. Somaliland, despite its stability and well-established institutions, lacks formal recognition as an independent nation. In 1998, Puntland, a territory in northern Somalia, formed a semi-autonomous administration to show its desire for self-governance. Puntland has attained internal stability and actively engaging in regional security initiatives (Lewis, 2019). During the early 2000s, the emergence of al-Shabab, an Islamist organization, further complicated the internal situation in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has initiated its assaults against governmental institutions, the military, and civilians in pursuit of establishing an Islamic state in the whole country. The group's participation in piracy has presented a significant regional security threat. International attempts to stabilize Somalia have included peacekeeping deployments, diplomatic initiatives, and assistance in establishing

a federal government. Since 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia has been deployed to assist the Somali government in combating al-Shabaab and stabilizing the nation (Ahmed, n.d.). The situation in Somalia is complicated and constantly shifting, with some favorable advancements in recent years. In 2016 and 2017, the country conducted legislative and presidential elections, respectively, signaling a notable advancement towards political stability. Nevertheless, issues including corruption, tribal conflicts, and persistent security threats from al-Shabaab impede growth (Tchie, 2022a).

The collapse of the central authority in Somalia led to the emergence of the country's internal conflicts. Following the downfall of President Siyad Barre in 1991, Somalia plunged into instability and political fragmentation as competing groups and warlords sought military control. For more than 30 years, the collapse led to the lack of an operational central government, leading to a power vacuum that armed groups exploited. Al-Shabaab, an Islamist terrorist organization associated with Al-Qaeda, gained prominence during this period (Menkhaus, 2003). Al-Shabaab has exploited the lack of a strong administration and a vulnerable security system to grow its power and capture significant territories in southern and central Somalia. The group has used the absence of fundamental services like security, justice, and government to position itself as a substitute entity offering a degree of organization and steadiness in the regions it governs. The lack of an operational central authority has also led to the emergence of more armed organizations and militias, intensifying the complexities of the struggle in Somalia (Mwangi, 2023). These organizations often pursued local and clan interests, participated in power conflicts, competed for resources, and engaged in territorial disputes. The lack of a governing body to arbitrate and resolve these conflicts enabled them to continue and intensify, resulting in a prolonged cycle of violence and instability. The central government's collapse affected the country's capacity to provide essential services, including healthcare, education, and infrastructure development. Inadequate administrative frameworks and the absence of public institutions resulted in a notable decline in public services, exacerbating the already severe humanitarian situation in the country. The situation in Somalia is varied, with several causes contributing to the continuous conflicts and problems in the country. These factors include historical disputes, tribal power struggles, resource competitiveness, international intervention, and regional connections. The fall of the central authority is a significant cause, but it is only

one component of a broader picture that has influenced the Somalia's future (Bradbury, 2008).

Somalia still experiences the violence and instability that have affected it since the collapse of the central government of the country. Multiple sections have exploited the breakdown of government power, including warlords, commercial entities, and radical Islamist organizations. These organizations have worsened the political and economic issues in the country, which are affecting the lives of Somali citizens. International actors, such as the Somalia's neighboring countries, some Arab countries like Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and some Western countries like Britain, Italy, and the USA, have been involved in the ongoing conflict due to the political and economic motives (Telci, 2022). International actors have been unable to achieve permanent peace and stability in Somalia despite their diplomatic efforts. The Somali conflict significantly influences the economic growth, social structure, and political stability of Somalia and its inhabitants. Therefore, it should be identified as mostly a Somali problem. Resolving the crisis must include local initiatives since they directly affect the safety and future of Somalis. Somalia is unlikely to achieve enduring peace and security without broad community engagement. The word “irredentism” means when a part of a state breaks away and joins another state, and Somalia is one of the countries that suffers from divisions caused by former colonial countries in Africa. Somalis have shown a strong inclination towards irredentism, which involves the breakdown of a state.

2.3. Colonial Division of the Somali Territory

The belief comes from the division of Somali territories among the French, British, and Italians in the 19th century. In 1977, French Somali was given the name Djibouti, and Somalia British extended from the Aden Gulf to the Hawd Reserve Region. In 1897, the British surrendered to Ethiopian Ruler Menelik II, resulting in the establishment of the Ethiopian Somali region. Some Somalis sent to the British East Africa colony, which eventually evolved into Uganda and Kenya. The Somali Italian situated in the southern region, along the coast of the Indian Ocean. The contemporary autonomous Somali nation established in 1960 via a combination of British and Italian Somalia. The Somali nationalist people have shown their irredentism by using symbols like a flag with a five-pointed star denoting Somali-inhabited regions and the 1961 Somali Republic

Constitution advocating for the unification of provinces. The Somali Republic offers citizenship to all ethnic Somalis living beyond its borders but does not claim authority over neighboring territories. The Somali government urged the British to give up the Somali-inhabited northeast areas of their Kenyan colony, but the Kenyan colonial authority ignored the request, highlighting the Somalia's continued fight for independence¹⁶.

According to the Abdisalam Issa - Silwe, "The policy of Greater Somalia is based on the historical reality that the Somalis inherited the lands of the Horn of Africa after it had been captured and divided by four external powers during the period of European ambition for Africa (Issa-Salwe, *The Collapse of The Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy* , 1996).The Somali nationalism supported the concept of a larger Somalia and found connection in the Bevin Plan. The concept is rooted in the aspiration to bring together the inhabitants of Somalia, who are now dispersed across five distinct areas. The prominent white star shown on the flag of the State of Somalia symbolizes this unification.

The intra-state conflict in Somalia caused by a mix of reasons, such as competitiveness for resources and control. Land conflicts, driven by population increase, relocation, and clan disputes, play a significant role in the conflict dynamics. Access to water supplies is essential for agricultural and cattle farming, sometimes causing conflicts in times of drought or limited resources. Competition for grazing areas and drinking places for cattle may lead to armed conflicts. Power disputes between clan-based militias, warlords, and political groupings are impeding the formation of a strong central administration and prolonging the conflict. The situation in Somalia is deep and varied, with forces that influence the interaction in various ways (Wam & Sardesai, 2005). Following a conflict, reconstruction encounters significant obstacles, mostly due to a lack of confidence among many stakeholders at the national level and limited resources after years of the conflict. The country has become a hub for foreign donors and projects due to the desire of

¹⁶ Refworld, Somali Transitional Charter: Transitional Federal Charter for the Somali Republic, February 2004, United Nations High commissioner for refugees, <https://www.refworld.org/legal/legislation/natlegbod/2004/en/43201>.

international partners, yet there is a lack of coordination among the many partners. Establishing a financing coordination body or NGO may enhance collaboration among many stakeholders.

Siyad Barre's administration in Somalia fell due to the Somali rebellion, which removed him from office, triggering the start of the Somali Civil War. President Barre escaped from the Somalia and found political protection in Nigeria and he died in 1995 while on his way to the hospital after having a heart attack. Barre's government's fall led to the emergence of a power vacuum, causing warlords and clan leaders to compete for leadership. During the instability, the Islamist organization Al-Shabaab gained significant influence. They took advantage of the political vacuum and seized control of several southern parts of Somalia. Al-Shabaab gained a reputation for engaging in terrorism and insurgency, focusing on attacking the Somali government and foreign troops (Hansen, 2023). Another significant reason that contributed to the intra-state conflict in Somalia is the most prevalent issue that the country has faced for over a century. Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, often known as Al-Shabaab, is an extreme religious terrorist organization mostly active in Somalia. The organization arose during the Somali Civil War and became more well-known after the downfall of Siyad Barre's regime in the early 1990s. Al-Shabaab's philosophy is rooted in an extreme interpretation of Islam, to establish a rigid Islamic state in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has participated in a range of actions, including terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare. They have focused on attacking the Somali government, African Union Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) soldiers, and other actors in the country. The terrorist group has committed many crimes, including bombings by suicide, killings, and kidnappings that have led to substantial civilian fatalities and displacement (Marchal, 2011). Al-Shabab's actions have significantly affected the security and stability of Somalia. The Somali government, ATMIS, and foreign allies, notably the United States and other Western countries, as well as Qatar and Turkey, have made efforts to combat the organization. The activities have included military operations, information sharing, capacity development, and actions targeting the group's recruiting and financial networks.

2.4 Wars in Somalia, 1991

In 1991, Somalia underwent drastic changes in its political landscape when forces from both the northern and southern clans, armed and supported by Ethiopia, successfully deposed the Somali President, Mohamed Siyad Barre, following several meetings between the Somali National Movement (SNM). In May 1991, the clan leaders and the politicians in the northern region of Somalia, which was formerly under the British rule, declared their independence from the rest of Somalia and established a new country called the Republic of Somaliland (Jhazbhay, 2009). Despite being completely separate and relatively stable compared to the bustling south, the Republic of Somaliland has not received diplomatic recognition from any foreign country. In January 1991, the Somali group selected Ali Mahdi Mohamed as the temporary president of the country. However, the next month, all key parties gathered in the Republic of Djibouti to hold a national conference and choose a new president. Nevertheless, Lieutenant General Mohamed Farah Aidid, the head of the United Somali Congress, vehemently opposed the selection of Ali Mahdi Mohamed right from the beginning and Abdirahman Tuur, leader of the Somali National Movement and other political parties and that reason caused a division in the Somali political field. International groups distributed food and shelter in southern Somalia because of the agricultural disruption and drought caused by the country's civil conflict. At the time, hunger and thirst were major problems in southern Somalia; as a result, international groups sent food to the region to help people. The highly charged feelings between the clans toward each other, along with the fight for control of natural resources and valuable pasturelands, may have been the major causes of the country's conflicts, and every clan believes they are better than other clans are at leading the country (Majid, 2019).

James Bishop, the last American ambassador to Somalia from 1990 to 1991, described the civil war in southern Somalia as a conflict over water, grazing territories, and cattle. The United States led a global military alliance, called the Unified Division, with the aim of establishing security, improving humanitarian conditions, and facilitating the arrival of relief. The coalition troops effectively restored stability and mitigated the impact of hunger in the southern region of Somalia through Operation Restoring Hope. However, in May 1993, the United States significantly decreased its military presence in the country, leading to the replacement of the Unified Division with the Second International

Peacekeeping Forces in Somalia. On the other hand, Muhammad Farah Aidid saw the presence of foreign peacekeeping troops as a threat to his power and so ordered his armed militias to attack the Pakistani forces deployed in Mogadishu. Approximately 80 members of the multinational peacekeeping force sustained injuries as a result. The conflict continued until the peacekeeping forces killed 19 American soldiers, two Pakistani soldiers, and one Malaysian soldier, as well as approximately 1,000 armed Somali militia members during the third and fourth phases. In October 1993, the "Battle of Mogadishu" occurred, which led to the United Nations initiating Operation "Unified Shield" on March 3, 1995 (Adebajo, 2003). This operation included the deployment of American, Egyptian, and Pakistani soldiers. Nevertheless, these troops suffered substantial losses and were unsuccessful in establishing a civilian administration in Somalia until the declaration of Aidid's demise in Mogadishu in June 1996.

2.5. Understanding the Stages of Intra-state Conflicts in Somalia

Intra-state conflicts have long been worldwide a recurring issue. Over the past century, the entire world has witnessed several intra-state conflicts that can be triggered by various factors and have both internal and external consequences. Somalia is among the nations globally that are vulnerable to this destructive conflict. However, it is important to note that every conflict undergoes specific phases, and the Somalia's intra-state conflicts are commonly characterized as having crisscrossed a sequence of difficult and ever-changing stages. Given the instability in Somalia, it is important to understand that the stages may overlay or follow in a different sequence depending on the specific situation. Below are the stages of the intra-state conflict in Somalia:

Pre-conflict Stage

There have been several conflicts in Somalia's past. Certain factors frequently lead to armed conflict, but they can also prevent or help end it. One of these factors is clannism, which means that people in separate groups are divided and have ties to each other. This can lead to fights over power and resources, and it can cause militias to form. Many disputes have started because clan leaders have played on clan rivalries, making it hard to bring everyone together. Clan loyalty, which results from politicians exploiting clan loyalty for their gain, has been a major contributor to the violent conflicts in Somalia since 1991. The intra-state conflicts in Somalia before 1960 were mostly focused on the

matter of self-determination and national sovereignty. The conflicts included territorial disputes between Somalia and neighboring nations such as Ethiopia and Kenya. The Somali administration promoted the idea of self-governance based on the concept of self-determination, whereas Ethiopia highlighted its authority over specific territories under its control.

Lewis (2002) further analyzed “the before the conflict in the Somalia (before 1960)”, the nation was under colonial administration, with the British governing the north and the Italians governing the south. Before gaining independence, Somalia did not undergo any major conflicts within its borders. However, several momentous events and factors influenced the political situation in the nation. During the period of colonial rule, British Somalia existed. The northern region of Somalia was under the British colonial governance from the late 1800s until gained its independence in 1960. The British government prioritized the preservation of peace and stability in the area via the establishment of institutions and infrastructure. The other side was Italian-Somali, for Italian colonial control, which governed the southern region of Somalia from the late 19th century until it gained independence in 1960. Despite their investments in infrastructure development, the Italians' authority was characterized by racial prejudice and persecution (Kapteijns & Farah, 2001).

According to Col. Dennis P. Mroczkowski , in 1956, Britain bestowed independence on British Somaliland and assimilated it into the newly formed Somali Republic. The new administration had difficulties resolving the economic, political, and social disparities between the northern and southern regions. The formulation of a stance that appealed to all factions facilitated the process of national unity (Kapil, 1966). In the 1960s, the new nation grappled with significant challenges, such as enhancing socioeconomic circumstances and developing physical infrastructure. Political leaders advocated for "Pan-Somalism," a concept that aimed to unite all Somali people into a single country. This concept, which encountered resistance from neighboring nations including Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya, resulted in border conflicts and guerrilla incursions. The Somali Youth Liberation (SYL) Party's ascendancy in the government grew in the 1960s, but its triumph turned into a liability (Mroczkowski, 2005). The Party attracted individuals from many political ideologies and convictions while promoting favoritism and loyalty based on family connections and tribal affiliations. Paradoxically, the SYL embodied the same

factionalism that it had originally denounced. Furthermore, the party and administration succumbed to corruption as acts of favoritism and the pursuit of personal wealth supplanted the commitment to public service. By the conclusion of the decade, the country was primed for a coup.

According to Menkhaus, Somalia, a post-colonial state, has established its legitimate presence via an intricate interaction of pre-colonial and colonial social structures. Despite a tumultuous past characterized by the colonial efforts of European powers, the state has steadily established its own distinct identity and justified its right to exist. Historical, political, and socioeconomic factors have shaped this process. The acknowledgment of Somalia by the international community has established a legal structure for its existence as a sovereign entity and confirmed its position as a self-governing country. The post-colonial state has solidified its presence by establishing power structures and institutions inside its borders, which enable the implementation of internal control and governance processes. This internal control has played a vital role in preserving stability, guaranteeing adherence to the law, and demonstrating the state's dominion over its area (Menkhaus, 2006). Although all people in Africa were very interested in pastoralism, they were much more experienced with the pastoral system, and they were making profits until now. In Somalia, Samatar (2001) mentioned that the pre-colonial Somali civilization was characterized by a lack of a centralized state and a formalized social structure. Pastoral producers practiced 'communitarian pastoralism', which was not characterized by the oppression often seen in class-based communities. Nevertheless, gender-based exploitation was a prominent attribute. As Somalia's economy became part of the global capitalist system, the shift from one social structure to another included changing the existing class and property relationships. The current social structure of Somalia is undergoing a shift, indicating the loss of the traditional communalism that existed before capitalism and the rise of capitalism on the outskirts. Contemporary pastoralism benefits not only the farmers, but also the merchants and the state elite. In the last century, the dynamics among pastoralists, merchants, and the state have undergone significant transformations, resulting in the development of new social connections and the decline of communitarianism. The commercialization of cattle and the appearance of non-producer 'claimants' have led to the improvement of a new social structure characterized by conflict, although being expressed in terms of family relationships (Samatar, 1999).

Escalation Stage

According to the Cambridge Dictionary, escalation is the process by which something becomes more intense and reaches a severe condition, often as a result of a demanding activity. The recent surge in violent crime demonstrates this. Escalation entails an increase in the intensity of conflicts and the use of increasingly extreme methods. The conflict fueled damagingly by the identities, grievances, objectives, and strategies engaged in growing disagreements.

The Escalation Stage (1970–1990) in Somalia was characterized by the Somali Civil War, or conflict, which arose in the 1980s as a reaction to the autocratic rule of President Siyad Barre. The war intensified from 1988 to 1990 when armed insurgent factions, such as the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali National Movement (SNM), and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), engaged in clashes with the Somali Armed Forces. These factions aimed to topple Barre's regime and create their systems of authority. The ousting of Barre in 1991 created a vacuum of authority, leading to several-armed opposition organizations competing for control and influence. The lack of operational central authority and the presence of divisions based on clans worsened the situation even further. Serious factional conflicts and humanitarian crises marked Somalia's transformation into a "failed state." As a reaction, the global community acted, with the United Nations sending military observers in 1992 to oversee the situation and provide support. Following the first United Nations (UN) operation, known as UNOSOM, the UN created subsequent missions like UNOSOM II to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief, promote efforts towards reconciliation, and assist in the development of a functioning government for the country (G. Anderson, 1995).

According to Abdi Samatar, the smooth assimilation of the northern area into Somalia after independence was shaped by historical circumstances and strategic deliberations. The British colonization of British Somalia, motivated by geopolitical considerations, resulted in a non-interventionist style of administration, supporting existing political systems and enabling a seamless transfer of power to Somali authorities. This choice, despite the difficulties met by other regions, serves as a commendable illustration of the process of showing a state after colonial rule. This statement highlights the significance of comprehending the intricacies involved in the process of constructing a state and the

influence of local factors in determining the results of political transitions (Samatar, 1989). The example of the northern area illustrates the possible advantages of using inclusive and culturally sensitive methods in the process of developing a country.

Transitional Stage

After President Siyad Barre was overthrown in 1991, tensions, bloodshed, and political instability increased in Somalia, marking the beginning of the country's turbulent history. President Siyad Barre commanded a military junta that had been in power since 1969. However, the regime faced serious dissatisfaction from the public owing to its repressive policies, human rights abuses, and economic incompetence. Rebel factions started to appear, contesting the Barre's power. As a result, the Somali armed forces, who remained loyal to Siyad Barre, initiated military campaigns against these rebels. However, the government's actions not only exacerbated pre-existing tensions but also incited bloodshed. The pre-transitional era from 1988 to 1990 saw a prolonged civil war in Somalia that lasted for nearly twenty years (Robinson, 2016). This period exposed fundamental political, social, and economic difficulties confronting the nation, hence emphasizing the need for a comprehensive approach to resolving the issue. Therefore, the absence of a peaceful transition after the use of violent opposition against the military dictatorship of Siyad Barre resulted in long-lasting instability and a humanitarian disaster in Somalia. To reconstruct Somalia with an effective system of governance at the national, regional, and local levels, the new government needs to achieve autonomy from other organizations involved in the Somalia's political affairs, consolidate the administration, and enhance the credibility of its administrative institutions by embracing inclusivity. The first stages are important in attaining a democratic state characterized by a transparent and competitive power structure in Somalia.

In the 1990s, Somalia saw a transitional period characterized by the breakdown of official authority, resulting in a power vacuum. This vacuum paved the way for the emergence of paramilitary organizations that functioned based on clan affiliations. As a consequence, the situation led to anarchy as different groups formed clan-based federated areas, which caused further fragmentation of the country. Consequently, these militias were largely motivated by their desire to make money from the war economy, resulting in the absence of a central authority and a shared determination to restore peace (Makhubela, 2016). The


post-transitional phases, including the Djibouti, Addis Ababa, Cairo, Arta, and Mbagathi Peace Conferences, encountered significant obstacles and ultimately failed to achieve a sustainable settlement. The lack of an effective central authority and the proliferation of rebel factions have hindered attempts to establish peace, leading to a cycle of violence and ineffective control that perpetuates an unstable environment. Furthermore, there has been no permanent path towards achieving peace.

Stabilization Stage

The overthrow of the Barre dictatorship in Somalia resulted in a protracted era of tumultuous chaos and conflict, characterized by clashes between clan-affiliated militias vying for dominion over strategically important urban centers, seaports, and residential areas. The battles devolved into indiscriminate plundering, lawlessness, and the seizure of important properties by victorious clan militias. The primary targets of this violence were vulnerable farming communities and marginalized coastal minority groups who found themselves caught in the crossfire. During the latter part of 1991 and the beginning of 1992, they encountered a substantial famine that triggered extensive international relief efforts. Food assistance became an integral part of the war economy, serving as a valuable resource that militias competed over and warlords used to fund their conflicts. Approximately 250,000 Somalis perished as a result of the conflict and starvation. Conversely, in the northwest and northeast regions of Somalia, the disintegration of the central administration did not expedite the conflict and plundering that ravaged the southern part of the country. Indeed, there have been instances of inter-clan conflicts in Somaliland, which included two significant battles in 1994 and 1996 (Buluma, 2013). Nevertheless, due to various factors such as the increased influence of traditional clan elders, improved political unity among clans, increased backing from traders to encourage peace and fund the process of demobilization, and more efficient political leadership, the conflict did not descend into chaos and widespread violence. Conversely, the self-declared territory of Somaliland progressively established a tiny government, using a national parliament consisting of traditional clan elders to effectively administer and maintain peace by restraining youthful militants. Armed conflict is a persistent problem in Somalia, but, there have been substantial changes in the kind, length, and severity of fighting since 1995. With some rare deviations, contemporary armed conflicts tend to be mostly localized, with sub-clans engaged in confrontations within a more fragmented

political setting. The Transitional National Administration (TNG) was established as a legal administration in southern Somalia after the 2000 Arta Peace Conference, marking the most ambitious effort to reconstitute governance in the region (Halabo & Berisso, 2022).

According to AEY Tchie, the stabilization phase in Somalia denotes the time after the overthrow of the Siyad Barre administration in 1991, during which the nation was recuperating from an extended civil war and striving to construct a steadfast government. International recognition of the Transitional Federal Government as the legitimate government of Somalia marked its founding in 2004. Nevertheless, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) encountered substantial obstacles as a result of the continuing fighting and the existence of armed factions like al-Shabaab. The establishment of the African Union Mission in Somalia was instrumental in safeguarding the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and expelling al-Shabaab from the capital city of Mogadishu. In 2012, the Federal Government of Somalia succeeded the TFG, which was a crucial milestone in achieving stability. During this time, the global community offered military support, financial aid, and programs to enhance Somalia's capabilities to help the country form a stable government and deal with security challenges (Tchie, 2022b)



Maps 3: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Stage

Sources: Political structure in Somalia after the breakdown of the state (BBC, 2018)

The post-conflict phase of intra-state conflicts in Somalia, spanning from 2010 to the present, has been characterized by political instability, battles for control, and the enduring presence of armed factions such as Al-Shabaab. Although the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established in 2004, political instability and power conflicts continued. The Somali administration had challenges related to security and the continuous presence of Al-Shabaab. The 2010 election year received criticism for prioritizing indirect elections instead of direct, one-person, one-vote elections. The advocacy for decentralization within a unitary state governance model was seen as a possible remedy for power conflicts and regional frictions (Le Sage, 2010). Nevertheless, the execution encountered difficulties, as some regional authorities embraced a 'fifty-fifty' strategy while others struggled with the consequences of continuing policies and activities related to terrorism and counter-terrorism. The humanitarian situation was worsened as a result of climate change, inadequate governance, and the consequences of prolonged violence, resulting in an escalation in the need for food aid and the displacement of civilians. The Somali government, with assistance from global allies, initiated military campaigns against Al-Shabaab, leading to the displacement of civilians and the retreat of some foreign troops. Attempts were undertaken to resolve the root causes of the war, with an emphasis on restoring the damaged social structure and creating genuine reconciliation. However, it is crucial to emphasize that the present political structure is a political manifestation and inheritance from the overthrown military administration, which adds difficulty to the process of rebuilding the state. Clan federalism, or clan territorializing, has emerged as a crucial solution for rebuilding trust and dependence among Somali clans and restoring a functional state in Somalia. Somalia's post-civil war political elites have adopted a new political formula, which the international community has been promoting to resolve the present political chaos. According to the figure above, Somalia has aligned itself with the government. However, Al-Shabaab groups continue to influence some parts, while pro-government organizations control other areas. In addition, there is oversight by the African Union and areas that are under the direct responsibility of the government. Since the central government of Somalia collapsed in 1991, the country has been dealing with political instability. The existence of terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab has been a major obstacle to peace and development. Despite the concerted efforts of the Somali government and its foreign allies to counteract

terrorism, persistent assaults continue to undermine the ongoing rehabilitation endeavors. The UN mission in Somalia and international actors have played a crucial role in stabilizing Somalia and fighting against militant organizations. Somalia has been consistently dealing with recurring humanitarian disasters, such as droughts, hunger, and displacement, which worsen the difficulties of rebuilding and progress. While there have been indications of economic improvement, growth is impeded by pervasive poverty, unemployment, and the inadequate provision of essential services. Continued efforts to reconstruct state institutions and develop effective governance systems have been persisting; however, progress is impeded by political fragmentation and limitations in resources (Dhoore et al., n.d.) A lengthy and controversial process has characterized the reconciliation efforts, which attempt to promote national unity and address past grievances. The reconstruction endeavors have mostly concentrated on the restoration of essential infrastructure. However, the advancement has been inconsistent, especially in distant areas devastated by conflicts. Achieving sustainable peace and development in Somalia requires ongoing dedication from both local actors and the global community, along with inventive strategies to tackle the underlying factors contributing to war and instability.

2.6. The Root Causes of the Intra-state Conflicts

For the last 3 decades, the world has suffered from intra-state conflicts, which repeatedly happen every year. Most intra-state conflicts in the world happen in Africa and the Middle East. The debates over territory, interests in significant areas, and persistent conflicts have made the Horn of Africa an extremely hot topic on the global stage in the last few decades. Emerging phenomena like piracy and terrorism, along with longstanding challenges like poverty and corruption, have intensified the complexity of East Africa. An analysis of the Somali conflict must take into account local, regional, and global factors, emphasizing the need for all-encompassing resolutions. The Horn of Africa is a crucial area for maritime routes, particularly for the transportation of oil from the Arabian Peninsula. Nevertheless, non-state actors, namely pirates based in Somali territory, present a significant danger to these maritime routes. The rise in illegal operations, such as the funding of terrorist organizations, and the potential for export instability have an impact on global interests. Because instability gives rise to both piracy and the danger of terrorism, the situation in Somalia deserves the global attention it deserves. The conflict's

regional character is of utmost significance since it poses the potential of disseminating instability to the surrounding area. The concept of "Greater Somalia" has had a significant impact on the Somalia's foreign policy and has played a role in shaping the Somali identity based on ethnic homogeneity. Regional influences facilitate the provision of funds, weaponry, and strategic assistance to the conflicting factions in Somalia. Instability also promotes indirect conflict between competitors in the area, as seen by the regional disagreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Marangio, n.d.).

In this section, I will deeply discuss the actors in the intra-state conflicts, such as clan rebels, businesspersons, religious leaders, and Al-Shabab terrorist organizations as well as the foreign military bases inside Somalia and their support of the Somali government.

2.6.1. The involvement of the Clan Warlords (First Actor).

The Cambridge dictionary states that clan rebel groups are organized factions or organizations within clans that challenge established authorities or institutions, often operating within tribal or family frameworks. These organizations usually possess intricate objectives, including political, economic, social, or ethnic grievances¹⁷. After the overthrow of the central government in 1991 by the opposition clans in Somalia, the country faced many internal conflicts and became a failed state, and the clan leaders did not agree to select the national leader for the country. Somalia descended into a state of chaos and instability, and then every neighbor clan started to fight with each other, and thousands of people were murdered, injured, or displaced as a consequence of power battles among the clan warlords.

The decline of President Siyad Barre's government and the beginning of the civil conflict occurred due to Siyad Barre's adoption of totalitarian individual rule and the regime's increasing violations, leading to popular discontent. This, along with the Somali army's defeat in the war with Ethiopia, ignited an armed tribal conflict within the military institution, which many scholars view as the initial catalyst. These wars signaled the beginning of the Barre government system's downfall. Conversely, these were the first actions that marked the beginning of the civil war. As Barre became aware that his

¹⁷ Cambridge University Press. (n.d.). *Rebel group*. Cambridge Dictionary. Retrieved June 30, 2025, from https://dictionary.cambridge.org/example/english/rebel-group?utm_source.

government was nearing its end, he deliberately instigated many disputes and confrontations among tribes. He provided weapons and financial support to some tribes, as well as committing several acts of genocide. Subsequently, he proceeded to carry out a succession of killings targeting certain officers from specific tribes, accusing them of betrayal (M. A. R. Hussein & Qarmout, 2022).

Regional organizations like the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have been helpful in settling intrastate conflicts in Somalia. As shown in Table 4, from 1991 to 2009, these groups have had a substantial impact on peace and reconciliation initiatives in the Horn of Africa area. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has convened peace and negotiation conferences for Somalia in countries such as Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Nevertheless, a significant number of these conferences have encountered setbacks as a result of the widespread occurrence of intra-state disputes, including clan conflicts, and the involvement of international actors. The intricate nature of conflicts in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, often deeply rooted in historical and social differences, has hindered their resolution. These factors have presented significant obstacles to achieving long-term peace. The enduring nature of intra-state conflicts and the detrimental influence of foreign players have impeded the efficacy of peace conferences. Notwithstanding these difficulties, regional groups such as IGAD continue to play a significant role in the endeavor to achieve peace and security in the area. Their ongoing involvement and cooperation are critical for surmounting these obstacles and achieving long-term peace. Adam Sheik Hassan states, “The organization of Somalia's tribes is both a real cultural fact and a unique social feature. Despite the different stages of progress and modernization that Somalia has seen over time, tribalism and the tribal system still exist as a psychological and cultural framework. They shape behavior patterns, including political behavior, and affect how politics and culture work together. People usually get more involved in politics during tough times like the civil war, the transitional government phase, and the unstable state era. This is called the politicization of the tribe or the dualization of politics (Osman, 2006). In Somalia, tribal affiliation plays a crucial role in the distribution of power and ensuring the safety of individuals. It is crucial in cases of disputes over land, water, agricultural regions, or the acquisition of exclusive privileges. Individuals often rely on their tribes to safeguard their entitlements and maintain their self-esteem. For Somalis, the tribes serve as a protective barrier during

times of need and danger. At times, it is the only way for individuals to ensure their safety and avoid confronting life's challenges alone. The tribe system in Somalia plays a crucial role in providing safety and mutual assistance. An essential aspect of tribalism is that in cases where a member of a different tribe causes the death of someone from the same tribe, the perpetrator's relatives demonstrate solidarity by providing compensation in the form of blood payment. Subsequently, they collaborate to safeguard the victim and prevent further acts of homicide. During conflicts over water and fields, each faction collaborates to provide compensation and distribute responsibility among the other factions (Makinda, 1999). According to Bradbury (1994), Clan warlords have had a substantial influence on the internal conflicts of Somalia, especially after the downfall of the Siyad Barre administration in 1991. The fall of the central government resulted in a power vacuum, which enabled clan-based allegiances to thrive. This, in turn, led to the rise of prominent warlords who took advantage of these differences. Clan warlords were able to gain considerable control over their clans and regions due to the lack of a strong central authority (Bradbury, 1994). They used their clan ties and accessible resources to organize armed groups based on clan divisions, which served as their main method of establishing authority, safeguarding their interests, and advancing their goals. The conflict between warlords and their militias often arose due to the fight for dominance over regions, resources, and authority and the competition for control over important areas, such as ports, agricultural land, and urban areas, heightened the significance of these conflicts. Warlords further used their power over resources, including weaponry, financial matters, and illegal commerce, to solidify their positions and extend their sway. The influence of clan warlords on Somalia's political terrain has been significant since the lack of a cohesive and efficient central government and division based on clan affiliations have impeded the formation of stable governing systems. Warlords in Somalia have benefited from maintaining the status system and are heading most factions of the clan-based militias, which has fostered rivalry for power and resources. Certain individuals have perpetrated atrocious offenses, resulting in a state of doubt over their future circumstances.

In May 2000, in the city of Arta in the Republic of Djibouti, the Somali National Peace Conference decided to distribute seats in the Legislative Council among different tribes. These seats would be responsible for selecting the country's president, ministries, and

government posts. This strategy aimed to formally incorporate the tribal element into institutions, enabling the government to resolve tribal conflicts and reduce the likelihood of the civil war that occurred in the 1990s. The government referred to this policy of sharing clans for the Government using Policy 4.5, the number 4 symbolizes the four dominant tribes, while half represents the ethnic minority in the nation (Lortan, 2000). This system allocates 61 seats to each of the four major tribes, out of the total 275 seats in the House of Representatives. In addition to the 54 seats in the Senate, so-called minority tribes received 31 seats. This formula selects officials for political and administrative offices. This process's use to validate tribal separation and establish it as an institution has sparked much debate among scholars, intellectuals, and all elements of society, prompting inquiries about its practicality. This process failed to consider the competency requirement when selecting representatives, leading to a gap between society's ambitions and the individuals chosen to represent them. Some contend that this strategy is well-suited for indigenous groups and ensures their representation. This upholds their rights and safeguards their interests. Some contend that this strategy, by endorsing the exclusion of tribal minorities in the nation and the unequal distribution of rights among individuals in society, exacerbated the division between different social groups and undermined its fundamental elements. Implementing the state-building strategy in Somalia, a country where the government has completely disintegrated, has additional challenges. Following the Ethiopian army's removal of the Islamic courts in late 2006, the international community has worked together to support and legitimize the transitional federal government. The aim is to empower the government to effectively counter the opposition from Islamic extremists. However, no level of foreign backing can offset the interim federal government's lack of domestic legitimacy. A significant drawback of the proposed solution for Somalia is the substantial prevalence of what a prominent expert referred to as governance without a formal government structure. The process of reconciliation between different tribes has established local governments in several ungoverned areas, supposed to be under the federal government's control. After the central government declined, the internal conflict started due to clan disputes for control of the government. The major clans - the four large clans (Dir, Hawiye, Darod, Rahanwayne) - then sought to back the government. The first step was to make reconciliation between the neighboring clans that had killed each other, and then to hold

a national conference for all Somali clans to reconstruct the government (Lewis, 2003). The Somali crisis originated with the breakdown of the central government in 1991 and has persisted through a series of internal and external conflict interventions. The collapse of the central government precipitated the eruption of violent hostilities among different factions and militias struggling for control. The different interventions, including the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces (UNOSOM) and American forces in the early 1990s, the involvement of African Union forces (AMISOM) in 2007, and the actions taken by Kenya and Ethiopia to counter extremist Islamic movements, aimed to bring stability to the region. However, the international actors made numerous efforts at mediation and reconciliation through peace conferences and consecutive transitional governments, with the aid of regional and international organisations. The following table presents a concise overview of the mediation and national reconciliation efforts carried out in different countries (A. S.-M. Hussein, 2022).

Conference	Date	Parties	Host Country	Facilitator
Djibouti I	5–11 June 1991	SPM, USC, SSDF, SPM, USC	Djibouti	Government of Djibouti
Djibouti II	15–21 July 1991	SSDF, SPM, USC, SAMO, SNU,SDM	Djibouti	Government of Djibouti
Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation	January 1993	15 factions	Ethiopia	United Nations
Addis Conference on National Reconciliation	March 1993	15 faction	Ethiopia	United Nations– Government of Ethiopia
National Salvation Council (Sodere)	November 1996– January 1997	26 factions	Ethiopia Government of Ethiopia	Government of Ethiopia
Cairo Conference	November 1997	Hussein Aideed's government & NSC	Egypt	Government of Egypt
Somalia National Peace Conference (Arta)	May–August 2000		Kenya IGAD/ Government of Kenya	Government of Kenya
Somalia National Reconciliation Conference (Eldoret/Mbagathi)	2002–2004		Kenya IGAD/	IGAD/Government of Kenya
Nairobi Informal	1994		Kenya	United Nations
Yemen	May 1997	Hussein Aided and Osman Atto	Yemen	Government of Yemen
Nakuru talks	Nakuru talks 1999 Nakuru, Kenya Government of Kenya	1999	Nakuru, Kenya	Government of Kenya
Khartoum	2006	TFG, ICU Sudan Arab League	Sudan	Arab League
Djibouti	2008–2009	TFG, ARS- Djibouti	Djibouti	United Nations

Table 1: Reconciliation and Mediation for Somalia Conflicts

Sources: Johnson, P. (2009), A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988, Interpeace.

2.7. The Foreign Military Bases in Somalia

Foreign military bases' involvement in East Africa has both positive and negative effects, as any imbalance can jeopardize the safety of the region. When two or more foreign countries connect in new ways, it affects security right away. From this point of view,

having troops in the Horn of Africa affects its standing among other world powers. On a regional level, countries compete for power and military presence in the Horn of Africa. Foreign military countries' presence in the Horn of Africa could be due to their significant impact on regional security, their influence on internal and regional stability, and their role in safeguarding international waterways (Atta-Asamoah, 2019). There are foreign military Bases Somalia and their involvements may have negative or positive effect so this section below I will mention the large bases that exist in Somalia and the most known are Halane Base, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and Turksom.

2.7.1. United States Airbase in Balidogli

In the 1970s, the United States maintained military bases in Somalia with the aim of extending its influence in the Horn of Africa and assisting the Somali army. The American military provided deadly weaponry to safeguard the Somali army against the Russian threats, although Somalia perceived that this overt hostility would ultimately reach the United States inside their borders. Nevertheless, the relationship between the United States and Somalia worsened with the actions of militias associated with General Mohamed Farah Aidid, who were responsible for the killings American troops during Operation Restore Hope in 1993 (History, 2002).

Consequently, the United States withdrew its military personnel from Somalia and minimized its interactions with the government due to the significant loss of American troops at the hands of Somalia's military. Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States has shown a notable resurgence in its involvement in Somali issues. This attention reached its peak in 2013, when the US officially recognised the federal government in Mogadishu. At the end of 2018, Somalia reinstated its diplomatic mission, marking its return after a 27-year absence (Maluki & Bashir, 2024). The United States Air Force used Balidogli Air Base, located in the city of Balidogli within the Somali province of Barawe, for the counterterrorism operations and assistance to the Somali National Army (SNA) and the governmental administrations. Equipped with armed drones, the base accommodates a contingent of American soldiers and staffs. In 2018, the United States Army significantly expanded its operations by building the Balidogli Air Base, housing approximately 800 beds and ranking as the third largest concentration of US Department of Defense personnel in Africa, following Djibouti and Niger. In early 2019, the Pentagon allocated \$12 million to restore emergency runways, with the

intention of developing Somalia as a strategic location. The United States of America plays a crucial role in devising strategies for its military operations in Africa and the Middle East (Sun & Zoubir, 2016). The American military has constructed a small facility at Kismayo Airport, which is located about 500 kilometers south of Mogadishu. Approximately forty American personnel, operating drones under strict security measures, staff the site, while several naval vessels from various countries, including the United States and the European Union, station themselves along the Somali coast to combat piracy. These ships serve as crucial hubs for American military operations within Somalia, facilitating logistics, communication, and the deployment of warplanes to target sites associated with groups deemed terrorists (Neal, 2011). The United States has been training and equipping the Danab Brigade with advanced weaponry for the last several years and People widely regard the Danab Brigade as one of the most proficient commando units in the Somali Army, specializing in counterterrorism operations against the Al-Shabab extremist group. The United States has provided advanced, state-of-the-art equipment to build exceptionally proficient armed forces to combat the terrorist organizations. This year, the Somali government and the United States have entered into fresh agreements to create supplementary military sites in Somalia.

2.7.2. Halane Base Camp in Mogadishu

Concrete walls encircle Halane Base, which spans a portion of the Indian Ocean coastline near the terminus of Mogadishu International Airport's runway. The facility houses the command hub for the American drone, which carries out targeted strikes on the positions of the Al-Shabaab terrorist groups in Somalia. The compound encompasses the primary headquarters for the African Union peacekeeping mission's (ATMIS) military personnel, as well as the participation of Western nations such as the United Kingdom and Arab nations such as the United Arab Emirates. For the last three decades, the Halane Base Camp in Mogadishu has served as a hub for numerous international embassies and the United Nations. The Republic of Somalia, currently struggling with Al-Shabaab organization threats, often regards this camp as one of the more secure areas where many international organizations stay. The base of Halane Camp plays a crucial role in conducting diplomatic efforts, overseeing military operations, and facilitating the transfer of relief to needy individuals. Historically, Al-Shabab terrorist organizations have

undertaken attacks on the camp, and this has led to a further enhancement of security measures (Tase, 2013).

2.7.3. Turkey's Military Base in Mogadishu

Somali-Turkish relations have a historical foundation dating back to the Sixteenth century, during the Ottoman Empire's rule. The Empire sought to establish dominance over the Horn of Africa region in order to dominate the seaports in the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf as a means of countering the encroachment of European powers seeking control over the area. Somalia fell under the Ottoman Empire's sphere of influence, with the cities of Zeila and Berbera serving as its primary centers of power. Following the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the European colonial powers gained authority over Somalia in the late 18th century (Siradag, 2017a). Somalia and Turkey had previously had diplomatic relations in 1969, but the establishment of embassies arose at different times in different situations. In 2011, the Republic of Turkey opened its embassy in Somalia, and this involvement improved the Turkey's engagements as well as its humanitarian support during a severe humanitarian disaster. Somalia and Turkey made very important commitments to increase their economic, political, and cultural relationships. During difficult times, Turkey assisted Somalia in rebuilding and providing support, as well as making investments in many different sectors, and their relations were defined as significant strategic partnerships for both countries. Additionally, several organizations, including IHH, Hudayi Foundations, Deniz Feneri, and other institutions like AFAD, Diyanet, Kızılay, and TIKA, participate in various projects and funds, either directly or indirectly (Özkan, 2014). Turkey's foreign policy includes an assertive military strategy in Africa. Mogadishu, Somalia, has an authorized symbol with the label "African Eagle." Turkey has established military facilities in Somalia, Libya, and Niger, using a unique military strategy for conducting operations outside the borders of Europe. Turkey is now providing training and completing the education of a fresh batch of trainees in Somalia. The development of a new military-sociological personality aims to shape Somalia's future trajectory, and the Turkey program aims to facilitate a transformation in the political landscape of the Horn of Africa (Kitio, 2020).

The biggest overseas military base of Turkey is located in Somalia, known as TURKSOM, and this camp base facility provides a training ground of 400 hectares for the purpose of training the Somali troops and supporting them in the military. As the

Turkish government stated, the construction of this facility in 2017 had a cost of around \$50 million, and for the last few years, the Somali battalions, after completing their military initiation, have often been sent to Turkey for advanced training programs that include commando and special operations and counter-terrorism for Isparta, a city in Turkey. The center in Isparta has significant importance in Turkey for training and graduating experienced military units, including those who participated in the Turkey's military operations in Syria and Iraq, and for the last few years, Somalia has made progress in combating al-Shabaab by reclaiming land outside Mogadishu. This achievement demonstrated the effectiveness of capacity-building initiatives implemented by Turkey and other countries for the Somali military (Kasapoglu, 2020).

Year	Exports	Imports	Trade Balance
2009	190,680	813,326	-622,646
2010	293,906	919,051	-625,145
2011	398,884	1,196,865	-797,981
2012	505,113	2,169,853	-1,664,740
2013	644,924	2,521,830	-1,876,906
2014	643,785	2,349,488	-1,705,703
2015	691,623	2,512,531	-1,820,908
2016	628,311	2,732,660	-2,104,349
2017	389,384	3,334,273	-2,944,889
2018	481,200	3,470,768	-2,989,568
2019	41,000	4,207,000	-3,791,000
2020	296,000	4,236,000	-3,940,000
2021	165,000	3,172,000	-3,007,000

Table 2: Somalia Exports, Imports & Trade Balance in Dollar

Source: International Trade Center (ITC); World Bank Database and Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK)

The table shows that until 2009–2021, Turkey had a very insignificant role in the Somalia's economy; however, it has since bolstered its position by substantially increasing its exports to the nation. In addition, Turkey has made rapid expenditures in several areas like education, health, infrastructure, and security. Between 2009 and 2021,

Turkey had significant growth in its trade with Somalia. Turkey set a new record in 2015 by sending a total of 691,623 metric tons of products. However, from 2016 to 2019, there was a decline in exports, with a significant decrease to 41,000 in 2019. The volume of imports from Turkey to Somalia showed a continuous upward trend, reaching a peak of 4,236,000 in 2020. The trade balance between Somalia and the Turkey is negative because Somalia imports more from Turkey than its exports. Despite fluctuations in Turkey's exports, the country has made substantial investments in Somalia, therefore enhancing the bilateral economic relations between the two nations.

2.7.4. General Gordon Base Military in Mogadishu

The United Arab Emirates dispatched 640 members of the Duty Force to Somalia in 1993 and 1994 to join the 37,000-strong Unified Task Force humanitarian operation. Not only that, but it sent a field hospital and several military units to aid in the "Second United Nations Operation in Somalia" peacekeeping operation. The conflicts resulted in the deaths of three Emirati troops. After foreign soldiers withdrew from Somalia due to the protracted civil conflict, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) became a contributor of troops to support stability efforts for the region for the United Nations operations in 1993, and at that time, this Emirati soldier was killed (Ramuhala, 2007).

The United Arab Emirates operates the General Gordon Military Base in Mogadishu, Somalia, as a military installation to further their interests in East Africa. The United Arab Emirates military is based out of the Mogadishu's General Gordon Military Base, and safeguarding the UAE interests in Somalia is its principal goal and the other objective is to support the Somali political leaders who can align with the UAE's declared aim to enhance the Somali military capabilities. The former Somali government under President Farmajo has accused the United Arab Emirates government of meddling in Somalia's internal affairs and making deals with regional administrations without the federal government's knowledge. The relationship between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Somali Government has experienced various phases of indifference, mutual reliance, and animosity, and these factors have contributed to a complex and unpredictable trajectory of their bilateral relations, influenced by significant interactions and the UAE's stance on internal matters within Somalia (Mohamud, 2025).


According to the Levy and Yusuf, "The United Nations (UN) involvement in Somalia from 1993 to 1995 established the formal diplomatic ties between the United Arab

Emirates (UAE) and Somalia. During this period, the UAE offered both military assistance and humanitarian relief. Nevertheless, the partnership encountered difficulties in 2017 as a result of the Gulf crisis, leading to the discontinuation of the UAE's training program for the Somali army, among other problems. Somalia seized funds from the United Arab Emirates ambassador's aircraft and opposed Dubai Ports International (DP World) World's involvement in its ports. The Somali president at the time demanded an apology from the UAE for its intervention in Somalia's domestic matters (Levy & Yusuf, 2024).

2.8. The Rise and the Involvement of Al-Shabaab Organizations in Somalia's Conflicts

Many terrorist organizations emerged on the African continent, taking advantage of the deteriorating economic, political, and social conditions in most of the continent's countries to work toward undermining the security and stability. As a result, the organization spread throughout most of the continent's countries. The most notable Organizations that emerged in West and East Africa, such as the Boko groups and their combatants in Nigeria and the Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahedin in Somalia, along with other terrorist groups, gained significant influence and success owing to their extensive military and logistical skills. These groups successfully instigated wars in Africa, resulting in higher rates of refugees. Using favorable operating conditions, they also managed to recruit many African youth and incorporate them into their ranks (Ibrahim, 2010). The issue of terrorism and its escalation is a very perilous and impactful concern, with far-reaching consequences that influence diverse domains such as human, economic, political, security, and social spheres. Terrorism has become a global menace, affecting several regions and governments across continents. The focus was on specific countries where terrorist groups were active. Terrorist activities have taken place in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, as well as in other European and other countries. For more than three decades, the disintegration of the state in Somalia has resulted in a multitude of armed organizations, mostly structured around clan affiliations and focused on attaining specific political objectives at the local people level. Periodic involvement had a role in shaping the political forces that emerged throughout the Somali conflict. In the 1990s, the Islamic Union, a reform organization that follows Salafism, engaged in armed conflict to establish an Islamic state that would include Somalia and some parts of Ethiopia. This

behavior represents a discernible pattern of militant Islamist activity. The Islamic Union recruited a small number of Somali jihadists who had participated in the war in Afghanistan under the Soviet rule (Vidino et al., 2010). The Al-Shabaab Islamic Movement often referred to as the Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen Movement in Somalia or Al-Shabaab organization groups, is a faction associated with Al-Qaeda. Despite its expulsion from most major Somali cities under its control, Al-Shabaab continues to pose a significant and evident danger. Al-Shabaab first arose in 2006 as a radical youth group associated with the disbanded Islamic Courts Union. They engaged in combat against the Ethiopian soldiers, who had intervened in Somalia to assist the fragile interim government (Joseph & Maruf, 2018).



Maps 4: The Al-Shabaab Area of Operations as Of October 2018

Source: Barnett, J. (2018, October 5). Al-Shabab area of operation: October 2018

The Al-Shabab organization groups, which were made up of former fighter leaders like Shongole, Godane, and Afghani, worked to improve their organizational structure and

arm their members all over southern Somalia. Al-Shabab organization groups are on the Internet, but their words mostly aimed at local people in their own country. It quickly grew its online footprint and made it easier to hire people in other countries. In response, the Somali community became a bigger source of money, and around 2007, their efforts began to find new members. Some of the Somali diaspora members send more than a billion US dollars worth of money to the country every year. There is no clear information on how much these money moves were worth in total, but it looks like Al-Shabaab organizations made a lot of money in their early years. Additionally, Al-Shabaab's growing ties with Al-Qaeda have made it easier for them to ask for money from rich Arab donors (Freeman & Ruehsen, 2013). The Al-Shabaab organization groups are the most well-known Somali-based Islamist extremist organizations, and they seek to topple the internationally recognized Somali government and create an Islamic state governed by the Sharia law, as they always argue. The Al-Shabaab groups are in opposition to the Somalia government, which is supported by the Western powers and regards it as a puppet regime controlled by international actors. Al-Shabaab also aims to expel the country's international troops, namely the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which provides help to the Somali government in its efforts to combat the organization. The Al-Shabaab groups view the foreign troops as invaders and aim to expel them from the nation (Yan, 2015). Al-Shabaab's organizational groups and administrative structure closely resemble the organizational decentralization. The tenuous nature of the relationship between the central authority and the political parties in implementing the principles and regulations on the ground demonstrates the organizational fragility and lack of unity within the movement. This is evident at the highest level of leadership, as well as among the movement's followers and field commanders responsible for military and security operations. Conversely, this decentralized structure provided the movement with the added advantage of swiftly advancing toward its objective or promptly reacting to perceived threats. As a result, the organization rapidly spread throughout vast regions of Somalia in a short timeframe. The organization's intellectual elites advocate for an organizational structure that entails the establishment and growth of diverse administrative entities. All individuals affiliated with the Al-Shabaab organization groups, as well as the general Somali population at different levels, have the opportunity

to be part of these organizations that are characterized by the Islamic titles and principles (Ali, 2008).

During the last five years, Al-Shabaab terrorist organizations have seen substantial transformations. The group's tactics, along with its inability to avoid clan influence, have greatly impacted its capacity to project force, attract new members, and impose control over the Somali populace. At first, al-Shabaab had popular backing as the main resistance to the Ethiopian incursions, but its influence diminished after the Ethiopian retreat in 2009 due to the emergence of clan rivalries and confrontations with other Somali groups. The group's reliance on the clan networks has undermined its ability to project force, resulting in a weakened leadership structure, internal conflicts, and power struggles. This has caused the group's troops to become fractured and has impeded its ability to sustain a cohesive front (Schaefer & Black, 2011). Clan dynamics have also influenced the Al-Shabaab's recruitment efforts; the organization garnered support as the sole feasible avenue for the Ethiopian involvement, attracting those who perceived al-Shabaab as a force protecting their clan interests. Nevertheless, with the emergence of clan rivalries and the escalation of internal tensions, the group's reputation as a cohesive resistance force started to deteriorate. Overall, the Al-Shabaab's approach and inability to reduce the clan dominance have greatly affected its ability to project power, attract new members, and exert control over the Somali community. Al-Shabaab has emerged as a significant regional danger, effectively carrying out attacks on Somalia's neighboring countries, including Kenya's Westgate, Dusit Hotel, and Garissa University, as well as conducting bombings in Uganda, etc.




Figure 7: AL-Shabab Attacks between July 2017 and January 2018

Source: Somali Civil War and Reflections for Social Contract Peacebuilding

Lastly, the Al-Shabab organization has played a significant and ongoing role in the intra-state conflicts in Somalia. It has successfully gained control over large portions of Somali territory and imposed taxes on the public, claiming it as Zakat. In addition, it started acquiring extensive tracts of agricultural land at the most favorable rates and endeavored to recruit a significant number of young Somalis to join its organization. The ongoing attacks by Al-Shabab organizations are significantly deteriorating the political and security landscape in Somalia. This is a result of the state's insufficient number of military teams about the country's size, as well as the absence of weaponry and deficiencies in the training process. Certain tribes' support contributes to the expansion and proliferation of Al-Shabab organizations. This support, along with the worsening economic conditions and the obstacles faced by the Somali refugees in returning to their homeland, hampers the progress of the national reconciliation process in Somalia. To mitigate the deterioration in Somalia and contain the proliferation of armed factions, such as the Al-Shabab organization groups, the Somali society must demonstrate unwavering allegiance to their homeland. The Somali tribes need to actively assist the Somali government and minimize their backing of armed factions like the Al-Shabab organization groups.

Neighboring countries must work together to effectively manage border crossings and prevent their infiltration into Somalia (Gartenstein-Ross, 2009).

2.9. The Role and Involvement of Businesspersons in the Conflicts.

The effects of terrorism affect a wide range of areas, including human resources, politics, economics, security, society, and more. Terrorism is a growing issue that is both serious and consequential. From one continent to another, the risk of terrorism is growing as it spreads to other parts of the globe. While the world public opinion focused its attention on countries known for their active involvement in terrorism, such as Somalia, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, terrorist activities were also occurring in various European nations.

Over the past few decades, business people's participation in politics has become the norm, and their involvement in conflicts is a significant issue that raises numerous concerns and questions. Suppose corporate leaders use their power and financial resources to promote their personal interests to the damage of public interests. In that case, it may escalate conflict, perhaps resulting in military conflicts or societal upheaval. The conflicts in Somalia have been a complicated and diverse problem, with businesspersons playing a significant role in the country's continuous conflict. Certain individuals in the business community have engaged in unlawful businesses connected to warfare, such as the illegal trafficking of weapons and businesspersons have benefited from internal wars by diverting food assistance, which some businesspeople have used to deny the most vulnerable access to essential resources and exacerbate instability and misery inside the nation (Keating & Waldman, 2019). The country's extensive and sometimes unregulated land offers ideal circumstances for the cultivation and manufacturing of illegal substances, including Qat and opiates and Certain entrepreneurs have taken advantage of this opportunity by constructing drug manufacturing facilities and engaging in drug trafficking and also following the internal war, the destruction of infrastructure and buildings resulted in significant scrap metal, and opportunistic entrepreneurs capitalized on this situation by exporting the scrap metal to neighboring nations and beyond, profiting from the high demand for raw materials Although this activity may not have a clear connection to the conflict, it does contribute to general economic exploitation and weaken the country's capacity to repair and recover.

The Somali government, together with international organizations and regional partners, has tackled these problems by implementing stricter regulations, enhancing law enforcement, and assisting lawful economic endeavors (Bakonyi, 2010). It is crucial to acknowledge that only a small number of entrepreneurs in Somalia engage in these activities, and they make a concerted effort to operate within the bounds of the law and benefit the country's growth.

The exploitation of resources such as minerals and oil might exacerbate conflicts in Somalia, including those involving al-Shabaab. This two-edged blade may lead to social instability and economic inequity. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab embezzled funds from small businesses that had to meet their annual tax obligations. Certain businesspeople may also provide direct financial support to armed factions or political organizations for political or ideological reasons or to safeguard their own interests. Furthermore, businesses can provide logistical support to parties involved in a conflict. However, companies have the potential to positively contribute to economic prosperity and security, which is crucial for fostering peace (Ahali & Ackah, 2015).

2.10. Conclusion

In conclusion, Somalia's history has been characterized by political instability, brutality, and protracted civil conflict. The nation's advantageous geographical position in the Horn of Africa has had a important influence on its diplomatic ties and has played a pivotal role in shaping regional politics and commerce. This chapter seeks to provide a thorough examination of Somalia's historical background, the underlying factors contributing to its conflicts, and the obstacles it encounters in attaining enduring peace and stability. Additionally, Somalia's historical backdrop demonstrates the consequences of colonial forces partitioning the territory, resulting in the fragmentation of communities and the deprivation of traditional grazing lands. Tribalism and sub-clanism have driven wars in the country, worsening the competition for resources. The breakdown of the central government resulted in a vacuum of power, which was capitalized upon by armed factions like Al-Shabaab, intensifying the state of instability and bloodshed. The conflict has attracted the involvement of international actors driven by political and economic interests; however, their efforts have failed to establish enduring peace and stability. Elements such as clannism and politicians' manipulation of clan allegiance have

intricately shaped the progression of intra-state conflicts in Somalia. The core causes of intra-state conflicts in Somalia are a complex interplay of local, regional, and global influences. The conflict is further complicated by factors like the struggle for resources, conflicts among clans, and the involvement of non-state players such as pirates and terrorist organizations. Tackling these fundamental factors is essential for attaining enduring peace and stability in Somalia. In order to attain enduring peace and security in Somalia, it is imperative to use comprehensive and inclusive strategies. These strategies should tackle the root causes of the conflict, include local people, and promote efficient government. Addressing resource competition, reducing clan rivalries, and fostering economic growth are crucial measures for establishing a peaceful and prosperous future for the Somali population. Political, economic, social, and ethnic grievances, among other contributing causes, have driven the wars in Somalia. The power struggle among clan warlords led to extensive bloodshed, death, displacement, and instability in Somalia. Foreign military stations have also had an impact on Somalia's dynamics. Although the presence of foreign countries may have a positive impact on regional security and stability, an imbalance or rivalry among these countries can pose a threat to the area's safety. Previously, the United States maintained military installations in Somalia with the objective of expanding its sphere of influence in the Horn of Africa. However, due to tense relations and aggressive activities carried out by some militias affiliated with them, the relationship deteriorated. Consequently, certain military installations, including Halane Base Camp in Mogadishu, have functioned as central locations for international embassies, the United Nations, and the operational headquarters for targeted attacks against Al-Shabab. The United Arab Emirates also sent military personnel to Somalia with the aim of providing humanitarian assistance and contributing to peacekeeping efforts. Nevertheless, the rise of terrorist organization such as Al-Shabab in Somalia and other regions of Africa has added complexity to the security landscape. These African terrorist groups, including Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, have exploited worsening economic, political, and social circumstances to undermine security and stability. They have effectively provoked conflicts, resulting in higher refugee rates and the recruitment of many African youths into their ranks. On a global scale, terrorism has extensive ramifications in several sectors, affecting human lives, the economy, politics, and social spheres. Another troubling issue is the involvement of businesspersons in the Somalia

conflicts. Certain members of Somalia's business community have been involved in illicit operations, including arms smuggling and misappropriation of food aid, which have worsened the country's instability and suffering. For last tackling the numerous issues in Somalia requires a holistic strategy. The process includes resolving political disputes, fostering economic growth, strengthening security measures, and countering the influence of terrorist organizations. Moreover, it is critical to hold individuals involved in illegal actions accountable and provide openness and effective management in the corporate domain. In addition, The attainment of enduring peace and stability in Somalia requires the cooperation of local, regional, and international actors. Somalia can overcome its obstacles and create a more positive future for its people by responsibility the underlying causes of conflicts, encouraging inclusive democratic processes, and boosting socio-economic growth. International support, collaboration, and conscientious involvement are crucial in this undertaking.

CHAPTER III: ROLES OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN THE SOMALIA CONFLICT

3.1. Introduction

One of the most noticeable things about Africa is the prevalence of conflicts. Almost every part of the continent has seen some kind of violent conflict, and these events have had far-reaching consequences for politics and society. The intricate nature of civil conflicts in Africa is a defining feature. Many factors contributed to occurrence of such conflicts. These factors can be categorized into two primary groups: the first group relates to internal conflicts, encompassing the diverse nature of the African societies and internal economic and political factors, while the second group includes the effects of international interventions, particularly the influence of international and regional powers. The role of international actors or third actors manipulate to the actions and impacts exerted by various entities in the global sphere. The actors involved in this situation encompass nations, international bodies (such as African Union and United Nations), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational enterprises, and even individuals with significant influence. In the late 1980s, Somalia had a tribal and violent civil war that lasted for almost above fifteen years(Arrieta, 2017). This conflict resulted in the deaths of thousands of the Somalian individuals and the extensive destruction of the country's infrastructure. The Somali case stands out because of the facts and consequences it has faced, including the state collapse and subsequent civil war, as well as the emergence of separatist autonomous areas. The involvement of international actors in the Somalia's internal crisis (conflicts) is critical from both theoretical and practical perspectives. This text critically examines the body of scholarly work on conflict settlement and resolution, which is a subfield within the discipline of political science. The practical component of the study focuses on analyzing the various aspects of settlement processes and foreign interventions in the crisis, taking into account the distinct characteristics of the Somali civil war. The civil war in Africa resulted in the state's disintegration, and the civil war's significance lay in the use of conflict resolution techniques such as discussions, mediation, and external intervention in the Somalia's

domestic affairs. The significance of this rests in its pertinence to the discipline of political science and the distinctive characteristics of the Somali civil war.




Figure 8: Roles of International Actors in Somalia's Conflicts

Source: Created by the author

The above diagram shows the analysis of the international actors plays a crucial role in Somalia's conflicts, with external actors supporting the federal government and influencing local governance. However, their involvement can disrupt local governance and escalate tensions. Military interventions by third states, such as Al-Shabab, can disrupt power dynamics and security. International support in military training can build local capacity but can also lead to dependency and internal power struggles. Diplomatic mediation can help resolve conflicts, but regional rivalries can complicate diplomatic efforts. Understanding these dynamics is essential for developing effective peace and governance strategies in Somalia.

The majority of external actors involved in the conflicts in Somalia are the regional countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, as well as the western countries such as the United States, the Great Britain, and Italy. In addition, In addition, some of the Arab countries, like the Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia, and also the

United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and even the intra-governmental organizations, play effective roles. In the meantime, Turkey's role, interest, and involvement in this matter have been discussed.

As results, this chapter will examine the contributory roles of international actors in the Somalia conflict, which have been previously discussed with regard to the theoretical approach. This chapter will explore the specific roles, desires, demands, abilities, and methods employed by various individuals or groups in pursuit of their goals. The chapter will also examine how these organizations, or individuals, participated at various points.

3.2. The Role and Involvement of the Regional Powers

Somalia has significant strategic value in the Horn of Africa part owing to its advantageous position in the eastern region of Africa and its supremacy over several marine resources. Furthermore, its unique economic, social, and historical characteristics set it apart from the rest of the African continent. Somalia is among the seventeen African countries situated in sub-Saharan Africa that achieved its independence from the European colonial rule in 1960, a significant year known as the Year of Africa, marking the beginning of many African countries gaining independence from the European colonialism. Somalia bridges Asia and Africa and shares borders with African, Arab, and Islamic countries. The Somalia's unique geographical location in the strategic planning of international and regional powers has paved the way for new and diverse international conflicts. The involvement of the regional powers in the Somalia's conflicts has been significant and multifaceted, affecting the country's stability and political landscape. The key roles and their involvement for regional actors have been analyzed in details below.

a. The Ethiopia's Intervention

It is widely known that the Somali area holds great importance for Ethiopia, as its rulers have always aimed to expand their control over that territory. The Ethiopian authorities, during the period of Italian rule, also sought to acquire territory that had historical ties to Somalia. These pressures persisted even after the end of Italian colonialism, but they shifted their attention towards the British Empire, which had dominion over the eastern portion of the African continent following the World War II. The border conflicts between the two countries regarding control over the heavily populated Somali border areas have

resulted in continuous turmoil since Somalia gained its independence from both the Italian and the British rules in 1960.

In the 1977–1978 conflict in the Hawd Reserve Area, which is now the Somalia area of Ethiopia, the Somali army was soundly defeated by the Ethiopian forces backed by Soviet Union (USSR) and Cuba at the height of the tensions between the two countries (Issa-Salwe, 2016). Ethiopia has actively worked to prevent the rise of a powerful Somali state that could challenge its position as the dominant force in the Horn of Africa, driven by clear geostrategic motives and the leadership in Addis Ababa had a dim opinion of its Somali neighbor and had long insisted on the merger of all Somali territories, including the Somalia region of Ethiopia and in reality Ethiopia became more concerned due to the Barre regime's strong determination to establish a highly formidable and courageous military force, with the aim of raising Somalia to the status of a major African power as a result the Somali matter has emerged as a primary issue for the Ethiopian leaders, who have shown limited enthusiasm for restoring the failed central state since 1991. In contrast, Ethiopia has offered assistance to both the Republic of Somaliland and Puntland. Somaliland, located in the northern region of Somalia, is separated from the Republic of Somalia and experiences a significant level of stability. It remains unaffected by the internal conflicts that plague the central and southern parts of the country (Lockyer, 2018).

The border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Somali region of Ethiopia dates back to the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885. This conflict has historical roots because it emerged from the division of the African continent between the European nations and Ethiopia, which was once an Italian colony but later became involved in the partitioning of Somalia (Ivanova, 2023). The Ottoman Empire once controlled the Somali area of Ethiopia before transferring it to Ethiopia. Until 1884, the territory was under the Egyptian authority. However, Egypt withdrew from that year as a result of the British pressure and financial devastation. Britain had ruled this territory since 1886, and later transferred it to Ethiopia. Ethiopia obtained the Hawd reserve area in the current Somali region of Ethiopia through a formal arrangement with Britain (Woodward, 2016). In December 2006, Ethiopia launched an invasion of Somalia, resulting in significant changes to the dynamics of the country. The removal of the Islamic courts from their

strongholds and the subsequent retreat of Islamic activists into hiding did not necessarily enhance the authority of the fragile transitional government, which lacked the ability to exert its control over the entire country. At that, there is apprehension regarding the possible resurgence of Ethiopian-supported warlord forces in Mogadishu and other regions, and this could result in a reemergence of disorder, civil unrest, and an exacerbation of the already horrible economic circumstances. In addition, the United States carried out airborne assaults in southern Somalia; specifically targeting locations suspected to be sheltering members of Al-Qaida and affiliated Islamists Al-Shabab (Stevenson, 2007). The forceful Ethiopian forces involvement, which led to a significant number of civilian deaths, has been subject to investigating by international organizations like the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations. There was concern that the situation might escalate and become more globalized if the Islamic armed groups successfully would form the alliances with other factions that have been against Ethiopia and the American military's presence in East Africa. According to Bjorn Moller, the involvement of Ethiopia in December 2006 ultimately had a highly detrimental effect. The expansion of militant groups like al-Shabaab and the propagation of more fundamentalist interpretations of sharia law have significantly increased the influence of radical factions within the Islamist movement, superseding the non-political and moderate Sufi practices. The expansion of militant groups like al-Shabaab and the promotion of more radical interpretations of sharia law, particularly the militarist Salafist ideology, have achieved this, contrasting with the less politically engaged and moderate the Sufi tradition (Møller, 2009a).

Over the past years, Ethiopia has emerged as a key regional actor in the Somalia conflict. The justification for the Ethiopia's attempts in Somalia stemmed from the growing security threats posed by the Al-Shabaab organization. This is particularly concerning, as Somalia has remained a conducive environment for terrorist activity over the past years. As a result, the Ethiopia's political, military, and intelligence presence in the region became stronger, leading to an increase in the Ethiopian power. Ethiopia has frequently engaged in the military interventions in Somalia, enabling it to extend its influence beyond its own borders (Aimé, 2013).

Multiple strategic reasons for Addis Ababa have motivated the Ethiopia's engagement in Somalia since the overthrow of President Siyad Barre's government in 1991. One of the

main reasons is that Ethiopia wants a friendly government in charge of Mogadishu to prevent any attempts to reclaim the Somali region of Ethiopia in eastern Ethiopia. Additionally, Ethiopia wants to ensure that Somalia does not become a safe place for the Ethiopian rebel groups. In addition, Ethiopia seeks to prevent regional actors, such as Egypt and Eritrea, from gaining significant influence over the Somali internal affairs. Hence, Ethiopia advocates for the existence of a fragile Somali government that relies on the Ethiopian assistance and revolves around it. Several regional parties, including Kenya, have endorsed this method to further their strategic interests, some of which are in line with the objectives of Addis Ababa, regardless of their regional rivalry (Chukwuma Okoli & Chijioke Iwuamadi, 2021). Ethiopia has supported the transitional government in its fight against the Islamic Courts Union, claiming to be doing so to safeguard both countries, which is the rationale for its involvement. This involvement, however, marked the beginning of the escalation, and Ethiopia did not intend to mediate the dispute between the Islamic Courts and the government. The Somali officials and Ethiopians saw the courts' decision to respond militarily to this intervention as a sign of coup plotting and power grab, ignoring the fact that this was actually a response to their own actions.

Over the past decade, Ethiopia has worked to establish its political influence in Somalia by manipulating the internal political circumstances. Addis Ababa has used its power to achieve its strategic goals in the region. Both international and regional approvals strengthen the Ethiopia's influence in Somalia. The international community argues that the Ethiopia's involvement has been essential for establishments of the security and stability of Somalia. Additionally, Ethiopia has demonstrated its political influence in Somalia by exerting pressure on the government to implement federalism as the country's system of government (Gilkes, 2002). Addis Ababa played a substantial role in shaping several regional and local governing bodies in Somalia. It also provided backing for the agreements and gatherings that led to the creation of certain the Somali states, such as Southwest Somalia and Jubaland. Since 1980, Ethiopia has maintained strong relations with Somali nations like Somaliland and Puntland, providing support for their survival and Addis Ababa established its consulate in 2010 and provides it with political and military assistance. As a result, the federal government of Somalia began to recognize Puntland and Somaliland as the regions that work for the Ethiopian interests (Cornwell, 2006).

Late in 2019, Addis Ababa deployed a unit of armed forces to Galmudug State. In December 2018, Addis Ababa sent its military troops to capture Mukhtar Robow, a previous candidate for the presidency of the Somalia's southwestern state (Menkhaus, 2007). The government, under the leadership of former President Mohamed Farmajo, ordered this action. Violent confrontations erupted between the Ethiopian military troops and the Roobo army rebels in response to the Abdullah Farmajo's intervention. Farmajo used the Ethiopian forces to overthrow certain key competitors in Somalia, including Ahmed Madobe in Jubbaland State, who had the Kenya's support. In the midst of the 2019 state elections, the Ethiopian military positioned themselves in the Gedo area, which is located to the north of Jubbaland State, to ensure security. Ethiopia and Somalia share a border, but the recent arrests of leaders in Jubbaland State highlight the level of Ethiopian involvement in the Somali's internal affairs¹⁸.

According to Mulat "The Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia went beyond political activity; it also included efforts to address the country's problems". Instead, Addis Ababa believed that it could influence its crucial field and determine the course of the Somali crisis by using all necessary measures, including military action. Additionally, Ethiopia is deeply concerned about the growing power of terrorist organizations in Mogadishu (Mulat, 2016). This could potentially lead to a revival of radical Islamic movements in the country, especially given the Addis Ababa's opposition to the foundation of an Islamic Government in the eastern region. In 2006, Ethiopia justified its direct military intervention in Somalia by fighting against terrorism and safeguarding its vital interests. The previous Prime Minister of Ethiopian Meles Zenawi expressed his concerns in 2002 that Somalia could become a new Taliban stronghold in the Horn of Africa, prompting Ethiopia to take this action (Karat, 2019). Ethiopia has defended its involvement in Somalia based on the lack of a robust central government that exercises its authority and influence across all regions of the country. Addis Ababa recognizes its right to ensure its security and defend itself against the security threats exacerbated by the conditions in Somalia. Ethiopia openly expresses its aspirations in Mogadishu, as it sought to exert control over the nation by occupying three regions in southern Somalia in 1996. However, Ethiopia later withdrew its military troops in response to international

¹⁸ Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia," International Crisis Group. March 7, 2022.
<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b158-ending-dangerous-standoff-southern-somalia>

pressure after the Somali transitional government filed a complaint with the United Nations. In late 2011, the Ethiopian military was involved with a similar intervention in Somalia, collaborating with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which later became the ATMIS Mission (Møller, 2009b). During this intervention, Ethiopia played a significant role in driving out the Al-Shabaab Mujahedeen Movement from various regions in the southern and central parts of Somalia. The regions mentioned include Hiran, Baldwin, Baidoa, Bey, Bakool, and Galgduud. The Ethiopian government collaborates with the administration of Somaliland, which has a long border and is situated near strategically important areas of Ethiopia, such as Jijiga, the capital of the Somali region in Ethiopia. This collaboration focuses on security issues, information sharing, and intelligence exchange. The ultimate goal is for the relative peace in Somaliland to contribute to regional stability, which aligns with the Addis Ababa's interests. In 2016, the Ethiopian military took action in Puntland State to dismantle the Al-Shabaab's effectiveness, creating the impression that Ethiopia was prepared to safeguard its allies within Ethiopia from the country's escalating security risks (Schneidman, 2019).

On January 1, 2024, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland President Musa Bihi signed a contentious memorandum of understanding. The agreement entails Ethiopia acquiring a maritime access point on the Somali coast, granting Somaliland a share in Ethiopian Airlines, and contemplating Somaliland's recognition as an autonomous country (Schneidman, 2019). The decision sparked extensive demonstrations in Somalia, prompting the Somali government to summon its ambassador from Addis Ababa for discussions. Somalia's President, Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, cautioned about

the potential ramifications on stability and safety in the Horn of Africa area, which is already struggling with the armed conflicts and disasters.




Figure 9 : The Ethiopian –Somalia Disputes

Sources: Ankara Declaration Reduces Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions but Leaves Unresolved Gaps.

The above figure shows the disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia over the last two years, and the tensions between the two countries increased after the Somali central government signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkey that was mostly about a defense and economic deals to rebuild the Somali Navy after Ethiopia signed port agreements with Somaliland (formerly part of Somalia). The figure also indicates that Egyptian officials announced plans for a joint military agreement with Somalia (Analytica, 2018).

Ethiopia maintains its military presence in Somalia to further establish its legitimacy. It capitalizes on the international community's apprehension regarding the potential security vacuum that could arise from the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. The belief that such a withdrawal could lead to further disorder and the resurgence of warlord authority is the root of this anxiety. The Ethiopian military engagement in Somalia worsened the destabilization of the country and had an adverse consequence on the efforts to build peace and establish a functioning state¹⁹. There are individuals who claim that Ethiopia

¹⁹ Somalia accuses Ethiopian troops of 'illegal' incursion," Reuters, June 24,2024.

aims to divide Somalia into smaller, weaker parts in order to prevent it from being a security concern in the future. The inability of Ethiopia to achieve a military victory in Mogadishu, along with fragmented and vulnerable Somalia, suggests that the Ethiopia's primary goal in Somalia is to maintain its dominant position in the area and strengthen its influence in the future.

b. Kenya

Conflicts over borders among neighboring countries are an inherent and inevitable fact. Because of the intersection of tribes and nationalities, the colonial powers frequently divided local communities and disrupted the Africa's social structure in order to advance their own agendas. The British governments unilaterally incorporated significant Somali territories into Kenya and Ethiopia without providing any financial compensation, while Somalia failed to acknowledge the impact of the borders imposed by the Western colonial powers. The conflict in Somalia seemingly originated from internal factors, namely the tribal nature of Somali society and the oppressive and unjust ruling structure. These factors are the primary catalysts for the outbreak of the conflict. Nevertheless, the involvement of internal actors, particularly influential international and regional powers, is equally significant, if not the primary cause, for the initiation and perpetuation of this conflict. Given that the Somalia's population is ethnically homogeneous, it is true that ideological, ethnic, or other factors did not cause the differences that occurred there. Politicians who wanted to take power instead caused the emergency of armed conflicts. Clan rivalry, which has become common among the Somali people, led to these conflicts. In Kenya, there is one region that is predominantly Somali. The British colonial authorities were involved in this region, and to this day, Somalis are seeking to reclaim it. Regrettably, the collapse of Somalia's central government has complicated these efforts. Kenya has been among the countries to intervene in the Somalia internal conflict in recent years (Aengwony et al., 2019).


A territorial deal between Britain and Italy in 1925 separated the Kenyan region of Somalia from Greater Somalia. The significant population of Somalis in the Kenyan colony prevented the Italian colony in southern Somalia from absorbing all the Somalis in the south. This required the two parties to give up territories between the two colonies. Britain lost the Jubaland region, currently in Somalia, situated west of the Juba River and

previously part of Kenyan territory as they claim, to Italy, which incorporated it into its Somali colony, in return for the acquisition of portions of southern Somalia to the British colony in Kenya, referred to as the North-Eastern Region (Simpson, 2020).

As mentioned earlier a conflict over territorial boundaries has erupted in the border areas between neighboring ethnicities or kingdoms on the African continent, causing security issues. The colonial powers increased these tensions by favoring certain nationalities over others, implementing a divide and rule strategy. As per usual, the British colonial authority supported Kenya over Somalia, just as they did with Ethiopia, to the detriment of Somalia. Subsequently, he incorporated important share of the Somali territories into both Kenya and Ethiopia, leveraging their shared Christian beliefs. Kenya's interventions in Somalia primarily focus on two main issues: the border dispute between Somalia and Kenya, which involves the northeastern region of Kenya as the conflict site, and the maritime boundary in the Indian Ocean. The maritime dispute between Somalia and Kenya originated in 2005, when Kenya unilaterally changed the route of the maritime borderline, neglecting the established land borderline between both states (Law, 2022). Kenya attempted to exploit the Somalia's internal difficult situation at the time, as well as the lack of a United Nations-registered convention for maritime border delimitation between the two countries.

European exploration companies identified eight locations suitable for oil exploration off the coast, as shown in the figure below. Out of them, seven are located in the disputed area. These companies have linked the current problem to the region's recent discovery of oil and gas. The Kenyan government has issued exploration permits to four corporations for these sites, and they are American Anadarko, Italian Eni, and French Total Company²⁰.

²⁰Abdikadir Khalif, "Maritime Dispute: Somalia rejects mediation offer", The East African, July 25 2023, <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/maritime-dispute-somalia-rejects-mediation-offer-4315018>.



Maps 5: Somalia and Kenya Area Disputes

Sources: Disputed maritime border

Somalia's approach outlines its marine boundaries in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) principles and regulations (Association, 2014). Somalia establishes its borders by extending them horizontally along the southeast latitude line. According to Article 57 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the width of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) should not exceed 200 nautical miles from the baselines used to calculate the territorial sea's breadth. Therefore, it is crucial to extend the maritime boundary from the land border between Kenya and Somalia to a distance of 200 Marine miles. On the geographical map, this extension should go horizontally towards the southeast. Failure to do so would result in Somalia losing a portion of its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone (Association, 2014). Two primary arguments support the Kenyan position: The two countries have reached a bilateral agreement. In this memorandum, Kenya argues that it reached an agreement with the Somali government in 2009 regarding the demarcation of maritime borders between the two nations. Kenya argues that Somalia ignored international norms by choosing to bring the matter before the International Court of Justice instead of seeking a peaceful

resolution²¹. According to this memorandum, the Kenyan government believes that the International Court does not have the authority to investigate this conflict (Harefa & Astuti, 2025b).

Two things make the memorandum of understanding between Somalia and Kenya unproductive. Firstly, it does not clearly specify the line of maritime boundaries. The agreement ensures that both countries will abstain from obstructing each other's appeals to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, regardless of any eventual determination on maritime boundaries. Second, regardless of the physical delineation of their maritime borders, any country may submit a report that includes the contested region. In addition, the letter states that the UN Commission's suggestions will not affect their maritime dispute and the Somali Parliament invalidated the memorandum, informing the United Nations that it had cancelled and would not be completed (Ioannides, 2021). A number of factors contribute to the Kenya's economy, including the presence of several United Nations organizations and international embassies in the city of Nairobi, as well as the many conferences held there that are directly or indirectly linked to the Somali crisis. A major blow to the Kenya's economy came when the Somalia's President, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, ordered the transfer of these offices to the capital city of Mogadishu. Furthermore, the Kenyan military, which is involved in the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), not only serves as the political extension of the Kenyan government and supports the execution of its economic plans in the Somali state of Jubaland, but it also fulfills an economic function. This is because of its strategic positioning in crucial areas of the capital city, Mogadishu, such as the airport and the main governmental headquarters (McEvoy, 2013).

During the colonial period, Kenya played an intervention role, specifically in the North Eastern Province, commonly referred to as Northern Frontier District (NFD). Formerly a British colony, the North Eastern Province is Kenya's third-largest province, with thirteen electoral districts represented in the Kenyan General Assembly. In 1948, the colonial authorities included the North Eastern Province into Kenya after conducting a referendum for the region's population, who ultimately declined the occupation. In 1963, Kenya

²¹ *Kenya-Somalia dispute threatens an embattled Horn of Africa*, " Relief web, March 16, 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/kenya-somalia-dispute-threatens-embattled-horn-africa>

conducted a referendum in which the Somalis decided to join the Somali Republic. However, Kenya, in collaboration with the British authority, subsequently rejected the referendum. The Kenyan authorities in the region have engaged in unlawful activities, including criminal crimes, large-scale killings, and sexual assault of children, in order to force this resilient population into acquiescence. The authorities' actions at Gaarisa resulted in a genuine tragedy for the city's residents. Additionally, Kenya committed war crimes in the city of Wajeer, which the United Nations recognized as "the most significant violations of human rights in the Kenya's history." Furthermore, the country's political elites have severely neglected the region, disregarding its fundamental requirements and denying its residents their rightful entitlements, comparable to those enjoyed by citizens in other regions of the country (D. M. Anderson, 2015). Currently, the eastern sector remains economically connected to the border regions of Somalia. The Wagalla Massacre not only caused damage to the community in that region, but also altered its social cohesiveness, the Wagalla Massacre, a well-known human rights violation in Kenya, took place on February 10, 1984. According to Annalenna Tonelli, the Kenyan security forces targeted ethnic Somalia people in the Northeast region of Kenya, particularly at the Wagalla Airfield in Wajeer County, subjecting them to brutal conditions such as stripping them naked and leaving them under the scorching sun for days, before many of them faced execution (Vercillo, 2016).

Following the collapse of the central government in Somalia, Kenya emerged as one of the neighboring countries involved in the internal conflict within the country. This intervention primarily involved military action, as evidenced by the Kenya's direct military engagement in October 2011, known as "Operation Linda Nchi." Kenya utilized its military capabilities to lessen the threat from al-Shabab and safeguard its borders. Kenya became a participant in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2012 and conducted multiple operations targeting the al-Shabab terrorist group²². Other efforts in Kenya significantly affected internal political dynamics, supporting certain factions of regional leaders, such as Jubaland, located near Kenya's borders due to its important buffer zones. Additionally, Kenya participated in diplomatic mediations for the Somali national reconciliation conference, which took place in Kenya from 2002 to 2004, leading

²² ACCORD, "Kenya's military intervention in Somalia, October 1, 2021, <https://www.acCORD.org.za/publication/kenya-s-military-intervention-in-somalia/>

to the establishment of the Somali transitional federal government (TFG). Kenya significantly contributed to the stabilization of Somalia's political situation while concurrently promoting its own interests. Additionally, there are ongoing economic engagements, particularly in investment and trade, which are characterized by competition for resources such as maritime conflict, gas-rich waters, and oil reserves (Ogembo & Ichani, 2024).

Kenya utilized both diplomatic and military means to safeguard its security, defend its territories, and pursue its expansionist goals and economic interests. This group of soldiers has successfully infiltrated Somali territory using a variety of justifications, all in pursuit of their ambitious undertaking known as "Azania." The Somali regional authorities have supported and executed this project, which spans three specific districts in Somalia: Gedo, Middle Juba, and Lower Juba. On October 18, 2011, the Kenyan military entered the Somali territory, claiming self-defenses due to an ongoing series of kidnappings by Al-Shabaab for Kenyan people. The movement issued a warning, stating that it would initiate operations within the Kenyan borders unless Nairobi withdrew its military soldiers from the Somali territory (Throup, 2012).

In a positive way, Somalian and Kenyan Defense forces collaborated to initiate assaults on Al-Shabaab organization-controlled areas, ultimately liberating vast areas from the militants' control, despite the fact that they are members and part of African peacekeeping forces that support the Somalia's government. To legally secure its presence in the Somali territory and obtain external funding for its forces, Kenya sought to court the African Union, which in turn was looking for additional forces to participate in the African peacekeeping forces in Somalia.

C. Djibouti

Djibouti plays a significant and multifaceted role in the Somalia conflicts, primarily focusing on diplomatic, humanitarian, and military instruments. In recent years, it has served as the sole mediator in several peace negotiations in Somalia, including the 2000 Arta Peace Conference, which resulted in the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG). Djibouti consistently participates in the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and actively engages with struggling rebel groups,

particularly Al-Shabab. Since 2011, Djibouti has sent military forces to Somalia, a municipality in the Hiiraan region of Somalia, with the goal of ensuring security and assisting the Somali governance (Williams, 2018). Additionally, Djibouti provides training and operational assistance to the Somali military forces, certifying the establishment of an independent and self-sufficient security system. Additionally, the Djibouti's military has been actively counter-insurgency, safeguarding important urban areas, fortifying transportation networks, and initiating offensives against rebel strongholds.

The 1991 Djibouti Peace Conference played a crucial role in achieving peace in Somalia after the downfall of the Siyad Barre dictatorship in the late 1980s. The Summit's goal was to convene the conflicting factions and political figures to engage in negotiations about peace and stability. With the assistance of international stakeholders and Djibouti, the meeting concluded with the appointment of Ali Mahdi Mohamed as interim president, with the aim of creating a unified national administration. Nevertheless, despite these endeavors, the violent war endures, underscoring the complex obstacles that Somalia confronts (Nyadera et al., 2019). A competition for dominance in seaports is currently taking place in the Horn of Africa. Djibouti is actively striving to enhance its regional influence as a significant center for trade and security. Djibouti has experienced limited regional rivalry in recent years. Sanctions have isolated Eritrea from the international community, while the Al-Shabaab organization and piracy activities along its coast have posed security challenges for Somalia. Nevertheless, there is a noticeable emergence competition for important ports due to the increasing interest in the port of Berbera in Somaliland (Ylönen, 2021). This port has the potential to serve as a crucial entry point to East Africa. The significant competition between the Port of Berbera and the Port of Djibouti highlights the significant value of the Horn of Africa in international commerce, as well as the region's potential for economic expansion and progress. The formation of the Port of Berbera presents a competitive challenge to Djibouti, namely in terms of catering to the Ethiopia's extensive market. Historically, Ethiopia has heavily depended on Djibouti for the majority of its trade. However, for the last few years, Ethiopia has expressed a desire to broaden its access to ports in order to decrease its reliance on a single route from a single country (Cannon & Rossiter, 2017).

Conference initiated by the United Nations in 2008–2009, the Djibouti peace process for Somalia sought to promote stability and peacefulness in an area plagued by prolonged instability and war. The goal of this conference was to unite different factions in Somalia in order to establish a more inclusive and representative government. Nevertheless, it faced significant obstacles, mostly due to the omission of crucial factions and parties from the negotiations. The rejection of certain voices like Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Somaliland and also some of regional authorities, alike Puntland and some of clan leaders during the peace talks weakened the overall effectiveness of the negotiations, as it failed to include important perspectives that may have enhanced the strength and durability of the resulting peace deal (Kasaija, 2011). Despite all these difficulties, the Djibouti's significant role in contributing to the resolution of conflicts in the region is remarkable. The Horn of Africa conflicts, especially the one in Somalia, have featured the Djibouti's active participation as a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

On May 9, 2000, the National Reconciliation Conference took place in Arta, Djibouti. The purpose of the conference was to deliberate on the peace proposal put forth by Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh. Over 300 delegates from the Somali clans participated in the conference for the first time. Over four complete months, the event culminated in the creation of a provisional constitution for the country. Additionally, 245 representatives from various Somali tribes established a national parliament. On August 26, the country appointed Abdiqasim Salad Hassan as its president for a term of three years. Twenty-four hours later, he solemnly swore the constitutional oath in the presence of prominent figures from various nations and organizations, such as the Presidents of some African countries like Ethiopia, Sudan, and Eritrea, as well as delegates from the United Nations, the European Union, the United States, the Arab League, and the Organization of African Unity. At that time, Somalia regained, and the conference became a successful meeting for Somali people (Mukhtar, 2007).

Djibouti, a neighboring country to Somalia, also maintains a complex role in regional affairs, which could potentially lead to adverse outcomes for Somalia. It has the potential to disrupt the Somalia's internal conflicts by sponsoring specific political groups and intensifying internal separations and disputes. Djibouti takes advantage of the Somalia's instability to enhance its economic position by channeling trade to its ports, expanding

economic reliance, and weakening motivations to promote stability in Somalia (Bereketeab, 2016). Foreign military installations, such as those found in the United States and France, are a subject of controversy due to their potential divergence from local interests and their tendency to aggravate local conflicts. The Djibouti's involvement in global geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa may lead to actions that advance strategic goals, yet negatively impact peace and development in Somalia.

3.3. The Interventions and Influence of the Western Countries

Somalia faced a difficult situation characterized by the breakdown of central government institutions, the proliferation of armed groups, and the clan conflicts, compounded by international and regional affairs, competition, and clashes among different Somali groups. Consequently, the government established three local authorities in the three areas of the country, each governing its own region. This led to the fragmentation of Somalia into various regions. International intervention is not a new occurrence in the history of international relations, but it emerged considerably in the 1990s. After the Cold War ended and a new international order emerged, it went through tremendous change, with its laws progressively evolving to reflect the present circumstances. Once the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States of America emerged as the sole global powerhouse capable of asserting its dominance and control. During this time, there was a noticeable decrease in international disputes and an increase in wars and internal conflicts in many countries, particularly in Africa and Somalia faced a difficult situation characterized by the collapse of the central government, an increasing number of armed groups, and intertribal conflicts. External interference, political power competition, and clashes among different Somali factions further complicated this situation. Consequently, the country established three local governing bodies in its three regions, each capable of exerting influence over its respective government. This resulted in the fragmentation of Somalia into multiple regions. Tensions and rivalries arose among various regions, resulting in inter-tribal warfare within the same geographical locations. While this section examines the involvement and significant interventions of some Western countries in the Somalia conflicts over the past year, the European Union asserts that it has actively supported the reconstruction of the Somali army by providing expertise, financial support, and training to the Somali forces. This is part of their strategy to promote regional stability in the Horn of Africa, which encompasses ensuring security in the Red Sea and combating

piracy off the Somali coast to safeguard international trade passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (Tobing & Windiani, 2020). The United States of America, the United Kingdom, and Italy primarily play a significant role in the Western countries' intervention and influence on the conflict in Somalia. While there may be other countries involved, these three powers have primary roles. They claimed that their interventions, which encompass military actions, humanitarian aid, and diplomatic efforts, aim to stabilize Somalia, address humanitarian crises, and combat terrorism.

a. The United States

As mentioned earlier after the downfall of the Siyad Barre dictatorship, Somalia plunged into a state of extreme anarchy and lack of a functioning central government. Conflicts emerged among the Somali factions with the aim of gaining control over the territory and establishing a new country. However, the United States had already implemented a plan to divide Somalia before the toppling of the central government. Moreover, ethnic and interest-driven ambitions, not political ideologies, motivated these conflicting forces, leading to the country's fragmentation. International factors had an effect on the Somali crisis that went beyond what was happening in Somalia itself. This allowed international actors to step in after the international aid organizations folded. In the 1970s, the United States of America set up a military station in northern Somalia to strengthen its position in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, the US supplied Somalia with a significant amount of deadly weapons to protect its interests from the Russian threat. The bilateral relations between the two nations experienced a substantial decline; with the loss of a considerable number of American military personnel during the operation restore hope in Somalia (Mangi, 1987). The US action in Somalia in 1992-1993 mostly aimed to strategically protect its military interests and avoid being deeply involved in a failing UN mission, rather than being solely motivated by humanitarian concerns. In addition, the Former US President George W. Bush decided to get involved in Somalia a few months before he left office. He wanted an effortless military victory that would show the portion the US plays in the world. The US also got involved in Somalia to protect its own interests. It accomplished this by allowing its own companies to conduct oil research. The action happened with the help of the UN, and the only reason given was that the humanitarian situation was getting worse (Recchia, 2020a). According to John L. Hirsch and R. Oakley, “the United States led a global military alliance with the goal of creating stability in


southern Somalia, improving humanitarian conditions in the region, and allowing the distribution of humanitarian assistance from the United Nations and donor countries. The Unified Division troops, also known as coalition troops, began their entry in December 1992 as part of Operation "Restore Hope" in accordance with Security Council Resolution No. 794" (Hirsch & Oakley, 1995a). International troops successfully re-established stability in southern Somalia and mitigated the impact of the country's famine, but the majority of American soldiers had withdrawn from the country by May 1993. The Security Council Resolution No. 837 mandated the second international peacekeeping force to replace the Unified Division Forces in Somalia on May. Mohamed Farah Aideed, one of the famous militia leaders in Mogadishu, perceived the presence of international peacekeeping forces as a danger to his power and consequently commanded his armed militias to attack the Pakistani forces stationed in Mogadishu. This attack resulted in the injuries of approximately 80 peacekeeping personnel from various countries. The conflict continued, leading to the fatalities of 19 American, two Pakistani, and Malaysian soldiers who were part of the peacekeeping force. Additionally, around 1,000 members of the armed Somali militias lost their lives during the period from October 3 to 4, 1993. Military history now recognizes this period as the "Battle of Mogadishu". In response to this, the United Nations initiated Operation "Unified Shield" on March 3, 1995, deploying a coalition of American, Egyptian, and Pakistani soldiers. Nevertheless, despite suffering substantial human losses, these forces failed to create a civilian government in Somalia until the declaration of Aideed's death in Mogadishu in June 1996 (Razack, 2004). The United States justified its engagement in Somalia by combating terrorism, establishing a secure area, and addressing the challenge of the country's lack of a widely accepted government. However, the reality is different. The United States intervened in Somalia in response to the deaths of its troops in 1993, with the aim of asserting dominance over the Somalia's strategic location and facilitating the transportation of oil tankers across the Horn of Africa. Moreover, Somalia plays a crucial role as a strategic access point to the Arabian Gulf area, the Indian Ocean, and East Asia, thereby amplifying the geopolitical importance of Somali ports.

In the Djibouti conference, when considering the US policy toward Islamic political movements, it is helpful to consider the country's fundamental objective of advancing its economic and security interests. In Somalia, the United States wanted to adopt a new

strategy based on supporting moderate Islamic movements in political systems for the same economic and security reasons as it was interested in fostering the participation of Islamic movements in government. After the Islamic courts in Somalia changed their organizational structure, intellectual outlook, and control over Somalia, the international actors, including the US, started to accept them, and this occurred in stark contrast to the collapse of the transitional government and the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. As a result of this approval, the parties were able to sign the Djibouti deal on June 9, 2008, with the US backing, allowing them to put the deal into action for security and the return of stability to Somalia (Mukhtar, 2007).

According to Stefano Recchia, the conventional wisdom about the Operation Restore Hope and the 1992 US intervention in Somalia were that it was a quintessentially humanitarian mission driven by normative concerns, with no traditional US national interests involved, and that President George H. W. Bush, who was personally affected by the humanitarian tragedy, supported the intervention. Furthermore, to the extent that strategic motives influenced the decision, the American leaders chose to intervene in Somalia to lessen the pressure for the US intervention in Bosnia, which they believed would involve far greater risks (Recchia, 2020b). Since gaining its independence, the United States has recognized the strategic importance of Somalia and among the first countries the recognized Somalia as an independent country; however, the political and security instabilities in Somalia influenced the strategy, exerting an influence that extended beyond its borders. The dynamics of the Cold War, particularly the regional aspirations and ideological orientations of the United States and the Soviet Union, affected this strategy. After the Cold War, the United States faced specific difficulties in the internal system of Somalia. This validated by the 1991 overthrow of President Mohamed Siyad Barre, the ensuing destructive civil war, and the subsequent breakdown of government institutions (Stevenson, 1995). Nevertheless, the political and security instabilities in Somalia also influenced the strategy, with consequences that extended beyond its borders. The two phenomena that accompanied this: The first was the emergence of the so-called warlords, and the second was the transformation of Somalia into a failed state according to global indicators for the figure below. It is worth noting

that the American policy towards Somalia included a set of goals and means of implementing these goals²³.



Maps 6: Fragile States Index

Sources: Fragile states Index

The American strategy of expanding its influence in Africa and establishing a dedicated American military command for Africa, known as "AFRICOM," closely links to the internationalization of Red Sea security. The internationalization of Red Sea security is a logical progression of efforts to strengthen the American military presence in Africa. Its implicit aim is to ensure an uninterrupted supply of oil from a continent that already serves as a significant source of energy imports for the United States (Pham, 2014). The security of the Red Sea is critical because it serves as a crucial maritime corridor, connecting the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean. The United States' involvement in this region is crucial for maritime trade and energy security. Because the United States engages in counterterrorism and anti-piracy measures due to the region's susceptibility to the terrorist activities that could potentially target shipping lanes. Additionally, piracy has targeted numerous international business shipments in recent years. However, the United States' primary motivation for remaining in these regions is

²³ Fragile States Index Heat Map, "Fragile States Index, accessed May 28, 2024, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/analytics/fsi-heat-map/>

to maintain strategic rivalry and competition with rival powers like Russia and China, thereby safeguarding the US interests (Shangguan & Seow, 2022).

Bale Doogle Air Base situated in Lower Shebelle Province, about 100 km northwest of the capital city of Mogadishu. It once served as a residence for a force of 30–40 United States troops and armed drones. In 2018, the US military underwent substantial expansion by constructing over 800 beds at Bale Doogle Air Base. This base now ranks as the third biggest gathering of the United States Department of Defense soldiers in Africa, behind Djibouti and Niger. In early 2019, the Pentagon allocated \$12 million to restore emergency runways. Additionally, the United States aims to develop Somalia into a significant strategic center for its military operations in Africa and the Middle East (Ajala, 2018).

b. Italy

The Somalia's advantageous position on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, along with its control over crucial commercial routes to India, Southeast Asia, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean, attracted the European colonial powers. Consequently, these countries partitioned Somalia into distinct geographical areas referred to as British, French, and Italian Somalia. Three European powers controlled Greater Somalia, while Ethiopian colonization of the Hawd Somali region resulted in the division of Greater Somalia among several countries. The dissolution of four countries, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia, fragmented the Somali people. In 1885, Italy began colonial operations in East Africa, aiming to participate in the division of the continent alongside Germany and Britain. The goal was to find prosperous regions of influence compared to their previous attempts around Assab area. Italy began this endeavor by conducting observation and exploration expeditions, deploying warships led by their sea captains to investigate the southern areas of Somalia, including the Juba River region (BUDASZ, 2024). Italy sought to assert dominance over Juba's territories by raising the Italian flag at the Juba River's entrance. Nevertheless, the naval forces stationed at the seaport were unsuccessful in their attempts to achieve any tangible success in exploring this area or navigating the Juba River. After that consequently, they went to Zanzibar. During a meeting with the Sultans of Zanzibar, they expressed the Italian government's desire to develop economic connections with the state of Zanzibar, and the Sultan's lack of cooperation stemmed from

his belief that the Italy's intention was to acquire a port in close proximity to the Juba River's estuary.

From the 19th to the 20th centuries, Italy exerted significant colonial influence in Somalia. It initiated territorial claims over some southern regions of Somalia in 1889 and officially declared Italian Somaliland in 1908. The colonial period had a tremendous influence on the socio-political and economic systems of Somalia, setting the foundation for later conflicts. Today Italy's role in the Somali conflicts is relatively limited compared to other international actors, but it has played other roles in diplomatic efforts for peacekeeping initiatives, as well as in development and economic assistance. These projects primarily support agriculture and assist the central government in rebuilding infrastructure. While Italy did not play a military role, it was a member of the United Nations operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). During the early 1990s, the focus was on bolstering the peace process in Somali conflicts. The Italian participation in the Somali conflict has a deep historical background, commencing in the 20th century, when Italy acquired a colony in Italian Somalia. Following the Somalia's independence in 1960, political and economic ties between Italy and Somalia grew stronger. Over the years, Italy's role in Somalia has developed, as it has provided support for peace initiatives and the reconstruction of the Somali government through the United Nations operations (Tripodi, 1999). Additionally, Italy has been involved in international mediation efforts, peace negotiations, and the provision of humanitarian assistance. However, critics contend that political and economic objectives, sometimes at odds with the interests of the Somali people, influenced the Italian activities in Somalia. Moreover, critics accused Italy of neglecting its responsibility to foster regional stability. Diversity and interdependence characterize the Italian engagement in the Somali conflict, reflecting the convergence of his colonial history, contemporary international politics, and national interests. Although Italy's involvement in the Somali conflicts was minimal, its status as Somalia's southern colony and its economic interest in the situation were significant. Italy has not actively participated in Somalia's internal affairs. After Somalia's independence, the relations between the two countries shifted to diplomatic and humanitarian support. In recent years, Italy has primarily focused on providing assistance for social development, supporting infrastructure for the weak government in Somalia, and

contributing to peacekeeping missions aimed at achieving security and good governance (Ajala, 2018).

c. The United Kingdom

The European colonization of the Horn of Africa region began with the Portuguese exploration in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. The Portuguese government discovered the Cape of Good Hope and established its control over various coastal and African areas, including East Africa. In 1839, the United Kingdom gained colonial power in Greater Somalia by occupying Aden and then extending its control on the Somali coast facing Aden, which is located across the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The British involvement in the Somali conflicts is complicated and connected with several international and regional interests, and the political and historical setting of Somalia offers valuable insights into it. After Somalia's gain of independence in 1960, Britain remained involved in the country's affairs, namely in the northern regions that were formerly under the British colonial administration. Italy's rule over Italian Somaliland, mandated by the UN, provided Somalis with the essential knowledge, political training, and ability for self-governance that was absent in British Somaliland. Due to concerns regarding regional security and counter-terrorism, Britain, along with other Western nations, has shown a keen interest in ensuring peace in Somalia. Beginning in the 19th century with the colonization of the northern portion of Somalia, known as British Somaliland, the British intervention in the Somali conflict significantly influenced the events taking place in this region. After World War II, Britain began the administration of lands formerly under Italian authority, with the aim of reuniting British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. Nevertheless, those efforts were unsuccessful due to political and economic inequalities and obstacles associated with colonial governance. After Somalia gained independence in 1960, the British refrained from active involvement in Somalia's internal matters until the outbreak of civil war in 1991. During this period, Western countries mostly concentrated on providing humanitarian assistance and participating in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations (Ajala, 2018). Over the past few years, the British government has offered humanitarian aid and backed peace efforts, but it has refrained from engaging in direct military intervention like the United States and Ethiopia. Additionally, Britain actively participates in international conferences to foster

regional stability and strives to facilitate peaceful resolutions to Somalia's problems. Nevertheless, Somalia's political sway is somewhat constrained compared to neighboring nations like Ethiopia, which play a more prominent and engaged role in Somali affairs²⁴.

According to the Michael Jones In a last with roots dating back to the colonial period, Britain contributes influential role in intervening in conflicts in Somalia, particularly in the Somaliland region, where it maintains significant political, economic, and even social influence. During the colonial era, their intervention contributed to the divisions among tribes. In the post-independence era, Britain continued its diplomatic influence on Somali issues, particularly during the breakup of the central government in Somalia. In a positive sense, Britain provided humanitarian and diplomatic assistance, supported international efforts to rebuild the Somali government, and participated in international Somalia conferences (Walls & Elmi, 2012). The UK has been involved in the fighting in Somalia because it was a foreign power with close connections to the area. Occasionally, Somali participants express suspicion toward the UK's involvement, perceiving it as a reflection of their past control or involvement. The United Kingdom is dedicating significant resources to combating terrorism, particularly targeting Al-Shabab organizations, which may impede efforts to foster peace in other regions. This narrow focus can cause groups to feel forgotten or mistreated, potentially leading them toward radicalism. Mismanagement in Somali government institutions has resulted in the waste or theft of a significant amount of UK aid. This makes UK-funded activities less effective and gives people in both the UK and Somalia less hope. Moreover, UK efforts frequently overlook the challenges inherent in Somali culture, such as the functioning of clanism and the local construction of power, leading to the failure or poor acceptance of programs (Doornbos & Markakis, 1994).

²⁴ UK Parliament, The UK's policy towards Somalia : Government Response to the Committees' Second Report (London: UK Parliament,2024), accessed August 18,2024, <https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/2504/documents/28421/default/>

Category of Intervention	Western Actions/Involvement	Impact on Somalia's Conflicts	Long-Term Consequences
Military Interventions	UNOSOM I/II (1990s) US Operation "Gothic Serpent" (1993, Black Hawk Down) EU NAVFOR (anti-piracy, 2008–present) US drone strikes vs. Al-Shabaab	Failed state stabilization Rise of warlords & Al-Shabaab Anti-piracy success but lingering insecurity	Distrust of foreign forces Persistent insurgency Militarization of conflict
Political & Diplomatic Influence	Support for Somalia Federal Gov. Recognition of Federal Gov. of Somalia UN/EU-backed elections & constitution	Weak governance & corruption Clan rivalries exploited Limited central authority	Dependency on foreign legitimacy Slow political progress
Humanitarian & Economic Aid	Food aid & NGOs (e.g., WFP, USAID) IMF/World Bank loans (structural adjustments) Remittances from diaspora	Short-term relief but aid diversion Economic dependency Elite capture of resources	Aid politicization Undermined local economies
Economic Exploitation	Illegal fishing by EU/Asian trawlers Land grabs by foreign investors Oil/gas exploration deals (e.g., UK, USA and etc.)	Resource conflicts Loss of livelihoods (fishing/agriculture) Environmental degradation	Deepened poverty Fueled grievances against foreigners

Table 3: Interventions and Influence of Western Countries in Somalia's Conflicts

Source: Created by the author

The Table above outlines the many roles, actions, and impacts of Western nations in Somalia's conflict. Western involvement in Somalia via military, political, and humanitarian efforts has resulted in both stability and unforeseen repercussions, such as enduring conflict and reliance. External engagement has compromised government by army interventions, economic exploitation, and political meddling, hence promoting criminality. Although these measures provide short respite, they have resulted in enduring insecurity and diminished sovereignty. Currently, Somalia is fragile and distrustful of international actors as it seeks greater autonomy.

d. The role of the African Union

Africa is the only continent experiencing an increase in the rate of armed conflicts, with the Horn of Africa region, particularly Somalia, serving as a prime example. The prolonged civil war, spanning almost ten years, resulted in the loss of over half a million Somali lives, the fragmentation of the country's borders, and converted this significant African country into a paradigmatic case for understanding the impact of conflict on regional stability. The African Union is actively endeavoring to deal with security challenges in Somalia, and the civil conflicts in Somalia have major implications within the framework of internal conflicts in Africa. While the African continent had several

instances of state collapse, this particular example stands out as the only one that completely disintegrated. Nevertheless, the collapse seen was only partial and of short duration, since some organizations with the ability to resolve the issue in their favour were present. Somalia is the only country that has experienced a prolonged and complete fragmentation of its government following the downfall of President Mohamed Siyad Barre's administration (Mohamoud, 2006). The African Union intervened in this region to establish peace and security, reflecting the continent's security concerns among regional and global problems. Hence, the resolution of these internal barriers and the approach towards resolving border conflicts are the key factors that shape the destiny of this cooperation. In response to the severe humanitarian conditions suffered by the Somali people, the African Peace and Security Council took action by adopting a decision on May 1, 2005, to send a peace mission to Somalia. The goal of this mission was to assist the transitional government in Somalia by supporting the construction of state institutions and creating a secure environment for humanitarian aid distribution. Significant debates took place in parliament over this matter, resulting in the submission of a draft law by the opposing and supporting teams. The proposed bill aims to exclude neighboring countries from participating in the African intervention forces. On the 18th of the same month, parliament conducted a vote on this matter, with the majority dismissing the government's proposed legislation. Meanwhile, the legislator who opposed the inclusion of neighboring countries received 156 votes out of 219 attendees, while 56 voted in favor of these countries' participation. Consequently, the outcome was a series of intense confrontations among the delegates in that particular meeting (Doornbos & Markakis, 1994).

Both transitional governments, under the leadership of Abdul Qasim Salah and later Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, have strongly lobbied for the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Somalia. In March 2005, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed submitted a draft law to Somalia Parliament to support this objective. On July 5, 2005, the African Peace and Security Council for the African Union resolved to dispatch the African Union Mission to Support Peace in Somalia in order to support the transitional government's institutions. To ensure the success of the mission, the Council requested during the same meeting that the African Union Commission compile a report regarding the decision and provide recommendations regarding the mission's effectiveness, composition, tasks, and financing (Neethling, 2005). In July 2006, the foreign ministers of the Intergovernmental

Authority Organization on Development (IGAD) held a meeting and granted President Abdullahi Yusuf's appeal to deploy troops from neighboring nations to Somalia in order to provide assistance to the government. Following a conference of military chiefs in Nairobi, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) took decisive action by deploying a troop force of 7,000 to Somalia in support of the African Forces deployment plan. On this issue, a difference of opinion between the countries that supported the intervention (Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda) and those opposed it (Eritrea and Djibouti). The last group thinks it is wrong to send African peacekeepers to Somalia before the Islamic Courts and the Transitional Government have reached an agreement on the matter. The latter signifies a less influential stance, as it failed to impede the momentum of the ongoing endeavors in this matter (Murithi, 2013).

Following the breakdown of the central government in Somalia, the African Union's involvement in the country considered a significant international operation that played a role in mitigating disorder and violence. The United Nations Security Council Resolutions established the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in 2007. Its primary objective was to assist the Transitional Federal Government in fighting the escalating dangers presented by the armed Al-Shabaab organization and other armed factions. ATMIS played a critical role in restoring a certain level of stability in key regions, including the Somalia's capital city, by offering military and security assistance, as well as training and preparing the Somali forces to independently handle their security responsibilities. Although the military operation has achieved some progress, significant problems continue, including the ongoing existence of armed factions and the difficulty of creating strong and permanent national institutions in Somalia (Omar Ali, 2015).

e. United Nations

One of the fundamentals of contemporary international law is the non-interference principle, which states that no party should refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of another state. This principle serves to uphold the legitimacy of each state's political independence and territorial integrity, as well as the sovereignty of the countries that represent it. This principle aims to grant the state the freedom to use its powers within its territory without any external intervention from other states or international/regional

organizations, as long as such interference interferes with the state's sovereignty and independence (Milojevic, 1997).

The United Nations, an exceptional coalition of sovereign states, joined to collaborate towards global peacefulness and societal advancement. The United Nations formally created in 1945 by 51 founding member states, with the idea originating from the aftermath of World War II (1939–1945). The World leaders who played a crucial role in ending the war were acutely aware of the pressing necessity for a system to facilitate peace and prevent future conflicts. They recognized that obtaining this goal demanded cooperation among all states within a worldwide institution. The United Nations made an effort toward the end of the Cold War to resolve regional disputes that threatened international stability and affected a number of nations, mostly in Africa. The Security Council accomplished this by adopting multiple resolutions regarding these matters. In the United Nations Charter, there is not a legal text that directly lists issues that threaten international peace and security for the Council to look at when changing positions and dealing with conflicts. According to Article 39 of the Charter, the Council has extensive discretionary power to modify and determine instances of endangerment to global peace and security. In addition, the 1990s were a time when these wars gave the Security Council a chance to expand its authority by redefining what constitutes a danger to world peace and security (Yamashita, 2007).

The United Nations intervened in Somalia in 1991 to resolve the conflict, which threatened international peace and security. The UN approved Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar's initiative to bring peace to Somalia. Following discussions with the new Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN agreed to dispatch a team of senior UN officials to Somalia for negotiations with the conflicting Somali factions and forces. The goal was to reach an agreement that would end fighting and allow international humanitarian organizations to work in Somali territory to deliver aid to civilians. The United Nations succeeded in discontinuing the famine that killed around 350,000 Somalis between 1991 and 1992. However, there is consensus that the United Nations failed to find a political settlement and caused complications in the political and security situation (Clark, 1992).

After the collapse of the central government, the complicated political crisis left the Somali people in an awful state of poverty, famine, and displacement both within and outside Somalia. International and regional organizations launched the delivery of food and medical supplies to Somalia in order to avoid the epidemic of hunger and disease among the civilian population. However, certain armed tribes looted humanitarian aid and obstructed relief operations in conflict-hit areas. As a result, the United Nations negotiated a deal with the primary factions involved in the Somali conflict, namely Ali Mahdi and Mohamed Aideed, in southern Somalia, particularly the capital city. This agreement entailed deploying a contingent of 500-armed soldiers to Somalia with the purpose of maintaining order at Mogadishu Airport and safeguarding humanitarian aid shipments. It is worth noting that Aideed strongly disagreed with this strategic plan. The opponent, Ali Mahdi, expressed approval of the deployment of these forces because they would limit Aideed's influence. In January 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution No. 733, which forbade the sale of weapons and called for a truce and diplomatic solutions to the conflict (Drysdale, 2018).

In 1992, the Security Council issued Resolution No. 767 and Resolution 775. In light of these resolutions and the failures of the peacekeeping mission in Somalia, the United States of America advocated for an exchange of UN troops with American soldiers within a relatively short timeline of no more than three or four months. Prior to the initiation of the "Restore Hope in Somalia" mission, the United States assembled a contingent of 28,000 troops together with forces from twelve other countries. The operation's primary goal was to reduce the famine that resulted from the drought in Somalia and provide relief to the Somali people. The United Nations organized a 100-day campaign to deliver food and assistance. Nevertheless, starvation persisted, and infectious diseases like malaria and tuberculosis proliferated. Hence, the Security Council backed the American suggestion in Resolution No. 794 in January 1992, leading to the deployment of the American forces in Somalia on December 9, 1992 (Recchia, 2020a).

The Security Council Resolution No. 794 mandated the establishment of an expanded military presence to safeguard the efforts of humanitarian aid teams and facilitate the delivery of supplies to Somalia. The US government has restated its dedication to upholding Somalia's sovereignty and independence, with American forces initially taking the lead in Operation UNOSOM before the United Nations takes over command. The

total number of soldiers involved in the operation has surpassed 35,000. The United Nations regards these forces and their prepared operations as some of the top-performing and most efficient peacekeeping operations. In March 1993, the United Nations established an army of 28,000 troops to take over from the American forces. Resolution No. 814 called for the establishment and strengthening of a safe environment in Somalia, as well as the reinstatement of democratic institutions and the country's rehabilitation. Although the United Nations effectively stopped most famines that resulted in the loss of more than 350,000 lives in Somalia from 1991 to 1992, its capacity to discover a political resolution to the Somali civil conflict is still uncertain. Although the international intervention in Somalia occurred without the Somali government's agreement due to the breakdown of state institutions, its achievement can be measured by the degree to which it completed the objectives specified by the United Nations and those directly responsible for the operation (Hirsch & Oakley, 1995b). Given the objective, the main objective of this operation is to deliver humanitarian aid to those impacted in accordance with the United Nations' declared goals to provide humanitarian assistance, establish a secure environment, safeguard infrastructure, establish security forces, repatriate refugees, and achieve disarmament, as outlined in all UN Security Council resolutions. The United Nations viewed the violent struggle between Somali forces as a risk to global peace and security (Gundel, 2002).




Figure 10: AMISOM/ATMIS in Currently ATMIS Power Generations Challenges

Sources: African Union Mission in Somalia. International Peace Institute

The figure 9 shows the AMISOM/ATMIS has persistently had challenges in achieving its authorized force levels, both in terms of manpower and in the provision of force enablers and specialized capabilities, such as aviation, engineering, medical, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance units and in addition AMISOM/ATMIS saw gradual advancement in assembling its sanctioned people, increasing from an initial force of 8,000 to approximately 22,000 by 2014²⁵.

Jonathan T. Howe states that the United Nations approached the military turnover with some reluctance, but it took a concentrated guerrilla operation to demonstrate unmistakably, the significant limitations of the type of UN multinational force deployed in Somalia. Combating organized opposition necessitates troops working closely together in mutual defense, which brings into sharp focus practical issues of interoperability, inadequate weaponry, and drastically different levels of training that are less noticeable when dealing with generalized lawlessness. This obstacle also augments the complexity of establishing a proficient integrated force comprising tiny units from around 1990 to 2010 countries that lack prior experience in collaborating (Hirsch & Oakley, 1995b).

The United Nations Security Council has imposed obligatory sanctions on the leaders of Al-Shabab organizations and certain sympathizers, directing their financial networks to halt the organization's activities in east Africa. In addition, the United Nations provides essential humanitarian assistance to Somali populations affected by the conflict, with the goal of mitigating the impact of Al-Shabab on vulnerable communities. Notwithstanding these challenges, Al-Shabab persists as a substantial menace, persistently executing assaults and exercising control over portions of Somalia, namely the southern areas. The United Nations actively engages in combating the Al-Shabab organization and seeks continuous international cooperation to establish enduring stability in Somalia. The United Nations (UN) has been instrumental in addressing Somalia's problems since the early 1990s by offering essential humanitarian assistance, conducting military interventions, and facilitating political talks. In fact, the United Nations has organized conferences, such as the Djibouti Conference, to bring various stakeholders together and

²⁵ Schmidt, A. (2020, May 12). Lessons for “Partnership Peacekeeping” from the African Union Mission in Somalia. International Peace Institute. <https://www.ipinst.org/2019/10/lessons-partnership-peacekeeping-amisom>.

aid in the establishment of state organizations and the raising of good governance (Lyons & Samatar, 2010). Additionally, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which later changed its name to ATMIS, has worked in partnership with the United Nations (UN) to bolster security and establish stability in Somalia. Nevertheless, the United Nations faces obstacles such as persistent instability, the proliferation of armed factions, and restricted access to impacted regions. Notwithstanding these obstacles, the United Nations persistently delivers stability and humanitarian aid to the Somali population, guaranteeing the country's security and progress. While there have been numerous positive interventions, the United Nations' involvement in the conflicts in Somalia has also had a negative impact. Essentially, the United Nations' intervention in Somalia, particularly during Operation Restore Hope (UNOSOM II and I) in the early 1990s, has faced criticism for its failure to prevent conflict escalation, reliance on military force, and negative impact on national sovereignty. The UN's military approach led to armed clashes with Somali factions, increasing mistrust between the local population and the United Nations. Critics argue that UN initiatives diminished the Somali government's sovereignty, weakened the legitimacy of the internationally backed government, and delayed the building of state institutions. Critics have also pointed out that UN interventions have failed effectively report humanitarian crises such as famines and natural disasters, as well as mismanaged the distribution of aid. The UN's heavy confidence in international experts and external resources has led to poor sustainability, with Somali institutions remaining fragile and unable to continue after the withdrawal of UN forces (Crocker, 1995).

F. The Arab Countries

The Horn of Africa, historically a place of significant power rivalry, is currently witnessing a novel competition along its coastline. The Gulf Arab countries and other countries, such as Iran, Turkey, China, and the western countries, are increasing their efforts to secure allies and expand their influence in the Horn. The primary political fault lines in the Middle East between Iran and the Arab states, as well as among the Arab states themselves are increasingly evident along the Red Sea region. These enduring, overlapping rivalries are exacerbating current regional conflicts and creating new tensions. Somalia is a conflict-ridden nation in the Horn of Africa, characterized by long-

term conflicts with its neighboring countries²⁶. Initially, the conflicts in Somalia seem to have sprung from internal forces, namely the tribal characteristics of Somali society and the oppression and despotism of the governing state. These reasons are frequently seen as the primary causes of the conflict's start. Nonetheless, the effect of external factors, especially the engagement of significant international and regional powers, is equally crucial, if not the principal cause of the war's initiation and persistence. This section examines the involvement of Arab nations in the Somalia's conflicts. While many Arab nations, including the Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt, were significant backers after the collapse of Somalia's central government, their participation has not consistently yielded beneficial outcomes. Conversely, they have occasionally exacerbated the violence by endorsing warlords and, at other times, leaders of regional administrations. Qatar is the paramount nation in facilitating the Somalia's development and rehabilitation following the downfall of the central authority in 1991. The relationship between Somalia and Qatar has significantly evolved in recent years, with Qatar emerging as a principal supporter of the Somali federal government through financial and political assistance, humanitarian aid, and collaboration in education, security, and infrastructure development. Doha has played a dangerous role in strengthening the Somali institutions by financing projects like hospitals, educational organizations, roads, and so on. Qatar has provided support for reconciliation efforts in the political dialogue among various Somali factions, including the Islamic Court Organization (ICU) and the Federal government. This assistance is viewed as an important part of Qatar's strategy for improving its regional influence by supporting governments tackling security and financial problems (Pericoli & Donelli, 2024a).

The financial support distribution in Somalia illustrates the Qatar's assistance policies in the eastern part of Africa, particularly after 2017, when competitions among the Gulf governments prompted novel methodologies and resource distribution in the area. Resource allocation influences the recipient setting and can either intensify or mitigate fragmentation, especially in weak or absent statehood scenarios where external actors vie for dominance. Qatari action in Somalia intensified in 2006, subsequent to a brief

²⁶ Crisis Group, "Intra-Gulf Competition," International Crisis Group, September 29, 2023, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula-horn-africa-turkiye/intra-gulf-competition>

engagement with the ICU. The links that Doha forged with prominent ICU leaders, notably Sheikh Sharif Sh. Ahmed, former president of Somalia, enabled the inauguration of the inaugural Qatar Red Crescent Society office in Mogadishu. At the same time, Qatar actively participated in mediating disputes between the ICU and the Transitional Federal Government, all the while upholding its commitment to bringing together the diverse oppositional groups in Somalia (Pericoli & Donelli, 2024b).

G. Qatar's diplomatic and development assistance

The Qatari government's role and interventions in shaping ongoing conflicts in Somalia have mostly involved positioning itself as a negotiator or mediator, simplifying negotiations between various groups, including the Somali federal government and local states, and strengthening government efforts. Additionally, the government of Qatar has financed infrastructure development projects. Nevertheless, the Qatar's engagement has occasionally ignited conflicts with neighboring countries, resulting in multifaceted geopolitical hates. Generally, the Qatar's role aligns with its broader ambitions to assert its influence in the Horn of Africa while simultaneously supporting the Somalia's endeavor to reach peace and stability in the country²⁷.

The Saudi Arabian government is heavily involved in the issues and conflicts in Somalia. This is evident in the numerous instances in which the Saudi Arabian government has intervened, primarily by offering political or financial support to various Islamic organizations. The Saudi Arabian government sees Somalia as an important country in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Arabs. They see it as an important part of global shipping lines and an important part of keeping the world secure. Part of Saudi Arabia's involvement in Somalia stems from the strategic importance of these positions, which significantly influence global oil transportation routes. The government of Saudi Arabia often competes with other countries in the area, especially Iran. Saudi Arabia has attempted to counter the Iran's influence in Somalia, a predominantly Muslim Sunni country²⁸.

²⁷Qatar's Foreign aid and political strategies in the horn of Africa: the case of Somalia," Global Policy Journal.<https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/articles/development-inequality-and-poverty/qatars-foreign-aid-and-political-strategies-horn-africa>

²⁸ UK and Saudi Arabia to step up vital aid funding for conflict-hit areas - Somalia. (2024, May 6). ReliefWeb. <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/uk-and-saudi-arabia-step-vital-aid-funding-conflict-hit-areas>

The Qatari government's role and intervention are mostly indifferent to those of other Arab countries. Despite the United Nations Charter designating mediation as a primary method for resolving international disputes, numerous analysts, observers, and scholars question the strategies employed by Doha to attain its prominent position in global dispute resolution, particularly through mediation. They also scrutinized the motivations underlying this role and the elements that have facilitated Qatar's success in several intricate political matters. Qatar's primary motivation for its mediation efforts is rooted in several factors, including a firm belief in the efficacy of soft power, the significance of international law, a policy of positive neutrality, and the desire to cultivate a distinguished international reputation. Furthermore, religious and ethical motivations prompted Qatar to undertake diplomatic and humanitarian initiatives to address these concerns in pursuit of peace and stability. Qatar has played a major involvements in Somali affairs for more than a decade, beginning in mid-2006 and continuing throughout the Islamic Courts in southern and central Somalia. Given the media's limited presence in Somalia at the time, Qatar used this as an opportunity to shape the trajectory of Somali political affairs. From 2012 to 2017, Qatar's involvement in Somalia remained minimal, lacking a significant effect on the political landscape despite ongoing efforts to influence those making decisions (Pericoli & Donelli, 2024c). Qatar enjoys considerable influence in the Horn of Africa, utilizing its considerable diplomatic capacity to resolve conflicts among countries in the region and offering material assistance to Islamic organizations. Doha's political operations in Somalia highlight a notable framework, especially with the emergence of Fahad Yassin, a former Deputy Chairman of the Intelligence and National Security Agency in Somalia. The increased intensity of Qatari projects to strengthen its influence in Somalia stems from Doha's concerns about a potential diminishment of its role following the latest reconciliation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as the growing involvement of Emirati and Saudi entities in the region. This suggests a shift towards a revised framework of relations and power dynamics in the Horn of Africa. Consequently, Qatar aims to secure a position for itself in the forthcoming phase²⁹.

²⁹ *Addis fortune*, *Can Qatar Ease Tensions with Somalia, Reshape Horn of Africa Geopolitics?*, published Jun 22, 2024, <https://addisfortune.news/can-qatar-ease-tensions-with-somalia-reshape-horn-of-africa-geopolitics/>

3.4 Conclusion

The topic of international intervention in legal law is a highly debated issue, leading to divergent opinions among lawyers. From a political standpoint, it serves as an indicator of power dynamics within the global system. The major powers leverage their capacities, coupled with their political and economic interests, to subdue and eliminate their power bases. Political, economic, and security considerations may drive the interventions in the Somali crisis, aiming to gain international recognition and exert influence over the interests of developing countries. Somalia occupies a strategic location in the Horn of Africa region, situated in the eastern part of the African continent. A very important shipping route connects the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea through the Red Sea, as well as important waterways such as the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Therefore, this region considered as the focus of international powers and an area of conflict and competition among them. It is imperative that Somali-Kenyan relations revert to their previous state in order to benefit both countries and ensure stability in the region, as dictated by neighboring countries' principles. The ongoing crisis has undeniably caused a division in the social structure of the Kenyan and Somali communities, resulting in a sense of distrust between them. The status is not viable considering the long-standing economic and social connections between the two groups. The political leadership in both nations must engage in constructive dialogue to find mutually beneficial solutions that prioritize their respective interests while also promoting positive neighborly relations and establishing favorable conditions for mutual investment and cooperation. This will contribute to a prosperous future for the Horn of Africa area. Neighboring country, particularly Ethiopia, exert significant influence on Somalia's future and have tremendously profited from the longstanding instability in Somalia. Initially, they took advantage of the increased activity of Ethiopian armed groups to enter Somalia and enforce their own agenda. Furthermore, they took advantage of the political and social breakdown in Somalia to strengthen their control over the Somali Hawd region, which they incorporated into their territory in the mid-1950. For many reasons, Somalia is always at odds with its neighbors. The main problem is that African countries perceive Somalis as Arabs rather than Africans. The spread of the Salafist jihadist Islamic organization, which dominated most of Somalia, led to instability. These groups posed a threat to neighboring countries, who feared that the Somali government might adopt

radical Islamic practices. Another factor is that Somalia was once a vast nation, but neighboring countries repeatedly seized its territory, leading to border disputes. As a result, Somalia's governments engaged in wars with these nations, with their primary objective being to reclaim the seized territories. Humanitarian intervention has emerged as a prominent concern, especially in relation to internal conflicts and an increasing global attention to human rights. Developed countries, such as the United States, seek to diminish each country's authority and establish new standards by leveraging the United Nations Charter. On the other hand, developing countries follow the Charter in order to achieve their goals. The United States is leveraging the United Nations to change the concept of sovereignty and non-interference by extending humanitarian intervention and allowing the Security Council the authority to deal with global and internal conflicts based on the interests of countries that hold power in the international system. This has resulted in the establishment of international legal norms that safeguard the United States' interests, as evidenced by its involvement in Somalia and other countries that have undergone international humanitarian intervention. International law embodies the prevailing views, interests, and values of the Global society, as well as the equilibrium of power. The colonial powers brought some tribes closer at the expense of other tribes, exploiting the problems between them, especially after the European powers realized the weak point among the Somali tribes, which is the sanctification of the tribe, the tendency to revenge, and adherence to tribal customs. The British worked to recruit Somalis to fight their Somali brothers. The Italians also employed a similar strategy to weaken nationalists and revolutionaries, specifically targeting certain tribes to incite them against the tribes that the revolutionaries were affiliated with it. France also followed the same policy, as it incited the Afar against the Somalis to thwart the national movements against the colonizer and enable its colonial policy in the regions that were subject to it, and they used for the social policy a practical implementation of the British principle of divide and rule and in lastly Somalia faces numerous challenges due to the ongoing conflicts among its various groups, which are further exacerbated by the rise in warlords and terrorist organizations. The situation necessitated the contribution of international and regional governments, including the African Union, to provide humanitarian assistance. The African Peace and Security Council, which is responsible for ensuring security in Africa, collaborated with the Intragovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the

United Nations to carry out all necessary actions for conflict resolution. Through its mission, it endeavored to tackle terrorist organizations and clan leaders, or warlords, with the objective of achieving regional security.



CHAPTER I V: SOMALIA- TURKEY RELATIONS: HISTORICAL ROOTS AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES

4.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to identify the nature of Turkey's role in Somalia and bilateral relationship between Somalia and Turkey, focusing on their historical roots and future opportunities. Somalia holds strategic significance in world politics due to its oversight of global maritime and terrestrial commerce routes, coupled with its rich natural resources and closeness to the Arabian Peninsula and the Arabian Gulf. Somalia possesses the largest maritime outlet in Africa, rendering it a vital conduit for influence; thus, direct control over it confers the ability to dominate the Horn of Africa region. Turkey has historically played a pivotal role, both regionally and globally, serving as the nexus of numerous ancient human civilizations in the ancient world. Consequently, Turkey has formulated effective foreign policy to become a significant player in international politics, aiming to achieve its objectives by taking advantage of global opportunities. The Somalia government urgently required international support; thus, the arrival of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, leading a delegation as the first non-African official to visit the capital, Mogadishu, highlighted the critical situation in Somalia. He provided extensive humanitarian, economic, and medical assistance, aiming to foster new bilateral relations between Turkey and Somalia and to strengthen the Turkey's presence and influence on the African continent.

4.2. Historical relations between Turkey and Somalia

In response to competing the European powers, the Ottoman Empire strengthened its control over maritime access to the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea in the sixteenth century. Somalia emerged as a sphere of influence for the Ottoman Empire, with Berbera and Zeila serving as its focal points. In the late eighteenth century, the European colonial powers gained control of Somalia due to the Ottoman Empire's decline. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the modern Republic of Turkey in 1923, which emphasized state building and independence protection, the bilateral relationship between the two nations weakened. Turkey and Somalia established embassies in both countries in 1979, signifying the commencement of diplomatic relations, and Turkey renewed their partnership by offering a modest aid program to Somalia (Hovhannisyan, 2022a).

In developing countries, political issues typically arise from the social sphere. The dictatorship of these regimes arises from their fundamental reliance on intelligence services, which play a crucial role in shaping social structure and internal power dynamics. In these nations, societal fear is systemic, stemming from the ruling party's persistent recognition that its privileges lead to injustice for groups beyond the government, including Somalia, which experienced a period of dictatorship. In the aftermath of the civil war in Somalia, which erupted after the collapse of the central government in 1991 and resulting instability, the Turkish government determined to close its embassy in Mogadishu. Despite the cessation of its diplomatic mission, it continued to deliver humanitarian and relief missions. In 1993, under the command of Lieutenant General Shafiq Bir, it deployed a contingent of 300 infantry soldiers and 3 warships to Mogadishu, contributing to the inaugural United Nations intervention. It commenced its operations in Somalia in 1996, in response to drought and hunger disasters. In 1998, Turkey implemented a program of involvement with Africa for systematically develop its political, cultural, and economic links with the African nations (Siradag, 2017).

Religious ties strengthen the bond between Somalia and Turkey. In 1529, Imam Ahmed Guray defeated the Abyssinians and continued his invasions into Abyssinia from within. In 1531, merely two years later, Imam Ahmed Guray invaded the territories of Ashwa and Amhara, resulting in the Muslims' successful domination of southern Abyssinia by 1535. Imam Ahmed launched an attack on the Tigray region for the first time, causing the Abyssinians to demand assistance from the Portuguese, who dispatched a contingent of almost four hundred armed fighters equipped with weapons to aid them. This brought a unique Crusader quality to the conflicts. In 1542, the Muslim leader confronted the Portuguese in the area between Amba Al-Aji and Lake Al-Shangi, culminating in the Imam's injury (Miftah, 2017a).

Imam Ahmed was injured, although he evaded capture and sought assistance from the Ottoman governor in Zabid, who dispatched a contingent of nine hundred riflemen and ten guns. The Mujahid Imam persistently attacked the Portuguese and Abyssinians, culminating in his defeat at Lake Tana. In 1542, the Portuguese navy, which hastened to his assistance, subsequently killed the Mujahid Imam Ahmed Ibrahim. In basically, Muslims broadly, and Somalis specifically, were obtaining both material and moral assistance from the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish backing for Mujahid Somali Imam

Sayyid Muhammad Abdullah Hassan's resistance against the British in the nineteenth century reflects the profound historical connection between Somalia and Turkey (Miftah, 2017).

The backing of the Turks for the Somali Imam Sayid Muhammad Abdullah Hassan during the nineteenth century in his fight against the British illustrates the significant historical ties between Somalia and Turkey. Recently, the relationship between Somalia and Turkey has slowed down due to various factors. The visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Somalia in 2011, while he was Prime Minister, represented a crucial turning point in the bilateral relationship between the two countries. This resulted in regular high-level discussions, the exchange of delegations, and cooperation in international forums, including the United Nations (Cannon, 2016).

4.3. Turkey's influence on foreign policy in East Africa.

According to the Husnu Mısırlı, “Turkish foreign policy has broadened its influence in East Africa, spanning from Somalia to Libya, despite facing obstacles in Horn of Africa. In addition, stated these obstacles include security crises and economic impacts that adversely affect both domestic living conditions and the volume of trade between Turkey and African nations (Mısırlı & Orhan, 2023). Turkey is focusing on strengthening its security and economic ties with Somalia, which considered as the center of East Africa, to enhance its influence in the region. Given the potential threats posed by the Al-Shabaab organization against the Turkish workers and diplomatic personnel, the Turkey's accomplishments in reaching both short- and long-term objectives, as well as maintaining a presence in Africa, seem to outweigh the challenges faced. However, Turkey's political actions, which lack thorough consideration of consequences, could potentially undermine its aspirations, particularly in the economic sector, which is crucial to its foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa. Turkey holds a crucial and strategic position in numerous significant matters within the developing world; aside from its essential involvement in East Africa, it also plays a vital role in other areas such as the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and the Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia. In 1979, Turkey initiated diplomatic relations with Somalia by inaugurating an embassy in Mogadishu. The ongoing conflict necessitated the embassy's shutdown from 1991 to 2011. During this critical period in the Somalia's history, when international relief organizations avoided to be in the country due

to security concerns, Turkey redirected its focus to Africa, aligning with the concept of the "New Greater Middle East" and enabling the execution of its new Ottoman initiatives (Donelli, 2017).

4.4. The Turkish strategic presence in Somalia

Turkey has created its largest military facility globally, founded in 2015 and opened in 2017 in Mogadishu. At its inauguration, the stated objective was to reconstruct the Somali military to effectively counter the northern Somali movement. It serves as a training ground for Somali soldiers, aids Mogadishu in fighting the Al-Shabaab group, bolsters the Turkish influence in the Horn of Africa, and facilitates joint military exercises with regional armies. The Turkish military camp equips the Somali soldiers and officers with sophisticated capabilities to improve their combat abilities and Turkey has effectively attained its objective of projecting hard power and building a significant and impactful presence in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa by entering into several security, defense, and military manufacturing partnerships with Somalia. This led to the creation of a military facility in the capital, Mogadishu. In December 2012, the two nations established military and security agreements that outlined the training of the Somali army and the enhancement of its fighting capabilities. This is remarkable given Somalia has faced challenges in developing an effective national army and security forces since 1991. The creation of the Turkish training base in Mogadishu represented the pinnacle of the Turkey's military participation (Burak & Tutek, 2024).

Turkey continues its support to the Somali armed forces via the Turkish base in Somalia, with the objective of creating cohesive and disciplined Somali national army. In early 2020, the fourth cohort of the Somali infantry division, including around 411 troops, graduated from the Turkish Training Centre in Mogadishu. Turkey, unlike former colonial countries, is a significant actor in soft power, presenting itself as a compassionate and humanitarian country through various attractive strategies and instruments, including "aid and assistance" diplomacy. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Red Crescent, and non-governmental organizations have been significantly involved in the biggest international aid initiative. Since 2011, Turkey has extended its humanitarian assistance to Somalia in excess of one billion dollars. Furthermore, Turkish enterprises have played a crucial role in the construction and management of ports and airports, which are essential for revitalizing the country's financial sectors (Beşgül, 2024).




Figure 11 : The trade opportunities between the two countries

Sources: Deconstructing Turkey's Efforts in Somalia

According to Brendon J. Cannon, Turkey's aspiration for global recognition as an emerging force motivated its involvement in Somalia. Turkey's financial assistance immediately benefitted crucial stakeholders in the Somalia Free Federation (SFG), facilitating access to President Hassan Sheikh's administration. This resulted in Turkish dominance of significant assets in Somalia, encompassing the airport and seaport. Turkish enterprises and the Turkish government also obtained profitable contracts. The Turkish government's reconstruction initiatives, scholarship programs, hospital refurbishments, and organizing international conferences in Somalia have received international praise (Cannon, 2016).




Figure 12: Turkish Financial Contributions

Sources: Created by the author

The above Figure 12 Shows the connection between Turkish financial contributions to Somali stakeholders and several dependent variables, including Turkish access, influence, control, and worldwide prestige, as shaped by Somali stakeholders, results in expanded financial resources and power for Turkey. Somalia and Turkey have signed numerous agreements and memorandum of understanding in the economic sector, including the "Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement," the "Investment Cooperation Agreement," and the "Tax Cooperation Agreement." The memorandum of understanding encompasses topics such as agricultural production, marine fishing, animal health, and the establishment of an economic cooperation committee between Somalia and Turkey. The transactions occurred in 2022. Somalia and Turkey have established an accord allowing the Turkish fishermen to conduct operations within Somali territorial waters. In 2022, Turkey's exports to Somalia totaled US\$386.31 million, as reported by the United Nations COMTRADE database on international commerce. In 2012, Turkish Airlines became the initial major international carrier that established regular flights to Mogadishu, signifying a pivotal achievement in the country's rehabilitation ambitions. Turkish investments in Somalia have concentrated on the economic and commercial sectors, with Turkish enterprises involved in diverse projects throughout the area, especially in Mogadishu. In 2013, Turkey assumed control of Mogadishu International

Airport, where the Turkish company Favori initiated operational modernization, while the Somali government granted the management of Mogadishu Port to the Turkish company Albayrak Group, which is required to provide 55% of the port's revenue to the government. This effective administration has strengthened the state budget and revitalized the Mogadishu's appearance, restoring its previous appeal as a city (Beşgöl, 2024).

4.6. Diplomatic missions and counterterrorism plans

The view of the Al-Shabaab organization about the Turkish involvement in Somalia, at the beginning, closely reflected the philosophy and attitudes of the Turkish government. However, it soon diverged when Turkey allied with the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and contributed to the development of an effective armed force by constructing a training base in Mogadishu. During that period, Turkey expanded its investments and strengthened the capacity of the Somali government, posing a threat to Al-Shabaab's goal of being an equal and parallel entity to the federal government (Mustapha, 2021). Consequently, Al-Shabaab focused its efforts on countering this threat. The head of the Al-Shabaab Organization, Ahmed Diri Abu Ubaidah, issued a threat to the Turkish authorities, declared them an enemy of the Muslim country, and accused them of exploiting Somalia's riches and resources. The Al-Shabaab intensified its terrorist activities by targeting Turkish diplomatic communications, as well as Turkish corporate locations, engineers, construction initiatives, and investments across the country. In 2016, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Somali President Hassan Sheikh inaugurated the Turkish Embassy Complex in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, which currently hosts the largest Turkish Embassy globally, as Turkey has constructed an expansive structure for its diplomatic mission. This structure not only enhances the city's aesthetic appeal but also signifies the evolution of bilateral relations from mere friendship to a strategic partnership in recent years. In addition to the strong diplomatic ties between Somalia and Turkey, Turkey has begun advocating for Somalia's interests in international and regional forums, acknowledging its significant influence in key international institutions such as the United Nations, NATO, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. If the Somali leadership recognizes the strategic significance of this

connection and commits to it earnestly as part of the state-building initiative, it will undoubtedly act as a safeguard for the project's success and sustainability (Vafina, 2023).

Some international perspectives reject the Turkish presence in Somalia. Turkey was not the only foreign actor in Somalia, as others sought to establish positions. Therefore, it is inevitable that Turkish influence will encounter both rejectionist and competitive challenges. First, the neighboring countries in the region—especially the Arab countries—did not unanimously accept the idea of building a Turkish military base in Mogadishu because of the threat it poses to their national security. Second, the Egyptian government viewed the Turkish influence in Somalia, particularly the military base in Mogadishu, as a threat to its national security. Therefore, it aimed to counter this influence by intensifying its presence in Somalia (Donelli, 2017).

According to the Brendon J. Cannon, “the United Arab Emirates viewed the Turkish intervention in Somalia as a threat and rapidly implemented an identical plan by sending a diplomatic mission to Mogadishu in 2013, appointing an extraordinary ambassador to Somalia, and establishing a memorandum of understanding with the Somali government in 2014 for military collaboration. The United Arab Emirates trained the Presidential Guard forces, founded a military training camp in Mogadishu in 2015 to instruct Somali commando groups, and committed to funding the salaries of the Somali security forces for four years (Cannon, 2022). The Emirati Ports Company secured a thirty-year concession to manage and develop the "Port of Berbera," with an expenditure of one million dollars. The UAE government pressured the Somali government to minimize the influence of Turkey and Qatar in Somalia, ending in an agreement with the Republic of Somaliland Government, to create an Emirati military facility in Berbera, northern Somalia, in 2017. However, all of their efforts were unsuccessful, leading to the turning of the military base into a civilian airport due to the resistance from the Somalis and its denial by the Somali federal government. Since 2011, Turkey has served as a pivotal partner and strategic ally of Somalia, endeavoring to fulfill the role of a security collaborator and have a significant influence on the Somalia's future. Turkey has engaged in the training and development of the Somali army by dispatching military missions to Mogadishu and accommodating Somali military units for training in Ankara. In February 2024, Turkey formalized a defense deal with the Somali government, establishing a strategic relations among the two countries. This agreement encompasses collaboration

in counterterrorism, financial and military cooperation, and enhancement of bilateral ties, suppression of piracy, prevention of foreign interventions, illicit fishing, arms trafficking, and the training and development of Somali naval forces (Murat & Sümer, 2024).

Somalia-Turkey Relations	
Strategic Interests	Enhancing influence in Horn of Africa; increased visibility in Africa
Defense	Training and equipping Somali navy; patrolling coastline
Energy	July 2024 exploration agreement for oil and gas exploration
Humanitarian and Diplomatic	Humanitarian aid and investment; support for state-building

Table 4: Somalia and Turkey Relations

Sources: Created by the author

The above figure 11 was summarized by Turkey and Somalia relations, and Turkey continued to strengthen its relations with Somalia by increasing its impact in the Horn of Africa, providing training and supplies to the Somali Navy for coastal patrols to formalize a July 2024 deal for oil and gas development, and delivering humanitarian assistance and investment to facilitate state-building.

4.7. Turkish diplomatic mediation roles in Somalia.

Turkey, a prominent player in the Horn of Africa, has been actively involved in regional diplomacy, specifically in the ongoing mediations between Somalia and Ethiopia. Despite its significant impact, the current crisis has not resulted in a development. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan noted the indefinite postponement of the third round of talks between Somalia and Ethiopian disputes, originally scheduled for September 17, 2024. In addition, expressed hope for a diplomatic resolution and expressed Turkey's intention to interact with both parties individually to facilitate understanding. Additionally, noted that Somalia's primary priority is the preservation of its sovereignty, while Ethiopia's

primary objective is securing maritime access. Regardless of the results of the Turkish-mediated discussions, Turkey seeks to expand its diplomatic, geopolitical, and economic influence in the Horn of Africa. According to the Gonzalo Vazquez the separatist republic of Somaliland, formerly a British Somali territory, and the landlocked country of Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding in January, granting the latter access to the Red Sea. In exchange for a 50-year lease of the coastline adjacent to the important port of Berbera for commercial and nautical activities, Ethiopia consented to contemplate recognizing Somaliland as an independent country, which would make it the first nation in the world to do so (Vázquez, 2024). The disagreement between Somalia and Ethiopia has elicited significant responses from countries adjacent, including Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea and the current rise of conflict threatens the stability of the Horn of Africa region and significant economic interests in the Middle East, affecting both the Western and Eastern worlds. The implementation of the Memorandum of Agreement between Ethiopia and the autonomous territory of Somaliland has sparked concerns among neighboring coastal countries. Ethiopia proposes to grant Somaliland potential statehood and a share in Ethiopian Airlines in return for 20 km of beachfront near the Gulf of Aden, intended for use as a base for naval operations. The controversial memorandum of understanding, signed in 2024 between Somaliland and Ethiopia, has escalated tensions and conflicts between the two countries. It raises two main issues: firstly, it threatens Somalia's sovereignty, and secondly, it undermines Ethiopia's interest in accessing the Red Sea. In addition, Somalia, which views Somaliland as a breakaway region and is currently among the countries seeking independence globally, regards the memorandum of understanding as a threat to its national integrity (Tigire & Kefale, 2025). Furthermore, gaining access to the Red Sea is of the utmost strategic importance for Ethiopia, as they have been landlocked for many years, and they believe it's time for them to gain access to maritime trade routes, just like their other Horn of Africa neighbors do. In contrast, Somalia has refused to share its routes or land. Due to its significant interest in both countries, the government has called upon Turkey twice to mediate this issue. However, these tensions remain unresolved to date, and in reality, finding final solutions to mediate this issue presents a challenging task. Turkey's involvement as a mediator in the Somalia and Ethiopia situations stems from its growing diplomatic and economic interest in these two

states over the previous years, as well as its desire to expand its influence and protect its economic investments in the region (Hovhannisyan, 2022).

Dimension	Historical Roots	Current Cooperation	Future Opportunities
Political Relations	Ottoman Empire's early contact with Somali territories in the 16th century.	High-level diplomatic engagement since 2011; embassies reopened in Mogadishu & Ankara.	Enhanced political partnership on regional peace and African Union cooperation.
Security & Military	Legacy of Ottoman support in Red Sea security.	Turkish military training base in Mogadishu (largest abroad); training Somali forces	Joint counterterrorism initiatives and maritime security in the Indian Ocean.
Economic Partnership	Early trade exchanges via Indian Ocean routes.	Investment in airports, ports (Mogadishu), and Turkish business presence.	Trade expansion, free trade agreement (FTA), joint infrastructure ventures.
Humanitarian Aid	Religious and cultural solidarity during past famines.	Massive aid during 2011 famine; continued health, education, and disaster support	Sustainable development programs in rural Somalia and health infrastructure expansion
Cultural & Educational	Shared Islamic and cultural identity.	Scholarships for Somali students, Turkish language institutes.	Creation of Somali-Turkish research centers and cultural exchange programs.

Table 5: Somalia - Turkey: Historical Roots And Future Opportunities

Sources: Created by the author

The above table summarizes Somalia-Turkey relations for their historical roots and future opportunities. In adding, it mentions the dimensions of political relations, cultural and educational relations, economic partnerships, and security and military coalitions for the two countries, as well as current cooperation and partnerships for both countries, including high-level diplomatic engagements since 2011, military training funded by the Turkish government in recent years, investments in airports and ports, as well as business cooperation in Somalia. It is clear that both countries will benefit from future opportunities if they continue to work together economically and diplomatically.

4.8. The Turkey policy concerns to the mediation efforts for Somalia and Ethiopia.

Turkey supports shuttle diplomacy, wherein its diplomats engage separately with both parties to promote discussion without open confrontation. This approach seeks to build confidence while looking at possible agreements on controversial matters. For the round of conversations conducted in August 2024, Fidan characterized the talks as positive, highlighting that the two sides had dealt with critical problems and offered hope for future consultations (Kalmoy, 2021). The Turkish government's mediation policy is to

equilibrate its connections with both countries, endeavoring to assist Ethiopia's requirement for maritime access while simultaneously honoring Somalia's sovereignty issues. This intricate equilibrium is essential because of Turkey's substantial investments in both nations, especially in military collaboration and development initiatives. The government of Turkey has further strengthened its military relations with Somalia by announcing its largest military training center and formalizing arrangements to improve Somalia's naval capacities. On the other hand, Turkey persists in its economic investments in Ethiopia, encompassing military agreements and infrastructure projects, viewing its mediation efforts as a crucial part of a wider strategy to boost its influence in Africa through soft power initiatives like economic aid and diplomatic engagement (Türker & Akçacı, 2025).

4.9. Conclusion

This chapter examines the relationship between Turkey and Somalia, focusing on the Turkey's development initiatives, their impact on the peace process in Somalia, and their interventions. The discussion covered the phases of independence, civil and military periods, the peace process in Somalia, and the conferences intended to peacefully address the Somali crisis. Due to the demonstrated success of all Turkish initiatives, whether humanitarian, developmental, investment, or economic, the Somali side has embraced them, demonstrating a diminished sensitivity to the Turkish efforts. In addition, the Somali population, more than any other Arab or Western entity, demonstrates a strong emotional connection to Turkey's initiatives and supports its efforts to reconstruct the Somali nation. The Turkish government highlighted Somalia's marginalization and alerted the international community to the gravity of its plight. Turkey has achieved international and regional acknowledgement through its strategic involvement with Somalia, capitalizing on the Somalia's geographic position, economic prospects, and natural resources. The enlarged trade, encompassing daily flights between Istanbul and Mogadishu, has enhanced commercial relations. Through the application of "soft power, Turkey cultivated a favorable image, garnered Somali trust, and facilitated the nation's development by enhancing infrastructure, including educational institutions, healthcare facilities, transportation networks, and universities. The majority of ongoing conflicts in Somalia stem from rivalry for power and resources. Somalia possesses renewable natural

resources, presenting an opportunity for Turkey, with its substantial prospective, to invest in promising sectors such as oil, agriculture, and fisheries. If this investment materializes, it would create job opportunities for an important proportion of the Somali population, benefiting both parties and potentially alleviating the intense competition for resources. Lastly, Turkey appears to be assuming a more proactive role in the Somalia's military operations. The operation involves training troops and non-commissioned officers in the Somali army and supplying these units with the Turkish military vehicles to strengthen their capabilities and attain military superiority against the Al-Shabaab organization on the battlefield. The objective is to secure its future presence in this key region, mitigate security challenges that endanger its interests, and improve the combat preparedness of Somali military forces. The collapse of state-building initiatives and political instability in Somalia could significantly risk the Turkey's presence, as well as the influence of African countries and international actors in the country's affairs.

The civil war in Somalia, characterized by numerous factions and phases, has affected the entire country. At times, the conflict has occurred between the Siyad Barre administration and the factions seeking to depose him; at other times, it has involved the same factions contending for control against the Islamists. The occurrences of the Somali conflict have rendered the country lacking in fundamental essentials, including infrastructure and key services. Despite the remarkable efforts of the international and regional community to resolve the conflict in Somalia, the majority of interventions have failed to contain the situation and end the three-decade-long catastrophe. During the drought crisis in Somalia, the Turkish government provided substantial assistance to the country. The following unconditional humanitarian assistance for Somalia signified a significant turning point in Somali-Turkish ties. This assistance attracted global attention to the Somali predicament, inciting a surge of interest in Mogadishu to secure a presence in this pivotal area, especially considering prospective disputes over water and maritime passages.

CHAPTER V: EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

International involvement is a contentious issue within legal jurisprudence, resulting in diverse perspectives among jurists. It serves as a reflection of power dynamics inside the international system. The principal powers leverage their capabilities with their political and economic goals to intimidate and eradicate their sources of influence. Political, economic, and security motivations may propel intervention in Somalia, aiming to achieve global prominence and influence in developing countries.

The issues of state collapse in Somalia are unique globally, as this condition persists to the present day. Despite the efforts of key domestic, regional, and international actors to devise conclusive solutions, instability and civil war continue to dominate the territory. Various external or internal factors, such as the unsuccessful parliamentary experiment of the 1960s, Siyad Barre's consolidation of power, his implementation of a one-party dictatorship, and the problems left by the colonialists, have contributed to the eruption of conflict in Somalia. The Somalis' struggle for independence from foreign forces encountered significant obstacles, marked by severe setbacks and a chaotic environment. Despite their efforts, they were unable to reclaim all their territory, leaving their nation fragmented and their lives vulnerable to conflict. The withdrawal of Western colonial powers and the formation of the Somali Republic revived aspirations for a larger Somalia. Subsequently, following numerous conflicts, the state collapsed, leading the Somalis into civil wars.

This chapter aims to evaluate and assess the roles that international actors play in intra-state conflicts and their comparison, the previous chapter, particularly chapter two, extensively explored the role of external factors in the conflicts in Somalia. Chapter 4 highlights the third state, or the international actors in the Somalia conflicts, while the other chapter primarily discusses the relations between Somalia and Turkey, their historical roots, and their future relations. The discussion also emphasized the significance of internal factors in the Somalia conflicts, particularly the involvement of Al-Shabab organizations and warlord clans, the roles of Ethiopia and Kenya in intervention, and the involvement and impact of the Western nations on the conflict in Somalia, mainly the United States and some of European countries.

As mentioned before, there are many reasons that international actors involved in to the Somalia because of Somalia possesses strategic and security importance. The strategic significance of Somalia compels numerous international and regional entities to pursue a sphere of influence in the region. Due to the security risks, Somalia has encountered from the lack of a robust national army and the proliferation of Al-Shabaab Mujahideen groups across the country's territory, the security strategy has been conducive for these actors to operate within the country for years. Consequently, the global powers acknowledge the significance of preserving the Somalia's stability, given that the security threats presented by the Al-Shabaab Mujahideen Movement threaten their essential interests in the Horn of Africa. The actors in Somalia emphasize the subsequent strategic and security interests.

The Somalia's extensive coastline, the longest in sub-Saharan Africa, underscores its geopolitical significance in the Horn of Africa. This strategic location along the eastern African coast provides critical access to the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, notably including the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a key global maritime passage. Consequently, Somalia serves as a connection between the African interior and many vital areas, including the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. This indicates the growing significance of Somalia in the priorities of the influential forces in the area.

The United States, China, France, the European Union, and other prominent global powers diligently engage in safeguarding the security of international trade via the Red Sea. The significance of this has intensified due to the rise and proliferation of piracy activities off the Somali coast, adjacent to the southern entrance to the Red Sea, near the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The Houthis group's intensification of operations in the Red Sea, aimed at ships in transit, has heightened these worries in recent months. The Israeli war over Gaza legitimizes international military involvement in the area and anticipates an escalation of militarization in the near future, exacerbating the current circumstances.

Considering challenges posed by the terrorist organizations the global powers are concerned about the growing scope of terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa, damaging their crucial interests and investments in the region's governments. The Al-Shabaab Mujahideen organizations continue to represent a significant threat to Somalia, with their operatives spread throughout the central and southern regions of the country, affecting security and stability. President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud initiated a military campaign in August 2022 to eliminate the movement's threats, but the movement persists,

threatening regional security in the Horn of Africa by spreading into neighboring countries like Kenya and Ethiopia. This situation requires active powers to accelerate their efforts to eradicate the financing of terrorism and curtail arms smuggling and organized crime.

Securing a maritime outlet signifies global activities to establish a strategic presence in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, underscoring Somalia's geopolitical significance to stakeholders in the Horn of Africa. This is particularly significant due to its proximity to the Bab al-Mandab Strait and its advantageous position over the Indian Ocean, which facilitates international interactions and intensifies global competition for Somalia. Consequently, certain powers are motivated to seek the building of military bases and the control of important seaports within Somalia and the neighboring countries.

Safeguarding international trade is of considerable geopolitical and security significance, as Somalia functions as a crucial maritime conduit for essential trade routes in the global economy. Moreover, it is a prospective source of oil and gas, based on international assessments of recent discoveries, which will encourage global businesses to pursue exploration and drilling concessions in the region.

Due to the growing strategic significance of Somalia in the Horn of Africa, chiefly attributable to its geostrategic position connecting the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, numerous prominent foreign countries have shown heightened interest in establishing relations with it. This seeks to strengthen their presence and influence in the region while securing access to critical strategic areas, including the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Gulf, and the Middle East. Prominent powers with large intervention roles, including the United States, Britain, the European Union, Turkey, the Emirates, and certain neighboring nations, have capitalized on the Somalia's necessity to reconstruct its national army as a fundamental means to augment their influence and presence within the countries. They have participated in this trend in recent years by training the Somali military forces, constructing several military facilities and training camps within Somalia, and deploying elements of the Somali army for training outside. This has prompted enquiries over the influence of these foreign actions on the Somalia's security prospects, especially concerning the development of the Somali military. The initial appearance of civil conflict in Somalia in 1991 provided a chance for various international actors to interfere, each pursuing distinct objectives. Although these actions

appeared to alleviate the problem, they failed to consistently restore tranquility. International activities exacerbated the situation in Somalia and contradict the goal of promoting peace and stability in the country. These interventions have only increased the divide among the opposing factions, thereby prolonging the armed conflict.

5.1. Analyzing the influence of international actors in Somalia through a theoretical approach.

Chapter III of this study examines the involvement of international actors for the conflicts in Somalia. The theoretical analysis of the involvement of international actors in Somalia begins with the collapse of the central government and the involvements by the United Nations and the United States in the Somali conflict in 1991.

The following arguments reinforce the theoretical foundation of this study:

- The power dynamics frequently shape international interventions as actors affiliate with factions that can further their strategic objectives.
- The national desires of international actors predominantly influence their peace initiatives and engagement in cross-border conflicts.
- The international actors endeavor to mitigate the conflict and facilitate peace, occasionally by endorsing alternative rebellious factions.

Before gaining independence, the Somali population made up of numerous basic tribes, each of which further divided into various clans. Sub-clans emerged from these clans, leading to further diversification. The Somali populace is tribal in nature, with the clan acting as an individual's shield against the challenges of public life. Prior to the colonizers' arrival, tribes in certain regions of Somalia had established kingdoms and states. They established assemblies similar to states, characterized by an organizational structure presided over by a tribal sheikh or Sultans, a security apparatus, and the implementation of customary rules, referred to as Somali laws (Xeer), which govern the tribal assembly from both economic and social standpoints. Subsequently, the colonizer incited disagreements and conflicts among tribes by fostering divisions and endorsing factions and parties based on tribal affiliations during the colonial era and beyond its withdrawal. Following its independence, the Somali Republic established on July 1, 1960, subsequent to the unification of the northern region, which had gained independence from Britain four days prior to the state's declaration, and the southern region, which had achieved independence from Italy. The republic selected Mogadishu as its capital. Subsequently,

the newly established legislative council elected a president for the whole country, comprising all members from both the southern and northern parliamentary councils.

The Somali conflict has undergone multiple phases, with the collapse of Siyad Barre's rule signifying the conclusion of the initial phase, which had begun to manifest since his ascension to power. Consequently, this conflict did not emerge instantly but rather evolved gradually over time. Following the dissolution of the Siyad Barre regime, national consciousness in Somalia diminished, and the central state fragmented into clan factions, with warlords dominating various territories. The North unilaterally proclaimed its independence and the other southern regions resulting in unrest and instability. Subsequent to the famine, the United States of America intervened in Somalia to safeguard workers and distribute relief to the affected population. Subsequently, the objectives of military involvement broadened to encompass the establishment of a political system and the apprehension of certain warlords. The Somali militias strongly condemned the US incursion, leading to the deaths of some US soldiers and injuries to others during efforts to capture the warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid. This incident expedited the decision of the newly inaugurated US President Bill Clinton to depart from Somalia. Following its withdrawal from Somalia, the United States of America engaged in significant intervention and training for the Somali military for years. This occurred after the military suffered material and personnel losses from Somali armed groups during the operations military in Somalia, following the breakdown of the President Siyad Barre administrations. Concerning the external influences, it appears that internal the causes, particularly the tribal characteristics of Somali society and the brutality and dictatorship of the governing regime, precipitated the outbreak of the civil war in Somalia. Nonetheless, the influence of external causes, especially the engagement of prominent international and regional powers, is equally crucial, if not the primary cause, for the initiation and prolongation of this conflict.

5.2. The involvements of the neighboring countries

The involvement of neighboring countries in internal conflicts is crucial to Somalia; as one of the most challenging neighbors, they significantly contribute to the internal conflicts within the country. Additionally, they occasionally serve as members of the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which deploys military troops to the

country and actively participates in its political, economic, and security affairs. Despite the risks posed by the terrorist organizations and security threats from Al-Shabaab, neighboring countries often claim to be diplomatic mediators and provide support to the federal governments of Somalia in areas such as military training and troop infrastructure.

Clans have organized Somalia into a state, and using the clan system in nation building can have both positive and negative effects. It can act as a trigger for conflict or as an instrument for promoting peace and settling disagreements. Early modernization theories contend that traditional societies can engage in development similarly to more advanced states. It also indicates that the advent of modernity diminishes the importance of religious beliefs and traditional cultural characteristics. The historical fact that four external powers captured and partitioned the provinces of the Horn of Africa during the European struggle for Africa underpins the Greater Somalia agenda. The Somali nationalists supported the Bevin Plan, which aligned with the notion of a Greater Somalia (Kalmoy, 2021). The white star on the flag of the State of Somalia represents the aspiration to reunite the Somali populace across five distinct regions. In 1960, two provinces, the Italian-administered Somali province under the UN mandate and the British Somaliland, amalgamated to become the Somali Republic. The "lost regions" refer to the Somali territories presently situated in the Republic of Djibouti; the fifth Somali province is the Somali State in Ethiopia; and the Northern Frontier Province (NFD) in Kenya.

The conflict between regional interests and major countries in Somalia, following the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of a civil war, could shed light on the ineffectiveness of numerous international efforts to resolve the crisis. This is due to these countries' failure to prioritize their search for a meaningful and conclusive resolution to this conflict. They gained immediate benefits from the conflict. The regional powers, especially Ethiopia and Kenya, are resisting reconciliation in this country because it would give them the opportunity to reclaim lands they seized during the colonial era. Each of them aims either to establish a regime in Somalia that is loyal to them or to foster anarchy and state fragmentation throughout the country. The Ethiopia's objective is to foster the establishment of small states from the remnants of present-day Somalia. This may involve a military invasion into the Somali territories and the deployment of its forces to the

capital city, Mogadishu, with backing from the United States and other international actors, ostensibly to combat the terrorist organizations in Somalia.

Somalia is a strategic priority for Ethiopia, whose emperors have long attempted to expand their control over the region. During the Italian mandate, the Ethiopian authorities endeavored to regain territories that were historically part of Somalia. These forces persisted post-Italian colonialism, redirecting their attention to the British Empire, which governed the eastern portion of the African continent following the World War II. Border conflicts between Italy and Britain regarding control over territories with a significant Somali population have resulted in persistent instability since the Somalia's independence and the Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia significantly affects relationships between the two countries and exacerbates their existing conflicts. Moreover, other regional countries are articulating their support for action in Somalia due to concerns over the foundation of an Islamic state in the surrounding area, while the Western leaders clearly indicate their worries that the country may become a hideout for terrorists.

The Ethiopia's attempts in Somalia indicate its desire to take advantage of the state's collapse, which occurred after Ethiopia, became landlocked due to the Eritrea's independence. The Ethiopia's ambition to profit from the Somali coastlines and acquire seaports has intensified, prompting considerations of annexing portions of the Somalia's land. Despite the potential inactivity of the Hawd region conflict, the potential for integration with Somalia suggests that a resolution to the Somali-Ethiopian war is unlikely in the near future, and it could resurface if conditions in Somalia improve. The Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia aims to maintain the current order and prevent instability; it desires an unstable and divided Somalia. A strong Somalia could strengthen the ethnic and religious opposition forces inside Ethiopia. The inability to achieve a political solution to the crisis in Somalia has resulted in heightened the international and regional actions, consequently worsening the humanitarian conditions of the Somali population. Throughout its continuous interventions, the United Nations is unable to resolve this conflict or restrict foreign interventions for Somalia, the Ogaden war represented a pivotal moment in the battle between the Somali Republic and Ethiopia, culminating in the Somali army's victory over the Ethiopian forces backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba (Ododa, 1985). Ethiopia was trying to prevent the establishment of a strong Somali state that could rival its dominance in the Horn of Africa. The Addis Ababa

administration was cautious of the Somalia's request for the union of all Somali territories, including the Hawd region of Ethiopia. The Barre the regime's resolve to advance Somalia to the status of a significant African power intensified Ethiopia's worry. The Ethiopian officials displayed no interest in reconstructing the central state that collapsed, opting instead to endorse the Republic of Somaliland and Puntland, two Northern provinces independent of the Somali Republic. Ethiopia has also positioned itself among other countries advocating for a resolution to the Somali issue by supporting the federal system and dividing the country into regions with significant powers.

According to the theory of opposites, which posits that one should respond in a diametrically opposed manner to a rival state, the Ethiopia's opponent, Eritrea, reacted to the news of the rival army's intervention with significant apprehension and animosity. This reaction particularly pronounced after the Islamic leadership recognized, following the intensification of the conflict with Addis Ababa last autumn, that the Eritrean government was supplying it with support and weapons. Eritrea has persistently denied these assertions, dismissing Ethiopian allegations that it is fostering the Islamic organizations in the region to destabilize Ethiopia's internal affairs and incite insurrection in predominantly Muslim areas. Eritrea, like Ethiopia, places significant importance on the Somali question, albeit for fundamentally distinct reasons. Since achieving independence, Eritrea has not hindered the formation of a Somali state, which may act as a buffer against the Ethiopia's dominance.

The defeat of the Islamic Courts from their bases and the retreat of Islamist activists into hiding may not effectively strengthen the influence of the unstable transitional government, which is struggling to establish its control over the country. There is apprehension that the Ethiopia-supported warlord groups may resurface in Mogadishu and other areas, potentially sparking disorder and conflict, worsening security challenges, and worsening the critical economic situation. The United States' resumed intervention into Somalia, subsequent to its airstrikes on locations in the southern region purportedly sheltering the Al-Qaeda affiliates and collaborating the Islamists, intensified the situation. This aggressive intervention, which resulted in the deaths of many innocent citizens, has attracted condemnation from several international organizations, particularly the European Union and the United Nations, and they are concerned the situation may

intensify and become internationalized if the Islamist militant factions ally with other organizations that oppose Ethiopia and the American military presence in East Africa.

Historically, people have viewed Ethiopia as the most significant regional and international power in Somalia, frequently facilitating the European colonization of Somalia and the Horn of Africa through support, alliances, consultations, or permission. The war assumed a theological dimension since the Islamic presence in Somalia represented a continual danger to Ethiopia, the predominant Christian authority in the area. The Ethiopia's relations with Somalia persisted in the contemporary period, despite differences among the Ethiopia's rulers: Emperor Haile Selassie, the ecclesiastical leader; the communist manifesto; and Meles Zenawi, the Christian who established a multi-party system. The Ethiopia's position remained crucial, as it backed the American involvement in Somalia, citing concerns about a potential alliance with Mohamed Farah Aided. The Ethiopian strategy included efforts to attract some Somali groups while simultaneously attempting to divide them, indicating that Ethiopia aims for a fractured, permanently divided, and weakened Somalia to safeguard its national security. Significant conflicts have consistently marked the Ethiopian-Somali relations. The emperor of Abyssinia first attacked the Somali territories in the Somali-Abyssinian battle, which led to fatalities and the looting of wealth. The conflict between the Kings of Abyssinia and the Somalis sparked a war between the mosque and the church in the Horn of Africa that the Somalis successfully fought against the Abyssinians.

The Djibouti Conference marks the start of true reconciliation attempts in Somalia. The Conference was organized using an innovative negotiating method, forsaking modern techniques in preference for "traditional approaches rooted in the Somali tribal customs," which have shown effectiveness in resolving the military conflicts in Somaliland. New strategies were clearly required for the Somali peace discussions, considering the unsuccessful efforts made from 1991 to 2000. David Stephen, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, engaged in the preparatory preparations and had comprehensive talks with Somali authorities over the Djibouti offer. The majority of groups gained substantial backing for the idea during these meetings, while a few highlighted the need to clarify certain concepts and address related concerns. Simultaneously, all international and regional organizations expressed their support of the

effort, first with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Standing Committee on Somalia, followed by the IGAD Development Partners Forum, and culminating in the IGAD Summit in November 1999. The Djibouti Conference relied on emerging intellectuals within the Somali society to establish new institutions, rather than the warlords and faction leaders. As part of the dialectic that governs Somali settlement initiatives, the Djibouti Conference recognized that engaging with prevailing factions, primarily leaders and entrepreneurs who profit from the ongoing civil war and are disinterested in its resolution, would not facilitate reconciliation. The Djibouti Conference aimed to energize the traditional and professional factions within the Somali society, which had been inactive since the downfall of the Siyad Barre regime and had not participated significantly in development efforts, except for a brief period during the American and international intervention in Somalia. The strategy of establishing new institutions and powerful individuals aims to motivate civil society elements to address the ineffectiveness of Somali society. However, the Djibouti conference did not entirely neglect the leaders of Somali factions, allowing them to involve in their individual abilities rather than as representatives of any illegitimate organizations or factions in Somalia.

As previously mentioned in the third chapter's section on the Kenya's interventions in Somalia, to evaluate the internal and external factors contributing to the conflicts there, it is necessary to adopt a cause-and-effect perspective, taking into account the diverse geographical locations. Strategies to resolve the conflict in Somalia must consider not only the country's internal challenges but also the significant implications for the regional stability concerning security, economic, and environmental factors. The instability in Somalia has significant implications for Kenya due to its geographical proximity and the resulting economic, social, and political effects. In light of the historical connections between the two nations, the Kenyan government has been vigilantly observing and actively engaging in the circumstances in Somalia. Kenya unilaterally changed the maritime borderline, negotiating into Somalia without permission, taking advantage of the Somalia's precarious economic situation and the lack of an UN-declared maritime border demarcation treaty. This sparked a maritime conflict between the two nations. After Somalia had tried every possibility of negotiation, it took on Kenya at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, accusing the Kenyan government of

distorting the maritime line that separates Somalia and Kenya from its maritime border. It became aware of the Kenya's actions and its determination to occupy part of the territorial waters.

Insecurity hinders diplomatic ties with Somalia, affecting most diplomatic missions and foreign relief agencies operating from Somalia to Nairobi, including the Kenya's ambassador to Somalia. As a result, the state of diplomacy deteriorates, making the process of mending relations entirely impossible. Kenya is experiencing considerable declines in tourism due to the widespread belief and recommendations against traveling to the nation, citing the risks associated with the terrorist incursions from Somalia. Furthermore, this has impeded trade and heightened apprehensions among international investors.

5.3. The involved roles of the Al-Shabaab organizations

Following the September 11 attacks on the United States, people around the world have become more interested in jihadist organizations. People have considered the ideas, fighting, and groups they join. The military improvements of jihadist factions in Nigeria, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Mali, and Somalia have gained considerable attention across various media platforms, research institutions, and policy-making arenas, particularly following the rise of the Islamic State organization, commonly referred to as ISIS, the preeminent jihadist entity in the Middle East and North Africa, which has demonstrated the capability to target strategic locations in Europe, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf region. Since September 11, Somalia has emerged as a significant locus in the global fight against suspected terrorism. Al-Shabaab, the jihadist group, took advantage of the country's instability after the Islamic Courts Union's takeover to recruit members and arm themselves. Following the collapse of the Islamic Courts' power, the Al-Shabaab organization leveraged its strength to establish itself as a global jihadist organization, asserting control over the Horn of Africa, acting as an intermediary for international jihadist groups, and drawing attention from both regional and global audiences. The movement's organizational expertise and the persistence of its activities and military operations, despite a reduction in its military and economic influence, have resulted in its recognition as the most dangerous group of jihadists in Africa, especially in the Horn of Africa. Consequently, other countries have engaged in military intervention in Somalia

to eliminate the movement's military infrastructure and safeguard their interests. Al-Shabaab shares its literature, methodologies, and intellectual concepts alongside Al-Qaeda, including its methods for fighting. The organization neglects regulation during its attacks, prioritizing the fighting with its enemies. Since Al-Shabaab gained control of southern and central Somalia in 2010, it has garnered heightened attention from global Islamist leaders. Renowned for its field and tactical operations, along with its destructive operations on Kenya and Uganda, Al-Shabaab acquired reputation and power, securing its position as the preeminent jihadist force in the Horn of Africa. As previously mentioned, the Al-Shabaab organizations are militant Islamist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, and they have played a significant role in the Somali internal conflicts for over three decades. When the central government collapsed, leaving Somalia without a functioning government, the Al-Shabaab organization took advantage of this power vacuum to establish their own administrations. They exploited the political instability of the country, targeted any internationally recognized government in Somalia, and accused them of being a proxy for foreigners. The Al-Shabaab organization has engaged in various activities that exploit the country's economy. They have established a group responsible for tax collection and the exportation of charcoal, utilizing the proceeds to finance their operations domestically. Additionally, the Al-Shabaab's involvement in internal conflicts obstructs humanitarian assistance, such as the United Nations aid, in the regions under their control. They also target vulnerable individuals for recruitment into their ideological programs, creating significant challenges for the peacebuilding efforts in Somalia.

5.4. The role and the interventions of the United Nations and the United States

The first chapter presents a theoretical approach that examines the techniques international actors employ to tackle the Somali crisis, emphasizing the United States' primary tactic, mass military force deployment. The United States began its involvement in the Operation Restore Hope in Somalia with humanitarian goals, aiming to stabilize the country amidst a devastating armed conflict and famine. The intervention rapidly transformed into a military operation that encountered substantial obstacles stemming from intricate clan circumstances, governmental disunity, and insufficient civilian participation.

The changes in American policy following President Carter's succession and the Ethiopia's transition from a longstanding US ally to the socialist bloc influenced the change in US support for the Siyad Barre administration. Upon becoming president in 1977, President Carter embraced the perspective of his National Security Advisor over the Horn of Africa. The adviser of the President, Brzezinski, perceived the region through the perspective of competition with the Soviet Union, considering it a crucial component of what he referred to as a chain of “crises” extending from Afghanistan to East Africa. The United Nations intervention in Somalia commenced when the Secretary-General Boutros Ghali ordered a delegation to assess the situation and its characteristics. The objective was to ascertain the delivery of assistance and relief to the afflicted people as well as to achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict and cease the conflicts between the sides. The group presented a report to the Secretary-General, outlining the results of its visit to Somalia.

- ✓ All stakeholders in Somalia need to reach a consensus on a crucial humanitarian project for the Somali populace.
- ✓ General Mohamed Farah Aideed bases his denial of the US involvement in the conflict with Ali Mahdi on the claim that it is a conflict within the United Somali Congress.
- ✓ Northern Somalia asserts its intention to secede from the south and establish the Republic of Somaliland. The persistent conflict among the factions has intensified the situation in Somalia.

Consequently, the Security Council adopted a resolution mandating the disarmament of Somali factions and prioritizing a ceasefire to facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid and assistance in the conflict resolution, as well as the operation of a complete weapons prohibition. The resolution did not yield any advancement in the Somali situation, leading the Security Council to adopt many significant the resolutions in an effort to address the problem. The Security Council adopted resolutions mandating the deployment of 50 United Nations observers to oversee the ceasefire alongside the United Nations security forces. The Secretary-General persists in his consultations to resolve the conflict and has appointed a special representative to offer overarching guidance for the

United Nations activities; however, the personal representative failed to secure an agreement with General Mohamed Al-Farah, whose forces dominate most of the regions.

The United States' involvement in Somalia was mostly strategic, and it simply supplied weapons and development assistance, particularly through the United States Agency for International Development. This assistance established Somalia as a US ally, forcing it to be nearly completely dependent on the Western foreign aid for economic support. The scale of this economic assistance presented substantial obstacles for Somalia, limiting the country's ability to efficiently assimilate and utilize it. This assistance adversely influenced the Somali economy, which subsequently deteriorated due to pervasive corruption, ineffective economic strategies, and the civil conflict that erupted for the country.

The tensions between the superpowers began to diminish and international condemnation of the Somali government's actions in its conflict against northern opposition forces intensified. During this period, members of the U.S. Congress began to vocalize their condemnation of human rights abuses in Somalia and advocated for the cessation of collaboration with the Somali administration. Legislators implored the administration to reevaluate its objectives in the region. Initially, the United States refrained from explicitly condemning the brutality by the Barre dictatorship because of the strategic significance of military installations in Berbera. The extensive bombing of people in Hargeisa prompted the United States to terminate its military cooperation program with Somalia, which had lost strategic significance following the conclusion of the Cold War.

The United States' actions in the region since the end of the Cold War exemplify the involvement of major nations in this struggle and its persistence to the present day. The United States exemplifies the involvement of major states in this struggle and its persistence to the present day, whether by mandating the international community to remain inactive and neglect the region in search of potential solutions, by directly intervening militarily against specific Somali factions in the context of the global war against terrorism, or by empowering certain regional powers to play a monitoring role with their support and assistance. These situations squander and neglect numerous opportunities that could have assisted Somalia in overcoming its failures and instability.

As previously mentioned, it believed that international and regional actors, despite having adequate mechanisms for intervention and conflict resolution at their lowest point, chose to observe the events in Somalia from a distance during the initial years following the breakdown of the Siyad Barre administrations. On the other hand, it is evident that the United States and several other European nations made significant efforts to bring the dictatorship to the verge of collapse. Either by not using the aid that was given to the regime to encourage it to have a peaceful transition and be more open with the opposition, or by persuading the opposition that it would be beneficial to negotiate with the regime and make some concessions, or at least not to back opposition groups that would take extreme positions and think a military solution is possible, or by stopping the systematic destruction that international financial institutions did to the country's economic institutions within the framework of political and economic restriction. Following the September 2001 events, the United States perceived Somalia as a threat in its war on terrorism due to the presence of Islamic groups that openly express their animosity toward the American policies globally and regionally. This change has prompted the United States to perceive Somalia as a significant battleground in its counterterrorism efforts, especially following the effective governance of the Union of Islamic Courts in the region. Throughout its deficiencies, the organization has demonstrated its capacity to enforce security and establish a degree of stability in the regions it governs. The organization's movement has demonstrated its ability to address and reduce piracy along the Somalia's coasts, thereby aligning with the objectives of the United States and promoting stability in the region.

The United States seems to prioritize fragmentation, division, and statelessness. This provides more arguments for intervening in regional issues, disregarding national sovereignty, and opting to execute this duty via local agents who facilitate the exploitation of the nation's resources. This is conducted either under the framework of the global war on terrorism and the Somali fundamentalist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda or via friendly nations such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, thereby advancing the interests of these regional powers.

The United States has employed diverse techniques in its fight against Al-Shabaab organizations. Drawing from this experience, they have ultimately devised a smart and effective approach that guarantees the safety of American soldiers. They accomplish this

by depending on local or allied forces and eschewing fighting with the American troops. In combating the Al-Shabaab Movement, the United States depends on the Somali army, the African Union soldiers, and some local tribes. This strategy has advantages, notably enabling the United States to minimize its deployment of military and financial expenditure while leveraging its credibility to attain its objectives. It minimizes the risk of involvement with foreign actors, reduces costs and risks, and minimizes the potential for fostering local populations and escalating tensions into direct confrontations with the American military forces against the Al-Shabab organization.

Another option involves strong direct military action by the United States to counter the Islamist organizations. This policy encompasses a series of military, political, and additional measures implemented by the United States to weaken or eliminate the jihadists and rebel factions. The strong intervention plan in Somalia contains various detrimental elements, and the US military involvement may unintentionally reinforce the narratives of Al-Shabaab militants and other Salafi-jihadist factions, which aim to portray the battle in a similar manner. These narratives could potentially heighten the probability of negative outcomes. The deployment of traditionally trained US armed forces to combat the Islamists overseas has frequently resulted in unforeseen consequences, such as fostering the emergence of a new generation of terrorists.

The United States always bases its involvement in Africa, particularly in its intervention roles for countries in the Horn of Africa. It prioritizes Somalia due to its security, trade, and international humanitarian programs. The primary goal of the United States' plans in Africa is to enhance the ability of African partners to address challenges posed by extremist organizations such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, ISIS, and others. Influenced by its ambition to establish a secure and stable regional environment to protect marine navigation from the terrorist organizations and piracy, the United States supports the efforts of the African peacekeeping force. Al-Shabaab is a significant threat to the interests of the United States and the West in the Horn of Africa. The United States aims to limit Al-Shabaab to the southern region and consistently attempts to eliminate the group through periodic attacks on its strongholds, an approach that has frequently led to deaths among the civilians. The United States is not primarily concerned with building peace and advancing democracy to enhance the prosperity of the Somali populace. Rather, it seeks to create an effective central government that can fight Al-Shabaab on its

behalf. This policy safeguards the America's military efforts, human capital, and economy while also securing internal stability and mitigating perceptions of being a threat in Islamic countries among the Muslim populations.

5.5. The roles and the involvements of Turkey

The Horn of Africa, historically an area of significant geopolitical competition, is currently witnessing new competition along its coasts. The Gulf Arab countries and Turkey are intensifying their efforts to secure allies and expand their influence in the Horn region. The primary political fault lines in the Middle East, between Iran and the Arab states, as well as among the Arab states themselves—are increasingly evident along the Red Sea region. These enduring, overlapping rivalries are exacerbating current regional conflicts and creating new ones. The African politicians, alongside the Gulf governments and their Western allies, are initiating discussions on preventing competition from erupting into overt conflict. The Gulf States and Turkey, due to their significant influence as allies, investors, donors, and mediators, should take advantage of this power to prevent rather than worsen the conflict in the region.

Over the past decade, Turkey has emerged as a crucial partner and strategic friend of Somalia, constantly contributing as a security collaborator and a significant influence in the Somalia's future. Turkey has been involved in the training and development of the Somali military by deploying military missions to Somalia and hosting the Somali military troops for training in Turkey. Furthermore, it has formalized security and military collaboration agreements with the Somali authorities as part of the strategic alliance between the two nations. These agreements encompass collaboration in counterterrorism, economic and military cooperation, enhancement of bilateral relations, and suppression of piracy, prevention of foreign interventions, unlawful fishing, arms trafficking, and the training and development of the Somali navy troops.

Considering the Turkey's NATO membership and its agreements with the Western nations, the strategic significance of Somalia is too substantial for the United States and Britain to overlook the Turkish activities in the region. As a result, both countries are eager to closely monitor the Somali situation and establish channels of communication with the Somali administrations, as demonstrated by former US Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Somalia and his willingness to meet the former Somali president in Kenya in July 2015. This clarifies why Britain organized multiple international conferences to

support Somalia, intending to remind Turkey of its enduring interests in the Horn of Africa. The Somalia's policy on Turkey markedly differentiates between its economic and political involvement. The Washington's Arab allies in Somalia achieved initial success through financial support, humanitarian aid, trade exchanges, development projects, and various investment contracts; however, their political influence did not reach its expected level, in contrast to Turkey, which effectively strengthened its influence in the Somali political stage. The involvement of Turkey's success in achieving what some Arab colleagues in the West has not transformed the Horn of Africa into a battleground between the two groups. Several Arab countries, who oppose the Turkish mission, have expressed concerns over the Turkey's growing presence in a crucial strategic region for Africa, the Middle East, and the world. The Turkey's efforts in economic, humanitarian, political and military sectors have strengthened its competition with other actors in Somalia. The Turkey's yearly funding has encouraged trust among the Somali population and increased its influence in Somalia, sometimes at the cost of other organizations aligned with the Western interests. As mentioned early in chapter four, the Turkey's involvement in Somali affairs has primarily been positive. However, it is main significant to note that no country can build a state, make pure investments, or provide military support unless it aligns with its interests. The Turkey's interest in Somalia is not recent, given the nation's historical connections dating back to the Ottoman Empire period. Somalia had significant connections with the Ottoman Empire. Recently, Turkey supported Somalia during the US-led Operation Restore Hope, commonly referred to as Operation Black Hawk Down, and contributed a battalion of the Turkish army under the supervision of the United Nations. Turkey has resumed its cultural and educational operations in Mogadishu. Over the years, Turkey, as the sole Muslim member of NATO, has maintained a strong bond with the Somali people.

However, Turkey claims that it will not avoid from its involvement in Somalia. It points out that the Somali people recognize it as a non-colonial state and that it does not plan to use Somali resources. The project it commits to aims to rebuild the Somali nation, unify its territories (including the currently separate Republic of Somaliland), and improve security within the nation, which is the main challenge. It asserts that sending international forces there would exacerbate the situation. Regional and international forces are positioning Somalia as a primary battleground, both now and in the future in

addition international organizations in Somalia have concentrated on mitigating the effects of drought on those affected. However, with thousands of displaced people, the Turkish government has recognized that food and medicine alone cannot rescue Somalia, and has expressed its commitment to engage in efforts aimed at reconstructing the country's infrastructure. Turkey has initiated bilateral cooperation with Somalia by offering support in essential areas like health, education, infrastructure development, waste management, sewage systems, airports, and especially the establishment of the Somali military forces. The primary objective of these programs is to establish institutions and achieve self-reliance in Somalia, as the government claims.

5.6. The Arab Countries Interventions (Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia)

The Arab countries' involvement in resolving the Somali conflicts has led to the emergence of two distinct methodologies: The political approach and the relief approach. Since the onset of the crisis, the countries have endeavored to mitigate the conflicts in Somalia and have repeatedly demanded that the various Somali factions cease their violent fighting, which is rapidly depleting the country's resources. In July 1991, the Assistant Secretary-General for Social Affairs sent a team from the General Secretariat of Arab League to Djibouti, where they engaged with relevant Somali groups and participated in the National Reconciliation Conference. The relationship between Somalia and the Arab countries was not of considerable significance. The primary emphasis was on political commitments and the carrying out of relief efforts in Somalia. Despite the Somalia's significant decline during the 1990s, the Arab response was particularly weak in defining its traits and charting the country's development. These efforts failed to resolve the Somali issue, leaving the situation unresolvable from the political perspective of Arab leaders. Since the onset of the conflicts in Yemen in mid-2015, the Gulf's influence in Somalia has grown, with this interest increasing frequently and the Horn of Africa has attracted attention from the Gulf, particularly from the Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who recently attempted to finalize a deal with Somaliland to create a military base at Berbera Airport. This arrangement has continued for nearly twenty years, despite generating the conflict in Somalia. The United Arab Emirates' involvement includes both military operations and participation in many governmental sectors. The conflict between the UAE and the Somalian government crosses many fault lines in Somalia. Initially, their

actions intensified pre-existing conflict between the government and the opposing groups in the city, further complicating a crisis within the Somalia's parliament that seemed poised to escalate into the conflict in late 2017. The government conducted operations on the residences and offices of two notable opponents, alleging they received financial support from the UAE. The weakening ties between the Somali government and the UAE provide a possibility of growing division within the Somali security forces, since the Somali officials believe that the UAE-supported troops ignored orders.

Conversely, the Abu Dhabi's policy does not impose equivalent limits. Despite initially utilizing soft power and maintaining numerous elements of it, the Abu Dhabi's policy does not emphasize countering opposing interests. Consequently, aside from conventional protocol events, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed looks as if he has no expectation of witnessing his images raised above the heads of brown Africans in the streets of Mogadishu. He seems indifferent as long as he can maintain control over others, whether by the attraction of wealth or the threat of violence.

As discussed in chapter three, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) plays a important role in intervening in the country's internal conflict. The relationship between Somalia and the UAE stems from the Mogadishu's concerns about the Abu Dhabi's involvement in undermining the fragile Somali state, as Somalia strives to regain control over its territory after a conflict that rendered it a failed state. The UAE government's choice to finalize direct agreements with members of the Somali Federal Union without securing the Mogadishu's permission hinders efforts to encourage strong relations among the central government and the sub-regional governments. Turkey and Saudi Arabia only negotiate with the government in Somalia, while the UAE maintains special direct connections, particularly with members of the Somali Federal Union. The Saudi Arabian government has been involved in interventions in Somalia as part of its multifaceted foreign strategy, which includes humanitarian help, political involvement, religious influence, and strategic objectives; the Saudi Arabia's involvement in Somalia reflects a confluence of strategic interests, regional rivalry, and international policy objectives. Although its assistance has aided specific developmental and stabilization efforts, the impact of religious and geopolitical factors has frequently complicated the Somalia's internal affairs. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has emerged as a significant financier of projects in Somalia since its independence, providing support channels, charitable organizations,

and contributions to the humanitarian agencies linked to the United Nations and regional entities. Saudi Arabia has rendered substantial support to government of Somalia in several areas, including education, the economy and health sectors. These funds wholly or significantly sponsored the execution of several infrastructure projects. After the Gulf Crisis, Somalia emerged as a theater of influence, with Saudi Arabia attempting to curtail the Qatar's involvement.

Concerning the Qatar's involvements, The Gulf crisis has stimulated renewed Qatari involvement and highlighted Doha's intention to strengthen its alliances in Somalia. For example, Qatar has sought to get involved in developmental initiatives, despite the UAE's considerable expertise and favorable standing. The planned operations in Somalia signify the Doha's inaugural effort to go outside its borders. Qatar maintains considerable influence in Somalia, utilizing its powerful diplomatic capacity to mediate the conflicts among the regional governments and offer practical assistance. The Doha's concerns about a possible rise in the involvement of Gulf states, especially the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, in the region, along with indications of a changing geopolitical landscape in the Horn of Africa, have underscored the growing importance of Qatar's plans to enhance its influence in Somalia. The Qatari government is one of the Arab countries actively engaged in the internal conflict in Somalia, frequently motivated by its interests and rivalries with countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Overall, the Qatar's cooperation strengthens the federal government in both financial and political dimensions. Qatar plays a crucial role in facilitating negotiations and providing funding for infrastructure projects, and it participates in rivalries with certain Arab countries to maintain its regional influence. Additionally, it highlights the Qatar's mediation efforts in the Somalia's internal conflicts through diplomatic conferences aimed at resolving factional disputes against the government. Modern global shifts are prompting developing nations, especially in Africa, to reassess their growth paths and strategies for attaining security and stability. Given the variety of obstacles and conflicts encountered in the political, economic, and social regions, integration and collaboration have surfaced as the most efficacious strategies to attain their objectives. From this perspective, it is evident that intervention serves as the essential and exclusive method for addressing developmental and security requirements, making it a crucial resource for all countries.

The fragmentation and collapse of the state alone cannot explain the fragility Somalia has experienced since its independence. The preceding information clearly establishes a sequence of external interventions as the origin of Somalia's instability. The vulnerability of Somalia originated from European colonialism, which dismantled the nation's physical and social framework. The dynamics of Cold War alliances facilitated the continued illegitimate governance of a failed and corrupt state. Numerous interventions followed the conclusion of the Cold War and the onset of civil conflict after the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime. Ultimately, the global war on terror and the major powers' view of Somalia as an important base for international terrorism were significant factors. Each of these stages adversely affected the Somalia's governance, prompting the international community to concur that the fragmentation of the Somali populace into clans obstructed their capacity for self-governance. The act of challenging the viability of the Somali state and misusing the phrase "failed state" serves as a psychological warfare tactic, fostering the perception that states in similar situations have collapsed and require military intervention, either explicitly or under the guise of humanitarian assistance, for their salvation. The danger of this argument mostly resides in its capacity to mislead international realities and the actual conditions contributing to the failure or collapse of the African states. The additional danger is in its unqualified and immediate acceptance by dominant nations, which, following the end of the Cold War, have perceived themselves as the primary guarantors of stability and custodians of global security

The evolution of the Somali state, from its foundation to its collapse, provides a concise historical overview of the incremental developments involved. The study delves into state building and conflict, outlines theoretical frameworks for state collapse, and subsequently analyzes the various perspectives espoused by several researchers. The research aims to categorize these perspectives into basic, operational, and situational points of view throughout the state's history. The research reveals that the current Somali state emerged from a weak governmental framework, leading to a political, economic, and social structure that was inadequate and incompatible with the characteristics of Somali society. The regime failed to incorporate all aspects of Somali identity, such as Islam and clan culture, into a complex structure that relied heavily on democratic concepts and responsibilities. The colonial powers left a Somali society that celebrated Independence Day with pleasure, but this society was simultaneously fragile and powerless, fueled by

strong nationalism and involved in conflicts with its neighboring countries. A closer look at the stated ideas indicates that the collapse of the Somali state occurred within the search for the permanent state identity promised by the founders of Somali nationalism. They mobilized national resources to complete this process, primarily seeking foreign backing for the nationalist agenda that aimed to establish Greater Somalia.

The conflict in Ethiopia depicted a weak country battling another weak one, and the Somalia's defeat in this war signaled the beginning of the fragmentation of the fundamental Somali ethnic identity. The war's effect was disastrous, increasing internal conflict between the Somali government and opposition groups supported by Ethiopia. Ethiopia strategically converted its battle with Somalia into an internal conflict in Somalia, resulting in the collapse of the Somali state. The state's failure mostly resulted from internal conflicts, including prominent power struggles and a negative political culture characterized by dictatorship, corruption, tribalism, and interest in foreign backing and protection. The evaluation of the collapsed state indicates that both the governing regime and the leaders of the armed opposition were unable to prevent the state's collapse. The fall of Somalia marked the beginning of a new phase in the Somali history, signifying the collapse of the post-colonial state and a decline in the identity that the state had established.

As formerly mentioned in chapter two, when it comes to the issue of internal conflicts, the clan leaders and regional governments hold differing perspectives on various aspects of the central government's plans and strategies. The government and regional states seem to have differing perspectives on several security matters. State leaders, convinced of the government's inadequacy in addressing the nation's security challenges, have resolved to create their own forces and implement a system for intelligence information exchange. The states have shown strong resistance to the federal government's activities regarding elections, the formation of the Judicial Council, the ratification of legislation concerning political parties, and the distribution of national resources, among other matters. Nevertheless, the Somali federal government maintains a facade of unity, focusing solely on the upcoming presidential elections in several states. However, there is no guarantee of success in managing these issues, which implies political divisions will persist until they fully understand how to resolve these issues or other internal conflicts.

Summary Conclusions for Third States Involvements in Somalia					
Actor/players	The main involvement method	The dynamic conflict resolution strategies	The conflict prevention strategies	The consequences of positive vs. negative stability	The spillover impacts and lessons learned
Ethiopia	Invasion for military interventions War of proxy Part-political reconciliations through IGAD	Military interventions for removal of Islamic Courts Unions	Creating zone buffers: supporting friendly border states	Direct tactical advantages of removing the ICU caused durable tactical delays, intensifying the Al-Shabab's insurrection and anti-foreign feeling.	Military interference that lacks proper political clearance and local support often creates a power vacuum filled with deeper underlying issues.
Kenya	Direct Armed Action Financial Deals AMISOM Troops	Armed Control: Process Linda Nchi is tasked with pushing the Al-Shabab organization to the border between the countries.	State Building in Jubaland: The establishment of a subsidiary local government aims to create a defined buffer area.	Diverse: Positively made a buffer zone and backed AMISOM improvements. There are allegations that the Somali central government is being discouraged in Jubaland to benefit specific interests.	Safeguarding the border can lead to significant political interference in local state politics, which may confuse national resolutions.
Qatar/EUA	Support for economic and military initiatives, treaties regarding ports and military bases, and political interventions.	Support efforts to establish permanency by solidifying alliances with specific regional administrations.	There is a need for economic improvement and financing in ports, as well as groundwork to generate economic strength and gain influence.	The Main Weakening: Their competition transferred Gulf conflicts into Somalia, breaking national safety militaries, worsening strains, and paralyzing governmental developments.	The geopolitical rivalry among external supporters is a dangerous driver of internal destruction; it stops unified state plans.

United States	The drone attacks, superior forces, and economic and logistical funding are all significant factors.	Killing: Targeted assassinations of al-Shabab organizations' leadership to damage the assembly's abilities.	Capacity Construction: Training of elite Somali counter-terrorism elements.	Varied strategies effectively undermined the construction of Al-Shabab's mid-level command. However, dynamic strikes produced citizen fatalities, powering staffing and continuing a cycle of strength.	A thin counter-terrorism emphasis that orders short-term security improvements over politically aware and state-building procedures can be counterproductive in the end.
Turkey	Türkiye provides charitable aid, government infrastructure, soldierly training, and political maintenance.	In State-Building: The Turkish Models, the construction of government infrastructure and also health and education to create legality and strength from the broken-up.	Building Capacity: Ensuring that Somali military officers and public servants are fit to strengthen government foundations nationwide.	The Stabilizing Largely: Constructed important goodwill and concrete assets. The central administration and the capital were also supported. Nevertheless, there is a risk of creating addiction.	A comprehensive strategy that includes development, social help, and military training can boost the national government's credibility and more favorably received by the local population.
AU/IGAD	The Diplomatic Mandates, the AMISOM/ATMIS Mission, and the Mediation Agreements.	Peacekeeping: Providing an armed force (AMISOM/ATMIS) to grip land and support the government administration. Mediation: enabling negotiation between the central government and other regional Leaders.	In the Norms Promotions: Supporting federalism and assistant voting procedures.	Mixed operations, AMISOM/ATMIS played a crucial role in regaining territory and preventing complete failure. However, the assignment suffered from unclear orders, donor requirements, and claims of corruption. Suited a party to the clash.	Many-sided interferences offer vital care but expression weak orders, underfunding, and disagreeing supporter benefits.

Table 6: Comparative of Third-State Roles Analysis and their and Outcomes Strategies

Source: Created by the author

CONCLUSION

Third-party involvement in Somalia is not just a consideration; it is essential to the conflict, as this argument shows that their efforts—whether military, economic, or diplomatic—have consistently been driven by global rivalry and their own pursuit of national security, rather than by a genuine desire to maintain stability in Somalia. The narrative of intervention predominantly revolves around unintended consequences: regional powers such as Ethiopia employed coercive measures to sustain the insurgency; Gulf adversaries like the UAE and Qatar exported their conflicts to Somalia, which fragmented the nation's governance; and external entities like the US prioritized counterterrorism tactics that frequently undermined enduring peace and stability. Nonetheless, the analysis uncovers a significant differentiation: tactics centered on the comprehensive building of states and establishment of institutions, exemplified by Turkey's methodology, produced more enduring and locally credible results. The primary conclusion is that third states have functioned as both instigators and mediators, thereby exacerbating the crises they aim to control, and sustainable peace in Somalia will ultimately rely not on eliminating foreign influence, but on directing it towards methods that align with a unified, Somali-led political initiative.

The Horn of Africa transformed into a theater of proxy warfare between opposing power blocs during the Cold War due to the international stance on the Ethiopian-Somali conflict in the late 1970s and the contest for regional hegemony. Consequently, the armaments race between the Eastern and Western blocs during that period led to an increase in the military stockpiles of significant nations in the region. Kenya's access to American military resources and experience transcended the two nations engaged in the border conflict during the Ethiopian-Somali crisis. This also led to the deployment of military resources by several governments against unarmed citizens, as previously discussed in the context of the Ethiopian government's actions against the Ogaden people during the same conflict. Resolving the Somali issue sustainably, particularly by addressing the overarching political framework, requires the complete commitment of all players. Both the Kenyan and Somali governments have consistently acknowledged the Somali conflict, allowing them to launch peace initiatives that utilize their values, expertise, and influence to foster a favorable environment at local and international levels, thereby strengthening the regional efforts. The civil war in Somalia, which resulted in the

breakdown of infrastructure for millions of local citizens, presented an opportunity for foreign governments to intervene in the Somalia's affairs. This involvement allowed them to establish secure zones for the transportation of humanitarian aid, reduce starvation, and promote national reconciliation positively. The involvement in the Somali affairs began with non-governmental relief organizations and the United Nations organizations financed by the Western and European nations. These organizations immediately dispatched team members to Somalia following the escalation of the crisis, but they failed to minimize the catastrophic situation. Consequently, assaults by the armed militias aimed at appropriating humanitarian supplies impeded these groups' ability to fulfill their designated objectives. The Armed militias diverted hunger-stricken humanitarian aid to their own groups, intensifying the war until victory.

The Gulf crisis significantly influenced the Somali internal politics and was a primary factor in the persistent conflict between the government and the regional powers. Notwithstanding the federal government's impartial position on the Gulf crisis and its encouragement for all parties to partake in negotiations to resolve their conflicts, certain states denied this decision, expressing their displeasure and their duty to support specific Gulf States regardless of the legitimacy of their arguments. This clearly violates the Somali constitution, which grants the federal government the authority to make final decisions about foreign policy, despite the recognition of conflict between some parts of the government. The federal government has always spoken out against trade and partnership deals between certain countries and states, even though these deals have nothing to do with the federal government.

The conflict in Somalia led to the complete breakdown of the state. Numerous cases of state collapse have occurred on the African continent, characterized by partial and fluctuating failures that did not persist over time. Leading factions have consistently emerged to resolve conflicts in their favor, with the exception of Somalia, where the state saw a total breakdown with the downfall of the Siyad Barre military dictatorship, and no Somali faction achieved authority over the administration. Given the ongoing decline of internal conflict in Somalia, the absence of a central administration, and the increasing level of disorder throughout the country, it appears that international actors are not giving this issue the attention it deserves; fortunately, over the years, Somalia has continued to

recover, making significant advancements in various sectors such as security, economics, and government infrastructure.

In conclusion the influence of global entities in Somalia's disputes and encapsulates key conclusions from preceding chapters. Chapter II investigated external variables in a comprehensive manner, Chapter III concentrated on the participation of international players, and Chapter IV analyzed Somalia's relationships with Turkey and other nations. This chapter synthesizes these observations to provide definitive conclusions and actionable solutions for mitigating Somalia's persistent conflict. The research indicates that international entities often endorse groups that align with their strategic or national interests rather than just humanitarian objectives. Ethiopia and Eritrea, neighboring nations, have significantly influenced Somalia's internal strife. Although they sometimes serve as mediators and provide assistance to the federal government, they simultaneously advance their own geopolitical aims, which might hinder conflict resolution initiatives. Al-Shabab continues to be a significant domestic entity whose military prowess, religious impact, and assaults intensify instability and undermine stabilization efforts in the nation. The United Nations and the United States have engaged in both charitable and armed interventions, but their effectiveness has been limited by complex clan relations, a fragile government, and insufficient local involvement. Meanwhile, Arab nations such as Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have employed political and humanitarian strategies that often emphasize negotiation and assistance; however, these efforts are shaped by their own foreign policy objectives. The participation of foreign players includes support, intervention, and strategic interests, which have influenced the course of Somalia's wars throughout time and also Effective conflict resolution tactics include diplomatic mediation among Somali groups by regional and international entities, including initiatives to bolster governmental institutions and security forces. In addition, the UN and African Union (AU) peacekeeping missions have aided in the protection of civilians; however, issues in coordination and neutrality persist, and also Negotiations and reintegration initiatives with terrorist factions, including local Al-Shabaab organizations, have sometimes resulted in localized stability developments, but success has been unpredictable.

These results provide various suggestions to inform future international and local initiatives. Facilitating international engagement is essential to prevent unintentional

backing for rival forces. Furthermore, long-term peacebuilding must take precedence over immediate military achievements by emphasizing institutional development and government transformation. The influence of foreign engagement must be meticulously monitored to prevent unforeseen repercussions, such as heightened local tensions or the strengthening of extremist factions, and in addition, the strategies for avoiding conflicts are crucial in mitigating the likelihood of future violence. The early warning systems for monitoring political tensions and violent outbursts enable international and regional players to take preventive measures. Promoting community involvement in governance and decision-making mitigates local grievances that often incite confrontations, and the economic and social initiatives, including employment generation, education, and infrastructure enhancement, tackle the fundamental causes of conflict and diminish the allure of extremist organizations, and in addition. The Somali war is influenced by a confluence of both internal and external causes, characterized by intricate interconnections among local players, regional neighbors, and global powers. International interventions have influenced both the escalation of war and the facilitation of peace, contingent upon the techniques used and the local circumstances. Achieving lasting stability in Somalia requires a cohesive strategy that harmonizes diplomatic mediation, security assistance, community involvement, and long-term development, ensuring that interventions tackle the fundamental root causes of conflict rather than only the appearances.

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