



**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**THE IMPACT OF HATE SPEECH IN SOCIAL MEDIA IN TURKEY
ON THE SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE OF SYRIAN MIGRANTS:
THE CASE OF TWITTER**

Master's Thesis

**Mehmet VARİŞ
170610012**

**MASTER OF ARTS PEACE AND
CONFLICT STUDIES**

January 2022



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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP AND ORIGINALITY

I am the sole author of this Master Thesis and have not used any sources other than those listed in the bibliography and identified as references. I also declare that I have not submitted this thesis to another institution in order to obtain an academic diploma.

Mehmet VARIŞ
(Signature)



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When I embarked on this academic journey, I was more interested in the media-related parts of the Peace and Conflict Studies department because I am a member of the media. However, due to the guidance and academic knowledge of my esteemed teacher, Prof. Dr. Havva KÖK ARSLAN, I discovered that this department, whose interdisciplinary aspect predominates, is an ocean, so to speak. Special thanks to my dear advisor Assoc.Prof. Dr. Nevfel BOZ for his contributions to my academic development, Prof.Dr. Havva KÖK ARSLAN and my department professors, Assoc. Prof.Dr. Kadir Onur UNUTULMAZ, Assoc. Prof. Dr. İbrahim Can SEZGİN and I want to thank Assoc.Prof. Dr. Vanessa TINKER. I also want to thank my dear friend Dr. Bahadır Avşar who supported me at every stage of my thesis from the beginning to the end.

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ÖZET

Sosyal Medya toplumsal barışa olumlu anlamda yansıdığı gibi, bazende olumsuz olarak toplumsal krizler oluşturabilmektedir. Toplumsal iç barışı oluşturan etmenlerden biri de göçmenlerin toplumsal kabulüdür. 2011 yılında Suriye iç savaşının patlak vermesi ile Suriyeli mülteciler yoğun bir şekilde Türkiye'ye sığınmayı tercih etmişlerdir. Savaşın uzaması ve geçici misafirliğin kalıcı misafirliğe dönüşmesiyle beraber sığınmacılara karşı mikro ölçekte ve lokal olarak ötekileştirme ve yer yer düşmanca tavırlar görülmüştür.

Bu çalışma ile Twitter Türkiye mecrasında kümelenen ve Suriyeli sığınmacılara karşı nefret söylemi üzerine inşa edilen sosyal medya kullanıcılarını analiz edilmektedir. Çalışmada Twitter'da nefret söylemini kullanan kullanıcılarının Suriyeli sığınmacılara karşı nefret söylemlerinin konuları ve nefret söyleminin en çok işlendiği hashtag ve mention alan hesaplar ve tonlar incelenmiştir.

Araştırmada, birincil ve ikincil verileri toplamak için nicel araştırma metodu kullanılmış ve Twitter'da nefret söylemi amaçlı sosyal medya kullanıcıları hakkında bilgi toplamak ve bu kullanıcıların algı ve perspektifini değerlendirmek için içerik analizi metodu tercih edilmiştir.

Suriyeli gündeminin en yoğun konuşulduğu tarihler olan İdlib şehitleri ve Afrin operasyonunun yapıldığı tarihlerde bile twitter Türkiye gündeminin yalnızca %2.02'sine tekabül etmektedir. Çalışmamızda elde edilen bulgular Twitter'da Suriyeli gündeminin düşük bir orana sahip olmasına ve Türk halkının gündeminde yer almamasına rağmen, kullanıcıların konsantre bir yapıda oldukları ve gündemi belirleyebilecek kadar etkili oldukları gerçeğini göstermiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Medya, Suriyeli Sığınmacı, Nefret Söylemi

ABSTRACT

While Social Media reflects positively on social peace, it can sometimes create social crises negatively. One of the factors that create social inner peace is the social acceptance of immigrants. With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Syrian migrants preferred to take shelter in Turkey intensively. With the prolongation of the war and the transformation of temporary visitation into permanent guest, marginalization and sometimes hostile attitudes towards migrants were observed on a micro-scale and locally.

This study analyzes social media users clustered on Twitter Turkey and built on hate speech against Syrian migrants. In the study, the topics of hate speech against Syrian migrants of users who use hate speech on Twitter and the accounts and tones of hashtags and mentions in which hate speech is most often processed were examined.

In the research, the quantitative research method was used to collect primary and secondary data, and the content analysis method was preferred to collect information about social media users with hate speech on Twitter and to evaluate the perception and perspective of these users.

Even on the dates of the Idlib attacks and the Afrin operation, which are the days when the Syrian agenda is discussed most intensely, Twitter corresponds to only 2.02% of Turkey's agenda. The findings of our study showed the fact that although the Syrian agenda on Twitter has a low rate and is not on the agenda of the Turkish people, users are concentrated and effective enough to set the agenda.

Keywords: Social Media, Syrian migrants, Hate Speech

ABBREVIATIONS

TDK	Turkish Language Association
USA	United States of America
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
TCK	Turkish Penal Code
DGMM	Directorate General of Migration Management
UN	United Nations

I dedicate this thesis to my family...



CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Mankind has always been in a power struggle since its existence. Conflicts and disagreements arose when the first societies were formed with the first human and the sharing of the first resources was in question. The concept of conflict, which we encounter in all areas of social life, has accompanied it since the day of existence of humanity. With socialization, conflict has become an integral part of our lives in a low or severe form due to factors such as division of labor, solidarity, and the obligation to share social life. Conflict is a concept that is accepted as natural as a result of the intense communication and dialogue in organized class societies (Koçak & Aktaş, 2019, s. 130-137). Conflict can sometimes be a show of power, and sometimes it is also used as a means of seeking justice. Sometimes it has been a means of expression that emerges as a result of expression with the accumulation of emotions psychologically.

When conflicts increase in intensity and become unmanageable, they turn into wars. Wars, on the other hand, cause forced migration of peoples due to the inability to establish positive or negative peace. In the Syrian civil war, which has been increasing in violence since 2011 and has turned into an inextricable spiral, the Syrian people have sought asylum in Turkey intensively, with the effect of Turkey's open-door policy for a while. Although the Syrian migrants are mostly hosted in the camps, due to the physical inadequacy of the camps, they are dispersed to all other provinces of Turkey, especially to the neighboring provinces. However, some local people groups were not satisfied with the presence of Syrian migrants who came as guests. This discontent has fueled hate speech against migrants.

1.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT

This thesis focuses on hate speech developed in social media against Syrian migrants. It has been narrowed down in order to examine the study area according to measurable criteria. First of all, twitter, which is considered as the social media area where political discourse is concentrated due to its structure, has been determined as the main work area. The discourses developed by users who develop hate speech on Twitter will be analyzed within the framework of cultural violence expressed by Johan Galtung in line with the results by creating tables and graphs of quantitative data for content analysis.

1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study will basically seek answers to the following questions in the context of the above-mentioned problem statement:

- What are the issues on which hate speech generated on Twitter against Syrian migrants is based on?
- What is the intensity of Twitter users in Turkey to generate hate speech against Syrians?
- What are the periods when the Syrian agenda on Twitter is the highest?
- What are the agenda topics regarding Syrians in the traditional media when the Syrian agenda on Twitter is at its highest?
- What are the most shared hashtags before and after the opening of the European border gates?
- Which accounts receive the most Mention before and after the opening of the European border gates?

1.3. RESEARCH AIMS

The main subject of this study, Twitter is a quantitative research aimed at understanding the perception of hate speech directed against Syrians in Turkey. Quantitative research is an objective type of research with a positivist approach that enables observation, measurement and numerical expression by making events objective. Through quantitative research, the researcher predicts numerical results about the sample that symbolizes the universe related to the subject being researched. In this method, mostly numerical data are interpreted statistically. Through these statistical solutions, social facts and the cause-effect relationships between these phenomena are revealed. He states that the most basic element of quantitative research is that the statistical findings and data obtained by the researcher can be measured in a way that creates numerical value, and that the hypothesis or hypotheses are tested with the findings and data collected in this way (Ekiz, 2003, s. 93).

1.4. SIGNIFIANCE AND THE PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH

In this thesis, it has been examined what motivates the users who produce hate speech clustered on Twitter to produce hate speech. What distinguishes this thesis from other studies is the quantitative research method revealing that Twitter users who produce hate speech have a

certain leader, always gather around the same account holders, and continue to produce hate speech in their own echo chambers.

1.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study analyzes social media users clustered on Twitter Turkey and built on hate speech against Syrian migrants. In the study, the hate speech topics generated by the users of hate speech on Twitter against Syrian migrants, the accounts that receive the hashtag, the mention of hate speech the most, and the emotional tones were examined. In the research, quantitative research method was used to collect primary and secondary data, and content analysis method was preferred to collect information about users with hate speech on Twitter and to evaluate the perception and perspective of these users. In this section, the methodologies applied for collecting data, analyzing data during the research process, methods applied, sampling technique and discussing sources are covered.

The findings obtained in the study the conversations made on Twitter about Syrian migrants living in Turkey were analyzed and converted into numerical data by content analysis method, and the five date ranges with the most intense Syrian agenda were selected between March 1, 2019 and March 31, 2020. Each date range is named as A, B, C, D, and E points, and the Twitter Turkey agenda is compared with the Twitter Syrian agenda. As a result of this comparison, the specified dates were examined and added to the findings in tables. It has also been investigated whether the points in the date range have parallels with the traditional media agenda. In this way, it is aimed to reveal the rate of hate speech on Twitter directed against Syrians in Turkey and whether it has a response in the eyes of the society. In the analysis made by twitter users; One of the words in any of their posts about the word Syrian is "Suriyeli, Suriye etc." and other similar words with "mülteci, mülteciler, etc." There are interaction volumes that occur when the words are used together or separately, provided that they are within the specified date range.

Derivatives of the word "Suriyeli":

Suriye, Suriyeli, Suriyelilerin, suriyeden, suriyenin, and suriyeye.

Related words and their derivatives: Mülteci, mülteciler, sığınmacılar, göç, sığınmacı, muhacir, muhacirler, mültecinin, mültecsinin, mülteciden, göçmen, göçmenler, multeci, multeciler, sığınmacılar, goc, sığınmacı, muhacir, muhacirler, multecinin, multecisinin, multeciden, gocmen ve göçmenler.

In the study, the rate of impact of the interactions on the Syrian Migrants agenda on the Twitter Turkey agenda was also included in the research. Social Media data analysis was made by compiling Twitter data collected under the consultancy of Adba analytics consumer research center, Twitter's solution partner, about the interactions related to the Syrian agenda. The tweets sent in line with the determined keywords and date limits were collected and placed in the excel sheet, and these data were loaded into the SPSS program and quantitative content analysis data were produced.

In determining the tone and topics, the word phrases in the cluster developed in line with the algorithms of Brand Watch, which is the method used by the companies that are solution partners of Twitter, to determine the data are based on. (Brand Watch is a software that can analyze content based on artificial intelligence)

1.6. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

The research was conducted by obtaining quantitative data for all interactions on Twitter between March 1, 2019 and March 31, 2020, that is, before and after the opening of the European border gates for Syrian migrants. Therefore, there is a periodic limitation. Another limitation is that only Twitter, one of the social media channels, of hate speech against Syrians is researched in Turkey and in Turkish. Only the effects of hate speech against Syrians on Turkish society have been tried to be measured. Therefore, these three factors formed the main limitations of the study.

1.7. DATA SOURCES

Between March 1, 2019 and March 31, 2020, tweets containing all Syrian or close meaningful words in Turkish were collected on Twitter. This is the main resource that allows us to test our hypotheses in our thesis. Another source of our thesis is the literature developed on Syrian migrants. In addition, publications, magazines, reports, newspapers, articles, books and other internet publications about Syrian migrants were also examined.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Social media can be summarized as the new form of interaction-oriented mass communication developed after the second generation internet technologies. Social media, which focuses on interaction instead of one-way communication produced by the owners of mass media, is a medium where there are options such as blogging, commenting, sharing content and making friends and communicating with social networking sites (Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.) (Kirtiş & Karahan, 2011, s. 262). Hate crimes, which can be expressed as the ideology of systematic exclusion, devaluation and hostility, have taken a new dimension in terms of prevalence and speed, with each individual being a content producer. The migration wave that emerged with the civil war in Syria caused a large number of migrants to migrate to Turkey. The largest Syrian refugee population in the world is in Turkey and everyone living in our country did not welcome this situation. This segment used this issue at every opportunity they could find, especially in social media. These reactions, especially on Twitter, create a perception as if all people living in Turkey have a general anger towards Syrian migrants. So how much does this perception reflect reality? Let's examine the concepts of hate crimes, lynching, migrants and social media in detail to better understand them.

2.1.SOCIAL MEDIA

Social media; It is the name given to the new mass communication structure that emerged after the two-way and simultaneous information sharing opportunity offered by the second generation internet technologies (Web 2.0). In other words, social media is the structure that turns every person who can access the internet into a potential mass media tool. With social media, the passive viewer/listener who cannot produce content, interfere with the produced content and comment on the produced content in traditional media, where there is one-way communication in the hands of a certain class, has been replaced by an active viewer who produces and interprets. The audience can actively interpret the content produced by traditional media, criticize it, and produce alternative content. The content created by the traditional media by considering both interest groups and economic concerns has been replaced by the content produced by the individual who has the anxiety of being followed, shared and liked.

Social media is the representation of analog media that has become digital (Manovich, 2001, s. 50). With the use of the term social media, the previous media tools are called old, that is, traditional. What is important here is not what the concept of new is, but what features are called new. Because with every developing technology, new vehicles have emerged or different features have been loaded on vehicles (Yengin & Bayrak, 2018, s. 34). Digitality, interactiveness, hypertextuality, virtuality and diffusion are listed as the 5 main features that stand out from the features of social media (Lister & et al, 2009, s. 13) “Digitality” includes numbers in its content. All files, sounds, sequences, applications and operating system on the computer are numbers. Digitality enables all data to be transformed into numbers. With this system, data is represented by binary codes in the form of ones and zeros. This feature contributes to the transformation of the media into social media (Yengin, 2012, s. 84).

The second feature of social media is “Interactivity”, the ability for users to exchange content. In the digital environment, users can influence the content, make additions or deletions, and continue to transmit information in this way. With this feature, social media has become individualized, increased participation and offered options to users (Yengin, 2012, s. 85). “Hypertextuality”, another social media feature, is defined as the relationship of a text with other texts. With this feature, it is possible to collect, share and refresh data. The important thing here are the links. These links provide the opportunity to navigate between resources by directing users. “Diffusion” creates the appropriate environment for the use of interactivity and hypertextuality features. Thanks to its diffusion feature, a large number of users can access different content at different times (Lister & et al, 2009, s. 33).

The network base allows a text in its content to be dispersed quickly, to be accessible again and again in different time periods, and to use data between different applications. The last feature, “Virtualism”, is the communication between the interface and the user, and it gives the users the feeling of being where they think they are in their networks. This feature has made social media an environment where users can reveal their demographic characteristics (Polat, 2009, s. 33-34). When all these features come together, social media differs from traditional media. Because traditional media has an analog structure, social media has a digital structure. While communication is one-way in traditional media, communication in social media is two-way. While professionals can produce content in traditional media, all users in social media are producers (Yengin, 2012, s. 88).

2.1.1. Social Media Concept and Social Media Tools

Social media is a group of internet-based applications that are built on the technological and ideological foundations of web 2.0 and allow the creation and sharing of user-generated content. Social media is a medium where internet users interact online, with options such as blogging, commenting, content sharing and making friends and communicating with social networking sites (Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.) (Kirtiř & Karahan, 2011, s. 262). According to Blossom, social media is a phenomenon or easy-to-reach communication techniques that allow a person to easily influence other people or groups (Kara & Özgen, 2012, s. 214). They are the media and tools that people can socialize with (Safko & Brake, 2009, s. 6). Social media has features such as participation, openness, conversation, connection and community building in a medium where many shares are made and different opportunities arise with online media (Mayfield, 2008, s. 5). Communication has become quick and simple feedback and the distance has blurred. Thus, social media receives feedback from all participants and encourages them. The second feature of social media is "Openness", which makes it easy for users to share or access existing content, regardless of time and place.

Shared content is blocked in rare cases. Another feature is "Chat", people started to have a say in society through social media, made their voices heard on the platforms here and, realized mutual communication. "Community" individuals form communities by coming together on topics they are interested in. Although individuals do not know each other through social media, they come together in these communities due to their common points and create an agenda. "Connecting", the last feature of social media, contributes to reach other sites, research or people by sharing links related to their interests with this feature. In this way, people can access and benefit from other sites more easily (Mayfield, 2008, s. 5).

The concept of social media is used together with online tools and websites that provide two-way communication by providing the opportunity to share (on subjects such as related fields and thoughts) to its users (Sayimer, 2008, s. 123). Individuals use social media to socialize, make new friends, have fun and spend their spare time. Social media users' conversations are the production of content and it strengthens the actions of sharing, cooperating and acting together with these contents.

2.1.2. Twitter as a Social Media Environment

Twitter is a social networking site where a person can interact with his family, colleagues and people in line with their common interests (Tasner, 2010, s. 34). Twitter is a microblogging service that was established in March 2006 and provides its users with the opportunity to send and receive quick and instant sharing with short texts. The site, whose initial purpose was to communicate among the employees of the company, was opened to the public in October and officially launched on March 19, 2007 (Safko & Brake, 2009, s. 264).

The general purpose of Twitter is to enable its users to express themselves using short and concise sentences through tweets. Tweet means “chirp, bird sound” and the bird symbol named “Larry” is used in its logo. The application, which has allowed the use of 140 characters since its official beginning, has updated the character limit to 280 in 2017. With the increase in the character limit, it has been stated that 6% of all tweets posted in Twitter's official data are over 140 characters and 3% are over 190 characters.

It added Turkish to its language option on April 25, 2011. With the arrival of Turkish language support, it has been actively used in Turkey and there has been an increase in the number of users in Turkey.

A diverse user network has made Twitter a platform that can be used to chat, find old friends, meet new people, connect with favorite writers, musicians or other individuals and groups, establish long-term relationships, promote brands and new products (Tasner, 2010, s. 35-36). Twitter offers its users the opportunity to use many portable devices such as computers, tablets, mobile phones and can be used in integration with other social media applications. In this application, text messages are displayed according to the user's mobile phone, application website or e-mail preference. With the follow option, a user friend list is created and the sharing is accessed by the users (Safko & Brake, 2009, s. 265). Tweets can be shared by adding text, photos or videos, and features such as live broadcast, poll creation and GIF can be used¹. Twitter also allows connection with other social networking sites. A video liked on the Youtube page can be tweeted by copying the link or a twitter user can connect with his facebook profile account. A post shared on the Facebook profile can be tweeted or the tweet posted can be viewed on the Facebook profile².

¹ (<https://help.twitter.com/tr/using-twitter/how-to-tweet>; <https://help.twitter.com/tr/search?q=twitter>).

² (<https://help.twitter.com/tr/managing-your-account/link-twitter-to-facebook>).

2.2. HATE SPEECH

2.2.1. The Concept of Hate Speech

Turkish Language Association defines hate as wishing for someone's evil and unhappiness, being disgusted³. Kocaman states that discourse has meanings such as narrative style, point of view, effective speaking art, verbal expression, ideology, and teaching (Kocaman, 2009, s. 5). Hate speech as a way of expressing evil, anger or disgust is basically shaped around the relationship between us and the other. The social structure, on the other hand, is the main ground that shapes the difference between us and non-us, that is, the other. Our ideas about the other; It is formed by being shaped in the social context we live in through institutions such as family, school and media. In this direction, society in general; it can be defined as a system formed by the coming together of many people living in a certain geographical place, sharing a common culture, interacting to meet their needs, showing different forms and features, and complex, changing and developing relationships in its unique structure. Eagleton states that we cannot judge anything without fully defining a subject or situation, without creating a kind of prejudice (Eagleton, 2011) .

Van Dijk emphasizes that generalizations are one of the main factors that lead to the formation of prejudices and that people form their own mental models based on their discourses in a prejudiced way. According to him, at this point, people do not only form prejudiced mental models, but they can also exhibit prejudiced attitudes even when there is no other information, counter-ideology or ideology (Çayır, 2012, s. 5-16) . Ideologies are the ones we use to determine how we will behave in social life and to position ourselves which are stereotypes (stereotype)/rules. Louis Althusser states that ideology represents the imaginary relationship between individuals' real lives and their existential conditions (Althusser, 2010).

One can basically hate many things. For example, cockroaches, car horns, pink shoes can be hated. However, the situation is not the same when hatred is against the masses of people, that is, against the other, which it expresses outside of the definition of us. So there is a big difference between hating cockroaches or pink shoes and hating separatist Kurds, reactionary Muslims, filthy Arabs, renegade Jews. The second is based on categorizations and generalizations that contain many prejudices against the other but us. For example, the prejudice that Arabs are dirty directly labels all people of Arab ethnicity in the world as dirty and reduces these people only to these assumed traits. As a result, the following result emerges: Arab = dirty! Therefore, hating

³ www.tdk.org

dirty Arabs makes all Arabs an object of hatred and targets all kinds of harmful actions that may arise from this hatred (Ersoy, 2018, s. 119).

Differentiating one social structure from another; It can have its own history, language, culture, needs, interaction and relationship systematics. The society in which a person defines himself and feels himself to belong brings the concept of us, and we bring the concept of the other. Stereotypes, which determine the other or one of the steps of recognizing the other, are generalized and categorized images formed in our minds for the individual or group (Öztürk, 2021, s. 144). The other is what we do not know, we are strangers, and the risk that arises due to the unknown of the other has the potential to turn into fear and fear into hatred.

2.2.2. Types of Hate Speech

The first step of discriminatory approaches begins with the "othering" process. The construction of the other is established by emphasizing the differences that are outside of the elements that make us the other. Hate crimes, which emerged as perhaps the most severe form of discrimination, and hate speech, which forms the mental and ideological background of these behavioral acts, includes negative emotions, but is essentially an ideology of exclusion, devaluation and enmity that points to the systematic hierarchy among the groups that make up the society (Göregenli, 2012, s. 178).

Hate speech is defined as follows by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in its recommendation in 1997: It is any form of expression that spreads, encourages, advocates or justifies racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and other forms of hatred based on intolerance. Although the definition of the committee is a general definition, it can be said that it is an incomplete definition since it does not include some layers of the society towards which hate speech is directed.

With the rise of the far right in Europe and the USA, Islamophobia against Muslims, xenophobia including hatred and marginalization against immigrants, homophobia against different sexuality preference in society, political hatred, religious or sectarian hatred, marginalization or hatred of women, the elderly or the disabled people etc. If hate speech against the layers of this society is included in the definition, it can be said that the definition of hate speech by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe will be a little more inclusive.

Hate speech, which covers many situations, mainly emerges over three situations. These situations can be listed as follows: inciting racial hatred, promoting hatred with religious motives, and provoking nationalism including lynching culture and other types of hatred based

on intolerance based on an ethnicity⁴. While prejudice, far-right nationalism, xenophobia, polarization, marginalization and homophobia feed hate speech, cultural identity codes and group characteristics, especially extreme nationalism and not being tolerant towards others who do not belong to us, can turn hate speech into more serious social events⁵.

Hate speech is often reinforced by stereotypes to gain political and social support; Hate speech, which is used for political or social purposes, is used as a vote storage mechanism for both opposition and ruling parties and a means of consolidating their supporters. Hate speech used in this way has the potential to turn into a hate crime when it is reflected to the public. Social elements exposed to this type of hate speech are suppressed and pushed to a secondary position in the society. Therefore, people who use ideological/political hate speech want to expand their relationship with the people or groups they discriminate in a way that will be accepted by the society in the context of hate crime (Alğan & Şensever, 2010, s. 10).

2.2.3. The Concept of Hate Crime and Lynching

In general, crimes that occur as a result of attacking a person or group with the aim of causing harm in different ways, for reasons such as their identity, belief, political opinion, gender or sexual orientation, are called 'hate crimes' (Göregenli, 2012, s. 182). In fact, the point that distinguishes hate crime, which is within the scope of criminal law, from other crimes involving a similar act is not the individual or individuals who are the victims of the crime, but the group to which the individual belongs. Intentional homicide is a crime and is within the scope of criminal law, but if the crime is considered as a hate crime, the perpetrator must commit the crime with the motive of hatred towards the group (Vardal, 2016, s. 133).

The OSCE definition of hate crime is as follows: Hate crimes are criminal acts motivated by prejudice or prejudice against certain groups of people. Hate crimes consist of two elements: the motive of crime and prejudice. A hate crime is committed when a perpetrator intentionally targets an individual or property because of one or more identity characteristics, or expresses hostility towards those identity characteristics at the time of the crime. Persons or properties that are associated with or even thought to be members of a group that shares an identity feature may be the target of hate crimes in places such as human rights defenders, community centers or places of worship⁶ (Kaymak, 2010, s. 255).

⁴ Anne WEBER, Nefret Söylemi El Kitabı, (Çeviri: Metin Çulhaoğlu), <http://insanhaklarisavunuculari.org/dokumantasyon/files/original/f4034d4ac32cd2c21e546188b86e9034.pdf> (Erişim Tarihi: 20.10.2021), s. 3-4

⁵ <https://hrantdink.org/attachments/article/2664/Nefret-soylemi-ve-Ayr%C4%B1mc%C4%B1-Soylem-2019-Raporu.pdf> (Erişim Tarihi: 20.10.2021), s. 7-8

⁶ <https://hatecrime.osce.org/> (18.10.2021)

According to Article 122 of the TCK, discrimination based on hatred based on language, race, nationality, color, gender, disability, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion or sect is considered a crime⁷. Ten protection groups are clearly defined in the law and certain actions against these ten protection groups are regulated as crimes. In accordance with the Principle of Legality in Crime and Punishment, if discrimination is made against a group other than the groups clearly defined in the law, even with the motive of hatred, or in case of discrimination against the groups specified in the law with an action other than the four different actions specified in the article, there will be no legal discrimination crime⁸. For example, discrimination or hate crime against Syrian migrants in digital media, especially on Twitter, will not be included in this scope because it is excluded from the four optional actions specified in the article. Even this situation alone indicates the fragility and strengthening of Article 122 of the TCK, which prohibits the crime of hate and discrimination, or that hate crime in digital media should be strengthened. and that a separate regulation should be made for discrimination.

In the Figure 1 defined as the Pyramid of Hate, hatred starts with the formation of prejudices, then it is reflected in the words and behaviors that can be expressed as hate speech, then it can reach discrimination and finally committing a hate crime. There is also a difference between hate and hate speech. Hatred, anger, fear is a state of mind that often emerges for those who are not recognized, unknown, but because they are different from themselves and are different from themselves. Hate speech, on the other hand, is a form of expression that spreads, encourages, defends or justifies hatred that stems from all kinds of intolerance and is fed by prejudices (Karadeniz, 2012, s. 1) .

⁷ <https://barandogan.av.tr/blog/mevzuat/tck-madde-122-nefret-ve-ayirimcilik-sucu.html> (20.10.2021)

⁸ <https://barandogan.av.tr/blog/mevzuat/tck-madde-122-nefret-ve-ayirimcilik-sucu.html> (31.10.2021)

Figure 1. Pyramid of Hate⁹



When this pyramid is examined, the process that starts with prejudiced attitudes and goes up to genocide in four steps is seen. Prejudice is also an issue that needs to be emphasized, as it constitutes the first two steps in the pyramid of hate. Prejudice are negative thoughts and attitudes that lead to distance from a person or group. Being prejudiced against a group is closely related to stereotypes created for that group. Since the relations with the marginalized group are formed by stereotypes, generalizations towards the whole group are reinforced and internalized over time.

Prejudices that refer to factors such as gender, age, race, religion, physical appearance, which can be encountered in social life, can reach a level that threatens social harmony in the future. Internalized prejudices have the potential to become widespread and normalized in social life by feeding discrimination. The stereotyped prejudices that permeate all areas lead to the approval and adoption of discrimination (Göregenli, 2012, s. 182).

The concept of lynch is a concept that takes place in our lives as we begin to socialize. It usually arises when the masses do not trust the law or think that the law cannot provide enough justice, and see itself as the legitimate and sole authority to punish in order to ensure their own justice.

⁹ <https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/pyramid-of-hate.pdf>

According to the TDK, the concept of lynching is defined as "the killing of someone, illegally and without trial, by more than one person due to an act that is a crime according to them."¹⁰ According to another dictionary, the concept of lynching, named after the Virginian judge William Lynch, who cleared the place where he lived from criminals in accordance with his own law, means that a person whom the public considers guilty by getting angry, carries a stone, stick, etc¹¹. It means to kill by beating with things. As it is understood from the definitions, even if the result is not death, lynching is carried out by a group that wants to establish the so-called law. Here, it can be concluded that the person or group exposed to the lynching does not deserve justice and the law according to the perpetrators of the lynching.

Seeing lynching only as a mentality problem in society or as a part of political tradition will make it difficult for us to fully perceive lynching. The problem can be characterized as the change of the social fabric with the effect of the physical transformation of the society. The problem of lynching and the social violence that produces it should be sought in the distortions of neo-liberal economic systems. The problem can also be evaluated through the state's desire to move away from statist policies in the restructuring processes, to increase privatization, and to consolidate the authority vacuum for reasons of terrorism and security. (Gambetti, 2007, s. 33). When we look at the articles 81, 87, 76 and 77 of the TCK (Law No. 37), we can say that the provisions of the article cover the crime of lynching¹².

Direct violence, which is one of the three types of violence defined by Johan Galtung, is the act of causing physical harm. According to Galtung, it is relatively easy to reveal the most conspicuous aspect of violence and try to prevent it (Galtung, 1969, s. 167-191) . Since the act of lynching aims to cause direct harm, it is directly involved in violence. Turning lynching into action by a certain group brings a culture with it. Since lynching, which also includes physical violence, is a penal sanction, the development of technology has created a new application area for lynching and caused the lynching action to shift to digital channels. According to this, social media sharing targeting an event, person or post by large audiences is considered digital lynching. This behavior has become very popular in recent years and a concept called "lynch culture" has emerged. Lynch culture is a culture in which large masses can target people or groups that they will lynch on social media and act together anonymously. Lynching is not just against individuals. It can also be done against countries, institutions or an event.

¹⁰ <https://sozluk.gov.tr/> (29.10.2021)

¹¹ <http://www.lugatim.com/s/lin%C3%A7> (29.10.2021)

¹² <https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=5237&MevzuatTur=1&MevzuatTertip=5> (03.11.2021)

According to Levent Eraslan, in the lynchings carried out on social media platforms; He states that lynched posts are frequently faced with situations such as insults and threats against individuals or institutions, and that these behaviors made with the aim of humiliating and attacking the other party are considered as social media aggression. This behavior has recently manifested itself in a wide variety of dimensions on social media and digital platforms. Behaviors aimed at embarrassing the other party on digital platforms and sharing fake and fake news with bot accounts aimed at targeting individuals or institutions are also considered as social media aggression. It is possible to evaluate this behavior, which aims to wear out and psychologically harm the other party, as a tendency to violence¹³.

2.2.4. Hate Speech ,Traditional and Social Media

Media plays an important role in spreading and distributing the values to be conveyed within social structures (Yanikkaya, 2009, s. 11) . The concept of Web 2.0, namely "Social media", which emerged after the two-way and simultaneous information sharing opportunity offered by the second generation internet technologies (web 2.0) and was first used by Tim O'Reilly in 2005, is the name given to the new mass communication structure. Social media, which emerged as the new stage of mass communication after the second generation internet technologies, strengthens this effect of the media due to its differences from traditional media such as instant and two-way communication. The discriminatory approaches in daily life and the hate speech produced in the traditional media are more easily circulated and become commonplace due to the characteristics of the new media.

While the independent, democratic and decentralized image of social media, where anyone with access to the Internet can produce content, strengthens its credibility, it also causes an impact on the production of hate speech and the spread of hate speech at incredible speeds, with the effect of the power of its technology. The hate speech that is produced and spread on social media has the potential to create a chaotic and even destructive effect on the society, bringing with it the legal definition of hate as a crime. Social media has replaced the passive viewer/listener who cannot produce content, interfere with the produced content and comment on the produced content in the traditional media, where there is one-way communication, which is in the hands of a certain class. According to Clay Shirky, Web 2.0 tools such as Flickr, YouTube, MySpace, and Facebook, which provide amateur production and symmetrical

¹³ <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/yasam/sosyal-medyanin-acimasiz-yuzu-linc-kulturu-494173.html> (29.10.2021)

participation, create social media environments that enable public participation (Clay, 2016, s. 8-42).

According to this, in other words, we can say that social media is the name of the structure that turns every person who can access the internet into a potential mass communication tool. In social media, the audience can actively interpret, criticize and produce alternative content produced by traditional media. According to Jan van Dijk, the most important structural feature of new media is that it presents telecommunication, data communication and mass media in a single environment under three headings (van Dijk, 1999). The content created by the traditional media by considering both interest groups and economic concerns has been replaced by the content produced by the individual who has the anxiety of being followed, shared and liked. From this perspective, social media is not the main artery of hate speech. Hate speech is produced by the society itself within the framework of its social, cultural and political structure, history, traditions and customs.

Hate speech has entered a new phase with social media. One of the most important effects of social media on hate speech is that it causes hate speech to spread at an incredible speed. There is a clear correlation between internet technology and the generation and spread of hate speech. Of course, hate speech on the internet is not new, but it has gained more visibility and spread more than traditional media (Karaman & Işıklı, 2016, s. 137-140). Any event brought to the agenda especially in the traditional media can find its place on Facebook after a short time. Groups with enthusiastic discussions on the subject are opened, members can develop all kinds of discourse, likewise, another opposing member can respond on the wall. In general, members exhibit the behavior of being together with other members who think like themselves (Toprak & et al., 2009, s. 47).

According to Binark, social media tools such as Facebook, Twitter, digital games, etc. produce hate speech, the discourse produced in these channels is seen as natural, the discourse seen as natural is internalized and internalized hate speech can organize hate crimes. All hate speech spreads through social media, gains power and hate speech is carried to the streets¹⁴. Researches on the content produced by social media users show that fanatical comments and content provide more interaction. According to a study conducted with unattended observation method on four internet portals; comments are written in a fanatic/partisan/insulting style rather than statements of opinion about the news/article/event. It was observed that most of the comments

¹⁴ <https://yenimedya.wordpress.com/2012/01/20/sosyal-medyanin-nefret-soylemi-icin-kullanilmasi-ifade-ozgurlugu-degidir/> (20.01.2020)

were made on ethnic-based news. Hate speech regarding ethnic-based news is around 80% on average. In addition, commentators who distance themselves from the content of the news may experience polarization and even fight with each other (Dirini, 2010, s. 70) .

Online platforms are not only suitable digital environments for entertainment, connectivity and interpersonal communication, but also political discourse and identity formation platforms (van Dijck, 2013, s. 4-5). Findings have been found that different social media platforms affect hate speech at different levels. Accordingly, Twitter users are more tolerant than Youtube users. A research on Twitter and Youtube in 2013; 42 percent of the comments made on the 1 million-viewed videos on Youtube spread negative emotions, and 96 percent of these comments contain direct hate speech. On Twitter, 1,065 comments on similar topics were examined, and hate expressions were found in only 7.5 percent of the comments (Karaman & Işıklı, 2016, s. 7). Inexpensive technologies such as social networks, online games, video sharing sites, and electronic books allow hateful content to spread rapidly on the internet (Brennan, 2009, s. 123).

In general, Islamophobia, as the fear, hatred or prejudice against the religion of Islam or Muslims, is a manipulative, provocative, malignant and highly dangerous type of hate speech. Hate speech based on ethnic origin and racist hate speech, which is the dimension of othering those who are outside of this definition under the concept of socialization and us, also forms the basis of hate crimes committed in this context (Kılıcı & et al, 2017, s. 156-157). Hate speech produced on social media can be ethnic, as well as sexist, religious, and political. As an extension of the physical world, the digital world and its interaction platform, social media, victims of hate speech are generally women, girls, minorities and weak people, as in the physical world. According to the data in the UN's 2015 report, women are 27 times more likely to experience violence on social media than men (Şimşek, 2020).

2.2.5. Twitter as a Hate Speech Production Tool

Twitter is a social media platform that was first launched in July 2006 by Jack Dorsey, Noah Glass, Biz Stone, and Evan Williams, as a social network inspired by SMS technologies and able to write posts called "tweets" for short messages limited to 280 characters. Twitter was one of the 10 most visited websites in 2013¹⁵. As of 2020, Twitter has 340 million active users¹⁶. Tweets posted by users can be viewed by anyone. However, users can limit their tweets so that

¹⁵ <https://www.vayes.com.tr/tr/blog/twitter-nedir-nasil-kullanilir>

¹⁶ 2020 Sosyal Medya Kullanıcı İstatistikleri, Medya Akademi, <https://medyaakademi.com.tr/2020/02/03/2020-sosyal-medya-kullanici-sayilari/> 3 Şubat 2020 tarihinde Wayback Machine sitesinde arşivlendi. Erişim Tarihi: 24.03.2020

only their followers can see them. Users can subscribe to other users' tweets. They can see the number of followers of the people or institutions they are a member of and who they follow. However, users can limit their tweets so that only their followers can see them. Users can subscribe to other users' tweets. They can see the number of followers of the people or institutions they are a member of and who they follow. All users can send and receive their tweets via Twitter's website. Users can login to Twitter's website by compatible external applications (such as smartphones) or by text messaging service that can be accessed

in certain countries¹⁷. An average of 98 thousand tweets are sent every minute in the media¹⁸. The central mechanism that enables organization and mobilization on Twitter is the hashtag, patient; A string of words written without spaces and preceded by a hash symbol (#) to indicate a topic on Twitter, to allow other users to more easily search for relevant information, and to classify the tweet as cohesive. As a communicative indicator, hashtags have a very strong effect on social participation on Twitter (Yang, 2016, s. 14) .

While the ideas spread on Twitter manifest themselves in the form of support mechanisms such as charity, philanthropy and success stories, they can sometimes be published with hostile statements confirming false, humiliating and prejudiced feelings/tensions about a person, group or community. Especially with the emergence of social networks, the spread of extremist narratives targeting minority groups and emerging with hate speech has become easier (Williams, 2016, s. 212). The rate of encountering hate speech based on race, belief and gender on Twitter is more common than in the mainstream media (Karaman & Işıklı, 2016, s. 11) .

Twitter's communication process that allows asynchronous communication (lack of a continuous feedback loop) and anonymity (lack of non-verbal clues and identity information) (Taşdelen, 2020, s. 568) is a discriminatory approach that its users reveal with their narcissistic self-confidence. It can cause different readings such as using harsh language that they will definitely not use in their aggressive or concrete social lives, except for the effect of mass psychology.

2.3. HATE SPEECH AND SYRIAN MIGRANTS

2.3.1. Syrian Civil War

¹⁷ <https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twitter>

¹⁸ <https://web.archive.org/web/20130102013003/http://bluetimeline.com/gen/b/2012/08/infografi-internette-bir-dakikada-neler-oluyor/> et: 20 08 2021

It all started when a young man named Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia set himself on fire on 17 December 2010 because of the confiscation of his car, which he was a peddler, and ill-treatment by the authorities, and then took to the streets in masses to defend the rights and freedoms of Tunisians democratically¹⁹. These demonstrations spread to neighboring countries with the influence of social media and created a domino effect. Democracy-based demonstrations were held against monarchical governments in Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria, respectively. These demonstrations, which started in the Middle East and North Africa, were called the "Arab Spring", which is an anonymous international concept. Although the concept of the Arab Spring is given a positive meaning in social media and in some academic studies due to the protests, demonstrations and search for rights in countries where the Arab Spring is located, the Arab Winter, which expresses negativity with unsuccessful results from time to time, and the Arab Awakening, Arab Revolt with different definitions. Names such as the Arab Revolution are also used (Dede, 2011, s. 23-24). The Arab Spring undoubtedly affected Syria in the worst way and took place in a way that supports the concept of the Arab winter. The Syrian civil war, which has continued until today, has turned into an inextricable situation with the intervention of neighboring countries, global and regional actors. After the death of Syrian President Hafez Assad in 2000, his son Bashar Assad came to power. Bashar Assad had followed a moderate line of rule in his first years of rule. Until 2011, the Turkish government had very close and positive relations between the two countries with the Bashar Assad regime in Damascus. For the sake of these relations, the Government of Turkey did its best to persuade Bashar Assad to refrain from drastic measures against the humanitarian protests that began in March 2011 and to adopt a reform agenda²⁰. But relations between the two countries deteriorated very quickly, when the Assad regime instead opted for increased repression and violence against civilians who were demonstrating humanely. Until the end of 2011, the Turkish government had fully supported the Syrian opposition and recognized the then Syrian National Council as the sole representative of the Syrian people. Turkey's expectation at that time, which was in harmony with a large part of the international community, was based on the fact that the Assad regime would not last long in administration. They entered Turkey for the first time in April 2011 under the framework known as "temporary protection"²¹.

¹⁹ <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/arap-baharinin-ilk-devriminin-uzerinden-10-yil-gecti/2109556> (09.11.2021)

²⁰ Syrian Leader, Assad, Rejects Turkey's Plea to End Crackdown - The New York Times (nytimes.com) (09.11.2021)

²¹ <https://www.perspektif.online/turkiyedeki-suriyeliler-9-yilin-kisa-muhasebesi/> (13.11.2021)

2.3.2. The Effects of the Syrian Civil War on Turkey

The Syrians who fled the Syrian civil war and took refuge in our country have been talked about in Turkey for 10 years. The civil war in Syria turned into a multidimensional war, which we will call proxy wars, in a short time, into a multi-layered and multi-actor war. Syrians fleeing the war took refuge in neighboring countries Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey. Factors such as the length of Turkey's land border with Syria, its proximity to Europe, and its proximity to religion, history and culture have made Turkey attractive for migrants. Undoubtedly, the humanitarian tragedy in Syria affected Turkey the most after Syria. The number of Syrians with temporary protection status in Turkey, which is known as a transit country in terms of international migration mobility, is 59,877 in 7 temporary accommodation centers established in 5 cities, and 3,559,041 outside the temporary accommodation centers, according to the data of the Directorate General of Migration Management on September 16, 2020²². If we add the unregistered Syrians and the increasing Syrian population in the process, it can be said that approximately 4 million Syrians live in Turkey.

In the 1951 Geneva Convention, which is the convention on the legal status of refugees, Turkey did not remove the geographical restrictions with the 1967 protocol and stated that it would only accept those who sought asylum from Europe to Turkey as "refugees". Based on this agreement, Turkey did not give the Syrian migrants the right to become refugees legally, and Turkey, which was seriously opposed to its Syrian population, made regulations within the scope of national law. Accordingly, Turkey initially looked at the Syrian migrants as temporary guests and humanitarian, and accepted everyone without question, in accordance with its open-door policy. Turkey has established camps in border provinces adjacent to Syria to accommodate the dense population of Syrian migrants under humanitarian conditions. These camps are camps that have been established entirely on the basis of the 'temporary guest' mentality. As the civil war and humanitarian crisis in Syria worsened and the conditions that would allow the Syrians who took refuge in Turkey to return to their countries safely, were not created, temporary protection status was provided to the Syrian migrants by Turkey without any conditions (Bostancı, 2017, s. 197)

Although Turkey initially used the Syrian issue as a foreign policy argument, due to factors such as the prolongation of the civil war, the deepening and increasing uncertainty of the Syrian crisis, the direct or indirect involvement of countries such as Iran, Russia and the USA in the

²² <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-korumamiz-altindaki-suriyeliler> (13.11.2021)

war, the PKK in Syria near the Turkish border. originating YPG and extremist Daesh, Al Qaeda, Al Nusra etc. With the terrorist organizations starting to threaten the border security, Turkey has started to deal with the issue as a threat to border security and internal security. Indigenous people living in metropolitan cities have started to express their discomfort with the process of becoming permanent Syrian migrants, who are temporary guests for many reasons, especially for economic concerns and security reasons. This situation has prompted both the Power and the opposition to seek to consolidate their own political mass.

While the Opposition used a completely anti-Syrian language, the Government used a more moderate language towards the Syrians. The harassment of our Syrian border by terrorist organizations and cross-border operations have been carried out in accordance with domestic policy. Among these operations, the most important operation is undoubtedly Operation Zeytindalı, which started on January 20, 2018 and included the Operation in Afrin, Syria. With this operation, an important change in discourse regarding the Syrians in Turkey came to the fore. Operation Zeytindalı brought with it a safe zone policy that will allow Syrians to return to their homes, as well as in the fight against terrorism, and for the first time, the issue of the return of Syrians was brought up at the highest level by the President. Due to this expectation in the society, the Government stated in its statements that more than 350 thousand Syrians returned to Syria because of these operations²³.

2.3.3. The Problem of Syrian Migrants

Undoubtedly, the Syrian migrants thought that they had a temporary situation in the first years of the war in Turkey, where they came as guests, and this situation was also considered temporary by Turkey. For this reason, Turkey's discourse has always emphasized temporary stay over the concept of Ansar-Muhajir, which is a religious concept and symbolizes Islamic brotherhood. It was the overthrow of the Assad regime, which was thought and expected together with the international public opinion. Therefore, temporary stay was always seen as a temporary problem. However, as the civil war dragged on and the Assad regime continued to maintain its power, and as the Syrian migrants left the camps of their own free will and began to disperse and live in the city centres, they began to become more visible, and the temporary residence began to give the signal to begin to leave its place to permanence. The vast majority

²³ <https://www.perspektif.online/turkiyedeki-suriyeliler-9-yilin-kisa-muhasebesi/> (22.11.2021)

of Syrians form ghettos in the suburbs of cities, create their own ecosystems and continue their lives without meeting with the local people (Ankara, Altındağ District, Önder Mah. Example)²⁴.

Although the concept of 'refugee' or 'asylum seeker' finds a legal equivalent, the concept of 'guest' has no legal counterpart. For this reason, Özden (2013) stated that Turkey did not develop any policy regarding Syrians in the first years, and that the status of Syrians was not based on rights but rather on the generosity of the Turkish Nation²⁵. In general, although the local people are uncomfortable with the Syrians, they do not make the Syrians feel this. Except for exceptional and micro-scale situations, Syrians have not seen any disturbing behavior from the local people²⁶. However, this does not mean that the local people accept the Syrians permanently and see them as a part of the society in terms of social acceptance. Undoubtedly, the language barrier in the efforts of the Syrians to be a part of the society or the late policy development of the state regarding social cohesion cannot be ignored. The document of the DGMM regarding social acceptance and cohesion, which aims for Syrians to live together with the Turkish society with the awareness of mutual respect, was approved by the President Erdogan on October 28, 2018 as a road map²⁷. The strategic objective pursued with this document is to manage the social perception and behavior of all immigrants, especially Syrians, in a way that will contribute to social acceptance and harmony, to consolidate the social acceptance level for immigrants and to take necessary measures regarding this.

Although a precise date cannot be given about the fact that the Syrian migrants began to be seen as a problem in the society, the statements made by the politicians started to create a reaction against the Syrian migrants in the society. being questioned by the society, economic reasons and the use of the Syrian representation in the traditional media in a way that creates a negative perception, etc²⁸.

The best-known example of Syrians or all migrants being perceived as a problem and facing discriminatory attitudes in the places where they live is the decision of Bolu mayor Tanju Özcan with a majority of votes in the city council, with more than 10 times different tariffs for Turkish citizens living in the city and migrants (to the detriment of migrants). Providing water service and the cost of getting married can be given as examples²⁹. Although the policy developed in

²⁴ <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/pazar/altindag-da-bir-suriye-mahallesi-2386604> (24.11.2021)

²⁵ Şenay Özden, "Syrian migrants in Turkey," Migration Policy Centre (MPC), MPC Research Report 2013/ 05 <http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/MPC-RR-2013-05.pdf>, 5.

²⁶ <https://www.dw.com/tr/alt%C4%B1nda%C4%9Fda-neler-ya%C5%9Fand%C4%B1/a-58849186>

²⁷ <https://www.goc.gov.tr/kurumlar/goc.gov.tr/Yayinlar/UYUM-STRATEJI/Uyum-Strateji-Belgesi-ve-Ulusal-Eylem-Plani.pdf> (24.11.2021)

²⁸ <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/misafirperverginin-faturasi-20353309> (24.11.2021)

²⁹ <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/boluda-yabancilar-icin-nikah-ucreti-100-bin-lira-suyun-metrekupu-2-5->

Turkey on the side of both the Government and the Opposition is based on the fact that Syrians will return to their countries one day, the 'Adaptation Strategy Document and National Action Plan 2018-2023' document of the DGMM has adopted the policy of the Government to build a safe Syria without Assad and to support the Syrians. It shows that he built it on preferring to return. The document also takes into account the existence of those who do not want to return, and acts as a roadmap for harmonization. The opposition, on the other hand, stated that it built its policy on the return of all Syrians in agreement with Assad. Both political discourses produce policies suitable for their target audience ³⁰.



dolar,8mLL_B0C1UCSwhFY3Z_ug (24.11.2021)

³⁰ <https://www.indyturk.com/node/391996/haber/t%C3%BCrkiyenin-g%C3%B6%C3%A7men-imtihan%C4%B1-suriyelileri-%C3%BClkelerine-g%C3%B6ndermek-m%C3%BCmk%C3%BCn-m%C3%BC> (24.11.2021)

CHAPTER THREE

	Total Engagement Including Retweets	Total Engagement Excluding Retweets	Most engaging topics (Trending Topics)
Before the opening of European border gates for migrants 1 March 2019-25 February 2020	5 M	1 M	1. Suriyeli Mahmut 2. Suriyelilere 40 milyar dolar 3. Suriyeli sığınmacılar
	762 k individual users	332 k individual users	
After the opening of European border gates for migrants 26 February 2020- 31 March 2020	642 k individual users	156 k individual users	1. 40 daha harcarız 2. Suriyelilere 40 milyar dolar harcadık

ANALYSIS OF THE THE IMPACT OF HATE SPEECH IN SOCIAL MEDIA IN TURKEY ON THE SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE OF SYRIAN MIGRANTS: THE CASE OF TWITTER

3.1. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The findings obtained in this research were created by analyzing the conversations made on Twitter about Syrian migrants living in Turkey. Research data covers the date range of 1 March 2019 - 31 March 2020. In the research conducted by the users; One of the words in any of their posts about the word Syrian is "Suriye, Suriyeli etc." It was stated that there were Twitter interaction volumes formed by using the words "mülteci, mülteciler, etc." together or separately, within the specified date range.

At the same time, the effects of interactions on the Syrian Refugee agenda on the Twitter Turkey agenda were also included in the research. Social Media data analysis, which has a solution partnership with Twitter Turkey, was made by the company 'Adba analytics consumer research centre', taking into account only the Twitter social media channel of the interactions related to the Syrian agenda. Getting interaction on Twitter means that all the posts shared on Twitter are seen, liked or shared by the followers³¹.

Table 1. Volume table before and after the opening of European border gates for migrants


³¹ <https://nenvar.com/twitterda-etkilesim-ne-demek/> (12.12.2021)

(March 1, 2019-March 31, 2020)

In Table 1, 5 million messages were shared by 761 thousand individual users on Twitter between 1 March 2019 and 25 February 2020 regarding Syrian migrants living in Turkey. These messages are volumes before Turkey announced that it will open its doors to Europe for migrants. It has been seen that the shares have received 40 Billion Views and 35 Billion Access. Between 26 February 2020 and 31 March 2020, the date when Turkey announced that it would open its doors to migrants in Europe, 642 thousand messages were shared on Twitter by 251 thousand individual users.

The subject, which has not lost its weight before and after the opening of the European border gates for Syrian migrants, is the subject of 40 billion dollars allegedly spent on Syrians. While the interaction with the Syrians was 5 million before the doors were opened, 1 million interactions took place after the opening. The fact that the interaction on Twitter has decreased by one fifth indicates that the intensity of the Twitter agenda regarding the Syrians, when evaluated in terms of time, has not decreased, but has increased proportionally. We have come to the conclusion that the opening of the European border gates, the users who generate hate speech against Syrians on Twitter, keep the hate speech agenda about Syrians hot after very few Syrians leave Turkey.

Table 2. Time-Volume Distribution Table



The time-volume distribution of the shares about Syrian migrants between the dates specified in Table 2 is shown above. The dates that reached the highest volume in the shares made were February 28, 2020, June 30, 2019 and July 28, 2019 and other specified dates. The part of the border gates after opening is indicated with a red stripe line. It is seen that the most intense agenda regarding the Syrians is right after the opening of the border gates, and when we look at the date range, it is seen that the Idlib attack, in which 33 Turkish soldiers were martyred. The peak points are listed as follows.

Peak points: The time-volume distribution of the shares about Syrian migrants among the specified dates, and the A, B, C, D and E points, which are the rising trend days with the most interaction, are shown in Table 2 above. Featured content and shares are listed in the tables below.

3.1.1. Point A: 28 February-2 March 2020

At point A, the news, comments and expressions on Twitter and in the traditional media were evaluated together, both the 33 martyrs in the Idlib attacks and the opening of the

European border gates to the Syrians. Accordingly, it is seen that the tweets posted contain hate speech with nationalistic motives against the Syrians and the thought that our soldiers were martyred because of the Syrians living in Turkey outweighs.

Table 3. Twitter Volume Increases and Sources at Point A

1300% volume increase on Twitter is due to the following interactions
The hashtag of the #suriyelileriistemiyoruz was mentioned in 29017 tweets
The hashtag of the #sehitlerimizvar was mentioned in 13439 tweets
A link belong to “video.twimg.com” was mentioned and shared in 4317 tweets ³²
A tweet belong to Journalist İsmail Saymaz was retweeted in 7786 times

3.1.1.1. Traditional Media Agenda Topics

Idlib attack; 33 Turkish soldiers were killed in an airstrike in Syria's Idlib province on Thursday, February 27, 2020. Hatay Governor Rahmi Doğan said, "There is no life-threatening injury among the injured." Reuters news agency reported that 54 Turkish soldiers lost their lives in Syria within a month with the latest attack³³. (28.02.2020)

Last minute... Doors were opened to Syrian migrants! They flock to Europe³⁴. (28.02.2020)

Operation Spring Shield or Operation Idlib is the cross-border military operation launched by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the Syrian National Army (SMO) on February 27, 2020, against the Syrian province of Idlib. The airstrike in Idlib, Syria, by the Syrian Armed Forces on February 27, 2020, started after the Idlib attack. Minister of National Defense Hulusi Akar declared that the aim of the operation was to achieve a ceasefire within the framework of Adana, Astana and Sochi agreements, to prevent migration, to ensure the security of the troops, the people and Turkey's borders. According

³² (https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1234372752024461313/pu/vid/1280x684/5vak9FyYTGHQpToA.mp4?tag=10)

³³ <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-51669820>

³⁴ ahaber.com.tr/gundem/2020/02/27/suriyeli-multecilere-avrupa-kapilari-acildi

to the agreement reached in Moscow, a ceasefire was declared in the region³⁵. (12.06.2021)

3.1.2. B Point: 30 June-1 July 2019

At point B, regarding the news, comments and opinions in the traditional media, it is seen that the allegations that a child was abused in the İkitelli neighborhood in Istanbul Küçükçekmece turned into a lynching attempt against the Syrians living in the area. Here, it is observed that social media is a reflection of traditional media. When we look at the interaction in the tweets, it is seen that there is a substantial amount of tweets stating that Syrians are our brothers (according to religious references) and that they are not alone, as well as tweets containing nationalist motives and hate speech.

Table 4. Twitter Volume Increases and Sources at Point B

1171% volume increase on Twitter is due to the following interactions
The hashtag of the #suriyelileryalnızdeğildir was mentioned in 34188 tweets
The hashtag of the #ikitelli was mentioned in 10663 tweets
The hashtag of the #suriyelileriistemiyoruz was mentioned in 2265 tweets

3.1.2.1. Traditional Media Agenda Topics

Announcement of the final results of the 23 June Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality election results by the Supreme Election Board (YSK)³⁶ (27.06.2019).

S400 missile defense system tension with the USA, the arrival of the first batch of S-400s to Turkey³⁷ (12.07.2019).

The allegations that a child was abused in the İkitelli neighborhood of Istanbul Küçükçekmece turned into a lynching attempt against Syrians. The police denied the harassment claim³⁸ (30.06.2019).

³⁵ https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bahar_Kalkan%C4%B1_Harek%C3%A2t%C4%B1

³⁶ <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2019/gundem/il-secim-kurulu-resmi-olmayan-sonuclari-acikladi-5194371/>

³⁷ <https://www.amerikaninsesi.com/a/msb-s400ler-ankaraya-geliyor/4997374.html>

³⁸ <https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/turkiye/2019/06/30/ikitellide-suriyelilere-saldiri>

Turkey proposed a safe zone for 3 million Syrians: It is aimed that the Peace Corridor or Safe zone proposal along the Turkish border in the north of Syria will be offered and explained by Turkey to the G20 countries at the G20 summit, and in this way, the safe return of Syrian migrants to their countries³⁹ (25.09.2019).

3.1.3. Point C: 26 -30 July 2019

At point C, it is seen that almost all of the news, comments and thoughts in the traditional media are about Syrians. Possible operations for the safe zone planned to be established by Turkey in northern Syria, the return of Syrians who went to Syria for Eid, the sending of unregistered Syrians to camps in Istanbul, etc. It is seen that the agenda topics are also reflected in the agenda on Twitter. Considering the interaction in the tweets, it can be seen that in addition to tweets containing hate speech with nationalistic motives against Syrians, there are also a substantial amount of tweets stating that Syrians are our brothers (according to religious references) and that the news about them is fake news and does not reflect the truth.

Table 5. Twitter Volume Increases and Sources at Point C

1048% volume increase on Twitter is due to the following interactions
The hashtag of the #suriyelileriistemiyoruz was mentioned in 31337 tweets
A tweet belong to politics Sinan Oğan was retweeted 6603 times
The hashtag of the #suriyelilerkardesimizdir was mentioned in 20141 tweets
The hashtag of the #doğruyanlış was mentioned in 13409 tweets

3.1.3.1. Traditional Media Agenda Topics

Turkish Central Bank's rate cut by 425 basis points⁴⁰ (25.07.2019)

Discussing the possible operation to the east of the Euphrates for the Safe Zone, the 'safe zone' in Syria: What does Turkey want, why doesn't the USA show a due interest in it.⁴¹ (29.07.2019)

³⁹ <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/turkiye-3-milyon-suriyeli-icin-guvenli-bolge-onerdi/1593760>

⁴⁰ <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-49134096>

⁴¹ <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/mit-ve-tskdan-irakin-kuzeyinde-iki-nokta-operasyon-424435.html>

Annihilation of the terrorists who martyred our Turkish diplomat in northern Iraq on 17 July 2019, two-point operation in northern Iraq from MIT and TSK⁴² (25.07.2019)

Discussions on the Readmission Agreement on migrants that Turkey signed with the EU in 2016 ⁴³(22.07.2019)

Statement from Istanbul Governor Yerlikaya on unregistered Syrians: “There will be no unregistered Syrians in Istanbul”⁴⁴(30.07.2019).

The return of Syrians to their countries during the Eid is again a polemical issue⁴⁵(19.08.2019).

3.1.4. D Point: April 10-11 2019

At point D, it is seen that the news and comments in the traditional media are mainly related to the 31 March 2019 Local Elections. It is seen that the first action of the elected mayor of Bolu Province Tanju Özcan (won form CHP the main opposition party), was to cut off aid to the Syrians, and this practice includes hatred and discrimination against the Syrians. Afterwards, it was witnessed that the same mayor increased the dose of discrimination and charged the Syrians and other migrants 10 times more expensive than the local people for water, tax and marriage fees, which are among the humanitarian practices. Here, it is seen that the agenda topics in the traditional media are also reflected on the agenda on Twitter. By associating the Syrians with the Local Election result on Twitter, the Opposition parties have won many municipalities, especially the first three big cities, by criticizing the Syrians policy of the ruling party.

Table 6. Twitter Volume Increases and Sources at Point D

680% volume increase on Twitter is due to the following interactions
A tweet belong to Actor Tolga Çevik was retweeted 13158 times
A tweet belong to Mayor of Bolu Province Tanju Özcan was retweeted 6952 times
A tweet belong to former Mayor of Capital Ankara Melih Gökçek was retweeted <u>2350 times</u>

⁴² <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/mit-ve-tskdan-irakin-kuzeyinde-iki-nokta-operasyon-424435.html>

⁴³ <https://www.dw.com/tr/%C3%A7avu%C5%9Fo%C4%9Flu-geri-kabul-anla%C5%9Fmas%C4%B1n%C4%B1-ask%C4%B1ya-ald%C4%B1k/a-49699277>

⁴⁴ <https://t24.com.tr/haber/istanbul-valisi-nden-kayitli-olmayan-suriyelilere-iliskin-aciklama,832772>

⁴⁵ <https://tr.euronews.com/2019/08/19/kurban-bayram-icin-ulkelerine-giden-suriyelilerin-turkiyeye-donusleri-basladi>

A tweet belong to Journalist İsmail Saymaz was retweeted 1415 times

3.1.4.1. Traditional Media Agenda Topics

In the local elections of March 31, 2019, the debate about the Istanbul elections continues and the issue of the cancellation of the election is on the agenda. The government and the opposition are mutually blaming each other ⁴⁶(10.04.2019).

The first action of the newly elected Bolu mayor of the Chp, Tanju Özcan, was to cut the aid given to migrants⁴⁷ (10.04.2019).

President Erdoğan said: “We will not allow the establishment of a terrorist state in the north of Syria”, emphasizing that a terror corridor will never be allowed in the south of Turkey, and that the necessary steps will be taken soon ⁴⁸(13.10.2019).

The economy package was announced by the Minister of Economy, Berat Albayrak ⁴⁹(10.04.2019).

3.1.5. E Point: 7-13 June 2019

At point E, it is mainly about the news and comments in the traditional media and the Renewed June 23, 2019 Istanbul election. The existence of the agenda regarding the Syrians is also striking. It is discussed that millions of Syrians will flock to the Turkish border, especially after the attack of the Russian-backed Regime forces.

Table 7. Twitter Volume Increases and Sources at Point E

604% volume increase on Twitter is due to the following interactions
A tweet belong to Nihal Olçok was retweeted 3186 times
The hashtag of the #suriyeliler was mentioned in 7949 tweets
A link belong to “video.twimg.com” was mentioned and shared in 6694 tweets ⁵⁰
This tweet was retweeted in 4316 times

⁴⁶ <https://www.haberler.com/aksam-gazetesi/tarih-2019-04-10/>

⁴⁷ <https://tr.euronews.com/2019/04/10/bolu-nun-yeni-chp-li-belediye-baskani-ozcan-dan-ilk-icraat-suriyeli-multecilere-yardim-yok>

⁴⁸ <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/111067/-suriye-nin-kuzeyinde-bir-teror-devletinin-kurulmasina-musaade-etmeyecegiz->

⁴⁹ <https://www.haberturk.com/son-dakika-ekonomi-reform-paketi-aciklaniyor-2428990-ekonomi>

⁵⁰ https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1138163308790525952/pu/vid/352x640/OBUAwnxiHXC-h28T.mp4?tag=10
(12.12.2021)

3.1.5.1. Traditional Media Agenda Topics

F-35 Desk without Turkey ⁵¹ (09.06.2019)

Election polemics before the 23 June 2019 Istanbul election ⁵²(11.06.2019)

The new migration wave is at the door, the Russian-backed regime forces attacking Idlib by violating the Sochi agreement, causing 2 million people to pile up on the Turkish border ⁵³(09.09.2019)

National Day; Turkey defeated the last World Champion France ⁵⁴ (10.06.2019)

Greek Cypriots issued an arrest warrant for the crew of the Fatih ship ⁵⁵(10.06.2019)

130 thousand Mehmetçik are waiting for the law for demobilization, excitement in the barracks, the General Assembly of the Turkish Grand National Assembly will discuss the new military system ⁵⁶(09.06.2019).

3.1.6. Evaluation of all Five Points Together

When the shares made at all points discussed in the research are examined, it can be said that the social media users have negative thoughts because of the Syrian migrants being in Turkey. When the negative messages are examined, it is stated that the state gives Syrian citizens more opportunities than their own citizens. Another prominent negative issue is the advocacy that Syrian citizens of military age should fight in their own country. In the posts made based on this, users say that Turkish soldiers should not fight in Syria and that Syrian youth should be sent there and fight for their country.

Twitter Users created the agenda on social media by creating hashtags such as *#Suriyelileriİstemiyoruz*, *#ülkemdesuriyeliistemiyorum*, *#suriyelilerdefoluyor*. During the Peace Spring Operation, President Erdogan's statement about Syrians, "Our goal is to ensure our border security and the return of migrants to their own lands," seems to have received some attention on social media. Shares and comments made on Twitter about Syrian migrants living in Turkey, 642 thousand messages were shared by 251 thousand

⁵¹ <https://www.karar.com/turkiyesiz-f-35-masasi-1234351>

⁵² <https://www.setav.org/duygusal-polemikler-uzerinden-devam-eden-tartismalar-secim-yaklastikca-yerini-projelere-birakacak/>

⁵³ <https://www.dw.com/tr/ankarada-idlib-endi%C5%9Fesi-500-bin-sivil-yolda/a-50357645>

⁵⁴ <https://tr.euronews.com/2019/06/08/turkiye-son-dunya-sampiyonu-fransa-kars-s-nda-1-0-one-geci>

⁵⁵ <https://www.haberturk.com/rum-yonetimi-nden-fatih-sondaj-gemi-personeline-tutuklama-karari-2487592>

⁵⁶ <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/meclis-yeni-askerlik-sistemi-icin-mesai-yapacak/1499375>

individual users between February 26 - March 31, 2020 (After the opening of European Border Gates). The shared posts received 3 Billion Views and 29 Billion Access.

Twitter users viewed Syrian migrants living in Turkey very negatively and they frequently expressed this on Twitter. The behaviors, attitudes and words of the Syrians during the migration, the increase in the number of martyrs, the absence of Turkey in regions that do not belong to our lands, the need for that region or Syrian soldiers to fight in the relevant regions were mentioned as the most frequently complained issues by Twitter users. They also shared about the European countries not opening their doors. Some users have shared that they do not find it ethical in the context of human values, the immigration conditions and the removal of immigrants with threats such as sound bombs at the Greek border gate.

3.1.7. Comparison of Twitter Syrian migrants Agenda and Twitter Turkey Agenda

Table 8. Proportional comparison of the agenda in which Syrian migrants are discussed and Twitter Turkey agenda (1 March 2019-31 March 2020)

Dates with intense interaction	Twitter Turkey Agenda Daily Average Volume	Twitter Syrian Agenda Daily Average Volume	Twitter Syrian/Turkey Agenda Daily Average Volume ratio (%)
Point A: 28 February -2 March 2020	4.525.673	78.523	%1.73
Point B: 30 June-1 July 2019	3.270.833	66.201	%2.02
Point C: 26-30 July 2019	2.875.002	56.163	%1.95
Point D: April 10-11, 2019	3.611.111	43.625	%1.21
Point E: 7-13 June 2019	3.358.796	27.685	%0.82

Twitter sharing volume in Turkey within the specified dates is 1 Billion 443 Million. The average daily volume of these posts is approximately 3.446.000. It is seen that the daily volume of the Agenda, in which Syrian migrants are discussed, is 11.574. The date range from February 28 to March 2, 2020, when the border gates were opened, has been one of the most influential dates on Twitter. This interaction contributed approximately 1.7% to the volume of Twitter Turkey by receiving 78.000 shares per day. Regarding the agenda where Syrian migrants were discussed, the impact rates of the effective dates throughout


the year on the Twitter Turkey agenda were 1.73%, from the highest trend to the lowest trend, respectively, It can be given as 2.02%, 1.95%, 1.21%, 0.82%.

As can be seen, another noteworthy issue in this research is that the agenda in the traditional media in Turkey and the agenda spoken on Twitter are influenced by each other, but do not exactly match each other, and that the Syrian agenda in Twitter has a very small percentage, approximately % on average, within the Twitter Turkey agenda. The fact is that it corresponds to 0.33 percent even on the days when the Syrian agenda is most intensely spoken, and it is a negligible rate. These findings show us the fact that the Syrian agenda on Twitter is not on the agenda of the Turkish people as much as it is exaggerated. Table 9 shows this ratio.

3.1.8. Twitter Agenda Change Rates

When we look at Table 9, it is seen that the daily average value of the conversations made on Twitter Turkey between the specified dates is 3 million. It is seen in the chart that the volume increase in Turkey with the opening of the European border gates increased at the same rate as the Twitter Turkey agenda. The contribution of the Syria issue to the daily average of Twitter was determined as 2%. The average value formed after the opening of the border gate in the discussions about the Syria issue is 823%. We see that after the opening of the European border gates, the ratio of the Twitter Syrian agenda within itself increased by approximately 823%, and within the Twitter Turkey Agenda, the Twitter Syrian agenda corresponds to only 2% of the entire agenda. In this case, after the opening of the European border gates, 98% of the Twitter agenda consists of issues other than the Syrian agenda, and we can easily claim that the Syrian agenda is not at the center of the Turkish people's agenda on Twitter.

Table 9. Twitter Turkey-Syrian Refugee Comparison Rates (1 March 2019-31 March 2020)



3.1.9. Comparison of Syrian Agenda on Twitter

Tablo 10. Topics on the Syrian Agenda on Twitter

	Before the European Border Gates Opening	After the European Border Gates Opening
1.Topic	Those who think that military-aged Syrian citizens should fight in their own country (40%)	Those who think that Syrians should leave Turkey (62%)
2.Topic	Those who think that the state provides more opportunities to Syrians than their own citizens (36%)	Those who think that we should not be in regions other than our lands, that if we are, the number of martyrs in our country will increase and that soldiers from the relevant nationalities should fight in the relevant regions. (22%)
3.Topic	Those who think they are prone to crime (24%)	Those who think that the number of immigrants migrating from the European border is not correct. Those who think that the number is less and that more immigrants will come to Turkey after the Idlib operation, or that they will return to Turkey again if they cannot cross the European border. In addition, those who think that most of them did not go to Europe and that most of the immigrants who went were not Syrians (16%)

When examining why Turkish citizens do not want Syrians in the posts on Twitter, it is observed that the issues are mainly gathered around the following three topics; Those

who think that Syrian citizens of military age should fight in their own country (40%), State provides more opportunities to Syrian citizens (36%), and Are prone to crime (24%)

After the opening of the European border gates, there were fewer posts about the above topics than before the opening of the border gates. Users throughout the posts. Due to the high number of martyrs in the operations of the TAF on the Syrian border, it is seen that there are more posts about sending Syrians from our country rather than the above items. The percentages of the Syrian agenda topics on Twitter, which are stated in Table 10, were found by content analysis method. The word groups that are the source of this analysis are listed in Table 11.

Table. 11. Syrian Agenda Topics Phrasegroups on Twitter

	Before the European Border Gates Opening	After the European Border Gates Opening
1.Topic	(suç* OR suc OR hırsız* OR çaldı* OR kapkaç* OR gasp* OR yakalan* OR katil OR yaralama* OR kavga* OR kumar* OR cinayet* OR çete* OR silahlı* OR bıçak* OR "kafasını kes" OR örgüt* OR mafya* OR hapis* OR tutuklandı* OR cezaevi*)	("geri dönsünler" OR "geri dönmeliler" OR "ülkelerine dönsünler" OR "defolup gitsinler" OR gitsinler* OR dönsünler* OR istemiyoruz* OR ayrılınlar* OR ayrıl* OR dönme* OR gitsin* OR istemi* OR dön* OR gönderin* OR gönder*)
2.Topic	(maaş* OR maas* OR yardım* OR kamp* OR eğitim* OR eğitim* OR sınav* OR işyeri* OR ruhsat* OR işyeri* OR kumanya* OR giysi* OR giyim* OR bağış OR bağış OR çadır* OR cadır* OR imkan*)	("ne işimiz var" OR "geri çek" OR "askerimiz ülkeye dönsün" OR "suriye'de ne işimiz" OR "suriyede ne işimiz" OR "savaşa hayır" OR "savaş istemiyoruz" OR "Mehmetçik dönsün" OR "Mehmetçik geri dönsün" OR "şehit vermemeliyiz" OR "daha fazla şehit" OR #suriyedeneisimizvar OR "idlib'de ne işimiz" OR #savaşahayır OR #savaşahayır OR "askeri geri çek" OR "mehmetçik geri" OR "askerlerimizi geri" OR "orduyu geri")
3.Topic	(asker* OR savaş* OR savaş* OR "asker çağında" OR Mehmetçik* OR mehmetcik* OR "eli silah tutan" OR "eli silah" OR "elleri silah" OR kaçan* OR kaçıyor* OR kaçtılar* OR kactı* OR kacan* OR kacıyor* OR "suriyeli tosunlar" OR "genç erkek nüfus" OR "ülkeleri için savaşsınlar")	("fazla göçmen" OR "sayı yanlış" OR "doğru değil" OR kandırılıyor* OR "türkiye'ye geri" OR "sınırdan geçemediler" OR "sınırdan geçemiyorlar" OR "sınırdan geçemediler" OR "fazlası var" OR "göçmen sayısı" OR "türkiye'yi terk" OR "ülkeyi terk" OR "avrupaya gidiyorlar" OR "sınıra yığıldılar" OR "sınır kapıları")

In the research carried out in Table.11, by the users; The volumes created by the use of the keywords "Suriyeli" together with the words "Mülteci, mülteciler" in all messages within the specified time period and the use of the keywords determined in the word groups in the messages were the source of the subject percentages for example:

1.Example: "Suriyeli olan komşumuz mülteci haklarından faydalanıyor.

2.Example: "Suriyeli olan komşumuz mülteci haklarından faydalıyor. Onları istemiyoruz. Ülkelerine geri dönsünler"

3.Example: "Suriyeli olan komşumuz mülteci haklarından faydalıyor. Onları istemiyoruz. Gitsinler"

4.Example: “Suriyeli mültecileri ülkelerine gönderin”.etc.

Table. 12. The Most Shared Hashtags Before and After the Opening of the Border Gates

Before the European Border Gates Opening			After the European Border Gates Opening		
most interactioned hashtags	Tweets / Retweets	Interactions	most interactioned hashtags	Tweets / Retweets	Interactions
#suriyeli	21.107/62.432	279.147.890	#suriyelileriistemiyoruz	11.995/17.274	45.307.975
#suriyelileriistemiyoruz	39.882/78.799	202.430.998	#sehitlerimizvar	4182/11.063	32.781.294
#barışpınarharekatı	806/21.292	144.445.906	#sehidimizvar	2812/9581	26.569.499
#suriyeliler	10.819/19.252	105.420.655	#suriye	1353/1803	17.791.557
#suriye	5633/14.786	93.489.467	#suriyeli	1081/2423	15.909.416
#suriyelileryalnızdeğildir	11.845/25.442	71.252.413	#mehmetciğinyanındayız	410/3725	12.551.772
#suriyeliyim	7799/13.977	52.522.252	#baharkalkanı	319/4520	12.232.258
#suriyelilerkardesimizdir	6568/14.815	43.456.058	#weareallturkishsoldiers	389/2701	7.196.855
#sehitlerimizvar	4213/11.217	33.248.101	#vaka5698	354/4926	4.808.053
#sehidimizvar	2882/10694	27.893.920	#evindekaltürkiyem	35/4541	4.282.874
#ülkemdesuriyeliistemiyoruz	2395/7782	18.121.581			
#suriyelilerdefoluyor	3550 /4654	12.339.746			

One of the hashtags that was shared before and after the European border gates in both cases and received the most interaction, #suriyelileriistemiyoruz, seems to have become an instrument of hate speech against Syrians by keeping it warm and sharing. Neutral or positive tweets can also be shared using this hashtag. But even if Syrians move to Europe or a third country, this hashtag has almost become a slogan of nationalist and sometimes

racist groups that still use concentrated hate speech in the echo chamber. Table 12, which contains the tone distribution for all interactions in general, is available below. Looking at this table, it can be seen that hate speech against Syrians has a more negative tone in both cases.

Table 13. Emotional Tone Distribution Before and After the Opening of the Border Gates

Before the European Border Gates Opening			After the European Border Gates Opening		
Positive	Neutral	Negative	Positive	Neutral	Negative
7%	31%	62%	8%	27%	65%
200k interactions	1,45 M interactions	2,9 M interactions	45k interactions	180k interactions	420k interactions

Positive tone words, which form the basis of the tone distribution of the posts before the opening of the border gates, are the word groups clustered around the words Türkiye, bari, güzel, iyi, Allah (See Appendix 5). Words with positive tones that form the basis of tone distributions after the opening of the border gates, are word groups clustered around the words; Yıldır diyor, Avrupa (See Appendix 7). The words with negative tones that form the basis of the tone distribution before the opening of the border gates are word groups clustered around the words; Türkiye, Türk, yok (See Appendix 6). Finally, words with negative tones that form the basis of tone distributions after the opening of border gates, are groups of words clustered around the words; Türkiye, Avrupa, dolar (See Appendix 8). Therefore, when we look at the content analysis of these word groups, 62% are Negative, 31% Neutral, (Announcement and News Texts) and 7% are Positive before the border gates are opened.

After the opening of the border gates, there is not much change in the rates. Distributions; 65% Negative, 27% Neutral, 8% Positive. After the treacherous attack in Idlib, after Turkey's decision that it will not stop the migrants who want to go to Europe, we conclude that the influx of immigrants to Turkey's European borders did not affect the hate speech directed against Syrian immigrants on Twitter. It is striking that there is a very small 3% increase in the negative tone value. For the full Table 13, see Annexes 3-4 of the Appendix.

Table 14. Most Mentioned Accounts Before and After the Opening of European Border Gates

Before the European Border Gates Opening			After the European Border Gates Opening		
Most Mentioned Accounts	Tweets / Retweets	Interactions	Most Mentioned Accounts	Tweets / Retweets	Interactions
@umitozdog	9415/144.775	231.367.738	@vekilince	121/15.815	9.565.305
@drsinnanogan	10.728/122.305	133.445.895	@kacsaatolduson	459/13.009	18.857.515
@akparti	7670/92.968	214.111.401	@ismailsaymaz	1403/10.614	10.679.199
@rterdogan	13.412/71.194	243.617.154	@drsinnanogan	602/10.339	8.951.706
@suriyelilers	5717/51.562	108.940.837	@rterdogan	2082/6231	15.354.526
@ismailsaymaz	6577/50.476	105.624.040	@haluklevent	786/6490	7.075.120
@mhp_bilgi	3666/50.824	112.979.061	@umitozdog	273/6846	7.198.609
@kacsaatolduson	3058/45.599	63.837.679	#weareallturkishsoldiers	389/2701	7.196.855
@gazetesozcu	4944/38.002	71.270.494	#vaka5698	354/4926	4.808.053
@lvntozrn	1247/32.248	32.409.861	#evindekaltürkiyem	35/4541	4.282.874

When we look at the accounts that were shared before and after the European border gates and that received the most interaction in both cases, it is seen that they go in parallel with the hashtags containing hate speech against Syrians. Especially when looking at a few accounts such as @umitozdog, @drsinnanogan, @ismailsaymaz and @kacsaatolduson, it can be seen that these accounts are mentioned a lot in both cases. It can be claimed from their statements or articles that these accounts generally have an anti-Syrian position and lead social media groups that generate political or ideological hate speech against Syrians. The anti-Syrian anti-immigrant discourse formed here coincides with the natural leadership of accounts such as @umitozdog, @drsinnanogan, @ismailsaymaz and @kacsaatolduson, who somehow crystallize and act as concentrated for the same purpose, find them ready and directable, and pursue their political goal

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS

Our research explains that the effect of traditional media is also valid for social media, which emerged after the second generation internet technologies and made interaction possible. In fact, social media; It can be said that fake identities, which benefit from manipulative algorithms and their decentralization, promise a more democratic environment compared to traditional media when we purge them from the habits of speculating on perception. In this context, we can say that social media is not the source of hate speech, it is fed from traditional media from time to time.

According to peace and conflict researchers, the most common definition of peace is “the absence or cessation of military operations and armed conflict between nations” (Campbell, 2010). However, such identification is commonly seen as only one side of the coin, according to Galtung, and is thus called negative peace. (Galtung, 1969) . The other side of the coin, the concept of positive peace, is called the existence of social justice, including equal opportunity, access to basic necessities of life, and the elimination of structural violence, and this is the desired peace in conflicts (Campbell, 2010).

Galtung focuses on three main types of violence, which are multi-layered and interrelated; These types of violence are Direct (direct) violence, Indirect (structural) violence and Cultural (symbolic) violence. Cultural violence refers to all layers in which a culture is exposed to direct or structural violence. Galtung talks about the six sub-layers of cultural violence. These layers are the cultural fields of religion, ideology, language, art, empiricism and formal science. Accordingly, Galtung directly states that structural and cultural violence as well as visible violence are types of invisible violence (Galtung J. , 2007).

It can easily be claimed that hate speech directed against Syrians in social media is a part of cultural violence according to ideology, cultural areas of religion and language layer, which are among the cultural violence layers defined by Galtung. Because Syrians are

exposed to cultural violence by being exposed to hate speech on social media and especially on Twitter, sometimes even though they speak Arabic, sometimes they share the same religious sect with the Turks (Sunniism), and sometimes just because they are not Turkish, that is, because of nationalist motives and stereotypical prejudices. According to Ak Yeşilmen's classification of conflicts, taking into account the increase in intensity levels, hate speech against Syrians in social media can be described as non-violent invisible-visible conflict or incompatibility. If hate speech turns into lynching, then it is considered as a visible crisis that disrupts the peace and tranquility of the society and includes violence (Akyeşilmen, 2018, s. 202).

In this study, social media and hate speech theories were mentioned. Twitter interactions on hate speech against Syrians on Twitter were analyzed. When we analyzed the dates of March 1, 2019-March 31, 2020 in depth, we came up with the following result. In Turkey, the agenda in the traditional media and the agenda spoken on Twitter are influenced by each other, but do not exactly match each other, and the Syrian agenda in Twitter corresponds to a very small percentage, approximately 0.33% on average, within the Twitter Turkey agenda. The fact that it corresponds to 2.02% and is a negligible rate even on the dates of the Idlib martyrs and the Afrin operation, which are the dates of intense talk. These findings show us that the Syrian agenda on Twitter is not a mirror of Turkey, and at the same time, the hate speech agenda produced against Syrians is not a mirror of Twitter.

So, why does the Syrian Agenda, which is revealed with its findings on Twitter, occupy such a small rate as 2%, but why does it keep both the traditional media and the social media agenda, thus the national agenda so much? Why does the hate speech agenda against Syrians determine the country's agenda so strongly and effectively? From which arguments does it derive its power and influence? Gerbaudo, with the phrase "choreography of coming together", a term he coined for the first time in his book titled "Tweets and Streets", said that the social movements that emerged in modern times are in a liquidity structure with the effect of social media, that is, they have a fluid structure and they do not have an official leadership structure, He emphasizes that they are not in an anarchic structure, that is, they are not leaderless, and they are open to interaction thanks to their characteristic fluid structures, and they are choreographically shaped in this way (Gerbaudo, 2012, s. 134-135) . Here, Gerbaudo states that Twitter is the focal

point of groups that crystallize and are concentrated and organized towards a goal. He summarizes this concentration with the concept of liquidity.

The result we reached in our research confirms Gerbaudo. When the accounts such as @umitozdog, @drsinanogan, @ismailsaymaz, which are the most mentioned accounts before and after the opening of the European border gates, are examined, the common feature of these accounts is that they produce hate speech against Syrians, their political language is designed to oppose Syrians, and they have a concentrated following of millions. We can say that they gather in an echo chamber, their focus is on a language containing hate speech against Syrians, and they keep this language warm all the time, and as such, they have a fluid and interactive structure.

It has been observed that the hashtags #suriyelileriistemiyoruz, #suriyeli, #suriyeliler, #ülkemdesuriyeliistemiyorum, #suriyelilerdefoluyor are used intensively by users before the opening of the European border gates. It is stated that these hashtags are the most interacted hashtags in hate speech against Syrians.

The topics that users use as justification for their hate speech are listed as the opinion that Syrian citizens of military age should fight in their own country before the opening of the European border gates (40%), the State providing Syrian citizens with more opportunities (36%), and their inclination to crime (24%). ; After the opening of the European border gates, these issues are listed as Syrians Should Leave Turkey (62%), Turkish soldiers should not fight in Syria, Syrians should fight (22%), and the number of immigrants migrating from the European border is not correct (16%).

Obtaining some of the predicted findings in this study was possible with content analysis. With the data obtained based on certain periods, it has been tried to make an inference about how much the hate language directed against Syrian migrants has spread to the people/groups clustered on Twitter. Interactions examined on Twitter were examined and evaluated, and the answers to the questions predicted before the study were reached to a large extent.

As a result of the interpretation of the findings, as mentioned before, the groups and individuals who are the subject of the anti-Syrian refugee news on Twitter use the discourse that increases the conflict more. It is one of the results that social media is affected by the traditional media agenda of Twitter, and that institutions and individuals

who are in a position to affect the public and the masses should carefully choose their statements in the context of freedom of expression in the traditional media. The point that draws attention in the tweets researched in this study is that the statements made when the expressions containing hate speech peak immediately after the operations or the news of martyrdom have more negative effects. It is important that the results of the statements made should be evaluated sensitively by politicians, artists or journalists who have a large number of followers on Twitter.

At this point, the duty of influential users who use social media, especially Twitter, will be to share common sense on Twitter by making more prudent and soothing news instead of provocative news or comments against Syrian migrants after the news of the operation or martyrdom. In this case Journalists, politicians and artists etc. In order to ensure an atmosphere of reconciliation and peace, it should refrain from posting some information on Twitter that may have the potential to fuel hate speech. It is equally important to keep the language of news, comments and evaluations to be made in the traditional media at a level that will not evoke hate speech. Otherwise, it should be known that the published news, comment or evaluation can be followed not only by the followers of a particular traditional or social media channel, but also by a larger audience. The violence and hatred that this will cause should be foreseen and acted with this sensitivity, that is, with the sensitivity of serving cultural peace.

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

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

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APPENDIX


Appendix 1. Distribution of sharing types before the opening of European border gates




Appendix 2. Distribution of sharing types after the opening of European border gates




Appendix 3. Emotional tone distribution before the opening of the European border gates




Appendix 3. Emotional tone distribution After the opening of the European border gates




Appendix 5. Before the opening of the border gates-- The most used Positive word headlines in the Twitter posts that set the tone




Appendix 6. Before the opening of the border gates-- The most used Negative word headlines in the Twitter posts that set the tone



Appendix 7. After the opening of the border gates-- The most used Positive word headlines in the Twitter posts that set the tone



Appendix 8. After the opening of the border gates-- The most used Negative word headlines in the Twitter posts that set the tone



Appendix 9. Most Shared Links Before the Opening of European Border Gates


Most interacted accounts	Tweets	Retweets	All Tweets	Interactions
twitter.com/i/web/status/12...	255	5808	6065	7986803
twitter.com/balkkk1/status/...	1	4909	4910	5728691
twitter.com/dokuz8haber/sta...	0	3813	3813	4254266
kamuilanlari.com/gundem/isk...	110	3082	3192	4990518
twitter.com/UyanTRK1/status...	4	3099	3103	4052169
youtube.com/watch?v=Nv1wKuz...	60	2740	2800	4641799
sozcu.com.tr/2019/yazarlar/...	8	2580	2588	7246797
twitter.com/Gazete_Yenicag/...	0	2478	2478	2482149
twitter.com/m_sukruoglu/sta...	1	2391	2392	2023105
twitter.com/SeyitYcel2/stat...	0	2342	2342	2129115

Appendix 10. Most Shared Links After the Opening of European Border Gates

Most interacted accounts	Tweets	Retweets	All Tweets	Interactions
twitter.com/i/web/status/12...	255	5808	6065	7986803
tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/...	10	1641	1652	5792069
twitter.com/busra_tekinns/s...	1	1602	1603	4437783
bbc.com/turkce/live/haberle...	5	983	988	5893902
twitter.com/i/web/status/12...	2	824	827	9184746
halktv.com.tr/gundem/sinir-...	44	755	799	5694972
sozcu.com.tr/2020/yazarlar/...	9	790	799	5705355
gazetefersude.net/marasta-s...	49	621	671	2765855
twitter.com/sputnik_TR/stat...	9	657	667	810314
yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/hata...	25	633	658	1935511

Appendix 11. The Most Used Word Titles Before / After the Opening of the border gates

Before the opening of the European Border Gates



After the opening of the European Border Gates




Appendix 13. Top Trending Topics Before / After the Opening of the Border Gates


Before the opening of the European Border Gates



After the opening of the European Border Gates



Appendix 14. User Analysis Before / After Border Gates Opening



Appendix 15. Interests and Professional Distribution of Users Before / After the Opening of the Border Gates

