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**SOVIET-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN WWII:
LEND-LEASE AS FOREIGN POLICY**

**The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
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ABSTRACT

SOVIET-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN WWII: LEND-LEASE AS FOREIGN POLICY

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November 2004

This thesis analyses Lend-Lease aid the U.S. offered to the S.U. throughout 1941-1945 and the contribution made by American Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet war effort in World War Two. Foremost attention is concentrated on the period from June 1941 till the end of 1942, which was the most intense and difficult phase of the war. This study is intended to provide a more balanced approach to the issue and attempts to overcome partisan and biased opinions about Lend-Lease contribution to the Soviet victory in WWII.

It will be argued that although Lend-Lease help was indispensable at the beginning of the war, and less vital at the end of it, when the S.U. established domestic war production and was practically able to supply its army with all necessary items, the aid was received disproportionately to the needs of the Soviet Army.

The conclusion is made that the supplies came too late to make a difference for the Soviet war effort, but were of invaluable help to sustain the country's war economy and partially alleviated war pressure. Although Lend-Lease was intended exclusively for the use of the Red Army, its humanitarian impact and contribution to ordinary people's lives is remembered today.

Keywords: Lend-Lease, Second World War, WWII, Soviet-American, military, diplomatic relations

ÖZET

SOVYET-AMERİKAN İŞBİRLİĞİ İKİNCİ DÜNYA SAVAŞ SIRASINDA: ÖDÜNC VERME VE KİRALAMA DIŞ POLİTİKASI

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Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans

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Bu tez, 1941-1945 yılları boyunca Amerika Birleşik Devletleri tarafından Sovyetler Birliği'ne sunulan Ödünç Verme ve Kiralama yardımını ve Amerikan Ödünç Verme ve Kiralama desteğinin 2. Dünya Savaşı'nda Sovyetler Birliği'nin savaş sürecine katkısını incelemektedir. Savaşın en yoğun ve zor evresi olan Haziran 1941 ile 1942'nin sonu arasındaki dönem üzerinde özellikle yoğunlaşmıştır.

Bu çalışma meseleye daha dengeli bir yaklaşım getirmeyi amaçlamakta ve Ödünç Verme ve Kiralama yardımının 2. Dünya Savaşı'ndaki Sovyet zaferine katkısı hakkında partizanca yaklaşımları ve yanlı fikirleri aşmayı hedeflemektedir.

Ödünç Verme ve Kiralama yardımı her ne kadar savaşın başında zaruri, sonunda ise daha az hayati idiyse de, Sovyetler Birliği yerli askeri üretime geçip pratikte ordusuna gerekli tüm materyalleri sağlayacak hale geldiğinde de yardım, ihtiyaçlarla ters orantılı olarak devam etmiştir.

Sonuç olarak yardım, Sovyet savaş amacına hizmette bir fark yaratmak için çok geç kalmış, ancak ülkenin savaş ekonomisinin idame ettirebilmesi için paha biçilmez bir katkıda bulunmuş ve savaş baskısını kısmen azaltmıştır. Ödünç Verme ve Kiralama yardımı her ne kadar özellikle Kızıl Ordu'nun kullanımı için tasarlanmışsa da, insani katkısı ve sıradan halka katkısı hâlâ belleklerde.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ödünç Verme ve Kiralama, İkinci Dünya Savaşı, Sovyet-Amerikan, askeri, diplomatik ilişkiler

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INTRODUCTION

World War II, the most disastrous event of the 20th century, is an excellent example of how states with different social and ideological structures could cooperate to achieve a common goal – the total destruction of aggression.

This was not a war between two enemies, rather almost the entire world divided in two oppositional blocs: the aggressors on one extreme, and people defending freedom and opposing enslavement, on the other. In WWII the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain and other friendly nations consolidated their forces into a single camp. In their struggle for victory these three major powers decided to sustain each other's efforts and combine their resources in order to achieve victory and eliminate the threat of fascism.

During the war, Lend-Lease (LL) became a vital mechanism, a foreign policy tool, through which the Allied nations were able to combine their physical and industrial resources against the Axis powers. This was an American device for victory, which despite some deficiencies, generally was a successful strategy and an excellent example of a cooperative attempt to combat aggression.

1.1 Historiography

Lend-Lease is a well-researched topic. Many studies had essentially focused on the impact of LL on Soviet war effort. R.H. Jones' *The Roads to Russia* is an

exhaustive research of the published official and unofficial sources and an interpretative account of how LL to Russia came to be realized. The study examines LL routes, types of materials received by the S.U. and obstacles encountered during the implementation of the program. The author tried to determine the use made of the supplies, though he was very careful to draw conclusions. Roger Munting's "Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort" reiterates the prevailing Soviet view that LL was not very important to the S.U. Another work by the same author, "Soviet Food Supply and Allied Aid in the War, 1941-45" concludes that vital deliveries of food began before the end of 1942, but the major contributions were made thereafter. Although *Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945*, written by Hubert P. van Tuyll is not the first study which focused on the effect of aid on the Soviet war effort¹, it is one of the most all-encompassing and discusses a variety of issues, as well as political and technical aspects, related to the main question: What did LL mean to the Soviet Union?

Moreover, several studies had focused on political and diplomatic aspects of LL. *Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy and the Origins of the Cold War* by George C. Herring, Jr. is the most comprehensive study of the diplomacy surrounding LL. The author examines in detail the decision to aid Russia and U.S. policy towards the S.U., but gives little attention to the issue of the actual impact of LL. Similar work has been done by Leon Martel in *Lend-Lease, Loans, and the Coming of the Cold War*, where the author is trying to establish a connection between LL and post-war U.S.-Soviet problems. Another excellent account on how decision to aid Russia was made is written by Raymond H. Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*,

¹ First wartime works focused on LL impact are Joseph E. Davies, *Mission to Moscow*, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1942) and Edward R. Stettinius Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory*, (New York: Macmillan, 1944). Immediately after the war another work came into life, written by John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with Russia*, (New York: Viking Press, 1947)

1941: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics. The study focuses on diplomatic aspects of LL and describes the process of policy making and decision of the U.S. to send aid to the S.U. as an interaction of foreign policy and national politics. This study points to the international and domestic factors which were dominant in shaping U.S. policy towards the S.U.

Two excellent accounts on aviation LL to the S.U. has to be mentioned. *Aviation Lend-Lease to Russia: Historical Observations*, written by Russian Major-General of aviation I. Lebedev, is a well-balanced account on aircraft supply to the S.U. The work includes both reminiscences² and technical details, which offer a good account on aviation LL to the S.U. The study attempts to rehabilitate the truth about LL aircraft and its significance to the S.U. Carl-Fredrik Geust and Gennadiy Petrov's cooperation produced the work *Lend-Lease Aircraft in Russia*, which is an extensive technical research on the types of foreign aircraft the S.U. received under the LL program. Besides detailed characteristics of the machines, the study is also supplemented with considerable statistics, which offers the reader almost complete and deep insight of the LL aircraft programs ever published.

During the Cold War the Soviet academic and popular press published relatively little about the LL program. The issue had been avoided or vaguely mentioned at best. Few studies were equally balanced and impartial. Most of the writings were reflecting Cold War politics and obviously revealed the impact of the political discord. Among Russian studies, there are three major investigations, each of which look at the LL program from three different perspectives – the Northern, the Pacific and the Iranian, and merit attention. M.N. Suprun's monographic work *Lend-Liz i Severnye Konvoi, (Lend-Lease and the Northern Convoys)*, inspects LL aid

² I. Lebedev served as a military representative of the S.U. in American aviation plants and later as a member of the Soviet Aviation Lend-Lease Group in the Government Purchasing Commission.

which arrived to the S.U. through the Northern route of supply. The author tried to establish the importance of LL supplies and the role they played for the Red Army's victories. His other work "Prodovol'stvennye Postavki po Lend-Lizu v Gody Vtoroi Mirovoi Voini", ("Food Supplies under Lend-Lease During WWII") concludes that during the war the S.U. lost millions of people because of malnutrition, and would have lost more if there was no LL food aid. A. Paperno's point is clearly stated in *Lend-Liz i Tikhii Okean*, (*Lend-Lease and the Pacific Ocean*), which argues that half of American LL supplies came through the Pacific routes to the Far Eastern ports of the S.U. She examines in detail the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the incredible cooperative effort made by the countries to achieve victory in war. These two studies came out almost at the same time in 1997-1998, but *Osoboe Zadanie*, (*A Special Mission*), by L.I. Zorin, Major-General and head of the Soviet military mission to Iran, was published in 1987. The study examines Anglo-American-Soviet cooperation in the Persian Gulf and LL supplies that came to the Iranian ports. The book, in its original version, perhaps, was comparable to T.H. Vail Motter's *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*, but was censored and came into life five times smaller than was originally written.

Lend-Lease is a very complex subject and many of the issues, related to the LL program, still need to be studied in depth. In this regard, use of LL supplies in the S.U. and their contribution to the Soviet war effort still need a more detailed investigation. To understand the actual impact of LL to the Soviet economy more work needs to be done in researching the Soviet war and post-war heavy industry, as well as auto and rail transport systems. Although the psychological impact of the LL on Soviet people is difficult to measure, this is another interesting issue for research.

1.2 The aim of research

Although this issue was already largely discussed by Western and Soviet writers, during the Cold War the American writers tended to overestimate and the Soviet scholars undervalued the impact of Lend-Lease. Moreover, even nowadays, when more than half a century has passed since the end of WWII, this controversial topic is obscured by anachronism. First of all, there is the difficulty of tracking down LL, since the Russian sources do not fully indicate and inform us about the usage of American armaments in the war. Secondly, it is hard to calculate this impact and there are some difficulties in measurement per se. As opinions still vary, paucity of measures and statistics is complicated by the controversy of the issue itself. This study is intended to provide a more balanced approach to the issue and attempts to overcome partisan and biased opinions about Lend-Lease contribution to the Soviet victory in WWII. Moreover, most of the abovementioned writers concentrated on military impact the LL supplies had on the Soviet war effort. However, little has been said or written about the humanitarian impact of Lend-Lease.

1.3 Précis

The thesis will discuss Lend-Lease aid the U.S. offered to the S.U. throughout 1941-1945 and contribution made by American LL supplies to the Soviet war effort in the Second World War. Foremost attention will be concentrated on the period from June 1941 till the end of 1942, which was the most intense and difficult phase of the war and when LL was the most important to the S.U.

It will be argued that although Lend-Lease help was indispensable at the beginning of the war, and less vital at the end of it, when the S.U. established domestic war production and was practically able to supply its army with all necessary items, the aid was received disproportional to the needs of the Soviet Army. Moreover, the aid and supplies were delivered in greater quantities only after the first victories of the Soviet Army in the battle for Moscow, when the initial strategic advantage Germany possessed was eradicated.

The conclusion is made that the supplies came too late to make a difference for the Soviet war effort, but were of invaluable help to sustain the country's war economy and partially alleviated war pressure. Although Lend-Lease was intended exclusively for use of the Red Army, its humanitarian impact and contribution to ordinary people was significant and still remembered.

1.4 Structure

The first chapter will provide a necessary background and general information about Lend-Lease. The discussion will cover the development of the LL program to the S.U. and difficulties encountered in the U.S. before the decision to aid Russia was taken. Later, American LL aid to the Soviet Union will be discussed in detail. The emphasis is to discover Soviet war needs in the framework of the results of the 1st Protocol, or the first year of the aid program. The third chapter will attempt to grasp whether LL was vital to the S.U., and if so to what extent, as well as LL impact on the Soviet capability to resist the enemy. The last chapter will discuss LL as a foreign policy tool, which was implemented to achieve a final goal – the total destruction of fascism.

1.5 Sources

This study is based on primary and secondary sources, published in Russian, German and English; various official documents; a large number of memoirs and reminiscences; and is supplemented by official histories, printed materials and monographic works. In addition to these, large portions of articles on the issue as well as newspapers were used.



CHAPTER I

EARLY COOPERATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE LEND-LEASE PROGRAM

1.1 What Was Lend-Lease About?

“We would defend our own home by helping them to defend theirs”.
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.¹

Lend-Lease was a policy initially created by the U.S. to protect its homeland from aggression by aiding Britain, and later other friendly nations to fight the Axis bloc. For the U.S. it was not only a strategic plan that kept the aggression from reaching their country, but also an opportunity to gain time to build defenses and consolidate the country's armed forces. During the war, Lend-Lease (LL) became a vital mechanism through which the Allied nations were able to combine their physical and industrial resources against the Axis powers. This was an American device for victory, which despite some deficiencies, was generally a successful strategy and an excellent example of a cooperative attempt to combat aggression.

¹ Edward R. Stettinius Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory*, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1944), p.4

1.1.1 Lend-Lease: Idea, Definition and Purpose

Encyclopedia of Russian-American Relations provided a definition of LL as follows: “U.S. system to transfer under lend or lease principles arms, munitions, raw materials, food, goods, information and services necessary to conduct the war to the countries –allies of the Anti Hitler coalition”.² The main idea of LL was that the Allies could draw upon the industrial resources of the United States under long-term loans.

Before the Lend-Lease Act (LLA) was issued by the Congress on March 11, 1941, the U.S. provided European powers with munitions under the “cash-and-carry” policy. “Cash-and-carry” became law in November 4th, 1939, and allowed Great Britain to buy war materials by paying in liquid currency.³ However, this policy could not be sustained for the reason that Britain was suffering enormous material losses. Thus, LL was created as a course of action to aid Great Britain when it became short of cash to purchase American munitions.

Moreover, the U.S. was bound by the Neutrality Act of 1937 and also was unwilling to become directly involved in this war. Further, it was determined to protect its own hemisphere from European aggression. For more than a century the U.S. had prevented any non-American power from obtaining new territory in the Western Hemisphere. Secretary of State Cordell Hull said that the Nazis were “definitely out to dominate the world and “there can be nothing more dangerous to our [American] nation ...to assume that the avalanche of the conquest could under no circumstances reach any vital portion of this Hemisphere.”⁴

² E.A. Ivanian, ed., *Encyclopedia of Russian-American Relations, XVIII-XX Centuries*, (Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 2001), p. 301

³ Edward R. Stettinius Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory*, p.20

⁴ *Ibid*, p.38, p.64

Thus, LL was born as a measure that circumvented the Neutrality Act and assumed that the U.S. would freely “sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of” items that were required by other nations to fight fascist Germany.⁵ It was the right of the President of the U.S. to decide which ‘other’ nations would receive this aid and name their defense as ‘vital to the security of the United States’. This act placed almost unlimited authority on the President and committed the U.S. to provide all possible assistance to friendly nations.

1.1.2 Lend-Lease Machinery and Bureaucratic Structure

The LL program was a unique device of U.S. foreign policy and for its simple purpose had a compound bureaucratic structure. Besides the State Department and Office of Lend-Lease Administration (OLLA), which was only a small part of the LL machinery, other already established and some purposely created entities were responsible for the fulfillment of the LL program, such as the Munitions Assignment Board, the War Department, the Navy Department, the War Shipping Administration, the War Production Board, the War Food Administration and others.⁶

Requests from the Allies came to the OLLA, which also controlled LL operations and regularly reported the results to the President and to the Congress. Before accepting requests, OLLA had to determine the quantity of the requested items in U.S. stocks and decide which country needed them the most – the U.S.A., the S.U.,

⁵ For detailed information on the origins and concept of the Lend-Lease idea see Warren F. Kimball, *“The Most Unsordid Act”: Lend-Lease, 1939-1941*, (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1969); George C. Herring, *Aid to Russia, 1941-1945: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p.3, *Sovetsko-Amerikanskii Otnosheniia vo Vremia Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny*, 2 vols., (Soviet-American Relations During the Great Patriotic War), (Moskva: Politizdat 1984), document no.106

⁶ excellent discussion about LL machinery is in Edward R. Stettinius Jr., p.viii; Leon Martel, *Lend-Lease, Loans, and Coming of the Cold War: A Study of the Implementation of Foreign Policy*, (Boulder: CO: Westview Press, 1979), pp.25-27

Britain, or another ally. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt refused to create a single agency that would control every stage of the LL program. While ensuring his personal control over the program, Roosevelt delegated responsibility for supplies procurement to the War, Navy, Agriculture and Treasury Departments.⁷

The LL design for Russia intended to maintain an active front in the East and help the S.U. resist the enemy.⁸ As in the case of Great Britain, leading American officials realized that the S.U. did not have adequate cash to pay for American supplies. The program started 3 months after the German invasion; at the time when the Soviet homeland was devastated by early Nazi attacks and evacuated the industrial complex to the Ural mountains, where it had not yet resumed its full production capacity. The LL became available to the Soviet Union on 7th of November, 1941, on the grounds that the defense of the S.U. was vital to the security of the U.S.A. However, more than 6 months passed before the official LL agreement was signed with the S.U. The war supplies were sent under different designs, but none of them was as binding as the Act on Mutual Cooperation and Aid Against Aggression, or LLA, signed on June 11, 1942.⁹

⁷ George C. Herring, *Aid to Russia*, p.34, Edward R. Stettinius Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory*, pp.158-162

⁸ Raymond H. Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1959), p. 792, J. L. Gaddis, *Russia, The Soviet Union, and The United States: An Interpretive History*, (New York: Wiley Corp., 1978), p. 151; Hubert P. Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear. American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945*, (New York, London: Greenwood, 1989), pp.3-6

⁹ Agreement between the US and the SU on Mutual Cooperation and Aid Against Aggression (LL Act) was fully published by *Izvestiia* and *Pravda*, on June 13, 1942. The full text was also published in *Sovetsko-Amerikanskie Otnosheniia vo Vremia Velikoï Otechestvennoï Voïny*, 2 vols., (*Soviet-American Relations During the Great Patriotic War*), (Moskva: Politizdat 1984), document no.106; *Sbornik Deistvuiushchikh Dogovorov, Soglashenii i Konventsii, Zakliuchennykh SSSR s Inostrannymi Gosudarstvami*, Vypusk XI, (*Collection of Valid Concords, Agreements and Conventions, Concluded Between the U.S.S.R. and Foreign Countries*), (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1955), document no.404, pp.24-28; Warren F. Kimball, *The Most Unsordid Act*, appendix 1, p.243

1.2 Soviet-American Cooperation Before the 1st Protocol

In order to pursue the dimension of the American L.L. program to the S.U., it is necessary and useful to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations briefly prior to the war and the U.S. decision-making process before the resolution to aid the S.U. was adopted. In this context, two American missions to Moscow, at the end of July 1941 and at the end of September 1941, as well as the following Moscow Supply Conference and its results will be discussed. This part of the chapter will also discuss the debates in the U.S. Congress and general public opinion during the first phase of the war.

1.2.1 U.S.-S.U. Pre-War Relations

Since the Russian Revolution of 1917 and creation of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the U.S. treated the Soviet Union with suspicion and distrust. Although diplomatic relations between the two countries were not established until 1933, commercial ties between the two states were strong during the N.E.P. years and in the 1930s.¹⁰

From 1918 to 1922 the young Soviet state was mainly importer of American goods. During the 1920s famine, when Russia suffered tremendous losses of population, the U.S. Relief Administration sent aid to sustain nourishment of 10 to 12 million people. In one and a half years American Relief Administration distributed

¹⁰ NEP – New Economic Policy, a Soviet official reconstruction program that envisaged a partial return to market economy. For detailed explanations about NEP period see: Akademiia Nauk S.S.S.R., Institut Ekonomiki, *Perekhod k NEPu, Vosstanovlenie Narodnogo Khoziaistva S.S.S.R., 1921-1925 gg.*, (Academy of Science of the U.S.S.R., Institute of Economics, *Transition to N.E.P., Recovery of Agriculture, years 1921-1925*), (Moskva: Nauka, 1976), pp.5-14; Evgeniĭ A. Ambartsumov, *NEP: A Modern View*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988) and more recently published Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Collectivization and the Terror-Famine*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987)

two billion individual rations, provided medicines and sanitary facilities.¹¹ From the 1920s onwards large quantities of manganese, chrome ore, furs and medicinal herbs were sent from Russia to America. On the other hand, the S.U. purchased semi-manufactured steel, factory equipment and cotton.¹² The Americans not only sold, but also provided technical services to the growing Soviet industries. During the 1930s they helped to build many factories and electrical power plants in the S.U. and some of the Russian technicians were sent to America for professional training. American methods and machines were introduced into mining, railroad transport, irrigation, hydroelectric installations, petroleum, glass and rubber industries.¹³ This collaborative trend continued to grow until 1932 when the S.U. started to export its own goods abroad, including raw materials and gold. In three years, from 1930 to 1933, American exports to the U.S.S.R. decreased from \$133.000.000 to \$8.900.000. According to the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act signed in 1935, the United States extended to the Soviet state certain benefits, thus expressing willingness to cooperate in the future. The S.U. paid in cash for the goods received. In June 1941, Soviet government asked its counterparts in America to provide a 5-years credit, and the U.S., in its turn proposed a barter exchange of goods.¹⁴ The Trade Agreement was renewed annually until 1942.¹⁵

¹¹ Russian Famine Relief Committee was established in 1891 and had 50 years of aid experience prior to Russian War Relief established in 1941. For detailed information see Benjamin M. Weissman, "The Aftereffects of the American Relief Mission to Soviet Russia", *Russian Review*, Vol.29, No.4 (Oct., 1970, pp.411-421; Edward C. Carter, "Russian War Relief", *Slavonic and East European Review*, American Series, Vol.3, No.2. (Aug., 1944), p.61; for an official document on famine relief and early cooperation in the 20's visit: www.ibiblio.org/expo/soviet.exhibit/coop.html

¹² Ernest C. Ropes, "The Shape of United States-Soviet Trade, Past and Future", *Slavonic and East European Review*, American Series, Vol.3, No.2. (Aug., 1944), p.4

¹³ William Henry Chamberlin, "American-Russian Cooperation", *Russian Review*, Vol.3, No.1.

(Autumn, 1943), p.3; Ernest C. Ropes, "The Shape of United States-Soviet Trade, Past and Future", p.5

¹⁴ William Langer and Everett S. Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p.546

¹⁵ Ernest C. Ropes, "American-Soviet Trade Relations", *Russian Review*, Vol.3, No.1, (Autumn, 1943), pp. 90; Ernest C. Ropes, "The Shape of United States-Soviet Trade, Past and Future", p.9

As a consequence of the Soviet-Nazi Pact signed in August 1939, the great majority of the export licenses for the production equipment and raw materials were refused for discharge by the U.S. authorities. With the German attack the Amtorg Trading Corporation, which was responsible for the Soviet purchases in the United States started negotiations with the State Department to release frozen supplies and their immediate shipment to Russia. During the first two weeks after the S.U. was attacked, \$9 million worth of supplies were released; however they did not contain any weapons.¹⁶ On June 25, 1941 the U.S. announced that the Neutrality Act would not be applied to the Soviet Union, thus, tacitly promising further cooperation with the Russian state. A few days later, the Soviet Ambassador to the U.S., Constantine Oumansky, formally requested war machines and munitions worth \$1.8 billion.¹⁷ During the official exchange of notes, the U.S. Undersecretary of State, Sumner Welles, handed the Soviets a memorandum in which the U.S. government expressed willingness to help the SU to resist the Nazis.

In order to 'hurry' the Americans with their decision, a Soviet Mission was sent to Washington D.C., headed by Lieutenant General Philip I. Golikov. It included high ranking military officials who arrived in the American capital to emphasize 'the need of speed' for shipment of the American munitions to Russia.¹⁸ Although the U.S. decided to extend its aid to the Soviets immediately after the former was attacked, the LL agreement was not signed until June 11, 1942. Before that, starting with October 1, 1941, the US supplied war materials without binding itself to an official arrangement. All shipments before October 1, 1941 (from June 22 to September 30,

¹⁶ Edward R. Stettinius Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory*, p.122

¹⁷ *FRUS, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, *General, The Soviet Union*, (Washington D.C: Department of State Publication, 1958), pp.779-780; George C. Herring, *Aid to Russia*, p.10; Warren F. Kimball, *The Most Unsordid Act*, pp.20-21

¹⁸ Edward R. Stettinius Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory*, p.123; for detailed information on this mission see Golikov's memoirs F. I. Golikov, *S Voennoi Missiei v Anglii i SshA, (Military Mission to England and the U.S.)*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987)

1941) were carried out not under the system of LL, but under the \$10 million credit offered by the Treasury Department.¹⁹

Two missions to the Soviet Union, namely Harry Hopkins' visit and the Averell Harriman-Lord Beaverbrook delegation to Moscow helped the U.S. government reach a final decision to help the Soviet Union. Not until these two missions provided detailed reports on the Soviet situation did the American government planned any long-term elucidation of the Russian problem.²⁰

1.2.2 Harry Hopkins' Mission to Moscow, July 1941

As the first step to figure out urgent Russian shortages of materials needed in their struggle against fascist Germany, President of the U.S. Franklin D. Roosevelt²¹ sent Harry Hopkins²², his special envoy, to Moscow in July 1941. Hopkins was an influential person in the United States and was the President's 'eyes and ears'.²³

Soviet determination to eliminate fascism was demonstrated during Hopkins' visit to the Russian capital. During meetings and talks, the Soviet government expressed willingness to cooperate and strengthen relations with the U.S.A.²⁴ Roosevelt's delegate, fascinated by the Soviet willpower to win, returned and reported that the S.U. "definitely is not going to lose this war", and therefore needs to be

¹⁹ Robert H. Jones, *The Roads to Russia: Unites States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union*, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), appendix 1, pp.272-274; appendix, table 1, p. 112

²⁰ A. Paperno, *Lend-Liz i Tikhii Okean, (Lend-Lease and the Pacific Ocean)*, (Moscow: Terra-Knizhnyi Klub, 1998), p.329

²¹ Franklin Delano Roosevelt, F.D.R., was the President of the United States between 1936-1945

²² Harry Hopkins served as F.D.R. unofficial emissary during the war years and worked in the LLA.

²³ Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt i Hopkins Glazami Ochevidtsa, (Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History)*, trans., vol.1, (Isdatel'stvo Leningrad, IL, 1958), pp.202-203, George C. Herring, *Aid to Russia*, p.11

²⁴ Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt i Hopkins*, pp.520-555

helped out in its struggle.²⁵ His report affected, to a particular degree, opinions of the major political and military officials.

During Hopkins' visit to Moscow, Joseph Stalin²⁶ insisted that urgently needed materials and munitions, such as octane gasoline, aluminum and anti-aircraft guns should be sent to the S.U. immediately. He expressed to Hopkins: "Give us anti-aircraft guns and the aluminum...[and] we can fight on for three or four years".²⁷ Thus, the Russian needs were varied and at the same time limited to some materials. The Soviets were confident in their potential to increase domestic war production, but requested initial foreign support for some crucial strategic materials.

In assessing the importance of Hopkins' visit to Moscow, many historians argue that it was a key or turning point in tripartite Allied relations.²⁸ After this mission, Roosevelt received optimistic reports that the Soviets were competent enough to resist Germany. However, some historians argue that this visit was important, because Hopkins was ensured about Russian intentions, but his mission did not affect the exports, character, volume and timing of economic help to the SU.²⁹

In fact, upon Hopkins' return and reports received, the President of the U.S. approved an additional amount over \$145 million worth of military equipment.³⁰ However, this was not enough to cover Soviet losses during the first months of the war. In the absence of a durable solution to the Russian problem, the necessity for a long-term strategic plan became acute. While Hopkins' mission was effective to a

²⁵ cited in L.I. Zorin, *Osoboe Zadanie, (A Special Mission)*, (Moskva: Isdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1987), p.11

²⁶ Russian political leader (1929-1953)

²⁷ George C. Herring, *Aid to Russia*, p.12, Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p.328; Gabriel Gorodetskiĭ, "The Origins of the Cold War and the Formation of the Grand Alliance", *The Russian Review*, Vol.47, 1988, pp.160-162

²⁸ Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt i Hopkins*, pp.317; A. Paperno, *Lend-Liz i Tikhii Okean*, p.139-142

²⁹ J.L. Gaddis, *Russia, The Soviet Union, and the United States*, p. 151; for a table of full export volume to the S.U. from July to September, 1941 see William Langer and Everett S. Gleason, *The Undeclared War*, p.560; appendix, table 1, p. 112

³⁰ George C. Herring, *Aid to Russia*, p.15

certain degree only, the conclusion of the Atlantic Charter on August 14, 1941 had the most noteworthy impact on Allied relations and positively affected the development of American-Soviet cooperation during the war. Soviet political standing about the Charter speeded up the U.S. decision to extend Lend-Lease aid to Russia.

The S.U. expressed its accord with the Atlantic Charter and this fact had international significance because it pledged the realization of democratic goals, stated in this document. The Soviets emphasized that the common goal of elimination of fascism could be achieved through unification of the peace-loving countries.³¹ Moreover, they believed that the consolidation of material resources represented a gigantic force that would definitely crush the Axis powers.³²

The Atlantic Charter was an official recognition where political interests of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain converged. In this document the Allied powers determined their goals in the war and formulated grounds for the post-war settlement. The idea of collective security, which was proposed on the eve of the war, was again restated as one of the main conditions for a long-lasting perpetual peace.

For the first time since the beginning of WWII, a Great Coalition emerged, which combined its economic potential, natural resources and manpower to eliminate the fascist bloc. For further coordination and establishment of joint Anglo-American-Soviet coalition an international conference was proposed and another joint British-American mission was sent to Moscow.

³¹ Soviet position about the Atlantic Charter was stated in a special declaration on September 24, 1941 during the international conference in London. See *Vneshniaia Politika SSSR v Period Velikoï Otechestvennoï Voïni, Sbornik Dokumentov, (U.S.S.R. Foreign Policy during the Great Patriotic War, Collection of Documents)*, (Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1946), p.163-166

³² *Izvestiia*, August 16-17, 1941

1.2.3 The Beaverbrook-Harriman Mission, September 1941

In September, 1941 Lord Beaverbrook³³ and W. Averell Harriman³⁴, Roosevelt's special envoy, visited Russia. Although positively inclined to help the Soviets, Harriman faced the reality of American small scale domestic war production. Thus, he had to convince Beaverbrook to forego most of the American supplies that were allocated to be sent to Britain and redirect them to the Russian front.³⁵

The prime objective of the Harriman-Beaverbrook mission to Moscow was 'to find out what the Russians needed'.³⁶ The two politicians also tried to agree with Stalin on terms and quantity of items to be supplied. Stalin, Harriman remembers, argued on every item he was concerned with. He required from the American official an increase of LL supplies from the U.S., especially in armor plate for the production of tanks, steel and emphasized the urgent need for trucks and barbed wire. The Soviets also expressed their desire to get as many munitions, raw materials and food, as the U.S. or Great Britain could offer them.³⁷

A confidential protocol, regarding items and quantities of supplies, was signed by the parties attending the Moscow Conference. The agreement envisaged the U.S. and Great Britain's duty to send munitions and requested materials to the Soviet

³³ E.A. Ivaniian, ed., *Encyclopedia of Russian-American Relations*, p.317. William Maxwell Aitken, later Lord Beaverbrook, (1879-1964) was appointed by the Prime Minister Churchill as Minister of aircraft production and Minister of Supply in 1940.

³⁴ George C. Herring, *Aid to Russia*, p.16. Harriman was a successful businessman who served in the board of Union Pacific Railroad, and National Recovery Administration during the New Deal era. He later became a member of Business Advisory Council of the Department of Commerce. Besides his official service, Harriman was close friend of the President. See also John Daniel Langer, "The Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission and the Debate over Unconditional Aid for the Soviet Union, 1941", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.14, No.3. (Jul., 1979), p.468

³⁵ Hans Adolf Jacobsen and A.J.P. Taylor, 1939-1945, "*Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Kronik und Dokumenten*," (*Second World War, In Chronicles and Documents*), (Moskva: Mysl, 1995), p.457

³⁶ William Averell Harriman, *America and Russia in a Changing World: A Half Century of Personal Observation*, Memoirs, (London: Allen & Unwin 1971), p.15-16

³⁷ *Ibid*, pp.17-19; for details of Harriman and Beaverbrook visit to Stalin see Andrew Rothstein, trans., *Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War, Documents and Materials*, Vol.1, June 22, 1941-December 31, 1943, (London: Hutchinson & Co. Publishers, 1946), pp.100-103

Union starting from 1 October, 1941 until 1 June, 1942. Although the main arrangement was made for airplanes, tanks, aluminum and other strategically important metals, Western powers also agreed to go beyond this agreement and provide the Russians with raw materials and other non-military supplies.³⁸

A short note was added to the deal - in case there were changes in military situation, or war would shift to other theaters, the aforementioned treaty would be reconsidered.³⁹ Thus, the Allies preferred not to bind themselves to a more serious commitment, adopting a vigilant policy of strategic waiting. Moreover, British and U.S. officials, despite the general positive inclination to aid the S.U., were not totally convinced about the Soviet power to resist the Axis.

This mission, as well as Hopkins', was one of the steps towards the realization of the LL program. Harriman remarked that "...they [the S.U.] were determined to win and we [the U.S.A.] were eager to help".⁴⁰ The Moscow Conference enhanced the ties between the allies and ensured the West that the Soviets were determined to fight their enemy until its total destruction.⁴¹

Cold War Soviet historians often blame the Allies for their hesitation and long negotiations while the Soviets suffered 'detrimental losses at war'. Indeed, it was not easy to meet monthly Soviet demands, which consisted of 400 airplanes, 1.100 tanks, 300 artillery pieces, 4.000 tons of aluminum, 4.000 tons of explosives and 10.000 of armored steel.⁴² The first American help sent to Russia was diverted from the British because the American production at that time was just beginning and could not satisfy

³⁸ George C. Herring, *Aid to Russia* p.16-18

³⁹ V.L. Israëlian, *Antigitlerovskaia Koalitsiia, 1941-1945, Diplomaticheskoe Sotrudnichestvo SSSR, SshA i Anglii v Gody Vtoroi Morovoii Voiny*, (Anti- Hitler Coalition, 1941-1945, Diplomatic Cooperation between U.S.S.R., U.S.A. During the Second World War), (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1964), p.68-78

⁴⁰ William Averell Harriman, *America and Russia in a Changing World*, p.20

⁴¹ *Izvestiia*, October 3, 1941; V.L. Israëlian, *Antigitlerovskaia Koalitsiia*, p.78

⁴² L.I. Zorin, *Osoboe Zadanie*, p.18-21

both the Soviet and British demands in munitions and important strategic materials.⁴³ The U.S. production capacity ran ahead of shipping capacity well into 1942.⁴⁴

This was partly one of the reasons why the U.S. could not help the S.U. during the first months of the war and did not meet the promised schedules of supplies. Moreover, the British were more than enthusiastic to share the burden of war and take the pressure off their land, thus they immediately extended some help to the S.U.⁴⁵ On the other hand, for the U.S. Britain had strategic priority over the Soviet Union in addition to a common distrust in the Russian ability to forbear the Germans. These and other reasons which hampered early cooperation between the two states will be discussed in the following sections.

1.3 American Hesitation to Help the Soviets

In the aftermath of WWI the U.S. followed the politics of isolationism, which only envisaged involvement of the state within its own hemisphere and non-interference in other states' foreign affairs. On the eve of WWII the U.S. faced a dilemma on how to conduct its foreign policy. The Second World War proved to be an exception to this isolationistic rule because it was a world event of aggression alien to the U.S. who had established and jealously protected the 'four principles' of freedom and democracy. Moreover, it was apparent that WWII would change the world order completely. For the U.S., unwilling to remain in the periphery of this potential world order change, involvement in the war was inevitable. However, LL help to the allies was extended after a long period of hesitation.

⁴³ William Averell Harriman, *America and Russia in a Changing World*, p.23

⁴⁴ Robert H. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p.122; Roger Munting, "Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.19, No.3. (Jul., 1984), p.497

⁴⁵ Roger Munting, "Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort", pp.497-498

1.3.1 Clashes Within the Congress

Although by December 1940 a great majority of the American people had made up their minds that it was for their benefit and an absolute necessity to aid other countries, some politicians and public circles were still against shipment of munitions to Europe.⁴⁶ The primary reason for American hesitation to help the S.U. at the beginning of the war was, particularly, the impact of clashes within the U.S. Congress and general public resistance to help the communist Soviet state. Besides these, the S.U. attitude towards the West, together with its foreign policy performance prior to the war affected the tempo and haste with which the U.S. took the decision to extend aid to the U.S.S.R.

When the S.U. was attacked by Germany in June 1941, debates in the Senate suggested that many high level officials were eager to establish relations with the S.U., while others resisted providing any kind of help to Russia.⁴⁷ However, strong disagreement persisted within the Congress between isolationists and interventionists since the LLA was extended to Great Britain. Now, with the Soviet Union involved in the war, this clash assumed an even more bitter discourse. Isolationists rejected the LL idea because it was a departure from neutrality, whereas interventionists pledged the necessity of U.S. involvement in the European struggle. Isolationists advised allowing 'Joe Stalin and other dictators fight it out' and concluded that American aid to Russia was 'unthinkable and immoral'.⁴⁸ On the other hand, interventionists perceived Germany, not Russia, as a threat that jeopardized the Western Hemisphere.

⁴⁶ Edward R. Stettinius Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory*, pp.36-38

⁴⁷ Congressional Record, 77th Congress, vol. 87, part 6, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), pp.6770-6774; Warren F. Kimball, *The Most Unsordid Act*, pp.10-12, 23-28

⁴⁸ Senator Burton K. Wheeler, quoted in George C. Herring, *Aid to Russia*, p.6; for the debates in Congress see Raymond Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, p.69-79

Hesitation and uncertainty persisted over a natural keenness to help the Soviets. Many Western officials in the U.S. government and Congress hardly believed that the Russian state would be able to resist the 'technologically sophisticated and invincible German army'.⁴⁹ The failure of Soviet Russia would signify that the Axis forces gain control over three continents and Britain, even with American aid, would consequently fall under fascist rule. Thus, in the U.S. government the majority of the leading military officials were against LL to Russia and foresaw a quick, in at most 3-months' time, Russian capitulation to the Nazis. There were a large number of people both inside and outside of military circles who believed that any arms sent to the S.U. would probably fall into Hitler's hands.⁵⁰ Some Congress members even expressed that extermination of both Germany and the SU would be beneficial for the USA. Others were convinced that communist victory over fascism would be more dangerous for the West.⁵¹ Those anti-Soviet tendencies, in a sense, prevented an earlier consolidation of the coalition and later proved to be a mere underestimation of the unity and strength of the Soviet people and Red Army.⁵²

However, President Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, ex-Ambassador to Moscow George Davis, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and other members of the Congress were positively disposed.⁵³ For instance, Joseph E. Davies⁵⁴ was pro-Russians and an ardent Russophile, while Cordell Hull and

⁴⁹ I.S. Liutov, A.M. Noskov, *Koalitsionnoe Vzaimodeĭstvie Soiuznikov, Po Opytu Pervoĭ i Vtoroĭ Mirovikh Voĭn*, (*Coalitional Cooperation of the Allies, From the Experience of First and Second World Wars*), Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defence, (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1988), p.87

⁵⁰ Edward Stettinius Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory*, p.121

⁵¹ W.L. Langer, S.E. Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, (New York, 1953), p.542

⁵² *FRUS*, 1941, vol. I, pp.832-833

⁵³ George C. Herring, *Aid to Russia*, pp.7-10; V.L. Israĕlian, *Antigitlerovskaia Koalitsiia*, pp.45-46

⁵⁴ It is also Joseph E. Davies, Roosevelt's advisor, who persuaded the President that the Red Army "would amaze and surprise the world" as quoted in Raymond H. Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1959), pp.139-140

Harold Ickes thought prudently that the U.S. ought to support any nation, which were struggling against Nazism.

Making an allowance for the Soviet role in this war, the United States and Great Britain expressed willingness to assist the Soviets in their struggle against fascism. Neither the President of the United States, FDR, nor Prime Minister of Great Britain, Churchill, hesitated to help the Soviet Armies. On June 24, 1941 F.D.R. affirmed that the SU would receive aid, but he was not sure what kind and form of aid it should be.⁵⁵

Both Roosevelt and Churchill had 'a clear-cut stand' about the situation on the Eastern front.⁵⁶ In the United States, the main authority to decide whether or not to help the Soviets belonged to the President. However, the Congress could cut off funds, if it disagreed with the President. Roosevelt did not vacillate to announce that the U.S. would help the Soviets.⁵⁷ However, he mentioned that the U.S.' main amount of help would continue to go to Britain and that American help to the S.U. would be effective only in case if the war would be prolonged. Although Roosevelt believed that the Soviet Union was a dictatorship, he regarded it not as dangerous as Hitler's Germany. "The survival of Russia is less dangerous to religion, to the Church as such, and to humanity in general than would be the survival of the German form of dictatorship", he wrote to the Pope on September 3, 1941.⁵⁸ Roosevelt by any means tried to ensure that American public, Catholic and Congressional oppositions to Russian aid would be minimized. Thus, for example, Roosevelt made an effort to

⁵⁵ I.S. Liutov, A.M. Noskov, *Koalitsionnoe Vzaimodeĭstvie Soiuznikov*, p.86

⁵⁶ Edward Stettinius Jr., *Weapon for Victory*, p.120

⁵⁷ *New York Times*, June 25, 1941, L.I. Zorin, *Osoboe Zadanie*, p.47; Leon Martel, *Lend-Lease, Loans, and Coming of the Cold War*, p.4

⁵⁸ Elliot Roosevelt, ed., *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters*, vol. II, p. 1205, in J.L. Gaddis, *Russia, The Soviet Union, and The United States*, p. 149; F.D.R. position also stated in John Daniel Langer, "The Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission and the Debate over Unconditional Aid for the Soviet Union, 1941", p.464

persuade Pope Pius XII that the S.U. adhered to democratic principles and would accept freedom of religion. The President wished to identify the Russians with Anglo-American ideals.⁵⁹ In other words, according to the President, the threat of fascism was just round the corner, while the Red Scare lost its prominence when compared with the horrors of WWII and Nazi aggression.

On the other hand, the President could not act driven by his personal feelings and had to be careful while authorizing aid to Russia under LL, because the Congress and general public opinion were not ardent to help communist Russia. Therefore, he authorized a provisional program to relieve the S.U. war effort, but refrained from financing it under LL.⁶⁰ This program, a new devise of American foreign policy, was a sharp departure from past American practices, and thus, had to be introduced cautiously. Moreover, the President of the United States, as well as many officials in the cabinet and Congress held a deep aversion to direct involvement in the war and avoided participation in the European struggle by any possible means.⁶¹

The policy of strategic waiting the United States adopted at the beginning of the war could be explained by the anti-Soviet attitude, related to communist politics and absence of belief in the U.S. that the S.U. could resist Hitler.⁶² Soviet historians thought that the American position was to wait until the results of the first summer battles were known and then to decide whether to help.⁶³ The Americans, on the other hand, had several problems in implementation of LL policy to the S.U. First of all,

⁵⁹ Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. p.296-298

⁶⁰ J.L. Gaddis, *Russia, The Soviet Union, and The United States*, p. 150

⁶¹ George C. Herring, *Aid to Russia*, p.xx, p.3

⁶² Roosevelt's military advisers thought that the S.U. would not be able to resist Germany, but the President did not want to share these views and insisted on sending aid to the S.U. See Raymond H. Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, pp.143, 152-153; Hopkins wanted to be sure of continued Soviet resistance before making large, long-term commitments. Hopkins also told Stalin that heavy munitions could not be provided unless the governments had explored their strategic interests and the S.U. provided information about its existing and potential capacity to produce munitions. See Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy*, p.293

⁶³ V.L. Israelean, *Antigitlerovskaya Koalitsia*, pp.52-53

although the U.S. was not at war at that time, it had to arm own forces and prepare for a potential interference in European conflict. Next, American military-industrial complex was still in development; the U.S. was fully geared up for war only in 1943. Moreover, there was not only shortage in munitions, but also difficulties of distribution and logistics.⁶⁴ For instance, in October-November forty-one ships were to carry goods to Russia, but in the U.S. only twelve were available. In December ninety-eight vessels were needed to meet Soviet demands by only forty-nine were available.⁶⁵ Physical problem of transport was also peculiar to the S.U. because the Soviet fleet was not in capacity to make large transoceanic transfers. These were few of the reasons why at the beginning of the war American-Russian partnership developed really slowly.

The mistrust in Russian ability to resist the Nazis was aggravated by the Soviet foreign policy conducted during the previous decade, especially by the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact concluded on August 23, 1939.⁶⁶ On the other hand, Stalin explained the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact as a 'friendly promise of peace between the two states', which the S.U., being a peace-loving country, could not decline. Another explanation he offered was that the S.U. actually profited from this pact, gaining one year and half of time and the possibility to prepare itself and its armed forces 'to repulse Nazi Germany'.⁶⁷ Conceivably, these justifications were not convincing enough to persuade the U.S. government and the American public that the

⁶⁴ *FRUS*, 1941, vol.1, pp.814-815; Raymond H. Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, pp.139, 149-150, Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy*, pp.294-295, 299. Besides Great Britain, which was already recipient of American LL, the S.U., China and the Netherlands East Indies also urged for support. LL law implied that the U.S. would provide military support to any country, security of which was vital to the security of the U.S. Security of which of three countries, China, Britain or S.U. was more vital to America and how sending the aid should have been prioritized? This was a complicated question.

⁶⁵ Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy*, p.299

⁶⁶ an extract from Nazi-Soviet Pact presented in Hans Adolf Jacobsen, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Kronik und Dokumenten*, p.94-95

⁶⁷ Stalin's Broadcast Speech, 3 July, 1941 in Andrew Rothstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War*, vol.1, pp.21-22

S.U. was an ally, not a foe. The U.S. distrust of the Soviets continued until the winter of 1941. Only when the Soviet Army managed to stop Nazi attacks, Washington's help to the S.U. started to increase.⁶⁸

Despite the existing problems, aid from the United States to the S.U. began outside the LL program. Some restrictions on American exports were eliminated.⁶⁹ In addition to this, provisions of the Neutrality Law, the United States was bound by, were lifted, thus allowing LL aid to be delivered under the American flag directly to the Russian Pacific ports. Shipments under the LL system were extended to the S.U. in September 1941 by Britain and in November 1941 by the United States, but the official agreement was signed only in 1942.⁷⁰ Until the end of 1941 the U.S. sent to the S.U. munitions worth \$545.000.⁷¹

1.3.2 Public Opinion

Akin to isolationist political officials, at the beginning of the war a significant part of the American public did not support the idea of helping the S.U. under the same terms and on equal conditions to Great Britain. Although most Americans preferred Russian victory in the European struggle, they argued that helping Russia would deprive the U.S. and other allies of essential equipment. A Gallup poll of June 1941 reported that only 35 percent of the public endorsed aid to the Soviet Union. Anne Morrow Lindbergh's research concluded that the American public was more

⁶⁸ V.L. Israëlian, *Antigitlerovskaia Koalitsiia*, p.54

⁶⁹ Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp.7-10; V.L. Israëlian, *Antigitlerovskaia Koalitsiia*, p.48

⁷⁰ *Vneshniaia Politika SSSR v Period Velikoï Otechestvennoï Voïni, Sbornik Dokumentov, (U.S.S.R. Foreign Policy during the Great Patriotic War, Collection of Documents)*, (Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1946), vol.1, p.177

⁷¹ *Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States of the Calendar Year 1941*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942), p.36

concerned with Russo-Finnish war than with German aggression and considered Russia to be the greatest threat to European civilization.⁷² In July the Gallup pole identified that fifty-four percent of the American public were against aid to the S.U. By September, the number opposing decreased to forty-four, and those who favored Russian aid were forty-nine.⁷³

The majority of those who were against LL justified their position that helping 'communistic Russia' would cause troubles for America. They feared that enhancing Soviet fighting capability and strength would mean digging their own grave themselves. The motives for suspicion were religion, hatred of the modes the Russian state expressed its power and deep mistrust of Soviet intentions.⁷⁴ Indeed, at the beginning opposition was very strong. In June and early July American skepticism was prevailing in press. *Liberty* magazine published an editorial entitled "To Hell with Communism", which was a solid attack on the Soviet government. *New York Times*, pointed to the critical shortage of supplies and argued that aid should be provided to the states which are "proved friends" to the U.S., that is Britain and China.⁷⁵

Moreover, American public opinion was not in support for LL allocations to the S.U. because of the Soviet actions in Poland, Finland and the Baltic States prior to the war. Except strong Polish lobby in the U.S.A., the country was not really interested in Baltic states or Finland, although Finnish was the only nation which had the reputation as "the only country alleged to have paid its WWI debts to the U.S." ⁷⁶

⁷² George C. Herring, *Aid to Russia*, p.7; Warren F. Kimball, *The Most Unsordid Act*, p.30; Leon Martel, *Lend-Lease, Loans, and Coming of the Cold War Policy*, p.26

⁷³ Robert H. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p.55

⁷⁴ Samuel Cross, "American-Soviet Relations," *Slavonic and East European Review*, American Series, Vol.3, No.2. (May, 1944), p.19

⁷⁵ Raymond H. Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, pp.138,185-186

⁷⁶ Amos Perlmutter, *FDR & Stalin: A Not So Great Alliance, 1943-1945*, (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1993), p. 243

Roosevelt acknowledged that Russian unpopularity among large groups who exercised great political power in Congress and among public is a serious difficulty to the implementation of LL program to the S.U. To make LL to the S.U. more acceptable to the Congress and public, Roosevelt first offered a \$1 billion credit, after which on November 7, 1941 LL was extended to the S.U.⁷⁷

1.3.3 Why Cooperation Developed Slowly

Thus, because of the resistance in the Congress and negative public opinion, cooperation between the U.S. and the S.U. developed slowly. Ideologically and structurally opposed dogmas, however, hardly prevented the two countries from efficient cooperation. The main reason for hesitation, conceivably, was the Western suspicion about Russian success in resisting fascist Germany. Moreover, hesitation was an advantageous policy. Immediate full commitment could have been too costly, since the U.S. would assign large material resources to this program.

Moreover, the circumspection about the S.U.'s political intentions was intensified by the Soviet foreign and domestic policies in the late 1930s, specifically the war with Finland, acquisition of the Baltic states, the partition of Poland and the deportation of many Poles to concentration camps in Siberia.⁷⁸ Furthermore, the totalitarian structure of the Soviet state and Stalin's repressions during 1937-1939 enhanced this hostility. Conventional suspicions were reinforced by the propaganda of

⁷⁷ Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy*, p.296; George C. Herring, *Aid to Russia*, p.18, 21

⁷⁸ Samuel H. Cross, "American-Soviet Relations", p.17

the Roman Catholics.⁷⁹ The Congress both feared the Russian collapse and had suspicions that Stalin might conclude a separate peace with Hitler.⁸⁰

Regarding other constraints that prevented the countries from strengthening cooperation were questions about the German satellites, especially Romania, Hungary and Finland. The U.S. continued to keep normal diplomatic relations with these states and regarded 'traitors' in a much broader view, while the S.U. ranked them equal to Nazi Germany.

Nonetheless, there was something that brought the U.S.A. and the S.U. together, namely convergence of national interests of the two states. National interests create a framework within which foreign policies are conducted. Thus, despite the 1933 diplomatic recognition of the S.U., political and diplomatic relations between the two states remained relatively cold until the beginning of the war, when the U.S. and U.S.S.R. discovered a common goal in defeating Nazi Germany. Ideological discord, differences in social and political structures were left aside, thus revealing to the rest of the world that crucial dissimilarities cannot prevent cooperation given that the parties are willing to pursue their national interests.

1.4 Consolidation of Forces

The coalition was strengthened and American hesitation to help the Soviets approached its end since the U.S. became officially a belligerent state. On December 7, 1941 Japanese aviation and submarines attacked the major American naval base in Pearl Harbor.⁸¹ Despite the fact that the S.U. signed a Neutrality Pact and was against war with Japan, sympathies of the Soviet people were on the Allied side. Although the

⁷⁹ George C. Herring, *Aid to Russia*, p.7

⁸⁰ Raymond H. Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia*, p.143

⁸¹ Robert H. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p.80

S.U. was reluctant to declare war on Japan, aggression in the Pacific only helped consolidation of the Allied forces against the Fascist bloc.⁸²

At the end of 1941 two coalitions were finally established: U.S.-Britain-S.U. supported by Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, India, Holland and Latin-American states against Germany, Japan, Italy and Axis satellites. The Allied coalition was formalized by a Declaration of 26 states, signed in Washington D.C. on January 1, 1942. This Declaration formally amalgamated anti-Axis forces and later was called the United Nations Declaration.⁸³

1.5 Conclusion

At the beginning of the war it was not the United States, but rather Great Britain who was the major supplier of war materials. Firstly, the U.S. was not at war until December 1941, and this complicated shipments of supplies to the friendly nations. Secondly, after the Great Depression the American economy was still weak. The U.S. military-industrial complex was still a novice and could not keep up with the constantly rising demands for munitions. Third, but not less imperative reason for the slow course of American-Russian cooperation was the obstinate resistance of some military and official circles to provide any kind of help to the S.U.

Thus, cooperation developed slowly, as William Chamberlin put it "...not at a rate comparable with the military advance of the Red Army on the Eastern front."⁸⁴ Serious commitments and LL supplies did not come until the victory of the S.U. Army in the defense of Moscow. Only after this first major battle, when the Western

⁸² V.L. Israélian, *Antigitlerovskaia Koalitsiia*, p.111

⁸³ *Vneshniaia Politika SSSR v Period Velikoï Otechestvennoï Voïni*, vol.1, p.194

⁸⁴ William Henry Chamberlin, "American-Russian Cooperation", p.5

Allies became convinced of the Soviets' capability to resist the aggressor, did they extend full-scale LL aid to their Russian ally. However, common action and full cooperation were especially needed in 1941 and 1942, when the S.U. experienced the most difficult time fighting Germany and its allies on the main front alone.

In consequence, Russo-American cooperation during the early stages of the war; particularly, the impacts of the first LL shipments and results of the First Protocol; the U.S. assistance to the Soviet war effort and importance of the LL supplies to the U.S.S.R. remain crucial issues to be explained in the following chapters.



CHAPTER II

THE BATTLE OF MOSCOW AND RESULTS OF THE 1st PROTOCOL

2.1 Was the S.U. prepared for war?

To assess the importance of the American LL aid to the S.U. several issues should be discussed. First of all, the state of the Soviet economy prior to and at the beginning of the war, conditions of the Soviet Armed Forces in the 1940s and its preparedness for the war will be discussed. Next, technical issues, such as logistics and supplies through LL routes, as well as problems and obstacles encountered will follow. At the end of the chapter, the first two parts will be incorporated into an assessment of results of the 1st Protocol in the framework of the first Soviet victory in the battle of Moscow.

2.1.1 Soviet Economy and Armed Forces Prior to the War: the 1930s - 1940s

The 1930s could be characterized by the velocity which spread military industry and new developments in the sphere of technology around the world. These developments may well have been the consequences of the unsuccessful politics of liberalism and appeasement policy and appeared as a reaction to fascism. The world

was terrified and few more years of hesitation could have been costly. Therefore, almost all European countries started rearmament and adjustment to the new situation. The Soviet Union too, although facing many difficulties, concentrated on improving its armed forces.

Comparative to the 1920s, an improvement had been achieved in the socialist industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture. For instance, compared to 1928, the output of industry increased 6.5 times by the end of 1940 and the means of production increased 10 times. Production of agriculture and collective farm livestock also increased and created a marketable surplus. Revenues under the state budget increased from 7.3 billion rubles in 1928 to 180 billion in 1940¹, albeit at a tremendous cost to human lives and livestock caused by Soviet agricultural reforms.

Moreover, Russia has always been blessed for its large natural resources and great variety of raw materials. Strategic natural resources have been a part of the Russian success in the world trade and an important leverage against other states. During the 1930s developments in heavy industry, getting know-how from the West and construction of new plants allowed the S.U. to bring the country to a quite competitive international level. In addition to this, the S.U. had enough skilled workers, which was a prerequisite for success and industrialization.

Significant developments were achieved in the spheres of coal mining and metallurgy. In 1940, 18.3 million tons of steel was produced; 31 million tons of petroleum and its products and 166 million tons of coal was extracted.² Mining and heavy industry continued to grow throughout the war. Thus, by 1943 coal production

¹ N.A. Voznesenskii, *Soviet Economy During the Second World War*, (New York: International Publishers Cop., 1949), pp.14-15

² Alexander Vert, *Rossia v Voïne*, (*Russia in War*), (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Eksmo Algoritm, 2003), pp.78-79

increased 60 fold and pig iron 65 times comparative to the output in the 1920s.³ Although the S.U. had a significant bulk of natural resources, in the early 1940s it looked abroad for petroleum and its products, fuel, tin plate, copper, electrical machinery, motors and metal-working machinery.⁴

The rearmament of the Soviet Union Air Force (S.U.A.F) developed long before the war started. In 1937 the S.U. concluded an agreement with the U.S.A. totaling \$1 million for the delivery of two types of American aircraft. Orders for accessories totaled \$1.25 million. Thus, during the 1930s the American aircraft industry had an impact on the development of Russian aircraft industry.⁵

In tank industry, at the end of the 1930s the S.U. began manufacturing light BT-7M, middle T-34 and amphibian T-40 machines. Although the industry grew rapidly, the production goal for 1940 of 700 tanks was not fulfilled. Only 115 of T-34 and 246 of KV types were produced short of the planned number. During the first 6 months of 1941 the S.U. produced 393 KV, 180 T-40 and 1.100 T-34.⁶ However, V. Molotov and J. Stalin understood the importance of tanks and artillery and gave specific directives to increase and speed the production of tanks.⁷

³ N.A. Voznesenskii, *Soviet Economy During the Second World War*, p.26

⁴ Ernest C. Ropes, "American-Soviet Trade Relations", *Russian Review*, Vol.3, No.1. (Autumn, 1943), pp.88-94; Ernest C. Ropes, "The Shape of United States-Soviet Trade, Past and Future", *Slavonic and East European Review. American Series*, Vol. 3, No. 2. (Aug., 1944), p.10

⁵ I.P. Lebedev, "Eshchë Raz o Lend-Lize", ("Once Again About Lend-Lease"), *SShA-Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, No.1, Moskva-Nauka, (1990), p.5; Kenneth Manson, *Fighters and Bombers of World War II, 1939-45*, (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003), pp.4-6

⁶ Central Archive of Ministry of Defence of the U.S.S.R, f.2, op. 75593, d.13, l.25, in O.A. Losik, red., *Stroitel'stvo i Boevoe Primenenie Sovetskikh Tankovikh Voisk v Gody V.O.V.*, (*Construction and Military Usage of Soviet Tank Divisions during WWII*), (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1979), p.10

⁷ M.Y. Miagkov, red., *Mirovye Voïny XX Veka, kniga 4, Vtoraia Mirovaia Voïna, Dokumenty i Materialy*, (*Global Wars of XX Century, Book 4, Second World War, Documents and Materials*), (Moskva: Nauka, 2002), directive No. 129, pp.166-167; Report by the Chairman of the State Committee of Defence at Ceremonial Session of the Moscow Soviet of Working People's Deputies, in Andrew Rothstein, trans., *Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War, Documents and Materials*, Vol.1, June 22, 1941-December 31, 1943, (London: Hutchinson & Co. Publishers, 1946), pp.23-24

Soviet artillery industry also experienced significant reconstruction and modernization during the interregnum. All modern types and techniques were designed during the 1930s and, **remained unchanged until the end of the war**, emphasis added. In general, during the war Russian artillery did not need any modernization, or as “acute necessity of new constructions.”⁸

Developments and achievements in heavy industry by the mid-1930s allowed Soviet authorities to launch large programs, directed to create a strong marine and transportation forces. Especially important was the Northern Navy of the Soviet Union, which during the war had a double function – to fight on the Northern war theater and to take part in convoys.⁹ However, there were some significant deficiencies. The Soviet navy lacked anti-aircraft defense weapons, mine, anti-mines gear, supplementary and cargo vessels, paramilitary ships, and artillery.¹⁰

2.1.2 Warnings About the Possibility of Attack

The first failures at the beginning of the war were caused not by the country's lack of preparedness, but rather because of some serious strategic mistakes and miscalculations the Soviet political and military authorities made in Summer, 1941.¹¹ The Soviet General Headquarters Office received clear intelligence information about the possibility of attack.¹² For example, Richard Zorge, a Soviet military intelligence

⁸ Memoirs of General-Polkovnik B.L. Vannikov, who was in charge of Nakomat of Arms/Munitions and Narkomav of Munitions during 1939-1946 in M.Y. Miagkov, red., *Mirovye Voïny XX Veka*, pp.45-46

⁹ I. Kochergin, *Sovetskii Podvodnyi Flot v Predvoennye Gody i Gody VOV (1932-1945)*, (*Soviet Submarine Fleet Prior and During WWII, 1932-1945*), Dissertation, Kursk, 2001, p.3

¹⁰ Memoirs of Admiral C. Gorshkov, in M.Y. Miagkov, red., *Mirovye Voïny XX Veka*, p.46

¹¹ G.K. Zhukov, *Vospominaniia i Razmyshleniia*, (*Reminiscence and Thoughts*), (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1969), pp.218-220; 238

¹² N.B. Kalutskii, “Moskovskaia Bitva”, (“The Battle of Moscow”), *Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, no.4, (1990), p.19; V.N. Kisilëv, “Upriamye Fakty Nachala Voïny”, (“Stubborn Facts About the Beginning of the War”), *Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, No.2, (1992), pp.15-16

agent, sent a telegram to Moscow one week ahead of the German attack stating the precise date of the German strike.¹³ Roosevelt and Churchill also warned Stalin about the possibility of German attack in March and April 1941 respectively.¹⁴

Despite all incoming warnings little was done to take extra-measures and enhance the country's protection against aggression. "According to the information received, Germany still respects Soviet-German Pact of Non-Aggression as well as the Soviet Union. Rumors regarding violation of this pact...have no grounds...recent concentration of German forces near our border is related, supposedly, to other motives, and has no connection to Soviet-German relations", *Izvestiia* wrote.¹⁵

Stalin, although he in the future expected a German attack, refused to allow defensive preparations until June 1941. In May 1941, High Commanders G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky proposed a preventive attack on Germany, but this idea was rejected by the cabinet.¹⁶ Stalin ignored all outside warnings and considered them to be 'capitalistic rumors'.¹⁷ His personality cult and suspicion aggravated the situation where the political elite was kept aside from the foreign policy decision-making process. As a result, the S.U. suffered losses in manpower, equipment and territory.

¹³ A.M. Samsonov, *Krakh Fashistskoi Agressii, 1939-1945, (The Crash of the Fascist Aggression)*, (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1980), p.133

¹⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Perepiska Predsedatelia Soveta Ministrov SSSR s Prezidentom SshA i Premier-Ministrami Velikobritanii vo Vremia Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ Voĭny, 1941-1945 gg., (Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945)*, (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1976), vol.1, pp.72-78; Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, (London: 1949-52), vol.III, p.316

¹⁵ *Izvestiia*, June 14, 1941

¹⁶ N.E. Eliseeva, "Nakanune Voĭni", ("Commencement of the War"), *Sovetskie Arkhivy*, (1990), no. 2, pp.3-8

¹⁷ V.L. Israēlian, *Antigitlerovskaia Koalitsiia, 1941-1945, Diplomaticeskoe Sotrudnichestvo SSSR, SshA i Anglii v Gody Vtoroi Morovoĭ Voĭny, (Anti- Hitler Coalition, 1941-1945, Diplomatic Cooperation between U.S.S.R., U.S.A. During the Second World War)*, (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1964), p.11; J.L. Gaddis, *Russia, The Soviet Union, and The United States: An Interpretive History*, (New York: Wiley Cop. 1978), p.148

However, as the fascist army advanced in Europe, some preparations started ahead of war. How much was actually done remains a question. Unfortunately, too short was the peaceful period of neutrality to prepare the country appropriately. As Marshal Zhukov pointed, “many things were started correctly, but we [the S.U.] miscalculated the exact timing of Hitler’s attack”.¹⁸

2.1.3 The Soviet Armed Forces and Soviet Economy in Summer 1941

A. Soviet Economy

By October 1941 the situation was critical, because plants producing military munitions were under direct threat while the Germans were advancing towards the heart of Russia. In due time, decision was taken to move factories towards the East. Since the beginning of the war approximately 500 factories and plants were transferred to Siberia from Ukraine alone.¹⁹ In order to evacuate one plant, 8.000 railway wagons were needed. If they were available, the shifted plant resumed its capacity in 4-6 months. However, the S.U. did not possess enough wagons and trucks to complete the evacuation in the shortest possible terms. Therefore, at the beginning of the war the S.U. needed transportation means more than anything else.²⁰ Trucks and railway wagons, tanks and planes, bullets and guns, as well as other strategic materials would be of great help to the Soviet relocation of its industrial plants.

¹⁸ A.M. Samsonov, *Krakh Fashistskoi Agressii*, p. 131

¹⁹ V.N. Kisilëv, “Upriamye Fakty Nachala Voïny”, pp.16-17

²⁰ For example, need for locomotives and railway wagons remained acute until the end of the war. Anna Soldatova, Russian factory worker, remembers that during the war civilian population was often left in the cities subjugated by the Germans and was not evacuated due to the absence of transportation means. For details and memoirs see Guido Knopp, *Stalingrad: Ders ve Uyarı*, (*Stalingrad: Lesson and Warning*), (Istanbul: Pencere Yayınları, 2004), p.147

Soviet defence spending increased gradually from 57 billion rubles in 1940 to a wartime peak of 138 billion rubles in 1944.²¹ This was about 57-58% of the GNP.²² Slow at the beginning of the war, production of munitions gradually expanded and in the first part of 1942 the Russians were already producing 1.6 thousand tanks and 1.1 thousand war airplanes. By the end of the year this amount raised to 2.000 and 1.700 respectively.²³ By the end of 1942 the S.U. produced enough artillery to arm 535 infantry and cavalry divisions, or 4.5-5 million men, 342 artillery regiments and 57 parachute units.²⁴ If during 1935-1939 years the S.U. produced munitions worth 8 billion dollars, by 1944 S.U. was already producing 16 billion dollars worth of military supplies.²⁵ Nevertheless, the transition and evacuation period were distressing because the Soviet front had no extra time to wait until the factories resumed full capacity of production. Thus, the period from June 1941 until late 1942 could be characterized both as the most difficult period of the war and as a phase of adaptation to war needs.

On the other hand, summer droughts in 1940-1941 caused a sharp decrease in harvest and availability of food supplies prior to the war. Furthermore, since the German attack on the Soviet Union huge amounts of food stuffs and animal stock were seized by the German Army. In 1942 main funds of agriculture dropped to 55%

²¹ Mark Harrison, ed., *The Economics of World War II : Six Great Powers in International Comparison*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.275

²² I. E. Chadaev, *Ekonomika S.S.S.R. v Gody Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ Voĭny*, (*U.S.S.R. Economy During the Great Patriotic War*), 1941-1945, 2nd ed., (Moskva: Mysl, 1985), p.443

²³ Hans Adolf Jacobsen, A.J.P. Taylor, 1939-1945, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Kronik und Dokumenten, Second World War, In Chronicles and Documents*, (Moskva: Misl, 1995), p.459

²⁴ R. Jones, *The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union*, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), p.228

²⁵ See appendix, table 7, p.116; also Andrew Rothstein, trans., *Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War, Documents and Materials*, Vol.1, June 22, 1941-December 31, 1943, (London: Hutchinson & Co. Publishers, 1946), p.28

of the pre-war period. Although by 1945 agriculture was 74% of the pre-war level, during the war its general growth was significantly lower than that of industry.²⁶

B. Condition of the S.U. Armed Forces

Misleading claims that the Soviet Army lost 90 percent of its tanks, aircrafts and artillery during the first stage of the war, provided the opportunity for some Western historians to argue that the LL supplies to Russia were indispensable and of absolute necessity.²⁷ Despite such kind of unsupported claims of great losses, the Soviet Army had the potential to resist the well-prepared enemy.

Soviet artillery was much better than the German side. Reactive bullets, firstly tested in the Russo-Finish war were extensively used in WWII. Moreover, in the middle of July, 1941, a new Soviet artillery machine was introduced near Smolensk – the famous “Katyusha”, which remained the most popular device of the Soviet Army during the war.²⁸ Moreover, during WWII the Soviets continued to produce and design other exceptionally good pieces of equipment, such as Stalin IS and modern T-34 tanks; Yak-3 fighter; IL-DB 3F bomber which were of better quality and fighting capability than the Germans’.²⁹ However, the majority of Russian equipment was based on already existent technologies, and was not developed as the result of conflict.

However, there were also some serious deficiencies. At the beginning of the war many Soviet machines needed maintenance and repair work. The Soviets lacked

²⁶ I. E. Chadaev, *Ekonomika S.S.S.R. v Gody Velikoï Otechestvennoï Voïny*, p.450

²⁷ For instance, see Jerome J. Peppers Jr., C.P.L., *History of the United States Military Logistics, 1935-1985, A Brief Review*, (Huntsville: Logistics Education Foundation Publishing, 1988), pp.12-14

²⁸ Alexander Vert, *Rossia v Voïne*, p.82

²⁹ Allan R. Millet, Williamson Murray, eds., *Military Effectiveness, Vol. III, The Second World War*, (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), p.262

sufficient aerodromes, aircrafts and tanks maintenance stations. Spare parts were in high demand and there were not enough armaments for KV and T-34 tanks. Moreover, the S.U. Navy did not have enough vessels, cargo and fortification ships.³⁰ Logistical problems, allocation and re-allocation of supplies were not clarified yet. As Marshal Zhukov described this situation, “we [high level commanders] had to beg in the High Quarters for artillery, rifles and armament.”³¹

Although significant developments were made during the 1930s, by June 1941 modernization and preparedness of the Soviet Union Air Force (S.U.A.F.) was far from being complete. The S.U.A.F. had almost equal number of machines compared to the Germans, though their fighting capability was lower than of the German aircrafts and domestic engine production was in its infancy.³² Nevertheless, the S.U.A.F. had skilled personnel and modern equipment.³³ Moreover, in the eve of the war new types of airplanes were designed, such as LA-5, Jak-1, LaGG-3 and MiG-3 fighters, but their use in industry and production developed on a slow pace.

With the German attack in June 1941 the Soviet aircraft industry was blocked because Germans took resourceful land and the factories had to be evacuated to the Eastern part of the country. The industrial output declined by ½ and the first strike destroyed many aircrafts with fighting capabilities. Therefore, at the beginning of the war, the S.U. urgently needed modern aircrafts, aluminum and spare parts from the West.³⁴ However, the S.U. “...possessed the capacity to produce most of its own

³⁰ I.G. Perechnev, “O Nekotorykh Problemakh Podgotovki Strany i Vooruzhënnnykh Sil k Otrazheniiu Fashistskoï Agressii”, “About Some Problems of Preparedness of the Country to Resist Fascist Aggression”, *Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, No.4, (1988), pp.43-44

³¹ G.K. Zhukov, *Vospominaniia i Razmyshleniia*, p.387; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Perepiska Predsedatelia Soveta Ministrov SSSR s Prezidentom SshA i Premier-Ministrami Velikobritanii vo Vremia Velikoï Otechestvennoï Voïny*, vol.1, pp.49-50

³² Kenneth Manson, *Fighters and Bombers of World War II*, p.11

³³ Richard C. Lukas, *Eagles East: The Army Air Forces and the Soviet Union, 1941-1945*, (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1970), pp.7-8; V.N. Kisilëv, “Upriamye Fakty Nachala Voïny”, p.16

³⁴ Ray Wagner, ed., *The Soviet Air Force in World War II, The Official History Originally Published by the Ministry of Defense of the U.S.S.R.*, (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1973), pp.14-18

equipment but required time, resources, and a stabilized front, none of which were in the offing during the summer and fall of 1941.”³⁵

Moreover, by June 1941 the S.U. was still backward in communications and radio transmissions. The S.U. possessed only 40-50 percent of needed radio and communication equipment. Therefore, primitive electro-technical industry seriously affected the fighting capability of the Soviet Army.³⁶ Additionally, because the Germans destroyed existing telephone lines and communication systems, at the beginning of the war the S.U. urgently needed field telephones and radio stations.³⁷ Also because of this, the intelligence services from the front line worked improperly and it was difficult to maintain communication with divisions in the rear.

2.1.4 Was the S.U. Ready for War?

Was the S.U. ready for war? While first failures of the RA could point to the ‘unpreparedness’ of the S.U., the country made almost impossible effort to defend its homeland. Regardless of either claim, if the country was able to resist the enemy and win the war – it was prepared, or had the potential to adapt quickly to the struggle in every aspect, including economic, military and socio-political considerations. Besides, the moral advantage of defending home territory cannot be underestimated.

Some Soviet historians did not admit the fact that at the beginning of the war the opponents’ forces were almost equal and in some units the S.U. had clear advantage. Either to excuse the first Russian failures or to magnify the significance of the Russian victory, unreal numbers were provided. Thus, according to the Soviet

³⁵ Ray Wagner, ed., *The Soviet Air Force in World War II*, p.12

³⁶ G.A. Kumanev, B.I. Zverev, “O Voenno-Ekonomicheskoi Gotovnosti S.S.S.R. k Otrazheniiu Fashistskoi Agressii”, (“About Military-Economic Preparedness of the U.S.S.R. to Resist Fascist Aggression”), *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, no.9, (1991), pp.16-27

³⁷ A.M. Samsonov, *Krakh Fashistskoi Agressii*, p. 141

sources, at the beginning of the Moscow offensive, German forces had three times more manpower, 1.7 times more tanks and 3.8 times more artillery than the Soviet forces. Having in position 5.000-7.000 men, 483 tanks (from which heavy and middle like T-34 type only 45, while the rest light versions BT, T-26 and T-37), the Soviets faced a difficult task in conducting the autumn 1941-winter 1942 operations.³⁸

On the other hand, according to an evaluation made by the German Defense Department, the German army had a clear superiority only in the central part and near the borders; in the North rival forces were approximately equal and in the South the Soviets had advantage.³⁹ Soviet manpower was estimated to be 1.5 times more than the Germans. Also the Soviets outnumbered Germany in bombers and fighters, but many of them were technically inferior to the last German types.⁴⁰ In terms of tanks, the Russians had a clear advantage, but many of the machines needed maintenance. However, T-34 tanks, which were in short supply at the beginning of the war, were the best devices of that time.⁴¹

Moreover, general preparedness is only one of the factors which affect an armed conflict. The country's potential, size, development level, prewar preparations and pre-war economic conditions are 'limiting factors on economic potential for war'.⁴² The economic potential is realized during the war, when the country has to manage its resources in a proper way and allocate them to war needs. In WWII, Russian willingness to win and devotion to the state's interests were so great that this factor overweighed all others. Correct policies and strategies, such as keeping large reserves in the rear or ensuring resilient discipline, and strong political leadership

³⁸ N.B. Kalutskiĭ, "Moskovskaia Bitva", p.20

³⁹ Department of Defense, IMT, Dok., PS-1746 in Hans Adolf Jacobsen, A.J.P. Taylor, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Kronik und Dokumenten*, 1939-1945, pp.146-147

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p.305

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p.452

⁴² Mark Harrison, ed., *The Economics of World War II*, p.271

played a decisive role in supervising and managing the war economy. Furthermore, a centralized control over the Army, economy and resources were planned for a long war, whereas Hitler was not prepared for such strategy in WWII and had made only short-term plans.

2.2 American Supplies Before the Battle of Moscow

2.2.1 Lend-Lease Routes

At the beginning of the war American and British supplies were shipped only through a few routes. As of August 1941, the American and British supplies arrived from the North, via Murmansk, Archangel and Molotovsk. Another route passed through the Pacific Ocean to Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk, Magadan, Nahodka and Khabarovsk ports. The Northern route, across the Atlantic, was the shortest, but the most dangerous one. The route was only 4.500 miles long and the supplies reached Russia in 10-12 days, which was quick enough to use them for the war needs without delay.⁴³ However, it was difficult to supply munitions even within the country, especially after the Kirov railroad and Baltic channel were cut off by the Germans.⁴⁴ The first aid to Russia arrived through this route and the first 6 convoys went untouched by the enemy. The Northern route served as the main waterway for the American LL shipments between October 1, 1941 and April, 1942. Until June 1942, 43 full ships and 28 with partial load released 264.320 tons of supplies designated for the S.U. After their failure in the battle of Moscow the German commanders realized

⁴³ R. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p.65; 84

⁴⁴ I. Kochergin, *Sovetskiĭ Podvodnyi Flot v Predvoennye Gody i Gody VOV*, p.3

the importance of the Northern route as the logistical source of Allied supplies and began operations to prevent loads from reaching Soviet borders.⁴⁵

The other way, the longest though safest, was across the Pacific Ocean to the Far Eastern border of the Soviet Union. Between June, 1941 and June, 1942, nearly 412.160 tons of supplies were received through the Pacific route.⁴⁶ The only disadvantage of it was the very long distance and thus, loss of precious time. The Pacific ports in Vladivostok region had the capacity to unload 15 vessels, other ports of the Pacific could release 10 more ships, but they did not have connection to the railways. Sometimes, goods received through the Pacific route were stuck for 2-3 weeks in the Trans-Siberian railroad.⁴⁷

The decision to expand the Southern-Persian Gulf route and also increase deliveries through Alaska and Siberia was taken by the American and Soviet officials when out of 34 caravans sent to the S.U. only 23 ships reached Murmansk and Archangel.⁴⁸ By a joint occupation of Iran of the U.S.A, Great Britain and the S.U., a Middle Eastern route was established.⁴⁹ The Iranian route via the Persian Gulf, which was opened in 1942, had small carrying capacity and therefore, was less preferred by the Soviets. The capacity of ports in the Iranian bay was only 97.000 tons/month, capacity of the railroads 39.000 tons/month and highways only 23.000 tons/month.⁵⁰

The first ship with Allied material sailed in November, 1941. A total of 12 vessels

⁴⁵ G.A. Rudnev, *Na Morskikh Dorogakh Voïny, Dokumental'nye Ocherki, (On the Sea Roads of War, Documentary Notes)*, (Vladivostok: Izdatel'stvo Dalnevostochnogo Universiteta, 1995), p.15

⁴⁶ R. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p.113

⁴⁷ M.N. Suprun, *Lend-Liz i Severnye Konvoi, (Lend-Lease and the Northern Convoys)*, 1941-1945, Institut Rossiïskoï Istorii Rossiïskoï Akademii Nauk, Pomorskiï Gosudarstvennyi Universitet im. M.V. Lomonosova (Moskva: Andreevskii Flag, 1997), p.28

⁴⁸ William Averell Harriman, *America and Russia in a Changing World: A Half Century of Personal Observation, Memoirs*, (London: Allen & Unwin 1971), pp.29-30; G.A. Rudnev, *Na Morskikh Dorogakh Voïny*, pp.37-39; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Perepiska Predsedatelia Soveta Ministrov SSSR s Prezidentom SShA i Premier-Ministrami Velikobritanii vo Vremia Velikoï Otechestvennoï Voïny*, vol.1, p.33, see also Ray Wagner, ed., *The Soviet Air Force in World War II*, pp.27-30

⁴⁹ R. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p.84; Edward Stettinius Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory*, pp.133-136, 150.

⁵⁰ A.B. Basov, G.I. Gutenmaher, "Persidskiï Korridor", ("Persian Corridor"), *Voenno-Istoricheskiï Zhurnal*, No.1, (1991), p.28

arrived to the Persian Gulf in 1941, carrying 13.502 tons of supplies, from which 11.327 tons were sent from the U.S.⁵¹ In 1942, an average of 10-12 vessels were sailing every month. By 1943 the number increased to 20 ships. The Persian route was especially important in 1942-1944, and always remained as the second best way to supply materials to Russia.

The Alaska-Siberian route, or ALSIB, was discussed since August 1941, as another option for quick and safe deliveries through the North to Russia. However, the ALSIB project was realized only one year later, in August, 1942.⁵² The first airplanes were received via ALSIB in September 1942, but from 131 planes sent to Krasnoyarsk, only 9 reached the front line. The reasons for that were long distances of transfer and Russia's huge territory. Moreover, aircrafts received required technical control ahead of being sent to the front line and Russian pilots had to go through a short training program. Sometimes accidents took place due to bad weather, equipment problems, or inexperience.⁵³

Difficulties related to the shipment of munitions were only one side of various obstacles that prevented the 1st Protocol to be realized in full. Collaboration between the U.S.A. and S.U. was at its infancy and many issues had to be worked out to ensure smooth and productive cooperation. The following sections will summarize results of the 1st Protocol and discuss some of its achievements and failures.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p.30

⁵² A.I. Kotliarov, "Osoboe Zadanie", ("Special Mission"), *SShA-Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologia*, No.9, (1992), p.9; Alla Paperno, *Lend-Liz i Tikhii Okean, (Lend-Lease and the Pacific Ocean)*, (Moscow: Terra-Knizhnyi Klub, 1998), p.274

⁵³ I.P. Lebedev, "Eshchë Raz o Lend-Lize", p.18

2.2.2 Achievements and Deficiencies

By the end of 1941 the S.U. received help of \$545.000 equivalent in war items and munitions.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, during the negotiations in Washington in May, 1942 results of the 1st Protocol appeared not that outstanding. The U.S. fulfilled its obligations only by 29.7 percent on bombers, 30.9 percent on fighters, 32.2 percent on middle tanks and 37.3 percent on light tanks.⁵⁵ Moreover, during the 1st Protocol 343.504 tons of LL cargo was lost at sea and 64 vessels carrying strategic and war materials were sunk by the Germans.⁵⁶

For the period of the first two months after conclusion of the LL agreement, 28 ships with a total load of more than 130.000 tons were sent from the U.S. to S.U. However, during winter 1941-1942 American imports were behind schedule. Manager of the OLLA, Edward Stettinius, explained the main reasons to be shortage of vessels, especially after the U.S. entered the war. In December imports rose, while in the following two months declined again.⁵⁷ Harriman's report to the President, dated December 24, 1941, stated that the U.S. was 75 percent and 2 months behind schedule.⁵⁸

Problems with the 1st Protocol, as defined by Philip Young, acting deputy administrator, were 'fiscal in nature'. "It took so long to make anything. We couldn't

⁵⁴ V.A. Potseluev, *Vneshniaia Politika SSSR v Kanun i v Gody Velikoï Otechestvennoï Voïny*, (*Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R. in the Eve of the Great Patriotic War*), (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Universiteta Druzhby Narodov, 1985), p.48; I.S. Liutov, A.M. Noskov, *Koalitsionnoe Vzaimodeïstvie Soiuznikov, Po Opytu Pervoï i Vtoroï Mirovikh Voïn*, (*Coalitional Cooperation of the Allies, From the Experience of First and Second World Wars*), Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defence, (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1988), p.87; L.I. Zorin, *Osoboe Zadanie*, (*A Special Mission*), (Moskva: Isdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1987), p.18

⁵⁵ *Vneshniaia Politika SSSR v Period Velikoï Otechestvennoï Voïni, Sbornik Dokumentov*, (*U.S.S.R. Foreign Policy during the Great Patriotic War, Collection of Documents*), (Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1946), 3 vol., p.222

⁵⁶ L.I. Zorin, *Osoboe Zadanie*, p.152; R. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p. 107

⁵⁷ Edward Stettinius Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory*, pp.203-205

⁵⁸ R. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p.86

get any planes....tanks...shells...or guns, anything that really counted in this war.”⁵⁹

The LL complex bureaucratic structure took more than two months to pass a request from all its agencies and ship it to the receiver state.⁶⁰ Moreover, in the U.S.A. a central agency to control and supervise the Soviet shipments was not established yet and this presented a serious obstacle to LL aid. Procurement agencies acted too slow for an improvement to be noticed. Moreover, some of the American contractors did not want to take Russian orders.⁶¹

Moreover, absence of cooperation experience and anti-Soviet lobby in the Congress hampered first shipments to be sent to the S.U. quickly. The War Department was hesitant to release military equipment to Russia from its stocks.⁶² The Allies were sending some munitions, but still did not believe that the Soviets could win the war.

Furthermore, Russian and American authorities argued about the capacity of ports; it was difficult for the Americans to satisfy Russian specifications and particular demands.⁶³ Allocation and loading were performed hastily and many materials were damaged during shipment. At the beginning of the war problems with packaging and loading war material caused supplies to arrive in parts, disjointed and sometimes on different ships.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Cited in R. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, pp.73-74

⁶⁰ M.N. Suprun, *Lend-Liz i Severnye Konvoi*, p.11

⁶¹ R. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p.90; pp.111-112; Edward Stettinius Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory*, pp.205-208; Leon Martel, *Lend-Lease, Loans, and Coming of the Cold War: A Study of the Implementation of Foreign Policy*, (Boulder: CO: Westview Press, 1979), pp.36-37

⁶² Leon Martel, *Lend-Lease, Loans, and Coming of the Cold War*, p.42

⁶³ I.P. Lebedev, *Aviation Lend-Lease to Russia, Historical Observations*, (New York:Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1997), p.18; R. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p.85

⁶⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Perepiska Predsedatelja Soveta Ministrov SSSR s Prezidentom SshA i Premier-Ministrami Velikobritanii vo Vremja Velikoj Otechestvennoj Vojny.*, vol.1, p.43; R. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p.112

2.2.3 The impact of LL on Autumn 1941 – Winter 1942 operations

Although during 1941-1942, the first year of the 1st Protocol, the U.S.A. realized just ¼ of its initial promises, the U.S.S.R. received many strategic supplies that were in short demand in the country. At the beginning pressing Russian needs included anti-aircraft and large-machine guns, rifles, aviation gasoline, barbed wire, armor plates and aluminum for aircraft construction.⁶⁵ These and other items were requested during the Hopkins and later, Harriman visits to Moscow. Moreover, the U.S. supplied S.U. with all telephone wire produced in January 1942 and 90 percent of its production in February and March.⁶⁶ This was important because the S.U. lost much of the communication equipment during the first months of the war, when Nazis cut off and destroyed the main telephone lines. At the same time in 1941 the S.U. purchased goods and munitions in cash payment in the sum of \$4.1 million.⁶⁷

In early 1942, the most important Soviet demands included tractors, transportation planes, radar and radio equipment, rubber, chemicals and submachine guns.⁶⁸ Thus, at the beginning of the war the main bulk of LL supplies included urgent Soviet demands in necessary raw and strategic materials, which the S.U. would use for its domestic production. Although the first deliveries had little impact on the initial battles, they boosted the morale of the Soviet people, which was more important at the initial phase of the war than any material goods.⁶⁹

In terms of trucks, by June 1942 the U.S. delivered 36,865 trucks to Russia. This might have increased the mobility of the Red Army (RA) in the battle of

⁶⁵ R. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p.49

⁶⁶ Edward Stettinius Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory*, pp.125, 209-210; R. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p.266

⁶⁷ I.P. Lebedev, *Aviation Lend-Lease to Russia*, pp.18-19; R. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, appendix 1

⁶⁸ R. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p.86

⁶⁹ M.N. Suprun, *Lend-Liz i Severnye Konvoi*, p.53

Stalingrad, but could not affect the battle of Moscow because trucks started to arrive at the end of December, 1941. Moreover, it would be naïve to estimate that all machines sent were used in the important battles or during the war in general. For instance, scarce Soviet statistics cannot help us find out how many of LL 81.287 submachine guns and 6.823 jeeps sent before the offensive were actually used in the battle for Stalingrad. However, with the LL machinery the S.U. was able to de-emphasize vehicle construction and to concentrate on the production of planes and tanks.⁷⁰ American transportation means might not have affected the Russian fighting capability, but substantially eased the RA effort, allowing great concentration of forces and increasing mobility of the armed forces.

Though the Allies were far behind some promised items, for instance, they sent more than was initially agreed in jeeps and trucks.⁷¹ Moreover, some items were supplied outside of the Protocol. Those were usually, spare parts for machines and various tools, which constituted nearly 10 percent of the total weight and cost of the LL munitions. Of the 144.000 tons of supplies, 9.000 were considered 'out of the protocol'. Moreover, military supplies comprised only 1/5th of the total tonnage. The rest included petroleum and agricultural products, industrial tools and raw materials, or necessary components to re-organize and start domestic production.⁷²

Certainly, this was significant help. But the Soviet losses were significant too. For instance, by December 1941 the S.U. lost 17.900 aircraft, 20.500 armored vehicles and 101.100 artillery items.⁷³ During the Autumn 1941-Winter 1942 offensives, LL machines could replace the Soviet losses only by 20 percent.⁷⁴ Thus, **delivery of fighting machinery to the S.U. could not affect the war potential of**

⁷⁰ R. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, pp.232-233; p.237

⁷¹ See appendices, tables 1 and 2, p.117; table 5, p.119; table 9, p.122

⁷² M.N. Suprun, *Lend-Liz i Severnye Konvoi*, pp.121-122

⁷³ For clarification see M.N. Suprun, *Lend-Liz i Severnye Konvoi*, p.12

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p.124

the Soviets, emphasis added, but ‘ensure the staying power of the U.S.S.R by helping to reinforce the second line of industrial defense for a long struggle’.⁷⁵ Therefore, in the battle of Moscow LL machines could not play a decisive role, but helped sustain domestic defense industry, which at that time was moving towards the Urals.

The first planes from the U.S.A., 195 Curtis Tomahawks P-40C; 19 Curtiss O-52 observation planes and 5 medium B-25B bombers, arrived about October 12, 1941 by the time the Soviets were trying to prevent German advance to Moscow.⁷⁶ During the first year of the war the U.S. sent 255 aircrafts to the Soviet Union. In 1942 LL airplane shipments increased 5 fold and by June 1942, constituted 1.148 machines.⁷⁷ However, the small quantity of early American aircraft supplies could not have ‘a detrimental impact’ on Russian combat capability. For instance, the first caravans delivered significant numbers of British “Hurricanes” and American “Kittihawks”, “Tommahawks” and P-39 “Aerocobra”s, but almost 65 percent of these aircrafts were stopped in the North to serve in the Northern Army Division.⁷⁸ This means they were not used in the battle of Moscow, and thus, could not have affected its outcome.

However, by the time LL fighters started to arrive in significant numbers, the S.U. barely needed them. The main bulk of the planes arrived after the decisive years 1942-1943 and the peak-value was in 1944-1945 (73 percent of all aircraft sent to Russia under LL), which was already too late because the war was almost over and the Soviet industry was producing enough machines to meet the declining German production.⁷⁹ Thus, in January 1943, when surrounding operations of S.U. Army were completed and elimination of the enemy troops started, the decisive role in the battles

⁷⁵ Joseph Barnes, Harriet Moore, “America and the Soviet Union”, *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol.10, Issue 15 (Aug.11, 1941), pp.172-178

⁷⁶ Ray Wagner, ed., *The Soviet Air Force in World War II*, Appendix 2, pp.397-399

⁷⁷ R. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, appendix A; appendices, table 2, p.117

⁷⁸ M.N. Suprun, *Lend-Liz i Severnye Konvoi*, p.39

⁷⁹ I.P. Lebedev, *Aviation Lend-Lease to Russia*, p.20

were played by tanks and infantry, not Air Force units.⁸⁰ Moreover, by May 1, 1942 only 249 foreign planes were used in the Soviet Air Force and almost all of them were older types of Hurricanes, Kittyhawks and Tomahawks.⁸¹ Therefore, the claim that LL aircraft were indispensable for Moscow and Stalingrad battles (Autumn 1941-Winter 1942; August-November 1942) and served a decisive role during the turning point of the war is not accurate.

The great percent of the LL supplies were tanks. However, some American tanks such as M2-A2, M3-A and M4-A4 had lower fighting capability than the Russian T-34, KV-1 or KV-2 and yielded to the Soviet items mostly in their dimensions, altitude, armor's quality, equipment and consumption of fuel.⁸² Moreover, tanks received even though not in great quantities, could not be sent to the front line immediately because Soviet soldiers had to pass specific training and check machines for defects. Until the end of 1941 in the S.U. Army 216 Valentine, 145 Matilda (both British), and 330 MK-1 armored vehicles were used. Americans tanks, received after serious delays were not noticed in the battle of Moscow.⁸³ Thus, limited American LL deliveries prior to the battle of Moscow could not affect the result of the battle. In fact, in tanks and artillery, the S.U. had enough machines, so even after the first German strike there remained more than 6.000 tanks, and by Spring, 1942 this number was almost 9.000, or 3 times more than what Germany had.⁸⁴ However, Russian demand for airplanes and trucks did not diminish even in 1942. Along with aircraft, plane motors, armament, aviation gasoline, other equipment was sent.⁸⁵ From

⁸⁰ Alla Paperno, *Lend-Liz i Tikhii Okean*, p.282

⁸¹ Ray Wagner, ed., *The Soviet Air Force in World War II*, p.91

⁸² L.I. Zorin, *Osoboe Zadanie*, p.68-72

⁸³ M.N. Suprun, *Lend-Liz i Severnye Konvoi*, p.52

⁸⁴ Alan Clark, *Barbarossa, The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-1945*, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1965), pp.140-142

⁸⁵ Alan Clark, *Barbarossa, The Russian-German Conflict*, p.41

Stalin's correspondence with F.D.R. of 22 August, 1942 we can observe that he demanded 'planes and other types of munitions and also trucks as many as possible'.⁸⁶

Nevertheless, despite the general great potential of the Soviet Army, LL help was needed at the beginning of the war and played an important role to sustain the morale of the Soviet army and fighting people. LL was especially needed in 1941 and 1942 when the Soviet industry was stalled with the evacuation process. Even in small quantities at the beginning, each piece was important to the S.U. before it could supply the front with high quantity machines produced within the country.⁸⁷

2.3 The Battle of Moscow as a Turning Point of the War

In the Battle of Moscow the S.U. was able to achieve a major victory over the German forces despite detrimental conditions and huge losses the Soviet Army bore since the beginning of the war. Many historians argued that the Soviet victory should be credited not to the Soviet fighting capability, but to the 'General Winter' and his -60°C degrees.⁸⁸ Was it the cold weather which helped the S.U. survive or other more important factors, such as miscalculations of the German commanders, Soviet resistance and willingness to win? What was the impact of the Lend-Lease Aid the United States sent to sustain the Soviet forces in the battle of Moscow and how did it help to turn the tide and reverse the disadvantage for the Allies? The next part of this chapter will discuss these issues.

⁸⁶ *Sovetsko-Amerikanskie Otnosheniia vo Vremia Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ Voĭny, (Soviet-American Relations During the Great Patriotic War)*, 2 vols., (Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1984), vol.1, pp.230-231; M.Y. Miagkov, red., *Mirovye Voĭny XX Veka, kniga 4*, pp.379-389

⁸⁷ I.P. Lebedev, *Aviation Lend-Lease to Russia*, p.34

⁸⁸ Alan Clark, *Barbarossa, The Russian-German Conflict*, pp.147-149, 159; O.A. Rzheshhevskii, *Voĭna i Istoriia, Burzhuaiznaia Historiografia SShA o Vtoroĭ Mirovoĭ Voĭne, (The War and History: Bourgeois Historiography on Second World War)*, 2nd ed., (Moscow: Mysl, 1984), p.182

2.3.1 The Battle of Moscow

The Battle for Moscow (September 30, 1941 – April 20, 1942) was an event of both domestic and international significance. It revealed that the Soviet people were able to overcome the consequences of the Nazi first strike in June, 1941 and gain strategic advantage over the enemy. It also signified that the war would last longer and that German plans for a quick victory were swept away. The S.U. proved that it wanted victory more than anything else and would struggle for it until the last man.

One of the most interesting debates WWII historians converse on are causes of the Axis defeat in Moscow. Immediately after WWII and for many years during the Cold War Western writers named firstly “General Winter”, secondly, Hitler’s political and strategic mistakes, and lastly, Allied help to the Soviets to be the primary reasons for German misfortune and Russian victory in Moscow. Some of them mentioned LL supplies as having had a great impact over the conclusion of the Moscow battle.⁸⁹ Historians credited mud, the lack of roads and cold temperatures that helped the SA win.

Indeed, the Russian winter and constant rain falls turned roads into dirty swamps. People, machines and horses lost their mobility and prevented the implementation of the German blitzkrieg strategy. Redactors of the *Encyclopedia Americana*, for instance, believe that if the weather was better Hitler could have gotten Moscow.⁹⁰ Although the weather conditions could have affected the mobility of German forces, this was probably a peculiarity of Russian weather, as well as

⁸⁹ Klaus Reinhardt, *Moscow-The Turning Point, The Failure of Hitler’s Strategy in the Winter of 1941-1942*, (Oxford: Berg Providence, 1992), pp.-38-39, pp.40-44; Alan Clark, *Barbarossa, The Russian-German Conflict*, pp.140-146; Jerome J. Peppers Jr., C.P.L., *History of the United States Military Logistics*, pp.20-23; O.A. Rzheshhevskii, *Voïna i Istoriia*, p.183

⁹⁰ *The Encyclopedia Americana*, (Danbury, Conn.: Grolier Inc., 1982), vol.29, p.427

underdeveloped infrastructure systems and other disadvantages that Hitler's commanders did not take into consideration.

Moreover, it is not true that during the whole winter there were horrible congealing temperatures. The period of slush in October was relatively short, the average temperature for November and December 1941 was 11 below zero, and temperature dropped underneath only twice, once for 4 days in November and again for 2 days in December.⁹¹ Therefore, German failure nearby Moscow could only partially be attributed to grave freezing weather.

German participants of this offensive named the main factor that played a decisive role in German failures during winter 1941-1942 operations as "the unwillingness to take up arms and fight because of the low temperatures and absence of warm clothes".⁹² The General Commander of the German Center group von Bock, recognized three major factors that affected German fighting capability and caused serious crisis in the Eastern front. Firstly, autumn rain, slush and bad roads. It was incredibly difficult to move forward to the Russian capital. Secondly, the railroads were paralyzed. Transportation means of the German Armed Forces got bogged down in mud and advance was hampered. The German army was in hard shortage of railway wagons, locomotives and trained personnel. Moreover, the Soviet partisans destroyed railways of major connection and supplies routes. Lastly, the German commanders underestimated Russian military capability, staidness, huge manpower

⁹¹ G.K. Zhukov, "Kontrnastuplenie pod Moskvou", ("Counterattack Beneath Moscow"), *Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, No.10, (1966), p.72; Zhukov, G.K., *Vospominaniia i Razmyshleniia*, p.38; Klaus Reinhardt, *Moscow-The Turning Point*, pp.38-42, O.A. Rzheshhevskii, *Voina i Istoriia*, p.183, 188

⁹² Paul Carell, *Barbarossa: Ot Bresta do Moskvi*, *Unternehmen Barbarossa: Der Marsch nach Rußland*, (*Barbarossa: From Brest to Moscow*), (Smolensk: Rusichi, 2002) p.258

and entrenched desire to win. The country's vast material resources were also not taken into consideration.⁹³

Moreover, the Soviets had another significant advantage which always remains one of the most important factors in a war – knowledge of and adaptability to terrain. Conditions of terrain is a very important factor because it can increase and respectively lower maneuverability of the troops. The Germans did not take into consideration vast territory and peculiarity of the Russian landscape, which hampered a quick leap forward. If in France it was relatively easy to make rapid advance, the Russian land and huge distances were five times larger. Impenetrable forests and impassable swamps hampered the movement of the German troops.⁹⁴ Furthermore, the Russians had not only the terrain advantage, but also 25 more divisions in the Far East, which were transferred to the Moscow front at the beginning of November.⁹⁵

Thus, the cold weather and rains should not be counted as the definitive causes for the German defeat in Moscow. Those views that consider German defeat at Moscow only as a gift to the Russians from mother-nature are discriminatory. In such a complex event as WWII many factors, including the weather conditions, should be taken into account. For instance, the economic potential of a country, availability of reserves and their accessibility to the front-line, infrastructure systems, power of the rear, army's morale and determination for victory are altogether significant. Only these factors, measured all together in a single paradigm can form a more correct, balanced and multifaceted view.

⁹³ Tagebuch Bock im Privatbesitz, in Hans Adolf Jacobsen, A.J.P. Taylor, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Kronik und Dokumenten*, p.169; p.460; Paul Carell, *Barbarossa: Ot Bresta do Moskvi*, pp.259-260; Klaus Reinhardt, *Moscow-The Turning Point*, pp.128-130

⁹⁴ James Lucas, *War on the Eastern Front, 1941-1945, The German Soldier in Russia*, (New York: Bonanza Books, 1985), p.15; p.89

⁹⁵ G.K. Zhukov, *Vospominaniia i Razmyshleniia*, p.361

For example, the German failure to take Moscow could not be only because of the above-mentioned reasons, but also due to the powerful Russian anti-aircraft defense system, or Protivo-Vozdushnaya Oborona (PVO), around the Moscow region. Russian artillery was powerful enough and prevented aircrafts to lift supplies to the German forces.⁹⁶ Well-equipped hangars and airports nearby Moscow offered another strategic advantage to the S.U. Army, enabling it to take off and act promptly. The German failure could derive also from the absence of required locomotives, misallocation of resources, weak reserves and logistics to supply the army.

2.3.2 Domestic and International Significance-The Battle of Moscow

Historians argue whether achievements in defensive operations during the battle of Moscow could be regarded as a turning point of the war. The opposite side of this argument poses that the Soviet Army did not have enough forces and capability to complete encirclement of the German forces and perform a total destruction of the enemy troops. Therefore, the offensives of late 1941-early 1942 brought only partial results. After success the Moscow situation on the front line was still difficult and was followed by the 5 months of strategic retreat towards the Volga River and inland Russia.⁹⁷ However, the international significance of this battle marks it as one of the most significant battles of WWII.

Victory, achieved by Russian troops in Moscow battles was the first grand counterattack in WWII and first grave defeat on the German army. The aura of invincibility of Axis forces was wiped and the initiative in battles was taken away.

⁹⁶ Paul Carell, *Barbarossa: Ot Bresta do Moskvi*, p.260; Klaus Reinhardt, *Moscow-The Turning Point*, pp.105-106

⁹⁷ A.A. Sidorenko, "Diskutsii i Obsuzhdeniia", ("Discussions and Debates"), *Voprosy Istorii*, no.5, (1988), p.58; A.M. Samsonov, O.A. Rzheshevskii, "O Korennom Perelome vo Vtoroi Mirovoi Voine", ("About the Turning Point in the WWII"), *Voprosy Istorii*, no.4, (1987), pp.79-80

Again, this fact was of international significance because it affected the course of war and augmented forces for further resistance. Russian achievements also affected relations between the Allies, but some problems, for instance a common program for military operations or opening a second front, were not yet solved. The Soviet success enhanced its international position and increased status of the S.U. and demoralized reactionary forces, which hoped for Soviet defeat in the war.

2.3.3 Failure of the “Blitzkrieg” and Plan “Barbarossa”

German attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 was planned to be the most powerful. This crushing first strike strategy was already known from the experience of WWI and beginning of WWII, when France was conquered in a few weeks. However, German commanders and strategists miscalculated some points, which by mid-1942 caused total failure of the Blitzkrieg tactic and brought changes in initial German plan “Barbarossa”.

Germans also miscalculated the strength and unity of the Soviet system, hoping that their invasion would cause social unrest and dissension in the U.S.S.R. Another cause of the German Blitzkrieg failure was underestimation of the Russian forces, overrating German strength and underrating Soviet capability to resist it.⁹⁸

The problems Hitler encountered in Russia were anticipated before. In the meeting held on 31 July 1940 he warned that Barbarossa made sense only in case if Russia would be smashed in one single powerful strike. Otherwise the early Russian winter would have detrimental effects. Moreover, Hitler was also alerted by his

⁹⁸ Stalin's Broadcast speech, in Andrew Rothstein, trans., *Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War, Documents and Materials*, Vol.1, June 22, 1941-December 31, 1943, (London: Hutchinson & Co. Publishers, 1946), pp.26-27

military advisors about the commonly known fact of the passive resistance of the Slavs.⁹⁹

2.4 Conclusion

First Soviet victories during autumn 1941 – winter 1942 offensives paralyzed the German army and allowed Russia to gain time and resume domestic production. For the S.U. the recommence of the domestic production was very important because the country possessed enough natural resources to conduct a protracted military conflict and could sustain the war needs itself. The rapid switch to the military economy had one prerequisite that is high concentration of political, economic and social determinants.

Before the war, the general level and economic conditions of the U.S.S.R were potentially good enough to resist aggression, but Soviet national economy was totally transformed to military needs only by the middle of 1942. Therefore, the LL aid could have been of great help not only at the beginning of the war, but also throughout 1942 until the S.U. domestic production resumed its full capacity.

Unfortunately, together with the Soviet victories in the Moscow offensives, the LL shipments remained limited. The results of the 1st Protocol were neither striking, nor very helpful to the Soviet situation. From October 1, 1941 until June 30, 1942 the U.S.A. sent only 29.7 percent of promised bombers; 30.9 percent of fighters; 34.3 percent of tanks and 19.4 percent of initially promised machines. The circumstances gradually improved only in February, when the Allies increased

⁹⁹ Das Nationalsozialistische, Deutschland, S. 373ff in Hans Adolf Jacobsen, A.J.P. Taylor, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Kronik und Dokumenten*, p.146; Halder Tagebuch, in Hans Adolf Jacobsen, A.J.P. Taylor, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Kronik und Dokumenten*, p.117

tonnage of supplies, which was augmented from February to March more than two fold, and in April the tonnage of March was doubled.

Thus, the battle of Moscow was won when the S.U. had strategic disadvantage and shortages in some war materials. Despite tremendous losses at the beginning of the war, the Red Army was still powerful enough to resist the enemy. The Soviet industrial potential, human resources and terrain were of huge help. Having achieved strategic advantage in the battle of Moscow, the S.U. gained time to stabilize and re-start its domestic production.

Although since November 1942 the S.U. was able to overproduce Germany and its allies alone, during the critical period of 1941-1942 the Lend-Lease help was most needed to supplement the Soviet effort in war and evacuation of military industry to the East. LL, even in small quantities also boosted Soviet morale revealing an extraordinary international effort in the struggle against a common enemy.

Needless to say that without mastery of the Soviet Army, fearlessness in combat of the soldiers, devotion to the Motherland and heroism, victory over Germany could not have been possible. Indeed, technology and war devices could do little to help the country win the war if its people were not determined for victory. Although less than desired at the beginning of the war, LL aid, amalgamated with these Russian qualities produced an excellent result – not immediate, though ultimate victory over the Nazi Germany.

CHAPTER III

WAS LEND-LEASE VITAL TO THE SOVIETS?

As the previous chapters revealed, LL was not only about munitions. The LL aid program was an extensive project that exported a variety of war machines, as well as food- stuffs, cloth, vitamins and raw materials. Which of these items was more crucial and had greater impact on the Soviet war effort? How were LL items utilized in the S.U.? To what extent did American armaments help the S.U. achieve victory over Nazi Germany and how did LL supplies help sustain the Red Army? Were the American military supplies more important for the S.U. than non-military deliveries? Who benefited the most from LL: the Soviet frontline or the rear? These questions, as well as LL role in revitalization of the Soviet economy, will be discussed in this chapter.

3.1 Onto Rails and Wheels

In 1943 Stalin emphasized his respect for the American industry at Tehran, claiming that ‘without the United States as a source of motors, this war would have been lost’.¹ Whether this was flattery or a frank recognition of the American war effort remains a question. However, the argument that America put the S.U. Army into rails and wheels is difficult to refute.

¹ William Averell Harriman, *America and Russia in a Changing World: A Half Century of Personal Observation, Memoirs*, (London: Allen & Unwin 1971), p.23

It is hard to disagree with this argument because with the U.S. transportation means the RA advanced faster than it otherwise would without all the trucks, bulldozers, motorcycles and other useful vehicles the U.S. sent to the S.U. under the LL Act. In a modern war physical mobility of the army means not only better strategic maneuverability, but also rapid advance of the armed forces. Moreover, because the domestic railway system was destroyed, the S.U. needed motorized vehicles to ensure logistics and supplies of the RA.² In this sense, the U.S. and LL aid helped enhance the mobility of the RA and accelerated victory in WWII.

Perhaps not all of the U.S. munitions sent through the LL program were 'vital' to the Soviet war effort, but some of the items were highly important for the RA. For instance, Lend-Lease trucks significantly increased mobility of the RA. Throughout the war the U.S. supplied its Soviet counterpart with 362.288 "6x6" trucks and 47.238 jeeps, besides other motor vehicles. Moreover, such important items as aviation gasoline and explosives were of great use in the S.U.³ The importance of LL supply of vehicles can be demonstrated in the case of lorries. While during the war Soviet production of lorries was only 197.100, Americans sent 409.256 lorries and other necessary vehicles under the LL aid program.⁴

LL motor vehicles and transportation means were important for coordination of the RA and large concentration of forces. Some scholars maintain that "good communications were a necessity for success, if not survival" and without LL, which increased Soviet offensive capacity, major attacks would have been delayed, and thus,

² Hubert P. Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear. American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945*, (New York, London: Greenwood, 1989), pp.61-62, 64

³ *Ibid*, pp.99, 118-120

⁴ Roger Munting, "Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.19, No.3 (Jul., 1984), p.500

the war could have been prolonged.⁵ It is impossible to refute that vast Russian territories and the size of RA required large numbers of vehicles to coordinate, supply and move around the battlefield. However, exaggerations should be avoided because the survival of a country does not only depend on its ability of successful deployment of forces and quality of its logistics for the following reasons. One, defending a home country usually gives a moral, or psychological, advantage to the defenders. Second, the Russian land mass and climate present formidable obstacles to invaders. And last, but not least, invaders and occupiers have utmost difficulty in surviving in a hostile environment without collaborators. Nevertheless, LL vehicles significantly increased the offensive capacity of the RA and made battles and offensive operations more dynamic.

Although the Soviet authors disregarded the importance of armored vehicles, tanks and airplane supplies to the S.U., some contemporary Russian authors acknowledged the importance of fuel, lubricants, food and clothes for the survival of 10 millions of Soviet soldiers.⁶ Moreover, the fact that such a powerful country as the U.S. was aiding the S.U. had strong psychological impact on the RA and Soviet workers' determination to purge the enemy.

3.2 The Psychological Impact of Lend-Lease Aid

Although national survival was never doubted in the S.U., Western aid and especially American LL supplies enhanced Soviet belief in victory. Lukashev, a Soviet official who was responsible for the LL allocation and distribution of supplies

⁵ Hubert P. Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, pp.94, 120

⁶ See for instance, V.L. Piankevich, *Vozrozhdenie Sovetskoï Ekonomiki v Gody Velikoï Otechestvennoï Voïny*, (*The Renaissance of the Soviet Economy during the Great Patriotic War*), (St. Petersburg: Nestor, 1999), p.34; A. Paperno, *Lend-Liz i Tikhii Okean*, (*Lend-Lease and the Pacific Ocean*), (Moscow: Terra-Knizhnyi Klub, 1998), pp.46-58

in the S.U. and who 'passed through his hands' most of the LL, said "it is impossible to measure this aid in rubles, watts and tones only...the LL gave us self-confidence, which was a serious weapon".⁷

Besides LL aid, the Russian War Relief, the United States' collection and purchasing agency significantly contributed to sustain the morale of the Soviet people. This agency included representatives of the Army Medical Services, as well as the Soviet Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Materials and aid sent by this agency were not loans or aid on the basis of reciprocity, but gifts from the Americans to the Soviet people.⁸ Moreover, because Soviet industry was converted to produce military goods, there was an enormous gap in consumers' demand for non-military items. The RWR, though partly, acted to alleviate these scarcities. This act boosted morale of the ordinary Soviet people and sustained their effort in struggle against Nazi Germany. The RWR was enhancing Soviet-American friendship, which in turn was a prerequisite for long-lasting peace in Europe.

Together with the RWR, another agency helped the Soviets survive – the American Committee for Medical Aid. This formation functioned both as the central and national agency for all private aid to the S.U. Besides this, the American Red Cross also carried its own program of Russian relief.⁹ Evaluated only in numbers and in comparison to the quantity of Lend-Lease supplies, American aid other than LL, roughly \$47 million, appears insignificant. Perhaps for this reason it was merely omitted by some historians. However, if it had helped Russian workers and partisans survive difficulties of the war, it was substantial help because by this act the U.S.

⁷ N. Matukovskii, "My boialisi ne Amerikantsev, a Voyny: O Cheloveke, kotoriy 'Propustil Cherez svoi Ruki' ves' Lend-Liz", ("We feared not the Americans, but the War: About Man who Passed Through His Hands Whole Lend-Lease"), *Izvestiia*, 17 June 1992; V.L. Piankevich, *Vozrozhdenie Sovetskoi Ekonomiki v Gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voyny*, p.38

⁸ Edward C. Carter, "Russian War Relief", *Slavonic and East European Review*, American Series, Vol.3, No.2. (Aug., 1944), p.62

⁹ *Ibid*, p.65-67

sustained Russian domestic production and released some shortages in medical supplies and food.

Although during the Cold War sincere acknowledgements about American LL were a rarity in Soviet historiography, the psychological impact of the LL aid was never underestimated by ordinary people. In the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s accounts on LL impact on the morale of Soviet people are more frequent. Modern Russian writers dwell on the 'psychological impact' of the LL program and American compassion that boosted morale and decently sustained Soviet people.¹⁰ However, those are merely contemplations, rather than a precise conclusion because of the immense difficulty in measuring this impact. But the memories are still kept in the minds of many Russian witnesses, who still remember what kind of machines and munitions the S.U. received from America.¹¹

"This... [the Lend-Lease aid]...came to us through the ocean – as a symbol of victory, friendship and something else...", as a Soviet prisoner, sentenced by Stalin in the late 1930s, remembers the LL aid during WWII.¹² In the majority of cases, people did not know who the helpers were and they would hardly question why a Western country was helping them. The only thing they were sure of was the true motive of their war and foreign help they received was a decent proof that these motives were genuine. Knowing that they were not alone in this war, the Russian people kept their desire to win intact.

¹⁰ A. Paperno, *Lend-Liz i Tikhii Okean*, pp.84-87; I.P. Lebedev, "Eshchë Raz o Lend-Lize", ("Once Again About Lend-Lease"), SShA- Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya, No.1, Moskva-Nauka, (1990), pp.72-75; M.N. Suprun, *Lend-Liz i Severnye Konvoi*, (*Lend-Lease and the Northern Convoys*), 1941-1945, Institut Rossiiskoi Istorii Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk, Pomorskiĭ Gosudarstvennyi Universitet im. M.V. Lomonosova (Moskva: Andreevskii Flag, 1997), pp.36-40

¹¹ I.P. Lebedev, "Eshchë Raz o Lend-Lize", p.72; Interview with Valentin Iliasenco, retired officer of the RA, 1939-present. Kishinev, Moldova. 28 January 2003. "My mother was working in a factory producing tanks in Cheliabinsk. We cautiously slid through the net and played around hundreds of Diamonds and Studebakers. These huge machines terrified us..."

¹² Varlam Shalamov, *Kolymskie Rasskazy*, (*Kolyma Talks*), (St. Petersburg: Azbuka-klassika, 2002), p.251

Were munitions or the psychological impact of the LL aid more important during the critical years of 1941-1942? It is obvious that at the beginning of the war and during the battle of Moscow direct LL impact on Russian success was limited. "The survival of the S.U. did not depend on Western aid in 1941-early 1942, but the psychological impact was great". LL was "an imponderable factor" that boosted the morale of Soviet people.¹³ Thus, even limited LL supplies were magnified as having had a great moral impact on the RA.¹⁴ LL filled Soviet soldiers with self-confidence and reassured that "they [the Soviet people] had strong allies who would not let them go under. This they had needed sorely."¹⁵

On the other hand, not only Western LL supplies helped boost the Soviet morale, but also the S.U. Army's success in the winter campaign supported and enhanced the confidence of the American people, who were frustrated after the December 1941 disastrous Pearl Harbor incident. In this sense, psychological support was mutual. Conceivably, cooperation between the allies did not only represent an amalgamation of resources, but also a unification of beliefs and worries, which significantly magnified the strength of the coalition.

3.3 Utilization of Lend-Lease Supplies in the S.U.

One of the most puzzling questions, and still not fully researched, is the utilization of LL supplies in the SU. Ironically, miscellaneous Soviet literature on

¹³ Hubert P. Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*. pp.52-53

¹⁴ L.V. Pozdeeva, "Lend-Liz Dlia S.S.S.R.: Diskussiiia Prodolzhaetsia", (Lend-Lease for the U.S.S.R.: Discussion is Continuing), in O.A. Rzheshhevskii, ed., *Vtoraia Mirovaia Voïna: Aktual'nye Problemy, Second World War: Actual Problems*, Rossiïskaia Akademiia Nauk, Istitut Vseobshcheï Istorii, (Moskva: Nauka, 1995), p.330

¹⁵ Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), p.17

WWII, (more than 20.000 books and 2.000 articles, works and dissertations are available in the Russian language), does not offer any specific information on how Western aid received by the S.U. was used in the battles. Moreover, no precise information is available about the LL supplies used in Soviet domestic industry and war production. To discover the past, reminiscences and memoirs of the Russian people who lived during this period could help, perhaps, but only partially.

First of all, Soviet authors were reticent about these facts because of the existing U.S.-S.U. tensions immediately after the war and during the following Cold War years. All information and published sources were censored. For instance, Zorin's book about Lend-Lease cooperation in the Persian Gulf was 729 pages long in its original version, including illustrations, schemas and maps. Politizdat, the Soviet main publishing house, eventually published only 175 pages of the book almost 10 years after the work was submitted to the censor authorities. There should have been some 'accidental' loss of pages because the book was shortened and contained no supplementary maps and tables. Furthermore, not only the Soviet writers were reticent about Lend-Lease issues, but the American government was also not very enthusiastic to disclose the exact amount of LL aid sent to communist Russia.¹⁶

Secondly, the capitalist system and particularly the U.S., which was the best representative of this social, political and financial structure, were alienated by Soviet politics. It was the Soviet state tradition to claim 'we're the best system' and 'we've got no equals'. Partly because of this inherent sense of pride and superiority, there was a continuous tendency to assert that WWII was won because 'we fought it' and because the Communist Party had the 'decisive leading role' in it.¹⁷ Thus, records about bravery and heroism of a Soviet soldier driving an American tank or holding an

¹⁶ A. Paperno, *Lend-Liz i Tikhii Okean*, pp. 8-10, 12-16, 28

¹⁷ A.M. Samsonov, ed., *Vtoraia Mirovaia Voïna, (The Second World War)*, Vol.I, *Obshchie Problemy, (Second World War: General Problems)*, (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1966), pp.26-32

American rifle would be rarely, if at all, seen in Soviet literature on WWII. Pride and conceit of the Soviet socialist system would hardly allow this to happen.

Thirdly, the LL supplies were not 'visually' seen in combat operations because the great majority were diverted and used for other purposes. Only numbers are provided in official publications and reports on LL supplies. Yet, it is unknown what proportion of the received LL aid, such as industrial machine tools, fuel and oil to run these and other war machines, food, clothes for soldiers and workers or other items were actually used in the battles, to produce or help to produce war munitions in the S.U. Varlam Shalamov, who during WWII was sentenced in Gulag camps, remembers that during the war American trucks and bulldozers were used to bury dead people, glycerin was sold as 'American honey' and second hand clothes, instead of being distributed among the prisoners, were "grabbed in a wrestling match between generals' wives".¹⁸ Many similar stories remained hidden in history, and only few of them were made public. Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the actual use of the Lend-Lease supplies.

While it might be very difficult to estimate the military impact of LL aid program in Russia, the humanitarian effect is more obvious. For Western scholars it was an intricate task to evaluate the real number of American weapons used in the battles, because during the war and in its aftermath available information was scarce, if not beyond reach. The reason was primarily 'unconditional aid', that is, the S.U. was not obliged to provide any kind of information and submit reports on its use of American munitions. Moreover, sometimes the U.S. officials were not allowed to travel to the Eastern frontline and inspect as requested by the U.S. which was often

¹⁸ Varlam Shalamov, *Kolymskie Rasskazy*, pp.247-251

denied by the Russians.¹⁹ Thus, the U.S. was providing military support, but knew little where it went and how it was used. It was not only difficult to control LL supplies and their use on Russian territory, but also to estimate possible Soviet requests. The Americans, being unaware of the situation, could do little to evade and solve problems related to the use and maintenance of American equipment in Russia. This, naturally, created misunderstandings and reduced the overall efficiency of the program.

Utilization of the LL supplies in the S.U. during WWII is not clear. Through the end of the war the U.S. officials received reports that some of the LL items were submitted to third parties and circulated in liberated areas. Russian 'goodwill' gestures of distributing American LL were known in case of trucks in Poland and sugar in Finland.²⁰

Lastly, the LL aid sent to the S.U. was not sent immediately to the front line. Besides training and getting to know the machines, Soviet technicians adapted them to better use, making modifications and rearming the machines. For instance, in many tanks original 40-mm guns were substituted by Russian 76-mm weapons, which significantly increased their fighting capability. The Soviets combined and configured machines according to their needs.²¹ There were also cases when the Soviets modified aircraft, such as Tomahawks, Kittyhawks and Hurricanes.²²

Due to the above-mentioned reasons, Western writers sometimes are very suspicious on how the S.U. utilized LL supplies. Ryavec, for instance, claimed that American Studebakers were used to remove several nationalities from their homeland,

¹⁹ Hubert P. Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, pp. 8-9, 11

²⁰ Roger Munting, "Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort", p.504; Leon Martel, *Lend-Lease, Loans, and Coming of the Cold War: A Study of the Implementation of Foreign Policy*, (Boulder: CO: Westview Press, 1979), p.55

²¹ Hubert P. Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, p.50

²² Carl-Fredrik Geust, Gennadiy Petrov, *Lend-Lease Aircraft in Russia, Red Stars*, Vol.4, (Kustantaja: Apali Oy, 2002), pp.189-192

for instance Kalmyks, Chechens and Crimean Tatars. Moreover, American transportation means facilitated Stalin's advance for domination in Eastern Europe and served "the attainment of Stalin's political purposes".²³ Most of these claims are speculative and maybe attributed to Cold War discourse. However, it is difficult to repudiate the importance of some LL supplies such as food and industrial machines for sustaining the Soviet war economy.

3.4 How Essential Was Lend-Lease for Soviet Victory?

3.4.1. American Food Supplies

Agriculture and production of food supplies were the most difficult problem the Soviets encountered during the war. By the end of 1941 the Nazis were in occupation of huge Russian territory – where 45% of the Soviet population lived, a zone which produced 1/3 of the industrial output, 38% of the grain and cattle, 84% of sugar, 60% of hogs.²⁴ Agricultural production and supplies never reached the pre-war level and many Soviet people were left to starve during the war.²⁵ Moreover, prior to June 1941 and during the first months of war, the country was moving its industrial and agricultural plants further to the East. Stalin ordered to exterminate and destroy 'without fail' everything that could not be transported to the East, all useful property, including non-ferrous metals, grain and fuel.²⁶ In 1941-42 agricultural production fell

²³ Karl W. Ryavec, *United States-Soviet Relations*, (London-N.Y.:Longman, 1989), p.40

²⁴ R. H. Jones, *The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union*, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), p.216

²⁵ Hans Adolf Jacobsen, A.J.P. Taylor, 1939-1945, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Kronik und Dokumenten*, (Second World War, In Chronicles and Documents), (Moskva: Misl, 1995), p.459

²⁶ Stalin's Broadcast Speech, in Andrew Rothstein, trans., *Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War, Documents and Materials*, Vol.1, June 22, 1941-December 31, 1943, (London: Hutchinson & Co. Publishers, 1946), p.23

by 2/3 and in some products by one half of the pre-war output. In these conditions, Lend-Lease food supplies, therefore, were the most valuable and most demanded items at the beginning of the war.

At the beginning of the 1930s, forced communist collectivization had a detrimental impact on the food reserves the S.U. possessed on the eve of war and diminished the country's capacity to feed itself. Peasants reacted to this policy by destroying their grain supplies and livestock. Moreover, in 1940 the S.U. signed an agreement with Germany under which it promised to export 1 million tons of feed grain and 120 million Reichsmarks worth of vegetables. Within 18 months prior to German invasion the S.U. delivered to Germany 1.604.000 tons of grain, 365 tons of seeds, 28.539 tons of soybeans, 9.350 tons of vegetable oil, 78.114 tons of whale oil, 24.761 of fish oil and other fats.²⁷ This drastically worsened the situation, because limited food hurt Russian ability to resist the enemy more than fighters and tanks did. Therefore, food was needed more than anything else.

Grain and fats were considered to be the most necessary items during war and constituted the largest part in total American food supplies to the S.U. However, even if the S.U. had not signed the agreement with Germany, the amount of exported food supplies would hardly have sustained the RA's extensive need for nutritious products. Even then, insufficient preparedness in terms of food supplies was obvious. Millions of civilian people were starving to death. Even in the RA, as many soldiers remember, food was in shortage.

Foodstuffs gradually became a top-priority on the list of Soviet demands in 1942-1943. One of the most important Russian requests in 1942 was food, which constituted around 15 percent of total LL tonnage. By the end of 1942, the S.U.

²⁷ William Moskoff, *The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the U.S.S.R. During World War II*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp.7-9, 13

received 4.5 million tons of foodstuffs. Food demands were persistent throughout 1943 and rose from 24 to 33 percent of total LL shipments.²⁸ Although by 1944 Soviet food production started to recover and some arable parts of the S.U. were liberated, U.S. food supplies continued to be of crucial help, which sustained Soviet endeavor for victory until 1945.

Moreover, the U.S. proved to be very responsive to Soviet needs. Thus, canned meat was produced under a special Russian formula, combining meat and spices into ready-to-use 'tushonka'.²⁹ Memoirs of Soviet soldiers and people who lived throughout the war provided evidence that American 'tushonka' was commonly known as 'friendly help' from the West:

American tushonka saved my life. During the war our camp did not receive any food supplies, except for American LL help, that was thrown directly from the air. Of course, government had higher priorities than to feed prisoners; we were basically sentenced to death. Fit enough practiced hunting, weaker hunted the weakest.... Those who could not catch animals, caught sick people... To the city – 100 km... Russian taiga and American planes, night riders, that kept us alive...³⁰

Special Soviet requests also included dried prunes and fruits, which were used to make hot fruity drinks during cold Russian winters. However, the food was not distributed consistently and many Soviet civilians did not see any, if at all. Soviet officials distributed American food first to the strategically important zones.

LL food aid was initially envisaged solely for the use of the RA, but gradually found itself on Russian black markets and Siberian industrial zones. During 1942-1943 food shortages were acute. The Russian Siberian population needed food not less than the soldiers in Stalingrad. It was vital to keep Siberian workers alive, since the bulk of military weapons was produced there. In 1942 the first American food aid

²⁸ Hubert P. Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, pp.60-62

²⁹ Edward R. Stettinius Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory*, p.178; Roger Munting, "Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort", p.499

³⁰ Unpublished memoirs of a Soviet prisoner, Nikolai Antonenko, (1913-1978), presented during an interview with his daughter Evdokiia Antonenko, (1950-present). Russian Embassy, Ankara, Turkey. 15 March, 2004

appeared in the Volga region. By 1943, some foodstuffs were distributed as part of civilian ration.³¹ An elderly lady remembers that in the Urals almost all trucks and cars used in industrial plants were American Studebakers. Food, which they lived on, was also American. It consisted of canned milk and meat, butter and other elementary products. The lady never expressed overt gratitude to Americans, though she acknowledged that they 'did a lot' to keep her children alive.³² Thus, the U.S. part in WWII and its supplies are kept back in memory, whilst during the Cold War they were suppressed and the truth about American food aid became known only in its aftermath.

Some scholars taking into consideration that the food was sent over 3.5 years and the RA had approximately 11 million soldiers, calculated that LL grain and flour would have constituted less than one month's supply for the RA ration.³³ The Office of Strategic Services computed that during first three months of 1943, LL food aid provided 17 percent of calories for the RA, which otherwise would reduce civilian food supplies by 38 percent.³⁴

However, these calculations do not count that most of the LL food sent was dehydrated or concentrated, which significantly increased its nutritious value. The initial belief that American food shipment met only a small part of the calorie requirement of the Soviet soldiers and was designed only for military use, has been recently rejected by the post-Cold War Russian historians, who claim that measured in proteins, vitamins and mineral value, the LL food aid made a serious contribution not only to the RA, but also to many civilian people, children and even prisoners. Suprun, for instance, calculated the energy value of all food products sent to the S.U.

³¹ Roger Munting, "Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort", p.502

³² Interview with Elena Proshenkova, retired, (1915-present). Moscow. 21 February 2004.

³³ William Moskoff, *The Bread of Affliction*, pp.120-122

³⁴ For OSS data and details see Roger Munting, "Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort", p.502

during the war. His finding is more than astonishing. Considering calories, alimentary products delivered under Lend-Lease could supplement an average daily portion of every Russian soldier during the entire five years of the war, given that the Soviet army was as large as 10 million men.³⁵ In this regard, American help was praiseworthy.

How important was LL food aid for the Soviet war effort? Taking into consideration that food shortages were obvious even in 1943, the S.U. would have serious troubles, if there was not food aid from the West. Without LL food supplies, Soviet agriculture would have to produce more food. This was not possible especially in 1941-1942, during full mobilization, shortage of labor and detrimental weather conditions. Moreover, Germany occupied fertile land in Russia, the Ukraine and Moldova, which decreased Russian food production capacity.

If there was no LL food aid, the Soviet authorities would have to cut either RA rations, which is less likely, or civilian workers' daily rations. Either would have caused more deaths. During the war, official food rations of the ordinary Russian people fell below the necessary amount to avoid malnutrition. Priority was given to the RA soldiers and manual workers, who produced munitions. During the war, death from malnutrition was common throughout the country. If there was no LL for the RA, rations for the rear would have been decreased, which could have caused larger number of civilian deaths and decreased production capacity of Soviet factories. Otherwise, if there was no LL, thousands of people would have lost their lives.

³⁵ M.N. Suprun, "Prodovolstvennie Postavki po Lend-Lizu v Godi Vtoroi Mirovoi Voini", (Food Supplies under Lend-Lease during WWII), *Otechestvennaya Istoriia*, no.3, 1996, p.455; A. Paperno, *Lend-Liz i Tihii Okean*, p.349

Contemporary Soviet writers reassert that if there were no LL, a greater number of people would die out in this war.³⁶ Memoirs of war participants confirm that LL food was of major importance to the RA, even at the end of the war. A Captain of the Pacific Fleet, N. Garntsev, remembers that during combat operations in the Far East “everything we ate, wore, every single weapon we fought the Germans was of American origin. If there was no LL, I would not exist, nor many of the others...”³⁷ In this sense, Allied help to the SU and benefit of the food supplies to the Russians could hardly be underestimated.

Thus, until the end of the war the main source of food for Soviet Russia remained American food supplies under LL agreement. During the war, from October 1941 through May 1945, \$1.7 billion worth of food supplies, 4.5 million tons, or approximately 15 percent out of total \$10.9 billion LL aid were sent to the Soviet Union.³⁸ Overall during the war out of the total LL tonnage, ¼ was food.³⁹ If divided equally, LL foodstuffs provided nutrition for 12 million Russian Army, that was ‘slightly more than a pound of concentrated food a day’.⁴⁰ However, the weight and volume of the U.S. food supplies cannot measure adequately the real value of such deliveries.

³⁶ M.N. Suprun, “Prodoval'stvennye Postavki po Lend-Lizu v Gody Vtoroi Mirovoi Voini”, (“Food Supplies under Lend-Lease During WWII”), *Otechestvennaia Istoriia*, no.3, (1996), p.53; A.Paperno, *Lend-Liz i Tikhii Okean*, pp.352-357; William Moskoff, *The Bread of Affliction*, pp.160-175

³⁷ A. Paperno, *Lend-Liz i Tikhii Okean*, p.340

³⁸ William Moskoff, *The Bread of Affliction*, pp.119-120; see appendices table 8, p.188; table 4, p.119

³⁹ *America's Economic Policy: for the War and the Peace*, Texts of statements by officials of the United States Government and the fifth and sixth Reports to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations, (Hutchinson & Co.: London, 1943), p.18-23; see also appendices table 3, p.118

⁴⁰ R. H. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p.220

3.4.2 “Stubborn” 4 Percent

Many Soviet historians tended to underestimate the impact of lend-lease supplies on Russian success over Germany and its allies. The main argument was put forward as follows. Whilst taken in numbers and tons, lend-lease supplies may appear as a significant help for the Soviet Army, but these shipments constituted only 4 percent of the Soviet war production. Therefore, they could not really help the situation much.⁴¹

Recognition, though underestimation of the Lend-Lease aid importance for the S.U., was a common position most of the Soviet writers and generals adopted. For instance, Marshal of the S.U. Sergey Sokolov, who served as Minister of Defence, said:

...we are grateful to our Allies for the shipment of war supplies to the USSR under the Lend-Lease Act...This assistance was, of course, helpful. It must be said though that arms shipments from the United States and Britain represented a mere 4 percent of the weaponry produced by the SU. The Nazi enemy was defeated, for the most part by the force of Soviet arms created by the heroic labor of the Soviet people, who worked at the limit of human endurance, without leaving workshops for months....⁴²

In Soviet historiography on the war, such a small amount as 4 percent could not have affected the outcome of war. However, different figures can also be encountered. Thus, Liutov and Noskov maintain that supplies under Lend-Lease in proportion to the Soviet domestic production accounted for 12 percent in aircraft, 10 percent in

⁴¹ I. E. Chadaev, *Ekonomika S.S.S.R. v Gody Velikoï Otechestvennoï Voïny*, (*U.S.S.R. Economy During the Great Patriotic War*), 1941-1945, 2nd ed., (Moskva: Mysl, 1985), p.475; *Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voïna 1941-1945, Slovar'-Spravochnik*, (*Great Patriotic War, Informative Dictionary*), (Moscow: Politizdat, 1985), p.258; N.A. Voznesenskiï, *Soviet Economy During the Second World War*, (New York: International Publishers Cop., 1949), p.44; V.L. Piankevich, *Vozrozhdenie Sovetskoi Ekonomiki v Gody Velikoï Otechestvennoï Voïny*, p.32; A. S. Iakovlev, *Sovetskie Samolëty*, (*Soviet Aircrafts*), (Moskva: Mysl, 1971), p.132; A.M. Samsonov, *Krakh Fashistskoi Agressii, 1939-1945*, (*The Crash of the Fascist Aggression*), (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1980), p.204

⁴² *Main Front, Soviet Leader Look Back on World War II*, (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987), pp.187-188

tanks and only 2 percent in artillery pieces.⁴³ It should be noted that only three items are counted in percentages, while the others are given in numbers. Oil and vehicles are not counted, for the simple fact that their percentage would be greater.⁴⁴ Also, this data refers to the Soviet production during the whole time of the war. No specification was made how much help the Soviet Army received during the critical periods and at the turning points of the war, such as the battles in Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk.

Moreover, the majority of Soviet authors while counting on 'percentage' considered only military help to the S.U., basically munitions. For instance, none of them provides the ratio of Soviet domestic production of food to the amount of foodstuffs received through LL deliveries. None of them mentioned, boots, which the S.U. stopped to produce because a sharp decrease in livestock created shortages of leather. Moreover, while considering 4 percent, many Soviet writers did not take into consideration particular items and strategic materials that the S.U. sought to import most. Thus, for instance, 42 percent of total wartime supplies of aluminum the S.U. needed for domestic production were met from the allied aid.⁴⁵

Discrepancy in numbers represents the biggest trouble for scholars who study LL and its effects on the Russian economy and war effort. Thus, although the Cold War is over and Soviet archives are available for study, dissimilar accounts prevent both sides from assessing the LL aid program with accuracy. Many Russian historians still do not take into account LL supplies, which were lost during transactions and shipments. They do not assess those supplies, which were diverted from direct use in

⁴³ I.S. Liutov, A.M. Noskov, *Koalitsionnoe Vzaimodeĭstvie Soiuznikov, Po Opytu Pervoĭ i Vtoroĭ Mirovikh Voĭn*, (*Coalitional Cooperation of the Allies, From the Experience of First and Second World Wars*), Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defence, (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1988), p.90

⁴⁴ John Garrard, Carol Garrard, ed., *World War Two and the Soviet People: Selected Papers from the Fourth World Congress for Soviet and Eastern European Studies*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p.7

⁴⁵ Roger Munting, "Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort", p.500; see appendices table 5, p.119

war into other activities, such as supporting S.U. domestic production of war materials and munitions, or diverted to the black market.

However, contemporary Soviet writers are more objective about the impact of LL supplies on the Soviet war effort. Based on archival documents, I.P. Lebedev concluded that LL war airplanes constituted 16-20% of their counterparts produced in the S.U. during the war. This could not be regarded as an 'incomparably small' amount of help, as many Soviet writers claimed. Another writer, Paperno, approached the problem more realistically and tried to establish a connection between the amount received by the S.U. and its actual usefulness for the battles, as opposed to just comparing the proportion of the LL to Soviet domestic production.⁴⁶ She concluded that the American LL supplies, especially ships and planes, as well as food and cloths were of greatest help to the Soviet war effort.

3.4.3 Lend-Lease Role in Revitalization of Soviet War Economy

As was mentioned above, Soviet literature on LL supplies and Allied coalition dwelled on 'insignificant help' provided by the US and other Western powers. It was also made clear that the S.U. won the war using and exhausting its own resources and was the single country able to win the war without relying on foreign aid and supplies. Moreover, Cold-War writers also maintain that the unique structure of the Soviet system, strength of political and economic organization the S.U. had allowed for the liquidation of the disasters of the war, again, without any foreign help.⁴⁷ Thus, there was even no mention that in the aftermath of the war the LL supplies rejuvenated the seriously damaged Soviet economy.

⁴⁶ A. Paperno, *Lend-Liz i Tikhii Okean*, p.34

⁴⁷ For a discussion on these matters see V.L. Piankevich, *Vozrozhdenie Sovetskoï Ekonomiki v Gody Velikoï Otechestvennoï Voïny*, p.30-32

These claims hardly reflect the reality. First of all because American machines and industrial tools that were used to produce war items could have been easily converted for peace-time production and industry could successfully produce consumer goods. For example, a tire factory would continue to produce tires for trucks that were needed for the state's economic recovery. As well, oil drilling and petroleum refinery machines could be of great use during the post-war recovery program. There were thousands of other raw and industrial materials sent to the S.U. that the Soviet authors have omitted as having had only impact on their struggle against German forces and on the reconstruction of their economy. For instance, supplies of industrial tools and machines constituted 25 percent of the Soviet domestic production in 1942-1945. Moreover, locomotives supplied (steam engines, about 2.000) recompensed damaged machines and despite the fact that their production was halted, the SU emerged out of the war with the initial pre-war number.⁴⁸

From the end of 1942, when the Soviet domestic production of war munitions recovered and assumed an accelerating path, in the Soviet "list of demands" industrial items and deficit materials used for war production prevailed.⁴⁹ Materials received were diverted to recover damaged plants, power stations and heavy industry. Moreover, in order to restore the economic potential of the country, transport means were required. The S.U. had difficulty in supplying its own army with all essential vehicles, thus it hardly was able to divert some transportation means from the front-line to the reconstruction of domestic economy. American bulldozers, excavators, locomotives and other transportation vehicles helped the Soviet economy to recover.

Moreover, among industrial supplies, there was equipment of permanent value, such as a complete automobile tire factory, turbines for several electric stations,

⁴⁸ V.L. Piankevich, *Vozrozhdenie Sovetskoj Ekonomiki v Gody Velikoj Otechestvennoj Vojny*, p.37

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p.35

\$50 million worth of petroleum refinery equipment, gear for tractor manufacture and coal mining. “Thus, the three foundation stones of modern industry, coal, oil, and steel, on which all Soviet industrial development in turn is based, are American in most characteristics and design.”⁵⁰ LL aid also helped with establishment of the railroad system, it supplied enough wagons that could have been used for revitalization of the economy during post-war reconstruction. In Soviet foodstuffs industry, American machines were used for canning meat, vegetables, fish, packaging services, dairy products, and poultry production.

An excellent example how LL aid was used in the aftermath of the war is the tire factory sponsored by Ford, which after long negotiations was delivered to the S.U. However, the plant had no operational value during the war because it was designed to produce car-type tires, while the demand was for military tires. Thus, this was a cost-free industrial capital for the Soviet Union.⁵¹ Nevertheless, it remains extremely difficult to estimate the impact of the LL machinery and industrial tools for the post-war Soviet recovery because Russian sources are scarce about LL utilization.

3.5 Conclusion: What If There Was No Aid?

Many scholars who wrote on LL and its implications for the Soviet war effort argue that LL aid was either ‘vital’ and ‘absolutely necessary’, or ‘insignificantly little’ to make a difference during major battles. Dubious arguments were put forward in some sources that the Allied help ensured Russian ability to resist the enemy and without this help the Soviet economy would not be able to offer enough material

⁵⁰ Ernest C. Ropes, “The Shape of United States-Soviet Trade, Past and Future”, *Slavonic and East European Review, American Series*, Vol. 3, No. 2. (Aug., 1944), pp.9, 12-13 During the war Ropes served in Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce

⁵¹ Roger Munting, “Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort”, p.504

sources to sustain its armies in battles.⁵² That is, the Soviet regime used limited resources to win the war and feed the army, and “it...[the S.U.]... was not a nation rich enough to fight a great war, that is to feed, clothe, and to supply its army and also feed its civilian population”.⁵³ Moreover, many historians took accounts of war participants and witnesses for granted, which may not be representative:

The economic position of Russia was a desperate one, and had it not been for the steady stream of Anglo-American supplies then pouring into Archangel it is doubtful whether the Russians would have been able to turn to their advantage, the fantastic situation in which Hitler had placed his armies.⁵⁴

These claims and the background of the Russian pre-war and wartime economy given in the previous chapters coincide. If the S.U. was potentially stronger than Germany, why did it ask the Allies for additional help, especially for tanks and aircraft? If the Soviets were so ‘desperate for aid’ and had huge demands, does it mean that they were weak? What considerations were behind providing and receiving Western aid?

As was already mentioned, the S.U. barely needed many of munitions received from the Allies, at the time when they began to arrive in great quantity, or after 1943, the crucial year. Besides being an air war, WWII was also a tank war, so let us approach the question from there. In tanks, for instance, besides T-34 and KV machines, which had no equals around the world, the RA had T-28, T-35, T-37, T-38, T-40 and BT-7, BT-7M machines abounded. BT-7, which is usually regarded as obsolete, had a motor almost 2 times more powerful than the best German HL-120 TRM.⁵⁵ At the beginning of the war the S.U. had 1400 T-34; 711 KV; 277 T-40 as of

⁵² W. Schwabedissen, *The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of German Commanders*, *U.S. Air Force Historical Studies*, no.175, (New York: 1968), p.159, cited in O.A. Rzheshhevskiĭ, *Voĭna i Istorii*, p.189

⁵³ William Moskoff, *The Bread of Affliction*, p.236, 238

⁵⁴ Major-General J.F.C. Fuller quoted in B.B. Schofield, *The Russian Convoys*, (London: B.T. Batsford, 1964), p.207

⁵⁵ V. Suvorov, *Samoubiistvo*, (*The Suicide*), (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Act, 2002), pp.39-40, 205-209

June 21, 1941.⁵⁶ Definitely, this was not enough to resist Germany. The production was resumed only in the second half of 1942, when evacuation of factories to the East was completed. Until then, scarce Western supplies could not make a big difference and the only option remained was all-out resistance to the enemy.

Moreover, the S.U. artillery industry implied some very important inventions, such as 120 mm guns, 152 mm ML-20 gun and BM-8, BM-13 203 mm, which were the best of that time. On the other hand, the German Army had standardized 50 mm anti-tank weapons, while this was not enough to destroy the armor of the Allied tanks.⁵⁷ Germany, technically, could have met the S.U. in quantity and quality of artillery units produced, but much precious time was used to determine which type of device to produce.

If WWII was for the most part a tank war, and the S.U. had advantage in both tanks and artillery, why did it require Western help? Apparently, at the beginning of the war the S.U. needed to evacuate its factories and industrial plants to the East, and had to stop domestic production for a while. The Soviet officials might have sought LL as supportive means during 1941-1942 to sustain the country's efforts in war. Conceivably, that is why Stalin insisted on speed of shipment and 'as many munitions as possible'.

Perhaps without exaggerating, the S.U. was the single country on the European theater of war that without relying on foreign help had the potential to cover the war needs of munitions and strategic materials. The Soviet Union had a relatively developed military-industrial complex, had large human resources and necessary raw materials. However, besides these, there was determination and outstanding will-

⁵⁶ *Boevoi i Chislennii Sostav Vooruzhennikh Sil S.S.S.R. v Period Velikoï Otechestvennoï Voïny, Sbornik N.1, 22 Iun', 1941, (Military and Numerical Composition of Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R., Collection N.1, 22 June 1941), (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1994), p.12*

⁵⁷ V. Suvorov, *Samoubištvo*, p.138

power. People were ready to sacrifice. 'Everything for the front' became the main principle that governed rear-frontline Soviet relations. For these reasons, LL aid should not be discussed in terms of vital necessity, but for sufficiency to help sustain the Soviet war effort.

Wars are most difficult at the beginning, even at the home front beginning with the first battles till advantage is taken away from the enemy. For the Soviet Army the period from June, 1941 to Spring, 1942 was the most difficult. However, at the beginning foreign shipments were limited, but when they arrived in significant amounts, the S.U. had already exhausted the Axis power and was overproducing Germany. Even at the end of 1941 Soviet production was 30 percent more than that of the German.⁵⁸ In 1942, the S.U. was producing \$11.5 billion worth of munitions, while Germany produced only \$8.5 billion worth. The production was almost equal in 1943, but it was already too late, because the Germans lost very important strategic battles and were practically defeated.⁵⁹ By 1944, Russian munitions production was at least 50 percent above what Germany could spare out of its current output for the eastern front.⁶⁰ Moreover, the LL aid was uneven in volume and frequency, and thus, could not have an equal impact on Soviet fighting capability throughout the war. As a Western scholar put it, "LL grew proportionally to the Soviet capacity to meet its own military needs".⁶¹

Nevertheless, LL helped sustain the Soviet effort, providing millions of people with daily rations, warm clothes and other non-military items. In retrospect, it might

⁵⁸ See appendices table 7, p.120

⁵⁹ Mark Harrison, "Resource Mobilization for World War II: The U.S.A, U.K., U.S.S.R, and Germany, 1938-1945", *The Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol.41, No.2. (May, 1988), p.172; appendix, table 7, p.116

⁶⁰ Raymond W. Goldsmith, "The Power of Victory: Munitions Output in World War II", *Military Affairs*, Vol.10, No.1. (Spring, 1946), p.75

⁶¹ Hubert P. Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, pp.49-50

be difficult to calculate how many lives LL food supplies saved or how many more months the S.U. could fight if there was no LL. Thus, in a sense, LL had a military rationale, but served the best for the rear and humanitarian purpose. But the S.U. did not survive simply because of LL. Foreign aid enhanced its capacity to resist the enemy, magnifying its resources and making up for some of its logistic deficiencies.



CHAPTER IV

LEND-LEASE AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL

The last chapter of this study argues that LL was a foreign policy tool through which, the U.S. utilized to attain its national interest at that point in time. In this framework the issue of the second front, purpose of the program, Soviet war effort and lastly, American and Soviet intentions and misperceptions will be discussed. An attempt will be made to understand the reasons behind the American decision to choose this policy and provide help to the S.U. It will be concluded that LL, as a tool for attaining a foreign policy goal in the conjuncture of WWII was an optimal decision and the best foreign policy option. First of all, the U.S. was not a belligerent yet and was unprepared for a direct involvement. Sending LL aid to European counterparts would gain extra time for preparations. Moreover, helping only Great Britain was risky, because if the S.U. would fail, the British would have to face the war with Germany alone. Furthermore, for the U.S. domination of Europe either by Germany or the S.U. was unacceptable. Potential risk to Europe perhaps was the main drive that urged this policy, given that the U.S. would stay away from the conflict, at least for a while.

4.1 Lend-Lease As Substitute to the Second Front

One of the primary questions of Anglo-Soviet, and later U.S.-British-Soviet coalition, was the second front issue. From the first months of the war, in order to relieve the tremendous burden on its homeland, the Soviet foreign policy goal and Stalin's diplomatic priority was to persuade the Allies to open a second front in Europe.¹ Stalin believed that early failures of the Soviet Army against Nazi forces were caused by the absence of a second front.² He hoped that with another front in Europe Germany would have to split its forces into more war theaters and thus, the Soviet burden of war would be partially released. Although several attempts were made to establish a second front in Europe, the decision to open a new arena for fighting was not taken until 1944.

Soviet historians of the Cold War period believed that the second front issue depended on Russian ability to resist Germany.³ At the beginning of the war, Americans were still suspicious about the Soviet potential to resist Axis powers, hence they were reluctant to start major military operations in Europe.⁴ However, there was a complication. First of all, the U.S. was not at war until the late 1941. Secondly, if the S.U. would be defeated, Germany might have directed its forces to the West. Therefore, the S.U. should have been kept in the struggle by all means. LL became the most feasible foreign policy solution to keep the S.U. fighting at that time.

¹ J.L. Gaddis, *Russia, The Soviet Union, and The United States: An Interpretive History*, (New York: Wiley Cop. 1978), p. 153

² Andrew Rothstein, trans., *Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War, Documents and Materials*, Vol.1, June 22, 1941-December 31, 1943, (London: Hutchinson & Co. Publishers, 1946), p.28

³ O.A. Rzheshhevskii, *Voïna i Istoriia, Burzhuaznaia Historiografia SShA o Vtoroi Mirovoi Voïne*, (*The War and History: Bourgeois Historiography on Second World War*), 2nd ed., (Moscow: Mysl, 1984), p.182

⁴ Cited in V.L. Israëlian, *Antigitlerovskaia Koalitsiia, 1941-1945, Diplomaticheskoe Sotrudnichestvo SSSR, SshA i Anglii v Gody Vtoroi Morovoï Voïny*, (*Anti-Hitler Coalition, 1941-1945, Diplomatic Cooperation between U.S.S.R., U.S.A. During the Second World War*), (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1964), p.130

Extension of LL or opening a second front in Europe remained as two major options widely discussed among American officials.⁵ Both foreign policy options were directed to help Russia survive the Nazi attack. Nevertheless, if the first implied drain of material resources and war materiel, deciding the opposite would require a standing American army to be sent to the war theater. Strong aversion to sending people to imminent death is what marked American decision to envisage LL help to the S.U.

During the war the second front remained one of the most important issues of discussion. On June 1, 1942 President Roosevelt, announced reduction of LL shipments from \$4.1 million to \$2.5 million tons to make the remainder available for a second front.⁶ Since by mid-1942 the S.U. had already established its domestic production of munitions, and the Soviet government was eager to agree with Roosevelt and cut down the LL supplies. However, some items were of great importance. Molotov expressed worries about non-military aid such as metals, railroad material and food, which he stated, 'would impose restrictions' on the Russian rear.⁷

If the U.S. would open a second front in Europe, the S.U. proposed to limit shipments to industrial goods and tools necessary for domestic war industry.⁸ In the same note Stalin mentioned the 'absolute necessity' of more help and a second front;

⁵ R. H. Jones, *The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union*, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), p.248. Roosevelt was convinced of the necessity to open the second front as soon as possible, but his military advisers, not without an impact of Churchill's view, dissuaded the President and pointed the difficulty and even danger in landing large American troops to Western Europe. See Amos Perlmutter, *FDR & Stalin: A Not So Great Alliance*, pp.232-233

⁶ Hubert P. Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear. American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945*, (New York, London: Greenwood, 1989), p.32

⁷ Hubert P. Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, p.32; William H. Standley, Arthur A. Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, (Chicago: H.Regner Co., 1955), p.82

⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Perepiska Predsedatelia Soveta Ministrov SSSR s Prezidentom SshA i Premier-Ministrami Velikobritanii vo Vremia Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ Voĭny, 1941-1945 gg.*, (Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945), (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo PoliticheskoiLiteratury, 1976), vol.1, p.19

otherwise Russia would be defeated, he warned. However, neither of these happened, nor was the S.U. defeated. Although the second front was not opened and supplies of munitions were not yet very large, the Soviet army started active attacks against Germany as early as Autumn 1941. Therefore, the second front and LL supplies could not have been of 'absolute necessity' to the S.U. Thus, if at the beginning of the war the U.S. had several foreign policy options, in Summer and Autumn of 1941 the Soviets had only one alternative – all-out resistance to Nazi Germany.

The Allied unwillingness to open a second front caused an impression in the S.U. that its allies wanted both the destruction of Germany and weakening of the S.U.⁹ General John R. Deane commented that several Allied promises to open a second front and relieve the Russian effort in the war were broken, which created distrust in the S.U., caused suspicions of the Allied intentions and complicated relations within the alliance and made the LL matter more difficult.¹⁰ While the Allies “expected the formation of the second front”, the Soviets perceived their promises with much suspicion.¹¹ For the Soviets the delay in opening a second front was deliberate. Anastas Mikoyan, commissar of external affairs, told Zorin: “Instead of opening the second front, our Allies try to purchase our effort by paying us with Lend-Lease goods”.¹²

It is a well-known position of some authors who believed that LL was a kind of payment the U.S. offered for the Russian blood spilled in this war.¹³ LL was vital

⁹ R. H. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p.248-250

¹⁰ John R. Deane quoted in R. H. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p.92; J.L. Gaddis, *Russia, The Soviet Union, and The United States*, p. 153

¹¹ *FRUS, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1942*, (Washington D.C., 1962), vol.III, p.575-578; R. H. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, p.92

¹² L.I. Zorin, *Osoboe Zadanie, (A Special Mission)*, (Moskva: Isdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1987), p.18. L.I. Zorin was responsible for the Iranian route of LL supplies in the S.U. during the war.

¹³ M.N. Suprun, *Lend-Liz i Severnye Konvoi, (Lend-Lease and the Northern Convoys), 1941-1945*, Institut Rossiiskoi Istorii Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk, Pomorskiĭ Gosudarstvennyi Universitet im. M.V. Lomonosova (Moskva: Andreevskii Flag, 1997), p.351

to the U.S. security and, in a sense, a payment for the U.S. national interest.¹⁴ However, there is nothing unusual in the American approach to war. The U.S., since its formation, has always been trying to replace blood and flesh with industrial production or other means, trying to result in minimum casualties and maximum benefit for the country. LL should be perceived not as a payment, but rather as a more vigilant foreign policy and a substitute to direct involvement in the war. It is always better and more advantageous to fight using someone else's manpower and the Americans were not willing to increase casualties in this war.

4.1.1 A Unified Command

Cooperation under LL and reverse-LL¹⁵ did not imply that the countries would conduct successful operations under a unified command. The history of WWII proves that such attempts were made, but remained ineffective. For instance, project Velvet, a dispatch of Anglo-American Air Force to operate under Russian command in the Caucasus did not work out. The Soviets rejected Roosevelt's proposal, accepting only bombers without crews.¹⁶

Moreover, the Soviets did not allow American officials to investigate the S.U. territory to choose the best route for ALSIB project¹⁷ and at the beginning even resisted its establishment. During Harriman's visit to Moscow, it was suggested that delivery of aircrafts to Russia would be conducted by American crews. Stalin rejected this idea, stating that there were sufficient numbers of professional pilots in the S.U.

¹⁴ A. Paperno, *Lend-Liz i Tikhii Okean, (Lend-Lease and the Pacific Ocean)*, (Moscow: Terra-Knizhnyi Klub, 1998), p.333

¹⁵ LL system had a reverse-LL, which implied that the countries, recipients of LL aid would send to the U.S. raw materials necessary for war production and support American troops abroad.

¹⁶ Richard C. Lukas, *Eagles East: The Army Air Forces and the Soviet Union, 1941-1945*, (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1970), pp.154-155

¹⁷ ALSIB project was mentioned in Chapter II, p.37

The Soviet officials also did not permit their allies to investigate the needs of the Eastern front, actual usage and effectiveness of the aid they had been sending.¹⁸ Such behavior prompted some historians to claim that Russia refused to cooperate. Indeed, the Soviet front needed more machines, foodstuffs and electric-electronic equipment than men.¹⁹ Moreover, a unified command would have been difficult, due to the problems of communication.

Nonetheless, cooperation was difficult even without a unified command, such as in combined efforts in shuttle bombing in Poltava, the Ukraine.²⁰ The S.U. put at American disposal three bases in the Ukraine for the purpose of increasing efficiency during strategic bombing of Germany. The initial Russian plan was to initiate a major attack on Finland, Stalin's fourth strategic offensive. However, because the U.S. did not declare war on Finland, this plan did not work out. The conflict aroused when the main American base in the Ukraine was destroyed by Luftwaffe. Soviet fighting units were responsible for air-defense and protection of the American bases, but somehow failed to do their jobs. This event had an incremental negative impact on Soviet-American cooperation during the war. It also contributed to Soviet paranoia of American intentions and enhanced American distrust of the Russian war aims.²¹

¹⁸ R. H. Jones, *The Roads to Russia*, pp.61, 232, 267

¹⁹ I.P. Lebedev, *Aviation Lend-Lease to Russia, Historical Observations*, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1997), pp.43-45

²⁰ Excellent accounts on Poltava affair are found in Glenn B. Infield, *The Poltava Affair: A Russian Warning-An American Tragedy*, (New-York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1973); related to the subject Mark J. Conversino, *Fighting with the Soviets: The Failure of Operation Frantic, 1944-1945*, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997)

²¹ Carl-Fredrik Geust, Gennadiy Petrov, *Lend-Lease Aircraft in Russia, Red Stars*, Vol.4, (Kustantaja: Apali Oy, 2002), p.181; Hubert P. Van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear*, pp.42-43

4.1.2 Cooperation Needed - Why Defend Russia?

On the other hand, cooperation was in the interest of both countries. President Roosevelt hoped that Soviet war-time cooperation with the West would prevent Moscow's ambitions and stop the spread of global revolution. Moreover, Roosevelt's administration was not willing to accept either German, or Russian domination of Europe. Being a pragmatic person, President Roosevelt understood that in case the S.U. won the war, power balances would shift to the East. If the S.U. would lose the war, Britain and the rest of Europe would collapse and then the Pacific would be lost to the Axis. In such a situation, the possessions of Germany would extend until the Far East, Africa and the Middle East. Invasions of Greece in 1940, Yugoslavia in 1941 and Axis actions in Albania furthered this threat. Conceivably, Roosevelt was afraid of losing Europe, which was unthinkable for the U.S.

Thus, while making a decision to aid the S.U., the U.S. President had post-war considerations in mind. Although it was allowed that the S.U. would use LL without any conditions, President Roosevelt and his administration could not allow the Russians to win the war on their own and then have full authority over Europe. Moreover, the President's decision to support the S.U. was based not on his positive inclinations; he was an anti-communist, but was rather based on a calculation of the potential risk to Europe. Therefore, the LL program was not only a vigilant action, but also a well-calculated foreign policy decision. Although Roosevelt's attempt to kill two birds with the same stone did not work out and the idea to create a democratic world was in vain, substituting one totalitarian regime with another, the Alliance, to a great extent, proved to be a successful tool in achieving the primary goal of the coalition – elimination of fascism.

4.2 In Whose Interests?

4.2.1 “Unsordid” Act

“It is permitted to walk with the devil until the bridge is crossed”²²

Churchill in his speech before the Parliament described LL as ‘the most unsordid act in the history of any nation’.²³ In other words, LL was an act of nobleness, a sincere help the U.S.A. extended to its allies. Yet, a sincere act is hardly a calculated decision, which is not the case of LL help to Russia. While on the one hand, LL was the best foreign policy option, the best decision to maximize the output – achievement of the foreign policy goals and objectives in pursuing American national interests, on the other hand, LL minimized the input – or U.S. direct involvement in the war and loss of further manpower.

It is more than naïve to think that in WWII the allies had ‘unsordid’ intentions to help each other in this war. National interests of a country are taken into consideration whilst foreign policy decisions are made. Despite being involved in the European war, Great Britain did not help the S.U. because of the ingenuous intentions. It needed to allay its own front and thus kindly submitted munitions to the S.U. for the sake of relieving pressure from German attacks. Moreover, the S.U. during the war not only received foreign aid, but was also helping Poland and Yugoslavia with war munitions.²⁴ The question remains as to what kind of intentions the S.U. had in providing this help to the European states. Soviet authors claim this

²² A Romanian proverb expressed in support of the LL to Russia by Virginia Democrat representative Clifton Woodrum, quoted in J. Herring, *Aid to Russia*, p.22

²³ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War, vol.2, Their Finest Hour*, (New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 1986), p.569

²⁴ I. E. Chadaev, *Ekonomika S.S.S.R. v Gody Velikoï Otechestvennoï Voïny, (U.S.S.R. Economy During the Great Patriotic War)*, 1941-1945, 2nd ed., (Moskva: Mysl, 1985), p.473

help to be 'unsordid', as well as 'unsordid' help of the U.S.A. to its allies. Providing help voluntarily does not exist in politics. Everything has a purpose and sense. The countries fight for their own survival and keep peace for their own benefits. Under every foreign policy action there are hidden objectives, which are hardly revealed at the beginning of an action.

Moreover, this act could not be 'unsordid' because the security of the United States was at stake.²⁵ American foreign policy has always been conducted in close tandem with the state's national interests and is directed to ensure national security. This idea has its roots and proofs in the U.S. foreign policy actions in history. Whenever the security and interests of the U.S. were involved, the U.S. suddenly woke up from hibernation and started 'tough' action. For instance, the war of 1812 with Great Britain, territorial dispute with Mexico 1846-1848, WWI, invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965, Vietnam war as of the 1950s and, more recently, response to September 11 terrorist attack on the United States were carried out for 'national security' considerations.²⁶ In case of the S.U. and the U.S., on the eve of WWII, driven by their national and self-interests found that both had the same enemy and both needed assistance to attain their goal, or destruction of the Axis powers. As opposite to a charitable act, the U.S. provided aid to other nations in order to secure itself, the Western Hemisphere and avoid direct involvement in the war. LL aid was out of self-interest of the U.S. and President Roosevelt acknowledged this in his statement to the Congress on 23 August 1944:

...we [the US] gave aid to Britain and the other nations resisting the aggressors because those nations held positions vital to our own defenses. If

²⁵ A similar idea was expressed in A. Paperno, *Lend-Liz i Tikhii Okean*, p.328; L.V. Pozdeeva, "Lend-Liz Dlia S.S.S.R.: Diskussiiia Prodolzhaetsa", (Lend-Lease for the U.S.S.R.: Discussion is Continuing), in O.A. Rzheshhevskii, ed., *Vtoraia Mirovaia Voïna: Aktual'nye Problemy, Second World War: Actual Problems*, Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk, Istitut Vseobshchei Istorii, (Moskva: Nauka, 1995), pp. 279, 293

²⁶ Stephen J. Valone, ed., *Two Centuries of U.S. Foreign Policy, The Documentary Record*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1995), pp.11-16, 35-36, 152

they had been defeated, the Western Hemisphere would have been left isolated and surrounded by overwhelmingly powerful forces that made secret of their hostility to our continued existence as a free and independent people. We gave lend-lease aid in order to aid ourselves.²⁷

For the U.S. LL meant not only supporting European resistance, but also reassuring that the S.U. will not conclude a separate peace with Germany. This threat was eradicated with signature in Washington D.C. of the Declaration of Twenty-Six States, which envisaged full allocation of military and economic resources against the Axis and forbade a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.²⁸ Another meaning of LL for U.S. foreign policy entailed that through LL absence of the second front could be compensated. Therefore, it would be too excessive to claim ‘unsordidness’ of the LL program.

4.2.2 The U.S. and S.U. War Aims

From the American perspective, the U.S. has always fought wars to promote its democratic principles, which were as old as the American Revolution. This “passionate devotion to great America ideals”, was expressed as love of freedom, equality of opportunity, traditions of self-reliance and independence.²⁹ Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius incorporated these principles in six major objectives for which the U.S. fought WWII as:

(1) To support our own and our allies’ military action in order to defeat our enemies completely and as quickly as possible. (2) To prevent our enemies from again

²⁷ Roosevelt quoted in John Beasant, *Stalin’s Silver*, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1995), p.64

²⁸ This declaration later became known as the United Nations Declarations. For details and excerpts see Andrew Rothstein, trans., *Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War, Documents and Materials*, Vol.1, June 22, 1941-December 31, 1943, p.114

²⁹ Annual Message of the President to the Congress, January 6, 1941, in *American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents, 1941-1949*, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Staff of the Committee and the Department of State, (New York: Arno Press, 1971), p.1; see also excerpts from *Life Magazine* in Karl Drechsler, Link Christa, eds., *Alternative Concepts of United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1947, European and Global Aspects of Postwar Relations with the Soviet Union, Documents*, (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1992), p.26; Warren F. Kimball, “Anglo-American War Aims, 1941-43, ‘The First Review’: Eden’s Mission to Washington”, in Ann Lane, Howard Temperley, eds., *The Rise and Fall of the Great Alliance, 1941-45*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 2-11

acquiring the power to wage war. (3) To encourage ...stable and democratic governments...(4)To maintain the unity of ...all United Nations...(5)To promote a great expansion of our foreign trade...(6) To encourage...a free and democratic way of life³⁰

Thus, the war was fought not only for democratic principles and to eliminate fascism. “We are fighting this war for security, not only from predatory enemies abroad but from enemies just as dangerous here at home – joblessness, depression, want”, Harry Hopkins wrote in August 1944. This suggests that the U.S. foreign and domestic policies were closely coordinated.³¹

The S.U., as well as the U.S. needed security. The S.U. needed a secure Europe and the Far East, and also maintain safe economic access to the seas. The U.S. wanted a democratic Europe, so it could continue economic and diplomatic relations. Among other Soviet aims were re-possession of the Baltic states, maintenance of peace with Poland and reacquisition of South Sakhalin. There was one more thing in common, that is both the U.S. and the S.U. had mutual concerns about European colonial Empires. Moreover, the U.S. was concerned not only about the revival of British imperialism, but also feared possible Soviet expansionism.³² Nonetheless, both countries had territorial considerations and both sought a prominent position in the new world order.

Although the initial U.S. war aims were incorporated into the Atlantic Charter, they were later renewed and expanded. Within the growing Soviet success in the war and significant achievements on the battlefield, the U.S. as early as in 1943 started to

³⁰ Edward Stettinius, Secretary of State to President Harry S. Truman, *The Foreign Policy of the United States*, April 16, 1945, in Karl Drechsler, Link Christa, eds., *Alternative Concepts of United States Foreign Policy*, doc.15, p.7, pp.66-67

³¹ Karl Drechsler, Link Christa, eds., *Alternative Concepts of United States Foreign Policy*, doc.7, p.23

³² Warren F. Kimball, “Anglo-American War Aims, 1941-43, ‘The First Review’: Eden’s Mission to Washington”, in Ann Lane, Howard Temperley, eds., *The Rise and Fall of the Great Alliance*, p.15; Jonathan Haslam, “Soviet War Aims” in Ann Lane, Howard Temperley, eds., *The Rise and Fall of the Great Alliance*, pp.22-23

discuss the post-war settlement.³³ Moreover, the U.S. needed the RA for fighting the Japanese and total defeat of the Axis powers. On the other hand, the S.U. needed U.S. involvement in this war. Thus, social and ideological differences did not preclude cooperation for the common interest.

4.2.3 Costs and Benefits

The LL program was helpful on the one hand for the Americans to improve and restructure their domestic production and then, to boost their economy. On the other hand, LL was obliging to the Soviets, because it sustained their economy and generated quicker recovery in the aftermath of the war.

Argument that at the beginning of the war LL program brought no benefits to the U.S. is misled. Firstly, after the victory in Moscow, Nazi forces were significantly weakened. Their damaged aura of invincibility further enhanced American confidence that the enemy would be eventually eradicated and boosted the morale of American people. Thus, the first reverse-LL was not in material terms, but was of moral value.

The most important benefit the U.S. received in return for the LL aid from its Allies – Britain, the S.U., China and others, was that these nations contributed to the ‘defense of the United States’ by fighting the Axis.³⁴ Moreover, LL helped keep away the U.S. from the epicenter of the war. Among other benefits the LL policy brought to the U.S. were standardization of weaponry, which simplified the logistics and supply systems in use during the war. The U.S. also gained “leverage to influence and sway Allied opinions and policies” through LL program; LL created the reverse LL system

³³ Warren F. Kimball, “Anglo-American War Aims, 1941-43, *The First Review*”, p.7

³⁴ Edward R. Stettinius Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory*, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1944), p.203-205

which supported American troops abroad and supplied the U.S. with some necessary raw materials.³⁵

Moreover, LL helped stimulate and expand U.S. industry. LL changed the system of trade transactions and thus, brought efficiency to the U.S. economic system. As one scholar put it, “Lend-Lease was a measure for waging war, and for the removal of financial impediments to the waging of war”.³⁶ The U.S. indeed enriched itself throughout the war. Rapidly restructured industry and quick adaptation to the needs of the war economy proved to augment the country’s financial situation. The economic boom the U.S. reached by the end of the war was a unique event, perhaps the highest economic ascent during the entire U.S. history until that time.³⁷ Thus, LL was a prodigious instrument of waging war, a financial devise for victory.

Although precise information exists on American LL shipments to its allies, a certain degree of ambiguity and secrecy is still present in the story of the LL program to the S.U. The U.S. official sources indicate the total amount of LL aid which was sent ‘out-of-the-program’, but new information about LL supplies continue to come to surface. For instance, in *Stalin’s Silver*, John Beasant reveals the story about the *John Barry*, a U.S. vessel, which was sunk while carrying LL cargo to an Iranian port.³⁸ The freight was loaded with ‘non-ferrous metals’, but little was known about its ‘secret role’ and several tones of silver bullion and industrial diamonds worth \$28

³⁵ Jerome J. Peppers Jr., C.P.L., *History of the United States Military Logistics, 1935-1985, A Brief Review*, (Huntsville: Logistics Education Foundation Publishing, 1988), pp.24-25

³⁶ Eugene V. Rostow, “Two Aspects of Lend-Lease Economics”, *The American Economic Review*, Vol.33, Issue 1 (Mar., 1943), pp.378-380

³⁷ See figures in appendices, table 10, p.123; A. Paperno, *Lend-Liz i Tikhii Okean*, p.343; and L.I. Zorin, *Osoboe Zadanie*, p.20-24; A.S. Orlov, V.P. Kozhanov, “Lend-Liz: Vzgliaid Cherez Polveka”, (“Lend-Lease: An Insight After Half a Century”), *Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia*, No.3, (1994), p.192; V.L. Piankevich, *Vozrozhdenie Sovetskoï Ekonomiki v Gody Velikoï Otechestvennoï Voïny*, (*The Renaissance of the Soviet Economy during the Great Patriotic War*), (St. Petersburg: Nestor, 1999), p.31

³⁸ *John Barry* was carrying something more exotic than jeeps and tanks. Of course, the fact was unknown, but on 28 August, 1944 a German submarine put two torpedoes into the ship. All but two of her crew were rescued, while the vessel went down in 1.000 fathoms of water.

million in today's value.³⁹ It would not be wrong to assume that such kinds of cargo, if there were more besides the *John Barry*, were rarely listed in official records and thus, went unrecorded. Neither is it possible to tell how many of these vessels, carrying 'special cargo' to the Soviet Union actually reached their destination. Moreover, similar facts bring into question the nature the relationship between the three superpowers – the US, the SU and Great Britain.

Benefits the S.U. derived from LL included relief of pressure, sustenance of the Soviet war effort, supplement with necessary raw materials and tools which were in great demand within the country. Moreover, LL had a significant psychological impact on the Soviet people. In addition to these, LL provided enough material and industrial equipment to ensure a rapid reconstruction of the S.U. in the aftermath of the war. Without LL the war would probably cost more to the Soviets, in terms of money and manpower. However, LL only partially took off the economic pressure and relieved military expenditures of the S.U. Comparatively much more material and human resources were allocated by the Soviet state.

4.3 The Soviet Effort in WWII

Given the initial feeble preparedness for the war and potential resources, how did the S.U. manage to fight this war? What was done for victory by the Soviet state? Classical national explanations include a variety of reasons, but few are, at least partly, related to the LL aid program. The Soviet official history names Russian inherent strengths, such as large resources and population as a prerequisite and main tool of success. Accordingly, courage and self-sacrifice of the Soviet people are the main reasons why the S.U. won in WWII. Moreover, an important role in Soviet

³⁹ John Beasant, *Stalin's Silver*, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1995), p. 178-181

victory is allocated to the Party and skills of leadership. These are certainly not enough to fight for almost five years.

In WWII, the Russians with their colossal manpower were fighting until the last man, never commiserating about losing their soldiers. Indeed, the S.U. authorities never felt sorry for losing the men, either before or during the war. On the other hand, at the beginning of the war there was no choice, but an all-out resistance to fascist attacks. Later on, Soviet military strategy planned to create a strong rear, supported by material and human resources more than the enemy had. Special emphasis was added to sustain the moral strength of the army.⁴⁰

Stalin's repressions of 1937-1938 continued through the duration of conflict. Talented and the most experienced officers had been sentenced, imprisoned or executed. Some of those executed had served in the Soviet Army for more than fifteen years.⁴¹ The number of the officers executed varies in different sources from 20.000 to 35.000 men.⁴² Thus, at the initial stage, many newly formed front administrations and high commanders had little, if any, war experience. Some of the incarcerated military senior officers were released and after a scrupulous control sent to the front. Moreover, at the beginning of the war Stalin attempted to relieve himself the responsibility of early failures by imprisoning, punishing and executing top level commanders. In the first six months of war from October 1941 to March 1942, more than 62.000 people were sentenced and penalized.⁴³ Although repressions and

⁴⁰ Besides cultural entertainment of the soldiers, such as showing the movies, inviting artists etc., the Soviet authorities used more radical measures through political propaganda, which 'convinced' soldiers of patriotism. Ensuring a strong discipline was one of the primary objectives the Soviet commanders implemented on the front-line.

⁴¹ N. Smirnov, *Vplot' do Vissheĭ Mery, (Until the Highest Punishment)*, (Moskva: Moskovskii Rabochii, 1997), p.30

⁴² Paul Carell, *Barbarossa: Ot Bresta do Moskvi, Unternehmen Barbarossa: Der Marsch nach Rußland, (Barbarossa: From Brest to Moscow)*, (Smolensk: Rusichi, 2002), p.262

⁴³ A.M. Samsonov, O.A. Rzheshevskii, "O Korennom Perelome vo Vtoroi Mirovoi Voine", ("About the Turning Point in the WWII"), *Voprosy Istorii*, no.4, (1987), p.76

executions continued throughout the war, from January 1939 to June 1941 the Soviet Army grew 2.8 times and included more than 5 million men.⁴⁴

What was the formula of Soviet success? Lack of accurate data prevents evaluation of the Soviet Armed Forces' effectiveness. However, some noteworthy points could be made without hesitation. Firstly, political effectiveness of the Soviet leadership consolidated the Armed Forces and created a plan for prolonged war. Soviet leaders also ensured discipline and obedience in the Army and rear war production.⁴⁵ Stalin achieved almost total national dedication to his personality and the Motherland.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the Soviets, besides the quick switch to war production, enhanced discipline not only in the Army, but also in the rear. Thus, for example, only teenagers below the age of sixteen had one day off weekly.⁴⁷ The rest of the workers had no free days, and many of them lived in the factories, working as much as they could to speed the victory.

The Soviet Union with its great human and material resources, along with its determination to win this war, could stand single-handedly and unaided. However, with Lend-Lease aid many acute deficiencies and needs were solved at least partially and relatively quickly. Lend-Lease was not only a policy to protect Europe from fascism, but also a strategy to speed up the Allied victory and help rejuvenation of

⁴⁴ G.K. Zhukov, *Vospominaniia i Razmyshleniia*, (*Reminiscence and Thoughts*), (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1969), p.126

⁴⁵ When the Red Army was originally established soldiers swore an oath to fight for international socialism. This was changed in 1939, when the soldiers were required to protect the property of the Red Army, the Soviet homeland and the people. The Red Army also contained political commissars whose role was to ensure loyalty to Joseph Stalin and his government. Members of NKVD, the Soviet secret police, were executing disloyal people, arresting and interrogating suspicious persons. Becoming a POW during the war was unthinkable for a Soviet soldier. He would rather die under enemy's tank or surrender, in best case, in concentration camps. After the war, NKVD was renamed KGB- the Committee for State Security. This was a more rapid and practical way of convincing the Soviet people of patriotism than showing movies and entertainment.

⁴⁶ Allan R. Millet, Williamson Murray, eds., *Military Effectiveness, Vol. III, The Second World War*, (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), pp.258-260

⁴⁷ *Vsë Dlia Fronta: Sbornik Dokumentov i Materialov*, (*Everything for the Front: Collection of Documents and Materials*), (Vladivostok: Dal'nevostochnoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1985), pp.24-27

the Soviet war effort, and later helped to a great extent the restructuring of Soviet post-war economy.

It would be unfair to disregard the U.S. and British help to the U.S.S.R. conducted under the Lend-Lease Act. However, taking into consideration enormous losses of the S.U. (total of 2.6 trillion rubles) and around 27 million men, by comparison to about 700.000 British and American casualties, one question remains open: who helped the victory and how much?

4.4 Misperceptions and Intentions

Although both countries had a common objective to exterminate Nazism and liberate Europe from aggression, they were less prone to understand each others' needs in terms of the management of the alliance in general. This refrain was reciprocal and revealed that the Allied camp was fractured.⁴⁸ Thus, every player in the game had its own priorities and played according to its own rules.

The Soviets were blaming the U.S. of not sending enough munitions and Washington's unwillingness to help in their struggle against Germany. Stalin perceived delays in shipment not as a technical, but rather a political problem. He also feared that major Allies, or the United States and Great Britain, might repeat the Wilsonian tactic in WWI. That is, to let the major belligerents annihilate each other, and then, at a decisive moment, demand the right to shape the peace settlement.⁴⁹

This worry was not groundless. The American and British elite hoped that in the post-war order dual-governance of two policemen – the U.S. and Britain would be established. Anglo-American aspirations for world dominance were not a new fact.

⁴⁸ J.L. Gaddis, *Russia, The Soviet Union, and The United States: An Interpretive History*, pp.153-154

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p.156

Britain, weakened after the Great Depression, hoped for 'new era' of British supremacy. Moreover, in the U.S. it was believed that the 20th century would be an American century.⁵⁰ German fascism and Soviet communism were equally regarded alien to the American principles of freedom and democracy. Thus, the 20th century and WWII provided new opportunities for the U.S. to extend its prophecy of freedom and democracy around the world. It is obvious that all parties of the Allied coalition were afraid to 'lose control' of the war. However, the primary reason was the desire to be the main author in world affairs in the post-war order.

Moreover, clearly stated anti-Soviet position of some political elites of the two powers affected fulfillment of the lend-lease program. For instance, William H. Standley, American Ambassador to Russia, suggested to the President not to behave as good Santa Claus, but to sustain a 'tough position' towards the Soviets. The anti-Soviet position of the American Ambassador to Russia and his like-minded counterparts could not help develop American-Russian cooperation. The position of the political elite played a very important role in relations between the Allies in general, and lend-lease supplies, in particular.⁵¹

Although sometimes diminished, mistrust between the two states was always present. For example, since the U.S. and the S.U. stood hand in hand in the struggle against fascism, public interest about Russia, Soviet thought and literature increased. However, it was difficult to disseminate information to the U.S. Moreover, some Soviet historians claim that Russian literature and periodicals were burnt or destroyed. Since some suspicious American officials hampered the information spread, this

⁵⁰ Henry R. Luce, editor of *Time* and *Life* Magazines, *Life Magazine*, February 17, 1941, vol.10, No.7, pp.64f, for excerpts of the article see Karl Drechsler, Link Christa, eds., *Alternative Concepts of United States Foreign Policy*, p.3

⁵¹ William H. Standley, Arthur A. Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, p.341; V.L. Israëlian, *Antigitlerovskaia Koalitsiia*, pp.228-230; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Perepiska Predsedatelia Soveta Ministrov SSSR s Prezidentom SshA i Premier-Ministrami Velikobritanii vo Vremia Velikoï Otechestvennoï Voïny*, vol.I, p.116

behavior prevented development of strong ties between the allies. The Soviet government through its Ambassador to Washington, M.M. Litvinov, called these actions as ‘obstacle, preventing sustenance and improvement of cultural ties and mutual exchange of information between the allies’.⁵²

American mistrust of Soviet intentions could be observed in the delivery of aircraft. Despite repeated Soviet requests, the U.S. officials refused to send under LL aid program four-engine heavy bombers and transport aircraft, as well as night-fighters. Certain tools and avionics, like top-secret and accurate Norden bombsight were also removed from shipped planes, whose destination was Soviet Russia.⁵³ Moreover discussion of the most important questions separately and without the presence of Soviet officials brought Anglo-American intentions into question.⁵⁴

The American mistrust of Soviet intentions sometimes was revealed in LL deliveries. For instance, LL supplies were immediately stopped whenever it was obvious that the materials were not used for direct battle needs. This happened for the LL deliveries of pipes for oil and gas.⁵⁵ On the other hand LL supplies could not have been used solely and exclusively for combat operations. The original purpose of LL was not to separate rear and combat use of supplies, but to keep Russian fighting at whatever cost and make them resist the enemy. Thus, even if the pipes were used to bring gas and heating to the Russian workers it does not mean that supplies under LL design were misused in Russia.

Moreover, the prevailing Soviet opinion that America was interested to aid the European powers without getting into the war is specious.⁵⁶ Mostly because the

⁵² For details see V.L. Israël, *Antigitlerovskaia Koalitsiia*, p.233

⁵³ Carl-Fredrik Geust, Gennadii Petrov, *Lend-Lease Aircraft in Russia*, p.180

⁵⁴ V.L. Israël, *Antigitlerovskaia Koalitsiia*, p.242

⁵⁵ I.P. Lebedev, *Aviation Lend-Lease to Russia*, pp.76-77

⁵⁶ However, W. Averell Harriman, the head of the first U.S. mission to Moscow and later responsible for the LL program, claimed that “Roosevelt and Churchill had deep interest to keep Russia in the

Americans, though not really eager to get involved in this war, knew that sooner or later they would take part in this struggle, it was unavoidable for them to stay apart for a long time. Even the fact that the Americans started to help the European powers and send them munitions signified that 'passive involvement' would come to an end. It was inevitable also because the U.S. since its formation was always interested in Europe and getting along with its European counterparts. The U.S. could not allow them to be conquered by Germany. Neither could it tolerate the spread of fascism around the world.

And Hitler provided the U.S. with an outright excuse. He declared war on the U.S. soon after Pearl Harbor. But the argument above reflects the Soviet point of view. The Americans, on the other hand, were more than willing to get involved through particularly air force and naval forces. Where they hesitated was buttressing Soviet forces, or committing ground forces to the Soviet effort either by opening a second front or under a unified command.

The former issue was a strategic concern. Opening a second front had to be feasible from a geographic standpoint to say the least. A unified command was not even feasible given that the Alliance was forged in the midst of war. No wonder then, that their only alternative was to bridge the Alliance through Lend-Lease.

war... [and] to this end assistance to Russia was essential'. Roosevelt, before the United States entered the war, was determined to keep the involvement of U.S. ground forces at minimum, and instead use naval and air powers. Roosevelt hoped that "if we...[the U.S.].. could help the Russians to continue to fight, the Red Army would be able to keep the Axis armies engaged, and by using our air and naval power we could avoid committing major ground forces on the continent of Europe". According to Harriman, this was the prime factor which affected Roosevelt's decision to aid Russia at that time. For details see William Averell Harriman, *America and Russia in a Changing World: A Half Century of Personal Observation, Memoirs*, (London: Allen & Unwin 1971), p.14.

4.5 Conclusion

LL was not a simple tool for victory. It was a political, military and economic measure. Moreover, it was a carefully calculated policy, the best option the U.S. decided to employ as a tool for victory. American officials were au fait with the risk German aggression posed to Europe. Losing Europe would mean losing the world, which the U.S. could not endure. Moreover, Aid to Europe implied American strategy of self-defense, so by aiding the Allies, the U.S. was to prevent Germany from taking strategic advantage over Europe. LL program, launched by the U.S. at the beginning worked as a preemptive defense strategy to protect the country's national security. However, calculations did not involve only these considerations.

Any war represents a threat to power balance; as the consequence of war, shifts in balance may occur. A previously powerful country might become insignificant and the other way around. LL was a foreign policy tool, an instrument to achieve a state objective – to defeat the Nazis. This policy came as a substitute to an early involvement in the European war, and also to ensure that the U.S. would be the prominent political and economic power in the aftermath of the war. Post-war considerations and self-interest were not only peculiar to the U.S. Each of the fighting sides, first of all, was fighting for its own national interests and objectives.

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of the thesis was to analyze Lend-Lease aid the U.S. offered to the S.U. throughout 1941-1945 and the contribution made by American Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet war effort in the Second World War. Foremost attention was given to the period from June 1941 till the end of 1942, which was the most intense and difficult phase of the war.

Because during the Cold War Western scholars overestimated the impact of LL for the Soviet war effort and Soviet historians avoided discussing this subject, the present work endeavored to provide a more balanced approach to the issue and attempted to overcome partisan and biased opinions about Lend-Lease contribution to the Soviet victory in WWII.

The study found that LL was crucial at the beginning of the war, and less vital at the end of it, when the S.U. established domestic war production and was practically able to supply its army with all necessary munitions. Because aid arrived in limited amounts at the beginning of the war and the main portion of it was received after 1942 and the most significant battles, the conclusion was made that the LL program was disproportionate to the needs of the Soviet Army.

One of the primary questions historians asked and still continue to research is the importance of LL supplies for the Soviet victory in WWII. Many of them ponder 'vital and crucial', 'dramatic and decisive importance' LL shipments had for the

Soviet war effort.¹ Critique continues on 'Soviet dependency on LL', or on the idea that some American supplies had no substitute in the S.U.² Debate includes that without LL the S.U. could not have conducted its immense offensives³ and even could have lost the war.⁴ However, LL was not based on dependency, but rather on equality. Both states were partners and fought for the same reason – to eliminate aggression from the European lands. Both were fighting until the end, exhausting both material and human resources.

While the supplies came too late to make a difference for the Soviet war effort, some of them were of invaluable help to sustain the country's war economy and partially alleviated war pressure. Particularly, motorized vehicles and communication gear significantly increased the mobility of the Red Army and improved its fighting capability. However, supplying the RA with 'eyes and ears' and 'legs and wings' would not make the bird fly. Head or brain, is what controls functioning of a corporate body. To this extent, credit should be given to Soviet authorities who not only knew very well how to make use of the country's potential, material resources, manpower and LL supplies, but also used correct strategies and ensured absolute obedience of the army. In this sense, a tight political control and rigid military administration contributed to the Soviet ability to survive.

¹ Carl-Fredrik Geust, Gennadii Petrov, *Lend-Lease Aircraft in Russia*, p.180; Jessup, J.E., "The Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945", in Allan R. Millet, Williamson Murray, eds., *Military Effectiveness, Vol. III*, p.261; Jerome J. Peppers Jr., C.P.L., *History of the United States Military Logistics*, p.22-23; Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 17

² For details on this viewpoint see Thomas A. Bailey, *America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations from Early Times to Our Day*, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1950), p.350; Carl-Fredrik Geust, Gennadii Petrov, *Lend-Lease Aircraft in Russia*, p.180-182; B.B. Schofield, *The Russian Convoys*, (London: B.T. Batsford, 1964), p.208; J. Herring, *Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, The Origins of the Cold War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p.32; Mark Harrison, "Resource Mobilization for World War II: The U.S.A, U.K., U.S.S.R, and Germany, 1938-1945", *The Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol.41, No.2. (May, 1988), p.189

³ Hubert P. Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear*, p.67

⁴ Stanford R. Lieberman, "The Evacuation of Industry in the Soviet Union During World War II", *Soviet Studies*, Vol.35, No.1 (Jan., 1983), pp.90-91; Jerome J. Peppers Jr., C.P.L., *History of the United States Military Logistics*, p.24

It is not easy to account for the actual impact of LL supplies for the Soviet war effort. Firstly, the information on LL utilization is scarce or unrecorded. Secondly, almost immediately after the war the U.S. was alienated by Soviet politics. Thirdly, many items, sent for specific purposes, were diverted and used for other purposes. Although the actual direct impact of LL supplies was marginal, the psychological impact was greater, which boosted the morale of the Soviet people.

Although Lend-Lease was intended exclusively for military use of the Red Army, its humanitarian impact and contribution to ordinary people is remarkable. In Cold War Soviet historiography on WWII this issue was totally omitted. However, LL food aid allowed greater mobilization of people, alleviated the consequences of 1941-1942 summer droughts and sustained the feeble Soviet agriculture during war. Moreover, at the beginning of the war many fertile lands, livestock and food were seized by German Army, which significantly decreased the country's capacity to survive. Taking into consideration serious food shortages the S.U. experienced during the war, food aid was of enormous help for starving Russian people. Needless to say foodstuffs sent saved the lives of many Soviet people who could have been otherwise sentenced to death.

However, in terms of artillery and tanks the American LL was less helpful. During the war, Soviets proved to have the best tank units and artillery. All modern types of machines the S.U. used in the war and production techniques were designed, or bought from the West, during the 1930s and remained unchanged until the end of the war. The S.U. possessed the capacity to produce, but required time and a stabilized front to accomplish this goal. Thus, the delivery of fighting machinery to the S.U. did not affect the fighting potential of the Soviets, but guaranteed the staying power of the U.S.S.R by helping to reinforce their potential.

Conceivably, the non-military materials supplied had an indirect, but greater effect than tanks, artillery and planes sent to the S.U. under the LL program. Non-military industrial tools were necessary to partially recuperate plants damaged during the war and helped rejuvenation of the Soviet post-war economy. To understand the actual impact of LL to the Soviet economy more work needs to be done in researching the Soviet war and post-war heavy industry, as well as auto and rail transport systems.

It is hard to estimate or trace the usage of LL supplies either in the RA or the Soviet rear. However, it is clear that the LL aid sustained Russian economy and allowed the Soviet officials to re-allocate the country's resources and release thousands of industrial workers for the front. Without a shred of doubt, LL supplies sustained the Soviet effort in combating fascist aggression. Some LL supplies significantly alleviated the Soviet exertion, relieving its domestic production and supplemented shortages. Aluminum, industrial tools, explosives, chemicals as well as foodstuffs and cloths were of great use. Nevertheless, LL was not 'vital' and of 'absolute necessity' as many historians had claimed. American help under LL program was rather a supplemental factor that sustained Soviet economy during the war. As V.M. Molotov expressed, "These [LL] supplies are an essential and important **supplement** [emphasis added] to those arms and supplies which the Red Army receives, in their overwhelming bulk, from our internal recourses".⁵

⁵ Report by V.M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. at the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., 18 June, 1942 in Andrew Rothstein, trans., *Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War, Documents and Materials*, Vol.1, p. 172

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TABLE 1: LEND-LEASE SUPPLIES TO THE S.U. BEFORE THE 1ST PROTOCOL

June 22, 1941-September, 30, 1941

Type of Cargo	Atlantic	Pacific	Total	Distribution, total tonnage, %
U.S. supplies				
R.R. Transportation equipment	0	0	0	0
Trucks and other vehicles	1,561	14	1,575	1
Metals	1,251	3,404	4,655	3
Chemicals and explosives	1,033	3,693	4,726	3
Petroleum Products	9,500	120,854	130,354	79
Machinery and equipment	280	15,575	15,855	10
Food	19	3,899	3,918	2
Other U.S. supplies	1,258	1,365	2,623	1
Canadian and British Supplies	0	0	0	0
Other sources	0	2,494	2,494	1
Total	14,902	151,298	166,200	100

*not shipped under LL, but under \$10 million Treasury department advance and other arrangements

TABLE 2: LEND-LEASE SUPPLIES TO THE S.U. DURING THE 1ST PROTOCOL

October 1, 1941 - June 30, 1942, First Protocol Period

Type of Cargo	Atlantic	Pacific	Total	Distribution, total tonnage, %
U.S. supplies				
R.R. Transportation equipment	0	0	0	0
Trucks and other vehicles	214,148	16	214,164	15
Metals	411,619	12,906	424,525	30
Chemicals and explosives	55,542	465	56,007	4
Petroleum Products	132,459	35,536	167,995	12
Machinery and equipment	29,116	576	29,692	2
Food	129,999	175,038	305,037	22
Other U.S. supplies	74,281	1,943	76,224	5
Canadian and British Supplies	137,841	8,770	146,611	10
Other sources	0	0	0	0
Total	1,185,005	235,250	1,420,255	100

*all tonnages are in long tons

* SOURCE: R.H. Jones, *The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union*, (Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), appendix A, pp.272-273; *America's Economic Policy: for the War and the Peace*, Texts of statements by officials of the United States Government and the fifth and sixth Reports to on Lend-Lease Operations, (Hutchinson & Co.: London, 1943), appendices

**TABLE 3: AMERICAN LEND-LEASE FOOD SUPPLIES TO
THE SOVIET UNION**

Wheat, flour, and other grains and cereals	901,220
Dried peas and beans	270,514
Seeds	37,477
Sugar	703,079
Canned meat and meat products	822,510
Smoked and prepared meats	319,341
Animal fats and oils	446,433
Vegetable oils	520,800
Canned milk	31,021
Dried milk	77,352
Dried eggs	121,144
Cheese	35,021
Soya flour	51,873
Soya grits	19,202
Fruits and vegetable pastes and purees	10,024
Concentrated juices	1,799
Dried fruits	2,340
Dried and dehydrated vegetables	15,687
Dried soups	9,485
Concentrated cereals	9,738
Canned fruits	369
Canned vegetables	1,938
Fresh fruit	183
Fresh vegetables	2,505
Vitamins	1,432
Yeast	1,155
Tea	1,217
Coffee	10,581
Salt	2,181
Spices	655
Flavoring Extracts	171
Hazelnuts from Turkey	3,638
Other nuts	58
Other foodstuffs	2,799
Feed	33,631
Other miscellaneous agricultural products	9
Total	4,468,582

*SOURCE: Department of State, Office of Foreign Liquidation, Foreign Economic Section, *Report on War Aid Furnished by the United States to the U.S.S.R.*, 1945, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1945), pp.21-22

TABLE 4: U.S FOOD DELIVERIES TO THE S.U. BY PERIOD

United States Food Deliveries to the U.S.S.R., by Period

	Tonnage (long tons)	As % of total tonnage
June 22 to September 30, 1941 ^(a)	3,918	2
October 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942	305,037	22
July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943	997,783	33
July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1944	1,734,801	30
July 1, 1944 to May 12, 1945	1,157,373	21
May 13, 1945 to September 2, 1945 ^(b)	258,201	17
September 3 to September 20, 1945 ^(c)	7,864	20
TOTAL dispatched ^(d)	4,464,977	25

*SOURCE: Roger Munting, "Soviet Food Supply and Allied Aid in the War, 1941-45", Soviet Studies, Vol.36, No.4 (Oct., 1984), pp.582-593;

Report on War Aid Furnished by the United States to the U.S.S.R., (Washington D.C., 1945), p.8

^(a) before LLA was signed, deliveries made under U.S. Treasury Department and other credits

^(b) Operation Milepost to aid the Soviets in the Pacific War

^(c) the period of termination after victory over Japan

^(d) includes some non-food items, such as soap, and does not allow for some 80.000 long tons lost en route

**TABLE 5: ITEMS SHIPPED UNDER LL TO THE S.U.,
JUNE 1941-FEBRUARY 1943**

U.S. Shipments to the U.S.S.R., 1941-1943

June 22, 1941 - September 30, 1941		To February, 1942	
Vehicles	1,764	thousands \$	
Petroleum	145,996	Ordnance & Ammunition	5,092
Metals	5,214	Aircraft & Parts	26,223
Machinery	17,758	Agricultural Products	3,241
Chem. & Explosives	5,293	Tanks & Motor Vehicles	20,335
Food	4,388	Machinery & Parts	15,374
Other U.S. supplies	2,938	TOTAL	70,265
Non U.S. supplies	2,793		
TOTAL	186,144		

March 1942 - February 1943

thousands \$

Ordnance & Ammunition	262,372
Aircraft & Parts	347,342
Agricultural Products	263,917
Tanks & Motor Vehicles	355,673
Machinery & Parts	387,763
Naval Gear	17,081
TOTAL	1,634,148

*SOURCE: U.S. President, Reports to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations, no.15, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1944), p.25

in Hubert P. van Tuyl, Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945, (Wesport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Inc., 1989), appendices, tables 22-23, pp.167-168

TABLE 6: DOMESTIC FOOD PRODUCTION IN THE S.U., 1940-1945

Food Production in the U.S.S.R. 1940-1945
million tons

	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	TOTAL 1941-45
All grains	95.5	56.3	29.6	29.6	48.7	47.3	211.5
Sugar beet	18.0	2.0	2.2	1.3	4.1	5.5	15.1
Sunflower seed	2.6	0.9	0.3	0.8	1.0	0.8	3.8
Potatoes	76.1	26.6	23.5	35.9	54.6	58.3	198.9
Vegetables	13.7	-	-	-	-	10.3	
Meat	4.7	4.1	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.6	12.3
Milk and dairy products	33.6	25.5	15.8	16.4	22.2	26.4	106.3
Eggs (milliard)	12.2	9.3	4.5	3.4	3.5	4.9	25.6

TABLE 7: VOLUME OF MUNITIONS PRODUCED BY MAJOR POWERS

Volume of Munitions Produced
billion dollars

Country	1935-1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
U.S.A.	1.5	1.5	4.5	20	38	42
Britain	2.5	3.5	6.5	9	11	11
U.S.S.R.	8	5	8.5	11.5	14	16
Germany	12	6	6	8.5	13.5	17

source: Hessel Duncan Hall, *North American Supply*, (London: Her's Majesty Stationery Office, 1955), p.421 in Hubert P. van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945*, (Wesport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Inc., 1989), appendices, table 3, p.153

**TABLE 8: U.S. DELIVERIES OF CLOSTHING AND MEDICINES
TO THE S.U.**

Deliveries of Clothing and Medicine to the U.S.S.R

Cloth (1.000 yards)	162,811
Leather (tons)	46,161
Boots & shoes (\$)	4,378,000
Other clothing (\$)	12,841,000
Relief Supplies (tons)	19,155
Red Cross Aid (\$)	22,859,979
Red Cross Aid (tons)	7,690


**SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, Report on War Aid Furnished by the United States to the U.S.S.R., (Foreign Economic Section, Office of Foreign Liquidation, 1945), pp.21-22, 28-30 in in Hubert P. van Tuyll, Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945, (Wesport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Inc., 1989), appendices, table 11, p.158*

TABLE 9: MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES TO THE S.U

\$ dollars	
ITEM	VALUE
Engines, turbines, compressors, pumps	39,287,000
Crushing, mixing, conveying gear	9,699,000
Winches, cranes, derricks, hoists	33,732,000
Industrial trucks and tractors	7,213,000
Electrical	215,829,000
Metalworking equipment	143,632,000
Machine tools	358,722,000
Agricultural (except tractors)	751,000
Mining, excavating, drilling	50,819,000
Scientific and professional instruments	10,469,000
Industrial and mining locomotives	2,788,000
Bearings	25,813,000
Textile, woodworking and paper machinery	2,629,000
Tire and rubber machinery	8,790,000
Petroleum refining equipment	43,138,000
Cartridge manufacturing lines	29,855,000
Specialized equip.for gas, chem. and gas produc.	15,808,000
Automatic signal systems	10,880,000
Power boilers	15,970,000
Agricultural tractors	2,773,000
Hand tools, non-powered	2,810,000
Fan and blower equipment	3,702,000
SUBTOTAL	\$1,035,109,000
Other equipment and machinery	24,124,000
TOTAL	1,059,233,000

*SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, *Report on War Aid Furnished by the United States to the U.S.S.R.*, (Foreign Economic Section, Office of Foreign Liquidation, 1945) pp.22-24 in Hubert P. van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945*, (Wesport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Inc., 1989), appendices, table 13, p.160

TABLE 10: CONDITIONS OF THE U.S. ECONOMY PRIOR, DURING, AND IN THE AFTERMATH OF WWII



*SOURCE: P.J. Larkin, *World History in the Twentieth Century, USA and Russia*, (London: Hulton Educational Publications Limited, 1968) in Paperno A., *Lend-Liz i Tikhii Okean, (Lend-Lease and the Pacific Ocean)*, (Moscow: Terra-Knizhnii Klub, 1998), p. 342