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**FROM DISCOURSE TO POLICY: ANALYSING
FRONTEX IN TERMS OF PARIS SCHOOL**

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Master's Thesis

Supervisor

Prof. Dr. Alper KALİBER

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XXXXXXXXXX

ÖZET

SÖYLEMDEN POLİTİKAYA: PARIS OKULU BAKIŞ AÇISIYLA FRONTEX ANALİZİ

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Bu araştırma Avrupa Birliği'nin göçü güvenlikleştirme politikasının nihai vücut bulmuş formu olarak Frontex'i ve Frontex'in görevini farklı durumlarda aynı şekilde yerine getirip getirmediğini inceleyen eleştirel bir yaklaşım sunmaktadır. Göçü güvenlikleştirme çalışmalarına Schengen Anlaşması ile başladığı kabul edilen Avrupa Birliğinin, aynı amaçla zaman içerisinde oluşturduğu politikalarına yansıyan farklı kurumlar oluşturduğu görülmüştür. Avrupa Birliğinin göçü güvenlikleştirme politikasının nihai vücut bulmuş kurumu Frontex olduğu için çalışma öncelikle söylemlerin nasıl ülkelerin politikaları haline geldiğini inceleyerek, güvenlik kavramını Paris ve Kopenhag Okulları olmak üzere iki okul açısından analiz etmekte; sonrasında da AB-Belarus ve AB-Ukrayna sınırlarında yaşanan son göçmen krizlerine odaklanmaktadır çünkü bu vakalarda Frontex'in rolü belirsiz kalmış, etkili medya ve uluslararası insan hakları örgütleri Frontex'in insan haklarını koruma ve insani durumu izleme konusundaki etkinliğini sorgulamışlardır. Belarus ve Ukrayna'daki göçmenlerin, bütün dünya üzerindekiyle oranla, sayılarının az olmasına rağmen Frontex 'in farklı yapıdaki göçmen krizlerine yaklaşımını analiz edebilmek için yine bu vakalar iyi örnek oluşturmaktadır. Göçmen krizlerinin güncelliği de aynı zamanda Frontex üzerinden AB'nin güncel göçmen politikasını anlamakta etkili olacaktır. Normal şartlarda Frontex'in faaliyetleri, ilgili ülkenin Frontex görevlilerinin ülkelere konuşlanmasını talep etmesiyle başlar. Eğer hükümet bu talebi yapmazsa ya da Frontex'in göreve hazır olduğuna dair yaptığı duyuruyu reddederse, AB- Beyaz Rusya göçmen krizi esnasında Polonya'nın Frontex'in

yardımlarını talep etmediği durumda olduğu gibi, Frontex inisiyatifi ele alıp kendi başına bölgeye yönelemez. Bu ataletin bir nedeni de Polonya'nın göçmen akınlarına karşı yeterli personel ve ekipmana sahip olmasıydı. Ancak uluslararası kuruluşlar ve medya, diğer nedenin, gazetecilerin ve insani yardım kuruluşlarının temsilcilerinin bölgelere girmesini ve Polonyalı görevlilerin göçmenlere nasıl davrandığına dair bilgi aktarmasını engellemek olduğunu iddia etti. Bu durumda Frontex görevlileri Romanya'da görevlendirilmiş olsalar bile, rolleri insan hakları ihlallerini kısıtlamakla sınırlı kalmıştır. Ukrayna göçmen krizinde Frontex uygulamaları hakkında ise farklı yönde ve ciddi iddialar bulunmaktadır. Frontex görevlilerinin Ukraynalı göçmenler ile kriz patlak verdiğinde Ukrayna'da bulunan siyahi ve Ortadoğulu göçmenler arasında ayrımcılık yaptığı görüşü de bu iddialar arasında yer almaktadır. Bütün bunların ışığında, bu çalışma Paris Okulu teorisinden yola çıkarak AB'nin göçmen krizlerine karşı politikasını Frontex üzerinden incelemek üzere hazırlanmıştır. Çalışmada oluşum ve süreçleri birbirinden farklı iki ayrı göçmen krizi seçilerek AB'nin göçmen politikasındaki anlayışı ortaya çıkarmak amaçlanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Frontex, Belarus, Göç, Avrupa Birliği, Güvenlikleştirme, Paris Okulu.

ABSTRACT

FROM DISCOURSE TO POLICY: ANALYZING FRONTEX IN TERMS OF PARIS SCHOOL

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This research presents a critical approach which investigates whether Frontex is an agency established by the EU as a result of securitization of migration and whether it always functions in the same way in its duties. It has been observed that the European Union, which is accepted to have started its policies on securitization of migration with the Schengen Agreement, has created different institutions for the same purpose, which is reflected in its policies over time. The study focuses on the recent migrant crises on the EU-Belarus and EU-Ukraine borders based on the theories of two different Schools namely Paris School and Copenhagen School within the context of securitization of immigration. Despite the relatively small numbers of migrants in Belarus Ukraine compared to global figures, the analysis of Frontex's approach to different structured migration crisis can be explored through these cases, which makes them good examples. Furthermore, especially in these cases Frontex's role stayed uncertain, and effective media and international human rights organizations questioned its effectiveness in protecting human rights and monitoring the humanitarian situation. In the ordinary course of events, activities of Frontex start with the relevant country's request for the Frontex officers to deploy to their countries. If the government misses the request or rejects Frontex's announcement so that they are ready for the mission, Frontex cannot take the initiative and direct toward the area by itself as it was in Poland's case where Frontex's assistance was not requested. One reason for that inertia was that Poland had enough personnel and equipment against the migrant flows. But

international organizations and media claimed that the other reason was to prevent the journalists and humanitarian organizations' agents from entering areas in order to convey information about how the Polish officers treated the migrants. Even if Frontex officers were deployed in Romania in this case, their roles stayed limited to restrict human rights violations. Conversely, the allegations against Frontex implementations involved the Ukrainian migrant crisis. Amidst the claims is the notion that Frontex officers engaged in discriminated between Ukrainian migrants and black or Middle Eastern migrants who had been in Ukraine when the crisis broke out. Against this background, this study has been prepared to examine the EU's policy on migration crisis through the lens of Paris School theory, by focusing on Frontex. The aim of the study is to illuminate the EU's understanding of migration policies by selecting two distinct migration crises with different formations and processes.

Keywords: Frontex, Belarus, Migration, Asylum, European Union, Securitization, Paris School.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFSC	:	Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
CRATE	:	Centralized Records of Available Technical Equipment
EBGT	:	European Border Guard Teams
EPN	:	European Patrol Network
Europol	:	European Police Organization
Eurosur	:	European External Border Surveillance System
FRA	:	European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
Frontex	:	The European Agency for Border and Naval Security
FSC	:	Frontex Situation Center
Interpol	:	International Police Organization
NATO	:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
RABIT	:	Rapid Border Intervention Teams
SIS	:	Schengen Information System
TRU	:	Training Unit

1. INTRODUCTION

Contemporary global human mobility is at an unprecedented level, driven by technological advancements, economic transformations, and societal shifts. This phenomenon has prompted individuals to relocate from their homelands in pursuit of enhanced living standards and expanded opportunities. In certain instances, migration is initiated by invitations from host countries seeking to address specific labor market needs. A notable example is West Germany's recruitment of Turkish workers during the 1960s to bolster their economic growth.

However, the primary impetus for migration often stems from adverse conditions faced by individuals in their home countries. These factors include environmental challenges such as prolonged droughts, political instability leading to armed conflicts, and human rights violations that threaten the safety and well-being of individuals. In response to these hardships, individuals often seek refuge in developed nations with the hope of attaining a more secure and prosperous existence. According to data released by migrationpolicy.org their first preference would be the USA and EU countries indubitably. ‘The United States is the world’s top migrant destination’^[1](<https://www.migrationpolicy.org>) The country accounts for 5 percent of the global population but has attracted 18 percent of all migrants. But differently, the United States has more global migrants (more than 50.6 million as of 2020) than the next four receiving countries—Germany, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the United Kingdom—combined (50.2 million) (<https://www.migrationpolicy.org>.) Australia, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom have joined the ranks of the top 10 destinations since 1990’.

On the contrary, destination countries are uncomfortable with these flows due to various reasons. Modern nation states recognize that a homogenized cultural identity can enhance the state's survival. They often prioritize the cultivation of a shared citizenship and national identity by promoting patriotism and disseminating the prevailing beliefs within society. The notion of societal security and conformity often serves as the underlying justification for attributing primary responsibility to the state. Political elites frequently emphasize the potential for immigrants, particularly irregular migrants, to engage in criminal activities such as robbery, theft, and prostitution. This narrative gained prominence during the Brexit

campaign, with prominent figures like Nigel Farage and Ed Miliband from the UK (politics.co.uk, 2012) employing it to advance their political agendas. For instance, during his 14 months as Minister of the Interior, Matteo Salvini repeatedly prevented ships carrying rescued migrants from docking at Italian ports (tr.euronews.com, 2021)

Furthermore, in France, Austria, Hungary, and Germany right-wing populist parties have used an anti-immigrant discourse particularly after The Arab Spring (bbc.com, 2015). For instance Hungary's anti-immigrant Prime Minister Viktor Orban stated that Hungary will not allow the Islamization of Europe referring to the Syrian refugees (BBC, Tr, 2015). This is a recurring phenomenon in Turkey, as well, where we read and hear immigrant-related crimes on a daily basis. The discourse surrounding immigration often triggers underlying fears and anxieties among citizens. Politicians frequently employ language that reinforces the distinction between "us" and "others," presenting public safety and morality as justifications for restricting immigration. This narrative often portrays immigrants as potential threats, associating them with terrorism and other dangers. In the aftermath of significant terrorist incidents, such as the September 11 attacks and subsequent ISIS attacks in European countries, anti-immigration sentiments have intensified in many societies.

Based on these concerns, European Union (EU) countries established Frontex, an agency tasked with managing irregular and illegal migration at the bloc's borders. Frontex operates by identifying irregular migrants, determining their countries of origin, and initiating formal repatriation procedures. However, allegations have surfaced regarding Frontex's disregard for human rights and international obligations during migrant crises. In 2019, for instance, Frontex faced scrutiny from a fundamental rights officer who monitors the agency's operations and reports on potential violations. The officer's assessment found that Frontex's actions had infringed upon human rights.

On that point, this research precisely aims to investigate how migration is securitized so that Frontex is established. This issue is tackled by focusing on the EU-Belarus migration crisis in 2021 and the ongoing one on the EU-Ukraine borders. In these cases, Frontex's role stayed indecisive, and effective media and international human rights organizations questioned its practices regarding human rights protection and humanitarian crisis monitoring. In the ordinary way, Frontex's mission starts with the relevant country's request for the deployment of Frontex officers within its borders. If a country fails to make the request or rejects

Frontex's readiness announcement for a mission, they cannot take the initiative and deploy personnel to the area independently. For instance, Poland did not request Frontex's help during the EU- Belarus immigration crisis. One reason for that inertia was that Poland's claim on having enough personnel and sufficient equipment to manage the migrant flows on its own (Euroactiv.com, 2021) However, international organizations and media claimed that another reason was to prevent the journalists' and humanitarian organizations' agents from entering areas and to convey information about how the Polish officers treated the migrants. Even if Frontex officers were deployed in Romania in this case, their roles stayed limited to restrict human rights violations.

Conversely, the allegations against the practices of Frontex involved the Ukrainian migrants crisis. Serious allegations are related to the Vega Project , approved first in 2015, that aims to safeguard children from child trafficking amidst the arduous circumstances it is emphasized that Frontex officers discriminated between Ukrainian migrants and black and Middle Eastern migrants who had been in Ukraine when the crisis broke out, all of which makes people think about the issue that pure Ukrainian immigrants are not securitized while the others are continued to be securitized. This study investigates these claims to draw the actual circumstance of activities with regard to securitization understanding of constructivism through the lenses of Paris School by doing a discourse analysis

Understanding the concept of securitization gains importance at this point. The concept of securitization, introduced by Wæver in the mid-1990s, serves as the cornerstone of the Copenhagen School's theoretical framework. Wæver posits that securitization involves employing the language of security to portray an issue as an existential threat or danger to the survival of the states or individuals (Weaver, 1996). This rhetorical move necessitates asking "how" and identifying the specific actors who transform a material or event/fact into a threat. From a securitization perspective, any fact, event, group, or development is not inherently a threat; rather, it becomes a threat through the process of securitization. (McDonald, 2008, pp. 3-5).

In other words, securitization is a process whereby actors legitimize their right to implement extraordinary measures by framing an issue as an existential threat. This process unfolds in three stages. In the first stage, the securitizing actor identifies an issue as a threat to a referent object, which typically represents a group or entity deserving of protection. In the second

stage, the actor's audience acknowledges the issue as a threat to the referent object. Securitizing actors can include politicians, government bureaucrats, or even activist groups. While the Copenhagen School traditionally excludes individuals from the category of securitizing actors, emphasizing instead the role of organizational structures and attitudes, the concept of securitization remains fluid and open to interpretation. Examining Frontex, hereby as a bureaucratic apparatus, through the Paris School is more convenient since Paris school emphasizes practices, everyday routines, and the functioning of bureaucracy in the process of securitization (Bigo, 2002). By doing a documentary analysis on reports and official documents of the EU, Frontex and related agencies and institutions together with news articles interpretation of the discourses of related documents helps us elaborate and display why Frontex staff treated discriminately against the migrants coming from the Belarus border in 2019, but they welcomed the Ukrainian migrants in 2022.

This study adopts the qualitative research method by doing documentary analysis of the data from theory books, reports news bulletins related to the EU-Belarus and EU- Ukraine immigrant crisis cases as the Frontex has been relatively new to the struggle with informal migration. During the literature review 'yöktez' system is checked over at first stage. It has been seen that there are only seven master theses related to Frontex, none of which consider the issue from the point of the immigrants of Belarus and Ukraine crisis. Therefore, it is clear that comprehensive research documents about Frontex as an institution created as a consequence of securitization of migration process and analyzing and comparing the institution in terms of EU- Belarus and Ukraine immigrants together is missing. Thus, comparing two different cases taking place contemporaneously would vividly represent Frontex as security institution of the EU which operates when the issues are securitized by the EU or the member states even by ignoring human rights. Whereupon the thesis primarily benefitted from the Frontex news bulletins and declarations together with articles in English and Turkish literature by examining Frontex's establishment, departmentalization, and functions as primary sources. However, these articles do not enlighten whether or not the institution intervened in the humanitarian crisis at the borders of the countries, which are members of the EU effectively and in accordance with its founding purpose It can be understandable because the factual events at borders rapidly grew, and they generally could not include the registers.

Nevertheless, a few valuable studies stress Frontex and its missions. Among these below mentioned studies are important. The research of Papastravridis named "Fortress Europe and Frontex: Within or Without International Law?" (2010), the study of Pallares named "Building Walls, Restricting Rights: Lithuania's Response to the EU-Belarus Border 'Crisis'" (2022), Bayrak's study named "Frontex'in Varoluşsal Krizden En Etkili Politika Aracına Dönüşümü Joint Operation RABIT 2010" (2022), Carrera's study named "Walling off Responsibility? -The Pushbacks at the EU's External Borders with Belarus" (2022). Among all Salih Turgay's article, in which he explained the role of Frontex in securitizing the EU's immigration policies and the impact of Frontex's activities and operations on the EU's values and principles, has the closest arguments with this thesis by regarding Frontex as a security institution established by the EU against immigrant flows indicating that the securitization of the European Union's migration policies through the practices of Frontex may pose a risk of compromising the founding values, membership criteria, and international human rights law of the EU. He argues the allegations about Frontex applications during its operations implemented in Mediterranean Sea borders (Turgay, 2021). However, it does not include the Belarus and Russia crisis through the securitization of migration lenses. Therefore, the thesis turned to secondary sources. The thesis's primary data sources were the reports of human rights organizations namely the Friedrich Naumann Foundation or Human Rights Watch, NGO's reports Additionally, respected news channels New York Times, TRT World, BBC and Guardian are the news channels from where data is collected. The thesis also evaluated this news from different newspapers dedicated space on their pages to cover the humanitarian crisis of migrants as much as they relate to the thesis research topic.

This study covers the time interval of the two migrant crises from the beginning of 2021 up to 2022 with references to the 2000s as well. Additionally, the 1990s, which is the period that concrete securitization of migration practices started to be implemented by the EU, is explained additionally to understand the theory behind. Furthermore, the period between 2004, when Frontex was established, and 2022, when the Ukraine-Russian war broke has more details for the sake of an in-dept analysis. The reason of focusing on mentioned periods is to find answers to first "Was Frontex established as a result of the EU's securitization of migration policy? Second, 'How the immigrants during the EU- Belarus Crisis are securitized and How did Frontex respond to the event? Third, 'How did Frontex respond to Russia- Ukraine migration crisis? Did Frontex function in compliance with its establishment

purposes or did it violate them, especially with respect to human rights and dignity?’’ To achieve the aim, the thesis focuses on specific operations. One is Frontex's activities after the EU-Belarusian crisis broke up, and the other is Frontex's activities during the Ukraine-Russian war. The thesis contends that Frontex, established as the ultimate agency by the EU and characterized as a bureaucratic apparatus with reference to the Paris School, is employed for the securitization of the immigration process. The argument posits that administrators of the EU and, indirectly, Frontex, have adopted a discriminatory approach to these distinct crises. Thus, such a high budget (with grant total 754 375 142 Eur) (Frontex, Budget, Vobu, 2022) is questionable, as well.

I examined the theories about securitization from the relevant theory books of Barry Buzan (Buzan, B., & Hansen, L. (2009). *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511817762), Jef Huysmans (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/297757680_The_Politics_of_Insecurity_Fear_Migration_and_Asylum_in_the_EU) as primary sources. The Copenhagen School and Paris School enshrine the securitization of migration issue in detail, about which primary sources are examined, as well. I set forth their fundamental arguments in the second chapter named “Theoretical Perspective on Securitization of Migration”. Based on the idea that ‘discourses create policies.’ This part tackles securitization of immigration policies in time by focusing on the crucial agreements with their insights. The third chapter explains what Frontex is, how it functions, and what Frontex's important missions are in its recent history. The last but not least important chapter is the fourth one, which is called "The Recent Conflicts in the Eastern Borders of European Union and Questioning the Duty Accomplishment of Frontex." This chapter examines the roles Frontex assumed during the cases of conflicts between the EU-Belarus crisis and the Ukrainian migrant crisis with the aim of addressing allegations regarding the Frontex's effectiveness in cases of conflicts.

2. SECURITIZATION AND MIGRATION

2.1 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM, SECURITY, AND SECURITIZATION: DISCOURSE ASPECT UNDER COPENHAGEN SCHOOL

2.1.1 The Social Constructivism: As a Conceptual Introduction to International Relations

The 1980s and 1990s marked the beginning period when critical viewpoints from liberalism and constructivism challenged neo-realist and realist theories. Thus, alternative theories transformed the scope and meaning of the concept of security. Critical theorists placed the "individual" at the center of such concepts as identity, forming the identity discursively and historically as a starting point (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 197). Social constructivism as a theoretical framework, which Alexander Wendt developed, emerged from the chaotic atmosphere following the end of the Cold War and significant shifts in attitudes and perceptions of international relations. Initially, the conflict manifested in immediate issues related to human existence, such as disarmament of nuclear weapons, environmental pollution, and ensuring healthier and safer conditions for human life. Constructivism grounds its base on a sociologic theory named structuration theory developed by Anthony Giddens who is a British sociologist. In his theory he provides an analysis of agency and structure. Here, agency reflects intentional activities whereby individuals seek to satisfy their needs and goals while structure refers to the already existing rules and resources employed in such actions. (Giddens, 1991). Simple everyday doings of people such as going to the cinema, doing the shopping, buying a train ticket are all the activities for which we have our own intentions and goals in mind. But it is probable that we also consider the actions and reactions of others in society. In essence, we shape the way we do these ordinary daily practices. Giddens claims that *Sociology is not concerned with a 'pre-given' universe of objects, but with one which is constituted or produced by the active doings of subjects.* (Giddens, [1976] 1993) Then, the theory is applied to international relations by a Marxist IR Scholar Nicholas Greenwood Onuf. In his book *World of our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* Onuf criticizes realist and liberal scholars for their conception of Brute Facts, rooted in their understanding of human nature. Simultaneously, he argued that 'Social Facts' are occurrences shaped by human actions. He opposed the realist theories of IR

who claims that wars are inevitable by claiming political events such as wars are not human condition therefore, they can be changed. Furthermore, in his book he is the first IR scholar used the constructivism as a term in international relations

Whether modernist or postmodernist in orientation, constructivists have sought to elaborate and explore three core ontological propositions about social life and their impact on aspects of World Politics. These propositions can be classified as ideational structures, identities, and agents-structures. Adler defines the first ontological character of the theory by stressing the importance of normative or ideational structures as well as material structures (Adler, 1997). According to Wendt, material sources acquire meaning in terms of human actions through the typical structure of knowledge in which they are embedded or with which they are closely related (Wendt, 1999) He emphasizes the effects of ideas and norms on world politics. Moreover, he is interested in how agents produce structures and how structures produce agents as it is in the establishment of international organizations which he considers as the social construction of power politics. In his article titled 'Anarchy What States Make of It? (Wendt, 1992). Constructivists argue that the founded or institutionalized meaning structures constitute the social identities of the political or international actors. As a result of these interactions, they find that all institutions have a structural dimension." (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 266) These identities generate the interests of these actors and assign the shapes of their actions which opposes the offensive realists understanding which says that national states, like human beings, have an innate desire to dominate others, there is no room for morality or no values in human condition, international system is an anarchic self-help system and international relations is a struggle for power. Realists pursue the Balance of Power, like a zero-sum game. They believe in the anarchic states but not in international law and corporations.

Constructivism's second ontological characteristic aspect focuses on the interplay between identities and their influence on interests and actions. Constructivists underscore the role of political or social actors' interests in shaping social and international events. Interest assumes a pivotal role in this context. Without a profound understanding of its true essence and recognition of it prior to engaging in social interactions, one cannot cultivate a mature perspective on human interactions, both in international and social realms. That is to say, social identities and their manifestations in the rapidly changing digital landscape influence and shape the actions and strategies of social actors. A third characteristic of constructivism

is that agents and structures affect each other reciprocally. Wendt discusses that "we create and instantiate the relatively enduring social structures in others of which we define our identities and interests." (Wendt, 1992 p. 406) For instance, when someone uses a phrase like 'hardworking student,' it implies the existence of the concept of a 'lazy student' because all identities are constructed in relation to others. Similarly, the representation of the word 'Kurdish' can vary depending on different social group members; it might symbolize one's mother tongue for one group or evoke hostility for another group in contrast. Therefore, state identities are always in the process of construction and so are their relations with each other. This perspective is deeply rooted in the sociological theory of structuralism, drawing heavily from Giddens' assertion that social structures continuously strive to institutionalize their discursive and physical practices within specific temporal and spatial contexts (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 267). Wendt contends that a fundamental connection exists between neorealism and world-system theory, stemming from their shared approach to addressing the "agent-structure problem." Both theoretical frameworks attempt to explain state behavior by examining actors and structures as distinct entities. However, this approach often leads to diluted findings, impeding the development of a more comprehensive understanding of state actions

Wendt asserts that the significance of material resources is derived from their integration within the prevailing knowledge structure and their dynamic interplay with human actions. Actors and structures exert reciprocal influence, shaping and being shaped by the knowledge systems in which they are embedded (Wendt, 1998, p. 350). The analysis assumes the transformation or conversion of actors or structures as an underlying premise. In Wendt's theory, structure encompasses not only material elements and physical constructs but also encompasses social phenomena and social constructs. In his view, shared knowledge, conceptions, and expectations are integral components of structure, material resources, and practices. These components within the structure can make it local in contrast to neo-realist approaches (Wendt, 1987, p. 73).

Wendt constructs an actor profile rooted in the concept of identity, asserting that actors' identities shape their behavioral and motivational proclivities. In essence, identity underpins actors' perceptions and self-conceptions. However, identity also delineates its core and the meaning of "others'" identities. Consequently, identities possess an interactive dimension, fostering reflection on identities and intersubjectivity. Given this intersubjective nature,

meetings become necessary to negotiate and develop relationships among states. It is relevant to state that this thesis applies constructivism but not post-structuralism as theoretical framework since for constructivists meanings assigned to objects are constructed through social practices and interactions in the course of time by emphasizing possibility of change which shares the same idea with this study. Our identity is in a way constructed and may change in time. It is a positivist approach that is why constructivism accepts security as an objective concept by stating that the way you define yourself will determine your priorities (Adler, 1997). Security communities (term used by Adler to define a group of people that have peaceful, dependable expectation of change) is socially and politically constructed which makes The EU the biggest security community. Therefore, the construction of the EU alone is a social constructivist approach. Therefore, as an agency established under the law of the EU Frontex should be analyzed with respect to objective approach of Constructivism. Post-structuralism, on the other hand, evaluates the meanings with regard to their contexts that they are in, by saying that knowledge is contingent and context dependent. It emphasizes the role of language and discourse in shaping reality while constructivists believe that reality is socially constructed through shared meanings and norms. Their understanding of power also differentiates in that post-structuralists argue that Power shapes identities and influences the way we perceive reality while constructivists focus more on how ideas and norms contribute to the formation of state interests and behavior. Norms, rather than just material power, are significant in constructivist analysis. With respect to identity, post-structuralists explore how identities are socially constructed through language and discourse. They are interested in deconstructing fixed categories and exposing power relations that shape identities while constructivists place more emphasis on the role of norms and shared beliefs in shaping state behavior and preferences. Role of institutions are argued by post structuralists in a way of reinforcing power structures and shaping particular discourses while Constructivists often analyze how institutions contribute to the social construction of norms and how they can influence state behavior through socialization and learning. Finally, their Approach to International Relations Theory differs from each other, as well. Post-structuralists are often seen as more critical and skeptical of grand theories and meta-narratives. They may reject the idea of a single, overarching theory that can explain international relations while constructivists are more likely to engage with and contribute to broader theoretical frameworks in IR, while emphasizing the importance

of social construction and ideational factors. Moreover, post structuralists, who are postpositivist at the same time, accept security as a subjective concept.

In summary, while both post-structuralism and constructivism highlight the socially constructed nature of reality, they differ in their emphasis on power, identity, and the role of institutions in shaping international relations. Post-structuralism tends to be more skeptical and deconstructive, whereas constructivism focuses on understanding how shared ideas and norms influence state behavior. At this juncture, the concept of interest once again intersects with identity (Wendt, 1999: 224). Rooted in its three distinct aspects, social constructivist theory challenges the prevailing theoretical assumptions in international relations, which are often accepted as established facts. It advocates for a paradigm shift in international relations, emphasizing the role of social practices and identities in shaping international dynamics.

2.1.2 Social Constructivism and Security: The Copenhagen School

The Copenhagen School (CS) revolutionized the concept of security by adopting social constructivism as its theoretical foundation. This novel paradigm introduced a fresh perspective on security, moving beyond traditional militaristic notions to encompass non-militarist threats. This expanded scope provided fertile ground for the school's theorizing. The theory's name originates from scholars affiliated with the Peace and Conflict Research Center at the University of Copenhagen. These theorists, including Buzan, Waever, Tromer, Lemaitre, and de Wilde, spearheaded a new understanding of non-militarist dimensions of European security.

On that scale, Buzan and Waever contend that neither state nor societies are static entities. In addition to these changes, they acknowledge that identities can change over time, emphasizing the dynamic nature of security perceptions. They view individuals as integral members of society, self-identifying as part of a collective. When society perceives a threat to its existence or security, individuals mirror this sentiment, experiencing anxiety and apprehension. (Buzan & Waever, 1997).

Buzan and Waever assert that France has undergone significant transformations over the centuries, yet a consistent French security policy has persisted. Analogously, they posit that certain elements remain unchanged throughout the period of analysis. (Buzan & Waever,

1997, p. 243). A significant portion of social science revolves around identifying relatively fixed elements. In this vein, Buzan and Waever merged the concepts of security and identity, proposing that a longstanding process of grounding in symbols, labels, and other identifiers generates societal and national identity. Consequently, understanding these powerful symbols, labels, and political discursive structures is essential, as the discourses of security wield political symbols and labels in general. (Buzan & Waever, 1997, p. 244).

Buzan and Waever acknowledge the fluid and ever-evolving nature of social identities and societal values, rejecting the notion of a fixed and permanent social identity, as well. However, they contend that this fluidity should not preclude researchers from examining identities as subjects of security policies. Instead, they advocate for leveraging this uncertainty and fluidity to inform and strengthen foreign and security policies. (Buzan & Waever, 1997, p. 244).

The Copenhagen School adopts an expansive view of security, encompassing non-militarist threats while simultaneously rejecting the inclusion of elements that could potentially harm individual and societal interests and well-being. They prioritize human rights, valuing individuals as humans and upholding their dignity. Consequently, they advocate for constraining the security concept within the boundaries of human rights and dignity to prevent the instrumentalization of security at the expense of these fundamental values. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde expand the security concept to include political, economic, societal, and environmental dimensions in addition to traditional militaristic concerns. Political security focuses on state regimes, political actors, tribes, supranational organizations, and minorities. Societal security addresses the dramatization of issues or actors, such as migrants, as existential threats to collective identities. Economic security examines economic relations, finance, and access to resources and markets. Environmental security emphasizes the interplay between human activities and biological developments (Buzan, 1991, pp. 19-20; Buzan et al., 1998: 75). Buzan asserts that examining the security concept through these distinct sectors is akin to viewing a holistic concept through a multifaceted lens, allowing for a nuanced understanding of its various components. Although Security may be applied in any context, its traditional understanding and scope in IR is identified by Buzan et al as being something about '*survival*'. '*It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object*' (Buzan, Weaver,

Wilde, 1998, p.21). This existential threat does not have to solely be within military context. Meaning of the concept is explained by Buzan et al.:

"The meaning lies not in what people consciously think the concept means but in how they implicitly use it in some ways and not others. In the case of security, textual analysis (Weaver 1988, 1995b, 1995c) suggests that something is designated as an international security issue because it can be argued that this issue is more important than other issues and should take absolute priority. This is the reason we link the issue to what might seem a fairly demanding criterion: that the issue is presented as an existential threat. If one can argue that something overflows the normal political logic of weighing issues against each other, this must be the case because it can upset the entire process of weighing as such: "If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)." (Buzan, Weaver, Wilde, 1998, p.24).

Once any of the political or unpolitical issue is securitized by any actors 'a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development' (Weaver 1988, 1995b) (Buzan, Weaver, Wilde, 1998, p.21)

Barry Buzan from Copenhagen School explains security in general as protection from existential threats which is 'a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue— not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat' (Buzan, 1998, p.24) by speech acts. Here, the securitization theory prompts the question of "how" and delves into the process by which a material or event/fact is transformed into a threat by specific actors. From a securitization perspective, any fact, event, group, or development is not inherently a threat; rather, it becomes a threat through the act of securitization (McDonald, 2008, pp. 3-5). The interpreters load a meaning so that it can pave the way to dangerous results. In other words, securitization is a strategic practice employed by actors to legitimize the use of extraordinary measures by framing an issue as an existential threat. Actors elevate an issue from the realm of ordinary politics to the domain of security, justifying the application of exceptional measures to address it. This tactic is often employed when actors seek to suppress or exclude a political agenda from public discourse, effectively relegating it to the realm of security concerns.

Clearly, securitization is made by politicians, government bureaucrats, or interest groups. In essence, a securitizing actor is an entity that directs attention towards a particular referent object, justifying the implementation of extraordinary measures. The Copenhagen School representatives refrain from considering individuals as securitization actors due to their embeddedness within larger groups and their tendency to reflect the opinions of those groups. Consequently, they advocate for focusing on organizational structures and organizational attitudes to gain a clearer understanding of securitization processes and their outcomes (Baysal and Lüleci, 2015: 79). Securitizing actors leverage the support of auxiliary functional actors, such as the media, to disseminate their messages to the broader public and garner support for their framing of an issue as a threat. Political actors' claims often incorporate subjective assessments of the threat. In this political realm, the subjective actor and their target audience engage in a reciprocal relationship, and this intersubjectivity fosters a social construction of the issue (Bilgin, 2010, p. 83).

Balzacq discusses security as follows: (Balzacq, 2005: 181)

“Highlighted in this context, the word ‘security’ does not point towards an objective reality; it is an agency in itself to the extent that it conveys a self-referential practice instantiated by discourses on existential threats that empower political elites to take extraordinary measures to alleviate ‘insecurity’. Furthermore, this approach reinforces the CS view that ‘real rhetorical urgency’ does not always equal the existence of a ‘real threat’. The radical approach to the relation between language and the facts surrounding it can be described like this — what is decisive for security is what language constructs and, as a consequence, what is ‘out there is thus irrelevant”

As a consequence, when the politicians or groups involved in an issue in a category of threat and ensured that the auditors recognized and approved it as a threat, the issue's nature changes. This change is brought by a discursive and narrative process relying on authorities claims in such a way that if the immediate measures cannot be taken against the threat it would be too late and society would be damaged by it. However, it should be added that whatever the danger level of the issue is, eventually, human rights and basic freedoms will be restricted to remove the threat (Waeber, 1996: 106-107). As Williams pointed out:

“Focusing on the speech act highlights the decision to securitize an issue. While the background conditions for enabling securitization to take place must exist, a focus on

decision highlights the explicitly political nature of such a choice. Securitization can never be reduced to the conditions of its social accomplishment: it is an explicitly political choice and act". (Williams, 2003: 520)

2.2 PARIS SCHOOL AND SECURITIZATION

Paris School emerged in the same period, in the 1990s. Bigo the highlighting figure of the school, argued that the security concept is constructed through political decisions and justification of practices of surveillance, control, and punishment as well as practices of protection, reassurance in the social and political way. Thus, his argument wields the "insecuritization" process to completely understand the process and its outcomes. According to Bigo, securitization or insecuritization can be developed by bureaucratic/political decisions on normal, day-by-day political issues and this practice normalizes the security issues because of their methods by relying on technological and technocratic ways (Bigo, 2002).

It should be added that the main thinking frame of the Paris School is grounded on Foucault's and Bourdieu's security approaches. Foucault, in his seminal work named *"Discipline and Punishment"*, examines the history of the "other" and focuses on the fact how societies and abnormal personalities can be kept under the control by disciplinary methods. He argues that every change in the criminal system is also a punishment for a particular segment of society and the government specifies it as an economic and effective method to keep control the society as a whole. He supposes that observation and surveillance redound a symbolic and omnipotent power for the government (Foucault, 2015: 31). Additionally, Foucault rejects a utopic expectation in such a way that the rule of law would replace the actual situation of war and chaos. Humanity temporarily settles an oppressive regime with another oppressive one because it historically registers the savage system within a symbolic "rule system". The government or authority accommodates the central position of society and contains different meanings such as "guider" and "Führung". The authority controls and wields both consent and violence in the same toolbox (Foucault, 2016: 257-258). It reflects on itself within the security concept's transformation. By moving from that point, Paris School handles security as a social construction done by the authority (state). They acknowledge the desires of states to expand their capacity for social observation and surveillance through the adoption of modern technology and the insights of social science research. This enhanced ability to monitor and analyze societal trends and dynamics empowers states to more effectively

manage and control their populations, potentially leading to the formulation of more effective public policies. (Bigo, 2000: 179) together with the institutions

The Paris School's security concept encompasses both internal and external dimensions, making no distinction between these aspects. This holistic approach is particularly relevant in the post-Cold War era, where traditional notions of border protection have become less effective due to the emergence of the European Union and the Schengen Agreement. Criminal and terrorist organizations have transcended national boundaries, necessitating a coordinated response from European security institutions. Military forces are primarily tasked with addressing external threats within national borders, while internal security agencies focus on mitigating internal threats originating from outside national borders. This collaborative effort aims to safeguard European countries from the illicit activities of terrorist and criminal organizations (Bigo, 2000: 172). The multifaceted nature of migration poses challenges due to the diverse categories into which migrants can be classified, such as immigrants, drug traffickers, or Islamist/radical terrorist groups (Bigo, 2000: 171). The Paris School's emphasis on the "others" who enter a country from outside firmly anchors the security concept within the realm of policy and governmentality. Security departments and governments are intrinsically drawn to understanding the "others" and their potential threats. In contemporary discourse, security is not merely about countering threats; it also entails lowering the threshold of acceptability for outsiders. This empowerment of security agencies translates into their increased involvement in daily life, effectively "securitizing" it. Governmentality, then, is about governing society regardless of territorial boundaries. Authorities strive to maintain societal balance and order through the instrument of security, indirectly utilizing the concept of "others." The "others" are constructed by the authorities, regardless of their actual threat potential. By cultivating fear and insecurity, governments simplify the task of establishing security measures, effectively persuading society of the necessity of heightened security, ironically fueled by the fear they themselves have instilled. Bigo succinctly captures this reality: (Bigo, 2000: 177)

“Too often, analyses of security are for too inattentive to social practices of security professionals. In many Cases they are the product of secondary rationalizations which reduce security or identity to natural objects. (...) The evolution of security and its various forms throughout history is explained either as an anthropological need (ontological security or security desire), as a Legitimate demand from citizens (safety), or as a speech

act with varies according to the moment (security discourses), rather than Analyzing the practices of securitization/insecuritization and the setup of the social power balance that enables them to be applied. This neglect of practices, of the actions of security agents, is a result of an inversion that would have us believe that ‘what is done determines the doing, when in fact the opposite true’”

The prejudice, which is produced by the authority, directly damages the “others.” In the European context, the concept of "others" often refers to migrants, who are perceived by some citizens as potential threats to their cultural values and social dynamics. This perception of threat, whether real or perceived, fuels the securitization of society, transforming fear into reality. Politicians exploit this fear to deflect attention from their shortcomings and garner public approval for their decisions to implement comprehensive surveillance and security measures. Through this process, society designates who is and will be subjected to scrutiny. This determination process draws upon Foucault's panopticon concept, where the government monitors selected groups with the consent of the populace. Bigo terms this government surveillance, legitimized by public approval, as a "ban-option." He elaborates on the concept as follows: (Bigo, 2002 p. 82)

“The form of governmentality of postmodern societies is not a panopticon in which global surveillance is placed upon the shoulders of everybody, but a form of ban-option in which the technologies of surveillance sort out who needs to be under surveillance and who is free of surveillance, because of his profile. This form of pre- and post-Hobbesian state seems, most emphatically, to renounce notions of a social contract and to transform misgiving into a mode of ruling. The emphasis is no longer on curing or promoting individual development but on playing with fears by designating potentially dangerous minorities. Neither reducible to sovereignty and punishment nor biopolitics and power over life, this political technology is based on proactive, anticipative, and morphing techniques and aims at mastering a chaotic future with minimalist management focusing only on risky groups (so identified) or groups at risk.”

Bigo delves into the intricate relationship between unemployment, crime, and migration. He posits that much of the anti-migration discourse stems from the perception that migration is a consequence of unemployment and a catalyst for criminal activity. Consequently, authorities construct a "fact" based on this discourse. Just as the state determines what

constitutes a security threat to society, it also shapes how this threat is perceived and characterized. In other words, securitization and our perception of the state's role in society are mutually reinforcing. As a result, we ascribe omnipotence and the role of "protector" to the state, granting it control over our political and societal perceptions as a whole (Bigo, 2002: 65)

All in all, Paris School scholars argue that every issue can be brought into the realm of security. The Paris School, which criticizes the Copenhagen School for limiting its approach solely to the level of discourse, addresses the concept of security as a social construct. In the process of securitization, the Paris School emphasizes practices, everyday routines, and the functioning of bureaucracy. Furthermore, contrary to the Copenhagen School's assertion that issues must necessarily entail an existential threat, Paris School scholars contend that politics is not solely formed through discourse. They emphasize that countries or authorities create their bureaucratic apparatus, and as these bureaucratic apparatuses are established, they concurrently create their own security technologies. This study analyzes the EU's securitization of migration with regard to Paris School by considering Frontex as its bureaucratic apparatus who has security technologies against immigration.

2.3 HISTORICAL CONVERGENCE OF CONCEPTS OF SECURITIZATION AND MIGRATION

Human mobility has been a constant feature of human history, dating back to the earliest civilizations. We understand migration as "the movement action of people or groups from one country to another country, from a residence to another residence, transportation, and exodus" (TDK, 2022). Similarly, it can be designated that the international literature defines the concept as "the movement of people to a new country or area to find work or better living conditions" by Oxford Learners Dictionaries. The study examines migration from an international perspective, focusing on the movement of individuals across national borders. It is essential to distinguish between the broad concept of migration and the more specific concept of refugees. The first term functions as an umbrella to the second one, while the second concept contains a "force" or "necessity" and "well-founded fear" factors as principal components. According to article 1 of the Convention Relation of Status of Refugees of 1951, the refugee can be narrated as follows:

“(...) owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

Other similar conventions include the Refugee Convention of the African Union Association of 1984 and the Arab Convention on Regulating the Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries (Arab Convention). These conventions enhance the scope of the refugee concept by adding ‘*within natural disasters, grave events resulting in significant disruption of public order in the whole country or any part thereof*’ (Arab Convention, art. 1) (Akalin, 2013, pp. 48-49). The EU, which the study focuses to the relationship with migration policy and security, define it in a similar context (EU, 2022a)

Today, migration is categorized in some contexts as regular/irregular or legal/illegal. States discomfort from and challenge to irregular or illegal migration because it means that people or communities enter into destination country by using illegal methods and without obeying its stipulations for entrance”. In another situation, illegal migration can happen if a foreign worker or visitor does not return to his/her origin country despite his/her working permission or residence permission expiring (Yazan, 2013: 38). At the issue, migration and security begin to converge. The imperative for state control over migration stems from the perception that uncontrolled migration can swiftly undermine public order and stability in the receiving country (Huysman, 2000: 756; Yilmaz-Elmas, 2016: 179). As expected, migration tends to gravitate towards economically developed nations. European countries have been grappling with this reality since the latter half of the 20th century. The historical trajectory of migration waves to Europe can be discerned from the accompanying graphs:

Figure 1 illustrates a consistent upward trend in migration waves, reaching a peak of 1 million individuals between 1990 and 1999. This level, unfortunately, proved unsustainable, and the trend continued to ascend. The outbreak of conflicts and wars in regions like the Middle East and Eurasia, particularly after the 2000s, fueled a surge in migration to Europe. This unfortunate circumstance contributed to the escalating migration wave, which steadily

surpassed the 1 million barrier annually, persisting to this day, albeit with occasional dips in certain years (Lima & Revoltella, 2016).




Figure 2.1: The Migration Flows to Europe According to Years.

(Source: Lima and Revoltella, 2016).

While the global refugee crisis has forced people from their homes in various regions, developed European countries. Germany, Sweden, and Finland have become preferred destinations for many refugees and asylum seekers. This concentration of immigrants in specific countries undoubtedly poses challenges in managing the process and maintaining domestic order and security




Figure 2.2: Non-EU Born Population Residing in the EU (2014) – % of Total Population (MAP).

(Source: Lima and Revoltella, 2016).

As Migration has become an entrenched feature of the European landscape, and it is foreseeable that this new normal will pose challenges to authorities and disrupt their carefully crafted plans for their respective nations. Consequently, security authorities have come to perceive migration as a looming 'threat' to European states. It is crucial to acknowledge that the securitization of migration is a dynamic process that can vary significantly depending on a country's unique demographic, economic, and socio-cultural characteristics, as well as its evolving societal self-perception. The post-Second World War era witnessed a welcoming attitude towards foreign workers from European industrialized countries, who played a pivotal role in bolstering the workforces of these nations. These countries actively recruited skilled labor from developing nations such as Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia. This research endeavors to delve into the theoretical framework underpinning the securitization of migration. It aims to uncover the underlying reasons that have driven the securitization of migration and to scrutinize the theoretical perspectives championed by the Paris School. Through an in-depth analysis of this approach, the research seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of the securitization of migration and its far-reaching implications within the European context by examining the EU's approach through Frontex.

2.4 THE REASONS FOR POPULARITY OF SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN EUROPE

The securitization of migration in Europe has become popular due to a combination of political, social, economic, and cultural factors which means Europe's existing strategy on migration, characterized as a "securitized" threat, relies on a potent mix of concerns. Populist leaders adeptly leverage fears of terrorism, cultural dilution, and economic strains, positioning themselves as guardians of the nation against incoming migrants. This narrative, intensified by sensationalized media coverage and historical influences, justifies stringent policies and exacerbates societal rifts. For instance, the 2015 migration crisis in Europe, also known as the European migrant crisis, involved a significant influx of refugees and migrants seeking asylum, mainly from conflict zones in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)'s report as of December 7, over 911,000 refugees and migrants had reached European shores since the beginning of the year, with approximately 3,550 lives lost during the perilous journey. More than 75 percent of those arriving in Europe had escaped conflict and persecution in Syria, Afghanistan, or Iraq. (UNHCR, 2015) upon this unprecedented migration crisis, together

with the terrorist attacks in different parts of the Europe Such as London and Madrid in 2005 and Paris in 2015 securitization of the immigrants increased since too many social and political discontents have aroused within the states and societies which have been evaluated many times by many academists since then. However, in the next chapter, my thesis focuses on the causes of the securitization of migrants, rather than examining the events that lead to it individually and the reasons are examined under five subheadings.

2.4.1 The Rising of Radical Right Tendencies

The term "radical right" encapsulates a range of ideologies that promote in-group favoritism and out-group hostility. These ideologies often manifest in policies that grant preferential treatment to members of the in-group while marginalizing and disenfranchising members of the out-group. In contemporary political discourse, the term "radical right" is frequently invoked to describe movements and groups that advocate for ethnocentric nationalism, anti-immigration stance, racial or religious supremacy, and the suppression of minority rights.(Mudde, 2010: 1174-1176) In his seminal work, political scientist Mudde delineates the defining characteristics of radical right parties, identifying four core ideological elements that consistently underpin these groups: nationalism, xenophobia, welfare chauvinism, and law and order. This shared ideological framework serves as a basis for classifying and understanding this distinct category of political parties. (Muddle, 2007: 20) However, Mudde later acknowledges and revises that not all nationalist parties or their supporters align with the broader radical right ideology. He recognizes that nationalism can exist independently of other radical right tenets, and that not all individuals who identify as nationalists necessarily subscribe to the full spectrum of radical right ideology. (Mudde, 2007: 30-31).

With regard to anti-immigration policies, it can be observed that these policies may align with radical right groups that emerged for the first time after the Second World War in the post-1980 era. These groups are described as radical right parties, neo-fascist parties, or right-populist parties by a set of academic studies but the definitional difference doesn't result in a significant semantic transformation of the term. A common aspect among radical right parties in various European countries is their emergence in a neo-liberal order, in contrast to old fascist regimes. They argue for the representation of a homogeneous culture, social background, and ethnicity. Therefore, they naturally object to the existence of others

in European civilization, they reject the plural democratic understanding (Vural, 2005: 22-23). Thus, it cannot be argued that the modern radical right parties are not against democracy as a whole but what they object to is liberal democracy which prioritizes minority groups and the basic rights of people as an “individual”. Whereas the radical right parties praise “nationality” and put forward communal values in front of the liberal values such as individualism and freedom (Aslan, 2018: 52) Also it should be emphasized that the modern radical right parties didn’t highlight unique and supreme leader (such as Fuhrer) to chart the path to their vision of the future, in contrast to their predecessors (Hillebrand, 2014: 9).

The members of radical rights-wing parties have diverse underlying reasons. Arzheimer and Carter's research demonstrates a higher propensity among older individuals in Europe, specifically within the 45-54 age group, to align themselves with radical right parties. Furthermore, they posit a strong inverse relationship between higher levels of professional qualification and affiliation with radical right parties. The more people work in professions that require qualifications and expertise, the more likely they are to join in radical right parties. Conversely, individuals engaged in jobs that require physical labor and have lower education tend to be more inclined to register with radical right parties compared to those who do not share their characteristics. (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006: 423-430). On the other hand, radical parties flourish in environments characterized by political instability and heightened tensions between center-aligned parties. When center-right and center-left parties collaborate and reach agreements on fundamental national policies, citizens often perceive this as a compromise orchestrated by an elite ruling class, fostering a sense of optimism regarding the state's future. In contrast, when the rift between center parties widens, citizens become more receptive to the agendas espoused by radical parties. Research findings corroborate this notion, demonstrating a surge in support for radical parties during periods of major coalition governments. Similar outcomes can manifest when center parties hold power, but their governing styles fail to resonate with the populace or address their aspirations. (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006: 423-430).

Nevertheless, it is not solely the migration wave that increases the radical right wing of the policy. Upon evaluating the literature regarding migration and securitization I found out that the first and foremost, globalization is a fundamental driver of their spread. The underlying reason is that globalization has corroded the significance of nationalism and national borders, which were the primary factors shaping international relations since the 17th century. In this

era, scholars such as Hobbes, took into consideration international relations as a reflection of powerfulness and competition (Badie, 2001:45). However, state-dominant international relations have been replaced with globalism and supra-national organizations gained importance since the 1970s. According to globalism, the new world order excludes localism. And inter-personal or inter-corporation relations cannot be controlled strictly any longer thanks to developed communication devices and other technologies. (Badie, 2001:45-46). The fact that people from different ethnicities can contact each other erases the supremacy arguments of some groups and personal transfers from country to country frequently occur. Also, globalism provides access to a qualified workforce that can readily migrate to more developed countries, potentially leading to unemployment problems in their home countries. Surely the ones who consider the “victims” of unemployment which is the result of globalism, reject globalism and the newcomers because of it (Kriesi, etc., 2006: 2).

The downside of globalization affects not only newcomers but also opportunities leaving them. The new order encourages agglomerate corporations to invest in countries that are more profitable to them. Moving from that viewpoint, the corporation have shifted their focus toward Eastern European countries such as Poland and Ukraine or Far East countries such as China and Indonesia due to lower labor costs and more flexible legal obligations. Thus, globalism paves the way for both the corporation and economic funds of countries to be removed from the country, which often results in difficulties and challenges for the lower or middle-income workers in finding new jobs. When unemployment and immigration rate rise simultaneously, the vote shares of radical right parties increase. (Guibernau, 2010: 5; Stockemer 2017, 50-51; Arzheimer 2009, 273). Moreover, most of European and American citizens accuse globalism of giving the way to El Kaide, ISIS, and other terrorist groups to coordinate and carry out their devastating attacks.

2.4.2 Ending of Cold War and Changing of Security Concept

The perception of migration as a security concern is a consequence of the end of the Cold War (Huysman, 2000; Bigo, 2002; Buzan and Hansen 2009). Huysman argues that the Cold War security paradigm was narrowly focused on preventing war between the two superpowers, overlooking other potential threats. However, following the Cold War's conclusion in the early 1990s, international security organizations like NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and ESCO (European Security Cooperation Organization)

started to reevaluate their threat understanding. They adopted a broader definition of "threat," encompassing any factor that poses a danger to a country, involves nuclear weapons, or constitutes a conventional attack on the state. However, this traditional definition of "threat" had limitations. In the contemporary world, "danger" is perceived across a wider spectrum of dimensions. These dimensions include natural disasters, human trafficking, ethnic conflicts, environmental problems, pandemic diseases, drug trade, migration, global warming, the extinction of natural sources at the present. Apparently, the new "danger" concept needs a legitimacy problem. Therefore, the literature classifies the dangers of "*hard security*" which means the conventional military security concept and "*soft security*" which includes the new wider security concept (Bilgin, 2010: 79).

Conversely, security concerns have expanded beyond traditional military threats, giving rise to the concept of "deepening" security by asking questions like "who or what does the threat turn toward?" "This concept encompasses a broader range of threats, including those that lack overt military characteristics, such as natural disasters, civil wars, religious conflicts, global warming, terrorism, migration, and even poverty. Because humans, the environment, or society can be exposed to various threats beyond those posed by soldiers or firearms. In fact, the focused object is still the state and the concept's aim are to protect the state's stability against threats in principal but they also add other subjects like "human" or "society" as potential victims. Clearly, this new phenomenon has necessitated the examination of global issues from a critical perspective, with the aim of determining whether these issues already constitute security problems or have the potential to develop into security challenges. In many instances, resistance movements against local governments in destabilized countries like Angola, Serbia, or Rwanda evolved into threats against humanity, prompting international powers to intervene as balancing forces (Buzan, 2008: 118).

Thereupon, the relationship between the acceptable security concept and migration can be investigated ardently. Indeed, armed conflicts, whether between nations or within a single country, often lead to significant displacement of people. For example, the most devastating result of the Syrian civil war, ongoing since 2011, was an influx of migrants toward neighboring countries like Turkey, Egypt, as well as developed European countries. Official data shows that Turkey alone received more than 3 million Syrian refugees (mülteciler.org, 2022).

What is more, the UN frequently records the fleeing refugees from armed conflicts of South Sudan, Yemen, the Central African Republic, Nigeria, Burundi, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. People from these countries' primary destination is typically Europe. Only in 2022, due to the Ukraine-Russia war, the number of people fleeing from their countries reached just about 4.7 million. The migration crisis is so immense that only 7.1 million people are displaced internally in Ukraine which means that 12 million people have had to leave their homes internally or externally. Just as the fact that Syrian refugees turned forward to Turkey, Ukrainian refugees similarly selected to refuge in Poland which has received 2.7 million people since the war began. Hungary has received 440,387 Ukrainians. Moldova, with 417,650 refugees, is the fifth country in terms of the number of arrivals. Moldova has 2.6 million inhabitants, which is one of the poorest countries in Europe. Finally, Slovakia has received 326,244 refugees and Belarus 22,428 (Guerra, 2022).

Apparently, these people naturally left their homes and moved to safe places in order to protect the lives of their own and their bellowed ones. However, in the process, they sometimes inadvertently create security problems in the places they are accommodated. Therefore, the evolving security paradigm due to the changing security understanding often categorizes a large number of migrants as potential security threats.

2.4.3 Cultural Identity

Identity is an intrinsic part of personality. In essence, identity serves as a distinctive marker for an individual, setting them apart from others. Individuals with a strong sense of identity experience a deep sense of belonging and distinctiveness, imbuing their existence with meaning. However, identity can also transcend individual boundaries, extending to groups, communities, or even nations. The nature of group identity varies depending on factors such as race, ethnicity, language, religion, and sexual orientation, shaped by the characteristics of the groups to which individuals belong. (Pembeciopku, 2012: 49). Through group or national identities, people attribute meaning and significance to their attitudes and beliefs, behaviors, thinking style. They create a sense of 'self' within the particular group when individuals gain a group identity and adopt shared beliefs, values, rituals, and skills. Thus, individual existence and self-image are ongoing together with group image and group identity. As a result, the individual develops a habit of viewing the world from a group perspective. From the same perspective, cultural identity can be described as follows.: *"Cultural identity is an*

individual's sense of self-derived from formal or informal membership in groups that transmit and inculcate knowledge, beliefs, values, attitudes, traditions, and ways of life" (Jameson, 2007: 199)

Modern states perceive that the homogenized cultural identity would contribute to the survival of the state. Today, states prioritize the establishment of a shared citizenship and national identity by fostering patriotism and disseminating the prevailing beliefs throughout society. This approach aligns with the state's primary responsibility, which is to ensure the security and cohesion of society. The more the state makes everyone feel and acts in the same way, the easier it would be to protect the general order (Taylor, 2011: 83). To facilitate conformity and safe interaction among people, a harmonized and cohesive societal structure is essential. Obviously, then the people do business with each other as long as they are confident that their actions won't have negative repercussions on the other party in the interaction. Then the state should accomplish its mission of patriotism and harmonization (Taylor, 2011: 90). On that issue, people from another culture break the harmonization of society. Indeed, when the cultural differentiation is bigger, the possibility of social conflict is deepened and intensified. The destination state's primary concern centers around how to assimilate or acculturate this different culture into the predominant culture of the state. Immigrants' successful acculturation is defined by psychological contentment, strong self-esteem, improved performance at work or school, and balanced mental and physical health. Other factors that are thought to influence adaptational outcomes include moderating factors prior to migration (age, gender, personality, and cultural distance from the host society), coping strategies used by the acculturating individual, prejudice and discrimination experiences, social support, and contextual factors such as demography, immigration policies, and ethnic attitudes of the host society (Berry, 2005; Rudiger and Spencer, 2003; Kymlica, 2007).

The cultural identities of the incomers and their consciousness of sociality play a crucial role in the process of harmonization and acculturation. For example, Erdem Öztürk (Ozturk, 2011) examined the Turks' acculturation process since the 1960s in Europe and the consequence he reached is that the Turks ensured the process slowly but exactly certain integration. She explains the situation by being of these generations simply Europeans but not Europeanized. The reality was so clear that some children of Turkish immigrants in European countries were often pressured to assimilate into the local culture and abandon

their native language, Turkish. This emphasis on assimilation led to a decline in the transmission of Turkish cultural traditions, including Islamic practices. As a result, Europeans began to explore the concept of multiculturalism, seeking ways to accommodate and celebrate the diverse cultures within their societies. Multiculturalism has enriched European civilization by fostering cross-cultural exchange and understanding. According to Öztürk Erdem, we should praise the acculturation process and she adds that *“So the fear of the « other » has finally been replaced by the curiosity to discover the specific characteristics of this other. Therefore, rather than creating conflicts, these different people are brought closer together. To conclude, in this love/hate story we can say that”* (Öztürk Erdem, 2011).

The integration and acculturation process are a complex and lengthy one, often spanning generations. Cultural differences can be perceived as a challenge to the dominant culture of a host society, potentially leading to protectionist attitudes. However, the perception of threat varies across societies and depends on various factors, including the degree of cultural homogeneity within the receiving country. Societies with a more established and unified cultural identity may be more inclined to view cultural differentiation with apprehension. This can be observed in some European countries with strong cultural traditions, such as France, which have adopted stricter immigration policies, particularly towards individuals from non-Christian or non-Western backgrounds. The underlying fear driving these policies often stems from concerns about preserving the nation's cultural identity and preventing undesired demographic changes. (Karyotis, 2007: 8-9).

This fact is supported by the region's recent developments. As the war between Ukraine and Russia erupted, European countries wholeheartedly welcomed Ukrainian refugees into their territories and even launched a few bus trips between Ukrainian and European cities. (European Committee of the Regions, 2022). The European Union's immigration policies reflect its commitment to fostering a cohesive European identity. European countries strive to establish a shared cultural identity that encompasses all European citizens. By doing so, they seek to promote a sense of belonging among European citizens and reduce the likelihood of marginalizing immigrants from other European nations. (Konings, De Coninck and d'Haenens, 2021).

In particular, citizens of host countries often resist adopting the communication styles of immigrants or using foreign brands introduced by businesses rooted in their own languages

and cultures. These visible “otherness” attitudes of the foreigners can be perceived as a challenge to the dominant culture, prompting host state citizens to initiate change. Their reflections on these paternal choices are the consequences of a political discourse based on “us” and “them”. Labeling, the immigrants and refugees as “them” categorizes them as “cultural others” and disrupt their cultural integration and harmonization within the society, leading to a cultural conflict between the two cultural groups. These messages position migrants as being lower than native residents and imply that they are a danger to the local culture. (Karyotis, 2007: 9). Countries with a strong national identity, such as Greece, can have complex relationships with immigration. The idea of being Greek is deeply ingrained in history and tradition, and some Greeks see immigration as a challenge to their cultural identity. The wave of immigrants in the 1990s caused some Greeks to perceive immigrants as a threat to their established customs and traditions (Swarts and Karaktsanis, 2012: 33).

While some European countries adopt a defensive stance towards immigration, others embrace integrationist approaches. European scholars recognize the contributions of immigrant cultures to shaping and enhancing European identity. Kancs and Lecca demonstrate that effective integration policies for refugees and immigrants yield long-term socioeconomic benefits. (Kancs and Lecca, 2017: 1-47).

2.4.4 Social and Societal Security

Capitalism prioritizes capital over human resources. This preference generates various social issues for states, including poverty, inequality, and social discontent among the less advantaged groups. Therefore, states established a supporting approach toward the disadvantaged groups through central policies called “social policies”. These social policies are supported by a societal security system funded through both individual and institutional taxes. In essence, the contributions of current workers sustain the benefits received by current retirees and other program beneficiaries. The modern social welfare state emerged in response to the demands of the working class for socio-economic rights. It transformed into a political and constitutional system that provides social safety nets for its citizens. The ineffectiveness of classical capitalist policies in the aftermath of the 1929 Great Depression prompted economist John Maynard Keynes to develop a new economic theory advocating for a more active role of the state in promoting economic stability. Through social security policies, states pledge to improve living conditions, encompassing viable employment

prospects, workplace safety, demographic enhancements, and advancements in education and healthcare. This concept was devised to safeguard socio-economically disadvantaged groups within the state against wealthier and more privileged segments of society.

Within the realm of social security policies, the state establishes both social insurance and social aid programs, facilitating the equitable redistribution of wealth across society. Due to that, the modern state considers the individual as a “person”, it doesn’t make discrimination between a citizen or another person which is officially a non-citizen but lives, works and produces an added value within the society. Nonetheless, migration has the possibility to affect the social security system adversely. Firstly, as previously mentioned, immigrants can present a cost-effective alternative to the local workforce supply. Therefore, migration is likely to pave the way for unemployment problems in the host countries. Plus, socio-economical rights of the immigrant workers problems arise (Demir, 2016: 79). This problem is handled as a human rights issue at first. This problem is so prominent that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which internationally regulated societal security rights primarily, did not distinguish between non-citizen workers and citizen workers, including provisions for “everyone.” “In 1962, the International Labor Organization established an international covenant known as the ‘C118-Equality of Treatment (Societal Security) Convention,’ which specifically addressed this issue. Article 2 of the Convention outlines the matter as follows: *“Each Member may accept the obligations of this Convention in respect of any one or more of the following branches of societal security for which it has in effective operation legislation covering its own nationals within its own territory: medical care; sickness benefit; maternity benefit; invalidity benefit; old-age benefit; survivors’ benefit; employment injury benefit; unemployment benefit; and family benefit”* (ILO, 1962)

Undoubtedly, these guarantees are extended to immigrants based on their fundamental human rights. Moreover, immigrants make substantial economic contributions to their host countries. However, in these recipient nations, the presence of an informal workforce often emerges spontaneously, negatively impacting economic indicators. The state faces the dual challenge of tackling this informality while simultaneously upholding the rights and ensuring dignified living conditions for both undocumented workers and immigrants.

It's worth noting that the state has a responsibility to not only combat illegal labor markets but also support and improve the living conditions of these immigrant workers. However,

during economic downturns when a country's overall income decreases, local residents may unfairly blame immigrants for the economic hardships and resist sharing resources with them. In such situations, immigrants can be perceived as a threat not only to the economic stability but also to the social security system of the state. Some scholars interpret this process as immigrants being viewed as individuals who strain borders and social orders by utilizing social services provided by the state, often at the expense of those who have a legitimate need for such support (Canpolat and Armer, 2012: 12)

At that point it is essential to make a distinction between social security and societal security. The first one refers to the well-being of people in terms of level of welfare financially in everyday practices involving feeling themselves secure from hazardous effects, while the second one refers to an understanding of abstract identity collectives involving being a member of a collective and identify their identities by this collective's way of living and way of perceiving the world in general.

This thesis mostly relates to the latter, societal security, which prioritizes identities of social groups when individuals identify themselves as members of a social group who has commonly shared ideas and practices. '*...Societal security is about collectives and their identities*'. '*The organizing concept in the societal sector is identity of those collectives. Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community*' (Buzan et al. 1998:119). Hereby, the securitization of migration by the EU is believed to be a threat to its collective identity upon the migration flows from the eastern regions. Migration as a threat to societal security is discussed by Buzan et al as below:

By migration '*....X people are being overrun or diluted by influxes of Y people; the X community will not be what it used to be, because others will make up the population; X identity is being changed by a shift in the composition of the population... thus members of the community would not see themselves as X anymore.*' (Buzan et al. 1998:121). Therefore, the collective identity of the EU member states as 'Europeans' would be spoiled by the influxes of immigrants.

2.4.5 Internal and Criminological Security

Politicians' speeches often center around immigrants, particularly those who are undocumented, and tends to emphasize crimes such as robbery, theft, and prostitution committed by this group. This discourse can fuel fear among the citizens regarding immigration itself. Politicians frequently employ rhetoric that distinguishes between 'us' and 'others,' with an emphasis on public safety and morality as pivotal concerns. Immigrants are often portrayed as potentially dangerous individuals in these discourses.

Politicians commonly argue that migrants are linked to terrorism, a notion that gained popularity following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and more recently, due to a series of terrorist acts attributed to ISIS within European countries. In response, the European Union has intensified its security policies to address these threats. In fact, statements made by figures such as Margaret Thatcher underscore this concern regarding illegal immigrants, with remarks like *“we joined Europe to have free movement of goods...not... to have free movement of terrorists, criminals, drugs, plant and animal diseases, and illegal immigrants”* (Karyotis, 2007: 9)

Furthermore, in contemporary times, certain European leaders advocate for security policies by alleging that immigrants support and espouse terrorist ideologies. For example, the members of EFDD, which are known for their anti-immigration policies, announced their statements in 2015 in European Parliament after French President Hollande spoke as follows:

“We are at war. The first casualties in this war must be appeasement and political correctness. We face one of two choices: we can accept eventual submission to the ideology of an ever-increasing Islamic population, or we can take the first step in resistance and end any more mass immigration from Islamic countries. Only then can we start to address the difficult issue of integrating the existing Muslim population” Similarly the members of ENF argued their ideas as follows: *“This EU is a complete fiasco and I repeat, Frontex is a towing service for illegal invaders from Islamic countries. That must stop. Open borders are a feast for terrorists, people, and arms smugglers and that has to stop. The economic dictation of Brussels plunges citizens into deep poverty. That must stop!”* (Güler, 2019: 355-356)

Clearly, their argument revolves around associating Islam with terrorism, primarily driven by the discourse of 'othering,' which categorizes Muslim immigrants as part of the 'other' group. Similar concerns can be mentioned about the internal security issue. The common perception is that legal and illegal immigrants commit crimes more than the citizens of the host country. It generates internal security concerns. Some researchers indicate that in countries where the immigrant flows have risen dramatically in a short period, local people are concerned about being harmed by these immigrants and their thought is in such a way that these people pose a threat to public peace by getting involved in crimes such as violence, theft, smuggling and prostitution (Erdoğan, 2019: 82). Sometimes, official announcements contribute to this perception. For example, former USA President Donald Trump asserted that *"They're bringing crime. They're rapists."* referring to the immigrants (NC Policy Watch, 2021). Additionally, due to a failure in social adaptation, they may be inclined to join criminal organizations or even establish their criminal organizations, and there is a possibility that they may become involved in terrorist organizations in the future. (Erdoğan, 2015: 67-68). However, the reality is contrary to the expectations or public fear. For example, in the USA, the world's largest recipient of immigrants, data shows that between 2012 and 2018, U.S.-born individuals were twice as likely as undocumented immigrants to be arrested for violent crimes in Texas and two-and-a-half times as likely to be arrested for drug crimes. (NC Policy Watch, 2021). Moving from these results, Michael T. Light, the criminologist from the University of Wisconsin, stressed that immigrants tend to be less crime-prone (NC Policy Watch, 2021). This shows us clearly that politicians may create discourses to impact society and policies regardless of the realities that can be proven by the documents.

3. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FRONTEX AS A TOOL FOR SECURITIZATION OF THE MIGRATION

The previous chapter delves into the theories of securitization as they relate to migration. Based on the research conducted so far, it's evident that Europeans perceive immigrants as a threat to their cultural and societal structures. In response to the beliefs and practices reflected in society, the EU has established a range of organizations over time to proactively address potential threats associated with immigration. As Paris School Theorists claims threats may not be an existential one, but States create bureaucratic apparatus, and technologies within this apparatus, to implement and mitigate their policies. In the following chapter, I will analyze the measures that have been implemented to address this perceived threat, ultimately leading us to the establishment of Frontex as a bureaucratic apparatus.

3.1 THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE FRONTEX

European politicians invested significant effort in the 1990s to establish a sustainable and secure European order. While they converged around a shared European vision, they encountered challenges in implementing effective and efficient border control regulations. To address these challenges, European countries came together to sign the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. This treaty aimed to enable unrestricted travel within European countries for their citizens. To translate this vision into reality, politicians explored various strategies to enhance their border security measures. This treaty aimed to enable unrestricted travel within European countries for their citizens. To translate this vision into reality, politicians explored various strategies to enhance their border security measures. The treatment provided a free-travel possibility within European Countries for their citizens. This political area had been called “Collaboration at Justice and Internal Affairs” but, after the treaty, it was called “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)”. The new area is prospected to build an order to prevent irregular migration and illegality; struggle against crimes; control the borders, and therefore ensure the free travel of European citizens within the European Union. The AFSC also represented a new political understanding of security threats. It is so clear that according to some authors, the politicians intentionally gathered the concepts of freedom and security. For example, Kostakopoulou argues that the formal discourses of the 1980s made a common perspective possible for the European countries to create one market, free travel of the

people, and an equal base on security. However, they projected that if they remove the internal controls in terms of border security to realize the free-cross of the people, then a security problem might break up. That's why they put the security concept in their one-market ideas (Kostakopoulou, 2009: 5).

By the failure of the AFSC plan, at the Cardiff Summit of 1998, the Commission prepared a road map to guarantee border security and free crossing of the citizens of EU countries. According to the Cardiff Summit's conclusion, the basic reason for the requirement for the area of freedom, security, and justice was to protect and develop the Union through the measurements relating to the struggle against illegal migration, crime, etc. The Union's representatives are aware of the importance of the judicial cooperation, and they recognize it as follows: *"the European Council underlines the importance of effective judicial cooperation in the fight against cross-border crime. It recognizes the need to enhance the ability of national legal systems to work closely together and asks the Council to identify the scope for greater mutual recognition of decisions of each other's courts."* (Cardiff Presidential Conclusions, 1998).

As a part of the plan, the first multi-annual program, Tampere Programme, was announced and the program was significant because it included a shared policy on migration. Consequently, the Eurojust was put into force. The Union convened once again at the Laeken Summit of 2001 and made the decision to combat crime and illegal migration more effectively by utilizing their political tools. Their declaration following the summit featured clear and decisive statements regarding the issue. The relevant part of the Declaration was as follows: (European Council Meeting in Laeken, 2001)

Better management of the Union's external border controls will help in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration networks, and trafficking human beings. The European Council asks the Council and the Commission to work out arrangements for cooperation between services responsible for external border control and to examine the conditions in which a mechanism or common services to control external borders could be created. It asks the Council and the Member States to take steps to set up a common visa identification system and to examine the possibility of setting up common consular offices.

At the beginning of the 21st century, in 2002, the Council and Commission proposed the formation of a common border-security department composed of every member of the EU.

However, some EU members resisted the idea due to the fact that their sovereignty could be violated on account of the fact that the department would have the authority to intervene in each administration of the border-security policies of member country. That's why this initial project couldn't be implemented. However, it is seen that EU politicians didn't give up and they reformed their project under the name of *European Border Police* in the Seville Summit's Conclusion Declaration.

In 2006, EU Parliament and EU Council accepted the Schengen Code. The code might be understood as a Union law that regulated the crossing of people across borders. Since then, the law has been regularly amended and developed with new regulations. The regulations drew a line for European citizens in a free-movement zone but also regulated the dwelling, accommodation, refugees' situation, police collaboration, judicial collaboration, the extradition of criminals, and protection of personal pieces of information, etc. (The Schengen Code, 2006). The Code established an information system called *SIS (Schengen Information System)*. The system aims to observe the passing of the borders and it includes detailed rules to address any uncertainties in the execution of the Code. Additionally, the code is designed to screen individuals attempting to cross the border, apply for residence permits, and so on, by accessing the databases of member countries. Therefore, before the European Countries gave a visa to the citizens of third countries, the officers should control their information through the SIS and if they were categorized as "risky persons", it is almost impossible to get the visa for them. In 2013, SIS was developed and removed by SIS II. As a connected information system, *VIS (Visa Information System)* aids SIS II by supplying the visa information about the applicant. The VIS gathers the consulates, which are accommodated in non-EU countries and Schengen countries (EU, 2023).

Frontex was created as a part of this plan and process in 2004 by Council Regulation no 2007/2004 *The Establishing of a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at External Borders*. Frontex is the agency that the regulation mentioned (Frontex, 2023a). Formal resources indicate that the Frontex Agency should assess the unprecedented rise of migration numbers and refugees. It is claimed that the Frontex was established to support local border security departments of the member states and therefore the machine can prevent irregular migration events and it forms a discouragement factor. Frontex's main responsibility is to make cooperation between coastal member states' maritime operations or land protection operations (Frontex, 2023b). In the beginning, the

Frontex was designed to protect the external borders but, in time, the Agency gained a new perspective and a set of powers through new regulations (Karamanidou, 2020: 135). It can be observed from the Council Regulation's first article that contains the aim of the Agency. The article is as follows: (Council Regulation-Frontex-, 2004)

“While considering that the responsibility for the control and surveillance of external borders lies with the Member States, the Agency shall facilitate and render more effective the application of existing and future Community measures relating to the management of external borders. It shall do so by ensuring the coordination of Member States’ actions in the implementation of those measures, thereby contributing to an efficient, high, and uniform level of control on persons and surveillance of the external borders of the Member States.”

3.2 SECURITY MECHANISM OF THE FRONTEX AND IT'S SUB-DEPARTMENTS

Frontex border security is formed into four basic lines These are the inner security of the EU, external border security of the EU, border-line security, and cross-border security. Inner security includes the migration policies, cooperation between EU member countries, control of migration, cooperation between the agency and EU countries, and extradition of illegal migrants and criminals to their countries. External security consists of the observation of blue and green borders, control of the borders, systematic risk analyses, and cooperation among border security agencies. Border-line security consists of the cooperation between border security authorities. Lastly cross-border security contains consulate transactions and visa applications (Laitinen, 2006).




Figure 3.1: Organizational Structure of the Frontex.

(Source: Admigov, 2021).

The Agency came into force in 2007. Its center is in Warsaw, Poland. The Agency's Management Board is formed of members and each member state sends its members and the two members that which EU Commission selects. These members are the highest-level authorities in their countries about border security operations. These representatives provide close relations with these agencies. The agency transformed its organizational structure recently. The fundamental rights officer is tied up directly with the Management Board now. Also, the Frontex Situation Center, and Risk Analysis and Sensitivity Evaluation Department were added to the Behavioral Awareness Department.

The Managing Director is responsible for the agency's activities. The director is independent of the other institutions and the states. It is thanks to the rule that any country or any branch cannot give an order to the managing director, except the management board of the agency. The submission of the annual reports which contain the actions of the agency and analysis reports to the Management Board each year is the duty of the managing director. Additionally, the director evaluates, coordinates, and approves the common operations or rapid border interventions, provides the implementation of the operational plans, and examines whether or not their operations violate basic rights or their international protection duties. On the other hand, the Management Board appoints three Vice-Management

Directors. These vice directors have their responsibility areas, and they help the directors with their duties (Frontex Europa EU, 2023).

Frontex Agency has the authority to cooperate with the neighboring countries' border security agencies outside of the EU structure and Schengen Zone as well as the international organizations and other European Agencies. This cooperation can be made by bilateral agreements or in the frame of EU foreign policies. For example, Frontex has representatives within Interpol and Europol. Also, the agency made partnerships with international organizations such as Amnesty International, civil society organizations, UNHCR, and other Council Forums (Frontex, 2015: 30).

Frontex's main amendments within the organization occurred about basic rights. The agency formed a Fundamental Rights Office. The officer is responsible for preparing the report about the possible basic rights violations which the activities of the agency caused and submitting these reports to the Management Director. The agency should provide a workplace atmosphere that provides independence for this agent. To achieve this goal, the officer has the privilege to select own personal. New regulations give additional authority to the Fundamental Rights Officer by enforcing the Management Director to respond against Agent's reports about basic rights violations that the agency's activities caused.

3.2.1 Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT)

RABIT forms a major part of the operational capacity of Frontex. This structural body came into force in 2007 with Act no 863/2007 amendments that are accepted by the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007. Before the RABIT was established, especially in the Mediterranean Sea, irregular migrants could easily cross the borders of European countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Malta. Obviously, the situation discomforted the EU as a whole. After the RABIT's establishment, a member country can request assistance from the agency to intervene and prevent the illegal entry of foreigners. On the other hand, it should be mentioned that the member states also have an obligation to prepare their land and sea territories in conjunction with RABIT's deployment. This intervention is envisaged for temporary and emergencies. Therefore, in situations requiring emergency intervention, such as mass flow events, the member states can request the assistance of the RABIT (European Parliament and Council, 2007).

For RABIT to function effectively, the member states transparently contribute to the pool of information that includes details on the growth of qualified personnel within member states and their capabilities. The Council's regulations rule that RABITs cannot make any kind of discrimination against people who try to pass illegally. These discrimination prohibitions contain age, religion, race, and sexual orientation. RABIT should observe and ensure that its activities comply with the European Basic Rights Charter, and it should respect its responsibilities which are based on international maritime law. When a member state request help from the agency, the managing director of the agency notifies the Management Board about the situation and, within 2 days, makes a decision regarding the intervention. If the decision is positive, the director and member state should prepare an operation plan (Frontex, 2023b).

RABIT's first major operation against illegal migration was in Greece between 2010-2011 years. Greek authorities demanded the help of RABIT because of the fact that the illegal mass migrant flow was directed to the Greece borders. Upon the Frontex Management Director's approval of the demand, RABIT deployed in Greece within 5 days, and their duties ended in March 2011 (Human Rights Watch, 2011: 24).

3.2.2 The European Border Observation System

European Council announced that the organization would prioritize the observation of its naval borders in 2006. After then, the plans and projects about the issue immediately were prepared and offered to the European Parliament in 2008. The Union, specifically, aimed to control and observe the south and east borders by EUROSUR. The draft offered a road map to set the system within the member states' legal and technical infrastructure. The EUROSUR aimed to realize three basic issues. First of all, EUROSUR intends to reduce the number of illegal migrants crossing European borders. Secondly, the system aims to prevent cross-border crimes and, thirdly, to raise and strengthen the internal security of the member states as a whole. To make these goals real, politicians prospected to build a more confident information network and they projected that the system is not designed only to challenge illegal migration but also would struggle with human trade, and drug and weapon smuggling. Additionally, the policymakers mentioned that the measures which the Union took would reduce the risks which migrants took over to pass the borders secretly (EU Commission, 2008).

EUROSUR has been completed in three phases. The first phase included the development of national observance systems and the integration of these systems into each other by a common network. In the second phase, it was planned to heal the present observance tools such as satellites, radars, movement sensors, thermal cameras, etc., and to provide the shared usage of these tools. In the third and last phase, the policymakers just focused on the naval observance, and they built an observance system to pursue the activities within the judicial authority areas of the member states and within the neighboring open seas by integrating these systems' wider observation wire (EUROSUR, 2008). EUROSUR's establishment and functioning triggered enormous debates about both the system itself and the security concept in general. One of the issues debated is the budget of the EUROSUR.

The mechanism commenced its operations in 2013. The system raised the secure information capacity of the Union by providing the exchange the information among member states (Buzmaniuk, 2021: 6). The EUROSUR had an important and major budget between 2014 and 2020 as 244 million Euros. The Union desired to ensure the maintenance of the system for a long time (until 2020). On the other hand, the experts argued that the system's cost can increase and reach one billion Euros (Gigli, 2020).

EUROSUR's functioning logic is based on preparing the data sets to prospect the possible risk factors on the border breaches. The system designates the risk patterns and offers them to the relevant personnel. The staff works on the data and benefits from its visions while the risk evaluation reports are drafted. EUROSUR categorizes the risky groups and generalizes the individual behavior trends. It helps to guess how they can act. Of course, it may be criticized because of the fact that the system violates the protection of personal data, and it treats discriminately among people in terms of access to legal remedies and the technology which EUROSUR wields. European politicians ignore the EUROSUR's functioning logic as a whole and underrate the fact that the system seizes the personal data of irregular immigrants before they reach the border and develops pre-border control mechanisms. Obviously, the international protection rules for immigrants should prevent these mechanisms in international areas but EUROSUR's rules disregard these guarantees potentially leading to more vulnerable situations for both migrants and the international order.

3.2.3 The Risk Analysis Department

Frontex Agency works on the mentality of intelligence. Therefore, its main object relies on the analyses of the data collected by the diversified and varied tools. Indeed, before the Frontex converted into a real border patrol and border security agency, its most important contribution to the EU was the risk analyses that the agency prepared for the first ten years. Actually, the Common Operations Department, one of the most powerful three departments, has executed the risk analysis studies, and then these studies were submitted to the Management Director. Then, the reports were approved by the Management Board assessments (COWI, 2009: 7). Therefore, just as the other developed intelligence agencies do, the Frontex Agency also created a department on the analyses of the risks. That's why the risk analysis phase constitutes the main starting point for operating the Frontex missions. The member states and the Union's branches gather different information from the open sources of the out-of-European borders. These pieces of information may be multi-layered, and this requires them to be differentiated and classified according to their values and meanings. As a consequence, the data are analyzed by the authorized branches to draw a clear image of the real situation of the facts in the world. To succeed in the situation, the Risk Analysis Department was created. The department offers the risk analysis activities of non-European countries in terms of the issues such as border controls, returning operations, the prevention of illegal border-crossings and border crimes, human trafficking, and terrorism. In the beginning, the Risk Analysis Department makes a distinction between analyses. The first category includes strategic analyses and focuses on high-level strategic decision-makers. The second category is called Operational Analysis Category, and it supports the shared operations which are coordinated from the Frontex. In the third and last category, there is Third-Country Analysis. It concentrates on integration and cooperation with the partner countries and regions of the Union. The West Balkans, Turkey, and Africa due to most of the migrant flows are originated from these countries (Frontex, 2023c). As can be seen in graphic 2, the riskiest borders of the Union are the borders of Spain, Greece, and Italy. These borders can be attacked by the African-Arabian and Asian immigrant flows.




Figure 3.2: Member States' Risk Analysis.

(Source: European Commission, 2021).

Member states demand to be made a risk analysis about a specific issue. Additionally, when the member launched the procedural necessities and proposed to be prepared the risk analysis about a determinative issue, the President of the department takes over the responsibility own, and (s)he is personally responsible for the publication of the analysis documents at the end of every year. When one considers, the reasons for the migrations, possible routes, function patterns of the migration movements, the conditions of the transit-passed countries, etc. are designating on the decision-making process about the border-security issue, the fact that these data should be processed and interpreted by the analysis experts, automatically arises. By using these analyses properly, it is possible to guide where the possible routes are that the immigrants can use and when they can start to use these routes. The fact that these problems are solved by the analyses, the operational methods are easily applied in these areas (Frontex, 2013: 4, 8, 16). Therefore, the risk analysis department takes place in the main point of the Frontex structure (Carrera, 2007: 15).

In relation to risk analysis, the department applies the Common Integrated Risk Management Model. This model provides a conceptual framework for the agency. In 2013, the model underlined that the risk concept is composed of three different components. These are threat, security gap (vulnerability), and effect(impact). The threat was described (Frontex, CIRAM Brochure, 2013. P:5) as the pressure or power which affects the external borders. The threat can be characterized by its magnitude, possibility, and habituation. Security gaps can be detected by the system's capacity to reduce the threats. The geographical location of the borders and reactions of the member states against the threat designated security gaps. Lastly, the effect can be attributed to the effects of the threats on the security of the external borders.

3.2.4 Frontex Situation Center

Europe hosts a lot of countries within. Surely all of these countries have more than one borderline. Europe's borders, it has 42.000 kilometers of coastal lines and 9.000 kilometers of land border lines. These enormous lines should be controlled momentarily because these territorial points Experience 500 million passing every year. For this aim, the Union designed an FSC within Frontex. FSC's mission is to control the passing by borders momentarily. This need originated from the information requirement. To achieve its mission truly, the FSC pursues coastal security and other maritime areas. It also focuses on the member states' security gaps, and it opens the data collected by itself to member states' usage to support common and developed security operations. Additionally, it should be added that the FSC doesn't only tend to irregular mass migrations, but it also works on criminal activities in cross-border areas (Frontex, 2019). It satisfies a requirement of communication and access to information for Frontex's shareholders as well as qualified information for them. FSC's functioning mechanism can be classified into five positions. It can be counted as follows:

- a. Situation Pursuing: It is FSC's main duty. FSC should have the ability to warn and offer the situation report for the shareholders on its data which it gets from the observation mission.
- b. Central Contact Point: This Function means FSC can contact officially with member states and Frontex as well as the other non-member countries and international partners.
- c. Common Operational Support: FSC holds the daily situation reports and it ensures that these reports would help to concrete and correct analysis for the border passing.

- d. Media Monitoring: FSC pursues the media and other open sources to see the whole picture of the border passing and the other threatening movements which would be possible movements toward the borders. The application uploaded and developed technical intelligence to serve properly, and it can scan 7.000 sources in 64 languages.
- e. Mission Responsibility and Sparing: It makes Frontex's staff able to get information about the non-member countries.
- f. Crisis Management Support: The responsibility exists to guarantee that the whole Procedure would be correctly functioned in a possible emergency.

3.2.5 The Training Unit

Training Unit (TRU) is established to prepare Frontex staff for agency's operational plans. Therefore, the TRU contributes to the development of a shared border security culture for all EU member states, and it is a key factor in preventing illegal crossing. TRU develops cooperation with other EU organs and international partners to offer a competent education service for its personnel (Frontex, 2023d). The Union developed a Common Academies Network to contribute to the development of common standards. The academies which are composed of academics, experts, and other institutions of the 27 member countries, were activated in Italy (Cesana) in 2008. These academies are provided to form a common curriculum (Marenin, 2010: 101). Basic Training, Specialization Training, and Training Support are departmentalization results of the TRU to achieve its objectives (Frontex, 2023d). It may be possible to classify TRU's curriculum as follows (Frontex, 2020):

First of all, TRU aims to increase the capabilities of its staff, enabling them to actively participate in Frontex-coordinated operational activities.

Secondly, it aims to provide specialized training in areas covered by the EBCG Regulation aimed at increasing the capacities and capabilities of the Member States and, in close cooperation with the IEC Division, delivering support to third countries in the context of the implementation of the Agency's mandate.

Thirdly, TRU creates, maintains, and develops a standardized educational structure. The structure provides a structure from the basic level to the master level and is based on the Sectoral Qualifications Framework for Border and Coast Guarding.

TRU encourages cooperation between border and coast guard training institutions in the member states.

TRU contacts third countries and contributes to their border and coast guard training programs to develop their capabilities and experiments so that they can participate in the struggle with preventing and discouraging migrant flows.

TRU establishes and maintains a quality assurance mechanism for the development, delivery, evaluation, and improvement of training, ensuring that operational competencies are achieved

TRU provides educational support services, incl. support for the training and certification of trainers.

TRU maintains an ICT platform and integrates innovative technological solutions to enhance learning and support processes across all training activities.

3.2.6 Centralized Records of Available Technical Equipment (CRATE)

Frontex, as a security agency, is already incurring a significant, huge cost. Therefore, the EU decided not to provide additional funds for the technical equipment for Frontex. The Frontex benefits from the common pool which member states contribute with the technical equipment. These contributions are gathered in CRATE. In 2007, former director of the Frontex, Laitinen evaluates the CRATE as a record. According to Laitinen, it will help the personnel to make their operations better. He mentioned that the CRATE is like a shop. The Frontex staff watches the CRATE and when they need a particular equipment, they demand it from the CRATE. He highlighted that the Frontex didn't have its own vessels and it didn't have huge budgets to afford deployment of a big number of units. All the assets which Frontex benefitted from belong to the Member States. He argues that if the CRATE wouldn't exist, Frontex's budget would be extinct within two weeks because of the technical equipment's costs (Frontex, 2007a).

3.2.7 European Patrols Network (EPN)

EPN launched to protect EU's South borders and to develop cooperation with regional partners. Official declarations put forward that the EPN's applications are carried out to establish a common patrolling activities in coastal borders of the EU such as Mediterranean

Sea and Atlantic Ocean in the first phase and to establish a National Coordination Centre strengthening the cooperation and adaptation of the member state's reaction and operation capabilities in the second phase (Frontex 2007b).




Figure 3.3: C EPN's Basic Mission Area.

(Source: Frontex, 2010).

It is obvious that the EU Council designed the patrols principally to struggle the irregular migrant flows from the North African countries. The EPN was formed in 2007 but its theoretical framework was launched in 2005. The Council requested the preparation of a risk analysis report on North African Countries with the aim of fostering dual relations through cooperation with African Countries. The Agency prepared two reports. One of them is about to establish the naval patrols networks named Medsea and the other is for an observation system to investigate and to observe the open seas named Bortec. As a consequence of these reports, the Frontex took over to establish a sea patrol network for securing Europe's coastal security. In this scope, the Frontex gathered the coastal security personal of the Mediterranean Countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, Malta, Slovenia, Italy, France and Cyprus. These eight countries advised to develop good relations with neighboring countries at the beginning. Meantime the agency continued to prepare operational plans, geographical

regions' descriptions and supply of source. Therefore, the EPN launched in May 2007. Some of the basic missions of the unit are to prevent irregular migration, to struggle with migrant smugglers and fake document editors. Additionally, the EPN also participates in other cross-border operations and coast guarding activities.

3.3 BUDGET AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF THE FRONTEX

For Frontex to operate independently and effectively it is important that the agency relies on its own resources as much as possible. Therefore, the agency's budget is detected by the EU and the budget has enhanced in time. In the beginning, due to the fact that the agency only functioned as a risk analysis department, its budget was limited in accordance with its mission within the Union. Therefore, in 2005, Frontex's budget was only 6 million Euros. However, in 2015, the budget enhanced to 140 million Euros (Graphic 4). It is obvious that the radical enhancement of Frontex's material and capital resources was parallel with the refugee crisis and immigrant flows.

Frontex's budget is approved by the Management Board and then submitted to the EU Commission. Frontex has a duty to prepare an annual report about its activities and spending patterns in the year. Additionally, the European Court of Auditors checks Frontex's financial tables to ensure its financial transparency. The European Parliament accepts or rejects the budget of Frontex by relying on the Council of Ministers' advice and the annual reports that Frontex submitted. These requirements are compulsory to guarantee in order to keep the agency under control (Frontex, 2023e). The authors show the radical raising of the budget of Frontex as follows:




Figure 3.4: The Budget of the Frontex Between 2005-2015.

(Source: Bayrak, 2022: 31).

After the immigrant flows continued increasingly, the Frontex's importance has also increased. The importance is reflected in its budget and material/capital resources. Therefore its 2022 budget reached 750 million Euros (Graphic 5).




Figure 3.5: The Budget of the Frontex between 2016&2022.

(Source: Bayrak, 2022: 34).

Frontex executors spent their budgets mostly on their operational expenses. In 2021, 370 million Euros, more than half of the total budget of the year, is expensed for operational spending. The 2021 budget agency, another important part of the budget in terms of the expense is the staff expenses such as salaries and equipment, etc. Among the other expense, items such as information technology, data processing, and gathering expenses can be included (Frontex, 2023f).

This radical raising of the budget triggered the debates on whether or not Frontex satisfied the expectations that the governors desired for. It was so irritating that the debates focused on Frontex's severe interventions to the immigrant movements on the Mediterranean Sea. For example, Amnesty International published the 2021 report which contains the 21 new push-back events of the Evros region in December 2020. The report emphasized that the illegal immigrants were held in custody by seizing their telephones, not being allowed to reach a lawyer, and not being do any record procedure in observance. These conditions meant the violation of basic human rights and it broke up a concerning debate about the legality of Frontex's activities and the functionality of the agency as a whole (Amnesty International, 2021).

These debates are not only vain and ineffective endeavors. The European Parliament took into consideration these debates on the budget negotiations. For example, the accusations against Frontex about human rights violations affected the EU Parliament's Decision about

the budget of Frontex in 2020. The members of the Budgetary Control Committee of the EU Parliament advised refusing the budget of the Frontex. Their argument was the “magnitude of the committed serious misconduct” and possible structural problems under the previous executive director of the agency (Anadolu Agency, 2022). In the voting process, the 345 MEPs voted in favor of the commission’s recommendation and 2484 MEPs voted against while 8 MEPs abstained (Anadolu Agency, 2022). Similarly, in 2022, the EU Budgetary Control Committee recommended freezing Frontex’s budget partly. According to the committee, 90 million Euros of the draft budget, which was 757 million euros in total, should be frozen. The advice was accepted by the EU Parliament with 558 votes in favor and 82 votes against. In the meeting, the EU representatives emphasized that the Frontex agency didn’t fulfill its responsibility to heal the human rights treatments and they drew attention to the issue that the Fundamental rights observers which would be composed of 20 experts, still didn’t start to work for their mission (Riehle, 2022).

Nevertheless, it should be accepted that Frontex will inevitably enhance its budget raise in the recent future. For example, the EU’s plan to employ additional 10.000 border guards will directly impact the EU’s security staff employed by Frontex. Therefore, it is expected that the agency’s budget will reach 9.4 billion Euros in total between 2021-2027 years (Bossong, 2019: 2).

3.4 THE OPERATIONS THE FRONTEXT EXECUTED

Frontex can execute security operations on different scales and concepts. These operations can include land, air, and maritime operations. Additionally, Frontex makes the Returning Operations against the immigrants. These operations can be classified as *Common Land Operations*, *Common Maritime Operations*, and *Common Air Operations*. The first of them is about the operations which are made in land borders with member states’ participation. The second type of operation is executed in the naval area of the state members and open seas to detect irregular migration movements and to increase cooperation between member states. The last type of operation happens on air. These operations are stable and regular in comparison to the other two types of operations. This category of operation often contains people attempting to enter EU member states using counterfeit documents. (Frontex, 2014).

Frontex operations are composed of the phases such as risk analysis, application, and assessment. These phases were considered above. However, it should be mentioned that the

Agency's operations generally focus on the migration routes that risk analysis reports indicate. These routes are as follows: (Frontex, 2023g)

West-Mediterranean Route: the road between North Africa and Spain

Middle-Mediterranean Route: the road between North Africa and Italy

East-Mediterranean Route: the route is used by Middle Eastern people who want to reach Greece

East Borders Route: it contains the borders that which EU shares with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova:

West African Route: the road between Morocco, Senegal, and the Canary Islands

West Balkan Route: the road between Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey (Frontex, 2023g).

In this section of the thesis, I examine some highlighting operations of the Frontex such as Hera I and Hera II and RABIT 2010 Operation In order to examine its implementations in different areas thus make it possible to evaluate its effectiveness objectively. Additionally, the implementations in the operations to be described below would help clarify whether Frontex is indeed a bureaucratic apparatus established by the EU, as viewed through the lens of Paris School theorists.

3.4.1 Hera I and Hera II Operations

In the beginning, I should stress that the Hera I and Hera II operations take place within the most transparent operations of the Frontex Agency. Although these two operations are accepted as the most transparent ones, we observe that, even at the conclusion of incidents deemed transparent, the prevention of deaths was not entirely successful, indicating that its mission has not been fully fulfilled

Hera Operations tended to prevent the immigrant flows from West Africa to the Canary Islands. West African people were charmed by Europe's economic and well-being conditions. Especially, Spain, which African people are able to reach easily compared to other European countries, is selected as the final destination for immigrants. Spain's GDP is 15 times more than Senegal's GDP, 25 times more than Mali's GDP, and 30 times more than Guinea's (<https://stats.oecd.org/> Therefore, the African people desire to migrate to Spain

generally. However, only charming factors are not limited to these economic conditions. These African countries exposed to a set of political crises and unemployment conditions for a long time. These crises converted into habitual in terms of relevant African countries. Additionally, some authors promote security gaps in the line between North Africa and the Canary Islands and the gaps make it easy to transit pass to Europe (Kemp, 2016: 2). Morocco and Spain have challenged cooperatively against illegal migrations since the 1990s. With the harsh measures taken by relevant countries' authorities, Spain's borders and the Canary Islands transformed into an observance center. Therefore, the migrants tended to move to the cities of Ceuta and Melilla. For example, in 2005, these cities host a set of events about illegal migration, and Spain and Morocco Coast Guards intervened in them, and which caused 11 illegal migrants dead. However, these events didn't stop the immigrants /Gallardo and Contreras, 2012: 33).

Spain demanded the intervention of the Frontex Agency in the migrant flows in May 2006. After the Procedural requirements were fulfilled and the necessary preparations were done, the operation was executed on 15 July, and it continued until 31 October (Papastavridis, 2010).

The official declarations show that during the operation, Frontex staff made the 6076 illegal immigrants sent back to their countries (Frontex, 2007). HERA I operation is directed toward the get information from these illegal migrants about the routes they used, how country they came from etc. However, the HERA II operations pursued the first one after one month, on 11 August 2006 and it continued until December 2006. The second operation mostly focused to prevent the reaching of illegal migrants, who came from Senegal, Cape Verde, and Mauritania to the Canary Islands and stopping them within African territorial waters. The Frontex staff tried to identify the migrants. This task was important because if the identified people escape from a war or political pressure, maybe they would be allowed to enter Spain's territories. Therefore, Frontex reports claimed they examined the immigrants' personality diligently and they didn't arbitrarily send back them to where they came from (Frontex, 2010: 35). Additionally, the operations were executed with third countries such as Morocco and Mauritania. These countries already made bilateral agreements with Spain, and it facilitated the process. Therefore, Frontex staff focused to be on joint patrols off the western coast of Africa involving personnel and equipment from several EU Member States as well as from Senegal and Mauritania. According to Frontex reports, the proximity of these joint

maritime and airborne patrols to the coast of West Africa was crucial: it meant that the unseaworthy boats used by the irregular immigrants could be stopped and turned back to safety before the dangerous voyage to the Canary Islands could claim even more lives. In the process, Frontex left the active responsibility to Moroccan and Mauritanian personnel. The Frontex members provide the platform and support them, but they are the authority for intercepting and returning the boats, according to Colonel of Spanish Guardia Civil Eduardo Lobo (Frontex, 2010: 34).




Figure 3.6: Operation Zones in HERA II.

(Source: Frontex, 2010: 31).

HERA operations had some mission tasks. These tasks can be mentioned as detecting the ships which sailed from African countries toward the Canary Islands and directing these ships toward the point where they started to sail again the officers explained that their mission would serve to reduce the number of people who died during the risky illegal migration process. From the legal perspective, this procedure should be followed by dual treatments between Spain and relevant African countries, but the operation managers didn't explain the conditions and the scope of their activities (Papastavridis, 2010: 88). However, some authors criticized the operations in such a way that these operations externalized the

European naval borders whose longitude contains thousands of kilometers (Kasperek, 2010: 129-130). Additionally, the same authors assessed the situation as excessively dramatized. They argued that the operations were defective because they didn't announce any required information to the public and what is only mentioned is "a quick solution" to the problem (Carrera, 2008: 12).




Figure 3.7: Irregular Migrant Flow toward Spain between 1994 & 2020.

(Source, IMO, 2021).

The other critics against the HERA operations are about it couldn't prevent the mass migration toward Spain. The intervention affected for a while and migrants were discouraged from migrating to Europe over the Canary Islands. According to IMO's data, the irregular migration toward the Canary Islands reached only 7000 until 2005 but, in 2006, the Canary Islands encountered irregular migrants more than 30000. However, HERA Operations prevented this fact dramatically until 2019. According to Frontex reports, the immediate results of Hera were impressive. By the end of October 2006, almost 19,000 irregular immigrants had arrived in the Canary Islands. Yet Frontex experts and the Spanish authorities involved in Hera I were able to identify every person (Frontex, 2010: 35) It is understood from the data that 2019 became a breaking point for the Canary Islands and the

trend reversed again, the migrant flows to the Canary Islands increased to the level more than 10000 again (Graphic 6).

3.4.2 RABIT 2010 Operation

2010 was a very hard year in terms of Greece's border security staff. During the first half of the year, Greece noticed that 45.000 irregular migrants tried to pass over Greece's border to Europe. Frontex reports show that these rates were %90 of the whole year and which means that 350 irregular migrants passed the borders per day (Graphic 8). Additionally, 46 people lost their lives trying to cross the border in the Evros region. 26 of them died within the operational area of Orestiada, four at the banks of Evros river, and 15 at sea in the vicinity of Alexandroupolis (FRA, 2011: 4). To stop these mass flow, Greek Minister Citizen Protection Papoutsis requested the demand from the Frontex.




Figure 3.8: Directions of Irregular Crossings at the Greek Border.

(Source: Carrera and Guild, 2010: 8).

Frontex's report indicated that migrants used the route of the Greek-Turkish sea border. Where 90% of the detections shows that the people from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia had formed the most of irregular immigrants. %60 of these irregular immigrants was detected in Border Control Unit, Orestiada which is under the biggest pressure (Graphic 9).




Figure 3.9: Nationalities of Detected Irregular Immigrants.

(Source: Carrera and Guild, 2010: 10).

It should be indicated that the Greek government hesitated to comply with human rights and this hesitancy took the attention of European and international authorities. For example, EU Interior Minister Cecilia Malmström evaluated the situation in Greece in such a way that especially the situation of the people who were asylum seekers, was concerning. The healing and repair of the acceptance procedure is an emergency now. Whereas the Greek authority has been supported by the EU central authority in terms of both finances and implementation.

FRA identified the causes which made deepen the humanitarian crisis in Evros as follows: (FRA, 2011: 56-8)

- a. Fragmentation of responsibilities for migration and lack of systematic coordination: Greek authorities divided into four ministries asylum, border security, and migration issues. It made it harder to intervene in the situation effectively.
- b. Systematic detention practices in unsuitable facilities: Greek authorities didn't use any alternative tool except the detention of irregular migrants.
- c. Lengthy bureaucratic Procedures Unclear division of responsibilities at a local level: The competencies and powers of municipalities, regions, and decentralized public administration are unclear and this uncertainty impacts the ability to cover essential needs in detention facilities.

- d. Limited nongovernmental presence in Evros: In Evros, any kind of non-governmental organizations, except MSF and the Church, doesn't exist to help and heal immigrants' situation by providing humanitarian assistance.
- e. No system to tap into local resources
- f. Inertia among local actors: Local actors didn't take any initiative to coordinate and to respond to the humanitarian crisis. The situation is so unclear that FRA's examination set forth that some mayors didn't know their legal authorities about the issue.
- g. The dire financial situation of Greece: Greece's economic stalemate impacted the situation negatively.

Thereupon, Frontex Director Laitinen went to the region to find out the situation correctly. After he observed the fact, he made an announcement and stated that: (Carrera and Guild, 2010: 4)

"The situation in Greece is very serious...I have decided that Frontex will provide assistance to the Greek border authorities by deploying adequate number and composition of Rapid Border Intervention Teams. Once deployed they will be operating under the command and control of the Greek authorities. A team of Frontex staff is on its way to the Greek/Turkish land border to assess the situation in view of Minister Papoutsis' request. We will decide how many officers and what kind of technical means will be needed to effectively assist the Greek authorities in strengthening this external EU border and act swiftly to provide the assistance that this Member State has requested"

This declaration indicated that the Frontex would send its operational teams to the Greek border and, Laitinen declared that he already signed the decision to send RABIT to the region, a day after. Thus, the Frontex Operational Office staff took over its first mission out of Warsaw to conduct an assessment of the situation. The operation mechanism was set up in the headquarters of the Hellenic Coast Guard in February 2010. Five days later, the operation officially launched at the borderline. A variety of experts and technical equipment were wielded during the operation. 26 member states and Schengen-associated countries provided valued contributions for the operations and 176 border control experts took part in the mission. The technique equipment pool, CRATE, also was wielded effectively in this operation and almost all of the member state's equipment was led to the region. The

equipment and the countries which supplied it, are as follows: Carrera and Guild, 2010: 5-7).

- a. 1 Helicopter (Romania)
- b. 1 Bus (Romania)

Minibuses (1 Romania, 2 Austria, 1 Bulgaria, 1 Hungary)

- a. 19 Patrol cars (4WD) (7 Romania, 3 Austria, 2 Slovakia, 7 Germany)
- b. 9 Thermo Vision Vans (2 Austria, 2 Bulgaria, 4 Germany, 1 Hungary)
- c. 3 Schengen buses (1 Austria, 2 Hungary)
- d. 3 office units from Denmark

During the RABIT 2010 Operation, 11.809 irregular migrants were detected, and 34 human traffickers were arrested. Just as HERA I and HERA II operations impacted the reducing of irregular migration, RABIT 2010 Operation also reduced the irregular migration events % by 76. However, Frontex director Laitinen evaluated that the process requires long-term solutions. Nevertheless, the authorities Comment that the operations contributed to regional border security (Frontex, 2011: 11). The RABIT 2010 Operations were replaced by JO Poseidon 2011 (Frontex, 2011b)

4. THE RECENT CONFLICTS IN THE EASTERN BORDERS OF EUROPEAN UNION AND QUESTIONING THE PRACTICES OF THE FRONTEX

As can be seen above, although there are allegations and skeptical implementations regarding human rights violations of irregular immigrants, the Frontex executed a variety of successful operations in Mediterranean Sea or Greek Border against the migrant floods. However, it should be mentioned that the recent developments strained the EU and Frontex to take position against migrant floods. Especially, Russia-Ukraine crisis triggered high-levelled migrants to direct toward member countries of EU. In this chapter, I consider these recent conflicts. In this context, I focus the conflicts between EU-Belarus and Russia-Ukraine.

4.1 THE EU-BELARUS CONFLICT

4.1.1 The Reasons of the Conflict

Belarus, after it gained independence from Russia in 1991, received immigrants from Baltic countries such as Moldova, Ukraine, etc. Its population is about 9 million. Official data (worldometers, 2023) shows that Belarus hosts about 1 million international migrants in the country. These migrants come mostly from Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan. Regarding the issue of illegal migration, the EU and Belarus signed a set of treaties on visa facilitation and readmission in 2020. The treaties included that Belarusian citizens easily cross EU borders and, for this aim, the visa fees were reduced by EU countries while the irregular migrants can return to Belarus in safe and orderly (EC, 2020).

The migrant crisis was triggered by the 2020 presidential election in Belarus. In these elections, the incumbent President, Alexandr Lukashenko claimed that he could be a candidate for the sixth time for the presidency. In reality, he has been incumbent since 1994. According to the official election results, Lukashenko won the elections by %80 against Tikhanovskaya, who was supported by opposition groups. Opposition groups immediately rejected these results and launched mass demonstrations against Lukashenko in the streets. These demonstrations were oppressed by the state officials with violence, and they detained 30,000 people as several people had been killed (Astapenia, 2020).

State's interventions in the demonstrations by violence had been criticized by human rights defenders or other international actors. Yet, it is not the only example of violations committed by the Belarusian state. International sources put forward that Belarus systematically violates human rights so that Lukashenko consolidates his power. To accomplish this, Russia is believed to provide support to the Belarusian leader. For example, in 2021, a variety of institutions that are compulsory components of the democratic process such as independent media, human rights organizations, and civil society, were intentionally surpassed and their responsible officers were detained by the state's security forces. Also, Lukashenko offended them as "agents" or "bandits" publicly (Mills and others, 2021).

EU representatives have advised and demanded an end to human rights violations by Belarus and have rejected the official results of the presidential election. Thereupon, Belarusian leader didn't give up on his position and desire. As a result, the EU declared and impose a set of sanctions against Belarus. These developments escalated tensions between European Union and Belarus. It was so visible that Belarusian authorities blocked landing of the Ryanair plane which was carrying the Belarusian dissident groups. Then the plane landed in Minsk, and the passengers were immediately detained. EU reacted to the event by increasing its sanctions levels (Pallares Pla, 2022). These sanctions contained the banning of flights toward Belarus and from the EU. EU and USA have persistently applied and removed the sanctions against Belarus since 1994. These sanctions mostly tended to push Belarus to rebuild its democratic attitudes and fortify human rights and civil society. In 2021, the USA suspended the wealth of Belarus state in the USA while the EU declared the 5th sanction packet as well as suspending flights.




Figure 4.1: Sanctions Which EU and USA Applied Against Belarus between 1996&2021.

(Source: Erdoğan and Karakoç Dora, 2022).

The political crisis formed an uncomfortable situation for the Belarusian authorities and the fact that the EU's strong stance against Lukashenko triggered the rapprochement, a closer relationship between Belarus and Russia. Also, it should be emphasized that, after the EU refused the official results of the presidential elections, Lukashenko responded to this declaration by mentioning that Belarus was the host of several migrants and these migrants caused macro-economic degrading for his country in the international arena. According to the Belarusian leader, these results are not at a level that Belarus may put up with anymore. These developments led to serious events. According to the article published on 15th Nov.2021 House of Commons of the UK.

'Approximately 4,000 migrants, including children, are reported to be stranded at Belarus's borders. The majority are being refused entry by the EU states, but equally are being prevented from leaving the border area by Belarusian border guards. Conditions are freezing and people have no access to proper shelter, food, water and medical supplies.' (www.commonslibrary.parliament.uk).

Plus, according to article dated back to 19th Nov.2021 from globalcitizen website at least 13 people sadly lost their lives due to violence, hazardous weather conditions, treacherous river crossing in their attempts to reach Poland. (Www.globalcitizen.org)

Also, he argued that the true intentions of the migrants hosted by Belarus were to enter EU countries, as European countries were a charming and appealing destinations for the citizens of undeveloped countries (Hatap and Yeltin, 2022). After Lukashenko made this announcement, Belarusian authorities allowed the crossing of non-EU citizens from the borders easily (Pallares Pla, 2022). Lukashenko also declared that Belarus suspended the readmission treatments which the EU and Belarus signed in 2020 (EC, 2021b).

These developments affected mostly the member countries such as Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia which are close to Belarus. These countries hold positions against Lukashenko and Belarus policies. For example, Lithuania hosts the opposition leader, Tijanovska who ran against Lukashenko in the presidential election of 2021 (Pallares Pla, 2022).

4.1.2 National Responses to the Migration Crisis

4.1.2.1 Poland

The crisis directly impacted Poland, prompting it to seek immediate action. The concern of Poland was that the influx of mass migrants might affect its socio-economic situation negatively. Frontex reports of 2021 set forth that several migrants crossed Poland's borders illegally. In October 2021, 16,000 migrants were waiting to cross the Poland border in Belarus. It was so dramatic that a Syrian family paid 16,000 USA dollars to agencies (Schmitz, 2021). These migrants came from mostly Middle East countries. The report shows that, of the illegally crossing the border, only about 4 thousand Iraqi people illegally crossed the borders between January and October 2021 (Frontex, 2021). Of course, the data was formed only by the official institutions detected.




Figure 4.2: Nationalities of Illegal Migrants Crossing Poland Border Between January 2021-October 2021.

(Source, BBC, 2021a, Frontex, 2021).

With the shift of the migration route towards the north of Europe, Poland authorities put some measures against the open border policy of Belarus. At first Poland, then Lithuania, initiated the construction of barriers, including walls and barbed wire fences, along their borders

To understand the concerns of Poland, it is enough to investigate Poland's Prime Minister's explanations about Russian President Vladimir Putin. Mateusz Morawiecki, Poland's Prime Minister, accused Putin of claiming that he was organizing illegal crossing events. According to Prime Minister, the migrant floods, which Belarus triggered as a state, had been supported by Russia directly. Also, he added that the ultimate aim of these organizations is the destabilization of the EU and Poland (France24, 2021). He accused Lukashenko of encouraging thousands of people from the Middle East to travel to Europe's borders. Morawiecki stated that Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia are considering invoking Article 4 of the NATO Charter. This suggests their belief that there is a threat to their territorial integrity, political independence, or security, prompting them to seek consultations within the alliance. (www.theguardian.com/world, 2021) Morawiecki declared emergency rule by announcing the mobilization of not only border protection forces but also, if necessary, military units. In that point, Hatap and Yeltin evaluate the explanations of Poland's Prime Minister by using constructivist's arguments with reference to the threat

against societal security and social identity of the EU. They argued that Morawiecki accuses the Russian President with wielding the migrant card politically to dismantle of homogeneity of EU nations (Hatap and Yeltin, 2022). On the other hand, Morawiecki also accused Turkey because of the fact that it adopted the migrant policy against the EU's interests. He argued that the migrants that Belarus directed toward the borders, had been carried by Turkish Airlines from İstanbul and Antalya. He based on the regular flight data from FlightRadar24 from Istanbul and Antalya to Minsk.



Figure 4.3: Flights from Middle East to Minsk.

(Source: BBC, 2021a).

To overcome the migrant crisis, Polish authorities declared a state of emergency against the migration crisis. The circumstance occurred for the first time in Poland's political history since communism was demolished (Morris and Dixon, 2021). The state of emergency necessitated taking into force the tough laws which foresee the measurements on which the administration may base. For example, the law banned gatherings and limited movements for 30 days in the border areas between Poland and Belarus (BBC, 2021b). These legal regulations have been supported by the majority of the Polish parliament even if some of them refused it due to the law included violating articles of human rights and these

regulations are not in proportion with the emergency that Poland authorities faced. Opposing groups argued that the 200 towns of Poland which are close to the border, are not reachable because of the law. These measures included the newspapers and journalists, as well. Therefore, the right to get information has been violated by these rules. On the other hand, these rules facilitated or reinforced pushbacks or disproportionate interventions against illegal migrants by Polish polices or soldiers as there wouldn't be any journalist around (BBC, 2021b).

Polish government deployed the military personnel in border areas relying on the state of emergency. They also ensured the closure of entry points for migrants. The police force and military aid reached 20.000 officers to proof of the severity of the Polish attitude against illegal migration. The Polish officers conducted pushback operations using force, and even violently. As a response to these defensive attitudes, Belarusian officers started to escort migrants in the forests between Poland-Belarus. A migrant gave details of how Belarusian police aided the theme. According to the Iraqi migrant, Belarusian police cut the barbed wire to provide an easy crossing for them. (Tondo, 2021). However, it should be added that the Polish officers didn't perform any merciful behavior against migrants. Some doctors, from *Doctors Without Borders*, told that Polish officers assaulted migrants and injured them (Tondo, 2021).

It should be noted that Belarusian leaders' political provocation in such a way that they would be able to enter to EU countries easily and Poland authorities' preventive attitudes resulted in the victimization of asylum seekers. The situation was so dramatic that some of the migrants died because of the negative weather conditions. For example, Kalina Czwarnog, a coordinator with a humanitarian assistance organization named Fonacja Ocalenia, expressed that *more and more people are coming* and she added "*sometimes people are in a state of hypothermia and they really can't walk again.*" Nevertheless, the Poland authorities' measures couldn't prevent the illegal crossing events. The official registers set forth that the 8833 migrants crossed the German borders from Poland via Belarus until November 2021 (Morris and Dixon, 2021).

4.1.2.2 Lithuania

Lithuania is another destination country for migrants who have moved from Belarus, similar to Poland, as it shares a border with Belarus. To challenge the migrant floods, the Lithuanian

parliament, Seimas, approved a law that declares a state of emergency. The parliament also approved the legal measures against illegal migrants. The legal measures involved in the removal of existing legal protections and the deployment of military personnel in the borders. Against Polish authorities, the Lithuanian parliament declared a state of emergency for the whole of the country despite a specific part of it (Pallares Pla, 2021). The measurements which Lithuanian authorities took have been criticized by human rights organizations and international organizations for arguing that these regulations violate Lithuania's obligations originating from EU laws and international law. For example, the legal amendments, which parliament approved, involved the amendments of Foreigners Law and it resulted in the limitation of asylum-seeking procedures as well as extending the duration of detention of the migrants up to six months. Also, the legal regulations restricted access to information, interpretation, medical care, and legal aid for individuals (Pallares Pla, 2021).

When one investigates details of Lithuanian practices against the migrants, it becomes evident that human rights were routinely violated by officers. These officers left the migrants in the border areas without providing adequate living conditions or meeting their fundamental needs. Interestingly, Lithuanian Border Guards didn't reject their actions and tactics which they applied, but nevertheless, they consistently blocked journalists and human rights watchers from entering the area and conducting routine observations (Pallares Pla, 2021).

Eight member states' Interior Ministers (Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, and Slovakia) wrote a letter expressing their concerns about the hybrid war which instrumentalized the migrant in floods against the EU member states. In their terminology, the hybrid war can be characterized in such a way that a third country facilitated, organized, and directed illegal migrant floods toward EU borders. This external support for the migrants put the member states in a difficult position when it came to taking necessary measures. Therefore, these Interior Ministers advised installation of physical barriers, such as fences, along the external borders of EU states. They offered that these physical borders should be financed by the EU budget. Moreover, European Council President supported this proposal. Lithuania adopted the offer immediately and initiated the building of walls with fences for the first section of its border with Belarus by using its own budget without waiting for the EU approval (Carrera, 2021).

4.1.3 EU's Response and Frontex's Role in the Crisis

The EU, as a Union, and its member countries persistently accused Belarus throughout the crisis, holding Lukashenko responsible. According to them, Belarus intentionally directed the migrants who refugeeed to Belarus from Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and other undeveloped countries. EU leaders were aware that Lukashenko had been supported for his actions. Consequently, both Angela Merkel, who was Germany's Chancellor at the time, and Emmanuel Macron, who was France's President, engaged in negotiations with Vladimir Putin to alleviate the migration crisis and encourage Putin to exert pressure on the Belarusian leader. (Hatap and Yelsin, 2022).

Ursula Von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, mentioned the crisis as follows: *"This is not a migration crisis. This is the attempt of an authoritarian regime to try to destabilize its democratic neighbors"* (European Commission, 2021). Her arguments and type of expression of the events were interpreted in such a way that she viewed the migrants as a "threat" against EU homogeneity (Hatap and Yelsin, 2022). Her expression clarifies the EU's immigrant threat perception towards the developed European society and societal security by referring the immigrants as the sources of heterogeneity. Also, she emphasized the humanitarian problems which migrants faced and added that the EU organs contacted UN organs and other humanitarian organizations to provide aid for migrants as they were protecting the borders. Therefore, Leyen mentioned that the EU set up a contact group with these organizations and they mobilized the guiding and aid to support their efforts on the ground (European Commission, 2021).

These expressions as a whole can be interpreted in such a way that EU leaders and member states encouraged the neighboring member states of Belarus to take necessary measures against illegal migrant crossings. Also, the Frontex organization declared it was ready to take a mission in the area. Poland didn't demand any aid from Frontex and rejected the offers for help from Frontex, however. The reasons why Poland did this way can be explained in different ways. But the human rights organizations and activists criticized Poland's attitude because if Poland accepted the deployment of RABIT teams of Frontex, it would provide the enhancement of observation of Poland authorities' activities against migrants. However, by rejecting Frontex and forbidding the entrance of journalists and human rights organizations in the debating areas, Poland blocked the possibility to monitor its acts.

Experts argued that in recent years, Poland has pushed back against attempts to expand the EU's role in migration policy, maintaining that migration policy should remain the competence of national governments. (Margesson, Mix and Welt, 2021). Bodnar evaluated that even if the primary role to protect the borders belongs to the member countries, European Union is an integrated body, and its border security management is the shared responsibility of Frontex as well as national authorities. Frontex's regulations clearly put forward that the external borders' security and enforcement return decisions should be made in cooperation with Frontex (Bodnar, 2021). Additionally, it should be mentioned that although Poland sends enough patrol personnel to protect its borders and it has adequate power to overcome the problem, Poland's defect in this process was transparency. Experts expressed that Frontex could provide it for Poland and the public opinion in total (Bodnar, 2021).

However, the other example demonstrated the opposite situation. Lithuania and Latvia demanded help in a short time partly because of their small scale of territory and abilities. Upon this, RABIT teams were deployed on the Lithuania-Belarus border. Frontex appointed 104 border guards to take the mission into operation with patrol cars as well as two Europol Guest Officers at first. Additionally, the officers carried firearms whilst on patrol. During the process, the RABIT teams' capacity was enhanced, and their number reached 120 while the patrol cars' number increased to 36 and two helicopters were also added (Pallares Pla, 2021). Therefore, the Lithuanian retaliation and return capacity was enhanced by cooperating with Frontex and the Commission. Frontex declared that, in June alone, more than 400 people were detected as they were crossing the Lithuanian borders illegally from Belarus. These numbers are six times more than the whole of 2020 (Frontex, 2021).

Of these people, only 91 migrants were allowed to stay in Lithuania for humanitarian reasons. RABIT teams' performance and the detected and pushed back migrants' numbers are exciting but it should be added that Frontex is not the only patrol organization. As mentioned above, in 2019, Frontex established a fundamental rights Office in its institutional body. The officer investigates unlawful activities in the borders. Its main responsibility is to monitor and assess the fundamental rights compliance in the conduct of operations and to transform the data in the report for the agency. However, the deployment of RABIT teams didn't prevent the Lithuanian patrol's unlawful activities and they continued to push back and intervene in severity against migrants. Frontex experts visited Lithuania in August 2021

to control and observe the activities and to share information on types of return operations. In these processes, Frontex news shared the notices that Frontex officers have worked with Lithuanian officers. Teams completed the missions of surveillance, registration, identification, and screening of irregular migrant floods (Mills and others, 2021). The Fundamental Rights Officer took responsibility and prepared the reports on human rights violations of Lithuanian activities which involved the mass expulsion of migrants. For example, Jonas Grimheden, Fundamental Rights Officer, assessed that they detected at least 20 serious incidents in their reports. However, in the report, he evaluated that Frontex officers didn't involve in these mentioned activities. Also, Fabrice Leggeri stated that he and his organization concern about human rights violations in Lithuania, and they advised redacting Lithuanian law in comply with humanitarian and international law. In the existing position, Lithuanian law run counter to EU acquis (Pallares Pla, 2021).

Actually, the Frontex institution continued to support Lithuanian actions in total even if their agents stated some doubts about their activities. The reason for this argument is article 46 of the Frontex Regulation saying that *'Fundamental Rights Monitors are assigned by the FRO to each operational activity to monitor and report to the FRO on fundamental rights concerns and alleged breaches of fundamental rights. In case of serious or systematic violations, the Fundamental Rights Officer reports them to the Executive Director for his/her decision on measures to remedy, which may include the suspension or termination of the activity.'* (Frontex, 2021). The article gives the authority to the Executive director of Frontex to suspend and terminate the operations if they detected violations of fundamental rights or international protection obligations related to the activities. However, the article didn't use Leggeri in spite of his statements in such a way that Lithuanian officers violated fundamental rights (Pallares Pla, 2021).

4.2 RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR AND MIGRANT FLOODS

4.2.1 The Roots of War

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is not new; it has been shaped by recent historical developments. The dissolution of URRS and the independency of Ukraine from Moscow left unresolved problems behind. Russia had managed Eurasia and the region named "Island of the World" for centuries. The region has important geopolitical values and Russia gained political advantages from its value as well as its giant territorial areas. Even if it lost most of

its power in the countries which were hegemonic satellites for a long time, it regained its military or economic power in a short time thanks to its natural sources such as natural gas. This transformation caused the re-arising of the desire to rebuild the hegemony of the old-“friend” countries in Central Asia and East Europe (Yılmaz, 2006).

On the other hand, the European Union or NATO persistently sought to enhance their effect zones toward former Soviet countries in East Europe. To achieve this goal, these organizations have made efforts to engage with countries like Georgia, Ukraine, and the Baltic states. The endeavor made an uncomfortable situation and raised concerns among Russian political actors due to that they have thought that the democratic West would encircle Russia’s territories (Akgün, 2010). Russia didn’t resist loudly the participation of Baltic countries in NATO, but events in Georgia and Ukraine were evaluated as a subjective threat against Russia. As a result, in 2008, Russia partly invaded Georgia and invaded Crimea of Ukraine in 2014.

In Ukraine, society has been divided into two sides. One of them is the Russian-oriented Ukraine citizens and the people who desire to converge with Moscow while the other side is the majority of society who feels closeness with western countries. In 2010, Yanukovich, who was a pro-Russian politician, was elected as President. Yanukovich’s policies tended to be far away from the western bloc. His attitude and aims were common with Putin and Moscow. However, the Euromaidan events and the resignation of Yanukovich by escaping from Ukraine toward Russia stretched the relations between Ukraine and Russia. Russia annexed Crimea in the same year (Doğrul, 2022).

However, this annexation has not stopped the sensitive situation. During 2014-2022, Russia encouraged the eastern regions of Ukraine, where pro-Russian people live mostly, to resist the central government. In February 2022, upon Zelensky who is the pro-EU President of Ukraine, launching a set of initiatives to participate in NATO and EU, Putin and Russian political elites mobilized their military against Ukraine and started a “special operation”. Actually, it has been an invasion attempt in spite of “the operation” (Doğrul, 2022).

4.2.2 Escaping of Ukrainian Citizens from Their Homes

Upon Russia starting a huge invasion operation, Ukrainian people feared and escaped from their homes. The situation resulted in an important displacement circumstance inner side of

Ukraine and toward the external sides. Most displaced people seek asylum or refuge in their neighbor countries who are EU members such as Poland.

The Russian invasion has driven an enormous displacement fact inside Ukraine. The estimations show that 7.134 million people left their homes (Data Friendly Space, 2022).

On 3 March 2022, the UN declared that about 1 million people had fled from Ukraine to the countries such as Poland, Hungary, Moldova, Slovakia, and Romania. Also, the EU announced that the war caused 6, 5 million people to have been displaced and about half of them seek international protection. Especially EU countries and the EU as a whole transformed into a confident destination, and they demanded to be accepted by them.




Figure 4.4: Fled People from Ukraine to Neighbor Countries, 8 August 2022.

(Source: Frontex, 2022).

Frontex reports indicate that more than 7.5 million Ukrainian people entered EU territories from February 2022 to August 2022. Their report compared the data with entrances from Belarus and Russia. They argued that the flows from these areas stayed at the same level. Frontex’s detections were in such a way that these entrances which were from Belarus and Russia belonged to Ukrainian people. Frontex foresaw that the internally displaced people’s

rate also stayed at a high level. For example, their estimations have shown that, in June, the rate indicated that 6.64 million people were internally displaced.

According to Figure 13, among the EU countries, Poland hosts the most people with around 5 million migrants from Ukraine. Romania follows Poland with 890.793 people and Hungary comes in the third position with 739.222 migrants. Of course, these numbers can be differentiated in terms of data which was supplied by other international organizations such as *the Operational Data Portal Ukraine Refugee Situation* or *UNHCR* (UNHCR, 2022). It should be noted that because of that the free-visa rights of migrants who came from Ukraine, paved the way to the uncertainties, and it is hard to estimate the real number of mobilizations. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the numbers have reached unprecedented levels for European countries in recent history.

Obviously, this tendency will trigger a new flow of migration toward EU borders inevitably in long term. By moving from the Belarus case, Frontex officers evaluated that Russia might push the migrants toward EU borders and potentially leading to an escalation at the borders due to asylum seekers or individuals carrying fraudulent documents for entry. Therefore, they suggested that the new migrant wave could be exploited by Russia. Frontex's arguments are as follows:

“The protraction of the conflict and a continued internal push to sustain Russia's aggression in Ukraine could impact the Russia-EU borders. The risks for illegal border crossings and the use of fraudulent documents might increase in case Russia will pursue more aggressive recruitment tactics. The risks for the instrumentalization of migration flows by Russia and Belarus remain high.” (Frontex, 2022).

4.2.3 EU's Policy Vis-a Vis Ukrainian Refugees

4.2.3.1 Why EU and member states welcomed ukrainian migrants?

European public opinion approached positively Ukrainian irregular migration. It made it easy to adopt the Ukrainian migrants. The main reason is the belief in a way that Ukrainian people were damaged physically and emotionally because of Russian cruelty and war, and the circumstances load a humanitarian responsibility on the European citizens. So, European public opinion has had the reflection on the issue that these people should be protected by their European neighbors. The other reason for the issue is that European public opinion has

a belief that when the war ended, the Ukrainian people would return to their homes intentionally in contrast to the migrants who came from Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries (Boyaz, 2022).

In recent times, migrants from the Middle East and North Africa were not welcomed by European authorities. The authorities asserted the situation merely as a security issue. Therefore, they suggested that this irregular migration event could be harmful to European society and economic sustainability. This view of emergency forced European countries to give out international rules about migrancy, and that is why European society didn't accept the entrance of the migrants. However, Ukrainian migrants have not been observed in the same way. Contrary, Today Ukrainian migrants have been welcomed by both European authorities and society as a whole as well as they have the opportunity of temporal protection. The European people considered that Ukrainian refugees have been looked like them and it separated them from the ordinary migrants that Europeans get used to. For example, an Al Jazeera journalist columned the situation as follows: (Bayoumi, 2022)

"Looking at them, the way they are dressed, these are prosperous ... I'm loath to use the expression ... middle-class people. These are obviously not refugees looking to get away from areas in the Middle East that are still in a big state of war. These are not people trying to get away from areas in North Africa. They look like any." Apparently looking "middle class" equals "the European family living next door"

This type of expressions display that Ukrainians are just like European family living next door so that they are not a threat to European identity and social homogeneity. There is no need to take measurements against them but a need to protect them as mentioned by Daniel Hannan, a writer for the Telegraph. He mentioned the situation as "shocking". The reason is that he asserts the Ukrainian people over *"watching Netflix", "using Instagram", voting in free elections"* and *"reading the uncensored newspapers"*. Additionally, the host countries have historical ties with Ukraine people, and they are neighbors. Therefore, the humanitarian crisis was not able to externalize and was ignorable by European countries (Boyaz, 2022).

We can separate Poland's urge to invite migrants from Ukraine or to facilitate their crossings to their territories. First of all, Poland has been known for its radical nationalist tendencies. They assert that Ukrainians and Polish people come from the same ancestors. Additionally, both of the society believe in the same religion, Catholic Christianity. Therefore, Poland

implemented a warm policy toward migrants from Ukraine. The situation was so obvious that Polish MP, Dominik Tarczynski emphasized these common shares as follows: *We don't accept even single Muslim refugees. Even one of them cannot enter Poland. We accepted more than two million migrants from Ukraine into our country. However, we will not allow Muslim refugees to enter because we promised it. I am proud of it*" (TRT World, 2022). The promise for rejecting Muslim refugees dates back to 9/11, Paris and London attacks, certainly.

Despite the discriminatory nature of these statements, which distinguish between white and blue-eyed migrants and brown-skinned migrants, they indicate a willingness on the part of European countries, intellectuals, and society to readily accept Ukrainian migrants (Bayoumi, 2022).

4.2.3.2 What rules EU implemented to ukrainian migrants

At the beginning, it is important to note that European countries have adopted different attitudes toward Ukrainian refugees compared to migrants coming from the Middle East and Central Asia. One of the reasons for this distinction can be attributed to the fact that the refugee crisis in Ukraine is a consequence of EU and NATO policies against Russian expansionist policies. That's why EU countries viewed Ukrainian migrants as individuals to be protected from the cruelty.

European countries, particularly Poland, have adopted an "open-door" policy for Ukrainian refugees since the outbreak of the war. This policy signifies a willingness to accept Ukrainian refugees into their respective nations.

The warm welcome extended to Ukrainian refugees has led to a rapid influx of Ukrainian refugees. Additionally, Ukrainian refugees have been swiftly granted access to "international protection." This response reflects the stance of European nations on the Russian invasion.

Poland has taken in the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, followed by Romania, Russia, Hungary, Moldova, Slovakia, and Belarus. While most Ukrainians sought refuge in Western countries, around 600,000 fled to Russia to escape the war's devastating effects. The EU has provided temporary protection to Ukrainian refugees in EU member states, allowing them to move freely within the EU. The following data provides details on the number of Ukrainian refugees crossing the borders of various countries:

Germany	366.000
Czechia	300.000
Bulgaria	205.000
Italy	93.000
France	55.000
Spain	51.000

Figure 4.5: Numbers of Ukrainian Refugees Crossing Relevant Countries' Borders.

(Source: Boyraz, 2022).

What indicates the EU launched “open-door” policy is the programs that are started by EU institutions. One of the main programs is the temporal protection system. The system officially came into force in 2001 by the Temporal Protection Directive which provides temporal and practical resolution to the situations of irregular migration flows. EU allowed Ukrainian people to benefit from the system. Thus, they can easily obtain a residence permit, or it facilitates Ukrainian people to benefit from the health or education services of EU countries. The system has been implemented for the first time in history for Ukrainian migrants. That’s why I first examine what the temporal protection mechanism entails.

After the civil war broke up within former Yugoslavia; Hungary and Slovenia declared their independence, leading to the first large-scale migrant flows in Europe since the Second World War. For example, after Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence in 1992, Eastern Bosnia witnessed a mass exodus, as a result %95 of the Bosnian and Hungarian population left their homes. In response to these crises EU adopted the temporal protection mechanism so that: (Yılmaz Eren, 2022)

- a. *The mechanism would serve the EU saves its financial resources and time thanks to the evaluation of the migrants’ conditions as prima facia,*
- b. *If the origin country repairs its own political circumstances, they can easily cancel the residence permits and accordingly may put into force the remittance procedure and*
- c. *Temporal protection delivers the message for public opinion by implying that the situation doesn’t have permanency and is temporal.*

As outlined in the directive, the temporal protection status identifies some rights and benefits for the users. These can be counted as follows: (EU Commission, 2023)

- a. *Residence permit*
- b. *Information on temporary protection*
- c. *Access to the asylum procedure*
- d. *Access to Employment*
- e. *Access to suitable accommodation*
- f. *Access to social welfare*
- g. *Access to medical care*
- h. *Access to education*
- i. *Opportunities for families to reunite*
- j. *Access to banking services*
- k. *Move to other EU countries*
- l. *Move freely in EU countries*

The directive mandates the provision of temporary protection to displaced migrants originating from third countries or specific geographical regions experiencing mass displacement. A displaced person is defined as an individual compelled to leave their country or region or evacuated by international organizations pursuant to formal applications. These individuals find themselves in circumstances that preclude their safe and permanent return to their home countries due to prevailing armed conflicts, endemic violence, or systematic and widespread human rights violations. (Yılmaz Eren, 2022).

European Commission proposed and recognized the temporal protection status for Ukrainian migrants encompassing three distinct categories. These categories included the people who have been displaced since 24 February 2022 when the Russian invasion was launched, and then, may not return to their countries; (Yılmaz Eren, 2022).

- a. Ukrainian citizens residing in Ukraine;

- b. Third-country nationals who officially resided in Ukraine;
- c. Family members of those in the above categories.

While each EU member state has implemented the Temporary Protection Directive with minor variations in their legal frameworks, the directive's core principles and provisions remain consistent across the EU. The directive's initial validity period is one year, with the option to extend it based on prevailing circumstances. Furthermore, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, signed in 2017, grants Ukrainian citizens visa-free travel to EU member states for up to 90 days. This visa-free regime facilitates mobility and enables Ukrainian citizens to temporarily reside in EU countries (Yılmaz Eren, 2022).

4.2.4 What Has (or Hasn't) Frontex Done Since the Process?

In response to the surge of Ukrainian refugees fleeing the conflict, Frontex assumed a pivotal role in managing the migrant crisis, mirroring its involvement in the Belarus-EU border crisis. The agency promptly declared its readiness to provide assistance in the early stages of the conflict, dispatching its first contingent of officers to the Ukrainian borders even before the EU formalized temporary protection for Ukrainian migrants. This deployment was initiated at Romania's request for Frontex support at its borders. Frontex responded by deploying 150 officers, 45 patrol cars, and the necessary equipment. Additionally, Frontex deployed 49 officers to Moldova in March, gradually increasing the number to 162. The operation, designated as "Terra," expanded to encompass 11 other EU member states and neighboring countries bordering Ukraine. Notably, certain countries, such as Moldova, which had collaborated with Frontex on information exchange and risk analysis since 2008, signed on to participate in joint operations with the EU for the first time (Gkliati, 2022).

Frontex promptly deployed teams to the border regions of member states to address the influx of Ukrainian refugees. On May 3, 2022, Frontex dispatched a total of 520 officers to various border locations. As illustrated in Figure 14, Frontex prioritized deployments to borders heavily traversed by Ukrainian migrants. Accordingly, Romania (207), Moldova (73), Slovakia (56), Lithuania (94), Estonia (37), Latvia (23), and Finland (4) were designated to host Frontex teams. Notably, Poland initially declined Frontex assistance, drawing criticism from media outlets and international human rights organizations. However, Poland eventually permitted Frontex operations within its territory to alleviate the

humanitarian crisis. Despite receiving a significant number of Ukrainian migrants, Poland's current Frontex presence is comparatively modest. In March, the EU and Moldova established a status agreement, leading to the deployment of 73 Frontex officers to support Moldovan authorities (Frontex, 2022b).




Figure 4.6: Deployments of Frontex in Borders during Ukrainian immigrant Crisis.

(Source: Frontex, 2022b).

Frontex's primary role during the Ukrainian migrant crisis has been to continuously monitor the situation at the borders and provide timely updates to EU member states. The agency deployed staff to border regions, operating around the clock to gather and disseminate information on migrant movements and border crossing trends. Frontex also utilized technological resources, including satellites, to generate informed forecasts regarding the potential future trajectory of the migrant crisis. Furthermore, Frontex personnel facilitated the distribution of humanitarian aid to migrants, collaborating with colleagues from EU member states to ensure the delivery of essential supplies (Frontex, 2022b).

Frontex's role during the Ukrainian migrant crisis has not been focused on preventing migrant crossings or engaging in pushbacks. Instead, the agency's primary function has been to act as a "standing corps" providing support to member states in managing the influx of refugees. This support encompasses tasks such as border checks (including registration in Eurodac), border surveillance utilizing satellite imagery and aerial observation, and coordinating crisis response efforts with member states. Frontex's focus on facilitating the orderly movement of refugees and supporting member states' response capabilities aligns with its mandate as a European Union agency tasked with managing external borders (European Parliament, 2022).

The VEGA Project, initiated by Frontex, aims to safeguard children from child trafficking amidst the arduous circumstances of migration. Approved in 2015, the Project deploys border guards at airports to identify at-risk children. Additionally, it establishes guidelines for the treatment of children at borders. Upon its activation, Frontex expanded the Project's reach to land and sea missions, incorporating it into all current operations. In response to the Ukraine crisis, Frontex, in collaboration with relevant member states, opted to activate the VEGA Project along the borders receiving the majority of migrants. As an example, the Project was implemented at prominent airports in Slovakia, Romania, Moldova, and Poland until the end of 2022. Within the scope of the VEGA Project, Frontex's fundamental rights officers assumed responsibility for the missions. Their primary duties involve providing consultation and advice on identifying vulnerable individuals and potential victims (Gkliati, 2022).

Several scholars have raised concerns about the differential treatment of migrants from Ukraine compared to those originating from the Middle East or North Africa. Karasapan (2023), for instance, highlights the EU's more welcoming stance towards Ukrainian refugees compared to other migrant groups. They emphasize the encounters of asylum seekers from the Middle East, Africa, and Afghanistan with violent pushbacks orchestrated by EU member states, often with the involvement of Frontex (Karasapan, 2022).

Frontex, typically identified with border security measures and pushback operations, faced a pivotal moment during the Ukrainian humanitarian crisis. Allegations of misconduct surrounding pushback activities culminated in the resignation of Fabrice Leggerini, the Executive Director of Frontex. Interestingly, Frontex adopted a seemingly contradictory role

during the Ukrainian crisis. This shift was aptly captured by the Greek Minister of Migration and Asylum's statement during a public meeting with Frontex's Executive Director, asserting “...*Frontex is a security force, not a welcoming committee*” (Gkliati, 2022).

Frontex's discriminatory practices are exemplified by the VEGA Project, which expedites the repatriation of non-Ukrainian refugees to their home countries. This initiative unequivocally aims to deter these individuals from entering EU territories. For instance, Frontex's announcement confirms that, as of March 11th, Frontex officers have facilitated the repatriation of 400 individuals from Poland to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (Gkliati, 2022). Furthermore, Frontex's enforcement of the directive's guidelines has been condemned for its discriminatory nature, disproportionately affecting individuals with white and blue eyes. This selective practice has been brought to light by international human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, who have compiled evidence indicating that Frontex has impeded the entry of Asian and Black individuals into EU member states, barring them from lists authorizing travel on trains and buses bound for EU territories (Gkliati, 2022).

5. CONCLUSION

This study examined the role of Frontex in migrant flows to EU member states. First, I emphasized that Frontex aims to represent a formidable bulwark against unprecedented challenges confronting EU nations since the Second World War. This is particularly significant given that The Middle East has been plagued by a protracted cycle of civil wars and terrorist insurgencies for the past two decades. Especially African people have lived in unsustainable economies, intricate social communities, and even were in need of basic needs for a comfortable life. The people living in these regions have headed to EU countries with the aim of better living conditions. This mass mobilization is more than the EU can put up with. Henceforth, Frontex may, on occasion, exceed the parameters of its intervention in managing migrant flows during its missions. Nevertheless, the overwhelming gravity of the situation does not rationalize the intensity of Frontex officers' actions as it was witnessed during Belarus-Poland migration crisis.

Thus, investigations have raised concerns regarding Frontex's adherence to human rights principles, suggesting that its practices may constitute violations of migrants' fundamental rights. In many instances, Frontex officers, in collaboration with border guard officers from EU member states, have engaged in pushback operations and other actions that undermine migrants' human rights. Firstly, Frontex is bound to uphold international law and EU regulations. The agency's mandate extends beyond surveillance and prevention missions to encompass the protection of migrants' rights. In 2019, the EU established a Fundamental Rights Office within Frontex, granting it special powers. However, this office has failed to curb Frontex's actions that conflict with the legal framework. The gravity of these allegations led to the resignation of Frontex's Executive Director, Fabrice Leggerini, during the Ukrainian refugee crisis.

Furthermore, Frontex's operational authority is contingent upon procedural authorization. Unless a relevant member state formally requests the deployment of Frontex teams to its borders, Frontex cannot independently initiate operations. Although its officers exceed their limits on migrant issues, they generally adhere to legal requirements. However, it is observed that when they are absent in the crisis areas, border guards, police, and military personnel from relevant member countries treated more violently towards migrants. For example,

Polish officers did not allow the journalists and representatives of human rights organizations to enter the area for observation, assistance, or any other humanitarian duties. The situation ended up with thousands of people' push backs violently and deaths.

The EU Parliament is also aware of the situation regarding Frontex's activities. This is evidenced by the partial or complete rejection of Frontex's budget on multiple occasions. However, as the persistence of these issues indicates, this approach has proven inadequate in effectively monitoring and regulating Frontex's activities. It would be better to establish an independent body to control Frontex's activities at the borders on behalf of the EU. Also, the establishment of an independent institution empowered to impose sanctions swiftly and effectively on Frontex officers is advocated. Conversely, to safeguard Frontex's operational efficacy, EU regulations should confer upon the Executive Director of Frontex the authority to proactively undertake measures during exigent circumstances, even without the express authorization of the pertinent member states. Notwithstanding, member states may express reservations regarding the latter recommendation, citing potential encroachments upon their sovereign authority.

Frontex is identified with prevention and pushback operations. The situation was so dramatic that in the middle of the Belarusian humanitarian crisis, the Executive Director of Frontex, Fabrice Leggerini, was forced to resign over allegations of misconducting with respect to pushback activities. However, in response to the Ukraine-Russia crisis, Frontex adopted a more nuanced stance towards pushbacks, highlighting the agency's evolving role in managing irregular migration.

The VEGA Project by which fleeing people who are non-Ukrainian are assisted to repatriate to their own countries has led Frontex to be perceived as a discriminating institution. For instance, as of March 11, Frontex officers convinced and assisted 400 Tajik and Kirghiz individuals for repatriation who are in Poland, as stated in Frontex's announcement. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Frontex's implementation of the directive's containment measures appeared to disproportionately target individuals of a particular racial or ethnic background. Some international human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, have reported that available indicators suggest Frontex may have prevented the entry of Asian and Black individuals into EU member countries and excluded them from lists of those eligible to board trains and buses to EU countries.

This thesis covers the period from 2004, when Frontex was established, to 2022, when the Ukraine-Russia war broke up. The main objective is to explore the securitization of the migration process, asserting that Frontex functions as a security entity established by the EU, serving as a bureaucratic apparatus. This perspective is analyzed through the Paris School approach, which posits that any issue can be transferred to the security domain, irrespective of its existential threat, enabling states to develop security apparatus and related technologies in alignment with their policies. During the research in accordance with the main aim I have seen that there is an incompatibility between Frontex's founding purpose and practices. When the issues are securitized, as it was in the Belarus-Poland crisis, Frontex do not take any initiative and step into the issue where hundreds of immigrants faced harsh conditions whereas with regard to Russia-Ukraine crisis the institution welcomed the Ukrainian migrants, but not Middle eastern and Afghans, on the EU borders. Therefore, the question "Did Frontex operate in accordance with its founding purposes, or does it violate them, particularly concerning human rights and dignity is examined. To achieve its aim, the thesis focuses on two specific operations. One is Frontex's response the EU-Belarus crisis, and the other is its operations during the Ukraine-Russia war. The former serves as a good example of securitization of immigrants, while the latter is a subject for De-securitization, respectively. Ukraine- Russia war could potentially be the case of another profound study in the realm of 'De-Securitization'.as well. However, here in this thesis, what specifically addressed is the incompatibility of Frontex in different cases for immigrants with different origins. All in all, the thesis argued that the EU authorities and, indirectly, the Frontex exhibited divergent attitudes toward distinct crises.

Last but not least, this thesis examines the theories about the securitization of migration as it is vital to clarify the process of securitization of migration within the EU. This understanding is essential in comprehending the founding purpose of Frontex clearly. The Paris School is instrumental in addressing this matter. The thesis set forth its fundamental arguments in the second chapter by tackling Theoretical Perspectives of Securitization and securitization of Migration." In the third chapter, the thesis explains what Frontex is, and how it functions by highlighting its significant missions in recent history. The fourth chapter, which is central to the thesis, is titled 'The Recent Conflicts in the Eastern Borders of the European Union and questioning the Practices of the Frontex.' This chapter examines the

roles Frontex played in the conflicts between the EU and Belarus as well as the Ukrainian migrant crisis.

All in all, the whole research questions that examines Frontex through the lenses of Paris School as a securitizing body and securitization of immigration by Poland, thus by the EU, has found answers such as the Frontex is the ultimate bureaucratic apparatus established to securitize irregular immigrants and lacks in harmony in different practices as it is supposed to be initially. Its violations are proved by the reports which are used as primary sources in this thesis. Due to its violations, the necessity of Frontex's current high budget has been a source of concern for many EU member states as well, claiming that the institution constitutes a burden to the EU. A further quantitative study may be done through questionnaires and interviews with the immigrants themselves who are engaged in Frontex practices in order to investigate and analyze Frontex with respect to human securitization in detail.

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