

THE NATURE OF EMOTIONS IN SPINOZA'S
PHILOSOPHY AND READING ITS REFLECTION IN
WHITE CASTLE



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PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Date: 28.06.2021

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ÖZET

“The Nature of Emotions in Spinoza’s Philosophy and Reading its Reflection in *White Castle*” “Spinoza Felsefesinde Duyguların Doğası ve *Beyaz Kale* Romanına Yansıması üzerinden Okunması” başlığı altında sunulan bu tez çalışmasında, felsefe tarihinde duygu kavramına yönelik farklı yaklaşımlar ele alınmış, devamında tarihsel ve postmodern unsurlar içeren bir romana, Spinoza felsefesi yansıması üzerinden köle-efendi/ Hoja beraberliğine uygulanabilir olup olmadığı sorunu ortaya koyulmuştur. Bu çalışma içerisinde ana hedef, Orhan Pamuk’un *White Castle* adlı romanı, Spinoza felsefesinde yer alan duyguların doğasıyla okumak, eseri felsefi bir çerçevede anlamak ve yorumlamaktır. Bu çalışmada, mitos ve duyguların felsefede ve edebiyatta ele alınışı serimlenmiş, felsefede duygu kavramı, edebiyat ve felsefenin kavşak ve çatallanmaları üzerinde durulurken, söz konusu esere hermeneutik bir yöntemle yaklaşılmış, romanın hikâye örgüsü içinde yer alan köle efendi/ Hoja beraberliğinin irdelenmesi aracılığıyla gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Spinoza felsefesinde isteme, sevinç, üzüntü ve bunların türevleri olan diğer duygular karşısında insanın kendi duruşunu ortaya koymasını belirleyecek olan gene insanın kendisidir. Köle ve içkin özgürlüğün çerçevesini, duyguların kontrolünü, zihin ile olan ilişkisi belirleyecektir. Bir eşdeyişle, içkin özgürlük, zihin ve bedenin birlikteliğidir. Hegel felsefesinin mihenk taşını oluşturan köle-efendi diyalektiği toprak, bilinç, özbilinç kavramları üzerinden şekillenir. Ölmeyi göze alamayan için kölelik başlayacak, bu sayede efendisi ve toprak arasında bir ayraç görevi üstlenecektir. Ama süregelen kölelik bozguna uğrayan efendilik olacaktır.

Bu bağlamda, bu tez çalışmasında önce *White Castle* romanında, köle ve efendinin/ Hoja’nın pozisyonları belirlenmiş, ardından kölenin duygularını kontrol edişi, duygularına boyun eğmemesi sonucunda fiziksel köleliğini sonlandırarak efendinin yerine geçişi Hermeneutic yöntemle anlamaya çalışılmıştır. Özetle, Spinoza felsefesinde duyguların doğasının yansıması üzerinden Orhan Pamuk’un *White Castle* romanı okunarak, köle ve efendisinin/ Hoja yer değiştirmesi duygular üzerinden değerlendirilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Duygu(lar), Köle, Efendi, Özgürlük, Yer değiştirme.

ABSTRACT

The objective of this thesis, presented under the title “The Nature of Emotions in Spinoza's Philosophy and Reading its Reflection in *White Castle*”, different approaches to the concept of emotion in the history of philosophy were discussed. After that, the question of whether it can be applied to the slave-master/ Hoja union is put forward through the reflection of Spinoza philosophy on a novel that has historical and postmodern elements. In this study, the main goal is to read Orhan Pamuk's novel *White Castle* with the nature of the emotions in Spinoza philosophy, and to understand and interpret the book within a philosophical framework. Therefore, in this study, the concept of emotion in philosophy, the intersections and workings of literature and philosophy are emphasized in detail, while the differences in the way emotions, myths are handled in philosophy and literature explicated. In this context, in the analysis in question, the book was first approached by a hermeneutic method, and this goal was realized through the study of the slave master/ Hoja union in the story structure of the novel.

In Spinoza's philosophy, it is the human who will determine one's own stance in the face of desire, joy, sadness and other emotions that are derivatives of them. The framework of slavery and immanent freedom will determine its relationship with reason, which is the control of emotions. In other words, -immanent- freedom is the unity of reason and body. Slave-master dialectic, which forms the touchstone of Hegel philosophy, is shaped by the concepts of land, consciousness and self-consciousness. Slavery will begin for those who cannot take the risk to die, so that s/he can act as a parenthesis between his/her master and the land. However, continued slavery will be the mastery that will be defeated.

In this context, in this thesis, the positions of the slave and the master/ Hoja were determined first in the *White Castle* novel, and then the slave's taking master's place by ending his physical slavery as a result of the slave's control of his emotions and arguing against his feelings was tried to be understood to by using hermeneutic method. In summary, Orhan Pamuk's novel *White Castle* was read on the reflection of the nature of emotions in Spinoza's philosophy, and the replacement of slave and immanent freedom was evaluated through emotions.

Keywords: Emotion(s), Slave, Master, Freedom, Substitution.

DEDICATION

Jâle SEVAL DAMAR and Şavkar ALTINEL.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Relationship Between Philosophy and Literature

While philosophy sets out from understanding and explaining existence, literature reveals the different structures of what is. The discipline of literature carries both beauty and aesthetic pleasure and tries to be interpreted with a philosophical approach -Hermeneutic-. Literature “Extends our life and our experience, making us reflect and feel about what might otherwise be too distant for feeling. (...) Literature widens our experience and expands our moral imagination” (Nussbaum, 1990: 43-90).

The connection of both disciplines in epistemology, ontology and ethics was seen for the first time in mythologies. In this case, not only in philosophy but also in literature myth/ mythos leads to the display of emotions. Thomas Bulfinch explained that connection between Mythology and Literature as “Without a knowledge of mythology much of the elegant Literature of our own language cannot be understood and appreciated” (Bulfinch, 1970: vi).

In this context, in the last part of the thesis, the overlapping and bifurcated aspects of both philosophy and literature will be discussed. Through the concepts that form the common points of both disciplines -slave and master/Hoja-, the nature of emotions in Spinoza's philosophy will be examined and Orhan Pamuk's *White Castle* novel will be tried to be understood and interpreted. The fact that whether it is possible that emotions, which in Spinoza's philosophy reduce and increase the power of the body, can be controlled by the mind, will be investigated through the characters of the novel, slave and master/ Hoja, through a hermeneutic method.

In a world full of Gods, the poet reveals the human will, fate, human-human, and human-God relationships as well as concepts such as wars, courage, and heroism. The epics called the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* reveal how the people living in a world with Gods cope with their emotions such as courage, bravery, misery, happiness, anger, pain, faith and will, and/or how they bear the consequences. Furthermore, "These epics provide us with an opportunity to find the researches on the first principle, tendency to monotheism, and the meaning of goings-on" (Kranz, 1994:1). *The Iliad/ Ιλιάς* (A.D. 750) and the *Odyssey/ Οδύσσεια* (A.D. 700), are considered as the first samples of western literature.

In the *Iliad*, which was considered as the first work of tragic art, "Motifs and images in which the tragic sense had shaped almost for three thousand years of the western poetry are revealed: Exposure of the heroes to the shortness of life and to the whims and fatal dangers of nonhuman powers and eventually, the fall of the city" (Steiner, 2011: 2).

The *Iliad*, begins with the withdrawal of Achilles, the commander-in-chief of the Achaean army, from the battle because of his anger against Agamemnon. After the death of his friend named Patroclus, Achilles returns to the battle, and fights with Hector, the Trojan hero, kills him and gives Hector's dead body to King Priam.

It has been said that the *Odyssey* was written by Homer in his old age though the *Iliad* is attributed to Homer's youth.

"It is obvious that Odysseus (or rather, Homer) is knowledgeable and experienced also in the 'latitude navigation'. Furthermore, according to the information in the fifth book of the epic, Odysseus could determine various bearings in accordance with some easily recognized planets such as the Venus and in accordance with the rising and setting directions of the constellations such as the Orion and the Pleiades while he sailed eastward from the goddess Calipso's island" (Yarkın, 2019: 83).

Odyssey includes the story of Odysseus, the cunning king of Ithaca, during his return home after the Trojan War. As Kabağaçlı states, "The words Odysseus and Odysseia mean travel and adventure in the language of ancient Crete". (...) Odysseus' 'humanistic approach to the events and the interestingness of the imagination created in the stor' constitute the main structure of the epic" (Yarkın, 2019: 81).

When we examine the *Odyssey* (or rather Homer) in the light of this information, we see that the celestial map leads the sailors, allows them to communicate with the Gods, and that it is the first chart for direction to the logos. In addition, Aristotle, in his work titled *Peri Ouranou/ Περὶ Οὐρανοῦ*, defines Aether, which is a matter different from the four main elements, and states that there are always running and moving stars, planets and, finally, fixed stars.

In this regard, the epics in mythology reveal the human-human relationship, the harmony and conflict with the Gods, and how people bow to their fate, and how they go against their fate. Furthermore, the epics develop a point of view on the relationship between the human and nature. It is also the issue "Called as the freedom of will in

philosophy” (Kranz, 1994: 1). This important point emphasized by Kranz also explains the connection between the questioning of God and human will.

Homer’s epics overlap the emotions –fear, sadness, joy- of the Gods with man in the God-Human relationship in the mythical world. And he addresses all this as human destiny.

When we remember the main themes in *Odysseia*, we find the concepts such as the story of travel, underground -aboveground- sky, design, reward and punishment. Furthermore, in the epic, we can see that there is a play upon words through the interpretation of Odysseus as nobody and an anachronism through time and place warp. Erhat emphasizes that “*Odysseia* includes “metis” and “phren”, in other words, the ability of comprehension, understanding and thinking” (Homer, 1984: xxiii). The fact that the characters in the epic proceed on their way by struggling with various difficulties indicates that life does not only offer happiness and beauty. Another important concept to be taken into consideration in this epic is cunningness. Getting over the difficulties is compatible not only with metis but also with the deep knowledge of cunningness.

As in Homer’s epics, Hesiod’s books (*Theogony* and *Works and Days*), which were written in a rhythmic scheme known as hexameter, are also included in these examples. Hesiod’s *Theogony* can be defined as a design that explains the birth of Gods and the structure of the cosmos. “All these names and items used in the forms of explanation refer to gods and also existence of the nature” (Gülenç, 2008: 120). The formation of the cosmos had caused various problems such as the beginning, the being

and the existence, the problem of change, time concept, eternity, the nature of nature, and the nature of Gods.

In this regard, we see that there is not a certain turn in transition from the mythos to the logos and that any certain line cannot be drawn. When examining the subject within the context of mythos- literature- philosophy, we should also read the epic that tells “The life of Gilgamesh, the king of the Sumerian city of Uruk, and his friend Enkidu in the 18th century BC” (Atak, 2011: 25). The epic is based on the concepts such as conquest, fame, immortality in a metaphysical sense, power, and equality. In addition, the epic takes its shape through issues/concepts such as emotions (love, jealousy, and hatred), civilization, culture, destiny, and death regarding the literature from the past to the present. It can be said that the war/competition of the magical structure in the *Epic of Gilgamesh (Epic of Bilgemiş)* with both Gods and extraordinary powers is similar to *Harry Potter* in today’s literature. “Uncovering dark secrets and confronting them are fantastically handled” (Rowling, 2021: 75). Throughout the history of philosophy, the concept of power has been considered an important concept by many philosophers, especially by Nietzsche, and it has shaped their philosophy.

If we remember, the hero who opposes the goddess Inane’s sexual desire faces the anger of the goddess in the *Epic of Gilgamesh (Epic of Bilgemiş)*. When we consider mythological epics and storytelling, the relationship between the story and the human cannot be ignored. Most of the stories in Islam, the last monotheistic religion, show us how we can go back in time in terms of anthropology and emotions in the existence of stories. When we combine that with the pre-Islamic story of the Virgin Mary on giving

birth to a son, the beginning of the story coincides with human existence and emotions. Thus, it reveals the inevitability of emotions in human culture and community life.

The *Manas Epic* of the Kyrgyz, which contains political, military, and theological motifs of the 12th Century, is based on heroism, and freedom. *Manas Epic* “Consists of three chapters covering the lives of Manas, his son Semetey and grandson Seytek. As in other epics, the subject is treated with surreal heroism and bodily power” (Arvas, 2016: 1-11).

Thus, the human beings, who form cultural activities of the social life began with mythic discourses and epics, give the place of such activities to logos and try to answer the question of what the arche of the world is. Logos means word, reason, expression, justification, etc.

Life began with mythos and epic and its place to logos, in time. Pre-Socratic philosophers suggest different ideas to clarify the question of what the arche of the universe is. Thales, one of the philosophers who lived in Miletus, thinks that water is the arche of all things. Thales, who questions the arche of the world and brings a philosophical perspective to the object, asks what the matter of abundance seen in the universe is, and adds the question of where the abundance begins. He emphasizes that the only thing that does not change and remains constant in the universe is water.

For Anaximander, the arche is apeiron meaning unlimited and infinite. On the other hand, for Anaximenes, the arche is air. And Heraclitus thinks that the arche is logos. The word "logos" comes, etymologically, from the Greek verb "legein" which

means "to say". It also refers to divine reason, mind, word, and notion, etc. "It has become one of the main concepts of philosophy since Heraclitus" (Akarsu,1998:124).

Since the *logos* is the constructive notion on the philosophy of Herakleitos, *ogos* contains various meanings such as language, rationality, measure, etc. and "Herakleitos finds the law of this world by researching into the depths of the universe through his intuition, and reveals polarity as the language of the infinite logos: This polarity is the development of the content of logos with the infinite motion which never ends in polar oppositions" (Kranz, 1994: 62).

In this regard, while the pre-Socrates philosophers suggest various ideas on what the arche of the world is, Heraclitus, in his work titled *On Nature*, emphasizes that everyone should strengthen himself with the logos, and adds, "It is wise, listening to the logos, to agree that all things are one" (Kranz, 1994: 63).

Heraclitus states that the main matter of the world is fire, and defines his principle as the struggle of opposites and promotes the invariance principle, in other words, the logos. According to his explanation, this world is the world of objects, there is always a change and continuity, and the world is a constant fire. Everything changes and hunger becomes fullness. In other words, '*panta rei*', everything flows and changes. For Heraclitus, who summarizes his philosophy through his words, we both step and do not step in the same rivers. We are and are not, everyone has the opportunity to examine the changing objects and to see their harmony only through 'the logos'. The logos gives the stability, and the form of thinking can be achieved through the logos. It makes the change unchangeable. For instance, when I said that John is dead, I

can relay that information to the others only through the logos because John is a human, and it can be relayed to the others through the logos.

Parmenides describes the main matter as nous and determines his principle as the principle of identity-noncontradiction. He asks that what it is in that thing, and wants to see the thing that makes that thing. It is not possible for the existing thing to be one and not to be a completely round sphere. Parmenides, known as the founder of ontology in the history of philosophy, draws the lines of the existing thing and carries it to the logos. Moreover, Parmenides adds, 'It exists, and it is not impossible not to exist/ It does not exist, it must not exist'.

When pre-Socratic philosophers are examined within the framework of emotions and philosophy of nature and its mythological power, it can be seen that Democritus defines the main material as the atoms, and the atoms are dispersed in the space. He adopts the principle of essentiality. For Empedocles, there are four elements as earth, air, water, and fire. All of them turn into each other. Love turns into hatred, favor turns into evil, and water turns into air, etc. Even though those philosophers were very engaged in the idea of nature and natural sciences, the mythical discourse had not been completely abandoned and what the main logos -arche of the world- was had been questioned. Empedocles's contrast includes emotional love and hate, favor and evil. Emotions are not left out. With all this discourse, logos and mythos have determined their own frames, although the myth does not disappear completely after logos.

For Anaxagoras known as one of the pre-Socratic philosophers, the source of action is important. He asks, what the hyle/ made is, and then he asks again, what

Hotenkinesis/ thought is. Anaxagoras finds the source/ origin of the action through his ideas.

Stoicism and Epicureanism were established in Athens “At about the same time (the late fourth and early third century BC) and remained important and influential theories for the remainder of the Hellenistic age (until 31 BC) and, especially in the case of Stoicism, until the second century AD and beyond” (Gill, 2013: 144). Stoicism established by Zeno of Citium (336-264 BC) brings a new expansion to the history of philosophy. In this expansion developed under three main categories as Logic, Physics, and Ethics, Heraclitus' concept of logos has been described as power, and fire has been considered as the first principle. "In Stoicism, the universe came into existence with 'the universal reason'. The aim of the Stoic ethics is to ensure that the human soul can be formed within the universal reason and be compatible with 'the nature', willingly” (Dürüşken, 2013: 287). Because the natural law “Is the law of reason (*lex naturae est lex divina*). Education based on the reason/ logic is necessary for a wise man to commune with the nature and the universal reason" (Dürüşken, 2013: 287).

For the Stoics, a virtuous life is the key to the happiness of human beings. The human being has logos, and acts according to logos. Therefore, “Virtue lies behind apathie (impossibility) which means not being determined by emotions” (Scheler, 2012: 11). Life in accordance with logos and nature is a happy life. “If we think that the previous Stoics lived in the same age with Aristotle, we can see that philosophy is within a structure based on physics and logic for the philosophers” (Brun, 2003: 36).

When we consider that “The Stoic naturalism includes the knowledge of the Nature which is suitable to reach the wisdom, it will be understood that physics is sometimes a starting point and the basis of philosophy, and sometimes a point of arrival and a dispersion of philosophy. As, the wise man is the person who lives in harmony with the natura” (Brun, 2003: 36).

The Stoics, under the influence of Heraclitus, think that “The nature has been regulated by “the logos” and that the humans participated in the logos will prefer to live properly and consider the virtue and the natural law as a guide. For them, the virtue, knowledge and nature are identical. Knowledge between the virtue and the nature is also the will itself ” (Önkal, 2018: 164-165). In this regard, for the Stoics, the distinction is between logos and non-logos. However, according to Epicurus, the virtue/happiness is associated with pleasure. This pleasure “Is found in ataraxia, in other words, emotional calm, not in relief from pain and uneasiness. Human is happy to the extent that s/he reaches spiritual calmness” (Scheler, 2012: 11). Together with the transition from the mythos to the logos, the emergence of philosophy has brought the examination of the concepts with it.

Even though the transition to the logos in this developing temporal process did not completely eliminate the mythic discourse, overlap and separation between the concepts of logos and mythos are revealed in Plato’s *Republic*. In his book VII., it is revealed that the mythic discourse has not been completely abandoned philosophically, that there is a difference between an educated human and an uneducated human, and what the episteme is through a way beginning with the mythos. Platon, in his book, mentions an individual, who lives in a cave and then escapes the cave and leave the

other people there behind, who then goes out of the cave, into the sunlight. In this allegory, Plato reveals the difference between education and lack of education. This allegory formed with “The cave, fire, objects, sunlight, and human also shows how an individual behaves against the situations” (Platon, 2007: 210).

Plato who uses the mythos in a dialectic structure to ground the concept of episteme and cannot abandon the mythos in his work called *Republic*, prefers to explain the concept of precision through the mythos in Book II. In addition, he tells the surrealistic mythic life of the shepherd Gyges and King. “In the light of the issue mentioned through this mythos, the formation of the live/ lives on the world through a gold ring achieved by chance is exemplified” (Platon, 2007: 50). The shepherd who finds a magical ring will do what he wants, like a God. “Is such a life possible? Heroes in the myths can change their roles with the God and have all characteristics belonging to the God” (Platon, 2007: 51).

The use of myths in Plato’s works explains that the mythos disappears and it is not continuous. He clearly reveals this issue through the allegories and myths in his work called the *Republic*. For Plato, the logos is the light, and it does not disappear. When we consider the mythos as a preliminary preparation on the way going to the logos, the logos is the place the individual wants to reach.

The two concepts that are not completely separated, the emergence of tragedy in the life, passing from verbal expression to written expression, the comments on tragedy, and in this regard, the understanding of a written text hermeneutic evaluation

are mentioned in the continuation of the way beginning with the mythos and going to the logos.

When we look at tragedies in the historical context, we see that the most detailed explanations are given by Aristotle. If we look at the first appearance of the notion of tragedy in European languages, then we see that, “Notion of tragedy is used in English language in the fourteenth century” (Steiner, 2011: 4).

Aristotle, in his *Poietike/Poetics*, emphasizes that “Art is a mode of imitation” (Aristotle, 1902: 1447a). In this regard, for Aristotle, “Most forms of literature are mimesis (Aristotle, 1902: 1447 a). In his book, we read to Aristotle’s ontological view.

It is known that tragedy imitates the actions of men better or worse than the average or of the average men, comedy imitates the actions of men worse than the average, and the origin of tragedy is the ‘dithyramb’ and the origin of comedy is the ‘phallic songs’. For Aristotle who frequently uses and emphasizes the term “The measure of the center/ mesotes in his philosophy, the action of tragic drama takes place between the hours of sunrise and sunset” (Aristotle, 1902: 1449 b).

For Aristotle, “[T]ragedy is not a mythy just a mimesis of the act. The spirit purified in tragedy achieves it through emotions. In this emotion, fear and pity” (Aristotle, 1902: 1449 b).

In this case, the action of tragedy is an imitation. The most important thing for tragedy is a certain plot. There may be a tragedy without character, but a tragedy

without plot, in other words, action is not possible. Mythos is the spirit and source of tragedy.

For Aristotle, it is the order which stimulates the emotions and offers beauty to us. This order can be achieved if it is neither too long nor too short. In a sense, reasonable emotions are exhibited. His teacher, Plato, who initiated the research for beauty, indicates that all beautiful things in the perceptible world have a share of the things 'beautiful in themselves'. Aristotle's definition of beauty depends on the concept of order which is the essence of 'beauty'.

"Fear and pity" (Aristotle, 1902: 1452 a) are felt in the face of unexpected situations which occur suddenly. If preferred naturalness is based on incidence and occurs spontaneously, its effect will be greater. If the situations based only on incidence seem to have an aim, such situations are the most extraordinary for a poet. Furthermore, the plots formed in this way have more artistic value and are considered more beautiful and valuable than the others. Aristotle, in his work, "Defines the characteristic of a perfect tragedy and also emphasizes that the tragedy will not make the will true" (Aristotle, 1902: 1453 a).

Aristotle considers literature as production. He seeks an answer for the question of what the whatness of literature is, he emphasizes that the aim of literature takes place in the effect the literature creates and researches the effect of the essence of tragedy on humanity.

In this regard, Aristotle emphasizes the emotions in the face of situations and the understanding of the plot presented in tragedy. In other words, verbal hermeneutic evaluation is emphasized as stimulation of fear and pity is hidden in the meaning of the plot presented. Thus, it becomes apparent when we examine philosophy and emotions in the light of hermeneutic evaluation, the emergence of the value of human's driving force initiated with humanism, in other words, the studies and thoughts on questioning and researching the place of the human in this world have made the relationship between literature and philosophy more prominent. Humanism, not only with its philological sense (if so, it would base only upon a scientific foundation) but also in the widest sense, brings itself into existence as a movement that expresses a new life understanding and emotion of the modern man, in other words, an 'idea' the man directs his researches to himself.

In the mean time, Aristotle, in his book, explains a very important point about poet and the historian, "Language and character are essential elements for tragedy to take place" (Aristotle, 1902: 1451 a).

In this context, from past to present, literature has used myths/ mythos to maintain the intensity of emotions and to exhibit a fantastical structure. Philosophy, on the other hand, has set boundaries for both mythos and logos through logos. From past to present, both disciplines have experienced crossroads and bifurcations in the context of mythos, language, and discourse. Mythos has not disappeared in both philosophy and literature, although its limits/ frames are drawn. On the other hand, mythos pioneered and enabled the overlapping of both disciplines. It is possible to read some philosophical texts -like Dialogues of Plato- as a theatrical text, also there is no doubt

that Nietzsche's philosophical texts are literary, and that makes his works like engrossing novels or stories.

The second part of the thesis will include philosophers who turn to emotions within the historical context, and the studies of Aristotle, Descartes and Hume as main philosophers will be examined. In this regard, a relation will be established with the concepts of emotions, ethics, logos, and values. In this ancient age, firstly, some concepts such as human, human structure, emotions, and ethics were emphasized in order to show and provide the compatibility of common life in a site, and such concepts were aimed to be explained by philosophers. Therefore, in particular, the soul- body - logos- unity according to Aristotle will be discussed. After that, Descartes' feelings in body-passion, and Hume's works about emotions and morality will be examined.

In the third part of the thesis, the notion of substance which was highly important in the 17th century, will be examined, and the study framework will be associated with the book called *Ethics* written by Spinoza. Then, Spinoza's philosophy will be examined in detail, and the concepts of immanent freedom, conatus, and nature of emotion -Desire, Sadness and Joyness- will be explained.

In the fourth part of the thesis, firstly, slavery, master-slave dialectic in Hegel's philosophy will be examined. After that examination, other equally important notions of Hegel's philosophy, such as consciousness, self-consciousness, working, land, fear, ownership, etc. will be discussed.

In the last section of the fourth part of the thesis, it will be attempted gain an understanding of the relationship between literature and philosophy by reading Orhan Pamuk's novel *White Castle* through Spinoza's philosophy. In this way, it is intended to understand and interpret the concepts of the novel, overlapping in the common area within two disciplines, which allows philosophical understanding. Therefore, the last section's main focus is to gain an understanding with regards to the notions of slavery and immanent freedom position and dimension via Orhan Pamuk's novel *White Castle*. Because such a change lies in the fact that the slave does not have any feeling of cowardice when he stays in the dungeon and lives together with the Hoja in the Hoja's house, he does not abandon his state of being competent before the Hoja, he has an intense sense of immanent freedom, and he always makes an endeavour /or conatus for his -immanent- freedom.

This thesis will be an example for an interdisciplinary study, and it will also aim to point to the possibility of living rationally with emotions and to see this possibility in the *White Castle* novel.

2. PHILOSOPHY AND EMOTIONS

2.1. Emotions in the Historical Context

The philosophy of emotion, which has been implicit for a long time in the discipline of philosophy, is rather obviously considered in psychology and psychiatry as one of the concepts which lead to interdisciplinary transitions. The subdisciplines of philosophy such as anthropology, ethics, epistemology, hermeneutics, and the philosophical study of values, and emotion(s) have been considered in accordance with this field of discipline. In addition, modernism adopted the principles of enlightenment and acted with the thought which emphasizes that the way to reach objective knowledge is experiment with the main objective to pursue reason and science, in the middle of the 18th century. While the human being was being described as a creature that used the reason, the consideration of emotions in philosophy had been locked in a room for a long time, and philosophers' epistemology/ cognitive studies had come to the forefront.

Besides being mentioned first in French language, "The word emotion itself, despite its Latin roots, being only in vogue in some European languages since the 16th century" (Mulligan-Scherer: 2013, 345-357). However, in 1580, emotion words were seen in the *Oxford Dictionary of the English Language*.

Many of us interpret the concept of emotion in different ways. Pleasure, grief, sadness, and fear are the emotions that include various degrees for everyone. Pleasure and grief form a basis for the definition of emotions. Social environment is the most important factor for the emergence of emotions and representation of emotions across different cultures. Many philosophers' approaches to the concept of emotion may differ.

The classical theory of emotion has been examined within three main parts, and the distinction between philosophy and psychology has been revealed at a certain point. The three main categories were "The feeling, behaviourist and psychoanalytic theories. The feelings, and cognitive streams have been dominant in philosophy, behaviourist and psychoanalytic streams have dominated psychology" (Lyons, 1985: 1-33).

In this regard, the distinction between two disciplines has been determined, although not yet certain, the relationship between the concept of emotion(s) and logos/ reason has been considered as emotions-cognitive in the discipline of philosophy, and the relationship between emotions and corpus has also been explained by philosophers. Aristotle, who defines human beings as 'zoon politikon / ζῷον πολιτικόν', brings completeness to the subject by considering various abstract and/ or concrete rules, laws, happiness, and virtue in his studies, and by creating a bridge in terms of emotions-reason with his work titled *Peri Psykhes*, *Rhetoric*, *Nicomachean Ethics* and via the distinction between the goings-on in the spirit.

The word which means 'emotion' is used in different ways in the Ancient Greek, "Word is pathos (...), the root from which terms such as 'pathology' and 'psychopath' are derived" (Konstan: 2006, 4).

Aristotle's posthumous work *Metaphysics* explains the word 'affection'. In his work, Aristotle claims that the notion of affection has four meanings, namely "Dryness and wetness or cleanness and dirtiness are the qualities of change for an existence.

Then, he considers actual forms of these variable qualities, and emphasizes that bad results occurred as a result of harmful changes and also damages and misfortunes caused by such harmful changes are affection” (Aristotle, 2016: 1022 b/ 21 Part-15).

Thus, one of the studies conducted by different principles on emotions firstly, “Darwin, (Darwin 1872/1989), James (James (1884-1890), and Freud (Freud 1900/1955) was stopped by the advancement of behaviourism in the 1920s as well as cognitivism in the 1950s” (Kisjuhas, 2017: 253). The article of Kisjuhas, "Reason Without Feelings"? He claims that "It is not surprising that majority of the greatest and most influential Western philosophers indeed have formulated clear and recognizable theories of emotions” (Kisjuhas, 2017, 254). He further discusses this issue in the article “Sense without the Sensibilities”.

When we examine the preparation process of the books which form the beginning of the studies conducted on emotions, Susan James, in her book *-Passion and Action-*, which examines the seventeenth-century philosophers’ studies on emotions, “Takes Thomas Wright’s work as the first study, and then, she mentions the book written by Reynolds in 1640. After Reynolds, the philosopher who corresponds with Elisabeth of Bohemia on emotions and wants to clarify this issue is Descartes” (James, 2003: 1).

Regarding this matter, James claims in her book that “In 1649 the Early of Monmouth published an English translation of a popular French work by Jean François Senault entitled *The Uses of the Passiones*” (James, 2003: 1).

In this regard, in this part of this thesis study, emotion, which is the main concept, and the main philosophers' views on emotion/ affection will be revealed, and Plato's *Phaedo* and the understanding of knowledge and existence will be examined in the first part. Afterwards, Aristotle's works will be studied thoroughly, and other thesis studies on Descartes (1596-1650), who indicated the breaking point of the history of philosophy, and on Hume's (1711-1776) concept of emotion/ affection will be examined.

The views of Marta Nussbaum and Robert Solomon, who are contemporary philosophers, will be included.

In the history of philosophy, emotions/ affections and their relationship with ethics, morality, logos, virtue, and happiness were examined by the ancient Greek philosophers, and the features of the soul and body, as well as their harmony with each other, were revealed. In Plato's (427-347 BC) *Phaedo* read by us within the framework of Socratic dialogues, and considered as a link between his youth and maturity, he reveals Socrates' speeches from the night before he died. In his book, *Phaedo*, Plato conveys the feelings of Socrates, *Phaidon*, and others on justice and injustice. Plato emphasizes that the soul is immortal, and also discusses this theory with friends before he dies. Socrates, by saying "What a strange thing, my friends, that seems to be which men call pleasure. How wonderfully it is related to that which seems to be its opposite, pain" (Platon, 2015: 60), tends to reveal emotions and affections and to give his friends moral support. In this regard, this dialogue refers to the fact that a human being is not just a soma/corpus. Plato's dialogue with his friends indicates that the human cannot be limited to only a body.

As another ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle explains that ‘soul’ has been defined as the arche of all living creatures. Aristotle discusses the soul structure within the context of whatness, and makes mention of the spirit and emotions in his work titled *Peri Psykhes*. Aristotle examines the human as ‘soul/ *psykhes*’ and ‘soma/ body’, and in this regard, aims to define the nature of emotions such as anger, courage, and desire revealed by the soul. He schematizes the relationship of the spirit with preferences, nous, sofia, desires, and pleasure through logos without logos.

Descartes, who indicates a breaking point through the concept of cogito in the history of philosophy, defines basic emotions as wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy - gladness-, and sadness in his work titled *Passiones Sive Affectus Animas/ The Passions Of The Soul*. Furthermore, he emphasizes that other emotions are various types of the basic emotions. Descartes evaluates the ‘soul’ from the point of active status and passive status by considering the relationship between the spirit and the body. In his work, Descartes reveals the relationship between the active status of the spirit and the will.

In the Medieval Period, emotions/ affections were hidden from God, considered as the ‘most high/ summum bonum’. King, in his article which examines the Medieval philosophers’ thoughts on emotions, reveals the relationship between emotions and the body as well as the cognitive relationship. “For most medieval thinkers, emotions are at once cognitively penetrable and somatic, which is to say that emotions are influenced by and vary with changes in thought and belief, and that they are also bound up, perhaps essentially, with their physiological manifestations” (King, 2013: 168).

The dark, finite, limited, and theocentric structure of the Medieval Age rejected the real human affections and separated daily actual life from the nature and colors of being while limiting the emotions only within the framework of faith. However, perennial philosophy (*philosophia perennis*) had continued to be in existence in the period of a thousand years that began with the closure of philosophy schools in 529. Petrus Abelardus' (1079-1142) life and studies exemplify how the dilemma of emotion and mind was shaped during that era.

Abelardus pays a heavy price for his love for Héloïse, and after this bad experience, he deepens his works on morality, emotion, and sin.

"*Scito te ipsum /Know Thyself*" was written between 1136 and 1140. (...) Abelardus, in *Scito te ipsum*, researches what the internal dimension or morality and the intention are, and how they can be defined. (...) Abelardus, in his work, considers the distinction between evil and sin. (...) The sense of morality presented in *Scito te ipsum* is a sense of morality which is purely religious, ignores the apparent side of morality and actions, and focuses on the intention and intrinsicness. (...) Then, Abelardus begins to become interested in the rational dimension of morality and consider virtues as a problem. For him, human is also an intelligent being besides being a believer" (Çotuksöken, 1988: 9-10).

Abelardus, who wrote the books titled *Ethica* or *Scito te Ipsum* and *Dialogus Inter Philosophum, Indaeum Et Christianum*, states that universals exist in our mind as a concept (*universalia sunt in re*). This is called as the problem of universals, the most

important discussion in the Middle Ages philosophy. For him, concepts are not a thing, but the human mind distinguishes them from reality, and he elaborates this issue with the example of roses.

Peter King, in his article which examines the Medieval philosophers' thoughts on emotions, reveals the relationship between emotions and the body as well as the cognitive relationship. Firstly, he discusses whether emotions have moral value or not. Secondly, he explains Augustine's thoughts on sensuality, sin and pleasure, and refers to the issue in terms of marital and extramarital aspects. He emphasizes that pleasure is not a marital or extramarital emotion, and thus, that it should not be considered a sin.

“Unlike Augustine or Anselm, Emotions have no intrinsic moral value, no matter how independent of reason they might be. Moral assessment rides strictly on the agent's intentions, not on the emotions as such, or even the actions the agent actually performs. We are constructed in such a way, Abelard declares, that feeling delight is inevitable in certain situations, and therefore cannot be morally objectionable or the penal consequence of original sin, as Augustine had claimed. If sexual pleasure in marriage is not sinful, for instance, then the pleasure itself, inside or outside of marriage, is not sinful; if it is sinful, then marriage cannot sanctify it – and if the conclusion is drawn that such acts should be performed wholly without pleasure, then Abelard remarks they cannot be performed at all, and it was unreasonable (of God) to permit them only in a way in which they cannot be performed (*Ethics* 20.1-6) Emotions are natural to human beings” (King, 2013: 173).

Hobbes' (1651-1679) masterpiece titled *Leviathan*, explained passions in chapter VI of the book. Hobbes begins with the need to explain human emotions before discussing the structure of state, and tries to explain human emotions through various concepts such as desire, effort, love, hate, and pleasure. On the other hand, Hume, another empirical philosopher, explains the sense of ethics through emotions, and indicates that it cannot be explained through any rational relation.

Hume, in *A Treatise of Human Nature* written in three volumes in 1739, opposes rationalism and states that human actions and preferences are rooted in emotions and passions. For him, the core, which forms such emotions and passions, lies in the sense of will, and the emotions, which prevent people from being selfish, are conscience, helpfulness, generosity, etc. Furthermore, Hume, who emphasizes the sense of empathy, mentions that a human can feel others' emotions and empathize with them. This sense, which potentially exists in all people, can be seen at various levels. Through the concept of empathy, it is possible that our justice and moral behaviors can be directed positively.

Benedictus Spinoza (1632-1677), in his book titled *Ethica/ Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata Ethica* -1662-, exemplifies all of his philosophy through the concept of substance. Moreover, based on his philosophy he suggests an explanation of nexus with emotions and freedom. Spinoza, in the third part, titled "The Origin And Nature Of The Affects", explains his thoughts about emotions and nature. For Spinoza, who called Part IV of his book "Human Bandage, or Power of The Effect", nature is not something we can see the defects of. Everything happens according to universal laws and rules of

the nature. According to Spinoza, emotions do not occur on their own, and emotions such as 'hatred', 'anger', and 'envy'- like all singular things - actually result from nature's necessity and power. Spinoza focuses on human freedom (if there's any) by explaining what the concepts such as beliefs, emotions, and God are for humans. In Spinoza's philosophy, freedom is in harmony with the body and the mind. For Spinoza, a human is not different from a slave if he lives only by thinking of death. When life is formed in the spiral of knowledge, Spinoza thinks that passing from the *passio* state to the *actio* state is in the human's power.

According to Hegel, inter-subjective conflict leads to the master-slave dialectic. When anyone does not accept the other's superiority, there is no desire. However, when someone forces the other to accept his superiority, this relationship reveals the master-slave conflict. The slave experiences individuality in fear and becomes a slave to survive, but communes with the nature as he has to work. On the other hand, the master consumes only and is recognized only by the slave. The slave's self-consciousness rises slowly, and he realizes that he is a special being as he works. Furthermore, he believes that he must fight with his master. In this regard, the nature, which plays a significant role in the master-slave dialectic, is shaped through emotions in Spinoza's philosophy. Slavery depends on whether emotions are controlled. In the next part of this thesis, titled 'Survivor Slavery Defeated Mastery', the relevant issue will be discussed in detail and exemplified. As it will be presented, by referring to the controllability of emotions, the next part will indicate how emotions help the transition from slavery to immanent without being enslaved by emotions, and the partnership between 'emotions' and 'nous/ logos/ reason' will be mentioned.

Existentialism was also an important contemporary philosophical movement in the 20th century. In that century -especially after WWII- religion, ethic, art, and morals needed to find the same basic explanation to find the meaning of life, to question what is or is not. Therefore, this philosophical movement was born. The goal of existentialism was to show what is fundamental to human, human essence and nature. It was believed that there was an essence of man in the 18th century. Existentialist philosophers said otherwise. Human existence precedes its essence. Man/ Human is free to realize his own essence. Man can/ or should make his own decisions. Man is thrown into the world, alone, and creates himself with his own actions. Other important concepts of existentialism were loneliness, insecurity, hopelessness, and nausea. The main philosopher of existentialism is Sartre, who describes the human escape of responsibility in his book titled *La Nausee* -1938-. It is his important philosophical novel. Sartre claimed that “Existentialism is a Humanism”.

Sartre (1905-1980), who is an Existentialist and heretic philosopher, makes a different interpretation of the concept of emotion. Sartre considers emotions as “behaviour”s. Dabrowski claims that, Sartre reveals the relationship of the concept of emotion with the consciousness, and examines the relationship between consciousness and the corpus. “Consciousness was experienced in the body (it was characterized by corporality- it existed only, if it was embodied), and in time (it was characterized by temporality –it existed only, if it went on in time). The emotional consciousness was the pre-reflective consciousness of the world. That was one of the ways to experience the world, and more, it was ‘transformation of the world’” (Dabrowski, 2016: 8-20).

For the last two/or three decades, it could be said that emotions are a main notion /topic in contemporary philosophy. Important philosophers of contemporary context who bring a cognitive perspective to emotions are Martha Nussbaum, Robert Solomon (1942-2007) and many others “The work of the philosopher of emotions Robert Solomon stand out among the first comprehensive contemporary conceptualizations of emotions in philosophy” (Kısjahas, 2017:266).

“He strongly criticizes the rationalistic assumption that ‘passions’ pose a threat to objectivity and the philosophical knowledge of reality, and tries to éregain central and defining a role of passions in our lives, which has been persistently and so long denied to them” (Solomon 1976/1993: xiv) for him. Emotions dominate human lives and represent the basic source of meaning, as well as sense in that life. He reject reasons as an alleged antithesis to emotions and calls the traditionaly conceptualization of the relationship among these domains as the philosophical “myth of passions” (related to the myth of the passivity of emotions” (Solomon 1976/1993:67)” (Kısjahas, 2017: 268).

As one of the pioneer philosophers, Robert Solomon considers the issue of emotions in his philosophical studies and details the relevant issue within two categories/themes. These themes are ‘cognitive’ and ‘existentialist’ perspectives.

His most important work hitting the headlines is *Not Passions Slave: Emotions and Choice*, that is accepted as the principal ground in the two themes, “The first present a ‘cognitive’ theory of emotions in which emotions are construed primarily as

evaluative judgments. The second proposes an ‘existentialist’ perspective in which he defends the idea that, as we are responsible for our emotions.” (Solomon, 2003: I). Emotions are variously characterized by Solomon, “‘as engagements with the world’, as involving ‘evaluative judgements’, or as ‘structured by judgements’” (Solomon, 2007: 204-206).

Martha Nussbaum, who conducts various studies on the concept of emotion, “Destroys Aristotle’s scholastic and dogmatic understanding” (Erkızan, 2012: 1). Nussbaum, in her books, mentions the individual’s possibility and considers emotions in accordance with belief and cognitive approach.

Martha Nussbaum, in her book, titled *Upheavals of Thought The Intelligence Of Emotions*, claims that “Emotions shape the lanscape of our mental and social lives” (Nussbaum, 2008: I). She explains emotions as judgements of value. Regarding most of people who think of emotions as totally noncognitive, Nussbaum argues:

“Even such people might think that we need to understand human psychology better than we often do in order to write well about ethics. But if a cognitive/evaluative theory of emotions is correct, these claims have a particular salience: for what that mean is that not a just a psychological adjunct to emotional thought, but a part of ethical thought itself will be omitted with the omission of emotions. Emotions are not just the fuel that powers the psychological mechanism of a reasoning creature, they are parts, highly complex and messy parts, of this creature’s reasoning itself” (Nussbaum, 2008: 3) .

Nussbaum starts her book with a mother-daughter story about her mother's operation and her own upheavals of thought after her mother died. Many people go through similar experiences. Nussbaum reveals emotions at the beginning of the book, while her work leans towards a cognitive and belief-related perspective. Nussbaum questions, "Why some emotions seem like great upheavals, and others seem less momentous. For these *differences of intensity* themselves involve object-directed intentionality: they are explained by the importance with which I invest the object (or what befalls it) among my own goals and projects" (Nussbaum, 2008: 55). She argues that emotions are best conceived as thoughts, in other words, that emotions are forms of thought.

Nussbaum, in her most important work, titled *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*, examines emotions and explains the cognitive relationship of emotions through various examples. For Nussbaum, we, first, create a structure/ form related to the object/ intention and, then, describe this form as real. We feel excited or hopeful about an uncertain situation. Furthermore, intentional emotions may cause us to reveal our false emotions. An expression we frequently use in our daily dialogue approves Nussbaum's theory. 'I was very frightened, but there was nothing to it' ; yes, the relevant person was frightened, however, whatever happened to that person is a misconception which occurs as a result of the perception of it in emotions, that feels as if it is real. In taking a walk we think that there will be no problem, yet, we are frightened when we see a barking dog. Our intention before walking is to walk on the beach on a quiet and beautiful day, and we create the form/ object that we will not

encounter with any negative situation. The intention is positive. However, a false intention disrupts our emotions.

Nussbaum, with the following example in her book, emphasizes that emotions are associated with the form/ object we create. Nussbaum clarifies the issue in terms of the concepts of belief, habit, and honor through the instance of Seneca in her book. When we come up against position -honor- we think it is not important, but we may feel grief even though we know that it is not important. “Seneca believes that honor isn’t very important, but: when someone seats him at a place at table that he thinks insulting, he is in the grip of his habits. Here Seneca has no temptation to say that the emotion is nonjudgmental: the whole problem is that he does judge that he has been significantly insulted, even while he knows that the matter is not significant” (Nussbaum, 2008: 36).

The concept of ‘belief’ has changed, as in Seneca’s example. Nussbaum’s work is a reflection of traditional cognitive theory of emotions. But what kind of cognitive? Gustava Ortiz Millan has criticized the thoughts of Nussbaum on emotions. Firstly, Millan discusses different meanings of the term ‘cognitive’. Millan, in his comprehensive study on Nussbaum’s studies, clarifies the concept of cognitive and reveals different fields of use. In this regard, he creates a preliminary field which will help us to understand Nussbaum’s thoughts on the concept of ‘cognitive’ and the explanation of emotions.

Millan claims that there are four categories of ‘cognitive’. “Firstly, cognitive refers to the information processing view of an individual’s psychological functions.

Perceiving, thinking, remembering, understanding, language, learning and other mental phenomena. Secondly, cognitive refers to propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, but also desires. Sometimes also called “intentionalism” (Millan, 2016: 2). He also explains the third category in two parts. One of them is ‘involving judgement’ another is ‘involving non-conceptual’. “Cognitive refers also to intentional states, but “intentionality” is, at least in some cases, a two-level phenomenon: one involving judgement, and a second level involving non-conceptual content. And lastly, cognitive refers to belief and knowledge” (Millan, 2016: 2).

In this case, Millan claim that Nussbaum also “Uses the term “cognition” in the fourth sense, meaning, quite literally, a truth-bearing state, a belief” (Millan, 2016: 2). On the other side, Jesse Prinz’s approach has a physiological-somatic perspective for emotions. Jesse Prinz conducts his philosophical studies on emotions from the somatic perspective contrary to Solomon and Nussbaum. “Theory build on the ‘somatic marker hypothesis’ (Damasio,1994), which is itself a development of the late 19th century James-Lange theory that emotions are perceptions of the body’s automatic reactions to stimuli” (Griffiths, 2013: 217).

Therefore, the concept of emotion considered from different perspectives within the historical context in the discipline of philosophy and by philosophers of our day has brought various questions and problems in itself. It is an unavoidable fact that emotions are crucial indicators for social, cultural, daily, and political life, and are at the main center of anthropological emergence. Thus, the relationship between emotions and the concepts such as ‘intentionality’, ‘cognitive’, ‘corpus’, ‘perceiving’, ‘judgement’ and “belief” have been explained by the philosophers, and the importance of the concept of

emotion being forgotten and remaining implicit for a long time has been emphasized. Studies on emotions bring up various sub-studies and form a multicentered and wide structure through their transitivity to other fields of discipline.

In the light of all these studies, it has been observed that the emotions that signify an interdisciplinary concept in contemporary philosophy have gained momentum again. Human is not just a being of mind. Trust, which has an important place in human relations, is also an emotion. Thus, the control and discipline of emotions – which Robert Solomon emphasizes in his book *True To Our Feelings / What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us*- gains importance. With the control and discipline of the emotions, a human improves both his/her own life and his/her relationship with other people in a positive way.

2.2. Philosophy and Emotions

When many concepts (body, mind, knowledge, and idea) in Plato's philosophy are examined in his work, titled *The Republic*, to provide a sustainable common life in Ancient Greece, Aristotle considers the emotions, goings-on in the spirit/ soul and their relationship with the body/ *corpus/ soma* or, in other words, virtue, eudamonia, logos in order to clarify the subject/ human.

Locke, Hobbes, and Hume, the empiricist philosophers, express the relationship between the place of emotions in human life and philosophy through their studies on the experimental relationship of everything with the reason. Descartes, who skeptically approaches the perspective to the concepts of 'I' and 'cogito' in philosophy, examines

emotions/ passions through six main parts, and examines the relationship between emotions and passions in his book titled *Pasiones Sive Affectus Animae/ The Passions Of A Soul*. Spinoza, who is one of the most important philosophers in the history of philosophy, in *Ethics*, examines emotions within three main parts and indicates that a life spent around emotions is not different from slavery. In this chapter of the thesis study, emotions/ goings-on in the spirit indicated in Aristotle's works, Hume's studies on emotions, ethics, and sympathy, and the emotion-corpus relationship in accordance with Descartes's book will be examined.

Aristotle gives the individual the right to choose what s/he can do according to her/him own wishes, and Hume wants to form a moral citizen prototype in the unsteady life of Britain and thinks that this can be achieved through sympathy. Though both philosophers shape their thoughts on emotions through individualism, Hume associates emotions with the concepts of sympathy and morality and seeks ways to establish a peaceful and safe life in the society, whereas Aristotle emphasizes that the individual's possibility and virtues will be learned through experiences.

As we know, in the historical context of philosophy, emotions were considered by Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Aquinas, Abelardus, Hobbes, Hume, Spinoza, Kant, Sartre, Heidegger, and many others. Therefore, in this part of the thesis only Aristotle, Descartes and Hume will be referred to.

2.2.1. Aristotle: Soul, Virtue and Logos

Emotions as a philosophical notion has been researched since Antiquity. Leading philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, and several other philosophers of the period were interested in this notion and tried to explain that theme via body/ *corpus* and mind/ cognition or passions.

While it is called ‘emotion’ in English, The Ancient Greek word for notion of emotion is *pathos* (plural: *pathê*), “The root from which terms such as ‘pathology’ and ‘psychopath’ are derived” (Konstan, 2006: 3). Also, “The specific sense of ‘emotion’ is in part conditioned by this penumbra of connotations: insofar as a *pathos* is a reaction to an impinging event or circumstance, it looks to the outside stimulus to which it responds” (Konstan, 2006: 4). In addition, according to Martha Nussbaum, Aristotle specified that “Emotions are necessarily accompanied by pain and pleasure, which are not, on his view, judgements but rather sensations” (Konstan, 2006: 21).

Moreover, Aristotle elaborates the connection of emotions with *soma*/ body in *De Anima / Peri Psykhes/ On the Soul*. In the first part of the book, he clarifies the subject through the examination and definition of the spirit. In this context, the notion of emotion in modern English and ancient Greek may differ. “Given that judgment and belief are central to the dynamics of the emotions as Aristotle conceives them it is natural that an understanding of the *pathê* should form part of the art of persuasion” (Konstan: 2006: 27).

Aristotle explains that the emotions, “First, every pathos is accompanied by pain and pleasure; second, the *pathê* are, in Aristotle’s words, those things ‘on account of which people change and differ in regards to their judgments’” (Konstan, 2006: 27). Therefore, according to Aristotle, psykes are what happens in the soul, influences, possibilities, and habits.

It is impossible to explain what the soul’s functions are, without defining it. In this context, Aristotle first clarifies ‘the soul’ by providing a definition for the soul and explaining whether it has qualities or not. “We are seeking to bring to sight and to understanding the nature and thinghood of the soul, and then whatever follows about it, among which seem to be some attributes of the soul by itself, and others that belong to the living things, on account of the soul” (Aristotle, 2004: 402 a5), by saying that, he emphasizes what exactly the soul is and what the spirit is. Aristotle bases his work “On the soul by investigating whether the soul belongs to substance or one of the twelve categories he had defined” (Aristotle, 2004: 402 a 25).

For Aristotle, it is necessary to decide first which general category it falls into, and what it is; “I mean whether it is an independent thing and a *this*, or a quality or quantity or some other one of the distinct ways of attributing being to anything, and further whether it belongs among things having being in potency or is rather some sort of being-at-work-staying-itself; for this makes no small difference” (Aristotle, 2004: 402 a 25). Therefore, Aristotle comes to the subject by emphasizing and answering the question of whether the spirit is potential, actual, or entelechy. Aristotle considers the emotions, goings-on in the soul and their relationship with the concepts of form-substance or, in other words, *energia* and *entelecheia* in order to clarify the subject.

On The Soul/ Peri Psykhes, Aristotle describes the soul as the common basis of living things. Aristotle, who describes the soul as the basis of living things, wants to unriddle the nature of the soul and what it is. “He wants to understand the nature of the soul and thinghood of the soul (Aristotle 2004: 13, 402a 5). In this unriddling, he emphasizes that the soul goes together with psykhes + soma. While the human reveals the material side with soma, psykhes is a form that gives the human its quality. In 403 a 35 and 403 b 32 of *Peri Psykhes*, “Aristotle describes the soul as form and function. And he confirms this “grounding with sphere example” (Aristotle, 2004: 403 a 10).

“Now if any of the kinds of work the soul does or any of the things that happen to it belong to it alone, it would be possible for the soul to be separated; but if nothing belongs to it alone, it could not be separate, but in the same way that many things are properties of the straight line as straight, such as touching a sphere at a point, still no separated straight line will touch a bronze sphere in that way, since it is inseparable, if it is always with some of body” (Aristotle, 2004: 403 a 10).

Aristotle emphasizes the unity of the soul and body and suggests that they cannot be separated. Emotions cannot show up with the soul alone or with the body alone. However, as it was mentioned before, “The attributes of the soul seem also to be with a body -spiritedness, gentleness, fear, pity, boldness, and also joy, as well as loving and hating -for together with these the body undergoes something” (Aristoteles, 2004: 403 a15). So, affection is “Forms that entered matter” (Aristotle, 2004: 403 a 25).

While talking about the union of soul and body, Aristotle discusses that it is the soul that makes the body live, that the body cannot live without the soul/ *psykhes*. He says that a body without the soul would decompose, that it would have no meaning and function, and also, he underlines that the union of the soul and body is an important matter, and that it is necessary. By saying, “For it is surely not the body, for it seems rather to be the soul, on the contrary, that holds the body together; at any rate, when the soul has gone out of it, the body gives off vapors and rots away” (Aristotle, 2004: 411b 5), Aristotle underlines the importance of the union of the soul and the body.

Aristotle, in the second part of his book *Peri Psykhes*, emphasizes that *psykhes* is a science like entelechy, and says that the spirit is ‘prote entelekheia’ and is a completion. What is important for Aristotle is to reveal the way of existence of the soul. He examines whether the soul is potential, actual, or what kind of an entelechy it is. Therefore “It is necessary that the soul has its thinghood as the form of a natural body having life as a potency. But this sort of thinghood is a being-at-work-staying-itself; therefore the soul is the being-at-work-staying-itself of such a body” (Aristotle, 2004: 412 a 20). In this context, *psykhes* is basis, and it is in *soma/ corpus/ body*. *Psykhes/ soul* shall be studied based upon body. Aristotle says that sleep or insomnia requires the presence of the spirit.

In his book, Aristotle defines the soul as the first entelechy of a natural and organized substance, and as a substance in the meaning of form. “Substance in the sense of the nature of an object of a certain quality/ whatness” (Aristotle, 2004: 412 b 15). In other words, he defines the soul as the reason and principle of the living body. “Soul is

has been said in general, for it is thinghood as it is unfolded in speech, and this what such-and-such a body keeps on being in order to be at all” (Aristotle, 2004: 412b 10). That it is the “Cause in the sense of the thinghood is clear for the thinghood is responsible for the being of everything, while the being of living things is life, and of this the cause and source is the soul” (Aristotle, 2004: 415 b 10).

When Aristotle’s works are studied, it can be seen that he uses the term *pathos* for emotions. Also he highlights emotions as passive states. Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* “Was the first detailed and systematic analysis of a series of individual emotions in Greek philosophy (Knuuttila 2004:27), as well as one of the first systematic discussions on human psychology. In that sense, a detailed philosophical discussion about the nature of emotions actually began with Aristotle, and not with Plato (Lyons, 1999: 22)” (Kisjuhas, 2018: 256).

In this regard, when we look at Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, *Nicomachean Ethics* and *De Anima* works, we understand that the emotions are elaborated “Concrete emotions by Aristotle were the following: anger, calmness, friendship, fear and self-confidence, shame and impudence, kindness, envy, compassion, indignation, and others” (Kisjuhas, 2018: 256).

“Aristotle in his unusually detailed discussion on anger emphasized that emotions had a biological component (physical feeling of pain), a complex cognitive component (for example, a perception of an undeserved insult), and a specific intention (e.g. a desire for revenge), which resulted in culturally-standardized behaviour (Aristotle 2007:117-118). He clearly distinguished

the physiological dimension of emotional experience, as well as the individual (cognitive) and social (cultural) component of that experience (Barbalet 2007: 1374). Accordingly, he approached emotions in an unusually comprehensive way, where his analysis of anger or fury incorporated a distinctive cognitive content, a certain social context, behavioural tendencies, and recognition of physiological excitement (Solomon 2008: 5)” (Kisjuhas, 2018: 256).

From an anthropological perspective, Aristotle can be considered as a person who takes a detailed look at the human being in order to ensure the sustainability of common life within the site. Human beings are by nature political animals, set of possibilities, they live in a society, education is important and rhetoric is an indispensable part of political life, but it is not only the physical structure that shapes life but also the emotional side of human beings. As we will see in the philosophy of Spinoza, everything is immanently shaped by human beings, who are a set of possibilities.

In his article about emotions, Dabrowski refers to Aristotle’s characterization of human being as a living creature in society, pointing out that the paradigm of socially learned emotions is an important function of Aristotle’s philosophy for moral education. By referring to Aristotle’s philosophy, he analyzes how a good life can be established and its connection with virtue and happiness in this life.

“He thought that there is a great variety of emotions connected with social institutions and human practices, topics discussed in practical philosophy, and that it is worthwhile analyzing the cognitive content and motivating functions of emotions (...) Socially learned emotional paradigm played an important role in Aristotle’s theory of moral education: its main question was how to train and instruct young people to join in the emotional patterns of culture in such a way that the habits of feelings and emotions contribute to a good life” (Dabrowski, 2016: 8-20).

Here, as an example, when we consider “‘Anger’, he defines this feeling as the movement of the body and the part of the body or the ability (403 b) formed by a certain cause for a particular purpose” (Aristotle, 2004: 403 a10). He expresses that “The physicist exposes this by revealing its connection with *soma*/ body, in other words, he interprets matter, describing it as the warming of blood around the heart. Dialectic view of anger is as follows; they say that it is primarily an appetite, defines it and tells about the desire for revenge, thus, interprets forms and facts” (Aristotle, 2004: 403b 30). But to reveal these reasons, there must be substances of the appropriate type. Aristotle elaborates this with the house example. “The reason for the house is that; the house is a cover that protects people from wind, rain and the destruction of the sun, but the reason for this is related to the existence of suitable substances. These are stone, brick and wood” (Aristotle, 2004: 403 b 10). For Aristotle, who discusses the soul/ *psykhes* in two parts as the ‘logos’ and the ‘alogos’ sides, there are wishes, pleasures and physiological side on the ‘alogos’ side. Our physiological side works without any problem with the ‘logos’. Our ‘logos’ side, “Contains the unchangeable principles and the things that we have to know. The fact that ‘the sun rises every day’ is the best

example of this. The side, of which its principles are different, contains the situations according to human being's choice, phronesis, is in here. Evaluation and negotiation side of human being" (Aristotle, 1908:1102 b 30). As Aristotle states in *Nicomachean Ethics*, the answer of the question; "“what is the human being's job” is “human being's job is to do the best.” And while doing this job, the spirit's sensible activity is very important. This activity should also be done in a virtuously” (Aristotle, 1908: 1098 a 10). Because human being learns ‘character virtues’ by doing them again and again.

“If the work of human being is the sensible or unreasonable activity of the spirit, and and if we say that the one who is competent is the same; If that is the case (also that the work of human is a certain life, and that this life is the rational activity of the soul and such actions), a virtuous person must do these in a good and beautiful way” (Aristotle, 1908: 1098 a).

In *Nicomachean Ethics*, one of the most important works of Aristotle, he explains virtue by explaining important concepts such as thought virtues, character virtues, and justice. The concept that forms the basis for explaining all these concepts is moderation/ medium/ *mezatos*. In his book, Aristotle, who discusses the common meeting point of wisdom and emotion with the concept of virtue, explains what virtue is. For Aristotle, who elaborates the relationship between virtue and soul, and what is happening in the soul, it can be explained in two categories. “The soul is irrational an one has a rationale principle. Irrational element one division seems to be widely distrubuted, and vegatative in its nature” (Aristotle, 1908:1102 b-1103 a 30). This causes growth and nutrition. In addition, while Aristotle explains in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, that while revealing what virtue is, this explanation also sheds a light on what

is in the soul. In his explanation, he discusses “Passions (anger, jealousy, fear, grief, etc.) and faculties (dynamis/ potential, allowing to be influenced), and the last states of characters (we learn by doing)” (Aristotle, 1908: 1105 b).

For Aristotle, virtue must be one of them. According to Aristotle “Passions means appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain” (Aristotle, 1908: 1105 b 20) and he further discusses faculties as “The things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g. of becoming angry or being pained” (Aristotle, 1908: 1105 b 25). For Aristotle, the states of character are our bad and good positions. He also states that “Virtue is in respect of its genus” (Aristotle, 1908: 1105 b 10).

For Aristotle, liking is what happens in the soul. He provides an instance, “For those who love to play, the game is pleasant, for a virtue lover, virtue is also pleasant” (Aristotle, 1908: 1099 a). Aristotle shows us that nice/ pleasant things are in conflict with people. It expresses that by establishing the connection of virtue and pleasure. Aristotle seeks to explain the link between virtue and happiness. Because happiness is the best, most beautiful and pleasant thing. In this context, he reveals the connection between liking and other concepts. With the point of view of Aristotle, liking is emphasized not as a simple feeling but in association with its connection to happiness.

Based on the instance given by Aristotle, if we are to explain what virtue is, doing the best of a job is virtue; “Because the lyre-player’s job is to play the lyre and the virtuous lyre’s job is to play the lyre better.” (Aristotle, 1908: 1098 a 10).

Human being has to make this activity permanently. In other words, it must become an ongoing habit. In Aristotle's words, "One swallow doesn't make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy" (Aristotle, 1908: 1098 a 15-20).

In his book, *Rhetoric*, we come across the emotion of anger, which we have also seen in his book of *De Anima/ On the Soul*. He defines this emotion in enthusiasm, but emphasizes how and in what situations it comes up. Anger is a feeling that raises one's emotions. What the limits of this emotion are, how it is kept under control is debatable. The important factors are the mood of the angry person, whom he/she is angry with, and why. Aristotle explains this matter as; "'1) which mood, 2) to whom, 3) for which reasons, must be clearly understood.'" (Aristotle, 1992: 1379 a 10) Because "this type of mood is a painful situation. In this case, one always has an aim" (Aristotle, 1992: 1379 a 25). Aristotle says that "People who are upset and suffering for illness, poverty, love, thirst or other unsaturated desires" are ready to get angry" (Aristotle, 1992: 1379 a 25-30). In this context, all people are ready to get angry. In Aristotle's words, in that case, "All people potentially carry anger inside them" (Aristotle, 1992: 1379 a 26). There are situations in which anger becomes actual, and according to the mental activity of the human soul, there is a stance against this anger. "All these are moods in which people are easily get angry" (Aristotle, 1992: 1379 a 25).

In the light of all this information, it is necessary for Aristotle to consider the concept of *ethos* in the context of character and reputation, also the person who is doing the speaking is important. The concept of *pathos*, on the other hand, gains importance

according to how the rhetoric is said and appealed to emotions. According to him, in *Poeitika*, in Tragedia part, emotions are explained in the context of arousing ‘fear’ and ‘mercy’. Considering all of these, ‘logos’ is the connection of soul with what is being said and what is said.

In all three of his books, Aristotle first explains what is the soul, exposes the connection of virtues with the soul, and predicates the subject by including the logos of what was happening in the spirit when dealing with the relationship of emotions to all of them.

2.2.2. Descartes: Passion and Corpus

In the history of philosophy, the substance became the focus point in the philosophical studies once again in the period starting with especially Rene Descartes (1596-1650). Cardesian dualism is based on the mind-body dilemma and the substance of the mind is sepearate from the body. Descartes explains the mens/ mind and *corpus*/ body dilemma throught substance. By looking at the suspicion, Descartes finds his famous saying ‘cogito ergo sum’ by using the suspicion as a method, presents the concept of the subject. Substance for the subject who fulfills the act of thinking brings dualism with it. When we consider the ‘finite substance’ and ‘infinite substance’ concepts emerging with Descartes, the ‘infinite substance’ is explained with the God and the ‘finite substance’ is explained as ‘mens/ mind’ and ‘*corpus* body’. According to Descartes, wanting to reach/ trying to find a way to reach the explicit (*Clara et Distincia*) information, ‘mens/ *res cogitans*’, does not require anything but also does

not take up space, and the 'corpus/ *res extensa*' takes up space. Two parts of the 'substance' are completely different but together, and both of these are accidents.

Descartes, who wrote *Discourse* (we shortly named *Discourse*) in 1637, explains all of his scepticism in his philosophy. In the first part of his book, we come across, thoughts about sciences, in the second part, we read about his methodology, in the third part, he explains the morality rules which he has derived from this method; before the last part, he presents arguments about the existence of God and human soul and in the fifth part, he investigates the difference between our soul and corpus.

Descartes wrote *Meditations on First Philosophy* in 1641. In this book he writes about 'Ego/ Scepticism', 'God' and 'Externalworld'. Firstly, he explains that sense is correct or false, and so the question of how one can believe those sensory organs comes up. In the traditional wax argument, he states that we conclude that the object is a piece of wax via the use of our sensory organs, that we can still come to the same conclusion and identify the wax by checking its color and smell even if after the wax melts, and that there is only a visual change. In addition, Descartes, who expresses that the relationship of the thinking activity with the soul is not problematic, aims to show things are reached through the mind, not the perceptions. Descartes, in part two of his book, *Meditation*, discusses how we have known the body better and also how we explain the nature of the human mind.

Wax example (wax argument) that lights in the hut is one of the most important examples Descartes provides, and that is the basic example of how the philosophers changes the corpus, shape and color and what the results are. Although the main

substance of the melting wax disappeared, its smell and displacement are the keystones of Descartes' understanding of substance dualism. The wax is melted. But the melted wax expands and take up a new place. Descartes emphasizes how the expression in the face and eyes changes with emotions.

“It has been taken quite recently from the honeycomb; it has not yet lost all the honey flavor. It retains some of the scent of the flowers from which it was collected. Its colour, shape, and size are manifest. It is hard and cold; it is easy to touch: If you rap on it with your knuckle, it will emit a sound. In short, evething is present in it that appears needed to enable a body to be known as distinctly as possible. But notice that, as I am speaking, I am bringing it close to the fire. The remaining traces of the honey flavor are disappearing; it is becoming liquid and hot; you can hardly touch it. And now, when you rap on it, it no longer emits any sound” (Ariew, Watkins, 2000: 32).

Descartes questions whether the same wax still remains and says “I must confess that it does; no one denies it; no one thinks otherwise. So what was there in the wax that was so distinctly grasped? Certainly none of the aspects that I reached by means of the senses. For whatever came under the senses of taste, smell, sight, touch, or hearing has now changed; and yet the wax remains” (Ariew, Watkins, 2000: 32).

Descartes, who wants to explain the functions of the soul and the body, and what the emotions are, examines the subject in detail in his work, titled *Passiones Sive Affectus Animae/ The Passiones of The Soul*, and emphasizes that it is necessary to examine the functions of the soul and the body as well as the difference between the

soul and the body. According to Descartes “our perceptions are also of two sorts, and the first have the soul as cause, the other the body. Those which have the soul as cause are the perceptions of our volitions, and of all the imaginations or other thoughts that depend on them” (Descartes, 1989: 29). He continues with a further and clear explanation about perception in the article 19,

“For it is certain that we could not will anything unless we perceived by the same means that we willed it. And thought with respect to our soul it is an action to will something, it can be said that it is also a passion within it to perceive that it wills. Nevertheless, because this perception and this volition are really only a single thing, the denomination is always made by the loftier one, and so it is not usually named a passion, but an action only” (Descartes, 1989: 29). He claims that it’s research and openly explains the topic.

Descartes, who reveals the relationship of the emotions with the nervous system, mentions the external signs of the emotions, and explains the relationship of the emotions with the body through the movements of the eyes and the face. Descartes emphasizes how the expression in the face and the eyes changes with emotions. He says that the face and the eyes are effective in concealing or revealing passions, and he explains what we cannot succeed in hiding our emotions. “ (...) And in general all the actions of both the face and the eyes can be changed by the soul, when, willing to conceal its passion, it forcefully imagines one in opposition to it; thus one can use them to dissimulate one’s passions as well as to manifest them” (Descartes, 1989: 79).

He also provides an instance about the master and the servant. It is impossible to understand the expression of love and hate in the eyes of the master by his/her servant or slave. Because the eyes and the face are perceived to reveal what and how emotions are.

“The stupidest servants can tell from their master’s eye whether or not he is upset with them (...). But although these actions of the eyes are easily perceived, and what they mean is known, that does not make it easy to describe them, because each of them is composed of many changes taking place in the movement and shape of the eye, so singular and slight that there is no perceiving each of them separately, even though what results from their conjunction may be quite easy to recognize” (Descartes, 1989: 79).

When we examine the photographs of the people in the wars in the past or in our day, the emotions of sadness, fear, suffering and helplessness on the eyes and faces of the people can be clearly seen. In this regard, Descartes reveals the reflection of the emotions on the eyes and the faces, in other words, the relationship of emotions with the body. According to Descartes, “In general all the actions of both the face and the eyes can be changed by the soul, when, willing to conceal its passion, it forcefully imagines one in opposition to it; thus one can use them to dissimulate one’s passions as well as to manifest them” (Descartes, 1989: 79).

In Article 46, in his book, he explains the reason that is underlying the fact that the soul cannot control its passions. Descartes points out the notion of Resolute. Resolute is one of the most important notions/ emotions. With the example of the

eyelid, Descartes examines what cannot be done by our own will with the organs in our bodies. Passion, will, and the expression of fear cannot be controlled only by the will. However, by the help of will, we have the chance to experience past examples. For example “If anger makes the hand rise in order to strike, the will can ordinarily restrain it; if fear incites the legs to flee, the will can stop them; and so on with the rest” (Descartes, 1989: 44).

For Descartes, the seat of the passions is not in the heart “There is a little gland in the brain in which the soul exercise its functions in a more particular way than in the other parts” (Descartes, 1989: 36). The soul has a seat in the little gland in the middle of the brain. With this statement, Descartes points out that the soul-body union/ functions takes place at one point. If a little nerve is descending to it from the brain we accept the passions are in the heart.

According to Descartes, we have the opportunity to control our will and anger. Even if we demonstrate a lot of anger towards a person and want to hit the other person due to that high level of anger, even after we raise our hand it is possible to sublimate it or do the action of hitting by our will. “There is only single soul in us, and this soul has within itself no diversity of parts; the very one that is sensitive is rational, and all its appetites are volitions” (Descartes, 1989: 45-46).

Descartes explain this in his book, emphasizing that will does not lead to passion. The sensory, which Descartes calls the lower part of the soul for the pineal gland in relation to emotions, and the intellectual part, which he describes as the upper

part, -in other words, the encounters/ collisions of will and natural appetites- contains the contradictions caused by the spirit of will and life in the pineal gland.

“So no struggle whatever occurs here, except as follows: as the little gland in the middle of the brain is capable of being driven from one side by the soul and from the other by the animal spirits, which, as I have said above, are only bodies, it often happens that these two impulses are in opposition and the stronger one prevents the other from taking effect”. (Descartes, 1989: 45)

Descartes, who seeks an answer for the question of what the reason of the events in a human's inner world is, whether it is the body or the spirit, titles the first section of his book as “Emotions in General”, and defines the nature of emotions as passive. According to Dürüşken, Descartes emphasizes that the verb *patior*, from which the word *passio* in Latin derived, means ‘being exposed to an effect’. In explanation of the passivity, he mentions “Impressions created by a certain object, event and individual in a human's inner world, psychological states or, in general, all emotions” (Dürüşken, 2013: 20). Descartes details the process of the corpus while he constructs a relationship between thoughts and soul. Shortly, Descartes explains/discusses the workings of the human body by comparing the power of the spring and the shape of the hour wheel with the example of the clock. Just as the clock works properly and naturally with these two forces, the natural movement works in the same way for the human body with the soul in the brain, muscles and nerves. He elaborates on this view in the sixteenth article.

He states and reveals that thoughts cannot be attributed to anything except for the soul. In addition, he classifies the emotional states in two parts, as ‘active’ thoughts and ‘passive’ thoughts. He emphasizes that active thoughts are voluntary preferences (to accept or reject etc.) and directly arise from the soul. On the other hand, he states that passive thoughts are based on all kinds of perceptions or information, and he elaborates the explanation of perception and will.

Descartes’ philosophy, which begins with ‘I/ Ego’, causes God to become part of this, with the principle of competence. He founds his philosophy on the idea that it is not possible for him as a human to be fully competent, but that ‘God is competent’. Competency is accidental in this context, and it must have an owner. And that who has complete competence cannot be anyone but God. God has placed the principle of competence in our minds at birth, so it is innate.

According to Descartes, Volitions come from two sources. “For the first are actions of the soul which have their terminus in the soul itself, as when we will to love God or in general to apply our thought to some object that is not material” (Descartes, 1989: 28). For Descartes, our other actions have their terminus in our body, that can be seen from the mere fact that when we have the volition to take a walk, what follows is that our legs move and we walk.

We have perception, it is not one unique perception, it consists of two parts, namely soul and body. As Descartes uses the concept of perceptio with the meaning of understanding and comprehension in his dictionary, we can detail the perceptions indicated in Article 19 of his book, as follows: “Our perceptions are also two sorts, and

the first have the soul as cause, the other the body” (Descartes, 1989: 29). In Articles 24 and 25 of his book, he details the perceptions on what the soul and the body are, as follows: “The perceptions we refer to our body or some of its parts are those we have of hunger, thirst, and our other natural appetites, to which may be added pain, heat, and the other affections that we feel as in our members and not as in objects outside us (Descartes, 1989: 32-33). Therefore, “We may feel at the same time, and by the mediation of the same nerves, the coolness of our hand and the heat of the flame it approaches, or on the contrary (...)” (Descartes, 1989: 32).

In this article, Descartes searches for the basics of ‘soul and perception’. He writes about feelings of joy and anger that result from nerves that are activated by objects and for some reason. Regarding the perceptions and the soul, Descartes claims that “The perceptions that are referred to the soul alone are those whose effects are felt as in the soul itself, and of which no proximate cause to which they may be referred is commonly known. Such are the sensations of joy, anger, and others like them, which are sometimes excited in us by objects that move our nerves and sometimes also by other causes” (Descartes, 1989: 32).

Descartes explains the types of perceptions and sensations regarding the objects in the external world, via an instance. And he claims that the relationship that exists with the object tells us our senses, due to the fact that we perceive the object not only in our external sense organs but also in the brain through nerves:

“When we see the light of a torch and hear the sound of a bell, the sound and the light are two different actions, which, solely by exciting two different

movements in some of our nerves and thereby in the brain, impart to the soul two different sensations, which we refer to the subjects we suppose to be their causes in such a way that we think that we see the torch itself and hear the bell, and not that we only feel the movements proceeding from them” (Descartes, 1989: 31).

In this regard, Descartes, with the relevant exemplification, emphasizes what we do not think about the excitations caused by objects. Descartes establishes his philosophy in accordance with the mind-corpus through emotions, and in Article 31 of his book, he states that the brain has the pineal gland, therefore, this gland is the main focus of the soul.

Descartes states that there are six main emotions. He emphasizes that these are, Sadness, Love, Desire, Wonder, Joy, and Hatred, and that all other emotions are derived from the relevant six emotions. Furthermore, Descartes defines these main emotions as main types of emotions, and all other emotions as their derivatives.

He provides a special explanation regarding curiosity. According to Descartes, admiration is important, because, thanks to the admiration, we want to get to know the object better that stands before us. He states that this is not an admiration for the object, but that it is fascination by the knowledge of the object, and introduces Wonder, which is one of six important emotions. Regarding Wonder, Descartes states, “When the first encounter with some object surprises us, and we judge it to be new, or very different from what we knew in the past or what we supposed it was going to be, this makes us

wonder and be astonished at it” (Descartes, 1989: 52). According to Descartes, Wonder is the first of all the passions.

“Wonder has the following peculiarity: it is not observed to be accompanied, as the other passions are, by any change taking place in the heart and in the blood. The reason for this is that, not having good or evil as its object, but only knowledge of the thing wondered at, it has no relation to the heart and blood, which all the good of the body depends on, but only to the brain, where the organs of the senses are that contribute to this knowledge” (Descartes, 1989: 57-58).

Descartes focuses on the harms and the benefits of the passions explained under six main headings. And this is because having these emotions may cause harm and benefit to the soul, and/or body. Descartes, in his explanations on emotions, states that “Where in all the passions are serviceable, and wherein they are harmful” (Article 74). With this statement, he answers the question he asks before, “The utility of all the passions consists only in their strengthening thoughts which it is good that (the soul) preserve and which could otherwise easily be effaced from it, and causing them to endure in the soul” (Descartes, 1989: 59).

William James (1842-1910), who follows Carl George Large’s (1834-1900) ideas and is known for “James-Large Theory” has an important status in American Psychology history. He defines emotions through ‘physical perceptions’. His definition is based on his philosophical studies on Pragmatism. According to James, it is important to define/ known which emotions come to the front in the connection of emotions with

the cognitive and/ or body. And he uses his own philosophy in favor of the body to explain the connection of emotions with the body through the sense of fear.

In his book titled *What Is An Emotion?* (1884) he explains the concept of emotion, as follows: “I should say first of all that the only emotions I propose expressly to consider here are those that have a distinct bodily expression. That there are feelings of pleasure and displeasure, of interest and excitement, bound up with mental operations, but having no obvious bodily expression for their consequence” (James, 2007: 12).

Roddy Cowie claim that for James, “famously observed that emotions is associated with visceral feeling—that is, awareness of physical changes that tend to accompany emotion such as a racing heart, tightness of breath, hairs standing erect, and so on. These are phenomena whose place in an adequate description of emotion is not in question. Note that they are mainly relevant to emergent emotion” (Cowie, 2013: 76).

According to James, when the result revealed by our emotions (fear, happiness, sadness) is perceived by our brain, it is in accordance with the reactions revealed by our body. Physiologically, our face turns yellow or red, we begin to tremble, and our brain determines our emotions as a result of such reactions. His thesis, on the contrary, is that the “Bodily change follow directly the PERCEPTION of the existing fact and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion” (James, 2007: 14). James grounds his thesis with the bear example. He tells us that when we see a bear, the reason for fear and running is not because we are afraid, and emphasizes that we are afraid

because we escaped, and emphasizes the act of escape. According to James, common sense says, we lose our fortune, we are sorry, and we weep;

“We meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be” (James, 2007: 14) .

Here he claims that the body reaction is crucial: “Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we could not actually feel afraid or angry” (James, 2007: 14).

William James, in his studies, considers the relationship between the mental results and the physical reactions in terms of the priority-recency. On the other hand, Descartes establishes a connection with the pineal-gland, considers the appearance of the emotions on the face and eyes, and thus, Descartes’s explanation on emotions cannot be explained only as a mental situation as it partially includes a physiological structure.

Descartes's relevant approach has been considered in accordance with the discipline of philosophy-psychology, and it seems to have provided a preliminary step to the interdisciplinary transition through the relevant relationship.

In Dabrowski's article, he exemplifies the relationship between philosophy and psychology, which is studied by various philosophers, with Descartes' body-soul example, and says that Descartes' approach to emotions, including the body, is a guide to studies in the modern neurophysiological field. Dabrowski details his claims regarding this issue in-depth, in his article titled "Emotion in Philosophy A Short Introduction". "Since Descartes stressed the bodily aspect of emotions, one can say that his theory anticipated modern neurophysiological theories" (Dabrowski, 2016: 8-20). He continues to expand his article further, "since this definition relied on the view that passion was perception (so it was a mental state), the theory should be treated as a variant of the cognitive approach. From the point of view of Descartes' ontological dualism of substance, there is no doubt that passions and any feeling belonged to the mental substance" (Dabrowski, 2016: 8-20). Some readers maintain that the identity of a passion was fixed by its sources, and, firstly, they appeared in the body, especially in the brain. Finally it is probable that emotions went on in the borderland between the body and the mind: "Descartes has attempted to create a hybrid psychology, giving space both to immaterial and to material aspects of the 'mechanism' of 'cognition and emotion'" (Dabrowski, 2016: 8-20).

Therefore, the process began with the correspondence made with Princess Elisabeth turns into a comprehensive psychoanalysis, and causes *The Passions Of The Soul* written. Descartes, "The soul may have pleasures by itself" (Descartes, 1989: 135).

However, he makes a separate bracket at the end of the book by mentioning Article 212, he concludes the relationship between the soul and the body. Descartes claims at the end of the book that emotions and the soul has their own different pleasures. On the other hand, he also claims that there is a common bond of pleasure of the body with all passions. He claims that as follows:

“But as for those that are common to it and the body, they depend entirely on the Passions, so that the men they can move the most are capable of tasting the most sweetness in this life. It is true that (these men) may also find the most bitterness in it, when they do not know how to employ them well and fortune is opposed to them. Wisdom is useful here above all” (Descartes, 1989:134-135).

In the philosophy of Descartes, emotions are categorized into six main types, but on the other hand, it is based on the examples associated with the pineal gland in the mind and brain.

2.2.3. Hume: Emotions and Moral

David Hume (1711-1776) has an important position between empiricist philosophers before enlightenment. The empiric philosophy understanding, which believes that the most fundamental elements of knowledge are experience and observation, has been taken to a different dimension by Hume's critical view. Hume, who continues his studies by taking human nature into the center of his philosophy, believes that it will be right to reveal the steps of the human's ability to understand and know. He argues that analyzing human nature's 'cause and effect' should be the basic principle of his philosophy.

David Hume's earliest work is *A Treatise Of Human Nature* (1758) –three volumes- and it constitutes the most important of his philosophical works about emotions, epistemology and moral. About the first volume, "Of the Understanding" we can say very openly is that it contains his epistemology, second volume, "Passions" can be seen as an explanation of emotional life, and last volume, "Morals", contains the notions of moral and virtue.

Firstly, in Hume's epistemology, our mind content is a perception. These perceptions has the most force, thus we can say they are impressions. For an instance regarding impression, today, I cut my finger, and I feel the pain very vividly. This is an impression. But one week from now, when I'll remember that I cut my finger today, I'll feel some faint pain again, but that pain is not going to be as vivid. This is going to be a copy of impression, therefore it is going to be the idea. Thus, impressions are vivid, ideas are faint.

Hume explains the connection of the ideas in three ways, and defines it as to experience certain relationship between objects. In this relationship occurs in three ways. Firstly, Resemblance secondly, Cause and Effect and Contiguity.

According to Hume, first of all “Human/man is a being of emotions” (Hume, 1960: 414-415) and his/her thoughts are shaped by the connection of the formation of these emotions with perception. The human is an acting being, and s/he sees the main source of human actions as “the perception of pain and pleasure in the human mind” (Hume, 1960: 118). Pain and pleasure are the sources of passions and emotions. Hume defines the consequence of the sense of pain and pleasure as a result of our thinking as “Passion and action and this is also involuntary” (Hume, 1960: 574). In this context, when its connection with the concept of beauty is considered, Hume defines it as “Only a passion or impression in the soul”, not regarding its connection with the object (Hume, 1960: 300). Thus, the influences of Aristotle’s expression in the context of what is happening in the soul -anger, jealous, fear, grief, etc.- shows that, in a sense, they coincide with Hume’s philosophy. Furthermore, in Hume’s philosophy, impressions, which we are conscious of, and facts are something that we can know.

Hume’s Moral philosophy “Is perhaps best seen as the synthesis of four main philosophical ideas: empiricism, subjectivism (more specifically sentimentalism), impartial spectator theory, and utilitarian thought” (Rayner, 2005: 8). According to Hume, morality arises from human sentiments.

For Hume, it is important to determine: the moral principles while living together in society, how to have a good moral life, and whether the reason or emotion is significant in the choices that are made by a human in her/his actions. But according to common sense in society, reasonable behaviours are considered virtuous. Hume claims that the moral rural is based on emotion. Solomon, whose research area is emotion, states that “In the eighteenth century, ethics was dominated by the “moral sentiment theorists” such as David Hume, Adam Smith, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and morals once again became a matter of having the right kinds of emotions” (Solomon, 2016: 16). Thus, Hume, when stating his thoughts on emotions and passions, calls the physical urges which are born as our instincts as ‘direct passions’ , and what he calls as ‘indirect passions’ directly affect passions based on pleasant uncomfortable positions and situations, and he says that they create emotions that tend towards the object and increase desire and reluctance. And he bases this opinion on a dress example.

“The dress made of stylish fabric creates pleasure, and this pleasure creates direct passions or impressions of demand and desire. If this dress seems to belong to us, it gives us a sense of pride, an indirect passion, through a double relationship; the pleasure that accompanies that passion goes directly back to the emotions, and this strengthens our demand and desire or our hope” (Hume, 2015: 292).

While handling direct and indirect passions through joy and grief, he shapes the occurrence of emotions such as joy and grief through the concept of good and evil.

Hume considers joy-grief, desire-unwillingness, and hope-fear as direct emotions. If the probability of being positive is high and certain, it evolves into joy, but if the probability of being positive is as low as possible, and if it is not certain, it evolves into grief. While a patient is waiting for the results of the test, the probability of receiving a positive outcome naturally creates joy for that person. In this case, if - joy and grief - both of them are uncertain, we naturally feel fear or hope. Because, according to Hume, the mind first understands all these passions, but it tends to combine the passions it understands with the good and evade the bad. Think about a person who runs every day, when he feels a problem in his heart when he runs, can quit running saying that he does not want to run anymore and can avoid interpreting this whole action as an indicator of anything bad. However, it is possible that he will have a bad thought about whether there is a problem in his heart.

In this part of his book, Hume clarifies many feelings such as love-hate, humiliation-pride, and says that if the feeling of pain and pleasure is caused by an object related to ourselves or others, these feelings form humiliation - pride or love-hate by cooperating with certain inactive principles of the human mind.

In this context, Hume explains in his work not by retracing to the origin of emotions, but by expanding them in the context of concepts with their impressions evolving in the human mind. David Hume may be the first major philosopher to grant significant theoretical status to the term 'emotion' in English. Evidently, he sometimes felt a need to refer to 'passions' and 'emotions' in his new science on the mind.

“Indirect passions are not simply feelings but rather combinations of feelings and ideas that function as a unified causal whole in explanations of mental processes and the generation of behavior. Thus indirect passions are complex affective states that inextricably implicate ideas in a manner that goes beyond the primitive feelings involved in taken instances of emotions” (Charland, 2013: 242).

When we return to Descartes’ thoughts on emotions, Descartes clarifies this connection with the pineal gland by retracing the origin of his emotions in a sense, with his psychological side. In this context, Hume examines the subject with moral rules and empathy within the social structure while explaining emotions through concepts, because the moral rules are unwritten and established by society. In addition, Hume’s display of moral rules includes reference to the unity of psychology and sociology. If we live in a social environment, there is an implicit obligation to follow these rules. A Turkish proverb sheds light on this subject; ‘you cannot go dancing after leaving a funeral home’. It is not a written law, it is not mandatory to be followed, but when we share the pain of a friend we cannot have fun on that day, we do it later. In this context, Hume says that moral rules are based on emotions, so that we can make the social life positive through empathy. In a sense, empathy is directing emotions. In order to share this feeling of a friend experiencing the pain of death, we direct our human feelings about life to the world and direct them to feel that pain.

Hume, in his most important book/work, titled *An Enquiry Concerning The Principles Of Morals*, emphasizes that human characters and actions will differ, and says that this difference can be explained more through habit, education, and sampling.

He emphasizes that this difference in the form of a gap can only be eliminated with common sense and reason.

The most important subject of the period is where moral principles originated. Thus Hume continues his book by saying that the principles of morality come from emotion or reason. Hume claims in his book that “What every person feels within himself is a standard of feeling”, (Hume, 2015: 16) referring to “The fact that righteousness cannot be discussed but liking is discussed” (Hume, 2015: 16). Hume wants to approach the subject by revealing the difference between reasoning and proving.

Hume argues that everything is revealed through experiences, but that the experiences do not have universality. Therefore, everything is a habit. On the other hand, as stated in Hume’s philosophy of morals, he emphasizes that reason will never be the driving function of the action because reason cannot resist passion.

At this point, Hume tries to answer this question; ‘what are morals and what are moral rules?’ And he says that; ‘all moral fictions have the purpose of teaching us our homework’, and he adds that; these fictions cause some habits which has suitable design about that; virtuousness is good and virtuelessness is bad. According to Hume, morality is not a practical study when we eliminate the classifications/ feelings of virtuousness and virtuelessness, and thus it does not exist by having a tendency to regulate our lives as well. When we ask what the parts that create the moral principles are, Hume gives the first place to the concept of ‘Kindness’ and ‘Justice’. In the next parts of his book, he addresses the concept of ‘Benefit’. The empiricist philosopher, who focuses on why

benefit pleases people, elaborates on this concept in his book by referring to the qualities that are beneficial.

In addition, Glossop who worked on Hume's philosophical view, in his book, *The Nature of Hume's Ethics Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, "makes a very relevant distinction between moral *sentiments* and moral *judgments*" (Rayner, 2005: 13). He explains that "Sentiments arise from actual sympathy, and by correcting them through reflecting on whom with an imagined impartiality we can attempt to make appropriate moral *judgments*, by adopting the sentiments afforded by the resultant *ideal sympathy*" (quoted by Rayner, 2005: 13).

Hume, who states that there are some key themes of human by nature, emphasizes that they are the themes/impressions such as 'friendly, good-natured, merciful, generous'. He adds that the characteristic features of a politician that assists his courage and increasing success are compassion, kindness and friendship. Hume here puts compassion and friendship at the first place of the characteristics that make us human. No matter how high positions we reach, if we don't have these characteristics, we can only become the person of these positions. However, if we can understand that these positions are temporary, then we can see that the life is based on friendship and on the human relations we established. He says that; while success can lead to positive and negative reviews about a human, the fact that he/she lacks the qualities that makes us human casts a shadow over one's success.

This expression of Hume reminds us of Aristotle's virtues of characteristic. If one does not have *phronesis* how can we trust his/her actions? In this context, Hume

emphasizes that in his philosophy, qualities such as kindness, humanity, friendship, and gratitude are aspects that confirm the goodwill of humans. All these discourses cause us to question what is good and what is bad. When we help a poor person by giving him money, we partially help his desperation about his difficult situation, but if we constantly give money to a person who makes it a habit, at the same time we cause him not to work and to be lazy. Hume, referring to Aristotle's saying; 'man is by nature a social animal', in his book, explains that although we think that social virtues such as family harmony, social order, and the mutual secure relationship in friendship are the rules that establish domination over the softness of man's heart, we should not forget that these values are important.

Hume, who seems to avoid combining moral sense with reason, refers to passions and emotions as the basis of human actions and moral judgments. Hume describes that as; 'the reason is a slave to passions', and while expressing that he claims that the driving force of action is not in the reason, but in a sense the reason succumbs to emotions. Reasoning does not constitute the driving force behind human actions. It is passion and emotions that determine our actions and will. In this context, the fact that people are comfortable and at peace in a social environment is a structure that will be resolved not by reason but by emotion. In this social environment, peace and happiness can only be resolved through empathy. The fact that we as human beings do not understand the sadness and feelings of the other person does not make it possible for us to live in peace in the social environment/ society. We cannot party and have fun in our house when our next-door neighbour is deeply saddened by grief. We share the pain of our neighbour. We become more quiet and try to help them. This sympathy we show is

a morally accepted virtue. According to Hume, human beings transform the concept of justice into virtue through empathy.

In this context, feelings are resolved with reason by Aristotle. In this regard, a relation will be established with the concept of emotions, ethics, soul, logos and virtue. In the ancient Greek, firstly, some concepts such as human, human structure, emotions, and ethics were emphasized in order to show how to provide the compatibility of common life in a site, and such notions have been aimed to explain the philosophers. For Aristotle, spirit is defined as the arche of all living creatures. Aristotle discusses the spirit structure within the context of whatness. Aristotle examines the human as *psykhes*/ soul and *soma*/ body, and in this regard, aims to define the nature of emotions such as anger, courage and desire revealed by the spirit. He schematizes the relationship of the spirit with preferences, nous, and pleasure through logos and without logos.

Descartes, who initiates a breaking point through the notion of cogito in the history of philosophy, lists main emotions as wonder, love, hatred, desire, gladness and sadness in his book. In Descartes' philosophy, affection is a state in which the body and soul accompany each other. Though the pleasures had by the soul and the body together are emotions, the soul may have its own independent pleasures known as passions. Descartes evaluates the soul from the point of active status and passive status by considering the relationship between the soul and the body. Descartes reveals the relationship between the active status of the soul and the will.

Hume says that this harmony can be achieved by acting not only with the inferences of reason but also with the inferences of emotions in order to be more

harmonious and peaceful in social life. In this way, while the human comes to a superhuman status in Aristotle's philosophy (the human being constantly doing the same thing, the virtues learned to do), in Hume's philosophy, he/she is treated as a person who is consisted of flesh and blood, makes mistakes, makes compensation, and establishes empathy. And it is not only that these actions are continuous, but that they are put before us as a choice through emotions. According to Hume, the sense of ethics through the emotions, indicates that it cannot be explained through any rational relation.

In the next part of this thesis, Spinoza's philosophy will be researched/discussed in terms of the possibility to control emotions with reason. Then, Spinoza's philosophy will be examined in detail, and the concepts of freedom, conatus, and nature of emotions -Desire- Gladness- Sadness- will be explained, while referring to the human bondage via emotions. According to Spinoza, a human who loses the control of her/his emotions is a slave.

3. SPINOZA AND HIS PHILOSOPHY

Benedictus (Baruch) Spinoza (1632-1677), emphasizes a kind of optimistic anthropological view. He also tries to establish an encouraging human-society relationship. For him, life, knowledge, emotion, happiness, joy, freedom, religion, and politics, etc. are all shaped by how different concepts can mean immanent positions for humankind. At the same time, the relationship between religion and politics exhibits a socio-political structure in this context, while examining the intertwining of these two concepts within society. In addition, “Spinoza’s moral system is designed to show us the way to happiness” (Scruton, 2002: 28).

According to Spinoza philosophy “Life is not an idea, a matter of theory. It is a way of being, one and the same eternal mode in all its attributes. And it is only from this perspective that the geometric method and method of proving are fully comprehensible” (Deleuze, 1988: 13).

Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) focuses quite intensely on the tight relationship between concepts and philosophy, and he searches for an answer to the question of - book- “*What is philosophy?*”, not only through concepts but also through conceptual people. For Deleuze, Spinoza’s book *Ethics*’ “The continuous set of propositions, demonstration, and corollaries, as a grand movement of concepts, and the discontinuous sequence of scholia, as a launching of affects and impulses, a series of whirlwinds” (Deleuze, 1988: 130).

Spinoza's philosophy in the main topic of *Ethics* is about the understanding the being's first causes and he explains their ontological, epistemological, ethics view. Because, each result is in the layers that "Substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence" (Spinoza, 2002: I/ VI. Definitions). In the philosophy of Spinoza, in a sense, Substance is *Causa sui*. For Spinoza, something in the universe either exists on its own or exists due to something else, depending on it. Because it is substance, *Natura*, *Causa Sui* and God, all of which have one meaning. In the philosophy of Spinoza, everything in *natura* occurs/works according to an eternal necessity.

For emotions, which Spinoza addressed in *Ethics*, he states that "For this much is quite certain, and proved to be true in our *Ethics*, that men are necessarily subject to passions, and are so constituted that they pity the unfortunate, envy the fortunate, and are more inclined to vengeance than to compassion" (Spinoza, 2002: 681). He also shows "That reason can indeed do much to control and moderate the passions; but at the same time we have seen that the path taught by reason is very difficult" (Spinoza, 2002: 682). Because, according to Spinoza, if we have mercy for someone who is unhappy, "The fact that its distress affects us with pain cannot cause us to hate a thing that we pity" (Spinoza, 2002: III/ XXVII. Prop- 2 Corollary).

A person feels jealous only of someone who is happy, which means that a person is predisposed to the sense of revenge rather than pity (mercy). Because of his/her nature, when a person likes something, s/he wishes and wants other people to love it. While explaining the nature of these emotions, Spinoza states that the emotional

structure of human becomes more important than the value judgments that beliefs present.

In the light of Spinoza's thought of a person's predisposition to revenge, when we look at Hannah Arent's reading of Nazism, the fact that they do not care about the Christian belief of 'thou shalt not kill' and their tendency to killing people very easily by gathering them under the same tent is an indication that their emotions take precedence over the values of faith.

"If a man has been affected pleurably or painfully by anyone, of a class or nation" (Spinoza, 2002: III / XLVI. Proof.) different from his own, and if the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or notion: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation which the stranger belongs to.

Spinoza, in his book, *Ethics* emphasises that people are necessarily subject to the emotions, by saying "It is effective, no doubt, at death's door, that is when sickness has subdued the passions and a man lies helpless; or again in places of worship where men have no dealing with one another; but it has no weight in law-court or place, where it would be needed most of all" (Spinoza, 2002: 682).

He expresses how emotional structure of human overcomes the value judgment produced by their beliefs. Human, with the sense of self, wants to come to the forefront, to be in the front, to be liked, to be better than the opposite sex, to be praised, and to be happy. But, shows us that s/he lives life as a prisoner of these emotions. According to

Spinoza, human can “That reason can indeed do much to control and moderate the passions” (Spinoza. 2002: 682). However, as he stated in *Ethics*, this is not something applicable for everyone. According to Akal, “A problem which identified with humanity is that it regularly produces all three preconditions that lead to the continuation of violence. The causes of violence are Fear, Lovelessness and Desire for Revenge” (Akal, 2014: 190). From this point of view, when we look at Spinoza’s philosophy, the unhappiness that these three concepts will create postpones and destroys human life.

Ethics, the main book of Spinoza’s philosophy, is like a spider web spun with plane of immanence and geometric structure. In this philosophy of the philosopher, the relation of the Substance with the *Attributum* is in a interaction/connection with each other within this immanent concentric system, considering the relation of the *Attributum* with the *Modus*. The thoughts that exist within this cobweb create a whole in pieces. In the philosophy of Deleuze, the concepts become clearer in the plane of immanence with the conceptual person, in the philosophical system of Spinoza, the concepts (*Causa sui*, *Conatus*, Gladness, Sadness, Desire) find their own existence on the plane of immanence, move, explore, become clearer, but remain on the same plane. Because the important subject in Spinoza’s philosophy is “Not substance or eternal things, but limited and finite *modi* /modes, in other words, everything around us” (Ergün, 2014: 46). Thus, the nature that imputed as the cause is finite modes/ *modus*, which includes the finiteness of everything, including man, within the cyclic structure. This finiteness does not attribute privileges to any modes. Spinoza has already seen nature as the cause with the concepts *Natura Naturans* (nature doing what nature does) and *Natura Naturata* (nature already created). Spinoza, in the case that there is and/or is not

an effect as an external cause, puts forward the basic logic principles of philosophy; the law of excluded middle/ otherwise impossible principle. Something either “A” or “non-A”. Spinoza explains in Part I, XXIX. Prof. “Nothing in nature is contingent, but all things are from the necessity of the divine nature determined to exist and to act in a definite way” (Spinoza, 2002: I/ XXIX. Prof.). And he adds to the Scholium part:

“I wish to explain at this point what we must understand by “*Natura naturans*” and “*Natura naturata* (...) By “*Natura naturata*” I understand all that follows from the necessity of God’s nature, that is, from the necessity of each one of God’s attributes; or all the modes of God’s attributes insofar as they are considered as things which are in God and can neither be nor be conceived without God” (Spinoza, 2002: I/ XXIX. Prof. Scholium).

In *Ethics*, Spinoza discusses that, “A free man thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom is a meditation of life, not of death” (Spinoza, 2002: XLVII Prof). He emphasizes that there is nothing to be moved in death. Man should build his philosophy on life, and not on death. If one lives according to the rules of reason, s/he does not get scared of death. He doesn’t make himself unhappy thinking about death all the time. “Under the guidance of reason we seek a future greater good in preference to a lesser present good, and a lesser present evil in preference to a greater future evil”, (Spinoza, 2002: IV/ XLVII Prof.) says Spinoza, leading man to a happier life. Roger Scruton, by saying that “Spinoza was more of a Stoic than Aristotle, more disposed to believe than any man achieve happiness and peace of mind by his own resources, regardless of his social, political, and material circumstances” (Scruton, 2002: 28) makes a note about this subject. According to Stoic philosophy, there is nature-human harmony, and a

person who is not the captive of his/her passions can only have a happy life. Thus, while it seems possible to read Spinoza's philosophy by considering it in the context of Stoic philosophy, according to Aristotle, happiness is "The activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, which is itself the purpose" (Aristotle, 1908:1102 a). And happiness is "One of those things that is valuable and itself a goal" (Aristotle, 1908: 1102 a). In this context, Spinoza's approach to joy and happiness in his philosophy is likely to be seen under both Aristotelian and Stoic influences, in terms of the human-nature approach, in Stoic philosophy and Aristotle's influence can be observed in reading happiness as an activity of the soul. According to Aristotle, "What happens in the soul is categorized as *logos* and *alogos*" (Aristotle, 1908: 1102 b). Thus, there is a connection between soul and reason as the basic structure that applies to the explanation of happiness.

Thus, according to Spinoza, man creates happiness. At this very point, it is the basis of the philosophy of immanent that people turn to happiness and peace through their own respect. Happiness is not out. And it is not the result of actions either. It seems impossible for a person without inner peace to be happy in any way. Because "Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our lusts" (Spinoza, 2002: V/ XLII Prof). In this context, in the philosophy of Spinoza, human competence and strength exist with the domination of the mind over emotions. In a sense, happiness is the display of the mind's control over emotions. And regarding virtue, it is said for human "By virtue (*Virtus*) and power I mean the same thing; that is (III vii), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a man's nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of effecting what can only be understood by the laws of the nature" (Spinoza, 2002: 172-247).

From antique age to the present, “what virtue is” has a lot of explanations. Aristotle forms the subject in two parts as the virtues of thinking and the virtues of character. And he states that the basis of having the virtues of character is through having the virtues of thinking. He says that the subject of scientific knowledge does not fall within the area of ethics, that the subject of ethics is human actions, and that virtue is not a characteristic of action, but a characteristic of a person. Virtue is “A habit which is proper for centeredness (...) and Virtue is not only proper for the right brain, but also a habit that goes with the right brain” (Aristotle, 1908: 1144 b-25).

But when we look at the subject of virtue in a comparative way with Spinoza’s *Ethics* and *Theological-Political Treatise* (1670), in Part V, Proposition XLII’s proof of *Ethics*, although he says that “Happiness consists in love towards God although this love belongs to the third kind of knowledge”, he shows a transaction between God-Happiness-Virtue. Because according to Spinoza, “In proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts” (Spinoza, 2002: V/ XLII Prof.). According to Spinoza, highest good and perfection depend solely on the knowledge of God. However, in the *Theological-Political Treatise* “God, that is, a Supreme Being, exists, supremely just and merciful, the exemplar of true life. He who knows not, or does not believe, that God exists, cannot obey him or know him as judge” (Spinoza, 2002: 517). In this case, Spinoza “Indicates that virtue is itself absolute, he recognizes that it is impossible for man to achieve an absolute attainment of it since it depends on his relative capacity for understanding and improving his intellect” (Crowther, 2007: 18).

If we think/consider 17th century as a substance era, Spinoza shaped his whole philosophy with the concept of substance in his work titled *Ethics*. However, *Ethics* includes the basis of one substance to the contrary of two-substance concept of Descartes. Thus, it may be stated that philosophers of the seventeenth century heavily argue the situation of substance which might be opposed to/or with a nature, God or without God. Godness is in everything. The God who does not expect anything for himself and does not expect anything.

Spinoza opens the beginning of *Ethics* with the title of “Concerning God”. And since everything along with sub-units exists within a whole, the system is formed as a system that is necessarily immanent. The God of monotheistic religions is the God who is prayed to, asked for help and expected to forgive. However, Spinoza, in his philosophy, builds a Godless God. “God is absolutely the first cause” (Spinoza, 2002: I/ XVI. Prof. 3. Corollary) but does not expect anything and is unexpected. In the third definition of the first chapter, Spinoza makes an introduction to the subject with the concept of substance which is called God or Substance, Natura. “By Substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; that is, that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing from which it has not been formed” (Spinoza, 2002: I/ III Definitions).

The Definition III of Chapter I in Spinoza’s book *Ethics* explains the concept of Substance. “One substance cannot be produced by another substance” (Spinoza, 2002: VI. Prof). “Existence belongs to the nature of substance” (Spinoza, 2002: I/ VII. Prof.) “Every Substance is necessarily infinite” (Spinoza, 2002: I/ VIII Prof.). In other words, “By that which is self-caused I mean that whose essence involves existence; or that

whose nature can be conceived only as existing” (Spinoza, 2002: I/ I Definitions). For Spinoza, substance is the natura described as that which is in itself, is conceived through itself, and does not need any concept except itself. In this context, for Spinoza substance is the Causa sui.

Spinoza bases his philosophy only on one substance. He explains that “One substance cannot be produced by another substance” (Spinoza, 2002: I/VI Prop.). Because “Existence belongs to the nature of substance” (Spinoza, 2002: I/VII). According to Spinoza, there cannot be two substance(s), which have the same nature or quality, in the universe. “In the universe there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute” (Spinoza, 2002: I/ V Prop). Substance does not exist as the first cause and in the sense of cause or creation, it itself exists necessarily because of its nature. The substance that has its own nature and is unique has unlimited and infinite qualities. Spinoza refers to an absolute limitlessness with the concept of limitlessness. In the Definition VII of Part I, Spinoza says that “That things is said to be free [*liber*]. A which exist solely from the necessity of its own nature, and is determined to action by itself alone. A thing is said to be necessary [*necessaries*] or rather, constrained [*coactus*], if it is determined by another thing to exist and to act in a definite and determinate way”. (Spinoza, 2002: VII Defination). All living and non-living beings, including human, are instances of the same -unique- substance. Like stone, earth and metal, also human is the same, human has no privileges or priorities. All of these have one and the same existence process, aforementioned expression is not being or creating, but the substance is in everything that exists.

When we consider the God-centered structure of the Middle Age, Spinoza's thoughts/ or works on the notion of God create a serious breaking point. In a sense, Spinoza reconsiders the Medieval concepts of God. He reconstructs them all over again. He believes that the concept of God, should not be transendant. In this subject Moses, ben Maimon or Maimonides, "Were the ones indeed, who did most to set medieval theology upon its Aristotelian path –a path that led, at last, to the strange stark Theism, which many denounced as Atheism, of Spinoza" (Scruton, 2002: 3).

Nadler, who emphasizes the aspects of Spinoza's understanding of God that are different from Maimonides. For Maimonides "The intellectual love of God is accompanied by fear, dread, and awe. This is because these represent the natural response for someone who is in such close and constant proximity to God" (Nadler, 2014: 151). Nadler continues to explain Maimonides thoughts "When one is conscious of being in God's presence –as the perfected individual is – one cannot but feel that God is standing in judgment" (Nadler, 2014: 151). In addition, although it is certain that Maimonides was effected by his works "God is no judge and does not possess the personal psychological life or moral characteristics with which traditional religious conceptions endow him, he is not properly an object of fear or other passions" (Nadler, 2014: 152).

According to Spinoza's philosophy "It is not enough to show how pantheism and atheism are combined in this thesis, which denies the existence of a moral, transcendent creator God" (Deleuze, 1988: 17). The reason Deleuze sees Spinoza's philosophy as groundbreaking is that "The practical theses that made Spinozism an object of scandal are 'Consciousness', of 'values', and of 'sad passions'" (Deleuze,

1988: 16). And he explains that therefore, these three theses mark the similarity between Spinoza and Nietzsche.

Two concepts expressed by Spinoza are '*Natura naturans*' and '*Natura naturata*' in the context of God. This expresses the nature-God relationship. Bayraktar says that in Spinoza's philosophy, God is described by "*Natura naturans*", while the other concept describes the adjectives of God. However, Bayraktar emphasizes that these concepts were commonly used by Islamic philosophers before Spinoza:

"The use of this verb as the active form of *natura naturans* and the passive form of *natura naturata* in the sense of naturalization began to be used in Europe in the XIII century, after Muslims', especially Ibn Rush's commentaries (annotations) on the works of Aristotle translated into Latin" (Bayraktar, 1996: 296).

Although '*Natura naturans*' and '*Natura naturata*' concepts were used by Muslim philosophers such as "Jabir Ibn hayyan (872-815), Sicistani (d. 1000) and Tevhidi (d. 1023), he states that Spinoza is the philosopher who uses the divine cause with the concept of immanence as the first cause (*primum causatum*)" (Bayraktar, 1996: 296). In the context of God-Natura, it is Spinoza's emphasis on the immanence of the divine cause to nature in the process that is leading to Pantheism. In this context, it is closer to the fact that Pantheism is not the real reason for the accusations made by Islamic thinkers to Spinoza philosophy. Deleuze describes this approach in three parts; "Devaluation of consciousness (for the benefit of thought): materialist Spinoza; the devaluation of all values, especially good and evil (for the benefit of "good" and "evil"):

Immoralist Spinoza and devaluation of all sorrowful passions” (for the benefit of joy): Atheist Spinoza” (Deleuze, 1988: 23). In terms of Spinoza’s approach to materialism and the concept of good and evil and his blessing of life, he takes a preliminary stance on drawing the boundaries between human and society. Monotheistic religions prioritize not life, but the next world/ afterlife, which is a transcendent structure.

Spinoza maintains a stance against the context of the relationship of religions with human’s hopes, rather than being exactly against the understanding of God. “Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived” (Spinoza, 2002: I/ XVI Prof.). And “Apart from God no substance can be or be conceived” (Spinoza, 2002: I/ XV. Prof.-Proof.).

Thus, as Spinoza states in *Ethics*, various commentators have emphasized that he is an atheist, a deist, or a pantheist, pan-entheist but what matters is his relation with religion rather than whether there is a God. In other words, rather than denying God, he processes the immanent being on the ontological and conceptual plane. But in a sense, as the exact opposite of this, he also indicates the existence of a transcendent eternity as the adjectives of God. In addition to all these, Spinoza stands against the restriction of human emotions and actions by theological definitions.

On the description of God in Spinoza’s philosophy, “Mason states that similar to Cassirer’s thoughts, Spinoza did not attempt to identify God or nature with substantial nature” (quoted by, Arıcan, 2013: 26). In his 72nd letter to Oldenburg in 1675 he says that “All things are in God and move in God” (Arıcan, 2013: 26). Thus, Although Spinoza’s thoughts of God has negations in themselves:

“Some thinks that he is a Pantheist basing this on that he ‘does not except God and universe or God A-and beings as identical’ (...) some thinks that he is a Pan-entheist basing the detail on that he thinks ‘God and being are different’ or as he states in *Ethics* ‘everthing is in God or by means of God’ (...)” (Arıcan, 2013: 29).

The influence of monotheistic religions on human both makes people unhappy and weakens the functioning of the mind and the act of thinking. Because God’s existence and transcendence attribute unlimited power and ability to him. However, Spinoza also wants to prove that God and religions do not have this authority on human. The content of the concept of good and evil has been determined by monotheistic religions. The limits of what a person can and cannot do while living in society are certain. Although this concept of good and evil remains valid in society when it does not touch its borders, it is generally accepted that it partially loses its value in Nazism/ and or repressive regimes. Spinoza evaluates the concepts of good and evil. “As for the terms “good and “bad”, they likewise indicate nothing positive in things considered in themselves, and are nothing but modes of thinkings, or notions which we form from comparing things with one another. For one and the same thing can at the same time be good and bad, and also different” (Spinoza, 2002: IV./ Preface). This exhibits the exchange of the concept of good and bad with human nature. Spinoza gives the following example;

“Music is good for one who is melancholy, bad for one in mourning, and neither good nor bad for the deaf. However, although this is so, these terms ought to be retained. For since we desire to form the idea of a man which we may look to as a model of human nature, we shall find it useful to keep these terms in the sense I have indicated” (Spinoza, 2002: IV./ Preface).

Spinoza evaluates these two concepts in terms of the benefits they provide to human beings. In the VIII. Prop. of the IV Part, he states “Knowledge of good and evil is nothing other than the emotion of pleasure or pain insofar as we are conscious of it” (Spinoza, 2002: IV/ VIII Prop).

Spinoza argues that the highest concept that any state and/or government can give to its citizens is the love of freedom. Spinoza, in his book of *Political Reviews*, makes a reference to giving small gifts to slaves in ancient Greece to prevent them from losing their hopes of becoming a free person in future, saying, that ‘slaves are rewarded for their good behavior, not free people’. It is only hope or dream that is given to the slave or felt by him/her. The hope of thinking that one day s/he might be free. According to Spinoza, this transcendence disconnects human with the world. However, life “Depends on the conditions and illusions of our consciousness and consists in the condemnation of everything that disconnects human from world” (Deleuze, 1988: 33).

Tractatus Politicus, which is one of the important works of Opera-Posthuma, is a work based on the ideas he defends regarding natural rights and forms of government, and can be described as both a reconsideration and reinforcement of *Theological-Political Treatise*, which he could publish while he was alive, as well as a re-emphasis

on civil rights and natural rights. In the words of Aristotle; man is a social animal. And management is an important phenomenon in the life brought by this social togetherness. “Freedom, in fact, is virtue or perfection; so anything that signifies weakness in man cannot be referred to his freedom” (Spinoza, 2002: 685). For Spinoza, the two important things that someone expects from the state are peace and security. We can remember from Hobbes’s book, *Leviathan*, how, with this idea of living in safety, people hand over their power to a person or state. So the two important things that the state has to establish are peace and security. And if we remind ourselves that Spinoza’s ancestors emigrated from Spain, we can also understand why Spinoza states that “Men are not born to be citizens, but are made so” (Spinoza, 2002: 699). When examining his own life, he considers himself a Dutch citizen after being expelled from the congregation. In this context, it can be thought that it would be better to address his experiences too, for being able to fully comprehend his works. Spinoza thinks that when state or government cannot maintain safety and peace this is because of the lack of maintaining civil rights. If we cannot be in safety and peace, we are not in a different position than the nature. In this context, this is a democratic form of government, as clarified by Spinoza, in his book *Tractatus Politicus*. “I pass on at length to the third kind of state, the completely absolute which we call democracy” (Spinoza, 2002: 650).

Ethics, begins with the explanation of the concept of God. Man lives in the shadow of the substance. Time does not exist, however, not only time but also space does not exist. The living place is a shadow. Eternity can be the only place to be happy. In *Ethics* human is not expressed as a historical, social and cultural being that we used to have in the general description of philosophy. His works do not contain any references

to art, the creation of human -which is not different from other objects- rather the societal existence of human is discussed.

According to Spinoza, “with the phrase of *Natura sive Deus*, cosmic nature adds all human nature inside itself, which will no longer be completely devoid of historical reality there” (Bumin, 1987: 13). According to Spinoza, not only God-Nature but Man-Nature is in its own spiral.

Spinoza thinks that when we live in a state or government could not maintain safety and peace this is because of the lack of maintaining civil rights. If we cannot be in safety and peace, we are not in a different position than the nature. In this context, this is a democratic form of government, as clarified by Spinoza, in his book *Tractatus Politicus*. “Thus no one can has a hereditary right to vote and to undertake offices of state, and no can demand that right for himself by law, as is the case with the state now under discussion” (Spinoza, 2002: 752). We can very briefly say that, the important point that Spinoza underlined here is that the citizens have the right to vote, and to be able to perform public duties, in other words, right to elect and to be elected and the right to change those who are elected. In the words of Spinoza, demeocracy means that;

“Everyone should be governed only by the laws of the country, should live with dignity without being under the rule of another, should have the right to vote in the Supreme Assembly and should be able to assume public service. I am saying that “to exclude foreign nationals of the state, knowingly, only those governed by the laws of the homeland” (Spinoza, 2002: 758).

Influenced by Spinoza, Goethe (1749-1832) refers to the relationship he establish between tradition and religion in the eighteenth century as follows in his interview with Friedrich von Müller, “Neither should they base and reinforce beliefs on traditions without subjecting them to any criticism, nor should they surrender to beliefs when traditions are critized” (Özlem, 2016: 152). Spinoza discusses being stuck between tradition and religion, perhaps in a sense, human despair. In this case, he reshapes the existing nature of human beings, resolves the connection between religion and human. “The tragedy of theology and its harmfulness are not just speculative, according to Spinoza; they are owing to the practical confusion which theology in stills in us between these two orders that differ in nature” (Deleuze, 1988: 24).

Spinoza’s extraordinary understanding of God, which contains differences in itself and is open to interpretation, violates that boundary between human and God, placing God in a more simple, understandable, immanent form of God, that does not punish, legislate, and take revenge when humans make mistakes. Godless God builds in the world. While Spinoza aims human happiness, he tries to reveal the connections between religion-politics-knowledge emotion and body. According to Spinoza, life is to be happy now and here, it cannot be a life that is postponed, given hope, or left to the future and the afterlife.

3.1. XVIIth Century In Substance Notion

The ongoing debate between East and West also showed itself in philosophy, and the debate about whether philosophy belonged to ancient Greece continued until

philosophy acquired a homeland. The fact that concepts were produced in ancient Greece gave a homeland to the homeless philosophy. In this context, the acquiring of a homeland is not only valid for people, but belonging to a place has provided a basis for tracing, searching for or finding origins in the emergence of disciplines. In particular, it reveals more clearly the connection between the ‘notion- philosophy-philosopher’ trilogy, to which country some concepts belong or to whom they belong. In short, this is; Aristotle’s ‘Ousia’, Descartes’ ‘Cogito’, Nietzsche’s ‘Übermensch (Superhuman)’, Leibniz’s ‘Monad’, Spinoza’s ‘Conatus’ and Hegel’s ‘Geist’. And goes on... Thus, while notion (s) are the keystone of philosophy, the link between philosophers and periods with concepts forms the core of their own philosophies.

Substance and accident has been the main concepts of philosophy since ancient times. Philosophical thought is methodologically shaped around both of these concepts. Aristotle begins his work *Categories* by explaining categories. We also come across ‘categories’ in one of Aristotle’s important works, *Meta ta Physika*. As Aristotle stated in his work title *Categoria* that is one of his important logic studies, the first *kategoria* is *ousia* and all the categories require the existence of *ousia*.

In this context, we understand that “Firstly and in substance, the ousia is neither the thing told for the bearer nor an ousia within the bearer for Aristotle” (Aristotle, 2002: 2 a 1). According to Aristotle, attribute can exist without ousia because attributes absolutely depend on the essence. Therefore, according to Aristotle ousia are the reality of the final constituents.

In the part of general sense in the metaphysical traditional philosophy, the substance is defined as existing on its own not with another thing or in another thing. In this context, various phrases were used to describe the concept of ousia by the philosophers; however, in the Antique Age, philosopher Aristotle approached the 'Ousia' and 'Substance' in a different way. The Ousia is the acquisition of all kinds of quality on its own, but there is no attribution to its own existence. According to Aristotle, Substance have two meanings. On the one hand "Substance is the last basis, which is not the verb of anything else. On the other hand, substance is what can be separated (from substance) as an individual, which is treated in terms of its essence. It is the form or form of every being" (Aristotle, 2016: V-1017 b- 20). As for accident, "It arises without going through the process of formation, and it has an accidental reason that is not subject to formation and creates itself without necessity. An accidental result is the result of random combinations of causes that are independent of each other and are not regulated to cooperate in this form in terms of their nature" (Aristotle, 2016: 1027 a 25 footnote).

In the simplest terms, 'concept' is an intellectual framework created for the external world, thinking and existing in language, because the concept is the basis of knowing what exists. Concepts exist in language as terms and they create the basis of all kinds of communication and explanation. In this context, the first thing we should learn is the necessity to make conceptual distinctions. Deleuze expresses his views in this field; "While creating concepts in a precise sense belongs only to philosophy, the sciences, the arts and philosophies are all creators" (Deleuze, 1994: 15). Notion do not wait for us like celestial bodies that were completed before. There is not a different sky for concepts. They must be discovered and produced, or actually they must be created,

and if they do not carry the signs of creators, they are nothing. In the light of all this, for Deleuze, the concept is not something given from the outside, it is created, and the concept carries that hidden power in it.

If we consider 17th century, the substance became the focus point in the philosophical studies once again in the period starting with especially Rene Descartes (1596-1650) explained the ‘mind’ and ‘body’ dilemma through substance. ‘*Cogito ergo sum*’ by using the suspicion as a method presented the concept of subject. For Descartes, the ‘infinite substance’ is explained with the God and the ‘finite substance’ is explained as ‘mind’ and ‘body’. In order to find a safe way to figure out explicit (*Clara et distincta*) information, Descartes made a distinction. For him, ‘*mens/ res cogitans*’ does not need anything and does not take up space either, but the ‘*corpus*’ ‘*res extensa*’ takes up space. Two parts of the ‘substance’ are completely different, but they are together, and both of them are accidents. Descartes reaches to the existence of God-his ontological argument- from infinite to endless substance.

Spinoza begins his philosophy with one substance and builds on it. On the other hand, by using ‘Monad’ instead of substance in the book of titled *New Essays on Human Understanding*, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) explains that the monads are infinite and self-sufficient- entelekheia-and metaphysics points including the telos in themselves. Monads are self-sufficient and they include the archke (antarkheus). Leibnez explains the concept of monad in his book, *Monadology*, as follows: “1-The Monad, of which we shall here speak, is nothing but a simple substance, which enters into compounds. By “simple” is meant “without parts” (Ariew-Watkins, 2000:239).

And “There must be simple substances, since there are compounds; for a compound is nothing but a collection or aggregatum of simple things” (Ariew-Watkins, 2000: 239).

Thus, monads are metaphysical points that do not take up space even though they are objective realities. Substance, which is called monad and which creates this universe, is like mathematical points and it is real like physical points. “That each singular substance expresses the whole universe in its own way, and that all its events, together with all their circumstances and the whole sequence of external things, are included in its notion” (Ariew-Watkins, 2000: 238). These metaphysical points, which carry their telos within themselves, are self-sufficient, in other words, entelechy. Monads are strength, energy and spirit. Monads, which have a perspective, are equipped with will and are infinite, but they are not atoms. Thus, the substance changes into an infinite number of substances. Besides their plainness and simplicity, there are perception and appetite in them. In addition to all these explanations about monads, the most striking point is the transformation of substance into multiple substances during this period. For Leibniz, the highest monad is God “Whence it follows that God is absolutely perfect; for perfection is nothing but amount of positive reality, in the strict sense, leaving out of account the limits or bounds in things which are limited” (Leibniz, 1898:7). Thus there are “No bounds, that is to say in God, perfection is absolutely infinite” (Leibniz, 1898: 7).

Perhaps, after Spinoza, who created a breaking point to Descartes’s dualism with one substance, -God, Nature, Substance, (*causa sui*)- Leibniz changed both the use of substance by creating a second breaking point, and tried to explain it from a metaphysical line like Spinoza. We see that the substance is used as a common concept

to explain the unexplained or the keystone in the philosophy by the philosophers. Also in the 17th century Spinoza wants to explain their cosmos or philosophy system with a single substance. However, this reduction is on the basis of one substance contrary to Descartes and Leibniz.

God, Substance -*Causa sui*-, Natura are described as the only substance in Spinoza's philosophy, while attributum is described in infinite numbers. Leibniz, who opposes the concept of one substance, says that although "But in simple substances the influence of one Monad upon another is only ideal, and it can have its effect only through the mediation of God, in so far as in the ideas of God any Monad rightly claims that God, in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should have regard to it" (Leibniz, 1898: 8). Beings/ attributums belong to substance with the concept of a single substance. In this context, Leibniz disagrees with the idea that existence must necessarily belong to a single substance, and disagrees with the important seventeenth-century concept of substance.

In the Definition III of Part I, Spinoza provides a definition for the concept of substance. With this definition, Spinoza aims to present the containing things in the concept of substance. If the concept is comprehended without any other concepts, this means that this is reason of itself. In other words, it is *causa sui*. The *causa sui* is the reason of itself. In other words, the God never created the world but it is the cause of the world. The essence (essential) is a thing whether exists in the universe on its own or exists depending on another thing.

At the beginning of *Ethics*, while discussing the concept of substance, Spinoza expresses his opinion and the reason of failure in the following premises by saying that “In the universe there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute” (Spinoza, 2002: I/ V Prop). “One substance cannot be produced by another substance” (Spinoza, 2002: I/ VI. Prop.). Therefore, “Every substance is necessarily infinite” (Spinoza, 2002: I/ VIII Prop.).

For Spinoza, in order for a thing to replace another thing, both things must have the same nature. There are no other substance to replace it. The substance is single. As the first reason, the substance does not exist in terms of reason or creation, it exists by necessity by its natura. The substance, that exists by its nature and does not have any similar things, is infinite. Spinoza aims to reach an absolute infinity with the concept of infinity. The reason is that, the thing , that exists by its nature, is necessity in terms of existing or operating.

In this context, the only free thing in the philosophy of Spinoza is substance. The human has no privilege over the substance. All living/ non-living things are the functions of substance, the human has no privilege over non-living things (stone, soil, table). All these include one and same existence period, the aforementioned expression ‘being’ ‘not creation’ is in everything of the substance.

Deleuze, summarizes Spinoza’s understanding of substance as follows: “It is the identification of the ontological relationship between substance and modes, the epistemological relationship between essence and features, and the physical relationship between cause and effect” (Deleuze, 1988: 17-25).

According to Spinoza, the Substance, Natura, God, *Causa sui* has one meaning. We can say, in Spinoza's words, God is both of them, it is *Natura Naturans*, Natura is created, and *Natura Naturata* created natura. According to Spinoza, cosmos and God are the same. The reason is that, the free nature is *Natura Naturans* and *Natura Naturata*. In this context, the different existence forms of the *Natura Naturans* are the nature.

In this philosophy of Spinoza, The God, Substance, Natura, *Causa sui* are indissociable and mean the same thing. In the Part I/ XIV. Premise, Spinoza claims, "Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God" (Spinoza, 2002: I/ XV Prop.) In *Ethics*, Spinoza, who uses the word God for the first time, explains that no substance can exist or be comprehended except the God. In this context, Spinoza, who founds his philosophy for the seventeenth century by bringing together the concepts of God, Nature and Substance, creates a serious breaking point in the context of Faith- God- Nature.

If we extend the underlying nature concept in the substance of Spinoza; it is the thing that exists on its own, is comprehended through itself, shapes its own concept, does not need another concept. "By that which is self-caused I mean that whose essence involves existence; or that whose nature can be conceived only as existing" (Spinoza, 2002: I/ I. Definition). The elementary idea in Spinoza's *Ethics* is for understanding the beings with their initial reasons. "Therefore, in the case of non existent modifications we can have true ideas of them since their essence is included in something else, with

the result that they can be conceived through that something else, although they do not exist in actuality externally to the intellect” (Spinoza, 2002: I/ VIII Prof. 2 Scholium).

For the naturalists, the transcendental nature is used with an immanent meaning in the philosophy of Spinoza. By saying that there is infinite number of ‘attributum/ character-quality’ arising from the substance, Spinoza passes to the second concept of attributum/attributen. The attributums are infinite and we can only know two of them. These are the ‘cogito/ thought’ and ‘extentio’ attributums. When we consider the attributum in the context; the intellectus/understanding is the thing that it comprehends and designs about the substance as if establishing the essence of the substance.

They have infinite number and diversity. The *modus/* modes, that are infinite, are the different types and views of the substance. The modes are in *Mens/ Intellectus* and *Movement/ Stillness*. We can only know of them. The *modus* are infinite and mandatory. From all these statements we can understand that there is only substance in the philosophy of Spinoza, the attributum and modes are only designs. We can only know two of the infinite modes, and these are *mens/* mind/ intellect and *corpus/* body/ object.

There is no temporality in this scheme, the existence of substance is privilege and everything only derives from it. In Premise XIX of Part I of Spinoza’s book, it is stated that “God [is eternal], that is, all the attributes of God are eternal” (Spinoza, 2002: I/ XIX Prop.). This is because its existence comes from its own definition. *Causa sui* is its own cause. In this context, existence in the philosophy of Spinoza is the nature of substance and everything derives from it.

Spinoza opposes Descartes' understanding of dual substance, but also opposes his claims regarding emotions and passions, which he characterizes as belonging to the soul. According to Spinoza, who opposes Descartes' ideas of will and freedom of will, "I shall be dealing with the power of reason, pointing out the degree of control reason has over the emotions, and then what is freedom of mind, or blessedness, from which we shall see how much to be preferred is the life of the wise man to the life of the ignorant man" (Spinoza, 2002: V/ Preface). Also, he adds in the same part (V) –Preface, "I shall be showing the degree and nature of its command over the emotions in checking and controlling them. For I have already demonstrated that we do not have absolute command over them" (Spinoza, 2002: V/ Preface).

With a Monistic structure, the substance in the philosophy of Spinoza replaces the infinite substance in the philosophy of Descartes. Infinite and single substance is also unique in terms of its attributes. Another substance with the same attributes can not be in question. There are two attributums that the human mind can know from substance that has an infinite number of attributums. These are cogito and *corpus*-body/ extensio. In this context, Spinoza opposes not only Descartes' dual understanding of substance, but also his understanding of God.

3.2. Conceptual Framework of Spinoza's *Ethics*

Spinoza shapes his philosophy through a geometric structure in *Ethics*. Spinoza, who addresses "God" in the first chapter "God's existence and his essence are one and the same" (Spinoza, 2002: I/ XX Prop.) and after that "The Nature And Origin Of The

Mind”, also addresses the nature of emotions, human actions and desires in the last three chapters of his book. He states that;

“Nature is always the same, and its force and power of acting is everywhere one and the same; that is, the laws and rules of Nature according to which all things happen and change from one form to another are everywhere and always the same. So our approach to the understanding of the nature of things of every kind should likewise be one and the same; namely, through the universal laws and rules of Nature” (Spinoza, 2002: III/ Preface).

Also, about emotions, he states that “Therefore the emotions of hatred, anger, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and force of Nature as all other particular things” (Spinoza, 2002: III/ Preface). Thus, he forms a structural plane by proving its own propositions.

The most important fundamental concepts in Spinoza’s philosophy are conatus, freedom, and the three primary/main emotions; desire, gladness/ joy and grief/ sadness. Within the framework of concepts, Spinoza makes the human nature the same as the essence of nature. Just as everything in nature works in its own order, this is also true for human. There is no transcendental life. Just as there is no transcendence in nature, and nature is always the same and identical, the way to understand the nature of other things would be to look at nature. Thus natura represents the central core, which forms the fundamental structure of Spinoza’s philosophy. Although the efforts of individuals to exist constitute an immanent freedom, there is no life outside the frame, just like in nature.

Therefore, in Spinoza's philosophy, "By emotions [affectus] I understand the affections of the body by which the body's power of activity is increased or diminished, assisted or checked, together with the ideas of these affections" (Spinoza, 2002: III/ III Definitions).

Spinoza quits writing *Ethics*, which he planned and began writing in 1661, and begins writing *Teological–Political Treatise* in 1665. In his previous book and other books:

"The close connection between individual liberty and politics in Spinoza's philosophy revolves around the idea that personal freedom, and satisfaction of individual desires, is greater or less, and the individual more or less secure, depending on the degree to which the state strives to maintain 'the common good', something which Spinoza argues is inherently more likely to happen the more the state is broad-based and democratic in character" (Israel, 2007: xxx).

In this context, from an anthropological point of view, the questions regarding human's place in society and what the form of government is in society are important. In *Ethics*, Spinoza believes that it is not a solution for human to live with hope or to be happy, on the contrary, s/he must bless his life that s/he lives now and here.

In the next chapters of the thesis, conatus and freedom will be addressed as important concepts of Spinoza's philosophy, and after that, the nature of emotions will be addressed in Spinoza's philosophy. The nature of emotions, Desire, Joy and Sadness,

which Spinoza calls three primary emotions, will be revealed and the conceptual framework will be drawn. Accepting all other emotions as derivatives of these three primary emotions, Spinoza processes them by addressing their unity in the context of the body and mind.

3.2.1. Conatus

In Spinoza's philosophy, the human naturally tends to protect his own existence. When we think of human being since the primeval era, hunting and the transition to the Neolithic order is always caused by the effort of human to protect his own existence. Human wants to live happily and well, and this desire creates his own essence. "Each thing, insofar as it in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being" (Spinoza, III/ VI Prop.). For Spinoza, in Proposition IV of Chapter III, "No thing can be destroyed except by an external cause" (Spinoza, 2002: III/ IV Prop.). Therefore, death is also an exogenous cause.

Spinoza clearly explains and proves this effort in *Ethica*'s Part III, Premise VII. "The conatus¹ with which each thing endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself" (Spinoza, 2002: III/ VII Prop.). Furthermore, conatus can be defined as protection, maintenance and strengthening. The concept of conatus, which is understood as the individual's desire and power to preserve and develop his own existence, also collaterally means power. Since singular things have

¹ [The term "conatus" plays an important role in Spinoza's psychology. It expresses Spinoza's view that each thing exemplifies an inherent tendency toward self-preservation and activity. This term has a long history, going back to Cicero, who used it to express Aristotle's and the Stoics' notion of impulse (*horme*). It was later used by medieval and early modern philosophers, such as Hobbes, to connote the natural tendency of an organism to preserve itself]

the attributes of God and are opposed to what will destroy themselves, they are naturally in a struggle to maintain their existence. Spinoza emphasizes the relationship between effort and essence in the next premise of that part. Anything makes an effort to maintain its own existence, and the effort is the essence found in that thing. And that effort and essence are in question in an unlimited time period. This effort does not take place in a limited time period. Because that thing will however disappear for an external reason, the effort exists in limitlessness.

Spinoza linked *conatus* with *desire* as follows: We make an effort because we want something. You don't make an effort for anything if you don't want it. Thus, desire is our *conatus* itself. In a sense, desire creates and shapes our effort/ *conatus*. "How exactly does our *conatus* shape our responses?" (James, 2003: 146). James answers his own question on the basis of Spinoza's philosophy as follows: "Spinoza argues that our striving to preserve in our being by reacting to other things are our passions" (James, 2003: 146). Thus, it is the derivative of three primary/ main emotions. "Our loves and hatreds, hopes and fears, are therefore all manifestations of the disposition to maintain and increase our power, which is our essence" (James, 2003: 146).

Spinoza explains not only the relationship of effort/ *conatus* to essence and time, but also the connection between effort, mind-body. The mind has many ideas and in the process, it tries to continue its existence. It is only through the emotional situation of the body that the mind achieve its own awareness. In this context, the mind is also aware of its own effort. Spinoza expresses the attribution of this effort to the mind and body with the following concepts: "When this *conatus* is related to the mind alone, it is called

Will [voluntas]; when it is related to mind and body together, it is called Appetite [appetitus], which is therefore nothing else man's essence, from the nature of which there necessarily follow those things that tend to this preservation, and which man is thus determined to perform." (Spinoza, 2002: III/ 9 Prop-Scholium). And Spinoza describes it by saying that "There is no difference between appetite and Desire [cupiditas] except that desire is usually related to men insofar as they are conscious of their appetite" (Spinoza, 2002: IX Prop-Sch).

While explaining the concept of Conatus, Spinoza also explains its connection with time. Because there is no finite time for Conatus. Time is infinitive. In the words of Aristotle, time is the number of measurements of motion from the previous to the next. Because the moments of time are continuous. Bergson, who says that "When time is understood, we become spatialized and turn it into space, also emphasizes that this time is not real time" (Alexander, 2019: 21). In order for the effort to disappear, there must be an external reason. It is impossible for the effort, that creates, to disappear unless an external cause is involved. If we read Spinoza's concept of Conatus through mind-body unity, we can conclude that our mind can not exclude our body. Creating an idea that excludes the body is contrary to the mind. The state of competence and non-competence of the effort-based mind will also help explain our feelings of joy and grief. According to Spinoza, naturally, "When the mind thinks of those things that diminish or check the body's power of activity, it endeavors, as far as it can, to call to mind those things that exclude the existence of the former" (Spinoza, 2002: III/ XIII Prop.).

According to Spinoza, anything can be the accidental cause of desire, joy and pain/ sadness, which are three basic concepts. In this context, what determines our love

and hatred is the result of its characteristic resembling joy and grief, which he describes as primary emotions.

3.2.2. Freedom

According to Spinoza, who considers the concept of freedom in connection with the law of nature, it is the substance, God or nature that is free and has its own reason. In this context, it is God who exists only by his own necessity/ free necessity, as his own cause. While Spinoza describes this as “*Deuse sive Natura*”, he describes God, natura, substance as the inherent cause of everything. As he states in *Ethics*, Part I, proposition XV. “Absolutely infinite substance is indivisible” (Spinoza, 2002: I/ XV Prop). So everything that exists can be found in nature. But God is not subject to an external cause. “Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause” (Spinoza, 2002: XXXII Prop.). Also Spinoza states in the next corollary that “The God does not act from freedom of the will” (Spinoza, 2002: XXXII Prop.-Corollary 1). He further adds, the God will cannot be free. On the other side, human will also can't be called free, because man determines causality by the laws of nature to the nature law. Death of a person, who is one of his modes, occurs for external reasons. However, according to Spinoza, God is free because he is not subject to an external cause. But he is not free because he has no choice to create one or another, because there is a necessity. If we're part of nature, we have to follow its order .

Emotions, and cognitive, the concept of freedom are in a spiral of integrity in the philosophy of Spinoza. It cannot be thought differently. Spinoza, regarding human, says “I assign the term “bondage” to man's lack of power to control and check the

emotions. For a man at the mercy of his emotions is not his own master but is subject to fortune, in whose power he so lies that he is often compelled, although he sees the better course, to pursue the worse ” (Spinoza, 2002: IV/ Preface).

In this way, for Spinoza, the definition of emotions means to create or to remove the immanent freedom for ourselves. Captivity/ Bondage of our emotions already makes us slaves, we cannot think of freedom, but by controlling our emotions we can get rid of this slavery. However, keeping emotions under control is not easy and not a method that everyone can achieve. First of all, there must be a stronger emotion than itself to suppress an emotion. As stated in the conclusion of *Ethics*’s Part V/ III Prop. “A passive emotion ceases to be a passive emotions as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it” (Spinoza, 2002: V/ III Prop.). Spinoza states that the better we know an emotion, the better we can control that emotion. This control is expressed proportionally in the way the mind is influenced by emotion. According to Spinoza, the duty of the mind is exactly to think and create ideas.

In the argumentation of *Ethics*’ Part IV, Premise VII, Spinoza makes a reference to emotion-cause-mind triad by saying that “An emotion cannot be checked or destroyed except by a contrary emotion which is stronger than the emotion which is to be checked” (Spinoz, 2002: IV/ VI Prop.). Spinoza, opens the prop of this proposition as follows “So when the mind is assailed by an emotion, the body at the same time is affected by an affection whereby its power of acting is increased or diminished” (Spinoza, 2002: IV/ VII Prop.-Proof). As stated by Spinoza, substance is a necessity. Human is not free either. The human has no privilege over the substance. All living and non-living being are functions of the substance. Human beings do not have priority

and privilege over the non-living beings, such as stone, soil, table and tree. All of these have one and the same existence process, aforementioned expression is not being or creating, but the substance is in everything that exists.

Spinoza discusses the subject of *action* situation, which saves human from the aforementioned slavery as follows: If I don't know the reason that upsets me, and if my sadness continues, my situation of *passion*, in other words, my slavery situation continues. But if I know what put me in a situation of slavery, I save myself of that situation of slavery, and I become action. By finding the reason our distress, we must prevent this situation from continuing for a long time. At the same time, Spinoza says that the uneducated person is also in a situation of slavery. Furthermore, one of the most striking aspects of Spinoza's philosophy is the distance that must be between the uneducated and the educated. Because even the kindness of the ignorant person is for that educated person, who has his/her own immanent freedom, in other words, the person who only obeys reason, not to draw the hatred of the ignorant people. Establishing a relation between freedom and honesty, Spinoza says in Part IV, LXXII. "The free man never acts deceitfully, but always with good faith" (Spinoza, 2002: IV/ LXXII). He emphasizes once again in this premise that free man acts according to the conditions of reason.

If we consider Spinoza's philosophy as whole, we reach a unity in the context of freedom and knowledge. Spinoza, who mentions four types of knowledge in his book *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione/Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect*, divides these types of knowledge into three categories in *Ethics*. A person realizes the desire to go from less competence to more competence with knowledge. The knowledge

obtained in the first stage; “From individual objects presented to us through the senses in a fragmentary [mutilate] and confused manner without ant intellectual order (see Cor. Pr. 29, II); and therefore I call such perceptions “knowledge from causal experience”. (Spinoza, 2002: II/ 40 Prop.-Scholium) *Cognitio Vaga*. As Spinoza discusses, the second type of knowledge is the one obtained through reasoning. We know that the emotion of hatred is a derivative of the three primary emotions, and that it is a type of sadness. “From symbols. For example, from having heard or read certain words we call things to mind and we form certain ideas of them similar to those through which we imagine things” (Sch. Pr. 18, II).

“From the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things /see Cor. Pr. 38 and 39 with its Cor., and Pr.40, II). I shall refer to this as reason and knowledge of the second kind.” (Spinoza, 2002: II/ 40 Prop.—Scholium II). According to Spinoza, another important knowledge exists, apart from these “Two kinds of knowledge there is, as I shall later show, a third kind of knowledge, which I shall refer to as “intuition” (Spinoza, 2002: 40 Prop-Scholium II). For Spinoza this kind knowledge “Proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things”(Spinoza, 2002: 40 Prop.-Scholium II).

As proved in *Ethics* Part III/ II Definitions, because all emotions restrict freedom, you are free when you know the underlying reason. According to Spinoza, the first type of knowledge is the cause of mistakes, while the second and third types of knowledge are necessarily true.

Spinoza's philosophy includes the concept of immanent freedom. In the philosophy of Spinoza, human beings who exist on an immanent plane are saved from being slaves only by determining the cause of what upsets him, by knowledge and by education. And this lies behind moving this emotion to a certain point. Only those who act according to reason are free. These people only have ideas.

Another point about the philosophy of the Spinoza is regarded to citizens right and freedom. Spinoza highlights here that the citizens have the right to vote, and to be able to perform public duties. In other words, they have the right to elect and be elected and to change those who are elected. In the words of Spinoza, democracy means that:

“My purpose is not to discuss every one, but only that kind wherein all without exception who own allegiance only to their country's laws and are in other respects in control of their own right and lead respectable lives have the right to vote in the supreme council and undertake offices of state (Spinoza, 2002: 753).

He explains very clearly that “Who own allegiance only to their country's laws so as to exclude foreigners, who are deemed to be subject to another government” (Spinoza, 2002: 753).

Regardless of the form of government, does anything change when it cannot provide peace and security? At this very point, the most remarkable expression of Spinoza lies in the issue of gender discrimination. Spinoza does not develop a point of view through gender and/or does not consider it necessary, and remains in a discourse

over men in governing and governing through gender discrimination. If we look at the spirit of the seventeenth century, we see that it does not give women any rights.

According to Spinoza, a human's effort to preserve and maintain human existence -conatus- partially frees him, while his/her lack of effort leaves him/her out of immanent freedom. When we ask the question of whether human has the opportunity to take action within this immanent system or how much opportunity he has, as stated by Pontus Hulden in his book *Vermeer and Spinoza*, Hulden clarifies the subject and states his opinion by saying that; "The possibility of the persons in Vermeer's paintings to act freely is as little as the possibility of Spinoza's human to act" (Hulden, 2012: 32). But even if the possibility of acting is low, what a person can do is not an obstacle to keeping his emotional equipment at a certain level. What is more or less important is the presence of action.

3.2.3. Nature of Emotions

Spinoza explains the nature of emotions in Part III and IV of *Ethics*. Just as everything in nature works without making a mistake, we also need to have a look at nature. Nature is subject to a universal law. Nature has an exemplary perfection. Thus, "By emotions [affectus] I understand the affections of the body by which the body's power of activity is increased or diminished, assisted or checked, together with the ideas of these affections" (Spinoza, 2002: III/ III Def.). Such emotions are the necessity and power of nature, or arise from the necessity and power of nature. Also he discusses in XV. Proposition of the Part III, that "Anything can indirectly [per accidents] be the cause of Pleasure, Pain, or Desire (Spinoza, 2002: III/ XV Prop.). Human's captivity is related to the nature of his emotions, and the increase and decrease of his emotions.

According to his philosophy, a human who becomes captive of his/her emotions is under the control of fate and submits to it. In this case, he/she cannot stop himself/herself going after the evil, even if he/she knows what is good. Because fate has established hegemony over him. What will not be easy for human to get is , according to Spinoza, “I begin, I should like to make a few preliminary observation on perfection and imperfection” (Spinoza, 2002: IV/ Preface)”.

Spinoza addresses the issue through the fact that a human can manage his/her emotions. He calls the inability of human to manage his emotions slavery, because if a human becomes slave of his/her emotions, s/he is in the shadow of emotions. S/he is in captivity. When we bow to emotions, we do not control ourselves, we are under control of our emotions. And this shows that we are in captivity of fate. He states as follows: “The force of any passive emotion can surpass the rest of man’s activities or power so that the emotion stays firmly fixed in him” (Spinoza, 2002: IV/ VI Prop.). After this definition, Spinoza moves to the concepts of virtue and power, expressing the connection of virtue with power in his own way. Because, according to Spinoza, virtue is not related to the concept of morality and values. Just as power/conatus forms the essence of man, virtue does the same. “By virtue and power I mean the same thing; that is (Pr.7, III), virtue, insofar as it is related to man, is man’s very essence, or nature, insofar as he has power to bring about that which can be understood solely through the laws of his own nature” (Spinoza, 2002: IV/ VIII Def.).

In the Introduction section of the book *Political Rewiew*, he uses the phrases “That men are necessarily subject to passions” (Spinoza, 2002: 681), like he also states in *Ethics*. He further adds; “All men everywhere, whether barbarian or civilized, enter

into relationship with one another and set up some kind of civil order, one should not look for the causes and natural foundations of the state in the teachings of reason, but deduce them from the nature and condition of men in general” (Spinoza, 2002: 682).

Sadness is the opposite to gladness, “Transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection” (Spinoza, 2002: III/ Def of the Emon.), and sadness is not perfection itself. Because the feeling of grief is also an act. Spinoza says that the emotion of hate is a derivative of the emotion of grief. He explains, “Hatred is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause” (Spinoza, 2002: III/ VII Exp.).

Thus, while Spinoza bases the primary emotions in the “Definitions Of The Emotions” part in the philosophy, he also discusses the derivatives of these emotions. Emotions are also described in an immanent structure to match Spinoza’s general philosophy. At the end of the part, Spinoza gives a basic description of emotions, a passive state of the soul. The emotions “Called a passive experience is a confused idea whereby the mind affirms a greater or less force of existence of its body, or part of its body, than was previously the case, and by the occurrence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another” (Spinoza, 2002: III/ Gen Def of Em.). Spinoza, emphasizes body-mind combination again in *Ethics*, “An idea that excludes the existence of our body cannot be in our mind, but is contrary to it” (Spinoza, 2017: 165). Because it can possibly destroy our body, it cannot be in there.

In this context, the basis or nature of the three primary/ main emotions that Spinoza addresses in the subject of emotions are in the same context. We see this clearly in the Definition XXXVII., explanation in the definition of anger. Revenge, “Is the

desire whereby we are urged from mutual hatred to inflict injury on one who, from like emotion, has injured us" (Spinoza, 2002: III/ XXXVII Def.).

In the philosophy of Spinoza, the concept of joy and grief -sadness- is compatible with the concept of good and bad. According to Spinoza, in order to be able to decide whether something is good or bad, we need to have the sense of joy and sadness that we are conscious of. Two primary emotions guide us to characterize something as good or bad. In Spinoza's philosophy, the mind combines with the body, and the idea combines with emotion. We know that what's going to be bad is going to cause damage to our existence. It seems impossible to characterize what causes sadness to us as good. And in addition to this, what makes us happy is good. Otherwise, characterizing the object as good and bad is not a solution. It's not just about the moment of time, it's about the moment of the future or the moment of the past. If I dream of swimming in the sea on a sunny day and sunbathing on the beach in the summer, I think the place I will go on holiday will be fine. When I tell someone about a restaurant that I've eaten and disliked in the past, I describe it bad. In this context, there is good and bad as a result created by joy and sadness. While bad decreases our act strength, joy increases our act strength. At this very point Spinoza's joy of life becomes concrete by saying that; every grieving situation or thing is a pressure instrument, badly affects our strength and must be condemned. Because, for Spinoza, it is possible that we can direct our mind and emotions in the direction of happiness and joy.

Here, Spinoza focuses on three primary/main emotions while explaining how emotions play a role in human life. These are; *Cupiditas*/ Desire, *Laetitia*/ Gladness-Joy and *Tristitia*/ Sadness. And he says that other emotions are derivatives of these

three primary/ main emotions. Desire is the main condition of a human to carry himself/ herself to a more competent position from a less competent position.

While Spinoza says that good and evil do not belong to object, he explains the relation of this emotions. And he examines the origin of these concepts. Is good always good? As for the terms, Spinoza states “By good I understand that which we certainly know to be useful to us” (Spinoza, 2002: IV/ I Def.) and “By bad I understand that which we certainly know to be an obstacle to our attainment of some good” (Spinoza, 2002: II Def.). According to Spinoza, same thing at the same time can be good, bad, and/or different. Also he corroborates the concepts of good and evil through the example of music. In this context, for Spinoza, since the concepts of good and evil are a tool that will bring man closer to the model of nature.

Spinoza addresses human freedom in the context of emotions rather than beliefs and the concept of God. As it is a structure for the establishment of Spinoza’s philosophy, freedom is actually an immanent freedom. And in Spinoza’s philosophy, freedom is addressed and analyzed by the connection of the corpus and the mind.

In this context, in the immanent philosophy that Spinoza founded, man is in society but he is also alone with his own individuality. In a sense, he is his own creator. He can make himself happy or unhappy. This is not something that comes from the outside. Because he can direct his emotions with his mind, so that life can be sustained. One can assign his/her own inner peace. In a sense, when we approach Spinoza’s philosophy from an Aristotelian point of view, man is responsible for his actions and himself. If he does something knowingly and willingly, it’s because he wants it. “Those

who do something involuntarily and forcefully suffer. The one who does nice and beautiful feels pleasure” (Aristotle, 1908: 1110 b 10). According to Aristotle, external actors should not be blamed. Precisely, just like in the life of Spinoza, being insistent in his knowing and willing thought system and bearing the consequences, is the foundation of his philosophy. What he lives after Witt and his brother are lynched in Den Haag (The Hague) in 1672, and in addition to that, his declining the professorial duty in Hiedelberg University, was because he believed that life is not to escape and to take shelter, but to live happily in the perspective he wishes. And this life cannot be ruined by anyone. Thus, from Aristotle’s point of view, it is up to the person whether or not to do things that have a beginning. Both philosophers bless life.

Part III of *Ethics* has the title of “On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotions”. Many philosophers have clarified emotions, but Spinoza in particular has put forward the opposite of Descartes’ works and provided demonstrations about the soul. According to Descartes “In order to understand the passions of the soul we need to distinguish its functions from those of the body” (Descartes, 1989: 19) by saying that he makes a reference to this second article, *Passions Of The Soul*. Descartes involvement for emotions with the pineal gland. He negates his saying of stating that pineal gland has a natural connection to a certain movement.

According to Spinoza, action in the soul is necessarily action in the body, while passions in the body is passions in the soul with the same necessity. Spinoza said that “Nature is always the same” (Spinoza, 2002: III Preface). Therefore, if we want to understand something, we will look at the nature and use the same method. This is called the nature’s method. In this context he also adds “The human body can be

affected in many ways by which its power of activity is increased or diminished; and also in many other ways which neither increase nor diminish its power of activity” (Spinoza, 2002: I Postulates). By these statements, he makes his thoughts on emotions clear. Spinoza, emphasizes that emotions have certain reason, by saying so in III Definitions. He establishes a bond between emotion and body that describes the word of ‘emotions’. The interaction of the body or mind is just as dependent on the legalities of the natural order.

These three primary/main emotions define our whole life. Other emotions are derivatives of these three main emotions. These three primary emotions are; Desire, Joy and Sadness. In part III, which he called as “Definitions of the Emotions”, Spinoza makes a clear definition of what joy and grief are by giving an explanation of the subject of emotions. Here the transition of emotions from negative to positive is emphasized. Because these emotions are not competent enough, they are more so in a transition and interface.

But the important word he uses here is the transition of emotions to more positive and more negative levels. Because these emotions are not fully competent, they are in a transition. Spinoza reduces the six primitive passions –Wonder, Love, Hatred, Desire, Joy, and Sadness, which Descartes states in Article 69 of the *The Passions Of the Soul*. With the proposition V in the Part VI, Spinoza, in a sense, reveals the satisfaction point of EQ. Your mind stabilizes its dominance over emotions where emotions will arise. Because the mind, “Insofar as the mind understands all things as governed by necessity, to that extent it has greater power over emotions, i.e. it is less passive in respect of them” (Spinoza, 2002: V/ VI Prof.).

3.2.3.1. Desire (*Cupititias*)

One of the main concepts of Spinoza's philosophy is desire. Because "desire is the very essence of man insofar as his essence is conceived as determined to any action from any given affection of itself" (Spinoza, 2002: III/ I Def. of the Emotions). In this part, Spinoza draws attention to the difference between the two concepts when describing emotions. These concepts are appetite and desire. Spinoza says that desire is an appetite that is conscious of itself, and that appetite leads to actions that will contribute to sustaining/ maintaining human's life. It doesn't matter whether or not human is aware of this appetite, because nothing changes. Spinoza takes into account the nature of human when explaining each concept.

A person does not desire anything because it is good, in other words, a person wants that thing because it is the one that s/he desires. And we call it good because we want it. In the history of philosophy, Spinoza brings a different approach to the ordinary concept of desire. Because the basic concept is desire. Desiring the good, desiring the beautiful, desiring the power etc. In the definition of emotions part, Spinoza brings forward that desire forms the essence of human as long as it is understood as directed at any action. Spinoza also adds a state of consciousness by clarifying this sentence. In this context, he once again states that "Desire is the very essence of man insofar as his essence is conceived as determined to some action. (...) So here I mean by the word 'desire' any of man's endeavors, urges, appetites, and volitions, which vary with man's various states, and are not infrequently so opposed to one another that a man may be drawn in different directions and know not where to turn" (Spinoza, 2002: III/ Def. of the Emon.). He explains that "Pleasure is man's transition from a state of less perfection

to a state of greater perfection. (...) Pain is man's transition from a state of greater perfection to a state of less perfection" (Spinoza, 2002: III/ II-III Exp).

While explaining the derivatives of the three primary emotions, Spinoza states that they can be combined with each other in many different ways. And he states that he considers primary emotions which arises as a result of this combination, but not all of them. Spinoza, who gives particular importance to the concept of love, while summarizing it through the example of food, emphasizes that love and hate can easily be replaced.

Spinoza, to put emphasis on body – mind unity, argues that; "The mind does not know itself, except insofar as it perceives ideas of affections of the body" (Spinoza, 2002: II/ XXIII Prop.) and puts excessive emphasis on that; human mind knows itself.

To explain all the efforts of human, he says this explanation covers all the efforts of human, and that it also covers the concepts such as appetite, will, desire or impulse. Desire "Is therefore a principal manifestation of our conatus, and it consequently belong to our nature to respond to the world desiringly in order to maintain our power" (James, 2003: 146).

3.2.3.2. Joyness (*Laetitia*)

While Spinoza emphasizes body-mind combination he says that these three primary emotions can be principal causes. Because according to Spinoza, anything can, accidentally, be the cause of joy, sadness or desire. Spinoza also takes into account the state of human activity and passivity to prove the emergence of these emotions, in other

words, the joy or sadness -pain- of human. In the argumentation of Part III, Proposition XV, he says that as a result of the mind being affected by both emotions simultaneously, that person's power of activity will either increase or decrease. Thus, the human mind is to be influenced by the feeling that increases/decreases the thinking power, rather than the first feeling that increases/ decreases the thinking power that really causes it. As a result, human will either be happy or sad. Because, accidentally the first emotion will be the cause of joy or grief.

Spinoza considers in Proposition XVIII, Part III that joy and grief are not limited only to the present but also to our thoughts of the future or the past. Yes, a sad event that we remember in the past moment of the present would cause us to grieve in the present. In the same way, when we dream of something that has not happened, and may never will, we find ourselves feeling a sense of joy. But our thinking of the past and our dream of the future needs to be something that affects us, not something that is ordinary and that we are not interested in.

While explaining all these emotions, Spinoza tries to demonstrate the connection of the mind with the body's power of influence. It is obvious that human will be happy when he imagines something he hates or dislike is gone, or that it moved away from himself or his environment. Spinoza describes this in the Proposition XX in Part III. by saying; in other words, it affects the mind pleurably.

In this context, joy and sadness are emotions that we have when we imagine in various ways, not just in the moment. No one wants to live in the same street or apartment with the person they hate. It would make this person happy to imagine that

the hated person left that place. On the contrary, we grieve when we think that a friend we love very much will go away from us. Unlike Descartes, Spinoza emphasizes mind-body uniqueness when describing the emotion world of human with three emotions. And he blesses life and happiness.

Spinoza explains why astonishment, which he does not see as a derivative of emotions, is like that. Because the mind may get stuck in an object. And Spinoza states that this singular imagination is not related to other things.

“The mind will be kept in contemplation of the said thing until it is determined by other causes to think of other things. So the thought of an unusual thing, considered in itself, is of the same nature as other thoughts, and for this reason I do not count wonder among the emotions; nor do I see why I should do so, since this distraction of the mind arises from no positive cause that distracts it from other things, but only from the lack of a cause for determining the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, to think of other things.” (Spinoza, 2002: III/ IV. Exp).

Therefore, he says “I acknowledge only three basic or primary emotions” (Spinoza, 2002: III/ IV. Exp). According to Spinoza, emotion of hope is an emotion that is not stable in its explanation. It is temporary. According to Spinoza, who describes the connection of hope with anxiety, emotions are a state that can be controlled by reason. In additions to all these, what Spinoza is trying to prove is that; the nature of joy and sadness is the same context with desire.

3.2.3.3. Sadness (*Tristitia*)

Spinoza states that, sadness/ pain is the opposite of gladness/ pleasure, “Pleasure is man’s transition from a state of less perfection to a state of greater perfection” (Spinoza, 2002: III/ II Def.), and sadness/ pain “Is man’s transition from a state of greater perfection to a state of less perfection” (Spinoza, 2002: III/ III Exp.). Because the feeling of grief is also an act. Spinoza says that the emotion of hate is a derivative of the emotion of grief. He explains that hatred is pain “Accompanied by the idea of an external cause” (Spinoza, 2002: III/ VII Def.).

Thus, while Spinoza bases the primary emotions in the “Definitions Of The Emotions” part in the philosophy, he also discusses the derivatives of these emotions. Emotions are also described in an immanent structure to match Spinoza’s general philosophy. At the end of the part, Spinoza gives a basic description of emotions, a passive state of the soul. The emotions “Called a passive experience is a confused idea whereby the mind affirms a greater or less force of existence of its body, or part of its body, than was previously the case, and by the occurrence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another” (Spinoza, 2002: III/ Gen. Def of Emon.).

Spinoza, highlights the body-mind combination in *Ethics*. In this context, the basis or nature of the three primary emotions are in the same context as Spinoza cited in Definition XXXVII of Part III, Explanation in the definition of anger. Revenge, “Is the desire whereby we are urged from hatred to inflict injury on one whom we hate” (Spinoza, 2002: III/ XXXVII Exp.).

In the philosophy of Spinoza, the concept of joy and sadness is compatible with the concept of good and bad. According to Spinoza, in order to be able to decide whether something is good or bad, we need to have the sense of joy and grief that we are conscious of. Two primary emotions guide us to characterize something as good or bad. In Spinoza's philosophy, the mind combines with the body, and the idea combines with emotion. Characterizing something as good and bad is about; what helps us preserving our existence and what does not. We know that what is going to be bad is going to cause damage to our existence. It seems impossible to characterize what causes sadness to us as good. And in addition to this, what makes us happy is good. Otherwise, characterizing the object as good and bad is not a solution. "This evils moreover, seemed to arise from this, that all happiness or unhappiness depends solely on the quality of the object to which we are bound by love" (Spinoza, 2002: 5). It's not just about the moment of time, it's about the moment of the future or the moment of the past. While bad decreases our act strength, joy increases our act strength. For Spinoza, it is possible that we can direct our mind and emotions in the direction of happiness and joy. In this point, joy, bad and good is in the same sphere. Grief has to be out of the life. Grief diminishes our liveliness.

According to Spinoza, "With the phrase of *Natura sive Deus*, cosmic nature adds all human nature inside itself, which will no longer be completely devoid of historical reality there" (Bumin, 1987: 13). For Spinoza, not only God-Nature but Man-Nature is in its own spiral.

Spinoza clearly expresses that sadness is the opposite to gladness, transition of a man from a greater perfection to a lesser perfection, and grief is not perfection itself.

According to Spinoza, the feeling of grief is also an act. In this context, Spinoza says that the emotion of hate is a derivative of the emotion of grief. He explains that hatred is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

Thus, while Spinoza bases the primary emotions in the “Definitions Of The Emotion” part in his philosophy, he also discusses the derivatives of these emotions. Emotions are also described in an immanent structure to match Spinoza’s general philosophy. Because something causes main emotions. “If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time, when it is later affected by the one it will also be affected by the other” (Spinoza, 2002: XIV Prof). Spinoza highlights his point about body-mind in *Ethics*, by arguing that the essence of the mind is the confirmation of the actual existence of its own body.

In this context, according to Spinoza, anger is described as a desire which is triggered, together with hate, against something or someone that is hated. Spinoza addresses his proposition that subject of emotions are in the same context. For example anger “Is the desire whereby we are urged from hatred to inflict injury on one whom we hate” (Spinoza, 2002: III/ XXXVI Exp.). Also he discusses cowardice, boldness, benevolence, and etc.

In Spinoza’s *Ethics*, which he opens with the concept of God, only the social part of human is discussed with an anthropological origin. In fact, this socialism is implicit. We want to think about where a man lives; where he lives is the shadow of the substance. Time does not exist, however, not only time, but also space does not exist. Living place is a shade. The place to be happy is in eternity. However, history and

culture are lacking in *Ethics* in discussion of human, which is a historical, social and cultural being in the general description of philosophy. In his works, which do not contain any references to art, the creation of human, which is not different from other objects, has been ignored. According to Spinoza, “with the phrase of *Natura sive Deus /Natura or God*’, cosmic nature adds all human nature inside itself, which will not longer be completely devoid of historical reality there” (Bumin, 1987: 13). According to Spinoza, not only God-Nature but Human-Nature is in its own spiral.



4. SURVIVOR SLAVERY, DEFEATED MASTERY

Undoubtedly, “Man’s first feeling was that of his own existence, and his first care that of self preservation” (Rousseau, 2011: 63). At the beginning of the neolithic age, the lands gave all necessary products for the people who cultivated the lands. The person who, ‘having enclosed a plot of land’, took it into his head to say this is mine and found people simple enough to believe him was the true founder of civil society. However, these lands had to be cultivated, the products had to be collected and sold, and money had to be earned. Human beings, which were not naturally different from each other, began to separate gradually from each other by competition and fell into a natural inequality. It was a keen struggle which would determine the master and the slave and the one who cultivated the land. As a slave, life had to be maintained with the effort to exist and survive.

Hobbes, in his work titled *Leviathan*, discusses the humanitarian conditions of living safely with their natural rights and laws, and the possibility of determining its rules through an agreement. The philosopher, in *Leviathan*, aims to set a civilised political system/ environment between human beings/ society and state. Hobbes states that human naturally “Love to dominate over others and to have freedom” (Hobbes, 1982: 133), and tries to end man’s domination over individuals. Such efforts limit man’s domination over anyone, and direct the aim to create a state/ great power within itself.

On the other hand, Rousseau states, “This struggle was not the beginning of a social situation, and it emerged through its effect” (Durkheim, 2019: 21). The relationship between human-human and human-society are determined by the balance

of power, the rights, the effort to exist and the preference of survival. In this regards, mastery and slavery are inevitable in the relationship of human-human. However, for Hegel, this class existence is not an absolute end, and it refers to a changeable class structure.

Hobbes, emphasizes a grammatical distinction between servants and slaves in this class difference, and defines the slaves as “They are not under any obligation, they may break their chains in accordance with the justice or escape from prison; they may kill or kidnap their masters” (Hobbes, 1982: 158). When we examine the concepts of mastery and slavery from the perspective of Hegel and Spinoza in the history of philosophy, in Hegel’s philosophy, the slave is associated with not having ownership of property (implicit consciousness). On the other hand, in Spinoza’s philosophy, the slave is considered in terms of the control of his emotions, the slave shows the struggle/ effort/ conatus regarding his emotions against himself. In the Hegel’s philosophy, as a result of such efforts, the mastery will be defeated, and the slavery will survive.

In this case, next chapter will explain Hegel’s master slave dialectic. After that literature will be aimed to understand, commented on and explained in terms of the changes made by the slave in his position through his emotions.

4.1. Slavery, Hegel’s Master – Slave Dialectic

The existence of man has been shaped through his actions as a historical, social and cultural living being. As stated by Aristotle, man is the totality of possibilities. However, Aristotle, who considers slavery as a general condition, does not consider slaves citizens within the site. In ancient Greece, slaves were considered as a group

worked to complete all kinds of physical activities. On the other hand, mental/intellectual works existed for free citizens as they could work for the public welfare and make a contribution to the state. Aristotle states that slavery is not a changing structure/absolute position and that this situation itself is associated with the nature of human being.

In ancient Greece, where having a slave was considered very normal, slaves were the people who “Had the weight of the world on their shoulders while they were running in the bazaar to buy something to eat or carrying the form of their masters” (Toner, 2015: 11). The masters “Knowing that they could not employ them by force, gave them small gifts and made them feel that there was a hope for them to achieve their freedom one day” (Toner, 2015: 12). In every sense, slaves were the people who worked to survive. In this regard, in ancient Greece, there was a harmonious life by obeying the rules within the site, and therefore, no more individuality.

Aristotle does not consider the existence of a class structure such as slaves, workers and farmers disturbing. What was important for him was that there was no difference among free citizens who would maintain the structure of the state. When we examine the human body physically, we see that the structural differences have been shaped by the nature. In this regard, slaves are suitable for physical labour, and other free people are suitable for participation in state government activities using their minds. According to “Alcidamas, a Sophist in the fifth century BC, states that God has not determined anyone as a slave and has created all human beings as free individuals, and Antiphon emphasizes that all human beings are naturally equal in all respects”

(Kıran, 2019: 352). In ancient Greece, the important class structure included being a citizen and thus, slaves were not considered as citizens.

The concepts of slave-master and freedom are considered as a structure beyond general moral in accordance with the concepts of good and evil in Nietzsche's work/book, titled *Beyond Good and Evil*. However, Spinoza considers such concept in the context of the nature of emotions. For Spinoza, the main rule for a human to behave rationally lies in not being enslaved by her/ his emotions. In this regard, in order for a person to exhibit rational behavior, it passes through the body, in which his/her feeling and passions are formed and live. "It is necessary to 'cultivate' the emotions which allow for a 'perfect' and 'good' life we want to live, to 'condition' the body and mind to such perfect lifestyle (...) and to prepare emotional conditions of the form of existence in which our mind decides that it is a 'good' life" (Fransez, 2012: 213). In Hegel's philosophy, slavery has been considered as a changable class structure in connection with the concept of consciousness and self-consciousness in addition to freedom.

Küçükalp, who considers the difference of views on the slave-master dialectic of Nietzsche ve Hegel, states, "Both of them try to place the essence in the movement of the being through a movement to opposite directions" (Küçükalp, 2010: 61), and Nietzsche emphasizes, "The essence of human being requires a great and difficult inner struggle" (Küçükalp, 2010: 55) against Hegel's concepts of consciousness and self-consciousness. Though a structure, which negates each other in slave-master power balance, has been shown in Hegel's philosophy, this power is not a negation in Nietzsche's philosophy, and "Negation does not exist in the essence as a form which

realizes the activity of the power. On the contrary, it is a result of the activity, in other words, the existence and difference of an active power (quoted by Küçükalp, 2010: 60).

In Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the slave-master dialectic has been discussed through the concepts such as Geist, individualism, historicity, self-consciousness, willing, recognition, fear, working, oppression and freedom. Hyppolite comments on Hegel's attitude towards master and slave relationship by stating, "He consider it is a dialectic relationship in accordance with the philosophy of history, and determines and affirm the slave's success/ victory as a historical obligation" (Hyppolite, 1973: 18).

Approaching Hegel's philosophy with an anthropological reading of Kojève, who examines Hegel's philosophy through an anthropological perspective, emphasizes, "What makes us human, in other words, the anthropogène element includes negation, struggle, working, creation, transformation and discovery" (quoted by Kojève, 2010: 14). In this anthropological reading, Kojève states that the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness arises from the Will. Desire is the concept that constitutes the absence of existence. What one wants always determines its content. Knowing leads human to the object, but desire leads human to himself/ herself and to the wanted. In order for the request to be satisfied, it must also be an object. Without the object, the request is not satisfied. The importance of the concept of desire is that it forms the slave-master dialectic. Desire to survive and desire to be recognized is the touchstone of this class dialectic. "Consists essentially in showing that the truth of the master reveals that he is the slave, and that the slaves is revealed to be the master of the master" (quoted by Cole, 2004: 579).

In Hegel's philosophy, self-consciousness is the will. In other words, we have self-consciousness thanks to the will. "Though self-consciousness is the awareness of another's awareness of oneself, it exists as a thing that is completely known" (Hegel, 2019: 80). "The fact that "the object of consciousness or the truth of otherness in itself is decisive in the relation it establishes with the otherness or the world, and it is itself the essential" (Günay, 2017: 10). Here, "It is the two objects of consciousness that reveal the antithesis that enables the movement of self-consciousness. (...) On the other hand, the sensory world as another is a meaningless "self" that suggests the essentiality of its own activity in its relationship with this world. (...) In Hegel's philosophy, the desire of self-consciousness also arises with this antithesis" (Günay, 2017: 10). A self-consciousness exists only in itself and for itself, as long as it is accepted by other self-consciousnesses. And this indicates that the first relationship between subjects is battle. "This is struggle between the master and the slave; both sides resolve the struggle not by eliminating the other but rather by remaining in a relationship of inequality and interdependency. It is the battle of wills, and a struggle for recognition" (Cole, 2004: 580). And this, opens the way for the recognition of the master who won the battle. Recognition, one of the important concepts of Hegel's philosophy, is the founding element of soul. "Soul, as a union of different self-consciousness, is made possible by these self-consciousness knowing each other; in this sense, Soul/ Geist is one that is "I" and one that is "We". (...) It is the phenomenological origin of Soul. (...) The founding element of Soul, along with Soul/ Geist, means that the concept of recognition' throughout phenomenology also exists in 'continuity'" (Günay, 2017: 16). But s/he is a slave who accepts the master, not another master. Recognition by an implicit/ dependent- consciousness loses its meaning.

According to Hegel in the slave-master dialectic, firstly, the slave forms dependent consciousness -veil consciousness-, the essence of which is to live for another -master-, and the master forms independent consciousness, the essence of which is to live for himself/ herself. In fact, the source of all this fight is based on the acceptance of one consciousness' own existence over another consciousness. At the end of this fight, the Master's will is based only on recognition or to be known. A slave acts as a separator before the master can transform nature by taking it under his own yoke. "Through labor that shapes and forms, the slave is the one who begins to see freedom" (Hegel, 1977:12). The difference between animal and human; is that working trains a person, therefore, a person who is trained - for the first time in his/her life-, a person who completes himself and reaches satisfaction with this consummation, is not necessarily a master, but a slave. Or, at least, a person who was a slave before. At the end, there is no slave without a master. For the master who forgives the life of the slave, this forgiveness is only for existence/ recognition. The absence of the slave indicates his/ her own absence, but also the absence of the master. Intersubjective existence determines the master and slave. And the three elements that determine this dialectic are based on desire, recognition, and action/praxis.

In Hegel's philosophy, "Existence consists of the spiritual principle -geist-, the opening of this universal reason revealing the possibilities it carries" (Gökberk, 1970:12). In the words of Hegel, dialectic is "The opening of a 'Inner' by moving in a certain way towards a certain purpose" (Gökberk, 1970:12). Moving towards this purpose is a self-conscious progress, and it will be the freedom gained at the end of this consciousness. Geist is the opening of the mind in time.

The master has won the struggle of living, in other words, “He has achieved his freedom by caring his life instinct more than his struggle” (Kojève, 2012: 50). On the other hand, the slave, who works for his master to survive, “Achieves his domination on the nature and his own nature, which was controlled by his master during the struggle, as he focuses on his own instinct and devotes himself to science, thoughts and techniques” (Kojève; 2010: 51). The success achieved by the master in the struggle will be shaped by the success achieved by the slave through working. The slave becomes aware of truth, freedom (Freiheit), and autonomy (Selbständigkeit) while changing his/her conditions. At this point, even if the slave continues his physical slavery, he opens the door of intellectual freedom. The substructure for the slave to achieve his real freedom has been shaped. During his life with his master, the slave should think the idea of freedom abstractly and have the absolute idea required to achieve his absolute freedom. At this point, the slave negates his fear of death felt by him in the beginning and realizes that what makes a human being a human is negation. On the other hand, “Opposition has to be overcome quintessentially as no opposition is sustainable when understood within their inner connections. When something happens within itself, it always includes its opposite as it refers to its opposite. (...) And it means the immanence of negation in Hegel’s philosophy, and “Is condemned to be resolved within each other sooner or later in the light of the understanding of such inner connections” (Mandalinci, 2017: 25).

Hegel states that history will be the history of the slave, not the history of the master. In the relationship between the nature-master and the nature-slave, cultivation and recognition of the ground by the dependent consciousness lead to another moment.

Survival of the slave having individualism with fear brings him the necessity to work, and thus, the slave makes a progress. On the other hand, the master is the one who does not work. The master is not happy with this stability. However, the one who wants the change is the slave, not the master. All this adventure is a journey led the way to the human rights and the modern state where individuals have understood freedom.

The main method of Descartes' philosophy has been shaped by doubt. Doubt is the cornerstone of the Cartesian philosophy. Descartes uses deduction and mathematics as a method. He reaches thinking of self through skepticism as a conceptual method. Furthermore, he wants to reach 'clarity and certainty' by leaving prejudices on knowing and sense organs aside. In this regard, though the first step of Descartes as reaching the subject/ I/ ego is full of doubt, it leaves its place to fear and work in the self-consciousness of Hegel's philosophy. "Working is the existence of the power in the self, particularly. In the slave's fear of his master, the consciousness does not know that it exists for the self. However, the act of work exists as a phase/ condition that makes the slave a slave and paves the way for the displacement" (Hegel, 2019: 85, 194).

For Hegel, absolute freedom includes mutual recognition only between equal and independent individuals. The unhappiness of the master is that he has been accepted by an implicit/ dependent consciousness, not by a self-consciousness that is equal to him. And this leaves his victory in the shade. According to Hegel philosophy "Essence of Geist/ Spirit is its freedom" (Hegel, 1988: 20). In this regard, the slave will reach the consciousness of freedom in his historical progress, complete his evolutionary structure, and will not be the history of his master.

The slave is a person who implies the existence of a sociological class structure, works in physical activities and is dependent on his master. When we examine freedom as an opportunity for humans, this absolute end -freedom- is considered in connection with world history in Hegel's philosophy. Because "(...) World history that is the exhibition of the Geist/ Spirit, the working out of the explicit knowledge of what it is potentially" (Hegel, 1988: 21). Hegel explain that geographical and temporal stages of world,

"In the world of the Orient, people do not yet know the Spirit –the human as such – is free. (...) They know only that one person is free. (...) It was among the Greeks that the consciousness of freedom first arose, and thanks to that consciousness they were free. Greeks and Romans world, as well knew only that some persons are free, not the human as such (...) It was first the Germanic peoples, through Christianity, who came to the awareness that every human is free by virtue of being human, and that the freedom of spirit comprises our most human nature" (Hegel, 1988: 21).

Hegel refers to Aristotle and Plato when he explains the Greek world. In ancient Greece it was not just owning a slave, "Greek life and their splendid freedom were bound up with this – but their freedom itself was partly a matter of mere chance, a transient and limited flowering, and partly a hard servitude of the human and the humane" (Hegel, 1988: 21). According to Hegel the final goal of the world is "Geist/ Soul's consciousness of its freedom, and hence also the actualization of that very freedom" (Hegel, 1988: 22).

The main aim of this study is to examine the philosophy of emotion and to understand the novel titled *White Castle* in the context of the nature of emotions in accordance with Spinoza's philosophy. The position/ class status of the slave and master in the light of the concepts of consciousness and self-consciousness generally only in Hegel's philosophy has been examined. In the next chapter of the thesis, the displacement of the nature and emotions in the slave-master dialectic will be discussed, and then, At the end of the last chapter, the issue in literature, philosophy and emotions will be examined.

4.1.1. Displacement of Emotion and Nature

In Spinoza's work, while freedom –immanent- and slavery are handled within the context of emotions, Hegel (1770-1831) clearly reveals/ states a class structure/ state, by explaining the dialectic of master and slave in terms of property. In Hegelian philosophy (Hegelianism), slave gives up his/her right to life and s/he is the one who cultivates the land for his master.

‘All that is real is rational; and all that is rational is real’. This suggestion is like a summary of Hegel's (1770-1831) philosophy. Here, the reason “Is not the sense of thinking found more or less in every human being; it is a principle beyond the subject, in other words, the main entity which constitutes human being, nature where the human beings live, culture world and everything” (Gökberk, 1970: 1-12). And this main entity is described as “Geist” in Hegel philosophy. From this point of view, in Germany where Hegel lived, “Hegel's own life finely documents Germany's feudal agricultural

structure well in to the 18th Century and beyond. In the most broad terms, this late feudalism is marked by its peasant/ lord relations” (quoted by Cole, 2004: 577-610).

In other words, slave knows the nature, understands its language and works. In addition, for the Hegel philosophy an important point is the slave-master notion. Actually, Hegel in his book title *Phenomenology of Spirit* “Never uses Sklave or Sklaverei, he refer to the Knecht and Herr” (Cole, 2004: 577-610). In this way, we should be able to say both of philosophers, Spinoza and Hegel, much more depend on the sociologist and land position while they create their own philosophy. According to Cole, he wishes to “point out some connections between Heegel and the Middle ages, connection that, again, Marx himself appreciated when he wrote in the Critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* that “The peak of the Hegelian identity, as Hegel himself admits, was the Middle Ages” (Cole, 2004: 578). And we remember that “Many, any probably most, German peasants were personally subject to one or more lords; they lived in Erbuntertanigkeit, hereditary subjection, which limited their rights to move, marry, and do certain kinds of work” (quoted by, Cole, 2004: 578). Also Jerome Blum who is an agrarian historian states that “The face of rural Europe looked much as it had in the Middle Ages (...) The great mass of people (...) lived at the narrow margin of subsistence, as much at the mercy of the shortage of food as their forbears had been in the had been in the thirteenth century” (quoted by Cole, 2004: 578).

Topographic structures are different for Spinoza, who lived in the seventeenth-century Netherlands. The Dutch people, who had their golden era in art and commerce, were mostly sailors and merchants, not peasants. They were townsmen. Despite all unrests, their political life was more developed than other countries. “In the 17th

century, (...) the Dutch people were the most urbanized society in the Europe, the country had the highest rate of literacy, the number of people having artworks in their homes was above average, the social background was strong, and different religious beliefs were tolerated” (North, 2014: 9). Spinoza emphasizes that human/ person lives in society. He emphasizes that people slavery and mastership are not something that is applied from outside to this life. In this regard, Spinoza discusses the concepts freedom and slave by considering the union of emotion-body. The framework of slavery and immanent freedom will determine its relationship with reason, which is the control of emotions.

Thus, the concepts of slave and master -for Spinoza immanent freedom- are handled differently by both philosophers. Hegel reveals work and nature as slave passes from consciousness to self-consciousness. “The slave appears as an instrumental body whose labor provides material conditions of his master’s wealth, and the slave’s material products reflect both his subalternity and his master’s domination” (Butler, 2004: 41).

In Spinoza’s philosophy, being a slave with emotions and getting rid of it depends on one’s ability to control own emotions. This action and passion is not only related to action but also to the power of thinking. This increase in mind or power of thinking can overcome all kinds of sadness, grief and slavery.

However, for Hegel, who explains the hierarchical structure in the society, the way to free the slave from this state of slavery, even though s/he has no right to own property, passes through the structural condition of the master and the master’s

relationship with nature, in other words, through the property and land owned by the master.

In this regard, when we examine the issue in accordance with the framework of human/ slave –nature- Human/ master, the main key leaves us alone with the concept of self-consciousness. Hegel's philosophy states that humans will achieve the awareness that they are not only a natural being, in the light of their will. On the other hand, for Kant, it is a result that humans come to through the act of knowing because this act takes the subject to the object. However, for Hegel, the will of the subject brings the self-consciousness into existence, and turns the subject to itself. Self-consciousness, which has been accepted as the existence condition of consciousness, forms the basis of Hegel's philosophy.

In this context, if we consider the slave-master dialectics through Hegel's philosophy, the defeated side will be mastery, the living or continuing side will be slavery. And at the end of a repeating struggle, slavery will evolve towards mastery. For both philosophers, slavery can change its side. In this context, both philosophers, Spinoza and Hegel, are in the nonabsolute position of mastery and slavery -for Spinoza immanent freedom-.

Although the master is well-known, while he/she destroys himself/herself, the slave who cultivates the land will open the way for himself to live freely. The only thing that helps him/ her in this process is his relationship with nature. For the slave who cultivates the land and understands the language of nature, this knowledge about the nature puts him/her on the path to freedom. But while becoming a master, s/he will lose

the mastery, because he will not have a slave anymore. He will build a mastery without slaves.

Desire, an important concept in the philosophy of Spinoza, also plays an important role in the shaping of slave-master dialectics in Hegel's philosophy. Because, desire “Brings (returns) a man back to himself” (Bumin, 2013: 35). But the valid condition for this return is “The emergence of self-consciousness and the subject of the desire is not the object but another subject” (Bumin, 2013: 35). And while animal desire involves organic nutrition only for the maintenance of physical life, the basis of human nutrition is desire. But in order for this desire to take place, one must be self-conscious. And s/he has to make his self-consciousness accepted by other's self-consciousnesses. The battle during the acceptance phase of other self-consciousnesses is a deadly battle. In the philosophy of Hegel, this battle forms the basis of humans being a citizen after the mastery and slavery.

4.2. Approaching on Novel *White Castle* within the Terms of Spinoza's Philosophy

In this last chapter, first of all, *White Castle* novel's class is going to be determined through master-slave dialectic of Hegel philosophy, after that, the novel is going to be explained through a notion and emotions perspective, and then *White Castle* will be analysed through the nature of emotions of Spinoza's philosophy and the concepts in the novel - especially, the emotions of the slave.

White Castle, will be read through the philosophical method, trying to interpret it through language and notion, which we call the intersection of two disciplines. In the analysis of the novel, slave's experiences with his master will be discussed and examined in the context of slave's feelings such as fear, anger, joy and sadness. At the same time, it will be questioned whether the master shows his feelings and whether this coincides with his position -master/ Hoja-. As someone who lives with his slave, the master/ Hoja sometimes does not feel emotionally as a master, with the emphasis on class difference. This causes us to question the turbulent emotional traumas of the master and the position in which he falls from time to time, in front of the slave, through the feeling-body dilemma.

According to Gadamer, "Literature, in other words, written word, is like poetry, alienated from its ontological value. This is true not only for famous books that deserve it, but also for books that deserve it, but also for books that are everyone's book and books that are nobody's book" (Gadamer, 2013: 271). Because the written work/ text, which we call literature, exists "As a material that should be read repeatedly, but not quietly" (Gadamer, 2013: 225). Gadamer, states in his work, *Truth and Method/ Wahrheit und Methode* that every reading is 'always a reproduction, execution and interpretation', there is no difference between audible and silent reading.

Orhan Pamuk's *White Castle* is a novel suitable for interdisciplinary work. When considered as a historical novel, it can be read as a historical novel and through post-modernism by examining the Mehmed IV Period (1642-1693). When considering that the novel ended with the slave replacing the master, we can remember that in Turkish and World Literature we can see these situations; "Taking one's place for a

temporary period, turning into it; and in the narratives of the old period; metamorphosis, entering another disguise, changing garment (incognito)” (Korkmaz, 2009: 119). *White Castle* can also be read under a metaphorical structure. In the historical structure, when the hunting passion of that period and the hunting passion of the Sultan are considered sociologically, it can be discussed within the context of human-nature. In addition to these, in history, through the astrologers and the social life of the Ottoman place, the connections of both the palace and ordinary people with the astrologers can be understood.

In the last part of this thesis, the goal is to understand the unity of literature-philosophy through different concepts and literary works and to determine the processing and place of emotions in literature, before interpreting the concepts in the novel through a method and through hermeneutics.

4.2.1. *White Castle* Novel: Master/ Hoja and Slave Position

While the concept of “self/ ego”, which Orhan Pamuk handles as a striking structure in his novel *My Name Is Red*, is shaped implicitly through the slave-master concept in the novel *White Castle*, the concept of “self/ ego” turns into ‘why me!’. The novel begins with the story of when a Venetian slave, who knows astronomy, physics and painting, and at the same time knows medicine, starts living with master/ Hoja who looks like himself, in the Ottoman city of İstanbul, shaped by the whims and passions of a child Sultan. The whole novel is shaped with the contrasts of the West and the East, Knowledge and Superstition, Slave and Master. “In the book, which is essentially an identity and history palimpsest, the slave is not a slave anymore and the master is not a

master anymore. Because the *White Castle* that master/Hoja and slave are representatives of East and West” (Koçakoğlu, 2011: 185-202).

The most important feature of the novel is the replacement of the concepts of slave and master. Firstly, the slave is a master, then he becomes a slave, and master again. The novel begins with the Venetian ship deciding to show the white flag. Recalling Hegel’s dialectic, the beginning of this chapter is a transition to accepting slavery in order to live and survive. The master has free consciousness, and the slave has dependent consciousness. In the last word of his novel, Pamuk writes that “That Master-Slave relationship which reminds us Hegel” (Pamuk, 2016: 129) was established, based on the idea that the slave from the West, who made progress with the Renaissance, has a more comprehensive knowledge of science.

“Cutting the unnerving wall of fog into waves of colour, more than ten Turkish galleys were upon us at once. Now at last our captain decided to fight, trying to overcome, I believe, not the enemy, but his own fear and shame; he had the slaves flogged mercilessly and ordered the cannons made ready, but the passion for battle, late to flame, was also quick to burn out. We were caught in a violent broadside volley –our ship would surely sink if we did not give up at once –we decided to raise the flag of surrender” (Pamuk, 1990: 6).

The novel describes its own formal structure, the purpose of writing the novel is to combine the used sources and to show how they are combined with fiction. These

are conveyed to the reader by the author. Open to postmodern reading, the novel is told based on a story from a certain part of history. “In the *White Castle*, history, in this respect, problematizes the contrast between reality representation or life-fiction” (Ayan, 2019: 38-59).

At the beginning, the slave, “Undoubtedly, can be known and recognized as a person who has not shown the courage to risk his/ her life. But in this case, it will not reach the truth of being recognized and known as an autonomous self-consciousness” (Kojève, 2015: 84).

Two people fight each other, while trying to create themselves, the aim for the fight is the death of the one of these two people so that the other one can survive. They want to kill the person against them, because this is a ruthless fight, in other words, “His/ her enemy must give up life and consciousness, but only destroy his/ her autonomy. Since s/he is the one who attacks the other, s/he must be eliminated. S/he must enslave the other” (Kojève, 2015: 87).

Although with the narration of the Venetian Slave it is stated that the novel is coloured in the light of events that took place during the period of Mehmet IV (1642-1693) as a fictionality of scientific knowledge, its discourse through language transforms the work and gives it the flavour of a novel, and therefore, the fictional structure is revealed. The slave is not an ordinary slave, he has studied *Septem Artes Liberales de Quadrivium*, he is well versed in these subjects, as well as helping other slaves with his medical knowledge to recover and improve their health. “People had heard I was a doctor, so now I was not just looking after the slaves rotting away in the

prison, but others as well. (...) With the money I was able to hide from them, I paid for lessons in Turkish” (Pamuk, 1990: 9). Ottoman language, in other words, Ottoman Turkish, was used in the Ottoman Empire. Turkish became the main language of the land after the declaration of the republic. The fictional structure of the novel is also revealed through statements made about language. We come across statements regarding the Turkish language among the lines of the slave, such as ‘Turkish lessons’, ‘despite my insufficient Turkish’, etc. Venetian slave does not mind escaping from the dungeon. Because he knows that those who have accepted slavery and escaped cannot go far away. In front of the master who threatened him with death, he knows that with his dependent consciousness.

The slave faces death in the fight/ struggle for self-consciousness. He realizes that death is his own end, which he has never thought of until that day. The survival of his own existence depends on another person’s self. And while accepting him as the master, he also submits to an implicit life and to a dependent consciousness. With his physical slavery, which continued after the dungeon, he starts living in the house of his master in İstanbul, who looks exactly like him. The dialectic that begins after this time continues entirely through emotions. Because there is no land to share. Wild nature is far from them, they are in the city life. Emotions will determine mastery and slavery and keep them in the shadow-light game in this nonabsolute class process. “The conversion or replacement motif used since ancient times describes the mutual replacement of two different people who meet in Slave- Master positions, involving each other by talking, writing, and acting” (Korkmaz, 2009: 120). “All three acts are expressions of emotion. But the flow of the Slave into the future that provides all these

possibilities will only be possible with the notion of knowledge that gives him privilege” (Korkmaz, 2009:120).

“As the slave speaks and makes Hoja face him, he frees and separates him from all his covers and patterns. Just like in the tale of “The Snake Prince”, Hoja begins to become himself more, as he writes and confesses his own bad behaviors. Within that period, he first experiences the anxiety of confronting himself without cover and loses his self-confidence; he feels almost naked and afraid. And he expects the slave to approve his words” (Korkmaz, 2009: 123).

Master/ Hoja’s anxiety and following fear after this confrontation are the preliminary steps to protect himself from evil. In other words, not knowing what might happen to him at the end of this confession causes him to face twice as much fear.

When the slave says that “If a person can see his/her appearance while looking in a mirror, s/he can also watch his essence by looking into his own thought”, (Pamuk, 1990: 71) this line has an implicit reference to reflexive thought, which is the basic structure of philosophy.

In the *White Castle*, the unbalanced relationship between the Hoja and his slave implies the slave’s effort for his own salvation, and draws the lines of emotions and knowledge in that relationship. Just as how we can see our faces in the mirror, we can see/ watch our essences by focusing on our thoughts and thinking processes in our mind. The *White Castle*, refers to reflexive thinking, that is one of the partial methods in

philosophy, and hints that Pamuk's novels consist the association of literature and philosophy.

The events that occur while the slave and master live together in the same house and try to fulfill some of the Sultan's wishes are attempts to exist secretly from the Self/ master and the implicit Self/ slave. "In the morning as I walked to my look-alike's house I imagined there was nothing I would be able to teach him. But apparently his knowledge was no greater than mine. Moreover, we were in accord" (Pamuk, 1990: 14). The slave thinks ahead of the possible balance of power for the master/ Hoja with whom he has to live. Master/ Hoja tests him whether he has enough knowledge. Because properly obtaining the explosive mixture is important for both of them. The slave constantly tests whether the master/ Hoja is superior to him. They weigh with scales and experiment with the mixture they carefully prepared in Surdibi. And slave notes the results, sometimes in the moonlight, sometimes in the dark. Because the master/ Hoja is the one who rules over him and makes him do things by giving him missions.

According to Hegel, "A Slave becomes aware of himself against his work and labor he creates", (Hegel, 1977: 117) however, according to the novel, a slave becomes aware of his own self and a transformation is achieved as a result of mixing his feelings with his knowledge, not through self-awareness by working in the land. This causes us to read the dialectic of freedom - slave in the novel through the emotions in Spinoza's philosophy. Because the emotions of the slave against the master/ Hoja ensure that he is in an active or passive position. "I must have glanced at Hoja with fear and hope for a moment. He said he would not free me until 'they' realized" (Pamuk, 1990: 29).

The novel is shaped by the joint work of the master/ Hoja and the slave in astronomy and the production of fireworks, and sometimes by performing tasks assigned by the Sultan:

“First, to welcome the guests and announce the beginning of the display, we fired off colourless rockets shooting straight up into the sky; immediately after that we set off the hoop display Hoja and I called ‘The Mill’ (Pamuk, 1990: 17). In an instant the sky turned red, yellow and green, booming with terrifying explosions”

The slave tells his master that he had studied astronomy, that he knew the basic rules of Ptolemaic Cosmography. In a sense, this looks like as the first step which is taken to make an impression on the master and in order not to be alienated:

“To live alone in that house we had shared for so many years unnerved me even more. My pockets full of Money, my feet soon learned the way to the slave market; I went back and forth for months until I found what I sought. In the end I bought some poor devil who didn’t really resemble me or Him and brought him home” (Pamuk, 1990: 133).

During their life in İstanbul, in the house of master/ Hoja, the slave and his master work together to fulfill the Sultan’s wishes in the context of feelings such as distrust, joy, grief, curiosity, anger and fear, and they create the self and the non-self/ other.

Thus, the *White Castle* novel ends with the emotional ups and downs of the slave and the master/ Hoja questioning ‘why me’, with the slave moving to the master’s house, in other words, replacing him. The slave is a master now, but a master without a slave. Although he buys a slave for himself, he sends him away.

4.2.2. Notions and Emotions: Philosophical Case In The *White Castle* Novel

All Humanities disciplines, such as Anthropology, Philosophy, Sociology, History, Art and Film Studies are interested in emotions of the human. Because those disciplines want to effect or reach readers or viewers. In a sense, the concept of emotion(s) forms the essence/ core/ soul of literature. Concepts such as passion, love, hate, betrayal, death, and jealousy are heavily processed in the spiral of literary person-space- object, shaping the literary work with emotion and presenting an aesthetic structure. In *The Museum of Innocence* novel, the passion for women is shaped through objects, and suddenly the reader goes after those objects. In this novel, love becomes implicit by being overshadowed by objects. When the reader reads the literary text, s/he wants to know something. Information is also “A bond between subject and object. A subject is a person with many existing characteristics, functions and actions. An object is also any area of the world of being or human works that have types and shapes. The bond between the subject and the object is a bond, just like the other bonds of being” (Mengüçoğlu, 1988 : 63). In this context, a bond is also established between the reader and the written text. The continuity of this bond is achieved only through emotions.

Nermi Uygur, describes literature “As a phenomenon that human creates and produces for human” (Uygur, 1969: 12). The reader converts the existence of the work

between the pages of the written text to ‘pure now’. And the literary work preserves and maintains its own uniqueness for everyone. Describing each novel as “An ideal depiction of reality” (Borges, 2015: 102), Borges, for the novels of control and Henry James, makes a reference to reality and written text through poetics, saying “The novelized truth because they thought it poetic” (Borges, 2015: 102)

“Emotions effect are triggered multiple ways by narrative, linguistik and stylistic features and the whole construction of fictional words” (Lyytikarnen, 2018: 248). And thus a link is established between the reader and the written text through words. “We may conjecture that any element of the story world, narration or the language itself many participate in creating emotions effect (Lyytikarnen, 2018: 248). By means of the literary text, the reader’s feelings are provoked and brought to light. Because literary text creates a bridge between the triangle of the other world, thinking, and language. In her work Vera Nunning, makes a reference to the phrase ‘writing is a method of commonucation’ by Virginia Woolf, in her book, *The Common Reader*. Written text, literary text, novel, story, poem and essays communicate with the reader through emotions. “This process of communication is based on knowledge conventions and experience shared by writers and readers. In order to communicate emotions, authors have to inspire the imagination of readers, who have to become the author’s “fellow-worker and accomplice” and take an active part in the process of literary communication” (Nunning, 2014: 30).

The reader is taken into the emotional sphere by the novel/ story character through language. These emotions are guilt, hatred, love, jealousy and fear. In this case, fictional emotions and real emotions are overlapped. According to literary theorist

Patrick Colm Hogan, the “structure of stories is a systematic product of human emotion systems” (Hogan, 2011). For poetry Platon argues that “Sexual desires and spirited anger, and to all the feelings of desire as well as pains and pleasures in the soul that we claim accompany us in every action, because poetic imitation works up things of those sorts in us” (Platon, 2007: 307), and he says that the analogy in the poem waters and feeds emotions, and that the poem leads human to being bad and unhappy. According to Plato, poetry affects emotions to a large extent and therefore he does not want the poetry to exist in his utopic state. “If you are going to let in the pleasure-laden Muse in lyric or epic poetry, pleasure and pain as a pair will hold the kingship in your city instead of law and the reasoning that seems best in each case to all in common” (Plato, 2007: 308). According to Plato, emotions are powerful enough to replace laws in poetry.

The importing thing is to be able to draw boundaries to the reader’s feelings in written text expression. But if the same event, the same problems, the same disappointments and the place in the story are also a part of our personal history and experiences, the degree of influence the story has over us is high; and if we just read it in the text and do not possess any similar experiences with that event, the degree of influence will be low. Empathy, established by what the literary text character experiences, can also occur in the real world, but the literary text contains only a fictional structure, since it shows what can happen. Awareness of this determines the boundary between literary work and the reader.

According to Aristotle, the main element of tragedies is that “One must imitate the actions that drive one’s emotions, fear and pity” (Aristotle, 1902: 1452 b). And in the novel *White Castle*, emotions start with pity. The fact that a Venetian educated

person becomes a slave, activates the readers' feelings of pity for the novel's character and leads them to reconsider their thoughts about slavery. The reader accompanies the slave's journey of struggle to survive in life and his efforts to get to a better position in the dungeon. We get afraid by the story that the writer tells us about what other slaves experienced in the dungeon. "Our cowardly captain had just died at the shake, and as a warning to others they'd cut off the noses and ears of the sailors who'd lashed the slaves, then set them adrift on a raft" (Pamuk, 1990: 8). The domination of authority, enclosed space, and death by torture are heartbreaking for the reader. For a moment, we take sides with the slave and wish him to be saved. We want him to live a normal and healthy life.

Aristotle states that, "Tragedy must be complex, not simple, only in this way will feelings of fear and pity be activated (Aristotle, 1902: 1452 b). And he adds that as much as possible, anger should be awakened. For Aristotle, tragedy must also consider the element of being middle. "It must be extraordinary neither in terms of moral competence and justice, nor because of its malignity and moral addiction. On the contrary, he is the one who has been accused of any crime" (Aristotle, 1902: 1453 a). He also cites Oidipus ve Theyestes as examples.

Language is the position that determines the processing of emotions in literary work. When we look at the subject in the context of literature and emotion, two points are important: a) the period and place of the language used in the literary work. b) Since the literary work retains its own uniqueness from the point of view of the reader, the person's approach to the character of the novel or story. The use of literary language in literary works is different in every country. Language indicates an artistic existence and

is reflected through each author's own 'self'. For instance, when we compare the language of Forough Farrokhzad's poem with Sylvia Plath's poems, Forough has a warm, fluid and understandable language, and Plath has a more closed, internal expression. Both women are surrounded by both the society and the partner and provided a role by the society, and are alone with a sense desperation (feeling trapped). Although both poets try to overcome this by writing or poetry, they know that they do not have many options. Thus, society, culture and the personal history of the author are reflected in the literary language, and after reaching the reader, it exists only through language. In particular, Pamuk avoids using a language trapped in Turkish spelling rules, for the author, the language exhibits its own unique structure. "Language, which is the most encompassing mediation for thinking and communication, is both the material and the mediation for literature, which is the artistic mediation alone" (Kula, 2010: 208). Also, the literary work finds its meaning in the context of each reader's own experiences, fears, loves and sorrows. There is a difference between the novel *White Castle* being read by someone whose grandfather was taken prisoner in the Turkish War of Independence Balkan and/ or Yemen War, and it being read by someone who has never lost a family member in the war. Thanks to the empathy that readers will establish with the literary work, the novel creates its own meaning with each reader.

When we look at the expression of emotions in the language in a literary work through a cognitive structure, we read the literary work not to get information, but to get to know worlds outside our own world. The literary work does not provide accurate historical information, and this is essential. The work -the novel – which turns into a didactic information content becomes far from having an aesthetic structure.

4.2.3. Explanation of Comparisons and Nexus in *White Castle* and Spinoza's Philosophy

In the *White Castle*, one of the novels in question, the unstable relationship of Hoja and his slave both indicates the slave's effort for his own rescue and draws the boundaries of knowledge in this relationship. The way to get rid of physical slavery is through defeating psychological slavery. In Spinoza's philosophy, the nature of emotions exists only to set the boundaries of slavery and freedom -immanent-.

In this part when we examine Spinoza's philosophy, it has been seen that it focuses on the idea that emotions play an important role in making the human a slave and in giving him/her freedom -immanent- though it does not draw any certain area of freedom in general terms.

Spinoza, both in his work called *Ethics* and in *Short Rewiews/ Korte Verhandelng van God, de Mensch En Deszelvs Welstan*, explains the concepts of Ambivalence, Cowardice and Horror, as follows: "Their kind and nature are an indicator of incompetence (...) then, there is no place for these emotions in a human quided by the real mind" (Spinoza, 2002: III/ Def. of the Emon. Exp.) Thus, the slave in *The White Castle* does not have any ambivalence or cowardice, and he acquires a privileged position when,

"When I protested that I was a doctor, with knowledge of medicine and science, they just laughed: there were walls to be built around the pasha's garden, men were needed. Yet still I was no ordinary slave. People had heard

I was a doctor, so now I was not just looking after the slave rotting away in the prison, but others as well. I had to give a large part of the fees I earned for doctoring to the guards who smuggled me outside” (Pamuk, 1990: 9).

In other words, the slave directly refers to the part of *Septem Artes Liberales* in *Quadrivium*. He states that he is interested in arithmetic, geometry and astronomy, and as mentioned before, his studies with the Hoja, who is his master, begin in these fields. The slave uses his opportunity to act in a struggle to continue his existence, in other words, he does not abandon his competence when we look from the perspective of Spinoza’s philosophy. The slave’s mind and body are in compliance, and this will open his way to freedom. However, like us, he is a human with a limited and finite life in this world.

Though the Hoja and the slave do various studies after they begin to live together, the Hoja always remains in the forefront while presenting such studies to the pasha and the Sultan. Although the slave’s knowledge is equal to his own knowledge, the slave’s position of staying in the background is because his physical slavery brings the Hoja into the position of mastery. In Spinoza’s philosophy, being deprived of freedom means being enslaved by his emotions and thus, being passive. And the way to overcome it is to become active. In this regard, the Hoja is often in the position of the slave when he is actually the master.

“I must have glanced at Hoja with fear and hope for a moment. He said he would not free me until ‘they’ realized. I didn’t ask what it was that ‘they’ must realize. And perhaps I had a premonition which made me afraid. I might

find that Hoja didn't know what it was either. Later they'd talked of other things, the pasha was frowning and looking contemptuously at the instruments before him (Pamuk, 1990: 28-29).

As it is understood from that speech, the Hoja has become fully passive as a result of the fact that the pasha did not appreciate his attitudes and studies. His role of mastery does not keep him in his position, and he expects to hear satisfactory words from his slave when he goes home. Though the slave says such words to him, the Hoja is not happy and satisfied because such words and thoughts belong to a slave.

According to Spinoza's philosophy, a human, who acts according to the reason, is free. The slave probably benefits from the Hoja's despair, by himself acting according to his mind, he does not fall into despair contrary to the Hoja, he uses his intellectual freedom since the day when he was captured by the Turkish pirates, even though he cannot reach his physical freedom, and he continues to use his intellectual freedom when he stays with the Hoja and makes mutual studies with him.

Even though the Hoja is the master in the house, he is in the position of a slave when he is not appreciated by the pasha. He cannot make any effort, he falls in despair and sadness because his works are not appreciated, and he does not/ cannot find the reasons of such situations.

When we examine the slave- master dialectic from the Hegelian perspective, in the relationship between the slave and the master/ Hoja, "The slave, who becomes the master of nature, frees himself from his own nature and from his own instinct that tied

him to the nature and made him the Master's Slave. Therefore, by freeing the Slave from the Nature, work frees him from himself as well from his slaves's nature: it fees him from the master" (Kojève, 2015: 95).

In the novel *White Castle*, although the slave knows that his own freedom is in the hands of the master/ Hoja, he also creates his own implicit freedom. This is possible with union/ nexus of mind and emotion. He does not consider this togetherness as a devastating situation. This determines the cognitive and emotional structure between the master and slave. Knowledge and cognitive structure is the first step that will save a person from his/ her current position. The slave, while aware of his slavery, approves of what the master does, although they are not good and true. This shows the use of mind in the existential state of the slave. Because not approving the master will cause punishment to him.

"When he said he wanted us to write together, I had no idea he would actually want to sit together at the table. I had thought that when he started to write I would get back to the idle freedom of an indolent slave. I was wrong. (...) After scrawling a few sentences, he showed them to me with the innocent humility and eagerness of a child: were these things worth about, he wondered? Naturally I gave my approval" (Pamuk, 1990: 53).

Interestingly enough, master/ Hoja wants his actions to be approved by his slave. He cannot ask a master- like himself- what he has done. Moreover, this slave sets the boundaries between the master and idiots. "When I saw that, as I'd hoped, he was affected by the dream, I insisted that this kind of writing was something he too should

try. It would distract him from this endless anticipation, and he would discover what it was that truly set him apart from his fools” (Pamuk, 1990: 52).

Susan James said that according to Spinoza “The reactions that are our passions are a manifestation of a striving to preserve in our being, which is our essence. As such, they are an instantiation in humans of a feature of all natural things. Substance itself, the casual subsystems that it contains, and particular things, all strive to preserve in their beings” (James, 2003: 146). In Spinoza’s philosophy, Hatred and Pain cause a decrease in our power. The slave in *The White Castle* does not have any grudge against those who captured him when he lived in İstanbul, or against the Hoja who is his master. As he does not have any grudge, he does not make himself passive before them. Similarly, he says that I was a free man, but now I am a slave, and he does not allow himself to fall into an intense despair. If he lives with hatred and sadness, it would be impossible for him to set himself free from slavery.

The relationship of the slave and the master comes to a different dimension with the plague epidemic. They question God, religion and belief. Neither of them ever deny that the disaster was God’s will, but they only indirectly do so. “For his reason even we mortals could take stock and act to protect ourselves without offending God’s pride” (Pamuk, 1990: 78).

Master/ Hoja and slave don’t believe that God directly intervene with people’s fate. In this context, both exhibit an implicit understanding of God as stated in Spinoza’s philosophy. Although the monotheistic religion they believe in is different, they believe that a prayer to God will not achieve a result. Slave and master/ Hoja’s bond with God

are through their emotions. In the proposition XV in Part V of Spinoza's *Ethics*, he makes the following connection about God and feelings. "He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God, and the more so the more he understands himself and his emotions" (Spinoza, 2002: V/ XV Prop.).

The way of work in the relationship of the Hoja and the slave in the *White Castle* realizes through the 'knowledge' and the principle of 'being competent in his emotions' when we look from Spinoza's philosophy. The slave reaches his freedom gradually as he frees himself from various emotions such as cowardice, fear of death, hatred and envy, and/ or he does not have such emotional fluctuations for a long time, and thus, he brings himself from a passive state to an active state.

When this Italian slave comes to the Hoja's house, he does not even realize that the slave and himself are very similar. The Hoja is acquainted with or aware of his own superior position. However, when he begins to live with the slave, who has the same knowledge as him, he feels that his own superiority and mastery begin to disappear. The Hoja faces this fact when the slave brings a table he likes to Hoja's house.

"While in Gebze, a town not far from İstanbul where we'd gone at the Pasha's request for three months to look after some business of this, the discrepancies between times of prayer at the mosques gave Hoja a new idea: he would make a clock that would show the times of prayer with flawless accuracy" (Pamuk, 1990: 25). "It was then that I taught him what a table was. When I brought home the piece of furniture I'd had made by a carpenter according to my specifications, but later he grew accustomed both to the

chairs and the table; he declared he thought and wrote better this way (Pamuk, 1990: 25).

The Master's purchase of a table in his house, which, as an object used by the slave before, determines the state of good with a Spinozism philosophy. Because, according to Spinoza, wanting something is good not because it's good, but because we want it. The fact that master/ Hoja works with his slave sitting together after buying a table for his house means that the boundaries between the two are partially weakened. On the other hand, the master/ Hoja works more comfortably at the table, and this helps his desire to make a perfect clock showing the prayer times. Because master/ Hoja tries to understand how to determine the time of prayer and fasting in cold countries that have great time differences between day and night. To work at the table and not on the floor makes it easier for them. According to Spinoza, "God, (bonum/bien/good) is all kinds of happiness, and it is what satisfies the longing that leads to happiness" (Fransez, 2012: 351). Although master/ Hoja does not like the table the first time he sees it, when he sits on the table and starts writing his liking towards the table is changed, "But later he grew accustomed both to the chairs and the table; he declared he thought and wrote better this way" (Pamuk, 1990: 25).

Even though the Hoja puts his mind to design a precise clock upon the pasha's request, his lack of knowledge of tables and chairs brings him face to face with the things in the slave's life. The Hoja is not perfect in his position of mastery, but he always thinks that his ideas and thoughts have to be appreciated by his slave even though he is not happy with such appreciation.

When we look at the Hoja /master in the *White Castle*, domination of the house and the slave's behaviours reveal his existence. However, the slave, who goes on with his life only through his knowledge and emotions, eliminates the limits of the Hoja's freedom -immanent freedom- and Mastery. Through the slave's mind games, courage between the Hoja and the slave turns into a game. As the managerial superiority in the house belongs to the Hoja, he demands that the slave demonstrates the courage that needs to be shown.

“But this pleasure would cost me dear not because he threatened to position me; a few days later, he demanded that I demonstrate the courage I'd said he lacked. At first I tried to make a joke of it; of course, a person could no more discover who he was by thinking about it than by looking in a mirror; I'd said that in anger to annoy him; but he seemed not to believe me: he threatened to feed me less, even to lock me in the room if I did not prove my courage. I must work out who I was and write it down; he would see how it was done, see how much courage I had” (Pamuk, 1990: 50).

When we examine the Hoja's condition, we see that he is completely passive, emotionally. He falls into an ambivalence, and is overwhelmed by his slave, in a sense. He forces his slave to follow his orders by anger and threat. Where is the Hoja's freedom? From the perspective of Spinoza's philosophy, freedom lies in not being enslaved his emotions. In this regards, is the Hoja free? The Hoja sometimes changes his role with the slave, who lives and works together with him, involuntarily. He has a character that is enslaved by his emotions and that cannot hide them. Such character gives the slave an opportunity. As it can be understood from the slave's words “Thus

in the space of two months, I learner more about his life than I'd been able to learn in eleven years" (Pamuk, 1990: 53) the slave captures his master/Hoja, in a sense.

Another important concept in the relationship between the Hoja and the slave is desire. According to Jason Read for Spinoza "desire is an attempt that is not affected by the others" (Read, 2013: 83) and adds,

"Desire is always relational and surrounded by history and emotions. However, this relation is not a relation already created between the individuals, but a relation between the emotions that develop the individuals. When an individual loves what the other loves, or hates something that hurts his own thing of love, the relation here is a relation between the transpersonal conditions of individualization, rather than a relation for recognition between an individual and the other" (Read, 2013: 84-104).

In this regard, The relationship of the master and the slave is not stable, it is conditional, and changeable and as Jason Read emphasizes in his article, it is not a relationship based on a their love for the same things (to write, to research, and to make an innovation). Therefore, mastery and slavery are distributed within their own boundaries.

Spinoza, in his Hypothesis LVI in the Part III of *Ethics*, "There are as many kind of pleasure, pain, desire, and consequently of every emotion that is compounded of these (such as vacillation) or of every emotion that is derived from these (love,

hatred, hope, fear, etc), as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected” (Spinoza, 2002: III/ LVI Prop.).

For Spinoza, desire is the essence, namely, nature of the human. And when Spinoza refers to luxury, desire, debauchery, greed, and ambition, the only thing that is indicated is an unlimited love or desire for fun, food, sexuality, luxury and dignity. In the *White Castle*, the Hoja’s ambition to gain honour before the pasha and the Sultan reveals the fact that his mind is defeated by the power to control such emotions.

Spinoza states that a person is in a passive state with emotions such as joy and grief, and in the novel *White Castle*, it is the expression and actions of the master/ Hoja that determine the slave to be in a passive state. But against these actions and expressions, slave becomes active with his own emotion control. And the fear, sadness and happiness that the novel characters master/ Hoja and slave feel even living together are inherently different from each other. Spinoza explains this as follows “Any emotions of a given individuals differs from the emotion of another to the extent that the essence of the one individual differs from the essence of the other” (Spinoza, 2002: III/ LVII Prop.).

This means that for each individual, the self-difference in emotions determines their position as well as the replacement they will make in their position. In this context, the desires of master/ Hoja and slave are also different. The master wants to rule, and this desire is different from the desire of the slave. But the slave’s desire is to be free. According to Spinoza’s philosophy, “all emotions are related to desire, pleasure or pain, as is made clear by the definitions we have given of them. (...) Therefore, pleasure and

pain is desire or appetite, insofar as it is increased or diminished, assisted or checked, by external causes; that is, (by the same Sch.), it is each individual's very nature" (Spinoza, 2002: LVII Proof.). If the desire varies according to the essence of human and each individual, the honour and criticism in the presence of the Sultan will also create a different level of emotion for the master/ Hoja and slave. Because master/ Hoja is also responsible for his slave. Under no circumstances, the slave's emotions will be the same with the master/ Hoja's emotions due to the reward given by this higher authority.

Honor and reproach given by the Sultan are different levels of emotion for the slave and the master. Even if desire is the essence of human being and if it depends on each individual, it will not be the same for the slave and master/ Hoja. Because the master is the person who is responsible for his slave. The award given by the Sultan will not give pleasure to the slave until the master/ Hoja admits it.

In Spinozistic terms, in this novel, the Hoja's ambition to gain honour before the pasha and the Sultan reveals the fact that his mind is defeated by the power to control such emotions. In Spinozistic terms, the slave's physical shyness is destroyed by the freedom of mind. Slave, who does not give up control of his emotions, replaces the master in the course of time. This, in turn, allows us to better see the structure of the novel, which destroys this duality -body and mind- in Spinoza's philosophy.

According to Spinoza, the mind, "The highest conatus of the mind and its highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge" (Spinoza, 2002: V/ XXV Prop.). and next Proposition "The more capable the mind is of understanding

things by the third kind of knowledge, the more it desires to understand things by this same kind of knowledge” (Spinoza, 2002: XXVI Prof.). Spinoza, in the proof part of the proposition states that “This is evident; for insofar as we conceive the mind to be capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, to that extent we conceive it as determined to understand things by that same kind of knowledge” (Spinoza, 2002: XXVII Proof.). According to Spinoza, because as long as the mind infers, it can’t evaluate anything as good except things that will help it to understand. This is an indication that the slave’s mental inferences overlap with his emotions. The slave is not a slave emotionally while continuing physical slavery, but rather, by deciding it in his consciousness, he paves the way for the change of his own future. By keeping his emotions against his master/ Hoja under control, he provides the master to be defeated by emotions such as sadness, hatred, and anger. As it can be understood from Part V / Proposition II and III of Spinoza, recognizing emotion also brings end to the slavery of emotion. Because, we control emotion in this way, and we must control the emotion, and not let the emotion control us.

Spinoza takes his thoughts on emotions one step further, demonstrating the correlation of emotions with rights and justice. According to Spinoza, every emotion that makes human grieve, are directly contrary to justice, fairness, honesty, morality and religion. According to Spinoza, the emotions of anger should be allowed from time to time to defend the right of both himself and others, otherwise it may seem unfair. If it is not allowed in a society, we cannot talk about laws in that society. Spinoza’s though, which he wrote in V Part XXIV, reminds us John Rawls’ ‘Just for Fairness’. While Rawls shapes the idea that people of different social structures benefit from justice fairly through economics, Spinoza describes the defense of human about their

rights and its connection with human grief, in other words, emotion, in order to speak about laws in a society.

According to Spinoza, nobody should feel a complex of inferiority. He says this is done in the context of sanctimony and religion. In this way, a person should first be able to control his own emotions and establish his life in society within this direction. In addition to these, thanks to his education, the slave can draw a path for himself in İstanbul, shaping his life next to the master/ Hoja who is just like him. In a sense, his education, his knowledge in disciplines such as astronomy, physics and medicine are the most important elements in his transition from slavery to mastery. In Spinoza's philosophy, education is very important. According to Spinoza, uneducated human is a slave.

Master/ Hoja and slave while living together in İstanbul, experience emotions and passions such as fear, joy, grief, hate, and anxiety at many times. Sometimes when making fireworks for the circumcision feast, sometimes when fulfilling the Sultan's wishes. But each sadness and fear is in its own uniqueness when we consider it with Spinoza's philosophy. The emotions of the slave, which he had when he came to the house of master/ Hoja after leaving the dungeon, and his emotions when he looked at the master/ Hoja's boil, which he saw during the plague pandemic -fear -have their own uniqueness. According to Spinoza, the three main emotions and their derivatives exhibit each other's different nature. Because nature also comes from different reasons. As Spinoza mentioned, a person's love for his wife and or/ child is different from each other. Every emotion is caused by its own reason. Thus, while the difference of both the master/ Hoja and the slave's own emotions within themselves are exhibited, essence

of the emotions of each person is different. The fear, which the slave feels about whether the master/ Hoja will free him or not, is different from the master/ Hoja's fear regarding the pasha's wishes. "Any emotion of alone individual differs from the emotion of another to the extent that the essence of vthe one individual differs from the essence of the other" (Spinoza, 2002: III/ LVII Prof.). And in the proof part of his proposition, Spinoza states that the more different the essence and/ or nature of an individual is, the more different the desire/emotion of an individual of an individual is from the other.

When we examine the *White Castle*, the slave with all his opportunities will change his position in time. However, such a change lies in the fact that the slave does not have any feeling of cowardice when he stays in the dungeon and lives together with the Hoja in the Hoja's house, he does not abandon his state of being competent before the Hoja, he has an intense sense of immanent freedom, and he always endeavours for his freedom.

The master/ Hoja is a man who has a slave, lives in Istanbul and, in a sense, has a good relationship with the palace. He has been asked to carry out some tasks with the slave given from the slave market to him, and they begin to live together in the same house. In that period, the slave has a command of the situation and begins to make decisions regarding the management and needs of the house – table, working hours, etc.-- and to express his opinions on the palace administration. In a sense, the slave, who has a way with cultivation, also has a good knowledge of the house. Therefore, he demands that whatever is missing in the house to be purchased.

Although master/Hoja is a master, the only person who recognizes the master/Hoja as a master is the slave. When he follows and/ or does not follow the orders of the palace, the one who praises or consoles him is the slave.

The slave is never enslaved by his emotions, in a sense, he takes all kinds of steps carefully to replace his master and gain his -freedom-. However, what he really wants to achieve is not to be a master, but to be free. His primary duty is to work; he always fulfills his duties. He has a good knowledge of the master's house, neighborhood and environment. In other words, he spin a cocoon around his master/Hoja. Though the master is aware of the situation, he comes to the inevitable end in time.

In the *White Castle* novel, "It is radical flow or replacement of different people in the status of master/ slave surrounded by impermeable borders" (Korkmaz, 2009: 119-130). This replacement/ substitution is reminiscent of the Hegel slave-master dialectic.

The master who has an implicit consciousness tries persistently to ensure the acceptance of his own existence. Just as a wall has been built against the master's land in Hegel's philosophy, the slave here builds a wall between his master and his house. In this regard, when we examine the *White Castle* from Hegel's philosophy in terms of the master's status, master will be defeated. Though the slave will replace his master/Hoja, he will be a master without a slave.

On the other hand, when we examine the slave's status from Spinoza's philosophy, the slave controls his emotions by his mind and does not fall into physical weakness against his emotions. On the way to freedom -immanent-, he controls his emotions, gains an advantage over his master, and acquires all properties had by his master. Consequently, he replaces his master. For this reason, being master or slave is not an absolute role, but is a changeable situation. The slave ends her physical slavery by controlling her emotions. The master is the one who loses his role.



5. CONCLUSION

In this thesis, which indicates the interdisciplinary study that is called “The Nature of Emotions in Spinoza’s Philosophy and Reading its Reflection in *White Castle*”, while emphasizing the bond of emotions have with reason and body, the subject was depended on the work of philosophers who worked on this subject in the history of philosophy. The secondary aim of this thesis is to reconsider Spinoza’s *Ethics* in terms of emotions and to evaluate the dimensions and forms of ‘slavery’ and ‘immanent freedom’ through emotions.

The slave-master/ Hoja dialectic in the novel of *White Castle* is treated not through the concept of property and land, but through the emotions of people, which are indicative of class structure. In this context, the novel was read with a hermeneutic approach, analyzing the nature of emotions of slave and master/ Hoja, in other words, with Gadamer’s hermeneutic approach. In this thesis, before this analysis, the framework of the concept of emotion in the history of philosophy was presented and the approaches of certain philosophers were discussed. While Aristotle’s, Descartes’ and Hume’s approaches to emotions were examined in detail, at the same time it was examined that how contemporary philosophers Robert Solomon and Martha Nussbaum approached the context of emotion-consciousness-corpus. Also in the Medieval Age the philosopher Abelardus was interested in the rational dimension of morality and considered virtue as a problem. He believed that human is an intelligent being as well as being a believer.

While Aristotle describes the subject through the relationship of emotion-reason, Descartes handles emotions through its connection with the pineal gland in the brain. The six emotions that the main/origin emotions, described by Descartes, are Love, Hate, Joy, Sadness, Desire, and Wonder. And he explains that these are the main types of emotions and that other emotions are derivatives of these main emotions that we are aware of and that can be qualified as real and true. We cannot seek the transfer of emotion to anything. But Volition is important because, it explains the link between the soul and emotions. For Hume, it is the experience of pain and pleasure that matters, both of which are the source of emotion and passion.

The concept of emotion, which has remained implicit in philosophy for many years, is the research topic of various disciplines. It is also an undeniable fact that in these days, when the antropological understanding is studied much more, the analysis of what a person does is not easy only with a cognitive connection, the fact that the emotional structure of a person affects his life should also be considered. Especially, the critical approaches to modernism lead to the examination of human beings from multiple standpoints. Human and the social structure of human , which are considered in ancient times in the context of concepts such as virtue and values, happiness, evolves into another dimension in the 21th Century. Today, concepts such as values, virtue and happiness are replaced by material power and consumption.

Robert Solomon addresses emotions in two main points with a cognitive and existentialist approach. Solomon points out that emotions are long-termed reactions, rather than instant reactions, but also they should not be ignored. By indicating love and anger, he emphasizes their spread over time. He reveals the fact that our love for

someone will continue for years, that we can spread the feeling of anger over time, even if we have sudden outbursts of anger, Solomon insists that, because of their nature, emotions are processes that take time and continue in time.

In the formation of emotions, Marta Nussbaum examines the perception of the form or thought we create about the object as real. Here, this opens the way to the discussion of ‘what is the truth of reality?’. This intention, which we think contains reality, may be wrong or may be right. This reveals the true nature of emotions.

In the Introduction part of this thesis, beginning with the epics, the God, godness, *hades* as the land of the death, and how human’s struggle for existence was handled in literary-mythological works were emphasized. Although they have been the subject of various controversies during time, the epics *Iliad* /*Ἰλιάς* and *Odesseia*/*Ὀδύσσεια*, all attributed to Homer, forms the beginning of western literature. Epics reveal that mortal people, living in a world full of Gods, cope with and/or endure many emotions, such as courage, heroism, pain, joy, anger, grief, suffering, faith and desire. Apart from the epics of *Iliad* and *Odyseia*, Hesiodos’ *Theogonia and Works And Days* are some of the instances that reveal human’s struggle for existence.

At this point we should also remember another important epic; the Sumerians’ *Epic of Gilgamesh* (*Epic of Bilgemiş*). *Epic of Gilgamesh* is an epic that seeks immortality and puts knowledge on the top order. *Epic of Oghuz Khan*, which is supposed to have been written in 174-209 BC, is a biographical epic. The subject of the epic is shaped through the life of the Hun Emperor *Mete Khna* (*Modu Chanyu*). The Finnish epic of *Kalevala* comes to front with its extraordinary narrative. *Beowulf* epic

of the British (which actually belonged to the Germanic people who emigrated from Scandinavia) was also written in the 6th Century, and the subjects of these epic are the same. Another epic to remember, is the *Shahnamed* epic, which describes the Turan wars of Iran; it is told through the situation shaped by the wars and the struggle to survive. Themes such as death, craftiness, struggle/effort, winning, virtue and morality form the main conflict in all these epics. In addition to these, *The Epic of Manas* of Kyrgyz, tells a war which was described through a theological point of view.

In this context, human who fights to protect his own existence fights against nature, supernatural forces, and Gods. Sometimes he rebels, sometimes he is defeated by fate and he learns to submit. While vital power shapes life, immortality cannot be found, wars do not end, and a comfortable and happy ending cannot be reached.

In the process that continues with Logos, the epics have never lost their importance, and there has never been a complete and sharp transition from Mythos to Logos. Although philosophers before Socrates sought to answer the question of 'what the arche -beginning- of the world is', in Plato's works, the path to the Logos passes through the Mythos. According to Thales, the water is the arche of the world. For Anaximander, the arche is apeiron, on the other hand, for Anaximenes, the arche is air. And for Herakleitos, the arche is logos. Thus, the pre-Socratic philosophers suggest many different ideas on what the arche of the world. Although mythological elements have been partially abandoned, they have not been completely removed from philosophy or literature. Undoubtedly that, the scientific structure was established and the journey started with Logos, and the Mythos silenced its first meaning to some extent. Mythos has become a structure that forms the first step/ threshold of Logos.

In the discipline of philosophy, on the path from Mythos to Logos, only the boundaries and place of Mythos were determined, so even if the Mythos-Logos distinction was made, this distinction was not a certain distinction. Literature, in its journey that started with Mythos and epics, still uses Mythos to activate the emotions of the readers by drawing them into a magical environment.

In the Introduction part of this thesis, the subject is examined through the connection of literary work with emotions, focusing on the subject of tragedy and order from Aristotle's book *Poeitka* in terms of the unity of literature and philosophy. The two emotions, fear and mercy, which are important to Aristotle, come to the force in the processing of the literary work, while it is important that the size of the text is in a character order.

A person who gains a new place and becomes aware of his own power with Humanism, questions his place in this world. Although Luther's disregard of the historical dimension in his reading of the Bible has been criticized, it has been the first step of the Reformist movement. In this context, after that, hermeneutics gained importance for philosophers, and was discussed in particular.

Interpretation performance that developed through religious and legal texts, after the Renaissance, the examination of Justinian's legal data leads to the development of private law hermeneutics. In 1463, *Constantius Rogerius, In His Treatise Concerning the Interpretation of Laws*, highlights the importance of his works on hermeneutic. Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey and Hans-Georg Gadamer, who created

the beginning of philosophical hermeneutics, pave the way for understanding, explaining and interpreting a work from different points of view.

Despite the overlapping –myth, discourse, language- and bifurcated structure of literature and philosophy –in terms of the use of concepts-, written, visual –art works – are tried to be understood, explicated, interpreted– by using philosophy –hermeneutic- as a method in literature. Philosophy uses all methods, and in literature, one of these methods is hermeneutic, is used for the interpretation of a literary work.

In the second chapter of this thesis, the concept of emotion(s) was discussed in a historical context, and the studies of Aristotle, Descartes and Hume as main philosophers were examined. In this regard, the topic was discussed based on the relation with the concepts of emotions, ethics, logos and values. Firstly, some concepts such as human, human structure, emotions, and ethics were emphasized in order to show and provide the compatibility of common life in a site, and such concepts were aimed to be explained by the philosophers. For Aristotle, spirit has been defined as the arche of all living creatures. Aristotle discusses the spirit structure within the context of whatness, and makes a mention of the spirit and emotions in his work titled *Peri Psykhs*. Aristotle examines the human as soul- *psykhes* and *soma*- body, and in this regard, aims to define the nature of emotions such as anger, courage, and desire revealed by the soul. He schematizes the relationship of the soul with preferences, nous, sofia, desires, and pleasure through logos and without logos.

Descartes and Hume, approach the subject with an interdisciplinary perspective. Descartes who initiates a breaking point through the concept of cogito in

the history of philosophy, mentions six main emotions defined as Wonder, Love, Hatred, Desire, Joy, and Sadness in his work, titled *Passiones Sive Affectus Animas*. Descartes evaluates the soul from the point of active status and passive status by considering the relationship between the soul and the body. In his work, Descartes reveals the relationship between the active status of the spirit and the will. On the other hand, Hume explains the sense of ethics through the emotions, and indicates that it cannot be explained through any rational relation. And according to Hume, empathy is the keystone to live altogether in social situations. In this context, in the history of philosophy, the emotions discussed by philosophers were not excluded from the discipline of philosophy, on the contrary, the concept was examined in the cognitive structure.

In the third chapter of this thesis, the concept of substance, which was highly important in the 17th century, the substance of notion was examined, and the study framework was associated with Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnez. In addition, Aristotle's point of view on the subject was exemplified by his book *Metaphysics*. It has been noted that the concept was described as Ousia in ancient Greek times and considered as a substance in the ongoing process.

Thus, by expanding the subject with the nature of emotions in Spinoza's philosophy, some important concepts in his philosophy were emphasized. In this concept, conatus, freedom, and desire/ *cupititas*, joy/ *laetitia*, sadness/ *tristitia*, were discussed. Regarding the emotions, Spinoza emphasizes the transition from being more competent to less competent, not to being fully competent and continuous.

In his philosophy, Spinoza explains the concept of emotions with a relation to freedom. He based the freedom, conatus, emotion and desire in the same framework. Also he takes the knowledge base and widens the subject while addressing the connection of emotions with human freedom –immanent-. Spinoza does not present a transcendent philosophy neither for God nor for men/human, but rather the preconditions for a happy life in an immanent system.

The nature of emotions in Spinoza's philosophy is based on the three main emotions. These are Desire, Gladness and Sadness. Other emotions are derivatives of these three emotions. But desire is a very important notion, because this notion was also used by Hegel, Schopenhauer etc. Desire, only desire, never grows, diminishes, increases and runs out. In Hegel's philosophy, self-consciousness is the desire, but it also provides the basis of the slave-master dialectic. Human is not a being that only knows but also acts. According to Schopenhauer, there is causality everywhere there is desire. And in addition to this, since desire is outside all forms, it cannot be an object; it is outside the principles that directs objects. Desire is a concept that is directly known and expresses itself to the person.

In this context, Spinoza's philosophy, desire constitutes/ grounds the essence of the conatus. In such presentation, by referring to the controllability of emotions, how emotions help one pass from slavery to mastery without being enslaved by their emotions was indicated, and the partnership between emotion and reason was mentioned.

In the forth chapter, “Survivor Slavery Defeated Mastery”, how the positions of master and the slave could/would change. While Hegel’s Master-Slave dialectic philosophy is based on/ shaped through the concept of property, Spinoza’s philosophy is explained by emotions and one’s owning –immanent- freedom. In Hegel’s philosophy, this structure, which is formed by concepts such as consciousness, self-consciousness, anxiety, and desire, leads the transition of the slave to mastery. Mastery and slavery, which is not certain in Spinoza’s philosophy, are determined by human’s own emotional existence. Thus, in the philosophy of Hegel and Spinoza, slavery and mastery -freedom- is replaced in the context of natura- emotion.

In this thesis, which is in the light on an interdisciplinary study, considering the relationship between literature and philosophy and processing of emotions, literature’s general characteristics are handled and explained via a hermeneutic method. While the transitional boundaries between literature and the discipline of philosophy was revealed in the context of language and concepts, the literary work was also tried to be understood using the philosophical method. This bond established between two disciplines through one method is evaluated differently by philosophers. While concepts, and the use of language leads the two disciplines, philosophy and literature meet at intersections, these two disciplines bifurcate on the fact that philosophy uses method, whereas literature is independent from methods. And with philosophical hermeneutics, a literary work is tried to be understood and interpreted. Although some philosophical texts are read like literary works, it does not seem possible to make a philosophical analysis of every literary work. In addition to this, while the use of emotions in literature is enthusiastically handled and processed, in philosophical

discipline, the whatness of emotions is resolved. This analysis exists, is handled and processed in literature through the main character of literary text.

The linguistic structure of the text is important when questioning whether the literary work's writer has a role in the act of understanding between the reader and the text after meeting with the reader. And with the different approach set by the Constanz School, what the existing text says is not important, the important thing is what it did not say. In a sense, the interpretivist proceeds by filling in the blanks. And this makes the reader responsible. Because correct understanding is important, it is shaped by solving the existing structure, not distorting the meaning of the text.

The last part of the forth chapter, firstly, *White Castle* is summarized, and the place of novel's main characters, the slave and the master, is examined. In Hegel's philosophy (Slave- Master dialectic), slave becomes aware of himself through his work and labour. But in the novel, the slave becomes aware of himself, not working on any land, but doing scientific work in the same house with his master. This, in turn, paves the way for the slave to control his emotions and not to be a slave of his emotions. The place of knowledge in the concepts of freedom –immanent- and slavery is determined.

In this thesis, the position, form and dimension of the slave- master have been determined first – hermeneutic-, the master's status has been considered in the light of Hegel's philosophy, and then the reasons for the master's change of position with the slave have been examined to understand and interpret the *White Castle* by Orhan Pamuk. The master/ Hoja could not maintain his own position, and the slave has gotten rid of the implicit consciousness and fulfilled all the conditions to replace the master/

Hoja. Here the master/ Hoja is a loser, and he has lost his house, environment, and relationship with the palace. The slave is the master/ Hoja, but he has become the master without a slave and settled in the house of his master/ Hoja in Gebze.

To understand the *White Castle* in the light of the nature of emotions in Spinoza's philosophy, the slave's reason control on his emotions has been examined, and his transition from slavery to freedom –immanent- / step by step- and his control of emotions by the feeling of freedom have been considered.

The effects of emotions on the master/ Hoja and the slave in the novel have been examined, and at the end of this examination, it was found that mastery and slavery do not have absolute positions. Spinoza emphasizes that a human can manage and control her/his emotions, and that one who fails to manage/ control her/his emotions will remain in the position of a slave. A human, who has been overwhelmed by her/his emotions, loses her/ his own control and falls under the domination of his emotions or faith for his whole life.

The fact that the slave has gotten free from the spiral of emotions such as cowardice, fear of death, anger, and jealousy and thereby ending his physical slavery, and/or that he has achieved an active position as he has not remained in such emotional layers for a long time has been discussed.

In the ongoing chapter, the novel is examined through concepts and emotions. The concepts that create the literary work are emotions, and also the intense and passionate processing of these emotions. The literary work directly established a bond

with the reader. The reader identifies with the character in the text he reads and does not even think about why the novel was written. The reader puts the author in a position that is independent of the book. That's why we don't think about why the author is writing, what really matters for us is the text.

Last but not least, in the last chapter of the thesis, a reading of the novel was done by analysing the slave- master/ Hoja union in the *White Castle* novel through the processing of emotions that is described in the philosophy of Spinoza. The emotional weaknesses shown by the master from time to time make him doubt that if he is the master of his slave. The master is often captured by his weaknesses, he wants his actions to be approved and appreciated by the Sultan and/or pasha, and his slave is the first person to support him in this regard. His actions are confirmed by his slave. Not another master approves the master, his slave approves him. The slave continues his life without losing hope and without being a prisoner of his emotions against these difficulties. The slave's time is fragmented in three parts which can be defined as 1. Captivity -freedom in which its past is implicit, the past time frame that is the present moment of the past when remembred-, II. Slavery and III. Immanent freedom. And finally they change their places. In this context, mastery and slavery are not certain class consequences.

The research intended to be described in this thesis, is the examination of the nexus/transitions and bifurcations between two different disciplines through the slave-master dialectic took place in a novel and the interpretation of this through literary text and language that are open to different readings. By using the place of primary emotions and derivatives and human's place as slave and immanent freedom, which are described

in Spinoza's philosophy, by analysing the novel characters, a reading of the novel was presented.

For the interpretation of the main points, examinations in this thesis were done by the hermeneutic approach, and the possibility of emotional control has been tried to be explained in the light of the master/ Hoja and the slave. And we experienced that this can happen through a novel character. Control and discipline of emotions seem possible. Thus, it is possible for us to save our lives from slavery and achieve freedom in the union of emotion-mind, without leaving ourselves at the point of breaking of emotions / in the whirlpool of emotions. Because this kind of life makes a human happy and a happy human lives peacefully in society. Not slavery, life should be blessed. Life should not be postponed to the future. Life, in the here and now is possible with the control of emotions through the mind.

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