

State of emergency and international alignment behaviors: Origins and implications

by

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September 14, 2022

**State of emergency and international alignment behaviors:
Origins and implications**

Koç University
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To my dear and loving husband Fatih

ABSTRACT

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This dissertation investigates the relationship between state of emergency (SOE) and interstate alignment behaviors, particularly adherence to human rights norms, security alliance formation, and participation in international peacekeeping efforts. Therefore, the study aims to answer the following related questions: “Does international setting matter for emergency declarations?” and “How do emergency declarations structure the cooperative interstate interactions?” Based on the review of legal-political theoretical discussions and a Boolean concept logic, this research develops an SOE conceptualization that can serve as a springboard for comparative research on the links between emergency and world politics. An SOE is, then, one of the governance types when a leader portrays a situation/crisis as a threat to a state’s survival and calls for extraordinary actions to address this situation/crisis. Unlike common conception, however, emergency declarations do not only reflect the political regimes’ institutionalized ways of handling crises. First, SOEs and the resultant practices exhibit the extent of abidance by the international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to draw the boundaries between derogable and non-derogable rights violations in times of crises. Second, SOEs reveal shifting power dynamics among the public, judiciary, legislative, armed forces, and the executive, who increasingly depend on external allies’ resources to remain in power. Accordingly, this research tests its expectations in a theoretically informed and methodologically robust collection of an original cross-national time-series SOE dataset based on hand-coded newspaper articles covering 24 Latin American countries between 1975 and 2018. Two qualitative case studies from Bolivia and Peru further elaborate on the causal mechanisms. Overall, the first main result suggests the strength of liberal norm diffusion that political, social, economic, and diplomatic ties to the West (such as those with the United States and the European Union countries) are associated with a higher proclivity to declare SOEs. The second primary finding evinces the logic of political survival that the executive deploying the military during SOEs is subsequently more inclined to sign defense cooperation agreements to keep the military resourceful with ally sources. Furthermore, regardless of military mobilization during the SOEs, countries that declare emergencies tend to participate more in peacekeeping operations, possibly to receive funding from the international community in the post-SOE phase and to repair their reputation abroad.

Keywords: state of emergency, international alignment, defense cooperation, peacekeeping operation, Latin America, multimethodology

ÖZETÇE

Olağanüstü hâl ve uluslararası iş birliği davranışları: Kökenleri ve yansımaları

Emine Arı

Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Siyaset Bilimi, Doktora

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Bu tez sıkıyönetimleri de kavramsal olarak bünyesinde barındıran olağanüstü hâller (OHAL) ile uluslararası iş birliği davranışları arasındaki bağlantıları irdelemektedir. Uluslararası iş birliği davranışları kapsamında da insan hakları normlarına bağlılık, güvenlik ittifakı oluşumu ve milletler arası barışı koruma operasyonlarına katılım değerlendirilmektedir. Bu amaçta, çalışmanın birbiriyle bağlantılı iki temel sorunsalı uluslararası bağlamın OHAL'ler ile ilişkili olup olmadığıyla ve OHAL'lerin devletler arası iş birliği etkileşimlerini nasıl yapılandığıyla ilgilenmektedir. Çalışma öncelikle yazındaki hukuki ve siyasal kuramsal tartışmalar ve Boole kavram mantığı çerçevesinde yeni bir OHAL kavramsallaştırması geliştirmekte ve böylelikle olağanüstü durumlar ve dünya siyaseti arasındaki bağlantıları karşılaştırmalı bir düzlemde araştırabilmeye alan açmaktadır. Bu kavramsallaştırmaya göre OHAL'ler bir yönetim türüdür ve bu yönetimde liderler bir durumu/krizi devletin güvenliği için tehdit olarak tasvir etmekte ve ilgili durumun/krizin çözümü için de olağanüstü eylemler çağırısı yapmaktadır. Fakat, yaygın kanının aksine, OHAL'ler sadece siyasal rejimlerin kurumsallaşmış kriz çözümü yöntemlerini yansıtmamaktadır. OHAL'ler ve OHAL uygulamaları öncelikle bir devletin Kişisel ve Siyasal Haklar Uluslararası Sözleşmesi ve benzeri uluslararası sözleşmelere ne ölçüde uyduğunu ve kriz zamanında dokunulamayacak / askıya alınamayacak haklar ile kısıtlanabilir haklar arasındaki ayırdıma gidip gitmediğini göstermektedir. Ayrıca OHAL'ler halk, yargı, yasama, ordu ve yürütme arasında değişen güç dinamiklerini ortaya koymakta ve bu değişen güç dengesinde OHAL ilan eden liderin iktidarda kalabilmesi için dış müttefiklerin kaynaklarına daha fazla ihtiyaç duyabileceğine işaret etmektedir. Tüm bunlar göz önüne alındığında, çalışmanın kuramsal beklentileri 1975-2018 yılları arasında 24 Latin Amerika ülkesini kapsayan gazete haberlerinin kodlanmasıyla oluşturulmuş, kuramsal temelli ve görgül olarak içsel geçerliliği test edilmiş orijinal kesitler-arası zaman serisi OHAL veri setinde değerlendirilmektedir. Bolivya ve Peru özelindeki iki vaka analiziyle de nedensellik mekanizmaları detaylandırılmaktadır. En nihayetinde, araştırmanın ilk ana bulgusu Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Avrupa Birliği üyesi ülkeler gibi batılı devletlerle olan siyasal, sosyal, ekonomik ve diplomatik bağların OHAL ilanları ile pozitif ilintili olduğunu göstermekte ve liberal norm yayılımının gücüne işaret etmektedir. İkinci ana bulgu ise OHAL esnasında ordusunu seferber eden devletlerin yeni savunma iş birliği anlaşmaları imzalamaya daha fazla meyil gösterdiğini ve liderlerin siyasal olarak hayatta kalmayı önceliklendirdiklerini ortaya koymaktadır. Tüm bunlara ek olarak, sonuçlar OHAL'lerin uluslararası barışı koruma operasyonlarına katılım ile pozitif bağlantılı olduğunu göstermekte. Bu bulgunun ordunun kriz esnasında sefer edilmesinden bağımsız olarak gözlemlenmesi OHAL ilan eden devletlerin uluslararası toplumdan gelecek fonlara ve yurtdışındaki itibarlarına değer verdiklerini belirtmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: olağanüstü hâl, uluslararası uyum, savunma iş birliği, barışı koruma operasyonu, Latin Amerika, çoklu yöntem araştırması

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACHR	American Convention on Human Rights
AIC	Akaike Information Criterion
ATOP	Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions
ATPA	Andean Trade Preferences Act
ATPDEA	Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act
BIC	Bayesian Information Criterion
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CHISOLS (or Sols)	Change in Source of Leader Support
CIRI	The Cingranelli and Richards
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease of 2019
COW	Correlates of War
DCA	Defense Cooperation Agreement
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
HBHF	Hafner-Burton, Helfer, and Fariss
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization

IMF	International Monetary Fund
LAC	Latin American Countries
MAS	Movement for Socialism
MID	Militarized Interstate Dispute
MRTA	Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
R&C	Richards and Clay
SIN	National Intelligence Service
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SOE	State of Emergency
STEM-II	State of Emergency Mapping Project (II)
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
V-Dem	Varieties of Democracy
WTO	World Trade Organization
YPFB Fields	Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos - Bolivian Fiscal Oil Fields

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Why are States of Emergency important to study?

With the global coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) caused by SARS-CoV-2, urgent measures such as curfews, banning public gatherings, and closing of borders, schools, and places of worship have been practiced by governments in varying degrees and numbers to mitigate the virus's effects. In 2020, 79 governments out of 188 declared a state of emergency (SOE). They took preventive actions, while 55 of 188 enforced the measures without declaring an SOE.¹ Furthermore, only 18 governments notified the United Nations (UN) about SOE declarations and relevant human rights violations during the SOEs. Aside from this most recent well-known example of epidemic disease outbreaks like COVID-19, SOEs have also been declared for various political, economic, social, and natural crises in contemporary world politics. However, only the recent notorious and widespread utilization of SOEs has drawn scholarly and public attention to emergency politics. In particular, attention is drawn to the consequences of SOEs for a democratic government (Lührmann & Rooney, 2020) and compliance with internationally sanctioned norms (e.g., civil liberties), as exemplified by contested views on COVID-19-related SOEs in El Salvador. Despite this attention, the scholarship lacks a theoretically informed and empirically tested cross-national explanation for the variation in the number, the geographical and temporal scope, the type of SOE declarations, and these SOEs' or their absence's implications for domestic and international politics.

¹ There are no data on the other 54 countries. For the complete statistics about SOE declarations, types of measures, and UN notification please see; CCPR States of Emergencies in Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic dataset (2020) <https://datastudio.google.com/reporting/1sHT8quopdfavCvSDk7t-zvqKIS0Ljiu0/page/dHMKb> last accessed on January 3, 2021.

On face value, SOEs appear to be matters of national politics. SOEs are executed by domestic actors such as the presidents, prime ministers, governors, or military chiefs based on their domestic practice or law (O. Gross & Ní Aoláin, 2006). However, international human rights treaties allow states to exercise emergency powers and derogate from human rights commitments. International human rights covenants and accords assert that every human being should enjoy civil and political freedom, and states in these agreements are required to respect these rights and freedoms of all individuals within their borders (e.g., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] and European Convention on Human Rights [ECHR]). However, if the nation and sovereignty are at risk, states have been allowed to derogate the citizen's rights – except non-derogable² rights under Article 4 of ICCPR (1966) and Article 15 of the ECHR (1950) – to ensure the state's survival³. The SOE declaration functions as a public announcement of the government's intention about the suspension of rights to deal with the crisis. Thus, a domestic emergency declaration and notification of derogation from human rights treaties bring legitimacy to state action.

The current wave of research identifies causes for SOE declarations due to rising numbers of emergencies countries face, such as terrorism and global pandemic diseases. Even when countries experience the same circumstances, such as COVID-19, some designate SOEs while others do not. Early research on the reasons for emergency declarations identified constitutions as the major predictor (Davenport, 1996; Rooney, 2017; Bjornskov & Voigt, 2018b) while also exploring the impact of other domestic political and structural factors. Although there is substantial literature on the interplay of domestic and foreign politics, past studies have neglected international drivers in the SOE declaration. This dissertation claims we cannot disregard international dynamics while considering the linkages between internal and international politics in SOEs. As a result, it is believed that foreign policy cooperation

² Derogability status of a right means that states can violate the right under certain conditions, such as crisis times.

³ The concept of state is defined both in terms of its functions and institutional structure. When both aspects are combined, the state has four components: (i) existence of institutions and personnel with particular duties; (ii) the centrality in political interactions and control over the periphery; (iii) functioning on a defined territory; (iv) and monopoly of the means of physical violence and rulemaking (Mann, p. 333). Therefore, the state has four elements—population, territory, government, and sovereignty and state's survival might include any of the state components' survival.

with democratic nations and international norm compliance behavior would aid in understanding the cross-country variance in SOE notifications and practices.

At the same time, SOEs are the roots of the accumulation of unilateral power in the executive body, which can be a trump card in national and international bargaining. When the nation and state encounter a grave danger, the governing body, primarily the executive (or legislature), takes emergency measures to mitigate the crisis's effect(s). The alleviating measures in averting political, economic, social, and natural emergencies are mostly extraordinary. A crisis is an unexpected event that cannot be pre-defined and legalized beforehand. Moreover, most constitutions and laws deliberately abstain from defining what constitutes an SOE⁴ (E. Gross, 2008), even if provisions permitting an SOE declaration are found in more than 90 percent of all constitutions (Ginsburg & Versteeg, 2020). For example, the United States (US) jurisprudence has no emergency definition in the National Emergencies Act, compelling a decision-making body to decide whether a situation is an emergency or not. Moreover, the same body also decides what extraordinary cautions should be taken against the crisis. Thus, an SOE is a period of time during which government accumulates political power at the expense of control mechanisms such as the legislative, judiciary, and civil society. By taking this unilateral decision-making power⁵ into account, this dissertation maintains that SOE-related changes in domestic political power dynamics address both a state's crisis-management abilities and international cooperation-conflict behavior.

SOE declarations are influenced by and shape international alignments, described as flexible formal/informal types of interstate cooperation in military, political, economic, and cultural components. Governments that amass political power through SOEs can use military force for public order. However, the military's help to maintain control comes at a cost in

⁴ It does not mean that the SOEs are unregulated in constitutions. There are institutionalization efforts about the usage of power proportional to the crisis, curbing rights in a limited period, and geographical limits (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006).

⁵ The power accumulation in the government is a highly contested issue and there are multiple provisions for preventing the abuse. For example, Ginsburg and Versteeg (2021) mentioned that 60 percent of all constitutions require ratification of parliament for an SOE declaration. However, despite all provisional acts since the government is the ultimate power to execute emergency rules with smaller restrictions, the accumulation of power to some extent is inevitable.

terms of material and financial provisions for military personnel later. For example, Morales – ex-president of Bolivia – employed military power during an emergency declaration in 2008. In the proceeding years, the Bolivian military was a significant actor in the country’s defense agreements in renewing military equipment even when there was no external danger to national security.⁶ As a result, Bolivia signed several defense cooperation treaties with Russia and China.⁷ Although the military did not back Morales and instead rewarded Jeanine Aez as interim president on November 10, 2019⁸, Morales had been president of Bolivia for three terms with the support of the military – the longest tenure record in the country’s history.

Overall, domestic structures and international alignment have crucial roles in the SOE declarations, which, in return, influence the links between the two. While domestic political structure, that is, effective judicial review (Hafner-Burton, Helfer, & Fariss, 2011) and crisis types, i.e., ingroup vs. outgroup terrorism (Rooney, 2020), have received considerable attention, there has been little discussion of international determinants for emergency declarations. As a result, one of the significant gaps in the domestic sources of alignment behavior research (Allen & DiGiuseppe, 2013; Barnett & Levy, 1991; Boutton, 2019; David, 1991; Kimball, 2010; Miller & Toritsyn, 2005) is a lack of sufficient theorization and empirical testing on how changes in the domestic political system during SOEs affect interstate engagements. This question must be addressed for academic, public, and foreign policymaking purposes. Accounting for the causes of SOEs and their repercussions on interstate cooperation will guide policymakers on the value of utilizing emergency declarations in the face of potential crises. Therefore, I aim to formulate a mechanism for the interplay between SOEs and interstate alignment and draw a full circle, starting with international alignment directed to SOEs and from SOEs to interstate cooperation agreements, particularly defense cooperation agreements (DCAs), which are “formal

⁶ <https://www.coha.org/la-politica-de-defensa-en-bolivia-y-el-rol-de-las-fuerzas-armadas-balance-de-gestion-2006-2014/>

⁷ <https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/bolivia-buys-chinese-planes-and-russian-helicopters-for-counter-drug-ops>

⁸ For other examples of civil government and military cooperation during national unrest in Latin America, see <https://www.wola.org/es/analisis/como-esta-afectando-el-control-civil-de-los-militares-la-agitacion-politica-de-america-latina/>

bilateral agreements that establish institutional frameworks for routine defense cooperation” (Kinne, 2020, p. 732).




Figure 1.1: Research questions

Hence, this research’s primary research question is: “To what extent are SOEs and international alignment related?” More precisely, two crucial questions arise at the interplay of SOEs and international alignment. First, “What are the domestic and international determinants of SOE declarations?” Second, “How do SOE declarations and measures taken during SOEs influence the SOE declaring state’s alignment behavior in world politics?”

1.2 Definitions: *SOE and interstate alignment*

The literature widely discusses what defines an emergency and when to call an event abnormal (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004; O. Gross & Ní Aoláin, 2006). Within the existing literature, there is a minimum effort to define and measure the SOE⁹ as the focus is on whether the government declares an emergency (Bjørnskov & Voigt, 2020; Davenport, 1996; Gupta, 1978; Hafner-Burton et al., 2011; Lührmann & Rooney, 2019, 2020; Richards & Clay, 2012). Nonetheless, the lack of a practical definition and decision criteria for an SOE limits our ability to comprehensively analyze emergency politics (and its links to international politics) in a time series and cross-national manner. Standardization of the SOE concept is critical because, without a consistent definition, development in this domain would be fragmented and evolve in separate directions rather than adding to each other. This removes

⁹ The SOE is used as an umbrella concept throughout the dissertation. Yet, the concept’s naming can vary across countries and also within countries depending on the type of legal regulation in consideration. For example, in Chile, the varieties include “states of siege, exception, assembly, and emergency” (Domrin, 2006, p.26). The Appendix A contains a list of terminology used in various legal/constitutional regulations.

our ability to evaluate the issue from all angles and hinders us from doing reliable and replicable research. Furthermore, cross-national analysis allows researchers to compare concepts and identify commonalities across different political contexts. As a result, based on a thorough review of the existing literature, this study proposes two defining conditions for an event known as an SOE.¹⁰ An SOE is when a government leader portrays a situation/crisis as a threat to the state's survival and calls for extraordinary actions to address this situation/crisis.¹¹

By its nature, SOEs afford leaders extensive decision-making power and immediate resource accumulation potential (e.g., fiscal appropriation, information monopoly, and human power recruitment). Therefore, this unilateral decision-making structure and higher resource commitment prospects would not necessarily be limited to crisis management in national politics and will more likely be used as bargaining tools when interacting with other states. Given the impermanent and volatile nature of emergency declarations and power, this study expects SOEs to be more likely related to interstate interactions with short- to mid-term policy payoffs rather than to the long-range ones (i.e., the formation or the sustenance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]¹²). For this reason, the SOEs' external spillovers are predicted to fall on the interstate alignment behavior. Interstate alignment is defined as a formal or informal "relationship between two or more states that involves mutual expectations of some degree of policy coordination on security issues under certain conditions in the future" (Wilkins, 2012, p. 56). The alignment emphasizes the military and political, economic, and cultural components of cooperation, as stated by Michael Ward (1982), by acting as a flexible form of interstate cooperation for the aim of this research (Wilkins, 2012). Two types of alignment behavior are utilized in this dissertation. The first

¹⁰ These studies are (i) international legal texts (e.g., ICCPR, the Siracusa Principles, and American Convention on Human Rights [ACHR]), which are discussed in E. Gross (2008); (ii) classical texts by Carl Schmitt, John Locke, Giorgio Agamben, and Albert Venn Dicey conveyed by Humpreys (2006), Casson (2008), and Dyzenhaus (2008); and (iii) contemporary discussions by Ferejohn and Pasquino (2004), Mizock (2001), and O. Gross and Ní Aoláin (2006).

¹¹ Leaders can be legislative, judiciary, and any executive type.

¹² Even though the security issues that led to NATO's formation began in 1947, the organization was not created until 1949. Thus, forming multilateral defense cooperation groups like NATO may necessitate lengthy talks and pre-agreements (see <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato>). As a result of numerous visible occurrences of SOEs, ad hoc and shorter-term military alliance agreements are expected, even within the same year.

interstate alignment behavior is the linkage of the SOE-declaring states with the Western democracies, specifically European Union (EU) countries and the US (Levitsky & Way, 2010). The density of links in economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational domains is referred to as linkage. The formation of DCAs is the second international alignment behavior. Participation in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) (with personnel, equipment, and training) is the alternative interstate cooperation measure to test the validity of findings derived from the DCA analyses.

1.3 Relevance and contributions of this study

The literature has long discussed the constitutional rules and legal forms to minimize human rights violations during an emergency (Ackerman, 2004; Davenport, 1996; Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004; E. Gross, 2008; Keith & Poe, 2004; Lillich, 1985) because, during SOEs, a government may accumulate a unilateral decision-making power. The accumulation of power, which means limited controls and checks by the legislature, judiciary, media, and civil society, might prepare a ground for a democratic downturn. In addition to that, a growing body of large-*N* and small-*N* comparative research about SOEs' determinants and outcomes has emerged with the increasing observations of emergencies that countries face, such as global terrorism activities and worldwide pandemic outbreaks. This wave of research analyzes SOEs in terms of their domestic political consequences, such as abuses of civil rights, democratic backsliding or autocratization, and the strength of economic and political institutions (Bjørnskov & Voigt, 2020; Davenport, 1996; Gupta, 1978; Hafner-Burton et al., 2011; Lührmann & Rooney, 2019, 2020; Richards & Clay, 2012), and the frequency of natural disasters and human-made crises (e.g., disease, landslides, volcanic eruptions, riots, and terrorism) (Bjørnskov & Voigt, 2018b, 2020; Yamauchi, Takeuchi, Horii, Yamano, Kuroda, & Nakadate, 2016).

Surprisingly, few connections between SOEs and international politics have been tested and found. International relations literature has largely ignored SOE studies but shows burgeoning interest in the interplay between domestic and international politics. The scholarship covers domestic governance types, individuals, institutions, political and economic factors, and how these relate to the international behavior of the states, such as

peace, war, and alliance (for classic examples, see Russett & O'Neal, 2001; Levy, 1988; Lai & Reiter, 2000). Therefore, the link between domestic and international politics is essential in international relations and has implications for foreign policy, e.g., dangerous democratization (Bernhard, Örsün, & Bayer, 2017), but the focus on regime transitions misses crucial internal changes, particularly when there is no regime change. A few recent studies, then, have found an effect of SOEs on international politics,¹³ particularly international alignment studies. Following the best of this dissertation's review of the existing works, there are assessments of international economic connections (measured with trade volume) and derogations under SOEs (Hafner-Burton et al., 2011).

Accordingly, this dissertation contributes to the extant literature on the connection between domestic and international politics by laying out the theoretical reasoning behind the associations between SOEs and interstate alignment behavior. This research, then, collects a unique and labor-intensive extensive time-series cross-national newspaper dataset on SOEs, which can be of use for comparative and international politics scholars. Despite the recent sharp increase in data efforts covering emergencies during COVID-19, only a small number of datasets concentrate on SOEs affected by other substantial crises. Some of these datasets code the SOEs dichotomously in a country-year format while examining rights derogations (Hafner-Burton et al., 2011; Zwitter, Prins, & Pannwitz, 2014). Some of the other existing data collection efforts include the spatial (national or regional) and temporal aspects of SOEs, along with the constitutional status of the rights (derogable or non-derogable) (Richards & Clay, 2012). Others examine constitutional rules that hand authority to the executive (Rooney, 2019; Bjørnskov & Voigt, 2018b). Additionally, these datasets focus on human rights violations, which are based on the SOE-declaring countries' self-reports and so might be more likely to be imbued with self-selection bias for any correlational and causal research purposes.¹⁴

¹³ Rooney (2019) finds that leaders who can acquire a very centralized executive power in the case of SOEs are more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) than leaders of countries that have constitutions that do not provide a high rate of centralization during SOEs.

¹⁴ There is also a study of UN that published annual reports about the SOEs of 1990s, yet this study has been ceased to exist in 2005 (Wright, 2012).

Given the areas of advancement in empirical studies of SOEs, this dissertation presents SOEs and human rights violations events dataset based on the hand-coded newspaper articles in the LexisNexis Academic in the Latin American continent between 1975 and 2018. This data originally expands on the questions of who, when, where, for what, for how long, and how, for additional robustness checks. Further, unlike the literature's mere focus on SOE declarations and no attention to SOE terminations, this dataset also presents original measures on how, when, why, and by whom SOEs are terminated. The Latin American context is an ideal field for such a comprehensive SOE data collection for three reasons. First of all, emergency politics is one of the long-lasting contested issue areas for democratization and autocratization waves in Latin America (Przeworski, 2009; Schneider, 2009). Second, the majority of the polities are presidential systems making it clear that the decisions to declare SOEs are generally taken by the presidents (Bates, Comisso, Migdal, & Milner, 1997; Mainwaring, 1990). Third, the Latin American foreign policy always has multi-faceted relations with the major powers such as the US, Russia, and China, and the remaining forces in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East during and after the Cold War (Brand, McEwen-Fial, & Muno, 2015; Sanchez, 2010; Smith, 2005).

1.4 Overview of the next chapters

Chapter Two focuses on the SOE definition. First of all, this chapter addresses the distinction between emergency and normalcy, followed by a discussion on the legal status of emergency and ways of containing SOEs. Later, in light of the scholarly exchanges in the literature, an SOE concept is provided.

Chapter Three consists of two themes focusing on the determinants of SOEs and international outcomes of SOEs. First, the chapter entertains the reasons behind SOE declarations by focusing on the effects of international links with Western countries and Western countries' leverage on the country's decisions to declare SOEs. In doing so, the chapter outlines the literature and hypotheses derived about the crises, domestic politics, leaders' individual characteristics, and international factors. Second, the chapter lays out the mechanism ranging from SOEs to interstate alignment. This sub-section examines changing domestic power balance between the executive and the military during the SOEs, particularly

when a political crisis endangers the executive's political survival. Then, when the military supports the executive during the SOEs, or the executive asks the military to do so, the executive needs to ensure its monopoly of political power in the post-SOE phase by rewarding the military with externally funded and nearly costless resources (e.g., income and modernization of equipment) via DCAs and by diverting the military's attention away from domestic politics to new external purposes through the PKOs.

Chapter Four pertains to the empirics detailing the data collection, measurement statistics, and analysis plans for testing the research hypotheses developed in Chapter Three. First of all, the chapter walks through the data coding procedures for the originally collected time-series cross-national newspaper SOE dataset. Secondly, the chapter summarizes the descriptive statistics of its original SOE dataset and compares and contrasts this new data with the existing SOE datasets. Thirdly, the chapter sets out the large-*N* multivariate analysis strategies, descriptive statistics of the independent and dependent variables, and the covariates, along with sources of secondary datasets, to evaluate the determinants and outcomes of SOEs.

Chapter Five presents the outcomes of the multivariate regression results on the determinants of SOE declarations. The main question is, 'What are the international factors that influence SOE declarations?' The models regressed international orientation (e.g., the linkage with and leverage of the Western countries), along with a composite crisis construct, structural/political attributes (e.g., the extent of being a liberal democracy), and leadership's support base on all SOE declarations and sub-categories of declared SOEs.

Chapter Six delineates the outcomes of the multivariate regression findings on the formation of DCAs. The main question of this part is, 'What impacts do SOEs and military mobilization during SOEs in times of domestic instability have on interstate cooperation?' In the monadic (state-year) data form, the models regressed military mobilization during the SOEs, crises, the level of political, economic, and human development, international threat environment, and previous DCAs on the DCAs. Additionally, the military mobilization during the SOEs is tested in both dyadic data form (state dyads - year) and regressed on the PKOs.

In addition to the two large-*N* analyses in Chapters Five and Six, Chapter Seven provides an in-depth small-*N* analysis of the SOE declaration performance and international alignment behavior of two democratic countries with similar democratic orientations but different SOE practices and foreign policy conduct: Bolivia (2006-2011) and Peru (2006-2011). The qualitative evidence is detailed together with the details of case selection, (in)dependent variables, and alternative explanations.

Chapter Eight summarizes the overall large-*N* empirical findings and small-*N* insights, details the research limitations, considers the directions for future research, and outlines the domestic and foreign policy implications.

Chapter 2

THEORY OF EMERGENCY

The purpose of this chapter is to examine previous literature on the SOE definition and offer a conceptualization of an SOE for comparative research in political science and international relations. This chapter begins with a discussion on whether an emergency can be empirically known as a phenomenon. Subsequently, this section delves into the three types of reasoning for identifying the difference between an emergency and normalcy: time-based (e.g., the extent and certainty of SOE duration), location-based (e.g., the geographical reach of SOE executions), and issue-based (e.g., health, agriculture, energy, and many more). Despite the existing works' efforts to provide objective criteria for a distinction, it can be concluded that, in practice, the decision to declare an emergency rests with leaders.

In addition, the chapter addresses the link between legal and political structures during SOEs and the normative constitutional control mechanisms. The key question for this subsection is whether the law or politics is superior in an emergency. Some scholars argue that the constitution, as a set of overarching principles, can regulate the emergency even if there is no law that directly addresses emergency regulations; thus, in emergencies, politics and the law may co-exist. Others argue that in times of emergency, legal norms must yield political demands and that the two cannot coexist. Despite differing viewpoints on the law vs. politics debate, these viewpoints converge on the fact that SOEs are extraordinary practices or the expectation of extraordinary practices.

The following subsection discusses whether SOEs are instruments for a certain regime type, reflection of state power, or war tactic. This part concludes by proposing that SOEs be viewed as a form of governance that is not unique to a regime or not a tool of a

powerful state during times of war. Finally, I present a conceptual SOE framework that adheres to social science concept rules (e.g., Boolean concept logic).

2.1 What is a state of emergency?

Given an increasing number of SOE declarations across the world and controversial practices that overrule political and civil rights during SOEs, the questions of who declares an emergency and what is the decisive moment at which normalcy turns into an emergency, have been reintroduced into contemporary politics. The ECHR anchors the “public emergency” definition upon the following four conditions:

“(1) [the emergency] must be actual or imminent; (2) its effects must involve the whole nation; (3) the continuance of the organized life of the community must be threatened; and (4) the crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal measures or restrictions, permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of public safety, health, and order, are plainly inadequate.” (Mizock, 2001, p. 234).

The conditions highlight a deviation from the normalcy towards emergency and the exceptionality of an unexpected situation such that existing rules cannot contain it.

The term state of exception dates back to the Roman Model of *iustitium*. *Institium* meaning “suspension of the law” (Agamben, 2005, p.41) is called as an early example of state of exception, to defend the state in times of internal and external war (Agamben, 2005, S 3.1). This is not exactly a new regime formation or ruling type under the *iustitium*. The incumbent just enjoys extensive power in a void of law (Agamben, 2005, S 3.4). Emergency is a fast response of state in times of extreme situations and necessity. Therefore, emergencies are hard to be defined because of their nature closely associated with the crisis, “civil war, insurrection and resistance” (Agamben, 2005, S 1.2).

Some other definitions focus on the legal aspect and human rights outcomes: “A state of emergency is a juridico-political regime that comprises ‘governmental action taken during an extraordinary national crisis that usually entails broad restrictions of human rights.’” (Allo, 2017, p. 140). This definition highlights that SOEs are established on institutional and regulative norms and are not just a product of politics. SOEs might also cause human rights breaches.

SOE executions have gained prominence as a crisis management tool. If a crisis threatens the political system’s survival and creates public disturbances, the executive needs

SOEs for quick and efficient action to restrain these crises' effects (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004, p. 231).

Multiplexed definitions, each highlighting a particular aspect of an SOE, exist due to the presence of various domestic and international legal texts and scholarly discussions over what components SOEs should include. In search of a definition for an SOE, literature about the normalcy-emergency division, the legality of SOE, and the position of an SOE along the autocracy-democracy spectrum are discussed.

First, the normalcy and emergency discussion is reviewed to determine whether a rule of thumb for identifying an emergency exists. The temporal and geographical criteria and limits for the division fail to draw a line between normalcy and emergency. The emergency and normalcy discussion demonstrates a practical need for a leader's decision on determining an emergency.

Second, SOEs can be executed on either a domestic or international legal base. However, as the predetermined rules are not sufficient to mitigate the effects of an unexpected crisis, they are, by nature, considered unusual (because they are newly introduced) compared with existing laws. If a law existed that directly addressed a crisis, an SOE declaration would not be necessary in the first place. The existing literature has been reviewed to determine whether an SOE is, by nature, a concept that is out of the legal order that should be considered beyond the rule of law's applicability or evaluated within the rule of law. Whereas these discussions further inform how liberal democracies can constrain the executive's emergency powers with constitutional and legislative mechanisms to prevent an arbitrary rule, they appraise SOEs as extraordinary measures instigated by the unexpectedness of an emergency, which requires quick and efficient action. Control mechanisms are not restricted to the legality of the actions. However, the institutions, formal checking mechanisms between the governing bodies, and cultural norms are vital components of preventing power abuse.

Finally, it is argued that an SOE is a governing tool always available to all state executives. The arguments about containing power abuse during SOEs assume that SOEs are crisis management tools for democratic systems. As the ruling is assumed already arbitrary in authoritarian systems, there is no question about constitutional or legislative restraints on

executive power (Lijphart, 1978, p. 402; Zwitter, 2012, p. 19; Rooney, 2017, 2019). In reality, authoritarian systems also utilize SOEs when crises hit. Nonetheless, an SOE is still required for more rapid action in non-democratic contexts. This is because authoritarian systems (e.g., military rule, personal dictatorship, monarchy, and party regime as in Geddes, Wright, and Frantz [2014]) subject the executive to mechanisms of check and balance by other authoritarian contenders (e.g., the military, local warlords, and the hegemon party), and must accumulate unilateral decision-making power.

2.2 Normalcy vs. emergency

An opposite polar of its extreme should be identified to define and analyze a concept (Goertz, 2006, p. 30). The literature has been discussing normalcy as the opposite polar of emergency. Yet, these extremes exist in categories further divided into two camps concerning an ontological problem caused by the ambiguity when defining and differentiating normalcy and emergency. Ferejohn and Pasquino (2004) divide ontological camps into two categories: so-called realists and skeptics. Realists argue that the difference between an emergency/crisis and a state of normalcy can be objectively observed and identified. However, skeptics argue that these two phenomena are hard to separate, and that no division or objective evidence indicates times of emergency or normalcy (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004, p. 226).

In line of this ontological division, there are two streams on whether the division between normal and abnormal is possible. On one side, decisionism argues that the exception is the norm and part of the regular politics. On the other side, republican exceptionalism seeks a difference between norm and exception and the relationship between the two is constant and in the end, norm predominates the exception (Wright, 2015).

The division between normalcy and emergency is also reflected in different constitutional designs through dualist and monist constitution-making, in broader classification (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004, p. 224). No difference exists between the two constitutional designs regarding emergency management policies and tools (Feldman, 2005, p. 1039).¹⁵ Yet, dualist systems aim to “ensure that any infringements upon normal

¹⁵ Dualism and monism are the relationship types of international and domestic law. In monism, the international law is superior and unified with the domestic rule, while in dualism domestic and international rules are separate


guarantees of freedom and liberty will be limited to the” emergency conditions and time (Feldman, 2005, p. 1041). Monistic constitutional writing does not seek and differentiate between the time of emergency and normalcy on paper; instead, they try to cope with a crisis within the ordinary (single) constitutional order (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004, p. 224).

Apart from the monist and dualist constitutional making, Gross and Ni Aolain (2006) identify three more specific strategies to be followed in case of extraordinary situations. These components are sorted under the republican exceptionalism. The first one is “Business as usual” that is about handling the crisis within the normal procedures and abstaining from any other constitutional, legal, or interpretive changes to the existing legal framework (Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006, p. 86).

The model of extra legality is the second model to use in the face of exception. This model assumes that the government officials can act beyond the legal order when there is a great danger against the constitutional order (Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006, p. 111). However, the decision makers should disclose their intentions and actions and let the public decide to support the proposed course of action or not, like an ex-post public ratification (Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006).

The final model is accommodation that is mostly applied in modern state system and especially democratic regimes. This last model provides the extraordinary powers to the decision makers in times of emergency for a quick and effective action. At the same time, this model ensures to sustain basic principles of democracy and rule of law (Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006, p.17). The Figure 2.1 shows the development of schools of thought in relationship between normal and exception.

and when and which one is the superior is decided by circumstances. In dualism, two different constitutional rules exist for different contexts and one of the normative constitutional orders is put in force. In monism, emergency is managed in a single normative order as in the normal normative rule. These two types are reflected as contemporary French (state of siege, dualism) vs. American (martial law, monism; Feldman, 2005).



The figure is an expanded version of Models of Reaction in Wright (2015, pg.12) that is created based in the O Gross and Ni Aolain (2006).

Figure 2.1: Models of reaction

The earliest example of the classical accommodation models is the Ancient Roman Model of iustitium, the word “iustitium” means suspension of law to defend the state in times of war (Agamben, 2005, p.41). In ordinary politics, Roman system has a very complicated system to control the executive office, but in times of emergency, the Senate gave power to Consuls to appoint a dictator for six months and expected those dictators to step down when the crisis ended (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004). The institution of dictatorship was established as a constitutional framework and seen as necessary to protect the constitutional republic in times of crises, a type of concession by the republic for the sake of republican principles (Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006). There are differences and similarities with the contemporary examples of emergency responses. In this Roman model, the dictator and the government are not the same, but in the contemporary examples, the person who uses the emergency powers are also the persons in the government (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004). Yet, there were clear distinctions between the time of war and peace. For example, Roman Dictators were appointed for six months for war purposes only; in post-war times, the Senate reclaimed the power (Ferejohn

& Pasquino, 2004, p. 224). The time threshold and underlining of the temporal scope of the emergency powers are also highlighted in the contemporary examples.

The second classical model is the state of siege in France, an apparatus for civil law systems. Before the French Revolution of 1789, the state of siege was only relevant to the war, which means transfer of all powers to the military rule in case of an external attack. After the revolution, the state of siege gained a statutory ground in 1791 as an early example of modern state of siege, and, in 1797, the rebellion was named as one of the emergency causes on a legal basis (Feldman, 2005). At that point, the state of siege became a tool for suppressing domestic opposition and so a mean for power abuse (Feldman, 2005). With the 1848 constitution amendments and 1849 law, the military power during the state of siege was expanded, the time frame in declaration of state of siege was revoked (which opened the path for the arbitrary usage with no time frame stated), and, additionally, in the following years, the imposition power of state of siege was granted to the executive (Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006; Feldman, 2005).

The French government was reorganized with a new constitution in 1875, and a new law on state of siege was developed in 1878. Senate was identified as a sole power that can declare state of siege in times of an external attack or an extreme domestic unrest. This Senate authority restricted loose interpretation of crises (Feldman, 2005). After these constitutional changes, the first occasion that would test the 1875 laws was the World War I, but in 1914, state of siege was imposed with a presidential decree and announced to be effective until the war was over. The time period was not explicitly stated, and the declaratory office was the president that violated the principles of 1878 law (Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006). Once again, in 1938, there were attempts for limiting the military power in times of emergency, but it was hard to observe its outputs as the early days of World War II ended the French sovereign rule (Feldman, 2005).

The third classical accommodation model is martial law in United Kingdom which is a model for common law systems. There is no statutory basis for martial law and the earliest example of martial law was associated with the foreign occupation or the times of war. Nonetheless, “non-statutory” and “extraordinary powers” under the banner of martial law were also resorted against the particular crises emanating from domestic issues (Gross & Ni

Aolain, 2006, p. 31). In response to these applications, there were also early attempts to restrict the abuse of monarch that punished civilians. For example, Petition of Rights in 1628, which was sent to the King, demanded no martial law in times of peace (Gross & Aolain, 2006).

The lack of statutory basis triggered many discussions on the legitimacy of the martial law. Dicey argues that martial law does not carry a military aspect in the UK, but rather has civil connotations that applies the public will to protect order as a necessity born out of the violent instances to respond force by force (Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006). The martial law does not provide new and extensive powers to the ruler (the crown) and the government, but it gives powers to the governments, which they already have but do not need to use (Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006).

As seen in the Figure 2.1, the other three accommodation models are descendants of classicals and can be called as the contemporary emergency responses in civil and common law practices and might be used interchangeably within the same political system. The first type is the constitutional accommodation model that is represented by the French constitutional model and constitution of Weimar Republic and it is widely applied in the civil law tradition (Wright, 2015). Latin American countries have constitutional articles on the emergency following the French model. The constitutional models are considered as vulnerable to abuses of power by providing extensive powers to leaders in the extreme circumstances (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004).

The second accommodation model is legislative. In this model either the regular system remained intact and only the complementary legislation is passed down to respond to the emergency (within the perimeters of the ordinary legal system) or a new emergency act (exclusively related to the particular crisis) is developed (Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006). In the US and UK systems, the legislative enacts ordinary laws to be in effect for a limited period along with other examples of Germany, Italy, and Spain (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004). The temporary character of legislation is seen as the strong aspect of this model, but there are examples of temporary acts, which can become permanent with extensions (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004). However, the legislative backed by the popular will enacts the powers for

the executive, and without a constant approval of the people, it would be hard to maintain the legitimacy of the emergency powers by the executive (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004).

The final and the third response in case of emergency is the interpretive model. Here, primarily the judicial interpretations reevaluate the existing relevant legal or constitutional clauses by extending the existing rules' application with a broader perspective (Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006). This model is mostly seen in the common law systems such as the US and the UK (Wright, 2015). One view suggests the system gives too much power and room for the interpretation such that the model is open to abuses of the US constitutional system (Levinson, 2008). However, another view claim the vagueness in the system is a bliss as it is flexible to respond a particular crisis in a best-fitting manner (Silverstein, 2011). The US system is one of the examples. Martial law was consulted on multiple occasions in the US, but the constitutional provisions of US abstain from referring directly to a martial law system (Feldman, 2005). Additionally, the US system is similar to the French case, giving the president extraordinary powers for crisis management (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004).

Constitutional writing considers the implications involved in the two types of constitution-making regarding the temporality issue, as well as the ambiguity around the concepts, and generates tools to identify the divide and study them. This includes the temporal, spatial, and issue-based divisions. It is crucial to have this division because defining and executing emergencies rests mostly on the same government body. Should a division point be spotted between emergency and normalcy, commonly accepted constraints on the executive power would be applied to the SOE-declaring governments easily and directly.

With the temporality mechanism, as in the Roman dictatorship model, we can differentiate the emergency from normal times decisively (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006, p. 174), such that the blurred division between the two states can be avoided. Nevertheless, the division of laws as emergency and normalcy does not ensure the objective division of these two states in contemporary politics (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006, pp. 174-228). During the prolonged crisis and constant expectation of crisis, crisis management tools, such as (Arslanalp & Erkmen, 2020), could become new normalcy and norm (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006, p. 174). As a result, normalcy may be the emergency conditions as the status quo, as

in the Israeli case during a permanent SOE (Mizock, 2001, p. 245). Alternatively, norms might change due to the crisis, such as the American public opinion on ethnic profiling after 9/11, and a new normalcy might emerge (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006, p. 228).

The spatial division—the second mechanism—also does not clearly distinguish between normalcy and emergency. The spatial division mechanism can be exercised between regions in a country or across domestic and foreign issues. The geographical division between normal and emergency areas of a country does not work since there is always a spillover effect (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006, p. 181). For example, thirteen provinces of Turkey were under emergency rule between 1987 and 2002 due to Turkey's counterinsurgency strategy against the Kurdish far-left terrorist organization, the Kurdistan Workers' Party - PKK. However, unlike the SOEs' local execution in the East and Southeast, this wholly transformed the national security understanding along with the state's administrative structures (Bezci & Öztan, 2016), such as the human rights violations related to the Kurdish issue (Aydin & Emrence, 2015).

The domestic vs. foreign issues—second spatial division—is another emergency tool for division between normal and emergency. The United Kingdom (UK), Israel, and France, for example, are not autonomous and are thus affected by the emergency laws/regulations in Northern Ireland, the occupied territories, and Algeria. Although emergency law has been established in distant lands, the mainland inevitably suffers rights limitations (Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006, p. 181). Moreover, globalization and interdependence make it hard to isolate citizens from other states' external interventions (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006, p. 208). For example, even though the media used cautious descriptions and naming for the events, torture and abuse were legitimized after the striking footage of Abu-Gharib prison in 2004 (Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2006). Even though the emergency was on foreign territory, Iraq, the American people, and transnational communities criticized the US. Us vs. them divisions and national security are the two widely used discourses during an emergency, yet they fail to draw a definite line between normalcy and emergency (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006).

Setting issue-based boundaries is the third method for distinguishing between normalcy and emergency. There are very specific domains of crises, such as fatalities due to heat waves, energy sector crises due to supply shortages, public health, and labor issues due

to pandemic diseases. These crises necessitate requirement-based responses of individuals and sectors to alleviate the consequences of the crises in specific domains. This issue-based division is thought to distinguish between times of emergency and normalcy and to prevent emergency rulings in one problem from being extended to other issue areas. However, real-world instances can quickly escalate into a national security concern, which is an expansive notion, which can imply a disease outbreak, a riot, or an energy crisis (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006, p. 215) and distorts divisions between what is required to limit the crisis, and for which domain of crisis. For example, Victor Orbán in Hungary and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador utilized Covid-19 emergency legislation to silence the opposition, resulting in non-Covid-19-related violations of human rights and liberties.

In this respect, the emergency debate runs parallel to the (in)security discussions. Prior to the world wars, national security was primarily a military concept; however, as the difference between the war front and the home front eroded due to civilian casualties in the wars, the idea of security grew to cover a more extensive range of concerns (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006, p. 216). Since 1952, the idea of security's multidimensionality has been debated (Wolfer, 1952; Baldwin, 1997). A significant portion of the security dimensions for identification has been altered since the Cold War. In the 1990s, there was a surge in attempts and conversations to establish what security means (Baldwin, 1997). Among these, Rothschild offered a new security approach that was expanded vertically and horizontally (1995). Vertically, security was extended from the security of nations downwards to the security of regions/locals, particular social groups, and individuals, and upwardly to the security of the international system, similar to the altering players in international relations from governments to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Rothschild, 1995). Rothschild's horizontal extension of security from military terms to political, economic, social, environmental, and human security against forces of market, nature, and press (1995), was relevant as the emergency spiraled from one issue to another, mostly from a non-political issue to national security. Owing to the overlap in concerns and comprehension between horizontally expanded security and emergency, ambiguous national security and emergency notions can be employed interchangeably in politics. However, security has international overtones as well, with the goal of supranational and intergovernmental security.

In short, the first step of defining an emergency is identifying at what point it is separated from normalcy. However, the temporal and spatial divisions in an emergency always have blurred areas, making it hard to find a widely accepted criterion. Consequently, skeptics contend that a leader—as a source of justification/decision—should decide whether it is a time of emergency or normalcy (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004, p. 226). Besides the theoretical discussions that continue attempting to establish normative standards for an emergency, empirical observations (E. Gross, 2008) and court decisions (Ireland v. the UK, Para. 207, 1978) also indicate that the leader's acknowledgment of a crisis is crucial for emergency decisions. Therefore, leaders' acceptance and acknowledgment of an emergency is the first component of an SOE definition.

Table 2.1: Differentiate emergency from normalcy

Question	Existing approaches	The first criterion this research utilizes
How do we differentiate emergency from normalcy?	Temporal: Setting time limits for emergency rule	Leaders can set a decision point on what is/is not an emergency
	Spatial: Setting territorial borders where the emergency applies	
	Issue-based: Differentiating domains of emergency, e.g., terrorism, energy sector, covid-19	

Establishing a criterion other than the leader's acceptance is essential because the leaders also decide on the emergency's execution measures.¹⁶ Thus, the leadership decision creates

¹⁶ The legitimacy, or at the very least the legality, of SOEs may be questioned if the leaders' decision-making is treated as a fundamental aspect of SOE. However, the purpose of this study is not to uncover a legitimate premise for SOEs, but rather to provide observable markers for a shared understanding of SOEs. Additionally, the discussions surrounding the legitimacy of SOEs are another venerable topic of research beyond this dissertation's scope. In that future research covering the legitimacy of SOEs, various topics might be considered as additional criteria while defining emergency declarations, such as legislative ratification, high court approval,

a loophole for a political system prone to executive power abuse. Constitutions become the focal venues of control to prevent this abuse. However, orders during the SOEs are mostly extraordinary because the nature of the crisis is unexpected. As a result, ongoing discussions about the defining characteristics of SOEs raise the question of whether the law or politics should be the primary foundation of SOEs.

2.3 *Law vs. politics*

Concerning the emergency rule, the discussion on the relationship between law and politics has two sides. On one side, scholars (e.g., John Locke) argue that the rule of law can exist with emergency provisions/rules (Locke, 2014[1689]; interpretations are by DeWilde, 2010b) and that emergency power is compatible with the general will (Rousseau, 2018[1762]; Allo, 2017, p. 141). On the other side, Thomas Hobbes argues that legal norms are submissive to necessity; therefore, politics are superior to the rule of law (Hobbes, 1996[1651]; interpretations are by Dyzenhaus, 2001). The origin of this discussion lies in whether politics (power) and legal norms (law) should be strictly separated and coexisting, or one should be superior and the other submissive.

Roman lawyer Cicero saw the social relations as the most important factor that is provided by the social order, and if the social order is under a threat, a wise and selfless man should be in charge to contain the effects of the crisis (Domrin, 2006). Machiavelli also highlights the Roman dictatorial model, praises one-man rule, regardless the regime type, there should be one person and “to be alone” to construct a new order (Machiavelli, 1996[1531] Book I, S 19.5, p.30). Nonetheless, Machiavelli supported his arguments by arguing that the name dictatorship is not the correct term to define the political order in Rome, but it was tyranny where the authority is taken by a citizen that rules against the public benefit. Therefore, the dictatorship is not a bad thing and made no harm to Rome. (Machiavelli, 1996[1531] Book I, S 34.1). Machiavelli’s conditions and limitations for the “political necessity of violence” (Domrin, 2006, p.13) do not consort with his ideas on the nature of power in *the Prince*.

the extent of the ruling party’s support base, approval rates, and the type of legislation (constitutional or statutory) that regulates emergency.

Since the Republic's decision-making mechanisms have multiple control and long-termed procedures, the time gap for the urgency of the issue can be destructive for the Republic. That is why, Machiavelli claims that Dictatorship is necessary in case of emergency (Machiavelli, 1996[1531] Book I, S 34.3). However, the dictatorship, which sustains the order by ruling with no appeal and consultation in an urgent manner, should have limits, and temporal limitation is a good aspect for the order and the state. Moreover, Machiavelli highlights that the dictator cannot replace the existing institutions with new ones or abolish senate and public authority (Machiavelli, 1996[1531] Book I, S 34.2). Machiavelli adds usage of frequent illegal powers to deal with a crisis can be very dangerous because this can be a habit of dictatorship for the political order and open the path for an abuse of power (Machiavelli, 1996[1531] Book I, S 34.3). Machiavelli says regular institutions of a republic generate ordinary modes of behavior. These ordinary modes of behavior are different but at the same time dependent on and defined over the extraordinary modes of behavior. These two ordinary and extraordinary institutions should exist together because the republic should be receptive as much as reactive (Mansfield & Tarcov, 1996, p. xxx).

There are different interpretations of these classical works. According to some views, Locke argues that fixed laws cannot help restraining the unpredictable side of life/politics; therefore, a well-framed government with legal and practical guides is needed (Locke, 2014[1689]; Casson, 2008, pp. 948-953). According to other opinions, Locke's statement somewhat accepts the possibility that the sovereign can act outside of the law in exceptional times (O. Gross, 2008; DeWilde, 2010b). In between these extremes (Pasquino, 1998, p. 199, as cited in Casson 2008, p. 954), a third interpretation argues that Locke provides "a systematic constitutional theory of extra-legal power." According to Locke (as evaluated in Ward, 2005, p. 721), "executive prerogatives is a potentially enormous extra-legal power, but it is not in the most crucial sense extra-constitutional."

Hegel criticizing Hobbes for saying the authority belongs to the sovereign, and the law can be replaced by the sovereign. However, Hegel's claims on the Crown's priority have striking resemblances with Schmidt (Norris, 2017). Hegel refers to the priority of the Crown in times of war "the times of exigency" (Hegel, 1952[1820], S278R). According to Hegel, state constitutes three divisions: Legislative, Executive, and Crown. The judiciary is not a

part of this division of the state (Hegel, 1952[1820], S272A). The separation of the powers guarantees the public freedom. However, the separation should not mean these divisions can exist on their own or they are in a competition or hostile relationship to one another. This is because the parts of state coexist in a unity (Hegel, 1952[1820], S272R). Hegel then describes the constitutional monarchy. The monarch has the ultimate decision-making power and standing at the top of the state and signifies the unity in the state (Hegel, 1952[1820], S273). Additionally, the Crown also contains the three moments of the state. The first is called universality with constitution and laws which was mentioned as Legislature division (Hegel, 1952[1820], S273). The second is particularity under the universal with the counsel that was mentioned as Executive division (Hegel, 1952[1820], S273). The third is the ultimate decision by the king that was mentioned as the Crown (Hegel, 1952[1820], S273-75).

Hegel talks about the despotism whose feature of arbitrariness makes it different from sovereignty. In contrast to the constitutional monarchy, under despotism, the law is replaced by the will of monarch or mob. Yet, sovereignty exists in the ideality – depicted as the ideality of the various spheres of the state where each fulfills their duties on their own and sustains their aim autonomously – where the legal and constitutional governance exists. In peace times, these spheres fulfill their duties in a harmony with the others and serves for the benefit of the whole. Yet, in times of exigency, these different spheres join together under a single sovereign (Hegel, 1952[1820], S278R). Hegel does not refer to a sovereign that can destroy all political system as Schmidt does, but Hegel's decision is a part of a bigger process (Norris, 2017). However, the “absurd”ity of his claims is that only then in times of exigency, the ideality is achieved at its highest point (Norris, 2017, p. 262) by praising the sacrifice of the parts in favor of the unity for “the salvation of the state” and claims that “ideality comes into its proper actuality” (Hegel, 1952[1820], S278R). Yet, these arguments led to the discussion of whether or not liberal democracy and limited government can coexist. The liberals are accused of hypocrisy as they put forward emergency provisions, knowing that emergency rules do not fit with the rule of law (Dyzenhaus, 2006, p. 39; Agamben, 2005). Giorgio Agamben considers the idea of the state of exception irrelevant to the judicial order and treats the concept as anomie that is diminishing the power of norm of law or moral of law among

the people (Agamben, 2005, p. 27; Humphreys, 2006). Agamben argues that it is neither lawlessness nor a dictatorship (Humphreys, 2006, p. 678).

These divisions were at the center of the legal discussions during the interwar period (1918-1939), with Carl Schmitt's contentious interpretation of these camps. For example, even though Rousseau (2018[1762]) differentiates the dictatorial powers from the sovereign authority in making laws—only the sovereign can make laws—and allows dictators to act outside of the law only temporally, and if necessary, Schmitt evaluates Rousseau's dictatorial powers similar to lawless power to protect the state (DeWilde, 2019). Referring to Hobbes, Schmitt argues that the SOE is one example of the will of politics/sovereign, which unravels the law's weakness and insufficiency (Casson, 2008, p. 951).

The arguments of Schmitt in *Political Theology* (Schmitt, 2005[1922]) were highly radical and believed to change the course of history. Schmittian conception of emergency powers opened the way for Fascist regimes in Germany and Italy in 1933 and 1922, respectively. Schmitt's claims that encourage an authoritarian ruling on the execution of an SOE reflect the discussion on where an SOE stands relative to the constitution and the relation between law and politics. For example, during the legal discussions over Article 48¹⁷ of the Weimar Constitution in 1924 in Jena, as a prominent German jurist, Schmitt conveyed that legal norms are conditional on the political situation, and if the constitutional rules and legislative mechanisms fail, then the executive should have the power to make rules, releasing all constitutional constraints over the President (DeWilde, 2010a, p. 139).

Schmitt rejects the strict separation of the law and political power, propagating that legal rules' concern should be only about "ethical and moral rightness" in legal writing (Schmitt, 2005[1922]); DeWilde, 2010a, p. 139). He strictly criticizes the inviolability of rights and suggests that the sovereign should decide the limitations of emergency powers if the ruler sees the necessity to save "political substance" (DeWilde, 2010a, p. 139-147); this is further established by his notorious statement "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception." (Schmitt, 2005[1922], p. 5). The constitution, according to him, is not inviolable

¹⁷ According to Article 48, the President of the Weimar Republic can institute emergency powers without the consent of the lower house of the legislature (Reichstag).

by the President (Schmitt, 2005[1922]); DeWilde, 2010a). In fact, he named the President “the guardian of the constitution” (Paulson, 2016, p.524).

The approach of Schmitt that highlights the political power’s superiority over the rule of law reminds us Machiavelli who conveyed the nature of power in the Prince. However, Schmitt differs from Machiavelli, as Schmitt argues that the sovereign can suspend the constitution and should have unlimited power because the existence of the state is more important than the existence of rule of law. The exception that is not applying the law becomes a law application. The order in juristic sense will remain even if there is no more a legal order. Similarly, Agamben tries to explain how the state of exception is related to the law. Agamben argues that “the state of exception” is not a type of law, but a point or a threshold where the law ends, but not exactly inside of the politics and life (Agamben, 2005, S 1.1). By reminding the concentration camps in Europe by Nazis and making associations with the Guantanamo prison after USA Patriot Act (October 26, 2001), Agamben explains how the individuals in these camps had no rights, how these facilities were founded by the authorities out of necessities, but at the same time, they were not legal (Agamben, 2005, S 1.4). By positioning the state of exception in between the law and politics, Agamben argues that state of exception is a management of conflict that has legal aspects and is maintained by the concentration of power. The state of exception is an “emptiness of law” and anomie where none of the law regulations can be applied (Agamben, 2005, S 1.8).

The force of law “the untouchability of law” (Agamben, 2005, p.37) is now separated from the law itself where the norm exists, but it is not applied. In times of exception, the force of law refers to the decrees that are occasionally initiated, and the force of law is applied without law (Agamben, 2005, S 2.3). Agamben believes that the temporary and controlled utilization of the exception rules does not contradict with the democratic order in theory. However, eventually, exception wipes the democracy off because after the state of exception, a new political order is dominated by a new strict security understanding (Agamben, 2005, S 1.5).

Agamben also converges with his predecessors on the legitimacy discussion by questioning who has competence to declare iustitium. While discussing the declaration, Agamben points to the Senate that has *auctoritas partum* – the power to approve a law – in

Rome and this power should be separately evaluated from potestas – meaning the power of magistrate the ruler (Agamben, 2005, S 6.1). Autoritas and potestas are separate but related parts of a binary system (Agamben, 2005, S 6.3 – S 6.9). If these two features are concentrated in one person's possession – or the two got blurred, then, in times of exception – the “juridico-political system transforms itself into a killing machine” (Agamben, 2005, p.86).

Scholars, such as Kelsen, challenge the Schmittian argument. They defend careful constitutional writing and a hierarchy among the laws that differentiate statutory and constitutional law, at the top. A grand principle that cannot be conspired is represented by constitutional law (Paulson, 2016). Adversely, if the sovereign does not follow the rule of law on non-derogable rights, politics is power rather than the rule of law (DeWilde, 2010a, p. 148). In this respect, Kelsen puts forward the idea of constitutional review that “guardians” the constitution (Paulson, 2016, p.524). Besides historical examples of Hitler's rise after the Weimer Republic's Article 48 concerning emergency, contemporary examples, such as the South-African semi-permanent SOE, forced the constitutions to take precautions against power abuse (Meyler, 2007, p. 545). Thus, in connection with discussions during the interwar period in Europe, many normative proposals and suggestions have been made to protect the separation of powers and control mechanisms across the governing bodies.

2.3.1 Minimizing the breaches of executive power

Lijphart (1978) gives two rules of thumb to prevent executive power abuses and protect democratic regimes. First, the decision of the SOE declaration should not rest with the executive; this is a response to Schmitt's argument regarding the SOE declaration by executive necessity. Second, there should be constitutional provisions on SOE termination (Lijphart, 1978, p. 404). In addition to Lijphart's two rules, Ferejohn and Pasquino (2004, p. 230) propose that if different branches claim responsibility for the decision of SOE declaration and termination, the exercise of power, and inspection of rules' execution, the system can prevent power abuses. The courts' roles are highlighted in control over execution during the SOEs. Ferejohn and Pasquino (2004, p. 227) see courts as both ex-ante and ex-post control mechanisms that can point out rule of law violations during SOEs.

Ackerman (2003) suggests a legislative solution to prevent power misuse by the executive. The system that Ackerman called super majoritarian escalator requires majority support to sustain the SOE. Accordingly, the SOE should be adopted for a short period, such as two or three months, and 60 percent legislative support should be required to expand the SOE for another two months. This number should be 70 percent for the next two months, and this rate continues until the system has reached its natural threshold (Ackerman, 2003, p. 1047). This system protects minorities against power misuse and prevents SOE's normalization (Ackerman, 2003, p. 1048).

Finding the balance between law and power and containing power within the law has been central to the SOE discussions. However, legal discussions have excluded the mechanisms of regular politics. The SOE is a governance order where law culture is abolished, and politics and fiction resume. Casson (2008, p. 952) argues that Schmitt mistakenly interprets Locke's presumption that a legitimate government can only be attained by the rule of law. However, according to Locke, a legitimate government can be legal and prudential if the executive acts according to the public good. Locke argues that if the leader does not fulfill the duties towards the people (trustees), the people have the right to revolt (Casson, 2008, p. 960). Therefore, Casson argues that a good government does not constitute only strict laws or the rule of law. The philosophical framework (judgment of the executive and assessment of the people) is essential for the constitutional order to continue to exist (Casson, 2008, p. 944). At this point, rather than diversifying the constitutional controls, regular politics' check and control mechanisms become crucial in SOE executions.

Contrary to the German inter-war experience, and as exemplified in American and British cases, the ambiguity of emergency rules and roles does not always lead to authoritarian shifts in democracies. In these systems, ambiguity is a blessing. One example is the American Business-as-Usual¹⁸ model (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006): as crises occur

¹⁸ One of the three "models of constitutional emergency regimes" (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006) is the Business-as-Usual model. The Business-as-Usual model does not introduce new legal powers to respond to the crisis because it believes that the existing structure of law is sufficient to deal the crisis. Therefore, the crisis should be handled within the regular rule of law. The others are "models of accommodation" and extra-legal measures. The models of accommodation try to keep promise on rights, while also aiming to enlarge the state's power to mitigate crises' outcomes. One classical example is Roman dictatorship. Extra-legality sees rule as submissive to politics; therefore, the crisis determines the extent of the rule.

unexpectedly and with varying degrees of severity, it is nearly impossible to define an emergency in the law. Even if it has been done, the crisis will exceed the extant regulations, so new regulations would be needed according to the emergency type (E. Gross, 2008). Thus, Silverstein (2011) argued that ambiguity could sometimes be the wisdom of the constitutions that leave room for leaders' political maneuvers. Madisonian constitutional design is remarkable in this respect as its ambiguity eases the interpretation of any potential problems. Additionally, it is not the written rules that solve the problems of democracies but usually politics and balance between the Senate, courts, and government (Silverstein, 2011, p. 261). As a result, in all political systems, congress (or the legislative body), courts, administration, and occasionally people should be viewed as self-interested entities that constantly attempt to balance each other. Only then can a universal principle be established under an overarching political norm to prohibit governmental abuse.

Table 2.2: Law or politics

Question	Different Views	The second criterion this research utilizes
Is law or politics more important during an emergency?	Law: Constitutional law and principles have the power to govern the whole political system and do not vanish during an emergency.	Both points of view agree that the emergency necessitates actions that do not exist in present regulations/laws (extraordinary)
	Politics: Politics takes precedence over the rule of law. Legal norms are subordinate to needs during an emergency.	

This part examines two opposing views on whether politics or law should be leading in the management of an emergency. In times of emergency, removing the rule of law with the power given by the law itself is a staggering phenomenon. Thus, the normative arguments discuss the ways of preventing power abuse and containing political power with careful constitutional writing. However, even if the governance during an SOE is not

unconstitutional, the regulation by nature is extraordinary in statutory law. Therefore, the extraordinary actions and their expectation should be a component of the SOE definition.

2.4 What is SOE a type of?

Following Schmitt and his opponents, the discussion on law and politics and constitutional mechanisms, such as separation of powers, court independence, and legislative majority arguments, place the SOE debate at the heart of regime differentiation between democracy and autocracy. Contemporary political science studies isolate SOE as a meaningful discussion only for the democratic systems because, in authoritarian systems, the ruling is already arbitrary. SOE cases of the 20th century European democracies were used to suppress class war, strikes, and colonial uprisings in Africa (Neocleous, 2006, p. 203), introducing the perspective that SOE is a regime transforming tool to shift from democracy to authoritarianism or an in-between format. An emergency is a rule that originated from the urge that “violence needs to be exercised and the limits of the rule of law overcome (Neocleous, 2006, p. 207).” Some studies named authoritarianism an arbitrary rule (lack of the rule of law) governed by SOE rule, such as in Ethiopia (Allo, 2017, p. 176). Others name a prolonged SOE as authoritarianism or no rule of law, as in Israel (Mizock, 2001, p. 245).

Another discussion focuses on state strength rather than regime discussion. Gupta (1978) takes the SOE into an exercise of power debate or a state strength discussion. Gupta (1978) argues that political adventurers are not only a phenomenon for authoritarian and underdeveloped countries because history shows that democratic regimes also have assertive leaders (Gupta, 1978, p. 316). Gupta stands this argument on the assumption that an SOE can also be a concern for autocratic regimes and a tool for an authoritarian leader to further strengthen economic and political control. An SOE is not a phenomenon of the regime and the rule of law discussions; instead, it is a product of state control, concentration, and accountability (Gupta, 1978, p. 317). Irrespective of the regime type, democracy or autocracy, each polity has a state apparatus. Control, concentration, and accountability concerns are common for all regime types, including the SOE.

If the regime type and state strength were the main components of the problem, we would not expect highly centralized states and authoritarian regimes to declare an SOE.

However, empirics challenge the theoretical arguments claiming that emergency powers are only tools for a democratic regime and strong state. For example, during the so-called authoritarian rule since 1995, Ethiopia declared a de-jure SOE for ten months on October 8, 2016. Authoritarian systems such as China and Egypt (deLisle, 2009; “Egypt extends state,” 2018) and the constitutions of all types of regimes (Bjørnskov & Voigt, 2018a) execute and use SOEs as a governing tool.

This section argues that SOE is not about democracy or autocracy, a strong or weak state comparison, or peacetime or wartime order. Further, SOEs have been in practice since the Roman Empire such that SOE has no temporality and is not a modern concept. The categorizations such as SOEs are tools of democracies, and strong states or tools during war times, limit each study’s scope and imply there are no SOEs in authoritarian societies, or it is not meant to observe an SOE in a period of peace. Instead, this work argues that SOE is a paradigm of governance¹⁹ that is consulted to manage crises where quick and efficient action is needed.

2.5 The SOE concept

There is no SOE (or state of siege, martial law, state of exception, or state of conflict) definition that countries have reached a consensus on (Crouch, 2017; Feldman, 2005). Existing definitions highlight particular aspects of SOE and build a definition around these various aspects. For example, for an SOE to occur, a crisis/emergency should be exceptional and generate a grave danger for the nation and sovereign (E. Gross, 2008, pp. 6-7). The exceptionality criterion is insufficient for an SOE definition because not every crisis leads to a declaration of emergency.

A group of definition efforts for the SOEs focuses on the abnormality of measures and accumulation of power by the executives, which leads to unilateral decision making and results in human rights violations (Allo, 2018; Grossman, 1986). However, the status of human rights cannot be a definitional component of SOEs. Findings suggest SOEs are positively correlated with human rights violations (Richards & Clay, 2012), but the

¹⁹ Humphreys (2006, p. 678) mentions the emergency powers as a paradigm of governance before. The study uses Humphreys’ (2006) point as a component of a general concept of an SOE.

outcome—rights violations—cannot define a phenomenon (Goertz, 2006). The empirics should not determine the concept criteria (Goertz, 2006). Therefore, this research does not include the rights violations in the definition criteria, which are the most prominent consequences of the SOEs.

This dissertation attempts to develop an SOE concept in response to the confusion about outcomes and components and the lack of definition. The discussions on how to know an emergency exists – whether SOEs should be considered as a deviation or within legal jurisdiction, and whether it is a governance or regime strategy – should be taken into consideration when generating the concept. First, the emergency and normalcy discussion indicates a need for a leader to decide if an emergency is happening. Second, SOEs are deviations from an extant judicial setting in their nature, as the predetermined rules are not sufficient for an unexpected crisis. Finally, SOEs are not exclusively a phenomenon in democracies; autocracies can also utilize them as tools. As a result, this research defines an SOE as the governance of a leader using extraordinary tools to mitigate the effects of a crisis that threatens the survival of the political system.

The existing definitions of SOE extract four main components that this definition has: (1) an emergency is a type of governance (Humphreys, 2006, p. 678) with two conditions: (2) the existence of a situation/crisis threatening the survival of state (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004, p. 231) and (3) in need of extraordinary actions to deal with the crisis (Casson, 2008, p. 954; Mizock, 2001, p. 236). Finally, (4) leaders must acknowledge these conditions (Mizock, 2001, p. 236).

First, an SOE is a paradigm of governance (Humphreys, 2006, p. 678). By calling an SOE a governance type, this study claims that it is not a component of democratic or authoritarian, parliamentary or presidential, military or civilian, party dictatorship or monarchy, weak and strong state, or peacetime and wartime order. Instead, an SOE is a governance order where law culture is abolished—checks and balances altered and rights suspended at least—but politics resumes (Ward, 2005, p. 721) regardless of regimes.

Secondly, there must be a state of crisis. The discussion on the ambiguity between normalcy and emergency originates from the different perspectives of people, leaders, and international judges who evaluate a situation subjectively. Only the leader's perception is

taken into account to clarify the distinction. This part is essential for our theory since if there is no threat (or a threat perception) acknowledged and announced by the leaders, the use of extraordinary powers would not be legitimized. The threat can be internal or international in origin and actual or fictitious (Humphreys, 2006) in nature.

The third component of the SOE is the necessity of extraordinary action (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006). This component signifies that the executive must deliver a quick and efficient response against the encountered crisis by not being constrained by horizontal and vertical accountabilities. Therefore, we can see a concentration of power under the executive and dwindling powers of courts, legislature, people, party comrades, or military cadres at one extreme. The main interest of this component is not the outcome of whether an extraordinary power is utilized; rather, it is capturing the expectation of the extraordinary power utilization because the crisis cannot be handled within the standard sets of rules.

The final part of this definition focuses on the leaders, who are defined as “effective rulers” (Goemans, Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009), in any local and national government office. Since the leaders oversee emergencies via unusual powers, they are the main actors of SOEs. Primarily relying on the leaders’ perceptions of crisis while revoking the rule of law during a crisis and need for unusual powers are considered problematic as this view can be associated with Hobbes’ (1996[1651]) *Leviathan* and Schmitt’s (2005[1922]) Nazi Germany, leaders with unlimited power. However, this investigation contends that SOEs are only possible if the leading governing body (cabinet, president, or legislative) recognizes and accepts an emergency in the practice of politics because the emergency power is also a right of governments provided by international law and can only be exercised by a government.

The concept of an SOE is constructed along with theoretical discussions. Two conditions can be evaluated as necessary conditions to convey the concept in a more systematic language: the crisis existence that the leaders acknowledge and the emerging need for the extraordinary exercise of power by the leaders. If we formulate these conditions around Boolean algebra, we can also find the irrelevant, negative, and disconfirming cases often confused with positive cases of SOEs, such as crises and executive orders. Thus, we can set clear borders for our SOE concept against the conceptual stretch among various

definitions and prevent the violation of the unit homogeneity assumption in empirical analyses (see King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994: 92).

Initially, both conditions are necessary and sufficient for a case to be considered an SOE. Necessary and sufficient condition concept structures use a logical AND Boolean operator (Goertz, 2006, p. 40). The AND operator is depicted in Figure 2.2. If X1 and X2 exist together, this study expects an SOE case to appear. For the other possibilities, the outcome of interest is not anticipated.

X1	X2	Y*	X1: There is a crisis that threatens the survival of the regime/communities acknowledged by the leaders.
1	1	1	
1	0	0	X2: There is a need of extra-ordinary powers that is acknowledged by the leaders.
0	1	0	
0	0	0	Y: SOE


* 1 (Yes, the condition exists); 0 (No, the condition does not exist)

Figure 2.2: Boolean AND operator and outcome variables

The necessary and sufficient condition structure inevitably assumes an equal weight of dimensions (Goertz, 2006, p. 47). Therefore, logically, the division between two opposite directions is dichotomous. Each type of governance has a status quo that is acknowledged as normalcy. Therefore, with our two necessary and sufficient conditions, we observe that a state's governance moves from normality to emergency through a form of exception within which the leader frames the issue as a matter of utmost security. As we move towards the emergency, we observe a power asymmetry or power accumulation for the executive's efficiency. Therefore, rather than defining vague concepts and normalcy and emergency divisions, we take the decision point as an emergency.

After defining the core components of an SOE concept, a universe of cases for choosing relevant and irrelevant cases must be explained to identify which cases are not SOEs, for which the relevant and irrelevant distinction must be made in a universe. For the

SOE case, as it is part of the definition, the universe is governance. To choose relevant cases within this universe, we use “the rule of inclusion,” where at least one condition is positively associated with the outcome of interest (Goertz, 2006, p. 186). For identifying *irrelevant* cases, we use “the rule of exclusion” (Goertz, 2006, p. 187), in which any eliminatory condition, such as the existence of a crisis (X1), predicts the non-occurrence of the outcome of interest (Goertz, 2006, p. 187).



The universe is governance types=U

Irrelevant cases= $U \setminus N \cup P$

Relevant cases= $N \cup P$: It consists of negative, positive, and gray area cases.

Positive cases = $P \setminus N$

Negative cases= $N \setminus P$: at least one IV exists

Gray area = $N \cap P$

Figure 2.3: Case selection: positive, negative, and irrelevant cases

Figure 2.3 is a re-created version of a figure in Gary Goertz’s (2006, p. 32) *Concept Formation Basics*. The cases confused in the literature are in the *relevant* section, which is

the union of *Negative* and *Positive* (denoted as $N \cup P$). To find relevant cases within variation, the dichotomous AND operator can be transformed into OR (Goertz, 2006, pp. 189-199). With the OR operator, all possibilities of different combinations of two conditions, X1 and X2, and outcome Y (Figure 2.4) are present. *Irrelevant* cases are not helpful to test the theory because neither conditions nor the outcomes of interest are observed. *Negative* cases refer to the control group testing the theory in question. Finally, the *positive* cases are the ones that researchers attempt to explain.



<u>(X1 AND X2 AND Y)*</u>	
(0 AND 0 AND 0)	→ <i>Irrelevant cases</i>
(1 AND 0 AND 0) OR (0 AND 1 AND 0)	→ <i>Negative cases</i>
(1 AND 1 AND 1)	→ <i>Positive cases</i>
(0 AND 0 AND 1)	→ <i>Impossible but happens</i>
(1 AND 1 AND 0) OR (1 AND 0 AND 1) OR (0 AND 1 AND 1)	→ <i>Disconfirming cases</i>
* 1 (Yes, the condition exists); 0 (No, the condition does not exist)	

Figure 2.4: Boolean OR operator and outcome variables

All things considered, to call an event an SOE, two necessary and sufficient conditions should be observed together. Rather than considering two conditions equally weighted, this work uses the existence of a crisis as a critical criterion for the base category/negative cases because, temporally, the crisis comes before the need for extraordinary action (the second component). Within this framework of two necessary conditions, if there is no need for extraordinary action against any crisis and no crisis to handle for a leader, this state is categorized under *irrelevant cases* in Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4. If one of the conditions exists, the case falls under the relevant case category, including negative, positive, and gray areas.

As explained in Figure 2.4, the negative cases are classified as the occurrence of either one of the conditions but not the outcome of interest. Since the *negative* cases are the base

category for the positive cases' mechanism, the distinctive features are crucial in explaining it. An example of the negative cases can be governance with presidential decrees containing the executive's extraordinary powers, which accept that regular legal rules are not capable of solving a policy problem. The leaders do not consider a policy problem as a threat or a crisis, yet they use extraordinary power. The most famous instance of this is the executive decrees initiated by the US presidents. Both SOEs and executive decrees are unilateral power exercises, but there is no need to justify the exercising of unilateral power under executive decrees during a crisis. For instance, US President Donald Trump issued three executive orders (Executive Order, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c) while declaring one SOE (Proclamation, 2020) related to the COVID-19 pandemic until July 2020.

In addition, should a crisis exist, and the need for extraordinary action is determined by a group, but the leaders do not acknowledge these conditions, it can be indicative of the *negative* case category. If a leader's recognition of the two conditions were not sought, any crisis management demand by business associations, unions, and human rights activists would be called an SOE. However, SOE declarations take their ground in international law (e.g., Article XV of the ECHR [1950]), and the parties that agree are the states; therefore, SOEs are exercised by the states.

Within the relevant cases, there is also an *impossible but happens* category. Cases in this category are void of any of the conditions but experience the outcome of interest.

A *disconfirming* case might be one where both conditions exist without the SOE being observed as the outcome. These cases can be observed, especially where there is no legal regulation or a norm for declaring an SOE. Alternatively, the political conjuncture of a country determines SOE declarations. Brazilian president Itamar Franco resisted declaring an SOE in 1994 during the violence by drug gangs in Rio de Janeiro (United Press International, October 1994). This is primarily due to his decision to take less drastic measures after years of oppressive military dictatorship under SOE rule. Another type of *disconfirming* case is extraordinary actions wherein an SOE declaration occurs without an identified emergency. As this study proceeds to the details of the data collection, which will be outlined in the following sections, it should be noted that there is only one case of this type among 701 cases of SOEs. Regarding this one outlier observed in 1978 in Trinidad and

Tobago, some details are available on the measures taken during the SOE, but no announced crisis has been identified. These types of cases might occur as a part of the arbitrary ruling that needs no justification pointing to a crisis or an occurrence of the need for extraordinary powers.

2.6 Conclusion

The time and geographical limits, as well as the issue-based divisions, are used to draw a boundary between normalcy and emergency. In this chapter, the ambiguity between emergency and normalcy demonstrates a practical requirement for a leader's decision on emergency status.

Next, the chapter investigates whether the SOE is a legal void that should be considered outside the purview of the rule of law or evaluated within the scope of the rule of law. While these discussions focus on how liberal democracies might limit the executive's emergency powers through constitutional and legislative processes to prevent arbitrary rule, they also assess SOEs as being extraordinary measures taken in reaction to the unexpectedness of the circumstance. Consequently, specified laws are insufficient to mitigate the consequences of an unexpected incident.

The fear of power abuse during emergencies is founded on the notion that SOEs serve as crisis management tools for democratic governments. In autocracies, there is no reason for concern because the government already rules arbitrarily. However, in reality, authoritarian governments also use SOEs when a crisis arises, and immediate action is required. Furthermore, under authoritarian regimes, the executive is checked by other authoritarian competitors while still having space to consolidate unilateral decision-making authority. An SOE is said to be a governing instrument available to all sorts of state governments.

Finally, a definition has been developed for SOE as a governance style in which there is an expectation of taking extraordinary action when a situation develops and is acknowledged by leaders as threatening the regime's and people's existence. To identify SOEs from other governing tools and conditions, such as presidential order and crisis, definition components and combinations of components are investigated.

Chapter 3

HYPOTHESES: DETERMINANTS AND OUTCOMES OF SOE

This chapter presents the expectations regarding the determinants and consequences of SOEs based on previous studies. For this purpose, the chapter has two sections.

Part I examines the literature on the SOE declarations. First of all, there are evaluations of crisis elements, political structure, and leader characteristics. Furthermore, because SOE is a power granted to states by international law, the declaration itself is treated as an indicator of compliance with international law. In other words, the more the state is aligned with international law entrepreneurs in the international arena, the more likely the state is expected to declare an SOE. As such, given the aim to account for the contribution of international factors to SOE declarations, this section reformulates the causal mechanism by referring to the link with the West and the leverage of the West framework.

Part II addresses a limited number of works about SOEs' effects on human rights, the erosion of democracy, and interstate conflict. The emphasis is on the variation of SOE executions, specifically whether the military is mobilized during the SOEs and, if so, whether this mobilization results in DCA formations and participation in PKOs after the SOEs. The main point is that mobilization during SOEs signals a shift in civil-military relations. This shift in domestic power is expected to impact international alignment. For crisis management in SOEs, governments mobilize the military. Following the crisis resolution, the civil government materially rewards the military without reducing the national budget. The SOE declaring governments form DCAs while also redirecting the military's efforts and attention to international issues. This way, the civil government's survival, monopoly, and political power are ensured.

3.1 Part I: Why are SOEs declared?

Following the normative and theoretical discussions on which events can be considered an emergency, this work focuses on the domestic and international political reasons for emergency declarations. A recent wave of research identifies reasons for the SOE declarations with the increasing observations of emergencies that countries face, such as global terrorism activities and worldwide pandemic outbreaks. Although countries face the same crisis, such as COVID-19, some declare SOEs, but others do not. Thus, this part focuses on the question, “why do some countries declare an SOE, but others do not, even though they encounter the same types of crises?” Herewith, the aim is to identify the cross-national factors -apart from the country-specific features.

Three crucial factors are highlighted for an event to be called an SOE. These factors are crisis, extraordinary powers, and a leader’s decision. Following the SOE components, the main interest is the crisis’s role in SOE declarations. This work categorizes crises by their types and threat levels and argues that some types of crises make executives more prone to declare SOEs. Second, legal and political structures are focused on discussing if a necessity is ingrained in the political mechanism to abolish regular politics. Finally, political survival factors are considered because the leaders have critical roles in SOE declarations.

Nevertheless, the crisis factors, domestic political indices, and leaders’ personal roles are considered alternative explanations and controls. The main argument of this study is that long-ignored international law and international power relations impact emergency announcements. As mentioned, SOE declarations are tools also allowed under international law to ensure state survival in crisis times. Another option for the states is using extraordinary measures without announcing an emergency state, but this option does not contain a justification of rights restrictions in the domestic and international areas. Thus, declaring an SOE is an indicator of a state’s alignment with the Western norm entrepreneur leader countries, and the alignment is closely related to cultural, political, and economic links and power relations with these Western states. Thus, international alignment factors are considered based on their effects on the SOE declarations.

According to the main argument of this study, SOE announcements demonstrate that a state is integrated into the international system, indicating that it is a practice of nations that

have strong ties with Western democracies, the architects of international law. These foreign ties are frequently assessed economically (e.g., trade and military aid), yet these findings do not show a consistent correlation across investigations. On the other side, research suggests that SOEs enhance anti-democratic inclinations and serve as a springboard for authoritarianism (Lührmann & Rooney, 2020). Furthermore, we know that the linkage with leverage can be a factor in successful democratization movements (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Thus, linkage and leverage, both thought to be closely connected to democracy, are chosen to assess their relationship with the SOE at the center of the autocratization arguments. Furthermore, linkage provides a solution for the need to measure interconnections in a sophisticated way that incorporates non-economic links.

3.1.1 Embeddedness in international law and power relations

In times of uncertainty during which the government, territorial integrity, people, or the sovereign's survival are at stake, states must ensure their survival by using the monopoly over the legitimate exercise of power. The sovereign's responsibility is to protect its citizens' life as much as their rights, but the terms and balance between rights and freedom can change in times of uncertainty and crisis. States can derogate some civil and political rights while prioritizing the state's survival at the expense of the citizen's rights. Among the human rights treaties, four of these treaties have derogation clauses that recognize each state's right to declare an SOE in times of crisis.²⁰ Needless to say, certain rights (freedom from torture, freedom from slavery and forced labor, and right to life) cannot be denied under any circumstances; and before restraining the rights, an announcement of an emergency or the realization of the crisis is mostly made as is reporting to international courts about the restricted rights during the SOEs. The declaration of an emergency in the domestic law can be based on the constitution or statute, or it can be based on the interpretation of the existing legal and constitutional clauses. The declaration is different from the government's reporting to relevant international human rights committees and derogation reporting because of being signatory at ICCPR. Uttering that an SOE exists and extraordinary measures are required to

²⁰ Note that under the obligations of human rights treaties states can report their derogations for the times other than the SOE (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006).

contain the crisis is an indicator of how much a state is willing to comply with international law, norms, and customs. This is because the declaration says the government needs time to fix the political disorder while being inspected by international bureaus and judges during an emergency (Neumayer, 2013).

Compliance appears first with international law's internalization, defined as "the process by which nations incorporate international law concepts into domestic practice" (Cleveland 2001, p. 6). The process between international norm/law acknowledgment and its effect on domestic practice and, eventually, state behavior composes multiple steps. One step missing might mean weak or partial compliance (Engstrom, 2010). Schmitz and Sikkink (2002) describe four steps of compliance: (i) the ratification of the norm-related treaty; (ii) completing the required reports requested by the international reviewers; (iii) readjustment of the domestic law according to international laws; (iv) the state behavior that is consistent with the norms.

In this analytical framework, finding the international determinants of this behavior is the key purpose here. Therefore, different approaches and mechanisms in state's compliance to the international law are tested. Then, the first hypothesis concerns whether signature in international treaties create binding obligations on the ratifying parties and I suggest the longer duration in year since the ratification of ICCPR positively correlates with higher SOEs. The second hypothesis is about whether transnational human rights advocacy networks put pressure on the government and so I expect a positive alignment between the higher links with the West and higher SOEs. The third hypothesis is on whether the bargaining power of the government against the Western democracies have an effect on the compliance and I posit a positive association between the higher leverage of Western countries and higher SOEs.

The first assumption is that ratification of the relevant international law is an early signal of the compliance behavior, otherwise states would not engage in negotiations or hold reservations on the certain articles that are considered as counter-productive for the state's benefits (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Neumayer, 2005). Therefore, the assumption is that the treaties are signed, and norms are obeyed in good faith (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). Accordingly, SOE declarations are expected to be influenced by the state's ratification of

ICCPR, which regulates the SOE and related human rights, is one area to check how much states internalize international norms. The ECHR, ACHR, and ICCPR all espouse fundamental human rights principles. However, this research used the ICCPR ratification date to provide a common ground for measurement and avoid the missing values problem in the analyses. The ICCPR has been extensively signed and ratified pact on a global scale (except Cuba, which became a signatory in 2008).²¹ The ACHR, a regional convention, is not entirely signed or ratified across the continent. Guyana and Cuba have not signed the treaty yet, while Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela have both denounced the ACHR. Hence, the ratification effect seems essential as an initial step of embeddedness in the international norm, as stated in the first hypothesis:

H1: States declare higher numbers of SOEs if they have ratified ICCPR in prior years compared to the states that have ratified more recently.

The extant and growing literature about ratification's influence on state behavior is that confirmed ratification might be positively associated with better human rights scores only if the state has a democratic rule and strong civil society; otherwise, ratification is associated with dampened human rights scores (Neumayer, 2005). Additionally, the state complies with international norms as a rational actor to silence domestic and international critics and to avoid being a subject for naming and shaming (Neumayer, 2005; Hafner-Burton et al., 2011). Thus, the embeddedness cannot be thought independent from relations with Western countries, which are centers of the international advocacy network

How much a state is willing to integrate itself into the international human rights advocacy network depends on the strength of the link with the countries that are centers of these ideas (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). Therefore, the initial sets of empirical analysis are on the networks of human rights advocacies (e.g., international non-governmental organizations [INGOs], civil society groups, and other parties specifically working on the human rights issue). These networks are directly connected to the governments' motivation

²¹ Appendix C, Table 5, contains details on the years of signature and ratification.

to comply with the international treaties (Schmitz & Sikkink, 2002; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005). For instance, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) concentrate on linkages, which are quantified by the number of INGOs that citizens of a country are members of.

Second, the idea of networks has been discussed and tested in the literature as economic interdependency in terms of aid (humanitarian, military, and economic aid) and multilateral and bilateral trade relationship and their effect on state behavior. The assumption is that if a state has more trade or aid dependence on Western states,²² that state is more likely to comply with the norms. Trade (Hafner-Burton, 2009), military aid, and military assistance (Blanton & Blanton, 2001; Cingranelli & Pasquarello, 1985) are alternative indicators for links with Western states.

Different measures of links with the West produce different outcomes; moreover, the literature only focuses on the relationship's economic aspect. Thus, this study uses a more complex linkage measure in cultural, social, communication, and economic connections. The linkage to the West, initially constructed for how much the international pressure for democratization is adequate on a country (Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 43), is adopted for an SOE declaration in this work. Thus, the second hypothesis is based on the links between the close relationship between the country and Western democracies and SOE declarations:

H2: States declare greater numbers of SOEs if they have a higher linkage rate with the US and EU.

While the linkage is utilized to measure the effect of bilateral relations, it is also essential to control for the expected sanctioning power of the West because the compliance behavior is also influenced by the state's power which is defined as "regimes' bargaining power vis-à-vis the West" or the ability to avoid possible punishments by the West (Levitsky & Way, 2010, pp. 40-41). This perspective carries a realistic undertone on the state's compliance with the international treaties when doing so is in their best interests (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). In this cost-benefit calculation, the power dynamics among states, the SOE

²² The West is an aggregated country list, as in Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 40), that includes the US and the EU member countries.

declaring state's economic development level vis-à-vis the Western counterparts (partners) are taken into account. If the states find compliance is in their benefit to violate the human rights, the expected cost of economic sanctioning from the Western countries should have been lower than the benefits. Therefore, the economic power of a state relative to the Western countries can influence the compliance behavior with human rights regulations.

For high leverage, a country must have a high economic standing, oil production capacity, nuclear capacity possession, and backing from “counter-hegemonic powers” (Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 41) such as Russia's and, more recently, China's against the Western governments.²³ If a country has poor records in these dimensions, then that implies that the state has no resisting capacity to comply with international law. This component is largely ignored in the international relations literature. Thus, the third hypothesis is:

H3: States declare higher numbers of SOEs as US and EU's leverage increases compared to these states.

3.1.2 SOEs as crisis management tools

The first condition for an event to be an SOE is the perception of crisis existence. The perception – at least from the perspective of leaders – is necessary to justify an SOE declaration. From personal dictatorships to liberal democracies, a crisis is shown to be the reason for SOE declaration apart from politics' regular course.

Different types of crises require different measures, even though the legal mechanisms are constant across the years. The political importance of these crises depends on their severity and the event's popularity and resonance with the country's history. Especially among EU countries, emergency declarations are rare in economic crises because these are hard to justify (Greene, 2015, p. 601). In terrorism, the situation can be easily justified because terrorism is a more salient issue after attacks resulting in mass killings and directly related to national security. For example, Ethiopia is surrounded by weak states that

²³ In this research the anti-systemic power denotes China because Russia has no record of aid after the fall of Soviet Union.

have become a haven for the terrorists of the neighboring countries (Allo, 2017). That situation boldens the national security discourse and justifies unusual tools and SOE rule, which is justified around rapid economic development and tackling poverty with a subsidiary of political developments (Allo, 2017). Moreover, the uncertainty and fear of terrorism easily justify the rights violations in the public's eyes (E. Gross, 2008, p. 22). Thus, leaders tend to use SOEs if they get the most out (Rooney, 2020). Based on these differences in justification of the crisis and public opinion about using emergency power, the fourth hypothesis is as follows:

H4: National security concerns, which endanger regime existence, relate to a greater number of SOEs than economic and environmental disasters.

However, identifying the realm of a crisis is not always feasible or straightforward. The crises may have several elements, and each has a spillover impact on other issues, such as a natural disaster that an economic crisis may accompany. For example, a banking crisis can relate to a void paycheck triggering social discontent (Heldagottir, 2011-2012). In contemporary liberal democracies, adopting SOE responses to the economic crisis has been challenged since the government's competency has been questioned (Greene, 2015). Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the purpose and circumstances for which SOEs are utilized evolved. Previously, SOEs were employed during wartime, but amid the socioeconomic upheaval in Europe throughout the interwar years and the cold war, SOEs were primarily used for labor strike situations as a weapon of liberal market economies (Scheuerman, 2000). Neocleous (2006, p. 195) provided 12 examples of labor strikes in the UK throughout the 1990s when the Emergency Power Act 1920 was used to suppress labor.

As a result, comparing a financial crisis with no political ramifications with an economic crisis that is viewed as a national security concern is essential. As a result, the second expectation is that, as indicated in hypothesis five, the SOE declaration is more likely amid an economic crisis if it happens concurrently with political turmoil:

H5: Social crises with reflections on the economic crises are more likely to result in SOE declaration than crises with no economic component.

Table 3.1: Main hypotheses for the determinants of SOEs

	Independent Variables		Outcome variable
H1	Earlier the signature year of ICCPR	is expected to be associated with	the higher number of SOEs.
H2	Higher the linkage with West		
H3	Higher the leverage of West		
H4	National security issue		
H5	Social crisis that has economic reflections		

3.1.3 Controls for emergency declarations

Aside from the variables described in Table 3.1, the political system, domestic inter-institutional structure, and the leader's political position can all impact SOE declarations. The current political processes (i.e., judicial control and legislative control over the executive), regime and executive types (i.e., democracy and presidential vs. parliamentary democracy), and constitutional rules all impact SOE declarations. Other elements (such as elections, support base, and tenure length) that are more personally relevant to the leader's political life and decisions are then controlled.

Political system and institutions

The SOEs are connected to the regime types in a few different ways. In the international norm compliance dimension, democracies are more likely to comply with international norms because of their high civil society activities and connections with non-state actors such as NGOs, private companies, and a shared understanding of the rule of law (Diamond, 1994). Across institutions, there are more developed control mechanisms than non-democracies (Hafner-Burton et al., 2011). Thus, democracies that are signatories of human rights treaties are more likely to declare an SOE during crises than autocratic regimes. The level of democracy is controlled.

One institution that effectively controls the executive over SOE execution is the ex-ante and ex-post judiciary controls. For example, high resilience between the executive and judiciary is crucial to contain executive abuse during SOEs in Pakistan (Qureshi, 2010) and Colombia (Uprimny, 2003). Even so, there are contradictory findings regarding judiciary control. Hafner-Burton et al. (2011) find that derogations during the SOEs are higher in the case of strong judicial review. Bjørnskov and Voigt (2018b) – based on Ferejohn and Pasquino's (2004) and Dyzenhaus's (2005) ex-post judicial review argument – find that judicial independence is weakly but negatively associated with SOE declarations.

Even though this research does not expect an association between the judiciary and the initial steps of SOE declarations, the higher rates of reporting, ratification, or annulment power of the judiciary can influence SOE declarations retrospectively. Thus, the government, in expectation of effective judicial monitoring during emergency management, is more likely to declare SOE.

This study predicts that legislative effectiveness might influence the decision of an SOE declaration, like judicial accountability and effectiveness. Ackerman's (2003) so-called supermajoritarian escalator is one example of how the legislative can be active in the SOE termination. Accordingly, the leaders' expectations on intervention and termination of an SOE by legislation affect the SOE declaration. So, the court independence and legislative effectiveness levels are controlled in the models.

SOEs are crisis-management tools for quicker and more efficient action when a crisis occurs. The political discussion of efficiency debate is primarily pursued around presidential vs. parliamentary democratic systems. Presidential democracies are argued to be more stable with temporal rigidity (Shugart & Carey, 1992) because there is no vote of no confidence (Bjørnskov & Voigt, 2018b). However, it is argued that presidential systems have dual legitimacy problems between legislative and executive and are imbued with the issue of gridlock in the system more often than in parliamentary democracies (Linz, 1990). Other than the extreme case of dual legitimacy, presidential systems are more efficient in decision-making than parliamentary systems. The presidential democracy and parliamentary democracy dummies are included in the models.

The final systemic factor is the power of the written rules. Constitutional provisions that determine the extent of the authority vested in the executive also create a pattern for SOE declarations. Bjørnskov and Voigt (2018b; 2020) indicate that if constitutional rules give more power to the leaders during an SOE, leaders are more likely to consult SOE declaration. Rooney (2020) also finds the positive effect of emergency provisions on SOE declarations, which gives extensive power to the executive. Accordingly, constitutional emergency provisions are tested in the statistical estimations.

Leaders and political survival

Crisis and political factors are intertwined with the leaders' perceptions and decisions that maximize their benefit with political survival strategies. Declaring an SOE is a leader's strategic choice depending on the political structure and nature of the crisis; therefore, we need to control the leader's political utility vested in the SOE declaration. According to the literature, democratic systems will declare an SOE in an exogenous crisis rather than an endogenous crisis (Bjornskov & Voigt, 2018b). This is because, in contrast to an authoritarian leader, the democratic executive, balanced with various domestic institutions and subject to public approval, is less likely to declare an SOE in response to an anti-government demonstration. Nevertheless, the declaration of SOE would not be unpopular after a natural disaster because the source is exogenous. In a human-made crisis, there is an expectation and a high probability of curbing political and civil rights/freedoms in favor of security. Hence, as rational actors try to maximize their tenure period, leaders would not want to be punished in the ballot boxes because of the emergency measures. They are expected to abstain from declaring SOEs during election periods.

If the leadership has been changed with the leaders' support base²⁴ (Mattes, Leeds, & Matsumura, 2016), the risks are lower for a leader after the change. This change would also create the opportunity to suppress the competing winning coalitions by an SOE rule.

The leader's perception plays a significant role in SOE declarations, but the idiosyncratic differences in the leaders' personalities are far beyond the range of this

²⁴ Change in support base means a new leader comes into power supported by a social group different from the previous leaders' societal supporters.

dissertation. Thus, the focus is on political and conjunctural factors that might elevate the leaders' tendency in SOE declarations. When leaders are more likely to lose power, they are expected to be more abusive to stay in control (Gallagher & Blackstone, 2015). Therefore, time left in the tenure determines leaders' future in power. Thus, the election year dummy, change in support base dummy, and tenure years are controlled.

In this section, the SOE declarations are expected to be impacted by various domestic and international factors. However, the SOE declaration only provides one side of the story: to establish a comprehensive framework, the results of SOEs should be studied. The SOEs are primarily investigated regarding their domestic political results, such as human rights violations and changes to the governmental check and control mechanism. The international outcomes will be addressed in the next section based on the previous arguments on internal political changes during SOEs.

3.2 Part II: How do SOEs influence international cooperation?

In SOE execution, the constitutional court and international monitoring aim to ensure that the restrictions on rights violations are followed by politics. Temporality is a critical component that divides exceptionality and normality, preventing power abuse for an extended period (E. Gross, 2008). Unfortunately, most of the time, measures are taken during an emergency, or its effects persist much longer than the emergency itself. Normalcy after the emergency is not the same as before the emergency, but new normalcy has an updated understanding of the old one that is frequently observed (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006, p. 175). For example, the 9-11 attacks have forever changed airport security rules and procedures (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006, p. 178). While the restrictions are supposed to be limited in SOEs, the empirics show that SOEs influence economic, political, and social domains during non-SOE times.

The consequences highlighted by empirical findings are mainly because of executives' power accumulation in domestic and international politics. The first body of literature studies SOEs' outcomes on the country's overall human rights performance, focusing on the changing state-citizen relationship. The second body of literature highlights the power of unilateral decision-making and the tendency toward authoritarianism, the executive body's relationship for balancing mechanisms such as courts, legislative, and separation of powers (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006, p. 62). In short, the outcome always strengthens the executive concerning citizens and control mechanisms. However, there are also unofficial political players in some political systems, such as the military, and in these systems, SOEs are primarily enforced via military power. Thus, SOEs in which the military mobilized – meaning using the military as a police force in domestic politics – reflects the existing and changing domestic power balance among the governing bodies and are suspected of having long-term effects on domestic and international politics.

In this context, the civil government and military partnership may not be a military tutelage but an outcome of a mutually beneficial relationship. Furthermore, constitutional provisions allow governments to use the military to deal with domestic political or natural disasters during SOEs. (Pion-Berlin & Acácio, 2020). However, the frequency of the military involvement in managing domestic crises and fighting crime (Pion-Berlin & Carreras, 2017),

especially the recent Latin American examples (e.g., the military replaced the police in the Mexican war on drugs), raises questions about whether the military is expanding its power area. Lenin Moreno announced an SOE in Ecuador while a group of army officers stood behind him in 2019 after protests opposing fiscal reform (Llangari & Valencia, 2019). A few days apart, Sebastián Piñera declared an SOE for protests against transportation fee raises in front of the military officials wearing official uniforms in Chile (Sherwood & Laing, 2019). Both leaders used the military as a police force to suppress uprisings, and these were powerful images that portrayed the military as a governing body partner (Fisher, 2019). However, civil governments ignore the threat of the military expanding its sphere of influence because public dissent appears more dangerous than the military would pose to the government otherwise.

Consulting military power is a result of the country's militarized political culture (Ruhl, 1996), as well as the temptation of civil governments to use excessive military force for political ends due to high and rising rates of domestic unrest (Huntington, 1996). Moreover, military mobilization threatens democratic gains. However, despite the military being called for, we observe fewer military coup attempts in Latin America (Mora & Fonseca, 2019). Researchers bringing these contradictory observations together are prompt to look at successful government strategies in military management. Therefore, this part tests the argument about providing military new roles in the international arena to sustain the cooperation between civil and military cadres (Huntington, 1996) after the military mobilization during SOEs. The main argument is that SOE declarations, especially after the ones with military mobilization, increase the likelihood of DCAs and contribution to PKOs.

The main question is how SOE declarations and measures during SOEs, such as military mobilization that changes domestic power structure, can influence a state's international alignment behavior. In search of this question, the outcomes of SOEs and civil-military relations literature in connection to SOEs are outlined. Then, SOEs' outcomes through the changing civil-military relations on international security cooperation are examined. In addition, alternative explanations for two examples of international alignment behavior, DCA formation and PKO contribution, are reviewed to identify potential confounders in SOE and alignment association.

3.2.1 Outcomes of SOEs

In the early works about SOEs, the congruence of human rights violations and written rules on human rights have been tested. Davenport (1996) examines the outcomes of detailed constitution-writing that explicitly mention press freedom, media censorship, and political rights restrictions on the rights violations at the country level. A comparison of 39 democracies between 1948 and 1982 indicates that countries that explicitly mention press freedom in their constitutions experience fewer media censorship and political restriction (Davenport, 1996, p. 643). Therefore, Davenport concludes that constitutions' written rules on freedoms would guarantee the freedom of the press and political rights in those countries (1996, p. 648).

Keith and Poe (2004) also test constitutional provisions on SOEs that restrict the executive's authority, such as the legislature's role, temporal limits, and clauses about non-derogable rights and their effects on the country's human rights score. They find a conditional effect; if a country faces a civil war, these provisions are associated with lower rates of rights abuse; if the country encounters a conflict short of a civil war, provisions are related to the higher abuse rates. Richards and Clay (2012) also find that the non-derogability status of a right does not guarantee that the states respect the non-derogable right during an SOE. Neumayer (2013) tests the human rights performance during SOEs and evidence that the regime types play a crucial role in the outcome. Autocracies violate all; anocracies violate a few; democracies do not violate derogable and non-derogable rights (Neumayer, 2013).

Some studies examine the preemptive power of the SOE in the case of terrorism and observe that the SOE declared after a terrorist attack leads to more terrorism activities and repression rather than preventing terrorism (Bjørnskov & Voigt, 2020). This outcome is further elaborated by dividing the terrorist attacks into outgroup and ingroup terror attacks and their relationship with the constitutional emergency provisions and SOE declarations (Rooney, 2020). After an SOE declaration, the existent executive power strength is associated with higher rates of terrorist attacks only if the terrorist group comes from the separatist movement, in other words, from the outgroup (Rooney, 2020).

In-dept case studies have been conducted on how SOEs can prepare authoritarian transformations to formulate the mechanism of SOEs to authoritarian rules (Arslanalp &

Erkmen, 2020). Interestingly, the cross-national analysis of whether SOEs lead to an autocratic turn has been missing. At the same time, the primary concern of the constitutional writing on emergency is preventing ways of democratic backsliding, as happened in the Weimar Republic (DeWilde, 2010a) and most recently in Hungary and Turkey (Lührmann & Rooney, 2020).

Rooney (2019) formulates in an early study that governments with unilateral decision-making authority during emergencies are more likely to have an MID because they lack various controlling and checking mechanisms in decision-making. Nonetheless, these studies do not mention a regime change. Lührmann and Rooney (2020) address this missing link of literature and argue that the recent autocratization wave occurs because the incumbent executive concentrates power, weakens the institutional checks, and represses opposition and media (Lührmann & Rooney, 2020). Moreover, SOEs provide incumbents opportunities to concentrate power and dilute democratic control networks (Lührmann & Rooney, 2020). The public resistance to state policies is expected to be at its lowest rate during SOEs because the measures are legitimized to deal with the crisis (Hafner-Burton et al., 2011). The findings suggest a 75 percent probability that democratic erosion will occur during an SOE period (Lührmann & Rooney, 2020).

SOEs indeed enable the government to consolidate authority, eliminate institutional constraints, and crush opposition and the media. However, not all SOEs will likely lead to democratic backlash or power consolidation. Alternatively, the actors who play active roles in SOEs may differ across political systems, and the concentration of power may not necessarily be advantageous to the government. Prior research suggests that there may be power transfers during SOEs since the official and informal political parties that play a role in domestic and foreign policy decision-making may change. Thus, to determine who gets to wield political power, we must study the process of SOEs in which the key actors are involved.

3.2.2 Civil-military relations during SOEs

In crisis and popular uprising, using the military is the most convenient and quicker way to quell disorder, and the ability to suppress opposition with military power is a temptation for

politicians hard to stay away from (Huntington, 1996). Additionally, using the military to preserve domestic stability is often a consequence of culturally ingrained practices that people think military intervention cannot be avoided and is necessary to protect the constitution (Ruhl, 1996). The military's self-identification also supports the practice of military intervention as a protector of the nation (Loveman, 2001).

In the long term, military involvement in domestic politics undermines the civil government's authority. People approach the military like a political party, an actor in politics, jeopardizing the civil government's autonomy due to military activity in domestic politics (Diamint, 2015). Thus, civil government, either democratic or autocratic, tries to control the military and keep it out of politics. Broadly, there are two types of civilian control mechanisms in the literature. In democracies, "objective civilian control" aims to form a rule in that military is subordinate to civil government, and a strict separation of functions and duties is achieved. The other type common in non-democratic regimes is "subjective civilian control," which means a small party or faction in the government controls the military (Huntington, 1957).

Different strategies are used to form control over the military. Objective control is expected to be achieved with military professionalization (Huntington, 1957; Myoe, 2017). Increased professionalization with a higher focus on the military administration than politics and standardization of recruitment practices enhances society's trust in the military (Martinez & Duran, 2016). The military gains a new neutral role in domestic politics, and with this new role, the likelihood of coup d'états decreases (Kohn, 1997; Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2018). Nonetheless, there are unexpected outcomes too. Modernization acts are often achieved through increased spending and arms transfers, which increase the military's budget, making it more potent than before, and then the civil government (Leon, 2014; Wang, 1998). Consequently, modernization of equipment and training and development of credible recruitment systems is insufficient to subordinate the military to a civilian government, like in the Middle East (Kamrava, 2000). For example, following periods of NATO membership, the Turkish army developed a political interest and involvement in politics (Narli, 2000).

Coup proofing and counterbalancing mechanisms are used to achieve the military's subjective control (Sudduth, 2017; Quinlivan, 1999). The primary purpose is to weaken the

military's strike capacity to prevent a coup d'état and control the military (Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2018). This strategy is mainly used in authoritarian systems where political survival is as essential as state survival. However, in democracies, state survival is more important than political survival; thus, if a government tries to weaken the military, citizens are expected to react against that strategy because it threatens the state's survival (Pilster & Bohmelt, 2012; Hunter, 2001).

Ideally, civil control must be achieved, regardless of regime type; otherwise, the military captures the political power. However, the dichotomous classification of civil-military relations failed to capture in-between types that the military carries political power by actively involving domestic security questions and receives a considerable rate of public trust in managing domestic security (Pion-Berlin & Carreras, 2017). Simultaneously, the civil government is also in a duty where the civil government's survival depends on military support.

For example, in Latin America, governments have been striving to limit the military's political influence for decades. While radical left autocracies, such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, carry out coup-proofing measures, the rest of the continent struggles to increase professionalization to keep the military under control (Rittinger & Cleary, 2013; Martin, 2017). Unfortunately, civil control in the continent has never been fully acquired (Diamint, 2015). It is argued that the military is autonomous to a certain extent, and civilian dominance has been conditionally accepted since the early 2000s in most advanced democracies, such as Argentina and Brazil (Fitch, 2001; Hunter, 2001). Even in 2017-18, the Brazilian military conditionally followed the civil government's orders (Pion-Berlin & Acacio, 2020).

Moreover, countries have faced increasing economic problems and crime rates in recent decades. Thus, civil governments voluntarily enlist the help of the military, which is ready to engage and has the capacity and resources (Diamint, 2015). The temptation of the civil government to use such great power for political ends (Huntington, 1996) once again confirms the government's desperation to keep political power; also, the military benefits through this opportunity by maximizing its gains (Karl, 1990). Colombia heavily conducts its counter-guerrilla warfare through the military; Mexico uses the military in anti-drug trafficking; the Chilean government calls the military to control jails and resource protection

(Solar, 2017; Skaar & Malca, 2014). In short, the civil-military relationship is not a competition to undermine others but a negotiated symbiosis, as evidenced by the constant bargaining between the parties.

The extant literature anticipates that frequent military use to maintain public order gives the military eventually political power (Pion-Berlin, 2001). Thus, the military's increasing political power will be reflected in a coup d'état whenever the military deems it necessary. However, fewer coup d'état events are observed in the continent, indicating that the relationship between the civilian government and the military has been transformed since the Cold War (Pion-Berlin & Acacio, 2020). Civil governments call on the military in desperate times but do so out of their free will (Diamint, 2015). The military no longer seeks political power, but military members pursue personal and institutional benefits and guarantees (Pion-Berlin & Acacio, 2020). The argument that there is a political power struggle between the civilian government and the military is null and void. Although, there are ongoing discussions between army members, political elites, and people about the military's role (Skaar & Malca, 2014; Hunter, 2001; Schiff, 1995).

Civil-military relations and emergency powers are separate pieces of political science literature, but both focus on institutional relations. Civil-military relations focus on the ideal balance between the civil government and the military. SOE studies focus on the separation of powers and horizontal accountability mechanisms, such as legislative and judicial control over the executive (Lührmann & Rooney, 2020). One intersection is that calling the military to duty during SOEs increases military power against the government, whereas legislative and judicial controls decrease over the government. A new power balance and modes of interaction between domestic actors have been established.

To curb popular strife, the government transfers the power to the army gained by the SOE declaration and military action, and the army becomes a government collaborator in the decision-making process. However, increasing military power and its utilization in domestic politics but decreasing coup d'état possibility raises questions about how the government keeps the military out of politics. There might be two answers to this question. First, the military may have complied with civilian control due to successful modernization and coup-proofing activities. In addition, the military cadres may have realized that politicization

generates an existential threat to the military organization by harming the professional administrative structure (Heper & Guney, 1996). The second answer is that the military might seek benefits other than political power. For example, the military becomes a civil government server because the army members seek personal and institutional protection (Pion-Berlin & Acacio, 2020), and the government successfully allocates new roles and resources for the military in the international arena (Huntington, 1996).

Therefore, the main argument is based on combining the two answers. The civil government uses the military for domestic political ends, but the SOEs and military mobilization during SOEs increases the threat of military involvement in politics that needs to be re-balanced. On one side, military members prefer personal protection and economic benefits rather than having political interests, which might be costly due to domestic and international backlashes. On the other side, the government wants to keep the military satisfied to use it for domestic political ends in future crises but also wants to keep the military out of politics. Thus, the bargain results in increasing interstate cooperation activities and security connections that allow new military training and equipment to deviate the military's attention from domestic politics to international security following the SOEs. In short, the relationship between the SOE declarations and military mobilization during the SOEs and interstate cooperation activity, specifically DCAs (Kinne, 2020) and PKO, is argued to be related.

H6a: As the number of military mobilizations under SOEs increases at time $t-1$, the likelihood of DCA formation increases in time t .

Contribution to PKOs is an alternative way to change civil-military relations due to military mobilization in favor of the civil government because the deployment of military forces in a foreign service limits the military's ability in domestic politics (Kathman & Merlin, 2016). The military gains autonomy in the international arena based on a good reputation, increased training, broader technological exposure, and professionalism (Adhikari, 2020). PKOs bring multiple countries together to maintain regional and systemic

peace (Muller, 2002). Contribution to PKOs is integral to establishing a security community and cooperation (Neto & Marcondes, 2013, p. 66).

For example, PKOs create a new identity for the military and direct its' attention from domestic to international politics (Worboys, 2007). In the long term, with socialization and professionalization via PKO contribution, the military's threat toward the elected government has decreased (Passmore, 2020). Argentina is one example of effectively utilizing peacekeeping activities toward democratization and limiting the military's political power (Velazquez, 2010). The joint military operations and cooperation of military activities, such as research and development in security issues, can serve the same purpose as the PKOs.

H6b: As the number of military mobilizations under SOEs increases at time -1, the number of PKO contributions increases at time t.

When there is economic hardship in domestic politics, there is a greater tendency to seek ally resources to meet domestic demands. These demands come along with a protest, riot, or uprising. Depending on the regime type, states either suppress domestic dissent or provide social policy reformation to restore the internal order. Furthermore, in the face of crises, most states declare SOEs. Thus, domestic unrest can cause both SOEs and DCA formation that we need to control.

H7: As the number of crises increases in time t-1, the likelihood of DCA formation increases at time t.

Table 3.2: Main hypotheses for the outcomes of SOEs

	Independent Variables		Outcome Variables
H6a	An increase in the number of	is expected to increase	likelihood of DCA formation
H6b	military mobilizations		number of PKOs
H7	An increase in the frequency of crises		likelihood of DCA formation

3.2.3 Controls for international cooperation

The government concentrates power in the political system. During SOEs, military mobilization reveals the government's vulnerability against public strife and the need for military help to survive. In new terms of civil-military relationships, the government generates new resources for the military. This shift in the balance of power between the civil and military spheres impacts the behavior of states in terms of international alignment.

The formation of DCAs, which govern "defense policy coordination, joint research and development, weapons production and arms trade, joint military exercises, training and exchange programs, peacekeeping, and information exchange" (Kinne, 2020, p. 729), is the first alignment behavior to be tested. The second one is participation in international peacekeeping missions. Multiple factors need to be tested while estimating the DCA formation and contribution to the PKOs, and these factors are discussed in the following sections.

Defense Cooperation Agreements

While it is argued that the changing relationship between civil government and the military affects the formation of DCAs and contributes to PKOs, the domestic and international determinants of these factors should also be examined to identify possible covariates. DCAs and PKOs are determined by existent interstate alignment and security communities and are motivated to prevent common security threats (Kinne, 2018; Hirst, 2017). Therefore, when examining the links between SOEs (and military mobilization during SOEs), DCAs, and PKOs, we need to account for the networks of DCAs, international threats, and other domestic covariates.

Even though DCAs are a new phenomenon in the extant literature, the alliance literature can be exploited as the predictors of DCAs. States form a security alliance with other states for external balancing in the anarchic international environment (Waltz, 1979). Hence, alliance literature emphasizes capability (Waltz, 1979) and threat environment (Walt, 1987) in alliance formation. As a state's capability increases relative to contiguous states, internal balancing would be successful, so alliance formation is unnecessary. Rivalry and MID in states' international environment also provide a state's potential threat perception.

Thus, the capability ratio to contiguous states, interstate rivalry, and MID in contiguous states are expected to affect DCA formation.

The reliability and credibility of the partner determine the formation of cooperation. Furthermore, trust can be formed with a network effect (Kinne, 2018). The existing defense cooperation and a common third-party ally for a state reveal information about the potential partners' reliability issues (Kinne, 2018). Thus, in determining the factors on DCAs, previous years' defense agreements are also effective.

States allying in the international threat environment have been challenged by examples of balancing failures and alliance formations when there is no apparent external threat. Therefore, the research focuses on domestic politics, leaders' preferences, institutional structure, and domestic issues to explain irregularities in the prevalent theory that assumes all states maximize security and favor the status quo (Schweller, 1994). As the literature unpacks the connection between domestic and international policy, the logic of the two-level game approach (Putnam, 1988) dominates the overall alliance literature along with international factors. One of the links that determine international behavior is the democracy level. Democracies are more reliable and desirable partners in cooperation because leaders are accountable to the public, decision-making is not arbitrary, and the system is transparent in domestic politics and reflects international behavior (Mattes & Rodriguez, 2014; Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds, 1999; Lipson, 2003). The democratic level of a state can be effective in DCAs.

States' resource extractive power and economic power also influence alliance formation. Governments with limited economic resources form alliances and use these allies' resources and assets to resolve domestic problems. Autocratic leaders mostly use allies' resources to suppress dissidents (David, 1991; Barnett & Levy, 1991; Boutton, 2019; Miller & Toritsyn, 2005). In democracies, the motivation to gather allies' resources generates supplies for citizens without requiring domestic social spending while also ensuring security with a partner (Kimball, 2010; Allen & DiGiuseppe, 2013). In both autocracies and democracies, economic necessities force the states to search for allies to ensure political and state survival; therefore, the worse the economic development indicators (i.e., basic education attainment and the gross domestic product [GDP] per capita), the state is expected to form more alliances.

Contributing to peacekeeping missions

There are international and domestic factors for joining PKOs. International factors are related to the international alignment of the state. The states aligned with the Western states are more willing to serve the status quo than those that are not Western-oriented. Thus, to maintain the status quo, the states having good relations with the Western powers contribute to peacekeeping missions (Hirst, 2017). These relationships are tested with US arms transfer to the country (Neack, 1995) and economic, social, cultural, and organizational links with Western democracies.

The domestic reasons for the PKO contribution can be examined in two factors. The first one is sincerely serving international peace. The state might want to serve peace and protect the people by contributing PKOs; in this case, the contributing state is expected to have a good record of individual integrity rights and a liberal democracy index. The second reason is the income level of the state. If the state fails to allocate resources for the defense, such as the salary of army members, training, and equipment, these states are more likely to contribute PKOs because of the UN subsidies to personnel and militaries that are contributing to the missions (Gaibullov, George, Sandler, & Shimizu, 2015; Adhikari, 2020).

3.3 Conclusion

The central hypotheses of the research are presented in this chapter. The first section goes into the matter of why SOEs are declared. The hypotheses' central premise of the study presented is that governments with better economic, social, cultural, and organizational links with the EU and the US are more likely to issue SOE pronouncements in the face of crises because they are more likely to comply with international law.

The second section investigates the impact of SOEs on international collaboration. The main argument is that if governments use the military to manage domestic-political crises, the military gains policymaking power, and the leader formulates more DCAs. Furthermore, participation in PKOs that provide modern equipment, personnel training, and increased income for the military are more likely to be signed.

The newly gathered SOE dataset will be studied in depth in the next chapter, along with comparisons to similar datasets to put these arguments to the test. The descriptive statistics for SOE determinants and outcomes analyses will then be presented.



Chapter 4

ESTIMATION STRATEGY AND SOE DATASET

This chapter is organized around two major themes. The chapter begins by introducing the SOE dataset. Later, the chapter details the descriptive statistics and data sources for the large- N analyses, whose hypotheses are outlined in Chapter Three.

Part One introduces the hand-coded newspaper SOE dataset, covering 24 Latin American countries (LAC) from 1975 to 2018. Following that, there are discussions about the selection of Latin America as the primary region for data collection, the data collection procedure, details of and theoretical reasoning behind the codebook, and exploration of the bivariate links among the variables collected in the new SOE dataset. The preliminary investigation provides evidence for the questions raised in the SOE literature and opens up new avenues for future research. The additive value of this new SOE dataset is explained in comparison to existing datasets, based on the number of observations and new variables not previously measured.

Parts Two and Three explain the large- N analyses' strategies, variable operationalization, and data sources. Part Two describes the first large- N analysis' dependent variable, SOE declarations, and the independent variables (by detailing the political and natural crisis indices). Part Three focuses on the second large- N analysis' dependent variables, DCA formation and contribution to PKOs, country-year and country-dyads-year units of analysis, as well as independent variables in estimating international security and domestic political factors.

4.1 Part I: Latin America SOE dataset (1975-2018)

The researchers are intrigued by the peculiarity of LAC, for lying at the intersection of Western and non-Western contexts and not entirely dominated by either (Tussie & Acharya,

2021, p. 2). This contextual blend offers avenues to test the theories developed after the Western democratic political systems' experiences and cultural backgrounds, such as constitutional design, executive abuses of SOEs, and effective tools to prevent these abuses (Pollis & Schwab, 2006, pp. 60-61). One key aspect of this uniqueness relates to the Latin American legal tradition, which has been influenced by its European counterparts as well as the US constitutionalism (Merryman & Perez-Perdomo, 2018).

Moreover, the LAC had a substantial impact on the international law. Carlos Calvo, an Argentine diplomat and scholar, inserts LAC's sovereign rights for jurisdiction about the issues with aliens that prioritize the nation state, in his work *Derecho Internacional Teorico y Practico de Europa y America (International Law of Europe and America in Theory and Practice)* in 1868 (Garcia-Mora, 1950). Calvo formulated international regulations regarding the illegitimacy of using force to recover a nation's debts by emphasizing state independence and the equality among nation states. The inviolability and non-intervention principle is reintroduced into international law, which overrules military intervention as an acceptable act to collect a nation's debt (Garcia-Mora, 1950). His writing influenced international law at the turn of the twentieth century, as the US non-intervention doctrine supported Calvo's ideas opposing European intervention in the Americas (Britannica, 2007). Therefore, systemic, institutional, and cultural resemblances with the Western democracies coupled with the region- and country-specific civil-military relations provide a unique sample to evaluate the origins and implications of SOEs.

Though the hypotheses generated from the literature are tested with this dissertation's original SOE data (covering 24 LAC with a population equal to or above 500,000 people by 2018), my inferences are not exclusively relevant to LAC. The conclusions drawn from the LAC can be generalized to other national and regional contexts and complement and even expand the international relations scholarship's theoretical expectations about power, war, peace, and institutional interdependency (Deciancio & Tussie, 2021). For instance, the theorized and tested mechanism can be applicable to several Asian countries, such as the Philippines, Myanmar, and Indonesia, with civil-military relationship dynamics similar to those observed in the LAC.

Focus on non-Western countries is lacking for a number of reasons, including the inability to easily access newspaper data on SOEs due to non-English language barriers, censored local reporting, a lack of global news coverage, and the weakness of online news channels. Due to geographical proximity to the US, internationally recognized strategic importance, and people living in the US originating from Latin America, this data limitation is less of a problem for the Latin American region than for the other non-Western contexts (Hafner-Burton & Ron, 2013). As a result, this dissertation concentrates on the Latin American region to get the most out of publicly available newspaper reporting.

Moreover, as Chapter Three explains, leaders and their threat perception are critical components of SOE declarations. Furthermore, SOE declarations are widely used by the executive branch. Therefore, LAC is chosen for its leadership and institutional structure because presidential cabinet systems dominate the continent's political system. Presidential systems have an advantage when it comes to identifying responsibility in decision-making. In parliamentary cabinets, responsibility is shared among cabinet members, whereas in presidential cabinets, decisions are made by presidents (Lijphart, 1992). The importance of the president is not only about domestic issues. Presidents are also the primary actors in foreign policy decision-making (Peterson, 1994). Identifying the department and the person making the decision allows us to answer why some countries are more likely than others to declare SOEs on personal and also political-structural, socioeconomic, and international levels. Thus, given the nature of presidentialism in the Latin American region, the centrality of leaders in SOE declarations can be exploited for a thorough analysis of the links between SOEs and international politics.

Finally, military power in times of crisis and the government's consideration of military force are central to SOE discussions. Latin America is a particularly interesting region for this dissertation because the region has a long history of military rule, and young democracies there have still been affected by the militaries' involvement in civilian affairs (Diamint, 2015). Emergency laws became a crucial component of the constitutions of the Latin American states because they are associated with the vicious tool for political repression in the region's past (Loveman, 1993; Wright, 2015). What is more, there is variation in the military's compliance with the civil government varies across the region

(Pion-Berlin & Acacio, 2020). Nonetheless, irrespective of compliance with the civilians, the military plays a vital role in the civil government's ability to maintain political power.

The SOE data covers a period of the late 1970s when Latin America underwent significant political, economic, and global changes. Beginning in the early 1980s, the LAC underwent democratization, democratic consolidation, and political pacification of the military. The 1980s were years of economic crises and instability for Latin America, with tough International Monetary Fund (IMF) regulations and increasing reliance on foreign financial institutions and international organizations. As Cold War tensions eased, the 1980s saw regional integration under the Organization of American States (OAS) and diversification of bilateral links. Additionally, the dataset, which covers the years between 1975 and 2018, shines a spotlight for almost 40 years continuously, spanning both the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods.²⁵

4.1.1 Dataset procedures and codebook

According to the two necessary and sufficient conditions explained in Chapter Two, I surveyed the newspapers to collect data on emergency declarations with different names (state of emergency, state of conflict, and martial law) through keyword searches on LexisNexis academic news sources. For each SOE case, a new event in the dataset is recorded. The oldest news source in LexisNexis electronic database is the Economist, dating back to 1975, followed by Washington Post dating back to 1977, and New York Times, from 1980 onwards. These news resources have worldwide coverage and are in English. Further, my data records a new event separately if the SOE moves to a higher (or lower) level (i.e., from a state of siege to a state of alarm) and changes in geographical coverage (i.e., from local to national). A complete Codebook of the SOE dataset is available in Appendix A.

After recording a new SOE event, I recorded the types of crises that led to SOE. Relying on Körösenyi's (2013) typology, I employed an exhaustive and mutually exclusive four sub-categories: (1) domestic political crises divided into two (1a) cabinet and (1b) regime crises, (2) international crisis that threatens the sovereignty and national security from

²⁵ Due to insufficient data on the variables used as the covariates and independent variables, the analysis periods in the large-*N* assessments differ from those descriptive SOE dataset details.

the outside, (3) economic crisis that can originate from both international and domestic sources, and (4) natural disasters.²⁶ Most of the time, one SOE event is recorded following multiple types of crises. For example, a political crisis can have an economic aspect, or a natural disaster might be intertwined with a government crisis, such as a riot. If there is more than one crisis of multiple types as the reason for SOE, the secondary crisis types are also coded, but these crises are coded as one SOE event. Therefore, it is crucial to identify the terms of how these crises are defined. The primary concern of coding is about whether the crisis is defined with narrow terms like preventing border crossing or broader/vague terms such as national security that is broad and vague and possible to mean more than one problem at a time.

Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step4	Step 5	Step 6	Step 7
Newspaper download from LexisNexis (24000 news)	Crisis	SOEs	Horizontal controls	Military's role	Rights violation	Termination of SOEs
	under 3 headings	under 4 headings	under 3 headings	under 2 headings	under 4 headings	under 2 headings
	scope, date, and type	date, duration, extension, and geographical scope	who declares, who ratifies, and who surpassed	military controls and military used	civil and political rights derogable and non-derogable	reason of termination and who terminates rights

Figure 4.1: Coding procedures

²⁶ A government crisis arises when a challenge to the government occurs before the mandate term expires. The term "regime crisis" refers to situations in which there is a crisis of societal dominance, and the state and society are in risk (Espinosa, 2001, p. 9) International crisis refers to the escalation of problematic interactions between countries as a result of a real or perceived threat to the political system or the citizens (Acuto, 2011). There are various kinds of economic crises, including those described in Appendix A: inflation crisis, currency crisis, debt crisis, and banking crisis (for detailed types of crisis and definitions, see Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009, pp. 3-20). Some forms of economic crises are based on empirical thresholds of economic indicators, such as inflation crisis, which occurs when a state's annual inflation exceeds 20 percent. A currency crisis is defined as a depreciation of a country's currency by more than 15 percent when compared to the US dollars. Some economic crises are classified depending on the events that happened. Banking crises include bank failures such as mergers, closures, and public takeovers, whereas debt crises occur when a sovereign fails to make principle and interest payments. Natural disasters include dangers caused by solid earth, weather and atmospheric conditions, water movement, exposure to live creatures and poisonous substances, and disruption of the earth's outer atmosphere (Lechat, 1984).

This coding does not require the existence of a constitutional or legal proceeding, but the announcer's (a government representative) claim that a crisis exists and that the authorities will take cautions to mitigate its negative consequences. As a result, the coding incorporates three types of accommodation: constitutional, legislative, and interpretive (O. Gross & Ni Aolain, 2006).

Then, I code how SOE is implemented by surveying the following questions: who declares SOEs, when, and for how long. The announcer's status in government, initial time range, and actual length of the SOEs are recorded as the available data permits. Additionally, I noted the geographical scope of the SOE. Finally, I recorded the termination terms of SOEs by looking at who ended the SOEs, why, and when.

The rationale behind the SOE is the need for quick and efficient action to mitigate the crisis' effects without bureaucratic and procedural check and control mechanisms. Therefore, we can talk about the power concentration by the executive and the shrinking of power at the expense of horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms.²⁷ In democracies, extra powers granted to the executive mean shrinking power at the cost of the people, judiciary, and legislative. The accountability actors can be other military members in collegial military regimes or the elites in the small winning coalitions in autocracies. Accordingly, I collected data on the types of institutions that were surpassed or intervened during SOEs. For example, on July 9, 1992, Colombian President Cesar Gaviria declared an SOE, but the constitutional court vetoed the decision.

Along with the legitimate bodies of states, the political system's informal veto players are coded in the dataset by carefully tracing the military's role in the SOEs. There are two variables of military activities. The first one is about whether the military is mobilized to mitigate the crisis or not. The mobilization orders the military to keep public safety during domestic political, economic, or natural crises. The second SOE variable about the military is whether the military controls the emergency area by capturing every aspect of the decision-making and the absence of non-military governance. This military control applies to both

²⁷ Vertical and horizontal control mechanisms are gathered from the V-Dem codebook, which explains the concepts as: "Vertical accountability refers to the ability of a state's population to hold its government accountable through elections, horizontal accountability refers to checks and balances between institutions" (Coppedge, 2020, p. 220).

military junta governments and regional military control in counter-insurgency movements, as observed in Colombia.

Furthermore, each SOE incident includes a record of political and civil rights abuses. When dealing with crises during SOEs, there are various degrees of civil and political rights violations. The current SOE databases encapsulate country reports submitted to international tribunals concerning civil and political rights violations (Hafner-Burton et al., 2011; Zwitter et al., 2014). There are also indices on the executive's constitutional powers (Rooney, 2019), but no data on practices. As a result, apart from country self-reports, there is a void in the literature regarding human rights breaches during SOEs, and we need data on how executives use emergency powers. According to Gupta (1978), there is no such rule that any specified emergency authority in the constitutions would be employed widely by the leaders. The constitutions of various systems do not discuss the powers in depth. These systems, like the US, are frequently criticized for lacking a clear set of executive responsibilities during times of emergency (Silverstein, 2011). Collecting the rights violations based on the newspaper reports elucidates the extent to which the government limits rights, the proportionality of the limitations concerning the crisis, and the consequences of SOEs.

Thus, I keep a record of a list of comprehensive items such as controlled and limited access to the disaster sites, forced evacuations, rationing of basic supplies (e.g., food, water, and fuel), price controls and quotas, private property appropriation, curfew imposition, abolishment of unions, media censorship, false imprisonment, and political killings. I also spotlighted political rights breaches by looking at the extent of electoral freedom (e.g., ban on a free campaign of candidates and political party formation and annulment of an election) and accountability principle (e.g., transparency of state contracts). These items are mainly constructed upon Freedom House's criteria of civil and political rights (2014).

Since civil rights range from the right of assembly to freedom from torture, I further divide civil rights into derogable and non-derogable rights, according to the ICCPR's 6th, 7th, 8th (1st and 2nd paragraph), 11th, 15th, 16th, and 18th non-derogable articles (ICCPR, 1966). Non-derogable rights are the right to life, leave the country, freedom of thought, not being subject to torture and slavery, and unlawful imprisonment.

4.1.2 Descriptive statistics in detail

The original SOE dataset (with an n of 691 SOE events) includes 24 LAC between 1975 and 2018.²⁸ Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador have the highest SOE cases within this time framework (for more detail on SOE distribution over the years, see Figure 4.2). The total number of SOEs is mainly composed of the declared ones. Only seventeen cases are undeclared, and the rest is composed of declared SOEs. SOEs are mostly in regional scope, while one-third of them are in the national scope. Only 59 SOEs mention a sector such as banking, agriculture, and energy, with no geographical meaning attached (refer to Appendix A and B for extended lists of variables and sub-categories of measures presented in the descriptive statistics).

²⁸ The descriptive statistics are calculated with 702 SOE events; 11 of them belong to the pre-1975 period and are excluded where I do panel data analyses in the following findings sections. However, the data source (Lexis-Nexis) not necessarily covers the period before 1975 for all countries. In this section, when within dataset dynamics are examined, I do not exclude pre-1975 observations from the descriptive analyses.




Figure 4.2: Number of SOEs declared by country-years

There are two broad types of SOE reasons. On the one side, there are natural crises that are independent of the political and social environment. Those are earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, epidemic diseases, and landslides due to weather and terrestrial activities. On the other side, there are human-made crises, which are the results of political, social, and economic interactions. Human-made crises are further divided into four: Government, Regime, International, and Economic. Natural disasters are not further classified into sub-categories such as disasters caused by atmospheric activities or disasters caused by earth's activities since there is no empirical evidence that these produce distinct results in the literature. Natural disasters are regarded as unpredictable events that have no bearing on political decision-making; the only political impact might be on how well the government handles disasters. Figure 4.3 presents the distribution of SOE events by their primary crisis types, as each SOE event is linked to one crisis type. In the figure, the numbers on the bars represent the observation numbers. Here, more than half of the SOEs in the sample is declared because of natural disasters. The second most observed crisis type is government crisis, which includes anti-government protests, strikes, and government deadlock. The rest of the crisis types, from higher to lower frequency, are economical, regime, and international crises.




Figure 4.3: The number of SOEs by crisis type

Over time, these crises have been dispersed as follows. SOEs declared because of government crises grew towards the end of the 1980s and after the 2000s, reaching a high point in 2010. The SOEs caused by regime crises, on the other hand, lasted from the 1980s to the early 1990s. The SOEs related to the international crises are concentrated between 1985 and 2015. SOEs by economic crises and natural catastrophes rose between 2000 and 2018.

Among the institutions, the president (or premier or government) declared more than half of the SOEs. While a judicial declaration is not observed, the legislative body made only five declarations. Concerning the ratifying institution, limited information is available. Another branch of the state (other than the executive) ratified only 50 SOEs, and 25 of these 50 SOEs were ratified by the legislative. I believe this trend is an outcome of reporting bias since there is limited information on ratification in the media. This is because constitutional requirements of ratifications are mostly not reported in the news if there is no conflict of interest and contradictory decisions by checking and balancing mechanisms such as judicial annulment of an SOE declared by the executive or the legislative denying a request of the executive. Graphs for declaring and ratifying institutions and crisis types by declaring institutions can be found in Appendix B, Figures 2 to 4.

Table 4.1 presents the total number of SOE cases and the total number of civil and political rights violations and non-derogable rights violations during SOEs. While Chile and Nicaragua have the highest number of political rights violations and non-derogable rights, Peru and Ecuador have the highest number of civil rights violations. The political and civil rights restrictions are not observed during each SOE case, but at least one civil rights violation is observed in 22 percent of all SOE cases. Only in 4.4 percent of SOEs at least one political rights violation is observed (Appendix B, Figures 5-6). Over the years, civil rights violations were slightly higher during the mid-1980s and got smaller by the end of the 1990s. However, there was another wave of rights violations by the 2010s (refer to Appendix B, Figures 7 to 8 for civil and political rights violations over the years).

Table 4.1: Number of SOEs and rights violations by country

Country	Number of SOEs	Number of Civil Rights Violations	Number of Political Rights Violations	Number of Non- derogable Rights Violations
Argentina	42	7	2	0
Bolivia	39	21	1	1
Brazil	76	15	7	4
Chile	30	49	18	7
Colombia	32	22	2	0
Costa Rica	40	1	0	0
Cuba	12	1	0	1
Dominican Republic	15	4	0	2
Ecuador	65	55	4	2
El Salvador	34	5	0	0
Guatemala	41	25	0	0
Guyana	5	2	0	0
Haiti	12	8	0	0
Honduras	38	32	0	3
Jamaica	11	41	6	4
Mexico	35	6	1	0
Nicaragua	19	50	12	8
Panama	16	23	0	5
Paraguay	23	15	0	2
Peru	61	112	0	4
Suriname	3	12	4	1
Trinidad and Tobago	12	32	2	0
Uruguay	13	12	3	3
Venezuela	28	29	0	0
Total	702	579	62	47

Figure 4.4 compares the average number of civil rights violations between groups using a narrow and broad definition of a crisis, broken down by crisis type (government, regime, international, economic, and natural). The figures on each bar represent the total number of observations per respective bar. For example, there are 58 government crises that are narrowly defined, and the average number of civil rights violated within these 58 SOE cases is around 1.3. Crises include 165 SOEs defined with broad concepts such as national security, threat to economy, social, and political life. Except for natural disasters, the graph shows that broadly defined crises, as opposed to narrowly defined ones, tend to have more civil rights violations. What is more, economic and natural disasters have mainly narrow definitions of crisis. Therefore, it can be argued that the initial description of the crisis by a leader sets the extent of whether the SOE is for a malign or benign purpose (also, see the mean civil rights violations according to the declaring institution and crisis type in




Figure 4.4: Mean civil rights violations by crisis type and crisis definition

The military is mobilized in 203 cases out of 702 SOEs to mitigate the crises' effects. Figures regarding military mobilization described below can be found in Appendix B, Figures 10 to 12. The military mobilization rates within the crisis types indicate that in more than half of SOEs incurred by government and regime crises, there is a military mobilization. Yet, the

number of cases where the military is not mobilized is higher if the crisis types are economical and natural. I also observe that, although political, regime, and international catastrophes are more likely to be accompanied by military power, economic and environmental disasters are less likely to be mediated by military. When I compare the military mobilization among the declaring institutions, in 19.4 percent of the cases (with the presidential declarations), there is military mobilization. This rate is the highest compared to the other declaring institutions. Furthermore, the military is mobilized in none of the SOE cases declared by the legislative (Appendix B, Figure 12).




Figure 4.5: Mean difference of civil rights violations by military mobilization

Moreover, irrespective of whether the military is mobilized or not during the SOEs, there are civil rights violations. Each number on the bars is the total number of observations per respective bar. 54 SOE cases among the non-mobilized 499 SOE events, there are civil rights violations. However, the average number of violations is significantly lower than the rights violated in SOE cases with military mobilization. The military mobilization cases have a higher mean of civil rights violations than cases with no mobilization. According to this

finding, using the military to manage crises is more likely to result in human rights violations than using non-military approaches.

One significant addition of the SOE dataset is an original data collection on the SOE termination. This is important because this study is the first data collection effort on SOE terminations. The termination statistics are presented in Appendix B, Figures 13 to 19. SOE terminations are mostly undeclared. Even if those terminations are announced, the media does not pay enough attention. The rest of the SOEs mainly wait to fade out or expire within constitutional limits. Thus, the endings were reported for only 13 percent of all SOE cases. Among the reported terminations, cross-tabulation results show that the presidents ended one-third of SOEs, and one-third of the ending cases were due to the resolution of crisis. Another one-third of the SOEs came to an end because of institutional vetoes and domestic and international pressure.

Terminations were reported mainly for government and regime crises. There was no termination report among those SOEs declared due to economic and natural reasons. Across almost all crisis types, SOEs were terminated mainly by the president, premier, and government. Legislative and judiciary played termination organ roles for government and regime crises.

4.1.3 Comparison with the existing SOE datasets

To the best of my knowledge, there are three publicly available SOE datasets that provide enough data to compare this dissertation's original data collection. The first one is the study of Hafner-Burton et al. (2011), a pioneer data collection attempt on SOEs, which provides worldwide time-series cross-sectional data at the country level from 1980 to 2007. Hafner-Burton et al.'s (2011) dataset includes information on the reasons (natural, national [political], and extra-territorial [international]) behind declarations. They also collect the data on both declared and undeclared SOEs, which is a precondition of the derogation clause of ICCPR. For the declared SOEs, the effective executive head officially announces an SOE (or announcement with alternative wordings such as state of siege). For the undeclared SOEs, they refer to the four criteria of the European Council of Human Rights with slight differences:

“(1) the situation must involve a threat to the nation, its government, or its population such as civil unrest, rebellion, insurgency, insurrection, coup, civil war, siege, riot, disturbance, martial law, or natural disaster; (2) the situation must be actual or imminent; (3) its effects must threaten the entire country or a specific region within it; and (4) the crisis must be of a significant magnitude (for example, not a single riot, but a series of riots over a large geographic area or a prolonged period of time)” (Hafner-Burton et al., 2011, p. 688).

Richards and Clay (2012) provided the second dataset on the SOEs, worldwide time-series cross-national data for only declared SOEs between 1996 and 2004. They mainly focused on the SOEs’ temporal scope and additionally coded SOEs’ geographical scopes as regional and national. The information about time-variation was coded if the SOE started and ended in the same year, sustained from the previous years with renewals or not. This dataset is unique as it adds substantive information about SOEs’ temporal and spatial scope rather than using a dichotomous measure of SOE in the analysis.

The third dataset is the State of Emergency Mapping (STEM) project by Zwitter, Fister, and Groeneweg’s (2016) worldwide event dataset between 1995 and 2015. This is the most comprehensive data on SOEs so far. This event data contains SOE start and end date, declaratory institution, geographical scope, trigger event type, and country reports on derogable clauses of the ICCPR during SOEs. The dataset relies on the annual country self-reports to the UN within the ICCPR agreement (Zwitter et al., 2014, pp. 5-7).

Table 4.2: Comparison between my original SOE dataset and other existing datasets

Dataset	Time	Data Format (units of observation)	Latin America (number of observations)	Colombia (number of observations)
Hafner-Burton et al. Dataset (HBHF)	1980-2007	Country-year dummy count (undeclared SOE cases in parenthesis)	219 (63)	19 (5)
SOE Dataset			240 (8)	15 (0)
Richards and Clay Dataset (R&C)	1996-2004	Country-year dummy count	16	4
SOE Dataset			100	4
STEM dataset	1995-2015	Number of SOE cases, events	77	3
SOE Dataset			232	8

Note: Numbers in parentheses are SOE cases that are officially not declared.

Table 4.2 shows the number of SOE observations for each dataset and the newly collected SOE dataset. It compares 24 Latin America Countries, and Colombia as one example among the surveyed countries. The original dataset for this dissertation contains the most observations overall. Yet, HBHF data has a slightly higher number of observations when accounting for undeclared SOE cases. In the declared SOE comparison, this dissertation's data still has more observations.

The difference in observation between my SOE and the HBHF datasets resulted from HBHF's case selection criteria. Their criteria of undeclared SOEs highlight only the existence and severity of a threat. However, my data is collected not only on the existence and gravity of a threat but also on an emergency state declaration that "is within the powers of both the Legislative and Executive branches" (E. Gross, 2008, p. 10). Therefore, while my criteria only account for the emergency cases realized by the state (executive, legislative, and local government), the HBHF dataset includes every grave crisis that a nation faces. The observations that can be included in the data are limited by my dataset criteria, which demand an additional condition about governance (or expectation of governance) that is outside of regular politics.

Apart from the number of observation comparisons, my SOE data's content and subsequent information outperform existing datasets and deliver direct answers to questions about SOEs. First, there are detailed categories of crises behind the SOEs, while the extant datasets broadly categorize these crises as human-made and natural or natural, political, and international. Detailed crisis coding is essential to record whether the human rights principle is followed by checking the proportionality of responses or violence that a state displays while dealing with the crisis. Encoding the crisis in a large- N data frame provides an opportunity to compare whether the response – the human rights violations – was proportional to the crisis that triggered the SOE. Additionally, qualitative coding of a crisis definition is noted. Since defining an SOE is crucial for justification of an SOE declaration and measures taken during the SOE, the SOE dataset records whether state official defines SOEs with narrow and specific terms and events or with broad, vague, and multiple events. The qualitative information on that crisis, defined narrowly or broadly, can serve the same purpose as the proportionality of measures argument. Describing an event with narrow and

specific terms is expected to be related to violence and actions that do not exceed the domain of the crisis.

Dates of SOEs (by day, month, and year), duration, and extension times are also coded in detail. In contrast to binary country-year observations that only display the status of emergency, this scale offers new ways of analyzing the data, such as in an event data form, which is helpful for assessing SOE declarations' survival rates. Geographical categories follow the existing dataset's classification strategy of coding SOEs into national and regional scope. Additionally, SOE data notes the location names (e.g., region, province, county, village) that prepare a baseline for analysis to measure within-country security variation by controlling the regions' geographical, socio-economic, and political characteristics.

The dataset includes information on who declares, makes press announcements about, and approves SOEs personally or through a government body. Unlike the existing datasets, the ratification process variables are new in the SOE data. However, there has not been much news in newspapers up to this point that can be used as data. Further, the data focuses specifically on the role of the military. The management of violence and use of violence under SOEs are primarily conducted through armies when the police force is considered insufficient. Moreover, SOEs are rare occasions in which the military is utilized in line with constitutional rulings. Thus, military mobilization status during an SOE is coded such that cross-country empirical evidence can be used to examine the distinction between SOEs during which the military was mobilized and SOEs without military mobilization. For example, more human rights violations occurred in the SOEs in which the military was mobilized.

Finally, another added value of this SOE dataset is a provision of information on SOE termination that the other existing datasets do not have. There is data on who terminates the SOEs, when, and why.

Besides the richer content in substantive information, the SOE dataset relies on newspaper coding, while the existing datasets use human rights committee reports. Zwitter et al. (2014) use the reported derogations to the ICCPR. HBHF uses reports of the ICCPR, the ECHR, and the ACHR.

The choice of a newspaper data source might have some advantages. The newspaper data may complement the court reporting data to capture a complete pattern of SOE declarations. This is because the human rights committee reporting can grasp the reality to a certain extent. A few countries report human rights derogations (Zwitter et al., 2014, p. 8).²⁹ For example, Guatemala and Peru are consistent and persistent in their reporting. Nonetheless, despite being a signatory to the ICCPR, Egypt abstains from reporting on SOE declarations and derogations (Zwitter et al., 2014, p. 11). In short, newspaper coding can be more impartial than the country self-reports, suggesting another advantage of this dissertation's SOE data.

4.2 Part II: The determinants of SOEs

This part outlines the estimation strategy while finding factors relevant to the SOE declaration. The analysis covers the years between 1975 and 2014 for 24 LAC, with temporal gaps due to the data availability of control variables. The unit of analysis is country-year. The main estimation method is ordinary least squares (OLS) for a more straightforward interpretation of the coefficients.³⁰ Table 4.3 provides the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analyses. Observations with missing values are deleted listwise to use the same sample consistently across the regression models. Alternative descriptive statistics without listwise deleted samples with missing observations can be found in Appendix C, Table 3.

The first set of dependent variables is divided by the type of crisis: the number of SOEs triggered by a human-made crisis, SOEs triggered by a natural disaster, and all SOEs declared. The second set of dependent variables is the number of narrowly and broadly described SOEs. Then, five types of SOEs by their triggering crisis (e.g., government, regime, international, economic, and natural disasters) are estimated as the dependent variables.

²⁹ According to the special report of the ICCPR on Africa, 22 African countries declared SOEs, but only seven of them sent the necessary documentation, even though they are parties in the Covenant (Hatchard, 1993).

³⁰ For modeling the count dependent variables, rather than the OLS models, Poisson regression is preferred. Yet, for the ease of the interpretation purposes, main analyses are conducted with OLS. Poisson regression is also included as robustness test.

Among those SOE classifications, narrowly and broadly defined SOEs are mutually exclusive measures. Nonetheless, human-made crises and natural disasters simultaneously can trigger an SOE, as exemplified by a riot occurring after an earthquake. Thus, it is hard to categorize SOEs in terms of their triggering crisis types. Also, the same sort of overlap between the human-made crisis types can be observed in government, regime, economic, and international crises, leading to the SOEs. Therefore, the dependent variables, which are the count of SOEs, are calculated as follows. Suppose there are two types of crises as reasons for an SOE declaration, like government and regime crises. In that case, this declared SOE is counted in both regime-related SOE declarations and government-related SOE declarations columns. For instance, if guerilla warfare as a regime-threatening crisis and anti-government protest as a government-threatening crisis occur at the same time and are announced as reasons for an SOE declaration, I counted these SOE events both in government-related and regime-related SOEs.

The multivariate models regressed the number of SOE declarations on crises, international, political-structural, and individual-level predictors. I developed five types of crisis indices according to five categories of SOE justifications in the codebook. Existing works in SOE declarations and human rights derogations employ various crisis measures, including protests, strikes, and terror attacks. However, the SOE announcements are justified by situations that are far more diversified than these specific sorts of crises. As a result, the need to develop an all-encompassing measure for crises emerges. Five crisis indices – government crisis index, regime crisis index, economic crisis index, international crisis index, and natural crisis index – are sums of events in sub-categories. A government crisis is a situation that brings the government's mandate into question before its term expires. For the government crisis index, the potential for a government crisis is assessed by polarization between the government and the legislature and the extent of executive's weakening dominance over the legislature, which may lead to gridlock and removal via a motion of no-confidence, the presence of violent and non-violent protests, and labor strikes. The regime crisis is a scenario in which the survival of the state is jeopardized - a crisis of social domination (Espinosa, 2001, p. 9). The occurrence of a successful coup, attempted coup, coup plot, or alleged coup plot is necessary for the regime crisis index's first subcomponent.

Second, the intensity level of civil conflict and fatal terror incidents are added to the regime crisis index. An economic crisis may occur as a result of a state's annual inflation rate exceeding 20 percent, a country's currency depreciated by more than 15 percent, bank failures such as mergers, closures, and public takeovers, or a sovereign failure to make a principal and interest payments (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009, pp. 3-20). Systemic, banking, currency, and inflation problems are summed together as economic crises. The term "international crisis" refers to the escalation of troublesome relations between states when there are threats against a political system and its citizens (Acuto, 2011). The MID hostility level is the international crisis indicator (Palmer et al., 2020). Finally, natural disasters include risks posed by the earth's movement, atmospheric conditions, contact with living animals, and toxic chemicals (Lechat, 1984). The natural crisis index is calculated by combining binary measurements of drought, earthquake, epidemic disease, wildfire, floods, landslides, storms, and volcanic eruptions. A complete list and descriptive statistics of crisis categories' components with data sources are in Appendix C.³¹

Following the crisis indices, there is an assessment of the main argument that states declare SOEs according to their relationship with the Western countries, which set the bar and standard for human rights and regulations.³² In line with the argument, embeddedness

³¹ Rather than using each crisis type as a separate independent variable in the regression models, I created five broader crisis indices by origin (government, regime, economic, international, and natural). This is because the idea is to observe a potential policy response against a natural disaster, which is hard to be under a political leader's control to prevent to occur. Doing separate analyses with individual natural crisis types (e.g., flood, earthquake, drought, or volcanic eruption) would lower the degrees of freedom, weaken the variance and comparability across observation units, and lead to questionable predictions of expecting differing domestic and foreign policy attitude changes against each natural disaster (e.g., flood and earthquake). Comparing banking crises to inflation crises is also neither theoretically sound nor practically useful in light of this dissertation's research questions because all of these problems refer to broader economic crises. Likewise, strikes, riots, or protests all jointly identify the challenges against the government authority.

³² Focusing on the US and the EU member countries while creating cumulative indices of linkage with and leverage of the West in the analyses might create concerns regarding the equivalence of these Western countries in international law and their relationships with the LAC. The first of such concerns might be that the US has not participated as actively in ratifying and signing international human rights treaties as EU members have. The US signed ICCPR in 1977 but ratified in 1992 with some reservations. Additionally, the US did not sign either of the two ICCPR optional protocols. The last ratification in this regard was by the US senate in 2002 for the two optional protocols of Convention on the Rights of the Child (signed in 2000), pertaining to the child soldiers and child abuse. Since 2002, the US has not ratified any international human rights treaties. However, the US has played a significant role in the respect for human rights in other nations, particularly through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programs that are intended to promote development and democratization (Haas, 2013). The US has been encouraging other countries to sign these treaties (Ahdanisa & Rothman, 2021), and has used human rights obligations as

and compliance with the Western countries' values are taken as international determinants of SOE declarations. The initial indicator for international rule abidance is the signature of relevant international law. In this case, it is the ICCPR, and the measure is the count of years since the country signed the treaty.

Then, based on the guidelines provided by Levitsky and Way (2010), more precise and ongoing measurements of these links with Western countries, I constructed the leverage of the West and linkage with the West.

The leverage measure indicates the state's bargaining power. Therefore, the country's more vital economic indicators, such as high GDP and oil production, and reception of financial support from an anti-systemic political force (e.g., for Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, Russia is the anti-systemic power that challenges the international status-quo [Tolstrup, 2015]) enable the country to stand against the Western developed countries. According to multiple conditions specified in Appendix C, a country can have low, medium, and high leverage scores. The low leverage of the West shows that the Western states do not have bargaining power with respect to the country in consideration because the country reserves solid economic independence. The medium leverage of the West means the country has a specific economic power and is supported by an anti-systemic power. The high leverage of the West applies when there is no economic power of a country and so no bargaining power with respect to the Western states.

Linkage indicates how strong the economic, organizational, communication, and social ties with the West are. The economic ties are measured as the percentage of trade with the West in the country's GDP. The organizational ties are calculated with the country's ideal point score minus the average ideal points of the Western countries, based on the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) votes. As the ideal point gap increases, nations take

conditions when engaging with other states. Furthermore, the US has consistently upheld human rights in domestic politics (Ahdanisa & Rothman, 2021). The second concern would be that while the US-LAC relations are intense because the US has a strategic interest on the region due to regional proximity and high number of migrants, the link between the EU and LAC is questionable. Nevertheless, despite their geographic separation, South America and Europe are linked in a variety of ways that go back to the days of colonization. Due to colonial ties, most of the Latin American countries adopt Spanish and Portuguese legal tradition (particularly, civil law) (Merryman & Perez-Perdomo, 2018). Besides, there are strong trade relations with the EU members. Europe is an important market for natural resources, agricultural products, and textile of LAC.

distinct positions on the issues. The social ties measure is determined by the proportion of a country's population that migrates to Western countries. These components are reclassified in five quintiles. The final linkage variable is a summation of the four link measures as recalculated between 0 to 1 (for the subcomponents of linkage measures, details about calculations, and data sources, see Appendix C, Table 2).³³

The models have eight control variables at the political, structural, and individual levels. The democracy score is a variable that shows the regime's nature (0 – complete autocratic regime to 10 – complete democratic rule). The score comes from Polity V (Marshall & Gurr, 2020).³⁴ High court independence and legislative control over the executive measures are taken as they are available in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database (Coppedge et al., 2020; Pemstein et al., 2020).³⁵ Political system, election, and years left in the office characteristics are taken from the Database of Political Institutions 2017, provided by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (Cruz, Keefer, & Scartascini, 2018).³⁶ There are three types of political systems specific to my sample: presidential, presidents elected by an assembly, and parliamentary. The election is a dummy variable if either executive or legislative elections are held in that year. The leader's support base change is obtained from the Change in Source of Leader Support (CHISOLS) data, and this measure represents the shift in the government from one faction of the competitors to another (e.g., in the US context, the executive office switching from Democrats to Republicans or vice-versa) (Mattes et al., 2016).³⁷ Years left in office show the effective executive's remaining time in office.

³³ There are three interdependent reasons behind creating an index for the linkage measure. First, the links between states reflect complex engagements, which are hard to be reduced to a single measure such as trade relations. Second, it is difficult to argue that different link aspects, i.e., economic, organizational, communication, and social, are independent from one another such that combining them in an index would prevent the problem of multicollinearity. Third, the linkage index construction would enable variance maximization and comparability across the units of observation.

³⁴ The reason why Polity V is used as a democracy metric rather than V-Dem data is that the models incorporate two subcomponents of the V-Dem democracy indices: high court independence and parliamentary authority over the executive. These indicators are important in the SOE declaration literature, but they are significantly associated with V-Dem's democracy scores. Polity-V data is utilized instead of V-Dem to avoid multicollinearity. Polity V dataset covers 167 countries from 1800 to 2018.

³⁵ V-Dem dataset covers 202 countries from 1789 to 2020.

³⁶ Political Institutions dataset covers 180 countries from 1975 to 2017.

³⁷ CHISOLS dataset covers 170 countries from 1919 to 2018.

Finally, the economic development indicator GDP³⁸ is controlled for the capacity of the state's response to crises (Godfrey, Saliceto, & Yegidis, 2019). Only for democracies equal to and higher than the Polity V score of 6, the strength of the constitutional provision that gives power to the executive during SOEs is represented by judicial emergency power (Rooney, 2019b).³⁹



³⁸ World bank GDP dataset covers 261 countries from 1960 to 2020.

³⁹ Judicial emergency power dataset covers 113 democracies from 1800 to 2012.

Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for determinants of SOE declarations

	Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent Variables	All SOE Events	737	.71642	1.1348	0	8
	Humanmade SOE Events	737	.28223	.70451	0	6
	Natural SOE Events	737	.45590	.88374	0	8
	Narrow defined SOEs	737	.55902	.98885	0	8
	Broad defined SOEs	737	.15739	.50236	0	4
	Government related SOEs	737	.16825	.50693	0	4
	Regime related SOEs	737	.05970	.3070	0	4
	Economy related SOEs	737	.07463	.323	0	3
	International related SOEs	737	.00814	.08992	0	1
Crises Indices	Natural related SOEs	737	.45455	.88367	0	8
	Government Crisis Index	737	1.9997	1.0485	0	4
	Regime Crisis Index	737	.64993	.84191	0	4
	Economy Crisis Index	737	.82090	1.1843	0	5
	International Crisis Index	737	.64315	1.3519	0	4
International Factors	Natural Disaster Index	737	1.8345	1.4614	0	6
	ICCPR Signature years	737	17.232	12.135	0	46
	Leverage of West					
	Low	737	.62822	.48361	0	1
	Medium	737	.05834	.23455	0	1
Political, Structural, and Individual Factors	High	737	.31343	.46420	0	1
	Linkage with West	737	.58528	.17320	.2	1
	Democracy Score (0=autoc.)	737	6.5916	3.1351	0	10
	High Court Independence	737	.39229	1.1406	-2.7	2.441
	Legislative Control	737	.57769	.29976	.028	.955
	Political System					
	Presidential	737	.84532	.3618	0	1
	Assembly-elect. President	737	.06513	.24692	0	1
	Parliamentary	737	.08955	.28573	0	1
	Election	737	.27408	.44635	0	1
	Sols Change	737	.12890	.33532	0	1
Political, Structural, and Individual Factors	Years Left in Office	737	1.9471	1.4261	0	5
	Logged GDP in US dollars	737	24.370	1.7726	20.830	28.516
	Judicial Emergency Power (only for democracies)	596	.50468	.75354	-1.016	1.533

4.3 Part III: The outcomes of SOEs

The variables and estimations strategy are outlined in this part for the international cooperation outcomes of SOE analysis. There will be two dependent variables for estimating the effect of SOEs and military mobilization during SOEs on international cooperation. The first dependent variable is DCAs, a binary measure that takes one (1) if the state forms a new DCA and takes zero (0) otherwise. The data comes from the Correlates of War (COW) project (Kinne, 2020). Since the dependent variable is a dummy variable, the estimation method is logistic regression. The unit of analysis is at a country-year level. According to the data availability, the countries are examined between 1981 and 2010.

The existing interstate cooperation research on the security issues utilizes either the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) (Leeds, Ritter, McLaughlin Mitchell, & Long, 2002) or COW Formal Alliances datasets (Gibler, 2009) and formulations of their cooperation types. For this study, I use DCAs as a measure of interstate security cooperation activities. There are differences between alliances and DCAs. Alliances are based on the promise to / consideration to use force under certain conditions, but DCAs are cooperation agreements on security, mostly during peace periods (Wilkins, 2012; Kinne, 2020). However, DCAs are a type of interstate alignment behavior and alliance because it is a formal treaty between nation-states to increase security policy coordination. Moreover, ATOP and COW include multiple types of alignments in these alliance datasets. These types are defense, offense, neutrality/non-aggression, and consultation/entente agreements based on treaties' obligations (Leeds, 2018; Gibler, 2009).

The common purpose of all these types of cooperation is coordination in the security of states. It is not argued that alliances are the same as DCAs. However, in recent decades, the international cooperation dynamic has changed in form with the prevalence of the Conventional Arms Register, Anti-Personal Land Mines Convention, and PKOs (Muller, 2002, p. 370). The interstate conflict has decreased, and new alliance formation is no longer observed, especially after the 1970s (Kenwick & McManus, 2021). This brings a limited analysis range of how interstate cooperation on security issues was handled after the Cold War. Thus, DCAs even have an advantage compared to ATOP and COW alliance

because DCA is a new type of cooperation act to deal with new kinds of security issues such as global terrorism, natural disasters, pandemic, and refugee crisis (Kenwick & McManus, 2021).⁴⁰

The main explanatory variables are SOE declarations and the absence/presence of military mobilization during the SOEs in the multivariate regression analyses. The first independent variable, SOE declarations, is the total number of declared SOEs because of political crises. The second independent variable, military mobilization during the SOEs because of political crises, is the count of SOEs with the mobilized military. These two key variables are from this dissertation's original newspaper SOE dataset.

Following the hypotheses outlined in Chapter Three, the international and domestic covariates are controlled. The first set of controls includes the state's power and threat perception in contiguous issues in the international security environment. The ratio of a state's capability (Singer, Bremer, & Stuckey, 1972) to neighboring states' capability, the existence of the strategic rivalry (Colaresi, Rasler, & Thompson, 2008), and the number of MID v.5 (Palmer et al., 2020) in the bordering states are controlled. The capability (National material capabilities v5.0)⁴¹, contiguous state (Direct contiguity data v3.2 [COW, n.d.]), and MID (4.01) data come from the COW project databases.

For the democratic development level, the liberal democracy index (Coppedge et al., 2020; Pemstein et al., 2020), for the economic development level, GDP (World Bank, n.d.), for the social development level, net primary school enrolment rate among pupils (World Bank, n.d.)⁴² are controlled. The number of existent DCAs a state has is controlled for the trend and a baseline in the previous years of DCA formation. Finally, the political and national crises compiled as crisis indices are taken into account.

⁴⁰ For example, after the Cold War, the role and future of NATO become a contentious issue if the alliance can survive. The role of NATO in new types of crises is also discussed, see Tomas Valasek, "The Fight against Terrorism: Where's Nato?" *World Policy Journal* 18, no. 4 (2002): 19-25.

⁴¹ National material capabilities v5.0 dataset covers 217 countries from 1816 to 2012.

Direct contiguity v3.2 dataset covers 185 countries from 1816 to 2016.

MID v4.01 dataset covers MID v.5 from 1816 to 2014.

⁴² Net primary school enrolment rate among pupils' data covers 244 countries from 1970 to 2019.

Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics for the DCA formation models

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
New DCA Formed	720	.14444	.35178	0	1
Number of SOEs Declared (t-1)	720	.25417	.65289	0	6
Number of Military Mobilization during SOE (t-1)	720	.1125	.40834	0	4
Number of All DCAs the state has (t-1)	720	1.6528	4.5528	0	41
Capability Ratio (State/Contiguous States)	720	.89556	2.1930	.00482	12.588
Number of Strategic Rivals	720	.55417	.73070	0	3
Average MID in the Contiguous States (t-1)	720	.40036	.49155	0	4.8
Liberal Democracy Index	720	.42174	.23863	.023	.879
Net Primary School Enrolment Rate	720	87.277	12.645	15.282	100
GDP per capita (logged)	720	7.7011	.80560	5.4884	9.962
Government Crisis Index (t-1)	720	1.8831	1.1086	0	4
Regime Crisis Index (t-1)	720	.67639	.86470	0	4

In addition to the country-year monadic analyses, dyadic analyses where the DCAs are formed by two partners are also conducted. The main argument reserves the SOE declaration for a domestic cause and a search for international resources and allies. DCAs are formed between two countries, so it is also necessary to include partner states' features in the equation. Moreover, power parity and domestic issues are tested more accurately in the dyadic analyses.

A dyadic data with 24 countries between 1991 and 2010 is used with a categorical mobilization variable that takes 2 if both countries declared SOEs and mobilized the military, 1 if only one of them in the dyad declares SOEs and mobilized the military, and 0 if none mobilize the military. Further, the average of SOEs in the dyad countries is used as an alternative independent variable to estimate DCA formation. In the dyadic estimation, there are also controls such as the dyad average of the existing DCAs signed in the previous year, DCAs with the US (a binary measure that takes a value of 1 if one of the countries in the dyad has a DCA with the US, 0 otherwise) (Kinne, 2020), the absolute difference of national material capabilities of the dyad (Singer et al., 1972), and democratic dyad (1 if both countries have Polity V score of 6 or more; 0 otherwise) (Marshall & Gurr, 2020).

Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics for the DCA formation models (dyadic)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
DCA Formed	5,520	.00652	.08050	0	1
Military Mobilization in SOE					
None=0	5,520	.85978	.34724	0	1
One=1	5,520	.13460	.34133	0	1
Both=2	5,520	.00562	.07474	0	1
Avg. Number of Military Mobilization in SOE	5,520	.09792	.28549	0	3
Avg. Number of all DCAs	5,520	2.3979	3.9437	0	34
DCA with the US	5,520	.20761	.40563	0	1
Capability Difference	5,520	.00429	.00456	2.18e-06	.02464
Both Democracy	5,520	.72681	.44564	0	1

The second dependent variable is the number of PKOs that a state contributes (UN Peacekeeping, nd.).⁴³ The peacekeeping data is available in monthly periods; for analysis purposes, the annual mean of monthly contributions is taken (UN, n.d.). In this analysis, OLS estimation is used. The unit of analysis is at a country-year level. The analysis data ranges between 1990 and 2018.

The main explanatory variables are the number of SOE declarations owing to political crises and SOEs in which the military was mobilized to handle the political crises. National material capacities data v5 (Singer et al., 1972) is available until 2012; the rest of the data is extrapolated to fill in the capacity scores between 2013 and 2018. The liberal democracy index is gathered from the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al., 2020). GDP is a fixed US dollars (2010) available in the World Bank database (n.d.). The linkage measure is based on Levitsky and Way's study (2010). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfer Database⁴⁴ exports from the US are used to determine how much the country depends on the hegemonic power in the defense industry. The Personal Integrity Rights score is acquired from the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights

⁴³ UN Peacekeeping data covers missions from 1990 to 2018.

⁴⁴ SIPRI arms transfer data (n.d.) covers 259 countries from 1950 to 2020.

Data Project (Cingranelli, Richards, & Clay, 2014).⁴⁵ The data is available until 2012, such that the rest of the years are filled with the latest score of the countries.

Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics for the PKO model

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Number of Peacekeeping Missions	696	2.1487	2.9222	0	12
Number of SOEs Declared (t-1)	696	.30172	.75545	0	6
Number of Military Mobilization during SOE (t-1)	696	.13075	.49618	0	6
Arms Transfer from the US in millions	696	10.797	31.175	0	280
Linkage with West	696	.65057	.17884	.2	1
CIRI Physical Integrity Rights	696	4.5603	1.7838	0	8
Liberal Democracy Index	696	.48375	.21756	.038	.879
Logged GDP per capita (US dollars)	696	8.1342	.87753	5.4884	10.324
National Material Capabilities	696	.00302	.00552	.00003	.02647

⁴⁵ Personal Integrity Rights data covers 202 countries from 1981 to 2011.

Chapter 5

RESULTS I: THE DECLARATION OF SOES

This first large- N analysis chapter investigates the determinants of SOE declarations at the crisis, political, structural, leader, and international levels. According to the cumulative crisis indices, troubles such as violent anti-government protests, labor strikes, and government gridlock that endangers the government's survival, as well as natural disasters, positively predict SOE declarations. Civil war, coups, and lethal terrorism threatening the regime's survival, as well as systemic banking, currency, and inflation crises, are all associated with fewer SOEs.

While the international linkage with the US and the EU is consistently positively associated with higher numbers of SOEs, the direction of the association between the leverage of the US and the EU and the SOE declarations is negative and in the opposite direction of the theoretical expectation. Democracy is also a moderator between the linkage and SOE declarations. If the political system is a democracy, higher links with the Western countries are associated with more SOE declarations because of human-made crises. However, democracy has no moderation effect on the relationship between the linkage and SOEs declared due to natural disasters. Further analyses of the leverage measure indicate that economic development is another critical predictor for a country to declare an SOE to reimburse crisis-management expenses or mitigate the negative effects of the crises.

Even after controlling for country fixed effects and constitutional emergency powers, using a lagged dependent variable to form a baseline in the model, and switching statistical estimation methods (from OLS to Poisson), the positive association between higher linkage with the West and higher SOE declarations remains statistically significant.

Finally, a comparison of my SOE dataset to the existing datasets is performed. First, the chi-square test for association shows statistical support for similarities between the

existing datasets and my SOE dataset categories. The main multivariate analyses are replicated by using the existing datasets. The model outputs indicate that the results differ depending on whether SOEs are measured as binary (SOE or No SOE per country-year observation) or continuous (e.g., count of SOEs per country-year observation).

5.1 Crises indices and SOE types

Before examining the main research question, this part analyzes the relationship between the crisis types and SOE declarations. As explained in the data chapter, Chapter Four, there are five types of SOE reasons, which are crisis categories I created to justify SOE declarations: government, regime, economic, international, and natural. Accordingly, the crisis indices derived from various available datasets, such as anti-government protests, labor strikes, government crises, international crises, and many more, are classified under five types. Additionally, existing studies broadly categorize SOEs and crisis types as human-made crises that include political, social, economic, and international reasons vs. natural disasters. Thus, I follow this division, SOEs declared for human-made and natural crises for replication purposes throughout the analysis.

Table 5.1 presents the regression results for numbers of SOE declarations in five types of dependent variables, with five types of crisis indices estimators. Each crisis as it occurs is expected to be a predictor of SOE of the same type. The government, regime, international crises, and natural disasters indices positively predict the respective SOE declarations of the same kind. Interestingly, only the economic crisis index, which is a cumulative measure for systemic, banking, currency, and inflation crises, is not positively associated with the SOE declarations that have economic reasons in justification. This finding supports Grene's (2015) argument that SOEs assume supremacy of the executive in decision-making, mainly in security issues where the political government is confident. However, recent economic crises like the financial crisis of 2008 demonstrate that the executive's leadership role in economic policy, in contrast to security issues, is easily contested due to a lack of expertise in the economy (or the expertise necessitates no state interference).

Table 5.1: Crises indices and the SOE types

VARIABLES	(1) DV: SOEs Justified with Government Crises	(2) DV: SOEs Justified with Regime Crises	(3) DV: SOEs Justified with Economic Crises	(4) DV: SOEs Justified with International Crises	(5) DV: SOEs Justified with Natural Crises
Government Crises Index	0.0589*** (0.0194)	0.000580 (0.00867)	0.0187* (0.0102)	0.000600 (0.00309)	0.0698** (0.0298)
Regime Crises Index	0.0273 (0.0243)	0.105*** (0.0242)	-0.0570*** (0.0138)	0.00365 (0.00573)	-0.164*** (0.0324)
Economic Crises Index	0.00367 (0.0177)	0.0297** (0.0141)	0.00733 (0.0117)	0.00382** (0.00188)	-0.0989*** (0.0239)
International Crises Index	0.0137 (0.0149)	-0.00877 (0.00938)	0.0181 (0.0113)	0.00877** (0.00427)	0.00830 (0.0211)
Natural Disaster Index	0.0431** (0.0172)	0.0111 (0.00955)	0.0109 (0.00928)	-0.00124 (0.00233)	0.210*** (0.0284)
Constant	-0.0580* (0.0323)	-0.0487* (0.0273)	0.0365* (0.0198)	-0.00194 (0.00617)	0.112** (0.0510)
Observations	737	737	737	737	737
R-squared	0.047	0.121	0.028	0.026	0.174
F test	6.580	4.248	4.770	0.980	18.41
F test p-value	0.000	0.0008	0.0003	0.429	0.000

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Model 4 in Table 5.1 shows that the number of international SOEs is not statistically significant because the sample in regression analyses contains only six events of SOEs justified by international crises. Among these, two SOE instances are from Nicaragua, which were proclaimed in October 1985 and January 1987 due to the US backing of domestic terrorism. Panama announced an SOE in March 1988, with identical charges leveled against the US for its assistance in the coup attempt. Terrorist operations and coup attempts were prioritized in these pronouncements, with claims of the US backing and the international element of the crisis coming in second. Costa Rica proclaimed an SOE along its border with Nicaragua in September 1983, citing a heightened danger and a malaria outbreak among the

Nicaraguan migrants. Ecuador declared an SOE in January 1995 owing to a border dispute with Peru and another in February 2002 due to instability in the neighboring state, Colombia.

Excluding model 4, according to the remaining four models (1, 2, 3, and 5), in the first row, the government crises index is positively associated with both SOEs by government and natural crises. Also, in the fifth row, the natural disaster index is related to SOEs by both government and natural crises. This finding supports an early conclusion in the literature that natural disasters influence government stability indirectly (Flores & Smith, 2012). Therefore, natural disasters appear in the model as both direct causes of SOE declarations due to natural crises and indirect causes of SOE declarations due to the creation of government crises.

While government crises and natural disasters are strongly related to the SOEs by government crisis and natural disaster, there are just two examples in my dataset that are justified by a natural catastrophe and a government crisis. Ecuador declared an SOE in October 2003 because of an agricultural pandemic in the banana industry and called for a government substitute for the commodity. Due to a controversial mayoral election outcome and an ongoing trash problem, the Peruvian president declared an SOE in the coastal city of Chiclayo in September 2006. Nonetheless, there are 15 SOE cases when natural disasters and economic issues were used to justify the declaration. Thus, there is a gap between the occurrence of the crisis measured with alternative crisis indices and justifications of SOEs. While SOE declarations caused by natural crises are typically justified with economic issues, in fact, government crises are more likely to be connected to SOE declarations caused by natural disasters.

In the second row, the regime crises index is negatively associated with the SOEs justified by economic and natural reasons. This finding indicates that countries that experience regime crises such as coup d'état, civil war, and deadly terror events have a lower number of SOE declarations to handle economic challenges and natural disasters. However, the economic crises index is positively associated with regime crises related SOEs, third row and fifth column. In short, while regime crises are associated with lower numbers of SOEs by economic crises, the economic crisis is associated with more SOEs by regime crises. This indicates that regime-related SOEs are closely associated with economic problems. Still, if a

country already suffers a threat to the regime's survival, that country is less likely to declare SOEs due to economic and natural disasters.

Finally, the economic crises index, the third row, is associated with lower numbers of SOEs by natural disasters. This finding indicates that states, which have economic hardship, tend to abstain from covering the damage born by natural disasters.

For testing hypothesis 4 (**H4**), which suggests the SOEs justified by political reasons and SOEs justified by natural disasters require different preventive measures and have different potential to alert security concerns. Based on the original crisis, I divide the SOEs into two; SOEs caused by human-made and natural disasters. The aggregated SOE categories' results presented in Appendix D, Table 1, and Table 5.1 provide mixed findings supporting **H4**. The expectation in **H4** is that the state's national security issues are more likely to result in SOEs than economic crises and natural disasters. However, government crises, such as anti-government protests and labor strikes, and natural disasters are associated with more SOE declarations, but the regime and economic crises have no association with the SOEs declared due to human-made crises. The difference between the regime crises (insignificant positive association) and government crises (significant positive association) might suggest a baseline difference. Countries with regime crises (which are more likely to be deep-seated) might be possibly saturated with emergency declarations. Therefore, a new regime crisis and the resultant SOE declaration do not add up much to the positive trend meaningfully.

The interaction models in Table 5.2 measure the effect of social crisis events on SOE declarations by conditioning the existence of economic crises. These models aim to test hypothesis 5 (**H5**), which is about whether socio-political crises are more likely to result in SOEs if an economic crisis accompanies the socio-political crisis. The models are presented for the two dependent variables: SOE declarations initiated by human-made and natural disasters. The independent variable that measures Social Crises is the sum of government and regime crises indices. The second (/the fourth) model is the same as the first (/the third) model, only changing the baseline of the binary economic crisis variable.

Table 5.2: Social crises' effect on SOEs by the economic crisis existence

VARIABLES	(1) DV: Humanmade SOEs	(2) DV: Humanmade SOEs	(3) DV: Natural SOEs	(4) DV: Natural SOEs
Marginal Effect of Social Crises when There is No Economic Crisis	0.0892** *		0.101***	
	(0.0232)		(0.0313)	
Economic Crisis Dummy (Base=0)	-0.0400 (0.0976)		-0.0503 (0.108)	
Social Crises##Economic Dummy (Base=0)	0.0152 (0.0413)		-0.0768* (0.0400)	
Marginal Effect of Social Crises when There is an Economic Crisis		0.104***		0.0246
		(0.0341)		(0.0250)
Economic Crisis Dummy (Base=1)		0.0400 (0.0976)		0.0503 (0.108)
Social Crises##Economic Dummy (Base=1)		-0.0152 (0.0413)		0.0768* (0.0400)
Constant	0.0443 (0.0491)	0.00431 (0.0844)	0.298*** (0.0790)	0.248*** (0.0740)
Observations	737	737	737	737
R-squared	0.033	0.033	0.030	0.030
F test	8.493	8.493	7.551	7.551
F test p-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0001	0.0001

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

he results suggest that economic crises are not related to the SOE declarations. Table 5.2 shows that regardless of the number of social crises based on the coefficients of Economic Crisis Dummy variables, there is no correlation between economic crises and SOE declarations. In SOE declarations against human-made challenges, the more social crises occur in the country, the more there are SOE declarations. This relationship is independent of the economic crises' existence since results remain the same irrespective of changing the baseline for the economic crisis variable. However, social crisis events are associated with the SOE declarations justified by natural disaster occurrence only if there is no economic crisis in the country-year unit. In an economic crisis, there is no association between social

crisis and SOE justified by natural disasters. This finding also supports the importance of funding in government decisions for declaring SOEs to cope with natural disasters.

5.2 Main models: International factors and controls

Here, multivariate regression models test the main argument that international connections with the Western states and the relative bargaining power of the Western countries might be predictors for SOE declarations, as explored in Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 (**H1**, **H2**, and **H3**). In Table 5.3, the count of years since the signature of the ICCPR (continuous measure for links with the Western countries) and three categories of leverage measures are used to estimate the number of SOEs by human-made crises and natural disasters. In the second and fourth models, the five crisis indices – government, regime, economic, international, and natural – are not included. The five crisis indices are all controlled together when modeling the SOEs by human-made and natural disasters because there are obvious links between human-made and natural crises and also SOEs.

Table 5.3: Main models without confounders

VARIABLES	(1) DV: Humanmade SOEs	(2) DV: Humanmade SOEs	(3) DV: Natural SOEs	(4) DV: Natural SOEs
ICCPR Signature years	0.00992*** (0.00264)	0.00586** (0.00281)	0.0133*** (0.00271)	0.00478 (0.00315)
Linkage with West	-0.0954 (0.194)	0.419** (0.200)	0.640*** (0.209)	0.591** (0.249)
Medium Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.357*** (0.0683)	-0.241*** (0.0687)	-0.277** (0.134)	-0.153 (0.135)
High Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.177*** (0.0452)	-0.135*** (0.0486)	-0.177*** (0.0588)	-0.0574 (0.0564)
Crises Indices	-	YES	-	YES
Constant	0.243** (0.102)	-0.290** (0.127)	-0.0758 (0.102)	-0.288* (0.164)
Observations	737	737	737	737
R-squared	0.046	0.079	0.083	0.194
F test	7.495	5.127	17.15	16.14
F test p-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note1: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note2: (b) means base category in the regression.

Hypotheses 1 to 3 for the international connections argument find mixed support in the results. The number of SOEs incurred by human-made crises, estimated in model 1 and model 2, is associated with a higher value of the ICCPR signature years. This positive association remains the same when the crisis indices are included in the models. This finding supports hypothesis 1 (**H1**), meaning that signing the international treaty is an early step for measuring compliance with the international norm.

In the same models, the second estimator – linkage in trade, intergovernmental, communication, and cultural domains with the 28 EU countries and the US – has a mixed effect on the number of SOEs by human-made crises. When only the crisis indicators are controlled for, the predicted positive association, stated in hypothesis 2 (H2), between linkage

and SOEs exists. Keeping the crises at their means, the more a country develops links with Western states, the more it is expected to have SOE declarations triggered by human-made crises. The results show that the alignment between the Western linkage and the SOE declarations is conditioned on the existence of the crisis, which confirms that crises are preconditions of SOEs.

The third and fourth rows represent coefficients for the medium and high leverage of the West compared to the low leverage. Interestingly, the Western leverage (signaling the Western bargaining power over the country declaring SOEs) has a negative direction of association, contrary to the expectation in hypothesis 3 (**H3**). These second and third hypotheses (**H2** and **H3**) are based on Levitsky and Way (2010), who argue that the main factors in achieving democratization are linkage and leverage along with domestic-party structures' strength. Therefore, there are domestic factors we need to check. The original prediction is that countries with lower bargaining power are expected to comply with international rules such that those countries declare more SOEs rather than restricting human rights without SOE declarations. However, in my multivariate analyses, the countries with low bargaining power with regard to the Western countries (i.e., those with medium to high Western leverage) declare fewer SOEs than the countries with higher bargaining power, such as those with high levels of oil production, GDP, and Chinese aid.⁴⁶

This controversial finding of Western leverage can indicate an indirect effect of leverage through linkage with the West. The economic weakness or strength compared to the Western countries can be a factor in bargaining if there is a connection and partnership between the country and the West. For example, reporting to human rights courts, which are dominated by the EU and the US, mainly targets countries that already have links with the Western norms and rules because these countries respond to the pressure more than the

⁴⁶ At this point, the leverage measure is changed by the addition of a new condition, which is about trade dependency of the LAC on the Western countries. The cut off points for the trade dependency are 0 percent to 47 percent for low, 48 percent to 73 percent for medium, and 74 percent and up for high trade dependency based on the percentage shares of the exported materials to the US and the EU in all exports. Accordingly, I recalculated the leverage measure together with the extant conditions – GDP, oil production, and Chinese aid, whose details can be found in Appendix C, Table 4. The main models are replicated with this new leverage measure and the results for the leverage and also the linkage on SOEs remain the same (regression outputs are in Appendix D, Table 14).

countries with no link with and no interest in the West (Terman & Voeten, 2008). The countries, which are considered cultural outsiders, are not responsive to Western responses or reactions to international norm compliance, so they are not a target of criticism (Snyder, 2020). In the following part, this mechanism is further tested.

In Models 3 and 4 in Table 5.3, the dependent variable is the number of SOEs declared for natural disasters. The independent variables show similar associational directions to the first two models. The ICCPR signature years are positively associated with the SOEs related to natural disasters. However, the significant relationship disappears in the fourth model, where crisis variables are controlled. Linkage with the West indicator is consistently significant in both models, irrespective of whether crisis indices are controlled or not. Finally, the Western leverage indicators' negative association with natural disasters disappears when the crisis indices are controlled.

Table 5.4 presents the findings by including the control variables outlined in Chapter Four on the determinants of SOE declarations. As the controls are added to the models, the ICCPR signature years effect's significance is diminished. The linkage with the West indicator remains significant for both SOE types. The leverage measures remain negatively associated with the SOEs triggered by human-made crises, while there is no association between SOEs by natural crises and both levels of leverage.

Political and structural factors such as democracy score, high court independence, and being in an election year have no association with the SOE declarations – meaning empirical findings failed to support the expectations. Countries with more substantial legislative constraints on the executive are related to higher SOE declarations triggered by natural disasters but are not associated with SOEs for human-made crises. The finding supports the expectations. Nonetheless, there is the suggestion that the control over the executive is critical and crucial when there is a socio-political crisis leading to SOEs that are more prone to rights abuse than the SOEs for natural disasters. Thus, the mechanism to connect the legislative effectiveness to control over executive decisions towards SOEs declared after natural disasters should be further examined.

Assembly-elected presidential systems and parliamentary political systems are associated with fewer SOEs compared to the popularly elected presidential political systems.

The findings in both models suggest an association in the opposite direction of the expectation (i.e., the presidential system is not prone to declare SOEs as much as the parliamentary system because presidentialism is already an efficient and quick mechanism). The findings are consistent across the models; however, since the sample is mainly composed of the presidential systems of Latin America, the results should be evaluated with caution.



Table 5.4: Main models with controls

VARIABLES	(1) DV: Humanmade SOEs	(2) DV: Natural SOEs
ICCPR Signature years	0.00543 (0.00348)	-0.00344 (0.00363)
Linkage with West	0.578** (0.253)	1.083*** (0.293)
Medium Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.339*** (0.0735)	-0.0592 (0.139)
High Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.310*** (0.0680)	0.0283 (0.0903)
Democracy Score (0=autoc.)	-0.000989 (0.0134)	-0.0105 (0.0121)
High Court Independence	0.0120 (0.0394)	-0.0302 (0.0354)
Legislative Constraints on the Executive	-0.114 (0.179)	0.403** (0.182)
Assembly-Elected President Political System (b=Presid.)	-0.0243 (0.0842)	-0.230*** (0.0729)
Parliamentary Political System (b=Presidential)	-0.313*** (0.115)	-0.429*** (0.112)
Election	-0.107 (0.0822)	-0.00425 (0.0954)
Sols Change Dummy	0.205* (0.118)	0.198* (0.109)
Years Left in Office	-0.0374* (0.0215)	-0.00771 (0.0273)
Logged GDP in US dollars	-0.0635*** (0.0197)	0.0714** (0.0347)
Crises Indices	YES	YES
Constant	-0.116 (0.150)	-0.432** (0.202)
Observations	737	737
R-squared	0.099	0.229
F test	3.632	12.12
F test p-value	0.0000	0.0000

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Leaders' support base change is associated with higher numbers of SOE declarations, but the statistical significance is at the 10 percent level. The anticipation is that as the leader's term year shortens, they will declare more SOEs. Thus, the expectation is partially supported in SOEs triggered by human-made crisis models, but this finding is also at a 10 percent significance level.

Finally, logged GDP (fixed 2010 US dollars) presents mixed results for the two models. The richer countries declare fewer SOEs related to human-made crises but more against natural disasters. These findings give a hint that the state's capacity is crucial in response to natural disasters. Therefore, one can argue that rich countries declare SOEs when they face natural disasters because they are willing and confident to patch up disaster areas by resource allocation. Moreover, richer countries have lesser numbers of SOE declarations against human-made crises. This result might indicate that developed countries handle socio-political crises without declaring and constraining governing power in the executive.

For example, while Haiti experienced natural catastrophes at a higher rate than the rest of Latin America, the number of SOE declarations justified by a natural disaster falls short of the continent's average. Haiti is one of the region's impoverished countries. Similarly, Nicaragua declared a lesser number of SOEs because of natural disasters that the country suffered. Among the wealthiest countries, Brazil and Mexico experienced more than the average human-made crises in Latin America, such as violent protests, strikes, and fatal terror incidents. Yet, the mean SOE declarations justified by human-made crises are lower than the continent average of SOEs by human-made troubles in these countries.

5.3 Causal mechanism testing: Conditional effects

The analyses confirm a positive relationship between the economic, social, intergovernmental, and cultural linkage with the West and SOE declarations even after controlling structural, political, and leader-level variables. However, theoretically salient predictors such as democracy and court independence are not statistically significant in the models. Measures like the Western Leverage and GDP show an association that is not in the expected direction. Thus, I further analyze if there is a confounder or omission bias in the analyses, in connection to leverage and democracy variables. Therefore, the interaction

model – linkage is conditioned on leverage and democracy – may help identify causal mechanisms when the linkage is associated with SOE declarations. The OLS models for the SOEs by human-made and natural disasters are run in the main models with confounders and crises indices, as in models 1 and 2 of Table 5.4.

The first inquiry is about whether different levels of a country's leverage – economic strength – can influence the relationship between the linkage and SOE declarations. Figure 5.1 shows plotted margins of the regression for continuous linkage measure, conditioned on the three levels of Western leverage (low, medium, and high). A complete regression output that shows coefficients of the controls is available in Appendix D, Table 2.




Figure 5.1: Marginal effect of linkage on different values of leverage

The marginal effect figures show that the leverage moderates the linkage's effect on the SOE declarations when the leverage is high and medium. There is no association between the linkage and SOEs if there is high West leverage (that is, when the country is not a significant oil producer, a developed economy, or receiving the support of an anti-systemic power such as China that can increase the bargaining power against the West). The positive association between linkage and SOE declarations for political reasons is present only if the country is economically strong or receiving a status-quo challenger state's support. There is a positive

association between linkage and SOEs by natural crises if the country satisfies at least one condition (e.g., being a strong economy, oil producer, or aid receiver from China).

The controversial findings are also sustained in conditional analyses. The expectation suggests that if the country has high links with the West and is economically weak or dependent on the West, there will be higher SOE declarations. On the contrary, findings showed that the countries which are both economically strong and independent and at the same time have strong links with the West are declaring more SOEs.

The main argument suggests that compliance with international norms is related to the diversity and strength of links with the Western-centered transnational advocacy networks. However, the domestic roots that establish a connection between local and international politics, such as civil society groups and NGOs, are crucial in this relationship. Therefore, the democracy level is included in the models to assess whether there is a domestic support base that cooperates with the international network. However, the extended models suggest that the democracy level is not associated with SOE declarations in response to human and natural crises. Still, theoretically, democracy is a crucial part of the analysis because the SOE studies mainly focus the democratic political systems. Therefore, the condition of democracy concerning linkage and SOE declarations will be tested.




Figure 5.2: Marginal effect of linkage by democracy (Polity V)

In Figure 5.2, the marginal effect of linkage on SOE declarations is presented across democracy and non-democracy. If the country's polity V score is six and above, it is coded as democracy; the rest is non-democracy. The extended models with confounders of the same interaction models can be found in Appendix D, Table 3. Moreover, the same models are tested with an alternative democracy score from V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2020). The graphs for the marginal effect of linkage by V-Dem democracy status can be seen in Appendix D, Figure 1.

The findings based on the Polity V measure of democracy indicate that the linkage with the West is positively associated with the SOE declarations in response to human-made crises if the country is a democracy. However, the relationship between the linkage and SOE declarations related to human-made crises disappears among the non-democratic systems. There is no difference between democracies and non-democracies for SOEs resulting from natural disasters; the linkage's effect is positive in both groups. According to the V-Dem categorization of democracies, the conditional effect of linkage on SOE declarations has been diminished for SOEs triggered by human-made challenges. However, only among

democracies is there a positive relationship between linkage and SOEs in the face of natural disasters.

Findings confirm that the domestic political structure is effective in foreign policy decisions, specifically the extent of compliance with international norms. The peace among the democracy's argument is based on the links of various kinds among countries. The democracies are connected through trade, international organizations, and domestic institutions, and they share democratic principles and have similar perceptions and expectations in a similar culture (Russett & Oneal, 2002; Russett, 1994; Reiter & Stain, 2002). Moreover, democracies have high vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms, and the aim is political survival, which would be more likely to be in danger in times of war, particularly when against other democracies.

The same logic also applies to the SOE declarations. Democratic governments declare SOEs before dealing with a crisis that might end with rights restrictions. Declaring SOE indicates that the country is complying with the international rule. The government can be punished in the domestic accountability structure if the norms are not followed. Thus, democracies are more likely to abide by the cultural standards developed by other democracies.

5.4 Robustness tests and subsample analyses

Next to accounting for the confounders, I did a few robustness tests. First, the country-fixed effects are tested to control country-specific factors other than those I included. The regression output can be found in Appendix D, Table 4. Even when there are country-fixed effects along with several other controls in the models, the association between the linkage and SOE declarations has a positive direction. Additionally, the negative association between leverage and SOE disappeared. The country-fixed effects are positive and statistically significant for SOEs triggered by human-made disasters in Ecuador and Peru. At the same time, Honduras, Costa Rica, Guyana, Bolivia, and Paraguay have positive coefficients for SOEs triggered by natural disasters.

However, given that the predicted values from OLS models may have minimum values below 0, which should not be the case for the count outcome variables, the same

models are inspected with Poisson estimation to fit the data distribution better. The Poisson model outputs are shown in Appendix D, Table 5. The directions of coefficients remain the same as in the main models. Linkage is still significantly associated with dependent variables.

Third, the SOE coding scheme aims to prevent double counts of SOE cases by carefully examining SOEs' extensions. Extensions linked to an initial SOE declaration are coded as a part of the original SOE, not as a separate SOE event. However, some countries, especially those that suffer guerilla warfare, are in a vicious cycle around the crisis and SOE declarations. The empirical research also finds that SOEs triggered by terror attacks cannot prevent further terror activities (Bjørnskov & Voigt, 2020), and new crises are susceptible to new SOE declarations. Therefore, the distinction of SOEs due to a new crisis or an extension of the same crisis becomes hard. Then, one-year lagged SOE declarations are included in the models to identify the effect of the previous SOE declarations. Model outputs are represented in Appendix D, Table 6. The results remain the same.

Next, it is argued that the constitutional emergency powers might also influence the SOE declarations because the polities are willing to declare SOEs if the constitution provides extensive powers to the government/leaders. If these emergency provisions give limited power, the leader is unwilling to declare SOEs. One additional test is then conducted to control constitutional emergency powers in the models. The publicly available emergency power data is only for democracies that take 6 and higher in the Polity II score (Rooney, 2019). Thus, the influence of emergency powers on the SOE declarations is tested in a democratic subset. The model outputs can be found in Appendix D, Table 7. Interestingly, there is no association between emergency power strength and SOE declarations.

The international system can have an impact on SOE declarations. The analyses for SOEs due to human-made crises and natural disasters are reexamined by dividing the sample before and after (e.g., Cold War and post-Cold War periods). In the post-Cold War period, while the linkage with the West remains significant, the significant relationship between the linkage and SOEs disappears for the sample of pre-1991 (Appendix D, Table 8). However, the *F*-tests for the models using the Cold War sample are not significant such that none of the model coefficients are statistically different from zeros. Considering these two findings,

it can be deduced that the salience of international economic, social, and political ties for human rights norms' internationalization is more of a post-Cold War dynamic.

Finally, the SOE declarations are divided into their geographical scope: regional and national. The results indicate that there is a positive relationship between the linkage and SOEs declared on the regional scale, but there is no correlation between the linkage and SOEs declared on the national scale (Appendix D, Table 9). The ties with the Western countries seem to be related to regionally restricted SOE declarations. In the case of territorially constrained SOEs, the finding might suggest that when political leaders focus on a specific issue in a particular area, they are less driven by power abuses and more problem oriented. The geographical concentration of SOEs, therefore, may suggest certainty on the crisis' origin, solution, and duration, which theoretically align with the expectation of international liberal norms' internationalization and good relationships with the Western democracies.

5.5 Alternative SOE datasets

The SOE dataset I formed is not the only example of the SOE dataset. Chapter Four provides the details of the datasets collected on SOEs in the past. In this part, the three existing datasets are tested to see whether there is support for my findings.

The first comparison is between my data and R&C's data. R&C data is limited in its observation numbers and exclusively accounts for the national political SOEs; for the period between 1996 and 2004. There are 216 country-year observations. A categorical measure of the data indicates whether a country is subject to an SOE or whether there was no SOE declared in the given year. My data, on the other hand, counts the number of SOEs for a given country-year such that it would be easier to match my data's formatting and conceptualization with R&C data.

In Table 5.5, two-by-two tabulations and column percentages are reported. The percentage distribution between the two datasets shows that percentages mostly overlap in the same categories, and a relationship between the same categories exists.

Table 5.5: Two-way table for my SOE data and R&C's SOE data

SOE Categories by R&C's SOE categories n=216			
	No SOE (R&C)	Under SOE (R&C)	Total
No SOE (my data)	86% (n=173)	13% (n=2)	81% (n=175)
Under SOE (my data)	14% (n=28)	87% (n=13)	19% (n=41)
Total	100% (n=201)	100% (n=15)	100% (n=216)

Moreover, a chi-square test of association is conducted to determine if the relationship observed in percentages for the two categories of SOE between the two datasets is statistically significant. The null for the chi-square test is rejected (see Appendix D, Table 10). The test result suggests statistical support for similarities between the coded categories of datasets. I also conducted a chi-square test of association between my SOE data and datasets by HBHF and STEM-II, which indicates statistically significant relationships between my data's SOE categories and HBHF and STEM-II datasets.

Since the number of observations for HBHF and STEM-II is available for multivariate analyses, besides the bivariate association tests, I tested the main multivariate models of my SOE data in the HBHF and STEM-II datasets. The results are shown in Table 5.6. The summary statistics for the SOE variables are in Appendix D, Table 11.

The first four models in Table 5.6 use the dependent variables of HBHF and my SOE data, which take the value of 1 if the country is under SOE and 0 if there is no SOE in that year. Thus, logistic regression is used as the estimation method. Models 1 and 2 estimate the SOEs because of political-national crises, and the third and fourth models are for SOEs owing to natural disasters. All SOEs only account for declared SOE cases, meaning undeclared SOE events are excluded from the analyses.

Comparing the first two models suggests that linkage is associated but in the other direction as opposed to the previous findings and the expectations in the HBHF dataset. In line with the expectations, the ICCPR coefficient is now statistically significant. Leverage is still measured as a binary variable instead of three categories since the third category has few observations to produce a statistical estimation, and leverage is negatively associated. Models three and four suggest that linkage in my SOE dataset is still significant, but in HBHF data, it is not associated anymore. There are mixed results that make it hard to find a common

explanation for the outcomes. One plausible answer regarding the differences in outputs would be that while my main analyses' dependent variables rely on the number of SOE declarations, the HBHF data's measure is binary in models 1 to 4. This suggests that the operationalization and measurement of SOEs play significant roles in the outcomes.

STEM-II dataset and my data are compared with two dependent variables, the numbers of SOEs triggered by human-made and natural disasters. This time, the STEM-II dataset's SOE extensions are not considered for congruence with the SOE data I collected. The outcomes show that STEM-II data gives similar results to those models tested in my SOE data. Only model 8 is not statistically significant. This might result from a small number of SOE reports in the STEM-II dataset for natural disaster triggers. This is because the STEM-II dataset is mainly concerned about human rights violations and interested in the respective country reports of human rights derogations, which are expected to occur more in times of human-made crises but not natural disasters.

Table 5.6: Main analyses with alternative SOE datasets

VARIABLES	(1) LOGIT DV: SOE Under SOE Political- National	(2) LOGIT DV: HBHEF Under SOE Political- National	(3) LOGIT DV: SOE Under SOE Natural	(4) LOGIT DV: HBHEF Under SOE Natural	(5) OLS DV: Humanmade SOEs	(6) OLS DV: STEM-II Humanmade SOEs	(7) OLS DV: Natural SOEs	(8) OLS DV: STEM-II Natural SOEs
ICCPR Signature years	0.0508*** (0.0165)	0.106*** (0.0195)	-0.00730 (0.0166)	-0.0368 (0.0275)	-0.00300 (0.00487)	-0.00483 (0.00403)	-0.0117** (0.00580)	-0.00537*** (0.00191)
Leverage of West (b=no leverage)	-1.213*** (0.310)	-1.228*** (0.370)	-0.244 (0.357)	-0.775* (0.435)	-0.516*** (0.105)	-0.357*** (0.0822)	-0.0672 (0.153)	-0.106*** (0.0373)
Linkage with West	-1.782 (1.186)	-8.167*** (1.589)	3.419*** (1.106)	1.220 (1.285)	1.372*** (0.367)	0.685** (0.308)	1.062** (0.482)	0.364** (0.148)
Democracy Score (0=autoc.)	-0.119** (0.0529)	-0.130* (0.0667)	0.0856 (0.0657)	0.360*** (0.0998)	-0.0493* (0.0287)	0.0178 (0.0144)	-0.0240 (0.0255)	0.00191 (0.00260)
High Court Independence	0.0103 (0.161)	-0.0260 (0.196)	-0.436** (0.170)	-0.523* (0.285)	-0.0227 (0.0560)	-0.0655* (0.0361)	-0.0514 (0.0579)	-0.0256** (0.0122)
Legislative Constraints on the Executive	-0.632 (0.724)	-0.905 (0.839)	1.300 (0.845)	-0.543 (1.326)	0.227 (0.263)	0.372** (0.181)	0.612* (0.320)	0.174** (0.0829)
Assembly-Elected Presidential System (b=Presid.)	-0.325 (0.568)	0.130 (0.665)	-1.501* (0.809)	0.327 (0.928)	-0.398** (0.183)	-0.0391 (0.0794)	0.0928 (0.226)	-0.0335 (0.0232)
Parliamentary System (b=Presid.)	-1.260* (0.707)	0.0530 (0.906)	-3.100*** (1.091)	-1.598 (1.277)	-0.826*** (0.220)	-0.334** (0.147)	-0.529** (0.260)	-0.187*** (0.0689)
Election	-0.125 (0.301)	-0.378 (0.391)	0.598* (0.317)	0.658 (0.439)	-0.110 (0.120)	-0.0910 (0.0687)	-0.0638 (0.147)	-0.00926 (0.0227)
Sols Change Dummy	0.327 (0.320)	0.593 (0.377)	0.251 (0.295)	0.177 (0.472)	0.276 (0.179)	0.0633 (0.101)	0.366** (0.166)	-0.0213 (0.0266)
Years Left in Office	-0.144 (0.0896)	-0.0546 (0.113)	0.0869 (0.0985)	0.197 (0.140)	-0.0152 (0.0326)	-0.0181 (0.0218)	-0.0212 (0.0454)	-0.00319 (0.00420)
Logged GDP in US dollars	-0.220** (0.0980)	-0.167* (0.101)	-0.00441 (0.111)	0.0115 (0.155)	-0.105*** (0.0337)	-0.0776*** (0.0203)	0.159** (0.0661)	-0.0275*** (0.0105)
Government Crises Index	-0.0711 (0.124)	-0.200 (0.143)	-0.0945 (0.128)	0.173 (0.184)	0.0950*** (0.0349)	0.0329 (0.0291)	-0.00903 (0.0470)	-0.0323** (0.0158)
Regime Crises Index	0.221 (0.146)	0.537*** (0.191)	-0.279 (0.199)	-1.005** (0.431)	-0.0259 (0.0750)	0.145** (0.0566)	-0.315*** (0.0793)	-0.00350 (0.0101)
Economic Crises Index	0.259***	0.228*	-0.161	-0.914***	0.0476	-0.00805	-0.159***	0.00169

	(0.0992)	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.286)	(0.0370)	(0.0272)	(0.0520)	(0.00421)
International Crises Index	-0.00267	0.117	-0.0301	-0.198	0.0605	-0.0206	0.0409	0.00133
	(0.0736)	(0.0852)	(0.0842)	(0.162)	(0.0433)	(0.0177)	(0.0373)	(0.00319)
Natural Disaster Index	0.0231	-0.0456	0.516***	0.577***	-0.00815	0.0416	0.147***	0.0196*
	(0.0856)	(0.111)	(0.0961)	(0.126)	(0.0403)	(0.0282)	(0.0435)	(0.0108)
Constant	6.031**	6.889***	-4.572	-5.378	2.357***	1.373***	-3.840**	0.570***
	(2.445)	(2.622)	(2.838)	(3.819)	(0.817)	(0.479)	(1.567)	(0.219)
Observations	553	553	553	553	407	407	407	407
X^2 test	69.24	137.1	87.60	80.85				
X^2 test p -value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000				
Pseudo R^2	0.125	0.292	0.215	0.317				
F test					2.669	1.986	7.995	0.521
F test p -value					0.0004	0.0113	0.0000	0.943
R -squared					0.142	0.133	0.230	0.160
Data Sources	HBHF data comparison with SOE dataset (1980-2007)				STEM-II data comparison with SOE dataset (1995-2015)			

Note1: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note2: Leverage measure is recoded as binary by collapsing medium and high leverage categories due to a small sample in medium leverage producing missing outputs.

5.6 Discussions and implications

The central claim is that international connections influence SOE declarations because, in addition to having domestic political motivations, SOEs are rooted in international law and norms. I want to draw attention to a few of the chapter's intriguing findings.

Table 5.7: Main findings on SOE declarations

	Independent variables	Expectation	Dependent variables	
			SOEs (due to Human-made crises)	SOEs (due to natural disasters)
H1	Greater duration of the ICCPR signature	is expected to be associated with a greater number of SOEs	Not significant	Not significant
H2	Higher linkage with the West		Positive association (expected)	Positive association (expected)
H3	Higher leverage of the West		Negative association (unexpected)	Not significant
H4	National security issues (government, regime, and international) compared to the non-security issue (economic and natural)		Mixed results - Government: Positive association (expected) - Regime: Not significant - International: Not significant - Economic: Not significant - Natural: Positive association (unexpected)	Non-relevant
H5	Social crisis with economic implications compared to social crisis with no economic implications		No difference between - social crisis with economic implications and - social crisis with no economic implications	Unexpected finding - social crisis with no economic implications: Positive (unexpected) - social crisis with economic implications: Not significant

The first finding is the robust positive relationship between linkage and SOE declarations. The linkage factor is a cumulative indicator of whether a country primarily trades and

emigrates with the US and the EU, whether it has a close ideal point on particular UNGA decisions with the US and the EU, and whether it has telephone and internet connections. This finding adds to the earlier research in international relations that demonstrated a positive relationship between trade and foreign aid and adherence to human rights norms. My findings imply that in order to disentangle the international alignment behaviors more, we should concentrate on factors other than economics, such as cultural, diplomatic, and other political and organizational ties with the major states spreading the norms. The literature stresses a connection between economic links and human rights norms across the states. The more a country is dependent on Western democracies, e.g., the EU countries, in terms of trade or aid, the more a country's score would improve in respecting human rights. However, there are inconsistent and contradictory findings in this association, as explained in the literature review section.⁴⁷ My findings indicate that the hypothesis linking trade and aid to a state's performance in upholding human rights should be reexamined using a more intricate interstate connections metric.

The second finding is the negative relationship between Western leverage and the SOE declarations triggered by human-made crises. This result is in the opposite direction of the expectation. The initial assumption is that when the bargaining power of the Western countries is high, compliance with the norm (by an SOE declaration) will occur. The finding, however, appears to suggest that a country's likelihood of adhering to norms decreases with its level of poverty. Thus, underdeveloped countries are expected to declare fewer SOEs than developed countries. One explanation for this association between economy and SOE declarations is that developing countries are already marginalized from the international economic networks. In the Latin American sample, these governments mostly have anti-American attitudes and foreign policies conflicting with the US. The marginalized countries are both poor and considered cultural outsiders that are out of the Western scope and

⁴⁷ When linkage is replaced by the percentage of trade (with the US and the EU) in the GDP measure, the coefficient for the SOEs related to the human-made crises is not significant (see Appendix D, Table 12). However, there is still a positive correlation between trade and SOEs by natural disasters, suggesting that economic power and links with the West are crucial for containing natural calamities.

influence. The enforcement of human rights through naming and shaming⁴⁸ might be only effective among cultural insider countries (Snyder, 2020). Thus, in line with the findings that linkage is conditioned on leverage and the existing literature about naming and shaming, the mechanism between linkage and SOE declarations may be more likely to be dependent on the country's economic power to a certain extent. The naming and shaming hypotheses can, therefore, help future studies of SOE declarations – international politics.

Finally, the comparative explanatory power of domestic politics declines when tested together with the linkage measure. Hafner-Burton et al. (2011) found that states with independent courts are more willing to report human rights derogations to an upper international court. Yet, my findings suggest that the high court independence and derogation connection might not seem relevant to the SOE declarations when the linkage with the West is considered. There is empirical evidence that narrowly defined SOEs are less likely to result in human rights violations, and broadly defined SOEs result in higher rights violations.⁴⁹ Then, additional multivariate analyses reveal that while high court independence cannot predict narrowly and broadly defined SOEs at all, the linkage meaningfully predicts narrowly defined SOEs, which are related to fewer human rights violations (see Appendix D, Table 13). This third finding raises the possibility of additional future research into how international engagements interact with domestic judicial systems and may have an impact on the international norms' institutionalization.

⁴⁸ Naming and shaming is a public announcement of a leader or a state that violates the rights of the citizens. It is argued that exposing the offender on global stages can alter state behavior and enhance human rights in these problematic countries.

⁴⁹ Figure 4.4 shows that the average number of civil rights violations is significantly higher in broadly defined SOEs compared to narrowly defined SOEs, except the SOEs declared against natural disasters.

Chapter 6

RESULTS II: THE OUTCOME OF SOES

This second large- N study chapter investigates the impact of SOE declarations and military mobilization during SOEs on the DCA formation and PKO contribution. Unlike the preceding large- N analysis chapter, this chapter only uses SOE declarations arising from human-caused crises. I use the SOEs and military mobilization occurring due to natural catastrophes to test the main argument's robustness.

The results display a positive association between SOEs and DCA development. The military mobilization and DCA links are investigated by using various robustness tests and models that include several control variables. There is a robust positive relationship between military mobilization during SOEs and DCAs.

Comparing democracies and autocracies allows us to put the mechanism to the test. Theoretically, in autocracies, where the civil-military bargain is unrelated to a government's political existence, the socio-political crisis and SOE pronouncements are less likely to be relevant. Governments in democracies, on the other hand, might be more likely to continue to seek the public's favor. When the government is threatened by popular upheaval, the executive might turn to the SOE proclamation and military force. Then, based on the findings, I observe that if the regime is democratic, a higher number of military mobilizations is associated with a higher likelihood of DCA.

The number of strategic rivals and the capability ratio of a state to its neighbors are both positively associated with the likelihood of DCAs. The outcome is also predicted by the DCAs from the previous year. Finally, DCAs are more likely to be built in countries with a greater primary school attendance rate.

There are several robustness tests, including restriction of the analysis time to the post-Cold War period, modification of the estimation method (from OLS to Poisson), control

of the country fixed effects, usage of alternative military mobilization construct and activity metrics (e.g., military's budgetary and personnel capacity), and change in the SOE measurement (from event counts to days of events counts). Finally, the data format is converted from monadic to dyadic form, and the main dependent variable, the DCA, is replaced by contributions to PKOs. The main findings remain the same.

6.1 SOEs and DCAs

Before testing the links between military mobilization during SOEs and DCA formation, I wanted to test the possible connections between SOEs and DCA formations, based on the domestic sources of alliance literature's hypotheses.

Table 6.1: Chi-square test of the association having an SOE and DCA

Having a DCA and an SOE n=720			
	No SOE	Under SOE	Total
No DCA	72% (n=420)	58% (n=79)	69% (n=499)
DCA	28% (n=164)	42% (n=57)	31% (n=221)
Total	100% (n=584)	100% (n=136)	100% (n=720)
Pearson $X^2 =$	9.9177	Pr = 0.002	
Likelihood-ratio $X^2 =$	9.5172	Pr = 0.002	
Fisher's exact test =	0.003		
One-sided Fisher's exact test =	0.001		

Note: Column percentage is reported.

Table 6.1 presents a tabulation of the percentage and frequency of having a DCA and an SOE and the results of the chi-square association test. According to the column percentages, 42 percent of the countries with SOEs also have DCAs signed in a given year. At the same time, only 28 percent of the countries that do not have an SOE have DCAs signed in the given year. Row percentages also indicate a higher rate of having an SOE among the states with DCAs than those without DCAs (see Appendix E, Table 1).

The complementary relationship between having a DCA and an SOE do not point in a causal direction and can go in either way or to a spurious relationship.

First, the SOE declaration can result from having a partner ready to provide resources in solving domestic crises. SOEs concentrate the power in the hands of leaders by limiting judicial, legislative, public, and media scrutiny because mitigating the crisis' effects requires quick and efficient actions. The increased power of unilateral decision-making restructures the system as more vulnerable to impulsive and authoritarian decision-making (Rooney, 2019). The SOEs might serve as a window of opportunity to make decisions unilaterally and justify the decisions in preventing the crisis' destructive effects, especially if an ally is available to provide support. States in expectation of an ally's help are more likely to suppress the dissident (Boutton, 2019). Accordingly, one of the expectations would be that SOEs follow DCA formations (specifically, expectations of DCAs).

Second, based on the SOE definition in the early chapters, the SOE declaration implies the existence of a crisis that needs to be settled. Then, DCAs might result from a need for extra resources in the resolution of domestic issues. Thus, DCA formation and SOE declarations may result from the exact cause, the crisis, suggesting a spurious relationship. For example, the economic constraints of a country might trigger protests leading to SOE declarations; at the same time, the popular dissent might result in DCA formation to find an extra resource and SOE declaration (monopolizing the decision-making power for swift actions, including treaty ratification).

Table 6.2: Relationship between SOE declaration and being a signatory in a DCA agreement by country-year

	Formation of a new DCA	
	Yes	No
Average SOE Declarations _(t-1)	0.45	0.22
	N=104	N=616

Note: The mean difference between the states that form a DCA and do not form a DCA is significant ($t=2.4203$) at a 95% CI level in a two-sample t-test with unequal variances.

Third, finding a source through an alliance following a domestic political crisis is the argument in favor of the primary mechanism. The domestic sources of alliance literature underline the search for resources, either for public policy spending (Kimball, 2010) or for

suppressing the uprising (Boutton, 2019), because of limited domestic resources. Thus, tracing and identifying these two phenomena's temporal occurrence (DCA to SOE or SOE to DCA) is necessary for the validity of the main argument.

Table 6.2 tests the mean difference for SOE declarations during the previous year among the states that formed DCA and states that did not form DCAs. The results suggest that countries creating DCAs – compared to the countries that did not – have significantly higher mean of SOE declarations in the previous year. When the formation of DCA and next year's SOE declarations are compared, this significant difference disappears between DCA and SOE (see Appendix E, Table 2).

To further assess the timewise relationship between SOEs and DCAs, Table 6.3 provides the bivariate regression results for the SOEs in the last five years on the likelihood of new DCA formation. The SOEs in the last five years variable is significantly associated with a higher chance of signing a new DCA. This finding evinces that SOEs are not the outcomes of DCAs.

Table 6.3: Effect of SOE declarations during the previous five years on signing a new DCA.

VARIABLES	(1) New DCA
Number of SOEs in last five years	0.126*** (0.0430)
Constant	-1.950*** (0.314)
Observations	720
Log Likelihood	-292.8
Chi-square	8.550
Chi-square <i>p</i> -value	0.00346
Pseudo <i>R</i> -squared	0.0153

Note: The dependent variable is a binary measure of DCA signing at time *t*. The result presents the logistic regression coefficients, and robust standard errors clustered in countries are in parentheses (***) $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$).

The association between SOEs and DCAs indicates an interesting connection between domestic crisis management and the decision to form international cooperation. However, the bivariate analysis that takes into account temporal differences and even an exaggerated five-year time distance suggest that the relationship is from SOE declarations to DCAs. Thus, the explanation that DCAs are guaranteed for the government to support allies in domestic crises is not valid in the DCA-SOE discussion.

6.2 Military mobilization during SOEs and DCAs

To assess the main argument that military mobilization during the SOEs is forcing the government to form new DCAs (because an alliance with the military requires allocation of new resources to the military in the post-SOE phase), I continue with the multivariate logistic regressions. These models use military mobilization during SOEs in year $t-1$, which are triggered by human-made disasters.

In Table 6.4, there are four logistics regression estimations; the standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country. In each model, year cubic splines account for temporal dependence across the countries (Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 1998). Model one is a bivariate regression model that estimates the number of military mobilizations on the likelihood of a new DCA formation. The second, third, and fourth models add international, domestic, and crisis elements into the estimation, respectively. For all models, I report the chi-squared test of model fits and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) values.

Four control variables and the primary variable – the number of military mobilizations during SOEs – are lagged by one year. The variables composed of the yearly sum of events are the number of military mobilizations during SOEs, the number of all DCAs, MIDs, and crises indices lagged by one year. An event such as a crisis or SOE can occur by the beginning or end of a year. Thus, lagging by one year ensures that the dependent variable chronologically follows the controls. The rest of the control variables are measured annually and are not expected to change throughout the year.

The number of military mobilizations is positively associated with the DCA formation likelihood. The outcomes are statistically significant and robust despite the various

international, domestic, and crisis covariates being controlled. The positive association supports hypothesis 6a (**H6a**). Further analysis of this relationship is also conducted, and the initial findings remain robust. For example, in model 4, each military mobilization during the year $t-1$ is associated with the increase in the odds ratio of signing DCA by 67 percent at time t . The odds ratios for the same models are reported in Appendix E, Table 3.



Table 6.4: Effect of military mobilization during SOEs on signing a new DCA

VARIABLES	(1) Bivariate	(2) International	(3) Domestic	(4) All
Number of Military Mobilization in SOE (t-1)	0.526*** (0.173)	0.634*** (0.124)	0.585*** (0.124)	0.514*** (0.145)
Number of all DCAs (t-1)		0.132*** (0.0208)	0.118*** (0.0241)	0.117*** (0.0259)
Capability Ratio (State A/Contiguous States)		0.291*** (0.0325)	0.275*** (0.0291)	0.255*** (0.0343)
Number of Strategic Rivals		0.796*** (0.183)	0.718*** (0.256)	0.710*** (0.250)
Mean MID in Contiguous States (t-1)		-0.268 (0.504)	-0.575 (0.564)	-0.624 (0.567)
Liberal Democracy			-0.883 (1.042)	-1.480 (1.080)
Net Primary School Enrollment Rate			0.0652*** (0.0224)	0.0652*** (0.0230)
Logged GDP per capita			0.105 (0.263)	0.227 (0.260)
Government Crises Index (t-1)				0.249* (0.149)
Regime Crises Index (t-1)				-0.0208 (0.142)
Year Spline 1	-0.0666 (0.200)	-0.0367 (0.275)	-0.0422 (0.263)	-0.0452 (0.254)
Year Spline 2	1.041 (0.750)	1.149 (1.149)	1.081 (1.127)	1.003 (1.092)
Year Spline 3	-2.779 (1.842)	-3.218 (2.814)	-3.087 (2.798)	-2.819 (2.724)
Year Spline 4	2.520 (1.922)	2.998 (2.736)	3.026 (2.757)	2.720 (2.732)
Constant	128.6 (397.7)	67.61 (545.5)	72.61 (523.3)	77.63 (505.9)
Observations	720	720	720	720
Log Likelihood	-251.1	-193	-189	-187.6
Chi-square	64.22	231.5	547.1	956.2
Chi-square test p-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R-squared	0.155	0.351	0.364	0.369
AIC	514.2122	405.9803	404.0313	405.1419
BIC	541.6877	451.7728	463.5615	473.8307

Note: The dependent variable is a binary measure of DCA signature at time t. The results come from logistic regression estimations' coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by countries. (***) p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05).

Model 2 includes the existing DCAs, meaning the DCAs a state has during the previous year, and three international security environment variables – strategic rivals, states capability ratio, and MIDs in contiguous states. The existing DCAs variable is positively related to the outcome variable, DCA formation. There are two main functions of this variable for the model. First, existing DCAs provide a baseline as a lagged measure of the dependent variable to estimate the main independent variable's relative effect on forming new DCAs. Second, existing DCAs also provide information about how the state is already active in interstate cooperation activities, predicting the new DCA formation.

The international security issues, parity of capability, strategic rivals, and number of MIDs in contiguous states lead to mixed results regarding the expectations. The assumption about the state's capability in relation to its politically relevant international environment (PRIE) is that being relatively weak compared to the contiguous states poses a threat to the state's survival. Thus, weak states are more likely to form DCA. However, the counter-intuitive finding indicates the opposite direction of expectation, which discovers that the strong states are more likely to develop DCAs. The contradictory finding remains the same in models 3 and 4.

The number of strategic rivalries is also associated with a higher likelihood of DCA formation. In addition, the rivalry finding is robust across the models when the domestic and crisis covariates are included. Finally, there is no relationship between the average number of MIDs in the contiguous states and the likelihood of DCA formation.

In model 3, the political, human, and economic development measures are included. Interestingly, on the one hand, there is no association between the liberal democracy index and GDP per capita and the likelihood of DCA formation. On the other hand, the country's net primary school enrollment rate is positively associated with the higher probability of DCA formation. This finding suggests that countries with high human development levels are more likely to form a DCA, indicating the opposite direction of expectation.

Model 4 includes the crisis indices that count various political, economic, and security challenges (for details of crisis indices, please see Appendix C, Table 1). The crises can be reasons for both SOE declarations and DCA formation, as explained in hypothesis 7 (**H7**);

however, there is no support. The only association is the positive link between the government crisis index and the DCA formation at the 10 percent significance level.

All models are statistically significant. Further, regarding model fits, based on the AIC and BIC model selection values, the domestic and crisis characteristics added in the third and fourth models do not improve the model fits, compared to model 2. Despite the variable addition, explanatory power decreases, in comparison to the second model.




Figure 6.1: Change in the predicted probability of a new DCA for each military mobilization

Figure 6.1 plots the predicted probabilities of DCA formation on four values of military mobilization during SOEs. The solid lines indicate the predicted probability, while the dotted lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals for each point estimate. The bars embedded in the graph are frequencies of military mobilization. The graph is produced upon the fourth

model of Table 6.4. If there is no military mobilization, the probability of forming a new DCA is 5 percent, while this value is 8 percent for the countries that have one military mobilization; 13 percent for the countries that have two military mobilizations; 20 percent for the countries that have three military mobilizations; and 30 percent for the countries have four military mobilizations during the year $t-1$.

6.3 Confounders: Causal mechanism testing

The multivariate regressions show that military mobilization during SOEs strongly predicts DCA formation. Yet, the connection between these two phenomena should be tested with further stress on the possible confounders. Thus, I also control for the international threat environment that is frequently used in explaining alliance formation, international financial expectations (which might explain the signaling power in international interactions) and linkage with the Western democracies while conditioning the military mobilization on the probability of DCA formation. Moreover, the domestic political process (particularly the democratic-autocratic nature of the regime) is also estimated as a moderator of the association between military mobilization and the probability of DCA formation.

DCAs are formed for synchronizing the security policies of partners with joint training, development of equipment, coordination in the defense industry, and exchange of information. Thus, DCAs primarily aim for the state's international security. Then, the international security environment is accounted for by rivalry, MID, and capability measures in the main models, and the results indicate that rivalry and capability variables are positively, but MID in contiguous states is negatively associated with DCA formation. Moreover, the international security environment might be a reason for SOE declaration and military mobilization during the SOEs, indirectly. For example, a state, which is threatened internationally, is more willing to securitize internal problems and suppress these problems because the justification of the suppression is more convenient in the public eye.

To estimate the effect of international security on the relationship between military mobilization during SOE and DCA formation, binary strategic rivalry and MID's interactions with military mobilization are included in the main model. Figure 6.2 demonstrates the average marginal effects of military mobilization on DCA formation, depending on the

presence/absence of the rivalry and MID. The logistic regression outputs with coefficients for these analyses are available in Appendix E, Table 4.




Figure 6.2: Plotted average marginal effect of military mobilization conditioned on international security

Overall findings indicate inconclusive results about the effect of military mobilization on DCA formation through the international threat environment. The left-hand side panel in Figure 6.2 suggests that military mobilization during SOEs is associated with a higher likelihood of DCA formation among the countries with no rival. However, there is no association between military mobilization and DCA formation for the states with a rival. The right-hand side panel shows that military mobilization is associated with higher probabilities of DCA formation when MID exists in contiguous states. Moreover, the link between military mobilization and DCA formation likelihood diminishes among states with no MID in their bordering states.

The results for two international security variables are contradictory. The MID's existence moderates the military mobilization's effect on the DCA formation, but the military mobilization is only associated with DCA when the state has no rival. Rivalry is a variable highly relevant to the current alliance formation literature. One possible explanation for this difference might be that rivalries are long-term, sometimes hundred years, phenomena, and there are very few changes in rivalry status over time. However, MID's take a relatively shorter time than rivalry, sometimes shorter than a year. In association with DCAs, which are

also short-term contracts compared to formal alliances, it is more probable that DCA formations can capture the MIDs' effect, but the rivalry is not.

The international financial environment is another feature that might be a confounder between military mobilization and DCA formation. The SOE declarations, especially the ones with military mobilization, are very likely to result in human rights violations.⁵⁰ These human rights violations can influence a country's international reputation and can result in the loss of international economic and financial resources. States use international agreements to signal that the country is safe for international investments to prevent this loss. One agreement type of this kind might be the DCAs that lead to further cooperation between the states in arms imports and joint military exercises (Kinne, 2020). Similarly, bilateral trade agreements were found to be predictors of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow (Büthe & Milner, 2008). Thus, DCA formation (potentially attracting future FDI) can be a strategic consequence of military mobilization.

The argument is tested with the interaction of binary military mobilization measure and FDI's percent share in GDP, which is included in the main models. FDI in the current year and the average FDI in the past three years signal the FDI inflow expectation for the following year.⁵¹ The average marginal effects are presented in Table 6.5, and logistic regression outputs can be found in Appendix E, Table 5.

Table 6.5: Effect of FDI in the current and last three years conditioned by military mobilization on DCA formation

VARIABLES	(1) FDI current year	(2) FDI past three years
When there is no Military Mobilization	-0.00278 (0.00190)	-0.00578* (0.00315)
When there is Military Mobilization	0.0197 (0.0167)	0.00115 (0.0123)
Observations	688	662

Note: Average marginal effects standard errors in parathesis, *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

⁵⁰ Descriptive statistics can be inspected in Chapter 4, page 63.

⁵¹ FDI inflow data is retrieved from the World Bank.

Results suggest that only if there is no military mobilization, the increase in the FDI inflow in the last three years is associated with a lower probability of DCA formation. The finding does not support the expectation in the literature. Thus, the international financial environment is not a determinant of DCA formation concerning military mobilization during SOEs.

The main argument assumes that there is a bargaining and mutual benefit between the civil and military cadres. Thus, there should be an effective military presence as well as a civil government responsive to the prevalent crises and demands. However, the bargaining argument cannot be applied to the military regimes that suppress national political movements and allocate domestic and foreign resources to the military. Military mobilization is conditioned on the democracy variable to examine the link between military mobilization and DCA formation on regime division. Figure 6.3 reports the average marginal effect of military mobilization on the DCA formation among autocracies and democracies. The regression output of the analysis is available in Appendix E, Table 6. According to the results, increasing military mobilization is associated with a higher DCA likelihood only among democracies. There is no association between military mobilization and DCA formation in autocratic regimes. The results support the causal mechanism.




Figure 6.3: Plotted average marginal effect of military mobilization conditioned on regime type

Finally, in the previous chapter, the SOE declarations are examined and analyzed as predictors of strong links with Western countries. The same connections with the West can also predict DCA formation. Kinne (2018) argues that previously signed DCAs build networks of states and the existence of a joint third party makes DCA formation more plausible between the potential partners. Thus, one might think that the DCA formations are not related to military mobilization. Rather, the DCAs may be phenomena of Western aligned states' behavior and military mobilization being a substitute for SOE declarations. To test if the linkage is associated with DCA formation, the linkage with the West variable is included in the main model. While the main finding remains the same, no statistically significant association between the Western link and DCA formation can be found (for the regression output, see Appendix E, Table 7).

Next, a linear prediction plot with a 95 percent confidence interval between linkage and military mobilization during SOEs for the current year is presented in Figure 6.4. There is also no statistically significant association between the linkage and military mobilization measures.




Figure 6.4: Two-way linear prediction plot for military mobilization on linkage

6.4 Robustness tests

Several robustness tests are conducted with alternative measures. The estimation method is changed. Logistic regression is replicated with probit regression to see whether the function used for the logistic regression affects the results. Results remain the same, as presented in Appendix E, Table 8.

By assuming that the DCA formation for a country-year is not independent of the country's overall tendency of DCA formation, the standard errors in the main analyses are clustered by countries. I take one step further by including the country-fixed effects in the models to control the unobserved country-specific factors. The results (Appendix E, Table 9) indicate that military mobilization is still positively associated with the likelihood of DCA formation.

Military mobilizations during SOEs are predictors of DCA formation because the bargain between the military and government assumes that the military would support the civil government by suppressing popular movements. In return, government favors the military by generating alternative resources in the domestic and international arena. Nevertheless, one can still argue that SOEs are the reasons for the DCA formation because it signals a crisis, and the government wants extra resources from allies. In the earlier parts of the analysis, a positive association between SOEs and DCAs is confirmed. As a result, a variable that counts the number of SOEs during which there is no military mobilization is used to isolate the effect of SOE declaration from the military mobilization. The result of the multivariate regression model in Appendix E, Table 10, suggests no association between SOEs with no military mobilization and DCA formation.

The readers can question if the military mobilization and DCAs result from overall high military activity instead of a bargain in the face of a popular uprising. First, the increased military activity can be observed with military mobilization in SOEs declared after natural disasters. The difference between military mobilization during natural and human-made disasters is that the former occurs exogenously, but the latter occurs because of the endogenous dynamics of the political system. The leader's survival is more in danger in political crises than in natural disasters due to responsibility in crisis occurrence. Therefore, in times of natural calamities, leaders (who should feel less threatened) are neither expected

to negotiate with the military nor form DCAs searching for resources. For testing the argument, I replaced military mobilization during SOEs due to a political crisis with military mobilization in times of SOEs caused by natural disasters. The regression results are reported in Appendix E, Table 11. Military mobilization after natural emergencies is negatively associated with the probability of DCA formation, which confirms that political crisis and the government's threat perception determine the link between DCA and military mobilization argument.

The second test for the high military activity argument can be the inclusion of the literature's commonly used measures of military strength and activity variables in the main models (Horowitz, Poast, & Stam, 2017). In Appendix E, Table 12, three models are tested with the annual change in military expenditure and military personnel (Singer et al., 1972, v5) and GDP share of military expenditure (SIPRI, n.d.) for DCA formation. None of the models support an association between military strength and activity and DCA formation.

I test the changes in measurement for the main variable in the models. First, military mobilization in SOEs is calculated as a binary measure, which takes the value of 1 when the country has military mobilization during the given year and takes 0 if there is no military mobilization. Second, the days of mobilization are estimated, rather than the count of mobilization, to see whether there are some changes in the main findings. If the observation's day information is missing, the value of one day is assigned, and the log of days is taken for the final models. The outcomes of these models are presented in appendix E, table 13. The association remains the same in both measurements.

Finally, the main analysis is tested for a narrower period, based on the theoretical expectations. The informal civil-military cooperation and bargaining in return for political survival for the government and material income are post-Cold War phenomena where interstate wars and conflicts decrease in number, and the military finds a new domain of influence. De-militarization of politics with democratization movements in LAC started around the late 1980s. Here, the DCAs are the types of interstate security cooperation mostly popular after the Cold War. Thus, the main analysis is repeated with a narrower time frame between 1991 and 2010. The results remained the same. The predicted probability of each value of military mobilization during SOEs can be seen in Appendix E, Figure 1.

6.4.1 Changing data structure: dyadic

DCAs are agreements between two countries, such that it is necessary to account for partners' status for key variables significant in DCA formation. Therefore, the main argument is based on the military mobilization in SOE due to the political bargaining between civil government and the military; then, the DCA formation is tested within a dyadic data structure. 24 LAC are reformatted in dyads from 1991 to 2010 with two types of measurement for military mobilization. The first one is a categorical mobilization variable that takes two (2) if both countries declared SOEs and mobilized the military, one (1) if only one of them in the dyad declared and mobilized the military, and zero (0) if none mobilized the military. Second, the average number of military mobilizations in SOEs per dyad is estimated in dyadic analysis.

The regression outputs are presented in Appendix E, Table 14. According to the results, the dyad average military mobilization count is significantly associated with the likelihood of DCA formation. But, in the categorical measure, the dyads where only one of the countries mobilized the military upon SOE declaration compared to the dyads with no mobilization have no association with DCA formation likelihood. On the other hand, the dyads where both countries mobilize the military are associated with a higher likelihood of DCA formation than the dyads with no mobilization, but the association is at a 10 percent significance level.

According to the findings, if both countries mobilized their military during SOEs, the likelihood of DCA formation increases on average compared to non-mobilization. However, the categorical measure that identifies the mechanism between mobilization and DCA shows a weak association.

The analyses also control the average dyad number of DCAs in year $t-1$, which is the lagged dependent variable to form a base in models. Also, there is another control variable, a binary measure of DCA with the US, which takes the value of 1 if one of the countries in the dyad has a DCA with the US and zero 0 otherwise. The absolute difference in the national material capabilities of the dyad countries and democracy dyad (if both countries have 6 and more in Polity V score or not) (Marshall & Gurr, 2020) are the two other factors that are included in the models, as well.

Interestingly, the DCA with the US measure is statistically associated with a higher likelihood of DCA formation. This finding suggests the existence of a possible confounder, which is tested in the monadic data analyses with the linkage measure. One difference from the linkage is that the DCA with the US measure contemplates the US as the most influential country with hegemonic power over the continent. However, the measure is only for the DCA formation, not for the other domains of international alignment measures. Yet, I can conclude that an existing DCA link with the hegemon increases the probability of DCA formation in the next year. The existing average DCAs of the dyad, capability difference, and being in a democracy dyad have no association with DCA formation.

6.4.2 Changing dependent variable: PKO

Contribution to PKOs is another strategy with that governments aim to reduce the military pressure on the democracies. Through participation in PKOs, the military gains socialization and professionalization with regard to issues of international security as well as a growing reputation in domestic and international politics. As a result, the same exact mechanism for DCA formation is applicable here because PKO contributions can be used to balance out increased military involvement in domestic politics during SOEs.

First, to determine the linear connection between SOEs and PKOs, two variables are plotted. There is an increase in the average number of PKOs for every unit rise in mean SOEs between 1990 and 2018. According to Figure 6.5, Uruguay is an outlier as the country has had no SOE declarations in three decades, although it has the highest contributions in number and personnel for UN PKOs. PKOs are not motivated by SOE statements for Uruguay. Velazquez (2010) claims that Uruguay participates in PKOs with the most troops on the continent primarily to take advantage of the UN's resources, and as a result, financial considerations play a part.

Brazil and Argentina are the other two countries that might be considered outliers, according to Figure 6.5. Compared to the other Latin American states, Brazil and Argentina participate in more PKOs but announce lesser SOEs between 1990 and 2018. Nonetheless, Brazil has a higher number of SOEs than the continent's average, but the major goal of its

contribution is to expand the market for military-owned weapons (Velázquez, 2010). The reasoning presented here is likewise unsupported.

Argentina is the other country that contributes significantly to PKOs but has a lower prevalence of SOE declarations. According to Velázquez (2010), Argentina's active participation in PKOs seeks to maintain civilian control over the armed forces in order to forge a new position in terms of global security while cutting back on military spending and dissolving military corporations. This reasoning is consistent with the main expectation. However, when I thoroughly analyze Argentina by graphing SOEs and PKOs for each year, I find no correlation between these variables.

Among the individual country graphs, El Salvador has a statistically significant positive connection with the number of SOEs and PKOs. While El Salvador's soldier commitment remains below the continent's average, the country contributes to more PKOs than the continent average. El Salvador supports the PKOs for two reasons. First, the government of El Salvador facilitates more diplomatic engagement by active participation in PKOs.⁵² Second, cooperation with the US in the US-funded Global Peace Operations Initiative security support program pays off, as evidenced by the 4.6 million US dollars spent on a UN force training facility in San Salvador or troop training.⁵³ The graph for El Salvador can be seen in Appendix E, Figure 2. Evidence from El Salvador and Argentina suggests that there may be a link between SOEs and PKOs, indicating a domestic political motivation behind PKO participation. However, the hypothesis argues that military mobilization during SOEs, rather than SOEs themselves, should be linked to PKOs.

⁵² <https://sv.usembassy.gov/u-s-donates-1-5-million-training-facilities-peacekeeping-operations/>

⁵³ <https://2017-2021.state.gov/with-u-s-support-el-salvador-steps-up-for-peacekeeping-mission-in-mali/index.html>




Figure 6.5: Association between average SOEs and average PKOs

Then, the argument stated in Hypothesis 6b (**H6b**) (As the number of military mobilization under SOEs increases at time -1, the number of PKO contributions increases at time t) is tested in a multivariate regression setting. Results are in Table 6.6. The models use Poisson regression with robust standard errors clustered by countries. I test the relationship between SOE declarations and PKO contributions in model 1. The output suggests there is a positive association between SOE declarations and PKO contributions. However, the intriguing finding appears when model 1 is interpreted together with models 2 and 3. In model 2, the leading independent variable is the number of military mobilizations during SOEs. For model 3, I use SOEs during which there is no military mobilization as a primary explanatory variable.

Table 6.6: SOEs and Military Mobilization during SOEs' effect on contribution to PKOs

	(1) Human- made SOEs	(2) Human- made SOEs w/ Military Mobilization	(3) Human- made SOEs w/ No Military Mobilization
DV: Contributions to PKOs			
Number of SOEs Declared (t-1)	0.279*** (0.0617)		
Number of Military Mobilization during SOE (t-1)		0.247*** (0.0880)	
Number of SOEs No Military Mobilization (t-1)			0.437*** (0.0857)
Arms Transfer from US in million	0.000442 (0.00178)	0.000185 (0.00168)	7.60e-05 (0.00184)
Linkage with West	-0.572 (1.230)	-0.480 (1.290)	-0.623 (1.196)
CIRI Physical Integrity Rights	0.0662 (0.0625)	0.0521 (0.0640)	0.0587 (0.0623)
Liberal Democracy Index	1.849* (0.944)	1.783* (0.922)	1.815* (0.954)
Logged GDP per capita (US dollars)	0.268 (0.246)	0.269 (0.254)	0.285 (0.238)
National Material Capabilities	27.87** (12.59)	27.40** (12.89)	26.17** (12.51)
Constant	-2.619* (1.489)	-2.515* (1.508)	-2.650* (1.431)
Observations	696	696	696
Log pseudolikelihood	-1605	-1637	-1607
Wald X^2	68.70	55.53	82.65
Wald X^2 test p -value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: Poisson regression robust standard errors clustered by country. (***) $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

In the first line, there is evidence that there is a connection between SOEs and PKOs. The military mobilization would generate a threat to the civil government later such that PKOs become tools for diverting the military's attention more on international security issues, and so the democratic process faces a lesser threat from the military. Since the main argument is based on an existing threat factor and then military mobilization, it is necessary to differentiate the effects of SOEs and military mobilization. The second model supports the

main argument, but the association is still through the SOEs, or military mobilization cannot be identified. Thus, I add the third model to see whether SOEs with no military mobilization have a relationship with PKOs and find a positive association.

Unexpectedly, overall findings indicate that SOEs are primarily associated with PKOs, not military mobilization during SOEs. Moreover, the international and domestic control variables mostly do not support the expectations. International connections, the arms transfer from the US, and linkage with the West are not statistically significant in predicting the PKOs. Thus, the hypothesis on good relations with the status quo in contribution to the PKOs (Hirst, 2017) is not supported by the models.

Domestic political issues such as sincerity in maintaining world peace and protecting civilians and so contributing to the PKOs argument are partially supported. There is no association between a country's physical integrity rights performance and PKOs. On the other hand, the liberal democracy index positively relates to the dependent variable, yet, this association is statistically weak at the 10 percent level.

Finally, I control the income level and national material capabilities. While there is no association between GDP per capita and PKOs, the association between national material capability score and PKO contributions is positive in contrast to the expectations. In other words, my models do not support the assertion that lower-income countries tend to contribute PKOs more frequently because the UN provides additional funding for army members' salaries, training, and equipment (Adhikari, 2020).

6.5 Discussions and implications

Findings confirm that there is a complementary relationship between SOEs and DCA formation. This finding suggests that a troubled country that tries to contain the crisis with SOE declarations is more likely to form international security and defense agreements than non-SOE countries. I run several alternative tests to disentangle the link between DCAs and SOEs by focusing on various characteristics, such as political or civil rights violations during SOEs, the type of government declaring SOEs, the government's tendency to abuse SOEs by defining the crises with broad terms, and the extent of military's involvement to contain the

crises by undermining the political authority or by implementing the government policies during SOEs.

Table 6.7: Main findings on SOE outcomes

	Independent variables	Expectations	Findings
H6a	An increase in the number of military mobilizations	is expected to increase the likelihood of DCA formation	Positive association (expected)
H6b		is expected to increase number of PKOs	Not significant
H7	An increase in the frequency of crises	is expected to increase the likelihood of DCA formation	Not significant

The study explores potential connections between SOEs and DCAs through domestic political actors, balance among the actors, leadership survival, and strategic use of international resources in accordance with existing theories of international cooperation and defense alliance formation. Since the most relevant actor in South America, other than the civil government, appears to be the military, I focus on the SOEs during which the military was mobilized to contain the crises' effects. Findings show that the military mobilization during SOEs and DCA formation likelihood are positively associated, irrespective of controlling multiple covariates related to international security, domestic political, and crises.

The conditional effects of MID in contiguous states, FDI expectations, linkage with the Western countries, and the regime type further elaborate the causal mechanism in military mobilization and DCA formation. The findings indicate that FDI expectations and linkage with the Western countries do not relate to the DCA formations. However, the positive association between military mobilization and the DCA exists when there is a MID in contiguous states, and the regime is a democracy.

The resource transition from a partner to a troubled country argument is tested in a country-year format. Dyadic data analysis supported the positive association between military mobilization and the DCA. Yet, this statistical association remained at a 10 percent level for the categorical classification of SOEs.

There is a considerable amount of literature about democratization through PKO contributions and military pacification. Following the existing mechanisms, the expectation was to find a positive relationship between military mobilization and PKOs. Instead, there are exciting findings regarding the connections between SOE and PKO. Peacekeeping and SOEs are found to be associated but not through military mobilization during SOEs. Therefore, there is no empirical support in favor of the main premise that governments would contribute to PKOs more to expand military training, equipment opportunities, and income for military personnel after military mobilization during SOEs (which gives the military, political control over the civil administration) is unsupported. However, SOEs continue to provide crucial information about the domestic political system and any shifts in the domestic actors' positions of power. Thus, despite the literature's limited discussion on the links between SOEs and PKOs, it is reasonable to anticipate that a government's foreign policy practices might change following the SOEs.

Chapter 7

RESULTS III: CASE STUDY

Chapter Seven begins with an introduction to the case study on the causal mechanisms, ranging from SOE declarations and military mobilization to the main international alignment behavior of interest (DCA formation), using evidence from Bolivia and Peru. The research goal and case selection strategy are described. The alternative explanations are tested with evidence from Bolivia and Peru, based on the hypotheses and mechanisms developed in Chapter Four. Finally, the case study outputs are shared.

Western aligned Peru in Alan Garcia's presidential term, and non-Western aligned Bolivia under Evo Morales' term declared SOE in the face of threats. However, Bolivia performed unsatisfactorily in informing the UN about these declarations and relevant human rights derogations. The economic and organizational links with Western countries and the democratic balancing mechanism significantly explain the difference between SOE declaration and derogation reporting. A close examination of government-military relations reveals that the system's sustenance is only possible if the military gets a ransom from domestic and international economic activities and the government keeps its political position. The close relationship discloses itself as the military takes the stage to suppress popular resistance against the government during SOEs. In the international arena, it is reflected in signing DCAs. However, the partners the SOE declaring countries have chosen vary in terms of their international alignment behaviors. While Bolivia mainly forms DCAs with the anti-Western powers, Peru has been developing DCAs mostly with Western democratic countries.

7.1 Research objective and case selection

This section aims to find empirical evidence by looking closer at the cases and events for deductively driven hypotheses of the previous section about the reasons for SOE declarations and the formation of DCAs. I am conducting small-*N* country case studies, complimentary in research that use large-*N* regression analyses—with the same theory and main arguments of this investigation. The two large-*N* analyses framework: SOE declarations examined regarding the leverage of and linkage with the West, and DCA formation as an outcome of military mobilization during SOEs will be explored through specific events, people, and dates. Additionally, alternative explanations, such as the country's political structure and international threat environment, will be examined in detail. In short, the case study analyses will handle the indicators, not in a country-year format but more extended periods, whether the case study findings support the large-*N* analysis findings or not.

The cases for the qualitative analysis are Bolivia and Peru. The selection is based on the principle of selection on the extreme values of the main independent variable, SOE declarations (Seawright, 2016, p. 502). Despite both being on the same continent and neighbors, Bolivia and Peru have distinct features in international alignment with the US and EU countries. Other states in Latin America, such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Guyana, Suriname, and Uruguay, have anti-American alignments. Even so, among these, only Uruguay can be considered a liberal democracy (V-Dem) with a Polity V score of 10.⁵⁴ Being a democracy becomes crucial because there should initially be a baseline between the countries in reporting the events and political structure. Thus, I choose two electoral democracies (V-Dem classification) for case studies. I eliminate the Uruguay case, despite being a democracy, because it does not hold the criteria of having extreme value on the main independent variable. Uruguay and US relations are not as problematic as between Bolivia and the US. Chronologically parallel periods, for Bolivia, the first two terms of Evo Morales from 2006 to 2014 and Peru Alan Garcia's tenure from 2006 to 2011 are selected.

Around the same time frame, on one side, following right-wing policies, Alan Garcia of Peru proceeded with privatization, cutting government spending, and a free trade

⁵⁴ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-unasur-membership-idUSKBN1HR2P6>

agreement with the US.⁵⁵ Openly criticizing the left-wing neighbors Ecuador and Bolivia and close cooperation on the prevention of coca production brought Peru to align with Colombia and Panama, where there are good relations with the US.⁵⁶ The liberal economic policies of Garcia increased the country's economic growth rates. However, the corruption scandals, the clashes with indigenous groups due to natural resources (Taft-Morales, 2009), and the sustenance of social stratification such as the rural-urban divide prevented a spillover effect of the high economic development to all communities, so there was a period of crisis in politics.⁵⁷ Hence, Garcia's period is remarked with the pro-US policies and statements as well as socio-political turmoil.

On the other side, the left-wing government of Evo Morales publicly opposed the US activities and policies in the continent by siding with Venezuela (in the continent) and Russia (in global politics). Starting from his early term, Morales nationalized the gas and oil fields and executed land reform that favored the indigenous majority.⁵⁸ In August 2008, five eastern departments went on strike and protested against the government's policy of using energy revenue to fund the national pension plan.⁵⁹ Within days, the protests went violent with the clashes between anti-government and pro-government groups. The police and military deployed in the Pando region to suppress the clashes. In November, Morales accused the US of plotting against him and declaring the US ambassador persona non-grata by indicting the ambassador for supporting pro-autonomy opposition groups.⁶⁰ Furthermore, Morales opposes the prevention of coca-growing policy as a strategy for US involvement in the continent.⁶¹

These two countries have socio-political turmoil and economic inequality issues during the same period. They have different international alignments. The expectation is to find nuanced and detailed evidence within the case study in the hypotheses guide before the developed causal mechanism. For each country and analysis period, there will be two analysis

⁵⁵ <https://www.coha.org/welcome-mr-peruvian-president-why-alan-garcia-is-no-hero-to-his-people/>

⁵⁶ <https://www.reuters.com/article/peru-bolivia-idINN0125578520080701>

⁵⁷ <https://www.coha.org/el-vrae-alan-garcia%E2%80%99s-failed-domestic-policy/>

⁵⁸ <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122198550>

⁵⁹ <https://www.france24.com/en/20080819-bolivia-protests-turn-violent-bolivia-protests>

⁶⁰ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-15632484>

⁶¹ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11816035>

themes. The first mechanism is to understand how the international alignment influences the countries' SOE declarations, UN reporting of those declarations, and UN reporting of rights violations.

7.2 SOE declaration: The evaluation of alternative explanations

Bolivia declared SOE due to demonstrations in September 2008 between January 22, 2006, and October 12, 2014. The reporting of the human rights derogation to the UN Human Rights Committee during the 2008 SOE was in March 2010 (Zwitter et al., 2016). In addition, the country's reporting did not contain the details of derogations during the SOE, despite the news that police used excessive force and the right of assembly was violated.⁶² According to information on the media, between July 28, 2006, and July 28, 2014, Peru declared 8 SOEs due to demonstrations, strikes, terrorism activities, and guerilla warfare. The relevant human rights derogations that occurred during SOEs were detailly reported within a week at most.

Table 7.1 indicates the country records in each factor that might explain the SOE declaration. The measures are means of yearly scores from 2006 to 2014 for Bolivia and from 2006 to 2011 for Peru. For reference, the score's average value for the 24 countries in Latin America (LAC mean) between 2006 and 2014 is placed in parenthesis. The causal mechanism assumes that the SOE declarations, SOE reporting, and derogation reporting are different perspectives of the same phenomenon, but there are not enough observations of UN reporting to analyze in quantitative analysis. Thus, the large-*N* analysis examines only the SOE declarations as a dependent variable. I also include the country reporting to the UN about the SOE declaration and human rights derogations in the case study.

The SOEs declared due to natural disasters are not included in the analyses, and the SOEs represented in table 7.1 are the SOEs declared for national/political crises only. I disregarded the natural disaster SOEs because there is no difference between Peru and Bolivia in their SOE declarations for natural reasons; both countries declared SOEs for natural disasters. Moreover, the SOEs declared because of a natural disaster are not reported to the UN since there is no relevance of rights violations with natural disaster management.

⁶² <https://www.france24.com/en/20080913-martial-law-declared-bolivian-state-pando-bolivia>

There is a significant disparity between Bolivia's and Peru's records in their SOE declarations and UN reporting performance; Peru has a better record than Bolivia in following international law. However, this does not immediately mean that Bolivia handles and restricts the rights without SOE declarations in times of crisis. The country might have lower crisis rates, so the declaration of SOEs is unnecessary. Thus, to make a meaningful comparison, the number and types of crises and country performance in individual integrity rights should have been compared first.

Table 7.1: Indicators for alternative explanation in SOE declarations

Country Analysis Period	Bolivia (January 22, 2006- October 12, 2014)	Peru (July 28, 2006- July 28, 2011)
DV1: SOE Declares	1 SOE declaration	8 SOE declarations
DV2: SOE and Derogation Reports	Incomplete reporting	Detailed Reporting
Demonstrations (Violent)	1.55 (LAC mean: .72)	1.17 (LAC mean: .72)
Strike	No data	78.16 (LAC mean: 157.41)
Deadly Terror	None	7.33 (LAC mean: 4.10)
Guerilla Warfare	None	It has existed for 4 years (low intensity)
Economic Crisis Index	None	None
International Crisis Index	None	None
Coup Plot	One: 2009	None
Individual Integrity Rights	5-6	5-6
Freedom of Expression and Information	.84 (LAC mean: .80)	.89 (LAC mean: .80)
Democracy	7.33 (electoral dem.)	9 (electoral democracy)
Legislative control	.45 (LAC mean: .62)	.817 (LAC mean: .62)
Judiciary independence	-.973 (LAC mean: .43)	.969 (LAC mean: .43)
Constitutional clauses	.286 (LAC mean: .45)	.057 (LAC mean: .45)
Linkage	.58	.72
Leverage	Low leverage of West	Low leverage of West
ICCPR year	1982	1978

The first set of indicators is shown in table 7.1, including the average number of violent demonstrations, strikes and lockouts, deadly terror attacks, guerilla warfare, coup plot, economic crisis, and international crisis. Accordingly, Bolivia and Peru have a high record of violent demonstrations compared to the LAC average. Bolivia did not declare SOEs even though the country had a slightly higher mean of violent demonstrations than Peru, who did

declare SOEs. There are no labor strike data for Bolivia, but Peru's average strike data are lower than that of all LACs. Similarly, there is no record of deadly terror and guerilla warfare in Bolivia. Peru has relatively low numbers of terror attacks compared to the LAC sample, and guerilla warfare is ongoing at a low intensity. Both countries had no economic and international crises during the given period. Finally, one coup was plotted in 2009, on April 16, and police announced that the plotters attempted to assassinate President Morales.⁶³

Apparently, there is a divide between Bolivia and Peru regarding the crisis types. Bolivia dealt with alleged coup accusations in 2008 and coup plots in 2009 as it had a considerable rate of violent protests. Peru also experienced a high rate of violent protests and strikes, lower than the LAC average, while there was no threat or threat perception about a coup attempt in Peru. In addition, Peru was dealing with a resurged guerilla warfare combined with deadly terror attacks. The crisis, considered a threat by the government, originated from different sources, but both countries experienced domestic security issues.

The divergence between Peru's and Bolivia's SOE declarations and UN reporting is not about the differences in the countries' crises. Both countries were dealing with political-social crises during this period. Another reason for the difference in SOE statements could be the countries' crisis-management style. Nevertheless, in either case, whether the country declares it or not, countries restrict their rights during crisis management. Bolivia had a similar score on integrity rights compared to Peru, which was relatively high, considering the highest score was eight between 2006 and 2011 (Cingranelli et al., 2014). Moreover, both countries had similar scores of freedom of expression, including journalists and media in print and social freedom (Coppedge et al. 2020, p. 41). From these indicators, it can be concluded that these countries were not conflicted societies that the state tried to contain. Additionally, the two countries had similar records in human rights scores that show that even if there were differences in the crisis experience, the rights violations should be correlated with the crisis. In short, based on the similar crisis and rights comparison rates, Peru had considerably higher rates of SOE declarations than Bolivia.

⁶³ <https://news.un.org/en/story/2009/04/298382-un-experts-concerned-over-mercenaries-alleged-coup-plot-bolivia>

Next, the alternative explanations related to political structural variables indicate a consistent relationship between political factors and SOE declarations. While both countries were above the minimum threshold Polity V democracy score, Bolivia was at approximately seven, and Peru was at nine. It is difficult to draw any conclusions from these scores. Moreover, both countries are classified as electoral democracies in V-Dem regime scores (Coppedge et al., 2020). However, there is a clear distinction between the countries regarding legislative control over executive and judiciary independence. Historically, Bolivia had low rates of judicial independence, especially after 2009, when Bolivia ratified a new constitution. There was a break in judicial independence scores for Bolivia in a negative direction. Moreover, legislative control over the executive was below the Latin American mean, indicating an incompetent Bolivian legislative and a lower legislative control score than Peru's. Thus, the alternative explanation that suggests a democracy score and judicial independence influenced the reporting of human rights situations and SOEs to international courts finds support in the Bolivia and Peru comparison (Hafner-Burton et al., 2011). Hence, this alternative explanation should be approached cautiously to differentiate its effects from linkage and leverage in the hypotheses.

Another alternative explanation suggests that if the constitutional emergency powers provide extensive authority to the governing body, the governing body is more likely to declare an SOE (Rooney, 2019a; Bjørnskov & Voigt, 2018b). However, this explanation could not find support in the case of Bolivia in comparison to Peru. The expectation is that the higher the constitutional empowerment to the executive – meaning higher scores in constitutional clauses – the more SOE declarations there will be. Both countries' scores were lower than the average in the Latin American sample. Thus, the difference between the country scores might not be significant enough to compare the two countries.

After evaluating the alternative explanations, a short introductory analysis of the main argument will be provided. The main findings that focus on the linkage and leverage and SOE declarations will be presented. The ratification years between the countries are not significantly different; Bolivia ratified the ICCPR four years later than Peru. The leverage of the West in Bolivia was low because the country had a high oil production; besides, Bolivia received Chinese aid for five years among the nine years of the analysis period. In Peru,

Western leverage was also low because the country had a high economic income and oil production status while there was no Chinese aid. The main difference appears in the scores of linkages with the West. Peru was entirely in line with the Western countries' UNGA ideal point. However, the social tie of Bolivia with the West was stronger than in Peru, which might be attributable to the high migration rates of Bolivians due to economic difficulties. Thus, the case study for SOE declarations in Bolivia and Peru will focus on organizational links such as UN commissions and assembly while considering the political structural factors in the following parts.

7.3 DCA formation: The evaluation of alternative explanations

The second part of the case study focuses on the second analysis of how civil-military relations and military utilization in the crises and DCA formation and partners are related. Unlike the large-*N* analysis, the case study allows examining the choice of partners in DCA formation. Thus, other than international cooperation, the Western alignment behavior of the countries in connection to militaries is also examined. This part of the case study will be from 2006, the beginning of Morales and Garcia administrations, to 2010 because there is no systematic data available after 2010 about DCA signings other than the DCA dataset (Kinne, 2020). Table 7.2 shows the quantitative scores for the alternative and main explanations.

Between 2006 and 2010, Bolivia signed 5 DCAs with Venezuela (twice), Brazil, Chile, and Russia. In the same period, Peru signed DCAs with both regional powers Brazil and Argentina, and on the global scale, the country is very active in DCAs with South Korea, Israel, Italy, Spain, and Ukraine. A comparison of Bolivia with Peru shows that the number of overall DCAs is relatively low. The Bolivian partners are limited to either neighboring countries, Brazil and Chile, or countries with anti-US stands, such as Venezuela and Russia.

Table 7.2: Indicators for alternative explanation in DCA formation

Country	Bolivia	Peru
Analysis Period	(January 22, 2006- October 12, 2010)	(July 28, 2006- July 28, 2010)
DV1: New DCA formation	5 DCAs	11 DCAs
Existent (still in effect) DCAs	1 (signed before Jan 22, 2006)	3 (signed before July 28, 2006)
Strategic Rivals	Chile (Spatial)	None
MID in Contiguous States	None	Colombia with Venezuela and Ecuador with Colombia
Capability Ratio (State/Contiguous states' mean)	.15	.43
GNI per capita, Atlas method	1442 US dollars (Lower- middle)	3638 US dollars (Lower- middle)
Primary School Enrollment (%net)	93.7	96.38
SOE Declaration	1 SOE declaration	7 SOE declarations
Military Mobilization in SOE	1 of the SOEs	4 of the SOEs

The alternative explanations for DCA formation other than military mobilization and SOE declarations can be examined under three categories. The first explaining factor is the country's previous performance in forming DCAs. DCAs in the large-*N* analysis function as a lagged dependent variable and prepares a baseline for a state's status in DCAs. Kinne (2018) uses the actual DCA numbers as a reference point for the potential partners because the most challenging issue in forming an alliance is determining how credible the partner will be when it comes to aid when it is required, such as during a war (Morrow, 1994). Additionally, Kinne maps the network of countries, arguing that a third common state positively affects the DCA formation between the two countries (2018). If the state signs higher numbers of DCAs and two states have a joint party in a DCA, these states sharing similar networks are more likely to form DCAs.

Comparing the two countries' existing DCAs, signed before 2006 and resumed during the 2006–2010 period, and DCAs formed during the 2006–2010 period, there is a consistent relationship between the two indicators. Bolivia had only one DCA signed with Spain in 2001, which was still active between 2006 and 2010. Peru signed 3 DCAs in 2006 and had active DCAs between 2006 and 2010 with Spain and India and one with Russia between

2004 and 2007. Existing relationships between countries predict future connections; thus, this alternative explanation has supported the Peru and Bolivia comparison.

Moreover, when we examine the partnership choices of the countries, there is still an East and West divide. For example, Peru's DCAs were either with Russia or Western states such as Italy and France. When Peru had a DCA with Russia, there was no DCA in effect with the Western states. This provides evidence for Kinne's (2018) network effect in the DCA formation. Moreover, the countries' network is still based on the West and East divide of the Cold War.

The second alternative explanation asserts that when states feel threatened in their international environment, such as by a rival, conflictual neighbors, or a state's capability concerning a neighbor's capability, those objectively or perceptually threatened states form DCAs. Focusing on the 2006–2010 period, while Peru had no international strategic rival, Bolivia was in a century-old rivalry with Chile (Colaresi et al., 2008). During this period, President Morales drastically changed the focus of Bolivia from an international rivalry with Chile to internal enemies toward elites, by forming new grounds of intercountry trust between Chile and Bolivia. One source of contention in the struggle against the old regime's elites was the drafting of a new constitution and favoring Indigenous people over economically advanced groups (Wehner, 2010). In 2008, Chile and Bolivia signed a DCA, highlighting the sectoral cooperation in advancing regional security (Bustamante, Cristian, Cañas, & Fernando, 2015).

Peru did not have a rival within the same period, but Peru's two neighbors, Colombia and Ecuador, were involved in MIDs at the level of display of force, border violation, and raids (Maoz, Johnson, Shreve, Ogunkoya, & Kaplan, 2019; Palmer et al., 2020). Peru was not involved in these conflicts. Besides, Peru was relatively more potent than its contiguous states compared to the neighbors' material capability. While resolving the issue with Chile, Bolivia's capability relative to the neighbor's capability was around 15 percent. That means the countries contiguous to Bolivia are relatively much more potent than Bolivia. Therefore, it is most probable that Bolivia perceives the state as under threat.

Comparing the international threat environment, Peru had troubled neighbors, and Bolivia was weaker than the neighbors in terms of material capabilities. Even so, the

qualitative evidence suggests that no international rivalry and conflictual neighbors were perceived as threats during the 2006–2010 period. Bolivia changed the relationship with Chile, eliminating the dispute, but there was a fight between elites and the Morales government in domestic politics. Furthermore, the revival of terrorism and guerilla warfare in Peru provides no evidence that the international threat environment played a role in the DCA formations of the Garcia government. Therefore, the international threat environment does not provide evidence for Bolivia and Peru's DCA formation patterns, directing attention to the domestic politics in DCA formation.

Domestic sources of alliance formations focus on the states' economic and human development indicators. Moreover, the literature approaches domestic motives to ally according to the country's democracy-autocracy orientation. The economically vulnerable and weak state does not have the resources to resolve domestic issues. Thus, those weak states ally to fund the crisis resolution if a crisis threatens the political survival of the government/leader. As explained by Kimball (2010) and Boutton (2019), the mechanism's functions are as follows: while democracies ally to find new security resources so that they can allocate the remaining national budget for domestic needs through resource distribution to a larger winning coalition (Kimball, 2010), autocracies resolve the domestic crisis by suppression of domestic demands via the resource distribution to smaller communities (Boutton, 2019). The assumption is that the poorer the country, the more likely it is to form a DCA.

Thus, the income levels by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita and primary school enrolment rates are compared to see if DCAs are motivated to find extra resources. Peru's GNI per capita was double that of Bolivia. In addition, primary school enrolment levels were slightly higher in Peru compared to Bolivia. On the global scale, these two countries were not significantly different in their economic and human development levels because they were at the lower-middle-income level in their GNI per capita (current US dollars) according to the 2020 World Bank classification. However, Peru had a better position than Bolivia in development indicators. Thus, the alternative explanation arguing that domestic economic conditions force countries to ally is not supported as Peru had higher DCA formation numbers than Bolivia.

Recent studies also demonstrate that a resource generation proposal with international security cooperation is only possible if the partner is a democracy or a reliable partner (Diguseppe & Poast, 2018). The argument for democratic dyads in resource generation between Peru and Bolivia is contradictory as Peru mostly signs DCAs with democracies, whereas Bolivia signs with autocracies, namely Russia and Venezuela. However, if the countries sign DCAs to fund social spending, Bolivia cannot be included, although the country is the less developed of the two.

The main explaining factor focuses on the crisis occurrence and suppression of the crisis with the military. In exchange for the military's assistance, the government forms DCAs for the resource transfer to military personnel, equipment, and income. Thus, the government stays in power, and the military acquires material power. Together with the main explanatory factor of civil-military relations in the case study, I will discuss the existing state's network and alignments in the DCA formation. Before detailing the significant events and issues, a brief introduction can provide background to the study.

Within five years (between 2006 and 2010), Bolivia faced one significant crisis that threatened the government's survival in September 2008, during which the military was mobilized; in the following year, in February 2009, Bolivia signed a DCA with Russia. Even though Bolivia had been forming relations with Russia, the main arms import to the country between 2006 and 2010 came from Venezuela, Spain, Argentina, and France. After this, China and Germany exported arms to Bolivia until 2020 (SIPRI, n.d.). However, there is no record of arms trade between Russia and Bolivia despite newspaper coverage of visits to Russia and strategic partnership messages, especially during Morales' presidential term.⁶⁴

However, during Morales' term, a new partnership between the Morales government and the military was formed after the appointment of the armed forces' new commander⁶⁵, unto the military's refusal to suppress the people's revolt against Morales administrative in 2019.⁶⁶ The Bolivian military gained importance as a protector of natural resources,

⁶⁴ <https://www.france24.com/en/20090215-morales-seeks-strategic-partnerships-with-france-russia-https://tass.com/defense/898143>

⁶⁵ <https://www.efe.com/efe/america/politica/morales-nombra-al-alto-mando-militar-en-bolivia-que-incluye-a-una-general/20000035-2800803>

⁶⁶ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/10/bolivia-military-chief-says-army-will-not-confront-people>

nationalization, and supporter of the democratic government. There was an increased budget for equipment and international cooperation,⁶⁷ especially with Venezuela. Furthermore, in 2006, the US decision to cut military aid to the country⁶⁸ pushed Bolivia to find alternative resources.

Peru utilized SOE declaration and military mobilization more frequently than Bolivia. Three new DCAs were signed in the following years of military mobilization in Peru, and up until 2010, the leading exporters in arms were Italy, the US, and the Netherlands. After 2010, Russia became one of Peru's main exporters of arms (SIPRI, n.d.).

The close relationship between civil authorities and the military goes back to the civil war with the Shining path. The civil-military relations were scrutinized because of the human rights violations announced in the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report in 2003. After this date, however, the prosecution of military wrongdoings has been limited because of the military's unwillingness to provide information.⁶⁹ In addition, resurging political violence regenerates civil-military cooperation and expands economic policies.

On the one hand, President Garcia enforced a neoliberal agenda with a democratic and transparent budget forming and spending for the military inherited from the previous presidents (Aviles, 2009). On the other hand, in 2002, the internal conflict reemerged with Shining Path's attacks. The rising attacks by the armed group were such that the arms purchase from China, Brazil, and the Netherlands was justified. Moreover, Garcia's aggressive liberal economy included extracting Peru's natural resources for international corporations, but the government was frequently faced with protests. Thus, the government used military deployments to suppress the opposition.⁷⁰

Bolivia and Peru's domestic political developments influenced civil-military relations. While the Bolivian military drifted from a pro-US policy to an anti-US nationalist policy and arose as a government supporter, the Peruvian military actively helped the

⁶⁷ <https://nuso.org/articulo/los-militares-antes-del-golpe/>

⁶⁸ <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/09/world/americas/09iht-bolivia.html>

⁶⁹ <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/pub/memos/peru0806.pdf>

⁷⁰ <https://upsidedownworld.org/news-briefs/news-briefs-news-briefs/the-militarization-of-the-peruvian-countryside/>

incumbent by suppressing the opposition and political unrest. Both militaries helped the government with the extraction and protection of natural resources. Thus, the case study for the DCA formation will focus on the economic interaction between the civil government and the military while the states' domestic political issues and international alignment are at the center.

7.4 International alignment, emergency, and civil-military relations in Bolivia

In this section, I will go into more detail about the conclusions drawn from the country comparisons of the previous section, as well as the select factors that may have contributed to the formation of SOEs and DCAs, by using data gathered from Bolivia. To observe the extent of international linkage and leverage of status quo powers (e.g., the US and the EU countries) and counter-systemic powers (e.g., Russia and China) over Bolivia, I examine the economic and political bilateral relations, along with the Bolivian ties with the international community and international organizations. Judicial independence is another difference revealed in the country comparison that might have an impact on the SOE declaration, so a thorough description of the interactions between the executive and judicial branches is given. Later, I exemplify several incidents of state-society relations and military's role in these interactions to illustrate the building blocks toward DCA formation.

7.4.1 Social dynamics and the state

Following the 1952 Bolivian national revolution, education and voting rights were extended to larger segments of the multi-ethnic society, but Indigenous communities—accounting for nearly 60 percent of the population⁷¹—remained systematically excluded in cultural and economic aspects throughout the twentieth century (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2011). The 1967 constitution, which was amended and reformed several times in the 1990s, was drafted without the input of Indigenous peoples.

Democratization in Bolivia was initiated in 1982 with the dissolution of the military junta. To keep social peace, the governmental system was based on a three-party coalition. These parties were the major political actors in constant negotiation, and none of them had

⁷¹ <https://www.countryreports.org/country/Bolivia/population.htm>

the majority of the seats (Souza, Filho & Santos, 2020, p. 4). The widespread clientelism in the public positions assured the unlikely partners' coalition to share state resources and prevented the multiplication of political actors (Domingo, 2005). Thus, without a coalition, the election of a president was not possible. Until 2005, this coalition-based governance – called “Pacted Democracy” –proceeded (Gamarra, 1996, p. 97). In the first years of the democratic experience in-between 1984 and 1985, the coalition government dealt with recurring problems in the mining sector, coca industry, social unrest,⁷² and hyperinflation that reached an annual 60,000 percent (Sachs, 1986). In the 1986-2002 period, political stability and coalition politics were the prevailing orders in Bolivian politics, but the Indigenous populations were still excluded from political life (Albro, 2006).

During the 1990s, recently mobilized Indigenous organizations and international developments highlighted human rights and emancipation of colonized communities as pressing issues for reforms in political participation and the electoral system—as reflected in the 1994 and 1995 constitutional amendments (Kohl, 2003; Schilling-Vacaflor, 2011). For the expansion of the political system, new municipal units were created to ensure decentralization of governance, and a single-member district election system was introduced. However, decentralization efforts in 1994, transferring resources to the municipalities, exacerbated the rich lowlands and poor highland polarization further because there was a fear that the central government might confiscate the property and wealth of the prosperous eastern lowlanders.⁷³

Moreover, even though deep-rooted ethnic division and social inequality persisted (Roper, 2003) at the expense of Indigenous people, in 1994 and 1995, political reforms and constitutional amendments culturally recognized Indigenous people and enabled the insertion of the new actors in politics, challenging political actors with an anti-establishment stand and in demand for equal democratic representation and resolution of socio-economic problems (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2011).

At the beginning of the 2000s, Bolivia faced a new wave of social, political, and economic instability. The 1990s' social movements dissented against neo-liberal economic

⁷² <https://www.britannica.com/place/Bolivia/Restoration-of-civilian-government>

⁷³ <https://www.cfr.org/background/bolivias-presidential-elections>

policies, especially targeting the privatization of the hydrocarbon industry in 1996 (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2011). In February 2003, the announcement of a new tax on salaries inflamed the street protests and resulted in clashes between police and the protestors.⁷⁴ In September 2003, the government announced the plan to export Bolivian gas through Chile (seen as a national arch enemy) ports⁷⁵ triggering a series of protests demanding the nationalization of the oil and gas reserves (Lehoucq, 2008). Furthermore, oil and gas prices were rising in domestic markets, indicating that the control of foreign oil and gas companies seemed to contradict national interests.⁷⁶ The September protests turned violent, and police and army confronted the people (Lehoucq, 2008). This so-called “Gas War” resulted in 58 civilian deaths and over 400 injured, mostly from El Alto (Albro, 2006).⁷⁷ Taking the blame for the deaths, in December 2003, President Sanchez de Lozada resigned from his post.

El Alto, where the clashes and so the majority of the deaths occurred, is a satellite city of La Paz that grew extremely fast with shanty towns by the closures of mines in the mid-1980s and peasants from the Indigenous highland population (Spronk, 2007). The city represented the stratification of Bolivian society along the overlapping ideological, ethnic, socio-economic, and regional divisions. Regionally, the country was divided (de la Torre, 2013) into “... a left-ethically Indigenous bloc that lives in poverty, constituted by the worker and peasant organizations based in La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosí, and Chuquisaca, and an eastern-bourgeois bloc that is rich, constituted by groups representing agro-industrial, financial, and petroleum capital in the Departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija, Pando, and Beni” (called Media Luna) (Weber, 2010, p. 51).

The interim government of Mesa (2003-2005) also failed to deal with the deep-rooted divisions in society, recurring demands for grasping the control of nature reserves to the advantage of the nation, and requests for greater autonomy from the rich provinces. In January 2005, an attempt to privatize El Alto water (five years later, so-called Water War of

⁷⁴ <https://reliefweb.int/report/bolivia/bolivia-crisis-and-justice-days-violence-feb-and-oct-2003>

⁷⁵ <https://www.equaltimes.org/bolivia-s-gas-war-ten-years-on#.YcMbtGhBxPY>

⁷⁶ <http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2015/4/5/traditional-development-or-vivir-bien-an-analysis-of-the-bolivian-gas-war-in-2003>

⁷⁷ <https://www.equaltimes.org/bolivia-s-gas-war-ten-years-on#.YcMdZmhBxPZ>

Cochabamba upon a failed attempt at privatization in 2000⁷⁸) was responded to with blockades, strikes, and protests⁷⁹ by the poor Indigenous Aymara people (Spronk, 2007; Weber, 2010). In March 2005, strikes and gatherings continued to protest multinational companies' abuse of Bolivian natural resources.⁸⁰ In June 2005, President Carlos Mesa could not resist the ongoing protests in the capital and resigned from his post.⁸¹

Rule of Morales: Changing state – society relations

In 2002, Evo Morales ran for the presidency for the first time and lost, but in 2005, he was elected, and consecutively in 2009 and 2014, served as the president until he finally fled the country after the controversial elections in 2019. In the 2005 elections, there were multiple economically, politically, and socially pressing issues that the country was facing, and Morales was sworn in to solve these problems, all interconnected and sometimes more prominent than the others (Kohl, 2010).

The disproportionate and unfair revenue distribution from the natural gas and oil reserves issues that forced the previous president's resignation was one of the initial areas of the new president's interest. The Hydrocarbons Law of 1996 that handed over the profit to the private companies for pulling investors into the country was changed in 2005, and the nationalization of hydrocarbons under the state-owned company Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos - Bolivian Fiscal Oil Fields (YPFB) was discussed.⁸² The 1996 regulation was not benefiting the Bolivian state since most of the wells operated in the country were discovered after 1996 (94 percent of production). That means the state's overall share was only 18 percent of total revenue.⁸³ At the same time, gas prices in the global markets were also rising (Lehoucq, 2020). In 2006, President Morales ordered the military to seize the oil

⁷⁸ <https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/water-privatisation-cochabamba-bolivia#:~:text=In%202000%2C%20privatisation%20of%20the,water%20received%20new%20legal%20backing.>

⁷⁹ <https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/bolivian-protesters-end-water-privatization-la-paz-el-alto>

⁸⁰ <https://www.theguardian.com/guardian/2005/mar/16/guardianletters.bolivia>

⁸¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/07/jeremylennard>

⁸² <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/bolivias-presidential-elections>

⁸³ <http://ain-bolivia.org/2007/11/bolivia%E2%80%99s-gas-nationalization-opportunity-and-cha-2/>

and gas fields from foreign companies and nationalized the hydrocarbon industry under YPFB.⁸⁴

As the first Native American president from the Aymara people, Morales promised to reduce poverty among the Indigenous population. Even though Indigenous Bolivians make up 60-70 percent of the country's population, racism systematically excludes them from economic development.⁸⁵ One problem that directly concerns the Indigenous community and the president himself is the coca production that has been suppressed with the help of the US government. The coca leaf was a traditional crop for the Aymara people, which is believed to have healing power, and Morales had a career as a leader of the coca union starting in the 1990s.⁸⁶ By the end of his presidential term, Morales had almost doubled the area of coca production.⁸⁷

The division in society was between urban-rich Bolivians living in the lowlands, occupying agro-industrialist jobs, acquiring government investments disproportionately, gathering rents from the natural resources, and having transnational links vs. rural-poor Bolivians living in the highlands, being further cornered by the limitation of coca production, and mostly migrating to the wealthy cities (Kohl, 2010). These divisions in society reflected the deep-seated racism in the events of 2007, 2008, and 2009 (Kohl, 2010). After Morales secured the revenues from oil and gas, which strengthened the state's economic power at the expense of rentier rich lowlanders, he started to include the marginal groups in politics (Kohl, 2010).

In the state departments, Morales also pursued an anti-elitist campaign against those who were allegedly associated with international actors (Kohl, 2010). The state apparatus was seen as weak and corrupt in the hands of white oligarchs (Kohl, 2010). Morales' government reduced the salaries, starting with his own, by over 50 percent. This cut was expanded to all public workers since the rule says no public worker can earn more than the

⁸⁴ "McFarren, P. J. & Arnade, C. W. (2021, April 20). Bolivia. Encyclopedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Bolivia>"

⁸⁵ <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/bolivias-presidential-elections>

⁸⁶ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/09/features11.g2>

⁸⁷ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-39214085>

president.⁸⁸ The revision on income resulted in multiple resignations, which created an opportunity for the Morales government to replace the resigned posts with his supporters (Kohl, 2010).

The tension between old elites and Morales for political and economic control was at its highest in the 2008 Pando massacre⁸⁹ proceeding with the discussion over the constitutional text and recall elections. In 2008, the opposition was in control of the majority of the parliamentary seats, restricting the Morales government's law-making ability. Thus, Morales mostly resorted to issuing presidential decrees to rule because, in 2008, almost 100 bills were rejected by the parliament (Kohl, 2010). The new constitution (carrying majoritarian tendencies by winning all of the governmental apparatus and economic gains with a single election) was opposed by the rich lowlanders (Lehoucq, 2008). Morales already raised taxes on multinational companies and took over the mining and telecommunication enterprises, which were previously controlled by the multinationals.⁹⁰ The street protests and social discontent were used by the Morales administration to establish an SOE in 2008 and social control in an anti-democratic way (Lehoucq, 2008). After this point, Morales also captured the political space and consolidated his political power in the 2009 elections, in which Morales' party, Movement for Socialism (MAS), controlled both parliamentary houses.

After the 2009 victory on multiple battlefields, Morales increased his popularity among the Bolivians, but not without a challenge. For example, Morales faced protests from the Indian community that opposed the construction of a vast jungle road on their territory in 2013.⁹¹ Further, the land reform that was promised by the Morales administration was slowed down in 2012 and 2013 by falling behind public expectations.⁹² Even though Morales fell apart with some of the Indigenous communities⁹³, he enjoyed his most popular period in the 2014 elections when the majority of the nation supported him. Even the prosperous provinces

⁸⁸ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4652940.stm>

⁸⁹ <https://www.tni.org/es/node/10263>

⁹⁰ <https://www.france24.com/en/20080819-bolivia-protests-turn-violent-bolivia-protests>

⁹¹ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22371275>

⁹² <https://nacla.org/blog/2013/3/31/bolivia-unfinished-business-land-reform>

⁹³ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/13/bolivia-evo-morales--president-third-term>

of Bolivia (previously on the opposition side by issuing an autonomy referendum in 2008) voted for him.⁹⁴

7.4.2 International alignment of Bolivia: Linkage and leverage

Political and economic relations with the US

Bolivia's domestic politics and international policymaking are intrinsically linked (Souza, Filho, & Santos, 2020). For this reason, the introduction of democracy in 1982 and the outbreak of an economic crisis led by hyperinflation in 1985 in Bolivia (one of the most dramatic inflation cases in world politics) might not be evaluated independently of the international shocks of the 1980s (e.g., increasing interest rates, decreasing lending opportunities in the global markets, and falling prices of commodity markets, particularly tin prices) (Morales & Sachs, 1989).

The economic hardship encouraged authorities to embrace a free market economy, as mandated by international organizations paralleling the US's preferences (Souza, Filho, & Santos, 2020). To stabilize the economy, a series of structural changes were adopted between 1986 and 1998, including tax reform, fiscal autonomy, financial market liberalization, policies encouraging FDI inflows and exports, and the privatization of a substantial number of state firms.⁹⁵ Meanwhile, the privatization of the oil and gas industries has been completed. In 1996, President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada signed a contract with multinational oil and gas firms to privatize oil and gas wells in return for 50 percent of existing well profits and 18 percent of future well profits, which later became a salient economic issue for Bolivians and a crucial cleavage point between Morales' government and international corporations because 94 percent of oil and gas production was from the new wells.⁹⁶

Following a period of economic expansion and substantial FDI inflows, the country's economy stagnated and experienced a financial crisis, and then the government's decision to implement a high-income tax sparked popular unrest, paving the path for Morales'

⁹⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/13/bolivia-evo-morales--president-third-term>

⁹⁵ <https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/The-Case-of-Bolivia.pdf>

⁹⁶ <http://ain-bolivia.org/2007/11/bolivia%E2%80%99s-gas-nationalization-opportunity-and-cha-2/>

assumption of power in the 2005 elections.⁹⁷ Until then, the IMF and World Bank had rigorously examined the Bolivian economy. Further, the country's foreign affairs were executed in line with the US's objectives (even at the risk of crashing coca farmers by coca production quotas and limitations), and Bolivia had no problems with Western liberal democratic governments (Souza, Filho, and Santos, 2020).

Even before Morales took office in 2005, when he ran for the presidency against Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada in the 2002 election—which Morales narrowly lost in the runoffs—US President George W. Bush threatened to withhold US aid and eliminate trade privileges if Bolivians elected Morales. There were two reasons that Morales's candidacy contradicted US interests in the region. First, given Morales' career as a coca unionist and ex-coca grower, coca production was projected to increase under Morales' leadership, hurting US anti-drug operations while strengthening impoverished Bolivians who relied on coca farming. Second, the US was concerned that Morales would join the Cuban-Venezuela camp on the continent.⁹⁸

Soon after, during Morales's first years in office, reciprocal policy changes in trade, counter-narcotics, economic management, and ideological positioning revealed the divergences between Bolivia and the US. In 2006, the US shifted the source of soybeans, which Bolivia has a significant share of in US agricultural imports, from Bolivia to Colombia and Peru.⁹⁹ In the same year, President Bush also protested declining counter-narcotics cooperation efforts and increasing coca production by Bolivia (Seelke, 2008).¹⁰⁰ Finally, the US's concerns were heightened with an announcement by Morales on May 1st, 2006, about the nationalization of the oil and gas industry – owned mainly by multinational companies – after his travel from Havana, where he met with Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez.¹⁰¹

In the following years, the detachment in bilateral relations gained new momentum and bore implications for Bolivia's domestic political divisions. Morales' administration was

⁹⁷ <https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/The-Case-of-Bolivia.pdf>

⁹⁸ <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/bolivias-presidential-elections>

⁹⁹ <https://www.tni.org/es/node/14246>

¹⁰⁰

https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20081114_RL32580_7059640453053afa300978d0e6653c79794928ec.pdf

¹⁰¹ <https://www.tni.org/es/node/14246>

accusing the US government of implicitly supporting domestic opposition in Bolivia during the discussions of the new constitution. Drafted by the central government, the majoritarian tendencies of the new constitution were opposed by the eastern rich provinces (Beni, Chuquisaca, Pando, Santa Cruz, and Tarija) with a series of autonomy referenda and declarations of autonomy with demands for a bigger share of energy revenues and greater regional autonomy in 2008 (Bebbington & Bebbington, 2010). Upon Santa Cruz's mayor's order to occupy the governmental buildings, clashes between Morales's supporters and opponents turned violent. Morales held the US embassy responsible for plotting anti-government activities through cooperation with provincial governors.¹⁰² Indicating the governor-embassy meetings before the outbreak of the violence, Bolivia declared the US embassy persona non-grata (along with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) by accusing them of spying activities against the central government. In response, President Bush suggested suspending Bolivia's trade benefits in 2008, which were born from the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA), granting favored access to the US market in boosting legal sectors to reduce the dependence on coca income for the first time since the ATPA programs began in 1991.¹⁰³ The diplomatic relations were reformed with the return of the diplomats in both countries with an agreement against illegal drug trafficking in 2011 during the Obama administration.¹⁰⁴ Nonetheless, diplomatic relations were on a knife-edge for the coming years as Morales announced his decision to expel the USAID from the country in a rally in retaliation against US Secretary of State John Kerry's statement in 2013, calling Latin America "the backyard of the United States."¹⁰⁵

When we look at the amount of aid that Bolivia received under drug control and development programs, as well as trade privileges, various pathways might give both strong connections between the US and Bolivia as well as a high leverage position for the US against Bolivia. For example, USAID transferred \$4,4 million through the Office of Transition

¹⁰² <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11816035>

¹⁰³

https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20081114_RL32580_7059640453053afa300978d0e6653c79794928ec.pdf

¹⁰⁴ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-15632484>

¹⁰⁵ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22371275>

Initiatives to promote democracy in Bolivia.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, despite the loss of ATPA trade benefits, the overall trade volume between the two grew (Langer, 2019).




Figure 7.1: Bolivia's trade volume and trade with the US and LAC

Why did Bolivia so easily sever all political and diplomatic ties with the US, despite trade benefits, development assistance, counter-narcotics aid, and military assistance? Because primarily, the aid was provided selectively by the US authorities via USAID and the DEA. The \$4,4 million was not in favor of the central government or the underprivileged population but rather “to help departmental governments operate more strategically”¹⁰⁷ against the central government. The fund was believed to be sent to four eastern opposition departments (known as "La Media Luna"), and these four were inhabited by major agricultural owners

¹⁰⁶ <https://www.tni.org/es/node/10263>

¹⁰⁷ <https://www.tni.org/es/node/10263>

who were concerned about Morales' agrarian reforms. Second, the re-nationalization of minerals boosted the central government's oil revenues while further distancing the Bolivian government from the US by lessening Bolivian economic dependence (Gamarra, 2007). Third, although that trade volume had risen over time (Langer, 2019), the percentage of trade with the US in the overall trade volume of the nation was declining. Based on the COW trade data v.4 (Barbieri & Keshk, 2016), Figure 7.1 depicts the trade in millions of current US dollars with the US (total trade volume, imports, and exports). Accordingly, bilateral trade volume rose over time, but the percentage of trade in national trade volume declined from 25 percent (in 1990) to 10 percent (in 2008) and 14 percent (in 2014). Bolivian trade mainly was with other LAC. Exports to the US accounted for a sizable amount of bilateral trade in rich Bolivian minerals, notably tin (Langer, 2019). Last but not least, the anti-American stance was rampant across large sections of Bolivian society (Gamarra, 2007).

Trade and diplomatic relations with the EU

Political dialogue and interregional economic cooperation arrangements between Andean countries (e.g., Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia) and the EU members date back to 1993 (Grieger, 2019). After the left-wing Morales government took power in Bolivia, trade relations with the EU began to deteriorate because the left-wing governments in Bolivia and Ecuador wanted to include both Cuba and Venezuela in regional integration plans with the EU, which coincided with the deterioration of Bolivia's relations with the US (Grieger, 2019).

Later, due to the loss of trade income because of the US' suspension of preferential access to the US markets, Bolivia attempted to establish new trade links with the EU as an alternative to its labor-intensive export products (e.g., agriculture, zinc, tin, and borate) (Telleria & Ludena, 2015). During the early years of his presidency, Morales worked to create a reputation among the EU countries as a trustworthy economic partner, establishing new relationships, for example, with a French firm interested in the country's lithium reserves.¹⁰⁸ Yet, the formation of new trade channels failed because the deteriorating

¹⁰⁸ <https://www.france24.com/en/20090215-morales-seeks-strategic-partnerships-with-france-russia->

influence of political developments impacted commercial relations with the EU members. Figure 7.2 shows that despite a rise in absolute trade volume to a million US dollars between the EU countries and Bolivia, the overall share of this trade in Bolivia's entire trade volume dropped. In 1995, the proportion of total Bolivian exports to the EU countries was 22 percent. In 2010, the percentage dropped to 8 percent and 6 percent in 2014.




Figure 7.2: Bolivia's trade volume and trade with the EU

Additionally, like the 2008 diplomatic crisis with the US, another diplomatic and political crisis with the European countries erupted in 2013, creating intense discussions on respecting Bolivia's national security, exacerbating the divide among Western countries (the US, France, Portugal, Italy, and Spain), anti-establishment forces (Russia, Venezuela), and the

LAC (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Suriname).¹⁰⁹ In July 2013, on the way back home from a gas producers' meeting in Russia, Morales' flight was forced to land in Austria and searched by airport personnel,¹¹⁰ a day after Morales stated he could grant asylum to a whistleblower, Snowden.¹¹¹ The search for Snowden on board was inconclusive, and Bolivia accused France, Portugal, Italy, and Spain, as well as the US administration implicitly, of being offensive for no reason by blocking the airspace of Morales' jet. Morales' government summoned the four European ambassadors to explain their governments' assault regarding grounding Morales' flight.¹¹² In conclusion, ties with the European democracies worsened as relations with the US faltered.

International organizations

To conduct a meaningful comparison across the LAC, participation in the OAS and possible inclusion in the EU do not provide a distinctive feature, as utilized through the linkage score operationalization by Levitsky and Way (2010). Because every country in Latin America is a member of the OAS and none of the nations has the chance to join the EU, there will be no variance among the countries based on these criteria. Thus, I focus on the country's votes and stances in the UNGA resolutions that reflect a country's political positioning in an international organization because the voting trend of a country is a survey of nations' opinions on certain issues, especially when opinion convergences and divergences are systematically investigated (Marin-Bosch, 1987).

In a large-*N* analysis, the organizational links of countries are measured using the reversed coded absolute distance between the country's ideal points and the average ideal point of 28 countries (the EU and US) (Voeten, Strezhnev, & Bailey, 2009). The ideal points are estimated based on the UNGA vote (Bailey, Strezhnev, & Voeten, 2017). The same UNGA dataset yields a similarity index ranging from 0 to 1 based on Lijphart's indicator of agreement between the country dyads (Bailey et al., 2017). One means the agreement is

¹⁰⁹ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/bolivian-presidents-plane-forced-to-land-in-austria-in-hunt-for-snowden/2013/07/03/c281c2f4-e3eb-11e2-a11e-c2ea876a8f30_story.html

¹¹⁰ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-23201767>

¹¹¹ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/bolivian-presidents-plane-forced-to-land-in-austria-in-hunt-for-snowden/2013/07/03/c281c2f4-e3eb-11e2-a11e-c2ea876a8f30_story.html

¹¹² <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/bolivia-summons-europe-ambassadors-over-snowden-spat/233575>

strong between the countries, whereas a value of 0 means two countries would cast opposing votes in the UNGA.

Figure 7.3 depicts the yearly scores of the US-Bolivia, China-Bolivia, and Russia-Bolivia voting agreements in UNGA. The raw agreement scores are smoothed with the mean of the agreement variable to reduce noise in the raw data. The graph shows that after the mid-1970s, Bolivia's voting preferences became more aligned with those of Russia and China. While there was a modest fall in agreement scores between Bolivia—China and Bolivia—Russia votes in the early 2000s, this decrease was temporary in comparison to the steep decline in Bolivia—US agreement scores over the years.




Figure 7.3: UNGA voting similarity Bolivia v. the US, Russia, and China

Focusing on particular resolutions, vote alignments suggest a schism between the Western allies and anti-establishment countries. For example, on March 27, 2014, the Crimean

referendum (proclaiming the decision to secede from Ukraine) was declared invalid by the UNGA resolution (A/RES/68/262), with votes from 100 states among 193 members. Eighty-two member states were absent/did not vote, while 11 nations, including Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela,¹¹³ and five other partners called the “dirty dozen,”¹¹⁴ declined the UNGA resolution condemning Russia’s policies against Ukraine. BRICS (Brazil, India, China, and South Africa) refrained from voting to avoid confrontations between Russia and the West.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, Bolivia, together with Russia, rejected the US-supported resolutions that aimed to condemn the use of chemical weapons in Syria multiple times in April, October 2017, and April 2018.¹¹⁶

According to Marin-Bosch (1987), the statements, discussions, and voting behavior at the UNGA are quite similar to legislative debates, except that the members are the states. Consequently, besides voting, the UNGA leader’s remarks may be used to assess the strength of a country’s ties with Western democracies. More recently, systematic dataset collections have outlined that it is possible to use the UN General Debate speeches as data representing state preferences on multiple issues (Baturu, Dasani, & Mikhaylov, 2017; Kertikelenis & Voeten, 2021).

According to the UN Speech data by Kertikelenis and Voeten (2021), during the Morales administration from 2006 until 2018, the statements indicate that Morales’ speech was overly critical, targeting the liberal international economic order, while there is no mention of the international criminal court or human rights systems. Specifically, he challenges the IMF and World Bank in his speeches, while investment arbitration and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are not in focus. However, the criticism of the leader is not as extreme as conveying the intention to exit from these institutions.

From the beginning of Evo Morales Ayma’s presidency through the end of his tenure, his UNGA comments focused mostly on economic and political activities of the US. On September 23, 2009, Morales pointed to capitalism as the source of inequities in the

¹¹³ <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/767565?ln=en>

¹¹⁴ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-un-idUSBREA2Q1GA20140327>

¹¹⁵ <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/03/the-worlds-post-crimea-power-blocs-mapped/359835/>

¹¹⁶ <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/03/russia-playing-geopolitical-game-in-latin-america-pub-76228>

distribution of goods and attacked the US for endangering social peace, democracy, and integration in countries where the US maintains a military post. He proposed lifting the blockade of Cuba and defended the medical benefits of coca leaves, implying that coca eradication is not a viable option for the illegal coca industry.¹¹⁷ In the following year, Morales reiterated his calls for the lifting of the blockade against Cuba, emphasized the significance of Bolivia's efforts to eliminate coca production, and criticized the US' destructive capitalist influence on other countries (September 23, 2010, 65th session).¹¹⁸ The major focus of the president's address at the 66th session of the UNGA general discussion in 2011 and the 67th session in 2012 was the US's bad influences on the sovereignty of states.¹¹⁹ From 2014 to 2018, he resumed his anti-capitalist and anti-US stances by referring to the crises in Iraq, Libya, and Syria, as well as the right of a sovereign country to have diplomatic ties with Cuba, Venezuela, and Iran,¹²⁰ and demanded the removal of blockages against Cuba and criticized the US for its adverse impacts on world peace.¹²¹

Human flow between Bolivia and the EU and US and communication ties

I concentrate on the migration flow from Bolivia to the Western democracies, as well as telephone connection and internet server data for social and communication linkages. According to the International Organization for Migration, as of 2010, 48.9 percent of Bolivian emigrants went to Argentina; Spain was the second most popular destination for 31.5 percent of the total emigrated population; and the US followed these countries by hosting 14 percent of the 706,508 emigrant Bolivians (IOM, 2011, p. 36). According to the World Bank, the total number of Bolivians who have emigrated is 6.8 percent of the entire population. Increasing rates of migration continue, and the government statistics provide higher numbers, implying that 20 percent of Bolivians live abroad.¹²² Between 2000 and

¹¹⁷ <https://gadebate.un.org/en/64/bolivia-plurinational-state>

¹¹⁸ <https://gadebate.un.org/en/65/bolivia-plurinational-state>

¹¹⁹ <https://gadebate.un.org/en/66/bolivia-plurinational-state>; <https://gadebate.un.org/en/67/bolivia-plurinational-state>

¹²⁰ <https://gadebate.un.org/en/69/bolivia-plurinational-state>; <https://gadebate.un.org/en/70/bolivia-plurinational-state>

¹²¹ <https://gadebate.un.org/en/73/bolivia-plurinational-state>

¹²² https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/americas/bolivian-migrants-ride-out-hard-times/2011/11/03/gIQAxXmNXN_story.html

2010, there was a dramatic increase in emigration; after 2010, the pace slowed down, but the growth continued; and, when compared to immigration, emigration figures are higher (IOM, 2011, p. 59).

Barring the number of individuals that emigrated to the Western democracies, the amount of indirect economic reliance established through remittances may also indicate the strength of the inter-country ties. In Bolivia, migrant remittances surged after 2006. In 2004, remittances totaled 178 million US dollars, grew significantly in 2006 to 570 million US dollars, and hovered around 1 billion US dollars between 2007 and 2010 (OIM, 2011, p. 49). The source of remittances was primarily Spain, accounting for over 51 percent of the total remittances, with the US and Argentina exchanging second place over the years.¹²³

In comparison to other LACs, Bolivia has one of the lowest emigration rates, with just under one million people leaving the country. Furthermore, with just under 100,000 people, Bolivian immigrants to the US do not constitute a significant proportion of American immigrants; thus, it is difficult to expect that human flow between the US and Bolivia will be effective in fostering close relations between the two countries. Spain, as a member of the EU, is a popular destination for roughly 250,000 Bolivians (as of 2014), most of whom are permanent residents.¹²⁴ However, bilateral relations between Bolivia and Spain were not separate from the Bolivia–EU relations. The Snowden scandal in 2013 had a severe impact on bilateral ties. Morales’ attempt to nationalize a Spanish electric business that controlled 3/4 of Bolivia’s electricity infrastructure in 2012¹²⁵ also strained relations between the two countries.

Between 2011 and 2015, the primary connections to the outside world in Bolivia were via television (82.7 percent), radio (47.8 percent), and internet access (14.9 percent) (Tomczyk et al., 2019). According to the 2012 Bolivian census, 23.3 percent of Bolivian homes owned a computer, 71.5 percent held a phone (mobile or landline), but just 9.45 percent owned an internet connection (Vargas, 2014). As of 2015, 58 percent of the population did not own a computer, while mobile phones accounted for around 87 percent of

¹²³ <https://boliviainmotion.wordpress.com/bolivians-in-virginia/>

¹²⁴ <https://boliviainmotion.wordpress.com/bolivians-in-virginia/>

¹²⁵ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-17922069>

all the connections. Bolivia ranked fifth among the LAC in terms of internet penetration rate, with a rate below 20 percent and second last in terms of internet speed, slightly ahead of Cuba (Vargas, 2014).

Access to the internet in a landlocked country becomes increasingly expensive as one moves further away from the ocean. Bolivia, besides ranking lower among the LAC and having a significant geographical distance from the coast, also has a rural-urban divide in terms of access to these technologies; whereas internet penetration in urban regions was 20 percent in 2015, it was 4.2 percent in rural areas (Tomczyk et al., 2019).

Although telecommunication access was acknowledged as a universal fundamental right in the 2009 constitution (Arratia, 2009) and subsequent government support for information technologies in schools and education (Tomczyk et al., 2019), the overlapping cleavages along ethnicity, residence, and socio-economic status were difficult to overcome with technological support for teachers and students. By the end of Morales' presidency, the social revolution aimed at elevating Indigenous people and connecting them to the rest of the world had failed.

Political and economic relations with Russia and China

Close ties (diplomatic, economic, international, and social) with anti-establishment powers can also provide leverage for a nation against international norms that Western democracies dominate and can influence a state's behavior in declaring an emergency and reporting performance. The first actor that can be a leverage power besides the US (and even against the US) in the Latin American region is Russia. While Russia's interest in the region dates back to the Cold War, there has been a decline in the 1990s, and the country has resumed its political, military, and economic activities in the sub-continent since 2000, primarily with Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba (Dall'Agnol, Zabolotsky, & Mielniczuk, 2019).

Energy investments and arms sales are two prominent domains of Russian policy in the Latin American region. Almost every LAC has a Russian helicopter, and 409 MI-17 transport helicopters account for 42 percent of the region's helicopters (Blank and Kim, 2015). Yet, the scope of Russia's influence over the continent is not at the level curtailing the

US influence, as the sub-continent only accounts for 4.6 percent of Russian arms exports (Dall'Agnol et al., 2019).

Morales' anti-US statements and critiques against US hegemony over world peace made Bolivia another candidate for the Russian domain of influence.¹²⁶ In February 2009, after the diplomatic crisis between Washington and La Paz and the expelling of the US Ambassador and DEA agents, a series of energy deals, defense cooperation treaties, and military-technical cooperation were signed between La Paz and Moscow.¹²⁷ At the 2009 meeting between Morales and Medvedev, Bolivia purchased 20 Mi-17 military helicopters, 2 of which were delivered in 2 months.¹²⁸ These helicopters were to be used for the anti-drug operations, which were previously controlled by US DEA agents in an effort to convey a message that Bolivia could handle the drug problem without Washington's help (Sanchez, 2010). In the military equipment purchases by Bolivia from Russia, China provided aid to buy the helicopters.¹²⁹

In the 2009 meeting, the Russian oil and gas industry, particularly Gazprom, was also mentioned as a key to developing bilateral relations by helping the extraction of the newly nationalized natural gas and oil reserves of Bolivia (Sanchez, 2010, 373-374). Russian Gazprom's activities in two hydrocarbon reserves in Bolivia and nuclear corporation Rosatom's involvement in a joint nuclear research and technology center in El Alto are examples of collaborative energy projects.¹³⁰ The position of the government was strengthened after the 2009 referendum, which meant the government had stronger domestic support in developing bilateral relations in an anti-American manner. Not only with Russian Gazprom, but the Bolivian state also owns the company YPFB, which produces oil and gas. To reduce its dependence on international monopolies of oil and gas companies, the Bolivian government also formed partnerships with state-run companies, like Venezuela's PDVSDA (Petroleum of Venezuela Company) and China's Shengli company (Kohl, 2010).

¹²⁶ <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/03/russia-playing-geopolitical-game-in-latin-america-pub-76228>

¹²⁷ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7894176.stm>

¹²⁸ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7894176.stm>

¹²⁹ <https://warsawinstitute.org/morales-visit-moscow-bolivia-drifts-closer-russia/>

¹³⁰ <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/03/russia-playing-geopolitical-game-in-latin-america-pub-76228>

Another mechanism to form bilateral relations is by providing aid and credit to each other. Yet, Russia's activity in providing aid and credit is limited, and the earliest example was in 1993 to Cuba.¹³¹ However, the loans and contracts between Bolivia and China provide evidence that Bolivia has strong economic associations with China. According to the Chinese bilateral aid data, China provided a significant amount of aid to 24 LAC, exceeding 1 billion US dollars in 2008 (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange, & Tierney, 2017).

Moreover, China's trade share is higher than the Russian share in Bolivian trade relations. As shown in Figure 7.4, after 2000, there was a steady increase in the total trade volume, from 75.3 million US dollars in 2000 to 2.25 billion US dollars in 2014. Exports to China mainly comprise raw materials (minerals, hydrocarbons, wood, and soybeans).¹³² In return, imports from China have drastically increased with value-added products (electronics and cars), widening the bilateral trade deficit between the two.¹³³ While the total trade between China and LAC increased by over 200 percent (from 2006 to 2016),¹³⁴ Chinese investors and the developing Bolivian market continued to allure the Chinese investors and traders such that bilateral trade increased by over 3,000 percent (from 2000 to 2014).¹³⁵

¹³¹ <https://theglobalamericans.org/2022/01/russia-return-latin-america/>

¹³² <https://www.chinaenamericalatina.info/financial-sovereignty-or-a-new-dependency-how-china-is-remaking-bolivia/>

¹³³ <https://www.chinaenamericalatina.info/financial-sovereignty-or-a-new-dependency-how-china-is-remaking-bolivia/>

¹³⁴ <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/03/russia-playing-geopolitical-game-in-latin-america-pub-76228>

¹³⁵ <https://www.coha.org/chinese-fdi-in-bolivia-help-or-hindrance-to-national-development/>




Figure 7.4: Bolivia's trade with Russia, China (export and import), and Venezuela

In line with the development plans of the Bolivian state, Chinese banks became the primary financiers of the infrastructure investments of the state in the early 2000s.¹³⁶ In exchange, the Bolivian government awarded Chinese contractors the construction of state infrastructure, creating a loophole in which Chinese companies were paid in exchange for Bolivian state contracts (refineries, processing facilities, plants for energy¹³⁷ and raw materials¹³⁸) while Bolivia was paying its debt to China.

Along with Russia and China, Venezuela and Iran were other smaller partners, transferring millions of US dollars. For example, Venezuela's presidential program transferred 200 million US dollars in two years for military training, personnel, and

¹³⁶ <https://www.chinaenamericalatina.info/financial-sovereignty-or-a-new-dependency-how-china-is-remaking-bolivia/>

¹³⁷ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-china-loans-idUSKCN0SD2A420151019>

¹³⁸ <https://www.coha.org/chinese-fdi-in-bolivia-help-or-hindrance-to-national-development/>

equipment to Bolivia (Farah, 2009). Moreover, Iran promised 1.1 billion US dollars worth of aid and investment in mining, industry, and infrastructure. However, these two countries lack several institutional checking mechanisms on government spending and transparency, making it extremely difficult to estimate the exact amount transferred to Bolivia and where it was spent (Farah, 2009).

7.4.3 High court independence and reporting performance

The derogation reporting during the SOEs is directly associated with the high court independence, and the SOE declaration is for delaying the democratic control mechanisms (Hafner-Burton et al., 2011). The more independent the high court, the more states declare an emergency and then take preventive measures rather than simply curbing human rights and suppressing dissent. High court independence is assumed to be related to a willingness to comply with international law. Thus, I argue that the derogation reporting mechanism applies to the SOE declarations. I also take legislative control into account, which is another horizontal control mechanism over the executive in democracies. Together with the high court's independence, legislative control is the main indicator of stable democracies.

The democracy score and classification of Bolivia (as an electoral democracy) and legislative constraints over the executive index do not show a meaningful change within the analysis period (and above and below 2006-2014). Yet, examining Bolivia's high court independence scores in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2020) provides turning points in the country's political history and constitutional reforms.¹³⁹ Starting in 1983, one year after the dissolution of the military junta in 1982, judicial independence improved in the country, which was extremely low during the military government. Yet, the positive indicator of judicial control turned negative in 2004. In 2003, the political and social instability triggered by the new tax impositions and popular protests demanding the nationalization of the oil and gas reserves resulted in clashes between security forces and civilians, leading to 58 civilian deaths and over 400 injured.¹⁴⁰ At the end of these events, President Sanchez de Lozada

¹³⁹ <https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Bolivia1.html#constitutional-reform-of-2004>

¹⁴⁰ <https://reliefweb.int/report/bolivia/bolivia-crisis-and-justice-days-violence-feb-and-oct-2003>;
<https://www.equaltimes.org/bolivia-s-gas-war-ten-years-on#.YcMbtGhBxPY>;
<https://www.equaltimes.org/bolivia-s-gas-war-ten-years-on#.YcMdZmhBxPZ>

resigned from his post. The Bolivian constitution of 1967, after the national revolution in 1952, was reformed and amended in 1994, 1995, 2002, 2004, and 2005.¹⁴¹ One of these amendments is the 2004 constitutional amendment, which was the first to address the Indigenous populations, despite the fact that they comprised a large segment of the population, just like the other groups and political parties.¹⁴² Yet, these modifications to cure social cleavages (which will be detailed further in the following subsection) and the limitation of the political parties' influence over the high courts do not improve the high court's independence in its practice. Contrarily, the reforms bred an administrative crisis.¹⁴³

At the beginning of 2004, a military court investigating security forces' shootings of 2003

decided that the four involved army officials were innocent of killing civilians during the anti-government protests of February 2003. The Constitutional Tribunal intervened in ongoing public discussions by taking over the trial and ruling that since the issue is related to human rights, the soldiers should face prosecution in civilian courts.¹⁴⁴ The Tribunal further sought a trial of the President of that term.¹⁴⁵ Following that suit, the military put the high court and president under pressure by threatening not to act in the event of a security threat and to remain in barracks unless there is an exclusive national threat or presidential order. Finally, the interim government of Mesa dropped all charges against the military (Pion-Berlin, 2010). The intense judicial reforms in the 1990s generated friction between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal in the 2004 decisions. The Supreme Court accused the Tribunal of interfering in the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, and as the highest court in the legal hierarchy, the Supreme Court argued that the Tribunal was pressuring the judges with multiple cases.¹⁴⁶

In 2006, Morales, a member of the Indigenous community, was sworn in with the promise of empowering the Indigenous population and nationalizing the country's energy sector. In the new term, political intervention in the judicial authority continued. Starting

¹⁴¹ <https://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Bolivia/bolivia.html>

¹⁴² https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Bolivia1.html#_edn18

¹⁴³ <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/48a57efd0.pdf>

¹⁴⁴ <https://ain-bolivia.org/2004/05/bolivian-constitutional-court-rules-that-soldiers-m/>

¹⁴⁵ <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/48a57efd0.pdf>

¹⁴⁶ <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/48a57efd0.pdf>

from 2007, the opposition-dominated provinces (Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Tarija, and Chuquisaca) disapproved of the new constitution draft because of the regulations on energy tax and the constitution's approach to the Indigenous question. These provinces issued referenda for provincial autonomy, but the central government rejected the referenda by calling them unlawful. The efforts to form a dialogue between the parties fell void. The challenged executive called for a recall referendum to refresh the public trust. In August 2008, nine days after Morales' 67 percent recall election victory, governors of five eastern departments began a strike and widespread protests for a larger share of energy revenues and regional autonomy, fearing Morales would consolidate power to the detriment of hydrocarbon-rich provinces.¹⁴⁷ The Governor's offices refused to admit the representatives of the central government and ordered the occupation of the government offices. The central government constantly called on the public to embrace democracy and labeled the strike as a civic coup. The Peasant Farmers Federation (Indigenous dominated) called for a meeting in the middle of events to evaluate the situation and defend their rights. However, opposition members of the Office of the Pando Governor drove the peasants away with heavy guns, and the clashes on September 11, 2008, left 11 dead and 50 injured, along with the kidnapping and threat allegations against the Governor's Office.¹⁴⁸ According to the UN, human rights watch, numerous Indigenous people were reported injured or killed in these incidents.¹⁴⁹

Based on the events in Pando, a State of Siege was declared on September 11 and revoked on November 24, 2008.¹⁵⁰ Multiple human rights violations were reported during the time of emergency, including nighttime house raids and warrantless searches, widespread ill-treatment of residents, and exile of detainees into a military facility without a court order, with none of the 25 to 38 (estimated) detainees brought before a judge.¹⁵¹ However, the reporting of these violations was incomplete when I checked the Bolivia country reports submitted to the Human Rights Committee in compliance with the ICCPR. There is no

¹⁴⁷ <https://www.france24.com/en/20080819-bolivia-protests-turn-violent-bolivia-protests>

¹⁴⁸ http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2009eng/Chap.V.1.htm#_ftn30

¹⁴⁹ <https://news.un.org/en/story/2008/09/273392-un-expert-deplores-anti-indigenous-violence-bolivia>

¹⁵⁰ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7764001.stm>

¹⁵¹ http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2009eng/Chap.V.1.htm#_ftn30

information on any of the derogations in the State of Emergency Mapping Project data (Zwitter et al., 2016) that Bolivia submitted in March 2010.




Figure 7.5: Bolivia timeline

The 2008 State of Siege is the only emergency declaration that is within the analysis period 2006-2014, but even if there were extremely limited numbers of emergency declarations, Wright argues that between 2000 and 2010, there were at least ten administrative forms of emergency declarations (2015, pp. 109-111). The government employed the emergency powers for direct purchases and contract processes to reduce the bureaucracy but did not declare a constitutional “state of siege” because the wording has a negative undertone among the Bolivians because its highly associated with the military regime and widespread human rights violations (Wright, 2015, pp. 111-114).

To remove the negative connotation of “state of siege,” the wording was changed to “state of exception” in the 2009 constitution. Yet, in the post-2009 period, judicial independence further decreased, almost to the level of the military government of pre-1983 Bolivia. On February 7, 2009, the 19th constitutional text of Bolivia entered into force following a referendum; 61 percent of voters approved the text.¹⁵² The transition from the Constitutional Court (1999—2011) to the new constitution was completed without a hurdle.

¹⁵² https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Bolivia1.html#_edn18

Between 2007 (when the government threatened to issue a file against the members of the Court with accusations of misconduct) and 2009, all five members of the Constitutional Court resigned because of the political aspects of this threat and the constant systematic harassment that could impede the independence of the court's decision. Until the end of 2010, the newly founded Plurinational Constitutional Court members (comprising the governmental control mechanisms over the executive) were not elected.¹⁵³

The judicial branch of the government was structured according to the constitution, but the new system threatened the job security of judges (those who had tenure and were appointed before 2009). The system jeopardized judicial independence.¹⁵⁴ In 2010, the Bolivian Congress gave President Morales the authority to appoint interim judges at the highest posts of the judiciary¹⁵⁵ and retrospectively changed the tenure status of judges to temporary duties.¹⁵⁶ After 2010, the system became an instrument for the executive to wield a sword over the judiciary by arbitrarily dismissing judges for political reasons. The independence of the Supreme Court was in danger. In 2018, only 13 percent of the Bolivian judges had tenure or permanent status.¹⁵⁷ After the 2009 elections, under the new constitution, Morales was politically empowered by winning the elections with a landslide victory and obtained the majority of seats in both parliaments (Chamber of Deputies and Senate).¹⁵⁸

In the 2014 elections, the controversy was over Morales' eligibility for re-election since the new 2009 constitution allowed the president to serve only two terms. In 2013, there was a controversial ruling that the third term of Morales should be considered his second term because the first three years (the first term between 2006 and 2009) were under the old constitution. The Supreme Court of Bolivia resolved the issue in favor of Morales.¹⁵⁹ In 2016, Morales tried to amend the rule of the presidential term in the constitution, but people voted

¹⁵³ http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2009eng/Chap.V.1.htm#_ftn30

¹⁵⁴ <https://reliefweb.int/report/bolivia-plurinational-state/visit-plurinational-state-bolivia-report-special-rapporteur-independence-judges-and-lawyers-diego-garcia-sayan-ahrc5036add1>

¹⁵⁵ <https://www.reuters.com/article/bolivia-judges-idUKN1316975720100213>

¹⁵⁶ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/25/will-luis-arce-rebuild-bolivias-broken-judiciary>

¹⁵⁷ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/29/bolivia-dozens-judges-arbitrarily-dismissed>

¹⁵⁸ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/07/morales-presidential-victory>

¹⁵⁹ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22605030>

“no” for the amendment proposal in the referendum.¹⁶⁰ Then, Morales applied to the Constitutional Court and Supreme Electoral Court for his right to be re-elected for the fourth time.¹⁶¹ The Constitutional Court, whose seats were held by Morales supporters, decided to let Morales run for a fourth time under human rights considerations, even if the referendum was against the extension of his term.¹⁶²

7.4.4 Civil-military relations and the DCA formations of Bolivia

In the 1960s, the military turned its attention toward domestic politics in fear of leftist revolutionist groups, and during the following two decades, the country experienced multiple military coups.¹⁶³ In the September 2003 protests, the so-called “Gas War” resulted in 58 deaths and 400 injured, where army/police clashed with people (Lehoucq, 2008). Although the army cooperated with the government during the initial protests, President Sanchez de Lozada intended to intensify the crackdown and offered bribes to the military, but the military refused to do so.¹⁶⁴ Then, Sanchez de Lozada had no choice left other than to quit.

The military followed government orders in suppressing popular uprisings during the 2003 and 2005 strikes and widespread protests, which can be interpreted as a division between the bourgeois white state and poor Indigenous society. The military assisted the government in maintaining domestic political order. In return, in 2004, the military was provided political immunity for their actions. President Mesa swept the human rights trial under the carpet (Pion-Berlin, 2010) to prevent the army’s attempt against the civil government. One hypothetical account argues that the military follows government orders because of the risk of being subject to trial with charges of treason and human rights violations in the event of non-compliance (Pion-Berlin & Trinkunas, 2010). Therefore, the government’s provision of immunity for the military assures the military’s compliance. However, in both cases of civil-military interaction in 2003 and 2004, under different

¹⁶⁰ <https://www.npr.org/2019/10/14/767967304/how-bolivias-evo-morales-could-win-a-4th-term-as-president>

¹⁶¹ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-politics/bolivian-court-clears-way-for-morales-to-run-for-fourth-term-idUSKBN1DS2ZX>

¹⁶² <https://www.npr.org/2019/10/14/767967304/how-bolivias-evo-morales-could-win-a-4th-term-as-pre>

¹⁶³ <https://www.coha.org/bolivia%E2%80%99s-military%E2%80%99s-a-difficult-life-but-no-sign-of-a-military-coup-yet/>

¹⁶⁴ <https://www.coha.org/bolivia%E2%80%99s-military%E2%80%99s-a-difficult-life-but-no-sign-of-a-military-coup-yet/>

presidents, the army was able to resist the civil governments by refusing to take any action. During Morales' administration, the military was also granted immunity¹⁶⁵, but this did not guarantee Morales' stay in power. Contrarily, the military fired a projectile at the president's plane, which was on his escape to Mexico.¹⁶⁶ Therefore, a third opinion that is presented by the events in Latin America supports the idea that the military is gaining power in comparison to civil politics in recent years.¹⁶⁷

Under Morales' term from 2006 to 2019, the military remained loyal to the civil government. In 14 years, the Morales administration proceeded with multiple measures to control the military and ensure its loyalty (i) by integrating the military's role in social and economic development; (ii) through selective promotions and rotations in the high-ranking personnel; (iii) creating parallel units to weaken the monopoly of the military over violence and keeping order; and (iv) increasing military spending by providing new equipment and higher salaries (Rittinger & Cleary, 2013). The measures Morales took to control the military were interpreted as the threat of a coup that was not eliminated on the continent, especially in the left-wing administrations of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador (Rittinger & Cleary, 2013). These strategies of control to establish absolute civil authority function differently when the military has a strong political background and takes decisions when required. Therefore, the main point of the government strategies listed above is not controlling the military but keeping the military happy such that the military can act in the name of the government when they are needed, especially against popular uprisings.¹⁶⁸ Governments were already aware that the sustenance of the civil authority in Bolivia was only possible if there was military support (Diamint, 2015). As it is observed toward the end of Morales' incumbency and his departure from the country after the military refused to act against the public and remained in barracks (Pion-Berlin & Acacio, 2020). Resultantly, the Morales administration serves as an example of how civil-military relations are not always based on

¹⁶⁵ <https://www.laizquierdadiario.com/Evo-Morales-fortalece-relaciones-con-el-ejercito>

¹⁶⁶ https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/m%C3%A9xico-bolivia_militares-bolivianos-casi-derriban-el-avi%C3%B3n-de-evo-morales--dice-l--obrador/46914354

¹⁶⁷ <https://www.wola.org/es/analisis/como-esta-afectando-el-control-civil-de-los-militares-la-agitacion-politica-de-america-latina/>

¹⁶⁸ <https://www.wola.org/es/analisis/como-esta-afectando-el-control-civil-de-los-militares-la-agitacion-politica-de-america-latina/>

complete control, whether democratically (modernization) or autocratically (coup prevention). As long as the military maintains its power, either outcome is possible, or the results are not always in the civil authority's favor.

After Morales' election campaign was based on the nationalization of natural resources, he ordered the military to occupy oil and gas fields.¹⁶⁹ The military complied with the government's order. This action increased the popularity of the military and trust among the Bolivians in May 2006.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, in the 2008 events, the army was loyal to the Morales government even if the military officials did not take political action on one side of these clashes. The military guarded eastern establishments of the government in occupations (Lehoucq, 2008). After declaring the SOE, the army was sent to remove right-wing groups' occupation of Cobija airport.¹⁷¹ The military also followed Morales' order to guard the gas pipeline that fed Brazil and Argentina and was controlled by the right-wing autonomy supporters.¹⁷² The nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry, the suppression of the autonomy movements, and Morales' positioning of himself and his party as nationalist, anti-imperialist, and socialist resonated very strongly in the military cadres (Kohl, 2010; Rittinger & Cleary, 2013). This resonance was combined with Morales' strategic actions to include the military as an actor in the new nationalist economic development. President Morales revived an old corporation, the Armed Forces' Corporation for National Development, established in 1972 for social and economic development and the provision of public services in drilling wells, mining activities, and mechanical support for heavy machines (Mani, 2011). Considering the role of the Bolivian military in the heart of social development in history (Mani, 2011), the military revived its financial and economic importance in domestic politics under Morales' government.

Upon his election, Morales ousted 28 high-ranking generals by skipping their promotions (Rittinger & Cleary, 2013). The justification for the selective promotions was a mixture of causes related to treason and human rights violations. These high-ranking officials

¹⁶⁹ <https://www.cfr.org/background/bolivias-nationalization-oil-and-gas>

¹⁷⁰ <https://www.coha.org/la-politica-de-defensa-en-bolivia-y-el-rol-de-las-fuerzas-armadas-balance-de-gestion-2006-2014/>

¹⁷¹ <https://www.tni.org/es/node/10263>

¹⁷² <https://www.tni.org/es/node/10263>

were mostly composed of Morales' opposition and pro-business elements; they were accused of dismantling the Chinese air defense systems that the country had because of a US request¹⁷³, and they were believed to be the ones ordering the violence in the street protests (Pion-Berlin & Trinkunas, 2010). It was the largest purge in the history of Bolivia since 1952.¹⁷⁴ The ethnic composition of the personnel was also redesigned as the military admitted Indigenous people into the high ranks (Kohl, 2010).

Adopting a model used in Venezuela, the military started a program in 2010 by training civilians to defend the country, which could be a target of the US because of its extensive national natural resources.¹⁷⁵ Even though the training was provided by the military, Venezuela trained the militia for protection from the military itself, yet in Bolivia, the military does not have any reservations about training the civilians. This was also because of the purge of high military officials (ones mostly opposing the Venezuelan effect in the military) (Farah, 2009). This new program was objected to by the opposition if the military was exclusively aimed at training the Morales/MAS supporters.¹⁷⁶ The duties that were given to the foreign military units in Bolivia, either for training or consultation purposes, further strengthened relations with the Venezuelan government (Rittinger & Cleary, 2013). Yet, these close interactions and the presence of the Venezuelan military sparked a critique of Bolivian opposition groups as actions that threaten the sovereignty of Bolivia.¹⁷⁷ Even though Morales' policies of selective appointments, training militia, and imposing foreign military units were examples of coup-proofing activities in the literature, there is no empirical evidence that the military's submission to the civilian government increased under Morales.

The economic expansion of the country because of a price increase in natural resources and raw materials was reflected in Bolivian military spending. After a landslide election victory, Morales faced challenges in consolidating his political power. For example,

¹⁷³ <https://www.coha.org/bolivia%E2%80%99s-military%E2%80%99s-a-difficult-life-but-no-sign-of-a-military-coup-yet/>

¹⁷⁴ <https://www.coha.org/la-politica-de-defensa-en-bolivia-y-el-rol-de-las-fuerzas-armadas-balance-de-gestion-2006-2014/>

¹⁷⁵ <https://www.reuters.com/article/bolivia-militias-idAFN0616063820100806>

¹⁷⁶ <https://www.reuters.com/article/bolivia-militias-idAFN0616063820100806>

¹⁷⁷ <https://www.coha.org/bolivia%E2%80%99s-military%E2%80%99s-a-difficult-life-but-no-sign-of-a-military-coup-yet/>

police and army officials were protesting for an improvement in salaries.¹⁷⁸ The improvement of military salaries was undertaken with an annual increase of between 7 and 10 percent, while national inflation remained at 4.3 percent on average (between 2009 and 2014).¹⁷⁹ Besides the military salary raise, the government has been using military power instead of police when police officers were on strike in demand for equal salaries with the military ranks.¹⁸⁰ As Morales's administration made

investments in the armed forces as "never seen in the institution's history" (Rittinger & Cleary, 2013, p. 412). Figure 7.5 illustrates the military expenditure in constant (2020) US dollars and the spending's percentage share of the country's GDP according to the SIPRI dataset (n.d.). According to the figure, military expenditures increased after 2007 while the share of this spending in the GDP decreased overall. This graph indicates that the economic expansion of the country, coupled with rising mineral prices, absorbed the effect of increased military spending. Moreover, another source of military income was the military hardware (Kohl, 2010) that was provided by multiple global and regional powers with the development of new relations taking advantage of the multi-polar world order (Garzon, 2015).

¹⁷⁸ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22371275>

¹⁷⁹ <https://www.coha.org/la-politica-de-defensa-en-bolivia-y-el-rol-de-las-fuerzas-armadas-balance-de-gestion-2006-2014/>

¹⁸⁰ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-18567732>




Figure 7.6: Bolivia's military spending in US dollars and spending share in GDP

Starting in November 2006, Morales tried to formulate options and opportunities for military training in the region. The initial talks on forming defense cooperation were conducted with Argentina, but efforts did not come to a conclusion after the parties expressed their goodwill.¹⁸¹ In the same year, Bolivia signed new defense cooperation with Venezuela, but this agreement (which contained Venezuelan military aid and foreign deployments of Venezuela on Bolivian soil) was asymmetric (Kinne, 2020). For example, Venezuela provided two helicopters, one that crashed later, and a jet for the President of Bolivia (Farah, 2009).

¹⁸¹ <https://www.coha.org/bolivia%E2%80%99s-military%E2%80%99s-a-difficult-life-but-no-sign-of-a-military-coup-yet/>

In 2007, another DCA was signed with Brazil that included the purchase of trainer aircraft, Universal-1, from Brazil.¹⁸² Along with the defense agreements that might include collaboration on training, joint military exercises, military industry cooperation, and research and development activities, Bolivia invested in military aircraft by purchasing transportation planes.¹⁸³

Bolivia signed a new defense agreement with Venezuela in May 2008, strengthening their cooperation with a more symmetrical term that cannot be interpreted as Venezuelan superiority as in the 2006 agreement (Kinne, 2020). Moreover, very surprisingly, Bolivia signed another agreement in June 2008, going back to a deal in December 2007 with Chile. These two countries have a long history of territorial disputes and have not had any diplomatic representation since 1978.¹⁸⁴ This appears salient because, especially after the US-Colombia agreement on military assistance in 2009¹⁸⁵, the regional insecurities of Bolivia and Venezuela against the US were inflamed with a fear of the US invasion of LAC.¹⁸⁶

Russian influence over the sub-continent has increased since 2008 through arms sales, trade, and counter-narcotics deals.¹⁸⁷ Furthermore, Bolivia, as one of the Russian partners in the region, is a fertile market for Russian weaponry. US and EU sanctions and developed aversion toward the US because of migration and trade issues forced countries worldwide toward Russia. In February 2009, the first DCA with Russia was signed that contained asymmetrical obligations, such as 100 million US dollars in renewable loans for military equipment (e.g., MI-17 helicopters),¹⁸⁸ and only about arms trade rather than policy coordination on defense policies (Kinne, 2020). The Russian–Bolivian Technical–Military

¹⁸² <https://www.coha.org/bolivia%E2%80%99s-militaryit%E2%80%99s-a-difficult-life-but-no-sign-of-a-military-coup-yet/>

¹⁸³ <https://www.coha.org/bolivia%E2%80%99s-militaryit%E2%80%99s-a-difficult-life-but-no-sign-of-a-military-coup-yet/>

¹⁸⁴ <https://www.coha.org/bolivia%E2%80%99s-militaryit%E2%80%99s-a-difficult-life-but-no-sign-of-a-military-coup-yet/>

¹⁸⁵ <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/131134.htm>

¹⁸⁶ <https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/bolivia-tambien-se-prepara-para-la-guerra-asimetrica-la-nueva-formulacion-estrategica-boliviana-y-sus-paralelismos-con-venezuela-ari/>

¹⁸⁷ <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/03/russia-playing-geopolitical-game-in-latin-america-pub-76228>

¹⁸⁸ <https://www.coha.org/la-politica-de-defensa-en-bolivia-y-el-rol-de-las-fuerzas-armadas-balance-de-gestion-2006-2014/>

Cooperation Commission was established, which was announced as the “largest investment in the armed forces” of Bolivia in the last two decades (Rittinger & Cleary, 2013, p. 412).

After 2011, the partnership in defense policies with Russia was strengthened, and in September 2016, another DCA was signed.¹⁸⁹ In August 2017, another agreement was reached between Bolivia and Russia on the transition of aircraft, combat vehicles, and armored transports.¹⁹⁰ Military cooperation culminated in the gas industry. Russian Gazprom began production in Bolivia in 2016.¹⁹¹ Along with the other investments in Mexico and Venezuela¹⁹², Russia invested in Bolivia around 500 million US dollars for oil and gas production.¹⁹³ In multiple joint declarations, Russian leader Putin and Bolivian leader Morales stated that the agreements were equal and mutually beneficial.¹⁹⁴ For Morales, the agreements fulfilled the requirements of respecting the sovereignty rights of states and keeping the international order intact.¹⁹⁵

Though not extensive and in-depth as Russia, China was the other global partner of Bolivia in purchasing military equipment and training, such as training on anti-riot armament.¹⁹⁶ Under broad agenda items, Bolivia was receiving financial and technical and technological support from China. In 2010, Bolivia received 2.6 million US dollars worth of donations for military equipment and a 67 million US dollars investment in the mining field for transportation.¹⁹⁷ Bolivia, with the help of China, launched the country’s first telecommunication satellite, and in 2013 another agreement on defense coordination and cooperation in science, technology, and industry.¹⁹⁸

¹⁸⁹ https://www.rbth.com/news/2016/09/06/russia-and-bolivia-sign-agreement-on-military-cooperation_627455

¹⁹⁰ <https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2017/12/08/russia-latin-america-promising-prospects-for-military-cooperation/>

¹⁹¹ <https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2017/12/08/russia-latin-america-promising-prospects-for-military-cooperation/>

¹⁹² <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/03/russia-playing-geopolitical-game-in-latin-america-pub-76228>

¹⁹³ <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60982>

¹⁹⁴ <https://tass.com/defense/1009370>

¹⁹⁵ <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60982>

¹⁹⁶ <https://www.cfr.org/background/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri>

¹⁹⁷ <https://www.reuters.com/article/bolivia-china-satellite-idUSN0111911620100401>

¹⁹⁸ <https://www.coha.org/la-politica-de-defensa-en-bolivia-y-el-rol-de-las-fuerzas-armadas-balance-de-gestion-2006-2014/>

7.5 International alignment, emergency, and civil-military relations in Peru

As in the previous Bolivia section, this part first details the social, economic, and political dynamics of Peru before comparing the findings on both countries. Mostly concentrating on Alan Garcia's presidency between 2006 and 2011, Peru's alignment with the status quo and counter-systemic powers, emergency declarations, and civil government-military relations are examined. The international alignment is once more exemplified in the case of Peru as an indicator for the SOE declarations. Peru has higher court independence in comparison to Bolivia, SOE declarations are high in number, and reporting is at an acceptable rate with some missing information. Although this association conforms to the general expectation in the literature, in practice, the high court independence in Peru is questionable because the Peruvian judicial system is open to the abuse of political power.¹⁹⁹

Moreover, civil-military relations have been examined from the past incidents to the current developments in the context of how the military acts not only as an independent player but also as a supporting partner of the civil government in keeping domestic security and order intact and how this relationship is maintained under the Alan Garcia's presidency. Even though the investments and promised purchases for the military are not satisfactory in the eyes of army members, especially after the clashes between security forces and indigenous protesters in 2009, the Garcia administration announced its aim to reconstruct a professional Peruvian army with modern warfare equipment with new DCAs.²⁰⁰

7.5.1 Social dynamics and the state

Peru declared its independence in 1821. Since then, 13 new constitutions have been written, and nine out of 19 elected governments were able to conclude their constitutional terms without military intervention (Taft-Morales, 2009). Among the exchanges of government between civil and military authorities, the most recent one was in 1980, after 12 years of military leadership (1968-1980), when the military's influence existed, but the leaders were civilians (Taft-Morales, 2009). The transformation of the country's economic model began in this period, in the final years of the military junta (1968-1975), and the statist economic

¹⁹⁹ <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4ecba64628.html>

²⁰⁰ https://elpais.com/internacional/2009/07/30/actualidad/1248904803_850215.html

model was adopted in favor of the nationalist initiations and interventions in the markets (Kat, 2020). Under the leadership of General Francisco Morales Bermudez (1975-1980), Peru transformed from a statist economy to a more neo-liberal oriented model; yet the decade of civilian rule was characterized by a prolonged economic crisis due to poor economic management, populist policies, and the government's unsuccessful struggle to suppress a radical Maoist guerrilla insurgency known as the Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) (Taft-Morales, 2009). The foreign debt of Peru reached 1.4 billion US dollars by 1985, and during the first tenure of President Alan Garcia between 1985-1990, the average annual inflation was 967 percent on an average (Kat, 2020). Peru failed to meet the obligations of 2 billion US dollars IMF loans as the world's leading nation in foreign debt (John, 2017).

Alberto Fujimori, an independent candidate, won the presidency in 1990, and for the ensuing 10 years, the government was ruled with an iron fist. Fujimori reversed his predecessors' statist economic policies by implementing harsh austerity programs, which reached success in stabilization and economic growth in addition to the increasing rates of FDI and restructuring of Peru's international debt by 1996 (Kat, 2020). Economic stability and growth were aimed to be achieved by harsh counterinsurgency measures, as exemplified by the capturing of the leader of Shining Path, Abimael Guzman, in 1992.²⁰¹ Later, this period became a notorious decade when state violence and human rights violations during the counterinsurgencies were widespread (John, 2017).

In 1992, the relationship between President Fujimori and the legislature began faltering, and Fujimori dissolved the legislature, suspended the 1979 constitution, and ordered the constituent assembly to draft a new constitution (Jasper & Seelke, 2008). This "self-coup" of himself dismantling the government allowed President Fujimori to fill the legislature with his supporters and control the judiciary by restructuring the whole system and further consolidating political authority (John, 2017). Even though he was elected a second time in 1995, due to the slowdown in economic growth and massive human rights abuses during the fight against the Shining Path, Fujimori was regarded as an authoritarian leader (Jasper & Seelke, 2008).

²⁰¹ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19928907>

The counterinsurgency operations in emergency zones during the Fujimori administration were mainly controlled by the military, and these left a violent legacy of the state that has not been put on trial. For example, in August 1990, 16 civilians were killed in Iquicha municipality for refusing cooperation with the military against the Shining Path; graves of 18 people previously detained by the military were discovered in September 1990; 16 people were tortured, and three were killed due to torture for resisting military's confiscation of animal stock for army consumption in the same year.²⁰² However, these accusations of human rights violations were deflected, and all military responsibility was removed with a law that Fujimori approved in December 1990; it stated that all crimes committed by the military in the emergency zones of terror are actions of duty.²⁰³

The second leap of human rights violations occurred after Fujimori's self-coup in 1992. To suppress the conflict and restore order, over 21 journalists were detained; multiple media outlets were closed; beating, ill-treatment, and imprisonment without a court ruling were among the widespread tools. Also, in the process of power accumulation in the state, the duties of parliament members, party directors, and court members were terminated unconstitutionally in 1992.²⁰⁴ Extremely inhumane conditions, including the lack of fresh air, restrictions on bathroom visits, the lack of food supplies, inadequate sheltering conditions, and disease outbreaks, prevailed in prisons during this time.²⁰⁵

In 2000, Fujimori was elected for the third time. Nonetheless, as a result of widespread human rights abuses and corruption in all branches of the state, as well as the fact that the 2000 election was held under close government surveillance, Fujimori was forced to call for another election; he fled to Japan after a corruption scandal outbreak and submitted his resignation via fax (Jasper & Seelke, 2008). After Fujimori's departure, Valentin Paniagua served as the interim President until Alejandro Toledo was elected in 2001. Valentin Paniagua was quick to undertake political and economic reforms to eliminate corruption, economic recession, irregularities in the elections, poor prison conditions, and

²⁰² <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr46/037/1991/en/>

²⁰³ <https://www.refworld.org/docid/467fca4c238.html>

²⁰⁴ <https://www.refworld.org/docid/467fca672.html>

²⁰⁵ https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/peru.html; https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/peru.html

human rights abuses, which were widespread during Fujimori's period.²⁰⁶ The most important action that the interim government achieved, and also was adopted by most of its successors, was the formation of the Truth Commission to inspect the extent of the rights violations of the 1990s.²⁰⁷

The next President, Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), imposed multiple reforms in economic management, such as increasing tax collection and cutting budget expenditures, in addition to the reforms in local elections by introducing direct elections. Consequently, Peru achieved high growth rates in Toledo's final years, 2005 and 2006, at 5.9 percent and 8 percent, respectively.²⁰⁸ Even though the enormity of the alleged corruption was not on the scale of that of Fujimori's period, Toledo was also faced with corruption allegations. Additionally, economic success did not result in an equitable income distribution that would have spread economic growth throughout the entire society. Toledo's approval ratings were extremely low, and he faced mass protests.²⁰⁹ Due to economic and social fluctuations, the Toledo administration failed to complete its reforms in human rights, especially torture under custody in prisons.²¹⁰ In 2001, the Truth Commission for examining human rights abuses of the 1980s and 1990s published a report that exhibits the scale of rights violations during the civil war between the Peruvian state and the Shining Path. However, as the transparency of the Toledo administration was questionable, the exposing and confronting of the rights violations were left untouched for another decade.²¹¹

Besides widespread corruption in the government, the poverty concentrated among the Indigenous population in the mountainous and Amazonian regions was another reason for the instability in Peru. The internal security issues and economic development problems have been interlinked in a more complicated way and reflected in the racial divisions. Since the country's restoration of democracy in 2001, the use of force to suppress the country's insurgent Indigenous population has been viewed as the main way of maintaining national order and security (Wright, 2015).

²⁰⁶ <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k2/americas9.html>

²⁰⁷ <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k2/americas9.html>

²⁰⁸ <https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Peru-Attacks-on-Justice-2005-Publications-2008.pdf>

²⁰⁹ <https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Peru-Attacks-on-Justice-2005-Publications-2008.pdf>

²¹⁰ <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k3/americas9.html>

²¹¹ <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2005/country-chapters/peru>

The population of Peru can be divided into three geographical regions. The economic power is concentrated on the narrow coastal line of the country; these regions are connected to the world economy and are relatively modern compared to the rest of the country in terms of economic activities. In the middle region, the Andean region, there are highlands that are mostly populated by Indigenous people. Finally, there is the Amazonian region, rich with minerals and natural resources and also populated by the indigenous Peruvians. The poorest of the population (20 percent of the Peruvians) hold 4 percent of the national income, whereas the richest (20 percent of the Peruvians) hold 57 percent.

Between 2001–2007, the poverty rates in Peru declined from 54.3 percent to 39.3 percent, and extreme poverty decreased from 24.1 percent to 13.7 percent (Taft-Morales, 2009). However, the regional concentration of poverty and distribution of economic growth exhibit the divide based on race. Compared with the urban poverty rates of 26 percent, the poverty rates in the rural areas were 65 percent in 2007 (this rate is 50 percent in Amazon) (Taft-Morales, 2009). While Peruvian economic growth rates are rising, the national poverty rates are still considered high.²¹² Likewise, even if the macroeconomic indicators in employment are promising, it is believed that over 60 percent of the workers are in the informal sector.

The wealth is concentrated among the people of European ancestry, and the native American population feels outcast because they are unable to receive their share, they are due from the success of the economy. Tensions between these two groups have been brought on by this economic inequality (Taft-Morales, 2009). The government's assertiveness in exploiting the natural resources in the lands, which are occupied mainly by indigenous people, has transformed this tension into bloody clashes and social polarization between the security forces and local occupants. In the Amazon, especially after the 1993 Fujimori constitutional reforms, the community-owned Amazon lands were allowed to be divided into smaller and private parcels for individuals.²¹³ Though Peru is a signatory to the UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, the reforms violated the inalienability of the land where nearly 60 tribes were living. This UN agreement guarantees the land rights of the Indigenous

²¹² http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01269/WEB/0__ME-14.HTM

²¹³ https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/peru.html

people (Taft-Morales, 2009). Residents of the rainforest thought that the government was very eager to rent their lands for resource extraction. There were also concerns about the pollution these mines left behind and the fact that the government was not sharing the profits with the locals (Taft-Morales, 2009).

The social divisions that resurrected socio-economic divisions between the Indigenous and white populations further solidified with the fight against terrorism and insurgency of those challenging the central government. The leftist non-state armed groups, such as the Shining Path and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), were formed by the end of the 1960s (Taft-Morales, 2009). The Shining Path took advantage of the remote highlands of Peru (where the state ignored socio-economic disparities for many years and failed to intervene), started to flourish there, and made recruitments free from state interference for many years until the group started carrying out bloody attacks in the 1980s (Switzer, 2007). Indian residents, hoping for better living conditions, were the main fighters of the group, whereas the same residents were the ones mostly targeted in the highlands of Ayacucho.²¹⁴ Without regard for sex, age, or affiliation, both combatants—the state and the Shining Path—targeted indigenous civilians in an effort to either increase support for themselves or decrease aid to the enemy.²¹⁵ The number of deaths estimated as a result of this fight is from 61,007 to 77,552²¹⁶ between 1980 and 2000, and 75 percent of the casualties were reported to be ethnically indigenous people.²¹⁷

By the end of the 1990s, the Shining Path was on the verge of extinction due to the state's harsh repression. However, the group's activities increased after 2002 due to the continuation of old grievances and unresolved greed brought on by economic inequalities. It is thought that the group was supported by drug money (Taft-Morales, 2009).

²¹⁴ <https://cja.org/where-we-work/peru/>

²¹⁵ <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8a824.html>

²¹⁶ <https://www.usip.org/publications/2001/07/truth-commission-peru-01>

²¹⁷ <https://www.ictj.org/news/ten-years-after-peru-truth-commission#:~:text=Ten%20years%20ago%2C%20on%20August%2028%2C%202003%2C%20the,examine%20the%20legacy%20and%20impact%20of%20the%20TRC.>

Rule of Garcia: Commitment to the status quo

In the 2006 elections, Alan Garcia was elected for the Presidency in his second non-consecutive term. In his first term (1985-1990), Alan Garcia, the leader of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, had adopted a leftist ideology and was in a fight with the international financial community. Garcia's ignorance of the budgetary constraints and espousal of populist expenses swept the country into hyperinflation and a foreign debt crisis. His failure to defeat the Shining Path, human rights abuses, and the widespread corruption in his administration opened the way for Fujimori's 10 years of tenure (Taft-Morales, 2009).

In his second term, Alan Garcia was elected in 2006 as "the lesser of two evils." His opponent, Ollanta Humala, has a nationalist and anti-globalization discourse and close relations with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who intimidated middle and upper-class Peruvians (Taft-Morales, 2009, p. 2). Garcia's willingness to maintain liberal macro-economic policies inherited from the earlier administrations and abandoning the populist rhetoric that Garcia used before played significant roles in the people's decision (Taft-Morales, 2009). Aside from that, Garcia had to seek a coalition to rule because his party did not hold the majority in the parliament (Taft-Morales, 2009).

President Garcia was committed to further integrating the Peruvian economy with the global liberal economy. For this purpose, Garcia pushed forward to increase excavation and production capacities in mining resorts. However, the Garcia administration failed to handle the grievances of economic inequality and preferred to criminalize the indigenous populations by supporting the mining companies.²¹⁸ Garcia wanted to increase the country's production by encouraging agriculture and natural resource extraction. The Indigenous inhabitants of the regions where the mines are located opposed the company's activities because the locals could not receive observable benefits for their communities.²¹⁹ This resulted in multiple clashes between the security forces and the people. For example, a small town protested an irrigation project, Majes-Siguas II, arguing that the communities' water resources would be destroyed and handed to a large private company in 2010.²²⁰

²¹⁸ <https://s3.amazonaws.com/oxfam-us/www/static/oa3/files/mining-conflicts-in-peru-condition-critical.pdf>

²¹⁹ <https://s3.amazonaws.com/oxfam-us/www/static/oa3/files/mining-conflicts-in-peru-condition-critical.pdf>

²²⁰ <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-peru-violence-idUKTRE68F5PQ20100916>

Throughout its time in office between 2006 and 2011, the Garcia administration was faced with multiple challenges of corruption allegations, clashes with Indigenous groups over land acquisitions, and recurrent terrorism that relied on drug trafficking. In his second year of presidency, Garcia's approval rates were as low as 26 percent because the positive macroeconomic development did not ameliorate the poverty rates and living conditions.²²¹ In October 2008, in response to the controversy involving bribery and corruption regarding the energy contracts, all cabinet members resigned.²²² However, the cabinet reshuffle could not pacify the anger of the public. In November 2008, the government sent police forces to the city of Tacna to disperse violent protests against the government (Agence France Presse – English, November 5, 2008).

In May and June 2009, deadly clashes between the indigenous protesters of Amazon and security forces resumed. Tension was created during the protests of the Amazonian residents in the regions of Cusco, Ucayali, Loreto, and Amazonas against the legislation on forests and energy production (Agence France Presse – English, May 9, 2009). On June 5, 2009, the Indigenous population protested in the province of Bagua in the Amazonas department against the exploitation of their native land by the companies, and the clashes resulted in the death of eight police officers and 22 protesters (CNN.com, June 5, 2009). By the time Garcia left his position of presidency in 2011, his 5-year tenure had witnessed more than 200 occasions of social conflict and 195 deaths in the clashes between the security forces and Amazonian inhabitants.²²³ The primary cause of these tensions was the failure of the national effort to reduce poverty and extend the generated wealth to all segments of society.²²⁴

In addition to the hustle between the Amazonian residents and the government, the Garcia administration was also committed to counterinsurgency moves against the recurrent threat of the Shining Path. Starting from 2003, several provinces of the Departments of Apurímac, Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Cusco, Junín, Huánuco, San Martín, and Ucayali were

²²¹ <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2008/0724/p06s01-woam.html>

²²² <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-oct-11-fg-peru11-story.html>

²²³ <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/jun/05/peru-indigenous-people-garcia-humala>

²²⁴ <https://www.limaeasy.com/peru-guide/history-of-peru/political-history-of-peru/president-alan-garcia-ii-second-try-from-2006-to-2011>

placed continuously under emergency (Wright, 2015). Even though the war reinitiated was not at an intensity as high as those of the 1980s and 1990s, Garcia reopened the military bases in the region and developed coordination between the police and military forces against the Shining Path that was believed to have 200 to 800 armed members (Taft-Morales, 2009).

7.5.2 International alignment of Peru: Linkage and leverage

Political and economic relations with the US

The Peruvian economic policy and the bilateral relationship with the US are closely related. When the nationalist economic policies were enforced (1968-1975), Peru formed economic relations with the Soviet Union and regional collaborations with Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador to oppose the US domination over global trade activities (Kat, 2020). The statist economic policy was changed to a neo-liberal model by General Francisco Morales Bermudez. There was a delay in the implementation of the neo-liberal economic model during Alan Garcia's term (1985-1990) when Peru-US relations were soured (John, 2017). However, the consecutive Fujimori administration (1990-2000) implemented an aggressive neo-liberal policy in the economy and "exchange-rate liberalization, import-tariff reduction, export-tariff elimination, capital-market liberalization, fiscal reform, lay-offs in government and state-owned enterprises, privatization of state-owned enterprises and financial institutions, elimination of employment security laws, elimination of wage indexation, easing of labor laws and protection, and privatization of social security" were some of the measures executed in the meantime (Kat, 2020, p. 190).

As a precondition to the successful liberal economic policy implementation, President Fujimori also aimed to restore bilateral relations with the US administration. By strategically using international assistance against drug trafficking, he was able to advance the development of the poor regions while also addressing Washington's primary concern in the subcontinent—the suppression of coca production (John, 2017). Fujimori received the promise of US aid (during the term of President George W. Bush in 1992) for creating economic development in the coca-growing regions (Kat, 2020). Moreover, he was formulating new ways of expanding trade relations under the ATPA (signed in 1991 and set

to expire in 2001), based on which Peru was one of the beneficiaries of lower tariff rates for the US market that was granted in 1993 (Kat, 2020).

The good relations with the US did not directly improve the trade relations in the 1990s. Figure 7.7 shows Peru's total trade volumes with the LAC and the US, along with a further demonstration of the imports and exports with the US. The graph shows that there was only a slight increase in Peruvian trade volume in the 1990s compared with the following decades' numbers. However, the low trade volumes are not sufficient to understand the extent of the partnership with the US, so we need to observe the other aspects of bilateral relations (Kat, 2020).

Within the framework of the drug eradication program, the US failed to sustain a consistent democracy imposition in Peru. In the 1990s, the widespread human rights abuses during the counterinsurgency operations were not believed to get deserved reaction or sanction from the US because Fujimori was performing well in eradicating coca production in cooperation with the US forces (John, 2017). In 1991, the US agreed to provide Peru with financial support amounting to 100 million US dollars²²⁵ to prevent coca production, which was mainly the Shining Path's activity.²²⁶ The US responded to Fujimori's self-coup and the dissolution of the parliament and judiciary in 1992 by cutting off aid in support of democratic governance (Aviles, 2009). However, after Fujimori's reelection in 1995, the reaction against his authoritarian leadership faded out of the necessity of cooperation for drug eradication. The Clinton administration did not impose any sanctions, suspend aid, or eliminate trade benefits.²²⁷ The amount of economic and military assistance that Peru received was the highest in the continent after Colombia between 1995 and 2004. Additionally, there was the USAID and National Endowment for Democracy assistance for Peru in developing strong institutions for human, economic, and political development (Aviles, 2009).

President Toledo (2001-2006) sustained good relations with the US. Moreover, he developed close personal relations with the US President, George W. Bush (2001-2009). The trade preferences act, ATPA, which expired in 2001, was renewed with a new agreement.

²²⁵ <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-05-16-mn-2521-story.html>

²²⁶ <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1990-04-22-9002020578-story.html>

²²⁷ https://ips-dc.org/peru_democracy_dictatorship/

The Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), which conditioned the trade relations on the LAC's contributions to the drug program, was signed at the end of the Toledo administration (Kat, 2020). During his tenure, Toledo negotiated a free trade agreement with the US and, together with Colombia, cultivated positive relations with Washington (Taft-Morales, 2009). However, good political and diplomatic relations were not reflected in the trade volumes between these partners. Figure 7.7 indicates that the trade volume in the first half of the 2000s had not increased as much as in the 1990s' trade expansion.

In return for the Peruvian government's acceptance of the US hegemony and the US as an indispensable actor in the Peruvian foreign policy, Peru was guaranteed 300 million US dollars World Bank and IDB funds in 2002 to encourage farmers to grow alternative agricultural products instead of coca (Kat, 2020). However, the partnership between the two countries should not be interpreted as Peruvian dependence on the US because during the same period, in the case of the Iraq invasion, Toledo refused to support the US's position, and Peru abstained from conveying an official opinion in favor of or opposition to the US invasion of Iraq (Kat, 2020).




Figure 7.7: Peru's trade volume and trade with the US and LAC

Even if Garcia had no close relationship with the US President, he successfully maintained the agreements of the previous administration. For example, though the ATPDEA was signed during the Toledo administration, Garcia lobbied the US Congress to convince it about the ratification of the agreement (Kat, 2020). During this period, as can be observed in Figure 7.7, there was a jump in the Peruvian trade volume, and the US was Peru's top trading partner. The Peru Trade Promotion Agreement was signed and ratified in 2006, which went into effect in 2009.²²⁸ During this period, trade relations with partners, especially the US, became an indispensable part of Peruvian economic growth. Bilateral trade agreements with the US favored Peruvian exports (Kat, 2020), among which mining and fisheries were the top items. In 2007, mining constituted 62 percent of the export earnings, which made the Peruvian economy vulnerable to the international commodity process and the weather (Taft-Morales,

²²⁸ <https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R42523.html>

2009). Therefore, Peru wanted to diffuse trade relations with more partners, such as China, while signing new agreements with the US and EU.²²⁹

Other important pillars of the relations between the Garcia administration and the US were security cooperation and democratic governance. Peru was the second-ranking country producing coca, which ended up in the US territory (Taft-Morales, 2009). In coordination with the US state, Garcia implemented the National Drug Program between 2007 and 2011 to trace the production, logistics, and accompanying constituents of the drug problem (Taft-Morales, 2009). Garcia managed to legislate multiple actions in the criminal court regarding coca production and responded violently against the producers with the help of the USAID Andean Counterdrug program, which funded military assistance, training, and multilateral operations (Taft-Morales, 2009). However, these intense and multi-aspect measures against coca production did not suppress the production because the UN report claimed that coca production increased by 16.4 percent from 2005 to 2008 (Taft-Morales, 2009). This failure was due to the high level of corruption in the judiciary and among the security forces, which made the inspection on the ground very difficult (Taft-Morales, 2009).

Under the USAID programs, anti-corruption and transparency measures in public institutions were also funded. For strengthening democratic institutions and regional governments, sustainable economic growth, investing in health and education, and integrating the international economy and trade with environmental policies, the US government provided 91 million US dollars, 114 million US dollars, and 119 million US dollars to Peru in 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively. For example, between 2006–2021, the US Department of Southern Command invested 50 million US dollars in Peru and 100 million US dollars toward the Venezuelan migration flow.²³⁰

This consolidation of the liberal international economy, which had started in the 1990s, was sustained after the Garcia administration.²³¹ Ollanta Humala Tasso, who was believed to be a leftist populist in the 2006 presidential campaign, changed his rhetoric after taking the government in 2011 by continuing with the moderate and pro-business stance of

²²⁹ <https://us.fashionnetwork.com/news/Peru-has-free-trade-with-the-usa-china-is-europe-next-,499027.html>

²³⁰ <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-peru/>

²³¹ <https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/humalas-foreign-policy-more-continuity-than-change/>

the Peruvian state. The period between 2001 and 2016 was the time that witnessed Peru's high economic growth rate and the peak of good relations with the US (McClintock, 2016).

Trade and diplomatic relations with the EU

According to the trade data (Barbieri & Keshk, 2016), the second trade partner of Peru was the EU countries (based on the total bilateral trade volume with the EU members in the relevant year) up until 2008. By the end of 2009, the Peru-EU volume was surpassed by the volume of bilateral trade with China. At the end of 2002, Peru had secured 86 million Euros from the EU for improving governance, institutions, socio-economic development, and integration of Peru with international trade. In the bilateral relations, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain were especially generous with allocating funds and debt for Peru's development (John, 2017). The political dialogue was started in 2003 between the blocks of countries in the Andean region (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) and the EU countries.²³² By the end of 2008, Peru was one of the prominent beneficiaries of trade preferences provided by the European Commission.²³³

The main trade items that Peru sold to the EU were agricultural, textile, and natural resources. Among these, the nutritious and exotic products were the champions of the European markets with a 6 billion US dollars exchange in purchases.²³⁴ Peruvian high-quality textile products were the main providers for prominent French, German, Italian, and Spanish brands, which bought over 100 million euros worth of products.²³⁵

²³² [https://www.europeansources.info/record/relations-between-peru-and-the-european-union/#:~:text=The%20European%20Union%20has%20various,Cooperation%20and%20Development\)%20roadmap%2C%20climate](https://www.europeansources.info/record/relations-between-peru-and-the-european-union/#:~:text=The%20European%20Union%20has%20various,Cooperation%20and%20Development)%20roadmap%2C%20climate)

²³³ <https://www.europeansources.info/record/eu-gives-developing-countries-duty-free-access-with-gsp/>

²³⁴ <https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/peru-eu-trade-deal-provides-boost-to-superfood-producers-other-smes/>

²³⁵ <https://us.fashionnetwork.com/news/Peru-has-free-trade-with-the-usa-china-is-europe-next-,499027.html>




Figure 7.8: Peru's trade volume and trade with the EU

Moreover, between 2006 and 2011, there were European integration programs that provided technical assistance to small and medium-sized enterprises. The money transferred through the programs that the EU provided for Peru and Colombia, in total, reached 4.4 million Euros. Also, the European Commission promised three million Euros to build a sustainable infrastructure after Peru was hit by a massive earthquake.²³⁶

The EU's foundational mission and normative influence in the protection of human rights and environmental sustainability did not play a significant role in relations with Peru. From an earlier period, for example, when Peru announced the decision to withdraw from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1999, the EU had no response except to express that Peru's decision might influence the European investors' confidence in the country.²³⁷ In

²³⁶ <https://reliefweb.int/report/peru/peru-visit-minister-foreign-affairs-garc%C3%ADa-belaunde-%E2%82%AC3-million-support-social-and>

²³⁷ <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8cc3c.html>

2009, during the violent clashes between the Peruvian security forces and civilians, the EU proceeded with trade talks with Peru.²³⁸

Because of the heavy investments of Chinese companies in the country, the mining activities and strikes in the mines were mainly attributed to the Chinese capitalist model, and the European countries were not mentioned in these controversial economic relations (Ratigan, 2021). Besides, when defending their native lands, the locals do not consider the nationality of the mining company. For instance, even if a company claims and reports that its projects adhere to universal environmental standards, the locals still believe that the mine will harm their resources (Zwitter et al., 2016), as happened in 2012 against a US-financed mining company.²³⁹ However, even though the volume of mining products, including copper ores, gold, lead, zinc, iron ores, and other precious metals, were not highlighted in the trade relations between Peru and the EU by international and national news outlets, the European countries—Germany, Bulgaria, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, and Finland—were the primary recipients of valuable minerals extracted from Peru.²⁴⁰

International organizations

Membership and active participation in international organizations indicate a country's degree of integration into the international system. For Latin America, the OAS plays a crucial role in a member's relations with the international order by promoting free trade and economic integration with international financial institutions and the neoliberal economic order (Aviles, 2009). The Peruvian governments, especially after 1990, have been demonstrating their willingness to accept the liberal order and the US hegemony in promoting democracy and strengthening international checks against the military dictatorship under the umbrella of the OAS (Aviles, 2009). This acceptance of the US hegemony and abstinence from raising any dissenting opinion about the US acts are expected to be seen in the UNGA voting trend. As it was done in the Bolivian subsection, Figure 7.9 shows the Lijphart's

²³⁸ <https://euobserver.com/green-economy/28324>

²³⁹ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19928907>

²⁴⁰ According to the historical yearly data belongs to 2011 Peru country profile provided in the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) in the section of main export products by the destination countries. Retrieved from; <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/per#yearly-trade>.

agreement score of Peru-US, Peru-Russia, and Peru-China dyads from 1975 to 2015. Particularly, 0 to 1 represents the UNGA voting patterns, 1 meaning that the country dyads vote in the same direction, and 0 meaning they vote in the opposite direction (Bailey et al., 2017). The raw agreement scores are smoothed with the mean of the agreement variable to reduce noise by using 40 percent of the raw data.

The graph shows that after the mid-1970s, Peru's voting preferences became more aligned with those of Russia and China. While there was a decrease in agreement scores between the votes of Bolivia and Russia until 1995, the agreement recovered to some extent between 2005–2010; yet it did not reach the previous high scores of the 1980s. The agreement with China is very high, and the line is more or less stable over the 40 years from 1975 to 2015. Finally, the negative association between the US and Peru is noteworthy because, historically, these two countries were in close contact with each other at the individual and state levels in the 1990s and the early 2000s.

In addition to the dramatic difference between the Peru-Russia and Peru-China dyads and the Peru-US dyad in the UN voting, the resemblance between the Bolivian UNGA agreement scores with the same global partners in Figure 7.9 and Figure 7.3 is hard to ignore. The only difference is the steep decline in the US-Bolivia similarity score under the Morales administration (2006–2015) and the small hike in the US-Peru similarity score under the Garcia administration (2006–2011). Thus, this measure may not be highly reliable for assessing the international alignment of a government.




Figure 7.9: UNGA voting similarity Peru v. the US, Russia, and China

In the large- N analysis in estimation of the organization ties component in linkage measure, where I used a reverse coded absolute distance of Peru or Bolivia's ideal points and the average ideal point of 28 countries (the EU and the US) (Voeten et al., 2009), there is a difference between the EU and the US-Peru and Bolivia dyads for the Garcia and Morales administrations. The scores of the organization ties for Bolivia and Peru between 1975 and 2014 are 2.6 and 3, respectively. However, when the six years of Garcia administration and nine years of Morales period are compared, the score for Peru rises to 5, and Bolivia's score slightly increases to 2.9. Therefore, Lijphart's index of agreement does not reflect the observed variances in foreign policy preferences of these country dyads because it shows very similar trends despite the striking differences in practice. However, another measure obtained from the UN voting data, the ideal points, still offers hope for the estimation of organizational ties for a large- N data analysis.

Moreover, in these voting similarity calculations, the consensus votes (the resolutions adopted without voting imply that all members of the UNGA at the time of voting agreed on the issue) are not included in the similarity and ideal points data calculations (Hage & Hug, 2014). The exclusion is justified on the grounds that there will be no coding of preference difference on this consensus voting, and it creates higher similarity scores between the states. However, Hage and Hug (2014) argue that the exclusion might create a bigger problem than the inclusion because each year, the number of consensual resolutions is different, such that the degree of agreement itself might vary across the years. Hence, the difference in the agreement lines in Figures 7.3 and 7.9 for country dyads with respect to Bolivia and Peru might be exaggerated because of this exclusion criterion.

For cross-validation, another dataset related to state behavior in international organizations can also be controlled. According to the UNGA speeches dataset (Kertikelenis & Voeten, 2021), during his administration, President Garcia did not utter any criticism against the international human rights system, criminal court, or economic system. On the contrary, he explicitly and implicitly expressed his preferences in support of the international human rights system, specifically the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, which compose the liberal economic order (Kertikelenis & Voeten, 2021).

In the UNGA statements, the Garcia administration was persistent in following the previous administrations' pro-Western discourse and policies regarding the international political order. Unfortunately, Garcia was not as active as Morales of Bolivia in the UNGA debates, as he only attended the meeting on the September 23, 2010 (65th) session. Between 2006 and 2009, Peru was delegated by the minister of foreign affairs and deputy minister at the sessions of the UNGA.

In these sections, the focus was mainly on Peru's economic and human development and the government's efforts to promote democratic development.²⁴¹ Furthermore, Peruvian representatives mostly preferred to mention security issues, such as migration flow, coca production, and terrorism, with suggestions for multilateral actions.²⁴² There were also

²⁴¹ <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/536/09/PDF/N0653609.pdf?OpenElement>;
<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/524/34/PDF/N0752434.pdf?OpenElement>

²⁴² <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/531/22/PDF/N0853122.pdf?OpenElement>

statements about how the past governments, which had closed economic development models with state ownership, failed and how the Garcia government was successful in managing the macroeconomy in harmony with the liberal international order and expanding trade relations.²⁴³

In support of the international status-quo, Peru underlined the importance of multilateralism, suggested the formulation of regional non-aggression pacts,²⁴⁴ and expressed support for the international regime on anti-personal mines.²⁴⁵ In the same meeting held in September 2010, three months after the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1929, which was highly endorsed by the US, President Garcia himself stated that the proliferation of nuclear arms should be deflated at any cost.

In conclusion, the UNGA ideal points and country voting similarities carry some biases in the state/leader preference in the international alignment, but we can still use the speeches on international human rights, criminal order, and economic order as indicators of the degree of internalization of these norms by countries.

Human flow between Peru and the EU and US and communication ties

The social ties measure focuses on the percentage of Bolivians and Peruvians who emigrated to the US and EU countries. Approximately 1.2 percent of Bolivians and 1.8 percent of Peruvians are currently living in Western democracies. These numbers approximately correspond with the absolute numbers of the population in 2010 in Peru (29 million) and Bolivia (10 million), and the data that 522,000 Peruvians and 120,000 Bolivians were living in Western democracies on average between 1975–2010.²⁴⁶ As the analysis period is limited to the shorter periods of Morales (2006–2014) and Garcia (2006–2011) administrations, the percentage of Bolivians (within the national population) is slightly higher than the Peruvian percentage.

²⁴³ <https://gadebate.un.org/en/65/peru>

²⁴⁴ <https://gadebate.un.org/en/64/peru>

²⁴⁵ <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/524/34/PDF/N0752434.pdf?OpenElement>

²⁴⁶ Estimations are based on the UN International Migrant Stock 2019 data. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). International Migrant Stock 2019.

When we broaden the destination countries from Western democracies to the whole world, the difference between Bolivia and Peru in their social ties with the world is striking. By 2007, 10 percent of Peruvians (nearly 3 million people) were living abroad, and the US, Spain, and Italy were the most popular destinations for Peruvian emigrants (Morales, 2007). According to the 2006 numbers, 20 percent of the expats arrived in Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, and Bolivia (Morales, 2007). The main reason Peru has a large emigration rate is the persistently high poverty rates and widespread political violence in the 1980s and 1990s due to the conflict between the Peruvian state and the Shining Path.²⁴⁷ Since the 2000s, the foreign affairs of the Toledo, Garcia, and Humala administrations have highlighted the importance of protecting the Peruvians living abroad to promote the domestic economy (John, 2017). Even if there were improvements in the poverty rates in the 2000s and positive macroeconomic indicators in 2017, more than half of the Peruvians stated that they would leave the country if they had a chance (John, 2017).

Human trafficking is also high in Peru. According to the State Department's June 2009 Trafficking in Persons Report, "Peru is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation."²⁴⁸ Peruvians, who live in extreme poverty, become vulnerable to labor exploitation in various sectors, such as mining, agriculture, brick-making, and domestic servitude, under false promises of employment. (Taft-Morales, 2009). The most vulnerable groups are women and children who are trafficked to Ecuador, Spain, Italy, Japan, and the US and abused as sex workers (Taft-Morales, 2009).

In the large-*N* analysis, the social connections were mainly measured through the human flow between Peru and its Western counterparts. However, Peru also has a special bond with the Asian communities that date back to the mid-19th century. After 1948, 100,000 Chinese migrated to Peru, and now they constitute the largest Chinese population in all of Latin America.²⁴⁹ Another major migration inflow from China happened in the 1980s that

²⁴⁷ <https://www.perutelegraph.com/news/peru-living-lifestyle/how-many-peruvians-would-leave-their-country-and-live-abroad>

²⁴⁸ "Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Dept. of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 16, 2009, pp. 11-13, 238-239." (Taft-Morales, 2009, p. 11).

²⁴⁹ <https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/09/how-chinas-relations-with-peru-explain-its-approach-to-diplomacy/279618/>

relocated to the existing Chinese communities, and currently, this community constitutes 8 percent of the Peruvian population (2.5 million people).

These Chinese Peruvians locally called the “Tusan” people, have sympathy for their home country (Cardenal, 2017). Furthermore, the Chinese state supports the Tusan community as a part of its soft power strategy and tries to increase cultural connections between Peruvians and Chinese communities with friendship programs, cultural activities, and the celebration of Chinese culture (Cardenal, 2017). This familiarity between the two countries pays off as the Peruvians believe that China-led economic globalization is a good thing and disregard the human rights violations and autocratic suppression by China (Cardenal, 2017). However, Peruvian citizens cannot be classified as having pro- or anti-Western tendencies, even though different parts of the society have different preferences. According to the surveys on the type of development model, the proportion of people who state that they support the US, China, and Japanese models are not significantly different from each other (Ratigan, 2021).

In comparison to Bolivia, Peru has an advantage in communication ties with the world as the country borders the Pacific Ocean. The majority of the population lives in the narrow strip beside the sea, and most of those Peruvians have access to communication tools (Saravia, 2005). However, up until 2012, the percentage of Peruvian internet users was only about 40 percent, which is lower than the rates in Trinidad and Tobago, Chile, and Argentina, where almost 60 percent of the population has access to the internet. Only after 2015, the percentage of Peruvian internet users crossed 50 percent of the population (World Bank, n.d.). Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people are below 10, which is at the same level as less developed economies, such as Bolivia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela. The number for the same in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile is 20 out of 100 people and 30 out of 100 people in Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay (World Bank, n.d.).

The telecommunication sector in Peru was privatized in 1999; even though the competition is limited, as one company dominates the market, there still are other companies. However, half of the country’s population is dispersed in large territories in lower densities located at high altitudes that require small-scale investments, but private companies do not

pursue any such investment to be cost-efficient.²⁵⁰ Poverty is a significant issue in these regions where the average income is lower than the national average—11 percent in the Amazon rainforest and 37 percent living in the Andes region (Saravia, 2005). Hence, the country's human and communication ties are also determined by the income gap as it determines the socio-political structure.

Political and economic relations with Russia and China

As in the case of human flow and cultural connections, Peru has special bonds with anti-establishment powers and has managed to have good relations with multiple superpowers to remain powerful in the region against its rivals. Peru successfully plays the world powers to its advantage and fills the void with a partner ready to help. During the nationalist-military rule (1968-1975), the Soviets and Peru had a special connection, and the country was the main destination for the Soviet Union's machinery and engineering services (Adins & Rooney, 2019). A defense system consisting of tanks, airplanes, missiles, and various weapons, was constructed with purchases from the Soviets (Adins & Rooney, 2019). When the economic crisis hit both the countries and as the world power was transitioning in the 1980s, Peru committed to the status quo and US hegemony, resulting in the lack of communication between Russia and Peru until 2006 (Adins & Rooney, 2019). At the beginning of the millennium, Russia initiated a new foreign policy act on a regional level to sell Russian energy to Latin America. In 2006, the Partnership Agreement was signed for cooperation in the military, economy, and science (Adins & Rooney, 2019). Also, in the same year, Peru and Russia signed a cooperation agreement on nuclear technology (Sanchez, 2010). With Medvedev's travel to the Latin American nations (Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil, and Peru) in 2008, diplomatic ties were rebuilt, as were commercial relations, particularly in energy, mining, natural resources, and nuclear power (Slot, 2019). The leaders of the two countries met on multiple occasions (e.g., President Humala's visit to Moscow in 2012) to express mutual readiness for further cooperation in other domains (Ellis, 2015).

²⁵⁰ <https://a4ai.org/research/supporting-innovation-and-sharing-for-rural-access/>

Bilateral relations were also expanded through military cooperation. To diversify the weapons supplier and modernize the Peruvian military equipment, Peru and Russia signed the Technical-Military Agreement in 2004. Between 2008 and 2013, the cooperation between Peru and Russia was sustained with military purchases (weapons, aircraft, and tanks) and technical cooperation (Adins & Rooney, 2019). However, the purchases and good relations between these countries do not mean that the strategic alliance and ideological fraternity of the 1970s were reformed. Peru, acting strategically, tried to diversify weapon sources in case the necessary weapons could not be sourced from the US (Sanchez, 2010), especially after the maritime disputes with Chile (Adins & Rooney, 2019), a rival in the region and an ally of the US. Therefore, Russia emerged as a reliable partner for Peru in diversifying its weapon resources (Adins & Rooney, 2019). The good relations established at the turn of the century were maintained through visits and meetings in 2014, as well as the signing of a number of bilateral agreements on energy, hydrocarbons, scientific cooperation, and trade in Peru, and trade, climate protection, and tourism agreements in Russia (John, 2017). Finally, in November 2015, during the UN Conference on Climate Change in Paris, Presidents Humala and Vladimir Putin signed a “strategic partnership agreement,” though its breadth and importance were unknown (John, 2017).

Most recently, in a meeting in 2016, the leaders of the two countries set the desired trade volume at 1 billion US dollars, but Peruvian exports (mainly fruits, seafood, and mineral ore) increased from 25 million US dollars in 2009 to 182 million US dollars in 2018, whereas the imports from Russia increased from 200 million US dollars in 2009 to only 450 million US dollars in 2018 (Slot, 2019). Therefore, compared to the other partners, Russia does not have a significant place in Peruvian trade. On a global scale, during the Cold War years, the main anti-establishment power to trade with was Russia. After the onset of multipolarity in 2004, China has become the main anti-establishment power and Peru’s trade partner. Given the minuscule volume of trade with Russia, the focus is directed at the import and export difference to measure the Peruvian dependency on China. Since Venezuela is a key regional actor with an anti-establishment stance, trade with Venezuela is also investigated. As depicted in Figure 7.10, trade with China increased after 2005, along with the overall trade volume of Peru; yet bilateral trade with Russia remained at an almost discardable level.




Figure 7.10: Peru's trade with Russia, China (export and import), and Venezuela

Peru's second trade partner is China; in some years, the trade volume with China almost surpasses that with the US (Barbieri, Keshk, & Pollins, 2009; Barbieri & Keshk, 2016). Especially after the 2008 financial crisis that hit the Western economies, China became active in the Latin American economies. As of 2013, the relationship between Peru and China has been a "comprehensive strategic partnership" to deepen economic and institutional ties (Cardenal, 2017).

Besides the cultural association between the two countries, with three million Tusan (Chinese Peruvians) people, the economic relations between these two nations date back to the 1990s. In order to encourage commerce and investment with China, South Korea, and Japan, President Fujimori relied on his Japanese roots. Peru joined the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, the Pacific Basin Economic Council, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in 1991, 1998, and 1999, respectively (John, 2017). The close

relationship with China was sustained through agriculture, tourism, and energy (oil and gas) research and extraction agreements (John, 2017). In this period, 220 million US dollars worth of Chinese investment was concluded (Creutzfeldt, 2016).

Peru is not one of the primary destinations of Chinese FDI, yet it receives a considerable number of investments for infrastructure support, mining activities, and technology transfer.²⁵¹ Between 2007 and 2011, China invested 7.2 billion US dollars in the Peruvian mining sector, especially in copper, gold, and steel (Creutzfeldt, 2016). Given Peru's lower rates of copper production when compared to alternatives, such as Australia, Chile, and even China, mining investments were further encouraged.²⁵²

As a result of this partnership, besides trade and investments, scholarships for Peruvian students to study science and technology in China quadrupled by 2013 (John, 2017). Moreover, a Chinese naval medical ship made a seven-day servicing call at Lima's Callao port in December 2015—the first time in a South American port (John, 2017). The close economic, institutional, and cultural ties between Peru and China give rise to the anxiety that the close relationship may mean Peru's distancing from Western democracies. Acting out of these concerns, the media have harshly scrutinized the Chinese way of doing business by focusing on the lack of sustainability of Chinese actions in the Amazon region.²⁵³ The main argument highlighted is that the Chinese mining activities are disturbing social stability and peace (during a protest against mining in 2009 at an Amazonian town where 33 people had died).²⁵⁴

Chinese influence has been exponentially growing over Latin America. The number of investments and trade relations with Peru and the familiarity between the two nations have been growing over the years. Hence, anti-Chinese sentiment is unlikely to develop among Peruvians. Though the Indigenous people have protested against and resisted the mining activities of Chinese companies, it is hard to differentiate the investor country of mining investment. Additionally, Chinese mining companies do not stand out or differ from

²⁵¹ http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0121-56122012000100003

²⁵² https://dar.org.pe/archivos/art_china_eng_161219_vf.pdf

²⁵³ <https://www.iied.org/report-scopes-sustainability-china-latin-america-relations>

²⁵⁴ <https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/09/how-chinas-relations-with-peru-explain-its-approach-to-diplomacy/279618/>

companies operating in other countries in terms of compliance with worker rights and environmental sensitivities (Irwin & Gallagher, 2012).

7.5.3 High court independence and reporting performance

In line with his promise to fix the Peruvian economy, President Fujimori undermined the horizontal control mechanisms over his government by utilizing presidential decrees frequently (Kat, 2020). Furthermore, Fujimori purged most of the members of the high courts, such as the Supreme Court and the Public Ministry (Kat, 2020), frequently relocated the judges due to political reasons and removed legislative autonomy (Levitsky, 1999). In the following years of Fujimori's self-coup in 1992 and the 1993 constitution formation, the authority of the Judicial Council was confiscated by the executive.²⁵⁵

In 1998, the National Magistrates Council, which was responsible for inspecting the abuse of duty committed by the prosecutors and judges, resigned in protest against the limitation of their power by the executive.²⁵⁶ In his final year, Fujimori altered the composition of the National Election Board of Peru by hindering the independence of the council to be elected.²⁵⁷ The high courts, such as the Supreme Court, the Council of Magistrates, and the Constitutional Tribunal (TC), became advocates of the executive in support of Fujimori's abuse of power (Levitsky, 1999).

The legacy of the decade of Fujimori in Peru is still evident in the state branches and institutional practice. Therefore, the transition into democratic governance is far from complete. The 1993 Constitution is still in effect, and though the discussion of reform programs continues, those implemented are very limited.²⁵⁸ In 2018, the reform discussion was revived upon the discovery of the tapes that exposed the corruption network in the judiciary. However, the reform proposal was prepared without any public discussion, and it was lacking in detail.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁵ <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/wp28.pdf>

²⁵⁶ <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport99/americas/peru.html>

²⁵⁷ <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport99/americas/peru.html>

²⁵⁸ <https://constitutionnet.org/news/drive-reform-perus-judicial-and-political-system-opportunistic-and-incompatible>

²⁵⁹ <https://constitutionnet.org/news/drive-reform-perus-judicial-and-political-system-opportunistic-and-incompatible>

In the early years of democratic transition, the Toledo and Garcia administrations made some efforts; but after 2011, there has been no attempt by Congress to reform the constitution or the government effort to look into the issue.²⁶⁰ The initial reforms for judicial independence and the rule of law were undertaken, but there were incomplete implementations of the decisions and the law. In 2003, a judicial reform package was enacted, but not all items in the package were implemented due to political interests in the judiciary (Laguna, 2011). In the previous periods, most of the judiciary members were appointed temporarily. The Toledo administration tried to improve the tenure and appointment conditions for judges resulting in the appointment of 1,478 members. However, these appointments were criticized because of the lack of transparency.²⁶¹

Despite these deficiencies in the implementation of rules, in comparison to the previous years (1996–2001), the independence of the Constitutional Court increased between 2002 and 2007, with the cases brought to the Court expanding significantly. This indicated that there was greater trust in the Court's arbitration (Dargent, 2009). The TRC was also formed in 2001 to investigate the human rights abuses of the previous decades.²⁶²

In 2004, the Constitutional Court was declared as the sole protector of the constitution and individual rights (Law No. 28,237). The trials of the 1990s counterinsurgency operations by the military were taken from the military courts to the civil courts if civilians were involved in the incidents (Dargent, 2009). The members of the MRTA and the Shining Path were tried by the civil courts.²⁶³ Nevertheless, within three years, in 2007, Law 29166 once again extended the jurisdiction of the military courts by arguing that the efforts of counterinsurgency were hindered because of human rights concerns (Wright, 2015). Moreover, the inefficiency and lack of skilled prosecutors in the judiciary prevented the investigations of past abuses. Hence, the report of the Truth Commission did not address past human rights violations adequately.²⁶⁴

²⁶⁰ <https://constitutionnet.org/news/drive-reform-perus-judicial-and-political-system-opportunistic-and-incompatible>

²⁶¹ <https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Peru-Attacks-on-Justice-2005-Publications-2008.pdf>

²⁶² <https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Peru-Attacks-on-Justice-2005-Publications-2008.pdf>

²⁶³ <https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Peru-Attacks-on-Justice-2005-Publications-2008.pdf>

²⁶⁴ <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2005/country-chapters/peru>

According to the abstract review that determines whether laws are unconstitutional or not, which is one of the Constitutional Court's responsibilities, there are 33 cases in which the Constitutional Court ruled the laws/or decrees unconstitutional between 2001 and 2011 (Tiede & Ponce, 2014). According to V-Dem data, even though there are specific conditions for the functioning of the high courts, starting from 2001, the regime type of Peru transitioned from electoral autocracy to electoral democracy, and high court independence score was on the rise between 2001 and 2006 with an average of 1.63.

Under the second Garcia administration (2006–2011), who was also politically responsible for human rights violations during his first presidential term between 1985 and 1990, a trial with 35 years of imprisonment for Fujimori started on December 10, 2007.²⁶⁵ Also, the head of the National Intelligence Service (SIN) during the Fujimori administration was sentenced to 35 years of imprisonment in 2008.²⁶⁶ In September 2008, during Garcia's tenure, a Peruvian Court began investigating whether there was enough evidence to charge Ollanta Humala, who had run for the presidency in 2006 against Garcia, for his role in the disappearances, torture, and murders at the Madre Mia military base, where he was patrol chief in 1992.²⁶⁷ However, the judiciary opened individual rights issues for discussion and made allegations against the executive only when public support for the government was declining and the government-forming party seats were being lost in Congress (Tiede & Ponce, 2011).

Due to the political motivation behind these trials, the defendants were frequently pardoned, and the importance of the cases was undermined. The proceedings were interrupted as the political leaders were unwilling to fulfill their obligations (Selzler, 2021). As the majority of political actors had some involvement in human rights abuse in the past that could have led to accusations against their actions, they were mostly discouraged from facing the mistakes of the Peruvian government in the past. For example, according to a declassified US government document that was released in a newspaper in 2006, Garcia's party ran at least one, if not many, covert paramilitary units during his first administration,

²⁶⁵ <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2009/country-chapters/peru>

²⁶⁶ <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2009/country-chapters/peru>

²⁶⁷ <https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/08/implicating-humala/evidence-atrocities-and-cover-abuses-committed-during-perus>

and his deputy interior minister supervised a secret police force. (Taft-Morales, 2009). In 2010, President Garcia issued a decree that initiated amnesty for many military members accused of human rights violations, many of whom were already refusing to help the judiciary by sharing information for investigations. However, on the eve of the elections, due to the criticism against his administration, Garcia asked Congress to repeal the two-week-old decree.²⁶⁸ In 2009, Fujimori was convicted and sentenced to 25 years of prison for corruption and human rights violations during his term. Analysts interpreted the court's decision as a considerable accomplishment for Peru's judicial system, which was considered weak and subject to political influence (Taft-Morales, 2009). Yet, in December 2017, President Kuczynski issued a pardon for Fujimori; this pardon was repealed by the Supreme Court after nine months (Selzler, 2021).

There were setbacks in the regime transitioning of Peru. During Garcia's administration, between 2007 and 2011, the average of high court independence, while remaining on the positive side, decreased to 0.89 (Coppedge et al., 2020). As of 2010, 70 percent of Peruvians stated that they believed the judiciary was corrupt (Laguna, 2011). The main issue of widespread bribery due to low wages became moral corrosion, which was hard to recover from even if the wages were increased. Additionally, trial decisions took a long time to be made due to the overwhelming workload (Laguna, 2011).

The other control variables that are used in the large-*N* analysis, which are the legislative control index over the executive and the legislative democracy index, do not change dramatically for Peru over time. In comparison to Bolivia, while the legislative control is higher in Peru, the overall liberal democracy scores are not different enough between the two countries. In 2008, the Peruvian Congress granted special powers to ink the free trade agreement with the US just before the end of President George W. Bush's tenure.²⁶⁹ With these special legislative powers, Garcia issued more than 99 decrees. The contents of these decrees were too contentious to be related to the trade agreements, and the decrees were issued without consulting with congress and the public (Taft-Morales, 2009). The Indian community opposed 11 of the presidential decrees, which opened the Indian lands for natural

²⁶⁸ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-peru-rights-idUSTRE68C56U20100913>

²⁶⁹ <https://canadians.org/analysis/peru-repeals-two-more-free-trade-decrees/>

resource extraction activities without consulting with the residents of the area.²⁷⁰ Upon the protests in August 2008, Congress abolished the two decrees on selling and opening the communal lands to commercial activities but held in abeyance eight other decrees for review, which later ignited more protests in April 2009. As some members of Congress tried to repeal the remaining decrees, Garcia's party in Congress opposed it. After the bloody clashes of June in the Amazon, Congress, upon the request of the government, repealed the two most controversial decrees (Taft-Morales, 2009).

Notably, in the earlier sections, where Bolivia and Peru are compared, the high court's independence has been discussed as a significant indication of the reporting of human rights derogations. Peru has substantially higher high court independence than Bolivia. Therefore, there is a strong expectation that in Peru, the reporting of derogations will be prompt and consistent and that more SOE declarations will be made. These are based on the results of the nation comparison in the Hafner-Burton et al. (2011) research on derogation reporting.

Peru is still recovering from the erosion of institutions under Fujimori. As the President, Fujimori effectively controlled both the legislature and the judiciary, inhibiting their development as independent and democratic organizations. The free press was routinely repressed, there was no inspection of the security services' operations in the war on crime and counterinsurgency operations, and the majority of terrorism cases were turned over to the military courts by seizing them from the civil courts. The way the Peruvian politicians treated human rights also affected how those issues were seen internationally.²⁷¹ The approach toward human rights in domestic politics was also reflected in the stance toward international inspection of human rights. By the end of his term in 1999, Fujimori called to withdraw from the I/A Court H.R. by arguing that the international court was violating Peru's sovereignty rights with criticisms of human rights violations. Thereafter, the Peruvian Congress voted to withdraw from the treaty.²⁷² Although post-Fujimori governments have sought to restore institutional independence, their ability to successfully carry out the

²⁷⁰ <https://www.smh.com.au/world/amazon-indians-agree-to-lift-bloody-jungle-oil-blockade-20090620-gdtlkn.html>

²⁷¹ <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport99/americas/peru.html>

²⁷² <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/07/08/peru-withdraws-from-international-rights-court/bbd3415f-2a8a-4965-a7ad-2616d214be60/>

programs was constrained by the need to maintain economic growth and boost investment during the global economic crisis.

The emergency declarations in the pre-2000 period were exclusively related to guerilla warfare and terrorism activities. After the democratic transition, the emergency declarations were linked to the demands of the class struggle between the workers and the capitalist state regarding the privatization acts in June 2002, the strikes of teachers and farmers in May 2003, and (finally, starting from 2008) the clashes between the security forces and the Indigenous people. The promise of economic development by Alan Garcia strengthened the repressive nature of the Peruvian state from 2006 onwards (Wright, 2015). The class and economic struggle were accompanied by a fight against drugs and crime in April 2007, as a result of which the Peruvian parliament gave extraordinary powers to President Garcia, which enabled the ruling with decrees.²⁷³

The fight against drugs and crime was an extension of the recurrent civil conflict between the Peruvian state and the Shining Path. This fight became active again in June 2003 with the kidnapping of 71 people at a pipeline construction plant.²⁷⁴ The issue kept Peru under constant SOE until August 2017, with temporal gaps (Wright, 2015). One of the Garcia administration's early declarations of an SOE was in October 2006, when eight police officers were killed by the rebel forces in the Amazonian provinces. This declaration was an extension of an SOE declared in January 2006.

²⁷³ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19928907>

²⁷⁴ <https://www.latinnews.com/component/k2/item/7631-peru--mass-kidnap-signals-return-of-shining-path.html>




Figure 7.11: Peru timeline

After 2008, there was a significant increase in the conflict between the state and the Indigenous people regarding the commercialization and exploitation of natural resources and the usage of land (Wright, 2015). These conflicts are the main reasons behind the multiple emergency declarations between 2009 and 2011. In 2008 (in August and November)²⁷⁵ and 2009 (in May and June), four SOEs were declared due to demonstrations and riots among the Indigenous people who claimed that the state violated the locals' right to use the land. Contrarily, the administration claimed that the acts of the Indigenous population put at risk energy production and distribution (Agence France Presse – English, May 9, 2009). During the clashes between the police/military and the Indigenous groups, there were reports of multiple injuries and even deaths on both sides (CNN, June 5, 2009). In 2010, after the local people tried to occupy a pumping plant and the destruction of infrastructure that belonged to a pipeline company in the Echarate district in Cuzco, the government declared an SOE (HIS Global Insight, August 2, 2010).

In 2009, trade unions and leftist groups went on strike against the government's free-trade policies.²⁷⁶ In 2010 and 2011, the Garcia administration also used the SOE for dealing with strikes in the Callao port and in the interest of trade (HIS Global Insight, May 20, 2010;

²⁷⁵ <https://s3.amazonaws.com/oxfam-us/www/static/oa3/files/mining-conflicts-in-peru-condition-critical.pdf>

²⁷⁶ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19928907>

El Comercio, February 4, 2011). In June 2011, it was reported that there were 200 ongoing social conflicts, mostly related to mining activities, and these protests were, in return, faced with brutal force.²⁷⁷ The protests against mining projects, the increasing activities of the Shining Path, and the increasing illegal cultivation and trading of coca continued during President Ollanta Humala's term (Zwitter et al., 2016).

Peru's average score in physical integrity is not different from that of Bolivia under the Morales administration. However, Peru is more successful in bringing the previous mistreatments and rights violations to the courts than Bolivia. After the hearing of 17,000 depositions,²⁷⁸ the final report of the TRC of Peru revealed the violent actions of the military during the civil conflict, especially the ones in the 1990s when massive human rights violations were committed.²⁷⁹ The commission reviewed 6,000 allegations of forced disappearances²⁸⁰ and 69,000 deaths between 2001 and 2003.²⁸¹ In October 2008, the Human Rights Ombudsman's office, a highly trusted public institution created in 1996,²⁸² requested a parliamentary panel to investigate the military activities that had murdered four people and resulted in the disappearance of two more in the Apurimac and Ene Valley region. The First Penal Prosecutor of Ayacucho also investigated the issue (Taft-Morales, 2009).

Despite controversial trials and an effort to face the old mistakes of the 1990s and the earlier military governance, during the Toledo government, excessive usage of police forces resulted in multiple deaths of protestors. As was the case during the Fujimori era, there were attacks on journalists and media outlets, torture, and poor prison conditions.²⁸³ While the abuses of rights of the previous governments were inspected, the Garcia administration preserved the notorious fame of the Peruvian state. In addition to clashes between protesters

²⁷⁷ <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country-chapters/peru>

²⁷⁸ <https://library.brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/chapters/chapter-6-the-andes/moments-in-andean-history/memories-of-violence-peace-and-justice-in-peru/>

²⁷⁹ <https://www.ictj.org/news/ten-years-after-peru-truth-commission#:~:text=Ten%20years%20ago%2C%20on%20August%2028%2C%202003%2C%20the,examine%20the%20legacy%20and%20impact%20of%20the%20TRC.>

²⁸⁰ <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB64/>

²⁸¹ <https://www.ictj.org/news/ten-years-after-peru-truth-commission#:~:text=Ten%20years%20ago%2C%20on%20August%2028%2C%202003%2C%20the,examine%20the%20legacy%20and%20impact%20of%20the%20TRC.>

²⁸² <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08bfce5274a27b2000edd/conferencepaper13.pdf>

²⁸³ <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2005/country-chapters/peru>

(coca growers, miners, opponents of natural gas extraction, and agrarian strikers) and the security forces, Peru also experienced frequent incidents of torture in detention facilities and prisons, beatings and intimidation of journalists, and the criminalization of NGOs and rights defenders between 2008 and 2010.

During the 2008 and 2009 incidents, multiple rights, such as personal safety, the inviolability of home searches without warrants, and the freedom of movement and transit during curfews, were suspended (Wright, 2015). The suppression efforts were also supported by the military. Only in June 2009, 33 people were killed (23 police officers and 10 civilians) during the protests in the Amazon region. In the same incident, 10 more police officers were killed by the indigenous protestors, who had occupied an oil pipeline.²⁸⁴ In June 2010, five civilians were dead and 16 wounded because of police firing during a miner strike.²⁸⁵

During the final account of counter-terrorism actions, the news reported multiple violations. Open and free private discussions and communication were forbidden (or wiretapped). Peaceful protests that were political in nature and the right to organize peaceful assemblies/gatherings were banned. Arbitrary arrests, detentions, and searches without warrants were executed, and there was no information at the time of the arrest. There was excessive usage of a police force, restriction of movement and access to besieged areas or curfew, checkpoints, and the punitive discharge of public workers without a court ruling. Other issues with respect to human rights that were brought up by the State Department included the mistreatment of detainees and inmates by law enforcement forces and prison security personnel, harsh prison conditions, protracted pretrial detention, excessive trial delays, attacks on the media by local authorities, harassment of NGOs, violence, and discrimination against vulnerable groups (e.g., primarily women, children, LGBT+ community members, and ethnic minorities).

According to the findings based on the Hafner-Burton et al. (2011) study of derogation reporting, the high court independence in Peru is much higher than Bolivia's score. In connection to this association, reporting of rights violated during emergencies is consistent with country self-reports. Still, there were multiple emergency declarations with

²⁸⁴ <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010/country-chapters/peru>

²⁸⁵ <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2011/country-chapters/peru>

multiple extensions (in total, 56 emergency declarations were recorded in the STEM-II dataset based on ICCPR regulations) in Peru. The derogation reporting is timely (mostly submitted in a week) and detailed in each emergency event (Zwitter et al., 2016). The rights violations stated by independent organizations and in newspapers were also listed in these country reports, such as providing information during an arrest and timely trial after a certain detention period, the freedom of movement in the country and the freedom of leaving the country, the right to have a private life with no unlawful interference in family and home, and the right to organize and participate in an assembly. There is a congruence in the extent of violated rights between the reports of international organizations and the ICCPR (Zwitter et al., 2016).

Moreover, the government welcomed international investigations and the organizations' free movement in the country for investigating the rights violations. The UN's concern during their visit in 2011 was about the frequent SOE declarations and derogations of human rights due to terrorism, yet the reporting of the state regarding these derogations was not an issue for the UN Human Rights Council.²⁸⁶ The torture and extrajudicial executions of members of the MRTA in 1997 were adjudicated as human rights violations by the I/A Court H.R. in 2015. The MRTA's attempt to kidnap the Japanese ambassador and 72 other people resulted in the state killings of the group members.²⁸⁷

There are some common practices that have spanned over decades: torture and ill-treatment in detention centers and prisons, threats against journalists and prevention of the media's freedom, negative statements about human rights defenders, alienation of drug addicts by ill-treatment,²⁸⁸ and the killing of people during protests due to excessive usage of force.²⁸⁹ These practices have become chronic since the authoritarian tenure of President Fujimori. However, these decades-long acts were missing in the country's self-reports. These concealed cruelties violate the integrity of non-derogable rights of the ICCPR, and these are the rights that cannot be violated under any circumstances. Peru does, in fact, have positive

²⁸⁶ <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4da56d99c.html>

²⁸⁷ <https://perureports.com/iachr-peru-violated-executed-rebels-human-rights/1631/>

²⁸⁸ <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/peru>

²⁸⁹ <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010/country-chapters/peru>; <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2011/country-chapters/peru>; <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country-chapters/peru>

connections with the international courts, as seen by Peru's determination to declare SOEs prior to taking any steps to prevent or contain a crisis. However, despite the violation of inviolable rights, Peru's reporting was timely and successful in avoiding any prosecution by leaving the most severe abuses in the dark. The majority of this impunity stems from a long-standing tradition that has been fostered by the country's positive relations with the US (particularly when it comes to anti-drug operations).

7.5.4 Civil-military relations and the DCA formations of Peru

Peru's military and civil government have a relationship based on which they simultaneously support and compete with one another. In 1968, a military wing that adopted a nationalist statist²⁹⁰ ideology took over the government and led the cultural and economic revolution of the 1970s (Hurtado Meza, 2006). Since then, the Peruvian army has been attributed to a historical role in social development (Hurtado Meza, 2006). The military governance between 1968 and 1980 that began under General Juan Velasco (1968–1975) ended President Belaunde Terry's administration in 1968. The military government was succeeded by a civilian government led by Belaunde Terry, who was elected as the President in 1980, replacing General Francisco Morales' (1975–1980) government.²⁹¹

The replacement of the military with civil governance was carefully designed by working on democratic transitioning and the drafting of a new constitution in 1977. The 1979 constitution aimed to transform social relations with more egalitarian arrangements and rights. For example, the constitution gave voting rights to illiterate Indigenous populations (Hurtado Meza, 2006). However, the democratic transition for Peru in 1980 was hardly a loss or defeat for the military. During the democratic transition, the military retained its administrative and financial autonomy (Crabtree, 2001). In the first five years of democratic transitioning, President Belaunde allowed the military to make their own budget and

²⁹⁰ Within the military, there were two factions that had different beliefs about the economic model that Peru should follow. On the one side, there was the statist developmentalist and more nationalist wing, and on the other side, there was a faction supporting neo-liberal economic policies (Aviles, 2009).

²⁹¹ <https://www.limaeasy.com/peru-guide/history-of-peru/political-history-of-peru/military-regimes-in-peru-from-1968-to-1980>

expenditures (Gales, 2000), as shown in Figure 7.12, and the military supervised the government in these years.




Figure 7.12: Peru's military spending in US dollars and spending share in GDP

Another element that enforced military control over politics was the declaration of war by Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) against the Peruvian government on the same day Belaunde was elected as the President. In the first two years of conflict, the fight against the insurgency was conducted by the police forces (Hurtado Meza, 2006). However, as the insurgency spread through the rural areas of the country, the government asked the military to act (Mauceri, 1991). Since 1982, the emergency area has grown, even covering Lima, the capital city. Its geographical coverage has fluctuated, but it has continued with a series of 60-day emergency declarations into the twenty-first century. The military became the sole power

in the provinces of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurimac upon President Belaunde's declaration of emergency in 1982 (Mauceri, 1991).

The civil war between the Peruvian state and the armed groups was not only limited to the Shining Path but there was also the MRTA, which became widely known after the Japanese embassy hostage crisis in 1996. The MRTA was fighting against the Peruvian government based on a leftist ideology that supported the statist development model (Aviles, 2009). The conflict with both of these groups weakened the military's statist wing (inclined towards the left) and so changed the dynamics of power within the military. In the 1990s, the integration of the neo-liberal economy was further aided by the military's statist faction losing ground (Aviles, 2009).

As can also be seen in Figure 7.12, between 1985–1990, the budget allocated for military spending in US dollars and the rate of GDP decreased compared with the previous periods (Gales, 2000). Yet, President Garcia (1985–1990) and, later on, Fujimori (1990–2000) successfully co-opted the military, and the army remained loyal to the presidents (Aviles, 2009). Especially as the long decade of Fujimori's tenure started, Fujimori appointed his supporters to the higher ranks of the army to guarantee the military's support (Gales, 2000). However, in this example, subordination of the military's authority is not to the Peruvian state but to the personal power of Alberto Fujimori (Hurtado Meza, 2006). Vladimiro Montesinos, Fujimori's advisor and the head of SIN, designed the cadres of the military by purging the army members who would not cooperate with Fujimori (Switzer, 2007). Therefore, in 1992, when Fujimori issued a self-coup, he received the support of the army.²⁹²

The economic crisis during the 1990s also influenced the military budget, and the side benefits became limited for the military personnel. However, Fujimori divided the military between institutionalists and his supporters, who were more inclined toward the co-optation of civilian rule by selectively promoting benefits among those units loyal to Fujimori (Aviles, 2009). This rift in the military further ensured the sustenance of the Fujimori administration and the independent ruling power. However, Fujimori had never broken the autonomous

²⁹² <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19928907>

position of the military, which could still decide whether to support the government or not (Aviles, 2009). This makes these two entities of state power—the Fujimori administration and the military—“coalition partners” (Levitsky, 1999, p. 80).

In this period, there was complete military autonomy in the emergency zones where the Shining Path was active (Aviles, 2009). However, as the insurgency activities subsided and the emergency zones shrank by the 1990s’ end, the Fujimori administration reduced military power and autonomy. Between 2000–2001, the transitional government of Paniagua worked on de-politicizing the military and ending the co-optation by enforcing civilian authority through the Ministry of Defense (Hurtado Meza, 2006). Toledo (2001–2006) also implemented a transparency policy and further consolidated civilian control (Aviles, 2009). However, in the same period, the reform process ceased, and concessions to the military were made by the Minister of Defense, ex-general Roberto Chiabra, starting in 2003 (Hurtado Meza, 2006).

Moreover, the Shining Path showed activities again in the 2000s,²⁹³ and the government reinstated the military authority in the areas of insurgent activity and coca-growing fields,²⁹⁴ throwing democratic progress out of the window. In September 2011, President Humala declared an emergency in coca-producing areas where the Shining Path was also active. The defense minister of Humala announced that the military will take over governance in the coca-growing areas for the first time since the democratic transition in 2000 (Taft-Morales, 2013).

President Garcia took the government with a fresh vision and appointed civilian defense ministers; the ministers consistently highlighted the transparency and negligible influence of the military on civil politics. Garcia even initiated a legal prosecution against 700 military members for their actions during the 1980s and 1990s civil war (Aviles, 2009). However, these actions were halted because the military was purposefully denying sharing information with the civil courts about army members who had committed rights violations.²⁹⁵ In 2010, Garcia changed his approach to the military forces as his aggressive

²⁹³ <https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna30172533>

²⁹⁴ <https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/peru-renews-military-operations-in-vraem-coca-hub/>

²⁹⁵ <https://www.hrw.org/node/230782/printable/print>

market-oriented policies (based on natural resource extraction to attract international investment) received unfavorable reactions from the people (Wright, 2015). The military authority was expanded to suppress the protests with the justification of economic development.²⁹⁶ Especially to increase the pressure on the indigenous protestors, the government granted national control to the military on July 7–9, 2009, after three days of strike.²⁹⁷ Later on, the legal changes of 2010, which gave extensive powers for counterinsurgency and foreign affairs, were utilized as a ground for the usage of lethal military interference in resource extraction.²⁹⁸

During the Garcia administration, on the surface, it can be claimed that civilian control was assured because there was no military intervention in politics. Garcia initiated an image restoration for the military by investing in the military for professionalization²⁹⁹ and paying higher salaries to decrease corruption. For example, due to the global rise in food prices, the Peruvian people living under the poverty line were supported by the government with door-to-door food donations in 2008. For this job, in cooperation with the social workers, the Garcia administration mobilized the military to hand the food. This cooperation was also beneficial for the military to restore the image of the military in the eyes of the public.³⁰⁰ Although the share in the budget was decreasing, the military spending during the Garcia administration increased slightly, as depicted in Figure 7.12.

Since the 1970s, Peru has tried to diversify the weapon purchases of the country so as not to rely on just one provider for the fight against terrorism and for prolonged border disputes; this is how it formed good relations with the US, Russia, Israel, India, Italy, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, China, France, Germany, and Brazil, all in the same period.³⁰¹ The political challenges and civil-military relations in the professionalization of the military were the reasons for the Peruvian activism in international defense cooperation, especially

²⁹⁶ <https://nacla.org/news/militarization-peruvian-countryside>

²⁹⁷ <https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/3148026/alan-garcia-autoriza-intervencion-fuerzas-armadas-durante-tres-dias-paro>

²⁹⁸ <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4ecba64628.html>

²⁹⁹ https://elpais.com/internacional/2009/07/30/actualidad/1248904803_850215.html

³⁰⁰ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-peru-food-idUSN1830233820080418>

³⁰¹

https://www.armyrecognition.com/november_2018_global_defense_security_army_news_industry/peru_and_spain_sign_defense_equipment_cooperation_agreement.html

after the 2000s. However, the international rivalry with Chile on maritime disputes, ideological diversions with Bolivia, and regional conflicts in the contiguous states, such as those between Colombia and Venezuela and between Ecuador and Colombia, also seemed to be factors in signing more DCAs. Especially the arms race between Chile and Peru was an important issue after 2005, which heightened the insecurity between these countries³⁰² and can be a reason for Peru to have more DCAs in this period.³⁰³

Interestingly, in a show of mutual goodwill, Peru had multiple meetings with the US and even conducted joint military exercises in 2007.³⁰⁴ Even though the US signed a number of DCAs in the continent, with Chile and Argentina in 2008, Colombia in 2009, and Brazil in 2010, no DCA was formed between the US and Peru between 2006 and 2010 (Kinne, 2020). Only in 2012, regarding the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, and search and rescue activities after natural disasters, an updated version of the half-century-old bilateral defense agreement (signed in 1952) was discussed.³⁰⁵

Moreover, unlike the political relations between 1985 and 2008, the arms transfer between Russia and Peru was not interrupted. One instance of ongoing relations is a procurement agreement between Russia and Peru that was signed on October 30, 1996 (Kinne, 2020). In the 1990s, during the Fujimori administration, Peru bought 24 MiG-29 fighter jets, Su-25 aircraft, and Mi-25 helicopters (Slot, 2019). There was a DCA signed in 2004 and expired in 2007, but no DCA was signed with Russia during the research period (2006–2010). In the second half of the decade, Russia became active in the LAC by signing multiple DCAs with Brazil and Ecuador in 2008, Bolivia, Chile, and Venezuela in 2009 (Kinne, 2020). At the same time, starting from 2008, the modernization of the military equipment gained importance for Peru, and new contracts for aircraft purchase were concluded with Russia. In 2008, for the repair of the arms previously purchased from Russia

³⁰² <https://www.coha.org/the-peru-chile-arms-race-current-ramifications-of-a-bitter-history/>

³⁰³ The series of DCA formation was also continued after the Garcia administration. By the end of 2013, the Peruvian government further expanded its security cooperation network by forming a defense cooperation with the UK regarding the issues of information and technology exchange and cooperation to prevent security threats. In the same year, another military training, information, and education exchange agreement was signed with India.

³⁰⁴ <https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/128001/airmen-work-alongside-peruvian-military-during-joint-exercise/>

³⁰⁵ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-latinamerica-panetta-idUSBRE89600420121007>

and cooperation in weapon development technologies, Peru signed eight bilateral agreements with Russia.³⁰⁶ Russia fulfilled its obligations under the 2013 contract by supplying Peru with 24 MI-171 helicopters at a total cost of \$528 million.”³⁰⁷

Newly formed economic relations with China, another global partner of Peru, in 2008 were also mirrored in the military cooperation on technology and scientific development in 2011.³⁰⁸ Yet, the purchases and security cooperation were not as close with Russia and China as the bilateral relations with the US (Slot, 2019). In 2010, the deal on the sale of Chinese MBT-2000 tanks to Peru failed.³⁰⁹ Further, China is not active in terms of forming DCAs in the continent, except DCAs formed with Cuba in 2000, with Brazil in 2004, and with Argentina in 2007 (Kinne, 2020).

7.6 Conclusion: Findings on Bolivia and Peru

The two countries, belonging to the same region of the Andean, started their democratic transition in the same period. They share similar “social, economic, cultural, historical, and institutional features,” have experienced similar governmental crises recently, and have a history of being in a permanent state of siege ruled by the military (Wright, 2015, p. xviii). However, their SOE declaration frequency is very different; while Bolivia has declared once, Peru has at least eight SOE declarations between 2006 and 2011.

The country comparison at first suggests differences in the high court independence between Bolivia and Peru. The findings of Hafner-Burton et al. (2011) suggest that high court independence is one of the main determinants of SOE declarations (or derogation reporting). Nonetheless, when the executive and judiciary relations are analyzed closely, it is found that the Peruvian judiciary can challenge the executive power only when the approval rates or popularity of the executive are low. Therefore, the independence of the judiciary in Peru is highly disputable and volatile even during a single five-year presidential term. Likewise, Bolivia has very low scores of high court independence. Thus, the expectation for a positive

³⁰⁶ <https://andina.pe/agencia/noticia-peru-russia-sign-agreements-on-military-technology-cooperation-205825.aspx>

³⁰⁷ <https://russia-direct.org/analysis/peru-another-latin-american-litmus-test-russia>

³⁰⁸ <https://www.peruviantimes.com/04/peru-china-sign-military-cooperation-agreement/12112/>

³⁰⁹ <https://www.coha.org/arm-sales-especially-by-russia-and-china-continue-to-latin-america/>

relationship between high court independence and SOE declaration/reporting should be approached with more nuance, based on the findings from Peru. The literature that grows on different channels can be combined such that next to the high court independence, a corruption criterion or the enforcement power of institutions can be used as a control element between the declaration and court independence (Cole, 2015).

The in-depth country analysis also suggests that the political and economic relations with the Western democracies are closely associated with the frequency of SOE declarations (or quality of derogation reporting). Therefore, there is some support for the main hypothesis that economic, cultural, political, and intergovernmental ties with the democratic states might be signals for a state to comply with international conventions.

The partners with whom the state forms a DCA, however, appear to depend on the alignment type of the state. Peru's DCA partners tend to be more Western-oriented, whereas Bolivia's partners tend to be counter-establishment powers, such as Venezuela and Russia. This trend seconds Kinne's (2018) conception of DCAs as networks (e.g., nodes of Western democracies and anti-establishment powers) with some actors having connections with several sides, such as Brazil and Argentina (active DCA formers in and outside the continent and DCA partners of both Peru and Bolivia).

The main argument of the second study (on DCAs) is that the utilization of the military during emergencies indicates that there are close relations between the military and the civil government. However, in the Bolivian case, there is only one declared SOE case to observe this proximity. Yet, the case study analysis of both countries supports the new format of civil-military relations. The military increases its power on domestic issues by functioning as a police force that is consulted in the case of criminal activities, protests, strikes, riots, and pandemics to maintain stability and order to protect government authority. However, the resort to the military happens with the compliance of the civil governments. Civil governments have been investing in and forming close relationships with the military not only over national defense issues but also over internal security. This is because of the newly arising tensions in the society due to the income gap, as well as grievances born from corruption and poor planning that resulted in the lack of economic growth in the 2000s and failed to generate more egalitarian income (Ortiz, 2020). The expansion of military

spending, the need for arms resources to be modernized and become more professional in training, and the further need for arms development capabilities necessitate the creation of new means for resource transfer. One primary way of doing so is the formation of DCAs. This finding is supported by the Bolivian and the Peruvian governments' relationship with their militaries.

The Morales period should be viewed as a rupture in Bolivian history that empowered the indigenous community in domestic politics and shifted Bolivia's global position in foreign policy. By half of 2013, economic development slowed down because of decreasing oil and gas prices.³¹⁰ The revenue, which came from hydrocarbon sales previously, was tried to be replaced with agricultural production. Yet, this replacement attempt led to an uncontrolled burning of the forests by the locals to open up new agricultural fields.³¹¹ The new economic model of Morales that encouraged the Indigenous people to settle in forest areas and for farming doubled the deforestation between 2014 and 2018.³¹² Even though the promise to decrease widespread poverty at the beginning of Morales' term was achieved, poverty was reduced by 42 percent, and extreme poverty decreased by 60 percent, which disproportionately benefited Indigenous Bolivians.³¹³ Average per capita income was low, and Bolivia remained one of the poorest countries in South America.³¹⁴ Thus, Morales' economic model proved to be unsustainable and paved the way for increased public scrutiny of his presidential duties. Morales attempted to extend his presidential term through public pressure after rejecting the referendum results in 2016, but his insistence on remaining president sparked protests following the 2019 elections. Morales was forced to resign and flee because the military refused to back him up.

The Garcia term, between 2006 and 2011, should be evaluated as a continuation of the successful macroeconomic policies implemented from 2000–2014 that resulted in a 5.3 percent annual growth on average (John, 2017). Toledo, Garcia, and Humala, until 2016,

³¹⁰ https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/45001/124/BPI2019_Bolivia_en.pdf

³¹¹ <https://theglobalamericans.org/2020/01/bolivias-three-greatest-challenges/>

³¹² <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-wildfires-politics-feature-idUSKCN1VU08T>

³¹³ <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/sep/18/silence-us-backed-coup-evo-morales-bolivia-american-states>

³¹⁴ "McFarren, P. J. & Arnade, C. W. (2021, April 20). Bolivia. Encyclopedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Bolivia>"

pursued aggressive production plans and faced clashes between the security forces and the local people.³¹⁵ As a continuance of the Garcia administration, good relations with the EU were sustained by Ollanta Humala. For example, in June 2012, a comprehensive trade agreement was inked (this agreement's negotiations with the EU had started back in 2007).³¹⁶ The agreement came into force in 2013, and within two years, the FDI inflow from the EU to Peru increased by 15 percent, which was 12 billion US dollars.³¹⁷

The civilian and military administrations continued to be close partners (Levitsky, 1999, p. 80) even in the 2019 events when the “military ... [made] public statements or a show of military force to back controversial presidential decisions.” (Pion-Berlin & Acacio, 2020, p. 163) There was no open challenge to the military that would imply any intention of political interference since the military handed in the government to civil authorities. However, the administrative autonomy was sustained, as every attempt of civil courts to question the human rights abuses of the war against the Shining Path was blocked by the military, and the executive gave support to the military, eventually. Therefore, this mutual dependence between the institutions became evident as the military assisted the government in reigning, specifically, the military control for domestic security and order in times of emergency. In return, the government transferred more resources with research, training, and weapon to the military via treaties called DCAs Even during the 2020 election campaigns, Peru continues to have chronic human rights violations in counterinsurgency, widespread state corruption, and repression of dissent in the name of economic development.³¹⁸

³¹⁵ <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/jun/05/peru-indigenous-people-garcia-humala>

³¹⁶ [https://www.europeansources.info/record/relations-between-peru-and-the-european-union/#:~:text=The%20European%20Union%20has%20various,Cooperation%20and%20Development\)%20roadmap%2C%20climate](https://www.europeansources.info/record/relations-between-peru-and-the-european-union/#:~:text=The%20European%20Union%20has%20various,Cooperation%20and%20Development)%20roadmap%2C%20climate)

³¹⁷ <https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/peru-eu-trade-deal-provides-boost-to-superfood-producers-other-smes/>

³¹⁸ <https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/president-problems-corruption-organised-crime-peru-crisis>; <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/fujimoris-legacy-the-origins-of-perus-ongoing-political-crisis/>

Chapter 8

CONCLUSION: DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE STUDY

8.1 General discussion and implications for theory and policy

We have been observing more emergencies than ever before, but there are not sufficient theoretical reasoning and empirical testing to make sense of these emergency declarations for national and international politics. Accordingly, two broader questions motivate this research. The first question concerns whether the international context affects emergency declarations. The second question concerns how emergency declarations affect interstate cooperative behaviors. This dissertation, therefore, aims at contributing to the venerable study of interstate alignment behavior in political science and international relations literature, as well as the understudied but still controversial and intriguing phenomenon known as SOE declarations.

Although SOE undoubtedly has a role in intrastate crisis management and regime discussions on its own, two other key features also make the SOE relevant to foreign policy for further theoretical reasoning and empirical testing. Firstly, SOEs straddle the line between domestic sovereignty and the legitimacy of the liberal international order, supported by Western democracies upholding the integrity of human rights in times of crisis. Therefore, the more a state is aligned with the Western democracies (particularly the US and the EU countries) in law, economy, politics, and diplomacy, the more likely emergencies will be declared to handle the crises properly, without jeopardizing fundamental democratic characteristics (e.g., human rights and the rule of law).

Secondly, executives typically call for military involvement during SOEs to cope with the crises swiftly, though doing so might come at the expense of the executive's political survival later. Accordingly, in a post-SOE phase, the executives would be more likely to initiate DCAs (for additional external resources to the military personnel) and to take part in

PKOs (for keeping the military personnel's attention outside the country's borders) in order to reward the military financially and to divert the military's attention away from domestic politics.

All in all, then, this research predicts that SOEs would be related to short- to mid-term interstate engagements, given the sudden, transient, and volatile nature of crises of various kinds (such as natural disasters or terrorism). In doing so, this research tests its expectations in a robust collection of an SOE dataset, based on the hand-coded newspaper articles published in the LexisNexis Academic for the Latin American continent across the years between 1975 and 2018, along with two qualitative case studies from Bolivia and Peru.

The lack of a precise definition and selection criteria in the scholarship for an event's designation as an SOE serves as the theoretical motive for this empirical research. This is because the absence of a standardized SOE conceptualization hinders our ability to do temporally and spatially comparative research on emergency politics and disentangle plausible connections with world politics. In light of this problem, this research tries to explore an SOE concept from three angles. First, despite the differentiation between the times of normalcy and emergency regarding time (durability of the emergency), location (scope of emergency), and issue (source of emergency, i.e., public health or national security threat), the literature review reveals that the most reliable objective measure of identifying an emergency is the executive's own act of declaration. Second, there is disagreement over whether emergency measures are compatible with the rule of law and the general will of the populace, as well as whether emergency politics should be determined by the law (specifically, the constitution) or by politics (politicians). Regardless of the starting point of the debate, the opposing parties agree that SOEs are extraordinary practices or, at the very least, expectations for such practices. Third, it would be easy to mistakenly equate SOEs with particular regimes such as autocracies, times of interstate or even intrastate wars, or state strength, considering the negative connotation of SOEs based on certain historical episodes. Examples include the frequent uses of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution by Adolph Hitler in Germany in 1933 to annul civil rights against the Communist takeover threat, Proclamation 3972 by President Richard Nixon in 1970 to deploy the US armed forces and the National Guard to deliver the mails against the US postal strike, and the invocation of

Article 155 by Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy in Spain in 2017 to dissolve the Catalan parliament against Catalan parliamentarians' vote for independence. However, the review reveals that SOEs should be viewed as a type of governance that is not unique to a regime, not a tool of a powerful state, and not the last resort just in times of war. Accordingly, these three angles, combined with a Boolean concept logic, help this research arrive at its own definition, namely that an SOE is rather one of the governance types when a leader portrays a situation/crisis as a threat to the state's survival and calls for extraordinary actions to address this situation/crisis.

Moreover, even if we may agree on an SOE definition for an empirical investigation, we still need comparative cases that can show us within- and between-country variations, not only the presence and absence of SOEs but also their durability and operational processes. As a way forward, it is thought that the Latin American context might offer theoretically puzzling and empirically informative observations to test this study's expectations for three main reasons. First of all, for social scientists and the general public, one enduringly contentious area of debate for democratization and autocratization shifts discussions in Latin America over the past 40 to 50 years has been the extent of emergency politics and the ensuing human rights violations. Proximity to the US, strategic importance (in terms of natural resources), and the number of Latin Americans residing in the US and the EU shed new light on the SOE practices—or lack thereof in the continent. Secondly, given the centrality of executive declarations in SOEs, the prevalence of presidential cabinet systems in the Latin American context helps to clarify any ambiguity regarding who takes responsibility for emergency decisions and the execution of declared policies. In addition to elucidating the decision-makers in SOE declarations in domestic politics, presidential systems in Latin America also help us identify the key players in foreign policy decision-making, which are crucial for any changes in interstate alignment behavior after some traumatic events. Third, the military is part of regime debates, leader survival, and emergency politics in Latin America. Furthermore, there are several alternatives to SOE-declaring Latin American states regarding how to elicit external resources for the military and direct the military's attention away from domestic politics by DCAs and PKOs, given the multiplicity

of relations with the major powers such as the US, Russia, and China, and the remaining forces in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East during and after the Cold War.

Accordingly, unique cross-sectional time-series SOE data (1975-2018) is collected for the 24 LAC with populations of at least 500,000 as of 2018. Through keyword searches with various names (e.g., state of emergency, state of conflict, and martial law) on LexisNexis academic news sources, data on emergency declarations is gathered from the available newspapers covering the Latin American context in English extensively (e.g., the Economist starting from 1975, the Washington Post from 1977, and the New York Times from 1980). A new event is added to the dataset for each SOE case. Moreover, if an SOE changes its level (e.g., from siege to alarm) or its geographic scope (e.g., from local to national), a new event is recorded separately. In contrast to other SOE data efforts, this dissertation also includes information on the geographical scope and the termination terms, in addition to who declares SOEs, when, and for how long, along with records of military involvement and rights abuses in the process. The final dataset contains 702 SOE instances, with 60.1 percent declared as a result of natural disasters, 22.8 percent being due to government crises, 7.7 percent for an economic downturn, 6.4 percent as a result of regime problems, 2.8 percent for international issues, and 0.1 percent declared for no particular reason.

Three broad exploratory and descriptive findings are observed in this data. First of all, with the exception of natural disasters, SOEs declared for broadly defined reasons tend to involve a greater number of civil rights violations. Therefore, the initial certainty/ambiguity regarding the crisis definition determines the extent of the malign/benign purpose behind an SOE and so the alignment with the liberal international order. Secondly, military mobilization is more frequently observed in times of SOEs that are declared due to government and regime crises. However, because there are numerous civil rights violations as a result of the military's involvement, the executives may be more worried about the military's attention to the civil office in the post-SOE phase and so be more interested in DCAs and PKOs later. Thirdly, SOEs designated to handle governmental and regime crises are more likely to have official termination, possibly in an effort to guarantee that the civil government (rather than the military) has exclusive control over the start and end of emergency politics.

Consequently, the first set of multivariate associational tests reveals the SOE predictors after several robustness checks and controlling various relevant covariates. In line with the theoretical expectation, legal, political, social, economic, and diplomatic linkage with the West is related to a higher proclivity to declare SOEs, suggesting the strength of liberal norm diffusion. Norm internalization is also hinted by the significant interaction between regime and linkage that democracies with greater links with the Western countries are more inclined to declare SOEs, particularly during human-made crises. However, the association between the legal link (number of years since the ICCPR ratification) and the SOEs becomes insignificant as more control variables are incorporated into the models. Even the direction of association shifts to negative for the models of SOEs declared due to natural disasters. This finding seconds the most recent empirical studies that disconfirm the assumption that the treaties are signed in a good faith for norm compliance (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). Based on the meta-analytical evidence coming from 224 studies over 250,000 international treaties, except the financial and trade treaties, the international treaties do not produce the expected outcomes (Hoffman et al., 2022). There are ineffective enforcement and oversight mechanisms, particularly with regard to human rights treaties. Therefore, the states that sign treaties might do so in expectation of decreasing the international pressure because of worsening human rights performance (Hathaway, 2002).

Nevertheless, unlike the theoretical prediction, a negative association emerges between the leverage of the West and the extent of a country's SOE declarations. This unexpected direction might indicate that wealthy countries with more bargaining power with the Western democracies also stand to lose a lot if the liberal international order's norms are disregarded. In this association, the alignment between democracy and economic development might be the other element that indicates the democracies are wealthy countries and also those with close relations with the Western norms. Therefore, the counter intuitive outcome on the leverage might be conditional on the regime type rather than an economic dependency. Additionally, this finding supports the development theory literature pondering about compliance that argues under-developed economies will fail to provide a stable political environment such that the instabilities in the societies would force the governments

to suppress people and so the states would display non-compliance behavior (Mitchell & McCormick. 1998).

Further, there is a greater tendency to declare more SOEs to deal with the problems quickly when the underlying crises are more challenging to the government's ability to remain in power (as in violent anti-government protests, labor strikes, government gridlock, or natural disaster). However, while there are more SOEs when the crises are essential to the state's survival, such as during civil wars, military coups, terrorism, systemic banking failure, currency and debt crises, and inflation, these effects are not significant. The difference between the significant government crisis (positive relation) and the insignificant regime crisis (positive association) suggests baseline differences that countries facing regime crises might be already imbued with pervasive emergency politics, and so a unit increase in regime crisis and the resultant SOE declaration does not deliver a statistically significant trend.

The second set of multivariate associational tests reveals the SOEs' implications for the interstate alignment behavior after running a series of robustness checks and accounting for a wide range of potential confounders related to the international security environment, domestic politics, and crises. First of all, the SOEs are meaningfully linked to the DCAs, because (i) there is a positive association between the numbers of SOEs and DCAs; (ii) the formation of DCAs tends to be greater in number in countries declaring SOEs in the previous years; and (iii) the number of SOEs in the past five years successfully predicts the new DCA formations.

Secondly, in line with the expectation, the number of military mobilizations during the SOEs in the previous years is significantly related to the new DCA signatures in the next year. It is also found that SOE-declaring democracies that mobilize their militaries in the meantime and have neighbors in MID situations are more inclined to be part of new DCAs.

Thirdly, contrary to the theoretical prediction, whether there is a military mobilization, the SOEs are directly linked to PKOs. The expected alignment among SOEs, military mobilization, and DCAs indicate that DCAs and the resultant joint military training, military equipment procurement and development, and exchange of defense industry know-how are useful to the SOE-declaring executive in keeping the military resourceful with ally sources and also allocating a sizable portion of the national budget to the civilian population

to move forward in the post-SOE phase. The unexpected irrelevance of military mobilization and the direct connection between SOEs and PKOs might suggest another point of interest: post-SOE self-image repair. States that have declared SOEs to deal with crises may want to engage in PKOs more to demonstrate that they are respected members of the international community that work to address their own problems and those of others. For this reason, PKOs may be a way to dispel any negative perceptions of SOEs and downplay any wrongdoing during times of emergency. In addition, this image restoration effort also includes windfalls and UN compensation payments, which would benefit post-emergency budget allocations. These three results complement the broader domestic sources of alliance literature (Allen & DiGiuseppe, 2013; Barnett & Levy, 1991; Boutton, 2019; David, 1991; Kimball, 2010; Miller & Toritsyn, 2005). That is, interstate alignment can be initiated by long-term factors such as the economic and human development indicators and also the short- to mid-term developments, as exemplified by the SOEs. This is because emergency declarations and the resultant shuffles in the domestic balance of power (particularly the one between the executive and the military) would incentivize the leaders more to seek external allies' resources to remain in office.

Later, a qualitative case study analysis is conducted to further explore the causal mechanism from emergency politics to military mobilization to the main alignment behavior of interest (DCA formation). Therefore, Bolivia (during the tenure of Evo Morales between 2006 and 2014) and Peru (during the tenure of Alan Garcia between 2006 and 2011) are the select observed cases. Both countries are electoral democracies, neighboring each other, and also similar in domestic social, political, and economic troubles (e.g., socioeconomic and political inequalities faced by the indigenous peoples, poor macroeconomic management and clientelism, and past military junta's encroachments on human rights and repercussions in today's politics). In-depth analysis parameters are societal cleavages and the role of state, political, economic, and cultural relationships with the US, the EU, China, and Russia, independence of the high court and SOE reporting performance, civil-military relations, and the DCA formation dynamics. In response to human-made crises, while the SOE declarations are common in Peru, Bolivia executes undeclared implicit emergency politics. The general point of direction in the Peruvian foreign policy parallels the US interests, whereas Bolivia

tends to be anti-American. When the military is mobilized in times of emergencies (whether explicit or implicit), new DCA signatures occur in both countries. In line with the broader foreign policy orientation, Peru is inclined to have DCAs with regional powers, such as Argentina and Brazil, and the global Western powers and their allies like the US, Israel, Italy, Spain, and Ukraine. Additionally, Peruvian DCA behavior generally reflects the Cold War-era East-West divide, as there are no functional DCAs with Western countries when the country has a DCA with Russia. In the case of Bolivia, the DCA partners are the regional powers, such as Chile, Brazil, and Venezuela, and the global powers with an anti-US posture, such as Russia and China. The findings obtained through the select case studies here can be extended beyond Bolivia and Peru, in and outside Latin America. For instance, the Philippines in Southeast Asia, during Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's tenure in February 2006, witnessed the symbiotic relationship between the president declaring an SOE against anti-government demonstrations and the military backing the executive and suppressing the protestors (Coronel, 2006). The country, later in the post-SOE phase in November 2006, signed a DCA with Australia (Kinne, 2018), advancing the Philippines' military capability.

Last but not least, a question might be raised about the research implications. The main point of departure is that emergency politics intersect with national and international politics. Firstly, a state's alignment with the broadly accepted international norms is related to the density of economic, political, and social exchanges with the leading countries and organizations. However, unlike the common conception, for this alignment behavior to emerge, the engagements should not take place on asymmetrical grounds. Otherwise, less powerful, poorer states, which are already marginalized in the international society, might turn out to be less sensitive toward the critiques against norm violations and so start a race to the bottom by not declaring emergencies and protecting the integrity of human rights in times of crises.

Then, crises (particularly of human origin) handled by emergencies signal the changing domestic balance of power and potential shifts toward more cooperative foreign policy behavior in defense and peace. However, this alignment behavior is conditional on a short-termed unanticipated event (a crisis) and an executive acknowledging the event as a crisis. This condition, however, might open the door to two possibilities. In the first scenario,

the states looking for DCA and PKO partners might start benefiting from and manipulating other states' crisis events and the resulting emergency politics. In a cycle of crises, SOEs, military mobilization, DCAs, and PKOs, increasingly dictated by international politics, public reactions calling for isolationism and animosity toward certain states might take the lead in breaking this cycle. In the second scenario, even if DCAs are acts of cooperation between the signatory states, escalating global economic, political, and social crises and the ensuing SOEs may cause more rival DCA blocks to form, setting the stage for more conflictual foreign policy behavior. Emergency powers strengthened by the ally resources might create security concerns and the perception of international threats in the neighboring countries. Those countries feeling threatened, in return, may subdue the existential concerns by declaring their own SOEs and forming alternative rival DCAs in the short- to mid-term that may escalate to interstate conflict (Leeds, 2003; Vasquez & Rundlett, 2016).

8.2 Considerations for future research

The results suggest that international alignment (e.g., the extent of interstate economic, legal, political, and social connections) is linked to the SOE declarations. Moreover, SOE executions, altering internal power relations among political actors, are associated with the establishment of DCAs and the participation of PKOs. These findings suggest that SOE research deserves more attention from the international relations field. Therefore, this investigation's limitations may give us hints about potential future directions.

Firstly, even though this study's unique and labor-intensive newspaper cross-sectional time-series observational data on SOEs is one of its strongest points, the final sample size might not be as large as ideal. This indicates that the study might have insufficient power and produce false-negative results (i.e., where some other relationships among the SOEs, military mobilization and several international alignment behaviors might also exist but are too small to be detected in the dataset). To better understand when and where SOEs and foreign policy conduct are related or not, as well as how and why questions, future research should seek to extend these analyses to additional national contexts and continents over a longer time window. We would have more events revealing the links among domestic, international, and emergency politics if we continued to collect data across countries up until

1945 (when post-World War II discussions on constitutions and emergency powers increased, given the malicious uses by Hitler). Next to the DCAs and PKOs (the modern-day alignment behaviors), this broader data collection effort would also open the paths for analyses on more long-standing behaviors such as deterrence, defense and offense pacts, and non-aggression and neutrality agreements. Moreover, it would be illuminating to test whether DCAs formed after SOEs are more likely to be perceived as threats by the neighboring non-signatories and lead to the formation of other DCAs rivaling each other.

Secondly, even if the executives are at the center of emergency politics and so the identification of an event as an SOE, this research does not directly address the question of whether leaders' personal characteristics are influential in crisis perception and the tendency to resort to emergency powers and initiate new courses of action in foreign policy. Identifying the association among several plausible individual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, ideological orientation, education and area of specialization, prior job experience, personality traits related to interpersonal skills and cognitive complexity), SOE declarations and practices, and foreign policy behaviors can support the theoretical reasoning more and thereby enrich the causal mechanism. In this regard, a multi-method approach combining in-depth analyses of leaders' memories before and after the emergencies (by fielding archival work) and multi-level inquiry (by analyzing leader-, crisis-, and country-level predictors in the same model) would inform us more about the interplay among the leaders' peculiarities, SOEs, and changes in interstate engagements.

That being said, this research has to use a labor-intensive hand-coded data collection because the details of rights violations during the SOEs require a careful and critical reading of the newspapers. Yet, the main large-*N* studies rely on the information about whether SOEs were declared, and military was mobilized. Therefore, as a viable alternative enabling greater spatial and temporal coverage, the semi-supervised tools with annotations of textual data (such as newspapers and social media contents) can be utilized for identifying the emergency declarations and military mobilization (Yao et al., 2020). This half-automated textual data collection and analysis can also enable profiling of the crisis perceptions at the elite level per event to develop predictive models on the trajectories of emergencies (or their absence).

Lastly, given the centrality of executives in emergencies, experimental research on political leaders' crisis perceptions and policy response preferences can be informative on its own (see Kertzer & Renshon, 2022). A multinational conjoint experiment presenting political elites with profiles of events (varying on human and natural origin, national and regional scope, time horizon, economic, human, and political costs) and then eliciting those elites' decision to declare SOEs or not would be the first step in this direction. A multilevel modeling of this experimental data allowing cross-level interactions with country-level covariates (particularly, the leverage and the linkage constructs) would inform us further about the causal mechanism. Another multinational conjoint experiment still relying on political leaders but manipulating different set of event attributes (crises of human and natural origin, spatial and temporal extent, costs, SOEs declared or not, and military mobilized or not) and later asking the elites' decision to form DCAs or not would be second step. In the latter, we would be more interested in the attribute interactions (e.g., SOEs x military mobilization) rather than the main effects only. With sufficient sample sizes (and so research budgets), we can field the second design not only for the generic DCAs only but also the DCAs with the powerful democratic and authoritarian countries.

8.3 Conclusion of conclusion

Prevalence of political, economic, social, and natural crises (e.g., terrorism, a downturn in the energy sector, a widespread violent crime, and a pandemic disease outbreak) and the need for swift policy actions to handle these troubles across the world pose a major governmental challenge: emergency declarations. In times of emergency, the implicit message is that the concessions from democratic principles are for the sake of democracy's survival. Thus, the public tends to tolerate, media self-censures, civil society groups abstain from criticizing government's actions in times of emergency because the government does what it does for the matter of survival – for the sake of the people, nation, state, sovereignty, and territory (interchangeably). Using the matter of survival by spreading panic and fear among the electorate in times of uncertainties ensures the people's support to the incumbent government (cf. Oneal & Bryan, 1995; Huddy et al., 2021; Erol, 2022). Therefore, the emergency times become keys for the political survival of leaders rather than the state survival. The whole

political construction is left to an individual's mercy because in contemporary political systems. Unfortunately, rather than appointing an outsider (as in the Roman model) for a brief period of time who was expected to resign when the crisis ends, the SOE declaring person is also the person who controls emergency power.

There are statutory and constitutional provisions intended to prevent the personal abuse of power, but no matter what the institutional design can assess and predict, the risk of misconduct exists in every political system. The democratic backlash is mostly triggered by the SOE declarations as in multiple occasions irrespective legal or constitutional rules (Lührmann & Rooney, 2021). The liberal thoughts are running around in circles and cannot escape a Schmittian approach. During the execution of SOEs, exigencies of situation come before the law and make laws on their own because abiding rule of law in times of crisis might be the end of state as an institution. This dilemma makes the SOE a necessary evil and no legal threshold can keep this evil in its chamber. Therefore, the democratic understanding among the citizens with a stronger civil society network that directly connects to the transnational human rights advocacy networks can balance an individual or a group that tries undermining democratic principles.

All in all, this dissertation delivers a twofold contribution to political science and international relations scholarship by evaluating the international origins and implications of SOEs. Firstly, this research adds to the international dimension of domestic governance research by theorizing and investigating how the leverage of and linkage with the Western democracies relate to the variance in SOEs and SOE practices. Secondly, this research advances the domestic sources of alliance behavior research by pondering over and examining the links between emergency declarations and military mobilization during SOEs, DCAs, and PKOs. The expectations are empirically tested by using a unique dataset, covering 24 countries in Latin America between 1975 and 2018. In two case studies involving Bolivia and Peru, the causal mechanism is detailed. I find that the linkage positively and the leverage negatively correlate with SOEs. I also observe that SOEs are linked with DCAs and PKOs, and military mobilization does not matter for the latter.

The main takeaway of this study is that the SOE, which seems to be an exclusively domestic political issue at first glance, takes its source of legitimacy from the liberal

international order, takes cues from the international context, and potentiates incremental shifts in interstate interactions.



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Appendix A: SOE names and codebook

Alternatives for ‘state of emergency’, the list is adopted from Domrin (2006, p.25).

1. state of emergency and its variations
 - State of emergency (or just ‘emergency’) – Russia, Canada, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Turkey, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Finland, Albania, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Portugal, Macedonia, Estonia;
 - internal state of emergency – Germany;
 - national emergency - USA, Ireland, or a ‘state of national emergency’ (estado de emergencia nacional) – Ecuador;
 - public order emergency – Canada;
 - international emergency – Canada, USA;
 - state of economic emergency – Colombia;
2. state of siege – Belgium, France, Argentina, Brazil, Panama, Portugal (declared only in time of actual or imminent war or rebellion), Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Turkey, Romania, Spain, Bolivia, Portugal, Mali, Hungary, Netherlands, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Senegal, Congo;
3. state of exception – Spain, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Colombia (el estado de excepcion), Algeria (etat d’exception);
4. martial law – Great Britain, USA, India, Netherlands, Poland, Lithuania, Cyprus, China, Russia, Ukraine, Cape Verde, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Czech Republic, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Philippines, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Vietnam, or ‘a state of martial law’ – Armenia (la loi martiale);
5. state of internal disturbance (el estado de conmocion interior) – Colombia;
6. state of public stress – Italy;
7. state of tension – Germany;
8. state of assembly (el estado de asamblea) – Chile;
9. state of defence – Germany, Brazil, Costa Rica, Finland;
10. state of alarm – Spain;
11. state of catastrophe (en estado de catastrophe) – Chile;
12. state of alert (l’etat d’alerte) – Gabon;
13. state of readiness – Finland, Norway, Gabon;
14. situation of public danger – Hungary (less serious than that required for a state of emergency);
15. state of natural disaster – Poland;
16. state of peril – Hungary;
17. regime of full powers (regime des pleines pouvoirs) – Switzerland;
18. regime of strict necessity (regime de stricte necessite) – Switzerland;
19. prompt measures of security – Uruguay;
20. no specific name but vaguely names ‘emergency powers’ - France, Great Britain, many countries of the British Commonwealth, and some other states by a tradition.

SOE Codebook**eventid**

country_code(COW)+year+month+day

keyword

An extended list of keywords: (Code=keyword)

1. state of emergency=1
2. martial law =2
3. state of siege=3
4. state of exception=4

newspapers_text

Source of Newspaper: Name of Newspaper

link

Link to other events, whether the observation is connected to another event in the list.

country_text

Country name SOE.

crisis_def_text

How the threat is defined: open-ended

crisis_defined

How the threat is defined: narrow vs. broad

1. Narrow (specific, i.e., prevention of border crossing, zika virus, etc.) = 1
2. Broad (non-specific i.e., national security, economic problems, etc.) = 0

crisis_date

The date of crisis occurred. Month Day, Year.

crisis_text1 & crisis_type1(2,3,4)

Extended list of crisis text and type.

1. A cabinet crisis or government crisis is a situation when the government is challenged before the mandate period expires.
 - a. Resignation of government, a motion of no confidence, impeachment, deadlock/gridlock=11

- b. Assassinations = 12
 - c. Crime = 13
 - d. Political Violence = 14
 - e. General strikes and boycotts=17
 - f. Riot=18
 - g. Other=19
- 2. Regime crisis is a situation when the regime's constitutional order and regimes' survival and stability are challenged.
 - a. Guerilla Warfare=22
 - b. Purges=23
 - c. Revolutions=24
 - d. Coup or threat of coup=25
 - e. Secessionist movements=26
 - f. Terror=28
 - g. Other=29
- 3. International crisis
 - a. Migration=31
 - b. Border violation=32
 - i. Air=32a
 - ii. Sea=32b
 - iii. Land=32c
 - c. War=33
 - d. Militarized interstate dispute=34
 - e. Threat=35
 - f. Other=36
- 4. Economic crisis
 - a. Currency crisis=41
 - b. Inflation crisis=42
 - c. Stock market crisis=43
 - d. Domestic and international debt crisis=44
 - e. Banking crisis=45
 - f. Recession/Financial Crisis=46
 - g. Other=47
- 5. Natural disasters
 - a. Earthquake=51
 - b. Hurricane/Storm=52
 - c. Floods=53
 - d. Volcanic eruptions=54
 - e. Wildfires=55

- f. Droughts=56
- g. Landslides/Mudslides=57
- h. Poison=58
- i. Epidemic disease=59
- j. Other=60

SOE_declared

Is there an official SOE declaration? Yes or No

Yes = 1

No = 0

reason_no_dec_text

If *SOE_declared* is no, and SOE is discussed publicly, or the government prefers other legal tools without declaration: open-ended.

date_SOE

Date of SOE? Month Day, Year.

days_intended

How long is it intended to be SOE?

days_lasted

How long it lasted?

extended

How many times is it extended?

geo_scp

Where and is there a geographical scope (at which level-district, province, regional, and country)? National = 1, Regional = 2, Sectoral = 3, Unknown = 4

urban_scp

Urban = 1, Rural = 0

geo_det_text

Location Detail: name of cities (regions, states, etc.) under SOE

decl_organ

Declaration organ of SOE?

1. President/Presidential Government = 1
2. Premier/Government = 2
3. Legislative = 3
4. Judiciary = 4
5. Local Governors (State governor/Municipality, etc.) = 5
6. Sub executive and legislative branches (e.g., administrative, bureaucracy, one branch of security forces and civil defense forces, etc.) (Un-Elected) = 6
7. Other = 7

ratif_organ 1 & 2

Ratification organ of SOE?

1. President/Presidential Government = 1
2. Premier/Government = 2
3. Legislative = 3
4. Judiciary = 4
5. Local Governors (State governor/Municipality, etc.) = 5
6. Sub executive and legislative branches (e.g., administrative, bureaucracy, one branch of security forces and civil defense forces, etc.) (Un-Elected) = 6
7. Other = 7

name_announcer

Name of announcer: open-ended

const_limits

Constitutional Limitations (integrate from other DATABASES: Rooney, etc.)

horizontal

Horizontal: The main inquiry in this part is over the question of which decrees have been adopted by the executive branch without legislative or judiciary approval. This is an indicator that details the extent of the issues within which the executive surpasses the regular political operation. This is also the measure of the horizontal concentration of power. Here, we are mainly interested in whether horizontal accountability has been surpassed or not and for which purposes. Which formal and informal command of government surpassed?

1. President/Presidential Government = 1
2. Premier/Government = 2
3. Legislative = 3
4. Judiciary = 4

5. Local Governors (State governor/Municipality, etc.) = 5

6. Other = 6

military_mobilized

Yes=1, No=0

military_control

Yes=1, No=0

decree_content

Open-ended variable.

measures_taken

If decree and content are not available in detail, this variable aims to capture what kind of measures are taken to prevent the effects or spillovers of crisis: open-ended.

vertical_civ

Civil Rights=00

1. Written and visual media censorship also social media tools are forbidden=1
2. Journalists threatened, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed=2
3. Religious institutions and communities to practice their faith and express themselves in private and the public is forbidden=3
4. Academic freedom and educational system under political indoctrination =4
5. Open and free private discussion and communication are forbidden (or wiretapped)=5
6. No freedom of expression and right to hold opinions without interference=6
7. Peaceful protests of political nature and the right to have peaceful assembly/ the gathering is forbidden =7
8. Freedom of association and freedom for nongovernmental organizations and civil society groups are banned=8
9. Freedom of trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents and effective bargaining is forbidden=9
10. Judiciary under political interference, no independent judiciary=10
11. Indefinite time after arrest and brought before judge=11
12. The person under custody is kept together with the convicted=12
13. The person convicted of guilt that is not true is not compensated=13
14. Everyone presumed innocent until proven guilty right is violated=14
15. Fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law is not existent=15
16. Decisions taken by courts are not subject to review by a higher tribunal=16

17. Arbitrary arrests and detentions without warrants, no information at the time of arrest=17
18. Torture under custody=18
19. Torture in prisons=19
20. Excessive usage of police force=20
21. Discrimination on race, color, sex, language, political opinion, national or social origin, property, and birth=21
22. Religious, national, racial, and gender hatred is existent=22
23. Expulsion of an alien (or citizen) from a country with an arbitrary political decision and exile=23
24. Restricting movement and access to besieged areas or curfew in operation or checkpoints=24
25. Freedom to choose residency is violated=25
26. Freedom to leave a country, including his own, is violated=26
27. Right to have private property and establish a private business is violated; confiscation of property=27
28. Arbitrary, unlawful interference with his private life about partner choice and size of family=28
29. Forced and compulsory labor=29
30. Punitive discharge of public officials (including professors) without court ruling=30
31. Price control and quotas and state ownership=31
32. Transportation, education, medical, sports facility, or business closures=32
33. Public service suspensions (e.g., transportation, education, medical, food, sports)=33
34. Extra-judicial killings=34
35. Searches without search warrants=35
36. Fees on institutions without court ruling=36

vertical_civ_cnt

How many civil rights have been violated among the list above?

non-derogable

According to ICCPR's 6, 7, 8 (1&2), 11, 15, 16, 18 articles, the civil rights above numbered 3, 6, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 29, 34 are non-derogable rights under any conditions of every human being.

non_derogable_cnt

How many non-derogable rights have been violated among the list above civil rights?

vertical_pol

Political Rights=100

1. Any restrictions (cancel) and delays (annul) on elections for the head of government=101
2. Registration of voters and candidates is not accurate, timely, transparent, and discriminatory for the head of government elections=102
3. Candidates cannot make speeches, hold public meetings, and enjoy media access throughout the campaign for the head of government elections=103
4. No free and secret voting and open counting for the head of government elections=104
5. Dissolving the government=105
6. Any restrictions (cancel) and delays (annul) for holding elections for legislative representative elections=106
7. Registration of voters and candidates accurate, timely, transparent, and non-discriminatory for the legislative representative elections=107
8. Candidates cannot make speeches, hold public meetings, and enjoy media access throughout the campaign for the legislative representative elections=108
9. No free and secret voting and open counting for the legislative representative elections=109
10. Dissolving the legislative representative=110
11. The electoral commission is not free from any tutelary influence=111
12. Freedom of people to organize political parties or different groups to form an opposition to gain power or representation is violated=112
13. Party members are not free to hold rallies, meetings, or other peaceful activities=113
14. Party members are intimidated, harassed, arrested, imprisoned, or subjected to violent attacks=114
15. The opposition is under political, legal, and violent suppression=115
16. Minority groups do not have full political and electoral opportunities=116
17. Voting that is conducted under any tutelary pressure of military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other kind of power groups=117
18. The policies of the government are not determined by freely elected officials without the interference of appointed or non-freely elected state actors or any other kind of power groups=118
19. Civil society groups, interest groups, journalists, and citizens are not able to comment and influence pending policies and legislation=119
20. Citizens' legal right and practical ability held in abeyance to obtain information and write a petition about government operations and contracts=120

21. Transparency in the budget-making process is not subject to meaningful legislative review and public scrutiny or public announcement=121
22. No transparency on detailed accounting expenditures in a timely fashion by the government and competition in the awarding of government contracts, an arbitrary decision in the distribution of government contracts=122
23. Tax increase without legislative, judicial, or public scrutiny=123
24. Any restrictions (cancel) and delays (annul) on elections for local government=124
25. Punitive discharge of elected officials in governmental and legislative duties without public hearing=125
26. Dissolving Supreme Court=126

vertical_pol_cnt

How many political rights have been violated among the list above?

term_date

When did SOE end? Month Day, Year

reason_term

Why did SOE end?

1. End of crisis = 1
2. Change of regime/change of constitution = 2
3. Change of government = 3
4. Due to constitutional limits, expired = 4
5. Harsher implemented (e.g., from a state of emergency to a state of siege)
or geographically extended = 5
6. Vetoed by a higher court or legislation (horizontal pressure) = 6
7. Partially removed (e.g., from a state of siege to a state of emergency)
or geographically decreased = 7
8. International/hegemon pressure = 8
9. Public pressure = 9
10. Unknown = 10

termination_organ

List of termination organ

1. President/Presidential Government = 1
2. Premier/Government = 2
3. Legislative = 3
4. Judiciary = 4


5. Local Governors (State governor/Municipality, etc.) = 5
6. Un-Elected executive and legislative branches (e.g., administrative, bureaucracy, one branch of security forces and civil defense forces, etc.) = 6
7. Other = 7

normalization


Whether or not the state of emergency laws integrated into the regular law for everyday politics




Appendix B: Extended descriptive statistics of SOE dataset



Appendix B, Figure 1: Number of SOEs' geographical scope




Appendix B, Figure 2: Number of SOEs per declaring institutions




Appendix B, Figure 3: Number of SOEs per ratifying institutions


Figure 4 compares the type of SOE declaring institutions according to the different kinds of crises. In all types of crises, the president has the highest values as the declaring institution. Local governments have played a significant role only in natural disasters, as 11.8 percent of the nature-related SOE declarations were taken by local governments. We can conclude that presidents are more willing to use SOE as a governing tool. However, we need to keep in mind that presidents' overuse of SOEs can be due to sampling bias because our data is from Latin American countries, mainly presidential systems.




Appendix B, Figure 4: Percentage of crisis type by declaring institution




Appendix B, Figure 5: Number of SOEs during which civil rights violated or not



Appendix B, Figure 6: Number of SOEs during which political rights violated or not




Appendix B, Figure 7: Number of civil rights violations by year




Appendix B, Figure 8: Number of political rights violations by year

Figure 9 presents the mean difference of civil rights violations according to crisis types and declaring institution types. Among the SOEs declared by the president, there are significantly fewer civil rights violations in economic and natural crises than in government, regime, and international crises. Moreover, SOEs declared upon natural disasters have the lowest mean of civil rights violations compared to the rest of the crisis types. Natural disasters have lower civil rights violations than government and regime crises across the premier/government declarations of SOEs. In general, SOEs declared because of economic and natural reasons have fewer civil rights violations.




Appendix B, Figure 9: Mean civil rights violations by declaring institution type and crisis type (Total number of SOEs above bars, standard errors included)


Interestingly, the mean civil rights violations are higher in regime crises than in government crises when unelected cadres declare SOEs. When we compare different declaring institutions for the same type of crisis, we see that SOEs declared by the premier/government have the highest number of violations for government crises. Overall, we can offer two conclusions. First, parliamentary regimes have significantly higher means of civil rights violations. Second, during SOEs declared to deal with an economic or natural crisis, civil rights are less likely to be violated.




Appendix B, Figure 10: Percentage of crisis type by military mobilization




Appendix B, Figure 11: Number of SOEs during which military mobilized and not mobilized




Appendix B, Figure 12: Percentage of declaring institution type by military mobilization




Appendix B, Figure 13: Number of reported terminations among all SOE cases




Appendix B, Figure 14: Distribution of reason of termination among reported cases




Appendix B, Figure 15: Distribution of terminating institution among reported cases




Appendix B, Figure 16: Mean civil rights violations by termination reporting and declaring institution type (total number of SOEs above bars, standard errors included)



Appendix B, Figure 17: Percentage of crisis type by terminating institution



Appendix B, Figure 18: Percentage of crisis type by termination reported



Appendix B, Figure 19: Percentage of civil rights violated SOE cases by termination reported

Appendix C: Crises indices and leverage and linkage measures

Appendix C aims to walk through the steps for generating crisis indices using the data sources. According to Codebook (in Appendix A), there are five types of crises.

Government Crisis Index

The first one is the Government Crisis composed of various political event types (deadlock, protests, strikes) that challenge the government's political survival.

The first is a government crisis that mostly ended with impeachment, resignation, and deadlock/gridlock. Since there is no governmental deadlock event dataset, two indices from the Database of Political Institutions will be used that indicate a potential for deadlock in government: (i) whether the executive dominates with more than 50 percent of the legislative and (ii) polarization score between executive party and four parties in the legislative.

The first component of the Government Crisis Index, deadlock, is a combination of a binary variable "Does the party of executive control all relevant houses...that have lawmaking powers?" (Cruz, Keefer, & Scartascini, 2018, p. 8), and three-factor polarization measures "Maximum polarization between the executive party and the four principal parties of the legislature" (Cruz et al., 2018, p. 19).

- Deadlock takes 0 if Executive Control All Houses=0 and Polarization=0
- Deadlock takes 1 if Executive Control All Houses=0 and Polarization=1
- Deadlock takes 2 if Executive Control All Houses=0 and Polarization=2
- Deadlock takes 3 if Executive Control All Houses=1 and Polarization=0
- Deadlock takes 4 if Executive Control All Houses=1 and Polarization=1
- Deadlock takes 5 if Executive Control All Houses=1 and Polarization=2

Finally, the 0 to 5 deadlock measure is rescaled between 0 to 1 by dividing 5.

The second government crisis is protest, either violent or non-violent type. Protest/demonstration and mass mobilization data come from two resources. From 1990 to 2020 Mass Mobilization Data project (Clark & Regan, 2016) gives annual numbers of violent and non-violent mass mobilization events. The earlier period of protest data is merged from two components of the SPEED Project (Nardulli, Althaus, & Hayes, 2015). Non-violent protest data is the count number of Mass Demonstration or Strike types of Reduced political expression variable. The event is coded as a violent protest if the mass demonstration is violent. These total numbers of events are converted to binary measures.

The third component of the Government Crisis Index is labor strikes. The data comes from International Labor Organization (ILOSTAT) statistics Industrial Relations data (ILO, n.d.).

The measure is the annual number of strikes and lockouts by all economic activity. The strike measure is converted into a binary variable.

Regime Crisis Index

A regime crisis means the survival of the state, regime, or nation in danger. The subcomponents are coup d'état, civil war, and deadly terror events. The index is a summation of these three components.

The Center for Systemic Peace provides the coup d'état events data (Marshall & Gurr, 2018). The measure is a dummy variable that takes 1 if there is one successful coup, an attempted coup, coup plot, or alleged coup plot in the given year and country, 0 otherwise.

The second component of regime crisis is civil war. This index shows the intrastate war intensity of the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002; Pettersson, 2020).

The third component of regime type is terrorism. The measure is binary if at least one deadly terror event occurred in a given year and country; the measure takes one, zero otherwise. The data resource is the Global Terrorism Database 2020 (LaFree & Dugan, 2007).

Economic Crisis Index

The economic crisis index is generated by adding systemic, banking, currency, and inflation crisis indices gathered from Behavioral Finance and Financial Stability Project (Laeven & Valencia, 2008; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011; BFFS, 2016).

International Crisis Index

The index is the hostility level of Militarized Interstate Dispute (5.0 MIDB) dataset (Palmer et al., 2020).

Natural Disaster Index

This index is an additive measure of binary drought, earthquake, epidemic disease, wildfire, floods, landslides, storms, volcanic eruptions, and other events. The data source is the EM-DAT natural disasters database (Guha-Sapir, Below, & Hoyois, 2018).

Appendix C, Table 1: Crises Indices sub-components and descriptive statistics

Crisis Type	Variable	Observation	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Government Crisis	Government Deadlock	1,083	.3154201	.4059772	0	1
	Non-Violent Protest	1,083	.5964912	.4908278	0	1
	Violent Protest	1,083	.2594645	.4385433	0	1
	Labor Strike	1,083	.5373961	.4988299	0	1
Regime Crisis	Coup d'état	1,083	.0581717	.2341761	0	1
	Civil War Intensity	1,083	.1514312	.4396744	0	2
	Deadly Terror	1,083	.398892	.4898967	0	1
Economic Crisis	Systemic Crisis	882	.1201814	.325358	0	1
	Banking Crisis	1,042	.1305182	.3370345	0	1
	Currency Crisis	929	.2561895	.4677382	0	2
	Inflation Crisis	926	.2656587	.441922	0	1
International C.	MID Hostility Level	986	.7109533	1.428009	0	5
Natural Disasters	Drought	1,083	.1265005	.3325661	0	1
	Earthquake	1,083	.1375808	.3446186	0	1
	Epidemic Disease	1,083	.1255771	.3315252	0	1
	Wildfire	1,083	.0590951	.2359116	0	1
	Floods	1,083	.4662973	.4990933	0	1
	Land slide	1,083	.1154201	.3196759	0	1
	Storm	1,083	.2520776	.4344062	0	1
	Volcanic eruption	1,083	.0692521	.2539996	0	1
	Other Natural Disaster	1,083	.4053555	.4911875	0	1

LEVERAGE MEASURE

The measures sub-items are gathered from Levitsky and Way's Leverage and Linkage measures (2010, p. 372-3). Two criteria are used by Levitsky and Way (2010) but do not apply to my research. The first one is whether the country has nuclear weapons. The second is if there is a competing security issue with the Western (the US and EU member) countries.

Low leverage is one of the criteria that does hold.

- If the country's GDP is more than 100 billion dollars (World Bank, n.d.). The measure is based on the GDP fixed 2010 USD (/OR)
- If the country produces more than one million barrels of crude oil per day on average (EIA, nd.)

The medium leverage is none of the low leverage criteria, but one of the criteria holds below.

- If the GDP is between 50 to 100 billion dollars (/OR)
- If the oil production is 200,000 to 1 million barrels of crude oil per day on average (/OR)

- If the country is the beneficiary of aid from China is equal and more than 1 percent of the country's GDP. The bilateral aid data is available for China only between 2000 and 2014 at AidData (Dreher et al., 2017).

The high leverage is none of the criteria above met.

LINKAGE MEASURE

This measure is economical, social, political, intergovernmental, and communication ties with the West. West means the US for all times and EU countries by year as country's changing membership status. All sub-measures are divided into five quantiles within the existent sample. The Overall linkage measure summarizes these four linkage components' quantiles and is reformatted between 0 to 1.

- Economic ties: Trade with the west. the percentage of trade (Barbieri et al., 2009) with West GDP fixed US dollars (World Bank, n.d.).
- Organizational ties: The congruence with the West is measured by the UNGA voting patterns. The data is a dyadic ideal point difference (Voeten et al., 2009). Absolute distance between the ideal points of the country and average ideal points of 28 countries (EU and USA). The ideal points are estimated according to the UNGA voting (Bailey et al., 2017). The final measure is reverse coded by multiplying with -1. The smaller the number means higher the connection with the Western countries.
- Communication ties: Fixed telephone subscription and secure internet servers (World Bank, n.d.) per person are two communication indicators used for this measure. The first one is a fixed telephone subscription. Around 2013 the fixed phone subscription numbers decreased because of the communication shifts through the internet. Thus, I also add the number of secure internet server data.
- Social ties: The percentage of the country's population has emigrated to the West. The UN Migrant Stock by Origin and Destination data (2019) is interpolated because it is available every five years from 1990 to 2018.

Appendix C, Table 2: Sub-components of leverage and linkage measures

		Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Leverage	Economic Status	Low	1,083	.6602031	.4738589	0	1
		Medium	1,083	.0849492	.2789349	0	1
		High	1,083	.2548476	.4359769	0	1
	Oil Production Status	Low	1,083	.3130194	.4639364	0	1
		Medium	1,083	.0360111	.1864038	0	1
		High	1,083	.6509695	.4768838	0	1
		China Aid	1,083	.0341644	.1817351	0	1
Linkage		Trade links to West	1,064	16.9852	14.64988	.636743	70.7943
		UNGA Ideal Point Difference	1,063	-2.17539	.7985235	-5.17153	-.167318
		Communication Rate	1,045	.0963244	.0747366	.0005296	.3378238
		Migration Rate to West	1,066	8.075769	11.82006	0	68.58589

Appendix C, Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for analysis. This version represents the main analysis variables without listwise delete.

	Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent Variables	All SOE Events	1,083	.6481994	1.088914	0	8
	Humanmade SOE Events	1,083	.265928	.6780236	0	6
	Natural SOE Events	1,083	.401662	.8382476	0	8
	Narrow defined SOEs	1,083	.4939982	.9442456	0	8
	Broad defined SOEs	1,083	.1542013	.5061985	0	6
	Government related SOEs	1,066	.1538462	.4794062	0	4
	Regime related SOEs	1,066	.0590994	.2862691	0	4
	Economy related SOEs	1,066	.0628518	.2919723	0	3
	International related SOEs	1,066	.0196998	.2222089	0	6
	Natural related SOEs	1,066	.4071295	.8432587	0	8
Crises Indices	Government Crisis Index	1,083	1.708772	1.10854	0	4
	Regime Crisis Index	1,083	.6084949	.821388	0	4
	Economy Crisis Index	881	.8093076	1.172586	0	5
	International Crisis Index	986	.7109533	1.428009	0	5
	Natural Disaster Index	1,083	1.757156	1.678705	0	9
International Factors	ICCPR Signature years	1,066	17.21857	13.67861	0	50
	Leverage of West					
	Low	1,083	.6509695	.4768838	0	1
	Medium	1,083	.0507849	.2196595	0	1
	High	1,083	.2982456	.4576992	0	1
Political, Structural, and Individual Factors	Linkage with West	1,037	.6001929	.1810522	.2	1
	Democracy Score (0=autoc.)	1,066	5.826454	3.671345	0	10
	High Court Independence	1,066	.245439	1.287879	-3.003	2.441
	Legislative Control	982	.5537648	.3053944	.028	.957
	Political System					
	Presidential	1,031	.7749758	.417801	0	1
	Assembly-elec. President	1,031	.0979631	.2974091	0	1
	Parliamentary	1,031	.1270611	.333203	0	1
	Election	1,083	.2363804	.4250548	0	1
	Sols Change	1,066	.1172608	.3218818	0	1
	Years Left in Office	960	1.979167	1.43092	0	7
	Logged GDP in USD	1,064	24.21196	1.689768	20.83	28.516
	Judicial Emergency Power	596	.5046768	.7535358	-1.0155	1.533

ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF LEVERAGE

Low leverage is one of the criteria in the main leverage measure or the following

- If the export to the Western countries is 47% (and below) of all exports volume

The medium leverage is none of the low leverage criteria but is one of the criteria in the main leverage measure or the following

- If the export to the Western countries is 48-73% of all exports volume

The high leverage is none of the criteria above met, or

- If the export to the Western countries is 74-100% of all exports volume

Appendix C, Table 4: Leverage measure with an export share

International Factors	Leverage of West					
	Low	1,083	.7072946	.4552146	0	1
	Medium	1,083	.10988	.3128846	0	1
	High	1,083	.1828255	.386702	0	1

Appendix C, Table 4: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

The Covenant was opened for signature in New York on 19 December 1966.

Entry into force: 23 March 1976.

No.	Participant	Signature	Accession(a), Succession(d), Ratification	Declarations and Reservations
1	Argentina	19 Feb 1968	8 Aug 1986	*
2	Bolivia		12 Aug 1982 a	
3	Brazil		24 Jan 1992 a	
4	Chile	16 Sep 1969	10 Feb 1972	*
5	Colombia	21 Dec 1966	29 Oct 1969	
6	Costa Rica	19 Dec 1966	29 Nov 1968	
7	Cuba	28 Feb 2008**		
8	Dominican Rep.		4 Jan 1978 a	
9	Ecuador	4 Apr 1968	6 Mar 1969	*
10	El Salvador	21 Sep 1967	30 Nov 1979	
11	Guatemala		5 May 1992 a	
12	Guyana	22 Aug 1968	15 Feb 1977	*
13	Haiti		6 Feb 1991 a	
14	Honduras		25 Aug 1997	
15	Jamaica	19 Dec 1966	3 Oct 1975	
16	Mexico		23 Mar 1981 a	*
17	Nicaragua		12 Mar 1980 a	
18	Panama	27 Jul 1976	8 Mar 1977	
19	Paraguay		10 Jun 1992 a	
20	Peru	11 Aug 1977	28 Apr 1978	*
21	Suriname		28 Dec 1976 a	
22	Trinidad & Tobago		21 Dec 1978 a	*
23	Uruguay	21 Feb 1967	1 Apr 1970	*
24	Venezuela	24 Jun 1969	10 May 1978	

*Data source:

https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=en&mtdsg_no=IV-4&src=IND#EndDec

**For the ICCPR measure, the Accession/Ratification date has been taken into consideration. Only for Cuba, the signature year is used instead of the Accession/Ratification year.

Appendix D: Determinants of SOE declarations regression analyses

Appendix D, Table 1: Crisis Indices and SOE types

VARIABLES	(2) DV: Humanmade SOE Events	(3) DV: Natural SOE Events
Government Crises Index	0.0810*** (0.0250)	0.0715** (0.0298)
Regime Crises Index	0.0492 (0.0382)	-0.165*** (0.0324)
Economic Crises Index	0.0230 (0.0245)	-0.0993*** (0.0239)
International Crises Index	0.0263 (0.0243)	0.00797 (0.0211)
Natural Disaster Index	0.0486** (0.0232)	0.209*** (0.0284)
Constant	-0.0366 (0.0457)	0.112** (0.0510)
Observations	737	737
R-squared	0.046	0.175
F test	6.555	18.46
F test p-value	0.000	0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		


Appendix D, Table 2: Marginal effect of linkage on different values of leverage

VARIABLES	(1) DV: Humanmade SOE Events	(2) DV: Natural SOE Events
ICCPR Signature years	0.00554 (0.00348)	-0.00388 (0.00365)
Effect of Medium Leverage of West Compared to Low when Linkage takes zero	0.318 (0.259)	-1.122 (0.739)
Effect of High Leverage of West Compared to Low when Linkage takes zero	-0.200 (0.198)	0.415** (0.210)
Effect of Linkage when Leverage takes zero	0.670** (0.295)	1.221*** (0.342)
Medium Leverage X Linkage	-1.014** (0.402)	1.596 (1.270)
High Leverage X Linkage	-0.195 (0.372)	-0.676* (0.367)
Democracy Score (0=autoc.)	0.000762 (0.0128)	-0.00411 (0.0121)
High Court Independence	0.0132 (0.0390)	-0.0211 (0.0357)
Legislative Constraints on the Executive	-0.142 (0.173)	0.320* (0.182)
Assembly-Elected President Political System (b=Presid.)	-0.00643 (0.0862)	-0.206*** (0.0780)
Parliamentary Political System (b=Presidential)	-0.322*** (0.119)	-0.448*** (0.116)
Election	-0.105 (0.0822)	-0.00454 (0.0949)
Sols Change Dummy	0.208* (0.118)	0.191* (0.110)
Years Left in Office	-0.0370* (0.0215)	-0.00831 (0.0271)
Logged GDP in USD	-0.0634*** (0.0197)	0.0719** (0.0347)
Government Crises Index	0.0641*** (0.0239)	0.0260 (0.0314)
Regime Crises Index	0.0510 (0.0419)	-0.137*** (0.0378)
Economic Crises Index	0.0828*** (0.0271)	-0.0827** (0.0335)
International Crises Index	0.0213 (0.0238)	0.0114 (0.0198)
Natural Disaster Index	0.0376 (0.0286)	0.142*** (0.0276)
Constant	1.323*** (0.469)	-2.208*** (0.831)
Observations	737	737
R-squared	0.111	0.244
F test	3.249	10.33
F test p-value	0.0000	0.0000
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		

Appendix D, Table 3: Marginal effect of linkage by democracy

VARIABLES	(1) DV: Humanmade SOE Events	(2) DV: Humanmade SOE Events	(3) DV: Natural SOE Events	(4) DV: Natural SOE Events
ICCPR Signature years	0.00574* (0.00337)	0.00574* (0.00337)	-0.00324 (0.00366)	-0.00324 (0.00366)
Medium Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.361*** (0.0761)	-0.361*** (0.0761)	-0.0820 (0.142)	-0.0820 (0.142)
High Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.327*** (0.0733)	-0.327*** (0.0733)	0.0103 (0.0952)	0.0103 (0.0952)
Effect of Linkage when country is not a democracy	0.635 (0.425)		0.979*** (0.339)	
Effect of Democracy when Linkage takes zero	0.167 (0.240)		0.0112 (0.206)	
Democracy X Linkage	-0.113 (0.458)		0.0677 (0.355)	
Effect of Linkage when country is a democracy		0.522** (0.262)		1.046*** (0.309)
Effect of Non-Democracy when Linkage takes zero		-0.167 (0.240)		-0.0112 (0.206)
Non-Democracy X Linkage		0.113 (0.458)		-0.0677 (0.355)
High Court Independence	0.0106 (0.0393)	0.0106 (0.0393)	-0.0296 (0.0352)	-0.0296 (0.0352)
Legislative Constraints on the Executive	-0.201 (0.149)	-0.201 (0.149)	0.287* (0.155)	0.287* (0.155)
Assembly-Elected President System (b=Presid.)	7.41e-06 (0.0819)	7.41e-06 (0.0819)	-0.206*** (0.0742)	-0.206*** (0.0742)
Parliamentary Political System (b=Presidential)	-0.278** (0.114)	-0.278** (0.114)	-0.392*** (0.107)	-0.392*** (0.107)
Election	-0.107 (0.0824)	-0.107 (0.0824)	-0.00382 (0.0955)	-0.00382 (0.0955)
Sols Change Dummy	0.194* (0.115)	0.194* (0.115)	0.186* (0.108)	0.186* (0.108)
Years Left in Office	-0.0360* (0.0211)	-0.0360* (0.0211)	-0.00620 (0.0272)	-0.00620 (0.0272)
Logged GDP in USD	-0.0628*** (0.0205)	-0.0628*** (0.0205)	0.0713** (0.0362)	0.0713** (0.0362)
Government Crises Index	0.0579** (0.0233)	0.0579** (0.0233)	0.0118 (0.0312)	0.0118 (0.0312)
Regime Crises Index	0.0534 (0.0411)	0.0534 (0.0411)	-0.129*** (0.0372)	-0.129*** (0.0372)
Economic Crises Index	0.0800*** (0.0269)	0.0800*** (0.0269)	-0.0854** (0.0339)	-0.0854** (0.0339)
International Crises Index	0.0213 (0.0244)	0.0213 (0.0244)	0.0139 (0.0202)	0.0139 (0.0202)
Natural Disaster Index	0.0347 (0.0285)	0.0347 (0.0285)	0.143*** (0.0280)	0.143*** (0.0280)
Constant	1.306** (0.556)	1.473*** (0.489)	-2.094** (0.922)	-2.083** (0.858)
Observations	737	737	737	737
R-squared	0.111	0.111	0.237	0.237
F test	3.389	3.389	10.71	10.71
F test p-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



Appendix D, Figure 1: Marginal effect of linkage by democracy (V-Dem)

Appendix D, Table 4: Country fixed effects

VARIABLES	(1) DV: Humanmade SOE Events	(2) DV: Natural SOE Events
ICCPR Signature years	-0.00153 (0.00493)	0.00861* (0.00482)
Medium Leverage of West (b=Low)	0.0339 (0.0906)	0.183 (0.187)
High Leverage of West (b=Low)	0.0433 (0.0942)	0.148 (0.136)
Linkage with West	1.422*** (0.369)	1.345*** (0.376)
Democracy Score (0=autoc.)	-0.0202 (0.0201)	-0.0361* (0.0186)
High Court Independence	0.0860 (0.0671)	0.0359 (0.0568)
Legislative Constraints on the Executive	0.0325 (0.254)	0.514* (0.268)
Assembly-Elected President Political System (b=Presid.)	0.0232 (0.118)	-0.746*** (0.195)
Parliamentary Political System (b=Presidential)	-0.0840 (0.112)	-0.228 (0.140)
Election	-0.0549 (0.0789)	0.0619 (0.0904)
Sols Change Dummy	0.160 (0.101)	0.164 (0.103)
Years Left in Office	-0.0154 (0.0210)	0.0179 (0.0243)
Logged GDP in USD	-0.0450 (0.120)	0.0953 (0.148)
Government Crises Index	0.0561** (0.0238)	-0.0369 (0.0371)
Regime Crises Index	-0.0329 (0.0459)	-0.0126 (0.0430)
Economic Crises Index	0.0828*** (0.0280)	-0.0563* (0.0336)
International Crises Index	-0.00147 (0.0224)	0.0174 (0.0214)
Natural Disaster Index	-0.0110 (0.0294)	0.125*** (0.0307)
COW country code = 42	-0.000700 (0.291)	0.167 (0.275)
COW country code = 52	-0.169 (0.243)	0.120 (0.249)
COW country code = 70	-0.0118 (0.591)	0.108 (0.778)
COW country code = 90	0.336 (0.263)	0.567* (0.291)
COW country code = 91	0.278 (0.273)	0.922*** (0.263)
COW country code = 92	-0.00370	0.434*

	(0.222)	(0.231)
COW country code = 93	0.142	0.419*
	(0.247)	(0.216)
COW country code = 94	-0.212	0.520**
	(0.190)	(0.216)
COW country code = 95	-0.0345	0.174
	(0.199)	(0.170)
COW country code = 100	0.509	-0.141
	(0.406)	(0.494)
COW country code = 101	0.418	0.307
	(0.500)	(0.619)
COW country code = 110	-0.269	0.867***
	(0.229)	(0.296)
COW country code = 115	-0.414*	0.110
	(0.244)	(0.315)
COW country code = 130	1.165***	0.519
	(0.437)	(0.386)
COW country code = 135	1.247***	0.104
	(0.410)	(0.437)
COW country code = 140	0.351	1.250
	(0.707)	(0.946)
COW country code = 145	0.447	1.098***
	(0.292)	(0.309)
COW country code = 150	0.361	0.723***
	(0.230)	(0.242)
COW country code = 155	-0.0896	-0.0365
	(0.367)	(0.451)
COW country code = 160	0.427	0.438
	(0.513)	(0.621)
COW country code = 165	-0.177	-0.0240
	(0.224)	(0.254)
Constant	0.310	-3.465
	(2.631)	(3.169)
Observations	737	737
R-squared	0.271	0.340
F test	3.603	6.632
F test p-value	0.0000	0.0000

Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix D, Table 5: Poisson models

VARIABLES	(1) DV: Humanmade SOE Events	(2) DV: Natural SOE Events
ICCPR Signature years	0.0160 (0.0103)	0.00389 (0.00722)
Medium Leverage of West (b=Low)	-1.825*** (0.589)	-0.210 (0.351)
High Leverage of West (b=Low)	-1.191*** (0.245)	0.0783 (0.195)
Linkage with West	2.188*** (0.685)	1.391** (0.571)
Democracy Score (0=autoc.)	0.0340 (0.0555)	0.0387 (0.0416)
High Court Independence	-0.00360 (0.124)	-0.120 (0.0874)
Legislative Constraints on the Executive	-0.400 (0.624)	0.768 (0.506)
Assembly-Elected President Political System (b=Presid.)	0.146 (0.445)	-1.203** (0.603)
Parliamentary Political System (b=Presidential)	-1.511** (0.640)	-2.924*** (1.016)
Election	-0.359 (0.299)	0.0354 (0.172)
Sols Change Dummy	0.483 (0.297)	0.411** (0.185)
Years Left in Office	-0.108 (0.0813)	0.00277 (0.0545)
Logged GDP in USD	-0.220*** (0.0677)	0.167*** (0.0603)
Government Crises Index	0.241*** (0.0833)	-0.0108 (0.0669)
Regime Crises Index	0.219* (0.127)	-0.394*** (0.106)
Economic Crises Index	0.245*** (0.0694)	-0.176** (0.0755)
International Crises Index	0.0597 (0.0651)	0.0411 (0.0509)
Natural Disaster Index	0.109 (0.0821)	0.263*** (0.0470)
Constant	1.966 (1.616)	-6.859*** (1.463)
Observations	737	737
Pseudo R2	0.1332	0.2203
Chi2 test	102.1	206.9
F test p-value	0.0000	0.0000

Appendix D, Table 6: Models include one-year lagged DVs

VARIABLES	(1) DV: Humanmade SOE Events	(2) DV: Natural SOE Events
ICCPR Signature years	0.00105 (0.00338)	-0.00373 (0.00381)
Medium Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.201*** (0.0690)	-0.0209 (0.145)
High Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.203*** (0.0626)	0.0244 (0.0937)
Linkage with West	0.466** (0.237)	0.910*** (0.313)
Democracy Score (0=autoc.)	-0.00553 (0.0121)	-0.00854 (0.0119)
High Court Independence	0.00348 (0.0354)	-0.0280 (0.0364)
Legislative Constraints on the Executive	0.00688 (0.173)	0.375** (0.185)
Assembly-Elected President Political System (b=Presid.)	-0.0227 (0.0837)	-0.178** (0.0773)
Parliamentary Political System (b=Presidential)	-0.227** (0.100)	-0.372*** (0.125)
Election	-0.0504 (0.0742)	-0.0130 (0.0960)
Sols Change Dummy	0.125 (0.0975)	0.197* (0.110)
Years Left in Office	-0.0215 (0.0204)	-0.00561 (0.0276)
Logged GDP in USD	-0.0383** (0.0187)	0.0630* (0.0348)
Government Crises Index	0.0566** (0.0222)	0.00292 (0.0319)
Regime Crises Index	0.0224 (0.0412)	-0.116*** (0.0377)
Economic Crises Index	0.0486* (0.0280)	-0.0805** (0.0334)
International Crises Index	0.0167 (0.0211)	0.0153 (0.0209)
Natural Disaster Index	0.00943 (0.0257)	0.131*** (0.0284)
One year lag humanmade SOEs	0.423*** (0.0855)	
One year lag natural SOEs		0.152*** (0.0426)
Constant	0.779* (0.445)	-1.845** (0.820)
Observations	715	715
R-squared	0.267	0.253
F test	4.242	11.18
F test p-value	0.0000	0.0000
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		

Appendix D, Table 7: Models include emergency power strength among democracies

VARIABLES	(1) DV: Humanmade SOE Events	(2) DV: Natural SOE Events
ICCPR Signature years	0.00566 (0.00462)	-0.00207 (0.00509)
Medium Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.432*** (0.0954)	-0.145 (0.184)
High Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.461*** (0.0985)	-0.0409 (0.129)
Linkage with West	0.646** (0.290)	0.974** (0.386)
Democracy Score (0=autoc.)	-0.146** (0.0667)	-0.125*** (0.0476)
High Court Independence	0.0327 (0.0515)	-0.0188 (0.0471)
Legislative Constraints on the Executive	0.187 (0.248)	0.435* (0.248)
Assembly-Elected President Political System (b=Presid.)	-0.373* (0.202)	-0.471*** (0.170)
Parliamentary Political System (b=Presidential)	-0.337** (0.169)	-0.503*** (0.191)
Election	-0.137 (0.0929)	-0.0164 (0.118)
Sols Change Dummy	0.204* (0.123)	0.252** (0.123)
Years Left in Office	-0.0686*** (0.0243)	0.00313 (0.0359)
Logged GDP in USD	-0.110*** (0.0300)	0.0755 (0.0503)
Government Crises Index	0.0586** (0.0269)	-0.00551 (0.0379)
Regime Crises Index	0.0612 (0.0632)	-0.235*** (0.0560)
Economic Crises Index	0.0758** (0.0317)	-0.0861** (0.0371)
International Crises Index	-0.00132 (0.0288)	-0.0164 (0.0256)
Natural Disaster Index	0.0262 (0.0373)	0.157*** (0.0359)
Emergency Power Strength	-0.0196 (0.0486)	-0.0213 (0.0480)
Constant	3.650*** (0.971)	-1.158 (1.261)
Observations	537	537
R-squared	0.145	0.246
F test	3.277	9.743
F test p-value	0.0000	0.0000
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		

Appendix D, Table 8: Models before and after Cold War

VARIABLES	(1) DV: Humanmade SOE Events	(2) DV: Humanmade SOE Events	(3) DV: Natural SOE Events	(4) DV: Natural SOE Events
ICCPR Signature years	0.00174 (0.00470)	0.0111 (0.00857)	-0.0109** (0.00526)	-0.00511 (0.00528)
Medium Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.532*** (0.0936)	0.113 (0.156)	-0.101 (0.205)	-0.00228 (0.0566)
High Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.438*** (0.1000)	-0.106 (0.0960)	-0.0221 (0.144)	0.144** (0.0731)
Linkage with West	0.932*** (0.335)	-0.505 (0.323)	1.184*** (0.396)	-0.0542 (0.217)
All control variables in the main analyses	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.955*** (0.730)	1.447* (0.781)	-3.272** (1.383)	-0.224 (0.497)
Years	>=1991	<1991	>=1991	<1991
Observations	491	246	491	246
R-squared	0.119	0.231	0.228	0.120
F test	3.273	1.400	8.985	1.351
F test p-value	0.000	0.133	0.000	0.158
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

Appendix D, Table 9: Models for national and regional scale SOEs

VARIABLES	(1) DV: National SOE Events	(2) DV: Regional SOE Events
ICCPR Signature years	0.00257 (0.00229)	-0.00599* (0.00353)
Medium Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.0539 (0.0703)	-0.244*** (0.0899)
High Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.0567 (0.0487)	-0.135 (0.0841)
Linkage with West	0.263 (0.175)	0.910*** (0.288)
All control variables in the main analyses	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.041*** (0.287)	-2.237*** (0.829)
Observations	737	737
R-squared	0.066	0.240
F test	3.206	8.984
F test p-value	0.000	0.000

Appendix D, Table 10: Chi2 Test between my SOE dataset and R&C dataset

SOE Categories by Richards and Clay's SOE categories n=216			
	No SOE (R&C)	Under SOE (R&C)	Total
No SOE (my data)	86% (n=173)	13% (n=2)	81% (n=175)
Under SOE (my data)	14% (n=28)	87% (n=13)	19% (n=41)
Total	100% (n=201)	100% (n=15)	100% (n=216)
Pearson chi2(1) = 48.0200 Pr = 0.000			
likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 35.8658 Pr = 0.000			

Appendix D, Table 11: Descriptive for HBHF and STEM-II SOE datasets

Variable	Years	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Under SOE (political national)	1980-2007	553	.2513562	.4341857	0	1
HBHF Under SOE (political/national)		553	.2169982	.4125746	0	1
Under SOE (natural)		553	.2513562	.4341857	0	1
HBHF Under SOE (natural)		553	.1103074	.3135562	0	1
#of SOE Humanmade	1995-2015	407	.3415233	.79952	0	6
STEM-II #of SOE Humanmade		407	.1523342	.5756882	0	4
#of SOE Natural		407	.7174447	1.067323	0	8
STEM-II #of SOE Natural		407	.022113	.1775655	0	2

Appendix D, Table 12: Linkage replaced with trade link

VARIABLES	(1) DV: Humanmade SOE Events	(2) DV: Natural SOE Events
ICCPR Signature years	0.00965*** (0.00314)	0.00191 (0.00316)
Medium Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.337*** (0.0746)	-0.0303 (0.144)
High Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.290*** (0.0665)	0.0272 (0.0922)
Trade percentage in GDP	0.00153 (0.00241)	0.00917** (0.00381)
Democracy Score (0=autoc.)	0.000461 (0.0139)	-0.0188 (0.0134)
High Court Independence	0.0303 (0.0388)	-0.00844 (0.0349)
Legislative Constraints on the Executive	-0.210 (0.176)	0.390** (0.183)
Assembly-Elected President Political System (b=Presid.)	-0.0221 (0.0854)	-0.254*** (0.0762)
Parliamentary Political System (b=Presidential)	-0.227** (0.106)	-0.377*** (0.121)
Election	-0.101 (0.0825)	0.0103 (0.0964)
Sols Change Dummy	0.209* (0.119)	0.205* (0.108)
Years Left in Office	-0.0375* (0.0215)	-0.00645 (0.0277)
Logged GDP in USD	-0.0570*** (0.0195)	0.0863** (0.0342)
Government Crises Index	0.0558** (0.0233)	-0.000704 (0.0313)
Regime Crises Index	0.0351 (0.0428)	-0.151*** (0.0380)
Economic Crises Index	0.0608** (0.0274)	-0.113*** (0.0324)
International Crises Index	0.0215 (0.0239)	0.0140 (0.0200)
Natural Disaster Index	0.0389 (0.0291)	0.140*** (0.0292)
Constant	1.522*** (0.469)	-1.972** (0.814)
Observations	737	737
R-squared	0.102	0.231
F test	3.298	11.27
F test p-value	0.0000	0.0000
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		

Appendix D, Table 13: Models with vaguely and specifically defined SOEs

VARIABLES	(1) DV: Vaguely Defined SOEs	(2) DV: Vaguely Defined SOEs	(3) DV: Specifically Defined SOEs	(4) DV: Specifically Defined SOEs
ICCPR Signature years	0.00344** (0.00172)	0.00375* (0.00212)	0.00539 (0.00356)	-0.00307 (0.00417)
Medium Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.112*** (0.0413)	-0.202*** (0.0460)	-0.267* (0.139)	-0.181 (0.143)
High Leverage of West (b=Low)	-0.0609* (0.0339)	-0.200*** (0.0476)	-0.112* (0.0629)	-0.0465 (0.0981)
Linkage with West	0.122 (0.151)	0.175 (0.184)	0.888*** (0.273)	1.410*** (0.321)
Democracy Score (0=autoc.)		0.00564 (0.00863)		-0.00863 (0.0136)
High Court Independence		-0.0112 (0.0290)		0.00131 (0.0406)
Legislative Constraints on the Executive		-0.0777 (0.128)		0.291 (0.202)
Assembly-Elected President Political System (b=Presid.)		-0.0174 (0.0561)		-0.214** (0.0873)
Parliamentary Political System (b=Presidential)		-0.113* (0.0687)		-0.555*** (0.138)
Election		-0.0556 (0.0474)		-0.0247 (0.104)
Sols Change Dummy		0.0633 (0.0725)		0.260** (0.115)
Years Left in Office		-0.0176 (0.0135)		-0.0180 (0.0299)
Logged GDP in USD		-0.0617*** (0.0136)		0.0745** (0.0368)
Government Crises Index	0.0418** (0.0168)	0.0490*** (0.0175)	0.0624* (0.0340)	0.0208 (0.0336)
Regime Crises Index	0.0817*** (0.0302)	0.0783** (0.0312)	-0.145*** (0.0406)	-0.155*** (0.0443)
Economic Crises Index	0.0614*** (0.0215)	0.0790*** (0.0238)	-0.0455 (0.0310)	-0.0810** (0.0360)
International Crises Index	0.00337 (0.0156)	-0.00126 (0.0160)	0.0216 (0.0229)	0.0267 (0.0221)
Natural Disaster Index	0.00523 (0.0165)	0.0225 (0.0202)	0.220*** (0.0325)	0.162*** (0.0314)
Constant	-0.147 (0.101)	1.379*** (0.323)	-0.413** (0.174)	-2.232*** (0.858)
Observations	737	737	737	737
R-squared	0.071	0.099	0.216	0.260
F test	3.493	2.519	18.49	11.92
F test p-value	0.0003	0.0005	0.0000	0.0000
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

Appendix D, Table 14: Models with new leverage measure, including export dependency on Western countries

VARIABLES	(1) DV: Humanmade SOE Events	(2) DV: Natural SOE Events
ICCPR Signature years	0.00455 (0.00340)	-0.00424 (0.00359)
Medium leverage w/ export dependency on West (b=low)	-0.268*** (0.0740)	0.0158 (0.105)
High leverage w/ export dependency on West (b=low)	-0.293*** (0.0677)	-0.0601 (0.0882)
Linkage with West	0.656** (0.260)	1.129*** (0.295)
Democracy Score (0=autoc.)	0.000443 (0.0133)	-0.00987 (0.0121)
High Court Independence	0.0149 (0.0396)	-0.0315 (0.0351)
Legislative Constraints on the Executive	-0.157 (0.176)	0.396** (0.183)
Assembly-Elected President Political System (b=Presid.)	-0.00180 (0.0861)	-0.239*** (0.0754)
Parliamentary Political System (b=Presidential)	-0.256** (0.110)	-0.477*** (0.101)
Election	-0.108 (0.0831)	-0.00462 (0.0954)
Sols Change Dummy	0.223* (0.119)	0.200* (0.109)
Years Left in Office	-0.0384* (0.0217)	-0.00834 (0.0272)
Logged GDP in USD	-0.0523*** (0.0189)	0.0620* (0.0319)
Government Crises Index	0.0745*** (0.0238)	0.0202 (0.0310)
Regime Crises Index	0.0600 (0.0417)	-0.135*** (0.0377)
Economic Crises Index	0.0717*** (0.0275)	-0.0841** (0.0327)
International Crises Index	0.0249 (0.0241)	0.0150 (0.0199)
Natural Disaster Index	0.0435 (0.0287)	0.144*** (0.0276)
Constant	1.022** (0.430)	-1.890** (0.738)
Observations	737	737
R-squared	0.103	0.238
F test	3.202	11.43
F test p-value	0.000	0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		

Appendix E: Outcomes of SOEs and military mobilizations during SOEs

Appendix E, Table 1: Chi-square test of association having an SOE and DCA

Having a DCA and an SOE n=720			
	No SOE	Under SOE	Total
No DCA	84% (n=420)	16% (n=79)	100% (n=499)
DCA	74% (n=164)	26% (n=57)	100% (n=221)
Total	81% (n=584)	19% (n=136)	100% (n=720)
Pearson chi2(1) = 9.9177 Pr = 0.002			
likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 9.5172 Pr = 0.002			
Fisher's exact = 0.003			
1-sided Fisher's exact = 0.001			
Row percentages are reported.			

Appendix E, Table 2: Relationship between SOE declaration and being a signatory in a DCA agreement by country-year

	Formation of a new DCA	
	Yes	No
Average SOE Declarations (t+1)	0.36	0.27
	N=104	N=616
The mean difference between the states that form a DCA and do not form a DCA is NOT statistically significant (t=0.9773) in a two-sample t-test with unequal variances.		

Appendix E, Table 3: Odds ratio, effect of military mobilizations during SOEs on signing a new DCA

VARIABLES	(1) Bivariate	(2) International	(3) Domestic	(4) All
Number of Military Mobilization in SOE (t-1)	1.693*** (0.294)	1.885*** (0.235)	1.796*** (0.224)	1.672*** (0.242)
Number of all DCAs (t-1)		1.141*** (0.0238)	1.126*** (0.0271)	1.124*** (0.0291)
Number of Strategic Rivals		2.217*** (0.407)	2.050*** (0.525)	2.035*** (0.508)
Capability Ratio (State A/PRIE)		1.337*** (0.0434)	1.317*** (0.0383)	1.290*** (0.0442)
Mean MID in Contiguous States (t-1)		0.765 (0.385)	0.563 (0.317)	0.536 (0.304)
Liberal Democracy			0.414 (0.431)	0.228 (0.246)
Net Primary School Enrollment Rate			1.067*** (0.0239)	1.067*** (0.0246)
Logged GDP per capita			1.110 (0.292)	1.255 (0.327)
Government Crises Index (t-1)				1.283* (0.192)
Regime Crises Index (t-1)				0.979 (0.139)
Year Spline 1	0.936 (0.187)	0.964 (0.265)	0.959 (0.252)	0.956 (0.243)
Year Spline 2	2.831 (2.124)	3.154 (3.623)	2.946 (3.319)	2.725 (2.977)
Year Spline 3	0.0621 (0.114)	0.0400 (0.113)	0.0457 (0.128)	0.0597 (0.163)
Year Spline 4	12.43 (23.89)	20.04 (54.84)	20.61 (56.82)	15.19 (41.48)
Constant	7.037e+55 (2.799e+58)	2.294e+29 (1.251e+32)	3.426e+31 (1.793e+34)	5.197e+33 (2.629e+36)
Observations	720	720	720	720
Log Likelihood	-251.1	-193	-189	-187.6
Chi-square	64.22	231.5	547.1	n/a
Chi2 test p-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	n/a
Pseudo R-squared	0.155	0.351	0.364	0.369
Logistic regression, odds ratio robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

Appendix E, Table 4: Conditional effects of the international security environment

VARIABLES	(1) Rivalry	(2) MID
Military Mobilizations in SOE when there is no rivalry or MID	0.804*** (0.227)	0.344 (0.287)
Strategic Rivalry = 1	1.149** (0.457)	
Rivalry X Military Mobilization	-0.856 (0.553)	
MID in Contiguous States (dummy) = 1		-0.625 (0.437)
MID X Military Mobilization		0.295 (0.303)
Mean MID in Contiguous States (t-1)	-0.745 (0.556)	
Number of Strategic Rivals		0.823*** (0.210)
Number of all DCAs (t-1)	0.0947*** (0.0348)	0.108*** (0.0222)
Capability Ratio (State A/PRIE)	0.263*** (0.0349)	0.289*** (0.0400)
Liberal Democracy	-1.486 (1.084)	-1.334 (1.093)
Net Primary School Enrollment Rate	0.0543** (0.0235)	0.0611*** (0.0222)
Logged GDP per capita	0.336 (0.254)	0.199 (0.275)
Government Crises Index (t-1)	0.275* (0.148)	0.233 (0.155)
Regime Crises Index (t-1)	-0.0393 (0.178)	0.0288 (0.137)
Year Spline 1	-0.0574 (0.222)	-0.0472 (0.251)
Year Spline 2	0.971 (0.989)	1.094 (1.076)
Year Spline 3	-2.645 (2.530)	-3.103 (2.694)
Year Spline 4	2.362 (2.726)	3.087 (2.766)
Constant	102.0 (441.4)	81.94 (499.6)
Observations	720	720
Log Likelihood	-186.1	-186.8
Pseudo R-squared	0.374	0.372
Logistic regression, coefficients robust standard errors in paratheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		

Appendix E, Table 5: Conditional effects on the international financial environment

VARIABLES	(1) FDI current year	(2) FDI past 3 years
Military Mobilization (dummy)	0.276 (0.376)	0.591 (0.402)
FDI net inflows %of GDP current year when military mobilization is zero	-0.0378 (0.0256)	
FDI Current X Military Mobilization	0.230 (0.163)	
FDI net inflows %of GDP past 3 years mean when military mobilization is zero		-0.0771* (0.0407)
FDI Past 3 years X Military Mobilization		0.0882 (0.127)
Number of all DCAs (t-1)	0.111*** (0.0258)	0.113*** (0.0240)
Number of Strategic Rivals	0.694*** (0.246)	0.754*** (0.252)
Capability Ratio (State A/PRIE)	0.255*** (0.0347)	0.240*** (0.0339)
Mean MID in Contiguous States (t-1)	-0.922 (0.627)	-0.832 (0.630)
Liberal Democracy	-1.224 (1.245)	-1.097 (1.243)
Net Primary School Enrollment Rate	0.0567** (0.0256)	0.0578** (0.0265)
Logged GDP per capita	0.298 (0.267)	0.282 (0.271)
Government Crises Index (t-1)	0.272 (0.188)	0.266 (0.191)
Regime Crises Index (t-1)	0.00149 (0.154)	-0.0224 (0.152)
Year Spline 1	-0.0717 (0.260)	-0.0668 (0.308)
Year Spline 2	1.018 (1.124)	1.091 (1.306)
Year Spline 3	-2.652 (2.805)	-2.945 (3.272)
Year Spline 4	2.136 (2.869)	2.675 (3.288)
Constant	130.5 (516.2)	120.7 (612.5)
Observations	688	662
Log Likelihood	-173.7	-171.3
Pseudo R-squared	0.387	0.383

Logistic regression, coefficients robust standard errors in paratheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix E, Table 6: Conditional effects of democracy

VARIABLES	(1) Democracy
Military Mobilizations in SOE when the regime is not democracy	-0.267 (0.512)
Democracy = 1	-0.0422 (0.427)
Democracy X Military Mobilization	0.930* (0.500)
Number of all DCAs (t-1)	0.103*** (0.0221)
Number of Strategic Rivals	0.856*** (0.190)
Capability Ratio (State A/PRIE)	0.270*** (0.0375)
Mean MID in Contiguous States (t-1)	-0.447 (0.538)
Net Primary School Enrollment Rate	0.0641*** (0.0229)
Logged GDP per capita	0.0157 (0.242)
Government Crises Index (t-1)	0.158 (0.155)
Regime Crises Index (t-1)	0.0284 (0.149)
Year Spline 1	-0.0694 (0.253)
Year Spline 2	1.117 (1.053)
Year Spline 3	-3.072 (2.580)
Year Spline 4	2.937 (2.588)
Constant	126.7 (503.6)
Observations	720
Log Likelihood	-188.3
Chi-square	819.9
Chi2 test p-value	0.0000
Pseudo R-squared	0.367
Logistic regression, coefficients robust standard errors in paratheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

Appendix E, Table 7: Models with linkage variable

VARIABLES	(1) Linkage
Number of Military Mobilization in SOE (t-1)	0.474*** (0.153)
Linkage with West	-2.386 (1.553)
Number of all DCAs (t-1)	0.107*** (0.0239)
Number of Strategic Rivals	0.550** (0.243)
Capability Ratio (State A/PRIE)	0.215*** (0.0434)
Mean MID in Contiguous States (t-1)	-0.635 (0.548)
Liberal Democracy	-1.397 (1.071)
Net Primary School Enrollment Rate	0.0525** (0.0264)
Logged GDP per capita	0.445 (0.305)
Government Crises Index (t-1)	0.299* (0.172)
Regime Crises Index (t-1)	-0.0333 (0.121)
Year Spline 1	-0.0885 (0.247)
Year Spline 2	1.132 (1.055)
Year Spline 3	-2.844 (2.617)
Year Spline 4	2.067 (2.657)
Constant	164.3 (491.2)
Observations	718
Log Likelihood	-185.8
Pseudo R-squared	0.374
Logistic regression, coefficients robust standard errors in paratheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

Appendix E, Table 8: Probit DCA model

VARIABLES	(1) Probit
Number of Military Mobilization in SOE (t-1)	0.264*** (0.0859)
Number of all DCAs (t-1)	0.0704*** (0.0136)
Number of Strategic Rivals	0.413*** (0.130)
Capability Ratio (State A/PRIE)	0.143*** (0.0179)
Mean MID in Contiguous States (t-1)	-0.309 (0.283)
Liberal Democracy	-0.768 (0.563)
Net Primary School Enrollment Rate	0.0352*** (0.0116)
Logged GDP per capita	0.113 (0.148)
Government Crises Index (t-1)	0.135* (0.0821)
Regime Crises Index (t-1)	-0.00538 (0.0802)
Year Spline 1	-0.00151 (0.123)
Year Spline 2	0.442 (0.528)
Year Spline 3	-1.275 (1.335)
Year Spline 4	1.269 (1.449)
Constant	-3.638 (245.3)
Observations	720
Log Likelihood	-185.9
Chi-square	1416
Chi2 test p-value	0
Pseudo R-squared	0.375
Probit regression, coefficients robust standard errors in paratheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

Appendix E, Table 9: DCA model with country fixed effects

VARIABLES	(1) Country fixed effects
Number of Military Mobilization in SOE (t-1)	0.418** (0.210)
Number of all DCAs (t-1)	-0.146** (0.0691)
Number of Strategic Rivals	-0.735 (0.463)
Capability Ratio (State A/PRIE)	-1.358*** (0.343)
Mean MID in Contiguous States (t-1)	0.394 (0.603)
Liberal Democracy	-1.165 (1.632)
Net Primary School Enrollment Rate	-0.0211 (0.0394)
Logged GDP per capita	0.949 (0.685)
Government Crises Index (t-1)	0.140 (0.281)
Regime Crises Index (t-1)	-0.268 (0.318)
Year Spline 1	-0.0818 (0.140)
Year Spline 2	1.322** (0.568)
Year Spline 3	-3.145* (1.687)
Year Spline 4	1.802 (2.852)
COW country code = 41, omitted	-
COW country code = 42	-2.585*** (0.841)
COW country code = 51, omitted	-
COW country code = 52, omitted	-
COW country code = 70, omitted	-
COW country code = 90	-1.060 (0.931)
COW country code = 91	-1.041 (1.213)
COW country code = 92	0.302 (0.708)

COW country code = 93	-0.671 (1.105)
COW country code = 94, omitted	-
COW country code = 95	-3.140*** (0.834)
COW country code = 100	3.050*** (1.176)
COW country code = 101	3.864*** (1.144)
COW country code = 110	-1.795** (0.785)
COW country code = 115	-2.675** (1.264)
COW country code = 130	-0.765 (0.643)
COW country code = 135	1.791* (0.958)
COW country code = 140	19.44*** (3.962)
COW country code = 145	1.456* (0.883)
COW country code = 150	0.432 (0.840)
COW country code = 155	4.180*** (1.117)
COW country code = 160	5.659*** (1.140)
COW country code = 165	-1.883* (1.049)
Constant	152.9 (280.9)
Observations	570
Log Likelihood	-156.3
Pseudo R-squared	0.423

Logistic regression, coefficients robust standard errors in paratheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix E, Table 10: SOEs with no military mobilization

VARIABLES	(1) SOEs no Mobilization
Number of SOEs without Military Mobilization	0.409 (0.315)
Number of all DCAs (t-1)	0.115*** (0.0247)
Number of Strategic Rivals	0.713*** (0.252)
Capability Ratio (State A/PRIE)	0.257*** (0.0364)
Mean MID in Contiguous States (t-1)	-0.584 (0.534)
Liberal Democracy	-1.368 (1.059)
Net Primary School Enrollment Rate	0.0709*** (0.0223)
Logged GDP per capita	0.188 (0.262)
Government Crises Index (t-1)	0.253* (0.143)
Regime Crises Index (t-1)	0.00201 (0.165)
Year Spline 1	-0.0472 (0.247)
Year Spline 2	0.960 (1.055)
Year Spline 3	-2.643 (2.637)
Year Spline 4	2.395 (2.716)
Constant	81.31 (490.6)
Observations	720
Chi-square	834
Chi2 test p-value	0.0000
Pseudo R-squared	0.367
Log Likelihood	-188.1
Logistic regression, coefficients robust standard errors in paratheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

Appendix E, Table 11: Military mobilizations for natural disaster SOEs


VARIABLES	(1) Bivariate Natural	(2) Natural
Military Mobilization for Natural Disaster SOEs	0.819* (0.449)	-0.893*** (0.276)
Number of all DCAs (t-1)		0.133*** (0.0280)
Number of Strategic Rivals		0.659*** (0.240)
Capability Ratio (State A/PRIE)		0.266*** (0.0343)
Mean MID in Contiguous States (t-1)		-0.472 (0.502)
Liberal Democracy		-1.516 (1.059)
Net Primary School Enrollment Rate		0.0693*** (0.0233)
Logged GDP per capita		0.178 (0.260)
Government Crises Index (t-1)		0.298** (0.147)
Regime Crises Index (t-1)		-0.00468 (0.153)
Year Spline 1		-0.0137 (0.245)
Year Spline 2		0.757 (1.024)
Year Spline 3		-2.035 (2.519)
Year Spline 4		1.684 (2.521)
Constant	-1.848*** (0.250)	15.07 (486.8)
Observations	720	720
Chi-square	3.322	707.1
Chi2 test p-value	0.0684	0.0000
Pseudo R-squared	0.0149	0.369
Log Likelihood	-292.9	-187.6
Logistic regression, coefficients robust standard errors in paratheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		

Appendix E, Table 12: Alternative of military mobilization, high military activity

VARIABLES	(1) Military Expenditure Change	(2) Military Personnel Change	(3) Military Expenditure to GDP
Annual Change in Military Expenditure	-5.83e-08 (7.81e-08)		
Annual Change in Military Personnel		0.00361 (0.00659)	
Military Expenditure Percent of GDP			13.96 (17.53)
Number of all DCAs (t-1)	0.117*** (0.0250)	0.120*** (0.0266)	0.117*** (0.0280)
Number of Strategic Rivals	0.702*** (0.239)	0.671*** (0.241)	0.518* (0.264)
Capability Ratio (State A/PRIE)	0.253*** (0.0314)	0.248*** (0.0321)	0.243*** (0.0372)
Mean MID in Contiguous States (t-1)	-0.564 (0.537)	-0.517 (0.542)	-0.876 (0.600)
Liberal Democracy	-1.578 (1.096)	-1.398 (1.064)	-1.212 (1.243)
Net Primary School Enrollment Rate	0.0723*** (0.0242)	0.0664*** (0.0231)	0.0505* (0.0263)
Logged GDP per capita	0.144 (0.271)	0.149 (0.266)	0.169 (0.259)
Government Crises Index (t-1)	0.262* (0.145)	0.281* (0.146)	0.273* (0.162)
Regime Crises Index (t-1)	-0.0120 (0.156)	-0.00136 (0.165)	-0.00435 (0.212)
Year Spline 1	-0.00452 (0.265)	-0.0348 (0.245)	-0.0875 (0.264)
Year Spline 2	0.730 (1.128)	0.877 (1.052)	1.072 (1.120)
Year Spline 3	-1.982 (2.807)	-2.374 (2.628)	-2.805 (2.761)
Year Spline 4	1.688 (2.862)	2.045 (2.674)	2.334 (2.750)
Constant	-2.996 (527.8)	57.44 (488.0)	163.4 (524.3)
Observations	682	706	595
Pseudo R-squared	0.360	0.361	0.357
Log Likelihood	-185.2	-188.5	-171.3
Logistic regression, coefficients robust standard errors in paratheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1			

Appendix E, Table 13: Alternative measures of military mobilization


VARIABLES	(1) Dummy Mobilization	(2) Days Mobilization
Dummy Military Mobilized in SOE	0.789*** (0.291)	
Avg. Days of Military Mobilized in SOE		0.193** (0.0871)
Number of all DCAs (t-1)	0.117*** (0.0260)	0.116*** (0.0256)
Number of Strategic Rivals	0.698*** (0.249)	0.697*** (0.248)
Capability Ratio (State A/PRIE)	0.250*** (0.0336)	0.252*** (0.0332)
Mean MID in Contiguous States (t-1)	-0.615 (0.565)	-0.625 (0.561)
Liberal Democracy	-1.500 (1.074)	-1.501 (1.082)
Net Primary School Enrollment Rate	0.0647*** (0.0226)	0.0680*** (0.0232)
Logged GDP per capita	0.254 (0.260)	0.213 (0.262)
Government Crises Index (t-1)	0.249 (0.153)	0.261* (0.147)
Regime Crises Index (t-1)	-0.0137 (0.146)	-0.0392 (0.164)
Year Spline 1	-0.0296 (0.256)	-0.0304 (0.262)
Year Spline 2	0.900 (1.090)	0.921 (1.117)
Year Spline 3	-2.504 (2.708)	-2.595 (2.782)
Year Spline 4	2.298 (2.697)	2.515 (2.772)
Constant	46.55 (510.0)	48.00 (521.0)
Observations	720	720
Pseudo R-squared	0.369	0.367
Log Likelihood	-187.7	-188.2
Logistic regression, coefficients robust standard errors in paratheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		



Appendix E, Figure 1: Post-Cold War period of analysis (1990-2010)

Appendix E, Table 14: Dyadic analysis

VARIABLES	(1) Dyad Mobilization Count	(2) Dyad Mobilization Dummy
Avg. Number of Military Mobilization in SOE	0.783*** (0.289)	
Military Mobilized (Both=2, One=1, None=0) = 1		0.385 (0.416)
Military Mobilized (Both=2, One=1, None=0) = 2		1.757* (1.004)
Avg. Number of all DCAs	0.126*** (0.0306)	0.126*** (0.0305)
DCA with the USA = 1	2.509*** (0.610)	2.482*** (0.611)
Capability Difference	8.980 (35.32)	7.027 (35.69)
Both Democracy = 1	0.569 (0.666)	0.507 (0.653)
Year Spline 1	1.273* (0.742)	1.320* (0.780)
Year Spline 2	-5.494* (3.180)	-5.709* (3.294)
Year Spline 3	16.66* (9.241)	17.32* (9.514)
Year Spline 4	-19.72* (10.11)	-20.49** (10.31)
Constant	-2,547* (1,480)	-2,640* (1,555)
Observations	5,520	5,520
Chi-square	173.8	n/a
Chi2 test p-value	0.0000	n/a
Pseudo R-squared	0.305	0.305
Log Likelihood	-150.8	-150.8
Logistic regression, coefficients robust standard errors in paratheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		



Appendix E, Figure 2: Association between average SOEs and average PKOs for El Salvador