THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE

SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

STATE AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM: A COMPARISON OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Master's Thesis

MELİH ARDA ÖZ

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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Melih Arda Öz

Thesis Supervisor
Assist. Prof. Filiz Tutku AYDIN BEZİKOĞLU

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DEMOKRASİ VE OTORİTERLİKTE DEVLET VE İSTİHBARAT KURUMLARI: RUSYA VE AMERİKA BİRLEŞİK DEVLETLERİ'NİN KARŞILAŞTIRILMASI

Melih Arda Öz

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Danışman: Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Filiz Tutku AYDIN BEZİKOĞLU

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Bu araştırma, istihbarat kurumlarının birbirinden farklı rejim türleri içindeki kurumsal davranışlarını karşılaştırmalı bir şekilde analiz etmeyi hedeflemektedir. Özerklik, şeffaflık, hesap verebilirlik ve kurumsal bütünlük bağlamında gerçekleştirilen analizde, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile Rusya örnek vakalar olarak belirlenmiştir. Bu iki ülkenin seçilme sebebi, modern istihbaratın evriminde öncü bir rol üstlenmeleridir, aynı zamanda mevcut literatürde demokratikleşme çalışmalarında istihbarat kurumlarının yeri de yeterince fazla değildir. Bu çerçevede, bu araştırmanın sorusu, demokratik ve otoriter rejimler, özerklik, şeffaflık, hesap verebilirlik ve kurumsal bütünlüklerini koruyup koruyamadıkları gibi temel faktörler aracılığıyla istihbarat teşkilatlarıyla nasıl pratikler yapıyorlar?

Araştırma, nitel araştırma yöntemlerinden karşılaştırmalı vaka analizi (en farklı sistem tasarımı) ile yapılmış ve tarihsel kurumsalcılık teorik çerçevesi ile ele alınmıştır. Bu yöntemle, rejimsel ve kurumsal açıdan farklılık gösteren ABD ve Rusya'nın istihbarat kurumlarının benzer ya da farklı davranış biçimleri sergileyip sergilemediği incelenmiştir. Araştırmada 21. yüzyılın başından korona virüs salgının başladığı 2019 yılına kadar her iki ülkede dikkat çeken istihbarat olayları analiz edilmiş ve kurumsal yapılar ile belirtilen değerlerin nasıl örtüştüğü incelenmiştir.

Elde edilen veriler, demokratik bir sisteme sahip olmasına rağmen Amerikan istihbarat kuruluşlarının şeffaflık, hesap verebilirlik ve özerklik açısından çoğu zaman önemli yetersizlikler sergilediğini göstermektedir. Diğer taraftan, otoriter yapısı ile tanınan Rusya'da bu değerlere dair net bir kurumsal yapı gözlemlenememekte, istihbarat teşkilatları ile devlet arasındaki sınırların belirsizleştiği ve kurumsal bütünlüğün kaybolduğu görülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İstihbarat Teşkilatları, Demokrasi, Otoriterlik, ABD İstihbaratı, Rusya İstihbaratı

Abstract

STATE AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM: A COMPARISON OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Melih Arda Öz

Graduate School of Social Sciences

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Filiz Tutku AYDIN BEZİKOĞLU

July 2025

This study aims to comparatively analyze the institutional conduct of intelligence agencies across different regime types. The analysis, conducted within the context of autonomy, transparency, accountability, and institutional integrity, identified the United States and Russia as case studies. These two countries were chosen because they have contributed largely to the evolution of modern-day intelligence, also intelligence institutions do not have a sufficient place in democratization studies in the literature. In this arrangement, the research question is to understand how democratic and authoritarian regimes practice with their intelligence agencies through key factors including autonomy, transparency, accountability and whether they maintain their institutional integrity?

The research was using qualitative research methods through a comparative case study most different system design with theoretical framing of historical institutionalism. This method examines whether the intelligence agencies of the US and Russia, which differ in terms of regimes and institutions, exhibit similar or different behaviors. The study analyzes notable intelligence events in both countries from the beginning of the 21st century until the start of the coronavirus pandemic in 2019, examining how institutional structures and stated values align.

The data accessed indicate that, under a democratic government, US intelligence agencies most of the time demonstrate grave failures in transparency, accountability, and autonomy. Under an authoritarian structure in Russia, it is seen that a clearly established institutional framework related to these values does not exist, and the distinction between intelligence agencies and the state appears to be becoming indistinct with the loss of institutional integrity.

Keywords: Intelligence Agencies, Democracy, Authoritarianism, US Intelligence, Russian Intelligence

List of Abbrevations

CENTCOM: United States Central Command

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

CHEKA: All-Russian Extraordinary Commission

COVID-19: Coronavirus disease 2019

DEA: Drug Enforcement Agency

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

FBI: Federal Buraeu of Investigation

FIORC: Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council

FISA: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

FISC: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

FSB: Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation

GCHQ: Government Communications Headquarters

KGB: Committee for State Security

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

NKVD: People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs

NSA: National Security Agency

ODNI: Office Directorate of National Intelligenec

OGPU: Joint State Political Directorate

OKHRANA: Department for the Protection of Public Safety and Order

PATRIOT ACT: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism

PCLOB: Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board

PRISM: Planning Tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization, and Management

SSCI: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

SVR: Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation

SIGINT: Signal Intelligence

UN: United Nations

US: United States

USA: United States of America

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Intelligence has a vital role in safeguarding national security, and in some cases state survival and by definition involves secrecy. Intelligence institutions emerged with the Cold War as an instrument that could be used in place of the military's hard power and when diplomacy did not work. Furthermore, they have become almost one of the most important institutions within the state. On the other hand, democracy means public consent of the activities of the state. Right from this point, there is a tension between intelligence and democracy. For, intelligence cannot be regarded as an absolute vaue for which all other values must be fordaken. It is a relative value in which the benfits of intelligence must be balanced with benfits fof freedom and rights, free specch rule of law and so on (Hastedt, 1991, s. 10)

Since the early 1970s the growing involvement of other actors especially the legislative and judicial branches, and the media in the management of the democratic state's relations with its intelligence community has expropriated the monopoly over this sensitive domain from the hands of the executive branch and has made previously secret intelligence issues a normal subject of a public debate. This has led in most cases to two results: first, intelligence action has become more law-abiding than in the past; second, intelligence action has become more immune than in the past to the influence of parochial political interests. This created what is called the “democratic-intelligence paradox”. While other topics of democratization is examined extensively, this paradox is largely ignored in the literature. However more empirical work is needed to understand the efforts to grapple with secrecy of intelligence and to understand the effectiveness of oversight mechanisms.

We provide a comparative empirical study of oversight and control of intelligence two different regimes- democratic USA and competitive authoritarian Russia. In both regimes we identified cases where intelligence seemed to be out of control by public. Despite differences in regime types and types of political governance, we ask why these two states fail to ensure democratic oversight of their intelligence institutions. The selection of Russia case might be curious as it could be already taken for granted that no institution in Russia can be checked by public and democratic mechanisms. Russia is also a case in post-communist countries which is competitive authoritarian but its intelligence organizations was not attempted to be reformed as

other post-communist countries but siloviki working in former KGB has captured state and economy. However, Russia is also a crucial case to demonstrate what lengths intelligence organizations can go if not oversawn by public- capture the state to solidify authoritarian and domestic foreign policy.

This thesis is significant for several reasons. Although Russian and American intelligence agencies were compared before, they were not compared in a systematic most different systems design in order to address probems of generalizability in small N studies. Moreover, having several minicases from the civil-intelligence relations in fact we increased the number of cases, and further increasing generalizability of our main argument. Secondly by utilizing historical institutionalist approach this work aims to bring together structural and agential factors hence balancing struccactural regularities with historical contingencies. Thirdly, by conduxting a case study of intelligence to understand the evolution of political systems in the world we demonstrate that there are significant commonalties developing in authoritarian and democratic systems, perhaps to suggest that world political systems are converging more than we realize, due to various structural and discursive factors.

1.1. Research Question

We will focus on the following research question: How democratic and authoritarian regimes practice with their intelligence agencies through key factors including autonomy, transparency, accountability and whether they maintain their institutional integrity?

In examining this research question, the practices of the two regimes in question, namely the democratic US and authoritarian Russia, regarding their intelligence institutions will be examined. Because intelligence institutions are inherently secretive, they conflict with democratic values such as transparency and accountability. Furthermore, for these institutions to function effectively, values such as institutional autonomy and institutional integrity will be considered, and the practices employed by different regimes regarding intelligence will be examined.

Furthermore, the operation of oversight mechanisms under different regimes will be as a subquestion of this research question.

1.2. Main Argument

We suggest in this thesis that authoritarian and democratic regimes ultimately both fail democratic control of intelligence with regards to transparency, accpountability, institutional integrity and maintain authoritarian practices. Despite various oversight mechanisms in place, these oversight mechanisms do not work. When the state official and intelligence bureacrats perceive that state security is endangered due to a critical event, they cooperate to expand the prerogatives (unchecked power) for intelligence agencies changing legal framework and prevent abusers of power from juridical scrutiny. These point to an inherent tension between national security and democracy.

Despite structural differences between the democratic U.S. and authoritarian Russia, historical institutionalism reveals that intelligence agencies in both states exhibit similar authoritarian practices during critical security crises, leading to a path-dependent trajectory that shape institutional evolution with increasing return that is because intelligence agencies are exceptional, decision-makers can easily evade the law and expand their influence. Even with regime differences, intelligence agencies may exhibit similar repressive tendencies at perceived national security threats which will increase over time due to path-dependency.

For instance, the post-9/11 expansion of security measures and intelligence powers in the U.S. created a path dependency that continues to shape institutional behavior, as illustrated by programs like CIA's Vault 7—developed long after the immediate terrorist threat had diminished and only exposed through leaks.

1.3. Methodology, Method and Scope

Metholodogically, historical institutionalism was used (i) we concentrated on meso-level structures (ii) traced large processes to understand paths and institutional lock-ins and feedback mechanisms (iii) tried to identify critical junctures in historical processes. The method used in the study is a comparative case study method. Multiple case studies and case comparisons are employed in this study. On the first level, this is a comparative case study of Russia and the US in the 21st century based on most different systems design. Despite different regimes, Russia and the USA both ended up deploying authoritarian practices regarding state

and public's relations with intelligence agencies. We chose to focus on the last two and a half decade because (i)Russia's intelligence and state systems became intertwined with Vladimir Putin's rise at the beginning of the 2000s, and (ii) the United States undertook significant intelligence reforms after the 9/11 attacks. In both countries, in the last decade, developing technologies and the changing international order have further expanded the intelligence agencies' spheres of influence. On the second level, mini-cases were chosen to examine a country in question. The USA minicases are the Snowden leaks, collateral murders in the WikiLeaks documents, Guantanamo Bay Prison and Vault 7, weapons of mass destruction and the Iraq War. The Russian mini-cases are the Yukos case, the Litvinenko assassination, and the Politkovskaya assassination. On the third level all mini cases are compared to each other.

As for technique in conducting case studies, we utilized open content analysis of documentary sources, media reports, official documents and secondary literature.

1.4. Limitations

Accessing documents is particularly difficult due to the inherent secrecy and state secrets of intelligence agencies. Furthermore, interviewing current intelligence officers is not currently possible. Furthermore, focusing on just two countries may limit generalizability. The analysis is based on specific incidents only; examples could be expanded, or, conversely, exemplary incidents could be included in the study.

1.5. Literature review of Civil-Inteligence and State-Intelligence Relations regarding democracy-intelligence dilemma

When considered the relationship between intelligence agencies and politics, we observe that the values of various different political regimes or the important features that constitute their institutions contradict the form of that political regime. The literature on this topic has adopted different approaches and presented different assessments. In this sense, the existing literature is divided into five distinct perspectives. The first of these perspectives addresses recommendations for intelligence agencies to operate in line with democratic values in democracies, where document collection is relatively easier, particularly in the USA and

Britain. The second literature examines authoritarian practices observed in democratic states. This section argues that, even if the state is not authoritarian, some actions taken are consistent with the practices of authoritarian states. The third section argues that these practices are not authoritarian but inherent in intelligence. These two sections will be discussed together in this review. The fourth section examines the consistent behavior of intelligence agencies in democracies with democratic values and the reasons for these behaviors, as well as the authoritarian attitudes of intelligence agencies in authoritarian states. The final section examines the relationship between state and intelligence in an authoritarian state, specifically Russia.

Leuprecht and McNorton (2021) engaged in an ambitious project of developing "democratic theory" of civil-intelligence relations and therefore examined states that they argue are most capable of yielding a set of best practices for resolving, or at least creatively handling, the paradox. Underpinned by a most-similar systems design, the study compares intelligence governance across Five Eyes partners to identify convergences and institutional variants. Those states gather and share the most sensitive information about their individual and collective threat environments. Those states arethe United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Leuprecht and McNorton (2021) examination of each country's procedures and institutions for assuring as much accountability as possible, in the circumstances. it remains unclear whether any member of the Five Eyes stands out by "using their powers lawfully, proportionally, and as warranted" (p. 193). "Does, or can, anyone get it right?" Apparently not, at least if we take their word for it. For they tell us that because of the sheer complexity injected by "endogenous" factors (including such hard-to-handle items as "history" and "culture"), it becomes "difficult to zero in on a definitive bottom line of what makes for 'good' intelligence accountability" (p. 202). Yet states can minimize, though never completely eliminate, the most disturbing consequences inherent in the democratic-intelligence paradox. Second, it is vitally important that they do what they can to minimize those negative consequences, for nothing other than the "future of democracy and democratic legitimation" is at stake (p. 206). They show how legislative and judicial oversight mechanisms have increasingly been layered onto executive/administrative controls from the post-Cold War era onward to meet evolving threats and technological challenges. (Intelligence As Democratic Statecraft: Accountability and Governance of Civil-Intelligence Relations Across the Five Eyes Security Community - the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). They found out that Democracies gain comparative advantage by combining executive, legislative, judicial, and

bureaucratic oversight instead of relying on single-model enforcement. Intelligence oversight institutions have evolved in response to technological disruption and escalated threats, ensuring accountability remains fit-for-purpose. Especially in asymmetric conflicts, transparent and law-based oversight reassures publics that intelligence remains aligned with democratic values, even under secrecy constraints. This book is criticized for not parallel description rather than than rigorous theoretical synthesis as applied in political science in examining political institutions.

There are other case studies of democratic countries. Phythian (2019) states that the Intelligence and Security Committee in Britain lacks oversight because it does not carry out as much as it does, that they are weak because they are accountable to the prime minister against political pressure. Gill (2016) also explored reform processes in old and new democracies. Intelligence reform is possible not only through legal regulations but also through political will and the participation of civil society. Kniep, Ewert, Reyes, Tréguer, Cluskey, & Aradau, (2024) examine the oversight and surveillance weaknesses in intelligence by taking the examples of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. They provide intelligence oversight should not be considered as a uniform institutional mechanism; It should be understood as a pluralistic, conflictual, and dynamic process in which struggle, participation, and objection are intertwined. Similarly, Hillebrand (2019) examines after the events of 9/11 in the United States the media renders intelligence institutions transparent in three ways: first, it conveys government decisions and activity reports to the public through news. Second, the media acts as a substitute watchdog when official watchdogs are inadequate (such as NSA wiretapping). Furthermore, it plays an important role in legitimizing intelligence decisions. Consequently, he underlines that the active use of the media can create a control and oversight role. In this parallel, Escobar (2001) examines the problems faced by intelligence institutions through a comparative analysis of newly democratizing countries- Argentina, Romania, and El Salvador- He suggests that new democratic intelligence systems should establish a proper balance between national security, intelligence activities, and individual freedoms. Sheptycki, J. (2007) argues in his article that national security doctrines in an increasingly globalized world are now harming people and human rights. He argues that, above all, they should see themselves as human beings and make decisions not based on narrow institutional interests but on the interests of common humanity and global societal interests. In the literature it is emphasized that the increasing role of non-state actors hinders democratic oversight. Many authors (Johnson) that

intelligence institutions must adhere to accountability, transparency, and ethical values, as well as an effective and swift intelligence system.

A second stream of literature examines authoritarian practices in democracies. Glasius & Michaelsen (2018) argue that the NSA's mass surveillance programs constitute an authoritarian practice in the democratic United States. This authoritarian practice is manifested through arbitrary surveillance, illegality, and the surveillance of whistleblower contacts. Giroux (2006), in his study focusing on a specific time period, argues that the USA state entered a period of significant authoritarianism with the Bush administration, in the areas of intelligence, social, and political spheres. Some media outlets cite the NSA's unauthorized surveillance of the US public, the CIA's illegal practices on detainees and potential criminals in various countries, and the revelations of corruption during the Iraq War as examples of these practices. It is also argued that similar practices exist in social and political contexts. Along similar lines, Varol (2014) uses the term "authoritarian practices" in his study, demonstrating that while covert authoritarian practices are prevalent in largely undemocratic regimes, such practices can also emerge in seemingly democratic regimes like the United States. Thus, he aims to reorient academic discussions on the need to focus on regime practices rather than regime types. Similarly, in line with his other study, Glasius (2018) argues that the concept of authoritarianism extends beyond elections and electoral participation. Contrary to Dahl's view in his book "On Democracy" (1998), authoritarianism does not only exist in places where democratic participation is lacking. Rather, he argues that it would be more accurate to focus on authoritarian and illiberal practices, which can lead to authoritarian approaches.

Caparini (2014) draws a different perspective, focusing on former communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, tracing the processes related to the democratization of intelligence in these countries. While monitoring these processes, she concluded that both the European Union, which considers itself representative of democratic values, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have prioritized security oversight for intelligence reforms in these countries, rather than democratization, and that institutions in these countries lack accountability and transparency. Similarly, Sepper (2010) argues that oversight mechanisms for international intelligence cooperation are difficult. He argues that such situations hinder the ability of institutions to serve democracy in liberal democracies, but that this is minimally achieved through internal oversight. He argues that the international work of intelligence agencies, which are supposed to protect democratic interests, bypasses both national and international legal regulations. The most well-known example is the Five Eyes. The proposed

solution is for the joint work of the countries' legislatures and executives and greater involvement of the judiciary in the process.

However, some authors and researchers argue that these authoritarian practices in the literature are not as significant or serious as they are portrayed. For example, Johnson (2002) explains that the USA, after the Cold War, disclosed millions of CIA-related documents, one by one. However, various incidents (such as the withholding of files on the Pinochet regime) did not satisfy the public. Richards (2019), after the Snowden revelations, emphasizes that mass data collection and mass surveillance are not the same. While acknowledging that data is collected, he argues that not all of this data is examined and is retained for potential risks. He also argues that technology will further develop in the future, making such practices unnecessary.

There is also literature that compares intelligence agencies in democratic and authoritarian regimes, exploring their working principles. In this context, Hatfield (2022) argues that the role of intelligence agencies in authoritarian regimes is primarily to defend and protect the regime. He argues that analytical objectivity is the first and foremost principle of intelligence agencies in democratic countries. Similarly, Váňová (2024) conducted a comparative analysis of intelligence accountability using the examples of the United Kingdom and Slovakia. In this context, he argues that the United Kingdom, as a democracy, has strong oversight mechanisms and high intelligence accountability, while Slovakia, a state transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy, remains authoritarian and requires increased intelligence oversight. Yauri-Miranda (2021), who reached the same conclusion with other countries, used the comparative examples of Spain and Brazil to identify four principles necessary for greater intelligence accountability. He stated that he could measure and evaluate accountability through representation and internal oversight; through regulation and parliamentary committee formation; through justice and judicial oversight; and through trust and media oversight. He argued that while Spanish institutions are relatively superior in this regard, oversight of both state institutions needs to be significantly improved, and oversight mechanisms must be subject to strict rules.

The final section examines the development processes of Russia and the United States within the framework of historical institutionalism, in addition to information available in the literature on the state of the Russian intelligence services. In this regard, Østbø (2024) examines the structure of the Russian state and its intelligence. He argues that simplistic judgments in the general literature, such as the KGB's takeover of the state, are incorrect, and adds that state

security and foreign intelligence are no longer two separate mechanisms. He also argues that the FSB's intertwining with state institutions is not a takeover but a distinct dynamic unique to Russia, and argues that this is not related to the former Soviet structure. Aksu (2019) explained the transformation of USA and Russian intelligence agencies over time within the framework of historical institutionalism. He emphasized the importance of changing international conjunctures and the perception of intelligence by national leaders. By focusing solely on the causes of change and development, a cause-and-effect relationship was established, not linked to political regimes. Nevertheless, the Russian state's intertwined nature with its intelligence institutions was evident.

In this sense, when the existing literature is evaluated alongside my own study, the term authoritarian practice is commonly used to describe the actions taken by US intelligence agencies. However, what distinguishes this study from others is that USA and Russian intelligence are examined within the same framework, selecting significant cases from both countries and analyzing them based on these cases. These cases are evaluated by measuring and assessing them against values such as accountability, autonomy, institutional integrity, and transparency. In this context, by establishing a cause-and-effect relationship with critical junctures using the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism, the intelligence agencies of both countries engage in the same authoritarian practices are explored.

CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL PROCESS OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Historical Process of Emergence of Intelligence Institutions of United States of America and Oversight Mechanisms

The United States of America, although it was founded approximately 300 years ago and declared its independence while being a colonial state, can be seen as the most prominent state in terms of intelligence and democracy. In this section, only the processes that the intelligence institution has gone through throughout history and how it has developed will be examined. Because the USA has only put the intelligence factor used in wartime into an organizational process and has created an organization consisting of many intelligence agencies that are shown as the most successful and most active today.

The development of the USA's intelligence institution and organization is often considered as being since World War I and World War II. For example, Christopher Maurice Andrew, although he begins his explanation of the development of the intelligence process of the United States by referring to George Washington in a short paragraph, claims that this development process occurred within three main headings (age of innocence, age of transformation and age of uncertainties) starting from the First World War (2013, pp. 138,141,145). In addition, although Zegart often makes references to the period of independence and the period after, he claims that World War II played a role in shaping the intelligence organization and the Central Intelligence Agency (2006, pp.23-24). Similarly, Scott and Jackson claim that the Pearl Harbor raid during World War II was a turning point in the transition of the intelligence field to professionalism in the United States and the beginning of the academic process (2004, p.140). However, this is actually the beginning of an unstoppable process, in other words, the development of the intelligence institutions that have come to the present day started in World War I and took a sharp shape during the Cold War, reaching its current state.

There is not only one large institution within this US intelligence community and there are 18 different intelligence agencies, and it consists of different independent intelligence institutions according to their operations and areas of duty. These institutions are headed by, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the most well-known of these institutions are the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) it is also independent like ODNI, the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), to be precise 2 independent agencies, 9 Department of Defence agencies and 7 other agencies are from other departments (*Office of the Director of National Intelligence*, 2024). Of course, these organizations were not established at the same time, they emerged due to different needs and different tasks and the necessities of historical conditions. At the same time, although the way politics uses these intelligence institutions changes from time to time, over the years, as a requirement of democracy, the functioning of these institutions has been placed on a legal plane and its limits have been specified.

In this sense, in the historical development section of the US intelligence institution, instead of starting only from World War I, in order to fully address institutional development, it will be examined from the war when the US gained its independence from Britain to the first years of the end of the Cold War. In this section, the Black Chamber, which was first used in the War of Independence, and later the intelligence activities and institutions used in the Civil War during Lincoln's presidency between 1861-1865 will be discussed. Afterwards, the intelligence agencies established due to the necessary conditions created by the First and Second World Wars and the cooperation-based studies and technology sharing with leading states in this sense will be discussed. In the last part, what caused the 1947 National Security Act and the CIA to play a central role among these institutions with the beginning of the Cold War and which events shaped it and the years and reasons for the establishment of other intelligence institutions will be examined.

2.1.1. Culper Ring

The independence of the United States as a state actually comes from events based on intelligence activities against the British Kingdom. When we examine it in this sense, it is possible to find the tradition of development of the USA in terms of intelligence in the roots of its foundation. Perhaps the most important reason why the United States played a successful

role in the revolutionary war that George Washington entered against the British in 1775-1783 was again the covert and clandestine operations based on human intelligence (humint), which Washington considered important and personally experienced and understood the value of in the French and Indian wars. (Andrew, 2013, p.138)

This organization, called the "Culper Ring" and having the distinction of being the first intelligence community of the USA, requested Charles Scott and Tallmadge, the generals with George Washington, to establish a reliable informant network against the activities of the British army in New York (Kilmaede & Yaeger, 2013, p.52). While Scott generally preferred a back-and-forth network, Tallmadge established a communication line between informants within the city, and since this situation was safer than the other, Tallmadge's method was applied (Rose, 2007, pp.76-77).

Although the intelligence organization called the Culper Ring seems amateur and primitive, it actually contains professionalism, as we see in Tallmadge's method. Indeed, in addition to logistical problems or military reluctance, the effective role of this intelligence organization was very important in the great victory of a newly established state against a nation whose roots date back centuries.

As a different perspective on this subject, Leskovar explained the culture and tradition of the USA, which did not have enough money, and more importantly, the fact that it recruited people for the Culper Ring intelligence with the concept of a nation's "notion of liminality", that is, the birth of a new nation by separating from another, and claimed that this organization was effective in creating a new nation (2020, p.21).

At the same time, the Culper Ring intelligence agency played a cornerstone role in the development of early American intelligence. Although George Washington disbanded this group after the war and did not intend to establish an intelligence agency directly, he convinced and pressured Congress to allocate the necessary financial resources for this issue during his presidency, and Thomas Jefferson also worked to establish a domestic intelligence network within the states (George & Staral, 2022, pp.53-54).

2.1.2. Pinkerton Detective Agency in 19th Century

The Pinkerton detective agency served the United States as a private company from the early 1850s to the early 20th century. In this sense, the United States has made an agreement with a private company for intelligence and police activities and has not shown any institutionalization activity.

Today, many national security studies written about the United States mostly write that it started with the Second World War and the National Security Act of 1947, but in the 19th century, states and especially the United States did this with private sector contractors and these private contractors were Pinkertons (Bilansky, 2018, p.68).

The Pinkerton detective agency made a name for itself by protecting US President Abraham Lincoln from assassination during the Civil War and started working with the United States (Bilansky, 2018, p.67).

Although the Pinkerton detective agency managed to protect US President Lincoln from the first attempt, Lincoln was later assassinated. Following this, the Secret Service, which was an institution tasked with protecting US presidents and was one of the first institutionalized intelligence and security organizations in the US, although not in the full sense, was established 3 months after Lincoln's death in 1865. (*Those Other Secret Services | United States Secret Service*, 2024)

2.1.3. The Bureau of Investigation

In the United States, the interest and attention of US presidents, the importance they gave and their worldview have often been of great importance in the institutionalization of intelligence, in addition to the historical development (Andrew, 2013, p.138). It is possible to say that the establishment of the Bureau of Investigation emerged with the personal request and insistence of a US president. After the assassination of President William McKinley at the beginning of the 20th century, US President Theodore Roosevelt, who replaced him, thought that the state was under threat from certain groups and wanted to observe these groups more and obtain more information (Weiner, 2012, pp.18-19).

On July 26, 1908, the Bureau of Investigation, or today's Federal Bureau of Investigation "FBI", was officially established with a team of 34 budget and secret service employees who left the Department of Justice (Weiner, 2012, pp.18-19).

In this sense, an organization was established to conduct the first large-scale domestic intelligence and investigation activities of the United States. Although this organization dealt with organized mafia and counterfeiting or human trafficking in its early years, it would later engage in activities of international importance such as counterespionage. (Stinson, 1979, p.215)

Although Bureau of Investigation is a cornerstone of the historical development of institutionalization in terms of intelligence, it is seen that the United States, which had almost become a world state in the early 20th century, was still trying to design intelligence activities within the country. However, although the importance of intelligence in times of war lies in the foundations of the establishment of the United States and the innovative ideas of the founding father George Washington on this subject are known, not much development was achieved in this sense in the 19th century and important steps were not taken in the stages of progress. Because the USA, which will find an important role at the end of the First World War that will break out 6 years later and will be with the great empires in Europe in important battles on the front, has not yet fully matured to develop an intelligence that will go outside the country for the rear or before the war. Although this is the case, it should not be forgotten that the USA is a federal state consisting of different states, because in this sense, it can be interpreted that the Bureau of Investigation, or FBI as it is called today, protects the integrity and reliability of the state in a way in the national and international arena.

2.1.4. Cipher Bureau (Black Chamber)

After the United States entered World War I, approximately 3 months later, it decided to establish a cryptoanalytic service equivalent to other states, and the name of this service would be the cipher bureau, or black chamber as it is also known (*The Black Chamber*, 2024). Although there was a code and cypher organization called MI-8, which served as a sub-branch of the US army before this (Friedman, 1942, p.9), this Cipher Bureau was the first large-scale organization.

However, Andrew states that the black chamber, or cipher bureau, was very inadequate in this regard and was in a miserable state under the influence of British and German spies during World War I, and even Woodrow Wilson openly stated to the public after the war that he thought that only the Germans had a secret intelligence service and that he did not know that other states had intelligence services (2013, p.139).

Despite this, the only successful and effective institution in cryptoanalysis for the United States during the First World War and the 1920s was the Black Chamber organization, especially the Japanese managed to decipher crypto messages during this time and direct information transfers were made to Washington DC (Dooley, 2016, p.5).

The Black Chamber institution, which continued its duty for about 10 more years after the war ended, was closed down with the approach of the Great Depression period and the decision to return to the pre-war economy, and its employees were transferred to other institutions (*The Black Chamber*, 2024).

When the Black Chamber is considered on its own, it is seen that it is not the continuation or aftermath of an institution, but an institution that emerged for the war period on its own. However, it is possible to say that this institution is a precursor, if not the official predecessor, of the National Security Agency (NSA) in terms of its activities such as dealing with crypto and obtaining information from the technological tools or sources of that period, breaking and monitoring the messages of other intelligence agencies and secret services.

2.1.5. Office of Strategic Services

With the beginning of World War II, although the United States was not fully involved in the war, they were aware of the inadequacies of their own intelligence institutions and in this sense, they established the Office of Strategic Services, which could be considered the first central intelligence organization and was capable of conducting operations in the clandestine, in order to expand and conduct promising research and analysis (Heaps, 1998, p.287). In this sense, the Office of Strategic Services organization was established just months before the United States itself became involved in this war, under the leadership and insistence of Franklin Roosevelt (Heaps, 1998, p.289).

The special operations branch under Office of Strategic Services carried out many activities during World War II, these were; They included activities such as sabotaging railways with local people in Japanese occupied areas in Far East Asia, implementing hit-and-run tactics, waging guerrilla warfare (approximately 10,000 Japanese soldiers were killed in these activities), or infiltrating agents into Nazi occupied areas in the Balkans and Europe to collect various information about the region and carry out sabotage (O'Toole, 2014, p.691).

However, one of the greatest benefits of the Office of Strategic Services during the war was the British-American intelligence cooperation. In this cooperation, intelligence work areas were divided into regions, primarily the exchange of information during the war, and the British Clandestine service shared with their colleagues in the USA about counterintelligence technologies and techniques, and strategies and techniques for controlled surveillance of captured agents to provide disinformation or training double agents (O'Toole, 2014, p.694).

The rapprochement of the USA and British agencies was one of the greatest developments in the history of American intelligence, laying the foundations of its own intelligence community thanks to these technologies, and the Office of Strategic Services gained a permanent place for itself in America's later years (O'Toole, 2014, p.716). In addition, the CIA, the central intelligence agency of the United States, was established as an apparatus of the Office of Strategic Services two years after the end of the war and found itself as an important mechanism within the state with the outbreak of the Cold War (O'Toole, 2014, p.717) (*CIA*, 2023).

2.1.6. National Security act of 1947

After the United States experienced a major transformation in World War II, namely the Pearl Harbor raid, "even though the Office of Strategic Services existed during this period", there were still major deficiencies in intelligence, and as in the previous title, the Office of Strategic Services was just learning technological developments from Britain and slowly. When we look at it from this perspective, the Pearl Harbor raid and the damage to a large part of the American Navy in the raid was a great milestone for the United States, and they learned the importance and necessity of intelligence by experiencing it firsthand for the first time in the modern age (Andrew, 2013, p.141).

In this sense, the National Security Act, which was enacted in 1947, regulated institutions in the military field and combined institutions such as the war department and the navy department under one roof in the defense department, and by realizing the inadequacy in the field of intelligence and taking the traditions and information of old intelligence agencies, it also constituted the beginning of modern institutionalization in intelligence (Office of the Historian, 2019). This act would also establish the Central Intelligence Directorate, leading both the Central Intelligence Agency and the US intelligence community in general, and the head of this institution would be a main advisor to the US president who could directly consult on intelligence matters. (*CIA*, 2023)

However, the different intelligence agencies and intelligence sub-branches within the US have never been able to establish solid communication with each other, especially within the Office of Strategic Services itself, so much so that the intelligence branches within the Office of Strategic Services cooperated more and more easily with their allies in Britain (Andrew, 2013, p.141).

In particular, the CIA was established approximately 3 months after this law and from the moment it was established, it became the first civilian intelligence gathering institution of the US. (Office of the Historian, 2019).

2.1.7. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

In 1944, General Donovan had conveyed an idea to the then President Roosevelt that would both continue international intelligence activities in peacetime and work directly under the White House as a central organization (Weiner, 2008, p.7). In 1945, after two large atomic bombs and the Soviets' rapid entry into Berlin, the cold war between these two powers had begun in a way at the Potsdam Conference. The fact that the Soviet Union did not withdraw from the places it had liberated from the Nazis in Eastern Europe and established communist regimes there and created an iron curtain by making them satellite states, was working directly with British intelligence MI-6 (Secret Intelligence Service) in order to keep Turkey and Greece away from this danger in US domestic politics, especially in 1946, and to ensure that they were on the side of the capitalists in a democratic regime. At the same time, the fact that the republicans had taken over both the Congress and the House of Representatives forced Truman to be a little faster in order to keep the world away from this threat (Weiner, 2008, pp.21-22).

The most important and fundamental purpose of the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency was to be informed of sudden attacks such as Pearl Harbor and to prevent the Red Menace, that is, the Soviet threat, from establishing an influence on world states (O'Toole, 2014, p.747). However, as Andrew stated, when it was first established, it was thought to pursue a policy only on intelligence, but after about 15 years, the CIA evolved to such an extent that it could conduct an operation against a legitimate and sovereign state that even Truman, who founded it, could not believe it (Andrew, 2013, p.142)

The most important missions and establishment purpose of the Central Intelligence Agency are officially stated as collecting important foreign intelligence, thoroughly analyzing all intelligence found and collected, conducting covert operations directly directed by the president, and protecting state secrets. (Central Intelligence Agency, 2024)

When the Central Intelligence Agency was established, the greatest expectation during the US administration was that it would collect information and intelligence from foreign countries, make high-probability predictions about the future, shape US foreign policy at this stage, and prevent unpleasant surprises. However, within 3 years of the establishment of the CIA, those unpleasant surprises occurred during Truman's term, namely the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Soviets' discovery of the atomic bomb and its test fires, and the start of the Korean War (O'Toole, 2014, p.747).

Again, the CIA experienced major failures in predicting a possible invasion in the Korean War and failed in this regard as well. "The agency failed on all fronts in Korea. It failed in providing warning, in providing analysis, and in its headlong deployment of recruited agents. Thousands of deaths of Americans and their Asian allies were the consequence." (Weiner, 2008, p.61). However, after the war began, the CIA was very successful in covert operations behind the front and in conducting guerrilla warfare, and in sabotaging supply lines (exploding railways and blocking supply truck convoys) so much so that Communist forces, especially Chinese generals, estimated the number of CIA units operating in that region to be almost 5 times larger than the actual number (O'Toole, 2014, pp.756-757).

When we look at it in general terms, it is known that the CIA was unsuccessful in gathering and predicting foreign intelligence between 1947 and 1953, but on the contrary, its covert operations were very successful and the success of these operations caused a great and impressive illusion in Washington (Weiner, 2008, p.92). All these hot moments and developments and the fact that the main actor for the US was almost the CIA at these moments

created great experience for them and moments where they could learn from their mistakes, so much so that immediately afterwards the CIA became its own.

This could be considered a success and they would apply the psychological and media warfare they learned in the Korean War here in Iran and then bring Shah Pahlavi to power with a successful coup, changing the balance in the Middle East in favor of the USA and Britain (Weiner, 2008, pp.87-88, 92).

2.1.8. National Security Agency (NSA)

The National Security Agency was established in 1952 as a signal intelligence and cryptology department to provide communication and was known as the most powerful and effective intelligence organization until the beginning of the 21st century (Aid, 2001, p.27).

Although the National Security Agency tried to provide intelligence flow on all countries from the moment it was established until the end of the Cold War, its main target and focus was the Soviet Union and they managed to obtain important information from there (Aid, 2001, p.29). When looked at in this sense, NSA and signal intelligence (SIGINT) analyzed what was behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War and shared it with policy makers and almost lifted the fog of war of the communist threat, and according to Aid, NSA developed more and played a more important role than the CIA during the Cold War (2001, p.53).

With the spread of the internet, the NSA has created a large network in the global arena and with this network, it has established a surveillance system almost all over the world and even after the events of September 11, they have applied this on their own citizens (for example, the Snowden incident) even though it is against human rights and the constitution and they have even accepted this (Glasius & Michaelsen, 2018, p. 3805).

2.2. Oversight of Intelligence agencies in USA

The United States has a sophisticated, multi-pronged oversight mechanism for intelligence, operating within independent bodies such as the legislative, executive, judicial, and media, as well as internationally. While this mechanism has evolved over the years as a

result of events required by a democratic regime, it exists theoretically and, at critical junctures, fails to fulfill its practical function. In this context, the most important oversight mechanisms will be described.

2.2.1. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was established in 1976, following the integration of intelligence agencies into the democratic process, to oversee intelligence activities conducted under the US government and to conduct academic research on the subject. This Committee, presenting appropriate legislative proposals to the Senate and reporting intelligence activities, and overseeing the constitutionality of the actions of intelligence agencies (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, n.d.).

The committee consists of 17 representatives, nine from the majority party and eight from the minority party. This committee examines intelligence reports and monitors budget and agency activities, but the president can block this committee's access to information during covert operations. (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, n.d.).

2.2.2. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

The House Permanent Select Committee is a body established within the House of Representatives in 1977 to oversee intelligence and monitor its activities. In a bicameral system, it was established a year after the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, as it was a partner of the same committee in the Senate (U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, n.d.).

This committee, comprised of 27 members, has 15 seats for the majority party, while the minority party receives 12. Although this committee was initially established in 1975 under the name Pike Committee to investigate illegal activities by the CIA and FBI, its reports have never been officially published (Haines, 1999).

2.2.3. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court 1978

In 1978, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act established the procedures for collecting information through electronic and physical intelligence within foreign intelligence. Later, under the heading of electronic intelligence, it began to oversight, primarily concerning matters concerning the NSA (Bureau of Justice Assistance, n.d.).

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) was also established alongside FISA, and this court was responsible for granting search warrants to intelligence agencies. Only the government is allowed to sit on this court; no one else is allowed to participate (Bureau of Justice Assistance, n.d.).

This court consists of 11 judges, each elected by the president and confirmed by the Senate (United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, n.d.).

The court approves electronic intelligence applications by examining probable cause and verifying whether the target is a foreign power or foreign agent. It also authorizes probable cause searches of U.S. citizens abroad. It authorizes the use of pen/register devices, recording, and monitoring devices by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It also verifies the legality of intelligence activities necessary to access the information of a foreign person living abroad (United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, n.d.).

2.2.4. Office of Director of National Intelligence (Inspector General of the Intelligence Community)

The Inspector General Act of 1978 established the Office of Inspectors General within all federal intelligence agencies to oversee their operations, granting them broad authority. This was intended to increase efficiency, provide greater oversight of budget spending, prevent mismanagement, and eliminate fraud. These offices still operate within federal agencies (the Office of the Intelligence Community Inspector General).

Later, in 2010, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010 established the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community as the primary oversight agency for the entire U.S. intelligence community. This office serves directly under the Office of the Director of

National Intelligence. This means that all expenditures are reported directly to this office, acting as a proxy for other agencies (the Office of the Intelligence Community Inspector General).

2.2.5. President's Intelligence Advisory Board

Eisenhower was the first president in the United States to prioritize intelligence and make significant strides in this area. In doing so, he not only improved intelligence but also made strides to ensure its compatibility with democracy and democratic values. In this sense, he established the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities in 1956, considered the predecessor of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board (Executive Office of the President).

This Advisory Board, comprised of no more than 16 members and experts in their respective fields, with no political affiliation, oversees the intelligence agency's compliance with laws and regulations and submits various reports to the president. It does not re-examine internal or congressional oversight, but rather supplements them and addresses any missing pieces. (Executive Office of the President)

2.2.6. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB)

The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board was established after the events of 9/11, with the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. It consists of a group of five individuals, all with no political affiliation, appointed by the President and elected upon Senate confirmation (Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, n.d.).

The mission of this board is to protect the privacy and civil rights of US citizens by intelligence agencies in the "war on terror" practices established after the events of 9/11. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States established the board in 2004 to balance the shift in power in favor of the government after the events of 9/11, within the framework of democratic values. The board operates independently within the legislative branch (Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, n.d.).

2.2.7. FIORC (Five Eyes Oversight Cooperation)

The Five Eyes intelligence cooperation was formed by the United States, Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. This intelligence cooperation came together under the UKUSA alliance, which aimed to form an alliance in signals intelligence. The countries primarily share information and mutually support each other in signals intelligence (Cox, 2013).

In 2017, the heads of inspector offices from these five countries came together to form the Five Eyes Oversight Cooperation Review Council, an oversight and oversee mechanism whose primary purpose is to provide public reports (Wetzling, 2023, p. 255).

The members of this council form an international oversight mechanism by exchanging ideas with each other. This increases the accountability and transparency of member countries to their own publics, even internationally. This council, which held its first meeting in 2018, is required to meet regularly at least once a year (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, n.d.).

2.3. Historical Process of Emergence of Intelligence Institutions of Russia and Oversight Mechanisms

The Russian Federation, although under different names, has a history that goes back to the 13th century in the geography it is currently located in. Throughout this history, the state has developed its own traditions, created its own bureaucracy and developed and formed its own culture to the present day. In this sense, Russia stands out as one of the most prominent states in the world in terms of intelligence and authoritarianism. In this section, only the history of intelligence and the development of intelligence institutions of Russia and how they are shaped today will be discussed and examined.

Although the intelligence of the Russian Federation is generally thought to have developed together with the KGB and the Cold War period, this is not exactly the case and has a long history. Pringle claims that Russia's intelligence was shaped 500 years before the Trotsky assassination during the reign of Ivan the Terrible and that the KGB produced informative books and publications on the history of intelligence as a continuation of the Glastnost policy in the late 20th century and that these publications began during the reign of Ivan the Terrible

(1998, pp.176,183). In addition, Çağlak sees the oprichnina's anti-opposition activities as the beginning and an important development of Russian intelligence (2022, p.14). However, instead of directly examining the Russian Tsardom and its history, leading figures in intelligence history and intelligence institutions like Andrew start from the intelligence activities of the Soviets and deal directly with studies on the KGB, because modern intelligence and current conflicts began precisely in these years. In fact, it is said that even the Cheka in the history of the KGB had not yet fully matured in internal operations and that Russian historians were ashamed of this situation (Andrew, 2000, p.23). Temir, on the other hand, takes a different approach by taking the history of Russian intelligence back to the Kiev Principality, but says that the real beginning, if not institutionalization, was in this period in terms of activity, and that it played an important role in foreign policy during the reign of Ivan the Terrible (2024, p.1664). Aksu, although he touches upon the oprichnina, starts this historical institutionalization part from the Okrhana (2019, p.95-96).

Although the KGB has been divided into 3 different institutions as a continuation of the KGB, it has been institutionalized under different institutions until today and has taken its own intelligence tradition from the ongoing historical process. When we consider all these, we see that suppressing a more active opposition movement in internal affairs throughout Russian history and this was the most important of the main purposes of the establishment of Russian intelligence in the Moscow principality. Later, with the Cold War, it started to take part in important activities such as counter-intelligence and covert operations. This culture created a state within the state and from time to time reached a level that harmed or interfered with the intelligence institutions or the actions of decision-makers.

In this sense, the institutionalization of Russian intelligence will first begin with the Oprichnina period of Ivan the Terrible. Because this institution often stands out as an institution in academic studies in this field, "even though its importance is relative". Then, the third branch and the Okhrana period from the Tsarist period will be discussed and the intelligence institutions in the Tsarist period will be completed and the Cheka section in the Soviet period will be moved on to. The OGPU and NKVD sections will be explained separately with their activities and the KGB section will be completed by touching on its current formation and the activities and duties of different intelligence organizations.

2.3.1. Oprichnina

With the practical transfer of the Moscow principality to the Tsardom with Ivan the Terrible, the country also created some needs within itself. Especially during the reign of Tsar Ivan the Terrible, known as the first Tsar, the Livonian War that would last for 25 years was lost at the end of the war and Tsar Ivan left the throne and went on a pilgrimage due to fear that some boyars would betray the country and the throne. The country, which was left in a vacuum, called Tsar Ivan to the throne again and Ivan took the throne again with full authority against traitors (De Madariaga, 2006, p.178). This situation was followed by the establishment of the Oprichnina.

The real beginning of Russia's intelligence history and institutionalization can be seen as the secret police organization and intelligence agency called the oprichnina established during the reign of Ivan the Terrible (Aksu, 2019, pp.95-96). Indeed, the roots of Russia's almost 500-year-old intelligence culture and understanding are actually based here, because the oprichnina was used for more domestic affairs, seizing the property of dissident aristocrats and eliminating them, reporting any internal unrest directly to Tsar Ivan, and establishing troops that directly served him. (Aksu, 2019, p.96). With Ivan's conditional re-ascension to the throne, he also needed an institution like the oprichnina so that he could operate within the tsardom without question and interrogation and judge traitors with his own decisions. In this sense, the oprichnina could both reveal the opposition and the boyars working for the enemies within the country and enable their direct capture and execution (De Madariaga, 2006, pp.179-180). It can also be seen as an institution that tried to centralize the country by seizing the lands of the boyars.

One of their first actions was to seize the lands of the boyars and condemn them to submit to the palace or die. To do this, they incorporated the nobles who submitted to them and deported the nobles who did not and the peasants who helped them to distant noble lands in the middle of the cold Russian winter (De Madariaga, 2006, p.183). Ivan also eliminated those who opposed the oprichnina and demanded its abolition through this institution (Pavlov & Perrie, 2003, pp.130-134).

With the start of the Crimean-Russian war, the defeat of the Crimean Tatars by the Russians through the cooperative work of the boyars and the oprichnina, the duality created by the oprichnina in the country and its inability to show successful resistance in the war can be

seen as the most important reasons for Ivan's decision to dissolve, and at the same time, the fact that he already had absolute authority made him believe that there was no longer a need for such an institution, so Ivan the Terrible thought that this institution was not fulfilling its duty completely and dissolved the oprichnina (De Madariaga, 2006, p.278).

2.3.2. Third Section

In addition to the new system and new understanding that Tsar Peter I created in Russia, he established the Preobrazhensky Prikaz, which was a more and more effective institutionalized intelligence organization after the oprichnina period and was seen as one of the first sparks of the transition to a modernized structure (Çağlak, 2022, p.109). The main purpose of this intelligence organization was to prevent subversive activities within the country after the new reforms and regulations, and this prevention of subversive activities was mostly successful (Hingley, 2021, p.28). However, the "Third Section", which was established before the "Okhrana", which was considered the beginning of modernization and the most important intelligence organization of the Russian Empire, and was its forerunner, was established by Tsar Nicholas I in 1826 (Hingley, 2021, p.49).

Following the death of Tsar Alexander, Nicholas I ascended to the throne after his brother Constantine renounced his right to ascend to the throne. However, during his accession to the throne, a small group within the army that wanted Constantine to ascend to the throne rose up in front of the Senate and attempted a revolt known as the Decemberist Revolution, but failed (Baumann, 2009, p.27). Tsar Nicholas I was greatly affected by this revolution and, because he wanted to know the depth and breadth of this revolution, he established the Third Section. Although this started as a smaller organization compared to the secret police services and intelligence agencies that preceded it, it is thought that by 1855, at the end of Tsar Nicholas's reign, there were approximately 40 spies in the Third Section (Andrew & Gordievsky, 1990, p.21). Although it is seen as a small and limited organization when looked at now, when the years of that period are examined and in an environment where such organizations were not yet fully institutionalized and professionalized, it can be considered a relatively large structure because its duties were mainly to suppress opposition and separatist movements in the capital and its surroundings.

The Duties of the Third Section Tsar Nicholas I stated the most important definitions of the duties of the third section to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the period as follows;

- Reporting of orders and information within all high police.

- Arresting or exiling dangerous and suspicious persons.

- Informing all alarming events.

- Detailed background information of all persons under police surveillance.

- Informing of illegal activities within the bureaucracy without exception (Monas, 1961, p.62).

The Third Section was a structure that not only engaged in espionage and surveillance, but also engaged in activities such as censorship and propaganda. For example, the compositions or news to be published in the newspaper had to be impartial and not contain insults to individuals (Monas, 1961, pp.139-140). This was an open-ended law and the Third Section could make censorships open to interpretation. At the same time, awards were given to names that honored or praised the work of the state and government. For example, the Third Section awarded journalist and historian Mikhael Pogodin for an article stating Russia's historical rights over Lithuania (Monas, 1961, p.152).

The Third Section, which had its most successful period during the reign of Tsar Nicholas I, due to its unsuccessful activities in recent years and its inability to fulfill the new conditions of the period and its failure to fully meet the reason for its establishment, was reformed and organized and transformed into the Okhrana, the most well-known and famous intelligence agency of the Russian Empire.

2.3.3. Okhrana (Department for the Protection of Public Safety and Order)

However, the greatest breakthrough and development in the modernization of Russian intelligence was the secret police and intelligence organization called "Okhrana" established by Nicholas II in the early 20th century to prevent threats against the Tsar and the Russian Empire (Çağlak, 2022, p.109). After Alexander II was subjected to an assassination attempt by opposition and revolutionary groups, Tsar Alexander III established the Okhrana, the most well-known and famous and also the last intelligence organization of the Russian Empire (Aksu, 2019, p.96). In this sense, the Okhrana can be seen as a more organized and structured

continuation of the Third Section. Because the Third Section missed the assassination attempt on Alexander II despite watching the assassin and could not prevent it. At the same time, revolutionary movements increased during this period and many revolutionary groups emerged.

The purpose of the Okhrana was to protect the tsar and the regime and to prevent revolutionary movements, similar to the intelligence organizations established before it in the Russian Empire (Pringle, 2006, xiv). When it was further privatized, it was established to fight against left-wing party structures and revolutionaries (*Okhranka | Russian Police Organization | Britannica*, 2024). The period when the Okhrana was established was a period of social unrest, revolutionary movements and demands, and wars caused by conflicts of interest in foreign policy, and during this period, especially the 1905 revolution and the Russo-Japanese war that occurred in the same year and the Russian defeat that followed changed the dynamics within the country against the current regime, and in this sense, the Okhrana caused great unrest within the society by infiltrating opposition groups or suppressing them with harsh measures (Çağlak, 2022, p.110).

Although Okhrana was successful on small groups, it was generally unsuccessful in preventing mass incidents, and as a result the number of Okhrana stations increased rapidly to 60 in 1911 (Ward, 2014, p.52), (Aksu, 2019, p.97).

In fact, from 1911 to 1914, the Okhrana had almost ensured stability within the country, for this reason they were occasionally supporting the revolutionary Bolsheviks, whom they saw as less of a threat, and getting rid of other revolutionary groups "while the Bolsheviks were getting stronger" until they entered the war with Germany. Although this war united the revolutionary groups on the Russian front under the roof of patriotism in the early years, the contact of German spies with the revolutionaries and the Okhrana's efforts to prevent them were both the first example of large-scale counter-espionage in Russian history and the first contact with foreign intelligence, and left the Okhrana helpless against the unstoppable progress of the revolution (Hingley, 2021, pp.133-139).

With the progress of the war, the Bolsheviks started the revolutionary movement, started a civil war and put an end to the tsarist regime. The Okhrana headquarters, which were seen as symbols of the oppressive regime, were burned (Ward, 2014, p.56).

2.3.4. Cheka (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission)

Despite all the efforts of the Okhrana and the Tsar, the revolution in the Russian Empire could not be prevented and on October 25 (November 7), 1917, the government in Petrograd was seized by the Bolsheviks led by Lenin in an almost bloodless coup (Hingley, 2021 p.150). After the Bolsheviks seized power, the pro-monarchy White Army started a civil war against the Bolsheviks with the support of their Russian allies in the West (Wade, 2018, p.169). In response, one of Lenin's most important and first solution suggestions was to establish an intelligence agency called the Cheka on December 20, 1917 (Pringle, 2006, xiv). With the Cheka, the first intelligence agency of the Soviet Union would be established and this intelligence agency would leave its legacy from the Soviets to today's Russia. At the same time, the KGB positioned itself as an heir to the Cheka during its establishment and added the shield found on its emblem to its own emblem (Andrew & Gordievsky, 1990, p.38).

None of the regulations establishing the Cheka were enacted and in fact it can be seen as a war machine created against the counter-revolution, and in addition, when the order was given to capture and shoot everyone they saw as supporting the counter-revolution in 1918, their number did not exceed 120 (Çağlak, 2022, pp.110-111). Despite this, it is possible to say that with the Cheka's successes and rapid growth, their numbers would have reached numbers never seen in Russian history. Because the Cheka was not only an intelligence organization but also a law enforcement force that would implement the actions to be taken after this intelligence was received. When examined in this sense, the Cheka is an institution whose sphere of influence is gradually increasing. In just 3 years, namely in 1921, the number of "Unions for the Internal Defense of the Republic", which was a structure within the Cheka, reached approximately 200,000 people (Aksu, 2019, p.98). When this excess in increase is examined, it can be seen that the Cheka was not only an institutional intelligence organization, but also the most important line of defense as a revolutionary guard and a counter-revolutionary measure. Because it is very difficult to find an intelligence organization that reached these numbers before under the conditions of the period.

Among the duties of the Cheka, there were especially counter-espionage, espionage, propaganda, disinformation and controlling economic formations, and they experienced these duties while fighting against the tsar and used them again to keep power in their hands. The Cheka was also responsible for the management of the labor camps called Gulag (Pringle, 2011, p.51). In addition, in 1921, in order to save the Russian economy from collapse, the Cheka, as

an important task in monitoring and implementing new economic policies, kept large-scale enterprises on the axis of communist policies and turned a blind eye to the limited adaptation of small-scale enterprises to the capitalist order, and although American intelligence was not a foreign intelligence agency at the time, they carried out many counter-espionage activities on the humanitarian aid of the American Relief Association (ARA) (Andrew, 2000, pp.30-31). The Cheka was also responsible for the reckless execution of 250,000 people for political crimes, while the Okhrana was responsible for sending only 4,100 people into exile (Andrew, 2000, p.28).

With the end of the civil war and the suppression of the counter-revolution, the Cheka successfully completed its duty, unlike most of the Russian intelligence agencies of the past, and successfully handed over its duty to the intelligence organization that would be restructured as the OGPU.

2.3.5. OGPU (Joint State Political Directorate)

When the Russian Civil War was almost over in 1922 and the Bolsheviks had completely seized power, the Cheka intelligence agency was replaced by the GPU (State Political Directorate) and then the OGPU (Joint State Political Directorate), although it is not known exactly why. The fact that it took the prefix "united" or "unity" in front of its name is related to the officialization of the name of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Hingley, 2021, p.134). The evolution of the Cheka into the OGPU is most likely due to the bad reputation it gained during the Red Terror, because when we examine the OGPU and the Cheka separately, we see that the personnel working in the Cheka or almost all of the Cheka's field of work continued in the OGPU (Hingley, 2021, p.135). One of the most important points that distinguishes the OGPU from the Cheka is that some situations were prevented by legal means. In particular, summary or unproven executions did not continue in the OGPU as in the Cheka period, and it was made lawful for people arrested as suspects to be released if they were not found guilty within 2 months (Çağlak, 2022, p.114).

After a certain period of time, Stalin expanded the powers of the OGPU and transformed this organization into a structure that would allow him to be used as a power mechanism over the state. By creating a personality cult for himself, Stalin drew boundaries between himself and the politburo and the party, as opposed to the intra-party debate grounds that existed during

Lenin's period, and used the OGPU against intra-party opposition (Seren, 2017, p.188). Stalin wanted to position himself a little higher than everything else at the state level. For this reason, Stalin used the OGPU as an instrument to achieve these goals. For example, while the intelligence agencies under Lenin were subordinate to the party and positioned as a sub-branch of it, during Stalin's era, the intelligence agency was positioned higher and more powerful than the party, and the only person they were accountable to was Stalin himself (Haslam, 2015, p.48). In this sense, when we consider the OGPU, we see that its framework was initially determined by laws and that after the constitution, it served as an official institution of the state, in contrast to the Cheka, but as Stalin consolidated his authority within the state, we see that the OGPU also became stronger in parallel with Stalin's strengthening, because the OGPU itself was the most important instrument that helped Stalin himself become stronger.

In 1934, after the death of the chief OGPU officer, it merged with the NKVD, which was affiliated with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in order to work more broadly and comprehensively, and especially to carry out Stalin's great purges. During its active period, the OGPU took on the anti-revolutionary, espionage and counter-espionage duties of the Cheka and continued its intelligence life as a more limited structure. However, in its last years, it became an important weapon of Stalin and took on a supra-state status. In fact, while the OGPU was only answerable to Stalin illegally, the NKVD was established to do this through more legal means (Aksu, 2019, p.105).

2.3.6. NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs)

The Soviet Union's intelligence agencies were primarily designed to suppress internal security threats and protect the regime's ideology. In this sense, the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) was established after the OGPU to further centralize intelligence. This institution became synonymous with Stalin's policies and became a crucial component of his actions. In other words, it can be said that the transformation from the OGPU to the NKVD marked the beginning of a process of consolidating Stalin's authority.

The NKVD exerted influence across many social and state structures, exerting significant influence both in its involvement in internal security and in suppressing ideological dissent (Shearer, 2001). Furthermore, during the "Great Purge" of 1936-1938, it was responsible for numerous arrests and executions. It was responsible for organizing and operating the Gulag

camps, where prisoners arrested for these arrests or other crimes were taken. The criminals in these camps were employed to contribute to economic development. While the NKVD carried out domestic intelligence duties, it was also responsible for foreign intelligence. In this respect, it was not very advanced; its most significant role was during the Soviet Union's invasion of Poland (Khlevniuk, 2025).

The NKVD's repressive policies began to attract considerable international criticism after World War II, and it also lacked a favorable reputation domestically. Consequently, the following year, the NKVD was divided into two separate departments, and with Stalin's death and the beginning of the Cold War, the NKVD was replaced by the KGB. (Semukhina & Reynolds, 2013, p. 59)

2.3.7. KGB (Committee for State Security)

Stalin's death had created political conflict and uncertainty. At the same time, the Cold War was just beginning to rise, with the Soviet Union leading one side in the war. After emerging from this turmoil, Khrushchev's first move as leader was to reduce the power of the ministries and law enforcement agencies that succeeded the NKVD, and he did so directly. He established the Committee for State Security (KGB) in 1954. In doing so, he also aimed to depoliticize law enforcement (Semukhina & Reynolds, 2001, p. 68).

However, unlike its predecessors, the KGB did not focus solely on domestic intelligence; it also played a very active role in foreign intelligence, reflecting the Soviet Union's status as a superpower. The institution followed a military hierarchy and had its own units. It was divided into directorates such as counterintelligence, foreign intelligence, technical and signals intelligence, and special operations. While doing all this, it also maintained ideological control over domestic intelligence and was seen as the "sword and shield" of the current regime. The KGB was often seen as a counterpart to the CIA on the other front of the Cold War. It actively participated in disinformation, sabotage, assassination, and propaganda. In this context, the KGB, similar to the CIA, conducted intelligence-gathering operations for Soviet interests worldwide, obtaining information through diplomats and other officials. In this sense, the KGB can be considered one of the first and most important modern intelligence agencies of the modern world (Pringle, 2025).

In this sense, the KGB remained one of the most important institutions of the Soviet Union until the end of the Cold War. During the final years of the Cold War, during Gorbachev's tenure, it publicly stated that it defended Gorbachev's policies, but in reality, it opposed them. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the KGB also ceased to exist institutionally (Walther, 2014, pp. 667-668).

2.3.8. FSB (Federal Security Service)

The Federal Security Service (FSB) is an intelligence agency established in the newly established Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the KGB was split into its various agencies in 1995, the FSB was seen as the primary successor to the KGB. Indeed, one of the most significant indicators of this is the fact that the FSB continues to operate from its headquarters in Moscow. The FSB focuses primarily on domestic intelligence matters, including counterintelligence, counter-separatist activities, counter-terrorism, and military surveillance (Pringle, 2025b).

The FSB, established in 1995 to replace the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) during the Yeltsin era, began its operations with greater authority. The FSB was composed of former KGB agents and officers trained in Soviet schools, inheriting the KGB's legacy. Its authority was expanded, even allowing it to enter private homes without authorization, but it was not as powerful as it once was. In 1998, President Boris Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin as head of the FSB. With Putin's subsequent rise to the helm of the Russian state, the FSB's authority was expanded (Pringle, 2025b).

With Vladimir Putin, the FSB experienced a remarkable increase in its power and influence, and began playing an active role in suppressing dissent and reinstating an authoritarian structure within the country. The FSB began to be suspected of being responsible for suspicious cases and deaths within Russia. FSB played a significant role in the harsh suppression of separatist incidents in Chechnya and the subsequent suppression of these incidents after 2009 (Berls, 2021).

2.3.9. SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation)

The foreign intelligence service, also known as the SVR, was established in 1991 after the KGB's institutional mandate ended and the Soviet Union collapsed. It acquired all documents, information, and infrastructure from the KGB to gather intelligence on, spy on, and exfiltrate information from foreign countries. Unlike the KGB, this institution, the SVR, was established solely to protect the interests of the Russian State, independent of ideology, and has no ideological affiliation (Ateş, 2020).

The SVR is the natural continuation of the KGB's Foreign Intelligence Service and conducts political, economic, technical, and industrial intelligence activities in foreign countries (Waller, 1995). Its organization consists of regional and technical departments. It is designed to influence elites in target countries through its capabilities to penetrate elite institutions, eavesdrop, and gather information (Watling, 2022).

Similarly, the SVR, like the FSB, is directly overseen by the president, and its oversight by parliamentary and judicial bodies is very weak. The SVR also engages in activities such as signals intelligence in foreign intelligence, access to Western technologies, and directing elite politicians there (Watling, 2022).

2.4. Oversight of Intelligence agencies in Russia

In Russia, while oversight mechanisms are not strictly intelligence-focused, there are committees within the legislature for security and defense. Oversight in the judicial branch is not well developed. The executive branch, the head of state, exercises primary oversight. Because of this interconnectedness, it can be said that oversight mechanisms exist in theory.

2.4.1. Federation Council's Committee for Security and Defense

The exact functioning of this council has not been described on official websites. However, according to their official website, the council holds preliminary meetings with the president regarding important decisions regarding security matters. It deals with potential

internal and external threats, makes financial arrangements related to security and intelligence, monitors the status of security personnel, and ensures their social security. (Council of the Russian Federation, n.d.)

While not officially designated as an intelligence oversight mechanism, it can be said to provide legislative oversight regarding intelligence, as security and defense fall under this category. However, its official status is questionable because it lacks a specific framework or regulation.

2.4.2. Committee for Security and Anti-Corruption of the State Duma

The Security and Anti-Corruption Committee in the Russian State Duma technically oversees intelligence agencies like the FSB, SVR, and GRU. However, the fact that most of its officials are from the ruling party and that the intelligence agencies report directly to the president makes its authority merely symbolic. (State Duma of the Russian Federation, n.d.).

2.4.3. Kremlin/President

In Russia, intelligence agencies are under the direct supervision of the president. In this sense, the Kremlin is the primary authority to which intelligence agencies are accountable. For example, the FSB states on its official website that it reports directly to the president (Government of the Russian Federation, n.d.). Furthermore, the SVR also states on its official website that it is directly under the president's supervision and reports to him (Government of the Russian Federation, n.d.B).

From this perspective, intelligence agencies are officially subordinate to and monitored by the Kremlin and the president, Vladimir Putin. This executive branch also conducts Oversight and Oversee activities. However, because these institutions are intertwined with the state, the accuracy of speaking of direct surveillance is a matter of debate.

2.4.4. Courts

Under the April 3, 1995 law, the FSB has the authority to enter any private residence without prior judicial approval. However, it is obligated to report its entry to the Attorney General within 24 hours of the operation. Although the FSB's powers have been expanded, this law provides only limited oversight and contains vague human rights provisions. The law allows for oversight of the FSB's activities, but it does not include the tactics, informants, or specialized tools used by the FSB (GlobalSecurity.org, 2011b).

In this sense, it would be quite natural to say that the judiciary is not a complete oversight mechanism, as it does not have jurisdiction in every area, and its powers are often restricted, leaving the FSB privileged in maintaining secrecy in its activities.

2.5. Theoretical Framework

The intelligence structure of the United States and the intelligence structure of the Russian Federation have developed according to very different values created by different political regimes. In this sense, they have been formed in very different ways in terms of their working steps, procedures and the existence of institutions that control the intelligence agencies.

However, although these two countries, which we take as examples of democratic and authoritarian regimes, contradict each other in terms of their operating procedures, we can explain how they actually reveal the same mechanism in their essence within the framework of the violations they have made and the basis of their operations with different theoretical approaches, historical institutionalism will be chosen for this study but the other will be examined. First we will examine various possible thoereitcal approaches and refute them. Then we will focus on historical institutionalism theory.

2.5.1. Theories that could potentially explain authoritarian practices of intelligence agencies in political systems

Securitization theory was introduced by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. This theory describes how states implement extraordinary measures through securitization policies. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde specifically question why securitization only applies to issues like terrorism and not traffic accidents. The theorists attempt to identify the securitizing actor, threat, and referent object. This theory is incompatible with the current thesis because the thesis addresses a variety of threats, not just the war on terror. While the Snowden leaks are compatible with securitization theory, events like Guantanamo Bay or Vault 7 are not. Guantanamo Bay measures can be implemented within the United States, and the threat against which Vault 7 was implemented is unknown. (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 25)

Furthermore, the theory would be more appropriate for use in the field of international relations. However, securitization events, particularly in the war on terror, benefit corporations, not the general public, and the rights of society are violated (Hayes, 2009). This theory fails to analyze oversight institutions and analyzes whether the results are successful rather than the legitimacy of the actions taken. However, this study examines process-oriented development, including how these are legitimized and what causes transformation.

The Dual State is a theory developed by Ernest Fraenkel. In this theory, the state has two aspects: one aspect, in which the state acts in accordance with rules and established regulations, is called the normative aspect. The other aspect is the prerogative state, in which state apparatuses engage in unrestricted arbitrariness and violence, without any legal accountability (Fraenkel & Meierhenrich, 2018). The Dual State approach explains how a structure operates, not why it has become so. However, in our thesis, we explain how these events have evolved.

The dual state approach has also been applied to authoritarian regimes, particularly Nazi Germany. In this thesis, it will be applied to both authoritarian regimes and liberal democracies. Dual state theory can be applied to cases like Guantanamo Bay because it represents a gray area, but it is difficult to apply to cases like the NSA case, where the constitution was directly violated, or the assassinations of Litvinenko and Politkovskaya.

The State of Exception theory was introduced by Carl Schmitt and later by Giorgio Agamben. According to this theory, in times of crisis, the state, or the government or individual

that governs it, can deviate from the rule of law and act accordingly. The most well-known example of this is the Nazi regime of Hitler (Agamben, 2008). Giorgio Agamben's "state of exception" approach makes significant contributions to analyzing extraordinary situations in which the boundaries of the rule of law are exceeded. However, because this study examines not the extraordinary nature of intelligence institutions, but rather the process of lack of control and power asymmetry that has become institutionally the norm, the theory of the state of exception is far from being explanatory. Therefore, historical institutionalism and structural analyses offer a more appropriate framework for understanding the causes of this transformation. Furthermore, while the state of exception typically focuses on a single government or individual, this study focuses on the process and its evolving focus, along with supervisory and intelligence agencies. Governments are not considered individually but rather individually throughout the process.

2.5.2. Historical Institutionalism

When we consider historical institutionalism, it explains how institutions have evolved into their current state in the historical process and for what reasons they have been shaped into their current state. Especially the “critical junctures” within historical institutionalism have been affected by international or social changes that have been effective in the development of their institutions (Ikenberry, 2019). At the same time, we can examine how these institutions resist change with "path dependency" (Pierson, 2004). On the other hand, when we consider the Cold War, we will try to understand the tendency of two different regimes to use intelligence institutions to concentrate power in the center in order to be stronger than others in order to stay strong at a common point from this perspective. In addition, we will consider the privileges of their institutions as an indicator of the superiority they provide to other institutions (Arendt, 1951) and how much they have become stronger for the survival of countries will be discussed.

While explaining the relevance of these two theories to the subject, the historical processes we explained in the first section will be mentioned in particular. For both countries (USA and Russia), the most important point in historical institutionalism, the beginning of the cold war and the cold war period will be mentioned. We will explain how such a result is achieved, especially in democratic regimes, by using both theories. Critical junctures and path dependency can be given as examples of these, and at the same time, how this institution is

strengthened and the authoritarian behaviors of its functioning will be discussed. Because Glasius and Michaelsen (2018) explained this situation as authoritarian practices in democratic countries. In addition, in our authoritarian state example, we will understand how Russian intelligence agencies monopolized power through the historical process, together with the theory of historical institutionalism, which is already completely compatible with the regime.

Historical institutionalism can be effectively used as a theoretical framework in the examples of this thesis, the Russian Federation and the United States. In particular, it directly complies with the definitions of “path dependency” and “critical junctures”, which are terms within this theoretical approach, and when it acts as an explanatory tool, it will help us understand the historical development of intelligence institutions in these two countries. In this sense, when starting historical institutionalism, which is a leg of the theoretical framework, it is necessary to first define historical institutionalism itself and then path dependency and critical junctures. However, before explaining historical institutionalism to the theoretical framework, there is a question that we need to start with and our theoretical framework approach will explain the answer to this question. "How do the intelligence institutions of two opposing political regimes operate the same in practice despite having different values in theory?" While the answer to this question is sought with its explanations, it will also be explained how historical institutionalism will help explain this.

First of all, historical institutionalism focuses on empirical questions and focuses on the political behavior of institutions as a result of historical processes and the way they handle the results (Steinmo, 2008, p.150). According to Steinmo (2008), historical institutionalism directly emphasizes the role that institutions play in shaping behavior (p.159). Thelen (1999) explains historical institutionalism as how institutions emerge from specific historical processes and how they are embedded in these processes (p.369). In this sense, when we briefly examine historical institutionalization, it tells us how the behavior of intelligence agencies is shaped by the influence they receive from certain pasts.

Secondly, the concept of path dependence is typically employed to back several important assertions: the timing and order of events are significant; given similar starting conditions, a diverse array of social results can emerge; even minor or contingent occurrences may lead to significant ramifications; specific choices, once made, can become nearly impossible to undo; and as a result, political evolution is frequently characterized by crucial moments or turning points that define the fundamental aspects of social existence (Collier and Collier, 2015 & Krasner, 1988). The concept of path dependency in historical institutionalism

is the idea that some shocks or certain advantages that occur during the historical process can change the historical course (David, 1985, p.332). Although Paul A. David wrote this explanation about path dependency from an economic perspective as an article about the "qwerty" keyboard, he also discussed one of the articles that explains the concept of path dependency in the most basic way from a social or institutional perspective. At the same time, the concept of path dependency in historical institutionalism is divided into differences within itself. These are characterized as increasing incomes, lock-in (the system locking on that choice in future times when a choice is made) and positive feedback (Page, 2006). According to Pierson, the concept of increasing returns is not only related to economics but can also be applied to politics. From this perspective, increasing power asymmetry, that is, those in power or those in power can organize existing institutions in a way that works in their favor, and the fact that the structure of political institutions is very difficult to change, has become an example of the concept of path dependency in historical institutionalism that is suitable and applicable to politics (Pierson, 2000, pp.257-261).

Finally, critical junctures will complement the theory of historical institutionalism. According to Capoccia and Kelemen (2007), critical junctures and path dependency can be related to each other, a decision is made among different choices and options and that decision creates path dependency, and the time when that decision is made is a critical juncture (pp.341-342). Similarly, Mahoney (2000) says that the concept of path dependency cannot be fully explained and is incomplete, and that this can only be explained through critical junctures (pp. 507, 513). According to the thoughts of writers in this field, critical junctures are known as important historical moments that constitute the beginning of path dependency.

Although the United States has institutions that carry democratic values and a democratic political regime, we see that intelligence agencies often do not function democratically like other institutions. We see that intelligence agencies, which have an exceptional structure in terms of accountability and transparency, cannot fully carry the same values and adopt authoritarian behaviors in practice.

We have seen certain intelligence structures and initiatives of the United States since its founding in 1776 in our section titled American intelligence history. However, the most important development in US history was the beginning of the Cold War, which was the clash of two global powers that emerged after the end of World War II. Many academics say that the central formation and serious structuring of the American intelligence agency developed after

the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor on the island of Hawaii during World War II. (Andrew, 2013, p.141).

However, with the Cold War, the current 21st century US intelligence agency network and tradition that we know today was formed. While this formation was taking place, many critical junctures were passed and these critical junctures created path dependency. For example, the Pearl Harbor attack was an important critical juncture in the establishment of the well-known US intelligence agency, and before this critical juncture, US intelligence was called the period of innocence. (Andrew, 2013, pp.138, 141).

However, the most important critical juncture was the CIA's successful regime change coups in Iran and Guatemala in 1953 and 1954, so much so that these successes provided the opportunity to create satellite states in the global arena without using problems and hard power, with less money and effort.

This situation caused the Bay of Pigs disaster when J.F. Kennedy came to power, but this was also a critical juncture in itself, because a relentless conflict arose between decision-makers and the intelligence agency. Kennedy was giving orders to the intelligence agencies in accordance with his policies and insisting on the operation despite the negative report of the experts on the operation, and after the death of President Kennedy, American intelligence agencies gained certain privileges over the democratic political regime, and with this critical juncture, a path dependency also emerged.

The events of 9/11 were a critical juncture that expanded these powers and also increased path dependency once again. During this period, while there were numerous regime coups, many practices such as sabotage in foreign policy were adopted as path dependency. Due to these events, American intelligence agencies were accused of many incidents, from the Kennedy assassination to human rights violations.

Although these situations were questioned and sometimes brought to court, intelligence community were able to get away with all of them in theory. These processes show that the US intelligence agencies, although democratic in theory, have evolved into an institution with authoritarian values in practice.



Table 1 Historical Institutionalism Process of USA

When we look at the history of Russia, we see that it has always had an authoritarian structure and that they have developed both politically and institutionally to suppress internal opposition and rebels. In this sense, one of the reasons why Russian intelligence cannot have institutional autonomy as an institution can be considered as the fact that Russian history has always had a centralized structure in terms of law enforcement and surveillance.



Table 2 Historical Institutionalism Process of Russia

We see the influence of the Soviet period in today's Russian intelligence quite a lot. Especially in the Russian civil war, after the execution of the Russian dynasty Romanovs due to the conflict between the Red Army and the White Army, the Red Army established various intelligence agencies in order to secure the revolution they had made and to suppress and eliminate internal opposition in order to protect the communist revolution. This was an important critical juncture in Soviet intelligence because this intelligence agency focused more on internal enemies than external enemies and was intertwined with the current political regime, which created a path dependency that led to the practices of today's intelligence agencies.

The Russian intelligence agency had almost no institutional autonomy during the Soviet period, and it is not possible to say that any institution had institutional autonomy at that time. With the Cold War, Russian intelligence once again entered a critical juncture because the Soviet Union intelligence agencies, which were intertwined with politics, served two values in terms of defending both the communist revolution and the homeland against external capitalist regimes.

The last critical juncture was the rise of intelligence-based politicians to power in the Russian Federation with the collapse of the Soviets, and even the most well-known example being former KGB agent Vladimir Putin. In this sense, the path dependency of intelligence agencies, where intelligence and the state are intertwined and where there is no institutional autonomy, has also reached the present day. Even interesting questions such as whether it is the intelligence's political authority or the political authority's intelligence has occurred.

2.5.3 Criterias for Examining Democratic Control of Intelligence Agencies

When we consider the relationship between intelligence agencies and politics, we observe that the values of various different political regimes or the important features that constitute their institutions contradict the form of that political regime

Born and Leigh (2008, p.157) say that intelligence agencies should be regulated in accordance with the law and put this within a legitimate framework, and then argue that they should be accountable to this committee, especially in the executive and legislature (creating a committee in the parliament, just like the successful example in Norway).

In democracies, state institutions are expected to uphold principles of accountability and transparency (Dahl, 1998, pp.125-126), whereas in authoritarian regimes, most institutions operate under direct control, having relinquished their autonomous structures (Brands, 2018, p.65). Intelligence agencies, by their nature of secrecy (Omand, 2013, p.25) (Davis, 2023, p.343), encounter conflicts within any regime.

This study seeks to analyze how intelligence agencies operate within different regime types and whether they maintain their institutional integrity despite these conflicts and contradictions. Also, the importance of the research is, study will be a comprehensive research to find out how the intelligence agency, which is different from other institutions and requires secrecy, works in democracy and authoritarian regimes and how it can be compatible with the values of these different regimes. In this sense, the work that was previously done only under democratic regimes will be done comparatively under different regimes.

For the democracy United States take as an example and for the authoritarianism Russia will be the example. While the United States of America is chosen as an example of a democratic regime because it is both the pioneer of the democratic regime and a leading state in terms of development in the intelligence organization, Russia acts as the authoritarian regime in recent years and its intelligence agency is still effective since the Cold War, even today. It plays a role in the domestic and foreign politics of the country and for this reason it has been chosen as an example of the authoritarian regime. Through a comparative approach, this research will explore the differences and similarities (variations and commonalities) across democracy and authoritarianism.

With assessing criteria such as autonomy, transparency and accountability of intelligence agencies. When we consider all countries and their unique regimes, we see that intelligence agencies reflect their own institutional identities, both parallel to and contrary to the regime, apart from other institutions. Additionally, governance structures that govern these agencies vary significantly, depending on the political regime in which they operate and administrate, with profound implications for their operational integrity and public trust (Diamond et al., 2016; Walker et al., 2020).

In this sense, while the democratic regime of the United States, which will be one of the examples, and the accountability, transparency and institutional integrity that democracy brings, can be seen theoretically (and sometimes practically), the other example is Russia, whose regime is authoritarian, and the internal autonomy and institutional integrity of the

institution, as well as the values and practices such as transparency and accountability that we have just mentioned, will be classified and examined in terms of subject and method in different articles and researches.

2.5.3.1. Accountability

First, we will examine the current literature and researches on the accountability status of these two countries, the United States and Russia, as institutions operating under a democratic regime and institutions operating under an authoritarian regime. First, the current political structure of the United States and the functioning of its institutions and intelligence agencies related to accountability will be discussed, followed by Russia's own special regime structure and the position of its intelligence agencies. When we consider the United States in the context of a democratic regime, we see that there is a supervisory control and that the intelligence agencies operate under these institutions. The intricate relationship between intelligence agencies and democratic institutions highlights the potential of supervision mechanisms - such as legislative committees, judicial review and public responsibility measures - to promote a culture of transparency. These mechanisms are essential to mitigate risks associated with power abuse and ensure that intelligence operations follow constitutional norms and human rights standards (Walker et al., 2020). Since Russia is governed by an authoritarian regime, we see that developments and values such as accountability and transparency are generally ignored or practically ignored. It can be said that the FSB (Federal Security Bureau) in particular creates political pressure and applies surveillance. This entrenches within the political apparatus undermines transparency and accountability before the people, as the lack of external supervision reduces institutional integrity and generates a culture of impunity (Diamond et al., 2016; Walker et al., 2020).

As noted by Caparini (2016a), US intelligence agencies are characterized by a formalized mechanism of supervision that is meant to guarantee a degree of autonomy without diminishing responsibility. The 1947 National Security Act laid the foundations for a system in which the president exerts significant control over intelligence operations, but this control is contrasted by the supervision of the congress. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency (NSA) are intelligence agencies that operate under a mandate requiring them

to refer to the Senate and Chamber Committees. Legislative supervision is crucial since it provides an important check against the possibility of overcoming by the executive branch.

Gill (2016), takes it further by illustrating how the sustainability of oversight mechanisms is what actually helps to enhance the integrity of institutions. How dual oversight-executive and legislative-serves to add an element of operational effectiveness; Intelligence agencies need to change their practices in keeping with democratic values- in this instance, transparency and accountability. However, this balance also raises questions about the reactivity of intelligence operations to the prevalent political climate and public sentiment. In situations of increased concerns for national security, the executive can try to expand its authority, thus threatening the autonomy of intelligence agencies and turning on a tension between safety needs and democratic principles.

In addition, checks and counterbalances in place in the US system also allow mechanisms beyond legislative oversight, such as judicial review and public defense, to guarantee greater autonomy for intelligence agencies while at the same time placing these agencies in democratic hands. For example, the Foreign intelligence surveillance act introduces judicial supervision into the reign of monitoring foreign intelligence, which thus establishes another level that holds intelligence activities to legal standards; this contrasts the potential abuse of power (Caparini, 2016a).

When accountability is examined in the United States, a dual system emerges. When we add both the executive and the law, as well as the judiciary, we see that all three main bodies supervise these intelligence agencies. The main reason for this is that there is a strong check and balance mechanism. At the same time, these institutions, which supervise each other, play a supervisory role over intelligence agencies. In Russia, the situation is a little different, operational autonomy and accountability of the intelligence agencies in Russia arises as a fundamental aspect of the country's authoritarian regime, which reflects the interaction of state control over the individual agency and the broader political landscape.

It follows that currying favor with the regime is essential for the intelligence community in Russia; as such, the FSB and other agencies do not only serve the interests of national security but also contribute to the political stability of the ruling elite. As Varol (2014) noted, the absence of substantive supervision mechanisms allows them to engage in practices that contravene the rules of responsibility. For example, intelligence agents usually enjoy immunity from prosecution for their activities, as long as it is in the interest of state security; this invariably

fosters a culture of impunity, which can easily lead to human rights abuses and can then spill over into methods of surveillance that breech civil freedoms. Where accountability is minimal, the FSB can have enormous latitude; it has the latitude to pursue strictly regime-solidifying goals under the leadership of Vladimir Putin.

When accountability has no value on this institution, it also has a great impact on the public. According to Glasius (2018), intelligence agencies such as the FSB in Russia suppress dissent and censorship, thereby exercising surveillance over the public and the opposition, thereby removing accountability to the public, while at the same time, such situations prevent and reduce the public's participation in possible democratic processes in state governance and their ability to watchdog over state practices.

When we consider the accountability of Russia's intelligence agencies within themselves, the intelligence agencies here are mostly accountable to the authoritarian regime and carry out operations according to their actions. The only place to which these institutions are accountable is the Kremlin, that is, directly to the president and the state itself, and these institutions are almost intertwined with the authoritarian regime. On the other hand, they do not have accountability to the public and society, and they have high-level protection in these matters. At the same time, they carry out activities directly against their own people by putting pressure on the opposition parties that appear in the elections where the public enters the state administration.

2.5.3.2. Transparency

Transparency in intelligence operations is a fundamental aspect of democratic governance, in particular in the context of the United States, in which public responsibility and supervision mechanisms are fundamental for the functioning of intelligence agencies. Literature underlines the multifaceted nature of transparency and its operational dynamics within the United States Intelligence community.

The public reporting mechanisms, although limited in the flow rate when it comes to national security, play a crucial role in promoting a culture of transparency. These mechanisms include annual relations presented by agencies such as the office of the National intelligence director. These relationships describe the budget, the strategic priorities and the operational

paintings of intelligence activities, as highlighted by Matei (2014). Although most of the data is kept confidential, a flow of information is shared with the public from these intelligence agencies for the sake of general information.

The legislative committees, which are under the responsibility of the US Congress and are tasked with intelligence monitoring and oversight, play an important role in ensuring transparency. According to Norris and Nai (2017), thanks to the oversight under these legislative committees, it is possible to monitor information that is hidden and is not safe to share with the public. In this way, the US intelligence agencies, which are subject to a two-stage review with oversight and inspection by both the public and the committees of legislation, can be examined in the broadest way to see whether they comply with the principles of democracy.

Besides, the function of media can be considered a key element of transparency when controlling intelligence operations. In this sense, while there are opinions in the existing literature that this transparency and accountability are abuse the laws and regulations also the civil rights and freedoms by the governments, on the other hand, it is mentioned that this transparency and accountability can be kept exceptional for the benefit of the public by legitimizing and rationalizing it. In the United States, the pursuit of integrity is facilitated by legislation, such as the Law of Freedom of Information and various human rights structures, trying to protect citizens' rights while regulating intelligence operations. However, the historical incidences of intelligence overtaking, exemplified by the NSA surveillance scandal, illustrate ongoing tensions and the need for stronger governance (Caparini, 2016b). Investigative journalism often can expose cases of overcoming power and abusive behavior by the government, focusing on the points where activities of intelligence bodies can conflict either with civil freedom or ethical norms-a kind of guard dog. In this regard, for instance, the post-9/11 revelations in relation to the mass surveillance practices by the National Security Agency reflected the role of the media in terms of public debate and responsibility attached to intelligence operations. Particularly regarding the views of exploitation, Halstuk (2007, pp.428,457) states that although the FOIA (Freedom of Information Act, 1966) that emerged in the United States gives certain rights to the society and the public in accessing information, these rights are not unlimited and although there are laws such as FOIA in the name of the survival of the state and the security of people in a certain place, also he argued that although the congress tried to prevent this, it was not successful, saying that we can understand from the results of the US Supreme Court in favor of the intelligence agencies being exempted from this

issue. Thus, Kreimer (2007, p.1079) made similar evaluations on this subject; with arguing that it is claimed that no matter how important the value of transparency is in democracies and no matter how much FOIA supports it, this value is still abused, and when it is opposed, the media, congressmen or activists are threatened or suppressed, and the acceptability of these violations is discussed instead of discussing the violations itself. On the other hand, Kirtley (2006, pp.508-509), who normalizes this situation and argues that it is not as extreme as it is said, states that in terrorist incidents such as 9/11 and events that cause public concern, information restriction, lack of transparency and decreased accountability of intelligence agencies are an inevitable result. However, he argues that it cannot be said that there is a conflict between society's rights and the government here, because the public is willing to give up these rights for their own security, so there is room for governments to expand the area of these moments. In addition, Lewis (1989, pp.471-472) states that FOIA and similar acts, although relatively old, are very effective in terms of transparency, and claims that such acts do not harm intelligence agencies or the security of the state as much as thought, and are very important for the benefit of society and public information. Another side says that this issue can actually be resolved and that there is example, Bakir (2018) argues that governments will often ignore laws and rights when intelligence is involved, and the most important thing is that these should be done by communicating with the public and a healthy management and communication example should be set.

Additionally, this sensitive balance between national security and the protection of civil rights and also liberties becomes most fragile in times of crisis and dangerous events. In the aftermath of terrorist attacks, the intelligence agencies are invariably under pressure to extend their sphere of operation and interest areas, which can create controversial debates on issues like privacy and civil rights and freedoms both legally in state or generally. These tensions, as Filgueiras notes, can test the institutional integrity of security and raise concerns about the erosion of democratic responsibility when the security imperative becomes essential. Filgueiras (2022) underlines that periods of increased perception of threats can foster a culture of secrecy and resistance to surveillance, with their cost in terms of institutional integrity. This kind of culture can generate administrative silos that are detrimental to effective collaboration and transparency in agencies and with external entities involved in surveillance. In short, while the US agencies may have formidable capabilities for change and compliance with democratic principles-through legislative modes of surveillance and responsibility mechanisms, for instance-the security crises similarly indicate susceptibility to fundamental vulnerabilities. The

possibilities of overstepping and the risks to civil freedoms might be greater in these periods, thus putting the institutional integrity at risk. For that matter, the operational dynamics of American intelligence agencies remain the tussle of a complex interplay between the needs of national security and the fundamental democratic values they are bound to uphold. This evaluation brings out that as much as responsibility and transparency would be entrenched in the structure of American intelligence, the application in practice would be complex and contextual.

In other words, the operational dynamics of transparency within the United States intelligence community reveal a solid public reporting framework, supervision of the congress and media involvement. On the other hand, analysis of the state of transparency within the Russian intelligence agencies reveals a complex interaction of state secrecy, disinformation, and a solid propaganda apparatus, which collectively serve to maintain the domain of the authoritarian regime. Specifically, the institutional and political reasons that make Russian intelligence agencies-opaqueness particular concern the FSB and SVR. The structure of both agencies, for the maintenance of state safety over transparency, keeps them mainly inaccessible to any public control, while it diminishes the supervisory capacity of democratic institutions, as noted by Barros (2016).

On the other hand, In the authoritarian regime of Russia the intelligence agencies such as FSB and SVR enjoy a great degree of autonomy, with political oversight, reflecting broader features and the practices of the authoritarian regime. Gill (2016) indicates that centralization of power within the Russian state extends the operational scope of such agencies to perform activities approved by the state, often without those constraints seen in Western democracies. In turn, the absence of an effective system of verification and balance promotes a culture of confidentiality and complicity and undercuts responsibility, thereby laying it open to possible abuses of power. According to Glasius and Michaelsen (2018), the deliberate and intentional dissemination of disinformation by Russian intelligence agencies misleads the public and suppresses dissenting voices, creates a forced loyalty to the state on the people, and prevents them from establishing the value of transparency. The media controlled by the state usually spread narratives that consolidate the legitimacy of intelligence operations, framing them as essential for national security. This systematic portrait effectively suffocates dissent, since any criticism of intelligence activities is often marked as non -patriotic or as part of a foreign plot to undermine the Russian state. Citizens do not have access to reliable information on the operational dynamics of intelligence agencies, which prevents the informed debate and limits

the ability of civil society organizations to support greater transparency and responsibility (Barros, 2016). Also, Matei and Bruneau (2011, pp.682-683) stated that Russia was making efforts to reform its intelligence agencies in those years, but its reforms were more focused on bringing them under the control of the executive and the president rather than on accountability and transparency.

In summary of the Russian context, the challenges posed by state secrecy, disinformation and a solid propaganda apparatus create an environment in which transparency in Russian intelligence operations is not simply elusive but systematically obstructed. This limitation not only affects the understanding of the public and the commitment with intelligence activities, but also serves to strengthen the authoritarian socket of the regime, highlighting fundamental discrepancies in the operational transparency of intelligence agencies in democratic and authoritarian contexts (Glasius & Michaelsen, 2018)

2.5.3.3. Institutional Integrity and Autonomy

The integrity of institutions relates to the integrity of an organization or even an entire public administration system, where integrity is defined as the institution's proper functioning and fitness for purpose, as well as its coherence and perceived legitimacy. Institutional integrity relates to the integrity of an organization or even an entire public administration system, where integrity is defined as the institution's proper functioning and fitness for purpose, as well as its coherence and perceived legitimacy (Gurzawska, 2015, p.3).

As mentioned in previous articles, American intelligence agencies undergo significant control in terms of transparency and accountability. In this sense, as can be mentioned again, in the United States, judicial oversight plays an important role in the effort to ensure accountability for intelligence activities. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court basically serves as a check on intelligence activities that could directly impinge upon civil liberties. This court examines applications for surveillance warrants, confirming whether such intelligence activities are warranted under the law. As Lurås (2014) mentions, even though the deliberations of the Court are often classified, the process indirectly contributes to accountability in that agencies are obliged to legally justify their claims and to heed established legal boundaries. This judicial review thus works as a kind of deterrent against arbitrary actions by intelligence agencies and, in this respect, contributes to greater legitimacy and integrity in their work.

Legislative surveillance also importantly provides an instrumental check upon the agencies carrying out the responsibility for the United States. In ensuring this accountability on intelligence activities occurs, Congress involves standing or special committees dedicated to the matters of intelligence that take part through a Senate or permanent select committee representative. Yauri-Miranda (2021) believes that those committees provide not only for surveillance but also for communication and interaction lines between elected officials by the people and the organizations in the gathering of intelligence activities.

The interaction between these responsibility mechanisms promotes and improve a culture of institutional integrity within American intelligence institutions or more specifically the agencies. The expectation of responsibility and accountability encourages professional ethics which prioritizes legal and ethical conduct. As Yauri -Miranda noted (2021), when intelligence agencies perceive that their actions are subject to rigorous surveillance of multiple directions of the state such as judicial, legislative and civil - this can lead to a more prudent and based on principles in the execution of their mandates. Thus, the institutional structure of responsibility in the American intelligence community attenuates not only the risks of authoritarian drift, but also nourishes a system where intelligence practices are aligned with democratic values and provide a solid institutional integrity in double way check. Additionally, institutional integrity within American intelligence agencies has been the subject of a considerable examination, in particular concerning their adaptability and their commitment to democratic values. A recent scholarship underlines the double role of these agencies: while protecting national security, they must also maintain the principles inherent in democratic governance (Grare, 2009; Filgueiras, 2022).

Considering how intelligence agencies operate in an authoritarian country, such as Russia, forces us to one to question what structural mechanisms and cultural norms mold responsibility in light of state-driven practices in force. Indeed, the literature highlights the virtually complete absence of accountability and transparency for the intelligence activities conducted by Russia, attributed primarily to the model of global authoritarian governance impeding institutional checks and counterbalances. Lagacé and Gandhi (2015) indicate that the structure of governance in most authoritarian regimes appears to provide a high degree of autonomy for organizations dealing with intelligence, thus allowing them to operate with minimal surveillance. In return for this situation, intelligence institutions in Russia are working under the pressure and influence of the current regime, in a sense, without preserving their

institutional integrity and ensuring their autonomy, and they cannot fully fulfill their main functions as laws.

Crawford (2000) underlines the fact that, in the authoritarian Russia regime, public institutions are not only reluctant but also systematically uninterested in keeping responsible intelligence agencies. This reluctance often finds its cause in the strategic interests of the State when intelligence operations are considered essential for the stability of the regime. However, this turnout to be a losing of institutional integrity of the intelligence agencies because of parallelism with state. Agencies like the FSB function within a closed system, bereft of pressures from the outside world that may enforce responsibility and accountability upon it in democratic societies, through legislative surveillance or by media scrutiny. These kind of values improves the institutional integrity within the agencies and effect the autonomy of the institution to work and effect properly.

Lagacé and Gandhi (2015) explain that because the intelligence agencies in Russia are pursuing secret operations without much fear of consequences, imperfect intelligence assessments are likely to form the basis of political decisions. In the absence of such crucial feedback mechanisms, calculation errors could occur in foreign policy. After all, intelligence outcomes may not have been an accurate depiction of the reality one tries to portray. As stated the deficit of the values of autonomy and integrity also causes the intelligence errors and policy mistakes because of the political pressure by the state and regime itself.

To summarize, Russian intelligence operations are framed by a comprehensive national security narrative that replaces individual rights considerations or institutional integrity (Gill, 2016). The collusion of state and intelligence functions usually results in systematic violations of civil freedoms, with intelligence agencies operating as instruments of political suppression and not as neutral referees of national security. In addition to not being able to maintain their neutral identity within state institutions, Russian intelligence agencies, which are clearly an instrument of the authoritarian regime, have lost their institutional integrity and autonomy, and for this reason, they are in danger of facing consequences that will affect their reliability as well as their success in the field of intelligence.

CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDIES OF U.S.A AND RUSSIA

3.1. Cases of United States of America

In the United States case study section, the cases will be presented in chronological order. This chronology will begin with the Iraq war and WMDs, then address the Wikileaks leaks and intelligence issues, and then conclude with the Snowden revelations. Each section will be examined in three main sections.

The first section will describe the case itself and outline its general characteristics. The second section will apply the theory of historical institutionalism to the case and demonstrate its implications. The final section will discuss the functioning of oversight mechanisms and the extent to which intelligence institutions align with values such as transparency, accountability, autonomy, and institutional integrity.

3.1.1. Iraq War and Weapons of Mass Destruction

The occupation of Iraq by US and coalition forces actually had a significant history, the most significant of which were the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. Following the events of 9/11, then-President George W. Bush, with his "War on Terror" policy, adopted an aggressive stance against entities recognized as terrorist organizations worldwide and the political regimes that supported them. The most well-known example of this is the military intervention in Afghanistan due to its links to al-Qaeda (Ayub & Kouvo, 2008, p. 641).

However, the war with Iraq was not solely based on the "War on Terror" policy but had a much longer history. The Iraq-Iran war, which began in 1980, focused the world's attention on the Gulf countries. While Iraq achieved early gains in this war, it lost these gains due to the uprisings that erupted within the country, and its harsh suppression of these uprisings drew criticism. At the same time, rumors and alleged evidence surfaced that Iraq, also known as Saddam's regime, was developing weapons of mass destruction for the first time and would

soon add them to its inventory. United Nations inspectors were dispatched to investigate this situation, but Saddam's regime terminated the agreement, claiming they were American agents. Later, during the invasion of Kuwait, UN-Coalition forces repelled Iraq from Kuwait and bombed facilities suspected of possessing weapons of mass destruction. The US would later bomb these facilities in subsequent years.

After the events of September 11th, the Republicans began pursuing a harsher and more pro-war policy, embracing the "War on Terror" policy. Iraq's previous record, its past as an enemy, and the instability it had created in the Middle East, which was contrary to American interests, made it a natural target. However, a justifiable war against Iraq required a justification. This complicated matters because civilian politics provided a justification for the war and, one might say, they had public opinion behind them. This was where American intelligence, the CIA, and British intelligence came into play. According to intelligence reports, Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, and these weapons of mass destruction posed a grave threat to the interests of the United States. It was also alleged that Iraq had links to the al-Qaeda terrorist organization (Woods & Lacey, 2007).

Finally, with the decision made, the invasion of Iraq began with the United States, along with countries such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, Australia, Poland, Portugal, and Spain (Robinson & Whitelaw, 2003). The war, which began on March 20, 2003, ended almost immediately with the occupation of Baghdad on April 9, 2003. Saddam Hussein was captured by coalition forces in December of that same year.

The main justification the US gave in its speech about launching the war (Bush, 2002) was the Saddam Hussein regime's links to the al-Qaeda terrorist organization and its possession of nuclear weapons, along with biological weapons. With the end of the war, the failure of US and coalition officials to find any concrete evidence that weapons of mass destruction were being produced or found in Iraq had a significant impact on public opinion, and the legitimacy of the war, the intelligence agencies' decision, and the Senate Select Committee's oversight were questioned.

3.1.1.1. Application of Historical Institutionalism Theory

When these events are examined through the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism, it becomes clear that institutions make certain impressions by going through certain critical junctures. However, the fundamental foundation of American democracy rests on the people and prioritizes their demands and desires. As such, when an incident involving a violation of human rights or the constitution by intelligence agencies occurs, specifically in the US, chaos or crisis ensues. Therefore, according to the theory that Samuel Huntington (1981) calls "promise of disharmony," US institutions prioritize effectiveness by examining whether they can act without interfering with or violating the civil rights and freedoms of the US public. Caparini (2016b) further elaborates on this point, stating that US intelligence agencies prioritize two distinct factors before taking action: efficacy and propriety. Efficacy describes the extent to which intelligence agencies can meet government demands, while propriety examines how these actions can be implemented without violating the rights and freedoms of US citizens and the steps to be taken (p. 9). In this case, it is possible to consider that propriety takes precedence over efficacy, given the structure of US intelligence agencies and their own political regime.

In the early 1970s, the Watergate scandal revealed that President Richard Nixon had used US intelligence for domestic affairs and against the opposition. Following this, in 1975, the New York Times newspaper accused the intelligence agencies of violating the rights of US citizens by spying on them and of plotting assassination plots against some foreign leaders, such as Fidel Castro. This sparked a major public debate. Following this incident, several reforms were implemented regarding oversight of intelligence agencies. These reforms also protected the integrity of intelligence agencies and provided a legitimate basis for keeping certain matters secret and confidential from the public (Krieger, 2009, pp. 227-228).

It might not be accurate to call this incident a critical juncture, as intelligence had already gained autonomy within itself during the upsurge that began after Kennedy's death, but steps regarding its oversight were disrupted. However, with the Watergate scandal and the New York Times report, we see increased institutional integrity and autonomy. However, we can argue that structural reforms, while oversight, also allowed for greater secrecy.

The American public was rightly asking: who was truly responsible for these events? Civilian politics or the intelligence agencies? In fact, since the founding of modern US intelligence under Eisenhower, it appears that during the presidencies of Eisenhower and

Kennedy, intelligence agencies took no action without the knowledge or understanding of these two presidents. And when the Senate Select Committee, now known as the Senate Select Committee, backed the aforementioned New York Times report, it was revealed that in some cases, intelligence agencies deliberately withheld some information, misrepresented it to mislead, and concealed others. It was determined that they abused their institutional power (Krieger, 2009, p. 228), (Schwarz, 2007, pp. 290-291).

Later, because this committee could not access the intelligence briefings provided to President Bush before the September 11 attacks, they questioned President Bush's accuracy after the attacks. However, Bush avoided taking personal responsibility. Indeed, after these events, President George W. Bush passed laws allowing intelligence agencies to gather information on specific incidents without a court order. As we mentioned in the Snowden incident, many laws were passed during this critical juncture (Kriegere, 2009, 228-229).

As a result, intelligence agencies have gone through several turning points before reaching the point of the non-existent weapons of mass destruction disaster in Iraq. In these incidents, intelligence agencies have achieved various privileges, achieving both institutional integrity and institutional autonomy despite being extremely sensitive institutions. However, as these situations have escalated, neither transparency nor accountability has diminished. Indeed, after the Watergate scandal, the Church Committee (Senate Select Committee) investigations, and the Iraq War, instead of taking any responsibility or holding them accountable, intelligence failures were attributed to incoming sources. However, oversight reports highlighted the WMD and al-Qaeda connections, which were legitimate civilian political reasons for laying the groundwork for the war, and generally concealed and ignored information that proved or could prove otherwise. However, intelligence agencies have not been held accountable for this situation, and politicians have been held accountable by themselves with their discourse.

3.1.1.2. Critical Assessment

The primary purpose of intelligence agencies is to gather and report information on all incidents that could harm the public and citizens in line with the state's interests. During these processes, they must never engage in concealment or exaggeration that could influence the actions or steps to be taken. It is crucial for intelligence agencies to operate completely autonomously, free from influence or pressure in their relationship with civilian politics. The

same applies vice versa. In the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) case, this practice appears to have completely disappeared, with intelligence agencies producing reports at the behest of policymakers. This situation emerged only after the major scandal erupted, after the WMDs were not found after the invasion of Iraq.

The most common accusation regarding the absence of WMDs in Iraq is the illegal politicization of intelligence. This has led to a major disaster. Instead of providing the actual information available about WMDs and the Iraqi regime, the officers working in these agencies provided information that policymakers wanted to hear. However, what the intelligence community should have done here was to provide information based on factual analyses and reports, not those of policymakers and decision-makers. This would have served the interests of the state and the public rather than politically motivated (Jervis, 2013, p. 216).

Furthermore, after this scandal unfolded, Democrats in Congress asked Republicans and the president, "Would you still attack if the intelligence community had issued and defended a report finding no al-Qaeda links or weapons of mass destruction in Iraq?" Bush responded, "We would have launched this attack regardless." This not only ignores the intelligence agencies' reports and analyses, but also appears to be a response intended to protect the role intelligence plays in legitimizing war. In both scenarios, it is observed that two important democratic institutions, the executive branch and the intelligence community, are not fully functioning in terms of two democratic values: accountability and autonomy. However, regardless of this, in a democratic regime, the intelligence agencies' reports and analyses could have exerted enough influence on Congress and the Senate, despite Bush's actions, to dissuade them from the war. (Jervis, 2013, p. 216).

Ultimately, whether the intelligence agencies engaged in deliberate deception or were influenced by civilian politics is a matter of debate. However, the possibility that civilian politics and the intelligence community collaborated to achieve specific objectives in Iraq should not be overlooked. If the intelligence agencies engaged in deliberate deception, we can say that the values of accountability and transparency are lacking. If civilian politics intervened and exerted pressure, we can say that there is a lack of institutional autonomy and institutional integrity. However, if the latter option were to materialize, it could be said that the democratic process and public representation would have been completely destroyed, as the very functioning of the institutions would have been completely disrupted, even though polls show that more than half of the American public supports the war.

3.1.2. Wikileaks Documents

Wikileaks launched online in 2006 with the motto "We open governments." Founded by Julian Assange, the website is not for profit and claims to operate solely in the public interest. In this regard, it verifies information from anonymous sources and shares it with prominent media outlets such as The Guardian and the New York Times to ensure the public's access to this information. In its early years, it provided various information on countries such as Kenya, Peru, Iran, and Guinea. Since 2006, this non-profit organization began by exposing human rights violations and corruption in Kenya, and has subsequently uncovered hundreds of critical files. It has also exposed how Iceland's top banks are contributing to the country's financial distress, and most importantly, how the United States' establishment of a prison at Guantanemo Bay and its violations of human rights prevented the American Civil Liberties Union from acting under the Freedom of Information Security Act (Sifry, 2011, p. 21).

These documents revealed by WikiLeaks contain three significant incidents concerning the United States' violations of democratic values and human rights. The first is Collateral Murder, leaked by Chelsea Manning in 2010, which depicts arbitrary killings during the Iraq War. The second is the Guantanemo Bay prison in Cuba, a prison run by the CIA, as mentioned earlier. The last is Vault 7, which involves the CIA gaining access to certain technological devices (such as Samsung, Apple, and Microsoft) without informing Congress or the House of Representatives.

The Collateral Murder incident involved the US military targeting civilians in Iraq on July 12, 2007. This incident was leaked to WikiLeaks in 2010 by American intelligence analyst Chelsea Manning. The incident essentially began with a series of attacks involving a group of civilians, including two Reuters journalists, from the air, fired 30mm artillery rounds from a US military helicopter, without any intelligence information or confirmation that they were armed. In the first footage, the civilians are labeled "armed" and opened fire. In the next footage, although the wounded journalist is neutralized, the attackers attempt to kill him, leaving him unharmed. Two children are injured in the process. In the second footage, the injured journalist's friends and the children attempting to help him into the truck are targeted, and the injured journalist is killed. The final footage shows two armed militants entering a building, which is then blown up by a bomb while a civilian, unrelated to the incident, passes nearby and harmless civilians are also present in the building. The fact that American soldiers engaged in dialogue throughout this incident, as if it were a computer game, sparked considerable outrage.

Furthermore, Assange stated that one of the main reasons this incident is called a collateral murder is that the wounded journalist was directly targeted, despite the fact that the attack on someone whose injuries violated the rules of engagement. (Christensen, 2014, pp. 2593-2595), (TheWikileaksChannel, 2020), (Al Jazeera English, 2010).

In this context, when we examine the Defense Intelligence Agency, they describe themselves as an institution responsible for providing information to the armed forces in times of war. They also claim to fulfill their duties without violating their own values, and their values include accountability, a democratic value. The DIA is also an intelligence agency that played an active role in Iraqi operations. Consequently, it is quite natural and normal for the DIA to be implicated in this incident. Deficiencies such as instructions, incomplete intelligence, or violations of the rules of warfare engagement, as well as failure to hold subordinate institutions accountable due to institutional integrity, can also be observed. (U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, n.d.).

Guantanomo prison was established by the United States in 2002, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, on a US military base in Cuba to detain criminals in the context of the "War on Terror." The existence of this prison was not a secret; it held suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban, as well as suspected perpetrators of attacks against the United States. Although it was initially argued that extrajudicial detention and interrogation violated the Geneva Conventions, George Bush stated that detainees detained in the "War on Terror" could not be considered within the scope of the Geneva Conventions (Hajjar, 2014, p. 20). What drew even more criticism than the existence of a prison and the detention of potential suspects was the fact that this situation was established by intelligence agencies in Cuba to evade constitutional regulations and to conceal practices intended to violate international human rights agreements and human rights conventions. No one, guilty or innocent, had any constitutional rights here, and WikiLeaks documents revealed various forms of torture, such as waterboarding, against criminals. At the same time, the fact that the CIA and DIA, key intelligence agencies, chose this path to avoid transparency and accountability created a major earthquake in terms of the pursuit of democratic values and democratic governance. The very immunity and exceptional status of these institutions before the law began to be questioned. (Miles, 2007, pp. 218-219), (Kreimer, 2007, pp. 1038, 1050), (Dhunnoo, 2022, p. 3).

The Vault 7 incident, reportedly involving the leak of 8,761 documents by Wikileaks in 2017, detailing the CIA's surveillance of technological devices. This constitutes the largest single-issue intelligence activity to date. Among these cyber weapons developed by the CIA

were devices capable of turning newer televisions into microphones, software capable of infiltrating and monitoring mobile phones (iOS and Android), and malware capable of hacking into computer operating systems like MacOS, Windows, and Linux, allowing them to control a computer without being physically present (Vogt, 2020, p. 3), (Youvan, 2025). Especially after Edward Snowden's leaks regarding the NSA's PRISM program, the Vault 7 incident raised questions about confidentiality and the accountability and transparency of intelligence. The fact that Vault 7 could not pass through the FISC, that it did not fall under the FISC's jurisdiction, that it lacked congressional approval, and that it was not publicly known or audited also indicates that it violates the process. The uncertainty about who will be the targets of this surveillance and monitoring activities of the CIA, which especially penetrates into the private sphere, makes some citizens think that it is threatening for them if information comes into the hands of the government, especially during democratic election processes (Mixon, 2022).

3.1.2.1. Application of Historical Institutionalism Theory

After Kennedy's death, we see a loosening of oversight of intelligence institutions in the United States, and it is known that a significant critical juncture occurred. This path dependency also demonstrates that intelligence institutions operate more freely and autonomously. In fact, intelligence institutions have sometimes played significant roles in domestic political matters, such as the Watergate scandal. This path dependency also demonstrates that US intelligence institutions gradually emerged from the oversight of democratic checks and balances and found themselves becoming somewhat more exceptional institutions. However, during the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush, known for his close ties to intelligence institutions and often considered the president who best understood them, implemented major reforms that expanded the reach of intelligence institutions and shortened or abolished certain legal processes to enable faster decision-making. (Andrew, 2013, p.148)

First, when we examine the Collateral Murder incident, we see that US soldiers arbitrarily designated targets with firearms and massacred numerous civilians without facing any punishment. In its assessment of the Collateral Murder incident, CENTCOM, the US Central Command, emphasized that the air force complied with the rules of engagement and that the civilian deaths resulting from this behavior were unintentional. No sanctions were imposed on any soldiers involved. The DIA's transfer of intelligence information and whether

they received any reports from the DIA are also in question. Because the DIA was conducting the operation in conjunction with CENTCOM, it is unknown whether any intelligence was provided (Crawford, 2013). The DIA was not involved in the accountability process for this incident, or was deliberately omitted. The fact that US intelligence agencies escaped without any sanctions during these events, which attracted significant international criticism after 9/11, the fact that these events were publicized due to a leak, and the lack of any opposition from civilian policymakers have led to discussions about the existence of democratic values of accountability, transparency, and institutional integrity. The path dependency observed after the events of 9/11, which constituted a critical juncture, can be interpreted as the protection of intelligence agencies from civilian authorities and accountability.

The Guantanamo Bay prison incident is no different. After the events of 9/11, which also constituted a critical juncture, the CIA pursued specific objectives in this prison, established at a US military base in Cuba. Its primary objective was to try prisoners of war and suspects it captured in this camp, disregarding any legal regulations or legal boundaries. The fact that alleged suspects detained here are subject to no constitutional safeguards during their interrogation, and some are imprisoned without concrete evidence, is also a factor. This also applies to the torture of those detained as suspects. This torture is carried out without any accountability. These include techniques that violate human dignity and are prohibited by human rights. Throughout all these events, the CIA's failure to be held accountable for its actions and the portrayal of these events as somehow legitimate have been among the most significant indicators that democratic values can be considered exceptional by US intelligence agencies. The events of 9/11, in turn, legitimized such undemocratic and unlawful actions within these institutions.

The Vault 7 incident can be considered almost a parallel to, and even larger than, the Snowden incident, which leaked the NSA's PRISM activities. This program, kept top secret without any information being disclosed to the FISC or Congress, raises questions about the extent to which the CIA has access to the private lives of individuals and its own citizens, and why it would want to. In this sense, the CIA's action, without Congressional or FISC approval, demonstrates a gross lack of oversee and oversight. It hinders oversight, limits accountability, and, since it must remain secret, lacks transparency. We see how US intelligence agencies act when these actions contradict democratic values. It's unknown who the CIA used it on, whether it used it arbitrarily, and indeed, if Vault 7 hadn't been leaked, it would never have remained a known program. As we've just presented as an argument, the exceptionalism and illegalization

of intelligence institutions that developed after the critical juncture of 9/11, and even more so, the path dependency of intelligence agencies' control over civilian authority, can also be seen in the Vault 7 incident.

3.1.2.2. Critical Assessment

In the three incidents previously revealed by WikiLeaks documents—the Collateral Murder, Guantanomo prison, and Vault 7—one would have expected both the DIA and the CIA, as democratic institutions of a democratic state, to function very differently. However, during the Collateral Murder, the DIA failed to take any responsibility and, instead of demanding accountability from the monitoring and judicial state institutions, stood behind them, thus failing to provide any accountability or prepare a transparent report on the unfolding events. In fact, CENTCOM and the DIA, the two responsible parties in this incident, should have been expected to be held accountable based on democratic values. It could also be argued that due to the lack of accountability or transparency, they acted contrary to democratic values and viewed the privilege of their own institutions being considered superior or exceptional over civilian authorities.

Furthermore, the CIA's actions at both Guantanomo prison and the Vault 7 program were not carried out under an oversight. Indeed, it could be argued that civilian politics, let alone oversight, also contributed to this process. One might question why the CIA needed to interrogate potential suspects at Guantanamo Bay, a facility established in Cuba to directly circumvent laws and regulations. Furthermore, the CIA, acting in violation of the Geneva Conventions, should have ensured that potential suspects were tried in an environment where they had certain rights and privileges, and that their interrogation was conducted without infringing upon human dignity. In the Vault 7 program, the CIA, going one step beyond the NSA's efforts following the Snowden Leaks, was already developing new technologies that would penetrate human life. Not only was the whereabouts and on whom this program would be used not transparently disclosed, but the very existence of such a program was revealed only after the WikiLeaks leaks.

The United States is undoubtedly known for having the largest intelligence and oversight agencies and commissions, the most extensive research on these issues, and the earliest to initiate them. In addition, it has developed the most comprehensive intelligence

oversight system for intelligence institutions, implementing a series of reforms addressing very serious and classified issues. As in a democracy, intelligence institutions must prioritize the interests and rights of their own citizens and produce high-quality assessments, measurements, analyses, and warning reports (Nolan, 2010).

However, as seen in these three incidents, while all this is happening, rights and freedoms, along with the values of transparency and accountability, are often disregarded.

On the other hand, Krieger (2009) argues that a dilemma arises. Committees established within Parliament or Congress are expected to oversee these intelligence institutions. However, because these intelligence institutions are inherently secretive, only a limited number of individuals can conduct oversight. Considering that the representatives or ministers who have access to these institutions are also civilian policymakers—in other words, the individuals who issue the intelligence orders—it would be inaccurate to claim that they will meticulously conduct oversight and transparency in the event of a scandal (p. 210).

In addition, the judiciary often flags intelligence flaws, prompting the executive branch to take significant steps toward reforming intelligence agencies. Despite the involvement of these three branches, it can be argued that a truly democratic oversight of intelligence is impossible (Krieger, 2009, p. 211).

3.1.3. Snowden Revelations

The United States of America is one of the most advanced and pioneering institutions in the world, both in terms of intelligence institutions and intelligence itself. Its democratic structure in political terms also allows it to stand out as the protectors of democracy. Their commitment to values such as the rule of law, transparency, and accountability, and their discourses in this direction have brought them to the position we are talking about. However, when we examine the United States of America in more depth, we see that this does not fully work in institutions such as intelligence, where exceptions and secrecy are essential. Although this situation has been addressed with many laws and legal regulations, the documents leaked to the press by Edward Snowden, a former CIA and NSA employee, have been an indication that the democratic and legal rights of citizens in the country are being violated and have caused

public debate. This situation has been evaluated by Glasius and Michaelsen (2018) as one of the both authoritarian and illiberal practices in democratic countries. (p. 3807).

In June 2013, Edward Snowden met with Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald, two American investigative journalists with whom he had previously communicated, in Hong Kong to share documents from the United States, one of the world's leading states, and one of its leading intelligence agencies, the NSA, which would perhaps create one of the world's greatest domestic and foreign political upheavals (Poitras & Greenwald, 2013). Snowden leaked approximately 10.000 documents during and after this meeting (Greenwald, 2013). In this revelation, he revealed the little-known details of the global surveillance conducted by the NSA (Greenwald & MacAskill, 2013), as well as the mass data collection process carried out by the NSA, including its own citizens, and the joint surveillance carried out with the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the British equivalent of the NSA (MacAskill, Borger, Hopkins, Davies, & Ball, 2013). At the same time, the surveillance of foreign diplomats and leaders who could be considered allies and the mass hoarding of metadata has raised questions about the US internationally.

The most notable program among these was the program called PRISM (Planning Tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization, and Management). PRISM began in 2007 with the Protect America Act under the Bush administration and is authorized under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act and overseen by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) (Gellman, 2013) (Lee, 2013). However, the government's desire to collect all information and expand its sphere of influence increased with pressures on private firms and companies. With the pressure of sanctions, patriotic pressure and many other external factors, many companies that provided access to the electronic environment were made part of the PRISM program. Many important brands such as Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Twitter and Apple were providing data to the NSA simultaneously and continuously, so that the people that every US citizen and other individuals contacted on the internet site they accessed could be recorded and stored (Deibert, 2015, p.11). Along with PRISM, GCHQ's “Tempora” program, which allowed it to collect large amounts of data from overseas fiber optic cables, and the real-time surveillance or tracking program of users' internet activities, known as “Xkeyscore” and used by the NSA, have been discussed in the public as a violation of democracy, transparency, accountability and the rule of law, as well as bringing up security vs. privacy debates (Porcedda, 2013, p.373).

All these events were a large-scale and effective application for intelligence and state security, but it is essential for a state like the USA, which claims to be the representative and pioneer of democracy, to also take into account human rights and constitutional guarantees. However, those involved in this incident preferred to go after the incident rather than calm it down. In particular, Google's CEO advised people not to do these actions that they do not want to be known, rather than to make them known, and Zuckerberg claimed that the concept of privacy no longer exists in today's social age (Greenwald, 2014, p.162). After the Senate Intelligence Committee Chair claimed that NSA data collection was not surveillance, the public demanded to know how much time the committee chair Dianne Feinstein talked to and who she emailed every month (Greenwald, 2014, p.163).

3.1.3.1. Application of Historical Institutionalism Theory

It would not be a correct approach to say that the NSA's activities began with the "Protect America" law approved by George W. Bush and the establishment of PRISM. Because the documents revealed by Snowden, namely the actions taken by the NSA under the name of security measures such as PRISM and Xkeyscore, cannot be kept independent of all other historical events and historical processes, because when explaining the development of US intelligence institutions, there are especially breaking points created by certain critical junctures and path dependencies that emerge in these results. The US, which is a democratic political regime and is seen as the pioneer of democracy, has a certain historical path for these authoritarian or illiberal practices. The democratic US regime, which attaches great importance to values such as transparency, accountability, institutional autonomy and integrity in its institutions, has led to the loss of these values in the Intelligence institution with the critical junctures and path dependency that developed over the years. By taking advantage of the exceptional advantage of this institution, which should already be secret by its nature, individuals' privacy and individual rights have been violated.

The 9/11 incident comes to mind first as the biggest reason for the arbitrary surveillance and information storage carried out by the NSA. However, in the past of the incident, certain critical junctures have occurred until this point has been reached. After the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba, one of the greatest failures in the history of intelligence by the USA, President John F. Kennedy became aware of the intelligence agency's willful actions and lack of institutional

control and took steps for reform in this regard. For example, President Kennedy dismissed Dulles and Bissel, the important names at the head of the CIA, and left the Directorate of Central Intelligence to John McCone, a Republican. In this sense, John McCone used intelligence not as a covert operation mechanism, but as an advisory and intelligence center in foreign policy-making, and thanks to this, the Cuban missile crisis problem was overcome without any danger (Usowsky, 1988, p.548).

However, there was a visible communication breakdown between intelligence agencies before and during the Bay of Pigs incident and this communication breakdown was also reflected in politicians. President Kennedy gave the order to establish the White House Situation Room after the Bay of Pigs fiasco in order to directly intervene in this situation, so that communication could be made quickly and promptly, decisions could be made as urgently as possible and implemented in the field (Donley, O'Leary & Montgomery, 1997, p.7). Finally, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, which was established by the previous President Eisenhower to monitor and supervise the CIA, could not fully fulfill its duty due to the lobbying of the Central Intelligence Directorate in the Senate. After all these incidents, Kennedy changed the name of the institution to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, expanded its previous authority and sphere of influence, and ensured that the names to be appointed to head this institution were non-political, leaving the task of monitoring the CIA to this institution (Absher et al. 2006, pp.7-8).

However, after all these reforms, after the mysterious death of President Kennedy, the reforms were not followed by other presidents and the CIA and other intelligence agencies continued to act on their own. It would not be wrong to consider this situation as the most important critical juncture of intelligence becoming an institution above surveillance. The most well-known example of this transformation is that President Johnson, instead of listening to John McCone's advice for the Vietnam War, expanded the CIA's authority during the war and gave the order to bomb Vietnam with the CIA's instructions and advice (Weiner, 2008, pp.244-248). The Operation CHAOS incident that came after these, with the widening scope of the monitoring of incoming and outgoing e-mails of American citizens by President Johnson and President Nixon (Johnson, 2008, p.200), was a premiere of what the NSA did after the 9/11 events. At the same time, during these periods, US intelligence agencies again intervened in foreign countries' elections (Chile) (Johnson, 2008, p.200).

With the decisions taken after 9/11 incident, institutions such as the CIA, NSA, and FBI were strengthened and both the authority and influence of intelligence agencies were

increased. On top of all this, government pressure was increased on the owners of large-scale and prestigious sites that had an impact on the internet, and they were forced to work together with the state for joint surveillance (Deibert, 2015, pp.10-11). The most important and well-known law after the 9/11 incident was the US PATRIOT ACT. Section 215 of this law authorized the NSA to collect bulk metadata data. In other words, the NSA derives its legal authority for metadata collection programs (such as PRISM) from this section, known as Section 215 of the US Patriot Act, which was later amended to FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) (McGowan, 2013, p.2413).

Barnett (2015) defends this situation by stating that although the conversations were already sent to the phone providers and were not confidential, he still says that this is a constitutional violation in the sense that it should only be shared with the NSA and another institution with "suspicious reasons and tangible evidence" (pp. 11-12). However, George W. Bush used his authority as commander in chief in 2005 to allow the NSA to collect data without relying on a search warrant, but since this created too many legal loopholes, in 2008, with FISA section 702, it became the legal basis for surveillance of terrorist suspects and only non-American citizens (Miller, 2019, pp. 139-140). However, when US citizens who were likely to be in contact with terrorists were also spied on, this situation raised some questions and led to many discussions such as surveillance of US citizens without warrant (Miller, 2019, pp. 139-140)

All these decisions paved the way for legal actions that would excessively expand the NSA's rights violations and surveillance authority, but despite all this, the NSA did not stop with these laws, and even the constitutionality of some laws passed after this incident was questioned and became a subject of debate, and it clearly violated US Amendment 4. According to US Amendment 4,

"*The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."* (U.S. Constitution amend. IV, n.d.).

First of all, Section 215, which came into force with the Patriot Act, was not in accordance with the constitution and its legitimacy was questioned. The fact that such a big gap was made publicly was an indication of how much the intelligence agencies had become

powerful within the state. The actions that the intelligence agencies, which had been strengthened and renewed since the Kennedy assassination, could take were now seen as being above the law in a way. In addition, although FISA Section 702 is a constitutional regulation, later examination of US citizens in violation of these regulations makes a situation that is legal in theory illegal in practice. As a result, after the 9/11 events, which were considered as critical junctures, although a legitimate ground was prepared for the expansion of the powers of the intelligence agencies with the FISA and Patriot Act regulations, a clearly authoritarian practice tendency was followed together with the constitutional violations.

All these developments created a path dependency and played important roles in the process leading to the Snowden Revelations. In fact, the Snowden revelations today are the result of a historical institutional development.

3.1.3.2. Critical Assessment

First of all, if there is something that needs to be known, there are bodies and committees that will monitor such exceptional institutions in countries with a democratic form of government. Different institutions are even created and even laws are passed to monitor them. The main problem we see in this case is the deficiencies in the functioning of these monitoring institutions or their deliberate disregard. For example, in the United States, there were institutions that were responsible for monitoring the NSA within the framework of the PRISM program. These are the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the bicameral system. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), which monitors its legality and compliance with the law. The office of inspector general, which is responsible for monitoring and supervising the NSA within itself. Finally, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), which was created by the 9/11 committee to monitor intelligence and the DNI after the events of 9/11.

To start with, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence defines itself as overseeing intelligence agencies and conducting work on behalf of US intelligence, presenting appropriate legislative proposals to the Senate and reporting intelligence activities, and overseeing the constitutionality of the actions of intelligence agencies (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, n.d.). The House Permanent Select Committee, on the other hand, has described its own mission in the dual-check US democratic functioning system as overseeing and

supervising intelligence and intelligence-related activities and all 18 different intelligence agencies (U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, n.d.). When considered in this context, the documents disclosed and revealed by Snowden, the possibility that the NSA's PRISM program was not reported and passed through these two committees, supports the claim that intelligence agencies are not in compliance with the principle of accountability. Because if these institutions had done their auditing correctly, the information leaked by Snowden would not have created a nationwide uproar and its unlawfulness and even unconstitutionality would not have been a matter of public debate. When we look at it in this context, we see that accountability, which is a democratic value, does not work.

Then, we can consider the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which is the institution responsible for auditing. The duty of this institution is to discuss the applications of the executive branch regarding the steps it will take regarding foreign intelligence and to approve them if they deem appropriate (U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, n.d.). When we look at it in this sense, the NSA had to get approval from this court for programs such as PRISM and UPSTREAM or Xkeyscore. However, as can be seen, this court was established to eliminate threats against US citizens created on foreign intelligence. On the other hand, the NSA used these programs to collect the data of US citizens in bulk and as a whole, in other words, it either went beyond the decision made by the court or the court reached an unlawful judgment. Here we are faced with two questions: is it against the transparency principle of democracy that the court's decision is not known on what basis, and can the inability to monitor the intelligence agencies' actions contrary to the court's decision indicate the deficiency of institutions that monitor intelligence and the lack of accountability? The answer to both can be yes, because although we cannot see what the court's decision was based on, if the court made this decision in accordance with the constitution, we can say that intelligence agencies are not accountable institutions. In addition, according to Donohue (2008), the NSA hid the extent of its program even from the FISC (p.244). And in 2006, a Detroit District Court Judge ruled that this program conducted by the NSA violated Amendments 1 and 4 as well as FISA (Donohue, 2008, p.244).

Thirdly, the NSA has an oversight body, the Office of Inspector General, which acts as a balance within the institution. This department has explained its duty as checking the compliance of the actions taken with the constitution, laws, enforcement and regulations, and using public expenditures for the public good (U.S. Office of Inspector General, NSA, n.d.).

Again, it is seen that the integrity and supervision within the institution remain weak due to the unconstitutionality of applications such as PRISM.

Finally, PCLOB emerged as an independent institution within the executive branch with the act of 2007 by the 9/11 committee, and its duty was deemed necessary for the checks and balances system with the increase in the authorities of the government after these 9/11 terrorism events and was established in this context (Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, n.d.). Until Snowden leaked the documents, they did not take any action regarding these programs, but after the documents were leaked, they held meetings with President Obama.

3.2. Cases of Russia

The Russian cases will be examined under two separate headings. Like the US cases, the Russian cases will be examined chronologically. In this sense, the Yukos case will be discussed first in Russia, followed by the Politkovskaya and Litvinenko assassinations under the same headings.

As with the US cases in the Russian cases, the study will consist of three main sections: a narrative of the case, the application of historical institutionalism to the case, and finally, a critical assessment section, which will explain the extent to which the values of transparency, accountability, autonomy, and institutional integrity were implemented by intelligence agencies.

3.2.1. The Yukos Affair Case

The Yukos affairs case is one of the most significant cases demonstrating how Russia's intelligence agencies and civilian politicians have taken control of the country. The Federal Security Service (FSB), responsible for Russian intelligence's internal security, is seen to be under civilian control, exerting harsh and oppressive influence over Yukos, one of Russia's most important oil companies. However, a crucial point here is that President Vladimir Putin served as FSB director before becoming Russian president, meaning that former branches of

the FSB or KGB, as they are known, have seized control of state governance within all of Russia's intelligence agencies.

Summarizing the Yukos affairs case from its individual years would be detrimental to achieving a full understanding, so it would be more accurate to trace this back to the glasnost and perestroika policies of Mikhail Gorbachev's era. With the Soviet economy no longer self-sufficient and the transition to a new system, Gorbachev took unprecedented steps in both economic, political, and social spheres. Among these steps, glasnost was the step taken in the political and social spheres. Glasnost was a policy that prioritized transparency and accountability, encompassing many democratic values such as holding elections with a free opposition open to criticism, freedom of expression, and impartial journalism. With this policy, the Soviet Union entered a period of significant transformation. Perestroika, on the other hand, was a transition from a communist to a liberal economy. This transition brought about significant economic changes within society, laying the foundation for oligarchization. However, its true beginnings were the privatization processes under Boris Yelstin, the first president of the Russian Federation.

The Soviet Union has never been open to such drastic changes since ancient Russian history. The system changed, the regime changed, but the authoritarian form of government remained unchanged, as was evident during the transition from an empire to a communist regime. At the same time, such changes fueled the problem of chronic opposition and were also seen as a vulnerability to external threats. Indeed, the Soviet Union eventually collapsed, and during the Boris Yeltsin era, the Russian Federation began to abandon communist values and transition to democratic values and a democratic form of governance, as well as a capitalist economic style. These privatization policies, coupled with the emergence of oligarchs who achieved wealth through various economic initiatives across the country, gained not only economic power but also political power as a result of this economic power. Unable to cope with the growing oligarch power and opposition pressure, Yeltsin appointed Putin as acting president. He later resigned, bringing Putin to the presidency.

Putin was essentially an intelligence agent who had previously served in the KGB and later served as head of the FSB. From this perspective, we can say that the two institutions became intertwined once intelligence took control of civilian authorities. However, the presidency was not sufficient simply to gain authority and maintain power. Oligarchs controlled the country's large capital. They also championed liberal economic reforms and made substantial donations to some opposition political parties during elections to the Duma, the

country's parliament. This situation brought about the problem of internal threats, a chronic problem in Russian history. Russia was once again fighting for power within itself (Volkov, 2003, p. 2).

In this context, it can be said that civilian authority, namely the Russian presidency, or the executive branch, was intertwined with Russian intelligence. The FSB and Putin perceived these donations made by Yukos owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky within the country as a threat to seize control of state power and took the first step. On July 2, 2003, the FSB arrested Lebedevi, the head of Yukos's financial resource center, and later Pichigun, the head of Yukos's economic security. During the Yeltsin years, Lebedev was arrested on charges of economic fraud and tax evasion, while Pichugin was arrested on contract killing charges. Later, Khodorkovsky, the head of Yukos, was arrested on the same charges as Lebedev and also on theft charges.

Putin stated that these incidents had nothing to do with a political power struggle and that they were carried out entirely through legal means. State authorities also reported that Yukos underpaid $1 billion in taxes in 2002, despite paying approximately $5 billion in taxes (Volkov, 2003, p. 1).

However, it was also predicted that investors entering the country would lose confidence and experience economic hardship following the Yukos cases and arrests. With this incident, the FSB and Putin clearly demonstrated that Yeltsin's legacy would no longer exist. They demonstrated that actions that would authoritarianly seize control of the state, engage in close relations with foreign countries, or create open opposition would not go unpunished (Volkov, 2003, p. 2-3).

This also created a structural mechanism that deprived the Russian people of their right to choose, leaving them with no alternative but the state itself, and that oppressed its own citizens.

With the Yukos incident, the FSB and Putin clearly demonstrated that any dissenting voice or dissenting opinion would be suppressed, regardless of the consequences and who perpetrated it. They demonstrated this through their operations against Khodorkovsky, the most powerful oligarch of the time.

3.2.1.1. Application of Historical Institutionalism Theory

The Yukos case is a significant case that demonstrates the state's re-entry into an authoritarian trend, and that this authoritarian trend has placed its intelligence agencies directly under the command of civilian politics or decision-makers.

As discussed in the theoretical framework in previous sections, Russia had established a long-standing tradition of suppressing dissent and taking harsh measures against external threats, and within this tradition, it has used its intelligence agencies quite effectively. This tradition has persisted from the time of Ivan the Terrible to the present day (Walther, 2014, p. 674). Later, during the communist regime of the Soviet Union, Lenin and Stalin, rather than establishing intelligence agencies as separate and autonomous institutions, established them as intertwined with the state to counter internal threats. This can be considered a critical juncture for contemporary Russian intelligence, as it can be argued that such a tradition still exists. During this period, intelligence agencies established under various names, from the Cheka to the KGB, operated directly in accordance with the policies and orders of politicians. With the onset of the Cold War, the KGB continued this tradition while also focusing on external threats. In fact, in this system established by Vladimir Lenin and Stalin, Russian intelligence, which had a more institutional identity than before, remained intertwined with the state, creating a path dependency (Pringle, 1998, pp. 177-178).

The process of decline that began with Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika initiatives, followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, created a power vacuum in the newly established Russian Federation during the Boris Yeltsin era. While the KGB publicly stated its support for these policies, it actually believed they were dangerous to the country's survival and that foreign intelligence agencies could be active there. This duality led to their failure (Walther, 2014, pp. 667-668). In this sense, the former KGB elites (mostly the FSB) sought to establish authority primarily at strategic points, while the oligarchs, on the other hand, established a sphere of influence by dominating companies in social spheres (Walther, 2014, p. 670). Yeltsin was considered close to the oligarchs, but due to increasing opposition pressure, he was forced to resign. A great opportunity presented itself for the former security elites, known as the siloviki, and especially for the FSB, as the new president, Vladimir Putin, was a former KGB agent and former FSB director.

Indeed, the authoritarian vacuum that needed to be filled first encountered a heated conflict through the Yukos corporation. Yukos openly supported the opposition and sought power over the existing civilian government, but Vladimir Putin and the FSB acted more quickly, ensuring a swift resolution to this situation. Once established, intelligence agencies and civilian politics intertwined, creating an authoritarian structure within the state, the siloviki (Ateş, 2020, p. 323).

In fact, since the founding of the Russian Federation in the early 21st century, Russia's path remained uncertain. However, with Vladimir Putin's rise to power, a new critical juncture occurred, with Russia once again leaning towards authoritarian rule, as it had in the past, and its intelligence agencies becoming intertwined with civilian politics. The swift and smooth resolution of the Yukos affair demonstrates that, despite being a new country and a new system, long-standing traditions remain effective and problem-solving today.

3.2.1.2. Critical Assesment

When considering Russia today or any other state in its history, it is never seen as having a separate and autonomous intelligence agency. Furthermore, it would not be wrong to say that intelligence agencies began to institutionalize in their modern sense with the Cold War, first under the leadership of the US and later Russia. Given that Russia is perceived as authoritarian both in civilian politics and literature, it would be unreasonable to expect transparency and accountability from Russian intelligence agencies. Indeed, the FSB states on its official website that the person who oversees and oversees its own institutions is the President of the Russian Federation (Government of the Russian Federation, n.d.). However, realistically, for the president to do this would be a significant and heavy burden, combined with his other duties. Furthermore, the extent to which President Putin, as a siloviki, would realistically carry out this task remains a question mark. Since the FSB operates under the orders of civilian politicians and decision-makers, it can easily be said that such oversight and monitoring are impossible.

Institutional integrity and autonomy are out of the question, as an institution so intertwined with the state and civilian politics can neither maintain institutional integrity nor act autonomously. The FSB's normal operation should be to inform decision-makers by presenting the intelligence it receives in a form of reports and analysis to civilian politics, but

the situation has evolved into taking direct action and acting in accordance with civilian politics' demands.

3.2.2. Assassinations of Anna Politkovskaya and Aleksandr Litvinenko Case

While the assassinations of Politkovskaya and Litvinenko appear to be two separate acts, they were actually interconnected and carried the same purpose. Both posed a threat to the current Russian regime, and Litvinenko's murder posed a risk of illuminating the Politkovskaya murder. In this sense, the Russian state and intelligence agencies used antiquated KGB methods to intervene and eliminate both individuals. The FSB, in fact, was covertly eliminating anyone it deemed a threat to the Russian state, whether politician or journalist, in violation of Russian law and with the approval of the state. This did not only occur during the Putin era, but the frequency of these incidents increased. Specifically, during Chechen President Dudayev's speech on behalf of peace talks with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1996, Dudayev's location was identified through signals intelligence (SIGINT). A Russian jet targeted Dudayev with a guided missile, killing him. However, figures like Galina Starovoitova, the politician assassinated during the Yeltsin era, Sergey Yushenkov, the politician assassinated during Vladimir Putin's term, and journalist Yuri Shekochikin lead us to the FSB, responsible for unsolved murders. In this sense, it is observed that the FSB not only sought to accelerate Putin's accession to power and the transition to an authoritarian regime, but also achieved its desired outcome by continuing these activities after Putin's arrival. Furthermore, countless individuals with social status, oligarchs, politicians, and journalists were eliminated for opposing the current authoritarian regime and the FSB (Tarabah, 2014, pp. 6-7).

Anna Politkovskaya, an investigative journalist working for Novoya Gazeta, criticized her impartial reporting on the Chechen war, the Russian state's disproportionate and infringing on human rights use of force, the authoritarian policies and authoritarianism that began in Russia with Vladimir Putin's accession to the presidency, and finally, the arbitrary practices carried out by the FSB in collaboration with the state. With these reports and criticisms, Politkovskaya came onto the radar of both the FSB and the current Russian regime, namely Vladimir Putin. Politkovskaya even wrote extensively critical books, including "A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya" (2001) and "Putin's Russia" (2004), both of which were critical of Putin and the events surrounding the Chechen war (Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d.).

Politkovskaya, who had been on the FSB's radar, was also the victim of an assassination attempt via poisoning on a plane en route to the "Beslan school raid." On October 7, 2006, Anna Politkovskaya was found dead in her elevator. The date of her death, notably, coincided with Vladimir Putin's birthday (Amnesty International, 2009). In 2014, five people, including one former FSB agent and three Chechens, were arrested for the planned murder of Politkovksaya. However, the perpetrators of these killings and who ordered them remain unknown and unsolved (Roth, 2014). However, even Edward Snowden, now a Russian citizen and known for exposing NSA data collection, suggests that the FSB may have been behind this death (Biddle, 2016). Anna Politkovskaya's reporting and writing on the Chechen war established her as a leading advocate and leader of human dignity and decency. Thanks to the reports and news reports she collected, we can still witness the atrocities, state-sponsored corruption, and lives taken during the Chechen war. With such a volatile agenda, it's difficult to maintain international attention for long, but Politkovskaya's reporting not only succeeded but also greatly distressed the Russian state and the FSB (Thompson, 2017, p. 74).

Alexander Litvinenko was an agent who served first in the KGB and then in the FSB. In 1994, he was part of the FSB team that investigated the attempted car bombing of oligarch Berezovsky. He met Berezovsky that year, and the two later became close friends. Litvinenko served in the FSB during the Chechen wars and participated in some operations. However, he later publicly revealed the massacres, corruption, and extortion committed by FSB officers. He even claimed to have been tasked with killing Berezovsky (The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d.).

While investigations against him continued in 2000, he fled to London and continued his life as a voice of opposition to the Putin regime in Russia. Since the Yeltsin era, he had been providing both Yeltsin and Putin with information about FSB corruption, aided by the oligarch Berezovsky (Goldfarb, 2010, p. 136). However, he explained that when he told Putin that the FSB supported certain mafia and drug lords and conducted illegal business there, Putin regarded him with hatred and did not take him seriously because he believed such incidents would damage his reputation (Goldfarb, 2010, p. 136).

After Politkovskaya's death in 2006, he conducted extensive research into the incident to shed light on the role of the FSB and Russian intelligence. He met with former KGB colleagues in London to gather information about the incident and to enlighten the public. During this meeting, a highly radioactive substance was added to his drink, causing him to become seriously ill and hospitalized. Approximately 1-2 weeks later, Litvinenko died.

Following Litvinenko's death, Judge Sir Robert Owen, at the public inquest held in Britain, stated that Vladimir Putin and the FSB were most likely behind the death (BBC News, 2016). In 2021, the European Court of Human Rights accused Russia of violating the right to life and noted that it had violated its obligation to conduct an effective investigation into the perpetrators. (Yönt, 2021)

3.2.2.1. Application of Historical Institutionalism Theory

When the assassinations of Politkovskaya and Litvinenko are examined, it becomes clear that such actions by Russian intelligence are not new inventions. This is an action that Soviet intelligence has already been implementing since the Soviet era (Uvarov, 2025). One of the most significant examples of this is the assassination of Soviet leader Trotsky, who opposed Stalin. Russian intelligence's historical intertwining with the state and eliminating elements that opposed existing authority or posed a threat to the regime was already a path dependency it had followed. Trotsky was tried and sentenced to death during the "Great Purge," the eradication and suppression of dissidents and opponents carried out by Stalin's NKVD. However, Trotsky was not executed because he had left the Soviet Union. Living in Mexico and protected to some extent by the Mexican and US governments, Trotsky continued his opposition to Stalin there, frequently spreading his ideas by explaining them to crowds eager to hear them (Soto-Perez-De-Celis, 2010, p. 418). This situation annoyed the NKVD and Stalin, who wanted it to serve as a lesson to potential dissidents within the country. A Stalinist named Ramon Mercader, posing as a journalist who had come to interview him at his home, severely wounded Trotsky in the head, and Trotsky died two days later. Mercader was later revealed to be an NKVD agent (Soto-Perez-De-Celis, 2010, pp. 418-419, 423). Furthermore, the elimination and assassination of voices such as anti-communist writer Stephan Banderas demonstrates that these actions were already a long-standing practice of Russian intelligence (Uvarov, 2025).

As mentioned earlier, the covert power used by Russian intelligence to protect the regime and the existing power is not something that began with the Russian Federation; it has become a tradition of the Russian state almost since its inception. However, the Soviet Union largely halted its external assassinations, even if not its internal ones, after the capture of KGB agent Bogdan Stashinsky in West Germany in 1961. The KGB recounted the operations and provided sensational information about these covert operations in Moscow, according to a court

(Dewy, 2022, p. 156). However, Vladimir Putin's FSB, with the rise of the Siloviki within the state and the intertwining of state and intelligence, began to reuse these practices. For, since Lenin's era, Soviet intelligence frequently favored assassination to suppress dissent within the country, this method can be described as a critical juncture. Later, the silencing and suppression actions through assassination also created a path dependency.

The power vacuum that emerged at the end of the 20th and the 21st centuries was filled by old Russian state traditions. The institutions responsible for security and intelligence had recaptured the state itself, continuing to implement old practices in the new regime. Vladimir Putin, however, can be considered more than a politician, but rather an intelligence officer who emerged from the FSB. In other words, both the intelligence agency controls the state and the state controls the intelligence. The frequently mentioned term "intertwined" reflects this. By uniting state and intelligence agencies under a single umbrella, Vladimir Putin destroyed values such as autonomy and institutional integrity, and directly integrated the FSB into the regime. In this sense, the Politkovskaya and Litvinenko murders can be seen as a 21st-century reflection of this intertwined intelligence and state structure inherited from the Soviet Union, and a continuation of path dependency. Politkovskaya was assassinated while opposing the current regime through her domestic opposition, while Litvinenko was poisoned by the FSB in London, in the heart of Britain, considered one of the Russian Federation's arch-enemies.

In short, Russian intelligence began a critical juncture in the Soviet era, eliminating dissident voices through assassination. This later, due to its relative effectiveness, created a path dependency. After a period of stagnation, with the resurgence of the "Siloviki" in the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin's leadership, Russian intelligence once again became intertwined with the Russian state, perpetuating this path dependency.

3.2.2.2. Critical Assessment

The FSB's actions, with state support, demonstrate the intertwining of intelligence agencies and policymakers, or rather, civilian politics. This demonstrates that Russian intelligence agencies, particularly the FSB, do not act autonomously, but rather take orders from and act according to political influence. Furthermore, instructions, appointments, and internal promotions are carried out under the supervision and at the whim of President Vladimir Putin.

Indeed, the FSB's activities are directly overseen by Vladimir Putin, the head of the Russian state (Government of the Russian Federation, n.d.).

However, an autonomous and institutionally integrated FSB, particularly under the current constitution, should have protected Anna Politkovskaya from potential threats due to her Russian citizenship, rather than eliminating her through assassination (The Government of the Russian Federation, n.d.). Furthermore, rather than working directly with the Russian government, the FSB should have informed and presented its opinions on policies and necessary measures through reporting, intelligence gathering, and analysis. However, the FSB has no such mandate, neither legally nor in practice. Because the FSB has become an instrument of covert use of force and repression within the country, rather than an intelligence agency.

The FSB's transparency and accountability are also very limited. The State Duma Security Committee, the legislative body, has only the right to receive information about FSB activities, and this body includes the directors-general of the SVR along with the FSB. Judicial oversight, like legislative oversight, is limited, and because the law contains numerous gray areas, the FSB is immune to both. In other words, with the terms of reference established by Federal Law 40-FZ (Renz, 2005, pp. 571-572), parliamentary oversight remains weak, the Prosecutor's Office has limited control, and there is external influence on the judiciary. The institution has become a direct servant of the political power (Globalsecurity.org, 2011).

However, in the Litvinenko assassination, he directly violated international law by conducting an operation in a country he did not control and by failing to inform that country of the operation. He also pursued this operation for domestic political purposes, attempting to keep key information about the Politkovskaya case secret and to prevent the FSB's involvement from being uncovered.

3.3. Comparative Analysis

Both the United States and Russia fought on different fronts during the Cold War and were the two leading powers. While the Cold War is often described as a war, it was actually called a cold war because it was a race for power—in technological, ideological, economic, social, and institutional spheres. In this sense, intelligence agencies played a crucial role both in the information received from countries considered enemies during the Cold War and in the

actions taken. The United States developed its intelligence community throughout the Cold War, starting with the breakthrough it initiated after the Pearl Harbor attack (Scott & Jackson, 2004, p.140). Conversely, Russia, the Soviet Union, expanded its intelligence reach with the KGB after Stalin's death and made significant strides with its ability to conduct operations abroad through counter-espionage (Pringle, 2025). With the end of the Cold War and Vladimir Putin's return to Russia, it can be said that Russia has regained its former authoritarian structure, reflecting the actions it has taken. On the other hand, with the United States serving as a pioneer of democracy, this secrecy is essential. To understand how these exceptional intelligence institutions operate under two different political regimes, one democratic and one authoritarian example was chosen. Care was taken to select the intelligence institutions from pioneering and historical backgrounds.

Secondly, we concluded that it would be more accurate to conduct an assessment of these two countries, and to understand the working principles and operations of their intelligence institutions, by examining major events that have been experienced and publicly recognized. While laws and principles provide some theoretical clues, they are not always reflected in practice. A comparative case study was chosen to best illustrate the practical implications of intelligence institutions, as outlined in theory, for how they should operate. Of course, these incidents were chosen because they violated the theoretically prescribed operational framework. This is because, while these incidents are exceptional, they are ongoing, and the way they were disseminated to the public occurred outside the will of governments and civil society.

Another reason is that a single violation of democracy in a democratic institution does not mean it can be ignored. Democratic institutions are required to adhere to democratic values no matter what and in all circumstances. Whether it's a single case or dozens, when laws and democratic values are not adhered to in a democratic institution, it can be clearly seen that the institution is pursuing authoritarian practices (Glasius & Michaelsen, 2018). In an authoritarian regime, the institution is expected to operate within the framework set forth by law. While the concepts of transparency and accountability are absent in authoritarian regimes, the concepts of institutional autonomy and integrity are also crucial for an institution to function fully and effectively. However, where these are not implemented, the institution's operating principles can be questioned.

Last but not least, the concepts of transparency and accountability are fundamental cornerstone values in democratic countries. These values are essential, and therefore, embracing

these two values is crucial. Although Russia is often portrayed as an authoritarian state in literature, its current constitution defines it as a democratic state. The concepts of autonomy and institutional integrity are essential for the efficient functioning of both institutions. While these two values are considered fundamental within democratic institutions, they must be fully implemented for the institution to function fully and effectively, even under an authoritarian regime. However, when these four distinct values are considered, the presence of these values is absent in the cases described in this research.

In this sense, these values are presented in two parts: first transparency and accountability, then autonomy and institutional integrity. A comparative analysis will be conducted, first in the United States' cases, and then in Russia's.

3.3.1. Transparency and Accountability

Transparency and accountability are two of the most important values for an institution to have a public responsibility. Therefore, the true authority of a democratic state allows the public to be informed about the processes and outcomes of actions taken by the government and institutions, and to monitor their impact on society. Furthermore, specific responsibilities and consequences for actions taken prevent arbitrary and illegal practices, ensuring compliance with laws and regulations (Nayaka, 2015, pp. 424-425), (Gaskarth, 2020, pp. 20-21).

First, when we consider the Snowden leaks in the United States, the values of transparency and accountability stand out. The NSA, while supposedly supposed to be collecting data from abroad and from US citizens to combat terrorism, collected data from both its own citizens and from non-US citizens who were not currently under suspicion. This act created a major uproar in the country. It was revealed that the NSA, which received authorization from the FISC for this practice, concealed the scope of its actions from the courts. However, despite pressure from the public, some media organizations, and civil society organizations regarding this institution, which violated the privacy rights of US citizens without legitimate justification, those responsible were neither prosecuted in court nor held accountable to any institution. Edward Snowden, who exposed this incident, was even added to the government's wanted list for revealing state secrets, but he himself defected to Russia. Another problem is that the Snowden Revelations weren't publicly disclosed by the government. Considering this, it's plausible that if Edward Snowden hadn't provided insider information

about NSA programs to journalists, these leaks wouldn't have been made public. The Snowden Leaks, along with the fact that neither the Senate Select Committee, the House of Representatives Committee, nor the FISA Court held anyone accountable for this matter, and even the current presidents' support for the NSA, demonstrate the lack of accountability for intelligence agencies (Glasius & Michalsen, 2018). Furthermore, we see a complete lack of transparency. Indeed, while the constitutional violation was being committed, the NSA failed to inform either the committee or the FISC about it; this was only revealed through Edward Snowden's individual efforts.

Wikileaks documents reveal three different incidents spanning several years. These incidents, along with Collateral Murder, Guantanamo Bay Prison, and Vault 7, have provided us with insights into US intelligence agencies. First, the violations of the rules of engagement during the Collateral Murder incident, the DIA's failure to provide sufficient intelligence on civilians or enemy targets in the region, and the incidents involving the Command Center demonstrate the lack of any punishment or accountability. Specifically, US officials' assertion that the attack was carried out according to the rules of engagement and their failure to punish those responsible, despite video footage clearly showing civilians and reporters being attacked, demonstrate that the concept of accountability is only theoretical. Furthermore, if it had not been for US intelligence officer Chelsea Manning, this incident would not have been publicized, and the public would have remained unaware of it. Furthermore, Manning, like Snowden, was detained by the US for seven years for publicly reporting the events (Savage, 2017). Guantanamo Bay, on the other hand, is an American prison in Cuba where accountability is nonexistent and where the CIA and FBI exploit gray areas to ensure this value is not directly enforced. Allegedly, because this prison is located in Cuba, it is not subject to the US Constitution in any way, and the prisoners held there have no legal rights or safeguards. Therefore, neither CIA nor FBI agents are held accountable for any human rights violations committed there. The existence of this prison was actually publicly known, but the torture and abuses committed within it became clear only through Wikileaks documents. The Vault 7 program, on the other hand, is notable for its resemblance to the NSA's Xkeyscore and PRISM programs. With this program, the CIA hacks and infiltrates operating systems to monitor individuals at will. They also install hidden cameras on televisions, allowing them to monitor individuals at will. Because this is not foreign intelligence, it can be done legally without resorting to a FISA court. However, there are still committees in parliament for CIA surveillance, which of course also constitutes constitutional violations, and the fact that it is not

known who this program is being used on is met with concern by the American public and raises concerns about democratic election processes (Mixon, 2022). In terms of transparency, it's possible to believe that these CIA programs wouldn't have been exposed if WikiLeaks hadn't existed. It's also thought that such a project, with its unclear scope of use, would naturally be used on American soil, and that current politicians could even exploit it, potentially harming the current democratic process.

The weapons of mass destruction scandal that triggered the Iraq War was a major setback for US intelligence. It can be argued that the data collected by the CIA was shaped according to the wishes of the US government. In fact, public knowledge of this incident was made possible by state institutions, so transparency is possible. However, the fact that no weapons of mass destruction used by the former Saddam regime were found in Iraq after the war began caused significant repercussions. As a result, it appears that intelligence agencies bowed to and were influenced by the pressure of civilian politics. Even though there was political pressure, it was still necessary for an institution like the CIA to bow to such pressure and report intelligence accordingly, taking responsibility and holding it accountable. Ultimately, the CIA was not held accountable. This may have been due to the public blaming the current US government for its pressures, not the CIA.

When examining the Yukos incident, it is clear that the FSB, in collaboration with Vladimir Putin, seized the company through conspiracies against Khodorkovsky and key Yukos employees to fill the power vacuum in the country. However, these attempts were not based on valid or genuine reasons, and the European Court of Human Rights declared these incidents to be without valid reasons (European Court of Human Rights, 2014). The FSB and the Russian state, in their policy of sole power and authoritarianism, implemented harsh measures against the dissenting Khodorkovsky, thus eliminating Yukos, Russia's largest company, and its owner, thus integrating them into the state. There was no need for transparency or accountability regarding this incident anyway, as the FSB was given clear authority over such matters and was operating under Putin's authority. Therefore, there is no transparency or accountability.

The assassinations of Politkovskaya and Litvinenko can be shown to be a direct result of actions taken by Russian intelligence agencies, particularly those related to Politkovskaya's involvement in the Chechen war and the Beslan School Raid. Litvinenko's efforts to eliminate opposition oligarchs and prevent the Politkovskaya murder from being publicly reported, thus avoiding any transparency. Politkovskaya was already emerging as an opposition figure due to her reporting. There had been previous assassination attempts against her, but she was not

killed. She was assassinated on Putin's birthday in 2006. Five people, including a former FSB officer, were arrested, but the instigators were never found. Litvinenko's assassination, however, took place in London. The fact that the British government requested potential suspects from Russia, but Russia refused to provide them and failed to conduct an effective investigation, can be considered both a lack of transparency with the public and a demonstration that the FSB was not required to be held accountable.

In conclusion, despite the US being a democratic political regime, we see minimal transparency and even a lack of accountability for intelligence agencies in specific cases, despite laws and regulations. Furthermore, even in times of media and public pressure, incumbent presidents and civilian leaders appear to shield intelligence agencies and generally assume responsibility. Bush did this with the weapons of mass destruction issue, while Barack Obama acted in this manner during the exposure of NSA programs, protecting the intelligence agencies. It can be concluded that Russia, on the other hand, does not observe the values of transparency and accountability in any way, that this transparency and accountability are only directed at President Vladimir Putin, and that most instructions come from the Kremlin. In other words, neither state adheres to these two values in this sense. While the US does theoretically, in practice, both are the same.

3.3.2. Institutional Integrity and Autonomy

The concepts of autonomy and institutional integrity, unlike transparency and accountability, can exist in both an authoritarian and a democratic state. Autonomy refers to an institution's ability to perform its duties within itself, free from external pressure, while institutional integrity refers to the institution's ability to select its personnel and, at the same time, to ensure reliability and consistency by adhering to ethical and rational principles (Blomgren, 2012, pp. 521-522), (OECD & OAS, 2002).

When we examine the cases in the United States, the documents leaked by Edward Snowden revealed that the NSA was not held accountable for its mass data collection on US citizens. However, this was because the existing political authority prevented this and protected them. From this perspective, it would not be inaccurate to say that this occurred at the request of the political authority. Neither NSA agents nor senior executives were accountable to the executive, legislative, or judicial branches, nor did they face any disciplinary action. In other

words, if the institution had acted autonomously, it likely would have been penalized for unlawful conduct. However, the fact that the civilian government also publicly apologized for the incident demonstrates that this action was not taken in isolation.

Considering the incidents in the WikiLeaks documents, including the collateral murder, Guantanamo Bay Prison, and Vault 7, the authorities, instead of declaring that those responsible would be held accountable and that the necessary disciplinary measures would be implemented, adopted a defensive stance against those responsible, except for the Guantanamo Bay incident. The Guantanamo Bay incident, however, occurred within the state's knowledge and control. In this sense, it can be assumed that civilian authorities and intelligence agencies worked together and in accordance with instructions. In other words, it appears that autonomy has been lost at some points.

Similarly, in the WMD incident, the US government and civilian authorities pressured the CIA, acting as if there was intelligence on the existence of WMD, and failing to consider alternative possibilities. The events following the US invasion of Iraq demonstrate that the intelligence and government acted in parallel and that their autonomy was limited. Nevertheless, it is partially possible to speak of institutional integrity.

Criterias/Case	Iraq War and Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003)	Collateral Murder (2007)	Guantanamo Bay Prison (2011)	Snowden Revelations (2013)	Vault 7 (2017)
Transparency	Partly	None	Yes	None	None
Accountability	None	None	None	None	None
Autonomy	None	Partly	None	Partly	None
Institutional Integrity	None	None	None	None	None

Table 3 Criterias and Cases of USA

When we examine the table, we see that in the cases studied, the United States' intelligence agencies largely fail to adhere to and disregard the four values identified in our study. In this sense, it would be more accurate to say that the practices of the United States' intelligence agencies are authoritarian rather than democratic.

In Russian intelligence, as seen in the Yukos case, autonomy and institutional integrity are absent. This is because the FSB, pursuing a goal of becoming the sole authority in domestic politics alongside Vladimir Putin, is virtually intertwined with the current political regime. In this context, Khodorkovsky's company was seized in a conspiracy, and one of the strongest opposition voices was quickly suppressed through operations by the FSB and state bodies (Volkov, 2003, p. 1). In this sense, the FSB cannot be said to operate autonomously because it acted directly in Vladimir Putin's interests. Institutional integrity is also undeniable because it is subject to state intervention, appointments, a lack of continuity, and structures that are not consistent with ethical and moral values.

The Litvinenko and Politkovskaya cases demonstrate the FSB's lack of institutional integrity more clearly. Killing its own citizens through assassination demonstrates the FSB's lack of both autonomy and institutional integrity. In these incidents, which took place under the direct protection of the Russian state, the true perpetrators and instigators have never been found. Furthermore, these extrajudicial killings by Russian intelligence agencies clearly reveal the lack of institutional integrity.

Criterias / Cases	Yukos Case (2003)	Politkovskaya Murder (2006)	Litvinenko Assassination (2006)
Transparency	Partly	None	None
Accountability	None	None	None
Autonomy	None	None	None
Institutional Integrity	None	None	None

Table 4 Criterias and Cases of Russia

When we examine the Russian situation, we see that, compared to the US, it fails to adhere to and disregards the majority of its values in many respects. It would be accurate to say that Russia, already considered an authoritarian state, is also authoritarian when it comes to intelligence. However, it's important to note that the line between the authoritarian practices of Russia's and the US's intelligence institutions has become almost invisible.

In other words, it can be concluded that the US and Russia lack the concepts of autonomy and institutional integrity.

Although US intelligence agencies are characterized in theory and by law as autonomous and institutionally whole, as are transparency and accountability, the cases cited

demonstrate that autonomy is not only indispensable, but also that institutional integrity has not been fully achieved.

In Russia, due to the intertwining of intelligence agencies and the state, there is no autonomy for the FSB, and the assassinations demonstrate the complete loss of institutional integrity.

All this being said, when we examine the oversight mechanisms and intelligence systems of both the United States and Russia, using their very different system designs, we see that they lead to authoritarian practices. As we can see in Table 5, while the US's oversight mechanisms for intelligence are sophisticated and advanced, Russia's oversight mechanisms for intelligence are not sufficiently developed. Despite their distinct oversight mechanisms, authoritarian practices emerge in both countries.

Table 5 Most Different Systems Design of USA and Russia

When we examine the table, we see that the US intelligence oversight mechanisms are sophisticated and can exert pressure on intelligence institutions through its independent organizations, fostering democratic values. However, in Russia, we see that such mechanisms are inadequate and there is no independent or affiliated mechanism to provide oversight. However, we see that the political regimes of both countries, whether or not these mechanisms

exist, fail to fully meet and violate the values of transparency and accountability, as well as autonomy and institutional integrity, when it comes to intelligence institutions. In this sense, it would be fair to say that both countries exhibit authoritarian practices.

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS

4.1. Conclusion and Reccomendations

This comparative case study examines the United States and Russia, using historical institutionalism theory to explain how intelligence institutions operate. In this context, it examines how intelligence institutions meet democratic values such as transparency, accountability, autonomy, and institutional integrity, and finds similar results in both countries.

For intelligence agencies to be subject to democratic oversight, not only legal regulations are necessary, but also political will, an active civil society, and an independent media. But most importantly those who responsible from the intelligence actions should be accountable to the oversight mechanisms. Even in democratic regimes, these institutions can escape oversight during crises. Therefore, a continuous, transparent, and multi-actor oversight mechanism must be established.

If those who use a powerful and secretive institution like the intelligence agency and those with authority face no consequences for the actions they take, this situation will continue to grow. The Bay of Pigs invasion was the most significant example, and the most significant example was the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Following the failure, no politician or intelligence officer to take responsibility and none of them held accountable, the NSA then carried out violations that violate democratic values, such as the Prism program, or CIA/FBI's Guantanamo Bay prison, DIA's Collateral Murder, and CIA's Vault 7.

In Russia, however, the intelligence agency must first establish an autonomous structure separate from the regime, as this is impossible without a separate institution. This intertwined structure must be broken, and supporting mechanisms must be established. In this sense, this autonomous structure will focus on real threats, rather than the opposition, without pursuing any political objectives. At least, these steps will be a good start in removing authoritarian practices from the intelligence agency in an authoritarian state.

4.1.1. Summary of Findings

Despite the different regime types in both countries (the United States being democratic and Russia being authoritarian), and despite the fact that the two countries' intelligence institutions have historically differing origins and paths, it has been observed that both the US and Russia's intelligence institutions operate with authoritarian practices. In the US, intelligence institutions began their modern development during the Cold War and were established to prioritize national security during this period. Later, with the death of Kennedy, intelligence institutions became more independent in their actions. During the Nixon and Bush administrations, intelligence institutions began to act in line with the domestic and foreign policies of politicians. However, with the expansion of intelligence agency authority following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and attacks, authoritarian behavior was observed in intelligence agencies such as the NSA, CIA, FBI, and DIA after these powers were granted.

Also, while oversight mechanisms are evident in both countries, the US oversight mechanisms are more serious and comprehensive than those in Russia. Despite this comprehensiveness and authority, however, the US oversight mechanisms fail to oversee intelligence agencies. Within both countries, significant areas exist where oversight can be evaded, and these gray areas, those areas not legally defined or left incomplete, are exploited.

The Snowden Revelation, including the NSA's illegal mass surveillance programs, intelligence failures and arbitrary actions during the Iraq War, and the CIA's human rights-violating prisons and programs, demonstrate that intelligence has lost its institutional integrity. Furthermore, access to this information through whistleblowers demonstrates a lack of transparency, the lack of accountability for those responsible for these incidents, and the fact that they bowed to political pressure for their actions demonstrates a loss of autonomy.

Russian intelligence agencies, however, have prioritized combating chronic opposition and internal threats since the Soviet Union and even earlier, during the Russian Tsarist era. The fight against internal threats continued during the KGB era, prioritizing external intelligence. With Vladimir Putin's rise to power, institutions like the FSB were shaped by centralized and politicized structures inherited from the Soviet era. The FSB, the forerunner of the Russian intelligence community, worked closely with Russian state institutions during the Yukos incident to consolidate central authority and protect the existing regime. It's safe to say that they are not autonomous in any respect.

On the other hand, in the case of journalist Anna Politkovskaya and former intelligence officer Aleksandr Litvinenko, these two individuals were assassinated to prevent transparency regarding the actions of intelligence agencies. Furthermore, the institution acted unlawfully and without legitimate justification, thus undermining its institutional integrity. Those primarily responsible for these events have never been held accountable. In this sense, the intelligence agencies of both countries operate in an authoritarian manner, and this is seen equally in democracies and authoritarian countries.

For the US, the events of 9/11 can be considered a major turning point. Following this, and particularly with the PATRIOT Act, intelligence agencies began to act more authoritarian and contrary to democratic values, taking authoritarian actions. Indeed, a path dependency began to be observed in this sense after the death of Kennedy, the first critical juncture, reaching its climax after the events of 9/11. For Russia, the rise of Vladimir Putin to power is a significant critical juncture. In this way, the FSB reverted to its old Soviet authoritarian practices and began working in close collaboration with the current government. A path dependency developed, following the path of the intelligence agency founded by Lenin and the Cheka, and with Putin, it returned to the same point, reintroducing authoritarian practices.

In conclusion, the examples of Snowden and Wikileaks demonstrate that despite the functioning of democratic oversight mechanisms in the US, there are "latent forms of authoritarianism." In Russia, the examples of Politkovskaya and Litvinenko demonstrate that the state directly controls the institution through violence, and that this structure has become perpetuated.

4.1.2. Implication for Theory and Practice

The theoretical results of this study demonstrate how critical junctures and path dependencies, not regime type but historical institutionalization patterns over many years, can lead to long-term consequences. Following their establishment, we observed and found how intelligence institutions were shaped by the responses of institutions and the state to moments of crisis throughout the historical process, and how authoritarian practices and actions were legitimized. Institutions have the capacity to reproduce themselves. Even in democratic systems like the US, institutions tend to perpetuate temporary unlawfulness during periods of crisis. In this sense, we observe the increasing authoritarian tendencies of US intelligence agencies.

Practically, intelligence reforms can be achieved not only through legal changes but also by challenging the historically established institutional culture. Democratic systems should institutionalize the process of "transparency" of oversight institutions not only after crises but also preemptively. At the same time, institutions should be fully autonomy-free and free from political pressure. Transparency can also foster accountability and institutional integrity.

4.1.3. Future Research

Future studies could focus on the post-COVID-19 era, focusing on concepts such as how society was controlled during COVID-19 and algorithmic surveillance through AI-powered applications. These studies could also examine different countries representing democracy, such as France and the United Kingdom, and authoritarianism, such as China and Iran. Furthermore, countries with competitive authoritarianism, such as Hungary and India, could be considered for a more comprehensive and comprehensive study. Furthermore, theories such as Dual state, state of exception and securitization could be explored, and the role of intelligence agencies in maintaining their strength within the emerging international system could be examined.

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CURRICULUM VITAE (CV)

MELİH ARDA ÖZ

PERSONAL INFORMATION

EDUCATION

2023-2025 Social Sciences University of Ankara (ASBÜ)

Graduate School of Social Sciences / Political Science (MA)

2018-2023 Social Sciences University of Ankara (ASBÜ)

Faculty of Political Sciences / Department of Political Science and Public Administration (BA)

INTERNSHIP

09/2022 – 01/2023 T.C. Governorship of Ankara Directorate Branch for Legal Affairs

LANGUAGES English (Advanced), Turkish (Vernacular Language)