

AN ERA OF NON-STRATEGIC ALLIANCE: TURCO-AMERICAN
RELATIONS, 1927-1939

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ABSTRACT

AN ERA OF NON-STRATEGIC ALLIANCE: TURCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1927-1939

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Upon the rejection of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce signed between Turkey and the United States in Lausanne in 1923 by the U.S. Senate in 1927, President Calvin Coolidge initiated diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1927 through the exchange of notes. This thesis examines the Turkish - American relations between 1927 and 1939, and questions whether the U.S. Presidents Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt had a significant influence in the bilateral relations. It also further analyzes the foreign policies, economic situation and dynamics of the United States in the 1920s and 1930s that generated an impact on bilateral relations, and also evaluates the nature of the Turkish-American relations until the World War II. This thesis concludes that there was no significant conflict in the Turco-American relationship until World War II, yet the U.S. Presidents did not have a significant influence in the bilateral relations, and the two countries did not establish a strategic partnership during this period.

Keywords: Turkish-American relations, Coolidge, Hoover, Roosevelt, Atatürk

ÖZ

STRATEJİK OLMAYAN ORTAKLIK DÖNEMİ: TÜRK-AMERİKAN İLİŞKİLERİ, 1927-1939

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1923 yılında Türkiye ve ABD arasında Lozan’da imzalanan Dostluk ve Ticaret Anlaşması’nın Amerikan Senatosu tarafından 1927 yılında onaylanmaması üzerine, Başkan Calvin Coolidge nota teatisi yoluyla 1927 yılında iki ülke arasında diplomatik ilişkileri başlattı. Bu tez, 1927 - 1939 yılları arasındaki Türkiye - Amerika Birleşik Devleti ilişkilerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma, dönemin ABD Başkanları Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover ve Franklin Delano Roosevelt’in ikili ilişkilerde önemli bir etkisi olup olmadığını sorgulamaktadır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, ABD’nin 1920’ler ve 1930’lar dış siyasetini, ekonomik durumunu ve ikili ilişkilere etkisi olabilecek dinamikleri analiz etmekte, aynı zamanda İkinci Dünya Savaşı’na kadar Türk-Amerikan ilişkisinin doğasını değerlendirmektedir. Bu tez, II. Dünya Savaşı’na kadar ABD ve Türkiye’nin önemli bir çatışma yaşamadığı, ABD başkanlarının ikili ilişkilerde önemli bir etkisi olmadığı ve tarafların bu dönemde stratejik bir ortaklık kurmadığı sonucuna varmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye Amerika ilişkileri, Coolidge, Hoover, Roosevelt, Atatürk

To my family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAA	Agricultural Adjustment Administration
APL	American Protective League
CCC	Civilian Conservation Corps
FDIC	Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FERA	Federal Emergency Relief Act
IWW	Industrial Workers of the World
NIRA	National Industrial Recovery Act
U.S.	United States
WPA	Works Progress Administration
WWI	World War I

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The initial steps of the bilateral relations between the United States and Turkey offer a noteworthy and comprehensive area to focus on. On the one hand, there is the United States which emerged from the World War I as a world leader, pioneered a new international order with its anti-war formulas, but escaped commitments in doing so. On the other hand, there is Turkey, which created a young republic upon the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire, succumbed to the WWI, and attempted to exist on the world stage. The era that began with the resumption of diplomatic relations with the exchange of notes in 1927 became an adventure for the American mission¹ which witnessed the modernization process of the new Turkish state until the subsequent war.

After the Great War, the United States turned inward following the “return to normalcy” policy introduced by the Republican President Warren G. Harding, and entered a process of healing, prosperity, restoration, serenity, and nationalism.² His successors Calvin Coolidge³ and Herbert Hoover⁴ maintained Harding’s policies until Franklin Delano Roosevelt took over the office in 1933. The Republicans’ foreign policy placed an emphasis on international cooperation to sustain peace and outlaw

¹ Joseph C. Grew, *Yeni Türkiye*, trans. Kadri Mustafa Orađlı (İstanbul: Multilingual, 1999), 17.

² “May 14, 1920: Readjustment,” Miller Center, accessed 4 October 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/may-14-1920-readjustment>.

³ “December 6, 1923: First Annual Message,” Miller Center, accessed 4 October 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-6-1923-first-annual-message>.

⁴ “March 4, 1929: Inaugural Address,” Miller Center, accessed 7 October 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-4-1929-inaugural-address>.

war,⁵ but concurrently maintained the policy of non-involvement in world affairs.⁶ The United States, in the Republicans' era, neither became a part of a permanent military alliance nor took military and political responsibilities.⁷ Roosevelt, whose fate became to fight the Great Depression which was the legacy of Republican Presidents, was preoccupied with the country's internal problems until World War II, and continued the U.S. isolationist policy despite his willingness to participate in foreign affairs as he declared in his Quarantine Speech⁸ that if the attacks spread to other parts of the world, the United States would not wait to hope for mercy.⁹

This thesis aims to analyze the years between 1927 and 1939, the period the bilateral relations between the Turkish Republic and the United States which has been not studied intensively. Since the U.S. Senate did not approve the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1923 signed in Lausanne, the main issues between the states in the Republicans' era were to conclude a series of agreements in the essential fields, and to ensure the American schools in Turkey maintain their status without conflict. Although treaty relations continued during the Roosevelt era, the regulation of trade relations became important due to the economic turmoil caused by the Great Depression.

This study first reveals the post-war political and economic situation of the United States, then draws a general framework for the history of the bilateral relations, and finally examines the Turco-American relations in the period in question, mainly according to the pertinent primary sources. Although official relations with Turkey began in 1927, the Ottoman-American relations were briefly explained in terms of

⁵ Warren I. Cohen, *Empire Without Tears: America's Foreign Relations, 1921-1933* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 60-61.

⁶ Harold Underwood Faulkner, *From Versailles to the New Deal: a Chronicle of the Harding - Coolidge - Hoover Era* (Toronto: Brook & Co, 1950), 60.

⁷ Richard William Leopold, *The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History* (New York: Knopf, 1973), 420-421.

⁸ "October 5, 1937: Quarantine Speech," Miller Center, accessed January 29, 2021, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/october-5-1937-quarantine-speech>.

⁹ Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 183.

forming the historical background of the relations since the new state was considered to continue from the Ottoman heritage.

Despite the fact that the beginning of the official relations was the year of 1927, the political and economic situation of the United States was discussed within the scope of the post-World War I period, as it was a continuation. The study examines the post-war conditions, domestic and foreign policy principles of the U.S. presidents, and prominent issues of the era. Especially the elaborative examination of the Republican presidents' period is a noteworthy part because the 1920s were rarely analyzed in detail with regards to the policies of the presidents in literature.

In this study, a process analysis of the relations between the first years of the newly established Turkey and the United States was conducted, according to the principles and practices of foreign policy of both the Republican presidents Coolidge and Hoover, and the first two terms of Franklin Roosevelt. How the change of president affected the U.S. foreign policy and the impact of this on the Turco-American relations are going to be revealed. In other words, this study explains despite the Senate's disapproval of the Turco-American Treaty if the amiable atmosphere in the official bilateral relations initiated by President Coolidge through the exchange of notes continued in the same harmony during the Roosevelt era or not.

The thesis presents a qualitative research method based on archival work. This is not a theoretical but an explanatory study, and attempts to explain the events from the point of view of both countries in a realistic perspective. The literature extensively examining the bilateral relations between 1927 and 1939 is limited, but more case studies are available. In this study, the online archives consisting the documents from the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, presidential speeches, official agreements, and diaries are analyzed as primary sources for detailed examination of the bilateral relations in that era. Domestic and foreign policies of the U.S. presidents are explicated by analyzing their speeches. The secondary sources, including books and articles, are studied in order to present the framework of the historical background and the political and economic conditions of both countries after the war.

In the existing literature, few books are available that deal with the relations of Turkey and the United States in entire detail until World War II. Among them there

are only those who describe Ottoman-American relations,¹⁰ and also those who explain the interwar period,¹¹ which is the main topic of this thesis. Fundamental books examining the United States' relations with the countries of the Middle East¹² and the Mediterranean,¹³ for the basis of subsequent extensive research with some chapters on Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. Differently, the study examining the diplomatic career of Joseph Grew, the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, reviews the bilateral relations of 1927-1932 from the perspective of diplomacy.¹⁴ Moreover, books related to political history¹⁵ and foreign policy¹⁶ occupy an important position in terms of overviewing the international conjuncture in the process analysis.

In the literature, there are several thesis studies, one of which is a master's thesis and two of which are doctoral dissertations that examine the relevant period. Of them, Semih Bulut (2008)¹⁷ presents the most detailed study on bilateral relations between 1923-1938 using both the Turkish and the U.S. archives, while Meral

¹⁰ Çağrı Erhan, *Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2001)

¹¹ Roger R. Trask, *The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971); Şuhnaz Yılmaz, *Turkish-American Relations, 1800-1952, Between the Stars, Stripes and the Crescent* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2015), 62-102; George S. Harris and Nur Bilge Criss, eds. *Studies in Atatürk's Turkey: the American Dimension* (Leiden: Brill, 2009).

¹² Thomas A. Bryson, *American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East, 1784-1975: A Survey* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1977); James A. Field, *America and the Mediterranean World 1776-1882* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

¹³ John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East 1900-1939* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1968).

¹⁴ Waldo H. Heinrichs, *American Ambassador Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

¹⁵ Fahir Armaoğlu, *19. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1789-1914)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997); Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914-1995)* (İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2020).

¹⁶ Baskın Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009); Richard William Leopold, *The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History* (New York: Knopf, 1973).

¹⁷ Semih Bulut, "Atatürk Dönemi Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri (1923-1938)" (doctoral dissertation, Hacettepe Üniversitesi, 2008).

Halifeoğlu (2012)¹⁸ studied a longer period (1914-1945) mainly with the Turkish archives and literature, and İsmail Türk (2006)¹⁹ analyzed the period 1920-1923 mainly using the Turkish secondary sources. This thesis, using Turkish and English primary and secondary sources, differs from Bulut (2008)'s study with its historical background, which examines the domestic and foreign policies of the U.S., the periodization of bilateral relations according to the U.S. presidents, and its more current use of secondary sources.

No Turkish books or articles have been found examining the period of the Republican presidents. Besides, the number of books that give a wide coverage to the United States in the 1920s in foreign literature is also few.²⁰ As Katherine Sibley stated, "situated in the deep valleys cast by the twin peaks of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, these three men and their eras have often been cast in shadow."²¹ The domestic²² and foreign²³ literature explaining the establishment and development processes of the Republic of Turkey, which are briefly mentioned in this thesis, view the new republic as the continuation of the Ottoman Empire.

The thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter is the introduction part. The second chapter explores the domestic and foreign policies of the U.S. Presidents

¹⁸ Meral Halifeoğlu, "1914-1945 Yılları Arası Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri" (doctoral dissertation, Fırat Üniversitesi, 2012).

¹⁹ İsmail Türk, "Atatürk Dönemi Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri (1920-1938)" (master's thesis, İnönü Üniversitesi, 2006).

²⁰ Cohen, 1987; Faulkner, 1950; Robert K. Murray, *The Politics of Normalcy: Governmental Theory and Practice in the Harding-Coolidge Era* (New York, Norton, 1973); Sean Dennis Cashman, *America in the Twenties and Thirties: The Olympian Age of Franklin Delano Roosevelt* (New York: New York University Press, 1989).

²¹ Katherine A. S. Sibley, ed. *A Companion to Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover* (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley/Blackwell, 2014), 1.

²² Kemal H. Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi: Sosyal, Kültürel, Ekonomik Temeller* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2010); Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal 1922-1938*, vol. III (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1999).

²³ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968); Feroz Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, trans. Yavuz Alogan (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1995); William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774* (London: Routledge, 2013); Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, trans. Yasemin Saner Gönen (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995).

in the interwar period in order to examine bilateral relations from their perspective. This part represents the normalization process, which began with President Harding winning the election by defeating his opponent James Cox with a historical margin in an environment where the Americans faced problems such as deflation and labor riots following the war. It analyzes the protectionist economic policies that served the business, the process of prosperity in which luxury goods entered the lives of ordinary people, and a decade of the U.S that ended with the Great Depression. The chapter also explores the relationship of the U.S. with the League of Nations, peace and disarmament activities, and the policy of leading the world through organizations such as the Washington Conference (1921-22) and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928). In addition, this chapter explains Roosevelt's new deal practices as well as the country's recovery process.

The third chapter investigates the issues in diplomatic correspondence between the two countries during the years of 1927 and 1939. This chapter explains the resumption of diplomatic relations in the Republicans era, the subsequent anti-Turkish reactions in the U.S., and the attempts to the improvement of the Turkish image in the U.S. This chapter also reveals in detail the issues related to the American schools in Turkey, the school incident in Bursa, and its lawsuit process. It describes the negotiations of the Treaty of Commerce of 1929 and the Treaty of Residence and Establishment of 1932. The fifth chapter finally explores the negotiation process of the Claims Agreement (1934), the Extradition Treaty (signed in 1923, entered into force 1934), and the Reciprocal Trade Agreement (1939), examines the issue of the planned revision in the Straits regime which the U.S. closely followed even though it was not a party, and includes the effort to prevent shooting of the anti-Turkish film *The Forty Days of Musa Dagh*. The final chapter is the conclusion part.

CHAPTER 2

THE UNITED STATES

2.1. The Republican Era

2.1.1. Post-World War I Years

When examining the 1920s, it is essential to view the effects of the Great War, both social and economic. President Woodrow Wilson had promised that the United States would remain neutral in World War I by mentioning that it was “a war with which we have nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us.”²⁴ In fact, the U.S. was economically in a difficult time when the war began. As well as unemployment increased significantly, business, agriculture, industry and banking sectors were in a poor condition.²⁵ With the start of the war, the American economy was revived, and more than \$2 billion worth of goods were sold to the Allies until April 1917. Therefore, the business of transporting cargo to the Allies became economically advantageous for the U.S. However, in April 1917, the Germans announced that they would sink any ship which brought supplies to their enemies, and the U.S. participated in the war as a result of Germany attacking American ships carrying weapons and directing these attacks on merchant ships.

The Americans were not very keen on participating in the war. Although a million men were needed when the war was declared, only 73,000 volunteered in six weeks. Ultimately, the U.S. Congress passed a conscription decision. The Socialist

²⁴ “December 8, 1914: Second Annual Message,” Miller Center, accessed October 15, 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-8-1914-second-annual-message>.

²⁵ Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2015), 362.

Party called the Congress's war resolution a crime against the American people, and began holding anti-war meetings. The Socialists quickly gained power. In June 1917, the Congress passed the Espionage Act which aimed to banish insubordination in the U.S. military or naval forces and defiance of military service. One year later, the Espionage Act was extended by the Sedition Act which prohibited the use of disloyal or abusive language against the U.S. government, flag, army or navy. About nine hundred people went to jail under the Espionage Act, which was used against the opposition. Some leaders of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), a labor organization that opposed the U.S. participation in the war, were also tried and convicted according to this law. Although the Sedition Act was repealed in 1921 during President Harding's term, who had voted against it, the Espionage Act is still in force.²⁶

In those years, another spy-hunting tool was the American Protective League (APL). Sponsored by the Department of Justice, the League was organized in 1917 as a private, secret, volunteer police force with more than 250,000 members in 600 cities and towns. The volunteers looked like officials because they wore badges like chief, captain, and lieutenant; they also carried out unlawful duties such as surveillance, investigation, and even arrest of people suspected of their loyalty. Abolished in 1919, the League claimed to have found 3 million cases of disloyalty. In September 1917, the APL spies simultaneously raided 48 IWW meetings and arrested 65 IWW leaders for obstructing conscription and supporting desertion. One hundred and one laborers were judged and found guilty in April 1918.²⁷

When the war just ended, the defeated countries were politically and socially unstable, while the victorious states were weary. In the precarious post-war world, where revolutions and revolts occurred on both sides, governments had to reorganize labor, finance, industry, and agriculture. The Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 also unsettled countries that experienced similar movements. On February 6, 1919, the first major general strike of the United States began in Seattle. The strike was initiated

²⁶ Zinn, 2015, 362-366; James D. Robenalt, "Warren G. Harding," in *The Presidents and the Constitution*, ed. Ken Gormley, (New York: New York University Press, 2016), 374.

²⁷ Zinn, 2015, 369; Robenalt, 2016, 373.

by 35,000 shipyard workers seeking wage increases lasted five days. There was news in the United Press comparing the general strike with the Russian Revolution, and also describing it as “a test of Americanism”²⁸ in order to weaken its impact.²⁹ Although no positive results were achieved to improve the situation of workers, strikes continued in many sector until they were taken under control in the 1920s.³⁰

In addition to the labor strikes, the U.S. was also facing with the racial riots. There was the explosion of racist insurrections in some cities like St. Louis and Chicago; and the fear that the labor struggles resulting from the deterioration in the economy would turn into a revolution like the Bolshevik revolution in Russia.³¹ One of the most powerful hate organizations was the Ku Klux Klan, founded after the Civil War, was revived in the 1920s, and it defended white Protestant supremacy and antagonized blacks, Jews, Catholics, socialists and foreigners. The Klan’s violent crimes included murder, whipping, kidnapping, or torture in various ways. By 1925, it had 4 million members mostly made up of “the rural and Protestant South and Middle West,”³² but jumped into northern states like Oregon, where the majority were native-white. Both the disturbance against its illegal actions and the excesses of its leaders in politics caused the Klan to be weakened.³³

The situation of those who had gone to the war was added to the turmoil of those who had not participated. With the end of the war, the organization process of the demobilization of four and a half million men from the army initiated. Different solutions were required for different groups. First, thirty-two training camps were discharged; later the problems such as transportation and health issues of two million men who were overseas were solved. In order to prevent disease importation, patients

²⁸ Robert L. Friedman, “The Seattle General Strike of 1919,” *The Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 52, no. 3 (1961): 90.

²⁹ Friedman, 1961, 90-97.

³⁰ Zinn, 2015, 370.

³¹ Robenalt, 2016, 372.

³² Faulkner, 1950, 152.

³³ Ibid., 150-156.

were once treated in a detention camp, and then they were allowed to enter the country. However, men returning to the civilian life encountered a serious problem: finding a job. War veterans had to compete with women, younger or older men to get their former jobs.³⁴

As for the U.S. economy, at the end of 1918, industry was working intensely, commodity prices reached more than twice the level before the war, and the government fulfilled some issues, such as regulating foreign trade, building ships, and operating railways.³⁵ After the war ended, although the commodity prices fell somewhat, they rose steadily after the spring of 1919, commercial activity increased significantly, and the export trade had successful years. Despite severe unemployment, American economy continued to be alive both during the war years and after peace, so that the U.S. turned from a debtor country to a creditor nation lending to war-weary countries. However, as in the post-war periods, the U.S. also experienced an economic crisis in the early 1920s.³⁶

A period of deflation began in 1920-22 when the Great War left economic collapse and social turmoil behind. The causes of the 1920-21 crises were noted as “exorbitant prices, maximum unfilled orders, and the cry of under- production; then the market broke, orders were cancelled, stocks accumulated and both prices and production fell precipitately to a minimum in the spring of 1921.”³⁷ After the declining agricultural prices began in May 1920, wholesale price drops initiated. The biggest decline was in food, with a 34% decrease in May 1921 compared to June 1920. The real wages remained 1913 levels due to the cost of living, although wage rates per hour increased 32% from 1919 to 1921.³⁸ Unemployment reached a peak in the summer of 1921, surpassing 5 million.

³⁴ Ibid., 4-6.

³⁵ Ibid., 22.

³⁶ Warren M. Persons, “The Crisis of 1920 in the United States: A Quantitative Survey,” *The American Economic Review* 12, no.1 (1922): 5; Faulkner, 1950, 22-27; Cohen, 1987, 6.

³⁷ Persons, 1922, 13.

³⁸ Ibid., 6-13.

Fortunately, the crisis did not last long, and many sectors, except agriculture, recovered over time. Between 1922 and 1928, the industrial production increased 70%; the gross national product grew 40%, per capita income 30% and real wages 22%.³⁹ The consumption of durable consumer goods increased 65% between 1919 and 1929.⁴⁰ In the 1920s, radio began to be used in homes, but the usage of vacuum cleaners, washing machines, refrigerators, telephones, and other electrical devices also expanded. While in 1920, 35% of the population could be enlightened with electricity in their homes, this rate rose to 50% in 1924 and 68% in 1930.⁴¹

2.1.2. Harding Era: Return to Normalcy

After the war and the socially and economically chaotic post-war years, President Wilson was accused of an “unconstitutional and dictatorial rule, defeating national economy, vetoing a budget law, and failing to reform taxation”⁴² by the Republicans who promised to return to normalcy. In the speech accepting the republican nomination in June 1920, the presidential candidate Warren G. Harding, a local newspaper owner and a two-term Ohio Senator, declared that he was committed to peace, reduction of armament, American leadership in the world, and security through international law in foreign relations; reconstruction as an industrial nation, competition in business, wage and production increases, stability and normalcy, elimination of freedom pressures, improving transportation were among his priorities, Federal aid for agriculture and reclamation, stopping waste, applying protective tariff policy, termination of child labor, and the right to vote for women in domestic politics.⁴³ Harding shaped the campaign as “return to normalcy” and in May 14, 1920, he expressed the country’s recipe as:

³⁹ Cohen, 1987, 18.

⁴⁰ Cashman, 1989, 42.

⁴¹ Ibid., 42-43.

⁴² Faulkner, 1950, 37.

⁴³ “June 12, 1920: Speech Accepting the Republican Nomination,” Miller Center, accessed 4 October 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/june-12-1920-speech-accepting-republican-nomination>.

America's present need is not heroics, but healing; not nostrums, but normalcy; not revolution, but restoration; not agitation, but adjustment; not surgery, but serenity; not the dramatic, but the dispassionate; not experiment, but equipoise; not submergence in internationality, but sustainment in triumphant nationality.⁴⁴

Harding explained that by "normalcy" he did not mean the old order, but a regular and stable order with normal procedure. The Republicans, on the other hand, used his "normalcy" as the equivalent of prosperity and anti-Wilsonism.⁴⁵ Eventually, Harding's promises yielded results in the 1920 presidential election when he defeated his Democratic opponent, James Cox, by a great margin of 60.4 to 34.2 percent. According to the electoral vote, Harding received 37 states with 404 votes against Cox who got 11 states with 127 votes. Thus, the twelve-year Republicans' period began.

Harding appointed his old friends Harry Daugherty as attorney general, John W. Weeks as secretary of war, Harry S. New as postmaster general, Albert B. Fall as secretary of the interior; then Edwin N. Denby as secretary of the navy, Colonel Charles R. Forbes as the head of the Veterans Bureau, Charles Evans Hughes as secretary of state, Herbert Hoover as secretary of commerce, Henry C. Wallace as secretary of agriculture, and Andrew W. Mellon, one of the richest men in the U.S., as secretary of the treasury. Hughes, the Republican nominee in the 1916 presidential election, and Hoover, the head of the Commission for Relief in Belgium during World War I (WWI) and then the head of the U.S. Food Administration, were the popular men in the Harding cabinet. The vice-president became Calvin Coolidge.⁴⁶

In his official message on April 12, 1921, President Harding explained the suggestions of the normalcy period. Stating that the first step was to solve the problems at home for which Harding listed the needs as: to reduce taxes, increase tariffs, legislation for the national budget system, lower railway rates and operating costs,

⁴⁴ "May 14, 1920: Readjustment," Miller Center, accessed 4 October 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/may-14-1920-readjustment>.

⁴⁵ Murray, 1973, 15.

⁴⁶ Cashman, 1989, 87-88. Coolidge became politically famous in the 1919 Boston Strike while he was the governor of Massachusetts. Calvin Coolidge, *Autobiography of Calvin Coolidge* (New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, 1929), 141.

strengthen laws regulating federal aid, improve maritime transport, regulate cable and radio service, establish an Aviation Office.⁴⁷ As he mentioned, Harding primarily focused on solving domestic problems and improving the economy. For purposes such as providing a national budget system and an independent control of state accounts, the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was approved by the President. According to the law, the President was required to submit an annual, comprehensive budget proposal to the Congress, taking overall responsibility for budget planning. In addition, a Budget Bureau was also set up to develop the annual budget and oversee the payments. Charles G. Dawes, a Chicago banker, was appointed by the President as the first director of the Budget Bureau and started to work immediately to reduce government expenditures.⁴⁸

Business expected the government to lower taxes. Inspired by the program prepared by the Secretary of the Treasury Mellon, the Congress eliminated the wartime excess profits tax, but raised the corporate tax from 10 to 12.5%; reduced the surtaxes on income, but the taxes remained the same in the lowest-income group.⁴⁹ Both tax reductions and, despite this, the public debt continued to decline throughout the 1920s.⁵⁰ The other request from the government was to raise the tariffs. For protectionism, which agriculture and industry needed against cheap foreign products, tariffs were raised with the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921 and the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922, which authorized the President to increase or decrease rates by 50% if necessary. Harding and Coolidge used the right as tariff upgrades, thirty-two of the thirty-seven changes. These practices brought a quick relief to business while also making it difficult for the European nations to export to the U.S. and thus earn dollars to pay off their war debts, and harmed American economy in the long term.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Murray, 1973, 46.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 46-49; Cashman, 1989, 88.

⁴⁹ Faulkner, 1950, 89.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 87-89.

⁵¹ Cohen, 1987, 20; Cashman, 1989, 92.

The Harding administration had other arrangements than to shift to protectionism by raising tariffs and lowering taxes, although it favored the upper income group. A disabled care program for war veterans was launched; the 1921 Packers and Stockyards Act was designed to break the monopoly on stockyards; the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922, exempting some agricultural associations from the application of antitrust laws, came into force; the Agriculture Credits Act of 1923 passed; immigration restrictions, which set the numerical limits on the number of immigrants who can enter the country, introduced in 1921; maritime trade was attempted by private ownership; the Sheppard-Towner Act of 1921 was adopted to provide maternal and child health care; and federal aid for road construction continued.⁵²

In addition to being a recovery period for the country, the Harding era was also the scene of a series of scandals. One of them, the director Charles Forbes at the Veterans Bureau, embezzled money for injured veterans and fled the country. Besides, Attorney General Harry Daugherty and his associates, particularly his assistant Jess Smith, were accused of selling alcohol confiscated by legal authorities.⁵³ While Smith committed suicide, Daugherty was acquitted. These men took the nickname “Ohio Gang”, a group with close political ties to the president. The Teapot Dome Scandal was the best known scandal. Two major oil reserves for the energy needs of the U.S. navy were located in California and Teapot Dome in Wyoming. Secretary of the Interior Albert B. Fall persuaded Harding to transfer control of the reserves from the Department of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior. Later, without a bid process, Fall leased the area in California to Edward L. Doheny of the Pan American Petroleum Company and Teapot Dome to Harry F. Sinclair, from Mammoth Oil Company. It turned out that Fall received a large amount of bribe for this job. Although the president was unaware of the inconveniences, his reputation was damaged.⁵⁴

⁵² Faulkner, 1950, 196-97; Cashman, 1989, 103.

⁵³ In 1919, the Eighteenth Amendment banned manufacture, sale and transportation of intoxicating liquor. Those who supported the ban were called “dry” and those who opposed it “wet”. Faulkner, 1950, 130.

⁵⁴ Robenalt, 2016, 379-380; Cashman, 1989, 93-94.

2.1.3. From Coolidge to Hoover

President Harding, frayed by the scandals, died of a heart attack on August 2, 1923 during a nationwide trip he had begun from Alaska. Handsome, well-dressed, polite Harding was called by some as the leader who saved America from the turmoil of the war years, and by some as one of the worst presidents of the U.S. His successor, Coolidge, who was a silent, shy, and cold man, took over the presidency in August, 1923.⁵⁵ In his first annual message dated December 6, 1923, Coolidge, like Harding, emphasized that the priority was to solve domestic problems and to ensure economic stability. Other major issues were tax cuts; having a merchant marine with defense and commercial competence; implementing projects related to waterways; a revision of the U.S. laws; accelerating trials, independent reformatories for women, and young men who were serving their first sentence; laws for preventing water pollution, regulating aviation, Alaskan fisheries; revision for the laws of radio interference, navigation, and the Federal Trade Commission; abandoning the reduction of the strength of the army and navy; minimum wage law for women; restricted immigration policy; aid for veterans; cheaper fertilizers to the farmers and governmental support for agricultural exports.⁵⁶

Coolidge continued Harding's normalcy program and became the nominee of the Republicans in the 1924 elections. Coolidge was not a good communicator. At press conferences, he gave neutral and evasive answers that he did not know enough about the issue; he had no comment on major developments of the era, such as the Ku Klux Klan, Scopes trial,⁵⁷ or the Sacco-Vanzetti case.⁵⁸ In the election campaign, the

⁵⁵ Coolidge, 1929, 173; John W. Johnson and Dale E. P. Yurs, "Calvin Coolidge," in *The Presidents and the Constitution*, ed. Ken Gormley (New York: New York University Press, 2016), 386; William E. Leuchtenburg, "Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover," in *American President: From Teddy Roosevelt to Bill Clinton* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 125.

⁵⁶ "December 6, 1923: First Annual Message," Miller Center, accessed 4 October 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-6-1923-first-annual-message>.

⁵⁷ The Scoper Trial, also known as the Monkey Trial, is the case where John Thomas Scopes, a high school teacher in Tennessee, was tried in 1925 for alleging that he taught human evolution, which was forbidden to be taught at school. Faulkner, 1950, 161.

⁵⁸ Leuchtenburg, 2015, 128. Nicola Sacco, a shoemaker, and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, a fish peddler, were two Italian immigrant anarchists convicted of murdering the paymaster of a shoe factory in

Republicans used a sympathetic slogan “Keep Cool with Coolidge” and based their campaign on the idea that the continuation of prosperity in the Harding term and the risks of change. He won by a 54% to 28.8% margin over his Democratic opponent, John W. Davis. Mellon, Hughes and Hoover continued their duties in the Coolidge cabinet.

Coolidge focused on business. He believed that “the Government can do more to remedy the economic ills of the people by a system of rigid economy in public expenditure than can be accomplished through any other action.”⁵⁹ The Revenue Act of 1926, a part of Mellon’s tax reduction plan, lowered the maximum individual tax rate, abolished gift tax, diminished inheritance and personal income taxes, canceled many excise taxes, and ended public access to federal income tax returns. These regulations apparently reflected positively on economy. Between 1925 and 1929, the number of factories, the value of their production for the domestic market, and the Federal Reserve index of industrial production increased. Besides, during the 1920s, corporations and mass production increased, trusts emerged, banks merged, chain stores developed, mass consumption grew, the number of automobiles increased from 7 million in 1919 to 23 million in 1929, Americans’ access to electricity increased almost fourfold from the war years to the mid-1920s, radio became a natural necessity in homes, the housing market grew, many industries such as timber, mineral, and textile developed, national debts decreased, and unemployment fell to 3% in 1929.⁶⁰

Nevertheless, the automobile and construction sectors, which were lively in the early 1920s, started to decline after 1925. More precisely, the automobile industry grew slowly, which led to a decrease in production in areas such as steel, rubber, glass, and other associated industries. On the other hand, the situation of agriculture was still troubled. The sector, which increased its capacity to meet the grain needs of Europe during the WWI, faced with excess supply after the war and in addition to the value of

Massachusetts, in 1920. Although much effort was made to save these men, who were thought to be innocent, they were executed seven years later. Faulkner, 1950, 145.

⁵⁹ “December 3, 1924: Second Annual Message,” Miller Center, accessed 4 October 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-3-1924-second-annual-message>.

⁶⁰ Sibley, 2014, 214.

its production, the farmer's purchasing power declined. Farmers also had trouble exporting excess supplies because of the high tariffs that protected the industry. Agricultural laws were enacted during the Harding period, and the McNary-Haugen proposal involving the government intervention to raise the price of products was also carried out during the Coolidge period, but the President vetoed twice. As a result, agriculture and related sectors suffered in these prosperous years, thus some rural banks and eventually other banks started to crash. 549 banks went bankrupt in 1928 and 640 banks in 1929. In the 1920s, the inequality between rich and poor grew.⁶¹

In the exciting 1928 elections, Coolidge did not want to run again. The Republican nominee Hoover, who had been in the cabinet for two terms, was lucky against the Catholic Democrat opponent Alfred E. Smith because the U.S. was not ready for a Catholic president. However, New York Governor Smith, who was against the prohibition, ended the election with an assertive rate. Hoover won the election with 58.2% of the vote to 40.7%, and took 444 against 87 votes in the Electoral College. Republicans moved the six southern states - Florida, Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia - that had not been taken since 1876, while Democrats took Massachusetts and Rhode Island, which had not been won since the Civil War.⁶² Although Smith lost this election, he paved the way for Franklin D. Roosevelt to win states where Republicans prevailed in the next election. The 1928 election was also the election in which women who had won the right to vote in 1920 went to the ballot the most.⁶³

Hoover's presidency was warmly received. Thanks to the new president who was a mining engineer, technical intelligence took over the country for the first time. In addition, Hoover had pioneered food and clothing aid from the U.S. to Europe during WWI, and even delivered aid ships to Soviet Russia, although he hated Bolshevism. Therefore, the President, both intelligent and humane, was expected to

⁶¹ Cashman, 1989, 102-104; Sibley, 2014, 212-213.

⁶² Cashman, 1989, 107.

⁶³ Leuchtenburg, 2015, 132; Cashman, 1989, 105-107.

solve the problems of the country.⁶⁴ Hoover started his Inaugural Address on March 4, 1929, stating that they had come out strong from the losses of the Great War and the subsequent structuring process, that they contributed to the recovery of the world, and that they reached a higher level of comfort and security than ever before. After talking about his suggestions on various issues, he ended his words as:

Ours is a land rich in resources; stimulating in its glorious beauty; filled with millions of happy homes; blessed with comfort and opportunity. In no nation are the institutions of progress more advanced. In no nation are the fruits of accomplishment more secure. In no nation is the government more worthy of respect. No country is more loved by its people. I have an abiding faith in their capacity, integrity, and high purpose. I have no fears for the future of our country. It is bright with hope.⁶⁵

2.1.4. The Great Depression

World War I revolutionized the world which had had an integrated economy; it made the circulation of people, goods and money difficult, and put the United States at the center of this new system. However, the U.S. did not lead the world in rebuilding the old, open economy, indeed did the opposite. Establishing quota limits with immigration laws of 1921 and 1924, and increasing tariffs by following protectionist policies caused other countries to follow the same path. With the war, the U.S. had switched position from the world's great debtor to the world's great creditor. Instead of London, New York became the central lender in the world's credit network, and this move revealed that post-war debts were different from pre-war debts. Before the war, countries spent British loans to build railways and farms, thus this improved their repayment capacity. Yet after the war, countries spent American loans for wartime spending, but because of the lack of repayment capacity, they borrowed more to pay off their debts.

American loans helped for a while, but then sent Germany, Poland, Brazil, Argentina, Australia and Canada into recession when the loans ran out in 1928. Meanwhile, the U.S. enjoyed the prosperity era. After the U.S. survived the post-war

⁶⁴ Leuchtenburg, 2015, 133.

⁶⁵ "March 4, 1929: Inaugural Address," Miller Center, accessed 7 October 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-4-1929-inaugural-address>.

recession in 1921, its economy recovered; people's income increased; technology improved, mass production grew, people did not see any problem in using more loans by turning to luxury consumption such as radios, refrigerators, and cars. Automobile industry advanced so much that by the end of the decade almost every household had a car. When the American loans ran out in 1928, both the borrower countries and the borrower American people sought a solution on Wall Street. An intense demand for stocks occurred, which caused them to rise excessively. Due to the increase in exchange trading and borrowing to trade on the stock markets, the Federal Reserve decided to make borrowing more expensive, and began to draw back funds from the money market. Early in 1929, speculation thrived at a high rate. The Federal Reserve's tighter monetary policy slowed the flow of American capital to foreign countries which negatively impacted nations such as Germany that were dependent on American loans.⁶⁶

On October 24, the Great Depression began by the complete collapse of the stock market. About 13 million shares of stock were sold and the day was called as Black Thursday. Next week, the damage was extended on Tuesday, more than 16 million shares were sold and the day was called as Black Tuesday. The stock market crash created panic, the Americans who doubted their future stopped most of their economic activities; luxury consumption ended, factories closed, banks went bankrupt, unemployment started to rise. The day after Black Thursday, Hoover did not see a situation to worry about, and stated that "the fundamental business of the country, that is the production and distribution of commodities, is on a sound and prosperous basis."⁶⁷ A few weeks later he did not change his mind and said:

... we have gone through a crisis in the stock market, but for the first time in history the crisis has been isolated to the stock market itself. It has not extended into either the production activities of the country or the financial fabric of the country,

⁶⁶ Eric Rauchway, *The Great Depression & The New Deal: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 8-17.

⁶⁷ "October 25, 1929: Message Regarding "Black Thursday", Miller Center, accessed 7 October 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/october-25-1929-message-regarding-black-thursday>.

and for that I think we may give the major credit to the constitution of the Federal Reserve System.⁶⁸

After the beginning of the Great Depression, Hoover arranged a meeting and invited important figures of American industry, asked them how to keep the crash from turning into a depression. He asked them not to decrease wages of their workers and asked for politicians increase their spending on public works. These strategies did not attract anyone's attention. None provided any immediate relief to Americans. Local and state governments also failed to respond effectively to Hoover's expectations. Although they had previously spent some money on construction projects, they could not continue as tax revenue fell and the aid bill for the poor rose. As a result, local governments had to postpone their debts. The balance of views within the Federal Reserve, which served as a central bank for the U.S., rested on the anti-intervention side. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse, while the Federal Reserve System took some steps to make it easier for banks to lend and borrow money, it did little after a few months.⁶⁹

Despite more than a thousand economists told Hoover not to act that way,⁷⁰ in June 1930 Hoover raised the tariff walls by signing the Hawley-Smoot Tariff. Over time, other countries retaliated against this highly debated policy by establishing their own tariff barriers. As a result, by 1930, world trade decreased by a quarter and borrower states' payments to the U.S. fell. During Hoover's presidency, banks took a serious hit, with more than 20% of American banks bankrupt. As many state laws did not allow banks to open branches, those unbranched banks entered the depression weakly. States that had stronger, more competitive banks met the depression with a stronger, more stable financial system. The Federal Reserve did not provide financial assistance to the banks that closed.

Since the Hoover administration did not take any action to weaken the bad effects of the depression, the Republicans lost fifty-two seats in the House of

⁶⁸ "November 5, 1929: Message on the Economy," Miller Center, accessed 8 October 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/november-5-1929-message-economy>.

⁶⁹ Rauchway, 2008, 25-28; Leuchtenburg, 2015, 135.

⁷⁰ Cohen, 1987, 102; Leuchtenburg, 2015, 138.

Representatives and left control to the Democrats. In February 1931, Hoover again opposed federal unemployment relief and expressed that he would only approve if the country's volunteer institutions could not find resources to prevent hunger and suffering. Some companies and states tried to find solutions: some set up loans for unemployment, some retrained their workers, and the states did what they could. The states spent tens of millions of dollars to help their citizens; however, these efforts were not enough. In February 1931, Hoover signed a law that created a Federal Employment Stabilization Board assigned with regulating federal construction spending to solve the problem of unemployment. Then in June 1931, he declared a one-year moratorium on intergovernmental debts in order to stop the international spread of credit collapses. Reelection was coming, and Hoover approved some policies to get rid of the depression. In order to save the Bank of America, Hoover signed the Emergency Relief Act of 1932 and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was founded with \$500 million capital and was allowed to lend \$1.5 billion credit to the financial institutions. Hoover also signed a bill giving \$125 million to the Federal Land Bank system, a farm mortgages provider. These kinds of measures were good for bankers and borrowers, but it did not help ordinary citizens.⁷¹

During the depression, the middle class became poorer. Distances between classes diminished. In 1932, about 11.5 million Americans had no work. This number represented only the workers.⁷² They have wives and children, so these unemployed people represented almost thirty million Americans who had lost their source of income. The hours and wages of people who were lucky enough to keep their jobs decreased. And so, by the summer of 1932, more than half of American workers did part-time jobs.⁷³ Over time, people used up the ways of help such as family, relatives, friends or charities. There became a big problem: Hunger. States tried to help their people for a while, but their treasuries run out. Some men who left to look for work never came back; they made their homes on the road. Older children left their homes

⁷¹ Rauchway, 2008, 28-34.

⁷² Ibid., 40.

⁷³ Ibid.

because they did not want to burden their families. When employers advertised jobs, they hired or kept on white men with work experience. Therefore, the young men, old men, women, and the African Americans were the majority of unemployed people.⁷⁴ In short, the hopeful words that Hoover made at his inaugural address were replaced by dark days.

2.2. Foreign Policy of the Republicans in the 1920s

In the 1920s, the foreign policy of the United States was based on staying out of war and peacekeeping, thus engaging the country in cooperation that would not impose military and political responsibility to achieve these goals.

2.2.1. League of Nations and the World Court

In the peace negotiations after World War I, the United States, especially President Wilson, wished for a lawful and sustainable peace order. Wilson's Fourteen Points was the expression of the first basic principles of such an order, and he placed primary emphasis on the establishment of a permanent organization in order to maintain peace and prevent its deterioration. Wilson believed in the leadership of the U.S. in this international organization, but the Americans did not agree with him. The Republicans and opponents of the League of Nations argued that by entering this organization, the U.S. would lose its independence in foreign policy and would have to move away from the Monroe Doctrine. The point they most objected to was Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. According to the article, "the Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League."⁷⁵ This provision was interpreted as the League of Nations would decide movement of the U.S. in foreign policy, and the U.S. would have to comply with it. Although Wilson went on a nationwide tour to convince the public, the Senate rejected three times the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Ibid., 38-42.

⁷⁵ "The Covenant of the League of Nations," Avalon Project, accessed November 11, 2020, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.

⁷⁶ Armaoğlu, 2020, 166-167; Cohen, 1987, 14.

The policies of the Republican presidents regarding the League of Nations were the same in the 1920s. Harding considered the issue to be chained by a written contract. According to him, it was better to become free agents with the conscience agreement of international justice and progressive civilization, rather than being chained by this covenant that ended the freedom of movement of the U.S. and gave the alliance the right to declare America's duty to the world. Harding thought that if the citizens of this country were to be asked for a sacrifice to join the war, it would be only for America and its dignity. The President also mentioned "association of nations" in his statements. The Republicans committed "an association of nations, cooperating in sublime accord, to attain and preserve peace through justice rather than force, determined to add to security through international law."⁷⁷ Although Harding spoke of a union in which the country would give up nothing for peace, he neither offered any suggestions on its details nor made any promises.⁷⁸

Harding found the policy of non-involvement in the Old World affairs successful. By linking the achievement of the United States to this policy, he signaled that it would continue, and stated that the U.S. could not be a part of a permanent military alliance, make any political commitments, or assume any economic obligations.⁷⁹ Coolidge followed the same policy as Harding. He indicated that the U.S. took care of its own business, protected the interests of its own citizens, had no need to assume the responsibilities of membership, and saw no reason to limit their freedom and independence of action by joining, and did not recommend any changes to this policy. He added that they also accepted their obligation to help others.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ "July 22, 1920: An Association of Nations," Miller Center, accessed October, 8, 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/july-22-1920-association-nations>.

⁷⁸ Leopold, 1973, 419-420.

⁷⁹ "March 4, 1921: Inaugural Address," Miller Center, accessed October, 8, 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-4-1921-inaugural-address>.

⁸⁰ "December 6, 1923: First Annual Message," Miller Center, accessed 4 October 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-6-1923-first-annual-message>.

Hoover barely spoke about the League of Nations and claimed that the public had decided that no political engagements should be made.⁸¹

While Harding and Coolidge left foreign policy to their secretary of states, Hoover, whose presidency coincided with the Great Depression, could not lift his head from domestic issues. Communication of the U.S. with League was troublesome. Before Charles Evans Hughes, Harding's Secretary of State, thirty-three communications were received over the course of a year from the League, eighteen were answered.⁸² The number of unanswered writings increased after Hughes, and he intervened when this bad manner was reported in the newspapers.⁸³ *The New York Times* portrayed the case as:

In the office of the Secretary of the League of Nations at Geneva there is a filing case devoted to unexpedited business. One section of this filing case contains a collection of papers which grows thicker. It contains the communications of the League of Nations to the new American Government. None of them has been answered, for since Mr. Harding has been President the attitude of the State Department (under Hughes) toward the League appears to be that 'there ain't no such animal.'⁸⁴

Six months later, Hughes responded to fifteen of the pending posts as they had received them.⁸⁵ A devious way of communication was then followed, with writings from the League being forwarded to Washington via the Swiss Minister for Foreign Affairs at Berne. In the Coolidge era, this system was abandoned and direct communication with Washington was allowed. Although the United States was never officially a member of the League, it cooperated with the League in various ways. Firstly, many Americans served informally on numerous bodies of the League. Secondly, during the Harding and Coolidge era, unofficial observers who did not

⁸¹ "March 4, 1929: Inaugural Address," Miller Center, accessed 7 October 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-4-1929-inaugural-address>.

⁸² Leopold, 1973, 421.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Clarence A. Berdahl, "The United States and the League of Nations," *Michigan Law Review* 27, no. 6 (1929): 622.

⁸⁵ Berdahl, 1929, 623.

participate in discussions, attended the League meetings, observed the process and reported to Washington. Thirdly, official representatives participated in the meetings, presented the views of the U.S. government, but did not vote or take responsibility, and they acted under unofficial titles. Finally, as in other countries, there was participation with completely official representatives on specific issues such as reduction of armaments. Thus the U.S. gradually recognized the League's right and capacity to act, at least on certain issues, and showed a willingness to cooperate.⁸⁶

In contrast to participation in the League of Nations, the Republican Presidents and even their successor Democrat Roosevelt supported membership in the World Court which was the judicial arm of the League. The Court could prepare advisory opinions at the request of the Council or Assembly; and it could decide all cases that members voluntarily submitted to it by special or general agreements. In 1923, Harding suggested the involvement to the Court and offered a proposal to the Senate the Protocol and the Statue of the World Court, but there was no positive result due to the opponent senators of the League.⁸⁷ His successor, Coolidge said that U.S. foreign policy was guided by two principles; one of which was to avoid permanent political alliances that would sacrifice the American independence, and the other was to bring peaceful resolutions to conflicts between nations.⁸⁸ He also continued that the U.S. had been a member of the Hague Tribunal for nearly twenty-five years and had long sought the establishment of a permanent World Court of Justice. As such, he supported Harding's proposal and recommended that it be evaluated favorably in the Senate.⁸⁹ After a year, since Harding's proposal was still before the Senate, Coolidge

⁸⁶ Ibid., 628-630.

⁸⁷ Leopold, 1973, 455.

⁸⁸ "December 6, 1923: First Annual Message," Miller Center, accessed 4 October 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-6-1923-first-annual-message>.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

repeated his request.⁹⁰ On March 3, 1925, the proposal was approved by the House of Representatives, and on January 27, 1926 the Senate confirmed it on the basis of five conditions.

The fifth condition desired an authorization for the U.S. to block advisory opinions on issues which it claimed an interest because the League members had a right to oppose a call for advisory opinions on topics distasteful to themselves in the Council or Assembly. The League Council invited the U.S. twice a conference to negotiate the ambiguous conditions, but Coolidge and his secretary of state, Frank B. Kellogg refused twice. Coolidge declared that the U.S. would not join the Court unless the members accepted all of American conditions, and dropped the Court plan.⁹¹ In 1929, Hoover requested a suitable way to join the Court. He stated that American statesmen were among the first to make proposals for a world court, thus the Permanent Court of International Justice identified with American ideals and American statesmanship in terms of its essential purpose.⁹² He added that the American conditions should not be misinterpreted because the U.S. did not seek a special privilege or advantage with these conditions, just wanted to clarify their relation to advisory opinions and other matters that were subsidiary to the main purposes of the court.⁹³

The statesman Elihu Root first revised the Statute of 1920, then became largely responsible for the preparation of a report dated March 18, 1929 that formed the basis for a new protocol designed to comply with the terms of the Senate. He found a formula for the fifth condition.⁹⁴ According to the new procedure, if the majority of Court members still asked for an opinion despite American opposition, the United

⁹⁰ "December 3, 1924: Second Annual Message," Miller Center, accessed 4 October 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-3-1924-second-annual-message>.

⁹¹ Leopold, 1973, 455-456; Cohen, 1987, 57-58.

⁹² "March 4, 1929: Inaugural Address," Miller Center, accessed 7 October 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-4-1929-inaugural-address>.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Leopold, 1973, 457.

States could leave the court without any claim of unfriendliness or unwillingness to cooperate generally for peace. The revised Statute and new accession protocol were accepted by the majority of the Court members and was signed by the United States on December 9, 1929. In an atmosphere where the great depression and disarmament issues were more important, it was not until January 29, 1935 that the Senate acted, and the U.S. did not become a member of the Court.⁹⁵

2.2.2. Naval Disarmament

In the interwar period, the idea that national armament had to be reduced in order to maintain peace prevailed in the worldwide public opinion. The phrase “disarmament” was used for direct and indirect forms of weapon restrictions on the production, acquisition, deployment and use of land, naval and air weapon systems. In the Covenant of the League of Nations, disarmament issue was included in Article 8 as “the Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.”⁹⁶

In the 1920s, because American foreign policy was based on the need and how to stay away from future wars, international cooperation on disarmament also attracted the attention of the U.S. With the logic that weapons were used in wars, it was believed if countries stayed away from the arms race, wars would also be avoided. Meanwhile, the U.S. government was deeply uncomfortable Japan’s imperialist stance on China in the Far East, and became distributed when the current Anglo-Japanese alliance began implementing a new program to surpass the American navy. The U.S. did not want the renewal of this alliance, which was about to expire. Britain, on the other hand, did not want to end an existing cooperation without replacing a new one, but at the same time did not have the economic power to pursue an arms race with the U.S. On 8 July 1921, the United States freed Britain from this dilemma by offering a trilateral conference on the limitation of armament in Washington. Britain accepted the proposal and suggested enlarging the conference to include all countries with interests in East Asia.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Andrew Webster, “Piecing Together the Interwar Disarmament Puzzle: Trends and Possibilities,” *International Journal* 59, no. 1 (2003): 188-189.

Hughes invited Belgium, France, Italy, China, Netherlands and Portugal in addition to Japan and Britain. Japan accepted Hughes' offer after receiving assurances that the issues of the China and its alliance with Britain would not be raised at the conference. The Washington Conference opened on November 12, 1921 with the participation of the nine countries and resulted in three treaties signed on the limitation of naval armaments. Under the Four-Power Treaty of December 13, 1921 signed between the United States, Great Britain, Japan and France, the countries pledged to respect their mutual rights in the Pacific Ocean. The Treaty ended the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Unlike other treaties, the Senate opposed seriously to the Four-Power Treaty. Harding argued that there was no written or moral obligation to commit to the armed forces, alliance, or to participate in the defense. With the key senators' support, it was approved on March 24, 1922.⁹⁷

The second and third treaties were signed on February 6, 1922. The Five-Power Treaty which was signed between the United States, Britain, Japan, France and Italy restricted the tonnage of capital ships to a ratio of 5:5:3 for the U.S., Britain and Japan; 1.67 for France and Italy.⁹⁸ Besides, new construction of capital ships for ten years was banned. With this agreement, the great powers for the first time voluntarily limited their freedom of armament. The lack of a notable agreement regarding restrictions on smaller ships, as well as the absence of Germany and Russia, were gaps in the treaty. The Nine-Power Treaty signed between the U.S., Britain, Japan, France, Belgium, China, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal determined the policy to be applied to China. The parties would not interfere with China's internal affairs, would respect its sovereignty, independence, territorial and administrative integrity, and would apply the principle of equal opportunity for trade in China.⁹⁹

The Washington Conference was of great importance for the United States. With the initiative of the U.S., all American interests such as arms limitation, end of

⁹⁷ Cohen, 1987, 47-52; Leopold, 1973, 428-433.

⁹⁸ With this limitation, the United States could have 525,000 tonnage, Britain 525,000, Japan 315,000, France 175,000 and Italy 175,000 tonnage, which is expressed as a ratio of 5: 5: 3, 1.67 and 1.67, respectively. Armaoglu, 2020, 171.

⁹⁹ Cohen, 1987, 52-53.

Anglo-Japanese alliance, control of imperialism in China, protection of American rights in China were realized in the conference that was organized and dominated by the U.S. Secretary of State. Peace was maintained without risking the lives of any American, without any action requiring the use of force, and without any crisis with any country. The conference was also successful from Wilson's Fourteen Points perspective. Great powers such as the U.S., Britain and Japan were able to come together and make decisions without crushing the weaker states. In the East Asia, a system was established in which no country maximized its own interests.¹⁰⁰

Disarmament efforts continued after the Washington Conference. Hughes believed that army and air corps was not a big burden for America; it was a problem for the European states.¹⁰¹ The Harding administration supported the Central American republics to conclude an agreement on February 7, 1923 limiting the size of land, sea and air components. At the same time, the U.S. efforts were directed towards the limitation of small ships. In June 1927, the second naval disarmament conference was held in Geneva; however, France and Italy did not attend. The conference was attended by second rank representatives – no presidents, no secretary of states – from the U.S., Japan and Britain did not yield a positive result, as the U.S. preferred few large ships with eight-inch guns and Britain chose many smaller ships with six-inch guns. On the one hand, the failure of the Geneva Conference strained Anglo-American relations, on the other hand, the cruiser race between the U.S., Japan and Britain accelerated. Therefore, the third naval disarmament conference was held in London in 1930 with the participation of high ranking officials from all five countries.¹⁰²

The U.S. delegation consisted of Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson (1929-1933), Secretary of the Navy Charles F. Adams, two senators and three ambassadors. The negotiations smoothed the Anglo-American tension, but there emerged another problem. France demanded that any further restrictions be accompanied by a security pact, an Anglo-American guarantee in case of danger, and insisted on this request.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 54.

¹⁰¹ Leopold, 1973, 445.

¹⁰² Ibid., 445-447.

After being rejected by the U.S. and Britain, France did not accept any addition in the tonnage quota system, and nor did Italy. Hence the London Treaty of April 22, 1930 was signed as tripartite. With this treaty, the ban on building battleships and cruisers was extended until December 31, 1936. Moreover, the tonnage margin was revised, thus reducing the U.S. share from 525,000 to 464,300, the Britain from 525,000 to 474,500 and Japan from 315,000 to 272,000. The ratio was still 5:5:3.¹⁰³ As for the cruisers, heavy and light cruiser distinction was made, and the number of heavy ones was limited. 146,800 tons of 15 heavy cruisers and 192,200 tons of light cruisers for Britain; 180,000 tons of 18 heavy cruisers and 143,500 tons of light cruisers for the U.S.; 108,400 tons of 12 heavy cruisers and 100,450 tons of light cruisers for Japan was formulated. For the first time, a quota for destroyers was also set and 150,000 tons were allocated to the U.S. and Britain and 105,000 tons to Japan. All three states received 52,700 tons of submarines.¹⁰⁴ Thus, the Five-Power Treaty signed as a result of the Washington Conference now developed, albeit with three countries.

2.2.3. Outlaw War

After World War I, states made an effort to establish peace in the world and statesmen carried out important peaceful diplomatic activities. The League of Nations was established, the Permanent Court of International Justice was founded, disarmament conferences and agreements were held, the Locarno Treaties, which lowered the tension between European states, were signed, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact was realized. For the steps they took to ensure world peace, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to British Foreign Minister Austen Chamberlain in 1925, French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand and German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann in 1926, and the U.S. Secretary of State Frank Billings Kellogg in 1929.¹⁰⁵ The United States, on the other hand, refused to join the League of Nations and postponed participating to the Court, but continued to cooperate with these institutions, while also paying

¹⁰³ Ibid., 447-448.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 448.

¹⁰⁵ Mehmet Sait Dilek, "Büyük Güçlerin Politikaları ve Briand-Kellogg Paktı," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 10, no. 37 (2013): 146.

attention to the disarmament agreements and the peace movement. The quest to outlaw war, one of the elements of the peace movement, yielded the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact.

There were three groups with three different aims that supported the formation of the Pact. First group led by Salmon O. Levinson, a Chicago lawyer, intended to prohibit the war; second group led by the President Nicholas M. Butler and Professor James T. Shotwell of Columbia University wanted to promote collective action; and the third group led by the French Foreign Minister Briand desired to develop French-American relations. Pacifist Levinson claimed that if war was prohibited by a multilateral agreement, there would be no more war. To solve international disputes, he offered negotiation and arbitration, and for years he tried to persuade the U.S. statesmen to attempt to make a treaty to ban war. France, on the other side, was worried about its national security, especially an attack from Germany. France found the only way to be protected from a German attack through alliances. Professor Shotwell, a supporter of international cooperation, met with Briand in Paris in 1927, hoping to bring the U.S. and France closer. On April 6, 1927, the tenth anniversary of the U.S. entry into World War I, Briand sent an open letter to the American people using Shotwell's draft, and proposed a bilateral treaty to outlaw war.¹⁰⁶ In this way, France aimed to gain a special position in Europe by becoming a close friend with the U.S. In addition, the low probability of a war between France and the U.S. made it easier for France to forward this proposal to Washington.¹⁰⁷

The U.S. disapproved the French offer. The Americans promised not to attack France under any circumstances meant that it would commit not to ally against France when a possible war broke out in the future. In addition, the fact that France made this offer through the press irritated Coolidge and Kellogg.¹⁰⁸ The French Foreign Ministry officially notified the proposal to the U.S. Ambassador in Paris on June 20, 1927.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Cohen, 1987, 59-60; Leopold, 1973, 458.

¹⁰⁷ Dilek, 2013, 147.

¹⁰⁸ Cohen, 1987, 60.

¹⁰⁹ Dilek, 2013, 148.

Levinson also supported the proposal and a massive campaign started, with more than three hundred letters a day going to Kellogg.¹¹⁰ Backup for Briand's proposal to ban the war grew even further when the naval disarmament negotiations failed at the Geneva Conference of 1927. The United States, unhappy with the offer of France, proposed a multilateral agreement to be signed not only with France but with all states to declare war illegal. Therefore, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, also known as Paris Peace Pact, was signed at Paris by fifteen states - Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, the Irish Free State, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, South Africa, and the United States - on August 27, 1928.¹¹¹

The pact consisted of three articles. Article 1 contained the obligation of not using war as a tool for national politics, but it did not have sanction power; Article 2 stipulated that disputes had to be resolved by peaceful means; and Article 3 invited other states to participate. The U.S. Senate approved the pact by great margin of 85 to 1 on January 16, 1929, and ratified by the President the next day.¹¹² Aside from the question of whether the pact would bring the war to an end, the American people were content that the U.S. was leading for world peace.¹¹³ Coolidge interpreted the pact as one of the most important treaties ever laid before the U.S. Senate and indicated that it promised more than any other agreements ever negotiated between nations for world peace.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ Cohen, 1987, 61.

¹¹¹ Cohen, 1987, 60-61; Dilek, 2013, 148-150.

¹¹² "Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928," Avalon Project, accessed November 13, 2020, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kbpact.asp.

¹¹³ Cohen, 1987, 62; Leopold, 1973, 459.

¹¹⁴ "December 4, 1928: Sixth Annual Message," Miller Center, accessed November 13, 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-4-1928-sixth-annual-message>.

2.3. Roosevelt Administration

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the 32nd president of the United States, had run for vice president in the election of 1920 alongside James Cox, but failed to win.¹¹⁵ This election paved the way for his further recognition. Although his legs remained paralyzed after he had poliomyelitis in 1921, it did not detain him from his path in politics. Throughout the 1920s he worked to come to a strategic position in the Democratic Party, and closely involved in the U.S. foreign policy. Advocating the U.S.' joining the League of Nations, he also designed a new Society of Nations, weeding out areas where the Americans were objectionable in the League. He supported the ideas of peace and disarmament, believing that unity in the country was necessary for an active role in the international arena.¹¹⁶ Roosevelt criticized the Republicans' policy about the fact that the \$10 billion loan given to the European states was expected to be paid out at \$22 billion, but the governments imposed a strict tariff policy, making it impossible to receive payments.¹¹⁷

After the Great Depression, when the country was in the midst of an economic crisis and the sense of nationalism was on the rise, he refrained from making statements about foreign policy. Roosevelt, who became the Governor of New York in 1929, did not want to attract the reaction of both the American people and the party members, as the disengagement of the idea of international cooperation within the party began. When he was nominated for president in January 1932 after being criticized for being an internationalist, he revised his statements, firstly on the League of Nations and then on debts. He criticized the League of Nations for not being the League that Woodrow Wilson designed, and not providing solutions to international problems, and also noted that the European states could pay off their debt to the U.S.

¹¹⁵ Alan Allport, *Franklin Delano Roosevelt*, (Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2003), 30.

¹¹⁶ In 1923, Roosevelt wrote an article named *Should We Trust Japan?* in the magazine *Asia* and answered that question as "yes", arguing that Japan remained loyal to the agreements at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922. In 1928, he wrote another article in *Foreign Affairs* to be used in the Democratic campaign in which he claimed that other than the naval disarmament step in 1921, the Republicans did not make a significant contribution to peace. Dallek, 1979, 16-17.

¹¹⁷ Dallek, 1979, 14-17.

by referring to their spending on armament.¹¹⁸ In his presidential race against his rival Hoover, he kept his foreign policy ideas to himself and, pressuring a sense of nationalism, won the election with 57.4% of the popular vote.¹¹⁹

2.3.1. The New Deal

During his first of four presidential terms, he had to deal with the ongoing Great Depression. In his inaugural address, he attributed the country's confronting with the troubles of rising taxes and unemployment, declining government revenues and demand, to "false leadership". The main policy, he explained, was to increase employment, as well as to realize projects for the use of natural resources. He added that it was necessary to increase the value of agricultural products, to make national aid programs functional, and to strictly control all banking, loans and investments.¹²⁰

The consequences of the Great Depression were severe by 1932-1933. First, M.J. Heale (2001) draws a neat picture of the economic conditions:

In 1930 industrial production dropped by 17 per cent; in 1932 it was down to little more than half what it had been in 1929. In 1929 there had been virtually full employment (only about 3 per cent were not in work), but by 1933 the official unemployment figure was nearly 25 per cent...Even the possession of land did not mean security; one in eight farmers had lost his farm by 1933...And those lucky enough to be in work did not escape hardship; average weekly earnings fell from nearly \$25 in 1929 to under \$17 in 1932, and while prices fell too their fall was not as fast.¹²¹

Roosevelt began responding to the ongoing economic depression by series of decisions, programs, projects, and reforms that mostly involved federal government's involvement to economy named as the "New Deal". His priority of focus was on the banking sector, unemployment, monetary issues, industrial and agricultural production. The banking sector was in crisis due to Great Depression. More than 20 percent of American banks went bankrupt. March 5, 1933, Roosevelt declared national

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 18-19.

¹¹⁹ Allport, 2003, 39; Dallek, 1979, 19.

¹²⁰ "March 4, 1933: First Inaugural Address," Miller Center, accessed January 20, 2021, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-4-1933-first-inaugural-address>.

¹²¹ M.J. Heale, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The New Deal and War*, (New York: Routledge, 2001), 9.

banks' closing for few days to prevent further financial collapse.¹²² Afterwards, on March 9, 1933, the Congress passed the bill for the Emergency Banking Act which dealt with two major issues about the banks: bringing back the bankrupt banks and the presidential authority over the banking system.¹²³ In addition to save the bankrupt banks, the Act aimed to reconstruct the confidence in the banking system to prevent the citizens' rush to withdraw their savings from the banks. President Roosevelt started to support his policies with radio speeches, known as the "fireside chats", asking for citizens' trust. The first fireside chat on March 12 sought to reassure the public by explaining the reasons for the bank holiday and its future.¹²⁴ The next day banks started to reopen.

The Emergency Banking Act of 1933 divided the banks into two: those that dealt with public depositors and those that invested in the Wall Street. Furthermore, the Act established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) which provided the Federal Government's temporary guarantee for the public depositors' savings in the banks. The result was that thanks to FDIC, "...bank failures dropped by an order of magnitude. In 1935 the Congress gave FDIC a permanent charter."¹²⁵

The Roosevelt government implemented expansionary fiscal policy and active monetary policy. Roosevelt shaped the Federal Reserve through his approach to gold. On April 19, 1933, he issued an executive order and wanted people not to hold gold except small amounts, and to exchange their gold into other currencies.¹²⁶ Additionally, under the Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act in 1933, "... Congress allowed the president to fix the price of the dollar in gold"¹²⁷ and

¹²² Dallek, 1979, 35.

¹²³ Rauchway, 2008; 57.

¹²⁴ "March 12, 1933: Fireside Chat 1: On the Banking Crisis" Miller Center, accessed January 20, 2021. <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-12-1933-fireside-chat-1-banking-crisis>.

¹²⁵ Rauchway, 2008; 59.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 61.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

“authorized the president to issue paper money and determine the gold or silver weight of the dollar”¹²⁸ The dollar price of gold rose to \$30 per ounce from \$20.67 per ounce. Accordingly, in January 1934, the Congress passed the Gold Reserve Act, and thus Roosevelt set the price of gold at \$35 per ounce.¹²⁹ The consequence was cheap money contributed to more operations of borrowing, investment and employment.

The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was the first major legislation on agriculture. The Act established the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) under the Secretary of Agriculture. The Act aimed to reduce agri-production through the subsidies to farmers for not producing; and to eliminate surplus production for certain crops like tobacco, corn, wheat, and rice, which later included peanuts, grain, sugar beet, barley, and rye.¹³⁰ Theodore Saloutos (1974) explains that the general idea was to increase the prices of agricultural products and balance the production with demand by stating that “the general objectives of the much heralded first AAA were to overcome the disparities between farm and nonfarm prices by granting benefit payments to producers who cooperated with the federal government to balance production with demand.”¹³¹

Regarding industry, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933 aimed to achieve economic recovery and to end unemployment. Its purpose was to create a more managed industrial policy through boards like management, labor, government and consumer representatives. It founded the National Recovery Administration to observe the drafting and implementation of the codes of fair competition. The Act intended to increase the profits of the industry through regulating the market and to increase the purchasing power of the workers through better wages.¹³²

¹²⁸ Ibid., 138.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 62.

¹³⁰ Theodore Saloutos, “New Deal Agricultural Policy: An Evaluation” *The Journal of American History* 61, no. 2, (1974): 399.

¹³¹ Salouts, 1974, 396.

¹³² Rauchway, 2008, 83.

Roosevelt's priority was to lower the unemployment rate, which was 25% when he took office.¹³³ The regulations of the labor market regarding working hours, unions and collective bargains, and retirement came after 1935. Some writers¹³⁴ distinguish the 1933-34 policies as the First New Deal and the 1935-36 policies as the Second New Deal. They separate the ones after 1935 as implementations for the future, while the ones before 1935 as producing urgent solutions.¹³⁵ In March 1933, the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) was established by the Roosevelt government with the objective of creating employment. The program provided jobs for healthy and single men between the ages of 18 and 35, and also married men who would pass most of his salary on to his family. There was a list of jobs: preventing floods and wildfires; pests that need to be eradicated; building roads, bridges, fences and firebreaks. The CCC was one of the manifestations of Roosevelt's priority of solving the high rates of unemployment.¹³⁶

In May, the Congress approved the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933 (FERA), which established the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA). This Act allocated a portion of \$500 million to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, had established in the Hoover era, as a grant to the states to support aid. While half of the money would be given to the states, the administrator of FERA would decide on the use of the other half.¹³⁷

The Works Progress Administration (WPA) was created with the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935 as the system to appraise the projects. The intention

¹³³ "March 4, 1933: First Inaugural Address," Miller Center, accessed January 20, 2021, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-4-1933-first-inaugural-address>; Rauchway, 2008, 1.

¹³⁴ According to Leuchtenburg, "both contemporary writers and historians" argued there was a "pattern, a break between the legislation of 1935 and that of 1933. Thomas Stokes in his book *Chip of My Shoulder* (1940), and Arthur Schlesinger *Politics of Upheaval* (1960) made the distinction, as Leuchtenburg exemplified. William E. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940* (New York: Harber & Row, 1963), 163-164.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Rauchway, 2008, 64.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 65.

was to give the most of people jobs as soon as possible.¹³⁸ The WPA became the means for the government as one of the stakeholders to employ people. Rauchway (2008) denotes how WPA became an employment agency:

With WPA, Hopkins once more hired millions, and put them to work building hospitals, schools, playgrounds, and airports. This agency employed artists and writers and actors to ply their trade. It built roads and public housing... Roosevelt meant WPA to hire as many people as quickly as possible to reduce unemployment as much as possible.¹³⁹

Despite the critiques regarding its result in ineffective government spending, the WPA became one of the significant institutions of Roosevelt's New Deal policy framework.¹⁴⁰

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 aimed to "provide for the establishment of fair labor standards in employments in and affecting interstate commerce, and for other purposes."¹⁴¹ After the Congress passed the bill, the national minimum wage was determined, maximum working hours was regulated, and child labor was banned.

The Social Security Act of 1935 started the welfare dimension of the U.S. and combined the social insurance benefits to employment. Its current title is the Federal Old Age, Survivors, Disability and Hospital Insurance Program. It included health and medical programs, and also had other dimensions. Wilbur J. Cohen (1984) describes the details of the Act as follows:

...the Act provided for three "assistance," or "welfare," programs: Title I, grants to enable states to provide Old Age Assistance to needy persons (OAA); Title X, grants to states for aid to the needy blind (AB); and Title IV, grants to states for aid to needy dependent children (ADC). OAA and AB later were effectively incorporated into the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI), a new and completely separate federal

¹³⁸ Ibid., 140.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 67.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ "The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, As Amended," *U.S. Department of Labor*, accessed January 28, 2021, <https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/FairLaborStandAct.pdf>.

program codified in subchapter XVI of the revised Act of 1972.¹⁴²

The Wagner Labor Relations Act (National Labor Relations Act) of 1935 provided the right to form unions and right for collective bargaining, and also aimed to empower organized labor and decrease the labor disputes for a robust economy.¹⁴³ The Act intended to increase the profits of the industry through regulating the market, and to increase the purchasing power of the workers through better wages.

As a result of all these policies, the country was still in the process of recovery when the decade ended. At the same time, Roosevelt's role was now about to change from the man who fixed the economy to the man who won the war.¹⁴⁴

2.4. Foreign Policy of Roosevelt: 1933-1939

Roosevelt had to put foreign policy in the background in his first term as he had to deal with the country's economic problems. In his first inaugural address, he made clear, by stating that "Our international trade relations, though vastly important, are in point of time and necessity secondary to the establishment of a sound national economy. I favor as a practical policy the putting of first things first."¹⁴⁵ During Roosevelt's first term, when he implemented the New Deal program, the emphasis on disarmament, world peace, and international cooperation continued in the American foreign policy.

In his speech on December 28, 1933, Roosevelt stated that he opposed armed intervention, as Wilson declared, and that the leaders were guilty for the danger to the world peace.¹⁴⁶ He further criticized the post-war order established at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 stating that the new order was far from Wilson's anti-war vision; emphasized that the League of Nations was founded on "political profit, personal

¹⁴² Wilbur J. Cohen, "The Development of the Social Security Act of 1935: Reflections Some Fifty Years Later," *Minnesota Law Review* 2500, (1984): 381.

¹⁴³ Heale, 2001, 29.

¹⁴⁴ Rauchway, 2008, 126.

¹⁴⁵ "March 4, 1933: First Inaugural Address," Miller Center, accessed January 20, 2021, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-4-1933-first-inaugural-address>.

¹⁴⁶ "Address before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation," *The American Presidency Project*, online, December 28, 1933, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-the-woodrow-wilson-foundation>.

prestige, national aggrandizement.”¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, he regarded the League important as it set the stage for international discussions, and wanted the League, promoting the extension of non-aggression pacts, and the disarmament agreements, remain the basis of world peace. He stressed that at least 90% of the world’s population might have considered reducing their armed forces, thinking that they were satisfied with their borders, but because of the expansionist ambitions of the 10%, others could not risk disarmament.¹⁴⁸ According to Roosevelt, this was threatening global peace. He defended world peace by opposing war throughout the entire speech.¹⁴⁹

The 1930s were years when the U.S. Congress was extremely isolationist. So much so that the special Senate commission, chaired by North Dakota Senator Gerald Nye, was investigating the consequences of the United States’ entry into World War I. In a 1,400-page report published in 1935, the Commission laid the blame for America’s entry into the war on arms manufacturers. Under the influence of this thought, the idea of the U.S. joining the war was too far.¹⁵⁰ Inspired by the Nye Report, Congress passed three (1935, 1936 and 1937) Neutrality Acts that reflected the isolationist tendencies of the Congress, to prevent the U.S. from going back to war.

In the interwar period, the American Congress and society demanded no involvement in the wars outside the U.S. territory.¹⁵¹ The Neutrality Acts were passed by the Congress to provide the provisions and the framework of isolationist policies. The war signs in Europe (rise of the fascism in Germany and Italy and their invasions through Europe, Slovak-Hungarian War, Polish-Czechoslovak border conflicts, annexations by Poland) and Asia (Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Soviet-Japanese conflicts) resulted in the First Neutrality Act. The export of “arms, ammunition, and

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomasi*, trans. İbrahim H. Kurt (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2000), 411.

¹⁵¹ “The Neutrality Acts, 1930s,” Department of State, accessed January 29, 2021, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/neutrality-acts#:~:text=After%20a%20fierce%20debate%20in,transporting%20goods%20to%20belligerent%20ports.>

implements of war”¹⁵² from the United States to foreign countries at war were banned. The U.S. arms manufacturers were required to apply for an export license with the first Act passed on August 31, 1935, and the Congress approved the first Neutrality Act. The Second Neutrality Act was an extended version of the first act dated February 29, 1936. The Third Neutrality act prohibited the U.S. citizens from traveling on warring ships, and American merchant ships were prevented from carrying weapons to the warring parties. The law empowered the President to remove all fighting ships from U.S. waters and also to extend the export embargo with additional items or supplies. One important clause of the Third Neutrality Act allowed for the sales of non-military products to belligerent states on the condition for cash only and shipping on non-American ships. This was named as the “cash-and-carry” provision. The Act intended to satisfy the American society’s demand for neutrality while at the same time providing space for the U.S. to benefit from a foreign war through sales of products to belligerent states.¹⁵³

Roosevelt outlined his foreign policy with his famous “Quarantine Speech” on October 5, 1937. Roosevelt informed the American people about the situation of the world by stating that the political condition of the world was deteriorating, and international lawlessness and terror had prevailed for several years.¹⁵⁴ He noted that if these attacks had taken place in other parts of the world, the U.S. would not flee, would not hope for mercy and would not continue its peaceful stance.¹⁵⁵ He went further, and threatened by stating that “there w[ould] be no safety by arms, no help from authority, no answer in science. The storm w[ould] rage till every flower of culture [wa]s trampled and all human beings [we]re leveled in a vast chaos.”¹⁵⁶ He argued that

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ “October 5, 1937: Quarantine Speech,” Miller Center, accessed January 29, 2021, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/october-5-1937-quarantine-speech>.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

policies of isolation or neutrality alone were not sufficient against peace violations, and that joint action was needed against them. He repeated the formula that the peace, freedom and security of ninety percent of the world's population was being threatened by the ten percent. In his speech, Roosevelt did not specify who was the ten percent who threatened the majority of the world's people. He argued that war was an infectious disease, and that it could be spread to areas far from the point of conflict, and suggested that quarantine be imposed against attackers, as with infectious diseases.¹⁵⁷

Roosevelt attracted the reaction of supporters of isolationism in the U.S. after his "Quarantine Speech".¹⁵⁸ They argued that distinguishing between peace-loving nations and warlike nations meant an American value judgment, which could lead to the abandonment of the policy of non-interference.¹⁵⁹ However, they claimed that Roosevelt and the Congress were under an obligation to adhere non-interference policy.¹⁶⁰ The policy of isolation was so intense that in 1938 the House of Representatives came very close to passing a constitutional amendment requiring a referendum for a declaration of war, except for the invasion of the country which Roosevelt had tried to prevent this decision from passing. Roosevelt disagreed with Congress on isolationism. He thought that instead of using the influence of the United States to stop the war, staying at home and closing all our doors and windows would make the situation even more dangerous.¹⁶¹

In April 1939, Roosevelt did not remain silent against the aggressive attitudes of the Nazi leader Adolf Hitler, and sent him a letter. Secretary of States Cordell Hull sent the same letter to Prime Minister of Italy, Benito Mussolini. In his letter, Roosevelt stressed that neutral nations, as well as victorious and defeated States, suffered. He listed thirty-one countries, including Turkey, and asked for assurances

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Kissenger, 2000, 413.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Kissenger, 2000, 413-415.

that Germany would not attack these countries.¹⁶² He added that he would ask the listed states to provide the same assurance if such assurances were given. Besides, Roosevelt suggested an international conference to solve the ongoing international problems. The letter was not taken seriously by Hitler and Mussolini.¹⁶³ According to Henry Kissenger, the letter was already cleverly prepared by Roosevelt to show the American people that the Axis countries really harbored aggressive ambitions.¹⁶⁴

In his response, Hitler tried to discredit Roosevelt by asking the states mentioned in Roosevelt's letter whether they knew about this message and whether their states felt a threat from Germany. While waiting the answers of the thirty-one states, he sent a telegram to Roosevelt, and implied that Roosevelt was pursuing a hypocritical policy, referring to British military regime in India, and asked him if he wanted Britain to put an end to that regime.¹⁶⁵ Some states answered the Hitler's question. Turkey's answer to Hitler was that Turkey did not consider itself in the face of any danger, and declared that in fact Turkey was in an unthreatening condition.¹⁶⁶

Hitler gave the main answer with his speech on April 28, 1939. He explained that his goal was the safety and unity of the German nation, and he complained that at the end of the Great War, their homeland was torn apart, their colonies were taken away, and they were wronged by seizing their raw materials.¹⁶⁷ He declared that he was ready to guarantee the states that Roosevelt listed in his speech, provided that they wanted it themselves. He rejected the international conference because he thought it meant taking Germany to court for its policies.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶² Tuğba Belenli, "II. Dünya Savaşı Öncesinde Roosevelt'in Hitler'e Gönderdiği Mesaj, Hitler'in Cevabı ve Kamuoyundaki Tepkiler," *Uluslararası Tarih ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 23 (2020): 366.

¹⁶³ Belenli, 2020, 369.

¹⁶⁴ Kissenger, 2000, 418.

¹⁶⁵ Belenli, 2020, 380.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 381-382.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 382.

Concurrently, in March 1939, Roosevelt, who applied to the Congress to expand the scope of the “cash and carry” principle, failed to get results.¹⁶⁹ As the war spread in Europe, a new Neutrality Act was adopted in November 1939. With this act, the arms embargo was lifted and all trade with warring countries was covered by “cash and carry” conditions. After all, the Neutrality Acts became ineffective in 1941 when the United States entered the World War II.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ Dallek, 1979, 183.

¹⁷⁰ “The Neutrality Acts, 1930s,” Department of State, accessed January 29, 2021, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/neutrality-acts#:~:text=After%20a%20fierce%20debate%20in,transporting%20goods%20to%20belligerent%20ports.>

CHAPTER 3

TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS: 1927 – 1939

3.1. Historical Background of the Bilateral Relations and the Young Republic

The first American - Ottoman contact took place in the North African region of the Ottoman Empire. Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Tripoli¹⁷¹, called as *Magrib States*, were the Ottoman Mediterranean ports that were open to international trade. All European states trading in the Mediterranean were buying their security in exchange for annual taxes to protect against those states' pirate attacks. The United States, had been trading under the flag of Great Britain until the declaration of independence, was new in the Mediterranean as an unprotected state after 1776, and started to make agreements with the Magrib States.¹⁷² After the first agreement was signed with Morocco in 1787,¹⁷³ agreements were concluded with Algeria in 1795,¹⁷⁴ Tripoli in 1796,¹⁷⁵ and Tunisia in 1797¹⁷⁶ respectively. With these treaties, the U.S. secured trade routes to the Ottoman Empire and had a chance to reach to the Ottoman ports.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷¹ Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Tripoli are generally called as *Magrib States* or *Barbary States*.

¹⁷² Erhan, 2001, 33-39.

¹⁷³ Gary E. Wilson, "American Hostages in Moslem Nations, 1784-1796: The Public Response," *Journal of the Early Republic* 2, no.2 (1982): 123-124.

¹⁷⁴ Erhan, 2001, 47-48.

¹⁷⁵ Bryson, 1977, 5.

¹⁷⁶ Erhan, 2001, 53-55.

¹⁷⁷ Field, 1969, 113.

The first treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the U.S was signed on May 7, 1830, named the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.¹⁷⁸ The treaty provided the most-favored-nation treatment, freedom for American vessels and merchants in the Ottoman Empire, liberty for passage through Turkish Straits, and the extension of capitulatory rights.¹⁷⁹ The secret clause providing the construction and purchase of vessels from the U.S. for the Ottoman Navy was rejected by the Senate.¹⁸⁰ While a new more detail trade agreement with the Empire and the U.S. was signed in 1862,¹⁸¹ the Porte had difficulty enforcing the terms of the treaty and the Treaty of 1830 remained the basic document regulating commercial relations.¹⁸² An interesting point in bilateral trade relations was that at the end of the American Civil War, the Empire began importing weapons from the U.S. as a result of the large amount of weapons left in both the U.S. Army and manufacturers, and also the Treaty of 1862 lifting the ban on the import of weapons and ammunition.¹⁸³

The bilateral diplomatic relations was pursued according to the Monroe Doctrine. In 1796, George Washington prepared his *Farewell Address* and advised the American people to extend commercial relations with all nations, but to have as little political connection as possible with them.¹⁸⁴ Washington's policies were later implemented in Monroe Doctrine. In 1823, the fifth President James Monroe stressed

¹⁷⁸ Gordon, 1928, 711.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Harry N. Howard, "The Bicentennial in American-Turkish Relations," *Middle East Journal* 30, no. 3 (1976): 294.

¹⁸¹ A. Üner Turgay, "Ottoman-American Trade During the Nineteenth Century," *The Journal of Ottoman Studies* III, (1982): 221-222.

¹⁸² Oral Sander and Kurthan Fişek, *Türk-ABD Silah Ticaretinin İlk Yüzyılı, 1829-1929: ABD Dışışleri Belgeleriyle* (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 2007) 23. With this Treaty of 1862, the Empire had accepted to reduce 8% ad valorem duty to 1% by decreasing periodically. However, between the years of 1874 and 1883, this tax rate on American exports increased to 20% in order to contribute state revenues. Upon the U.S. refusal in 1884, the Ottoman government repealed the Treaty of 1862. Turgay, 1982, 22.

¹⁸³ Sander and Fisek, 2007, 26.

¹⁸⁴ "Washington's Farewell Address, 1796," Avalon Project, accessed April 11, 2020, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp.

briefly in his annual message to the Congress that the U.S. would not permit the colonization of the Americas by the European states, and would treat any attempt to do so as an unfriendly disposition. He also emphasized that the U.S. had nothing to do with the problems of the European states and would not be involved in those problems, but in turn, European states could not be involved in the problems of the U.S., either. Any attempt by European states to bring their systems to the American hemisphere would be considered an act towards the United States' own peace and security.¹⁸⁵

In the light of these policies, it appears that Ottoman - American diplomatic relations began to achieve commercial goals, but one of the cornerstones of bilateral relations is the issue of American missionaries in the Empire. Starting from the 19th century, the U.S. used missionary activities in addition to trade so as to deepen the relations with the Ottoman Empire and protect American interests.¹⁸⁶ The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, a missionary organization of American Protestants founded in Boston in 1810, arranged to establish a mission in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁸⁷ Two missionaries, Pliny Fisk and Levi Parsons, were commissioned in 1819, and instructed to make a field research about the ethnic groups in the Empire, such as the Druses, Maronites, Turks, Greeks, and Armenians.¹⁸⁸ The missionaries began the work by handing out Bibles where they visited, and giving sermons on Protestantism.¹⁸⁹ The first success of the pioneer missionaries was to open the first Protestant American missionary school in the Ottoman Empire on July 28, 1824.¹⁹⁰ Then, the American missionary network spread throughout the Empire over time and diffused perfectly in Turkey.¹⁹¹ The number of American missionaries in Turkey rose

¹⁸⁵ Armaoğlu, 1997, 712.

¹⁸⁶ Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Kendi Belgeleriyle Anadolu'daki Amerika: 19. yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki Amerikan Misyoner Okulları* (İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2000), 12-14.

¹⁸⁷ Field, 1969, 93.

¹⁸⁸ James Levi Barton, *Daybreak in Turkey* (Boston, New York: The Pilgrim press, 1908), 119-120.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 120-122.

¹⁹⁰ Kocabaşoğlu, 2000, 28-29.

¹⁹¹ Barton, 1908, 138; Kocabaşoğlu, 2000, 43.

from 38 in 1850 to 162 in 1900; the number of churches¹⁹² increased steadily; American mission schools, which were an important key in expansionism, reached from 7 in 1850 to 438 in 1900, and the number of pupils jumped over twenty thousand in the 20th century. It was the Armenians who responded most moderately to the American missionary movement in the Ottoman Empire. Most of the students in the mission schools were by far the Armenians.¹⁹³ The 1856 Edict of the Empire, *Islahat Fermanı*,¹⁹⁴ facilitated the work of missionaries, but, when the Muslims were disturbed by their activities, The Porte announced that the publications engaged in political and religious propaganda would be censored with a circular dated 1862, and imposed sanctions until the Second Constitutional Era, when censorship on the press was abolished.¹⁹⁵

During the World War I, diplomatic relations were severed in 1917 after the two countries entered the war in different blocs. The American Embassy was closed and the Swedish legation looked after the American interests in the Empire. The President Wilson never declared war on the Empire because of the Secretary of State, Robert Lansing and the Foreign Secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions and director of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, James L. Barton argued that a declaration of war on Turkey would have bad effect for the missionaries in the country.¹⁹⁶ American missionaries, who stayed in the Ottoman lands and had close ties with the Armenians, helped those who were damaged in war conditions. The missionaries organized relief committees in the U.S.

¹⁹² By the imperial decree issued on 15th November 1847, native Protestants recognized as “separate and independent community”, therefore the Protestant churches started to take place in the Empire. Harrison Gray Otis Dwight. *Christianity Revived in the East* (New York: Baker and Scribner, 1850), 253.

¹⁹³ Barton, 1908, 192-193.

¹⁹⁴ The Edict provided a full equality between Muslim and non-Muslim Ottomans by removing the nation system and ensuring equal rights of citizenship of all religious communities. The right to change religion was also accepted. Armaoğlu, 1997, 258.

¹⁹⁵ Erhan, 2001, 199-204.

¹⁹⁶ Robert L. Daniel, *American Philanthropy in the Near East 1820-1960* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1970), 255-259; DeNovo, 1968, 106.

and founded the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief in 1915 to raise funds for Armenians. The thought of the missionaries, also supported by Morgenthau, that the Armenians were persecuted and even massacred by the Turks created a negative stereotype of the Turks in the U.S., such as “Terrible Turk”. Despite the missionaries’ anti-Turkish propaganda, before the U.S. entered the war, the Turkish-American relations continued within the borders of courtesy and no crisis occurred.¹⁹⁷

The Ottoman Empire ended the WWI with defeat by signing the Armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918. In the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, without a serious meeting between the victorious and the defeated states, a number of treaties were signed with the defeated ones. The Treaty of Sevres of 10 August 1920 fell to Ottoman Empire’s share.¹⁹⁸ The Turks did not wait for signing of a treaty and had already started the national struggle to provide complete independence as of May 19, 1919, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk against the invasion on the Entente States.¹⁹⁹ In the Sivas and Erzurum Congresses gathered in 1919, after discussing many options, including the American mandate, the principles of the national movement called *Misak-ı Milli* (National Pact) determined and Ankara became the center of the ongoing movement.²⁰⁰ Important fights occurred in the Turkish borders, and as the military successes were gained, the nationalists became stronger both at home and abroad.

¹⁹⁷ DeNovo, 1968, 98-102; *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920*, Volume I. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1939), Document 700; Robert L. Daniel, “The Armenian Question and American-Turkish Relations, 1914-1927,” *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 46, no. 2 (1959): 252-255.

¹⁹⁸ Armaoğlu, 2020, 116-119; Zürcher, 1995, 211. Under the Treaty of Sevres, Ottoman rule in İstanbul would continue, but control over the straits would be placed in an international commission; the Ottoman lands were distributed to allied states, leaving a minor part; Armenia would be established as an independent state in eastern Anatolia; a local autonomy plan for the Kurds, possibly leading to full independence, would be drafted by a commission; and more articles that would take away the freedom of the country. Fortunately, the Treaty of Sevres was legally invalid because it was not ratified by the Ottoman or any other Turkish parliament. Lewis, 1968, 32; Karpat, 2010, 124.

¹⁹⁹ Karpat, 2010, 119-120.

²⁰⁰ Karpat, 2010, 121-122; Zürcher, 1995, 220. According to the National Pact, recognition of full independence for the country; the integrity of Ottoman territories that were not under occupation when the Armistice of Mudros was signed; popular plebiscites to determine the future of Arab lands, Kars, Ardahan and Batum whose status were dubious; removal of capitulations; a multilateral treaty for regulations relating to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles Straits; recognition of minority rights according to the principle of reciprocity were accepted. Hale, 2013, 33.

Ultimately, the Armistice of Mudanya was signed on October 11, 1922 between Turkey and the Entente states. With this agreement, the Entente States officially recognized the new Turkish government, and then the solution of many problems between the parties was carried out at the Lausanne Conference.²⁰¹

At the end of the Conference, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed on July 24, 1923²⁰² and Turkey was officially recognized internationally by achieving most of the goals of the National Pact. Unlike other peace agreements imposed on the defeated states at the end of the WWI, the Treaty of Lausanne is a text of reconciliation that emerged through mutual negotiations. Again, unlike others, Lausanne is the only treaty in force. The Treaty of Lausanne established Turkey's borders with Bulgaria, Greece and Syria, while the Iraqi border could not be resolved due to Mosul issue.²⁰³ In the Dardanelles, the Marmara Sea and the Bosphorus, the principle of freedom of transit and passage by sea and air in times of war and peace was recognized, and it was decided that both sides of the straits be demilitarized and supervised by an international commission.²⁰⁴ Under the Treaty of Lausanne, all capitulations were abolished, but Turkey accepted existing concessions granted to foreign firms, and the government would not be able to change customs tariffs until 1929. Ottoman debts to the Entente States were partitioned among the states that separated from the Empire, and Turkey accepted its share.²⁰⁵ The Treaty was approved by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on August 24, 1923.²⁰⁶

²⁰¹ Hale, 2013, 38; Armaoğlu, 2020, 244.

²⁰² Zürcher, 1995, 236-237.

²⁰³ The Mosul problem was decided to be concluded within nine months between Britain and Turkey. At the Istanbul Conference of 1924, the issue could not be resolved through bilateral negotiations, and according to the League of Nations resolution of 1925, Mosul joined the territory of Iraq. Oran, 2009, 223.

²⁰⁴ Oran, 2009, 222-232; Armaoğlu, 2020, 245-246; Hale, 2013, 39; "Lausanne Peace Treaty," *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, accessed November, 30, 2020, [Lausanne Peace Treaty / Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs \(mfa.gov.tr\)](https://mfa.gov.tr/Lausanne-Peace-Treaty/Rep.-of-Turkey-Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs).

²⁰⁵ Hale, 2013, 40.

²⁰⁶ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk* (Ankara: Kaynak Yayınları, 2015), 571.

After gaining independence by the Treaty of Lausanne, the Turks concluded many reforms step-by-step to reach a modern, secular, democratic nation state.²⁰⁷ The Sultanate and the caliphate was abolished, the status of the state declared as a republic, and Mustafa Kemal was elected as the first president of the Republic of Turkey.²⁰⁸ The framework of Turkish foreign policy was mainly determined by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.²⁰⁹ Between 1919 and 1923, the necessity of a free and independent state to ensure national and economic growth was emphasized, and the way of dialogue that would establish diplomatic relations with other states were kept open.²¹⁰ In the period of the 1923-1930, the Republic of Turkey was primarily concerned with the remaining issues from the Treaty of Lausanne in foreign policy. The population exchange with Greece, debts with France, and the issue of Mosul with Britain which had not been resolved in Lausanne, came up with peaceful solutions.²¹¹ After 1923, because the Turkish foreign policy was carried out under the influence of the national struggle and the Treaty of Lausanne, it was generally implemented according to the attitudes of the countries that had to be in one-to-one relations rather than the general condition of international relations.²¹²

In the 1930s, while many economic and political problems began to be experienced all over the world, Turkey tried to maintain its relations with other countries in accordance with the developments in the international arena. Turkey joined the League of Nations in 1932 and played an important role in the establishment of the Balkan Entente on February 9, 1934. Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 caused

²⁰⁷ Feroz Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, trans. Yavuz Alogan (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1995), 79; Lewis, 264.

²⁰⁸ Atatürk, *Nutuk*, 601-612; Ahmad, 1995, 80-81; Karpas, 2010, 128-129.

²⁰⁹ Oran, 2009, 74.

²¹⁰ Mehmet Gönlübol and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Atatürk Dönemi Türk Dış Politikasına Genel Bir Bakış," *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* 1, no:2 (1985): 454-456.

²¹¹ Gülnihal Bozkurt, "Atatürk Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası," *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayını* (2003): 920.

²¹² Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, *Atatürk ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası (1919-1938)* (Ankara: Diyanet Vakfı Matbaası, 2013): 104.

a new problem in the Mediterranean, which led to cooperation with Britain within the framework of the Mediterranean Pact. Then, the Treaty of Saadabad was signed in 1937. After 1935, upon polarization between revisionist and anti-revisionist states accelerated and tension increased, the status of the Straits due to threat perception came to an alarming situation for Turkey and raised the willingness to revise the regime. The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits signed on July 20, 1936 provided Turkey with full sovereignty over the Straits.²¹³

Turkey conducted a multidimensional foreign policy in the 1930s. On the one hand, the problems with the Western countries were solved to a great extent, on the other hand, although Mustafa Kemal was aiming for westernization, dialogues with the Soviets continued. As an independent state in the international arena, Turkey's main goal became to sustain this position in a peaceful way.²¹⁴ When Atatürk died and İsmet İnönü became president, he was preoccupied with the issues that the world was dragged into a war, foreign relations were unstable and unfounded, and a peace order was required in domestic politics. Indeed, İnönü's presidency passed on dealing with the issues surrounding the World War II, which started shortly after he took office. He prevented the recurrence of the national catastrophe resulting from the country's involvement in WWI and managed to stay out of the second one with the diplomacy he sustained.²¹⁵

3.2. Bilateral Relations in the Republicans Era

Mutual peaceful policies pursued by the American Presidents Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover, and Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in foreign policy resulted in amicable relations during this period. In 1928, the nations agreed via the Kellogg-Briand Pact to use peaceful means instead of war as a way to solve problems. Focused on maintaining peace through international cooperation and disarmament conferences, American foreign policy avoided any commitment alongside peace

²¹³ Gönlübol and Kürkçüoğlu, 1985, 460-461.

²¹⁴ Gönlübol and Sar, 2013, 104.

²¹⁵ Aydemir, 1999, 33.

advocacy and sustained its isolationist identity to some extent.²¹⁶ Mustafa Kemal's foreign policy was also peaceful. His primary purpose was to ensure the independence and interests of the Republic by gaining the trust and respect of other nations, but in doing so he was neither expansionist nor aggressive. After resolving the remaining problems from the Lausanne Treaty, the President implemented an active and peaceful foreign policy, which entered into bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

3.2.1. Initiation of Diplomatic Relations

Since Ottoman-American diplomatic relations were severed in 1917, both nations faced with the new post-war order. On the one hand, Turkey, which successfully terminated the period of national movement, took a step to modernize the institutions left over from the Ottoman Empire by declaring the republic. On the other hand, the United States first emerged from the Great War as a world leader and enjoyed a prosperous decade with the leadership of the Republicans, then struggled with economic problems at home. The signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 enabled the signatory nations to recognize the new Turkish government and initiate diplomatic relations. In Lausanne, on August 6, 1923, the U.S. and Turkish delegations also signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce, and an Extradition Treaty. The Amity and Commerce Treaty intended to establish good relations between the two countries and to restart diplomatic and consular relations; however, it had disappointing provisions for the American people such as the abrogation of the capitulations and no provisions regarding minorities. Other than this, the treaty warranted the free trade and navigation, authorized individuals to settle and establish business within the framework of the reciprocity principle, and right of passage through the Straits for the American vessels. Unfortunately, the Senate rejected the treaty on January 18, 1927,²¹⁷ hence official relations could not begin between the two countries and the question of how to establish official relations came to a boil.

While the American press criticized the Senate's refusal to ratify the treaty, the Turkish press was moderate as it received instructions from the government not to be

²¹⁶ Yılmaz, 2015, 62.

²¹⁷ DeNovo, 1968, 128; Trask, 1971, 30-36; Howard, 1976, 301.

harsh on this issue.²¹⁸ The news appeared in the leading American press such as: “Our only suggestion is that this young republic [Turkey] show that what she has written into law she intends to carry into effect, and make manifest, even to those who have opposed the treaty, the seriousness and honesty of her purpose.” in *New York Times*; “We must learn to deal with modern Turkey on equal terms and to meet problems of citizenship one by one by negotiation, just as we do where other independent nations.” in *New York World*; “Rejection by the Senate of the Lausanne Treaty with Turkey was a rather absurd performance.” in *Philadelphia Public Ledger*; “The defeat of the Lausanne Treaty in the Senate is nothing less than a disgrace.” in *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*; “In rejecting the Lausanne Treaty with Turkey a minority in the Senate sacrificed commonsense diplomacy to ancient prejudices and rancors.” in *New York Herald-Tribune*.²¹⁹ Moreover, the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet*, after explaining the situation regarding the Senate's refusal of the treaty, stated that “The President is absolutely responsible for foreign relations. Therefore, if he believes the entering into relations with Turkey to be absolutely necessary he may do this even without a treaty.”²²⁰

So the President Coolidge agreed with the press that on January 18, the same day as the Senate’s decision, the Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg sent a telegram to the American High Commissioner in İstanbul, Admiral Mark Bristol,²²¹ asking him

²¹⁸ *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927*, Volume III, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 2018), Document 731.

²¹⁹ Cited in FRUS 1927, Document 724.

²²⁰ Cited in FRUS, 1927, Document, 725.

²²¹ Admiral Mark Bristol was appointed as Senior Naval Officer to İstanbul after the Armistice of Mudros (October 30, 1918) and was appointed as High Commissioner in August 1919. He recorded in his diary what he observed between 1919 and 1927, when he served in Turkey. He found that the anti-Turkish propaganda carried out in the United States did not reflect the truth; therefore he was accused of being a Turkish lover. In addition to providing charitable institutions and missionaries in Turkey to maintain their presence, he prevented them from getting involved in politics and pointed out that American schools would operate in accordance with the Turkish law. He wanted missionary organizations to be careful, stating that Turkey became an independent and sovereign country, and that capitulatory protections disappeared. He also sought the approval of the Turco-American Treaty signed in Lausanne in the Senate. Hikmet Öksüz and İsmail Köse, *ABD Yüksek Komiseri Amiral Bristol'un*

to explain to İsmet Pasha and Foreign Affairs Minister Tevfik Rüşti Bey that the Senate's refusal did not mean that the United States was reluctant to maintain friendly relations with the current Turkish government. Kellogg instructed Bristol to convey that the U.S. government would not want to disrupt the cordial relations that advanced in recent years with Turkey, and the government wanted to establish diplomatic relations with Turkey through the exchange of notes. Kellogg advised Bristol to keep the instructions confidential, and tell the Turkish authorities that his investigations were personal and informal.²²² Meanwhile, the Turkish government did not enter into diplomatic relations with other countries until the finalization of the exchange of ratification of treaties of amity. Although Bristol was concerned about this detail,²²³ the Secretary of State was hopeful.²²⁴

Bristol's meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs,²²⁵ then with Prime Minister İsmet İnönü,²²⁶ and giving a memorandum of American goodwill made the officials grateful. At the same time, Bristol explored the possibility of resubmission of the treaty to the Senate, but learned from Kellogg that this was not possible. The Turkish representatives in these meetings opposed the idea of exchanging notes, instead offered to start diplomatic relations by signing a simple amity treaty.²²⁷ The American side did not lean towards the Turkish proposal because the new treaty would either delay or not make the resumption of bilateral relations possible, as it would still require the consent of the two-thirds of the Senate.²²⁸ Although Tevfik Rüşti was

Rapor ve Savaş Günlüklerinde Ermeni Meselesi: (1919-1927) (Trabzon: Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2015), 327-338.

²²² FRUS, 1927, Document 721.

²²³ FRUS, 1927, Document 722.

²²⁴ FRUS, 1927, Document 723.

²²⁵ FRUS, 1927, Document 727.

²²⁶ FRUS, 1927, Document 733.

²²⁷ FRUS, 1927, Document 731.

²²⁸ FRUS, 1927, Document 734.

sympathetic to the American proposal, he was concerned about whether the method of establishing relations with the exchange of notes was in line with the international law.²²⁹ Kellogg clarified the issue that it was sufficient to accredit the letters of credence of Ambassadors and Ministers by the President to establish official relations.²³⁰ Finally, diplomatic and consular relations were established through exchange of notes, a *modus vivendi*,²³¹ on February 17. The notes also referred to the Turco-American Treaty of 1923, and some articles were updated in case of its ratification in the Senate before June 1, 1928.²³² On the same day, the commercial relations between the two countries were once again regulated through exchange of notes, and the current regulation was extended for one year from February 20, 1927.²³³

3.2.2. Appointment of Ambassadors

President Coolidge appointed Joseph Clark Grew, who had signed the Amity and Commerce Treaty with Turkish delegation in Lausanne, as American ambassador to Ankara on May 20.²³⁴ Grew, his wife and two daughters left New York on July 31, 1927, and arrived in İstanbul on September 18. In those years, although the Turkish government expected all embassies to settle down in Ankara, the foreign representatives were not yet able to adapt to the capital, residing in İstanbul and going to Ankara in the times of meeting and important ceremonies resulted in frequent train travels. The new ambassador also continued to live in İstanbul during his duty.²³⁵

²²⁹ FRUS, 1927, Document 735.

²³⁰ FRUS, 1927, Document 736; FRUS, 1927, Document 741.

²³¹ A temporary or provisional agreement, this is an older term for what is now more usually styled an interim agreement. Geoff R. Berridge and Alan James, *A Dictionary of Diplomacy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 176.

²³² FRUS, 1927, Document 745.

²³³ FRUS, 1927, Document 748; Fahir Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), 110.

²³⁴ FRUS, 1927, Document 759.

²³⁵ Yılmaz, 2015, 64; Heinrichs, 1986, 129; Grew, 1999, 23-24.

A few days after his arrival, Grew went to meet with Tevfik Rüştü in Ankara. During the meeting with the Minister in mutual good intentions, Admiral Bristol was praised for raising bilateral relations to the successful point of that day. Since Grew had been the official who negotiated the Turco-American treaty with the Turkish delegation in Lausanne, his appointment pleased the government due to his being experienced in Turkish-American relations.²³⁶ The ambassador, who presented his letter of credence to President Mustafa Kemal on October 12, and met with him for the first time on this occasion, stated that he was impressed by the expression of strength and determination on the President's face. A few days later, on October 15, the first day of the historical six-day speech of Atatürk, the new ambassador took his place in the diplomatic loge, and after a while he witnessed the first census of the Republic on October 28.²³⁷

When American Ambassador Grew was appointed to Turkey, Turkey also assigned Ahmet Muhtar Bey as ambassador to Washington.²³⁸ Although it had been two months since Grew arrived in Turkey, Ahmet Muhtar Bey had not yet left the country in November. Considering that the American Senate would meet on December 6, the absence of the Turkish Ambassador could put the American Ambassador's approval of appointment into trouble. After Grew expressed his concern, Ahmet Muhtar Bey was instructed to leave the country immediately by Tevfik Rüştü Bey, and arrived in America on November 28. However, The Turkish ambassador was not welcomed because James Gerard, the former American ambassador to Germany, opposed the resumption of diplomatic relations with Turkey, and made anti-Turkish propaganda in the press claiming that the Turkish ambassador was responsible for the deaths of thirty thousand Armenians in WWI. Therefore, to avoid the possible risk of assassination, the Ambassador was taken off the ship *Leviathan*, and was accompanied by armed motorcycle police. The Secretary of State had taken measures to welcome

²³⁶ FRUS, 1927, Document 758; Grew, 1999, 29-30.

²³⁷ Grew, 1999, 44-48.

²³⁸ FRUS, 1927, Document 761-762.

the ambassador in New York and to take him to Washington under protection. On December 5, President Coolidge accepted Ahmet Muhtar Bey's credentials.²³⁹

Those who opposed the arrival of Ahmet Muhtar were objected to the resumption of official relations between the two states, trying to maintain the "Terrible Turk" stereotype in the United States. Greeks and Armenians, who had immigrated extensively to the United States since the end of the 19th century, revealed this image "as an ignorant, barbaric, fanatic figure"²⁴⁰ in the U.S. with the stories they brought with them, of the persecution and massacre of the Christian population by the Ottomans, and the behavior of the Turks against Armenians in the 1890s and 1915. These Armenian groups, with the support of some missionaries, were deemed to be an obstacle in Turkish-American relations in the 1920s.

The anti-Turkish propaganda first objected the Turco-American Treaty signed in Lausanne because of the lack of an Armenian homeland provision and other capitulations, therefore prevented it from being approved by the Senate.²⁴¹ Among those who supported the ratification of the Treaty were the leading members of the State Department such as the Secretary of State Charles Hughes, his successor Frank Kellogg, ambassador Joseph Clarke Grew, High Commissioner Mark Bristol, Senator William Borah, and American businessmen and organizations that had interests in Turkey. Among those opposed were Henry Morgenthau,²⁴² a former ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Senators William King and Claude Swanson, James Gerard, a

²³⁹ Grew, 1999, 58-59.

²⁴⁰ John M. Vander Lippe, "The Other Treaty Of Lausanne: The American Public And Official Debate On Turkish-American Relations," *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations* XXIII, no. 23 (1993): 35.

²⁴¹ Bryson, 75-77; Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "Challenging the Stereotypes: Turkish-American Relations in the Inter-War Era," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 2 (2006): 224; Roger R. Trask, "The Terrible Turk and Turkish-American Relations in the Interwar Period," *The Historian* 33, no. 1 (November 1970): 40.

²⁴² Henry Morgenthau, who served as the U.S. ambassador to İstanbul between 1913 and 1916, published his observations in his diary titled *Secret's of the Bosphorus* (1918). According to Köse's research, there are inconsistencies between what Morgenthau represented in his diary and the U.S. State Archive; in his memoirs, reports he sent to the U.S. Department, news he published in European and American newspapers, it is revealed that he acted biased, handled events according to his own fiction, and took a racist approach to Turks and Germans. İsmail Köse, "Amerika'nın İstanbul Büyükelçisi H. Morgenthau'nun Türk Algısı," *Tarih Dergisi* 2, no. 56 (2013): 56-58.

former ambassador to Germany, David Hunter Miller, and Vahan Cardashian, a lawyer from New York City. Gerard, Miller and Cardashian founded the Committee for the Independence of Armenia in 1918 and the Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty in 1923.²⁴³ Since the Armenians and their supporters still regarded the U.S. as a key to obtain an Armenian homeland in Turkey, they showed an effort to prevent Turkish-American relations' development.

The anti-Turkish movement protested the initiation of the official relations between the two nations. The United States and the Ottoman Empire first established diplomatic relations with the Treaty of 1830, and so the U.S. gained capitulatory rights similar to the rights and privileges granted to the European countries, including the permission to establish missions, schools, and hospital within the borders of the Empire. This treaty was the basis for bilateral relations until the Ottoman Empire announced in 1914 that it had abolished all capitulations.²⁴⁴ Although the new Turkish Republic was very different from the Ottoman era with its political, social, secular transformation, most Americans assumed that these revolutionary changes would be short-lived, and did not show much evidence that Turkey had essentially changed.²⁴⁵ Actually, most Americans knew little about Turkey in the 1920s, the capital was still thought to be İstanbul as Constantinople, women were thought to live in harems, and the Turkish people were seen as oriental in disguise and attitude, very different from Europeans.²⁴⁶ The memoirs of Selma Ekrem, a Turkish woman who visited America in the 1920s, and the results of an academic survey conducted among one hundred Princeton students in 1932, were evidences of prejudices against the Turks. Selma Ekrem recounted that Americans depict the Turks as “a huge person with fierce black eyes and bushy eye-brows, carrying daggers covered with blood.”²⁴⁷ As cited in Yılmaz (2015)'s work which is based on a survey, Princeton students, on the other

²⁴³ Lippe, 1993, 50.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 32.

²⁴⁵ Trask, 1970, 41.

²⁴⁶ Harris and Criss, 2009, 147.

²⁴⁷ Yılmaz, 2006, 224; Trask, 1970, 43.

hand, described the Turks mostly as “cruel, very religious and treacherous” among eighty-four adjectives assigned to them.²⁴⁸

In order to improve the image of the Turks in the U.S., important figures such as Admiral Bristol, who served in Turkey during the period when official relations were cut off; the first American ambassador to Turkey, Grew and his successor Sherill; the first Turkish ambassador to Washington Ahmet Muhtar, and his successor Münir Ertegun all tried to eliminate the “terrible Turk” stereotype. Bristol was worried about the wrong ideas about Turks and the new government, and he urged Turkish officials to change the American public opinion, and tried to inform Americans visiting Turkey about the Turks positively.²⁴⁹ Ahmet Muhtar, who was proficient in French but not able to speak English, he resolved the press problem with a well English-speaking Turkish secretary.²⁵⁰ Later, he met with the newly organized American Friends of Turkey²⁵¹ association from time to time, and explained Atatürk’s revolutions in English via the texts prepared by his staff, and he managed to appear in the American press several times.²⁵² While serving in Turkey in the 1927-1932 period, Grew witnessed the country’s significant transformation years, appreciated the reform movements, quickly adapted to the transition to the Latin letters, and immediately changed the embassy’s plate to the new alphabet. He tried to dissipate the Turkish opposition by publishing the articles of Turkish officials in the American press. His successor, Charles Hichcoch Sherill, despite his short-term mission in Turkey, wrote a book titled *A Year’s Embassy to Mustapha Kemal* (1934), praising Atatürk and his

²⁴⁸ Yılmaz, 2006, 224-225.

²⁴⁹ Trask, 1970, 44-45.

²⁵⁰ Harris and Criss, 2009, 158.

²⁵¹ The association was founded by “Asa K. Jennings, formerly Secretary of the International Committee of the Young Men’s Christian Association in Turkey” and Amiral Bristol. It strengthened in 1932 with Admiral Bristol’s becoming president. At the celebrations of Republic Days on October 29, the Turkish ambassador had the opportunity to give speeches, and thereby reached a large number of Americans via the press. The meeting, which was held to celebrate the tenth year of the Republic, also received messages from President Roosevelt and Atatürk. The works of American Friends of Turkey significantly helped the development of Turkish-American friendship in the United States. Trask, 1970, 48-50.

²⁵² Harris and Criss, 2009, 158.

revolutions, and attempted to provide information about Turkish progress through his speeches.²⁵³ The efforts of both Turkish and Americans to improve the Turkish image in the U.S. eventually yielded results, and during the Republican era Turkish-American relations progressed amicably, resulting in two official treaties.

3.2.3. American Schools in Turkey

Despite not yet been approved by the Senate,²⁵⁴ Grew began his term in Turkey and clarified his goal of being in the country as providing support to the legitimate interests of America, ensuring the development and strengthening the friendliest relations between the two countries.²⁵⁵ His close relations with Prime Minister İsmet Pasha from the Lausanne days, “the firm, central direction and peaceful objectives of Turkish policy and the favorable international climate”²⁵⁶ facilitated Grew’s task. The American schools in Turkey were the first of the issues the Ambassador had to deal with.

Since 1886, American schools had been officially recognized in Turkey where bilingual education - Turkish and English - had been provided, and French had been including in the curriculum at high school level. During the years of the WWI, only the schools of the states that were allies of Turkey were allowed to operate, and therefore certain American schools were closed. According to the annual report of the American Board of 1921, in western Turkey 2 colleges with 503 students, 4 secondary/middle schools with 724 students, 7 primary/elementary/other schools with 503 pupils; in central Turkey, 3 colleges with 79 students, 4 secondary/middle schools with 448 students, 5 primary/elementary/other schools with 1075 pupils were

²⁵³ Yılmaz, 2006, 227.

²⁵⁴ The appointment of Grew was approved by the Senate on April 6, 1928. Grew, 86-87; FRUS, 1928, Document 775. In December 1927, opponents of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in Lausanne condemned the exchange of notes and ambassadors as a executive attempt to circumvent the Senate and establish relations on the basis of Lausanne without a treaty. Heinrichs, 1986, 133.

²⁵⁵ Grew, 1999, 34.

²⁵⁶ Heinrichs, 1986, 131-132.

educated,²⁵⁷ and many schools were waiting to reopen. The issue was resolved in the Convention Respecting Conditions of Residence and Business and Jurisdiction signed in Lausanne and in additional letters.²⁵⁸ İsmet Pasha in his letter dated August 4, 1923 declared:

I have the honour to declare, in the name of my Government, that the latter will recognize the existence of (British, French, Italian) religious, scholastic and medical establishments, as well as of charitable institutions recognized as existing in Turkey before the 30th October, 1914, and that it will favorably examine the case of other similar (British, French, Italian) institutions actually existing in Turkey at the date of the Treaty of Peace signed today, with a view to regularize their position. The establishments and institutions mentioned above will, as regards fiscal charges of every kind, be treated on a footing of equality with similar Turkish establishments and institutions, and will be subject to the administrative arrangements of a public character, as well as to the laws and regulations, governing the latter. It is, however, understood that the Turkish Government will take into account the conditions under which these establishments carry on their work, and, in so far as schools are concerned, the practical organization of their teaching arrangements.²⁵⁹

In other words, the religious, educational, health and charitable institutions of these three countries in Turkey were recognized; they would be treated equally with the Turkish institutions in monetary terms, and would be bound by Turkish laws and regulations. İsmet Pasha also transmit this letter to the U.S. observer Grew.²⁶⁰ Based on İsmet Pasha's letter,²⁶¹ the American Board applied to the Minister of Education on May 1, 1925, but it did not receive a positive result. After the resumption of the

²⁵⁷ The One Hundred and Fifteenth Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Boston, 1921, 4.

²⁵⁸ Oran, 2009, 234.

²⁵⁹ *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923*, Volume II, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1938), Document 959.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ According to the Professor Fahir Armaoğlu, Turkey is not legally bound by this letter. Since the letter sent by İsmet Pasha was sent as part of the treaty of amity and commerce to be signed on August 6, and later because the treaty was not approved in the Senate, the letter became invalid. Armaoğlu, 1997, 10-11.

diplomatic relations between Turkey and the United States, a new application was filed to the Ministry of Education in March 1927. The ministry sent the application to the Educational Council with the idea that opening these schools would be beneficial, and at the same time consulted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and received a reply that there was no obstacle or political danger for reopening of the schools. However, no steps were taken in this regard.²⁶²

Ambassador Grew unofficially conveyed his support to Tevfik Rüştü for the reopening of American schools in the Anatolian cities, Antep, Sivas and Kayseri, which had been closed since the Great War, and the reopening of schools in Talas and Maraş whose personnel were already waiting to start their duties.²⁶³ Kellogg, by the way, advised him not to hold any formal talks about the schools with the Minister, however he supported such informal initiatives with reference to İsmet Pasha's letter or the exchange of notes of 1927.²⁶⁴ Tevfik Rüştü Bey articulated that as the issue was under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education he could not intervene, but he would give his personal support to the issue while discussing the cabinet meeting, and yet, since it was against the government policy to allow foreign schools in particular regions, it would probably be not possible to open all these schools.²⁶⁵

Upon the official application of the American Board dated November 3 regarding issue, in his response on November 13, Tevfik Rüştü Bey mentioned the appointment of a representative to discuss the details of the purchase of the properties of American schools.²⁶⁶ This response came as a surprise to the American side, as such a purchase had not been mentioned before. According to the information that Grew obtained about the purchase of foreign schools as a result of his correspondence with other embassies, the French Catholic schools in Anatolia had been sold to the Turkish government, and other than these Catholic schools there were French schools

²⁶² FRUS, 1927, Document 765, Enclosure 1.

²⁶³ FRUS, 1927, Document 763.

²⁶⁴ FRUS, 1927, Document 764.

²⁶⁵ Grew, 1999, 57-58.

²⁶⁶ FRUS, 1927, Document 765, Enclosure 2.

operating in İstanbul, İzmir and Konya. In addition, the French Embassy made an official application to reopen certain French schools, but had not yet received any results. The Italian and the British embassies reported no problem. The Italian Embassy stated that there were no problems with Italian schools in Turkey, except for the usual minor problems. The British Embassy informed that there were three British schools in Turkey, all in İstanbul, and that they did not apply to the Turkish government because they had no schools closed during the war. Lastly, the German Embassy instructed about their intention to end all school activities in this country. At this stage, Grew was not in favor of officially requesting the reopening of schools, he left this to the American Board,²⁶⁷ and noted that if the Turks did not want American schools and other institutions in their country, it was not his job to force them; the days of capitulation were long past.²⁶⁸

The head of the Ministry of Education responsible for foreign schools was the “highly nationalist”²⁶⁹ Necati Bey, and he was not as moderate as Tefik Rüşti.²⁷⁰ For instance, he did not want to deal in any way with the Bible House, which printed religious books in Turkey at the time, because he saw them as a Christian missionary propaganda institution.²⁷¹ According to Grew, an incident took place on January 22, 1928 which would delight Necati Bey. Upon news spread that three Turkish girls studying at the American school in Bursa, a girls’ high school with 144 students,²⁷² had converted from Islam to Christianity. The Turkish authorities launched an investigation and seized the girls’ diaries which were stolen by their classmates and handed over to a teacher. The news took place widely in the Turkish press and what

²⁶⁷ FRUS, 1927, Document 765.

²⁶⁸ Grew, 1999, 60.

²⁶⁹ Grew, 1999, 128.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ FRUS, 1927, Document 765; Fahir Armaoğlu, “Türkiye’de Amerikan Okulları Krizi 1927-1928,” *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* XIII, no. 37 (March 1997): 6.

²⁷² Grew, 1999, 68, footnote.

happened was interpreted as a crime of betrayal to the Republic.²⁷³ On January 31, the press released the official statement of the Ministry of Education, stating that active religious propaganda was strictly carried out at the American school in Bursa and therefore the school would be closed and legal action would be taken against those who were responsible. As Grew learned from the Americans just returned from Bursa, Ms. Sanderson, one of the teachers, had given informal lectures on Christianity and the Bible to some of the girls at the school and she had accepted full responsibility for the accusations.²⁷⁴ According to the research carried out by the Americans consisting of Mr. Goodsell, Field Secretary of the Turkish Mission for the American Board, Mr. Hare, Vice Consul, and Ms. King, correspondent of the Associated Press, Ms. Sanderson's happy nature and serenity prompted these students to ask how she had these desirable qualities, and thus led the teacher to give informal conferences about Christianity and led girls to become actively interested in the matter. Girls recorded their conversations with Ms. Sanderson in their diaries and the teacher already admitted the accusations.²⁷⁵

In order to get rid of the negative atmosphere against all American educational institutions in the press, Robert College and Constantinople Women's College officials declared denouncement regarding the incident in Bursa.²⁷⁶ The Secretary of State advised Grew to have an official and friendly contact with the Turkish authorities, and an informal conversation with Tevfik Rüştü Bey and İsmet Pasha, reminding him that this was not an instruction.²⁷⁷ Grew, on the other hand, preferred to remain silent for a while because he thought it was too early for diplomatic intervention; any contact to be made could be perceived as intervention and the

²⁷³ *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928*, Volume III, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 2018), Document 798; Grew, 1999, 68-69.

²⁷⁴ FRUS, 1928, Document 799.

²⁷⁵ FRUS, 1928, Document 801.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ FRUS, 1928, Document 800.

allegations were already accurate.²⁷⁸ Mr. Goodsell's pressure to officially deal with the issue did not discourage him either.²⁷⁹

In his telegram to the Secretary, Grew mentioned his investigation about the legal basis of the prohibition of religious propaganda in the schools and stated that he could not find a legal basis other than the provision in the Civil Law that the child's religious upbringing belongs to the parents.²⁸⁰ He learned from Mr. Goodsell that the Ministry of Education had foreign schools sign a commitment to this issue. Goodsell also said he did not know of a Turkish law prohibiting religious propaganda in schools.²⁸¹ In fact, the situation was related to the transition to a secular education. By the law of March 3, 1924, all *madrasahs*, Muslim theological schools, and other schools in Turkey were united under the Ministry of Education, and to raise religious officials the opening of theological faculties in universities was determined.²⁸² In the same year, the Ministry of Education closed the *madrasahs* that offered religious education. Instead firstly opened a Theological Faculty at İstanbul University and then opened *imam* and *hatip* schools to lay the groundwork for the faculty. As the government aimed a secular education, the Ministry removed religious lessons from the curriculum gradually. The administrators showed great diligence in implementing the secular principles adopted in Turkish state schools in the same way as in foreign schools. With the circular sent to all foreign schools in the country, it was notified that the education based on religious principles and religious propaganda was prohibited and foreign schools that did not comply with this rule would be closed.²⁸³

Finally, after a two-week silence, Grew had a meeting with Tefik Rüşti Bey about the incident. In this meeting, the Minister told Grew about intimate issues such

²⁷⁸ Grew, 1999, 71.

²⁷⁹ FRUS, 1928, Document 802.

²⁸⁰ FRUS, 1928, Document 801.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² "Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanunu," Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi, accessed January 2, 2021, [229 \(mevzuat.gov.tr\)](http://229.mevzuat.gov.tr).

²⁸³ Mehmet Okur, "Milli Mücadele ve Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Milli ve Modern Bir Eğitim Sistemi Oluşturma Çabaları," *Atatürk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimleri Enstitüsü Dergisi* 5, no. 1 (2005): 209-210.

as that Bursa had a fanatical mass of people who were sensitive to religious matters that opposed recent secular regulations, and even sent their own candidate to the Assembly instead of the government's candidate in the last elections, and stated that it was necessary to close the American school in Bursa in the face of the Christian propaganda incident. The minister went forward and stated that the school could be reopened after the public turmoil calmed down. The Ambassador asked the Minister to appease the Turkish press and stop the polemics against the American schools in public, stating that the Turkish-American relationship could be damaged if the hostile attitude of the Turkish press continued, also requested not to take the responsible teachers to court.²⁸⁴ A few days later, on February 10, accepting that he exceeded his authority in the previous meeting; Tevfik Rüştü updated his statements, and explained that under any circumstances the cabinet had no intention to reopen the school in Bursa. The minister also added that the government had documentary evidence about some other American schools, but the evidence would be filed and the Ministry of Education would continue to be benevolent towards American schools. In addition, he mentioned the possibility of reopening schools in Talas and Maraş.²⁸⁵ Grew wrote in his diary that the Minister's correction was both unpleasant and embarrassing for him.²⁸⁶ Kellogg was also dissatisfied with the correction that, in his telegram dated February 14, he suggested Grew using the following arguments if needed:

(1) This incident furnishes the best kind of ammunition to Turkey's opponents in this country. (2) Trying in a Turkish court on a charge of carrying on Christian propaganda of three American women will do much to convince the American public of Turkey's still being fanatically Moslem. (3) This incident possesses tremendous value as news and will deeply impress all church circles and women's organizations. (4) Yesterday a Congressman, calling at the Department, showed three telegrams he had received about the trial of the three women missionaries. As these telegrams may well be the

²⁸⁴ Grew, 1999, 72-75; FRUS, 1928, Document 803.

²⁸⁵ FRUS, 1928, Document 805.

²⁸⁶ Grew, 1999, 76-77.

forerunner of many such messages, Congressional opinion cannot fail to be influenced by them.²⁸⁷

The Secretary, although so far had tried to stay out of the issue of American schools and advised Grew to hold informal talks with the Turkish authorities, hardened his attitude with the telegram dated February 14. On the same date, the first hearing of the trial against the teachers at the school in Bursa, Jeannie Jillson, Ms. Sanderson and Lucille Day, who were charged with the violation of school regulations, was held, four student witnesses were heard, and the hearing was postponed until March 5. Mr. Goodsell interpreted the delay as good for the public to calm down.²⁸⁸

On February 21, Grew visited İsmet Pasha to discuss about American schools. A good gesture by the Turkish government would have a positive impact in the United States; accepting immediately the opening one or two American school in Turkey would be welcomed by the American government, and would be effective to show that the Turkish government was against religious propaganda, not the American schools. As a result of his negotiations regarding the American schools with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Education, İsmet Pasha talked about his opinion that at least one of the schools could be reopened, and the Ministry of Education would decide on. At this point, the Ambassador reminded the schools in Talas and Maraş, whose staff were ready.²⁸⁹ With the decision of the Ministry of Education to reopen the boys' school in Sivas and to add a vocational part to the school in Merzifon, Grew thought he found the gesture he wished for.²⁹⁰ However, he soon learned that the school in Sivas was rented to the Ministry of Health for five years, so it was not possible to open until 1930; again, one of the conditions required for the reopening of this school was that it had to be opened in September 1928. Moreover, the fact that the Ministry of Education had previously requested a technical curriculum for the school in Merzifon, and that the new permission was not a compromise, made Grew think

²⁸⁷ FRUS, 1928, Document 806.

²⁸⁸ FRUS, 1928, Document 8067; Grew, 1999, 75.

²⁸⁹ FRUS, 1928, Document 811; Grew, 1999, 79-80.

²⁹⁰ Grew, 1999, 81.

that Necati Bey was implementing a tactic in which he carried out the impossible gesture.²⁹¹

While the school incident in Bursa was not solved yet, a new school incident occurred in İstanbul in March. According to the Dean of Robert Girls College in İstanbul, two children aged ten, one Greek and one Maltese, drilled holes in the Turkish map hanging in the study hall and uttered some humiliating words about Turkey. Certain Turkish students reported what had happened to the newspaper *Milliyet*. The students were immediately expelled from the school by the administration, and the police came to the school to investigate the incident. Grew considered the expulsion of two young children from school as a heavy punishment for their irresponsible acts, but noted that a lighter sentence would endanger the future of the school. The school incident in İstanbul, which the Ambassador explained in his diary, did not take place in the American official records.²⁹²

Three American teachers who were tried for making religious propaganda in the American school in Bursa were found guilty on April 30, and sentenced to three days in prison and three liras each. The application for a suspension of the sentence was rejected, but because of the defendants were women and this was their first crime, prison sentences were allowed to be served at their own residences. The lawyer of the American side, Ali Haydar Bey²⁹³ appeal the case to the Court of Appeal, and therefore the serving of the sentences was suspended. The teachers could leave the country without serving their sentence if they wished, and Ms. Sanderson left. If the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, teachers would have to serve their sentences when they return to Turkey.²⁹⁴

While Grew notified the Court's decision to the Secretary of State, he commented that the teachers were not fairly tried according to the evidence; either they tried by direct instruction from Ankara or the Judge's attitude to avoid to put the

²⁹¹ Grew, 1999, 81-83.

²⁹² Ibid., 85; Armaoğlu, 1997, 23-24.

²⁹³ FRUS, 1928, Document 805.

²⁹⁴ FRUS, 1928, Document 812.

Ministry of Education in an embarrassing situation with decision of the acquittal. He also attributed the growth of the Bursa event to what Tevfik Rüştü Bey had told him about the city and the people.²⁹⁵ Referring to the article written by Avni Bey²⁹⁶ the Turkish magazine *Hayat*, the Ambassador attributed the main issue to cultural nationalism, arguing that Christianity was insignificant for a secular irreligious government. Even discussing with the students about Christianity, let alone conversion, was to distract the sensitive youth from spiritual loyalty to the Turkish state, he claimed.²⁹⁷ In the Turkish magazine, foreign schools were depicted as institutions that distanced the Turkish youth from their society and carried them to a foreign ideal. It was stated by Avni Bey that especially the children of rich and important families attending foreign schools caused class education which was extremely harmful for a democracy, and that the children of the wealthy receiving a different education from the general public was a sociological mistake.²⁹⁸ The educational ideals of some of the higher classes were determined as foreign language, piano and social behavior, and it was claimed that the outer splendor of schools affected parents. Saying that the character was largely a matter of nationality, it was shaped, for better or worse, in its own national environment, continuing that a foreign school shaped a character only according to foreign ideals and it was harmful to national Turkish ideals, the author asked the families: “Should not the families who are giving their children to foreign schools think that they are by their own hands doing away with the probability that their children may become great Turks in the future?”²⁹⁹

In the telegram dated May 8, Grew notified the Department about the Bursa incident and made long evaluations. Despite all these negative views and the fact that Minister of Education Necati Bey was against foreign institutions, Grew did not

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ İdris Yücel, “Yabancı Okullar ve Kültürel Milliyetçilik: Bursa Amerikan Kız Koleji Tanassur Hadisesi (1928),” *Belleten* LXXX, no.287 (April 2016): 307.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

consider the Bursa case a calculated step towards the gradual closure of foreign schools as a whole. Because, at least currently, Turkey needed foreign schools; even though the country's education system continued to evolve slowly, the funds were insufficient to establish adequate schools to serve the nation's youth and to create a staff of trained teachers. Grew also added the Field Secretary of the Turkish Mission for the American Board Mr. Goodsell's comments about the situation in the telegram. Mr. Goodsell was extremely discouraged by the Bursa decision and considered the question of the possible withdrawal of the Turkish mission from the country. He was tired of the Turkish authorities' large or small demands; one of the largest demands was that the school in Merzifon should hold its classes on Sunday. It required only to certain classes with Turkish teachers, and since it was not applied to other schools, it was believed to be only a local arrangement, which was tolerated for then but could not be allowed to continue indefinitely. In addition, the requirement to pay the Turkish teachers in American schools at the same rate as the Americans in certain regions, and in some regions, direct assignment without allowing schools to select or nominate Turkish teachers were some of the problems. Finally, Goodsell noted that the attitude of the Bursa people towards American teachers had changed completely since the beginning of the trial, and turned into a friendly behavior, and even some Turkish friends of the teachers saying that they prayed for their acquittal.³⁰⁰

Throughout 1928, the developments regarding American schools continued, but over time it ceased to be on the agenda. On August 20, the Turkish government verbally permitted to reopen the American school in Talas,³⁰¹ in addition, on August 30 the Court of Appeal annulled the verdict against the American teachers of the Bursa School, and decided to hear this case again.³⁰² On September 26, the Bursa Court upheld the original conviction and sentence of American teachers, and the case

³⁰⁰ Ibid; Grew, 1999, 94-97.

³⁰¹ FRUS, 1928, Document 813; Grew, 1999, 104.

³⁰² FRUS, 1928, Document 814.

appealed again.³⁰³ Grew thought the trials would last forever.³⁰⁴ The American Board's petition to reopen the school in Bursa in October was rejected by the Ministry of Education.³⁰⁵ At the end of almost a year, the issue of reopening of schools for the U.S. did not make much progress; the school in Bursa was closed, another one was reopened in Talas. Apart from these, after the correspondence of Tevfik Rüştü Bey with the American Board regarding the acquisition of American schools, Grew requested an appointment to start the negotiations from the Ministry on behalf of the Board, but he did not get any results, and the issue was not referred to in the documents.³⁰⁶

The American school incident in Bursa, which strained the Turkish-American relations in 1928, coincided with two modernization and secularization steps of the Turkish government - the removal of the phrase “religion of the Turkish state is Islam” from the Constitution, and the transition to the Latin alphabet - and proved that Islam was not the enemy, the reaction was given and would be given for any action against the pragmatic, secular, and nationalist culture of the new Turkey. Kellogg and Tevfik Rüştü Bey conducted the crisis in friendly talks, and did not act to cause tension. It is clearly understood from the official documentation that the American foreign policy preferred to leave issues related to schools officially to the American Board in Turkey, and supported them with informal and moderate relations with the Turkish authorities. Ambassador Grew realized that although the Turkish infrastructure was not ready for an education system without the support of foreign institutions, the government policy did not match with foreign schools. Grew thought at the time that the only hopeful approach for the Americans in education was to work closely with the Turkish government and to prepare young people for maximum fitness as citizens of the Republic, completely ignoring religion.³⁰⁷

³⁰³ FRUS, 1928, Document 815.

³⁰⁴ Grew, 1999, 107.

³⁰⁵ FRUS, 1928, Document 816.

³⁰⁶ Grew, 1999, 82.

³⁰⁷ Heinrichs, 1986, 133-135.

On March 5, 1929, the Court of Appeal upheld the three-lira fine and three-day imprisonment of Ms. Sanderson and Ms. Day, who had already left the country, from the American school in Bursa.³⁰⁸ It was not known for certain whether Ms. Jilson, who was still in Turkey, was acquitted.³⁰⁹ In July 1929, Grew reported that the general situation of American educational and charitable institutions in Turkey was improving, that officials in Ankara were friendlier than the previous year, and even the officials of the Ministry of Education began to contact with the Bible House officials. He outlined this change of attitude in several reasons. First, the death of the “fanatical nationalist”³¹⁰ Necati Bey, who was the head the Ministry of Education; second, the growing awareness of the value of foreign schools in the Turkish education system, which needed resources and qualified teachers; third, the inclination of religious tolerance, and this was given the example of what a Scottish Mission School in İstanbul experienced. The director of the school in İstanbul was instructed from his superiors in Scotland to inform the Turkish authorities that the school was essentially supported and maintained as a religious institution, and that it would be closed unless the students were allowed to attend the daily prayers and read the Bible.³¹¹ The Turkish authorities first accepted this request verbally, and when the Scots requested written guarantees, they fulfilled the permission of non-Muslim students to conduct religious education and religious ceremonies in a letter, and notified all schools about the issue with a circular dated May 24, 1929. According to Grew, the last reason for the change in attitude was a decrease in fanatic chauvinism, mostly because of inferiority complex of Turkish authorities. The Turkish government, which greatly controlled its security both inside and outside, calmed the fear of aggression, and allowed non-Muslims to visit Bursa, a home of religious unrest.³¹² In his report, Grew described his position on

³⁰⁸ Grew, 1999, 120.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Ibid., 128.

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Ibid.

issues related to the American schools in Turkey as friendly and informal mediation.³¹³ Based on his experiences, he added that courtesy and patience were very important when dealing with the Turks, and it was necessary to avoid any words or actions that reminded the capitulation regime especially, with high-level officials.³¹⁴

Taxation, in this era, was one of the issues which were related to American schools. In late 1929, tax officers in İstanbul conducted a survey on the income of American education and charities, questioning the amount of their deficits and from what source they were closing this gap.³¹⁵ Grew was concerned that the purpose of this survey could have associated the assessment of these incomes with the Inheritance and Bequest Tax, and expressed his apprehension at length in his unofficial letter to Tevfik Rüştü Bey dated December 24, 1929. The institutions in question received money from their parent organizations in the United States, which controlled and operated them, as managing expenses to cover the deficits and balance the budget. Grew opposed the perception of this money as gifts or bequests.³¹⁶ He touched on many issues such as without the existence of this money, American institutions in Turkey could not survive; despite the reduction of school fees of Turkish students in order to support their education, these institutions should not be punished; Turkish authorities' insisting on applying this tax was contrary to the spirit of Inheritance and Bequest Tax Law.³¹⁷ In his research with embassies of other countries in Turkey, Grew learned that the Turkish tax authorities did not take any steps to impose this tax on the institutions of the British, French, German or Italian, thus these embassies did not take any measures in this regard.³¹⁸

³¹³ Ibid., 129.

³¹⁴ Ibid., 130.

³¹⁵ FRUS, 1930, Document 795.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ Ibid.; Grew, 1999, 172-173.

³¹⁸ FRUS, 1930, Document 797.

On April 2, 1930 a tax of 109,000 Turkish liras was accrued to the Constantinople Women's College through donations and bequests.³¹⁹ Grew, who met the Minister of Foreign Affairs and then the Prime Minister on the issue, stated that İsmet Pasha had discussed the issue with his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, and Minister of Education, while the Minister of Finance who shared the opinion that foreign schools and colleges should be taxed based on the law in question. Yet the Minister of Education did not adopt this view and that the issue would be discussed at the Council of State. The matter would not be able to come to the Counsel for a while, but İsmet Pasha instructed tax officers not to put pressure until the final decision was made. On the matter, the Department's earlier proposal about the initiative through Ahmet Muhtar Bey was opposed by Grew, talking about the possibility that such an initiative would be perceived by the Turkish government as a protest. Emphasizing the importance given by İsmet Pasha to the issue, he said that the Embassy did not need to take any further action for that moment.³²⁰ As the Council of State's decision on July 2 that the American school in Göz Tepe was not subjected to taxation with regard to the Inheritance and Bequest Tax Law which would set a precedent for other schools, the Americans thought that the tax problems had disappeared at least in the short term.³²¹

3.2.4. Commencement of Treaty Relations

3.2.4.1. Negotiations of Treaties of Arbitration and Conciliation

Although negotiations of arbitration and conciliation treaties continued between Turkey and the United States throughout 1928, no conclusion was reached. The American Secretary of State attempted to make treaties with certain countries, identical to the arbitration treaty signed with France on February 6, 1928, as well as making conciliation treaties with countries where there was no such a treaty, based on the agreement with Britain in 1914. Secretary Kellogg also proposed to make such agreements with Turkey. He considered that negotiation of an arbitration treaty and a

³¹⁹ FRUS, 1930, Document 798.

³²⁰ Ibid.; Grew, 1999, 173-174.

³²¹ FRUS, 1930, Document 800.

conciliation treaty between the United States and Turkey could allow initiating treaty relations between the two governments. He presumed that such agreements were likely to be acceptable for the Senate, and that a formal treaty could begin, which the Turkish state had hoped for. On the one hand, he questioned whether this proposal would help Ambassador Grew in the near future in his negotiations for the renewal of the *modus vivendi* of 1927.³²²

Grew suggested that the negotiations should be conducted in Turkey, as he thought it would strengthen his position in this country. Yet the negotiations were governed in Washington with Ambassador Ahmet Muhtar Bey because of the procedure followed by the Department so far.³²³ During Ambassador Grew's meeting with Tevfik Rüşti Bey, the treaty of "outlawry of war" was discussed more than the arbitration and conciliation treaties; the Minister asked if this agreement could be extended to countries other than the great powers, and implied that Turkey would welcome such an offer.³²⁴ Kellogg reported that if it was successfully negotiated, the United States would certainly be pleased with Turkey's participation for the renunciation of war treaty.³²⁵

The Secretary handed over the draft treaty texts of arbitration and conciliation to the Turkish Ambassador in Washington on April 19. The Turkish government, while looking warmly at both treaties, wanted to set a condition for excluding any issue related to the Armenians from the agreement, via a *procès-verbal*³²⁶ or an exchange of notes. Tevfik Rüşti proposed that the Armenian issue be permanently eliminated by an acceptable formula, just as it was removed from the Turkish-American relations in Lausanne, without offending either the American public or the Senate.³²⁷ The Minister

³²² FRUS, 1928, Document 769.

³²³ FRUS, 1928, Document 770; FRUS, 1928, Document 771.

³²⁴ FRUS, 1928, Document 772.

³²⁵ FRUS, 1928, Document 773.

³²⁶ The English term is *minutes* which means "a record of the proceedings of a meeting or conference, with any decisions highlighted; thus sometimes known as conclusions. Berridge and James, 2003, 175.

³²⁷ FRUS, 1928, Document 777.

asked Grew about his opinion on this issue, namely an acceptable formula, but he declined to answer without consulting the State Department,³²⁸ and after all Kellogg advised him to dissuade the Minister from suggesting any terms. He explained that domestic matters were excluded from the arbitration treaty, and that it was unthinkable for the U.S. government to attempt to put forward the provisions of a conciliation treaty on behalf of citizens of a foreign country.³²⁹ He informed Grew that the texts of the arbitration and conciliation treaties were largely identical to all governments except Latin America, and since the modifications would make the government implementation of the negotiation program of the treaties complicated, the given condition seemed impossible.³³⁰ The Turkish Minister reiterated his offer in a personal letter in June,³³¹ but Kellogg did not accept any condition.³³² Though the Secretary informed the Turkish Ambassador that he could give a note in a regular official correspondence asking whether the term “domestic jurisdiction” in the arbitration treaty included questions involving sovereignty and questions which international law left to the exclusive jurisdiction of states,³³³ further negotiations did not result in the signing of an arbitration or conciliation treaty.³³⁴

3.2.4.2. The Kellogg-Briand Pact

The Kellogg-Briand Pact, negotiated with the U.S. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg at the suggestion of French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, was signed by fifteen countries in Paris on August 27, 1928. Later, other countries were also called upon to join the pact, which aimed to resolve international disputes by peaceful means

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ FRUS, 1928, Document 778.

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ FRUS, 1928, Document 779.

³³² FRUS, 1928, Document 780.

³³³ FRUS, 1928, Document 781.

³³⁴ FRUS, 1928, Document 783.

and to outlaw war.³³⁵ Carrying out a peaceful foreign policy, Turkey showed interest to participate in international cooperation. Tevfik Rüşti Bey conveyed to the United States the Turkish government's request to join the Pact as a founding member through Ambassador Grew on April 10, 1928.³³⁶ Grew believed that Turkey's participation to the pact among the original signatories would increase the U.S. reputation in Turkey. According to him, the inclusion of Turkey, the most powerful country in the Middle East, in the pact would have a positive impact on other states, and Turkey would be removed from the Soviet Union, as the westernization process was supported. However, Kellogg rejected this offer because it was impractical due to the similar interest in some countries.³³⁷

In August, the U.S. State Department instructed its diplomatic representatives to make attempts to invite nearly fifty states, including Turkey, to join the pact based on Article 3 of the Pact.³³⁸ Hence, Grew invited Turkey to join and Tefvik Rüşti Bey conveyed Turkey's positive attitude to the ambassador.³³⁹ Tefvik Rüşti Bey informed Grew on December 12, 1928 that as soon as the U.S. Senate approved the Kellogg Pact, it would be confirmed by the Turkish Assembly. Ankara was ready, and Turkey would be the first country to ratify the pact after the United States. Indeed, given that the President ratified the Pact on January 17, 1929, Turkey acted quickly and unanimously approved it on January 19. Even, Grew wrote in his diary that circular reporting the President's ratification of the Pact reached him on January 20, and that the Turkish Assembly approved the Pact without receiving that news. Ambassador Grew conveyed the satisfaction of the United States to the Minister.³⁴⁰

³³⁵ Grew, 1999, 111.

³³⁶ Dilek, 2013, 151.

³³⁷ Trask, 1971, 224.

³³⁸ Dilek, 2013, 152.

³³⁹ Trask, 1971, 224.

³⁴⁰ Grew, 1999, 112-113.

Joining the Kellogg-Briand Pact was in line with the politics of peace that Turkey pursued in those years. Atatürk, in his speech on November 1, 1928 in the Turkish Assembly, stressed that Turkey made special efforts to sign security treaties between nations, and that the appropriate opinion to join the Kellogg Pact was given sincerely.³⁴¹ Although he was sick on the day the pact was discussed in the Assembly, Tevfik Rüşti Bey also attended the negotiations and gave a speech demanding that this pact, which outlawed war, be quickly accepted.³⁴² Turkey's willingness to participate in the pact proved its position on maintaining international peace and had a positive impact on its relations with the United States.³⁴³

3.2.4.3. Negotiations of Treaty of Commerce

In 1927, when bilateral relations began with the exchange of notes, a one-year provisional regulation was made in the nature of a *modus vivendi* to regulate trade relations. In 1928, negotiations were held between the two countries for a new commercial *modus vivendi*, since the old one in question expired. At a meeting between Ambassador Grew and Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüşti Bey in April, the Ambassador was verbally informed that the Council of Ministers' approval of the extension of the commercial *modus vivendi* with the United States until April 10, 1929.³⁴⁴ After implementing some minor changes to the previous regulation, on May 19, 1928, a Turkish-American Commercial Modus Vivendi was concluded between two countries to temporarily regulate trade relations for ten-month and twenty-day based on the Treaty of August 6, 1923, pending to come into force. The *modus vivendi* regulated the export of soil and industrial products for the purpose of consumption, re-exportation or transit from the United States to Turkey and vice versa.³⁴⁵

According to the current legal situation, a temporary arrangement could be made no more than twice, and now the U.S. and Turkey had to start negotiations on a

³⁴¹ Dilek, 2013, 152-153.

³⁴² Ibid., 153.

³⁴³ Trask, 1971, 226.

³⁴⁴ FRUS, 1928, Document 784.

³⁴⁵ FRUS, 1928, Document 790.

formal agreement. Grew claimed that because at that time statistics showed that the United States was the main buyer of Turkish goods, and also that the value of exports from Turkey to the United States was between three and four times the value of imports from the United States to Turkey, an uninterrupted commercial agreement, whether on the basis of a *modus vivendi* or on the basis of a treaty, was more important to Turkey than the United States.³⁴⁶ Grew, on the other hand, thought that if the Turkish-American commercial *modus vivendi* became invalid before the signing of a commercial treaty, higher taxes would be applied immediately to American imports, and American tobacco interests could be affected adversely.³⁴⁷ On October 2, Tevfik Rüşti Bey told the Ambassador to start negotiations on a commercial agreement. He spoke of his plan to start treaty negotiations with the United States, Italy, Great Britain, Germany and other states respectively, and suggested starting talks with the U.S. in January.³⁴⁸

In order to avoid any action that would hearten more anti-Turkish provocation in the United States, and thus perhaps jeopardize the growing feelings of friendship towards Turkey, the Secretary of State reported Grew that the Department's preference for the continuation of commercial relations was to make a new trade agreement without a definite time limit via exchange of notes, expressing the Minister's proposal was impracticable, and exemplified that by the exchange of notes, the U.S. conducted its trade relations with thirteen countries according to the mutual unconditional most-favored-nation treatment. Moreover, the Department sent Grew a text which was almost identical to the note sent to the Romanian Foreign Minister, considering acceptable by the Turkish government. The Secretary advised Grew that if Turkey proposed a mutual tariff reduction for certain imported goods, he would oppose it in accordance with America's tariff policy. During this period, the United States imposed high customs tariffs in accordance with the policy of protectionism in the economy.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁶ FRUS, 1928, Document 794.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ FRUS, 1928, Document 795.

³⁴⁹ FRUS, 1928, Document 797.

At his meeting with Grew, Tevfik Rüştü Bey regretted that it was completely impossible to finalize an exchange of notes providing mutual unconditional treatment of the most favored nation in customs matters without a time limit under Turkish law, and that the Turkish government had no legal authority for such a procedure.³⁵⁰ Since the current *modus vivendi* was going to end on April 10, 1929, and the approval of a new commercial treaty to be made by the American Senate probably could not occur before December, an article prolonging the validity date of *modi vivendi*,³⁵¹ would be added to the new Turkish tariff law. As the tariffs restricted by the Treaty of Lausanne were about to expire, the government's work on a new Turkish tariff law was proceeding. He proposed a simple commercial treaty that included conditions similar to those of the current *modus vivendi*. If the Senate would not approve the treaty in question by January 1, 1930, then the Turkish government would make every effort to further expand *modus vivendi*. Grew acknowledged that the government did not have the legal authority to make a *modus vivendi* for an indefinite period through exchange of notes, but the government could persuade the Assembly to do so if it wished; however this kind of request was contrary to the government policy, as no such agreement had been made with any nation before. In his long telegram to the Secretary, he also respectfully added that he did not believe that a brief and simple treaty on customs issues, as proposed by the Minister, would not be approved by the Senate or would increase any anti-Turkish agitation in the United States.³⁵² Besides, although the Turkish government did not have the authority to make the kind of agreement that the Department offered, it would damage Turkey's current friendly attitude towards the U.S., if the government received this authority from Assembly because America was reluctant to make a simple agreement.³⁵³

³⁵⁰ *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929, Volume III*, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 2018), Document 890.

³⁵¹ Plural form of *modus vivendi*.

³⁵² FRUS, 1929, Document 890.

³⁵³ *Ibid.*; Grew, 1999, 115-118.

Tevfik Rüşti Bey, on the other hand, stated that he prepared to make a *new modus vivendi* for one-year in order to provide the United States government with the greatest possible convenience and to give sufficient time for the approval of a brief commercial treaty. He had the authority of the Assembly to do so. The minister might have taken this step, as the new Turkish tariff draft had been still on the agenda of the committee in the Assembly, and no information about its final form or possible enactment date had not been obtained, as Grew thought.³⁵⁴ On April 8, an exchange of notes took place between the United States and Turkey, which enacted the commercial *modus vivendi* for one year starting from April 11, 1929.³⁵⁵ Then, in summer, the negotiations of a brief commercial treaty were initiated based on most-favored-nation treatment to both customs matters and navigation,³⁵⁶ and concluded within a few months. Meanwhile, Henry Lewis Stimson took office instead of Secretary Kellogg while negotiations were under way. On October 1, 1929, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and Turkey was signed in Ankara. The signatories of the treaty were Joseph C. Grew, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Turkish Republic from the American side; Zekai Bey, Deputy of Diyarbakır, former Minister, Ambassador, and Menemenli Numan Bey, Minister Plenipotentiary, Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Turkish side.

According to the Treaty, which consisted of five articles, the United States would adapt to Turkey and Turkey to the United States, its territories and possessions the unconditional treatment of the most favored nation (Article 1); each of the two countries will treat each other equally favorably with other countries whenever they resort to bans or restrictions (Article 2); the United States vessels would receive the same treatment as national vessels in Turkey and Turkish ones in the United States.³⁵⁷ This article excludes a few practices such as coastal traffic (cabotage) subject to the

³⁵⁴ FRUS, 1929, Document 892.

³⁵⁵ FRUS, 1929, Document 897; FRUS, 1929, Document 897, Enclosure 1-2.

³⁵⁶ FRUS, 1929, Document 901.

³⁵⁷ FRUS, 1929, Document 913.

laws in force in the territory of each side (Article 3); each country had a right “to impose prohibitions or restrictions of a sanitary character designed to protect human, animal or plant life, or regulations for the enforcement of police or revenue laws.” (Article 4); in addition to ratification procedure, the validity period of the treaty was set at three years, and then it was determined to remain in force for up to one year from the date on which one of the parties notified its intention to terminate it (Article 5).³⁵⁸

The Treaty was approved by the Senate on February 17, 1930, and ratified by the President on March 3, 1930. It was also approved by the Turkish Assembly on April 21, 1930, and approvals were exchanged in Ankara on April 22, 1930.³⁵⁹ According to Grew, the treaty negotiations were a bit tough at first. Since Zekai Bey, the head of Turkish delegation, did not speak English, discussions were held in French and the texts were prepared in Turkish and English. Zekai Bey swore he would not sign an agreement prepared in English, thus it became difficult to find the exact translation. However, because the Turkish side was more willing to conclude a formal treaty, the delegation softened over time and agreed on the text.³⁶⁰

3.2.4.4. Negotiations of the Treaty of Residence and Establishment

Since it was clearly understood that the Turco-American Treaty in Lausanne would not be ratified, various fields between the two countries were tried to be regulated by separate agreements. After the successful conclusion of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation negotiations between the United States and Turkey, the negotiation of a convention of residence and establishment became a current issue. The Turks proposed a brief convention consisting of a single clause to Grew:

With reference to the conditions of residence and establishment and judicial competence to which the citizens and companies of the two countries will be submitted, Turkey will accord to the United States of America and the United States of America will accord they to Turkey national treatment in cases where the respective laws of the two

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Grew, 1999, 150-154.

countries permit national treatment and in all other cases most-favored-nation treatment.³⁶¹

If presenting both agreements for the Senate's approval became a problem, Grew stated, the Turks would be willing to embody those provisions either within a *modus vivendi* or as an annex to the minutes of the last plenary session for the commercial and navigation treaty.³⁶² Secretary Stimson, on the other hand, preferred to start negotiations on an establishment and residence treaty between the United States and Turkey after the ratification of the commercial and navigation treaty.³⁶³ The Department also preferred not to start negotiations before October because the presentation of the treaty to the Senate would be appropriate in December. Stimson wanted to keep the time between signing the treaty and its submission to the Senate short, and to prevent anti-Turkish opponents from launching an anti-treaty campaign.³⁶⁴ Tevfik Rüştü Bey accepted the timing. Trying to avoid a possible conflict between the establishment treaty and the Immigration Law of 1924, namely avoiding a statement that would lead to the rejection of the Senate by imposing privileges on Turkey with the new treaty, Stimson proposed Grew an addition to the article formulated by the Turkish delegation, "With respect to matters affecting the entry of nationals of the High Contracting Parties into the territories of the other Party, the United States will accord to Turkey and Turkey will accord to the United States most-favored-nation treatment subject to the immigration laws in force in the respective countries."³⁶⁵ Grew desired to change the original Turkish formula as little as possible,³⁶⁶ eventually this addition was not recommended to the Turkish side;³⁶⁷

³⁶¹ *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1930*, Volume III, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 2018), Document 773.

³⁶² Ibid.

³⁶³ FRUS, 1930, Document 774.

³⁶⁴ FRUS, 1930, Document 775.

³⁶⁵ FRUS, 1930, Document 782.

³⁶⁶ FRUS, 1930, Document 783.

³⁶⁷ FRUS, 1930, Document 784.

instead proposed a formula that explicitly excluded the immigration law without offending the Turks, a similar treaty with Germany on the Senate reservation.³⁶⁸

In the negotiations that began on October 18, the Turkish delegation appeared willing to accept to practice the Senate's reservation to the Treaty of 1923 with Germany, but asked whether the Americans would state with a *procès-verbal* with which they applied the same legal immigration control to all European countries as Turkey.³⁶⁹ Stimson noted that the United States could write a letter that it enforced the same immigration laws and regulations for foreigners coming to America from Turkey as foreigners from all European countries.³⁷⁰ However, the statements written by the Turkish delegation to the agreement disposing the Treaty of 1830 were not accepted by the Department, and Stimson suggested Grew to suspend the negotiations.³⁷¹ The treaty came out of the initially proposed one-article brief status, and the negotiations became complicated. In his telegram dated November 21, 1930, Stimson, referring to Grew's diary, expressed the Department's astonishment towards Zekai Bey's proposal as, "to the effect that with the entering into force of this treaty all previous treaties between Turkey and the United States of a similar nature would thereby terminate."³⁷² Such a Turkish interpretation refuted the claims that the capitulations ended in 1914. Stimson told Grew that he should refrain from arguing with the Turks against this interpretation and that the date for the termination of the Treaty of 1830 should be decided.³⁷³

The failure of negotiations of arbitration and conciliation treaties on the one hand, the bad going negotiations of the treaty of establishment and residence on the other hand, made Grew think that the commencement of treaty negotiations revived

³⁶⁸ Heinrichs, 1986, 149.

³⁶⁹ FRUS, 1930, Document 785.

³⁷⁰ FRUS, 1930, Document 786.

³⁷¹ FRUS, 1930, Document 789.

³⁷² FRUS, 1930, Document 791.

³⁷³ Ibid.

Turkish fears, which had always been hidden, about the American attitude and intentions regarding the capitulations. Therefore, in order to discuss this issue and express American attitude clearly, he asked the Department for the authority to negotiate with İsmet Pasha, and suspended the negotiations on November 25.³⁷⁴ At the meeting that took place two days later, İsmet Pasha stated that the difference between the American and Turkish treaty delegations to a great extent gave the impression of being a matter of form, hoping that this could be corrected when the time became more appropriate.³⁷⁵ Meanwhile, he guaranteed that the Americans in Turkey would continue to receive the treatment of the most favored nation, assuming that Turks in the United States would continue to receive the same treatment.³⁷⁶

The meeting with İsmet Pasha yielded results and the treaty, without a *procès-verbal*, was signed between Grew and Zekai Bey, Minister for National Defense on October 28, 1931.³⁷⁷ After the Senate approved the treaty on May 3, 1932, the President ratified it on May 12, and Turkey ratified it on November 24. The first article of the two-article treaty provided the signatory countries as the most favored nation treatment in terms of establishment, residence, fiscal charges, and judicial competence.³⁷⁸ With the following sentence at the end of the article, “nothing contained in this treaty shall be construed to affect existing statutes and regulations of either country in relation to the immigration of aliens or the right of either country to enact such statutes,”³⁷⁹ both countries’ concerns about their national laws were resolved. According to the second article, it was determined that the agreement would remain in force for three years, after which it would remain in force until the end of

³⁷⁴ FRUS, 1930, Document 792.

³⁷⁵ FRUS, 1930, Document 794.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931*, Volume II, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 2018), Document 1102.

³⁷⁸ FRUS, 1931, Document 1103

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

twelve months from the date when one of the parties would give notice of termination to the other. The ratified treaties exchanged at Washington on February 15, 1933.³⁸⁰

Grew also wrote the same speech he had with İsmet Pasha before, in a letter to Tevfik Rüştü at the request³⁸¹ of the Minister on July 6, 1931, regarding the theoretical continuation of the Treaty of 1830 in force and the date of the abolition of the capitulations. The text of the previously agreed letter was as:

The Government of the United States of America is fully alive to the changes which have taken place in Turkey. Its sole desire is that the development of the relations between the two countries should proceed upon the basis of these changed conditions. It was with such considerations in mind that the Government of the United States of America negotiated the exchange of notes of February 17, 1927, and the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of October 1, 1929; it is on this same basis that it has negotiated the Treaty of Residence and Establishment which its representative is signing today, and that it is always ready to negotiate treaties of arbitration and conciliation.³⁸²

The Department considered the adoption of this treaty as the annulment of the Treaty of 1830, which included American capitulatory rights.³⁸³

3.3. Bilateral Relations in the Roosevelt Era

As Ambassador Joseph Grew left Turkey in March 1932 with an emotional farewell, he stated that it was a privilege to witness the development of the five most important years of the young Turkish Republic.³⁸⁴ After Grew, General Charles Hitchcock Sherrill was appointed as the American ambassador to Turkey by President Hoover on March 17, 1932. Serving in Turkey for eight months, Sherrill's only prior diplomatic experience had been Minister to Argentina from 1909 to 1911. During his mission in the country, in addition to a book about mosaics, he wrote a biography of

³⁸⁰ FRUS, 1931, Document 1103; Trask, 1971, 198.

³⁸¹ FRUS, 1931, Document 1099.

³⁸² FRUS, 1931, Document 1104.

³⁸³ Trask, 1971, 198.

³⁸⁴ Grew, 1999, 240.

Atatürk which brought him closer to the President,³⁸⁵ and even after his mission, he continued to improve the image of Turkey with his positive statements about Atatürk and the country.³⁸⁶ The new U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's choice for ambassador to Turkey became Robert Peet Skinner, who was an experienced diplomat. Appointed on June 8, 1933, he served in Turkey until January 1936.³⁸⁷ The last U.S. Ambassador of that period, John van Antwerp MacMurray, served in Turkey from 1936 to 1942. MacMurray, one of the Department's leading Far East experts, defined his mission in Turkey as a tranquil and uneventful experience in the friendly environment that had been created by Admiral Bristol and Grew.³⁸⁸ Since the diplomatic relations commenced, Ahmet Muhtar Bey, who served as the first Turkish ambassador to the United States, held his position until April 20, 1934.³⁸⁹ His successor, the Ambassador to London, Münir Ertegün, began his mission as the Turkish Ambassador to Washington in June 1934.³⁹⁰

Apart from the mission officials, Atatürk and Roosevelt also communicated several times, other than the formality national holiday greetings. In 1933, upon the tragic earthquake in Los Angeles and the crash of the passenger zeppelin, Atatürk sent messages to Roosevelt expressing his sadness. In 1933, at a meeting celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic in New York, Roosevelt sent a congratulatory message stating that he found the path taken by the Turkish Republic successful, and he appreciated Atatürk's moves.³⁹¹ Atatürk responded to Roosevelt's gesture in October 24, 1933 with the message "The Turkish nation feels unlimited love and attraction towards the previously enlightened allied American nation and their

³⁸⁵ Trask, 1971, 75.

³⁸⁶ Yılmaz, 2015, 68.

³⁸⁷ Trask, 1971, 77.

³⁸⁸ Yılmaz, 2015, 68.

³⁸⁹ Harris and Criss, 2009, 174.

³⁹⁰ Ibid., 181.

³⁹¹ Hikmet Öksüz and İsmail Köse, "Türkiye'nin Amerikalı Dostları Cemiyeti'nin Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri," *Akademik Bakış* 10, no. 19 (2016): 24.

mighty President.”³⁹² Roosevelt also sent a message on October 29, 1933 congratulating the Republic Day. Another intimate event was when Ambassador Skinner applied to purchase a set of newly released Turkish stamps, stating that Roosevelt was interested in stamp collecting. Atatürk ordered these stamps to be presented to President Roosevelt on his behalf.³⁹³ In his letter of thanks, Roosevelt was stating that he had observed the stamps presented to him during one of his rare rest times, and desired to see the landscapes depicted on them with his own eyes.³⁹⁴ Correspondence became gradually companionable. In 1937, when President Roosevelt in the White House watched the film about Atatürk and his revolutions, he wrote a letter to Atatürk and expressed his enthusiasm and excitement for the many innovations he had created in a short time. He added that he became happy to see the pictures of Atatürk playing with his daughter on the beach.³⁹⁵ Both Roosevelt’s letter and Atatürk’s which he sincerely thanked him ended with “Yours faithfully”, unlike the previous ones.³⁹⁶

In this era, the sincere communication between the two leaders was reflected in official bilateral relations. In the tense international environment created by the upcoming world war, the United States and Turkey, in general, concentrated on the areas of treaty-making in the missing fields and regulating trade relations.

3.3.1. Treaty Relations

3.3.1.1. The Claims Agreement

After the exchange of the ratification of the Treaty of Establishment and Residence on February 15, 1933, the Turkish and American governments moved onto the next issue; the question of the claims of the American citizens against the Turkish

³⁹² Fahir Armaoğlu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri 1919-1997* (İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2019), 37.

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ Mehmet Okur, “Atatürk Tarafından Yabancı Devlet Başkanlarına Verilen Hediyeler ,” *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, no. 33-34 (2004): 87-88.

³⁹⁵ Enis Dinç, “How to Impress an American: The Power of the Motion Picture,” in *Atatürk On Screen Documentary Film and the Making of a Leader* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2020): 133-135.

³⁹⁶ Ibid., 36-40.

government. The claims were related to the resettlement of the Armenians during World War I, as well as the problems of their assets left behind. According to various regulations³⁹⁷ made during this period, the property and lands belonging to the Armenians transferred to other places were ordered to be protected by the State, then to give back the properties to those citizens who wanted to return to their homeland after the war.

While the relevant regulations regulated the rights of the Turkish citizens who were still in the country, the regulation of the liquidation of the property of people who did not return to the country and changed their citizenship became the subject of international agreements. The first contacts with the U.S. on the subject of claims were held in Lausanne, and it was decided to start negotiations twenty days after the Turco-American Treaty was signed. However, the negotiations started with a delay on November 7, 1923 due to the high number of claims, the fact that a classification had not been made yet, and the Turkish side requested a detailed file.³⁹⁸ Both sides ultimately decided to examine the claims in a commission to be established. With the exchange of notes of December 24, 1923, it was stipulated that six months after the mutual exchange of the ratifications of the Turco-American Treaty in Lausanne, a commission consisting of two Americans and two Turks would be convened in İstanbul. As the treaty was not approved in the Senate, negotiations stalled until 1933.³⁹⁹

In the long dispatch dated April 4, 1933, the U.S. State Department informed that it desired to start negotiations with the Turkish government on the claims of American citizens of Ottoman origin, and gave Howland Shaw, the U.S. Counselor of

³⁹⁷ By the regulation of May 30, 1915, it was ruled that the Armenians could take all their portable goods and animals together. Moreover, by the regulation of June 10, 1915, for the remaining items, it was determined to record the type, quantity and value of the goods and names of the owners in detailed minutes and take the properties to places suitable for storage, such as churches, schools, hotels, and to place them separately according to their owners. The relevant minutes would be delivered to the local authorities and the copy to the *Emvâl-i Metrûke Komisyonu*, a commission dealing with the issue. In addition, it was ordered that the perishable goods and animals be sold and the costs be entrusted to the deposit boxes and paid to their owners upon application. Kemal Çiçek, "1934-1935 Türk Amerikan Tazminat Anlaşması ve Günümüze Yansımaları," *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, no. 37-38 (2010): 20-21.

³⁹⁸ Çiçek, 23.

³⁹⁹ Ibid., 23-24.

the Embassy, instructions on this issue. Secretary Cordell Hull stated that he could not definitively specify the number and amount of demands put forward by the American citizens of Ottoman origin. However, he reported that the total amount of claims from the 1880 application was \$24,150,000, and the total amount of the applications received up to a year ago for which the amounts were not specified were calculated as \$12,075,000. With 750 claims received recently, the total amount reached \$55,000,000. Hull hoped to agree on a reasonable amount with the Turkish government, as he considered it impossible to come to a definitive conclusion on the number of claims that could be supported under international law, or the amount of compensation to be appropriately claimed where international liability could be established.⁴⁰⁰ He instructed Shaw to take a conciliatory and sympathetic approach in the negotiations with Turkish authorities, demanding a \$5,000,000 payment; and also instructed him to obtain a written statement that fully laid out the reasons for its behavior if the Turkish government took a position that it would not take into account the settlement of the claims of those people.⁴⁰¹

Shaw, on the other hand, in his response, asked the Department for authorization to explain that at least most of the demands were due to confiscation and requisition and to allow the Turkish government to pay in installments.⁴⁰² Hull notified that the claims were largely due to confiscation and requisition actions of the Turkish army and civilian authorities between 1914 and 1922, and that the installment payment could also be used for bargaining during negotiations.⁴⁰³ In the dispatch describing his meeting with Acting Foreign Minister Şükrü Kaya on May 8, 1933, Shaw conveyed that the Minister was not surprised by the claims, noting that the current government had consistently taken a position to accept and fulfill its fair obligations to the extent

⁴⁰⁰ *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, Europe, Near East and Africa, 1934*, Volume II, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 2018), Document 749.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² FRUS, 1934, Document 750.

⁴⁰³ FRUS, 1934, Document 751.

possible.⁴⁰⁴ At the second meeting held the following day, the Minister requested a list containing the names and places of birth of the claimants, quantity, nature and source of the claims, dates of the act or event causing the claim, and nature of the proof.⁴⁰⁵ Until this stage, the U.S. State Department had only reported the number and amount of applications to the Turkish side, and had instructed Shaw not to give details about the allegations.⁴⁰⁶ Yet after his second meeting with Şükrü Kaya, Shaw informed Hull that the negotiations could not progress without presenting the list requested by the Minister,⁴⁰⁷ at least part of the list had to be prepared until the claims convention which was going to be held on August 15, 1933.⁴⁰⁸

On June 27, 1933, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to the American Embassy, excluding the American claimants who were Ottoman subjects under Turkish law at the time of the incident subject to compensation by referring to the Ottoman Nationality Law of 1869. According to Article 5 of this law, the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, who acquired foreign citizenship with permission, were considered foreigners and treated as such. If the citizenship was changed without permission, the new citizenship was deemed void; in any case, the change of citizenship of an Ottoman citizen was subject to the delivery of a document based on an Imperial *irade*. Furthermore, according to the Article 1 of the same law, the children of the Ottoman parents or a father who was an Ottoman citizen at that time were accepted as Ottoman citizens.⁴⁰⁹ Therefore, the Turks argued that in violation of these provisions, those who gained American citizenship could not claim because they were considered Ottoman subjects at the time of the incident.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁴ FRUS, 1934, Document 752.

⁴⁰⁵ FRUS, 1934, Document 753.

⁴⁰⁶ FRUS, 1934, Document 749.

⁴⁰⁷ FRUS, 1934, Document 753.

⁴⁰⁸ FRUS, 1934, Document 755.

⁴⁰⁹ Erhan, 2001, 226.

⁴¹⁰ FRUS, 1934, Document 756.

At the Mixed Commission⁴¹¹ held on August 15, 1933, the claims files submitted by the American side were examined. Of these, 96 were allegations filed by American citizens or people naturalized as Americans without any Turkish citizenship, and were supported by convincing evidence. 280 files in the same category were being examined by the Department authorities in terms of the proof value of the evidence presented. 1504 petitions were claims made by naturalized Americans who were formerly Turkish citizens. Hence the total amount of the 1880 files was equivalent to 55 million dollars. The American delegation offered to pay the Turkish side about ten percent of the total amount in order to save the parties from long-term negotiations and scrutiny, also considering financial difficulties of Turkey. The Turkish side, on the other hand, argued that the majority of the claimants did not have any documentary evidence or only partially had the list claimed to be American citizens was not entirely so and the value of claims was based on unilateral estimates and was exaggerated. Therefore, even ten percent of the total amount would be well above the real value. The Turkish Delegation proposed a payment of \$500,000 spread over ten-year installments.⁴¹²

Shaw, in his meeting with Şevki Bey from the Turkish delegation, stated that the claims of native American citizens and American companies were estimated at approximately \$15,000,000, that even one claim that was carefully examined by the Department's legal advisors and whose proof was completely perfected amounted to approximately \$2,000,000, thus the Turkish proposal was so insufficient. He also added that this was the requisition claim of MacAndrews and Forbes, and there were similarly well-proven \$7,000,000 worth of claims. Şevki Bey took note of these allegations and told he would investigate them.⁴¹³ On January 13, 1934, the Department sent Ambassador Skinner a draft protocol to negotiate with the Turkish

⁴¹¹ The Turkish members of the commission were Şevki Bey and Esat Bey, and the American members were Howland Shaw and Julian E. Gillespie, the Commercial Attache from the Embassy. Çiçek, 2010, 24.

⁴¹² FRUS, 1934, Document 759.

⁴¹³ FRUS, 1934, Document 760.

side.⁴¹⁴ The Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, requested Skinner to submit the full list of claims to the Commission in order to complete the investigation and propose a reasonable solution. The Minister stated that the claims about which the Commission could not take a decision unanimously could be resolved by an arbitrator to be determined by the two sides in an agreement. In other words, he leaned towards the arbitration issue proposed by the American side in the draft protocol.⁴¹⁵ The Minister stressed that the Commission would only address the claims of American citizens who had been harmed in Turkey.⁴¹⁶

On the contrary, the Department in the telegram sent to Skinner on February 10, 1933, stated that the U.S. government could not understand the reference of the Turkish government about the claimants' nationality and the places of origin of the claims.⁴¹⁷ Thereupon, the Turkish Foreign Minister notified that he would make a lump sum offer on the total list without examining the nationality of the claimants in detail, but if the Commission could not agree at this point, only the claims of those who were American citizens would be evaluated by looking at the content of the files.⁴¹⁸ The American side accepted the first procedure proposed by the Minister, but did not accept the distinction according to nationality, even if the parties did not agree in the Commission;⁴¹⁹ because restricting the authority of the Commission was against the notes on December 24, 1923 and February 17, 1927, in which the commission originally formulated.⁴²⁰ Meanwhile, in February 1933, Fred K. Nielsen, an international lawyer and a member of the American-Mexican International Claims

⁴¹⁴ FRUS, 1934, Document 761.

⁴¹⁵ RUS, 1934, Document 764.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ FRUS, 1934, Document 765.

⁴¹⁸ FRUS, 1934, Document 766.

⁴¹⁹ FRUS, 1934, Document 767.

⁴²⁰ Trask, 1971, 203.

Committee,⁴²¹ was appointed as one of the two members of the Commission. Nielsen was accompanied by two legal assistants from the Department of State, Francis M. Anderson and Mr. John Maktos.⁴²²

In the instruction sent by Secretary Hull to Nielsen on July 13, 1934, he was primarily instructed to endeavor to reach a compromise on a lump sum payment without evaluating the files one by one, namely individual claims, but if this was not possible, he was instructed to negotiate an exchange of notes or a protocol for each claim to be decided by the Commission or an arbitrator as a last resort.⁴²³ In case the Turkish government refused to negotiate such a protocol or an exchange of notes before evaluating individual requests, the Department accepted to hand the Commission individual requests, albeit reluctantly, and then negotiate the protocol or exchange notes. Hull wanted the process to end without too much prolongation and this one important problem between the two countries to be resolved as soon as possible.⁴²⁴

Nielsen summarized the results of a series of meetings with the Turkish delegation in his report dated August 14, 1934 as there were:⁴²⁵ 1. "Serious cases" worth \$12,099,994.18 which were supported by the evidence under the applicable rules and principles of international law. 2. Cases that seemed convincing at first glance, but were not, with insufficient evidence, worth \$1,419,614.60. 3. Claims, worth \$1,366,242.32, were deemed to fall under local Turkish law on abandoned properties, and were suspended for the American delegation to investigate in this context. 4. "Insignificant cases" valued at \$49,347.78 were not rejected but passed as

⁴²¹ The commission functioned between 1924 and 1934 to deal with claims arising from the Mexican Revolution and to reach a treaty that settled the claims of the citizens of both the United States and Mexico. The claims were concluded with delay in the Settlement of Mexican Claims Act of 1942. Herbert W. Briggs, "The Settlement of Mexican Claims Act of 1942," *The American Journal of International Law* 37, no. 2 (April 1943): 222-223.

⁴²² Russell Lutz, "Claims Against Turkey," *The American Journal of International Law* 28, no. 2 (1934): 347; Trask, 1971, 204.

⁴²³ FRUS, 1934, Document 768.

⁴²⁴ Ibid.

⁴²⁵ FRUS, 1934, Document 769, Enclosure 1.

they would have little or no impact on the lump sum. 5. Cases pending to allow the Turkish delegation worth \$905,953.47 to carry out some investigations. 6. “Non-serious cases”, worth \$1,665,026.36 which the Commission unanimously found no legal basis. 7. Numerous cases (about 600) that the American delegation, after a cursory examination, considered clearly lacking legal basis and gave a list to the Turkish delegation. 8. Several cases involving Turkish and American dual citizenship questions.⁴²⁶

In his report to the State Department August 16, 1934, Nielsen estimated that the \$5 million offer made by the United States for the claims, which he thought the file numbers were about 2,500, was not much. He reported that the total value was \$15,841,150, even excluding the insignificant of the eight categories mentioned in the previous report and evaluating the serious claims, and suggested that a certain percentage should be calculated on this amount. According to Nielsen, a 15% rate of \$2,500,000 seemed reasonable.⁴²⁷ He claimed that in the event of destruction or seizure of property, the amounts of compensation should include “not only the value of the property, but also the value of its use,”⁴²⁸ namely interest, the amount proposed by the Turkish delegate would not even cover interest.⁴²⁹

At the four-hour Commission meeting on September 4, 1934, despite Nielsen’s insistence on finding a common solution, Esat Bey, the Turkish Commissioner, stated that he received an order from the government to insist on the \$500,000 offer, and reiterated that the amounts of the claims were exaggerated. Nielsen admitted that he also found the amounts of the allegations were exaggerated and therefore, he suggested a new bid by reducing the initial U.S. offer. He summarized the latest situation for the Department by explaining that the Turkish government had not done anything to fulfill a lump sum settlement, sent the Turkish Chief Commissioner (Şevki Bey) to Sofia, and that the other Commissioner Esat Bey, who was in charge of another commission,

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

⁴²⁷ FRUS, 1934, Document 769, Enclosure 2.

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

had voluntarily given the information that he had not examined a single case yet.⁴³⁰ According to the U.S. Commissioner, at the meeting, Esat Bey hinted that the Turkish offer could increase to \$700,000; Nielsen thought that this could go up to \$1,000,000 and the American offer could be reduced to \$1,500,000.⁴³¹

In the telegram sent by Nielsen to the Department, a commission meeting was held on September 17, 1934, with the participation of Şevket Bey who offered \$1,200,000 for the claims to the American side in 12 annual installments. Nielsen found the offer reasonable and reported that Shaw, to whom he mentioned the meeting, also suggested it to be accepted urgently.⁴³² However, the Department ordered to continue negotiations for a “reasonably fair settlement,”⁴³³ not exceeding a 5-year installment.⁴³⁴ In his response to the Department, Nielsen mentioned that Şevki Bey suggested to show the records of the Ministry of Finance to prove that Turkey could not pay more than \$100,000 a year. Therefore, considering the economic conditions of the country but also taking into account the installments spread over many years, Nielsen stated that he could try to get interest.⁴³⁵ In this case, Secretary Hull notified Nielsen that the Turkish offer of \$1,200,000 to be paid in 12-year installments with 3% interest was \$995,400 at that time, reminding that the .U.S. was applying 2.5% interest rate on short-term borrowings, and asked that a bid with the present value of \$1,200,000 should be obtained. Nevertheless, he informed Nielsen that if Şevki Bey’s offer had to be accepted or rejected immediately, he had the authority to accept it.⁴³⁶

In the telegram dated September 28, 1934, the U.S. Commissioner reported that Şevki Bey did not accept the payment with interest, but increased the proposal of

⁴³⁰ FRUS, 1934, Document 771.

⁴³¹ Ibid.

⁴³² FRUS, 1934, Document 772.

⁴³³ FRUS, 1934, Document 773.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

⁴³⁵ FRUS, 1934, Document 774.

⁴³⁶ FRUS, 1934, Document 775.

the Turkish side to \$1,300,000 with a 13-year installment payment and Nielsen accepted the offer.⁴³⁷ Finally, the Claims Agreement between the United States and Turkey was signed on October 25, 1934. The signatories were Fred Kenelm Nielsen from the U.S. and Tevfik Rüştü Bey from the Republic of Turkey. According to the three-article agreement, when Turkey made the payment of \$1,300,000 with a 13-year installment, it would be exempt from liability for all claims formulated against it. In addition, the government would make the first payment on June 1, 1936.⁴³⁸ The agreement was not submitted to Senate approval as it had an executive character for the United States.⁴³⁹ The Turkish Grand National Assembly ratified the Claims Agreement on December 23, 1934,⁴⁴⁰ thus, one more important issue was resolved between the United States and Turkey.⁴⁴¹

After the Claims Agreement took congressional authorization on March 22, 1935, Nielsen opened an office in Washington, and reviewed the files submitted to the Commission one by one. He calculated the amount of compensation and legal interest requested, excluding most of the claims on the grounds that they were false or that there was insufficient evidence. According to Nielsen's last report in 1937, only 33 claims, the amount of which was \$899,338.09, "including principal and interest,"⁴⁴² were eligible for compensation. Mac Andrews and Forbes Company received the largest part of the payment as \$260,870.96, and the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions received \$191,583.48. When all payments were calculated, it

⁴³⁷ FRUS, 1934, Document 776.

⁴³⁸ FRUS, 1934, Document 778.

⁴³⁹ Çiçek, 2010, 34.

⁴⁴⁰ FRUS, 1934, Document 779.

⁴⁴¹ Trask, 1971, 211.

⁴⁴² Ibid., 209.

turned out that the amount that Turkey would pay was \$400,661.91 less. At Nielsen's suggestion, the U.S. reported less debt to the Turkish government.⁴⁴³

According to Wallace Murray, Chief of the Near East Division from the State Department, when he reported the situation to the Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Münir Bey became very excited and emotional by the honesty of the U.S. government.⁴⁴⁴ Murray thanked and advised the ambassador that the matter should remain confidential,⁴⁴⁵ "since unsuccessful claimants might protest."⁴⁴⁶ Finally, the Turkish Foreign Ministry was informed that it would not pay the last four installments of \$100,000.⁴⁴⁷

3.3.1.2. Extradition Treaty

On the day of the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Turkey and the United States on August 6, 1923 in Lausanne, the Treaty of Extradition on the mutual exchange of criminals had also been signed.⁴⁴⁸ According to the dispatch sent from the Department to the Embassy dated July 3, 1930, the Treaty of Extradition, which had been transmitted by President Coolidge to the Senate for approval on May 3, 1924, was still pending before the Committee on Foreign Relations. In this dispatch, Ambassador Grew was instructed to investigate whether the Turkish government would be inclined to approve the agreement if the United States ratified it.⁴⁴⁹ The dispatch dated December 5, 1930 explained Grew's meeting with Secretary General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Numan Bey regarding the issue. Numan Bey asked for various corrections in the treaty, pointing at the extradition treaties

⁴⁴³ Çiçek, 2010, 37; Trask, 1971, 209-210; *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, the British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East and Africa, 1937*, Volume II, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 2018), Document 749.

⁴⁴⁴ FRUS, 1937, Document 750.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁶ Trask, 1971, 210.

⁴⁴⁷ FRUS, 1937, Document 751.

⁴⁴⁸ Trask, 1971, 211.

⁴⁴⁹ FRUS, 1934, Document 780.

signed by the Turkish government with other states, stating that the criterion in these agreements was the degree of punishment, not crime, and that it was necessary to remove the crimes listed in the Treaty of 1923.⁴⁵⁰ The U.S. government did not look warmly at the modification of the Extradition Treaty of 1923 at the time, but the Samuel Insull incident two years later accelerated the process of reaching an agreement.⁴⁵¹

Samuel Insull, the American business magnate who had been escaping from justice despite of a warrant for his arrest because of being accused of fraudulent bankruptcy and fraud, fled to France in 1932. On October 6, 1932, Governor of Illinois applied to the State Department requesting the American Embassy in Paris to demand the arrest of Samuel Insull who had escaped justice from the State of Illinois. Insull, by the way, had run away from France first to Italy then to Greece. The American Legation in Athens was instructed to request Insull's arrest, while the extradition treaty between the U.S. and Greece was signed, and was at the stage of ratification exchange for its entry into force. Greece reported that it could not arrest Insull, as the agreement had not yet come into force. Thereupon, the U.S. first requested via the Embassy that Insull's passport be confiscated, and on October 13, demanded that Insull be prevented from leaving the country until the exchange of ratifications. On October 14, the Legation reported that Insull had not surrendered his passport.⁴⁵² On November 1, the ratifications of the agreement were exchanged, and on November 4, Insull was temporarily arrested in Greece. On December 27, 1932, the Athens "Council of Judges of the Court of Appeal"⁴⁵³ rejected the extradition application made by the United States for Insull, due to the lack of legal basis.⁴⁵⁴

⁴⁵⁰ FRUS, 1934, Document 781.

⁴⁵¹ DeNovo, 1968, 240.

⁴⁵² Charles Cheney Hyde, "The Extradition Case of Samuel Insull, SR., in Relation to Greece," *American Journal of International Law* 28, no. 2 (1934): 308.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid., 308-309.

It is understood from the official documents that Insull remained in Greece until March 1934, when the United States, meanwhile, put diplomatic pressure on Greece to deport him. The correspondence in February-March 1934 between the U.S. Minister in Athens and the Department was about when and how the Greek government was going to deport him.⁴⁵⁵ Concurrently, in 1933, Turkey and the U.S. representatives resumed negotiations on an extradition treaty. On April 17, 1934, Shaw informed Hull about the meeting with Numan Bey. At this meeting, he obtained information about the recently signed Turkish-Swiss Extradition Treaty which contained an article enumerating the crimes in detail, and also the possibility of a similar treaty could be concluded with the United States.⁴⁵⁶ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs accepted⁴⁵⁷ Hull's proposal to reassess the Lausanne Extradition Treaty listing the crimes.⁴⁵⁸ On February 5, the U.S. Senate approved the Treaty of Extradition signed at Lausanne on August 6, 1923⁴⁵⁹ which was ratified by President Roosevelt on February 21, 1934. The treaty, which was presented to the Grand National Assembly in November 1933, was still pending.⁴⁶⁰

In a telegram dated March 28, 1934, Hull informed Skinner that Insull's ship, *Maiotis*, was moving in the Dardanelles, and requested him to inquire informally the intention of the Turkish government to temporarily arrest Insull for extradition in the event of his entering Turkish territorial waters.⁴⁶¹ In his reply, Skinner stated that the Turkish government intended to arrest and detain Insull when a certified copy of the full text of the arrest warrant was delivered.⁴⁶² In the dispatch to which Hull delivered

⁴⁵⁵ FRUS, 1934, Documents between 463 and 471.

⁴⁵⁶ FRUS, 1934, Document 782.

⁴⁵⁷ FRUS, 1934, Document 784.

⁴⁵⁸ FRUS, 1934, Document 783.

⁴⁵⁹ FRUS, 1934, Document 786.

⁴⁶⁰ FRUS, 1934, Document 787.

⁴⁶¹ FRUS, 1934, Document 487.

⁴⁶² FRUS, 1934, Document 488.

the text of the warrant, he also instructed Skinner to make every effort to immediately approve the extradition treaty by the Republic of Turkey and exchange the ratifications of the treaty.⁴⁶³ On March 31, Skinner notified the Department that Insull was detained,⁴⁶⁴ and on April 2 reported that the Turkish government accepted his extradition.⁴⁶⁵ Turkey had followed the path of arresting Insull and extraditing him to the United States before the Extradition Treaty took effect. According to Article 9 of the Turkish Penal Code of 1926, the extradition of a foreigner who had committed a common crime may be accepted by the government.⁴⁶⁶ Therefore, Turkey extradited Insull to the United States under the Penal Code.

The Assembly ratified the Extradition Treaty on May 8, 1934, and ratifications were exchanged in Ankara on June 18, 1934.⁴⁶⁷ The signatories of the treaty were Joseph C. Grew, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Swiss Confederation from the United States; İsmet Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Deputy of Edirne, Doctor Rıza Nur Bey, Minister of Sanitary Affairs and of Social Welfare of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Deputy of Sinop, and Hasan Bey, former Minister of National Economy of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Deputy of Trabzon from the Turkey.⁴⁶⁸ With the principle of reciprocity of this twelve-article treaty, the crimes subject to extradition were enumerated, imprisonment and more severe punishment required for these crimes, and that political crimes excluded.⁴⁶⁹

⁴⁶³ FRUS, 1934, Document 489.

⁴⁶⁴ FRUS, 1934, Document 490.

⁴⁶⁵ FRUS, 1934, Document 491.

⁴⁶⁶ FRUS, 1934, Document 490; Trask, 1971, 214; “Türk Ceza Kanunu (Mülga),” Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi, accessed January 14, 2021, <https://ceza-bb.adalet.gov.tr/mevzuat/765.htm>.

⁴⁶⁷ FRUS, 1934, Document 787.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁹ FRUS, 1923, Volume II, Document 965, Enclosure 2.

3.3.2. Revision in the Straits Regime

On July 24, 1923, the Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits in Lausanne was signed and “the principle of freedom of transit and of navigation by sea and by air in the Strait of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus”⁴⁷⁰ was determined. With the Convention, the passage about the conditions in times of war and peace was regulated, some zones in the Straits were demilitarized, and the establishment of an international Straits Commission in İstanbul was determined.⁴⁷¹ In the international conjuncture, it turned out that the post-war peace environment and disarmament agreements in the 1920s did not work with the invasion of Manchuria by Japan, and then the invasion of Abyssinia by Italy in the 1930s. Countries began to take measures against the impending war. Turkey, meanwhile, became a member of the League of Nations in 1932, attempted to change the Convention regarding the regime of the straits on various platforms.⁴⁷² The United States, on the other hand, was not a party to this Convention, it had secured its passage in Turkish territorial waters by the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in 1929, anyhow was closely interested in developments regarding the Straits Convention.

After Ambassador Skinner, on July 12, 1934, informed the Department that no official steps had been taken at the League of Nations session in Geneva regarding Turkey’s intention to seek revisions in the straits regime for the allowance the “construction of fortification in the Dardanelles,”⁴⁷³ the Secretary asked American representatives in the relevant countries about developments on this issue. The American Consul in France Theodore Marriner informed the Department that he had learned that Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüşdü Aras had various times attempted to get the support of the French government regarding the modification of the straits

⁴⁷⁰ “II. Convention Relating to the Régime of the Straits,” *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, accessed January 15, 2021, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ii_-convention-relating-to-the-regime-of-the-straits.en.mfa.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

⁴⁷² Oran, 2009, 370-371.

⁴⁷³ FRUS, 1934, Document 809.

regime determined in Lausanne in July 24, 1923, but became unsuccessful.⁴⁷⁴ The American Ambassador in Italy Breckinridge Long obtained information that Turkey did not officially or informally applied to the Italian government on this issue, but there was a feeling that it would apply at any time, and it was known that Turkey had accumulated war materials just outside the unfortified regions of the Straits.⁴⁷⁵ The American Consul in Italy later reported that he had received information that Italy preferred to leave the control of the Straits to Turkey.⁴⁷⁶

According to the information obtained by the American Consul in Geneva Prentiss B. Gilbert, the issue did not come directly before the League of Nations, and as officials of the League Secretariat reported that they had received the impression that the Turkish government had no intention of raising this issue at that time. The Consul added that the issue was verbalized before the Disarmament Conference at Geneva of 1933 by the Turkish representative Tefik Rüşti Aras.⁴⁷⁷ The American Ambassador in the United Kingdom Ray Atherton also gave similar news to the Geneva Consul that at this Conference; during the negotiations for the removal of heavy mobile artillery, the Turkish official brought up the revision of the strait regime because in such a case it would have problems in protecting the straits.⁴⁷⁸ The Ambassador stated that since the plan for heavy guns failed, the Turkish proposal was also dropped.⁴⁷⁹ The American Ambassador in Japan Joseph C. Grew stated that according to the information obtained unofficially from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was understood that the Turkish government had not made any attempt on the subject to the Japanese government.⁴⁸⁰ Skinner reported to the

⁴⁷⁴ FRUS, 1934, Document, 812.

⁴⁷⁵ FRUS, 1934, Document 813.

⁴⁷⁶ FRUS, 1934, Document 817.

⁴⁷⁷ FRUS, 1934, Document 814.

⁴⁷⁸ FRUS, 1934, Document 815.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁰ FRUS, 1934, Document 818.

Department that the Turkish government had activities on improving the highway to Gelibolu and Çanakkale as well as reorganizing military forces in the Straits region.⁴⁸¹ After the Department asked Skinner about Turkey's approach to making a navigation agreement in the Straits with the U.S.,⁴⁸² he stated that such an agreement would not give the U.S. more than it had.⁴⁸³

In the dispatch dated April 17, 1935, the American Consul in Geneva stated that the Turkish representative expressed his revision ideas on the Straits at the Council of the League of Nations where the decision on German rearmament was discussed. The representative did not formally raise the issue.⁴⁸⁴ At the meeting, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras was at the same time the President of the Council of the League of Nations, and once again expressed his opinion that demilitarized zones in Turkey were not compatible with the military preparations in Europe and he stated that they had to be.⁴⁸⁵ Skinner informed the Department that at "the second regular meeting of the Permanent Council of the Balkan Entente",⁴⁸⁶ which took place on May 10-13, 1935, the member countries decided to support the Turkish view on the Straits.⁴⁸⁷ Thus, by 1935, Turkey informally expressed its desire to revise the Straits Convention on several international platforms, and the initial support came from its allies of the Balkan Entente Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania. In his next dispatch, Skinner mentioned about the preparations around the Dardanelles, which he had the opportunity to observe during his İzmir trip. He reported that a military camp was established at the mouth of the Straits ten days earlier, and according to information he obtained, there were about 250 men under a Commander, and they were either

⁴⁸¹ FRUS, 1934, Document 816.

⁴⁸² FRUS, 1934, Document 819.

⁴⁸³ FRUS, 1934, Document 821.

⁴⁸⁴ FRUS, 1935, Document 887.

⁴⁸⁵ FRUS, 1935, Document 892.

⁴⁸⁶ FRUS, 1935, Document 889.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid.

engineers conducting research for permanent fortifications, or they were already making fortifications.⁴⁸⁸ The Ambassador notified the Department that his observations were not an expert opinion, but he comprehended that Turkey was preparing for war by stating, “I should say that it was clearly the case that the military authorities are taking the most active preparatory steps to the end in view.”⁴⁸⁹

As reported in Skinner’s dispatch of the meeting with the Minister dated June 26, 1935, Tevfik Rüştü Aras stated that he thought that Britain and France would support the Turkish idea regarding the Straits, albeit slowly, and that all Turkish desires for the rearmament of the Straits were accepted at the meeting held with the Balkan Entente states in Bucharest on June 20.⁴⁹⁰ In addition, the Minister explained that when the Straits Convention was signed in Lausanne, disarmament seemed likely to be carried out everywhere after Germany’s disarmament, but various countries were then heavily mobilizing, and Turkey could not be left vulnerable.⁴⁹¹ Skinner acknowledged that Turkey’s desire to defend its territory against a possible threat coming from Europe was one of the reasons for requesting a modification of the Straits Convention, but he added that there could be other reasons, such as the idea that the demilitarization of some parts of the Turkish territory by an international agreement was humiliating, and Turkey’s sense of prestige could emerge.⁴⁹²

In relation to the issue of the implementation of a separate official agreement with Turkey for the free passage of American ships and aircraft through the Straits, the Department had previously asked opinion to Skinner, and it was realized that the Turkish government was reluctant to sign such an agreement unless the United States agreed to “assume certain responsibilities for the defense of the Straits.”⁴⁹³ As this was

⁴⁸⁸ FRUS, 1935, Document 890.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁰ FRUS, 1935, Document 891.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

⁴⁹² FRUS, 1935, Document 892.

⁴⁹³ FRUS, 1935, Document 893.

clearly unacceptable for the United States, such an attempt to make an agreement was put on hold.⁴⁹⁴

On April 10, 1936, Turkey took a formal step, sent a note to the signatory states of the Lausanne Straits Convention, and asked for an international conference to be convened to determine a new regime for the Straits.⁴⁹⁵ Münir Bey also conveyed the note to the U.S. State Department.⁴⁹⁶ The U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom reported that the Foreign Office had a sympathetic view of the Turkish proposal to revise the Convention to rearm the Straits, and that a British official stated that Turkey would not see much opposition other than France.⁴⁹⁷ Meanwhile, the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey was changed, and MacMurray took over the mission after Skinner. On April 20, 1936, when the Department asked MacMurray to comment on the news that the Turkish soldiers entered the demilitarized zones of the Straits,⁴⁹⁸ he reported that the news was officially denied.⁴⁹⁹ According to the dispatches from American diplomatic officials in countries including the Soviet Union,⁵⁰⁰ Japan,⁵⁰¹ Yugoslavia (albeit not signatory state),⁵⁰² Romania,⁵⁰³ and Britain⁵⁰⁴ announced that they accepted Turkey's invitation of a new Straits Conference.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁵ Oran, 2009, 371.

⁴⁹⁶ *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, the Near East and Africa, 1936*, Volume III, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 2018), Document, 564, Annex.

⁴⁹⁷ FRUS, 1936, Document 568.

⁴⁹⁸ FRUS, 1936, Document 567.

⁴⁹⁹ FRUS, 1936, Document 569.

⁵⁰⁰ FRUS, 1936, Document 571.

⁵⁰¹ FRUS, 1936, Document 572.

⁵⁰² FRUS, 1936, Document 573.

⁵⁰³ FRUS, 1936, Document 574.

⁵⁰⁴ FRUS, 1936, Document 575.

The conference was held in Montreux on June 22, 1936 with the participation of all states party to the Straits Convention, except Italy. At the end of the Montreux Conference, the Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits was signed on July 20, ratified by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on July 31, and entered into force on November 9, 1936.⁵⁰⁵ The new Convention regulated air and naval passage in three ways: wartime, peacetime and when Turkey felt threatened by an imminent war. The Convention eliminated the restrictive provisions against Turkey with the allowance of remilitarization of the Straits and the abolition of the Straits Commission.⁵⁰⁶ On the basis of the additional protocol of the Montreux Straits Convention, the militarization of the Straits region by the Turkish army began on August 15, 1936.⁵⁰⁷

On July 29, 1936, Ambassador MacMurray informed the Department about his meeting with Foreign Affairs Minister Tevfik Rüşti Aras. MacMurray reported that when he went to visit the Minister the day after his return from Montreux, that was, on July 25, he was in a complete victory mode, stating that despite very serious difficulties, Turkey had achieved a satisfactory result at the Conference with largely due to “the friendly support of the British Delegation.”⁵⁰⁸ In that meeting, about the absence of Italy, Tevfik Rüşti Bey indicated that Italy viewed the revision of the Lausanne Straits Convention positively and welcomed the invitation to the Conference in Montreux favorably, and that Italy’s action could not be considered friendly, although there were other reasons.⁵⁰⁹ When MacMurray went to visit the Minister again after the Convention came into force, he was informed by Tevfik Rüşti Bey that the Convention was equally beneficial to the signatory or non-signatory states by

⁵⁰⁵ Oran, 2009, 374.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid., 374-380.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid., 381.

⁵⁰⁸ FRUS, 1936, Document 585, Enclosure.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

recognizing the principle of free passage in the Straits. In his dispatch dated November 13, 1936, the Ambassador informed the Department about this detail.⁵¹⁰

3.3.3. *The Forty Days of Musa Dagh* Issue

In 1933, the Austrian writer Franz Werfel published his novel *Forty Days of Musa Dagh*, which describes the Armenian resistance on Musa Mountain in Hatay province for forty days, after the Turkish decision of deportation Armenians from Anatolia in 1915. Following its publication, various countries reacted against the book apart from Turkey. Austria and Switzerland were the first protesters, and Germany banned the sale of the book in early 1934. The book not only began to be published in the United States in 1934, but also the subject of filming it came up in November.⁵¹¹ The Turkish Ambassador to Washington Münir Bey visited the Department of State, and indicated that he had heard that the book would be filmed in the U.S., and if it happened, the film would feed anti-Turkish sentiment in the United States.⁵¹² Wallace Murray, the head of the U.S. State Department's Near East Division, conveyed the Turkish government's sensitivity to the issue to the President of Motion Pictures Producers and Distributors of America, a leading U.S. film production company, and asked if the company would shoot the film.⁵¹³

President Will Hays stated that the script for the film based on the book was prepared for the Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer company, but the script was revised upon sensitivity, and that the film did not address any Armenian massacres, and would not hurt the Turks.⁵¹⁴ When Münir Bey learned that the company was going to shoot the film in April 1935 and that the script included alleged Turkish savageness, he applied to the Department again, and asked for the Department's pressure to be made on the

⁵¹⁰ FRUS, 1936, Document 586.

⁵¹¹ Rıfat N. Bali, "Bir Tarih Romanının Filme Çekilememesi Serüveni Musa Dağ'da Kırk Gün'ün Hikayesi," *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 170 (February 1998): 21.

⁵¹² Bali, 1998, 22.

⁵¹³ Ibid., 23.

⁵¹⁴ Harris and Criss, 2009, 184.

company not to shoot the film.⁵¹⁵ Murray asked Münir Bey to evaluate the script after reading it, stating that the production company did not intend to defend that the Turks had committed genocide.⁵¹⁶ After reading the script, the Ambassador strongly opposed the film being made because he did not like the portrayal of Turkey.⁵¹⁷

In his dispatch dated September 5, 1935, Münir Bey expressed that he had met with a representative of the company in question who wanted to obtain the views of the Turkish government on the subject, explaining that the fictional work was full of slander against the Turkish people, and that filming such a story would give a completely inaccurate understanding. The Ambassador informed the Department that upon the company's proposal to change the script, he submitted the draft scenario to the relevant departments in Turkey, however, because the entire story was written with a certain political purpose and it was unlikely to change the original text, negative opinion was received from Turkey.⁵¹⁸ He added that the Turkish government believed that if the film was made, it would not find a market in Turkey or in many other European countries, and it would not be welcomed sympathetically by the U.S. government.⁵¹⁹ Finally, he asked the Department to use its influence to prevent the execution of this project, which was harmful to bilateral relations.⁵²⁰

Murray conveyed the note of Münir Bey to the Motion Picture President Will Hays, and asked him to display all his help in this matter to solve the problem.⁵²¹ The Department transmitted Hays' response to Münir Bey that the script was not completed and that production would not start without his approval.⁵²² On October 4, 1935, Münir

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid., 185.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid.

⁵¹⁸ FRUS, 1935, Document 908.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

⁵²¹ FRUS, 1935, Document 909.

⁵²² FRUS, 1935, Document 910.

Bey stated that a representative from Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer came to the Embassy, and affirmed that a decision was taken about not shooting the film in case it was harmful, and he thanked the Department for its efforts in this regard.⁵²³ Although the subject of filming came back to the agenda from time to time, it did not happen as a result of Münir Bey's pressure on the film company through the State Department.⁵²⁴

3.3.4. Diplomacy in Trade Relations

Although commercial relations between the two countries witnessed an official treaty in 1929, the impact of the Great Depression in the world started to affect the trade between the two countries. On the one hand, with the expiration of the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Lausanne on Turkish customs tariffs in 1929, Turkey first passed a new and more protectionist customs tariff. In 1931 established a quota system; on the other hand, aiming to protect its manufacturers by imposing high customs tariffs throughout the 1920s, the United States further increased its tariff walls by implementing the Hawley-Smoot Tariff in 1930. Thus, the low volume of trade between two countries in the 1930s became inevitable.⁵²⁵

During his mission, Ambassador Skinner was worried about the trade balance between the United States and Turkey. While the U.S. imports from Turkey in 1929 fell from \$12,166,000 to \$8,189,000 in 1933, its exports fell from \$5,810,000 to \$1,343,000.⁵²⁶ The Ambassador stated that Turkey's commercial preferences were directed towards several European countries, especially Germany.⁵²⁷ As reported by Skinner, the reason for this deteriorating commercial balance in terms of the United States, while the Turks attributed it that the American goods were not preferable in the Turkish market and that American contracting firms did not show interest in important

⁵²³ FRUS, 1935, Document 911.

⁵²⁴ Bali, 1998, 30-33.

⁵²⁵ Yılmaz, 2015, 77-79; Trask, 1971, 94-97.

⁵²⁶ Trask, 1971, 105.

⁵²⁷ FRUS, 1934, Document 788.

initiatives of Turkey, he attributed it to Turkey's "confusing system of quotas".⁵²⁸ The Ambassador also complained in the same dispatch that the Turkish government was planning the construction of some war vessels, a note sent on March 19 for the naval base to be built in İzmit requested companies to bid by April 15, and that the end date was too close for an American firm to offer a proposal.⁵²⁹

In his dispatch dated April 28, 1934, Skinner asked the Ministry for an opinion on proposing to the Turkish government a trade agreement without restrictions on quantity or quota of exported Turkish goods to the United States for two or three years, in which Turkey also met the same conditions.⁵³⁰ He stressed that if such an arrangement would work in Turkey, similar conditions could be proposed to other quota-burdened countries with favorable trade balances for the U.S.⁵³¹ Skinner's proposal was not approved by the Department because of the U.S. trade policy based on protectionism.⁵³² In addition, the Department emphasized that the Ambassador's private complaint about the American companies' lack of opportunity to offer a proposal for Turkish armament projects would not be welcomed in the light of the government's not to encourage armament trade policy.⁵³³

In his dispatch of May 22, 1934, Skinner informed the Department that Turkey was "arming actively and heavily"⁵³⁴ because of the Turkish feeling about the expansionist ambitions of the Italians against Anatolia, and especially the Antalya region. He added that Turkey's peaceful intentions did not doubt or question the sincerity of its belief about the danger. As Skinner reported, a cabinet meeting was held on May 15 under the chairmanship of Mustafa Kemal to accelerate the

⁵²⁸ Ibid.

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

⁵³⁰ FRUS, 1934, Document 789.

⁵³¹ Ibid.

⁵³² FRUS, 1934, Document 791.

⁵³³ Ibid.

⁵³⁴ FRUS, 1934, Document 800.

arrangements of defense which normally expanded a few years.⁵³⁵ At the meeting, it was decided that a budget restriction would be imposed by reducing the spending of each Ministry, and to provide the required amount, an additional excise tax of one penny per kilogram of flour, an additional tax on tobacco, cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, tea, coffee, sugar and cocoa, as well as a sojourn tax for foreigners.⁵³⁶ Skinner stated that the common belief in Turkey was that a general war was inevitable, but Turkey would not enter as long as it could, and that it should be prepared for anything.⁵³⁷

The ambassador had various suggestions regarding the failure of American contractors to submit proposals for important projects in Turkey.⁵³⁸ He stated that German, Swiss and other companies gave loans for Turkish business for three to ten years, and if the same opportunities were not offered by American firms, they would not be able to compete with the Europeans.⁵³⁹ Skinner reported that, due to the low purchasing power of the Turkish people, the amount of ordinary goods to be exported to Turkey was limited, but the enterprises planned by the Turkish government was creating an important productive market, and suggested that the American government pursue a policy of lending to ensure that American firms secure Turkish jobs.⁵⁴⁰ The Ambassador also recalled that he was aware of the mistrust in the United States regarding foreign loan transactions, but not a single case of failure was reported in the decade of Mustafa Kemal's government.⁵⁴¹ In his dispatch of August 2, 1934, Hull expressed his concern that Turkey's industrialization program largely involved war preparation. Therefore, the Department had questions about supporting Turkey's industrialization program since promoting trade of weapons and ammunition was

⁵³⁵ Ibid.

⁵³⁶ Ibid.

⁵³⁷ Ibid.

⁵³⁸ FRUS, 1934, Document 792.

⁵³⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁴¹ Ibid.

against the U.S. government policy.⁵⁴² When it came to lending credits, Hull acknowledged that American firms could not offer Turkey long-term credit opportunities without governmental support, and also stated that encouraging such companies to enter into business in Turkey could burden the U.S. government responsibility. As for Turkey's loan payment performance, the Secretary reminded that the Turkish government had failed to fulfill the first of the Ottoman debt payments and insisted on getting more concessions from the bondholders; in addition according to the reports of the U.S. Consul, and the U.S. Commercial *Attaché* in İstanbul, the Turkish government was having a certain difficulty in meeting its obligations to foreign contractors and suppliers.⁵⁴³

The United States, in those years, was implementing the policy of not to encourage the sales of arms and munitions of war and require export license for the American firms according to the Neutrality Acts.⁵⁴⁴ For this reason, the government did not want American companies to export products that would support war. During his mission, Ambassador Skinner, on the other hand, tried to get the Department to take a positive position in the attempts of the Turkish government to purchase war materials from American companies, but did not get favorable results. On September 26, 1934, the President of Jones & Lamson Machine Company from Vermont applied for the Turkish ordering to the Department. He stated that he could meet the financing he needed for ordering machinery and equipment to be used for the repair and maintenance of artillery and light weapons from the Export-Import Bank, but the bank was reluctant to provide any financial aid guarantees without a positive decision from the Department regarding the transaction, so he applied for the necessary ruling.⁵⁴⁵

⁵⁴² FRUS, 1934, Document 795.

⁵⁴³ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁴ "The Neutrality Acts, 1930s," *Department of State*, accessed January 29, 2021, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/neutrality-acts#:~:text=After%20a%20fierce%20debate%20in,transporting%20goods%20to%20belligerent%20ports.>

⁵⁴⁵ FRUS, 1934, Document 803.

However, the Department did not provide the essential approval document, since the products to be sold were in the arms and munitions category.⁵⁴⁶

In his dispatch dated January 9, 1935, Skinner noted that he was aware that the Export-Import Bank was going to give a five-year loan to the Caterpillar Tractor Company in order to sell tractors to the Turkish government.⁵⁴⁷ He inquired respectfully that the firm could sell tractors based on the idea that they could be useful for the purposes of peace and war, whether the similar practice could be applied for the company in Vermont based on the idea that the machine tools could be useful for the purposes of peace and war.⁵⁴⁸ Similarly, to be utilized in the military, the Turkish government applied to the General Motors Export Company in New York for an order of 900 tractors worth \$1 million to be paid 20% in cash and the rest in bonds issued by the Turkish Ministry of War over five years.⁵⁴⁹ As the Vice President of the Company informed, at a meeting with Chase National Bank in New York on the subject, it was learned that the Turkish government's credit score was good; on the other hand, according to the information obtained at the meeting with the Export-Import Bank, if credit was requested from this bank, it would probably not accept Turkish bonds because it would not finance exports for military purposes.⁵⁵⁰

Skinner's ideas for the scope of war weapons and munitions did not find support in the Department. Hull claimed that the approval and non-approval of orders from foreign states by the Department was not only of interest to whether these goods were war materials, but also to broader political policy, and stated:

I feel that even when commodities purchased by a foreign government do not fall within any recognized definition of arms and munitions of war, we should as a Government avoid assisting the financing of their exportation when there is danger that, in case of war, this Government could be justly

⁵⁴⁶ FRUS, 1934, Document 806.

⁵⁴⁷ *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, General, the Near East and Africa, 1935*, Volume I, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 2018), Document 897.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁹ FRUS, 1935, Document 898.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

criticized for assisting in the military preparation of one of the parties thereto.⁵⁵¹

When Skinner asked the Department on January 14, 1935, the Turkish government's willingness to purchase Sperry anti-aircraft projectors worth \$700,000 on the condition that the Export-Import Bank provided credit,⁵⁵² he immediately received a refusal from the Secretary.⁵⁵³ On February 21, 1935, Skinner reported that the Turkish Prime Minister organized the purchase of 16 Martin bombers from the United States, but asked the Department for help because the War Department did not allow more than one delivery per month.⁵⁵⁴ The State Department likewise notified that it was not the U.S. government's policy to encourage the export of weapons and munitions, and the Acting Secretary of State William Phillips stated that he could not give voluntary advice to the Secretary of War on the issue.⁵⁵⁵ Although the Turkish government contacted the State Department through the Turkish Embassy in the United States about the issue of ordering the Martin bombers, it did not receive a positive result.⁵⁵⁶ Apparently, Martin Company was heavily manufacturing bombers for the United States Army, and the War Department was giving similar answers to other countries trying to order them.⁵⁵⁷

During Skinner's mission, his efforts to increase American exports to Turkey were replaced by the problem of exchange that arose when Turkey abolished the quota system in foreign trade on November, 1936. The new decree set up five categories of Turkish imports:

(1) a free list; (2) goods, amounting to about 65 per cent of Turkey's imports, which could enter without quota restrictions if they came from a country having a clearing agreement with

⁵⁵¹ FRUS, 1935, Document 903.

⁵⁵² FRUS, 1935, Document 899.

⁵⁵³ FRUS, 1935, Document 900.

⁵⁵⁴ FRUS, 1935, Document 901.

⁵⁵⁵ FRUS, 1935, Document 902.

⁵⁵⁶ FRUS, 1935, Document 904.

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid.

turkey or whose balance of trade was consistently favorable to turkey; (3) goods importable only with specific permission from an appropriate Turkish ministry; (4) merchandise authorized for import in bilateral agreements with the Turkish government; and (5) a list of commodities not open to import.⁵⁵⁸

Despite various restrictions, the removal of quotas meant that Turkey's doors were open to unhindered entry of most American goods. As a matter of fact, American exports to Turkey began to increase after 1937. Exports to Turkey, which were \$6,222,000 in 1936, rose to \$14,916,000 in 1937.⁵⁵⁹ On the other hand, when Turkey turned to the American market as a result of the fact that trade with the countries with which it signed a clearing agreement not going well; exports to the U.S., which were \$9,811,000 in 1936, rose to \$17,855,000 in 1937.⁵⁶⁰ Turkey's imports from the United States increased more than its exports to the United States, and caused it to start experiencing currency shortages. Eventually, on May 11, 1938, all foreign exchange payments were suspended by the Turkish government due to the sudden increase in imports from the United States.⁵⁶¹ The exchange problem also took an important place in the negotiations of the new trade agreement.

3.3.5. The Reciprocal Trade Agreement

Towards the end of 1936, when the Turkish government offered the United States to start negotiations for a new trade agreement,⁵⁶² the State Department instructed Ambassador MacMurray to take it over if the Turkish government submitted an official proposal, and also to avoid giving the impression that the United States would be ready to start negotiations at an early date.⁵⁶³ In its dispatch dated May 3, 1937, the Department informed the Ambassador that a preliminary investigation had

⁵⁵⁸ Trask, 1971, 102.

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid., 105.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid., 103.

⁵⁶² FRUS, 1937, Document 734.

⁵⁶³ FRUS, 1937, Document 735.

been conducted on the possibilities of a trade agreement with Turkey, the establishment of a country committee responsible for performing technical work was planned in preparation for negotiations on the agreement, and additionally instructed MacMurray to examine the research report, and without being limited to it, to advise on the possibilities of concluding a trade agreement with Turkey.⁵⁶⁴ When the Turkish Foreign Minister sent a note to the U.S. Embassy on May 4, 1937, "proposing the negotiation of an arrangement for reciprocal tariff reductions,"⁵⁶⁵ the Department, this time, stated its views on possible negotiations with Turkey became sufficiently clear, requesting information from MacMurray on the detail of the note.⁵⁶⁶

Although the note did not specify details, according to the information obtained from the Turkish authorities, the Turkish government would offer the United States a tariff reduction for carpets, wool, mohair, nuts, figs and raisins in exchange for a tariff reduction on machines, cars, radios and a wider range of American products.⁵⁶⁷ Secretary Hull deemed the Turkish Foreign Minister's offer⁵⁶⁸ to negotiate a tariff reduction agreement in Washington at the end of September (1937) to be early, and reported that the negotiations with the Turkish delegation could begin after November.⁵⁶⁹ Thereupon, in August, a list of goods for which the Turkish government aimed to receive tariff reductions from the United States was presented to the U.S. Commercial Attaché in Turkey. According to the dispatch, the Turkish government offered tariff reduction for "figs, rugs, carpets and kilims, mohair, hazelnuts, walnuts, pistachio nuts, pine nuts (kernels), olive oil, almonds, and tobacco".⁵⁷⁰ However, it also desired to grant tariff reduction for "machinery, motors, automobiles and trucks,

⁵⁶⁴ FRUS, 1937, Document 736.

⁵⁶⁵ FRUS, 1937, Document 737.

⁵⁶⁶ FRUS, 1937, Document 738.

⁵⁶⁷ FRUS, 1937, Document 739.

⁵⁶⁸ FRUS, 1937, Document 741.

⁵⁶⁹ FRUS, 1937, Document 742.

⁵⁷⁰ FRUS, 1937, Document 743.

radios, typewriters, rubber goods, including automobile tires, mechanical goods etc.”⁵⁷¹

On October 23, 1937, the Turkish Foreign Ministry declared that it accepted to negotiate the agreement based on unconditional most favored nation treatment⁵⁷² which previously desired by the American side,⁵⁷³ and the Turkish government agreed to give this principle “for all forms of commercial restriction and control.”⁵⁷⁴ The Foreign Ministry also updated the lists of goods which would be the basis for agreement negotiations. The added products to the list of goods that offered tariff reduction were “wool, raisins and meerschaum”,⁵⁷⁵ and the products added to the list of goods requested for tariff reduction were:

valonia; valonia (valex); sheepskins, lambskins and skins of all kinds of wild animals; goatskins and kid skins; canary seed; olive oil (non-edible); emery; animal hair (goat hair, et cetera); gun tragacanth; attar of rose; beeswax; carpet wool; gallnuts; sheep casings; chrome and chromite; licorice paste; and paste.⁵⁷⁶

Additionally, the Foreign Minister asked for a solution to the problem of Washington Export-Import Bank’s 5-year credit which was not on the agenda in any discussion on the issue of the trade agreement.⁵⁷⁷ The Department did not welcome the inclusion of this matter in trade agreement negotiations, added that it could

⁵⁷¹ Ibid.

⁵⁷² FRUS, 1937, Document 746. It was announced in the dispatch dated June 6, 1935 that the United State would make bilateral trade agreements according to the Trade Agreement Act dated June 12, 1934 which contained unconditional most favored nation treatment. FRUS, 1935, Document 419.

⁵⁷³ FRUS, 1937, Document 745.

⁵⁷⁴ FRUS, 1937, Document 746.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid.

announce the negotiations beginning on November 3.⁵⁷⁸ The Department further submitted its list to the Turkish side.⁵⁷⁹

Former Economy Minister and new Prime Minister Celal Bayar showed great interest in trade agreement negotiations. At the beginning of 1938, since the government had only a few experts for trade agreement negotiations and he did not prefer them to stay away from Ankara for a long time, he suggested the negotiations be held in Ankara.⁵⁸⁰ Secretary Hull accepted his request and notified that an American delegation would be sent to Turkey.⁵⁸¹ “Henry J. Wadleigh of the Division of Trade Agreements, Department of State, and Mr. Norman R. Burns of the United States Tariff Commission”⁵⁸² were the members of the U.S. delegation, as well as Julian E. Gillespie, Commercial Attaché in Turkey and Robert F. Kelley, Consul in Turkey.⁵⁸³ The negotiations, which began on March 29, 1938, failed to progress for a while. The Turkish delegation argued that most of the provisions proposed by the American side were contrary to the Turkish trading system, and that Turkey could not get “neither material nor moral advantages”⁵⁸⁴ from an agreement containing these provisions,⁵⁸⁵ thus offered to suspend negotiations. However, on June 15, Secretary Hull reported that he rejected the proposal regarding suspension until it was definitively determined that there were no acceptable alternatives.⁵⁸⁶

⁵⁷⁸ FRUS, 1937, Document 747.

⁵⁷⁹ FRUS, 1937, Document 748.

⁵⁸⁰ *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, the British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East and Africa, 1938*, Volume II, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 2018), Document, 859.

⁵⁸¹ FRUS, 1938, Document 862.

⁵⁸² FRUS, 1938, Document 864.

⁵⁸³ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁴ FRUS, 1938, Document 867.

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁶ FRUS, 1938, Document 868.

For this new agreement, in contrast to the general provisions of the 1929 Treaty, negotiations were held on more detailed regulations such as “the consolidation of tariff rates, other similar taxes and charges, and bases and methods of determining dutiable value, and that regarding exchange control.”⁵⁸⁷ Turkey, on the other hand, was avoiding concessions due to its troubled foreign trade. In 1937, the value of Turkish exports to the U.S. was \$17,855,000, while the value of its imports was \$14,916,000.⁵⁸⁸ The shortage of foreign currency became so alarming that import payments were halted on May 11.⁵⁸⁹ In 1938, the government tightened the measures to place Turkish trade based on the clearings in order to solve the foreign exchange shortage. For these reasons, it was difficult for the delegation to agree on exchange provision.⁵⁹⁰

Seeking to acquire foreign currency, Turkey generally “limited exchange for import payments to a country to a maximum of 80 percent of the value”⁵⁹¹ of its exports to the same country. The United States, on the other hand, stated that it could not accept “such restrictions, which might prohibit or at least delay payments for American sales.”⁵⁹² According to the Turks, the problem was that Turkey’s exports to the United States were seasonal, especially for tobacco, so the Turkish side proposed a clause in which it could pay for American imports within a certain period of time after buying from the United States,⁵⁹³ but the American side did not agree and offered its own formula as:

Turkey would undertake to make available for payments for commercial imports of merchandise of American origin, as a minimum, an amount of exchange sufficient to pay for a proportion of turkey’s total imports from all countries

⁵⁸⁷ FRUS, 1938, Document 873.

⁵⁸⁸ Trask, 1971, 105.

⁵⁸⁹ FRUS, 1938, Document 867.

⁵⁹⁰ FRUS, 1938, Document 866.

⁵⁹¹ Trask, 120.

⁵⁹² Ibid.

⁵⁹³ Ibid.

equivalent to the proportion of the total imports supplied by the United States in the three year period 1935-1937.⁵⁹⁴

This rate was equal to 10.91 percent, and Turkey would reserve available exchange at this rate every year to cover American imports.⁵⁹⁵ Turkey accepted this formula. When a formula was found for the foreign exchange, which was the most challenging problem, an agreement was reached on tariff reduction and other procedures, and finally the Reciprocal Trade Agreement was signed in Ankara on April 1, 1939.⁵⁹⁶ The agreement was ratified by President Roosevelt on May 5 who did not need the approval of the Senate as it was an executive agreement, and was approved by the Grand National Assembly on June 16, 1939.⁵⁹⁷

The Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1939 did not repeal the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1929 as provisions on navigation continued with the previous one.⁵⁹⁸ The 16-articles agreement set out to make the necessary customs discounts on enumerated products to be imported from the United States and Turkey. In all costs related to the products and goods that the parties would send to each other, both parties would earn the most favored nation treatment. The listed products would be allowed to be imported to the other country, namely Turkey or the United States, without any prohibition or restrictions. If the exchange rates of both countries changed significantly from the exchange rate on the day the agreement was signed, and if it would harm the trade and industry of the countries, the parties could offer talks to

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁵ Yılmaz, 2015, 78.

⁵⁹⁶ Trask, 1971, 118-122; *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, the Far East, the Near East and Africa, 1939*, Volume IV. (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2018): Document 922.

⁵⁹⁷ Trask, 1971, 122; Armaoğlu, 1991, 117.

⁵⁹⁸ Armaoğlu, 1991, 117.

amend the treaty.⁵⁹⁹ If the matter could not be resolved within thirty days, the government offered to negotiate would be able to terminate the entire treaty.⁶⁰⁰

On 29 July 1939, Münir Bey visited the State Department on the instructions of the government to discuss the impact of the American-Turkish Trade Agreement on trade between the two countries, and explained the reasons for this situation by stating that the Turkish exports to the U.S. had actually stopped after the agreement came into force.⁶⁰¹ According to the Ambassador, first of all, American buyers were forced to withdraw from the market when Germany raised the domestic price level by offering higher prices for Turkish raw products, additionally, discounts of custom duties for Turkish products had also been extended to other countries, and German exporters were able to sell much more goods in Turkey due to these lowered duties, and finally, Turkish traders who wanted to buy American goods learned that they had to pay a premium of up to forty percent above the official rate in order to obtain the dollar exchange rate. For these reasons, it became difficult to obtain a dollar exchange gradually, and currently there were almost no dollar exchanges left in Turkey. The Ambassador stated that the Turkish government inquired whether a system would be adopted in which exports from Turkey to the United States, excluding tobacco, would be allocated in Turkish lira per dollar above the official rate.⁶⁰²

The issue could not be resolved until the radio speech of the Turkish Minister of Commerce Nazmi Topçuoğlu on December 2, 1939.⁶⁰³ The Minister explained that since 1933, the clearing and compensation systems were applied in the Turkish foreign trade, which caused to increase the domestic prices of Turkish products above the prices of the global market, and this constantly growing gap between the two price

⁵⁹⁹ Doğan Koçak, "Tarihsel Süreç İçerisinde Türkiye ile ABD Arasında Olan İlişkilerin Gelişimi ve Türkiye-ABD Ticaret Antlaşması (1Nisan 1939)," *Atatürk Dergisi* 7, no. 1 (2018): 95-120.

⁶⁰⁰ Koçak, 2018, 114.

⁶⁰¹ FRUS, 1939, Document 928.

⁶⁰² Ibid.

⁶⁰³ FRUS, 1939, Document 938; Trask, 1971, 124

levels affected Turkey's exports also to the United States.⁶⁰⁴ As he reported, products, except tobacco, accounted for 50% of Turkey's exports to the United States by 1929, while in recent years this share decreased to 4%.⁶⁰⁵ Since Turkey's imports from the United States continued, it became difficult for Turkey to pay the counter-value of imports, thus foreign currency debt was accumulating, and imports from the U.S. were becoming more difficult and more expensive every day. The accumulated blocked arrear was approximately \$6,500,000. The Minister stated that the solution was to apply the compensation system to American imports and exports in order to eliminate the difference between Turkish domestic prices and world market price. According to this new formula, "the American compensation premium will be approximately 25 percent, consequently every exported article will receive a premium in this proportion and every imported article will pay a premium in the same proportion."⁶⁰⁶ This system was expected to bring about a reduction of up to 50% in the current high prices of imported American goods. The new system began to take effect on December 15, 1939. After those who received a foreign exchange permit according to the old rate refused to pay the new premium, the Turkish Ministry of Commerce announced that the exchange would be made at the old rate, valid for 15 days. Thus, from 1940 onwards, the new rate was passed.⁶⁰⁷

⁶⁰⁴ FRUS, 1939, Document 938.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁷ FRUS, 1939, Document 948.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

This thesis initially examines the situation of the United States in the interwar period in order to analyze the Turkish-American relations until the World War II in terms of the influence of presidents, then briefly looks at the history of bilateral relations and refers to the birth of Turkey. To evaluate this period as two separate decades, the United States enjoyed a prosperous decade despite the failing aspects in the 1920s, but ended the decade with the worst economic crisis in its history.

Since the American people were not very keen on fighting in the war, they protested the congressional decision about conscription. When the war ended, it became clear that the government had to reorganize labor, financing, industry and agriculture. There were labor strikes and race riots across the country. On the one hand, the Ku Klux Klan was revived in the 1920s, and continued its violent activities. On the other hand, economic problems occurred when the labor force, which worked at full capacity during the war, began to give surplus supply after the war. Additionally, there was also the issue of finding jobs for four million men who had returned from the war. Despite severe unemployment, the American economy was alive in the peacetime similar to the war years, hence the U.S. was transformed from being a debtor country to a creditor nation, lending to war-weary countries. American economy faced a short period of deflation between 1920 and 1922, but many sectors apart from agriculture recovered over time, and the Americans enjoyed the prosperity era.

In 1921, Republican President Harding replaced Wilson, whom he accused of dictatorship, and paved the way for a decade of implementation of the “return to normalcy” policy that shaped his campaign. Harding, as he declared in his speech dated June 12, 1920, gave priority to domestic issues and attempted to stimulate economy, and he was committed to peace, reduction of armament, American

leadership in the world, and security through international law in foreign relations. Although Harding's policies initiated a healing process in the country, the irregularities of his inner circle, called the Ohio Gang, led to his presidential term being commemorated by scandals.

Coolidge, like Harding, emphasized to ensure economic stability, and continued his normalcy program. With the slogan of "Keep Cool with Coolidge" in the election of 1924, he based his campaign on the idea that there was going to be a continuation of prosperity that had started in Harding's term, and he referred to the risks of change, and he won. It happened as he promised that the number of factories, the value of their production for the domestic market, and the Federal Reserve index of industrial production along with the number of corporations, and mass production increased; trusts emerged, banks merged, chain stores developed, mass consumption grew, and the number of automobiles rose. Nevertheless, agriculture and related sectors suffered when Coolidge vetoed the government intervention formula twice. Eventually, in the 1920s, the inequality between rich and poor grew. As a result of the economic policies implemented throughout the 1920s, the Great Depression hit Hoover. The Hoover administration's mismanagement of the depression made it deeper, and also brought the death of his presidency.

Franklin Roosevelt doubted whether the United States, promised by the Republicans, became the world leader or not. In the Republican era, the U.S. did not join the League of Nations in order not to move away from the Monroe Doctrine and not to lose its independence in foreign policy, while the U.S. representatives participated the League meetings at various levels, and they guided decisions when necessary. In addition, the United States led the 1921 Washington, 1927 Geneva, and 1930 London Conferences on reducing naval armament. Although the offer came from France, the fact that the U.S. was the organizer of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which declared war as illegal, and reinforced the idea that it was leading world peace. The U.S. Secretary of States developed all these international organizations as their ideas. Firstly Charles Evans Hughes and then Frank Billing Kellogg led foreign policy during the Republican era.

The 1930s were a period when the U.S. gave importance to its domestic issues and struggled with economic problems. Although Roosevelt was keen to be active in

foreign policy, he avoided this in the first of his four-ter presidency, and focused on the New Deal program that would save the country from the Depression. Roosevelt pursued a policy of non-interference in foreign policy dominated by nationalism. In his second term, the U.S. tried to stay away from the mess in the world with an isolation policy directed by Neutrality Acts.

This thesis further explores the course of the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the United States, and indicates that the official relations did not encounter a crisis until the diplomatic relations were severed during World War I. In this period of more than a century, from the end of the 18th century to the World War I, the relations between the two countries were classified as commercial relations and the activities of American missionaries in the Empire.

Turkey, defeated in the World War I, started the national struggle without waiting for the signing of the peace treaty, or rather the imposition of it. Turkey's military successes paved the way for the new state to negotiate an agreement in Lausanne, and to gain recognition in the international arena. Most of the problems left over from the loss of World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire were solved in Lausanne, and those that could not be solved were cleared up one by one with the relevant countries in the subsequent process. The status of the new state was declared as a republic, and a series of reforms were implemented on the way to the transition to a secular and democratic nation-state Turkey that ended theocracy. In the meantime, the collapsed economy was attempted to be transformed into a national economy with liberal policies. As a result of the Great Depression, which also affected the Turkish economy badly, protectionism for several years, and then policies of both statism and protectionism were implemented in the economy, which improved industry and agriculture, but worsened foreign trade.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who held the presidency of Turkey for almost the entire period between the two wars, directed foreign policy himself, and pursued pro-peace policies. Until 1923, foreign policy was based on being recognized as an equal and fully independent country. When this policy was fulfilled with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkish foreign policy in the 1920s focused on solving the unsettled problems with the relevant countries through peaceful means. In the 1930s, a multidimensional foreign policy was implemented in collaboration with many states,

although Turkey appeared to be getting closer to the European countries in the world, which was preparing for war.

The main purpose of this thesis is to determine the role of the Presidents in the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States in the eras of Republican Presidents Coolidge and Hoover, and during the presidency of Roosevelt. The prominent issues of the period are analyzed according to foreign policy principles, and the role of the leaders in directing foreign policy.

The issues were the continuations of the previous ones. As an outcome of the analysis of relevant primary sources, this thesis asserts that the main subjects in bilateral relations during the Republican Presidents era were related to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, some issues regarding American schools in Turkey, removing the “Terrible Turk” image in the U.S., and the concluding agreements in the necessary areas. The ambassadors from both countries were appointed immediately after the diplomatic relations commenced through the exchange of notes. New agreements continued to be made during the Roosevelt era. In addition, it was realized that the “Terrible Turk” image was not as dominant in the U.S. as it had used to be. In this period, in the case of shooting an anti-Turkish film in the United States, the Secretary of State attempted not to shoot the film by unofficial means, although he did not officially have such authority.

No incidents were encountered that caused a crisis in bilateral relations in both periods. In the Republican Presidents’ era, the issue of the conversion of the Turkish students at the American school in Bursa turned out to be a sensitive problem that could cause tension in bilateral relations, but it was solved relatively without difficulty. The ambassador’s moderate attitude helped in this regard, being aware that the American schools in Turkey could be closed with a decision which could be taken by the Turkish government, in his own words. In addition, the Ambassador did not officially meet with the Turkish authorities on the issue of American schools; he met them informally, and left it to the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions in Turkey, claiming that this was not his job. In the Roosevelt era, the reconciliation of claims - most of which were related to the Armenians’ alleged land confiscation and their seizure during World War I - had to be resolved without creating tension. The matter which resulted in a certain compensation payment by Turkey was

later updated by the United States, and the files that did not have sufficient evidence were also eliminated, and it was reported that the Turkish payment was reduced. This honest attitude of the American side was welcomed by the Turkish authorities.

During Roosevelt's presidency, it was determined that commercial relations had to be brought forth, whereas during the Republican Presidents era, the issue of American schools was the most important concern in the bilateral relations. In the interwar period, the American imports from Turkey outweighed Turkey's imports from the United States. However, especially after 1935, since Turkish imports from the U.S. increased faster than its exports, the problem of foreign exchange arose, which made it necessary to give the economy a new direction. The most predominant issue of the Republican presidents' era was the reopening of American schools in Turkey, which had been closed during World War I. The United States could not make much progress on this issue.

Within the context of the relations between the leaders, there was no interaction between the Republican Presidents and Atatürk other than the usual correspondence, while there was a communication between Roosevelt and Atatürk that reached sincerity. Between Roosevelt and Atatürk, there was an important correspondence that began with Atatürk's message about the miserable events that occurred in the United States in 1933, the tragic earthquake in Los Angeles and the crash of the passenger zeppelin, and continued with Roosevelt's message to the meeting of the American Friends of Turkey, the association aimed at improving the Turkish image in the U.S. established by Asa K. Jennings and Amiral Bristol, celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic. The mutual correspondence included the messages of Roosevelt, in which he admired Turkey's progress and appreciated Atatürk's reforms. It also contained the messages of Atatürk, in which he stated that he always considered the United States a friend of Turkey.

During the studied period, it can be referred that the U.S. and Turkey were in a positive communication for finding solutions to their mutual problems in the areas of their interests. However, they did not reach a decision for becoming strategic allies. Relevant references are obtained by examining specifically the documents from the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS), as well as secondary sources (books and articles) about the subject.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

Bu tez, 1927-1939 yılları arasındaki Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Başkanları Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover ve Franklin Delano Roosevelt'in Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerine etkisini incelemektedir. Bu çalışma, ABD'nin 1920'ler ve 1930'lar dış siyasetini, ekonomik durumunu ve ikili ilişkilere etkilemiş olabilecek dinamikleri analiz etmekte, aynı zamanda II. Dünya Savaşı'na kadar Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin doğasını değerlendirmektedir. 1927 yılı, I. Dünya Savaşına karşıt kutuplarda dahil olan iki ülkenin 1917 yılında kesintiye uğrayan diplomatik ilişkilerinin Başkan Coolidge döneminde tekrar başladığı senedir. 1923 yılında Lozan'da imzalanan Türk-Amerikan Dostluk ve Ticaret Anlaşması'nın Birleşik Devletler Senatosu tarafından 1927 yılında onaylanmaması üzerine diplomatik ilişkiler nota teatisi yoluyla başlatılmıştır. İki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin ABD Başkanları politikaları çerçevesinde değerlendirildiği bu dönemde, ABD ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti arasında önemli bir çatışma yaşanmadığı, ABD başkanlarının ikili ilişkilerde önemli bir etkisi olmadığı ve tarafların bu dönemde stratejik bir ortaklık kurmadığı sonucuna varılmıştır.

Tez, ikili ilişkileri incelemeye 1927 yılından başlamakla birlikte hem ilişkilerin arka planına kısaca değinmekte hem de ABD'nin savaş sonrası sürecini analiz etmektedir. Bu çalışma, Amerikan Başkanları perspektifinde ikili ilişkileri incelediğinden, bahsi geçen dönemde ABD'nin iç ve dış politikalarını araştırmak çalışmanın temelini oluşturmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, ikinci bölüm, iki savaş arası dönemdeki ABD Başkanlarının iç ve dış politikalarını açıklamaktadır. I. Dünya Savaşından dünya lideri olarak çıkan ABD, Cumhuriyetçi Başkan Warren G. Harding'in uygulamaya başladığı "normale dönüş" politikası ile birlikte iç siyasete odaklanarak iyileşme, refah, restorasyon, huzur ve milliyetçilik sürecine girmiştir. Calvin Coolidge ve Herbert Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt 1933'te görevi devralana kadar Harding'in temelini attığı iç ve dış politikaları uygulamaya devam etmiştir.

Cumhuriyetçiler dış politikada, savaştan kaçınıp barışı sürdürmek için uluslararası işbirliğini desteklemekle birlikte kalıcı bir askeri ve siyasi ittifakın parçası olmamayı tercih etmiştir. ABD'nin Milletler Cemiyeti'ne katılımı reddetmesi, bu anlayışın bir parçasıdır.

Başkan Woodrow Wilson'ın ABD'nin savaşta tarafsız kalacağı sözünü tutamaması ve Amerikan halkının da savaşıma pek istekli olmaması üzerine çıkarılan zorunlu askerlik yasası, ülke genelinde protestolara sebep olmuştur. Savaş sona erdiğinde ise ülke bir yandan 1920'lerde yeniden canlanan Ku Klux Klan'ın şiddet içeren ırkçı isyanları ile diğer yandan savaş sırasında tam kapasite ile çalışan işgücünün savaştan sonra arz fazlası vermeye başlamasının yarattığı ekonomik sorunların getirdiği işçi grevleri ile uğraşmıştır. Bu sorunlara savaştan dönen dört milyon erkeğin iş bulma sorunu da eklenince, 1920 seçimlerinde Harding'in vadettiği normale dönme politikaları Amerikan halkını ikna etmiş, böylece Cumhuriyetçi Başkanlar dönemi başlamıştır. Amerikan ekonomisi 1920-1922 yılları arasında kısa bir deflasyon dönemiyle karşı karşıya kalsa da tarım hariç birçok sektör kısa sürede toparlanmış ve Amerikalılar 1920'ler refahının tadını çıkarmıştır.

Amerikan halkı otomobil, buzdolabı, radyo gibi lüks tüketim ürünleri çağını yaşarken, Türk halkı I. Dünya Savaşından yenik çıkan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan kalan topraklar üzerinde yeni bir devlet kurmaya çalışıyordu. Savaş sonu anlaşmaların imzalandığı Paris Barış Konferansı'nda kendisine dayatılacak olan Sevr Anlaşmasının imzalanmasını beklemeden Kurtuluş Savaşını başlatan halk, Mustafa Kemal önderliğinde hem askeri hem siyasi olarak var olma mücadelesi vermiştir. Sonunda, Lozan Barış Antlaşmasının imzalanması ile Türk halkı için hem I. Dünya Savaşı sona ermiş hem de Türkiye'nin bağımsızlığı diğer devletlerce tanınmıştır. ABD, Lozan Konferansına gözlemci statüsünde katılmış, Lozan Barış Antlaşmasını ve eklerini imzalamamıştır. Bunun yerine, Türk heyeti ile Amerikan heyeti arasında bir dostluk ve ticaret antlaşması ve bir de suçluların iadesi antlaşması imzalanmıştır. Yine de bu anlaşmalar henüz yürürlüğe girmemiş olduğundan Lozan Konferansı Türkiye-ABD resmi ilişkilerini başlatamamış; Senato, kapitülasyonların yer almadığı ve Ermenilerle ilgi meselelerin bahsedilmediği dostluk anlaşmasını onaylamamıştır.

Tarihin en büyük krizlerinden biri olan 1929 Büyük Buhranı, hem Amerikan halkının zenginlik döneminin hem de Cumhuriyetçiler döneminin sonunu getirmiştir.

I. Dünya Savaşının ardından ABD, borç alan ülke konumundan borç veren ülke konumuna gelmiş, ancak uyguladığı korumacı ekonomi politikalarıyla borçlu ülkelerin ödeme yapmalarını imkânsızlaştırmıştır. Böyle bir dönemde, “Kara Perşembe” olarak adlandırılan 24 Ekim 1929 günü New York Borsasında başlamış olan çöküş, Başkan Hoover tarafından durdurulamamış, depresyona dönüşmüş ve bir dünya krizi haline gelmiştir. 1933’te göreve başlayan Franklin D. Roosevelt, dört dönemlik başkanlığının ilkinde ülkeyi buhrandan çıkaracak “Yeni Düzen” programlarına odaklanmıştır. Ana politikası istihdamı artırmak olan Roosevelt, tüm bankacılık, kredi ve yatırımları sıkı bir şekilde kontrol altına alınması, doğal kaynakların kullanımına yönelik projeler gerçekleştirilmesi, tarımsal ürünlerin değerinin artırılması, milli yardım programlarının işlevsel hale getirilmesi gibi politikalar yürütmüştür. 1930’ların sonunda Roosevelt’in sorunu artık buhran değil yaklaşmakta olan savaş olmuştur.

Bu tez, iki savaş arasındaki dönemde hem Cumhuriyetçilerin hem de Roosevelt’in genel olarak iç politikaya odaklandığını savunmaktadır. Dış politikada ise Cumhuriyetçiler döneminde, ABD’nin Milletler Cemiyeti ile ilişkisini, Washington Konferansı (1921-22) ve Kellogg-Briand Paktı (1928) gibi oluşumlar aracılığıyla barış ve silahsızlanma hedefleriyle dünyaya liderlik etme politikasını açıklamaktadır. ABD Senatosu, Milletler Cemiyetine katılımın Amerikan dış politikasının bağımsızlığını kısıtlayacağını düşünerek üyelik konusunu üç kez reddetmesine rağmen, ABD temsilcileri resmi ve gayri resmi olmak üzere toplantılara çeşitli seviyelerde katılım sağlamıştır. ABD’nin dış politikada aktif olduğu alanlardan biri, muhtemel savaşları önleme gayesiyle silahsızlanma olmuştur. 1921’de düzenlenen Washington Konferansı sonucunda deniz silahlarının sınırlandırılmasına ilişkin üç anlaşma imzalanmıştır. Cumhuriyetçiler döneminin önemli bir diğer gelişmesi de Kellogg-Briand Paktının imzalanmasıdır. Fransa’nın ABD’ye teklif ettiği pakt çok taraflı bir kimliğe dönüştürülerek uluslararası anlaşmazlıkların çözümünde savaşı yasaklamış, ancak herhangi bir yaptırım getirmemiştir. Yine de Amerikan halkı, Birleşik Devletler hükümetinin dünya barışına önderlik etmesinden memnun olmuştur.

Her ne kadar Roosevelt dış politikada Cumhuriyetçiler gibi silahsızlanma, dünya barışı ve uluslararası işbirliğine vurgu yapmış olsa da 1930’larda dünya artık

barışçıl değildi. Japonya, Almanya ve İtalya yayılmacı politikalarla harekete geçmişti. Bu yıllarda son derece izolasyonist olan ABD Kongresi, ülkenin yeni bir savaşa girmesini önlemek için üç Tarafsızlık Yasası (1935, 1936 ve 1937) kabul etmiş, ABD'nin savaş sırasında yabancı ülkelere silah ve mühimmat ihracatını düzenlemiştir. Bu çalışmada, 1937 yılındaki “Karantina Konuşması”na kadar Roosevelt'in dış politikada aktif bir tavrına rastlanamamıştır. Roosevelt bu konuşmasında, Amerikan halkına dünyanın durumu hakkında bilgi vermiş, terörün ve kanunsuzluğun hüküm sürdüğünü açıklayarak saldırıların dünyanın diğer bölgelerine yayılması halinde ABD'nin barışçıl konumunu korumayacağını açıklamıştır. Yeni tavrı Kongre tarafından desteklenmeyen Roosevelt, muhtemel savaşı engellemek yerine ABD'nin sessiz kalmasını doğru bulmadığından Almanya lideri Adolf Hitler ile İtalya lideri Benito Mussolini'ye birer mektup yazarak saldırgan ve yayılmacı politikalarını eleştirmiştir.

Bu tez üçüncü bölümde, Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri incelemektedir. Öncelikle, Türkiye'nin Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun devamı olduğu kanısıyla kısaca Osmanlı-ABD ilişkilerine değinerek 18. yüzyılda ticari amaçlarla başlayan ilişkilerin, I. Dünya Savaşına kadar temel olarak ticaret ilişkileri ve Amerikan misyonerlerinin Osmanlı Devleti'ndeki faaliyetlerinden doğan ilişkiler özelinde ilerlediğini ortaya koymaktadır. Savaş sırasında kesintiye uğrayan ikili ilişkiler Lozan'da imzalanan Dostluk ve Ticaret Anlaşması yürürlüğe girmediği için bir süre başlayamamış, 1927 yılında karşılıklı nota teatisinden sonra büyükelçilerin atanmasıyla yeni bir sürece girmiştir. Amerika'nın ilk Türkiye Büyükelçisi Lozan'da Türk heyeti ile dostluk anlaşmasını imzalayan Joseph Grew olmuştur. Türk heyeti ile Lozan'da başlayan dostluk sonucunda Türkiye'ye gelişi olumlu karşılanan Grew'in aksine, temelleri 1915 Ermeni olayları sırasında atılan “Korkunç Türk” imajı nedeniyle Washington'a atanan Türk Büyükelçisi Ahmet Muhtar protestolarla karşılanmıştır. Bu nedenle ABD'de Türk imajının iyileştirilmesi Ahmet Muhtar'ın görevi süresince önemli çalışmalarından biri haline gelmiştir. 1930 yılında, Türk milletine sempati duyan ve “Korkunç Türk” iddialarına karşı çıkarak Türk imajını geliştirmeye çalışan Amerikalılar tarafından kurulan Türkiye Amerikan Dostları Derneğinin çalışmaları Muhtar'a bu konuda yardımcı olmuş, yeni Türkiye'yi ve reformları anlatmasına imkân sunmuştur.

Bu çalışmada, 1927-1939 yılları arasındaki ikili ilişkiler, Cumhuriyetçi Başkanlar Coolidge ve Hoover ile Demokrat Başkan Roosevelt dönemi olarak iki ayrı dönemde ve ABD Dış İlişkiler arşivi (FRUS) rehber alınarak incelenmiştir. Cumhuriyetçiler döneminde ikili ilişkilerde öne çıkan konu Türkiye'deki Amerikan okullarıdır. Aslında, Amerika Yabancı Ülkelerdeki Misyoner Komiserleri Üst Kurulu okullar konusunda Türk hükümeti ile resmi diyalog halinde olan kurumdur. Ancak Büyükelçi Grew, gayri resmi yollardan Amerikan okullarının yeniden açılması sorununu çözmek için büyük çaba göstermiş, dönemin Dışişleri Bakanı olan Tevfik Rüştü Aras ile sık sık toplantılar gerçekleştirmiştir. Kurul, okullar konusunun çalışma alanına girdiği Eğitim Bakanlığına Antep, Sivas, Kayseri, Maraş ve Talas'taki okulların yeniden açılması için dilekçe veriyse de olumlu bir sonuç alamamıştır. Büyükelçi de Anadolu kentlerindeki Amerikan okullarının yeniden açılması için Tevfik Rüştü Bey'e gayri resmi olarak desteğini iletmış, fakat hem Milli Eğitim Bakanı Necati Bey'in konuya negatif yaklaşımı hem de Bursa'daki Amerikan okulunda yaşanan olay durumu zorlaştırmıştır.

1928 yılında, 144 öğrencili bir kız lisesi olan Bursa'daki Amerikan okulunda üç Müslüman öğrenci Hristiyan olmuş, sınıf arkadaşlarınca bu öğrencilere ait günlüğün ele geçirilerek Türk yetkililerine teslim edilmesi sonucu okulda dini propaganda yapmak suçundan soruşturma başlatılmıştır. Soruşturma sürecinde bahsi geçen okul kapatılmış, Amerikalı bir öğretmen kız öğrencilerle dini sohbetler yaptığını itiraf etmiş ve okul müdürü ile iki öğretmen yargılanmıştır. Türk kamuoyunda sert bir tepkiyle karşılanan ve cumhuriyete ihanet olarak yorumlanan olay, ülkede yabancı okulların varlığının sorgulanmasına neden olmuştur. Büyükelçi Grew Tevfik Rüştü Bey ile gerçekleştirdiği görüşmede, Türk basınının yatıştırılmasını, kamuoyunda Amerikan okullarına yönelik polemiklerin durdurulmasını, sorumlu öğretmenlerin yargılanmamasını talep etmiştir. Fakat taleplerin karşılanması mümkün bulunmamış, basın zaman geçtikçe sakinleşse de öğretmenler yargılanmıştır. Ertelenen ilk duruşmadan sonra öğretmenler ikinci duruşmada suçlu bulunarak üç gün hapis ve üç lira para cezasına çarptırılmıştır. İki defa temyiz edilen mahkeme kararı sonucunda 1929'da Temyiz Mahkemesi, çoktan ülkeyi terk etmiş olan iki öğretmenin üç lira para ve üç gün hapis cezasını onamıştır. Türkiye'nin henüz gelişme aşamasından olan eğitim sisteminin yabancı okullara ihtiyacı olduğunu düşünen Grew, Bursa'daki

okulun kapatılmasının Türkiye'deki diğer Amerikan okullarına yansayacağı konusunda endişelenmemiş, günlüğünde Türkiye'nin yeterince okul açmak ve öğretmen yetiştirmek için bütçesi olmadığını savunmuştur.

Bununla birlikte, Amerikan belgelerinde Büyükelçi Grew'in Bursa'daki Amerikan okulunda yaşanan hadisenin yasal dayanağını açıklamakta zorlandığı görülmüştür. Lozan Barış Antlaşması ile uzun yıllardır süregelen savaş halinden kurtulan Türkiye, 1920'lerde saltanatın ve hilafetin kaldırılması, yönetim sistemi olarak cumhuriyetin kabul edilmesi, batı tarzı kanunların kabulü gibi reformlarla modern, laik, demokratik bir ulus-devletin temelini atmıştır. 3 Mart 1924 tarihli Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu ile ülkedeki bütün eğitim kurumları Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı bünyesinde birleştirilerek din görevlilerini yetiştirmek için üniversitelerde ilahiyat fakültelerinin açılması kararlaştırılmıştır. Böylece, eğitimde yetkiyi elinde toplayan Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı din eğitimi veren medreseleri kapatmış, bunun yerine önce İstanbul Üniversitesi'nde İlahiyat Fakültesi, ardından fakülteye öğrenci yetiştirmek için imam ve hatip okulları açmıştır. Yeni eğitim sistemi ile laik bir eğitim hedeflediğinden, Bakanlık dini dersleri müfredattan kademeli olarak kaldırmıştır. Ülkedeki tüm yabancı okullara gönderilen genelge ile de dini esaslara ve dini propagandaya dayalı eğitimin yasaklandığı ve bu kurala uymayan yabancı okulların kapatılacağı bildirilmiştir. Bu çalışmada, konuyla alakalı Türk mevzuatı ve Misyoner Komiserleri Üst Kurulunca da Amerikan okullarına bildirim yapılmış olduğunun kabul edildiği açıklanmıştır.

Cumhuriyetçiler döneminde ikili ilişkiler, düzenlemeye ihtiyaç duyulan alanlarda anlaşma yapma çabasıyla devam etmiştir. 1923 tarihli Türk-Amerikan Anlaşmasının yürürlüğe girmemesi nedeniyle, bu tarihlerde Türkiye ile ABD arasındaki ilişkileri düzenleyen temel bir anlaşma bulunmamaktaydı. 1927 yılında resmi ilişkileri başlatan nota teatisi yapılırken bir de ticari ilişkileri düzenleyen nota değişimi yapıldıysa da süresi yalnızca bir yıllıktı ve en fazla iki defa bu şekilde düzenleme yapılabilirdi. Hem Cumhuriyetçiler hem de Roosevelt döneminde resmi ilişkileri düzenleyecek temel bir anlaşma yapılmadığından birçok konuya özel anlaşmalar yapılmıştır. Müzakerelerin başlatıldığı ancak sonuçlanmayan tek alan Türkiye'nin Ermeni meselesiyle ilgili endişeleri nedeniyle Tahkim ve Uzlaşma Anlaşmaları olmuştur. Türk hükümeti, her iki anlaşmaya da sıcak bakmasına rağmen,

Ermenilerle ilgili ilerde sorun olabilecek herhangi bir konuyu dışarda bırakmak için anlaşmaya bir koşul koymak istemesi üzerine Amerikan Dışişleri Bakanı Frank B. Kellogg'un, yerel meselelerin tahkim anlaşmasının konusuna girmediğini ve ABD hükümetinin yabancı bir ülkenin vatandaşları adına bir uzlaşma anlaşmasının hükümlerini öne sürmeye çalışmasının kabul edilemeyeceğini belirtmesi sonucunda anlaşma sağlanamamıştır.

Bu anlaşmaların müzakere edildiği sırada, barış yanlısı olan ve uluslararası işbirliklerini destekleyen Türk dış politikasının doğası gereği Türkiye, Kellogg-Briand Paktının imzalanması ile daha çok ilgilenmiştir. Türk hükümeti, Büyükelçi Grew aracılığıyla pakta kurucu üye olarak katılmayı ABD'ye teklif etmiştir. Grew, Türkiye'nin teklifini uygun bulmuş, bu vesileyle ABD'nin Türkiye'deki itibarını artıracığını, Ortadoğu'nun en güçlü ülkesi olan Türkiye'nin kurucu üye olarak pakta dahil edilmesinin diğer devletleri de olumlu etkileyeceğini ve batılılaştırma süreci desteklenmiş olan Türkiye'nin bu dönemde yakın ilişkiler içinde olduğu Sovyetler Birliği'nden uzaklaştırılacağını savunmuştur. Ancak, Kellogg bu teklifi geri çevirmiştir. Türkiye ise ABD Senatosunca onaylanır onaylanmaz pakta katılacağını büyükelçiye bildirmiştir. Paktın 3. maddesi gereği pakta katılmaya davet edilen ellie yakın devletten biri olan Türkiye, 19 Ocak 1929 tarihinde Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinde üyelikle ilgili kanunu onaylayarak pakta dahil olmuştur. Türkiye'nin barıştan yana tutumunun ve Kellogg Paktına katılımdaki isteğinin Amerikan tarafında takdir topladığı Tefvik Rüştü Bey'e iletilmiştir.

Ticaret konusundaki resmi ilişkiler nota değişimi yoluyla 1928 yılında bir kez daha düzenlense de daha ileri götürülemediğinden, 1929 yılında bir ticaret anlaşması için müzakereler başlamıştır. Hem gümrük hem de denizcilik konusunda en çok kayırlan ulus muamelesine dayalı kısa bir anlaşma yapmak amacıyla görüşen taraflar birkaç ay içinde sonuca vararak 1 Ekim 1929 tarihinde beş maddeden oluşan Ticaret ve Seyrisefain Antlaşmasını imzalamıştır. Bu anlaşma ile ticari ilişkiler ve tarafların gemilerinin birbirlerinin denizlerinde milli gemiler gibi değerlendirilmesi konusu resmi bir kimlik kazanmıştır. Ticari alanın sorunsuzca düzenlenmesini ardından ikamet ve yerleşim alanlarında müzakereler gündeme gelmiştir. Her iki ülkenin kendi ulusal yasalarına ilişkin endişeleri nedeniyle müzakereler biraz daha zor geçse de, göç düzenlemeleri hariç bırakılarak sonuca ulaşılmış, 28 Ekim 1931 tarihinde imzalanan

iki maddelik Yerleşme ve İkamet Antlaşması ile iki tarafın vatandaşlarına ve şirketlerine yerleşme, ikamet, mali suçlamalar ve yargı yetkisi açısından en çok kayırılan ulus muamelesi kabul edilmiştir.

Roosevelt döneminde Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri, ihtiyaç duyulan alanlarda anlaşmalar yapma çabasıyla devam etmekle birlikte bu dönemi Cumhuriyetçi başkanlar döneminden ayıran en önemli özellik, iki ülke liderleri Roosevelt ve Atatürk'ün birbiri ile geliştirdiği özel diyalog olmuştur. Atatürk ile Cumhuriyetçi başkanlar ulusal bayram kutlamaları vesilesiyle resmi bir şekilde diyalog kurarken Roosevelt ile iletişim zamanla samimiyet kazanmıştır. Atatürk, 1933'te ABD'de meydana gelen trajik olaylar üzerine Roosevelt'e bir mesaj göndermiş, Los Angeles'ta deprem ve ardından bir yolcu zeplininin düşmesi hadiselerinden duyduğu üzüntüyü ifade etmiştir. Roosevelt, aynı yıl New York'ta Türkiye Amerikan Dostları Derneğince Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin onuncu yılını kutlamak amacıyla düzenlenen toplantıya, Türkiye'nin izlediği yolu başarılı bulduğunu ve Atatürk'ün politikalarını takdir ettiğini belirten bir tebrik mesajı göndermiştir. Atatürk, Roosevelt'in jestine, Türk milletinin Amerikan milletine ve onların kudretli Başkanına karşı dostluk duyduğu mesajıyla cevap vermiştir. Bir başka samimi olay da 1933-36 yılları arasında görev yapan Amerika'nın Türkiye Büyükelçisi Robert Peet Skinner'ın Roosevelt'in pul koleksiyonculuğuyla ilgilendiğini belirterek yeni çıkan bir dizi Türk pulunu satın almak için başvurduğunu öğrenen Atatürk'ün, bu pulları Roosevelt'e hediye etmesidir. Roosevelt ise teşekkür mektubunda, pullarda tasvir edilen manzaraları kendi gözleriyle görmek istediğini belirtmiştir. İki liderin diyalogunun zamanla dostluk seviyesine geldiğini gösteren bir diğer yazışma da 1937'de Beyaz Saray'da Atatürk ve devrimlerini konu alan filmi izleyen Roosevelt'in, Atatürk'ün kısa sürede meydana getirdiği pek çok yeniliğe duyduğu heyecanı ifade ettiği, Atatürk ve kızının plajda oynadıkları görüntülerin kendisini mutlu ettiğini bildirdiği ve sözlerini "içtenlikle" bitirdiği mektubudur.

Roosevelt döneminde ikili ilişkilerin en hassas konusu, 1. Dünya Savaşı sırasında yer değiştiren Ermenilerin geride bıraktıkları mal varlığına ilişkin talepleridir. İddialar ağırlıklı olarak, Türklerin Ermenilerin mallarını müsadere etmesi ve varlıklarına el koymasıyla ilgilidir. ABD'nin, Amerika'da yaşayan Ermenilerin iddialarını içeren başvuru dosyalarının toplam maliyetinin 55 milyon dolar olduğunu

bildirerek Türkiye’den 5 milyon dolar talep etmesiyle müzakereler başlamıştır. Teklif, ABD’nin dava dosyalarının içeriğinin savunulabilir olduğundan emin olmaması, her dosyanın tek tek incelenmesinin getireceği yük ve uzlaşamayacak konuların tahkime gideceği riski göz önünde bulundurulduğunda konuya hızlı bir çözüm getirmek amacıyla makul olduğu düşünülerek belirlenmiştir. Türkiye’nin dosyaları görmek istemesi üzerine her iki ülkenin temsilcilerinden oluşan bir komisyon kurulmuş, üyeler dosyaları tek tek incelemekten belirli bir fiyat üzerinde anlaşmaya çalışmıştır. ABD’nin 5 milyon dolarlık teklifine karşı Türkiye’nin 500 bin dolar teklif ettiği görüşmeler yaklaşık bir yıl sürmüştür. Sonuçta, 1934 yılı sonuna doğru, Türk tarafının 13 taksitle ödeyeceği 1.300.000 dolarlık bir ödeme planı yapılmış, ancak Amerikalı komisyon üyesi Fred Kenelm Nielsen’in ödeme aşamasında dosyaları tek tek incelediğinde kararlaştırılan miktarın bile çok olduğu anlaşılmıştır. Ödemenin son dört taksitinin alınmayacağını bildirildiği Türkiye’nin o dönemdeki Washington Büyükelçi Münir Bey, ABD’nin dürüst davranışından son derece etkilenmiş, Ermeni iddialarının çözüm şekli ikili ilişkilerde olumlu bir gelişme olarak yerini almıştır.

Olumlu sonuçlanan anlaşma müzakerelerinden biri de suçluların iadesine ilişkin anlaşmadır. Aslında, ABD 1923’te Lozan’da imzalanan Suçluların İadesi Antlaşmasını onaylamayı teklif etmiş, ancak Türkiye’nin revizyon istemesi üzerine görüşmeler duraksamıştır. O esnada, hileli iflas ve dolandırıcılık suçlamasıyla tutuklama emrine rağmen ülkeden kaçan Amerikalı işadamı Samuel Insull’un Avrupa’ya sığınması, önce Fransa, ardından İtalya ve Yunanistan’a kaçması, ABD’yi Türkiye ile bir an önce bir iade anlaşması yapma konusunda harekete geçirmiştir. Sonuçta, Türkiye 1923 Antlaşmasını yürürlüğe koymayı kabul etmiş, Insull Türkiye’ye sığınmak istediğinde ABD’ye iade edilmiştir.

Bu dönemde, Ermenilerle ilgili konular Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinde yer tutmaya devam etmiştir. 1933 yılında Avusturyalı yazar Franz Werfel, 1915 tarihli tehcir kararının ardından Hatay’da bulunan Musa Dağı’nda direnişe geçen Ermenilerin hikayesini konu alan *Musa Dağında Kırk Gün* adlı romanını yayınlamıştır. Kitap, Türkiye’nin yanı sıra Avusturya, İsviçre, Almanya gibi ülkelere protesto edilmekle birlikte güçlü bir Ermeni lobisi bulunan ABD’de 1934’te basılmaya başlanmış, aynı yılın sonunda romanın filme uyarlanması mevzusu gündeme gelmiştir. Türkiye’nin Washington Büyükelçisi Münir Bey Dışişleri Bakanlığı’nı ziyaret ederek söz konusu

durumun kabul edilemez olduğunu, filmin çekilmesi halinde Amerika’da Türk karşıtı duyguları besleyeceğini belirtmiştir. Konuyla ilgili yetkisi bulunmayan ABD Dışışleri Bakanlığı, Türk hükümetinin 1915 olaylarına ilişkin hassasiyetini kabul ederek film yapım şirketinin Türk Büyükelçiliğine onaylatmadan harekete geçmeyeceğini bildirmiştir. Türkiye Dışışleri Bakanlığına da iletilen senaryo ne büyükelçilikten ne de Bakanlıktan onay almamış, konu zaman zaman gündeme gelmeye devam etse de bu dönemde romanın filme uyarlanması gerçekleşmemiştir.

Anlaşma müzakereleri sorunsuz bir şekilde devam ederken bir yandan Büyük Buhranın etkilerinden kurtulmaya çalışan diğer yandan da yaklaşmakta olan savaşa karşı ekonomik önlemler almaya çalışan her iki ülkenin de temel endişe alanı ticaret olmuştur. Büyükelçi Skinner, ABD ile Türkiye arasındaki ticaret dengesinin ABD’nin aleyhine olmasından dolayı endişesini dile getirmiş, soruna çözüm bulmak için Birleşik Devletler Dışışleri Bakanlığıyla sık sık iletişime geçmiştir. Büyükelçi, önce kotasız yeni bir ticaret antlaşması önerdiyse de, bu durum Amerika’nın korumacı ekonomi politikası açısından uygun bulunmadığından Bakanlıkça reddedilmiş, daha sonra Türk silahlanma projelerinde Amerikalı firmaların yer almasının teşvik edilmesini savunmuş fakat bu da ABD’nin silahsızlanmayı destekleyen politikasına aykırı bulunmuştur. Skinner’ın endişesi Türkiye’nin 1936 yılında dış ticarete kota sistemini kaldırarak Amerikan mallarının Türk pazarına girmesini kolaylaştırması ile sona ermiştir. ABD ticareti için müspet olan bu gelişme, zaten döviz sıkıntısı çekmekte olan Türkiye’nin ticaret sorununu daha da derinleştirmiştir. 1939 yılında iki ülke arasındaki mevcut ticari sorunların giderilmesi ve ticaretin geliştirilmesi hedeflenerek yeni bir ticaret antlaşması yapıldıysa da bu durum Türk ticareti için verimli olmamıştır.

Sonuç olarak bu tez, Cumhuriyetçi başkanlar Coolidge ve Hoover dönemleri ile Roosevelt başkanlığı döneminde Türkiye ile ABD arasındaki ikili ilişkileri incelemekte ve dönemin öne çıkan konularında başkanların rolünü sorgulamaktadır. Bu çalışmaya göre, iki ayrı dönemde incelenen konular birbirinin devamı niteliğindedir. İlgili birincil kaynakların analizinin bir sonucu olarak, Cumhuriyetçi başkanlar döneminde ikili ilişkilerde ana konular diplomatik ilişkilerin yeniden kurulması, Türkiye’deki Amerikan okulları ile ilgili çeşitli hususlar, ABD’deki “Korkunç Türk” imajının giderilme çabaları ve gerekli alanlarda akdedilen anlaşmalar olmuştur. Roosevelt döneminde yeni anlaşmalar yapılmaya devam edilmiş, ABD’de

“Korkunç Türk” imajının eskisi kadar baskın olmadığı anlaşılmış, Amerika’da Türk karşıtı bir filmin çekilmesi söz konusu olduğunda Dışişleri Bakanlığının resmi olarak yetkili olmamasına rağmen gayrı resmi yollarla sorunu çözmek için çabaladığı görülmüştür.

Her iki dönemde de ikili ilişkilerde krize neden olan olaylara rastlanmamıştır. Cumhuriyetçiler döneminde Bursa’da bulunan Amerikan okulundaki Türk öğrencilerin din değiştirmesi meselesi ikili ilişkilerde gerilime neden olabilecek hassas bir sorun olarak ortaya çıkmış, ancak nispeten zorlanmadan çözülmüştür. Büyükelçi Grew’in ılımlı tavrı, Türk hükümetinin istemesi halinde alacağı tek bir kararla Türkiye’deki Amerikan okullarını kapatılabileceğinin farkında olması, bu konunun çözümüne yardımcı olmuştur. Roosevelt döneminde ise, 1915 olaylarından kaynaklanan Ermeni iddialarına karşılık Türkiye’nin belli bir tazminat ödemeyi kabul etmesi ile sonuçlanan Ermeni talepleri konusu, tazminat tutarının iki yıl sonra güncellenmesi ve ödeme miktarının azaltılması ile iki tarafı birbirine yaklaştırmıştır.

İkili ilişkilerde temel endişe alanı Roosevelt döneminde ticari ilişkiler iken Cumhuriyetçiler döneminde Amerikan okulları meselesi olmuştur. İki savaş arası dönemde, iki ülke arasındaki ticaret dengesi Türkiye’nin lehine olmasına rağmen, özellikle 1935’ten sonra Türkiye’nin ABD’den ithalatının ihracatından daha hızlı artması döviz sorununu ortaya çıkarmış, bu da ekonomiye yeni bir yön vermeyi gerektirmiştir. ABD, Cumhuriyetçiler döneminin temel meselesi olan I. Dünya Savaşı sırasında kapatılan Amerikan okullarının yeniden açılması konusunda pek ilerleme kaydedememiştir. Bu tezde, 1927-1939 yılları arasında, ABD ve Türkiye’nin karşılıklı sorunlara çözüm bulmak için olumlu bir iletişim içinde olduğu, ancak stratejik ortak olarak değerlendirilemeyeceği sonucuna varılmıştır. ABD’nin bu dönemdeki tutumu, tarih sahnesinde yeni olan bir devlet ile ihtiyaç duyulan alanları düzenleme şeklinde gelişmiştir.

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