



**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
INSTITUTE FOR GRADUATE STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
(1991–2019)**

MASTER’S THESIS

BÜŞRA SARI

MASTER OF ARTS IN PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES

AUGUST 2021



**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
INSTITUTE FOR GRADUATE STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
(1991–2019)**

MASTER’S THESIS

**BÜŞRA SARI
175411009**

**THESIS SUPERVISOR
ASST. PROF. DR. RESUL YALÇIN**

MASTER OF ARTS IN PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES

AUGUST 2021

STATEMENT ON ACADEMIC INTEGRITY

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all materials and results that are not original to this work. I declare that this thesis is written according to the writing rules of Social Sciences University of Ankara, Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences.

Name and Surname: Büşra SARI

Signature:

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge everyone who played a role in my academic accomplishments. First of all, to my thesis supervisor, who supported and guided me with his intellectual knowledge, patience and dedication. Secondly, I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. Sabir Askeroğlu who introduced and helped me to understand the regional parameters of Russia with his deep field knowledge. I am also thankful to my dissertation committee members Assoc. Prof. Dr. Meryem Hakim and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erman Akıllı for their valuable contributions and guidance. Last but not the least, I owe a debt of gratitude to my family and my best friends for their unconditional love and persistent encouragement throughout the research process.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ii
ÖZET	v
ABSTRACT	vi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	vii
CHAPTER 1	1
INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT	2
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS	3
1.3. RESEARCH AIMS	3
1.4. SIGNIFICANCE AND THE PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH	3
1.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	4
1.6. RESEARCH SCOPE	4
1.7. LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS	4
1.8. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS	5
1.9. LITERATURE REVIEW	5
(a) Literature on foreign policy and the role of leadership	6
(b) Studies on Russian Leaders	7
CHAPTER 2	12
POST-SOVIET LEADERSHIP IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY	12
2.1. THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN FOREIGN POLICY	13
2.2. THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY	14
CHAPTER 3	21
YELTSIN'S LEADERSHIP: RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY PERCEPTION AND PRIORITIES (1991-1999)	21
3.1. THE EFFECT OF KOZYREV AND ATLANTIC SCHOOL IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY	26
3.1.1. Policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)	30
3.2. THE CHANGING PERCEPTIONS IN 1993-1996	32
3.2.1. The Western Threat Perception Reborn: NATO Enlargement	33
3.2.2. The Blizhneye Zarubyezh (Near Abroad) Policy	35
3.2.3. The Karaganov Doctrine	35

3.2.4. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).....	36
3.3. RUSSIA'S CHANGING FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES: YELTSIN'S SECOND PRESIDENTIAL TERM.....	38
3.3.1. Eurasianism and the Primakov Doctrine (1996-1998)	38
3.3.2. Russia's 'Balanced' Foreign Policy: Orientations in CIS, Asia and Middle East Regions	41
CHAPTER 4	46
PUTIN'S RISE TO POWER: NEW LEADERSHIP IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY (The First Term: 1999-2008).....	46
4.1. DOMINATING IDEOLOGY FOR THE POST-2000 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: 'PRAGMATIST STATISM'	47
4.2. PUTIN'S 'GREAT RUSSIA STRATEGY' IN 2000-2001	49
4.3. PUTIN'S CIS PROJECT: A NEW SOVIET UNION REBORN?.....	51
4.4. RUSSIA-US RELATIONS: ANTI-TERROR ALLIANCE AFTER 9/11.....	54
4.5. RUSSIA-EU RELATIONS: FOUR COMMON SPACES	56
4.6. THE CRITICAL POINT IN US-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE: 2003 IRAQ INVASION	57
4.7. CRISIS IN RELATIONS WITH THE WEST: THE EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT	58
4.8. WESTERN PRESENCE IN RUSSIA'S NEAR ABROAD: COLOR REVOLUTIONS (2003-2008)	60
CHAPTER 5	64
MEDVEDEV'S PRESIDENTIAL PERIOD: THE REFLECTION OF 2008 FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (2008-2012)	64
5.1. THE DETERMINANT FACTORS OF MEDVEDEV'S FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA	67
5.2. RUSSO-GEORGIA RELATIONS: THE AUGUST WAR (2008).....	68
5.3. UKRAINE-RUSSIA GAS CRISIS IN 2009	70
5.4. RUSSIA'S MULTIPOLARITY DISCOURSE.....	71
5.5. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY: MEDVEDEV'S SOLUTION	72
5.6. THE EU INVOLVEMENT IN RUSSIA'S NEAR ABROAD: THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP (EaP) PROGRAM	73
5.7. SOFT POWER STRATEGY OF RUSSIA TOWARD ITS NEAR ABROAD.....	75
5.8. RUSSIA'S FAILED EXPECTATIONS: VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH.....	76

5.9. MOLDOVA'S EUROPEAN COALITION	77
CHAPTER 6	80
PUTIN AGAIN: THE THIRD TIME AS RUSSIAN PRESIDENT	80
6.1. PUTIN'S FOREIGN POLICY PARADIGMS: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTS.....	86
6.1.1. The Post-2012 Pragmatic Reflections on Putin's Foreign Policy	86
6.1.2. Basic Documents: The Foreign Policy Concept and National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation.....	89
6.2. PUTIN'S ASSERTIVE FOREIGN POLICY	91
6.2.1. The Ukraine Crisis and The Annexation of Crimea in 2014.....	93
6.2.2. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).....	95
6.3. RUSSIA'S REAFFIRMATION OF ITS GREAT POWER STATUS	97
6.3.1. Putin's Axis in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)	99
6.3.1.1. Syrian Intervention	100
6.3.1.2. Russia's Libya Policy under Putin's Rule	101
6.3.1.3. Russia as Mediator for Israel-Palestine Conflict	103
6.3.2. Russia as Energy Superpower	105
CHAPTER 7	109
CONCLUSION.....	109
BIBLIOGRAPHY	115
CURRICULUM VITAE	127

ÖZET

RUS DIŞ POLİTİKASINDA LİDERLİĞİN ROLÜ (1991-2019)

BÜŞRA SARI

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Barış ve Çatışma Programı

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Resul YALÇIN

Ağustos 2021

Bu tez, Sovyetler Birliği'nin 1991 yılındaki dağılmasından başlayıp 2019'a kadar süregelen Rus dış politikasındaki liderliğin rolüne ilişkin bir çalışmadır. Rusya Federasyonu Başkanlığı görevini yürüten üç liderin liderlik tutumlarını, dış politika karar, eylem ve bunlara ilişkin etkenleri ele almaktadır. Rusya Federasyonu 1991'den 2019'a kadar, dış politika eğilimleri farklılık gösteren ve dış politika kararlarının dönemin şartları ve başkanlık dönemlerinde öne çıkan Rus ulusal çıkarlarını da içeren pek çok değişkenle şekillendiği, üç farklı devlet başkanı tarafından yönetilmiştir. Dolayısıyla, bu çalışmanın amacı üç devlet başkanının liderlik biçimlerinin Rus dış politikas içinde nasıl şekillendiğini ve Rus dış politikasına nasıl yansıdığını göstermek ve yürüttükleri özgü dış politika hamlelerinin arkasında yatan nedenlere ilişkin açıklama sunmaktır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, bu çalışma yedi bölümden meydana gelmektedir; birinci bölüm, tezin amacı, önemi, araştırma soruları, sınırlılıkları, bölüm özetleri ve tezin araştırma yöntemini içeren bir giriş bölümü niteliğindedir. İkinci bölümde Rus dış politikasında Sovyet sonrası liderlik rolü tartışılmıştır. Sonraki dört bölüm Rus dış politikasında değişen liderlik rolü ve algısıyla beraber, üç liderin de liderlik rolü detaylı bir şekilde sunulmuştur. Nitekim, üçüncü bölümde Yeltsin'in, dördüncü bölümde Putin'in, beşinci bölümde Medvedev'in ve altıncı bölümde 2012 sonrası Putin'in liderlik rolü, değişen şartlar ve özgün dış politika hamleleriyle birlikte tartışılmıştır. Son bölüm ise, sonuç niteliği taşımaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rus dış politikası, liderlik rolü, Yeltsin, Medvedev ve Putin'in liderlik rolleri.

ABSTRACT

A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY (1991–2019)

BÜŞRA SARI

MA, Department of International Relations

Program of Peace and Conflict Studies

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Resul YALÇIN

August 2021

This thesis is a study of the role of leadership in Russian foreign policy from 1991 to 2019. The study attempts to explain the leadership roles of the three Russian presidents within the context of their foreign policy decisions, actions and related parameters. Over the periods from 1991 to 2019, the Russian Federation has been led by three different presidents, whose foreign policy tendencies differed and their decisions were shaped by many factors determined by the circumstances of the time and the prioritized Russian national interests. Accordingly, the aim of this thesis is to show in which circumstances these leadership roles have been formed and how they were reflected into Russian foreign policy by providing the reasons behind specific foreign policy moves during the rule of the three leaders. For this purpose, the thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter consists of the introduction and is organized to describe the aims and importance of the thesis, the research questions, limitations of the thesis, the methodology of the research and the literature review. The second chapter constitutes the leadership role in post-Soviet foreign policy. The next four chapters provide a detailed presentation of each three presidents' leadership roles along with the changing leadership perception and role in Russian foreign policy. Thus, Yeltsin's leadership role is discussed in the third chapter, Putin in the fourth, Medvedev in the fifth and Putin's post-2012 period in the sixth chapter, touching upon the changing patterns and specific moves of foreign policy during their presidency periods. The final section is the conclusion.

Keywords: Russian foreign policy, the role of leadership, the leadership roles of Yeltsin, Medvedev and Putin.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Baltic States	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
BSEC	Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
Comintern	Communist International
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
DUMA	Gosudarstvennaya Duma, ‘State Assembly’ of Russia
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
ECU	Eurasian Customs Union
ENP	European Union's <i>European Neighborhood Policy</i>
EU	European Union
EurAsEC	Eurasian Economic Community
G-7	Group of Seven
G-8	Group of Eight
GNA	Government of National Accord
ICBMs	Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IS	Islamic State
ISFED	International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, ‘The Committee for State Security’
MENA	The Middle East and North Africa region

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NOC	National Oil Corporation
NSC	National Security Concept
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RIC	Russia, India, China
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SES	Single Economic Space
SLBMs	Submarine-Launched Ballistic missiles
SORT	The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
SVR	Sluzhba vneshney razvedki Rossiyskoy Federatsii, ‘The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation’
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis attempts to analyze the leadership roles of the three Russian Federation presidents, namely Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev and Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, who headed the country following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and focuses on the reflection of their decisions and actions over Russian foreign policy. It is important to point out here that the analysis this thesis provides is from Western point of view, and depends on Western oriented sources. Another point is that this work does not intend to provide an analysis of the characteristics and personal leadership traits of these leaders, or any psychological assessment of their decisions and policies. This thesis tries to examine broadly the prominent and specific foreign policy moves of the Russian Federation from 1991 to 2019 under each of the above-mentioned leaders and provides an explanation of their leadership roles in Russian foreign policy. 2004 was a transformation year for Russian foreign policy, in which the foreign policy goal now went beyond the scope of keeping the Russian Federation strong to making Russia re-join the international relations as a powerful actor as if a phoenix rising from the ashes of the Soviet ruins. This is not surprising, though, that rooted in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union tradition, the Russian Federation would turn to military and defense industry to regain its position in the global affairs and international arena. Thus, the period of making Russia stand up in international order has called for a more assertive foreign policy particularly for the post-2004 period, Putin's second term in presidency, beginning with the war with Georgia and ending up in a conflict with Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in March 2014. Russia's seizure of Crimea was the first time since the Second World War that a European state invaded the territory of another.

The leadership role in Russian foreign policy from 1991 to 2019 has changed from the soft and cooperative policies to the pro-active and aggressive decisions. While the leadership role in Yeltsin's period engaged the cooperative and pro-Western foreign policies, Putin has carried out more active and audacious foreign policy decisions by

also standing out as Prime Minister of Medvedev's leadership period. It is undeniable that these three leaders have their own way of political priorities, the principles of Russian national interests required by their presidential periods, domestic turmoil, and international politics during each of their leadership years. Thus, this thesis focuses on the changing leadership roles in Russian foreign policy by analyzing various prominent foreign policy decisions of the three leaders through the events from the year 1991 to 2019.

Consequently, this thesis employs the idea that from 1991 to 2019 leadership role in Russian foreign policy has transformed from Yeltsin to the current leader Putin in such a way that Russia which was pro-Western and struggling to join among the European states and open to cooperation with the West during the years 1991-2004 has turned into assertive policies. Russian 'national interests' stand out with the emphasis on the importance of its immediate neighbors and the image of the Russian Federation as regional and global power.

1.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT

This research focuses on the leadership role in Russian foreign policy between 1991 and 2019. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 26, 1991, three different leaders/presidents, namely Yeltsin, Putin and Medvedev ruled the Russian Federation. During the rule of all these leaders, the Russian Federation has adopted dissimilar foreign policies and decisions. So much so that the cooperative and intimate policies toward the Western states under Yeltsin's leadership faced off against Putin's proactive strategies in Russian foreign policy. Thus, this thesis will provide an analysis of various prominent foreign policy actions taken during these 28 years under the three Russian leaders, and attempts to unearth the roles these three leaders have played in transforming Russian foreign policy. This thesis also tries to understand the motives behind this transformation in Russian foreign policy under the rule of these leaders by giving an account of each of the three leader's roles by touching upon the prominent foreign policy actions and decisions in their presidential periods.

1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This thesis will attempt to look for answers to the following questions;

- What impact did Russian leadership have on Russian foreign policy in 1991-2019?
- What were the parameters and (domestic/international) events of the foreign policy decisions of each leader, which effected their specific leadership perception?

1.3. RESEARCH AIMS

The main aim of this thesis is to assess the role of leadership within Russian foreign policy through examining the specific foreign policy decisions and actions taken by each of the Russian Federation leaders from 1991 to 2019. In this respect, this study will try to show the correlation between the developments and the changing leadership roles in Russian foreign policy.

1.4. SIGNIFICANCE AND THE PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH

The reflection of the leadership role in Russian foreign policy in the beginnings of the 1990s and 2019 has differed both in terms of leadership understanding in Russian foreign policy as well as how the leadership role has operated Russian foreign policy priorities, decisions and actions. The purpose and significance of this study lies in the presentation of the transformation of the leadership role in Russian foreign policy under the presidency of the three Russian leaders, based upon noteworthy foreign policy decisions within their terms in office. Beginning in the 1990s up until post-2004 period, Russian foreign policy has evolved from prioritizing of cooperation and building good relations with the West into the applications of more concrete and even audacious decisions to ensure what Russian national interests require, such as the Russian attitude in the gas crisis with Ukraine in 2009, or the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Although there are studies on the comparison of Russian leaders in terms of their policies, this

thesis alternatively bridges over the changing leadership roles and the political applications of these leaders in Russian foreign policy.

1.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The qualitative research method is used in the research process of this thesis. Academic articles, books, book chapters, online newspaper articles, news, reports and English versions of Russia's foreign policy concepts have been used while conducting the research. However, some numerical data were also benefitted for providing the figures on Russia's natural reserves and economic outlook, the population rates of Russian ethnic groups in some countries and the national support rates for the leaders, namely Putin. In this respect, CIA Report in 2011 and the studies of Guan-fu (1983); Stent (2008); Kramer (2009); Yapıcı (2010); Solanko (2011); Kelley (2016); Shapovalova & Burlyuk (2016) and Gurganus & Rumer (2019) have been useful to gather related data. These figures are vital for both indicating the rates of public support for Putin's leadership, for instance, when taking into consideration his being the only Russian president in power more than two terms, and also shedding the light on some Russian foreign policy actions.

1.6. RESEARCH SCOPE

This research covers up the post-Soviet Russian Federation presidential terms of Yeltsin, Medvedev and Putin from 1991 to 2019 in terms of changing leadership role in Russian foreign policy. This study includes the effect of these three leaders on Russian leadership role in conducting their foreign policy viewpoints and how this leadership role has reflected on their specific foreign policy decisions.

1.7. LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS

It is noteworthy to state that this study does not compromise any analysis of the characteristics, personal leadership styles of these three leaders or any psychological assessment of their policies, since they are out of the focus of this thesis. In addition, it is critical that the decision-making process cannot be dissociated from the political

advisors within the leaders' political periphery, such as the ones with the same political backgrounds, or the oligarchs, who started to rise economically and politically following the loan for shares policy of Yeltsin, who had the oligarchs' support for the 1996 elections. However, the inclusion and effect of these political advisors into foreign policy conducting are limited in this research because the role of these leaders in foreign policy stands out mostly. Moreover, the research for this thesis has been made mostly from the secondary and English-written sources from mostly Western point of view, including academic articles, books, news etc. Thus, the contribution of native Russian works lacks in this study.

1.8. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

This thesis is composed of seven sections. The first chapter provides an introduction, which includes the scope of the thesis, the purpose (s) of the current topic, the research questions the thesis tries to answer, the related limitations, the literature review and the methodology. The second chapter provides post-Soviet leadership in Russian foreign policy. The next four chapters refer the main discussion parts of this thesis by introducing the leadership styles of the three leaders in the context of their foreign policy priorities, agenda and applications. It is noteworthy, however, to state that the sections of the leaders are classified as their date of taking office. Thus, the third chapter begins with the Yeltsin period, the four provides Putin's first two terms, the fifth comprises Medvedev's period and the sixth chapter focuses on Putin's third and fourth presidential term until 2019. In this respect, the evaluation section of Putin's leadership and presidency is provided at the end of his post-2012 presidential term, together with his first two terms between 2000 and 2008. The seventh as last chapter constitutes the conclusion part. This section provides an overall evaluation of the leadership roles of the three leaders and their foreign policies.

1.9. LITERATURE REVIEW

In this thesis, the resources written in English were benefitted mostly, though few Turkish academic articles and books were also included in the process of writing. As for establishment of a better understanding of the literature used in this thesis, two

parts are provided which are the sources of the role of leadership in foreign policy and the works on foreign policy of the Russian Federation during Yeltsin, Medvedev and Putin periods.

(a) Literature on foreign policy and the role of leadership

In the literature on foreign policy, the area of studies changes from the definition, scope, parameters, actors to decision-making process. In Ahmed's work (2020), foreign policy refers to be an indispensable parameter for states to develop relations with each other. However, its scope and parameters vary for different scholars, for instance, while Rosenau (1984) puts the effects of domestic politics, the decision-making process, the effect of leader etc., into foreign policy process. He discusses, more specifically, five critical factors serving to grasp the foreign policy process and primary interests of states, which are idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal, and systemic. Morgenthau (1949), on the other hand, attributes importance the acts and desired outcomes by emphasizing national interests in their foreign policy definitions. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin's joint study (2002) provides a well-defined determinants of foreign policy, both externally, namely the international system, international organizations, alliances, and also domestic factors, i.e. culture, history, public opinion or personality traits of political leaders as well as the effects of non-governmental organizations, pressure groups, or the elites within the country. Apart from that, as Jensen argues (1982), some societal determinants as national character play crucial role in determining the foreign policy orientation of a state. Coplin (1974) provides a detailed actors-oriented argument by necessitating two main actors as states/nations and non-state actors, and the sub-categories of the latter. However, states are accepted as the main actors and individuals or political leaders as the main decision makers in foreign policy. According to Ahmed's study (2020), the leadership role of the political leaders adopt has an effect on whether or not the foreign policy priority will be aggressive or soft, cooperative or pro-active. Since as Hermann & Hermann (1989) explains while a pacifist leader may turn to enriching relations with other states, an aggressive leader may have make clear-cut decisions such as going into a war without hesitation. Specifically, Wivel & Grøn (2020) focuses on charismatic leaders who prioritize the identity of the nation with the intent of creating a moral unity as well as an instrument to

ensure an acceptance among the citizens. Nikitin's (2008) work specifies leader's role as a determinant factor in shaping foreign policy.

(b) Studies on Russian Leaders

Gorodnia (2018) sheds light on the period after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 and elaborated the changing parameters both for the perception of threat and emergence of a new hegemony in international system, while Nikitin (2008) elaborates the five factors Russian foreign policy has been based on through the years. Furthermore, Timmermann (1992) shapes the framework of current foreign policy understanding and expectations of Russia. Yeltsin's pro-Western, liberal, market economy oriented and cooperation-based foreign policies with the aim of engaging Russia into the Western system and the civilized states are stated in the Goldman's work (1992). Tsygankov (2012) explains the roles of Kozyrev as well as Primakov for the post-1996 policy change, on Yeltsin's policies, into assertive foreign policy that required more focus on Russia's near abroad of former Soviet Republics. Markedonov (2011) elaborates the investment period to Yeltsin's presidency. The CIS region rooted back the Soviet Union is another area of prioritization during Yeltsin term. Willerton argues (1997) that Yeltsin required an equal level of relations between Russia and the CIS, along with inclusion of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus to the Collective Security Treaty Organization in 1992. Litera (1994) highlights Yeltsin's Blizhneye Zarubyezhe (Near Abroad) policy, motivated by Primakov. Bernier (2018) suggests Primakov's rising the position of new Foreign Minister as the successor of Kozyrev brought along policy changes in Russia, in the sense of leaving the pro-Western attitudes as well as abandoning the conciliatory policies toward the West, but adopting a more assertive move in Russian foreign policy, introducing Russia as a counterbalancing state to the USA. His Eurasianism policy based on Russia controlling the heartland, the Eurasia, which also refers the territory of the former Russian Empire, was elaborated in the work of Clover (1999), by touching upon Mackinder's two spheres of power. Duffield (1994) presents the NATO enlargement, which caused Russia's threat perception coming from the West to rise again, despite NATO's initiatives to overcome the perception. Medvedev presidency is assessed in many studies as a necessary interlude to make Putin's third term possible, since the Russian law does not let anyone be elected to the

presidency for a third consecutive term. In this respect, Makarychev (2010) refers Medvedev period, along with Putin taking up the position of the Prime Minister, as a tan-democracy with Putin's overriding control over politics than the president Dmitry Medvedev. The work of Lazarević (2009) and CIDOB International Yearbook (2010) sustain that Medvedev has pursued of Putin's foreign policy against NATO's enlargement, which was even stiffened by NATO's decision concerning Georgia and Ukraine joining the alliance one day. Once the positive declarations toward the integration to the Western system by these states were done, Sauvageot's study (2011) reveals the first response by Russia as the 2008 war with Georgia, and in 2009 a cut in gas transferring to Ukraine.

Solanko's work (2011) sheds light on Russian interest on the profits of energy sector to increase economic output, and he discusses that Russia does not hesitate to use its energy power as a tool in international relations. Although 2009-gas crisis was a display of force for a pro-European Ukraine, Pirani, Stern and Yafimava, (2009) argue that this was a detrimental move for Russia's prestige as an energy partner for Europe, by leaving central European countries without gas. On the other hand, the Russian victory in the war with Georgia supported and proved Russia's rhetoric of multipolar world order, so much so that as Erlanger & Myers (2008) states the retreats from the deployment of anti-missile systems in the Czech Republic and Poland by the US side, as well as the Membership Action Plans to include Georgia and Ukraine by NATO were done. Alternatively, CIDOB International Yearbook in 2010 details Medvedev's suggestion the European Security Treaty as an obstacle for NATO's future plans about Georgia and Ukraine.

Within massive loads of work on Putin presidency, the amount of articles or studies this thesis benefited from lacks of all of these content, of course. One of the vital points in Vladimir Putin's leadership is his approval rating as the Russian Federation president. Kelley's work (2016) clarifies Putin's first presidential term by reaching up to 40% support from the Russian citizens. Although Treisman (2010) provides some political turmoil Putin's period mingled with, stemming from the Yeltsin presidency, Putin still had his own plans for the future of Russian foreign policy. In this respect, the work by González (2013) specifies Putin's first term foreign policy determinants,

namely, pragmatism and collaborative relations with its Western partners. Kasymov's work (2011) shows the dominant ideology of Putin's presidency, including his post-third period, as Pragmatist Statist, strengthening the state's control within the country. Putin maintained his pragmatic agenda in the strategies of foreign relations. In this respect the 9/11 period was utmost importance to shed the light of Putin's cooperation with the USA according to the study of O'loughlin & O'Tuathail & Kolossov (2004). Kellermann (2004) focuses on the progression in the EU level, introducing the Four Common Spaces program. During the 2000s period, Beitāne (2013) puts forward Putin adopted a multivectoral foreign policy by prioritizing Russian-European relations, as well as developing good relations with the non-European powers. Secieru's work (2006) contributes literature concerning another foreign policy agenda of Putin that is pertained to the CIS policy. Secieru elaborates Putin's wish to provide a successful integration process within the CIS, by the leadership of Russia, and what was the basic issue as to the CIS was Russian interests in economic cooperation and acting in a common reaction to security concerns. Although that does not mean that all the CIS were in favor of the big brother role of Russia, particularly after the Soviet hegemony in the region. González (2013) categorizes Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan among more promotive ones, though the economic debts they owed to Russia or economic dependency to Moscow were also among the motives. Apart from the economic issues, what Putin put forward was the historical roots as well as the presence of Russian citizens and the Russian speakers within these states, especially in Ukraine and Belarus. Kirkham (2016) evaluates this move as a new possible Soviet system under the leadership of the Russian Federation, along with Putin's adoption some Tsarist and Soviet symbols, though. Putin's further policy change were discussed in Sarotte's work (2014) as what is accepted as a more anti-Western, assertive and aggressive way was rooted in NATO's role in bombing Kosovo and expanding through Russia's area of interests both in 1999 and 2004. Lynch (2004) provides Russia's new anti-Western policy with the truth of the EU's own enlargement policies in 2004 for the states NATO aimed at and showed its face when the USA decided to realize Iraq Invasion in 2003. The work of Ambrosio (2005) provides justification for Russia's attitude, coming out as opposition, attached with Russia's wish to present itself as a great power who could take a stand against the system hegemony.

The Munich Conference was another vital development for Russian foreign policy and its reflection to the international relations in Putin's second term. So much so that, Giles (2017) displays Putin for the first time declaring Russia's uneasiness concerning the USA-led one-polar world order and presenting Russia as a counterbalance power to the USA. Thien (2009) attributes Russian security concerns with the Western policies aiming at the post-Soviet zone were outreached by the Western involvement in the anti-government uprisings in Russia's near abroad, namely, Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Morozov (2005) says this would also play role in Putin's giving support for the OSCE as an alternative to NATO to ensure the security for Europe. Baldoni (2016) explains Putin's policies with the aims of reaching great power status which is also seen in Russia's military interference in Syria in 2015, agreement for investments in Libya, and in general MENA policies. Another contribution to its great power status came by Russia's becoming the mediator for the conflicts such as Israel-Palestine. Estrin (2012) argues Russia wished to position itself as intermediary who has had the capability to solve the conflicts and to rise as an alternative power to the conflict-creating USA. Moreover, Putin's another strategy to put Russia among the great powers in the world politics is to highlight the advantageous position of Russia in terms of energy resources. In the assessment by Goldman Sachs (2007) Russia makes advantages of her rich energy resources as a tool of boosting Russian economy, which are figured in detail numbers in the work of Gurganus & Ruler (2019).

Putin's leadership has been more decisively shaped after taking the office once again in 2012. As Kumar (2018) quotes from the assessment by Mearsheimer, who depicted Putin's leadership as feared and respected by anyone who challenges him. Russia's activist foreign policy strategy, as in the examples of Crimea in 2014, Syria in 2015, or the overall near abroad policy, is an indicator for a more dominant and daring style of Putin in defending Russia's national interests and foreign policy lines in the role stage. Dugin (2013) expresses Putin's call for conservatism ideology, which combines, Tsarist like factors, religion, nationality and Russia's great power status, in an attempt to keeping its area of interests to become the orbit of the West, as a counter maneuver toward the Western presence in its sphere of interests jeopardizing Russia's security. In

this respect, Avdaliani (2019) puts forward what Putin planned has been to ensure Russia's regional superpower role in its near abroad, which ended up with the annexation in 2014 by means of Russian majority in the region as much as 58.5% . The Ukraine case is also noteworthy among the post-Soviet states. As Roberts (2017) discusses Ukraine, along with Belorussia, are accepted by many Russian officials, Putin himself, too, as coming from the same root with Russia. Thus, encouraged by this thought as well as the number of Russian speakers in these regions, Kumar (2018) suggests that Putin's taking Crimea has been evaluated by Russia as a re-incorporation rather than annexation. Another factor emphasized by Roberts (2017) is NATO's plans for including Georgia and Ukraine, as members for the future, to which Putin severely opposed. Apart from eliminating the Western powers in Russia's near abroad, Dragneva & Wolczuk (2012) requires Putin's integration projects toward the CIS and initiated the Eurasian Economic Union for the post-Soviet geography.

CHAPTER 2

POST-SOVIET LEADERSHIP IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy is a crucial indicator for a state's political orientation and global image in international relations. So much so that, foreign policy decisions of a state is a reflection of various determinants. Rosenau expresses this as follows, "the decision of an individual, the deliberations of a committee, the outcome of a policy-making process, the sum of clashing interests groups, the values of a dominant elite, the product of a society's aspirations, the reinforcement of a historical tradition, the response to an opportunity or challenge elsewhere in the world". (cited in Dugis, 2007) Rosenau puts modern states into the position of prime international actor, but that does not necessarily mean that leader is all alone in directing the state's foreign policy orientation. He is accompanied with many contributing factors and actors in the decision-making process from the interests of the elites to the historical heritage on which state's foreign policy conducting has been based on, which somewhat collaborates with expectations of the society.

Morgenthau, on the other hand, puts emphasis on the foreign policy acts, and states that only through a well analysis of foreign policy acts and possible outcomes, one can be sure of foreign policy character a state has. (1949) Foreign policy includes various components such as the effect of domestic politics, the decision-making process, or leaders into foreign policy process. Leaders, at this point, produce a very determinative effect in a state's foreign policy, because foreign policy decision-makers are political leaders in general terms. As the main actors and subject-definer in national and international politics in foreign policy, how they relate the global or regional interactions with national interests and priorities will determine the strategy they acquire. As an example, perceptions are one of the key points, here, since how political leaders perceive external world decides their reactions accordingly. They define and position the goals, the meaning of interactions and actions of other states as well as other things that may have an impact on the current situation, with an aim of interpreting the situation and specify their aims. (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 2002, p. 59)

That does not mean that they are all alone in shaping a state's foreign policy orientation, though. What is behind a leader's decisions also lies domestic politics, other political groups, administrative/bureaucratic elites, geography, natural resources, political system and military or economic capability. (Schuetz, 1945, p. 534; Hermann & Hagan, 1998, p. 126; Coplin, 1974, p. 28; Jensen, 1982; Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 2002, p. 61; Ahmed, 2020, p. 790) Under the influence of various agents, as a decision-maker, the political leader has its own limits from individual belief systems, his/her level of interest to the current problem and how far s/he can make decisions independently, to background of psychological, educational, familial and characteristics of him/hers.

2.1. THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN FOREIGN POLICY

The role of a leader in a state's foreign policy has contributing effects on the direction of a specific policy. Foreign policy takes shape from national expectations, behaviors and speeches of a leader in a particular way. Whether the leader is aggressive or soft, clear-cut decision-maker or agreeable, or how s/he analyses a current international problem also plays significant role. (Ahmed, 2020) The notion that individual leaders can make a difference in state's position in world politics (or foreign relations) was illustrated in the works of Machiavelli, who, in *The Prince* provided a guide book to young rulers (much as Sun Tzu had for military leaders centuries earlier). The leader's orientation to foreign affairs along with his/her set of views about his/her nation's role in the foreign policy arena, which national interests should be prioritized, tendency toward a pacifist or proactive foreign policy etc., constitutes the style of his/her leadership and bears upon foreign policy outcomes of a state. A pro-peace and cooperative leader may build compatible relations with other states; on the other hand, an aggressive leader may have war without hesitation with the motive of fulfilling the national interests. In this respect, the leader determines a specific political style to deal with foreign policy problems and a national foreign policy strategy to follow. (Hermann & Hermann, 1989) Moreover, the foreign policy orientation of the country takes form under the effect of the perceptions, interpretation of events and actions of other states or actors. Leaders' interpretation framework shapes by their beliefs, goals and experiences about the world and consciousness to the political concept. (Hermann & Hermann, 1989, p. 126)

The importance of the style a political leader would rather to wear on reflects on both the identity of the nation, and the future relations and position of the state. In this respect, a charismatic political leader fulfils these notions by emphasizing the identity on which the nation is positioned via asking the question of who 'we' are, as well as taking the lead and guiding for the future decisions and actions of the state. (Wivel & Grøn, 2020) The term has been attributed to different associations through the years; while Max Weber emphasizes the notion of personal capacity of the charismatic leader in the early twentieth century, Robert Tucker requires a 'charismatic hungry' nation is the ultimate cause of the charismatic leaders. By saying so, the nation itself creates such a leadership portrait in the society with the motive of finding the real identity of themselves. Moreover, because of the political leaders have the opportunity to build a nation's perception by their specific interpretations of the world, especially in the societies with limited or no access to a rational logic, the nation will increasingly need for the interpretations and transference of the leader by his/her own sight. This, in turn, will feed the commitment and the stability the leader needs for his/her direction of the state. It is noteworthy the charismatic leaders should establish a level of acceptance among the citizens to make such a commitment emerge, since in this way s/he turns to use such tools as justifying his/her decisions and actions in an emphasis on value-based right from wrong. Additionally, s/he can provide a moral unity within the state thanks to symbolic measures, and benefit emotional figurations to constitute conviction and passion for the maintenance of the situation. However, such leadership style may create a state of polarization, drifting apart from universal popularity. (Wivel & Grøn, 2020)

2.2. THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

A leader's effect and role have always been a determinant factor in shaping Russian foreign policy. As Nikitin classifies the determinant factors of Russian foreign policy, he puts the leader's character and role in foreign policy decision-making in the very first place. So much so that the foreign policy parameters in Russia have been effected by the leaders' way of responding to the global developments as well as the country's domestic profile and determinants. (2008) Russian foreign policy under Yeltsin and Putin, for instance, varies to a great extent. While Putin's decisions appear as more proactive and venturous, Yeltsin's foreign policy orientation remained limited

to cooperation with the West, besides overshadowed by his two Foreign Ministers, Kozyrev and Primakov.

Yeltsin's giving priority to building a soft web of relations with the West actually dates Gorbachev's 'new thinking' policies in the late 1980s. (Tsygankov, 2012) Gorbachev shaped a new foreign policy, different from the ideology of that of Lenin on class struggles, and put some reforms to break down the perception of the Russians on unquestionability of political issues, and the perception of the West on the Iron Curtain. Gorbachev's reforms would open the door slightly to the moves of softening the anti-Western ideology and mutual national security as well as the independent status of the Eastern part of the USSR. This would lead to the cooperation with and integration into the West. (Mandelbaum, 1998) Yeltsin's leadership could do nothing but strengthened this foreign policy ideology in a way that once Soviets' imperialist West ideology turned to the West as 'the center of the universe and the only actor in world politics'. One of the labels given credit to the imperialist world was 'the civilized world'. (Lukin, 2008) Thus, Yeltsin wished to be included in this 'community of civilized states' in an attempt to get 'outside support for internal transformation'. (Timmermann, 1992) In this context, bilateral relations with the USA were also strengthened because of common international security and cooperation approach Russian leaders owned after the Cold War. (Shearman, 2001) As opposed to Soviet's anti-capitalist ideology in the Cold War, the Russian Federation adopted a westward policy in economic, political, and cultural terms; put market reforms into action and plunged into democratization process, despite being as a junior partner of the civilized West. (Lukin, 2008; Mandelbaum, 1998) Yeltsin prioritized a cooperation-based foreign policy toward the West. He renounced the communist state ideology and adopted a westernizing approach including capitalist and democratic political views. The objective behind such policy was to engage Russia into western civilization as some Russian reformers address to, by abandoning the traditional geopolitics and strategic balances of power. (Shearman, 2001) For this purpose, Yeltsin introduced radical economic reforms, called as the shock therapy, pursuing a full status in transatlantic economic and security institutions, i.e. the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, G-7 and the International Monetary Fund. (Tsygankov, 2012) It is noteworthy that Yeltsin's two Foreign Ministers, Andrei

Kozyrev and Yevgeny Primakov, respectively, were head to head in directing and handling Russian foreign policy. Thus, Yeltsin was not the only decision-maker in formulating Russian foreign policy. While Kozyrev's westernized policy made mark in Russian foreign policy from 1990 till 1996, prioritizing cooperation between the United States, Primakov required a nationalist mood appeared for the period as of 1996. (Wilson Center, 2016; Tsygankov, 2012)

Primakov was widely accepted as a more dominant and strong Foreign Minister than his predecessor Kozyrev. As a matter of fact, Primakov's appearance as the new head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation was an indicator of how institutions, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, did stand out in shaping Russian foreign policy. For throughout the Tsarist and the Communist regimes, the individuals masterminded the foreign policy scheme and national aims rather than the institutions taking active role; however, Primakov's raising the position to the Minister of Foreign Affairs proved a change in Russian foreign policy. (Tripathi, 2021) His foreign policy emphasized Russia's status in international arena as more assertive, especially concerning with its near abroad including the former Soviet Republics. (Shearman, 2001) The motives of Yeltsin's new Foreign Minister based on defending the image of Russia as a strong state, improving relations with non-Western states and taking together the former Soviet states under the control of Moscow. (Tsygankov, 2012; Bernier, 2018) Following the Statist tradition, Primakov's foreign policy included predictable and friendly relations with global, European and Asian economics and political actors, as specified in National Security Concept of 1997, and required for the integration of the CIS in the security matters. (Tsygankov, 2012) The change in Russian foreign policy orientation after 1996 was actually the result of non-response or non-assistance of the West toward Russia's pro-Western foreign vision. On the contrary, NATO expanded toward Eastern Europe excluding Russia from the process. The attitude of the West resulted in Russia's questioning the pro-Western policy objectives; as a result, Russia produced the sense of not being accepted by the West and turned to the Statist's defensive policy. (Tsygankov, 2012) However anti-Western the leadership paradigms in Russian foreign policy from the 1990s to the post-2000 periods may seem, it does not necessarily mean that Russian leaders adopted the policies contradicting with

the western states or organizations just because, simply, to lead anti-Western policies, rather it was meant to make it clear that Russia is not Western. Thus, foreign policy orientations of leaders of Russia during this time focused on what Russian national aims required, either to ally with the West or to oppose Western policies by giving precedence to Russian national interests. (Mankoff, 2009) This balanced policy is seen during Putin's different presidential terms, as well. The attacks in 2001 required a Russo-Western (the US) alliance and served Russian national interests well (even though a particular domestic-benefit for the Chechen War) to get involved among the powerful states in the course of fight against the international terrorism. Nevertheless, Russia did not hesitate to turn to total opposite foreign policy when it came to its sphere of interest as in the Ukraine Crisis in 2014.

It is also crucial to note that Yeltsin's personality and leadership was influential in removing the walls between the Foreign Ministry and its role in determining Russian foreign policy. Yeltsin's pro-Western approach toned down the anti-Western point of view of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Tripathi, 2021) Vladimir Putin's leadership, on the other hand, marks a proactive and assertive foreign policy discourse as well as formulation. The leadership of Putin and Medvedev has run through anti-Western rhetoric, embarking on closer incentive to the Eurasian viewpoint, opposed to Yeltsin, but not necessarily ignored any positive alliance with the West, either. When examining, Putin's leadership consists of both Atlanticist and Eurasianist perspectives, which means Yeltsin's pro-Western foreign policy formulation has diminished though not disappeared completely, but rather weighed down by Eurasianism with the emphasis on Russia's self-identity, status in the global arena and national interests. (Tripathi, 2021). Bobo Loo describes Putin's leadership as, *'His words, tone, actions, demeanor and postures are as much scrutinized as the actual content of his policies. He exudes an air of importance that has uplifted Russia's game in the international domain. Policies during his time have strongly brought Russia back to the great power politics. His actions in Crimea and Georgia, regaining influence in the neighborhood, revising major agreements of the 1990s with the West, Russia's role in the Syrian crisis and steady expansion of ties with China, have all brought Russia back to the Great Game'*. (cited in Tripathi, 2021, p. 9) Putin, as opposed to Yeltsin and Medvedev, is the

prominent leader and decision-maker of all the key policies in Russia from defense, security and foreign affairs beyond other contributing actors and paradigms in foreign policy such as domestic politics, international environment or his political advisors. (Tripathi, 2021, p. 10)

Putin's first phase of presidency went hand in hand in collaboratively with the USA. (Friedman, 2013) The new foreign policy under Putin in the 2000s would include not only maintaining the values of preserving great power status, but also embracing the vision of Russia as a part of the West. (Tsygankov, 2012) The reason for that political change from previous Yeltsin's period is that Putin wished to build a new framework concerning the relations with the USA. In 2001 9/11 attack, he would give their full support, including needed resources, to fight back against global terrorism, although did not provide support for the military intervention of the USA into Iraq. (Tsygankov, 2012 p. 10) In fact, domestic concerns play significant role in Putin's foreign policy agenda. He was aware of the systemic competitiveness in global world and Russia needed western support for domestic reforms, and thus, Putin developed cooperative relations with the West in order to prove Russia to be a trustworthy actor in world affairs. (Medvedev, 2008) However, the cooperative attitude altered because of the USA's unilateral hegemony actions as well as deploying elements of a missile defense system in Europe. Thus, Russia resorted to moving its conventional forces in its territory according to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. The Russian Federation perceived Western policies as disrespectful of Russia's sovereignty and independence.

Putin also gave prominence to Russia's energy role in world markets by building pipelines, increasing energy prices for the oil and gas-dependent neighbors, controlling transportation system in the former Soviet states and coordinating its activities with other energy-producers. (Tsygankov, 2012) Russia's assertive foreign policy provided for ensuring development, stability and security. Of the reasons behind such a policy change, domestic confidence, increasing oil and gas prices, and economic recovery until the 2008 crisis had a vital role. The Russian Federation as of 2000 has also engaged in interstate military disputes such as in Georgia in 2005, Ukraine in 2014, or even in Syria in 2015. Under Dmitry Medvedev's presidency in 2008 until 2012, the underlying

causes of such a severely active foreign policy rest upon several factors such as Russia's economic condition, the vote and popularity concern of leaders by using nationalism discourse, the expansion of NATO and the EU into Russia's sphere of interest, and the changing oil-prices. (Snegovaya, 2019) In 2009, the assertive policy changed into a new phase of cooperation with the USA, once again, afterwards the USA's wish to reset relations with Russia and 2008 financial crisis. (Tsygankov, 2012) What Medvedev focused on was actually the modernization of domestic economy and encourage investments.

Thus, the new approach of Russian foreign policy was to have modernization alliances across the world, which can provide new investments as well as technologies for the country's economic development. From Russia's perspective, the expected support or cooperation has never, at least sufficiently, came from the Western countries. Thus, at the end of 2010 Moscow would propose the European Security Treaty with European nations because of not getting support from NATO and the United States. (Tsygankov, 2012) The different approaches to who will take active role for the global defense in the world between Russia, supporting for the European Security Treaty, and the USA, insisting NATO's role in maintaining Europe's security, created a tension between two states. While Russia wishes to keep its right to protect its sphere of interests concerning the post-Soviet space, the West support for the former Soviet states' membership for NATO.

The post-2012 period in Russian foreign policy was wavy with Russia's economical fragilities and the Primakov Doctrine's aim for Russia as an independent power center from the USA's hegemony. As an important sign that Russia's still within the race for global power, Russia distinguished itself with the eastern Ukraine Crisis in Donbas and Luhansk in February 2014 followed by the annexation of Crimea. This proves Russia's near abroad plans still exist and its ongoing military intervention since 2015 into Syrian has contributed Russia's major power role in the world politics once again. The way the West deals with the Middle Eastern crisis and playing role in fostering regime change in Libya and Syria was a conflicting issue between the West and Russia. (Tsygankov, 2012) However, Russia in a sense needs the West's cooperation, despite discrepancies and the absence of assistance. Russia's fragile

domestic economy, based on mainly oil and gas exports, and Western investments for economic modernization requires such a cooperation, but Russia still does not give up its national and regional interests and motives, and this constitutes the other side of its foreign policy that is assertiveness. (Tsygankov, 2012) In the Ukraine Crisis, in 2014, after the coup on behalf of the West-sided Petro Poroshenko's presidential election, the problem was assessed by Stephen M. Walt as the West's attempt to pull Ukraine out of Russia's sphere of interest. To Walt's point of view, Ukraine constitutes a buffer zone between the East (Russia) and the West rather than belonging to just one of them. (Snegovaya, 2019).

Despite all of these, Russia has followed an activist foreign policy strategy and the above-mentioned events are the indicators of Russia's risk-taking position, along with its warfare capabilities in various areas i.e. land, cyber, sea, air etc. Furthermore, Russia has illustrated how stick it is to the activist policy abroad even though its economy is excessively depended upon the exporting of raw materials and hydrocarbons such as natural gas, fuel oils, petroleum. Despite economic infertility, the Russian Federation carries on resisting the Western sanctions and taking part in the global politics actively. (Gurganus & Rumer, 2019)

CHAPTER 3

YELTSIN'S LEADERSHIP: RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY PERCEPTION AND PRIORITIES (1991-1999)

Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's presidency coincided with a state of chaos and disorder in the Russian nineties. The Russian Federation emerged as the successor of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991; however, there was no specific administrative mechanism since the Soviet Communist Party was no longer an effective arbiter in government, beside lack of legislative framework and army. In the chaos of post-Soviet Russia, the institutions were managed by a combination of Soviet councils at all levels in the whole country from the capital to the deepest countryside. Although some attach the Yeltsin era to losing Russia's (the Soviet's) status as a great power, abandoning the policy of independence and even affronting herself before the West by the new pro-Western perspectives and reforms, Yeltsin's presidential term also experienced investment successes for Russia. (Markedonov, 2011) Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet power produced the local and global instability at the same time; the geopolitical power instability within the borders of Soviet geography and the occupation of American hegemony in the international system and empowering its power and place with such institutions as the NATO which would adopt the policy of enlargement through Eastern Europe in 1999.

Following a new beginning after the Soviet dissolution, the Russian Federation moved on adopting its first foreign policy concept in 1993 along with the first president in its history. The first foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation was shaped within the principles of international law, and more importantly, the prime purpose was specified as protecting Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. (Light, 2015) In this respect, specified as the backyard of Russia, the post-Soviet republics were prioritized in the post-1993 Russian foreign policy and Yeltsin pursued a more proactive and decided policy concerning the CIS. The background reason of Russia's policy toward its near abroad in 1993 was the enlargement policy of NATO, in the same year, through the post-Soviet region. (Mandelbaum, 1998) As a response to the threat to

its territorial integrity caused by the enlargement and containment policy of NATO, Russia took up the defensive realism strategy by rebuilding Russian influence upon the former Soviet republics, and preventing any other third state to involve in this region. NATO's enlargement policy (the West) was perceived as a threat to Russian territorial integrity and national interests. As the post-Soviet region (including the Baltics) was included within the '*crucial vital interests*' of Russian foreign policy in 1993, Russia employed a defensive position both to protect its national interests, to ensure its security and, in the long term, survival of Russia, and also the rights of Russian population in these states. (Litera, 1994, p. 45) The same year, in December 1993, Russia adopted a fresh military doctrine in order to defend the CIS and Baltic corridor due to the same Western threat perception. The Karaganov Doctrine was the second document in the same year emphasizing the Russian interests in the region. This time, though, Russia turned to using its armed forces and other troops in this area for the purposes of: '*protection of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and other vitally important interests of the Russian Federation in the event of aggression launched against it or its allies; the termination of armed conflicts and any unlawful armed violence on the state border or the border of another state in accordance with treaty commitments, or within the bounds of the territory of the Russian Federation that threaten its vitally important interests.*' (Federation of American Scientists, 1993)

1993 military doctrine of the Russian Federation was an indicator of self-help strategy for Russia to take up the responsibility of the CIS with its all military forces when in need to protect its national interests. In this respect, the Collective Security Organization was formed within the CIS requiring united military bodies and troops, joint military operations and training; thus, Russia moved its defensive foreign policy strategy forward by creating a common defense perception against any threat of third countries concerning the member states. NSC 1997 (National Security Concept) states the transformation of international system to multipolar world order at the very beginning and Russia was declared as a great power in international arena. The document defines Russia as a state that is '*an influential European-Asian power with national interests in Europe, the Near East, Central and South Asia, and the Asian and Pacific region*' and requires cooperation between Russia and the CIS member states.

The '*sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia*' are once again emphasized as national interests. International cooperation was based on the partnership and foreign trade. The international threats are signified as '*destroying the Russian Federation's territorial integrity, including actions involving the use of inter-ethnic, religious, and other internal contradictions, and also in territorial claims involving allusions in individual cases*' with an aim to limit Russia's influence in Europe, the Near East, the Transcaucasia and Central Asia. As for internal threats, the emergence of an aggravation or direct threat in the borders of the CIS members concerning political, ethnic and economic crises that were capable of delaying or destroying the integration process is required special importance for the Russian Federation. (Federation of American Scientists, 1997)

The Russian Federation embarked on a cooperative, influential and defensive national security concept for the pre-2000 Putin period. Improving bilateral relations with the CIS member states and taking a stand against NATO enlargement policy were among the post-1997 Russia's foreign policy priorities. Yeltsin took up the West (NATO) threat perception in his second presidency and addressed NATO's enlargement policy to hold the possible threat against destroying Russia's territorial integrity, causing inter-ethnic or religious conflicts. NATO created the security concern in Russia's territorial integrity and caused Russia to keep the territories with all its military capability. Yeltsin's foreign policy envisioning was mixed with domestic post-Soviet leftovers. The Russian foreign policy agenda between 1991 and 1995 was comprised of eluding of corrupt socialist institutions and adopting a capitalist, liberal democratic form of governance, and simply turning Russia into a European state, but by feeding the nationalist passions against the Soviet regime. (Kumar, 2016) A series of reforms from economic privatization including loans-for-shares schemes to political reforms were carried out. As from 1996, a West-centric Russian viewpoint was substituted by a more pragmatic and balanced foreign policy. (Kumar, 2016) The collapse of the country's economic and political institutions limited the country's foreign policy moves framework, as well. To reinvigorate the Russian economy, he adopted Western-type economic reforms i.e. transition to market economy in internal politics. (Goldman, 1992) He also had to compete with social disintegration and political instability that led

to the ethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet geography. Thus, the main paradigm was shaped around domestic fragilities i.e. the continuity of the state which also includes preventing the Communist Party to come back to power, maintenance of the stability in the post-Soviet geography and, inevitably, preventing the imperialistic aims on the country. These domestic fragilities also triggered Yeltsin to seek for a Western support both politically and economically to rise Russia from the Soviet ruins. Both to recover the domestic disturbance and to enhance the ruined Russian image, Yeltsin tried to keep in step with marginalized non-Soviet principles. This 'new' Russian principles addressed to a Westernized perspective in foreign policy with the contributions of Russia's first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Kozyrev.

When Yeltsin took office as the first president of the Russian Federation in June 1991 and appointed Kozyrev as the Minister of Foreign Affairs until mid-1993, the leadership role of Russian foreign policy was comprised of pro-Western, pragmatic and cooperation based ideologies toward the West. Led by both Yeltsin's wish to elude the Cold War hostility, to position Russia among the civilized states and Kozyrev's subsidiary Atlantic foreign policy, Russia enjoyed a two-year honeymoon phase in the relations with the West and the USA in the early period of Yeltsin's first presidential term until 1996. (Marantz, 1997)

During the first two years of presidency, Yeltsin had to solidify his presidential powers as the first post-Soviet president, to ensure clearing the Soviet's hostile and competitive foreign policy toward the West and the USA, especially, and to guarantee Russia's sovereignty as an independent and civilized state. Both to destroy the so-called Soviet perception in the West and also believing that Russia needed a foreign support (especially economic), the years 1991 and 1993 noted a Russia being disposed to cooperate and develop conciliatory relations with the West that would be called as 'Honeymoon Phase' by many. The root of the Westernized foreign policy conducting during these two years is based on Gorbachev's 'New Thinking Policy'. From his footsteps, the belief was that a peaceful and balanced international system could be established. Gorbachev also proved this intention with the actions of ending the hostilities of the Cold War period through negotiation and cooperation with the West, followed by arms deals with the USA in order to put a stop to arms race between the

west and east blocs. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, liberals in Russia required political and economic reforms. In addition to the reforms, radicals led by Yeltsin were in support of a quick pace economic reforms. In furtherance, Yeltsin led a sudden transition to the market economy that had been already planned by him and economist Yegor Gaydar prior to Russia's independence in 1991, but was strengthened and put into practice when Yeltsin took office. (Kumar, 2016) With the aim of getting out of the Soviet difficulties, Yeltsin's economic program included ending price controls and privatizing of state-owned companies. However, new market-oriented Russian economy did produce a hyperinflation, not to mention the appearance of the oligarchs, super rich elite class, and poverty-stricken masses; but not a middle class, because of the swift privatization phase in January 1992. (Marantz, 1992; Hays, 2008) At this point, Yeltsin resorted to enjoying a foreign (Western) economic assistance to overcome inflation, economic turmoil, mass hardship, along with growing political discontent such as the denial of Chechnya and Tatarstan to sign federation treaties as well as the refusal of a number of other republics to take orders from Moscow. Another contributing factor was the fear that the Communists may take the power once again in the 1996 presidential elections. In a sense, Yeltsin was obliged to initiate a Western-oriented foreign policy, because the post-Soviet economy was in ruins, domestic political concerns were on the carpet, there were chaos and discontent among the republics while some of them gained their independencies. Moreover, Russia was in a quandary for the next move in foreign policy once it got out of anti-Western (the USA) policy of the USSR. (Kumar, 2016) Herein Yeltsin relied on the success of neoliberal reforms to achieve a Western aid. The expected Western aid would precisely require following a pro-Western Russian foreign policy and adopting Western type policies to prove that the Russian Federation was a different country than its predecessor, completely abandoned the Soviet foreign policy and perfectly saw itself to cooperate with the West now. (Marantz, 1997) The domestic situation would contribute to appear a new pro-Western period in Russian foreign policy in 1991 and 1993.

3.1. THE EFFECT OF KOZYREV AND ATLANTIC SCHOOL IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Kozyrev took up position of Minister of Foreign Affairs on 11 October 1990 as the first Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation of Yeltsin presidency. His foreign policy toward the West stood for the idea of reciprocity and even provided concessions; however, no expected steps came from the West. He also had shared in the decision taken in 1991 to dissolve the Soviet Union. Throughout the aim of Yeltsin to integrate Russia into the West via the policies of the four Ds: namely, democratization, de-idealization, de-militarization and de-globalization, he held a vital role in shaping the new foreign policy orientation accordingly.

Taking after the tradition of Westerners in the tsarist Russia, Peter the Great and Alexander II as well as that of the democratic elites before the First World War, Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's foreign policy aim was to open the door to Europe to make possible for Russia to catch up with the modern industrial world, without disappearing among them. This adoption did not mean 'to imitate blindly other countries or import from abroad ready-made patterns for building a state and organizing the economy', though. (Timmerman, 1992, p. 175) The point is Russia should not isolate itself on behalf of protecting the Russian character, since this would lead to backwardness. Kozyrev's Westernism (or Atlanticism) does not simply mean Europe or Western Europe, but such influential states as the Atlantic-European region, Japan and also northern industrial states. To the viewpoint of his, Russia possesses natural, scientific, economic and human resources, and has the status of great power among world's most developed states. In this respect, Russia's emerging strategic interests and domestic and foreign policy concepts toward the modern world required material help on a large scale from these states to overcome and stabilize the economy and make internal reforms successfully. Such an intimacy created the leadership role that was based on partnership and cooperation with the industrialized states, since the most influential international economic and financial institutions were in the hands of these Western states, i.e. IMF, the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (Timmerman, 1992) Following the ideas about democracy, self-determination, the market economy and integration with the West, Yeltsin prioritized Russia's foreign

policy with abandoning Soviet imperialism, but adopting nonproliferation of nuclear rivalry, promoting the partnership and peaceful relations with the USA (and the West), developing bilateral relations between Russia and NATO, and gaining membership status to the Western institutions such as G-7 and WTO. (McFaul, 1999; Kısacık & Kaya, 2016, p. 49) In this respect, Kozyrev declared the USA and Europe as natural partners of Russia. The pro-US foreign policy of Russia costed the rupture of relations with Asia, the military ties with China and India during this period. It also supported US intervention in Iraq in 1990–1991 for a short while. (Kumar, 2016) Fixing Soviet and promoting new Russian relations with the West were also included in Kozyrev's foreign policy agenda by emphasizing that Russia should follow and integrate with the West, proceeded from the Atlantic perspective. (Bernier, 2018) Moreover, he even moved further from Gorbachev's thinking by not only pro-Western motives but also abandoned the Marxist-Leninist ideology all over. Having appeared also in the deciding group of the dissolution of the USSR, he had the belief of integrating Russia into the Western democratic values, promoting and supporting the independence of the old Soviet Republics, and even adopting the de-militarization policy by cutting the expenses on defense industry, because there was not a Western threat any more. In 1991-1992 both Yeltsin, with a letter addressed to NATO, and Kozyrev stated that NATO was regarded as neither a threat nor an aggressive block for Russia. Conversely, NATO provided stability for both Europe and the rest of the world. (Marantz, 1997)

The Atlanticists or Westerners do not have a negative perception, but conversely think highly of the West and consequently do not see Russia and the West into a conflict; but rather, Western level of civilization is a top point to reach and achieve a similar state of civilization. According to them, Russia is a part of the West and, thus, it should seek for a deep integration with the Western system. Atlanticism refers to Westernism as well, and they both are addressed to 'zapadniki' arising from 'zapad' that means the West in Russian. The background of the Atlanticists or Westerners went beyond Peter the Great and his reforms. He literally Europeanized Russia from every level of life, i.e. bureaucracy, military, society, industry and even the dress style, and realized many more reforms. He even constructed a new capital by his name with European style (Saint Petersburg or Petrograd) and near to the borders of Europe.

(Bernier, 2018) After the dissolution, Yeltsin tried to promote such westernization process for new Russia with Kozyrev. The Atlantic point of view had already lost blood in the mid-1990s with their own thesis concerning a Western-Russia that should make amendments to overcome the deficiencies in the direction of becoming a Western state, though. While both Yeltsin and Kozyrev expected a Western help, in which way the US would provide as it did for Europe through the Marshall Plan, to merge Russia into a Westernized move, this help never came. Thus, Atlanticism did not succeed as expected. (Bernier, 2018; Kumar, 2016) They even had liberalist perspective on collective security, membership into international organizations and globalization. However, what was going on was more reasonably sorted out by the Eurasianists and the Statists who thought, for example, the expansion of NATO through the eastern part of Russia including the post-Soviet States could not be well intentioned, because they neither included Russia itself nor consulted when in process. (Bernier, 2018)

To acquire external support for the internal transformation, Yeltsin wished to get rid of isolationism, as well, and to engage Russia into the modernized and civilized states via bilateral relations and partnerships with international communities. Yeltsin's leadership became more distinct on adopting a different agenda to diminish the focus on the post-Soviet ideology, geography and imperialism. He left enemy perception toward the West the USSR possessed, but rather supported and paved the way for including and building partnerships and alliances with the Western states to assure the required financial and political support from the West. (Timmermann, 1992) However, the radical policy changes from the former viewpoints and concepts Yeltsin led did not comprise of a full-scaled strategy for future foreign policy or how to conduct it. On the contrary, the new international relation patterns of Russia remained ambiguous. There were understandable reasons for Yeltsin to fail managing a well-defined concept for a future Russian foreign policy, although politicians and Russian media had such expectations. (Timmermann, 1992) However, his leadership lacked of a strategic road map to follow up for the New Russia concerning enriching the relations with the West. The tsarist imperialist system and the Soviet system as well as their set of behaviors were different toward the western states and now Russia turned to totally different foreign policy. (Timmermann, 1992) Another reason was the power struggle between

the national democrats and the national patriots. The former ones including Yeltsin wanted to make Russia integrated into the community of civilized states within the leadership of the West. On the other hand, the national-patriots supported Russia to hold the principal role within the CIS, emphasizing on a specific Russian identity. The dispute between Westerners and Slavophiles was also a follow-up version that of nationals and democrats. Westerners wanted to rule the country according to the Western system and engage into the European integration process, as opposed to Slavophiles' Eurasian Russia idea as a bridge between Europe and Asia. Clearly, Yeltsin's heart and policy were on behalf of the Westerners to make sure Russia find its place in the international politics following the dissolution. It was accepted that the USSR's membership in international organizations and institutions was transferred to Russia. It had taken over the Soviet seat at the UN Security Council and the right to control the nuclear arms arsenal. Moreover, although Yeltsin followed de-globalization and economization foreign policy, the federation was maintaining its great power status. While the country was experiencing domestic troubles and financial problems, they organized the conference of foreign ministers for resolving the Middle East conflict in Moscow in 1992. The state's loser position after the USSR was noticeable. Other pre-Soviet states became free from the big brotherhood of Russia. Ukraine, Belorussia and the three Baltic republics were on the edge of specifying their foreign policy priorities by coming close to the West, and the Central Asian republics turned to the Turkic and Islamic world. Although Russia established itself as the leader within the Soviet states and system, it was the only historical loser in this game now. Consequently, Yeltsin's leadership role in Russian foreign policy for the post-Soviet geography was far from promising. Moreover, the Foreign Ministry had just been instituted in 1990 after the declaration of independence from the USSR and foreign policy formulations and priorities were blurred, let alone how to practice them. Thus, it was a matter of the re-organization of Russia. (Timmermann, 1992) Yeltsin's foreign policy actually invented such questions as 'Who are we actually?' and 'What path should we follow?' (Timmermans, 1992, p. 166) The West had the chance of involving and directing Russia and the modernization process, especially in such a time both Foreign Minister Kozyrev stood up for a 'liberal democracy' in Russia as well as Yeltsin, in presidency chair, wanted to lead the country toward 'community of civilized states'; but the West would

fail this chance. In pursuit of linking Russia with the European integration processes, bilateral relations with Western Europe's main powers such as Germany and France along with the USA were the main concepts of Yeltsin's leadership. (Timmermann, 1992)

Yeltsin tried to realize what Gorbachev aimed at finding a seat for the Soviet Union in G7 in 1989. Not to fail as Gorbachev did because of lack of a concrete plan, Yeltsin introduced radical economic reforms in October 1991 and put them into practice in January 1992 with Soviet-Russian economist Yegor Gaidar. Moreover, he liberalized foreign economic relations and took steps to manage a market economy. Apart from economic reforms, Yeltsin made great steps to enable its position in the western-based political order. He realized radical reduction of strategic arms to below the limits of the START treaty, maintained the ratification and continuation of the CSCE treaty on the reduction of conventional armed forces, highlighted the UN's role as mediator between conflicting parties and for securing peace. Additionally, he gave support for sanctions as in the case of Libya and for setting up a military contingent for joint crisis management or even military intervention, as in Iraq. He dropped the idea of socialist orientation in the Third World, i.e. Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba, Angola; but chose cooperation with western-oriented regions, i.e., South-East Asia, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico. In the light of all these attempts, the West was in favor of supporting Russian membership in the IMF and even invited Yeltsin to the World Economic Summit in 1992, and finally donated \$24 thousand million financial aid to Russia.

3.1.1. Policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

On 8 December 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus had agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union and created the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On 21 December 1991, they signed the Alma-Ata Protocols and the CIS was formed including Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Georgia and the three Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, did not participate the organization, although Georgia joined in 1994, but withdrew in 2009 for membership in NATO. (Timmermann, 1992) Yeltsin's leadership toward the post-Soviet republics was in equal

treatment as Russia. Thus, the leadership role in Russian foreign policy toward these newly independent states was not big brother role as in the Soviet times. Yeltsin stated Russian intentions to the CIS without any imperial interests, but becoming equal among equals. So much so that the CIS region was 'close foreign countries' for Yeltsin and 'our relatives' for Kozyrev. (Timmermann, 1992) Yeltsin simply did not want to lose the post-Soviet states completely to the West hegemony and Western system as well as to give up on this geography as a whole; nor did he want to re-establish Soviet hegemony over them. However, the discourse toward the CIS was still on behalf of Russian psychological dominance over these Soviet successors. Kozyrev's advisor Galina Sidorova stated this in a frankly manner that *'There is a psychological barrier preventing us from treating other CIS members as absolutely independent'*. Moreover, Anatolii Sobchak, a democrat, defined Russia as 'natural center' for the Commonwealth of States. (Timmermann, 1992, p. 167) In contrast with Sidorova and Sobchak, even the most Russian-rooted Soviet states, Ukraine and Belorussia, with high numbers of Russian natives and speakers, were on behalf of following European patterns after the dissolution. Foreign policy priorities of both states had the aim of developing closer relations with Europe and joining the European Commission. Especially, for Ukraine, the relations with the Central Asian states were tough and the CIS would bind Ukraine to Asia forever; however, Ukrainians wanted to work together with their Eastern and Central European neighbors. (Timmermann, 1992)

However, in his foreign policy concerning the CIS, one way or another, Yeltsin promoted Russian dominance and sense of imperialistic possession in including all the Soviet ministries and embassies, by taking over the Central Bank, making statements on protecting the Russian-speaking population living in the CIS area, and reserving the right to annex territories where Russians were suppressed and behaved as second-class citizens. Thus, the policy toward the CIS remained as the first priority for Yeltsin's leadership. Kozyrev's active foreign policy to the CIS required such priority to solve economic and military-strategic problems. However, Yeltsin was aware that what was forcefully made could not continue so; thus, he brought flexibility for successor states, somehow. (Timmermann, 1992) Overall, Kozyrev's pro-Western foreign policy to integrate Russia into the liberal world caused the relations with the former Soviet

republics lost their significance for Russia. The lack of relations with the post-Soviet geography was by the reason of Yeltsin's concern over particularly Central Asian states' slowing effect on Russia's modernization efforts. (Günay, 2013)

3.2. THE CHANGING PERCEPTIONS IN 1993-1996

Until 1993, it had turned out to be that integration into the West was not and would not go in the positive direction for Russia and the other Western-related policies would not see a different response, either. Russians held the belief that the Atlanticism could not stand for Russian national interests over the Western political and military maneuvers as in the events of Bosnia and the CIS region, and finally dissented the whole Russian foreign policy decisions of Kozyrev. (Larrabee & Karasik, 1997) This promoted them to vote for the opposite standpoints as well as to support for Primakov to take up the position as Kozyrev's successor. Thus, the rising of nationalism in the domestic politics within the Russian Federation played a crucial role in shaping a new leadership orientation for Russian foreign policy. Another reason of Russians turning toward the opposite side was the idea that the West still put the Russian Federation on the threat agenda. (Bernier, 2018)

There was a displeasure of the current Russian policy in the mid-1993. Yeltsin and Kozyrev's foreign policies were disputed as unrealistic assumptions that were based on overestimating the economic assistance from the West, but underestimating the difficulty of Russian economic transformation. The reason is ending of the Cold War caused Russian foreign policy to have a kind of appreciation of Russian weakness and an acceptance of Russia's need to get along with the West during the post-Soviet political and economic vulnerability period. (Marantz, 1997) Moreover, Russian awareness of absence of an expected foreign support raised nationalist wave in Russia in mid-1993. To overcome Russia's decreasing influence in the CIS region, importance of the near abroad for Russia was included into the priorities of Russian foreign policy now.

The leadership role for post-1993 Russian foreign policy underwent a transformation in the context of perceptions toward the West; the near abroad and other

Russian priorities, i.e. deterioration of economic relations with the former Soviet republics; nuclear weapons left within Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus; wars and ethnic tensions in the post-Soviet territory and the situation of the Russians living in former Soviet republics. (Günay, 2013, p. 91) Although both before and after 1993 Yeltsin's leadership style was based on pragmatic policy-making in order to protect and promote Russia's national interests and position within the international system, the changing leadership role between 1993 and 1996 required to abandon the conciliatory policies toward the West, but adopt more assertive moves, especially for its near abroad. (Marantz, 1997)

3.2.1. The Western Threat Perception Reborn: NATO Enlargement

In fact, the conciliatory policies with the West until 1993 provided Russia to get over the international isolationism of the Soviet period by cooperating more with the West and the USA, to take a weight of military expenditures by enjoying the membership of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as well as economic assistance, and to maintain Russian national interests and compensate for the weakness of the country at the time. (Marantz, 1997) As seen, the foreign policy agenda of Yeltsin and Kozyrev in the first two years also brought benefits along with criticism. In 1992, though, Yeltsin's economic reform program led to excessive increase in prices, new taxes, shutting down of many industries, high unemployment rates and finally an economic depression. The Russian parliamentary crisis with the president Yeltsin and appearance of the nationalistic forces in the parliamentary elections in 1993 aroused Western concerns upon the possible change in Russian foreign policy and to which direction it would evolve in the near future. Both Russia's still having nuclear capability as well as Yugoslav Civil War would put NATO into alert as to the future of the post-Soviet region and the possibility of domestic turmoil, mass migrations into the NATO countries, armed conflicts, and even direct military threats to its members. (Duffield, 1994) NATO's enlargement policy toward the post-Soviet region made Russia face with containment. To overcome this, Russia was included into the Partnership for Peace Program in 1994 and into the NATO-Russia Dialogue and the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security in 1997. (Marantz, 1997; Kumar, 2016) This did not mean that Russia went hand in hand with the West as it was. In 1993 and 1994,

Russia did not hesitate to oppose to NATO enlargement, which was strengthened a new Russian foreign policy paradigm, 'The Near Abroad'. Instead, what Russia suggested was to eliminate NATO and creating a new security organization under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). However, the West never approved this replacement. (Kumar, 2016) Apart from the vitality of Russia's 'backyard' (the former Soviet states) and NATO's enlargement, Russia's positive cooperation and perception toward the West also diminished with the contributing effects of West's opposite policies toward Serbia and peacekeeping operations in Bosnia as well as American actions toward Iraq and Libya. From Western side, though, the point of failure in bilateral relations with Russia came with Russia's sale of nuclear reactors to Iran, Moscow's willingness to remove the limits on Russian forces by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and Russia's violent responses toward Chechen guerillas. (Marantz, 1997)

Upon NATO's adopting the basic principles for the membership of Eastern Europe in 1995, Russia rang the changes on the anti-NATO enlargement policy in 1997 that Yeltsin had adopted with assertive denouncements of NATO expansion and even threatening retaliatory measures and warning of the possible consequences for European security and international peace, if it kept on proceeding toward Russia's backbone, Eastern Europe. However, signing the Founding Act in May 1997, Yeltsin turned to a different approach as to NATO and initiated the process of cooperation between NATO and Russia. The threatening position toward NATO's enlargement moves and protective policy toward the post-Soviet space replaced by dropping out the negative discourse toward NATO's enlargement by official Russian spokespersons. The reason is Russia had already understood they could not prevent NATO from enlarging. Moreover, the consequences of Russia's contending policy toward NATO(the West) would be more harsh than expected: isolation from the West, devoid of Western aid and investment, the increase in military spending and the economic burden of the military expenses on already bad economy, and consequently the deadlock of economic recovery. In this respect, Yeltsin's present reconciliatory policy toward NATO in large scale helped to improve relations and avoid the conflicts unlike the Soviet period. (Marantz, 1997)

3.2.2. The Blizhneye Zarubyezhe (Near Abroad) Policy

The perception change toward the West accelerated Yeltsin presidency to adopt a new foreign policy. In April 1993, Russia accepted a new foreign policy doctrine under the leadership of Kozyrev concerning the neighboring states of the federation that were within the borders of the former Soviet Union. Referred as *Blizhneye Zarubyezhe* (Near Abroad), the policy emphasized the Russian Federation took the role of rebuilding its (Soviet) influence once again over the territory of the former Soviet Union and of preventing any other third state's involvement in this region. (Litera, 1994; Günay, 2013) The post-Soviet republics, although they were independent states now after the Soviet hegemony collapsed, were still the area of vital importance and interests for Russia. Kozyrev underlined the policy as; '*... the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Baltic republics are an area where Russia's crucial vital interests are concentrated. That is where the major threats to these interests come from.*' (Litera, 1994, p. 45) Interestingly enough Kozyrev defined the possible threat to vital Russian interests within the framework of this post-Soviet geography although until 1993 he had also put emphasis there was a Western threat no more, so no need to military investments, either. However, in the near abroad geography, crucial Russian interests and preventing a possible threat required a Russian military presence in those countries, as well. Thus, the withdrawal of Russian troops from this area should also be prevented, since this lack of military presence would attract the forces (the West) which did not apparently hold a friendly inclination toward Russia, as opposed to the Russian government perception of the absence of a Western threat until 1993. Apart from the territorial presence of Russia, the rights of Russian population, and their dual citizenship, residing in these states were another priority for the Russian Federation. In 1994, Moscow prepared a program concerning the protection of the Russians who lived in the former Soviet Union territory. (Litera, 1994)

3.2.3. The Karaganov Doctrine

Yeltsin's leadership also required a new military doctrine, approved in December 1993, relatedly to the perspective change on a Western threat toward Russia, through the CIS and Baltic corridor. Referred as the Karaganov Doctrine from the name

of Sergey Alexandrovich Karaganov, Yeltsin's senior foreign-policy adviser, this new doctrine was first stated by Yeltsin in the ceremony of graduates of military academies in June 1994. According to Russia's fresh military doctrine, Russia should take on the responsibility of defending the Euro-Asian region. (Litera, 1994) The vital interests of Russia in the post-Soviet region were once again stressed and made way for an even further step for Russia to defend this area all the way in the case of any threat coming along. However, the possible threat would not come only from the western part of the world; but the Islamic fundamentalism coming from Iran and Afghanistan threatened the stability of the Central Asia, especially Tajikistan, in 1993, as well. The problem is if 20 million Muslims living in the post-Soviet space were taken in by the extremist Islamic wave, it was inevitable that the stability of the region would be harshly damaged. Yeltsin's aim for the CIS played a crucial role in his strategies toward the region. In Yeltsin's mind, the basic aim of the CIS was to include Slav nations based on a spirit of neo-Slavism, which is why he literally abandoned the Central Asia that would also create a guerrilla war by the Islamists against the Russian government. Yeltsin put the blame on Afghanistan for the crisis by the Islamic fundamentalists in Tajikistan and this caused Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed the Collective Security Treaty in 1992. (Litera, 1994) This process would eventually originate the statement of the post-Soviet space as the vital Russian interests in 1993 within the concept of both the Near Abroad policy and the military doctrine. Thus, the Russian leadership turned to active strategies with new military doctrines.

3.2.4. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

Yeltsin's leadership gave particular importance to developing the bilateral relations between Russia and each of the CIS states. (Litera, 1994) The presence of the CIS was empowered with its bodies and the Charter in 1993. Then came further integration moves as security system and foreign policy inclinations. For the economic integration, the CIS Economic Union was launched to include a common market, a customs and currency union in 1993 that was turned to more official institution as the International Economic Committee in 1994. While Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization in May 1992, the two former states also enjoyed the CIS in the second half of 1993. (Litera, 1994) Although Yeltsin stated

equal relations and positioning within the CIS states, Russia still had the dominant position with officials in the CIS institutions.

The Collective Security Organization concluded a new program that gave way to united military bodies and troops, joint military operations and training. According to the new program, all member states would hold a common defense perception and counterattack in presence of any territorial claims of third countries concerning the member states, of use of mass destruction weapons against the member states, of the proliferation of these weapons to terrorist organizations, or other states, to be used against the member states, of any external interference or influence of third parties into the internal relations within the organization, or of any destabilization the internal affairs and political situations of the member states. (Litera, 1994) The organization could enable the member states to interfere the internal affairs without any resistance and to position their military troops in the borders of destabilized region, or deploy their military bases there on the basis of the principle of *any destabilization in the internal affairs and political situations of the member states*. Considering the military and economic power it had, Russia would be the one that took advantage of such military intervention into the bloc countries. The possible military intervention and Russian military bases in the region could also enable Russian presence on the territory and prevent any anti-Russian forces to gain influence by local states. (Litera, 1994) Russia also attempted to promote bilateral relations, separately, with the CIS countries, with the exception of Ukraine, by signing the Treaties on Friendship and Cooperation in which Georgia was the final signatory in 1994. The most interesting thing was the Belarus-Russia relations because the inter-state agreement made the unification of two countries (or as Yeltsin concluded ‘a confederation’) in a similar form of the CIS. (Litera, 1994)

On the one hand, Yeltsin quickened to enhance interrelations with the CIS countries and Russia; on the other hand, he aimed at keeping the economic, political and military dependence of these countries upon Russia and preventing any inter-states relations among the CIS or with any third country. Russia’s dominancy in the region proceeded as the guarantor of the region. In 1993 Yeltsin put into the words of Russia’s guarantor role of the post-Soviet states at the Congress of Civic Union as *‘the time has come for the relevant international organizations, including the UN, to grant Russia*

special powers as the guarantor of peace and stability on the territory of the former USSR'. (Litera, 1994, p. 50) A year later, the support came from Russian Foreign Minister for Yeltsin that Russia did not need any consent of international organizations to maintain peace and stability operations in the former USSR region, following the disapproval of the UN and other international organizations.

3.3. RUSSIA'S CHANGING FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES: YELTSIN'S SECOND PRESIDENTIAL TERM

The inefficiency of Kozyrev and Yeltsin's neoliberal reforms since 1990, the failure to acquire expected Western aid, NATO's declaration of road map to expand through Eastern Europe in 1995 and disavowal of taking care of Russia's national interests in the expansion policy as well as refusal of creating a new security organization by dismissing itself caused Eurasianists gain support in Russian political discourse and public. Moreover, Western criticism toward the way Yeltsin dealing with the Chechen War (1994-1996) and, last but not least, the emergence of the Communist Party as the dominant party in the Russian parliamentary election in 1995 put the boot in the pressures on Yeltsin to change the current pro-Western foreign policy. (Kumar, 2016)

The leadership role during the post-1996 period in Russian foreign policy under Primakov was an obvious shift from West-centric and cooperative Russian foreign policy that was pursued until the end of 1995 by Yeltsin and Kozyrev to the policy of pragmatic, self-sustained and non-conciliatory but open to diplomatic cooperation with the West for Russia's national interests. Primakov's foreign policy maintained its effect and paradigms until 2006 in which Russia played the role of creating a counterbalance to the West by building partnerships in the East and its Near Abroad. (Marantz, 1997)

3.3.1. Eurasianism and the Primakov Doctrine (1996-1998)

Yevgeny Primakov took office as the successor of Kozyrev, in Boris Yeltsin's second presidential term, beginning in July 1996 that was overshadowed by Yeltsin's health problems having already become more apparent in August and September, and

dominated Russian foreign policy between 1996 and 1998. (Marantz, 1997) He was the former head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR), enjoyed a background in security agencies, had worked in *Pravda*, the official Communist Party gazette until 1991, and thus developed a wider political community than Kozyrev did. As a result, all of these contributed Primakov to build a leadership much more effective, prestigious and assertive in foreign policy. His Eurasianist view was shared by the directors of military enterprises, Ministry of Defense, and the Russian intelligence communities and backed by both the nationalists and communists in Duma. (McFaul, 1999) Another contributing factor to Primakov's prominent role in Russian foreign policy was by means of Yeltsin who issued full responsibility to Primakov for conducting foreign policy that Kozyrev lacked previously. (Larrabee & Karasik, 1997) Primakov was an Orientalist and expert of Middle East and West Asia. (Kumar, 2016) The Primakov Doctrine, named after him, prioritized a multipolar world order that includes different power centers alternatively to American hegemony continuing since 1991, and fulfilling Russian interests in the CIS and Asia regions. (Bernier, 2018) He visited Tehran in 1996 and signed agreements with Iran in addition to that Russia and China signed the 'Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New International Order' a year later in 1997. He also induced cooperation in the context of both balancing and eliminating Western hegemony and trilateral relations between Russia, India and China (RIC), which was also the origin of the BRICS group of nations with the membership of Brazil and South Africa in 2006 and 2010 respectively. His main aim was to realize Russia as the main influencer of the system and counterbalance the USA and NATO. (Kumar, 2016; Bernier, 2018) Although Primakov's foreign policy was the direct opposite, the current economic hardships as well as the need of turning around the economy after the dissolution, the Russian Federation had to turn to obtaining loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which made itself a West-dependent and under the control of it, though it was done for the pragmatic reasons. (Bernier, 2018)

The increasing Eurasianist wave in Russian foreign policy obtained approval within the domestic politics. Following Eurasianism, he had the idea that pro-Western foreign policy was incapable of promoting and protecting Russian national interests

before the Western world. (Kumar, 2016) One of the three schools in Russian foreign policy, Eurasianism introduces Russia as the one who assumed the 'mission' to solve the 'Russian dilemma' as a country between Europe and Asia. To do this, a synthesis should be managed enabling 'a balance' between Western and Eastern orientation. The Eurasianists saw Russia neither a European country of the Western type nor a Slavic country, but a Eurasian thing. This required Russia, as expected, not to be included into the Western equal partnership because of its weak economy; but into Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, the South African Republic, Greece, Turkey, India, China and other south-east Asian states. In this way, Russia would not lose their identity and not give up on its national interests to find place in Western system. (Timmerman, 1992)

Eurasianism, in furtherance of Dostoevsky's words, '*It is better to be a master in Asia than slaves in Europe*,' puts geopolitics on the center. The logic of Eurasianism stands for Halford Mackinder's positioning of world geopolitics as two opponent spheres: land power and sea power. In this positioning, the Eurasian 'heartland', which was the territory of the former Russian empire, is the global land power. The important point is controlling the heartland means dominating the Eurasian land and finally the world itself. (Clover, 1999) Eurasianism also emphasizes on the unique Russian history identified with the tsarist absolutism and the power of proletariat resulting in building a fresh Russian identity in the post-revolution period. (Kumar, 2016) The reason of Russia placed in the very center of the 'heartland' argument is Russia's specific role between the Western and the Eastern geopolitics. They see Russia as a bridge and go-between the East and West that promotes and maintains peace and harmony in the Eurasian region. In this respect, Russia holds the role of protecting the West from the East and the East from the West. It took the form of buffer zone to prevent Mongol attacks to spread to the West and those of the Fascist and Nazis to the East. (Kumar, 2016) Russia in the proper meaning of the word was the one to redress the balance between the two civilization globes. The victory of Russians over Napoleon in 1812 and over Hitler in Eastern Front in 1941 stirred the Russians to feel the Eurasian power that returned to its cultural and historical tradition and values by casting away the European dreams.

To the Eurasianists, the international stage is a zero-sum game, which means either Russia is winning and US hegemony is losing, or the vice versa. In this respect, the aim of Russian foreign policy was to weaken the United States and NATO allies and replacing the unipolar system with the multipolar power centers, introducing Russia as one of these power centers. Thus, the three strategies Russia should pursue in order to achieve this goal are to *become internally stronger both in economic and military terms, weaken the Western alliance by fomenting divisions, and balance Western power by forming anti-Western alliances with countries such as China, Iran, Iraq, and India.* (McFaul, 1999, p. 5) Although they are against imitating and taking after the Western policies, as a follower of pragmatic policies for the sake of Russian national interests, the Eurasianists are also open to cooperation with the West. One of the reasons of this is economic weakness of Russia while the West has the potential of providing financial assistance to avoid further economic deterioration. That is why they support the cooperation with the West for the short term for pragmatic reasons to reach the long-term Russian foreign policy interests. Eurasianism is also called as anti-Western pragmatism. (McFaul, 1999) Specifically, the aim of the Eurasianist policy is to ensure the great power status of Russia once again. In this respect, Eurasianism prioritizes making up the pride of Russia, economic integration of the former Soviet republics, preventing any Western attempt to change the regimes in the neighborhood, abdicating the West-centric policy and searching for alternative partners in Asia, protecting the Russian diaspora in the former Soviet zone and turning to close cooperation with China. (Kumar, 2016, p. 218)

3.3.2. Russia's 'Balanced' Foreign Policy: Orientations in CIS, Asia and Middle East Regions

Primakov's viewpoint of multipolar world order made a balanced foreign policy in his time. He aimed at cutting loose Russia from the West-centrism policies and enabling her to have a balancing role among different power centers created against the American hegemony. Actually, Kozyrev had already adopted the motive of 'balance' foreign policy at the end of 1992, when realizing the absence of any Western support toward Russia and withdrew from pro-Western (Atlantic) foreign policy in 1994. The effects of Eurasian orientation in Russia's foreign policy were partially initiated by

Kozyrev in the Near Abroad policy in 1993 in which the post-Soviet CIS and the Baltic region were declared as an area of Russian vital interests, and backed by a new military doctrine, the Karaganov Doctrine, toward this space in the same year. The post-1993 Russian foreign policy did not rely on the West any more.

Primakov held the belief that *security, stability and peace* were common concerns for Russia and the world community in the post-Cold War era and the UN should take over the primary responsibility to deal with these issues, especially the international security, and becoming '*safety net*'. Moreover, Primakov specified OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) should substitute NATO, the reminiscent of the Cold War bipolar system, to ensure security, but not to fall into the UN's area of responsibility. Leadership perception in Russian foreign policy for the post-1996 period constituted Russia as the balancer and one of the power centers in the international community. (Bernier, 2018, p. 31) In line with multipolar world order, Yeltsin's leadership strategy promoted well-developed relations and cooperation with Eurasian neighbors, invigorated relations with China and India in the Asia, and maintained a balance between North and South Korea. In this respect, the Shanghai Five, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization after 2001, was created with the aims of military cooperation and the security and stability of the former Soviet-Chinese border with the memberships of China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in 1996, and Russia's multilateral relations with its neighbors were deepened. (Iwashita, 2007) 'Russo-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New International Order' were formalized in 1997. Primakov adopted the new cooperative-based leadership strategy and put into practice 'strategic partnership' between Russia and China as well as similar partnerships with both India and Japan. (Shtraks, 2015; Iwashita, 2007)

Primakov, in discordance with Kozyrev's policy of developing relations with the West while overlooking the post-Soviet zone, focused on building up the ties with the CIS. (Larrabee & Karasik, 1997) This neighboring perspective is also attributed to Eurasianist view. One of the reasons is that Russia, as the heartland, should firstly dominate over in her own historically tied post-Soviet region to create the land power against sea power. Moreover, the former Soviet states include a considerable amount of

Russian diaspora, almost 25 million, within their territories. Another reason is that neighboring borders may have home to terrorism, smuggling etc. Any instability in the neighboring borders may pose to security problems for Russia. (Kumar, 2016) Primakov's policy toward the CIS region was pragmatic-oriented. In this sense, he prioritized protecting and promoting Russia's interests and re-establishing its territorial dominance for Russia's great power status. (Günay, 2013) However, Central Asian states were leading their foreign policies away from Russia to the West especially on security and military issues. The Central Asian republics, with the exception of Tajikistan joining in 2002, already joined the Partnership for Peace Program of NATO in 1994 that promoted '*bilateral cooperation between individual Partner countries and NATO*'. (Günay, 2013, p. 96) The CIS was in great importance for the entire Yeltsin's leadership period. During Kozyrev's ministry, the relations with the CIS for Russia implied '*a belt of good-neighborliness around Russia*', while Primakov attributed the CIS's importance to determine Russia's framework of relations with the other countries, including the USA as a part of NATO expansionism through Eastern Europe. (Willerton, 1997, p. 30) Another important point in Russian foreign policy in conjunction with the Eurasianist view is that the CIS legitimized Russia's regional power interests. Once having ensured its dominancy over the post-Soviet region, Russia could build its land power status (with her role in the center) as the heartland. In the light of the Near Abroad policy in the post-1993 period, economic and security relations with the CIS were also kept a close watch by Russia, i.e. a customs union agreement with Uzbekistan in 1994, the foundation of Turkmenrosgaz, a Russian Turkmenistan gas joint-stock company in 1997. (Willerton, 1997) Though not a member to the CIS, Ukraine was prioritized in the Yeltsin's second term. Primakov's statements concerning Ukraine's becoming the top priority in Russian foreign policy in 1997 refreshed Ukraine's importance in Russia's historical ground and territorial integrity. As opposed to Ukraine's ongoing concerns and suspicions over Russian dominancy in the post-Soviet region and Ukraine's preference and fondness to the West, Ukraine and Russia signed the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership in 1997 and bilateral relations were advanced under Primakov's ministry. (Willerton, 1997) In the same year both countries also concluded the agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Status and Conditions of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet's Stay

on Ukrainian Territory that Russia reserved the right to use the Sevastopol Naval Base in Ukraine for twenty years until 2017 and had the strategic advantage in the Black Sea region. (Askeroğlu, 2020) Russia also aimed at re-establishing its role of serious player on the international community by the Commonwealth of Independent States. At some point, the CIS addressed the Russian Federation's territorial integrity and, as a Russian sphere of influence, the Commonwealth of Independent States required Russia to pursue political, military and economic cooperation. This would provide Russia to recover its economy and avoid further disintegration of the federation. (McFaul, 1999)

Yeltsin's leadership policy had already abandoned its withdrawal from the Middle East early in 1996. By force of the more assertive Russian foreign policy concept since 1993, the Middle East also gained importance. Yeltsin's wish of building a permanent Russian presence in the Middle East was supported by Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov. As an Arabist and a specialist on the Middle East, Primakov's own Middle Eastern background and policy of a more assertive Russia in the international politics were contributing factors to build a concrete presence of Russia in the Middle East region. (Dannreuther, 1998) By year of 1997, Russian involvement in the peace process between Arabs-Israelis on the basis of her co-chairman role in the Madrid Conference in 1991 was realized. Russia's interest in the region consisted of bringing to a halt to American hegemony since the Cold War, its forces of liberal market economy as well as financial institutions supported by it, and finding customers and economic partners for Russian industry. The Arab world had about \$32 billion arms debt to Russia in 1995; however, Russia's exploitative purpose required to take advantage the situation and have control over the Caspian Sea oil and its transportation to the West. (Kreutz, 1999)

Yeltsin's leadership role between the period of 1991 and 1999 was under the influence of the changing political conditions and foreign policy attitudes to the end that Russia could take place in the world politics after the dissolution. At the beginning of the 2000s, Russia's foreign policy acted a different political leadership profile under Vladimir Putin. The walls between the Foreign Ministry and its role in determining Russian foreign policy were removed during the presidential term of Yeltsin, however;

Putin was a more predominant leader who would be the ultimate decision-maker in constituting Russian foreign policy for 20 years. (Baldoni, 2016)



CHAPTER 4

PUTIN'S RISE TO POWER: NEW LEADERSHIP IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY (The First Term: 1999-2008)

Following the crisis of dissolution of the USSR into the 15 republics, Russian foreign policy in the beginning of the 2000s was still in a twinge of losing control over its ethnic, cultural and territorial connections with the former Soviet states. The inefficiency of Yeltsin's cooperative policies with the West along with his lack of strong leader idea in Russians mind opened the door to a new figure with new dynamics in Russian foreign policy. Appointed as Prime Minister on 9 August 1999 and holding the position until 7 May 2000, Vladimir Putin's political career shone after taking the charge of the policy toward the rebellions in Chechnya and bombings of civilian targets in Moscow and other Russian cities. Public support for Putin saw a gradual increase in votes; in August 1999 2%, by the end of September 15%, by the end of October 25% and by late November, the votes for Putin already reached 40%. (Kelley, 2016) Putin's election campaign program promised a strong leadership that would realize what was ignored or could not realize under the presidencies of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, i.e. a strong state, order and discipline in the society, building a good-working market economy, suppression of separatist movements in the provinces and finally rehabilitating Russia's status in the international politics. (Kelley, 2016)

In the first place, Putin faced with the turmoil of politics in domestic relations. On the one hand, regional politics was confined with Yeltsin's family members, i.e. his daughter Tatiana; on the other hand, the oligarchs had a certain power in politics who got rich after the 'loans for shares' privatization program in 1992 and had great stakes in such companies as Lukoil, Yukos, Sibneft in 1996 when the government could not repay the loans taken by them. (Treisman, 2010) However, he succeeded in building a balance to prevent neither sides to reach disproportional power in Russian politics. Moreover, he created his team as 'United Russia' that would act as a bridge between presidency and the periphery. Putin in this way aimed at having a control over political life in the whole of Russia, establishing his presidential identity as well as finding the

environment to sell his agenda and plans for the future of Russian politics. Putin's team included his past experiences and professional connections in the KGB. (Kelley, 2016)

The first term of Putin's leadership in 2000-2004 refers to soft power tools with Russia's neighbors and collaborative relations with its Western partners on common interests. The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept was determined to build a positive impression and impact of Russian state and to introduce Russian culture and language in the world. (González, 2013) Moreover, strengthening its economic position in joining the influential international organizations and its economic ties in integrating the world economic system, the Russian Federation assumed to become one of the contributors to create a stable and democratic world order in compliance with the UN. (González, 2013) Putin followed a well-defined pragmatic and tactical foreign policy in his first two-round presidency. Regaining and maintaining Russia's regional power in her backyard was Putin's top priority and all his moves, even cooperation with the West and specifically with the USA, were made with this purpose in mind. Dropping the policy of gaining Russia's superpower status back, he initiated a foreign policy based upon conflict-free relations and interaction with the West as well as warm relations with the Asian partners. There were two reasons behind this 'multivectoral foreign' policy. As Secrieru elaborated, firstly, non-conflicting relations with the West and the USA enabled Russia to concentrate more easily on her project to enrich cooperation with and rebuild her regional dominance in the post-Soviet zone with economic, political and military tools; and secondly, for the long term, the multivectoral foreign policy attitude would provide benefit for Russia to show itself in the 'international power platform' as refreshed regional power beyond its near abroad. (2006, p. 289)

4.1. DOMINATING IDEOLOGY FOR THE POST-2000 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: 'PRAGMATIST STATISM'

Russia, Putin laid his hands on during the post-Yeltsin period, went topsy-turvy with nationalism, internal political pressures, deteriorating economic conditions along with social discontent and secessionist movements in the Caucasus causing direct threat to state security. (Kasymov, 2011) In response to the current environment, Putin's political strategy was composed of domestic and foreign political recovery to relieve

Russia of the domestic chaos and disorder caused by his predecessor, namely to provide the growth of the country's welfare and security and to reclaim the global power image of Russia as the foreign policy purpose. Stated as crucial to strengthen Russian statehood in the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept, Putin's strategy concordantly was to increase the role of the state, its control over the political environment and correspondingly to preserve and ensure its role to restore the social and political order in domestic life as well as Russia's position in global arena.

Overemphasizing the state control, Statism in foreign policy also highlights nationalism in a strong way. In this respect, to Statists, the West/ern interests are seen as a direct threat to Russian statehood. Thus, Russia should prevent and keep guard any Western presence or activity both within Russia and in the world. (Kasymov, 2011) The critical point is that Statism attaches the perception of external threat to the West and any Western involvement in or near Russia is assessed as the direct threat to the security, survival and unity of the Russian Federation. As stated earlier, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union many Soviet states stated interest in joining NATO. In addition to this, NATO's concern over possible political turmoil in the post-Soviet region as in the Yugoslavian War triggered the enlargement policy in 1993. Thus, NATO's enlargement policy and military presence in Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet territory caused the perception of threat to the state's survival among Statists in Russia.

Putin's political attitude is in Statist paradigm, when thinking his nationalist and security-based way of thinking being rooted in his KGB background, which put Russia in a specific position in which neither Western values nor those of Eastern certainly define Russian identity. Russia was, to Statist way of thinking, neither a Western nor an Eastern state, but a global power on its own way. In this regard, Vladimir Putin's leadership requires ensuring Russia's security and integrity as the ultimate goals. (Kasymov, 2011) Statism, or Pragmatic Statism, is in the middle of two other opposing political schools of thought. Statists neither are a direct supporter for pro-Western policies as the Westernisers, nor think that the West/US and Russia should inevitably collide because of their different values as the Eurasianists. (Kasymov, 2011) Statism harmonizes two opinions by emphasizing state's control, maintenance, security and

integrity at the same time. They assess cooperation with the West/US positively, but are against subordination to the West. Russia is in its own right a great global power by its history and geopolitical position, and its national interests should be prioritized and preserved. Neither a European nor an Asian country, Russia acts as a bridge between the West and the East. The key perception in Statist school's political agenda is 'multivectoral' foreign policy paradigm. To multivectoral foreign policy paradigm, adopted by Putin, as well, good relations with the great Western (European) states are not enough, but relations with other great non-European powers as such China, India and Brazil should also be enhanced. (Beitāne, 2013)

The resurgence of Russia as a global power underlies the state's control and its role both within and outside of Russia, as Putin did reduce the economical involvement and presence of private capital both in the industrial and resource sectors; thus, turning into the main course of state income, rather than the development of civil society or democratic institutions. The role of state here can be realized coercively. Statism makes a point of power structures and military force, and by-pass the involvement of civil actors from the political process. Putin in this respect excluded the foreign Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and civil actors working actively in demanding government reforms and a free society, as well as the political opposition groups and critics to raise voices in political matters. (Kasymov, 2011)

4.2. PUTIN'S 'GREAT RUSSIA STRATEGY' IN 2000-2001

Putin's presidential campaign discourse focusing on 'Strong Russian Statehood' within the country had its way in his foreign policy orientation, as well. For a generally speaking, early 2000s Russian foreign policy consisted of such elements as prioritization of European relations, pragmatism and development of economic relations with other countries. (Beitāne, 2013) Associating the 1990s with Russia on the knees before the West, i.e. pro-Western foreign policy with no expected support from the West in return, NATO's expansionist policies as well as bombing the Serbian province Kosovo in 1999, Putin adopted completely different foreign policy that presented Russia far more assertive and aggressive in the international arena. (International Yearbook CIDOB, 2010) Particularly NATO's intervention in the Kosovo War in 1999

against the Serbians' disclamation and ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians divided the West (NATO) and Russia. Russia was a pro-Serbian and supporter of the unity of the Yugoslavia, severely within and after the crisis, which was assessed as one of the reasons having effected Putin's assertive and daring foreign policy for the post-2000s period. (Antonenko, 2007) Additionally, Russia's status of being a great power lied at the very heart of Putin's foreign policy that was primarily conditioned by Russia's national interests as basic guidelines.

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation approved on June 28 by Vladimir Putin determined 'development of regional and sub-regional integration in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, Africa and Latin America' among Russian interests. (Federation of American Scientists, 2000) Russia's standing position, its role as one of the influential centers and great power status in the international politics were emphasized. As for the role of the UN, Russia persisted that the United Nations should keep its position as the main center to sustain international relations. The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept did consider constructive foreign policy attaching importance to mutually advantageous pragmatism with other states, requiring joint decisions. The new concept also stressed '*the multi-functional character*' of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which was stated as one of the vital partner organizations in Europe in respect to security. (Morozov, 2005) Russia was clearly in support for the role of OSCE in sustaining European security, rather than NATO, by the reason of the fact that OSCE consists all Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian States including the CIS. (González, 2013) The negative perception of the Russian Federation toward NATO's presence, due to its anti-Soviet/communist background determined the post-Cold War Russian foreign policy. Approving the Strategic Concept in April 1999 and Washington Summit in 2000, NATO enjoyed the authority to '*...contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations*', which turned up in NATO's air strike campaign without endorsement of the UN Security Council between April to June 1999 against Serbia in the Kosovo Crisis. (Washington Summit Communiqué, 1999, Article 6) In addition to this, the three former Soviet states, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, joined NATO in the same summit, on which subject Gorbachev had been ensured back then in 1990

that NATO did not have the intention of expansion through Eastern Europe. (González, 2013; Sarotte, 2014) As for NATO's such strategic moves, it was clearly stated that NATO's post-Cold War strategies concerning expansion toward the post-Soviet space as well as use of force operations without the sanction of the UN Security Council conflicted clearly with Russian national interests, and the Russian Federation's opposing to its expansion policy was highlighted. (Federation of American Scientists, 2000) Although Putin's first year of presidency hosted partly mistrust against the West by the reasons of the West's role in the CIS region, the Baltic States as well as other conflicts, the Russian-West relations were somehow a follow-up of Yeltsin's term. (Baldoni, 2016) In April 2000, Putin ensured the State Duma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia, to ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) which obliged both the USA and Russia to cut down on strategic nuclear warheads until 2007. (International Yearbook CIDOB, 2010) Putin's first year cooperative foreign policy tendency toward the USA/West was as much notable as for the EU, which was declared as one of the main political and economic partners to Russia.

4.3. PUTIN'S CIS PROJECT: A NEW SOVIET UNION REBORN?

As for the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Putin's policy was to guarantee Russia's big brother role in promoting a successful integration process within the CIS. (Smith, 2000) Russia's foreign policy concept required good neighboring relations and strategic partnership through the agency of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the main role of the Customs Union and '*particularly in combating international terrorism and extremism*', under the roof of the Collective Security Treaty. Russia's foreign policy toward the region was comprised of economic cooperation and a common reaction to security concerns. Signed in 1992 by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan with the inclusion of Belarus in 1993 and exclusion of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan in 1999, the Collective Security Treaty (CST) gained a new significance in protecting the southern borders from the wave of the Islamic terrorism by preventing the spillover effect of the conflicts in Afghanistan as well as Tajikistan in the late 1990s. In this respect, between 1999 and 2000, the Southern Shield military exercises were held with the participation of Uzbekistan. (Smith, 2000)

Among the CIS, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan that were the members of the Customs Union excluding Armenia were more favorable and leaned toward the cooperation with Russia. (González, 2013) As to Putin's statement when he was still prime minister in December 1999, the Russian Federation's CIS integration policy was not necessarily the release of Russian resources to these countries nor building a center-periphery power relation under the leadership of Russia. As a matter of fact, considering that every member CIS state were in debt to Russia (\$7 billion according to 2000 statistics) except for Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, Putin's aim was not to promote further debts or create new economic burden on Russian economy; but to make them dependent on Russia's way of foreign policy tendencies. (Smith, 2000) In saying so, he used the current economic dependency and integration policy in the creation of common law and transformation the Customs Union, which was formed in January 1995, but reformed into the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) on October 10, 2000. (Borodin & Stokov, 2015) Already a member of the Customs Union and, then, of the EurAsEC, and having the integration level with Russia one move ahead to other member states, Belarus was a matter of priority for the new Russian foreign policy for the purpose of strengthening the Union of Belarus and Russia.

In fact, strengthening relations with the CIS was a matter of Russian national security priority. The further task, according to the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept, would proceed creating of a free trade zone that was already signed in 1994 among the CIS states, but not ratified yet by Duma, and implementing the programs of joint rational use of natural resources among the CIS. (Smith, 2000) Another important statement concerning the CIS was to preserve and enrich the common cultural heritage within the CIS member states. The identity and unity of Russians were developed by the inclusion of Russian citizens and Russian speakers in the near abroad, especially in Ukraine and Belarus having the historic roots of the Russian identity, and foreign states who by all means met on a common language and culture. (González, 2013) Putin's inclusive strategy toward the Russians within and outside of Russia as well as the CIS peoples was assessed as a reminiscence of the Soviet Russia by some. His adoption of the acts in December 2000 of the white-red-blue flag as the state flag, of the old imperial emblem

of a double-headed eagle as the symbol of the Russian state which was once used by the Czarist Russia, and of the Soviet-era red banner as the military flag with its red star as well as replacing the current national anthem with the tune of the old Soviet Union anthem as the Russian Federation state anthem under new lyrics written by Sergey Mikhalkov smacked of Putin's possible imperial plans concerning the CIS, or a fresh Soviet system among the post-Soviet space under the concept of 'integration'. (Chufrin, 2002, p. 14) However, Putin stated such moves served in the memories of '*...our mothers' and fathers' lives...*' and was to prevent the perception '*...that their lives were in vain*', he also declared that as a divided nation now Russians should embrace and remember of all the past symbols uniting them, which also included those of the Soviet era. (Tyler, 2000) Criticized as heading Sovietize and Tsarist symbols, Putin's such legal initiatives were associated with forming a Russian identity in the wake of national unity, supported by the majority of Russian population up to 70%, which required to comprehend the post-Soviet republics, as well. (Chufrin, 2002) In brief, the perception of a possible fresh 'Soviet-oriented' Russian foreign policy to include and integrate the CIS under the leadership of the big brother Russian Federation was awakened in the early term of Putin's presidency.

Putin's pragmatist strategy toward building warm and positive relations with the USA and other Western states saw an increase after 9/11 attacks in 2001. Bush's call for a global war on terrorism found an immediate answer from Moscow and initiated a common rhetoric against the evil forces. Although Russia attached the global terrorism to more the Chechen guerrillas within its borders, Putin still gained from the international status of the USA to present itself as one of the great powers that was fighting against the common enemy with the dominant power in the world. Apart from developing the Russo-American alliance, the bilateral relations with the EU were also strengthened, especially for the purpose of the commercial concerns of Russia. During the period of 2001 and 2003 Russia made a hay of making itself an important actor accepted to the international system.

4.4. RUSSIA-US RELATIONS: ANTI-TERROR ALLIANCE AFTER 9/11

Putin's collaborative and middle-of-the-road policies toward the West/USA escalated into another point in September 2001. Putin announced Russia's support for the USA from the earliest days of the 9/11 attacks and George W. Bush's declaration on global war on terrorism. Emphasized also in the new Russian foreign policy concept, his statements concerning terrorism as '...plague of the twenty first century...' and that Russians fully and truly understand what terrorism is was partly because of the terrorism activities in the southern borders of the Russian Federation. In this respect, Putin put aside the traditional Russian security concerns toward the West within the concept of becoming dominant power in the Eurasian region and gave the USA the nod for establishment of bases in Central Asia for operations against international terrorism. (O'loughlin & O'Tuathail & Kolossov, 2004)

The logical background behind Putin's anti-terror alliance with the USA was rather a tactical move to handle with the Second Chechen War in 1999-2000 in the North Caucasus, which threatened the security of Russia's southern borders. The cooperation with the USA was also a necessity for Putin to compensate for the US military deployment in Central Asia rather than standing up to. (Secrieru, 2006) Putin's rhetoric toward the 9/11 attacks was in the context of accommodation with the Chechen terrorism Russia was dealing with. From his remarks, Russia was one of the primary countries to be able to understand the pain American people going through, because *'Russians have themselves experienced the horror of terror'*. Moreover, he addressed the airline hijackings and suicide attacks as 'the same signature' with the Moscow apartment bombings in 1999. Putin also remarked that both Russia and the USA faced with a common enemy, the international terrorism in the 2000s, and the Nazi tyranny in the 1940s. (O'Loughlin & O'Tuathail & Kolossov, 2004, p. 7) Putin was clearly in a struggle for finding a common ground with the USA, as standing for the same atrocities that were the same in the core but in their own geographies, with which such remarks as *'we have a common foe, the common foe being international terrorism'*. In this respect, Putin thought the Chechen War nothing but a part of the international terrorism and by dealing with the Chechen problem he opened a gateway to legitimize Russian responses against Chechens in the context of global war on terrorism. (Secrieru, 2006) His rhetoric

was also promoted by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, successor of Primakov for the term of 1998 and 2004, noted that *'we are both victims already, both the United States and Russia...'* by referring terrorism as *'common evil'* (O'Loughlin & O'Tuathail & Kolossov, 2004, p. 9) Another point of attachment between the 9/11 attacks and the Chechen War can be found in the rhetoric of Russian officials. For Russia, Al-Qaeda along with Taliban and Chechen rebels, particularly Khattab and Shamil Basaev, were somewhat related to each other, and Bin Laden was one of the supporters of the Chechen guerrillas, as well. According to Russian officials, *'These are simply people practically belonging to the one organization. They were trained together in the same terrorist centers. They consider Bin Laden to be their teacher. He trained them on his bases in Afghanistan. They fought together against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and so on.'* (O'Loughlin & O'Tuathail & Kolossov, 2004, p. 12) As a matter of fact, Putin put a premium on Russia's being accepted as a 'regional super power' by the USA. In this way, Russia would appear as the American ally in Eurasia. (Secrieru, 2006)

Another area of cooperation with the US was held on 22 May 2002 on strategic nuclear weapons reduction. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) required the USA and Russia to limit their strategic forces, i.e. warheads of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers. (Kimball, 2006) Moreover, only six days later, in Rome Summit, a NATO-Russia Council was held out opening a new page in their relations by providing such justifications that *'new threats and challenges demand increasingly united responses'* as well as teaming up *'in areas of common interest and common threats and risks to the security'*. Russia and NATO would progress as equal partners in providing the security for Euro-Atlantic region by consultation, consensus-building, joint decision and joint action. (Rome Summit, 2002) The motive behind such cooperation moves of Russia with both the USA and NATO was undoubtedly the terrorist attacks of 11 September. In his speech in the summit, Putin drew a comparison between the attacks of 11 September in New York and 9 May in the Russian town of Kaspiisk by calling both under the same roof of 'international terrorism.'

4.5. RUSSIA-EU RELATIONS: FOUR COMMON SPACES

For the 2001-2003 period in Russian foreign policy, Putin's leadership strategy promoted the importance of the relations with the Western partners, by underlining Russia's position as a European and an Asian country, along with its indisputable economic ties with the EU. (Lynch, 2004) Putin's aim was to strengthen EU-Russia commercial partnership, which the amount of counter trade already reached €78 billion in 2002, to promote trade and investment, to increase export and import rates and to reinforce the overall economic cooperation that were set as the policy aims of the Common Economic Space of the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003. (Kellermann, 2004) In this summit, the program of the four common spaces was launched, namely a Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; a Common Space of External Security; a Common Economic Space and a Common Space of Research and Education, including Cultural Aspects, with the purpose of enhancing the bilateral relations. (Van Elsuwege, 2008) Putin had already showed his intention when he addressed the State Duma on May 16, 2003 stating that doubling the nation's GDP in the next decade would be the ultimate goal of Russian foreign policy in order to provide economic development and attract new investments in order to enable Russia to find place in international market. (The European Union and Russia: Close Neighbors, Global Players, Strategic Partners, 2007) In this respect, the membership of Russia into the World Trade Organization (WTO) mattered a lot to Putin to realize economic development and necessary reforms and attract the foreign investments. (Kellermann, 2004) However, the cooperative web of relations were affected adversely with the Eastern Enlargement Policy of the EU started in 2004.

The post-2003 events had a transformation effect on Russian foreign policy that was in collaboration with the West and USA even though for pragmatic reasons under-the-counter. Firstly, the USA's Iraq invasion by justifying the 9/11 attacks and the production of weapons of mass destruction aroused Russian suspicion that caused Russia to state the hostility to the unipolar world order by the USA and to put forward multipolarity in international order in 2007 Munich Conference. The second strike came with the enlargement policies of the EU and NATO in 2004 that included the post-Soviet and post-communist geographies, which also awakened the security worries of

Moscow. In this respect, especially the inclusion of the Baltics in the NATO membership and the military bases in Poland and the Baltic states alarmed Russia with the presence of foreign powers in its immediate borders. The antigovernment demonstrations and protests beginning in Georgia in 2003 that dispersed into Ukraine in 2004 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 were supported and funded by the Western powers. The West and USA's interference into the elections in these countries and their aims for imposing Western type of democracy by promoting the pro-western leaders were perceived by Moscow as building their own sphere of influence in the region by neutralizing Russia. Thus, Putin's cooperative relations with the Western powers at the beginning of the millennium turned into adopting traditional Western threat perception once again.

4.6. THE CRITICAL POINT IN US-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE: 2003 IRAQ INVASION

Moscow's cooperative relations with the USA experienced a departure by the 2003 invasion of Iraq of the USA. After the 9/11 attacks, bilateral relations of two were strengthened through the military alliance concerning the security matters. Moreover, Putin's Russia was one of the leading states who gave support for America's war on global terrorism, when compared to other American allies in Europe, by declaring the terrorists as the common enemies. Putin's and Russian officials' words on understanding the American pain, NATO-Russian Council in 2002 concerning the military cooperation, Moscow's acceptance of NATO expansion and the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty created the moderating effect between two states. It is crucial to state that Russia's post-9/11 alliance with the USA was of utmost pragmatic root. Considering its relatively weak position in the international power structure, Russia required to make alliance with the USA, as the only global power, in order to get a share of the cake. Russia, at the same time, would contribute the great power status of itself through standing by the USA in the fight for global security. (Ambrosio, 2005)

However, Bush's invasion of Iraq in March 2003 sparked off Russia's reaction as unacceptability of the USA's self-ordained actions by taking advantage of the

unipolar power system. Consequently, Putin turned to multipolar world order rhetoric. Behind Russia's objection to the Iraq invasion was the Russian-Iraqi deal of \$40 billion economic and trade. Apart from that, Russia also required the USA not to act by itself to intervene into the Iraq, but let the UN investigate into prohibited weapons claimed by the USA. Although it was argued that the USA presence in Georgia disturbed Russia and if the USA had let Russia benefit the right of the self-defense in Georgia, then would Russia do the same for Iraq, Putin wasn't be backward in giving the veto for the USA's plan of Iraq War and highlighted his rhetoric of multipolarization against American's unipolar actions. (Ambrosio, 2005)

The 2003 invasion of Iraq damaged Russia's great power status by reducing it as a minor power. In other words, while Putin's strategy to ensure Russian national interests and great power status required to benefit from the alliance with the USA, American's unilateral action in 2003 changed the Russian alliance rhetoric and damaged Russia's position in the international system. Russia's great power role as an American ally deteriorated to a minor power, the national interests of whom the dominant superpower ignored. The post-invasion period revealed that Putin's strategy to bandwagon the USA was not functional anymore and Russia should turn to the Primakov Doctrine once again. Moreover, Russia's multipolarity was contributed by France and Germany who also objected to America's invasion in Iraq. This caused a split in opinion in the Western powers, which could also enable Russia to say the anti-American unipolarity explicitly. (Ambrosio, 2005) Although Russia's strategy to get France and Germany onside against the unipolar world order, which was unsuccessful, Russia-USA relations experienced the beginning of the retrogression in the millennium.

4.7. CRISIS IN RELATIONS WITH THE WEST: THE EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT

The crisis in the relations between Russia and the West began on March 29, 2004 with the NATO's new members, namely, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the three Baltic states that were also among the former Soviet Union, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Back then in 1999, the three other post-communist states, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland had joined the NATO already. Such chain of

expansionist moves of NATO aroused threat perception in the leadership strategy of Russia, which were contributed by NATO's military activities under Russia's nose in the edges of western borders once the Baltics were included into NATO. Thus, NATO's Baltics move, perceived as a direct threat to Russian national security, and interests of political, economic and military issues, caused a threat-oriented leadership policy for 2004 Putin period. Putin promoted attention to Russian security concerns, because NATO's declaration of further enlargement policies, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, were on the agenda for the near future along with the current NATO's military bases in Poland and the Baltic states. (Gidathubli, 2004; Lachowski, 2007)

Another demonstrator for Putin's threat-oriented leadership strategy came just a few months later. On May 1, 2004, the EU initiated its enlargement policy to include ten more states into the organization. The crucial point is these ten states also included the Baltics along with Czech Republic and Poland. Although the EU was the main trading partner for Russia (only natural gas exports of Russia reached 63% in the European markets in 2000) by covering the state's foreign trade as much as 35% and the leading actor of Russian foreign direct investment, the enlargement policy of the Union meant another threat to Russian perception because Russia regarded Eastern Europe still as its natural sphere of influence. (Lynch, 2004) Moreover, the Union by embracing these Soviet satellite states simply meant they would move away from Russian influence, adopt pro-Western policies and choose to strengthen relations with the EU rather than Russia. This would cause Russia to lose its authority in its immediate neighbors in the long term that were also in the position of buffer zone for Russia against any external threat. This is because, after the enlargement, Russia was surrounded by five members of the EU—the Baltics, Finland and Poland. (Neuman, 2010) Apart from the enlargement policy thorough Central and Eastern Europe, Russo-EU relations had already got a major blow due to the EU's support for NATO's military intervention in 1999 into the Yugoslavian War as well as adversative role in the Second Chechen War, beginning in the same year, toward the Russian excessive use of force. (Kellerman, 2004) However, the role of the EU in the Color Revolutions displayed evidently the ideological differences between the Union and Russia.

4.8. WESTERN PRESENCE IN RUSSIA'S NEAR ABROAD: COLOR REVOLUTIONS (2003-2008)

The importance of the CIS for Russian foreign policy could be summarized from Secieru's words: '*Russia has only three friends in the world: its army, its energy monopolies, and the pro-Russian leaders in the CIS space*'. (2006, p. 6) Thus, the pro-Russian governments in the post-Soviet republics were all important for the maintenance of the CIS project of the Russian Federation. Putin's leadership role, too, was in support of the maintenance of the pro-Russian governments in these states. However, the post-2000 period opposition demonstrations that aimed at overthrowing the current regime through political but nonviolent ways riveted the current Western threat perception in the leadership strategy of Russia. Known as the Color Revolutions, these pro-Western public demonstrations penetrated Serbia with 'the Bulldozer Revolution' in 2000, Georgia with 'the Rose Revolution' in 2003, Ukraine with 'the Orange Revolution' in 2004 and lastly Kyrgyzstan with 'the Tulip Revolution' in 2005, which also coincided with Putin's victory in 2004 elections. (Thien, 2009) Russia analyzed all of the four Western type of democratic movements as including some sort of Western involvement with the aim of providing a room for the regimes advocating for cooperation and integration with pro-Western or EU policies, as well as for adopting Western type of democratic institutions which required a centrifugence from the remains of the Soviet system. (Stewart, 2009) Russia's perception of Western involvement in these demonstrations included widely effective media, the promotive role of the civil society organizations funded by foreign entrepreneurs, international actors' watchdog strategy and controversial statements concerning the so-called rigged election results via such institutions as the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) stood by the transition from the current regimes to the Western type of democracy. (Kandelaki, 2006) As Thien cited, in the example of Ukraine, the Guardian claimed that the Orange Revolution was funded by both the US government and its NGOs, including billionaire George Soros's open society institute, as much as \$14 million to be spent in organizations and demonstrations against the current regime. In Georgia's case, the US ambassador himself, Richard Miles, was among the foreign supporters to guide Saakashvilli toward outrivalling Shevardnadze. Media's involvement

in the anti-regime movements was another story. (2009) After all of these, for Putin, all three leaders, Shevardnadze, Yanukovych and Akaev who were overthrown and applied to all the people's dissatisfaction were Russian-supported, and the political challenge they were facing with at some point was against Russian views, as well. On the other hand, the others, Saakashvili, Yushchenko, supported by the West gave their words as to pro-Western foreign policies and institutions that would lead the country '*into the mainstream Europe*' and the European Union. (Thein, 2009, p. 4)

The reason for Russia's displeasure proceeded from the fact that these countries were within the post-Soviet zone framework, and had West-supported and funded governments. Thus, Western economic pressure in case of pro-Western leaders win the day in these states would come into question when carrying out their policies, and this simply mean Russia would be in losing position of its buffer zone, jeopardizing its territorial integrity. Moreover, its connection with Russian citizens residing in these states would be subject to influence and approval of the Western forces in the long term. Yushchenko's victory from Russia's viewpoint would mean Ukraine's NATO membership at the same time. Russian-supported Yanukovych, though, could enable Ukraine's involvement into the Eurasian Economic Space along with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. (Thien, 2009) Apart from its national interests in its backyard, Russia also had an opposite attitude toward Western type of democracy by the reason of lack of Western responses and staying on the sidelines of Western actors when post-Soviet democracy going into a pretty pass under Yeltsin leadership. (Stewart, 2009) Apart from that, Putin deemed the USA responsible for interfering the presidential elections in Georgia and Ukraine, preparing a substructure for the Western-led candidates to achieve in the elections by mounting an anti-Russian rhetoric among the people through demonstrations and protests, and by doing so giving room for American influence and dominance in Russia's sphere of influence. (International Yearbook CIDOB, 2010) In this respect, Russia felt apprehension a possibly similar outcome would sweep away in these countries, would cause throw off the current domestic balance as well as Russian role and, equally important, would create a spill-over effect for rest of the near abroad geography.

Putin's leadership at this point applied an active response to the series of revolutions in its near abroad, firstly toward Georgia. Georgia's separatist republics, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, appeared as disputed territories between Russia and Georgia once again since the 1990s. Following Saakashvili's victory of presidency in 2004, Georgia acted swiftly to require Russian peacekeeping forces out of these two territories, which were positioned after the demand of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Russian government after Georgia's response appeared as use of force toward the separatist demands in 1991 and 1992. The bilateral relations bogged down after Russian claim of Chechen guerrillas hiding within Georgia in 2005 and 2006, along with advising against Georgia's future NATO membership. On the other hand, Putin included the energy role of Russia for Moscow-Kyiv line that was already at an impasse with gas tariffs, and subjected Ukraine to pay as other international markets paid for the gas. When Ukraine failed to pay the debts, Russia turned to cut off gas supplies through Ukrainian territories in 2006. Despite an agreement, the Ukrainian debt kept growing and gas disputes between two countries struck itself in 2007, 2008 and 2009. (International Yearbook CIDOB, 2010) As it is seen, the leadership understanding in Russian foreign policy reflected rather pro-active ways on Russia's bilateral relations with its immediate neighbors. For the period of the Color Revolutions, the growing Western involvement in Russia's near abroad affected Putin's leadership to take steps that are more concrete in his foreign policy.

Munich Security Conference, February 2007, in which Putin's active leadership went beyond regional policy to the international arena by stating Russia's dissatisfaction concerning the unipolar world order of the USA was one of the turning points of Russian foreign policy. Never before had Putin spoken out so straight-out Moscow's opinion about '*one center of authority, one center of force, one center of decision-making*'. He referred the current international order as '*one master, one sovereign*' that was also in contradiction with democracy. (Courtesy Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2007) The underlying reasons of such remarks were directly related to the actions by the West and USA within a few years. American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Color Revolutions between 2003 and 2005 were among the key factors that awakened Russian threat perception and triggered Russian security concerns over its

sphere of influence. (Giles, 2017) From the viewpoint of Russia, the USA was in a struggle for counterbalancing Russian effect and presence in the post-Soviet space through the Western interventions with the purpose of regime change by imposing Western type of democracy, however, left behind domestic disorder and instability in the region. From a more long-term threat perception, Russia was in the fear of being captured by the foreign powers once its buffer zones were finished off. One of the underlying causes was Russia's abundance of natural resources, which made Russia appealed for the foreign control over the country. Thus, the traditional security matters against the foreign powers were back once again, after four years, in 2004 but was clarified by Putin in 2007 for international counterparts. (Giles, 2017)

2008 Russian presidential elections opened the way of presidency to Dmitry Medvedev, though Putin's support for him played the utmost role in such a change of power through Putin's assignment as Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. Since Putin's effectiveness in the policies and implementations, the period between 2008 and 2012 was often called as tan-democracy addressing the joint rule between Medvedev, as head of state, and Putin, as head of government. (Hale & Colton, 2010, p. 5) The next chapter focuses on Medvedev's foreign policy attitudes without discussing the reflection of Putin's first term leadership manner in Russian foreign policy. Putin's first two presidential terms will be assessed together with his next presidential term that began in 2012.

CHAPTER 5

MEDVEDEV'S PRESIDENTIAL PERIOD: THE REFLECTION OF 2008 FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (2008-2012)

Having a law degree with a PhD and coming from a different background than that of Putin's days in KGB and service in East Germany at the time of the Soviets' fall, the leadership of Dmitry Medvedev posed great expectations for the West to promote for a more democratic and less authoritarian vision of Russia in international politics. He did not fail to satisfy these hopes, either, in especially domestic reforms of liberalization such as the human rights, or modernizing the army, which included the shifting of power from military to civilian officials. (Gill, 2011) His leadership role between 2008 and 2012 was assessed as the continuation of his predecessor and the role he was provided within four years was Putin's loyalist or puppet. (Makarychev, 2010) The fact that the constitutional provisions allowing only two consecutive terms in presidency made Putin turn to making a shift with Medvedev in 2008 resulting in Putin's prime ministry until 2012 when he could be re-elected as president. However, at this point, there were speculations in their collaborative presidency, metaphorically, constituting a tandem. Rather than a prime minister who awaited the directives from the president, he was an initiator and popular politician. That is to say, he was a very active prime minister, making speeches at major gatherings, being directly involved in Russian foreign policy, travelling abroad more than his predecessors, and taking an active role in conducting the war with Georgia in 2008. In fact, they already accepted the trueness of working together; however, the disagreements between two also occurred, not in public, though. (Gill, 2011)

Medvedev's leadership was still more than a just follow-up of Putin's eight years in office. His foreign policy became distinct from Putin's presidency in aspects of Russia-West relations on the concepts of multipolar world order and new security architecture in Euro-Atlantic to replace NATO, and in Russia's near abroad, the use of soft power became more highlighted as a priority of the Russian Federation.

(Makarychev, 2010) Just after Medvedev's taking office in Kremlin on May 7, 2008, the new foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation was accepted on July 12. The new concept prioritized '*protection of interests of the individual, society*' once again with the inclusion of '*the state*', this time. (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, 2008) With reference to the fact that state interests are equal to national interests, the leadership role in the Russian Federation from 2008 to 2012 turned to protect the regional status in its near abroad, to make offensive moves either with its hard power as in the case of 2008 Georgia War or with its soft power tools as in the gas crisis with Ukraine in 2009; to maintain the rhetoric of a world order with more than one poles; and even to activate a new security formation to replace NATO which would also release Russian security concerns by the West. All of these political moves pointed out Russian uneasiness on the presence of the Western states in Russia's area of special interests and the conflict of interests between two. Medvedev's Russia now put '*guaranteeing Russia's competitiveness in the global world*' to the list of national interests. In this respect, Medvedev's priority was to ensure '*emergence of a new world order*', by introducing Russia-India-China Troika and BRIC (Brazil- Russia-India-China) in an effort to global development and pulling the international relations out of Western-controlled organizations.

NATO's expansion through the area of Russia's 'special interests' was noteworthy for Russian foreign policy during Medvedev period. So much so that Russia already failed to maintain its effect or possibility of collaboration with the Communist Pact states of the Soviet times in Eastern and Central Europe, and more importantly the three Baltic states were amongst the new NATO members in 2004. Four years later, NATO's strategy even extended through Ukraine and Georgia this time. Russia's apprehension of losing its immediate neighbors to such an opponent as NATO led it to act defensively to the foreign powers. That is to say, the process beginning with the EU's enlargement and NATO's extension through Eastern and Central Europe, continuing with the Western-controlled Color Revolutions in three countries within Russian immediate periphery and NATO's 2008 strategy as well as the EU's Eastern Partnership programs in 2009 gave rise the defensive maneuvers by Russia. On the

other hand, Russia's defensive foreign policy toward the Western states turned out to be offensive moves within the borders of its immediate periphery.

Russia's war into Georgia in 2008 was the case in point. Georgia's military intervention into its separatist South Ossetia came up against Russia's use of force toward Georgia on behalf of South Ossetians who were under Russian protection. Georgia's desire of a Western type of democracy resulted in both a loss to Russia and Russia's recognition of two regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were demanding independence since the disintegration of the Soviets. As for Ukraine, it has even more long-lasting effect. The statements of Putin and other Russian officials on a somehow unity of Ukrainians and Russians placed Ukraine on a more different status. Thus, both in the Orange Revolution in 2004 with the aim of a pro-Western leader's rising to power as well as Ukrainians' wish to join the EU apart from NATO's plans toward Ukraine's inclusion into the alliance one day, and the efforts of the USA to create a regional level of cooperation with the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development composed of four post-Soviet states, namely Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, and the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) created a perception of a reciprocal desire between Ukraine and the West. However, it is notable that the eastern part of Ukraine with a large number of Russian ethnic residents had still an opinion of being under the control of Russia that it would become prominent in Crimea's annexation in 2014. Ukraine's involvement into NATO meant for Russia both to lose its periphery to foreign powers and to break up its buffer zones that maintained protection for Russian territorial integrity against a possible foreign invasion. NATO's infiltration through expansion policy and similarly the EU's trojan tactics to enlarge till the edge of the Russian borders led to create a military threat of the former and the political threat of the latter for Russia. Thus, in 2009 gas crisis for Ukraine's western orientation along with Ukraine's existing debts, Medvedev made a move to introduce Russia as an important regional power by showing its teeth indirectly to Europe by leaving them without gas in January 2009. Actually, Russia's intimidation toward Ukraine was not just talk. Rogozin's statements on a possible military activity to Ukraine that was similar to the August War if Ukraine joined NATO showed Russia's seriousness in its defensive policies.

The leadership role in Medvedev's period led to the defensive strategies in Russian foreign policy toward NATO to propose a new European Treaty, based on the cooperation toward the Euro-Atlantic security on equal bases. Russia wished to be accepted as equal partners with the NATO members and incorporated into this security process equally. Russian lack of trust for NATO resulted in Russia's highlighting the OSCE to both guarantee security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region instead of NATO. (CIDOB International Yearbook, 2010) By doing so, Russia would also overcome its fear of NATO's containment of Russian geography by introducing Russia as an active partner, since the presence of NATO was a signal of a possible Russian threat for the Western periphery rooted from the Communist Soviet times. However, Russia saw no reasons both for such a concern now that the Soviet Union collapsed, and for a Western military alliance. Thus, Russia's new military alliance proposal would also prevent its near abroad zone to become a member of the anti-Russian alliance. As a matter of fact, NATO's insufficient policies to collaborate with Russia or inability to activate the partnership programs also played a role in such a proposal. The new security treaty also highlighted the great power status of Russia, which was another foreign policy aim of 2008 concept.

5.1. THE DETERMINANT FACTORS OF MEDVEDEV'S FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

NATO's continuing enlargement through Central and Eastern Europe was extended through Russia's soft belly, Ukraine and Georgia, in 2008 NATO's Bucharest Summit in Romania. Already joined by Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and the three Baltic states in 2004, NATO members reached a consensus over the vitality of membership for both countries, though not ratified their joining to the alliance, but adopted an open door policy for them, which would in the end enable them to become member states in the future. On the Russian side, though, the presence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was unnecessary because its role ended after the Cold War between Eastern and Western blocs in 1991. The existence of the alliance was a signal that the West still saw the Russian Federation, which as the successor state of the Soviet Union in the international level, as a possible threat. Furthermore, NATO's enlargement, firstly in 1999 by including post-communist states, Poland, the Czech

Republic and Hungary, secondly in 2004 especially enrolling the three Baltic States, made Russia pursue of defensive position toward NATO's moves with the purpose of ensuring Russia's security concerns. The climax came with the Color Revolutions in 2003 and 2004, and NATO's decision in the favor of Georgia and Ukraine joining the alliance one day, with the USA's support to the utmost degree in Bucharest Summit. (Lazarević, 2009) The support of the USA in this respect was worthy of notice, because in 2007 the US Congress had already ratified the expansion of NATO through Georgia and Ukraine that was also positively held in Bucharest Summit in 2008. Having the USA support, two countries were engaged into such regional initiatives as GUAM and the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). (Lazarević, 2009) However, Medvedev's response came in August against Georgia as the use of force, which was assessed as the presence of the Western role in Georgian attacking South Ossetia. Ukraine and Georgia were the integral part of Russia's 'near abroad' and 'sphere of influence' for Russian perception. Apart from their roles in transporting of Russian oil and gas toward Europe and their dependence upon Russia in terms of energy and commerce industries, they are assessed within the Soviet unity for the Russian Federation both culturally, traditionally and with the fact that they are hosting Russian nationals within their borders. (Lazarević, 2009) Thus, Russia's uneasiness about the ignorance of its national interests and sphere of influence by NATO led it to use military force if necessary as in Georgia War, or turn to soft power tools as it did in gas crisis with Ukraine. However, the purpose behind these moves was certain: the Near Abroad was Russia's red line and no Western or foreign influence was permitted.

5.2. RUSSO-GEORGIA RELATIONS: THE AUGUST WAR (2008)

Toward the possible membership of Georgia and Ukraine to NATO after the West-sponsored Color Revolutions, Medvedev firstly adopted a response of use of 'language' against the memberships of two countries either by asserting that the majority of these countries were against the membership of NATO, or, where the public support was certain, by emphasizing the required conditions for Western democracy were not fulfilled. From time to time, Russia even used a threatening rhetoric, as Dmitri Rogozin did, Russia's ambassador to NATO in 2008, as on the condition that Ukraine joined the alliance, the current Ukraine borders would not be the same. The same

rhetoric was valid for Georgia's membership into NATO, because neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia was willing to be a member of NATO under the state of Georgia. Russia's identification of NATO as a hostile actor, ignoring Russia's security needs as well as provoking instabilities, resulted in adoption of a foreign policy strategy by Russia for Georgia and Ukraine to impede their NATO membership. (CIDOB International Yearbook, 2010)

Russia's intervention into Georgia for the reason of defending South Ossetia from Georgia's attack was one of the phenomena under the leadership of Medvedev, although the reasons of the intervention were rooted in Putin's previous presidential term. Upon the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia on 1 August 2008, Russian troops intervened into Georgian borders on 7 August to defend South Ossetians as well as the large numbers of Russian nationals in the region, who were under the guarantee of Russian protection. On 26 August, Russia recognized the two regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, although Georgia received the international support, including the EU, for accepting these regions as an integral part of Georgia. The Russian Federation attacked Georgia as behaving in an aggression against South Ossetia; however, this military move costed Russo-EU, Russo-USA and Russo-NATO relations. However, one positive achievement was that Medvedev's leadership enabled the multipolarity Russia had emphasized since the Primakov Doctrine.

The Russo-Georgian War was an indicator of how the role of leadership in Russian foreign policy evolved into seriousness in order to protect its near abroad from any foreign effect and intervention, and determinedness over using military force if needed. Moreover, the special interests of Russia as well as the red line concept over the post-Soviet zones were declared in this war. Actually, Russian foreign policy could be assessed as acting both defensively in order to protecting its backyard and 'sphere of influence' from foreign 'veiled' invasion and also offensively to show aggressive and military response to such an attack. (Makarychev, 2010) In terms of Georgian dominancy over the two regions, Russia also declared its big brother role, rooted from the Soviet times, as still valid, and displayed the opposition, along with using military force if necessary, against any state of self-ordained in these zones.

5.3. UKRAINE-RUSSIA GAS CRISIS IN 2009

The role of the natural resources required attention in Russian foreign policy since Putin's first term. From his statements, *'Russia's natural resources base will not only secure the country's economic development, but will also serve as the guarantor of the country's international position'*, Russia has benefitted from its energy resources both to realize its economic development, and also to ensure its position by using its energy power as a tool in international relations. (Sauvageot, 2011, p. 4) Russian exports consisted of 70% of its crude oil and 30% of its natural gas production. For the rest of Russia's export goods included energy-intensive products of the metals, petrochemical and forestry industries. However, the share of machinery industry in export rates was not even 6%. Furthermore, Russian domestic economical balance was also dependent on energy products. As Russian Ministry of Finance declared nearly 50% of federal government gains between 2008 and 2009 were comprised of oil and gas. (Solanko, 2011) Although Russia had such gas crises with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova as transit countries, in Ukraine example in early 2009, we see Medvedev using Russia's energy dominance as a weapon of his foreign policy. To some authors, the reason behind such Ukraine mistakes of adopting market arrangements and political orientations appears as pro-Western leaders coming to power in the Orange Revolution in 2004. (Sauvageot, 2010-11, p. 11) Ukraine's relation with Russia was much more fragile in terms of the status of the large Russian-speaking minority in Ukraine, conflicts over natural gas supplies, and the status of Sevastopol and Crimea. After the Orange Revolution in 2004, pro-Western president Viktor Yushchenko's reforms of moving the political system of the country from a presidential to a parliamentary system, Freedom House's declaration in 2006 Ukraine as a free country, extensive support from the western part of the country for joining the EU and NATO, and NATO's optimistic viewpoint to the membership of Ukraine and Georgia, led Russian foreign policy to concentrate on Ukraine after the August War. (Lazarević, 2009) The result came with a series of foreign policy moves by Russia, such as cutting off the Ukrainian gas supply in 2009.

In January 2009 after the current deal for the price of Russian natural gas to Ukraine and the European tariff through Ukraine expired on 31 December 2008, Russia

wished to increase the tariffs from \$179.50 to \$450 per 1,000 cubic meters, and this increase caused the gas dispute between two countries. (Kramer, 2009) Ukraine was heavily dependent on Russian gas; on the other hand, Russia was dependent on Ukraine for gas transfer to Europe. However, both Ukrainian dependency and accumulation of debts to Russia were the reasons that gained the upper hand of Russia. When no deal was met, Russia cut off the gas supply to Ukraine and indirectly to Europe on 1 January 2009 until re-transferring on 20 January. Because Russian natural gas was transferred through Ukraine, and then Belarus, to 16 EU members, Europe was affected by the dispute in such a way that Ukraine diverted volumes provided for Europe, causing the supplies to Central European countries fell. (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava, 2009) However, Russian-Ukrainian crisis was determinant not only specific to the bilateral relations, but also the EU-Russian relations deteriorated, because Russia's role as a gas-supplier and Ukraine as the transit country were damaged in the eyes of the EU countries. (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava, 2009)

5.4. RUSSIA'S MULTIPOLARITY DISCOURSE

Medvedev's statements of a multipolar world order were put in action with the victory of Russian army over Georgia in 2008. Lavrov, Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, stated that the victory of Russia over Georgia in August 2008 was the moment of both disrupting the American hegemony as well as realizing the multipolar world order. (Makarychev, 2010) The presence of the Western powers in the August War faced the truth of the status of regional and preventer power of Russia to protect its national interests. The Western recognition of Russia's regional role was accompanied by the suspense of deployment of missile system of the USA in Poland and Czech Republic in 2009 by Obama Administration, and the reverse maneuver of NATO to halt its Eastern Enlargement policy. Actually, NATO members had yet not reached a consensus to extend the Membership Action Plans to Georgia and Ukraine, but insisted on the importance of the open door policy of the alliance for these two countries in 2008 Bucharest Summit. (Makarychev, 2010; Erlanger & Myers, 2008) The second move by Russia came with the proposal of a new European Security Treaty in substitution for NATO, which still had remnants of anti-Soviet (now anti-Russia). Although this new treaty would regain the involvement role of Russia into providing security to the

Atlantic-Eurasian region, which Russia lacked for because of political preferences and strategies, the Western states did not sympathize with this idea.

Russia's multipolar discourse came with the notions of 'concert of great powers' or 'great power management' along with contributing effect of multipolarity on the development of democratic institutions.(Makarychev, 2010, p. 168) Thus, once a multipolar world order was ensured in international system, and then democracy would be accompanied by it. In fact, the European Security Treaty was a solid evidence of Russia's wish to build a new world order to include more than only one dominant power, which would eliminate the bossy effect of the USA in international relations and give room for Russia to get integrated into the security alliance with the European powers along with the USA. Russia's security association with the West would also facilitate its threat perception posed by NATO to its area of special interests. However, the Eastern Partnership Program of the EU toward the six post-Soviet states, namely Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Ukraine, maintained Russian security concerns.

5.5. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY: MEDVEDEV'S SOLUTION

As discussed, the August War highlighted the discourse of a new security cooperation by Medvedev himself for NATO's expansionist moves, including Ukraine and Georgia this time, by accepting the fact that both countries would be the member of the alliance one day in Bucharest Summit, though, ignoring Russia's concerns over their security. What Medvedev proposed also contained Georgia's response toward the separatist South Ossetia under the wing of Russia that positioned its peacekeepers in the back then in 1992 with Sochi Peace Agreement. (CIDOB International Yearbook, 2010) One of the purposes of Medvedev in bringing such a security treaty to the table embodied a Russian self-defense against NATO's inclusion new members dispersing through the post-Soviet and communist geography by restraining Russia to its own territories with no buffer zones to eliminate any possible foreign attack. Thus, a common security creation for the whole Euro-Atlantic geography including Russia would both decrease NATO's role of threatening by the '*expansion of military alliances at the expense of other parties*' and also contribute the role of '*building an integrated*

and solid system of comprehensive security'. Moreover, Medvedev required the European Security Treaty to be subject to the principles of international law, to enable a multipolar world and to overcome conflicts peacefully as well as to build common perception and multilateral cooperation in the sphere of security. (CIDOB International Yearbook, 2010, p. 228)

Both Medvedev's Berlin visit in June and his speech in the World Policy Conference in October 2008 underlined the necessity of a new European security alliance and, as a continuation of Putin's Munich speech, charged the American unilateral actions for causing divisiveness in international relations. (CIDOB International Yearbook, 2010) Another reason of such a new treaty to replace NATO to maintain Euro-Atlantic security was its inefficacy to fulfill its role. From the viewpoint of Russia, NATO was unable to prevent violent crises from Balkans to the Caucasus. Moreover, NATO kept its anti- communist position as in the Cold War days, now as against the Russian Federation. Thus, a new multilateral creation with non-bloc nature was another requisite. (Makarychev, 2010) However, the new security treaty proposal was not taken a blind bit of notice by the West. Furthermore, Russia was criticized as dominating European international relations by expanding its interests throughout Europe. In fact, Medvedev's initiative was for the first time to take building an institutional partnership with the EU and NATO seriously, and Russia was ready to recognize the EU as a trustworthy collaborator. Nevertheless, Russian-EU relations, excluding the gas crisis at the very beginning of the year, boomed with the EU-Russia Summit in 2009 that concluded the negotiations on the visa regime, the program of Partnership for Modernization to contribute the Russian technology and Russia's joining the World Trade Organization. (CIDOB International Yearbook, 2010)

5.6. THE EU INVOLVEMENT IN RUSSIA'S NEAR ABROAD: THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP (EaP) PROGRAM

Russian cut-off of gas transfer to Ukraine in 2009 crisis meant nearly 80% of shipments of gas exports to Europe halted. Furthermore, Europe's dependency on Russia for its imported fuel was as much as 40%. When taking into consideration the Russian gas supply route throughout Europe, the cut-off clearly induced a regional and

international crisis. Apart from Russia's near abroad, namely Ukraine and Moldova, from the Western Balkans, i.e. Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Greece and Turkey, to Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy and Austria were badly affected. As Czech foreign minister stated, *'The main lesson learned from this crisis is that Russia and Ukraine aren't reliable suppliers. Europe must think about alternative sources and pipelines.'* (as cited in Kramer, 2009; Pirani, Stern and Yafimava, 2009, p. 57) The EU gave some thought to decreasing the Russian effect on the energy industry and diversifying the Russian gas through the North Stream and South Stream pipelines. The security of the gas and energy corridors became also a current issue. Since the process of re-transferring gas export got complicated by disagreements about debts, prices, and transit tariffs as well as European supplies being completely cut off for two weeks in the winter season, with serious effects especially for south-east European countries, Russia's so-called carrot and stick method by abusing the gas issue because of the pro-Western Ukrainian orientation and image claimed its energy supplier role of its EU partners. (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava, 2009)

Russia and the EU did never meet a cordial relationship. In other words, their relations always followed a series of ups and downs, and so did during Medvedev's leadership. Although Dmitry Medvedev's rising to power raised the West's hopes that for the post-Putin term Russian foreign policy could be more collaborative to the West/EU, it would turn out that especially the effects of Putin's post-2004 foreign policy tendencies and style maintained in Medvedev's period somehow. Medvedev's liberal policy reformations, including the domestic structure, NATO's back down from the Ukraine-Georgia membership and the possibility of further eastern enlargement of the alliance in the foreseeable future, Obama's administration treating Moscow as a crucial international partner and accordingly Russia's wish to be recognized as a great power gave an impression of a fresh period of the relations between Russia and the West under Medvedev's leadership. (Moshes, 2012) Even Russia-US relations came in a 'reset' period under the presidency of Obama. In September 2009, Obama relieved Russians' mind by declaring the cancellation of deploying the missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, which had been planned since 2006. Although the aims of the USA were to create counter maneuver by Russia concerning more harsh sanctions

against Iran and halting sales of S-300 air-defense missiles to Teheran, the bilateral relations were somehow satisfying. (CIDOB International Yearbook, 2010) However, firstly August War and then the gas crisis after a year proved that Russian foreign policy did not pose quite a new strategy. Having said that, the post-Soviet strategy of the EU did not go through fundamental changes, either, but only retarding policies. The European Union's Eastern Partnership Program (EaP) beginning in May 2009 committed a framework in such areas as stronger society, stronger economy, stronger governance and stronger connectivity and for the six post-Soviet states, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine with the partnership of the EU member states. (European Union External Action Service, 2016) The exclusion of Russia from this program resulted in the idea Russia failed in its foreign policy for the post-Soviet geography and took another loss in maintaining its role after the EU's enlargement in 2004. Another reason to increase Russia's worries over an EU involvement in this geography was a possible free trade and association agreement between the EU and Ukraine that was declared in 2008 and planned to sign in 2012. (Moshes, 2012) Moreover, Medvedev's initiative on creating the European Security Treaty to replace NATO was found unfavorable by the European Union member states, which put bilateral relations and collaboration in a more fragile level.

5.7. SOFT POWER STRATEGY OF RUSSIA TOWARD ITS NEAR ABROAD

Both the initiatives of the EU and NATO to embrace the post-Soviet states and accordingly formation of a pro-Western rhetoric in some countries as in the Color Revolutions were vital signals to demonstrate the decreasing effect of the Russian Federation in its sphere of influence, and just the contrary the increasing influence of the Western states supported by the countries in the region. Russian normative arguments highlighting the traditional and cultural values throughout the history were its defense mechanism against Georgia's Saakashvili regime, Ukraine's NATO membership and the presence of Russian-speaking population in the Baltics. (Makarychev, 2010) However, both in Moldova and Ukraine the presidential elections either resulted in the pro-Western governments in power or the pro-Russian president failed to enhance the bilateral relations and cooperation level. Additionally, Russian

lack of experience in applying soft power tools was another contributing factor in not turning out an advantage for behalf of bilateral relations.

5.8. RUSSIA'S FAILED EXPECTATIONS: VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH

Following Viktor Yanukovych's rising to power in 2010 presidential elections, the effects of the Color Revolutions, of public's call for more Westernized state, especially residents of the western part of the country, because the eastern part was evidently in the opinion of a pro-Russian Ukraine, cleared up Russia's worries about the Western strategy to initiate a regime change in Russia once building pro-American regimes on Russia's periphery. Furthermore, Russia's losing blood in Ukraine along with its aims of preventing of an anti-Russian regime rising to power and eliminating any effect of the Color Revolutions into Russia went in Russia's favor when Yanukovych, Putin's favorite, won elections in February 2010. The political wing of the Orange Revolutions, namely Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, were beaten by the election results and remained ineffective.

Obama pursued of a regional balance of power strategy but not a containment policy toward Russia by strengthening neighboring countries. All of these parameters led Russian side to have an expectation of a clean sheet for bilateral relations between Ukraine and Russia. (Makarychev, 2010) However, it did not take long that such an expectation would not be realized as it was hoped. Although Yanukovych was introduced with his pro-Russian tendency, his first official visit would be to Brussels in 2010. This was an important signal that he positioned the relations with the EU as priority, although he also wanted to promote bilateral relations with Russia, but not completely drifting away from Russian influence. As in the case, in April 2010 Yanukovych agreed to extend the lease of the naval base in Sevastopol to the Russian Black Sea Fleet for 25 years until 2042. The lease contract was due to expire in 2017, which Yanukovych's predecessor Viktor Yushchenko had declared to eliminate Russia's Black Sea fleet from the port of Sevastopol by the reason of its presence vandalizing Ukraine's sovereignty and also its destabilizing effect on the peninsula. The ethnic Russian majority in the peninsula, which made up more than half of the two-million population and held a pro-Russian political view, supported the presence of Russian

military base in Sevastopol. Such a political maneuver received a Russian discount on Ukraine gas bills. (Harding, 2008; 2010) Yanukovych's another move toward enhancing the relations with Russia came with the legislation by Rada, Ukrainian Parliament, concerning the non-bloc status of Ukraine which comforted Russia's concerns over Ukraine's relations with NATO. (Moshes, 2012; Pifer, 2020) By the way, Ukraine's bi-directional foreign policy was based on the maintenance of the good relations with the EU, as well. Moscow's push Kiev to join the Eurasian Customs Union (EACU) failed when Ukraine declared its priority in April 2011 to complete the negotiations on the association agreement with the EU, rather than to join the Russian-led Customs Union. (Moshes, 2012) As seen, Ukraine after Yanukovych carried out a balance foreign policy by coming close to the EU, but not eliminating the relations with Russia, either. However, Ukraine's political shift, in spite of not leaving out of Russia's influence completely, meant a lot for the post-Soviet geography. Ukraine was a different part of the story. In other words, apart from the rest of the post-Soviet states, the Russian Federation assigned a different meaning to Ukraine and Ukrainians. Putin's rhetoric titling Ukraine as 'Novorossiya', which was the territory the Russian Bolsheviks gave to Soviet Ukraine in 1922, or accepting Russians and Ukrainians as '*practically one and the same people*' as well as attributing Ukrainians to a single '*East-Slavic ethnicity: Russians and those same Ukrainians*' were notable examples of the Russian perception of Ukraine. (Socor, 2020) Thus, a political shift of Ukraine especially toward the West could result in Russia to take a firm stand accordingly.

5.9. MOLDOVA'S EUROPEAN COALITION

Moldova was another post-Soviet state experiencing policy shift in support of the West. After Russian-supported president Vladimir Voronin lost 2009 elections to a coalition of 'European choice', the weakening Russian effect also came into view. A contributing factor in bilateral relations between Russia and Moldova was the presence of Transnistria problem. Transnistria was a self-proclaimed state, but recognized by international authorities as a part of Moldova. The Transnistrian conflict, though, is one of a number of 'frozen conflicts' in the post-Soviet Russian periphery. The pattern, similarly to the other post-Soviet states, began with the presidential elections in April 2009 when the Communist Party leader Voronin came to power. The street

demonstrations having the Western support behind were followed by the failure of the Communist Party to ensure enough votes in parliament to elect a president and then by the re-elections in July. The result of the second elections was a coalition, 'the Alliance for European Integration'. Included in the Union's European Neighborhood Policy in 2003, Moldova-EU convergence resulted in building closer ties by way of an ENP Action Plan in 2004/5, Moldova's membership to the European Energy Community in 2010 as well as an Association Agreement in June 2014. The EU's Moldova strategy was a follow-up its accession of the Baltic and Central European states in 2004 and of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. Thus, the EU engagement with Moldova came into question and the presence and funds of the EU increased in the country accordingly. The EU's political tools appeared as the Transnistrian conflict. (Beyer & Wolff, 2016)

As for Medvedev's strategy toward Moldova, the same offer for Moldova to join the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union, as in Ukraine, was proposed by Russia in 2012, but not resulted with an active response. (Beyer & Wolff, 2016) Moldova's reluctance to integrate into the Customs Union was a direct result of the new government's pro-European course of policies and actions. The crucial point is new coalition accused Russia for being a part of the Transnistria problem, rather than a mediator. (Moshes, 2012) Russia's strategic hardships to pull Moldova out of the Western influence resulted in its adopting more soft power tools that would enable Russia to solve out the communication problem with the new pro-Western government, as well as elites in Chisinau, the capital of Moldova, and a variety of non-governmental groups. (Makarychev, 2010) However, the failure of this strategy was certain.

In both cases of Ukraine and Moldova, Russia's creating a communication bridge through the non-governmental organizations to reach the people supporting a more Westernized states and enjoying the memberships of Westernized institutions as in the EU or NATO, was often met with such repugnance by the public who perceived such organizations as offsprings of Kremlin. Moreover, Russia as a country was not good at normative policies, despite the fact that the EU was making good use of value-based policies through its neighborhood policy. Thus, Russia's such deficit of promoting the common values was an obstructor to apply its soft power as a tool of

Russian foreign policy. As a matter of course, Russia's traditional real politik way of foreign policy conducting was a contributing factor, too. (Makarychev, 2010)



CHAPTER 6

PUTIN AGAIN: THE THIRD TIME AS RUSSIAN PRESIDENT

Putin, in many vital moments of the Russian foreign policy moments, has had the leadership image who is the main decision-maker in state's all key foreign, security, and defense issues, such as letting the USA establish military bases in the post-Soviet Central Asia, despite differences and opposition from Russia's national security elites; or encouraging Yanukovych's nomination during the 2004 Ukrainian elections and masterminding gas crisis with Ukraine in 2006. (Stern, 2008). He is the ultimate controller of the country's strategic direction. (Hussain & Shakoor, 2017) However, the Russian security community also has a contributing role in helping Putin shape and carry out foreign policy decisions. (Trenin, 2016) Yeltsin was directed by his foreign ministers and oligarchs, and Medvedev by Putin himself in conducting their foreign policy tendencies. However, Putin's leadership has not been of such by any means.

Different from his predecessors, he refers to be the man who controls Russia. Mearsheimer assessed Putin's leadership consisting of wise strategies in foreign policy instilling fear and respect to anyone challenging him. (Kumar, 2016) As a matter of fact, the control over foreign policy of one leader was specified by the constitution itself. Articles 80 and 85 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation legitimizes the President as the authority to shape the country's foreign policy. However, Putin's own popularity and approval among many Russians were contributing effects to his personal power as the leader of the post-Soviet Russia. (Baldoni, 2016). According to Levada Center ratings, 9 out of 10 Russians had a positive view of their president in 2015. Besides, Putin's approval rating was as high as 87% in July, and reached an all-time high of 89% in June 2015. (Nardelli & Rankin & Arnett, 2015) Although both Ukraine events, the Crimean incorporation and the Western sanctions, which were assessed by the public as humiliating and weakening Russia, were accepted as the main reasons behind Putin's support, Russo-Georgian War in 2008 had been a dramatic disadvantage over Putin's popularity. However, this disadvantage was reversed in the affirmative thanks to Putin's foreign policy moves especially in 2014 with nine out of ten Russians

approving him. (Nardelli & Rankin & Arnett, 2015) Putin's rising as a leader was also contributed by the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, namely, the post-Soviet chaos of economic depression, street crime, and fight among the oligarchs for taking control of the former Soviet assets that were being privatized. Additionally, following coming to power in the beginning of the 2000s, Putin succeeded in establishing a functioning state by the help of his strategic moves in energy prices. (Baldoni, 2016) Stent argues that Russian foreign policy since Putin's rising power has undergone a transformation of restoration and revolution. The distinctive point is Putin regains Russia's historical position in the world stage by not traditional political and military tools, but promoting economic power. As an example, Russia hosted the G-8 summit in St Petersburg in 2006 and, then, Winter Olympics in Sochi in 2014, under Putin's presidency. As seen, Russia was accepted as a major global economic player by the West and its membership to the G-8 was approved. Actually, Russia's economic performance was highly contributed by the high oil prices. (Stent, 2008) However, Russia's joining to the G-8 group could not necessarily mean Russia became part of the Western alliance system; on the contrary, the multivectoral foreign policy persisted. Foreign Minister Lavrov stated '*Russia will continue playing its balancing role in global affairs. It will never be part of new "holy alliances" against anybody*'. (2007 as cited in Stent, 2008, p. 1090) Except for Medvedev's assuming the position in 2008, Putin was non-stop on the very top of the state for 15 years in 2019. Through years, he highlighted and strengthened different aspects of Russian foreign policy, but his Russia now is a lot more different, from Russian way of style to the current position of Russia in the world, from what remained after the day the Soviets dissolved on 26 December 1991. The years between 2000 and 2001 in Putin's presidency were characterized by mistrust of the West in such issues as the West's role in the CIS and the uncertain future of the Baltic countries; disagreements concerning energy routes as well as the US intervention in Yugoslavia and possible NATO's expansion to Eastern Europe. After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, Putin rather to turn his foreign policy from disagreement to cooperation toward the West. Furthermore, he announced that Russia was ready to supply military aid and share intelligence to the US in its war on terror in an effort to erase Al-Qaeda off the map. What is more, he even made dramatic changes from the previous Russian foreign policy lines by proposing to strengthen Russia-NATO

relations and possibly join the North Atlantic Alliance as a member state. Behind such a political move lied NATO's eastward expansion, since Putin aimed at collaborating Russia's long-standing opponent to eliminate a Western military alliance presence in Russia's backyard. From the neorealist way of thinking, Russia's power relations and security issues caused a twist from cooperation with the West in 2001–2002 to more confrontational behavior during Putin's next term. (Mankoff, 2012) Thus, the dalliance period ended in 2002-2003 with the USA's Iraq intervention and Russia's opposing rhetoric followed by discourses of veto in the US-sponsored Security Council.

Putin's main strategy in his first period between 2000 and 2003 was to attract foreign investments along with domestic ones to the country. In his first term, Putin prioritized to have control over what left from Yeltsin presidency: the oligarchs' role in state's domestic and foreign policies. Thus, Putin drew a picture of a Statist leadership, promoting state power, which centralized around an advance for democracy in the sense of the application of the law for everybody from common Russian to regional bosses, the oligarchs. (Sakwa, 2008) Putin's second presidential term between 2004 and 2008 had the feature of more antipathetic policies toward the USA including the EU, as well. The US's intention of deploying missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic was what Putin accused the USA of making divisions within Europe. Moreover, NATO's expanding policy to include the Baltic states and the Western support for the Color Revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan were other issues which created tensions between Russia and the West. Accordingly, the pro-Western governments of these countries, including Moldova, were punished by Russia either politically or via military force. During his 2000-2008 presidency period, he modified Russia from a simple regional power to a level of self-identification as a global energy power. (Nikiti, 2008) The post-2012 period, though, has hosted more aggressive foreign policy moves and an increasing hostility toward the West. Russia's uneasiness of the Western influence in the Color Revolutions within Russia's sphere of influence resulted in 2008 August War with Georgia, and, in 2014, the annexation of Crimea and Russia's invasion of eastern Ukraine. (Estebo, 2015)

In fact, Putin's assertive foreign policy began with the acceptance that the West would never approve Russia as its equal. Thus, Russian foreign policy turned to

adopting more assertive policies and taking a more defensive position to ensure its territorial integrity by the protection of its backyard from any foreign presence. (Baldoni, 2016) Furthermore, to suppress Ukraine because of aligning with the EU more, Putin adopted such a strategy '*that Western expansionism could be reversed only with an 'iron fist,'*' as in the annexation of Crimea. The other one came with the Syrian intervention to show the USA that Russia should be taken into account in respect to solving the Syrian conflict. (Aboyade, 2018, p. 82) He developed a rhetoric of ideational narrative by virtue of the West's neglecting of Russia's resurgence, and proceeding NATO's expansionism toward the frontiers of Russia. In his narrative, Putin firstly introduced the West as the threat for Russia's territorial integrity, with the strategies of NATO and the EU in Eastern and Central Europe, then in the post-Soviet states, and then necessitated Russia being to an alternative to the enemy West. Moreover, the enemy West thinking led to the ideology of Putinism, addressing the nationalist tendency in the Russian Federation, and the feeling that Russian national interests are neglected by the West, and Russia is under threat from the hostile West. Hence, Russia's foreign policy after Putin's third term in 2012 was characterized as Putin's reconstructing of Russia's past and highlighting its destiny along with his pragmatist thinking. (Roberts, 2017) Russia's foreign policy under Putin has been daring and promising for future of the state as in the examples of hosting the international organizations.

Multipolar world order was also one of the core elements in Putin's foreign policy, which was introduced by Yevgeny Primakov. In connection with this, Putin highlighted the importance of Russia's status as a great power, *derzhavnost*. Putin regarded it as necessary that Russia stand among the great powers in the international system. As a matter fact, Putin himself put it into words as, '*we will strive to be leaders*'. (Putin apud Light, 2015, p. 16, as cited in Baldoni, 2016, p. 5) Russia has always considered itself as one of the great powers and strategic players besides the USA and Europe in international relations. The historical attachments to a special mission of Russia to both religiously presenting the third Rome itself and also keeping a geo-strategic power in Eurasia, provoked a perception of Russian pride and highly aggravation to the West whenever the latter reacted as denial via any political tools.

(Baldoni, 2016) Mearsheimer's revisionist foreign policy reflects upon Putin's multipolar world order. In his first term, the cooperation with the West especially in the sphere of economic relations or dedication to create a stable and democratic world order in compliance with the UN was a necessity to integrate the Russian Federation into the international system after the USSR disaster. However, in the long term, this means re-gaining Russia the status of great power once again and presenting it as one of the power poles in the international system. The first step to reach the great power status require being regional power in its own backyard. Thus, even Putin's inclusive strategies toward the CIS by referring the historical and cultural roots they share, and adoption of the Soviets and Czarist symbols in 2000 could be assessed as protective and defensive instincts. That is to say, Putin saw a threat coming from the West to include the post-Soviet states into its orbit. Thusly, he proved to be right, by NATO's expansionism in 2004 including the Baltics as well as military bases in Poland; the EU's policy to include the Baltics in the same year, and the Western aids and support in the Color Revolutions. The final move came with Crimea in 2014 by the reason of, again, Russia's defensive purposes against the Western-supported Euromaidan protests on the side of joining the EU and NATO. Crimea has been a strategic region for Russia, hosting the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, and losing Crimea to NATO would devastate Russia's military presence in the Black Sea. In fact, NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 was a vital turning point for Putin's foreign policy that was one of the underlying causes of Putin's further aggressive policies toward the West. The threat perception toward NATO was so abstract that Putin called for an alternative security organization that would include Euro-Atlantic, the Eurasian States, and the CIS. Thus, Russia would be one of the states who could contribute the security concerns, NATO excluded, and even founded against at one time. This new organization would also comprehend the security not just for Europe but the Eurasian continent. While revisionist foreign policy results from the offensive tactics, Putin has also taken up defensive measures by having the capability to protect the state as well as realize its national interests including the security, upon the threat of NATO's plans toward the post-Soviet region encouraged by the enthusiasm of many Soviet states to join the alliance.

Putin's foreign policy addresses as a realist, pragmatist and having geopolitical strategies. (Roberts, 2017) In this respect, his leadership features him as predominant comparing to his predecessors. (Baldoni, 2016) From another point of view, the expectations of Russian people enabled him to build his patrimonial leadership style. By saying this, first of all the patrimonialism characterizes the system of Russian governance, and Russian society demands such a leadership position either willingly or because there is no alternative to him. Thus, Putin has played the game by the rules. (Roberts, 2017) To Immelmann's assessment, Putin has presented a leadership profile that is classified in the category of dominant individuals. He details that the leadership style of these people ranges from tough, strong-willed, outspoken, and competitive to forceful, power-oriented and domineering. The foreign policy strategy of dominant political leaders, accordingly, holds the features of assertive tendencies. (Immelman & Trenzeluk, 2017) What Putin carried out as a response to Ukraine's pro-EU protestors and policies in both Euromaidan and 2014 crises was a worthy example of his aggressive tendencies, beginning with the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, when it comes to Russian national interests, including its sphere of influence. Rising through the KGB and Russia's political elite, Putin has shaped his leadership style within the scope that the world is divided between Russia and the West, and any gains by the West will be evaluated as either a possible threat to Russian national interests or an indicator of Russia's strategic fail before the West. In other words, Putin's perception of international power relations are constituted on the basis of zero-sum game. (Immelman & Trenzeluk, 2017) Putin's first image as the new leader of the Russian Federation was charming for the post-Yeltsin term. By saying so, tired from the political instabilities, Russian people found what was missing in Yeltsin's period. As a leader, Putin was young and healthy, and had an unspoiled reputation, opposed to Yeltsin, and more importantly satisfied the demands of confidence and security by Russian society. The public popularity and support he enjoyed within the country, who was also called as 'the Teflon president', would gain Putin the status of becoming the top person in decision-making process concerning both domestic and foreign relations. However, the data of public support toward Putin differed by his first and second terms. Although Putin was supported by 43% of voters before the 2000 presidential elections, and increased almost 14%, the public trust in him saw a decline in his second term (2004-2008), because of

his lack of response to social moods, his state decisions and the Chechen War. However, that does not mean that Putin did not keep his positive image in public. (Shestopal, 2016) Putin's Russia has followed an activist foreign policy strategy, and the above-mentioned events are the indicators of Russia's risk-taking position and warfare capabilities in various areas i.e. land, cyber, sea, air etc. Furthermore, Russia has illustrated how it is stick to the activist policy abroad even though its economy is excessively depending upon the exporting of raw materials and hydrocarbons as natural gas, fuel oils, petroleum. Despite economic infertility, the Russian Federation carries on resisting the Western sanctions and taking part in the global politics actively. (Gurganus & Rumer, 2019)

6.1. PUTIN'S FOREIGN POLICY PARADIGMS: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTS

Theoretical background Putin reflects upon Russia's foreign policy is pragmatist abroad, Statist at home. Despite of the alliance with the traditional Russian hostile forces time to time, his priority has proved itself as a proactive and aggressive. The crises in Georgia and Ukraine are the noticeable examples in this respect. The assertive side of Putin's leadership has also approved itself whether through hard power or soft power tools. Putin's Crimean move was assessed by the West as the expansionist aims of re-building the Russian Empire, on the other side it could be also assessed as a response to Ukraine's endeavoring to get involved in the EU and NATO, based on the Russian national strategy, approved in December 2015, which stated NATO is a threat to Russia's national security. Beyond all assessments, it is a fact that Putin responded with an interventionist strategy through the Russian military presence in Crimea by invading it.

6.1.1. The Post-2012 Pragmatic Reflections on Putin's Foreign Policy

Russian foreign policy after Putin coming to office since 2000 has seen a gradual policy changes from cooperative policies with the West to more traditional, independent and assertive foreign policy moves. Putin's predominant leadership and the changes in balances of power have led Russia to adopt assertive policies in defending its interests

and to benefit from its increasing influence especially in its sphere of influence. Putin's foreign policy moves resulted from the urgent perception of threat from the Western organizations toward its immediate borders and the state of Russia's reaching enough strength and military power as well as economic enhancing to counter this threat and satisfying its own security needs. (Giles, 2017)

Alexander Dugin categorizes Putin as a Russian conservative. His conservative policy, however, has resulted from the rising of Statist right after the global financial crisis in 2008, Putin's popularity at home, as well as the status where the Russians put their leaders. In fact, Russia's political leadership has a continuation from the Russian Tsars to Vladimir Putin. In other words, the statement of 'Good Tsar, bad elites' and leaders' having the control over the Russian state have always been prominent in Ivan the Terrible, Joseph Stalin, Peter the Great or Vladimir Lenin, and now Putin's presidency. Considering Putin's policies during the post-2012 period, he reinforced his leadership position both in decision-making and in the government, and also won the hearts and confidence of the Russians so much so that he weakened the role of oligarchs in the government and foreign policy, fitted against the corruption, including the firing of Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov because of inclusion into a corruption scandal. (Dugin, 2013) Today's Russian conservatism contains anti-communism and anti-liberalism in itself, and depends on undivided political power. Putin's conservatism is formed on three foundations; importance of the traditions of established religion, a sovereign foreign policy and ensuring great power status. (Dugin, 2013) Putin today highlights Russia's religious history that was ignored in the Soviet times. Apart from Moscow's religious role in Orthodox Christianity, he also stresses Russia's longstanding interests in the Holy Land and especially in Jerusalem that dates back to tsarist rule. Russia's conservative ideology proves itself in its promoting Russian Orthodox connections to the birthplace of Christianity. (Krasna, 2018) Actually, Putin's Statism is reminiscent of pre-1917 Russian ideology, the triad of Czar Nicholas, 'Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality'. This is also seen in his demand of unconditional loyalty as demanded by the Russian Tsars and his statements, as 'Russia should look to its own history and traditional values'. (Roberts, 2017, p. 35-36) Thus,

Putin's power at home also redounds on his dominance role of foreign policy decision-making.

Putin's nationalism has become a conservative modernism particularly during his third term at home and a realist and pragmatic foreign policy abroad, by putting emphasis on state sovereignty, distrust globalization, limiting liberalization and democracy within a sovereign and national framework. Moreover, Putin does not stand for a status-quo; conversely, he is and will strive for revising the status quo using all the opportunities he encounters. As a result, his foreign policy depends upon the pursuit of Russia's national interests, regional and global power status, protectionism and mercantilism. (Dugin, 2013)

Putin's conservative rhetoric is also seen when he tries to position Russia as an alternative to the Western dominant international system. Especially in its near abroad, Putin's Russia prompted this policy by coming up with the aims of protecting its eastern brothers from the Western malevolence and preventing the Western hegemony or the dominance of Western liberal values to pervade through Russia's neighbors. Putin offers a Russian alternative toward the weaker nations on whom the West is imposing its principles. If the alternative of the Western dominance is substituted by Russia, Putin's aim of presenting a powerful Russia on the world stage will be realized, as well. Above all, his speech in Munich Summit in 2007 was the moment of Putin's expression of the current world order. He put the blame on the USA leading the unipolar world, abusing of power, creating instabilities in the international system, and misusing of international law conveniently for its own policies. He, also, openly criticized the USA's role in provoking military conflicts, but not resolving any, and by so doing, making the international system a dangerous and unbalanced place. In this respect, Putin asserted a necessity for multipolar world in which Russia would make a leader along with other power centers. (Roberts, 2017)

The pragmatist foreign policy of Putin necessitated ensuring Russia's national interests in cost and profit analysis. In other words, Russia collaborated with the West from time to time, if it was essential for Russia's national interests. However, cooperation with the West did not necessarily mean Putin did not oppose to NATO's

expanding through the Russian frontiers or the role of the EU in the Color Revolutions. The near abroad was still a matter of national interest for Russia and Putin put this into military actions both in Georgia and Ukraine showing that, if necessary, Russia would not hesitate to use of military force in its sphere of interest. (Roberts, 2017) In parallel to this, in 2016, Putin put patriotism as the new Russian national idea. Russian patriotism refers to the state as the main criteria for a Russian world, including Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, as well as the Russian diaspora around the world. Thus, the near abroad does not refer only Russia's immediate neighbors, but the Russian world itself. Russian patriotism stands for also Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Moldavian people. (Trenin, 2016) In this respect, Putin's patriotism has caused Russia to be seen as having expansionist policies through the post-Soviet geography. Thus, he is characterized as keeping a neo-imperial ideology by his aims of making Russia great again and proving protection for all Russian speakers around the world. In this respect, Putin's neo-imperial image is believed to mostly prove itself in the Russian perception of Ukraine's being an artificial state as well as the belief that Putin strives for building a Russian empire which will lead its dominance over its near abroad. (Roberts, 2017, p. 44)

6.1.2. Basic Documents: The Foreign Policy Concept and National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation

In 2013, within Russia's foreign policy goals, the security of the country, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the role of Russia as one of the power poles in world politics were ensured once again. The protection circle within the frame of a steady and safe environment expanded from at the beginning of the 2000s a stable world to a more safe Russia in 2013 with the statement of '*creating favorable external conditions for a steady and dynamic growth of the Russian economy and its technological modernization*'. Promoting international peace, collective decision-making, building good relations with the neighbors as well as helping to overcome existing and preventing future threats or conflicts in these countries were emphasized. (Kumar, 2016) Russia's dedication to ensure world peace, security and stability occurred in Putin's military intervention both in Russia's near abroad and Syria. The Western policies and activities in these regions could be understood as destabilizing factors from the viewpoint of Russia. Another significant point is '*ensuring*

comprehensive protection of rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots residing abroad', which took place in the annexation of Crimea by the approval of the public vote. (Gonzalez, 2013)

The report also comprehended the transition to a multipolar world in international relations, which makes global politics more unpredictable. The West cannot maintain the leadership of the global politics, and its dominance upon world economy and politics is fading, and now the development of the East and especially the Asia-Pacific region is discussed. The unipolar world order is the very reason of the geopolitical, economic and political crises, and the emergence of the new political and economic actors is the way of stability in international relations. Russia supports economic interdependency among states as a key factor for a stable international order. For Russia, the setbacks before a stable international order are the unipolar world order and the inefficacy of traditional military and political alliances. In this respect, Russia now requires a network diplomacy based on temporary coalitions in order to manage national foreign policy goals to overcome the international crises and manage trans-border threats and conflicts. (Kumar, 2016)

The National Security Conception approved in 2016 refers the USA and its allies try to '*retain their dominance in world affairs*' and contain Russia against Russia's independent foreign policy. By this containment, Russia has been under the pressures of political, economic, and military implementations. Moreover, the new polycentric world order has caused '*an increase in global and regional instability*' between countries. (Instituto Espanol de Estudios Estrategicos, 2015) The concept highlighted the Russian security concerns over its immediate neighbors. Russia is under the immediate threat of militarization and arms race processes carried out in its neighboring territories. Actually, this is a global level of security problem owing to building up and modernizing offensive weaponry and developing and deploying new types of weapons. Thus, ensuring security is not in equal levels between Eurasia and other regions. More importantly, the report introduced NATO as a threat to Russia's security. (Kumar, 2016) It clearly states that the buildup of the military potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) violates the norms of international law, and its strategies and activities to expand its alliance by triggering the bloc countries' military activity are

'creating a threat to national security'. (Instituto Espanol de Estudios Estrategicos, 2015) Thus, Putin's assertive foreign policy stems from this threat perception that he openly and directly noted in the National Security Strategy approved in 2015.

6.2. PUTIN'S ASSERTIVE FOREIGN POLICY

Although the war with Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the conflict in eastern Ukraine are accepted by many as a proof of Moscow's expansionist ambitions, according to another perspective, Moscow's annexation of Crimea was actually the final straw of ensuring its regional dominancy and the continuing state of relations between Kyiv and Moscow. (Avdaliani, 2019) The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership signed between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in 1997 provided to *"respect each other's territorial integrity, and confirm the inviolability of the borders existing between them,"* under Article 2. More importantly and strategically, the treaty provided the opportunity for especially Russia to enjoy *"the protection of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious originality of national minorities on their territory"* and the creation of *"conditions for the encouragement of that originality."* (Kimball, 2014) The crucial point was the clear Russian majority in the region, so much so that, according to the Ukrainian Population Census of 2001, Russians comprised of 58.5% of people in Crimea, while Ukrainians of 24.4%, followed by Crimean Tatars of 12.1%. As for the language, the numbers were again in favor of the Russians, because Russian was the native language of 76% of Russians, 11% of Crimean Tatars and 10% of Ukrainians in 2001. All of this prompted Russia to protect the Russians and Russian-speaking population in Crimea as well as to regain the place that *'was and has always been an integral part of the country'*. (Shapovalova & Burlyuk, 2016) Furthermore, even before the annexation in 2014, Russia had had the control upon and military bases in Crimea and the post-annexation included the opening of additional military bases as well as increasing economic influence. (Avdaliani, 2019)

The Georgia War in 2008 was not a different page, either. The breakaway regions, South Ossetya and Abkhazia are not recognized by most countries, but have had the Russian support and control both militarily and economically before the war.

(Avdaliani, 2019) Russia's support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia on separatist conflicts dated back in the late 1980s, which in the end turned out to be the war in 2008 upon Russia's claiming that Georgia hosted Chechen guerrillas. Russia has gained these regions as Russian dependencies by building military bases, protecting the borders, recognizing them as independent states, building new infrastructure and covering state budgets. (Gerrits & Bader, 2016)

The two Russian interventions during Putin's second term were notable to ensure public support. Both the war in Ukraine and the military intervention in Syria were depicted and propagated as the continuation of the World War II. It was declared by Russian officials that Russia's Crimea move was a reincorporation, which means Russia took back what was given to Ukraine as a gift by the Soviets. The policies of Ukraine and Syria were attached with the Great Patriotic War memories of Russia, so much so that the Western role in the Color Revolutions and the Ukraine crisis was portrayed with the aims of conquering and damaging the Russian state, and the Western sanctions toward Russia were a follow-up of Nazi Germany actions. Thus, the Russians accused the Ukrainians of being manipulated by the West for the murders of civilians in the eastern part of Ukraine. Similarly, Putin addressed the Russian soldiers positioned in Syria as "*worthy successors of the Great Patriotic war heroes*". (Baldoni, 2016, p. 19) In this respect, Putin's strategy as keeping the Russian public onside was to create a perception that Russia, their motherland, was under attack from foreigners and assertive foreign policy decisions were necessary to ensure the national security.

Putin's strategy toward Russia's near abroad was not limited to eliminate the Western presence in the region, but also to appeal the historical roots between Russia and the region states. Putin announced 2014 as 'Year of Culture' by the themes of 'patriotism, values and ethics'. Putin's soft power strategies by embracing Russia's sphere of influence were assessed by the West that he evaluated Russia's immediate neighbors as a lost component in Russia's history. His statements also contributed the view that Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia are from the same roots and cannot live without each other. He also congratulated the Russian soldiers on bravely bringing Crimea into the Russian Empire. One should note that he addresses Ukraine as a divided part of Russia and the post-Soviet division of two countries are a tragic separation of a

notion. Add to that, he has stated many times that Russia will be prepared to protect the rights and interests of Russian-speaking people abroad. (Roberts, 2017)

6.2.1. The Ukraine Crisis and the Annexation of Crimea in 2014

The EU's Partnership for East Program was the main factor of the Ukraine Crisis in 2013 and 2014. Beginning with the anti-government protests, it turned out to be a civil war, in which the eastern provinces waged war against the Ukrainian army, and ended up with Russia's including Crimea into its territory. While the West identified it as annexation, Russia called it as re-incorporation of an old territory. (Kumar, 2016) Whatever it is called, the territory was included into Russia less than a month from 20 February to 26 March. (Värk, 2014) From the Russian viewpoint, Ukraine is not a different country. The language they speak is similar, their cultural ties are interwoven because of the fact that Ukraine was a part of the Russian Empire as well as the USSR, and it is accepted that the Russian Empire came into being from the Principality of Kiev on the banks of the Dnieper River. However, as for the Russian perception of the Caucasus and the Central Asia is rather associated with having a share of the energy resources of the Caspian basin, the number of ethnic Russians and blocking out the threats coming from there into the Russian territory. The Ukrainian case is matter of multinational empire aims and a nation-state for Russia. Characterized as the second most powerful Soviet successor, Ukraine has ethnic Russians more than any other non-Russian country and this constitutes another important factor in the eyes of the Russian Federation, as to the West-Russia relations and the reason why it fails to see Ukraine's independence legitimate. The control of Ukraine can be assessed as a game board where Russia will prove itself as a multinational empire or keeps its nation-state presence. (Avdaliani, 2019)

The critical point of the Ukraine Crisis came with the suspension of the implementation of the association agreement with the EU on 21 November 2013 by the acting president Victor Yanukovich. He had the aim of maintaining the economic relations with Russia. However, the pro-European mass protests began and led to a movement called as Euromaidan. The protestors demanded the policies requiring closer ties with the EU and accordingly to overthrow the pro-Russian Yanukovich

government. The Euromaidan protests were recognized as the largest ever pro-European rally in history and were widely believed to be outsourced by the EU and US. (Kumar, 2016) Following Yanukovych's being ousted on 22 February 2014, the Russophobes regions in Crimea declared that Crimea is Russia, and took action to replace the Ukrainian flags with the Russian ones in Sevastopol and Kerch in 23 February. By the way, similar pro-Yanukovych and pro-Russia actions took place in other regions of eastern and southern Ukraine such as Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv and Odessa. Following up the referendum on the status of Crimea which was held on 16 March by the Supreme Council of Crimea, in which as high as 96% voted in favor of uniting with Russia, the Council declared its independence from Ukraine and requested to join Russia. Finally, Russia intervened into Crimea and incorporated into its territory on 18 March 2014.

As for the claims of the West accepting the annexation as violation against international law, Putin drew a comparison with Kosovo with these words, *'the Crimean authorities referred to the well-known Kosovo precedent — a precedent our western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation, when they agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea is doing now, was legitimate and did not require any permission from the country's central authorities.'* The independence of Kosovo from Serbia was Putin's political and legal justification of Crimea. As a matter fact, against the accusations by the West against Russia's violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity, Putin objected that it was the West *'who sacrificed Ukraine's unity for their political ambitions'*. (Värk, 2014)

The main motives of the annexation of Crimea were the strategic and ethnical issues. Putin considers Crimea as an ethnically and culturally Russian region. Crimea had dominantly ethnic Russian population and was originally a part of Russia that was transferred to Ukraine in 1954 by the Soviet Union. (Kumar, 2016) Thus, ethnic Russians in this region should be united with the motherland. (Roberts, 2017) In addition to its ethnic kinship to Russia, Crimea's geostrategic position was a lot more important for Russian foreign policy with the presence of Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. Thus, upon NATO's statements on Ukraine membership into the alliance, Putin stated in March 2014, *'we could not allow a historical part of the Russian territory*

with a predominantly ethnic Russian population to be incorporated into an international military alliance'. (Roberts, 2017, p. 41) Although Russia's assertive foreign policy toward its near abroad began with the Russo-Georgian War, there were differences of Russia's perception concerning Georgia and Ukraine. That is to say, in Georgian War, Russia supported the rebel provinces without incorporating any territory and recognized the de-facto independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; however, in Ukraine intervention, Russia gave support for the rebels in the eastern provinces as well as incorporated Crimea, which was an autonomous republic in Ukraine. (Kumar, 2016) Thus, while the Georgian issue could be assessed as a security matter, Crimea was important for both strategic and security purposes, but also a matter of survival for Russian policy.

6.2.2. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)

In 2015, Putin made an important step to promote further integration and ensure Russian hegemony in Eurasia. Three members of the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, along with Kyrgyzstan and Armenia came together to form the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in January 2015. The Eurasian Economic Union coming into being in the post-Soviet geography is an initiation by Putin to create a counterbalance against the EU's Eastern Partnership program. Similarly, the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) is a project by which Russia can control the reintegration process in the post-Soviet space, including the countries that fall within the sphere of the EU's eastern neighborhood. Putin lays stress the economic benefits of the union, in this respect. The union allows for the creation of a huge single market as well as the lowering of barriers to the movement of goods and people between its members. (Mankoff, 2012) Highlighting the ECU, Putin keeps the Russian presence in its sphere of influence and reminds the West that they are not the only actors in this game. (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2012) Despite of considering the concepts of Russia's political, economic or military dominance along with cooperation between states in the union, as well, in fact Putin's post-Soviet regionalism intends to guard the regional countries from external democratic influences as well as to assure 'mutual protection' for autocratic regimes. Moreover, with this integration, Russia will have strengthened Eurasia's role in the both political and economic arena, and have also re-positioned Russia as a major

global player in the world. (Mankoff, 2012) The first step to the EEU has its origins of the treaty for a Customs Union (CU) signed by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 1995, and later by Kyrgyzstan in 1996 and Tajikistan in 1999. (Borodin & Stokov, 2015) Before the 2000s, the Eurasian integration experienced little progress due to the post-Soviet states' priority in their political integration following the disintegration of the Soviet Union; adoption of a multivector foreign policy, backed by legal reforms and domestic market liberalization to improve the investments, in order to maintain the survival of the state; and, placing Western investors to the top for the economic development rather than a Eurasian economic integration. (Kirkham, 2016) However, the two turning points for the future of the integration came into being first with the Customs Union in 2007, the launch of the common tariff in 2010, and then developed with the elimination of internal physical border controls in 2011, and finalized with the inauguration of the single economic space in 2012. The main parameter behind the Eurasian Union was to build an institutional unity similar to that of the EU with its own Parliamentary Assembly, Eurasian Court, and Eurasian Parliament, so on. (Kirkham, 2016) Although the Eurasian Union was formed as an EU-like association consisting of the post-Soviet states in an attempt to deepen economic ties among members, the further political integration was a part of Putin's agenda concerning the future of the union, as well. (Mankoff, 2012) In fact, the basis of Russia's Eurasian ideology comes from the geopolitical concept of Eurasianism. The concept of Eurasianism at some point has characteristics of a competitor project to China, the EU and USA, because one aspect of Putin was to limit the reach of foreign powers to these countries. It does not constitute sharp contrasts between the West and Eurasia as rival civilizations; on the contrary, it does accept the main advancements of the Western civilization that are the political freedom through the separation of powers, and the rule of law. Russia has hoped to get an advantage of sharing a common Soviet history to re-build a Eurasian identity. Russia, Kazakhstan and Belorussia, to some extent, made quite achievements in sharing Soviet cultural values. However, the effect of Eurasianism is not strong enough over the post-Soviet states, as in Ukraine, as Russia expects to be. (Kirkham, 2016) As a proof, Ukraine made announcement not to join the Eurasian Union because of the union's deterrent effect in Ukraine's integration with Europe. On the other hand, Putin has used a trump of Kyiv's debts to Gazprom and repeatedly put pressure on

Ukraine for joining the Customs Union. In aware of Ukraine's prominence for the success of the Eurasian Union idea, Russia keeps its pressure strategy to affirm Ukraine's "no" as an answer. (Mankoff, 2012)

To some, Russian foreign policy toward the post-Soviet zone can be seen a complexity of Putin's ambition for re-establishing the Russian empire and hegemony in the post-Soviet geography, and thus characterized as expansionist, post-imperialist and even de-colonialist. (Kirkham, 2016) Specifically, Moscow is evaluated of encouraging regional integration in order to keep its neighbors within Russia's orbit, ensuring Russia's influence over their political process, and preventing them to develop relations with foreign powers. (Mankoff, 2012) However, Putin himself declared Russia did not hold such an interest in the region, nor the Russian Federation does have the capability to keep all fourteen other post-Soviet countries in its orbit. No matter whether Russia holds the ideology of imperialism or expansionism, Russia has ensured its leadership position as well as achieved a successful integration process, establishing strong economic ties, in the region in a deeper way, step by step, via regional initiatives of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), the Single Economic Space (SES), and the Eurasian Union. (Mankoff, 2012)

6.3. RUSSIA'S REAFFIRMATION OF ITS GREAT POWER STATUS

Russia's presence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), take it as militarily or political, results from Putin's objection to the unequal distribution of power in the US-led world order. Accordingly, pursuing a revisionist foreign policy in recent years, Putin's main foreign policy aim is to regain Russia the position of a great power status. The first opportunity in this respect came in with the Syrian crisis with the absence of the USA in the region. Putin maintained his strategy to build up well-balanced relations with the traditional American allies, such as Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The outcome contributes Russia's prestige, so much so that Russia's intervention in 2015 prevented the threat of another regime change in the Middle East as well as the destabilizing effects of sectarianism, Islamic radicalism, and terrorism promoted by the US in Iraq and Libya. (Krasna, 2018)

Apart from providing a ‘playground’ where Russia takes an active role, the Middle East region also appeals to other Russian interests as the petroleum, defense, and nuclear industries. The region stands out as the world’s largest oil producing region and a leading partner in controlling prices and developing gas projects. As for the defense and nuclear markets, Middle Eastern countries also provide a vital trading volume for Russia’s arms sales. According to statistics, Russia’s arms sales to the region have risen since 2011, corresponding to 36% of Russian defense deliveries in 2015. (Krasna, 2018, p. 7) Moscow’s policy concerning Damascus has a history inherited from the USSR times of close partnership and military backing for Syrian military failure to Jordan in the 1970s. Russia had had a military base there. Thus, Russia’s involvement into its near abroad and the Arab World is actually the way of the last point of a series of continuing relations and solidification of its presence, started with Syrian military activity in 2015. (Avdaliani, 2019) The role of Russia in the international power system was strengthened with its presence in Syrian territories by happening to be a part of the Syrian conflict. Russia proved its entity in both fighting against the Assad opposition and in conducting conflict resolution, against the USA-led hegemonic international system. Apart from Putin’s attribution of a new multipolar world order, Russia’s Syrian intervention has been introduced in domestic politics as an indicator that now Russia is a force for good waging against evil. Moreover, the posters on which Putin’s words were written as “*Russia’s armed forces are the guarantor of world security*” were hanged in Russia’s bases in Syria. (Baldoni, 2016, p. 19) Although Libya factor bears importance for fighting against international terrorism to protect the Russian borders, and its rich oil resources, Putin was also in aware that the Russo-Libya cooperation would contribute Russia’s role in the Middle East and North Africa. Similarly, despite aiming at eliminating a possible Israel obstacle for Russia’s presence in the Middle East, Putin has also taken into consideration what Russia would gain from a mediating role in the regional conflicts where Israel is involved; a rise on the rank of Russia’s status in the world politics and in great power competition along with rising as an alternative to the USA.

By hosting the Group of Eight (G8) in 2006 and showing up ubiquitously in many international organizations as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council of Europe, Russia's status has risen to one of the players in the international arena. Russia's energy dominance in the world market is one of the contributing factors in its great power status. Putin's energy policy shapes Moscow's Asian policy, as well. Putin seeks to attract investments from the Asian partners, especially Chinese, in order to enable new sources of oil and gas and to keep the economic relations strong with these states. After opening a new oil pipeline in 2009, the exports of Russian oil to Asian markets such as Japan, China and Korea have reached 30 million tons. Additionally, Russia and China made a 30-year agreement to supply pipeline gas to China, costing \$400 billion. The importance of the Asian states for Putin's Russia comes from the assessment that Asia will be the future's economic center and the place of future economic growth. Thus, the economic ties with China, India, Vietnam and Japan will bring along political and global aims of the Russian Federation. The economic partnership between Russia and Asia will contribute Russia's regional security and stability as well as global position in international relations. In fact, after the annexation of Crimea, bilateral relations of Russia and the USA (also Europe) were transformed into the American and European sanctions on Russia, and consequently Moscow's policy appeared as a shift of political and economic priority to Asia by enhancing relations with China, especially. (Mankoff, 2015) In other words, Asia is a window of opportunity for Russia to challenge the economic and geopolitical dominance of the West and reach global power status. Energy issue is obviously one of the main tools in Putin's foreign policy and sometimes he used this advantage as the punishment for the other side, as cutting the gas flow to Ukraine in 2015. What Putin puts into as energy strategy turns out to Russia's role in changing the game as it wishes to be, particularly in its near abroad.

6.3.1. Putin's Axis in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

Russia's foreign policy in the Middle East during the Arab Spring, started in Tunisia in 2010 and then spread through Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria etc., was based on pragmatist and realist strategies. (Erenler, 2012) The importance of the Middle East region comes from the fact that the Middle East is an area where Russia could unhinge the Western interests and position itself as one of the great powers who can display the power capacity through its presence in foreign lands. Before the protests and revolts

pervaded throughout the region at the beginning of 2010, Russia maintained the relations based on commercial relations, selling arms, clearing the Soviet era debts and trying to build up diplomatic ties, as with Hamas. As a matter of fact, when Vladimir Putin became the president of the Russian Federation in the 2000s, the Middle East was not a priority in Russia's foreign policy, nor Russia was a major player in the region where the US hegemony was available beyond dispute; however, the turning point came with the Russian military intervention into Syria in 2015. From now on, Russia's presence and power in the region is a reality for other actors. Russia pursues the regional policy mostly through its focus on Syria and Libya. (Cafiero, 2020)

6.3.1.1. Syrian Intervention

Russia's intervention into Syria in September 2015 was the first military operation for the post-Soviet period beyond the borders of the USSR. The presence of Russia's forces in Georgia and Ukraine was understandable for the West, because Russia was a regional power. However, it was surprising for the Western states to see that Russia sent its military forces to Syria. The purposes behind such a military action of the Russian Federation firstly were to weaken the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and protect the Bashar al-Assad regime. In fact, Syria's importance for Russia resulted from the Russian naval base at Tartous and air base at Latakia. Thus, if the US or IS exercised control over Syria, then Russia's influence in the region would come to an end. Another reason was the Russian national security concerns. Russia's military intervention to Syria was also conducted with the intent of fighting against international terrorism. That is to say, more than 2,000 jihadists fighting with the IS were from originally Caucasasia and Central Asia. In case of turning back to these regions after the cessation of the conflict, they could create a security threat to the Russian borders directly or indirectly through Central Asia. (Kumar, 2016) To put it more detail, if the Assad Regime was overthrown and Daesh and other terrorist groups, namely Al-Qaeda and the Al-Nusra, asserted dominance over the region, then they would easily organize attacks against Russia. Thus, Kremlin's plan was to ensure a united Syrian state whether it was authoritative or democratic. (Baldoni, 2016) From the Russian viewpoint, the Western powers encouraged the IS forces in Syria and Iraq by putting support behind the rebel forces in the region. In the opposite side of the Syrian policy of the West,

Russia turned to cooperate with Iran to maintain the Assad regime and the Syrian state. In this respect, the main point was to prevent the IS to become the dominant power in West Asia. Russia maintained its Syrian policy in international forums by standing behind the Assad regime and with its military actions on the ground. The Syrian conflict brought a climax between NATO and Russia from time to time as in Turkey's shooting down of Russian fighter aircraft for the reason of violation of Turkish airspace in November 2015. However, neither Turkey nor Russia escalated any further hostilities. In March 2016, Russia withdrew some of its troops, yet it has still been accepted as a key player in Syria. (Kumar, 2016) Syrian intervention was a kind of turning point for Russia's presenting itself from just a regional power, but positioning itself to a great power and an international actor who took responsibility in international conflicts and becoming an integral part of the Syrian solution. That is to say, the role of Russia in intervening Syria and providing protection of Russian-ally Assad Regime against the Western-backed rebels was a vital opportunity to position itself as a great power. If Russia would prove its capability to protect its allies, then the West would accept it as equal to sit at the negotiating table and to collaborate for a solution of the Syrian conflict. Russia would rule out the unipolar world order of the US as the only dominant player at the same time. That was the reason behind Moscow's Syrian policy. At this point, Russia has proved itself as a systemic player to move dominoes in the international system as well as featuring itself as an indispensable international actor in solving major crises. In this respect, Russia's assertive and pragmatic foreign policy contributed its rhetoric of a multipolar world order, too. The weakening effect of the EU and USA in Syria were replaced by Russia's influence.

6.3.1.2. Russia's Libya Policy under Putin's Rule

In February 2017, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) of Libya and Russia's Rosneft, state-controlled oil company, signed an agreement for laying the groundwork for investments and redeveloping Libyan oilfields. The cooperation areas were comprised of a variety of sectors, including crude exploration and production. (Wintour, 2017) Actually, Russia had already made investments in Libya, such as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), for oil and gas exploration and production. However, the cooperation level between two countries in 2017 was

remarkable. In early 2011, Libya had its own share from the Arab Spring uprisings as in Tunisia and Egypt in 2010, and many people displayed nationwide and nonviolent protests against the Muammar Qaddafi regime. (Kuperman, 2013) When NATO started its military intervention and sanctions toward the capital city Tripoli upon Qaddafi's armed response toward to the protestors and killing the civilians in 2011, Russia lost out more than \$4 billion because of the cancellation of a 600-million euro contract for the supply of anti-missile systems as well as of the agreement for Russian Railways to build a Sirte-Benghazi high speed railway. The overthrow of Muammar Gadhafi after the revolution concerned Russia about Libya's possible pro-Western foreign policies. (Fasanotti, 2016)

Russian supported Tobruk-based Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani who also got General Khalifa Haftar onside, the head of the self-styled Libyan National Army, was described as Putin's man in Libya over against the Government of National Accord (GNA), which was supported by the United Nations. (Fasanotti, 2016) Although Russia appeared as pursuing a pro-Qaddafi foreign policy in Libya, it had its own motives. In Russia's foreign policy, the Libya factor is not presented as a specific regional conflict. Putin's strategy is based on a broader international fight against terrorism. In other words, intervening into the coastal cities, Russia provided justifications on its presence and role in Libya for fighting IS and its affiliates having attacked Russia before. Haftar's anti-Islamist position was one of the reasons of Putin's support for Haftar, because Russia could cooperate with Haftar in the matter of counterterrorism. Moreover, Russia could address Egypt, which was Haftar's main sponsor, as another partner with the support of Haftar. (Toaldo, 2017) Moreover, there were also commercial matters of Russia's oil and gas companies; because Haftar's forces have the control most of Libya's oil resources, as well as Russia's weapons supply to the Tobruk-based government. (Pieper, 2017) Furthermore, both Russia's military intervention into Syria and its role of peacemaker in Libya would add to Putin's domestic and international leadership position. (Toaldo, 2017) Haftar demanded Putin to provide political support to legitimate himself as the leader of Libya in order to help lifting the UN arms embargo and maintain deliveries of weapons. (Toaldo, 2017) In response to Haftar's interests, the role of Libya in Russia's foreign policy was shaped

upon the outcomes of compensation for the financial losses with economic deals, in numbers of \$150 million in profits from construction projects, \$3 billion from a Russian Railways contract, nearly \$3.5 billion in profits from energy deals, and at least \$4 billion in arms sales. Additionally, the Libya factor could strengthen Russia's military position on the Mediterranean Sea that will open up an opportunity for Russia to enrich its position in Europe's coasts as well as the Middle East and North Africa, through opening a naval base near Benghazi.

Putin's other aim was to prove Russia as an international actor who contributes to resolve a regional conflict. Putin's pro-active foreign policy in Libya is vital to increase Russia's influence in the Middle East and North Africa. However, some also suggest that the main aim of Russia is to show the world that what the USA ruins, Russia can fix. Libya, in this respect, constitutes of a good example of what Putin suggests as the US's interventions failure, because from the viewpoint of Russia, NATO's intervention in 2011 was the ultimate reason of conflict in Libya. (Pigman & Orton, 2017) Russia's presence in Libya drew a Russian portrait similar to Russia's military intervention in Syria to the effect that Putin has once again ensured a pro-Russian leader and maintained a Russian influence in North Africa. One of the reasons is how Haftar and Assad present themselves in the global axis. In other words, both leaders position the rebels as terrorists and the reason for violent extremism, of which Putin takes advantage in his MENA policies. (Pigman & Orton, 2017)

6.3.1.3. Russia as Mediator for Israel-Palestine Conflict

Russia's 2015 direct military intervention into Syria was an approval of a Russian reality in the Middle East by both state and non-state actors. As a matter fact, Russia proved its capability and capacity to ensure its national interests as becoming a major player in the region, so much so that other actors now cannot come to the table without Russia to resolve the conflicts happening in the region. Russia also positions itself as an '*indispensable middleman*' by building up ties with other major players in the region and negotiating with the conflictual parties. (Krasna, 2018, p. 5) As for the conflicts Israel have experienced with Iran and Palestine, the situation is again on which basis Russia and Israel bilateral relations depends. That is to say, Russia builds up

relations with Israel as interest-based, rather than value-based which the US rather to have. Thus, Russia's mediating role in the region has gained approval more than the US. (Krasna, 2018)

Russia's mediator role de-escalated the conflictual situations between Israel and Iran, and Israel and Palestine. In February 2018, when Syrian air defense shot down an Israeli fighter plane, President Putin held the role of easing the situation by convincing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to make any further moves that would make situation worse. The reciprocal attacks kept on when a series of airstrikes struck the Iranian targets in Syria on May 10, 2018 and just weeks later another Israeli missile assault hit Iranian soldiers. Israel, in the end, took the credit of these attacks against the Hezbollah and Iranian strategic capabilities in Syria since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War. In this respect, Russia urged Iranian and Hezbollah forces in Syria to be distanced from the border where Bashar al-Assad's regime forces would return. Although Russia-Iran partnership is at great depth, which was proved with Russia's help for Iran to build a \$1 billion reactor in Bushehr and try for softening international sanctions against Iran along with Syria, Russia carried out a policy of what Israel wanted in exchange for keeping Russia's interests through the Syrian policy. (Krasna, 2018; Estrin, 2012)

Israel is important for Russia's foreign policy for many reasons. One of Russia's biggest diasporas, nearly a million Russian speakers, lives in Israel. Moreover, Israel is just one of the two countries in the world Russia buys arms. There is also the issue of Israel's newly discovered natural gas in the Mediterranean that Russia wishes to derive a profit. (Estrin, 2012) Moreover, Putin sees Israel as a bridge, in the Middle East, to the West and US, with the fact that Israel has strong relations with both sides. A close ally to the US, Israel also acts as a 'finger in the Americans' eye' from Russia's perspective. It is also noteworthy that Netanyahu made visits to Moscow more than he visited Washington, he had a better relationship with Putin than with Obama, and his first call after the 2018 incident was to Putin rather than to Trump. Israel is an important regional power, and Russia's Syrian intervention faces off two on the Golan Heights.

Considering that Israel has a potential and capacity to become an obstacle before Russia's Middle East policy, Putin pursues a policy to defuse the Israel threat by building close cooperation with it. Russia's mediating role has achieved the purpose, so much so that Putin declared once the Assad regime had control over the country, all foreign military forces would leave Syria. Moreover, on May 28, Foreign Ministry Sergei Lavrov stated only Syrian regime forces would be stationed on Syria's border along with Israel and Jordan, but neither Iran nor Hezbollah would be allowed in the border zone. This statement in fact gave the impression of a possible deal between Israel and Russia in which Israel accepted the return of Assad's forces to the border with Israel on the Golan Heights. (Krasna, 2018)

Another conflict Russia held the role of reconciliation is the Palestinian issue. Russia is already a member of the Middle East Quartet formed by the memberships of the European Union, Russia, the United Nations and the United States in 2002. (Tocci, 2013) Thus, Russia is a natural partner in presenting any solution to the conflict or intermediating any peace agreement between Israel and Palestine. Lavrov's call for a direct dialogue between two as an only possible way to reach a successful solution to the conflict made no positive response by Israel, although Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas agreed this proposal. Putin's strategy for Palestinian issue is to ensure Russia's position of an acceptable alternative to the US and to find a middle compromise by both recognizing West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and at the same time not offending Palestinian and Arab sensibilities. Putin also makes use of the US's declaration Jerusalem as the capital of Israel to assert that the US can no longer be an objective mediator between two parts. As a result, Putin proves Russia as a more honest player in this game who has good relations with both Palestinian Authority and Hamas and Israel. In fact, it is debatable that Putin really wants to resolve this conflict, but what he strives for is to maintain Russia's participation in the process in order to demonstrate Russia's great power status. (Krasna, 2018)

6.3.2. Russia as Energy Superpower

The recognition as a great power has been one of Russia's foreign policy key terms since the late 1990s. (Jordan, 2008) To achieve the hardships and insecurities of

its geography and to pave the way of geographical ambitions, Russia should legitimize the actions under the cover of great power position. The claims on being a great power lies on the victories against Napoleon and Hitler. In 1993, the concept of 'Russia as a great power' was included to the foreign policy agenda by furthering integration of the CIS. After three years, in 1996, when coming to office as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yevgeny Primakov indicated in his speech that Russia would be a great power in the future, as it was in the past. In 2000, Putin maintained this foreign policy perception on his actions. (Gurganus & Rumer, 2019)

In 2006, Russia minded the opportunity to enhance its global status by hosting the G8 in St. Petersburg. Putin attributed importance to Russia's leading G8 presidency as a way to improve its foreign standing. Highlighting the energy issues in the summit, Putin played his cards by promoting Russia as the world's second largest exporter of oil after Saudi Arabia and having the world's largest natural gas reserves. The European Union receives 25 percent of its oil and gas supplies from Russia. However, not only in the G8 summit but Russia's attending as a member state of international and regional decision-making forums, including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council of Europe, are equally important for ensuring international prestige and respect. (Jordan, 2008) Putin would rather to benefit from Russia's rich energy resources as a tool of boosting Russian economy in such a way that the economic output of Russia in 2007 was 70% larger than in 1999. (Goldman Sachs, 2007, p. 29) Moreover, the economic policy he pursued enabled to create a fund from energy profits in order to promote investments in Russia and abroad, along with the early payback of Russia's foreign debt. (Stent, 2008, p. 1093) Russia's economic policy has already been set to grow as much as the world's fifth largest economy by 2030. With this purpose in mind, Putin proposed at the St Petersburg Economic Forum in 2007 that Moscow should rank among the world's leading financial centers, the ruble should become a reserve currency and it should be are constitution in global economic institutions. (Stent, 2008)

Russia's dependency upon energy sector leads to pursuing the role of energy superpower. Putin has paved the way of state interests by means of private sector investments and capabilities. (Goldman, 2008) Nearly half of Russia's economy

depends on exports of natural gas, petroleum and crude oil. Fuels and energy products constituted 63% of total shipments in 2015, of which crude oil and natural gas accounted for 26% and 12% respectively followed by metals, chemical products etc. According to Gazprom's 2018 statistics, one of Russia's main natural gas producer companies, the Western European market including Germany, Turkey, the UK, France and Italy is the main consumer of Russia's natural gas. Moreover, the Eastern and Central European natural gas market including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia is another prominent export destination. In 2017, 39% of the European Union's natural gas imports originated in Russia. Russia maintains its status as energy provider and the largest supplier of natural gas along with oil and hard coal to the European Union in 2018 and Germany, followed by Italy, stands out as the largest foreign buyer of Russia's gas. In 2017, 60% of the EU's total imports were energy products from Russia and 30% of petroleum oil imports and 39% of total gas imports came from Russia in the same year. Furthermore, for Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Finland, more than 75% of their imports of petroleum oils were Russian originated.

Energy issue refers as a soft power tool that became the key feature of Putin's foreign policy, especially toward the post-Soviet states. However, Putin's energy strategy refers to the use of Russia's energy as '*hard soft power*', to some. In other words, Russia holds and makes use of its role and prestige of great energy provider in the world. In January 2006, Russia's interruption gas supplies to Ukraine, which also transports 80% of Gazprom's exports to Europe, is an example of how Russia could politicize its energy power. In Putin's leadership, energy has become a major issue in Russia's relations with its neighbors and Europe especially after the 2005-2006 Russia-Ukraine gas dispute. Putin's strategy to penalize Ukraine for its pro-Western tendencies and the West for its increased presence in Russia's near abroad bears similarities between what the Soviet Union did previously with nuclear weapons and what Putin aims with oil and gas, who evidently aims at increasing Russia's political influence over its neighbors and the EU. (Stent, 2008) In 2015, Russia halted gas flow to Ukraine once again over 2014 crisis upon the annexation of Crimea and the eastern Ukraine districts by mostly Russian nationals populated. Upon Ukraine's call for the USA and the EU's help to ease the military conflict and to regain the eastern part from Russia's

interference, the situation took a turn for the worst. Ukraine distinguishes as the main natural gas route from Russia to the EU countries, meeting the EU's gas demand for about a quarter. Thus, in 2015 Russian's gas cut had a negative effect for the transferred countries such as the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Poland etc. (Gurganus & Ruler, 2019)

Consequently, Russia is number one producer of oil and has the world's largest natural gas reserves. It possesses 26% of global gas reserves and almost 13% of global oil reserves. In 2006, it supplied 21% of the world's gas and is the world's leading pipeline gas supplier. More than 90% of its energy exports go to Europe. (Stent, 2008, p. 1094) Thus, Putin takes advantage of Russia's prominent position as an energy giant in the world.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The leadership roles of each of the three Russian presidents were under the influence of various factors from domestic politics, the Russian nationalism beginning in the late 1990s, the expectation of the citizens, the effect of influence groups, national aims prioritized by the leaders, to the characteristics and background of the leaders, or the international developments, turmoil or conflicts. Thus, the content of foreign policy process under each leader requires a deep analysis by taking into account many parameters to reach a comprehensive understanding. However, this thesis tried to examine their leadership styles based on their specific decisions and actions in Russia's foreign policy. Thus, the leadership analysis in this thesis touches briefly the domestic parameters or the personality types of the leaders. The scope of this thesis sheds light on how the three Russian presidents reflected their leaderships into their foreign policy strategies. In this respect, after mentioning the post-Soviet leadership in Russian foreign policy, this study was centered on Russian leaders' foreign policy priorities and moves, in chronological order. As the background of leaders and the political paradigms the current period called for differed from each other, their foreign policy approaches varied accordingly.

Boris Yeltsin, the first president of the Russian Federation, headed the country under two different agenda. His first presidential term between 1991 and 1995 was comprised of pro-Western perspective and reforms in Russian foreign policy that was based upon a capitalist and liberal democratic form of governance in internal politics. In the period after 1996, Yeltsin introduced a new Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, and adopted a nationalistic and assertive foreign policy, prioritizing Russia's near abroad. There was a displeasure in Russia against the western foreign policy and both some Russian officials and citizens believed that the Atlanticism proved itself as unsatisfactory when protecting Russia's national interests. Furthermore, Yeltsin's pro-Western policies did not generate a satisfactory Western collaboration as expected, either. (Larrabee & Karasik, 1997; Marantz, 1997) Russia's adoption of more anti-

Western policies was contributed many other factors as NATO enlargement toward the post-Soviet geography, the conflict of the policies of Russia and the Weston Serbia and Bosnia, and American actions toward Iraq and Libya. (Marantz, 1997) Actually, in 1993, Kozyrev had already led a new policy and military doctrine toward Russia's near abroad to keep its influence and defense on these states once NATO's plans for including the post-Soviet republics came out. (Litera, 1994; Günay, 2013) Moreover, Yeltsin, in the meantime, was in an attempt to making further integration moves with the CIS through economic programs, such as a common market and customs union, or military formations, joint military operations and training under the Collective Security Treaty Organization. (Litera, 1994) While Foreign Minister Kozyrev's Atlantic foreign policy made its mark on Russian foreign policy the Eurosianist foreign policy was centered upon the post-1996 period, directed by Primakov. (Marantz, 1997; McFaul, 1999) Primakov enjoyed the former positions in security agencies as well as in the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, had an education in the fields of the Middle East and West Asia and could assume the full control over Russia's foreign policy that was due to Yeltsin's health problems to some extent. Primakov's new doctrine set out a multipolar world order introducing Russia, Japan, China, the United States and an integrated Europe as important powers. He prioritized Russia's balancing role in Western and Eastern geography, who had both European and Asian values. (Larrabee & Karasik, 1997; McFaul, 1999; Kumar, 2016; Bernier, 2018; Timmerman, 1992) Eurosianism, in which Eurasia was classified as the heartland of the land power by Mackinder, positioned the territory of the former Russian empire, mainly the CIS, on the center of the heartland, by calling for keeping Russia's status-quo in this region, by the reason of dominating Eurasia equally means dominating the world. (Clover, 1999; Günay, 2013)

The leadership parameters during each three leaders were as a matter of great difference. In other words, Yeltsin's presidential period coincided with the political and economic chaos and disorder, a ruined international status of Russia, a combination of the Soviet councils in governmental institutions etc. Since all of this confusion was rooted in the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin shaped his foreign policy strategy within the framework of making successful reforms to dispose of decaying socialist

institutions, to build a stable economy based on capitalist reforms, to constitute a successfully functioning liberal democratic form of governance, and to help the Russian Federation emerge as an independent state in international relations. (Markedonov, 2011; Kumar, 2016) This brought along a pro-Western and cooperation-based foreign policy in an attempt to ensuring the Western support and aids. Yeltsin's new policy would contribute to both Russia's economy to refresh, overcome the domestic difficulties such as the possibility of the Communists rising to power once again and position Russia into the European system. (Marantz, 1997) Although his own personal view on Russia's inclusion into the Western system along with his first Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's tight-knit acceptance of the principles of Atlantic school required a Westernized foreign policy orientation, Yeltsin's pro-Western foreign policy was based on pragmatic purposes for the survival and future of Russia. (Timmerman, 1992) Thus, Yeltsin's first presidential developments as ensuring the partnership and peaceful relations with the USA and West, or supporting for the US intervention in Iraq in 1990–1991 should be analyzed from this viewpoint. (McFaul, 1999; Kısacık & Kaya, 2016; Kumar, 2016) Foreign Minister Primakov's principles and foreign policy agenda, on the other hand, was an indicator of Yeltsin's loss of control on leading the state policies and damaged leadership status, Russia's re-emerging anti-Western orientation and re-gaining its internationally recognition back. Although Medvedev period in Russia is speculative whether it really existed or drew the curtain over the real controller of the state, with reference of Putin, it is still certain that by any means Dmitry Medvedev was in charge of the Russian Federation from 2008 to 2012. With reference to following Putin's first two presidential periods ending in 2008, Medvedev's leadership came into prominence with the war against Georgia and gas crisis with Ukraine, in 2008 and 2009, respectively. Putin appeared as the main decision-maker in both of the cases, when Russia invaded Georgia for the purpose of protecting both South Ossetians and Russian residents in South Ossetia from the Georgian aggressiveness. Another matter came out as the gas crisis with Ukraine, in which Russia halted the gas transfer to Ukraine, along with Belarus and Moldova, and indirectly to the sixteen European states, justifying the debts of Ukraine to Russia. (Sauvageot, 2010-11) Although it was natural for Russia to overtake such a role of the protector of the South Ossetians as well as ethnic Russians in the Russo-Georgian War, and to demand Ukraine to discharge its natural gas debts, the

underlying reasons seem related to both the Color Revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in 2003-2005 with the contribution of the West both at discourse and financial levels, and also NATO's Bucharest Summit in 2008 concluding the decision of Georgia and Ukraine to become the members of the alliance in the future. Medvedev's presidency proved Russia's energy role and dominance at the global level, so much so that Russia may leave both Ukraine and as many states as sixteen in Europe without gas in the middle of winter, as did in January 2009, if it wishes. However, it also reflected Russia's image as a state that could instrumentalize its energy exportation as a foreign policy tool with the aims of punishment. (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava, 2009) Moreover, Russia's victory over Georgia strengthened its prestige in speaking out a world order with more than one power poles, and caused some Western policies to be suspended as NATO's action plan for the membership of Georgia and Ukraine. However, in overall assessment, Medvedev's leadership is considered as Putin's leadership at closed doors.

Unlike his predecessors, the leadership role Vladimir Putin displayed had the characteristics of predominant leadership. During both of his first two as well as the third term, he was the main person to shape and lead the foreign policy agenda of Russia. The allowance for the USA to establish military bases in post-Soviet Central Asia, support for Yanukovych's campaign in 2010 Ukrainian presidential elections, the annexation of Crimea or the military interference in the Syrian War were the frameworks shaped by Putin. (Stern, 2008) The Russians approved his leadership style, because the support of Russian citizens to him was on the verges of 90% in 2015, which went along with the 2014 ranking as nine out of ten Russians supporting Putin, with the inclusion of Crimea as a contributing factor. (Nardelli & Rankin & Arnett, 2015) As a matter of fact, except for some specific Russian foreign policy moves that played a deteriorating effect on his approval ratings, such as the Georgian War, his leadership ranking was always in top levels, including his first term. In November 1999, he held the public support of 40%, while he was still Prime Minister of Yeltsin. (Kelley, 2016) Thus, apart from the periods of Yeltsin without good health and Medvedev without leading ability, what the Russians want is what Putin presents: more proactive, speaking out and daredevil Russia, who could turn to aggression when national interests are at stake.

Putin's first presidential term until 2003 took shape under the policy of cooperative relations with the West and contributing the world order with stability and democracy, as a follow-up of Yeltsin's period. (González, 2013) However, one of his core strategies was to build pragmatic steps to put Russia's national interests above all. In his first term what he aimed was to ensure Russia as a regional power by focusing on its near abroad that called for good relations with the Western states to not emerge any obstacles. (Secrieru, 2006) Thus, while carrying out the policy of state control over the whole country in domestic relations, he followed pragmatic dimensions in his actions of foreign policy. (Kasymov, 2011; Beitāne, 2013) In other words, Putin's all decisions from 9/11 cooperation with the West against international terrorism to enriching the bilateral or economic relations with the Western states have had pragmatic purposes for Putin's agenda. To put it more explicitly, in the post-September attack, Russia's cooperation with the USA was projected for a legitimization of Russia's fighting in the Second Chechen War, by declaring the Chechen guerillas among international terrorists. Additionally, the possibility of Russia's inclusion into NATO membership in his first presidential term was also for the sake of easing any possible conflicts or disagreements that may keep Russia's focus out of its near abroad agenda. His pragmatic orientation brought along nationalism, too. The CIS policy framework of Russia was comprised of free trade zone, joint use of natural resources and attribution to the common cultural heritage among the states. The CIS, whether you call it near abroad, area of special interests or sphere of influence has always been a top matter in Russia's foreign policy, particularly after NATO and the EU's inclusion policies through this geography. However, what Putin accepted in December, 2000 arouse a perception of a possible Soviet-style Russian hegemony over these states. The acceptance of the symbols to represent the Russian Federation, which were rooted back both in the Czarist Russia and the Soviet-era, strengthened the perception of a kind of national unity among the CIS and Russia. (Chufrin, 2002)

Putin's second term was motivated by NATO's expansionist and the EU's enlargement moves in 2004 toward the Eastern European states as well as the Western-supported Color Revolutions in Russia's near abroad. Thus, for Putin, Russia was under a Western threat from both NATO and the EU that strived for including the post-Soviet

states, converting these states as their orbits and reaching Russia's territory in the end. The follow-up foreign policy decisions as the August War, the Ukraine Crisis and Russia's involvement in eastern Ukraine, came out on this basis, with the purpose of protecting Russia's motherland from foreign 'invaders' and eliminating the foreign hands out of its near abroad. In this respect, the particular defensive realist paradigms (assertive or aggressive moves, to some) during especially Putin's presidency periods could be evaluated from the viewpoint of 'Western-threat'.

Putin also made worthy contributions for Russia's history by prioritizing Russia's regional role, adopting foreign policy agenda for the sake of Russia's superpower status or as a leading energy power at the world stage. In this respect, the Syrian, Libya or Israel policies along with the alleged interference to the USA elections in 2016 were in this direction to prove Russia's great power status, even as an alternative power to the USA. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 was beyond suspicion of its regional power status. Likewise, Russians defeating the Georgian army in 2008 War reflected both its regional power as well as great power to Western-supported Georgia. Putin's energy policies, similarly, ensured Russia's economic output saw a rise in 2007 that was 70% larger than in 1999. (Goldman Sachs, 2007) Furthermore, the fuels and energy products constituted 63% of total shipments in 2015, 60% of the EU's total imports in 2017 were energy products from Russia and 30% of petroleum oil imports and 39% of total gas imports came from Russia in the same year. The Western European market has been a major buyer of Russia's natural gas, according the Gazprom statistics in 2018. Keeping in mind that Russia is the number one producer of oil and has the world's largest natural gas reserves, what Putin required has been also done by himself: to create a position for Russia as an energy giant in the world. (Stent, 2008)

As last words, while Yeltsin's leadership depicts a scene of keeping the Russian Federation alive who lost blood during and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Medvedev stayed on hold and Putin has ensured Russia could recover its full health and stand out by itself.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aboyade, S. A. (2018). The changing pattern of the foreign policy of the new Russia since 1991. *Historia Actual Online*, 45(1), 73-83.
- Ahmed, J. (2020). The theoretical significance of foreign policy in international relations-an analyses. *Journal of Critical Reviews*, 7(2), 787-792.
- Ambrosio, T. (2005). The Russo-American dispute over the invasion of Iraq: International status and the role of positional goods. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 57(8), 1189-1210.
- Antonenko, O. (2007). Russia and the deadlock over Kosovo. *Russie.Nei.Visions. Ifri – Russia NIS Center*, Paris. Retrieved from: https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifri_kosovo_antonenko_ang_july2007.pdf.
- Askeroğlu, S. (2020). *Rusya'nın Büyük Güç Olma Stratejisi*. Ankara: Orion Kitabevi.
- Avdaliani, E. (2019). Straightening out Russian foreign policy. *BESA Center Perspectives PaperNo.1* (pp. 372), Israel.
- Baker, R. H. (1978). Understanding Soviet foreign policy. *The RUSI Journal*, 123(1), 46-51.
- Baldoni, G. (2016). A theoretical analysis of Russian foreign policy: Changes under Vladimir Putin. *E-international Relations*. Retrieved from: <https://www.e-ir.info/2016/09/10/a-theoretical-analysis-of-russian-foreignpolicy-changes-under-vladimirputin/>.
- Beitāne, A. (2013). Understanding Russia's foreign policy rationale. *Latvijas Arpolitikas Instituts*. Retrieved from: <https://www.lai.lv/viedokli/understanding-russias-foreignpolicy-rationale-340>.
- Bernier, P. (2018). *Yevgeny Primakov's Operational Code and Russian Foreign Policy*. Master's Thesis, University of Tampere, Finland. Retrieved From: <https://trepo.tuni.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/104635/1542616872.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.
- Beyer, J., and Wolff, S. (2016). Linkage and leverage effects on Moldova's transnistria problem. *East European Politics*, 32(3), 335-354.

- Borodin, K., and Strokov, A. (2015). The Customs Union in the CIS. *Journal of Economic Integration*, 30(2), 334-358.
- Cafiero, G. (2020). What do Russia and Hamas see in each other?. *Middle East Institute*. Retrieved from: <https://www.mei.edu/publications/what-do-russia-and-hamas-see-each-other>.
- Chamberlin, W. H. (1956). Seven phases of Soviet foreign policy. *The Russian Review*, 15(2), 77-84.
- Chufrin, G. (2002). Putin's domestic policy: Its implications for national security. *Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes – Connections*, 1(2), 9-20.
- Clover, C. (1999). Dreams of the Eurasian heartland: The reemergence of geopolitics. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1999-03-01/dreams-eurasian-heartland-reemergence-geopolitics>.
- Coplin, W. D. (1974). *Introduction to International Politics: A Theoretical Overview*. USA: Rand McNally Publishing Company.
- Dannreuther, R. (1998). Is Russia Returning to the Middle East?. *Security Dialogue*, 29(3), 345-358.
- Dorani, S. (2019). The foreign policy decision making approaches and their applications – Case study: Bush, Obama and Trump’s decision making toward Afghanistan and the region. *CESRAN International*. Retrieved from: <https://cesran.org/the-foreign-policy-decision-making-approaches-and-their-applications.html>.
- Dragneva, R., and Wolczuk, K. (2012). Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation, stagnation or rivalry?. *Chatham House Briefing Paper REP BP 2012/01*. Retrieved from: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2125913.
- Duffield, J. S. (1994). NATO's functions after the Cold War. *Political Science Quarterly*, 109(5), 763-787.
- Dugin, A. (2013). The world needs to understand Putin. *The Financial Times*. Retrieved from: <https://www.ft.com/content/67fa00d2-874b-11e2-9dd7-00144feabdc0>.
- Dugis, V. (2007). Analysing foreign policy. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/19899095/Analysing_Foreign_Policy.
- Erenler, M. (2012). Russia's Arab Spring policy. *Bilge Strateji*, 4(6), 167-191.

- Erlanger, S., and Myers, S. L. (2008). NATO allies oppose Bush on Georgia and Ukraine. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/world/europe/03nato.html>.
- Estebo, S. E. (2015). *Russian Foreign Policy and Putin's Fear of Revolution*. Master's Thesis, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Massachusetts, USA.
- Estrin, D. (2012). Russia asserts itself as mediator in Middle East. *The World*. Retrieved from: <https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-06-25/russia-asserts-itself-mediator-middle-east>.
- European Commission. (2007). *The European Union and Russia: Close Neighbors, Global Players, Strategic Partners*. Brussels: Directorate-General for External Relations.
- European Union External Action Service. (2016). *Eastern partnership*. Retrieved from: https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/eastern-partnership/419/eastern-partnership_en.
- Fasanotti, F. S. (2016). Russia and Libya: A brief history of an on-again-off-again friendship. *Brookings*. Retrieved from: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/09/01/russia-and-libya-a-brief-history-of-an-on-again-off-again-friendship/>.
- Federation of American Scientists. (1993). The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Retrieved from: <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html>.
- Federation of American Scientists. (1997). Russian National Security Blueprint. *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* – 26 Dec 1997 (pp 4-5). Retrieved from: <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/blueprint.html>.
- Federation of American Scientists. (2000). The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Retrieved from: <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm>.
- Friedman, G. (2013). Beyond the post-Cold War world. *Stratfor*. Retrieved from: <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/beyond-post-cold-war-world>
- Gerrits, A. W. M., and Bader, M. (2016). Russian patronage over Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Implications for conflict resolution. *East European Politics*, 32(3), 297-313.
- Gidathubli, R. G. (2004). Expansion of NATO: Russia's dilemma. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 39(19), 1885-1887.

- Giles, K. (2017). *The Turning Point for Russian Foreign Policy*. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.
- Gill, G. (2011). The Medvedev presidency. In G. Gill and J. Young (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Russian Politics and Society* (pp. 27-32). New York: Routledge.
- Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group. (2007). *BRICs and Beyond – Chapter Two*. New York: The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
- Goldman, M. I. (1992). Yeltsin's reforms: Gorbachev II?. *Foreign Policy*, 88, 76.
- Goldman, M. I. (2008). *Petrostate: Putin, Power, and The Russia*. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.
- González, F. J. R. (2013). The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation: A comparative study. *Instituto Espanol de Estudios Estrategicos*. Retrieved from: http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs_marco/2013/DIEEEM06-2013_Rusia_ConceptoPoliticaExterior_FRuizGlez_ENGLISH.pdf.
- Gorodnia, N. (2018). Transformation of the post-Cold War international system: Trends and prospects. *21st Century International Relations*. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325248874_Transformation_of_the_post-Cold_War_International_System_Trends_and_Prospects.
- Guan-fu, G. (1983). Soviet aid to the third world: An analysis of its strategy. *Soviet Studies*, 35(1), 71-89.
- Günay, M. Z. (2013). Russia's Central Asia policy under Boris Yeltsin. *Avrasya İncelemeleri Dergisi (AVİD)*, 2(1), 85-113.
- Gurganus, J., and Rumer, E. (2019). Russia's global ambitions in perspective. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved from: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/20/russia-s-global-ambitions-in-perspective-pub-78067>.
- Hale, H. E., and Colton, T. J. (2010). Russians and the Putin-Medvedev "tandemocracy." *Problems of Post-Communism*, 57(2), 3-20.
- Harding, L. (2008). Crimea: Divided peninsula plays host to Russian warships and Ukrainian pride. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/sep/16/ukraine.russia>.
- Harding, L. (2010). Ukraine extends lease for Russia's Black Sea Fleet. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/21/ukraine-blacksea-fleet-russia>.

- Hays, J. (2008). Shock therapy and economic policy under Yeltsin. Retrieved from: http://factsanddetails.com/russia/Economics_Business_Agriculture/sub9_7b/entry-5168.html.
- Hermann, M. G., and Hagan, J.D. (1998). International decision making: Leadership matters. *Foreign Policy*, 110, 124- 137.
- Hermann, M. G., and Hermann, C. F. (1989). Who makes foreign policy decisions and how: An empirical inquiry. *International Studies Quarterly*, 33(4), 361.
- Hermann, M. G., Preston, T., Korany, B., and Shaw, T. M. (2001). Who leads matters: The effects of powerful individuals. *International Studies Review*, 3(2), 83-131.
- Hierman, B. (2019). *The World Today Series, Russia and Eurasia 2019-2020*, (50th Ed). USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Hussain, N., and Shakoor, F. (2017). The role of leadership in foreign policy: A case study of Russia under Vladimir Putin. *IPRI Journal*, 17(1), 1-25.
- Immelman, A., and Trenzeluk, J. V. (2017). The political personality of Russian Federation president Vladimir Putin. *St. John's University and the College of St. Benedict Working Paper No. 1.2*.
- Instituto Espanol de Estudios Estrategicos. (2015). *Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015*. Retrieved from: <http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf>.
- Iwashita, A. (2007). Primakov redux? Russia and the “strategic triangles” in Asia. In A. Iwashita (Ed.), *Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia* (pp. 165-194). Japan: Slavic-Eurasian Research Center.
- Jacobson, J. (1994). *When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Jensen, L. (1982). *Explaining Foreign Policy*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Retrieved from: https://archive.org/details/explainingforeig00jen_ufi/mode/2up.
- Jordan, P. A. (2008). International and domestic dimensions of Russia’s G8 presidency in 2006. *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 50(3-4), 397-423.
- Kandelaki, G. (2006). Georgia’s Rose Revolution: A participant’s perspective – Special Report. *US Institute of Peace*. Retrieved from: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2006/07/georgias-rose-revolution-participants-perspective>

- Kasymov, S. (2011). Statism in Russia: The implications for US–Russian relations. *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 3, 58-68.
- Kellermann, A. E. (2004). The impact of EU enlargement on the Russian Federation. *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, 4(3), 5-40.
- Kelley, D. R. (2016). Putin I, 2000-2008. In *Russian Politics and Presidential Power: Transformational Leadership from Gorbachev to Putin* (pp.121-161). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Kimball, D. G. (2006). The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) at a glance. *Arms Control Association*. Retrieved from: <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/sort-glance>.
- Kimball, S. (2014). Bound by treaty: Russia, Ukraine and Crimea. *Deutsche Welle*. Retrieved From: <https://www.dw.com/en/bound-by-treaty-russia-ukraineand-crimea/a-17487632>
- Kirkham, K. (2016). The formation of the Eurasian Economic Union: How successful is the Russian regional hegemony?. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 7(2), 111-128.
- Kısacık, S., and Kaya, F. (2016). Rusya Federasyonunun yakın çevre doktrini kapsamında Dağlık Karabağ ve Ukrayna politikalarını anlamak. *VIII. Uluslararası Uludağ Uluslararası İlişkiler Kongresi*, 28 Kasım, Bursa.
- Kramer, A. E. (2009). Russia cuts gas, and Europe shivers. *New York Times*. Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/world/europe/07gazprom.html>.
- Krasna, J. (2018). Moscow on the Mediterranean: Russia and Israel's Relationship. *Foreign Policy Research Institute*. Retrieved from: <https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/krasna2018.pdf>.
- Kreutz, A. (1999). Post-Communist Eastern Europe and the Middle East: The burden of history and new political realities. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 21(2), 1-30.
- Kumar, R. (2016). Russia's foreign policy: An overview of 25 years of transition. *International Studies*, 53(3-4), 210-226.
- Kuperman, A. J. (2013). A model humanitarian intervention?. *International Security*, 38(1), 105-136.
- Labs, E. J. (2007). Beyond victory: Offensive realism and the expansion of war aims. *Security Studies*, 6(4), 1-49.

- Lachowski, Z. (2007). Foreign military bases in Eurasia. *SIPRI Policy Paper No. 18*. Retrieved from: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/31819/Polycypaper18.pdf>.
- Larrabee, F. S., and Karasik, T. W. (1997). *Foreign and Security Policy Decision-making Under Yeltsin*. Washington, DC: National Defense Reserah Institute, RAND.
- Lazarević, D. (2009). NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia: Old wine in new bottles?. *Connections*, 9(1), 29-66.
- Leffler, M. P. (1990). National security. *The Journal of American History*, 77(1), 143.
- Light, M. (2015). Russian foreign policy themes in official documents and speeches: tracing continuity and change. In D. Cadier and M. Light (Eds.), *Russia's Foreign Policy*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Litera, B. (1994). The Kozyrev Doctrine - A Russian variation on the Monroe Doctrine. *Perspectives*, 4, 45-52.
- Lukin, A. (2008). From a post-Soviet to a Russian foreign policy. *Russia in Global Affairs*. Retrieved From: <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/from-a-postsoviet-to-a-russian-foreignpolicy/>.
- Lundborg, T. (2019) The ethics of neorealism: Waltz and the time of international life. *European Journal of International Relations*, 25(1), 229-249.
- Lynch, D. (2004). Russia's strategic partnership with Europe. *Institute for Security Studies*. Retrieved from: <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/analy077.pdf>.
- Makarychev, A. (2010). The Medvedev presidency: Russia's changing profile. In *CIDOB International Yearbook 2010* (pp. 165-170). Barcelona: CIDOB Press.
- Mandelbaum, M. (1998). Russian foreign policy in historical perspective. In *The New Russian Foreign Policy* (pp. 1-22). New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press.
- Mankoff, J. (2012). What a Eurasian Union means for Washington=. *National Interest*. Retrieved from: <https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/whateurasian-union-means-washington-6821>.
- Mankoff, J. (2015). Russia's Asia Pivot: Confrontation or Cooperation? *Asia Policy*, No. 19, pp. 65-88.
- Marantz, P. (1997). Russian foreign policy during Yeltsin's second term. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 30(4), 345-351.

- Markedonov, S. (2011). Yeltsin's complicated legacy in the Caucasus. *Open Democracy*. Retrieved from: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/yeltsins-complicatedlegacy-in-caucasus/>.
- McFaul, M. A. (1999). What are Russian foreign policy objectives?. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved from: <https://carnegieendowment.org/1999/05/01/what-are-russian-foreign-policy-objectivespub-424>.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: Norton.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2009). Reckless States and Realism. *International Relations*, 23(2), 241-256.
- Medvedev, S. (2008). The stalemate in EU-Russia relations. In *Russia's European Choice* (pp. 215–232). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Morgenthau, H. (1949) Politics among nations. *Social Forces*, 28(2), 224.
- Morozov, V. (2005). Russia's changing attitude toward the OSCE: Contradictions and continuity. *Sicherheit und Frieden (S+F) / Security and Peace*, 23(2), 69-73.
- Moshes, A. (2012). Russia's European policy under Medvedev: How sustainable is a new compromise?. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 88(1), 17-30.
- Nardelli, A., Rankin, J., and Arnett, G. (2015). Vladimir Putin's approval rating at record levels. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2015/jul/23/vladimir-putins-approval-rating-at-record-levels>.
- NATO Association of Canada. (2021). A timeline of Russian aggression. Retrieved from: <https://natoassociation.ca/a-timeline-of-russian-aggression/>.
- NATO. (2002). *NATO-Russia Council, Rome Summit 2002*. Retrieved from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-rome/rome-eng.pdf>.
- Neuman, M. (2010). EU–Russian energy relations after the 2004/2007 EU enlargement: an EU perspective. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 18(3), 341-360.
- Newmann, B. (n.d.) A brief introduction to theories on international relations and foreign policy. Retrieved from: <http://www.people.vcu.edu/~wnewmann/468theory.htm>.

- Nikitin, A. (2008). Russian foreign policy in the fragmented post-Soviet space. *International Journal on World Peace*, 25(2), 7-31.
- O'loughlin, J., O'Tuathail, G., and Kolossov, V. (2004). A 'risky westward turn'? Putin's 9–11 script and ordinary Russians. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 56(1), 3-34.
- Owens, M. T. (2004). The 'correlation forces', then and now. *Ashbrook*. Retrieved from: <https://ashbrook.org/viewpoint/oped-owens-04-cof/>.
- Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union. (2008). The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Retrieved from: https://russiaeu.ru/userfiles/file/foreign_policy_concept_english.pdf.
- Pieper, M. (2017). Russia has a serious stake in Libya's uncertain future. *The Conversation*. Retrieved from: <https://theconversation.com/russia-has-a-serious-stake-in-libyas-uncertain-future-79371>.
- Pifer, S. (2020). Ukraine, NATO, and Russia. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*. Retrieved from: <http://turkishpolicy.com/article/1028/ukraine-nato-and-russia>.
- Pigman, L., and Orton, K. (2017). Inside Putin's Libyan power play. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/14/inside-putins-libyan-powerplay/>.
- Pirani, S., Stern, J., and Yafimava, K. (2009). The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: A comprehensive assessment. *Oxford Institute for Energy Studies*. Retrieved from: <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/NG27-TheRussoUkrainianGasDisputeofJanuary2009AComprehensiveAssessment-JonathanSternSimonPiraniKatjaYafimava-2009.pdf>.
- researchgate.net (2012). What are the basic concepts of neorealism?. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/post/What_are_the_basic_concepts_of_neorealism.
- Roberts, K. (2017). Understanding Putin: The politics of identity and geopolitics in Russian foreign policy discourse. *International Journal*, 72(1), 28-55.
- Rosenau, J. N. (1984). A pre-theory revisited: world politics in an era of cascading interdependence. *International Studies Quarterly*, 28(3), 245-305.
- Russell, F. M. (1936). *Theories of International Relations*. USA: D.Appleton-Century Company, Inc.
- Sakwa, R. (2008). Putin's leadership: character and consequences. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 60(6), 879-897, DOI: 10.1080/09668130802161132.

- Sarotte, M. E. (2014). A broken promise? What the West really told Moscow about NATO expansion?. *Foreign Affairs*, 93(5), 90-97.
- Sauvageot, E. P. (2010-11). *Energy disputes between Russia and Ukraine: A case study of Russian decision-making*. Retrieved from: <https://ecpr.eu/filestore/paperproposal/3d7d0dcd-1e93-48fb-9a97-001d91dab1bb.pdf>.
- Schuetz, A. (1945). On multiple realities. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 5(4), 533-576.
- Secrieru, S. (2006). Russia's foreign policy under Putin: "CIS Project" renewed. *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, 10, 289-308.
- Shapovalova, N., and Burlyuk, O. (2016) *The Situation of National Minorities in Crimea Following its Annexation by Russia*. Directorate- General for External Policies-Policy Department, European Parliament, Belgium.
- Shearman, P. (2001). The sources of Russian conduct: Understanding Russian foreign policy. *Review of International Studies*, 27(2), 249-263.
- Shestopal, E. (2016). Transformation of Putin's perception in Russian society (2000-2016). *Paper for the ECPR General Conference*, September 7-10, Prague. Retrieved from: <https://ecpr.eu/Events/Event/PaperDetails/31610>.
- Smith, M. A. (2000). Russian foreign policy 2000: The near abroad. *Conflict Studies Research Center*. Retrieved from: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/96793/00_Dec.pdf
- Smith, S. (1986) Theories of foreign policy: An historical overview. *Review of International Studies*, 12(1), 13.
- Snegovaya, M. (2019). What factors contribute to the aggressive foreign policy of Russian leaders?. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 67, 93-110.
- Snyder, R. C., Bruck, H. W., and Sapin, B. (2002). *Foreign Policy Decision-Making*. New York, U.S: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Socor, C. (2020). Putin and Ukraine's Black Sea lands: Another iteration of Novorossiia?. *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 17(2), 103-106.
- Solanko, L. (2011). Why energy efficiency is vitally important for Russia?. *International Association for Energy Economics*, 19-26.
- Sönmezoğlu, F. (2019). *Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları.

- Stent, A. E. (2008). Restoration and revolution in Putin's foreign policy. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 60(6), 1089-1106.
- Stewart, S. (2009). Democracy promotion before and after the 'color revolutions'. *Democratization*, 16(4), 645-660.
- Telbami, S. (2002). Kenneth Waltz, neorealism, and foreign policy. *Security Studies*, 11(3), 158-170.
- The Washington Post. (2007). Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html>.
- Thien, P. P. (2009). Explaining the color revolutions. *E-International Revolutions*. Retrieved from: <https://www.e-ir.info/2009/07/31/explaining-the-color-revolutions/>
- Timmermann, H. (1992). Russian foreign policy under Yeltsin: Priority for integration into the 'community of civilized states'. *The Journal of Communist Studies*, 8(4), 163-185.
- Toaldo, M. (2017). Russia in Libya: War or peace?. *European Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from: https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_russia_in_libya_war_or_peace_7223/.
- Tocci, N. (2013). The Middle East quartet and (in) effective multilateralism. *Middle East Journal*, 67(1), 29-44.
- Trenin, D. (2016). A five-year outlook for Russian foreign policy: Demands, drivers, and influences. Task Force on U.S. Policy toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved from: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Trenin_Russian_FP_TF_clean.pdf.
- Triesman, D. (2010). 'Loans for shares' revisited. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 26(15819), 207-227. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46467531_Loans_for_Shares_Revisited
- Tripathi, S. (2021). Leadership role in Russia's foreign policy. *Third Concept*. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348185762_Leadership_role_in_Russia's_foreign_Policy.
- Tsygankov, A. P. (2012). Change and continuity in Russia's foreign policy. *Russian Analytical Digest*, No.109.

- Tyler, P. E. (2000). Soviet hymn is back, creating much discord. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/06/world/soviet-hymn-is-back-creatingmuch-discord.html>.
- Van Elsuwege, P. (2008). The four common spaces: New impetus to the EU–Russia strategic partnership?. In A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (Eds.), *Law and Practice of EU External Relations (Salient Features of a Changing Landscape)* (pp.334– 359). UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Värk, R. (2014). The incorporation of Crimea into Russia: Legal perspective. Retrieved from: <https://icds.ee/en/the-incorporation-of-crimea-into-russia-legalperspective/>.
- VV. AA. (2010). Foreign policy of the Russian Federation. In *International Yearbook CIDOB 2010*. Retrieved from: https://www.cidob.org/en/media2/publicacions/anuario_cidob/2010/anuario_cidob_2010_eng/rusia_politica_exterior_de_rusia_ang.
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. The USA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
- Waltz, K. N. (2000). Structural realism after the Cold War. *International Security*, 25(1), 5-41.
- Washington Summit Communiqué. (1999). NATO Summit. Retrieved from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm>.
- Willerton, J. P. (1997). Russian security interests and the CIS. *Willamette Journal of International Law and Dispute Resolution*, 5(1), 29-53.
- Wilson Center. (2016). Inside the Russian revolution: A missed chance for change. Retrieved From:<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/andrei-kozyrev>.
- Wintour, P. (2017). Russia increases involvement in Libya by signing oil deal. *The Guradian*. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/21/russia-increases-involvement-libya-signing-oil-deal-rosneft>.
- Wivel, A., and Grøn, C. H. (2020). Appendix to ‘charismatic leadership in foreign policy’. *International Affairs*, 97(2), 1-6.
- Yapıcı, M. İ. (2010). *Rus Dış Politikasını Oluşturan İç Etkenler*. Ankara: USAK Yayınları.
- Yeşilbursa, B. K. (2019). Understanding Soviet foreign policy (1917-1991). *Journal of International Eastern European Studies*, 1(1), 215-234.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Büşra SARI

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

- **Social Sciences University of Ankara** **2018-2021**
Master's Degree in Peace and Conflict Studies
- **Anadolu University** **2017-2021**
Bachelor of International Relations
- **Istanbul University** **2010-2014**
Bachelor of Translation Studies (English)
- **Trabzon (Anatolian then/Science now) High School** **2008-2010**
Trabzon Merkez Fen Lisesi

WORKING EXPERIENCE

Translator (English) **2017-still**

Ministry of Labour and Social Security