



REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

**SULTAN ABDÜLHAMİD II'S POLICIES AND PRACTICES TOWARDS
JEWISH ZIONISTS REGARDING BAYT AL-MAQDIS**

Master's Thesis

Murat GÖKMEN

Master of Arts in Quds Studies

July 2024



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ABBREVIATIONS

- A. I. U.** : Alliance Israelite Universelle.
- B. E. O.** : Bab-ı Ali Evrak Odası.
- B. O. A.** : Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi.
- C. H.** : Cevdet: Dahiliye.
- DH. MKT.** : Dahiliye Mektubi Kalemî.
- D. H. A.** : Daru'l Hilafet'î -Aliyye.
- F. O.** : Foreign Office.
- HR. İD.** : Hariciye Nezareti: İdare.
- HR. SFR.** : Hariciye Nezareti: Londra Sefareti.
- HR. SYS.** : Hariciye Nezareti: Siyasi.
- HR. TH.** : Hariciye Nezareti: Tahrirat.
- İ. DH.** : İrade: Dahiliye.
- İ.HUS.** : İrade: Husisi.
- İM. MS.** : İrade: Meclisi Mahsus.
- K. Ş. S.** : Kudüs Şer'iyye Sicilleri.
- M. D.** : Mukteza Defterleri.
- N. D.** : Nizâmât Defterleri.
- P. R. O. F. O.** : Public Record Office Foreign Office Files in London.
- S. D. A. O.** : Salnâme-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye.
- S. N. M. U. M. A.** : Salname-i Nezaret-i Maarif-ı Umumiye, Matbaa-ı Amire.
- S. V. B. V. M.** : Salname-i Vilayet-Beyrut, Vilayet Matbaası.
- S. V. S.** : Salnâme-i Vilayet-i Suriye.
- ŞD.** : Şura-yı Devlet.
- T.V.** : Takvim-i Vekayi.
- U. N. G. A.** : United Nations General Assembly Resolution
- Y. E. E.** : Yıldız Esas Evrakı.
- YIL. PER.** : Yıldız Perakende.
- Y.PRK. AZN.** : Yıldız Adliye ve Mezahib Nezareti Maruzatı.

Y.PRK. BŞK. : Yıldız Başkitabet Maruzatı.

Y.PRK. BŞK. : Yıldız Saray-ı Hümayun Başkatibet Dairesi.

Y.PRK. MYD. : Yıldız Yaveran ve Maiyyet-i Seniyye Erkan-ı Harbiye Dairesi.

Y. A. RES. : Yıldız Resmi Maruzat.

Y.PRK. TŞF. : Yıldız Teşrifat-ı Umumiye Dairesi.

Y. T. : Yıldız Tasnifi.

W. F. : Wallace to Frelinghuysen



TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	I
ABBREVIATIONS	III
TABLE OF CONTENT	V
ABSTRACT	VII
ÖZET	IX
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. Problem Statement.....	3
1.2. Research Questions	5
1.3. Research Objectives.....	6
1.4. The Significance of the Study	6
1.5. Research Methodology	7
1.6. Research Scope and Limitation	8
1.7. Literature Review	8
1.8. Structure of the Thesis	16
CHAPTER TWO: THE BASIC CONCEPTS	17
2.1. Historical Context.....	17
2.2. Bayt al-Maqdis	27
2.3. Anti-Judaism in Europe	32
2.4. Christian Zionism	34
2.5. Jewish Zionism	37
2.6. The Differences between Jewish Zionism and Judaism.....	42
CHAPTER THREE: FOREIGN POLICY	45
3.1. Sultan Abdülhamid II's Foreign Policy	45
3.1.1. Relations with Britain	52
3.1.2. Relations with Russia	58
3.1.3. Relations with France	61
3.1.4. Relations with Germany	64
3.2. Jewish Zionist Influx	69

3.2.1. The Sultan's Attitude Towards Jewish Zionism	72
CHAPTER FOUR: ADAPTATION OF THE POLICIES	79
4.1 Jewish Zionist Influx to Bayt al-Maqdis	79
4.2 Dr. Theodore Herzl's Proposal	81
4.3 The Precautions	84
4.3.1 Direct Precautions	86
4.3.1.1. Advisory Council	86
4.3.1.2. The Secret Service	87
4.3.1.3. The Sultan's Personal Precautions	88
4.3.1.4. Prohibition of Land Sale to Jewish Zionists	92
4.3.1.5. Red Travel Cards	93
4.3.2 Indirect Precautions	96
4.3.2.1. Communication and Information Office	96
4.3.2.2. Investment in Educational and Cultural Institutions...	100
4.3.2.3. Empowering Administration in Bayt al-Maqdis.....	105
4.3.2.4. Supporting Regional Tribes in Bayt al-Maqdis..	107
4.3.2.5. Islamic Civility.....	111
4.3.2.6. Caliphate as a Soft Power Instrument	112
4.3.2.6.1. The Sultan's Role as a Caliphate	117
CONCLUSION	122
REFERENCES	129
APPENDIX.....	169

ABSTRACT

SULTAN II ABDÜLHAMİD'S POLICIES AND PRACTICES TOWARDS JEWISH ZIONISTS REGARDING BAYT AL-MAQDIS

The study suggests that Sultan Abdülhamid II, as one of the pioneer leaders of the 19th century, not only rescued the Ottoman Empire from its financial, internal, and external problems but also fostered neat and successful policies in restricting Jewish Zionist systematic land purchasing and settlement activities in Bayt al-Maqdis. The main argument of the study dwells on three pillars. Firstly, the study argues that the Sultan pacified and limited Jewish Zionist settlement and land-purchasing activities in Bayt al-Maqdis by putting restrictive measures into force. By that, the study also suggests that the Sultan prevented possible Jewish Zionist superiority in the region in terms of population and territory by preserving demographic structure of the region. Secondly, the study supports that the Sultan increased the cohesion among Muslims, Arabs, Christians, Jews and non-Muslims in Bayt al-Maqdis despite Jewish Zionist provocations against the empire. The study further suggests that the people coming from different nationalities and faiths in the region were content with living under the banner of the Ottoman Empire. The study by that suggests that non-Muslim minorities supported the Sultan and his policies undertaken against Jewish Zionists. Therefore, the study further supports the idea that the Sultan successfully strengthened the cohesion and hope among Ottoman citizens regardless of people coming from varying national identities and beliefs to live together. Thirdly, the study summons up with the idea that, the Sultan not only prevented a Jewish Zionist State to be founded in Bayt al-Maqdis in near or far future, but he also successfully ended the hope of establishing a Jewish Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis by limiting Zionist immigration and land-purchasing activities. In this regard, the Sultan embraced *eklimleme* as a policy for rehabilitating the empire.¹ This study contends that the

¹ **Eklimleme:** Laying the foundation of a thing, giving its initial form and layers of a fountain. Although the the word *eklimleme* emancipates from the word family of *ekleme*, the word differs from *ekleme* in terms of stressing the first form substance (Göksoy & Gökmen, 2024, p. 288).

foundation of the Zionist Jewish state in 1948, after forty years of Sultan's reign under the protectorate of Britain was the result of the Sultan Abdülhamid II's successful restrictive policies addressing Jewish Zionists in Bayt al-Maqdis.

Keywords: Middle East, Bayt al-Maqdis, Ottoman Empire, Sultan Abdülhamid II, Jewish Zionist Influx, Precautions, Restrictions.



ÖZET

SULTAN 2. ABDÜLHAMİD'İN BEYTÜLMAKDİS'TE YAHUDİ SİYONİSTLERE KARŞI YÜRÜTTÜĞÜ POLİTİKALARI VE UYGULAMALARI

Çalışma, 19. yüzyılın öncü liderlerinden biri olan Sultan 2. Abdülhamid'in Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nu sadece mali, ulusal ve uluslararası çatışmalardan kurtarmakla kalmadığını; aynı zamanda Yahudi Siyonistlerin Beytülmakdis'te sistematik toprak satın alma ve yerleşme faaliyetlerini kısıtlamak adına yerinde ve başarılı politikalar uyguladığını ileri sürmektedir. Çalışmanın savunduğu fikir üç saç ayağı üzerine oturtulmuştur. İlk olarak çalışma, Sultan'ın Yahudi Siyonistlerin Beytülmakdis'e yerleşmelerine ve toprak satın alma faaliyetlerine karşı kısıtlayıcı önlemler alarak onların bu girişimlerini pasifize ettiğini ve bununla birlikte Yahudi Siyonist yerleşimini ve toprak satın alma faaliyetlerini Beytülmakdis için engellediğini savunmaktadır. Bu çalışma, aynı zamanda Sultan'ın bölgedeki Siyonist Yahudi nüfus yoğunluğunu engellediğini ve onların Beytülmakdis'te toprak edinim üstünlüğünün önüne geçtiğini de savunmaktadır. İkinci olarak bu çalışma, Yahudi Siyonistlerin Sultan 2. Abdülhamid'e yönelik tahriklerine rağmen Sultan'ın Beytülmakdis'te yaşayan Müslümanlar, Araplar, Hristiyanlar, Yahudiler, gayri-Müslümler ve bölgesel aşiretler arasında birlikte yaşama uyumu umudunu artırdığını; bununla birlikte Osmanlı İmparatorluğu bayrağı altında bölgede yaşayan ve farklı kimlik ve inançlara sahip bu insanların Sultan'ı ve onun Yahudi Siyonistlere karşı yürüttüğü politikaları desteklediğini ileri sürmektedir. Böylelikle bu çalışma, Sultan'ın ulusal kimlikleri ve inanç sistemleri ne olursa olsun Osmanlı tebaası arasındaki birlikteliği de pekiştirdiğini ileri sürmektedir. Üçüncü olarak, bu çalışma Sultan'ın sadece Beytülmakdis'te bir Yahudi Siyonist Devlet'in kurulmasını engellemekle kalmadığını, aynı zamanda Siyonist Yahudilerin yerleşim ve toprak satın alma faaliyetlerinin temel motivasyonu olan yakın ve uzak gelecekte Beytülmakdis'te bir devlet kurulması umudunu da kırdığını ileri sürerek Sultan'ın Siyonist Yahudilere karşı koşulsuz bir zafer kazandığını ileri sürmektedir. Sultan'ın bu sayede imparatorluğun

yeniden doğuşunu eklimlediği bu çalışmada ileri sürülmüştür.² Bu çalışma, Siyonist Yahudi devletinin Sultan'ın iktidarından ancak kırk yıl sonra 1948 yılında İngiltere garantörlüğünde kurulabilmesinin Sultan'ın Beytülmakdis'te Yahudi Siyonistleri ve yerleşimlerini sınırlayıcı tedbirleri başarılı bir şekilde uyguladığının somut bir sonucu olarak değerlendirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ortadoğu, Beytülmakdis, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Sultan 2. Abdülhamid, Yahudi Siyonist Göçü, Tedbirler, Sınırlamalar.



² **Ekimleme:** Bir şeyin, olgunun temellerini atma, ona ilk şeklini verme ve onun temel yapı taşı oluşturma. Ekimleme ile aynı kelime aile grubundan olsada burada ekimleme ekimlemeden önceki durumu, özü ve ilk halin şekillenmesi anlamını içinde barındırmaktadır (Göksoy & Gökmen, 2024, s. 288).

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

“I am sure that the historians will vindicate me and even if the Turkish historians do not do so, I am certain that some foreign historians will do me justice (Haslip, 1973).

The reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II was one of the most prolonged rules that witnessed significant changes in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Hanioğlu, 2008, pp. 109-115). The crucial events that shaped the social, cultural, and political life of the empire goes back to the *Hatt-ı Hümayun of Gülhane (Tanzimat Fermanı)* issued on 3 November 1839 and 18 February 1856 by *Islahat Hattı Hümayunu (Islahat Fermanı)*. The preliminary phase of Paris Conference ended the Crimean War (1853-1856) by enabling the Empire to regain its invaded territories back (Ediz, 2020, pp. 76-77; Karpaz, 1974, pp. 95-96; Koç, 2018, p. 38; Korkmaz, 2016, pp. 2-3; Makdisi, 2000, p. 3; Şimşir, 1989, pp. IV- XXXI). In 1876, on the eve of the Sultan's accession to the throne pioneered by British representative Lord Salisbury, a delegation composed of the Ottoman Empire, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Britain, Italy and Russia gathered together in İstanbul to discuss the future of the Empire at the İstanbul Conference (Hacıoğlu, 2020, pp. 187-218; Aydın, 2005, pp. 59-66; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 16-17). However, the consequences of the Conference did not benefit to the empire with Paris Conference after Crimean War. The conference aimed to provide alternative suggestions and resolutions to the challenges the Empire was facing with, such as uprisings, financial and domestic administrative problems within the Empire and Balkans (Aydın, 2005, pp. 59-66; 2006, pp. 101-115; Hacıoğlu, 2020, pp. 187-218; Kızıltoprak, 2002, pp.92-117; Şimşir, 1989, pp. IV- XIII; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 16-17). However, the conference upon the defeat of Ottoman Empire against Russia with the Russo-Ottoman War could not produce productive and practical resolutions on behalf of the empire, what's more with the conference it became quite clear that Britain like other participant European countries did not support Ottomans against Russia (Aydın, 2005, pp. 59-66). With the conference, the Sultan would no longer support Ottoman presence in the Middle East. After the conference, it became quite clear that the Sultan was left alone by the European countries without providing any help so as to compensate the expenses of the war.

The study supports the idea that the Sultan consolidated and eased the atmosphere within the empire despite all the hurdles of the time. Beside reconciling problem in administration and strengthening the prestige of the empire in international platforms; the Sultan had to deal with Jewish Zionist influx towards Bayt al-Maqdis during his reign. The Sultan, shortly after getting onto the throne, paid close interest in paying the inherited high amount of debt beside the expenses of the war with Russia in 1876 (Ahmad, 1999, pp. 24-25; Clay, 2000, pp. 553-565; Farah, 2008, p. 13; Hanioglu, 2008, pp. 194-195; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 40-45). Therefore; the Sultan by producing rational and productive policies strengthen the empire both in national and international terms (Karpat, 2001, pp. 154–155; Kocabaş, 1995, pp. 104-157; Mandel, 1974, p. 325). With that, the Sultan gave priority to the welfare of the empire in preserving the boundaries of the empire. The Sultan tried hard to gain time for his further important reforms and renovations within the empire by preserving local and international diplomatic heritage inherited by previous Ottoman sultans starting from Sultan Osman to his uncle Sultan Abdülaziz (Afyoncu, 1997, pp. 1-3; Akpınar, 2012, pp. 79-119; Hanioglu, 2008, pp. 72-109; Kafadar, 1995, pp. 37-47; Kara, 2020, pp. 547–548; Seton-Watson, 2006, pp. 275-389). Shortly after getting hold of the power and balancing the administrative structure, concentrating on diminishing foreign debts so as to get the empire out of European (particularly Britain and France) countries' interference zones both in domestic and international policies dwelling on the capitulations granted to them, the Sultan conducted policies so to turn the empire back to its old glorious days (Karpat, 2001, p. 116-118; Mandel, 1974, p. 316-319; Özdiş, 2020, pp. 49-50). Meanwhile, the Sultan was closely interested in producing constructive, rational, and functional policies in hindering the Jewish Zionist settlement and their land purchasing activities in Bayt al-Maqdis (Bostancı, 2006, p. 2; Haslip, 1973, p. 206; Kodaman & İpek, 1993, pp. 571-574; Özcan, 2019, p. 120). The Sultan did not support a change in demographic structure of Bayt al-Maqdis by the hands of Jewish Zionists who were already struggling hard to engrave the seeds of a Jewish Zionist state in the region pioneered by countries such as Britain, Russia and France (Bostancı, 2006, p. 2; Kaygısız, 2014, pp. 59-73; Sharif, 1983, pp. 1-5). Therefore, the Sultan from the first day hold a negative attitude towards the proposal delivered by Jewish Zionists for founding a state in Bayt al-Maqdis. Meanwhile, the study proposes the idea that the Sultan with his precautions and their applications on the ground achieved a great victory against

the Jewish Zionists in restricting their settlement and land purchasing demands and activities in Bayt al-Maqdis. Meanwhile, the Sultan, while enforcing restrictions for Jewish Zionists provided peaceful living conditions for Ottoman Jews and the Jews who were expelled by Russian pogroms in Russia and Anti-Semitism wave in Europe. The study summons up with the idea that despite extensive and systematical plans and projects initiated by the Jewish Zionists towards for settling a Jewish Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis, the Zionists failed to realize their plans and projects during the Sultan's reign.

1.1. Problem Statement

The 20th century witnessed one of the most interesting massive organized immigration undertaken by the Jewish Zionists addressing Bayt al-Maqdis in history. The Jewish Zionists formed an international network bringing the Jews of the world together around Bayt al-Maqdis under the umbrella of Jewish Zionism pioneered by Theodore Herzl aiming to establish a Jewish Zionist state. This was probably the first of its kind which was both empowered and released by the Jewish Zionists in history. Their aim was so simple: they would convince the Sultan for reserving them a region in Bayt al-Maqdis to establish a semi-independent or an autonomous entity whose expenses would be met by the Jewish Zionists. In exchange for their request, the Jewish Zionists offered to pay the debts of the Ottoman Empire. However, the Jewish Zionists could not get what they had expected from the Sultan. The Sultan, by declining their offer not only prevented them from realizing their dream in overpopulating the region come true and gathering as much land as they could but prevented them from founding a state in Bayt al-Maqdis during his reign. Despite Sultan's rejection, the Jewish Zionists did not quit their plans and programs in Bayt al-Maqdis. On the contrary, they tried to find other ways and channels to immigrate and purchase land by any means they could attain at all costs in Bayt al-Maqdis. However, the Sultan did not step back from his decision and introduced series of legislations restricting their immigration, settlement, and land acquisition projects and activities in Bayt al-Maqdis both at national and international levels.

The main argument of the study dwells on this premise. While the Sultan's measures and restrictive regulations have already been extensively and deeply analyzed so far by many national and international scholars, the study supports that there is still not a definite consensus about the cause-and-effect of the precautions undertaken by the Sultan towards

the Jewish Zionists. Regarding the Sultan's attitude towards Jewish Zionists, there are varying ideas and thesis about Sultan's attitude. However among them two main groups of scholars have different interpretations regarding the Sultan's attitude towards Jewish Zionists. While the first group of scholars affirm that the Sultan took restrictive measures against Jewish Zionists by limiting their immigration and land acquisition activities in Bayt al-Maqdis, they advocate the idea that the Sultan was not successful in restricting Jewish Zionist settlement and land acquisition activities in the region. They based their argument on the premise that the Sultan's policies were not successful in restricting Jewish Zionist immigration and land purchasing activities since the Jewish Zionists increased their population and territories in Bayt al-Maqdis during the Sultan's reign. As for the second group of scholars, they support the idea that the Sultan was indifferent to the Jewish Zionists, therefore did not adopt any restrictive measures against their settlement and land purchasing activities in the region. They further supported the idea that the Sultan not only supported their immigration and settlement activities but also welcomed Jewish Zionists in the region. They based their argument on the premise that since the Jewish Zionists increased their population and territories in the region during the Sultan's reign, the Sultan's policy was not successful in restricting the Jewish Zionists. This duality and uncertainty regarding the Sultan's attitudes towards Jewish Zionists in the literature are the main motivations of the study. Therefore the study in this respect concentrates on reanalyzing the validity of the precautions undertaken by the Sultan limited with Bayt al-Maqdis. The study argues that the measures undertaken by the Sultan and the way in which they were applied were successful in limiting the inflow of Jewish Zionists and their land purchasing in the region. Therefore, the study argues that the Sultan unless fostered restrictive measures against Jewish Zionist settlement and land purchasing activities in Bayt al-Maqdis, the demographic structure of the region would completely be changed on behalf of Jewish Zionists doubling Muslim and Christian population in the region even during his reign. In this context, the study does not support the idea that Jewish Zionists did not increase their population and territory in the region during the reign of Sultan II; however, the study further promotes the idea that although there was already an Ottoman Jewish population in the region and due to some unofficial ways and means Jewish Zionists were able to increase their population, this increase was far below their expectations were limited. As they were not able to get superior position

in the region in terms of their population and the land they reserved despite consulting illegal ways and help provided by the civil servants who were thought to be bribed by Zionists for their settlement and land purchasing in Bayt al-Maqdis. Furthermore, when other religious and ethnic groups in the region are evaluated as a whole, the increase in Jewish Zionist population in the region was not so much higher than Arabs, Muslims and non-Muslims as their population equally increased as well. On the wise, when Jewish Zionist expectations and plans regarding Bayt al-Maqdis are considered in detail, the increase in their population and acquired land can only be regarded to be a failure when their financial, political and networking activities were evaluated at the time. Therefore, the study suggests that, the Zionists cannot be considered to be successful in achieving their aims for overpopulating the region and acquiring critical territories in the region despite the support provided by Britain, France and Russia. Meanwhile, the study contends that the Sultan preserved the multinational atmosphere of the region despite Jewish Zionists and their supporters in Europe and all around the world.

1.2. Research Questions

This thesis attempts to seek answers to the following questions. What were the motives for Jewish Zionist settlement and their land purchases in Bayt al-Maqdis during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II? Could the Jewish Zionists succeed in their aim to overpopulate and lay the foundations of a Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis? What were the Sultan's motivations for restricting the Jewish Zionist migration and land purchase in Bayt al-Maqdis while simultaneously welcoming Jews exiled from Europe and Russia into Anatolia? What precautions did the Sultan take after rejecting the Jewish Zionist settlement request to establish a Jewish Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis? Why the Jewish Zionists could not convince the Sultan to establish a 'National Home' in Bayt al-Maqdis? Could the Sultan with the measures undertaken limit the Zionist settlement and their land purchase activities in Bayt al-Maqdis?

1.3. Research Objectives

The primary aim of the study is to analyze the consequences of the measures undertaken by Sultan Abdülhamid II against the Jewish Zionist influx into Bayt al-Maqdis. The study aims to illustrate that while the Jewish Zionists were backed by Britain, Russia and France for establishing a Jewish Zionist state in the region, they were unable to do so thanks to the precautions issued by the Sultan for restricting their settlement and land purchase activities. The motivation of the study is to analyze restrictive measures undertaken by the Sultan against the Jewish Zionist settlement and their land-purchasing activities in Bayt al-Maqdis. The study further supports the idea that the Sultan beside restricting the Jewish Zionist settlement for the foundation of a Jewish Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis, increased the cohesion among varying nationalities and religions already living in the region. Moreover, the study suggests the precautions undertaken by the Sultan strengthened the ties among people from varying faiths and helped residents of the region get united under the umbrella of the empire pioneered by the Sultan.

The study aims to illustrate that the Jewish Zionists were not successful in their unremitting quest for settlement and land purchasing activities in the region. The study seeks to provide reasons why the Jewish Zionists were not successful in their aims to increase their population and purchased lands in the region. Within the study, the role of the Sultan and his precautions were illustrated as a means to preserve the coherent atmosphere in Bayt al-Maqdis and prevented a Jewish Zionists state to be founded in the region.

1.4. The Significance of the Study

There have already been many researches conducted on the Sultan regarding his policies and practices in restricting Jewish Zionists in Bayt al-Maqdis. However, the presumptions about the consequences of precautions and the Sultan's policies have not reached a consensus yet. Although there are studies supporting the idea that the Sultan successfully prevented the region from being overpopulated and colonized by Jewish Zionists, there are equally some studies supporting the idea that the Sultan failed to preserve the region from becoming a place for Jewish Zionists to settle and purchase land in. As for them, the Jewish Zionists increased their population and the land they acquired

from the region. Although both sides have relevance, they lack in supporting the idea that the Sultan, without any hesitation, limited Jewish Zionists' settlement and their land purchasing activities in the region and preserved the region from becoming overpopulated by Jewish Zionists. The study supports the idea that the Sultan did not tolerate the region to be under the authority of Jewish Zionists and did not let an increase expected by Jewish Zionists in terms of their population and reserved land in Bayt al-Maqdis. This study supports the idea that the Sultan undertook necessary precautions against the Jewish Zionists. The study argues that the Sultan successfully restricted the Jewish Zionist settlement and their land acquisition with preventive measures and their application in the region. The study differs from other already conducted research on the issue in terms of fostering the idea that the Sultan not only conducted a successful campaign against the Zionists but also preserved the welfare, security, and multicultural atmosphere in the region, as no revolt or separatist movement against the Empire and the Sultan initiated by the Ottoman Christians, Jews and Arabs in the region despite Jewish Zionist provocations. The study further argues that, despite the provocations against the Sultan; the Sultan achieved to increase the cohesion among Muslims and non-Muslims in the region and strengthened their bond towards the Empire by increasing their visibility in governmental and nongovernmental communities supporting their nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) activities, such as signing agreement with the French government to establish cultural institutions and schools; allowing them to build their schools, hospitals and religious buildings within the region. By that, while the Sultan put restrictive and preventive precautions and exercised them successfully by limiting the Jewish Zionist settlement and land purchasing activities, he equally enhanced the stability and peace among Muslims and non-Muslims in the region.

1.5. Research Methodology

The research employed a qualitative research method by using a document analysis technique welded by archive documents, memoirs, research papers, books, Master and Ph.D theses, letters regarding Bayt al-Maqdis and the Sultan, his foreign and domestic policies, practices on the ground both in national and international level. The study started with searching the literature and later on continued with seeking for primary documents in archives so as to find relevant ground for the thesis statement. As the

subject of the research was quite controversial, the researcher used both primary and secondary sources regarding the period by cross-checking both national and international archives for the period between the late 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. The study greatly benefitted from the memoirs of the Sultan Abdülhamid II, Theodore Herzl, Tefvik Biren, Fethi Okyar, Tahsin Paşa.

1.6. Research Scope and Limitation

The study focuses mainly on the precautions and implementation of the restrictive measures and policies undertaken by the Sultan against the Jewish Zionist influx and their land purchases in Bayt al-Maqdis between 1876 and 1908 at domestic and international level. Therefore, the study aims to shed light on precautions and applications the Sultan initiated against the Jewish Zionists. This study does not seek to analyze the Sultan's policies all throughout his reign since this is not applicable for a research thesis to encapsulate 33 years of Sultan's reign. Therefore, the study is limited with Sultan's policies and practices in restricting the Jewish Zionist influx and their land acquisition in the region. The study is limited to the relevant measures undertaken by the Sultan during his reign between 1876 and 1908 and their application and effects on the ground. What distinguishes this study from other studies is that the study explicitly assumes that the Sultan achieved unconditional success against Jewish Zionism during his time and successfully pacified the Zionist threat in the region and thus prevented a Jewish Zionist state from being founded during his reign in the region. Meanwhile, the study further argues that, the Sultan used Jewish Zionism as a motivation to strengthen the ties among Ottoman citizens varying from Christians to Jews, Arabs to Turkish descendants. In the study, it is discussed that the Sultan, by strengthening the bounds among citizens within the empire, fostered a strong networking among Muslims and non-Muslims in the world against both the colonialist European countries and Jewish Zionism.

1.7. Literature Review

It is important to note that no region, state, or entity was called Palestine during the Ottoman Empire. The place that is called Palestine today was regarded as a part of the Sham region in the late 19th and beginning of the 20th century. Some European countries such as Britain and France, preferred to entitle the region as Palestine. However, towards

the end of the 19th century and at the onset of the 20th century, the name Palestine was noted to be used in Ottoman official texts as well. In the study, Bayt al-Maqdis refers to Palestine as a part of the Sham region consisting of Kudus, Nablus and Akka. Due to varying regional names, scholars must pay keen interest and attention while entitling the region since the entitled place may not correspond to the region addressed. By that it is important to state that, throughout the study the Middle East region will refer to the geography encompassing Eurasia and the Middle East/North Africa. Therefore, throughout the study, the researcher paid close attention to referring to the region while using the terminology of the Middle East. The researcher consulted numerous national and international primary and secondary sources regarding the Sultan's policies and practices towards Jewish Zionists. The researcher began conducting his studies with Necip Fazıl Kısakürek's book written (1965) about the Sultan. In his book, Kısakürek provided a holistic perspective on the Sultan by giving important accounts starting from his childhood to his educational life; how and under what conditions he was raised and got onto the throne; confronted with challenging situations during his tenure in office. The Sultan's attitude towards cases and his choices narrated by Kısakürek enlightened the scope and capacity of the research, and thus, the researcher after reading the book had much more detailed information to conduct and wave the research on. The reason why the researcher has chosen to study Sultan's policies and practices against the Jewish Zionists dwell on two premises. One of the motivation is to lay historical accounts and facts regarding the Sultan and his attitude towards Jewish Zionists since the researcher, long before he had started studying the program had given a promise to the Sultan to conduct an objective research on him and his policies. The second motivation is to follow and again contribute to the narrative and discourse initiated by leaders such as Sultan Mahmut II, Sultan Abdülmecid, Sultan Abdülaziz, Sultan Abdülhamid II, Sultan Mehmet Reşat, Sultan Vahdettin, President Gazi Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK, Prime Minister Adnan MENDERES, President Turgut ÖZAL, President Recep Tayyip ERDOĞAN and scholars such as Ahmet HAŞİM, Necip Fazıl KISAKÜREK, Nuri PAKDİL, Kadir MISIRLIOĞLU and many other scholars whose names could not be stated here. These two motivations were the core of the study. In this regard, Kısakürek's book helped researcher to consult primary sources on the Sultan. Therefore while the researcher before reading Kısakürek's book had some hesitations about finding relevant sources and

materials for an important person on whom there have already been quite many studies conducted, this hesitation came into futile as there were already many historical records approving the success the Sultan attained against Jewish Zionists. However throughout the middle of the research, it became quite clear for the researcher to find relevant sources approving the Sultan's success against Jewish Zionists by preventing their aims come true in Bayt al-Maqdis. Therefore the researcher dwelling on this historical fact approached the Sultan from a different angle furthering the idea that the Sultan defeated Jewish Zionists during his office. The study, in its basic and clear form supports the idea that, Sultan was such succesfull that even after his throne, a Jewish Zionist state could only by the help of Britain be founded in 1948 after 40 years of his throne. In this regard, the research in way approved the declaration of Kısakürek further stating that: 'Understanding Sultan Abdülhamid II is understanding the sum of everything regarding the time and empire'. When it became quite clear that the Sultan was successful in preventing Jewish Zionists' dream came true, the historical narratives, memoirs and any archival materials used in the research become more absoletee in approving this statement. Therefore, the researcher by Kısakürek's book got the soul of the work and constructed the body of the research out of national and international sources by knitting the flesh with inches. After getting an overview of the Sultan by Kısakürek's book, the researcher consulted to the Sultan's memoirs (1975, 1974). In his memoirs, the Sultan shares information regarding his domestic and foreign policies, his attitude towards the Jewish Zionists, how he managed to consolidate financial crisis and dealt with Jewish Zionists. Since the study is limited to his attitudes towards the Jewish Zionists and his undertaken precautions addressing their settlement and land acquisition activities in Bayt al-Maqdis. By that, the researcher could find the ground for engraving the argument of the study and the Sultan's attitude towards the Jewish Zionists since there were also some narratives concerning the Sultan's attitude sponsoring the idea that the Sultan did allow the Jewish Zionist settlement and their land purchasing activities in Bayt al-Maqdis. This study, in this regard supports the contrary argument sponsoring the idea that the Sultan limited Jewish Zionists to settle and purchase land in Bayt al-Maqdis. Moreover, the researcher consulted to primary sources (Turkish Presidency Ottoman Archives) so as to strengthen argument of the thesis on whether the Sultan according to the official account put forward restrictive policies both on the stage and the table. The study benefitted from

Theodore Herzl's books, memoirs and letters (2017, 1989, 1899, 1896) in terms of keeping time sequence and cause effect relations of the events regarding Bayt al-Maqdis. Herzl's memoir in this regard helped the researcher to analyse the sequence of historical events. After having an idea about Herzl and his policies upon reading his book (1989), the researcher consulted to his memoirs (1960) and his letter to M. Youssuf Zia Al-Khalidi (1899) in order to cross-check the chronological sequences of the events and his plans regarding the Empire and Bayt al-Maqdis of which was officially started with Basel Congresses and continued with his networking activities. Herzl's memoir, in this respect, served as a litmus paper for questioning the legitimacy of the historical narratives concerning Jewish Zionism. The researcher consulted Herzl's memoirs all throughout the study when needed. Although Herzl's dairy do not provide an objective historical account; the researcher consulted to it so as to follow the sequences of the events. In order to draw the boundaries of the 19th century, the researcher consulted to İsmail Hakkı UZUNÇARŞILI's works (1954, 1988) in order to give a holistic perspective towards the Sultan's policies and attitudes towards Britain. Uzunçarşılı's portrayal of the status of the Ottoman Empire and European countries, particularly Britain, Russia and France enabled the researcher to contextualize the conditions that were inherited to the Sultan and provide the causes and effects for the empire to become on the verdict of decay. The study greatly benefitted from Edward Said's (1979, 2003) studies in terms of contextualizing the status of Bayt al-Maqdis. Fahir ARMAOĞLU's (2010, 1997, 1989), Bernard LEWIS's (1984, 1982), William HALE's (2000), Oral SANDER's (2021), Halil İNALCIK's (2015, 1982), David KUSHNER's (1986), İlber ORTAYLI's (2015, 2009, 2002), Beshara B. DOUMANI's (1992), Maurits H. Van Den BOOGERT's (2005), Alexander SCHOLCH's (2006), Alan PALMER's (1992), memoirs of Fethi OKYAR (1980), Bilal B. ŞİMŞİR's studies (1989) Feroze A. K. Yasamee studies's (2011, 2023), Işıl Işık BOSTANCI's PhD thesis (2006) greatly contributed to the study in structuring historical background regarding Bayt al-Maqdis and the Ottoman Empire. The researcher greatly benefitted from Ussama MAKDISI's studies (2019a, 2019b, 2008, 2000) in terms of comparing and contrasting the past and present conditions in Bayt al-Maqdis. The researcher in order to strengthen the context of the periods starting from Sultan Abdülmecid benefitted from Makdisi's studies. Bostancı's thesis in this regard enabled researcher to develop his insight towards Bayt al-Maqdis in 19th century and know

Ottoman policy towards the region. The sources Makdisi and Bostancı provided in their studies enabled the researcher to further consult resources and develop the scope of the study as well. Karpat's studies (2003, 2002, 2001, 1982, 1974) enabled the researcher to interpret the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan's reign within the context of its time. Ruth KARK's studies (2017, 2012, 2010, 2004, 1991, 1989, 1986, 1984) also helped the researcher to have a clear idea about the lands the Empire acquired before Jewish Zionist mass immigration and draw the boundaries of Bayt al-Maqdis on which the Sultan conducted his policies and measures actively on the ground. Alex CARMEL's studies (1975, 1986) helped the researcher acquire contextual information regarding Sultan's policies. To obtain a broad perspective and objective reports, the researcher has benefited greatly from the book of Johann BUSOW (2011). David VITAL's book (1975) analyzes the historical and cultural evolution of Zionism and alternative definitions for Zionism which is an already controversial subject whose definition and connotation have evolved and are still evolving. Vital's book, in this regard, helped the researcher to trace the evolution of Zionism. As Zionism and Judaism were much-conflicted terminologies for the readers, the researcher consulted to Skolnik & Berenbaum (2007) for justifying the definitions and historical account. Sokolow's book (1919) provided a definition for political Zionism which is widely used today. The researcher consulted on Abd Al-Fattah EL-AWAISI's book (2015), which underlines the importance of Bayt al-Maqdis. El-Awaisi has a theory regarding Bayt al-Maqdis of which is very much important in terms of understanding the present condition of Bayt al-Maqdis. El-Awaisi's book suggests that Bayt al-Maqdis is the cradle of the Middle East and so is the Middle East for the world. Such as Aristotle, who regards humans as the center of the universe; El-Awaisi equally regards Bayt al-Maqdis as the center of the universe; for El-Awaisi, at the center of the universe Bayt al-Maqdis resides. For him, Bayt al-Maqdis serves as the locomotive of change in the world. In this context, the reasons and motivations are quite clear why the Sultan attached great importance to Bayt al-Maqdis. The importance of Bayt al-Maqdis was also shared by the Sultan as well. Therefore, the Sultan directed all his governmental policies and practices during his reign toward the region for its protection and welfare centering Bayt al-Maqdis at the core of his domestic and foreign policies.

El-Awaisi, in his book (2007) explains the importance of Bayt al-Maqdis and its function. In his theory, he asserts that the Middle East is the cradle of the world and that Bayt al-

Maqdis plays an important role in the with cyce theory effect other regions of the world as well. El- Awaisi advocates the idea that the world is a limited place where invisible, indeterminate borders bind every civilization, nation, and country. Therefore, what happens in Bayt al-Maqdis, if not completely or directly but certainly indirectly, impacts the rest of the world. In order to to draw the importance of Bayt al-Maqdis, El-Awaisi's theory helped the researcher to further state the importance of Bayt al-Maqdis for the world, Muslims, Christians and Jews.

The researcher consulted to the theses written about the Ottoman Empire starting from its first mission in shouldering the caliphate that transited from the Mamluks to Selim I (Selim the Grim, Selim the Resolute, Yavuz Sultan Selim) to the Sultan to provide historical accounts focusing on the importance of Bayt al-Maqdis and Ottoman caliphate. Therefore, the researcher consulted Emine ERDOĞAN's master's thesis (1998) for providing historical accounts of caliphatehood inherited from Bayt al-Maqdis. The study gives historical accounts and artifacts for the researcher to have a deep understanding of the time when caliphatehood was passed on to the Ottoman Empire. In addition to providing historical accounts of the caliphate, the study emphasizes the region's importance for three divine religions, which harbours different ethnicities and nationalities in its core. Engin Deniz AKARLI's studies (1976, 1980) as forerunner studies analysing the Sultan and his attitude instigated further studies conducted on the Sultan. Akarlı's studies enabled the researcher to consult more primary and secondary resources regarding the Sultan and Bayt al-Maqdis by providing insight into Sultan's policies and attitudes towards the Jewish Zionism and European countries. The researcher has later on benefited greatly from Mim Kemal ÖKE's studies. Öke's studies (2021, 2006, 1985, 1983, 1982a, 1982b) enhanced and strengthened the argument of the study and widened the scope of the study. So as to classify the precautions and analyse the precautions undertaken by the Sultan, the researcher consulted to Öke's studies and Tufan Buzpınar's studies (2020, 2019, 2016, 2003, 2002, 2000, 1996, 1994). Buzpınar's studies were important in terms of providing historical and contextual basis of the argument of the study regarding conditions, Sultan's attitudes, atmosphere in the world at the time. The study also helped the researcher to further cross check Ottoman archives regarding the Sultan's attitude and official accounts in Ottoman archives. So as to gain general information about Sultan's foreign policy, the researcher consulted to Vahdettin ENGİN's

study (2011) Mahmut AKPINAR's study (2012), Necmittin ALKAN's studies (2018, 2023), İsmail ÇOLAK's study (2007) Tahsin Paşa's memoir (2017), A. Alaaddin ÇETİN & Ramazan YILDIZ's (1976) and Cevat MUSTAFA's archive studies (2015) regarding the Sultan and his time, Hüseyin TEKİNOĞLU's study (2022), İhsan Süreyya SIRMA's studies (2021, 2007, 1979), Zekeriya KURŞUN's study (2022) in terms of providing Sultan's domestic and foreign policy and Sultan's attitude towards Jewish Zionists. These studies strengthen the argument of the study. Alexander SCHOLCH's book (2006) contributed to the contextual background of the study to a great extent. Schölch very vividly illustrated the political, social, cultural, and economic status of Bayt al-Maqdis. Süleyman KOCABAŞ's studies (2018, 1995), Yaşar KUTLUAY's study (2013) and Ömer TELLİOĞLU's studies (2019, 2018) were important sources the study greatly benefitted from in strengthening the thesis statement of the study. As Tellioglu's thesis statement in his study was in parallel with the study's argument; the researcher in constructing the context of the study benefitted greatly from his works. The sources Tellioglu used in his research helped the researcher to reach further related studies regarding the Sultan and Bayt al-Maqdis as well. In this regard, Tellioglu's study served as an important constituent of the argument of the study. Süleyman KIZILTOPRAK's book (2011) and his article (2002) contributed to the study to a great extent in terms of giving important and precious information about the Sultan's foreign policy and his attitude towards European countries, Russia, and Japan. The researcher benefitted from Gökhan ÇETİNSAYA's studies (2016; 2019) to great extent in terms of contextualizing Sultan's domestic and foreign policies towards Jewish Zionists. For Çetinsaya, the Sultan associated his foreign and domestic policy altogether. The researcher also consulted to Ziya POLAT's article (2017). In his article, Polat provides contextual information regarding the period. The study greatly benefitted from Polat's article in terms getting to know the of the precautions undertaken by the Sultan against Jewish Zionists in the region. One of the important research projects that benefitted to the study was Ahmet AKGÜNDÜZ's article (1987) which gives important historical facts and figures the Sultan had undertaken against the Jewish Zionist. In his study Akgündüz gives information regarding the Sultan supporting the idea that the Sultan was successful in stopping Jewish Zionist settlement and land purchase activities in Bayt al-Maqdis. Raşit GÜNDOĞDU's book (2019) provided a general perspective on the Sultan and his

policies. The writer benefitted from the book by supporting his argument that the Sultan carried out successful measures against the Jewish Zionists by obstructing their settlement and land acquisition activities in Bayt al-Maqdis. The researcher continued his research by consulting on Zachary J. FOSTER's PhD thesis (2017) in order to strengthen the context of the study. Khalid EL-AWAISI's studies (2020, 2019a, 2019b, 2016) had contributed a lot to the study in terms of emphasizing the importance of Bayt al-Maqdis for three divine religions. Süleyman KIZILTOPRAK's book (2011) and article (2002) contributed to the study to a great extent in terms of giving important and precious information about the Sultan's foreign policy and his attitude towards European countries, Russia, and Japan. Mehmet Akif KIREÇÇİ's PhD thesis (2007) has contributed to the thesis by giving important historical accounts regarding Bayt al-Maqdis and its region. The researcher had an opportunity to analyze the period both textually and contextually. Mustafa TEKİN's article (2011) contributed to the study in terms of providing critical perspective towards the Sultan and his policies. In the article, Tekin quite obviously states that the Sultan fostered necessary precautions for stopping Jewish Zionist's expansion to Bayt al-Maqdis. For Tekin the Sultan was successful in his measures against Jewish Zionists. In this context, the researcher has benefited from Mohammed A. M. YASIN's article (2019) to a great extent for the article supports the thesis statement of the study in that the Sultan successfully implemented measures against the Jewish Zionist for preventing their settlement and land purchasing activities in Bayt al-Maqdis. The researcher has greatly benefited from the bibliography of the research to establish the theoretical basis of the research as well. The study benefitted from Emine EREN's MA thesis (2008) to great extent in terms of understanding the Sultan's attitude and policies towards Bayt al-Maqdis. The study welded by Büşra BARIN's Master's thesis (2014) to great extent strengthened the argument statement of the study. By her thesis the study had opportunity to test the argument statement of the study and benefitted from the primary and secondary sources Barin had consulted to great extent in supporting the Sultan's success against Jewish Zionists. Lastly, the study benefitted from British foreign affairs diplomat Valentine CHIROL's research paper (1906) in terms of justifying the success the Sultan attained against Jewish Zionists when the Sultan was still on his throne as of 1906.

1.8. Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is composed of four chapters. Chapter One gives an overview of the study by providing information about the scope and limitations, aims, and ideas of research, including the introduction, problem statement, research questions, research objectives, the significance of the study, research methodology, research scope, thesis limitation and the structure of the thesis and literature review.

Chapter Two, entitled 'The Basic Concepts' provides general information about Bayt al-Maqdis, European anti-Judaism, Christian Zionism, and Jewish Zionism. It then ends with giving a short analysis of the differences between Jewish Zionism and Judaism.

Chapter Three, entitled 'Foreign Policy' starts by providing general information about the Sultan, his attitude towards the administration of the Empire, his renovating style and his attitude towards Jewish Zionism. Meanwhile, the chapter concentrates on giving the Sultan's foreign policy and his ties with other countries such as Britain, Russia, France and Germany.

Chapter Four, entitled 'Adaptation of the Policies' is the main body of the study. This chapter gives account regarding the Sultan, his policies and practices in preventing the Jewish Zionists's settlement and land purchasing activities addressing Bayt al-Maqdis. The chapter divides Sultan's precautions under two headlines as direct and indirect precautions. As for direct precautions the measures the Sultan fostered to prevent Jewish Zionist influx are given. As for the second headline entitled indirect precautions, the Sultan's indirect precautions in restricting Jewish Zionists's settlement and land purchasing activities in Bayt al-Maqdis are given. The chapter ends with justifying the consequences of the measures undertaken by the Sultan in limiting Jewish Zionists influx towards Bayt al-Maqdis.

CHAPTER TWO: THE BASIC CONCEPTS

2.1. The Historical Context

The late 19th century witnessed one of the most critical and hectic periods in history characterized by rapid changes across social, economic, cultural, and industrial spheres of life (Taniguchi, 2004, pp. 105-124). In such a dynamic context, countries especially those of vast empires like the Ottoman Empire faced significant challenges both in adapting implementing essential and transformative changes in their domestic and foreign policies. Due to Industrial Revolution (1760) and the French Revolution (1789), which profoundly effected Europe and subsequently reverberated throughout the world, leaders of the empires found it necessary to navigate transformative shifts in their demographic, social, and economic parameters while also preserving their countries' existing status (Bolat, 2014, pp.17-10; Gökmen, 2023a, p. 30; Wahnich, 2012, pp. 100-108). The Industrial Revolution offered promising opportunities for nations like Britain and France by facilitating the ease of life and accumulation of wealth through advancements in their technologies and industries such as the transition from manpower to mechanization, the shift from small-scale production to mass production, easy and cheap transportation to many parts of the world including Africa and the Middle East (Akarlı, 1976, p. 10). However, the empires such as Ottoman and Russia experienced the drawbacks of this revolution since they could not catch up with the ongoing changes (Gaidar, 2007, pp. 15-28). Nevertheless, leading European countries such as Britain and France due to mass production demands of industrialization intensified their colonial activities, thereby posing a threat to the sovereignty and territories of empires in Africa and the Middle East (Quataert, 2005, pp. 5-113). Under the veil of this atmosphere, empires such as the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Tsar sought to maintain their existing status and power against expansionist and colonialist countries such as Britain, Russia and France who invested on technological advancements in expanding their wealth through colonial ventures (Alam, 2009, p. 35; Tekinoğlu, 2022, p. 75). Their advancements in transportation technology reduced costs by enabling colonizing countries to reach more raw materials, enrich their economies, and bolster their military strength (Erdoğan & Canbay, 2016, p. 31; Smith, 2012, p. 12).

Consequently, in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution many European nations utilized their newfound wealth and military prowess to acquire additional resources and raw materials worldwide with a particular focus on Africa and the Middle East regions which were abundant in resources and inhabited by less powerful people (Hannoum, 2021, p. 7). The European powers, predominantly invested in strengthening their colonies and naval supremacy further consolidated their dominance over rival colonizing nations in their quest for new territories, disguising their colonizing purpose as introducing civilization for the welfare of the people living in Africa and Asia (Gaidar, 2007, pp. 15-28; Kalin, 2019, pp. 128-129; Quataert, 2005, pp. 111-136). Additionally, the rise of nationalism stemming from the French Revolution posed a significant threat to the empires who were composed of diverse nations and religious groups (Öke, 2021, pp. 27-28). This nationalist fervor instigated nations living under the empires for seeking independence by challenging imperial authorities. With the wave of nationalism emancipating from the French Revolution, the empires already inholding varying nations and religious groups had to witness significant threat emerging from nationalism of which created an opportunity for small states to become independent entities (McPhee, 2006, p. 207; Öke, 2021, pp. 27-28). The French Revolution, in this regard, by fostering nationalist tendencies posed a significant threat to the cohesion and stability of the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, both The Industrial Revolution and the French Revolutions presented a challenge to the Ottoman Empire and its territories in the Middle East such as Yemen, Libya, and Iraq. They were the targets of colonialist European powers eager to exploit their natural resources (Quataert, 2005, pp. 110-140). The Ottoman Empire, in particular, felt the impact of these nationalist movements. Greece and Bulgaria were among the primary states seceded from Ottoman rule and were established during the Sultan's reign (Karpas & Zens, 2002, p. 1508; Özcan, 2002, p. 1550). The initiation of transformative changes within the Ottoman Empire began with the issuance of the *Hatt-ı Sherif of Gülhane* Edict on 3 November 1839 during the reign of Sultan Abdülmecid (Özdemir, Çiydem & Aktaş, 2014, p. 322). Inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution and the nationalist fervor it instilled, this edict marked a significant departure by acknowledging and embracing Western superiority (Erdem, 2010, p. 327; Farah, 2008, p. 1). It advocated the modernization and reformation of the empire welding by European norms, institutions, and technology but building a universal Muslim identity (Özdemir et al.,

2014, p. 322; Tekin, 2011, p. 42). The edict also provided an opportunity for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy by promoting equality among all subjects of the empire by ensuring the protection of private property (Özdemir et al., 2014, p. 330). Notably, it addressed the social rights of non-Muslims (dhimmis), albeit under the pressure of European influence, thereby signifying an important shift in Ottoman policy towards equality (Erdem, 2010, p. 327; Farah, 2008, p. 1; Özdemir et al., 2014, p. 330). In response to the need for adapting global changes and counter foreign interference in the empire's domestic affairs, Sultan Abdülmecid instituted *Hatt-ı Sherif of Gülhane* Edict and Edict of Reform following the defeat in the Crimean War (1856). These reforms became mandatory for the empire (Gümüş, 2009, pp. 30-46). Key principles of these reforms included granting rights to non-Muslims, fostering their presence in the empire, ensuring their safety, and promoting equality, including equal taxation from whom extra taxes were granted, for they were not serving in the military. Previously, non-Muslims had been subject to additional taxes due to their exemption from military service (Eryılmaz, 1992, pp. 96-135). The opportunities afforded by these reforms were significant. They were as follows. (a) Equality of all individuals under the law within the Empire was ensured, promoting fairness and justice in legal matters. (b) Safeguarding the safety of property and the right to live peacefully was guaranteed, providing reassurance and stability to residents of the empire. (c) All inhabitants of the empire, regardless of their religion or ethnicity, were granted the opportunity to work as civil servants and participate in military service, fostering inclusivity and participation in state affairs. (d) Foreigners were permitted to purchase property, establish institutions, and appoint their representatives, facilitating economic development and international engagement within the empire (Armaoğlu, 1997, pp. 258-259; Eryılmaz, 1992, pp. 138-140). As for Ottoman domestic policy, it was not an easy hand over of the dynasty from Sultan Abdülaziz to Sultan Abdülhamid II as Sultan Murat V was the natural heir of the throne who was already acknowledged by European countries. After the death of Sultan Abdülmecid II, his brother Sultan Abdülaziz came into throne as Sultan Abdülmecid's children were not mature enough to cope with the challenges the empire was facing with. After Sultan Abdülaziz, there were again three two strong candidates for the throne. Despite the initial circumstances suggesting that Sultan Abdülhamid II would not ascend to the throne due to Prince Murat V being ahead in the line of succession who was meticulously prepared

for leadership. Equipped with a diverse set of qualifications and attributes, the Sultan Abdülhamid II defied expectations and maintained his rule for an uninterrupted period of 33 years. Despite the challenges posed by the succession order, his education and upbringing imbued him with the necessary skills, resilience, and determination to successfully navigate the complexities of governance and maintain stability within the Empire. Midhat Pasha in this regard had helped the Sultan to get into throne. The Sultan shortly after got into throne found himself in the middle of the war in which the empire was sure to be defeated. This could well be observed by the consequences of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878. With Berlin and San Stefano treaties, the empire lost quite a lot of its territories in Balkans where new states were founded such as Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania and Montenegro (Baykal, 1988, p. 199; Maden, 2013, p. 270-278; Yasamee, 2023, 81-106; 2011, 53-72). Batum, Kars, Beyazid, Erzurum and Ardahan were captured by Russia, Katur and Eastern Thrace was given to Iranians, Albania, Epirus, Thessaly were annexed (Afyoncu, 2024, p. 260; Baykal, 1988, p. 200). Cyprus with the Cyprus Convention was given to British protection but not protectorate as the Sultan did not quit Ottoman authority within the island. Beside Cyprus, Epir and Theselya were also given to Britain. While Britain as a negotiator status gained the most out of the war in acquiring strategic locations of the empire laid the foundation of invading Egypt in 1882. This situation instigated a new phase for the Ottoman Empire, the empire after this incident conducted reflexive and flexible public and foreign policy (El- Awaisi, 2019, p. 22; Mazza, 2009, p. 16-25). The aftermath of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 further instigated economic decline and authority deficiency for the Empire (Aydın, 2005, pp. 59-66). The empire, after the war had lost 212 thousand square kilometres territory (Afyoncu, 2024, p. 261). Although the war was fought between Ottoman Empire and Russia, Britain as a negotiator status gained the most out of the war in acquiring strategic locations of the empire, such as getting hold of Cyprus (1878). British after the treaty laid the foundation invading Egypt as of 1882 by which Britain both in the short and long run aimed to strengthen its status in the Middle East and contribute to the security of his way from Britain to India by preserving Suez Channel (Gümüş, 2018, pp. 72-73; İnalçık, 2023, pp. 199-200; Maden, 2011, p. 83; Şener, 2024, p. 189).

The Russo-Ottoman War of 1877 and 1878, with another perspective presented Russia an opportunity to assert its dominance by legitimizing its authority in Bayt al-

Maqdis, positioning itself against its rival powers such as Britain and France who were supporting Protestants and Catholics living within the empire (Farah, 2008, p. 3; Özcoşar & Akman, 2018, pp. 20-21; Trimbur, 2011, p. 96; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 40-46). In another perspective, the conflict between Christian churches and their representatives in Bayt al-Maqdis for the management of sacred spaces intensified and instigated Crimean War (1853-1856) and Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 (Bostancı, 2006, p. 46; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 40-45). Russia, like European powers, sought to benefit from capitulations granted to Western nations as well aiming to be the protectorate of Orthodox churches in the region; therefore Russia in order to strengthen its status within the empire declared war on the Ottoman Empire (Boogert, 2005, p. 8; Özcoşar & Akman, 2018, pp. 19-21; İpek, 2002, pp. 10-27; Yasamee, 2011, p. 46). Although the war on the stage was declared with the Empire, the war was actually fought between European countries and Russia for increasing their visibility and authority on the churches of Bayt al-Maqdis. Despite suffering significant losses in terms of military and economy, Russia could not strengthen its authority in the Mediterranean region particularly in Bayt al-Maqdis as it expected it to be (Kızıltoprak, 2002, pp. 57-69; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 40-41). Subsequently, with San Stefano and Berlin Treaties of 1879, the Ottoman Empire negotiated the payment of a ransom to Russia and regained control over eastern cities such as Erzurum, Kars, and Ardahan with the support of Britain and France, albeit at the cost of ceding the island of Cyprus to Britain (Alkan, 2023, pp. 240-242; Kızıltoprak, 2002, pp. 57-69; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 40-41). To some accounts, the empire was fined with 1.410.000.000 LT from which with 1.100.000.000 LT would be compensated in exchange of the seized territories (Baykal, 1988, p.199). The empire in sum was expected to pay round 310.000.000 LT after the war (Baykal, 1988, p.199). As for another account, the empire was expected to pay 40.000.000 LT to Russia for war expenditure (Yasamee, 2011, pp. 53-72). Britain and France, in order to secure their borders against Russia, which was also threatening their existence, gave full support to the Ottoman Empire even though they were not in favor of the Ottoman Empire (Haslip, 1973, p. 206; Kızıltoprak, 2002, pp. 57-69; Tekinoğlu, 2022, p. 75). The war compelled the Empire to develop relations with the countries in the world not limited with Europe, but also with Russia and eastern countries such as Japan and China (Akpınar, 2012, p. 90; Mandel, 1974, p. 325; Ortaylı, 2015, p. 128; Sırma, 1979, pp. 199-205; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 40-41). The empire faced decay and

witnessed the presence of the Russian Armada in the shores of the Marmara Sea in İstanbul (Tekinoğlu, 2022, p. 75). Despite the geographical distance between the Black Sea and the Middle East, Russia did not quit extending its authority in Bayt al-Maqdis region. With that, Russia aimed to eliminate French and British influence in the region. As the region was at the crossroad of colonial activities, Britain and France in order to secure their way to their colonies paid keen interest towards Bayt al-Maqdis (El- Awaissi & Yiğit, 2020, p. 14; HR. İD. 1889, 140 / 39). This rivalry among Russia, Britain and France towards Bayt al- Maqdis instigated the Sultan to pursue a cautious public and foreign diplomacy prioritizing the preservation of the Ottoman borders and demographic stability, particularly in Bayt al-Maqdis (Bolat, 2014, pp. 17-20; Çolak, 2007, p. 23). By maintaining good relations with neighboring countries and navigating power dynamics with Europe and Russia, the Sultan aimed to safeguard the empire's sovereignty and territorial integrity (Davutoğlu, 2020, p. 26; Kızıltoprak, 2011, p. 25; Özcan, 2019, p. 120). Following the devastating aftermath of the war, the Sultan found it necessary to defer the implementation of constitutional monarchy and the Ottoman Basic Law due to their impracticality amidst the ongoing turmoil (Buzpınar, 2016, p.11). This decision aimed to steer the empire towards recovery from its state of decline and disarray (Sander, 2021, pp. 310-314). That was why the Council for the Administration of the Ottoman Debt Office (Düyun-u Umumiye) was established within the empire. This measure aimed to consolidate the empire's debt and shield its territories from potential invasions by the European powers seeking repayment (Hanioglu, 2008, pp. 194-195). Bayt al-Maqdis during the 19th century became a battleground for competing powers vying for influence and control (El- Awaissi, 2019, p. 22; Farah, 2008, p. 3; Mazza, 2019, p. 16). The Crimean War (1853-1856) and Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 emerged from Russian willingness to increase its authority and visibility in Middle East region by supporting Orthodox Christians living within Ottoman Empire but particularly concentrating on Orthodox Christians against Catholic and Protestant Christians of Bayt al-Maqdis (Bostancı, 2006, p. 46; İpek, 2002, pp. 10-27; Özcoşar & Akman, 2018, pp. 20-21; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 40-45). Although the empire was 500 years old, there was a quite rare period of time when the empire was struggling with financial and political traumas that were threatening the welfare and future of the empire. Thereby, in order to understand well the success the Sultan attained during his 33 years of reign, it is important to

underline the policies conducted by the Sultan in developing good neighborhoods with nearby countries such as Russia, Iran and the European countries in the Balkans on mutual respect by acquiring their support or at least to eliminate a ground to arouse conflict with them (Davutoğlu, 2020, p. 26). The Sultan was developing his foreign policy according to the tension between European countries, Britain and Russia. When the relations with Russia were getting warmer, which would cause disturbance among them, the Sultan developed counter-policies with the European countries and approached them accordingly (Akpınar, 2012, pp. 79-119; Hanioglu, 2008, pp. 72-209; Seton-Watson, 2006, pp. 275-389). When the policies conflicted with the European countries, the Sultan approached to Russians and started developing political and economic relations with them without actively supporting their politics (Yasamee, 2011, p. 184). The Sultan in this regard did not hesitate to develop relations with the countries in the world by preserving its neutral status whose most concrete consequences could be observed in the Berlin Treaty by which the Ottoman Empire resecured its geographic status and position (Koç, 2018, p. 38). The Sultan sought to secure the borders of the Empire while maintaining the demographic structure of the empire in general and Bayt al-Maqdis in particular (Bolat, 2014, pp. 17-20). The Sultan's approach extended beyond the conflict between France and Britain encompassing diplomatic engagements with Japan, Russia, and other relevant actors (Akpınar, 2012, pp. 80-81; Yılmaz, 2015, p. 85). His primary objective was to preserve empire's existing status in terms of boundaries and population which helped him to gain more time for stabilization and rejuvenation of the empire (Sultan II. Abdülhamid Han, 1976, p. 53; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 23, 41; Yılmaz, 2015, p. 85). By avoiding confrontation and prioritizing constructive relations, the Sultan aimed to mitigate security threats and economic challenges facing the empire (Kızıltoprak, 2011, p. 25; Özcan, 2019, p. 120; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 5-49). This approach allowed him to focus on internal reforms and promote social cohesion among Muslim and non-Muslim populations within the empire (Özcan, 2019, pp. 115-126; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 7-18). The success of the Sultan's policy was evident in its contribution to the empire's stability and resilience amidst external pressures and internal challenges (Akpınar, 2012, pp. 79-119; Hanioglu, 2008, pp. 72-109; Seton-Watson, 2006, pp. 275-389). By adeptly managing diplomatic relations and avoiding entanglements in major conflicts, the Sultan effectively prolonged the Empire's existence. He gained valuable time for necessary reforms in strengthening

and reconsolidation the status of the central government, military and bureaucracy (Çolak, 2007, p. 24; Hanioglu, 2008, pp. 72-109; Yasamee, 2011, p. 24). Foremost, the Sultan undertook the challenging task for consolidating and pacifying domestic and international spheres by intertwining its external and internal relations (Tahsin Paşa, 2017, p. 160; Umar, 2002, p. 431). Managing an empire encompassing various ethnicities and religious groups posed considerable complexity, especially given the interference of the European powers and their allies under the guise of protecting minority rights (Çetinsaya, 2019, p. 27). The Sultan , therefore, adopted a holistic approach towards inhabitants of the empire and in his foreign affairs which were inherited by previous Ottoman Sultans who were nourished by Islamic civility (Çetinsaya, 2019, p. 27; Kafadar, 1995, pp. 71-72). Notably, the Sultan leveraged his position as the Caliph of Islam in fostering unity among Muslims worldwide, extending his influence to regions such as North Africa, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Indonesia (Barlak, 2019a, pp. 185-214; Gümüş, 2018, pp. 200-208; Sırma, 2021, p. 11). Despite facing colonial and imperial pressures, the Sultan endeavored to revive Islamic solidarity globally, guided by Islamic principles and values, emphasizing respect for religious diversity (Aydın, 2014a, p. 52; Kısakürek, 2020, pp. 289-290). Even in contemporary academic studies, it remains challenging to encounter an unbiased portrayal of the Sultan and his policies during the 19th and 20th centuries. The Sultan 's reign was marked by significant domestic and international challenges that threatened the stability and future of the Ottoman Empire. As the European powers vied for control over the Ottoman territories in regions like the Balkans, the Middle East and Africa; the Sultan faced the daunting task of addressing inherited debts, modernizing the administration, and maintaining the empire's integrity (Arı, 2019, pp. 195-207; Eraslan, 2019a, pp. 127-128; Özcan, 2019, pp. 115-126). Against all odds, the Sultan centralized his authority by shifting the governing office from *Bab-ı Ali* to *Yıldız Palace* aiming to strengthen the government's control and preempt potential threats emanating from European powers and Russia and renovated and strengthened military and bureaucracy of the empire (Kızıltoprak, 2011, p. 13; Yasamee, 2011, p. 24). Amidst these challenges, the Sultan faced an additional threat posed by Jewish Zionist movements, primarily based in Europe targeting Bayt al-Maqdis so as to acquire land, and establish a Jewish Zionist state pioneered by Theodore Herzl (Sharif, 1983, pp. 1-5; Vital, 1975, p. 19). The Sultan's policies not only influenced the foreign policies of major

European states but also shaped the future of the Ottoman Empire in terms of its borders and demographic structure (Bostan, 2019, p. 259; Kocabaş, 1995, p. 204). The Sultan (1876-1908) in this respect, residues an important place in the political history of Bayt al-Maqdis (Kısakürek, 2020, p. 5). The Sultan's policy in domestic affairs played a crucial role in strengthening ties and communication with provinces where Jewish Zionists sought to settle and acquire land (Ari, 2019, pp. 195-207; Kocabaş, 1995, p. 331). This instigated countries such as: Britain, Germany, France and Russia to renew their attitudes towards the Ottoman Empire and adjust their policies by sending their Jewish citizens to Bayt al-Maqdis (Buzpinar, 1994, p. 276; Hanioglu, 2008, p. 29; Kocabaş, 1995, p.204). Despite being relatively small in number, Jewish Zionists posed a significant threat to the empire due to their wealth and the support backed by European countries against the status of empire in the Middle East (Buzpinar, 1994, p. 271). However, the Sultan was very well aware of the expansionist and colonialist inclinations of the European powers. Therefore the Sultan did not want to support any country in the world so that a campaign against the empire would be settled towards the empire (İpek, 2002, p. 9; Kodaman, 1989, p. 22). Jewish Zionists' efforts to acquire land and settle in Bayt al-Maqdis using legal and illegal means during the Sultan's reign doubled (Y. PRK. DH. 1894, 7/29/1; Öke, 2021, pp. 38-41; Tellioğlu, 2018, p. 16). Despite their relentless efforts, the Sultan effectively thwarted their attempts to overpopulate the region, recognizing their potential threat for a future Jewish Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis (Erkan, 2015, pp. 105-106; Sharif, 1983, pp. 1-5; Y. PRK. TŞF. 1902, 6/72). However, beside the Jewish Zionist threat to the Ottoman Empire, the Jews residing within the Ottoman Empire enjoyed a stable and respectful relationship with the state from its inception under Osman Bey, the founder of the empire to Sultan Abdühamid II (Gerber, 2008a, p. 32). The Jews without any restriction could hold positions within the government offices. At the time of the Sultan like previous reigns of Sultans, Jews beside Christians and other sects of societies living within the empire could work at important governmental offices such as consultancy, ministry, and translation offices (Akarlı, 1980, p. 47). Besides that, the Sultan did not hesitate to co-work with a Jewish descendant jeweler Monsieur Zarifi in order to conduct his personal savings starting from his prince years to his throne (Çolak, 2007, p. 136; Tahsin Paşa, 2017, p. 16). The Jews found unconditional acceptance and protection within the Ottoman Empire. Upon their immigration, they were granted the

same rights and opportunities in terms of livelihood, trade, and land ownership as other Ottoman citizens (İ. MMS, 1891, 123/5276; Tezcan, 2020, pp. 28-42). These immigrants had no aspirations for settling in Bayt al-Maqdis or establishing a Jewish Zionist state; rather, they were seeking for a place to settle within the empire (Pears, 1917, pp. 205-206; Vital, 1987, p. 15-35). Unlike the Jewish Zionist movement in the late 19th century, they were not posing a threat to the empire and hence they were placed in Anatolia where they were welcomed and granted citizenship with the same rights as the Ottoman citizens had in terms of building their homes and businesses with on generously allocated lands ranging from around 100 to 130 dunams (ŞD. 1879, 2425/8; Tellioglu, 2018, p. 9; Tezcan, 2020, pp. 28-42; Vital, 1975, p. 7; Y. PRK. BŞK. 1882, 6/77). The Empire welcomed immigrant Jews in Aydın, İzmir and surrounding regions (Karaköse, 2004, pp. 48-53). This attitude was not anew for the Ottoman Empire as the empire in the 15th century welcomed the exiled Jews from Spain and assured security within the Ottoman territories as well (Bardakoğlu, 2008, p. 118; Chua, 2007, pp. 170-175; Davey, 2001, p. 394). The exiled Jews found the Ottoman Empire to be a land of freedom and prosperity where they could attain high positions without facing discrimination (Friedman, 1977, p. 20; Güllü, 2020, pp. 56-160; Tezcan, 2020, pp. 28-42). As will be dealt with in the following chapters, the Sultan also conducted the same sheltering policy towards Zionists in the late 19th century as well (Buzpinar, 2002, p. 133; Erkan, 2015, pp. 105-106; İpek, 2002, p. 15; Öke, 2021, p. 76; Tezcan, 2020, pp. 28-42; Y.PRK TŞF, 1902. 6-72). However, while the Sultan and the imperial administration were receptive to exiled Jews from Europe and Russia, they remained vigilant against the Jewish Zionist agenda addressing Bayt al-Maqdis by prohibiting their settlement and land acquisition activities (Buzpinar, 2002, p. 143). While the Sultan extended similar hospitality to the Jews exiled from Europe and Russia, he also imposed measures to counter Zionist threat in Bayt al-Maqdis distinguishing Jews from Jewish Zionists (Erkan, 2015, pp. 105-106; Y.PRK.TŞF, 1902, 6-72). The Sultan neatly differed Jews from Jewish Zionists. As Jewish Zionists were unconditionally seeking ways to settle and purchase land in Bayt al-Maqdis, it was not difficult at first sight to differ Jews from Jewish Zionists. Although the Sultan was well aware of the Jewish Zionist plans, the Sultan did not quit from his tolerant attitude by providing multicultural and multireligious environment for various ethnic and religious groups towards exiled Jews (Gerber, 2008a, p. 32; Gökmen, 2023a, pp. 28-42; 2023b,

pp. 199-212; Özcan, 2019, pp. 115-126; 2012, pp. 7-18). Jews in this regard were not alone to be sheltered and welcomed by the Empire as they were just one of the many ethnic groups seeking for shelter at the time (Bozkurt, 1993, pp. 540-556). As long as these groups remained loyal and did not rebel against the state, The Sultan's administration did not differ them for their religious and national identities. On the contrary, the Sultan afforded them the opportunity to engage in trade, acquire land and property and contribute to the government and welfare of the Empire (Lilienthal, 1982, p. 53; Kocabaş, 2018, pp. 33-41; Polat, 2017, p. 8).

2.2. Bayt al-Maqdis

From the 16th century onwards to the last quarter of the 20th century, Jews lived in peace and harmony with Muslims, Christians, Arabs, and members of other religious groups within the Ottoman Empire (Erdoğan, 1998, pp. 3-8; Landau, 1990, pp. 62-187). The Ottoman Empire was one of the longest-lasting empires in the history of Bayt al-Maqdis contributing to peaceful, inclusive, and tolerant atmosphere within the region by encapsulating varying ethnicities and religions such as Latins, Arabs, Turkomen, Assyrians, Armenians, Coptics, Abyssinians, Rums, Franks, Georgians, Jundis, Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians, and Muslims in itself (Erdoğan, 1998, pp. 68-71). It is essential to regard Bayt al-Maqdis within the context of its component countries, including Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Anatolia (Avcı & Özdemir, 2023, p. 51; Erdoğan, 1998, pp. 68-71; Gül & Gökçen, 2010, pp. 221-222; İnat & Duran, 2020, pp. 6-30). According to an account provided between 1850-1851, it is estimated that the total population of Bayt al-Maqdis was around 340,000 with approximately 300,000 Muslims, 13,000 Jews, and 27,000 Christians. According to Schölch, in 1850, Bayt al-Maqdis had about 350,000 inhabitants, with nearly two-thirds residing in 657 villages and one-third in cities or small towns, and approximately 85 percent of the population being Muslim (Schölch, 2006, pp. 42-284). Christians accounted for 11 percent of the total population, primarily residing in Quds, Bethlehem, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramla, Haifa, Acre, Nazareth, and villages around Bayt al-Maqdis and in Lower and Upper Galilee (Schölch, 2006, pp. 24-26). Interestingly, less than 4 percent of the population were Jews, mainly concentrated in Bayt al-Maqdis, Hebron, Safad, and Tiberias (Schölch, 2006, p. 26). By another account provided between 1907-1908, the population had increased to 645,784 comprised of 544,704

Muslims, 29,753 Jews, and 71,327 Christians (McCarthy, 1990, p. 10). According to Ottoman records dating from 1871-72 Bayt al-Maqdis had a population of 2,393 consisting of 1,025 Muslims, 299 Greek Orthodox, 179 Roman Catholics, 175 Armenians, 18 Greek Catholics, 16 Protestants, 44 Copts, and 630 Jews (S.D.A.O, 1872). Despite variations in reports regarding the demographic structure of Bayt al-Maqdis which do not provide exact figures due to constant changes over time, the region experienced peace, serenity, and security for the past 400 years under the Ottoman rule, reflecting its mosaic demographic composition. During the reign of Yavuz Sultan Selim, from 1517 onwards till 1917 Bayt al-Maqdis had been under Ottoman rule (Ataman & Çaylak, 2024, p. 14; Erdoğan, 1998, p. 10; Yalçın, 2022, p. 474). However, the status of Bayt al-Maqdis as a province had been under the authority of Damascus province, and as of 1842, the region was divided into three districts, which were entitled as Bayt al-Maqdis (Kudus), Gazza, and Jaffa including Nablus (Satış, 2015, p. 546). As of 1856, during the Crimean War, Bayt al-Maqdis was regarded to be under Sayda province (S.D.A.O, 1850, p. 85-86). In 1871, the Ottoman Empire divided the 'Holy Lands' into two administrative units to strengthen governance, extend authority, and mitigate potential European threats and rebellions in the region, therefore directly bounded the region to İstanbul (El-Awaisi, 2019b, pp. 399- 401; Satış, 2015, p. 547). The northern part encompassing Nablus and Acre fell under the jurisdiction of the province of Damascus and later Beirut. The southern part evolved into the district of Bayt al-Maqdis. In the study, unless otherwise stated, Bayt al-Maqdis as a region and entity refers to Palestine, Kudus, Quds, Jerusalem and Islamicjerusalem terminologies (Bussow, 2011, p. 5). Subsequent administrative restructuring further solidified empires' governance in Bayt al-Maqdis (Bostancı, 2006, p. 44; Öztuna, 1989, p. 36). Geographically, the Middle East with its crescent-like shape extending from the Persian Gulf through Mesopotamia, Jordan, and Bayt al-Maqdis to Lower Egypt, has been considered to be the cradle of civilization hosting diverse civilizations and serving as a pivotal hub in the world (Akarlı, 1976, p. 12; Akbaş, 2011, p. 27; Breatty, 1971, p. 3; Davutoğlu, 2001, pp. 323-338; El-Awaisi & Yavuz, 2020, p. 216; Erdoğan, 1998, pp. 7- 8). It has been widely believed that dominance over the fertile crescent line equates to control over world civilizations (Akarlı, 1976, p. 12; Kaygısız, 2014, p. 1; Özey, 1996, p. 2). Moving from this premise, Bayt al-Maqdis maintains its significant position as the center of the crescent line within

the Middle East historically revered by followers of major religions (Akbaş, Babahanoğlu & Çaylı, 2016, p. 87; Çakmak, 2020, p.195; Erdoğan, 1998, pp. 7-8). Beyond its religious significance, the region is situated at the crossroads of vital trade routes from Europe to India. This was the motivation fostered by Britain in showing its interest towards the region (Akarlı, 1976, p. 12). Consequently, the status of Bayt al-Maqdis has remained pivotal in shaping global politics and trade from the 20th century onwards (Okumuş, 2016, p. 3). Despite the changes in rulership and ongoing transformation within the region, the sacredness of Bayt al-Maqdis persists to this day, symbolizing the coexistence of three major religions: Islam, Judaism, and Christianity (Çakmak, 2020, p. 195; Yalçın, 2022, p. 474). Bayt al-Maqdis residues an important place for Muslims in terms of its cultural, social and political importance for adherents of all three faiths (Armstrong, 1997, pp. 5-6). Therefore, Bayt al- Maqdis represents hope for the people worldwide. The region is unique in terms of its historical background and encompasses varying faiths and cultures combining past, present, and future generations in itself (Said, 1979, p. 7). The location of Bayt al-Maqdis with its varying cultures and people serves as a model for multiculturalism (El-Awaisi 2007, p. 60). Bayt al-Maqdis is the center of universe whose borders represent peaceful coexistence for all the people regardless of their faiths (Yalçın, 2022, p. 474). This inclusive attitude finds its foundation in Islam and embodies its principles (Erdoğan, 1998, p. 47). Therefore, Muslims demonstrate tolerance as well as respect towards both Muslims and non-Muslims which was the main motivation of the Ottoman Empire from the first day of its establishment to the last day (Kalin, 2018b, pp. 158-163; Tezcan, 2020, pp. 28-42), based on the teachings of the Qur'an (Surah Al-Mumtahanah 60/ 8). Sultan's tolerant and peaceful attitude towards non-Muslims was also approved by a British and French authorities at the time whose gladness were mirrored to the publications at the time (Y. PRK. TKM. 1883, 5/58; Y. PRK. TKM. 1880, 3/9). The tolerance the Sultan employed was based on this premise. The Empire has maintained a tolerant coexistent atmosphere throughout its history within its borders (Ataman, 2003, p. 94; Gül & Gökçen, 2010, pp. 221-222; Pears, 1917, pp. 205-206). Therefore, Bayt al-Maqdis residues an essential place for Islam on four pillars: firstly, it is the place where the last Prophet Muhammed Mustafa ascended to heaven; secondly, it is the first qibla of Islam; and thirdly, it is a place where one of the four big angels Israfil will blow his horn twice one of which is believed to be on Domesday and the other for

resurrection of human race on earth again (Akçin, 2024, p. 205; Ataman & Çaylak, 2024, p. 14; Sabri, 2020, p. 13; Yari & Masroor, 2024, p.76). The first horn, believed to be echoed from the region, would signal the end of the world by which there would be no living being left in the world; the second horn, as again believed to be echoed from the region as well, signaling the resurrection of the people on earth for gathering together in Bayt al-Maqdis for the last judgement according to Islamic jurisprudence (Quran, 17:1; Quran, 50: 41-42; Sabri, 2020, pp. 13). Forthly, the region is esteemed for hosting numerous prophets including Abraham Moses, and Jesus, making it symbolically rich in Islamic jurisprudence (El-Awaisi & Yavuz, 2020, p. 216; Erdoğan, 1998, p. 8; Mustafa, 2015a, p. 15). Therefore, the region for Muslims is not only the symbol of power, authority, and might; but it is also the symbol of resurrection where the divine judge is believed to be settled in for the deeds people did on earth during their lifetime. This dual importance of the region was another motivation for the empire to preserve its sanctity for varying people by settling secured, just, and peaceful living conditions for the people of the world till the Domesday. Therefore, from the first Ottoman caliph Yavuz Sultan Selim to the last caliph Sultan Abdülhamid II, the empire did not quit fostering peace, security, and equality for the people living under Ottoman authority, including those people who were seeking for shelter (Buzpınar, 2016, p.17, 141; Çolak, 2007, p. 68; Erdoğan, 1998, pp. 3-11; Yavuz, 1987, pp. 27-28). Bayt al-Maqdis, metaphorically considered to be the center of the world and the source of hope that would emerge from and disseminate to the entire world second to Kaba (Abu-Munshar, 2007, p. 5; Armstrong, 1997, p. 9; Brooman, 1989, p. 1; El-Awaisi, 2015, p. 15). Bayt al-Maqdis in this regard is the epicenter of change in the world, directly or indirectly affecting countries and nations globally (El-Awaisi, 2015, pp. 15-21; 2007, pp. 11-41). Bayt al-Maqdis in its simplest form has the boundaries of a small entity but problems of the continent due to its sacredness and history (Koestler, 1949, p. 196). Bayt al-Maqdis, with its religious connotations and historical significance serves as a common ground for three major faiths (Krämer, 2018, p. 13). It holds immense importance for Christians symbolizing hope and salvation as Jesus's birthplace and the site of his suffering and anticipated return (Hopwood & Phil, 1975, p. 394; Mazza, 2009, p. 78). Similarly, for the Jews, Bayt al-Maqdis is regarded to be their promised land (*Arz-ı Mev'ud*) making them perceive as the natural heirs of the region (Krämer, 2018, p. 13). According to British accounts, Bayt al-

Maqdis's boundaries extend from Lebanon in the north to the Red Sea in the south, from the Mediterranean Sea in the West to the Syrian desert in the East (Mustafa, 2015, p. 15). Traveler Alexander Aaronshon underscores the historical and spiritual beauty of Bayt al-Maqdis attributing its allure to figures like Abraham and Moses whose presence imbued the region with symbolic significance (Aaronsohn, 2019, p. xi). Due to its sacredness for three divine religions, the history of the region had been full of wars, destruction, and massacres (Brooman, 1989, pp. 1-2). The region not only witnessed significant wars but also experienced one of the most notable rebellions led by an Ottoman governor who sought independence during the Eastern Crisis incited by the Egyptian Governor Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Pasha and his son İbrahim Pasha (Gümüş, 2009, p. 29; Ünlü, 2024, p. 63; Yasamee, 2023, p. 21). The region was garnered attention by powerful countries due to its religious significance and its strategic position sitting at the crossroads of colonization activities of the late 19th century starting by Sultan Mahmut II who also fostered inclusivity towards various ethnic and religious groups such as Ottoman Christians, Jews, Armenians, Coptics, Arabs, and Kurds (Ataman, 2003, p. 96). The varying nationalities represented in Bayt al-Maqdis caused many countries to use religion and their followers as a means to interfere with Ottoman domestic affairs. For European countries, the ideal means to enforce their visibility and presence in the region were to use non-Muslims and provoke them against the empire. Their purported aim of safeguarding minorities often served as a pretext for meddling in Ottoman domestic and foreign affairs. In this regard, Kavalalı served as an important instrument for foreign countries in increasing their authority within the region. Therefore, European countries, in order to preserve their status and position within Bayt al-Maqdis supported Kavalalı as he was the first authority within the region that enabled foreign countries to open their consulates and official representatives. By opening consulates in the region, European powers sought to closely monitor developments in the region and exert influence, utilizing the sympathy of minorities to legitimize their interference in Ottoman politics (Dickson to O'Conor, 21.10.1898; 195/2028, 408; Finn to Russell, 1862, Pro; Fo, 78/1692, 218; Öke, 1980, p. 372). However, against odds, Britain after opening its consulate was not content with other countries' increasing influence in the region as well. As Britain saw Russia and French as its rival countries threatening its colonies in India gave full support to Ottoman Empire in dethroning Kavalalı in Bayt al-Maqdis in order to preserve the welfare of the

region on behalf of Britain without posing change in terms of its already gained political and demographic status in the region (Kocaoğlu, 1995, pp. 202-204; Öke, 1983, p. 32).

2.3. Anti-Judaism in Europe

The plight of the Jews after the Hadrianic and Babylonian exiles from Bayt al-Maqdis during 132-135 CE was a tragic reality. However their plight did not end with that but unfortunately continued in Europe as well. Increasing hostility toward Jews in Eastern Europe in the early 19th century led their inability to lead peaceful lives caused many of them to change their living residences (Öke, 2021, pp. 34-35; Pulzer, 1964, pp. 71-77; Stoltheim, 1927, p. 63; Yakira, 2010, pp. 33-308). The insecurity faced by the Jews in Eastern Europe during the late 19th century served to the the interests of both Jewish Zionists and European leaders as many wealthy Jews sought refuge and settlement elsewhere from Europe (Stoltheim, 1927, pp. 200-201). As the Jewish population was increasing very fastly at the time in Europe and the Jews were gathering power and authority within the region in terms of economically and politically each day due to their wealth, they were regarded as a threat posing danger for the future of Europe (Baron, 1938, pp. 51-65). That was the main motivation for anti-Judaism in Europe. However, while the Jews were facing exiles and execution in Europe, the European leaders and Jewish Zionist leaders were getting on well (Herzl, 1960, p. 10). Jewish Zionists were content with anti-judaist attitude and expulsion of the Jews from Europe was strengthening Jewish Zionist community who were desperately seeking ways to increase their number and wealth by new Jewish Zionists who were willing to settle and buy land in Bayt al-Maqdis. The head of the Jewish Zionist organization and founder of Political Zionism, Dr. Theodor Herzl was content with anti-Jewish sentiment in Eastern Europe and regarded it as a chance for Jewish Zionists to enhance their solidarity and unification in Bayt al-Maqdis (Bozkurt, 2021a, p. 195; Herzl, 1960, p.10; Tezcan, 2024, p. 166). Herzl affirms this as follows: “The anti-Semites will become our most dependable friends, the anti-Semitic countries our allies. We want to emigrate as respected people” (Herzl, 1960, p. 84). In this regard, Herzl’s remarks approve the organic bound between Jewish Zionism, anti-Semitism and pogroms. As is well and openly stated by Herzl, the Jewish Zionists aimed to encourage Jews to settle in Bayt al-Maqdis and alter their demographic status in favor of Jews by engraving the seeds of a future state in the region

(Ben-Artzi, 1997, pp. 16-64; Penslar, 1991, pp. 128-129; Sharif, 1983, pp. 1-5). As a part of this distrust against Jews in Europe, living and trading conditions for Jews were getting worser each day and their ability to carry out daily activities were under threat (Berger, 1971, pp. 57-62; Gökmen, 2023a, pp. 32-33; Rotenstreich, 2007, pp. 53-96). The increasing insecurity experienced by Jews both in Eastern and Western Europe exacerbated their situation (Laqueur, 1971, pp. 161-168; Lazare, 1983, pp. 109-112). However, Ottoman empire was one of the few countries the Jews could find peace and stability devoid of any discrimination and degradation towards their presence. During the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, the exiled Jews from Europe and Russia could find a place to settle in secured conditions in the 20th century (Akarlı, 1986, p. 77; Gökmen, 2023a, pp. 29-41; İnalcık, 1982, p. 438; Yasamee, 2011, p. 28). Since the Sultan permitted the settlement of exiled Jews in Anatolia, it would be unfair to regard the Sultan to be an anti-Semitic as his restrictions were limited to Jewish Zionists who were trying to settle in Bayt al-Maqdis (Barın, 2014, p. 209). For instance in 1892 the empire upon signing a bilateral agreement consented Emil Frank and his friends to buy lands Lebanon and Syria except in Bayt al-Maqdis (Y. PRK. DH. 1892, 5/63/1). The Jews and even Jewish Zionists were welcomed to settle within other provinces of the Ottoman Empire other than Bayt al-Maqdis such as in Anatolia. The approval of this attitude could be observed by Ottoman policy towards the dhimmis (non-Muslims) who were already living in peace and serenity under the Ottoman Empire. This was not started with Ottoman empire, the dhimmis (non-Muslims) had been enjoying reasonable and comfortable lives from the time of Umar Ibn al-Khattab to Salah al-Din Ayyubi, Yavuz Sultan Selim till the Sultan (Çakmak, 2020, pp. xvii-xix; Erdoğan, 1998, pp. 3-11; Gökmen, 2023a, pp. 28-42; Yavuz, 1987, pp. 27-28). However, the Sultan was the last resort where varying nationalities and religious groups found peace and security in Bayt al-Maqdis. It is also equally important to state that anti-Judaism was a European concept that found little support among Ottoman citizens irrespective of their nationality or religion (Shaw, 1990, pp. 1073-1074). Therefore, during Sultan's reign anti-semitism could not find a ground to emerge within the empire. However, Jewish Zionist initiations to unite and shelter Jews of the world in Bayt al-Maqdis were observed by the Sultan. However, due to already peaceful conditions provided by the empire and as the the Ottoman Jews were already living the idealized life proposed by Jewish Zionists, Jewish Zionists could not even find support by Ottoman

Jews. This reality on the ground enable the Sultan to differentiate Jews from Jewish Zionists. As for Ottoman Jews, Bayt al-Maqdis was equally important but that did not cause them to buy land or settle in the region as they were without any restriction could visit the region and do their worshippings.

2.4. The Christian Zionism

The resettlement of Jewish Zionists in Bayt al-Maqdis and their desire to return to the land traces back to the time of Hadrian's expulsion during which Jews sought avenues to reclaim Bayt al-Maqdis, rebuild the first Temple, and establish their state (Schölch, 2006, p. 54). The origins of Jewish Zionism can be traced back to Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) who encouraged Jews during his expedition to Egypt to suggested Jews to settle in Bayt al-Maqdis or its neighboring regions (Alam, 2009; Cole, 2007; El-Awaisi, 2019a). However, it's important to note that Jewish Zionism was distinct from Judaism as Zionism is a political movement and should not be conflated with Judaism (Herzl, 1896, pp. 7-12). Even before the emergence of Jewish Zionism, British missionaries were actively involved in promoting Zionist ideals in Bayt al-Maqdis (El-Awaisi, 2019a, p. 14). The London Church Missionary Society in this regard founded its first school in Bayt al-Maqdis in 1839 and opened its second school in Jaffa as of 1844 (Erkan, 2015, p. 51; Nizâmât Defterleri, 10, pp. 29-30). These missionary efforts continued until 1870 with the establishment of additional schools aimed to cultivate Zionist sentiments in the region. It's important to note that Zionism predates Herzl, as evidenced by Sir Oliphant's direct invitation to Jews around the world to settle in Bayt al-Maqdis which indicates that the movement existed prior to Herzl and was not exclusive sponsored by the Jews (Ör, 2012, p. 29). Therefore, it is important to see the holistic picture that long before the emergence of Jewish Zionism, Christians of Europe were targeting to exempt Europe from Jewish presence by finding them a place where they would not be motivated to turn back to Europe again (El-Awaisi, 2019a, pp. 14-16; RES. 5/58, 1881). In this regard, Bayt al-Maqdis was an unquestionable region for Jews from where they would not feel a need to turn back to Europe. In this regard, it is important to stress the importance of Christian Zionism in terms of preparing the Jewish generation and reviving their interest towards Bayt al-Maqdis. This was pioneered by France dating back to Napeleon Bonaparte to British Missonary schools but enlarged by Russia,

Germany and later on by USA (El-Awaisi, 2019a, pp. 15-18). They held influential position in sponsoring colonial expeditions beside their involvement in trade among the countries. This in itself provided Jews significant political, economic, and social space to increase their wealth and status in Europe (Tellioglu, 2018, p. 27). Jews' not having a specific nation or a country for a long time since time of Eretz Israel was in this regard an important motivation nurturing Zionist discourse and its expansion worldwide (Bartal, 2002; Dawidowicz, 1982, pp. 3-98; El-Awaisi, 2019a, pp. 13-26; Miano, 2004, pp. 126-147; Sharif, 1983, p. 51). By instigating interest towards Bayt al-Maqdis among Jews and non-Jews alike, Christian Zionists contributed to the growth and spread of Zionism in Europe (El-Awaisi 2019, pp. 13-26). Their actions often in collaboration with European colonial powers had a profound impact on the political landscape of Bayt al-Maqdis and in a broader frame to the Middle East region (McCarthy, 2002, p. 857). Concrete movement of this ideology came out by Sir Moses Montefiore (as British) who played a pivotal role as a Christian Zionist in legitimizing Zionism and laying the groundwork for the emergence of Jewish Zionism, particularly in Europe by proposing a map to the Ottoman Empire for resettling the Jews to Bayt al-Maqdis during the reign of Sultan Abdülmecid (Perry, 2003, pp. 27-31; Wolf, 1919, pp. 105-107). Additionally, Churchill as one of the pioneers of Christian Zionists with a letter addressing to Sir Montefiore declared his open full support and willingness for the Jews of Britain and Europe to settle in Bayt al-Maqdis and surrounding regions by convincing Ottoman Empire for an autonomous state under British protectorate (El-Awaisi, 2019a, pp. 19-20; Wolf, 1919, pp. 121-122). In this regard, Britain could be regarded to be the forerunner of Christian Zionist who missioned to return the Jews of Europe to Bayt al- Maqdis back and purify Europe from Jewish presence (Laqueur, 1972, pp. 42-43). The support provided by the British Empire to Zionists, particularly in the late 19th and early 20th centuries shed light on Herzl's objectives. One possible explanation was rooted in geopolitical interests, specifically regarding British colonial ambitions and the strategic importance of securing trade routes to India (Buzpinar, 2016, pp. 406-407). By establishing a Jewish satellite state in Bayt al-Maqdis, the British Empire addressed multiple concerns. Firstly, it aimed to alleviate domestic pressures instigated by a growing Jewish population in Britain some of whom were becoming increasingly affluent. Secondly, such a state could serve as a buffer zone or ally in the region enhancing British influence and safeguarding trade routes

to India. Thirdly, increasing Jewish wealth and authority in Europe would be prevented and Europe would be purified from their increasing population. As for Britain, it was important to leave a trustable folk in the Middle East who would serve to British interest and ally with Britain (El-Awaisi, 2019a, pp. 14). Therefore, Christian Zionism with its longer history and widespread support among Christians played a significant role in laying the framework of Jewish Zionism. Another motivation was to develop their colonial ties to Middle East (El-Awaisi, 2019a, pp.13-26). In essence, the support for Zionism from the British Empire could be seen as a convergence of geopolitical strategy, colonial ambitions, and the long-standing tradition of Christian Zionism (Bar-Yosef, 2003, pp.18-44). Understanding these dynamics were essential for grasping the broader context in which Herzl's Zionist movement emerged and gained traction. Zionism in its origin did not start with Jewish aspiration but on the contrary started for the Jews by Christians and in other words 'Christian Zionists' so as to purify European continent from increasing population and wealth of the Jews (Merkley, 2007; Miano, 2004, pp. 126-47; Wolf, 1919, p. 121-123). Churchill declares this in a letter to Montefiore quite frankly by giving open support to immigration of Jews from Britain and Europe to Bayt al-Maqdis (Wolf, 1919, pp. 121-123). With that, Christians just like Churchill aimed to fulfill two dreams: the first one was to rescue Europe from the Jews as their population was increasing very fastly, and the second one was to establish a state for Jews in Bayt al-Maqdis (Bar-Yosef, 2003, 18-44; Baron, 1938, pp. 51-65; El- Awaisi, 2019a, pp. 13-26). Indeed, another significant factor driving Christian Zionism was the belief among Evangelicals that the establishment of a Jewish state in Bayt al-Maqdis was a prerequisite for the return of the Messiah to the earth (Pieterse, 1991, pp. 75-103; Tellioglu, 2018, p. 29). This theological conviction fueled support for Zionism among Evangelical Christians who saw the fulfillment of biblical prophecy in the Zionist movement (El-Awaisi, 2019a, pp. 13-26; McTague, 1982, pp. 100-112; Pieterse, 1991, pp. 75-103). Furthermore, the London Jewish Society played a pivotal role in supporting Zionism, in terms of converting Jews to Christianity. Through initiatives like the Palestine Fund established in 1825, the society provided assistance to Jewish immigrants seeking to settle in Bayt al-Maqdis viewing it as their ancestral homeland (Buzpinar, 2003, pp. 107-120; Sokolow, 1999; ŞD, 1896, 2286 / 26; Şener, 2024, p. 192). Thus, Christian Zionism was not only driven by geopolitical interests but also by religious convictions as well, particularly the

belief in the fulfillment of biblical prophecy through the return of the Jews to their ancestral land (Maccoby, 2006; Merkley, 2007; Miano, 2004, pp. 126-147; Popkin, 1988). Originating from the London Jewish Society founded by Friedrich Frey in 1809, The London Missionary Society aimed to introduce Christianity to Jews and contributed to the broader Christian Zionist movement (Perry, 2003, p. 13). The first foundation of the school was laid in 1840 by this organization with the help of Christ Church from which onwards, schools for women and men, hospitals, trade centers, and libraries followed to be founded in Bayt al-Maqdis (Öke, 2021, p. 83). The London Jewish Society's support for Zionism underscores the complex interplay between religious ideology and political agendas in shaping the Zionist movement (El- Awaisi, 2019a, p. 13). This aspiration found support and encouragement from Christian Zionists who invested in community services, religious institutions, and schools to pave the way for future Jewish settlement in Bayt al-Maqdis (Schölch, 2006, p. 54). In this respect, Christian Zionists played a pivotal role in establishing key institutions for Jews in al-Maqdis, such as the Jewish Community and the London Missionary Association in 1840. They also spearheaded the creation of an Anglican Church (Christ Church) in Bayt al-Maqdis and established schools, hospitals, caravansaries, and libraries for the Jewish community (Öke, 1982, p. 62). The conversion of Jews to Christianity was shared by some Christian Zionists. With that, they supported the idea that with the teachings and advice of Christianity, Jews would not constitute a threat to Europe. Although this was not explicitly stated, it was an idea that was put forward to deal with the Jewish population by Christian Zionists.

2.5. The Jewish Zionism

Jewish Zionism, according to Zionists embodies the ideological aspiration to 'return' and 'gather together' the Jewish community from diverse locations worldwide in Bayt al-Maqdis under the shelter of a Jewish Zionist state (Erkan, 2015, p. 100). In its simplest form, the Jewish Zionism embodies the aspiration for 'reunification of the Jews scattered around the world' who sought to return to Bayt al-Maqdis which was deemed 'divine' and designated by God for their exclusive use (Schölch, 2006, p. 54). However, inherited by Christian Zionists, Jewish Zionists composed of Jews pioneered by Dr. Theodore Herzl missioned to coordinate scattered Jews around the world, create new

national identity for them by instigating Jewish consciousness towards Bayt al-Maqdis (Bar-Yosef, 2005, pp. 187-188). Dr. Herzl, founder of Jewish Zionism, was born in 1860 coming from a Jewish descendent middle-class family in Hungary. Herzl gained his Ph.D degree from the University of Vienna in Austria, specializing in Rome Law in 1884 and had for a short period of time worked as a lawyer and produced literary manuscripts such as short stories, plays and political articles (Ataş, 2024, p. 38; Bein, 1941, p. 24; Garaudy, 2017, p. 14; Öke, 2021, p. 55; Polat, 2017). Herzl later started working at one of the famous daily newspaper headquartered in Vienna entitled *Neue Freie Presse* as a Paris representative in France, where he got opportunity to observe the status Jewish pogroms during his stay (Öke, 2032, p. 53). The initiatives of Herzl and his companions included political, economic, social, and academic studies by promoting Zionism and its 'rightful' activities and future plans. Another motivation of Zionism that triggered Herzl's interest in Jewish place in Europe was the Dreyfus affair in France where Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish lieutenant was found guilty by a trial for espionage activities despite insufficient evidence convicting him of treason (Ataş, 2024, p. 38; Herzl, 1960, p. 1702; Ör, 2012, p. 73). This event allowed Herzl to observe the prevalent anti-Semitic attitudes towards Jews in Europe during the late 19th century. In this regard Dreyfus trials served as a ground and motivation for Herzl to further reforms and unification of Jewish race in the world as the Jews were already alienated from the society they were living in Europe (Ataş, 2024, p. 38; Herzl, 1960, p. 615). Moreover, Dreyfus's trial served as a significant motivation and catalyst for Herzl in inspiring his ideas about seeking a separate and independent entity for Jews in Bayt al-Maqdis (Ataş, 2024, p. 38; Ör, 2012, pp. 73-102). Even prior to the Dreyfus trial, Herzl and his followers harbored sympathy and sentimental feelings towards the unification of Jews worldwide in Bayt al-Maqdis (Ataş, 2024, p. 38). However, the Dreyfus affair served as the basis for Herzl and his followers and strengthen their determination to settle Jews of the world starting from Europe to Bayt al-Maqdis of which never stopped even after Herzl (Visson, 1944, p. 122). To solidify his perspective towards Zionism, Herzl aimed to get support from wealthy Jews, including Baron Maurice de Hirsch and Baron Edmond Rothschild (Ör, 2012, pp. 121-122). However, he could not get the support he was expecting from them (Herzl, 1960, pp. 24,44). In this respect, it was not an easy task for Herzl to convince Jewish to become Jewish Zionists. (Mendes & Reinartz, 1995, p. 540). Therefore, Herzl fostered the idea that 'every Jew

should consider himself as participant in the Exodus from Egypt' parallels the concept that every Jew should view themselves as partaking in the forthcoming national renewal (Sachar, 1976, p. 51). This notion in its basic form codified the seeds of national identity for the Jews worldwide who were desperately seeking for a call for unification and pronounce their status and presence. Herzl's call in this regard met with their devine expectations and the European expulsions and Russian pogroms also nurtured and nourished their national sentiments as they were expelled from Europe and Russia by major force leaving them no other ground and served as a significant codification of Jewish identity, redirecting them towards Bayt al-Maqdis. The revival of Jewish nationality as the primary motivation of Jewish Zionism, tracing back to exiled Jews during the Babylonian kingdom in 586 B.C with this new call and wave would upside down the history (Olson, 2013, p. 150; Simon, 1918, p. 16). This core motivation distinguishes Jewish Zionism from philanthropic endeavors (Simon, 1918, p. 16). In this regad, in its simplest form, the Jewish Zionist ideology aimed to revive a Jewish state through the Jews around the world located in Bayt al-Maqdis (Herzl, 1896, pp. 6-7; Kutluay, 2013, p. 27; Laqueur, 2003). Herzl in this regard could be regarded as the forerunner for uniting the Jews across the world actively on the ground in Bayt al-Maqdis. Although in its ideological terms this was long before him thought and practiced by Christian Zionists, it was by him and during his time that Jewish Zionists could have the wave behind them and actively produce policies and plans for resettling the Jews around the world in Bayt al-Maqdis under the shelter of Jewish Zionism (Netanyahu, 2012, p. 86). Dr. Herzl and his companions in order to unify the Jews around the world in Bayt al-Maqdis fostered religious aspirations by prioritising Jewishness. Moreover, in order to achieve this unification, Jewish Zionists laid the political, economic, social and academic ground for Jews acquiring the support of Jews and Christians towards their cause (Kornberg, 1980, pp. 226-249). Jewish Zionism transcends religious, political-ideological movement originating from Eastern Europe and spearheaded by Jews residing in suburban areas towards the end of the 19th century (Elmessiri, 1977, pp. 1-84). Herzl in this regard emphasized the significance of Bayt al-Maqdis for Jews proposing its religious and geopolitical significance for the Jews worldwide (Altuncu, 2024, p. 108; Herzl, 1960, p. 183). Herzl envisioned Bayt al-Maqdis as the natural and rightful heir for the Jewish community where they could establish their own sovereign state and achieve

self-determination (Herzl, 1896, pp. 6-7). This vision of founding a Jewish state in Bayt al-Maqdis served as a rallying point for Jewish Zionists, inspiring them to act on the ground by economic, political and diplomatic efforts. Therefore in order to be strong and powerful in terms of financial, political and social affairs, Herzl fostered proposing national identity for the Jews (Herzl, 1989, p. 156). Creating of a new national identity for the Jews was important and necessity for uniting the Jews of the world under Jewish Zionism. Meanwhile, Herzl engraved the seeds of Jewish Zionism as a national identity for the Jews to get united in Bayt al-Maqdis and establish an independent entity composed and governed by the Jews. However, as the Jews were used to living in Europe and if not most but many of them could live a decent life; many of them were hesitant towards Herzl's call although at first sight the idea was instigating their interest. The Jewish Zionism movement, largely led by secular Jews was initiated as a response and nurtured by anti-Judaism in Eastern Europe and Russian pogroms (Aronson, 1990, pp. 3-5; Elmessiri, 1977, p. 72; Laqueur, 1971, pp. 178-180). Mustafa, 2015a, p. 17). Emerging as an offshoot of modern nationalism, Jewish Zionism originated as a reaction to assimilationist pressures and anti-Judaic sentiments towards Jews in Europe fueled by anti-Semitic attitudes (Öke, 1982, p. 23; 2021, p. 76; Rabinovich, 2008, p. 1). This movement could be seen as a collective response to anti-Judaism in Europe and Russia, motivating Jews to get united and seek refuge (Öke, 1982, p. 23., 2021, p. 76; Laqueur, 1971, p. 168; Rabinovich, 2008, p. 1). The emancipation of Jews in Europe presented an opportunity for Jewish unity in Bayt al-Maqdis (Al-Tabari, 1987, p. 45; Laqueur, 1971, p.177; Umar, 2002, p. 422). As divine inspiration waned, the prospect of uniting Jews worldwide and returning to Bayt al-Maqdis became a more feasible and legitimate ideal. Furthermore, Herzl's vision provided a beacon of hope for the Jews who were expelled from European countries and Russia. While emancipation itself was a challenging ordeal, it motivated Jews to 'return' to Bayt al-Maqdis (Vital, 1975, p. 9). For Herzl, the Jewish problem was a consequence of European anti-Semitism (Öke, 2021, p. 53). Emancipation enabled Jews to transcend their insular existence in Europe, where they lived a primarily prayerful and tribal life, toward the dream of establishing a presence in Bayt al-Maqdis (Vital, 1975, pp. 123-210). Although Elmessiri and Vital share similar perspectives on Jews and their status in Europe, Vital contends that emancipation facilitated Jewish integration into the wider world (Elmessiri, 1977, pp. 4-210; Vital, 1975, pp. 123-210).

Jewish Zionism was a political ideology shaped by the socioeconomic realities of Europe, where Jews endured segregation in suburbs, ghettos, and harsh living conditions until the 19th century (Kalin, 2018a, p. 421). Consequently, this ideology attracted individuals from various backgrounds, including general, socialist, religious, and revisionist movements (Elmessiri, 1977, pp. 1-98). To achieve this goal, the World Zionist Organization, pioneered by Herzl coordinated networking activities to arouse interest and gather the attention of scattered Jews worldwide. While the gathering of the Jews around the world at a congress was considered a success, the failure to establish a state in Bayt al-Maqdis represented a failure on behalf of Jewish Zionists (Erkan, 2015, p. 101; Herzl, 1960, p. 1599). According to Olson, Jewish Zionism transcends mere application of Judaism; it represents a political unification of Jews in Bayt al-Maqdis (Olson, 2013, pp. 146-258). This viewpoint was echoed by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379, which defined Jewish Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination on 10 November 1975 (Aral, 2018, pp. 46-67). In order to unite Jewish Zionists, a congress was held in Basel to plan and discuss the future of Jewish Zionism (Ataş, 2024, p. 39; HR.TH. 1898, 218/122). The Basel Congress, held in Switzerland on 27 August 1897 laid the foundation of the World Zionist Organization sponsored by the Jewish National Fund in conducting political, organizational, and economic affairs for Jewish settlement in Bayt al-Maqdis (Ataş, 2024, p. 39; Kamel, 2015, p. 81; Öke, 2021, p. 58; Vital, 1975, p. 351). Under the leadership of Herzl, Jewish Zionists convened to develop policies and practical measures for the establishment of a Jewish Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis for discussing future settlement and land acquisition policies as a roadmap for the Jewish Zionist movement ranging from varying sects of the society such as Ashkenazi Jews from the West, Sephardic Jews from the East, retired members of the Lovers of Zion, students, tradesmen and socialist revolutioners of the Jews all around the world in Basel (HR. SYS. 1897, 1776/13; Öke, 2021, p. 57). Their primary goal was to convince the Sultan for their settlement activities addressing to Bayt al-Maqdis (Kamel, 2015, p. 81). At the Basel Congress, the articles proposed by Herzl were adopted after challenging discussions (Öke, 2021, p. 60). The Congress called for a series of actions that combined the established activities of Hovevei Zion with innovative elements (Vital, 1975, p. 352). The headlines of the resolutions adopted at the Congress were as follows: (a) the promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonization of Bayt al-Maqdis by Jewish

agricultural and industrial workers, (b) the organization and binding together of the entire Jewry through appropriate institutions, both local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country, (c) the strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment, consciousness, and Jewish education, (d) a telegraph link with Bayt al-Maqdis was established in June 1865, and one with Jaffa as early as August 1864 (Herzl, 1989, p. 156). The Basel Program proposed by Herzl was adopted by the Congress after a heated debate and called for a series of measures that combined the established activities of Hovevei Zion (Chibbath Zion, Zion Lovers) with innovative elements (Öke, 2021, p. 61; Vital, 1975, p. 354). Hovevei Zion was sponsored by wealthy Jewish Zionists, including Baron Rothschild, which eventually enabled the founding of the Jewish National Fund by the World Zionist Organization in 1900 (Kaygısız, 2014, p. 68). At the end of the congress, Herzl expressed his satisfaction and summarized his contentment with the congress and its resolutions (Shapira, 1999, p. 19). For Herzl, the Basel Congress was the first and most significant event shaping the future of Jewish Zionism providing a roadmap for Jewish Zionists (Vital, 1975, p. 355). Organizing a congress that brought together Jews from around the world was a revolutionary achievement with approximately gathering 200 to 250 attendees from 24 countries and regions (Vital, 1975, p. 356). For many attendees, the congress ignited a candle of hope, as no concrete steps had been taken since Hadrian's expulsion (Shapira, 1999, p. 19). The congress itself, and the overall sentiment of the participants was deemed a great success and promising for Jewish Zionists (Herzl, 1960, p. 581; Öke, 2021, p. 61). At the time, the Sultan was closely monitoring Herzl's activities and those of the Jewish Zionists, and was well-informed about their thoughts, plans, and goals for establishing a Jewish Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis (Öke, 1982, p. 66; 2021, pp. 88-106).

2.6. The Differences Between Jewish Zionism and Judaism

It was crucial to distinguish between Jewish Zionism and Judaism as they had distinct aims corresponding to different identities (Laqueur, 1971, pp. 177-180). While Jewish Zionism corresponded to a political, ideological movement aiming to re-settle the Jews around the world in Bayt al-Maqdis, this ideology was not shared by all the Jews at the time since there were some Jews who were critical of Herzl and his project, such as Samuel Saadi Halevy who was the editor of *La epoka* and *Journal of Salonique* as of 1898

(Eisen, 2014, p. 180; Laqueur, 1971, pp. 161-182; Tezcan, 2024, pp. 160-161). Therefore, Jewish Zionism was a reductionist and misleading unification of the Jews not representing all the Jews at the time since as is already stated, there were Jews who were not supporting Jewish Zionism at the time (Laqueur, 1971, pp. 178-179). For instance, Jews living within the Ottoman Empire and the U.S. were not in favor of Jewish Zionism for several reasons at the initial phase of emerging Jewish Zionism (Başaran, 2016, pp.75-86). Additionally, some felt that there was no need for Jewish Zionism because Jews could already visit and perform their pilgrimages to Bayt al-Maqdis without any restrictions; hence, establishing a Jewish Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis might hinder this on going practice and provoke the Ottoman Empir for fostering possible restrictions for the Jews and their visits to Bayt al-Maqdis (Sham region) (Dawidowicz, 1982; Glazer, 1972; Kocabaş, 1995, 2018; Öke, 2021). Mahatma Gandhi also rejected the association between Judaism and Jewish Zionism, asserting that religious acts cannot be achieved politically (Tendulkar, 1961, p. 314). Mustafa Cevat concurred with Gandhi's stance, arguing that Jewish Zionism transcends religious boundaries to become a nationality-based ideological movement (Mustafa, 2015a, p. 18). Herzl's vision of Jewish Zionism aimed to fulfill what he perceived as the Jewish people's destiny, granted to them by God, through a return to Bayt al-Maqdis. However, defining Zionism remains a contentious issue with ongoing debates about its essence and alignment with Judaism. While Jewish Zionism ostensibly fulfills the old desire of the Jewish community and their return to Bayt al-Maqdis, it also lays claim to the 'promised land' a concept that may conflict with certain interpretations of Judaism. Berdal Aral contributes to the discourse on Jewish Zionism by characterizing it as a form of colonialism, a viewpoint ratified by the United Nations General Assembly in 1973 (Aral, 2018, pp. 46-67; Unga 1: A/Res 3151, 1973, G XXVIII). While the desire to return back to Bayt al Maqdis dates back to the Babylonian exile, organized efforts to realize this aspiration emerged in the 19th century, with Jewish Zionists actively seeking land acquisitions in Bayt al-Maqdis (Al-Tabari, 1987, p. 45). These endeavors were supported by charitable organizations like the Jewish Colonization Association financed by individuals such as Baron Edmond de Rothschild (Koester, 1949, p. 36). Jewish Zionism aspired to create a homeland for Jews worldwide providing them with security and a sense of identity rooted in Judaism (Simon, 1918, pp. 9-10). Some scholars argue that Jewish Zionism evolved in response to anti-Jewish sentiments prevalent in Europe,

while others view it as a manifestation of Jewish national consciousness (Barin, 2014, p. 14; Maccoby, 2006, p. 29; Sokolow, 1919, p. 415). Regardless of its origins, Jewish Zionism continues to evoke diverse interpretations and impassioned debates about its nature and implications. For Jazbhay however, Jewish Zionism is a kind of colonialism which occupies Bayt al-Maqdis fostering Jewish identity (2020, p. 34). The Sultan's discernment in distinguishing between Jews and Jewish Zionists and adjusting his policies accordingly underscores his astuteness as a leader (Kocabaş, 1995, p. 331). An exemplification of his discernment lies in his differentiated treatment of Jewish refugees and Jewish Zionists. While he welcomed Jewish refugees fleeing persecution in Eastern Europe and Russia and permitted them to visit Bayt al-Maqdis for religious purposes with a return timeframe, he imposed restrictions on the entry of Jewish Zionists into Bayt al-Maqdis. Therefore, it would be misleading to regard Jewish Zionism as a representation of Judaism since Jewish Zionism had nothing to do with Judaism. For instance when Britain proposed Argentina to Herzl for a place to establish their state, Herzl personally accepted this offer (Herzl, 1960, pp. 22-23). However, if Jewish Zionism was the representation of Judaism this proposal would not be accepted by Herzl as founding a state was not the main motivation of Judaism but turning back to Bayt al-Maqdis and founding a state in the region was the sole aim of Judaism. Therefore, Herzl's Jewish Zionism would not have been regarded as a representation of Judaism but more than that it was a political movement supported by Christian Zionists, European leaders and the Jews.

CHAPTER THREE: FOREIGN POLICY

3.1. Sultan Abdülhamid II's Foreign Policy

The Sultan's adopted foreign policy could be categorized under two premises: the first was to preserve the neutrality of the empire towards the countries who were already at the war with another country and the second was to develop friendly relations with neighbouring and powerful countries despite their hostile and colonial aims towards the empire (Güngör, 2021, p. 87; Öke, 1983, p. 42; Yasamee, 2023, p. 12). Upon recognizing the importance of foreign affairs and its effects on Ottoman domestic affairs, the Sultan, before initiating or fostering a renovation or reform within the empire; founded the layers and instruments of change by his diplomatic relations with the countries so as to gather their support for his reforms. This was important for the Sultan as the support coming from outside of the empire was important to deter European countries' interference to Ottoman domestic affairs and beside that the Sultan with the support of countries could foster reforms and renovations within the empire more easily by convincing bureaucrats and society for a change (Alkan, 2018, pp. 22- 222; Kocabaş, 1995, pp. 203-204). Therefore, the Sultan's attitude helped him to gain more time for further reforms without foreign interferences to his domestic and foreign affairs. Therefore the Sultan was able to refurbish and regenerate the empire from its ashes both in its internal and foreign affairs without any invasion or assault to the country at the time (Alkan, 2018, pp. 22- 222; Kocabaş, 1995, pp. 203-204; Özcan, 2019, p. 162; Yasamee, 2011, p. 41). The Sultan's strategy was simply to engrave the seeds of trust and mutual respect between the countries and pursue economic engagement and trade with the countries by building a stable and trustable relations based on equal and just relations for securing Ottoman presence and boundaries (Abdülhamid II, 1975; Kocabaş, 1995; Tahsin Paşa, 2017). Moreover, the Sultan was cautious in his foreign affairs. The Sultan avoided to partner with a country and act as its ally since at the time ally of a country naturally meant to share the enemy of the country. The Sultan in this regard in order to avoid indirect enemies towards to empire to emerge did not partner with any country but on the contrary developed policies to strengthen relations, trade and mutual trust without any binding relations. This was the core of Sultan's reflexive and flexible balance policy of which enabled him to foster change and rescue the empire from decay in his 33 years of reign. The Sultan conducted

policies that could not contradict with its neighbouring countries and super powers at the time such as Britain, Russia and France (Yasamee, 2011, p. 45). Therefore the Sultan was well aware of the positive and negative sides of the empire when got into throne (Gençoğlu, 2014, pp. 36-68). This was an important factor why the Sultan during his reign did not hesitate to develop relations with European countries, and benefit from their experience, technology and science for rehabilitating institutions of the empire (Gençoğlu, 2014, pp. 40-65). This perspective was the main motivation behind Sultan's developing rational policy and trading activities with Germany. The Sultan in this regard invited Germany specialists and scientists in renovating the military and academy of the empire (Çolak, 2007, p. 77; Uffin, 2019, pp. 231; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 20, 73-74). The Sultan was cautious not to develop ties and policies that would contradict powerful countries of the period, such as France, Britain, and Russia (Özcan, 2019, p. 162). As Britain had a powerful navy and was an important authority with its naval force and Russia had vast territory, the Sultan paid close interest not to contradict with these two important countries (Akarlı, 1976, p. 10; Yasamee, 2011, p. 193). The Sultan was conducting policies that would neither risk the empire to be assaulted by the enemy of another country nor provoke any powerful country against its politics (Güngör, 2021; Özcan, 2017). That was the core of the Sultan's rational foreign policy (Abdülhamid II, 1974; Güngör, 2021; Kocabaş, 1995; Özcan, 2017; Tahsin Paşa, 2017). The Sultan attached significant emphasis on cultivating ties with Muslim countries, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula (Akpınar, 2012, p. 99; Bolat, 2014, p. 22). In this vein, he not only attached keen interest to sacred places but also acted as a protector of them. His protective attitude towards Bayt al-Maqdis, as the role of Caliph of Islam inherently required him to preserve the welfare of Muslims, protect sacred sites on earth, and protect the honor and rights of those living under his reign. The essence of the Sultan's foreign policy can be succinctly summarized as follows: maintaining amicable relations with Russia, avoiding conflicts with Britain, fostering trust in Germany, and being cautious about Austria's plans for Macedonia, which involved supporting its independence and forging close ties with them (Sultan II. Abdülhamid Han, 1976; Yasamee, 2011, p. 44). Consequently, the Sultan had no alternative but to pursue a decent, benevolent foreign policy to quell unrest in the Balkans and prevent Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks from uniting against the Ottoman Empire (Ademi, 2018, pp. 141-154; Çetinkaya, 2019, p. 17). By prioritizing neutrality in

diplomacy, the Sultan sought to navigate the complexities of the post-Crimean War (1853-1856) and Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 geopolitics while safeguarding Ottoman interests and sovereignty (Akarlı, 1980, p. 46; Özcan, 2019, 161-165; Yasamee, 2023, p. 12; 2011, pp. 40-45). As the Sultan was well aware of the ongoing dispute among powerful colonizer countries and foresaw a possible war among them, the Sultan conducted policies that would serve to reconcile tension in his foreign policy; strengthen administrative and military capacity of the empire by avoiding from direct conflict with Britain, Russia and France (Çolak, 2007, p. 79; Güngör, 2021; Özcan, 2017). His efforts to cultivate friendly relations with neighboring and distant, powerful countries underscored his commitment to preserving the Empire's stability and security in a rapidly changing international landscape at home, within the borders, and beyond. Therefore, in order to understand the Sultan's foreign and domestic policies, it is important see the relation between them (Yasamee, 2011, p. 41). The Sultan was also cautious about participating in international organizations and platforms as well, for instance when a conference, meeting or gathering was organized by a country that was in dispute with countries such as Britain and Russia, the Sultan preferred not to send representatives to that gathering so that the Sultan at its core was cautious not to cause any misunderstanding or a possible conflict to be emerged with the countries by participating to a conference that might have a conflict with other countries (Çolak, 2017; Sultan II. Abdülhamid Han, 1976, p. 31; Öke, 1983, p. 42). The Sultan's attitude in his foreign affairs illustrated the interconnectedness between his domestic and foreign policies (Yasamee, 2011, p. 59). Therefore, the Sultan sought to align foreign engagements with domestic priorities and concerns, ensuring that Ottoman interests were protected on both fronts. By carefully managing international relations in line with his domestic considerations, the Sultan aimed to bolster the Empire's resilience and secure its interests in an ever-changing geopolitical landscape. The Sultan's approach to diplomacy contributed to the overall coherence and effectiveness of his governance (Yasamee, 2011, p. 18). The Sultan's foreign policy played a crucial role in maintaining the multicultural structure of the Ottoman Empire particularly in Bayt al-Maqdis (Sham region) in which there were already 199.613 Muslim, 26.445 Christians and 7.105 Jews living in the region, according to the general population statistics (women were counted) between 1881 – 1893 (Gül & Gökçen, 2010, p. 59; Karpas, 2003, pp. 184-185). The Sultan recognized the significance

of engaging with the international community by avoid isolation and ensure the Empire's relevance on the global stage (Hale, 2000, pp. 11-13; Özcan, 2019, pp. 117-125). This approach was particularly evident in his dealings with Russia, and to whom he adhered special emphasis to especially in the aftermath of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 when the Russian fleet anchored to Bosphorus. The Sultan paid close attention to the fundamental goals of the empire such as by paying huge sum of the debts, social, cultural and political traumas of the empire inherited by Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1799, the Crimean War (1853-1856). However his defeat of Russo-Ottoman War (1877-1878), witnessing France' invasion of Tunisia (1881) and British invasion of Egypt (1882-1883) during his first years of throne approved the idea that the empire was under a great threat and there was no trustable ally to the empire (Akarlı, 1976, pp. 11-13; Barlak, 2019b, p. 369; Yasamee, 2011, p. 79). Although Britain until Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 was in favour of Ottoman presence and supporting its status in the Middle East, the defeat of Ottomans to Russians instigated Britain to change its priority and attitude towards the empire and saw that the empire was not powerful enough to preserve its colonial way from Britain to India (Alkan, 2023; Akar, 1976; Sirma, 2007, 11-14; Yasamee, 2023; 2011). Therefore, Britain in order to secure its colonies and way from Britain to India after Russo- Ottoman War invaded Egypt as of 1882. While these politically and internationally important incidents were happening, the Sultan had no other option than to foster diplomacy as the empire had neither enough military force nor a budget to finance a counter-campaign against the countries (Alkan, 2023, pp. 240-259; Çolak, 2007). Therefore, for the Sultan, the primary aim and goal of the country were to regain its power and authority back and preserve its boundary and population; therefore, for the Sultan the empire unless regained its boundaries and might cannot protect its borders against colonizer European countries, cohesion and welfare of the people among varying nationalities and faiths (Sultan II. Abdülhamid Han, 1976, p. 31). The equilibrium policy was central to Sultan's approach, grounded in a rational assessment of the Ottoman Empire's economic and military capacities (Ademi, 2019, p. 145). Recognizing the empire's relative weakness vis-à-vis colonialist and imperialist powers, he pursued a foreign policy of neutrality as the most viable strategy for survival (Akarlı, 1980, p. 46; Yasamee, 2023, p. 12). As the imperialist countries were struggling hard to enlarge the scope of their colonial territories, the Sultan as the only sovereign Muslim leader

representing the Muslims in the world by the caliphate was regarded to be the hope by those Muslims living under colonizer countries such as in North Africa and Hijaz (Berkes, 2012, pp. 341-342; Findley, 2010, p.136). This expectation enabled Sultan to foster Islamic unity and civility within the empire and in the world (Barlak, 2019a, p. 190; Berkes, 2012, pp. 341-343). The Sultan seized every opportunity to enhance his ties with the countries, including those of colonialist countries such as Britain and France, by adopting a cautious and preemptive approach to his foreign policy (Ademi, 2019, p. 145; Yasamee, 2011, p. 184). His overarching goal was not only to navigate disparities in military and economic power but also to rejuvenate and safeguard the empire. Therefore, the Sultan regarded security and positive relations with border countries as essential for the empire's rehabilitation, reorganization, and renewal (Yasamee, 2011, p. 41). The Sultan pursued his foreign policy with diligence, prioritizing centralization, maintaining a delicate relations among nations by upholding principles of objectivity, independence, and freedom from restrictions (Alkan, 2018, pp. 221-222; Kocabaş, 1995, pp. 203-204). Drawing inspiration from his illustrious ancestors such as Bayezid, Mehmet the Conqueror, and Yavuz Sultan Selim, the Sultan adhered significant emphasis on preserving the multicultural structure of the empire despite the pressure instigating different ethnicities to rebel against the empire (Çakmak, 2020, pp. xvii-xix; Erdoğan, 1998, pp. 3-11; Ör, 2012, p. 25; Salâhi, 1992, pp. 201-202; Yavuz, 1987, pp. 27-28). The Sultan created a tolerant atmosphere for non-Muslims already residing in the region, including the Ottoman Sephardic Jews who were sheltered by the Ottoman Empire and placed in the Old Yishuv region in Bayt al-Maqdis in the 16th century while they were escaping from the Spanish Inquisition (Armaoğlu, 1989 p. 11; Öke, 2021, p. 48). Similar to his predecessors, Sultan Bayezid II and Suleiman the Magnificent who welcomed Sephardic Jews exiled from Spain in 1492 with an open arm policy, the Sultan extended his welcoming to the Jews expelled from Russia and Europe except for Bayt al-Maqdis (Bardakoğlu, 2008, p. 118; Chua, 2007, pp. 170-175; Güllü, 2020, pp. 56-160). By that, the Sultan advocated equality and justice among all the people living under Ottoman, irrespective of their religious and national identities, besides with welcoming new incomers in Anatolia who were exiled by Russian pogrom and anti-semitic countries. On the contrary, the Sultan ensured non-Muslims to enjoy the same rights as Muslims in economic, social, and religious terms within the empire (Akarlı, 1986, p. 74; Pears, 2017,

p. 271; Tezcan, 2020, pp. 28-42). His witnessing the partition of Bulgaria, Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina could be given as an example to this situation. Therefore, the Sultan like all previous Sultans continued to preserve the multicultural atmosphere of the empire but unlike those of Sultans, the Sultan employed balance policy as a way to preserve the welfare of the empire against colonialist countries. Since Russia, France and Britain were seeking reason and ways to support Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant Christians within the empire (El-Awaisi & Yiğit, 2020, p.11; Yasamee, 2011, p. 12). This attitude was an important instrument of his foreign affairs. For the Sultan it was important to preserve the cohesion and justice among the folks living within the empire. However, the Sultan was quite strict and insistent on not to disregard Muslim majority within the empire despite European countries' interference to the Empire for supporting Christian rights within the empire (YEE. 1887, 120/5). This was one of the distinguishing features of the Ottoman Empire (Akyol, 2013, pp. 34-35). This attitude enabled the Ottoman Empire to be a peace island for both Muslims and non-Muslims where colonization activities, ethnicity, and religion-based labeling were at their zenith (Akarlı, 2006, p. 359; İpek, 2002, p. 15). Gathering the Muslims of the world under the banner of Islam and regenerating Muslim unification under the banner of Caliphatehood were the primary motivations of the Sultan against the expansionist colonialist European countries and Jewish Zionists (Aydın, 2016, pp. 171-189; Buzpınar, 2016, p. 19; Eraslan, 2014, p. 25; Okumuş, 2019, p. 57). Therefore, the Sultan fostered Caliphatehood to consolidate both Muslim and non-Muslim populations within and without the Empire headquartered in İstanbul (Buzpınar, 2016, pp. 22-28; Farah, 2008, pp. 219-215; Karpat, 2001, p. 15; Özcan, 2002, p. 1552). That is why his period was entitled as '*İttihad-ı İslam*' corresponding to the 'Unification of Muslims' (Özcan, 2019, p. 165). The Sultan fostered a realist, rational and pragmatic approach in his foreign and domestic policies (Akarlı, 1980, p. 46; Alkan, 2023, p. 245; Barlak, 2019a, p. 196; Koloğlu, 1987, p. 203; Özcan, 2002, p. 1562; Yasamee, 2011, p. 41). While imperial rivalries and conflicts were abounded during his reign, the Sultan sought to develop relations with countries that did not have colonial plans towards the Ottoman Empire. However, the Sultan was also trying to develop ties with the countries who were hostile to the empire so as to ease the atmosphere such as Britain, France and Russia (Akpınar, 2012, pp. 79-119; Engin, 2011, p. 10; Ortaylı, 2015, p. 128). Against all odds, the Sultan continued to foster diplomacy with Britain, whose colonialist aims

toward the Empire was quite certain and evident; being enemy of Britain would cost to the empire than having neutral stance who was willing to develop trading and technological trading (Engin, 2011, p. 10). The Sultan was well aware of British policies seeking to colonize Ottoman lands. Therefore, the Sultan, while approaching Britain, conducted a cautious attitude, neither distancing him from the empire nor affirming his policies and practices on the ground and getting so intimate to let him interfere with the internal and external policies of the empire (Sultan Abdülhamit 1975, pp. 143-144). The Sultan closely conducted politics regardless of their boundaries with the empire which enabled him to formulate policies against Jewish Zionists and colonialists addressing Bayt al-Maqdis and the Empire as a whole. The Sultan's attitude represents extending the scope of mutual benefit and understanding among the countries who were prejudiced to cooperate with the empire (Ademi, 2018, p. 145; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 6). Additionally, the Sultan based his foreign policy on the principles of equality beside balancing the relations both within the countries and with the empire, refraining other countries from interfering with its domestic affairs. The Sultan endeavored to eliminate foreign interference in his own policies and negotiations, proceeding with a realist approach on equal terms (Barlak, 2019a, p. 196; Bolat, 2014, p. 20; Öke, 2021, p. 82; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 23- 41). The Sultan's generosity towards exiled Jews from Europe and Russia, sheltering them despite the Zionist Jewish threat, was a rational application of his foreign affairs (Buzpinar, 2002, p. 133; Y.PRK.TŞF, 1902, 6-72). In this sense, he, like many European countries beside Russia, did not regard all the Jews as Jewish Zionists and hence did not practice reductionist policies towards them, and differentiated Jews from Jewish Zionists. Herzl narrates Sultan's attitude towards exiled Jews in his diary as such: "Last year, as you know, his Imperial Majesty was gracious enough to make some land in Anatolia available to Rumanian Jewish refugees" (Herzl, 1960, p. 1135). Under the Sultan's reign, the Ottoman Empire pursued a foreign policy focused on peace and mutual respect (Engin, 2011, p. 30; Özcan, 2019, p. 117). The Sultan implemented a tolerant and cohesive foreign policy, which, during his era, was somewhat challenging. Theodore Herzl's remarks in his autobiography provide crucial insights into the Sultan's attitude toward them. The Sultan reaffirmed his multicultural, respectful foreign and domestic policies. "Turkey has arrived at a turning point in its history, and the glorious reign of Sultan Abdül Hamid Khan II, so beloved by his Moslem and Jewish subjects whom he

makes happy” (Herzl, 1960, p. 1138). In the letter, Herzl acknowledged the Sultan’s popularity among his people and Muslims worldwide, recognizing the significant influence of Caliphatehood within the Muslim community.

3.1.1. Relations with Britain

Britain was the most influential colonial empire of the late 19th and beginning of the 20th century. However, he was not all alone at the time who was trying to extend the boundaries of its colonization activities in Africa and Middle East. His most important rivalries were France, Russia and Japan at the time who were trying to enlarge their boundaries and preserve their ways towards their colonies (Çolak, 2017, Yasamee, 2023; 2011). In this respect, Britain, as an empire where the sun never sets, was shaping world politics. When the Sultan got into the throne, he had no power and authority to foster a change in international politics. However, Britain was conducting neat and to the point politics in terms of protecting its colonies. Shortly after realizing the weakness of the empire in the Middle East region, Britain did not hesitate to take the control of Cyprus and Egypt for securing its way to Indian colonies (Buzpınar, 2016; Gümüş, 2018; Yasamee, 2011, p. 215). Therefore, the Sultan’s approach to the Britain fulfilled its prophesy. Britain did not hesitate to seize Egypt upon seeing emerging threat emancipating from Russia and France towards his colonies in India (Alkan, 2023, pp. 243-245). Britain acquired Cyprus with the Berlin Treaty and waited for the invasion conditions for Egypt to be settled (Yasamee, 2011, pp 215-238). The countries at the time would not hesitate to cooperate on their mutual benefits. Therefore at the time Mediterranean Treaty, Triple Alliance and Egyptian Convention were by the European countries were settled against the empire and their enemy countries (Yasamee, 2023, p. 282). Upon learning about secret cooperation of the countries against the empire, the Sultan tried to benefit from the deteriorating relations between Germany and Russia as well as counter argument (Yasamee, 2023, p. 283). The Sultan both in Cyprus and Egypt fostered international diplomacy to regain the regions from Britain and did not accept British sovereignty and invasion (Gümüş, 2018, pp.75-81). As the empire was not powerful in terms of military and economy, the diplomacy was the only working important instrument for Sultan in conducting his policies at the time (Alkan, 2023, 238-247; Gümüş, 2018, pp. 72-75). Therefore, the Sultan, knowing the grave rivalry between

Russia and Britain, instigated a territory in Afghanistan so that the empire would have time and conditions to regain Egypt from Britain diplomatically (Gümüş, 2018, pp. 80-81). Sultan's keen interest in Egypt helped him to preserve Ottoman authority within the region by the help provided by Egypt's High Commissioner Gazi Ahmet Mukhtar Pasha (Barlak, 2019a, p. 197). Sultan's policy prevented Britain from turning Egypt into his colony (Barlak, 2019a, pp. 196 - 197). The Sultan, in his foreign policy, never preferred to war or create a diplomatic conflict; his main motivation was to further the empire to its glorious old days without any foreign and domestic interference to Ottoman politics (Alkan, 2023, pp. 234- 266; Gümüş, 2018, pp. 70- 85). The Sultan did not officially recognize the invasion of Egypt by Britain, but he tried to develop his ties with the local tribes and people authorities such as Ali Pasha, Nizami Pasha, Server Pashas, and Ahmet Muhtar (Buzpinar, 2016, pp. 334- 335; Gümüş, 2018, 159-177; Kodaman, 1987, pp. 11-35). The support provided by the tribes enabled the Sultan to foster Islamic unity and prevent the expansion of colonialist countries in North Africa and Hijaz (Akarlı, 1980, p. 55; Findley, 2010, p. 137). The help provided by Muslims and tribes in Egypt helped the Sultan to continue his authority in the region when Britain seized the region (Barlak, 2019a, pp. 189-214; 2019b, p. 379). That was the motivation why the Sultan did not hesitate to propose caliphate as an institution in Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan and Yemen for consolidating the people under the banner of Islam (Barlak, 2019a, pp. 190-191; Findley, 2010, p. 137; Gümüş, 2018, p. 200-205). While the Sultan fostered international diplomacy towards Britain, he also tried to empower Islamic unity in the region against Britain as the region was still composed of Muslims (Gümüş, 2018, pp. 208-209). As the local people and British authorities were not getting on well and had a conflict among themselves, the Sultan tried to unite those of Muslims in the region against British authority as well (Buzpinar, 2016, pp. 342-347). Although the British attitude towards the empire in the course of time and due to changing conditions at the international level had changed, the Sultan's cautious attitude towards Britain did not change (Yasemee, 2023, 296-301). The Sultan, meanwhile tried to benefit from the Russian- British conflict at the time by developing ties with Britain as well (Yasemee, 2023, p. 301). The Sultan, being well aware of the naval might of Britain tried to benefit from British Empire in terms of developing its military might on the sea. Although the Sultan was planning to benefit from the technological innovations of Britain at the time, Britain did not respond

positively to the request and expectation of the empire. However, Britain, despite its discontent towards the Ottoman Empire did not cut its political ties with the Ottoman Empire for Britain would not risk losing the Ottoman Empire to France and Russia. Due to unremitting rivalry among them who were trying to block their way to their colonisations and as the empire was still in conjunction point of Balkans, the Middle East, and Anatolia, which were still important for British way to India; Britain did not want to cut its diplomatic relations with the empire. This line was important and stood at the key conjunction of the roads to its colonies in India (Buzpinar, 2016, p. 420; Kushner, 1986, p. 310). Therefore, Britain although was not content with the empire due to the aggressive attitudes of Russia and France, did not want to open another front with the Sultan and lose him to France and Russia (Akarlı, 1976, pp. 33-37; Yasamee, 2011, p. 7). In order not to have direct contact with Russia, Britain regarded the Ottoman Empire as the last patrol for its security in Europe and its way to India. The Sultan, well aware of British foreign policy and concerns did not conflict with Britain and preserved the security of the road that was under his control towards India so that British support of the empire in the international arena would not diminish (Uzunçarşılı, 1954, p. 43; Çolak, 2007, p. 73). The Ottoman Empire and its welfare constituted significance for Britain in terms of preserving and securing its way to the Suez Canal (1869) to India (Buzpinar, 2016, p. 420; Kushner, 1986, p. 310; Yasamee, 2011, p. 89). The Ottoman Empire under the reign of the Sultan was well aware of British policy towards the region; therefore, the Sultan approached Britain with caution, knowing very well that if Britain had a chance, it would not hesitate to occupy Ottoman territories or shape the Sultan's policy on its behalf (Özcan, 2002, p. 1570; Yasamee, 2011, p. 44). The Sultan was well aware of British policy towards the empire and knew that Britain was trying to provoke dissemination of the nationalities within the empire such as Albania and Armenia for founding separate independent entities and move caliphate from İstanbul to Jeddah in Arabia or to Egypt (Sultan II. Abdülhamid Han, 1976, p. 302). From the 19th century onwards, during the reign of the Sultan, the Ottoman Empire tried to conduct a stable and neat relationship with Britain since Britain at the time was the superpower colonialist empire of the age in need of more raw materials and human resources. The Sultan, being aware of the threat Britain was posing and well acknowledging the strategic position of the empire situated at the crossroads of British colonial way benefited from this and secured the way from

Britain to India so that Britain would find no need to produce counter-power in the region as Russia and France were already at the same time trying to increase their visibility in Bayt al-Maqdis. France in this sense greatly invested in cultural, educational institutions within the region (Burrows, 1986, pp. 109-135). Therefore, the Sultan wittily conducted his foreign policy for the empire's benefit, although he had neither economic nor military might as those of countries. Therefore, the Sultan's policy can be assumed to prolonge the life and might of the empire in the region since the Sultan used Russia and France as alternative power blocks against Britain. The Sultan, well aware of the interest posed by Britain and potential European countries towards oil reserves in the Middle East issued two special degrees of 1888 and 1898, particularly for Mosul and Baghdad, changing the status of the residence by making the property of the Sultan belongs to his private treasury of which caused distress among Britain and Germany who already invested to the region for drilling oil (Çolak, 2007, pp. 182-183). With the decree no company in the region could drill for oil without getting permission from the Sultan by means of the law thereby guaranteed (Çolak, 2007, p. 302). The Sultan, knowing very well that he could not challenge Britain, did not hesitate to use the instruments he had against Britain in order to preserve the welfare and interest of the empire. For instance, the Sultan upon realizing British policies against him, did not hesitate to cancel the construction of the Baghdad railway that was granted to a British company and change his decision and give the construction of a railway to a German-origin company in order to trigger challenge among Britain and Germany over Ottoman Empire and put major force over Britain to conduct affirmative productive policy towards the Empire (Çolak, 2007, pp. 186-187; Earle, 1924, p. 86). Nevertheless, in 1882, the British invasion of Egypt approved the idea that Britain did not regard the Ottoman Empire as a power block in the region anymore; therefore, the Sultan, after this invasion, conducted more careful relations with Britain, fostering Germany as an alternative power block beside France and Russia (Armaoğlu, 2010, pp. 11-115; Yasamee, 2011, p. 51). Towards the British invasion, the Sultan conducted careful and cautious policies so that Britain would not get stuck in the region as the concrete reason for the invasion was a debt of a merchant the Empire indebted but could not pay back (Kurşun, 2022, p. 59). Since the presence of the empire in the region was securing the acquired status of Britain, France, and Russia, none of the states wanted to risk their position as they did not want one another to strengthen their position in Bayt al-

Maqdis and therefore, after Crimean War to Russo-Ottoman war of 1877- 1877. The balanced policy was the core of Ottoman policy that the Sultan had conducted in order to rehabilitate and reconstruct the empire out of its ashes (Okumuş, 2019, p. 59). The Sultan identified Britain as a foremost antagonist whose agenda aimed to dissolve the empire into smaller states, collaborating with Zionists for settlement and land acquisition in Bayt al-Maqdis (Sultan II Abdülhamid Han, 1976, pp. 83-88). Towards the British employing pressure on the empire militarily, financially, and diplomatically, the Sultan recognized Britain as an important threat to for the empire within the Middle East. Therefore, so as to bypass French and Russian interest in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan was well aware of the importance Britain as a part his balance policy (Kocabaş, 1995, p. 213; Yazbak, 1999, p. 43). This pursuit stemmed from the Sultan's efforts to establish a mutual partnership with Britain, notwithstanding Britain's underlying intentions to provoke conflict with the Ottoman Empire for its territorial gain. The Sultan was not disinterested with developing ties and cooperation with Britain however, as the British foreign policy was not in favour of supporting Ottomans, especially after the Ottoman defeat to Russia, Britain tried to search for reasons to initiate a war with Ottoman Empire (Öke, 1983, p. 36; Uzunçarşılı, 1954, p. 43). Given its strategic location being at the crossroads of colonization and trade routes linking Asia, the Middle East, and Africa to Europe, the Ottoman Empire garnered significant attention from colonizing powers like Britain and France (Kamel, 2015, pp. 86-110). Britain, seeing the threat that the Sultan may pose to his Muslim colonies who was already the caliph of Islam in the world, aimed to shift the Caliphate to the Kureishi tribes in Arabia instigating Arab nationalism so that he would preserve its authority in colonial territories (Yasamee, 2011, p. 27). The Sultan starting from Sultan Abdülmecid tried to preserve and strengthen Islamic Caliphate against European countries. The Sultan employed Caliphate as a way to unite people under Islamic banner and form a body against colonizers at home and abroad beside Jewish Zionists and European countries as the only legitimate caliph of Islam (Buzpınar, 2016, pp. 69-71; Sırma, 2021, pp. 40-81). Britain's fostering of an alternative Caliphate in Arab territory even continued during the reign of the Sultan, alternating the Charif Husein in Mecca to Sultan so as to break Islamic unity (Kurşun, 2022, p. 124). However the Sultan successfully preserved to be only legitimate caliph at the time whose status was approved by Arab scholars such as Mawlawi Sayh Hafâz Abdülcemil Efendi against alternative

caliph sponsored by Britain (Mevlevi Hafız Abdülcemil Efendi, 2020, pp. 12-39). The Sultan, as is already touched upon in the fourth chapter entitled ‘soft power’ employed Caliphatehood as an instrument to unite Muslims within the empire and all around the world against colonizer countries such as Britain and France (Çolak, 2016, p.18; Eraslan, 2014, pp. 25-31; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 26-47). The Sultan underscored the significance of the Caliphate within the broader context of his policies against Britain and its policies towards the Caliphate. The Sultan upon realizing the colonialist aims of the the country employed caliphate as an alternative unification front against Britain in African region where it was extending its colonies (Barlak, 2019a, p. 190). The Sultan in African region dwelling on caliphate sponsored and supported African Muslims against Britain ranging from Oman to Zanzibar as a counter argument against British colonialist attitude towards Ottoman Empire (Alkan, 2023, pp. 269- 273; Barlak, 2019a, pp. 189- 193; Findley, 2010, p. 136). The Sultan in this regard got in contact with religious leaders in the African region such as Shadhili shaykh Muhammad Zafir al-Masani supported Sanusiyya Sufis in the region (Findley, 2010, p. 136). The Sanusiyya Sufi religious group stated their loyalty to the Sultan and helped Ottoman authority to expand its boundaries among Muslims against French and British invasions (Barlak, 2019a, p. 199). With that, the Sultan could be regarded to be successful in constructing a power block threatening Britain with his colonies in Africa gathering Muslim population living under British colony (Barlak, 2019a, pp. 190-191). The Sanusiyyas were so loyal to the empire that they were acting as the representatives of the empire and served as a connection hub among İstanbul, Tripoli and Middle Africa (Barlak, 2019a, p. 199). A Sussex-born British diplomat, Valentine Chirol, on 14 November 1904, at proceedings of the Central Asian Society regarding Muslims and Ottoman presence in the world, approves British policy towards the empire and showed the righteousness of the Sultan in conducting his pan-Islamic policy. Chirol in the preceding of conference approves the success the Sultan attained (Chirol, 1904, pp. 1-2). Their colonies in Africa and the Middle East, encompassing India and Burma where nearly a hundred million Muslims resided by the end of the 19th century were threatened by Sultan’s Islamic unity proposing caliphatehood as a way to gather Muslims of the world (Barlak, 2019a, pp. 185-214; Çolak, 2017, p. 18; Eraslan, 2014, pp. 25-31). The Sultan was keenly aware of the potential threat and the impact of the utilized Caliphate against Jewish Zionists indirectly by aiming the cut Britain and France support for Jewish

Zionists against the empire (Blunt, 2005, p. 3; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 28-60). Thus, he did not hesitate to employ Caliphatehood referencing religion as a deterrent soft power instrument against Jewish Zionist settlement by obstructing and nullifying the support of European countries for Jewish Zionists. As religion in itself can be attained as a soft power, Caliphatehood as an application and representation of religion can function as a soft power instrument (Mercan & Dündar, 2021, pp. 488- 493; Thomas, 2000, pp. 7-8).

3.1.2. Relations with Russia

Turkish and Russian relations although was not always stable, had persisted during war periods, characterized by ongoing communication and diplomacy. This endurance could be understood by Ibn Khaldun's phrase very easily as he remarked: "The boundary is the fate of a country and a city" (Ibn Haldun, 2007, pp. 341-362; Ibn Khaldun, 1980, pp. 233-305). Given their shared geographical proximity, close ties between the Ottoman Empire and Russia were not just an option but a necessity dictated by their common borders stretching along the Black Sea (Özcan, 2019, p. 120). Ignoring Russia would have hindered the Ottoman Empire's ability to craft an effective foreign policy both in the region and outside it. As Russian policy to move to Mediterrean region and increase its authority within the region by means of its support to Orthodox Christians living in Bayt al- Maqdis, Russia both in 1853 and 1877 declared war on Empire which were namely called Crimean War (1953-1956) and Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 (Yasamee, 2023, pp. 24-46). With the war, Russia tried to compel the empire to increase its authority and visibility in the Middle East starting from the region of Bayt al-Maqdis (Yasamee, 2023, pp. 24-25). The invasion of Moldavia and Wallachia (Eflak ve Boğdan) by Russian forces were the concrete outcome of Russian interest and his employing hard power to accept Russians to increase its authority on Orthodox Christians within the region (Yasamee, 2023, p. 24; 2011, p. 8). Therefore, the Ottoman Empire and Russia did not want to lose mutual respect and good neighborhood relations. Russia made great efforts not to lose the Ottoman Empire to European countries (Özcan, 2019, pp. 115-126). Russian rivalry with France and Britain, the leading colonial powers of the 19th century, further benefited the Ottoman Empire allowing it to conduct flexible public diplomacy despite its vast geography and limited military and financial resources. Sultan's policy sometimes required cultivating close ties with Britain and France, while at other times, it

necessitated fostering relations with Russia, depending on changing circumstances, opportunities, and power dynamics (Özcan, 2019, pp. 115-126). Up until Russo-Ottoman War of 1877- 1878, Britain conducted policy to preserve the status Ottoman Empire and protect it from decay; however after the war, Britain had changed his policy seeing that the Ottoman Empire was not a buffer zone any more and was not strong enough to block Russians (Yasamee, 2011, p. 44). The Sultan, recognizing the strategic significance of Russia actively sought opportunities to strengthen ties and cooperation with the country (Morrison, 2021, p. 65). When the Sultan ascended the throne in 1876, the Ottoman Empire was already at war (Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878) with Russia. However, the Sultan pursued the war, resulting the defeat and substantial debt to European countries. This conflict as noted in the study's introduction helped the Ottoman Empire to lose British support as Britain would no longer support an empire who could not secure its boundaries and the Britain would no longer trust the empire for securing its way to his Indian colonies. European countries regarded the Ottoman Empire as a vital ally against Russian expansion, preferring a buffer zone between Russia and Europe to maintain its security (Yasamee, 2011, p. 8). The motivation of Russian interest towards Bayt al-Maqdis was to increase its visibility and power in Middle East by supporting Orthodox Christians of the Empire against Protestant Britain and Catholic France (Yasamee, 2011, p. 8). Russia in order not to lose the empire to Britain and France paid close interest to Ottoman Empire and opened a shade war to Ottoman Empire to enforce him accept the demands for increasing its authority on Orthodox Christians. As this was the direct interference of a country to another country; the Sultan rejected this offer and hence Russia declared war to the empire. However, Russian expansionist attitude persisted with efforts to spread Pan-Slavism among Balkan Christians, particularly in the Middle East and Central Asia aiming to extend its influence towards the Mediterranean Sea, posing a challenge to British and French interests (Hopwood, 1969, pp. 4-60; Karpat, 2011, pp. 78-82; Özcan, 2019, p. 121). Russia intensified its presence and influence in the Middle East, particularly in Bayt al-Maqdis. Meanwhile, Russia searched ways to strengthen its support for Greek Orthodox Church of Bayt al-Maqdis by investing significant resources in maintaining religious monuments and educational institutions (Özcoşar & Akman, 2018, p. 20; Trimbur, 2011, p. 96). The Sultan, seeking to exploit rivalries among Britain, France, and Russia for dominance over Christian of Bayt al-Maqdis refrained from

imposing restrictive measures and used the conflict among the countries to produce alternative ways to capture the attention of the countries so that the empire would have more time to rehabilitate the bureaucracy and economy of the empire (Ari, 2019, pp. 195-207). For instance Sultan in order to gain their confidence and trust allowed Germany, Russia, and France to construct churches, schools, and hospitals simultaneously in Bayt al-Maqdis leveraging their rivalries to the Ottoman Empire's advantage. Some of the missionary schools were as follows: Syrian Protestant College and the College St. Joseph in Beirut, the College des Freres in Bayt al-Maqdis, and the Friends' Schools in Ramallah (Burrows, 1986, pp. 109-135; Khalidi, 1992, p. 124). These actions exemplify and concrete outcomes of the policy implemented by the Sultan in Bayt al-Maqdis (Mukteza DeFTERleri, 35/31-33; Kayyali, 1978, p. 10). Russian expansionist ambitions towards India posed a significant threat to British colonies and trade routes, prompting Britain to align itself with the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century. This collaborative stance, manifested notably by the presence of the British armada in İstanbul to protect against potential Russian invasion, underscored the strategic partnership between Britain and the Ottoman Empire (Ediz, 2020, pp. 73-86; Karpāt, 2011, p. 80). However, Russian incursions into Central Asian Muslim territories in 1869 strained Ottoman-Russian relations, leading to enmity between the two powers (Karpāt, 2001, p. 18). The Sultan recognized this reality and crafted a foreign policy emphasizing good neighborly relations dwelling on mutual respect (BA, İrade, Dahiliye, 49343; Karpāt, 2001, p. 61). Despite periods of conflict, the Sultan remained open to cultivating relations with Russia. For instance, Tahsin Pasha's diary records that the Sultan would send representatives to welcome the Tsar whenever he visited the Black Sea coast (Tahsin Pasha, 2017, pp. 79-100). Under his leadership, the Ottoman Empire promoted the concept of a unified Muslim world based on Islamic commonalities in opposition to Russian Panslavism (Eraslan, 2019a, pp. 127-138; Karpāt, 2001, pp. 18-121). This was motivated by several factors, including countering the growing Jewish Zionist threat in Bayt al-Maqdis and consolidating Muslim unity against European powerful countries like Britain, France, and Russia (Eraslan, 2019a, pp. 128-129). Additionally, fostering khilafat served to counter Russian Panslavism in the Balkans, where many regions were separated from the Ottoman Empire and became independent entities after Berlin and San Stefano Treaty. The residents that became independent after the treaty were Bulgaria, Serbia, and Bosnia

Herzegovina (Akarlı, 1976, pp. 36-37; Karpas, 2001, p. 68). Among the significant events that left a mark on 19th century, the Russian pogroms and anti-Judaist attitude of European countries were important in terms of fostering change within the demographic structure of its country, neighboring countries and particularly in Bayt al-Maqdis as those of expelled Jews by pogroms were pushed to settle in Bayt al-Maqdis and ask for protection from the empire (Brooman, 1989, p. 4; Kushner, 1986). This directly impacted Ottoman foreign affairs, as numerous Russian Jews, along with European Jews, sought asylum in the Ottoman Empire (Kushner, 1986, p. 311). Russia's domestic policies, particularly its anti-Semitic attitudes and pogroms, compelled the Ottoman Empire to adjust its foreign policy accordingly. The Ottoman Sultan navigated his relationship with Russia cautiously and attentively, cognizant of the potential for conflict. He maintained a prudent approach to avoid antagonizing Russia (Tahsin Paşa, 2017, p. 79). This recognition underscored the Ottoman Empire's strategic importance in the region's geopolitics (Karpas, 2001, p. 75). Within this context, the Ottoman Empire enhanced its diplomatic relations with Russia by leveraging European powers, Japan (during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905), and China to counter Russian influence when relations with Russia deteriorated. The Sultan enforced this policy to ensure the stability of the empire within international politics (Akpınar, 2012, pp. 79-119; Ediz, 2020, pp. 77-79; Esenbel, 2002, p. 273; Tahsin Paşa, 2017, p. 79). The Sultan's sending Ertuğrul ship to Japan is the concrete example of Sultan's policy in extending its relations and boundaries of diplomacy (Yılmaz, 2015, 80-93). By that the Sultan both aimed to develop alternative relations against British and Russian dominion in international politics against the empire (Yılmaz, 2015, pp. 85-86). That was another sample of developing its balance policy in its foreign policy as Japan at the time was in combat with Russia and was trying to develop its power zone in the world (Yılmaz, 2015, pp. 80-93).

3.1.3. Relations with France

France's interest in Bayt al-Maqdis traces back to the time of Crusades who were prepared and organized by the Church and the Empires within Europe in order to increase their barbarity and they warriorship against Muslims to whom Crusades were later on nourished by (Muhlberger, 2017, pp. 6-12; Nickel & Breiding, 2010, pp. 125- 186). Throughout the 19th century, France, as a leading colonial power, sought new territories

in North Africa and West Asia for resources and colonization. The Sultan remained cautious of France's foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire, particularly in Bayt al-Maqdis, due to historical mistrust (Arabacı, 2019, p. 141; Özcan, 2019, pp. 117-121). Just like Russia who was trying to protect the right of Orthodoxes in Bayt al-Maqdis, Franks were supporting Catholics living in Bayt al-Maqdis although those people were already living peacefully in the region (El-Awaisi & Yiğit, 2020, p.11; Yasamee, 2011, p. 12). Franks invested in cultural, educational needs of the region as for them it was important to generate a society that would be nurtured by French institutions just as Catholics in the region (Burrows, 1986, pp. 109- 135). Franks' attitude although at first sight did not pose a threat for the empire, the Sultan was well aware of Franks' initiations to increase their visibility in the region and did not limit their activities as their presence was important in terms of consolidating Russian and British presence and aims in the region. This awareness prompted the Sultan to adopt a cautious stance, recognizing the potential threats posed by colonial powers to the Ottoman Empire's territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Sultan's policy was crucial in navigating these complexities while he did not actively seek closer ties with France, he also avoided exacerbating tensions by maintaining stable and respectful relations (Ortaylı, 2015, p. 128; Özcan, 2019, p. 165). Despite France's hostility towards the Empire, the Sultan held diplomatic and prudent stance towards France by ensuring its political stability (Karpat, 2001, p. 220). For Sultan, Franks were different from Germans and they were not friendly with the empire and were holding hostile attitude towards the empire. Their invasion of Tunisia was one of the important instance that the Sultan lost confidence in France (Abdülhamid, 1975, p. 137). During French invasion of Tunisia, as the empire had neither military force in Tunisia nor had enough soldiers and budget to protect and regain the region from France asked for Germany to help him regain Tunisia; Germany would not answer to his call and would support French invasion to Tunisia (Yasamee, 2011, p. 79). Therefore, the Sultan, throughout his reign conducted stable public diplomacy with France and did not pay special attention for developing relations further with France (Sultan II. Abdülhamid Han, 1976; Sultan Abdülhamit II, 1974). Russia, France and Britain in order to interfere with Ottoman domestic politics, were disguising themselves under the veil of supporting their religious descendants, although neither Christians nor Jews were in need or demand of this at the time despite minor provocations fostered by those countries. Such like Russia

and Britain, Franks were by using religious motivation trying to increase its visibility and power in Bayt al-Maqdis (Christopher, 1988; Vereté, 1979, pp. 316-345; Wasserstein, 1991). The invasion of Tunisia was an important constituent of Sultan's policy towards France and Africa region. The Sultan against French invasion due to financial and political hurdles at the time could not respond with a direct war with France, therefore the Sultan with the tribes in Tunisia and African region by the help of Caliphate consolidated Muslim population just as the Sultan did in Egypt (Özcoşar & Ertekin, 2019, pp. 264-265). The Sultan in Africa just like in Bayt al-Maqdis and Eastern side of Anatolia organized local people against the invasion of France and supported them both financially and militarily (Y. PRK. BŞK. 1892, 25/43). Those groups were composed of Muslim residents of the regions entitled as Hamidiye Regiments (Özcoşar & Ertekin, 2019, pp. 259- 264). For uniting those of Muslims under the banner of Ottoman Empire cemented by Islam, the Sultan had sent Şakir Pasha to unite those Muslim forces against France in Africa (Özcoşar & Ertekin, 2019, p. 264). In this regard, the Sultan's employing Muslim identity and unification was responded positively by the inhabitants of Bayt al-Maqdis, Africa and East part of the Anatolia. His unification of Muslims in the colonized region disabled those of countries to further their power and authority in the region. In this regard it is also important to restate that, the Sultan although could not have enough source to battle with France in Tunisia did not leave the region to France but continued to develop its ties in Muslims regions. As is explained in Chapter Four, the Sultan employed his caliphatehood as a soft power instrument in his foreign policy and by producing counter argument to those of colonizer countries on the ground. He did not leave ground to the colonizer countries and struggled hard to preserve Muslim population and their presence in Bayt al-Maqdis and Africa. His policy in Africa in this regard summons up Sultan's attitude towards colonizer countries as he did not step back and left those region to colonizer despite the fact that he was not able to battle with France due to financial program the empire was facing, he coordinated regional tribes under the title of Hamidian Regiments against France and Britain (Barlak, 2019a, pp. 187- 214; 2019b, pp. 269- 396; Özcoşar & Ertekin, 2019, pp. 259-273). The Sultan sought a way to prolong Ottoman presence in the region by using the rivalries of the countries towards Bayt al-Maqdis by prioritizing one another when the interests of the countries conflicted with Ottoman interest in Bayt al-Maqdis (Eraslan, 2019a, pp. 127-128; Özcan, 2019, p. 120; Said, 2003,

pp. 75, 226; Schölch, 2006, p. 50). Alternating one country to another helped the Sultan gain time for fostering reforms and strengthening Ottoman status in the region (El-Awaisi & Yiğit, 2020, pp. 1-18; Tekin, 2011, p. 46).

3.1.4. Relations with Germany

The 20th century was a period when countries could not conduct individual policies but had to develop cooperation with other countries since the power blocs and distribution of the power were not on equal terms. While there were countries who could invade three different countries simultaneously with their military force, such as Britain, France, and Russia, there were also countries who were trying hard to adopt the changing conditions of the time, such as the Ottoman Empire and Germany. Therefore, cooperation and unequal power-sharing were the reality of the period (Bolat, 2014, pp. 20-24). Therefore, the Sultan preferred to develop ties with Germany as a company since Germany at the time had no colonization aims for Ottoman Empire (Alkan, 2018, p. 229; Engin, 2011, p. 10). Since the Sultan was looking for a trustable ally to secure his borders and power against Russia and Britain, Germany, in this regard, served as a secured harbor for the empire to develop trustable relations with as a counter and alternative power against Britain and Russia (Alkan, 2018, pp. 221-229; Yasamee, 2023, p. 12; 2011, p. 44). This was particularly the late inclusion of the German empire in the rapidly changing world order after the Industrial and French Revolutions. The Sultan's preference for Germany as a close trading partner can be assumed to dwell on the hostile attitudes of Russia, France, and Britain towards the Ottoman strategic location in the Middle East. The reason why the Sultan regarded Germany as a trustable country to develop ties with can be summoned by these: a) Germany was seeking way to preserve the status of Alsace and Lorraine taken from France and get back the residents inhabited by German districts of Russia and Austria, b) increase its visibility in Africa by invasion of certain places in order to settle colonies in Africa so as to increase its wealth by trade, c) for a new world order, the Sultan regarded Germany as an important country who could rival Britain and France and did not pose a threat to the existence of the empire within its boundaries (Sultan II. Abdülhamid Han, 1976, p. 32; Yasamee, 2011, p. 51). As Germany was already an industrialized country at the time that did not have colonial aims towards Ottoman empire but was trying to develop relations and trading with the empire, the

Sultan by giving the construction of the Baghdad Railway, approved his support to Germany (Alkan, 2023, pp. 256-259). With that, the Sultan sought to develop the country through the support provided by Germany in terms of industry, economy, military and education (Çolak, 2007; Yasamee, 2023, pp. 107-122; 2011, p. 80). The Sultan was very much fond of German discipline, manners, and intellect when he himself witnessed during his visit to Europe with Sultan Abdülaziz (Çolak, 2007; Yasamee, 2023, pp. 107-122; 2011, p. 80). Besides that, trust and close relations between the Sultan and Bismark was important in terms of settling mutual respect and cooperation. Germany's not having an active war on the ground also strengthened the Sultan's trust in cooperation with Germany (Yasamee, 2023, pp.107-122; 2011, p. 80). Britain's not providing support militarily to the empire during the war with Russo- Ottoman War of 1877 and 1878 and again showing hesitation to the request of the Sultan for fostering reform and renovation in military, education and economy instigated the Sultan to develop political, economic and military relations with Germany (Çolak, 2007; Yasamee, 2023; 2011, pp. 6, 17, 80). The Sultan, knowing the colonial, imperial, and political aim of Britain on Ottoman territories in Africa and the Middle East avoided to come across with Britain (Özcan, 2019, p. 120; Yasamee, 2023, pp. 107-122; 2011, p. 24-25). Therefore the Sultan did not prefer to conflict with Russia and Britain and hence developed respectful mutual relations with Germany (Özcan, 2019, p. 120; Yasamee, 2023, pp. 107-122; 2011, p. 24-25). However, the Sultan developed constructive policies and good relations with them and preferred indirect conflicts with them (Farah, 2008, p. 219; Kocabaş, 1995, p. 211). Germany, however for the Sultan was a trustable country for renovating the political, military, and school systems of the empire which was at the time far beyond its time in terms of technology, industry, and political stability (Tadmori, 2019, p. 95; Yasamee, 2011, p. 24-26). What was important for the Sultan in preferring Germany to other countries in terms of developing trade and policy was its neutral position in its international affairs since Germany under the rule of Bismark was just like the Sultan who was not looking for a conflict with any country in the world directly (Yasamee, 2011, p. 74). The second reason why the Sultan preferred Germany was its powerful military structure since the empire was not that strong and its military was not ready for a battle. The Sultan approached Germany positively industry and military of the Germany were even at the time well beyond its age each day was developing and becoming quite strong

(Yasamee, 2011, p. 73-75). However, Germany in a quite short of time would not be able to pass the test of being a true ally to the Empire. German's templar camp was another instance that tested the relations between Germany and the empire whose ties were settled on trust and mutual respect (Eliav, 1986, p. 375; Friedman, 1977, pp. 5-7; Kocabaş, 1995, p. 213; Pulzer, 1964, pp. 11-33). Germany unofficially was supporting Jewish Zionist settlement and land-purchasing activities in Bayt al-Maqdis so as the purify his country from Jews (Carmel, 1975, pp. 442-466; Friedman, 1977, pp. 10-16). However, their support for Jewish Zionism did not totally end but on the wise continued backstage (Friedman, 1977, pp. 70-71). Germany was interested in Bayt al-Maqdis, and it was the German Templars who were among the first German settlers in Bayt al-Maqdis who resided Jews so as to influence Jews of Bayt al-Maqdis in the 19th century 1880s (Carmel, 1975, pp. 442-466; Kushner, 1986, p. 311; Pears, 1917, p. 160). For this reason, the Sultan prioritized close relations with the Germans in his foreign policy (Yazbak, 1999, p. 48). The Sultan benefited from the Germans by settling the Templars in Bayt al-Maqdis and mediating relations between them regarding their introduction of technological advancement in farming in Bayt al-Maqdis. Germans and their technological advancement had helped the region to meet new advanced farming technologies (Earl, 1924; Eliav, 1986, p. 375; Kocabaş, 1995, p. 213). In addition, he used Germany as a countervailing power and allied with Great Britain (Pears, 1917, p. 176). While the Germany found a secured place to sell its products and increase its wealth, the empire in terms of technology, military, agriculture were by the help provided by Germany reconciling the empire (Yasamee, 2011, 53-87; 2023, 81-106; Earle, 1924, p. 86). Germany endorsed colonization efforts in Jaffa (1869), Sarona (1878), Bayt al-Maqdis (1878), Wilhelma (1902), Hebron (1906), and Waldheim (1907) (Carmel, 1986, p. 452; Kaya, 2013, p. 148). The Sultan had a sympathy towards Germans and regarded them to have similar characteristics with Ottomans; therefore for the Sultan it was important to have a country to model with whose characteristics were familiar to Ottoman characteristics (II. Abdülhamid, 1975, pp. 136-137). Meanwhile, the Germans for the Sultan was an ideal country to rebuild the empire with by dwelling on their technological capacity and military might (II. Abdülhamid, 1975, pp. 136-137). The Ottoman Empire faced significant challenges after the war with Russia and the partition of Greece and Bulgaria, severely weakening its economy and military strength (Schölch, 2006, pp. 156-

157). Besides that, huge masses of immigration, expansionist colonialists and Jewish Zionists deepened the financial crisis the empire had to confront with (Bozkurt, 2021b, pp. 481-506). Recognizing the need for a strong ally against the encroaching colonialist powers of Europe, particularly Britain, the Sultan took Germany as a vital partner. Unlike Britain, whose policies could shift unpredictably, Germany offered a more steadfast commitment (Kocabaş, 1995, p. 211). The Sultan prioritized the modernization and strengthening of the military and educational systems to ensure the country's stability and future (Alkan, 2023, pp. 287- 288; Akarlı, 1980, p. 47; Kızıltoprak, 2011, p. 2). His domestic and foreign policies focused on centralizing administration and bureaucracy while accommodating the diverse populations within the empire, including Muslims, which also proved effective in countering Jewish Zionism (Arı, 2019, pp. 105- 207; Karpas, 2001, pp. 158-221). The Sultan believed that a secured and trustworthy domestic environment was essential for implementing an effective foreign policy (Çolak, 2007, p. 78; Yasamee, 2011, p. 47). For the Sultan, Germany represented a distinct country when compared to other European countries. The Sultan emphasized the significance of Germany for the Ottoman Empire, recognizing its reliability and steadfastness. Germany, in line with the Sultan's declaration, maintained and bolstered its relationship with the Ottoman Empire, unlike other European countries who were hostile to the empire (Alsberg, 1975, p. 539; Yasamee, 2023, pp. 107-122; 2011, 24-18). Similar to Russia, Germany pursued a strategy of supporting religious and charitable institutions in the region to solidify its presence (Kushner, 1986, p. 311). By 1902, there were a total of 53 German-affiliated institutions in the region, with 41 located in and around Bayt al-Maqdis. These included 11 schools, 5 orphanages, 6 hospitals, 4 churches, 2 sacred sites, 4 guesthouses, 2 care facilities for children and the elderly, 4 reserved estates, and 3 cemeteries (Erkan, 2015, p. 68; N. D. 9, p. 251-256). Ironically, nations who were discontented with the Jewish presence in Europe and Russia united on the idea to expel the Jews from their regions and countries who were welcomed by the Ottoman Empire (Başaran, 2016, p. 77; Brenner, 2011, pp. 194-195). Furthermore, as Germany was a staunch opponent of Britain and France, in the course of the time towards the late 19th century, it did not provide open support to Jewish Zionists while dually jeopardizing its relationship with the Ottoman Empire (Öke, 2021, p. 108). With the emergence of nationalist sentiments following the French Revolution, Germany was at the forefront

stage of implementing anti-Semitic policies (Friedman, 1977, pp. 11-129). Towards the late 19th century, Germany, with the intention to reduce the Jewish population within its borders, tacitly supported Jewish Zionism and adopted stringent measures against Jews, incentivizing their relocation to Bayt al-Maqdis (Friedman, 1977, pp. 5-7; Pulzer, 1964, pp. 11-33). Although Germany's support for Jewish Zionism was primarily motivated by a desire to expel Jews from Germany rather than to harm the Ottoman Empire directly, the Sultan perceived Germany as a close ally and urged Kaiser Wilhelm II to cease support for Jewish Zionists in Bayr al-Maqdis (Öke, 2021, p. 108). Although Germany such like many European countries, including Russia, Germany was looking for ways to eradicate its Jewish population. Anti-Judaist attitudes toward Jews were at their peak in Germany in the late 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries; the Sultan did not regard Germany as a country whose attitude was hostile to the empire even though sometimes German and Ottoman policies conflicted with each other. However, in these kinds of circumstances, the Sultan preferred diplomacy and mutual understanding with Germany, with whom the empire could resolve many conflicts before it affected the stable and trustable relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Germany. Like many European countries, Germany in the late 19th century was not content with Jewish presence within its boundaries and was seeking ways to purify its boundaries from Jews. Hence, Germany supported Jewish Zionism so that Jews of Germany would find somewhere other than Germany to settle in, but this was not motivated by Germany's hostile attitude towards the Empire but to homogenize their country from Jews towards the end of 19th and the beginning of the 20th century (Friedman, 1977, pp. 70-80). However, after the Sultan realized this, had sent an urgent and compelling message requesting Kaiser Friedrich Wilhelm II to stop supporting Jewish Zionist activities, such as supporting their settlement and land purchasing activities in Bayt al-Maqdis (Friedman, 1977, pp. 70-80). Thereafter, Germany preferred to side with the empire and maintained close and strong cooperation with the empire other than providing open support to Jewish Zionists such as Britain (Friedman, 1977 pp. 70-71). This instance was important in terms of seeing the diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and Germany. As both countries would not risk losing one another and need each other, they did not produce conflicting policies that would contradict each other but preferred to find reasonable diplomatic ground to flourish and continue their political cooperation.

3.2. The Jewish Zionist Influx

The first Jewish influx headed to Bayt al-Maqdis between 1870 and 1882 from Eastern Europe, where anti-Judaism was the most pronounced and practiced on the ground (Laqueur, 2003, p. 56; Schölch, 2006, p. 281; Tezcan, 2019, p. 1136). In the first phase of the influx, there were about 25 thousand Jewish immigrants who were mainly from Eastern Europe and Russia, settling in Mikveh in 1870 in the First Jewish Quarter (Köse, 2021, p. 128; Laqueur, 2003a, p. 56; Schölch, 2006, p. 281). The immigrants who came with the first wave of immigration did not push the native Arab population off their lands, as they had already fled from a massacre and endured an expulsion from Russia and Eastern Europe, in order not to gather negative attitude of the residents' (Muslim Arabs) in the region and not to be regarded as if they were posing a threat and problem and conflict with the Arab residents in Bayt al-Maqdis since residents of Bayt al-Maqdis were even at the time tolerant towards refugees who were exiled from Europe and Russia (Ceylan, 2019, p. 303; Gökmen, 2023a, pp. 32-33). According to the reports of Medoff and Waxman, during the first wave of immigration from 1882 to 1904, about 30,000 to 40,000 Jews came from Eastern Europe to the Empire. Besides this, Russian and Romanian Jewish refugees also immigrated to Bayt al-Maqdis under the protection of Ottoman authority since their security was under threat posed by Russia and Romania (Medoff & Waxman, 2009, p. 6). However, according to the accounts provided by Laqueur, Schölch, and Köse, the first influx was estimated to be around 25 thousand Jewish immigrants, mainly coming from Eastern Europe and Russia between 1870-1882 in Mikveh Israel within the First Jewish Quarter (Köse, 2021, p. 128; Laqueur, 2003, p. 56; Schölch, 2006, p. 281). This can be regarded as an initial step in building a Jewish society in Bayt al-Maqdis, and shortly after the first immigration, the Arab inhabitants and the Jews began to share the land and develop communication among themselves (Ceylan, 2019, p. 303). The alienation of the Arabs from their homeland occurred after the systematic Jewish Zionist immigration that began with the second wave of immigration influx between 1904 and 1914 (Skolnik & Berenbaum, 2007, p. 660). In the first phase of immigration, the Jewish community lived mainly in agricultural residents and did farming activities, and hence, the first settlement mainly concentrated on agricultural territories (Ataş, 2024, p. 38; Medoff & Waxman, 2009, p. 7). Some of the settlements

were Petah Tikvah, Zikhron Ya'akov, Ekron, Rehovot, Hadera, and Rishon le-Zion (Medoff & Waxman, 2009, pp. 92-141).

Leon Pinsker, the leader of the first influx of immigration to Bayt al-Maqdis, argues in his book *Auto-Emancipation* that there was no cure for anti-Judaism, which was heredity (Shumsky, 2011, p. 51). Therefore, he expanded his ideas and fostered the idea that the only and best solution to the puzzling situation in which the Jews lived in Eastern Europe and Russia was the colonization of Bayt al-Maqdis, where he was among the initiators of the first Jewish immigrants, along with the platform of Zionists who shared his ideas and immigrated to Bayt al-Maqdis from Russia and Eastern Europe (Shumsky, 2011, p. 43). There was already a Jewish community in Bayt al-Maqdis before the first influx began in the late 19th century and the earlier immigration even before Jewish Zionism (Halpem & Reinhartz, 1998, pp. 59-60). The Jewish Zionist settlement movement began with the first and second waves of immigration and formed the backbone of modern Israel in the region from 1882 to 1904 (Grossman, 1994, pp. 184-185). The negative attitude or, more precisely, the anti-Judaist attitude towards Jews in Eastern Europe and Russia did not arise overnight but developed over time and was triggered by countries such as Britain, France, and Russia, which were not satisfied with the increase of the Jewish population and their influence and power on social and economic life in Europe. As the Jews were posing a threat to the future of Europe, the best and neat solution for Europeans to break Jewish hegemony in economic, social, and cultural life and stop a possible threat to Europe was to accelerate Jewish immigration to Bayt al-Maqdis and support them (Sultan Abdülhamit, 1974, pp. 76-77). The assassination of the Russian Tzar II on 13 March 1881, nurtured by an anti-Judaist attitude towards the Jews in Russia, reached its peak and, by that spread throughout Europe, worked on behalf of European leaders to find ground for displacing Jewish Zionists from their countries (Aronson, 1990, pp. 3.9; Brooman, 1989, p. 4). The Jews of Russia had no other choice but to leave the country by pogroms. Additionally, the Jews living in Europe were forced to exile of which worked on behalf of Herzl who was already seeking ways to increase supporters of Jewish Zionism willing to move and settle in Bayt al-Maqdis (Cahan, 1903, p. 4; Gökmen, 2023a, p. 29; Kushner, 1986, p. 311). However, on the other side, European leaders were content with Jewish exiles and their willingness to travel to Bayt al-Maqdis since the European leaders were not happy with the Jewish presence in Europe. The Jews in Russia had no

other choice but to leave the country with pogroms, and the status of the Jews in Europe was no different from the Jews in Russia; they were forced to exile and find new secured place to settle for themselves by seeking ways to move or settle in Bayt al-Maqdis (Brenner, 2011, p. 198; Brooman, 1989, p. 4; Stephen, 1977, pp. 22-39). Herzl's remarks approve his contentment towards the pogroms and exiles those Jews confronted with. For Herzl as stated in his memoir, anti semitism and Galatz pogroms benefitted to the Jewish Zionism in terms of increasing their members and wealth thanks to the people expelled from Europe and Russia (Herzl, 1960, p. 209). The main beneficiaries of this plan, on the one hand, were European society and leaders who were dissatisfied with the increasing influence of the Jews on their economy and social life, and, on the other hand, the Jewish Zionists who directed these masses to Judaism with religious references convinced them of the importance of Bayt al-Maqdis and directed them towards Bayt al-Maqdis (Öke, 2021, pp. 34-35). In other words, although the initiator of Jewish Zionism was a secular Theodore Herzl, as stated previously, he did not quit benefiting from Judaist references and never left to associate Jewish Zionism with Judaism, which served as a basis for the expansion and enlargement of the Jewish Zionism in the world (Laqueur, 1971, p. 189). Herzl's affirmative attitude towards settlement in Uganda approves the idea that he is not religiously motivated to settle in Bayt al-Maqdis. In order to consolidate the masses of Jews who became part of Jewish Zionism, Herzl used Bayt al-Maqdis as a sacred place to unite people on his Jewish Zionist ideology (Sharif, 1983, pp. 1-5). The second wave of Jewish influx to Bayt al-Maqdis was initiated in 1905 by the German economist Arthur Ruppin by founding a new Jewish colony with the principle of collective ownership (Öke, 2021, p. 194). These people could build only 139 houses with 1,500 inhabitants, called 'hill of the spring' in Hebrew, near the villages of Ruppin and Jaffa (Öke, 2021, p. 194). The second influx changed the relationship between Arabs and the Jews. Unlike the first influx, the Jews of the second influx had an agenda of overpopulating the geography and pushing the Arabs to the margins and, therefore, were compelled or convinced residents of Bayt al-Maqdis to sell their estates to those Jewish Zionists who were coming from Europe and Russia (Ceylan, 2019, p. 300; Gorny, 1987, pp. 67-120). The first Jewish Zionists to arrive Bayt al-Maqdis were to experience the conditions and atmosphere of the region who later on became the leaders and forerunners of the second and third Zionist influx (Gorny, 1987, pp. 13-118). Therefore, Jewish

Zionist's second influx to Bayt al-Maqdis caused distrust and fear among the native population in Bayt al-Maqdis (Gorny, 1987, p. 30). These emotions can be interpreted as rallying the Arabs into unity, developing the idea of togetherness, and enabling them to realize the main purpose of Jewish Zionist presence in their land (Ceylan, 2019, p. 223). Shortly after settling with the second influx, the Jewish Zionists invested in building their new society through education, which is why elementary education with a Hebrew curriculum demonstrated concrete ground for extended Zionist settlement plans and policies in Bayt al-Maqdis (Öke, 2021, p. 194). Jewish Zionists quickly gathered support since they had their smoothly working network and they were so wealthy that even the European countries were in need of them (El- Awaisi & Yiğit, 2020, pp. 2-4; Vereté, 1970, pp. 341-342).

3.2.1. The Sultan's Attitude Towards Jewish Zionism

The Sultan, as 34th Sultan of the Ottoman Empire and 113th caliph of Islam, navigated one of the most turbulent periods in Ottoman history during his 33-year reign, which spanned nearly six centuries of the Empire's existence (Alkan, 2018, p. 216; Gündoğdu, 2019, p. 13). Upon ascending to the throne, he faced the lingering effects of the French Revolution and nationalist movements, exemplified by the Cretan Crisis of 1897 and subsequent conflicts with Greece (Hacısalıhoğlu, 2018, p. 110). Throughout his reign, the Sultan grappled with internal and external threats that profoundly influenced his policies in both domestic and foreign affairs (Fischel & Kark, 2008, p. 129; Tekin, 2011, p. 43). As a Muslim leader and caliph, the Sultan demonstrated the patience, strategic foresight, and steadfastness necessary to address the challenges of his time (Pears, 1917, pp. 205-206). Despite initial efforts to stabilize the empire in the early 1880s, the Sultan faced new challenges that arose with alarming frequency, such as Jewish Zionism emerging as a significant threat, particularly in Bayt al-Maqdis (Akarlı, 2006, p. 356; 1986, pp. 82-83). As a response to that, the Sultan adopted a firm stance against the Jewish Zionists, implementing a series of restrictive measures through legislation, decrees, and precautionary actions to prevent further unrest and conflict in the region (Öke, 1982, p. 364). Leaders should in hard conditions stabilize the conditions and prepare for a collective and continues improvement create vision and perspective towards their followers (Gökmen, 2019, pp. 11-13). In this regard the Sultan , a remarkable leader

of his era, demonstrated a concerted effort to stabilize and ameliorate the challenging conditions within and beyond the Ottoman Empire's borders (Clay, 2000, pp. 553-565; Farah, 2008, p. 13; 'Uffin, 2019, p. 228). His approach mirrored that of Sultan Osman, the founder of the Ottoman Empire, albeit with heightened complexity due to the task of governing an already established yet fragmented state with global reach (Karpas, 2001, p. 8). Karpas characterizes the Sultan's era as 'revivalist,' emphasizing the Sultan's endeavor to rejuvenate the empire (Karpas, 2001, p. 8). Similar to his predecessors, the Sultan exhibited qualities of courage, wisdom, and strength, which he adeptly employed rationally and practically in both domestic and foreign affairs (Kızıltoprak, 2011, p. 23; Tekin, 2011, p. 43). Notably, he engaged in a persistent diplomatic struggle against the Jewish Zionists, employing astute policies to navigate the complexities of his era (Çetinsaya, 2016, p. 357). Foremost, the Sultan undertook the challenging task of consolidating and pacifying both domestic and international spheres, recognizing that the Empire's internal politics were deeply intertwined with its external relations due to its diverse population (Tahsin Paşa, 2017, p. 160; Umar, 2002, p. 431). Managing an empire encompassing various ethnicities and religious groups posed considerable complexity, especially given the interference of the European powers and their allies under the guise of protecting minority rights (Çetinsaya, 2019, p. 27). The Sultan therefore adopted peace and respect based approach towards inhabitants of the empire along with his foreign and domestic affairs with the countries and tribes that was inherited by Sultan Osman who founded the empire on Islamic civility (Çetinsaya, 2019, p. 27; Kafadar, 1995, pp. 71-72). Notably, the Sultan leveraged his position as the Caliph of Islam in fostering unity among Muslims worldwide, extending his influence to regions such as North Africa, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Indonesia (Barlak, 2019a, pp. 185-214; Gümüş, 2018, pp. 200-208; Sırma, 2021, p. 11). Despite facing colonial and imperial pressures, the Sultan endeavored to revive Islamic solidarity globally, guided by Islamic principles and values, emphasizing respect for religious diversity (Aydın, 2014a, p. 52; Kısakürek, 2020, pp. 289-290). Even in contemporary academic studies, it remains challenging to encounter an unbiased portrayal of the Sultan and his policies during the 19th and 20th centuries. It was largely due to the enduring influence of negative narratives propagated by the Jewish Zionist lobbies both during and after his reign that a negative attitude towards the Sultan was started to be constructed (Kısakürek, 2020, pp. 22-232; Masalha,

2007, pp. 283-284). This persistent negativity continues to permeate academic and political discourse, contributing to the enduring association of derogatory labels such as 'Red Sultan,' 'butcher,' and 'stingy Hamid' with the Sultan's legacy. This illustrates the importance of words and language in constructing a discourse over a person or a country in shaping their status in society (Kaya & Mercan, 2016, p. 10). The Jewish Zionists were eagerly awaiting to catch an opportunity for establishing a state in Bayt al-Maqdis (Avineri, 1999, pp. 14-166; Sharif, 1983, pp. 1-5; Surzyn, 2020, p. 24). For Hoare, the Sultan in person was associated with the empire; therefore convincing him was enough for founding a Jewish Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis. That's why the Zionists pressured on the Sultan (1876, p. 106). A reader seeking to comprehend the Sultan should undertake comprehensive research and study about him; otherwise, one would be at the risk of being misled by prevailing discourse and literature surrounding him unless its historical context and conditions are reconsidered (Kaya & Mercan, 2016, p. 8). This underscores the influential nature of discourse. For Foucault, practicing power and employing it creates knowledge in which power is embedded as it is difficult for power to be exercised without knowledge (1980, p. 52). History, intertwined with power dynamics, is subject to manipulation through the construction of myths (Garaudy, 1996, p. 123; Kaya & Mercan, 2016, p. 8). The Sultan's significance lies in his implementation of precautionary and restrictive measures against Jewish Zionism, effectively halting their migration into Bayt al-Maqdis. His policies and actions thwarted the establishment of a Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis (Mandel, 1974, p. 321). The Sultan's primary goal was to preserve the multicultural, multireligious, and sacred nature of Bayt al-Maqdis, a land revered from the time of Prophet Abraham to the last Prophet Muhammad Mustafa (Sultan II. Abdülhamid, 1975, p. 57; El-Awaisi, 2016, p. 29; Engin, 2011, p. 8). The period between 1876 and 1908 under the Sultan was one of the longest period the Empire and particularly the Bayt al-Maqdis region had witnessed peace, tolerance, prosperity, political stability, and economic growth. The era starting from the late 19th century to the 20th century was entitled as the Hamidic period (Bussow, 2011, p. 2). The Sultan pursued a rational policy in his foreign affairs, considering power and the military as two crucial instruments in his diplomatic relations. However, Jewish Zionists were using any means that they could attain against the Ottoman Empire with their developing relations and coordination with the countries who were already behaving hostile policy towards the Empire (Ahmad,

1999, pp. 24-25). One of the prominent instances can be exemplified to be realized at the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), in which a memorandum prepared by the Jewish Zionist was presented to the Ottoman Empire proposing a region in Bayt al-Maqdis to be under British custody. Jewish Zionists aimed to settle their state depending on British presence and eliminate the Empire from the region. However, this proposal was called as a ‘crazy idea’ and was rejected by Bismark (Bolat, 2014, pp. 18-20; Hurewitz, 1975, p. 410; Y. PRK. MYD. 1901, 24/14). On May 9, 1880, at the request of the Sultan, the Council of Ministers considered the matter and rejected the memorandum in question since the request was considered to propose a state within the state in Bayt al-Maqdis (Hurewitz, 1975, p. 410). As can be seen from the ministers’ statements, it was understood that the Jewish Zionists were not dreaming but making plans for the country and its future. For that, they did not hesitate to perform their plans; this instance showed and approved the necessity of the precautions for restricting Jewish Zionist influx and land purchasing activities in the region (Ersoy, 2019, p. 304). Theodore Herzl tried to meet the Sultan and convince him to establish a Jewish Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis (Herzl, 1960, pp. 305-370). Herzl, in his attempt, succeeded in meeting the Sultan and declaring his offer in exchange to help the empire consolidate its debts and provide the support of Jewish wealth for the empire in exchange for providing a residence and territory for the Jews exiled from East Europe and Russia (Çolak, 2007, p. 111; Y.PRK.TKM. 1901, 44/52). With his offer, Herzl was thinking of convincing the Sultan by providing and offering important arguments and ideas to convince the Sultan. Fostering Judaism was one of the important and strong arguments the Sultan initiated to convince Jews and people to support Jewish Zionist settlement plan in Bayt al-Maqdis. Herzl, beside employing religion as an important instrument to unite people on Jewish Zionist ideology, aimed the reawaken young generations who were marginalized by the society they gained their education. It was important for Herzl to revive young generations towards Bayt al-Maqdis who in the last thirty years, had their education in engineering, architecture, technology, chemistry, physics, and law. By them, Herzl would constitute the foundation of a Jewish Zionist race and develop trading activities in the region (Herzl, 1960, p. 28). As is obvious, for Herzl, Jewish Zionism was a political and ideological ground for uniting the Jews under Jewish Zionism in Bayt al-Maqdis so that a Zionist state could be established as a reaction to the Jews living in Europe where they were restricted and reduced to live

in suburbs and ghettos (Bozkurt, 2021a, pp. 193-225; Kalın, 2018a, p. 421). The main motivation of the Jewish Zionist ideology was to convince Jews as well as people from other religions who had no prejudice against Jewish Zionism and their settling a Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis (Kayyali, 1978, pp. 9-17; Taylor, 1972, p. 40). The Jewish Zionists tried to approach the Ottoman Empire from its fragile side and made efforts to convince the Sultan to give Bayt al-Maqdis to the Jewish Zionists for the establishment of a Jewish Zionist state and in return for paying the debts of the Ottoman Empire (Herzl, 1960, pp. 1308-1886; Öke, 2021, p. 69-70; Pears, 1917, p. 167; Y. PRK. ML 1902, 23/8/1). Herzl did not hesitate to insist on his offer. The reaction of the Sultan, on the other hand, was not a surprise, for he very well knew that Jewish Zionism and its activities were quite concrete and clear; under this veil, the Sultan rejected his offer (Çolak, 2007, pp. 111-113; Gencer, 2002, p. 46; Kızıltoprak, 2002, p. 92). In order to convince the Sultan, Herzl paid five visits to İstanbul in order to discuss the possibility of settling Jews in Bayt al-Maqdis and founding them an independent or semi-independent state whose administration and community mostly were composed of Jewish Zionists (Herzl, 1960, pp. 1308-1886). The two of five visits were compensated by the Sultan's private treasury (*Hazine-i Hassa*), in which Herzl was received both by the Sultan and the Ottoman statesmen Grand Vizier Halil Rıfat Pasha and Said Pasha privately at the Yıldız Palace for about two hours between 1896 and 1902 (Öke, 2021, p. 66). Herzl's first visit to İstanbul was realized in 1896 (Öke, 2021, p. 66). Herzl managed to convince the Polish nobleman Kont Philipp Newlinski about Jewish Zionism for working on behalf of Jewish Zionism. Newlinski from that on gathered information for Herzl and simultaneously worked for the Sultan as well by collecting information from European countries (Herzl, 1960, pp. 305-338). Herzl appointed Newlinski as a negotiator to deliver his message to the Sultan (Buzpınar, 2002, p. 138). The Sultan's reply to Newlinski was quite clear. In 1890, although Sultan's reply to Herzl was quite clear and vivid, it was equally important for Herzl to state this in his diary. From the remarks of Herzl, it became quite clear that the Sultan would not allow a Jewish state to be founded and a change to occur in the demographic structure of the region. Herzl in his dairy approves the idea that Newlinski was working on behalf of Jewish Zionists. However, the Sultan as represented within the dairy of Herzl did not let a Jewish Zionist state to be founded in Bayt al-Maqdis (Herzl, 1960, p. 378). While the Sultan was conveying his message to Herzl with Newlinski who

was simultaneously strategizing the measures to counteract Jewish Zionist settlement and their land acquisition addressing Bayt al-Maqdis. However, the Sultan took necessary precautions to prevent Jewish Zionists from realizing their plans (İ. HUS. 1892, 1/42/1). These precautionary measures can be delineated into two phases. Firstly, the Sultan prohibited new settlements and the influx of immigrants, and secondly, the Sultan prevented land acquisition by Jewish Zionists (BEO, 1899, 1063/79680; C.DH. 1840, 24/1159; DH. MKT. 1901, 2188/ 106; Y. PRK. BŞK. 1882, 6/77; Tellioğlu, 2018). Commencing in October 1882, all foreign Jews, except for Jewish pilgrims, were barred from entering Bayt al-Maqdis, and as of March 5, 1883, Jewish Zionists were prohibited from purchasing land in Bayt al-Maqdis (Ataman & Çaylak, 2024, p. 14). However, the Sultan did not harbor any animosity towards Jews and never exhibited prejudiced attitudes towards them. Rather, his opposition was directly related to settlement and land purchasing activities of Jewish Zionist ideology and Jewish Zionists themselves, who had little connection with Judaism itself. Since Jews could easily do their pilgrimages, and visits; and besides that, Ottoman Jews in the region had the rights that European Jews could not at the time (Friedman, 1977, p. 10). Jewish Zionism for the Sultan, could not have a ground to be associated with Judaism. For the Sultan, Jewish Zionism was a political movement sponsored by European countries, particularly Britain and France, in order to weaken Ottoman authority in the Middle East to secure their ways to colonies as Bayt al-Maqdis was at the conjunction of their road (Vereté, 1970, pp. 332-334). Newlinski, as their mutual acquaintance, ardently supported Theodore Herzl's cause, endeavoring to persuade the Sultan to permit Jewish Zionists to establish a state in Bayt al-Maqdis. Nonetheless, each of Newlinski's proposals was rebuffed by the Sultan. In a dialogue recounted by Herzl in his diary, Newlinski's unwavering support for Jewish Zionism is distinctly evident. Over time, Newlinski became an ardent advocate of Jewish Zionism, much like Herzl himself. Following Newlinski's death, Herzl approached Prof. Dr. Arminius Vambéry, who was working on behalf of Britain and had dually close ties with the Sultan. Herzl persuaded Vambéry to arrange a meeting with the Sultan in exchange for 5000 gold pieces (Bostancı, 2006, p. 109; Kaygısız, 2014, p. 41). Herzl's fervent interest in Bayt al-Maqdis drove him to engage in a significant political and diplomatic struggle with the Sultan. The pressure on Jews in Europe and Russia further fueled the idea of resettling in Bayt al-Maqdis and establishing a Jewish state.

Interestingly, the aftermath of the French Revolution played into the hands of Jewish Zionists, who aimed to designate Bayt al-Maqdis as a new settlement area for their state-building aspirations (Simon, 1918, pp. 3-4). Leveraging the nationalist movement, Herzl, along with the Jewish Zionist movement, sought to unify scattered Jews worldwide under the banner of Jewish Zionism in Bayt al-Maqdis by engraving the seeds of a Zionist state in Bayt al Maqdis with his writer friend Max Mordo (Umar, 2011, p. 421; Y. A. HUS. 1887, 376/ 151). By employing Judaism as an unifying force for Jews worldwide and appealing to Judaist religious sentiments, Herzl endeavored to rally as many Jews as possible to the cause of Jewish Zionism. He melded the nationalist fervor stemming from the French Revolution with Jewish religious symbolism in Bayt al-Maqdis, amalgamating the two into a potent narrative to inspire belief in the feasibility of establishing a Jewish Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis (Friedman, 2004, pp. 66-71). The acquisition of land by Jewish Zionists began with the efforts of the Communities of Zion Lovers (*Hovevei Zion*), aided by wealthy Jews. Later, the Jewish Colonization Association established in 1900 by Baron Rothschild, played a significant role in land acquisition. Subsequently, the Jewish National Fund was founded by the World Zionist Association to facilitate land acquisition, with supervision and support from the Palestine Land Development Company (Kaygısız, 2014, p. 68; Öke, 2021, p. 62). The Sultan permitted the settlement of thousands of Jews within the Empire on the condition that they settle in locations deemed appropriate by the Ottoman administration, excluding Bayt al-Maqdis, where settlement by Jewish Zionists was prohibited (Buzpınar, 2018, p. 121). While Jews from all around the Empire and the world were welcomed to settle in Anatolia without restriction, their settling and purchasing land in Bayt al-Maqdis were restricted (Buzpınar, 2020, p. 281).

CHAPTER FOUR: ADAPTATIONS OF THE POLICIES

4.1. The Jewish Zionist Influx to Bayt al-Maqdis

The official and organized Jewish Zionist influx to Bayt al-Maqdis took place between 1870 and 1882, predominantly from Eastern Europe and Russia where anti-Jewish sentiment and pogroms were at its highest point (Schölch, 2006, p. 281). Approximately 25,000 Jewish immigrants, mainly from Eastern Europe and Russia, settled in Mikveh Israel, in 1870, marking the beginning of the First Jewish Quarter in Bayt al-Maqdis (Schölch, 2006, p. 281). These immigrants did not intend to displace the native Arab population in the region but were seeking for a shelter by escaping from the violence and persecution in Russia and Eastern Europe (Ceylan, 2019, p. 303). During the subsequent wave of immigration from 1882 to 1904, an estimated number of 30,000 to 40,000 Jews from Eastern Europe and Russia sought refuge in Bayt al-Maqdis under Turkish authority due to anti-Semitic persecution in their home countries (Medoff & Waxman, 2009, p. 6). This period marked the initial phase of Jewish society building in Bayt al-Maqdis, during which Arabs and Jews began to coexist and interact with each other. In the first wave of immigration, the Jewish community primarily engaged in agriculture leading to the establishment of agricultural settlements in the region (Medoff and Waxman, 2009, p. 7). The displacement of Arabs from their homelands started with systematic Zionist immigration flow commenced in the second wave between 1904 and 1914 (Skolnik & Berenbaum, 2007, p. 660). Leon Pinsker, who was the leader of this influx, advocated in his book *Auto-Emancipation (1882)* that the colonization of Bayt al-Maqdis was the only solution to the persistent anti-Semitic persecution experienced by Jews in Eastern Europe and Russia (Shumsky, 2011, pp. 43, 51). Pinsker's ideas inspired the first Jewish immigrants, who shared his vision and migrated to Bayt al-Maqdis to establish a homeland. However, at the time, there was already a Jewish community in Bayt al-Maqdis even before the first influx began in the 19th century, living under Ottoman authority with peace and serenity (Halpem & Reinhartz, 1998, pp. 59-60). The Jewish Zionist settlement movement accelerated with the first and second waves of immigration forming the backbone of modern Israel from 1882 to 1904 (Grossman, 1994, pp. 184-185).

The plan to establish a Jewish homeland in Bayt al-Maqdis had multiple benefits. On the one hand, European societies and leaders, who harbored anti-Judaist sentiments were concerned to increase influence of Jews in their economic and social spheres. Immigration of Jews to Bayt al-Maqdis was an important solution to their perceived 'Jewish problem'. On the other hand, Jewish Zionists, including secular figures like Theodore Herzl, capitalized on religious references to persuade and mobilize Jewish communities by emphasizing the divine significance of Bayt al-Maqdis (Berger, 1971, pp. 57-62; Gökmen, 2023a, pp. 32-33, Rotenstreich, 2007, pp. 53-96). On the other hand, Jewish Zionists including secular figures like Theodore Herzl, capitalized on religious references to persuade and mobilize Jewish communities by emphasizing the significance of Bayt al-Maqdis as their historical homeland by encouraging their migration (Ben-Artzi, 1997, pp. 16-64; Bozkurt, 2021a). By leveraging religious rhetoric, Zionist leaders aimed to foster a sense of unity and collective purpose among Jews despite differing levels of religious observance (Laqueur, 1971, pp. 177-180). Herzl's willingness to consider alternative locations for Jewish settlement, such as Uganda, demonstrates that his motivations were not solely religious. Herzl's advocacy for the Uganda Scheme, proposed during the Sixth Zionist Congress in 1903 reflected a pragmatic approach in finding a solution to the persecution and discrimination faced by Jews in Europe (Barin, 2014, p. 209; Ör, 2012, pp. 39-40). While the proposal was ultimately rejected by the majority of Zionist delegates, Herzl's willingness to explore alternative options underscores his commitment to securing a safe haven for Jewish communities regardless of their specific geographical location. Herzl regarded Chaberbain's suggestion for Uganda as an important chance to establish a state in Mozambique. For Herzl, Mozambique would be able to provide a ground to gain experience for founding a state in Bayt al-Maqdis, which would be close to Cyprus. This would help Jewish Zionists lay the foundation of a Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis (Herzl, 1960, p. 1487). Although Herzl seems to be religiously motivated in directing Jewish Zionists to Bayt al-Maqdis, he actually did not have this motivation; his changing attitude towards Bayt al-Maqdis approves this idea (Herzl, 1960, p. 1487). After the first influx, Jewish Zionists aimed to continue overpopulating Bayt al-Maqdis with Jewish Zionists. The second wave of Jewish Zionist influx to Bayt al-Maqdis was initiated in 1905 by the German economist Arthur Ruppin by founding a new Jewish colony with the principle of collective

ownership where people could build only 139 houses with 1,500 inhabitants (Öke, 2021, p. 194). The second influx changed the relationship between Arabs and Jews; they had an agenda of overpopulating the geography by pushing the Arabs to the margins, compelling or convincing residents of Bayt al-Maqdis to sell their estates to Zionists (Ceylan, 2019, p. 300). The first arrivals of Jewish Zionism experienced the conditions and atmosphere of the region who later on became the leaders and forerunners of the second and third Jewish Zionist influx. They were the forerunners of foundation of a Jewish Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis (Gorny, 1987, pp. 13-118). Shortly after settling the second influx, the Jewish Zionists invested in building their new communities by educating them, starting with elementary education with a Hebrew curriculum (Öke, 2021, p. 194). Jewish Zionists with the help of their professionalism in financial issues enabled them to earn huge sums of money from whom many European countries including Britain had adopted debts to compensate their financial market, new technological innovations and building residences in their new colonial territories (Karady, 2004, pp. 98, 148, 303). In this regard, Britain did not miss the chance to support Jewish Zionists in Bayt al-Maqdis (Gorny, 1987, pp. 67-120).

4.2. Dr. Theodore Herzl's Proposal

In the early days of Jewish Zionism, even before the establishment of the World Zionist Organization, the Jewish Zionists reserved some lands in Bayt al-Maqdis individually with their own budget without systematic purchasing sponsored by Jewish Zionism (Vital, 1975, p. 84). However, after the establishment of the World Zionist Organization, the purchasing of land in Bayt al-Maqdis became more systematic thanks to the help provided by wealthy Jewish Zionists in tie with World Zionist Organization (Vital, 1975, p. 20). Zionist interest towards the region continued until official restriction laws and decrees put into force (BOA İ. HUS, 1901, 91/2; Mandel, 1975, pp. 33-46; İ. HUS. 1892, 1/42/1). The frontier Jews who came to Bayt al-Maqdis did not have a colonizing aim as Jewish Zionist ideology had, but came to Bayt al-Maqdis mainly for religious reasons so as to make their pilgrimages, to pray and feel the sanctity of the region and escape from the anti-Judaism in Europe whose numbers were few (Laqueur, 2003, p. 75; Vital, 1975, p. 100).

After the World Zionist Organization fulfilled its organizational mission, it coordinated immigration and took care of the daily needs of the inhabitants, such as housing, social needs and education (Penslar, 1991, pp. 2-41). In 1870, an agricultural school entitled Mikveh Israel was established near Jaffa, which was the first agricultural settlement called Petah Tikva (Schölch, 2006, p. 75). Theodore Herzl in this regard after Napoleon Bonaparte was the second important figure who actively invited the Jews to settle in Bayt al- Maqdis of which was throughout the history had longed for (Laqueur, 2003, p. 4; Y. A. HUS. 1897, 376/151). Herzl used every means to get in contact with the leaders of the states who had organic or inorganic ties with Bayt al-Maqdis. Therefore, meeting with the Sultan was one of the foremost motivation that had been longed for. With the meeting, Herzl was planning to convince the Sultan for accepting Jewish Zionist settlement in Bayt al-Maqdis (Herzl, 1960, p. 663). So as to realize his dream, Herzl wanted to use Newlinski as a bridge to reach the Sultan and offer his good and valuable services to the Empire. By the meeting, Herzl was planning to convince Sultan for letting Jewish Zionists to settle and purchase land in Bayt al-Maqdis. (Öke, 1982, p. 51; Ör, 2012, pp. 9-10; Tahsin Paşa, 2017, p. 196). Herzl (1960), in his diary as of 20 June 1896 underlines the issue that Newlinski would negotiate with the Sultan and receive him of which approves the idea that Newlinski was working on behalf of Herzl supporting Jewish Zionists against the Sultan (Herzl, 1960, p. 382). Newlinski tried to convince the Sultan for a Jewish Zionist settlement in Bayt al-Maqdis (Buzpınar, 2002, p. 137). Although Newlinski, a Polish Jewish merchant, had long worked for the Sultan as a spy to gather information from Europe, was convinced by Herzl in order to work for him rejoicing Jewish Zionism and seeking ground for a close contact with the Sultan (Herzl, 1960, p. 847; Öke, 2021, p. 66). The Sultan's conversation with Newlinsky on 22 June 1896 was important in illustrating Newlinski's attitude towards the Sultan, empire and Jewish Zionism as he was an old friend of the Sultan previously. The Sultan, by emphasizing the importance of Bayt al-Maqdis for all divine religions asked Newlinski following question: 'What would the Jews do unless they establish their state in Bayt al-Maqdis; besides that what would be their alternative plans for founding a state for Jews'. Newlinski as an answer to Sultan told that, 'the Jews unless could find a have chance to establish their state in Bayt al-Maqdis, would seek for establishing their state in Argentina' (Herzl, 1960, p. 395). Herzl was aware of the problems the Ottoman Empire

was facing with under the Sultan's rule and so as to gather the sympathy of the Sultan, Herzl offered his help in publishing positive news in the European press about him and the empire. As in the European press there were huge amount of provocations sponsored by Armenians, it was important for the Sultan to deter provocations and manipulations in the European press addressing to the eastern cities of Anatolia. Therefore, Herzl tried to capture the attention of the Sultan and find a ground to convince him (Erkan, 2015, pp. 101-102; Umar, 2002, pp. 422-427). Therefore, Herzl offered his help to the Sultan via Newlinski in order to foster counter policies against Armenians in Europe. In other words, Herzl tried to exploit an internal problem and showed goodwill to soften the Sultan's heart and convince him to agree with him and authorize Jewish Zionist settlement activities in Bayt al-Maqdis (Herzl, 1960, pp. 346-362). As for the Sultan, this would pose a threat for the people living in the region as the Jews would start changing the demographic structure of the region and increase their power and presence in the region of which for the Sultan would be to sign the death warrant of the Muslims and Christians in the region. Therefore, the Sultan did not hesitate to decline this offer again and showed his insistence on keeping the multicultural structure of the region (İ. MMS. 1891. 123/5276; Sultan Abdülhamit, 1975, pp. 76-77). As can be deduced from his own statements, the Sultan had no prejudice against Jews who had no tie with Jewish Zionism. The Sultan welcomed and sheltered the Jews who escaped from Russian pogroms and anti-Judaist assaults in Europe (Kocabaş, 1995, p. 330; Shaw, 2008, p. 329). The Sultan, while trying hard to restrict Jewish Zionist settlement and land purchasing activities in Bayt al-Maqdis, the same Sultan was welcoming the Jews exiled from Europe and Russia within Anatolia as well. Although at first sight, these policies may seem to be contradicting with each other, it is important to see the nice, neat, and careful public and foreign policy the empire conducted during the Sultan's reign. As there were already Jewish and Christian communities who were ready to be supported by European countries, the Sultan in order to deter European countries from interfering Ottoman domestic and foreign politics and provoke dhimmis against the empire, the Sultan did not differentiate welcomed Jews from exiles and pogroms with the dhimmis living in the empire. Even under the threat of Jewish Zionism, the Ottoman Empire did not deviate from its multicultural and multi-religious attitude towards non-Muslims. However, the Sultan knew the real aims and attitudes of the Jewish Zionists and Europeans towards the

Jews and the Ottoman Empire (Kocabaş, 1995, p. 330). Jewish Zionists were very proactive and initiated their plans smoothly; shortly after gathering decisions in Basel Congress, did not hesitate to put them into force (Herzl, 1960, p. 784; Söylemez, 2016, p. 46; Tokgöz, 2017, p. 188). Another important reason was that the Sultan did not want a Jewish Zionist state to be founded in Bayt al-Maqdis, just like Armenians who founded their national states in the east part of Anatolia. In order not to create new problems within the empire and pose a conflict in the future, the Sultan did not let a Jewish Zionist state be founded in Bayt al-Maqdis. Sultan insisted on preventing the establishment of a Jewish Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis since the Empire was already in the process of reformation and reconciling; he did not want these reforms to end and equally did not want to lose any more territory, especially one of the most precious, sacred space of the empire in Bayt al-Maqdis to Jewish Zionists (Çolak, 2007, p. 24; Yasamee, 2011, p. 24).

4.3. The Precautions

The Sultan implemented measures to counter the perceived threats posed by Jewish Zionism which he viewed as intertwined with both internal and external challenges to the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan did not regard Jewish Zionists solely as a group of people who were trying to immigrate to Bayt al-Maqdis but an international organization supported by European countries. As a response to these threats and challenges, the Sultan pursued a comprehensive domestic and foreign policy addressing Jewish Zionists (Bostan, 2019, p. 7; Pears, 1917, p. 328). This policy based on strict measures in restricting the entry of Jewish Zionists into Bayt al-Maqdis coordinated by Interior Ministry who communicated with local governors for ensuring regional security and alert for possible future threats (Bostancı, 2006, pp. 101-102). One of the decrees issued by the Sultan aimed to regulate Jewish Zionist settlement and land purchase activities in Bayt al-Maqdis. This decree likely sought to distinguish between Jewish Zionists and other Jewish populations, indicating a targeted approach to address the specific concerns posed by Zionist aspirations (Bostancı, 2006, pp. 30-102). The Sultan's careful differentiation between Jews seeking refuge from persecution and Jewish Zionists had a significant impact on his standing among Jews. By differing Jews from Jewish Zionists; not holding a negative or prejudiced attitude towards the Sultan wanted to earn the sympathy and support of Ottoman Jews who were closely following the Sultan's

policies towards Jewish Zionists and exiled Jews who were exiled by Russian pogroms and anti-semitic expulsions in Europe (Bozkurt, 2021a, p. 221; Davey, 2001, p. 394; Kocabaş, 2018, p. 30; Margolis & Marx, 1972, pp. 471-472).

The Ministry of Finance also played an important role in enforcing restrictions towards Jewish land ownership in Bayt al-Maqdis (Bussow, 2011, p. 63). Despite these precautions, the Ottoman Jews generally enjoyed a peaceful life under the Sultan's rule and expressed their gratitude to the empire for their protection and shelter (Ortaylı, 2009, pp. 70-30; Tezcan, 2020, pp. 28-42; Y. PRK. AZN, 1890, 4/73). However, it's important to note that Jewish Zionism did have a ground within the Empire as the Zionists expected to have (Ortaylı, 2002, p. 1519). Those who were little in number did were distinct from the broader Jewish community within the empire (Ortaylı, 2002, p. 1515). The Sultan while producing precautions and alternative ways to consolidate Ottoman Jews and non-Muslims invested in transportation infrastructure, particularly railways to limit the influence of Jewish Zionism within Bayt al-Maqdis. By enhancing transportation networks, such as the Hijaz Railway (1900), Baghdad Railway (1899), and roads connecting key regions like Bayt al-Maqdis, Hebron, and Gaza; the Sultan aimed to strengthen Ottoman authority in the region (Earle, 1924, p. 86; Fischel & Kark, 2008, p. 148; Kark, 1989, pp. 58-61; Landau, 2016, pp. 13-14; Ochsenwald, 1973, pp. 129-149). The infrastructure projects not only enhanced Ottoman presence in the region but also enabled him to restrict Jewish Zionists activities in the region. With that, the Sultan enhanced the stability of the region by increasing his control (Akarlı, 1986, pp. 82-83). The precautions the Sultan undertook can be categorized into two regarding their effects towards the Empire as direct and indirect precautions. While the direct precautions were undertaken directly for limiting Jewish Zionist immigration and their land purchasing activities in the region, direct precautions in the long run enabled the Empire to produce policies and practices that would both raise awareness towards Jewish Zionists and limit their settlement and land purchasing activities in Bayt al-Maqdis.

4.3.1. Direct Precautions

4.3.1.1. Advisory Council

It was after 1882 that Jewish Zionist's settlement and land purchasing activities addressing Bayt al-Maqdis became more active and had the tendency to increase each day thereafter for a future Jewish Zionist to be founded in the region (Kushner, 1986, p. 313). The Sultan convened all the relevant administrators, ministers, and advisors of the state for talks to take adequate precautions against the Jewish Zionists through internal and external arrangements, 'extraordinary precautions' (HR. İD. 1892, 16 / 4; Kushner, 1986, p. 313). While the Foreign Ministry, through diplomatic channels, informed the international community about Ottoman Empire's righteousness towards the Jewish Zionists and the Interior Ministry developed policies that restricted Jewish Zionist settlement and land acquisition, especially in Bayt al-Maqdis (Fischel & Kark, 2008, pp. 130-156; Ünlü, 2024, p. 63). Protecting and preserving the superiority of the Muslim population and not recognizing the Jewish Zionists in Bayt al-Maqdis were the motivations for the Sultan not to accept Jewish Zionists' proposal (Karpas, 2003, pp. 323-328; Mezkit, 2013, p. 94; Mısıroğlu, 2017, pp. 360-370). While the Ministry of Interior Relations controlled and protected the Muslim supremacy in Bayt al Maqdis, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided confirmed accounts against hazardous publications addressing the empire (Y. HR. SFR. 3. 1884, 299 /100; Öke, 2021, p. 107). The fragility and the threat that Jewish Zionists posed to the future of the Empire and Bayt al-Maqdis required an attentive and professional domestic and foreign policy with regard to the future of the Empire. Since the Jewish Zionists did not settle only in one particular country, the international network they had allowed their voice to be echoed on international platforms and enabled them to strengthen international support for their claims in settling and founding a state in Bayt al-Maqdis composed of Jews around the world (Öke, 2021, p. 62). Simultaneously, a commission to discuss possible and necessary precautions against Jewish Zionism and Jewish Zionists in 1883 was settled (Kaygısız, 2014, p. 60; Öke, 1980, pp. 83-84). This commission was aiming to discuss the Jewish Zionist influx and foster possible scenarios and restrictions against their settlement and land purchasing activities, particularly addressing Bayt al-Maqdis

(İ.MMS. 1891, 123-5276). The precautionary measures were intended to hinder newly immigrating Jewish Zionists but had nothing to do with Jews already living in Bayt al-Maqdis. On 10 May, 1900, the Assembly of Ministers (*Meclis-i Vükela*) decided that Jews and members of other religions would not be allowed to settle within the boundaries of the empire (Meclis-i Vükela, 1900; Kaygısız, 2014, p. 58; Tellioglu, 2018, p. 108). The ministries shared their work in fighting against Jewish Zionism. The Foreign Ministry decided to work very hard to stop spreading Jewish Zionism and its future followers in other regions and encourage big countries not to cooperate with Jewish Zionist organizations herded by Herzl (Bostancı, 2006, p. 97). The empire was behaving in a cohesion in support of one policy which was not to let a state to be founded in Bayt al-Maqdis by Jewish Zionists. Therefore the administration and Assembly acted in cohesion in support of this standing point. In this regard in order to produce cohesive and constructive policy, this office helped the coordination among administration offices. Therefore this office was one of the primary office that produced precautions against the influx. In this respect, this office can be regarded to be a direct precaution against Jewish Zionists influx as the office was founded to produce counter argument and precaution against Jewish Zionists.

4.3.1.2. The Secret Service

The secret service established by the Sultan was one of the most effective organisations the Sultan used against the Jewish Zionists since he could get to know their plans before they put into force (Beyhan, 2002, p. 1600). Keeping a close eye on Jewish Zionism was the first and most effective way to fight against Zionism and find appropriate, reasonable restricting to the Zionist threat. Tahsin Pasha who worked for the Sultan for 15 years states in his diary that the Sultan employed official ambassadors and unofficial people from folks to garner and collect information, accounts from the countries all around the world but particularly in Europe who were working against the empire those times (2017, pp. 16-80). The Sultan's ability to shape his policies was greatly aided by extensive information gathered through networking and espionage activities. Grand Vizier Tefvik Pasha highlighted the importance of intelligence service in gathering, stating that ambassadors stationed in key European capitals were tasked with collecting information on Zionism and presenting it to the Palace. This information was


crucial for informing policy decisions regarding Jewish Zionist activities (Beyhan, 2014, p. 70). The networking of embassies and consulates established by the Sultan abroad played a vital role in keeping the Ottoman Empire informed about technological advancements, political developments, and economic trends in other countries as well. This allowed the Sultan to get alert for the happening changes in the world and know the emancipating threat before it turn into a big problem (Öke, 1980, p. 372). While the efforts restricted and discouraged quite many Jewish Zionist there were little group of people who could enter and settle in Bayt al-Maqdis illegally with the help of corrupt officials. For example, it was discovered that 272 Jewish Zionists had entered Bayt al-Maqdis from Romania and settled in Haifa. This incident led to investigation, and the officials responsible for allowing their entry (İ.DH. 1900, 1378/33; ŞD. 1886, 2275/34). Such incidents underscored the challenges faced by the Ottoman authorities in managing Jewish Zionist immigration and enforcing policies related to settlement in Bayt al-Maqdis. The Sultan had varying instruments to learn the conditions and happenings in the region. The secret service in this regard although had become an official office during the Sultan's reign the people who were gathering information for the Sultan did not necessarily be a official servants of the empire (Alkan, 2023, pp. 181-185). During the Sultan's reign people from varying occupations and nationalities could share the information they acquired for the Sultan. However the information provided by the office helped the coordination of a true, legitimate information and differ them from unreal information (Alkan, 2023, p. 182). This office in the regard can be regarded to be a direct precaution in limiting Jewish Zionist influx towards the region since by the office the Sultan could produce counter arguments and policies before Jewish Zionists employ their plans.

4.3.1.3 The Sultan's Personal Precautions

The Sultan proactively undertook measures to preserve the status of land by investing his private funds to acquire substantial lands in Bayt al-Maqdis (Öke, 1982, p. 364; 'Uffin, 2019, p. 228). Officially, the acquired lands were registered with the Treasury under the name 'Hazine-i Hassa' to prevent attempts by Jewish Zionists for buy them. The Sultan's adoption of 500,000 dunams of land illustrated his determination to prevent the spread of Jewish Zionism and to preserve Ottoman interests in Bayt al-Maqdis

(Bouazi, 2011, p. 80; Engin, 2010, pp. 55-56). The Sultan by purchasing the lands aimed to increase Ottoman control within the region and prevent further possible land purchasing activities by Jewish Zionists (Fischel & Kark, 2008, p. 156). The Sultan's proactive attitude included issuing decrees to restrict Jewish Zionist settlement and land acquisition in Bayt Al-Maqdis provided the supports of the villagers of Bayt al-Maqdis for bolstering the local economy by preventing economic disparity between villagers and Jewish Zionists (İ. DH. 1888, 1085/85110; Yasin, 2019, p. 326). The Sultan strategically acquired lands in Bayt al-Maqdis by creating a buffer zone against Jewish Zionists as they would possibly by illegal ways purchase land within the region despite the laws that were enacted to prevent their economic and demographic expansion (Fischel & Kark, 2008, p. 156). Openly expressing his opposition to the Zionist settlement, the Sultan emphasized the Ottoman Empire's sovereignty over Zionist land acquisition and issued statements rejecting Jewish influx and their settlement activities in Bayt al-Maqdis (İ.HUS. 1898, 66/79). To preserve residents of Bayt al-Maqdis's interests, the Sultan allocated significant landholdings in the Beisan and Jericho regions to the Bedouin population, protecting their welfare and economic stability (Kark, 2017, p. 9). These lands, registered under the miri system in the name of the Sultan, were managed by establishing *Çiftlik-i Hümayun* court to prevent unauthorized land sales (Yasin, 2019, p. 326). The Sultan not only prevented Jewish Zionist settlement but also preserved the superior position of the Empire and citizens in terms of population and revenues in Bayt al-Maqdis (Ataman & Çaylak, 2024, p. 14). Over 811.417 dunams estates and lands (*embark-ı Humayun*), %75.7 were under the authority of the Bisan Administration, which was established to govern the estates of the Empire and Sultan's property in Bayt al-Maqdis (Aydın, 2020, p. 86; Fischel & Kark, 2008, p.132). Despite acquiring these lands, the Sultan did not seek personal enrichment but aimed to thwart Jewish Zionist expansion and secure territories in Bayt al-Maqdis. The Beisan Valley serves as a prime example, where the Sultan's intervention preserved the local way of life without disruption (Akgündüz, 1987, p. 24). Strategically purchasing lands to limit Zionist expansion, the Sultan ensured that these lands would not be accessible for future Jewish Zionist endeavors by effectively hindering their aims in establishing a corridor for a Jewish state in Bayt al-Maqdis (Kark & Frantzman, 2010, pp. 49-79; Umar, 2002, p. 424). The Sultan's witty measures on the

ground aimed to eradicate the threat posed by Jewish Zionism by safeguarding the interests of residents of Bayt al-Maqdis and Ottoman sovereignty in the region.



Map 1: (Kark & Franzman, 2010, p. 56).

These acquisitions were meticulously planned not only to prevent Jewish Zionist land purchases but also to strategically disable any future attempts by Zionists to consolidate landholdings in this fertile region and found a state in the region by enjoining the separate purchased lands in Bayt al-Maqdis. The specific locations where the Sultan acquired land in the Baysan Valley, such as Al-Bira, Baisan, Bashatwa, Jabbul, Dana, Al-Ashrafia, Umm Ajra, Al-Zaba, Khan Al-Amir, Al-Hamaria, Kaukab Al-Hawa, Kafr Misr, Kafra, Al-Mafraq, Al Murssas, Sakhina, Al-Samaria, Al-Ghazawiyya, Al-Safa, and Tel es-Shauk were carefully chosen to strategically thwart Zionist expansion in the region (Kark & Frantzman, 2010, p. 55). By acquiring these lands, the Sultan effectively prevented Jewish Zionist settlement and ensured that these territories remained under

Ottoman control. Moreover, the Sultan initiated the construction of model farms and settlements within the acquired lands, offering favorable terms to the tenants in Bayt al-Maqdis, such as giving the lands with low costs or requesting no rent in return for the allocated lands. These initiatives aimed to create new job opportunities, bolster the local economy, and empower the Muslim population economically (Bussow, 2011). By encouraging economic self-sufficiency among residents of Bayt al-Maqdis and promoting agricultural development, the Sultan sought to ensure the prosperity and stability of the region while safeguarding it from Zionist influence.

In conclusion, the Sultan's land acquisitions in the Baysan Valley served as a testament to his proactive measures to counter Jewish Zionist settlement and land purchase in Bayt al-Maqdis (Bostan, 2019, p. 259; Gümüş, 2018, p. 175). Through strategic land acquisitions and initiatives to promote Bayt al-Maqdis's economic empowerment, the Sultan effectively defended Ottoman sovereignty and preserved the cultural and demographic integrity of the region. The Sultan as of 1894 invested greatly to Bayt al-Maqdis in terms of building offices and stores in Jericho and building a Mosque and a school in the village of al-Jaladiyya, trading centers in Beirut, railways stations, building new farms by supporting agriculture in the region so as to revive the economy (Al-Jarhi, 2019, pp. 160-161; Bussow, 2011, p. 93; Tadmori, 2019, p. 95). Therefore, the Sultan beside fostering administrative, and legislative precautions against Jewish Zionist influx, used his personal budget to reserve the land by auction publicly and bought the lands. The Sultan had three motivation in sum for this. Firstly, in order to prevent Jewish Zionists to buy lands by means of third persons and illegal ways, the Sultan reserved a critical conjunction point of the region and fertile lands. This was to increase Ottoman sovereignty on private property and control the population in Bayt al-Maqdis. Secondly, the Sultan foresaw the possibility of a Jewish Zionist state to be founded in Bayt al-Maqdis, therefore, in order to prevent Jewish Zionists to enjoin the lands they acquired by using third person reserve the lands in Bayt al-Maqdis. Thirdly, the Sultan in order to strengthen the economy of the region and meet the farmers with advanced technology of the time rented the reserved lands to farmers in order both to provide job opportunities for the people in the region, included them to production cycle so as to enrich their economical status by renting the lands to them with little amount of Money. In this

respect, the Sultan's buying land and establishing Bisan Administration for the lands can be regarded to be a direct precaution in restricting Jewish Zionists.

4.3.1.4. Prohibition of Land Sale to Jewish Zionists

Jewish interest in Bayt al-Maqdis after their expulsion from the land by the Babylon Kingdom never ended (Akşit, 1985, pp. 145-153). However, between 1856 and 1914, interest in land acquisition and related to that influx to Bayt al-Maqdis nearly doubled (Kark, 1993, p. 211). The Ottoman Administration under the Sultan enforced a firman (decree) so as to restrict Jewish Zionist immigration to Bayt al-Maqdis from 1882 onwards more strictly (BEO.1893,155 / 11594; Mandel, 1975, pp. 33-46). Upon this firman, varying initiatives were put into practice to settle 400 Wallachian immigrant Jews in Syrian lands upon the confirmation of Ottoman Authority (İpek, 1993, pp. 565-587). For the initiative of Jewish immigrants who could not settle in Bayt al-Maqdis and sought a way to settle near residents in Syria and Lebanon on 27.01.1897, The assembly of Vukela took a decree prohibiting new Jewish settlements in Syria and Beirut near the Bayt al-Maqdis border, and therefore settlement of Jews in those lands were prohibited (Y. PRK. BŞK, 1891, 22/89). Within this frame of this decree, 250 Jewish families' residential proposals were rejected (Arslan, 2006, p. 76; İ. HUS. 1892, 1/42/1). Ottoman Empire issued an order to all its embassies and their representatives working at the port offices to reject visa applications of those of suspicious Jews who were willing to come into Ottoman lands (İ. HUS. 1898, 68/90; Tellioğlu, 2018, p. 108; Yasin, 2019, p. 323). Ottoman Empire in 1884 issued a new legislation hindering Jewish Zionists, including Jewish pilgrims would not be allowed to enter into Bayt al-Maqdis without confirming their visas in Ottoman embassies (İ. HUS. 1898, 68/90; Yasin, 2019, p. 323). However, Zionists produced forgery in identity cards and documents to violate the rules in Bayt al-Maqdis (Özdemir, 2010, p. 157; Y. PRK. DH. 1894, 7/29/1). In this respect, the Sultan wanted to produce counter-arguments by limiting procedures to stop Jewish Zionists, their settlement, and land acquisition in Bayt al-Maqdis. As a reaction to Jewish Zionist interest in Bayt al-Maqdis, the Sultan enforced measures restricting Jewish Zionist influx and their land purchases on 8 April 1885 (Kark, 1993, p. 214). Additionally, in 1897, the Sultan enforced the prohibition of land sale for desolate areas (mahlul) (BEO, 1899, 1063/79680). This restriction was not limited to Bayt al-Maqdis, but it also encapsulated

the whole region as well (C.DH. 1840, 24/1159). The ministries were, therefore, expected to develop an appropriate policy toward the Jewish Zionists and the initiatives of Herzl. Realizing the seriousness of the issue, the Ministry of Interior in 1887 restricted those of Jews who were willing to stay in Bayt al-Maqdis limited within a month (DH. MKT, 1901, 2188 / 106). This, to a great extent limited and discouraged the influx but cannot be said to totally discourage them and diminish Zionist interest towards the region (DH. MKT. 1901, 2188/ 106). Jewish Zionists searched for other ways to enter and buy lands in Bayt al-Maqdis such as changing their nationalities and using fake names and third persons. A huge deposit was requested from those Jews who were aiming to enter Ottoman land and whose deposit were to be refunded after their exit with their passport (İ. HUS. 1898, 68/90). However, European countries that had Jewish citizens among the pilgrimages and, by dwelling on capitulations, intensified their pressure on Ottoman Empire so as not to apply these restrictions towards their citizens and the Empire upon the objections, decided to determine the duration of their stay in Bayt al-Maqdis for three months (Öke, 2021, p. 84). Therefore, in order to prevent foreign interference to Ottoman politics and preserve the multicultural and respective attitude towards its non-Muslim populations, the Sultan did not conduct a strict limiting attitude towards Jews but tried to limit and register their activities in the region. This precaution was important in limiting Jewish Zionists activities and helped to approve Ottoman attitude towards Jews who were trying to gain land and settle in Bayt al-Maqdis via unofficial ways. In this respect, this measure enabled the Sultan to earn the contents of Arab, Muslim, Christian and Jewish population living within the empire beside eradicating potential European threat to the empire.

4.3.1.5. Red Travel Cards

The card approves the idea that the Sultan could differentiate Jews from Jewish Zionists. As the Jewish Zionists were strongly in favour of settling in Bayt al-Maqdis, their attitude helped the Sultan to differentiate Jewish Zionists from Jews who were seeking for shelter within the empire after pogroms in Russia and anti-semitic assaults in Europe. In addition to that, the Sultan could differentiate Jews from Jewish Zionists as Jews who were invited to Anatolia without hesitation accepted the Sultan's welcoming offer and settle where they were directed to. However, Jewish Zionists were

very much hesitant to settle in Anatolia and preferred to settle solely in Bayt al-Maqdis and its regions. Therefore, the Sultan as a measure to limit Jewish Zionist expansion to the region fostered red travel card as a precaution to monitor and control Jewish Zionist activities in Bayt al-Maqdis. By the card, the Jews were expected to present a visa approved by Ottoman consulate before getting in to Bayt al-Maqdis. With the card, they were expected to submit a proposal for their visit to Bayt al-Maqdis stating their aims, plans, due of stay and reason of visiting Bayt al-Maqdis. Once their visits were approved, they in return received a red temporary visit card with a limited residence permit for thirty days (HR. İD. 1887, 96/19). This measure enabled Ottoman officials to monitor incoming Jews towards Bayt al-Maqdis and see their networking activities within the region. As it would gather the negative remarks of the European countries the Sultan did not prefer a reductionist attitude by limiting whole Jews who were willing to visit Bayt al-Maqdis. In order for the Jews who resided in Europe and other districts of the empire to do their pilgrims and to preserve the interference of European countries to Ottoman domestic affairs, the Sultan fostered this measure into force to limit and keep track of the nationalities of the Jews visiting Bayt al-Maqdis. So as to record the incomings of the Jews in the region with their aims, it was important to register the incomings and outgoings from the region both in pilgrimage and normal times. The authorities and security organs had the right to arrest these people on suspicion of security violations and check their documents. Jews who did not receive the card had to leave the region within 30 days; otherwise, they would be deported by the Ottoman security forces (HR. İD. 1887, 96/19). In 1882, the police authorities recorded the dates of entry and exit with the addresses of the persons in the monthly registration books. Jews whose residence permits expired in a month had to return to their countries and report to the police authorities, handing in their collected cvs to retrieve their passports (Barın, 2014, p. 36; HR. İD. 1887, 96/19; Umar, 2002, p. 424). Jews whose residence permits were due but who had not reported to the police in time received the red travel pass card. The Ottoman Empire, closely following events through the Foreign Ministry, published a package of measures on 21.11.1900, entitled 'Entry Conditions for Jewish Guests and Conditions to Keep Zionists Out of 'Bayt al-Maqdis' (Barın, 2014, p. 36; HR. İD. 1887, 96 / 19; Umar, 2002, p. 424). Zionist Jews coming to Bayt al-Maqdis from any part of the world should, above all, carry with them a collection of biographies noting their occupation, nationality, and

the reason for their journey, or they should carry with them a passport (HR. İD. 1887 96 / 19). Therefore, the authorities closely monitored and registered arriving Jewish Zionists to distinguish them from Jews who came to Bayt al-Maqdis for religious reasons, such as pilgrims (HR. İD. 1887, 96 / 19). In addition to legal measures, strict controls implemented by gendarmes and the administration further restricted the settlement and land purchasing activities of Jewish Zionists in the region. This precaution was directly aimed at registering the Jews to follow their activities in Bayt al-Maqdis. This card was in another perspective illustrates the respectful attitude the empire conducted on Jews by respecting their pilgrimages and temporary visits in Bayt al-Maqdis. Specifically, only individuals possessing red card were allowed entry into the Ottoman Empire, reflecting his nuanced approach to immigration (İ. HUS. 1901, 91/2/1; Öke, 2021, p. 37). The Sultan's discernment is further evident in his application of these policies regardless of the origin of Jewish Zionists. For instance, 45 Jewish immigrants from the U.S. were denied to enter into Bayt al-Maqdis and were sent back to the U.S. indicating that restrictions were not solely targeted at Jewish Zionists originating from specific countries (İ. HUS. 1898, 66 /79). This however also demonstrates the Sultan's consistent and impartial approach to regulating the entry of Jewish Zionists into Bayt al-Maqdis, irrespective of their country of origin. Although the Sultan fostered restrictive measures against Jewish Zionist activities in the region, the Sultan was cautious not to offend Jews in the world and Ottoman Jews. As Jewish Zionists were seeking ways to gather the support of Ottoman Jews, the Sultan by not disregarding the importance of Bayt al-Maqdis for them did not conduct a harsh, strict attitude without differentiating Jews from Jewish Zionists. Therefore, the Sultan with the card strengthened the authority in the region by eliminating the interferences of European countries as their Jewish citizens were not restricted. This card in sum had four aims. The first was to show the European countries that the empire does not prevent Jews and their visits to Bayt al-Maqdis but preserved its authority in the region. Therefore by that the Sultan eliminated European interference to domestic and foreign affairs of the empire. The second aim of the card was to register the Jews who were willing to visit the region, monitor their visits, connections and ties in Bayt al-Maqdis. The thirds aim by monitoring incoming Jews was to differentiate Jews from Jewish Zionists. As Jews who were coming for pilgrimages were not seeking for settling or purchasing land in the region but concentrated on their

prayers, the Sultan guaranteed their pilgrimages with the card. The forth aim was to broadcast to the world that the Ottoman Jews were not in favor of Jewish Zionists and the empire was not conducting anti-semitic policy towards Ottoman Jews and Jewish Zionists. Moreover, the Sultan by the card aimed to preserve his authority in the region. Therefore the card helped the Sultan to limit Jewish Zionists settlement and land-purchasing activities in the region. Besides that, the card also enabled the empire to spot forged identity cards and documents as Jewish Zionists by forged identities could purchase land within the empire. Therefore, this card was one of the important direct precautions that limited Jewish Zionists activities in Bayt al-Maqdis.

4.3.2. Indirect Precautions

4.3.2.1. Communication and Information Office

Jewish Zionism posed threat for the empire , therefore the Sultan paid close interest to the press and put censorship into force upon seeing the threat that may emancipate from the publications as instruments such as books and journals were essential in disseminating the information and get people to know about the incidents that happened and were happening at the time (Altun, 2022a, pp. 2-7; Tezcan, 2024, pp. 159-188). Therefore, media and its tools were regarded to be important in terms of representing a self or an entity in regards to providing reliable and credible messages to the public (Altun, 2021, p. 368). It was largely due to the enduring influence of negative narratives propagated by the Jewish Zionist lobbies both during and after his reign that a negative attitude towards the Sultan was started to be constructed (Kısakürek, 2020, pp. 22-232; Masalha, 2007, pp. 283-284). This persistent negativity continues to permeate academic and political discourse, contributing to the enduring association of derogatory labels such as ‘Red Sultan,’ ‘butcher,’ and ‘stingy Hamid’ with the Sultan’s legacy. This illustrates the importance of words and language in constructing a discourse over a person or a country in shaping their status in society (Kaya & Mercan, 2016, p. 10). The Jewish Zionists were eagerly awaiting to catch the chance for establishing a state in Bayt al-Maqdis (Avineri, 1999, pp. 14-166; Sharif, 1983, pp. 1-5; Surzyn, 2020, p. 24). For Hoare, the Sultan in person was associated with the empire; therefore convincing him was enough for founding a Jewish Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis. That’s why all the pressure

was concentrated on the Sultan (1876, p. 106). This underscores the influential nature of discourse. For Foucault, practicing power and employing it creates knowledge in which power is embedded as it is difficult for power to be exercised without knowledge (1980, p. 52). History, intertwined with power dynamics, is subject to manipulation through the construction of myths (Garaudy, 1996, p. 123; Kaya & Mercan, 2016, p. 8). The Sultan's significance lies in his implementation of precautionary and restrictive measures against Jewish Zionism by effectively halting their migration towards Bayt al-Maqdis. His policies and actions successfully thwarted the establishment of a Zionist state in Bayt al-Maqdis (Mandel, 1974, p. 321). The Sultan's primary goal was to preserve the multicultural, multireligious, and sacred nature of Bayt al-Maqdis, a land revered from the time of Prophet Abraham to the last Prophet Muhammad Mustafa (II. Abdülhamid, 1975, p. 57; Engin, 2011, p. 8). Due to the obvious negative consequences of disinforming the public, the Sultan went to great lengths to reinforce his policies and create a positive image in Europe against the Jewish Zionists who were spreading misinformation about the Empire and the Sultan personally (Altun, 2023b, pp.13-15). As Fahrettin Altun has underlined, misinformation has the ability to create hate, prejudice, and negative perceptions towards an entity, an organization, a person, or an empire; it is equally important to produce counter-arguments against this misinformation (2023b, p. 15; Altun, 2022b, pp. 367-379). Therefore entities and important persons need to propagate in two terms; the first aim is to let their followers know about their deeds and the second aim was to represent and project the truth against the misinformation addressing them and threatening their social status (Altun, 2023b, pp. 13-28; 2023a, pp. 21-22; 2022a, pp. 9-15; 2021, pp. 367-379; Mull & Wallin, 2013, pp.1-7). Meanwhile, raising awareness towards Bayt al-Maqdis and the threat of Jewish Zionism coupled with the dissemination of reports in newspapers elucidating the Ottoman policy towards this threat, constituted crucial measures implemented by the Sultan to counter Zionist propaganda in both European and Ottoman press and media outlets was both necessary and crucial (Buzpınar, 2016, p. 397; Engin, 2011, p. 62; Findley, 1980, p. 253). Therefore, the Sultan paid close attention to the publications both within the Empire and worldwide regarding the Empire and conducted an agreement document with Et Eugene Rappaport for the publication of a newspaper in France on behalf of the Ottoman Government (Tezcan, 2024, p.164; Y. PRK. TKM. 1882, 4/109/1). An illustrative instance of this stance is exemplified by an

article by Ali Ferruh Bey for a prestigious United States newspaper, wherein he expounded upon the Ottoman Empire's stance and policy towards Jewish Zionists. In his writing, Ali Ferruh Bey advocated the notion that Jews residing within the Empire held equal Ottoman citizenship and were afforded the same rights as any other Ottoman subject, emphasizing that the expansionist and colonialist ideology of Jewish Zionists posed a threat to the sovereignty of the nation (Öke, 2021, p. 114; Tezcan, 2020, pp. 28-42). Furthermore, Ali Ferruh Bey asserted in another newspaper declaration that Jewish Zionism could not proliferate its presence within the Empire, particularly in Bayt al-Maqdis, and that their numbers were dwindling daily (Öke, 2021, pp. 114-115). These pronouncements by Ali Ferruh Bey serving as the Ottoman Empire's consul in the U.S., underscored the global dissemination of the Sultan's policies by consular officials and bureaucrats. An evident manifestation of this approach was encapsulated in the article by Ali Ferruh Bey, which reached the populace of the U.S. during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Sultan in his own words states the aims of Jewish Zionists as follows:

We must dismiss the notion of permitting Jewish immigration to Bayt al-Maqdis. Otherwise, we would be sealing the fate of our religious brethren, as eventually they would wield complete authority wherever they choose to settle (Sultan Abdülhamit, 1975, p. 76).

The Sultan was keenly aware of the formidable networks mobilized by Jewish Zionists against him, urging him to grant them land in Bayt al-Maqdis for their settlement activities (Koloğlu, 1987; Öke, 1982, 2006, 2021). Consequently while on the one hand, the Sultan by means of establishing educational institutions aimed to strengthen the intellectual capacity of the empire against European and Jewish Zionists threat and their propogations (Akarlı, 1980, p. 47). Upon realizing that Jewish Zionists were steadily gaining strength and expanding their networks worldwide, the Sultan deemed it essential to maintain close relations with other nations to safeguard the interests of Bayt al-Maqdis by means of media as it became evident to present true information regarding the Empire (Akgündüz, 1987; Buzpınar, 2002; Kaygısız, 2014; Öke, 2021; Polat, 2017; Tellioğlu, 2018; 2019; Tezcan, 2024, p. 164; Umar, 2002). Herzl, upon realizing that the Sultan would never allow Jewish Zionists to settle in Bayt al-Maqdis orchestrated a media campaign in Europe against the Sultan and the Empire (Barın, 2014; Gümüş, 2009; Öke, 2021; Tellioğlu, 2018, 2019). As a journalist at the Neue Freie Presse newspaper, Herzl

skillfully utilized the media to advance his policies and objectives (Herzl, 1960, pp. 76, 84). The Sultan's rejection of Herzl's proposal served as a significant test for Herzl's tactics. The Sultan, well aware of the power of media on his both domestic and foreign affairs, paid special emphasis on media and their publications (Herzl, 1960, p. 87). While Herzl emphasized the influence and manipulative potential of the press, he also hinted at his plans for the Ottoman Empire and Bayt al-Maqdis. In response, the Sultan utilized both national and international publishing bureaus by bolstering the Empire's ties with them so as to prevent the dissemination of provocative and manipulated news that could undermine his foreign policy objectives. This approach was not solely directed against Jewish Zionists (Engin, 2011, p. 62; Koloğlu, 1987, p. 77; Polat, 2017). The Sultan leveraged the press as an international power tool to fortify his position in the Muslim world under the Caliphate's rule (Buzpınar, 2016, p. 397; Tekin, 2011, pp. 42-50). Through a mechanism of refutation, the Sultan produced a counter-argument against Herzl's negative and false statements about the Empire and him personally (Engin, 2011, p. 62; Findley, 1980, p. 253; Öke, 1982, p. 80; Y. HR.SYS. 1901 41/45). Therefore, the Sultan used the communication office to generate counterarguments against Jewish Zionists who were trying to settle in Bayt al-Maqdis as their natural and divine right bestowed by God according to their belief (Engin, 2011, p. 62; Findley, 1980, p. 253; Öke, 1982, p. 80; Y. HR.SYS. 1901, 41–45). The significant contribution of the office realized by the Sultan succeeded in supporting the imperial attitude towards the Jews and Jewish Zionists by differentiating them from each other (Kocabaş, 2018; Öke, 2021; Polat, 2017; Tellioglu, 2018). The office informed the London Embassy of Theodore Herzl's misleading statements about the Sultan and his decision. Although the Sultan rejected Herzl's proposal for Jewish Zionist settlement in Bayt al-Maqdis, Herzl stated in his speech that the Sultan agreed with his proposal. This Breau, by sending a notary to the British Embassy, forced Herzl to correct his statements regarding the Sultan's decision on Jewish Zionist settlement and land purchase activities in Bayt al-Maqdis (HR. TH. 1902, 263/7/1). Therefore the Sultan used media to support and preserve Empire's self-righteous position against Jewish Zionists. By this office, the Sultan was not only able to get to know the news from the publication both in and outside the empire, but also produce counter arguments for supporting his policies and measures undertaken against Jewish Zionists. The Sultan by that, was trying the preserve

the rights of the empire in media so that a negative discourse would not be settled against the empire so that the European countries would not find a ground to interfere with Ottoman domestic and foreign affairs. Therefore, the Sultan's by paying close interest towards the media in this regard wanted to prevent possible interference and seizure of territory by European countries. Meanwhile, although at first sight, publications and media may not seem to be related to the precautions undertaken by the Sultan, the communication and information office in this regard helped a lot to embed the measures on media and strengthen the discourse against Jewish Zionists by enhancing the righteousness of the measures undertaken against Jewish Zionists.

4.3.2.2. Investment in Educational and Cultural Institutions

Sultan Abdülhamid II promoted education from primary school level to higher education at all cycles infusing all sects of society so as to expand their scope towards the world by means of Ottoman Basic Law (*Kanun-i Esasi*). Primary education became compulsory under the reign of the Sultan (Gümüş, 2009, p. 121; Kırpık, 2023, p. 153). The Sultan regarded education as one of the most important institute for promoting change by shaping a country's future permanently. In this respect, the Sultan fostered education as a means to enhance the seeds of rebuilding Ottoman civilization from its ashes along with renovating the empire in terms of administration and infrastructure (Akarlı, 1980, p. 47; Çolak, 2007, p. 24; Desjardins, 2015, pp. 239-241; Tadmori, 2019, p. 98; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 24-27). This was precisely what the Sultan did in dealing with the economic problems of the day beside Jewish Zionists threat (Çelebi & Asan, 2015, p. 186). As the Sultan recognized the scope of Jewish Zionist threat and knew that this threat would not disappear overnight; invested in education by creating a society that would be aware of the changing conditions both within the empire and in the world (Kızıltoprak, 2011, p. 24). In the fight against poverty, economic turmoil, and the Jewish Zionist threat, the Sultan paid great attention to education. Therefore, his main concern was to improve the educational and economic status of the people living within the empire regardless of their faiths but put special emphasis on developing the scope of Muslims both within the empire and Muslims in worldwide (Ortaylı, 2002, pp. 1522-1528). The Sultan shortly after ascending to the throne carried out comprehensive educational reforms by opening new schools, madrasas, and universities throughout the empire, particularly in Bayt al-

Maqdis and its surrounding regions so as to secure the future of the empire of whom would later on become the architects of Turkish Republic (Al-Jarhi, 2019, pp. 160-161; Alkan, 2023, pp. 181-283; Çolak, 2007, p. 24; İnalçık, 2015, p. 92; Tadmori, 2018, p. 95; Uzun, 2005, p. 153; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 24-27). Although the Sultan was critical of Europe politically and culturally rejoiced and took their best traits, applications, and systems, such as their educational system, curriculum, and teaching methods (Çelebi & Asan, 2015, pp. 183-190). This prompted him to put the empire's potential into action by revitalizing knowledge, which was an important way to free the empire from foreign interference. Therefore, the Sultan regarded education as an essential way to rebuild the throne and Ottoman civilization beside its the administration starting by freeing the empire from foreign pressure and interference by prioritizing investment in education (Çelebi & Asan, 2015, pp. 183-190; Duymaz, 2019, pp. 327-328; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 24-28). The Sultan was aware of the importance of education for the continuity of generations; therefore, for future generations to become aware of the Jewish Zionist threat invested in education for leaving awakened generations for possible threats such like Jewish Zionists (Çolak, 2007, p. 158; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 24-28). In this regard, the Sultan awakened an empire from its deep sleep and rehabilitated and reformed it during his 33 office in Yıldız Palace. In that, the Sultan was successful as is already stated in the study, that even after his throne, a Jewish Zionist state could only be founded 40 years later his throne. Through education, the Sultan prevented a nation from decaying. He rebuilt the empire from its ashes with its citizens for a more powerful empire that tried to meet the people with their roots and Islamic jurisprudence. This helped the empire to limit the influx and settlement of Jewish Zionists with strict precautions. In this regard, education was one of the prominent precautions that enlightened the people against the Jewish Zionist threat (Bulut, 2019, pp. 216-217; Çolak, 2007, p. 159). Since Ottoman policies focused on the righteousness of Islam and its practice at the state level, it was quite normal for different ethnic groups to satisfy their education needs and expectations according to their religions. This was the motivation why the Sultan opened new schools on the one hand and changed the Ottoman education system on the other hand (Bulut, 2019, p. 217; Tezcan, 2020, pp. 28-42; Tadmori, 2018, p. 95; Yasamee, 2011, p. 24). The Sultan enhanced investment and renovation policy toward Bayt al-Maqdis by fostering new institutions, schools, security forces such as military, gendarmerie and police forces

as well (Bussow, 2011 p. 94). While he promoted changing the Ottoman education system on the one hand, he did not restrict foreign schools the founded in the country on the other hand (Çelebi & Asan, 2015, pp. 183-190; Foster, 2017, p. 201; Tezcan, 2020, pp. 28-42). Ottoman policies focused on the righteousness of Islam and its practice at the state level, so it was quite normal for different ethnic groups to satisfy their need for education according to their faiths (Bulut, 2019, p. 217; Ortaylı, 2009, p. 16). The Sultan introduced new categories of schools such as Ottoman Secondary School (*Rushtiye*), Ottoman High School (*Idâdi*) and along with these schools (Tadmori, 2018, p. 95; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 24- 28). The Sultan increased the number of primary schools (Mekteb-i İptidai) from 200 as of 1877 to nearly 9. 347 schools as of 1906 and equally he increased the number of secondary schools (Mekteb-i Rüşdiye) from 250 to 900 when he was overthrown (Çolak, 2007, p. 159, Yasamee, 2011, p. 24-28). The Sultan as of 1909 increased the number of high school to 109 one of which was the first private Ottoman school entitled Şems'ül-Maarif founded in 1882 (Çolak, 2007, p. 160). Some of the schools the Sultan had instituted were as follows: modernized Military Academy with foreign lecturers (Mekteb-i Harbiye), founded in 1877 Political Sciences Academy (Mekteb-i Mülkiye) become higher education institution, founded in 1880 Law Academy (Mekteb-i Hukuk-i Şahane), founded in 1892 Halkalı Agricultural Academy (Halkalı Ziraat Mektebi), founded in 1896 Veterinary Academy (Baytar Mektebi), in 1884 Engineering Academy (Hendese-i Mülkiye Mektebi), founded in 1883 Fine Arts Academy (Sanayi-i Nefise Mektebi), founded in 1891 Silkworm farming Academy (Harir Darüt-tahsili mektebi), founded in 1879 Police Academy (Polis Akademisi), founded in 1898 Ankara Model Field and Shepherd School (Ankara Numune Çiftliği, Çoban Mektebi) (Acar, Bir & Kaçar, 2016, p. 11; Akgönenç, 2024, p. 2; Aydın, 2014b, 74-81; Aydın & Özdemir, 2019, p. 88; Çeşme, 2014, p. 46; Çolak, 2007, p. 160; Gölcü & Erer, 2014, pp. 16-17; Kara, 2016, 551-564; Keskin, 2010, p. 88; Koyuncu, 2012, p. 168). He also built museum of antiquities (1901), a theatre near Jaffa Gate (1904) and state hospitals in support of education, culture and health in Bayt al-Maqdis as well (Akarlı, 2006, p. 361; Kark, 1986, p. 53; Kırpık, 2023, p.153). The Sultan, by renovating the education system of the empire, allowed Christians and Jews to establish their schools both in the Empire and in Bayt al-Maqdis (Kırpık, 2023, p. 163; Zengin, 2007, pp. 625-626). As of 1913, there were 103 schools and institutions with the treaty signed with the French government in support of meeting the

cultural, social, religious, and educational preferences of the non-Muslims (Bozkurt, 2021a, pp. 193-225; Muktaza Defterleri, 35/ 29-33). The Sultan fostered education to unify various nationalities within the empire against the threat of the European countries and the Jewish Zionists (Bulut, 2019, pp. 209-218; Evered, 2005, pp. 152-153). In this way, he successfully embedded a cautious attitude towards colonialists and Jewish Zionists who were planning to colonize the land through educating the Ottoman generations, encompassing all the citizens regardless of their religion, ethnicity, and identity and providing them equal opportunity for reaching the kinds of schools they wanted to settle (Akarlı, 2006, p. 361; Kark, 1986, p. 53; Zengin, 2007, pp. 625-626). The Sultan's main goal and motivation of investing in education was solely to generate a loyal, intellectual, cohesive, and peaceful society that would contribute to the welfare and future of the empire with publications and translations of the canonical works emancipated in Europe in the field of literature, philosophy and science (Al- Jarhi, 2019, p. 160; Çelebi & Asan, 2015, p. 188; Çolak, 2007, p. 154; Tekin, 2011, p. 47). By that, the Sultan enhanced libraries and disseminated them throughout the empire (Alkan, 2023, pp. 289-191). With that, the Sultan aimed to generate awakened and cautious generations through education towards colonialist European countries, Jewish Zionist and their tricky plans both in Bayt al-Maqdis and Muslim geographies since, for the Sultan, knowledge was the key to success Muslim world since only decent education reaching the knowledge of the universe can open the gates of Islam to the world and became representatives of Caliphatehood. The motivation behind his opening new schools and restructuring curriculums was to produce educated Muslim generations to serve Islam and, with Islam, exercise the obligations of being caliph of Muslims in the world (Al- Jarhi, 2019, pp. 160-161; Feriddun Attar, 2017, p. 361; Tadmori, 2019, pp. 91-110). The Sultan while representing Muslims did not conduct a negative discourse or relations with other Muslim leaders in the world (Barlak, 2019a, p. 206). The Sultan, on the contrary tried to strengthen the ties between Muslim leaders as well. His sponsoring knowledge was not for worldly needs but more than that to reach knowledge served to Muslims and act as the servant of a heir of Allah on earth by refurnishing it (Arıcan, 2023, p. 20; İbrahim Hakkı, 2006, pp. 87-434; Kalın, 2018b, p. 120, 147; Mercan, 2022, pp. 144- 145; Yavuz, 1987, pp. 31-39). For the Sultan, in order for the empire to revive from its ashes, it was important for the empire to turn back to the norms that rejoiced during its glorious times.

They were namely the Islamic advice fostering knowledge, science and renovations. By that the Sultan regarded Islam as important in terms of raising awareness among the people towards knowledge, peace and multicultural life and Islamic tolerance for protecting the welfare of the empire (Sultan Abdülhamit 1975, p. 171). The Sultan, in his own words, broadcasted the importance he had attached to knowledge, science, and education (Alkan, 2023, p. 52). For him, education was the primary motivation for change in society. His prioritizing education enabled the empire to get on its feet and initiate development and change even after his reign. The Sultan's policies and practices at the time, even today, inspire and provide advice for Turkish Republic. The Sultan's empowering education and cultural instruments in the region helped new well-educated generation to hand over the authority within the empire but particularly in Bayt al-Maqdis. By that the Sultan aimed to generate people who could well comprehend the time, Ottoman status in the world and Jewish Zionist and European colonizers' aims, ambitions and plans towards the empire and Bayt al-Maqdis. It was quite convenient at the time that European countries and Jewish Zionists had a good and decent education (Kodaman, 1987, p. 107). The Sultan for the people of the empire fostered education and cultural performances such as opera and theatre so that people from the beginning of their life could learn their religion, social, natural and engineering science to continue the rehabilitating policy the Sultan initiated (Alkan, 2023, pp. 281-295). As it was quite clear at the time that, without education; reforms and renovations would not continue. Therefore, in order to preserve the advantageous status in the world but particularly in Bayt al-Maqdis the Sultan paid close attention to schooling and education and cultural performances (Alkan, 2023, pp. 292-294; Akarlı, 1980, p. 47; Kanal, 2016, p. 152; Kodaman, 1987, p. 67). Therefore, Sultan's foundation of new schools and paying close interest to cultural institutions within the region can be regarded as a precaution in preventing Jewish Zionist settlement and land purchasing activities in Bayt al-Maqdis as the Sultan generated new generations who were more cautious about the threat towards the empire so that the precautions and measures he had undertaken were continued by those of people who got their education from the schools he founded. In this respect, founding schools can be assumed to be one of the best effective indirect precaution that enable the reforms to be stable and continue even after his reign.

4.3.2.3. Empowering Administration in Bayt al-Maqdis

Between 1831-1840, after Kavalalı's invasion, Bayt al-Maqdis became a Mutasarrifate directly connected to Istanbul encompassing Gaza and Jaffa as well (C.DH, 1840, 24-1159; S. D. A. O, 1875, 29, p. 254; El-Awaisi, 2019b, pp. 399- 401; Satış, 2015, p. 546). Bayt al-Maqdis previously part of the province of Syria was separated from Syria in 1872 and directly linked to İstanbul (Ataman & Çaylak, 2024, p. 14). The administrative division included Bayt al-Maqdis (Kudus) Mutasarrifate, Nablus (Balqa), and Safed Sanjak (Bouazi, 2011, p. 10). Therefore, the Sultan further solidified its status as a Mutasarrifate in 1874 (El-Umle, 2022, p. 296). Ottoman governance in Bayt al-Maqdis; Bayt al-Maqdis (Kudus) sanjak became mutasarraflık connected directly to İstanbul including provinces such as Gazza, Jaffa and Nablus (Bostancı, 2006, p. 44; El-Awaisi, 2019b, pp. 399- 402; Öztuna, 1989, p. 36). By 1900, Bayt al-Maqdis was divided into three sanjaks: Bayt al-Maqdis Sanjak, Acre Sanjak and Balqa Sanjak each comprising various cities and regions in themselves (Kushner, 1986, p. 311; McCarthy, 1990, p. 6). Bayt al-Maqdis Sanjak included Quds, Jaffa, Gaza, and Hebron; Acre Sanjak included Acre, Haifa, Safad, Nazareth, and Tiberias; Balqa Sanjak included Nablus, Banisab, Jemain, and Jenin (McCarthy, 1990, p. 6). The Sultan implemented various measures for monitoring and controlling tax income in agriculture, including the establishment of new administrative units (nahiyes), government and administrative institutions, villages (muhtar), gendarmeries, and land registries (tapu) (Al-Jarhi, 2019, pp. 160-161; Bussow, 2011, p. 63). This administrative restructuring strengthened political, social, military, and economic coordination between the Ottoman Empire and Bayt al-Maqdis. Empire's self capital played a pivotal role in infrastructuring the empire under the Sultan's rule. It significantly enhanced the quality and quantity of civil servants by focusing on the overall improvement and infrastructure of education, trading and transportation buildings and centers through railways, ways and ports (Bussow, 2011, p. 63; Tadmori, 2019, pp. 92-110). The administrative status concerning the people and their environment underwent constant renewal (Mazza, 2009, p. 18). Large portions of the budget were allocated to ensure the well-being and security of the country and its people, given threats both from abroad and within, particularly from Jewish Zionist propagators seeking opportunities for separatist activities in Bayt al-Maqdis (Bussow, 2011, p. 94). Internal provisioning extended to rural areas through the establishment of new

administrative units (nahiyes), government and administrative institutions, villages (muhtar), gendarmeries, and land registries (tapu) to monitor and control tax agriculture closely (Bussow, 2011, p. 63). The infrastructure of the city was empowered, hence its gates and walls were opened and new ones were built. Additionally, in health, education, and culture, primary and secondary schools, state hospitals, and even a museum of antiquities were opened in Bayt al-Maqdis in 1901 (Çolak, 2007, p. 24). A theater building was constructed near Jaffa Gate in 1904, and waqfs were established to support religious buildings, manuscripts, and orphaned children (Akarlı, 2006, p. 361; Kark, 1986, p. 53; Memiş, 2018, p. 88). To enhance regional security, the Sultan initiated the construction of new military garrisons. He established special forces with well-equipped technology and German military specialists to improve their protective and service capabilities against potential threats emancipating from European colonialist countries and Jewish Zionists (El-Umle, 2022, p. 298; Y. A. HUS. 1898, 381/21-2). Furthermore, the Sultan decided to overhaul the bureaucracy in Bayt al-Maqdis, replacing local leaders who deemed to be incompetent in implementing Ottoman Empire policies and decisions (Mazza, 2009, p. 18). Mukhtar offices were opened in the highlands for precise implementation of precautions and measures (Bussow, 2011, p. 63). Efforts to exert effective control over human and natural resources were challenging. Still, they were based on the revised Vilayet Law of 1877, requiring settlements with more than 200 households to constitute a nahiyah. Administrative units were established in the three sub-districts: Quds, Jaffa, and Hebron (Bussow, 2011, p. 68). Jews living illegally in Bayt al-Maqdis were urged to accept Ottoman citizenship, and those who refused, including individuals from the U.S. and Greece, were deported. Entry into the country was banned in June 1882, land purchase was prohibited, and unauthorized construction could be demolished (Y. PRK. BŞK. 1882, 6/77). The Ottoman Empire invested significantly in the region, strengthening administration, the gendarmerie, the police force, and infrastructure. Despite rejecting Herzl's offer, the Sultan continued investing to the region by constructing government houses, public buildings, mosques, public parks, water fountains, clocktowers, and various educational and cultural institutions, reflecting his commitment to the welfare and development of the Bayt al-Maqdis (Akarlı, 2006, p. 361; Kark, 1986, p. 53). In this regard, his appointing Mehmet Tevfik Biren to Mutasarrifate of Bayt al-Maqdis who graduated from Mulkiye, by the school the Sultan founded,

approved the great importance the Sultan attached to Bayt al-Maqdis (El-Awaisi, 2019b, p. 400). Biren after his graduation started working at the office in Yıldız Palace close to Sultan as an officer responsible for official writings of the directorate of the Sultanate of which later on helped him to be trusted by the Sultan after updating the status of Mutasarrifate in Bayt al-Maqdis. He was among the first to be appointed to this critical new status in Bayt al-Maqdis as Mutasarrif which would directly be connected to İstanbul whom later fostered the undertaken precautions by the Sultan neatly (Biren, 1993; El-Awaisi, 2019b, p. 400). Biren was an important figure in fostering precautions undertaken against Jewish Zionists as he was a trustable, clever intellect of his time; he could well comprehend the conditions and coordinated with Yıldız in a very prompt and successful way. He can be regarded to be an important figure in the Sultan's success against Jewish Zionist influx and land purchasing activities in Bayt al-Maqdis (Biren, 1993). In that, the Sultan's empowering administration of the empire within the region enabled the Sultan to increase his authority and preserve the welfare of the people living in the region. The empire against changing conditions and provocations of the Jewish Zionists in Bayt al-Maqdis by empowering the administration enhanced the authority of the empire within the region did not spare a ground for Jewish Zionists to settle and purchase land in the region. Strong administration and direct link between empire and the region enabled the Sultan to gather information from first hand and preserve the cohesion among different nationalities and peoples of varying faiths against Jewish Zionists. This policy in this regard can be regarded to enhance the multicultural atmosphere and preserve the welfare of the people living peacefully under the empire. Strengthening the administration structure of the empire in the regard can be regarded to be a precaution that prevented Jewish Zionists from increasing their authority and visibility by their land purchasing and settlement activities.

4.3.2.4. Supporting Regional Tribes in Bayt al-Maqdis

As a precaution against Jewish Zionist threats and their manipulations, the Sultan paid close attention to the tribes in Bayt al-Maqdis by keeping close contact with them (El-Umle, 2022, p. 298; Gökmen, 2023b, p. 204; Kodaman, 1987, pp. 11-35). He established direct communication networking and strengthened ties and good relations with them (Akarlı, 1986, p. 80). Under the rule of the Sultan, the Empire granted tapus

(land registries) to the tribes approving the state's goodwill and trust towards the tribes and communities in Bayt al-Maqdis in order to gather their support and company against European colonisers and Jewish Zionists (Akarlı, 1986, p. 80; Kodaman, pp.11-89). This approach served for two purposes: firstly, it aimed to gain the trust and attachment of the tribes and communities to the state, and secondly, it worked to prevent Jewish Zionists from acquiring land in the region. The strategy aimed to form a united and strong community against possible Jewish Zionist colonies and to counter the Jewish Zionist influence in terms of community and population in the geography (Kodaman, 1987, pp. 11-35; Y. MTV. 1906, 284/66-1; Tahsin Paşa, 2017, pp. 235-298). The Sultan welcomed important Arab ulemas and Sufi Shaykhs in İstanbul in order for Muslims world to get united against division sponsored by Britain with an alternative caliphate. As Britain was trying to initiate an alternative caliphatehood against the empire, the Sultan as a precaution, welcomed important representatives of Islam and Arab world in İstanbul under the surveillance and protection of the empire (Akarlı, 1986, p. 81). The Sultan reserved places for tribes and Muslim immigrants coming from varying countries in Bayt al-Maqdis so as to preserve Muslim population against Jewish Zionists' land purchasing and settlement activities (DH. MKT. 1901, 2188/ 106). The Sultan, serving as the Caliph of Muslims, advocated for the unification of Muslims within the empire in İstanbul (Gökmen, 2023b; Özcan, 2008, pp. 107-115). To rally against colonialism and Zionism, the Sultan paid close interest in the unification of the Islamic world. In this regard, Jewish Zionism and European colonization activities and threats posed by them to Muslim territories constituted an important motivation for the Sultan to propose Muslims in the world to get united under the banner of the Ottoman Empire (El-Umle, 2022, pp. 296-306; Farah, 2008, p. 162; İ. DH. 1892, 1260 / 98929). The revival of the Muslims and the spirit of Islam resonated strongly worldwide involving nearly three or four million Muslims. Even after his rule, this wave of unification sought to find a foundation for continuity (Farah, 2008, p. 162). The Sultan had representatives all throughout the empire including tribes beside his official and secret representatives in Turkistan, India, Africa, Japan, and China to get to know the things going on the region and disseminate Islam to those regions against colonialist countries as a counter-argument (Alkan, 2018, p. 232; Barlak, 2019a, pp. 185-214; Sırma, 1979, pp. 199-205). The Sultan succeeded in uniting Muslims both within the Empire and worldwide by fostering a counter-defensive stance

against Jewish Zionism and European colonization in Muslim regions such as India, Kenya, Tunisia, and Algeria. Muslims from Indonesia to India openly supported the Sultan and the empire in their struggle against Jewish Zionists and European colonialists (Akarlı, 1986, p. 81; Buzpınar, 2016, p. 167; Kodaman, 1987, pp. 23-33). While paying close attention to Arab tribes and encouraging their collaboration in security and religious matters within the provinces, the Sultan aimed to strengthen relations between the tribes (Akarlı, 1980, p. 55; Gökmen, 2023b, p. 204; İ. DH. 1892, 1260 / 98929). One tangible outcome of this interest was the Hamidic Security Forces in Anatolia comprised of local inhabitants, particularly by the Kurds and Arab Tribes against Armenians and Arab tribes in the Middle East against colonization activities of Britain (Çolak, 2007, p. 148; Kodaman, 1987, pp. 11-89). With them, the Sultan sought to build a robust community against Jewish Zionists, colonialist European countries, and Armenians who were in revolt against the empire (Çolak, 2007, p. 148). Recognizing the Zionists' intentions, the Sultan issued a firman prohibiting Jewish Zionist visits, immigration, and land purchasing activities (Y. PRK. BŞK. 1891, 22/89). In 1892, the Sultan took a significant step towards securing the future of the tribes by establishing a distinguished school for the children of tribe leaders (Ekinci & Şenel, 2023, pp. 411- 426, Kodaman, 1987, pp. 69- 76; Rogan, 1996, p. 83). Besides his initiations to gain the support of the tribes and resolve the conflict among the tribes in 1892, the Sultan invested in the future of the tribes by opening a distinguished school with professional scholars furnished with a special curriculum (El-Umle, 2022, p. 297; Rogan, 1996, pp. 84-87). This institution, named Schools for Arab Tribes (Aşiret Mektepleri) aimed to nurture educated, loyal, and patriotic leaders who would remain dedicated to the empire (Alkan, 2023, p. 283; Kodaman, 1987, p. 69; Rogan, p. 84). The school, equipped with a specialized curriculum and staffed by professional scholars played a crucial role in producing graduates who were later granted opportunities to pursue further studies in Imperial Military (Harbiye) and Civil Service (Mülkiye) Schools (Alkan, 2023, p. 283; Khalidi, 1992, p. 124; Rogan, 1996, pp. 83-96). Schools for Tribes were exclusively reserved for the children of tribe leaders, ensuring that they received an education tailored to meet the empire's needs (Ekinci & Şenel, 2023, pp. 411-426). The Sultan's focus on the education of these children was driven by his desire to preserve tribal support, enhance loyalty, strengthen future relations, and foster cooperation with them in the region they inhabit (Totonji, 2020, pp. 68-70). The

curriculum at the school covered a range of subjects, starting from teaching of Quran and Islam from primary school to foreign languages such as French and Persian to Islamic sciences, humanities, geography, history, arithmetic, and technical and military education (Ekinçi & Şenel, 2023, pp. 411-426; Rogan, 1996, p. 93; Totonji, 2020, p. 69). This educational initiative served as a precautionary measure against potential threats arising from tribal collaboration with the empire's enemies, such as Jewish Zionists and European countries (Kodaman, 1987, p. 2). Not only did this initiative eliminate the risk of tribes being used against the empire by European countries and Jewish Zionists, but it also fostered a sense of unity and common identity among the tribes from Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Bayt al-Maqdis under the umbrella of the Ottoman Empire and the Caliph of Islam in İstanbul (El-Umle, 2022, p. 297; Rogan, 1996, pp. 83-107). The specialized education offered to the children of tribes also proved to be beneficial in expanding collaboration across various Muslim regions with the empire (Kodaman, 1987, p. 75). This strategic approach contributed to the Sultan's success in navigating complex geopolitical challenges and reinforcing the empire's strength and unity. (Kodaman, 1987, p. 75; Rogan, 1996, p. 104; Sırma, 2021, p. 14; Totonji, 2019, pp. 70-71). Therefore, the establishment of Schools for tribes helped the Sultan strengthen the authority of the empire in Arab regions and in East Anatolia by increasing their loyalty towards the empire. As British and Jewish Zionist activities were at its hectic period, establishing schools enhanced cooperation between the empire and tribes against British and Jewish Zionist colonization activities in Bayt al-Maqdis and its surrounding region. The establishment of the schools in this regard can be regarded as a precaution for preventing new partitions from the provinces in Bayt al-Maqdis and East Anatolian region. Sultan's developing relations with Arab tribes in Bayt al-Maqdis in this regard can be regarded to be an indirect precaution in preventing tribes from supporting Britain and Jewish Zionists against the empire. Therefore, the Sultan by supporting local tribes not only enhanced the mutual respect and cooperation but also became more active on the ground as the tribes were reporting daily issues to the officials. Therefore the officials in the region by the support provided by the tribes, could conduct more effective policies in preventing Jewish Zionist influx to Bayt al-Maqdis. The tribes in the region were the important constituents of the success the Sultan achieved against Jewish Zionists. By their support, the Sultan

was able to conduct and implement proactive measures against Jewish Zionists more quickly and effectively.

4.3.2.5. Islamic Civility

The Sultan, as the Caliph of Islam, demonstrated tolerance not only to Muslims worldwide but also to people of various religious groups within the Empire just like previous Ottoman Sultans and Caliphs (Ortaylı, 2002, p. 1515; Tezcan, 2020, p. 3). This approach served two primary objectives: firstly, to foster peace and harmony among the Empire's diverse populace, contributing to the overall tranquility and prosperity of the state, and secondly, to curtail foreign interference in internal affairs, particularly from consulates and Jewish Zionists seeking to incite religious groups within the state (Öke, 2021, p. 111). The Sultan's tolerance encompassed all the citizens within the Empire resulting in minimal rebellious movements during his reign, except for incidents involving Armenians and Macedonians. Despite extensive provocations against the Empire, many of which originated before his rule, the Sultan managed to maintain stability within the empire and particularly in Bayt al-Maqdis (Yasamee, 2011, p. 28). In the face of the Jewish Zionist threat, the Sultan welcomed Jews expelled from Russian pogroms and anti-Judaist assaults, providing them refuge in Anatolian cities like Aydın and İzmir. The Sultan did not differentiate them from other Ottoman citizens (Lilienthal, 1982, p. 53; Nahum, 2000, p. 45; Vital, 1975, p. 7). The Sultan's attitude reflected the cultural nature of the state, highlighting the challenges of governing such a diverse empire (Gül & Gökçen, 2010, p. 266). He acknowledged the difficulty of maintaining order and harmony within its boundaries (Yasamee, 2011, p. 28). The empire did not resemble to any of the empires during its time. In the empire, all kinds of people from varying nations and religions could find a place to live freely without any restriction or obligation assigned to the empire other than showing respect to other people living among and beside them, from Zoroastrians, Ghebre including Pagans to Christians and Jews. Our traditions and our religion also advise us to be equal toward them (Ergin, 2011, p. 79). The Sultan each year spared a specific budget to poor Muslims and inhabitants from varying faiths, including poor Jews to soften their hearts towards Islam and to its representant at the time (DH. MKT. 1894, 248/5; İ. HUS. 1893, 10/44/1; İ. HUS. 1893, 11/92/2). The Sultan with his dialogue with Newlinski told him that the citizens of the empire were his children and

for that reason he would not differentiate one from another, therefore the request of Jewish Zionists at the time could not be realized within the region as it would pose a threat to people living in the region and foster change in social and demographic structure of the region (Herzl, 1960, p. 388). The Sultan, through his tolerant approach and commitment to equality, successfully fostered cohesion among Arabs, Muslims, Ottoman Christians, and Ottoman Jews (Gökmen, 2023a, pp. 28-42; 2023b, pp. 199-212). His inclusive policies created a peaceful atmosphere for people of various religions, including European and Russian Jews seeking refuge (Vital, 1987, pp. 15-35). By welcoming these exiled individuals and investing in education to enhance living conditions, the Sultan aimed to integrate them into the Empire while improving the conditions of Ottoman citizens. This policy played a crucial role in preventing Jewish Zionism and colonialist countries from garnering support against the Sultan and his policies (İ. MMS. 1981, 123-5276; Pears, 1917, pp. 205-206). The Sultan's tolerant approach toward the non-Muslim population played a crucial role in countering the influence of European colonialist and Jewish Zionist countries. This policy, rooted in a longstanding Ottoman tradition of fostering peace and cohesion among diverse nations and religions within the empire, was not solely initiated by the Sultan but rather continued and expanded under his rule (Chua, 2007, p. 174; Davutoğlu, 2020, pp. 133-136). The Sultan's welcoming attitude toward both exiled Jews and Ottoman Jews forged a bond of friendship and enduring trust between the Sultan and Ottoman Jews as the Sultan sheltered the exiled Jews within Anatolia. The peaceful and inclusive atmosphere within the empire left no room for doubts about the Sultan's hospitality and tolerance (Gökmen, 2023a, p. 34; Öke, 2021, pp. 70-71). Consequently, Jewish Zionists' manipulations and provocations found little support among Ottoman Jews. The Sultan's policies proved effective on the ground, ensuring that Ottoman Jews did not rebel against the Empire and remained resistant to manipulation and provocation directed to the Sultan (Bozkurt, 2021a, pp. 193-225).

4.3.2.6 Caliphate as a Soft Power Instrument

Power and hegemony are exercised in different ways worldwide, and the results depend on the type of power used to achieve the desired ends. In its most basic form, power is the ability to bring about or coerce changes in the behavior of the target group or groups (İlkbahar & Mercan, 2023, p. 2; Kılıçoğlu, 2018, p. 335; Nye, 2004, p.

2). Soft power, according to Nye is the ability to shape the attitude and decisions of the people (Nye, 2004, p. 2). The instruments of soft power can be assumed to be cultural influence, ideology and varying international institutions (Nye, 1993, p. 167). While power is typically associated with commands, orders, and responses, Nye's concept of soft power diverges from this by emphasizing leaders' aim to obtain the people's consent under their rule. In this distinct form of power known as 'soft power,' there are no direct commands or orders; instead, attractive policies are employed, possessing the ability to unite and resonate with people's needs, expectations, and commonalities. This way, individuals willingly implement the directives (Kekevi, 2018, pp. 303-304; Nye, 2004, pp. 6-11). Within soft power, leaders are expected to formulate and communicate their political decisions and instructions in a manner that aligns with the expectations and needs of the people, avoiding reliance on concrete power or force. These decisions should also resonate with the aspirations and expectations of the people, aiming to capture their interest and consent without resorting to military or economic sanctions (Nye, 2004, p. 5; Yılmaz, 2018, pp. 18-23). 'Consent' is the key common concept between Islam and soft power (Ensaroğlu, 2023, p. 84; Nye, 2004). The term 'consent' used in soft power had similarities with servant leadership, whose main motivation was to please people and earn their consent during their offices by providing a reliable, stable and fair atmosphere (Bekker, 2010, p. 56; Daft, 2018, p. 6; Greenleaf & Spears, 1998, pp. 24-42; Sendjaya, 2015, pp. 1-5). Unlike hard power (control), which relies on direct commands and force, soft power seeks to create favorable conditions for people, allowing leaders to convince and earn their consent for the voluntary implementation of policies and decisions with great motivation. Feroze Yasamee defines hard power as a way to (with compelling or consent) make the person or state opposite to what is demanded from them, and for him, defining the task or the rules are important markers of hard power (Yasamee, 2023, p. 16). In this regard, as faith dwells on the consent and willingness of the people, it would not be misleading to associate soft power and religion with each other since they both primarily request the consent and willingness of the people (Mercan & Dündar, 2021, p. 488; Fox & Sandler, 2004, pp 43, 45, 60). That's why soft power has a durable effect on people compared to hard power due to the consent the soft power employs. As Mercan & Dündar, Fox & Sandler, and Nye pointed out, the enduring effects of the soft power alternates hard power (2021, p. 488; 2004, pp. 4 - 60; 2004, p. 99). The primary objective

of soft power, a responsibility shouldered by leaders, is to create an environment where the individuals under their governance can openly harbor their attainable expectations, aspirations, and dreams without any constraints (Nye, 2004, p. x). As the caliph of Islam, the Sultan utilized his caliphate in consolidating Muslims in the world, particularly within the regions that European countries had already colonized by producing an alternative power against colonial countries as (Bussow, 2011, p. 91; Karpas, 2001, pp. 258-275). There were estimated to be around 250 million Muslims living under colonial authorities colonized by Britain, Holland and Russia who were waiting for Muslim unification and freedom from their colonial authorities (Çolak, 2007, p. 68). Therefore, the Sultan by employing the teachings of Islam, earned the sympathy of its citizens and the Muslims in the world. In 1882, an Ottoman warship's visit to Port of Alexandria and people's close interest towards the Ottoman Empire's ship and Islamist Brotherhood Activities in Africa against France were supported by Muslim residents (Y. PRK. TKM. 1882, 4/69/1). The important motivation for this policy was dwelling on his ability to reference his policies on Surah Al-'Alaq. The Sultan can be regarded to employ the first revelation of Islam revealed to Prophet Muhammad in Surah Al-'Alaq, which advises reading, writing and learning new things (96:1-5). As the Surah advice, the Sultan aimed to gain and practice Islamic advice by earning the grace of Allah and regenerate an educated Muslim population that would develop counter-arguments towards their enemies or counterparts through education, acquiring knowledge, and acting accordingly by referencing the Qur'an and its prophets starting from the first prophet Adam to last prophet Muhammad Mustafa (Arıcan, 2023, p. 20). For the Sultan, opening the gates of knowledge was a means to open the gates of the world; learning how to earn the grace of Allah was his primary motivation. Therefore, the Sultan, in this context, can be regarded as employing the advice of the Qur'an from the first revealed verses in Surah Al-'Alaq to the last revealed verses in the Surah Al-Fatihah. The Sultan was among the renovator sultans of the empire who was working hard to reach the old glorious days of the Empire when Islam was successfully represented with his reforms and initiations. By that, the Sultan aimed to earn the grace of Allah and the consent of the people as a caliph. As leaders are expected to provide policies that their followers would support, it is important to earn their consent (Gökmen, 2019, pp. 33-34; Tekin, 2011, p. 42). The Sultan in this regard employed Caliphatehood as a counter instrument against Britain, France and Russia in Bayt al-

Maqdis and the African region (Barlak, 2019a pp. 187- 194; 2019b; pp. 369- 380; Özcoşar & Ertekin, 2019, pp. 264- 273). The Sultan by that, earned the consent and approval of the people in the region and provided their help against colonialist authority (Barlak, 2019, pp. 191-194; Özcoşar & Ertekin, 2019, pp. 264- 269). His sincere attitude and respect for the people, regardless of their faiths and national identities both within the empire and in the region far from the empire, granted him to gain their respect and consent. Therefore, the Sultan's employing caliphatehood can be regarded as applying soft power. That's why his caliphatehood was also approved by people from varying religions as his caliphate was not posing a threat their faiths (Ademi, 2019, pp. 150-151; Deringil, 1999, pp. 47-67, Güngör, 2021, pp. 87-88; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 29-30). Wilfred Scawen Blunt by attesting to the Sultan's soft power influence in the Muslim world described him as 'actual Emir el Mumenin' (2005, p. 3). The Sultan employed caliphatehood as a way to eradicate nationalism and ethnicity. The Sultan united Muslims under Ottoman caliphatehood regardless of their identities and preferences in their daily lives (Yasamee, 2011, pp. 26-27). In this context, the Sultan, particularly in Bayt al-Maqdis, employed soft power strategies, including establishing communication (telegraph) channels, listening to the expectations and aspirations of the empire's inhabitants, and shaping policies accordingly (Çolak, 2007, p. 154). The Sultan used Caliphatehood as a basis for the unification of the Muslim population both within and without the boundaries of the empire under the banner of jihad without utilizing any power instruments against the countries who were threatening the empire (Buzpınar, 2016, p. 167; Gökmen, 2023b, pp. 203-205). The Sultan united Muslims and non-Muslims under the shade of the empire (Gökmen, 2023b, p. 203). Despite limitations, representatives of various people and religious groups were allowed to meet with the Sultan to discuss matters related to Bayt al-Maqdis. Through the implementation of soft power strategies, the Sultan gained the consent and trust of the people in Bayt al-Maqdis to such an extent that Jewish Zionists, despite their significant provocations, they were unable to provoke Ottoman Christians, Jews, and Arabs against the empire (Gökmen, 2023a). Soft power necessitates the country to develop its cultural, social, intellectual, political, and even cuisine as an attraction of soft power instruments for those people who were unfamiliar with the country (Nye, 2004, pp. 40-70). The Sultan as a caliph of Islam performed tolerance of Islam as the main pillar not only to Muslims in the world but also

to the people of various religious groups living within and without the boundaries of the empire with ambassadors and representants of Islam (El-Buti 2022, pp. 309- 317; Karademir, 2021, pp. 5- 16). However, it is equally essential for those of people to accept the change and process of development since this again cannot be fostered all alone by a leader as a hard power instrument. However, their support should also be included in their consent. In order to disseminate his deeds and unify the Muslims of the world headquartered in İstanbul, the Sultan sent translated versions of publications about Islam and Muslims varying from the European continent to the far east countries such as Japan and China beside American continent in order disapprove alternative caliph sponsored by Britain at the time (Alkan, 2018, p. 232; Sırma, 1979, pp. 199-205; Söylemez, 2016, p. 48; Yılmaz, 2015, p. 85). In this regard, the Sultan before applying the precautions for hindering Jewish Zionist immigration and their settlement activities in Bayt al-Maqdis, had developed the ties and dialogues and listened to the expectations of the people of the residents living in Bayt al-Maqdis. The Sultan produced and employed attainable policies supported by Ottoman citizens in Bayt al-Maqdis, including Muslims, Arabs, Christians and Jews of the empire within the region towards Jewish Zionists. This unification enhanced the Sultan's measures in limiting Jewish Zionist presence in the region (Akgündüz, 1987; Akyol & Demirci, 2013; Gökmen, 2023a, p. 38; Vital, 1975, p. 17). The Sultan strategically employed caliphatehood as a unifying force against European countries and Jewish Zionists. (Gökmen, 2023b, p. 203; Kızıltoprak, 2011; Özcan, 2019; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 24-25). In this regard, the application of the caliphate can be seen as a sum of his attitude enforced upon the invasion of Egypt by Britain. The Sultan, while developing relations with a country tried to gather the support of other countries as well. His peace at home and peace abroad policy gave him more time to foster renovation and reform for the empire. The Sultan enforced his caliphatehood and Islam unity in Egypt to reconsolidate the people under British siege on the ground and British hegemony over Ottoman diplomatic relations when Egypt was seized by Britain (Gümüş, 2018, p. 200-205). This approach allowed him to foster secure, free, and inclusive policies towards the dhimmis (non-Muslims) across the Empire, including Bayt al-Maqdis. The Sultan's inclusive and tolerant stance was crucial in building trust and a collective identity throughout the empire (Gökmen, 2023a, 28-42; 2023b, pp. 199-212). His prioritization of religious freedom and genuine concern for the challenges faced by both Muslims and

non-Muslims (dhimmis) can be seen as a form of employing soft power. Caliphate as a soft power instrument, the Sultan strengthened the bonds among people regardless of their faiths and identities within the empire against separatist provocations from European countries and Jewish Zionists. Drawing on Nye's analogy of religion as a double-edged sword, the Sultan strategically decided where to cut and use this instrument during his rule (Nye, 2004, p. 59; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 24-28). His deep understanding of when and how to apply this influence contributed to unifying diverse populations and fostering a sense of security, appreciation, and support. This approach aimed to diminish the need for external influence, particularly from Jewish Zionist entities whose religious and national identities were already intertwined (Rizo, 2021, p. 131). Under the Sultan's guidance, the Empire already provided a foundation of respect and tolerance, creating secured conditions for the region's people (Gökmen, 2023a, pp. 28-42., 2023b, pp. 199-212). The Sultan's attitude towards dhimmis, within the framework of his Caliphate, aligns with Nye's definition of soft power, which involves mobilizing cooperation without resorting to threats (Nye, 2004, p. 60). The Sultan employed his Caliphatehood as a form of soft power instrument in encouraging cooperation and unity among diverse religious communities within the Ottoman domain (Gökmen, 2023a, pp. 38-39; Sirma, 2021, pp. 71-75).

4.3.2.6.1. The Sultan's Role as a Caliphate

Late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century witnessed array of changes and reformations. Dwelling on this premise, it turned out quite difficult for people, especially for the people in authority to enhance the cohesion in order to avoid partition. In this regard the empire particularly with the consequences of the Industrial and French Revolutions the empire economically was threatened. Therefore, the empire witnessed two outstanding threat emancipating in Europe. Consequently, it became quite difficult for the empires to compete with colonizer countries abroad and separatist activities within the empire as both were interrelated and united against the empire. This instigated a change in attitudes of the Sultans and Tsars of the empires. In this regard, Ottoman Empire coming from tough conditions for the past 500 years, fostered a multicultural atmosphere among the citizens which was inherited from Osman Bey and continued by the Sultan (Kafadar, 1995, pp. 37- 45). Therefore, the Sultan other than

employing hard power instruments such as military or physical pressure on the ground, fostered diplomacy and cooperation by seeking common ground among the people and countries prioritizing flexible balance policy (Alkan, 2023, pp. 237-261; Wilson, 2008, p. 114). The Sultan in employing caliphatehood did not utilize the instrument of hegemony or hard power but created an atmosphere where the Muslims of the empire and the world could find a ground to get united with their consent (Alkan, 2023, pp. 237-261; Gramsci, 2007, p. 65). In this regard, the Sultan can be assumed to employ the instruments of soft power by investing on common goals and aims among the Muslims by fostering their attachment towards Islam. The Sultan employed soft power instruments to strengthen the attachment of the people towards the empire, developing collective and respectful attitude towards both Muslim and non-Muslim populations, enhancing collective identity among the citizens regardless of their faiths on common ground on shared purposes and values (Nye, 2008, p. 31). Subsequently, by accepting the Jews exiled from Europe and Russia, the Sultan continued to leverage soft power strategies to foster their consent by preserving a multicultural and religious atmosphere within the empire (Gökmen, 2023a, pp. 28-42). By welcoming Jewish refugees expelled from Europe and Russia, granting them Ottoman citizenship, and providing them employment opportunities in Anatolia, the Sultan implemented a soft power approach toward the Jews who had limited alternatives for resettlement. Despite threats from Jewish Zionists regarding the demographic structure of Bayt al-Maqdis, the Sultan's decision to accept Jews into the empire serves as a noteworthy example of the application of soft power. Through this, the Sultan obtained the consent of the inhabitants in Bayt al-Maqdis and preserved its demographic structure by developing dialogue with them. By producing policies that would meet their expectations such as opening new schools for non-Muslims and letting those people to renovate their sacred spaces and places within the empire, the Sultan earned their consent and support (Gökmen, 2023a, pp. 28-42; 2023b, pp. 199-212). Furthermore, by accepting exiled Jews into Anatolia, the Sultan not only prioritized the consent of the local population but also enhanced Ottoman diplomacy on the global stage by sheltering Jews who were potentially viewed as a threat to the empire (Gökmen, 2023a, pp. 28-42). This demonstrates the ability to achieve objectives through attraction rather than coercion, known as soft power, which is rooted in the attractiveness of a country's cultural and political ideals (Nye, 2004, p. x). The Sultan employed the Caliphate to

ensure peace and tranquility within the empire (Eraslan, 2019b, p. 128; Gökmen, 2023a, p. 38-39). Additionally, in his role as the Caliph of Islam, the Sultan strategically utilized his title to unite Muslims worldwide, especially in colonized regions, against European colonizers. He employed Caliphate as a counter-argument to European colonizers and Jewish Zionists, effectively exercising soft power to unify Muslims under the pan-Islamic ideal (Bussow, 2011, p. 91; Buzpinar, 2016, p. 167; Çolak, 2007, pp. 67-7; Karpat, 2001, pp. 258-275; Mercan, 2022, pp.145-146; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 29-30). Acting by Islamic principles, the Sultan easily garnered the praise and respect of Muslims both locally and globally, leveraging this support as a soft power instrument enabling him to influence Muslims in the world at both local and international levels. With that, the Sultan successfully achieved the unification of Muslims both within the empire and worldwide, although many unification and collaboration activities remained to be employed among Muslims globally under the banner of the Islamic Caliphate (Deringil, 1999, pp. 47-67; Sırma, 2021, p. 11; Tekin, 2011, p. 53). However, in using the Caliphate as a soft power instrument, the Sultan was not alone, as Britain also sought to unite Muslims under the banner of Islam by attempting to shift the Caliphate from the Empire to various tribes in the Arab region, particularly in Saudi Arabia (Buzpinar, 2016, pp. 159-161). Nevertheless, as an application of soft power, the Sultan maintained representatives throughout various tribes and secret representatives in Turkistan, India, Africa, Japan, and China, extending the broad of his influence by developing dialogue with them (Alkan, 2018, p. 232; Barlak, 2019a, pp. 185-214; Sırma, 1979, pp. 199-205). A university entitled Beijing Hamidiye University, established for the Sultan in China was one of the markers of his successful policies in China (Sırma, 1979, p. 204). By empowering the concept of Caliphate, the Sultan effectively wielded it as a tool to challenge European powers expanding their colonies in the Muslim world as an instrument of soft power (Aydın, 2006, p. 218; Buzpinar, 2016, p. 167; Sırma, 2021, pp. 10-13). Publications from İstanbul, such as '*Peyk-i İslam/İslam Bağı*' were sent to India in two languages. Additionally, '*El Gayret*' a journal published in Arabic and Turkish languages, reached India from London through Ottoman Sefir Musurus Pasha (Alkan, 2018, p. 232). Yasamee highlights the Sultan's dedication to Muslim unification under the Ottoman banner, emphasizing the significance of this effort (Yasamee, 2011). The Caliphate was also an important instrument for Muslim unity (Buzpinar, 2016, pp. 70-71; Tekin, 2011,

p. 43). The Sultan was among the first Ottoman Sultans confronted with the possibility that sentiments of nationalism and ethnic separatism might take root among both Muslims and non-Muslims (Buzpınar, 2016; pp. 69-72; Yasamee, 2011, pp. 26-27). The Sultan, by unifying Muslims in the world can be regarded to be successful both within and outside the empire (Kurşun, 2022, pp. 128-129). People on earth, according to Islamic jurisprudence and Quran, are the heirs of Allah. Therefore, any person born to earth, according to Islam, is the caliph of Allah (Al-Baraqa, 2:30). As the caliph of Allah, people were expected to furnish the earth with decent knowledge and its practices along with just, kind and equal attitude towards the creatures of the earth regardless of the identities, differences and kind (Arıcan, 2023, p. 20; İbrahim Hakkı, 2016, pp. 738-739). In his role as a caliph of Islam, the Sultan embraced tolerance as a cornerstone of Islam, by extending this principle not only to Muslims globally but also to diverse religious groups living within and without the Empire (El-Buti, 2022, pp. 309-317; Kurşun, 2022, pp. 119-141). The Sultan had two objectives: first one was to foster peace and harmony among the diverse population within the empire, contributing to their overall well-being, and the second objective was to curtail foreign interference in the internal affairs of the empire as consulates and Zionists sought ways to provoke religious discord among different groups (Yasamee, 2011, pp. 28-60). Besides that, his policy of tolerance encompassed all citizens of the Ottoman explaining the absence of rebellious movements, except for Armenians and Macedonians, despite extensive provocations against the Empire (Karademir, 2021, p. 16, Yasamee, 2011, p. 28). The Sultan strategically employed the Caliphate during a challenging period when the empire was facing threats to its territories, an impending economic collapse and intensified efforts by Jewish Zionists to increase their presence in Bayt al-Maqdis (Sharif, 1983, p. 5; Sirma, 2021, p. 11; Yasamee, 2011, p. 49). Leveraging the universal influence of the Caliphate, the Sultan was successful in wielding soft power against European countries like Britain and France who had colonies in India and Africa. The Sultan emphasized the power zone and zone of proximity in his Caliphate against European powers (Sultan II. Abdülhamid Han, 1976, p. 302; Tekin, 2011, p. 53). In this context, the Sultan achieved a remarkable reconstruction, repair, and rebuilding of the administrative structure, the economy, educational institutions, and holy sites in Bayt al-Maqdis, a region with a diverse population comprising of Muslims, Greeks Orthodox, Latins (Roman Catholics), Armenians, Catholics (Greek Catholics), Protestants, Coptics,

and Jews (Özcoşar & Akman, 2018, pp. 20-23). This comprehensive effort was part of his commitment to a sustainable domestic and foreign policy, which can be regarded as applying soft power instruments (Nye, 2004, pp. 20-100; Schölch, 2006, p. 20). Additionally, the Sultan bestowed medals upon individuals deemed to have contributed to the welfare of the empire and affirmed his authority as a caliph of Islam. This act served as a soft power application, fostering a bond between them (Sırma, 2021, p. 225). His success in preventing Jewish Zionist settlement and land acquisition in Bayt al-Maqdis, despite challenging conditions such as economic and military challenges beside administrative restructuring, stands out as a remarkable accomplishment. The Sultan, acting as the protector of Muslims, preserved the Empire's multicultural structure by unifying Muslims both at home and abroad, increasing cohesion and power of solidarity of the Muslims against colonialist European countries and Jewish Zionists proposing and employing the Caliphate as a soft power instrument (el-Umle, 2022, p. 296). In this regard the Sultan's employing soft power with his caliphate helped to earn the grace and praise of the people living in the region; therefore the Sultan employed caliphatehood as a soft power instrument in strengthening the unification of the Muslims, Arabs and non-Muslims within the empire against Jewish Zionists and colonizer European countries. Soft power in the regard after educational institutions acts as the second most effective indirect precaution that helped the Sultan initiate measures against Jewish Zionists. With that the Sultan prevented them their population increase limit their land purchasing activities in Bayt al-Maqdis along with prevented Zionists provokings against the empire.

CONCLUSION

The Sultan successfully reconstructed, repaired and rebuilt the administrative structure, the economy, the curricula and institutions of the educational system and the holy sites in Bayt al-Maqdis with its population consisting of Muslims, Greeks Orthodox, Latins (Roman Catholics), Armenians, Catholics (Greek Catholics), Protestants, Coptics, Jews during his 33 years in reign and pursued a common and sustainable domestic and foreign policy. His successful policy and practice in restricting the Jewish Zionist settlement and land purchasing in Bayt al-Maqdis, when the hard conditions, such as the decay of the economy, military, and administration structure are regarded, is a success story. The Sultan pioneered many renovations and kept close contact with the world of the technical and industrial revolution. The Sultan's success against Jewish Zionism lies in his ability to renovate the Empire not only infrastructurally but also intellectually. He focused on the monetary and administrative deficits of the empire and paid great attention to education, instituting renovation and reformation from military to administration office that would meet the expectations of the time. He not only updated the curricula and changed the structures and categories of schools but also allowed students to study according to their areas of interest with varying schools from technical to medical schools and universities both within the country and in Europe following his grandfather Sultan Mahmut II, his father Sultan Abdülmecid II and his uncle Sultan Abdülaziz. The Sultan knew very well that many of the problems in the empire were emancipating from the deterioration of administration offices and the lack of well-educated intellectuals working on behalf of the empire. Therefore, the Sultan fostered science, technic and literary studies as instruments to reform the empire according to the necessity and expectations of the time. For this reason, the Sultan opened two fronts to battle in; one was to combat with uneducated people who were behind their gains and the second was opened against Jewish Zionists who were trying to colonize Ottoman territory with their money and diplomatic support gathered by European countries. In his 33 years of reign, the Sultan achieved a great victory on both fronts. As the Sultan was well aware of the systematic and organizational superiority of the Europeans and the wealth of Jewish Zionists, pursued flexible and reflexive public diplomacy in international politics knowing that without international cooperation, the empire could not stand alone for a long time within the

hectic time of colonization. Considering the atmosphere of the time, it was not possible and rational for an empire to pursue stable relations with the countries; therefore, in order not to be negatively effected by the changing relations and conditions among the nations, the Sultan tried to produce stable, rational and flexible public diplomacy without being official partner of a country. By that, the Sultan restabilized the country by dealing with the debts he had inherited amounting to 70,929,000 British gold liras accounted as 2,528.010.885 Ottoman Liras foreign debts, 68,043,630 British gold lira domestic debts, totaling 138,969,630 British gold lira as well as 58,247,505 British gold liras interest and other commissions. However, the revenues amounted to 80,722,125 British gold liras. Obviously, the total debt with its interest and other commissions was 198,351.00 British gold lira, but the revenue was only 80,722,125 (Kısakürek, 2020, p. 44). Regarding to another account, as of 1879-1880, the revenues of the empire were 1.428.582 Ottoman Liras, but the expenditure was 1.523.660 Ottoman Liras; therefore, the budget had 95.078 Ottoman Liras deficit, however with the instituting decent budget policy in cooperation with Duyum-u Umumi the empire under the Sultan achieved to catch the same balance of revenue of 1877-1878 between 1905-1906 years without foreign aid (Bozkurt, 2021b, p. 486). While decreasing the empire's debts, the Sultan, while limiting Jewish Zionist settlement decreased the debts of the empire to a great extent. In the late 19th century, Jewish Zionists had three primary aims to be realized in Bayt al-Maqdis, which were increasing their population in Bayt al-Maqdis and thus outnumbering the Muslim and Christian population, buying as much as land and dominating the lands and achieving territorial superiority and establishing a Jewish Zionist state. Since none of the expectations of the Jewish Zionists were realized during the Sultan's reign, the Sultan achieved a clear victory against Jewish Zionists. The astonishing decrease in the number of Jewish immigrants to Bayt al-Maqdis shows the success of the measures and practices the Sultan employed against the Jewish Zionists. Between 1850 and 1880, there were 25,000 Jewish immigrants; this number decreased to 20,000 between 1881 and 1903, and equally, from 1881 to 1901 Jewish population in the region increased by only 8,931 people. Between 1904 and 1910, it reached 20,300 people, and from 1911 to 1914, 14,000 Jewish immigrants were registered, giving a total of 79,300 immigrants from 1850 to 1914. It is also important to state that the Zionists tried any means to increase their presence in the region, varying from asking for European countries' support to their

immigration to Bayt al-Maqdis to convince the civil servants in the region by offering bribes to them. Despite the diverse population and ethnicities, the people of Bayt al-Maqdis lived peaceful and harmonious lives. The Bisan Administration under the guidance of the Sultan had %75.7 of the territory in Bayt al-Maqdis. When the number of Jewish Zionists who were eager to settle and purchase land in Bayt al-Maqdis was taken into consideration, the Sultan's success was quite vivid. The increase in Jewish Zionist population and their purchasing of land were within this perspective was not a success and cannot be regarded to be an achievement for Jewish Zionists since that number would be expected to be higher when supporting countries such as France, Britain, Russia and partially German and even by U.S. were taken into account. In this regard, this number approves the Sultan's success in restricting and limiting Jewish Zionist influx and their land purchasing activities. The Sultan enforced decrees and legislations for restricting their settlement and land purchase activities in Bayt al-Maqdis since Jewish Zionists living in Europe and the Jewish Zionists all around the world with the help of the World Zionist Organization Fund could easily acquire the land that was for sale in Bayt al-Maqdis regardless of their prices unless the Sultan enforced restriction against their land purchasing activities. The settlement of only 15 Jewish colonies on 107,100 dunams, which was %4 of the total population of Arabs in Bayt al-Maqdis, confirms the success the Sultan attained against the Jewish Zionists. Furthermore, preventing the establishment of a Jewish Zionist state during his time and limiting the number of invading Jewish Zionists to only 15 colonies in 107,100 dunams approves his success against Jewish Zionists. The number would be much higher if the Sultan had not taken and applied the necessary and effective restrictive measures. In 1917, when the Ottoman Empire ceded al-Maqdis to the British Empire, there were about 515,000 Muslims and 65,000 Jews actively living in Bayt al-Maqdis, which again confirms that the Sultan achieved a victory against the Jewish Zionists in the region. Even after 40 years of his rule, the Jewish Zionists failed to outnumber the Muslim and Christian population in the region. Thus, while on the one hand, the Sultan pursued successful diplomacy both in his domestic and foreign affairs, he did not change his inclusive attitude toward non-Muslims, particularly toward the Jews both within and outside the empire. On the contrary, while restricting the settlement of Jewish Zionists in al-Maqdis, the Sultan welcomed the Jews who had fled or been expelled from Russia and Europe.

The Sultan successfully rehabilitated the empire, conducted renovation, and preserved the unity of the Empire with its distinguished identity despite the negative effects of French and Industrial Revolutions beside Jewish Zionist and European colonization activities addressing the empire. The study from the beginning to the end underlines that the Sultan was always one step ahead of the Jewish Zionists thanks to his networking and secret service and thus took necessary precautionary measures in time well before Jewish Zionists exercised their plans. Ranging from political to economic level and from national to international level, the precautions undertaken by the Sultan were so successful that the Jewish Zionists could not even lay the seeds for the establishment of a Jewish Zionist state in the region during his reign. If the Sultan had led Jewish Zionists to be able to expand their population and land purchasing activities in Bayt al-Maqdis, a Jewish Zionist state even during his reign would eventually, with the help of European countries such as France and Britain, be founded. Moreover, it would not be a surprise for Jewish Zionists to extend their boundaries and dominate the entire Middle East by eradicating peaceful and multicultural atmosphere provided and strengthened by the Ottoman Empire with their newly founded state in fifty years' time even during Sultan's reign. The Sultan, in a letter after his dethronement to the leader of the Shazeli religious community leader Sheikh Mahmud Abu al-Shamat (1850-1922), explains this explicitly. In the letter, it is stated that after successfully preventing the Bayt al-Maqdis from becoming land for the Jewish Zionists, he had rejected their financial aid in exchange for Bayt al-Maqdis, he was dethroned (Şazeliyye Tarikatı, 2024). Thus, after achieving a great victory against the Jewish Zionists, beside rejecting their offer, the Jewish Zionists were convinced that the only way to pacify the Sultan and his anti-Zionist policies was to overthrow him for he had already ended Zionist initiatives to settle and purchase land in Bayt al-Maqdis (Şazeliyye Tarikatı, 2024). Even after his dethronement, the negative discourse was so strongly and powerfully constructed that his success in restricting Jewish Zionist settlement in Bayt al-Maqdis was overshadowed. The Sultan was successful in preventing Jewish Zionist settlement and land-purchasing activities in Bayt al-Maqdis. The Sultan, with the precautions and their applications, restricted Jewish Zionist influx to the region, and as a consequence of the restrictive measures, a Jewish Zionist state could not have ground to spring in his time. According to the records provided by the Jewish Colonization Association as of 1910, in 1870, 150 Jewish

residents were settling on 225 Hectare in the colony named Mikrev Israel; 28 people in 59 Hectare in 1878 in the colony called Mozah; 1500 people living on 2274 Hectares in Petach-Tikvah, 150 people on 500 Hectares in Katra; 1190 people living on 1180 Hectare in Rishon le-Zion in 1882; 200 people were living on 285 Hectares in Wandy el-Chanin in 1882; 15 people living on 12 Hectares Jehudie in 1883; 300 people living on 1275 Hectares in Ekron (Mazkeret Mathya) in 1884; 150 people living on 550 Hectares in Kastinieh in 1888; 600 people living on 1300 Hectares in Rohobot in 1890; 50 people living on 460 Hectares in Artuf in 1896; 100 people living on 65 Hectares in Ain Ganim 1908 and 40 people living on 182 Hectares in Hulda in 1909 and in total between 1870 and 1909, 1110 people were particularly living in and around Bayt al-Maqdis which is today called al-Quds and its surrounding on 8778 Hectares which approves that the Sultan successfully restricted the Jewish Zionist settlement and their land purchases. More than that, his precautions were effective and restrictive. Despite all odds and enormous lobbying to bring about partition and separation of the Ottoman Arabs, Jews, and Christians, the Sultan preserved their welfare and ensured a peaceful and adequate atmosphere in Bayt al-Maqdis. During the Sultan's reign, no rebellious attitude or negative attitude in Bayt al-Maqdis was observed from Arabs, Christians, and Jews demanding partition or a separate entity from the Sultan. On the contrary, they declared their content towards the Sultan. As there were already Ottoman Jews in Bayt al-Maqdis, if they were in favor of Jewish Zionists, there would be a rebellious movement as Armenians who were at the time revolting against the empire in the eastern part of Anatolia. In an interview with Prof. Dr. Vambery, the Sultan summarized his 33 years of reign by engraving seeds of a modern, well-educated and productive Ottoman society regardless of their religious beliefs and identities. For the Sultan, it was important to inherit an empire that would not have financial problems. The Sultan was planning to leave a society that would meet their expenses and needs. When the status of the empire is analyzed, it is quite clear that the Sultan had inherited an empire and a society far ahead of his time. From the Sultan's statements, one can deduce his divine love for his country. The Sultan, the last sovereign Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, laid the foundation of a new style of political, social and cultural renewal for the empire that brought him success against the Jewish Zionists. In the 1900s, before his dethronement, he gave indications of his success against the Jewish Zionists by addressing Dr. Vambery in that all his policies

were based on the national and cultural instruments of the Empire, without any interference or pressure from above. As discussed in the above chapters, without hesitation, from the first to last day of his rule, the Sultan produced and preceded domestic and international policies to hinder Jewish Zionist settlement and land-purchasing activities in Bayt al-Maqdis. However, while preventing their settlement and land purchase activities in Bayt al-Maqdis, the Sultan, as the Caliph of Islam, conducted a tolerant and peaceful policy towards the people regardless of their religion, culture, and nationality. The Sultan welcomed the difference within the Empire. In this regard, Jews of the Empire were never alienated, marginalized, and exiled; on the contrary, the Sultan opened the gates of the empire and welcomed the Jews who were escaping from Russia and Europe. The Sultan, on the other hand invited even Jewish Zionists and the Jews exiled from Russia and Europe to Anatolia for their settlement doing business within Anatolia. The Sultan's success was confirmed in his time by a British diplomat, Valentine Chirol, who knew the history of the Empire and the Sultan very well. Her words approve the success the Sultan had achieved during his reign, which made him regarded as a threat to Britain for she had her colonies in Muslim geography. Chirol defines the Sultan's success by referencing to the visit of German emperor Wilhelm II who was at the time a rival of the British Empire and friend of Ottoman Empire. For Chirol, the Sultan was one of the most successful heirs of the Ottoman Empire who united Muslims within and outside the empire under the Pan-Islamic ideal with caliphate. In this regard Sultan's fostering Hejaz Railway approved and supported the success the Sultan attained during his office. The Sultan's success and achievement were so clear that even German General von der Goltz, in his report to General Auler, approved the Sultan's success in his pan-Islamic policy. Goltz regarded the Sultan as successful in terms of unifying the Muslims in the world under the banner of Islam headquartered in İstanbul by the Sultan.

In sum, the Sultan successfully preserved the demographic structure of Bayt al-Maqdis and its sacredness for three divine faiths. The Sultan preferred a soft attitude and strict restrictions towards the Jewish Zionists. In this regard, the Sultan approached European colonizers and the Jewish Zionists with an Islamic attitude in restricting their settlement and land purchasing activities while showing the grace of Islam to them unless they posed a threat to the empire by welcoming them to settle their life and business in Anatolia. Therefore as the last Caliph of Islam, the Sultan approached them nicely, kindly

and justly despite their hostile attitude towards the empire. The Sultan, upon recognizing the colonizing and expansionist inclinations of European countries and their collaboration with Jewish Zionists asserted Caliphatehood as an alternative instrument that would counter the threat posed by these countries, which were already colonizing many Islamic communities. The call for Muslim unification by an Ottoman Sultan held particular significance as the Sultan was also the Caliphate of Islam and regarded as the heir of the prophet on earth who represented the unification of the Muslims. This call for the unification of Muslims worldwide also served to unify Muslims already living under the authority of the Ottoman Empire and the Muslims living under colonial authorities. Hence, the call had multifaceted consequences, all of which were crucial in understanding the objectives of the Sultan in issuing Caliphatehood. The unification of Muslims in a global sense posed a threat to colonizing countries, as their politics were intertwined with the exploitation of human and natural resources. However, his goal was to get together the Muslims of the world without alienating non-Muslim by providing peaceful conditions for their cohabitation.

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
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Appendix


Map 1: The Lands Sultan Abdülhamid II Bought as of 1908 (Kark & Frantzman, 2010, p. 56).



Map 2: The Lands Sultan Abdülhamid II Bought as of 1908 (Oliphant, 1880, pp. 256-257).




Document 1: A Document Rejecting Oliphant's Proposal to Settle Jewish Immigrants in Belqa Sanjak by Ottoman Government (Assembly of Vukela) (BOA. Y. A RES. 1881, 5/58/1).




Y.A.RES.00005.00058.001

Document 2: A Document Authorising Jewish Immigrants to the Ottoman Empire (İ. MMS. 1891, 123 / 5276).



Document 4: A Document Refusing to Accept Jews Emigrating From Russia to The Ottoman Empire (İ. HUS. 1892, 1 / 56 / 1).




وَبَر عَرِيفَةُ عِيَادُ مَعْرِفَةُ مَوْسُو مِلَّاجُ بَرِيكَ اِسْكَافُ حَقِيقَةُ نَكَايَتِ عَادِي هَكَارِدَ سَعَادَةُ قِيَمَتُهُ
كُونُ حِسَّةِ اَوَّلِهِ مَكْتُوبُ عَرِيفَةُ وَبَرِ وَفَرُّ بَرِيكَ رَاكُ بِالْمَدْفُوعِ مَقْدُورُ عِلْمِ اَلْمَعْرِفَةِ عَظِيمَةُ بَرِيكَ
عَهْدُ وَتَقْدِيمُ قَلَمُهُ وَفَكْرُهُ مَكْتُوبُ مَدْرَجَاتِهِ مَوْسُو بَرِيكَ اَوَّلُ اَوَّلِهِ بَرِيكَ بَرِيكَ بَرِيكَ
وَالْحَقُّ اِسْمُهُ بَرِيكَ كُونُ مَجْمُوعُهُ كُونُ مَكْتُوبُهُ بَرِيكَ فَاخِرُهُ اَوَّلُهُ اَوَّلُهُ عَظِيمَةُ قِيَمَتُهُ

وَأَعَدَّ مَسَارِي
مَعْرِفَةُ مَوْسُو

سَازِشَةُ بَرِيكَ


175

Document 6: A Document Approving the Continuation of the Prohibition of Jewish Zionist Immigration into Bayt al-Maqdis (İ. HUS. 1901, 91 / 2 / 1).



İ.HUS.00091.00002.001

Document 7: A Translated Form of the Letter Sent by Theodore Herzl to the Ottoman Empire Offering Financial Aid on the Condition that the Empire Reserve Land in Bayt al-Maqdis for Jewish Zionists (Y. PRK. ML. 1902, 23 / 8 / 1).




[illegible]

Document 9: A Document on Issuing Atiyya to the Muslim Inhabitants of Sofia and Constendil Who Were in Need of Support (İ. HUS. 1893, 11 / 92 / 2).


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Document 10: A Document Showing the Atiyyes to be Given to the Patriarchates and the Rabbinate on the Easter Eve (İ. HUS. 1893, 10 / 44 / 1).




İ.HUS.00010.00044.001

Document 11: A Document Showing the Excitement Caused by an Ottoman Warship Entering the Port of Alexandria Due to the Ottoman Government's Islamist Brotherhood Activities in Africa Against France (Y. PRK. TKM. 1882, 4 / 69 / 1).



Y.PRK.TKM.00004.00069.001

Document 12: A Document Showing the Contendness of British Government Towards the Ottoman Empire for its Granting religious and Sectarian Freedom Towards non-Muslims (Y. PRK. TKM, 1902, 3 / 9 / 1).



Y.PRK.TKM.00003.00009.001

Document 14 : An Agreement Document with Et Eugene Rappaport for the Publication of a Newspaper in France on Behalf of the Ottoman Government (Y. PRK. TKM, 1882, 4 / 109 / 1).

