



REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
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Political Science and International Relations

**EVALUATION OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEES
ABSORPTION POLICIES: A CASE STUDY OF
TURKEY, LEBANON, AND JORDAN**

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Master's Thesis

Supervisor

Assoc. Professor Nur Banu KAVAKLI

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The thesis titled EVALUATION OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEES ABSORPTION POLICIES: A CASE STUDY OF TURKEY, LEBANON AND JORDAN prepared by MOHANAD HAMEED HAMAD and submitted on 23/05/2022 has been **accepted unanimously** for the degree of Master of Art in Political Science and International Relations.

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Mohanad Hameed HAMAD

Signature

DEDICATION

For my loving mom whose warm encouragement was the reason for me reaching this point,in
the memory of my dad.



ABSTRACT

EVALUATION OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEES ABSORPTION POLICIES: A CASE STUDY OF TURKEY, LEBANON AND JORDAN

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Syrian refugees' risk long-term displacement due to the conflict's inability to be resolved, which necessitates the development of long-term, sustainable programs to assist them in maintaining their lives. Among the countries that have been affected by the Syrian migration are Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the Syrian conflict and its economic and social repercussions. It focuses on the implications for host countries and their policies and the most prominent services given by host countries to Syrian refugees, such as education, healthcare services, and economic assistance, among other things. It also examines the many types of agreements that have taken place between host countries and the international community to reduce the refugee crisis. The data for this study was gathered through scholarly articles, books, and websites. According to the research findings, policies adopted by some countries, such as Jordan and Lebanon, are short-lived and ineffective in assisting refugees. In contrast, policies adopted by others, such as Turkey, have proven successful in assisting refugees by accommodating a large number of Syrians and providing essential services. According to the findings, Jordan and Lebanon have a policy of pressuring the European Union for financial assistance. In contrast, Turkey relied on the 2016

Agreement, which was based on the exchange of refugees registered between the European Union and Turkey, to obtain financial assistance from the European Union.

Keywords: Evaluation, Syrian Migrations, Negotiations, Absorption Policies, Social Services



ÖZET

SURİYELİ MÜLTECİLERİ KABULÜ POLİTİKALARININ DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ: TÜRKİYE, LÜBNAN VE ÜRDÜN ÖRNEĞİ

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Suriyeli mülteciler, çatışmanın çözilememesi nedeniyle uzun vadeli yerinden edilme riskiyle karşı karşıya kalıyor ve bu da hayatlarını sürdürmelerine yardımcı olacak uzun vadeli, sürdürülebilir programların geliştirilmesini gerektiriyor. Suriye göçünden etkilenen ülkeler arasında Ürdün, Lübnan ve Türkiye yer alıyor. Bu tezin amacı, Suriye çatışmasını ve bunun ekonomik ve sosyal yansımalarını incelemektir. Diğer şeylerin yanı sıra ev sahibi ülkeler ve politikaları üzerindeki etkileri ve ev sahibi ülkeler tarafından Suriyeli mültecilere verilen eğitim, sağlık hizmetleri ve ekonomik yardım gibi en belirgin hizmetlere odaklanmaktadır. Ayrıca mülteci krizini azaltmak için ev sahibi ülkeler ile uluslararası toplum arasında yapılmış birçok anlaşma türünü de incelemektedir. Bu çalışmanın verileri bilimsel makaleler, kitaplar ve web siteleri aracılığıyla toplanmıştır. Araştırma bulgularına göre Ürdün ve Lübnan gibi bazı ülkeler tarafından benimsenen politikalar kısa ömürlü ve mültecilere yardım konusunda etkisiz. Buna karşılık, Türkiye gibi diğerleri tarafından benimsenen politikaların, çok sayıda Suriyeliyi barındırarak ve temel hizmetleri sağlayarak mültecilere yardım etmede başarılı olduğu kanıtlanmıştır. Elde edilen bulgulara göre Ürdün ve Lübnan'ın mali yardım için

Avrupa Birliđi'ne baskı yapma politikası var. Buna karşılık Türkiye, Avrupa Birliđi'nden mali yardım almak için Avrupa Birliđi ile Türkiye arasında kayıtlı mülteci mübadelesine dayanan 2016 Anlaşması'na güvendi.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Deđerlendirme, Suriye Göçleri, Müzakereler, Soğurma Politikaları, Sosyal Hizmetler



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ABBREVIATIONS

EUHCR:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
MPIC:	The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
HRCU:	Rapid Response Program on the Ruins of the Human Rights Commission
NGOs:	Non-governmental organizations
RP:	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan
MIC:	Middle-Income Country
PSP:	Progressive Socialist Party
TPR:	The Temporary Protection Regulation
TECs:	Temporary Teaching Places
CCTE:	The Conditional Cash Transfer Engine for Education
MFSP:	Ministry of Family and Social Policy
MoNE:	Ministry of National Education
AFAD:	Turkey's Disaster and Emergency Management Department
WHO:	World Health Organization

1. INTRODUCTION

The issue of Syrian refugees has serious consequences for the neighboring countries. It has become one of the most prominent global issues resulting from the political crisis, the outbreak of civil war, and foreign interventions. All of this has resulted in an unprecedented wave of internal displacement and asylum to neighboring countries, particularly Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. The Syrian displacement wave has created a slew of political, security, economic, and social ramifications. According to official data, more than 26, 000 Syrians have fled their homeland and settled in neighboring countries. As a result, the registered refugee numbers in Lebanon and Jordan have largely stayed steady, at roughly 630,000 in Jordan and 1.1 million in Lebanon, since late 2014, as a result of both governments' stricter border policies. The number of refugees in Turkey has continued to rise, reaching 2.5 million by the end of 2015. These countries, in particular, lack the resources needed to care for refugees (Ferris & Kirişçi, 2016: 33–70). The fate of the nearly six million Syrian refugees residing outside their country have led directly to three options defined by the old international refugee system: local integration in the first asylum-seeking nation. In view of the complicated interaction of domestic and international policy, the option of integration within initial asylum countries or third-country relocation appears to have limited value as feasible alternatives. Instead, the concept of return has become increasingly popular with politicians, and it is being considered by a variety of actors, including states and international organizations.

The Syrian conflict has resulted in a complicated demographic situation. More than 5 million people have been internally displaced within Syria, according to UN estimates, and almost the same number are refugees outside Syria, either in neighboring countries or stuck on the border (Abram, Biding, Lang, Hites, UEMOA, Amp & Nouredine, 2015). A demographic catastrophe is made much more dangerous when it happens in a country with poor social and political structures. Regional societies appear to be a mix of ethnicity, cultures, and sects (Faleh & Ahmad, 2018). Many people are compelled to live below the poverty line as a result of various economic problems caused by the cross-border movement of refugees. In regions where violence appears to be the norm, extremism and terrorism feed on people's fear

and despair. Terrorist groups in the area are taking advantage of perfect conditions to expand and attract new members, while the number of refugees and displaced individuals continues to climb in nations with weak political and economic institutions (Peter & Reitano, 2018).

Due to its diverse impacts on the political, social-cultural, and economic stability of host nations, the Syrian refugee crisis is one of the most complicated crises on the international scene. Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the fundamental criteria set by host countries in the case of Syrian refugees in terms of health, education, and economic endurance. Due to the varied policies employed in each country, these criteria will be evaluated based on the thorough absorption of migrants and the length of success of the policies adopted in each country. The effect of Syrian refugees on international negotiating diplomacy will also be considered.

1.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Although considerable research has been devoted to investigating the effects of Syrian migrants on neighboring countries, little attention has been paid to the policy strategies implied by those countries and the international negotiation diplomacy concerning the Syrian refugees. Similarly, the economic, educational, and health care services offered to those migrants and their efficiency have gone unnoticed. Accordingly, further research is needed. The present study is designed to meet this need.

1.2 REASERCH QUESTIONS

The current study attempts to answer the following questions:

- i. How efficient are the absorbing policies implied by the concerned countries?
- ii. Has the presence of Syrian refugees in the host countries been used as a tool for international negotiations?
- iii. How does the Syrian crisis affect those countries at the levels of education, the economy, and health care?

1.3 THE AIM OF THE STUDY

This study aims at:

- i. Examining the international diplomatic negotiations regarding the Syrian refugees
- ii. Highlighting the countries' absorption of Syrian refugees
- iii. Emphasizing the migration policies implemented by host countries.
- iv. Evaluating the basic services and policies provided by host countries

1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Secondary sources of information will be used to collect data. Secondary data sources include books, research journals, international periodicals, policy papers, and the numerous United Nations publications that are accessible online. The data will be analysed using a content analysis approach.

1.5 POLITICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

Last decade, war in Syria claimed the lives of about 400 thousand people and caused the displacement of millions of Syrians. The beginning of the protests in Syria, which began in Darla on March 15, 2011, marked a turning point for the country. Since the start of the war, Assad regime forces and pro-Assad militias have killed more than 63 thousand civilians, including 12 thousand children and about 7 thousand women and 44 thousand men and children (Doanay, 2019; Specia, 2018).

Outside intervention has had the biggest impact on the Syrian war. Russia has been the main backer of the regime of Bashar al-Assad, and it has had the most prominent role in controlling some areas in the regime's favor (Lucas, 2015). On the other hand, the American presence in Syria has been to preserve geographic interests, as Donald Trump states, "We will fight where our interests are concerned" (Jacob, Bremmer & Kaplan, 2017).

The Syrian civil war has destroyed everything in Syria. This has led to a mass exodus of millions of Syrians who migrated to neighboring countries in search of safety after the war destroyed their homes and almost everything they had back home. At the beginning, it was estimated that the war would not last for a long time, as so many international organizations and donors played a great role in providing support. But the opposite was evident because of the complexity of the problems in Syria. Many parties provoked the Syrian conflict, and every group wanted to impose control (Goldman, 2017). Neighboring countries have opened borders to Syrians and are providing all possible assistance to them. For example, Turkey used an open-door policy and provided camps along the Syrian-Turkish border that took in thousands of Syrians at the onset of migration (Danièle & Saracoglu, 2019).

Following the European Convention on Refugees in 1951, Turkey and the European Union signed an agreement to exchange migrants registered in Turkey with others who were not registered in the European Union. The European Union, in turn, provided financial support to help Turkey reduce immigration but did not abide by the terms of the agreement between the two countries (Anas, 2016). Lebanon has also followed a policy of rapid response that allowed migrants to enter its area of border and provided the necessary assistance to them. Lebanon was unable to meet the demands of Syrian refugees due to its weak economy and large number of Syrian migrants (Estella & enouz, 2019).

In a number of countries, the Syrian refugee issue is used at times against regional rivals or even against their domestic political partners. In an attempt to capitalize on growing Western fears of a mass influx of refugees, some host countries have been able to use their location to secure undue external income as a form of rent for refugees. It can be said that there are two main types of behavior that seek funds for the presence of refugees. Hosting countries may adopt "mutual interest" strategies and rely on cooperation between states, or they may choose coercive blackmail. The former involved appeals for international assistance and the use of international norms and law and contrasted sharply with the latter, which often entailed threats of unilateral action (Tsourapas, 2019).

A study by Alice (2015) showed that the Syrian crisis could lead to a long-term displacement of Syrian refugees. Education is a basic platform for protection, social stability and economic.

Recovery (UNICEF et al., 2013). Access to quality education is key to ensuring continued learning for children displaced by the ongoing conflict in Syria. A high percentage of uneducated Syrians will have serious individual and societal consequences. Education for Syrian children is indispensable in the countries hosting them, however, 57% of the region's children are currently not in school. Providing education to Syrian refugees in three neighboring countries: Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. It will specifically look at the educational potential of Syrian refugee girls and the role they can play in reducing the vulnerabilities migrants can face in times of displacement. One of the most important findings of researcher was the difficulty of obtaining the official document that can facilitate the registration process and the validity of the data that can be provided to the institution to avoid any possible problems and the difficulty of accessing schools making education difficult to reach Syrians especially those who live in areas far from schools as well as children working to help the family to live in difficult conditions and finally early marriage for migrants in ways that alleviate the living pressure on the family and help find livelihoods.

Casarico, Facchini and Frattini (2015) investigated the illegal immigration in terms of challenges and prospective. The researchers mentioned that mixture of increasing immigrants and preventive policies improperly imposed by several destination countries caused the increase of illegal immigration. The study offers a review about the technique behind the formation of immigration policies, laws and their role in decreasing the current illegal immigration. Moreover, they studied how governments deal with ex-post with the existence of illegal foreign workers by providing immigration amnesties. They reviewed the determinants for their introduction and address their demand from the point of view of collective welfare. Since the countries in the European Union differ substantially in conducting both ex-ante and ex-post immigration policies, they focused on the need to more organizing in the immigration policy area both in the border and inside the countries (Alessandra, Facchini & Frattini, 2015).

According to Hawamdeh and Al-Qteishat (2018), from the very start of Syria's civil conflict widespread displacement has become a reality. The article also examines the difficulty faced by Syria neighbors (Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon) who have housed nearly five million forced refugees according to current UN estimates. The article concludes that the Syrian refugee crisis remains one of Middle East's most serious issues. It is particularly sensitive to humanitarian and political issues, especially given the region's state of disorder, volatility, and long-running wars.

Içduygu (2020) explained that the options six million Syrian migrants have in the host countries, and the operational international migrant system was initially designed to integrate into the host country, voluntary repatriation or resettlement in the three countries. It seems that the option of integration into the first countries of asylum or resettlement in third countries acquires a limited currency as a viable possibility. The idea of return is increasingly becoming a politically preferred one and is being taken into account by various actors, including governments and international agencies. In fact, around 172.796 refugees are alleged to have returned between 2016 and 2019. It seems that returns are being expressed repeatedly in the context of establishing "safe zones" in Syria for refugees to return. Three conditions for the Syrians' voluntary return can be identified: sustainability, continuity, and safety.

The research presented on international policies to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis shows how countries make rational calculations based on their relative position and strength in the face of the target countries. When countries host a large number of refugees and local elites realize that their country is geopolitically important, they are more likely to resort to blackmail; otherwise, they are more likely to pursue a strategy of exchange of interests, as is the case with Jordan or Lebanon. The rise of the refugee rents approach suggests that power policy analyses are not accurate if they do not take forced migration into account. Weapons here are not used in the sense of new wars but as tools for diplomatic negotiations and influence, as an essential part of the international system (Akik, Ghattas, Mesmar, Rabkin, El-Sadr, & Fouad, 2019). Since 2016, following the European Convention on Refugees, Turkey

and the European Union had a Signature to exchange migrants registered in Turkey with others who were not registered in the European Union. The European Union, on the other hand, provided financial support to Turkey to reduce immigration but did not abide by the terms of the agreement between the two countries.

Lebanon has also followed a policy of rapid response that allowed migrants to enter its area border and provided the necessary assistance to them, but because of the economic structure in Lebanon, this is not the first time that Lebanon has dealt with migrants. It has a previous experience with Palestinian immigrants, but the difference here is the number of Syrians who entered Lebanon, on the other hand is that the infrastructure in Lebanon cannot receive the huge number of immigrants. Despite efforts by the Lebanese government, international organizations and donors, Lebanon has not been able to provide all basic services to migrants, due to the possibility that the state cannot absorb the huge number of migrants and the Lebanese infrastructure is unable to absorb them.

Jordan has responded to the crisis in Syria and allowed the entry of migrants. The main reason for this policy is that Jordan has not intervened in the Syrian events. As for procedures and services, Jordan has provided basic services, such as health, education, employment and helping to solve other problems. One year after receiving migrants, the Jordanian government has closed the borders to migrants and prevented them from entering thousands of emergency cases to provide health services to Jordan. It has a long history of receiving Palestinian and Iraqi migrants and providing them with basic services. As for the huge number of Syrians in Jordan, which has exceeded one million, the hope to return to their homeland has persisted, and problems have emerged in the cities where migrants are concentrated, unemployed and have no access to health service.

2. JORDAN

This chapter deals with problems faced by Syrian refugees in Jordan. Negotiating strategies, assimilation policies, and social services are also covered. Many Syrians were protesting against President Bashar al-Assad's rule prior to the start of the conflict, citing economic hardship, injustice, and a lack of democratic liberty. Demonstrations against democracy began in March 2011 in the southern city of Daraa, encouraged by instability in neighboring nations against their regimes. The Syrian administration exerted deadly pressure to suppress the resistance, demanding the removal of the president. The feud quickly escalated and spiraled out of control, and civil conflict erupted throughout the country. Hundreds of rebellious companies appeared. Accordingly, the world feared a humanitarian catastrophe due to the unrest as many residents lost their homes. The reports of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) show that by December 2020, more than 387,118 people had died. The SOHR study does not include the 205,300 individuals who reported being missing and thought dead. In addition to the 88,000 civilians allegedly killed in prisons run by the authorities due to torture (Charles, 2016),

Because of the lack of food, water, and protection, thousands of Syrians have fled to neighboring countries, which has gradually grown to tens of millions. Taking an active role in dealing with these migrations differs from one country to another. These differences raise a controversial question: "How do neighboring countries deal with the challenges of the presence of Syrian migrants?" To address the question, it is necessary to assess the negotiation techniques, absorption policies, and social services provided by these governments in recent years.

2.1 JORDAN'S OPEN BORDER POLICIES

Since the start of the crisis, Jordan has absorbed a huge number of Syrian refugees. Several factors contributed to the significant influx, including Jordan's refugee relationship and

friendliness, the Hashemite Kingdom's political stability, and the two nations' close historical, cultural, and geographical ties (Olwan & Shiyab, 2012). However, little is known about the Syrian road that crosses the border, the access standards, and the Kingdom's ability to manage the unofficial border crossing. Asylum seekers must travel a long and perilous road to reach Jordan. Most refugees entering Jordan arrive via the eastern borders of Daraa, Aleppo, and Homs. The Jordanian government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees jointly manage a transit center (hereinafter UNHCR). They were registered with the UNHCR and subsequently moved to one of various camps, including Zaatari, Blue, and Jordanian UAE Camp (Achilli, 2015).

Only half of Jordan's refugees are registered with the UNHCR. Only about 10% of Syrian refugees dwell in recognized refugee camps, with the rest dispersed across the country. Refugees, who make up 13% of Jordan's population, put a tremendous strain on the country's already ailing economy. The cost of sheltering refugees accounted for 17.5 percent of Jordan's budget in 2015, a considerable contributor to the country's \$2 billion deficit. Furthermore, Jordan's economy lacks sufficient space to welcome refugees. The unemployment rate in the country is around 12%, with young unemployment at around 30%. More social tensions arose as refugees competed for a few jobs (Saieh, Abi Khalil, & Gorevan, 2017).

Oman's attitude had changed toward curbing the influx of refugees by the end of 2015, cutting off access to over 15,000 Syrians along the Jordanian-Syrian border. Then On the Syrian side of the border, the government is likewise attempting to build a "safe zone" where refugees can live in relative safety from the Assad dictatorship and the "Islamic State." Jordan's new measures are aimed at minimizing Syrian refugees' severe impact on the country's economic, social, and political circumstances (Francis, 2015).

In light of the Jordanian government's current policy, this is a worst-case scenario. They're long and don't always make sense. In terms of procedure, the approval systems have hampered humanitarian organizations' ability to provide assistance and protection. The government has also asked humanitarian organizations to only serve refugees with complete documentation, according to reputable sources. Large numbers of refugees in host

communities are currently unable to access and present services in response to a variety of possible and actual protection difficulties, such as arrest, exploitation, and limited access to essential services (Lenner, 2020). Humanitarian aid "opportunities" decreased in 2014 and are on the verge of disappearing by the end of 2015. Domestic aid has experienced a severe drop in the progressive contraction of humanitarian activity, and its already restricted possibilities for a quality job have been reduced, as have restrictions on their freedom of movement (Kraft & Smith, 2019). Humanitarian aid is increasingly falling under Jordan's government's control, with apparent negative effects in terms of security and service delivery. The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MPIC) must authorize any projects that help refugees. In terms of procedure, complex and completely opaque approval processes have limited humanitarian organizations' capacity to deliver aid and provide security (AKSU, Ferris & Kirişci, 2020).

Furthermore, humanitarian organizations have been urged by the government to always support refugees with valid documentation. Large numbers of refugees in host communities cannot receive humanitarian aid. They are at risk of imprisonment, exploitation, and people have less access to important services as a result of these procedures. This is certainly linked to a growth in the proportion of people detained and compelled to return to the camps to work either illegally or without legal documents. International groups have also recorded an increasing number of evictions. In June 2014, for example, some 1,300,000 Syrian refugees were expelled from the country and moved to the Azraq camp (Helm & Bakker, 2017).

The number of voluntary returns to Syria appears to have increased since the beginning of 2014. Despite the various hazards and general lack of assistance in Syria, little is known about what drives refugees to return to their homeland. Border limitations, as well as the consequent separation from family members who are unable to visit Jordan, may explain, at least in part, the high rate of return. The full motivation for these returns, however, is unknown (LaGuardia, Trudi, Dijk, & Merckx, 2015).

The monarchy was reasonably open and accommodating of Syrians prior to the conflict in Syria. This was because of the country's memorable choice to make its ways for Syrian

foreigners and refugees overall. Nonetheless, until 2013, the objective of this open strategy was to show an impartial, non-meddling stance in the Syrian government-resistance war. The Jordanian authorities opened the Zaatari refugee camp July 2012, just a few kilometers from the Syrian border (Ali & Memisoglu, 2017). Jordan welcomed Syrian refugees who had found a safe shelter there. The government has imposed various limits on refugees' ability to work and has pushed them to reside in camps rather than cities. Palestinians who sought sanctuary in Syria prior to the conflict were met with hostility. As indicated by reports, the Jordanian government has endeavored to localize Palestinians without legitimate documentation. Despite the tensions surrounding security checkpoints, the concentration on camps, and the occasional restrictions on illegal border crossings, Syrians have often found refuge inside Jordan (Santos, 2014).

In 2015, Jordan's government became more forceful in its approach to the security and development issues that come with hosting more than one million Syrian refugees. Reports of refugees returning to Syria and severe limits on refugees' socio-economic rights have emerged as a new reality, with borders virtually blocked (Alshoubaki, 2017). Jordan was characterized by an absence of legitimate structure for displaced people in the preceding Syrian evacuee emergency. Jordan has not acknowledged the Status of Refugees 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Geneva Convention as the territorial host for refugees in the Middle East, which incorporates Lebanon and northern Iraq, just like Turkey. The Constitution only protects the writers of Article 21 from extradition if they seek political refuge (Al-Sharari & AlKhatib, 2015).

During the Iraqi refugee crisis, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation devised the Rapid Response Program on the Ruins of the Human Rights Commission (HRCU). Jordan's Al Samoud Fund (JRP) can be viewed as a platform that brings major parties in the refugee crisis together, including ministries, ambassadors, UN MPs, NGOs, and donors (Juline, & Rasheed, 2019). The crisis reaction plan, as per Marco Stella, an UNDP delegate at the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation in Amman, is a cycle that arranges Jordan's reaction to the Syrian refugee emergency to fortify the Jordanian government's ability and increment trust among all accomplices (Juline & Rasheed, 2019).

Almost \$3 billion will be driven into 11 essential businesses, as per the Emergency Response Program (ERP). Giver commitments to the arrangement are composed through a solitary channel (JRF), which Jordan and the United Nations created (Francis, 2015).

Because of the ongoing flood of refugees into Jordan, the 2015 Rapid Response Program was extended until 2020 in two phases: JRP 2016-2018 and JRP 2018-2020. The Jordanian reaction to the Syrian refugee emergency has generally focused on the refugees, disregarding the strain on the host society. This uneven intercession stirred up Jordanian discontent and exacerbated social strains, redirecting consideration from the 2016 crisis reaction program's center needs of refugees and versatility, even as it tended to both the requirements of Syrian refugees and the outcomes of segment tension on Jordan's state and populace (Beaujouan, & Rasheed, 2020). At long last, Jordan marked the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), which was sent off by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Republic of Turkey in December 2014 and intends to guarantee assurance, compassionate guide, and strength (UNHCR, 2015). Jordan's response strategy to the Syrian crises for the years 2018-2020, for example, is in accordance with current public systems. Several political and supportive players, on the other hand, have shown a lack of dexterity, hampering the emergency response's productivity. Jordan's sluggish reaction might be to blame for this. Above all, there is a lack of collaboration between 3RP and JRP (Buckner & Nofal, 2019).

Jordan's administration never marked or approved the 3RP arrangement, and it was not recorded as a key government entertainer in the arrangement. So, there is an absence of global and neighborhood participation in Jordan and other host countries in managing the Syrian refugee issue. In spite of the guidance and subsidizing provided for advancement projects, due to the Syrian evacuee emergency, their effect has been restricted, for the refugees as well as for the host society and the Jordanian economy. As per the authority observing and evaluation strategy created by UK-based consultancy business Agulhas, the Jordan Compact's belongings have been "blended," with lazy financial advancement, high joblessness, and negligible measures of extra products and occupations produced (Nuwar, Porcia & Kabatilo, 2019).

The new MoI card is a critical piece of legal paperwork since it establishes an individual's formal right to remain outside refugee camps. The primary categories of concern are refugees who are ineligible for new MoI cards and refugees who are qualified but have not yet gotten new MoI cards due to a lack of papers required for the routine issuance procedure. Every Syrian in Jordan is required to register with the Jordanian government, which started the process of re-registering all Syrians in the nation in early 2015; as of October 2016, the procedure, dubbed the Urban Verification Exercise ("UVE"), is still underway. Syrians residing in host areas outside of the camps acquire new MoI cards via the UVE. Along with granting legal status, enabling travel, and allowing access to services, the new MoI card assists Syrians born in Jordan in establishing nationality, which may aid in future voluntary repatriation or relocation attempts (NRC, 2016).

2.2 THE JORDANIAN SOCIAL SERVICES

2.2.1. Education

The host community virtually revolted against the extension and overcrowding of the classrooms as the public schools were overloaded with Syrian refugees. As a result, the two shift school hours are scheduled. Jordan proved to be a watershed moment in the educational system, but subsequent demands in government institutions have enraged both the public and the authorities (Michael, 2019). From 7.6% in 2012 to 13.4% in 2014, the proportion of undergraduate students enrolled in double-semester schools grew (Inquiry Initiative, 2014). The greater part of Jordan's Syrian refugees is younger than 18, putting a strain on instructive assets. To reduce overcrowding in classrooms, Jordan has constructed 98 new dual-term schools (2014, *ibid*). According to the UNHCR's exaggerated international positioning, one in every three Syrians in Jordan (about 1,260,000 out of 660,000) is between the ages of 5 and 17 (Lupieri, 2020). The requirement for Syrians to register with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and get a service card for the Syrian community is necessary for Syrian students to receive free education and reciprocity, just as it is for Jordanian students (Krafft, Sieverding, Salemi, & Keo, 2018).

Outside of the camps, the issues will more often than not be gathered toward the beginning of the new school year, particularly in 2018-2019, and in two primary areas. The first involves enrolling pupils in various Jordanian public and even private schools despite the lack of a UNHCR card. Second, many families have enrolled their children in private schools in recent years and discovered that the fees of private education are prohibitively expensive due to variables relating to Jordan's general economic status (Alshoubaki, 2019). Due to the deployment of Syrians in various places, one of the most serious challenges Jordan faces is access to schools. Due to Jordan's low resources to support the education sector, the Jordanian government has been unable to meet access standards. The two-term method has been utilized in some locations to accommodate the highest number of pupils in one institution (Topcuoğlu, 2019).

For 80–90 percent of Syrian youngsters, enlistment peaked between the ages of 9 and 10, then fell as they grew older. Although they were more resistive to being recruited at a younger age in their early and middle adolescence, early young adult (age 16-17) participation percentages were equal to or slightly lower than those in Syria before the emergency (Sieverding, Krafft, Berri, Keo, & Sharpless, 2018). In terms of enrollment, Syrian refugees fared worse than Jordanians of all ages. The enrollment gap widened significantly and maintained for those beyond the age of ten (Assaad, Ginn, & Saleh, 2018).

Between 662,000 and 1.3 million Syrian refugees have entered Jordan by 2015, representing for 7 to 13% of the country's population. 2 Jordanian assistance was essential since many of these Syrians were of school age. Authorities must quickly find space in their schools for a high number of immigrants. According to the Educational Management Information System (EMIS) of the Ministry of Education, there were 126 thousand Syrian students registered in Jordanian public schools in the 2016/17 academic year, accounting for 9% of the total student population. the bodies of humans (Ministry of Education 2017). Syrian students made up 12% of elementary school pupils and 4% of secondary school students. Secondary school students account for around 6% of the total population. Studies such as (Ragui, Thomas, 2018) have failed to discover evidence of any influence of Syrian refugees on Jordanians' educational achievement.

2.2.2. Healthcare

Because of ongoing solicitations from refugees and medical care transportation, Jordan has assembled an organization of essential medical care offices to give admittance to health administrations. These facilities deal with a high volume of patients as well as drug shortages. Similar to the impacts on the health-care system, social needs are expanding. According to the Access Survey, 56% of Syrians believe that having access to hospital treatment in Jordan exacerbates conflict (Doocy, Lyles, Akhu-Zaheya, Burton, & Burnham, 2016). Regardless of the way that health administrations are accessible and available to Syrians in evacuee camps, Syrians living in cities put pressure on the country's care system (Alshoubaki, 2017).

According to the Jordanian ministry of health, the number of Syrians treated at public medical facilities in Jordan increased by 250 percent from 2013 to 10,330. In March 2013, the number of Syrians requiring medical treatment outside of displaced person camps increased by 600%, from 105 to 622 (Al-Rousan, Schwabkey, Jirmanus, & Nelson, 2018). To get therapeutic benefits at the cost of an able and uninsured Jordanian, the patient must have a valid refugee report (for refugees of various identities) and a Syrian people group administration card issued by the ministry of the interior (security card). If a refugee's shelter record expires, the person will be responsible for the cost of treatment at the outsider's rate (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Loescher, Long, & Sigona, 2014).

2.2.3. Economy

The surge of refugees into the nation has an adverse consequence since it prompts an expansion in imports of different supplies and products to satisfy the needs of the populace, which has developed principally because of the flood of outsiders into the country. Jordan and Lebanon are instances of low-asset nations (Salama, Turki, Muhammad, Abdel-Bouh, & Al-Silwani, 2020). Working legally, on the other hand, has always been an option if one can afford the fees and produce the necessary documentation; however, the majority of Syrians

have had little choice but to work informally if any work is available (Topcuoğlu, 2019).

The Syrian presence in Jordan has had mixed consequences on the economy and infrastructure, with 80 percent of registered refugees living in urban host communities rather than camps. Syrians' ability to attend government schools and get medical treatment has worsened already-existing issues in both areas. Municipal services such as trash and water infrastructure are overburdened, especially in the country's northern refugee-hosting regions. While many people claim that the Syrian presence is raising rent rates, research shows that the pressure on the rental market has eased since roughly 2014. While Syrians continue to struggle to pay their rentals, Jordanians, who generally own homes or pay lesser rents, are not affected in the same way. However, it benefits Jordanian landlords, who profit from charging Syrians exorbitant rents (Lenner, 2019).

Examine the kinds of jobs that Syrian refugees, Jordanians, and other nationalities were employed to do. The six sorts of work researched are: (1) independently employed or neglected family laborers; (2) businesses; (3) unpredictable pay businesses; (4) casual private standard compensation work; (5) formal private customary pay work; and (6) public area work. Informal private regular wage work was the most common type of work among Syrian refugees who were employed (Caroline & Assaad, 2016). A work license is held by 43% of working Syrian refugees. In the authority area, 73% of Syrian displaced people held grants, while 40% of Syrian refugees worked in the casual area (Kelberer, 2017).

The overall number of Syrians working in Jordan with work permits was 44,900 as of January 2017. According to government estimates, 282,871 Syrians are either unemployed or working without a permit. The number of work licenses awarded to Syrians increased by 13,195 between June and July 2016. Syrians can now receive work licenses without paying any fees or meeting any restrictions thanks to the Ministry of Labor (Fakih & Ibrahim, 2016). If they had secured a permit during the grace period, workers expressed concern about having to pay large fees in the future. As per information, bosses and laborers are receptive to changes in the expense of work licenses. In May 2016, it was decided to permit agrarian cooperatives to apply for work grants in the interest of Syrian refugee representatives. From May to June

2016, the number of grants awarded climbed by 3,706 in the horticulture sector (Fallah, Krafft, & Wahba, 2019).

2.3 JORDAN'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH EU

Millions of Syrian displaced people have escaped to adjoining countries, including Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. The EU has moved its concentration from expanding states' and social orders' strength to weakness and emergencies. Strategy and program rules for fortifying versatility in intermittent emergencies were distributed by the US Agency for International Development (Dijkstra, 2016).

Developing suppleness may end up compromising rather than guaranteeing Europe's security. The capacity of an individual, a family, a community, a nation, or a district to withstand, adjust, and recover as quickly as possible from extreme events, according to the European Commission (European Commission, 2012, p. 5). Adaptability is defined as the ability to adapt to unanticipated threats as they arise. Adaptation was an important component of catastrophe risk reduction strategies around the world. Some see the adaptable topic as deeply depoliticizing since it "must constantly battle to accommodate itself to the world" (Wagner & Anholt, 2016).

The European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) Resilience Marker exhibits the idea's developing noticeable quality. Understanding the unique circumstance and job of neighborhood entertainers and establishments is underlined in the measure. At the United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai, Japan, the EU Resilience Compendium: Saving Lives and Livelihoods was sent off. An adaptation-based methodology in Yemen may involve conveying assets to the least fortunate and weakest individuals through neighborhood circulation frameworks (European Commission, 2015).

In the EU, the term "resilience" has become a catchphrase, but how is it understood and applied in practice? Here, we analyze the why and how through which the EU sees Adaptation, just as how these are placed into impact. The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) are intended to help countries lining Syria in managing the refugee flood. The

European Union's organizations are a significant supporter of the 3RP (Supporting Syria & the region, 2019). To show what Adaptation might resemble practically speaking, we take a gander at instances of Adaptation working in Jordan and Lebanon. Jordan's policy on Syrians' ability to work signals a shift in its humanitarian assistance tenant strategy. Major donor countries have substantial sway over how humanitarian aid is distributed. Jordan's plan to allow Syrian refugees to work has been met with criticism. Patterns in the global market for helpful and advancement help have incited arrangement changes (Kader, 2016). The local joblessness rate is considerably higher among ladies and young people in the country. Jordan did not sign the Geneva Convention on Refugees in 1951 and does not have a public law on refugees right up 'til the present time. In 1954, the public authority stretched out citizenship to Palestinians in the nation, making it the main local host state to do as such (Loescher & Milner, 2013).

Jordan welcomed migrants fleeing the violence with open arms. Most of Syrian refugees have gotten comfortable metropolitan or pier-metropolitan districts, where they frequently exist together with other minimized gatherings like different displaced people and devastated Jordanians. Syrians presently approach the nation's medical care and schooling organizations, on account of the public authority's choice. Jordan has campaigned for further developed guide access by involving its refugee arrangements as influence in worldwide exchanges. In spite of its announced position against endowments, the World Bank endorsed a \$150 million advance to Jordan in 2013 for its bread sponsorship program (Kelberer, 2017). Jordan's intentional absence of restricting worldwide refugee regulation is planned to give the country the best adaptability in establishing and renouncing policies. The public authority's refugees lease looking for strategy has filled with regards to the Syrian refugee emergency. At the February 2016 London meeting, Jordan's evacuee leases looking for methodology and strategy suggestions were on full presentation. The London gathering represents the serious worldwide market for philanthropic and advancement help. Jordan's strategy was impeccably lined up with the goals and prerequisites of both benefactor nations and global associations (Lenner & Turner, 2019). Jordan is named an upper Middle-Income Country (MIC) with a GNI of \$4,680, a status it has held beginning around 2012. Jordan's bundle of compassionate

guide, improvement backing, and exchange benefits significantly surpasses those of other local host nations. Since the option to work for any migrant gathering is generally petulant, the arrangement conveys political ramifications for the public authority (Kelberer, 2017).

Jordan's capacity to keep getting philanthropic and advancement help because of its facilitation of Syrian refugees is under peril. Givers submitted more than \$6 billion in awards and credits in 2017, remembering \$2.2 billion for low-interest advances. These strategies are inconvenient on the grounds that they are depicted as ways of diminishing interest for resettlement and casual movement to contributor nations. To guarantee that the restricted early aftereffects of the earlier year can be extended, the Jordan Document advocates for additional improvement help and economic accords (Argyropoulos, 2018). Despite the manner of speaking with regards to the significance of improvement, \$834.6 million in credits were utilized for direct financial plan support, with just \$93 million going to advancement drives. As the common struggle continues, the worldwide market for help might advance, constraining Jordan's administration to move its sources and lease looking for approach (Amman: International Labor Organization, 2016; 2017).

3. LEBANON

3.1 LEBANON'S OPEN BORDER POLICIES

Lebanon, like many other Middle Eastern countries, refused to accept the 1951 Convention's tradition of untouchable status for acceding states. As a result, statutory "refugee" status was not established until 1967, and resettlement limits were in effect at the time (Bobseine, 2016). The majority of Syrian refugees are housed in Lebanon, with the government estimating that there are approximately 1.5 million inside the nation. Around 18,500 Ethiopian, Iraqi, Sudanese, and other refugees, as well as more than 200,000 Palestinian refugees, are included (Schoemaker, Baslan, Pon, & Dell, 2021).

In the early phases of their asylum requests, displaced Syrians encounter a variety of obstacles. Whatever the case, the state is present practically everywhere for the lion's share of Lebanese society, especially with the growth of the so-called "free, partisan national development," which was startlingly radical (Turner, 2015). It went on to say that Lebanon requires a legal specialist to manage the requests of the large number of immigrants who have entered the country lawfully or illegally and have a residence visa. When Syrian refugees have settled in, the US is unable to enroll the pieces of legal documentation for unused authorization (Janmir, 2018).

The illegality of refugee presence could put Syrian refugees in such a precarious situation that they are forced to flee Lebanon, a scenario that some have argued would be a violation of Lebanon's international commitments. Under international law, the State maintains the essential principles of refugee protection, particularly the principle of non-refoulement (Janmyr, 2016). This protects refugees from being deported or repatriated to places where their lives or liberties are at risk. Due to tight admission processes and new restrictions for renewing or restricting legal stay, many refugees fleeing the Syrian conflict are unable to reach safety in Lebanon. Most people are unable to renew their licenses because they are too stressful and expensive. Accordingly, most Syrian refugees in Lebanon will be denied asylum

(Kassir & Hariri, 2018).

The Palestinian refugee community from Syria has found it difficult, if not impossible, to find protection in Lebanon. Syrians in Lebanon essentially have two choices: leave or stay and endure exploitation and marginalization (Janmyr, 2016). Because of the perception that Syrian refugees were a burden and how their presence altered Lebanon's demographic system, the state began to protect them. The political class in Lebanon has done this through a rhetorical strategy. The Lebanese elite shaped the country's narrative, and refugees are viewed as an existential threat to the country's stability (Rosita, 2019).

In Lebanon, they have constantly exploited refugees as a target for a variety of difficulties. The public's perception of refugees and their behavior toward them has been influenced by the Lebanese new actions. A significant number of individuals seeking refuge in the country, as well as surges of homeless persons escaping public and international hostilities, disasters, and economic downturns (Alsharabati & Nammour, 2015). While the Lebanese government established a Directorate for the Settlement of Palestinian Refugees, the UNHCR was given a primary responsibility in determining the status of non-Palestinian refugees. In any event, Lebanese experts do not believe the UN's refugee emergency is necessary (Kagan, 2011).

The lack of a specific order for entertainers working in administration and relocation in Lebanon appears to exacerbate the country's ongoing extremely delicate situation. Shelter seekers and displaced persons rely on the security advantages, in general, of the General Directorate of Public Security. Furthermore, a terrifying and abhorrent crusade has been carried out without a sign of a decent migration approach especially for those who do not have legal status (Rahme, 2020). Added to that, long-distance relocation makes it more difficult to provide assistance (Sanyal, 2018).

As the emergency, which began as compassionate and momentary crisis assistance, morphed into a medium-term effort, the benefactors were left debilitated after seven years. Confronted with waning public and global guidance, shaky day-to-day environments, expanded refugee security, and negligible resettlement in affluent nations, refugees and haven searchers give off an impression of being compelled to choose between suffering critical difficulty in Lebanon

or getting back to their nations of origin. Lebanon's entryway strategy implies that it doesn't perceive Syrian refugees as refugees since it has not marked the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and, on second thought, remembers them as uprooted people (Salem, 2012). Furthermore, on the grounds of Lebanon's political and ethnic unrest, the public authorities have been reluctant to manage the uprooted. Lebanon is still recuperating from its inward difficulties. This approach adversely affects the economy (El Hariri, 2020).

The Lebanese government's compassionate methodology is to acknowledge transients in spite of Lebanon's refusal to sign the refugee accord. This is on the grounds that the organization would prefer not to interfere in the Syrian conflict's homegrown issues (Kamel, 2018). Following an increase in the number of migrants entering the country, the Lebanese government has devised a variety of options for allowing Syrian foreigners to stay, including the reinstatement of legal status. The cycles additionally included directing the control of Syrian displaced people's entrance and leaving. These actions are planned to limit Syrian appearances in Lebanon because of the Lebanese government's insufficiency to acclimatize travelers (Yanmyr, 2016). Most Syrian refugees lost their lawful status in Lebanon because of these actions, leaving them powerless against social minimization, work double-dealing and misuse, lewd behavior, and the powerlessness to look for help from the police or security administrations in case of an attack. They lost all security, leaving Syrian refugees totally incapable of meeting their essential necessities throughout everyday life (Shawaf & Asmar, 2017).

As indicated by a 2017 report by the Syrian Network for Human Rights, the demonstrations of the Lebanese specialists have brought about most of the Syrian displaced people losing their legitimate status in Lebanon. They lost all assurances, leaving Syrian displaced people practically totally unfit to meet their principal necessities in life because of social minimization, work double-dealing and misuse, lewd behavior on occasion, and their powerlessness to go to the police and security administrations in case of any attack (Nassar & Stel, 2019). From the get-go, the Lebanese government followed two approaches on the issue of Syrian workers. In 2012, regulations were passed to protect Syrian outsiders from the negative effects of the common conflict. The unfortunate results are expected to influence

their wellbeing or save them from death, keeping them from joining the Syrian common battle for an assortment of reasons. The subsequent stage is the separation technique, which aims to help Syrians while keeping any unbiased party from taking part in the Syrian conflicts inside undertakings (Elizabeth & Spencer & Cha, 2018).

Around 1 million Syrian refugees live in Lebanon's ad hoc camp settlements; a significant percentage of them require legal status in the nation. Recently, there has been a rise in anti-Syrian rhetoric, particularly from Lebanese officials. For example, Deputy Prime Minister Zeina Awkar has demanded the repatriation of Syrian captives to Syria, while Lebanese Overseer Prime Minister Hassan Diab has stated that "the Lebanese government strategy for the progressive return of the displaced Syrians is using a phased bring-back approach" (Arsan, 2018). Lebanon declared a "state of financial crisis" on September 2, 2019, as a result of the country's long-standing major issues, which include an \$85 billion public debt (almost 150 percent of GDP), sluggish GDP growth, and a large budget deficit. Starting in October 2019, political and monetary worries sparked mass demonstrations, which were quickly followed by a rapid financial retreat: actual GDP was expected to shrink by 18.6% in 2020.

The value of the Lebanese lira has plummeted by roughly 80%. In addition, the introduction of an equal money rate has resulted in enormous price hikes in a variety of vital items. The lack of dollars, along with the depreciation of the currency, has put critical stockpile shortages at danger (Youssef, 2020). Finally, it is often said that Lebanon was dealing with internal concerns that arose when the refugees arrived, and what the consequences of this issue were at the time of its emergence. Because of the bombing at Beirut's port, which serves as the country's financial center, and the accompanying cash flight outside, the Lebanese government's delicacy was revealed.

3.2 LEBANON'S SOCIAL SERVICES

3.2.1. Education

Syrian refugees' suffering is undeniably one of the world's most sympathetic issues. Between the commencement of the conflict in 2011 and September 2015, the majority of Syria's 23 million people were displaced. As part of an inward migratory surge, around 7.6 million individuals were transferred to nearby governorates, while millions more fled the country. The number of Syrian pariahs has risen to the point where the economics of the country's acceptance of them has altered (Sorenson, 2016). The population of Lebanon rose by 25%, Jordan's by 10%, while the population of Turkish border areas increased by 10% to 20%. These nations' governments, as well as their residents, have shown remarkable compassion for those who have been forced to flee their homes (Hourani & Van Vliet, 2014). Syria's liberal conflict has created a genuine crisis in the Middle East. Around 40% of the young people were as yet alive. Syrian pariahs go to class consistently. Syrian refugees represent a danger to schooling, in addition to Syrian culture and public social frameworks over the long haul. The accomplishment of the district will be controlled by how well underage kids are instructed. The conditions in which these youngsters and their families end up ought to be very different. While Syria's kids are its future, the nation is seeing the return of a former time (Murad, 2017).

The Ministry of Education and Higher Education in Lebanon has undertaken a number of important initiatives to select Syrian adolescents for formal schooling. In any case, the school system struggled to cope with the situation. Over 250,000 children, a significant proportion of Lebanon's youth, have received no training five years after the Syrian conflict began. Several of them had been identified at school (Crul et al., 2019).

Lebanon now has around 1.5 million Syrian refugees, with 488,000 of them in school. Through the Reach All Children with Education (RACE) strategy, Lebanon's Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) has taken the lead in ensuring that all poor girls and boys in Lebanon, including refugees, have access to inexpensive education options. MEHE's

main technical and financial partner in attaining the aforementioned objectives has been UNICEF. This strategy was introduced in 2014, before a series of disasters threw the government's capacity to teach into disarray. Due to the economic crisis, a lack of government-level catastrophe preparedness, and the paralyzing effects of the COVID-19 epidemic, the educational system has been harmed, especially for vulnerable groups such as Syrian refugees. This article examines where the RACE plan stands today, as well as how the education of Syrian refugee students has been impacted by a triple crisis: economic collapse, the 4 August explosion, and the COVID-19 pandemic, all of which arise as a result of the Lebanese government's severe political incapacity, the result of decades of post-civil war corruption combined with infrastructural breakdown (Buckner et al., 2019).

Lebanon received a \$1.87 billion "Crisis Response Arrangement" in 2015, with 62.8 percent of stockrooms being authorized. The vast majority of those who have been uprooted rely on Lebanon's open schools system, which has been disrupted by the Syrian conflict. State-funded schools remained unchanged for 30 percent of Lebanese children. With an increase in the number of Syrian children out of school, the issue of government-funded schools has been worsened by the influx of Syrian refugees (Hoda & al, 2016). There were 249,494 Syrian understudies in the 2015-2016 school years, according to estimates. Lebanon is attempting to incorporate Syrian teenagers into its school system. Experts dropped registration costs and offered classrooms at 238 eligible institutions, allowing Syrians to enlist without having to present evidence of residency (Fida & Nakhle, 2016).

In Lebanon, school enrolling techniques are hampered by major constraints that make it impossible for Syrians to get legal status and work in the country. Countless families have been destroyed because they were hijacked while attempting to work or hunt for a suitable career. These families frequently lack the financial resources to pay for school expenses such as transportation and supplies, and as a result, they rely on young people's labor rather than sending their children to school. Regardless of how class numbers are growing, Syrian nonconformists are still not recognized in state-funded institutions. Despite the fact that 200,000 Syrian children were enrolled in government-funded schools in 2015-2016, this figure is still less than half of the 495,910 Syrian children that were initially enrolled with

UNHCR for the year (Humud, 2018). Lebanon essentially requires more financial assistance to meet the educational needs of Syrian refugees, including the transformation and remodel of government-funded schools, foraying into quality training, full inclusion of children with special needs, educator recruitment and enrollment, and school transportation (Ibid:2016).

In Lebanon, there are three types of training available: open training, informal schooling, and free excellent education. Up to 30% of students in Lebanon's educational system attend government-funded schools, with the majority of them concentrated in 250 of the country's poorest areas. The Lebanese Teaching Framework selected 249,494 pupils in state-funded schools during the 2015-2016 academic year. There are three levels of education in Lebanon: primary (grades 1-6), lower secondary (grades 7-9), and upper secondary (grades 10–12) (Kochen, 2012).

Syrian children in Lebanon are selected for a variety of non-formal education programs, ranging from sporadic teaching in poor study rooms to long-term training in non-formal schools supervised by local and unfamiliar non-legislative organizations. These schools, on the other hand, are not affiliated with the government and do not require confirmation (Brock, 2011). There are a few UN association projects and schools in Lebanon that are "illicit and not

perceived by the Guidance Department." The Ministry of Education and Higher Education has launched a pilot program for understudies who have missed up to two years of school before entering 10th grade. Around 5,500 understudies took part in this preparatory tutoring session at the start of 2016. A framework for non-formal education has been developed by the Ministry (Buckner et al., 2017).

3.2.2. Healthcare

The surge of refugees has put a strain on Lebanon's as of now shaky medical services framework. The Lebanese government is not required by law to provide medical care to the refugees. In addition, refugees are unable to afford healthcare or work in order to gain access to it. As a result, many are looking for less expensive medical treatment options, with some

resorting to self-medication or potentially dangerous traditional remedies. In Lebanon, Syrian refugees have access to healthcare. The flood of Syrian refugees has clearly had a significant impact on Lebanon's public health system (Kassak et al., 2006). Since the Lebanese government isn't legitimately committed to giving medical services to Syrians who can't bear the cost of them, they should look for elective clinical therapy, which can be exorbitant and perilous because of the improper utilization of conventional medication. The Syrian evacuee emergency has presented difficulties for all nations surrounding Syria. The public authorities of Lebanon have been stressing the need to adapt to the inundation of refugees (Dalia & Kalis, 2014). Despite the fact that they have invited the refugees, the evacuee emergency has put a strain on their medical services framework. Because of an absence of assets, packing, and a lack of specialists and attendants in both public and private medical clinics, Lebanon's medical care framework can't adapt to the convergence of refugees (Garwood & Roula, 2013).

Between Syrian refugees in Beirut and those in different pieces of Lebanon, there is a huge dissimilarity in admittance to clinical benefits. — In Lebanon, Syrian displaced people defy an assortment of obstructions to medical services, including "absence of legitimate status, work imperatives, and the average cost of basic items." Many of these issues, notwithstanding, can be tended to innovatively by, for example, "binding evacuee medical care to their UNHCR enrollment number so the Lebanese government can offer them public medical care." —Syria's refugee emergency has seethed across the Middle East for quite a long time, with adjoining countries enduring the worst part of the strain. Nearly 1,000,000 Syrian refugees are enrolled in Lebanon, with no access to medical care or education (Hossain, Leidman, Kingori, Al Harun, & Bilukha, 2016). Lebanon's public areas are overburdened and unfit to meet every one of the prerequisites of the refugees. Therefore, the cause area has stepped in to give each of their prerequisites, including schools, clinics, and centers (Lyles, Hanquart, & Woodman, 2016).

The medical services framework in Lebanon is set apart by high therapy costs, which are basically private, constraining numerous refugees to depend on UNHCR-financed medical services (Lyles et al., 2020). Because of an absence of financing, UNHCR was constrained to

execute a framework that restricted the quantity of conditions that a displaced person should meet to get clinic treatment. Regardless of whether the refugee fits such standards, he will be needed to pay 25% of the whole expense of wellbeing administration holes for Syrian refugees in Lebanon out of his own pocket (Kassak et al., 2006).

Lebanon's medical care system is inefficient due to its design and character. It's entirely unplanned and has a big influence on a lot of individuals. While both public and private specialist cooperatives exist in Lebanon, political realities and a lack of transparency in the public sector have resulted in a divide in the medical care system, with private specialist cooperatives exerting enormous power and influence (Chammay & Ammar, 2014). The Lebanese Ministry of Public Health, the UNHCR, NGOs, and other aid groups have all collaborated to increase Syrian refugees' access to medical treatment in Lebanon (Refaat & Mohanna, 2013).

Without access to a primary medical services office, a foundation of 25 non-legislative organizations provides mobile clinical units, free meetings, and medical supplies to refugees. Almost 200 basic medical care facilities in Lebanon provide limited treatment to Syrian refugees, with drugs and immunizations being made accessible as often as possible for free and without restrictions. According to the UNHCR (Selby, 2015), medical services in Lebanon have improved since the influx of Syrian refugees in 2011. More specialized therapy has been available as the number of well-being focused employees has grown. Mental assistance, for example, is claimed to be on the rise and is increasingly becoming recognized as a true and pressing health worry. Despite this, Syrian refugees in Lebanon continue to exist due to financial and geographical constraints (Ammar et al., 2016).

3.2.3. Economy

Around 55 percent of Syrian refugees in Lebanon lived in poverty prior to October 2019, indicating that the Syrian refugee community needs assistance even before the crisis. Around 90% of Syrian refugees are currently living in extreme poverty, demonstrating a significant increase in poverty levels throughout the economic crisis. As poverty levels among Syrian refugees in Lebanon increased, the value of Lebanon's currency, the Lebanese pound,

dropped. Between 2019 and 2021, food costs in Lebanon increased by 402 percent. As a consequence, Syrian refugees who were already having difficulty purchasing basic necessities before the crisis started now have far less purchasing power. Due to a shortage of funds to buy basic necessities, Syrian refugees in Lebanon are building up debt. Obtaining supplies, even for Syrian refugees who can afford basic necessities like as medication, is challenging owing to pharmacy shortages. The problem does not impact all refugees in the same way. Women-led Syrian refugee households are especially vulnerable to food hardship. The children of these households are particularly vulnerable to the issue. Unfortunately, the rate of child labour in Lebanon almost doubled between 2019 and 2020. In addition, child labour is more common in Syrian refugee households led by women than in those led by men. The economic crisis has intensified anti-refugee sentiment. Prior to the onset of the crisis, Lebanese politicians used the looming economic catastrophe to legitimise anti-refugee rhetoric. Local Lebanese locals accuse Syrian immigration of depriving them of their opportunities as the country's economy deteriorates (Caroline,2021).

The economy of Lebanon is on the verge of collapsing. Control shortcomings caused hospitals to turn off air conditioning equipment, according to the German news agency, and specialists warned of hunger. President Michel Suleiman contemplated stepping down without a successor in May 2014 (Brown, 2012). People's emotions deteriorated as a result of financial troubles, which disrupted formal learning, provoked political instability, and widened the range of permissible fury. The International Monetary Fund decreased its forecast for Lebanon's financial development from 2.5 percent to 2 percent in its October 2015 spot report, down from 2.5 percent in its April 2015 report. The growth rate is the same as that forecasted by Universal Financial Finance in 2014. The International Monetary Fund predicts that real growth will reach 2.5 percent this year (Yousef, 2020).

Political, economic, and security concerns have been addressed as the number of displaced Syrians in Lebanon has increased. It hurt the economy's fundamental engines, such as commerce, account management, and tourism, and curtailed business prospects, making the thousand-year progress targets even more difficult to achieve. Debt rose at a rate of 141 percent of GDP in 2013, suffocating fiscal progress (Murad, 2017).

Since 2011, a third of Lebanese young have been unable to find suitable employment, as the jobless rate has doubled to 34%, reached 5.7 percent, and set new highs, with the difficult campaign expanding to 50%. More than 56% of additional work is provided by the private sector. Low-wage jobs, in particular, have challenges, which have had a significant influence on job offer procedures. The government's resources were reduced as a result of these issues, putting Lebanon's financial, social, and political capability to the test (UNHCR; UNDP, 2015).

In actuality, the vast majority of Lebanese are impoverished. As the number of migrants who charge \$4 per day has increased, outrage has escalated. Another 170,000 Lebanese will be plunged into extreme poverty as a result of a World Bank agreement. Unemployment is expected to rise by 10% in 2014, according to predictions (Guy Nathaniel, 2017). On a daily basis, Syrian refugees and Lebanese laborers vie for limited job opportunities. All Syrians, the great majority of them are slaving away in vain, want for acceptance. Over a third of Syrian refugees are still unemployed, according to Lina Khatib, the domain manager. She mulls over the reality that the average salary for working individuals is just 40% of the lowest wage (BRIEF, 2015).

3.3 LEBANON'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH EU

Lebanon and Jordan are the countries with the most Syrian refugees in relation to their own populations. Both countries maintain that the true figures are significantly higher. According to Jordan, 1.3 million refugees live in the country, while 1.5 million live in Lebanon, accounting for 13 percent and 25 percent of the population, respectively. The 3RP is one of the UN's largest humanitarian efforts to date. The objective of adaptation is to further develop public entertainers' capacity to lead emergency reactions (Tsourapas, 2019). The Jordan section utilizes an "adaptation-based way to deal with react to and mitigate the impacts of the Syrian refugee emergency," as per the part (Jordan's Government, 2018: p. 2) The Lebanon country section, which is officially controlled by the Ministry of Social Affairs, utilizes the expression "adjustment." According to other people, the Lebanese government dismisses the idea of adaptation since it infers the emergency's drawn-out nature and the presence of

refugees (Oliker, Baruch, & Blum, 2016).

The EU emphasizes that national governments bear primary responsibility for resilience. This is not generally the situation, as our models from Jordan and Lebanon illustrate. We propose that zeroing in on the responsibility of emergency-impacted states allows the EU to disregard its own liability. Lebanon originally embraced a "no-policy" approach, assigning a significant part of the emergency to the UNHCR. As the number of refugees kept on rising, Lebanon started to request more command over the reaction. It stopped UNHCR's displaced person enrollment administrations in 2015 (Mufti, 2014; Mourad, 2017; Janmyr, 2018; Nassar & Stel, 2019).

An undertaking mentioning government leeway in Jordan should incorporate basically 30% weak host (Jordanian) populations and 30% refugees. A key staggering boundary is the different techniques for philanthropic and improvement subsidies. Benefactors regularly don't permit assets for evacuee assurance to be utilized for local area advancement as well as the other way around. Regardless, according to one global NGO working in Jordan, at least a portion of their contributors consider adaptable subsidizing (Kittaneh & Stolk, 2018). The EU has become progressively mindful of the requirement for more adaptable and long-term refugee help. Strains among UN organizations are another hindrance to trying the compassionate improvement nexus (European Commission, 2014).

How have nations managed a divided evacuee system with regard to return policies? The limit of the host state as a unitary performer has been given a huge load of thought in the composition. Checking out the organizational structures of Middle Eastern host states can be particularly useful in closing such openings. Notwithstanding not being a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Lebanon has taken in well over 1 million Syrian outsiders. Regardless of extended evacuation, political trailblazers have begun to advocate for the hurried getting back of refugees, portraying them as a weight (Fakhoury, 2021).

Taking everything into account, Lebanese elements have used refugee stay and return management as a tool of power and international influence. In this situation, removal from Syria has crashed into enraptured perspectives on the Syrian system among Lebanese groups.

The state's governmental issues of adjusting to contradicting interests have been molded by these unpredictable crossing points (Carpi, 2014). The Future Movement (FM), Lebanon's biggest Sunni party, just as huge Christian gatherings and the Druze-drove Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), have shaped the March 14 Alliance. Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, the country's essential constituent gatherings have supported the Syrian resistance just as provincial nations are pushing to delegitimize the Assad system (Sayigh, 2001).

The current key government players in Lebanon might agree that Syrian refugees should return. In any case, they have arranged and executed so many countless projects that deciding on a focal dynamic site is almost troublesome. As indicated by the Lebanese organization, around 170,000 refugees have "willfully" returned to Syria. Secular and common innovators in Lebanon have been instrumental in supporting return programs for Syrian refugees who have been dislodged by the brutality (Secen, 2021). Besides, lesser-known political gatherings, for example, the Christian-based Lebanese Promise Party, guarantee to have empowered the bringing home of 2000 displaced people by 2019 (The Daily Star, 2019).

The UNHCR's deliberate, secure, and environmental returning standards are generally acknowledged as the all-encompassing system under which bring-home exercises should occur. Key supporters of Syrian Alliance players have asked for "safe" rather than "intentional" returns. The overstretched limit of Lebanon, just like the absence of global weight sharing, makes it hard for a state to "endlessly" have uprooted individuals. In any case, with regards to system-controlled regions, Lebanon can work with safe returns and reinforce their manageability. Hezbollah has guaranteed that "influence" rather than "pressure" ought to be used to bring them back (Fakhoury, 2021).

Due to their steady collaboration with the Syrian system, supportive of Syrian gatherings, for example, Hezbollah and the FPM have emerged as critical homegrown players with blackball power. The counter-Syrian Alliance emerged as an insecure collusion that immediately deteriorated. To solidify their predominance, Lebanese political and religious pioneers have endeavored to oversee displaced persons' returns. They have laid down a good foundation for themselves as gatekeepers of Lebanon's people group by pushing for the return

of Syrian refugees. On the other hand, Syrian groups that have suffered losses have used the evacuee return as a bargaining chip. Certain administration players have endeavored to address themselves as power merchants by endeavoring to arrange returns. Following its victory in Northern Lebanon over Islamist radicals from Syria in 2017, Hezbollah organized the arrival of in excess of 50 Syrian families all alone. Hezbollah seeks to achieve a more extensive security objective by confining the development of dislodged individuals (Yigit & Tatch, 2017).

Lebanon professes to be a non-haven country while facilitating the world's largest number of refugees. The UNHCR's ability to carry out its global insurance order has been hurt by Lebanon's activities pointed toward decreasing the number of Syrians in the nation, as per this report. The significance of the expression "refugee" in global law for Syrians in Lebanon is analyzed in this segment. It additionally checks out the UNHCR's enrollment and de-enlistment rehearsals for Syrian refugees (Janmyr, 2016).

Starting around 1963, the UNHCR has had a presence in Lebanon. UNHCR has therefore borne the brunt of the weight of doing status assurance, enrollment, medical services, training, sustenance, and vocation help. It has adopted a realistic strategy towards the Lebanese government, seldom squeezing for sanction under the 1951 Refugee Convention by the Lebanese government. This is due to the way basic issues such as non-refueling events, enrollment, and the ability of refugees to work were not adequately addressed (Janmyr, 2017).

Lebanon has a long history of declining to define an arrangement to address the approaching refugee emergency. Between 2012 and 2014, Syrian refugees were primarily served by their networks, civil society organizations, and UNHCR, with the Lebanese government requiring a subsequent seat. Lebanon's true line of conclusion with Syria has had awful ramifications for displaced people. In May 2015, Lebanon prohibited UNHCR enrollment of Syrian displaced people, trying to bring down the country's true refugee populace, which had ascended to around 1,200,000 by March 2015. The majority of the debate appears to have revolved around the use of the term "refugee" as a code word for Syrian refugees and displaced people (Hassan, 2014).

For in excess of 50 years, the expression "refugees" has been politically charged in Lebanon. The broadly held conviction that the main 'official' refugees in the locale are Palestinians has persevered. With the flood of Syrians into Lebanon, banter regarding how to sort individuals looking for asylum in the nation have warmed up. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) wound up progressively gotten between worldwide displaced person regulation and nearby shelter points of view. As a result of their conflicts over the Syrian struggle, Lebanese political powers went to extensive measures to forestall perceiving Syrians moving to Lebanon as people escaping abuse (Jennifer & Tabar, 2015).

In Lebanon or somewhere else, the UNHCR has not given a proper statement of at first sight displaced person status for Syrians. All things being equal, it alludes to the mass migration of Syrian regular folks as a "refugee development." 'People who left Syria have been enrolled as people looking for global insurance,' as per its first International Protection Considerations on individuals escaping the Syrian Arab Republic. The UNHCR expressed in 2014 that most of Syrians looking for worldwide security are probably going to meet the states of Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Convention's displaced person definition. This would need to occur before his evacuee status still up in the air (UNHCR, 2015).

Accordingly, affirmation of displaced person status does not make somebody a refugee; rather, it announces him to be one. Most of the countries getting Syrian refugees have not marked the 1951 Refugee Convention. One hypothesis is that UNHCR trusts that the political expenses of deciding displaced person status offset the conceivable insurance gains, basically on a superficial level. In the ensuing part, I'll outline how refugee affirmation through enrollment was basic for legitimate residency and appropriate insurance in Lebanon (UNHCR, 2017).

The UNHCR has as of late embraced another essential heading on the job of refugee status insurance in getting security and privileges. Command RSD might be supplanted by faster case handling, expanded enrollment, and smoothed out methodology, or by blending RSD and resettlement case handling, as in the Syrian circumstance. UNHCR workers in Lebanon seem to trust that UNHCR's characterization of Syrians as a "displaced person development" and

the by all appearance's strategy are almost indistinguishable all around however custom, making the current arrangement "hard to clarify." Following enrollment and case ID, the solidified RSD resettlement talk with happens. This sped up RSD process doesn't exclude somebody from refugee status; rather, it just 'de-focuses' them for resettlement purposes. Cases that are "muddled to the point of requiring more opportunity to clear" won't be focused on for resettlement except if they are "extremely critical" (UNHCR, 2016).

The UNHCR does not dive excessively far into Article 1(F) and go over everything about each case. Later, after a top-to-bottom meeting and the finishing of the Resettlement Registration Form, an authority assurance of status is made. Assuming a case neglects to match the accommodation conditions, it will be de-focused. Staff working in detainment organizations, like courts, police divisions, security contraptions, military, government services, and specially appointed offices, de-focus on UNHCR's refugee profiles. A case might be considered "rigorously earnest" in explicit conditions, like when there are clinical or security issues (Ibid, 2016).

In 2015, Lebanon's Ministry of Social Affairs requested that all new enlistments of Syrians, both those all around in the nation and fresh debuts, be ended. The authority reason given was that another strategy for refugee enlistment was to be formulated, albeit this new instrument still cannot seem to be carried out starting at 2017. The suspension of enlistment doesn't seem to altogether affect the quantity of Syrians living in Lebanon. Starting around 2015, UNHCR has been not able to enroll Syrian displaced people in Lebanon, except for new-conceived infants brought into the world to Syrian guardians who are as of now enlisted with UNHCR. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lebanon guaranteed that enlisting children would be a hidden advance to resettling those uprooted Syrians on Lebanese domain (Aziz, 2015).

According to the UN refugee agency, more than 36,000 newborn Syrian newborns in Lebanon are stateless and lack identifying cards. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees registration statistics, almost 51,000 Syrian infants were born in Lebanon since the onset of the Syrian crisis in 2011. The UNHCR does not keep track of births among unregistered refugees. One of the primary reasons parents avoid filing for their children's legal

status is a concern of visiting their embassy for security or political reasons. "For a variety of circumstances, parents of newborn children may lack the required civil status papers, including identification cards and marriage certificates. A valid identification document, often a driver's licence or passport, is necessary to get a birth certificate from the mukhtar or to register with the PSD. Many refugees may have lost their documentation during their displacement or their documents may have expired, making replacement impossible. Many refugees, particularly those married informally via customary norms, may not have registered their marriages in Syria or may be unable to verify their marriage in Lebanon (Al Jazeera, 2015).

4. TURKEY

4.1 TURKISH OPEN DOOR POLICY

Given that Turkey was historically a local home to the Ottoman Empire, which included a variety of Turks, Middle Easterners, Kurds, Persians, and people of different religious roots, temporary designs in the Turkish region are not uncommon. In 1923, developed Turkey, also known as the Republic of Turkey, was established. On June 14, 1934, the Turkish government developed a resettlement methodology that established the basic criteria for resettlement. According to Joost Jungerdine, this may be a constraining integration effort of the non-Turkish minority through mass immigration (Aatay & Soner, 2001: p281). On June 14, 1934, the Resettlement Law of 1934 was passed for Turkish citizens. The law was passed and entered into force a week after its distribution, approving Insides Serve Sukru Kaya (Ülker, 2008). In 1934, the Compromise became the primary legal treatise to be distributed. This continued for a long time until Turkey joined the United Nations in 1945. Ever since, Turkey has been signing agreements and passing legislation to oversee the movement's curricula ever since. The Turkish record was the Geneva tradition moment, marked in 1951 (çduygu, 2015: p4).

It was forbidden for non-Turks to enter the nation. Later, in the 1980s, be that as it may, Turkey began to integrate foreigners into its legal framework after corrections in immigration law. Several variables contributed to this crucial step, including globalization and a large number of other financial and social changes, particularly within the Middle East. In an effort to remain in Turkey or on their way to Europe, Turkey pulled out some 5,000,000 intermittent travel vagrants from Afghanistan, Eastern Europe, and African countries in the early 1990s. Because of the unrest in northern Iraq in 1990–1991, Turkey absorbed more than 500,000 Kurds fleeing the conflict (ibid, 2015: p. 4).

As a result, Turkey passed the Refugee Law in 1994, which was superseded in 2013 by the Law on Foreigners and the Comprehensive Security Law. Be that as it may, the topographical boundaries of the Geneva Convention were protected. As a result, non-Europeans who have

moved to Turkey are entitled to temporary security in lieu of asylum. However, the length of the temporary guarantee must be determined. Turkey, with a passion for connecting the EU, has been instrumental in adjusting the country's immigration and asylum frameworks to EU rules. The Aliens Work Permit Act (4817) was enacted in 2003 to make it easier for remote nationalsto work within the United States. Moreover, in 2005, the Turkish government established the 2005 Asylum and Migration Action Plan, which indicated specific timelines and activities(Soykan, 2012: p. 38).

Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011, many thousands, if not millions, have set out on an excursion to remain in Turkey or emigrate to Europe. Following that, Turkey passed the Foreigners and International Protection Law in 2013, which explicitly protects non-Turkish residents.Nonetheless, in 2014, the progression of development was so extraordinary that the camps couldn't handle any extra passage (zden, 2013). In October of that very year, Turkey set up the Joint Directorate of Movement Regulation, notwithstanding the unused synopsis, similar to the case for any outsider or haven searcher. The temporary security establishment was intended to be a temporary game plan for the massive influx of people that began in mid-2014 (Harunolu, 2017: p248).

In the Syrian clash, Turkey can assume a significant part. 54% to 64.8 percent of the more than 6.6 million displaced Syrians are really focused on assuming reasonable neighboring nations are taken into account.Since 2014, Turkey has had the largest number of displaced people on the planet (Alawa, Zarei, & Khoshnood, 2019). Starting in 2019, roughly 3,643,870 Syrians were granted impermanent haven in Turkey. In addition, beginning around 2011, Turkey has seen countless displaced people from adjoining nations, primarily from Afghanistan and Iraq. The UNHCR itemized 367,000 non-Syrian haven searchers in 2018. Somewhere in the range of 2010and 2018, the Directorate General of Movement Management (DGM) measures 478,309 people associated with worldwide assurance. This implies that 58,018 people who were under worldwide security in Turkey in 2011 are at present 4,122,179 based on the possibility that the individuals who are authoritatively enlisted are being screened. This data, addressing more than 5.02 percent of Turkey's populace, suggests that the "open passage approach" that was at that point connected with Syrians was at present proper

for other refugee up-and-comers. (Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015).

"Transitory insurance" is the sort of worldwide security proposed to most Syrian refugees in Turkey because of Turkey's geological reservation in the Geneva Convention, which keeps non- European shelter searchers from getting "displaced person" status. Moreover, people who have escaped "enormously" to an adjoining nation inferable from struggle are relied upon to get back once the conflict is finished.

Sanctioning laws is a basic cycle, yet it is hard to carry out. When contrasting migration laws and strategies with the current circumstances of Syrian refugees in Turkey, the former gives off an impression of being more intricate. From the establishing of the Republic to ongoing changes in movement strategies, for example, the Aliens and International Protection Act, which came into power in April 2014 with the foundation of the Immigration Department, there are numerous laws and guidelines (Kirişci, 2014). However, the Law on International Protection, the Law on the International Protection of Foreigners, and the Temporary Protection Regulations currently set up a legitimate system for managing the Syrian refugee emergency, including the extraction of records, lawful basis, and formal methodology. A few laws and guidelines have all the earmarks of being invalid. For instance, the 1951 Geneva Convention connected Turkey to geological lines, albeit this can't be applied under current conditions because of the convergence of thousands of non-Europeans as refugees. Turkey had recently agreed to the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, but held the "topographical limitation" proviso, which implies that non- European residents are not allowed the lawful status of "refugees". In this manner, Turkey didn't acknowledge the Syrians as "refugees", but conceded them the situation with "impermanent insurance" as per Article 91 of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection No. 6458 of April 4, 2013 and Temporary Protection regulation (Adal, & Türkylmaz, 2020). The framework No migration rules drafted by or connected to different worldwide laws, especially movement and refuge laws, are regularly internationally connected, as though the Geneva Conventions were under review (Karczewski, Samocha, Fennell & MacArthur, 2016).

Turkey's migration strategy is in a tight spot between the two limits, and it is hard to organize with local and worldwide issues. Since the 1930s, Turkey has been locked between an old movement strategy dependent on public legacy and another age direction dependent on a worldwide methodology, including the Settlement Law (connecting with individuals brought into the world in Turkey) and the 1951 Geneva Convention (Effevottu, 2021). Turkey has found a way to change movement laws and guidelines to stay up with the advancements of globalism. Work laws are changing, but they will be more controlled later on. In January 2016, another law called the Temporary Protection of Work Permits for Foreigners Law was passed, permitting Syrian refugees to apply for work grants. Syrian refugees who have lived in the governorate for more than a half year can apply for a "work license" under this guideline (ibid, 2016).

Before the foundation of the brief insurance system in 2014, Turkey didn't have a lawful instrument to decide the freedoms and honors of Syrians. The Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) raises the degree of security for Syrians in Turkey by explaining the freedoms and honors of those getting brief insurance. Individuals who have escaped Syria and entered Turkey and are enrolled as recipients of brief assurance with the Turkish specialists are qualified to get data and counsel about the transitory insurance framework in their language, free crisis clinical benefits, and a character card that permits them to stay in Turkey under impermanent security simultaneously the framework is set up (Durieux, 2014). Syrian youngsters can join up with impermanent training habitats that show Syrian language courses in Arabic, or government funded schools that follow Turkish language courses and educate in Turkish (Gürel & Büyüksahin, 2020).

What's more, it is important to completely comprehend the presence and complex everyday environments of Syrian refugees. Checking the reaction of Turkish society to the circumstance in Syria and the effect of the presence of Syrians on Turkish residents is basic. As referenced before, 10% of the 3 million Syrians chose to remain in the camp, while the other 90% would like to live external the camp. As indicated by late gauges, since the start of the emergency, over 53% of Syrian displaced people younger than 18 have been younger than 18, and in excess of 60,000 kids have been brought into the world in Turkey (Yıldız &

Uzgören, 2016). The Turkish host local area and the host Syrian displaced people face hindrances and troubles. These issues might emerge in the soundness and day to day environments of new migrants, for example, finding a new line of work for actual security and other fundamental components of life (counting instruction, social ties, and future assumptions). As far as culture and customs, the presence of Syrians in Turkey will affect Turkish families and networks (Cagaptay& Menekse, 2014).

The ongoing violence in Syria has resulted in large numbers of visitors since 2011, and Turkey has implemented an open migration strategy. Resettling refugees in safe zones in Syria and along the Turkish border, as well as guaranteeing their lives in secure environments, have long been pillars of Turkey's migration system. Syrians make up more than 33% of all displaced people on the planet, with Turkey facilitating 63.4 percent of them, or 3,570,352 people (Yaylaci, 2018). The statistic comes from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' data from last month, and it's 4.2 percent greater than Turkey's population of 8,174 in 2017 and 500 in 2016. In this vein, a more in-depth examination of the segmental, financial, social, and political aspects of this massive and sensitive flood is required (Akar & Erdodu, 2019).

The Turkish Disaster Response Agency (AFAD), which was answerable for settling the public power's response to the overflowing of displaced people, was the main association. The organization changed itself later with the development of the Syrian pariahs and adjusted its area to deal with a thoughtful fiasco on Turkey's southern line, in spite of its foundation to oversee fiascos like seismic quakes (AKKA, 2020). In a disaster or crisis, the Board of Directors, as a noteworthy or dynamic relationship with full financial and political help from the public power, guaranteed that the necessities of the dislodged were met using the limits of workplaces and different taxpayer-supported organizations. Camps for refugees, where daily conditions far exceed those set by the UN (Carpi & enouz, 2019).

In Turkey, Syrians are confined to two gatherings: the fundamental gathering lives in camps run by the Turkish express; the latter get-together, which makes up the mass, lives outside the camps, eminently in gigantic metropolitan regions like Istanbul and near the Syrian line. Notwithstanding the fact that the number of Syrians formally enlisted in 2020 surpassed 3

million, the number of Syrians living in camps is unquestionably low (Ozden & Packard, 2021). The General Directorate of Migration deals with the undertakings of the camps and distributes missions to public and private Turkish relationships to help Syrians. As coordination and instruction were completed by the Directorate of Migration, the Turkish Red Crescent was allocated the obligation of overseeing food inside the camps (OPREA, 2017).

Consequently, millions of Syrians are homeless. Almost 12 million women, men, and children are internally and externally displaced in Syria. However, among this community, there are tens of thousands for whom the concept of "home" is difficult to define. These are the infants born to the Syrian refugees. Over 60,000 Syrian infants have been born in refugee in Turkey, where a RI team researched the topic in March, and these numbers will continue to rise as the civil conflict continues. None of the surrounding nations that are hosting Syrian refugees, including Turkey, provide citizenship solely on the basis of birth. Even if a birth is registered, Syrian nationality law, with very few exceptions, allows only Syrian fathers to confer citizenship. Thousands more Syrian dads have been killed, disappeared, or are fighting in the ongoing conflict. Without them, children born in refugee since the conflict started, and even those born in Syria, may be unable to prove their Syrian citizenship when they return home(Yaylaci, 2018)..

4.2 TURKEY'S SOCIAL SERVICES

4.2.1. Education

Around 212,000 Syrian youth someplace far off, banished in shame, didn't go to Turkish essential and elective schools since Turkey permitted them to go to schools supported by the Turkish government. While 90% of the youngsters in the 22 deserted camps on the Syrian-Turkish line who live with their families are relied on to attend school, the vast majority of the dislodged live outside the genuine camps. About a fourth of younger students are attempted outside of casual camps. As verified by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 40% of dislodged Syrian youth are not in school. Despite the fact that enrollment in

camps is higher than in urban areas, approximately 500,000 children were not tested in school (Aydin and Kaya, 2019). In spite of the fact that the number of Syrian children who have attempted Temporary Teaching Places (TECs) has run to something like 500,000 since 2016, the Turkish government won't ensure the schools because of the lower nature of the proposition compared with state-subsidized schools. The obvious inferior quality is generally because of the manner in which specialized instruction places prepare in Arabic and volunteer educators who have practically no tutoring experience. Also, there are 230 schools run by Syrians in 19 Turkish locales (Alanay & Aydn, 2016).

The displaced Syrians' humanitarian condition is precarious. Only 34% of Syrian children are sent to rural schools outside Syria, expelled in fear, leaving somewhere between 500,000 and 600,000 Syrians without confirmation or preparation. Since the number relies totally on the Syrian outsiders who are enlisted, it is a lot higher (UNICEF, 2018). On account of their exercises in the country, UNHCR and UNICEF have perceived a portion of the objectives and necessities. They declare that language hindrances and the shortfall of authoritative reports keep Syrians from taking on Turkish schools in networks. Homeroom space is restricted and hardware widths, very much like the absence of driving to schools and the absence of confirmed instructors in Syria, where purposely huge quantities of them work, are other issues (Rothbard, Stuer, & Kamto, 2020). Besides, the absence of endorsements for school investment and authorization deters understudies from going to classes. Absence of a school license was the principal driver of school dropouts and a surprising investment in the camps. Early marriage has likewise been referred to as a component in young ladies' exiting school while attempting to help families as a significant legitimization for exiting (Aidan & Kaya, 2019).

Turkey has long been one of the most well-known refugee destinations due to its geographical location and historical and cultural characteristics. Today, Turkey is making every effort to meet the needs of millions of refugees living in camps specifically intended for them; housing, food, health, security, and education are just a few of the issues Turkey is addressing. According to the most current figures from 2018, 1,138,192 Syrians aged 5 to 18 account for 3,618,624 persons in Turkey. Around 400,000 Syrian refugee child below the age of 18 are

projected to be out of school. any kind of educational institution According to the latest current figures from the Ministry of Health, According to the Turkish Ministry of Education, 532.469 Syrian children are enrolled in Turkish schools, accounting for 54.55 percent of total enrolment. Nearly half of all students get their education in a temporary learning facility (Educator Trade Union, 2017).

The law alludes to the genuine right of Syrian kids to select classes like Turkish understudies. In these schools, Syrian understudies, like any leftover understudies, concentrate on the Turkish Training and Education Program. Youthful Syrians are chosen for standard Turkish language programs without hanging tight for a game plan period. In 2016, the Ministry of Higher Education and the European Union teamed up on a mission called "Mixing Syrian Students with the Turkish Education System" to help Syrian understudies learn Turkish in Turkey all the more genuinely (Keskiner, Lelie & Ghaeminia, 2016). As a benefit of this program (Taskin & Erdemli, 2018), instructors will be unequivocally utilized to teach Turkish to Syrian understudies as a benefit.

Turkey, which presently has countless Syrian youth refugees, looks to resolve this issue by offering an assortment of choices inside and outside the camps. Syrian youth presently hold the honor of attempting state-subsidized schools and getting free preparation because of distribution 2014/21. Moreover, the Ministry of Higher Education offers free review materials to all Syrian understudies who have attempted government-subsidized schools (Yigit & Tatch, 2017). This is a work to lessen the enormous mass of preparation, which is the financial requirement. Regardless, when outer youngsters arrive at preparing, the instructive course is hampered by an assortment of hardships, including language limits, restricted issues, severe showdowns, kid marriages, and school dropouts. Turkey keeps on ensuring the largest number of refugees on the planet. In 2019, more than 3.57 million Syrians will be enrolled in transitory protection. In excess of 680,000 school-matured dislodged Syrians are taken to study halls, with in excess of 33,000 Syrian understudies trying out high-level training organizations (3RP Turkey Country Chapter 2019).

The Conditional Cash Transfer Engine for Education (CCTE) attempts to cure this by offering a smidgen of monetary incentive for youngsters to go to class. This program is constrained by

the Ministry of Family and Social Policy (MFSP), UNICEF, and the Ministry of National Education (MONE) and guarantees that the security needs of young officers are thought of and dealt with. CCTE motor is attempting to cure this by offering little monetary motivation for kids to go to class. This program is carried out by MFSP, the United Nations children's fund and MONE, which guarantees that the protection needs of chosen youth are perceived and dealt with. This is obviously a temporary course of action to be utilized in accordance with longer-term and stronger solutions to expand school enlistment and investment (Alk, 2021).

Obtaining assurances for Syrian refugees' education is difficult. The significance of maintaining the nature of Syrian schools; social concerns, as well as more broad socio-political aims of coordination, the relationships between adjunct training and faculties are enhanced. There are security flaws identified with the initial adaptation of the framework. Close working relationship between the team and the general authority agency support for the integration of IDPS into the general education framework incentives are derived from donor cash terms (Al-Fattal, 2010). Refugees' exchange from the camps to urban areas: in the Syrian conflict, factors from the more comprehensive political economy, the dated political way of speaking, and the adjustment of power relations, the massive development in the number of refugees, as well as the emphasis on the prolonged character of the state of emergency (Shaw & Kaneko, 2016).

4.2.2. Healthcare

The Social Welfare Service has set up immigrant health centers (MHCs) to hold refugees with requirements that include groups of interpreters, physiologists, and social workers, as well as clinical professionals. In a joint effort with the World Health Organization, the Ministry of Health is preparing Syrian welfare experts and benefiting from their knowledge in covering these displaced persons. In addition, neighborhood associations and the relevant global community have supported these endeavors by providing medical care and striving to improve the financial determinants of well-being to reduce disruption. Regardless of these capabilities, the gap between strategy and reality remains (zger-lhan & lhan, 2019). The

refugees suffer from more physical and mental problems due to the environmental and mental constraints imposed by the uprooting. Uprooting encounters present mental problems (Cloeters & Osseiran, 2019).

Recently, Turkey has found huge ways to ensure refugees have access to public medical care. In this part, there is a decision to monitor the admission of Syrians to medical care departments, and guidance papers are prepared in partnership with government specialists. In Article 27 of the Temporary Protection Regulation (2014), the welfare strategies that must be provided to displaced Syrians under short-term insurance are specified. Under Article 60 of Law No. 5510 on Social Security and Public Health Insurance, refugees and stateless persons are approaching the comprehensive health care coverage scheme in Turkey (Lang, Nouredine, Akram, & Kistner, 2014).

To ensure the takeover of care departments for temporary security beneficiaries, the Disaster and Emergency Department and the Ministry of Health have adopted an agreement on access to medical care that depends on an individual amount estimated (Ibid: 2019) for all Syrians who do not. I care a lot about registration and getting medical admission without hindrance. service departments in the event of a crisis or situation considered a potential danger to public welfare. Both public and private offices accept installments. Syrians in the camps have free access to basic and paramedical sections. Emergency clinics in disaster and emergency management employ medical professionals and service providers in the camps (Bircan & Sunata, 2015).

Furthermore, the departments available in these locations are planned by unfamiliar association exercises. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) works with the Ministry of Health to provide training and seminars on the most critical issues affecting Syrian refugees, as well as broaden the scope of their work (Frontières, 19970). Six of the institutes that will be created in Syria's heavily populated areas will be funded by the World Health Organization. IOM funded two multi-issue public spaces and a vital medical care facility in Istanbul by organizing with complicit NGOs such as the International Blue Crescent, the Syrian Social Gathering, and Doctors Worldwide (DWWT) (Mansfield, 2017).

The health care of Syrian refugees varies depending on their previous degree of social links, length of migration, security situation, and access to social support in Turkey. Due to a shortage of screening services, Syrian refugees in Turkey are unable to detect persistent medical conditions. Turkey is a signatory to this international treaty, which has major legal authority and priority over domestic law and legislation (Pinto, 2017). The first is Article 56 of the Turkish Constitution, which states that, the right to welfare, and hence to medical treatment, is not related to citizenship and is available to all citizens of the country (Assi, 2019).

The Social Insurance and Universal Health Insurance Act, enacted in 2006, clarifies the types of social care departments that can be accessed, access states, and expenses for medical services. Stateless individuals, refugees, asylum seekers, and candidates for safe haven status were considered to have general medical coverage due to the Aliens and International Protection Act, described in Article 60 (Okpani & Abimbola, 2015). We do not conclude that all health treatments are free. In any case, most of them are paid through health care coverage, and the amount of obligation the patient has to pay is specified in Sections 60 and 69 of a similar law (Ineli-Ciger2017).

4.2.3. Economy

Syrians in Turkey were initially protected in displacement camps. Before settling outside the camps, they were stationed along the Syrian border and in the places where the camps were. They have migrated to various parts of Turkey in search of work and greater freedoms over the last two years. Many of them were forced to flee their homes. Four districts remain, to be exact, with more than 300,000 Syrian refugees in each. Istanbul is the largest region in Turkey. (Orabatr, 2016). It is estimated that a large proportion of one million Syrians currently live in Istanbul. Istanbul is the monetary center of Turkey, so it is no surprise that it is a popular target for Syrian travelers. Plus, Istanbul is close to Europe, and for Syrian refugee Syrians whose main goal is to get to Europe, it might be the best place to stay until then, at that point. The remaining three regions in the east are lining regions. Gaziantep is the 6th biggest city in Turkey, and the city is, for the most part, jammed in the east. Accordingly, it is

only natural that many transients head to the financial focus of the region. About 300,000 refugees call it home (Balkaya et al., 2021).

In terms of financial mobility, Sanliurfa and Hatay are the most modest regions, but not as much as the population. The massive closeness of the refugees is expected to have a significant financial and social impact here. As of the end of 2016, only 6000 work grants have been awarded. Since most Syrians do not yet have enough rank in Turkish to be considered a suitable prospect for most open careers, the number of registered Syrian workers remains low. Since 2012, the size of manufacturing organizations with Syrian partners has expanded little by little. 1,777 new companies were created in 2016, up from 157 in 2012. Syrian organizations accounted for 28% of all coordinated efforts abroad in 2016. Reciprocity holds the weight of newly established Syrian organizations, primarily through transfers. Thus, the exchange between the two countries is expanding. The city that houses the largest number of Syrian companies in Istanbul is Istanbul is the most transited city by Syrians, with 16%. Syrian organizations are more inescapable towards the border, where there is a large settlers' local area (ibid).

The modal of competitive labor showed clear and unambiguous consequences of the excessive supply of labor due to the movement. Within unused harmony, worker convergence leads to an exogenous increase in labor supply, which results in a lower equilibrium wage rate and partial substitution of foreigners with neighborhood workers (Borjas, 2003: p74). The causal effect of labor supply difficulties arising from resettlement on the cooperation of the neighboring workforce is likely to be perplexing in the face of job-related shock demands or the wage gap. It was unreasonable to compromise on such a wide-ranging issue as deciding the impact of automatic transfer on Turkish domestic employment advertising. The number of enrolled Syrian displaced people in Turkey has expanded significantly from thousands to millions since 2011 (Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2013).

One of the most disturbing aspects of analyzing the impact of immigration is the non-random spread of immigrants across ranges within a nation. Foreigners choose to settle in financially rich areas. As a result, regional relationships between the number of workers and job advertisement outcomes overestimate the impact of migration, as strong economies have to

some extent counterbalanced the negative effects of migration (Bell & Machin, 2011). Displaced Syrians have been flocking to Turkey since 2011, and the numbers have not abated. The Turkish government had to work hard to deal with the Syrian proximity within the job fair (Card 1990; Chase 1992; Friedberg, 2001: P. 57).

For the Turkish economy and society, the Syrian migrant surge has four repercussions. The first is via the use of government monies. Since 2011, Turkey has set aside 1% of its GDP to provide temporary protection to Syrian refugees. Second, Syrian refugees have developed new personas. In Turkey, not only in terms of labour supply, but also in terms of economic development, it is a significant economic player. In 2015, 1599 new businesses were created, up from 157 in 2014. Syrian enterprises accounted for 26% of all international cooperation in 2015, compared to 26% in 2012. Finally, the influx of Syrian migrants will have an impact on the Turkish population's age structure. Turkey's demographic window of opportunity might be slashed significantly (Tumen, 2016).

Window for demographics A "window of opportunity" is a period when the working-age population of a nation is exceptionally big, in proportion to the number of people that rely on it. When there isn't enough fertility, something occurs. As a nation grows, rates decline, but the ageing population remains manageable. This is understood, as a period during which great progress may be made. Turkey's demographic window will close in the coming years. The opportunity began in 2010 and will continue through 2030. With the help of Syrian refugees, Turkey's demographic window of opportunity may be widened, and it is possible that it may stay open beyond 2030. The fourth option is to look at the impact of Syrian refugees on regional labour markets. Under Law No. 29153 on the Summary Guarantee for Syrians, which was distributed in the Official Gazette in October 2014, Syrian immigrants currently have a work permit. Moreover, immigrants can start pledges on the back of small loans from the Turkish government, with the approval of controls. As a result, in mid-2016, the Turkish government backed a decision limiting the training of foreigners to "temporary security", to the detriment of Syrians in Turkey. Several components related to the work of Syrians that are included in the selection are among those guaranteed by the warranty. The basic criterion for obtaining a Syrian work permit is to be conscripted into the temporary security framework for six months,

i.e. six months after obtaining the Kemlk (expanding on the fact that he must apply for it using an electronic portal) - Arranging for access to students (college students and alumni) with a brief work permit for the security card. Prohibition of selecting certain categories from occasion to work permit and utilization of their contact points, specifically, welfare faculty) of specialists, medical caretakers and correctional experts (but with the prior permission of the Instruction Service or the Higher Education Commission, the lowest remuneration set up by the service must be monitored Work (Gazete, 2014).

As the number of Syrian refugees grew, the camps were unable to accommodate them all, and they were allowed to live outside of them. The majority of those who were uprooted first stayed in the cities that shut down the camps, but over time, a large number of those who were displaced traveled west. Their slow progress may have an impact on local job markets as well. Since January 2016, Syrians have been able to get work visas (Tumen, 2016). Because of their regional dispersion and official adjustments affecting their admission to labor markets, their favorable impact on actual business may be modified for a long time (Destiny & Hellesund, 2015).

4.3 THE TURKISH NEGOTIATIONS WITH EU

The European Commission has been providing humanitarian aid to Syrian and Iraqi refugees in Turkey since the beginning of the conflict. Nearly half of the increased money in 2015 will go to health care, notably physical rehabilitation and post-operative care, as well as basic health care services in disadvantaged areas which are all part of a charitable guidance that uses cash or electronic vouchers to support the most disadvantaged refugee families (Röttsches, 2016).

On March 18, 2016, Turkey and the European Union celebrated the "Readmission Agreement," which accommodates the repatriation of refugees who have entered Europe illegally in exchange for conditions such as the lifting of the Turkey visa, revision of the customs union agreement, and revision of certain clauses in membership. At the Turkish-European Agreement, which included arrangements urging Turkey to move forward as a

cradle against the advance of refugees to European countries that do not need Middle Eastern issues to join the union and bear the weight of more refugees, over a million people attended (zer, 2016). Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has warned that if he does not get enough monetary and political assistance to create a protected area in northern Syria, he may open the lines to a large number of Syrian travelers seeking sanctuary in European Union countries. Meanwhile, as reported by the Anatole Agency, a high-ranking Turkish official, US National Security Adviser John Bolton, confirmed that Ankara is ready to implement the agreement with Washington on a protected area in Syria at the earliest opportunity (Cillán, 2020).

Understanding readmission aims to further develop line security and, in this way, reduce intermittent movement to the EU. The EU agrees that by applying this methodology, it will actually want to reduce the negative monetary impacts of illegal traffic while keeping up with line security. The EU has emphasized that readmission arrangements will not be used to infringe on public liberties. However, it will not allow illegal immigrants to enter its domain (Léonard & Kaunert, 2021). On March 18, 2016, Turkey and the European Union agreed to the "Reaffirmation Agreement," which entered into force on March 20, 2016 (Laas & Leyts, 2016). The basic interest coincides with the development of the passing Syrians. After March 20, 2016, all those transiting through Turkey to the Greek islands in the Aegean will be repatriated to Turkey, as one Syrian person under insurance will be briefly recognized in Turkey in the EU countries for each individual returning to Turkey (Serkan, 2017). After the decisions of the readmission agreement, it was difficult to describe the status of the displaced and the status of the additional guarantee, notably at the meeting of March 18, 2016. People in these situations are returned to Turkey whenever they enter the EU countries due to the legitimate construction of these situations. Their repatriation to Turkey was induced by readmission agreement decisions. After the meeting, Ahmet Davutoglu showed that he believed the result was very viable. This is a positive outcome of our arrangement that stops illegal immigration and transfers untouchables to Europe by law (Genç et al., 2018).

The following is a summary of the content of the articles of this arrangement (Council of the European Union, 2016)

- a. Beginning March 20, 2016, all irregularly traveling or seeking refugee people whose petitions are deemed illegal will be deported from Turkey to the Greek islands.
- b. In exchange for each Syrian returning to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be relocated to the European Union directly from Turkey.
- c. Turkey will do all possible to prevent the formation of new irregular sea or land patterns linking Turkey to the European Union.
- d. When the inconsistent convergences between Turkey and the European Union are completed or reduced entirely, the purposeful confirmation conspired on beneficial grounds will be implemented.
- e. The timeline for completing the visa progress proof in order to remove visa requirements for Turkish citizens by the end of June 2016 is now available. Turkey will go to every length to fulfill its wonderful duties.
- f. In close collaboration with Turkey, the EU will expedite payment of the €3 billion previously granted under the Turkey Refugee Facility. Despite the fact that these assets are practically depleted, the European Union will activate further financing for the facility totaling €3 billion until the end of 2018.
- g. The European Union and Turkey applauded the forward-thinking efforts to expand the Customs Union.
- h. The increasing cycle will be resumed, with Chapter 33 launching under the Dutch Presidency of the Council of the European Union and preparatory work on the following parts beginning.

The European Union and Turkey will work together to eliminate Syria's enabling environment. Initially, the plan takes into consideration a circulation limit of 72 thousand refugees.

The trade and readmission procedure, which began in April 2016, is supported by the European Union. Only 3,000 and 565 Syrians, individually, have been readmitted to EU countries out of a total of 72,000, while the number of refugees shipped from the EU to Turkey has risen to 1,487 since the arrangement was agreed. The withdrawal of visas for Turkish citizens to enter the EU countries may have been the main part of the approval that the EU was not bound by, and the European Commission should submit a motion to expel Turkish residents to the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. By May 2016, the European Union will have been formed.

According to Made of Minds, Germany and the European Union expect a significant reduction in the number of transients showing up in Europe because of this arrangement. Human traffickers, again, can be fully managed, and fewer sanctuaries risk suffocating in the Aegean. The European Union has provided €6 billion in cash to help Syrian refugees pay for their education, accommodation, and clinical treatment in Turkey. As pointed out by Deutsche, the understanding reduced the number of travelers entering the European Union while similarly preventing them from suffocating while simultaneously trying to cross the Mediterranean. In February 2016, the number of Syrian refugees arriving on the Greek islands reached a median value of 2,000 per day. The blockage of the Balkan route due to the game plan resulted in a daily increase of 100 Syrians crossing to the Greek islands. The number of IDPs in Germany decreased between 2015 and the first half of 2016. It should be remembered, though, that 15,000 refugees from Turkey come to Europe every month (Welle & Knaus 2018; Welle 2018).

The European Union neglected to maintain its commitments a year after the migration arrangements were made, as indicated in the Anadolu Agency's assessment of the Migrant Note in March 2017. Because of this understanding, the unexpected movement in the Aegean has completely decreased. The official responsibilities of the Republic of Turkey have been

fully fulfilled. In the areas of visa applications, cash guides, resettlement and customs, the EU has, once again, missed the target on its commitments. Of the 72,000 Syrian refugees, only 3,565 were shipped from EU countries by Turkey (Ajansi, 2017).

Turkey's prosperity was lopsided, with Erdogan's organization asserting that pivotal parts of the understanding had not materialized. Somewhere between 2016 and 2019, the European Union swore to contribute €6 billion in useful evidence, education, medical care, city foundations, and financial assistance to displaced Syrians in Turkey. Despite the fact that in the European Union cases in which the entire amount was laid off and several billion euros were lost, the Turkish government reported its disappointment with the speed and manner in which the premiums were paid, which went to associations serving the refugees against the government. The EU agreed to grant an additional €485 million in 2020 (Akkerman, 2018).

Regardless, advancements in EU organizations demonstrate that the EU is focusing on movement control on the mainland. In September 2020, the European Commission announced the Migration and Asylum Pact, which is expected to ease the movement of the EU under CEOs while enhancing consistency among member states through better sharing of commitments. Better and faster movement and sanctuary measures are as appealing as the temptations to migrate asylum seekers and repatriate those whose petitions have expired. The understanding also urges the upgrade of the Common European Asylum System and the improvement of the European Asylum Support Office to assist the interests of member states. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency has fundamentally risen since a sudden spike in its emergence in 2015- 2016, demonstrating the EU's commitment to border control at the EU level. Since this arrangement was reached, the number of travelers coming to Europe has shrunk dramatically. About 2,740 individuals were returned to Turkey, while European countries received a total of 28,621 individuals from Turkey under this arrangement, which is less than they pledged. Today, five years later, the arrangement is at a crossroads as Turkey requests its re-establishment and EU personnel debate the conditions under which it can move forward and how, during the European asylum emergency, it can appear as an ever-present achievement. While the German government sees the understanding as a victory, resistance groups trust that it will fade (Adler & Andersen, 2021).

The Syrian refugee crisis necessitates more than just financial assistance. It also poses a number of political and social risks that the EU is unwilling to accept at this time. Indeed, closing Turkey's borders to migrants and keeping them in the country under unknown conditions would result in serious long-term security issues. The issue of Syrian refugees has forever been a wellspring of conflict in Turkey, both at the ideological group and grassroots levels, attributable to the enormous number of refugees as indicated by measurements given by the Turkish Refugee Association in 2021, dispersed in camps and numerous Turkish urban areas, reflecting a huge effect on the demography, economy, legislative issues, and social texture of Turkish society (Nugent, Matlin, Schütte, & Saso, 2018).

Then again, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has reliably involved displaced people as an negotiating advantage with the European Union, compromising European nations to open their boundaries to refugees and permit them to cross into Europe. He was undermining it to convince the European Union to press Assad's powers and their Russian sponsor to end their tactical hostile in northern Syria, explicitly because Turkey couldn't acknowledge any more Syrian refugees and to acquire support for Turkish military activities in the Syrian region by allegedly setting up a safe zone in the north of Syria where both new and Turkish refugees could reside (Greenhill, 2016).

Baggi criticized the EU-Turkey agreement, saying, "the EU wants to solve the problem by paying Turkey money, but Turkey cannot bear the burden of Syrian refugees alone." According to Murad Erdogan, an immigration expert at the German-Turkish University in Istanbul, Europe's reliance on financial aid to reduce the flow of refugees is false, because "the European Union pursued the wrong policy and is now pursuing financial negotiations with Ankara." The appropriate solution, according to Murad Erdogan, who is not related to Turkey's President, is to establish a "support and cooperation mechanism" with concrete assistance (Haferlach & Kurban, 2017).

The Syrian refugee file was and continues to be a means of Turkish bargaining and pressure on the West, which may or may not have motivated its investment by waving the refugee file

concurrently with the crisis in Turkish-American relations at the start of Turkey's receipt of the system. At the same time, Washington began imposing sanctions on Ankara in parallel with Turkey's crisis with the European Union and against the backdrop of East Mediterranean gas exploration activities and sanctions against Turkey (Khatib & Al-Barasneh, 2021). Turkey is also attempting to alleviate the pressure placed on it by the West, whether the United States of America or Europe, and Europe has recently imposed sanctions, so "Turkey wants to make the refugee paper known," while Europe relies heavily on Turkey to deal with the influx of refugees. Don't forget that we have the ability to open the border and flood you with refugees and illegal immigrants (Petrou et al., 2017; Tramountanis et al., 2017; Giannaki et al., 2017).

The EU's current goal is to prevent President Erdogan from inciting millions of Syrians and other migrants to attempt to come into Europe, as well as to obtain assurances from him that refugees would not be used as pawns in future political games. After NATO member states rejected calls for Turkey to establish a no-fly zone in north-western Syria to prevent Syrian President Bashar Assad from targeting Turkish military forces and displaying hundreds of thousands of Syrians heading towards the Turkish border, Ankara decided to abandon the asylum deal. Even if the two parties reach an agreement, it is unlikely that it will last as long as the previous deal, which expired in 2016. In the next few years, Ankara is likely to utilize the fear of a migrant inflow into Europe and their suffering at the hands of European border security guards to exert pressure on European politicians on a variety of subjects (Motomura, 2019).

5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The purpose of this chapter is to give analysis and discussion of the data presented in the preceding chapters, as well as to place it in a broader conceptual perspective. The fundamental goal of this study is to look into the policies used by host countries to absorb Syrian refugees, as well as their involvement in international diplomatic discussions. A related goal is to assess the efficiency of economic, educational, and health services and facilities.

Assumptions about the nature of international politics after the Second World War, especially in the Fifties, witnessed developments that showed it did not remain the same as in the period between the first and second world wars. Looking at the international system means looking at patterns of interactions between actors. interdependence focuses on the interrelationship between the internal units of the system, and this interdependence affects the wishes of decision-makersto act (Hilgers, 2012).

5.1 THE EFFICIENCY OF THR EMPLOYED ABSORBING POLICIES

Since the start of the massive scale resettlement to Jordan, the Jordanian government has received colossal monetary assistance from the European Union. The way that Jordanian specialists have not freely campaigned for a bringing home arrangement as an administration strategy is expected to some extent to be related to financing related to displaced person absorption. Be that as it may, as the contention has advanced, Jordan's benefactors have become tired of the battle, and global commitments have dwindled. Many compassionate workers are questioning whether or not the Jordanian government will eventually consider allowing them to bring them home, despite the financial risks (Shteiwi & Shtei, 2020).

Jordan, like other critical host nations in the area, has put forth questionable attempts to urge Syrian displaced people to get back. The idea of willful return is hard to acknowledge in these conditions. The Jordanian government's methodology toward the country's Syrian evacuee populace has been raised in doubt because of these episodes. UNHCR (United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees, 2018). As the Syrian populace has developed to incorporate considerable quantities of Palestinians, Iraqis, and Yemenis from past relocations, social perspectives in regard to displaced people have changed. Syrians are frequently blamed for a lack of assets in open discourse, and as a result, they are increasingly seen as sources of blame and doubt (McKenzie, Spiegel, Khalifa, & Mateen, 2015).

The return of the boundary came as Jordanians accepted that Syrians had exceeded their welcome. Nations ought not to give variables to advance evacuees' return home as long as there is vulnerability to the protected return of displaced people. It ought to, be that as it may, proceed with neighborhood combination drives, for example, working with instruction, business, and preparing (Morris, 2019). The locales where Syrian refugees might look for gainful employment in Jordan have effectively been brought into question as a component of the broadly scrutinized Jordan Compact. By excluding refugees from the list, the Jordan Compact prevents them from obtaining critical abilities such as medication, training, and design (UNHCR, 2017).

As expressed in the previous part, the Jordanian arrangement towards the Syrian refugees went through three stages. Each stage has its downsides, as follows: The principal stage denotes the start of the Syrian turn, where Jordan takes an impartial position. Jordan didn't remain by any of the battling gatherings' side and applied a discretionary open line system. An enormous number of Syrian refugees have entered the country. This leads to an increase in inactivity unemployment rates, which has a negative impact on Jordan's fragile economy.

The subsequent stage starts with the entry of an enormous number of Syrian travelers, which has negatively impacted the social, monetary, and welfare lives of the Jordanians. This provoked the Jordanian government to give requests to philanthropic associations to give compassionate guides to transients who have full authority over archives. This approach characterizes the gatherings that take advantage of the government and worldwide help given to settlers. The repercussions of the choice were:

- a. A huge number of the transients didn't get help.
- b. At the end of the day, the vast majority of them needed official reports bringing about the captures of unlawful outsiders by the Jordanian government.
- c. Financial abuse of foreigners because of their illicit status
- d. Limited admittance to fundamental administrations

The Syrian emergency kept on heightening through the third stage. The heightened clashes inside Syria have raised the Jordanian government's interest in the drawn-out endurance of transients in its region and the conceivable genuine outcomes of tolerating them in the midst of the monetary issues and the repercussions of refuge. As a result, it attempted to limit the administrations provided to Syrian displaced people in the country, for example, by repealing free clinical treatment, reducing the security space for assurance, and imposing versatility limitations. These results led to the arrival of numerous Syrian families at their homes (a required return). Also, a few refugees begin to participate in criminal operations to make money.

All things considered, notwithstanding Jordan's long history of managing transient emergencies, it neglected to ingest the monstrous measure of Syrian travelers because of an absence of good preparation. To conquer this disappointment, the Jordan government needs to offset prompt and helpful requirements with long-haul arranging. The criminalization of refugee presence might put Syrian refugees in such a dubious place that they are compelled to escape Lebanon. The State keeps the fundamental standards of displaced person insurance put down in global law, including the guideline of non-refoulement (Janmyr, 2016). This keeps refugees from being sent back to or removed from nations where their lives or freedoms are in danger. Because of tight affirmation processes and new limitations for reestablishing or confining lawful stay, numerous displaced people escaping the Syrian clashes can't arrive at security in Lebanon. Refugees can't reestablish their licenses because of the unpleasant and expensive situation. As a result, the vast majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are ineligible for asylum (Yahya, Kassir, & El-Hariri, 2018).

Jordan, like the rest of the host countries, adopted a realistic approach in dealing with the issue of the displaced Syrians. In the beginning, Jordan received the migrants and provided aid and camps, taking into consideration the existence of solutions to the Syrian crisis in the short term. However, the continuation of the Syrian crisis and the lack of solutions forced Jordan to change its policy towards the displaced Syrians. The presence of displaced Syrians in Jordan threatens the interest of the Hashemite Kingdom. The main reason for receiving the displaced Syrians is the non-interference in the internal affairs of Syria and its adoption of neutrality in dealing with the Syrian issue.

Closing the Jordanian borders to the displaced Syrians is a major reason to avoid security risks and preserve the security of the Kingdom. In addition, there is public pressure on the government to stop receiving Syrian immigrants. This is for two reasons, namely, the presence of Syrians in Jordan has a significant impact on the destruction of infrastructure, which negatively affects the citizens. Another reason is the high unemployment among the Jordanian people.

The same approach is adopted by Lebanon, the Lebanese world class molded the story of Lebanese society, and displaced people are considered to be an existential danger to the nation's strength. Syrians in Lebanon basically have two options: either leave the nation or remain and suffer double-dealing and underestimation (Janmyr, 2016). As a result of the discernment that Syrian refugees were a weight, the state tried to secure them, and their quality adjusted Lebanon's segment framework. The political class in Lebanon has done this through an explanatory procedure (Estriani, 2019).

In Lebanon, they have over and over taken advantage of refugees as substitutes for an assortment of issues. The Lebanese tip-top's new activities have affected the public's impression of refugees and their conduct toward streams of people looking for asylum in the country, just as they would rushes of travelers escaping public and global conflicts, cataclysmic events, and monetary emergencies. While the Lebanese government set up a Directorate for the Settlement of Palestinian Refugees, the UNHCR was allowed a fundamental obligation regarding assessing non-Palestinian evacuee status (Alsharabati &

Nammour, 2015).

By and by, in any case, the Lebanese specialists don't put a high demand on the UN displaced person circumstance. The absence of an unmistakable command for players associated with the organization and guidelines of relocation in Lebanon seems, by all accounts, to be intensifying the country's ceaseless and highly sensitive situation. Haven searchers and refugees every now and then depend on the security administrations, especially the General Directorate of Public Security, for watchfulness. Moreover, a mission of terrorizing and provocation has been completed in the absence of a lucid migration procedure (Rahme, 2020). particularly for people who don't have legitimate status. Besides, long-haul resettlement makes it harder to help (Sanyal, 2018).

As the emergency dragged on, what began as compassionate and transient crisis assistance evolved into a medium-term effort that crippled givers for the next seven years. Displaced people have all the earmarks of being confronted with the decision of experiencing Lebanon or getting back to their local country. This is because of an assortment of factors, including declining public and worldwide help, perilous day-to-day environments, more noteworthy refugee security, and low resettlement in affluent countries. Lebanon's entryway strategy implies that Syrians are not perceived as displaced people. It has not marked the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, so they are viewed as uprooted people. Moreover, because of Lebanon's political and ethnic strife, the public authorities have been reluctant to manage the dislodged. Lebanon is still recuperating from its interior inconveniences. The economy has endured because of this approach (El Hariri, 2020).

The Lebanese government's compassionate methodology is to acknowledge transients regardless of Lebanon's refusal to sign the displaced person accord. This is on the grounds that the organization would prefer not to interfere in the Syrian conflict's homegrown undertakings (Dorai, 2018). The Lebanese government has carried out various measures in light of the increasing number of workers in the country, including recharging legitimate residency and controlling the passage/exit of Syrian refugees (Dorai, 2018). Struggle and movement in the Middle East have brought Syrian refugees to Jordan and Lebanon. These

actions are planned to limit Syrian appearances in Lebanon because of the Lebanese government's inadequacy to acclimatize transients (Yanmyr, 2016). Most Syrian displaced people lost their legitimate status in Lebanon because of these actions, leaving them powerless against social underestimation, work double-dealing and misuse, lewd behavior, and the failure to look for help from the police or security administrations in case of an attack. They lost all security, leaving Syrian refugees totally incapable of meeting their essential requirements throughout everyday life (Shawaf & El Asmar, 2017).

A 2017 report by the Syrian Network for Human Rights shows that the activities carried out by the Lebanese specialists drove the vast majority of the Syrian refugees to lose their legitimate status in Lebanon. These activities made them helpless against social underestimation, work double-dealing, and misuse, inappropriate behavior on occasion, and their failure to depend on the police and security administrations in case of any attack. They lost all assurances, rendering Syrian refugees totally unfit to meet their essential needs throughout everyday life (Nassar & Stel, 2019).

Right away, the Lebanese government took two measures on the issue of Syrian settlers. In 2012, regulations were passed to shield Syrian outsiders from the negative effects of the common conflict. The adverse results are planned to influence their wellbeing or save them from death, keeping them from joining the Syrian common conflict. The subsequent methodology is withdrawal, which involves adding to Syrian help without intruding into the Syrian conflict's inward issues by any impartial party (Buckner, Spencer, & Cha, 2018).

In Lebanon, around 1,000,000 Syrian displaced people live in ad lib camp settlements. A significant number of them need legitimate status in the country. Prejudicial comments on Syrians have become more common as of late, especially from Lebanese pioneers. For instance, Syrian prisoners ought to be gotten back to Syria, as indicated by Deputy Prime Minister Zeina Awkar. Also, Lebanese Prime Minister Hassan Diab declared a procedure for the progressive return of dislodged Syrians, expressing that "the Lebanese government plan for the steady return of the uprooted Syrians will take on" (Arsan, 2018). Lebanon has announced a highly sensitive situation. Because of the nation's long-standing primary

difficulties, which incorporate an \$85 billion public obligation (very nearly 150% of GDP), powerless GDP development, and a huge financial plan deficiency, the nation was proclaimed in a "condition of monetary crisis" on September 2, 2019. Starting in October 2019, political and monetary concerns incited far-reaching shows, which were followed by a quick financial constriction. Genuine GDP is relied upon to recoil by 18.6% in 2020. The Lebanese lira has suffered in esteem, shedding around 80% of its worth. Besides, the implementation of an equal cash rate has brought about enormous cost expansions in various significant products. The absence of dollars, alongside the money's deterioration, has brought about an extensive danger of essential inventory deficiencies (Youssef, 2020).

More or less, it could be guaranteed that Lebanon had interior issues that emerged because of the refugees' appearance. The Lebanese government's weakness was cleansed by adapting to difficulties together. The circumstance crumbled after the blast of Beirut's port, which addresses Lebanon's monetary spine, and the subsequent monetary trip outside. Lebanon's political and monetary framework fizzled, and the nation was parted between the individuals who upheld public authority and the people who went against it. These elements added to Lebanon's choice to change its methodology toward Syrian refugees.

Lebanon and Jordan were among the surrounding countries that assisted in the initial reception of Syrian refugees following the commencement of the Syrian civil war, although both nations pursued a defensive posture focused on the state's sovereignty. Despite international backing and contributors, it led to the closure of the two nations' borders, despite the fact that Syrians pose a threat to the state and security in both countries. It also adds to the two nations' economic and social decline.

On the other hand, the neoliberal founders paid attention to the importance of self-interest. The European Union countries emphasized working through the United Nations and its agencies to alleviate the severity of the humanitarian crisis. Countries set policies by responding to historical processes and their own self-understanding of global relations and issues of global concern. Turkey adopted the "open door" policy, which was a humanitarian stance on the Syrian civil war. Turkey is an excellent example of the policy of assimilation

towards the Syrians in providing services, programs for integration into society, and so on, which in turn has proven its positions on global issues.

As indicated by UN gauges, Syria's considerate struggle has incited around 6 million and 600,000 individuals to escape the country, with roughly 3 million and 700,000 taking safe haven in Turkey, making it the world's biggest displaced person country. In contrast with comparable states, Turkey keeps on treating the displaced person issue reasonably and wisely, in any case, ongoing expansions in threatening language in homegrown popular assessment toward refugees and the event of certain episodes in this specific situation. Understanding the major parts of this sensible methodology will most likely assist in giving a more reasonable picture and appraisal of Turkey's evacuee strategy (Aras, & Duman, 2019).

This principle also regards travelers fleeing Syria to avoid common violence as genuine, and states that the international community should focus on ensuring and ensuring the survival of these refugees. Besides, Turkey has really bent over backward to guarantee that refugees approach fundamental assistance. Turkey has provided the refugees with every necessary assistance, including wellbeing, instruction, sanctuary, and nourishment, for them to proceed with their day-to-day routines in helpful conditions (Kadioglu, 2019). Rather than Turkey's philanthropic way of dealing with refugees, a helpful misfortune unfurled in Europe, where the mainland shut its lines to displaced people and saw evacuee endeavors impeded (Hansen, Adler- Nissen, & Andersen, 2021).

It's likewise significant that Turkish resistance groups are endeavoring to depict refugees as an enormous weight on the country's three tomahawks. The main hub ensures that refugees are to blame for Turkey's financial problems, just as undocumented displaced persons are to blame for the country's high unemployment rate. The subsequent hub affirms that refugees have turned into a security issue in Turkey, representing a danger to local area security and wellbeing through the foundation of shows and groups. The third pivot is the production of phony concerns about evacuee reconciliation into Turkish society and culture (Memisoglu & Ilgit, 2016).

Displaced person emergencies that have primarily occurred in neighboring countries and are now reaching Turkey have compelled the United Nations and its compassionate partners to reconsider their philanthropic assistance methodologies. The UN has sent off various projects to deal with the evacuee issue in Syria's host nations, most notably Turkey, as the common struggle in Syria heightens and the weight of its states develops (Kirişci, 2020). Syria's Regional Response Plan (thus alluded to as RRP), which was declared in 2012, has as its objective. This was the primary comprehensive help program for each host country, including key UN bodies as well as global and nearby non-legislative associations, and it set up a structure for coordinated effort between the UN and public administrative organizations.

Metropolitan refugees in the network were remembered for the plan. The objective of this program under the QRP is to lessen clashes among refugees and host networks and to perceive the unfavorable effects of relocation on individuals from the host local area and nearby organizations. The program includes long-term points and responses, but the quick response program has focused on pressing philanthropic issues, such as displaced person assistance and fundamental social administration (United Nations, 2013).

In Turkey, people's group talk has ascended because of the developing uproar to get back to their country, and there has been developing discontent inside the local area to varying degrees. The public discussion is progressively crumbling, and xenophobic perspectives and separation are turning out to be more apparent. The insight that refugees are a channel for the economy and foundation has developed. Turkish residents accept that they are battling for restricted assets with Syrian migrants, and they are requesting their social freedoms back (Abid, Manan, & Rahman, 2017).

The return of Syrian refugees appears to be a bright spot on the Turkish government's agenda at the moment. Authorities began looking at the possibility of returning in 2016 after a long period of developing an entry plan and accepting consolidation agreements. This new approach represents a turning point in Turkey's policy; demands from native and Syrian communities, the country's ailing economy, and the next political election season are all on the table. It has been argued that the willingness of Syrians to remain in Turkey has an

influence on the economy and society (Içduygu & Ayaşlı, 2019).

The thought of setting up a protected zone in northern Syria and returning refugees has been examined by President Erdogan a few times. In February 2018, he commented, "We need our evacuee siblings and sisters to get back to their property, to their homes." We need our uprooted brothers and sisters to get back to their countries. We can't keep 3.5 million individuals here endlessly... We will settle the Afrin emergency just as the circumstances in [Syrian rebel-held] Idlib, and we need our refugees to get back to their country (Secen, 2021).

The host countries-EU negotiations contributed to providing funds to the Syrian refugees. At last, the Turkish government's international strategy utilized all accessible apparatuses to demonstrate that the world is encountering an emergency, specifically the evacuee emergency. It additionally shows that Turkey is the biggest country to have taken in refugees, furnishing them with every fundamental convenience. This is in accordance with the current situation, especially as far as financing, which has depended on the Turkish government to accomplish its goals. These can be summarized in the European Union's obligation to the provisions of the understanding and the upkeep of safe zones on the Syrian side, like Adlib, to restrict the progression of travelers into the country, and the Union nations' commitments to the transient emergency. After the European Union nations upheld Bulgaria and Greece and made an obstruction to end the progression of outsiders to them, the Turkish government has embraced new approaches tending to displaced people. That is, the Turkish government's displaced person paper, which it utilized against EU nations, is at this point not substantial. Turkish policy was better than working on the successful policy that I started through an open door policy, which has saved many lives. After building camps on the Turkish-Syrian border, allowing them access to all public facilities and services such as health, education, employment and organizing their own affairs, developing a system of temporary protection for Syrians that allows them access to most existing legal public services. Also, Turkish organizations like the Turkish Red Crescent and others contributed that led to the success of the Turkish government's assimilation policy. In contrast, Lebanon allowed Syrians to enter during the first period of the civil war. But Lebanon is one of the countries with a fragile economy. The increasing Syrians and the widespread government corruption in Lebanon

would result in severe economic problems. All of this contributed to the emigration of Syrians either to other countries or to return to their country. As tensions in the host community increased, Jordanian citizens called on the government to limit competition from Syrian refugees. Since 2014, the Jordanian government has responded to increasingly outspoken and obvious public frustration.

5.2 THE IMPACT OF THE SYRIAN DOWNTURN ON HOST COMMUNITIES

The Syrian downturn has negative impact on the host communities. Countries have adopted the neoliberal principle of providing services to refugees. Donor nations' help to countries hosting Syrian refugees, such as Jordan and Lebanon, has been critical in offering high-quality educational opportunities. Despite Jordan's intention of offering refugee education, educational barriers exist, such as refugee registration rules that demand public school qualifications. It is hard to recruit trainers to deliver high-quality education due to a lack of resources sufficient to accommodate Syrian children's lessons. Acts of violence against Syrian children were committed in schools or throughout the educational community, resulting in a high dropout rate. The Turkish government and foreign NGOs, on the other hand, have attempted to provide educational services to Syrian refugees in the past. However, several obstacles stand in the way of Syrians enrolling in regular public schools.

Despite Turkey's two-track refugee system, which allows Syrians and non-Syrians to apply for global security status on the basis of restricted obligations, there are significant differences between nations seeking universal insurance status in order to obtain Social Security payments. As a result, communication is still an issue in different parts of their lives, such as studies, vocational rehabilitation, finding a new field of employment, remaining at work, social contacts, and learning about their surroundings. Large groups of Syrian refugees are settling in one location, and medical issues in a given region are shifting and developing, making it hard to relocate welfare offices. Turkey's existing mobility legislation and policies acknowledge non-EU asylum seekers, such as refugees, as having a non-permanent insurance status and give them access to medical treatment, but they dislike all of the liberties that refugees have.

It's unclear if the low-paying or low-experience positions are a result of the Jordanian government's efforts to address the country's extremely high unemployment rates, especially among young people, or the outcome of economic expansion. The increase in the number of Syrian immigrants has worsened labor market issues, resulting in greater unemployment and informal labour. Prior to the crises, as well as in this instance, Lebanon's labor market was fraught with difficulties, as it was dominated by Syrian quality talent and jobs, and the high unemployment rate was aggravated by unforeseen efficiency changes. While this theory is based on explicit models from Lebanon and Jordan, it also takes into account other factors.

Helping immigrants integrate may open the path for financial progress in Turkey, a method that may be followed owing to the availability of human resources in low-paying positions, demonstrating that Turkey's response to change is counterproductive. Due to administrative restraints imposed by restricted economic options, competent Syrian travelers choose to rest in Western nations, according to the theory. Turkey should take efforts to confine and integrate skilled asylum seekers into the country's economy, such as current professionals, experts, educators, and specialists. To that end, organizational methods should make it easier to select individual applications, allow an approved workforce to enter the general economy, and, once Turkey's administrative arrangements are finalized, keep a large number of Syrians and non- Syrians in the country, as well as arrange for all friendly assistance and admissions in the departments. The Syrian crisis has a wide variety of grave economic, educational, and health ramifications for surrounding nations, as data demonstrate.

5.2.1. Education

Donor countries' help to Jordan for the accommodation of Syrian refugees played a critical role in offering high-quality educational opportunities. Despite Jordan's policy of offering refugee education, there are impediments to education, such as refugee registration rules that require identification credentials for government schools. Poverty, work constraints, and school enrollment, on the other hand, impose tangible costs that are difficult for families to meet due to their inability to find permanent employment. There is no ability to attract teachers to provide high-quality education due to restricted resources that are insufficient to

accommodate classrooms for Syrian children (Malkawi, 2014).

Syria's children have been subjected to violence in schools or in the educational community as a whole, which has resulted in a significant dropout rate. This was a common occurrence in Syria, but because of Syrians' poor living conditions, it was four times as common in Jordan. Early marriage, which serves as a means of coping with poverty and instability, is one of the most significant impediments to learning (Handicap, 2018).

Some Syrian students found it difficult or impossible to enroll in institutions due to a lack of required documentation. These papers serve as proof of their enrollment in Syria prior to the civil conflict. As a result, the number of refugees in Jordan who did not get an education grew. Another reason for dropping out of school is financial constraints. Despite the fact that the European Union and donor countries granted some funds to Syrian students, the numbers were insignificant in comparison to the total amount of help provided by the donor countries and the European Union.

At all levels, there is a lot of talk about the tragedies, issues, and difficulties of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. However, discussing education, particularly the education of Syrian children fleeing with their parents from the scourge of their country's war, may take precedence over any analysis that may emerge on the subject. Furthermore, not all instructors have been educated to deal with refugee children who are dealing with psychological issues as a result of the tragedies they have witnessed. Some parents and children claim transportation as a major stumbling block, as well as distance and safety concerns, leaving many children without an education to fill these gaps.

Non-formal education is provided by many community-based groups in the form of remedial lessons, skill development, and homework assistance. A significant number of community-based groups even run full-fledged local schools in refugee communities where public schools are too far away or cannot accommodate more students. Non-formal education, on the other hand, does not provide credentials, and programs vary widely in quality and scope. According to the country's registration rules, Syrians do not need to provide legal residency credentials to enroll at government schools in Lebanon. Some administrators make it mandatory for them to

do so.

Syrian parents' mobility is restricted as a result of their loss of legal residency, reducing their capacity to earn a living and keep their children in school. These are some of them:

- a. A lack of commitment on the part of local governments to implement student registration policies and a minimum number of Syrian students
- b. Inadequate assistance for refugee children in adapting to new curricula and languages. Due to a lack of accessible spaces and family hardship, children are assigned to labor instead of school, incurring transportation expenses.
- c. Harassment and violence
- d. Poor educational standards, a lack of health-care facilities, and a lack of psychosocial support.
- e. Children are unable to study due to work obligations.
- f. Families that rely on their jobs are unable to pay for basic necessities such as transportation and school supplies.
- g. One type of financial burden that affects Syrian children's ability to study is transportation.

International donors backed a child enrolling strategy that excused all children from paying elementary school fees in public schools. Refugees in Lebanon, on the other hand, frequently struggled to provide for their children's education. According to UNHCR, the average distance between refugee villages and government schools is 6.1 kilometers. Government secondary schools have registration procedures that Syrian refugee families may find challenging to meet. Obtaining a government certificate is one of these prerequisites. For years, school administrators have required them to submit school statements. Many families did not take them with them when they fled Syria. Because most girls who get married drop out of school, child marriage is seen as a major hindrance to their education. The Turkish government, as well as Turkish NGOs and foreign organizations, has undertaken several efforts to aid Syrian refugees with educational services. It began with ad hoc education in the camps. In an effort to ensure that children do not go without an education, the Turkish

government assisted certain teachers in providing educational services and using the Syrian national curriculum. Due to a lack of international or even regional solutions, Syrian refugees have been unable to move from camps to cities. However, a number of impediments to Syrians enrolling in regular government schooling have surfaced, including a language barrier. The language barrier between the two countries presented numerous challenges for youngsters who were unable to attend school.

Another impediment is the law that limits access to public education services owing to a lack of proper documentation. Following the passage of the temporary protection law for Syrians in Turkey, the education law mandated that Syrians attend Turkish schools, and the European Union funded the "Integration of Syrian Students into Turkish Education" program to assist Syrians in teaching the Turkish language. Early marriage amongst Syrians in Turkey, as in other countries, remained, as did dropping out and the inability to gain financial support for students to continue their education and find jobs, i.e., child labor. Access to education is hampered by schools' incapacity to accommodate a large number of students. Through UNICEF social institutions and foreign organizations, the Turkish government is striving to provide financial assistance to Syrian families.

5.2.2. Healthcare

Syrian displaced people generally have simple admittance to essential and safeguarded medical services. Those Syrians face various impediments with regard to getting clinical consideration. A portion of the troubles are connected with the kinds of wellbeing worries that refugees defy. Different volunteer associations that offer different types of assistance in the camps give free clinical consideration for intense cases or potentially irresistible illnesses to most refugees. Most Syrians have adequate access to medical services, but this is, for the most part, inferable from free medical care given by NGO-subsidized medical services units in camps. Ongoing treatment in serious and long-haul circumstances is perhaps the greatest test for refugees as far as access is concerned. Acquiring long-haul care and keeping up with it in a generally overburdened medical care framework, just as the absence of adequate monetary means and the legitimate archives to get to all types of care, are all potential issues.

This condition requires ongoing consideration, as well as follow-up and congruity of care. However, medical clinics are encountering packing because of a critical expansion in patients with intense and ongoing sicknesses, putting a strain on Jordan's now extended spending plan and labor force. Therefore, medical service needs for refugees can't be met. Moreover, the Jordanian host populace needs an appropriate worldwide affirmation of aggregate liability, including monetary commitment. Expanded adaptability concerning documentation is one feature that could handle a significant primary test for those without admittance to medical services. Stateless transients are bound to encounter huge degrees of agony and mental issues, just as a deterioration of constant physical ailments. Coordinated efforts among UNHCR and nearby wellbeing suppliers can be worked with by means of enlistment frameworks. The Jordanian government might have the option to give data about the Syrian populace's segment and geographic dispersion, the idea of infections, the quantity of individuals impacted, and those at risk, in addition to other things.

Outside of the camps in Jordan, Syrian displaced people experience issues getting welfare administrations, essentially because of monetary requirements. Following the move to allow financing of medical care, this hindrance is probably going to deteriorate. It is additionally affected by the constant weakening of monetary conditions that numerous refugee families face. These families depend vigorously on the public authorities for essential and expert treatment, putting a strain on Jordan's well-being framework. Expanded co-payments for public administrations and a trend toward private administrations are expected to impede evacuee access.

Alternative options could include allocating more resources to NCDs and other standard emergency clinic administrations, developing evacuee-centered administrations, a solid avoidance-centered wellbeing advancement crusade, and more significant self-care and home treatment of the illness. These actions won't just help refugees, but they will likewise assuage the strain and monetary weight on the wellbeing framework, freeing up assets to zero in on conveying fair consideration to displaced people and Jordanians at the same time.

The circumstances in Lebanon are not vastly different. In terms of health administrations, Lebanon is currently confronted with both organic market issues and On the interest side, epidemiological and segmental factors give hindrances to displaced people. Because of the populace's maturing and ways of life connected with a typical sickness trouble associated with helpless neatness and the absence of admittance to essential medical services, there is a high predominance of NCDs. On the inventory side, wellbeing offices have seen an increment in the expense of administration conveyance and a monetary failure to address each of the issues of the displaced person population, who have been unable to get to social assurance programs since the World Bank set up an improvement asset to help Lebanon's wellbeing area.

Legislative associations, benefactor nations, and the Lebanese government have kept on offering essential types of assistance to refugees in their region. The Syrian evacuee emergency has expanded generally and replicated difficulties and insufficiencies currently present in a profoundly customized medical services framework, making it incapable of giving an economical way to give medical care to patients who were residents or displaced people. Because of the huge number of displaced people in Lebanon, the Lebanese framework isn't retaining the strain. This, in fact, leaves numerous Syrian refugees without any chance to partake in their fundamental freedom of admittance to medical services. Consequently, they rely upon casual offices for admittance to medical services and, at times, clinical help. To be sure, this demonstrates that there is a more profound issue than any monetary or functional test in giving such consideration.

The medical services framework in Turkey, then, can be delegated to an arrangement of standing participation that rises above contrasts in lawful status. Regardless of Turkey's two-track refugee framework, in which Syrians and non-Syrians are dependent on brief assurance as candidates for global security, there are significant differences between nationalities applying for global

insurance status. The biggest evacuee groups in Turkey after the Syrians are the Iraqi Turkmen and Afghans. In any case, the Turkish government has utilized interpreters at each stage of the medical service interaction to lighten the issue. Subsequently, correspondence remains an issue in different parts of their lives, like schooling, professional recovery, getting a new line of work and remaining at work, social relations, and acknowledgment of their surroundings.

The absence of multidisciplinary recovery administrations for refugees is another issue. By enrolling qualified experts, for example, specialists, word-related advisors, nutritionists, discourse and language specialists, physiotherapists, attendants, analysts, kid improvement trained professionals, and social laborers in adequate numbers, the Turkish government provides more extensive medical care and recovery administrations for Syrians. Refugees will ultimately assist with further developing their integration into society. The Syrian evacuee movement, which moves from one governorate to the next, also causes issues because their health is difficult to control and monitor, particularly for pregnant women, children, and refugees with special needs. Quantities of Syrian migrants get used to a specific region, medical issues in that space change and increase, prompting an inability to convey wellbeing administrations.

Current movement rules and strategies in Turkey perceive the impermanent insurance status of non-EU shelter searchers, like refugees, and give them admittance to medical care administrations. They abhor every one of the freedoms delighted in by refugees. Temporary assurance has not been endorsed by global law; subsequently, Turkey has the ability to renounce this status for a Syrian person whenever. This "open entryway" strategy has helped Turkey and has saved numerous Syrian lives.

In conclusion, the social and etymological contrasts and the monetary circumstances of displaced people are predominantly the fundamental snags to refugees' admittance to wellbeing administrations. Obviously, Turkey gave all well-being administrations to Syrians, and particularly those subject to short-term insurance. The advancement of health administrations was not a difficult expectation. Over the course of the long stretches of common conflict, Turkey contributed with neighborhood global and logical associations to

giving fruitful clinical help. There is no doubt that the current situation exacerbates the negative effects on the clinical foundation due to the increasing strain on it.

5.2.3 Economy

Jordan's Syrian evacuee situation is now more perilous than it was already. Little gatherings of the evaporated started to pass on Syria because of an absence of assets and helpful guides. Jordan needs \$3 billion, and 33% of that sum has been saved to help Syrian refugees. The Jordanian economy has characteristics that at first helped with the mix of Syrian transients. Jordan has an immense number of unfamiliar workers, maybe at least 1,000,000. Most of these individuals, including some of them, are right now working illicitly. Jordan has a significant non-public population, as indicated by the ILO. Countless Asians, large numbers of them ladies, work in homegrown callings that pay near Jordan's lowest pay permitted by law. The monetary impact of Syrian refugees on Jordan is still being debated, with some studies emphasizing the burden they place on the country and others emphasizing their positive effect on financial development through pay decreases that serve as an impetus for endeavors as well as buying helpful things in Jordan, spending cash there, and putting resources into Syria. While the public authority is quick to feature examinations of the momentum emergency's advantages to general development, in reality, this development doesn't naturally convert into a superior way of life for less fortunate Syrian or Jordanian displaced people, nor does it reduce the consumption of scant water assets or the weights on wellbeing, schooling, and different administrations.

As far as the job market, after the Syrians showed up in Jordan, the contest for occupations in Jordan expanded because of Jordan's poor financial circumstances. The current country depends on unfamiliar guides and has a segment of nearby enterprises, bringing about an increment in joblessness among Jordanians and Syrians. Work grants, which can't be given without a task and are given after the application, are unique. When refugees get a grant, it is the work space that turns into the wellspring of their languishing. Most Syrian refugees who are looking for a job in Jordan seem to have emerged because of the inundation of Syrian transients.

It is unclear whether low-paying or low-expertise occupations are the result of government efforts to address the moderately high unemployment rates that exist today, particularly among young people, or the result of a developing guide economy. The expanded requests brought on by the flood of Syrian transients are hard to anticipate. One of the review's key findings is that Syrians will accept lower pay and more difficult working conditions than Jordanians. This pushes Jordanians out, but it additionally creates an inexorably casual work market in Jordan, making consistency with work laws a genuine danger to all specialists. The debasement of work norms has likewise put an extra strain on Jordanian specialists' capacity to uphold existing work rules, like the lowest pay permitted by law.

The flood of Syrian refugees has exacerbated work market hardships, which is projected to prompt expanded joblessness and casual work. Before the emergency, the job market in Lebanon was trying since it was comprised of Syrian-quality abilities and positions, and the high joblessness rate was exacerbated by helpless efficiency twists. The flood of Syrian transients is probably going to support work market supply, making the most mischief for ladies, youths, and laborers with restricted abilities. This massive increase in the number of job seekers had a significant impact on the labor market.

Joblessness and casual work rates might be higher in general. Balancing out the work market requires an extensive arrangement of projects focused on expanding expectations for everyday comforts and benefit possibilities for the time being, as well as monetary assets to help firms stay away from additional cutbacks. While this theory is based on explicit models in Lebanon and Jordan, it also provides insight into how nations deal with their labor markets and homegrown workforces in different conditions with a limited range of constrained relocation.

Lower-financial refugees become a monetary asset to be tapped when a host country accepts its inclinations as appropriately lined up with a monetary first class, focuses on an unlimited work market, and is content to depend on huge quantities of transient specialists. Nations set up conditions for the abuse of the workforce by not having camps and making it easier to take part in the work market. These actions increase work supply and deflationary strain on compensation, so the non-public workforce is taken advantage of to raise residents' and non-

residents' monetary weakness. In certain circumstances, then again,

Refugees can be seen as a potential monetary risk that should be tended to. Movement of a huge scope consistently produces competition in the work market with residents and worsens the host country's monetary situation. At the point when this work market contention brings about famous discontent and political strain from areas of the populace that compromise the framework's power, the framework might trap refugees, focusing on the framework's dependability over conceivable monetary benefits from the double-dealing of a temperamental labor force. Because applying for and getting work with a home grant given by the Lebanese government subsequent to entering Syrians into the nation requires confounded techniques, the work allows the Lebanese government to attempt to control the banner of Syrians in the nation requires convoluted strategies. Then again, the costs of reestablishing a home visa are so high that Syrians can't bear the cost of the cost of restoring their residency inferable from work market seriousness. All of this encourages Syrians to look for occupations through unlawful means and to participate in illegal exercises that put them at risk of removal.

The circumstances of this situation were kept up with by monetary guides obtained by Syrians from worldwide associations and moved by benefactors and target nations as regularly scheduled installments. Nonetheless, debasement in helpless countries, like Lebanon, upsets any further monetary help to settlers on the grounds that the cash was utilized for different purposes. Following the new monetary emergency in Lebanon, the fall of the Lebanese currency constrained numerous Syrians to get back or escape to adjoining nations. The world's involvement in shelter and movement concerns reveals that a considerable inundation of displaced people or travelers to nations has a financial effect since it drains administrations and foundations while additionally creating new and crisis-related contests in the work market.

With regards to the economic circumstances of Syrians in Turkey, there are two points of view to consider. From one viewpoint, the Turkish government has borne a few monetary commitments and consumption on behalf of Syrians in the space of wellbeing and training, helped by benefactor nations and worldwide associations. Then again, more than 97% of

Syrians who live and work in Turkish urban areas and towns spend their profit or investment funds on the state and nearby legislatures by paying client expenses for water, power, gaseous fuel, and transportation. They contribute to the state Treasury through VAT on almost all items of use in Turkey, and they contribute to the payment of charges through their food and non-food utilization of items and administrations.

Syrians should likewise get work licenses to be permitted into the Turkish work market, and the Turkish Ministry of Labor is needed to apply for such authorization and pay the expense. Assuming a Syrian specialist is paid, their pay should be essentially the lowest permitted by law in Turkey. The Turkish government will attempt to expand on these establishments and proof and work toward the long-term reconciliation of Syrians into the Turkish economy, taking on reasonable measures and genuine impetuses to empower them, especially in the field of schooling. For Syrians of a more youthful age, migration helps Turkey's financial advancement since most transients are bilingual and have genuine yearnings and certified longings to begin another life in Turkey.

As indicated by macroeconomic measurements, the monetary guide from worldwide associations has given financial portability to Syria's thickly populated regions. This guide animates interest in entrance into the nation while additionally adding to the region's occupations. Therefore, Syrians have gained ground as far as results and utilization go. Rather than increasing their budget shortfalls, the findings of this study suggest that migrants can help their assessment selections by increasing work, business, creation, and utilization activities. For all of this, we're discussing set up economies that have had the option to oblige countless settlers, some of whom travel to the EU and others who select to remain in Turkey (Ozdemir & Tansel, 2019).

Working with reasonable rivalry conditions for refugees will affect direct creation and long-term monetary development, especially while considering the increased chance of refugees remaining longer. Assuming that activities are not done to help the coordination of the work supply within the framework, the specific far edge of the range is probably going to be noticed, prompting a slanted feeling of value in the public eye. The movement, while valuable

to financial advancement, has been shown to bring about expanded homegrown joblessness in the short run. The current Turkish work circumstances require a more definite clarification to examine this finding. The young joblessness rate in Turkey is a significant determinant of the work market.

Turkey's economy is a significant determinant of the labor market. Turkey's joblessness issue is not just one, since the nation is as of now recuperating from the 2018 cash and obligation emergencies. Following the 2018 obligation emergency, the effect of the Syrian emergency on work and expansion has turned into a more serious sticking point on the table. Standard financial examination directed in this review shows that Syrian migration adversely affects casual joblessness in Turkey temporarily, inferring that refugee rivaled Turkey's incompetent workforce, particularly given that casual business rates were higher in the host district.

Helping refugees with joining might be a way for financial development, a way that is probably going to be sought after because of the presence of prepared HR in low-wage positions, suggesting that Turkey's change interaction is fruitless. The present situation demonstrates an open door that is effectively ignored, with the gifted who can contribute in different fields simply moving to different nations that are better prepared to comprehend and profit from this potential. Furthermore, refugee searchers are used as often as possible in areas where the local population is unwilling to work, allowing them to create new jobs in the area.

Individual applications are accessible, permitting a gifted specialist to enter the public economy. Syrians utilize an assortment of procedures to change the speed of expansion. To begin with, relocation has raised interest and created cost increments, especially in southeastern Anatolia, where significant expansion was noted after the Syrian inundation. Regardless, value decreases have been observed in the post-relocation period, particularly in the work-serious casual areas. One of the essential points made in this thesis is that skilled Syrian travelers decide to get comfortable in Western countries because of administrative boundaries that cutoff work possibilities.

Turkey should devise measures for holding gifted refugee searchers, like specialists, experts, scholastics, and modern specialists, by incorporating them viably into the nation's economy. To this end, regulatory techniques should be smoothed out or the choice of individual applications should be made accessible, permitting a certified labor force to enter the public economy. Last, but not least, following Turkey's achievement as far as administration arrangement, the retention of the enormous number of Syrians and non-Syrians in the country is just as important as the arrangement of all friendly help and admittance to administrations. The diverting consequence of this convergence is to acknowledge them on a drawn-out premise with no shot at settling the Syrian emergency, which keeps on exhausting the host nations' assets.

The Syrian emergency has plenty of negative impacts on the bordering nations at the economic, educational, and health levels. To start with the economic effects, the refugees can be considered an economic threat. First, the labor markets were limited due to the huge number of refugees. This, in turn, increases the chances of unemployment among host country citizens. Second, the Syrian displacement has reduced the wages of the employed citizens in exchange for the jobs that were thin on the ground. Third, there has been an increase in competition for vacancies. Fourth, in countries like Lebanon, there has been a collapse in the currency that corresponds to the production rate that was exacerbated. This resulted in distortions of the production system in terms of supply and demand. Fifth, the Syrian refugee presence drains infrastructure and services, which in turn creates new competition in the labor market. All these reasons cause public resentment and political pressure, which could lead to a ban on the entry of refugees by the host country's authorities.

At the educational level, however, the host countries suffered from intense pressure on their educational institutions. Some countries, such as Jordan and Lebanon, employ a two-shift system to absorb the increasing number of refugees. These countries faced a severe shortage of classrooms as well as difficulties in absorbing large numbers of Syrians. Lebanon lacks the financial support to build new schools. As for the health system, the continuous pressure on the infrastructure, the health supplies, and access to health services were very weak. These supplies are insufficient to accommodate the huge number of immigrants. Due to resources of

these countries, they have not developed their own health systems. Recently, the health care systems of countries such as Lebanon collapsed as a result of the tremendous pressure.

5.3 THE ROLE OF THE HOSTCOUNTRIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

Negotiations are one of the principles in addressing international issues, and Turkey has sponsored negotiations with countries and international organizations to contribute to the Syrian crisis. This began with the Turkish agreement with the European Union in 2016 to develop international solutions to the refugee issue. Such positive steps demonstrate the mechanism that the Turkish government has followed concerning the Syrian issue. Considering that the issue of Syrian immigrants is an international issue, which obliges the European Union to bear the burden with Turkey. In addition, there are agreements between international organizations to facilitate the provision of services to Syrians. Since the onset of the Syrian emergency, Turkey has pursued a "open door" policy toward fleeing Syrian refugees at the price of Assad's arbitrary outbreak. Turkey was using refugees as a bargaining chip with the EU. Given Turkey's \$40 billion in transitory spending, the EU is breaking its promises to Turkey on the refugee crisis by granting 6 billion euros in cash proof. Although the agreement has decreased the number of migrants entering in Europe, Ankara claims that Brussels has failed to keep its commitments to relax visa restrictions for Turks and develop the customs union between Turkey and the EU. The European Union has decided to contribute roughly 130 million euros in aid to Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan.

A host country employs coercion and the prospect of flooding chosen nations with refugee populations inside their borders unless compensation is provided to actively participate in the hunt for refugee leases in its international strategy. Blackmail is employed when neighboring elites discover their nation is of geopolitical importance to particular countries and harbors a big number of refugees. The approaches of Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, according to a three-case study of international host country strategies for a group of displaced Syrians that began around 2011, prove this. Jordan ensures that the number of Syrians living in the nation is higher than the UN-approved level. When it comes to dealing with immigration, Lebanon,

like Jordan, has embraced a rentier approach. The Lebanese government passed a new rule prohibiting refugees from being registered in the country from the beginning of 2015. The Syrian Embassy in Lebanon is organized under this statute. Those who have not been registered with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees are released on bail by a Lebanese national, following the Jordanian model. As a result of this strategy, Lebanese people have exploited immigrants, resulting in the selling of sponsorship to newcomers. Lebanon followed Jordan's lead and utilized the same strategy to seek foreign help. The Regional Strategy for Refugees and Resilience, established in Berlin in response to the Lebanese crisis, sparked this curiosity. Lebanon has vowed to assist in the resettling of 1.5 million Syrian refugees as part of a humanitarian response plan, and is requesting financial assistance.

Refugee populations are every now and then considered to be potential cash sources by nearby elites in the host country. The expression "rentier" refugee nations alludes to nations that are setting themselves up to oblige persuasively dislodged individuals. According to the global relations thought system, a host country could use two strategies to directly participate in the search for refugees in its international strategy: coercion and taking steps to flood designated countries with refugee populations within their borders, unless compensation is paid. Choosing between compulsion and participation as a legislative arrangement is rarely a binary choice (Tsourapas, 2017; 2018). The host country's choice between two practices – coercion or back scratch – is based on the attitudes of nearby elites toward the designated nations. Blackmail is utilized when nearby elites accept that their nation is geopolitically important to the designated nations and harbors an enormous number of refugees. It is proven by the strategies of Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, as per a three-case investigation of host nations' international strategies of dislodged Syrian people groups starting around 2011 (Betts & Loescher, 2011: 20; Betts 2017).

To exhibit how Lebanon and Jordan took on a technique of wading through in their international strategy, eastern nations used strategies of getting lost and extortion. They believe they have housed huge gatherings of Syrian refugees, yet they consider themselves to be geopolitically important to the European Union. Turkey, then again, sought an extortion crusade. It tends to be clarified by express elites' impression of Turkey's international

significance, just as the tremendous number of Syrian refugees dwelling inside its lines, which added up to 6 million individuals, including Syrians, Afghans, Iraqis, and Iranians. Lebanon has had enough of Syrian displaced people. International concerns (Vohra, 2019).

From 2013 onwards, the Syrian refugee emergency started with the steady foundation of a rentier condition of refugees in Jordan. This was fundamentally proven by legislators' endeavors to make Syrian refugees as apparent to the world as could really be expected. They additionally plan to increase their numbers, notwithstanding Jordan's invite strategy, which allowed transientsto enter the country somewhere in the range of 2011 and 2013 (Human Rights Watch 2014).State security is essential to nearby policymakers, which has prompted a change in Jordan's strategy on line intersections focused on additional features highlighting the Syrian refugee issue. Individuals entering the country through informal intersection focuses are perceived as refugees, apparently, as indicated by a 1998 update of comprehension between Jordan and the UN RefugeeAgency (UNHCR). "

With the assistance of alleviation laborers, local official authorities had the option to order all Syrians entering Jordan as displaced people rather than visitors. Syrians who entered Jordan illegally were deported to the Zaatari refugee camp. In 2012, Zaatari obliged approximately 45,000 Syrians, while in 2013, in excess of 76,000 Syrians lived there, arriving at 156 in March 2013. This strategy allowed Jordan to emphasize that it was dealing with a flood of Syrian visitors while also supporting its appeals for international assistance. Assuming we don't fabricate camps, the world won't comprehend that we are in an emergency, the Jordanian government said (Betts, Ali & Memi Soglu, 2017). Jordan guarantees that the number of Syrians living in Jordan surpasses the official UN figure. While the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) reports that there are about 655,500 Syrian displaced people enrolled in Jordan, the public authority asserts that Jordan housed 1.3 million Syrians in 2017. As indicated by the organization, these figures are planned to support the obtaining of a worldwide guide and the utilization of refugees as an influence (Turner, 2015: 393).

The Jordan Compact, made in 2016 with regards to the London Refugee Summit, was the aftereffect of exchanges with benefactors. The culmination's significant objective was to build

up 200,000 open positions for Syrians in the country during the next three to five years. Jordan has also committed to removing administrative barriers that prevent refugees from working in the country and lowering work grant installments for people seeking incompetent occupations from 700 to 10 Jordanian dinars. It's important that the arrangement states: (Government of Jordan, 2016).

Turn the refugee emergency into an advancement opportunity by drawing in speculations to open the EU market with work on beginning principles, creating occupations for Jordanians and Syrian displaced people, and supporting Syria's post-struggle economy. Rebuild Jordanian host networks by giving sufficient award backing to the Jordanian Response Plan 2016-2018, with an emphasis on the host networks' capacity to assimilate refugees. As part of Jordan's entrance into the new Extended Fund Facility Program with the International Monetary Fund to advance the circumstances of refugees in Jordan, support adequate awards and concessional subsidizing to help the economy and address Jordan's issues over the course of the next three years. It is undeniable that the Jordanian government received material assistance under the Jordan Charter in response to the 2016 refugee crisis. The keenness of Western countries to take measures to help halt the flow of Syrian refugees to Europe and surrounding countries was clearly a factor in the international community's support (Reed, 2017).

In discussions with the international community, Jordan has used a "back-breaking" technique. After accepting 1.3 million refugees, the significance of cooperating and partnering with many stakeholders to help deal with the effects of refugees becomes clear. According to the administration, countries close to crises are unable to bear the burden of relocating migrants on their own (Arar, 2017). It's worth mentioning that the Jordan Agreement's domestic ramifications were based on talks that resulted in the signing of job prospects for refugees. In practice, the Jordanian economy grew slowly due to substantial unemployment and a lack of investor interest. Work permits increased to 60,000 in 2017. As a result of this approach, tensions between the Jordanian government and overseas manufacturers have grown. It was an attempt to meet the global community's needs. It was never intended to put foreign support in jeopardy (Abaza & Jihad, 2016).

Lebanon, like Jordan, has embraced a rentier strategy when it comes to dealing with immigration. According to the UNHCR, more than one million immigrants have entered the country and have been registered with UNHCR. At the beginning of 2015, the Lebanese government passed a new law prohibiting the registration of refugees (Gallart, 2015). This statute is intended to organize the Syrian Embassy in Lebanon. It specifies that people over the age of 15 who are registered with the UN in Lebanon must pay a charge of \$200 to the Lebanese government. Those who have not registered with the UNHCR are actually given bail by a Lebanese citizen, following Jordan's pattern. This strategy has resulted in the exploitation of immigrants by Lebanese citizens, leading to the sale of sponsorship to newcomers (Human Rights Watch, 2016).

In order to seek international aid, Lebanon used the same technique as Jordan. This fascination began with the regional strategy for refugees and resilience, which was held in Berlin in response to the Lebanese crisis. Lebanon has pledged to assist in the reception of 1.5 million Syrian refugees as part of a humanitarian response plan and to seek financial funding. Lebanese villages offered their schools and hospitals to hundreds of thousands of Syrians at the start of the migration. However, the rising number of refugees puts an immense strain on Lebanon's institutional institutions. It jeopardizes the country's long-term stability. As a result of this pressure, Lebanon held talks with donors to provide support to the Lebanese government, particularly the regional response plan, which attempts to help the Lebanese government cope with the crisis (Tsourapas, 2019).

- a. Assisting and protecting vulnerable refugee populations
- b. Financial assistance for government-provided services
- c. Support for Lebanon's economic and social structures, which will initially include \$2.8 billion in financial assistance as well as low-interest loans,

A 2016 deal was made between the European Union and the Lebanese government. From 2016 to 2017, it granted \$455 million in loans to a financial union as a result of its virtue. This agreement, according to the EU, improves Lebanon's economic and social status, as well as its

flexibility in dealing with refugees. Donor organization help, aid received by Lebanon, and money earmarked for refugees were all part of the package. This assistance was similar to what a rental would be for refugees (European Commission 2016). In its 2016 negotiations with the European Union, Lebanon utilized a backsliding strategy. It demonstrates, as in Jordan, that international calls and pluralism are favored above threats. "The world should comprehend that Lebanon is ready to collapse due to refugees," said Lebanese Prime Minister Asad Hariri(Reuters, 2016).

The overthrow of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is no longer a key aim for international supporters and opponents of the regime. Despite the fact that the Syrian war breached the red line by employing chemical weapons, neither the UN nor even large countries have acted militarily (Lewis, 2013). Hariri, as Prime Minister of Lebanon, is a supporter of Bashar al-Assad's administration. As a result, the various forms of help those foreign countries might provide to the Lebanese government were limited. The reason for this is a deal reached between Jazb Allah and Hariri about the need for refugees to return to Syria. It should be noted that Hezbollah is a staunch backer of Bashar al-Assad's administration. It works with pro-regime Lebanese political groups to make it easier for refugees to return to Syria (Mohammed & Stewart, 2018).

The intensification of humanitarian pledges to Lebanon is a good example of this. Pledges made in response to refugees suggest that refugees will stay in the long run if long-term programs are supported as much as possible. The opposition puts political pressure on refugees to return. Political pressure is applied by the opposition to refugees to return. In exchange for the relaxation of limitations on Syrian refugees, the Lebanese government will receive conditional aid. It stepped up surveillance to look for signs of corruption and financial manipulation by donors, as well as to monitor humanitarian aid to both Lebanese and Syrians. Syrians had to be included in programs as well. New international help is being delivered to Lebanon. Payments to municipalities and non-governmental organizations should be made more quickly (NGOs). Municipalities with efficient and successful operations are rewarded. Maintain financial support for livelihood programs while minimizing dependency on emergency cash aid.

The fact that Turkey has the largest refugee population, estimated at 3.5 million, requires significant support and humanitarian assistance. As the flow of migrants continues, the demand for Turkish government assistance has grown (3RP Turkey 2019). Turkey differs in dealing with refugees from both Jordan and Lebanon. It brings together a number of refugees in camps that are mainly located on the Syrian-Turkish border. At the same time, it allows residency in all parts of Turkey after reaching the legal age.

The Turkish-EU negotiations began in 2015, with the EU supporting Turkey with financial assistance to cope with the high number of refugees. The negotiations reached their peak in 2016 (European Council, 2016). The European Union made certain concessions in the deal. One of these is to speed up the execution of the plan with the goal of eliminating visa restrictions for Turkish nationals and disbursing funds previously intended to help refugees in Turkey, estimated at 3 billion euros. When the aid runs out, the project will be restarted with new funding until 2018 (Lybk-Jensen, 2019). In contrast to Lebanon and Jordan, Turkey has used the strategy of pressure in its foreign policy regarding the refugee crisis. The policy used by Ankara's elite, which clarified Brussels and the European Union, was abbreviated in a meeting between Erdogan and Tusk Wenker. The meeting considers stating the country's position on the refugee crisis. It also considers that the EU countries should participate in this crisis and shoulder the burden with Turkey (Reuters, 2016). Turkey's ruling party has dealt with the Syrian refugee issue in two main ways (Bélanger & Saracoglu, 2019):

Since the start of the Syrian emergency, Turkey has had an "open-door strategy" toward Syrian refugees escaping from the abusive Assad fascism. As a feature of its global responsibilities, it has clung to the idea of non-refugee at the line. The underpinning of Al-Kamlik gives different advantages to Syrian displaced people, including admittance to training, medical services, help, and occupation approval. Syrian refugees reserve the option of birth enrollment, marriage adjustment, separation, and passing, as indicated by the Turkish Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Affairs. They reserve the privilege of remaining in Turkey till they return to their nation of origin. They just need to reside in the state where they were first enrolled, and they can't head out to one more state without first getting approval from his command.

Every individual from the Syrian family was additionally given TL 120 every month as Turkish Red Crescent cards. Moreover, Turkey's Disaster and Emergency Management Department(AFAD) has set up 26 transitory safe houses for Syrian refugees the nation over. It provides refugees with well-being and social assistance, as well as classes and projects demonstrating handicrafts and livelihoods. As a result, Afad has directed the instruction of countless Syrian refugees, from kindergarten to optional school, as part of a team with the Turkish Ministry of Education. Turkey's help for Syrian refugees has not been limited to its own lines; it has likewise provided help inside Syria, adding up to around 1.75 billion Turkish pounds. Likewise, Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu declared in 2019 that 79,820 Syrian refugees have been granted Turkish citizenship.

Recep Tayyip Erdoan, the Turkish president, has been involving refugees as a negotiating advantage with the EU. He has undermined European nations at different events to open their boundaries to refugees and empower them to cross into Europe. He has squeezed the EU to stop Assad's powers and their Russian sponsor from sending off a tactical hostile in northern Syria, especially in Idlib. Turkey has attempted to acknowledge extra Syrian refugees on its soil and to get backing for the making of a protected zone in northern Syria where refugees, both new and existing on Turkish soil, may reside. Taking into account that Turkey had burned through \$40 billion on transients, the EU was neglecting to meet its commitments to Turkey on the issue of refugees by giving €6 billion in monetary guidance.

On September 12, 1963, in Ankara, a "Agreement forming an association between the European Economic Community and Turkey" was signed, which went into effect on December 1, 1964. The Association Agreement between the EU and Turkey aims to encourage a continuing and balanced development of trade and economic links between the two parties, as well as the gradual establishment of a customs union. Turkey has taken steps to open its boundaries to permit transients into Europe for various events. By allowing refugees to move toward European lines, it has started to solve this danger. Because of the organization's endeavors, Syrian transients are as of now thinking that it is hard to get to Europe via land or water. Many transients walked to the Greek and Bulgarian boundaries, where it was affirmed that no displaced people would be permitted in. Subsequent to

discovering that something like 33 of its fighters had been killed in an air strike in Idlib, Ankara made a move (Triandafyllidou, 2018). Beginning with the Turkish government's endeavor to contribute this paper (the Syrian refugee paper) to apply strain on the Europeans, "political speculation of refugees" has turned into a pattern. Especially since a 2016 arrangement with the European Union on the arrival of refugees to Turkey said that "transients who crossed the boundary are promptly moved to Greece and, afterward, to Turkey, where Syrian occupants get transitory ensured status." The organization needs to deal with this arrangement to get extra money, estimated to be worth six billion euros. The Turkish president needs the European Union to accept there is an emergency by taking part in this arrangement (Yavuz, 2019).

To review, diplomatic negotiations take place between host countries and the European Union, which is the ultimate goal for immigrants to have a decent life. Turkey, which began negotiating with the Alliance, signed the 2016 agreement, which helped organize the arrival of registered Syrians between the two countries. The agreement has already reduced the number of immigrants arriving in Europe, yet Ankara says Brussels has not kept its promises to ease visa conditions for Turks and to expand the customs union between Turkey and the EU. There was tension between Turkey and the European Union, which continued because the latter did not meet all the terms. In 2019, the Turkish government sent Syrians to the borders of the European Union, which was a warning to the Union's policy because it did not provide any solutions to the Syrian problem.

The European Union has approved the provision of aid to support Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, amounting to approximately 130 million euros through the Regional Trust Fund. Negotiations between the three countries were based on supporting the Syrians with the services necessary to stay in the country. Lebanon was among the countries that used the Syrians as a pressure card on the European Union to obtain financial support. The situation continued until the collapse of the Lebanese currency and the economic system due to government corruption, followed by Jordan's refusal to obtain aid and humanitarian relief for Syrians in the country. It began with the explanation of the Jordanian response plan to the Syrian crisis 2017–2019. The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation of the

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has issued a detailed plan aimed at developing a comprehensive economic and social policy to meet the challenges posed by Syrian asylum in Jordan. It also aims to ensure the transition from the emergency phase of dealing with refugees to the phase of recovery from the effects of the large refugee crisis and then the transition after that. To the stage of ensuring sustainable development in the long term, The plan was implemented with technical and financial support from the European Union and the following United Nations organizations: UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN- Women, the Global Nutrition Programme and WHO. In support of this, Jordan could not afford to receive more immigrants.

6. CONCLUSION

Syria's civil war has deteriorated into a domestic struggle. This conflict results in large-scale internal and external migration. Syrians have sought refuge in urban areas where they have been displaced by violence. Outside of Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq accounted for the majority of the Syrian crowd. Turkey inhabits a unique topographical region. Turkey was seen as one of the nations designated for mobility because of its closeness to EU states until recently. World and regional associations have been established in Turkey as part of the company's entrance strategy. Camps have been established along the Syrian-Turkish border to accommodate transients and provide them with services like as welfare and education. The Turkish government issued a statement explaining the situation. Camps have been established along the Syrian- Turkish border to accommodate transients and provide them with services like as welfare and education. The Turkish government issued a statement explaining the provision of the temporary protection statute that allows Syrians to stay in Turkey. Turkey provided a blueprint for dealing with the migration crisis. It won when it came to providing basic services like education, health care, and job chances.

To better understand the subject, the realistic theory was applied to the host countries, which revealed that Lebanon and Jordan were concerned about their own state's interests in the humanitarian issues that arose as a result of the Syrian war, and that the absorption policy failed in both countries for the reasons stated earlier. In the case of Turkey, it is obvious that neoliberal theory is best suited to comprehending the actual execution of the assimilation program, which was successful in confining Syrians, delivering services to them, managing work affairs, and providing safety, among other things.

Syrians have been recruited by Turkish educational foundations. It also helped in the adoption of the coordinated strategy by several administrations and European Union. This mingling occurs at the level of public activities. The explanation of Syrians' legal position in the country, the use of the Temporary Protection Act, work rules, and the acquisition of labor grants is a natural life guideline. These laws, provided by Turkish movement professionals, bring our examination of the possibility of host nations to an end. The Syrians' absorption into

their viewpoints has led them to assume that Turkey is a financially advanced country. It has efficient emergency response plans. The Turkish plan for Syria is not yet complete, notwithstanding its success up to this point. The purposeful return needed the presence of a protected area. As a result, Turkish security is jeopardized because Turkey shares vast borders with Syria.

Because of the success of the integration strategy and administrative arrangements, Syrians may now work on a regular basis. This demonstrates that the government has worked out how to recognize an emergency. Turkey, on the other hand, has recently battled with challenges to its monetary structure. These are due to the negative impacts of instability on political and monetary frameworks in countries such as Syria, Iraq, Iran, and others.

In terms of the agreement, the European Union assists Turkey in dealing with immigration difficulties. Turkey's adherence to international agreements poses a threat to the European Union. It calls for the European Union to take responsibility for states that are involved in supporting material, changing mobility tactics, and so on. The gatherings have reached an agreement that takes into account the outsiders' concerns. The European Union was unable to carry out the agreement, leaving Turkey to face the fate of Syrians without assistance from anybody else. The pressure on European nations persisted as the designated nations that the Syrians expected to end the conflict in their country.

Turkey has done an excellent job of assimilating Syrian immigrants. The most significant factor in its accomplishment was community acceptance. It reduces the possible threats as well as the general sense of boredom and worry that pervades society. Despite the fact that Turkey has launched programs targeted at resolving emergent difficulties, resolution and thorough strategic planning are still not attainable in collaboration with foreign partners. However, Turkey faces a variety of problems and difficulties in developing policies of cohabitation and integration, not just for immigrants but also for the millions of refugees whose future is uncertain.

Rather of concentrating on the refugee crisis, Turkey has typically prioritized maintaining Syria's stability. Damascus' concepts of settlement have created the ground for Turkey's

problems to worsen. It has also led to the increase in risks and issues. Because integration tactics favor long- term stability and survival, the Turkish government has a negative attitude toward the realities of survival. Several governments throughout the globe are fighting the return of cohabitation rules due to uncertainty or hesitation. Turkey has escalated its pressure on the European Union on the Syrian refugee crisis and other concerns in the short and medium term, which is unsurprising.

The European Union should continue to work to expand and improve the substance of the Convention. The Syrian refugee issue in Turkey has exacerbated tensions between Turkey and Europe. On the one hand, a foundation for collaboration has been built that safeguards the European Union as a whole. Turkey has shown itself to be a trustworthy partner. Those interactions, on the other hand, were virtually entirely restricted to the issue of refugees. Turkey appeared to welcome – albeit without refugees, as in the Cold War, and the EU's "buffer zone" position bolstered anti-Western and anti-European sentiment. It utilized European foreign- exemption policy as a political instrument in Turkey.

Sadly, it appears that collective human migration and instability in the region surrounding Turkey are not yet done. Many issues and criticisms have arisen as a result of society's forbearance and togetherness. This scenario cannot go unnoticed in politics, regardless of how efficient international procedures and rules are. More harsh policies will be implemented by the government and opposition parties. Syrian and non-Syrian refugees' futures are inextricably connected to collaboration based on meaningful financial burden sharing between Turkey and the EU. Moving beyond sharing the shared budgetary load, strategic collaboration in Turkish- European ties must be built on a more realistic and inclusive basis. Chronic difficulties, on the other hand, might cause greater turbulence in the coffers, both for the good and the bad.

If Oman dismisses the Syrian opposition, the opposition's success or the emergence of a new administration in new circumstances would be cut off from the old Syrian dictatorship. From afar, Jordan will be subject to threats posed by the Syrian regime. If their ties are not strained, a dictatorship like that does not share Amman's interests. Jordan pays a heavy security and

economic price for Assad's leadership or the end of his mandate. Syria's refugees cannot afford it, and their numbers are continually growing as the conflict or crisis in Syria continues unabated. If the crisis continues without a sensible international settlement, Syria's "religious fanaticism" will infiltrate Jordan as well as the rest of the region.

Other existential or structural issues are also prevalent in Oman, such as those linked to changes in Syria's topography as a result of the conflict or its resolution. Jordan will be concerned by the prospect of Syria's state collapse, as well as some of its effects. In terms of the regime structure, Jordan did so in such a way that these concerns cannot be overlooked in any assessment of Jordan's position and tracks, which it imposed on itself and made vulnerable to the impacts of major and regional states' postures, the Syrian war's course, and its daily sites.

Jordan continued to provide services to Syrians once they arrived by opening its borders to them. However, the situation in Jordan differed somewhat from that of its former Turkish neighbor. It does so because of Jordan's infrastructural system and its precarious economic policies. Jordan is a tiny country with a thriving light industry that contributes to the country's economy. Jordan is one of the countries that relies on economic help and grants from other countries for financial support. The influx of Syrians puts a strain on services and infrastructure. As a result, Jordan closed its borders in response to the influx of Syrian refugees.

Jordan enlisted the Syrians to exert financial pressure on European nations. Jordan has a limited economy and is unable to provide emergency assets or administrations to assist Syrians. The main goal of the Syrian assembly in Jordan was for Jordan to adopt a non-obstructive approach to Syrian affairs and a nonpartisan approach to the Syrian crisis. Essential services for Syrians in Jordan can be used once Syrians arrive in the nation. Due to a lack of foundation, Jordan's approach has included a variety of methods to limit the presence of Syrians in metropolitan areas, such as obtaining residency licenses from Jordan, military institutions, transportation restrictions, and so on. Syrians should aid Jordanians with work permits; the Syrians' capacity to rely on international organizations and giver nations for

health treatment was predicated on international organizations and giver nations. The Syrian people's incapacity to form health-care foundations was due to the country's poor health-care infrastructure.

Jordan eventually has to cope with a political dilemma as a result of the refugee crisis. Jordan's actual willingness to adopt helpful tools, such as formalizing Syrian labor, to mitigate the negative effects of the Syrian evacuee situation has been hampered by negative perceptions about Syrian displaced persons. Jordan has repeatedly chosen to momentarily relieve pressures in the host local region over creating appropriate responses to tactics that would alleviate the country's endemic issues in the long run with growing public displeasure. By regulating the arrangement of administrations and limiting Syrian refugees' admission to Jordanian domain, the public authority has passed the increasing obstacle of pressure. In any case, limiting haven methods would do nothing to help Jordan overcome the issues it was facing before the arrival of Syrian refugees, highlighting the politicized nature of the displaced person approach. Further restrictions on migrants would only increase Syrians' desperation and, truth be told, would only exacerbate Jordan's long-standing problems.

Regardless, Jordan lacks a driving force to increase the weights of Syrian refugees, despite facing its own public issues as a result of the lack of coordinated worldwide local area support. Since the international community has consistently curtailed funding for the needs arising from the influx of refugees, Syrian refugees in Jordan have faced a similar constraint on the scope of security. Despite the fact that the final option has resulted in a net increase in global guide, donors' scorn raises concerns that they will be held responsible for yet another refugee influx in the long run. As a result, if the burden on the host community grows due to contributory tiredness, Jordan will most likely continue to extend its insurance to Syrian refugees. Jordan was not prepared to receive and assimilate Syrian refugees on its territory. Jordan has a lengthy history of receiving Palestinians, Iraqis, and other types of refugees. Because of the country's financial situation, lack of administration, difficult standards for obtaining a residence permit, and employment and school enlistment, the country's success in keeping refugees has been limited.

On the other hand, Lebanon is regarded as one of the most important destinations for Syrian refugees. The number of Syrian refugees entering Lebanon has increased since the commencement of the well-known uprising in Syria. Regardless of the existence of effective groups that provide assistance and accommodation to Lebanese families and the general public, Lebanon must intervene to solve the current situation more systematically. The majority of displaced people live in volatile climates. The biggest challenges for those with limited or no financial resources are access to shelter, food, water, sterilization, medical treatment, and security. The obstacles faced by aid networks include the large increase in the number of displaced individuals, the lack of access to enrollment offices, the lack of access to shelters, and the tough financial situations of families assisting refugees. Differences between Syrian and Lebanese educational curricula, Lebanon's financial situation, the lack of unfilled posts, and the question of security are among the major challenges.

The Lebanese government and common society did not have the choice to handle the tension given the existing refugee situation, limited local area resources, and a sincere enticement for common society not only to expand aid but also to further improve planning. As a result, the global community and the EU should prepare to raise assets in order to provide the necessary assistance. For years, Lebanon relied on outside assistance to set up health, education, and financial services. Help came in the form of multinational organizations or individual contributors. Lebanon has a history of recognition by Palestinians and other immigrants. Lebanon had been beset by common conflicts for years, and differing strict perspectives were to blame for the country's political and financial instability. Despite Lebanon's inability to keep Syrians due to flimsiness, limited assets, and other concerns, the framework and financial collapse have exiled many Syrians into Iraq and Turkey.

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