

TALKS WITHOUT COMMITMENT: THE IMPACT OF REBEL
GROUP ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES ON THE PROSPECTS
OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS

A Master's Thesis

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To my family



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OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS

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ABSTRACT

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There are multiple bargaining stages in a peace process and their outcomes can vary due to certain parameters affecting these processes. Studies examining peace processes highlighted various factors leading to failures in negotiated settlements as a peaceful resolution is conditional on many factors. In this thesis, I aimed to contribute to the existing literature by investigating the rebel organizational capabilities' impact on the peaceful resolution of conflict by investigating prospects of negotiation failures. I conceptualized organizational capabilities as positive relations with constituencies, high centralization in leadership, territorial control, and natural resource funding and hypothesized that these capabilities are positively related to negotiation failures. To test these capabilities' impact, I constructed a dataset by using available data which contains a total of 859 observations of 180 rebel groups in 63 different countries from the period 1990 to 2005. I used my dataset to run Cox proportional hazard regression models and logistic regression models. My findings from both analyses revealed mixed results in terms of constituency relations, organizational structure, and natural resource funding but confirmed that rebel organizations with territorial control are more likely to be involved in negotiation failures after a talk is initiated.

Keywords: Rebel organizations, organizational capabilities, negotiation, settlement, negotiation failures.

ÖZET

TAAHHÜTSÜZ MÜZAKERELER: İSYANCI GRUPLARIN ÖRGÜTSEL YETENEKLERİNİN MÜZAKERELERİN ANTLAŞMA İLE SONUÇLANMASI ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ

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Bir barış sürecinde birden fazla aşama vardır ve bu süreçleri etkileyen belirli parametreler nedeniyle bu süreçlerin sonuçları farklılık gösterebilir. Barışçıl çözüme ulaşmak birçok farklı faktöre bağlı olduğundan bu zamana kadar barış süreçlerini inceleyen çalışmalar müzakere edilen antlaşmalarda başarısızlığa yol açan bu çeşitli faktörleri incelediler. Bu tezde, isyancı grupların örgütsel yeteneklerinin çatışmanın barışçıl çözümü üzerindeki etkisini müzakere başarısızlıklarının olasılıkları üzerinden araştırarak mevcut literatüre katkıda bulunmayı amaçladım. Örgütsel yetenekleri, tabanlarla olumlu ilişkiler, liderlikte yüksek merkezileşme, bölgesel kontrol ve doğal kaynaklardan elde edilen finansman olarak kavramsallaştırdım ve bu yeteneklerin müzakere başarısızlıklarıyla olumlu bir şekilde ilişkili olduğunu varsaydım. Bu yeteneklerin etkisini test etmek için, mevcut verileri kullanarak 1990-2005 dönemi için 63 farklı ülkede 180 isyancı grubun toplam 859 gözlemini içeren bir veri seti oluşturdum. Hipotezlerimi Cox regresyon modelleri ve lojistik regresyon modelleri ile test ettim. Her iki analizden elde ettiğim bulgular, taban ilişkileri, örgütsel yapı ve doğal kaynak finansmanı açısından karışık sonuçlar ortaya koysa da, toprak kontrolüne sahip isyancı örgütlerin, bir görüşme başlatıldıktan sonra müzakere başarısızlıklarına karışma olasılığının daha yüksek olduğunu doğruladı.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İsyancı örgütler, örgütsel kapasite, müzakere, antlaşma, müzakere başarısızlıkları.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BATNA- Best Alternative To A Negotiated Settlement
ELN- National Liberation Army or Ejército de Liberación Nacional
FARC- Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
JVP- Janatha Vimukthi Peramun
LJ- Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
LRA- Lord's Resistance Army
LTTE- Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
NDFB- National Democratic Front of Bodoloand
NPFL- National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NRA- National Resistance Army
OPM- Free Papua Movement or Organisasi Papua Merdeka
SNM- Somali National Movement
SPP- Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
UNITA- The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In 2016, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) agreed to demobilize following signing a peace agreement with the Colombian government after many negotiation attempts that started in 2012. Until that achievement, in its long existence since the 1960s, FARC refused the talk offers of the government, requested pre-conditions for the initiation of negotiations, did not comply with the partial agreements or ceasefires or withdrew from the negotiations without a decisive outcome many times. According to the Nussio and Ugarriza (2021), the decision of FARC to settle on a peace agreement after a five-decade-long conflict came only after its organizational decline and a high number of deserters as part of due to its leadership decapitations in a very centralized rebel organization, the decline in its abilities to provide security and incentives, and disruptions in organization's primary income because of the economical fluctuations in the cocoa economy. Therefore, as long as FARC was able to hold these advantages it was more likely for the organization to stall or spoil negotiations either to preserve the status quo or for a better outcome in the future.

Therefore in a conflict, some rebel groups can be more willing to negotiate and sign settlements with the government, some can engage in negotiations but leave the negotiation table without agreements or some can reject negotiation offers at all. Thus, this poses a puzzle in terms of peace process outcomes. Why do some rebel organizations that engaged in formal peace talks sign agreements that will resolve their incompatibilities while some negotiations become unsuccessful despite repeated attempts?

Due to the complex dynamics of civil conflicts, scholars tried to come up with systematic analyses of the variances in the explanations of onset, duration, termination, and recurrence of conflicts. Acknowledging and explaining these variances led to better capture of how the intrastate conflicts occur, proceed, end, or recur. In line with this, studies focused on peace processes and incentives of rebel organizations and argued that it will depend on different endogenous and exogenous factors. In this thesis, I am trying to explain this by conceptualizing rebel capabilities and investigating if there is a relation between organizations holding these advantages and negotiation failures. Thus, in this thesis, I am asking: How organizational capabilities of rebel organizations may impact the prospects of negotiated settlements?

Many approaches can be used to study intrastate conflict. Leading works in the conflict literature mostly focused on the explanations of onset, duration, and resolution of the conflict based on the state-level attributes. Even though these studies specified rebel attributes in their theories they did not analyze rebel groups' features while testing their hypotheses. The macro data, aggregate measures of national

attributes or government characteristics caused inadequate explanations of conflict (Cunningham et al., 2009). Treating rebel groups as unitary and homogenous actors with certain motivations either driven by greed or grievance (Collier & Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Fearon & Laitin 2003) led to accepting these groups are as actors fighting under a master cleavage and omitted individual and group-level dynamics (Parkinson & Zaks, 2018). Although these approaches explained structural factors (i.e. opportunity structures) at the state level well, they also neglected variance in rebel organizations, their unique capabilities, and nuances in wartime motivational changes (Bultmann, 2018). Indeed, how strong a government can be an important factor in defining the course of conflict but it can not be the sole factor as these groups also gain certain capabilities that increase their resistance due to the war-time opportunities (Cunningham et al., 2009). In line with this, the reasons for violence can not be explained by stated pre-war objectives and motives but are highly affected by the generated actions and dynamics of the conflict (Kalyvas, 2006).

The focus started to move away from macro-level to meso-level and micro-level analysis as data collection efforts made it possible to investigate these dynamics and interactions between levels. In an intrastate conflict there are two primary parties, one is the government and the other is the rebel group; however, there can be separate dyadic characteristics. The realization of the existence of multiple types of rebel groups, their heterogeneity, different strategic behaviors, rivalry, and alliances led to new investigations in the literature (McQuinn, 2016). Therefore, the scholars acknowledged that the risk of not including individual and organizational levels in the analyses may impact the real-world applications of the studies. A growing number of studies are now investigating areas such as rebel recruitment strategies (Gates, 2002;

Weinstein, 2005; 2006), rebel governance (Arjona et al., 2015; Mampilly, 2011), and inter-group relations (Akcinaroglu 2012; Tokdemir et al., 2021), and social networks of rebellion (Staniland, 2014).

Why the organizations and organizational level explanations are important to include in the analysis? Ultimately, over the years, social movements and rebellions formed under organized unit structures for more successful, effective, and sustainable revolts (Della Porta, 1995). The structural and social organizations of rebellions and the variation in their behaviors, strategies, and motivations are very vital parts of the analyses explaining the dynamics of civil wars as these are prone to change over the course of the conflict. Therefore change that happens at the level of the organization can have an effect on the conflict dynamics and outcomes.

Weinstein (2006, 19) defined the organization of a rebel group as “membership, policies, structures and culture” and as a phenomenon that structures the behaviors of the collectives. All rebel groups have certain organizational characters, but they differ in the extent to which this is formalized. Parkinson and Zaks (2018: 272) argue that we need to see these organizations as “collections of roles, linked by relations, which produce behaviors, to work toward goals within a given context”. These organizational structures and behaviors can have an impact on the groups’ internal and external behaviors (Bultmann, 2018). So, the organizations have certain roles assigned to them and they have intra, inter, or extra social linkages between these roles which in conclusion define their actions and ends pursued (Parkinson & Zaks, 2018). Thus in my thesis, I am focusing on rebel organizational capabilities to explain variance in the peace process outcomes, particularly its impact on not reaching a

successful negotiated settlement as these organizations may be satisfied with the status quo.

Assuming that reaching an agreement is a favorable outcome for the rebel organization could be misleading. Although there is a trade-off between the effectiveness and increased survival of the organization in traditional terms, this thesis argues that the successful maintenance of the organization -therefore its capabilities and gains- can be considered an achievement by the group. So some organizations may be motivated to intentionally stall or spoil the negotiations causing unsuccessful negotiation processes in the end. This thesis' purpose is to reveal the value that a rebel organization may put on its organizational capabilities earned during conflict and how this could affect its behavior. Therefore, it is important to question what these motivations could be or what incentives can lead these parties to act as spoilers or to be involved in negotiation failures?

This thesis is one of the studies acknowledging the premise that the organizational capabilities of the groups can affect conflict outcomes, specifically the outcomes of separate stages of a peace process. However, contrary to what is common in the literature, I am not conceptualizing the capabilities solely as rebel fighting capacity, troop size, battlefield performances, or conflict duration but with other existing capability conceptualizations that existed in theories but have not been tested analytically according to my knowledge. Indeed, the military performance of an organization is one of the most important components of an organization sustaining a fight with the government in unconventional terms as the decline in military performance may cause a reduction in other capabilities of the organization.

Additionally, my conceptualizations of rebel capabilities may be the reason or conclusion of rebel military effectiveness. However, this does not have to be operationalized with rebel troop size, conflict duration or battlefield casualties, as sometimes rebel organizations choose to engage in low-intensity conflict to secure other organizational benefits or misrepresent their mobilization capacities.

In this thesis, I argue that rebel organizations with the ability to provide services to their constituencies, have higher centralization in the leadership, control territory, and earn funding from natural resources can trust their organizational capabilities. I am aiming to contribute to the growing area of research on organizational-level explanations which uses data on rebel group attributes such as their organizational structures and leadership (Cunningham et al., 2013), governance and service provision (Heger & Jung, 2017), material capabilities and funding (Walsh et al., 2018; Conrad et al., 2019) and the relative strength of rebels (Cunningham et al., 2013) by examining these facets' impacts on peace process outcomes as well as conflict duration. This is contrary to the previous literature which assumed rebel groups as unitary strategic actors and "black-boxed" them by disregarding their unique features.

Therefore may decline a settlement agreement despite the given opportunity through initiation of negotiations. Along with this argument, I assume rebel groups make strategic decisions accordingly to the cost-benefit analysis based on their capabilities during a peace process. Ultimately, these groups may reject any resolutions or may stall the whole process. Rebel organizations' principal aim may not be signing an agreement while entering the negotiations. Besides they can be confident in their

capabilities to maximize their pie out of an outcome by searching for their best alternatives.

As Cunningham et al., (2009: 573) wrote, “once a conflict is underway, violence will continue until one side is defeated, or until actors agree to come to the bargaining table and find a negotiated settlement”. There is constant decision-making on which strategies to follow and I argue the rebel group can assess its own capabilities as success that this may determine their behaviors in peace processes, even though they may overestimate their strength. Governments can offer accommodation to these groups as they are able to challenge the government and its resources while rebels may choose to seize on the opportunity to negotiate a good deal. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that rebels negotiate in good faith (Stedman, 1997) or are committed to a negotiated settlement as they are after their best alternative to the benefits of violence. There may be many motives to engage in negotiations but refuse to sign a settlement such as “achieving time to regroup and reorganize; internationalizing the conflict; profiting materially from ongoing conflict; legitimization of their negotiation positions and current status; face-saving; and avoiding costly concessions by prolonging the process itself” (Newman & Richmond, 2006: 2). Thus, this line of theoretical framework refuses that negotiations are always one of the favorable outcomes for the groups or groups are always enter the negotiations due to the high costs of the conflict and search for peaceful options as they out of alternatives. There can be groups with devious objectives (Stedman, 1997) or these organizations can be false negotiators (Glozman et al., 2015).

Finally, as another contribution to the literature, despite just focusing on explanations when peace agreements are more likely, I follow a recent approach that follows a different theoretical framework, conceptualizes peace processes as a multi-stage bargaining process and collects original data accordingly (Findley, 2013; Ogutcu-Fu, 2016). Therefore, I am planning to explain if rebel organizations with certain capabilities are more likely to stall or spoil the negotiations after they engaged in the negotiations. Put differently, I am interested in their prospects to be involved in negotiation failures following to initiation of negotiations but refusing to sign a settlement that will possibly solve some of their incompatibilities or end the conflict.

To be able to answer my research question and test the relation between organizational capabilities that I specified and the prospects of negotiation failures, I conducted an empirical analysis of intrastate armed conflicts between 1990-2005. I constructed my dataset by extracting data from existing datasets containing information on rebel attributes and peace processes. The final dataset includes intrastate conflicts of a total of 859 observations of 180 rebel groups in 63 different countries. I used my dataset to run both survival analysis and logistic regression analysis. More specifically, first, I conducted a survival analysis and ran Cox proportional hazard regression models. Later, I conducted an alternative statistical model with logistic regression. My findings from both analysis revealed mixed results in terms of constituency relations, organizational structure and natural resource funding but confirmed that rebel organizations with territorial control are more likely to be involved in negotiation failures after a talk initiated.

1.1.Thesis Outline

Following this introduction, first I will summarize the relevant literature on rebel motives, capabilities and peace processes in Chapter 2 to situate my thesis within previous studies. Then drawing from the existing studies, I will evaluate my theoretical framework and introduce my hypotheses. Subsequently, in Chapter 3, I will present my research design, introduce the data and operationalizations of the variables that I used to test my thesis' hypotheses. In Chapter 4, I will define my empirical strategy and discuss the findings of two different analyses.. Finally, in Chapter 5, I will conclude with a summary of findings and implications. The final section also includes limitations of my study and reflections for future research.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY

In this section of my thesis, I will summarize the relevant literature and situate my thesis within the existing studies on rebel objectives and success, rebel attributes, and capabilities, as well as peace processes and incentives of the organizations. Later drawing from the existing literature and gaps that I have identified, I will make my theoretical claim and introduce my hypotheses. My theoretical claim here tries to measure the impact of rebel organizational capabilities on the peace processes. In the theory section, I will introduce these organizational capabilities and I will argue that these groups may be more likely to be involved in negotiation failures in which there is a chance to settle the conflict but no settlement has been signed by the organization.

2.1. Rebel Organization's Objectives and Success

There are two primary theories in the conflict literature suggesting two major motivations for the rebellion that are also primary explanations for conflict duration. The first one defines rebel motivations through grievance-based explanations. It has been argued that conflict is largely driven by justice-seeking motives due to ethnic or religious hatreds, political exclusion, inequalities, or in general political grievances (Cederman et al., 2013). On the other hand, in greed-based explanations, researchers

focused on economic opportunities and the capture of resources available in the conflict environment (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Ross, 2004). Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) argued that grievance-based motivations are not adequate explanations for rebels' decision to engage in violence while economic motivations and opportunity structures are better explanatory variables of rebellion as they create peculiar opportunities. Civil wars as "investment" (grievance-based ones) versus civil wars as "business" (greed-based ones) can have different motivations and therefore different durations (Collier et al., 2004; Sobek & Payne, 2010). In the investment model, rebels actually invest the costs during the conflict, therefore, a shorter duration is expected while in the business model rebels may want the continuation of the conflict as they profit from the conflict such as from profits they generated from lootable natural resources (Sobek & Payne, 2010).

In addition to investment and business differentiation, some other researchers like Buhaug (2006) differentiates conflicts to overthrow the regime or secessionist conflicts or Sobek and Payne (2010) examined different driving forces behind civil wars of replacement and legitimacy. However, the authors acknowledge that these classifications are not straightforward, as these motivations can change throughout the conflict. Of course, in a dynamic and transformative conflict environment, greed and grievance may be present simultaneously and even one motive can leave its place to another. For example, according to Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) note, the conflict itself may generate subjective grievance consciously rather than objective causes as many rebel organizations invest in ideological training and indoctrination after the conflict is initiated. Or the group may earn new benefits during the conflict which makes their fight viable and attractive (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). A grievance-based

motivated rebellion at the onset can turn into a greed-based rebellion as these groups may become able to control territories, attract external support or engage in illicit economic activities. So, rebels may update their expectations (Buhaug, 2006). Therefore, it is not an easy task to detect sole motivating factors that will onset and maintain the rebel movements as the reality is more complicated and heterogeneous (Sobek & Payne, 2010).

As a new development in the micro and meso-level explanations of rebel actions, studies started to point out the multiplicity and dynamism of motives that may change throughout the conflict (Bultmann, 2018). According to Stern and Modi (2007: 19), “the groups that survive tend to evolve from the cause-maximizing end of the spectrum to the incentive-maximizing end”, moving between a spectrum of maintenance goals and collective goals. According to Muro (2018), the groups may have different goals that can be categorized as internal, organizational, ideological, military, propaganda, etc., therefore rebels may have goals that are different than their political objectives. The need to address the internal needs of the organization may also account for specific actions that can not be explained by solely referring to long-term strategic objectives (Staniland, 2014). According to Stern (2016: 204), the organizations like other nonprofits, “can shift their missions in two principal ways from one stated objective to another stated objective or from their stated objectives to no objective other than organizational survival or personal enrichment”.

The literature also investigates the group’s ability to reach their goals, effectiveness, and success based on the objectives announced by the groups mostly at the initial stages of the conflict. Although scholars engaged in major debates over whether non-

state violence is an effective method to reach aims (Pape, 2005; Abrahms, 2006; Jones & Libicki 2008; Cronin, 2011; Lyall & Wilson, 2009), there is no established consensus on what should be considered as success or there are no serious considerations of what might be a success for NSAAs themselves. In fact, the literature mostly associates rebel success with rebels' outright win, and attainment of maximalist objectives, even highly unattainable goals of reaching a caliphate. For example, Buhaug (2006: 692) defined the rebel objectives as "the ultimate stated goal of the rebellion". As Krause (2013: 261) argued there is a "universal consensus on conceptualizing political effectiveness solely as the achievement of strategic objectives". However, de Rouen and Sobek (2004) find that the rebel's dependence on primary commodities may increase the possibility that the conflict will end in a truce and this could be a favorable outcome for rebels rather than outright winning. Likewise, if a rebel organization has control over a territory it can be satisfied with this outcome and therefore may engage in low activities in terms of fighting (Cunningham et al., 2009). So, success may have different meanings for different rebel organizations and these meanings also may change according to war-time circumstances (Muro, 2018).

The studies also put much emphasis on the military capabilities of the rebel force to reach these favorable outcomes. For example, Aronson et al. (2015: 9) argued that "successful rebels are more likely to be competent military machines able to raise and arm large numbers of soldiers that can wage modern infantry combat". This is true, considering that rebel organizations need to have the power to resist the government's military attacks in an irregular conflict. However, can we explain rebels' perception of success and failure just by focusing on strategic outcomes or their military

performances? As an alternative, we can search for other explanations by not treating organizational success as something “irrelevant or omnipresent” (Krause, 2013: 262). Therefore, in this thesis, I want to explain what can be these organizational factors that effecting success perceptions, how they may differ for different groups, and how these may affect conflict outcomes.

2.1.1. Organizational Objectives

As Krause (2018) wrote, if the attacks were initiated by unorganized individuals despite pursuing common and strategic objectives then one could not talk about any organizational objectives. The idea of an organization is not just a vital part of the rebellion but it makes the opponent an identifiable threat in the eyes of the government. Ultimately, these organizations became able to develop a certain organizational structure, mobilized support, and perhaps increased their strength by procuring arms, controlling territory, or earning funding from resources. The others, which attempted to do develop these capabilities but failed to do so, can not emerge as credible threats to the government. For example, Cronin (2011) suggested “organizational failure” as a pathway for termination for terrorist organizations because these organizations failed to sustain the necessary organizational capabilities. Many other studies excluded the organizations from their datasets because these groups did not prove to be durable or capable in terms of attracting support or funding (Connable & Libicki, 2010) or did not manage to survive (Asal et al., 2019). Therefore it is important to conceptualize what emerges under organizational goals, and how they affect organizational effectiveness, conflict processes, or outcomes.

Unfortunately, there is no broadly accepted conceptualization of what falls under the concept of organizational objectives but there are studies that compare it with the ultimate strategic objectives. Della Porta (1995), in his study of social movements, distinguished the externally-oriented activities of an organization from internally-oriented activities. In the former one group mostly focuses on legitimizing the goals of the organization while in the latter one group focuses on maintaining the organization itself through “obtaining material resources, avoiding arrests or maintaining the loyalty of members” (Della Porta, 1995: 114-124). Cronin (2011) also distinguished process goals that may serve internal and external organizational goals from the strategic goals of the organization. However she also noted that, these process goals such as leadership survival or defeating a rival can cause rebels to enter into a “bounded rationality” and the broader outcome or strategic goals of the organization can become distant or even insignificant over time (Cronin, 2011: 77).

As one of the scholars who acknowledged the differentiation between various goals of organizations at different levels, Peter Krause (2013) refused to measure the political effectiveness of non-state violence with single-level frameworks which are based on the achievement of the ultimate stated objectives of the organization. With a two-level framework, he argued that armed groups can employ violence for their strategic objectives (which benefit their larger social movements) while simultaneously pursuing their organizational objectives that benefit the group itself (like increasing membership and funding) (Krause, 2013). Even more radically, making progress toward strategic objectives (or even sometimes appearing to make) can be an important factor for their ultimate success (Crenshaw, 1988); however, their principal aim may not be achieving these publicly stated goals (Stern & Modi, 2007: 21).

Additionally, a relatively neglected theoretical explanation from the terrorism literature, organizational process theory by drawing on the classics of organizational theory gives researchers a roadmap to search for internal dynamics within the organizations. According to this theory, organizations' fundamental purpose to maintain themselves to reach stated goals "can be overshadowed by other incentives related to social relationships or financial rewards (Crenshaw, 1988). Therefore, making progress toward objectives can still be an important factor for organizations; however, their principal aim could not be to achieve these stated goals necessarily (Stern & Modi, 2007: 21). This could be because the rebels want further benefits by preserving the status quo or more out of a conflict.

Therefore even more radically, as in the Weberian theory of bureaucratization, survival can be a goal of its own too. As Della Porta (1995: 84) summarized, this can happen through "organizational institutionalization characterized by the centralization of decisional structures, the moderation of goals, and the predominance of organizational survival over the transformation of external reality". Cronin (2011: 80) also highlights this aspect of organizational survival and she argues it may "overshadow the cause" because not all groups want to replace the government or cause the collapse of the state it has been feeding on. An example of this could be the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) which confirmed that they have abandoned their political rationale to fight with the Ugandan government, but they are now suggested to be a bunch of refugees fighting for their own survival without abandoning their violent or illegal activities in the region (Ronan & Titeca, 2020).

I am arguing in this thesis, that groups that have certain organizational capabilities or see their organizational functioning as effective can be more likely to reject an offer from a government to solve their dispute and can be more likely to value continuing the fight. The next section discusses available conceptualizations and operationalizations of rebel strength and capabilities as well as the possible shortcomings within the existing studies.

2.1.2. Organizational Capabilities

The strength of a rebel organization, may determine the course of the conflict and even can shape the parameters of the rebel objectives (Buhaug, 2006). However, what could be the organizational incentives driving and shaping these motivations? As I mentioned above, groups may have organizational interests, the most prominent ones being to maximize the strength of their organization, ensure organizational survival, and recognition, weaken or destroy other rival organizations, and increase recruits, funds, and supporters besides aiming to defeat the state (Krause, 2018). Strengthening the organizational capabilities is an important factor to become the dominant organization within a conflict considering that the state and other rivals are ready to prevent them from achieving these accomplishments (Krause, 2013). The strength of an organization can determine its threat level and can prove its effectiveness and sustainability. However, as aforementioned, not all organizations are capable of increasing their strength or even proving to be durable enough to become a significant opponent to the state or other rival non-state actors. Therefore, the capabilities that these groups gained during the conflict may be effective in shaping the rebel behavior and in terms conflict outcomes.

Then the major question becomes, what falls under the category of rebel strength?

The strength of the rebels is often measured in terms of their military or fighting capacities, especially through their troop size estimations or battlefield performances (Cunningham et al., 2009; Aronson et al., 2015). Aronson et al. (2015) argued that the emphasis should be on rebel military capabilities and they examined rebel armed force size and access to internal secure shelter. However, some other possible aspects of organizational strength found place in the theories but did not attract much attention in the empirical analyses. For instance, Wood (2010) examined civilian support as one component of rebel capacities and the utilities that come with it (like mobilization and resources) as an objective for rebel groups. Still, Wood (2010) did his analysis on rebel capabilities by operationalizing it with the ratio of the troop sizes of rebels and the government, yet he also mentioned other possible components of rebel capabilities such as organizational structure, resource wealth, or broad popular support.

As one of the prominent works in the conflict literature which examines rebel attributes and their effects on the duration and outcomes of the conflict, Cunningham et al. (2009) argued that rebel strength can be categorized as “power to target” and “power to resist”. According to this differentiation, the strength of the rebels can be either offensive and they may have “power to target”; or their strength can be about their ability to continue to inflict costs on the state therefore they may have “power to resist” to the state repression (Cunningham et al., 2009). Rebels with the “power to resist” may lack the power to outright win or to earn concessions but they can still have the ability to prolong the fight (Conrad et al., 2019). They included measures

such as mobilization capacity, arms procurement abilities, fighting capacity, and territorial control as possible components of rebel strength. Therefore, Cunningham et al. (2009, 2013)'s studies paved the way for looking at and clarifying various components of rebel strength and capabilities that may have an impact on conflict processes.

In addition to increasing the strength of the organization, another component of the organizational capabilities is sometimes conceptualized as organizational maintenance, resistance, and longevity. Because the groups as much as they struggle to keep the fight viable are also struggling to keep their organizations viable (Crenshaw, 1988). Some group-level studies in the literature mostly focused on explaining the group's survival based on factors that increase the group's durability or longevity. For example, scholars investigated the effects of inter-organizational cooperation or violence among groups (Phillips 2014; 2015), organizational age (Blomberg et al., 2010) , size, ideology, or diversified tactics (Blomberg et al., 2011) , the conflict environment and resources (Young & Dugan, 2014) and reputation building strategies (Tokdemir, 2021) as factors influence the durability of the groups. However, much of the existing studies do not consider the organization's survival as a favorable outcome for rebel organizations and even consider it as a trade-off for success as their analysis is based on the strategic objectives of the groups. For instance, Aronson et al., (2015: 9) suggested that "survival is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a favorable outcome" as the rebel side must induce costs on the government through its material military capabilities. Or, Acosta (2014) argued that survival works as a function of "living to win another day" but few achieve their stated goals during their existence. For terrorist organizations, Fortna (2015) argued

that terrorism is not an effective tactic to reach their ultimate political goals because when rebels use terrorism it increases the duration of the fight at the expense of the goals they are fighting for. None of these studies highlighted the ability to sustain the organization as a considerable success in the eyes of the organization.

Indeed, some studies acknowledged the fact that survival can be an important success for the group without a trade-off. Ultimately, as long as a group manages to survive while others are failing to do so, they can be seen as successful as they keep accomplishing one of their primary goals (Phillips, 2019). This could be the case because organizations that can survive longer than others can be seen as strong and resistant and can be more popular. So contrary to interpreting the prolongation of their existence as a trade-off for their outcome goals, groups may look for ways to continue to survive, not be defeated, or not settle on undesirable outcomes to ensure that they seemed resistant enough to get desired concessions from the state or they may increase their prospects for a more favorable outcome in future.

Day (2017: 3) pointed out the fact that rebel resilience, which can be defined as the “ability to maintain strategic control over organization and resources” should be considered a distinct outcome of the civil war because the rebels can deny an opportunity to settle down the conflict, by choosing to keep the conflict situation viable. So a rebel organization may choose to focus on their survival as they may fear that they are accepting an offer that is not more beneficial than continued war and may choose to increase their chances of getting more concessions. An organization’s survival and increased capabilities can also increase the possibilities of an outright win, getting more extreme concessions, or can provide useful stalemates where the

rebels keep the profits or earn time without being contingent upon a formal agreement. Therefore, organizations can purposefully look for ways to increase their resilience, legitimacy, and relevance compared to the state or to other groups to reach a favorable outcome in the end as a strategy. According to Bapat (2005) if rebels are certain about their survival prospects and if they survived their weakest period at the early stages of the conflict they would not make concessions by engaging in negotiations or signing agreements.

Many studies suggest that a negotiated settlement is the second-best favorable outcome after the outright win based on the evaluations of strategic objectives. However, categorizing a negotiated settlement as a favorable outcome could be misleading, for instance, if one side will make more concessions than the other (Prorok 2016). Therefore if a negotiated settlement is favorable or not depends on many other circumstances including rebel groups' or leadership's incentives, own assessment of capabilities, or even the terms of the settlement (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Cil & Prorok, 2020). Therefore, this thesis by acknowledging a more nuanced approach tries to revive the existence of different types of success and if perceptions of organizational success can lead to the perpetuation of the conflict intentionally. Can these groups engage in more actions to prolong the conflict despite opportunities to lay down arms as the organizational gains will be viewed as valuable assets for pushing their chances for more profitable concessions from the state or outright victory? As one of the possible explanations, this thesis argues that they can pursue organizational survival at a minimum as one of the organizational goals even when there is a chance of a negotiated settlement if the organization is confident in its organizational capabilities.

2.2. Peaceful Resolution of Conflict and Rebel Organization's Incentives in Peace Processes

The outcomes of intrastate conflicts in the literature refer to categories of government victory, rebel victory, truce, or treaty (Mason et al., 1999; de Rouen & Sobek, 2004; Shelton et al., 2013) while the continuation of the conflict is regarded as a baseline. It has been suggested that decisive outcomes happen through military victory or a yield, compromise outcomes occur when sides give up demands or settle on concessions; and stalemates occur in which there are no decisive changes in the status quo (Quackenbush & Venteicher, 2008; Mason & Fett, 1996; Brandt et al., 2008). Once conflict starts, the violence can continue until a decisive outcome or a favorable decision for both sides comes to end the fight. Analyzing the data on years of civil wars showed the end of a campaign also highly depends on the rebellion side's decision to abandon the fight and terminate its existence if there is satisfactory outcome (Pape, 2005; Collier et al., 2004; Cunningham et al., 2009). Yet, sometimes it can be unclear what is a decisive or favorable outcome considering that conflicts prolong for years or often recur despite signed peace agreements.

As aforementioned, rebel organizations have heterogeneous features and variances in their motives. Different motivations and capabilities are likely to lead to different conflict outcomes (Hegre, 2004: 246). Similarly, there can be various rebel-related factors affecting the different stages of a peace process (see Cunningham et al., 2009; Krause, 2014; Ogutcu-Fu, 2016). Therefore, an analysis of why negotiations start, stall, or fail is necessary to understand why some rebels choose to cooperate while some choose to continue to fight (Cunningham, 2006). This thesis tries to

answer why there are unsuccessful negotiations by arguing that possible cooperation with the government can be seen as a threat to organizational survival and to the organizational capabilities therefore the rebel organizations may be reluctant to commit to a negotiated settlement.

So what can be the factors affecting sides to decide to engage in or prevent them from a peaceful resolution of conflict? In the bargaining theories, the basic premise is that there is always an agreement that will satisfy the actors because the war is a costly option (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2002). However, in the intrastate conflict, the wars are often prolonged for years despite its costs and sides refuse to settle on peaceful terms or renege on conflict after settlements. Accordingly, the literature suggested two main strategic problems causing negotiations are likely to fail: information failures due to the desire to hold private information and problems of credible commitment or fear of exploitation in the future (Lake & Rotchild, 1996).

Information failures regarding the rebels are mostly related to asymmetric information, meaning that there is a lack of information about rebel groups' capabilities and strengths such as their commitments to fight, cohesiveness, or the support they receive (Mattes & Savun, 2010). Especially, rebel groups can use this information asymmetry to their advantage as they are clandestine organizations with the ability to hide and overestimate their advantages. However, some suggested that due to the increased private information gained from the battlefield, misperceptions about relative military capabilities must be reduced and the probability to settle should have been increased over time (Collier et al., 2004; Fearon, 2004). So, for some scholars information problems may not explain why sides that have been fighting for

so long are not able to resolve the conflict (Fearon, 2004). Of course, due to the unconventional nature of intrastate conflict, the amount of private information may not be that much to expect information asymmetries to diminish (Walter 2009). So still, As Mattes and Savun (2010: 514), argued “due to information asymmetries and incentives to misrepresent, negotiations to reach an agreement may not succeed”. However, this view still can not explain why the generous concessions are denied by the rebels. For example, after 26 years of conflict, in 2002, the incumbent government in Sri Lanka made maximal concessions to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) including a semi-autonomous zone yet LTTE continued to press its attacks (Connable & Libicki, 2010).

The other possible explanation is commitment problems. Fearon (1998) and Walter (2002) argued that the basic concern is that the side that leaves better-off from the deal may use its power to abuse the other. Accordingly, a major concern for rebels is that governments may not credibly commit to the deal. If the rebel leadership believes it would lose its relative power and position, this could prevent a settlement. This is mostly related to the fact that most of the agreements include conditions to disarm and demobilize the organization’s resources and rebels fear that the government will use the future opportunity to gain their superior position (Walter 1997; 2002). In addition to demobilization, there are other necessities that are expected from a rebel group in a classical liberal pace package such as democratization, respect to rule of law and human rights and free market (Newman & Richmond, 2006). Therefore, even though the government offers significant concessions to the rebels, the rebels always calculate the possibility that the government may turn against them in the implementation process of the agreement. Moreover, the process could be found as

unfair by the rebels (Newman & Richmond, 2006). The probabilities of settling can be affected by the presence of third-party mediation or intervention (Walter 1997; Stedman 1997) or the contents of the probable agreement (Mattes & Savun, 2009).

Not only do rebel groups may have incentives to prevent a settlement due to fear of future exploitation they may also have fear of losing current benefits due to asymmetric characteristics of the conflict. This could also be because rebellion has significant financial payoffs for rebels driven by greed (Collier et al., 2004) or due to intangible benefits like solidarity feeding the grievances if the relevant agreement is not worth abandoning these gains. Ultimately, even though the parties would not prefer the continuation of the fight they equally desire to ensure a good deal (Mattes & Savun, 2010) with future guarantees. Looking at explanations at the level of strategic objectives poses a puzzle as the reasons for organizations refusing to settle despite initiations of negotiations and concession offers could be related to the fear of losing organizational gains and positions (Krause, 2011).

Despite these major obstacles to negotiations, negotiations often occur. So why do rebels enter the negotiations in the first place? Zartman (2000) in his theory of ripeness or war-weariness, suggested that a “mutually hurting stalemate” can drag parties to the negotiation table as a favorable alternative to the ongoing conflict. So, for him, the willingness to negotiate or cooperate is dependent on a ripe moment or a military stalemate between the government and rebels. Additionally, it is important to note that according to Zartman (2000) parties engage in negotiations as a way out due to feeling of a deadlock or not being able to continue to pursue more extreme objectives like victory. So even if the actors can use the ripe moment to initiate

negotiations there is no guarantee that this will lead to an agreement or prevent the recurrence of the conflict as the peace process consists of multiple stages (Findley, 2013). Because there are multiple stages and these are often time-consuming processes the incentives for engaging in negotiations may not lead to a settlement. For example, when the studies operationalized this ripe moment with recently available data like battle death, conflict duration, or parity of military strength and applied it to the different stages of a peace process found that negotiations are more likely to occur but this does not guarantee to reach an agreement (Findley, 2013; Ogutcu-Fu, 2016). Thus, the results are mixed and dependent on the operationalization in the existing studies. Also, it is not possible to measure all asymmetries of the disputants' relationship (Richmond, 2006) and that is why comparing their military power or duration of the conflict may not be enough to capture the whole picture. So it can be true to argue that the “barrier to initiating negotiations is low when compared with signing an agreement” (Ogutcu-Fu, 2016: 3).

Literature suggested other reasons for the initiation of negotiations such as increased information on each other (Bapat, 2005; Findley, 2013). Or if the rebel group increases costs for the government, proved its competency and capability by controlling a territory (Asal et al., 2019; Kaplow, 2016), provides social services (Heger & Jung, 2017), or receives external support (Kaplow, 2016). However, many of these explanations are not tested using the separate stages of a peace process. Thus, it is vital to determine and explain incentives that may be effective at each stage of a bargaining process for rebel organizations (Findley, 2013; Ogutcu-Fu, 2016). As this thesis argues a rebel group may enter a talk for a peaceful resolution with the

government but this does not necessarily end with a negotiated settlement or increase the possibility of reaching a durable peace.

Indeed, the rebel groups may prefer to enter the negotiations with the government when there is a chance. However, this may not be because they are fully committed to a peaceful compromise and resolution. On the rebel decision to enter the negotiations, in his prominent work, Stedman (1997) argued that not all rebel organizations agreed to enter the negotiations in good faith. These groups with “devious objectives” (Stedman, 1997) can enter the negotiation process for various assets, but can violently or non-violently spoil the peace processes. They may do this either *ex-ante* as these negotiation processes often occur for long periods to create opportunities for groups to change their behavior or even *ex-post* as new incentives may emerge after settlements (Newman & Richmond, 2006).

Richmond (2006: 63) defined devious objectives “as any involvement in a mediation or peacemaking process on the part of a disputant that is not committed to a compromise”. Newman and Richmond (2006: 4) defined spoilers as “any actors who are opposed to peaceful settlement for whatever reason, from within or outside the peace process, and who use violence or other means to disrupt the process in pursuit of their aims”. This includes parties that joined and became part of the process. The spoiler type is “dependent on the situation on the ground” *per se* on their organizational capabilities or opportunities that they have during the negotiation process (Greenhill & Major, 2007: 23). Also, any behavior change could be expected during a peace process from spoiling to compromise or compromise to spoiling considering that almost all processes are very long, complicated, and circular. This is

in line with my argument in my thesis, as groups may decide to enter the negotiations but may change their incentives of reaching a compromised settlement.

The decision to enter but not sign a settlement agreement could be a conclusion of utilizing an opportunity structure during negotiations or a “capability-based assessment” based on the expected utility of continuing the conflict (Greenhill & Major, 2007). This could be conceptualized as the “best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA),” in which sides evaluate relevant agreements relative to their best alternatives and agree on agreements that only are more beneficial than their best alternative (Glozman et al., 2015: 673). In the end, a peace process consists of cost and benefit analyses, learning and updating information about opponents as well as revealing their bargaining preferences (Doyle & Hegele, 2021). As Cunningham et al. (2009: 575) argued “The opposition’s incentives to use violence are not only based on an assessment of their military capabilities, but also of the attractiveness of violent means relative to its alternatives”. Thus the outcome of not signing a settlement after initiation of negotiations is not necessarily a conclusion of the rebel organization’s own military assessment relative to the government but could be related to its other organizational capabilities that I will detailly investigate in the theoretical framework section.

In this regard, similar to the logic of success assumptions discussed in the first part, what the world sees as a spoiling action or a lost opportunity for the rebel group could be a legitimate action for the organization (Newman & Richmond, 2006), therefore not an unsuccessful outcome. Even though the fight seems like a costly option, if the organization manages to earn and keep its gains from organizational capabilities it is

more likely that these kinds of groups may demand a more satisfactory outcome or greater pie from a deal later in the future (Garfinkel & Skaperdas, 2000).

In sum, the main aim of my thesis is to find a possible answer to why do we see cases where rebels had a chance to lay down arms after the initiation of a talk but rejected negotiated settlements? Answering this question at the organizational level under the framework of organizational theories and not through stated ideological commitments or military strength can have significant contributions to the literature. It can provide a potential explanation for why high costs of conflict do not necessarily produce a negotiated settlement for groups that have specific organizational capabilities as they may rely on their success or because they do not want to compromise without desirable terms as they are better off without an agreement. As Greenhill and Major (2007: 37) put it, “all parties to a conflict are potential spoilers, but only the powerful ones tend to become a manifest threat”.

This thesis will try to test this by looking at organizational capabilities that may influence negotiation spoiling behavior. First, it will look for the effects of an organization’s human capital: its constituency relations and its service provision capabilities. Second, it will look at the role of power, organizational structure, and leadership as an asset. Ultimately, if an organization was able to maintain its existence and became a significant challenger to the government, it highly depends on its civilian support and an effective organizational structure (Weinstein, 2007). Lastly, it will look at the territorial control and fundraising abilities of the organization.

2.3. Theoretical Argument

2.3.1. Civilian Support and Service Provision

The primary objective of an organization is to survive and this can be ensured by its support base (Weinstein, 2005). The support rebels receive from their constituencies provides the necessary cohesion and compliance to sustain the organization. Rebel groups, like all organizations, are socially constructed interactive systems “designed to aggregate a wide variety of individual agendas and perspectives into a single, purposive coalition” (Mampilly, 2015: 82). The organization becomes a social entity, or a source and a way of living for its members. Even in terrorist groups, Cronin (2011: 40) pointed out the fact that if violence is linked with the rebel’s identity these groups may not want to end the conflict because they may lose their voice after a possible disbanding of the organization. Without an organization, these individuals may fear that they might lose their political or social relevance. Of course, preventing a possible disbanding of the group highly relies on members’ sustained willingness and the organization’s ability to attract future members.

How civilian support and rebel governance can be linked to organizational capacities? As mentioned before, in the previous literature on organizational capabilities positive relations with constituencies are suggested as a signal of organizational capabilities. For example, at the initial stages of its existence, National Resistance Army (NRA) targeted civilians who seemed as potential suspects collaborating with the government as they were weak however when NRA’s organizational capabilities grew the organization started to establish civilian institutions to provide services mimicking the government institutions to make more competitive offers (Wood, 2010: 602). As

Bultmann (2018: 611) argued sometimes “the binary distinction ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ is problematic in many regards” because it causes neglecting the ‘quasi-state’ character of armed groups.

The rebel organizations need support from domestic (and international audiences if any) to reach their best conflict outcomes. The elites’ relations with their constituencies is a vital part of this relationship because the decline in support may affect organizational survival. The maintenance of the organization should be mutually beneficial for the leaders and the constituencies, or at least the constituencies must be convinced enough to prevent their desertion. This can be achieved by providing tangible and intangible benefits to the constituencies. One way to ensure compliance is to have effective governance. However, as Huang and Sullivan (2021) highlighted, not all organizations are capable enough to apply governance strategies..

Considering the organizations are vulnerable to internal defection the problem of defection may be tried to be reduced by the distribution of goods or private incentives (Jung, 2018). Of course, rebels are assumed to be committed to the ideological and political goals of the organizations they are participating in. However, not all individuals join or stay in groups to embrace stated goals. Rebels may enter organizations due to various individualistic motives such as an attempt to achieve security, essential goods, material benefits, protect the property, or due to a sense of alienation, forced displacement, perceived threats, or existing network structures (Abrahms, 2008). Ultimately, “an individual’s willingness depends on the capacity of an organization to catalyze individual motivations for collective action” (Nussio &

Ugarriza, 2021). Thus, this can be achieved by various ways but not just ideological commitment.

Rebels' self-image can become more intertwined with the organization in time (Post et al., 2010) and they can start to associate their identity with the organization. For some, the organization can become the only available means to achieve status, success, and a reason for living as options to have a life outside the organization are not satisfactory, not available, or not seen as possible. It is important to emphasize that the incentives do not have to be just material rewards. As Della Porta wrote (1995: 84), there can be times "when individual commitment is based on rewards related to participation per se rather than material rewards". Membership in an organization can be a "valued social relationship" and these feelings of a recruit also can be intensified with the decreased amount and quality of external information they could receive as the time they spent within the organization increase (Crenshaw, 1988: 19). So these groups by employing strategies of positive reputation building can even increase their organizational capacity by ensuring the loyalty of the existing base and quality of internal resources (Tokdemir, 2021).

Indeed, not all decisions to participate or stay in an organization are voluntary. Recruitment allocation and preservation strategies can be based on force as the organization may choose to apply coercive methods like kidnapping children, looting local villages, or punishment. Forced recruitment can be applied especially if the popular support is low. Of course, this type of access to a violent organization can also make a life out of the organization undesired or impossible due to the violence

committed. However, with forced recruitment, it is not possible to keep and attract committed recruits (Tokdemir, 2021), especially for the longer term. Rebels must ensure that they provide security to their current and potential supporters to convince them that they are pursuing the benefits for all or after their best alternative in the conflict.

Finally, positive relations with constituency and the ability to ensure loyalty with the provision of material, social and security-related incentives is a component of organizational capacity (Wood, 2010). Therefore, providing social services to their constituencies can signal high organizational capacity to ensure support and loyalty with non-violence. This means that a positive relationship between constituency support and rebel group stepping out of negotiations without signing an agreement could be expected. Thus, the first hypothesis highlights especially the role of non-combatant support, positive relations and social service provision and suggests that:

Hypothesis 1: Rebel organizations that have positive relations with their constituencies are more likely to be involved in negotiation failures.

2.3.2. Power, Leadership, and Organizational Structure

There is variation among organizational structures of the rebel organizations, specifically how much control the leadership has to decide on “day-to-day activities of the organization” (Cunningham et al., 2013). The literature acknowledged this structural differentiation between the rebel organizations and how these organizations are ruled led to new questions. As previously mentioned, identifying the variation in

structures is important for analyzing the type of organizational roles, relations and behaviors as well as for examining intra-relations and inter-relations of the organizations (Parkinson & Zaks, 2018).

According to Bultmann (2018: 613), “the organizational structure of an armed group is to a large extent a continuation of loyalty structures, interdependencies, hierarchies, and popular support within its social base”. So, how an organization is structured can influence its internal relations, its member structure, members’ incentives, competence, commitment, and congruence to the goals of the organization (Haer et al. 2011). Also, the structure can influence its external behavior, in terms of its actions in the field or its relations with the government or other groups in the region. It is important to add to these definitions that the organizational structures are also open to organizational transformation over time, switching from one type of structure to another (Jung, 2018). Additionally, a successful organizational transformation can increase the organization's durability as it will increase its adaptability to the environment and challenges.

A major component of organizations is the relations and the relations within an organizations defines “nature, centralization, and hierarchy of the organization” (Parkinson & Zaks, 2018: 274). Therefore, one of the factors causing the variance among different rebel organizations is the centralization level within the organization or internal hierarchies. Centralization often refers to the command structure and leadership’s decision-making power. Therefore, different levels of centralization can define where an organization stands on a spectrum of centralized and decentralized

organizational structures. For example, The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola and National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in Liberia have hierarchical structures, Janatha Vimukthi Peramun (JVP) in Sri Lanka and Somali National Movement (SNM) in Somalia have central governing bodies while Free Papua Movement (OPM) in Indonesia has a less centralized structure with its operating cells (Prorok, 2016: 72).

In a structure where centralization is high, there are traditional authority figures at the center and the order is hierarchical with leaders, sub-commanders, and subordinates (Doctor, 2021). The top-tier leaders has the most power control over the group while mid-level commanders are in charge of sub-groups (Doctor, 2020). The leaders in commander cadre structures are responsible for providing material and non-material incentives and benefits (Stern & Modi, 2007). On the other hand, in moderately centralized or decentralized structures there are “key players” to inspire a broader audience through norms, but they are not there to organize every operational procedure or daily routine required for more coordination (Stern & Modi, 2007). So the degree of centralization and its higher presence can affect the level of leadership control on commanding, how incentives and services are distributed, how agendas are set or day-to-day activities are regulated, and who has the power of decision-making. High centralization in an organization often refers to organizations where there are certain procedures or codes of conduct established by the authorities (Cunningham et al., 2009). In a centralized structure, it is the leaders’ role to achieve compliance with the established rules either through incentives or internal punishment mechanisms.

Why centralization can be considered an organizational capability or advantage?

There can be some consequences of concentration of power in leadership and control over the decision-making. Leaders can be effective on conflict outcomes, or during each stage of the peace of process, as they may decide to comply or not based on their strategic decision-making mechanism. For example, a rebel leader may see the continuation of the conflict as less costly than the peace since they can try to avoid punishments such as “loss of power, exile, imprisonment or death” in the future (Prorok, 2016: 70). Or powerful leaders may hesitate to reach accomplishments that will dissolve the organization, and end its utility and dependency on themselves (Crenshaw, 1988). In the end, many leaders choose to form hierarchical organizational structures as they want to control the information, the resources, as well as their status within the organization (Stern & Modi, 2007).

Leaders in centralized structures not only mobilize and manage their forces but they play a prominent role in influencing organizational behavior, manipulating incentives, and translating group objectives to actions as these organizations rely mostly on leadership, charisma, and entrepreneurship capabilities (Crenshaw, 1988; Doctor 2020). According to Weinstein (2006), the organization’s motives, strategies and behavior are shaped the way rebels recruited to these organizations and whom recruited them. Leaders’ incentives become important in this sense because rebel leaders’ motivations and goals may contradict the groups they represent and there can be many reasons for the leader’s behavior driven by his incentives such as political survival (Prorok, 2015) or rent-seeking behavior. For example, when Stern (2017: 34) interviewed a member of the Pakistani sectarian group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ), which split off from the group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), he told her that “SSP leaders

got addicted to their political success, and started compromising on the organization's ideology". It is important to note that not just top-ranked elites could be the ones thinking their political survival or their benefits from a possible outcome but some mid-level commanders can be affective on decisions too.

Indeed, there can be consequences for organizations that adopt such a self-focused approach. Some rebels who are unsatisfied with the leadership and its actions may choose to "exit" to another alternative organization, may form their own factions, or can voice their discontent internally which can still be destructive to the organization (Crenshaw, 1988). Sometimes even more flexibility in the structure can be useful to ensure the security of the leadership and deal with the dynamic processes of the conflict environment. A flexible organizational structure can play a key role to adapt to internal and external challenges with innovations to adapt to the new changes. Yet, even these decentralized structures can face more difficulties to ensure cohesion due to greater agency loss risks or abusive behavior (Doctor & Willingham, 2020).

However, the leadership in centralized structures is more able to use their power to apply different strategies to prevent dissent within the organization. According to Schlichte and Schneckener (2015), rebel organizations follow certain rules depending on their organizational structures to ensure legitimacy. As mentioned, this can be achieved either through force and punishments but also provision of tangible and intangible benefits, socialization, internationalization of norms, detaching from previous values, or promotions to higher ranks within the organization (Haer et al., 2011). The cohesion can also be achieved by the symbolic power of the leadership to

control both internal and potential constituencies (Mampilly, 2015) and the leadership may naturalize its hierarchy in a conflict environment (Bultmann, 2018).

In addition to the power of leadership to have control over these issues, leaders also can hold private information on their own competence therefore audiences may not be fully aware of the decisions at the top decision-making (Prorok, 2015). Abrahms (2008) argues that there are many cases in which members are unaware of the aims of the organization. Or there can be further precautions at the organizational level. For example, in FARC, each commander had their own bodyguards who are not allowed to talk with each other to prevent subversion as a firm rule of the organization (Powell, 2015, p. 45). In conclusion, when groups become more centralized, they become more isolated from the external environment and they become more focused on the internally-oriented activities of the organization in which they may “emphasize survival and solidarity more than political effectiveness” (Della Porta, 1995, 119). Thus, as long as a rule continues to be seen as legitimate it is easier for rulers to achieve loyalty.

Therefore, rejecting a possible settlement that will resolve the conflict requires high organizational cohesion as this can be easily labeled as leadership’s mission-creep, incapability, or failure to secure a favorable agreement. A higher centralization can have necessary cohesion, coordination capabilities and more internalized group norms. Therefore, the second hypothesis suggests that:

Hypothesis 2: Rebel organizations that have a higher level of central command strength in leadership are more likely to be involved in negotiation failures.

2.3.3. Territorial Control and Natural Resources

War is a costly way of expressing discontent. Geography of the rebellion has been suggested as a major factor of rebel strength due to the advantages provided by “natural resource wealth, location, terrain” that also “affects the balance of power between the rebels and the government” (Buhaug et al., 2009: 546) and reduces the costs of the conflict (Collier et al., 2004). The benefits generated from geography and available resources can emerge as a factor that may increase the resilience of rebellion through increasing the organization’s abilities (Conrad et al., 2019). The ability to control and generate these resources can be seen as another method to achieve compliance because winning the hearts and minds of the constituencies can be achieved with tangible resources in exchange for loyalty (Tokdemir, 2021). Or, vice versa, if the organization faces a reduction in resources, it may have difficulties providing incentives to its recruits and an eventual decline of an organization may reduce its capacity to control members (Nussio & Ugarriza, 2021).

Ultimately, the availability of financial rewards can be an important factor both for the leadership and the recruits to have a motive to sustain the resistance. The influx of revenues to the organization can affect organizational dynamics as money rather than ideology can become “the glue that holds these organizations together” (Dishman, 2016: 142). Again, FARC can be given as an example as after the loss of its key ideological leader and due to increased drug revenues, it has been argued that the organization chose profit over politics (Dishman, 2016).

Not all types of benefits generated from geography and the locations of the rebels are monetary or greed related. The control of the territory could be both strategic and motivational. First, it can be strategic because the control of territory can provide a secure place for armed forces to train and plan (Aronson et al., 2015). It can signal the government's inability to exercise control over the area, especially if it is in more rural or border areas of a country. Or rebels may have a chance to evade the government's attacks as these places are mostly rooted in more peripheral areas. Second, if these territories have symbolic meanings the control of the territory can also provide intangible benefits too (Buhaug et al., 2009). Additionally, territorial control can be linked to other organizational capabilities as these groups can build infrastructure and employ governance strategies. For example, when Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) became able to control territories outside of the government control in El Salvador, the organization started to provide social services like educational and medical services (Wood, 2010).

Studies also showed that governments are more inclined to offer negotiations to their adversaries if they control a territory (Asal et al., 2019). Therefore, territorial control can give rebels a way to express their capabilities, giving them a reason to trust their bargaining power vis a vis the government. Thus the following hypothesis suggests that:

Hypothesis 3a: Rebel organizations that control territory are more likely to be involved in negotiation failures.

The existence of some valuable and extractable primary commodities likely to influence conflict dynamics as they may make rebellion viable, feasible, and even an attractive solution (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Ross, 2004; Buhaug et al., 2009). Indeed, rebel groups can earn significant profits during conflict or from a war economy due to peculiar chances like the extortion of resources (Collier et al., 2004) or engaging in criminal activities. Even when rebels may lack the capacity or expertise to extract natural resources (i.e oil) they can still use extortion or production control as funding strategies (Conrad et al., 2019). Or the possibility of future revenue flows may be so high that the rebel group may find the motivation to prolong the conflict (Buhaug et al., 2009) considering the benefits of a victorious outcome with a sole control on the resources. Even the income generated from these resources can transform the rebel strategies, as they may choose to employ low-scale violence against the government to not attract much attention (Buhaug et al., 2009). However, this will not prevent the government to offer rebels a place on the negotiation table as these groups' existence still a threat to the government and as long as they exist they will continue to exploit state resources. The availability and profit from the natural resources can also increase the group's military capabilities as these funds can be directed towards spendings on such as arms procurement (Buhaug et al., 2009).

The organization needs to be flexible enough by having alternative streams to raise and receive funding. Many groups learned that relying upon only one source of funding can be risky, most of them choose to diversify their revenues (McQuinn, 2016). As one of the most resilient groups in Africa, LRA with its semi-autonomous sub-groups under the leadership survived through a combination of resource allocation strategies diverging from looting, cultivation, petty trading, transportation

of goods as well as its regional illicit networks with other rebel groups in the region (Day, 2017: 13). Even the mission spryness can be achieved more freely if the revenues are diversified enough to secure the operations (Stern & Modi, 2007). Crenshaw (1988: 20) wrote that some circumstances in a dynamic conflict environment can cause disruptions in incentives and may force organizations to come up with “substitute incentives.” Of course, not only the internal revenues but also the rebel’s ability to attract external revenues (i.e. state sponsors, diaspora) can be an important factor affecting the insurgent cohesion (Tamm, 2016). Yet, the decline in state sponsorship after the Cold War led groups to focus on internal fundraising activities.

Ultimately, rebels’ capabilities can increase by the availability of natural resources but this also depends on if rebels earn significant income from these resources to fund their organizations (Conrad et al., 2019). The availability and utilization of the resources not only may increase the resilience of the organization but also can emerge as a major factor disrupting the successful resolution of the conflict as it may aggravate bargaining and commitment problems. Therefore, the “excessive wartime income” (Buhaug et al., 2009) may reduce any incentives for negotiated settlements:

Hypothesis 3b: Rebel organizations that fund their operations with natural resources are more likely to be involved in negotiation failures.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

This research asks how the organizational capabilities of rebel groups can influence their strategic behavior during negotiations and can affect peace process outcomes. In the previous chapter I summarized the previous literature and situated my theoretical framework and arguments accordingly. Before the test of the hypotheses introduced in the previous chapter, this part explains the data selection method, introduces variables, and gives descriptive statistics. In the previous chapter, I emphasized which rebel organizations are more likely to have the interest to continue fighting or preserve the status quo despite entering into the negotiations, therefore, pursuing organizational survival due to their organizational advantages or capabilities. As I clarified, the groups that have positive constituency relations, centralized leadership, territorial control, and funding from natural resources may apply strategies to stall or derail the negotiations to preserve the status quo or press for a better outcome in the future.

3.1. Data

The tests of the hypotheses require assessment of the factors that may enhance the preservation of the organizational capabilities and therefore perception of ongoing conflict as a successful outcome. To be able to answer my research question and test my hypotheses, this thesis will be based on a large-N quantitative analysis in which I expect to find support for the relation that I proposed between negotiation failure and organizational capabilities. To create the conflict population for this thesis, I rely on the conflict cases from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), specifically the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD). UCDP/PRIO ACD uses the conflict year as the unit of analysis and the latest version covers conflicts that occurred between 1946 and 2020. According to the UCDP criteria, an armed conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year” (Gleditsch et al., 2002). I choose the version of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, as the definition of the non-state actors may vary in other dataset versions of the UCDP. UCDP/PRIO ACD defines an opposition organization as “any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed force to influence the outcome of the stated incompatibility” and notes that the UCDP only includes formally organized opposition groups and not spontaneous violence (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

Data for this thesis is extracted from existing datasets on rebel organizations and I combine several datasets to be able to uncover and question the relationship that I presented between organizational capabilities and negotiation failures. Therefore, the

dataset used in this study has been constructed by merging compatible datasets, namely the Ogutcu-Fu's (2016) Negotiation Dataset, Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA) (Cunningham et al., 2013), The Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset (Albert, 2022) and Rebel Contraband Dataset (Walsh et al., 2018). The dataset of this thesis provides information regarding whether rebels with certain organizational characteristics engaged in talks but refused to sign a peace deal. Because my dataset is extracted from existing datasets, this requires including data available for dependent and independent variables. Additionally, this also defines the time period of my study. After taking out cases that have missing values on dyad id, my final dataset includes intrastate conflicts of a total of 859 observations of 180 rebel groups in 63 different countries from 1990 to 2005.

3.1.1. Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in this study is conceptualized as the organizational capability to continue to pursue survival despite a chance to lay down arms. More specifically this can refer to a group's capacity to stall or spoil the negotiations causing a "negotiation failure". Stalling or spoiling the negotiations could be a signal of this kind of intended behavior as they may want this to improve the benefits of an agreement or to derail the whole process by spoiling (Stedman, 1997) for reasons that can be driven by actors themselves, intra-group or inter-group relations, or structural factors.

Various alternative datasets could have been used for the dependent variable of this thesis. For example, one of the most prominent ones, The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Pettersson et al., 2019) could have been used as it is compatible and reliable. Yet this source is not useful for identifying exactly when a negotiation started, signed, and implemented. However, for the aim of this research, it is important to use data that will show each stage in a peace process separately because it is important to observe that there was no formal peace agreement or a ceasefire signed after the initiation of the negotiations to define it as a “negotiation failure.”

Peace processes can be evaluated with multiple stages of bargaining consisting of the decision to engage in negotiations, reach a peace agreement and implement it, but very few studies examine the dynamics of these peace process stages separately (Findley, 2013; Ogutcu-Fu, 2016; Ari, 2018). Acknowledging different stages in a conflict resolution process is important because different factors could drive the outcomes of each stage and there can be successful or unsuccessful outcomes in each stage. Driven from the existing studies on peace processes that have conceptualized different stages (Findley, 2013; Ari, 2018; Ogutcu-Fu, 2016), Table 1 shows the five stages that I have identified.

Table 1: Stages of A Peace Process

0	On-Going Conflict with No Contact/Status Quo
1	Pre-Negotiation Period or Secret Talks
2	Formal Negotiations
3	Peace Agreement
4	Implementation Process

Examining different stages separately, makes it easier for researchers to observe that the process doesn't have to be perfectly sequential leading to a negotiation success or a negotiated settlement. The rebel group may decide to engage in negotiations but may not commit to settling with an agreement, or reaching an agreement does not ensure that the implementation will be successful to prevent the re-escalation of the conflict. It is important to highlight that the “establishment of a peace process does not necessarily mean the end of violence” (Richmond, 2006: 61). Some peace processes may collapse immediately or some can take very long to reach a decisive outcome. For example, the talks between El Salvador and FMLN collapsed after a single session while the talks between Colombia and FARC took nearly 30 years (Ari, 2018). As a note, pre-negotiations or secret talks could be evaluated as part of the peace processes stages as defined in Table 1, as it captures the time before the initiation of formal negotiations and important in affecting parties’ decisions and behaviors. However, these are not easily observable as most of them are secret (Ari, 2018; Doyle & Hegele, 2021).

This study is particularly interested in unsuccessful transitions from formal negotiations (1) to a peace agreement (2) as indicated in Table 1. By looking at rebel organizations that entered into negotiations but refused to settle on the relevant agreement I am trying to assess if this outcome has a relation to the organization’s capabilities that gives them the confidence to pursue survival or pursue a different alternative other than settling such as continuing the fight or maintaining low activity.

3.1.1.1. Coding Procedure for the Dependent Variable

The data for the dependent variable is taken from Ogutcu-Fu's dataset covering all negotiations and settlements that occurred during civil wars between 1980 and 2005 defined by the criteria of UCDP (Ogutcu-Fu, 2016). In her dataset, Ogutcu-Fu distinguished two stages of a peace process and examined how specific dyadic characteristics affected occurrence of negotiations and settlements. She constructed her original dataset using primarily news articles and editorials from Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS) International (ProQuest), Lexis-Nexis, Factiva, and other sources like UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, United States Institute of Peace, Civil Wars Mediation dataset, UCDP Encyclopedia, and Minorities at Risk (MAR) Encyclopedia to identify negotiations and negotiated settlements (Ogutcu-Fu, 2016). On her resulting dataset, Ogutcu-Fu (2016) analyzes 209 dyads in total while 84 of them initiated negotiations and 57 that initiated negotiations and signed a peace agreement.

My dependent variable is a composite variable consisting of measures of two things relying on the conceptualizations and operationalizations of Ogutcu-Fu (2016). Firstly, Ogutcu-Fu (2016) coded the *Negotiation* variable as 1 if negotiations occurred between the group and the government within the group year. She defines formal negotiations as cases where parties held face-to-face negotiations "between the government and the rebel group with representatives of both sides regarding the resolution of the conflict in a given year" (Ogutcu-Fu, 2016: 409). It is important to note that, Ogutcu-Fu (2016) included traditional negotiations, preparatory talks, talks

with the group's political wing, and secret negotiations that were revealed retrospectively in the coding of the negotiations.

Secondly, Ogutcu-Fu (2016: 409) defines settlements as cases where “negotiations were successful in formalizing a peace agreement between warring parties addressing some or all disputed incompatibilities and the agreement lasted until the end of that calendar year”. It is important to highlight the definition includes agreements that solved “some or all disputed incompatibilities” meaning that ceasefires and partial agreements are also accepted as settlements. Therefore, she coded *Negotiated settlement* coded as 1 when there is a formal peace agreement in a given year and 0 if there is not. She also included observations where parties negotiated or settled despite being active on the battlefield as sides may stop fighting during negotiations.

For my dependent variable for this thesis, I have created a variable called *Negotiation failure*. The *Negotiation failure* variable is a binary variable coded as 1 if *Negotiation* is 1 and *agreement* is 0. *Negotiation failure* coded 0 in other possible situations such as *Negotiation* (0) and *Settlement* (0) as there is no initiation of a process or *Negotiation* 1 and *Settlement* 1 as the group settled on the terms of the agreement. Of course, where no *Negotiation* is initiated (0) but there is a *Settlement* (1), this case is also coded as 0 as it is highly unlikely. *Negotiation failure* does not imply that failure was an unwanted outcome for the sides but refers to the event in general, in this case, the negotiations failed to reach a settlement. Table 2 shows the summary of the coding of the dependent variable.

Table 2: Coding Procedure of the Dependent Variable

Negotiation \ Settlement	No=0	Yes=1
	Negotiation Failure=0	Negotiation Failure =0
No=0	Negotiation Failure=0	Negotiation Failure =0
Yes=1	Negotiation Failure =1	Negotiation Failure =0


As mentioned before, the negotiation process can be complex and time-taking to reach an outcome that satisfies both sides. Therefore, it could be unrealistic to expect that government and the rebel group to solve their disagreements within the year the negotiation is initiated. Although, it is important to note that many rebel groups engage in negotiations and sign a peace agreement that resolves at least some or sometimes all of their incompatibilities within a year. Therefore, while coding the dependent variable, I coded 1 for cases where *Negotiation* (1)-*Settlement* (0) in that year as well as the cases in which the *Negotiation* turned to 0 in the following observation. Table 3 is an example of a coding procedure from my dataset.

Table 3: A Coding Procedure Example from the Dataset for the ELN Rebel Organization

Side B	Year	Negotiation	Settlement	Negotiation Failure
ELN	1990	0	0	0
ELN	1991	1	0	1
ELN	1992	0	0	1
ELN	1993	0	0	0
ELN	1994	0	0	0
ELN	1995	1	0	1
ELN	1996	0	0	1
ELN	1997	0	0	0
ELN	1998	1	0	1
ELN	1999	1	0	1
ELN	2000	1	0	1
ELN	2001	1	0	1
ELN	2002	1	0	1
ELN	2003	0	0	1

The basic frequency distributions show that there are a total of 236 cases of initiation of negotiations. There is a total of 91 cases of settlements in the total sample. In those dyads where negotiation is initiated, 91 of them signed agreements that are solving some or all of their incompatibilities. In terms of my dependent variable, there are 145 negotiation failures in the year in which negotiation was initiated in the total sample and a total of 180 negotiation failures when we include the following observation to the operationalization. In the end, 56 of the 180 rebel organizations in my dataset engaged in at least one negotiation failure.

Figure 1: Distribution of the Negotiation Failures in the Sample



3.1.2. Independent Variables

Having the opportunity to continue to fight or preserve the status quo despite a chance to lay down arms can be explained by looking at the rebel organizations' capacities and gains. As introduced in the previous chapter, Hypothesis 1 proposed that rebel groups with positive constituency support are more likely to trust their organizational capabilities while Hypothesis 2 argued that the same behavior could be seen in organizations with higher central control. Hypotheses 3a and 3b questions the effect of territorial control and natural resource funding of organizations, as the groups may not want to lose the advantages of sole control of an area or profits from

the natural resources. Therefore, the independent variables are *Constituency support*, *Central command strength*, *Territorial control*, and *Natural resource*.

For Hypothesis 1, I created the variable *Constituency support*. As discussed before, the organizations can engage in nonviolent governance activities for their constituencies to gain legitimacy and credibility while increasing support and loyalty. It is possible to measure rebel constituency support in various possible ways. For example, Ogutcu-Fu (2016) measured rebel constituency support by using a composite variable that captures the mobilization capacity of the rebel organization and one-sided violence against civilians committed by the rebel group. I follow a different coding procedure and use a different proxy measure of rebel constituency because I want to highlight the organization's capacity to preserve the positive relations with its constituencies as discussed in the theory section. As a proxy measure, I looked at whether the organization provides social services to the constituencies that may signal the organization has positive relations. Therefore, the data for constituency support comes from The Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset (Albert, 2022). Rebel QSI codes social service provision of 235 rebel groups active between 1945–2012. The dataset includes 25 rebel quasi-state institutions yet I only include 10 of them: taxation, education, health, infrastructure, transportation, law, policing, justice, housing, and aid. The rationale for including these 10 categories in the analyses, is that they are social service provisions directed at the constituencies. Taxation is included in the analysis because it covers systematic taxes collected by the group's leadership that return to the group in the end (Albert, 2022). For Hypothesis 1, I coded 1 if the group has provided at least one of these social services in that year and 0 if it did not. This is because all service provision activities can be very influential to gain constituency support. Therefore, I am questioning if any of the

service and security-related provisions of rebel governance can have an important effect on rebel negotiation behaviors.

For Hypothesis 2, I created the *Central command strength* variable to capture how much power the leadership has over the organization. This variable comes from the *strengthcent* variable in the NSA dataset (Cunningham et al., 2013). NSA dataset is a useful source as it includes information regarding the attributes of rebel organizations like rebel strength, territorial control, and organizational structure (Cunningham et al., 2013). The NSA dataset covers all conflicts that occurred in the period 1945 to 2011 and its unit of analysis is the state–rebel group dyad spell. This means that a single row coded about a rebel group reflects changes in the dynamics with the government. In the NSA dataset, *strengthcent* is coded as high (2), moderate (1), and low (0). I coded *Central command strength* again as an ordinal variable but included cases where there is no central control at all. Therefore my coding structure is as follows: no central control (0), low (1), moderate (2), and high(3).

For Hypotheses 3a and 3b, I created the variables *Territorial control* and *Natural resource* to identify the effects of territorial control and organizations' funding from natural resources on the behavior to pursue organizational survival despite a chance to lay down arms. I used the territorial control variable again from the NSA dataset (Cunningham et al., 2013) and it is a binary variable coded as 1 if the group has territorial control and 0 if it has not.

To be able to test Hypothesis 3b, I used the Rebel Contraband Dataset (RCD) (Walsh et al., 2018). This dataset is useful for my study as it differs from the prior works that

solely consider the country-level factors such as the availability of the resources in a location. Thus, different than prior studies, RCD tries to assess if and how the organizations generate income for survival across time to prevent including resources in the analysis just because they are available in the organization's country of operation (Walsh et al., 2018). Therefore, RCD is a useful data source to question the impact of resource acquisition and utilization strategies on rebel group negotiation behaviors. The dataset provides information regarding diversified natural resources that provide funding for the organization and increase its organizational abilities (Conrad et al., 2019). The unit of analysis in the RCD is the rebel group-government dyad in a given year and data covers conflict events in UCDP from 1990 to 2012 (Walsh et al., 2018). In terms of its coding strategy, RCD distinguishes natural resource variables from crime variables. Under the category of natural resource variables, there are 4 funding strategies (extortion, theft, booty features, and smuggling) and 26 resource categories (Walsh et al., 2018). Therefore RCD is useful to capture funding from a wide range of natural resources. Categories of natural resources not only cover resources like oil or diamond but also resources like drugs and cannabis. The crime variables excluded the crime events involving natural resources but focused on activities like human smuggling or kidnapping, therefore these strategies were not included in my main analysis. RCD codes a resource-strategy variable as 1 when there is evidence that the group earned significant funding from that resource, and 0 if it did not (Walsh et al., 2018). Therefore, I coded *Natural resource* as a dichotomous variable and as 1 if the group profited from any given strategies in that year or as 0 if the rebel group did not profit from the given strategies in that year.

Table 4: Operationalization and Sources of the Independent Variables

Hypotheses	Variable	Coding	Source
H1: Rebel organizations that have positive relations with their constituencies are more likely to be involved in negotiation failures.	<i>Constituency Support</i>	Dichotomous variable, coded as 1 indicating if the rebel organization provides at least one of the social service provisions of taxation, education, health, infrastructure, transportation, law, policing, justice, housing and aid, and 0 if it does not.	The Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset (Albert, 2022)
H2: Rebel organizations that have a higher level of central command strength in leadership are more likely to be involved in negotiation failures.	<i>Central command strength</i>	Ordinal variable, measuring the degree of centralization in the rebel organization in that year. No centralization has the value of (0), low centralization has the value of (1), moderate centralization (2), and high centralization has the value of (3).	Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA) (Cunningham et al., 2013)
H3a: Rebel organizations that control territory are more likely to be involved in negotiation failures.	<i>Territorial Control</i>	Dichotomous variable, coded as 1 indicating that if the rebel organization controls territory and 0 if it does not.	Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA) (Cunningham et al., 2013)
H3b: Rebel organizations that fund their operations with natural resources are more likely to be involved in negotiation failures.	<i>Natural Resource</i>	Dichotomous variable, coded as 1 if a rebel group earned income from any of the natural resource acquisition strategies (extortion, theft, booty futures, or smuggling), and as 0 if the rebel group did not profit from the given strategy in that year.	Rebel Contraband Dataset (Walsh et al., 2018).

3.1.3. Control Variables

There can be more factors that may create an incentive for groups to engage in talks but refused to sign a settlement other than the organizational capabilities that I specified. Therefore there can be potential confounding variables that need to be controlled to prevent spurious relations in the analysis. The control variables used in this thesis are factors identified by previous research as factors influencing rebel decision-making during negotiations and calculations of reaching a settlement with the government.

Other than the capabilities that I specified in my theory, as another group-level factor, rebel strength can have an impact on the prospects for negotiated settlements. This variable is from the NSA dataset and Cunningham et al. (2013) measured rebel strength by essentially looking at the troop size ratio between the rebel group and the government and tried to capture rebel abilities' to fight conventional wars with the government. Therefore the ordinal measure for *Rebel/Government Strength* comes from the NSA dataset's *rebstrength* variable (Cunningham et al., 2013) and it is coded as if the group is much weaker (0), weaker (1), at parity (2), stronger (3), much stronger(4) than the government. I followed the same coding procedure in my dataset.

Additionally, there can be different external factors influencing the internal decision-making processes. Most of the conflicts are not just about dynamics between a state and a single insurgent group so there are inter-organizational considerations. Multi-actor civil wars have led to the development of different strategies by both states and rebel organizations. The external environment may have an impact on the strategies of the rebels like firms in a market system, or it may have an impact on the internal

structures of the groups. Therefore, at this stage, the number of actors involved in the conflict can be an important confounding factor that the organizations may choose to apply different strategies to eliminate the rivals (Akcinaroglu, 2012). Therefore I add the control variable *Number of other rebels* fighting the government to control the effect of the presence of other organizations fighting with the same government. The variable is from Ogutcu-Fu's (2016) dataset.

I also added External Support as a control variable. The rebel group's incentives to sign a peace settlement may decrease if they receive military and non-military support from other states as it may shift the balance of power between the group and the government by increasing the capabilities of the rebel group. For this variable, I used the NSA dataset *rebel.support* and *rtypesup* (Cunningham et al., 2013) and coded 1 if the rebel organization received external military or non-military state support and 0 if it did not. As another control variable, I included *Conflict Intensity*, I followed the same coding procedure with Ogutcu-Fu (2016) and it is coded as 0 if the dyad is not active, 1 if the conflict has less than one thousand battle-deaths per year and as 2 if the conflict has reached the one thousand battle-deaths thresholds. The variable is taken from UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Harbom et al., 2008).

Although my analysis focused on group capabilities it is important to include country-level control variables for a more comprehensive analysis, as famously stated in the conflict literature, "it takes two to tango". In order to control for state capacity, first I add the variable *Democracy* to control the effect of regime of the country. The states which have democratic governments in the rule, arguably can be more inclusive and can be tend to offer negotiations to the rebel organizations which have better terms

while undemocratic regimes may not inclusive peaceful resolutions. I took the data for this variable from the Polity IV dataset which measures the democracy scores of countries. I also included a natural log of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as a conventional state strength and economic capacity measure (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Buhaug, 2006). Finally, I added the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization index based on the study of Fearon (2003) which is a measure of the probability of randomly selected individuals belonging to different ethnic groups in a state or, put it simply, polarization. This is a significant control measure as there can be more groups fighting the government in ethnically diverse countries as well as a higher chance of the conflicts within these countries to be ethnic conflicts. The ELF Index variable also comes from Fearon (2003). Adding these control variables will help me to find more robust results. Table 5 shows the coding and the sources for control variables.

Table 5: Operationalization and Sources of the Control Variables

Variable	Coding	Source
Rebel/Government Strength	Ordinal variable, coded as if the group is much weaker (0), weaker (1), at parity (2), stronger (3), much stronger(4) than the government	Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA) (Cunningham et al., 2013)
Number of other rebels	Count variable, the number of other rebels fighting the same primary state.	Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA) (Cunningham et al., 2013)
External Support	Dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the rebel organization received external military or non-military state support and 0 if it did not.	Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA) (Cunningham et al., 2013)
Conflict Intensity	Ordinal variable, coded as 0 if the negotiations are ongoing and dyad is not active, coded 1 if there is less than 1,000 battle-related deaths and coded as 2 if it exceed that threshold.	UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Harbom et al., 2008)
GDP per capita	Gross Domestic Product per capita, logged variable.	Gleditsch (2002)
Democracy	Democracy scores are from Polity IV Project	Marshall and Jaggers (2010)
Ethnic Fractionalization	This measures “the probability that two individuals selected at random from a country will be from different ethnic groups” (Fearon, 2003, p. 208).	Fearon (2003)

Finally, Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for negotiations and settlements in the final dataset as well as the dependent variable, indicators, and control variables included in my models. To reiterate, the final dataset includes a total of 859 observations of 180 rebel groups in 63 different countries from 1990 to 2005. As a note, due to the inclusion of *Constituency Support* as an independent variable I lost 210 observations, due to inclusion of *Natural resource* I lost 94 and due to inclusion of *Central command strength* I lost 24 observations in the models with independent variables. This is because I merged existing datasets that are using different data inclusion criteria.

Table 6: Summary Statistics

VARIABLES	(1) N	(2) mean	(3) sd	(4) min	(5) max
Negotiation	859	0.275	0.447	0	1
Settlement	859	0.106	0.308	0	1
Negotiation failure	859	0.210	0.407	0	1
Constituency support	649	0.525	0.500	0	1
Central command strength	835	1.862	0.801	0	3
Territorial control	859	0.361	0.481	0	1
Natural resource	765	0.541	0.499	0	1
Rebel/Government strength	859	0.650	0.735	0	4
Number of other rebels	859	0.874	1.194	0	5
External support	818	0.641	0.480	0	1
Conflict intensity	859	1.271	0.506	0	2
Ln GDP per capita	859	7.705	0.971	5.597	9.966
Democracy	842	1.517	5.851	-9	10
ELF Index	859	0.607	0.227	0.0784	1

Note: ELF= ethnolinguistic fractionalization index. GDP=gross domestic product.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

In this chapter, I will present the results from the analysis and interpret the results to assess whether the hypotheses introduced in the theory chapter can be supported or not. First I will discuss the results of Cox proportional hazards regression to search for a significant relation between organizational capabilities and negotiation failures to find evidence for my hypotheses. Second, I will discuss the results of the logit models.

4.1. Empirical Strategy

In order to test my hypotheses I employed two different models: survival models and logistic regressions. In this part, I will discuss how both models have their own advantages and how they are both appropriate for my thesis' research question.

4.1.1. Survival Analysis

This thesis is interested in investigating the relation between rebel organizational capabilities and their incentives to leave the negotiations without a settlement after

talks are initiated. To investigate this, my first empirical strategy is to employ survival analysis. Indeed, survival analysis is mostly used to explore how long something will survive until a failure event happens. Therefore, it is widely used in medical studies, for instance, to reveal the relationship between certain diseases and mortalities or survival and treatment effects. The method tracks subjects over time and observes at which point in time they experience the event. For the purpose of my research question, I am particularly interested in the failure, or the risk of failure although the survival analysis in general not necessarily designed to be done to explain something negative. For instance, the same survival analysis can be done for searching predictors' relations with successful outcomes in a peace process too. My aim in conducting a survival analysis is to get predictions on negotiation failures to explain the relationship between rebel organizations engaging in talks but not signing a settlement by the independent variables that I specified in the previous part.

To conduct a proper survival analysis, first, I formatted my dataset as survival data. I defined the “event variable” first. This can be called an event of failure and in my theory the event of failure is a negotiation failure occurrence (*Negotiation failure*=1). The second step is to define a “time variable”. The survival analysis is useful as it allows to track multiple occurrences of the repeated events in a single subject (Jones & Branton, 2005). This is the case when two or more events occur for the same subject, or in this case, for the same rebel organization. Although this is not very common in the survival analysis, my dataset includes cases where the same event occurred in the same rebel organization multiple times. It is important to note here that, the occurrence of the events are not ordered, meaning that they are not dependent

on the event that has occurred before. Thus, I constructed a counter variable (equivalent to a time variable in survival analysis), that counts the years of observation for rebel organizations and that is both renewed with each unique id and an event of negotiation failure. So I set the counter variable considering the first year of rebel group occurred in the dataset until the year they were involved in a negotiation failure based on the coding procedure that I defined in Chapter 3. The counter is renewed at each negotiation failure because the hazard has happened and I need to see the results of the new hazard until another event occurs or the rebel organization is involved in a negotiation in which there is no settlement.

Survival analysis is also known as the time to event analysis. The method allows to track of both time-varying and time-fixed variables' impact on the outcome. The capabilities of rebel groups are time-varying due to both endogenous factors related to rebels or exogenous factors related to the conflict environment (Wood, 2010).

Therefore, the survival analysis allowed me to track the changes in the capabilities yearly, and assess whether the change in the capabilities yearly has a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of negotiation failures. This method is also useful to have information on the cases that remain out of the dataset's time frame as it includes right-censored observations as their time-to-event is not observable.

As I mentioned before, I am particularly interested in the risk of failures or hazards of a negotiation failure occurrence. To test the arguments, I used Cox's proportional hazard regression. Cox's models are useful to compare the hazards of the indicators with all independent and control variables included. Hazard rates are the probabilities

that an event will happen at any time given that the subject is at risk of experiencing the event. As the hazard is the risk of reaching the endpoint, *Negotiation failure*, given that the rebel groups have not yet experienced or involved in any failures up to that point. Hazard ratios are the base of my analysis and are constant over time. As a note, all the Cox regression models are clustered with the unique IDs of the observations as it is necessary to specify which observations are related.

In the end, survival analysis is a useful method for this thesis as it allows to track multiple events occurring to the same subject, control for missing values, and can assess the impact of time-varying and time-fixed covariates on the negotiation failure. Specifically, it allows me to assess if certain groups with organizational capabilities that I specified, have a shorter time engaging in negotiation failures. I will discuss how to interpret the results of Cox's proportional hazard regression in the next chapter.

4.1.2. Logistic Regression

Are groups with certain organizational capabilities more likely to have the leverage to leave the negotiation table? What is the probability of these groups being involved in a negotiation failure? Answering this question requires an analysis that can reveal the relation between organizational capabilities and negotiation failures. So, as the second alternative analysis, I employed binary logistic regression. My dependent variable is coded as a dichotomous variable therefore it is proper to run a logistic regression analysis. This is because logit models are used to model variables that have binary outcomes which do not have normal distributions. I am using logistic regression as an alternative analysis method to develop predictive models that will provide me with the

estimated probabilities and the odds of negotiation failures depending on the values of the independent variables.

However, my dataset required modifications to be able to run the necessary logistic regression analysis. Standard logistic regression analysis requires that each observation be independent of one another and yearly observations in my data had the risk of being time-dependent. I collapsed the variables to create a dataset where I have only the rebel organizations. By doing this, I transformed my dataset from group year to group. In the final dataset for the logistic regression, I have single observations for each group, and the dataset is no longer time-dependent. I choose to collapse the data based on the maximum values of the independent variables of Negotiation, Settlement, Negotiation failure, Constituency support, Central command strength, Territorial control, Natural resource, Rebel/Government strength, Number of other rebels, Democracy, Conflict intensity, and the means of Ln GDP per capita and ELF Index. The final dataset has 180 observations in total after collapsing the dataset with 56 negotiation failure observations. The major disadvantage of collapsing data from group year-to group is that I lost a significant number of observations. I run simple logit models in order to find the probabilities as well as odds ratios in the results of the models. All the results from both statistical methods will be discussed in the next section.

4.2. Findings

4.2.1. Survival Analysis Findings

Thereby, I report the results of Cox proportional hazards regression with hazard ratios in Table 7. In the Cox proportional hazard model, hazard ratios represent the likelihood of that hazard to occur and are interpreted according to whether or not they exceed the value of 1. Those ratios that are greater than 1 imply that greater values of the variable increase the risk of failure. In terms of my argument, if the hazard is greater than 1, this means that there is a greater hazard for a negotiation failure to occur thus there is more leverage for organizations to leave the negotiation table without signing a settlement. If the hazard ratio is smaller than 1 this implies a reverse relationship with the dependent variable, increasing the survival time. The hazards are also measured accordingly to the difference between the groups or between the values of the variables like rebel organizations have territorial control and rebel organizations do not have territorial control. So for example, if the hazard ratio is equal to 1 in the regression result, we can not conclude that there is a significant difference between the two groups that can be interpreted.

Model 1 is showing the relation between the dependent variable, *Negotiation failure*, and all independent variables while Model 2 is the full model with controls. The other models in the analysis are showing the relation between *Negotiation failure* and all independent variables of *Constituency support*, *Central command strength*, *Territorial control*, and *Natural resource* individually as disaggregated analyses and with controls.

An initial look at the overall results, shows that as predicted in Hypothesis 3a, the hazard of the *Territorial control* variable is positive and significant. In Model 1, a hazard ratio on 2.332 shows that the risk of the group to be involved in negotiation failure is increased by 33.2%. In Model 2, a hazard ratio on 1.837 shows that the risk of the group to be involved in negotiation failure is increased by 83.7%. However, the significance level decreases to $p < 0.1$ in the full model although the hazard rate is positive.

The models which includes *Territorial control* and control variables require an emphasis as basic models do not directly show final likelihoods like Model 5 where the risk is increased 42.3%. So, in Model 5a there is a positive and significant relationship between *Territorial control* and *Negotiation failure* at $p < 0.01$. In Model 5a, the risk of the group to be involved in negotiation failure is increased by 19.9%. It is possible to conclude that rebel groups that control territory make negotiation failures more likely or they are more likely to negotiate but refuse to sign a settlement. This may be because these organizations are satisfied with the current situation as they have de facto control over a territory. Thus, I can conclude that I found evidence to support my Hypothesis 3a in the survival analysis results.

In the full model (Model 2) which includes all predictors and controls, the *Central command strength* variable also becomes significant at $p < 0.05$. However, the hazard ratio on the *Central command strength* is smaller than the value of 1. Therefore, the result is not supporting my Hypothesis 2, as there is a negative relationship between

higher centralization in the rebel leadership and negotiation failure. So a one unit increase in the rebel strength decreases a group's risk of involving in a negotiation failure. Therefore, it is more likely for rebel organizations to not to be involved in negotiation failures. As illustrated in Table 2, my cases of not being involved in negotiation failures both includes successful negotiated settlements (Negotiation=1, Settlement=1) but also where there is no negotiations at all. So the groups with higher centralization may not be engage in negotiations at all. Or, there can be a negative relation because the group has more unity to represent itself and can be seen as a more credible partner by the government. Or because lesser centralization can give group more flexibility in its actions while the leaders in highly centralized rebel organizations are accountable to their sub-ordinates who can blame the leader for mission-creep or being incapable of reaching group goals by failing to represent them in negotiations. Therefore, they can be more under pressure to sing an agreement.

The hazard ratios on the *Constituency support* and *Natural resource* variables are not significant at conventional levels in any of the Cox models in the survival analysis. Thus, their effects can be evaluated as non-existent for the Cox regression analysis and I could not found evidence to support my Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3b in these models. So the service provision capabilities of a rebel group and natural resource funding have no association with negotiation failures according to the findings of this analysis.

Of the control variables, *Rebel/Government strength* as a control variable also proved to be positive and significant at in all models that I run in the survival analysis. For instance, in the full model, the risk of the group to be involved in negotiation failure is

increased by 76.6%. This is an important and expected result considering that organizational capabilities can be operationalized with their ability to stand militarily against the government although it was not the base of my theory. Indeed, it may require a larger fighting capacity for a great organizational capacity and capability to maintain the military challenge against the government (Cunningham et al., 2013). Although governments may see these rebels as significant threats and consider diplomatic ways or granting concessions, rebels may be more inclined to reject settlements. The strength of the troops may emerge as a source of over-confidence for the rebels and may conclude with negotiation failures as rebels believe they can get better deals. The *Number of other rebels* as a control variable is significant in Model 3a at $p < 0.05$ when I run it with *Constituency support*; and in Model 4a and Model 6a when I run it with *Central command strength* and *Natural resource*.

Table 7: Regression Table for Cox Proportional Hazards Regression outputs

VARIABLES	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 3a	(5) Model 4	(6) Model 4a	(7) Model 5	(8) Model 5a	(9) Model 6	(10) Model 6a
Constituency support	0.887 (0.221)	1.210 (0.368)	1.200 (0.288)	1.329 (0.292)						
Central command strength	0.849 (0.116)	0.715*** (0.0867)			0.948 (0.168)	0.844 (0.131)				
Territorial control	2.332*** (0.693)	1.837* (0.602)					2.423*** (0.616)	2.199*** (0.615)		
Natural resource	0.899 (0.241)	0.856 (0.213)							1.310 (0.351)	1.388 (0.355)
Rebel/Government strength		1.766*** (0.268)		1.713*** (0.249)		1.635*** (0.211)		1.411** (0.192)		1.711*** (0.230)
Number of other rebels		0.824 (0.104)		0.793** (0.0937)		0.831* (0.0918)		0.868 (0.0952)		0.800* (0.103)
External support		0.859 (0.231)		0.969 (0.275)		1.035 (0.288)		1.133 (0.321)		1.131 (0.335)
Conflict intensity		0.945 (0.156)		0.963 (0.167)		1.167 (0.205)		1.158 (0.198)		1.000 (0.214)
Democracy		1.001 (0.0216)		1.004 (0.0219)		0.993 (0.0207)		1.005 (0.0227)		0.991 (0.0207)
Ln GDP per capita		1.032 (0.184)		1.062 (0.191)		1.149 (0.184)		1.074 (0.181)		1.204 (0.202)
ELF Index		0.298** (0.162)		0.417* (0.203)		0.467 (0.249)		0.337* (0.206)		0.559 (0.302)
Observations	584	567	649	632	835	779	859	803	765	715

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: ELF= ethnolinguistic fractionalization index. GDP=gross domestic product.

4.2.2. Logistic Regression Findings

Table 8 reports the results of my analyses of logistic regression. All the models are the same as the models in the survival analysis. The results are slightly different from the survival analysis outcomes.

In Model 1 and Model 2, the coefficient on the *Territorial control* is positive and has a significant effect on the negotiation failures. In Model 1, the likelihood of negotiation failures increases with a log-odds of 1.345 while in the Model 2 it increases with a log-odds of 1.442. Also, when I run *Territorial control* in Model 5 and 5a the coefficients are positive and significant. So, if the rebel organizations control a territory it is more likely for them to be involved in negotiation failures. Precisely, when a group controls territory, as it increases one unit from the value of 0 to 1, it is expected that the predicted probabilities of negotiation failure also increase. The likelihood of *Negotiation Failure* increases with a log-odds of 1.345 in Model 1 and 1.442 in the full model. The likelihood of *Negotiation Failure* increases with a log-odds of 1.386 in Model 5 and 1.379 in Model 5a for the predictor *Territorial Control*.

To better interpret the results I also run logistic models with odds ratios which can be found in Appendix A. The odd ratios simply are the ratio of the probability of an event occurring to the probability that the event does not occur. It is useful to interpret the risks of two groups, for example, the risks for involving in negotiation failures for

organizations that have territorial control and those that have not. When I look at the odds ratios, the odds ratio for *Territorial Control* is more than the value of 1 in all models that include *Territorial control*. In other words, as you go from groups that have no territorial control to organizations that have territorial control, the ratio of the odds becomes larger and positive. In the full model, the groups with territorial control are more likely to be involved in negotiation failures.

Different than the survival analysis results, this time the coefficients on the *Constituency support* variable are both in Model 3 and Model 3a (with controls) has a positive significant effect on negotiation failures at $p < 0.5$. As the *Constituency support* variable is binary, when the group receives constituency support, the likelihood of *Negotiation Failure* increases with a log-odds of 0.993 in Model 3 and 1.188 in Model 3a with controls. This result confirms Hypothesis 1, the more the group provides services to their constituencies, the more likely they are to leave the negotiations without a settlement. This could be because these rebels with quasi-state institutions can be satisfied with the current status quo. However, the *Constituency support* variable loses its significance at conventional levels in Model 1 and Model 2. The descriptive statistics and detailed logit analysis of the types of the services provided which include taxation, education, health, infrastructure, transportation, law, policing, justice, housing, and aid on the likelihood of negotiations failures can be found in the Appendix B and Appendix C. Only policing and transportation became significant at conventional levels.

According to the logit models of 6 and 6a, another variable that substantially increases the chances of negotiation failures is the *Natural resource* variable. Although there is no significant relationship between the *Natural resource* variable and the *Negotiation failure* variable at the conventional levels in the full model, I found a significant and positive relationship when I run the *Natural resource* variable in Model 6 and Model 6a. So I found evidence that funding from natural resources can increase the likelihood of negotiation failures as in line with Hypothesis 3b with the log-odds of 0.909 in Model 6 and 0.839 in Model 6a with controls. Through the findings of my dataset which merges available data for the period 1990-2005, it is possible to draw some conclusions regarding the impact of organizational capabilities on negotiation failures. This will be discussed in the final chapter.

Table 8: Logit Models -Effects on Negotiation Failure

VARIABLES	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 3a	(5) Model 4	(6) Model 4a	(7) Model 5	(8) Model 5a	(9) Model 6	(10) Model 6a
Constituency support	-0.0415 (0.523)	0.308 (0.678)	0.993** (0.395)	1.188** (0.498)						
Central command strength	0.0888 (0.294)	-0.162 (0.370)			0.265 (0.216)	0.203 (0.239)				
Territorial control	1.345*** (0.491)	1.442** (0.625)					1.386*** (0.340)	1.379*** (0.405)		
Natural resource	0.665 (0.468)	0.281 (0.555)							0.909*** (0.339)	0.839** (0.409)
Rebel/Government strength		0.862** (0.376)		0.728** (0.312)		0.448* (0.246)		0.287 (0.249)		0.627** (0.263)
Number of other rebels		-0.0173 (0.0426)		-0.0213 (0.0344)		0.000844 (0.0243)		0.0113 (0.0253)		-0.000224 (0.0277)
External support		0.851 (0.572)		0.531 (0.488)		0.965** (0.389)		0.903** (0.398)		1.053** (0.418)
Conflict intensity		-0.00690 (0.525)		0.241 (0.447)		0.510 (0.371)		0.466 (0.380)		0.117 (0.417)
Democracy		0.109** (0.0550)		0.0609 (0.0465)		0.0338 (0.0391)		0.0563 (0.0409)		0.0364 (0.0407)
Ln GDP per capita		-0.104 (0.343)		-0.161 (0.299)		-0.0314 (0.242)		-0.144 (0.249)		0.0322 (0.248)
ELF Index		-2.969** (1.215)		-2.631** (1.040)		-1.416 (0.878)		-1.849** (0.933)		-1.320 (0.894)
Constant	-1.425** (0.650)	0.314 (2.908)	-0.891*** (0.297)	0.557 (2.596)	-1.257*** (0.466)	-1.690 (2.116)	-1.355*** (0.229)	-0.649 (2.201)	-1.213*** (0.243)	-1.976 (2.208)
Observations	104	100	114	110	172	157	180	165	169	154
Pseudo R2	0.0976	0.239	0.0424	0.171	0.00718	0.0919	0.0768	0.150	0.0349	0.129

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: ELF= ethnolinguistic fractionalization index. GDP=gross domestic product.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

There is continuous decision-making in wars. In intrastate conflicts, all sides of particular incompatibility must make certain decisions such as which strategies to follow, what is the best outcome, and which way to reach that outcome is the best alternative. In this thesis, I searched for if rebel groups' decisions to sign an agreement addressing their incompatibilities can be driven by assessments of their own capabilities.

My thesis posed a research question that questions the impact of organizational capabilities on peace process outcomes. The previous literature mainly evaluated rebel capabilities as the military capacity of the rebels and operationalized this concept in terms of the rebels' troop size, battlefield performances, or conflict duration while explaining the prospects of negotiated settlements. Although the analyses were completed in terms of these operationalizations, many theories acknowledged that there may be other capabilities of rebel groups that make them significant threats to the governments and can cause over-confidence in their own capabilities. I decided to follow a different theoretical framework as a large part of the literature could be neglecting the other possible types of organizational capabilities as

well as the rebel organization's effectiveness and success perceptions. As suggested by Newman and Richmond (2006: 5), I followed an approach that does not assume there is a commitment to a compromise or a "compromise peace is attainable and desirable". Thus, my purpose was to assess the effect of other possible organizational capabilities and their possible effects on rebel behavior and strategies in the context of peace processes.

Following the recently introduced peace process framework, I looked at the data for negotiation occurrence and settlement separately to create my dependent variable of negotiation failures. This dependent variable tried to measure if groups are considered as strong opponents involved in negotiations but had the leverage to stall or refuse the possible agreements. To answer my research question and test my hypotheses, I used both Cox proportional hazard models to identify the risk of failure and logit models to estimate probabilities. My findings from both analyses revealed mixed results in terms of my predictors.

5.1. Summary of Findings

First, I ran Cox regression models and I found evidence that territorial control is significantly associated with negotiation failures by increasing the risk of hazards. In contrast, higher centralization in the authority goes against the expected direction in Hypothesis 2 and decreases the risks of these groups being involved in negotiation failures. Unfortunately, groups that can build positive relations with their constituencies and earn funding from natural resources have no association with the negotiation failures in my time-to-event analysis.

Second, logit models demonstrated once more that groups with territorial control are more likely to be involved in negotiation failures. This time, groups that can achieve positive relations with their constituencies through supplying services became significant and positively related to the occurrence of negotiation failures. Similarly, the rebel organizations earn income from natural resources through various strategies that I specified in Chapter 3, which increases the probabilities of these groups being involved in negotiation failures. Thus, contrary to the findings of survival analysis I found some support for my Hypothesis 1 and 3b in the logit models.

When testing the effect of rebel organizational capabilities on the negotiation failures, only those that have territorial control have a significant positive effect across models of two analyses.

5.2. Implications

The empirical findings have several implications for my theory that links organizational capabilities with the prospects of negotiated settlements. This thesis aimed to provide an alternative explanation through rebel capabilities to peace agreement failures despite negotiation initiations. First, rebel capabilities and their other conceptualizations in the analysis matter. Territorial control may give rebels a reason for over-confidence or partial achievement that they may have more leverage to leave the negotiation table. In the future, in a study with more observations, one can

study also the effects of the higher level of territorial control as an alternative operationalization of capability and rebel governance in that area.

Driven from the logistic regression results, a driving force for negotiation failure could be the rebel group's capacity to have positive relations with its constituencies. This is an important outcome for rebel governance and peace process linkages although these groups may be more inclined to enter the negotiations they still have the power and leverage to stall or spoil the negotiations. A similar conclusion can be made for rebel organizations with natural resource funding as these groups can become significant threats to the peace processes and should be addressed by the governments. However, the findings of this thesis should be presented with limitations.

5.3. Limitations

Although my theoretical framework and findings are insightful, this study is not conclusive as there were limitations. In this thesis, I relied on the best available data to test my hypotheses, but I also faced significant challenges and limitations working with existing data. My dataset was restricted to the 1990-2005 period and thus included negotiations and settlement data from Ogutcu-Fu (2016) for these years. Therefore, I could not include pre-Cold War negotiation failures or more recent data. This both caused a rather limited time coverage and the number of observations became unevenly distributed in some models, especially for models that included *Constituency support* as the predictor. There is more work that needs to be done in

terms of identifying relevant data and time coverage for an extended period to prevent biased results.

5.3.1 Dependent Variable

In terms of the dependent variable, this thesis' dataset tries to capture the negotiations with no successful settlements, despite identifying them as being resolved, partially resolved, or failed. So, in the dataset, it is possible to observe data where negotiation (1) and settlement (1) for a single group year however this does not mean that the agreement signed to settle the incompatibility ended the conflict between the rebel group and the state. This could be either because the agreement was a "partial agreement" or a "ceasefire" or simply failed to end the conflict as it renewed due to the withdrawal of the primary parties. A partial agreement may not succeed in a final agreement and a ceasefire could be violated by both sides. An alternative coding procedure of the dependent variable could be very similar to what Cronin (2011) follows for coding terrorist organizations that engaged in negotiations with the governments. She constructed her dataset by not only looking at the initiation of talks but also the stability of the talks and divided the results of a negotiation process as resolved, stable, unstable, and failed. Although this information is not available in my current dataset as I relied on available data for UCDP organizations, I am planning to track these outcomes by adding additional information from sources like the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset (Pettersson et al., 2019) or Peace Process Yearbooks which includes detailed information on separate stages of the whole process in later projects.

Another limitation of this thesis is the fact that the best measure that can signal an organization is capable and willing to fight or preserve the status quo could be examined by looking at if the negotiations are broken by the organization itself. However, the negotiations could be broken due to the government's actions, internal dissent within the organization, the presence of other organizations, or other exogenous factors. Still, if an organization is committed to a negotiated settlement it is possible to observe that the particular organization engage in negotiations despite negotiation failures in the past. Although this could signal the commitment to a peaceful resolution, still, there is a need for systematic data collection effort in future research about which actors are responsible for the negotiation failure by collecting detailed information from primary and secondary sources. Indeed, that may have its own risks, as it can be a challenge to look for unbiased information about the failures in a peace process. Therefore, this thesis focuses on failures to reach an agreement after the initiation of a negotiation process in general.

Another caveat of working with existing data was that tracking the negotiation failure process is limited to the time period that my concluding dataset covers, 1990-2005. It is important to highlight this limitation because even though I observe negotiation failure events; the organization and the government could have reached a full settlement after 2005. For example, when I detailly examined the case of a rebel group in my dataset called National Democratic Front of Bodoland (BDSF renamed as NDFB after 1994), I observed that after refusing to settle with the government in 1993, NDFB requested a unilateral ceasefire in 2004 and signed a full agreement in 2005 while some of its factions continued their attacks against the government

(*Insurgency / Peace Process Overview*, 2018). Or, it took forty-nine rounds of negotiations for FARC and the Colombian government to reach a final agreement. I was not able to track these processes with the current status of the dataset, however, I am planning to expand the time coverage to code for the years in which rebel organizations existed for a more comprehensive analysis. This is because the most up-to-date data can have the best explanatory power.

As a final note on the dependent variable, in many civil wars, actors even refuse to engage in negotiations (Bapat, 2005) or can put pre-conditions for talks that a government is hardly ready to accept. So not only there is variation between groups who sign and do not sign settlements after negotiations but also there could be a significant variation in who are rejecting the peaceful offers while other groups in the same conflict are agreeing to engage in talks. Of course, systematic refusal to engage in the negotiations could also signal the bad behavior (Zahar, 2008) or devious objectives of rebel groups, their over-confidence in capabilities or mistrust towards each other and other violent actors in the conflict. However, this is harder to analyze due to the lack of relevant available data. This thesis accepts the premise that rebel organizations prefer to enter negotiations to search for possible alternative benefits or strategic reasons but may avoid reaching an unwanted agreement (Glozman et al., 2015). Therefore, the findings in my thesis should not be considered as conclusive as these limitations that I summarize here should be solved.

5.4. Future Studies

Despite its limitations, I believe my thesis does make important contributions to the literature and pave way for future research. The theoretical framework that I followed in this thesis, the findings, and future research, can contribute to organizational-level analysis and explanations regarding conflict outcomes, and conflict resolution processes.

Studies focusing on the organizational level can provide more critical insight into the conflict outcomes and enables “precise” comparisons between rebel organizations (Parkinson & Zaks, 2018). Therefore, the effort to examine different aspects of rebel institutions and capabilities should continue as there may be other factors affecting the rebel groups’ decisions and their behavior. Future research can add other potential capabilities as additional explanatory variables to the analysis such as through various operationalizations of military strength, mobilization and recruitment strategies, and organizational cohesion and compliance. This is also the case for control variables. Future studies can search for the effects of the presence of mediators and the nature of mediation (coordinated or uncoordinated) as if it encourages or discourages the spoiling or stalling behavior. Similarly, other may factors such as the nature and terms of a peace agreement, concessions made by the government, group’s age and other types of external support like diaspora groups can affect the outcomes of a peace process.

Additionally, even though I focused my analysis on rebel groups this should consider the governmental dynamics and state-level variables such as tracking governmental

changes, the vote share of the government, or even public support for the negotiations in a more comprehensive analysis.

As part of the limitations of this thesis but as a suggestion for future studies, any future studies on negotiation failure should include the type of agreements reached in a peace process. Including the type of agreements can enable researchers to track if the settlements were partial in a negotiation process, unilateral or bilateral ceasefires, or final agreements that resolved all incompatibilities of that particular dyad.

Finally, although I supported my arguments with examples, the quantitative findings of my thesis can be supported with additional qualitative data in the future. The large-N analysis may be supported with case studies or comparative case studies to add details on organizational behavior and how it is vary in peace processes. For instance, the cases can be defined by “selecting comparable cases, selecting cases that vary on the dependent variable, and selecting cases across sub-groups of the population to address alternative explanations” (Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999).

In the future, policymakers may also benefit from the explanations of the relationship between organizational capabilities that are operationalized in various ways and separate effects on the peace processes.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Logistic Regression-Odds Ratios

VARIABLES	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 3a	(5) Model 4	(6) Model 4a	(7) Model 5	(8) Model 5a	(9) Model 6	(10) Model 6a
Constituency support	0.959 (0.501)	1.361 (0.922)	2.699** (1.066)	3.282** (1.635)						
Central command strength	1.093 (0.321)	0.850 (0.315)			1.304 (0.281)	1.225 (0.293)				
Territorial control	3.837*** (1.886)	4.229** (2.644)					4.000*** (1.362)	3.972*** (1.607)	2.483*** (0.842)	2.314** (0.946)
Natural resource	1.945 (0.909)	1.325 (0.735)								1.871** (0.492)
Rebel/Government strength		2.368** (0.891)		2.070** (0.647)		1.565* (0.385)		1.332 (0.332)		1.000 (0.0277)
Number of other rebels		0.983 (0.0419)		0.979 (0.0337)		1.001 (0.0243)		1.011 (0.0256)		2.865*** (1.197)
External support		2.341 (1.339)		1.701 (0.831)		2.625** (1.021)		2.468** (0.982)		1.124 (0.469)
Conflict intensity		0.993 (0.521)		1.272 (0.569)		1.665 (0.617)		1.593 (0.606)		1.037 (0.432)
Democracy		1.116** (0.0613)		1.063 (0.0495)		1.034 (0.0404)		1.058 (0.0432)		1.033 (0.256)
Ln GDP per capita		0.901 (0.309)		0.852 (0.255)		0.969 (0.235)		0.866 (0.216)		0.267 (0.239)
ELF Index		0.0514** (0.0624)		0.0720** (0.0749)		0.243 (0.213)		0.157** (0.147)		0.139 (0.306)
Constant	0.241** (0.156)	1.369 (3.981)	0.410*** (0.122)	1.745 (4.529)	0.285*** (0.133)	0.185 (0.391)	0.258*** (0.0591)	0.522 (1.149)	0.297*** (0.0722)	
Observations	104	100	114	110	172	157	180	165	169	154
Pseudo R2	0.0976	0.239	0.0424	0.171	0.00718	0.0919	0.0768	0.150	0.0349	0.129

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: ELF= ethnolinguistic fractionalization index. GDP=gross domestic product.

Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics for Constituency Support Sub-categories

VARIABLES	(1) N	(2) mean	(3) sd	(4) min	(5) max
Taxation	596	0.376	0.485	0	1
Education	626	0.265	0.442	0	1
Health	621	0.188	0.391	0	1
Infrastructure	632	0.111	0.314	0	1
Transportation	631	0.0602	0.238	0	1
Law	605	0.226	0.419	0	1
Policing	623	0.220	0.415	0	1
Justice	615	0.272	0.445	0	1
Housing	647	0.0247	0.155	0	1
Aid	627	0.129	0.336	0	1

Appendix C: Logit Model- Constituency Support

VARIABLES	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4	(5) Model 5	(6) Model 6	(7) Model 7	(8) Model 8	(9) Model 9	(10) Model 10
Taxation	0.402 (0.398)									
Education		0.466 (0.427)								
Health			0.107 (0.469)							
Infrastructure				-0.270 (0.548)						
Transportation					2.061* (1.113)					
Law						0.430 (0.418)				
Policing							0.981** (0.449)			
Justice								0.565 (0.433)		
Housing = 0,									-	
Aid										0.135 (0.579)
Constant	-0.549** (0.246)	-0.531** (0.230)	-0.444** (0.220)	-0.336 (0.207)	-0.452** (0.197)	-0.491** (0.232)	-0.693*** (0.236)	-0.565** (0.233)	-0.298 (0.195)	-0.423** (0.209)
Observations	112	112	111	113	114	112	109	110	108	110
Pseudo R2	0.00674	0.00788	0.000351	0.00161	0.0308	0.00695	0.0332	0.0115	0	0.000366

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1