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**TECHNOLOGIES OF DOMINATION AND
THE SELF IN *BRIEFING FOR A DESCENT
INTO HELL* BY DORIS LESSING**

MASTER'S THESIS

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TECHNOLOGIES OF DOMINATION AND THE SELF IN *BRIEFING FOR A
DESCENT INTO HELL* BY DORIS LESSING

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ÖZET**Yüksek Lisans Tezi****Doris Lessing'in *Briefing for a Descent into Hell* Adlı Romanında
Baskı ve Benlik Teknolojileri****Vildan YILDIZ****Fırat Üniversitesi****Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü****Batı Dilleri ve Edebiyatları Anabilim Dalı****İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı Bilim Dalı****Elazığ-2018; Sayfa: V+136**

Bu çalışma, Doris Lessing'in, *Briefing for a Descent into Hell* (1971) adlı eserinde, akıl ve akıl dışı ikili karşıtlığını yapı bozumuna uğrattırken Foucaultcu baskı teknolojileri ve benlik teknolojilerine ulaştığını göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Romanda, Lessing akıl hastası kabul edilen Charles Watkins ana karakteri aracılığıyla, 1960'larda İngiltere'de yaşayan ayrıştırıcı uygulamalarla kuşatılmış modern insanı resmeder. Bireyi akıl/akıl dışı, medeni/ilkel ve normal/anormal gibi ikiliklerle kuran psikiyatri, arkeoloji ve eğitim gibi alanlar, Watkins ve diğer sözde deli karakterler üzerinden Lessing'in eleştiri oklarına maruz kalmıştır. Aşamalı yapılarla ayıran, sınıflandıran insan merkezci Batı epistemi, antik dönemin benlik teknolojilerinden—varoluş sanatından—uzaklaşmış ve yerleşmiş bilimsel bilginin yardımıyla bireyi öz-parçalanmışlığa itmiştir. Foucault baskı teknolojilerine karşı benlik teknolojilerinin bireyin kendini sosyal norm ve egemen yapılardan bağımsız olarak kurmasına olanak verdiğini kabul ederken, benzer şekilde, Lessing de akıldışını çıkış yolu olarak kullanan böyle bir özgürlük için yöntemler bulmaya çalışır. Bu yüzden, Lessing'in akıldışı savı Foucaultcu delilik ile kesişir ve benlik teknolojileri olarak Jungcu psikoloji ve Tasavvuf ile paralellik gösterir. Bu bağlamda, delilik kavramı çerçevesinde, bu çalışma Lessing'in *Briefing for a Descent into Hell* inde özneyi kuran baskı teknolojileri ve benlik teknolojilerini irdeler.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Doris Lessing, *Briefing for a Descent into Hell*, Michel Foucault, delilik, baskı teknolojileri, benlik teknolojileri.

ABSTRACT**Master's Thesis****Technologies of Domination and the Self in
Briefing for a Descent into Hell by Doris Lessing****Vildan YILDIZ****Fırat University****Institute of Social Sciences****Department of Western Languages and Literatures****English Language and Literature****Elazığ-2018; Page: V+136**

This study aims to present that by deconstructing rational/irrational binary opposition in *Briefing for a Descent into Hell* (1971), Doris Lessing reaches out Foucauldian technologies of domination and technologies of the self that constitute the subject. In the novel, Lessing draws the picture of the modern man of 1960s in England, who is surrendered by the technologies of domination, by means of the protagonist Charles Watkins and accepted as mentally ill. Via Watkins and the other so-called insane characters, the areas such as psychiatry, archaeology and education which constitute the individual with the dualisms of rational/irrational, civilized/uncivilized and normal/abnormal are exposed to the arrows of criticism. The anthropocentric Western episteme that divides and classifies via hierarchal structures has gotten farther from the ancient culture's technologies of the self—the art of existence—and it has forced the individual to self-fragmentation with the help of the established scientific knowledge. While Foucault accepts that against the technologies of domination, the technologies of the self enable the individual constitute herself/himself free from social norms and dominant structures, similarly Lessing tries to find out the ways for that kind of freedom which uses the realm of the irrational as a way out. Therefore, Lessing's assertion of the irrational intercepts with the Foucauldian madness and parallels to Jungian psychology and Sufism as the technologies of the self. In this sense, basically within the concept of madness, this study examines the technologies of domination and the technologies of the self that construct the subject in Lessing's *Briefing for a Descent into Hell*.

Keywords: Doris Lessing, *Briefing for a Descent into Hell*, Michel Foucault, madness, the technologies of domination, the technologies of the self.

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INTRODUCTION

Traditional historians have a tendency to focus on the continuities and causal relations between historical events; therefore, human beings are believed to have a progressive history. However, Michel Foucault suggests that there are also discontinuities and contingencies in terms of historical time span. Within that scope, Foucault points out two discontinuities in the Western form of knowledge (episteme)—the classical age and the modern age in *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (1961)¹. Even if those two periods are similar to each other, there are profound differences in the archaeological level since “the system of positivities was transformed in a wholesale fashion at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century” and “it was simply that the mode of being of things, and of the order that divided them up before presenting them to the understanding, was profoundly altered” (Foucault 1994: xxiv). As a consequence, Foucault chooses dubious sciences such as psy-sciences to make an archaeology of the transformed modern Western episteme. In that sense, he draws attention to the Cartesian philosophy which backs up the human sciences in making a division between the sane and the insane, the body and the soul bringing along other binary oppositions. Being left out of *the cogito*, the madness is placed in the lazar houses abruptly, which is clearly seen when the history of psychiatric hospitals is traced back. In that frame, “[t]he classical age (more commonly termed the Enlightenment) was distinctive not for its faith in intellectual liberation but rather for its commitment to the disciplining of human behavior” (Hutton 1988: 125). Therefore, asylums become only a part of the Panoptic project including hospitals, prisons and even the educational institutions. Asked about his interest on social outcasts by such institutions, Foucault states:

It is one of my targets to show people that a lot of things that are a part of their landscape—that people think are universal—are the result of some very precise historical changes. All my analyses are against the idea of universal necessities in human existence. They show the arbitrariness of institutions and show which space of freedom we can still enjoy and how many changes can still be made. (Martin 1982: 11)

¹ This book is the abridged version of *History of Madness (Folie et Dérison: Histoire de la Folie à l'âge Classique)*. The book will be referred to as *Madness and Civilization* henceforward.

That's why, the figures that exist on the margins of society are vital to present the borders set between the non-conforming elements and the obedient. In that case, the first catchy topic is madness since it is easy to constitute a mad object out of the rational realm by means of the discourse of an accepted sane subject. Therefore,

the constitution of madness as a mental illness at the end of the eighteenth century, affords the evidence of a broken dialogue, posits the separation as already effected, and thrusts into oblivion all those stammered, imperfect words without fixed syntax in which the exchange between madness and reason was made. (Foucault 1988a: x)

Presenting his oeuvre as autobiographical texts, Foucault mentions his close contact with madness when he works at a psychiatric hospital. After then, he realizes that there are disputable treatments such as shock therapy, medicines, brain surgeries and many other practices applied in psychiatric hospitals. In his first book, *Mental Illness and Personality* (1954), Foucault analyzes madness through a medical stance with a Marxist positivist approach. Recognizing the silence of the mad people within the scientific zone, Foucault turns to the literary texts such as those by Sade and Nietzsche; art works that of Goya together with historical documents uniting “the erudite knowledge and local memories” in a genealogical method (Sarup 1991: 59) especially in *Madness and Civilization*. After *Madness and Civilization*, the transformation in Foucault's thinking becomes significant since he is clearly away from the Marxist dialectic and scientific positivism. He is inspired by Nietzsche who explains the void in human history as in the following sentences: “[S]o far, all that gives color to existence still lacks a history. Where would you find a history of love, or avarice, of envy, of conscience, of pious respect for tradition, or of cruelty? Even a comparative history or at least of punishment is so far lacking completely” (quoted in Mahon 2001: 184). Foucault writes his later books including the second edition of *Mental Illness and Personality* “beneath the sun of the great Nietzschean quest” trying to fill in the blanks in the human history (Foucault 2006a: xxx). According to Foucault, beneath the classical experience of madness, there was a coherent binary structure constituting dichotomies such as truth and fallacy; Day and Night, and beneath the modern experience of madness, there could be a modern “anthropological three term structure of man, his madness and his truth” (quoted in Gutting 1989: 98). Foucault planned to study that structure in his later works, which he could not achieve to complete.

In the genealogy of the objectified mad people, it is explicitly pointed out that their relation to cosmic order (Renaissance experience of madness as tragic) is cut out by the modern episteme and by psy-sciences later on and it is placed in a fixed form conditioned, deluded and guilty. After unveiling the Panoptic structure of asylum and mental hospitals, Foucault aims at explaining the genealogy of the Western sane subject which has the capacity to formulize the insane and insanity. Recognizing the subject under the shadow of the disciplinary institutions such as hospitals, prisons and schools and of the positive and human sciences, power and knowledge relation becomes clearer, which refashions his previous works. Then, Foucault studies the constitution of the subject (surrendered by the apparatuses such as discourses, laws and institutions) throughout history in order to comprehend the modern concept of the self. “[H]istoricizing the formation of the modern deep self might create a possibility for a new ethical subject that is free from the disciplinary scientific discourse” (Markula 2004: 306). In that sense, historicity of the subject leads us to conceptualize it as unfixed and changing; therefore, transformable subjects are possible through technologies of the self. In his later works, Foucault studies the self-forming techniques of ancient culture, which can be used either for good as an aesthetic of existence or bad for conforming the status quo.

The technologies of the self include various practices such as spiritual exercises, fasting, reading, writing, *askesis* (mastery over oneself), and so on. Regarding the spirit as a part of cosmos, Foucauldian spirituality opens way to “form our own unique individuality by way of our own experience and ethical code,” (Batters 2011: 5) which is closely related to the realm of irrationality together with madness, deviant behaviors and also drives. In this respect, Jungian psychology which also gives importance to irrationality and spirituality functions as a technology of the self. While Foucault goes back to ancient cultures to propose self-forming techniques, Jung goes back much more by explaining the archetypal structures in human’s history. Therefore, Jungian psychology especially the individuation process is examined in the thesis as an example of technologies of the self in *Briefing for a Descent into Hell*² (1971). To Jung, the first part of life is dedicated to meet the basic needs such as occupation, success, prosperity, marriage and so on. Then, the individual is able to reach the level of questioning, which

² The novel will be referred to as *Briefing* henceforward.

leads to an inward turn in the second part of her/his life as in the case of the middle-aged Charles Watkins, the protagonist of the novel. That turning toward the deeper part of one's self starts the individuation process, which aims at accepting feminine and masculine features (androgyny) as complementary forces. Denying such oppositions increases the tension and strengthens the shadow side of the individual becoming more destructive. Watkins presents the masculine logos together with pure rationality at first, which is the probable reason of his breakdown. Later on, by means of the archetypal patterns in his visions and the fusion of conscious and the unconscious realm, Watkins comes to the verge of a higher state of consciousness. After that recognition, Watkins realizes the potential of the good. Therefore, he starts to concern for others feeling sadness and worry for them. His inward turn exemplifies a transformation from pure rationality to spirituality and from aloofness to the affection welcoming the realm of the irrational.

Besides Foucauldian and Jungian technologies of the self, Lessing's Sufi concerns are also examined as self-forming technologies which fashion the novel a Sufi fable. Like Jungian psychology, Sufi teaching also accepts madness as a breakthrough by deconstructing rational/irrational binary opposition since it operates outside the Western episteme, which is based on the realm of rationality. Learning through fantasies and dreams is possible from a Sufi perspective, which draws attention to the potential power of madness. Therefore, both Jungian psychology that focuses on personal wholeness and the Sufi thinking whose main goal is oneness for humanity function as Foucauldian thinking otherwise. The outcome of those parallels redefines madness regarding all faculties of human beings.

In *Briefing*, practices that are related to Jungian individuation and Sufism transform docile bodies into critical awareness and help exerting "freedom in a civilization dictated by forces of power" (Batters 2011: 1). In that respect, limit-experiences defined as madness turns into "an aesthetic goal" (Feder 1980: 203) and a kind of resistance by Doris Lessing. Besides turning out to be "a task which will carry the one who toils through it toward a higher condition of integrity, a deeper version of the self" (Sukenick 1974: 114), madness refers to the chaotic atmosphere of the twentieth century in social, political, and moral sense. As a consequence, "the poetics of new forms and rhetoric [are] created out of the need to account for the theme [madness]" (Cheng 1999: 15) such as Lessing's inner space fiction.

In her novels such as *The Golden Notebook* (1962), *Landlocked* (1965), *The Four-Gated City* (1969) and *Briefing*, Lessing presents madness and dreams as “states of greater perception than so-called sanity and wakefulness” (Whittaker 1988: 76). By means of Watkins, she opens way to critical awareness by questioning the Panoptic mechanisms and dividing practices such as psychiatric hospitals, educational institutions and psy-sciences together with archaeology and teaching of Classics. Therefore, *Briefing* “breaks the closed circle of reason as well as of language and gives voices to the irrational” (Cheng 1999: 1) violating the silence of madness, which will be the focus of this study. As a social construct, madness is labelled as mental illness by not only society but also mental hospitals as part of social mechanisms in the novel (Shu-Ming 2012: 15). In that sense, Lessing “takes madness from the realm of the clinical, where it is domesticated and judged, confined, as it were, to an institutional attic, into the realm of the cosmic” (Suknick 1974: 116).

In the novel, while Watkins’s inner journey is emphasized more than his outer life, the dichotomies of real/unreal and sane/insane get blurry, which opens way to think critically getting closer to Foucault’s oeuvre. As a result, Watkins, the schizophrenic subject, turns into “the sane performer in a mad society” (Shu-Ming 2012: 14) and he is able to act as an emissary in reminding others the brainprint of wholeness. In that sense, this study aims to provide an analysis of *Briefing* with the intention of showing how Foucauldian concepts of technologies of domination and the self, Jungian psychology and Sufism have a role in the construction of the subject in Lessing’s novel as an example of inner space fiction.

Regarding his oeuvre, Foucault states: “I am well aware that I have never written anything but fictions” (1980: 193). Thus, problematizing reality, accepted absolute truth and normality, Foucault opens the way to re-read his works and other fictional works correspondingly. In this sense, there is a possibility of making “fictions function within truth” (Cheng 1999: 21). Keeping in the mind that fiction does not refer to the unreal or the inaccurate but to “the creative or productive power of the book in the context of a particular historical moment” (O’Leary 2008: 18), the analysis of *Briefing* in this study tries to show a fictional work as a powerful tool to understand sanity and insanity both in history and daily life of contemporary subject. To Foucault, writing fiction turns out to be a means in going after the limit-experience that “wrenches the subject from itself” and transforms it by thinking otherwise (2001: 241). The newly formulated genre, inner space

fiction supports the idea of such a capacity that literature has in transforming both the writer and the readers showing them the possibility to think differently. As a fiction writer, Lessing not only focuses on the marginalized subjects that have been left in a foreign and strange realm for so long but also creates the need for new forms that would describe her themes like in her inner space fiction.

Writing about extra-sensory perceptions and paranormal capacities together with madness in her later works spiritedly, Lessing has entered the unfamiliar land, which scares her milieu. Since the mid-twentieth century, the time of her inner space fiction novels had been highly against such tendencies and novelties. To exemplify the limited point of view of that time and its prejudices, she states:

Somebody picked up a book and asked me, scandalized, ‘What’s this you’re reading?’ ‘It is a book on Hatha Yoga,’ says I. Hatha Yoga is the physical discipline of Yoga. Exchanged looks, raised eyebrows, tactful changings of the subject. Within five years every one of these people would think nothing of saying, ‘No, I can’t on Wednesday; it’s my Yoga class (Lessing 1997: 353).

The increasing interest of mystic practices signifies that pure rationality is not sufficient for the human soul; therefore, there is always a need for the transcendent, the spiritual, metaphysical and the irrational. Experiencing the Sufi way of life, Lessing writes a Sufi fable, *Briefing*, in which she speaks about such needs to the ones who are ready for unclassifiable experiences. According to Foucault, “[a]n experience is always a fiction; it is something which one fabricates for oneself, which doesn’t exist before and which happens to exist after” (2001: 243). Just like described by Foucault, using the inner experiences, Lessing fabricates a Sufi allegory which shows the way out telling us that “we are capable of imagination, invention and experiences we have only glimpsed” not limited by conditions or conditioning (Ferguson 1981: 29). In this context, this study intends to urge the readers to think in a critical way about rationality and irrationality laying together Foucauldian madness, Jungian psychology, Sufism and *Briefing*.

The first chapter introduces Doris Lessing as a writer-activist in creating awareness of ontological, social and environmental problems. There is a brief overview of her works including *Briefing* (1971) to present a broader context of her political, aesthetical, ethical, and spiritual concerns. Then the inspirations and the need behind writing *Briefing* are presented together with her connection to R.D. Laing, Carl Jung and Idries Shah. The outcome of that triad is vital in comprehending the parallels between

Briefing and Foucault's oeuvre since those relations point out Lessing's attitude especially toward madness, psychiatry and mental hospitals. In that section, the unconscious self is presented as "colonized by the conscious, conforming self" (King 1989: 55) and one-dimensional Western thinking about rationality and irrationality is discussed, which resonates with the Foucauldian modern episteme. By means of individual, Lessing aims at touching the land of the collective presenting Watkins as the microcosm of the everyman, which is the recurrent theme of her novels such as *The Four-Gated City*, in which the protagonist Lynda exemplifies another extra-sensitive individual aiming to create an awareness among the human race. In this sense, such inner space fiction novels are able to bring people together who share similar experiences. Regarding madness as a breaking through, Lessing brings together Laingian psychiatry and Jungian analytic psychology aiming to show the individuation process in the end. Within that scope, Lessing's Sufi concerns as turning into one's self and realizing the connection between the self and the other attribute to the picture of modern subject as a self-forming technology. Within the examination of those issues, a more detailed introduction to her novel *Briefing* is provided in this section.

In the second chapter, not only the institutions such as hospitals and educational buildings, and dividing practices such as psychiatry, archaeology, and education but also the social norms which surrender the so-called modern madman are discussed by means of Foucauldian technologies of domination. In that sense, the Western episteme is deconstructed including its dualisms such as sane/insane, civilized/uncivilized and rational/irrational. Finally, this chapter argues that a Foucauldian reading of the novel leads the interrogation of the self/other dichotomy in various fields and calls for a critique, which is available by means of technologies of the self.

Initially, the third chapter examines Foucault's technologies of the self together with the genealogy of the Western subject. In relation to Foucauldian technologies of the self, Jungian theory of personality is provided in order to comprehend the mythopoetic narrative of the novel related to collective unconscious and the archetypal images in Watkins's inner journey that are related to his madness. This chapter focuses on Lessing's portrayal of madness as a network connected to one's nature, unconscious, deeper self and therefore one's spirituality. Toward the end, Sufism is studied as a technology of the self creating a fusion of binaries such as mind/body, real/dream, and personal/collective. The philosophies of Plato and Ibn el Arabi together with Jungian analytic psychology are

merged creating a hybrid understanding of madness as a capacity to take freedom from sovereign structures and social norms which Foucault claims in his works as well.

Consequently, analyzing technologies of domination within a Foucauldian reading of *Briefing*, this study firstly examines how literary works make apparent the biased discourses toward the people who have different capacities in contemporary world labelling them “mad” or “abnormal”. According to Lessing, human beings cannot exist without those unclassifiable experiences; many people experience them; however, some dare to accept and reveal it. Welcoming those energizing centers, people are able to achieve conscious evolution that will take humanity to an upper position individually and socially. Within that scope, this study examines how the novel portrays the personal/collective division starting from the hierarchical binary opposition of sane/insane. It contributes to the call for the readers to an awareness, which would link the individual to the collective turning one’s life into an aesthetic oeuvre attaining the wholeness/androgyny as an example of Foucault’s self-forming technologies. Related to the self-forming technologies, Jungian theory and Sufism direct the subject to attain wholeness firstly in itself then with other beings. Thus, Foucault’s deconstruction of the subject, Jung’s theory of archetypes with his concept of the “self” and Sufi thinking intersect in the novel as means of technologies of the self which should be developed against the technologies of domination.

CHAPTER ONE

1. DORIS LESSING AND *BRIEFING FOR A DESCENT INTO HELL*

1.1. Doris Lessing and Her Literary Career

Doris Lessing (Doris May Tayler) was born in Persia to British parents in 1919. Her father who had been crippled in World War I, was a clerk in the Imperial Bank of Persia and her mother had been a nurse. In 1925, her family moved to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) where she spent her childhood on her father's farm. Doris Lessing attended a convent school and a girls' school, but ended her studies at the age of fourteen and left home. In 1937, she moved to Salisbury, where she worked as a telephone operator for a year. She held a number of different jobs working as a telephone operator, a nursemaid, an office worker and a journalist. At nineteen, she married Frank Wisdom, and had two children. Not able to fit in the conventional life in the suburbs, she joined Rhodesia's Communist Party and got divorced. In 1945, Tayler married a fellow party member, Gottfried Lessing, and took his surname becoming Doris Lessing. Four years later, her second marriage also ended in divorce.

She moved to London with her son of her second marriage. After a short time, she published her first novel *The Grass is Singing* (1950) which started her career as a professional writer. The book is about the relationship between a white farmer's wife in Rhodesia and her black house servant, and through their story Lessing makes a critique of the white colonial society in Southern Africa. Her later stories and novellas set in Africa, published during the fifties and early sixties, were written within an aspect of morality deconstructing colonialism and highlighting the lives of the dispossessed and assimilated African people. She has always been brave enough to speak her mind regardless of the possibility of non-acceptance and failure in the end. In 1956, in response to Lessing's courageous outspokenness, she was declared a prohibited person in both Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

Brought up at an African retreat, she could be seen at the borderline of Western literary discourse not speaking for the sake of the colonizer and the dominant but speaking for the colonized and the other as in the example of her early works such as *The Grass is Singing*. According to Lessing, another reason for her freedom of the Western literary

canon is her lack of formal education. To Lessing, the ordinary Western educational system is arrogant since it shows Europe as the cradle of civilization hypnotized by the words Greece and Rome. However, as she mentions there was a time in which “Europe lay in the dark for centuries, marvelous civilizations brought some sciences to levels we [the Westerners] have not approached—medicine and psychiatry among them” (Lessing 1971).

Between 1952-69, Lessing wrote *Children of Violence* series, a five novel sequence. In those books, there is a heroine, Martha Quest, who grows up in Southern Africa and settles in England like Lessing did as well. In each book, she questions different subjects, as her surname indicates, from racial problems to marital ones. Following the crackdown in Hungary in 1956, Lessing turned away from Communism and left the party. After that, she wrote her most widely read novel, *The Golden Notebook* (1962) and she was awarded the Nobel Prize in 2007, at the age of 88. She would be the eleventh women and the oldest person who took the Nobel Prize. *The Golden Notebook* is about a female writer, Anna Wulf, who was caught in a personal and artistic crisis. She sees her life divided into various roles such as woman, lover, writer, and political activist. She writes diaries in different colored notebooks each of which corresponds to different parts of her divided self. Anna suffers a mental breakdown through which she is able to discover a new wholeness and she writes that experience in the part of the golden notebook.

In her later novels, *Briefing* (1971) and *The Summer Before the Dark* (1973), she keeps studying mental breakdown of individuals who are under the pressure of social conformity. *Briefing*, the focus of this study, is about a man, Charles Watkins, who is found wandering the streets of London with no memory of a ‘normal’ life, while Kate, the central character of *The Summer Before the Dark*, achieves a kind of enlightenment through what doctors would describe as a breakdown. Even if the readers classify some of her novels as science fiction, Lessing does not agree on that. According to her, for instance *Memoirs of a Survivor* (1974) which is about dreamscapes and other dimensions and *Briefing* are inner space fiction as they do not “examine some scientific idea, exaggerate, even those not born yet” (Ean 1991: 200).

Another series by Lessing, *Canopus in Argos: Archives* (1979-83) is classified as space fiction. The first novel in the series, *Re: Colonized Planet 5: Shikasta* was published in 1979. The second novel was *The Marriages between Zones Three, Four, and Five*

(1981). The third novel was *The Sirian Experiments* published in 1980. The fourth book in the series, *The Making of the Representative for Planet 8*, was adapted by Philip Glass as an opera, with a libretto by the author. The last one was *Documents Relating to the Sentimental Agents in the Volyen Empire* published in 1983. Since 1960s, Lessing had been interested in Idries Shah and his Sufi teaching which stresses the evolution of consciousness and the belief that individual liberation can come about only if people understand the link between their own fates and the fate of society. In the books mentioned above such Sufi thoughts were reflected.

Lessing's other novels are *The Good Terrorist* (1985) and *The Fifth Child* (1988). The former brought WH Smith Literary Award to Lessing. She also published two other realist novels, *The Diary of a Good Neighbour* (1983) and *If the Old Could...* (1984) under the pseudonym; Jane Somers. In addition, she has written several nonfiction works, and autobiographies; *Under My Skin: Volume One of My Autobiography to 1949*, appeared in 1995, and received the James Tait Black Prize for best biography. Moreover, in June 1995 she received an Honorary Degree from Harvard University. Doris Lessing's recent fiction includes *Ben in the World* (2000) and *The Sweetest Dream* (2001), which follows the fortunes of a family through the twentieth century. She was made a Companion of Honour by the British Government in 1999, and was President of Booktrust, the educational charity that promotes books and reading. In 2001, she received the David Cohen British Literature Prize. Lessing wrote *The Grandmothers* in 2003, a collection of four short novels centered on an unconventional extended family; and *Time Bites* (2004), a selection of essays based on her life experiences. The last book by Lessing is *Alfred and Emily* (2008), which explores the lives of her parents. In 2007, Doris Lessing was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. *On Not Winning the Nobel Prize* (2008) is the full text of the lecture she gave to the Swedish Academy when accepting the prize. Doris Lessing died peacefully at her London home on November 17, 2013, at the age of 94.

It is not easy to put Lessing into a fixed category as a writer since there are many profound transformations in her life some of which are communism and Sufism. Yet her work is united by her being a moralist, an investigator of the states of consciousness and forms of fiction, and a portrayer of how individuals function within society. It is also hard to cover all her oeuvre in detail in that chapter; it is recorded that she wrote more than 55 works that spanned literary genres, including multiple narratives both of her personal

experience and her political visions. Asked about the function of writers by Schwarzkop, Lessing notes:

In my opinion, it is obviously the job of writers, if they take their profession seriously, to place their fingers on the wounds of our times, but that is not enough... In my opinion, the author should be something of a prophet, tracing a thing before it is fully apparent, grasping a subject before it becomes a trend, stretching out one's antennae into the universe to sense its most subtle vibrations. (Schwarzkop 1981: 109)

Doris Lessing fits in her own portrayal of a writer. When she wrote about her disapproval of white rule in Africa in the 1950's, she was barred from entering Rhodesia and South Africa. However, she visited South Africa in 1995, which was her first visit since she moved forcibly removed in 1956 for her political views. After 40 years, she was welcomed as a writer acclaimed for the very same topics that had forbidden her the country. She has opened new literary scopes for the succeeding writers. She is not classifiable; as the wounds, the problems she puts her finger on change throughout the time in accordance with the society's needs. In the *Conversations*, Lessing explains her almost infinite subject matters for her writing with a well-thought-of metaphor: "[W]ith surprise and fear I realize how many problems there are everywhere. Often it seems to me like being in Bluebeard's castle. Everywhere there are doors which I open and behind each closed door sits someone with a ravaged spirit" (Schwarzkop 1981: 110). Therefore, Lessing was to write about African landscapes, outer space, Sufism, nuclear holocaust, Spanish rural poverty, the war in Afghanistan, a Hampstead political family, and even cats, all within the same career. Due to such diverse subjects, Lessing's oeuvre includes various genres such as realistic fiction, inner space fiction, science fiction, non-fiction, short story, autobiography, and fantasy.

The following part of this chapter will focus on the inspirations that enabled Lessing write *Briefing*. In that section, Lessing's related autobiography, her relations to some intellectuals such as Idries Shah, C. G. Jung and R. D. Laing will be examined.

1.2. *Briefing for a Descent into Hell*

The core reason behind writing that book was the belief for the need of a religion according to Lessing: "I wrote [it] because a friend said nobody sat down to read books about Judaism, Christianity, and Islam [...] So I got the idea of using elements common

to the three religions in my story” [with a prophet figure, Charles Watkins] (Ean 1991: 200). In that, she dismantles the borders between different religions focusing on the path that they all try to enlighten for the human beings. Mentioning the religions, Lessing states: “They’re the same religion, in fact, in different installments [...] [W]hat they have in common is ‘messengers’ or prophets who come and say to human beings, ‘You stinking lot of no-good-niks, pull your socks up and do better, or else’” (Gray 1986: 121). In the novel, Charles Watkins has prophetic tenets attending the Conference by the Planets. In that conference, there is a briefing about the forgotten brainprinting of human beings, which is about the wholeness, the unity of the Earth, and the universe including all the elements within from human beings to animals, and plants.

Lessing’s interest in such mythical subjects and inner world coincides with her encounter with Idries Shah and Sufism in the 1960s after she had been a Marxist. At that time, she experienced many things she could not explain. To Lessing, people try to deny a large part of their experience for fear of those who would call them crazy, which did not hinder her. However, she found her answers in *The Searchers* by Idries Shah and Sufism in the end (Torrents 1980: 72).

At the beginning of *Briefing*, there are two quotes which strengthens her belief in the reality of different worlds: The first quote is from the book *The Secret Garden* by Mahmoud Shabistari and the second one is taken from *The Edge of the Sea* by Rachel Carson.

If yonder raindrop should its heart disclose,
Behold therein a hundred seas displayed.
In every atom, if thou gaze aright,
Thousands of reasoning beings are contained.
The gnat in limbs doth match the elephant.
In name is yonder drop as Nile’s broad flood.
In every grain a thousand harvests dwell.
The world within a grain of millet’s heart.
The universe in the mosquito’s wing contained.
Within that point in space the heavens roll.
Upon one little spot within the heart
Resteth the Lord and Master of the worlds.
Therein two worlds commingled may be seen ...

The Sage Mahmoud Shabistari, in the fourteenth century
(The Secret Garden)

This minuscule world of the sand grains is also the world of inconceivably minute beings, which swim through the liquid film around a grain of sand as fish would swim through the ocean covering the sphere of the earth. Among this fauna and flora of the capillary water are single-celled animals and plants, water mites, shrimplike crustacea, insects, and the larvae of infinitely small worms—all living, dying, swimming, feeding, breathing, reproducing in a world so small that our human senses cannot grasp its scale, a world in which the microdroplet of water separating one grain of sand from another is like a vast, dark sea.

The marine biologist, Rachel Carson, twentieth century
(The Edge of the Sea)

No matter how different the time those two texts were written, they describe the same subject as a “macrocosm encapsulated within a raindrop or a sand grain suspended in water... By analogy, the unnamed seafarer of the first pages... is Everyman, rediscovering (remembering) through the exploration of the microcosm of his own consciousness the experience of the human race” (Rubenstein 2014: 213).

The experience of the human race could also relate to the Jungian collective unconscious. Lessing had a direct contact with the ideas of Jung’s psychology through a Jungian analyst for about three years (Lessing 1997: 39). On the other hand, Perrakis calls her post-Jungian and states that she “incorporates her Jungian insights into a larger whole stemming from her encounter with Sufi teachings” in her novels (quoted in Bloom 2003: 62). Jung had already some inclinations toward paralleling religion and psychiatry. According to him, religions are psychic cure systems and God tries to cure psychic disorders; the same process is called psychotherapy.

According to Jung, human psyche is not constituted by merely conscious and unconscious parts as Freud suggested. There is another part of psyche called collective unconscious, not attained through experience as other parts are, but it is already there by inheritance. To Jung, “[I]t consists of pre-existent forms, the archetypes, which can only become conscious secondarily and which give definite form to certain psychic contents”

(quoted in Fahim 1994: 7). Those archetypes are not experienced in everyday life but in dreams, arts and literature.

When Lessing talked about her dreams to her analyst, the analyst named them typical Jungian dreams: “Sometimes it can take years to get someone to dream a dream on that level” and Lessing added that “Jungian dreams had been my night landscape for as long as I could remember...” (1997: 40). Dreams including archetypes are indispensable sources she uses in her works. She includes dreams even in her hobby list after her garden, and her cats. She notes that “[t]he older I get, the more concerned I am with the reality of dreams, which I believe are mirrors and outlets of the soul. I’m fascinated by the way in which symbolism and the multiplicity of the world are represented in dreams” (Schwarzkop 1981: 111). In *Briefing*, Watkins’s inner journey develops and his evolution of self happens only when he is sleeping. Just like Lessing, herself, he also makes use of dreams and evaluate them as signals in the way to truth.

Another vital intellectual that inspired Lessing was the Scottish psychiatrist, R. D. Laing. Asked about R. D. Laing, Lessing expresses their similarity as follows: “We were both exploring the phenomenon of the unclassifiable experience, the psychological ‘breaking-through’ that the conventional world judges as mad” (Oates 1972: 42). Their attitude toward modern medicine and psychiatry coincides as well. According to Lessing, psychiatry is a discourse which turns its patients to subjects and creates cases out of them, which would also parallel with Foucauldian theory. Moreover, Laing tried to break the power relation between the doctor and the patient creating a non-Panoptic hospital in which “there were no staff, no patients, no locked doors, no psychiatric treatment to stop or change states of mind...” (quoted in Rubenstein 2014: 138). While Lessing had a personal encounter with Jungian psychotherapy, she was also quite familiar with the Laingian methods due to her lover, Clancy Sigal. He had worked with Laing for seven years, experienced the drugs just like Lessing did and made psychological and spiritual explorations under his guidance. Laing theorized such explorations as inner space journeys, which accords not only with the term—*inner space fiction* Lessing uses for *Briefing*—but also the novel itself with its inner space traveler. There are also some parallels between the experiences of Watkins “and the existential phenomenology of schizophrenia proposed by R. D. Laing, not the least of which is a ten-day psychotic journey described by one of Laing’s ex-patients, coincidentally named Jesse Watkins” (Bloom 2003: 214).

Published in 1971, *Briefing* takes place in 1969 and is written in two parts. In the first part, Charles Watkins is found by the British police in a state of total amnesia near the Waterloo Bridge after he has been robbed of his wallet. They take him to the Central Intake Hospital where he is cared for by Doctors (Doctor X. whom he cannot see, and Doctor Y. who favors drugs over electroshock therapy). While staying at the hospital, he remembers his earlier vision of sailing journey in the northern Atlantic Ocean where he and his eleven companions drift with the clockwise currents. He believes that all of his friends are taken up by a crystal UFO. After being alone, he makes a raft and leaves behind the ship which is hard to handle by himself. He plans to reach the anti-clockwise currents in the southern hemisphere, and he succeeds. When the raft breaks up, he stays on a rock and with the help of a porpoise, he reaches a land in Brazil. Watkins goes in “an Edenic forest where he is completely alone like Adam in the Garden and where animals are at peace with each other” (Fike 2016: 19). Walking up to a plateau, he finds a savannah, and discovers the ruins of an ancient city. Waiting for the Crystal, he cleans a large circle within the city’s central square so that the Crystal could land. After he has been moonstruck at that time, he joins three women in eating bloody meat. Later, there are battles between rat-dogs and apes; rat-dogs also fight against each other. In that chaotic atmosphere, a large white bird takes him on its back and he sees everything around the city including the coast of Portugal. Eventually, the Crystal takes him up into a higher plane of existence where he sees the patterns that underlie the things in the physical world and watches the earth from the outer space. He witnesses a conference of the classical gods, and at the conference, Mercury gives a prenatal briefing to those who are about to descend into physical bodies. They are taught to remember their brainprints when they descend into the world as amnesia often accompanies incarnation. However, their task is to deliver a message of unity and harmony to the people on the earth. After watching his own birth and life up to the sleepless nights that preceded his breakdown, Watkins wakes up in the hospital, having experienced ocean, land, the Crystal, and the briefing.

While the first part of the book is told in a play-like format with dialogue exchanges mostly between the patient and his doctors, the second part is written with the stream of consciousness and flashbacks that may or may not have occurred. There is also a shift in the narrative technique from dialogues to epistolary. The letters help Doctors and shed light on the life of Watkins’s piecing together the details. By means of those letters, it becomes clear that Watkins is a professor of Classics at Cambridge University.

He is fifty years old and has a wife named Felicity, who is fifteen years younger and once his student. He is also the father of two sons with Felicity and one with Constance Maine, his once mistress and a veteran of the second World War who experienced combats in Africa and Italy. Despite being successful professionally, he is egocentric and indifferent to people. There is much information about his character in the letters. The length of the letters does not depend on the familiarity of their writers. For example, there are relatively short letters written by him, Felicity, Constance, Jeremy Thorne (his department chair), and his comrade Miles Bovey. On the other hand, there is a very long letter from a retired headmistress named Rosemary Baines. Her letter is the most intense one in terms of the information it gives about him and it covers a lot of subjects helpful for understanding the vision of Watkins before the breakdown. In that letter, she relates her positive reaction to Watkins's public lecture on educational reform and she explains that her friend Frederick Larson, an archeologist who has traveled much, has experienced some of the same symptoms of Watkins such as stammering.

When he is staying at the hospital, Doctor Y. wants Watkins write down some of his experiences in an attempt to make him remember. Then, he scribes two papers; an account of parachuting into Yugoslavia to help the Partisans' effort against Nazis and a depiction of honeysuckle and camellia outside his residence hall room at college. Including falling in love with Konstantina Ribar, the Yugoslavian piece is apparently an imaginary exaggeration of Bovey's wartime experience. While writing that letter, he makes friends at the hospital with twenty-one-year-old Violet Stoke, who resembles Konstantina. They think about leaving the hospital to live together, which is discouraged by Doctor Y. Following the inefficiency of the psychiatric therapy, Watkins submits to electroshock therapy hoping that he could remember the content of the briefing more profoundly despite the unwillingness of Violet and the other patients. In an ironic way, he regains his memory of his former life but loses all the memory of his visionary experience in return. At the end of the novel, he pens a letter to Thorne assuring that he is able to deliver his previously scheduled lectures on *The Iliad*, which proves his permanent descend into the hell that is the world.

In *Briefing*, Lessing problematizes many concepts and discourses such as reality, reason, psychiatry, education, archaeology, and civilization. She takes away the safe and certain ground under the Western civilized humanity blurring the borders between binary oppositions such as the real and the unreal, the rational and the mystical world. As the

novel progresses, it is no more available to favor the first concept in those dichotomies due to her fantastic descriptions of the protagonist Watkins's inner journey with profound archetypal imageries and the other well-structured 'insane' characters; Frederick Larson and Violet Stoke who stand against the powerful structures of Western society questioning its norms and the disciplines. Lessing refers to sovereign Western structures as "traps" and "Prison shades" (Lessing 2013: 153)³ throughout the novel. While the signifier always changes from hospitals and schools to psychiatry, archaeology, standardized education, and science, the signified is always the well-established authority founded upon such dichotomies as real/unreal, sane/insane, and civilized/uncivilized. In the division of such discourses, there is no place for a grey area either this or that, and the accepted truth lays certainly within the first concept. They are all programmed by the society itself to create zombies (docile bodies in Foucauldian term) which would not break the social order but work for improving it. In that case, madness turns into a resistance against a disciplinary society, or a disciplinary institution in accordance with the related character of the novel and it is a way out both for the sane and the insane. The illuminated people are no longer able to catch up with the norms of everyday-life, they act against the status quo and turn into insanity in the end. The sane label those unclassifiable experiences as a mental illness and create a discourse in which the mentally ill are taken under control through various technologies including disciplinary power, psychiatric hospitals and psy-sciences in general with its sleeping pills, electroconvulsive therapy and so on. In this context, Lessing's critique of those institutions and practices in *Briefing* coincides with Foucault's theories on technologies of power and domination which intentionally makes a distinction between sanity and insanity. Thus, in the following chapter, technologies of domination/power will be studied related to the sovereign institutions and disciplines; hospitals and schools, psychiatry and archaeology within their reflections on the novel and with their relation to Foucauldian madness.

³ The references to the novel will be given with the abbreviation of *B* and page numbers henceforth.

CHAPTER TWO

2. TECHNOLOGIES OF DOMINATION IN *BRIEFING*

In order to examine the present, Foucault chooses to “problematize” it by posing questions about it, and then he goes back to the past with a critical stance. In *Madness and Civilization*, he problematizes the contemporary social sciences focusing more on madness. He tries to answer the question of how the human sciences are historically possible and what the outcomes of their existence are. Thanks to his genealogy, the scientific background of psychiatry is dismantled and the outcome of his criticism proposes that mental illness has been constituted by its societal apparatuses with powerful discourses and institutions, namely psychiatry and psychiatric hospitals. Within his later works, he keeps developing the Foucauldian madness creating new links between power and knowledge. “When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was talking about in *Madness and Civilization* or *the Birth of the Clinic*, but power? Yet I’m perfectly aware that I scarcely ever used the Word and never had such a field of analysis at my disposal” (Foucault 1980: 115).

According to Foucault, the human sciences were constituted in their modern forms in the 18th century and certain new ‘technologies’ were developed which help human beings understand themselves. Foucault theorizes those technologies as

technologies of production, which permit us to produce, transform, or manipulate things; technologies of sign systems, which permit us to use signs, meanings, symbols, or significations; technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject; technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. (Foucault 1988b: 18)

The last two technologies, technology of power/domination and technology of the self draw Foucault’s attention more than the former two. According to Foucault, the first technology of power is disciplinary power that emerges from the classical sovereignty diverging gradually as it progresses:

The historical moment of the disciplines was the moment when an art of the human body was born, which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely [...] The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it [...] discipline produces [...] ‘docile’ bodies. (1995: 137-138)

As the number of people who go to school or hospital has grown gradually, there has been a need for an efficient and inexpensive technology which would enable the authority to control easily and effectively. Thus, discipline is not identifiable with any institutions or disciplines as it becomes a technique. For example, it is perfectly used for particular ends in hospitals and schools exploring the human body as to provide docility; therefore, there are multiple similarities between them in practicing disciplinary power.

Disciplinary power has extended over every day experiences of individuals which was not possible previously for the state. It creates its own code by “the comparative measures that have the norm as reference” (Foucault 1995: 193). Furthermore, “the parts of the judicial state apparatus (police)” become responsible for the little details of individual lives (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 153). It is an economic power not practiced by tyranny but by non-stop surveillance. Through such strategies the power becomes internalized within a humanistic atmosphere. The control of space and activity with time tables are vital features of disciplines which act in concert with the practice of a double mode; gratification and punishment. Moreover, disciplinary power uses simple instruments such as “hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and their combination in a procedure that is specific to it, the examination” (Foucault 1995: 170) which are all traceable in *Briefing*. In the next section, firstly institutions such as hospital and school, secondly disciplines such as psychiatry and archaeology will be analyzed by taking into consideration their relation to power and madness. In that chapter, the subtitles of hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and the examination are taken from the book, *The Discipline & Punish* (1995) by Foucault.

2.1. Enclosed Institutions of Discipline: The Central Intake Hospital and The Educational Institutions

In *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault studies how Western society has defined and viewed madness and interacted with people accepted insane. In this genealogy of Western thought, examining the act of exclusion is the initial point because that exclusion makes the triumph of reason possible. The early example of exclusion was the highly infectious disease, leprosy. In the 12th century, there were 220 leper houses in England and Scotland and the number of such institutions increased throughout Middle Ages at the borders of European cities. In that way, the lepers were not only excluded from the society but also they were close enough to be observed. Their position was twofold: “[l]epers were seen as dangerous and wicked; they had been punished by God, but by the same token they were physical, bodily reminders of God’s power and of the Christian duty of charity”, which meant both a “spatial and social exclusion and cultural integration” simultaneously (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 3).

Due to the segregation of the lepers and cessation of the Crusades, leprosy became less widespread by the 16th century and with the waning of Middle Ages it almost disappeared from the Western world. “As leprosy vanished a void was created and the moral values had to find another scapegoat” (Sarup 1991: 60). There was a difference within the exclusion method in that epoch. Madness was not repelled from the city by ships, it was rather confined within castle-like buildings. In the 17th century, leper hospitals were taken over and they were used as asylums for those people “who were categorized as ‘socially useless’; this included the idle, the poor, those who had scandalized their families, together with those whose behavior was considered to be in any way abnormal” (Mills 2003: 100). There was a shift from Ship of Fools to Hospital of Fools. That is called the Great Confinement by Foucault and “more than one out of every hundred inhabitants of the city of Paris found themselves confined (in houses of confinement), within several months” (Foucault 1988a: 37).

The classical system of confinement had been related to the external social and economic changes such as the 17th century economic crisis in the Western world. After a break with that system, there was a novel attitude toward poorness. Previously, it had been regarded as both a personal choice and a moral fault due to the idleness. However, it was understood that poverty was the outcome of certain economic forces which was out of a person’s control. Moreover, it was rather needed for the wealth of a society.

Because they labor and consume little, those who are in need permit a nation to enrich itself, to set a high value on its fields, its colonies, and its mines, to manufacture products which will be sold the world over; in short, a people would be poor which had no paupers... The poor constitute the basis and the glory of nations. And their poverty, which cannot be suppressed, must be exalted and revered... (Foucault 1988a: 229-30)

There was even an appreciation of the poor which paralleled with the realization of the population as an economic force. In this sense, the system of confinement turned out to be an enormous mistake. It left out a major quantity of cheap labor from the market and it also required public charity. Those conditions transformed the confinement system. From an economical lens, there had to be a distinction between the interns who were able to work and who were not. Those who could not work needed care and support from society. There were some subgroups that still required confinement such as the mad, the physically ill and the criminal who caused troubles for the society. There was the idea that the mad had to be separated from the other interns. Therefore, there was a need for a new system of confinement in the 18th century. The groups excluding the ones above, were to be handled by the charity of their family and the neighbours. On the other hand, the mad and the criminals were distributed to the hospitals and the prisons as they needed to be handled by the wider community due to their danger against the public order. Thanks to the writers such as Tenon and Cabanis, the hospital version of confinement was seen the most proper model for the mad due to the fact within the confinement system,

a madman, in general, is let loose for most of the day: that freedom, in people unaccustomed to the rule of reason, is already a remedy that brings calm to the wandering or lost imagination'. In itself, without being anything other than this secluded form of liberty, confinement was thus an agent of cure: it was medical, not so much in terms of the care that it provided as in the play of imagination, liberty, silence and limits, and the movement that spontaneously organized them and brought error back to truth and madness back to reason. (quoted in Foucault 2006a: 436)

Even if the mad were put in the hospitals, doctors played tiny roles in the treatment of them at first. Gradually, the place that doctors held grew reaching the top position in the pyramid of the structure of hospitals.

Doris Lessing is conversant with Foucault's oeuvre and there are many examples in *Briefing* which relate to Foucauldian subjects. For instance, the names of the hospitals seem to be chosen on purpose and to refer to the Hôpital Général of Foucault. The establishment of the Hôpital Général in 1656 in France initiated the classical age of madness. That historical contingency is marked as 'the classical experience' of madness, defining the European attitude toward madness until the end of the 18th century⁴. From the establishment of the Hôpital Général to the end of the 18th century, the madmen⁵ were confined with prostitutes, homosexuals, blasphemers, libertines, spendthrift fathers, and prodigal sons all of which constituted a similar class; the unreasonable, the useless. The Hôpital Général "was a semi-judicial, semi-autonomous institution, operating outside the normal legal machinery and possessing powers of judgment, discipline, and punishment" (Sheridan 2006: 23). It was a practice of a monarchical and bourgeois order being organized in France. Several such institutions were gathered under a single administration seen in the king's edict of 1656: "All houses were assigned to the poor of Paris of both sexes, of all ages and from all localities, of whatever breeding and birth, in whatever state they may be, able-bodied or invalid, sick or convalescent, curable or incurable" (Foucault 1988a: 39). Thus, those institutions laid the base of today's institutes of psychiatry one of which is pictured in *Briefing*.

There are two hospitals mentioned in the novel; The Central Intake and The North Catchment. The word, "intake" has lexically been defined as "the number of things or people that are taken into something" (*Merriam Webster Learner's Dictionary*). Considering the description, the phrase Central Intake does not signify merely a conventional psychiatric hospital but there is more in it. The noun phrase suggests that Lessing focuses on the institution rather than a peculiar hospital. In the case of the Hôpital Général, it was a hospital in which multiple groups of people were confined labelled as the mad, the beggar, the vagabond to be corrected and adjusted to the society, and thus it marked the emergence of such enclosed institutions in Western history. The North Catchment also sounds peculiar and means "the area from which a school takes its students, a hospital its patients" (*Oxford Learner's dictionaries*). Considering their lexical meanings, the names of the hospitals seem to suggest that they are "scientifico-

⁴ The term Classical derives from the fact that French people generally calls that period "L'âge Classique", which is different from the Classical Age referring to ancient Greece.

⁵ This term is used in the text since Foucault uses it in *Madness and Civilization*.

disciplinary mechanisms” collecting different kinds of individuals for the same purpose; to strengthen the social forces and ensure order just like the Hôpital Général once did (Foucault 1995: 193). When patients are accepted to a hospital with or without a consent (generally in the case of madmen), they have already accepted to be questioned about subjects such as their disease, name, age, and family beside staying under constant surveillance during their treatment. In other words, patients enter a disciplinary machine which will turn them into docile bodies by training, distributing and analyzing. In the following section, Foucauldian hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and their combination as the examination will be studied to clarify how polyvalent disciplinary mechanisms operate through such humble instruments in the areas of medicine and education, and how those mechanisms are depicted and criticized by Lessing via *Briefing*.

2.1.1. Hierarchical Observation

Foucault names disciplinary institutions as observatories modelling on military camps: “In the perfect camp, all power would be exercised solely through exact observation; each gaze would form a part of the overall functioning of power” (Foucault 1995:171). In that sense, the structure of the asylum is significant to understand the essence of the modern cognitive consciousness of madness. It was not the disinterested scientific inquiry that created modern psychology and psychiatry but the asylum’s structure. According to Foucault, asylums were the places in which the mad became objects of the “medical gaze” and of medical treatment (2006a: xvii). The former was related to “a moral judgment of the mad as violators of bourgeois society’s values and that the latter consists of techniques for compelling the mad back beneath the yoke of these values (Gutting 1989: 91).

In the Central Intake hospital, to which Watkins is brought, there is a hierarchized surveillance placing the doctor at the head of the pyramidal disciplinary structure. The nurse are placed under the doctor and the basement is constituted by the patients. “[I]n the internal hierarchy, Doctors relegate (the staff) to a clearly specified, but subordinate role” (Foucault 1995: 186). In *Briefing*, there are two hospitals; the Central Intake and the North Catchment and Watkins is treated in the former by Doctor X. and Doctor Y. The doctors’ names are not abbreviated to conceal their identity as in the case of psychiatric patients, but to pin their material function in the scientifico-disciplinary mechanism of

the hospital as mere mathematical symbols masqueraded as health-care providers (Fike 2016: 23).

Watkins is not able to see Doctor X.; therefore, he “never say[s] a word to him” (*B* 236). That occasion signifies Watkins’s dislike of the doctor according to Doctor Y.: “It would be so much easier if you didn’t show your dislike of Doctor X. so strongly. It is quite irrational you know. I understand that among the patients I’m a goody and he is a baddy. It’s like schoolchildren” (*B* 236). However, it does not cause a change in the caring process regarding the superior position of doctors. On the other hand, Doctor Y. asks Watkins whether he wants to talk to his nurse, Nurse Kincaid, or not. If not, Doctor Y. suggests putting a tape recorder in his room which will do the same work: recording Watkins’s speech. As each gaze has a significant role in the functioning of power, the nurses have to be with the patients as much as possible observing them, talking to them and even filling files about them in accordance with their tasks entrusted by doctors beforehand. During their shifts, Doctors may question the patient in accordance with the information brought by the nurses. In the dialogue between Doctor Y. and Watkins, Doctor Y. utters Watkins that “the nurse tells me you are Sinbad today?” (*B* 17); the question mark implies that a doctor may question the patient in accordance with the statement of a nurse.

After Watkins has been taken to the hospital by the police, he is immediately put at “the small Observation ward” due to his loud noise and uncontrolled conducts by the night nurse (*B* 11). The features of the room are significant in resembling the cellular form of disciplinary architecture. Watkins is safe and alone in that ward and other patients are protected from any probable danger and discomfort that would be caused by him. As the peculiar naming suggests, the room is created to observe patients individually and in detail.

In the case of psychiatric hospitals, there has been a transformation in the schema of enclosure from thick walls, heavy gates to empty spaces, passages and transparencies all of which render visible those who are inside a building similar to the Foucauldian metaphor, Panopticon. Panopticon is an architectural structure designed for prison by Jeremy Bentham, the English philosopher of modern utilitarianism. That model of prison aims “to create in the prisoners a feeling of constantly being watched whereas, in reality, he is not being watched at all... The essence of the idea of the Panopticon is the internalization of the behavioral code of the oppressor” (Nandi 2015: 397). It enables the

guards to have an uninterrupted view and everlasting observation or gaze of the activities of the inmate. According to Bentham, “[i]ts great excellence consists in the great strength it is capable of giving to any institution it may be thought proper to apply it to” (1995: 29-95). To Foucault, it functions not only for a prison but also for other institutions such as hospitals and schools all of which are touched upon throughout the novel by means of the words of prison shades, and traps.

Through Panopticism, according to its supporters, social control is possible with the operation of an automatic and anonymous form of power. Within that scope, “the disciplinary technologies of power, domination, and the objectification of the human subject produce new ‘knowledges’ that enable human sciences to develop” (Besley 2002: 18). Placing people under surveillance is more efficient, profitable, and cheaper than to subject them to some exemplary penalty as in the case of sovereign power. Such discoveries have led a transformation in terms of power both as a concept and as a technique. According to Foucault, power does not repress, constraints, or prohibits as it was once accepted; it rather produces reality and the domains of objects and rituals of truth as in the example of psychiatry. It cannot be possessed by an individual or a class and it does not emanate from a sovereign or a state. It is more like a network and extends to everywhere. In the interview, “Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual” conducted by Michael Bess, Foucault clarifies how his understanding of power differs from the earlier intellectuals:

[Power] does not mean picking up this tape recorder and throwing it on the ground. I have the capacity to do so—materially, physically, sportively. But I would not be exercising power if I did that. However, if I take this tape recorder and throw it on the ground in order to make you mad, or so that you can’t repeat what I’ve said, or to put pressure on you so that you’ll behave in such and such a way, or to intimidate you—well, what I’ve done, by shaping your behavior through certain means, *that* is power. (Bess 1988: 2)

According to Foucault, physical force does not mean the real power, contrarily he names it zero-degree of power since the real power shapes one’s behavior and mindset by humble instruments such as hierarchical observation. Therefore, Foucault does not accept Philippe Pinel in France Pinel and Samuel Tuke in England (the founders of The Moral Management reform in asylums) the saviors of the madmen even if they are famous for freeing the insane from the chains. They were believed to destroy the cells of the classical

confinement system and originate the scientific and humanitarian psychology and psychiatry (Gutting 1989: 91). Tuke freed the mad placing them at the idyllic country, the Retreat in York. He stressed that the artificial features of the modern social life were the basic reasons for madness. They had a simple living with a natural setting at the Retreat. However, Foucault interprets that simple living as a return to a primitive social group emerging from the Biblical family which was

a great fraternal community of patients and helpers, under the authority of the directors and the administration. It was a rigorous family, without weakness or complacency, but fair, in accordance with the great image of the biblical family... [The patients] were the children of the family in its primitive ideality. (Foucault 2006a: 474)

In that system, the mad were supposed to submit themselves to both work and observation. The mad were adjusted to the order that divine commandments suggested by means of the therapy of work. Their progress was observed by the caretakers and tea parties were the best organizations in which the mad met their directors, caretakers and other staff. They were supposed to dress their best clothes and behave in an elegant way.

Foucault does not evaluate that kind of life as natural and to him it could not heal madness. The system of the Retreat “placed the alienated (the mad) in a moral environment where they entered into debate with themselves and their surroundings; the aim was to constitute a milieu in which, far from being protected, he was maintained in a state of perpetual unease, constantly threatened by Law and Guilt” (Foucault 2006a: 483). The mad were the objects of scrutiny in the Retreat and that process did not supply any scientific knowledge for the observing people but it created fear and guilt for the people being observed. In the classical age there was also terror and fear, yet in the Retreat those feelings were internalized according to Foucault:

Tuke substituted the stifling responsibility of anguish for the free terror of madness; the fear was no longer of what lay on the other side of the prison door, but what raged instead beneath the seals of conscience... The asylum organized the guilt of the madmen for the madman as self-consciousness, in a non-reciprocal relation with his keeper, and it organized it for men of reason as a consciousness of the other, and a therapeutic intervention into the madman’s existence. (2006a: 485)

As a result, the mad became an object of punishment. Even if the Retreat seemed more humane than the classical confinement system, it was more dominating and manipulative. The mad was controlled “by the manipulation of his own feelings of responsibility and guilt. Never before had he been recruited as his own keeper” (Gutting 1989: 93). Thus, through the modern technologies of power, there is the internalized form of power in modern institutions which can actually be more dangerous.

Foucault assimilates the Panopticon cells to the “cages [and] so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible” (1995: 200), which parallels to the features of the Observation ward in the Central Intake of the novel. There is not much information about Watkins’s day room, though. It is described as cozy having pink curtains, which shows how different the disciplinary power is from that of tyranny in terms of its false humanistic side. There are three other men in his room, which supports the idea of the orderly grid. In the orderly grid, patients are grouped by the hospital regarding their illness, age and gender to control the space and observe the inmates easily. When Violet, another patient in the Central Intake, has dropped by Watkins’s room for a bed-time chat, the steps of the nurse are heard: “Feet were coming along the passage to this room [...] lights were going out in the wards off the passage [...] This was the last ward of this set of wards” (B 246- 247). That description coincides with the features of disciplinary architecture furnished by the passages and an orderly grid as set of wards. Foucault states that “[t]he science of mental disease, as it would develop in the asylum, would always be only of the order of observation and classification” (1988a: 250) and that peculiar architectural transformation eases such a construction process. In *Briefing*, this continuous observation is apparent in the institution. Even if Violet has been allowed to turn off the light in a minute, the nurse does not leave her alone even for a minute. The nurse waits somewhere close to the door until Violet leaves the room, which demonstrates that Violet is not permitted to stay at Watkins’s room by herself probably due to her gender, her age, or the time table even if they are close friends. As a classification system, there is an orderly grid in the organization of the patients and their wards in the Central Intake as a symbol of psychiatric institutions.

As another kind of Panopticon, teaching establishments with their educational system correlate with the hierarchical structure of hospitals. The head of educational pyramid is the instructor and then follows him some peculiar students who are given

certain tasks by their teachers. The basement is constituted by ordinary students. In *Briefing*, although the educational system is criticized, there is not much emphasis on its physical structure. In her letter to Watkins, Rosemary Baines, the retired headmistress, makes some references to the educational buildings:

Outside the University entrance... I slowed and began glancing in at the great porticoes and pillars, the formal pompousness of the place, and I was thinking that such impersonality, formality, is how one can most easily identify a place of learning—school, university, college, and that this atmosphere in itself must set a condition of thinking for a young person being educated in it. (*B* 155)

According to Foucault, disciplinary power is invisible in its apparatuses; therefore, the schools turn into educational disciplinary machines which are not attached to individuals applying powerful techniques but seen as formal systems secreting a machinery of control. Baines carries on reading the architecture of the University via the lens of semiotics writing that

there was a steady stream of them [students] coming across to the gates. I was looking... thinking how tinily unimportant these human beings looked beside the great cold buildings that were supposed to be their servants, and that no young thing learning there could ever believe that human beings are more important than their institutions. Words, teachers, textbooks could say one thing: the building itself shouted the opposite. (*B* 155-156)

As a symbol, the building signifies the hierarchical structure of the educational system with its dominant architecture turning the students into tiny and unimportant *things* ready to experience a kind of docility by a standardized education. Students learn how to label and classify things demolishing their brave, gay and creative mindset in the standardized education. According to Lessing, “[t]he child must be protected from the narrowing and littling of ordinary education, from the idea that a person can be a tinker or a tailor but not both, or, if both, then he is to be congratulated on his versatility” (1971). Considering her criticism against education, it is needed to remember Lessing’s lack of formal education. In an interview, she states that “I am glad I haven’t been educated because it seems to me almost impossible not to have this arrogance if you are brought up inside the Western education system” (Bigsby 1980: 85). By arrogance, she refers to the established authorities to reinforce dichotomies and judge others in connection with their own classifying schemes such as civilized/uncivilized—either this or that. In the same letter

of Baines, there is also a description of a lecture hall in which Watkins gives a speech about education. It is an “ugly lecture room” with “hard upright chairs” which is interpreted as an “uninspiring setting” for a creative discussion of education for children (*B* 148-149). Baines likens the hall to “the village hall,” “the local hall,” or “the church hall” (*B* 149) showing their similarity as powerful disciplinary systems which aim at creating docility represented firstly in their design.

Disciplinary establishments have a tendency to become “de-institutionalized” disseminating throughout the society as centers of observation (Foucault 1995: 211). The gaze is alert everywhere about which Doctor Y. warns Watkins when he wants to leave the hospital and share a flat with Violet. The doctor states that “[i]t’s extremely easy to find out where people are these days. There is an industry to do just that” (*B* 239). That quote indicates the panoptic fashion of contemporary world with its constant surveillance practiced even in the society itself. Considering the quote above, “the panoptic principle—seeing everything, everyone, all the time” (Foucault 2006b: 52) operates in the novel surpassing the walls of the Central Intake hospital and disperses through the society, which leads a possibility of “endless extraction of knowledge” (Foucault 2006b: 77) ready to be used.

2.1.2. Normalizing Judgement

Normalizing judgement is the standard by which disciplinary systems operate efficiently. It has a double system consisting of gratification and punishment. The outcome of that mechanism is that the definition of behavior and performance is based on two opposed values of good and bad (Foucault 1995: 179). There is a tendency to disobey such a two-poled system for Watkins even before his breakdown. In his letter, Jeremy Thorne, Watkins’s colleague in Cambridge, mentions that when Watkins is at war,

Charles was in infantry, and then with Tanks [...] He refused a commission, more than once. This was so like him. I asked him why, and he began roaring with laughter and said he had refused to annoy people. I found it then, and find it now—affected [...] I could say that ‘this caused ill feeling’ [...] I realized that it might have caused ill feeling in me, but I don’t think in Charles. (*B* 186)

An individual is rewarded due to her/his good performance and behavior in that mechanism. Accepting a reward or a commission is also seen as a good feature and it is

normalized within society; that's why, having been asked about Watkins by the doctors, Watkins's acquaintances think about his refusal of commission immediately. In the army, Watkins serves under Philip Brent-Hamstead for four years. Philip writes in his letter that Watkins "refused a commission for some time although [Philip] brought pressure to bear" (B 201). That attitude of Watkins takes lots of attention and in the end he has to change his mind to become a lieutenant.

The lecture Lessing gives after having won the Nobel Prize is named "On not Winning the Nobel Prize". In the article named "On Doris Lessing and Not Saying Thank You", Alexandra Schwartz notes the following story of Lessing. After her run-in with the press that has announced the Nobel Prize, Lessing goes into her house (quoted in *The Newyorker*). She returns with a glass of water. Sitting on her front steps, she asks the reporters how she is supposed to react to their announcement. She adds that "[t]he whole thing is so graceless and stupid and bad mannered" (quoted in *The Newyorker*). In that occasion, the press stammers and Lessing is clearly having fun, which is similar to Watkins's unexpected attitude toward commission. His reason to refuse the commission is to annoy people and he explains that attitude with a laughter given to his friend, Thorne. In both situations, the manner is abrupt and confusing tearing down the norms.

Even if there is a rewarding pole in the normalizing judgement, it is characterized more like as a kind of "infra-penalty", which can penetrate the neglected and escaped area by law within disciplinary institutions (Foucault 1995: 178). In that sense, hospitals and schools subject their inmates or attendants to a system of micro-penalty structured by micro-penalty "of behaviour (impoliteness, disobedience), of speech (idle chatter, insolence), of the body ('incorrect' attitudes, irregular gestures, lack of cleanliness), of sexuality (impurity, indecency)" (Foucault 1995: 178) all of which are exemplified in *Briefing*.

According to La Salle, "[b]y the word of punishment, one must understand everything that is capable of making [people] feel the offence they have committed, everything that is capable of humiliating them, or confusing them" (quoted in Foucault 1995: 178). In Watkins's case, there are many examples of non-physical punishment. As an example of micro-penalty of behavior, he is unaccepted by the society and labelled by different characters in various ways all of which actually refers to a kind of abnormality. Thorne describes him in his letter as "Negative," "destructive," "pain in the neck" and "the original eccentric oddball" (B 191). According to Constance, his mistress, Watkins

is above every human emotion (*B* 192). Felicity mentions him as “strange” (*B* 182) in her letter to Doctor Y. To Miles, the war does not change Watkins, but Miles finds him “ill” (*B* 201). As Lessing notes in the Afterword, or End-paper of the novel, extra sensitivity and perception are handicaps in a society organized as ours is, which favors the conforming, the average, and the obedient (*B* 251). By experiencing things differently, Watkins has problems in keeping pace with his surroundings. When he tries to socialize, everybody around him endeavors to adjust Watkins to the norms accepted by the society in multiple ways.

In his letter, Thorne states that when Watkins visits him after he has got the post at University with his help, Watkins is “scruffy, untidy, a bit flamboyant [...] Nothing terrible [...] but pretty irritating” (*B* 187). Therefore, Thorne tells him to take his appearance more seriously adding that Watkins is putting him in a difficult position. Watkins’s reaction is quite surprising and effective in solving the situation. In their following encounter, Thorne finds Watkins wearing Thorne’s own jacket which her wife is planning to throw away and smoking a pipe which Watkins has never smoked before, and he even gets his hair cut just like Thorne does (*B* 187). In that example, Watkins’s extraordinary conducts exemplify the link between madness and Foucauldian resistance. Watkins seems to conform to the social norms on the surface. However, his new style irritates Thorne more than his previous outfit.

According to Foucault, the most significant technique used in the asylums was to subject the patients to “perpetual judgement”: “Everything is organized so that the mad recognize themselves in the world of judgement that envelops them from all sides: they are to know that they are observed, judged and condemned” (2006a: 500-501). In the psychiatric hospitals there are similar techniques which aim at normalizing the patients and turn them into docile bodies in the end. In the Central Intake hospital, doctors give different soothing medications that will enable Watkins to stay calm and get relaxed. Sleeping pills and other medications are backed up with the control of space, time and activity of the patients. The control of space tactic has been mentioned in the observation section. In the normalizing part, the emphasis is on the adjusting patients’ behaviors and activities to the daily life standards. Foucault notes that “*tableaux vivants*” transform “the confused, useless or dangerous multitudes into ordered multiplicities” (1995: 148). In other words, time table is practiced within disciplinary institutions as another effective

normalizing technique. In the novel, the most vivid example of such a time table is sleep-wake schedule including the fixed meal times.

Lessing describes Watkins both as psychiatric patient and as an inner space traveler simultaneously, which helps readers be aware of different dimensions sometimes paralleling with each other. In Watkins's inner journey, there is a transformation from ocean to land starting from the Atlantic Ocean. Thanks to his raft, he is able to reach anti-clockwise currents in the southern hemisphere and land on a rock in the end. His inner journey fits in his outer life within the hospital in that part. Affected by the numerous sleeping pills of doctors and nurses, Watkins is able to sleep in the hospital. In his inner journey, Watkins's handmade raft has split apart and after a harsh sea voyage, he lands on a rock with the help of a porpoise. Since he is safe in his visionary experience, there is no hindrance for him to sleep. The nurse comes into the room to wake Watkins as he has slept too much according to hospital's time-table.

NURSE: Wake up. Wake up there's a dear. Come on, *no* that's it. Sit up, all right I'm holding you.

PATIENT: Why? What for?

NURSE: You must have something to eat. All right you can go back to sleep in a minute. But you certainly can sleep, can't you?

PATIENT: Why make me sleep if you keep waking me up?

NURSE: You aren't really supposed to be sleeping quite so much. You are supposed to be relaxed and quiet, but you do sleep.

PATIENT: Who supposes? Who gave me the pills?

NURSE: Yes, but—well never mind. Drink this.

PATIENT: That's foul.

NURSE: It's soup. Good hot soup.

PATIENT: Let me alone. You give me pills and then you keep waking me up.

(B 32-33)

The nurse signifies the psychiatric control over the patients stating that Watkins is supposed to be relaxed and quiet. He is not supposed to sleep that much. With her word "no", written in italics by Lessing, the nurse also concretizes her restrictive authority. This time, Watkins has problems of adapting to the norms of the hospital, which has its peculiar laws and needs that are all designed to normalize and control the patients.

In terms of exemplifying micro-penalty of body and sexuality, Lessing places a twenty-one-year-old girl, Violet Stoke in the novel who violates “the framework of ordinary morality” as her name suggests (*B* 228). In the novel, Violet is described a beautiful brunette. Yet, her beauty does not provide her acceptance into the society of that time. While her dress fits her smoothly over her breasts and hips closing her neck high, it ends four inches below the top of the thigh, which means that the dress is shorter even than fashion demands according to female nurses. In such descriptions, the focus is always on her body. Adding to the lopped mini-dress, she does not wear panties, leaving her private part evident “as a moist dark fuzzy patch” (*B* 227). Furthermore, Violet comes in Watkins’s room at ten at night, wearing flowered little- girl pyjamas and a white fluffy dressing gown, which can be another example of an incorrect attitude related to her incorrect clothing (*B* 245).

Due to her way of dressing, she is under the constant observation especially of the two female nurses. She is perfectly aware that the two middle-aged women observe her more than they observe the other patients considering the aura of hatred created by the nurses to isolate her. While the nurses judge that her being in a parody of a housekeeper’s dress which does not cover her sexual organ is a challenge to their sanity, Violet accuses them of being old-fashioned, girl-hating, sex-hating and *old* (*B* 228). Those nurses are poor women, badly paid, working class, and they have to work there because their husbands are not paid enough. However, Violet sees them “three times life-size, arbitrarily powerful, dangerous, and frightening” playing their part in the hierarchical and powerful structure of the hospital as both “mother-and-authority figures” (*B* 227-228). Found disgusting and seditious by the nurses, which imply “indecent and impurity” (Foucault 1995: 178), Violet is under the micro-penalty of body and sexuality simultaneously as a technique of normalizing judgment.

Moreover, Violet is not able to escape from the female gazes in terms of her “irregular gestures,” which is a sub category of micro-penalty of body in *The Discipline & Punish* (Foucault 1995: 178). While Violet is in Watkins’s room, she asks the nurse to turn off the light a bit later with her “flashing eyes and pouting lips, trying out her three-year-old powers” (*B* 248). In another section, Doctor Y. asks Watkins whether he is sure about leaving the hospital and sharing a flat with Violet since Violet is behaving like a small girl playing at grown-ups (*B* 238). Regarding the examples, both the nurses and the

doctors of the Central Intake benefit from the disciplinary technique of normalizing judgment using their authoritative discourses on both Watkins and Violet.

As another micro penalty of body, the lack of cleanliness is also exemplified by means of the same character, Violet. Her dress is depicted as grubby and she is described as smelling due to not washing as much as she should, which is interpreted also as “a very familiar sign of her illness” (*B* 228) by the same nurses. According to them, she does not keep clean as she is not normal. Thus, the uncleanliness is related to her being accepted as mentally ill.

After doctors and nurses apply multiple forms of normalizing judgments and the patients complete their time in the hospital (The Central Intake is a reception hospital), there are some cases in which there is no improvement in patients' health. In such circumstances, the last treatment is the Electroconvulsive Therapy which actually operates as a physical punishment. It is noted in the novel that “[t]here was no method of treatment that caused more emotion in the wards, more fear [...] [even the new drugs whose effects were known little] did not provoke nearly as much fearful comment and speculation” (*B* 235) among patients as E.C.T did in the Central Intake hospital. Practicing shock therapy is polyvalent in the hospital creating a fearful atmosphere, which supports the idea that “[t]he principle of fear, which is rarely decreased by insanity, is considered as of great importance in the management of the patients” (quoted in Foucault 1988a: 245).

On the other hand, the outcome of shock therapy as a medical treatment is not completely known in psychiatric hospitals. Watkins asks Doctor Y. whether doctors know about the effects of E.C.T. on patients or not. Doctor Y.'s reply is brief and clear when he says “no” adding that “there are thousands, probably millions by now, of people who would be too depressed to go on living without it” (*B* 241). This statement is a proof for the docility caused by shock treatment, which stupefies patients who are dealing with daily problems and some unclassifiable experiences. Regardless of its unknown side effects, E.C.T is used in psychiatric hospitals in adjusting the non-conforming to the norms as a secreted punishment.

After the shock treatment, patients either improve in accordance with doctors' standards or turn into zombies indicating their docility. “In such process of normalization, individuals are turned into ghosts and act as they are asked; just like zombies who have no discerning eyes and belonging bodies” (Beheshti and Shafieyan 2016: 2057). Watkins

and Violet are aware of such probable consequences. After Doctor Y. has talked about the alternatives for Watkins, Watkins understands that he does not have another choice except the shock therapy. While Watkins is trying to persuade himself for shock therapy, Violet does not hesitate to talk about the frightening result of it. She states that “[y]ou know as well as I do what some of them (electrocuted patients) get like. They’re like shadows. They’re like zombies. It isn’t as if you haven’t seen what happens” (B 246). As the story gets closer to the end, Central Intake hospital reminds readers more of a Panoptic prison rather than a psychiatric hospital. “Some of the patients reacted as if they were in a prison and one of their number had offered to be electrocuted” (B 246) when it comes to experience shock therapy. The hospital turns into a prison with all its disciplinary practices and punishing devices, especially the E.C.T at the end of Watkins’s story.

It is vital to explain that E.C.T is generally used just after the trial of other medicines if there is no improvement. However, it is applied to Watkins much later, at the end of the book due to Doctor Y.’s impediment (B 245). Before his breakdown, Watkins was a professor of Classics at Cambridge University having a prestigious place within society. Therefore, he is even asked about the course of his would-be treatment by Doctor Y., which exemplifies the hierarchy established even among the patients in the hospital.

According to Foucault, normalizing judgement can be applied within different disciplinary mechanisms one of which is education. As a comparative measure, the power of the Norm is utilized within both hospitals and educational buildings such as schools and universities.

The Normal is established as a principle of coercion in teaching with the introduction of a standardized education and the establishment of the *écoles normales* (teachers’ training colleges); it is established in the effort to organize a national medical profession and a hospital system capable of operating general norms of health... (Foucault 1995: 184)

Foucault theorizes some similarities between hospital and school both of which refer to the disciplinary structure of a prison. In *Briefing*, Lessing gives examples of hospital and educational discourse evaluating them as dominant systems which operate through the construction of the normality like a practice of Foucauldian theory. In her letter to Watkins, Baines mentions a lecture given by Watkins about education in which there are her ex-pupils. They are planning “for a new kind of school [for their kids]—no, not to

supplant ordinary education, what the State provide, but to supplement it. Some kind of a weekend school with emphasis on unorthodox individual teaching” (*B* 148-149). The parents are in search of something new and better in education; however, they do not know exactly what they are searching for. According to Watkins, parents including him see children as creatures being trapped and corrupted by what once has trapped and corrupted them (*B* 150). Their effort to educate their children better is to be appreciated; however, “[o]nce adulthood is reached the newly grown ones join with the older ones, their parents, as they turn about and look back into their own infancy having missed the opportunity of being better, braver, and gayer” (*B* 151). Better education is believed to create a race of children that is superior than their families, yet the point is to disagree that something better than oneself is possible. Accordingly, in the novel Watkins notes: “Education means only this—that the lively alert fearless curiosity must be fed, must be kept alive. That is education” (*B* 152).

After the lecture given by Watkins, Baines feels awake and names that peculiar experience as the “wavelength” in which she feels as if she is “three, four or five, a creature quite different from the person she [is] doomed to grow into” (*B* 153). Following that transition, she writes down in her letter that she remembers things she has forgotten for years before those “prison shades” come down shutting the trap (*B* 153). Regarding the word usage above, Lessing in a way renames the Panopticon of Foucault with the phrase of ‘prison shades’.

The recurrent use of “trap” also proves its vitality within the novel. Even if the imputed signifier changes, the signified is always a disciplinary power mechanism either an institution or a discourse both having Panoptic characters. Before his official breakdown is diagnosed by the police, doctors and the nurses, Watkins has gone to see Baines. Watkins finds her and Frederick Larson while they are chatting at a Greek restaurant in Gower Street, which is mentioned in Baines’s letter to Doctor Y. After ordering Watkins a meal, they take him to Baines’s house regardless of his grimy clothes, dirty hands and his stale smell. At that time, Watkins “was talking about getting out of the trap, getting out of prison, of escaping—that kind of talk [...] [Baines adds that] I have no way of knowing how real to Charles that night were the prisons, the nets, the cages, the traps that he talked about” (*B* 199).

After having read Baines’s letter in the Central Intake, Watkins tells Doctor Y. that “[s]ometimes I do think that there is something there [in Baines’s letter] for me [...]

but how can I be sure? It is so easy to be trapped. I'm trapped here. I might find that another trap" (*B* 240). Before his breakdown, Watkins is aware of the traps/Panopticons as the means of standardized education, normalized society, and other powerful discourses. Yet, he cannot fight against that pressure of "the framework of ordinary life" in sanity as Baines suggests (*B* 200). Therefore, he goes out of the borders becoming "abnormal" and "mad". However, that situation does not escape Panoptic mechanism and this time he is in a new trap called the Central Intake turning Watkins into a chronic sceptic in interpreting even Baines's letter as a would-be trap.

2.1.3. The Examination

Hierarchical observation and normalizing judgement are disciplinary techniques that are combined within the examination. Examination is a "normalizing gaze", which enables classifying, qualifying and correcting its subject in the end (Foucault 1995: 184). In the case of hospitals, "[o]ne of the essential conditions for the epistemological 'thaw' of medicine at the end of the eighteenth century was the organization of the hospital as an 'examining' apparatus" (Foucault 1995: 185). The hospital transformed into an examining machine by the regular visits of physicians at that time. Eventually, the physician increased the regularity of the visits, and his role enlarged including the administrable scope of the hospital. As a resident physician, he started acting on "the internal hierarchy relegating the staff to a clearly specified, but subordinate role" in the examination machine (Foucault 1995: 186). After that, the category of the nurse appeared providing the perpetuity of examination. All such applications have turned the hospital into a training and correcting space, which also enable the constitution of a corpus of knowledge/power.

The 'well-disciplined' hospital became the physical counterpart of the medical 'discipline'; this discipline could now abandon its textual character and take its references not so much from the tradition of author-authorities as from a domain of objects perpetually offered for examination. (Foucault 1995: 186)

In the examination machine, patients are individualized and analyzed by various techniques one of which is the highly practiced documentation. In documentation, individuals are situated in a network of writing by being captured and fixed. According to Foucault, surveillance is also based on documentation. In a system of permanent registration, the name, age, sex of every patient, complaints and irregularities of them are

documented and transmitted to the hospital staff and to the doctors (Foucault 1995: 196). *Briefing* opens up with an admittance sheet of CENTRAL INTAKE HOSPITAL written in capital letters: “Name... Unknown, Sex... Male, Age... Unknown, Address... Unknown,” and some general remarks written by the night nurse at 6 a.m. on Friday, August 15th, 1969 (B 11). When Watkins has been brought to the hospital, he immediately enters into the registration system. The registration is made by the night nurse and the later documents of him are filled by his doctors: Doctor Y. and Doctor X. interchangeably.

As another field of documentation, the police records support disciplinary mechanisms acting as a state-apparatus. Although the police institution is organized by the state and linked to the political sovereignty, it actually operates with specific elements. For the police, the minute details of everyday life are open to be scrutinized. “Police power must bear ‘over everything’ [...] the police are concerned with ‘those things of every moment’, those ‘unimportant things’”⁶ (Foucault 1995: 213). In the General Remarks by the night nurse, it is stated that Patient has been found by the police at mid-night near Waterloo Bridge (B 11). Following that, the patient is taken to the station as the police reckon that he is either drunk or drugged. After the police have agreed the patient suffers from neither of them, they take him to Central Intake Hospital.

To Foucault, unlike judicial or administrative writing, earlier police registers were about the behaviors, attitudes, possibilities and even suspicion, “a permanent account of individuals’ behavior” in the 18th century (Foucault 1995: 214). By taking into account Watkins’s case, there has been no change in the scope that the police power is in charge of. The police describe the patient as Rambling, Confused and Amenable and find him wandering on the embankment at mid-night, which also parallels with the description of disciplinary power as “[i]t ‘trains’ the moving, confused, useless multitudes of bodies and forces into a multiplicity of individual elements” (Foucault 1995: 170).

With all its documentary techniques, the examination turns each individual into a “case” which constitutes not only an object for a branch of knowledge but also a hold for a branch of power (Foucault 1995: 191). In the novel, everything Watkins says and does is interpreted through the language of psy-sciences and written down on his dossier by the doctors and the nurses all turning him into a case. Watkins is having an inner journey as a sea voyager when he is brought to the hospital. He attempts to lie down on the desk

⁶ Single quotation marks are taken from Great Instruction of Catherine II, Supplement to the *Instruction for the drawing up of a new code*, 1769, article 535.

thinking that it is a boat or a yacht. When he is under the impression that he is on some sort of voyage, he becomes a possible amateur or a yachtsman in the eyes of doctors (*B* 11). When Doctor Y. asks Watkins about what he has lectured, he replies “Sinbad the sailor man” and he utters: “Sinbad and bad sin,” all of which make him a would-be criminal even with a non-routine guilt, which is written and fixed in his dossier (*B* 19). After Watkins has attended the conference in his inner journey, he tries to explain that inner experience to Doctor Y. In that planetary conference, “messengers from a superior intelligence are briefed for a journey to Earth, where they are to reawaken previous messengers and alert potentially responsive humans to their central purpose—the need to live in Harmony with the Laws of Existence” (King 1989: 58). After his try to explain that unclassifiable experience, Doctor Y. labels him as a “paranoic” and “disassociated” with “religious delusions” (*B* 138) in his file.

According to Lessing, “[e]ach person is a marvelous mosaic of thousands of pieces. Each is unique”; therefore, she opposes “the methods of case studies with which human beings are classified and stamped” (Schwarzkop 1981: 109). The novel exemplifies her mindset since Watkins has been stamped as paranoid, deluded and even as criminal within the files till his lost wallet is found. After the police have found his wallet in the street in Parliament Square with a family photograph, they match the photograph with another photograph taken by them at station the night Watkins is picked up (*B* 133). After that, Watkins is able to do away with previous superficial labels such as sailor and criminal. Following his one month stay at Central Intake, there has been no change in the course of his amnesiac state. After all, his name and other basic information about him have been attained thanks to the police.

When Doctor Y. is away from the hospital for some time, Doctor X. starts a new treatment to help Watkins remember who he is: the medications of Librium, 3 Tofronil, 3 t.a.d. After that medication, Watkins is not able to stay awake. That treatment is known making people drowsy, but in Watkins’s case, it makes him very sleepy. Therefore, his condition hardens to make a classification and start a treatment accordingly, all of which leaves Doctor X. nonplussed. After Doctor Y. has returned to the hospital, he diagnoses that Watkins is in a coma regarding the information brought by the nurse. Doctor Y. writes in the file that this new drug used by Doctor X. is “contra-indicated”, which may suggest that Doctor Y. wants Watkins quit the drug (*B* 87). On the other hand, Doctor X. disagrees Doctor Y. with the authority of attending the conference in which Watkins’s case has

been discussed. In that conference, it is agreed that the drug's effects are often not fully developed for three weeks; therefore, the treatment needs more time. In that section, the relation between hierarchical observation and examination is clarified since the medical conference and its attendants are at the higher state of the pyramidal structure of the psychiatric hospital in deciding the course of a treatment. Watkins is examined in the meeting being turned into an object of knowledge exemplified in the following quote:

The examination as the fixing, at once ritual and 'scientific', of individual differences, as the pinning down of each individual in his own particularity [...] clearly indicates the appearance of a new modality of power in which each individual receives as his status his own individuality, and in which he is linked by his status to the features, the measurements, the gaps, the 'marks' that characterize him and make him a 'case'. (Foucault 2013: 192)

In turning patients into cases, the everyday individuality of everybody is observed and described in detail which turns out a document for possible use. Watkins is regularly described and analyzed by the doctors in his file. Furthermore, he is asked for writing his memories after which he scribes two texts; the Yugoslavian war experience and the story of a honeysuckle. In that sense, documentation technique is used in every possible way functioning as a procedure of objectification and subjection in Central Intake.

Examination techniques are also practiced in some occasions when it is "necessary to recognize the patients and expel shamblers" (Foucault 1995: 189) Watkins has not improved as expected reacting the drugs in unique ways. Therefore, Doctor X. reinterprets his situation as a possible "shambling" that Watkins remembers more than he lets on (*B* 233). By that way, Doctor X. tries to fill in the gaps between Watkins and other cases. Violet tells that she has heard, "there was a case last year when a man went on pretending he couldn't remember his wife (resembling Watkins's case), but then Doctor X. caught him out and he had to go home" (*B* 233).

In terms of analyzing examination in teaching establishments, there are not many examples in the novel as the narrative takes place in a psychiatric hospital. Yet, there are some references to standardized education and the related establishments thanks to the letters by Watkins's family and friends. In teaching establishments, it is necessary to "define the aptitude of each individual, situate his level and his abilities" (Foucault 1995: 189). In his letter, Thorne notes that Watkins has an almost photographic memory which enables him get phenomenal marks by studying day and night for the month beforehand

the examination, adding that he forgets most of it a few months later (*B* 187). Considering that example, Watkins tries to adjust to the norms of any kind throughout his life; however, his memory is not so strong against the effects of ‘prison shades’. Having managed to pass the examination threshold of training machine, he lets go off all the memorized knowledge afterwards. In her letter to Doctor Y., Mrs. Watkins mentions the effects of examination time on Watkins even if he is a professor at the mentioned time. According to her, at the beginning of summer Watkins always “gets difficult”; he is “bad-tempered” and “crotchety” because it is “examination time”, which supports the idea that Watkins is always overwhelmed with the trapping institutions and its disciplinary techniques concretized in the examination (*B* 146).

Consequently, as a polyvalent technique, the documentation enables “individuals to be captured, [examined] and fixed in writing and facilitate[s] the gathering of statistics and the setting of norms—that is the construction of unitary and global knowledge about persons” (White and Epston 1990: 70). Therefore, it is used in different institutions by different authorities to strengthen their authority. That knowledge is accumulated through the interviews, the initial procedures, the registers conducted by social workers such as the police, the doctor, and the nurse; and through the examination processes in the case of both hospitals and teaching establishments as exemplified in *Briefing*.

2.2. Psychiatry as a Disciplining Discipline

In the last chapter of *Madness and Civilization* (The Birth of the Asylum), Foucault analyses modern view of madness as a mental illness. According to Foucault, that understanding is not accurate because accepting madness as a mental illness means that it has always been an illness affecting merely the mind. Therefore, all the previous experiences of madness become invalid from that scientific standpoint. Furthermore, it is believed that scientific approach of madness could alleviate the sufferings of the mad for the first time in history. That interpretation helps us read previous ages’ therapies of madness as cruel exemplifying an “innocent ignorance” or a “deliberate maltreatment” (Gutting 1989: 87). In that, modern psychology and psychiatry are needed to liberate the mad from the so called cruelties of the past. However, the idea that psychology and psychiatry frees the mad from the cruel treatments of confinement is a myth according to Foucault. Modern knowledge and its therapies of madness are actually the upgraded descendants of previous knowledge and treatments. In that sense, Foucault’s archaeology

operates in comprehending the structure beneath the surface of the concepts and theories of psychology and psychiatry. Deconstructing the understanding of those disciplines is possible only if their scientific pretensions are realized and accepted.

In the Foucauldian description of power/knowledge relation, “[i]t is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power” (Sarup 1991: 74). In other words, new objects of knowledge are created through exercise of power and psychiatry is an example of such a construction clarifying the relation between knowledge and power strongly. Through the judgements and the knowledge attained by the constant Gaze that operates both inside and the outside the asylums and hospitals, a novel human science that is psychiatry is constituted, which is called one of the “games of truth” by Foucault (Foucault 2006b: xviii). Organization of the asylum or psychiatric hospital as in the case of Watkins and other practices are only possible and institutionalized within establishments that are being given a medical status and by people who are medically qualified (Foucault 2006b: 12). Thanks to the practices of Pinel, the asylum reformer, psychiatry turned into a specialty and was inserted into the medical practice. As a consequence, psychiatry has described madness as a series of mental illnesses, taking normal clinical medical discourse as its model; on the other hand, it has never used psychiatric nosology in its practice in classifying the patients and declaring them cured or ill (Foucault 2006b: 133-134). Such medical discourses are some sorts of guarantees of truth for a psychiatric practice and they do not operate in a real sense. Therefore, there is an absence of a link between discourses of truth and psychiatric practice which will be analyzed in the Watkins’s case.

In the psychiatric mechanism as a “truth game,” (Foucault 1988b: 18) psychiatrists or the doctors who work at psychiatric hospitals are the possessors of the criteria of truth having “the imprescriptible rights of reason over madness” (Foucault 2006b: 135). Therefore, the language of psychiatry turns into a monologue using reason about madness and Foucault tries to write “the archaeology of that silence” in his *Madness and Civilization* (Foucault 1988a: xi). After Freud has refashioned the psychiatric technique of confession as a ‘talking cure’, the analysand has started a kind of inner-talk. However, the speeches of the analysand become meaningful only within the discourse of psychoanalysis. Psy-sciences regulate the acts and the behaviors of the patient, which were analyzed in the previous chapter and they also control the speech of the patient which is studied in the following section: the medical personage. In the end, the mad and

the madness become the object of psychiatry by means of the medical personage which is amplified further by Freud in a well-structured way.

2.2.1. Medical Personage and Psychoanalysis

During the mid-17th century, ship of fools turned into hospital of fools and there were directors appointed to the hospitals whose responsibilities were accepting, placing, and feeding the inmates, and also assuring the general order. According to the edict of 1656⁷, directors “have all power of authority, of direction, of administration, of commerce, of police, of jurisdiction, of correction and punishment over all the poor of Paris, both within and without the Hôpital Général” (Foucault 1988a: 40). They were also responsible for appointing a physician per hospital and the physician had to visit the hospital twice a week. When the physician was introduced at first, he used to make visits to the related hospitals. Then physicians started to work at hospitals and played part in the administrative structure; therefore, the most significant tenet of the structure of the asylum life appeared at the end of the 18th century. That is “the apotheosis of the medical character (*‘personnage médical’*)” (Foucault 2006a: 503). The medical character started to have a dominating role in the admission of the patients to the asylum and their treatments. The madmen were mentally ill and therefore they needed doctors for their medical treatment, which was accepted quite normal. However, Foucault drew attention to the power mechanism that enabled medical characters rule the asylum as that mechanism did not emerge from the scientific medical knowledge but from their authority. According to Foucault, “modern man, [...] the man of reason delegates the physician to madness thereby authorizing a relation only through the abstract universality of disease” (1988a: x). In that frame, the structures of bourgeois society, specifically, Father-Child relations (the theme of paternal authority), Transgression-Punishment relations (the theme of justice), and Madness-Disorder relations, (the theme of social and moral order), invested the physician with his power to cure madness (Foucault 1988a: 274). Samuel Tuke, the first physician charged in the Retreat realized that his medical knowledge did not help patients improve their condition. Although the proportion of cures, in the early part of the Institution, was respectable; “yet the medical means were so imperfectly connected with the progress of recovery, that he could not avoid suspecting

⁷ Edict of 1656, article IV. Later the Saint-Esprit and the Enfants-Trouvés would be added, and the Savonnerie withdrawn.

them, to be rather concomitants than causes” (Foucault 2006a: 505). In terms of medical personage, Tuke in York suggested that moral standards were much more important than the medical methods for the authority of doctor (Foucault 1988a: 272). Accordingly, Pinel in Bicetre, another physician who started working at an asylum described the relation between doctor and patient in such an explicit way showing how the medical personage is established and what the outcomes of it are:

[T]he medical personage [...] had to act not as the result of an objective definition of the disease or a specific classifying diagnosis, but by relying upon that prestige which envelops the secrets of the Family, of Authority, of Punishment, and of Love; it is by bringing such powers into play, by wearing the mask of Father and of Judge, that the physician, by one of those abrupt short cuts that leave aside mere medical competence, became the almost magic perpetrator of the cure, and assumed the aspect of a Thaumaturge; it was enough that he observed and spoke, to cause secret faults to appear, insane presumptions to vanish, and madness at last to yield to reason. (Foucault 1988a: 273)

In the 19th century, due to the development of medical practice as purely objective and value-free scientific knowledge, the society including the physicians started to think that they worked merely on the basis of medical knowledge. Simultaneously, “[t]he view of madness as a purely psychological disorder was coming to dominate. The natural result was the belief that doctors in asylums were curing the mad in virtue of their scientific knowledge of mental illness” (Gutting 1989: 94). In that sense, there appeared the modern concept of scientific psychology and psychiatry. Those concepts turned out to be disguises for the doctors’ moral domination over the mad in accordance with the norms of bourgeois society. According to Foucault,

[a]nyone who wants to pursue an analysis of the deep structures of objectivity in the knowledge and the psychiatric practice of the nineteenth century, from Pinel to Freud, needs to show that, from the very beginning, objectivity was a reification of a magical type, which could only be accomplished with the complicity of the patients themselves, starting out from a transparently clear moral framework which was slowly forgotten as positivism imposed the myth of scientific objectivity... What we call psychiatric practice is a certain moral tactic contemporaneous with the late eighteenth century, which is preserved in the rituals of life in asylums, covered over by the myths of positivism. (2006a: 509)

In psychiatric practice, what Foucault calls moral tactic is carried out by the medical personages who exercise power over the patient using the myths of positivism. Thus, in the name of positivism, objectivity and scientific knowledge, those medical personages function as the exercisers of power.

In *Briefing*, there are two significant doctor figures that are Doctor X. and Doctor Y. in Central Intake hospital and a family doctor, Doctor Z., who is mentioned briefly. The relationship between the doctors and Watkins is viewed through the dialogues and the files doctors fill in during their work. From those documentations it is understood that there is a broken communication between Watkins and Doctor X. Watkins claims that he is not able to see him; therefore, he never speaks to him throughout the novel. Doctor X. seems not minding that situation and he merely writes some of his observations and the name of the medicines he suggests in the file. Furthermore, there is a lack of communication and agreement between Doctor Y. and Doctor X. exemplified in the following notes in the file.

Nothing from police. No reports of any small boats, yachts or swimmers unaccounted for. Patient continues talking aloud, singing, swinging back and forth in bed. He is excessively fatigued. Tomorrow: Sodium Amytal. I suggest a week's narcosis.

August 17th Doctor Y.

I disagree. Suggest shock therapy.

August 18th Doctor X.

Besides suggesting shock therapy in his first visit, Doctor X. writes the following lines in his second examination:

Patient distressed, fatigued, anxious, deluded, hallucinated. Try Tofronil? Marplan? Tryptazl? Either that or shock.

August 21st Doctor X. (B 13-15)

Even if they are assumed to have similar medical degree, Doctor X. and Y. are quite different in their medical techniques and treatments. There is not a tiny agreement between them about their treatments which is easy to relate to a real life experience narrated by Lessing at end of the book. In the Afterword, or End-paper of the novel, Lessing notes that she was inspired by a man whose senses were different from other people while she was writing a script for a film. According to her, one is to be "trained to believe that to put a label on a feeling, a state of mind, a thing; to find a set of words or a

phrase; in short, to describe it; is the same as understanding and experiencing it” (*B* 251). Looking at both incidents that of the oversensitive man and of Watkins, psychiatry has to try to prove itself against such abnormalities. Having wrote the script, Lessing sends it to two doctors: one is the Consultant Psychiatrist and the other is a respectable neurologist. No matter how professional they are in their field, “their skilled and compassionate diagnosis, while authoritative, [are] quite different from each other’s. They agree about nothing at all” just like in Watkins’s case (*B* 252).

When Doctor Y. is away some days, Doctor X. immediately changes his treatment into Librium, 3 Tofronil, 3 t.a.d. which possibly send Watkins to a non-stop sleep. After Doctor Y. has returned, he fills the file with these words:

I must record my strong disagreement with this treatment. If it were the right one, patient should by now be showing signs of improvement. Nor do I agree that the fact he sleeps almost continuously is by itself proof that he is in need of sleep. I support the discontinuation of this treatment and discussion about alternatives. (*B* 61)

Toward the end of the book, there is still no progress in Watkins’s case despite his one-month stay in Central Intake Hospital; he does not remember who he is; neither does he accept to be Professor Watkins when Doctor Y. tells him so. While Doctor X. stresses more on shock therapy, Doctor Y. keeps trying different techniques such as confronting Watkins with his wife, Mrs. Watkins and also with his friends. Doctor X. wants Watkins to be transferred to North Catchment at Higginhill in the end if there is no change in the next two or three days and provided that he refuses the shock therapy. On the other hand, the last suggestion by Doctor Y. is to withdraw all drugs including sleepers and to see what will happen afterwards (*B* 143). Suggestions like Watkins’s transfer to another hospital and withdrawal of the drugs prove the scientific myth of psychiatry in treating ‘mental illness’. Doctors in the hospital try various ways in normalizing Watkins; however, he has not improved in accordance with their recovery criteria till the E.C.T. experience.

Another difference between Doctor X. and Doctor Y. is seen in their attitudes toward Watkins and other patients. Doctor X. is stronger than Doctor Y. in terms of the medical personage. Doctor X. uses “gentleness or firmness, conciliatory terms or the tone of authority and an inflexible severity” (Foucault 1988a: 271) accordingly. Doctor Y. does not adjust himself to the situations and he always has a gentler manner than Doctor

X. has, not only for Watkins but also for the others including Watkins's family, especially his wife. In her letter, Watkins's wife Felicity Watkins thanks Doctor Y. for his kind explanations about her husband. She adds that she is upset after Doctor X.'s telephone call because she is rather ignorant about mental illness and Doctor X. does not tell her very much (*B* 138). In her letter, Baines also thanks Doctor Y. for his kind and explanatory letter adding that it is not possible to gather very much from Doctor X.'s letter (*B* 197). It is mentioned in Baines's letter to Doctor X. that Doctor X. merely asks Baines whether Watkins has come to see her just before his breakdown or not. Doctor X. is presented as insensitive in his speeches, his letters, and also in his file reports.

During her visit to Watkins, Felicity cannot help crying as Watkins does not recognize her. After that, Doctor X. fills the file as "[p]atient was visited by his wife today. Visit terminated at patient's request [...] wife hysterical subject, better kept away from patient for the time being, in my opinion" (*B* 174). After the visit, Felicity wants to see Doctor X. and they have a chat on Watkins's situation. According to Doctor X., Watkins is better as he is more rested. In that dialogue, it is seen that Doctor X. is the authority of the criteria of cure and the possessor of truth regardless of the lack of standardized medical detection. His prestige is beyond the medical discourse and that authority makes Felicity feel inferior. She states that "I know I am very stupid Doctor. I know that. But it doesn't help me when you are sarcastic. You say he is better. But I've never seen him look so awful" (*B* 175). The ironic statement of Felicity appears as a criticism of psychiatry in this sense.

The psychiatric power which is backed up by the medical personage is experienced also in the larger medical scope. As an example, Watkins's family doctor, Doctor Z. mentions in his letter to Doctor Y. that Professor Watkins came to consult him in the spring of that year in connection with stammering and he prescribed Librium and a holiday. After explaining his relation to Watkins's family, he wants to give suggestions regarding the situation of Mrs. Watkins. According to him, she is under heavy strain therefore she is better see her husband. Even if his medical treatment and his suggestions are not so different from Doctor Y., he is hesitant before the medical personage of psychiatry and adds that "[o]f course I am only that old-fashioned thing, a family doctor, and I don't know as much as I should about mental health" (*B* 172). Considering the quote, the psychiatric knowledge is accepted as the ultimate truth in terms of treating "mental illness" and psychic abnormalities. In that sense, there is a rarefaction not about

the emergence or production of truth but who can discover it. There is a universal subject of that so called universal truth; however, the universal subject who is able to grasp that truth is rare as it must be “a subject qualified by procedures of pedagogy and selection” (Foucault 2006b: 247). There are various ways of organizing the rarity of those who can have access to a truth that science posits as universal such as universities, educated societies, canonical teaching, schools, laboratories, the interplay of specialization, and professional qualification in accordance with the related discourse. Such truth games are all touched upon in the novel considering the examples of Watkins’s profession, Larson’s archeological studies, Baines’s reflections on standardized education, and the subordinated place of Doctor Z. in the psychiatric power zone, even if he is a family doctor.

Another psychiatric anomaly is that neither of the doctors makes a clarified diagnosis about Watkins’s illness either in their dialogues or within their files. Watkins is in the hospital due to memory loss, which is named amnesia in medical jargon. However, neither Doctor Y. nor Doctor X. uses that medical diagnosis in their files. Only once, Doctor Y. diagnoses Watkins to be in a coma and his diagnosis is based on what the nurse has previously said about Watkins (*B* 87).

There are different treatment suggestions and applications by Doctor Y. and Doctor X. throughout the novel without explicit explanations of their suggested treatments. They do not focus on his illness attentively and on the essence of the pressure that has caused his mental break down. On the other hand, they focus more on his amnesiac state and try to make him remember who he is: Professor Charles Watkins. The doctors’ practices suggest that psychiatric nosology as a discourse of truth does not operate efficiently in the psychiatric practice.

Medical personage creates a powerful contact between the doctor and the patient in all aspects of the treatment. Furthermore, the staff within the mental hospital are to be included that power network in some occasions. As Foucault states, there are some techniques practiced within the hospitals one of which is the Father-child relation; in other words, the paternal authority stemming from the bourgeois structure. In the novel, besides the doctors, the nurses also function as power agencies wearing the mask of father (or authoritative mother).

Regardless of the patient’s inner journey, his imagery visions and his fear of death related to sleeping, Watkins is put to sleep by the nurse just like a mother lullabies her

child. In persuading Watkins, the nurse uses the first person plural pronoun and tells Watkins that “[w]e don’t want you to get so terribly tired. We’re worried about you; do you know that?” (*B* 15) By the usage of “we”, the nurse is included in “the same” group of the doctors and the patient becomes “the other” excluded from the categorical collective. Watkins seems aware of such self/other dichotomy. When the nurse asks what he wants from her, he replies “[y]ou as *we*. Not you as *you*” trying to take the nurse by his side and put himself in the category of the self (*B* 15).

While Doctor Y. wants Watkins rest and try not to talk so much, he operates as the subject and puts Watkins in the place of the object in the psychiatric discourse deciding on and controlling what he can do or not. On the other hand, Watkins is conscious of his silenced madness. When Doctor Y. seems complaining about the patient’s non-stop talking, Watkins replies that “I am not talking to you, am I?” and keeps saying “[a]round and around and around and around” (*B* 15) After some days, the same doctor suggests Watkins to speak to the nurse realizing that he does not speak to Doctor X. Doctor Y. says to Watkins: “We think you should try and talk to her. You see, we must find out more about you. You could help if you talked. But try to talk more clearly and slowly, so that we can hear you properly” (*B* 17). There is a recurrent use of the first person plural strengthening the authority of the doctors. Watkins’s reply to Doctor Y. is quite significant: “Are you the secret police?” (*B* 17) Considering his utterance, Watkins seems he is aware of the truth game of psychiatry which is available through discipline and control held also by the police and other power mechanisms. After some days, Doctor Y. tells Watkins that he has been talking practically non-stop for days and asks him whether he knows that or not. Watkins replies: “You told me to talk. I don’t mind thinking instead” (*B* 29) pointing out his inner coherence.

During Watkins’s sleeping period, this time Doctor Y. wants him stay awake and talk to the other patients (*B* 61). Toward the end of the book, the doctors decide not to give drugs to Watkins. After that, Watkins tells Doctor Y. that he is thinking more clearly at that time (*B* 143). The dialogue between Doctor Y. and Watkins is generally the same throughout the book. It is either about sleeping, talking or about accepting the reality that the patient is at the hospital and he is Professor Watkins, married with two boys. After the withdrawal of drugs, Watkins is able to explain his situation more clearly. He tells Doctor Y.:

Your attitude to me is this: I've got to make him remember what I know to be true about him [...] But that means that you don't take *me* seriously. You haven't once taken me seriously [...] I say to you. I'm not what you say I am. I *know* that. I'm not Professor Charles Watkins. Or if I am nominally that, it isn't the point. But you just go on and on and on, sticking to that one point. (*B* 143- 144)

As an example of antinomy, modern psychology aims at finding truths about human nature, which could help doctors cure madness. However, according to Foucault, "the human truth that madness reveals is the immediate contradiction of the moral and social truth of man. The initial moment of any treatment is thus the repression of that inadmissible truth" (2006a: 521). Watkins's lamentation for not being taken seriously and accepted as he claims exemplifies Foucault's statement of the contradiction of the moral and social truth of Watkins in this sense.

While Doctor X. does not talk much to Watkins as Watkins is not able to see him, Doctor Y. seems talking to him a lot. Even if Doctor Y. chats with Watkins in a great deal, he never sympathizes with his patient trying to figure out the patient's self-coherent speech and Watkins is aware of that blockage. Watkins does not utter incoherent sentences, on the contrary, he makes clear arguments against the pure rational ground of the psychiatric power. Since "[l]anguage is the first and last structure of madness, its constituent form; on language are based all the cycles in which madness articulates its nature" (Foucault 1988a: 100). However, the medical personage of both doctors hinders them from trying new viewpoints in understanding the inner logic of their patient, which supports the Foucauldian assumption that a doctor's will, as a foreign will, is officially superior to the patient's will; therefore, any relationship of exchange, reciprocity, or equality becomes inaccessible between the doctor and the patient in terms of truth (Foucault 2006b: 147).

After recognizing the forms of positivist thought exemplified in Watkins's case, there stays a single concrete reality that of doctor patient-couple in psychiatry. Freud is the first man to accept the seriousness of that reality. While demystifying all other asylum structures, "he exploited the structure that enveloped the medical personage; he amplified its thaumaturgical virtues, preparing for its omnipotence a quasi-divine status" (Foucault 1988a: 277). In other words, Freud transforms all the powers that have been distributed in the collective existence of the asylum "into an absolute Observation, a pure and circumspect Silence, a Judge who punishes and rewards in a judgment that does not even

condescend to language; he made it the Mirror in which madness, in an almost motionless movement, clings to and casts off itself” (Foucault 1988a: 278). Thanks to Freud, all structural technologies of confinement are transferred to the doctor’s hand, which is theorized through the constitution of psychoanalysis. Considering Eli Zaretsky’s statement that “all forms of psychotherapy, other than drugs or behavioral modification, are based on some variation of psychoanalysis” (quoted in Milchman and Rosenberg 2014: 2); the psychiatry section intertwines with the medical personage subsection in this study.

To Foucault, psychoanalysis operates as a “dividing practice” (1982: 777) objectivizing the subject and creating binary oppositions between normality and pathology. That’s why, including psychoanalysis, psychiatry turns into a dangerous practice as it judges individuals as ‘insiders’ (normal) and ‘outsiders’ (pathological). Even before his breakdown, Watkins is already seen as the outsider by his society with such labels as “negative,” “destructive,” “pain in the neck” and “the original eccentric oddball” (*B* 191). He is not able to deal with such normalizing systems within the society, which he renames as ‘the traps’; therefore, he is put into the most effective adjusting mechanism that is the psychiatric hospital in the end.

On one hand, there are many examples of psychoanalytical variations in Watkins’s treatments such as collecting biographical knowledge from his acquaintances, confronting him with his wife, making him talk and also write; on the other, there is a lack of interest in his childhood, his own parents and his dreams. There are merely a few psychoanalytical implications in such subjects. After being taken to the hospital, Watkins behaves like he is on a boat and he keeps saying ‘around, around; in and out in and out’ as if he is describing the waves of his vision. At that time, Doctor X. interprets Watkins’s situation as he has reverted to the age eleven or twelve in which Doctor X. has enjoyed sea stories personally (*B* 28). In that example, Doctor X. links his personal childhood memories to the childish state of mind of the patient from a psychoanalytic lens.

As mentioned earlier, even if Doctor Y. and Doctor X. use different techniques and they do not have similar attitudes toward Watkins, they both try to find out more about him by means of the letters of his family, friends and colleagues; the police reports; Watkins’s own writings and also conversations with the nurses. The outcome of the accumulation of that biographic corpus is to benefit from “the performative character” of the statement of truth in the “game of cure” (Foucault 2006b: 159). Watkins has to

identify with the given biographic reality if he wants to be cured. Yet, he is reluctant to accept that given reality as he is on the point of discovering more of himself as an inner traveler, which is exemplified in his reply that “I’m not what you say I am. I *know* that. I’m not Professor Charles Whatshisname. Or if I am nominally that, it isn’t the point” (*B* 144). Watkins continues to explain his inner experience to Doctor Y. as he believes that he is different from Doctor X. and he is more liable to break the borders of his medical personage. However, Doctor Y. draws a strict line between the speech of the patient and the possibility of truth.

Consequently, both doctors are more like Pinel and Tuke in their attitude toward Watkins at the deep level. It is apparent that they want to dismantle the patient’s logic by taunting the facts and the realities of the outside world. They do not listen to him attentively, nor do they try to give meaning to his utterances with a stance differing from the common rational discourse. They merely consider Watkins’s insanity as a result of their scientific mentality expressing its own limitation through its “inability to see things except as facets and one at a time” (*B* 121). However, the reader is able to catch Watkins’s inner coherent world no matter how mystic it seems through his visionary experiences together with his outer life. Therefore, the reader may have a different viewpoint of madness. They are able to recognize him not only as a psychiatric patient but also as an inner-space traveler simultaneously. The reader are also able to cover that “[w]hen he experiences himself as most profoundly alert and alive to his experiences and his surroundings, he is, from a medical perspective, deeply asleep or unconscious” (Rubenstein 2014: 136) disturbing the mediating line between the inner and the outer world.

Considering *Briefing* thoroughly, it is easy to assume that Lessing is aware of the socially constructed aspect of madness and the psychiatric discourse. Therefore, she creates another wakened character, Rosemary Baines. Baines is peculiar since she can do away with the labels such as abnormal or mad and has alternative perspectives in describing and approaching the phenomenon of madness. In her letter, she explains Watkins’s visit to her while she is with Larson. She accepts that Watkins talks in a disconnected sort of way yet it makes sense while he keeps talking. She adds:

He was talking about getting out of the trap, getting out of prison [...] And it did not seem as odd to us [...] because our own thoughts were running on similar lines [...]. While his remarks may have been scattered, there was an inner logic to them,

a thread, which sounded at first like a repetition of certain words or ideas. Sometimes it seemed as if the sound, and not the meaning of a word or syllable in a sentence, gave birth to the next sentence or word [...] we have perhaps to begin to think of the relation of the sound of a word with its meaning. Of course poets do this, all the time. Do doctors? we have no way yet of knowing [...] how a verbal current may match an inner reality, sounds expressing a condition? But perhaps this sort of thought is not found useful by you. (*B* 199-200)

In terms of Baines's explanation about Watkins's situation, the possibility of seeing the mad people in a different way and thinking madness differently are presented. According to Lessing, such unclassifiable experiences strand the conventional world; therefore, the society judges that psychological 'breaking-through' as madness thanks to various psy-sciences (Rubenstein 2014: 135). Put differently, mental breakdown could be "a potentially liberating and instructive experience, capable of contributing to the self-awareness and growth not only of the individual subject but of the society as a whole" given the opportunity (King 1989: 56). That mindset parallels with Watkins's description of mental hospitals that psychiatric hospitals are the places where cracks in individuals might let light shine through at last (*B* 130).

By means of Watkins's story, Lessing expresses her condemnation of the conventional practices of the psychiatric profession for its insensitive and often punitive treatment of people suffering from mental or emotional breakdown (Rubenstein 2014: 135). Her criticism is clarified through the medical personage of Doctor X. and the lack of objective knowledge in diagnosing and also treating the so called 'mad'. As in the case of Central Intake, founding psychiatry as a strict truth is not feasible since it is not a question of truth already. According to Foucault, the essence of psychiatric discourse is found not in truth but in danger related to public hygiene and crime (2003: 118) which will be analyzed in the following section.

2.2.2. Madness, Morality and Crime

Modern experience of madness is divided into two types of consciousness; cognitive and evaluative. The former is value-free from a modern psychological and psychiatric lens. The cognitive consciousness "treats madness as an object of disinterested scientific inquiry" (Gutting 1989: 88). The latter one has a dimension named critical consciousness. That is a moral judgment of madness, which is exemplified by the "Great

Fear” (Foucault 1988a: 209). It takes Foucault’s attention as a contingent event within a ‘progressive’ history of madness. Having swept over Europe in the mid-18th century, there was a great fear of contagion emerging from the houses of confinement.

People were in dread of a mysterious sickness that apparently emanated from houses of confinement and was soon to spread throughout the cities. There was talk of gaol fever, and the carts transporting the condemned were blamed, as were the chain gangs who were marched through the towns, leaving a trail of disease in their wake. It was thought that scurvy was contagious, and widely believed that air contaminated by the disease was spreading through residential areas. (Foucault 2006a: 355)

Even if the description was made of medical terms, the great fear was fed by a moral myth. Thanks to that myth, madness was seen as a moral fault. According to Foucault, madness had also been seen as a moral defect in the classical age, it was a choice of unreason, though. For that reason, madness had been left out of human world as the mad turned the world of human realities into a world of delusions by his choice and became an immoral animal in the end. Therefore, it was outside the human history and society. The Great Fear is a significant break with that mindset, bringing madness into the human world again. That humanization had two outcomes. The first one is that it became a human experience and it could be subjected to correction henceforth. According to the classical consciousness, madness could not be corrected due to its animal feature, which transformed into madmen’s humanity in the modern age. The essence of that correction lays in the acceptance of one’s incorrectness. Thus, madmen have to feel guilty over his situation. The second one is that madness is away from its external factors such as cosmic forces because it belongs to the human world. In the study of a madmen, features of the local surrounding of the mad became important rather than the lunar influences. For instance, Foucault gives the example of melancholia which is accepted as a common English illness because of the wealth and the freedom of English society.

In the construction of madness and morality linkage, Philippe Pinel and William Tuke are again important figures. Pinel’s system is different from Tuke’s Retreat on the surface. While the Retreat was related to Quakers, Pinel not only opposed religion but also saw it as one of the reasons for madness. On the other hand, he included moral content of religion in his asylum Bicetre. “The asylum was thus a religious domain stripped of religion, a domain of pure morality and ethical uniformity...The asylum was

now to figure the great continuity of social morality, and was ruled by the values of family and work and all recognized virtues” (Foucault 2006a: 493). Rather than creating a natural community, Pinel tried to integrate the mad into the bourgeois society. For instance, there was an English captain at the asylum and became Pinel’s personal servant as a treatment method. While those two asylums differed in terms of running, they both aimed at subjecting the mad to bourgeois morality and they shared the same techniques to achieve that. Depicted within the modern experience of madness, in *Briefing*, Watkins is also subjected to the established morality which expects from him to accept his incorrectness and feel guilty in order to be cured. According to Foucault, to cure madmen, “[s]uffering and knowledge were to adjust to each other in the unity of a common experience. And this would require a common language, a communication at the very least imagined between the doctor and the patient” (2006a: 307). In the novel, the trial of such a common language is exemplified in the following dialogue.

Watkins: Why do you keep calling me Professor?

Doctor Y.: Professor Charles Watkins. 15 Acacia Road, Brink. Near Cambridge.

Watkins: But I don’t want that. I won’t accept that.

Doctor Y.: I’m afraid you have no choice Professor. We know that’s who you are.

Watkins: But I know I am not.

Considering the quote, Watkins does not have a choice in knowing who he actually is other than his social identity which is provided by the police, the doctors and his acquaintances. He has to comply with the norms of the medical treatment and accept that he is incorrect, which should make him feel guilty. He is accepted as guilty since he lost his memory: “I do feel very deeply indeed that it is irresponsible to lose one’s memory” (*B* 235). Thus, madness is related to being firstly guilty as a result of immorality and secondly having the potential to commit a crime. By means of psychiatry and its medical personages, the patient is made feel immoral and guilty who has the potential of crime.

At the beginning of the 19th century, psychiatry was not a specialized medical science or theory, it was rather related to a specialized public hygiene institutionalized as a domain of social protection against all the dangers to society, which may arise from the illness itself. To exist as a well-structured and justifiable medical knowledge, it had to take on two coinciding codifications. Firstly, psychiatry needed to codify madness as illness and it needed to

pathologize its disorders, errors, and illusions, and undertake analyses-symptomatology, nosographies, prognoses, observations, clinical files, et cetera-to bring this public hygiene, or the social safety it was responsible for, as close as possible to medical knowledge and thereby enable this system of protection to function in the name of medical knowledge. (Foucault 2003: 118)

As a second codification, madness needed to refer to danger and crime particularly. According to Foucault, between 1820-1825, there was a strange process in the courts where doctors who were not called on by the prosecutor or by the court's president, not even by the lawyers gave their opinion on a crime. One of the reasons for their interest in crime is "the attempt to demonstrate not so much that every criminal may be mad, but to demonstrate something that is much more serious, and also much more important for psychiatric power, namely, that every mad person is a possible criminal" (Foucault 2006b: 250). At that point, there is a shift in the scope of psychiatry from truth to danger. Doctors become the protectors of the society against a possible crime. Since psychiatrists cannot base their treatment of madness in psychiatry as a medical practice as in the example of Watkins, they focus on madness in terms of a social defense. The doctors have not been able to bring Watkins's lost memory back with different kinds of treatments such as drugs and therapies until the police find his wallet in the Parliament Square. After that, Doctor X. writes to the file that "He is Professor Charles Watkins, Classics, Cambridge. Married, two sons. Aged 50" (B 133). There has been a transformation in the focal point of psychiatric power, and surveillance from the problem of "who are ill" to "what they are liable to"; that's why, Watkins comes to the police's attention and he is taken to the station due to his unexpected behaviors. There is a police register about him at the station, which enables the police identify him when they find the lost wallet.

In the dialogue between Watkins and Violet, Watkins tells her that the doctors say he has lost his memory because he feels guilty (B 235). On the other hand, he believes that he feels guilty because he has lost his memory. With an emphasis, he adds that there is something that he *has to* remember, he *has to* (B 235). In the middle of all medicine, behavioral discipline and psychoanalytical treatments, Watkins tries to remember the essence of the briefing since he is attained as the heavenly messenger in his inner journey. So that he will be able to teach that imprinted knowledge of wholeness and oneness to the others. According to Anita Myles, Watkins's journey "reveals him as a person concerned with macrocosmic unity" (quoted in Shu-Ming 2012: 173). However, instead of

remembering his duty and transforming the message of unity to other people, he is made feel guilty because of his extraordinary position.

Assuming Watkins as amnesiac, the doctors try to invoke his memory by asking his name frequently to find out his real identity. Whenever they ask, Watkins tells different names such as Jason, Jonah, Odysseus, Crafty, and even Why signifying his forgotten and split identity. Before doctors get the information about Watkins's identity from the police, Doctor Y. has heard from the nurse that Watkins calls himself Sinbad, as well. When the doctor asks about that, Watkins replies that "Sin bad. Sin bad. Bad sin" (*B* 17). The name, Sinbad takes Doctor Y.'s attention much more than the other names. Through that utterance, Doctor Y. "suggest[s] a wild hypothesis that just this once patient may have committed a crime and this not just routine guilt?" (*B* 19). That hypothesis reminds the notion of monomania and strengthens the accusing point of view toward the ones who have extraordinary capacities, which tends to label them criminal and having a potential to guilt.

According to Foucault, in placing the psychiatric discourse of madness not in truth but in danger, the doctors

constructed the very curious notion of monomania which, schematically, means this: when someone commits a crime which has no *raison d'être*, no justification at the level of his interest, wouldn't the fact alone of committing the crime be the symptom of an illness, the essence of which would basically be the crime itself? Monomania was a sort of single symptom illness with just one symptom occurring only once in the individual's life, but a symptom that was, precisely, the crime? (2006b: 149)

In that hypothesis, Watkins's utterance of "bad sin" is accepted as a confession; therefore, it is accepted as a symptom of monomania. Doctor X.'s writing down on his dossier that Watkins may have committed a crime just for once and it was not a routine guilt parallels with the definition of monomania as a single symptom of illness. When a crime is committed without reason and a justifiable interest, it automatically becomes a symptom of mental illness, monomania in Watkins's case. Thus, Watkins has already been regarded as abnormal and unreasonable staying at a psychiatric hospital. That's why, Doctor Y. instantly accepts that hypothesis and only asks about what kind of crime it would be. That is almost the only subject those two doctors agree upon throughout the novel without hesitation. That rapid judgement as a consequence of a single utterance and the prompt

acceptance of the judgment suggest that there is a strong tendency to relate madness to a possible crime strengthening the place psychiatry holds within the society it is constituted.

2.2.3. Family as a Consumer of Psychiatry

According to Foucault, how psychiatry functions cannot be analyzed only by restricting ourselves to the workings of the asylum institution; therefore, it is better to look at the places where disciplinary power is emergent, one of which is the family association. At first, family has been related to sovereign power in early Foucauldian lectures. Afterwards, he finds out a transformation from sovereign power to the disciplinary one. To Foucault, at a certain level, “watchful family eye became a psychiatric gaze or a psycho-pathological, a psychological gaze” (Foucault 2006b: 124) bringing family sovereignty closer to the disciplinary form. The family used to keep an eye on child’s behavior, character, and sexuality and such supervision of the child led the family decide on the normal and the abnormal, which marked the emergence of psychologization of the child within the family.

In the novel, in terms of child sexuality, Violet is depicted as mentally ill in the Central Intake. Even if her admittance is not depicted, Watkins pays attention to the contrasts in her “formal black dress and the lower nakedness”; “the social position of the card player and the isolation spread around her by her fear and hatred” in a different way from both her family and the nurses (*B* 230). According to Watkins, if you let yourself slide inwards Violet’s head through her eyes, there you encounter “not the violence of hatred but a puddle of tears,” all of which are the possible outcomes of “being beaten or ill-treated by a powerful parent [...] [S]he was all victim, betrayed, tormented, vulnerable, and a sponge for love” (*B* 230). The reason of Violet’s hospitalization is seen in her improper clothing and behavior by the society no matter what the actual problem she has in her familial circle.

As their friendship develops, Violet tells Watkins that “Oh I wish I was your daughter. Oh I do so wish I were [...] But you like me, you see. My families don’t,” which supports the interpretation of Watkins about her lack of love (*B* 233). Watkins’s mention of her two mothers and two fathers seems to suggest that Violet’s parents are probably divorced and married to different people afterwards creating four-peopled double disciplining parenthood. Doctor Y. also points out such a disciplinary atmosphere in her family when Watkins consults the doctor to live with Violet outside the hospital.

According to the doctor, if Watkins and Violet leave the other day and set up a ménage together he will not be stopped physically; however, the doctor guarantees that she will come running back to the doctors within a week mostly because of her family (*B* 238). That example parallels with the Foucauldian theory that “the first role of the family is to pinning of individuals to the disciplinary apparatus” (Foucault 2006b: 82). Even if her family relations are not described in detail, Violet’s sexuality is likely the object of knowledge within her family bringing her to the hospital which “substitute[s] for the family with a familial reference” (Foucault 2006b: 85). In that case, the hospital is accepted as the place where “the incorrigible” (Foucault 2003: 325) and the disobedient like Violet are corrected. In that case, there is a shift in the essence of madness from delirium to intractability, resistance, and disobedience (Foucault 2003: 120).

As another example, there is a vision in which Watkins experiences his own birth⁸ in which there are some references of the disciplinary “intra-familial relations” (Foucault 1995: 215) especially in the sleep schedule of him as a baby. In his dream, Watkins is reborn and enters in the normalizing judgement cycle immediately. He is described as a “good baby” as he goes straight off to sleep after a good quiet birth (*B* 126). His struggle with the drugs and the controlling apparatus within the hospital coincide with his struggle at home with his mother. “I must rise and walk [...] but they rock me, hushhhh, they crooon me, shush, they knock me over the head with sleepers, soothers, syrups, drugs and medicines” (*B* 126). As a baby, he wants to stay awake and experience the world he has not experienced before by touching, sniffing and tasting. He wonders the million textured light changing as the day changes (*B* 127). Watkins likens being pushed back to sleep as a baby to drowning a kitten. In the adjustment of that sleeping schedule, he reckons that he is punished by tones of voices and by silences, gripped into sleep by dummies and dope (*B* 127). After all, in his fight against the restrictive controlling practices, the mother-doctor ally wins the battle thanks to its multiple instruments: medicine, sleeping pills, syrups, time-table, sleeping schedule, dummies, and dope. In the end, Watkins describes his own situation stating “[m]e half beaten back into dark, me quietened, regulated, time-tabled, a nuisance tamed, me the obediently sleeping”, which works for a certain part of the disciplinary structure within society starting from the family and being backed up by the medical institutions (*B* 128). Consequently, disciplinary

⁸ Experiencing one’s own birth is a Jungian therapy which will be studied under the title of “Technologies of the Self” in detail.

network steps in where the family fails both in Violet's and Watkins's case and the family is an efficient link between the disciplinary systems.

2.3. Archaeology as a Dividing Discipline

Archaeology is traditionally defined as “the study of the material remains of our human past” (Harris and Smitt 2001: 15). That definition does not cover the discipline completely according to some archaeologists. Therefore, other descriptions must be included here about the nature of archaeology: “It is not archaeology, but archaeography (Deetz 1988). It is neither creative art nor science (Hodder 1986); it is the accumulation of facts (Courbin 1988); it is (or should be) revolutionary practice, but failing that it may be nothing but the practice of ideological dupes (Shanks and Tilley 1987a); it is the history of ideology (Leone 1982:754)” (quoted in Gargett 1992: 115). Regarding such a variety of definitions together, archaeology seems to be another Foucauldian discourse which operates through power/knowledge relation producing reality and becomes another “dividing practice” (Foucault 1982: 777). Dividing practices function in objectivizing the subject by dividing the subject from others and it divides the subject within (Foucault 1982: 778). In the case of archaeology, thanks to binary oppositions such as subject/object and civilized/uncivilized the subject is separated from others. On the other hand, mind/body dichotomy divides the subject within itself. In that section, how dualisms become entrenched in modern Western thought, especially archaeology, is discussed together with the idea that such hierarchal oppositions are related to the concept: dividing practice as a power mechanism.

2.3.1. Modernist Dichotomies and Archaeology

In *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault has focused on how madness is left out of the Cartesian *cogito* as the ultimate non-reason in the reason/unreason dichotomy. The 17th century was named the Age of Reason thanks to the triumph of the completed critical consciousness. In that period, madness was excluded also from the intellectual world, which is perfectly seen in *Discourse on Method* (1637) and *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641) written by French philosopher and mathematician Rene Descartes (1596-1650). They are based on the motto of *cogito ergo sum*.

Descartes endeavors to counter the position of severe skepticism concerning the world and his own existence. He asks, “How do I recognize that I exist?” and

speculates if he is not mad or being misinformed about his own existence (Descartes, 1999: 57). The response is basically that, albeit all other proof is discounted, Descartes knows that he doubts his existence; and since he doubts, he ought to be thinking. If he is thinking, he must exist and cannot be misleading himself...Descartes believes he cannot be mad since he reasons: reason disputes itself utterly to madness. (Mesbahian 2008: 26)

In this respect, the insanity and the insane are left out by the judgment of the doctrine of rationalism that inflicts and institutes rationality. Madness was excluded from *the cogito* argument; however, this exclusion is only possible with *the cogito* itself not from the inside but from the outside by the judgment of “the sane”.

To Foucault, “[t]he Cartesian Cogito reduces the being of man to thought-conscious-of-itself, leaving out that whole realm of unaccounted-for experiences in which man does not recognize himself” (quoted in Cheng 1999: 5). By means of Cartesian philosophy, many other dualisms such as subject/object, nature/culture and mind/body have emerged, which constitute the essence of the modern Western thought (Gamble 2001: 106) influencing both daily lives and academic disciplines such as archaeology.

According to Julian Thomas, “archaeology first emerged with modernity, as an investigation into the origins and depths of human historical achievement through the medium of its material residue” (2002: ix). Therefore, unravelling the assumptions of archaeological analysis parallels with questioning foundations of modernist thought (Thomas 2002: ix). Modernism as the triumph of humanism and the birth of man is asymmetrical since it overlooks the simultaneous birth of the non-humanity: things, objects, or beasts (Latour 1993: 13). In that philosophy, the physical/material realm is delineated from the ideal/mental one; therefore, human mind has been given the capacity to rationally observe the material world, which is the basis of Western science. In that ontological division, culture is placed within the mental zone becoming the privileged term and the nature stays at the material realm becoming the suppressed binary. As a consequence of that culture/nature dualism, the environment turns into an object to be fought against and exploited by humanity. According to Olsen, “it is because we are able to distinguish between people and things, culture and nature, that we differ from them” (2003: 95). Those differences are believed to emerge due to the inherent qualities or essences.

The inferred possession of these qualities placed an entity into one category or the other. First and foremost, among such qualities was ‘intentionality’ or ‘consciousness’. It may seem overly philosophical, but such presumed essences give rise to a host of resultant concepts key to archaeology and based upon an either/or reasoning. (Webmoor 2007: 570)

As a result, what lacks intentionality or consciousness such as time, environment and objects are categorized as nature by a traditional archaeological lens. In that sense, archaeology operates as a dividing practice making a division between the human subject and the other. However, Lessing deconstructs such an ontological standpoint by means of the unclassifiable experiences of her main characters: Watkins and Larson.

In *Briefing*, Lessing focuses on modernist dichotomies which are related to philosophy of science and archaeology in two places. In the first one, Watkins comes upon an ancient city after a tedious ocean travel, which refers to the Jungian ocean of images emerging from the unconscious. It is more like the Foucauldian interpretation of *stultifera navis* as “the Ship of Fools” that “sails through a landscape of delights, where all is offered to desire, a sort of renewed paradise, since here man no longer knows either suffering or need; and yet he has not recovered his innocence” (Foucault 1988a: 22). Watkins chooses to remain in that paradise-like place due to its beauty and Harmony despite the things it lacks. Even if he approaches the place cautiously at first, he is immediately overwhelmed with the Edenic atmosphere. blend together and Watkins feels welcomed there as a result of the harmony between the man-made structures and the nature.

I need not be solitary. For this city had an atmosphere as if it were inhabited, as I’ve said. More, as if this city was itself a person, or had a soul, or being. It seemed to know me. The walls seemed to acknowledge me as I passed. And when the moon rose for the third time since I had arrived on this coast, I was wandering among the streets and avenues of stone as if I were among friends. (*B* 53)

Watkins does not hesitate in attributing humanistic features to the city breaking the boundary between the intentional subject and the inanimate object. According to Bolling, in presenting “the city as an organism, with its corollary of exchange and mutuality between the individual and his environment, Lessing implies a contrast to the mechanized and dehumanized modern city of Western capitalism (Bolling 1974: 140-141). The idea of interrelatedness strengthens more when he is inside the Crystal, which

“symbolically stands for the union of extreme opposites—of matter and spirit” states Marie-Louise von Franz in “The Process of Individuation” in *Man and His Symbols* (quoted in Bolling 1974: 140). Aboard the Crystal, Watkins experiences the world from outside contemplating over the solar system and the relationship between its planets. In describing the planets’ characters, they are likened to the mankind as unfixed subjects having their own personality and their peculiar time. In that depiction, Lessing seems to criticize the idea that “the advent of modernity led to the creation of two ontological zones: that of human beings and that of non-humans” (Olsen 2003: 95). In modernist dialectical process, there is “a radical gulf between intentional subjects [human beings] and inanimate objects” (quoted in Webmoor 2008: 60). In *Briefing*, Watkins does not apply such a schema in describing ‘the things’ he sees from the Crystal. Inside the Crystal, Watkins states:

I saw the dance of the sun and its attendants, Mercury the Sun’s closest associate was the only one which could maintain steadily and always the consciousness of the sun’s underlying song, its need, its intention, Mercury whose name was, also, Thoth, and Enoch, Buddha, Idris, and Hermes, and many other styles or titles in the earth’s histories, Mercury the Messenger, the carrier of news, or information from the Sun, the disseminator of laws from God’s singing centre. (B 101)

The description of the planets dancing together with the Sun is peculiar since “[d]ance represents or reproduces a cosmic rhythm. Throughout the Middle Ages and until the rise of modern astronomy, the turning of all the heavenly spheres and of the planets around the sun were considered to be parts of a great cosmic dance” (Franz 1997: 65). In that sense, Watkins starts to question why it is “unreasonable to suppose that planets, as indeed, stars—like people—change character; for a weighty, responsible old planet in its maturity may give a very different report of itself than the same creature in its skittish youth” (B 107). Lessing has demolished the boundaries between real/unreal and rational/irrational in *Briefing* as mentioned earlier and she enlarges the area of that fusion also by breaking the Western ontological compartmentalizing.

As another example, Watkins is aware of the effects that the moon has over him in his inner journey. Being moonstruck, Watkins states:

I began to fancy that the moon knew me, that subtle lines of sympathy ran back and forth between us. I began to think the moon’s thoughts [...] Looking at Moon, at Sun, we see matter, earth or fire, as it were people walking in the street. We

cannot see the self-consciousness of Moon, or Sun. There is nothing on Earth, or near it, that does not have its own consciousness, Stone, or Tree or Dog or Man. (B 57-58)

Considering the quote, there is not a clear-cut division between a stone, a tree, a dog or a man according to Watkins in terms of being and they are all affecting each other. Within the Crystal, he is at “a state of heightened consciousness” (quoted in Shu-Ming 2012: 173); therefore, he utters that “[b]odily eyes see bodies, see flesh” (B 57). According to Merleau-Ponty, French philosopher and public intellectual, “we can touch and be touched, see and be seen, act upon things and at the same time being acted upon by them—all this [is] due to our common ‘fabric’ as flesh” and he steps further asking that “[w]here are we to put the limit between the body and the world, since the world is flesh? (quoted in Olsen 2003:98)

There are conceptual transformations in the human/non-human and nature/culture divides in archaeology. For the former dichotomy, the category of ‘phenotype’ in which both things and people are merged into a novel third ontologically posited category is constituted (Webmoor 2007: 566). In the case of nature-culture dichotomy, a new concept is termed by Soja: “third space” or a space of “multiplicitous representations” (quoted in Owen 2008: 43). It does not erase the binary oppositions, but rather opens up the possibilities of alternatives, of the “both-and-also”, rather than the “either-or” reasoning (Owen 2008: 43). The shift in the “Anglo-American philosophy of science” (Webmoor 2007: 572) from either-or to both-and-also reasoning is exemplified in the developments which Watkins has had in his inner journey. By means of Watkins’s breakdown, Lessing conveys “the necessity of a holistic approach to living that takes account of both the external, everyday life, and the internal psychic life of a character” (Whittaker 1988: 83). Watkins tells Doctor Y. that “[y]our dreams or your life. But it is not or, that is the point. It is an and. Everything is. Your dreams and your life” (B 142). As his psychic journey develops, Watkins realizes the essence of the chaotic atmosphere of the world more clearly. To Watkins, “[s]ome sort of a divorce there has been somewhere along the path of this race of man between the ‘I’ and the ‘We,’ some sort of a terrible falling away” (B 103). The multiple use of “I” both in *Briefing* (B 103) and in *The Golden Notebook* (Lessing 1973: 628) suggests that Lessing considers “the ideology of total egoism [...] as the ground of ethical failure in modern western culture” (quoted in Cheng 1999: 87) in her oeuvre.

To bring science into this discussion as another dividing practice and source behind the human/non-human dualism, it might be helpful to study the following quotation. “In fact, the distinguishing feature of this new religion, and why it has proved so inadequate, is its insistence on dividing off, compartmenting, pigeon-holing” (*B* 121). ‘This new religion’ refers to the dogmatic aspects of science and Lessing criticizes science when it does not have a holistic view of life. In that case, standardized education likens to science as it “consists of putting labels on things, to categorize neatly, to see all of its existence, in a word, as neatly fitting predetermined pigeonholes” (Schlueter 1973: 124). According to Lessing, “this kind of theoretical discourse, with its emphasis on distinguishing characteristics, classes, orders and hierarchies, embodies an inherently oppressive impulse to imprison reality in rigid structures” (quoted in King 1989: 61). As a result, disjunctions of the ‘normal’ such as Watkins and Larson must be worked through since they can create sufficient detachment from the dominant ideology and its disciplinary power to make a radical critique of that ideology (King 1989: 60).

The second place where Lessing discusses the relation between modernist dichotomies and archaeology is in Rosemary Baines’s letter. In her letter to Watkins, Baines states that she has a friend, Frederick Larson who has a stammering problem like Watkins. Baines talks about Larson in depth so that Watkins can benefit from Larson’s experience. According to Baines, Larson has been content with his job as an archaeologist till his African visit and his dig in Turkey. After those experiences, Larson has “Profound Doubts about what was going on in Archaeology, Doubts about its bases, premises, methods, and above all, its unconscious biases” (*B* 169) all of which presumably trigger both his stammer and his mental breakdown. “The stammer thus became an outward symptom of his internal doubts [signifying that] he had ceased to believe in what he was saying” (Whittaker 1988: 82). In other words, “stammer designates speech that blocks itself out of doubt” (Cheng 1999: 82). In that case, Watkins and Larson develop a stammer when they are no longer certain about the bases of their profession. Moreover, they realize that Classics and archaeology are both categorical and classifying; therefore, they operate as dividing practices.

In his Turkey dig, which triggers his second stammer, Larson has to deconstruct another dichotomy the material/spiritual during the excavation of the related civilization since that society does not fit in such a modernist schema. According to the findings, Larson points out that the related society is a highly technological one, on the other hand,

they keep believing in witches, fairies, superman, magic of all kinds and they even take pains to inculcate these beliefs in their children side by side with scientific techniques (*B* 159). In that society there is no boundary between the material and the spiritual zone, which stems from the Western ontological dualism. Instead, that society seem to blur such a dualistic mindset creating a fusion, which supports the idea that “the dualistic mode of thinking prevents us from properly understanding the non-Western societies” (Herva and Ikaeimo 2002: 95), especially in the archaeological studies.

Similar to Baines’s problematizing the recurrent use of some certain sounds that Watkins utters in his visit to her, Larson focuses more on the use of sound amidst the excavation deductions. To Larson, that society has priests who use “sound in all kinds of ways [...] they have little belief in the effectiveness of words by themselves, because these talks [...] are introduced by, accompanied by, interrupted by, concluded by, a variety of sounds, usually musical [...] their use of music in this way, if we (archaeologists) can understand it, would be the key to their civilization” (*B* 159). In that section, Larson pushes the limits of the rational archaeological discipline, which merely focuses on the material aspect of a culture in terms of civilization. Archaeology interprets the material culture within a certain symbolic discourse, which aims at “overemphasizing the human-subjective and mental dimension of how people relate to landscapes and monuments” (Olsen 2003: 91). However, Larson’s focus is on the significance of “the sound” more than the language, which transcends the traditional archaeological approach. There are current debates over the traditional archeological approach which has focused more on the visual aspects of the artefacts.

In the study of rock art, the shift from a purely visual and iconocentric interpretation to wider geographic and non-visual issues has been an important development [...]. In particular, Ouzman’s (2001) work on San rock art emphasizes the importance of non-visual aspects of rock art, indicating that touching images and hammering them to produce sounds were significant, if not very obvious activities” (Herva and Ikaheimo 2002: 105).

Considering the example, archaeological zone needs to enlarge its horizon to understand a civilization in terms of both material and spiritual aspects.

In the Cartesian philosophy, human/non-human divide has other sub-categories. The world is further divided “into inanimate (rocks) and non-sentient (sheep) things, and humans who are animate and sentient” (Gamble 2001: 106). The society that Larson

encounters in his Turkey dig, has an “animistic culture believing that animals and plants have human and even sometimes magical characteristics,” (B 159-160) which is interpreted as “non-(a)modernist recognition” in which things are accepted as much “a part of being” (quoted in Webmoor 2007: 570). In that society, humans become de-centered and they are no longer autonomous and independent beings sharing such human features with other beings. Such a philosophy cannot be interpreted in accordance with the Cartesian dualistic schema and the traditional Western thought in general but such traits do not contrast with the holistic Sufi thinking practiced by Lessing.

Subjects as people are separated from the objects as the things, but also a person is divided “into mind and body, detaching thought from action [thus] we become thinking machines, applying our subjective reason to the objects of the world” (Gamble 2001: 106) in the Cartesian philosophy. That can be described by a theatre metaphor in which our mind sits in the audience, analyzing our body performing on the stage (Gamble 2001: 106). There are some opponents of the Cartesian *cogito*, though. Merleau-Ponty “claims that prior to the Cartesian ‘I think’, it is necessary to acknowledge an ‘I can’ or ‘I do’; that is: a practical, non-discursive consciousness which governs my relationship with the world and which is expressed in routinized practices and actions, in bodily habits” (Olsen 2003: 96). In that sense, he draws attention to the body in which knowledge is stored (Olsen 2003: 96).

In terms of psy-sciences, Descartes’s point of view toward man consisting of mind and body was put forward at the beginning of the classical age, however, it did not have a profound influence on medical thought and practices, not like his *cogito* had. It is in the 19th century, medicine takes up a dualistic view of mind and body and there emerge questions about the relation between the material and the immaterial. According to Foucault, supporting body-mind dualism constitutes a basis for converting madness into mental illness and brings with it questions of matter and the immaterial. By means of such a dualistic structure, madness and reason; madness and civilization are linked in a new way: “madness exists in a constitutive relation with civilization; ungraspable outside the integral ties that divide it from and bind it to reason” as Nicholas Rose states (2002: 143). Moreover, David Cooper clarifies that link in the introduction of *Madness and Civilization* as “the invention of madness as a disease is [...] a disease of our civilization [...] people are driven mad by others” (Cooper 1967: viii) by means of discourses,

disciplinary systems and society as in the case of Watkins, Larson and of Violet exemplified throughout the book.

2.3.2. Civilized/Uncivilized Divide

After the shift from Marxist dialectic to the Nietzschean genealogy, Foucault took a different attitude toward history. Nietzschean genealogical critique and his decentering historical development of reason open way to a non-dialectic thinking (Bernauer 2005: 183). From a genealogical lens, there is not a linear story of humanity from ‘savage’ to the ‘civilized’ in the historical sense. Instead, there is overdetermination of events which means that there could not be plain explanations, and certain reasons and results of an event. Therefore, Foucault looked for inconsistencies in the history, which enables us to reread the past and reconstruct accepted ideologies and concepts of the present. He focuses on the probabilities of new links between the events. Thusly, Foucault puts thought in an archive. Archive is an efficient metaphor giving way to the possibilities of thought. Like a library, it does not have a hierarchy within thoughts. There are various parchments and documents which are written and published many times and all these hodgepodge texts enable us to face what we have escaped as human beings.

According to Gordon Childe, “urban Revolution led to the earliest civilizations with writing, monumental buildings, bureaucracies, cities, trade and agricultural surplus” (quoted in Gamble 2001: 32). Furthermore, he sums up full civilization as metallurgy, the wheel, the ox-cart, the pack-ass and the sailing ship, which succinctly constituted a technological package (Gamble 2001: 165). Lessing draws attention to the material aspect of civilization criteria through Watkins’s unclassifiable experience within the Crystal in the following quote. “Everything is dated and known by things, fragments of things: the children of a society that is obsessed with possessions, objects, have to think of previous civilizations in this way: slaves of their own artifacts, they know that the old barbarians were too” (*B* 89).

In the case of Larson, the material aspect of progress and civilization puts him in a difficult situation in distinguishing who is civilized and who is not. In his African travel where his first stammer emerges, Larson is highly affected by a tribe whose life is entirely based on the movements of a river (*B* 164-165). Their villages are built in the mounds of the plain. The river floods every year, and a large plain disappears under water. When the flood rises to a certain height they get on to boats and move to live on the shores till the

waters subside again. In the case of a flood that rises higher than the usual height, they are able to live somewhere else. After two or three years it would be impossible to know that there has been a tribe at that place since the huts and the vessels are of wood and earth; the roofs are of thatch and even the earthenware are sun-dried. Moreover, the weapons are of iron and not for warfare but for rituals. In short, every item they make and use can be destroyed by water and ants in months. Even if nothing material would remain after that tribe other than modern tin ware and plastic things, it is a society on a high level to Larson if a society is judged by harmony, responsibility toward its members, and lack of aggression toward neighbors (*B* 165). It is “a society more integrated with nature than any he could remember [...] the tribe’s life centered on flooding and subsidence of the river [...] ritualized around the seasons, the winds, the sun, the moon, the Earth” (*B* 165). However, those features are interpreted in archaeology as “nonexistent/barbaric/plentiful/backward/sparse or whatever is the current notion” (*B* 168). What fanned his doubts is the main thought that our society is dominated by things, possessions, and objects and we judge previous societies by artefacts due to our thinking barriers and our own biases (*B* 165). That’s why, scholars have made the same mistake in calculating “the birth of civilization”; they set it “somewhere between two thousand and four thousand BC depending on the bias of the archeological school and the definition of civilization” (*B* 109) abstaining from the possibility that civilizations may have very old histories.

After his African visit, Larson intrinsically realizes that “we, as human beings set up the differences” (Gündoğdu 2015: 7) and divisions by apparatuses like disciplines. For that reason, archaeological truths are not self-evident which is supported in the following quote by Jonathan Friedman: “Both primitivism and evolutionism are founded on a [...] hierarchical vision of the world divided between civilization/primitivity and we/they” (1994: 5). By means of such binary oppositions and related theories such as Darwin’s evolution, archaeology has had a tendency to become nationalized. Archaeological funds clarify such a tendency exemplified in Larson’s case. He is affected profoundly by the African excavation; however, he is not able to keep working there, which is related to financial aspect of archaeology.

[T]hat the financing of an excavation was always the key to it, and particularly whether it took place at all. Certain people got money easier than others. Some people couldn’t get money at all, or only with great difficulty. Some countries

were easy money-extractors, others not [...] he had been able to get money for that site [Turkey site] from an American source—a museum short of a certain kind of artefact which was known to be freely available on that site. (*B* 167)

While Larson cannot carry on working in the African site due to the lack of funds, he is not able to make any pronouncement about the Tukey dig no matter how deeply he is affected by the excavated ‘civilization’ due to the imposed rules of archaeological approach.

On a plateau in Turkey part of a top layer of a city has been laid bare, which takes a high form of human living (one dare not say civilization) back ten thousand years, and underneath that layer are many other layers, still unexcavated... but do the specialists say: We cannot make any pronouncements at all about human history, because our knowledge (or our guesses) is limited to the last site we have (partly) dug? No, no, not at all, what their present knowledge is—is knowledge [...] (*B* 110)

In *Time Bites*, Lessing draws attention to the possibility of deconstructing the imposed knowledge by means of archaeology. Therefore, Lessing points out that “Çatal Höyük, [an] ancient town in Turkey where, it is claimed, farming began, has had only its top levels excavated, and below them lie who knows what surprises” (2004: 131-132). However, it is not easy to break the traditional boundaries in terms of archaeology. For example, there are different reasons behind different excavations stopping the project especially when there is a possibility of unexpected knowledge, which will put the traditional archaeological assumptions at risk, in *Briefing*. In the case of the real world, the tendency to nationalize archaeology becomes clearer.

Since Mediterranean civilizations of Greece and Rome get special attention especially during Renaissance and Enlightenment due to forming an important background of European culture, archaeology does not need to introduce new techniques and concepts despite contravention of wonders such as Egypt and Mesopotamia (Greene 1996: 30). Combined with nationalism archaeological research becomes more selective in choosing the past that it wishes to emphasize. For example, after the collapse of Ottoman Empire, physical reminders of Turkish rule and its religion such as the mosques and harams are completely removed to allow the new Greek nation underline its connections with European roots of classical culture (Greene 1996: 31). The demolition of historical buildings that relate Turkish culture did not invoke any moral

responsibility or ethical approach probably because Turkey is accepted as a non-European country. According to John Lubbock, “[n]on-European cultures are biologically inferior; therefore, the most primitive people are doomed to inevitable extinction through natural selection” (quoted in Greene 1996: 167-168) in Darwinian terms. “[N]o moral responsibility should be felt for their decline or loss of identity through [various reasons such as] colonization, since they result from innate biological differences” (quoted in Greene 1996: 167-168). After 150 years, Bernal stresses the opposite viewpoint that there is also “non-European contribution to ancient Greek culture, in a major work of scholarship with the arresting title *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic roots of Classical civilization* (1987; 1991)” (quoted in Greene 1996: 168). There is a similar case in *Briefing* where Larson discusses that

‘Greece was the mother of Western civilization and Rome its daddy’ directed archeology and excavation for a long time—yet he, Frederick, would be able to make out a case that the Arabs, Moors and Saracens were parents to ‘western’ civilization, sources of its ideas, its literature, its science, a case based on the same kind of evidence that made us legitimate heirs to Greece and Rome ... this case wouldn’t necessarily be more true, but its bases would be as powerful. (*B* 167)

Larson does not make a distinction between the East and the West, but refers to the East as the mother of Western civilization indicating the hybrid culture complemented by various civilizations, which surpasses the borders of the national mindset (Gündoğdu 2015: 7). In that case, Larson draws attention to the archeology as a method in recreating the past, which also affects the present. In order to comprehend the past, an archaeologist needs to interact with the artefact. There is a double-sided interaction after such an experience; not only the artefact can affect the archaeologist’s assumptions but also his own mindset can affect his interaction with the artefact, which creates the archaeological interpretation in the end. Due to watching television between four and seven, Larson interprets that the most outstanding characteristic of civilization in Britain in 1969 is that all events are equally important, whether war, a game, the weather, the craft of plant-growing, a fashion show, a police hunt, the conclusion of which might change if he watched the television between eight and twelve (*B* 159-160). By means of that metaphor, he explains how analogous that method is with the archaeological methods used in his digs in reading the findings of the related civilizations.

According to Foucault, “our thought [...] bears the stamp of our age and our geography” which parallels with the conventional archaeological approach (1994: xvi). In *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, Foucault’s mindset as a westerner makes him laugh while reading a passage in Borges taken from a certain Chinese encyclopedia about animal classification. In that passage, it is written that “animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame [...] (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies” (quoted in Foucault 1994: xvi). To Foucault, after reading such passages, the exotic charm of another systems of thought emerges due to “the limitations of our own; the stark impossibility of thinking *that*” (1994: xvi). That kind of thinking otherwise threatens the self/other distinction just like the Turkish excavation, which has left Larson in profound doubts about archeology, its basis and its methods blurring such divisions as subject/object and civilized/primitive. Surrounded by such powerful discourses and binary oppositions, he is not able to escape from stammer and mental breakdown.

CHAPTER THREE

3. TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF

In his earlier works such as *Madness and Civilization*, *The Birth of the Clinique* and *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Foucault has aimed to write “the history of the different ways in [Western] culture that humans develop knowledge about themselves” (Foucault 1988b: 17-18) by means of some institutions such as asylums, hospitals and prisons. After having written *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, the relation between knowledge and power is more clarified refashioning his previous works such as *Madness and Civilization*. That’s why, in the third chapter, madness in *Briefing* has been analyzed in accordance with the technologies of domination with the titles taken from the book: *Discipline and Punish*. In his later works such as *History of Sexuality*, Volume 1, 2, and 3, Foucault deepens his understanding of the constitution of the subject, which is the outcome of “the interplay of various technologies” especially technologies of domination and the self (Thomson 2011: 6).

Foucault has worked on the concept of *subject* more than twenty-five years; however, he does not suggest a method or a theory of the subject since “setting an *a priori* theory of the subject implies an idea of a universal and timeless subject which attaches people to specific identities” (Thomson 2011: 2). Instead, he keeps trying to “create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” and he mentions “three modes of objectifications which transform human beings into subjects” (Foucault 1983: 208). Those are the modes of inquiry: dividing practices which create binaries such as the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the ‘good boys’; and the ways human beings turn themselves into subjects, (1983: 208) which are the techniques of the self in other words. In that frame, there is a transformation in Foucauldian power network. According to McNay, Foucault gave up insisting “on the weakness of the subject who is manipulated and oppressed by different forms of power as a docile body,” which was the focus of his early works and “he started to consider the subject as an agent who has the capacity of autonomous action toward the end of his life” (quoted in Gözel 2012: 154). Counterbalancing “the analysis of the techniques of domination with an analysis of techniques of the self [...] provide[s] a complete examination of the subject” as McNay suggests (quoted in Gözel 2012: 155). For that

reason, in the third chapter of this study, the first two objectifying techniques (sciences together with dividing practices) were studied under the title of technologies of domination and the last technology that is of the self will be analyzed in this chapter together with the so-called “insanity” of the main character in *Briefing* to complete the picture of the subject.

Foucauldian subject has two meanings: “subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to” (Foucault 1983: 212). In both ways, “the subject constitutes itself in an active fashion through practices of the self, these practices are nevertheless not something invented by the individual himself. They are the models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, and imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group” (Becker, Fornet-Betancourt and Gomez-Müller 1994: 291). Considering the emergence of the modern self, Foucault relates the base of the psychoanalytic structure of the self to the self-care techniques, which open the way to knowing oneself. In that sense, “[t]o know oneself is to retrieve from the oblivion of the unconscious mind, lost memories of painful experiences or unresolved conflicts” (Hutton 1988: 124). For that reason, operating in the psychoanalytical discourse, the doctors of the Central Intake hospital assume that Watkins has committed a crime and feels guilty, which results in his amnesiac state. Watkins’s case also reminds the madmen of *Madness and Civilization*, whose structure of the mind has also been shaped by external authorities (Hutton 1988: 125).

Psychoanalytic techniques parallel with the techniques of self-analysis in the past. Just like lazar houses were used as madhouses later on, self-care practices have been used in different ages for different purposes. At first, Foucault sees the beginning of the genealogy of psychoanalysis in the “auricular confession of the Catholic church” and states that “the examination of conscience” is taken from “a religious practice, [and put] in a medical garb” (Hutton 1988: 133). Then he traces back those technologies of self from Christian-Roman Empire of the fourth and the fifth centuries to the Stoics in the first and the second centuries C.E. (Hutton 1988: 134). Even the self-care practices of the Stoics have earlier precedents: The Pythagoreans of the fourth and the fifth centuries B.C.E. (Hutton 1988: 134). At the same epoch, “Plato, in his dialogue *Alcibiades I*, presents Socrates teaching his young disciple [Alcibiades] a method for self-care as a means of preparing him for the adult responsibilities of public life” (Hutton 1988: 134).

In that frame, Foucault's objective is not to pinpoint the beginning of self-care practices but to show the historicity of "the formation of modern deep self," and the historicity of the methods of Freudian psychoanalysis to "create a possibility for a new ethical subject that is free from the disciplinary scientific discourse" (Markula 2004: 306).

To Foucault, there is a "relationship between three major and inherently connected forces: power, truth and subjectivity" (Batters 2011: 1) which in tandem operate in the formation of the self. In that frame, the place of critique has an immense effect since critique render possible "one's ability to exert freedom in a civilization dictated by forces of power" (Batters 2011: 1). Foucault states that

the focus of critique is essentially the cluster of relations that bind the one to the other, or the one to the two others, power, truth and the subject. And if governmentalization is really this movement concerned with subjugating individuals in the very reality of a social practice by mechanisms of power that appeal to a truth, I will say that critique is the movement through which the subject gives itself the right to question truth concerning its power effects and to question power about its discourses of truth. Critique will be the art of voluntary inservitude, of reflective indocility. (quoted in Batters 2012: 2)

Considering the quote, critique stands for a kind of awakening from docility into a critical awareness, which enables one to examine the status quo and therefore feel free to question it. As a related Foucauldian concept, governmentality "designates different relations: relation between state and its subjects, relation between man and things and relation of the self with himself" (Gözel 2012: 154). Accordingly, in *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*⁹ it is mentioned that Socrates advises Alcibiades to learn how to cultivate his soul and take care of himself before he governs people so that he is able to use his power ethically in *Alcibiades I*.

In an interview with Rux Martin, Foucault states: "My role [...] is to show people that they are much freer than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called evidence can be criticized and destroyed" (1982: 11). In that sense, Foucault presents his books as autobiographic texts, which transforms himself at first. In the case of Foucault, writing operates as a technology of self transforming his own self and

⁹ The book will be referred to as *Technologies of the Self* henceforward.

Foucault's oeuvre aims at changing the readers or making the readers think differently. In that frame, Lessing walks on the same path both transforming herself through her writing and she works up the reader as well.

In the Foucauldian genealogy of the hermeneutics of the modern self, one has to look at both pagan and the Christian self-care techniques. That's why, a brief history of pagan and Christian practices in terms of technologies of the self is to be mentioned in the first section. Technologies of the self will be examined in relation to some practices of late antiquity, which are basically named "*epimelesthai sautou*" and "*gnothi sauton*" (Foucault 1988b: 19). The former means "the concern with self," "to be concerned, to take care of yourself" and the latter stands for "know yourself" (Foucault 1988b: 19). In the second section, Jungian symbols together with mythic patterns in *Briefing* will be analyzed since Lessing uses archetypal images and symbols in her description of Watkins's inner voyage toward his individual self. If the person is able to encounter her/his self in a healthy way, which is possible through the cultivation of the soul, there occurs a shift from the individual to the collective self, which parallels with the principles of take care of yourself and know yourself. Through that, the formation of the self, Sufi thinking, a significant theme in *Briefing*, will be examined within the third section.

3.1. Foucauldian Care of the Self and Know Yourself

In ancient culture, care of the self is related to know yourself since "knowledge of oneself" is seen "as the consequence of taking care of yourself" (Foucault 1988b: 22). The practices of care of the self which open way to know yourself are used to transform men into ethical beings (Markula 2004: 306). Such techniques of self are seen explicitly in Plato's *Alcibiades I*. There are some other sources following Plato's that advise one to be concerned with oneself such as Socratic dialogues, Xenophon, Hippocrates, and the Neoplatonist tradition from Albinus on (Foucault 1988b: 20). To clarify the scope of technologies of the self, Plato's *Alcibiades I*, Stoics', Epicurean and Christian practices will be examined in this section.

In *Alcibiades I*, the center of the dialogue is constituted by the principle of self-care techniques and that dialogue was accepted as *arche* (the first to be read, the first to be studied) by the Neoplatonists in the third or fourth century C.E. (Foucault 1988b: 23). Accepted as the basis for technologies of the self, *Epimelesthai sautou*, is initially discussed in 127d of the *Alcibiades I*. It stands for "taking pains with one's holdings and

one's health" (Foucault 1988b: 24). The book is about the dialogue between Alcibiades who is supposed to govern people; therefore, he "wishes to speak before the people and be all-powerful in the city" regardless of "the privileges of his birth and heritage" (Foucault 1988b: 23) and Socrates who wants to "help him gain the upper hand—to acquire *techne*—Alcibiades must apply himself, he must take care of himself" (Foucault 1988b: 24). *Techne* is used by the Greeks to refer to art in the aesthetic sense and to instrumental practices not differentiating the aesthetic and the instrumental (Kelly 2013: 519). Considering the word's etymology, there is a tendency to see one's life as a kind of art in ancient culture. Moreover, it is explicitly seen that care for oneself cannot be detached from caring for others; therefore, "ethical care of the self translates to ethical care of others" (Markula 2004: 318).

Foucault analyzes the ethics of the self in the second (*The Use of Pleasure*) and the third volumes (*The Care of the Self*) of *The History of Sexuality*. By means of the concept of ethics, Foucault does not refer to "a matter of rules or principles for actions that can be labeled as "right" or "good," hence "ethical" or "moral" (Kelly 2013: 517). In the Foucauldian sense, ethics stands for "character" therefore relates to "a dimension of ourselves" (Kelly 2013: 517). That's why, there is a clear-cut distinction between morality and ethics in Foucault's oeuvre. According to Foucault, "[b]y 'morality,' one means a set of values and rules of action that are recommended to individuals through the intermediary of various prescriptive agencies such as the family (in one of its roles), educational institutions, churches, and so forth" (Foucault 1990: 25). In the case of ethics, Foucault states: It is "the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, *rappor a soi*, which I call ethics, and which determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions" (Foucault 1997: 263). That definition is opposite of the traditional definition of morality which expresses "historically universal truths" (Kelly 2013: 517) from a modernist lens.

To apply self-care techniques, one has to be aware of what the self actually is. The self is not about material means such as clothing, possession, or tools but it is "found in the principle which uses these tools, a principle not of the body but of the soul" (Foucault 1988b: 25). The soul needs a similar element, a mirror to see itself through, which occurs in the contemplation of the divine element (Foucault 1988b: 25). In that sense, having "a mirror relation to itself, the soul relates to the concept of memory and justifies dialogue as a method of discovering the truth in the soul" (Foucault 1988b: 31). In that frame, care

of the self cannot be separated from the Delphic principle that is *know yourself*. Therefore, it is better to say that “caring of oneself consists of knowing oneself” and “knowing oneself becomes the object of the quest of concern for self” (Foucault 1988b: 26).

While care of the self and knowing oneself are interrelated, the hierarchy between them differs regarding the time-span they are practiced. Plato and Platonists gave priority to know yourself. On the other hand, Hellenistic and Greco-Roman culture focused more on the concern with oneself. Furthermore, Epicurus together with his followers, Cynics and Stoics such as Seneca, Rufus, and Galen all accepted ‘taking care of oneself’ as a universal philosophical theme (Foucault 1988b: 26). According to Epicureans, “it’s never too late to care for the well-being of the soul” (quoted in Foucault 1986: 46) and to the Stoics, one must “retire into the self and stay there” (Foucault 1988b: 27). However, the person is expected to “retire into the self [...] not to discover faults and deep feelings, [as in the case of Christian confession] only to remember rules of action, the main laws of behavior” (Foucault 1988b: 34).

In the case of Western society, techniques of know yourself become more important than self-care practices. There are some reasons for that hierarchical shift. One of the reasons is that care of the self is regarded as a kind of immorality due to the effects of Christianity on Western culture. It is not moral to give ourselves care since the self must be renounced to reach another level of reality in Christian tradition. “Christian morality [...] makes self-renunciation the condition for salvation” (Foucault 1988b: 22). Another source that Western culture has fed on is the “secular tradition which respects external law as the basis for morality” and social morality “seeks the rules for acceptable behavior in relations with others” (Foucault 1988b: 22). The last reason that increases the importance of knowledge of the self rather than care of the self is the theoretical philosophy from Descartes to Husserl, which is based on the thinking subject in terms of epistemology (Foucault 1988b: 22).

In the Roman imperial period, there was a philosophical movement named as Stoicism. The Stoics are known for their multiple technology of the self practices such as “letters to friends, disclosure of self by examining self and conscience, and *askesis*” (Foucault 1988b: 34). As a Stoic philosopher, Marcus Aurelius’s letter is discussed in *Technologies of the Self* in depth. It is about tiny details of everyday life together with such unimportant things as “relieving [one’s] throat [...] by swallowing honey water” (quoted in Foucault 1988b: 28). In the last lines of the same letter, “Aurelius goes to bed

and looks in the notebook to see what he was going to do and how it corresponds to what he did,” which exemplifies also “the examination of conscience at the end of the day” (Foucault 1988b: 30). Regarding the example, tiny details of everyday life, which relate to self-forming technologies become significant.

While the philosophical field was based on writing practices such as “letters to friends,” “writing treaties” and “keeping notebooks”, “the development of the administrative structures and the bureaucracy of the imperial period increased the amount and the role of writing in the political sphere” (Foucault 1988b: 27). As a consequence of both social and philosophical focus on writing, it has become one of the most applied self-care techniques in Western tradition from the ancient period to the modern age. Taking care by writing includes “taking notes on oneself to be reread, writing treatises and letters to friends to help them, and keeping notebooks in order to reactivate for oneself the truths one needed” (Foucault 1988b: 27). In *Briefing*, epistolary part of the novel has such a significant role that the doctors are able to bring together the split identity of Watkins by means of letters by him and his friends. Furthermore, recognizing such self-forming techniques, Lessing’s well-known novel, *The Golden Notebook* is about Anna’s fragmented consciousness, which is split up into several notebooks of different colors, and this separation symbolizes her relation to herself, her body, to other people, and to society in general (Kaplan 1974: 122). Considering the examples, novel writing operates as another technology of the self about which Anna remarks that “the novel has become a function of the fragmented society, the fragmented consciousness” (Lessing 1973: 113). Lessing is aware of the power of writing novel in terms of a self-forming technique in her own life as seen in the following quote: “I have never personally been mad or broken down, but I feel as if I have. The reason for my not having been personally mad or in breakdown is, I think—partly—that any inclination toward it has been staved off by writing about it” (Lessing 1997: 267).

While dialogue was disappearing at the Roman imperial period, another method of examining the self emerged. There was “a new pedagogical relationship—a new pedagogical game where the master/teacher speaks and doesn’t ask questions [different from Socratic doctrine] and the disciple doesn’t answer but must listen and keep silent” (Foucault 1988b: 32). That was practiced as a disclosure of the self: examination of the self. In such practices, the Stoics were inspired by the Pythagorean culture, in which disciples did not speak for five years applied as a pedagogical rule. By that way, the

disciples learned to develop the art of listening and therefore they have the adequate setting for acquiring the truth. Even if there was the disappearance of the dialectical structure that operated through dialogues, the art of listening did not aim at creating passivity. Instead, the disciple needed to look and listen to the self for the truth within while being obliged to listen to the truth expressed by the teacher.

As the second disclosure of the self, examination of conscience also emerged from the old tradition by the Pythagoreans. It was related to purifying oneself before going to sleep since sleep was associated to death. As another Stoic philosopher, Seneca advises to “do good things, have a good examination of the self” to attain the purification of the conscience adding that “a good sleep follows together with good dreams, which is contact with the gods” (Foucault 1988b: 33). There are clear-cut differences between Senecan and Christian style of examination of the self and conscience. While “faults are simply good intentions left undone” for Seneca, “Christian confession will look for bad intentions” (Foucault 1988b: 33). According to Seneca, if one follows the rule of conduct, everything has been done properly. On the other hand, the penitent has to “memorize laws [...] in order to discover his sins” in Christian confession (Foucault 1988b: 34).

Besides self-care techniques such as letters to friends and disclosure of the self by examining the self and conscience, Foucault addresses the third Stoic technique as “*askesis*” which means “a remembering” and “the progressive consideration of the self, or mastery over oneself, obtained not through the renunciation of reality but through the acquisition and assimilation of truth” to attain “the reality of this world” (Foucault 1988b: 35). On the other hand, the reality together with the self is to be renounced in Christian asceticism to achieve another stage of reality (Foucault 1988b: 35).

In the Greek culture, *askesis* consists of a two-poled structure: *melete* and *gymnasia*. The former term means meditation:

[It] is the work one undertook in order to prepare a discourse or an improvisation by thinking over useful terms and arguments [...] While meditation is an imaginary experience that trains thought, *gymnasia* [to train oneself] is training in a real situation [such as] sexual abstinence, physical privation, and other rituals of purification. (Foucault 1988b: 36-37)

In such practices, the individual is able to test her/his independence regarding the external world and strengthen the soul against plain desires. As an example of *gymnasia*, Seneca “prepares for a great feast day by acts of mortification of the flesh in order to convince

himself that poverty is not evil and that he can endure it” (Foucault 1988b: 37). In an intermediary line between *melete* and *gymnasia*, Epictetus gives two metaphors, which clearly expresses his philosophy. The first one is “a night watchman who checks the entries at the gate of cities or houses” and the second one is a “money-changer who won’t accept any coin without having made sure of its worth” (Foucault 1986: 63). Considering the quotes, one must be a watchman over her/his thoughts and a money changer of her/his own representations of the thoughts, testing, and verifying them.

The last technology in the examination of the self is the interpretation of dreams whose meaning “was an announcement of a future event” in antiquity (Foucault 1988b: 39). In the second century, Aelius Aristides wrote *Sacred Discourses*, which was about Aristides’s dreams and how to interpret them. “He believed that in the interpretation of dreams we receive advice from the gods about remedies for illness” (Foucault 1988b: 39). While interpretation of dreams constitutes an important part of the Freudian psychoanalysis opening way to unconscious and the repressed part of the self, it is the source for the archetypes by which the individual is able to discover her/his self entering into the collective unconscious in the Jungian psycho-analytic tradition.

Despite such psychiatric discourses, the doctors in the *Briefing* fall short in understanding and interpreting Watkins’s dreams and visionary experiences; therefore, they are not able to use that technology of the self. On the other hand, Watkins is seen practicing the technique of interpretation of dreams by himself. At the ancient city, he dreams about his friends George, Charlie, Stephen, Miles, and the rest. In his dream, Watkins talks to his old comrades and then Conchita and Nancy join the conversation by singing and laughing. When he wakes up, Watkins has the feeling that he has something to do. Then, he realizes the square at the center of the city with an inner circle, which “he had to prepare [for the Crystal] by clearing away all the loose dirt and pulling out the grass” (B 54). He interprets his dreams as a kind of information source; that’s why, he adds “I knew only that this was what I had to do, and could only suppose that my friends must have told me so, since after my dream of them that I had known it” (B 54). In that example, Watkins gets advice from his friends about remedies for his illness like in the example above from *Sacred Discourses*. He makes his decisions by interpreting his dreams as a technology of the self regardless of outer sovereign mechanisms.

According to Foucault, to make a genealogy of the modern self, one must study the transition from pagan to Christian culture to see clear-cut continuities and

discontinuities (Foucault 1988b: 40). In that sense, Christian religion is a religion of both salvation and confession; therefore, it aims at leading a person “from one reality to another” and it “imposes very strict obligations of truth, dogma, and canon, more so than do the pagan religions” (Foucault 1988b: 40). While these characteristics are related to faith, there are other models of “truth obligations” (Foucault 1988b: 40). “Each person has the duty to know who he is, that is, to try to know what is happening inside him, to acknowledge faults, [...] and everyone is obliged to disclose these things either to God or to others in the community and hence bear public or private witness against oneself” (Foucault 1988b: 40). There is a strong link between truth obligations of faith and the self. Therefore, the purification of the soul is only possible with self-knowledge. There are two main forms of disclosure of the self for Christians of the first centuries. The first one is named *exomologesis*, or “recognition of fact,” which means that “recognizing publicly the truth of their faith or to recognize publicly that they were Christians” (Foucault 1988b: 41). The same word was also associated with a penitential meaning and it became a ritual in which the sinner recognizes themselves as penitents and that status stayed with them for four to ten years. There were other tenets of *exomologesis* such as fasting, certain way of clothing and sexual prohibitions.

In the fourth century, the second form of disclosure appeared as *exagoreusis*, which stands for the verbalizing practices of teacher/master of the pagan philosophy, especially the Stoics (Foucault 1988b: 44). Likening the example of lazar houses, verbalization techniques are refashioned within human sciences to constitute a new self. As an example for *exagoreusis* in Christian aesthetics, John Chrysostom states: “In the morning we must take account of our conduct of ourselves, to examine what is to our advantage and what is prejudicial against us, with prayers instead of indiscreet words,” (quoted in Foucault 1988b: 44) which likens to the Senecan way of self-examination. However, there are not much examples of such self-examination style especially within the monastic Christianity, which is based on “obedience and contemplation” (Foucault 1988b: 44). There is a different relation between the disciple and the master in monastic life. While the disciple asks for a good advice, therefore stays with the master for a certain time in antiquity, the monk needs to have a complete life-time obedience. John Cassian recites an old principle: “Everything the monk does without permission of his master constitutes a theft” (quoted in Foucault 1988b: 44). The monk is under the constant control, which leads to the sacrifice of the self.

Consequently, examining multiple self-forming techniques in different discourses, Foucault draws attention to the idea that any practice can actually “serve as ethical self-care: No practice in itself is good or bad, but its ethical value depends on how it is used” (Markula 2004: 307). Through the examples of ancient and Christian culture, Foucault suggests that there is no need to invent practices, instead we need to fold of existing everyday practices to create a self (quoted in Markula 2004: 307). As an example of self-care practice in *Briefing*, Jeremy Thorne, Watkins’s colleague, asks Watkins to take his appearance more seriously; Watkins is “scruffy, untidy, a bit flamboyant [...] Nothing terrible [...] but pretty irritating” (B 187). Then Thorne finds Watkins wearing his own jacket which her wife is planning to throw away and smoking a pipe which Watkins has never smoked before, and he even gets his hair cut just like Thorne does in their next encounter (B 187). In that example, wearing Thorne’s jacket, a new hair style and even smoking a pipe are all self-aestheticization practices applied by Watkins. Basically, Watkins cares for himself; however, he transforms his self changing his way of clothing and his appearance “to comply with the dominant discourses [rather than] to actively increase the understanding of [his] self as an ethical being” (Markula 2004: 308). Therefore, to achieve “freedom to invent a self,” (Lloyd 1996: 252) one has to be critically aware in practicing self-care techniques, and apply “problematization of behavior” by becoming more self-reflexive relieving oneself from the norms of one’s society (Foucault 1990: 101).

3.2. Jungian Theory of Personality as a Technology of the Self

In the hermeneutics of the self, Foucault pays close attention to Protestant Reformation, which “stresses on the individual’s unmediated relation to God” (Gutman 1988: 119). Martin Luther initiated the Reformation by hanging Ninety-five Theses on the door of Wittenberg’s Castle Church in 1517. According to Foucault, by means of those articles, Luther “established a technology, or anti-technology, for underwriting the ordeal of the individual self. That ordeal can be identified as an anguished quest to relocate the power of unimpeachable author within impeachable self,” which led a movement “from God-centered discourse of theology and confession to the man-centered discourse of Freud and Jung” (Rothwell 1988: 81). Regarding the quote, Foucault implies that Jungian psychology is highly related to the techniques of the self even if he does not make a direct reference to Jung in his oeuvre.

Although Foucault has put Freud and Jung in the same category as the founders of man-centered discourses, there are multiple differences in their theories about psychology and human mind. At first, they worked together in structuring the human psyche divided in conscious and unconscious. Then Freud's relating all repressed desires or feelings to sexuality did not suffice Jung, who "was interested in an open-minded search for truth", which has gone far beyond the material realm (Fleming 2005: 6). Once Freud said to Jung that "promise me never to abandon the sexual theory. That is the most essential thing of all. You see, we must make a dogma of it, an unshakable bulwark [...] Against the black tide of mud" (Jung 1989: 150). Freud seemed to evaluate any kind of spiritual tendency as the black tide of mud, on the other hand, he tried hard to make the sexual theory turn into a dogma, which did not comply with Jung's critical and questioning mind. To Jung, sex "plays a large part in [...] psychology as an essential—though not the sole—expression of psychic wholeness" (1989: 168). Furthermore, Jung started to have impersonal and ancient images in his dreams at that time. One of the most structurally explicit dream of him was about a two-story house, the top of which represented the conscious mind, and the lower one the unconscious. Below that story, there were passage-ways to deeper depths (Jung 1989: 158-159). Freud could only make sense of a small part of the imageries in that dream, which fanned Jung's doubts about Freudian theory and led Jung part company with Freud afterwards. That dream was peculiar to Jung since he termed the deepest level as the collective unconscious and the primordial images—the archetypes—later on by interpreting his own dreams according to his own rules as a technology of self. The structure drawn out of that dream constituted the essence of Jungian theory of human psyche releasing him from the Freudian discourse.

According to Jung, "the very goal of human existence was the development and fuller realization of the self, [which likens to one of the Delphic technologies of the self as 'know yourself'] and that uncovering the knowledge of the self was foremost in his psychology" (Fleming 2005: 2). Besides resembling the Delphic credo of 'know yourself', Jungian psychoanalytic approach is inspired by ancient philosophy in many other ways since collective unconscious is the depth of the psyche, which connects us to our ancestors including their philosophical, spiritual and religious culture. In that frame, in their nature, people have a spiritual side either neglected or mistreated in modern times. Having a Gnostic background, Jung does not refer to a certain religion in his oeuvre and

his texts are about world religions which are widely embraced such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and Indian religions. In that frame, he focuses on the similarities between them and reads religious texts as myths which are filled up with archetypal patterns.

To understand Jungian contribution to technologies of the self, the concept of the self must be discussed. According to Roy Baumeister, “[n]o topic is more interesting to people than the self. It is what you mean when you say ‘I’... Providing a satisfactory definition of self has proven fiendishly difficult” (quoted in Fleming 2005: 1). Therefore, there are many different definitions of the self. To Jung, it “represents the unity of the personality; it is all that a person can attain through personal growth and striving in one’s life” (Fleming 2005: 14). Like a vicious circle, the achievement of self-realization, or a state of wholeness must be the ultimate aim of personal development, which is never complete; therefore, one must continue the quest for the development of the self. That viewpoint coincides with the following quote from the article “Foucault, Freud and the Technologies of the Self” in *Technologies of the Self*. “The quest for self-understanding is a journey without end [...] the quest for such knowledge is itself a form of self-care, as ancient practitioners of the technologies of the self taught long before Freud” (Hutton 1988: 140) and also Jung.

According to Jung, the self is one of the most important archetypes that symbolizes personality. It appears as a “mandala, [the Crystal in *Briefing*] a fish, gemstones, or animals (when they connect to the basic, primitive parts of ourselves)” (Fleming 2005: 14). Other archetypes are the persona, the shadow, anima, and animus. In that sense, the psyche consists of the conscious, the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious whose contents are known as archetypes (Jung 1981: 4). In the archaeology of the term, archetype is traced

as early as Philo Judaeus, with reference to the *Imago Dei* (God-image) in man [...]. The term occurs several times in Dionysius the Areopagite, as for instance in *De caelesti hierarchia*: immaterial Archetypes, and in *De divinis nominibus*: Archetypal stone. The term archetype is not found in St. Augustine, but the idea of it is. Thus in *De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII* he speaks of *ideae principales* which are themselves not formed ... but are contained in the divine understanding. (Jung 1981: 4)

When it comes to the persona, it “is the outward appearance or public image that one creates; it is ordinarily a façade that hides one’s true feelings,” (Fleming 2005: 10)

which is “Professor Charles Watkins. 15 Acacia Road, Brink. Near Cambridge” in *Briefing* (B 139). In the case of Watkins, he needs to move away from his persona to get closer to his inner self. When a person “dons his persona too much, one is in danger of forgetting who one really is underneath that public face,” (Fleming 2005: 11) which is called as “inflation—identification with the archetype” (Jung 1981: 35) in Jungian theory. While he wears the persona of wise man, Watkins cannot connect to his inner self. On the other hand, he cannot recognize his persona when he tries to identify with his deep self, which is simply seen as amnesia by the doctors.

To Jung, the dark side of one’s personality is represented through shadow archetype. However, it does not stand for merely the negative parts, it rather consists of “the parts of ourselves that we do not consciously wish to own. The shadow also represents the primitive but artistic creativity within each of us; it speaks to our vitality” (Fleming 2005: 11). In the novel, Watkins is chosen as a highly-educated male character by which Lessing represents the ultimate rationality, which is broken off the emotional realm. Therefore, the feelings and emotions suggest the shadow of Watkins’s personality, which is closely related to the anima archetype that Jung proposes people to face with to gain a whole self. Pure rationality that is criticized also by Foucault is under erasure in Watkins’s case and that criticism goes parallel with Jungian technology of the self that requires to be a whole using all faculties including emotion, sentimentalism and intuition. In that sense, *Briefing* is grounded in mythopoetic narrative, which eases the description of unclassifiable experience related to emotion, sentimentalism and intuition, which create the main theme of the novel that is mysticism. According to Whittaker, Lessing “uses the fantastic, the mythic, the archetypal and the symbolic not merely as literary devices [...] but because she genuinely needs those modes of expression to convey her experiences of another dimension than that of the everyday world” (1988: 76). Furthermore, Lessing points out the need behind such a style in another novel by her. In *The Golden Notebook*, Anna, the protagonist, thinks that “the real experience can’t be described;” therefore, she states that “a row of asterisks [...] might be better. Or a symbol of some kind, a circle perhaps, or a square. Anything at all, but not words” (Lessing 1973: 1074). Besides circles, squares and the gleaming disc there are other mythic patterns in *Briefing* such as “the Fall, and the rebirth,” and so on. In this context, the imageries and the visionary experiences of Watkins appear as mythic patterns of Jungian archetypes which serve as technologies of the self.

To Horkheimer and Adorno, “[m]yth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology (2002: xviii). That’s why, “we shall not solve the ultimate secrets of neurosis and psychosis without mythology and the history of civilization” (Jung 1974: 279) since the psyche (the soul and body) have “an intensely historical character” (Jung 1989: 235). According to Otto Rank, especially in the case of comprehending schizophrenia, historical parallels are necessary as its sufferers, such as in the example of Watkins in *Briefing*, are overwhelmed by “the reminiscences of mankind” that Jung states (Lu 2012: 11). In that frame, “the imagery of schizophrenic fantasy perfectly matches that of the mythological hero journey,” (Campbell 1973: 131) which is already recognized by Lessing as she exemplifies such a heroic inner journey in *Briefing*.

As the name of the novel suggests, Lessing presents a mythological journey, a kind of *Nekyia* in *Briefing*. Borrowed from the Greek mythology, Jungian *Nekyia* stands for “the journey to Hades, the descent into the unconscious, and the leave-taking from the upper world” (Jung 1971: 177). When Doctor Y. wants Watkins write about his war experience, he pens another *Nekyia*: a duplicitous Yugoslavian war story, which is a metaphor for the unconscious. In that story, after the briefing about how to survive, Watkins and “Miles Bovey were dropped together on a dark and very cold night into a total darkness,” (B 205) which likens the description of the archetypal realm by Jung. In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung states: “Then I let myself drop” and “I plunged down into dark depths” (1989: 179). *Nekyia* is not an aimless and negative fall but “a descent into the cave of initiation and secret knowledge” (Jung 1971: 180). Therefore, it “turns out to be a wakeful insight to recall the imprinted innate knowledge that [Watkins] has lost to attain his social identity” (Gündoğdu 2015: 2). That secret and innate knowledge is related to intuition, extra sensory perception, and therefore madness for Jung and Lessing. While “Jung attached great importance to the non-rational, [...] breakdown and madness are seen as states of great potential” (Whittaker 1988: 12) by Lessing in her late novels and short stories. In a similar vein, in *Mental Illness and Psychology*, Foucault indicates that “the experience of Unreason [...] was to become, and still remains for us, the mode of access to the natural truth of man” (1987: 74). Accordingly, madness is “the threatening yet fascinating vision of esoteric learning, of forbidden wisdom and of man’s hideous secret nature” in Foucault’s oeuvre (quoted in Megill 2002: 98). For Lessing, “people who are called mentally ill are often those who say to the society, I am not going to live according to your rules. I am not going to

conform” (quoted in Sukenick 1974: 114-115). That’s why, madness can turn into a form of resistance and rebellion. In that frame, those three intellectuals—Foucault, Lessing and Jung—accept that there are unclassifiable experiences in the world such as visions, dreams and madness that all human beings share in common since those experiences come not from outside but inside as a result of the nature of human beings. To Lessing, “there is never anywhere to go but in,” (B 10) which rotates her narrative to the inner space fiction. In that sense, through inner space fiction, Lessing is able to explore “subjectivity which leads the reader into new ‘spaces’, new imagined worlds, which offer an alien perspective on contemporary reality” (King 1989: 55).

It is vital to consider why Lessing chooses a male protagonist before exploring Watkins’s mythopoetic descent. In her oeuvre, Lessing has chosen female protagonists in general; therefore, creating a ‘mad’ male protagonist for *Briefing* is peculiar. In that sense, Lessing draws attention to the traditional dilemma between male and female, in which the former is accepted to represent *reason* and the latter *emotion*. To Cederstrom, Lessing chooses a male protagonist “to create a contrast between the masculine *logos*, and the feminine *eros*, the world of unconscious, in which the savage, instinctual and uroboric mysteries come into their own” and that way “to demonstrate the limitations of the masculine mode of perception [one-sidedness] in the apprehension of the truth of cosmic harmony and unity” (1990: 138). Another significant feature of Watkins is that he is a professor of Classics at Cambridge University, which strengthens the idea of his rational capacity. Despite exemplifying the top position of the intellectual scope, Watkins starts to question the theoretical knowledge behind his profession like Frederick Larson, Mrs. Baines’s archaeologist friend. Watkins points out that “everything taught under the heading of Classics is pignose from beginning to end, and never has been anything else, and what we have never had any idea at all of what Plato or Socrates and Pythagoras were teaching” (B 190). Even if Watkins has studied Classics, there were some subjects that he was not thought of such as the technologies of the self, (care of the self and know yourself) which were related to wholeness, therefore spiritual sources practiced by the very same philosophers. Furthermore, Watkins, a Classics teacher, lectures about the “meaning of myth while exhibiting the most profound lack of understanding of the sacred and numinous tales of the gods himself” (Cederstrom 1990: 140). In Lessing’s *The Four Gated-City*, Martha recognizes a likewise situation that

her education, the education of every one of her generation (and of how many generations back?) had been so set, so programmed, that not a word of this information [esoteric knowledge] had been able to come through to her except in odd fragments, phrases, notions, each one soaked in, redolent of, ‘dottiness,’ ‘eccentricity, shadiness, unpleasantness. (Lessing 1969: 486-487)

According to Foucault, “we are not constrained only by social structures, but by our way of thinking about things,” (Kelly 2013: 522) which is the main reason why Watkins feels trapped both within the psychiatric hospital and outside of it. Watkins feels trapped within the Central Intake Hospital (which signifies the psychiatric institution in general as its name suggests) since he is controlled by scientific classifications and limitations. Moreover, he is trapped outside the hospital since he is together with people who are educated in such a one-dimensional episteme—together with himself that regards the ration as the ultimate way to truth. That education teaches one to label and classify things by differentiating and therefore excludes the non-conforming elements like Watkins. In “An Ancient Way to New Freedom,” Lessing states that “the kind of education most of us get is not giving us information we ought to have [and it] has led curiosity about Eastern cults, Buddhism, gurus of various sorts, or the dozen or so Yogas,” (1971) all of which suggest that there are other dimensions.

To Jung, “a traumatic incident of one type or another can trigger an inner journey” (Fike 2016: 23). That experience is called near-death experience in psychiatric nosology. There are different examples of NDE, a broken foot and a heart attack for Jung, and a robbery for Charles Watkins. When Watkins was found by the British Police rambling and confused near the Waterloo Bridge, he had been robbed of his wallet, which probably triggered his inner journey and what he experienced beforehand was left ambiguous in the novel. According to Jung, “the anima should function as a bridge, or a door, leading to the images of the collective unconscious, as the persona should be a sort of bridge into the world” (1989: 392). In that point, the Waterloo bridge symbolizes such “a transition and [...] the anima’s role in transporting unconscious content to the conscious awareness” (Fike 2016: 22).

In medical records, it is accepted that “[t]he content of NDE and the effects on patients seem similar worldwide, across all cultures and all times” such as “out-of-body experience, pleasant feelings, seeing a tunnel, a light, deceased relatives, or a life review” (Lommel 2006: 134). In the case of Jung’s own NDE, out-of-body experience takes a step

further into the out-of-world experience in which he “finds himself one thousand miles out in space, staring down India and surrounding areas” (Fike 2016: 23). Watkins’s NDE parallels with Jung’s experience; after experiencing such struggles as the harsh ocean voyage, eating flesh with witch-like women and living through the war between the apes and rat-dogs, Watkins finds himself out in space aboard the Crystal, looking back at the earth and contemplate over the solar system. Looking at the earth through space helps Watkins understand his place in the cosmic order and he realizes that he is a part of it affected by larger parts such as the planets. “He sees the earth and all the planets as a unit of forces which determine individual and national destinies [...] This view of universe is like the Medieval world-view in which the microcosm and macrocosm are part of a divine plan” (Cederstrom 1990: 143). About the cosmic order, Watkins states: “I saw how lines and currents of force and sympathy and antagonism danced in a web that was the system of planets around the sun [...] and this web was iron, a frightful necessity, imposing its design” (*B* 100).

Coming back to the parallels between schizophrenic fantasy and mythological journey, Campbell states:

The usual pattern [for both] is, first, of a break away or departure from the local social order and context; next, a long, deep retreat inward and backward, as it were, in time, and inward, deep into the psyche; a chaotic series of encounters there, darkly terrifying experiences, and presently (if the victim is fortunate) encounters of a centering kind, fulfilling, harmonizing, giving new courage; and then finally, in such fortunate cases, a return journey of rebirth to life. (1973: 132)

Considering the quote, Watkins’s inner voyage resonates with the patterns of schizophrenic fantasy and mythological journey since he departs from the social order and retreats into his unconscious. In his vision, Watkins encounters his evil side in the ancient city that represents his deeper psyche after which he achieves the higher state of consciousness and gets ready for a rebirth to life. According to Jung, “[t]he beauty and grandeur of the sea consists in our being forced down into the fruitful bottomlands of our own psyches, where we confront and re-create ourselves in the animation of the mournful wasteland of the sea” (1989: 369). Besides wandering the embankment of the Waterloo bridge physically, Watkins’s dream starts with “a sea journey, in which he is at once Jason, in pursuit of his ‘purpose’, and a second Odysseus fighting against the lure of the Sirens. He is Sinbad, a Jonah, an Ancient Mariner left alone on board ship, a Judah,

‘branded’ as guilty when only his eleven companions ascend in the heavenly Crystal” (King 1989: 56).

The recurrent metaphor of sea and ocean reminds us the Freudian concept “oceanic feeling” mentioned in *Technologies of the Self*. “It is a feeling which he would like to call a sensation of ‘eternity’, a feeling as of something limitless, unbounded — as it were, ‘oceanic’. [...] That is to say, it is a feeling of an indissoluble bond, of being one with the external world as a whole” (Gutman 1988: 116). In the oceanic state, Watkins starts to discover his deep self initially by eluding his persona getting away from the familiar land thus he is able to recognize his animistic self getting closer to the nature itself. In that sense, he departs from the home together with the local social order: He enters a non-conversant ancient city as the unconscious realm in his dream forgetting his social self, his persona, which is medically described as amnesia.

To Jung, “the persona is only a mask of collective psyche, a mask that *feigns individuality*, making others and oneself believe that one is individual, whereas one is simply acting a role through which the collective psyche speaks” (1966: 216). It also masks the power network fooling the modern man. In that sense, humanism contributes to that formation in a great deal since “humanism is everything in Western civilization that restricts the desire for power: it prohibits the desire for power and excludes the possibility of power being seized” (Foucault 1971: 221-222). Therefore, madness is left out of *the cogito* and excluded from the rational realm as a possibility of power and resistance. As a result, the persona, a self-forming technology, turns Watkins into “a product of his society and act in line with social codes composed of boundary opposition[s]” (Gündoğdu 2015: 4). To comply with the society, he used to be “Professor Charles Watkins,” which he no longer identifies with during his mental breakdown while discovering his inner self. Another example is that of Frederick Larson, Baines’s archaeologist friend, who describes his experience as “extra wakefulness”: “It was as if I approached a mirror and found it blank” (*B* 161). According to King, “instead of accepting as his identity the mirror image [the persona] reflected by society, validating or censoring his desires, he [Larson] becomes again a *tabula rasa*” (1989: 59). Watkins has a split identity which is away from his social mask; however, he starts to connect to the nature in every possible way. Watkins senses the “pull and antagonisms and tensions from the sun and the moon,” (*B* 54-55) and his sleep is “ordered by the timing of the moon” (*B* 55) in his dream afterwards.

After Watkins's friends have been taken in by the Crystal and he is left behind, he makes a raft and leaves the ship. Struggling in the currents of Atlantic, he loses his oars; therefore, he is unable to act in accordance with his will, which "symbolizes the loosening of ego-control necessary if the spirit is to achieve re-birth" (Bolling 1974: 136). Watkins reaches the shore by means of a porpoise (purpose) which symbolizes a transition between states of being since it is well-adapted to both air and water (Bolling 1974: 140). After such a tedious journey in the ocean, he is rendered "purged and salt-scoured and guiltless" (*B* 60); therefore, he feels welcomed at that Edenic place. Analogous to the birth process, that journey is a re-enactment of the evolution of the collective consciousness and his personal development (Whittaker 1988: 79). At that place, Watkins feels the need to climb up; however, he is not able to find a way to climb the steep wall. At that point, two leopard-like creatures help him find the way by letting him follow their secret path. In that scene, Lessing presents "a prelapsarian state where fruit is abundant and wild animals are friendly" (Whittaker 1988: 79). According to Jung, "the animal stands for the non-human psyche, for the world of subhuman instincts, and for the unconscious areas of the psyche"; therefore, human beings are helped by animals in myths and tales (Cirlot 2002: 13). In the cosmic interconnected span, there is an indispensable relation between human and animal psyche that the modern mankind need to accept. "This relation of the Self to all surrounding nature and even the cosmos probably comes from the fact that the nuclear atom of our psyche is somehow woven into the whole world, both outer and inner" (Franz 1997: 207). That's why, Watkins states: "I was wandering among the streets and avenues of stone as if I were among friends" (*B* 53). The streets of that ancient city also relate to the unconscious realm of the protagonist.

Within the same section, the Fall is re-enacted. At first, Watkins feels welcomed at the Edenic place "as if this was a country where hostility or dislike had not yet been born" (*B* 40). Then, he recognizes the evil within himself when one of the cattle from the "ghostly heard" (*B* 60) is slaughtered (Bolling 1974: 142). Smelling the blood, Watkins feels guilty as if he has killed the animal. In that sense, an awareness of "capacity for evil is the shadow side of a capacity for good" and that "awareness is a necessary stage of self-knowledge," according to Lessing (Whittaker 1988: 80). Watkins states that "I had drawn evil into my surroundings, into me and I knew, as if it had been my own hand that had drawn that bow and loosened that arrow," (*B* 60) which killed the cattle. In that frame,

Watkins comes up with his shadow archetype, which he has denied since he has been a prototype of the so-called patriarchal rationalism and intellectualism.

Trying to walk against the place of that “bloody ritual” (B 72) does not prove that he is the son of “the Sun, man’s father and creator,” (B 57) since he cannot resist identifying with the moon and act in accordance with moon cycle recognizing his evil self attending the carnal feast. Moon-crazed, Watkins eats flesh and dances over the body of a dead infant together with the three blood-smeared woman, which helps him recognize more of his carnality (King 1989: 57). Watkins believes that he fails in seeing the Crystal when it arrives for the second time since he is under the influence of the moon. In that section, being moonstruck, Watkins forgets his goal of attaining the personal wholeness symbolized as cleaning the square and getting into the Crystal. Due to that lunacy, Watkins turns his back to the absolute existence and goodness which is represented with the Platonian metaphor of the Sun. “To see her [moon] full face I sped off in imagination till I lay out in space as in a sea, and with my back to the sun, I gazed in on her, the Moon, but simultaneously I was on the high plateau, looking at the moon’s back which was dark, its face being gazed upon by the sun and myself” (B 57). In that point, Watkins needs to attain the state of higher consciousness. “The consequences of his failure [missing the Crystal] are depicted in the subsequent arrival of the rat-dogs, their war with apes, their self-destruction through violence and sexuality, and their pollution of land and sea” (King 1989: 57). To Lessing, the need of the psyche is to embrace the dark dimensions to attain personal wholeness, which is metaphorically presented by rat-dogs.

After the war scene between rat-dogs and apes, there arrives a white bird, “watchful” and “severe,” (B 87) which helps Watkins clean the square of the city by wiping the blood of the corpses. Watkins establishes his links with the “sacred Time of beginnings” since his preparation of the square in the ancient city is a ritual of renewal (Cederstrom 1990: 141). Therefore, “when the bird places itself in the center of mandala, we realize the narrator [Watkins] is ready to enter into the crystal” (Bolling 1974: 143). In late 1912, Jung also dreamt about a white bird which tells him that it can transform itself into a human being only in the first hours of the night while the male dove is busy with the twelve dead (Jung 1989: 172). It is quite explicit that Jungian dream is related to various images in *Briefing*; a white bird, the anima, the land of the dead as the unconscious, and the number twelve (Fike 2016: 21).

The symbolism of the number twelve reminds “the twelve apostles, the twelve months of the year, the signs of zodiac” (Jung 1989: 172) strengthening the idea of wholeness. Furthermore, Hermes/Mercury, who “was said to have left behind him a table upon which the basic tenets of alchemical wisdom engraved in Greek” (Jung 1989: 172) actually delivers the briefing in the novel, which is related to the truth left out of the rational realm. In the case of number twelve, there are many recurrent uses of it in *Briefing*. Watkins states: “On this voyage there were twelve men on board, with myself as Captain” (B 21). “I made a raft about twelve by twelve of balsa wood poles” (B 25). “The bird’s back, its wing span was ten or twelve feet” (B 80). “The band [Partisans] remained in numbers between twelve and thirty” in Yugoslavia story (B 210). Those “references to the number twelve parallel and reinforce Mercury’s message of unity and harmony, primarily because of their association with the months of the year and their division into seasons” (Fike 2016: 22). According to Jung, the seasons refer to the quartering of the circle corresponding to the cycle of a year (1968: 191-192). In that sense, the symbol of twelve is related to other Jungian images of wholeness: the quaternity and the mandala.

According to Jung, archetype of the mandala is a symbol of the center, the goal, or the self as psychic totality; self-representation of a psychic process of centering; production of a new center of personality. This is symbolically represented by the circle, the square, or the quaternity, by symmetrical arrangements of the number four and its multiples. (1989: 396).

Number ‘four’ and the word ‘quarter’ are frequently repeated in the novel, which signifies their peculiarity as symbols operating with mandalas and circles simultaneously. In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung mentions one of his dreams in which “[t]he various quarters of the city were arranged radially around the square. In the center there was a round pool, and in the middle of it a small island” (1989: 198). In *Briefing*, Watkins’s description of the ancient city resonates with the Jungian city of the unconscious seen in the following quote.

[A]mong the buildings, in what seemed like the center of the old city, what might very well have been the former central square, was an expanse of smooth stone which was not interrupted by flowers or by water channels. The square was perhaps seventy or a hundred yards across, and in it was an inner circle, about fifty yards across [...]. [P]atterns glowed in [the circle], continuous geometrical

patterns that suggested flowers and gardens and their correspondence with the movements of the sky [...]. (*B* 54-55)

To Fike, those geometric patterns on the circle are apparently “signs of the zodiac” (2016: 22). Jung suggests that the mandala or the circular image for the modern man is the Unidentified Flying Objects, the UFOs, “circular lens” and “gleaming discs” (1989: 323). He does not try to prove that they exist; however, he draws attention to the need that people feel of such crystalline discs representing “the wholeness of the psychic ground” (Jung 1989: 335). That’s why, there are worldwide stories of the UFOs since “they are the symptom of a universally present psychic disposition” (Jung 1989: 335). Parallel to that, the main goal of Watkins is being taken in such a Crystal he describes as “a shining disc,” (*B* 22) which will be a huge step in his self-transformation and individuation process.

While experiencing the death of the milking white cow and the bloody fest, Watkins tries hard to confront and merge with his shadow to reach the individuation. In that frame, he welcomes his denied feelings such as affection since he weeps for the hopelessness of the world after seeing the death of the female rat-dog while giving birth (*B* 85). Moreover, Watkins feels concerned with the white bird that he fears it “might be killed by the warring beasts” (*B* 86). All those transformations and experiences show that Watkins is ready to be taken into the Crystal.

Just like a hero is able to reach his goal and get rewarded after overcoming terrifying struggles with the help of nature, Watkins is inside the Crystal after coping with “darkly terrifying experiences” (Campbell 1973: 132) with the help of leopard-like animals and the transcendent white bird. Inside the Crystal, he realizes “how people once were before they were polluted, symbolized in the transparent images and bright light, represented by lucid glass, and tinted luminosity” (Shu-Ming 2012: 193). Furthermore, he notices that not only his body and but also the city is a shape in light “like an illuminated mist that has shadows or echoes held in it” (*B* 89). There is also a “crystalline air kneaded into” the beasts around, which changes in quality and quantity regardless of the belonging “group” or “pack morality” (*B* 90). At first, females are not represented in the Edenic space such as Felicity, Constance and Vera. Then Watkins states that I accepted and held the memory, and then I had moved out and beyond, but now the women were lodged in my mind, my new mind, I knew, though dimly enough at that time (*B* 91).

Regarding the quote, Lessing seems to suggest that Watkins has welcomed his shadow/anima of the self. According to Becker, “the hermaphroditic images represents a striving for wholeness [...]. It is the desire ... for ... unity with the rest of nature, as well as for a completeness in oneself. It is a desire for a healing of the rupture of existence, the dualism of self and body, self and other, self and world” (1975: 225). In that sense, by attaining the psychic wholeness in the micro level, Watkins realizes the interconnected span within the wholeness of the macro level. That comprehension leads Watkins’s “fusion with the people who were friends, companions, lovers and associates, a wholeness,” in which he is “stuck like a bit of colored glass in a mosaic” (*B* 92). In that section, there are multiple images of fusion, like “reeling” and “spinning” by which Lessing draws attention to “the possibility of overcoming binary divisions of patriarchy (Shu-Ming 2012: 193). Watkins points out that “the Crystal was a thought,” in which [his] sympathies enlarged again, [his] mind washed out” (*B* 90). In that frame, Watkins is on the edge of releasing from the traps/Panopticons that Foucault mentions which are both outside and inside in our one-dimensional thinking. In that frame, technologies of the self are especially important for the power holders in order to use their power ethically seen in the case of Alcibiades in the ancient culture. Within the medical personage section, it is clarified that Doctor Y. is more friendly and humane in his attitudes and medical suggestions than Doctor X. is. Acting outside the medical discourse, Doctor Y. is probably more aware of his own self together with his patient’s self; therefore, Watkins is able to see Doctor Y. as “a small light. But a good one” (*B* 141). On the other hand, he stresses that Doctor X. is “solid all through. He’s all animal without light. No light. No God. No sun” (*B* 137).

Watkins travels “from his celestial voyage aboard the Crystal; then figures of Greek and Roman mythology appear to effect his return to earth” (Bolling 1974: 143). That is the last stage in his “mythological heroic journey” and the “schizophrenic fantasy” (Campbell 1973: 131). In that section, there is a conference of deities, which can be found in “Jewish legends, the Gnostic Hymn of the pearl, and Platonic philosophy” describing “a descent to earth from a condition of primal unity and a forgetting once life on earth begins” (Cederstrom 1990: 145). Since man is forgetful especially after the birth, the gods need to send reminders with the same message that “there is a Harmony and that if they wish to prosper they must keep in step and obey its Laws” (*B* 113). While describing the briefing to his wife and doctors, Watkins changes the names of the mythical Gods to

contemporary names such as Minna Erve, Merk Ury, and the Chief. However, they do not able to comprehend his try in explaining the unconscious realm together with the brainprinting (Life is One).

The last stage of Watkins's inner journey, the rebirth scene occurs after he has gained the self-knowledge together with the imprinted knowledge of humanity in general. During *rebirth*, "the personality which is renewed is not changed in its essential nature, but only its functions, or parts of the personality, are subjected to healing, strengthening, or improvement" (Jung 1981: 114). In that form, the renewal is related to a transmutation, in which there is a transformation of a human into a divine being (Jung 1981: 114). Watkins's rebirth scene occurs only when he is at the state of heightened consciousness telling the good news of his healing even if the doctors and his wife are not able to comprehend. After his rebirth, Watkins remembers bits and pieces of information given in the briefing. He states that "It was there, I know it was We have to. We have to remember. [...] It's knowing. Harmony. God's law. That's what it is" (B 153). After remembering, he begs Doctor Y. to let him stay awake, yet the doctor advises him to sleep and be a good boy just like Watkins's mother has done before when he was a baby.

This episode parallels with the Wordsworthian concept that "our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting" (quoted in King 1989: 58). No matter how badly an infant wants to stay awake and attain new experiences, its "hell of want," (B 126) it needs to conform to "the ideal of infant goodness, which in this culture is defined as total passivity" (King 1989: 58). As an infant, Watkins's sleep is for the parental approval; therefore, he utters that "I sleep so that they love me" (B 128). According to King, the desires that are repressed into the unconscious manifests themselves through the dreams with the images (1989: 59). Therefore, one of the ways of the cultivation of the self is interpreting one's own self including dreams, emotions and intuition which are also practiced by Lessing. For that reason, when Doctor Y. tries to show Watkins the difference between reality and a dream, Watkins tells Doctor Y. that "[y]our dreams or your life. But it is not or, that is the point. It is an and. Everything is. Your dreams and your life. You can talk there, talk. I dream whatever I do, lying or waking" (B 142). In that sense, Lessing demolishes the binary opposition of real/dream creating another realm for a complete fusion in *Briefing* which parallels with her connection with Sufism.

In that section Jungian patterns have been studied under the title of the technologies of the self. After a brief explanation of Jungian concepts, the images and the

visionary experiences that Lessing uses in *Briefing* have been analyzed as Jungian archetypes that operate in the discovery of the deeper individual self of the main character, Watkins. In the following section, it will be presented that the self-discovery through archetypes will lead to the realization of the collective self, which parallels with the holistic approach of Sufism in terms of an art of living.

3.3. Sufism as a Technology of the Self

*‘From realm to realm man went, reaching
his present reasoning, knowledgeable, robust
state – forgetting earlier forms of intelligence. So,
too, shall he pass beyond the current forms of
perception... There are a thousand other forms of
Mind...’ and ‘The degree of necessity determines
the development of organs in man... therefore
increase your necessity.’*

(Mathnavi-i-Maanavi: Couplets of Inner Meaning)

According to Foucault, “a real science recognizes and accepts its own history without feeling attacked;” however, when a psychiatrist is told that mental institution came from the lazar house, they get frustrated (Martin 1982: 12). That’s why, Foucault names psy-sciences especially psychiatry as a pseudo-science denying its history. Besides drawing attention to the background of psychiatric institutions, Foucault retraces the practices of psychoanalysis till he reaches Christian asceticism and then the technologies of the self in ancient culture such as self-writing, art of listening and *askesis*. In that frame, Lessing mentions another source in the introduction of *Learning How to Learn* by Idries Shah, Lessing’s spiritual teacher: Especially “the ‘discoveries’ of Freud and Jung [the fathers of psychoanalysis and analytic psychology] are to be found in Al Ghazzali and Ibn El Arabi [...] and in other great thinkers of the time” (Lessing “Introduction” 1993: 8). Moreover, in a letter to Rubenstein, Lessing states “Ibn El Arabi and El Ghazzali, in the Middle Ages, had more developed ideas about the unconscious, collective or otherwise, than Jung, among others” and she adds “[b]oth Jung and Freud were useful as far as they went” (quoted in Fike 2016: 20). Ibn El Arabi is accepted as “one of those powerful and rare spiritual individuals who are the norm of their own orthodoxy and of

their own time, because they belong neither to what is commonly called ‘their’ time nor to the orthodoxy of ‘their’ time;” (Corbin 1969: 15). Therefore, Ibn El Arabi is “known to the Arabs as Sheikh el-Akbar, the Greatest Sheikh, and to the Christian West by a direct translation of this title: Doctor Maximus” (Shah 2015: 71). Considering him as one of the great Sufis, self-forming technologies of ancient philosophy, Jungian Psychology and Sufism interlace and function together by means of spirituality.

As a technology of the self, Sufism operates through the simplest and the most banal of all things and ordinary life (Lessing 1971). It works through books, lectures and various kinds of everyday activities including the jokes of Nasreddin Hodja. In that frame, the novels such as “*Briefing*, *The Summer Before Dark* (1973), and *The Memoirs of a Survivor* (1974) are literally Sufi fables,” (Bazin 1999: 33) written by Lessing as a Sufi follower to highlight the truth that “life is One” (B 121). In *Briefing*, Watkins acts as a Sufi “emissary of the gods to remind individuals that they must humble themselves and accept the higher truth that all is One” (Bazin 1985: 159). By means of Watkins, Lessing, another emissary, presents a “medium through which she reminds us that we must submit ourselves to the will of the gods and thereby discover our true place in the universe” (Bazin 1985: 159). In that fame, Lessing tears down the boundaries, classifications and hierarchical dualisms of any kind such as sane/insane, rational/irrational, self/other, civilized/uncivilized, man/woman, body/mind, and real/unreal. She creates a fusion in the end by means of Sufi spirituality in *Briefing*. If applied properly, that spirituality may also merge the philosophies of the West—Platonian, Jungian and Foucauldian theories—with the Eastern ones, especially the hermeneutics of Ibn El Arabi as a Sufi master.

Self-care techniques of the antique culture were “spiritual exercises, including meditation, contemplation of nature; political discussion, Socratic dialogue, truth-telling, abstention from food, sex, and pleasure, journal-writing, and rumination about death,” (Engels 2015: 291) some of which are similarly practiced in the Sufi Path. Then, there has been a transformation in the Western episteme in terms of such spirituality together with its practices. According to Foucault, spirituality has been suppressed by Western Culture especially after the “Cartesian moment,” (2005: 17) in which Descartes declares that

one does not need to cultivate oneself in order to know, but rather that knowledge is accessible to subjectivity as such without the need for the subject to transform itself. Cartesian conception of subjectivity as simple and substantial rather than

constituted and formal: subjectivity is taken to be unchanging, hence any notion of spiritual practices of self-transformation ceases to make sense. (Kelly 2013: 520)

Therefore, in order to access the truth, the only prerequisites are marked as sanity and a decent education, (Foucault 2005: 18) which strengthen the place that *the cogito* holds alienating it from the realm of non-rational, namely extra-sensory perception, dreams and madness. However, the reason cannot save the subject having merely an incidental value, (Foucault 2005: 19) since man is a “strange empirico-transcendental doublet” (Foucault 1994: 318). In that frame, Lessing’s novel suggests that through the Sufi Path, man is able to achieve such an empirico-transcendental reality of himself that Foucault states.

From the Western point of view, Sufism is regarded as a thousand-year-old Islamic mysticism and “mysticism has been almost a joke in the West” (Lessing 1971). According to Lessing, Sufism is “a far cry from what our conditioning has thought us to call mysticism,” (1971). Mysticism is a derivation from the word *myein*, which stands for ‘to shut one’s eyes to’ (quoted in Gözel 2012: 157). In *Cambridge Online Dictionary*, mystification means the state of feeling very confused because someone or something is impossible to understand. Regarding the definitions, the Sufi must “be distinguished from both mystic and magus [a sorcerer]” (Hardin 1974: 150) since “the mystic wants to ‘be’ and the magically minded wants to ‘know’” (Shah 1971: 381). The Sufi attitude is undoubtedly that of ‘being;’ but, unlike the familiar type of mystic, he will use ‘knowing’ as well,” (Shah 1971: 381) which can merely be practiced by no creature but a “strange empirico-transcendental doublet” (Foucault 1994: 318).

According to Foucault, man is able to “think the unthought” through spirituality, (1994: 356) surpassing the Cartesian *cogito* which “reduces the being of man to thought-conscious-of-itself,” (1994: 353) leaving out “that whole realm of unaccounted-for experiences in which man does not recognize himself” (1994: 352). In Foucault’s oeuvre, the *unthought* is used interchangeably with unreason and the unconscious creating a new linkage between the unthought, the unconscious, and the technologies of the self. That linkage is able to turn man into an ethical being in the end creating her/his own morality. Self-forming technologies enable an individual to disengage the current self from the domination of religious, pedagogical, medical, and psychiatric institutions (Markula 2004: 306). In that sense, the reactivation of spirituality is needed in contemporary Western societies as a savior, which will “presage a return to ethics” (Kelly 2013: 524).

As a self-forming practice, Foucauldian spirituality does not refer to deities and religions but one's "spirit" or "soul" refers to an ethical, cosmic sense of the self (Batters 2011: 4). That's why, Foucauldian spirituality and Lessing's Sufi thinking resonates, which is seen in Lessing's turn to cosmic fiction to present her philosophical and spiritual concerns. To clarify Lessing's spirituality as Sufism, it is needed to reshape the concept of spirituality as Lessing states "spirituality immediately implies a division, a dichotomy" (Hunter and McIntosh 1999: 110). In Lessing's oeuvre, spirituality exists in the space between mind/soul and body/material demolishing that kind of traditional dualisms, in which the spirit is related to mind or the soul, not the corporeal or the temporal (Hunter and McIntosh 1999: 110).

In order to comprehend Sufism as a spiritual practice which operates both as an artistic way of life and search for the truth through refashioning one's self (Gözel 2012: 154), it is better to start with shortly what Sufism actually is. According to Shah, a "Sufi, the Sufis, cannot be defined by any single set of words or ideas" (1971: 17). "Sufism is known by means of itself," which shows the significance of experience over experiment (Shah 1971: xxvi). When Lessing draws attention to the core of Sufism, she states that

the contention is that the river of knowledge from beyond the stars that has run since Adam, through Noah and Abraham, and on through a hundred wise men and prophets, ran also through Jesus and then Mohammed. Those men are different aspects of the same Truth, or Way, manifesting as Divine Messengers. Both started world religions, both fed the inner heart of religion. (1971)

Considering the quote, it is understandable for Lessing to tell the reason behind writing *Briefing* as in the following quote: "I wrote [it] because a friend said nobody sat down to read books about Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Ean 1991: 200). From a Sufi standpoint, "[t]hey're the same religion, in fact, in different installments (Ean 1991: 200) and they do not address a certain group or race but humanity in general. In that frame, Sufism is a method or philosophy which "can be hostile to no true religions, since all religions are the outer faces of an inner truth" (Lessing 1971); therefore, they are related to Sufism in one way or another. According to Hardin, "Sufism is noted for its denial of codification of exact and prescriptive rules of behavior; indeed, it is a composite of anomalies and espouses neither ideology nor dogma"; that's why, it includes scientists as well as philosophers and writers influencing diverse people such as St. Francis, Roger Bacon, and Denis de Rougement (Hardin 1974: 149). According to Lessing,

the physicians, who are the most obstinate in accepting this type of experience, are beginning to work with the metaphysical. The best scientists, those on the highest levels, always come closer and closer to the mystical. Much of what Einstein said could have been said by a Christian mystic, St. Augustine, for example. Science, which is the religion for today, looks for the metaphysical, as with Catholics of old. Hence the boom in science fiction, which reflects this preoccupation and which moves in the world of the non-rational. (Torrents 2000: 72)

In that sense, Sufism coincides with the definition of Foucauldian spirituality that relates to the cosmic self more than deities or religious institutions and therefore, Sufi method operates in politics of self. Ibn El Arabi has said: “The Sufi must act and speak in a manner which takes into consideration the understanding, limitations and dominant concealed prejudices of his audience” (quoted in Shah 2015: 79). That mindset provides that the Sufi must be awake and aware of the technologies of domination which classifies and labels such as the dividing practices; by this way the Sufi are able to address the people who are under the effect of such power mechanisms.

As mentioned before, according to Foucault, one of the most essential component of individual freedom and politics of self is the practice of critique (Batters 2011: 1). “It is a means of maintaining mobility of mind and spirit; of avoiding a fixed, stabilized view of the ever-changing present; of maintaining a critical awareness of oneself and the place and time in which one resides” (Batters 2011: 1). Practicing critique provides someone think differently and question the things that are taken for granted. “The critically self-aware individual constantly questions what is seemingly ‘natural’ and inevitable in one’s identity and, as a result, creates an identity of his or her own” (Markula 2004: 308). In that frame, Lessing’s approach toward Sufi study enlarges her critical awareness since she is initially invited, as a Sufi follower, to find out why she believes the things she does believe and examine the bases of her ideas (Lessing 1971). To Foucault, “[t]o be able to think differently creates an opportunity to question the limitations of one’s freedom instead of merely coping with one’s situation” (Markula 2004: 3008). Yet it is highly hard for the Western people to think differently due to its strongly-structured historical discourses. In “An Ancient Way to New Freedom,” Lessing advises people to go down to any paperback book shop and scan some textbooks on popular astronomy,

meteorology, the history of art, medicine, psychiatry, and archaeology (1971). To Lessing, in each book, there will probably be the following sentences:

Between the decline of Greece and Copernicus, science stagnated in superstition. Those temperate latitudes in which all civilization has flowered. Europe, the cradle of civilization ... Science was the creation of the Renaissance in Europe. Before Freud the unconscious did not exist. Jung's theory of the archetype ... A much trumpeted, and very flattering, history of civilization, on television, is the history of art in Europe-with a few side glances elsewhere. (1971)

On the other hand, once attained, the ability of thinking differently as a Westerner culminates in seeing "Europe as it was, a little dark provincial fringe to great civilizations that sent emissaries, advisers, missionaries out of the plenitude of their arts and sciences to help the barbarians" (Lessing 1971). Exemplified in *Briefing*, Larson's doubts about the bases of archaeology deepens when he excavates an African site. Similar transformations occur in his Turkey dig, where the societies are found having been more integrated to nature and lived in harmony with nature even if they lacked the features that are needed to name a society civilized. In *Briefing*, Larson is Lessing's voice since she criticizes the same taken for granted standpoint in her articles:

When Copernicus and Galileo discovered that the earth went around the sun, this knowledge was not only a commonplace in Islamic cultures [including Turkish culture] but in darkest Africa [...] Long before Lister had to fight the medical hierarchy about germs and infection, African witch doctors were using antisepsis and other advanced medical techniques. (Lessing 1971)

Breaking such biased facets of scientific knowledge, Lessing does not try to produce another discourse. For the Sufi, it is not a question of being better than the other or greater since it surpasses the arrogance of class or race; contrarily the goal is to achieve the whole humanity demolishing such biased discourses that constitute the base of archaeology, medicine and history.

According to al-Kalabadhi, in order to achieve the personal wholeness, the Sufi must withdraw from the world, incline the soul away from it, leave all settled abodes, keep constantly to travel, deny the carnal soul its pleasures, purify conducts, cleanse the conscience; as a consequence, he is able to dilate the breast, and the quality of leadership in the *et-Ta'arruf* (*The Doctrine of the Sufis*) (1935) (quoted in Gözel 2012: 158). Considering the quote, the definition of a Sufi correlates with the Foucauldian principles

of know yourself and care of the self. Besides being a traveler, the Sufi is called a seeker (*murid*), which reminds the following quote from the book of *Technologies of the Self*. “The quest for self-understanding is a journey without end [...] the quest for such knowledge is itself a form of self-care as practitioners of the technologies of the self” (Hutton 1988: 140). In that sense, Jungian archetypes especially the hero archetype together with the individuation process, which is “the overall structural pattern” of Lessing’s late novels, (Cederstrom 1990: 8) is related to such an inner journey of self quest. While individuation means “self-realization” (Jung 1981: 106) and “the development of the self” (Jung 1981: 145), and a “synthesis of conscious and unconscious elements in the personality” (Jung 1981: 164), “the treasure which the hero wins after [his] painful effort is nothing less than himself” (Cirlot 1990: 340). The heroic experiences of the individuation such as “monster slaying” and struggling against the dark parallel to the struggle against one’s self, which is the ultimate goal of the Sufi follower. Coming back from a battle, Prophet Mohammed (pbuh) states: “You have returned from the small struggle but not from the greater one. [...] The greater struggle is the struggle which against one’s self (*nafs*) (quoted in Gözel 2012: 159). In other words, “Great Holy War, or combat with the spiritual enemies inside the personality” is harder than “the ‘little holy war’, that is the struggle with the material enemies outside” (Cirlot 1990: 147-148).

In order to struggle against one’s self, one is needed to know the self (*nafs*) at first. Therefore, knowing of the self—*nafs* (the Delphic credos of know yourself) is one of the main goals of the Sufi learning. It is a significant motto that “he who truly knows himself knows God, for the heart is a mirror in which every divine quality is reflected” (Nicholson 1975: 50). That resonates with the transformed Delphic principle into the Gnostic culture as “[i]t is then ... the greatest of all lessons to know one’s self. For if one knows himself, he will know God” (Martin 1988: 52). In that frame, there are some stages (*maqamat*) along the [Sufi] path (*tarikah*) that the seeker (*murid*) needs to advance in order to attain the purification of the soul, which will end in the knowledge of Reality (*ma’rifat*) (Nicholson 1975: 21). In the case of Watkins, three main stages of the self should be examined from a Sufi standpoint, which also relate to Watkins’s “confrontation with the God within” (quoted in Cederstrom 1990: 136) as an individuation process. That “common Sufi triad [includes] *nafs ammara* (the self that commands to evil), *nafs lawwama* (the self that blames itself for its own shortcomings) and *nafs mutma’inna* (the self at peace with God) (Chittick 2007: 58). According to Shah, those stages have peculiar

tenets and they “are readily recognizable by their detailed descriptions given unanimously by all masters” (1993: 59). In that sense, Shah evaluates Sufism as a kind of science since it is “based on palpable experiences which can be reproduced, like in any other science, under set circumstances,” (1993: 58) especially in the case of the stages that Sufi pass through in her/his inner journey.

The first stage, the commanding soul (*nafs ammara*) is “the tendency in man to disobey God, and to take pleasure in evil deeds and thoughts. This inclines man toward [...] pride, selfishness, lust, hatred and jealousy” (Gözel 2012: 159). For Shah, “[t]his self is actually largely what most people imagine to be their own personalities, their own and only selves; and it is interposed between objective reality and the real self, the essence, of the individual, whose realization is the purpose of Sufi study” (1993: 42). Considering the quote, the commanding self of Watkins likens to his ego-identity, which his friends, family, doctors and his own self reckon as his real self to be. Therefore, the doctors, Doctor Y. and Doctor X. and his wife want Watkins accept that he is no one but Professor Watkins representing “pure masculine logos; he is intellectual, aloof and unemotional, without any feminine attributes,” (Cederstrom 1990: 139) “locked in smugness and selfishness” (Rowe 1994: 64). According to Shah, “[s]ometimes the manifestation of this [commanding] self is characterized by ideas or behavior attributed to other people, as can happen in a dream” (1993: 42). That’s why, Watkins experiences the death of the cattle and the carnal feast together with witch-like women. In those occasions, he signifies the transition from the carnal soul to the reproaching soul. Struggling against the carnal self, he states that “I knew that I had arrived purged and salt-scoured and guiltless, but that between then and now I had drawn evil into my surroundings, into me, and I knew, as if it had been my own hand that had drawn that bow and loosed that arrow, that I had caused the shining milk-white beast to fall dead” (*B* 60). Moreover, in the bloody ritual, Watkins eats a piece of flesh all raw and bloody and recognizes that he was laughing and singing with those three witch-like women at that time (*B* 63). Even if he initially projects his potential carnality to the women, Watkins takes pleasure in joining the bloody fest himself in that stage.

Being on the verge of the second stage, the blaming soul (*nafs lawwama*), Watkins has had new experiences from the emotional realm through his inner journey. In that stage, the blaming soul reproaches the person “for his evil deeds and impels him to acts of mercy and generosity” (Gözel 2012: 160). Having a Sufi inner journey toward

wholeness, Watkins welcomes his evil self (his shadow) and feels responsible for the evils even in his surroundings. He accepts that the Edenic land is introduced by murder due to his drawing evil into himself and therefore to his surroundings. Therefore, he falls on his face on the earth and weeps. Watkins states: “Oh, I’ll never know such sorrow again, I’ll never know such grief, Oh, I cannot stand it. I don’t wish to live, I do not want to be made aware of what I have done and what I am and what I must be, no, no” (*B* 60-61). After having experienced the fight between the female rat-dog and two males while the rat-dog was giving birth and two male rat-dogs were trying to mate with her, Watkins feels a likewise emotion. He states: “I [...] lay face down, weeping. Now I believed that everything was ended, and there was no hope anywhere for man or for the animals of the earth” (*B* 85). As a final example, Watkins fears that the white bird, which helps him clean the square for the coming Crystal, might be killed by those fighting beasts. Considering the examples, Watkins’s self-discovery parallels with his concern for others, which reminds us the scope of the self-forming technologies of the ancient culture. Like in the case of Alcibiades, “ethical self-care implie[s] a relationship with others: the care for the self [is] always aimed at the good of others” (Markula 2004: 307).

In the third stage, the contended soul (*nafs mutma’inne*), “the Sufi develops to the fullest tendency to obey God and to act in perfect harmony with God’s commandments” (Gözel 2012: 160). After cleansing the city square that represents mandala, Watkins encounters the Crystal as the archetype of self, which is significant in his individuation process. He recognizes the God within; therefore, he states: “We have to. We have to remember. [...] It’s the law of God. [...] It’s knowing, Harmony. God’s law” (*B* 133). Aboard the Crystal, Watkins attends the conference in which there is a briefing by gods. Therefore, he discovers his role as an emissary and realizes the need for the “pressure of forces,” (*B* 100) personifying the oppositional pulls (Hunter and McIntosh 1999: 115). Watkins claims “THE THREE IS ME” in capital letters while he is descending from the heavens to the Earth—the real hell (*B* 126). “[O]ne (reality) plus one (alternate reality) plus one (the individual or place of intersection) equals three,” (Hunter and McIntosh 1999: 115) which resonates the following poem by Ibn El Arabi.

I follow the religion of Love.
 Now I am sometimes called
 A Shepherd of gazelles [divine wisdom]
 And now a Christian monk,

And now a Persian sage.
 My beloved is Three-
 Three yet only one;
 Many things appear as three,
 Which are no more than one (quoted in Shah 1971: ix)

In that sense, Watkins is able to merge multiple realities such as his dreamy visions and the real world of hospital by means of his self composed of the three; therefore, he states “it isn’t either or at all, it’s and, and, and” (B 140) signifying that fusion.

Aboard the Crystal, Watkins attends the briefing in which the people who will born into the world are briefed about the need to remember the brainprinted knowledge, which reminds another technology of the self *askesis* of ancient philosophy. *Askesis* is “not a disclosure of the secret self but a remembering” for the Stoics (Foucault 1988b: 35). According to Plato, “one must discover the truth that is within one” (Foucault 1988b: 35). In that sense, the soul is eternal and it has forgotten what it should naturally know; therefore, effortful spiritual exercises are necessary in order to fix it. Plato believes that there is a knowledge that is not derived from sense impressions.

For Plato, there are latent in our minds the forms or impressions of the Ideas, the realities which the soul knew before its descent into the body. [...] The soul enters at birth into oblivion and is covered with a layer of wax on which there is as yet no impression. However, it seems that the wax tablet is not completely wiped clean: there remain imprints of the Ideas, so that we retain a latent knowledge of them. (Whitehead 2009: 17)

That innate knowledge of the Ideal forms is forgotten after birth, which correlates with Watkins’s amnesiac state in the Central Intake. He has forgotten the brainprint that “all is One” only remembering bits and pieces. Sufism and Platonic Idealism have a common ground in that sense. To clarify the coordination of the spiritual topography, it is significant to mention one of the epithets of Ibn El Arabi named the “son of Plato” (*Ibn Aflaṭun*) (Corbin 2008: 34). Ibn El Arabi’s oeuvre holds a peculiar place in Sufi teaching since

Ibn-i Arabi’s hermeneutical project is based entirely on emphasizing the inclusive nature of the Qur’an, meaning bringing together [...] By such emphasis he constituted an attempt to integrate all knowledge existing up to his time (from Plato to Averroes) in the Qur’an; his hermeneutics opens the meaning of the

Qur'an, and the meaning of Islam, to be very conclusive meaning that integrates Christianity, Judaism and all other religions. (Abu-Zayd 2004: 16)

Regarding the quote, the philosophy of Plato is among the sources that Ibn El Arabi has used in his hermeneutics. Therefore, it is possible to compare Ibn El Arabi's *ayan-i thabitha*, "objects of God's knowledge" (Chittick 2007: 191) to Platonian Ideal forms, in which the memory is concerned with recollecting. In that frame, both concepts stand for fixed forms which are common for all people. They are unchanging, infinite and exist everywhere exemplified in the novel: "There was no such thing as judges, but only Judge, not soldiers, but Soldier, not artists, but Artist, no matter if they imagined themselves to be in violent disagreement" (B 95).

While *ayan-i thabitha* and Ideal forms correlate, the reality behind the Ideal forms are in the transcendence, turning the immanence as the realm of unreal. However, Watkins observes "two identities become one" (B 93) aboard the Crystal which "represents the image of [another] Ideal form," (Gündoğdu 2015: 5). In that sense, Watkins deconstructs the Platonian metaphysical dualism by forgetting the theory of Ideal forms as an amnesiac in order to remember that there is a unity of transcendence and immanence. Within that scope, Plato and Ibn El Arabi differ in approaching two realms of immanence and transcendence. According to Plato, "the material world is seen as immanent and substantial," whereas the transcendental forms are "beyond and ontologically superior to the corporeal world" (quoted in Gündoğdu 2015: 3). Since knowledge can be attained in the transcendental realm, Platonic idealism dwells on reason and transcendence. On the other hand, according to Sufis, "it is best to ignore the reason and depend on the inner light for guidance [since] sense and reason cannot transcend the world of phenomena or see the real Being behind the intrinsic phenomena" (quoted in Gündoğdu 2015: 2). While getting loose from the pure reason, the Sufi regards the realm of immanence indispensable since it is "where the inner light would work as guide" (Gündoğdu 2015: 2). Therefore, Rumi advises the Sufi not to "give up working" since "the treasure which [the follower] seek derives from it" (quoted in Shah 1971: 137). Thus, the Sufi follower should keep working and be "balanced to be 'in the world but not of it'" (Shah 1971: 37) attaining an equilibrium between the realm of transcendence and immanence.

In other respects, "Plato's intellectual realm of transcendence can be linked with the conscious while the denial of immanence with the unconscious (Gündoğdu 2015: 5).

Regarding that linkage, Watkins's case is rather an actualization of Jungian individuation process, in which the goal is bringing together conscious and unconscious realm. Therefore, it is possible to say that Sufism operates as a psychology (Shah 2015: 18). While Sufism is regarded as psychology, individuation process is highly related to a spiritual journey since God archetype and the self archetype cannot be distinguished from each other (quoted in Gürses 2007: 90). As human beings carry the conscious and the unconscious realm within themselves, they also carry the archetypes (*ayan-i thabithas*). The archetypes lay in the unconscious involving the God archetype, which reminds the following Quranic verse: "He [God] is closer to you than your jugular vein" (Qur'an, 50:16).

Archetypal activation or the activation of Ideal forms/*ayan-i thabithas* are related to remembrance practices in all three approaches formulated by Ibn El Arabi, Plato and Jung. In the Sufi tradition, there are various self-transforming practices that enable one to remember such as *dhikr*, music and dance/*sama*. *Dhikr* stands for "rememoration; the word means to make remain in the heart, to have in mind, to meditate," (Corbin 2008: 295) which also resonates with the Greek technology of self, *melete* (meditation). In the remembering process of the Sufi, "[t]he first stage is remembering oneself, after which the function shifts to one of harmony with the greater consciousness" (Shah 1971: 440). In that frame, "in order to remember the Real in its fullness, seekers must forget the unreal" at first, "the western face of their own selves and the world," (Chittick 2007: 20) which is probably the reason behind Watkins's amnesiac state. Furthermore, in the novel, Larson describes a similar situation as a symptom of his breakdown: "It was as if I approached a mirror and found it blank" (B 161).

Even if there is not a direct reference to *dhikr* in *Briefing*, there are some sections in which Lessing draws attention to the sound/music and its effects on human beings. For example, Larson finds out in his Turkey dig that the priests' "use of sound is altogether challenging and enigmatic" (B 159). He states: "It is my belief that their use of music in this way, if we could understand it, would be the key to that civilization. It is probably to do with indoctrination or brainprinting" (B 159). The quote signifies that "music can be used as a device for the reflexive process of remembering/constructing who one is, a technology for spinning the apparently continuous tale of who one is" (DeNora 1999: 45). In the case of Watkins's disorderly speech, Baines and Larson realize that there is an inner

logic in his scattered words since they are aware of the function of sounds. In that section, Baines draws attention to the one dimensional approach of psychiatry:

Of course poets do this, [relating the sound of a word to its meaning] all the time. Do doctors? Sounds, the function of sounds in speech... we have no way yet of knowing—have we? —how a verbal current may match an inner reality, sounds expressing a condition? But perhaps this sort of thought is not found useful by you. (*B* 200).

Furthermore, Ibn El Arabi focuses on the effect of the sound in terms of psychology and states: “Modern psychology has not yet realized that there is a special function of sound for deviating consciousness” (Shah 1971: 179). He “defended the special use of music to elevate the perceptions in his *Ihya*—and music is used in this way in the Mevlevi and Chishti Orders of dervishes” (Shah 1971: 175). Within that scope, music operates as a technology of the self; it is able to bring understanding and raise the listener to another level; it has transformative powers.

There are recurrent uses of the word of sound in Watkins’s depictions of the Crystal and the other evoked things. In their first encounter, Watkins describes the Crystal as “it seemed no longer a disc, with a shape, but it was more a fast beating of the air, a vibration that was also a sound” (*B* 23). Moreover, Watkins’s description of the Earth together with cosmos is also related to music, sound and dance when he is inside the Crystal.

[I]n this great enclosing web of always changing light, moved flames and bones and thrills of light that sang and sounded, on deeper and higher notes, so what I saw, or rather was part of, was neither light nor sound, but the place or area where these two identities become one [...] [A]ny category anywhere always beat on its own wavelength of sound/light, there could not be individuals in this nourishing web. Together they formed one beat in the great dance, one note in the song. (*B* 93-96)

One beat and one note represent *ayan-i thabithas* that transcend the individual forms. As technologies of self, sound and music operate together in the Sufi tradition. It functions for the human beings on the micro and for the creation on the macro level both of which come from One (quoted in Hardin 1974: 150).

Sufi poets and authors link music to two moments of Divine speech described in the Qur’an: 1. the ‘call-and-response’ covenant of *alast* (7:172) in which God asks

the souls of all humankind, ‘Am I not your Lord?’, to which they reply in the affirmative, and 2. the verbal creative command ‘Be!’ by which God brings all things into being. (Ogunnaike 2013:15)

In that sense, true *sama* is simply “remembrance of the primordial ‘Be’ (*kun*) that brought about the world’s ‘being’ (*kawn*) in the first place” (Chittick 2007: 97). God’s love is the force behind his command so that anything hears it (*sama*). Therefore, the things need to hear (*sama*) God’s command (*kun*) to come to exist. This word *sama* also relates to listening to music and, by extension, music itself (Chittick 2007: 96). Rumi states,

The creatures are set in motion by love,
love by God in all eternity—
The wind dances because of the spheres,
the trees because of the wind. (quoted in Chittick 2007: 97)

Attaining the serene self, which is able to recognize God’s love, Watkins realizes the holistic movement of the cosmos, which resonates in Rumi’s poem. Aboard the Crystal, Watkins states: “I watched a pulsing swirl of all being, continually changing, moving, dancing, a controlled impelled dance, held within its limits by its nature, and part of this necessity was the locking together of the inner pattern in light with the other world of stone, leaf, flesh and ordinary light” (B 93). As a Sufi metaphor, “*sama* means to die to this world and to be revived in the eternal dance of the free spirits around a sun that neither rises nor sets” (Schimmel 1975: 184). That description also parallels to Watkins’s turning around at the hospital just like a Sufi follower practicing *sama* which is a kind of ritual in which dervishes whirl around their own axis accompanied by Sufi music (Schimmel 1975: 325). Accordingly, physical rituals enable one to move from one level of energy to another, as if changing gears by accumulation of any creative energy, (quoted in Hardin 1974: 155) which occurs in dancing. Within that scope, dancing as another technology of the self is related to spirituality and one’s body reminding Foucault’s following words: “Isn’t the body of the dancer precisely a body dilated along an entire space that is both exterior and interior to it?” (Foucault 2006c: 232)

Consequently, Watkins must remember the brainprint which “he made to forget and that has to be through a unique way that is a circular path, revolving at the same line [*sama*] and he must uncover what is not known but is already there, until he reaches a certain recognition” (Matosoğlu 2014: 18). In that frame, Watkins’s conducts and words are related to circle in one way or the other, which needs a peculiar attention to its

symbolism. “The image of the circle—regarded as the most perfect form since Plato’s *Timaeus*, the prime authority of Hermetic philosophy—was also given [...] to the first created light” (Jung 1960: 66-67). That idea parallels with the Islamic recognition of being, which is not a straight process but a circular one exemplified in the following quotes from Qur’an: “I have fashioned him completely and breathed into him” (Qur’an, 15:29). “Who has created death and life that He may test you which of you is best in your deed” (Qur’an, 67:2). “He will give you death, then again will bring you to life (on the Day of Resurrection) and then unto Him you will return” (Qur’an, 2:28). All those verses indicate that human beings emerge from God, live in accordance with their fate and then return back to Him completing the circle of being.

If one’s life is also a circle, the middle stage of one’s life cycle corresponds more or less to the age of forty, which is special in both Sufism and Jungian analytic psychology. There are also some references to middle ages and adult life in Plato’s *Alcibiades I*: “During his adolescence Alcibiades was desirable and had many admirers, but now that his beard is growing, his lovers disappear. Earlier, he had rejected them all in the bloom of his beauty because he wanted to be dominant, not dominated” (Foucault 1988b: 24). At that time, Alcibiades makes a pact with Socrates that he “will submit to his lover, Socrates, not in a physical but in a spiritual sense” (Foucault 1988b: 24) like a Sufi follower submits to her/his teacher. In that sense, Socrates encourages Alcibiades to apply himself and to take care of himself by means of their dialogues on self-forming technologies. Considering those examples, it is possible to say that adulthood or middle-ages open way to mindfulness about one’s self and the others. It is believed that Qur’an was revealed to Prophet Mohammed at the age of forty, which strengthens the significance of the age of forty in Sufi thinking. Forty is “the number of patience and trial, the number of days of seclusion that the adept [the murid] undergoes at the beginning of the [Sufi] Path” (Schimmel 1975: 94). It “corresponds to the forty stages through which man, having descended into the depths of created beings, can ascend again to God, eventually throwing off the ‘shawl of humanity’” (Schimmel 1975: 224).

While Freud regards adulthood “as a scene in which the early unconscious conflicts were re-enacted, rather than as a time of further development,” (quoted in Shalit 2011: 8) the individual must turn toward the self and spirit in the second part of life according to Jung (Shalit 2011: 11). “Jung notes that around the age of forty, a slow process of character change takes place. Interests and inclinations alter. Simultaneously,

however, moral principles tend to harden and grow rigid” (Shalit 2011: 13). According to Jung, “[a]t the time of middle age, many (if not most) people encounter what Jung termed a *midlife crisis*” since the first part of the life cycle is completed through accomplishing some goals and the individual starts to question automatically when they are middle-aged (Fleming 2005: 26).

In the case of Lessing’s novels, “the protagonists are all middle-aged, with the exception of Martha Quest at the beginning of *Children of Violence*” (Cederstrom 1990: 8). Accordingly, the characters that are on the verge of awakening are all middle-aged excluding Violet in *Briefing*. In her letter, Baines mentions that Watkins was middle-aged while he was giving the awakening lecture on education, (*B* 149) which makes Baines experience a sense of remembering something important, long forgotten (Whittaker 1988: 82). At that time, Baines was a retired headmistress which also stands for middle-agedness. In the same letter, Baines talks about her friend, Frederick Larson, another middle-aged character, whom they are “in the same orbit,” (*B* 156) which refers to the realm of irrational. Larson is an archaeologist who has started to doubt about the bases of his profession. At the time of his crisis, Larson “found he was sleeping badly” like a person has an uneasy sleep before a journey (*B* 160). When Larson goes to the doctor thinking that he is ill, he is given a sleep tonic. Then he accepts that “he was slightly mad, and perhaps this was due to discovering he was indubitably middle-aged!” (*B* 160). When he has stammer, he takes sedatives and sees a psychiatrist, who cannot unearth his problem since “he is happy in his work, his life, his habits, his wife and his children” on the surface (*B* 163). Therefore, Larson discovers that “he is suffering from male menopause and manic depression” (*B* 163). Then he forgets his Doubts after the Turkey excavation until his visits Wiltshire, where he tries to remember deliberately the things he buries (*B* 170). No longer, he “slid[s] into a Euphoric, or Male Menopausal, or Manic-Depressive (pay your penny and take your choice!) state of mind” again (*B* 170).

The public room of the Central Intake Hospital is described having forty or fifty people, “middle-aged predominated” (*B* 226). In the novel, the people who are open to other dimensions in which one has unclassifiable experiences and extra-sensory perceptions are generally middle-aged people in and out of the psychiatric hospital. In that sense, those people function to show the reader a kind of message that could operate as a kind of technology of the self: “In the second half of life, man must withdraw from external preoccupations, and seriously prepare for old age, death and eternity—which

amounts to a (not necessarily formal) religious attitude” (Shalit 2011: 15). As Foucault states, Pliny The Elder, a Roman scholar of the ancient culture also “advises a friend to set aside a few moments a day, or several weeks or months, for a retreat into himself. This was an active leisure-to study, to read, to prepare for misfortune or death” (1988b: 27) as a technology of the self. Those preparation includes various practices such as reading, writing and any kind of self-examination. To Foucault, the most effective practice is the meditation on death, which is the outcome of all mentioned techniques (1988b: 38).

The “psychological and biological changes that a person undergoes in the second half of life may [...] blur the distinction between male and female traits, though this may be a far cry from the erotic character of juvenile androgyny” (Shalit 2011: 14). Accordingly, in “Androgyny or Catastrophe: Doris Lessing’s Vision in the Early 1970s”, Bazin uses androgyny in order to describe personal wholeness and recognition of one’s inherent oneness with others and with nature (1999: 33). In this sense, androgyny in Lessing’s works should be considered as a much more extended idea of wholeness and it corresponds to the Sufi understanding of being One. The Sufis “believe themselves to be taking part in [such a] higher evolution of humanity,” (Shah 1971: 19) which is possible “by developing extrasensory perception, intuition, dreams, and journeys into inner space” (Bazin 1985: 159-160). While androgyny could bring human beings together, with the absence of androgyny, catastrophe or dystopia would appear “because of our failure to think in terms of “we” (Bazin 1995: 144). In the case of *Briefing*, there is an emergency in giving the message of Oneness since the catastrophe knocks on the door. Asked about the stories of Armageddon in her novels, Lessing states:

We are already living it. The newspapers this past week gave some statistics from the FAO about infantile hunger. Some said that 37 million children will die before they are six months old, others 57 million, and this is without counting those who will die of malnutrition or progressive infirmity. This is the apocalypse, here and now. (Torrents 2000: 73)

As a sensitive intellectual with Sufi liaison, Lessing believes in the capacity of individuals since the “society changes when the individual changes, rather than the group action” (Cederstrom 1990: 4). According to Rumi, “[t]he human being’s organism is producing a new complex of organs in response to such a need. [...] What ordinary people regard as sporadic and occasional bursts of telepathic or prophetic power are seen by the Sufi as nothing less than the first stirrings of these same organs” (Shah 1971: 61). Those organs

are needed in order to reach a certain destiny, in which the people get evolved and reach the wholeness/androgyny in the end.

According to Lessing, “[t]he moment you have a shot of the earth from space [...] then there’s a new sensibility; there has to be” (Gray 1986: 122). That’s why, Watkins realizes that “mankind was a minute grey crust,” which is “smaller than the tiniest of grains of sand or dust of pollen” (B 93) when he starts getting farther from the Earth aboard the Crystal. The mankind as the representative of ration turns into a tiny pollen within the cosmological system in that experience. Overthrowing the sovereignty of the rational mind, Watkins states:

It was the mind of humanity that I saw, but this was not at all to be separated from the animal mind which married and fused with it everywhere. Nor was it a question of higher or lower, for just as my having drunk blood and eaten flesh with the poor women had been a door, a key, and an opening, because all sympathetic knowledge must be that, in this spin of fusion like a web whose every strand is linked and vibrates with every other. (B 92-93)

To Shah, after experiencing one’s place at the cosmos, the ego-identity has to diminish; therefore, self-pride is recognized and overcome (1971: 175) enabling one to welcome the illuminating truth that life is One. In the outer space, all binaries and distinctions are cleared away by the cosmic fusion. As the outcome of such a union, Watkins, “the mad protagonist in *Briefing*, sees humankind as [the real] mad” (Bazin 1995: 142). According to Watkins, “saying I, I, I, I, is their madness” since “they form a unity, they have a single mind, a single being, and never can they say I, I, without making the celestial watchers roll with laughter or weep with pity [...] Some sort of a divorce there has been somewhere along the path of this race of man between the ‘I’ and the ‘We’” (B 103). That divorce will bring catastrophe as the perspective that is “dividing-off, compartmenting, pigeonholing” (B 121) is the reason behind “racism, sexism, class consciousness, ecological problems, [and] world wars” (Bazin 1995: 143).

In the evolutionary process of androgyny, Watkins undergoes a period of suffering, which is a need in both ancient and Sufi culture to transform the self. He gets stuck in a vicious circle for some time physically and mentally: “[T]he waiting to meet up with Them [the Crystal and his comrades] had become a circuit in our minds as well as in the ocean” (B 22). Then Watkins experiences multiple violent scenes, in which he recognizes his capacity of evil: the death of the cattle, the death of a male infant and

joining the bloody feast of it; the civil war between rat-dogs and the apes, and the death of Konstantina Ribar, his lover in the Yugoslavian war story. After having experienced those everlasting struggles, he purifies his soul and attends the briefing. As a consequence, Watkins “finds perfect satisfaction (*itminan*) in being governed by heart, the Divine mirror in man” (Gözel 2012: 160) and turns into a mirror of Divine Mystery in man, which is seen in the following dialogue between him and Doctor Y.

Doctor Y.: So you are God, too, are you?

Watkins: You as well.

Doctor Y.: I don’t aim so high, I assure you.

Watkins: Stupid. You don’t have a choice. (*B* 137)

In the third stage of Sufi awakening, the spirit (*ruh*) gains the victory over the soul (*nafs*) and the heart is transformed into spirit transmuting the soul simultaneously. Then the heart (*qalb*) reveals itself what it really is as a part of divinity (Gözel 2012: 159). Within that scope, “gradual development of Sufism that begins in a mysticism of asceticism and fear, slowly changes to an emphasis on love and devotion, and then turns to stressing knowledge and gnosis” (Chittick 2007: 74). At the beginning of his inner journey, Watkins is in a fright on the ship and in the ocean. As his inner voyage develops from water to land, his state of fright diminishes. Yet, he is not truly free from fear when he is on the shore, under the effect of the Moon, or during the battle of rat-dogs and apes. After he has been taken by the Crystal, attended the briefing and experienced the re-birth, his individuation process gets nearer to the end; therefore, Watkins is able to feel free from fear and grief. In the Yugoslavian made-up story, Watkins and Konstantina encounter a doe in the forest. Watkins describes the animal as beautiful: “It was a pretty sight, a golden beast, with its fur warm and rich and sunny” (*B* 220). Amazed at the deer’s beauty, it does not come into his head that the deer can be dangerous even if the animal “kept making the same movement, a light shaking semi-circular movement with its horns, [that are] sharp forward-pointing, [...] black and glossy” (*B* 220). However, the deer jumps forward and kills Konstantina, who moves in front of Watkins to protect him. Even after such a touching scene, Watkins does not feel anger for the doe, or he is not afraid of the beast, instead he focuses on burying Konstantina, his lover. Only after the burial, Watkins realizes that the doe is still there since she has given birth lately. Amidst such a scene, he states: “But to witness a birth is to be admitted into Nature’s workshop, and there life and death work together” (*B* 223). In that story emerging from the false memory of Watkins,

death and birth are experienced simultaneously and that recurrent theme suggests that experiencing such a scene is vital in the individuation process of the self bringing together the ego, the shadow and the anima under the umbrella term, the self.

In that scene, “[d]eath and birth may lead us to the circle of life and to the whole novel itself which is like the Crystal’s turning around until all oppositions become one and correspond with the greater being so that the oppositions such as evil and good and individual and group exist and complete one another” (Matosoğlu 2014: 26). By that scene, Lessing suggests that a transformed self (by means of Sufi tradition in Watkins’s case) is able to melt danger, fear and sadness in the love pot. “To put it succinctly, love is a form of existence for the Sufi through which he aims to move beyond life and death that is beyond everyday troubles and the fear of death” (Gözel 2012: 160). That’s why, Watkins feels happy and serene in that section. This reminds us Rousseau’s statements in *The Confessions* which is about self-forming techniques; therefore, there is a section about Rousseau’s *Confessions* in *Technologies of the Self*. To him, “[t]rue happiness is indescribable; it can only be felt, and the stronger the feeling the less it can be described, because it is not the result of a collection of facts but a permanent state, had indicated that experience somehow transcends categories and divisions” (2000: 150).

Rousseau’s concept of permanent state also correlates with the description of “wavelength,” the term that Baines, the retired headmistress, uses to define the quality of her wakefulness due to Watkins’s awakening lecture on education (*B* 94, 96, 106, 154). According to Baines, that quality of joy is “like a suddenly touching a high-tension wire. Of being, briefly, on a different, high, vibrating current, of the familiar becoming transparent” (*B* 154). Experiencing such an awakening, Baines feels like “a child of three, four, five [...] [b]efore those ‘prison shades’ had come down. Before the trap had shut” (*B* 153) indicating the sovereign institutions.

Filled with happiness and love, the serene and the awakened self of the third stage acts with “mercy, kindness, and a burning zeal to help others” (Gözel 2012: 160). Lessing instances that idea toward the end of the novel. Watkins tries to escape from the Central Intake with Violet in order to share a flat together and look after her like a dad would do to his daughter (*B* 236). That is not an action that Watkins would take before his breakdown since he was so indifferent beforehand especially to the women around him. Yet Violet is a peculiar female character. Watkins’s only friend at hospital, Violet is depicted as a little child who is despised by both doctors and the nurses. However,

Watkins disagrees and tells Doctor Y. that “she is not just a small girl, Doctor Y. Emotionally yes, of course. But in other ways she understands things you don’t” (*B* 238). That quote resonates with the peculiar tenets of the state of a child which is closely related to following ‘the whim of the moment’.

Consequently, *Briefing*, as a Sufi allegory, “conveys secrets to the elect and conceals them from others” (Hardin 1974: 154). It does not operate as “A to Z content of a textbook or teaching;” (Shah 2015: 238) “the variety of accounts subverts conventional chronology” (Rowe 1994: 64). Therefore, it asks for “the interplay of the minds of the teacher and the taught” (Shah 2015: 238), here, of the writer and the reader. According to Lessing, “man must develop by his own effort, toward growth of an evolutionary nature, stabilizing his consciousness [by means of technologies of the self]. He has within him an essence, initially tiny, shining, precious” (1971). In *Briefing*, with his own effort, Watkins enables to transform his self. Then he links his individual consciousness to the collective one. He functions as “[e]veryman, rediscovering (remembering) through the exploration of the microcosm of his own consciousness the experience of the human race” (quoted in Rowe 1994: 62). However, the evolutionary process of Watkins is intervened by literal-minded doctors. Watkins is restored to his sanity, the so called zombie-like normality by means of electro-convulsive therapy by his own will “in the hope that it might help him to remember something he feels” (Whittaker 1988: 82). Instead, Watkins loses all his memory of the experiences he has gained through his inner journey and therefore he loses a chance of remembering the brainprint and discovering his deeper self. While Watkins exemplifies a failure in his self-discovery, Baines and Larson “listen out for the irrational and madness, welcome them, and incorporate them into their conscious awareness. Quietly, they recognize and recruit the people of the New Age (Whittaker 1988: 83). Lessing conceptualizes that kind of ‘madness’ as a “wavelength” which is frequently used in her other novels that have madness as its theme. In *The Four-Gated City*, it is described: “I don’t know how to explain it... It is as if... not that *she* is mad, but there is madness. A kind of wavelength of madness—and she hooks into it and out, when she wants. I could hook into it just as easily. Or it could hook into me—it’s in the air” (Lessing 1969: 380). Considering the definition, there is a shift from personal to collective; madness is “like the thought that is around” (Sukenick 1974: 115). In that case, Lessing’s Sufi concerns match the overall picture since

[the] Sufis believe the mad are mad because they can see more and yet are not developed enough to comprehend and sustain their hallucinations, which come and go at random. The enlightened are those [Rosemary Baines and Frederick Larson in *Briefing*] who survive their madness, who have learned how to understand and control their visions, and can achieve those visions at will. (quoted in Galin 1997: 120)

Those people are able to achieve the evolutionary state developing a new consciousness due to the need. Within that scope, welcoming experiences such as “a phase of marriage, a serious love, an illness, a nervous breakdown” is significant since such “a way of learning, a time of crammed thoughtful living, is perhaps nearer to the learning of the Sufi way” (Lessing 1971). Once allowed, those experiences have a capacity to teach the mankind more than the rest of one’s life put together.

To attain the conscious evolution through mentioned experiences gets easy if the seeker is released from the necessities of the everyday life which veil the truth of one’s self. As Lessing states:

It is only in love and in war that we escape from the sleep of necessity, the cage of ordinary life, to a state where every day is a high adventure, every moment falls sharp and clear like a snowflake drifting slowly past a dark glistening rock, or like a leaf spinning down to the forest floor. Three months of ordinary living can be not much more than the effort of turning over from one side to another in a particularly heavy uncomfortable sleep. (*B* 210)

In that sense, the Yugoslavian war story at the end of the *Briefing* is noteworthy. In that duplicitous story, the war is idealized and there is a group of soldiers who transcend personal differences constituting a mosaic:

This group of young soldiers contained Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, Catholics, and Moslems. Nowhere but in these mountains, among these soldiers, these comrades, could it be possible for two people to meet, take each other’s hands, call each other by name, Miro, Milos, Konstantina, Sloba, Vido, Edvard, Vera, Mitra, Aleksa ... take the Red Star as their bond, and forget the rest. (*B* 209)

In that section, Lessing also brings war and love together symbolized by Konstantina Ribar, Watkins’s lover. “[O]ur love was carried, or contained by the group, a flower it” (*B* 212) says Watkins. Even if that is a worldly love, it happens after the struggles, the briefing and the rebirth that Watkins lives through linking him to the third stage of the contended

soul and therefore transforms him into the state of conscious evolution that culminates in “a personal morality” (Torrents 2000: 71). Therefore, the inner journey of the protagonist together with the unclassifiable experiences operate as technologies of the self, in other words as an art of existence transforming Watkins from an aloof professor to a Sufi follower.

Foucault states that the techniques of the self are “those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an *oeuvre* that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria” (1990b: 10-11). As a self-forming technology, Sufism is able to jerk the individual away from the sovereign mechanisms and social norms; it turns the individual into a work of art answering the following questions by Foucault in the affirmative. “But couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object, but not our life?” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 236). In that vein, Lessing suggests the reader to turn to oneself in order to discover the human nature and the nature of the self in depth, which is related to cosmos including all other beings.

CONCLUSION

What is insanity and who is the mad, really? From the perspective of *Briefing*, the metaphor of madness is depicted in multiple ways by various observers. According to the British police, a person who wanders around an uncanny place rambling and confused but not drunk is to be taken to a psychiatric hospital. For the nurses working at a psychiatric hospital, an improperly dressed girl not washing as much as she is expected perfectly exemplifies mental illness symptoms. When it comes to the doctors including psychiatrists, a patient who has a sleep disorder and experiences a state of extra-wakefulness is probably having either a male menopause, a Euphoric or Manic Depressive. Considering the descriptions, Charles Watkins the protagonist, a twenty-one-year-old girl Violet Stroke and a middle aged archaeologist Frederick Larson are all regarded having mental illness in *Briefing* (1971). As a consequence, their medical treatments are analogous irrespective of what they are actually saying. Within that scope, Lessing provides other characters Frederick Larson the archaeologist and Rosemary Baines the retired head-mistress who are able to attain a different point of view from the mainstream. They do not accept Watkins as insane since they are experiencing a likewise wavelength opening way to other dimensions to which Western episteme is tightly closed because of the so called reason. Therefore, presenting the limit-experience from the inner and the outer perspectives, Lessing's novel operates as the practical facet of the Foucauldian theories on madness and the subject in terms of the technologies of domination and the technologies of the self.

Having focused on the books about madness such as *Mental Illness and Personality* and *The Madness and Civilization*, to draw the picture of the madmen as the object and the unfixed subject—the outcome of discourses and dividing practices was the initial goal of this study. Due to the highlighted power/knowledge relation in his later works, a Foucauldian reading has diverted this study to the technologies of power together with the deconstruction of the opposition of reason/unreason. Foucault's last works such as *History of Sexuality*, Volume 1, 2, and 3 and other studies on his works such as *Technologies of the Self* have transformed the scope of this study into a complete examination of the madness surviving amidst the technology of domination and the technology of the self. Therefore, the shifts in this study present the core of Foucauldian approach to literature. Foucault does not provide a well-structured theory, method or

analysis in his history of systems of thought that is attainable as a literary criticism, he rather shows the capacity to think otherwise by means of problematizing, criticizing and refashioning the self by the self-forming technologies. His critique creates possibilities for us to choose how we might see, understand, and in turn negotiate our subjectivity and the power relations in our world.

Foucault suggests there is a possibility that madness could speak to a society with its first person utterances and that dialogue is available through art. Art including literature is the space which enables breaking out of the lines of oppressive orders. Such writers and artists as Diderot, Goya and De Sade, are examples transmitting the cries of madness in different ways. While madness was not that silent at the end of the 18th century, in the 19th century, there were still some works which escaped from the modern experience of madness such as Nietzsche's last works and Van Gogh's paintings. Although there was a silence of madness in mental institutions by means of psy-sciences, there were cracks in literature where the light of madness as a part of human nature could shine through.

Through a Foucauldian reading of *Briefing* as transgressive literature, this study has attempted to violate the silence of madness and show how Lessing parallels to Foucault's genealogy of madness by deconstructing the opposition of sanity and insanity. That deconstruction initially unveils the deep classifying, labelling and 'dividing practice' that is psychiatry. Within that scope, the novel parallels to the Foucauldian genealogy of sciences since *Briefing* does not present a progressive history and absolute truths in the case of psychiatry and archaeology. Instead, Lessing's novel accepts the social structures and the oppressive mechanisms of the society as failures. Therefore, hierarchical dualisms are torn down in the novel turning the scales in her favor questioning the rationality of taken-for-granted institutions together with the so called madness as a mental illness.

Problematizing the subject and the truth that is attainable through reason, Lessing makes a critique of related discourses such as education, archaeology and mostly psychiatry. Pointing out the one-dimensionality of the Western episteme, Lessing emphasizes limit-experiences, the paranormal capacities and madness that are placed within the realm of irrational. The novel extends the nature of human behavior to the realm of "irrational" bringing together extra-sensory perception and madness. According to Foucault, what detaches man from feeling is both knowledge and sensibility: a sensibility that is no longer controlled by the movements of nature, but by all the habits

and all the demands of social life (1988a: 218). In that sense, escaping from the grasp of society, at the beginning Watkins is relieved of its demands and he is integrated with his nature gradually. The probable reason behind the increasing number of the modern civilized man who experience ‘the mental breakdown’ is that they have gradually been moved away from their nature which relates to the cosmos, which includes some other faculties such as intuition rather than pure reason. On the other hand, constitution of unreason as a mental illness is the result of civilization and modernization since it is the inevitable outcome of the restrictive structures and apparatuses which are constituted by technologies of domination. In this sense, the discourse on madness is used to control the disobedient and to adjust the non-conforming identities. Consequently, in the name of psychiatric treatments, zombies and robot-like individuals emerge in and out of the psychiatric hospitals. In the Central Intake of the novel as the sample of psychiatric institutions in general, that kind of docility is attained by means of medicine, scheduled practices and Electroconvulsive therapy as the ultimate treatment. After such intrusions, the outputs of the panoptic machine are left with no other choice than obeying to the norms and conforming the status quo as in the case of Watkins. After all, madness is constituted as *the other* within the dialectic of self/other, by which the privileged term, “self”, is constituted as the rational. That’s why, Watkins, Violet, and Larson, the objectified mad characters of the novel, form a group of insanity even if they exemplify different parts of the oppressive mechanisms such as education, social norms and profession, respectively. Labelling them “insane” enables the society to either put them in mental hospital or prescribe them soothing medicines, which will “normalize” them in the end.

Surrendered by oppressive mechanisms and literal-minded people such as Doctor X. and Doctor Y., visionary experiences of Watkins serve as an antidote for his mundane and monotonous everyday life. Lessing gives a chance to Watkins to discover his deeper self and the nature of the human beings by means of his breakdown. Violating the silence of madness, *Briefing* transforms the concept of madness from a breakdown to a breakthrough. Therefore, operating as a technology of self, madness helps Watkins discover his self in a deeper sense together with the realm of his unconscious and his shadow side. At first, he tries hard to project his unwanted parts of his psyche onto others such as women. Then, he is not able to escape his shadow and has to accept the disliked features of him such as carnality. Within that scope, self-forming technologies resonates

with Sufi stages of the soul and the more he recognizes his self the more he feels attached to the others. Watkins's aloof persona culminates in his affectionate novel self, which not only cares for the things around such as animals but also the human beings in general. Discovery of his deeper self enables the shift between the micro realization of his self and the macro reality of one's relation to the cosmic order. Aboard the Crystal, Watkins is able to achieve a heightened consciousness by which he is ready to discover his real self as a minuscule part of the larger mosaic of the existence.

Depicted as *the everyman*, Watkins's experience signifies the experience of the human race in general. In that case, the novel suggests that the change does not come from the group acts but occurs within the individual, which later provides the change in the society. While Foucault's oeuvre shows that being away from his own nature, the Western man of rationality is therefore unhappy, Lessing draws a dystopia as the ultimate picture of such unhappiness. The unclarified dystopia appears due to the mindset which functions as compartmentalizing and dividing. In that case, transformation from the individual to the collective by diminishing the categories is the only remedy for the upcoming catastrophe which will probably destroy the humanity. The novel exemplifies such a catastrophic atmosphere in the allegory of the civil war between the rat-dogs and the apes who contaminate the Edenic place by sexual harassments and bloody battles. The reason behind a likewise dystopia is the pigeonholing and the dividing perspective of the Western episteme which defines madness/irrationality according to its own rules operating with the technologies of domination. However, people need to re-define the concept of madness regarding all faculties of human being though they may seem irrational. In that sense, the technologies of the self, Foucauldian concept of madness, Jungian psychology and Sufism are presented to have the capacity to prevent the catastrophe in which people will be demolished due to self-centered, accepted "rational" roles. As a consequence, the novel proposes the idea that madness/wavelength which is welcomed as an example of self-forming technology is able to waken the individual and relocate her/him to the level of sympathy and conscious evolution/androgyny. In this sense, this study indented to make this call more visible and audible with the hope of exemplifying an attainable method of aesthetic existence by getting closer to the realm of the irrational.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: The Originality Report



SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ORJİNALLIK RAPORU

ÖĞRENCİ BİLGİLERİ	
Adı-Soyadı	Vildan Yıldız
Öğrenci Numarası	141201101
Enstitü Anabilim Dalı	Batı Dilleri ve Edebiyatları
Programı	İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı
Danışmanın Unvanı, Adı-Soyadı	Dr. Seda Arıkan
Tez Başlığı (Türkçe)	Technologies of Domination and the Self in <i>Briefing for a Descent into Hell</i> by Doris Lessing

SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ'NE

Yukarıda başlığı belirtilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 138 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 23/05/2018 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda belirtilen filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı % 27'dir.

Uygulanan filtrelemeler:

- 1- Kabul/Onay ve Bildirim sayfaları hariç,
- 2- Kaynakça hariç
- 3- Alıntılar hariç/dâhil
- 4- 5 kelimeden daha az örtüşme içeren metin kısımları hariç

Yukarıda bilgileri verilen öğrencinin doktora tezi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yönetim Kurulu tarafından belirlenen azami benzerlik oranlarını aşmadığını ve tez çalışmamın herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.


Danışmanın Adı-Soyadı
(İmzası)


Prof. Dr. Mehmet AYGÜN
Anabilim Dalı Başkanı
(İmzası)

Lisansüstü tezler, savunma öncesinde **intihal program raporu** ile birlikte enstitüye teslim edilir.

İntihal raporu ile ilgili olarak etik kuralları dâhilindeki benzerlik oranları ilgili Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu tarafından belirlenir. (Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu tarafından tezin, intihal kapsamı dışında değerlendirilmesi için TURNITIN'den alınan raporda "benzerlik oranı"nın, "alıntılar hariç" en fazla %10, "alıntılar dâhil" % 30'u geçmemesi şeklinde kabul edilmiştir).

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

Vildan YILDIZ was born in Bolu in 1989. She completed her primary school education in Sakarya and high school education in İstanbul due to her father's academic life. She took her BA from the American Culture and Literature in Fatih University in 2011. She studied at Tübingen University in Germany for six months in 2010. After graduation, she worked as a teacher in different institutions for five years. She has been working as a teacher in İstanbul Beykoz Primary School since September 2016.

