

Rising Conservatism in the Face of Threats

by

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August 7, 2020

Rising Conservatism in the Face of Threats


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
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


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To my beloved wife Hatun.

ABSTRACT

Rising Conservatism in the Face of Threats

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Terror Management Theory presents two competing hypotheses regarding the effect of mortality salience on political ideology: a shift to a conservative stance and the defense of one's worldview. My research considers how three types of mortality primes, reminders of death due to cancer, a terror attack, and unknown causes, may lead to diverging ideological responses. This can shed light on the conditions under which people respond differently to mortality salience. Based on an online survey experiment ($N=2,629$) conducted in Turkey in 2018, the reminder of death due to cancer had no significant effect whereas reminders of death due to a terror attack and unknown causes had significant positive effects on conservative self-identification.

Keywords: terror management theory, conservatism, liberalism, survey experiment

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ÖZETÇE

Tehditler Karşısında Yükselen Muhafazakârlık

Fatih Erol

Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Siyaset Bilimi, Doktora

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Dehşet Yönetimi Kuramı ölüm hatırlatmalarının siyasal ideolojiler üzerindeki etkisine ilişkin iki çelişkili hipotez sunmaktadır. Bu hipotezlerden ilki hem solcu hem de sağcı bireylerde artan muhafazakâr tutum ve davranışları tahmin etmektedir. İkincisi ise solcu ve sağcı kişilerin dünya görüşlerinin perçinleneceğini öngörmektedir. Araştırmam kanser, terör saldırısı ve belirsiz nedenlerden kaynaklanan üç tür ölüm hatırlatmasının siyasal ideolojilerde sebep olacağı etkileri kuramsal bir çerçevede değerlendirmeyi ve sebep-sonuç ilişkisi içerisinde test etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmam 2018 yılında Türkiye’de gerçekleştirdiğim internet anketi deneyinin ($N=2,629$) bulgularından yararlanmaktadır. Kanser ölümü hatırlatmasının istatistiki anlamlı bir etkisi bulunmamaktadır. Terör ve belirsiz ölüm hatırlatmaları ise muhafazakâr öz tanımlama üstünde pozitif ve istatistiki olarak anlamlı bir etkiye sahiptir.

Anahtar kelimeler: dehşet yönetimi kuramı, muhafazakârlık, liberalizm, anket deneyi

Ali Köken

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	Anterior Cingulate Cortex
ADNKS	Address Based Population Registration System
AKP	Justice and Development Party
ANES	American National Election Studies
ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
AVG	Average
BFI	Big Five Inventory
BH	Benjamini-Hochberg
CFA	Confirmatory Factor Analysis
CFI	Comparative Fit Index
CHP	Republican People's Party
CI	Confidence Interval
C-scale	Wilson-Patterson Conservatism Scale
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
DF	Degrees of Freedom
DHKP/C	Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front
DRD4	Dopamine Receptor D4
DZ	Dizygotic
EFA	Exploratory Factor Analysis
FE	Fixed Effect
F-scale	Fascism Scale
HDP	Peoples' Democracy Party
HEXACO	Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and Openness to Experience
IAT	Implicit Association Test

IBDA-C	Revolutionary Headquarters, Great Eastern Islamic Riders Front
IPIP	International Personality Item Pool
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISSP	International Social Survey Programme
IYIP	Good Party
MAX	Maximum
MHP	Nationalist Action Party
MFT	Moral Foundations Theory
MIN	Minimum
MRI	Magnetic Resonance Imaging
MSC	Motivated Social Congition
MZ	Monozygotic
N	Number of Observations
NA	Do not Know / No Response
NB	Negativity Bias
NEO-PI-R	Neuroticism-Extraversion-Openness Personality Inventory-Revised
NFC	Need for Closure
NMDA	N-Methyl-D-Aspartate
NUTS	Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
OT	Oxytocin
PCTL	Percentile
PKK	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane
PR	Probability
RE	Random Effect
RMSEA	Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
RWA	Right-Wing Authoritarianism
SDO	Social Dominance Orientation
SP	Felicity Party
SRMR	Standardized Root Mean Square Residual
TAK	Kurdistan Freedom Hawks

TIPI	Ten-Item Personality Inventory
TKP-ML	Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist
TLI	Tucker Lewis Index
TMT	Terror Management Theory
TUIK	Turkish Statistical Institute
VA 30K	Virgiana 30,000
VP	Patriotic Party



Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Motivation and Research Question

All individuals occasionally think about death, encounter it personally or in the news, and worry about survival and separation from those nearest and dearest. Individuals also display varying reactions to the death of a loved one or the knowledge that they themselves are going to die. Psychological responses to impending death may include anger, resentment, guilt, depression, and grief (Archer, 2008). Furthermore, individuals may also display differing physiological reactions, such as disorders in eating and sleeping habits, fatigue, immunosuppression, muscular pain, or impaired motor skills (Utz, Caserta, & Lund, 2012).

Individual-level variations in these psychological and physiological response patterns to death also help define our belief systems, including political ideologies.¹ According to the dominant perspectives within political psychology, particularly the *Motivated Social Cognition* (MSC) and *Negativity Bias* perspectives (NB), political conservatives tend to be more sensitive than political liberals to physical threats of bodily harm or danger, including death.

For the MSC literature, conservatism is a social cognition that provides “psychological management of uncertainty and fear” and composed of two cognitive

¹ According to McClosky (1964, p. 362), political ideologies are “systems of belief that are elaborate, integrated, and coherent, that justify the exercise of power, explain and judge historical events, identify political right and wrong, set forth the interconnections (causal and moral) between politics and other spheres of activity”. Thus, a political belief system has three components: (i) issue opinions on international relations, freedom and democracy, the political system, the economy, welfare and quality of life, the fabric of society, social groups, and so forth; (ii) constraints (or correlations) and stability between and within issue opinions; and (iii) abstractions or cognitive shortcuts to understand the political arena, i.e. liberal, left, conservative, and right (Converse, 1964).

components: resistance against change and equality (Sibley, Osborne and Duckitt, 2012: p. 664). Accordingly, conservatives are likely to wish to fulfill three social cognitive needs in the face of threats: (i) *epistemic needs* for certainty, order, and structure, (ii) *existential needs* for safety, security, minimization of danger, and threat; and (iii) *relational needs* of affiliation with others and a sense of belongingness and shared reality (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008, p. 172).

For NB research, humans have genetically coded behaviors against threats, e.g. fight-or-flight responses. The negativity bias – the prime salience of adverse events – causes humans to preferentially recognize negative faces, words, and social-political-economic information (Rozin & Rayzman, 2011; Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014). Furthermore, longitudinal, physiological, and neurological findings showed that conservatives were exceptionally responsive to negative stimuli and events (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Oxley et al., 2008; Amodio, Jost, Master, & Yee, 2007).²

With these in mind, this dissertation is motivated by my curiosity about the political responses to the knowledge of death's inevitability. I ask, "Does the awareness of mortality shape our political belief systems to identify what is right and wrong in politics and society?" and if so, "Why death uniquely benefits political conservatism, but not other political ideologies such as liberalism?"

Accordingly, I find a comparative analysis of the effects of reminders of death due to cancer and unknown causes compared to a more typical threat situation, namely the reminder of death due to a terror attack, theoretically puzzling and empirically informative. The MSC and NB literature might predict that individuals become strongly conservative in the face of any threat to survival. However, if individuals can differentiate the causes behind specific

² The political psychology literature, however, has remained cautious about the NB perspective due to the effects of context on threat sensitivities. For instance, Fazio, Eiser, and Shook (2004) employed an original food foraging game called BeanFest to show that conservatives explored food environments more cautiously, which made them form more negative attitudes than liberals by learning and remembering more negative than positive beans. Researchers have taken this finding as evidence that negativity bias tends to be higher among conservatives than liberals. Nonetheless, when Fiagbenu, Proch, and Kessler (2020) reframed the BeanFest game as the StockFast game – a stock market game, they found a pronounced learning asymmetry among the liberals, which was previously only seen among conservatives in the original game (Fazio, Eiser, and Shook, 2004). Then, contrary to Oxley et al. (2008), Bakker, Schumacher, Gothreau, & Arceneaux (2020) reported no statistically significant relationship between political conservatism and physiological reactions to disgusting and negative images (e.g. a giant spider on a person's face, a bloody human face, and an open wound with maggots).

threats, would there still be a change in political orientations and whether this change would increase affinity for conservative or progressive orientation?

1.2 Theory, Problematics, and Broader Research Aims

To study the links between threats and conservatism, researchers typically operationalize threats as physical dangers resulting in death. One line of theorization is *Terror Management Theory* (TMT). For TMT, worldviews provide individuals with a sense of meaning in life, so individuals reminded of their mortality tend to become more conservative by directing feelings of threat against outgroups with different belief systems (Lavine, Lodge, & Freitas, 2005; Chatard, Arndt & Pyszczynski, 2010).³ The demonstrated causal mechanism linking reminders of death and increased conservatism is that, when individuals are reminded about their own mortality by asking them to contemplate their death, this evokes fear and inhibition. This, in turn, elicits affinity for politically conservative identification and policy positions (Oxley et al., 2008; Thorisdottir & Jost, 2011; Dodd et al., 2012). This typical TMT finding is called the *conservative shift*: against mortality threats, liberals turn towards conservatism while conservatives become more conservative (Bonanno & Jost, 2010). Since Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, and Breus (1994), TMT has become increasingly influential and advanced research as the dominant theoretical framework to explain the alignment between mortality reminders and political conservatism.

However, as TMT research advances, its problems increase. The first is the problem of mixed findings. Besides the typical *conservative shift* finding, there has also been an alternative finding called the *worldview defense*: against mortality threats, liberals become more liberal or progressive, whereas conservatives become more conservative (Burke, Kosloff, & Landau, 2013).

³ Parallel to TMT, another line of research posits that individuals with authoritarian dispositions are more prone to value social conformity and manifest feelings of threats against beliefs, values, and behaviors that contradict social conventions and their government's ability to implement commonly held social rules and regulations (Altemeyer, 1981; Feldman, 2003; and Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007). Thus, conservatism stands in ideational opposition to uncertainty, confusion, and ambiguity (Rokeach, 1960; Kruglanski, 2004). Furthermore, macro-level archival studies indicated that this cognitive opposition to uncertainty strengthened right-wing conservatism politically during economic, political, and social uncertainties, like higher rates of homicide, unemployment, and terrorism (Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991; McCann, 1997; Sales, 1973; and Willer, 2004).

The second is the problem of overgeneralization. In the original TMT design (for the U.S. sample), against the mortality salience, the outcome variable is the choice between pro- vs. anti-U.S. essays. A pro-American article generally covers the U.S. as a great place to be, due to freedom, opportunities for social mobility, and safety and the rule of law. On the other hand, an anti-American article refers to the U.S. not as a great place to live, owing to economic inequalities, materialism, and lack of sympathy. The scholarship interprets the selection favoring the pro-U.S. essay as a conservative shift. However, theoretically plausible critiques of overgeneralization argue that this conservative shift does not reflect increases in conservative beliefs per se, but rather *rally round the flag effects* – increasing support for in-group cultural and national identities and political incumbents in the face of external threats of war or terrorism (Crawford, 2017; Baker & Oneal, 2001; Lambert et al., 2010).

The third is the problem of replicability. Some scholars have questioned the replicability of TMT's typical finding of the tendency to show prejudice, nationalism, and intergroup bias when faced with a subtle mortality salience. In the original design, the respondents in the control condition were asked to write about their emotions and what had happened to their physical bodies when watching TV. The respondents in the mortality salience condition, on the other hand, were asked to write about their emotions and what would have happened to their physical bodies when they were going to die. The outcome variable is evaluations of pro- vs. anti-U.S. essays that to what extent these essays' arguments are valid or not. Keeping these in mind, Klein et al. (2019) recently released a pre-print, which failed to replicate TMT despite the use or no use of this original experimental design of Greenberg et al. (1994) in 21 different labs in the U.S.⁴ The failure to significantly differentiate the choices between pro- vs. anti-American author essays cast serious doubts on TMT's robustness and generalizability and therefore suggest an effort to update TMT's boundary conditions (see Sætrevik, & Sjøstad, 2019) .

Given these issues, this dissertation aims to theoretically and empirically refine TMT research. To start with, one possible reason for the weakening ability to replicate the link between threats and conservatism may be that researchers have overlooked the changing

⁴ Chatard, Hirschberger, and Pyszczynski (2020), on the other hand, questioned the replication failure of TMT due to including sample and effect sizes in the analyses, which were previously not justified by Klein et al. (2019).

parameters of threats. Since Greenberg et al. (1994), individuals have become increasingly aware of diverse threats to survival, such as terrorist attacks (e.g., 9/11), infectious diseases like Ebola (and currently the infamous Coronavirus), and global environmental disturbances, such as deadly heatwaves in faraway places previously unreported by TV, radio, or social media.⁵ In this changed context, individuals may normalize the phenomenon of death itself, such that TMT's typical mortality reminder⁶ of asking people to contemplate their own death no longer abruptly evokes fear to increase affinity for politically conservative identification and positions. Thus, it may now be necessary for researchers to move from internal threats (i.e., a mere reminder of one's mortality) to external threats (i.e., a reminder of one's death due to a specific cause such as cancer or terrorism). Then, people may be able to identify the causes behind the threats and be galvanized into action, either to support further social welfare provision (political liberalism) or additional protection (political conservatism).⁷ By this way, we can also detect whether it is a threat with social or personal origin (e.g., a terrorist attack vs. cancer), which induce more conservative or liberal self-identification and policy positions.

Besides, the contradictory findings of the *conservative shift* and *worldview defense* do not necessarily weaken TMT. Instead, they may hint that we should control for potential moderators affecting the effects of threats on political ideologies. For example, Openness to New Experiences, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism, aka the *Big Five Traits*, may influence whether individuals move towards more conservative (or liberal) self-identification and attitudes in the face of threats to their lives (see Chapter 2: Literature Review, f.n. 10). Thus, the causal mechanism proposed in this dissertation is that personality traits can affect individuals in three ways: (i) whether they feel there is a threat, perceptually or objectively; (ii) what causes they see behind the threat; (iii) how they

⁵ For a theoretical review of perceptions of diverse threats to values and physical security in conservative and liberal ideologies, see Crawford (2017).

⁶ For the treatment group, the TMT literature uses two open-ended mortality reminder questions: "Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you", and "Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you physically as you die and once you are physically dead" (Greenberg et al., 1994, p. 628).

⁷ For the group conceptions and policy positions of political conservatism and liberalism vis-à-vis dangers in psychological theory, see, for instance, Janoff-Bulman (2009).

understand how to deal with the threat's causes in personal and public life through either the *conservative shift* or *worldview defense*. Previous research on the *Big Five Personality Traits* supports this prediction for one trait, in that Openness to New Experiences may moderate or mediate the relationship between threat situations and increased conservatism. For example, in threatening conditions like high homicide and unemployment rates, open-minded people's tendency to oppose conservatism decreases (Sibley et al., 2012). Likewise, societal threats (a reminder of the crime situation in one's society) both mediates and moderates the effect of Openness to New Experiences on right-wing authoritarianism, tendency for conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and aggression (Dallago & Roccato, 2010). Finally, threats of death from terrorism increased closed-mindedness, which in turn heightened conservatism (Thorisdottir & Jost, 2011). Therefore, this dissertation serves an explanatory rather than confirmatory purpose in simultaneously testing the moderation and mediation effects of the *Big Five Personality Traits* on the relationship between threats and conservatism (see Chapter 2: Literature Review, f.n. 11 and subsection titled 3.1 Expectations of Chapter 3: Methodology).

I also wish to argue that researchers have misinterpreted the *rally round the flag effect* as a *conservative shift*. Previously, this was because of an overly broad definition and operationalization of conservatism and the theoretical bias that political conservatism is the only ideology well suited to handling life-threatening traumatic events.⁸ Instead, we need more direct measures of political conservatism by asking self-placement questions. Moreover, we should not necessarily limit the outcome variables to conservatism. The literature has recently started to evolve towards accepting that certain threats such as environmental degradation and poverty can also lead to *liberal shifts*. To illustrate, according to Eadeh and Chang (2020), against healthcare threats (denial of healthcare coverage to a child with cancer), environmental threats (death of an asthma-stricken child living close to extreme pollution), and corporate threats (maleficent conduct of banks against homeowners), there were increases in liberal attitudes on healthcare, environmental, and financial regulation, among liberals and conservatives. In addition, there is also a complementary approach to the *conservative shift*, which I call the *partial conservative shift*; that is, only

⁸ This theoretical concern was previously raised by Greenberg and Jonas (2003, pp: 378-381) that why threats should uniquely benefit political conservatism, but not liberalism?

liberals became more conservative against mortality reminders (Nail, McGregor, Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson, 2009; Landau et al., 2004, Study 3). Hence, in any study of the links between threats and political ideology, post-treatment questions should tap widely into explicit conservative and liberal self-identification along with latent conservative and liberal attitudes of flexibility towards change, uncertainty, and equality.⁹ Afterall, across post-treatment measures, any significant increase in conservative self-identification should favor the interpretation of a *conservative shift* rather than a *rally round the flag effect* because individuals themselves attribute increases in their affinity for political conservatism to their own ideological self-placement.

Least to say, I think that more direct measures of political ideologies not only can solve TMT's problem of overgeneralization but also of replicability. If we anchor TMT's replicability to the higher likelihood of choosing a pro-American author essay over an anti-American piece, we may not be able to notice the shifts in political ideologies against a mortality salience, even when there is one. It is possible that to reduce anxiety, fear, and uncertainty of death, individuals may display an increasing affinity for conservatism, but without changing their views on how good/bad their country is. Therefore, more implicit measures can potentially lead to false negatives in TMT, if we do not measure political beliefs by more explicit measures like self-placements. Then, tests with direct measurements of ideologies can allow us to draw the boundary conditions of TMT that where, when, and how a mortality salience causes an affirmation or refutation of one's political belief systems.

1.3 Research Field

In addressing TMT's issues of over-generalization, replicability, and mixed findings, I also believe researchers need to conduct studies outside the usual western, educated, industrialized, prosperous, and democratic contexts for further testing of internal and external validity. Turkey offers a particularly puzzling case in this respect. Firstly, in contrast to northwestern European and north American samples' more recent exposure to intensifying waves of terrorism since the early 2000s, such as the 9/11 attacks, Turkish citizens have

⁹ For definitions and measurements of conservatism and liberalism, see Wilson (1973), Kekes (1998), Knight (1999), and Sibley et al. (2012). For a recent review of exemplary items measuring the political ideologies of conservatism and liberalism, see Claessens, Fischer, Chaudhuri, Sibley, & Atkinson (2020).

suffered domestic leftist and rightist political terror since the 1960s, domestic ethnic terror by the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) since the 1980s, and international fundamentalist terror by Al-Qaeda and ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) since the 2000s (Sayari, 2010; Tezcur, 2016; Orhan, 2010; 140journos, 2017).

Secondly, malign neoplasms (or cancerous cells) is one of the frequent causes of mortality in Turkey and contra northwestern European countries, the causes of cancer rates in Turkey have not only been attributed to genetic tendencies, environmental pollution, and lifestyle factors, such as smoking, unhealthy diet, obesity, alcohol, sedentariness, and high exposure to sunlight. Also, recent right-wing governments have been accused of failing to prevent public exposure to radiation and cancer-inducing environmental pollution. For instance, the Turkish public debated how much contaminated Black Sea tea and hazelnuts reached soldiers and schoolchildren in 1989, and whether the government was downplaying the risks after the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown on April 26, 1986. The trade minister of the time, Cahit Aral, drank tea from the contaminated harvest and proclaimed in front of the journalists that “A little radiation is good for you”. The then-prime minister, Turgut Ozal, stated that “Radioactive tea tastes better” while President Kenan Evren claimed that radiation was good for the bones (Pope, 1993; Gusten, 2011). Discussions still continue as to whether Turkey’s governments have been acting responsibly to prevent cancer threats from mining coal, uranium, and gold, and from industrial facilities near residential areas (Sonmez, 2017; Ashdown, & McGee, 2019; Hattam, 2019).

Thirdly, Turkish citizens are predominantly Muslim. In a Muslim-majority country, people are more used to regular reminders of death and its total randomness via daily and Friday prayers, Thursday night salahs signalling the next Friday pray, and holy days and months (e.g., Ramadan, Eid al-Fitr, and kandil nights), irrespective of religiosity and religious denomination. Furthermore, residents of Turkey are not only reminded of their mortality but also are made aware of fellow citizens’ deaths by the broadcasted public announcements from the mosques each day. Still, Turkey’s predominantly Muslim population does not mean that conservatism is defined entirely differently from northwestern European and north American contexts. Since the French revolution in 1789, Western conservatives have favored defending society, order, and tradition by rejecting social change and equality (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a, 2003b). Similarly, Turkish

conservatism also defended “the old against the new, the past against the future, the East against the West, traditions against the encroachments of modernism” (Kalaycioglu, 2007, pp. 235-236) in reaction to rationalization, bureaucratization, and the resultant modernization, secularization, and political change of the Tanzimat (Reorganization) Period of the Ottoman Empire between 1839 and 1876 (for further details, see sub-section 2.6.1 Definitions of Conservatism and Liberalism in Turkey in Chapter 2: Literature Review). Therefore, testing the validity and robustness of TMT in Turkey, a context with constant reminders of mortality and with a universally understandable concept of conservatism, can offer the scholarship a unique case study to analyze.

Lastly, while not demonstrating causality, my exploratory findings reveal a statistically significant positive correlation between conservatism and death, and a statistically significant negative association between conservatism and liberalism in the Turkish public’s Google Search inquiries between January 2004 and March 2020, even after controlling for monthly internet prices and time random effects (see Appendix A: Google Trends Analyses).

Thus, I can argue that the research problem of determining how death reminders affect conservatism is relevant to the Turkish public. Furthermore, conservatism and liberalism are theoretically and socially crucial for the Turkish social sciences and the people. Equally important, a positive association between conservatism and death and a negative association between conservatism and liberalism in online searches hints that Turkey falls under TMT’s human universal scope condition. Thus, it is necessary to test the cause-effect relationships among death, conservatism, and liberalism using Turkish research subjects. Addressing the alignment between threats and conservatism in Turkey can allow us to test the effects of context on TMT’s internal and external validity.

1.4 Research Design

1.4.1 Experimental Design

I used a between-subjects design that manipulated the reminder of the thought of death as compared to a control condition. The prompt asked participants how worried they were about losing their lives because of cancer, a terrorist attack, or unknown causes. The absence of a

death reminder was the control treatment. The first experimental treatment was a placebo threat, which was the reminder of death due to cancer. Cancer is a threat to oneself due to abnormal, uncontrolled cell growth, i.e., a natural, non-social cause. While the threat to survival due to cancer may increase conservatism, there is no direct societal threat to induce a stronger conservative ideology. Consequently, the purpose of employing a placebo-like threat, such as the reminder of death due to cancer, was to determine whether or not threats due to social causes have a real effect on political ideology. The second experimental treatment was a sociotropic threat, such as a terrorist attack that creates a generalized sense of threat to the society, country, or one's district, city, or region. This is a threat from external causes, whether ill-willed outgroups or their local accomplices. The third experimental treatment was the vague threat of unknown causes of death. This creates a sense of threat to oneself, society, or country, or one's sense of control and certainty that depends on each respondent's unmeasured risk attitude and perception of death. A vague threat in the form of a reminder of death due to unknown causes is a threat from internal causes, a mere reminder of one's mortality, in a similar form to TMT's original mortality reminder.

To evaluate how threats influence political ideology, I asked participants about their conservative and liberal self-placement, and a set of conservatism-liberalism scale questions on their support for holding long-standing values and customs against change, uncertainty, alternative lifestyles, and gender-equality. I also incorporated word puzzles as manipulation and attention checks immediately after the experimental manipulations.

1.4.2 Associational Design

As a sub-question, I asked, "What do increases and decreases in conservative and liberal self-identification and attitudes mean in the political arena?" This sub-question remained exploratory and associational with the available information from the control group. In the survey design, I kept the question inventory limited to minimize attrition rates. Therefore, for the political attitude and behavior sets – the dependent variables, I included questions on interpersonal trust (a proxy variable measuring social capital), partisanship strength, strategic voting, ideological left-right placement, political polarization, sociotropic retrospective evaluation of the economy, sociotropic prospective assessment of the economy, satisfaction with the current level of democracy, and turnout in the previous general elections (November

1, 2015). The independent variables were the respondents' conservative and liberal self-placement and attitudes, while the controls were age, sex, education, and the *Big Five Personality Traits*. The robustness of the associational findings was checked by testing the similar models in the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2012 and 2016 Time Series Studies, the two publicly available survey modules asking the *Big Five Traits* along with conservative self-identification and policy positions.

1.4.3 Data

The data were collected from an online non-representative survey experiment conducted in Turkey between June 15 and 23, 2018, before the June 24, 2018, presidential and general elections, via the Qualtrics survey platform. The participants were recruited by Facebook advertisements. Out of 6,489 people who visited the survey link, 2,629 respondents were included in the analyses who were at least 18 years old and fully completed the survey. Although this sample was not representative of the Turkish population in 2018, it was still far more heterogeneous than convenience samples of university students typically used in political psychology research in terms of demographic and geographic distribution (see Appendix B: Demographics and Survey Instruments).

1.5 Overview of the Following Chapters

In Chapter 2: Literature Review, I position the links between threats and political ideologies of conservatism and liberalism within the broader political psychology literature and extend these to research in Turkey. In Chapter 3: Methodology, I first develop my predictions about how and why threats can affect the electorate's conservative and liberal/progressive identification and attitudes, and to what extent personality traits are moderators and mediators. I then explain the experimental design, present the survey experiment sample's descriptive statistics, survey response scaling, estimation methods, and potential research limitations. In Chapter 4: Concept Measurements, I explain the operationalization and measurements of the moderators, mediators and outcome variables, *the Big Five Personality Traits*, and conservatism and liberalism measures, including appropriate tests of their psychometric validity. In Chapter 5: Experimental Findings, I report the outcomes of the

multivariate experimental mediation and moderation analyses. In Chapter 6: Associational Design, I propose correlational hypotheses regarding the links among conservatism, liberalism, and political attitudes and behaviors. I then outline the multivariate estimation strategies. In Chapter 7: Associational Findings, I discuss the correlations between conservatism, liberalism, and selected political attitudes and behaviors in comparison to a unique cross-sectional survey datasets, ANES 2012, and 2016. Lastly, in Chapter 8: Conclusion, I discuss my findings, research limitations, and implications for the linkages among threats and other political ideologies using the discourse of menaces.



Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The objective of this chapter is to introduce general concepts and theoretical approaches to the political psychology of conservatism and liberalism research as well as to describe the links between threats and political beliefs. In Section 2.1, I introduce the historical and political definitions of conservative and liberal political ideologies. In Section 2.2, I review the differing approaches linking several self-reported psychological characteristics, e.g. authoritarianism, issue opinions, values, moral judgments, and personality traits, to conservatism and liberalism. In Section 2.3, I present the linkages between inherent psychological characteristics such as selective attention and information processing and political beliefs. In Section 2.4, I summarize the research on the relationship between physiology like genes, hormones, and brain structure and functions, and the political ideologies of conservatism and liberalism. In Section 2.5, I present the theoretical perspectives, and physiological and psychological empirical evidence on the alignment between threats and political ideologies. Finally, in Section 2.6, I describe previous research on conservatism, liberalism, psychological characteristics, and threats in Turkey.

2.1 Definitions of Political Beliefs

When Napoleon Bonaparte (1804-1814), the first Emperor of France, was defeated at the Battle of Waterloo in Belgium by Britain and Prussia, the conservative order (1815-1830) reigned in Europe. The congress of Vienna (1814-1815), convened by Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia, took place to restore the balance of power in Europe, which had been upset by the French revolutionary wars (1792-1802) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). At the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815), leaders led by Austrian foreign minister Klemens

von Metternich (1821-1848) were conservatives who wanted to return to the situation as it was before the war or the 1793 borders. The conservatives therefore restored the Bourbon dynasty in France and Spain, and the House of Savoy in Italy. Unsurprisingly, these conservative leaders' belief system disregarded both of the liberal ideals, republicanism and (the right to) revolution, as Metternich (1881, p. 274) noted in his memoirs:

The first and greatest concern for the immense majority of every nation is the stability of the laws, and their uninterrupted action — never the change. Therefore, let the governments govern, let them maintain the groundwork of their institutions, both ancient and modern; for it is at all times dangerous to touch them, it certainly would not now, in the general confusion, be wise to do so.

Hence, within this context of turmoil after the French revolution in 1789, conservatism emerged as an ideology that prioritized society, order, and tradition over individuals, in particular obedience to the political authority and the pragmatic utility of religion for ensuring social cohesion and order. Consequently, the conservative belief system disapproved of revolutionary movements, republican ideals of civil liberties and representative governments, and nationalism (Spielvogel, 2009, p. 592). Even before Metternich and the Congress of Vienna resulted in the conservative order, the British parliamentarian and political thinker Edmund Burke (1729-1797) became the first political actor to lay the groundwork for conservatism by rejecting the French revolution and emphasizing the eternal significance of continuity in government:

“but the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico, or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. ... [the state] becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.” (Burke, 1790, p. 80)
[bold highlighting added]

However, while conservative ideology was motivated by restoring the domestic order and ending the inter-state/empire wars after the French revolution, the impetus for liberal ideology dated back to the internal turbulence of the mid-1600s in England. Against the backdrop of the English civil war (1642-1651) and the resultant war of all against all, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) (1651) suggested an absolute state to keep the peace, which he named

The Leviathan after the sea monster from the Hebraic bible. While *The Leviathan* would end everyone's fear in the state of nature, it would subjugate every human by fear and awe for its order. Yet, although Hobbes called for an absolute monarchy, he limited it through the fundamental liberal principle that the citizens rather than the sovereign were the monarch. Hence, the king was accountable to those sovereign citizens to justify the limitations on liberty for survival (Waldron, 2001, p. 456). This liberal justification for political authority and law to limit individual rights is also traceable back to the Magna Carta of 1215, which bound King John of England (1166-1216) by the rule of law vis-à-vis the English nobility. Subsequently, liberalism became based on two principles: (i) humans are naturally free and equal; and (ii) any limitation of the natural right to freedom and equality should be justified by a *social contract* between the people and a legitimate government (see Hobbes, 1948 [1651]; Locke, 1960 [1689]; Rousseau, 1973 [1762]; and Kant, 1965 [1797]).

Then, given these historical definitions of conservatism and liberalism, what does a political ideology mean? Political ideologies, such as conservatism and liberalism, are “systems of belief that are elaborate, integrated and coherent that justify the exercise of power, explain and judge historical events, identify political right and wrong, set forth the interconnections (causal and moral) between politics and other spheres of activity” (McClosky, 1964, p. 362). According to Converse (1964), each political belief system has three components. Firstly, it offers opinions on every aspect of economic, political, and social life, e.g. family structure, gender relations, macro-economic policy strategies, and foreign policy conduct. Secondly, its opinions on issues are consistent over time, such that a preference for internationalist foreign policy conduct always be positively correlated with a preference for participatory democracy and tolerance for outgroup members like migrants or homosexuals. Thirdly, there are series of abstractions or cognitive heuristics, like liberal, left, conservative, and right, to help laypeople comprehend the ideology's complexity. Fundamentally, these cognitive heuristics differentiate left-wing ideologies, such as liberalism, from right-wing ideologies, like conservatism.

Given Western societies' critical junctures since the French revolution, a key dyadic divides is between liberal and conservative ideologies. This divide concerns the extent of support and resistance to social change and equality (Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b). Furthermore, partly due to partisan cues, and partly due to the literature's unidimensional measurements,

liberalism and conservatism continue to be depicted as opposite poles of the same dimension (Knight, 1999). Thus, a person is either a liberal with a greater emphasis on equality or a conservative with a greater emphasis on freedom (Rokeach, 1973). For instance, concerning social and economic justice and change, conservatives oppose welfare redistribution, such as social security, social housing, universal health care, free education provision, progressive taxation, immigration, and same-sex marriages, compared to liberals (Jacoby, 1991; Evans, Heath and Lalljee, 1996; Federico and Sidanius, 2002; Bartels, 2008). Based on Kerlinger's (1984, pp. 15-17) comprehensive account, the general definitions of these two poles are as follows:

Conservatism is a set of political, economic, religious, educational and other social beliefs characterized by an emphasis on the status quo and social stability, religion and mortality, liberty and freedom, the natural inequality of men, the uncertainty of progress and the weakness of human reason. It is further characterized by a distrust of popular democracy and majority rule and by support for individualism and individualistic initiative, the sanctity of private property and the central importance of business and industry in society.

Liberalism is a set of political, economic, religious, educational and other social beliefs that emphasize freedom of the individual, constitutional participatory government and democracy, the rule of law, free negotiation, discussion and tolerance of different views, constructive social progress and change, egalitarianism and the rights of minorities, secular rationality and rational approaches to social problems and positive government action to remedy social deficiencies and to improve human welfare.

Yet, despite these comprehensive historical and political definitions of conservatism and liberalism, do ideologies actually matter for the electorate? Early voting behavior researchers debated whether political ideologies were mere issue preferences (Converse, 1964) or just symbolic and affect-oriented labels (Conover, & Feldman, 1981). Moreover, there were arguments that the [American] electorate was inconsistent across issue areas, unable to absorb political information and form political opinions, and vacillating in beliefs (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Converse, 1964). Nonetheless, despite this ideological unsophistication, later findings revealed that the electorate did not wholly lack opinions and issue attitudes, and did value using ideological labels to understand the politics (Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1993; Lau, & Redlawsk, 1997; Jacoby, 2004; Adams et al.,

2017). That is, voters are substantially responsive to candidate and party ideologies in making voting decisions.

2.2 Self-Reported Psychological Characteristics and Political Beliefs

Political ideologies of conservatism and liberalism correlate with various psychological characteristics. The first approaches, after World War II, treated conservatism as a pathology and attempted to link conservatives with negative personality traits (Verhulst, Hatemi, & Martin, 2010, p. 306). Among those negative characteristics, one of the earliest and best known was authoritarianism. In *The Authoritarian Personality*, Adorno et al. (1950) argued that rigid adherence to conventional social values and mores, submission to supposed moral and social superiors, and hostility towards those not complying with commonly-held social values and mores clustered into a distinct personality trait, which they measured by the F-scale (Fascism scale). Variations in scale scores correlated with several political attitudes, such as ethnocentrism, prejudice (anti-Semitism, homophobia, racism, and sexism), and conservative political views. Likewise, for McCloskey (1958, p. 37), conservatives were

social isolates, ... people who think poorly of themselves, who suffer personal disgruntlement and frustration, who are submissive, timid, and wanting in confidence, who lack a clear sense of direction and purpose, who are uncertain about their values, and who are generally bewildered by the alarming task of having to thread their way through a society which seems to them too complex to fathom.

However, identification of negative traits like authoritarianism with conservatism led to poor operationalization and measurement of liberalism. For instance, for McCloskey (1958, p. 44), a liberal person was just someone who “rejected the values of conservatism”. Furthermore, identifying authoritarian personality traits with conservatism conflated the distinction between personality and politics, which led to the adjectives authoritarian and conservative being used interchangeably. One post-Adorno study that linked personality traits and conservatism was Altemeyer’s (1981) *Right-Wing Authoritarianism* (RWA). RWA was the refinement and improvement of the F-scale with three distinct sub-scales: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism (Mavor, Louis, & Sibley, 2010). Individuals high in RWA tended to score higher for prejudice, ethnocentrism,

nationalism, political rightism, and social conservatism whereas those low in RWA tended to favor individual liberties, personal freedom, democracy, and liberalism (Altemeyer, 2007; Duckitt, & Sibley, 2009). The other key study linking personality traits and conservatism was *Social Dominance Orientation* (SDO) (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius, & Pratto, 1999). People high in SDO tended to view the world as a competitive jungle, had a generalized preference for group-based hierarchy and discrimination, and economic conservatism, and endorsed various forms of prejudice, e.g. classism, homophobia, racism, and sexism, (Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2014; Sin, & Hayes, 2018).

However, other studies treated political beliefs as unique concepts, distinct from personality traits. They attempted to measure conservatism and liberalism by looking at individuals' stances on political and non-political issues. To illustrate, the Wilson-Patterson Conservatism Scale (C Scale) (Wilson, & Patterson, 1968) measured conservatism and liberalism by tapping into respondents' support for several issue area catchphrases, such as the death penalty, evolution theory, striptease shows, patriotism, and mixed marriages. According to Thomas (1975, p. 97), socialization to authoritarianism, inequality, aggression, obedience, i.e. conservatism, was both the cause and effect of authoritarian child-rearing practices, such as "restrictions during eating, non-permissiveness of 'sexual' behavior (nudity, masturbation and sex play), mother's expectation of immediate obedience, low amount of affectionate interaction between the mother and child, a high degree of sex-role differentiation in training children and between the mother and her husband, high demands for the child to retaliate to aggression from peers, non-permissiveness of aggression towards parents, and belief in the effectiveness of smacking".

Issue opinions are not the only psychological characteristics differentiating political conservatism and liberalism. According to the *Theory of Basic Human Values* (Shwartz, 1992; 2012, pp. 5-7), there are ten universal human values that structure the motivational bases of our attitudes and behavior: (i) **self-direction**, whose defining goals are "independent thought and action"; (ii) **stimulation**, whose defining goals are "excitement, novelty, and challenge in life"; (iii) **hedonism**, whose defining goals are "pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself"; (iv) **achievement**, whose defining goals are "personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards"; (v) **power**, whose defining goals are "social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and

resources”; (vi) **security**, whose defining goals are “safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self”; (vii) **conformity**, whose defining goals are “restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms”; (viii) **tradition**, whose defining goals are “respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's culture or religion provides”; (ix) **benevolence**, whose defining goals are “preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact (the ‘in-group’)”; and (x) **universalism**, whose defining goals are “understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature”. In the *Theory of Basic Human Values*, there are two bipolar dimensions. The first dimension expresses the conflict between *Openness to Change* (self-direction and stimulation) and *Conversational* (conformity, security, and tradition) values. The second dimension captures the conflict between *Self-Enhancement* (achievement and power) and *Self-Transcendence* (benevolence and universalism) values (Cieciuch, & Schwartz, 2012, pp. 321-322). In terms of the first dimension, *Openness to Change* values versus *Conversational* values, conservatives tend to espouse conformity and security whereas liberals tend to favor self-direction and stimulation (Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010).

Besides issue opinions and values, different moral judgments also discriminate against political beliefs. According to *Moral Foundations Theory* (MFT) (Haidt & Joseph, 2004), individuals make moral decisions based on how they feel about the multiple social problems they face. The functioning of a society relies on moral systems, which are “interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible” (Haidt, 2008, p. 70). For MFT, there are two types of moral systems: (i) *individualizing foundations*, which regulate selfishness by directly protecting individuals and individual rights; and (ii) *binding foundations*, which regulate selfishness by directly protecting groups, institutions, roles, and duties against human imperfection (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009, p. 1030). While *individualizing foundations* are related to the sub-foundations of **harm/care** (“concerns for the suffering of others, including virtues of caring and compassion”) and **fairness/reciprocity** (“concerns about unfair treatment, cheating, and more abstract notions of justice and rights”), *binding foundations* are related to the sub-foundations of **ingroup/loyalty** (“concerns related to obligations of group membership, such as loyalty, self-

sacrifice, and vigilance against betrayal”), **authority/respect** (“concerns related to social order and the obligations of hierarchical relationships, such as obedience, respect, and the fulfillment of role-based duties”), and **purity/sanctity** (“concerns about physical and spiritual contagion, including virtues of chastity, wholesomeness, and control of desires”) (Haidt, & Kesebir, 2010, p. 822). Accordingly, in their moral judgments, conservatives are predisposed to rely on the *binding foundations*, which include considerations about **ingroup/loyalty**, **authority/respect**, and **purity/sanctity**, whereas liberals tend to consider **harm/care** and **fairness/reciprocity** (Haidt, & Joseph, 2004; Haidt, & Graham, 2007).

In addition to issue opinions, values, and moral judgments, knowledge-formation styles can differentiate conservative and liberal belief systems. One widely used cognitive approach to political psychology scholarship is the *Need for Cognitive Closure* or the *Need for Closure* (NFC) theory (Kruglanski, Webster, and Klem, 1993), although there are others, such as dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960) and uncertainty orientation (Sorrentino, & Short, 1986). Kruglanski (1989) defined the need for closure as a desire for definite answers to every question while avoiding ambiguity, confusion, and uncertainty. NFC has five sub-domains: (i) *desire for predictability*, (ii) *preference for order and structure*, (iii) *discomfort with ambiguity*, (iv) *indecisiveness*, and (v) *closed-mindedness*. The following exemplary items represent each sub-scale: “I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it”; “I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success”; “I'd rather know bad news that stay in a state of uncertainty”; “I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently”; “I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view” (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993, p. 876). The term *need* in NFC was chosen to describe “a motivated tendency or proclivity rather than a [brain] tissue deficit” (Kruglanski, & Webster, 1996, p. 264). Studies have shown that individuals predisposed to desire cognitive closure tend to self-identify as conservative and have conservative political attitudes (Kimmelmeier, 1997; Chirumbolo, Areni, & Sensales, 2004).

Lastly, other research has treated personality traits and political beliefs as unique concepts and tried to enclose the links between the two, unlike the F-scale, RWA, and SDO research. One of the most recent and widely accepted approaches is the *Big Five Personality*

Traits theory.¹⁰ This was developed through lexical analysis by asking individuals to evaluate how much personality adjectives match their personality attributes. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were then applied to the responses to identify five broader personality traits: (i) Extraversion, (ii) Agreeableness, (iii) Conscientiousness, (iv) Neuroticism (or Emotional Instability), and (v) Openness to New Experiences (for a brief illustration of these five traits' sub-dimensions, see Table 2.1).¹¹

¹⁰ Various inventories have been compiled with differing numbers of traits, such as the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann Jr., 2003), Big Five Inventory (BFI) (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) with 44 items, Big Five Inventory-2 (BFI-2) with 60 items (Soto & John, 2017), International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) (Maples, Guan, Carter, & Miller, 2014) with 120 items, and Neuroticism-Extraversion-Openness Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO Personality Inventory-Revised or NEO-PI-R) (Costa Jr, & McCrae, 2008) with 240 items. In political science, one of the most frequently used inventories is TIPI because it is briefer, cheaper to administer, and yields higher response rates in surveys due to smaller questionnaire length (see Edwards, Roberts, Sandercock, & Frost, 2004). TIPI has been used in several national election studies, such as the ANES 2012 and 2016 Time-Series Studies, and for cross-nationally representative survey studies, such as the World Values Survey Wave 6 (2010-2014) (Inglehart et al., 2014). However, Bakker and Lelkes (2018) caution against short personality measures like TIPI due to Type M (magnitude) and Type S (sign) errors regarding the associations between the Big Five Personality Traits and political ideology. Hence, the present study used the 44-item BFI as a compromise between higher response rates for shorter personality measures and lower type M and S error rates with longer measures (see Chapter 4: Concept Measurements for further details on BFI item translation, criterion validity, and measurement invariance across education, gender, and primary language groups).

¹¹ At this point, I should also justify theoretically and empirically my use of the *Big Five Traits* rather than other personality approaches, such as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers, 1962), Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), or Hexaco Personality Inventory (Ashton & Lee, 2007). The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers, 1962) uses Jung's (1921) stereotypes, specifically a person's preference for Extraversion (E) / Introversion (I), Sensing (S) / Intuition (N), Thinking (T) / Feeling (F), and Judgement (J) / Perception (P) to derive 16 personality types: ISTJ (the inspector), ISFJ (the protector), INFJ (the advocate), INTJ (the architect), ISTP (the crafter), ISFP (the artist), INFP (the mediator), INTP (the thinker), ESTP (the persuader), ESFP (the performer), ENFP (the champion), ENTP (the debater), ESTJ (the director), ESFJ (the caregiver), ENFJ (the giver), and ENTJ (the commander). The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) is a 90-item measure of three factors: extraversion, neuroticism, and psychoticism (tendency for recklessness, common sense ignorance, or inappropriate emotional expression). Rather than the usual Likert-type 5 or 6-point scales, this questionnaire uses Yes/No response options. Hence, to detect socially desirable response bias, researchers also include a 9-item Lie scale. The Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience (HEXACO) Personality Inventory (Ashton & Lee, 2007) (either 60 or 100 items) employs lexical and factor analyses like the Big Five Trait Inventory. However, it identifies six factors: Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Openness to New Experiences, Agreeableness, Emotionality, and Honesty-Humility. The first three dimensions and operationalizations are quite similar to those in the Big Five Traits. However, Agreeableness and Emotionality differ (Ruslin & Condon, 2016). In the Hexaco Personality Inventory, Agreeableness measures lack of anger rather than tendermindedness (Ashton & Lee, 2007: 152) while Neuroticism measures courage and bravery rather than angry hostility. Finally, Honesty-Humility measures the tendency to manipulate other people for personal gain, break rules, and lavish luxuries on oneself. While these other personality inventories have merits for assessing personalities, I chose the *Big Five Traits* for three reasons: construct validity, reliability, and the investment by political psychology scholarship in developing theories linking the *Big Five Traits* to political beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. Regarding construct validity, five-factor solutions have been reported across multiple languages, including Croatian (Mlacic & Ostendorf, 2005), Dutch (De Raad, Hendriks, & Hofstee, 1992), English (Goldberg, 1990), Polish (Szarota, 1996), and Turkish (Goldberg, & Somer, 2000). This dissertation also found

Table 2.1: Big Five Personality Traits' attributes

	Extraversion	Agreeableness	Conscientiousness	Neuroticism (or Emotional Instability)	Openness to New Experiences
Definition	Implies an energetic approach toward the social and material world	Contrasts a prosocial and communal orientation toward others with antagonism	Describes socially prescribed impulse control that facilitates task- and goal-directed behavior	Contrasts emotional stability and even-temperedness with negative emotionality	Describes the breadth, depth, originality, and complexity of an individual's mental and experiential life
Facets	Gregariousness; Assertiveness/Leadership; Social Confidence (vs. Anxiety)	Modesty (vs. Narcissism); Trust (vs. Suspicion); Empathy/Sympathy; Altruism	Orderliness; Industriousness; Self-Discipline	Irritability; Depression; Rumination-Compulsiveness	Intellectualism; Idealism; Adventurousness
High on Trait	High social status in groups and leadership positions; selection as jury foreperson; positive emotion expression; large number of friends and sex partners	Better performance in work groups	Higher academic grade-point averages; better job performance; adherence to their treatment regimens; longer lifespan	Poorer coping and reactions to illness; experience of burnout and job changes	More years of education completed; better performance on creativity tests; success in artistic jobs; create distinctive looking work and home environments
Low on Trait	Poorer relationships with parents; rejection by peers	Risk for cardiovascular diseases, juvenile delinquency, interpersonal problems	Smoking, substance abuse, and poor diet and exercise habits; attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)	Feeling committed to work organizations; greater relationship satisfaction	Conservative attitudes and preferences of conservative political party

Note. Table summaries directly adapted from Ha, Kim, & Jo (2013, p. 514).

a five-factor solution in Turkish for its newly adapted 44-item Big Five Inventory (BFI) (see Chapter 4: Concept Measurements). Secondly, the Big Five Traits are relatively stable over time according to four definitions. One is rank-order stability, which measures differences in personality traits between age cohorts. From their meta-analysis of 152 longitudinal studies, Roberts and DelVecchio (2000) reported increasing rank-order stability coefficients in the Big Five Personality Traits from childhood to adulthood. The next definition is measurement and structural invariance over time, which measures changes in covariations among the Big Five Personality Traits using different factor analyses. These include item-level exploratory factor analyses for different age-groups (Soto, John, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Srivastava, John, Gosling, & Potter, 2003), confirmatory factor analyses (De Fruyt et al., 2006), and exploratory structural equation modeling (Marsh et al., 2010). The third definition is mean-level stability, which measures absolute changes in the Big Five Personality Traits over time. Unlike the first two definitions, mean-level stability research indicates particular changes across the life course. Here, there have been mixed results. From their metanalysis of 92 studies, Roberts, Walton, and Viechtbauer (2006) found Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and Openness to New Experiences increased over time whereas Agreeableness and Neuroticism decreased. However, Srivastava, John, Gosling, and Potter (2003) reported no increase in Openness to New Experiences and a decrease in Agreeableness during adulthood based on their cross-sectional online survey. The final definition of reliability, effect-stability, measures the stability of the Big Five Personality Traits' effects on social and political attitudes and behaviors over time. For instance, Bloeser, Canache, Mitchell, Mondak, and Poore (2015) found stability in both the traits themselves and consistency in their effects on social and political attitudes across time using the British Household Panel Study Wave 13 (2003-2004), Wave 15 (2005-2006), and Wave 17 (2007-2008). My third, and most important reason for preferring this personality measure is that political psychology scholarship has long been interested in the Big Five Traits' links to diverse sets of political attitudes and behaviors. Thus, there is a theoretical richness regarding the causal mechanisms linking these traits and political issues like democratization (Freitag, & Ackermann, 2016), foreign policy attitudes (Bakker, & de Vreese, 2016), immigration (Canache, Hayes, Mondak, & Wals, 2013), legislative politics (Dietrich, Lasley, Mondak, Rempel, & Turner, 2012), partisanship (Webster, 2018), political culture (Mondak, & Canache, 2014), political elites (Caprara, & Zimbardo, 2004), political ideology (Fatke, 2017), political participation (Weinschenk, 2017), populism (Fatke, 2019), survey response patterns (Hibbing, Cawvey, Deol, Bloeser, & Mondak, 2017), and vote choice (Wang, 2016).

Specific facets from these dimensions can be linked to political beliefs. First, the socialization facet of Extraversion implies that the social interaction of political behavior can appeal to individuals who are gregarious, sociable, assertive, and socially confident towards crowds (Mondak, 2010). Thus, extroverts are more likely than introverts to be liberal by engaging with out-group members and developing tolerance towards diversity and change.

Second, the facets of orderliness, norm-compliance, and self-control within Conscientiousness align with the conservative call for stability, certainty, and inequality (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008: pp. 813-814). Therefore, because conscientious people tend to be hard-working, orderly, and risk-averse, they are less likely to accept liberal promotion of uncertainty, intolerance for diversity, and equality of opportunities.

Third, Openness to New Experiences implies a need for breadth, depth, originality, and complexity in an individual's mental and experiential life. Since such people have less need for cognitive closure, they are less likely to accept hierarchical power and decision-making structures in support of simplicity, order, and security (McCrae, 1996: pp. 326, 328).

Fourth, Agreeable individuals could theoretically prefer either conservatism or liberalism. Given their higher levels of trust, empathy, and sympathy, such altruistic individuals could favor equality and diversity, and hence liberalism (Bakker, 2017, p. 1027). However, their prosocial and communal orientation, and social norm compliance could equally foster espousal of traditional values, and hence conservatism (Cooper, Golden, & Socha, 2013: 69; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002).

Fifth, nervous, depressive, preoccupied, and obsessive individuals may eschew political participation to avoid the stress from political conflict (Gerber et al., 2011, p. 696). Similarly, neurotic individuals would be more liberal-oriented because conservative self-identification comes with constant distress for being intolerant against diversity, change, and equality and any likely threats of uncertainty and danger (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, & Ha, 2010, p. 116).

2.3 Implicit Psychological Characteristics and Political Beliefs

In addition to self-reported psychological characteristics, such as authoritarianism, issue opinions, moral judgments, personality traits, and values, there are also implicit psychological characteristics linked to political beliefs. The first is selective attention. In one

common protocols to measure attention bias, named the *Emotional Stroop Task*, participants are asked to name the ink color of the displayed words as fast and accurately as possible. At the same time, they are advised to ignore the words' meanings (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). The slower response rate to name the ink color of emotional words (or in our case, politically relevant words) as compared to neutral words, indicates the respondents' attentional bias for emotionally (or, politically) salient information (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). In another exemplary common protocol named the *Dot-Probe Task*, participants are presented series of slides with two pictorial stimuli on the left and right, and then, asked to indicate on which side a dot appears. Faster responses to locate the dot based on the dot's location in the previous screen indicates selective attention (Thigpen, Gruss, Garcia, Herring, & Keil, 2018). For instance, the threatening picture is on the right and the neutral picture is on the left side at phase t, then selectively attentive respondents located dot on the right more quickly than average. In the last exemplary common protocol, named the *Flanker Task*, respondents are presented with series of images within which the target picture is in the middle and the flanking images are on either side (Eriksen, & Eriksen, 1974). These flanking images either correspond to the direction of the target image, e.g. a fish (target image) swimming to the right and surrounding fish (flanking images) swimming right as well, or incongruent, e.g. a fish (target image) swimming to the right but surrounding fish (flanking images) swimming left. Respondents have to ignore the flanking images and identify the direction of the target image. The difference between the choice reaction times in incongruent and congruent slides is called the *Flanker effect* to reflect enhanced sensitivity to the target. In all three common protocols to measure selective attention, *Emotional Stroop Task*, *Dot-Probe Task*, and *Flanker Task*, conservatives tend to demonstrate stronger automatic selective attention than liberals to negative stimuli, such as negative words (hate, vomit, disaster, etc.), images (hurricane, shark, etc.), and angry faces, (Carraro, Castelli, & Macchiella, 2011; McLean et al., 2014).

The second implicit psychological characteristic is selective word usage. One of the tools for measuring the word usages is the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which catches the strength of associations between **concepts**, e.g. thin people, and **evaluations**, like good or bad, or **stereotypes** such as athletic (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). IAT has five stages (see Project Implicit, n.d.). In the first stage, the respondents are asked to

categorize concepts displayed on slides. To exemplify, if the category “Fat People” is on the left and there is a picture of a heavy person in the middle of the screen, the respondent is expected to click on the “Fat People” button. In the second stage, respondents are asked to sort words by evaluations. To illustrate, if the category “Good” is on the left and a picture of a pleasant word in the middle, the respondent is expected to click on the “Good” button. The third stage combines the first two stages in that respondents are directed to sort concepts and words by both categories and evaluations. For example, respondents see the category and evaluation “Fat People” and “Good” on the left and “Thin People” and “Bad” on the right, respectively. The fourth stage repeats the first and second stages except that the categories/evaluations “Fat People/Good” are located on the right while “Thin People/Bad” are located on the left. The last stage repeats the third stage, except that the combined categories and evaluations “Fat People” and “Good” are located on the right while “Thin People” and “Bad” are located on the left. The IAT score is calculated from the differences in response speed between the fifth and the third stages. For example, a person with an implicit preference for certain concepts, like thin people, tends to respond faster to categorizing “Thin People” and “Good” than “Fat People” and “Bad”. Political psychology researchers have found that the more participants exhibit an automatic preference for implicit conservatism-related concepts, e.g. pro-life, religion, less immigration, more security, the more politically conservative they are in their explicit self-identification (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008; Choma, & Hafer, 2009). Similarly, Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) observed that conservatives, on average, are cognitively rigid and more intolerant of ambiguities than liberals in sorting words into categories. For example, conservatives find it is easy to classify a well known word like *airplane* under the *vehicle* category but much harder to put the less typical word *camel* into the same category. More importantly, this finding indicates that conservatives are more likely to interpret the world in terms of strictly defined categories (Hibbing et al., 2014, p. 301).

The last archetypical implicit psychological characteristic is information processing. The computer game *BeanFest*, developed by Fazio et al. (2004), assesses how individuals form attitudes towards a new object based on their past engagements with objects of varying similarity to the new object. In the game, the respondents are given 100 points and then were asked to select beans, which vary by shape, from circular to oval to oblong, and by number,

from 1 to 10. The costs/benefits of ± 10 points per bean are not disclosed to the participants. Instead, they have to learn the rewards and punishments by playing the game. The design allows researchers to examine individual variations in two sub-components of information processing, *learning bias* and *weighting bias*. *Learning bias* concerns the extent of the asymmetry in memorizing positive or negative beans whereas *weighting bias* concerns the extent of overgeneralization in classifying new beans as more likely to be positive or negative, based on their similarities to previously selected beans (Fazio, Pietri, Rocklage, & Shook, 2015, pp. 108-110, 134). Shook and Fazio (2009, pp. 997-998) showed that conservatives tend to have stronger *learning* and *weighting biases*. That is, they are more likely than liberals to see the world as a “relatively harsh place”.¹²

2.4 Physiological Characteristics and Political Beliefs

Differences in political beliefs not only relate to psychology but also extend to physiology. One line of research examining the roles of genes and environmental influence on ideological attitude formation is twin studies. In a standard twin study design, variations in political beliefs are considered as the sum of two components: heredity, i.e. the genetic inheritance from the parents, and (shared and unshared) environment, i.e. non-genetic external experiences from the prenatal period through childhood to social and work settings (Martin et al., 1986, pp. 4365-4366). Twin studies generally recruit monozygotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ) twins. MZ twins share 100% of their genes whereas DZ twins share 50% of their genes on average and be same or different sex (Friesen, & Ksiazkiewicz, 2015, p. 802). If a trait like support for a conservative policy position is measured on a dichotomous scale (agree-disagree), the estimated¹³ contributions to the variance of inherited and environment components are calculated as follows (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005, p. 158):

¹² To reiterate my points in Chapter 1: Introduction, Fiagbenu et al. (2020) recently reframed the BeanFest game as StockFast, a stock market game, and found the same pronounced learning asymmetry in liberals as Fazio et al. (2004, 2009) reported for conservatives from their BeanFest game. Thus, depending on the game’s context, as a food environment or financial environment, both conservatives and liberals may display threat sensitivities and/or negativity biases.

¹³ According to Alford et al. (2005, p. 158), correlations should be computed for same-sex DZ twins to produce variation scores comparable to same-sex MZ twins. Otherwise, sex differences between the twins may confound the relationship between genes and the outcome variables.

$$(a) \text{ Heredity} = 2 * (\text{correlation for MZ twins} - \text{correlation for DZ twins})^{14}$$

$$(b) \text{ Shared Environment} = 2 * (\text{correlation for DZ twins}) - \text{correlation for MZ twins}^{15}$$

$$(c) \text{ Unshared Environment} = 1 - \text{correlation for MZ twins}$$

Using a twins sample from Virginia 30,000 dataset (VA 30K), Alford et al. (2005, pp. 158-159) tested scores on the Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory Items on school prayer, property tax, moral majority, capitalism, astrology, the draft, pacifism, unions, Republicans, socialism, foreign aid, x-rated movies, immigration, women's liberation, the death penalty, censorship, living together, military drill, gay rights, segregation, busing, nuclear power, Democrats, abortion, modern art, federal housing, and liberals. They found that heredity explained 32% of the variance in mean scores, shared environment explained 16%, and unshared environment explained 53%. Thus, while unique life experiences in unshared environments explained nearly half of the variation in conservative attitudes, heritability was roughly twice as influential as shared environment, such as parental socialization, in determining differences in conservative policy positions. Similarly, Ksiazkiewicz, Ludeke, and Krueger (2016) reported that the genetic correlation accounted for 99.9% of the variation between the need for cognition – a better predictor of political ideology than need for closure and Openness to New Experiences – and scores on the Wilson-Patterson ideology scale.

Hatemi, Gillespie et al. (2011) and Hatemi, Medland et al. (2014) advanced this line of research by trying to locate the specific genes related to heritability of political beliefs. Two of the most plausible are the gene for the N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptor associated with memory and (social and spatial) learning, and the gene for serotonin receptors related to regulating mood, blood clotting, bone density, digestion, and sexuality (Hatemi, Gillespie et al., 2011, pp. 277-279). Settle, Dawes, Christakis, and Fowler (2010, pp. 1191, 1196-1198) investigated gene-environment interactions for the 7R allele of the D4 dopamine receptor gene *DRD4*, related to brain reward and reinforcement mechanisms and novelty-seeking behavior. They found that this allele became more negatively associated with conservatism as one's number of friends increased.

¹⁴ Heredity can range from 0 (no heritability) to 1 (pure heritability) because of $2 * (1.0 - 0.5)$.

¹⁵ Shared environment can be 0 (pure heritability due to $2 * 0.5 - 1.0$), above 0 (shared environment impact, if correlation for DZ twins > Correlation for MZ twins, i.e. $2 * 0.5 - 0.4$) or below 0 (shared environment impact, if correlation for DZ twins < correlation for MZ twins, i.e. $2 * 0.1 - 0.4$).

The second area of research exploring physiological differences related to political beliefs is hormonal analysis. While no studies have found a direct link between hormones and conservative or liberal self-identification, there are several potential associations with policy positions. One of the promising hormones is the neuroactive hormone *oxytocin* (OT), associated with prosocial behaviors of trust, empathy, and reciprocity (Domes, Heinrichs, Michel, Berger, & Herpertz, 2007; Morhenn, Park, Piper, & Zak, 2008).¹⁶ Merolla, Burnett, Pyle, Ahmadi, and Zak (2013) demonstrated that experimentally increasing OT levels leads to higher interpersonal trust, and trust in government and political figures on the left and right, especially among liberal participants with lower OT baseline levels. On the other hand, De Dreu, Greer, Van Kleef, Shalvi, and Handgraaf (2011) reported that a similar OT increase strengthened ethnocentrism due to in-group favoritism and out-group derogation in IATs.

The third area of physiological research is brain imaging studies. Kanai, Feilden, Firth, and Rees (2011) used structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans to show that self-identified liberals tend to have larger gray matter volume in the *anterior cingulate cortex* (ACC) whereas self-identified conservatives tend to have larger right amygdalas.¹⁷ Amodio et al. (2014) collected functional MRI data as respondents did the Go/No-Go Task to show alignment between ACC and political ideology. In a typical Go/No-Go Task, respondents are instructed to press a button within two seconds after seeing “Go” on the screen but not to press any button after seeing “No Go”. By facing more trials with “Go” than “No Go”, participants develop a habitual response favoring the former whereas the latter becomes a negative stimulus conflicting the habituated behavior. Amodio et al. (2007) showed conclusively that higher levels of self-identified liberalism are associated with stronger conflict-related (or error-detecting) ACC activity whereas higher levels of self-identified conservatism are associated with lesser accuracy on Go/No-Go trials. This physiological

¹⁶ In addition to OT, serotonin, cortisol, and testosterone may also be linked with the differences in political beliefs. Madsen (1985), for example, argued that whole-blood serotonin levels regulating mood and social behavior are associated with power-seeking behavior patterns like aggressiveness, competitiveness, self-confidence, and distrust of others. Other experimental research has shown that elections are a type of dominance hierarchy. Partisans whose preferred presidential candidate lost an election display decreased testosterone levels – the sex hormone regulating sexual and male reproductive development, and increased cortisol levels – the stress hormone related to the fight-or-flight response (Stanton, Beehner, Saini, Kuhn, & LaBar, 2009; Stanton, LaBar, Saini, Kuhn, & Beehner, 2010).

¹⁷ The ACC is related to decision making, e.g. error detection and outcome monitoring, socially driven interactions, and empathy (Lavin et al., 2013, p. 1). The amygdala is related to disgust recognition, emotion regulation, information integration, attention, and memory retrieval (Ahn et al., 2014, p. 2696). The right amygdala specifically is involved in “initial and rapid detection of stimuli, processing data over a shorter duration of time, compared to the left amygdala that may more elaborately evaluate stimuli with a longer latency response” (Bonnet et al., 2015, p. 7).

finding supports the previously discussed psychological findings on personality, cognitive style, and word usage in that conservatives tend to be more conscientious, favor cognitive closure, and explain the world within strictly defined categories (Hibbing et al., 2014, p. 302).

2.5 Threats and Political Beliefs

According to the dominant perspectives within political psychology scholarship, particularly MSC and NB, political conservatives tend to be more sensitive to threats than political liberals. Why? MSC theory assumes that individuals have preconscious biases or predispositions motivating them to think and behave in specific ways in the political area:

normal human psychological biases, such as the tendency to exaggerate differences between social categories, the tendency to favor ingroups over outgroups, the motivation to reduce uncertainty, the tendency to be especially responsive to threats rather than to potential gains, all contribute to people's predilections to define social group boundaries, to stereotype outgroup members, and to discriminate against the generalized "other" (Sidanius, & Pratto, 1999, p. 301)

From this perspective, conservatism is a social cognition related to the "psychological management of uncertainty and fear" (Jost et al., 2003a, p. 369). Conservatives are more susceptible to fulfilling the three social cognitive needs in the face of threats, ambiguity/uncertainty, complexity, and change: (i) the *epistemic needs* for certainty, order, and structure; (ii) the *existential needs* for safety, security, [minimization of] danger, and threat; and (iii) the *relational needs* of [affiliation with] others and a sense of belongingness and shared reality (Jost et al., 2008; Jost, 2017). Here, conservatism had two attitudinal components: rejection of change and acceptance of inequality (Sibley et al., 2012, p. 664). For Robbins and Shields (2014, pp. 326-327), rejection of change, as measured by RWA, stems from the motivation to maintain the existing social order, hierarchical authorities, and institutions; acceptance of inequality, as measured by SDO, stems from the motivation to maximize self-interest.

Similarly, according to NB research, humans have genetically coded behaviors against threats, e.g. fight-or-flight responses. The negativity bias – the prime salience of negative events – causes humans to recognize and respond to negative faces, words and social-political-economic information to ensure their survival (Norris, Gollan, Berntson,

Cacioppo, 2010; Rozin & Rayzman, 2011; Hibbing, et al., 2014). Faced with a sudden or physical threat, extensor and flexor muscles become more rapid to lower the likelihood of damage to vital organs by movements such as rapid blinking and retraction of the head (Bradley, & Lang, 2007, pp. 592-593). When a threat is less immediate, the response is threefold. First, the brain's sensory cortex sends signals to the thalamus, which processes sensory information, and then to the brainstem, which regulates several involuntary actions like the heartbeat and breathing. Second, the locus coeruleus in the brainstem, which manages physiological responses of arousal, vigilance, and attention to external stimuli, produces the hormone norepinephrine to mobilize the brain and body to respond. Third, the resultant increase in norepinephrine activates the automatic nervous system's sympathetic division, which activates the fight-or-flight response (Oxley et al., 2008, p. 1667; Elman, & Borsook, 2018, pp. 2-3, 7).¹⁸

Given these causal mechanisms from threats to physical reactions, the NB perspective assumes that appropriate responses to threats have evolved to ensure survival. However, there are wide differences in threat sensitivities between self-identifying conservatives and liberals. Negativity bias predisposes individuals to lean towards conservatism, prioritizing the possibilities of negative events, whereas liberalism prioritizes change and egalitarianism (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). Both physiological and neurological findings support the NB assumption that conservatives are more responsive to negative stimuli and events than liberals. For instance, Oxley et al. (2008) found that participants who strongly support conservative policy positions tend to have higher skin conductance responses to threatening images (e.g. a giant spider on a human face, a bloody human face, and an open wound with maggots) than respondents with weaker support for conservative issue areas. Oxley et al. (2008) also observed that participants who strongly support conservative policy positions tend to blink faster after a startlingly loud noise than respondents with weak support for conservative issue areas. Finally, Pedersen, Muftuler, and Larson (2018) showed that, when

¹⁸ Sweating, which is controlled by the activated sympathetic nervous system, is one indicator of psycho-physiological arousal against threats. One of protocols measuring this sympathetic automatic activity of sweating is the skin conductance response, the level of electrical conductivity and electrical resistance of skin on the palms of the hands and fingertips. Regarding the human universality of NB, Soroka, Fournier, and Nir (2019) conducted a cross-national psychophysiological experiment in 17 countries: Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, France, Ghana, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, Senegal, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They found that respondents seeing news stories with negative tones exhibited higher skin conductance and heart-rate variability than participants seeing news stories with neutral and positive tones.

threatened with an unpredictable electric shock, compared to economically liberal participants, economically conservative individuals displayed higher neural activity (or connectivity) between the amygdala and the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis. These regions are critical for initiating a response to a threat (see also Davis, Walker, Miles, & Grillon, 2010).

Within the NB perspective, threats are generally operationalized based on the assumption that they are “negatively valenced and arousing stimuli and events”, which can be perceptual or objective (Crawford, 2017, p. 256, f.n. 2). Thus, at the micro (or individual level), threats are broadly defined, ranging from external threats of war and terrorism (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003) to disgusting images and loud noises (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Oxley et al., 2008) to belief-inconsistent information (Nam, Jost, & Van Bavel, 2013). Threat situations are similarly broadly defined at the macro-level, such as higher rates of homicide, unemployment, and economic downturn (Sales, 1972; Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991; Sibley, Osborne, & Duckitt, 2012). For Crawford (2017, pp. 356-361), these can all be categorized in two groups: (i) anxiety-arousing *meaning threats*; i.e. threats to one’s identity, values, beliefs, and sense of certainty and control; and (ii) fear-arousing *physical threats*, i.e. physical harm and danger.

The threats-political ideologies literature has researched the extent of differences and similarities in conservatives’ and liberals’ responses to these different types of threats.¹⁹ Earlier political psychology research found no significant differences in conservatives’ and liberals’ responses to meaning threats. Against threats of information inconsistent with one’s prior beliefs and values, conservatives and liberals both avoid belief-inconsistent information by favoring belief-consistent information (selective exposure), absorb belief-inconsistent information partially (biased assimilation) or display prejudice against outgroups (sexual minorities for conservatives; devout individuals, bankers, and stock traders for liberals) (Taber & Lodge, 2006; Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015; Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013).

¹⁹ Throughout this study, I do not mean that only negativity bias and/or motivated social cognition explains affinities for conservatism and liberalism. Several alternative explanations also exist, such as spatial issue distance and political socialization based on one’s parental socialization, social class, gender, race, region, and religion (Berelson, Gaudet, & Lazarsfeld, 1968; Downs, 1957; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; and Budge, Crewe, & Farlie, 1976). These theoretical alternatives can be treated as orthodox control variables like age, sex, education, and left-right ideological placement for multivariate testing of the threats’ relative explanatory power on conservatism (see Chapter 3: Methodology).

In contrast, research into physical threats and ideology has almost always demonstrated threats-conservatism alignment. Physical threats arouse fear, and there was an a priori positive association between the extent of gray matter in the right amygdala of the human brain linked to fearfulness and conservatism (van der Plas, Boes, Wemmie, Tranel, & Nopoulos, 2010; Kanai, Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011). Other evidence also indicates that conservatives have a stronger tendency than liberals to protect their bodies from diseases and contaminants, show disgust and threat sensitivity against disgusting and threatening images and noises, and manifest negativity bias by first recognizing negative faces (Oxley et al., 2008; Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012; Dodd et al., 2012; Crawford, Inbar, & Maloney, 2014).

TMT has positioned itself between the two research lines using either meaning or physical threats. According to TMT scholars, one of the ultimate sources of fear and uncertainty is death, which each individual needs to make sense of in terms of earthly life and the afterlife (Lavine et al., 2005, pp. 227-228). Thus, the reminder of death is both a meaning and physical threat. Worldviews provide individuals with a sense of meaning in life (and for the afterlife), so individuals reminded of their mortality tend to become more conservative by manifesting feelings of threat and danger against out-groups with different belief systems (Chatard et al., 2010).

However, as well as this *conservative shift* in response to death reminders – increased in-group favoritism and support for strict law enforcement against miscreants, several studies have supported the *world-view defense* – that individuals faced with threats strengthen their prior political beliefs, whether conservative or liberal (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989; Greenberg et al., 1990; Castano et al., 2011). Besides, despite the increasing influence and advancement of TMT theory in the political psychology of conservatism scholarship, there are problems regarding its replicability and generalizability.

Firstly, Klein et al.'s (2019) pre-print failed to replicate the TMT despite the use or no use of the original experimental design of Greenberg et al. (1994) in 21 different labs in the U.S. Chatard et al. (2020), on the other hand, questioned this replication failure of TMT due to sample and effect sizes' inclusion into the analyses, which were previously not justified by Klein et al.'s (2019) pre-print. Thus, the two of the contested issues are on whether the mortality salience was a Type I error – a false-positive finding and whether the

TMT's boundary conditions need to be updated to account for the changing context in domestic and world politics.

Next, there were fair critiques of overgeneralization that *conservative shift* findings did not reflect increases in conservative belief, but rather the *rally 'round the flag effects*, or the increasing support for the cultural-national identities and the incumbents against threats of war and terrorism (Crawford, 2017; Baker & Oneal, 2001; Lambert et al., 2010). Thus, we need more ideological self-identification questions to differentiate *conservative shifts* from *rally 'round the flag effects* under mortality salience. Most importantly, if the TMT's typical outcome variables measured *rally 'round the flag effects* but not the ideological self-placements, then, this overgeneralization critique is potentially related to the previous replicability problem. Because Klein et al. (2019) and Chatard et al. (2020) discussion revolved around the TMT's original outcome variable, which measured the participants' preference for the pro-U.S. essay author over the anti-U.S. essay author compared to the control condition with no reminder of death (see Greenberg et al., 1994).

2.6 Psychological Characteristics, Threats and Political Conservatism and Liberalism in Turkey

2.6.1 Definitions of Conservatism and Liberalism in Turkey

Definitions of Conservatism in Turkey

According to Kalaycioglu (2007, pp. 234-235), conservatism in Turkish politics (*muhafazakarlik* in Turkish) is, by default, associated with *Müslüman* (Muslim):

[Conservatism] has stressed adherence to religious values, and social customs and traditions, as opposed to reasoning and rational inference in reforming the established institutions and practices of socio-political life. In a rapidly changing environment conservatism functioned in converting and adapting old concepts and practices into the new social milieu Turkey has come to experience.

This “social conservatism of an Islamic variety” (Yilmaz, 2008, p. 58) is anchored in an idealized family structure in which the ideal hard-working and obedient woman guard the home's honor as endorsed by religious interpretation. Yet, there has also been a historical and theoretical discussion about the origin of conservative ideology and its merging with

religion in Turkey. Some studies (Bora, 1998; Mollaer, 2008; Cigdem, 2003) have defined conservative ideology as a reaction to Turkey's republican revolutions between the 1920s and 1930s. They searched for the French Revolution's (1789) equivalent in Turkey by looking at Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's (1881-1938) reform period, which implemented a secular, republican, centralized, and bureaucratized nation-state. Hence, for these researchers, Turkey's Republican Revolution was against the economic, political, and social classes of the old order – the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan (Padisah) [Mehmed VI] (1861-1926) and his palace in Istanbul resembled the last French king, Louis XVI (1754-1793) in Versailles and the French aristocracy while *seyhulislam* (the head of the religious class *ulema*), the caliphate, and the *ulema* resembled the French Catholic or Gallican church and its clerics, and the Ottoman Empire era resembled France's *ancien regime* (Meshur, 2010, 11-13).

The categories defined by Turkish conservatism to understand the environment reflected both psychological and political defenses in favor of “the old against the new, the past against the future, the East against the West, traditions against the encroachments of modernism” (Kalaycioglu, 2007, pp. 235-236). Thus, rather than the early Republican period, Turkish conservatism originated in reactions to the rationalization, bureaucratization, and the resultant modernization, secularization, and political changes of the Tanzimat (Reorganization) Period of the Ottoman Empire between 1839 and 1876. The Tanzimat or the Ottoman Reforms consisted of two decrees: the Edict of Gulhane in 1839 and the Hatt-ı Humayun of 1856 (Islahat or Improvement). Fiscally, decentralized taxation based on tax farming was replaced by centralized taxation with salaried state officers. Militarily, universal conscription replaced the slavery-based *devshirme* system. Most importantly, legal reforms established the rule of law for all subjects irrespective of their religious denomination. These changes eliminated administration of the Ottoman Empire subjects according to religious divisions. In particular, these improvements ended the *millet* (the nation) system – the regulation of non-Muslim (Christian and Jewish) communities' social life by their religious laws and appointment of their legal courts' heads by the Muslim state. Thus, in the military, bureaucracy, and education system, secular policy improvements eradicated the centuries-long influence of Muslims and Islamic scholars over all societal, civil, and military positions.

The first group of Ottoman Turkish intellectuals to circulate the ideology of conservatism was the Young Ottomans, including Ziya Pasha (1825-1880). The Young Ottomans were not content with the Tanzimat reforms; rather, their conservative ideology aimed at transforming the Ottoman Empire by selectively integrating European political institutions onto the Islamic base. Based on their thinking of loyalty to the state, the Young Ottomans were skeptical of full-scale European political modernization because European theories, such as John Locke's (1632-1704) *Two Treatises of Government* (1660 [1689]), endorsed individualism and the people's right to revolt, which could not be placed within any major Islamic theory (Gencer, 2014, p. 10). Therefore, "the Ottoman and later Turkish cultures developed a cultural and political movement that combined economic liberalism, socio-cultural conservatism, and religion (i.e. Islam with a strong tendency toward Sunni Islam)" (Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu, 2009, p. 25). In these cultures, conservatism systematically aimed at preserving religion, social customs, tradition, and culture against the rationalization, bureaucratization, and modernization of their inherited (and also imagined) customs and morals. In essence, conservatism in Turkey was also social cognition,²⁰ which psychologically managed the fear and uncertainty regarding religion, social customs, tradition, and culture:

It seems as if Turkish conservatism receives its inspiration from the Ottoman-Islamic past of Turkey, which often appears as a cultural and aesthetic nostalgia for a golden age of traditional, Islamic, Ottoman, and Turkic customs, as well as even the eroding local traditions. Under these circumstances, conservatism becomes no more than a systematic effort in preserving the traditions, culture, religion and all those institutions that emanated from such sources" (Kalaycioglu, 2007, p. 236).

This Ottoman-Islamic conservatism was one significant variant of conservatism in Turkey; another was republican/Kemalist (and nationalist) conservatism. In the late 1920s and 1930s, republican conservatism entailed ideological adherence to the six arrows of the Turkish Revolution – secularism, nationalism, populism/peopleism, reformism, republicanism, and statism. It held that the nation-state and the nation were above individuals.

²⁰ Saribay and Yilmaz (2018, pp. 208-209) conducted associational research with college students to show that conservatism is a motivated social cognition in Turkey due to positive associations between resistance to change and equality, rightist self-identification, religiosity, and social and economic conservatism. However, they found no relationship between resistance to change and economic conservatism.

Rather than trying to preserve the Ottoman-Islamic remnants, it aimed, under a secular state and nationalized religion, to consolidate the “modern secular moral order on some commonalities such as religion, custom, tradition, and language” (Irem, 2002, p. 99). It strived to find the right balance between tradition and modernity while integrating Western civilization with Turkish culture. However, this was not the elitist culture of the Ottoman palace in Istanbul but Anatolian culture, according to the ideologue of nationalist conservatism, Ziya Gokalp²¹ (1876-1924). He was a well-known Turkish sociologist and prominent political figure in developing the early republican education reforms and the 1924 constitution (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey or the first constitution after the interim 1921 constitution) (Berkes, 1998, p. 409; Yilmaz, 2007, p. 141).

Yet republican conservatism was not a complete break from Ottoman-Turkish state culture and was also authoritarian in its top-down management of state-society-individual relations (Tezel, 2006, p. 25; Koker, 2006, p. 28). Thus, as long as we do not essentialize conservatism in Turkey into just its religious dimension, we can demonstrate that the republican regime remained conservative in its gradual, controlled, nationalist, and traditionalist modernization project (Bora, 1997, pp. 16-17) against threats of reactionism (*irtica/gericilik*) by its Islamist opponents and secessionism (*ayrilikcilik*) by its liberal and leftist rivals espousing freedoms and decentralization. As the genealogical narrative research of Yilmaz (2006) shows, there were two psychological factors behind this nationalist conservatism, which was suspicious of uncontrolled change and broadly defined (ethnic and ideational) equality, in the republican/Kemalist memory. The first was the *Tanzimat Syndrome*: the belief that Western European countries’ demands during the Tanzimat Period (1839-1876) for more human rights in the Ottoman Empire were ill-willed while providing rights and freedoms weakened people’s loyalty to the state. The second was the *Sevres Syndrome*: the belief that Western states could never be trusted, given their behavior as European-Christians or crusaders after the Mondros Armistice of 1918 and while negotiating the Sevres Treaty of 1920. Instead, Turkey’s nationalist conservatives tried to Westernize or modernize without the West, using methods contrary to Western liberalism.

²¹ Besides Gokalp, some of the other key intellectual figures behind this republican, nationalist conservative ideological formation were a prominent academician, Ismail Hakki Baltacıoglu (1886-1978) – the founder of the traditionalist (*ananeci*) movement, and Peyami Safa (1899-1961) – the conservative columnist, journalist, and novelist, who expressed the traditionalist-conservative imagination of westernization crises in daily life, as in his well-known novel *Fatih Harbiye* (1931) (Irem, 1997, 1999; Durukan, 2012).

Besides Ottoman-Islamic and republican conservatism of the early 1900s, a new rightist and leftist conservatism since the 1980s are the other two major variants of conservatism in Turkey. Firstly, the year 1980 is another critical juncture for the Turkish right's conservative mindset resisting the change and uncertainty, but, of globalization's rapid social and economic transactions and mobilization. In 1980, 93% inflation rate and highest level of deficits in the payments' balance acted as the motor behind the change in industrialization policy from import substitution to outward-oriented export policy (Lohrmann, 2000, p. 80). With the resultant liberalization in the trade regime and export incentives via tax rebates and exemptions and export credits, Turkey's total export increased by 431.03% from 1980 to 1993, and in the market, manufactured products, e.g., goods, chemicals, and machinery, overtook agricultural products, such as commodities, intermediate inputs, and raw materials, by 61% from 1979 to 1989 (Lohrmann, 2000, pp. 81-82). At the macro-economic level, Turkish policy makers pursued International Monetary Fund's and World Bank's orthodox structural adjustment programs by contracting real wages, real devaluations and lower investments, and excess export subsidies (Onaran, & Stockhammer, 2005, p. 73-74).

Within this period, notwithstanding Turkish export strategy's reliance on labor-intensive and medium-technology sectors and the consequent failed competitiveness in the international market (Arslanhan, & Kurtal, 2010, p. 3), Schumpeter's (1942) "the process of creative destruction" occurred both economically and socially. Economically, technical advancements took place in the market, not innovative but imitative firms outdistanced established firms, and new consumption products replaced the old ones. Socially, the workers' union weakened due to combined effects of the 1980 coup and the structural adjustment programs. Thus, the voters' mental cleavage shifted from the clash between workers and owners of production to identity cleavages between the Sunni Islam and secularism, and between Turks and Kurds (Carkoglu, & Kalaycioglu, 2009, pp. 3-4). At the macro-level, macro-economic mismanagement (Rodrik, 1999, 385-387, 391-392) still occurred due to (i) "latent social conflict" due to widening income inequality, contested ethnic, linguistic, and religious fragmentation, and declining inter-personal trust; and (ii) weak "institutions of conflict management" of 10% electoral threshold in local and general elections and disproportional election outcomes, diminished rule of law, civil and political

rights, and clientelistic public spending. In consequence, post-1980 structural adjustments put forward the sense of short-term focused selfishness among the individuals and corruption within the state, in regard to public procurement contracts and spending. Consequently, in the 1990s, centripetal electorate moved further to the political right to create “a new economic policy ... [based on the] moral and just order of the past in place of the decadent practices of globalization” started to gain momentum under a conservative mental map (Carkoglu, & Kalaycioglu, 2009, p. 24).

In response to rising conservatism of the right since the 1980s and the conservative Justice and Development Party's (AKP) single party government cabinets since 2002, a new leftist conservative mental map incorporating ultra-secularism and ultra-nationalism called *Ulusalçılık* also gained pace among the main opposition party Republican People's Party (CHP) voters since the 2007 general elections (Ciddi, 2008). This leftist conservatism is a reactionary ideology that aims at protecting the Republican regime and legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk against threefold threat perceptions from Kurdish problem, political Islam and disintegration of the nation-state owing to globalization (Uysal, 2013). As a conservative ideology, ultra-secularism and ultra-nationalism, or *Ulusalçılık*, is a combination of xenophobic, secular and authoritarian mental construction; as a frame of mind, it becomes nearly the moral code of the middle class; and as a political project, it envisages a civilian-military restoration in government (Gurpinar, 2011, p. 75). Similar to its counter-part on the right, this leftist conservatism is a “left melancholy” in which the leftist parties’ “failure to devise new policies to adapt to changing domestic and international conditions” [of the post 1980s] make the left adhere to the past symbolism such that the left becomes “the conservative engine of the [Republican] history” (Alpman, 2013, p. 34; Ates, & Konuralp, 2013, p. 14).

Definitions of Liberalism in Turkey

Similar to conservatism, liberalism's development in Turkey can be traced back to the 1800s. Between October 7 and November 15, 1808, an Ottoman-Turkish equivalent of the Magna Carta of 1215 was negotiated between Sultan Mahmut II (1785-1839) and his local landlords, called ayans. While this *Sened-i Ittifak* (Charter of Alliance) was a momentary text, it was one of the first constitutional references to the liberal principles of private property

(inheritability of the landlords' estates), the presumption of innocence (innocence of landlords until proven guilty), and the need to justify limiting natural rights to freedom from violence and excess taxation (protection of poor and Christian subjects from the ayans' excessive and indiscriminate taxation and violence) (see Aksin, 1997, p. 30; Gozler, 2000, pp. 3-12; Tanor, 1995, p. 38).

Then, the Tanzimat reforms between 1839 and 1876, specifically the formation of the Sublime Porte or the centralized Ottoman cabinet government under a constitutional monarchy, implemented a more liberal conception of state-individual relations. For the first time, argumentation emerged in Ottoman-Turkish thought in terms of the liberal social contract. For example, Sadik Rifat Pasha (1807-1857), a diplomatic colleague and ideological mentor of Mustafa Resit Pasha (1800-1858), who declared the Edict of Gulhane in 1839 (Kuran, 1994, pp. 137-139; Seyitdanlioglu, 1994, p. 28) that governments are for the people whereas the people do not exist for governments ("hukümetler halk için mevzu olup, yoksa halk hükümetler için mahluk degildir") (as quoted in Mardin, 1990, p. 259). Next, two key terms emerged in Ottoman-Turkish as equivalents of the French word *liberte*. These were *serbesti*, meaning economically free and unconstrained, such as freedom of trade (*serbest-i ticaret*), and *hurriyet*, meaning political freedom, such as freedom of thought (*hurriyet-i efkar*) (Insel, 2005, pp. 41-42).²²

However, unlike conservatism, liberalism in Turkey was not a well-established belief system due to its mixture with Islamism and nationalism (Ozavci, 2012, p. 141). For instance, Namik Kemal, a liberal Young Ottoman politician and journalist for the leading liberal newspaper *Tasvir-i Efkar*, wrote a series of articles called *Letters on Constitutional Regime* (*Usul-u Mesveret Hakkında Mektuplar*) (1911), in which he strived to reconcile liberalism and Islam. Namik Kemal was not only the first Ottoman-Turkish intellectual figure who tried to theorize liberal doctrines of natural rights, the sovereignty of the people, and constitutionalism; he was also the first Muslim to anchor liberalism within Islamic law,

²² Liberal terminology mainly entered the Ottoman-Turkish literati's usage with the writer Ibrahim Sinasi's (1826-1871) newspaper *Tasvir-i Efkar* (Representation of Opinions, 1862-1925). In *Tasvir-i Efkar*, Sinasi circulated the new mode of liberal thinking by several key words in his writings: *millet meclisi* (national assembly), *efkar-i umumiye* (public opinion), *efkar-i serbesti* (freedom of the opinion), *hukuk-i nas* (natural law), and *millet* (nation) (Berkes, 2003, p. 263).

specifically the *Seriat*²³ (Sharia).²⁴ For Kemal, Sharia determined how much individual rights can be limited to protect other individuals' rights:

the Seriat which is the expression of the abstract good and the ultimate criterion of the truth. ... Considering its greater power to impose universal obedience by material and spiritual means, the Islamic provision for politics is many times superior to the European method of legislation. ... Being the product of a thousand-years' historical development, the fiqh had reached the level of technical perfection; therefore, it was incomparably superior to those laws stolen hastily from the French codes. The provisions of the fiqh were better suited to the interests not only of the Muslims but even of the Christian subjects of the Empire than those of the French laws. The matter did not stop even here. Being the product of centuries, the provisions of fiqh had become the property of the whole Muslim ümmet and part and parcel of the mores, customs, and traditions of the people. Therefore, they were not mere legal norms. ... Is there any other religion in the world which has succeeded in associating justice with moral virtue (ihsan) and thereby transforming moral obligations into legal obligations? (as quoted in Berkes, 1998, pp. 212, 217)

The next question for the liberal Young Ottomans, who wanted to maintain the Ottoman Empire's unity on an Islamic basis, concerned the rights and status of Christians. Namik Kemal tried to unify liberal, Islamic, and national modes of thinking behind the idea of Ottomanism by developing a romanticized concept of the fatherland, *vatan*, the equivalent of *patrie* in French (Steunebrink, 2005, p. 158). However, although *vatan* originated from French, the Young Ottomans' liberal patriotic allegiance to the fatherland was rooted in the "romantic liberal nationalism" of the 19th century Risorgimento ("Rising Again") movement for Italian unification (Mardin, 2000, pp. 21-22, f.n. 22). For example, the archetypal unification of liberalism, nationalism, and religion (Christianity) was the political thought of Guiseppe Mazzini (1805-1872). He founded the secret revolutionary organization Young Italy and was an ardent supporter of Risorgimento. He claimed that national unity was God's

²³ Islamic law comprises the Quran, the prophetic traditions, Hadith, consensus (ijma) of the community (ümmet) and jurists' analogies (kiyas). This provided the predominant civil law in the Ottoman Empire over other legal systems, such as customary law (örf) and the sultan's law (kanun). See Somel (2003, pp. 138-139).

²⁴ Besides self-identifying liberals, self-identifying Islamists were grouped under the name of the Preservation of the Seriat (Muhafaza-i Seriat) or the Society of the Self-Sacrificers (Fedais). They also claimed to call for liberal constitutional government, representative of and responsible to the Islamic community (ümmet) (Berkes, 2003, pp. 271-272). This group of fundamentalists, particularly the members of the fundamentalist Naksibendi brotherhood, was involved in the Kuleli Incident of 1859, a coup and assassination attempt against Sultan Abdulmecid I (1823-1861). The plot was foiled and the plotters were captured at Kilic Ali Pasha mosque (Beyoglu, Istanbul) before being interrogated at Kuleli military barracks (Uskudar, Istanbul), giving the incident its name. Later, Namik Kemal and other liberal Young Ottoman intellectuals interpreted the Kuleli Incident as a movement for freedom and criticized the government for secretly undermining the liberal principles of the Tanzimat reforms (Tezcan, 2009, p. 480).

order and that fellow Christians were trying to create nations as divinely ordained entities and achieve goals like liberty and equality whereas opposing human-made empires, such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, were disobeying God's will (Coppa, 1970, pp. 240-241, 244).

Thus, Turkish liberalism was not a complete ideology but rather opposition to authoritarianism (Ozavci, 2012, p. 142). When Sultan Abdulhamid II (1842-1918) abolished the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire, *Kanun-u Esasi* (1876-1878), in 1878, the Young Ottomans of the Tanzimat period fled to Europe to topple the sultanate regime through opposition activities in European cities. Those fleeing Young Ottomans gained a new name, the Young Turks, (*Jeune Turks* in French), under the banner of a new organization, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (1889-1918). The self-identifying liberals, led by (Prince) Mehmed Sabahaddin (1878-1948), were one CUP faction, and later, a splinter group opposing the authoritarianism of Sultan Abdulhamid II. They espoused private initiative in a market economy, political decentralization, individualism, and hence freedom from the state. They sought intervention by liberal Western powers like Britain to remove the sultanate regime in Istanbul (Kadioglu, 2007, pp. 172-173). They also opposed the other CUP faction, the nationalist unionists led by Ahmet Riza (1858-1930), who started the second constitutional era with the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 in direct opposition to the liberals' call for British custody, a laissez-faire economy, and political decentralization.

2.6.2 Psychological Characteristics and Political Beliefs in Turkey

Regarding *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al., 1950), Kagitcibasi's (1970) study of high school subjects in the U.S. and Turkey showed that authoritarianism in Turkey, specifically respect for authority and patriotism, was a social norm rather than a personality attribute, due to higher average authoritarian attitude values with low variability, compared to the coherent and consistent authoritarian thinking style in the U.S. Later, based on another high school subject sample, Kagitcibasi (1973) proposed two main personality types in Turkey: the Type 1 or traditional profile, which was authoritarian, religious, anomic, pessimistic, and fatalistic and the Type 2 or modern profile, which was patriotic, optimistic, self-reliant, and achievement-motivated. Kagitcibasi (1978) then examined the stability of students' authoritarian attitudes following temporary stays in the U.S. for a year-long high school exchange program. Using a before-after, between-subjects design matched for age,

education, sex, and social-economic status, Kagitcibasi (1978) reported that the students' experience of the U.S. led to reduced authoritarianism and religiosity and increased world mindedness, self-reliance, and perceived family control in the house. This decrease in authoritarianism after brief exposure to a relatively liberal setting like the U.S. supported Kagitcibasi's (1970) earlier argument that authoritarianism in Turkey was not a stable personality attribute but rather a reflection of the existent authority accepting social norms.

Turning to post-Adorno research, Guldu (2011) adapted the RWA scale (Altemeyer, 2006, pp. 11-12) for Turkish use. Guldu (2011) found that self-identifying conservative and nationalist students had higher average RWA scores than students with social democratic and socialist tendencies for the need for strong leaders against radical new ways and sins damaging the fabric of society, trust in government and religious authorities, endorsement of traditional values, beliefs, and morals, and punishment of abortion, pornography, and premarital sex. Similarly, Hasta and Karacanta (2017) tested the ideological correlates of the SDO scale (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). They observed that group-based (social and economic) inequality, but not group-based dominance, predicted higher right-wing ideological self-placement levels among college students in Turkey.

Kalaycioglu (2007, pp. 242-246) conducted a nationally representative survey study to measure conservatism in terms of individuals' stances on non-political issues under seven dimensions: *authoritarianism*, *decadence*, *faith*, *family values in child-rearing*, *parochial morality*, *religiosity*, and *traditional family values*. The final composite values positively correlated with the four-item conservatism scale (Lane, 1955) on youth discipline, will power, strong leadership, and honor ($r = 0.37, p=0.001$), and also positively correlated with rightist ideological placement ($r = 0.34, p=0.001$). Likewise, Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu (2009: 28-35, 59-63, 85-89) noted a positive relationship between right-wing self-identification and latent constructivism dimensions. These included the following items: *authoritarianism*, *old-fashioned values* (youth-related, gender-related, and yearnings for the past), *dogmatism*, *political intolerance*, *religiosity* (religious faith, religious practice, religious attitudes, and self-evaluated religiosity), and *status quo orientation*.

In addition to authoritarianism, RWA, SDO, and issue opinions, three other theories of psychological characteristics have been used to differentiate political beliefs in Turkey: *Theory of Basic Human Values* (Schwartz, 1992; 2012), MFT (Haidt, & Joseph, 2004), and

NFC (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993). Arslanturk and Donmez (2019) found that self-identifying right-wing student respondents hold social values of conformity, tradition, and security more strongly than leftist participants, who value self-direction and universalism more. Moreover, Yilmaz, Saribay, Bahcekapili, and Harna (2016) showed that a right-wing orientation in college students is negatively associated with the individualizing moral system, particularly the fairness/reciprocity sub-foundation, and positively associated with the binding moral system, particularly the authority/respect and purity/sanctity sub-foundations. Also using a student sample, Yilmaz and Saribay (2016, Study 3A, p. 291) reported that NFC is positively associated with right-wing ideological self-placement, personal conservatism (resistance to social change and equality), social conservatism, but negatively associated with economic conservatism.

The final self-reported psychological approach to evaluate differences in political beliefs concerns personality traits. The first analysis based on *Big Five Personality Theory* in Turkey was conducted by Savran (1993), who tested the adjective control list's feasibility (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983). The theory was then applied to personnel recruitment in both the private and public sectors (Sinangil, Savran, Ones, & Balci, 1997; Sumer, Sumer, Ciftci, & Demirutku, 2000). It was also further adjusted for Turkish syntax (Somer, 1998; Somer & Goldberg, 1999; for more information, see Gulgoz, 2005). More recently, Yilmaz and Saribay (2016, Study 3A, p. 291) investigated the links in college students between the *Big Five Personality Traits* and personal, social, and economic conservatism. Their findings are summarized in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2: Summary of association of Big Five Personality Traits with various facets of conservatism (Yilmaz, & Saribay, 2016)

Big Five Personality Traits	Personal Conservatism	Economic Conservatism	Social Conservatism	Social Conservatism (Revised)
Extraversion	-**	+	None	-**
Agreeableness	-**	-	-	None
Conscientiousness	+	None	+	+
Neuroticism	+	-	None	None
Openness	-**	None	-	-**

Notes:

None = No statistically significant correlation

+ = Positive correlation

- = Negative correlation

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Social conservatism was the average of items questioning respondents' support for a country's territoriality, social and economic inequality in a society, morality and tradition, law and order, national culture, and identity (Yilmaz, & Saribay, 2016, p. 298). Revised social conservatism was the average of items questioning respondents' opposition to marijuana consumption, premarital sex, legalization of porn watching and gambling, abolition of capital punishment, gay marriage, euthanasia, reduced prison sentences, and non-married female and male individuals' living together in the same home (Yilmaz, & Saribay, 2016, p. 299). Economic conservatism was the average of items questioning the respondents' support for the state's non-interference in the economy and pro-supply-side incentive policies (Yilmaz, & Saribay, 2016, p. 299). Personal conservatism was the average of items questioning the respondents' opposition to change in their lives, socialization with different individuals, unpredictable friends, experience with new things in life, and absence of hierarchy in work-life (Yilmaz, & Saribay, 2016, p. 300).

Overall, Turkish political psychology scholarship has demonstrated the empirical richness of the links between political beliefs and self-reported psychological characteristics, such as authoritarianism, RWA, SDO, issue opinions, social values, moral judgments, cognitive styles, and personality traits. However, there is a significant lack of theorization efforts and empirical tests of implicit psychological attributes and psycho-physiological differences across political ideologies in Turkey. Concerning implicit psychological characteristics, we need analyses of selective attention processes measured by several protocols, specifically the *Emotional Stroop Task*, *Dot-Probe Task*,²⁵ and *Flanker Task*, selective word usages computed by IATs, and information processing, as tested by the *BeanFest* game. Regarding psycho-physiology, there have been no twin studies or research into genome-wide associations, hormonal analyses, and brain-imaging. The lack of research on implicit psychological characteristics and psycho-physiology also means that research is lacking into one of the dominant perspectives dealing with threats, the NB perspective.

Regarding TMT, there are more published articles and unpublished theses on non-political research topics than political ideology. Based on Dogulu's and Sakalli's (2015) review, TMT has been linked to *collective self-esteem* (Asliturk, 2001), *uncertainty* (Yavuz,

²⁵ There was one exceptional study by Peker, Booth, and Dikce (2017), who assessed threat sensitivity using the *Dot Probe Task* in Turkey. They found that conservative college students are more sensitive to threatening stimuli than less conservative college students.

2007), *aggression* (Aksut Cicek, 2008), *health-promoting behavior* (Bozo, Tunca, & Simsek, 2009), *attitudes towards the headscarf ban* (Camli, 2010), *loss anxiety* (Atabey, 2011), *romantic relationship commitment* (Dalda, 2011), *consumer behavior* (Ugurlar, 2011), *system-justifying gender attitudes* (Dogulu, 2012), *ostracism* (Yavuz Guzel, 2012), *attitudes toward diet pills* (Cihan, 2013), *stereotyping among football fans* (Kuzlak, 2014), and *speeding* (Alper, & Ozkan, 2015). In contrast, I only came across four studies of TMT using college students whose findings were all in line with the *conservative shift* hypothesis. Yavuz and van den Bos (2009) reported that, against mortality salience, respondents tended to favor a pro-Turkish civil law essay against an anti-Turkish civil law vignette depicted as written by an Iranian woman. Kokdemir and Yeniceri (2010, Study 2) found that Turkish respondents in the mortality salience condition tended to favor closer relations with Turkmenistan rather than with Armenia, China, France, Greece, India, Iraq, England, Iran, Russia, or the U.S.²⁶ Koca-Atabey and Oner-Ozkan (2011) reported that, after the mortality reminder, respondents with a defensive religious orientation under an omnipotent God who they believe protects, watches, and guides the self, became more conservative. Guler (2014) showed that mortality salience strengthened participants' negative peace attitudes, political trust in parliamentarians, terrorism risk perception, and social dominance orientation.

²⁶ According to Kokdemir and Yeniceri (2010, p. 171), support for closer foreign relations with Turkmenistan following an existential threat reflected the respondents' tendency to strengthen their cultural worldview, represented by the ethnic identity *Turk* (Turkish).

Chapter 3

METHODOLOGY

The objective of this chapter is to present my predictions regarding the alignment between threats and political ideologies and to detail the experimental design, estimation strategies, and descriptives of the collected data. In Section 3.1, I present my expectations regarding TMT's problems of replicability, generalizability, and contradictory findings. In Section 3.2, I present the survey experiment design and the estimation methods. In Section 3.3, I describe the collected data and a priori research limitations due to the survey response scaling.

3.1 Expectations

To address the replicability problem of TMT, I shifted the operationalization of threats from typical internal causes (a mere reminder of one's mortality) to external causes (a reminder of one's death caused by various factors). Citizens should be able to identify the reasons behind these external threats and be galvanized into action by increasing their affinity to political conservatism (or liberalism). In doing so, I developed three types of threats.

The first type is a placebo or fake threat like cancer, where there is a sense of threat to oneself due to natural, non-social causes, namely the uncontrolled growth of abnormal cells in the body. Although the threat to survival due to cancer may increase conservatism, there is no direct societal threat to explain a higher affinity for conservative ideology. Thus, the purpose of employing a placebo-like reminder of death due to cancer is to determine whether or not threats due to social causes have a real effect on political ideology.

The second type is an external sociotropic threat like a terror attack, where there is a generalized sense of threat to the society, country, or district, city, or region where one lives.

The third type is a vague threat due to unknown causes to oneself, society, country, or sense of personal control and certainty. This depends on the respondent's unmeasured risk attitude and perception of death. Because this is a threat from internal causes, it is a similar form to TMT's original mortality reminder.

For all three threats, I predict that conservatism, but not liberalism, increases due to different motives. First, even if the cancer death treatment is a placebo, compared to respondents in the control condition, participants reminded of death due to cancer are more likely to think of how to reduce the risk, and hence be more protective of their bodies by thinking about how to adjust their unhealthy habits like eating, cigarette and alcohol consumption, lack of sunscreen use, and unprotected sex. Thus, precautions at the micro-level will increase the tendency for conservative self-identification and attitudes (**Hypothesis 1**).

Second, I predict that individuals reminded of death due to a terror attack tend to display stronger conservative self-identification and attitudes by giving up some of their liberties and rights to the government to crack down on terrorism. This is because, faced with a terrorist attack by dangerous outsiders, individuals may try to protect their lives and lifestyles by conforming more to traditional norms, enhancing order and security, denying equality to rival groups perceived as the perpetrators or their collaborators, and supporting the executive's harsher actions against terrorism (e.g., Merolla & Zechmeister, 2013). Thus, social-political policy responses at the macro level will increase the tendency for conservative self-identification and attitudes (**Hypothesis 2**).

Third, I predict that a vague reminder of death due to unknown causes threatens an individual's sense of personal control and certainty regarding their life, priming a sense of the randomness of life events. This makes individuals more likely to search for greater certainty through a belief in an omnipotent deity, strong government, and a secure and stable family (e.g., Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008; Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009). Thus, compensation for lack of control over life at the micro-level will increase the tendency for conservative self-identification and attitudes (**Hypothesis 3**).

In addition to the first three hypotheses to test TMT's replicability and generalizability, four further hypotheses test whether the contradictory findings are conditional on *Big Five Personality Traits* (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Summary of Big Five Personality Traits hypotheses

Threats x Personality Trait <i>i</i>	Higher Levels in Personality Trait <i>i</i>	Lower Levels in Personality Trait <i>i</i>	Hypothesis #
Threats x Openness to New Experiences	-	+	Hypothesis 4: Worldview Defense [Openness to New Experiences]
Threats x Extraversion	-	+	Hypothesis 5: Worldview Defense [Extraversion]
Threats x Conscientiousness	+	+	Hypothesis 6: Conservative Shift
Threats x Neuroticism	-	-	Hypothesis 7: Liberal Shift
Threats x Agreeableness	-	NA	Hypothesis 8A: Partial Liberal Shift
Threats x Agreeableness	NA	+	Hypothesis 8B: Partial Conservative Shift

Note:

+ means that, compared to the control condition, there will be an increase in conservatism.

- means that, compared to the control condition, there will be a decrease in conservatism.

NA means that, compared to the control condition, there will be no significant change in conservatism.

The fourth hypothesis concerns the worldview defense: that liberals became more progressive or liberal whereas conservatives became more conservative when faced with threats or reminders of death (Burke, Kosloff, & Landau, 2013). These effects on conservatism and liberalism could conceivably be moderated by the Big Five traits of Openness to New Experiences and Extraversion, respectively. Open-minded personalities have greater cognitive breadth, depth, originality, and complexity, hence less need for cognitive closure (simplicity, certainty, and clarity) against uncertainties and threats (McCrae, 1996, pp. 326, 328; Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2013). Besides, both a priori theoretical predictions and empirical findings (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, & Dowling, 2012, p. 655) indicate that open-minded individuals tended to be political liberals whereas closed-minded individuals tend to be conservatives. Therefore, as depicted in Figure 3.1, compared to the control group, open-minded (assumed liberal) respondents will show less conservatism whereas closed-minded (assumed conservative) individuals will display stronger conservatism under any of the three threat conditions in this study (**Hypothesis 4: Worldview Defense [Openness to New Experiences]**).

Next, extravert personalities, who tend to be gregarious, sociable, assertive, and socially confident in crowds, tend to have larger social networks (Mondak, 2010). Previous

findings indicate that extroverts are more likely than introverts to be liberal by engaging with out-group members and developing tolerance towards diversity and change (De Neve, 2015). Therefore, as depicted in Figure 3.1, compared to the control group, extravert (assumed liberal) respondents will show weaker conservatism whereas introvert (assumed conservative) individuals will display stronger conservatism under any of the three threat conditions in this study (**Hypothesis 5: Worldview Defense [Extraversion]**).




Figure 3.1: Visualization of the moderation hypotheses on the worldview defense

The sixth hypothesis concerns the conservative shift: that both liberals and conservatives become more conservative when faced with threats (Bonanno & Jost, 2010). Conscientiousness may moderate the effects of threats on conservatism because its facets of orderliness, industriousness, and self-control align with conservatism's call for stability, certainty, and inequality. Furthermore, conservatives tend to be higher in trait Conscientiousness (Carney, Jost, Gosling & Potter, 2008). On the other hand, individuals lower in Conscientiousness tend to defy their societies' idealized work-life norms of orderliness, industriousness, and self-control. Hence, less conscientious personalities tend to

be liberals who question the social order (Ksiazkiewicz, 2020). Faced with threats, however, less conscientious individuals tend to decrease their noncompliance with the social order to ensure that there is at least a societal status quo to define the self. Therefore, as depicted in Figure 3.2, compared to the control group, both less conscientious (assumed liberal) and more conscientious (assumed conservative) respondents will show stronger conservatism under any of the three threat conditions of this study (**Hypothesis 6: Conservative Shift**).




Figure 3.2: Visualization of the moderation hypothesis on the conservative shift

The seventh hypothesis concerns the liberal shift: that both liberals and conservatives become more progressive or liberal in the face of threats (Crawford, 2017, p. 362; Eadeh & Chang, 2020). Neuroticism might moderate the effects of threats on conservatism and liberalism. Neurotic (or emotionally unstable) individuals tend to be (at least economically) liberal (Mondak & Halperin, 2008, p. 352; Verhulst, Hatemi, & Martin, 2010; De Neve, 2015). Due to the risk of stress from political conflicts, nervous, depressive, preoccupied, and obsessive individuals may avoid political participation, including conservative or liberal self-identification. However, this is outweighed by their need for security against threats to

survival in personal and public life. Consequently, neurotic individuals will be more likely to identify as liberal or progressive and call for social and political security via the provisionary benefits of a welfare state. Less neurotic personalities, on the other hand, will tend to minimize their fear and/or anxiety of threats to maintain their emotional stability. Consequently, they will prefer the less fear-ridden ideology of liberalism over conservatism. Accordingly, as depicted in Figure 3.3, compared to the control group, both less neurotic (assumed conservative) and highly neurotic (assumed liberal) respondents will show weaker conservatism under any of the three threat conditions in this study (**Hypothesis 7: Liberal Shift**).




Figure 3.3: Visualization of the moderation hypothesis on the liberal shift

The eighth hypothesis, the partial shift, is the least likely theoretically. It predicts that conservatives become progressive or liberal (a partial liberal shift) while liberals become conservative (a partial conservative shift). Previous research only supports the latter prediction (Nail, McGregor, Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson, 2009; Landau et al., 2004, Study 3). Agreeableness could moderate the effects of threats on conservatism and liberalism.

However, theoretical expectations go in opposite directions for Agreeable individuals' ideological affinity. Because of their higher levels of trust, empathy, and sympathy, altruistic Agreeable individuals may favor equality and diversity, hence liberalism (Bakker, 2017). However, their prosocial and communal orientation may also foster compliance with majority or traditional values and norms, hence conservatism (Cooper, Golden, & Socha, 2013, p. 69; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002). Nevertheless, as a baseline, I assume that conservatism is positively associated with Agreeableness (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008, pp. 821-822; Fatke, 2017, pp. 884-885). Therefore, as depicted in Figure 3.4, conservatism will be weaker among agreeable (assumed conservative) individuals against threats because they will prefer to avoid tough-minded and conflictual conservative precautions in their personal and public lives (**Hypothesis 8A: Partial Liberal Shift**). Conversely, conservatism will be stronger among disagreeable (assumed liberal) individuals against threats because they prefer to maintain personal and social-political order by maintaining harmony with commonly held norms and values (**Hypothesis 8B: Partial Conservative Shift**).




Figure 3.4: Visualization of the moderation hypotheses on partial shifts

Finally, one problem in threats-conservatism research, is that mediational causal identification, e.g., threats → decrease in Openness to New Experiences → higher conservatism, is both theoretically and empirically problematic. This is because personality traits like Openness to New Experiences are relatively stable in time (Caspi, & Moffitt, 1993; Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011; Bloeser, Canache, Mitchell, Mondak, & Poore, 2015).²⁷ Therefore, there will not be a mediation effect from reminders of death due to cancer, a terror attack, or unknown causes to the Big Five Traits to conservative/liberal identification and attitudes (**Hypothesis 9**).

3.2 Design and Methods

This study used an online random non-representative survey experiment conducted in Turkey between June 15 and 23, 2018, before the June 24, 2018 presidential and general elections, via Qualtrics survey platform. Participants were recruited by Facebook advertisements. While 6,489 participants visited the survey link, I only used 2,629 respondents for the analyses who were 18 or above and fully completed the survey (see Appendix B, C. Dropouts).²⁸ Although this sample was not representative of the Turkish population in 2018, it was much more heterogeneous than most university student samples typically used in political psychology research in terms of the respondents' demographics and geographic distribution (see Appendix B, A. Demographics, Figure 10.1 and Table 10.1). I employed an experimental design with three treatment groups and one control group to test the research

²⁷ Most disorders or aberrations in personality traits have physiological causes, such as changes in prefrontal cortex size affecting conscientiousness (DeYoung et al., 2009). There are only two known non-physiological causes of instability for personality traits. The first is when trauma (e.g., an earthquake) increases Neuroticism (Lockenhoff, Terracciano, Patriciu, Eaton, & Costa Jr., 2009; Milojev, Osborne, & Sibley, 2014). The second is significant life events like first-time job recruitment or retirement, which change Conscientiousness.

²⁸ Before the randomized online survey experiment, an a priori power analysis was conducted by G*Power (v3.1) with an effect size of 0.111111 (~ R-squared of 0.10), 1% probability of type I error, and 1% probability of type II error (or 99% statistical power) along with an intercept and 27 independent variables (age, sex, education, ideological left-right ideological placement), three treatment groups [base: control group], the *Big Five Personality Traits*, the two-way interaction terms between the treatment groups and the *Big Five Personality Traits*. The expected minimum sample size was 516 per experimental group.

hypotheses by multivariate interaction/moderation and mediation analyses (see Figure 3.5 for the survey flow and Appendix B, B. Survey Instruments).




Figure 3.5: Experimental design

Throughout the analyses, the dependent variable was conservatism, with three different operationalizations. The first was self-conservatism placement (between 0 [Least Conservative] and +10 [Most Conservative]). The second was multi-dimensional conservatism (between -10 [Most Liberal] and +10 [Most Conservative]) by subtracting self-liberalism scores from self-conservatism scores. The third was a conservatism scale variable, which was the average of the selected micro-conservatism, macro-conservatism, and gender-equality items.²⁹

The independent variables were the experimental treatments, no death reminder (control), and the reminders of death due to cancer, a terror attack, and unknown causes. Randomly assigned individuals either did not read any mortality reminder or read one of the following three sentences and were asked how strongly they agreed/disagreed: “I am afraid of losing my life because of cancer”; “I am scared of losing my life in a terrorist attack”; or “It makes me worried not knowing when I am going to lose my life”.

²⁹ Conservatism scale was the mean of the six out of nine items that gave the best fit in the confirmatory factor analysis solution (see Chapter 4: Concept Measurements, Table 4.13).

The interaction variables (moderators) and mediators were the personality traits taken from the Big Five Inventory (BFI) (44 items) (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008). BFI items were measured on a 0 (Completely False) - 10 (Completely True) scale.^{30,31} Control variables were respondents' sex (nominal, [Female, Male (Base)]), age (ratio), education (interval), and left-right ideological placement (interval) (see descriptive statistics in Table 3.2).

Since the outcome variables were interval, the model form for the ensuing analyses was the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. As depicted in Figure 3.5, I used the lower path for the mediation analyses (Random Assignment to Experimental Groups → Manipulation Checks → Personality Traits Questions → Conservatism Questions). The upper trail, in Figure 3.5, was for the sensitivity analyses that personality traits were relatively stable against at least one-shot experimental manipulations of death reminders (Random Assignment to Experimental Groups → Manipulation Checks → Conservatism Questions → Personality Traits Questions). I used both the lower and upper paths together for the interaction/moderation analyses.

³⁰ To the best of my knowledge, Karaman, Dogan, and Coban (2010) is the only study that tried to adapt the Big Five Inventory with 44 items (from John, Donahue and Kentle, 1991) into Turkish using back-translation. However, I noted several measurement problems in this translated inventory, such as double-barreled adjectives, over-complicated wording for ordinary people, and the use of adverbs like 'sometimes' in personality adjectives, which a priori carry one of the response options. Therefore, I decided to convert the inventory (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) into Turkish myself in three steps: back translation (with the help of the Koc University, Department of International Relations doctoral graduate students), dropping of double-barrels and relativity adverbs, and cognitive interviews with six ordinary Turkish citizens to test comprehensibility.

³¹ For the respondents in the Control group (No Death Reminder), the average Cronbach's alpha was 0.86 for the Extraversion items, 0.65 for the Agreeableness items, 0.8 for the Conscientiousness items, 0.75 for the Neuroticism items, and 0.78 for the Openness items. In the analyses, the *Big Five Personality Traits* were the means of the items with the best fit in the CFA solution (see Chapter 4: Concept Measurements, Table 4.7).

Figure 3.6 shows the multiple mediation path analysis model. Its formal modeling is as follows, where a_i , b_i , and c_i are coefficients of the respective independent variables and e_i is the error term of the respective dependent variable:

$$\text{Conservatism} = c_1 * \text{Treatment 1 [Cancer]} + c_2 * \text{Treatment 2 [Terror Attack]} + c_3 * \text{Treatment 3 [Uncertainty]} + c_4 * \text{Age} + c_5 * \text{Sex} + c_6 * \text{Education} + c_7 * \text{Self Left - Right Ideological Placement} + e_6$$

$$\text{Extraversion} = a_1 * \text{Treatment 1 [Cancer]} + a_6 * \text{Treatment 2 [Terror Attack]} + a_{11} * \text{Treatment 3 [Uncertainty]} + e_1$$

$$\text{Agreeableness} = a_2 * \text{Treatment 1 [Cancer]} + a_7 * \text{Treatment 2 [Terror Attack]} + a_{12} * \text{Treatment 3 [Uncertainty]} + e_2$$

$$\text{Conscientiousness} = a_3 * \text{Treatment 1 [Cancer]} + a_8 * \text{Treatment 2 [Terror Attack]} + a_{13} * \text{Treatment 3 [Uncertainty]} + e_3$$

$$\text{Neuroticism} = a_4 * \text{Treatment 1 [Cancer]} + a_9 * \text{Treatment 2 [Terror Attack]} + a_{14} * \text{Treatment 3 [Uncertainty]} + e_4$$

$$\text{Openness to New Experiences} = a_5 * \text{Treatment 1 [Cancer]} + a_{10} * \text{Treatment 2 [Terror Attack]} + a_{15} * \text{Treatment 3 [Uncertainty]} + e_5$$

$$\text{Conservatism} = b_1 * \text{Extraversion} + b_2 * \text{Agreeableness} + b_3 * \text{Conscientiousness} + b_4 * \text{Neuroticism} + b_5 * \text{Openness to New Experiences} + e_6$$




Figure 3.6: Multiple mediation analysis paths

For the moderation analyses, I included all the paths in Figure 3.5, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation with the following generic model:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Conservatism} = & \alpha + \beta_1 * \text{Treatment 1 [Cancer]} + \beta_2 * \text{Treatment 2 [Terror Attack]} + \beta_3 * \text{Treatment 3 [Uncertainty]} + \beta_4 * \text{Age} + \beta_5 * \text{Sex} + \beta_6 \\
& * \text{Education} + \beta_7 * \text{Self Left - Right Ideological Placement} + \beta_8 * \text{Extraversion} + \beta_9 * \text{Agreeableness} + \beta_{10} \\
& * \text{Conscientiousness} + \beta_{11} * \text{Neuroticism} + \beta_{12} * \text{Openness} + \beta_{13} * \text{Treatment 1 [Cancer]} * \text{Extraversion} + \beta_{14} \\
& * \text{Treatment 1 [Cancer]} * \text{Agreeableness} + \beta_{15} * \text{Treatment 1 [Cancer]} * \text{Conscientiousness} + \beta_{16} * \text{Treatment 1 [Cancer]} \\
& * \text{Neuroticism} + \beta_{17} * \text{Treatment 1 [Cancer]} * \text{Openness to New Experiences} + \beta_{18} * \text{Treatment 2 [Terror Attack]} \\
& * \text{Extraversion} + \beta_{19} * \text{Treatment 2 [Terror Attack]} * \text{Agreeableness} + \beta_{20} * \text{Treatment 2 [Terror Attack]} * \text{Conscientiousness} \\
& + \beta_{21} * \text{Treatment 2 [Terror Attack]} * \text{Neuroticism} + \beta_{22} * \text{Treatment 2 [Terror Attack]} * \text{Openness to New Experiences} + \beta_{23} \\
& * \text{Treatment 3 [Uncertainty]} * \text{Extraversion} + \beta_{24} * \text{Treatment 3 [Uncertainty]} * \text{Agreeableness} + \beta_{25} \\
& * \text{Treatment 3 [Uncertainty]} * \text{Conscientiousness} + \beta_{26} * \text{Treatment 3 [Uncertainty]} * \text{Neuroticism} + \beta_{27} \\
& * \text{Treatment 3 [Uncertainty]} * \text{Openness to New Experiences} + \epsilon
\end{aligned}$$

The experimental setup also had three manipulation checks that also worked as attention checks. After the treatment, respondents were asked to fill in the vowels of three words in sequence. The first word was “death” (“ölüm” in Turkish); respondents needed to fill in “_ l _ m”. The second word was “tomb” (“kabir” in Turkish); respondents needed to fill in “k _ b _ r”. The third word was “mortal” (“fani” in Turkish); respondents needed to fill in “f _ n _”. Note that all three words could also be completed with other vowels to create different meaningful words in Turkish. For instance, “ölüm/death” could also be completed as “alim” (scholar), “elem” (sorrowful), “ilim” (science), “alım” (glamour), “elim” (deplorable), “alem” (universe), or “ulam” (category).³² The order between vowels in the respondents’ choices was randomized. Overall, each respondent’s manipulation check was scored on a 0-3 scale (0 – mortality treatment not working to 3 – mortality treatment working at its highest). The same went for the attention check: 0 meant no meaningful word creation whereas 3 meant meaningful word creation for all three word puzzles.

³² Alternatives for “kabir” (tomb) include “kebir” (old), “kibar” (kind), “kibir” (arrogance), or “kubur” (holster). Alternatives for “fani” (mortal) include “fena” (badly) or “fino” (lap-dog).

3.3 Descriptives and a priori Research Limitations

Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the experimental analysis variables.

Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of the experimental data

Control Group (No Reminder of Death)							
Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl. (25 th)	Pctl. (75 th)	Max
Self-Conservatism Placement	665	5.238	3.062	1.000	2.000	7.000	11.000
Multi-Dimensional Conservatism	661	-3.454	4.327	-10.000	-7.000	0.000	10.000
Conservatism Scale	622	4.375	2.193	1.000	2.500	6.000	10.667
Extraversion	663	7.953	2.092	1.750	6.500	9.750	11.000
Agreeableness	663	9.043	1.698	3.333	8.000	10.333	11.000
Neuroticism	657	5.411	2.364	1.000	3.667	7.000	11.000
Conscientiousness	664	8.451	1.833	3.000	7.333	10.000	11.000
Openness	660	8.164	1.919	2.333	7.000	9.667	11.000
Age	668	23.352	7.562	18.000	19.000	25.000	64.000
Sex: Female [Base: Male]	673	0.654	0.476	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Education	674	4.979	0.918	2.000	4.000	5.000	8.000
Left-Right Ideological Placement	652	6.049	3.162	1.000	4.000	8.000	11.000
Treatment 1 Group (Reminder of Death due to Cancer)							
Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl. (25 th)	Pctl. (75 th)	Max
Self-Conservatism Placement	635	5.313	3.275	1.000	2.000	8.000	11.000
Multi-Dimensional Conservatism	635	-3.471	4.474	-10.000	-7.000	0.000	10.000
Conservatism Scale	592	4.322	2.187	1.000	2.667	6.000	11.000
Extraversion	634	7.946	1.983	1.000	6.562	9.750	11.000
Agreeableness	640	9.123	1.731	3.333	8.250	10.667	11.000
Neuroticism	636	5.413	2.355	1.000	3.667	7.333	11.000
Conscientiousness	643	8.501	1.844	2.667	7.333	10.000	11.000
Openness	640	8.180	1.884	1.333	7.000	9.333	11.000
Age	641	24.167	9.179	18.000	19.000	25.000	89.000
Sex: Female [Base: Male]	638	0.660	0.474	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Education	641	4.995	1.012	2.000	4.000	6.000	8.000
Left-Right Ideological Placement	622	5.788	3.143	1.000	4.000	7.000	11.000
Treatment 2 Group (Reminder of Death due to a Terror Attack)							
Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl. (25 th)	Pctl. (75 th)	Max
Self-Conservatism Placement	620	5.540	3.177	1.000	3.000	8.000	11.000
Multi-Dimensional Conservatism	616	-3.291	4.276	-10.000	-7.000	0.000	10.000
Conservatism Scale	584	4.361	2.116	1.000	2.667	6.000	11.000
Extraversion	627	7.928	1.993	1.000	6.500	9.500	11.000
Agreeableness	629	9.093	1.709	2.000	8.333	10.333	11.000
Neuroticism	628	5.188	2.238	1.000	3.583	6.667	11.000
Conscientiousness	623	8.475	1.807	2.000	7.333	9.667	11.000
Openness	624	8.259	1.803	2.667	7.000	9.667	11.000
Age	630	24.011	9.395	18.000	19.000	24.000	89.000
Sex: Female [Base: Male]	634	0.658	0.475	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Education	633	5.022	1.031	2.000	4.000	6.000	8.000
Left-Right Ideological Placement	609	5.936	3.089	1.000	4.000	8.000	11.000
Treatment 3 Group (Reminder of Death due to Unknown Causes)							
Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl. (25 th)	Pctl. (75 th)	Max
Self-Conservatism Placement	628	5.654	3.132	1.000	3.000	8.000	11.000
Multi-Dimensional Conservatism	625	-3.259	4.233	-10.000	-6.000	0.000	10.000
Conservatism Scale	585	4.521	2.064	1.000	2.833	6.000	10.167
Extraversion	633	8.048	2.072	1.250	6.750	9.750	11.000
Agreeableness	633	9.215	1.699	2.333	8.333	10.667	11.000
Neuroticism	630	5.487	2.351	1.000	4.000	7.333	11.000
Conscientiousness	634	8.493	1.791	2.667	7.333	9.667	11.000
Openness	628	8.178	1.813	2.667	7.000	9.333	11.000
Age	637	23.352	7.365	18.000	19.000	24.000	62.000
Sex: Female [Base: Male]	639	0.673	0.470	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Education	634	5.058	0.981	2.000	4.000	6.000	8.000
Left-Right Ideological Placement	624	6.152	3.162	1.000	4.000	9.000	11.000

In addition to relatively heterogeneous sample demographic characteristics (see Appendix B, A. Demographics, Figure 10.1 and Table 10.1), there was diversity in terms of partisanship and voting choice. I was able to survey participants from across the political spectrum. The governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) had the most affiliates (partisans), followed by the main opposition Republican Peoples' Party and then the other parties represented in parliament: Peoples' Democracy Party (HDP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and Good Party (İYİP) (see Figures 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9, which include missing responses, No idea / No response (NA)). Since respondents appeared to be more secretive about their past vote choice in the November 1, 2015 general elections than their partisanship, the NA percentage was 25.83% higher for the former. In Figure 3.9, comparing the affiliated (Figure 3.7) and voted party (Figure 3.8) bar plots indicates that, among the 826 NAs for the affiliated party (partisanship) question, only 39.27% of respondents were also NA for the vote choice question. However, the largest proportions of NAs in the voted party question's total responses were 21.73% for AKP and 21.86% for CHP partisans.




Figure 3.7: Bar plot of the affiliated parties (partisanship)

Note: The voted party question was directed only to respondents who responded “Yes, I did (Evet, tutuyorum) [1]” to “Q12. Were you able to turn out to vote in the November 1, 2015 general election?” (1 Kasım 2012 genel seçimlerinde oy kullanma imkanınız oldu mu?). The voted party question was as follows: “Q13. For which party did you vote in the November 1, 2015 general election?” (Peki, 1 Kasım 2015 genel seçimlerinde hangi partiye oy verdiniz?).





Figure 3.8: Bar plot of the voted parties on November 1, 2015, general elections

Note: The partisanship question was directed only to respondents who responded “Yes, I do” (Evet, tutuyorum) [1] to “Q3. Today, do you feel close to any political party?” (Siz bugün herhangi bir partiyi tutuyor musunuz?)” The partisanship question was worded as follows: “Q4. From the list below, which party do you feel closest to?” (Peki, tuttuğunuz bu parti aşağıdakilerden hangisidir?).



X Axis Stands for the Affiliated Party (Partisanship)

Figure 3.9: Facet wrapped bar plots to compare the affiliated (partisanship) and voted parties

Note: To exemplify how to read this facet-wrapped bar plot: in the upper left corner (AKP Voters), 75.47% of AKP partisans voted for AKP in the November 1, 2015 general election whereas only 2.8% CHP partisans and no VP partisans did so. However, 14.72% of NA respondents to the partisanship question indicated that they voted for AKP.

Lastly, before moving to the analyses in the next chapters, I should acknowledge one potential research limitation due to the survey response scaling. In the online survey experiment, the responses were given on 11-point scales (0-10) with response labels at the extremes (e.g., Completely False, Completely True) and the mid-points (e.g., Neither True nor False). However, I still needed to test whether using a shorter scale, such as 1-5 or 1-7, with labels for all response categories, could have led to different responses. Accordingly, I asked two left-right ideological self-placement questions (see Table 3.3). The first used an 11-point scale (0-10) with labels only at the extremes and the midpoint. This was asked as the survey's seventh question. The second also used an 11-point scale (0-10) but with labels for all response categories. This was asked at the very end as the 42nd question as a proxy for shorter scales with full labels. Between these two questions, respondents replied to 90 questions due to sub-items for some questions. Consequently, there was enough time to make it difficult for them to remember their exact response to the first question.

Table 3.3: Self left-right ideological placement questions with and without full scale labels

Below there is a ruler ranging from the far left to the far right. Could you please indicate that where your thoughts fall on this ruler? (Aşağıda, en soldan en sağa giden bir cetvel var. Siz kendi düşüncelerinizin bu cetvelin neresine yerleştiğini belirtir misiniz?)											
Self Left-Right Ideological Placement without Full Labels (Q7)	1 Far Left (En Sol)	2	3	4	5	6 Center (Ne sağ, Ne de sol)	7	8	9	10	11 Far Right (En Sağ)
Self Left-Right Ideological Placement with Full Labels (Q42)	1 Far Left (En sol)	2 Closer to Far Left than Left (En sola, Soldan daha yakın)	3 Left (Sol)	4 Closer to Left than Center (Sola daha yakın)	5 Center Left (Merkez sol)	6 Center (Ne sağ, Ne de sol)	7 Center Right (Merkez sağ)	8 Closer to Right than Center (Sağa daha yakın)	9 Right (Sağ)	10 Closer to Far Right than Right (En sağa, Sağdan daha yakın)	11 Far Right (En sağ)

I conducted paired t-tests on the ideological placement means, acquiescence response bias means, extreme response bias means, socially desirable response bias means, and no response bias means for the responses to questions with and without full labels (Table 3.4).³³

In the acquiescence response bias operationalization, for both questions, respondents who placed themselves as 6 (Center) or above were given 1 whereas the rest were coded as

³³ Since the second left-right ideological self-placement question (Q42) came after the treatments, I used only the control group (N=683) for the paired t-test analyses.

0. Because there could be a positive connotation of higher numbers (i.e., a feeling of achieving a higher test score), respondents may have chosen larger numbers on the response scale due to the lack of full labels.

In the extreme response bias operationalization, for both questions, respondents who placed themselves at either extreme (0 – Far Left and 10 – Far Right) were given 1 whereas the rest were coded as 0. This is because, being unable to categorize the numbers between the extremes, non-median voters may have chosen the extreme labels according to their ideological position.

In the socially desirable response bias operationalization, for both questions, respondents who placed themselves at the center (6 – the Center) were given 1 whereas the rest were coded as 0. Due to privacy concerns and inability to categorize the middle numbers between the extremes, respondents may have selected the neutral position at the center.

In the no response bias operationalization, for both questions, respondents who chose do not know / no response were given 1 whereas the rest were coded as 0. Being unable to fully understand the verbal categorizations for numbers between the extremes, respondents may have decided not to answer the questions.

Table 3.4 indicates three findings. First, there was a statistically significant difference ($p < 0.01$) in the averages of the left-right ideological self-placement scores with and without full labels. When given full labels, respondents' scores moved towards the left of center from the right of center. Second, there was a statistically significant difference ($p < 0.001$) in the extreme response bias averages. When given full labels, respondents' scores tended move away from the extremes towards more meaningful responses closer to their belief systems. Third, there was a statistically significant difference ($p < 0.01$) in socially desirable response bias averages. Similar to the logic in the extreme response bias, when given full labels, respondents tended to move away from the center towards more meaningful responses closer to their belief systems. In short, because of the selected 11-point scale, the data and analyses regarding ideological self-placement are limited by potential extreme response and socially desirable response biases.

Table 3.4: Paired sample t-test results to compare the response styles against the self left-right ideological placement with and without full labels

	Self Left-Right Ideological Placement with Full Labels (Q42)	Self Left-Right Ideological Placement without Full Labels (Q7)
N	644	652
Average	5.79	6.05
Standard Deviation	2.7	3.16
Minimum	1	1
Maximum	11	11
% of Acquiescence Response Bias	56.66	60.47
% of Extreme Response Bias	13.91	28.84
% of Socially Desirable Response Bias	21.38	26.94
% of No Response Bias	5.71	4.54
Paired Sample t-Test on Self Left-Right Ideological Placement Averages	$\mu(Q42) - \mu(Q7) = -0.21$ $p\text{-value} < 0.01$	
Paired Sample t-Test on Acquiescence Response Bias Averages	$\mu(Q42) - \mu(Q7) = -0.02$ $p\text{-value} > 0.10$	
Paired Sample t-Test on Extreme Response Bias Averages	$\mu(Q42) - \mu(Q7) = -0.15$ $p\text{-value} < 0.001$	
Paired Sample t-Test on Socially Desirable Response Bias Averages	$\mu(Q42) - \mu(Q7) = -0.04784689$ $p\text{-value} < 0.01$	
Paired Sample t-Test on NoResponse Bias Averages	$\mu(Q42) - \mu(Q7) = 0.01$ $p\text{-value} > 0.10$	

Chapter 4

CONCEPT MEASUREMENTS

The objective of this chapter is to dwell on the operationalization, measurements, and psychometric properties of the validity of the moderators/mediators, the Big Five Personality Traits, and outcome variables, conservative-liberal attitudes. In Section 4.1, I detailed the Big Five Personality Traits' measurement by delving on the literature's measurement problems, procedures of my adaptation in Turkish, reliability tests, measurement statistics, measurement invariance tests, and inter-item associations. In Section 4.2, I explained the conservatism scale's measurements along with its item and measurement statistics.

4.1 Measurement of the Big Five Personality Traits

In the case of Big Five Personality Traits, to the best of my knowledge, Karaman's, Dogan's and Coban's valuable 2010 study is the only research that tried to adapt the Big Five Inventory with 44 items (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) into Turkish with the back-translation method. However, I saw two measurement problems both in the original and its directly translated Turkish inventory. The first problem is the use of double-barreled adjectives. For instance, for Conscientiousness' one sub-dimension, the following question was directed: "I see myself as someone who makes plans and follows through with them (Kendimi, planlar yapan ve planına bağlı birisi olarak görürüm)" [the original 38th item]. Nevertheless, being planned and being the executioner of the plans stand for two different sub-dimensions, and that makes it hard to track the respondents' choice whether they thought of the first or the latter when responding.

The second problem is the use of complicated wording. For example, for Openness to New Experiences' one sub-dimension, the following was directed: "I see myself as

someone who prefers to work that is routine (Kendimi, rutin işlerden hoşlanan birisi olarak görmekteyim)” [the original 35th item]. However, especially for non-Western samples with lower educational background and with no contact with English or French language, the wording routine (rutin) would remain strange to the ordinary citizens on the street. The alternative for routine’s (rutin) Turkish equivalent could have been more understandable wording like sıradan (ordinary).

Accordingly, I applied John’s, Donahue’s and Kentle’s Big Five Inventory (1991) into Turkish myself in three consecutive steps: back translation (with the help of the Koc University, Department of International Relations doctoral graduate students), dropping of double-barrels and relativity adjectives and cognitive interviews with ordinary Turkish citizens for comprehension. The descriptive statistics of the cognitive interview participants are in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of the cognitive interview participants

Date of Interviews	Neighborhood in Istanbul, Sarıyer	Interview Duration (Minutes)	Sex	Birth Year	Highest Degree
04.22.2018	Merkez Mahallesi	29	Female	1963	Primary 5 Years Degree
04.22.2018	Buyukdere Mahallesi	44	Male	1981	College Degree
04.23.2018	Kirecburnu Mahallesi	38	Male	1994	High School Degree
04.23.2018	Merkez Mahallesi	29	Female	1984	College Degree
04.23.2018	Buyukdere Mahallesi	25	Male	1995	College Degree
04.23.2018	Buyukdere Mahallesi	34	Female	1995	College Degree

In the cognitive interview questionnaire, there were back-translated Big Five Inventory with 44 items in Turkish and one self-conservatism and one self-liberalism questions. The cognitive interviews went question-by-question, and after each question, I asked the participants the motives behind their responses and any difficulties and misunderstandings they might have had. In doing so, I aimed at catching the extent of

questions' comprehension by the respondents. Among the interview items, the respondents did not have the difficulty of comprehending and answering the questions. However, there was one wording that one of the participants objected to. This wording was the personality trait Openness to New Experiences' one sub-dimension – "I see myself as someone who values artistic, aesthetic experience (Kendimi sanatsal, estetik deneyimlere değer veren birisi olarak görmekteyim)" [the original 30th item]. 55 years old female participant with a primary 5 years degree equated the aesthetic with nudity and replied by an extremely negative response meaning disgusting (iğrenç in Turkish). Consequently, after adjusting for the detected measurement problems, I created my adaptation of the Big Five Inventory with 44 items in Turkish to be used for the randomized online survey experiment (see Appendix B, B. Survey Instruments).

4.1.2 Item Statistics

As for the reliability of the Big Five Inventory with 44 items in Turkish, when I used the control group data, the average Cronbach's α was 0.86 for the Extraversion items, 0.65 for the Agreeableness items, 0.8 for the Conscientiousness items, 0.75 for the Neuroticism items and 0.78 for the Openness to New Experiences items (see Tables 4.2 to 4.6).³⁴ Within these adapted traits adjectives in Turkish, the only weak reliability belonged to the Agreeableness items, whose Cronbach's α value was smaller than 0.7 (see Kline, 1999). Among the Agreeableness items, the most problematic three items were (i) Agreeableness Item 3 (Reverse Coded) (çevresindekilerle kavga çıkaran [starts quarrels with others]), (ii) Agreeableness Item 5 (genellikle çabuk güvenen [is generally trusting]), and (iii) Agreeableness Item 6 (R) (soğuk ve başkalarına uzak duran [can be cold and aloof]). Those three problematic Agreeableness items' item-rest correlation was below 0.30. To put it in other words, those three problematic Agreeableness items did not correlate well with the Agreeableness scale (the total of the remaining Agreeableness items).

³⁴ To estimate the Cronbach's α , I used R package psych's alpha() function.

Table 4.2: Extraversion reliability test item statistics

	<i>N</i>	Item-Total Correlation (Corrected for Item Overlap and Scale Reliability)	Item-Rest Correlation	Scale Mean	Scale Standard Deviation
<i>Extraversion Item 1</i> [konuşkan (is talkative)]	675	0.62	0.58	7.5	2.8
<i>Extraversion Item 2 (R)</i> [içine kapanık (is reserved)]	666	0.66	0.61	7.6	3.1
<i>Extraversion Item 3</i> [canlı (is full of energy)]	674	0.69	0.61	8	2.6
<i>Extraversion Item 4</i> [coşkulu (generates a lot of enthusiasm)]	670	0.64	0.57	7.8	2.4
<i>Extraversion Item 5 (R)</i> [sessiz (tends to be quiet)]	674	0.61	0.56	7.2	2.9
<i>Extraversion Item 6</i> [girişken (has an assertive personality)]	674	0.73	0.67	7.9	2.7
<i>Extraversion Item 7 (R)</i> [çekingen (is sometimes shy, inhibited)]	672	0.66	0.61	7.4	2.9
<i>Extraversion Item 8</i> [sosyal biri (is outgoing, sociable)]	672	0.74	0.68	8.1	2.5

Note: The Extraversion subscale was reliable at Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.86$.

Table 4.3: Agreeableness reliability test item statistics

	<i>N</i>	Item-Total Correlation (Corrected for Item Overlap and Scale Reliability)	Item-Rest Correlation	Scale Mean	Scale Standard Deviation
<i>Agreeableness Item 1 (R)</i> [başkalarının kusurlarını arayan (tends to fault with others)]	668	0.39	0.31	8.7	2.4
<i>Agreeableness Item 2</i> [yardımsever (is helpful and unselfish with others)]	670	0.6	0.46	9.3	2.1
<i>Agreeableness Item 3 (R)</i> [çevresindekilerle kavga çıkaran (starts quarrels with others)]	673	0.39	0.29	9.1	2.2
<i>Agreeableness Item 4</i> [merhametli (has a forgiving nature)]	676	0.61	0.48	9.6	1.9
<i>Agreeableness Item 5</i> [genellikle çabuk güvenen (is generally trusting)]	674	0.18	0.14	6.2	3.1
<i>Agreeableness Item 6 (R)</i> [soğuk ve başkalarına uzak duran (can be cold and aloof)]	673	0.35	0.28	7.5	3
<i>Agreeableness Item 7</i> herkese karşı anlayışlı (is considerate and kind to almost everyone)	673	0.58	0.45	8.1	2.5
<i>Agreeableness Item 8</i> [başkalarına kaba davranan (is sometimes rude to others)]	672	0.44	0.35	9.5	2
<i>Agreeableness Item 9</i> [başkalarıyla iş birliği yapmayı seven (likes to cooperate with others)]	671	0.44	0.36	7.6	2.7

Note: The Agreeableness subscale was reliable at Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.65$.

Table 4.4: Conscientiousness reliability test item statistics

	<i>N</i>	Item-Total Correlation (Corrected for Item Overlap and Scale Reliability)	Item-Rest Correlation	Scale Mean	Scale Standard Deviation
<i>Conscientiousness Item 1</i> [titiz iş yapan (does a thorough job)]	670	0.59	0.52	7.8	2.6
<i>Conscientiousness Item 2 (R)</i> [dikkatsiz olabilen (can be somewhat careless)]	665	0.47	0.43	5.9	2.6
<i>Conscientiousness Item 3</i> [yaptığı işe güvenilen (is a reliable worker)]	673	0.52	0.43	9.2	2.1
<i>Conscientiousness Item 4 (R)</i> [düzensiz olmaya yatkın (tends to be disorganized)]	672	0.54	0.49	6.5	3.2
<i>Conscientiousness Item 5 (R)</i> [tembel olmaya yatkın (tends to be lazy)]	671	0.67	0.62	6.9	3
<i>Conscientiousness Item 6</i> [azimli (perseveres until the task is finished)]	674	0.6	0.51	8.2	2.4
<i>Conscientiousness Item 7</i> [becerikli (does things efficiently)]	673	0.57	0.47	8	2.4
<i>Conscientiousness Item 8</i> [programlı (makes plans and follows through with them)]	670	0.64	0.57	6.5	2.8
<i>Conscientiousness Item 9 (R)</i> [kolayca dikkati dağılan (is easily distracted)]	672	0.43	0.38	6	2.9

Note: The Conscientiousness subscale was reliable at Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.8$.

Table 4.5: Neuroticism reliability test item statistics

	<i>N</i>	Item-Total Correlation (Corrected for Item Overlap and Scale Reliability)	Item-Rest Correlation	Scale Mean	Scale Standard Deviation
<i>Neuroticism Item 1</i> [bunalımlı (is depressed)]	661	0.6	0.52	5.1	3.2
<i>Neuroticism Item 2 (R)</i> [sakin (is relaxed, handles stress well)]	675	0.43	0.35	5.4	2.9
<i>Neuroticism Item 3</i> [asabi (can be tense)]	672	0.68	0.57	5.2	2.9
<i>Neuroticism Item 4</i> [sürekli kaygılanan (worries a lot)]	670	0.52	0.44	6	3.1
<i>Neuroticism Item 5</i> [kolayca üzülmeyen (is emotionally stable, not easily upset)]	673	0.36	0.31	6.9	3.1
<i>Neuroticism Item 6</i> [günü gününü tutmayan (can be moody)]	674	0.42	0.37	4.8	3.1
<i>Neuroticism Item 7 (R)</i> [gergin durumlarda sakin kalabilen (remains calm in tense situations)]	672	0.49	0.41	5.2	3
<i>Neuroticism Item 8</i> [kolayca sinirlenebilen (get nervous easily)]	670	0.71	0.59	6.1	3.2

Note: The Neuroticism subscale was reliable at Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.75$.

Table 4.6: Openness to New Experiences reliability test item statistics

	<i>N</i>	Item-Total Correlation (Corrected for Item Overlap and Scale Reliability)	Item-Rest Correlation	Scale Mean	Scale Standard Deviation
<i>Openness to New Experiences Item 1</i> yeni fikirler üreten (is original, comes up with new ideas)	669	0.7	0.61	8.4	2.3
<i>Openness to New Experiences Item 2</i> öğrenmeye meraklı (is curious about many different things)	674	0.64	0.56	9.4	2.1
<i>Openness to New Experiences Item 3</i> derin düşünen (is ingenious, a deep thinker)	673	0.52	0.45	9	2.2
<i>Openness to New Experiences Item 4</i> hayal gücü yüksek (has an active imagination)	674	0.56	0.49	9	2.2
<i>Openness to New Experiences Item 5</i> icat kabiliyeti yüksek (is inventive)	674	0.56	0.48	6.7	2.7
<i>Openness to New Experiences Item 6</i> her türlü sanata değer veren (values artistic, aesthetic experiences)	670	0.62	0.55	8.7	2.5
<i>Openness to New Experiences Item 7 (R)</i> alışlagelmiş, sıradan işleri tercih eden (prefers work that is routine)	666	0.2	0.18	7.8	2.7
<i>Openness to New Experiences Item 8</i> her konuda fikir sahibi olmak isteyen (likes to reflect, play with ideas)	668	0.45	0.39	8.7	2.6
<i>Openness to New Experiences Item 9 (R)</i> sanata ilgisi düşük (has few artistic interests)	673	0.36	0.31	8.6	2.8
<i>Openness to New Experiences Item 10</i> sanat, müzik ya da edebiyat hakkında bilgi sahibi (is sophisticated in art, music, or literature)	672	0.63	0.56	8.1	2.6
Note: The Openness to New Experiences subscale was reliable at Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.78$.					

Further, to construct the Big Five Personality Traits as moderators in the experimental design analyses and as control variables in the multivariate associational analyses, I employed the best fitting CFA solution (see Table 4.7).

Table 4.7: Big Five Personality Traits CFA result (control group only)

Measurement Model with Standardized Coefficients		Factor Loadings
Extraversion →		
Extraversion Item 3 (<i>Canlı / Full of Energy</i>)		0.794***
Extraversion Item 4 (<i>Coşkulu / Enthusiastic</i>)		0.703***
Extraversion Item 6 (<i>Girişken / Assertive</i>)		0.772***
Extraversion Item 8 (<i>Sosyal Biri / Sociable</i>)		0.745***
Agreeableness →		
Agreeableness Item 2 (<i>Yardımsaver / Helpful</i>)		0.776***
Agreeableness Item 4 (<i>Merhametli / Forgiving</i>)		0.754***
Agreeableness Item 7 (<i>Herkese Karşı Anlayışlı / Considerate to Almost Anyone</i>)		0.516***
Conscientiousness →		
Conscientiousness Item 3 (<i>Yaptığı İşe Güvenilen / Reliable Worker</i>)		0.679***
Conscientiousness Item 6 (<i>Azimli / Persevering</i>)		0.691***
Conscientiousness Item 7 (<i>Becerikli / Doing things efficiently</i>)		0.723***
Neuroticism →		
Neuroticism Item 1 (<i>Bunalımlı / Depressed</i>)		0.834***
Neuroticism Item 3 (<i>Asabi / Tense</i>)		0.455***
Neuroticism Item 4 (<i>Sürekli Kaygılanan / Worrying a lot</i>)		0.595***
Openness to New Experiences →		
Openness to New Experiences Item 1 (<i>Yeni Fikirler Üreten / Coming up with New Ideas</i>)		0.778***
Openness to New Experiences Item 2 (<i>Öğrenmeye Meraklı / Curious about Many Different Things</i>)		0.689***
Openness to New Experiences Item 5 (<i>İcat Kabiliyeti Yüksek / Inventive</i>)		0.648***
Fit Indexes		
X ² (df)	362.780 (94)	***
RMSEA	0.067	***
CFI	0.931	
TLI	0.911	
SRMR	0.045	

Note 1: *** $p < 0.001$

Note 2: For the best model fit, in the first run, items with loadings smaller than 0.45 were dropped. In the next run, items with loadings smaller than 0.60 were dropped. The only condition to keep items with loadings smaller than 0.60 was that there should have been at least 3 items per latent variable.

When I used the CFA to detect the items with the best fitting statistics per trait in the control group (the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) < 0.90 , comparative fit index (CFI) and Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) < 0.05), there remained 4 items for Extraversion, 3 items for Agreeableness, 3 items for Conscientiousness, 3 items for Neuroticism, and 3 items for Openness to New Experiences. Therefore, in the rest of this dissertation, each personality trait is the average of the items that gave the best fitting statistics in Table 4.7.

Accordingly, Extraversion is the average of Extraversion Item 3 (*Canlı / Full of Energy*), Extraversion Item 4 (*Coşkulu / Enthusiastic*), Extraversion Item 6 (*Girişken / Assertive*), and Extraversion Item 8 (*Sosyal Biri / Sociable*).

Agreeableness is the average of Agreeableness Item 2 (*Yardımsaver / Helpful*), Agreeableness Item 4 (*Merhametli / Forgiving*), and Agreeableness Item 7 (*Herkese Karşı Anlayışlı / Considerate to Almost Anyone*).

Conscientiousness is the average of Conscientiousness Item 3 (*Yaptığı İşe Güvenilen / Reliable Worker*), Conscientiousness Item 6 (*Azimli / Persevering*), and Conscientiousness Item 7 (*Becerikli / Doing things efficiently*).

Neuroticism is the average of Neuroticism Item 1 (Bunalımlı / Blue), Neuroticism Item 3 (Asabi / Tense), and Neuroticism Item 4 (Sürekli Kaygılanan / Worrying a lot).

Moreover, Openness to New Experiences is the average of Openness to New Experiences Item 1 (Yeni Fikirler Üreten / Coming up with New Ideas), Openness to New Experiences Item 2 (Öğrenmeye Meraklı / Curious about Many Different Things), and Openness to New Experiences Item 5 (İcat Kabiliyeti Yüksek / Inventive).

Additionally, in Table 4.7's CFA output, one latent variable, the Openness to New Experiences, appeared to be distinct from the literature's general expectations. Turkish sample's Openness to New Experiences was mostly materialist and reflected still industrial society elements priming survival and its tools that care mechanistic open-mindedness as opposed to post-materialist elements of deep thinking, active imagination, artistic, aesthetic experience and sophisticated interest in art, music, or the literature.

I think this counter-intuitive finding on Openness to New Experiences might reflect Piedmont's and Aycock's (2007) argument that in pre-industrial countries like Zimbabwe, or in my case, a still-industrializing country like Turkey, the vocabulary of the Openness to New Experiences items like aesthetics would be the latest to enter into the ordinary people's daily languages to be meaningful to describe the self. Since the 1950s, Turkey has still been in its industrial phase, and the majority of the population have not satisfied their material needs for survival to hold post-materialist values of equality, freedom, and environmental protectionism and to define their personas (see Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Therefore, the Turkish public may need additional years to embed Openness to New Experiences items on art, ideas, literature, or music into their lexicon to evaluate the self.

Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with oblique rotation and minimum residual solution estimation also concurred the CFA finding on the Openness to New Experiences' division into two components. When I executed the parallel analysis to find out the number of factors, the actual eigen values dropped below the eigen values of the simulated and resampled data after the sixth factor (see Figure 4.1). Since there are theoretically expected correlations between the personality trait factors, in the EFA, I selected oblique rotation with OLS factoring called minimum residual solution estimation, which does not assume a multivariate normal distribution. In the EFA solution with six factors, Openness to New Experiences was divided into two, Openness to New Experiences 1 and Openness to New

Experiences 2 (see Table 4.8). The items of the Openness to New Experiences 1 were the following: Item 1 (Yeni Fikirler Üreten / Coming up with New Ideas), Item 2 (Öğrenmeye Meraklı / Curious about Many Different Things), Item 3 (Derin düşünen/ Ingenious, a deep thinker), Item 4 (Hayal gücü yüksek / Has an active imagination), and Item 5 (İcat Kabiliyeti Yüksek / Inventive). The items of the Openness to New Experiences 2 were the following: Item 6 (Her türlü sanata değer veren / Values artistic, aesthetic experiences), Item 7 (Alışılmış, sıradan işleri tercih eden / Prefers work that is routine) [Reversed-Coded], Item 9 (Sanata ilgisi düşük / Has few artistic interests) [Reversed-Coded], and Item 10 (Sanat, müzik ya da edebiyat hakkında bilgi sahibi / Sophisticated in art, music, or literature). The most apparent difference between the two components of Openness to New Experiences was that elements of artistic, aesthetic experience, and sophisticated interest in art, music, or the literature only loaded into the latter.




Figure 4.1: Big Five Personality Traits parallel analysis scree plot (control group only)

Table 4.8: Big Five Personality Traits EFA output (with oblique rotation and minimum residual solution estimation; control group only)

	Factor 1 <i>Extraversion</i>	Factor 2 <i>Agreeableness</i>	Factor 3 <i>Neuroticism</i>	Factor 4 <i>Conscientiousness</i>	Factor 5 <i>Openness to New Experiences 1</i>	Factor 6 <i>Openness to New Experiences 2</i>
<i>Extraversion Item 1 (Kuşkan / Talkative)</i>	0.5					
<i>Extraversion Item 2 (İçine kapanık / Reserved) [Reversed-Coded]</i>	0.69					
<i>Extraversion Item 3 (Canlı / Full of Energy)</i>	0.36	0.37				
<i>Extraversion Item 4 (Coşkulu / Enthusiastic)</i>	0.4	0.36				
<i>Extraversion Item 5 (Sessiz / Tends to be quiet) [Reversed-Coded]</i>	0.78					
<i>Extraversion Item 6 (Girişken / Assertive)</i>	0.49				0.36	
<i>Extraversion Item 7 (Çekingen / Shy, inhibited) [Reversed-Coded]</i>	0.74					
<i>Extraversion Item 8 (Sosyal Biri / Sociable)</i>	0.55	0.36				
<i>Agreeableness Item 1 (Başkalarının kusurlarını arayan / Tends to fault with others) [Reversed-Coded]</i>						
<i>Agreeableness Item 2 (Yardımcı / Helpful)</i>		0.6				
<i>Agreeableness Item 3 (Çevresindekilerle kavga çıkaran / Starts quarrels with others) [Reversed-Coded]</i>						
<i>Agreeableness Item 4 (Merhametli / Forgiving)</i>		0.69				
<i>Agreeableness Item 5 (Genellikle çabuk güvenen / Generally trusting)</i>		0.42				
<i>Agreeableness Item 6 (Soğuk ve başkalarına uzak duran / Cold and aloof) [Reversed-Coded]</i>	0.6					
<i>Agreeableness Item 7 (Herkesle Karşı Anlayışlı / Considerate to Almost Anyone)</i>		0.45				
<i>Agreeableness Item 8 (Başkalarına kaba davranan / Rude to others) [Reversed-Coded]</i>						
<i>Agreeableness Item 9 (Başkalarıyla iş birliği yapmayı seven / Likes to cooperate with others)</i>		0.37				
<i>Neuroticism Item 1 (Bunalımlı / Depressed)</i>			0.46			
<i>Neuroticism Item 2 (Sakin / Relaxed, handles stress well) [Reversed-Coded]</i>	0.38		0.51			
<i>Neuroticism Item 3 (Asabi / Tense)</i>			0.75			
<i>Neuroticism Item 4 (Sürekli Kaygılanan / Worrying a lot)</i>			0.34			
<i>Neuroticism Item 5 (Kolayca üzülmeyen / Emotionally stable, not easily upset) [Reversed-Coded]</i>		0.32				
<i>Neuroticism Item 6 (Günü gününü tutmayan / Can be moody)</i>						
<i>Neuroticism Item 7 (Gergin durumlarda sakin kalabilen / Remains calm in tense situations) [Reversed-Coded]</i>			0.37			
<i>Neuroticism Item 8 (Kolayca sinirlenebilen / Get nervous easily)</i>			0.72			
<i>Conscientiousness Item 1 (Titiz iş yapan / Does a thorough job)</i>				0.55		
<i>Conscientiousness Item 2 (Dikkatsiz olabilen / Can be somewhat careless) [Reversed-Coded]</i>				0.52		
<i>Conscientiousness Item 3 (Yaptığı İşe Güvenilen / Reliable Worker)</i>					0.3	
<i>Conscientiousness Item 4 (Düzensiz olmaya yatkın / Tends to be disorganized) [Reversed-Coded]</i>				0.7		
<i>Conscientiousness Item 5 (Tembel olmaya yatkın / Tends to be lazy) [Reversed-Coded]</i>				0.73		
<i>Conscientiousness Item 6 (Azimli / Persevering)</i>				0.36	0.3	
<i>Conscientiousness Item 7 (Becerikli / Doing things efficiently)</i>					0.35	
<i>Conscientiousness Item 8 (Programlı / Makes plans and follows through with them)</i>				0.54		
<i>Conscientiousness Item 9 (Kolayca dikkati dağılan / Easily distracted) [Reversed-Coded]</i>				0.43		
<i>Openness to New Experiences Item 1 (Yeni Fikirler Üreten / Coming up with New Ideas)</i>					0.45	

Openness to New Experiences Item 2 (Öğrenmeye Meraklı / Curious about Many Different Things)	0.36
Openness to New Experiences Item 3 (Derin düşünen/ Ingenious, a deep thinker)	0.34
Openness to New Experiences Item 4 (Hayal gücü yüksek / Has an active imagination)	0.31
Openness to New Experiences Item 5 (İcat Kabiliyeti Yüksek / Inventive)	0.5
Openness to New Experiences Item 6 (Her türlü sanata değer veren / Values artistic, aesthetic experiences)	0.67
Openness to New Experiences Item 7 (Alışlagelmiş, sıradan işleri tercih eden / Prefers work that is routine) [Reversed-Coded]	0.31
Openness to New Experiences Item 8 (Her konuda fikir sahibi olmak isteyen / Likes to reflect, play with ideas)	
Openness to New Experiences Item 9 (Sanata ilgisi düşük / Has few artistic interests) [Reversed-Coded]	0.68
Openness to New Experiences Item 10 (Sanat, müzik ya da edebiyat hakkında bilgi sahibi / Sophisticated in art, music, or literature)	0.58
Sum of Squared Loadings	3.739
Proportion of Variance	0.085
Cumulative Proportion of Variance	0.085
Note 1: RMSR: 0.03, TLI: 0.887, and RMSEA: 0.046 Note 2: Loadings smaller than 0.30 were omitted.	

4.1.3 Measurement Invariance Tests

After the Turkish Big Five Personality Traits' best-fitting CFA model in Table 4.7, the next question is whether these traits were comparable and understandable across certain groups based on gender, primary language, and education. Hence, I run measurement invariance tests for three groups: (i) male v. female, (ii) Arabic/Kurdish primary language v. primary Turkish language, and (iii) below college degree (primary 5 years, primary 8 years, and high school) v. college degree.

There are four consecutive measurement invariance tests (Van de Schoot, Lugtig, & Hox, 2012). The first test is configural invariance to show that the CFA model fits for each group. The second test is weak invariance that constrains the factor loadings to be equal across the groups to show that the meaning of the personality trait constructs is the same across the groups. The third test is strong invariance that constrains both the factor loadings and the intercepts to be equal across the groups to show that the meaning and the level of the personality trait constructs are the same across the groups. The fourth test is strict invariance that constrains the factor loadings, the intercepts, and residual variances of the personality trait construct to be equal across the groups to show that the meaning, the level, and actual score variance of the personality trait constructs are the same across the groups. Therefore, with strict invariance, the personality traits factors would have identical measurements across

the groups. Given the consecutive addition of constraints in the tests, the next model is the child of the previous parent model, or in other words, the next model is nested in the previous model. Accordingly, the second test weak invariance is nested within the first test configural model, the third test strong invariance is nested within the second test weak invariance, and the fourth test strict invariance is nested within the third test strong invariance. To deliver any meaningful comparisons among the tests, I executed Chi-Square difference tests between each parent and child model.

Based on Table 4.9, there are four results. First, I observed a configural invariance such that the Turkish Big Five Personality Traits' best-fitting CFA model in Table 4.7 fitted for both males and females. Second, I also observed a weak invariance such that males and females had the same meaning when reading the personality traits in Table 4.7 during the survey. Third, there was no strong invariance (equal factor loadings and the intercepts) such that I cannot compare the differences in the mean across the personality traits constructs between males and females. Fourth, there was still partial strong invariance (equal factor loadings and the intercepts) if I kept the intercept of the Openness to New Experiences Item 2 (öğrenmeye meraklı [is curious about many different things]) free across the gender groups. Thus, except for Openness to New Experiences Item 2, males and females had the same understanding of the personality traits with the same levels in their responses. When looking at the partial strong invariance model's factor structure, males appeared to be higher on Neuroticism by 0.164 standard deviations and on Openness to New Experiences by 0.129 standard deviations. Further, females appeared to be higher on Extraversion by 0.170 standard deviations, on Agreeableness by 0.346 standard deviations, and on Conscientiousness by 0.150 standard deviations. Fifth, there was no (partial) strict invariance such that residual variances for the latent personality traits were not equal between males and females. Furthermore, I needed to be cautious of the varying residual variances when averaging the respective observable personality traits in Table 4.7 because the observed variance in any of the five traits (i.e., Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to New Experiences) is the sum of the actual score variances and residual variances.

Table 4.9: Tests of measurement invariance of the Big Five Personality Traits in Turkish based on gender groups (male v. female)

	χ^2	df	$(\Delta \chi^2)$ p -value	RMSEA	TLI	CFI	AIC
Configural Invariance Model	507.4149	188		0.0736	0.8961	0.9186	42943.71
Weak Invariance Model	517.0755	199	0.5611	0.0713	0.9022	0.9189	42931.37
Strong Invariance Model	538.5940	210	0.02838	0.0706	0.9043	0.9162	42930.89
Partial Strong Invariance Model	531.3365	209	0.1614	0.0701	0.9057	0.9178	42925.63
Partial Strict Invariance Model	562.3507	225	0.0134	0.0691	0.9083	0.9140	42924.65

Note: $(\Delta \chi^2)$ p -value is the p -value of the Chi-Square difference tests between the consecutive parent and child models. Non-significant $(\Delta \chi^2)$ p -value indicates that the child model is just as good and more parsimonious than the respective parent model.

In Table 4.10, I displayed the invariance test results based on comparisons between the primary language groups (Arabic/Kurdish v. Turkish). In the survey, all respondents were also directed to a question that inquired their level of proficiency in the following languages: Arabic, English, French, German, and Kurdish. In addition to No Response option, the respondents were expected to select one of the following choices per language: (1) Yes, I can speak enough to carry out the daily conversation; (2) Yes, besides the daily conversation, I can read a newspaper in this language; and (3) No, I cannot speak. For the measurement invariance test grouping, the ones who delivered 1 or 2 for Arabic or Kurdish were treated as Arabic/Kurdish primary language group, and ones who cannot speak Arabic and Kurdish at all (3) were treated as Turkish primary language group.

That being said, based on Table 4.10, there was strong invariance (equal factor loadings and the intercepts) across the primary language groups. Thus, persons with Arabic/Kurdish and Turkish primary languages had the same understanding of the personality traits with the same levels in their responses. When looking at the strong invariance model's factor structure, Arabic/Kurdish primary language speakers appeared to be higher on Extraversion by 0.393 standard deviations, on Agreeableness by 0.170 standard

deviations, on Conscientiousness by 0.168 standard deviations, and on Openness to New Experiences by 0.225 standard deviations.

Furthermore, Turkish primary language speakers appeared to be higher on Neuroticism by 0.330 standard deviations. Nevertheless, there was no strict invariance such that residual variances for the latent personality traits were not equal between Arabic/Kurdish and Turkish primary language speakers. Moreover, I still needed to be cautious of the varying residual variances when averaging the respective observable personality traits in Table 4.10 because the observed variance in any of the five traits (i.e., Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to New Experiences) is the sum of the actual score variances and residual variances.

Table 4.10: Tests of measurement invariance of the Big Five Personality Traits in Turkish based on primary language groups (Arabic/Kurdish v. Turkish)

	χ^2	df	$(\Delta \chi^2) p\text{-value}$	RMSEA	TLI	CFI	AIC
Configural Invariance Model	499.3391	188		0.0736	0.8938	0.9168	41860.38
Weak Invariance Model	507.6736	199	0.6831	0.0713	0.9006	0.9175	41846.72
Strong Invariance Model	519.5086	210	0.3762	0.0695	0.9055	0.9173	41836.55
Strict Invariance Model	562.3507	225	0.03123	0.0691	0.9083	0.9140	42924.65

Note: $(\Delta \chi^2) p\text{-value}$ is the $p\text{-value}$ of the Chi-Square difference tests between the consecutive parent and child models. Non-significant $(\Delta \chi^2) p\text{-value}$ indicates that the child model is just as good and more parsimonious than the respective parent model.

In Table 4.11, I displayed the invariance test results based on comparisons between education groups (below college degree v. Turkish). In the survey experiment's control group, among the total of 683 participants, 5 people had primary education with 5 years, 18 people with primary education with 8 years, 485 people with high school education degree, 166 people with a college degree, and 9 people with No Response. Hence, to compare at least two groups, I classified primary education with 5 years, primary education with 8 years, and high school education as below college degree and a college degree or above as a college

degree. Based on Table 4.11, there was partial strong invariance (equal factor loadings and the intercepts) across the education groups. Thus, if I kept the intercept of the Agreeableness Item 6 (soğuk ve başkalarına uzak duran [can be cold and aloof] – Reversed Coded) and factor loading of Neuroticism Item 3 (asabi [can be tense]) free across the education groups, ones with below college degree and with a college degree had the same understanding of the personality traits with the same levels in their responses. When looking at the strong invariance model's factor structure, respondents with a college degree appeared to be higher on Extraversion by 0.398 standard deviations, on Agreeableness by 0.469 standard deviations, on Conscientiousness by 0.607 standard deviations, and on Openness to New Experiences by 0.290 standard deviations.

Furthermore, respondents with below college degrees, on the other hand, seemed to be higher on Neuroticism by 0.355 standard deviations. Nevertheless, there was no strict invariance such that residual variances for the latent personality traits were not equal between the individuals with and below college degree. Therefore, I again needed to be cautious of the varying residual variances when averaging the respective observable personality traits in Table 4.11 because the observed variance in any of the five traits (i.e., Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to New Experiences) is the sum of the actual score variances and residual variances.

Table 4.11: Tests of measurement invariance of the Big Five Personality Traits in Turkish based on education groups (below college degree v. college degree)

	χ^2	df	$(\Delta \chi^2)$ p -value	RMSEA	TLI	CFI	AIC
Configural Invariance Model	471.8764	188		0.0693	0.9039	0.9247	42982.17
Weak Invariance Model	485.4810	199	0.2557	0.0677	0.9084	0.9240	42973.77
Strong Invariance Model	510.4231	210	0.009296	0.0674	0.9090	0.9203	42976.72
Partial Strong Invariance Model	498.3090	208	0.1705	0.0666	0.9112	0.9230	42968.60
Partial Strict Invariance Model	563.3283	224	7.31e-08	0.0694	0.9036	0.9100	43001.62

Note: $(\Delta \chi^2)$ p -value is the p -value of the Chi-Square difference tests between the consecutive parent and child models. Non-significant $(\Delta \chi^2)$ p -value indicates that the child model is just as good and more parsimonious than the respective parent model.

4.1.4 Inter-Item Associations

Next, I display the associations among the Big Five Traits for the control group ($N=683$). To deliver a piece of parsimonious information, I decided to use scatter plot matrices via R package psych's `pairs.panels()` function. In these scatter plot matrices, there are scatter plots below the diagonal, histograms on the diagonal, and the Pearson's correlation coefficient with p -values above the diagonal. I employed two scatter plot matrices. In the first scatter plot matrix (see Figure 4.2), I displayed the Big Five Personality Traits before the CFA. In other words, in Figure 4.2, each trait was the average of its all items (see Appendix B, B. Survey Instruments). In the second scatter plot matrix (see Figure 4.3), I displayed the Big Five Personality Traits after the CFA. In other words, each trait was the average of the items that gave the best fitting statistics in the CFA in Table 4.7. The major difference between these two matrices was that before the CFA, each trait displayed a relatively bell-shaped curve or normal distribution. However, after the CFA, except Neuroticism, the remaining four traits displayed left-skewed distribution.




Figure 4.2: The scatter plot of matrices for the Big Five Personality Traits before the CFA (bivariate scatter plots below the diagonal, histograms on the diagonal, and the Pearson correlation coefficient above the diagonal) [$p < 0.05^*$, $p < 0.01^{**}$, $p < 0.001^{***}$]




Figure 4.3: The scatter plot of matrices for the Big Five Personality Traits after the CFA (bivariate scatter plots below the diagonal, histograms on the diagonal, and the Pearson correlation coefficient above the diagonal) [$p < 0.05^*$, $p < 0.01^{**}$, $p < 0.001^{***}$]

Since I used the fitting statistics of the CFA to construct the Big Five Traits for multivariate analyses, I further detailed the latter matrix. In Figure 4.3, the most notable information was the statistically significant positive association between Conscientiousness and Openness to New Experiences at $p < 0.001$ level. In the correlation matrix, their association was the highest, Pearson's $r = 0.65$, and this was understandable because Turkish sample's Openness to New Experiences sub-dimensions lacked the post-materialist elements of deep thinking, active imagination, artistic, aesthetic experience and sophisticated interest in art, music, or the literature. Later, the second-highest association was between Extraversion and Conscientiousness, Pearson's $r = 0.64$, at $p < 0.001$ level. In the Turkish sample, energetic, enthusiastic, assertive, and sociable individuals tended to be reliable workers who were perseverant and efficient, or vice-versa. Given the positive and significant association between Conscientiousness and Openness to New Experiences, and between Extraversion and Conscientiousness, unsurprisingly, the third-highest association was between Extraversion and Openness to New Experiences, Pearson's $r = 0.58$, at $p < 0.001$ level. Original, curious, and inventive Turkish individuals also inclined to be energetic, enthusiastic, assertive, and sociable, or vice-versa. Notwithstanding the lack of post-materialist elements, this positive association between Extraversion and Openness to New Experiences was still reasonable because the Turkish sample's Openness to New Experiences sub-dimensions had one common element, which was the cognitive exploration of the natural and social life around.

Next, there was a statistically significant positive association between Conscientiousness and Agreeableness at $p < 0.001$ level. Helpful, forgiving, and considerate Turkish individuals tended to be reliable workers who were perseverant and efficient, or vice-versa. This positive association seemed to be counter-intuitive against the literature's theoretically expected negative relationship between the two. Because while altruistic agreeable individuals were expected to support welfare policies for all, self-disciplined, orderly, and hard-working, conscientious persons were expected to favor the equality of opportunities environment without any welfare schemes (Bakker, 2017; Gerber et al., 2010). Additionally, those agreeable Turkish individuals tended to be extrovert (Pearson's $r = 0.47$ at $p < 0.001$ level), open-minded (Pearson's $r = 0.45$ at $p < 0.001$ level), and, to a certain extent, emotionally stable (Pearson's r with *Neuroticism* = -0.11 at $p < 0.001$ level) or vice-versa. Last

but not least, Neuroticism was the only trait that had negative associations with the remaining four traits (Pearson's r with Extraversion = -0.27 at $p < 0.001$ level, Pearson's r with Agreeableness = -0.11 at $p < 0.01$ level, Pearson's r with Conscientiousness = -0.20 at $p < 0.001$ level, Pearson's r with Openness to New Experiences = -0.19 at $p < 0.001$ level). To a certain extent, blue, tense, and worried Turkish individuals were introverted, less conscientious, close-minded, and agreeable.

4.2 Measurement of the Conservatism Variables

Conservatism is the generic dependent variable throughout the dissertation. I used three different versions. The first is self-conservatism placement (0-10 placement). The second is multidimensional conservatism, where I subtracted self-liberalism scores from self-conservatism scores with a resultant index ranging from -10 (highly liberal) to +10 (highly conservative). I employed this multidimensional conservatism construct because in unidimensional measurements when a person gives lower scores on self-conservatism, this individual is taken to be less conservative and more liberal, which might not be the case after all. The third is a conservatism scale, composed of the average of the micro-conservatism, macro-conservatism, and gender-equality items after the best fitting CFA model in Table 4.13.

For self-conservatism, I followed the orthodox way³⁵ and directed the following question to the respondents: “Some people are considered conservative by looking at their worldviews and attitude and preferences towards societal events. From what you understand from this term, how conservative do you think you are? (Bazı insanlar dünyaya bakış ve toplum içindeki tercihleri ve olaylar karşısındaki tutumlarına bakılarak muhafazakar olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Siz bu terimden ne anlıyorsanız, kendinizi ne derece muhafazakar görürsünüz?)”. When using the control group ($N=683$) for visualization (see Figure 4.4), there was bimodal distribution with peaks at the center and “no conservative at all” response. After excluding the center (29.87%) and the NAs (2.64%), 39.97% of the control group participants perceived themselves as not conservative, with varying degrees. 27.53% of the

³⁵ For instance, see the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), Family and Changing Gender Roles IV (2012) Turkey Data Questionnaire (ZA5900_q_tr.pdf), p. 13, B.08. / c118, from https://search.gesis.org/research_data/ZA5900 (Jorat et al., 2016)

control group participants, on the other hand, perceived themselves conservative, still with varying degrees.




Figure 4.4: Bar plot of the self-conservatism placements

For self-liberalism, however, to the best of my knowledge, none of the survey studies in Turkey have asked any question. The self-liberalism question's wording is problematic because the adjective *liberal* in Turkish connotes a pejorative political curse. Thus, any use of the adjective *liberal* (liberal in Turkish, as well) can potentially lead to socially desirable responses. Then, there remained two alternatives for liberalism in Turkish. The first alternative adjective was *ilerici*, which could be translated as "progressive". However, this adjective *ilerici* also has the spatial meaning, which indicates forward, and its opposite is backward, whose Turkish is *gerici* – puritanical. Therefore, the use of the adjective *ilerici* (progressive, forward) could also lead to socially desirable responses, as shown by most of the cognitive interviewees. Then, the second alternative adjective remained as the only option, and it was *özgürlükçü* whose English is still *liberal*, but more genuinely it means *promoter of freedoms* or *freedomist*.

Consequently, I directed the following question to the respondents: "Some people are considered liberal by looking at their worldviews and attitude and preferences towards

societal events. From what you understand from this term, how liberal do you think you are? (Bazı insanlar dünyaya bakış ve toplum içindeki tercihleri ve olaylar karşısındaki tutumlarına bakılarak özgürlükçü olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Siz bu terimden ne anlıyorsanız, kendinizi ne derece özgürlükçü görürsünüz?). When using the control group ($N=683$) for visualization (see Figure 4.5), there was still bimodal distribution with peaks at the center and “highly liberal” response. After excluding the center (20.06%) and the NAs (1.02%), 74.08% of the control group participants perceived themselves as liberal, with varying degrees. Only 4.83% of the control group participants saw themselves as not liberal, again, with varying degrees.




Figure 4.5: Bar plot of the self-liberalism placements

Then, as theoretically expected, contra to 27.53% of the control group participants who perceived themselves as self-conservative (in Figure 4.4), when multi-dimensional conservatism is constructed, only 15.82% of the control group appeared as conservative, the total percentage of the ones between the values 1 and 10 in Figure 4.6.




Figure 4.6: Bar plot of the multi-dimensional conservatism

4.2.1 Item Statistics

As for the reliability of the conservatism scale with 9 items in Turkish (3 micro-conservatism, 3 macro-conservatism, and 3 gender-equality items), the average Cronbach's α was 0.71 for the control group ($N=683$) (see Table 4.12). Under micro-level conservatism items, I inquired the extent of respondents' support for (1) old customs against uncertainty and change, (2) life under old customs, and (3) social contacts' and associationalism's importance against uncertainty.³⁶ Under macro-level conservatism items, I inquired the extent of respondents'

³⁶ The exact wording of the micro-level conservatism question was the following: What do you think we should do as a citizen in the face of the uncertainty created by the change in each case? Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each statement after the end of each sentence. (Sizce, her olayda değişimin yarattığı belirsizlik karşısında bir vatandaş olarak ne yapmalıyız? Lütfen her bir cümlemin bitiminin ardından, ilgili ifadeyle hangi ölçüde hemfikir olduğunuzu belirtir misiniz?) The first micro-level conservatism statement was the following: In order to reduce the uncertainty, we must oppose change and resist it by keeping our customs and traditions (Belirsizliği azaltmak için değişime karşı olmalı, ona örf ve adetlerimize sarılarak direnmeliyiz). The second micro-level conservatism statement was the following: We must strive to live within the framework of our customs and traditions (Örf ve adetlerimiz çerçevesinde yaşamaya gayret etmeliyiz). The third micro-level conservatism statement was the following: When we encounter uncertainty, instead of escaping from other people, we should have plenty of contact with others in these environments and benefit from their experiences (Belirsizlikle karşılaştığımızda insanlardan kaçmak yerine bu ortamlarda başkaları ile bol temas edip, onların tecrübelerinden yararlanmalıyız).

support for (1) Turkish state's conformity with changes in domestic and international politics, (2) more democracy and multi-faceted discussions with various circles to solve Turkey's problems and (3) Turkey's resistance against change by holding the long-standing values at the expense of alternative lifestyles.³⁷ Under gender-equality items, I inquired about the extent of respondents' support for (1) abortion, (2) arranged marriages by families, and (3) full-time female employment.³⁸

³⁷ The exact wording of the macro-level conservatism question was the following: What do you think we should do as a country in the face of the uncertainty created by the change in each case? Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each statement after the end of each sentence. (Sizce, her olayda değişimin yarattığı belirsizlik karşısında bir ülke olarak ne yapmalıyız? Lütfen her bir cümlemin bitiminin ardından, ilgili ifadeyle hangi ölçüde hemfikir olduğunuzu belirtir misiniz?) The first macro-level conservatism statement was the following: We should try to keep up with change in both domestic and foreign policy (Gerek iç gerek dış politika alanında değişime ayak uydurmaya çalışmalıyız). The second macro-level conservatism statement was the following: In contact with different circles, we should try to solve our problems with more democracy (Farklı çevrelerle temas içinde sorunlarımızı daha çok demokrasi ile çözmeye çalışmalıyız). The third macro-level conservatism statement was the following: As a country, we must embrace our standing values in the face of change, and return to our own essence against life styles that increase uncertainty (Ülke olarak değişim karşısında ayakta kalmış değerlerimize sarılmalı, belirsizliği arttıran yaşam biçimlerine karşı kendi özümüze dönmeliyiz).

³⁸ The exact wording of the gender-equality question was the following: Below there are various statements. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each statement after the end of each sentence. (Aşağıda çeşitli ifadeler verilmiştir. Lütfen her bir cümlemin bitiminin ardından, ilgili ifadeyle hangi ölçüde hemfikir olduğunuzu belirtir misiniz?) The first gender-equality statement was the following: If it is known that the child of a pregnant woman will be born with a very serious illness, she should be allowed to abort the baby (Hamile bir kadının çocuğunun çok ciddi bir rahatsızlıkla doğacağı belirlenmişse, çocuğu aldırmasına (yani kürtaj) yaptırmasına izin verilmelidir). The second gender-equality statement was the following: The marriages arranged by the families are more appropriate, than the ones done by the couples themselves (Çiftlerin kendilerinin tanışıp anlaşmalarıyla kurulan değil, ailelerin ayarladıkları evlilikler daha uygundur). The third gender-equality statement was the following: When a woman is employed at a full-time job, her entire family is harmed (Bir kadın tam zamanlı bir işte çalıştığında bundan bütün ailesi zarar görür).

Table 4.12: The conservatism scale reliability test item statistics

	<i>N</i>	Item-Total Correlation (Corrected for Item Overlap and Scale Reliability)	Item-Rest Correlation	Scale Mean	Scale Standard Deviation
Micro-level conservatism item 1	666	0.64	0.539	3.8	3.2
Micro-level conservatism item 2	661	0.66	0.564	5.4	3.1
Micro-level conservatism item 3	665	0.11	0.037	3.1	2.4
Macro-level conservatism item 1	658	0.34	0.243	3.6	2.6
Macro-level conservatism item 2	667	0.42	0.303	2.6	2.3
Macro-level conservatism item 3	660	0.54	0.468	6.5	3.3
Gender-equality item 1	661	0.5	0.441	4.7	3.9
Gender equality item 2	669	0.52	0.455	2.8	2.6
Gender equality item 3	667	0.43	0.369	3.5	3.3
Note: The conservatism subscale was reliable at Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.71$.					

In Table 4.12, the conservatism scale's Cronbach's α value was 0.71, which was higher than the suggested threshold 0.7 (see Kline, 1999). However, among the nine conservatism scale items, there were two items whose item-rest correlations were below 0.30, and they were micro-level conservatism item 3 (social contacts' and associationalism's importance against uncertainty) and macro-level conservatism item 1 (Turkish state's conformity with changes in domestic and international politics). Then, to construct the conservatism as one of the dependent variables in the multivariate analyses, I used the best fitting CFA model (see Table 4.13).

Table 4.13: Conservatism scale's CFA solution (control group only)

Measurement Model with Standardized Coefficients		Factor Loadings
Conservatism →		
Micro Conservatism Item 1 (Old Customs against Uncertainty and Change)		0.748***
Micro Conservatism Item 2 (Life under Old Customs)		0.833***
Macro Conservatism Item 3 (Long-standing Values against Alternative Lifestyles, Uncertainty, and Change)		0.662***
Gender-Equality Item 1 (Against Abortion)		0.444***
Gender-Equality Item 2 (Arranged Marriages by Families)		0.461***
Gender-Equality Item 3 (Against Females' Full-Time Employment)		0.435***
Fit Indexes		
X ² (df)		58.564 (9)***
RMSEA		0.094**
CFI		0.947
TLI		0.912
SRMR		0.049

Note: ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Accordingly, when I used CFA to detect the items with the best fitting statistics, the online non-representative Turkish sample's latent conservative attitude appeared to be against uncertainty, change, and gender-equality in female's right over their body, social and economic independence. However, unlike the Anglo-Saxon cleavages, the Turkish latent conservative attitude did not reflect individualism (at the micro-level), isolationism (at the macro level), and anti-democracy/-pluralism (at the macro level) (see Table 4.13). Then, throughout the dissertation's multivariate analyses, the conservatism scale was the average of Micro Conservatism Item 1 (Old Customs against Uncertainty and Change), Micro Conservatism Item 2 (Life under Old Customs), Macro Conservatism Item 3 (Long-standing Values against Alternative Lifestyles, Uncertainty, and Change), Gender-Equality Item 1 (Against Abortion), Gender-Equality Item 2 (Arranged Marriages by Families), Gender-Equality Item 3 (Against Females' Full-Time Employment).

4.2.2 Inter-Item Associations

Later, when I used the scatter plot matrix in Figure 4.7 for scatter plots below the diagonal, histograms on the diagonal, and the Pearson's correlation coefficients with p -values above the diagonal, two conclusions can be drawn. First, self-liberalism placement had a statistically significant negative association with all conservatism measures (Pearson's r with

self-conservatism placement = -0.27 at $p < 0.001$ level, with multi-dimensional conservatism = -0.73 at $p < 0.001$ level, and with the conservatism scale = -0.30 at $p < 0.001$ level). Hence, on face validity, the control group respondents were aware of the distinction between conservatism and liberalism. Second, the highest association was between self-conservatism placement and multi-dimensional conservatism, Pearson's $r = 0.86$ at $p < 0.001$ level, which was quite natural, given that self-conservatism placement was part of the latter construct. Therefore, both self-conservatism placement and multi-dimensional conservatism had a similar level of associations with the conservatism scale (Pearson's r equals to 0.59 and 0.58 at $p < 0.001$ level, respectively). Thus, there was also relative congruity between self-conservative placement and latent (innate) conservative attitude averages.




Figure 4.7: The scatter plot of matrices for the conservatism variables (bivariate scatter plots below the diagonal, histograms on the diagonal, and the Pearson correlation coefficient above the diagonal) [$p < 0.05^*$, $p < 0.01^{**}$, $p < 0.001^{***}$]

Chapter 5

EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS

The objective of this chapter is to deliver the findings of the multivariate experimental mediation and moderation analyses. In Section 5.1, I depicted the internal validity tests on balance testing and manipulation check. In Section 5.2, I evaluated the multivariate moderation findings on TMT's problems of replication and overgeneralization. In Section 5.3, I assessed the multivariate moderation findings on TMT's contradictory findings. In Section 5.4, I checked the robustness of my multivariate moderation findings by geographical mixed-effects, multiple comparison testings, and subset analyses. In Section 5.5, I weighed the multivariate mediation findings.

5.1 Internal Validity

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 presented descriptive statistics for the demographic variables and other characteristics of the respondents in the four experimental groups. The cross-group similarities in age, education, sex, an affiliation for Turkey's governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), and the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) and Openness to New Experiences suggested that randomization was successful. A likelihood ratio test from the multinomial logit regression of treatment assignment on these characteristics was statistically insignificant (Wald $X^2_{(18)} = 18.575, p < 0.4184$).

Table 5.1: Distribution of online survey experiment participants into experimental groups

Group	Frequency	Percentage
Control	683	25.98
Treatment 1 (Cancer)	651	24.76
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	644	24.5
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)	651	24.76
Total	2629	100.00

Table 5.2: Sample characteristics across experimental groups

	Treatment 1 (Cancer)	Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)	Control
Age (Avg.)	24.2	24	23.4	23.4
Female (%)	64.7	64.8	66.1	64.4
College Degree (%)	25.3	27.8	27.6	24.3
AKP Supporter (%)	24	24.2	26.1	25.5
CHP Supporter (%)	24.6	23.4	23	23.3
Openness to New Experiences (Avg.)	8.18	8.26	8.18	8.16

Besides, among the three treatment groups, only Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) and Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) conditions had statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) manipulation check score³⁹, and conservative self-identification⁴⁰ averages higher than the averages of the Control group. The placebo condition of Treatment 1 (Cancer), on the other hand, had a statistically insignificant ($p > 0.05$) manipulation check score, and conservative self-identification averages higher than the averages of the Control group.

³⁹ Based on the Bartlett test of homogeneity of variance tests, there were no significant differences in the variances between Treatment 1 (Cancer) Condition and Control Group, and Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) Condition and Control Group. Thus, except for Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) Condition v. Control Group, the two-sample t-tests were conducted with the equal variance assumption. The null hypothesis that Treatment 1 (Cancer) Group's Mean Manipulation Check Score (0.6451613) was not greater than the Control Group's Mean Manipulation Check Score (0.5865546) was not rejected at $p = 0.06858$ level. However, the null hypothesis that Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) Group's Mean Manipulation Check Score (0.6713533) was not greater than the Control Group's Mean Manipulation Check Score (0.5865546) was rejected at $p = 0.01621$ level. Similarly, the null hypothesis that Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) Group's Mean Manipulation Check Score (0.6672158) was not greater than the Control Group's Mean Manipulation Check Score (0.5865546) was rejected at $p = 0.02338$ level.

⁴⁰ Bartlett's test of homogeneity of variances had p values smaller than or equal to 0.05, such that I failed to reject the null hypothesis that variance was the same for all experimental groups. Hence, the two-sample t-tests were conducted with the equal variance assumption. The null hypothesis that Treatment 1 (Cancer) Group's Mean Self-Conservatism Placement Level (5.313386) was not greater than the Control Group's Mean Self-Conservatism Placement Level (5.237594) was not rejected at $p = 0.3332$ level. However, the null hypothesis that Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) Group's Mean Self-Conservatism Placement Level (5.540323) was not greater than the Control Group's Mean Self-Conservatism Placement Level (5.237594) was rejected at $p = 0.04112$ level. Similarly, the null hypothesis that Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) Group's Mean Self-Conservatism Placement Level (5.654459) was not greater than the Control Group's Mean Self-Conservatism Placement Level (5.237594) was rejected at $p = 0.007837$ level.

5.2. Hypotheses 1-3: TMT's Replicability and Overgeneralization

The standardized regression coefficients with full statistics for the interaction/moderation models are shown in Table 5.3, while Figure 5.1 presents the coefficient plots. Across these moderation models, after controlling for the respondents' age, education, sex, and left-right ideological placement, the reminders of death due to a terror attack and unknown causes increased self-conservatism placement levels by 0.1 and 0.11 standard deviations, respectively, at $p < 0.05$ level, compared to the control condition. After adding *the Big Five Personality Traits* and their two-way interactions with the experimental groups to the equation, the reminders of death due to a terror attack and unknown causes maintained their statistically significant positive effects on self-conservatism placement (see Figure 5.1). Considering their coefficient sizes and their standard errors, reminders of the thought of death due to a terror attack and unknown causes were equally effective in increasing conservative self-identification.⁴¹ Therefore, across the base and full models on conservative self-identification, this study rejected Hypothesis 1 (cancer) but failed to reject Hypotheses 2 and 3 (a terror attack and unknown causes).

⁴¹ When I estimated the asymptotic Chi-squared statistic by carrying out a Wald-test that the coefficients of the Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) and Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) were equal to each other, I failed to reject this null hypothesis (Self-Conservatism Placement: Base Model = Chisq: 0.0191, $\Pr(p > \text{Chisq})$: 0.8902; and Self-Conservatism Placement: Full Model = Chisq: 0.0312, $\Pr(p > \text{Chisq})$: 0.8597). Hence, there was no difference between the effects of Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) and Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) on self-conservatism placement levels.

Table 5.3: Experimental moderation OLS models with standardized coefficients

	Self-Conservatism Placement: Base Model				Self-Conservatism Placement: Full Model				Multi-Dimensional Conservatism: Base Model				Multi-Dimensional Conservatism: Full Model				Conservatism Scale: Base Model			Conservatism Scale: Full Model		
	Predictors	Estimates	CI (95%)	p	Estimates	CI (95%)	p	Estimates	CI (95%)	p	Estimates	CI (95%)	p	Estimates	CI (95%)	p	Estimates	CI (95%)	p			
Intercept	-0.15	-0.22 – -0.07	<0.001	-0.12	-0.20 – -0.04	0.004	-0.03	-0.11 – 0.05	0.449	-0.01	-0.09 – 0.07	0.810	0.02	-0.07 – 0.10	0.717	0.05	-0.04 – 0.13	0.286				
Treatment 1 (Cancer)	0.07	-0.02 – 0.16	0.155	0.05	-0.04 – 0.15	0.258	0.03	-0.06 – 0.12	0.505	0.02	-0.07 – 0.11	0.690	0.00	-0.10 – 0.10	0.995	-0.01	-0.11 – 0.09	0.816				
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	0.10	0.01 – 0.19	0.030	0.09	0.00 – 0.19	0.047	0.06	-0.04 – 0.15	0.241	0.05	-0.04 – 0.15	0.275	0.00	-0.09 – 0.10	0.968	-0.01	-0.10 – 0.09	0.909				
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)	0.11	0.02 – 0.20	0.020	0.10	0.01 – 0.20	0.029	0.02	-0.07 – 0.11	0.626	0.02	-0.07 – 0.12	0.627	0.06	-0.04 – 0.16	0.216	0.06	-0.03 – 0.16	0.205				
Extraversion				0.00	-0.09 – 0.09	0.982				0.02	-0.07 – 0.11	0.716				0.05	-0.05 – 0.14	0.339				
Agreeableness				0.14	0.06 – 0.22	<0.001				0.06	-0.02 – 0.14	0.137				0.17	0.09 – 0.25	<0.001				
Conscientiousness				0.12	0.02 – 0.22	0.014				0.06	-0.03 – 0.16	0.204				0.07	-0.03 – 0.17	0.147				
Neuroticism				-0.03	-0.09 – 0.04	0.467				0.05	-0.01 – 0.12	0.121				-0.01	-0.09 – 0.06	0.727				
Openness to New Experiences				-0.13	-0.22 – -0.05	0.003				-0.17	-0.26 – -0.08	<0.001				-0.15	-0.25 – -0.06	0.001				
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Extraversion				-0.03	-0.16 – 0.10	0.660				-0.10	-0.23 – 0.03	0.125				-0.05	-0.18 – 0.09	0.473				
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Extraversion				-0.01	-0.14 – 0.12	0.898				-0.08	-0.20 – 0.05	0.251				-0.08	-0.21 – 0.06	0.268				
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Extraversion				-0.03	-0.16 – 0.09	0.628				-0.08	-0.21 – 0.05	0.222				-0.04	-0.17 – 0.09	0.566				
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Agreeableness				-0.10	-0.20 – 0.01	0.082				-0.06	-0.17 – 0.05	0.290				-0.11	-0.22 – 0.01	0.065				
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Agreeableness				-0.06	-0.17 – 0.05	0.295				-0.03	-0.14 – 0.08	0.578				-0.12	-0.24 – -0.01	0.037				
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Agreeableness				-0.08	-0.19 – 0.03	0.159				-0.06	-0.17 – 0.06	0.327				-0.08	-0.20 – 0.03	0.161				
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Conscientiousness				-0.02	-0.16 – 0.11	0.738				0.03	-0.11 – 0.16	0.711				0.04	-0.10 – 0.18	0.551				
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Conscientiousness				-0.01	-0.15 – 0.12	0.831				0.03	-0.11 – 0.16	0.691				0.09	-0.05 – 0.23	0.221				
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Conscientiousness				-0.04	-0.18 – 0.09	0.538				0.01	-0.13 – 0.15	0.889				-0.02	-0.16 – 0.12	0.778				
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Neuroticism				-0.05	-0.14 – 0.05	0.326				-0.14	-0.24 – -0.05	0.003				0.01	-0.09 – 0.11	0.872				

Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Neuroticism				-0.01	-0.11 – 0.09	0.889					-0.06	-0.16 – 0.05	0.278					-0.02	-0.12 – 0.09	0.738
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Neuroticism				0.04	-0.06 – 0.14	0.400					-0.06	-0.15 – 0.04	0.257					0.01	-0.09 – 0.11	0.838
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Openness to New Experiences				0.06	-0.06 – 0.19	0.311					0.04	-0.09 – 0.16	0.541					0.10	-0.03 – 0.23	0.140
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Openness to New Experiences				0.16	0.04 – 0.28	0.012					0.10	-0.02 – 0.23	0.109					0.10	-0.04 – 0.23	0.150
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Openness to New Experiences				0.09	-0.03 – 0.21	0.159					0.06	-0.07 – 0.18	0.352					0.12	-0.01 – 0.25	0.060
Sex: Female [Base: Male]		0.10	0.04 – 0.17	0.003	0.06	-0.01 – 0.13	0.094	-0.00	-0.07 – 0.07	0.970	-0.02	-0.09 – 0.05	0.538	-0.06	-0.13 – 0.01	0.107	-0.11	-0.18 – -0.03	0.005	
Age		-0.04	-0.07 – -0.00	0.026	-0.08	-0.11 – -0.04	<0.001	-0.04	-0.07 – -0.00	0.033	-0.05	-0.09 – -0.01	0.013	0.04	0.00 – 0.07	0.049	0.01	-0.03 – 0.05	0.673	
Education		-0.01	-0.04 – 0.03	0.730	-0.00	-0.04 – 0.03	0.830	-0.02	-0.05 – 0.02	0.331	-0.01	-0.05 – 0.03	0.590	-0.08	-0.12 – -0.05	<0.001	-0.08	-0.12 – -0.05	<0.001	
Left-Right Ideological Placement		0.60	0.56 – 0.63	<0.001	0.59	0.55 – 0.62	<0.001	0.60	0.57 – 0.63	<0.001	0.60	0.57 – 0.64	<0.001	0.58	0.54 – 0.61	<0.001	0.56	0.53 – 0.60	<0.001	
Observations		2362			2250			2354			2244			2214			2132			
R² / R² adjusted		0.365 / 0.363			0.386 / 0.379			0.362 / 0.360			0.378 / 0.371			0.331 / 0.329			0.349 / 0.341			




Figure 5.1: Coefficient plot for the selected experimental moderation OLS models

5.3 Hypotheses 4-8: TMT's Contradictory Findings

The personality trait Openness to New Experiences only had a moderating effect on the relationship between the reminder of death due to a terror attack and Self-Conservatism Placement. The main effect of Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) was 0.09, at $p < 0.05$ level, the associational coefficient of Openness to New Experiences for the Control Group was -0.13, at $p < 0.01$ level, while the interaction effect between Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) and Openness to New Experiences was 0.16, at $p < 0.05$ level. The interaction effect was 0.335 standard deviations at its maximum (see Figure 5.2 and Table 5.4).




Figure 5.2: Interaction plot between Openness to New Experiences and Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) with CIs (95%)

Note: The interaction plot in Figure 5.2 was taken from Self-Conservatism Placement Level: Full Model in Table 5.3. In this plot, I conditioned the continuous independent variables to their mean values and categorical independent variables to their base categories. Accordingly, the conditioned values were as follows: 9.12 for Agreeableness, 8.48 for Conscientiousness, 7.97 for Extraversion, 5.38 for Neuroticism, 23.72 for age, 5.01 for education, 5.98 for left-right ideological placement, and ‘male’ for sex.

Table 5.4: Average marginal effects of the Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) conditional on the Openness to New Experiences' five selected values at its minimum, 25th and 75th percentiles, median, and maximum.

Factor	Openness to New Experiences Values at	Openness to New Experiences Values	Average Marginal Effect	SE	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>	Lower CI (95%)	Upper CI (95%)
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	Min.	-6.8614	-0.4945	0.2411	-2.0511	0.0403	-0.967	-0.022
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	25 th Pctl.	-1.1947	-0.0082	0.0641	-0.1284	0.8978	-0.1338	0.1174
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	Median	0.1386	0.1062	0.0475	2.2358	0.0254	0.0131	0.1993
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	75 th Pctl.	1.1386	0.192	0.0599	3.2077	0.0013	0.0747	0.3093
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	Max.	2.8053	0.335	0.1047	3.1993	0.0014	0.1298	0.5402

The robustness of this interaction between Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) and Openness to New Experiences was tested in three ways. First, a joint hypothesis test using the *F*-statistic that the coefficients for Treatment 2 (Terror Attack), Openness to New Experiences, and the Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Openness to New Experiences interaction were zero was rejected at $p < 0.05$ level ($F = 4.5506$; $df = 3$). Second, the Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Openness to New Experiences interaction was not conditional on the remaining four personality traits' interactions with the treatments (see Appendix C: Supplementary Outputs, Table 11.1 and Figure 11.1). Third, the Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Openness to New Experiences interaction was not conditional on the constituent items of the Big Five Personality Traits (see Table 11.2 and Figure 11.2 in Appendix C, Supplementary Outputs).⁴²

Nevertheless, did I have a large sample to replicate this robust interaction effect? Even though the number of participants surpassed the expected minimum sample size (minimum *N* of 516 participants per experimental group) for 99% power, this power calculation was for a simple multivariate regression with an intercept and 27 independent

⁴² In addition to the best fitting CFA Solution construction of the personality traits (see Chapter 4: Concept Measurements, Table 4.7), I also tried the ten facet scales for the Big Five Inventory (from Soto & John, 2009). These ten facets are Assertiveness (Extraversion), Activity (Extraversion), Altruism (Agreeableness), Compliance (Agreeableness), Order (Conscientiousness), Self-Discipline (Conscientiousness), Anxiety (Neuroticism), Depression (Neuroticism), Aesthetics (Openness to New Experiences), and Ideas (Openness to New Experiences). I can still see the interaction between Openness to New Experiences (Ideas facet) and Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) at $p < 0.05$ level but the difference from the Control condition was visible with 90% CIs (see Figure 11.2 in Appendix C, Supplementary Outputs). Further, when I averaged these facets for the Big Five Traits before checking their fitting statistics, their psychometric properties were not good enough to reflect the respondents' underlying personality profiles ($X^2(df) = 4037.493(550)$, $p < 0.000$; RMSEA = 0.101, $p < 0.000$; CFI = 0.568; TLI = 0.533; SRMR = 0.128). (see Table 11.3 in Appendix C: Supplementary Outputs).

variables (age, sex, education, ideological left-right ideological placement), three treatment groups [base: control group], the Big Five Personality Traits, the two-way interaction terms between the treatment groups and the Big Five Personality Traits) (see f.n. 28 of Chapter 3: Methodology). To do a proper power analysis for the interaction between Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) and Openness to New Experiences, I simulated the data with the given effect size to learn how frequently I can get a statistically significant Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Openness to New Experiences interaction effect with the current sample size, at $p < 0.05$ level.

Accordingly, with $\beta(\text{Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Openness to New Experiences}) = 0.16$, $\beta(\text{Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)}) = 0.09$, $\beta(\text{Openness to New Experiences}) = -0.13$, and $r(\text{Treatment 2 (Terror Attack), Openness to New Experiences})^{43} = 0.03$, the power analysis results for the interaction with simulation is in Figure 5.3 (A: Simulated Data). The power analysis using a simulated data indicated that $N = 600$ can give 97.67% power.

Next, I bootstrapped 10,000 new samples from my survey experiment dataset and, then, ran Self-Conservatism Placement: Full Model of Table 5.3, to see how frequently $p < 0.05$ was observed for the interaction between Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) and Openness to New Experiences. The power analysis results for the interaction with bootstraps is in Figure 5.3 (B: Real Data – Bootstrapped). The results were not similar to the simulations and indicated that $N = 600$ can only give 21.3% power. Instead, for seeing a significant Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Openness to New Experiences interaction in at least 95% of the time, N has to be 5600 per experimental group. Therefore, this study is not powered enough to detect Openness to New Experiences' moderation effect against the reminder of mortality due to a terror attack. Even if this moderation effect seems to concur with the previous findings (Sibley et al., 2012) that in difficult times, open-minded progressive individuals stop resisting conservatism, this present moderation effect is more likely to be a noise.

⁴³ Since Terror 2 (Terror Attack) is a dummy variable, for the Pearson's r between Terror 2 (Terror Attack) and Openness to New Experiences, I followed an alternative strategy. I run a bivariate OLS model where Openness to New Experiences was the dependent variable and Terror 2 (Terror Attack) was the independent variable. I saved the predicted values fitted by Terror 2 (Terror Attack) as a new variable in the dataset. Then, I estimated the linear association between the actual and predicted values of Openness to New Experiences. The Pearson's r was 0.03 and this near zero linear correlation is quite normal because the assignment to Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) is random for the survey experiment participants.




Figure 5.3: Power analysis for the moderation effect

In addition to the insufficient power, the Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Openness to New Experiences interaction did not match the prediction of Hypothesis 4: Worldview Defense (Openness to New Experiences). Instead, the Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Openness to New Experiences interaction matched the prediction of Hypothesis 8B: Partial Conservative Shift. I originally predicted that this would apply to the least agreeable respondents, not the highly open-minded (liberal) ones. Consequently, my findings concerning inconsistent results from TMT studies were inconclusive.

5.4 Additional Robustness Checks on the Moderation Models: Hypotheses 1-8

5.4.1 Geographical Mixed-Effects

Even if the study was underpowered to significantly detect the moderation effects, what made me fail to predict the partial conservative shift expectation correctly? Possibly, when reminded of death due to a terror attack, respondents remembered different terrorist groups and events, such that it was the highly open-minded rather than least agreeable respondents who perceived a threat and became more self-conservative. For urban residents in Turkey,

PKK terror attacks in rural areas might not have been a salient reason to fear their death. Instead, they could have been more sensitive to reminders of death from suicide bombings and mass shootings in cities by the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK), Al-Qaeda/ISIL, or other Marxist and Islamic militant groups like the Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist (TKP-ML), Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), Revolutionary Headquarters, Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C), or Turkish Hezbollah. I, therefore, needed to test whether the effect of a reminder of death due to a terror attack and its interactions with personality traits were conditional on the respondents' residential regions. As a sensitivity test, I used a mixed-effects model on self-conservatism placement by adding interactions among the treatments, Big Five Personality Traits, and residential regions into the equation.

In Turkey, the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) – 1 has twelve regions: Istanbul (Istanbul), West Marmara (Tekirdag, Edirne, Kirklareli, Balikesir, Canakkale), Aegean (Izmir, Aydin, Denizli, Mugla, Manisa, Afyonkarahisar, Kutahya, Usak), East Marmara (Bursa, Eskisehir, Bilecik, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Duzce, Bolu, Yalova), West Anatolia (Ankara, Konya, Karaman), Mediterranean (Antalya, Isparta, Burdur, Adana, Mersin, Hatay, Kahramanmaras, Osmaniye), Central Anatolia (Kirikkale, Aksaray, Nigde, Nevsehir, Kirsehir, Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat), West Black Sea (Karabuk, Bartin, Kastamonu, Cankiri, Sinop, Samsun, Tokat, Corum, Amasya), East Black Sea (Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Artvin, Gumushane), Northeast Anatolia (Erzurum, Erzincan, Bayburt, Agri, Kars, Igdir, Ardahan), Central East Anatolia (Malatya, Elazig, Bingol, Tunceli, Van, Mus, Bitlis, Hakkari), and Southeast Anatolia (Gaziantep, Adiyaman, Kilis, Sanliurfa, Diyarbakir, Mardin, Batman, Sirnak, Siirt).

To get enough observations for each variable in the analysis, I reduced these twelve regions to the following six: (i) Istanbul (Base Category) [$N=1098$], (ii) Aegean [$N=326$], (iii) Eastern [$N=207$] and Western [$N=52$] Marmara, (iv) Mediterranean [$N=278$], (v) Western Anatolia [$N=347$], and (vi) Others (Central Anatolia [$N=72$], Central Eastern Anatolia [$N=38$], North Eastern Anatolia [$N=20$], South Eastern Anatolia [$N=76$], Eastern Black Sea [$N=32$], and Western Black Sea [$N=67$]).

There were two findings (see Appendix C: Supplementary Outputs, Table 11.4 for full model statistics, and Figures 11.3 and 11.4 for the interaction plots). First, the reminders

of death due to a terror attack and unknown causes lost their statistical significance at $p > 0.05$ level. Second, compared to respondents in Istanbul, the least Agreeable (a priori liberal assumed) individuals from Western Anatolia (Ankara and Konya) became more conservative after a reminder of death from a terror attack or unknown causes at $p < 0.05$ level. This second finding correctly supported my Hypothesis 8B: Partial Conservative Shift for the least Agreeable respondents residing in one of Turkey's most nationalist-conservative regions. Nonetheless, the replicability of this geographical mixed-effects finding is at its lowest level, given the insufficient sample size (see Figure 5.3).

5.4.2 Multiple Testing

If I were to choose one model providing the most parsimonious fit of the data for self-conservatism placement among (i) the base model (treatments and controls), (ii) the full model (treatments, personality traits, treatments x personality traits, and controls), and (iii) the full model with geographical sensitivity (treatments, personality traits, regions, treatments x personality traits, treatments x regions, regions x personality traits, treatments x personality traits x regions, and controls), it would be the second option.⁴⁴

However, this most parsimonious model (Self-Conservatism Placement: Full Model in Table 5.3) had the problem of false positives due to the multiple testing problem. In statistics, the multiple testing problem occurs when more than one single null hypothesis is tested simultaneously. In a single null hypothesis test case, the Type I error rate (false positive) or α is 0.05 by general practice. However, if there are multiple hypotheses, for instance, m , the probability of the Type I error rate increases by $1 - (1 - \alpha)^m$ such that there has to be an adjustment for the reported marginal p values (Bretz, Hothorn, and Westfall, 2011, pp. 1, 4). For example, in a regression model with eight independent variables, if the marginal p -value of one of the independent variables is 0.025, the adjusted p -value by the Bonferroni method multiplies 0.025 by 8 and requires the adjusted p -value of 0.2 to be less than the α value (~ 0.05).

⁴⁴ The analysis of variance (ANOVA) testing showed that 20 df , by adding the Big Five Traits and their interactions with the experimental treatments significantly improved the fit, at $p < 0.001$ level, over the Self-Conservatism Placement: Base Model in Appendix Table 5.3 and the Self-Conservatism Placement: Full Model with Geographical Sensitivity in Appendix C, Supplementary Outputs, Table 11.4.

Since the main model, Self-Conservatism Placement: Full Model, tested 28 null hypotheses (intercept, experimental treatments (cancer, a terror attack, and unknown causes), Big Five Personality Traits, experimental treatments x Big Five Personality Traits, age, sex, education, and left-right ideological placement), there was a potential multiple testing problem. Based on several multiple comparison/testing procedures, namely Benjamini-Hochberg (BH), BY, Bonferroni, Holm, Hochberg, Hommel, Single-Step, Free, Shaffer, and Westfall (Bretz, Hothorn, and Westfall, 2011, p. 62), the adjusted p values for the treatments lost their statistical significance at $p > 0.05$ level. Thus, even if the Self-Conservatism Placement: Full Model offered some conclusions regarding the TMT's contradictory findings problem, there were potential Type I errors with higher probability than 0.05.

Next, since this study's prime aim was testing TMT's replicability, multiple testing procedures were also applied to the Self-Conservatism Placement: Base Model in Table 5.3. Across the ten multiple testing methods in Table 1, only the Benjamini-Hochberg (BH) procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995), which controls for the false discovery rate, displayed statistically significant adjusted p -values for Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) and Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) at $p < 0.05$ level.

Table 5.5: Comparison of several multiple testing methods for the self-conservatism: Base Model in Table 5.3

	Self-Conservatism: Base Model p_i	Adjusted p values for Multiple Testing									
		BH	BY	Bonferroni	Holm	Hochberg	Hommel	Single-Step	Free	Shaffer	Westfall
Intercept	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001
Treatment 1 (Cancer)	0.155	0.177	0.481	1.000	0.309	0.309	0.309	0.681	0.286	0.309	0.286
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	0.030	0.040	0.110	0.243	0.104	0.091	0.091	0.196	0.096	0.104	0.096
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)	0.020	0.040	0.110	0.163	0.102	0.091	0.061	0.138	0.092	0.102	0.092
Sex: Female [Base: Male]	0.003	0.007	0.020	0.022	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.021	0.016	0.017	0.016
Age	0.026	0.040	0.110	0.208	0.104	0.091	0.078	0.171	0.096	0.104	0.096
Education	0.730	0.730	1.000	1.000	0.730	0.730	0.730	1.000	0.730	0.730	0.730
Left-Right Ideological Placement	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

5.4.3 Subset Analyses

According to Greenberg et al. (1994, p. 630), mortality salience is most effective if there are a delay and distraction between the reminders of death and conservatism measures. The effects of the delay are explained in terms of psychodynamic theory that death-related thoughts have to become unconscious in order to motivate changes in political ideology. Thus, measuring conservatism immediately after a reminder of death should not lead to an

increase or decrease in political ideology because the respondents will still have conscious awareness of death-related thoughts and therefore try to avoid mortality related thinking as a defense mechanism.

The multiple mediation analyses of this study (see Subsection 5.5: Hypothesis 9: Mediation Effects of Personality Traits) indicated that personality traits are relatively stable in the face of reminders of death. Therefore, it is safe to employ the 44-item Big Five Personality questionnaire as a delay task between the reminder of death and the measurements of conservatism. The experimental design allowed me to analyze comparatively the effects of threats on conservatism with and without delay tasks (see Chapter 3: Methodology, Figure 3.5, for the survey flow). The respondents who randomly received the delay tasks proceeded along the following path: Random Assignment to Experimental Group → Manipulation Checks → Personality Traits Questions → Conservatism Questions. On the other hand, the respondents who randomly did not receive the delay tasks proceeded along the following path: Random Assignment to Experimental Group → Manipulation Checks → Conservatism Questions → Personality Traits Questions. Table 5.6 showed the standardized regression coefficients with full statistics for the two models of Self-Conservatism Placement with and without delay tasks. As predicted by TMT research, reminders of death due to a terror attack and unknown causes increased conservative self-identification after a delay task. The multiple testing procedures in Table 5.7 revealed that the reminder of death due to terror attack had the most replicable effect on self-conservatism in this study, compared to the TMT's typical internal threat – a reminder of death due to unknown causes.

Table 5.6: Subset analyses for the selected experimental moderation OLS models with standardized coefficients

Predictors	Self-Conservatism Placement: Base Model with Delay Task [Post-Treatment Question Order: Personality Traits → Conservatism]			Self-Conservatism Placement: Full Model without Delay Task [Post-Treatment Question Order: Conservatism → Personality Traits]		
	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
Intercept	-0.21	-0.32 – -0.10	< 0.001	-0.08	-0.19 – 0.04	0.190
Treatment 1 (Cancer)	0.09	-0.04 – 0.21	0.169	0.03	-0.10 – 0.16	0.668
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	0.20	0.08 – 0.33	0.002	-0.01	-0.14 – 0.12	0.889
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)	0.16	0.03 – 0.28	0.013	0.05	-0.08 – 0.18	0.469
Sex: Female [Base: Male]	0.14	0.04 – 0.23	0.005	0.07	-0.02 – 0.17	0.143
Age	-0.01	-0.06 – 0.04	0.608	-0.07	-0.11 – -0.02	0.008
Education	-0.02	-0.06 – 0.03	0.515	0.00	-0.05 – 0.05	0.927
Left-Right Ideological Placement	0.61	0.57 – 0.66	< 0.001	0.58	0.53 – 0.62	< 0.001
Observations	1171			1191		
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.393 / 0.389			0.342 / 0.338		

Table 5.7: Comparison of several multiple testing methods for the self-conservatism: Base Model with and without delay task

	Self-Conservatism: Base Model with Delay Task p_i	Adjusted p values for Multiple Testing									
		BH	BY	Bonferroni	Holm	Hochberg	Hommel	Single-Step	Free	Shaffer	Westfall
Intercept	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Treatment 1 (Cancer)	0.169	0.226	0.614	1.000	0.508	0.508	0.508	0.718	0.420	0.508	0.420
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	0.002	0.005	0.013	0.014	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.013	0.010	0.010	0.010
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)	0.013	0.021	0.057	0.104	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.092	0.050	0.052	0.050
Sex: Female [Base: Male]	0.005	0.009	0.025	0.037	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.034	0.023	0.023	0.023
Age	0.608	0.608	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.608	0.608	0.999	0.757	1.000	0.757
Education	0.515	0.589	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.608	0.608	0.993	0.757	1.000	0.757
Left-Right Ideological Placement	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

5.4.4 An Alternative Explanation for TMT's Contradictory Findings

Does age have any moderating effect between mortality reminders and political beliefs? It is possible that against Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes), those much older respondents might have naturally feared most and, in return, become more conservative in self-identification and attitudes, to ensure certainty against the oncoming phenomenon of death. Thus, rather than *Big Five Personality Traits*, an alternative explanation for the TMT's contradictory findings might be the respondents' age group that while those older respondents may become

more conservative (or liberal) against mortality salience, younger participants might not fear and display an increasing affinity for conservatism (or liberalism).

The standardized regression coefficients with full statistics for the alternative moderation models are shown in Table 5.8. Across these alternative moderation models, after controlling for the respondents' education, sex, and left-right ideological placement, age group: 25-34 (Base: 18-24) seemed to have a moderation effect with Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) on conservatism scale. Compared to the participants of the age group between 18 and 24 in the control condition, the ones 25 to 34 years old in Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) condition were strongly conservative in attitudes towards uncertainty, alternative lifestyles, and gender inequality. Yet, visually, there was not any statistically significant differences between these two age groups across the experimental groups (see Figure 5.4).




Figure 5.4: Interaction plot between the age group and Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes), with error bars

Note: In this plot, I conditioned the continuous independent variables to their mean values and categorical independent variables to their base categories. Accordingly, the conditioned values were as follows: 5.01 for education, 5.98 for left-right ideological placement, and 'male' for sex. A joint hypothesis test using the F -statistic that the coefficients for Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes), Age Group: 25-34 [Base: 18-24], and the Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) and Age Group: 25-34 [Base: 18-24] interaction were zero was rejected at $p < 0.05$ level ($F = 3.0981$; $df = 3$)

Table 5.8: Alternative experimental moderation OLS models with standardized coefficients

	Self-Conservatism Placement: Model 1				Self-Conservatism Placement: Model 2			Multi-Dimensional Conservatism: Model 1			Multi-Dimensional Conservatism: Model 2			Conservatism Scale: Model 1			Conservatism Scale: Model 2			
	Predictors	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	
Intercept		-0.08	-0.14 – -0.02	0.013	-0.06	-0.13 – -0.02	0.123	-0.03	-0.10 – -0.03	0.308	-0.00	-0.07 – -0.07	0.998	-0.02	-0.09 – -0.04	0.479	-0.08	-0.16 – -0.01	0.037	
Treatment 1 (Cancer)		0.07	-0.02 – 0.16	0.151	0.04	-0.06 – 0.15	0.433	0.03	-0.06 – -0.12	0.493	0.00	-0.10 – -0.11	0.983	-0.00	-0.10 – -0.09	0.977	-0.03	-0.14 – 0.08	0.587	
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)		0.10	0.01 – 0.19	0.030	0.09	-0.01 – 0.20	0.092	0.06	-0.04 – 0.15	0.231	0.03	-0.08 – -0.13	0.617	0.00	-0.09 – -0.10	0.967	0.04	-0.07 – 0.15	0.443	
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)		0.11	0.02 – 0.20	0.021	0.14	0.03 – 0.24	0.011	0.02	-0.07 – -0.12	0.607	0.03	-0.08 – -0.13	0.602	0.06	-0.04 – 0.15	0.245	0.12	0.01 – 0.23	0.027	
Age		-0.08	-0.15 – -0.00	0.041				-0.09	-0.16 – -0.01	0.021				0.03	-0.05 – 0.10	0.458				
Age x Treatment 1 (Cancer)		0.06	-0.03 – 0.16	0.195				0.08	-0.01 – 0.18	0.097				0.07	-0.03 – 0.17	0.145				
Age x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)		0.07	-0.02 – 0.16	0.132				0.07	-0.02 – 0.16	0.132				0.00	-0.10 – 0.10	0.977				
Age x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)		-0.02	-0.12 – 0.08	0.723				0.01	-0.09 – 0.12	0.795				-0.07	-0.18 – 0.04	0.201				
Age Group: 25-34 [Base: 18-24]					-0.00	-0.17 – 0.17	0.982				-0.05	-0.23 – 0.12	0.543				0.30	0.11 – 0.48	0.002	
Age Group: 35-44 [Base: 18-24]					-0.22	-0.55 – 0.11	0.197				-0.14	-0.47 – 0.19	0.410				0.28	-0.05 – 0.62	0.099	
Age Group: 45+ [Base: 18-24]					-0.30	-0.66 – 0.06	0.102				-0.43	-0.79 – -0.07	0.019				-0.15	-0.52 – 0.21	0.411	
Age Group: 25-34 [Base: 18-24] x Treatment 1 (Cancer)					0.01	-0.23 – 0.26	0.916				0.02	-0.23 – 0.26	0.899				0.08	-0.17 – 0.34	0.520	
Age Group: 25-34 [Base: 18-24] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)					0.06	-0.20 – 0.31	0.656				0.17	-0.09 – 0.43	0.195				-0.17	-0.44 – 0.11	0.232	
Age Group: 25-34 [Base: 18-24] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)					-0.16	-0.41 – 0.08	0.188				-0.08	-0.33 – 0.16	0.513				-0.32	-0.57 – -0.06	0.016	
Age Group: 35-44 [Base: 18-24] x Treatment 1 (Cancer)					0.44	0.00 – 0.88	0.050				0.28	-0.16 – 0.73	0.208				0.10	-0.36 – 0.56	0.661	
Age Group: 35-44 [Base: 18-24] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)					-0.06	-0.50 – 0.38	0.780				-0.05	-0.50 – 0.39	0.811				-0.28	-0.73 – 0.18	0.233	
Age Group: 35-44 [Base: 18-24] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)					0.10	-0.35 – 0.55	0.654				0.12	-0.33 – 0.57	0.591				-0.20	-0.66 – 0.27	0.401	
Age Group: 45+ [Base: 18-24] x Treatment 1 (Cancer)					0.06	-0.40 – 0.53	0.788				0.36	-0.11 – 0.83	0.129				0.32	-0.17 – 0.80	0.202	
Age Group: 45+ [Base: 18-24] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)					0.22	-0.25 – 0.68	0.359				0.24	-0.23 – 0.71	0.325				0.17	-0.31 – 0.66	0.486	
Age Group: 45+ [Base: 18-24] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)					-0.13	-0.64 – 0.39	0.628				0.09	-0.42 – 0.61	0.723				-0.03	-0.57 – 0.51	0.902	
Sex: Female [Base: Male]		0.05	0.02 – 0.08	0.004	0.05	0.02 – 0.08	0.004	-0.00	-0.03 – 0.03	0.900	-0.00	-0.04 – 0.03	0.863	-0.03	-0.06 – 0.00	0.088	-0.03	-0.06 – 0.01	0.114	
Education		-0.00	-0.04 – 0.03	0.837	-0.01	-0.04 – 0.03	0.647	-0.02	-0.05 – 0.02	0.390	-0.02	-0.05 – 0.02	0.327	-0.08	-0.11 – -0.04	<0.001	-0.10	-0.14 – -0.06	<0.001	
Left-Right Ideological Placement		0.60	0.56 – 0.63	<0.001	0.59	0.56 – 0.63	<0.001	0.60	0.57 – 0.63	<0.001	0.60	0.57 – 0.63	<0.001	0.58	0.54 – 0.61	<0.001	0.57	0.54 – 0.61	<0.001	
Observations		2362				2362			2354			2354			2214			2214		
R² / R² adjusted		0.366 / 0.364				0.369 / 0.364			0.364 / 0.361			0.366 / 0.361			0.333 / 0.330			0.340 / 0.335		

5.5 Hypothesis 9: Mediation Effects of Personality Traits

Next, was there any mediation effect via personality traits from threats to conservative self-identification and attitudes? Chapter 3: Methodology, Figure 3.6 shows the multiple mediation analysis paths' identification while full statistics are in Appendix Tables 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11. The multiple mediation analyses with standard errors bootstrapped with 5,000 draws showed no mediation effect from reminders of death due to cancer, a terror attack, or unknown causes via any of the *Big Five Traits* to any of the three measures of conservatism. Hence, Hypothesis 9 was not rejected.



Table 5.9: Multiple mediation analysis of the self-conservatism placement

Paths	Standardized Effects	Non-Standardized Effects	BootLLCI	BootULCI	SE	z	p
Total Effects:							
Treatment 1 (Cancer)	0.037	0.274	-0.132	0.702	0.215	1.277	0.202
[c1 + (a1 * b1) + (a2 * b2) + (a3 * b3) + (a4 * b4) + (a5 * b5)]							
Treatment 2 (Terror Attacks)	0.084	0.626	0.210	1.034	0.209	2.992	0.003
[c2 + (a6 * b1) + (a7 * b2) + (a8 * b3) + (a9 * b4) + (a10 * b5)]							
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)	0.068	0.496	0.088	0.908	0.207	2.393	0.017
[c3 + (a11 * b1) + (a12 * b2) + (a13 * b3) + (a14 * b4) + (a15 * b5)]							
Age [c4]	-0.054	-0.022	-0.047	0.000	0.012	-1.838	0.066
Sex: Female [c5]	0.040	0.269	-0.054	0.579	0.161	1.664	0.096
Education [c6]	-0.009	-0.030	-0.189	0.141	0.084	-0.353	0.724
Left-Right Ideological Placement [c7]	0.609	0.597	0.549	0.642	0.024	25.051	0.000
Indirect Effects:							
a1*b1	-0.000	-0.003	-0.032	0.023	0.012	-0.21	0.833
a2*b2	0.007	0.051	0.004	0.117	0.03	1.715	0.086
a3*b3	0.008	0.059	-0.007	0.142	0.037	1.594	0.111
a4*b4	0.000	0.000	-0.015	0.016	0.007	0.057	0.955
a5*b5	-0.001	-0.006	-0.07	0.057	0.031	-0.187	0.852
a6*b1	-0.000	-0.001	-0.024	0.02	0.01	-0.122	0.903
a7*b2	-0.001	-0.004	-0.058	0.046	0.025	-0.165	0.869
a8*b3	0.000	0.000	-0.07	0.071	0.035	0.002	0.998
a9*b4	0.000	0.003	-0.031	0.036	0.016	0.185	0.853
a10*b5	0.000	0.003	-0.056	0.065	0.03	0.086	0.932
a11*b1	-0.000	-0.003	-0.034	0.022	0.013	-0.224	0.823
a12*b2	0.003	0.019	-0.024	0.075	0.024	0.795	0.427
a13*b3	0.005	0.037	-0.026	0.117	0.035	1.04	0.299
a14*b4	-0.000	-0.000	-0.015	0.014	0.007	-0.003	0.998
a15*b5	0.003	0.025	-0.03	0.09	0.03	0.837	0.402
Standardized Path Coefficients:							
Self-Conservatism Placement ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [c1]	0.023	0.173	-0.235	0.596	0.214	0.806	0.42
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [c2]	0.084	0.626	0.227	1.028	0.206	3.04	0.002
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [c3]	0.057	0.417	0.019	0.825	0.205	2.037	0.042
Age [c4]	-0.054	-0.022	-0.047	0.000	0.012	-1.839	0.066
Sex: Female [5]	0.04	0.269	-0.054	0.579	0.161	1.664	0.096
Education [6]	-0.009	-0.03	-0.189	0.141	0.084	-0.354	0.724
Left-Right Ideological Placement [c7]	0.609	0.597	0.549	0.642	0.024	25.054	0.000
Extraversion ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [a1]	0.032	0.155	-0.196	0.496	0.178	0.869	0.385
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [a6]	0.015	0.074	-0.275	0.421	0.176	0.422	0.673
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [a11]	0.036	0.171	-0.182	0.523	0.177	0.967	0.333
Agreeableness ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [a2]	0.079	0.33	0.039	0.617	0.147	2.24	0.025
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [a7]	-0.006	-0.027	-0.329	0.273	0.153	-0.174	0.862
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [a12]	0.031	0.127	-0.154	0.415	0.145	0.874	0.382
Conscientiousness ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [a3]	0.065	0.289	-0.037	0.598	0.16	1.812	0.07
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [a8]	0.000	0.000	-0.316	0.315	0.161	0.002	0.998
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [a13]	0.041	0.179	-0.129	0.488	0.156	1.145	0.252
Neuroticism ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [a4]	-0.011	-0.058	-0.447	0.325	0.194	-0.296	0.767
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [a9]	-0.081	-0.429	-0.786	-0.074	0.184	-2.331	0.02
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [a14]	0.001	0.003	-0.379	0.371	0.192	0.015	0.988
Openness to New Experiences ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [a5]	0.007	0.033	-0.294	0.363	0.17	0.196	0.844
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [a10]	-0.003	-0.015	-0.334	0.299	0.162	-0.091	0.927
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [a15]	-0.032	-0.144	-0.454	0.166	0.159	-0.906	0.365
Self-Conservatism Placement~							
Extraversion [b1]	-0.011	-0.017	-0.122	0.082	0.051	-0.328	0.743
Agreeableness [b2]	0.086	0.154	0.053	0.256	0.052	2.965	0.003
Conscientiousness [b3]	0.123	0.205	0.098	0.322	0.057	3.613	0.000
Neuroticism [b4]	-0.005	-0.007	-0.076	0.061	0.034	-0.202	0.84
Openness to New Experiences [b5]	-0.107	-0.175	-0.278	-0.075	0.051	-3.44	0.001

Model fit statistics:Chi-square = 120.536, df=20, $p = 0.000$

Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.959

Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) = 0.882

Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.067, $p = 0.007$

Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = 0.037

Notes:

Standard Errors Bootstrapped with 5000 draws. BootLLCI, BootULCI, and SE for the non-standardized effects.

Abbreviations: BootLLCI = bootstrapping lower limit confidence interval; BootULCI = bootstrapping upper limit confidence interval; and SE = standard error

Table 5.10: Multiple mediation analysis of multi-dimensional conservatism

Paths	Standardized Effects	Non-Standardized Effects	BootLLCI	BootULCI	SE	z	p
Total Effects:							
Treatment 1 (Cancer)							
[c1 + (a1 * b1) + (a2 * b2) + (a3 * b3) + (a4 * b4) + (a5 * b5)]	0.023	0.243	-0.346	0.833	0.297	0.819	0.413
Treatment 2 (Terror Attacks)							
[c2 + (a6 * b1) + (a7 * b2) + (a8 * b3) + (a9 * b4) + (a10 * b5)]	0.051	0.531	-0.051	1.098	0.297	1.79	0.073
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)							
[c3 + (a11 * b1) + (a12 * b2) + (a13 * b3) + (a14 * b4) + (a15 * b5)]	0.041	0.425	-0.171	1.01	0.301	1.414	0.157
Age [c4]	-0.019	-0.011	-0.04	0.014	0.013	-0.813	0.416
Sex: Female [c5]	-0.005	-0.047	-0.501	0.394	0.231	-0.204	0.839
Education [c6]	-0.015	-0.07	-0.287	0.15	0.109	-0.644	0.52
Left-Right Ideological Placement [c7]	0.626	0.861	0.797	0.922	0.032	26.848	0.000
Indirect Effects:							
a1*b1	-0.002	-0.017	-0.081	0.032	0.027	-0.639	0.523
a2*b2	0.000	0.003	-0.05	0.061	0.026	0.129	0.898
a3*b3	0.006	0.06	-0.01	0.159	0.043	1.381	0.167
a4*b4	-0.000	-0.003	-0.033	0.022	0.012	-0.207	0.836
a5*b5	-0.000	-0.005	-0.105	0.094	0.049	-0.105	0.916
a6*b1	-0.001	-0.007	-0.062	0.042	0.025	-0.299	0.765
a7*b2	-0.000	-0.000	-0.027	0.025	0.012	-0.036	0.971
a8*b3	-0.000	-0.002	-0.08	0.072	0.037	-0.052	0.959
a9*b4	-0.002	-0.016	-0.075	0.029	0.025	-0.622	0.534
a10*b5	0.001	0.008	-0.082	0.107	0.047	0.177	0.859
a11*b1	-0.002	-0.022	-0.089	0.024	0.028	-0.761	0.447
a12*b2	0.000	0.001	-0.029	0.037	0.015	0.095	0.925
a13*b3	0.004	0.04	-0.027	0.131	0.039	1.017	0.309
a14*b4	-0.000	-0.000	-0.027	0.023	0.011	-0.014	0.989
a15*b5	0.004	0.041	-0.047	0.139	0.047	0.869	0.385
Standardized Path Coefficients:							
Multi-dimensional Conservatism ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [c1]	0.02	0.205	-0.374	0.789	0.297	0.691	0.49
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [c2]	0.053	0.548	-0.03	1.119	0.296	1.849	0.064
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [c3]	0.035	0.364	-0.236	0.933	0.298	1.224	0.221
Age [c4]	-0.019	-0.011	-0.04	0.014	0.013	-0.813	0.416
Sex: Female [5]	-0.005	-0.047	-0.501	0.394	0.231	-0.204	0.839
Education [6]	-0.015	-0.07	-0.287	0.15	0.109	-0.644	0.52
Left-Right Ideological Placement [c7]	0.626	0.861	0.797	0.922	0.032	26.851	0.000
Extraversion ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [a1]	0.029	0.142	-0.209	0.492	0.177	0.805	0.421
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [a6]	0.013	0.062	-0.282	0.391	0.174	0.355	0.722
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [a11]	0.037	0.179	-0.167	0.527	0.178	1.002	0.317
Agreeableness ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [a2]	0.076	0.316	0.028	0.601	0.147	2.146	0.032
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [a7]	-0.01	-0.04	-0.34	0.256	0.151	-0.263	0.793
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [a12]	0.033	0.134	-0.159	0.422	0.147	0.913	0.361
Conscientiousness ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [a3]	0.063	0.28	-0.042	0.601	0.163	1.718	0.086
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [a8]	-0.002	-0.009	-0.335	0.304	0.161	-0.055	0.956
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [a13]	0.043	0.187	-0.129	0.494	0.157	1.195	0.232
Neuroticism ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [a4]	-0.014	-0.073	-0.445	0.308	0.193	-0.375	0.708
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [a9]	-0.084	-0.444	-0.802	-0.092	0.182	-2.438	0.015
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [a14]	-0.001	-0.004	-0.362	0.351	0.184	-0.024	0.981
Openness to New Experiences ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [a5]	0.004	0.019	-0.321	0.354	0.171	0.108	0.914
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [a10]	-0.007	-0.03	-0.353	0.279	0.161	-0.184	0.854
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [a15]	-0.033	-0.145	-0.459	0.162	0.16	-0.91	0.363
Multi-dimensional Conservatism ~							
Extraversion [b1]	-0.057	-0.121	-0.27	0.017	0.072	-1.671	0.095
Agreeableness [b2]	0.004	0.011	-0.131	0.157	0.074	0.144	0.885
Conscientiousness [b3]	0.091	0.213	0.057	0.368	0.08	2.661	0.008
Neuroticism [b4]	0.018	0.036	-0.066	0.132	0.051	0.701	0.483
Openness to New Experiences [b5]	-0.122	-0.281	-0.42	-0.133	0.073	-3.85	0.000

Model fit statistics:Chi-square = 121.562, df=20, $p = 0.000$

Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.958

Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) = 0.879

Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.068, $p = 0.006$

Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = 0.037

Notes:

Standard Errors Bootstrapped with 5000 draws. BootLLCI, BootULCI, and SE for the non-standardized effects.

Abbreviations: BootLLCI = bootstrapping lower limit confidence interval; BootULCI = bootstrapping upper limit confidence interval; and SE = standard error

Table 5.11: Multiple mediation analysis of conservatism scale

Paths	Standardized Effects	Non-Standardized Effects	BootLLCI	BootULCI	SE	z	p
Total Effects:							
Treatment 1 (Cancer)							
[c1 + (a1 * b1) + (a2 * b2) + (a3 * b3) + (a4 * b4) + (a5 * b5)]	0.025	0.124	-0.17	0.426	0.151	0.821	0.412
Treatment 2 (Terror Attacks)							
[c2 + (a6 * b1) + (a7 * b2) + (a8 * b3) + (a9 * b4) + (a10 * b5)]	0.016	0.078	-0.229	0.371	0.154	0.504	0.614
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)							
[c3 + (a11 * b1) + (a12 * b2) + (a13 * b3) + (a14 * b4) + (a15 * b5)]	0.033	0.161	-0.131	0.45	0.149	1.082	0.279
Age [c4]	0.036	0.009	-0.007	0.025	0.008	1.148	0.251
Sex: Female [c5]	-0.036	-0.162	-0.376	0.055	0.11	-1.474	0.141
Education [c6]	-0.089	-0.198	-0.312	-0.082	0.058	-3.419	0.001
Left-Right Ideological Placement [c7]	0.569	0.37	0.336	0.404	0.017	21.461	0.000
Indirect Effects:							
a1*b1	0.001	0.004	-0.014	0.029	0.01	0.378	0.706
a2*b2	0.005	0.027	-0.003	0.071	0.019	1.402	0.161
a3*b3	0.008	0.041	-0.011	0.103	0.029	1.443	0.149
a4*b4	0.001	0.006	-0.015	0.031	0.011	0.504	0.614
a5*b5	0.000	0.000	-0.051	0.051	0.025	0.009	0.993
a6*b1	0.000	0.001	-0.018	0.023	0.009	0.144	0.885
a7*b2	-0.001	-0.003	-0.036	0.03	0.016	-0.176	0.861
a8*b3	-0.001	-0.006	-0.062	0.046	0.027	-0.211	0.833
a9*b4	0.004	0.022	-0.001	0.055	0.015	1.47	0.142
a10*b5	0.002	0.008	-0.039	0.056	0.024	0.339	0.735
a11*b1	0.002	0.01	-0.011	0.042	0.013	0.728	0.467
a12*b2	0.002	0.012	-0.015	0.049	0.016	0.727	0.467
a13*b3	0.006	0.031	-0.018	0.089	0.027	1.145	0.252
a14*b4	0.000	0.002	-0.019	0.024	0.01	0.193	0.847
a15*b5	0.004	0.019	-0.028	0.068	0.024	0.791	0.429
Standardized Path Coefficients:							
Conservatism Scale ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [c1]	0.009	0.047	-0.243	0.345	0.148	0.314	0.754
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [c2]	0.011	0.055	-0.24	0.345	0.15	0.364	0.716
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [c3]	0.018	0.088	-0.2	0.379	0.146	0.601	0.548
Age [c4]	0.036	0.009	-0.007	0.025	0.008	1.148	0.251
Sex: Female [5]	-0.036	-0.162	-0.376	0.055	0.11	-1.474	0.14
Education [6]	-0.089	-0.198	-0.312	-0.082	0.058	-3.419	0.001
Left-Right Ideological Placement [c7]	0.569	0.37	0.336	0.404	0.017	21.463	0.000
Extraversion ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [a1]	0.021	0.103	-0.256	0.455	0.182	0.564	0.573
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [a6]	0.007	0.036	-0.307	0.388	0.179	0.2	0.841
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [a11]	0.052	0.251	-0.101	0.607	0.183	1.367	0.172
Agreeableness ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [a2]	0.066	0.276	-0.022	0.568	0.15	1.84	0.066
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [a7]	-0.007	-0.029	-0.338	0.279	0.156	-0.188	0.851
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [a12]	0.029	0.121	-0.16	0.405	0.145	0.831	0.406
Conscientiousness ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [a3]	0.059	0.262	-0.07	0.579	0.165	1.586	0.113
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [a8]	-0.008	-0.036	-0.357	0.283	0.164	-0.219	0.827
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [a13]	0.045	0.197	-0.114	0.515	0.159	1.233	0.217
Neuroticism ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [a4]	-0.022	-0.116	-0.499	0.274	0.199	-0.583	0.56
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [a9]	-0.086	-0.455	-0.823	-0.091	0.19	-2.393	0.017
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [a14]	-0.008	-0.041	-0.431	0.329	0.191	-0.215	0.829
Openness to New Experiences ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [a5]	-0.000	-0.002	-0.336	0.34	0.173	-0.009	0.993
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [a10]	-0.013	-0.057	-0.372	0.266	0.164	-0.348	0.727
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [a15]	-0.031	-0.135	-0.445	0.194	0.163	-0.83	0.407
Conservatism Scale ~							
Extraversion [b1]	0.038	0.038	-0.031	0.108	0.035	1.085	0.278
Agreeableness [b2]	0.081	0.096	0.024	0.168	0.037	2.616	0.009
Conscientiousness [b3]	0.143	0.158	0.076	0.239	0.042	3.791	0.000
Neuroticism [b4]	-0.052	-0.048	-0.097	0.001	0.025	-1.965	0.049
Openness to New Experiences [b5]	-0.129	-0.142	-0.217	-0.067	0.038	-3.696	0.000
Model fit statistics:							
Chi-square = 114.572, df=20, p = 0.000							
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.957							
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) = 0.877							
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.067, p = 0.009							
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = 0.038							
Notes:							
Standard Errors Bootstrapped with 5000 draws. BootLLCI, BootULCI, and SE for the non-standardized effects.							
Abbreviations: BootLLCI = bootstrapping lower limit confidence interval; BootULCI = bootstrapping upper limit confidence interval; and SE = standard error							

Then, were personality traits stable against at least one-short experimental manipulations of death reminders? As a sensitivity analysis, when I used the upper trail of

the experimental design (see Chapter 3: Methodology, Figure 3.5), the personality traits remained stable against threats across the structural equation modelings where the Big Five Traits were the dependent variables, experimental treatments were the independent variables, conservatism (self-conservatism placement, multi-dimensional conservatism and conservatism scale, separately) was the mediator, and age, sex, education, left-right ideological placement were the controls (see Appendix C: Supplementary Outputs, Tables 11.5 to 11.7). Similarly, when I used OLS models where Big Five Traits were the dependent variables, experimental treatments were the independent variables, conservatism (self-conservatism placement, multi-dimensional conservatism and conservatism scale, separately), age, sex, education, left-right ideological placement were the controls, the personality traits remained stable against threats. As theoretically expected, only the life-long or long-term variables such as conservative self-identification, age, sex, and left-right ideological orientation had statistically significant effects on personality traits (see Appendix C: Supplementary Outputs, Table 11.8).

Chapter 6

ASSOCIATIONAL DESIGN

Since the main experimental findings of Chapter 5 were on the self-conservatism placement levels, I needed to evaluate what an increase in conservative self-identification means in Turkish politics. Therefore, as a sub-question, I asked, “after controlling for personality traits, demographic and political variables, how does an increase in self-conservatism placement level correlate with various political attitudes and behaviors?” Accordingly, in Section 6.1, I introduced my expectations on the links between conservative self-identification and several political attitudes and behaviors, e.g., inter-personal trust, partisanship strength, strategic voting, ideological placement, political polarization, sociotropic retrospective evaluation, sociotropic prospective evaluation, satisfaction with the current level of democracy, and turnout on November 1, 2015, general elections. In Section 6.2, I presented the estimation methods and described the datasets for the associational analyses.

6.1 Associational Expectations

Based on political theory perspectives of Hobbes (1651) and Burke (1790), conservatives tended to have a cynical view of humanity (Ray, 1981, p. 158). With the hierarchical authority and the resultant order and predictability, a conservative eliminates the fragile need to trust the unknown others, who are taken to be selfish and ill-willed. Moreover, religiosity sub-dimension of conservatism might induce conservatives to take scriptural convictions of original human sin for granted such that conservatives’ commitment to religious, moral framework and authority can also lower the potential for trusting others in society (Hempel, Matthews, & Bartkowski, 2012). Thus, I expect that respondents would show lesser degrees

of inter-personal trust when their levels of conservative self-identification increases (**Hypothesis 10**).

Next, conservatives untrustworthy of unknown others may need stronger political demarcations between in-group and out-group members in politics, to control the extent of change and equality in society. Here, even if the scholarship did not directly connect conservatism to partisanship strength, affective polarization research hinted that those conservatives relying on the parties' polarizing cues inclined to have higher levels of social polarization and lower levels of generalized trust (Hooghe, & Oser, 2017; Garrett, & Bankert, 2018). Therefore, I anticipate that respondents would show higher degrees of partisanship strength to their affiliated parties when their levels of self-conservatism placement increases (**Hypothesis 11**).

Besides, participants will be more likely to be politically polarized when their conservative self-identification heightens (**Hypothesis 12**).

What is more, participants with higher conservative self-identification will be the affiliates of the conservative party, which is the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP) (**Hypothesis 13**).

In addition to the identification of the partisan platform, conservatives will be more likely to value the left-right ideological identification. I predict that individuals would be more politically rightist when their self-conservative placement increases (**Hypothesis 14**).

Moreover, as long as the incumbent conservative government is in office, self-identified conservatives will be satisfied with the current level of democracy and macro-economic management in the country (**Hypotheses 15 and 16**).

So, how those conservatives might elect their political representatives in the legislature to avoid uncertainty, change, and equality in politics? For the national legislature, the electoral system in Turkey is majoritarian, particularly D'hondt, with a 10% electoral threshold. Based on Duverger's (1951; Lijphart, 1994, pp. 70-72) prediction of psychological and mechanical effects under majoritarian electoral systems, citizens have incentives to vote strategically. Mechanically, majoritarian electoral systems systematically deprive small parties of legislative politics by creating disproportionality between the vote shares and the seat shares in favor of larger established parties. Psychologically, voters do not want to allocate their time, money, and energy for parties that have been hindered (or are perceived

to be likely hindered) by the electoral system. Accordingly, voters do not vote for their first choice parties close to their genuine preferences, but instead, vote for the second or lesser choice parties that have the potential to win at least a seat (Hobolt, & Wittrock, 2011, p. 32). Given the conservative nationalist tendencies of the Ottoman-Turkish state since the early 1800s, I assume that the Turkish conservatives would be more likely to see themselves as the majority of the electorate with a strong political presence at the national assembly. In consequence, I foresee that respondents would show a lower likelihood of strategic voting when their levels of self-conservatism placement increases (**Hypothesis 17**).

What is more, in order not to lose their majority status in the parliament, conservative respondents will be more likely to turn out to vote in general elections (**Hypothesis 18**).

The summary of these associational hypotheses is in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Associational hypotheses for the control group

Independent Variable	<i>Dependent Variables (DV):</i>									
	DV 1	DV 2	DV 3	DV 4	DV 5	DV 6	DV 7	DV 8	DV 9	DV 10
Self-Conservatism Placement	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+

Notes:

DV 1 = Inter-Personal Trust (Hypothesis 10);

DV 2 = Partisanship Strength (Hypothesis 11);

DV 3 = Political Polarization (Hypothesis 12);

DV 4 = Party Identification: Largest Conservative Party in the Party System (Hypothesis 13);

DV 5 = Left-Right Ideological Placement [Rightist Orientation] (Hypothesis 14);

DV 6 = Satisfaction with Democracy (Hypothesis 15);

DV 7 = Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation (Hypothesis 16a);

DV 8 = Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation (Hypothesis 16b);

DV 9 = Strategic Voting (Hypothesis 17); and

DV 10 = Turnout in General Elections (Hypothesis 18).

+ = Positive and statistically significant relationship

- = Negative and statistically significant relationship

6.2 Estimation Methods and Datasets

Throughout the associational multivariate analyses, the control group data is the dataset and self-conservatism placement is the independent variable. The fixed list of control variables is the following: age, sex, education, left-right ideological placement, and the Big Five Traits (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to New

Experiences). For each model, I added additional theoretically necessary controls. Accordingly, generic models and their estimation methods per dependent variable are as follows:

Model 1 (OLS):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Inter - Personal Trust} = & \alpha + \beta_1 * \text{Self - Conservatism Placement} + \\ & \beta_2 * \text{Age} + \beta_3 * \text{Sex} + \beta_4 * \text{Education} + \beta_5 * \text{Left - Right Ideological Placement} + \\ & \beta_6 * \text{Extraversion} + \beta_7 * \text{Agreeableness} + \beta_8 * \text{Conscientiousness} + \beta_9 * \text{Neuroticism} + \beta_{10} * \text{Openness to New Experiences} + \\ & \beta_{11} * \text{Political Polarization} + \beta_{12} * \text{Language Group: Arabic or Kurdish} + e \end{aligned}$$

Model 2 (OLS):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Partisanship Strength} = & \alpha + \beta_1 * \text{Self - Conservatism Placement} + \\ & \beta_2 * \text{Age} + \beta_3 * \text{Sex} + \beta_4 * \text{Education} + \beta_5 * \text{Left - Right Ideological Placement} + \\ & \beta_6 * \text{Extraversion} + \beta_7 * \text{Agreeableness} + \beta_8 * \text{Conscientiousness} + \beta_9 * \text{Neuroticism} + \beta_{10} * \text{Openness to New Experiences} + \\ & \beta_{11} * \text{Political Polarization} + \beta_{12} * \text{Inter - Personal Trust} + e \end{aligned}$$

Model 3 (OLS):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Political Polarization} = & \alpha + \beta_1 * \text{Self - Conservatism Placement} + \\ & \beta_2 * \text{Age} + \beta_3 * \text{Sex} + \beta_4 * \text{Education} + \beta_5 * \text{Left - Right Ideological Placement} + \\ & \beta_6 * \text{Extraversion} + \beta_7 * \text{Agreeableness} + \beta_8 * \text{Conscientiousness} + \beta_9 * \text{Neuroticism} + \beta_{10} * \text{Openness to New Experiences} + \\ & \beta_{11} * \text{Satisfaction with Democracy} + \beta_{12} * \text{Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation} + \beta_{13} * \text{Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation} + e \end{aligned}$$

Model 4 (Logit):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Party Identification} = & \alpha + \beta_1 * \text{Self - Conservatism Placement} + \\ & \beta_2 * \text{Age} + \beta_3 * \text{Sex} + \beta_4 * \text{Education} + \beta_5 * \text{Left - Right Ideological Placement} + \\ & \beta_6 * \text{Extraversion} + \beta_7 * \text{Agreeableness} + \beta_8 * \text{Conscientiousness} + \beta_9 * \text{Neuroticism} + \beta_{10} * \text{Openness to New Experiences} + \\ & \beta_{11} * \text{Satisfaction with Democracy} + \beta_{12} * \text{Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation} + \beta_{13} * \text{Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation} + e \end{aligned}$$

Model 5 (OLS):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Left - Right Ideological Placement} = & \alpha + \beta_1 * \text{Self - Conservatism Placement} + \\ & \beta_2 * \text{Age} + \beta_3 * \text{Sex} + \beta_4 * \text{Education} + \\ & \beta_5 * \text{Extraversion} + \beta_6 * \text{Agreeableness} + \beta_7 * \text{Conscientiousness} + \beta_8 * \text{Neuroticism} + \beta_9 * \text{Openness to New Experiences} + \\ & \beta_{10} * \text{Satisfaction with Democracy} + \beta_{11} * \text{Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation} + \beta_{12} * \text{Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation} + \\ & \beta_{13} * \text{Political Polarization} + \beta_{14} * \text{Party Identification} + e \end{aligned}$$

Model 6 (OLS):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Satisfaction with Democracy} = & \alpha + \beta_1 * \text{Self - Conservatism Placement} + \\ & \beta_2 * \text{Age} + \beta_3 * \text{Sex} + \beta_4 * \text{Education} + \beta_5 * \text{Left - Right Ideological Placement} + \\ & \beta_6 * \text{Extraversion} + \beta_7 * \text{Agreeableness} + \beta_8 * \text{Conscientiousness} + \beta_9 * \text{Neuroticism} + \beta_{10} * \text{Openness to New Experiences} + \\ & \beta_{11} * \text{Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation} + \beta_{12} * \text{Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation} + \\ & \beta_{13} * \text{Political Polarization} + \beta_{14} * \text{Party Identification} + \beta_{15} * \text{Left - Right Ideological Placement} + e \end{aligned}$$

Model 7 (OLS):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation} = & \alpha + \beta_1 * \text{Self - Conservatism Placement} + \\ & \beta_2 * \text{Age} + \beta_3 * \text{Sex} + \beta_4 * \text{Education} + \beta_5 * \text{Left - Right Ideological Placement} + \\ & \beta_6 * \text{Extraversion} + \beta_7 * \text{Agreeableness} + \beta_8 * \text{Conscientiousness} + \beta_9 * \text{Neuroticism} + \beta_{10} * \text{Openness to New Experiences} + \\ & \beta_{11} * \text{Satisfaction with Democracy} + \beta_{12} * \text{Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation} + \end{aligned}$$

$$\beta_{13} * \text{Political Polarization} + \beta_{14} * \text{Party Identification} + \beta_{15} * \text{Left} - \text{Right Ideological Placement} + \beta_{16} * \text{Employment Status} + e$$

Model 8 (OLS):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation} = & \alpha + \beta_1 * \text{Self} - \text{Conservatism Placement} + \\ & \beta_2 * \text{Age} + \beta_3 * \text{Sex} + \beta_4 * \text{Education} + \beta_5 * \text{Left} - \text{Right Ideological Placement} + \\ & \beta_6 * \text{Extraversion} + \beta_7 * \text{Agreeableness} + \beta_8 * \text{Conscientiousness} + \beta_9 * \text{Neuroticism} + \beta_{10} * \text{Openness to New Experiences} + \\ & \beta_{11} * \text{Satisfaction with Democracy} + \beta_{12} * \text{Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation} + \\ & \beta_{13} * \text{Political Polarization} + \beta_{14} * \text{Party Identification} + \beta_{15} * \text{Left} - \text{Right Ideological Placement} \\ & \beta_{16} * \text{Employment Status} + e \end{aligned}$$

Model 9 (Logit):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Strategic Voting} = & \alpha + \beta_1 * \text{Self} - \text{Conservatism Placement} + \\ & \beta_2 * \text{Age} + \beta_3 * \text{Sex} + \beta_4 * \text{Education} + \beta_5 * \text{Left} - \text{Right Ideological Placement} + \\ & \beta_6 * \text{Extraversion} + \beta_7 * \text{Agreeableness} + \beta_8 * \text{Conscientiousness} + \beta_9 * \text{Neuroticism} + \beta_{10} * \text{Openness to New Experiences} + \\ & \beta_{11} * \text{Political Polarization} + \beta_{12} * \text{Language Group: Arabic or Kurdish} + \beta_{13} * \text{Satisfaction with Democracy} + e \end{aligned}$$

Model 10 (Logit):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Turnout} = & \alpha + \beta_1 * \text{Self} - \text{Conservatism Placement} + \\ & \beta_2 * \text{Age} + \beta_3 * \text{Sex} + \beta_4 * \text{Education} + \beta_5 * \text{Left} - \text{Right Ideological Placement} + \\ & \beta_6 * \text{Extraversion} + \beta_7 * \text{Agreeableness} + \beta_8 * \text{Conscientiousness} + \beta_9 * \text{Neuroticism} + \beta_{10} * \text{Openness to New Experiences} + \\ & \beta_{11} * \text{Satisfaction with Democracy} + \beta_{12} * \text{Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation} + \beta_{13} * \text{Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation} + \\ & \beta_{14} * \text{Party Identification} + \beta_{15} * \text{Strategic Voting} + e \end{aligned}$$

The first dependent variable was the level of generalized trust of others or the interpersonal trust, asking to what extent the majority of the people can be generally trusted. The responses were on an 11-points Likert scale from 0 (Never stop taking precautions) to 10 (Most people can be trusted).

The second dependent variable was the level of partisanship strength for the affiliated party. The responses were on a 4-points Likert scale from 0 (I may feel close to the party I am affiliated with, but I can change my affiliation to another party if there is one), 1 (I do not feel close to the party I am affiliated with), 2 (I feel close to being part of the party I am affiliated with), and 3 (I feel like being an integral part of the party I am affiliated with).

The third dependent variable was the degree of political polarization, which was derived from the left-right ideological placements of the political parties in the party system, e.g., AKP, CHP, HDP, IYIP, MHP, SP, and VP, by the respondents, on an 11-points scale from 0 (Extreme left) to 10 (Extreme right). Based on Sartori's (1976) account, political polarization was the average left-right party position measuring each competing parties' ideological distance from the center with the following formula:

$$\text{Average Left - Right Position} = |\overline{P}_R - \overline{P}_L|$$

where $\overline{P}_R$ is the mean ideological left-right position of the rightist parties whose mean ideological scores are greater than 5; and $\overline{P}_L$ is the mean ideological left-right position of the leftist parties whose mean ideological scores are lesser than 5. Higher values away from the midpoint 5 indicate that the respondents see the party system as predominantly rightist while lower points below 5 mean the party system is seen as mainly leftist.

The fourth dependent variable was party identification. The respondents were asked to select the parties that they felt closest, and the options were AKP, CHP, HDP, IYIP, MHP, SP, VP, and Other (open-ended). In the analyses, AKP affiliated were coded as 1, and the rest were coded as 0.

The fifth dependent variable was the self left-right ideological placement. The responses were on an 11-points scale from 0 (Extreme left) to 10 (Extreme right).

The sixth dependent variable was the degree of satisfaction with the current level of democracy in Turkey. The responses were on an 11-points scale from 0 (Not satisfied at all) to 10 (Very satisfied).

The seventh dependent variable was sociotropic retrospective evaluation about the effect of the incumbent government's policies on the economy in the last 12 months. The responses were on an 11-points scale from 0 (Very bad effect) to 10 (Very good effect).

The eighth dependent variable was sociotropic prospective evaluation of the potential effect of the incumbent government's policies on the economy in the next 12 months. The responses were on an 11-points scale from 0 (Very bad effect) to 10 (Very good effect).

The ninth dependent variable was the tendency to vote strategically in the June 24, 2018, general elections. The respondents were directed to the following hypothetical question "Let us say a party that you will never consider voting in the incoming June 24, 2018, general elections seems to be able to get the most votes in your electoral district. Also, your favorite party has no chance to win. Then, would you vote for another party that would be successful against the party you would never vote for?". There were two response options that "Yes, I would vote" and "No, I would still vote for my favorite party".

Lastly, the tenth dependent variable was the turnout in the June 24, 2018, general elections. Those who indicated that they turned out to vote in the previous November 1, 2015,

general elections were coded as 1, and those indicating that they did not turn out to vote in the same previous general election were coded as 0.

The descriptive statistics of the control group are in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics of the control group

	Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Pctl. (25 th)	Pctl. (75 th)	Max.
	Inter-Personal Trust	676	3.151	2.741	1.000	1.000	6.000	11.000
	Partisanship Strength	476	3.011	0.891	1.000	3.000	4.000	4.000
	Political Polarization	402	4.200	1.741	0.167	3.021	5.167	10.000
	Party Identification: AKP	683	0.255	0.436	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
	Left-Right Ideological Placement	652	6.049	3.162	1.000	4.000	8.000	11.000
	Satisfaction with Democracy	674	3.911	3.675	1.000	1.000	6.000	11.000
	Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation	650	4.054	3.798	1.000	1.000	7.000	11.000
	Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation	634	5.839	3.885	1.000	1.000	11.000	11.000
	Strategic Voting	656	0.462	0.499	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
	Turnout	664	0.502	0.500	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
	Self-Conservatism Placement	665	5.238	3.062	1.000	2.000	7.000	11.000
	Extraversion	663	7.953	2.092	1.750	6.500	9.750	11.000
	Agreeableness	663	9.043	1.698	3.333	8.000	10.333	11.000
	Neuroticism	657	5.411	2.364	1.000	3.667	7.000	11.000
	Conscientiousness	664	8.451	1.833	3.000	7.333	10.000	11.000
	Openness to New Experiences	660	8.164	1.919	2.333	7.000	9.667	11.000
	Age	668	23.352	7.562	18.000	19.000	25.000	64.000
	Sex: Female	673	0.654	0.476	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
	Education	674	4.979	0.918	2.000	4.000	5.000	8.000
	Language Group: Arabic or Kurdish	651	0.261	0.440	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
	Employment Status: Working	664	0.319	0.467	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000

6.2.1 Robustness Strategies

To check for the robustness of the multivariate associational findings, I decided to follow two routes. First of all, throughout these models, only the standardized estimates whose multiple comparison-adjusted p values remained below 0.05 after Benjamini-Hochberg (BH) correction were taken as statistically significant. Secondly, any BH corrected significant estimate in my dissertation data's control group was taken as robust if the same estimate's BH corrected p -value was below 0.05 in the similar models using the ANES 2012 and 2016. Among the publicly available ANES Times Series Studies from 1948 to 2016, I only employed ANES 2012 and 2016 because only those two modules have the Big Five Traits, besides conservative self-identification. The pooled ANES 2012 and 2016 models used year fixed-effects taking the year 2012 as the base.

2012 ANES Variables

The first dependent variable, the inter-personal trust, was from the variable `trust_social` asking “Generally speaking, how often can you trust other people?” on a 1-5 scale where 1 stood for “Always”, 2 for “Most of the time”, 3 for “About half the time”, 4 “Some of the time”, and 5 “Never” (reversed-coded).

The second dependent variable, partisanship strength, was from the variable `cses_degclose` inquiring “Do you feel [very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close / not very close, somewhat close, or very close to this party]?” on a 1-3 scale (reversed-coded).

The third dependent variable, political polarization, was calculated based on the two variables `cses_dptyleft` (“In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place the DEMOCRATIC PARTY on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?”) and `cses_rptyleft` (“Using the same scale, where would you place the REPUBLICAN PARTY?”).

The fourth dependent variable, party identification, was from the variable `cses_ptyclost` with 3 categories (1 = Democratic Party, 2 = Republican Party, and 5 = Other).

The fifth dependent variable, left-right ideological placement, was from the variable `cses_selfleft` on a 0 (Left) -10 (Right) scale by directing the question “Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale?”.

The sixth dependent variable, satisfaction with democracy, was from the variable `cses_satisdem` posing the following question “On the whole, are you [VERY SATISFIED, FAIRLY SATISFIED, NOT VERY SATISFIED, or NOT AT ALL SATISFIED / NOT AT ALL SATISFIED, NOT VERY SATISFIED, FAIRLY SATISFIED, or VERY SATISFIED] with the way democracy works in the United States?” (reversed-coded).

The seventh dependent variable, sociotropic retrospective evaluation, was from the variable `econ_ecpast_x`, which was the recoded version of the follow-ups for the question `econ_ecpast` asking “Now thinking about the economy in the country as a whole, would you say that over the past year the nation's economy has GOTTEN BETTER, STAYED ABOUT THE SAME, or GOTTEN WORSE?” (reversed-coded).

The eighth dependent variable, sociotropic prospective evaluation, was from the variable `econ_ecnext_x`, which was the recoded version of the follow-ups for the question

econ_ecnext asking, “What about the next 12 months? Do you expect the economy, in the country as a whole, to GET BETTER, STAY ABOUT THE SAME, or GET WORSE?” (reversed-coded).

Unfortunately, the ninth dependent variable, strategic voting, did not have an equivalent in ANES 2012.

Lastly, the tenth dependent variable, turnout, was from the variable interest_voted2008 asking, “In 2008 Barack Obama ran on the Democratic ticket against John McCain for the Republicans. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election?” with two options 1 “Yes, voted” and 2 “No, didn’t vote”.

The independent variable, self-conservatism placement, was from the variable libcpre_self asking “Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?” where 1 was for “Extremely liberal”, 2 for “Liberal”, 3 for “Slightly liberal”, 4 for “Moderate; middle of the road”, 5 for “Slightly conservative”, 6 for “Conservative”, and 7 for “Extremely conservative.”

The first control variable, age, was constructed by 2012 - the variable dem_birthyr (“Birthdate: year of birth”). The second control variable, sex, was from the variable gender_respondent_x (“SUMMARY: Gender of Respondent for both FTF and Web modes”). Female respondents were coded as 1, and the male participants were coded as 0. The third dependent variable, education, was from the variable dem_edu (“What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?”).

The fourth control variable, Extraversion, was the average of the two variables: tipi_extra (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'extraverted, enthusiastic' describes me) and tipi_resv (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'reserved, quiet' describes me) (reversed-coded) on a 1 (Extremely poorly) - 7 (Extremely well) scale.

The fifth control variable, Agreeableness, was the average of the two variables: tipi_warm (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'sympathetic, warm' describes me) and tipi_crit (We are interested in how you see yourself.

Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'critical, quarrelsome' describes me) (reversed-coded) on a 1 (Extremely poorly) - 7 (Extremely well) scale.

The sixth control variable, Conscientiousness, was the average of the two variables: `tipi_dep` (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'dependable, self-disciplined' describes me) and `tipi_disorg` (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'disorganized, careless' describes me) (reversed-coded) on a 1 (Extremely poorly) - 7 (Extremely well) scale.

The seventh control variable, Neuroticism, was the average of the two variables: `tipi_anx` (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'anxious, easily upset' describes me) and `tipi_calm` (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'calm, emotionally stable' describes me) (reversed-coded) on a 1 (Extremely poorly) - 7 (Extremely well) scale.

The eighth control variable, Openness to New Experiences, was the average of the two variables: `tipi_open` (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'open to new experiences, complex' describes me) and `tipi_conv` (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'conventional, uncreative' describes me) (reversed-coded) on a 1 (Extremely poorly) - 7 (Extremely well) scale.

The ninth control variable, race, was from the variable `dem_raceeth_x` (PRE: SUMMARY- R race and ethnicity group). The tenth control variable, employment status, was derived from the following variables: `dem_emptype_work` ("PRE: R employment status: mention working now"), `dem_emptype_layoff` ("PRE: R employment status: mention temporarily laid off"), `dem_emptype_unemp` ("PRE: R employment status: mention unemployed"), `dem_emptype_retire` ("PRE: R employment status: mention retired"), `dem_emptype_disabled` ("PRE: R employment status: mention permanently disabled"),

dem_emptype_hmaker (“PRE: R employment status: mention homemaker”), and dem_emptype_student (“PRE: R employment status: mention student”). Those working were coded as 1, and the rest were coded as 0. Lastly, in the eleventh control variable, those respondents whose mode of the interview was face-to-face were coded as 1, and those surveyed online were coded as 0.

The descriptive statistics of ANES 2012 are in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics of ANES 2012

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Pctl. (25 th)	Pctl. (75 th)	Max.
Inter-Personal Trust	5,895	2.995	0.946	1	2	4	5
Partisanship Strength	4,132	2.163	0.626	1	2	3	3
Political Polarization	5,167	5.198	3.122	0	3	8	10
Party Identification: Republican Party	4,087	0.373	0.484	0	0	1	1
Left-Right Ideological Placement	5,214	5.902	2.400	0	5	8	10
Satisfaction with Democracy	5,447	2.742	0.758	1	2	3	4
Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation	5,871	2.866	1.120	1	2	4	5
Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation	5,776	3.389	0.992	1	3	4	5
Turnout	5,892	0.778	0.416	0	1	1	1
Self-Conservatism Placement	5,300	4.172	1.470	1	3	5	7
Extraversion	5,487	4.129	1.274	1	3.5	5	7
Agreeableness	5,490	5.130	1.094	1	4.5	6	7
Neuroticism	5,487	3.048	1.230	1	2	4	7
Conscientiousness	5,492	5.611	1.130	1	5	6.5	7
Openness to New Experiences	5,490	4.855	1.140	1	4	5.5	7
Age	5,768	49.622	16.852	18	35	63	90
Sex: Female	5,914	0.519	0.500	0	0	1	1
Education	5,846	10.626	2.471	1	9	13	16
Race: Black, non-Hispanic	4,530	0.225	0.418	0	0	0	1
Race: Hispanic	4,518	0.223	0.417	0	0	0	1
Race: Other	3,855	0.090	0.286	0	0	0	1
Employment Status: Working	5,901	0.489	0.500	0	0	1	1
Mode of Interview: Face-to-Face	5,914	0.347	0.476	0	0	1	1

2016 ANES Variables

The first dependent variable, the inter-personal trust, was from the variable V161219 asking, “Generally speaking, how often can you trust other people? [Always, most of the time, about half the time, some of the time, or never / Never, some of the time, about half the time, most of the time, or always]?” (reversed-coded).

The second dependent variable, partisanship strength, was from the variable V162292b inquiring, “Do you feel [very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close/ not very close to this party, somewhat close, or very close]?” (reversed-coded).

The third dependent variable, political polarization, was calculated based on the two variables V162287 (“In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place the Democratic Party on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?”) and V162288 (“Using the same scale, where would you place the Republican Party?”).

The fourth dependent variable, party identification, was from the variable V162292a with 3 categories (1 = Democratic Party, 3 = Republican Party, and 7 = Other).

The fifth dependent variable, left-right ideological placement, was from the variable V162289 on a 0 (Left) -10 (Right) scale by directing the question “Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale?”.

The sixth dependent variable, satisfaction with democracy, was from the variable V162290 posing the following question “On the whole, are you [very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied / not at all satisfied, not very satisfied, fairly satisfied, or very satisfied] with the way democracy works in the United States?” (reversed-coded).

The seventh dependent variable, sociotropic retrospective evaluation, was from the variable V161140x, which was the recoded version of the follow-ups for the question V161140 asking “Now thinking about the economy in the country as a whole, would you say that over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?” (reversed-coded).

The eighth dependent variable, sociotropic prospective evaluation, was from the variable V161141x, which was the recoded version of the follow-ups for the question V161141 asking, “What about the next 12 months? Do you expect the economy, in the country as a whole, to get better, stay about the same, or get worse?” (reversed-coded).

The ninth dependent variable, strategic voting, did not have an equivalent in ANES 2016.

Lastly, the tenth dependent variable, turnout, was from the variable V161005 asking, “In 2012 Barack Obama ran on the Democratic ticket against Mitt Romney for the Republicans. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election?” with two options 1 “Yes, voted” and 2 “No, didn’t vote”.

The independent variable, self-conservatism placement, was from the variable V161126 asking “Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?” where 1 was for “Extremely liberal”, 2 for “Liberal”, 3 for “Slightly liberal”, 4 for “Moderate; middle of the road”, 5 for “Slightly conservative”, 6 for “Conservative”, and 7 for “Extremely conservative”.

The first control variable, age, was constructed by 2016 - the variable V161267 (“PRE: Respondent age”). The second control variable, sex, was from the variable V161342 (“PRE FTF CASI / WEB: R self-identified gender”). Female respondents were coded as 1, and the male participants were coded as 0. The third dependent variable, education, was from the variable V161270 (“What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?”).

The fourth control variable, Extraversion, was the average of the two variables: V162333 (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'extraverted, enthusiastic' describes me) and V162338 (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'reserved, quiet' describes me) (reversed-coded) on a 1 (Extremely poorly) - 7 (Extremely well) scale.

The fifth control variable, Agreeableness, was the average of the two variables: V162339 (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'sympathetic, warm' describes me) and V162334 (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'critical, quarrelsome' describes me) (reversed-coded) on a 1 (Extremely poorly) - 7 (Extremely well) scale.

The sixth control variable, Conscientiousness, was the average of the two variables: V162335 (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'dependable, self-disciplined' describes me) and V162340 (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word

describes you better than the other. 'disorganized, careless' describes me) (reversed-coded) on a 1 (Extremely poorly) - 7 (Extremely well) scale.

The seventh control variable, Neuroticism, was the average of the two variables: V162336 (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'anxious, easily upset' describes me) and V162341 (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'calm, emotionally stable' describes me) (reversed-coded) on a 1 (Extremely poorly) - 7 (Extremely well) scale.

The eighth control variable, Openness to New Experiences, was the average of the two variables: V162337 (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'open to new experiences, complex' describes me) and V162342 (We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. 'conventional, uncreative' describes me) (reversed-coded) on a 1 (Extremely poorly) - 7 (Extremely well) scale.

The ninth control variable, race, was from the variable V161310x (PRE: SUMMARY - R self-identified race). The tenth control variable, employment status, was derived from the variable V161277 ("We'd like to know if you are working now, temporarily laid off, or are you unemployed, retired, permanently disabled, a homemaker, a student, or what?"). Those working were coded as 1, and the rest were coded as 0. Lastly, in the eleventh control variable, those respondents whose mode of the interview was face-to-face were coded as 1, and those surveyed online were coded as 0.

The descriptive statistics of ANES 2016 are in Table 6.4.

Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics of ANES 2016

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Pctl. (25 th)	Pctl. (75 th)	Max.
Inter-Personal Trust	4,255	3.127	0.919	1	2	4	5
Partisanship Strength	1,993	2.251	0.575	1	2	3	3
Political Polarization	3,434	5.329	3.082	0	3	8	10
Party Identification: Republican Party	1,927	0.473	0.499	0	0	1	1
Left-Right Ideological Placement	3,502	5.721	2.463	0	5	8	10
Satisfaction with Democracy	3,606	2.699	0.728	1	2	3	4
Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation	4,252	2.912	1.072	1	2	4	5
Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation	4,184	3.023	0.935	1	3	4	5
Turnout	4,254	0.733	0.443	0	0	1	1
Self-Conservatism Placement	3,303	4.176	1.598	1	3	6	7
Extraversion	3,589	4.221	1.377	1	3.5	5	7
Agreeableness	3,588	5.203	1.139	1	4.5	6	7
Neuroticism	3,596	3.029	1.263	1	2	4	7
Conscientiousness	3,594	5.699	1.124	1	5	6.5	7
Openness to New Experiences	3,588	5.047	1.123	1	4	6	7
Age	4,149	49.582	17.578	18	34	63	90
Sex: Female	4,218	0.529	0.499	0	0	1	1
Education	4,226	11.171	2.325	1	9	13	16
Race: Black, non-Hispanic	3,435	0.116	0.320	0	0	0	1
Race: Hispanic	3,488	0.129	0.335	0	0	0	1
Race: Other	3,390	0.104	0.305	0	0	0	1
Employment Status: Working	4,254	0.598	0.490	0	0	1	1
Mode of Interview: Face-to-Face	4,270	0.276	0.447	0	0	1	1

Chapter 7

ASSOCIATIONAL FINDINGS

Given the positive alignment between threats and conservative self-identification in the main experimental findings of Chapter 5, I aimed to expound on what an increase in self-conservatism placement means for several political attitudes and behaviors in Turkish politics. Accordingly, the objective of this chapter is to explain the findings of the multivariate associational analyses. In Section 7.1, I evaluated the findings on inter-personal trust. In Section 7.2, I assessed the results on partisanship strength. In Section 7.3, I interpreted the outputs about political polarization. In Section 7.4, I analyzed the models on party identification. In Section 7.5, I weighed the findings on left-right ideological placement. In Section 7.6, I interpreted the links with satisfaction with democracy. In Sections 7.7 and 7.8, I delivered the results about the sociotropic retrospective and prospective evaluations of the incumbent government's policies on the economy. In Section 7.9, I detailed the models on strategic voting. In Section 7.10, I presented the findings on turnout. Throughout the analyses, I took the self-conservatism placement estimates from the control data models as statistically significant if the BH corrected p values were below 0.05; and as robust if the estimates from the same models in the pooled ANES 2012 and 2016 datasets had BH corrected p values below 0.05. In Section 7.11, I comparatively summarized the (non-)significant and (non-)robust findings.

7.1 Hypothesis 10: Self-Conservatism Placement's Negative Association with Inter-Personal Trust

The standardized regression coefficients with full statistics for the inter-personal trust models are shown in Table 7.1. The main model for the control group data was Model 3 because the full model, Model 4, had a non-significant F statistics, $F(12, 330) = 1.695$, $p < 0.10$. After controlling for age, sex, education, language group, and the Big Five Traits (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to New Experiences), in Model 3, self-conservatism placement had a non-significant, but theoretically expected negative relationship with inter-personal trust, $b = -0.052$, $p > 0.10$. On the other hand, in the equivalent ANES 2012 and 2016 model, Model 7, self-conservatism placement significantly negatively predicted inter-personal trust levels, $b = -0.024$, $p < 0.05$.

However, despite the negative and significant association between the conservative self-identification and generalized social trust in the ANES 2012 and 2016, control data did not offer significant conclusions such that I rejected my tenth hypothesis (self-conservatism placement's negative association with inter-personal trust).

Instead, across Models 3 (control group) and 7 (ANES 2012 and 2016), the significant and robust predictor of the generalized social trust was the personality trait Agreeableness, which was the average of the Agreeableness Item 2 (Yardımsever / Helpful), Agreeableness Item 4 (Merhametli / Forgiving), and Agreeableness Item 7 (Herkesle Karşı Anlayışlı / Considerate to Almost Anyone) (see Table 4.7 in Chapter 4: Concept Measurements). For a unit increase in being helpful, forgiving, and considerate, on average, respondents' levels of inter-personal trust tended to increase by 0.141 standard deviations at $p < 0.01$ level for the control group and by 0.075 standard deviations at $p < 0.01$ level for the ANES 2012 and 2016 respondents.

Table 7.1: Inter-personal trust models with standardized coefficients

	Dissertation Data (Control Group)				ANES 2012 and 2016			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Self-Conservatism Placement	0.007 (0.039)	-0.011 (0.041)	-0.052 (0.043)	-0.038 (0.070)	-0.0003 (0.011)	-0.029*** (0.010)	-0.024** (0.011)	0.010 (0.014)
Age		0.007 (0.044)	0.008 (0.049)	0.063 (0.072)		0.100*** (0.011)	0.079*** (0.011)	0.076*** (0.011)
Sex: Female		-0.121 (0.086)	-0.139 (0.089)	-0.122 (0.111)		-0.050** (0.020)	-0.076*** (0.022)	-0.077*** (0.023)
Education		0.141*** (0.043)	0.112** (0.046)	0.123** (0.063)		0.207*** (0.011)	0.184*** (0.011)	0.173*** (0.012)
Language Group: Arabic or Kurdish		0.056 (0.093)	0.070 (0.098)	0.103 (0.127)				
Extraversion			0.038 (0.060)	0.096 (0.080)			0.052*** (0.011)	0.053*** (0.011)
Agreeableness			0.141*** (0.049)	0.140** (0.064)			0.075*** (0.012)	0.072*** (0.012)
Conscientiousness			-0.103 (0.063)	-0.168** (0.084)			-0.025** (0.012)	-0.028** (0.012)
Neuroticism			-0.069 (0.044)	-0.037 (0.063)			-0.094*** (0.012)	-0.092*** (0.012)
Openness to New Experiences			-0.071 (0.060)	-0.066 (0.082)			0.001 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.012)
Left-Right Ideological Placement				0.044 (0.068)				-0.067*** (0.014)
Political Polarization				-0.037 (0.056)				0.046*** (0.011)
Race: Black, non-Hispanic						-0.561*** (0.033)	-0.591*** (0.034)	-0.572*** (0.035)
Race: Hispanic						-0.301*** (0.032)	-0.294*** (0.033)	-0.263*** (0.034)
Race: Other						-0.325*** (0.042)	-0.375*** (0.044)	-0.353*** (0.045)
Mode of the Interview: Face-to-Face					-0.024 (0.024)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.055** (0.024)	0.054** (0.025)
ANES Year: 2016					0.208*** (0.022)	0.083*** (0.021)	0.089*** (0.023)	0.082*** (0.023)
Intercept	0.005 (0.039)	0.076 (0.073)	0.089 (0.075)	0.102 (0.089)	-0.006 (0.015)	0.154*** (0.019)	0.184*** (0.020)	0.178*** (0.021)
Observations	659	608	575	343	8,586	8,234	7,429	7,097
R ²	0.00005	0.024	0.040	0.058	0.011	0.118	0.138	0.141
Adjusted R ²	-0.001	0.016	0.023	0.024	0.010	0.117	0.137	0.139
Residual Std. Error	1.007 (df = 657)	0.998 (df = 602)	0.989 (df = 564)	0.995 (df = 330)	0.976 (df = 8582)	0.921 (df = 8224)	0.912 (df = 7414)	0.907 (df = 7080)
F Statistic	0.031 (df = 1; 657)	2.974** (df = 5; 602)	2.357*** (df = 10; 564)	1.695* (df = 12; 330)	31.175*** (df = 3; 8582)	122.103*** (df = 9; 8224)	85.107*** (df = 14; 7414)	72.690*** (df = 16; 7080)

Notes: **Bolded values are the estimates whose multiple comparison-adjusted p values remained below 0.05 after Benjamini-Hochberg correction.**
Standard errors are in parentheses.

7.2 Hypothesis 11: Self-Conservatism Placement's Positive Association with Partisanship Strength

The standardized regression coefficients with full statistics for the partisanship strength models are shown in Table 7.2. The main model for the control group data was Model 3 because the full model, Model 4, had a non-significant F statistics, $F(12, 241) = 1.660$, $p < 0.10$. After controlling for age, sex, education, and the Big Five Traits (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to New Experiences), in

Model 3, self-conservatism placement had a significant, and theoretically expected positive relationship with partisanship strength, $b = 0.109$, $p < 0.05$. However, the self-conservatism placement estimate's BH corrected p -value did not fall under 0.05 such that there was potential for false-positive error due to the multiple testing problem. Besides, contrary to my theoretical expectation, in the equivalent ANES 2012 and 2016 model, Model 7, self-conservatism placement significantly negatively predicted partisanship strength levels, $b = -0.049$, $p < 0.01$.

All in all, despite the positive association between the self-conservatism placement and partisanship strength, control data did not offer significant conclusions such that I rejected my eleventh hypothesis (self-conservatism placement's positive association with partisanship strength). Further, there was not any common significant variable across the control group and ANES 2012 and 2016 models. Therefore, the models did not offer any conclusive evidence on robust predictors of partisanship strength.

Table 7.2: Partisanship strength models with standardized coefficients

	Dissertation Data (Control Group)				ANES 2012 and 2016			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Self-Conservatism Placement	0.122*** (0.045)	0.134*** (0.047)	0.109** (0.049)	0.078 (0.074)	-0.040*** (0.013)	-0.056*** (0.013)	-0.049*** (0.013)	-0.141*** (0.016)
Age		0.047 (0.048)	0.018 (0.053)	-0.038 (0.074)		0.102*** (0.014)	0.101*** (0.014)	0.114*** (0.014)
Sex: Female		0.147 (0.101)	0.100 (0.105)	0.132 (0.123)		0.164*** (0.027)	0.141*** (0.028)	0.104*** (0.028)
Education		-0.030 (0.047)	-0.034 (0.051)	0.066 (0.065)		-0.092*** (0.014)	-0.106*** (0.014)	-0.089*** (0.015)
Extraversion			-0.005 (0.073)	0.018 (0.093)			0.056*** (0.014)	0.063*** (0.014)
Agreeableness			-0.070 (0.060)	-0.098 (0.072)			0.027* (0.015)	0.032** (0.015)
Conscientiousness			0.160** (0.076)	0.197** (0.091)			0.009 (0.015)	0.003 (0.015)
Neuroticism			-0.051 (0.053)	-0.010 (0.067)			-0.018 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.015)
Openness to New Experiences			-0.011 (0.073)	-0.046 (0.092)			0.053*** (0.015)	0.042*** (0.015)
Left-Right Ideological Placement				0.081 (0.071)				0.124*** (0.016)
Political Polarization				-0.042 (0.060)				0.259*** (0.015)
Inter-Personal Trust				0.029 (0.061)				-0.033** (0.015)
Mode of the Interview: Face-to-Face					0.166*** (0.029)	0.179*** (0.029)	0.147*** (0.030)	0.124*** (0.030)
ANES Year: 2016					0.174*** (0.029)	0.185*** (0.029)	0.172*** (0.030)	0.129*** (0.029)
Intercept	-0.007 (0.046)	-0.115 (0.083)	-0.086 (0.085)	-0.089 (0.093)	-0.129*** (0.019)	-0.213*** (0.023)	-0.196*** (0.023)	-0.211*** (0.023)
Observations	464	445	416	254	5,476	5,293	5,258	5,045
R ²	0.015	0.024	0.041	0.076	0.014	0.039	0.049	0.121
Adjusted R ²	0.013	0.016	0.019	0.030	0.014	0.038	0.047	0.119
Residual Std. Error	0.994 (df = 462)	0.993 (df = 440)	0.985 (df = 406)	0.924 (df = 241)	0.993 (df = 5472)	0.979 (df = 5286)	0.975 (df = 5246)	0.939 (df = 5030)
F Statistic	7.264*** (df = 1; 462)	2.749** (df = 4; 440)	1.907*** (df = 9; 406)	1.660* (df = 12; 241)	26.747*** (df = 3; 5472)	35.603*** (df = 6; 5286)	24.502*** (df = 11; 5246)	49.675*** (df = 14; 5030)

Notes: **Bolded values are the estimates whose multiple comparison-adjusted p values remained below 0.05 after Benjamini-Hochberg correction.**
Standard errors are in parentheses.

7.3 Hypothesis 12: Self-Conservatism Placement's Positive Association with Political Polarization

The standardized regression coefficients with full statistics for the political polarization models are shown in Table 7.3. The main model for the control group data was Model 4 with full controls and significant F statistics, $F(13, 317) = 2.040$, $p < 0.05$. After controlling for age, sex, education, the Big Five Traits (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to New Experiences), left-right ideological placement, satisfaction with democracy, sociotropic retrospective and prospective evaluations, in Model 4, self-conservatism placement had a non-significant, and theoretically unexpected negative relationship with political polarization, $b = -0.134$, $p < 0.10$. Likewise, in the equivalent ANES

2012 and 2016 model, Model 8, self-conservatism placement had a non-significant negative estimate, $b = -0.020$, $p > 0.10$. Thus, I rejected my twelfth hypothesis (self-conservatism placement's positive association with political polarization). Moreover, there was not any common significant variable across the control group and ANES 2012 and 2016 models. Therefore, the models did not offer any conclusive evidence on robust predictors of political polarization.

Table 7.3: Political polarization models with standardized coefficients

	Dissertation Data (Control Group)				ANES 2012 and 2016			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Self-Conservatism Placement	-0.075 (0.049)	-0.087* (0.051)	-0.078 (0.053)	-0.134* (0.074)	0.041*** (0.011)	0.049*** (0.011)	0.049*** (0.012)	-0.020 (0.015)
Age		-0.144** (0.062)	-0.097 (0.069)	-0.133* (0.071)		0.018 (0.012)	0.007 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)
Sex: Female		-0.194* (0.105)	-0.153 (0.107)	-0.121 (0.111)		0.067*** (0.023)	0.047** (0.024)	0.035 (0.024)
Education		0.068 (0.058)	0.038 (0.060)	0.013 (0.062)		0.114*** (0.012)	0.091*** (0.012)	0.113*** (0.012)
Extraversion			0.133* (0.074)	0.109 (0.080)			0.002 (0.012)	0.0001 (0.012)
Agreeableness			-0.035 (0.062)	-0.027 (0.064)			0.028** (0.013)	0.029** (0.013)
Conscientiousness			0.128 (0.080)	0.167** (0.083)			0.074*** (0.013)	0.072*** (0.013)
Neuroticism			0.163*** (0.058)	0.113* (0.061)			-0.019 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)
Openness to New Experiences			-0.099 (0.077)	-0.122 (0.082)			0.048*** (0.013)	0.050*** (0.013)
Left-Right Ideological Placement				0.220*** (0.077)				0.156*** (0.014)
Satisfaction with Democracy				-0.029 (0.115)				0.026** (0.012)
Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation				-0.003 (0.122)				0.011 (0.014)
Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation				-0.174** (0.088)				0.076*** (0.013)
Mode of the Interview: Face-to-Face					0.107*** (0.025)	0.121*** (0.026)	0.109*** (0.026)	0.065** (0.027)
ANES Year: 2016					0.146*** (0.023)	0.114*** (0.024)	0.102*** (0.024)	0.138*** (0.024)
Intercept	0.008 (0.050)	0.121 (0.080)	0.127 (0.081)	0.089 (0.084)	-0.035** (0.016)	-0.070*** (0.019)	-0.052*** (0.020)	-0.045** (0.020)
Observations	394	376	363	331	7,478	7,199	7,144	6,988
R ²	0.006	0.027	0.052	0.077	0.009	0.024	0.038	0.063
Adjusted R ²	0.003	0.017	0.028	0.039	0.009	0.023	0.037	0.061
Residual Std. Error	1.002 (df = 392)	0.998 (df = 371)	0.986 (df = 353)	0.964 (df = 317)	0.968 (df = 7474)	0.963 (df = 7192)	0.956 (df = 7132)	0.942 (df = 6972)
F Statistic	2.340 (df = 1; 392)	2.586** (df = 4; 371)	2.167** (df = 9; 353)	2.040** (df = 13; 317)	23.635*** (df = 3; 7474)	29.158*** (df = 6; 7192)	25.644*** (df = 11; 7132)	31.045*** (df = 15; 6972)

Notes: **Bolded values are the estimates whose multiple comparison-adjusted p values remained below 0.05 after Benjamini-Hochberg correction.**
Standard errors are in parentheses.

7.4 Hypothesis 13: Positive Association between Self-Conservatism Placement and Identification with the Conservative Political Parties

The log of odds estimates with full statistics for the identification with the major conservative political parties models are shown in Table 7.4. The main model for the control group data was Model 4 with full controls because the Wald likelihood ratio test showed a df of 4 (political ideology and issue opinions on democracy and economy) led to a significantly improved model fit, at $p < 0.01$ level, over Model 3 only controlling for age, sex, education, and the Big Five Traits (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to New Experiences).

In Model 4, self-conservatism placement had a non-significant, but theoretically expected positive relationship with identification with the incumbent AKP, $b = 0.143$, $p > 0.10$. In the equivalent ANES 2012 and 2016 model, Model 8, self-conservatism placement had a significant positive estimate, $b = 1.975$, $p < 0.01$. In other words, the probability of identifying the self with the Republican Party tended to increase, on average, by 87.81% ($\sim (e^{(1.975)} / (1 + e^{(1.975)})) * 100\%$), for a unit increase in conservative self-identification level. Overall, despite the positive and significant association between the conservative self-identification and identification with the conservative Republican Party in the ANES 2012 and 2016, control data did not offer significant conclusions on the identification with the conservative AKP such that I rejected my thirteenth hypothesis (positive association between self-conservatism placement and identification with the conservative political parties).

Instead, across Models 4 (control group) and 8 (ANES 2012 and 2016), the significant and robust predictors of the identification with the conservative political parties were the two issue opinions, satisfaction with democracy and sociotropic retrospective evaluation. In the control data, for a unit increase in the satisfaction with the current level of democracy in Turkey and satisfaction with the effects of the incumbent AKP government's policies on economy for the last 12 months, respondents' probability of identifying themselves with AKP increased by 84% ($\sim (e^{(1.625)} / (1 + e^{(1.625)})) * 100\%$) at $p < 0.01$ level and 74% ($\sim (e^{(1.051)} / (1 + e^{(1.051)})) * 100\%$) at $p < 0.01$ level, respectively.

In the ANES 2012 and 2016 datasets, for a unit increase in the satisfaction with the current level of democracy in the U.S. and satisfaction with the state of the economy in the

last 12 months during the presidency of Barack Obama (Democratic Party), participants' probability of identifying themselves with the conservative Republican Party decreased by 46% ($\sim (e^{(-0.151)} / (1 + e^{(-0.151)})) * 100\%$) at $p < 0.01$ level and 28% ($\sim (e^{(-0.940)} / (1 + e^{(-0.940)})) * 100\%$) at $p < 0.01$ level, respectively.

Table 7.4: Party identification models with the log of odds

Dissertation Data (Control Group)					ANES 2012 and 2016			
	<i>Dependent Variable: Party Identification: AKP</i>				<i>Dependent Variable: Party Identification: Republican Party</i>			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Self-Conservatism Placement	1.339*** (0.129)	1.357*** (0.135)	1.305*** (0.145)	0.143 (0.319)	2.273*** (0.059)	2.324*** (0.061)	2.316*** (0.063)	1.975*** (0.074)
Age		0.017 (0.127)	-0.042 (0.148)	-0.436 (0.271)		-0.054 (0.043)	-0.086* (0.044)	-0.101** (0.051)
Sex: Female		1.224*** (0.252)	1.213*** (0.270)	0.930* (0.494)		-0.127 (0.082)	-0.188** (0.088)	-0.410*** (0.102)
Education		0.069 (0.114)	0.068 (0.129)	0.006 (0.251)		0.306*** (0.044)	0.318*** (0.046)	0.516*** (0.054)
Extraversion			0.233 (0.162)	-0.507 (0.334)			0.155*** (0.045)	0.148*** (0.052)
Agreeableness			0.026 (0.142)	0.346 (0.300)			0.041 (0.049)	0.075 (0.056)
Conscientiousness			-0.051 (0.175)	-0.127 (0.355)			0.105** (0.049)	0.042 (0.056)
Neuroticism			-0.433*** (0.124)	-0.414* (0.239)			-0.019 (0.049)	-0.114** (0.055)
Openness to New Experiences			-0.300* (0.165)	-0.051 (0.313)			-0.326*** (0.048)	-0.311*** (0.056)
Left-Right Ideological Placement				0.638* (0.333)				0.491*** (0.063)
Satisfaction with Democracy				1.625*** (0.366)				-0.151*** (0.052)
Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation				1.051*** (0.344)				-0.940*** (0.059)
Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation				0.797** (0.368)				-0.423*** (0.057)
Mode of the Interview: Face-to-Face					-0.231*** (0.086)	-0.233** (0.091)	-0.149 (0.093)	-0.159 (0.108)
ANES Year: 2016					0.682*** (0.089)	0.611*** (0.093)	0.638*** (0.095)	0.565*** (0.109)
Intercept	-1.450*** (0.119)	-2.305*** (0.236)	-2.387*** (0.253)	-3.857*** (0.567)	-0.733*** (0.055)	-0.681*** (0.069)	-0.700*** (0.072)	-0.539*** (0.082)
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test	$p = 0.1727$	$p = 0.1718$	$p = 0.5533$	$p = 0.8503$	$p = 0.0000$	$p = 0.0000$	$p = 0.0000$	$p = 0.03745$
Observations	665	639	601	522	5,368	5,189	5,154	4,921
Log Likelihood	-298.154	-277.270	-248.744	-78.619	-2,020.155	-1,904.424	-1,854.855	-1,449.055
Akaike Inf. Crit.	600.308	564.541	517.489	185.238	4,048.310	3,822.847	3,733.710	2,930.111

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$
 Notes: **Bolded values are the estimates whose multiple comparison-adjusted p values remained below 0.05 after Benjamini-Hochberg correction.**
 Standard errors are in parentheses.

7.5 Hypothesis 14: Self-Conservatism Placement's Positive Association with Left-Right Ideological Placement

The standardized regression coefficients with full statistics for the left-right ideological placement models are shown in Table 7.5. The main model for the control group data was Model 4 with full controls and significant F statistics, $F(14, 316) = 27.487$, $p < 0.01$. After controlling for age, sex, education, the Big Five Traits (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to New Experiences), satisfaction with democracy, sociotropic retrospective and prospective evaluations, political polarization and party identification in Model 4, self-conservatism placement had a significant, and theoretically expected positive relationship with left-right ideological placement, $b = 0.339$, $p < 0.01$. Those tending to have higher conservative self-identification inclined to be politically rightist. Similarly, in the equivalent ANES 2012 and 2016 model, Model 8, self-conservatism placement significantly positively predicted left-right ideological placement levels, $b = 0.502$, $p < 0.01$. Therefore, I failed to reject my fourteenth hypothesis (self-conservatism placement's positive association with left-right ideological placement).

Moreover, across Models 4 (control group) and 8 (ANES 2012 and 2016), the additional significant and robust predictors of the left-right ideological placements were one political attitude and two issue opinions, particularly, political polarization and satisfaction with democracy and sociotropic prospective evaluation. In the control data, for a unit increase in political polarization, the satisfaction with the current level of democracy in Turkey, and positive expectations for the effects of the incumbent AKP government's policies on the economy for the next 12 months, respondents' tendency to be rightist increased by 0.352, 0.198, and 0.116 standard deviations, respectively, at $p < 0.01$ level.

In the ANES 2012 and 2016 datasets, for a unit increase in political polarization, the satisfaction with the current level of democracy in the U.S. and optimism for the state of the economy in the next 12 months, participants' inclination to be rightist increased by 0.086, 0.049, and 0.098 standard deviations, respectively, at $p < 0.01$ level.

Table 7.5: Left-right ideological placement models with standardized coefficients

	Dissertation Data (Control Group)				ANES 2012 and 2016			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Self-Conservatism Placement	0.545*** (0.033)	0.537*** (0.034)	0.529*** (0.036)	0.339*** (0.051)	0.579*** (0.009)	0.567*** (0.010)	0.561*** (0.010)	0.502*** (0.016)
Age		-0.032 (0.036)	-0.038 (0.040)	0.037 (0.052)		0.016* (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.012)
Sex: Female		0.027 (0.072)	0.022 (0.075)	-0.075 (0.082)		0.100*** (0.019)	0.108*** (0.020)	0.129*** (0.025)
Education		0.056 (0.036)	0.064* (0.039)	0.071 (0.045)		-0.151*** (0.010)	-0.155*** (0.010)	-0.184*** (0.013)
Extraversion			0.030 (0.050)	-0.069 (0.058)			0.008 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.012)
Agreeableness			-0.068 (0.042)	-0.027 (0.047)			-0.025** (0.011)	-0.043*** (0.013)
Conscientiousness			-0.012 (0.053)	-0.028 (0.061)			0.028*** (0.011)	0.012 (0.013)
Neuroticism			-0.092** (0.037)	-0.081* (0.044)			-0.043*** (0.011)	-0.041*** (0.013)
Openness to New Experiences			-0.008 (0.050)	0.047 (0.060)			-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.028** (0.013)
Satisfaction with Democracy				0.352*** (0.085)				0.086*** (0.013)
Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation				-0.045 (0.095)				-0.082*** (0.015)
Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation				0.198*** (0.064)				0.049*** (0.014)
Political Polarization				0.116*** (0.040)				0.098*** (0.013)
Party Identification: AKP				0.053 (0.175)				
Party Identification: Republican Party								0.225*** (0.036)
Mode of the Interview: Face-to-Face					0.147*** (0.021)	0.141*** (0.022)	0.142*** (0.022)	0.135*** (0.027)
ANES Year: 2016					-0.062*** (0.020)	-0.013 (0.020)	-0.006 (0.020)	0.005 (0.027)
Intercept	0.003 (0.033)	-0.007 (0.058)	-0.001 (0.059)	0.077 (0.072)	-0.045*** (0.013)	-0.095*** (0.016)	-0.105*** (0.016)	-0.195*** (0.026)
Observations	637	614	580	331	7,561	7,281	7,225	4,860
R ²	0.299	0.301	0.312	0.549	0.333	0.355	0.362	0.437
Adjusted R ²	0.298	0.296	0.301	0.529	0.333	0.355	0.361	0.435
Residual Std. Error	0.838 (df = 635)	0.842 (df = 609)	0.835 (df = 570)	0.700 (df = 316)	0.826 (df = 7557)	0.811 (df = 7274)	0.807 (df = 7213)	0.812 (df = 4843)
F Statistic	271.395*** (df = 1; 635)	65.505*** (df = 4; 609)	28.674*** (df = 9; 570)	27.487*** (df = 14; 316)	1,259.934*** (df = 3; 7557)	667.807*** (df = 6; 7274)	372.392*** (df = 11; 7213)	234.666*** (df = 16; 4843)

Notes: **Bolded values are the estimates whose multiple comparison-adjusted p values remained below 0.05 after Benjamini-Hochberg correction.**
Standard errors are in parentheses.

7.6 Hypothesis 15: Positive Association between Self-Conservatism Placement and Satisfaction with Democracy

The standardized regression coefficients with full statistics for the satisfaction with democracy models are shown in Table 7.6. The main model for the control group data was Model 4 with full controls and significant F statistics, $F(14, 316) = 99.264$, $p < 0.01$. After controlling for age, sex, education, the Big Five Traits (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to New Experiences), sociotropic

retrospective and prospective evaluations, political polarization, party identification, and left-right ideological placement in Model 4, self-conservatism placement had a significant, and theoretically expected positive relationship with the satisfaction with democracy, $b = 0.072$, $p < 0.05$. Those tending to have higher conservative self-identification inclined to be more satisfied with the current level of democracy in Turkey. However, the self-conservatism placement estimate's BH corrected p -value did not fall under 0.05 such that there was potential for false-positive error due to the multiple testing problem. Further, in the equivalent ANES 2012 and 2016 model, Model 8, self-conservatism placement had a non-significant, but theoretically expected positive relationship with the satisfaction with democracy, $b = 0.030$, $p > 0.10$. Therefore, I rejected my fifteenth hypothesis (positive association between self-conservatism placement and satisfaction with democracy).

Moreover, across Models 4 (control group) and 8 (ANES 2012 and 2016), the additional significant and robust predictors of the satisfaction with democracy were one political attitude and one issue opinion, specifically, party identification and sociotropic retrospective evaluation. In the control data, compared to the affiliates of other political parties, those identifying themselves with the incumbent AKP tended to have higher levels of satisfaction with the current state of democracy in Turkey by 0.591 standard deviations at $p < 0.01$ level. Moreover, for a unit increase in positive evaluations on the effects of the incumbent AKP government's policies on the economy in the last 12 months, satisfaction with democracy in Turkey inclined to increase by 0.494 standard deviations at $p < 0.01$ level.

In the ANES 2012 and 2016 datasets, compared to the affiliates of the liberal incumbent Democratic Party, those identifying themselves with the conservative Republican Party tended to have lower levels of satisfaction with the current state of democracy in the U.S. by 0.156 standard deviations at $p < 0.01$ level. Furthermore, for a unit increase in the satisfaction with the state of the economy in the last 12 months during the presidency of Barack Obama (Democratic Party), satisfaction with democracy in the U.S. inclined to increase by 0.095 standard deviations at $p < 0.01$ level.

Table 7.6: Satisfaction with democracy models with standardized coefficients

	Dissertation Data (Control Group)				ANES 2012 and 2016			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Self-Conservatism Placement	0.539*** (0.033)	0.533*** (0.034)	0.509*** (0.035)	0.072** (0.035)	0.016 (0.011)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.013 (0.012)	0.030 (0.020)
Age		0.005 (0.036)	-0.006 (0.039)	-0.001 (0.033)		0.095*** (0.012)	0.077*** (0.012)	0.070*** (0.014)
Sex: Female		0.268*** (0.071)	0.248*** (0.072)	-0.022 (0.053)		-0.011 (0.023)	-0.032 (0.024)	-0.055* (0.028)
Education		0.016 (0.036)	0.009 (0.037)	0.006 (0.029)		0.013 (0.012)	0.003 (0.012)	0.003 (0.015)
Extraversion			0.080* (0.048)	0.102*** (0.037)			0.027** (0.012)	0.021 (0.014)
Agreeableness			-0.029 (0.040)	-0.022 (0.030)			0.048*** (0.013)	0.030** (0.015)
Conscientiousness			-0.002 (0.051)	-0.054 (0.039)			0.004 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.015)
Neuroticism			-0.114*** (0.036)	0.014 (0.029)			-0.081*** (0.013)	-0.072*** (0.015)
Openness to New Experiences			-0.056 (0.048)	0.001 (0.038)			-0.059*** (0.013)	-0.054*** (0.015)
Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation				0.494*** (0.054)				0.095*** (0.017)
Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation				0.073* (0.041)				0.098*** (0.016)
Political Polarization				-0.005 (0.026)				0.032** (0.015)
Party Identification: AKP				0.591*** (0.107)				
Party Identification: Republican Party								-0.156*** (0.041)
Left-Right Ideological Placement				0.145*** (0.035)				0.112*** (0.016)
Mode of the Interview: Face-to-Face					0.297*** (0.025)	0.314*** (0.025)	0.320*** (0.026)	0.282*** (0.031)
ANES Year: 2016					-0.003 (0.023)	-0.012 (0.024)	-0.006 (0.024)	0.045 (0.030)
Intercept	0.003 (0.033)	-0.172*** (0.057)	-0.161*** (0.058)	-0.135*** (0.046)	-0.078*** (0.016)	-0.076*** (0.019)	-0.072*** (0.020)	0.052* (0.029)
Observations	658	634	596	331	7,768	7,479	7,421	4,860
R ²	0.287	0.307	0.332	0.815	0.018	0.026	0.039	0.075
Adjusted R ²	0.286	0.303	0.322	0.807	0.018	0.026	0.037	0.072
Residual Std. Error	0.846 (df = 656)	0.841 (df = 629)	0.819 (df = 586)	0.449 (df = 316)	0.984 (df = 7764)	0.979 (df = 7472)	0.973 (df = 7409)	0.927 (df = 4843)
F Statistic	264.659*** (df = 1; 656)	69.636*** (df = 4; 629)	32.374*** (df = 9; 586)	99.264*** (df = 14; 316)	47.762*** (df = 3; 7764)	33.837*** (df = 6; 7472)	27.138*** (df = 11; 7409)	24.655*** (df = 16; 4843)

Notes: **Bolded values are the estimates whose multiple comparison-adjusted p values remained below 0.05 after Benjamini-Hochberg correction.**
 *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Standard errors are in parentheses.

7.7 Hypothesis 16a: Self-Conservatism Placement's Positive Association with Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation

The standardized regression coefficients with full statistics for the sociotropic retrospective evaluation models are shown in Table 7.7. The main model for the control group data was Model 4 with full controls and significant F statistics, $F(14, 314) = 84.165$, $p < 0.01$. After controlling for age, sex, education, the Big Five Traits (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to New Experiences), satisfaction with

democracy, sociotropic prospective evaluation, political polarization, party identification, left-right ideological placement, and employment status in Model 4, self-conservatism placement had a significant as well as theoretically expected positive relationship with sociotropic retrospective evaluation, $b = 0.180$, $p < 0.01$. Those tending to have higher conservative self-identification inclined to have higher degrees of positive views on the state of the economy in the last 12 months due to the incumbent AKP government's policies. In the equivalent ANES 2012 and 2016 model, Model 8, self-conservatism placement significantly negatively predicted sociotropic retrospective evaluation levels during the liberal incumbent Obama presidency (Democratic Party), $b = -0.119$, $p < 0.01$. Therefore, I failed to reject my sixteenth hypothesis' part a (self-conservatism placement's positive association with the sociotropic retrospective evaluation).

Moreover, across Models 4 (control group) and 8 (ANES 2012 and 2016), the additional significant and robust predictors of the sociotropic retrospective evaluation were one political attitude and one issue opinion, in particular, party identification and sociotropic prospective evaluation. In the control data, compared to the affiliates of other political parties, those identifying themselves with the incumbent AKP tended to be more satisfied with the state of the economy in the last 12 months, due to the incumbent AKP government's policies, in Turkey by 0.278 standard deviations at $p < 0.01$ level. Moreover, for a unit increase in being optimistic about the state of the economy for the next 12 months, due to the incumbent AKP government's policies, in Turkey, positive evaluations on the effects of the incumbent AKP government's policies on the economy for the last 12 months inclined to increase by 0.278 standard deviations at $p < 0.01$ level.

In the ANES 2012 and 2016 datasets, compared to the affiliates of the liberal incumbent Democratic Party, those identifying themselves with the conservative Republican Party tended to have lower levels of satisfaction with the current state of the economy in the U.S. by 0.662 standard deviations at $p < 0.01$ level. Furthermore, for a unit increase in positive expectations for the economy in the next 12 months, the respondents' satisfaction with the level of economy in the U.S. for the last 12 months tended to increase by 0.322 standard deviations, at $p < 0.01$ level.

Table 7.7: Sociotropic retrospective evaluation models with standardized coefficients

	Dissertation Data (Control Group)				ANES 2012 and 2016			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Self-Conservatism Placement	0.557*** (0.033)	0.547*** (0.033)	0.521*** (0.035)	0.180*** (0.034)	-0.411*** (0.010)	-0.407*** (0.010)	-0.408*** (0.011)	-0.119*** (0.017)
Age		0.016 (0.035)	0.002 (0.038)	0.025 (0.036)		-0.002 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.011)	0.001 (0.013)
Sex: Female		0.364*** (0.070)	0.344*** (0.072)	-0.036 (0.055)		-0.126*** (0.020)	-0.122*** (0.022)	-0.107*** (0.024)
Education		0.012 (0.035)	0.009 (0.037)	0.034 (0.031)		0.091*** (0.010)	0.082*** (0.011)	0.081*** (0.012)
Extraversion			0.050 (0.049)	0.020 (0.039)			-0.021* (0.011)	-0.010 (0.012)
Agreeableness			-0.010 (0.040)	0.022 (0.031)			0.017 (0.012)	0.014 (0.013)
Conscientiousness			0.021 (0.052)	-0.034 (0.040)			-0.010 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.013)
Neuroticism			-0.093** (0.036)	-0.017 (0.030)			-0.034*** (0.012)	-0.017 (0.013)
Openness to New Experiences			-0.080* (0.048)	-0.019 (0.040)			0.009 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.013)
Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation				0.278*** (0.040)				0.322*** (0.013)
Political Polarization				-0.008 (0.027)				-0.012 (0.013)
Party Identification: AKP				1.155*** (0.090)				
Party Identification: Republican Party								-0.662*** (0.033)
Left-Right Ideological Placement				0.063* (0.036)				-0.067*** (0.014)
Employment Status: Working				-0.085 (0.062)				0.084*** (0.025)
Mode of the Interview: Face-to-Face					0.069*** (0.022)	0.076*** (0.022)	0.074*** (0.024)	0.023 (0.026)
ANES Year: 2016					0.086*** (0.020)	0.062*** (0.021)	0.057*** (0.022)	0.203*** (0.025)
Intercept	0.014 (0.033)	-0.219*** (0.056)	-0.216*** (0.057)	-0.232*** (0.054)	-0.045*** (0.014)	0.019 (0.017)	0.022 (0.018)	0.243*** (0.028)
Observations	636	614	576	329	8,571	8,246	7,436	4,865
R ²	0.307	0.338	0.355	0.790	0.172	0.182	0.186	0.406
Adjusted R ²	0.306	0.334	0.345	0.780	0.172	0.181	0.185	0.404
Residual Std. Error	0.836 (df = 634)	0.822 (df = 609)	0.807 (df = 566)	0.466 (df = 314)	0.911 (df = 8567)	0.905 (df = 8239)	0.903 (df = 7424)	0.781 (df = 4848)
F Statistic	280.820*** (df = 1; 634)	77.750*** (df = 4; 609)	34.616*** (df = 9; 566)	84.165*** (df = 14; 314)	594.144*** (df = 3; 8567)	305.709*** (df = 6; 8239)	154.037*** (df = 11; 7424)	207.338*** (df = 16; 4848)

Notes: **Bolded values are the estimates whose multiple comparison-adjusted p values remained below 0.05 after Benjamini-Hochberg correction.**
 *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Standard errors are in parentheses.

7.8 Hypothesis 16b: Self-Conservatism Placement's Positive Association with Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation

The standardized regression coefficients with full statistics for the sociotropic prospective evaluation models are shown in Table 7.8. The main model for the control group data was Model 4 with full controls and significant F statistics, $F(14, 314) = 36.862$, $p < 0.01$. After controlling for age, sex, education, the Big Five Traits (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to New Experiences), satisfaction with

democracy, sociotropic retrospective evaluation, political polarization, party identification, left-right ideological placement, and employment status in Model 4, self-conservatism placement had a non-significant and theoretically unexpected negative relationship with sociotropic prospective evaluation, $b = -0.059$, $p > 0.10$. Similarly, in the equivalent ANES 2012 and 2016 model, Model 8, conservative self-identification had a non-significant and theoretically unexpected negative relationship with sociotropic prospective evaluation, $b = -0.016$, $p > 0.10$. Therefore, I rejected my sixteenth hypothesis' part b (self-conservatism placement's positive association with the sociotropic prospective evaluation).

Moreover, across Models 4 (control group) and 8 (ANES 2012 and 2016), the additional significant and robust predictors of the sociotropic retrospective evaluation were two political attitudes and one issue opinion, particularly, party identification and left-right ideological placement, and sociotropic retrospective evaluation. In the control data, compared to the affiliates of other political parties, those identifying themselves with the incumbent AKP tended to be more optimistic about the state of the economy in the next 12 months, due to the incumbent AKP government's policies, in Turkey by 0.419 standard deviations at $p < 0.01$ level. Further, as participants became more politically rightist, their inclination to have higher degrees of positive sociotropic prospective evaluation in Turkey increased by 0.476 standard deviations at $p < 0.01$ level. Moreover, for a unit increase in being satisfied with the state of the economy in the last 12 months, due to the incumbent AKP government's policies, in Turkey, positive expectations on the effects of the incumbent AKP government's policies on the economy for the next 12 months inclined to increase by 0.476 standard deviations at $p < 0.01$ level.

In the ANES 2012 and 2016 datasets, compared to the affiliates of the liberal incumbent Democratic Party, those identifying themselves with the conservative Republican Party tended to have lower levels of optimism about the state of the economy in the U.S. in the next 12 months by 0.275 standard deviations at $p < 0.01$ level. Further, for a unit increase in being more rightist and holding more positive evaluations of the economy for the last 12 months, the respondents' positive expectations for the state of the economy in the U.S. in the next 12 months tended to increase by 0.059 and 0.363 standard deviations, respectively, at $p < 0.01$ level.

Table 7.8: Sociotropic prospective evaluation models with standardized coefficients

	Dissertation Data (Control Group)				ANES 2012 and 2016			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Self-Conservatism Placement	0.410*** (0.037)	0.388*** (0.037)	0.356*** (0.039)	-0.059 (0.047)	-0.200*** (0.010)	-0.201*** (0.011)	-0.197*** (0.011)	-0.016 (0.018)
Age		-0.056 (0.038)	-0.082* (0.042)	-0.133*** (0.047)		0.026** (0.011)	0.017 (0.012)	0.004 (0.014)
Sex: Female		0.407*** (0.077)	0.384*** (0.079)	0.117 (0.072)		-0.048** (0.021)	-0.037 (0.023)	-0.054** (0.025)
Education		-0.043 (0.038)	-0.060 (0.041)	-0.102** (0.040)		-0.011 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.040*** (0.013)
Extraversion			0.088* (0.053)	0.062 (0.050)			0.017 (0.011)	0.016 (0.012)
Agreeableness			-0.041 (0.044)	-0.097** (0.041)			0.017 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)
Conscientiousness			0.063 (0.056)	0.070 (0.053)			-0.015 (0.013)	-0.016 (0.014)
Neuroticism			-0.105*** (0.040)	-0.024 (0.039)			-0.052*** (0.013)	-0.032** (0.014)
Openness to New Experiences			-0.072 (0.053)	-0.021 (0.052)			0.029** (0.013)	0.031** (0.014)
Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation				0.476*** (0.069)				0.363*** (0.014)
Political Polarization				-0.063* (0.036)				0.064*** (0.014)
Party Identification: AKP				0.419*** (0.143)				
Party Identification: Republican Party								-0.275*** (0.036)
Left-Right Ideological Placement				0.161*** (0.047)				0.059*** (0.015)
Employment Status: Working				0.166** (0.081)				-0.057** (0.026)
Mode of the Interview: Face-to-Face					0.108*** (0.023)	0.113*** (0.024)	0.096*** (0.025)	0.040 (0.027)
ANES Year: 2016					-0.365*** (0.021)	-0.368*** (0.022)	-0.379*** (0.023)	-0.365*** (0.027)
Intercept	-0.010 (0.037)	-0.281*** (0.062)	-0.270*** (0.063)	-0.311*** (0.071)	0.109*** (0.015)	0.135*** (0.018)	0.138*** (0.019)	0.371*** (0.029)
Observations	618	596	560	329	8,447	8,128	7,336	4,865
R ²	0.165	0.212	0.241	0.622	0.077	0.077	0.083	0.254
Adjusted R ²	0.163	0.206	0.228	0.605	0.077	0.077	0.081	0.252
Residual Std. Error	0.917 (df = 616)	0.894 (df = 591)	0.873 (df = 550)	0.609 (df = 314)	0.946 (df = 8443)	0.944 (df = 8121)	0.941 (df = 7324)	0.829 (df = 4848)
F Statistic	121.532*** (df = 1; 616)	39.672*** (df = 4; 591)	19.393*** (df = 9; 550)	36.862*** (df = 14; 314)	234.771*** (df = 3; 8443)	113.664*** (df = 6; 8121)	60.095*** (df = 11; 7324)	103.239*** (df = 16; 4848)

Notes: ^{*}p<0.1; ^{**}p<0.05; ^{***}p<0.01. Bolded values are the estimates whose multiple comparison-adjusted p values remained below 0.05 after Benjamini-Hochberg correction. Standard errors are in parentheses.

7.9 Hypothesis 17: Negative Association between Self-Conservatism Placement and Strategic Voting

The log of odds estimates with full statistics for the strategic voting models are shown in Table 7.9. The main model for the control group data was Model 4 with full controls because the Wald likelihood ratio test showed a df of 3 (political ideology, political polarization, and satisfaction with democracy) led to a significantly improved model fit, at $p<0.01$ level, over Model 3 only controlling for age, sex, education, language group, and the Big Five Traits

(Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to New Experiences).

In Model 4, self-conservatism placement had a non-significant, and theoretically unexpected positive relationship with the strategic voting, $b = 0.026$, $p > 0.10$. In the previous models, Model 1 to 3, on the other hand, the probability of voting strategically in the 2018 general elections of Turkey decreased by 37.8% ($e^{(-0.496)} / (1 + e^{(-0.496)}) * 100\%$), 37.9% ($e^{(-0.495)} / (1 + e^{(-0.495)}) * 100\%$), and 37.2% ($e^{(-0.523)} / (1 + e^{(-0.523)}) * 100\%$), for a unit increase in conservative self-identification level. Yet, in Model 4, self-conservatism placement's theoretically expected negative links with strategic voting appeared to be outweighed by the satisfaction with democracy. As respondents' level of satisfaction with the current state of democracy decreased, their proclivity for voting strategically increased by 31.7% ($e^{(-0.767)} / (1 + e^{(-0.767)})$), at $p < 0.01$ level. Then, I rejected my seventeenth hypothesis (negative association between self-conservatism placement and strategic voting).

Table 7.9: Strategic voting models with the log of odds

	Dissertation Data (Control Group)			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Self-Conservatism Placement	-0.496*** (0.084)	-0.495*** (0.089)	-0.523*** (0.095)	0.026 (0.168)
Age		-0.126 (0.094)	-0.109 (0.105)	-0.146 (0.167)
Sex: Female		-0.515*** (0.181)	-0.512*** (0.190)	-0.450* (0.257)
Education		0.065 (0.091)	0.047 (0.098)	0.190 (0.151)
Language Group: Arabic or Kurdish		-0.133 (0.199)	-0.230 (0.211)	-0.342 (0.307)
Extraversion			0.133 (0.129)	0.193 (0.183)
Agreeableness			-0.020 (0.106)	-0.223 (0.150)
Conscientiousness			0.020 (0.135)	-0.060 (0.198)
Neuroticism			-0.010 (0.095)	-0.178 (0.148)
Openness to New Experiences			-0.009 (0.128)	0.151 (0.193)
Left-Right Ideological Placement				-0.406** (0.176)
Political Polarization				0.157 (0.129)
Satisfaction with Democracy				-0.767*** (0.188)
Intercept	-0.141* (0.082)	0.235 (0.154)	0.293* (0.160)	0.191 (0.207)
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test	$p = 0.7763$	$p = 0.8848$	$p = 0.7563$	$p = 0.3564$
Observations	641	594	560	332
Log Likelihood	-424.553	-388.332	-364.496	-189.063
Akaike Inf. Crit.	853.107	788.663	750.993	406.126

Notes: **Bolded values are the estimates whose multiple comparison-adjusted p values remained below 0.05 after Benjamini-Hochberg correction.**
Standard errors are in parentheses.

7.10 Hypothesis 18: Positive Association between Self-Conservatism Placement and Turnout in General Elections

The log of odds estimates with full statistics for the turnout models are shown in Table 7.10. The main model for the control group data was Model 2 with demographics because the Wald likelihood ratio test showed a df of 4 (age, sex, education, and language group) led to a significantly improved model fit, at $p < 0.01$ level, over the base Model 1 with conservative self-identification. With a df of 5 (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to New Experiences), Model 3 did not provide a significant fit over Model 2, at $p = 0.6859$. Naturally, with a df of 5 (satisfaction with democracy, sociotropic retrospective and prospective evaluations, party identification, and strategic voting), Model 4 did not provide significant fit over Model 3, at $p = 0.4658$.

In Model 2, self-conservatism placement had a non-significant, but theoretically expected positive relationship with turnout in the general elections, $b = 0.111$, $p > 0.10$. In the equivalent ANES 2012 and 2016 model, Model 6, self-conservatism placement also had a non-significant positive estimate, $b = 0.001$, $p > 0.10$. Thus, I rejected my eighteenth hypothesis (self-conservatism placement's positive association with turnout in general elections).

Rather, across Models 2 (control group) and 6 (ANES 2012 and 2016), the significant and robust predictors of turnout in the general elections were the two demographics variables, age, and sex. In the control data, for a unit increase in the participants' ages, the probability of turning out to vote increased by 98.5% ($\sim (e^{4.187} / (1 + e^{4.187})) * 100\%$) at $p < 0.01$ level. Besides, compared to the males, the females' probability of casting a vote in the November 1, 2015 general elections of Turkey was 37.6% ($\sim (e^{-0.507} / (1 + e^{-0.507})) * 100\%$) lower at $p < 0.01$ level.

In the ANES 2012 and 2016 datasets, for a unit increase in age, participants' probability of voting in the 2008 presidential elections of the U.S. increased by 70.6% ($\sim (e^{0.874} / (1 + e^{0.874})) * 100\%$) at $p < 0.01$ level. Compared to the males, the females' probability of casting a vote was 54.1% ($\sim (e^{0.164} / (1 + e^{0.164})) * 100\%$) higher at $p < 0.01$ level.

Table 7.10: Turnout models with the log of odds

	Dissertation Data (Control Group)				ANES 2012 and 2016			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Self-Conservatism Placement	-0.023 (0.078)	0.111 (0.113)	0.150 (0.126)	0.150 (0.166)	0.077*** (0.027)	0.001 (0.031)	-0.011 (0.034)	-0.093 (0.057)
Age		4.187*** (0.460)	5.206*** (0.572)	5.297*** (0.635)		0.874*** (0.034)	0.849*** (0.036)	0.892*** (0.050)
Sex: Female		-0.507** (0.233)	-0.495* (0.253)	-0.471* (0.280)		0.164*** (0.061)	0.106 (0.067)	0.139 (0.092)
Education		0.397** (0.166)	0.269 (0.187)	0.256 (0.202)		0.693*** (0.033)	0.661*** (0.036)	0.666*** (0.049)
Language Group: Arabic or Kurdish		-0.010 (0.254)	-0.013 (0.283)	-0.215 (0.316)				
Extraversion			-0.023 (0.172)	-0.060 (0.193)			0.066** (0.033)	0.072 (0.045)
Agreeableness			-0.239* (0.138)	-0.243* (0.147)			0.066* (0.036)	0.081* (0.049)
Conscientiousness			0.024 (0.177)	0.119 (0.198)			0.043 (0.035)	0.022 (0.048)
Neuroticism			0.040 (0.127)	0.051 (0.137)			-0.046 (0.036)	-0.040 (0.049)
Openness to New Experiences			0.130 (0.172)	0.065 (0.188)			0.034 (0.036)	-0.061 (0.050)
Satisfaction with Democracy				0.023 (0.274)				-0.035 (0.046)
Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation				-0.174 (0.287)				0.044 (0.055)
Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation				0.086 (0.191)				0.094* (0.051)
Party Identification: AKP				0.627 (0.517)				
Strategic Voting				0.449 (0.278)				
Party Identification: Republican Party								0.355*** (0.132)
Race: Black, non-Hispanic						0.579*** (0.105)	0.558*** (0.111)	0.560*** (0.152)
Race: Hispanic						-0.376*** (0.083)	-0.365*** (0.089)	-0.363*** (0.121)
Race: Other						-0.480*** (0.112)	-0.442*** (0.121)	-0.401** (0.174)
Mode of the Interview: Face-to-Face					-0.405*** (0.058)	-0.206*** (0.066)	-0.259*** (0.070)	-0.402*** (0.094)
ANES Year: 2016					-0.147*** (0.055)	-0.370*** (0.063)	-0.404*** (0.068)	-0.322*** (0.099)
Intercept	0.015 (0.079)	1.481*** (0.264)	1.842*** (0.307)	1.569*** (0.371)	1.543*** (0.040)	1.721*** (0.060)	1.789*** (0.064)	1.942*** (0.106)
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test	$p = 0.0.8505$	$p = 0.000$	$p = 0.000$	$p = 0.000$	$p = 0.0000$	$p = 0.007978$	$p = 0.05655$	$p = 0.1317$
Observations	647	603	568	495	8,578	8,225	7,422	5,027
Log Likelihood	-448.403	-252.465	-221.617	-191.761	-4,306.023	-3,461.096	-3,095.990	-1,745.442
Akaike Inf. Crit.	900.806	516.931	465.234	415.523	8,620.046	6,942.192	6,221.980	3,528.884

Notes: **Bolded values are the estimates whose multiple comparison-adjusted p values remained below 0.05 after Benjamini-Hochberg correction.**
Standard errors are in parentheses.

7.11 Summary of the Findings

The brief and comparative summary of the multivariate associational findings for the control group data is in Table 7.11. If the control group's conservative self-identification estimates had BH corrected p values below 0.05, those coefficients were taken as statistically

significant. Further, if the equivalent ANES models' self-conservatism placement estimates had BH corrected p values below 0.05, those conservatism estimates in the control group data were also taken as statistically robust. Accordingly, across the several outcome variables, only the one political attitude (political ideology) and one issue opinion (sociotropic retrospective evaluation) remained statistically significant and robust for the control group participants. Those respondents with higher degrees of conservative self-identification, on average, tended to be more ideologically rightist and more positive about the effects of the incumbent AKP government's policies on the economy from 2017 to 2018.

Table 7.11: Associational findings for the control group

Independent Variable	<i>Dependent Variables (DV):</i>									
	DV 1	DV 2	DV 3	DV 4	DV 5	DV 6	DV 7	DV 8	DV 9	DV 10
Self-Conservatism Placement	-* (E)	+* (E)	-+ (NE)	+* (E)	+*** (E)	+* (E)	+*** (E)	-+ (NE)	+* (NE)	+* (E)

Notes:

DV 1 = Inter-Personal Trust (Hypothesis 10);

DV 2 = Partisanship Strength (Hypothesis 11);

DV 3 = Political Polarization (Hypothesis 12);

DV 4 = Party Identification: Largest Conservative Party in the Party System (Hypothesis 13);

DV 5 = Left-Right Ideological Placement [Rightist Orientation] (Hypothesis 14);

DV 6 = Satisfaction with Democracy (Hypothesis 15);

DV 7 = Sociotropic Retrospective Evaluation (Hypothesis 16a);

DV 8 = Sociotropic Prospective Evaluation (Hypothesis 16b);

DV 9 = Strategic Voting (Hypothesis 17); and

DV 10 = Turnout in General Elections (Hypothesis 18).

*** = Significant (in the control group data) and robust (in the ANES 2012 and 2016 datasets)

* = Not significant (in the control group data) but robust (in the ANES 2012 and 2016 datasets)

+ = Not significant (in the control group data) and Not robust (in the ANES 2012 and 2016 datasets)

E = A priori expected sign

NE = A priori unexpected sign

Chapter 8

CONCLUSION

8.1 Discussion

This dissertation explored how three types of mortality primes – reminders of death due to cancer, a terror attack, and unknown causes – may lead to diverging ideological responses that can shed light on the conditions under which people respond differently to mortality salience. In doing so, this study aimed to resolve three problems with TMT studies: replicability, inconsistent findings of a conservative shift and the worldview defense, and generalizability. Based on an online survey experiment conducted in Turkey in 2018 with a random non-representative sample ($N=2,629$), the reminder of death due to cancer had an insignificant positive effect while the reminders of death due to a terror attack and unknown causes had similar significant positive effects on conservative self-identification.

The most robust and replicable model for explaining self-conservatism placement was the base model in which experimental treatments were the independent variables and age, sex, education, and left-right ideological placements were the control variables. Across several robustness checks of multiple testing procedures and subset analyses on the base model, TMT's replicability was high if a threat was formulated either as a sociotropic threat to one's society or country (e.g., a terror attack), or as a vague threat to one's sense of control and certainty (e.g., unknown causes of death), which was TMT's original treatment of a mere reminder of one's mortality. As expected, a placebo-like cancer threat, on the other hand, did not elicit sufficient fear and inhibition to increase conservative self-identification. This is because a reminder of death from cancer was probably not perceived as socially threatening and immediate unlike deaths from terror attacks or unknown causes.

Furthermore, the only increase in conservative self-identification across the models resolved the issue of overgeneralization to the advantage of a (partial) conservative shift, but

not the rally round the flag effect. When respondents indicated increased conservative self-identification against threats of terrorism and uncertainty, the blurred line between a conservative shift and the rally round the flag effect became clearer in favor of the first.

Besides, the significant positive interaction between higher Openness to New Experiences and reminder of a terror attack threat may have resolved TMT's mixed findings in line with the conservative shift hypothesis. This conclusion matches previous macro-level findings that, in threatening times with high homicide rates and unemployment (or terrorist attacks in this case), open-minded people's tendency to oppose conservatism decreases (Sibley et al., 2012). However, the interaction between Openness to New Experiences and terror attack threat was not replicable due to underpowered sample and was susceptible to false positive error due to the multiple testing problem and should, at most, be treated as exploratory finding for future work on the links between threats, personality traits, and political ideologies.

Next, there was no statistically significant mediational causal path, e.g., threats → decrease/increase in the *Big Five Traits* → higher/lower conservatism. As theoretically expected, all the *Big Five Traits* remained stable against experimental reminders of death. Only life-long attributes, such as conservative self-identification, age, sex, and left-right ideological orientation, had statistically significant effects on personality traits (see Appendix C: Supplementary Outputs, Tables 11.5 to 11.8).

Later, multivariate associational findings from the control data offered two conclusive evidence on what an increase in conservative self-identification means for the non-representative Turkish sample. First of all, respondents who tended to have higher self-conservative placement levels inclined to be ideologically more rightist. Second, those with higher conservative self-identification inclined to have higher degrees of positive views on the economy's state in the last 12 months due to the incumbent conservative AKP government's policies.

Then, considering these findings, this dissertation's contribution to the literature can be twofold. The first is the broader contributions. The robust and significant positive effect of a vague reminder of death due to unknown causes on conservative self-placement supports the TMT's replicability potential in a non-Western context such as Turkey with full of mortality reminders in daily life. This is because a threat of unknown causes is similar to the

TMT's original mortality reminder asking the respondents to contemplate their death. Moreover, cancer's insignificant positive and a terror attack's robust and significant positive effect on conservative self-identification also inform us that threats due to social causes affect ideological shifts. What is more, the reminders of mortality due to a terror attack and unknown causes only affected conservative self-placement, but not the implicit attitudes on uncertainty, change, alternative lifestyles, and gender inequality. Therefore, we can safely resolve overgeneralization by naming the mortality salience effects as conservative shifts.

The second is the substantive contributions. This dissertation provides a new and puzzling case study of Turkey, outside the usual Western and North American samples for the TMT research. Further, this case analysis delivers original experimental data with a more heterogeneous sample than the typical student samples in terms of age and residential area. Least to say, the experimental evidence of death's effect on conservatism is backed by a macro-level secondary data analyses such as Google Trends that death and conservatism are positively related topics in Turkish people's personal lives. Moreover, for the TMT studies, at least, in Turkish, this dissertation invented an original manipulation check – a randomized word completion puzzle, which can be used in other experimental settings, as well. Similarly, the originally adapted BFI with 44 items in Turkish is with proper psychometric properties (e.g., Cronbach's alphas greater than or equal to 0.65, five factors solution in EFA, measurement invariance across gender, education, and language [Arabic-Kurdish v. Turkish] groups), and is ready for further usages in Turkish social sciences.

Finally, the question for us is, “What would be the policy implications of the TMT?”. We define political ideologies as stable and consistent systems of beliefs to understand politics and behave accordingly (cf. McClosky, 1964; Converse, 1964). Nevertheless, rising conservatism in the face of threats, mainly the momentary reminders of mortality due to a terror attack and unknown causes, might suggest that ideologies are not firmly persistent after all. Thus, given the effectiveness of mortality salience on political conservatism, we might observe that conservative politicians can use transitory reminders of death to their favor during the election campaigns.

8.2 Research Limitations and Future Directions

This study had limitations due to its operationalization of threats, response scaling, design, and theoretical scope. First, the reminders of death due to a terror attack may have been too generic to remind respondents about the same cause of death. When reminded about death due to a terror attack, Turkish respondents probably remembered different terrorist groups and types of attacks depending on their residential region, e.g., suicide bombings and mass shootings in urban areas, and selective targeting of security forces, bureaucrats, and civilians in rural areas.

Secondly, the research design used an 11-point scale (0-10) with labels at the extremes (e.g. Completely False, Completely True) and midpoints (e.g. Neither True nor False). I tested whether using shorter scales, such as 1-5 or 1-7, with labels for all response categories, could lead to different responses. I asked two left-right ideological placement questions (see Supplementary File, E. Survey Instruments). The first left-right ideological placement question used an 11-point scale (0-10) with labels only at the extremes and the midpoint. This question was asked before the experimental treatments and was the main ideology variable of interest in the analyses (see Chapter 3: Methodology, Figure 1 for the survey flow). The second left-right ideological placement question was also on an 11-point scale (0-10) but with labels for all response categories. This question was asked as the last question of the survey as a proxy for ideological left-right placement with a smaller scale and full labels. Between these left-right ideological placement questions with and without full labels, respondents replied to questions on mortality reminders, manipulation checks, personality traits, conservatism, and demographics, such that there was enough time to make it difficult for them to remember their exact location in their first left-right ideological placement response. I then implemented paired t-tests on acquiescence response bias averages, extreme response bias averages, socially desirable response bias averages, and no response bias averages for the responses on the left-right ideological placement questions with and without full labels (see Chapter 3: Methodology, Table 3.4). Compared to the responses with labels at the extremes and midpoints, when responses were given with full labels, the averages of the extreme response and socially desirable response biases decreased.

Thirdly, in this study as well as in the broader literature, there is no finding on the duration of the mortality salience effects on political attitudes and behavior. The scholarship

lacks information on whether those ideological changes after reminders of death are large enough to motivate any sort of political changes in the personal and public lives. Thus, any future research may need to consider fielding a longitudinal experimental design to test the extent of mortality salience's long-lasting effects.⁴⁵

Lastly, the theoretical scope behind this research's design only allowed me to evaluate the effects of threats on conservatism and liberalism. This was a research limitation as well as a consideration for future studies. At first, the public has not only faced threats from outsiders, such as terrorist organizations. There have been increasing incidents of threats from the government to ordinary citizens' rights, liberties, and even lives. For instance, parts of the American public interpret their constitution's second amendment as the right to keep and bear arms. Nevertheless, some other parts of the American public view this constitutional interpretation as a threat to their society, given the series of mass shootings in public places like bars, markets, schools, and state buildings (Gopnik, 2018). Thus, there is a perceived threat from the constitutional status quo. Likewise, given the high-profile of police killings against black citizens, the U.S. public opinion has had renewed attention to deaths due to police brutality, or the threat from the order/security status quo (Edwards, Lee, & Esposito, 2019). Accordingly, there is a shortage of theoretical and empirical research on how, and to what extent threats from the government affect the public's conservative and liberal attitudes?

Next, the literature remains open to theoretical questions regarding how threats affect other ideologies. The ideological divide in the face of threats could move beyond the conservatism versus liberalism/progressivism discussion to divisions between (i) liberalism (or conservatism in the U.S.) and environmentalism against ecological threats inflicted by human activities like oil spills and nuclear leakages, or (ii) between conservatism and feminism against threats of physical, psychological, or emotional abuse, or violence by males against females, children, and sexual minorities. Furthermore, aside from dyadic conceptualizations and analyses, we also need to conduct monadic theorization and tests by looking at how threats may affect one ideology overall. For example, it would be valuable to determine how threats and their interactions with personality traits affect the ascendant 'thin-

⁴⁵ The only exceptional and indirectly relevant study appears to be conducted by Enjolras et al. (2019) who examined the levels of fear after a threat of terrorism with a longitudinal design in Norway (2011), France (2015-2016), and Spain (2017).

centered ideology’ of populism, which claims that “corrupt elites” threaten the existence and values of “the pure people” (see Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 6, 100).



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Appendix A

GOOGLE TRENDS ANALYSES

I extracted Google Trends data for the keyword searches related to conservatism, liberalism, and death in Turkey between January 2004 and March 2020. The analysis unit was at the state-month level. In the search terms, conservatism-related keywords were conservatism (*muhafazakarlik*), conservative (*muhafazakar*), and reactionism (*tutuculuk*); liberalism-related keywords were freedomist (*ozgurlukcu*), liberalism (*liberalizm*), and progressive (*ilerici*); and death-related keywords were death (*olum*), dying (*olmek*), and decease (*vefat*).⁴⁶ For each search term, Google Trends assigned search interest value ranging from 0 (the least popularity) to 100 (the highest popularity) for the given region and time. Accordingly, I generated three variables, (i) conservatism-related keywords, (ii) liberalism-related keywords, and (iii) death-related keywords by the sum of their respective search terms. Theoretically, those three variables ranged from 0 (the least popularity) to 300 (the highest popularity).

Additionally, to employ proper multivariate panel data analyses, I collected data on the monthly consumer prices for the internet in Turkey via the Turkish Statistical Institute's (TUIK) Consumer Product Prices Dataset (2003=100) [variable id: 0830009]. The publicly available data ranged from January 2005 to March 2020. I used spline interpolation to replace the missing values in 2004 by the R package titled *Time Series Missing Value Imputation* and named *imputeTS* (Moritz, 2019).

⁴⁶ I did the search popularity exploration for conservatism- and liberalism-related keywords in all categories. However, I restricted the exploration for death-related keywords to Religion & Belief under People & Society to prevent potential search population inflation due to inquiries for popular movies such as Die Hard (Zor Olum) series and Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows – Parts 1 and 2 (Harry Potter ve Olum Yadigarlari: Bolum 1 ve 2).

I plotted the time trends for the word search popularity and internet prices in Figure 9.1. The descriptive statistics are in Table 9.1. The searches for conservatism- and liberalism-related keywords were found to be moderately negatively correlated, $r(193) = -0.189$, $p=0.008$. Further, there was a moderate positive association between conservatism- and death-related keywords, $r(193) = 0.216$, $p=0.002$. However, the weak negative correlation between liberalism- and death-related keywords was not statistically significant, $r(193) = -0.114$, $p=0.112$. Since the searches were done in an online platform such as Google, the internet prices exhibited low to moderate correlations with the keywords for conservatism ($r(193) = 0.175$, $p=0.014$), liberalism ($r(193) = -0.333$, $p=0.000$), and death ($r(193) = 0.302$, $p=0.000$).




Figure 9.1: Time trends for the internet price (2003=100) and searches for conservatism, liberalism, and death keywords on Google

Note. The end dates represented the values for each month.

Table 9.1: Descriptive statistics of Google Trends models

	Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Pctl. (25 th)	Pctl. (75 th)	Max.
Conservatism-related Keywords	195	19.928	16.395	0	10	24	100	
Liberalism-related Keywords	195	23.508	13.425	0	16	27.5	115	
Death-related Keywords	195	55.349	17.055	0	46	67	100	
Internet Price	195	52.916	20.013	8.064	37.572	68.749	81.746	

Later, I employed linear fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) by the following general model:

$$y_{it} = \alpha_{it} + \beta_{it}^T X_{it} + v_{it}$$

where $i = 1, \dots, n$ was the individual (month, year) index, $t = 1, \dots, T$ was the time index, y was the outcome variable, X was the list of time-variant covariates, and v_{it} was a random disturbance term with a mean 0. There were two dependent variables. The first dependent variable was the Google Search interest values for Conservatism-related Keywords, and the time-variant independent variables were the Google Search interest values for Liberalism- and Death-related Keywords, Internet Price, and two-way interactions between Liberalism-related Keywords and Internet Price, and Death-related Keywords and Internet Price.

The second dependent variable was the Google Search interest values for Liberalism-related Keywords, and the time-variant independent variables were the Google Search interest values for Conservatism- and Death-related Keywords, Internet Price, and two-way interactions between Liberalism-related Keywords and Internet Price, and Death-related Keywords and Internet Price.

To standardize the dependent and independent variables, I subtracted the grand mean from all (non-dichotomous) variables and divided them into two standard deviations. Hence, across the models, the regression coefficients were comparable, and those non-dichotomous variables' standardized coefficients were corresponding to a change of 2 standard deviations (Gelman, 2008). The panel data analyses' outputs are in Table 9.2.

Based on the Model 8 (M8): Random Effects (RE) in Table 9.2, for 2 standard deviations increase in the searches for Death-related Keywords across months and years, the search interest in Conservatism-related Keywords increased by 0.375 standard deviations at

$p < 0.001$ level. Besides, the online popularity of Conservatism-related keywords decreased by 0.341 standard deviations at $p < 0.001$ level, where the interest in Liberalism-related Keywords increased across months and years by 2 standard deviations.

What is more, the effects of Death- and Liberalism-related Keywords were moderated by Internet Price. Compared to the months with the lowest interest in Liberalism-related Keywords, months highly interested in Liberalism-related Keywords tended to display 0.459 standard deviations decrease in Conservatism-related Keywords' search popularity at $p < 0.001$ level, when Internet Price increased by 2 standard deviations across months and years (see Plot A in Figure 9.2). Contrarily, compared to the months with the lowest interest in Death-related Keywords, months highly interested in Death-related Keywords tended to display 0.196 standard deviations increase in Conservatism-related Keywords' search popularity at $p < 0.05$ level, when Internet Price increased by 2 standard deviations across months and years (see Plot B in Figure 9.2).

As for the Liberalism-related Keywords model, the Hausman test favored the Model 15: Fixed Effects (M15: FE) over the Model 16: Random Effects (M16: RE) in Table 9.2. However, for comparability with the Conservatism-related Keywords final model, M8: RE, I decided to refer to M16: RE while making the interpretations. Then, only Internet Price had a statistically significant effect and moderated the effects of Death- and Conservatism-related Keywords. The online popularity of Liberalism-related keywords decreased by 0.368 standard deviations at $p < 0.001$ level, where the Internet Price increased across months and years by 2 standard deviations. Also, when Internet Price was at its highest level, months with the highest popularity of Conservatism-related Keywords inclined to exhibit lesser interest in Liberalism-related Keywords by 0.484 standard deviations at $p < 0.001$ level, compared to the months with the lowest interest in Conservatism-related Keywords (see Plot C in Figure 9.2). Moreover, when Internet Price increased by 2 standard deviations away from its mean, months with the highest popularity of Death-related Keywords tended to show a higher interest in Liberalism-related Keywords by 0.392 standard deviations at $p < 0.001$ level, compared to the months with the lowest interest in Death-related Keywords (see Plot D in Figure 9.2).

Table 9.2: Panel analysis outputs

	Dependent Variable: Conservatism-related Keywords								Dependent Variable: Liberalism-related Keywords							
	M1: FE	M2: RE	M3: FE	M4: RE	M5: FE	M6: RE	M7: FE	M8: RE	M9: FE	M10: RE	M11: FE	M12: RE	M13: FE	M14: RE	M15: FE	M16: RE
Death-related Keywords			0.306*** (0.055)	0.297*** (0.056)			0.380*** (0.063)	0.375*** (0.064)			-0.145* (0.068)	-0.138* (0.067)			0.055 (0.080)	0.134 (0.078)
Liberalism-related Keywords					-0.046 (0.064)	-0.068 (0.064)	-0.299** (0.097)	-0.341*** (0.094)								
Conservatism-related Keywords													-0.061 (0.085)	-0.120 (0.078)	0.087 (0.089)	-0.035 (0.076)
Internet Price	0.164** (0.057)	0.166** (0.058)					0.084 (0.057)	0.082 (0.057)	-0.326*** (0.062)	-0.328*** (0.063)					-0.366*** (0.067)	-0.368*** (0.068)
Liberalism-related Keywords x Internet Price							-0.426*** (0.102)	-0.459*** (0.100)								
Conservatism-related Keywords x Internet Price															-0.432** (0.160)	-0.484** (0.162)
Death-related Keywords x Internet Price							0.190* (0.088)	0.196* (0.088)							0.298** (0.104)	0.392*** (0.103)
Constant		0.002 (0.077)		0.003 (0.088)		0.002 (0.082)		-0.050 (0.079)		-0.0003 (0.052)		-0.001 (0.067)		- 0.00004 (0.057)		-0.008 (0.041)
Hausman Test p -value		0.876		0.149		0.004		0.9997		0.804		0.360		0.093		0.000
Observations	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195
R ²	0.044	0.041	0.144	0.129	0.003	0.006	0.250	0.242	0.131	0.123	0.024	0.021	0.003	0.012	0.199	0.216
Adjusted R ²	-0.019	0.036	0.088	0.124	-0.063	0.001	0.183	0.222	0.074	0.118	-0.040	0.016	-0.063	0.007	0.127	0.195
F Statistic	8.434** (df = 1; 182)	8.335**	30.655*** (df = 1; 182)	28.515***	0.510 (df = 1; 182)	1.125	11.881*** (df = 5; 178)	60.244***	27.434*** (df = 1; 182)	27.002***	4.568* (df = 1; 182)	4.166*	0.510 (df = 1; 182)	2.386	8.863*** (df = 5; 178)	52.051***

Note 1: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Note 2: Standard errors are in parentheses.




Figure 9.2: Interaction plots

Note. Plots A and B are from M8: RE (Conservatism-related Keywords Random Effects Model with all controls) and plots C and D are from M16: RE (Liberalism-related Keywords Random Effects Model with all controls) in Table 9.2. In plot A, a joint hypothesis testing using the F-statistic that the Internet Price's, Liberalism-related Keywords', and Internet Price x Liberalism-related Keywords interaction term's coefficients were zero was rejected at $p < 0.000$ level by $X^2 = 49.641$ and $df = 3$. In plot B, a joint hypothesis testing using the F-statistic that the Internet Price's, Death-related Keywords', and Internet Price x Death-related Keywords interaction term's coefficients were zero was rejected at $p < 0.000$ level by $X^2 = 45.547$ and $df = 3$. In plot C, a joint hypothesis testing using the F-statistic that the Internet Price's, Conservatism-related Keywords', and Internet Price x Conservatism-related Keywords interaction term's coefficients were zero was rejected at $p < 0.01$ level by $X^2 = 13.449$ and $df = 3$. In plot D, a joint hypothesis testing using the F-statistic that the Internet Price's, Death-related Keywords', and Internet Price x Death-related Keywords interaction term's coefficients were zero was rejected at $p < 0.000$ level by $X^2 = 45.619$ and $df = 3$.

Since there were statistically significant increases and decreases in Conservatism- and Liberalism-related Keywords across months and years in multivariate settings, the next task was to elicit 'what may those search keywords mean for the ordinary internet users in Turkey?' Google Trends data allowed me to inspect the related queries, the terms that were also searched by the users interested in Conservatism-, Liberalism-, and Death-related Keywords, on the same metric scale (0 'the least popularity' - 100 'the highest popularity'), but by averaging the values for the given region Turkey and time between 2004-01-01 and 2020-03-31. In Figure 9.3, I plotted the rising related queries, the queries with the most

significant increase in search frequency since 2004-01-01. While the top three questions for Conservatism-related Keywords were ‘what is conservatism’, ‘what is reactionism’, and ‘conservative hotels’, the top queries for Liberalism-related Keywords were ‘progressive sergeants’, ‘freedomist democracy’, and ‘what is liberalism’.

Interestingly, in addition to search inquiries for the conceptual definitions of conservatism and liberalism, the related inquiries exhibited mutual exclusion between the two camps. To illustrate, in Figure 9.3, while the individuals who were searching for the keyword *conservative* tended to search for conservative summer vacation destinations visited by the like-minded conservative people, those individuals searching for the keyword *progressive* inclined to search for the like-minded progressive people in the online websites and civic associations.




Figure 9.3: Plot of the Google search queries' average interest values related to conservatism and liberalism keywords between January 2004 and March 2020

Note. In the plot, I multiplied Liberalism-related Keywords' Google Search Interest Values by -1, for visual purposes.

Appendix B

DEMOGRAPHICS AND SURVEY INSTRUMENTS



A. Demographics



Figure 10.1: Comparison of the random non-representative online survey experiment sample and Turkish population in 2018 across provinces

Note: The values show the percentage over- and under-representation of the Turkish population in 2018 in the non-representative online sample for each province. I divided the shares of the respondents in the dataset by the actual shares of the Turkish population before subtracting 1 and multiplying the results by 100 to get percentages. Theoretically, the values could range from -100% (complete under-representation or no respondent from that province) to +100% (complete over-representation or two-times more respondents from that province) while the mid-point of 0% means exact representation. To illustrate, while the data over-represented Istanbul by 124% and the capital city Ankara by 64%, a South Eastern city like Diyarbakir was under-represented by 73%. Information for the Turkish population was derived from TUIK's Address Based Population Registration System (Adrese Dayali Nufus Kayit Sistemi [ADNKS]). In 2018, available official data at the province level only identified age groups equal to or above 15 for a total of 62,819,553 people. The total sample size of respondents aged 18 years old or above and who completed the surveys and resided in Turkey was 2,613. The remaining 16 respondents resided outside Turkey: 5 from Germany, 4 from the United States, 3 from France, 2 from the United Kingdom, 1 from Austria, and 1 from Bulgaria.

Table 10.1: Comparison of the random non-representative online survey experiment sample and Turkish population in 2018 in terms of age, sex, and education

		Turkey 2018 (%)	Randomized Online Survey Experiment 2018 (%)	Turkey 2018 (%)	Randomized Online Survey Experiment 2018 (%)	Turkey 2018 (%)	Randomized Online Survey Experiment 2018 (%)	Turkey 2018 (%)	Randomized Online Survey Experiment 2018 (%)	Turkey 2018 (%)	Randomized Online Survey Experiment 2018 (%)
<i>Age</i>	<i>Sex</i>	<i>Primary 5 Years Degree</i>	<i>Primary 5 Years Degree</i>	<i>Primary 8 Years Degree</i>	<i>Primary 8 Years Degree</i>	<i>High School Degree</i>	<i>High School Degree</i>	<i>University Degree</i>	<i>University Degree</i>	<i>Row Totals</i>	<i>Row Totals</i>
18-24	Male	0.1	0.0	2.9	0.6	4.0	21.3	0.9	2.7	7.9	24.5
18-24	Female	0.1	0.1	2.1	1.1	3.8	42.6	1.2	6.6	7.2	50.3
25-34	Male	0.6	0.0	3.2	0.2	3.2	1.2	3.6	4.6	10.6	5.9
25-34	Female	1.2	0.2	2.7	0.2	2.3	2.3	3.5	7.6	9.8	10.3
35-44	Male	1.8	0.0	3.0	0.0	3.2	0.3	2.5	1.5	10.6	1.9
35-44	Female	3.4	0.2	2.3	0.2	2.2	0.9	2.0	1.5	9.9	2.9
45-54	Male	2.1	0.0	2.8	0.0	1.9	0.4	1.5	0.6	8.3	1.0
45-54	Female	3.6	0.2	1.7	0.2	1.3	0.7	0.9	0.7	7.5	1.7
55-64	Male	2.7	0.0	1.3	0.0	1.2	0.2	0.9	0.4	6.0	0.6
55-64	Female	3.3	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.7	0.1	0.4	0.4	5.0	0.6
65+	Male	2.8	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.1	0.5	0.0	4.3	0.1
65+	Female	2.5	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.1	3.2	0.2
Column Totals		24.3	0.7	23.4	2.6	24.6	69.9	18.2	26.8	90.5	100.0

Note: The values are the percentages of the respective groups. The data for the Turkish population were derived from TUIK ADNKS. In 2018, the total Turkish population above the age of 18 was 57,195,194. The total sample size of the sample who were 18 years old or above and who completed the surveys was 2,629. Since the random non-representative online survey experiment did not have any respondents whose education was below 5 years of primary-level education or with no formal education, we omitted the Below 5 Years Degree columns in the comparison table. Therefore, the row (or the column) totals of the Turkish population percentages equal 90.5 because 9.5% of Turkey's population aged 18 or above either have no formal education or only less than 5 years of primary-level education. Additionally, college student respondents were treated as high school graduates. They represented 43.36% of the 2,629 respondents.

B. Survey Instruments

Pre-Treatment Question

Left-Right Ideological Placement

Aşağıda 11 puandan oluşan ve '0' puanının en solu, '10' puanının da en sağ gösterdiği bir cetvel var. Siz kendi düşüncelerinizin bu cetvelin neresine yerleştiğini belirtir misiniz? (Below there is a ruler with 11 points ranging from the far left (0) to the far right (10). Could you please indicate where your thoughts fall on this ruler?)

En sol (Far left)					Ne sağ, Ne de sol (Neither left nor right)					En sağ (Far Right)	Fikrim yok / Cevap vermek istemiyorum (Do not know / No Response)
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

Experimental Manipulation

Aşağıda sizin için geçerli olabilecek ya da olmayabilecek bir ifade verilmiştir. Lütfen, ilgili ifadeyle hangi ölçüde hemfikir olduğunuzu belirtir misiniz? (Below there is a statement that may or may not apply to you. Please indicate to what extent you agree with this statement?)

Kanserden dolayı hayatımı kaybetmekten korkuyorum. (I am afraid of losing my life because of cancer.)

Tamamen yanlış (Completely false)					Ne doğru, Ne de yanlış (Neither true nor false)					Tamamen doğru (Completely True)	Fikrim yok / Cevap vermek istemiyorum (Do not know / No Response)
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

OR

Terör saldırısında hayatımı kaybetmekten korkuyorum. (I am scared of losing my life in a terrorist attack.)

Tamamen yanlış (Completely false)					Ne doğru, Ne de yanlış (Neither true nor false)					Tamamen doğru (Completely True)	Fikrim yok / Cevap vermek istemiyorum (Do not know / No Response)
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

OR

Ne zaman öleceğimi bilememek beni korkutur. (It makes me worried not knowing when I am going to lose my life.)

Tamamen yanlış (Completely false)					Ne doğru, Ne de yanlış (Neither true nor false)					Tamamen doğru (Completely True)	Fikrim yok / Cevap vermek istemiyorum (Do not know / No Response)
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

OR

Participants randomly assigned to a control condition are not be reminded of the thought of death and are directed to the manipulation checks and post-treatment questions.

Manipulation Checks

Şimdi, "_L_M" kelimesini tamamlamak isteseydiniz, aşağıda vereceğimiz harflerden hangi ikisini seçerdiniz? (Now, if you wanted to complete the word "_L_M", which two of the letters given below would you choose?) [ORDER OF THE LETTERS RANDOMIZED PER RESPONDENT]

Do not know
/ No
Response
(Fikrim
yok /
Cevap
vermek
istemiyorum)

	A	E	I	İ	O	Ö	U	Ü
Birinci Harf Yerine (Instead of First Letter)								
Üçüncü Harf Yerine (Instead of Third Letter)								

"K_B_R" kelimesini tamamlamak isteseydiniz, aşağıda vereceğimiz harflerden hangi ikisini seçerdiniz? (Now, if you wanted to complete the word "K_B_R", which two of the letters given below would you choose?) [ORDER OF THE LETTERS RANDOMIZED PER RESPONDENT]

Do not know
/ No
Response
(Fikrim
yok /
Cevap
vermek
istemiyorum)

	A	E	I	İ	O	Ö	U	Ü
İkinci Harf Yerine (Instead of Second Letter)								
Dördüncü Harf Yerine (Instead of Fourth Letter)								

"F_N_" kelimesini tamamlamak isteseydiniz, aşağıda vereceğimiz harflerden hangi ikisini seçerdiniz? (Now, if you wanted to complete the word "F_N_", which two of the letters given below would you choose?) [ORDER OF THE LETTERS RANDOMIZED PER RESPONDENT]

Do not know
/ No
Response
(Fikrim
yok /
Cevap
vermek
istemiyorum)

	A	E	I	İ	O	Ö	U	Ü
İkinci Harf Yerine (Instead of Second Letter)								
Dördüncü Harf Yerine (Instead of Fourth Letter)								

Post-Treatment Questions

Big Five Inventory (BFI)

Aşağıda kendinizi nasıl gördüğünüze dair çeşitli kişilik özellikleri verilmiştir. Lütfen her bir özelliğin bitiminin ardından, ilgili ifadeyle hangi ölçüde hemfikir olduğunuzu belirtir misiniz? (Below you will read various personality traits about how you see yourself. Could you please indicate the extent to which you agree with each statement after reading them?)

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Tamamen yanlış (Completely false)					Ne doğru, Ne de yanlış (Neither true nor false)					Tamamen doğru (Completely true)	Fikrim yok / Cevap vermek istemiyorum (Do not know / No response)

Kendimi ... biri olarak görmekteyim. (I see myself as someone who ...)

1. konuşkan (is talkative) [Q20_1]	23. tembel olmaya yatkın (tends to be lazy) [Q25_3]
2. başkalarının kusurlarını arayan (tends to find fault with others) [Q20_2]	24. kolayca üzülmeyen (is emotionally stable, not easily upset) [Q25_4]
3. titiz iş yapan (does a thorough job) [Q20_3]	25. icat kabiliyeti yüksek (is inventive) [Q26_1]
4. bunalımlı (is depressed) [Q20_4]	26. girişken (has an assertive personality) [Q26_2]
5. yeni fikirler üreten (is original, comes up with new ideas) [Q21_1]	27. soğuk ve başkalarına uzak duran (can be cold and aloof) [Q26_3]
6. içine kapanık (is reserved) [Q21_2]	28. azimli (perseveres until the task is finished) [Q26_4]
7. yardımsever (is helpful and unselfish with others) [Q21_3]	29. günü gününü tutmayan (can be moody) [Q27_1]
8. dikkatsiz olabilen (can be somewhat careless) [Q21_4]	30. her türlü sanata değer veren (values artistic, aesthetic experiences) [Q27_2]
9. sakin (is relaxed, handles stress well) [Q22_1]	31. çekingen (is sometimes shy, inhibited) [Q27_3]
10. öğrenmeye meraklı (is curious about many different things) [Q22_2]	32. herkese karşı anlayışlı (is considerate and kind to almost everyone) [Q27_4]
11. canlı (is full of energy) [Q22_3]	33. becerikli (does things efficiently) [Q28_1]
12. çevresindekilerle kavga çıkaran (starts quarrels with others) [Q22_4]	34. gergin durumlarda sakin kalabilen (remains calm in tense situations) [Q28_2]
13. yaptığı işe güvenilen (is a reliable worker) [Q23_1]	35. alışlagelmiş, sıradan işleri tercih eden (prefers work that is routine) [Q28_3]
14. asabi (can be tense) [Q23_2]	36. sosyal biri (is outgoing, sociable) [Q28_4]
15. derin düşünen (is ingenious, a deep thinker) [Q23_3]	37. başkalarına kaba davranan (is sometimes rude to others) [Q29_1]
16. coşkulu (generates a lot of enthusiasm) [Q23_4]	38. programlı (makes plans and follows through with them) [Q29_2]
17. merhametli (has a forgiving nature) [Q24_1]	39. kolayca sinirlenebilen (gets nervous easily) [Q29_3]
18. düzensiz olmaya yatkın (tends to be disorganized) [Q24_2]	40. her konuda fikir sahibi olmak isteyen (likes to reflect, play with ideas) [Q29_4]
19. sürekli kaygılanan (worries a lot) [Q24_3]	41. sanata ilgisi düşük (has few artistic interests) [Q30_1]
20. hayal gücü yüksek (has an active imagination) [Q24_4]	42. başkalarıyla iş birliği yapmayı seven (likes to cooperate with others) [Q30_2]
21. sessiz (tends to be quiet) [Q25_1]	43. kolayca dikkati dağılan (is easily distracted) [Q30_3]
22. genellikle çabuk güvenen (is generally trusting) [Q25_2]	44. sanat, müzik ya da edebiyat hakkında bilgi sahibi (is sophisticated in art, music, or literature) [Q30_4]

Big Five Inventory (44 Items) details:

“R” means reversed-coded.

Extraversion [8 Items]: 1, 6R, 11, 16, 21R, 26, 31R, 36;

Agreeableness [9 Items]: 2R, 7, 12R, 17, 22, 27R, 32, 37R, 42;

Conscientiousness [9 Items]: 3, 8R, 13, 18R, 23R, 28, 33, 38, 43R;

Neuroticism (or Emotional Instability) [8 Items]: 4, 9R, 14, 19, 24R, 29, 34R, 39;

Openness [10 Items]: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35R, 40, 41R, 44.

Notes:

[1] The original Big Five Inventory (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) is derived from John, Naumann, & Soto (2008: 157-158).

[2] In the inventory, the following structure is used: The Big Five Inventory in Turkish (the original Big Five Inventory in English) [the online survey experiment question order]

Conservatism Questions

Bazı insanlar dünyaya bakış ve toplum içindeki tercihleri ve olaylar karşısındaki tutumlarına bakılarak muhafazakar olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Siz bu terimden ne anlıyorsanız, kendinizi ne derece muhafazakar görürsünüz? (Some people are described as conservative by looking at their worldviews, and preferences and attitudes in society. Based on what you understand from this term, to what extent do you see yourself as conservative?)

Hiç muhafazakar değilim (Not conservative at all)	Biraz muhafazakarım, biraz değilim (Partly conservative, partly not)										Çok muhafazakarım (Extremely conservative)	Fikrim yok / Cevap vermek istemiyorum (Do not know / No Response)
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	

Hiç özgürlükçü değilim (Not liberal at all)											Biraz özgürlükçüyüm, biraz değilim (Sometimes liberal, sometimes not)											Çok özgürlükçüyüm (Extremely liberal)											Fikrim yok / Cevap vermek istemiyorum (Do not know / No Response)										
0		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		99																					

[illegible]

Peki, her olayda değişimin yarattığı belirsizlik karşısında bir ÜLKE olarak ne yapmalıyız? Lütfen her bir cümlemin bitiminin ardından, ilgili ifadeyle hangi ölçüde hemfikir olduğunuzu belirtir misiniz? (So, what should we do as a COUNTRY in the face of the uncertainty created by change in each case? Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements.)

[illegible]

[illegible]

Control Questions

Cinsiyetiniz: (Your gender)

- Kadın (Female)
- Erkek (Male)
- Cevap vermek istemiyorum (No Response)

Doğum yılınızı öğrenebilir miyiz? (May we learn your year of birth?)

- 1929
- ...
- 2000
- 2001 veya daha ileri bir yıl (2001 or subsequent years)

Sahip olduğunuz en yüksek eğitim seviyesinin ne olduğunu söyleyebilir misiniz? (Could you please tell us what is your highest level of education?)

- Hiçbir resmi eğitim almadım, okuma yazma biliyorum (I have not received any formal education, I know how to read and write)
- İlkokul mezunu (Primary school graduate)
- Ortaokul mezunu / İlköğretim mezunu (Secondary school graduate)
- Lise mezunu (High school graduate)
- Üniversite öğrencisiyim (College student)
- Üniversite mezunu (College graduate)
- Yüksek lisans veya Doktora öğrencisiyim (M.A. or Ph.D. student)
- Yüksek lisans veya Doktora sahibiyim (M.A. or Ph.D. graduate)
- Fikrim yok / Cevap vermek istemiyorum (Do not know / No Response)

Left-Right Ideological Placement with Full Labels

Aşağıda 11 puandan oluşan ve '0' puanının en solu, '10' puanının da en sağ gösterdiği bir cetvel var. Siz kendi düşüncelerinizin bu cetvelin neresine yerleştiğini belirtir misiniz? (Below there is a ruler with 11 points ranging from the far left (0) to the far right (10). Could you please indicate where your thoughts fall in this ruler?)

	En sola, Soldan daha yakın (Closer to Far Left (Far left)		Sola daha yakın (Closer to Left than Center Left)	Merkez sol (Center left)	Ne sağ, Ne de sol (Neither right nor left)	Merkez sağ (Center right)	Sağa daha yakın (Closer to Right than Center Right)	Sağ (Right)	En sağa, Sağdan daha yakın (Closer to Far Right than Right)	En sağ (Far Right)	Fikrim yok / Cevap vermek istemiyorum (Do not know / No Response)
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

C. Dropouts

While 6,489 individuals visited the survey link on Qualtrics, my analyses only used data from 2,629 respondents who were 18 or above and who fully completed the survey. Of the dropouts, 3,493 out of 3,860 were 18 or above. Thus, there was a dropout rate of 53.83% ($\sim (3493/6489) \times 100\%$). I checked for two issues: (i) whether there was any systematic dropout after reading the treatment questions (reminders of death); and (ii) whether there was any systematic dropout after reading the post-treatment questions on conservatism. One of the most relevant systematic dropout variables would be the respondents' left-right ideological placements, which was asked for before the experimental treatments.

Among the dropouts, 72.345% ($\sim (2527/3493) \times 100\%$) of the respondents abandoned the survey before seeing the treatments while only 2.204% ($\sim (77/3493) \times 100\%$) left the survey immediately after seeing the treatments. Based on the two-sample t-tests with equal variance assumption across the experimental treatment groups, there were no statistically significant difference in left-right ideological placement averages between the respondents who dropped the survey after the treatments and those who fully completed the survey at $p > 0.05$ level.

Of the dropouts, 11.709% ($\sim (409/3493) \times 100\%$) abandoned the survey immediately after seeing the conservatism questions. Based on the two-sample t-tests with equal variance assumption, only respondents in the control condition who left the survey after the conservatism questions ($N=89$, $\mu=5.35$, $\sigma=2.95$) tended to be less right-wing than those completing the survey ($N=652$, $\mu=6.05$, $\sigma=3.16$) at $p < 0.05$ level.

Appendix C

SUPPLEMENTARY OUTPUTS

Tables

Table 11.1: Step-wise experimental moderation OLS models with standardized coefficients

	Dependent variable: Self-Conservatism Placement						
	No Interactions	All Interactions	Interactions with Openness to New Experiences	Interactions with Conscientiousness	Interactions with Extraversion	Interactions with Agreeableness	Interactions with Neuroticism
Intercept	-0.147*** (0.039)	-0.118*** (0.040)	-0.122*** (0.040)	-0.122*** (0.040)	-0.121*** (0.040)	-0.120*** (0.040)	-0.120*** (0.040)
Treatment 1 (Cancer)	0.066 (0.046)	0.053 (0.047)	0.055 (0.047)	0.054 (0.047)	0.054 (0.047)	0.053 (0.047)	0.053 (0.047)
Treatment 2 (Terror)	0.101** (0.047)	0.094** (0.047)	0.097** (0.047)	0.101** (0.047)	0.101** (0.047)	0.099** (0.047)	0.099** (0.047)
Treatment 3 (Uncertainty)	0.108** (0.046)	0.103** (0.047)	0.105** (0.047)	0.105** (0.047)	0.106** (0.047)	0.104** (0.047)	0.103** (0.047)
Extraversion		0.001 (0.046)	-0.016 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.005 (0.036)	-0.019 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)
Agreeableness		0.140*** (0.040)	0.079*** (0.020)	0.079*** (0.020)	0.080*** (0.020)	0.123*** (0.035)	0.080*** (0.020)
Conscientiousness		0.121** (0.049)	0.103*** (0.024)	0.112*** (0.038)	0.103*** (0.024)	0.103*** (0.024)	0.102*** (0.024)
Neuroticism		-0.025 (0.035)	-0.029* (0.018)	-0.027 (0.018)	-0.026 (0.018)	-0.027 (0.018)	-0.027 (0.034)
Openness to New Experiences		-0.134*** (0.045)	-0.087** (0.036)	-0.057** (0.023)	-0.057** (0.023)	-0.058** (0.023)	-0.057** (0.023)
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Extraversion		-0.029 (0.066)			-0.037 (0.048)		
Treatment 2 (Terror) x Extraversion		-0.008 (0.065)			0.041 (0.048)		
Treatment 3 (Uncertainty) x Extraversion		-0.031 (0.064)			-0.053 (0.046)		
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Agreeableness		-0.096* (0.055)				-0.086* (0.048)	
Treatment 2 (Terror) x Agreeableness		-0.059 (0.056)				-0.007 (0.048)	
Treatment 3 (Uncertainty) x Agreeableness		-0.080 (0.057)				-0.082* (0.048)	
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Conscientiousness		-0.023 (0.068)		-0.034 (0.047)			
Treatment 2 (Terror) x Conscientiousness		-0.014 (0.068)		0.046 (0.048)			
Treatment 3 (Uncertainty) x Conscientiousness		-0.042		-0.051			

Notes:

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$
Standard errors are in parantheses.

Table 11.2: Experimental moderation OLS model for self-conservatism placement with standardized coefficients and BFI facets

	<i>Dependent variable: Self-Conservatism Placement</i>
Intercept	-0.157*** (0.040)
Treatment 1 (Cancer)	0.068 (0.047)
Treatment 2 (Terror)	0.083* (0.047)
Treatment 3 (Uncertainty)	0.105** (0.047)
Extraversion: Assertiveness	-0.084* (0.044)
Extraversion: Activity	0.058 (0.044)
Agreeableness: Altruism	0.102** (0.042)
Agreeableness: Compliance	0.059 (0.043)
Conscientiousness: Order	-0.012 (0.043)
Conscientiousness: Self-Discipline	0.148*** (0.052)
Neuroticism: Anxiety	0.0001 (0.040)
Neuroticism: Depression	0.015 (0.045)
Openness to New Experiences: Aesthetics	-0.117*** (0.038)
Openness to New Experiences: Ideas	-0.049 (0.043)
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Extraversion: Assertiveness	0.104* (0.060)
Treatment 2 (Terror) x Extraversion: Assertiveness	-0.015 (0.064)
Treatment 3 (Uncertainty) x Extraversion: Assertiveness	0.022 (0.063)
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Extraversion: Activity	-0.040 (0.064)
Treatment 2 (Terror) x Extraversion: Activity	0.042 (0.067)
Treatment 3 (Uncertainty) x Extraversion: Activity	-0.001 (0.064)
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Agreeableness: Altruism	-0.062 (0.058)
Treatment 2 (Terror) x Agreeableness: Altruism	-0.009 (0.059)
Treatment 3 (Uncertainty) x Agreeableness: Altruism	-0.035 (0.060)
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Agreeableness: Compliance	-0.040 (0.058)
Treatment 2 (Terror) x Agreeableness: Compliance	-0.0003 (0.060)
Treatment 3 (Uncertainty) x Agreeableness: Compliance	-0.060 (0.059)
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Conscientiousness: Order	0.059 (0.060)
Treatment 2 (Terror) x Conscientiousness: Order	0.040

	(0.062)
Treatment 3 (Uncertainty) x Conscientiousness: Order	0.080
	(0.061)
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Conscientiousness: Self-Discipline	-0.047
	(0.071)
Treatment 2 (Terror) x Conscientiousness: Self-Discipline	-0.087
	(0.072)
Treatment 3 (Uncertainty) x Conscientiousness: Self-Discipline	-0.039
	(0.070)
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Neuroticism: Anxiety	-0.012
	(0.055)
Treatment 2 (Terror) x Neuroticism: Anxiety	0.063
	(0.056)
Treatment 3 (Uncertainty) x Neuroticism: Anxiety	0.002
	(0.056)
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Neuroticism: Depression	-0.016
	(0.063)
Treatment 2 (Terror) x Neuroticism: Depression	-0.075
	(0.063)
Treatment 3 (Uncertainty) x Neuroticism: Depression	0.005
	(0.063)
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Openness to New Experiences: Aesthetics	-0.085
	(0.053)
Treatment 2 (Terror) x Openness to New Experiences: Aesthetics	-0.057
	(0.053)
Treatment 3 (Uncertainty) x Openness to New Experiences: Aesthetics	-0.033
	(0.054)
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Openness to New Experiences: Ideas	0.025
	(0.060)
Treatment 2 (Terror) x Openness to New Experiences: Ideas	0.117**
	(0.059)
Treatment 3 (Uncertainty) x Openness to New Experiences: Ideas	-0.034
	(0.059)
Sex: Female [Base: Male]	0.124***
	(0.037)
Age	-0.081***
	(0.020)
Education	-0.008
	(0.018)
Left-Right Ideological Placement	0.550***
	(0.018)
Observations	2,191
R ²	0.414
Adjusted R ²	0.401
Residual Std. Error	0.777 (df = 2143)
F Statistic	32.240*** (df = 47; 2143)
Notes:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Standard errors are in parantheses.

Table 11.3: Big Five Personality Traits with Facets CFA result (control group only)

Measurement Model with Standardized Coefficients		Factor Loadings
Extraversion →		
Extraversion Item 1: Assertiveness (<i>konuskan / talkative</i>)		0.593***
Extraversion Item 2: Assertiveness (<i>içine kapanık / reserved</i>) [Reversed-coded]		0.626***
Extraversion Item 5: Assertiveness (<i>sessiz / tends to be quiet</i>) [Reversed-coded]		0.513***
Extraversion Item 6: Assertiveness (<i>girişken / has an assertive personality</i>)		0.778***
Extraversion Item 7: Assertiveness (<i>çekingen / sometimes shy, inhibited</i>) [Reversed-coded]		0.611***
Extraversion Item 3: Activity (<i>canlı / is full of energy</i>)		0.742***
Extraversion Item 4: Activity (<i>coşkulu / generates a lot of enthusiasm</i>)		0.673***
Agreeableness →		
Agreeableness Item 2: Altruism (<i>yardımsever / is helpful and unselfish with others</i>)		0.765***
Agreeableness Item 5: Altruism (<i>genellikle çabuk güvenen / is generally trusting</i>)		0.211***
Agreeableness Item 6: Altruism (<i>soğuk ve başkalarına uzak duran / can be cold and aloof</i>) [Reversed-coded]		0.254***
Agreeableness Item 7: Altruism (<i>herkese karşı anlayışlı / considerate to almost anyone</i>)		0.545***
Agreeableness Item 1: Compliance (<i>başkalarının kusurlarını arayan / tends to find fault with others</i>) [Reversed-coded]		0.234***
Agreeableness Item 3: Compliance (<i>çevresindekilerle kavga çıkaran / starts quarrels with others</i>) [Reversed-coded]		0.194***
Agreeableness Item 4: Compliance (<i>merhametli / has a forgiving nature</i>)		0.768***
Conscientiousness →		
Conscientiousness Item 2: Order (<i>dikkatsiz olabilen / can be somewhat careless</i>) [Reversed-coded]		0.519***
Conscientiousness Item 4: Order (<i>düzensiz olmaya yatkın / tends to be disorganized</i>)		0.558***
Conscientiousness Item 3: Self-Discipline (<i>yaptığı işe güvenilen / is a reliable worker</i>)		0.453***
Conscientiousness Item 5: Self-Discipline (<i>tembel olmaya yatkın / tends to be lazy</i>) [Reversed-coded]		0.740***
Conscientiousness Item 6: Self-Discipline (<i>azimli / perseveres until the task is finished</i>)		0.573***
Conscientiousness Item 8: Self-Discipline (<i>programlı / makes plans and follows through with them</i>)		0.588***
Conscientiousness Item 9: Self-Discipline (<i>kolayca dikkati dağılan / is easily distracted</i>) [Reversed-coded]		0.522***
Neuroticism →		
Neuroticism Item 2: Anxiety (<i>sakin / is relaxed, handles stress well</i>) [Reversed-coded]		0.229***
Neuroticism Item 4: Anxiety (<i>sürekli kaygılanan / worries a lot</i>)		0.617***
Neuroticism Item 7: Anxiety (<i>gergin durumlarda sakin kalabilen / remains calm in tense situations</i>) [Reversed-coded]		0.352***
Neuroticism Item 8: Anxiety (<i>kolayca sinirlenebilen / gets nervous easily</i>)		0.503***
Neuroticism Item 1: Depression (<i>bunalımlı / is depressed</i>)		0.725***
Neuroticism Item 6: Depression (<i>günü gününü tutmayan / can be moody</i>)		0.591***
Openness to New Experiences →		
Openness to New Experiences Item 6: Aesthetics (<i>her türlü sanata değer veren / values artistic, aesthetic experiences</i>)		0.645***
Openness to New Experiences Item 9: Aesthetics (<i>sanata ilgisi düşük / has few artistic interests</i>) [Reversed-coded]		0.344***
Openness to New Experiences Item 10: Aesthetics (<i>sanat, müzik ya da edebiyat hakkında bilgi sahibi / is sophisticated in art, music, or literature</i>)		0.622***
Openness to New Experiences Item 2: Ideas (<i>öğrenmeye meraklı / is curious about many different things</i>)		0.671***
Openness to New Experiences Item 3: Ideas (<i>derin düşünen / is ingenious, a deep thinker</i>)		0.547***
Openness to New Experiences Item 5: Ideas (<i>icat kabiliyeti yüksek / is inventive</i>)		0.522***
Openness to New Experiences Item 7: Ideas (<i>alışılgağılmış, sıradan işleri tercih eden / prefers work that is routine</i>) [Reversed-coded]		0.191***
Openness to New Experiences Item 8: Ideas (<i>her konuda fikir sahibi olmak isteyen / likes to reflect, play with ideas</i>)		0.479***
Fit Indexes		
χ^2 (df)	4037.493 (550)***	
RMSEA	0.101***	
CFI	0.568	
TLI	0.533	
SRMR	0.128	

Note: *** $p < 0.001$

Table 11.4: Geographical sensitivity analysis for the selected experimental moderation OLS model with standardized coefficients

Self-Conservatism Placement: Full Model with Geographical Sensitivity				
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI (95%)</i>	<i>p</i>	
Intercept	-0.09	-0.20 – 0.01	0.087	
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul]	-0.14	-0.36 – 0.07	0.201	
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul]	-0.07	-0.31 – 0.17	0.562	
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul]	-0.06	-0.29 – 0.17	0.608	
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul]	-0.03	-0.24 – 0.18	0.786	
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul]	-0.00	-0.24 – 0.23	0.969	
Treatment 1 (Cancer)	0.04	-0.10 – 0.18	0.561	
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	0.12	-0.02 – 0.27	0.092	
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)	0.13	-0.01 – 0.27	0.071	
Extraversion	0.06	-0.08 – 0.20	0.377	
Agreeableness	0.09	-0.03 – 0.21	0.150	
Conscientiousness	0.18	0.03 – 0.33	0.021	
Neuroticism	-0.09	-0.20 – 0.02	0.098	
Openness	-0.23	-0.36 – -0.10	0.001	
Sex: Female [Base: Male]	0.05	-0.02 – 0.13	0.155	
Age	-0.07	-0.11 – -0.03	<0.001	
Education	-0.01	-0.05 – 0.02	0.523	
Left-Right Ideological Placement	0.59	0.56 – 0.63	<0.001	
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer)	0.16	-0.15 – 0.46	0.308	
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer)	0.09	-0.26 – 0.44	0.615	
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer)	0.02	-0.31 – 0.34	0.929	
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer)	-0.08	-0.37 – 0.21	0.575	
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer)	-0.08	-0.42 – 0.26	0.636	
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	0.02	-0.30 – 0.34	0.886	
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	-0.14	-0.48 – 0.19	0.397	
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	0.04	-0.29 – 0.37	0.821	
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	0.08	-0.22 – 0.38	0.602	
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	-0.11	-0.43 – 0.22	0.515	
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)	-0.02	-0.32 – 0.29	0.909	
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)	-0.07	-0.41 – 0.27	0.690	

Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)	-0.01	-0.34 – 0.33	0.975
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)	0.02	-0.28 – 0.32	0.898
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)	0.03	-0.29 – 0.34	0.870
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Extraversion	-0.09	-0.40 – 0.23	0.583
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Extraversion	-0.12	-0.44 – 0.19	0.445
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Extraversion	-0.16	-0.47 – 0.15	0.307
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Extraversion	-0.10	-0.37 – 0.17	0.453
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Extraversion	-0.08	-0.43 – 0.28	0.679
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Extraversion	-0.09	-0.29 – 0.12	0.404
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Extraversion	-0.13	-0.33 – 0.07	0.208
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Extraversion	-0.08	-0.27 – 0.11	0.424
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Agreeableness	0.12	-0.15 – 0.39	0.384
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Agreeableness	0.07	-0.18 – 0.31	0.588
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Agreeableness	0.05	-0.22 – 0.31	0.736
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Agreeableness	0.33	0.06 – 0.60	0.018
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Agreeableness	-0.20	-0.49 – 0.10	0.187
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Agreeableness	-0.04	-0.22 – 0.14	0.656
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Agreeableness	0.04	-0.14 – 0.21	0.683
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Agreeableness	-0.00	-0.18 – 0.17	0.996
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Conscientiousness	-0.10	-0.42 – 0.22	0.545
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Conscientiousness	-0.16	-0.51 – 0.19	0.356
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Conscientiousness	0.00	-0.32 – 0.32	0.993
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Conscientiousness	-0.17	-0.48 – 0.13	0.273
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Conscientiousness	0.14	-0.23 – 0.51	0.450
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Conscientiousness	-0.15	-0.36 – 0.05	0.149
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Conscientiousness	-0.12	-0.32 – 0.08	0.240
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Conscientiousness	-0.15	-0.37 – 0.07	0.194
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Neuroticism	0.05	-0.17 – 0.27	0.660
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Neuroticism	0.16	-0.09 – 0.41	0.211
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Neuroticism	0.16	-0.10 – 0.42	0.220
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Neuroticism	0.20	-0.00 – 0.39	0.054
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Neuroticism	0.01	-0.24 – 0.26	0.936
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Neuroticism	-0.08	-0.23 – 0.06	0.275
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Neuroticism	0.04	-0.12 – 0.19	0.641

Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Neuroticism	0.08	-0.07 – 0.23	0.298
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Openness	0.12	-0.17 – 0.41	0.415
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Openness	0.21	-0.12 – 0.55	0.213
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Openness	0.17	-0.13 – 0.46	0.266
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Openness	0.15	-0.12 – 0.43	0.281
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Openness	0.16	-0.18 – 0.50	0.351
Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Openness	0.26	0.08 – 0.45	0.006
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Openness	0.20	0.01 – 0.39	0.044
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Openness	0.21	0.01 – 0.41	0.038
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Extraversion	0.10	-0.32 – 0.53	0.631
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Extraversion	0.08	-0.42 – 0.59	0.743
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Extraversion	0.15	-0.30 – 0.59	0.514
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Extraversion	0.22	-0.17 – 0.61	0.267
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Extraversion	0.02	-0.46 – 0.51	0.924
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Extraversion	0.22	-0.22 – 0.66	0.325
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Extraversion	0.34	-0.08 – 0.77	0.114
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Extraversion	0.20	-0.26 – 0.66	0.396
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Extraversion	0.09	-0.30 – 0.49	0.648
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Extraversion	0.22	-0.29 – 0.72	0.400
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Extraversion	0.11	-0.34 – 0.56	0.633
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Extraversion	0.05	-0.45 – 0.54	0.855
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Extraversion	-0.37	-0.85 – 0.11	0.129
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Extraversion	0.26	-0.12 – 0.64	0.185
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Extraversion	0.17	-0.27 – 0.60	0.449
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Agreeableness	-0.18	-0.54 – 0.19	0.344
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Agreeableness	-0.22	-0.62 – 0.18	0.276
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Agreeableness	-0.08	-0.45 – 0.30	0.691
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Agreeableness	-0.11	-0.45 – 0.24	0.552
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Agreeableness	-0.09	-0.49 – 0.32	0.678
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Agreeableness	-0.27	-0.69 – 0.14	0.194
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Agreeableness	-0.18	-0.56 – 0.19	0.339
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Agreeableness	0.03	-0.32 – 0.39	0.851

Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Agreeableness	-0.50	-0.88 – -0.13	0.008
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Agreeableness	0.08	-0.32 – 0.48	0.707
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Agreeableness	-0.04	-0.42 – 0.35	0.847
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Agreeableness	-0.26	-0.64 – 0.11	0.167
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Agreeableness	0.15	-0.30 – 0.61	0.516
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Agreeableness	-0.47	-0.84 – -0.10	0.012
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Agreeableness	0.09	-0.30 – 0.48	0.652
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Conscientiousness	0.16	-0.31 – 0.63	0.504
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Conscientiousness	0.28	-0.22 – 0.77	0.277
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Conscientiousness	0.41	-0.03 – 0.84	0.067
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Conscientiousness	0.16	-0.26 – 0.58	0.455
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Conscientiousness	0.07	-0.43 – 0.57	0.777
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Conscientiousness	0.15	-0.32 – 0.62	0.535
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Conscientiousness	0.08	-0.40 – 0.55	0.749
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Conscientiousness	0.23	-0.22 – 0.69	0.318
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Conscientiousness	0.27	-0.17 – 0.71	0.230
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Conscientiousness	-0.09	-0.61 – 0.44	0.743
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Conscientiousness	0.08	-0.37 – 0.54	0.718
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Conscientiousness	0.21	-0.31 – 0.73	0.435
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Conscientiousness	0.34	-0.12 – 0.81	0.150
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Conscientiousness	0.18	-0.24 – 0.60	0.405
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Conscientiousness	-0.11	-0.58 – 0.36	0.635
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Neuroticism	0.12	-0.18 – 0.43	0.429
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Neuroticism	-0.19	-0.56 – 0.19	0.329
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Neuroticism	0.20	-0.14 – 0.54	0.244
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Neuroticism	0.05	-0.24 – 0.33	0.744
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Neuroticism	0.15	-0.20 – 0.51	0.402
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Neuroticism	0.05	-0.30 – 0.40	0.767
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Neuroticism	-0.08	-0.43 – 0.26	0.634
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Neuroticism	-0.13	-0.48 – 0.22	0.467

Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Neuroticism	-0.18	-0.50 – 0.13	0.259
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Neuroticism	-0.10	-0.45 – 0.25	0.563
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Neuroticism	0.15	-0.17 – 0.46	0.371
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Neuroticism	0.01	-0.39 – 0.41	0.965
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Neuroticism	-0.16	-0.50 – 0.18	0.355
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Neuroticism	-0.24	-0.55 – 0.07	0.126
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Neuroticism	0.07	-0.26 – 0.40	0.661
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Openness	-0.18	-0.58 – 0.23	0.391
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Openness	-0.42	-0.92 – 0.07	0.094
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Openness	-0.52	-0.93 – -0.10	0.014
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Openness	-0.32	-0.72 – 0.08	0.119
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 1 (Cancer) x Openness	-0.36	-0.79 – 0.08	0.108
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Openness	-0.13	-0.56 – 0.29	0.544
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Openness	-0.04	-0.50 – 0.41	0.850
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Openness	-0.09	-0.52 – 0.35	0.700
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Openness	0.05	-0.35 – 0.45	0.820
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Openness	-0.10	-0.57 – 0.37	0.668
Region: Aegean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Openness	-0.08	-0.50 – 0.33	0.691
Region: Eastern and Western Marmara [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Openness	-0.11	-0.55 – 0.33	0.625
Region: Mediterranean [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Openness	-0.31	-0.74 – 0.12	0.159
Region: Western Anatolia [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Openness	-0.31	-0.71 – 0.09	0.135
Region: Others [Base: Istanbul] x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Openness	-0.22	-0.67 – 0.22	0.328
Observations	2238		
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.422 / 0.381		

Table 11.5: Multiple mediation sensitivity on the personality traits' stability against threats (self-conservatism placement as the mediator)

Paths	Standardized Effects	Non-Standardized Effects	BootLLCI	BootULCI	SE	z	p
Total Effects:							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) on Extraversion [c1 + (a1*b1)]	0	-0.001	-0.305	0.3	0.154	-0.008	0.993
Treatment 1 (Cancer) on Agreeableness [c2 + (a1*b2)]	-0.013	-0.048	-0.306	0.215	0.133	-0.36	0.719
Treatment 1 (Cancer) on Conscientiousness [c3 + (a1*b3)]	-0.026	-0.099	-0.372	0.166	0.136	-0.724	0.469
Treatment 1 (Cancer) on Neuroticism [c4 + (a1*b4)]	-0.011	-0.057	-0.444	0.33	0.196	-0.292	0.771
Treatment 1 (Cancer) on Openness to New Experiences [c5 + (a1*b5)]	0.019	0.076	-0.214	0.362	0.144	0.523	0.601
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) on Extraversion [c6 + (a2*b1)]	-0.013	-0.056	-0.377	0.263	0.16	-0.348	0.728
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) on Agreeableness [c7 + (a2*b2)]	0.011	0.04	-0.207	0.295	0.13	0.309	0.757
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) on Conscientiousness [c8 + (a2*b3)]	-0.008	-0.032	-0.301	0.238	0.137	-0.234	0.815
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) on Neuroticism [c9 + (a2*b4)]	-0.024	-0.133	-0.507	0.248	0.19	-0.696	0.486
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) on Openness to New Experiences [c10 + (a2*b5)]	0.041	0.162	-0.123	0.453	0.146	1.11	0.267
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) on Extraversion [c11 + (a3*b1)]	0.033	0.148	-0.175	0.474	0.165	0.902	0.367
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) on Agreeableness [c12 + (a3*b2)]	0.047	0.171	-0.091	0.426	0.131	1.305	0.192
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) on Conscientiousness [c13 + (a3*b3)]	-0.018	-0.069	-0.343	0.204	0.139	-0.501	0.616
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) on Neuroticism [c14 + (a3*b4)]	-0.002	-0.009	-0.406	0.381	0.2	-0.045	0.964
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) on Openness to New Experiences [c15 + (a3*b5)]	0.048	0.192	-0.082	0.48	0.145	1.324	0.185
Age on Extraversion [c16]	0.116	0.028	0.016	0.04	0.006	4.641	0.000
Age on Agreeableness [c20]	0.097	0.389	0.156	0.624	0.118	3.306	0.001
Age on Conscientiousness [c24]	0.037	0.072	-0.034	0.183	0.055	1.307	0.191
Age on Neuroticism [c28]	-0.017	-0.011	-0.057	0.035	0.023	-0.473	0.636
Age on Openness to New Experiences [c32]	0.118	0.024	0.012	0.035	0.006	3.949	0.000
Age on Self-Conservatism Placement [c36]	0.154	0.507	0.311	0.71	0.102	4.969	0.000
Sex: Female on Extraversion [c17]	-0.002	-0.004	-0.093	0.086	0.047	-0.083	0.934
Sex: Female on Agreeableness [c21]	-0.041	-0.021	-0.058	0.017	0.019	-1.111	0.266
Sex: Female on Conscientiousness [c25]	0.195	0.042	0.032	0.053	0.005	7.955	0.000
Sex: Female on Neuroticism [c29]	0.103	0.364	0.162	0.565	0.103	3.519	0.000
Sex: Female on Openness to New Experiences [c33]	0.045	0.078	-0.02	0.179	0.051	1.547	0.122
Sex: Female on Self-Conservatism Placement [c37]	-0.043	-0.024	-0.067	0.015	0.021	-1.174	0.241
Education on Extraversion [c18]	-0.153	-0.046	-0.064	-0.028	0.009	-5.17	0.000
Education on Agreeableness [c22]	0.01	0.051	-0.238	0.326	0.144	0.354	0.723
Education on Conscientiousness [c26]	-0.058	-0.141	-0.283	0.003	0.073	-1.916	0.055
Education on Neuroticism [c30]	-0.115	-0.09	-0.146	-0.034	0.028	-3.168	0.002
Education on Openness to New Experiences [c34]	0.059	0.013	0	0.026	0.006	2.001	0.045
Education on Self-Conservatism Placement [c38]	-0.048	-0.171	-0.37	0.036	0.104	-1.652	0.099
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Extraversion [c19]	0.022	0.038	-0.067	0.146	0.055	0.698	0.485
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Agreeableness [c23]	-0.059	-0.033	-0.075	0.01	0.021	-1.548	0.122
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Conscientiousness [c27]	-0.06	-0.024	-0.043	-0.005	0.01	-2.449	0.014
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Neuroticism [c31]	0.039	0.258	-0.063	0.568	0.161	1.604	0.109
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Openness to New Experiences [c35]	0.004	0.013	-0.139	0.163	0.078	0.16	0.873
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Self-Conservatism Placement [c39]	0.569	0.595	0.542	0.646	0.027	22.44	0.000
Indirect Effects:							
a1*b1	0.001	0.004	-0.02	0.03	0.012	0.341	0.733
a1*b2	0.002	0.006	-0.027	0.037	0.016	0.363	0.716
a1*b3	0.002	0.007	-0.03	0.041	0.018	0.367	0.714
a1*b4	-0.001	-0.006	-0.038	0.029	0.016	-0.351	0.726
a1*b5	0.001	0.004	-0.019	0.026	0.011	0.337	0.736
a2*b1	0	0	-0.027	0.024	0.012	-0.041	0.967
a2*b2	0	-0.001	-0.034	0.03	0.016	-0.044	0.965
a2*b3	0	-0.001	-0.038	0.033	0.018	-0.043	0.965
a2*b4	0	0.001	-0.031	0.038	0.016	0.042	0.967
a2*b5	0	0	-0.024	0.02	0.011	-0.041	0.967
a3*b1	0.002	0.01	-0.014	0.038	0.013	0.769	0.442
a3*b2	0.004	0.013	-0.017	0.047	0.016	0.834	0.404
a3*b3	0.004	0.015	-0.02	0.052	0.018	0.836	0.403
a3*b4	-0.002	-0.013	-0.047	0.02	0.016	-0.813	0.416
a3*b5	0.002	0.008	-0.012	0.034	0.011	0.755	0.45
Standardized Path Coefficients:							
Extraversion ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [c1]	-0.001	-0.005	-0.31	0.298	0.154	-0.035	0.972
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [c6]	-0.012	-0.055	-0.374	0.266	0.16	-0.346	0.729
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [c11]	0.031	0.139	-0.187	0.466	0.165	0.844	0.399
Age [c16]	0.116	0.028	0.016	0.04	0.006	4.641	0.000
Sex: Female [c17]	0.097	0.389	0.156	0.624	0.118	3.306	0.001
Education [c18]	0.037	0.072	-0.034	0.183	0.055	1.307	0.191
Left-Right Ideological Placement [c19]	-0.017	-0.011	-0.057	0.035	0.023	-0.473	0.636
Agreeableness ~							
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [c2]	-0.015	-0.054	-0.311	0.212	0.132	-0.405	0.686
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [c7]	0.011	0.041	-0.203	0.293	0.128	0.319	0.75
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [c12]	0.043	0.158	-0.102	0.411	0.13	1.213	0.225
Age [c20]	0.118	0.024	0.012	0.035	0.006	3.949	0.000
Sex: Female [c21]	0.154	0.507	0.311	0.71	0.102	4.97	0.000
Education [c22]	-0.002	-0.004	-0.093	0.086	0.047	-0.083	0.934

Standard Errors Bootstrapped with 5000 draws, BootLLCI, BootULCI, and SE for the non-standardized effects.
Abbreviations: BootLLCI = bootstrapping lower limit confidence interval; BootULCI = bootstrapping upper limit confidence interval; and SE = standard error

Table 11.6: Multiple mediation sensitivity on the personality traits' stability against threats (multi-dimensional conservatism placement as the mediator)

Paths	Standardized Effects	Non-Standardized Effects		BootLLCI	BootULCI	SE	z	p
Total Effects:								
Treatment 1 (Cancer) on Extraversion [c1 + (a1*b1)]	0	-0.001	-0.307	0.305	0.157	-0.009	0.993	
Treatment 1 (Cancer) on Agreeableness [c2 + (a1*b2)]	-0.013	-0.048	-0.314	0.203	0.131	-0.367	0.714	
Treatment 1 (Cancer) on Conscientiousness [c3 + (a1*b3)]	-0.026	-0.099	-0.365	0.159	0.137	-0.719	0.472	
Treatment 1 (Cancer) on Neuroticism [c4 + (a1*b4)]	-0.011	-0.057	-0.444	0.315	0.195	-0.291	0.771	
Treatment 1 (Cancer) on Openness to New Experiences [c5 + (a1*b5)]	0.02	0.076	-0.205	0.358	0.144	0.529	0.597	
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) on Extraversion [c6 + (a2*b1)]	-0.012	-0.055	-0.384	0.261	0.162	-0.34	0.734	
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) on Agreeableness [c7 + (a2*b2)]	0.01	0.037	-0.21	0.284	0.126	0.295	0.768	
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) on Conscientiousness [c8 + (a2*b3)]	-0.009	-0.036	-0.305	0.23	0.137	-0.265	0.791	
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) on Neuroticism [c9 + (a2*b4)]	-0.023	-0.126	-0.508	0.249	0.194	-0.648	0.517	
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) on Openness to New Experiences [c10 + (a2*b5)]	0.044	0.176	-0.116	0.46	0.146	1.21	0.226	
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) on Extraversion [c11 + (a3*b1)]	0.032	0.143	-0.19	0.471	0.166	0.859	0.39	
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) on Agreeableness [c12 + (a3*b2)]	0.045	0.166	-0.102	0.42	0.13	1.281	0.2	
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) on Conscientiousness [c13 + (a3*b3)]	-0.018	-0.073	-0.346	0.196	0.136	-0.532	0.595	
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) on Neuroticism [c14 + (a3*b4)]	-0.001	-0.003	-0.4	0.396	0.203	-0.014	0.989	
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) on Openness to New Experiences [c15 + (a3*b5)]	0.047	0.188	-0.113	0.482	0.147	1.283	0.199	
Age on Extraversion [c16]	0.109	0.027	0.014	0.038	0.006	4.358	0.000	
Age on Agreeableness [c20]	0.097	0.388	0.168	0.618	0.115	3.373	0.001	
Age on Conscientiousness [c24]	0.037	0.073	-0.035	0.179	0.055	1.329	0.184	
Age on Neuroticism [c28]	0.056	0.036	-0.009	0.081	0.023	1.561	0.118	
Age on Openness to New Experiences [c32]	0.111	0.022	0.01	0.034	0.006	3.688	0.000	
Age on Multi-Dimensional Conservatism [c36]	0.159	0.527	0.325	0.738	0.105	5.031	0.000	
Sex: Female on Extraversion [c17]	-0.001	-0.001	-0.093	0.095	0.047	-0.028	0.977	
Sex: Female on Agreeableness [c21]	0.025	0.013	-0.026	0.051	0.019	0.672	0.501	
Sex: Female on Conscientiousness [c25]	0.187	0.04	0.03	0.051	0.005	7.427	0.000	
Sex: Female on Neuroticism [c29]	0.108	0.384	0.181	0.583	0.103	3.74	0.000	
Sex: Female on Openness to New Experiences [c33]	0.046	0.08	-0.019	0.184	0.052	1.542	0.123	
Sex: Female on Multi-Dimensional Conservatism [c37]	0.036	0.02	-0.021	0.061	0.021	0.954	0.34	
Education on Extraversion [c18]	-0.15	-0.045	-0.063	-0.027	0.009	-4.915	0.000	
Education on Agreeableness [c22]	0.008	0.038	-0.242	0.327	0.145	0.263	0.793	
Education on Conscientiousness [c26]	-0.059	-0.144	-0.286	0.003	0.074	-1.944	0.052	
Education on Neuroticism [c30]	-0.146	-0.114	-0.17	-0.058	0.028	-4.02	0.000	
Education on Openness to New Experiences [c34]	0.047	0.01	-0.002	0.023	0.007	1.587	0.112	
Education on Multi-Dimensional Conservatism [c38]	-0.047	-0.169	-0.373	0.041	0.105	-1.611	0.107	
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Extraversion [c19]	0.022	0.038	-0.068	0.147	0.055	0.695	0.487	
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Agreeableness [c23]	0.05	0.029	-0.013	0.071	0.021	1.334	0.182	
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Conscientiousness [c27]	-0.061	-0.033	-0.06	-0.006	0.014	-2.446	0.014	
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Neuroticism [c31]	-0.001	-0.008	-0.442	0.41	0.216	-0.038	0.97	
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Openness to New Experiences [c35]	-0.008	-0.035	-0.256	0.182	0.11	-0.322	0.748	
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Multi-Dimensional Conservatism [c39]	0.567	0.804	0.736	0.872	0.035	22.802	0.000	
Indirect Effects:								
a1*b1	0.001	0.003	-0.012	0.022	0.008	0.381	0.703	
a1*b2	0	-0.001	-0.015	0.007	0.005	-0.269	0.788	
a1*b3	0	0	-0.012	0.009	0.005	-0.086	0.931	
a1*b4	0.001	0.003	-0.011	0.027	0.009	0.34	0.734	
a1*b5	0.002	0.006	-0.019	0.034	0.013	0.483	0.629	
a2*b1	0.001	0.003	-0.013	0.022	0.008	0.401	0.689	
a2*b2	0	-0.002	-0.016	0.007	0.005	-0.276	0.782	
a2*b3	0	0	-0.013	0.01	0.005	-0.089	0.929	
a2*b4	0.001	0.003	-0.012	0.029	0.01	0.348	0.728	
a2*b5	0.002	0.007	-0.02	0.035	0.014	0.499	0.618	
a3*b1	0.001	0.006	-0.009	0.027	0.009	0.636	0.525	
a3*b2	-0.001	-0.003	-0.018	0.007	0.006	-0.418	0.676	
a3*b3	0	-0.001	-0.015	0.012	0.006	-0.131	0.896	
a3*b4	0.001	0.006	-0.009	0.033	0.011	0.542	0.588	
a3*b5	0.003	0.012	-0.014	0.042	0.014	0.845	0.398	
Standardized Path Coefficients:								
Extraversion ~								
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [c1]	-0.001	-0.004	-0.308	0.301	0.157	-0.028	0.977	
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [c6]	-0.013	-0.059	-0.387	0.257	0.162	-0.361	0.718	
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [c11]	0.031	0.137	-0.193	0.465	0.166	0.827	0.408	
Age [c16]	0.109	0.027	0.014	0.038	0.006	4.358	0.000	
Sex: Female [c17]	0.097	0.388	0.168	0.618	0.115	3.374	0.001	
Education [c18]	0.037	0.073	-0.035	0.179	0.055	1.329	0.184	
Left-Right Ideological Placement [c19]	0.056	0.036	-0.009	0.081	0.023	1.561	0.118	
Agreeableness ~								
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [c2]	-0.013	-0.047	-0.314	0.203	0.131	-0.356	0.722	
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [c7]	0.011	0.039	-0.208	0.285	0.126	0.307	0.758	
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [c12]	0.046	0.169	-0.097	0.424	0.13	1.301	0.193	
Age [c20]	0.111	0.022	0.01	0.034	0.006	3.688	0.000	
Sex: Female [c21]	0.159	0.527	0.325	0.738	0.105	5.032	0.000	
Education [c22]	-0.001	-0.001	-0.093	0.095	0.047	-0.028	0.977	

Standard Errors Bootstrapped with 5000 draws. BootLLCI, BootULCI, and SE for the non-standardized effects.
Abbreviations: BootLLCI = bootstrapping lower limit confidence interval; BootULCI = bootstrapping upper limit confidence interval; and SE = standard error

Table 11.7: Multiple mediation sensitivity on the personality traits' stability against threats (conservatism scale as the mediator)

Paths	Standardized Effects	Non-Standardized Effects		BootLLCI	BootULCI	SE	z	p
Total Effects:								
Treatment 1 (Cancer) on Extraversion [c1 + (a1*b1)]	0.004	0.018	-0.307	0.333	0.162	0.11		0.913
Treatment 1 (Cancer) on Agreeableness [c2 + (a1*b2)]	-0.021	-0.076	-0.347	0.188	0.136	-0.561		0.575
Treatment 1 (Cancer) on Conscientiousness [c3 + (a1*b3)]	-0.022	-0.085	-0.364	0.181	0.14	-0.61		0.542
Treatment 1 (Cancer) on Neuroticism [c4 + (a1*b4)]	-0.013	-0.07	-0.463	0.333	0.2	-0.353		0.724
Treatment 1 (Cancer) on Openness to New Experiences [c5 + (a1*b5)]	0.013	0.051	-0.243	0.337	0.148	0.342		0.732
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) on Extraversion [c6 + (a2*b1)]	-0.001	-0.005	-0.33	0.308	0.165	-0.03		0.976
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) on Agreeableness [c7 + (a2*b2)]	0.001	0.003	-0.265	0.253	0.132	0.024		0.98
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) on Conscientiousness [c8 + (a2*b3)]	-0.001	-0.002	-0.28	0.275	0.139	-0.016		0.988
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) on Neuroticism [c9 + (a2*b4)]	-0.032	-0.172	-0.539	0.202	0.194	-0.886		0.375
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) on Openness to New Experiences [c10 + (a2*b5)]	0.045	0.178	-0.111	0.466	0.148	1.202		0.229
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) on Extraversion [c11 + (a3*b1)]	0.037	0.163	-0.168	0.495	0.169	0.961		0.336
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) on Agreeableness [c12 + (a3*b2)]	0.043	0.155	-0.116	0.408	0.134	1.16		0.246
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) on Conscientiousness [c13 + (a3*b3)]	-0.036	-0.141	-0.423	0.14	0.142	-0.992		0.321
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) on Neuroticism [c14 + (a3*b4)]	-0.004	-0.025	-0.43	0.382	0.205	-0.12		0.905
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) on Openness to New Experiences [c15 + (a3*b5)]	0.036	0.144	-0.155	0.439	0.15	0.958		0.338
Age on Extraversion [c16]	0.119	0.029	0.016	0.042	0.006	4.506		0.000
Age on Agreeableness [c20]	0.108	0.43	0.196	0.664	0.119	3.626		0.000
Age on Conscientiousness [c24]	0.049	0.097	-0.017	0.211	0.059	1.646		0.1
Age on Neuroticism [c28]	0.012	0.008	-0.039	0.054	0.023	0.326		0.744
Age on Openness to New Experiences [c32]	0.122	0.024	0.012	0.036	0.006	3.982		0.000
Age on Multi-Dimensional Conservatism [c36]	0.162	0.537	0.33	0.75	0.106	5.042		0.000
Sex: Female on Extraversion [c17]	-0.002	-0.003	-0.098	0.095	0.049	-0.051		0.96
Sex: Female on Agreeableness [c21]	-0.03	-0.016	-0.054	0.021	0.019	-0.851		0.395
Sex: Female on Conscientiousness [c25]	0.182	0.039	0.028	0.05	0.006	6.865		0.000
Sex: Female on Neuroticism [c29]	0.106	0.375	0.166	0.59	0.108	3.482		0.000
Sex: Female on Openness to New Experiences [c33]	0.073	0.13	0.03	0.237	0.054	2.407		0.016
Sex: Female on Multi-Dimensional Conservatism [c37]	-0.01	-0.006	-0.047	0.037	0.021	-0.262		0.793
Education on Extraversion [c18]	-0.155	-0.047	-0.064	-0.029	0.009	-5.146		0.000
Education on Agreeableness [c22]	0.029	0.144	-0.143	0.441	0.149	0.965		0.334
Education on Conscientiousness [c26]	-0.066	-0.162	-0.309	-0.013	0.075	-2.149		0.032
Education on Neuroticism [c30]	-0.188	-0.149	-0.206	-0.094	0.029	-5.213		0.000
Education on Openness to New Experiences [c34]	0.058	0.013	0	0.026	0.007	1.911		0.056
Education on Multi-Dimensional Conservatism [c38]	-0.051	-0.181	-0.391	0.03	0.108	-1.679		0.093
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Extraversion [c19]	0.027	0.048	-0.066	0.161	0.058	0.825		0.409
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Agreeableness [c23]	-0.034	-0.019	-0.063	0.025	0.022	-0.873		0.383
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Conscientiousness [c27]	-0.002	0	-0.015	0.015	0.008	-0.057		0.954
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Neuroticism [c31]	-0.045	-0.201	-0.425	0.029	0.115	-1.749		0.08
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Openness to New Experiences [c35]	-0.069	-0.154	-0.273	-0.034	0.062	-2.505		0.012
Left-Right Ideological Placement on Multi-Dimensional Conservatism [c39]	0.554	0.401	0.364	0.436	0.018	21.914		0.000
Indirect Effects:								
a1*b1	-0.001	-0.005	-0.03	0.008	0.009	-0.563		0.574
a1*b2	-0.004	-0.013	-0.051	0.018	0.017	-0.789		0.43
a1*b3	-0.003	-0.011	-0.044	0.014	0.014	-0.739		0.46
a1*b4	0	-0.001	-0.02	0.017	0.008	-0.172		0.864
a1*b5	-0.001	-0.004	-0.025	0.008	0.008	-0.536		0.592
a2*b1	-0.001	-0.004	-0.028	0.01	0.009	-0.421		0.674
a2*b2	-0.003	-0.01	-0.047	0.021	0.017	-0.57		0.568
a2*b3	-0.002	-0.008	-0.041	0.018	0.015	-0.54		0.589
a2*b4	0	-0.001	-0.017	0.016	0.008	-0.139		0.89
a2*b5	-0.001	-0.003	-0.023	0.009	0.008	-0.409		0.683
a3*b1	0.001	0.006	-0.01	0.027	0.009	0.637		0.524
a3*b2	0.004	0.015	-0.018	0.05	0.017	0.859		0.39
a3*b3	0.003	0.012	-0.014	0.044	0.015	0.814		0.416
a3*b4	0	0.002	-0.016	0.024	0.009	0.174		0.862
a3*b5	0.001	0.005	-0.008	0.024	0.008	0.598		0.55
Standardized Path Coefficients:								
Extraversion ~								
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [c1]	0.005	0.023	-0.3	0.338	0.162	0.142		0.887
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [c6]	0	-0.001	-0.324	0.314	0.165	-0.006		0.995
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [c11]	0.036	0.157	-0.176	0.492	0.17	0.923		0.356
Age [c16]	0.119	0.029	0.016	0.042	0.006	4.507		0.000
Sex: Female [c17]	0.108	0.43	0.196	0.664	0.119	3.627		0.000
Education [c18]	0.049	0.097	-0.017	0.211	0.059	1.646		0.1
Left-Right Ideological Placement [c19]	0.012	0.008	-0.039	0.054	0.023	0.326		0.744
Agreeableness ~								
Treatment 1 (Cancer) [c2]	-0.018	-0.063	-0.333	0.196	0.136	-0.463		0.643
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) [c7]	0.004	0.013	-0.257	0.265	0.132	0.1		0.921
Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) [c12]	0.038	0.141	-0.128	0.393	0.133	1.053		0.292
Age [c20]	0.122	0.024	0.012	0.036	0.006	3.982		0.000
Sex: Female [c21]	0.162	0.537	0.33	0.75	0.106	5.042		0.000
Education [c22]	-0.002	-0.003	-0.098	0.095	0.049	-0.051		0.959

Table 11.8: Sensitivity tests on the personality traits' stability against threats

	<i>Dependent variables:</i>				
	Openness to New Experiences	Conscientiousness	Extraversion	Agreeableness	Neuroticism
Treatment 1 (Cancer)	0.030 (0.057)	0.034 (0.056)	0.022 (0.057)	0.056 (0.057)	-0.004 (0.057)
Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)	0.055 (0.058)	-0.023 (0.057)	-0.012 (0.058)	-0.006 (0.057)	-0.086 (0.057)
Treatment 3 (Uncertainty)	-0.002 (0.058)	0.003 (0.056)	0.043 (0.057)	0.048 (0.057)	0.019 (0.057)
Sex: Female [Base: Male]	-0.106** (0.043)	0.198*** (0.042)	0.146*** (0.043)	0.271*** (0.043)	0.009 (0.043)
Age	0.029 (0.022)	0.167*** (0.021)	0.081*** (0.022)	0.098*** (0.022)	-0.125*** (0.023)
Education	0.062*** (0.022)	0.050** (0.021)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.003 (0.021)	-0.039* (0.022)
Left-Right Ideological Placement	-0.035 (0.026)	-0.031 (0.025)	-0.013 (0.025)	-0.053** (0.025)	-0.114*** (0.025)
Self-Conservatism Placement	0.045* (0.026)	0.141*** (0.025)	0.075*** (0.025)	0.148*** (0.025)	-0.055** (0.025)
Constant	0.055 (0.049)	-0.126*** (0.048)	-0.096** (0.049)	-0.200*** (0.048)	0.006 (0.049)
Observations	2,315	2,325	2,316	2,323	2,314
R ²	0.011	0.056	0.022	0.043	0.041
Adjusted R ²	0.007	0.053	0.019	0.040	0.038
Residual Std. Error	0.985 (df = 2306)	0.966 (df = 2316)	0.979 (df = 2307)	0.972 (df = 2314)	0.977 (df = 2305)
F Statistic	3.074*** (df = 8; 2306)	17.182*** (df = 8; 2316)	6.538*** (df = 8; 2307)	12.964*** (df = 8; 2314)	12.469*** (df = 8; 2305)
<i>Notes:</i>					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Standard errors are in parantheses.


Figures

Figure 11.1: Interaction plot between Openness to New Experiences and Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) with CIs (95%) from Table 11.1, Interactions with Openness to New Experiences Model

Note: I conditioned the continuous independent variables to their mean values and categorical independent variables to their base categories. Accordingly, the conditioned values were as follows: 7.97 for *Extraversion*, 9.12 for *Agreeableness*, 8.48 for *Conscientiousness*, 5.38 for *Neuroticism*, 23.72 for age, 5.01 for education, 5.98 for left-right ideological placement, and 'male' for sex. A joint hypothesis testing using the F-statistic that the *Openness to New Experiences: Ideas*, *Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)*, and *Openness to New Experiences: Ideas* x *Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)* interaction term's coefficients were zero was rejected at $p < 0.05$ level by $X^2 = 7.3259$ and $df = 3$.




Figure 11.2: Interaction plot between Openness to New Experiences: Ideas and Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) with CIs (90%)

Note: I conditioned the continuous independent variables to their mean values and categorical independent variables to their base categories. Accordingly, the conditioned values were as follows: 7.51 for *Extraversion: Assertiveness*, 7.97 for *Extraversion: Activity*, 7.83 for *Agreeableness: Altruism*, 9.23 for *Agreeableness: Compliance*, 6.22 for *Conscientiousness: Order*, 7.34 for *Conscientiousness: Self-Discipline*, 5.58 for *Neuroticism: Anxiety*, 4.95 for *Neuroticism: Depression*, 8.5 for *Openness to New Experiences: Aesthetics*, 23.72 for age, 5.01 for education, 5.98 for left-right ideological placement, and 'male' for sex. A joint hypothesis testing using the F-statistic that the *Openness to New Experiences: Ideas*, *Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)*, and *Openness to New Experiences: Ideas x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack)* interaction term's coefficients were zero was not rejected at $p < 0.10$ level by $X^2 = 2.2566$ and $df = 3$.




Figure 11.3: Interaction plot between Agreeableness and Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) with CIs (95%) from Table 11.4

Note: I conditioned the continuous independent variables to their mean values and categorical independent variables to their base categories. Accordingly, the conditioned values were as follows: 7.97 for Extraversion, 8.19 for Openness to New Experiences, 8.48 for Conscientiousness, 5.38 for Neuroticism, 23.72 for age, 5.01 for education, 5.98 for left-right ideological placement, and ‘male’ for sex. A joint hypothesis testing using the F-statistic that Agreeableness, Treatment 2 (Terror Attack), Region: Western Anatolia, and Agreeableness x Treatment 2 (Terror Attack) x Region: Western Anatolia interaction term’s coefficients were zero was rejected at $p < 0.05$ level by $X^2 = 4.6308$ and $df = 4$.




Figure 11.4: Interaction plot between Agreeableness and Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) with CIs (95%) from Table 11.4

Note: I conditioned the continuous independent variables to their mean values and categorical independent variables to their base categories. Accordingly, the conditioned values were as follows: 7.97 for Extraversion, 8.19 for Openness to New Experiences, 8.48 for Conscientiousness, 5.38 for Neuroticism, 23.72 for age, 5.01 for education, 5.98 for left-right ideological placement, and ‘male’ for sex. A joint hypothesis testing using the F-statistic that Agreeableness, Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes)), Region: Western Anatolia, and Agreeableness x Treatment 3 (Unknown Causes) x Region: Western Anatolia interaction term’s coefficients were zero was rejected at $p < 0.05$ level by $X^2 = 4.5456$ and $df = 4$.