

**THE OTTOMAN SPECIAL ORGANIZATION - *TEŞKİLAT-I MAHSUSA*: A
HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ITS
OPERATIONS AGAINST BRITISH OCCUPIED EGYPT
(1914-1916)**

A Master's Thesis

by

POLAT SAFİ

**THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA**

September 2006

To my family

**THE OTTOMAN SPECIAL ORGANIZATION - *TEŞKİLAT-I MAHSUSA*: A
HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ITS
OPERATIONS AGAINST BRITISH OCCUPIED EGYPT
(1914-1916)**

**The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University**

by

POLAT SAFİ

**In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS**

in

**THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA**

September 2006

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.

Assist. Prof. Oktay Özel
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.

Prof. Dr. Stanford J. Shaw
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.

Assist. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel
Director

ABSTRACT

THE OTTOMAN SPECIAL ORGANIZATION - *TEŞKİLAT-I MAHSUSA*: A HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ITS OPERATIONS AGAINST BRITISH OCCUPIED EGYPT (1914-1916)

Safî, Polat

M.A., Department of History

Supervisor: Ass. Prof. Oktay Özel

September 2006

The present level of the knowledge about the plans and operations of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* forces against Egypt during World War I is very poor in terms of the analysis of this phenomenon at a micro level in different localities. This study, in this context, is an attempt through the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* concentration, nourished mainly from Sinai, Libya, and to a lesser extent Sudan, against Egypt between 1914 and 1916 to further our understanding of not only the details of the *Teşkilat*'s activities in these regions but also its administrative and operational characteristics.

Keywords: *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, *Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi*, Sinai, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Süleyman Askeri, Mümtaz Bey, Hasan Efendi, Eşref Kuşçubaşı, Nuri Paşa, Cafer el-Askeri, Afrika Grupları Kumandanlığı.

ÖZET

TEŞKİLAT-I MAHSUSA: İNGİLİZ İŞGALİ ALTINDAKİ MİSİR’A KARŞI YÜRÜTTÜĞÜ EYLEMLERE MAHSUS ATIFLA TARİHİ BİR DEĞERLENDİRME (1914-1916)

Safı, Polat

Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Oktay Özel

Eylül 2006

1. Dünya Savaşı esnasında, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* kuvvetlerinin Mısır’a karşı planları ve operasyonları hakkındaki mevcut bilgi düzeyi bu hadisenin değişik mahallerde mikro bir seviyede analiz edilmesi bakımından oldukça fakirdir. Bu çalışma, bu bağlamda, Mısır’a karşı başlıca Sina, Libya ve daha az ölçüde Sudan’dan beslenen *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* konsantrasyonu yoluyla yalnızca *Teşkilat*’ın bu bölgelerdeki faaliyetlerinin ayrıntılarına ilişkin değil aynı zamanda idari ve eylemsel özelliklerine ilişkin anlayışın ilerlemesi için bir girişimdir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi, Sinai, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Süleyman Askeri, Mümtaz Bey, Hasan Efendi, Eşref Kuşçubaşı, Nuri Paşa, Cafer el-Askeri, Afrika Grupları Kumandanlığı.*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to many people for help, both direct and indirect, in writing this thesis. First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Oktay Özel for his support and guidance in the last three years. Without his enthusiasm, critical comments, analytical questions, and constant encouragement, I would have never been able to complete this dissertation. I would also like to thank Stanford Shaw for commenting on an early draft of the work and letting me make use of his valuable library. Moreover, I have to express my gratitude to Nur Bilge Criss for enhancing the quality of this thesis with her critical comments on the final draft. I am also thankful to Eugenia Kermeli, Hasan Ünal, and Hakan Kırımlı for encouraging me to become an historian for four years ago.

This thesis would have never come into existence without the liberal attitude of the present ATASE administration. Therefore, I would like to express my thanks to Col. Dr. Ahmet Tetik, departmental chief of ATASE archive, not only for facilitating my research but also for his constructive comments on my thesis as an exact scholar. I am also greatly indebted to Arzu Yoğurtçuoğlu and Şeyda Büyükcan, archive experts in ATASE, for helping me in reading the materials and their entertaining friendship.

My family, Macit, Sevgi, and Esra Safi, deserves the most profuse gratitude for spiritually and materially supporting me during my entire life. I would also like to express my gratitude to my uncle, Sacit Safi. I feel, moreover, obliged to voice my gratefulness to Eren Safi whose support, good will, and patience, as well as intellectual remarks has greatly contributed to the complementation of this study. I also thank the

staff of the periodical, *Kılavuz*, especially Turan Kandemir and Hakan Arslanbenzer, for supporting and critically evaluating my studies for years.

Furthermore, I feel compelled to appreciate the close and exciting companionship of Emrah Safa Gürkan for almost eight years. My thanks also go to my friends, Fatih Durgun, Alphan Akgül, and M. Burak Özdemir, for not only generating new psychoanalytical methods to put up with my constant complaints about this study but also playing an active part in the realization of this thesis by their invaluable analysis and criticism.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	1
A) Intelligence Studies in Turkey	1
B) Literature on the <i>Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa</i> Revisited	6
C) Sources	23
CHAPTER TWO: THE <i>TEŞKİLAT-I MAHSUSA</i> FORCES IN SINAI	35
A) The Mission of the <i>Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa</i> in the 1 st Canal Campaign	39
1. <i>Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa</i> in the Turkish Plan of Attack	39
2. <i>Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa</i> Forces in the Region	42
3. <i>Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa</i> 's Missions Across the Frontier: Military Activities and Intelligence	46
4. <i>Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa</i> 's Involvement in Local Conflicts	50
5. Formation of the <i>Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa</i> Units in the Districts	53
6. Concentration in Yafa	55
7. The Situation in Egypt	62
8. The Attack on the Suez Canal	70

B) Mission of the <i>Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa</i> in the 2 nd Canal Campaign	74
1. Reorganization of the 4 th Army and the <i>Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa</i>	
Forces.....	74
2. Minor Operations against the Canal	77
CHAPTER THREE: <i>TEŞKİLAT-I MAHSUSA</i> IN LIBYA	83
A) The mission of Süleyman el-Baruni to Libya	85
B) The mission of Nuri (Kılıgil) and Cafer el-Askeri	87
C) British Mediation	89
D) <i>Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa</i> 's means of pressure	94
E) Cafer el-Askeri's Mission to Get Military Equipment and Money ..	96
F) Organization of the Forces in Libya	100
G) Searching for Fait Accompli	105
H) Invasion of Egypt and British Counter Attack	109
I) Cooperation with the Sultanate of Darfur in Sudan	110
CHAPTER FOUR: ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL	
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE <i>TEŞKİLAT-I MAHSUSA</i> : AN ASSESSMENT	
.....	118
A) The chiefs of the <i>Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa</i>	119
B) Central structure.....	127
C) Regional structure.....	131
D) Mission of the <i>Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa</i>	133

E) On the role of Eşref Kuşçubaşı	137
CONCLUSION.....	142
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	145
APPENDICES.....	156

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

A. Intelligence Studies in Turkey

The outbreak of the World War I (1914-1918) was marked by a deeper understanding of intelligence on the part of each state involved in the fighting. Having entered the war on the side of the Triple alliance, the Ottoman Empire tested such an experience mainly by the foremost role of *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*¹ (Ottoman special organization), which grew out, to a great extent, of the experiences of the *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* [Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)] in Tripoli and the Balkan Wars 1912-1913. As a European model of political and military intelligence association, the *Teşkilat* had no precedent in Ottoman history. It not only provided the field commanders and planning staff with intelligence required about the opponents but also recruited, trained, and directed the bands whose role was to be in close combat with the enemy and weaken her ability to fight in military and semi-military operations. Besides, it also propagated pan-Islamic discourse to strengthen Muslim solidarity and engaged in espionage and counter-espionage facilities to reveal the interior and external threats to Ottoman interests. Thus, the *Teşkilat* fulfilled the broader functions of an intelligence organization.

¹ Hereafter *Teşkilat*.

Despite its vital importance, studies on the history of the *Teşkilat* have not produced a reliable and sound account; the current level of knowledge on the subject, therefore, is not only extremely limited but also highly distorted and controversial. This can be attributed firstly to the specific circumstances of Turkey under which intelligence studies have been carried out.² The academic sphere of inquiry regarding intelligence matters followed quite a peculiar path in Turkey, which neither developed a coherent understanding of the matter nor an institutional basis that works properly, unlike Western countries like USA³, England⁴, and France⁵.

² A short glance at the development of intelligence studies in Western historiography reveals an increasing academic interest in the subject. Having raised very little voice until the late 1950s primarily due to very limited access to original documents and partly due to academicians' sneering away the importance of intelligence, the sphere of inquiry on the intelligence dimension in historical research remained insufficient. For one of the earliest works on intelligence see; Sherman Kent, *Strategic intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1949). However, with the dramatic expansion of the public knowledge about the subject, academicians have gradually become aware of the need to scrutinize the influence of intelligence and its role in policy-making and military operations in the past. Guided largely by the policy-oriented and conceptual approach of American scholars, study of intelligence and its role in historical events came into existence starting in the late 1970s.

³ Generally considered "parochial", American approach reflected the paradigms of political science and policy analysis without being nourished by multi-disciplinary studies. Yet, the strategic importance of US in Western alliance combined with a variety of conceptual approaches was enough to mark US as the most productive center of intelligence studies. In this context, Kenneth G. Robertson defines four major approaches to the study of intelligence in United States. The very first one is constituted by a series of early works which stressed "analysis" as the key issue in intelligence studies. The liberal approach, on the other hand, suspects that alleged threats to domestic issues are overstated; therefore, the practices of intelligence services which are designed to encounter those threats put democracy in jeopardy. For the most prominent figure of this approach see; Harry Howe Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970). Thirdly, "Surprise school" deals with the crisis management by examining whether or not the intelligence information is the key to a good management in times of international crisis. This approach paved the way for a number of studies on particular intelligence services during specific historical periods. Thomas Troy, *Donnovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Frederick, Md: University Publications of America, 1981). Realist approach, the fourth major approach in US, argues that intelligence capacity should be effective to defend the national security against international challenges. See, Kenneth G. Robertson, "The Study of Intelligence in the United States", Roy Godson (ed), *Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., the USSR, the U.K. and the Third World* (McLean, Virginia: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988), 7-41. Thus, led mainly by policy-oriented and conceptual approaches, the "surprise school" seems the only one having carried out historical study of particular intelligence organizations in American approaches.

⁴ No doubt, the other important center of intelligence studies has been the United Kingdom, where scholars generally pursue a more historical approach. It seems not possible, however, to allege that intelligence studies have been conducted with no trouble. The years subsequent to the revelation of the "Ultra Secret" (the decrypting by British intelligence of the German cipher machine called 'Enigma') and

“Double Cross System” (one of the greatest intelligence coups of the World War II ran to control the German espionage in the United Kingdom) documents in the mid 1970s, which might possibly be called a turning point in intelligence studies, witnessed a serious tendency to incorporate intelligence into historical accounts. The “biggest hole” a term used by David Kahn marked the fundamental characteristic of intelligence studies of the era. In the article, having defined “intelligence gaps as the biggest hole in the historiography”, Kahn puts forward the reasons why we know very little about intelligence. Given the importance of the elements of intelligence, he offers some steps to link intelligence to operations. See David Kahn, “World War II History: The Biggest Hole” *Military Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Apr., 1975), 74-76. The first efforts were made to fill this ‘hole’, however, by a variety of nonacademic historians up to the late 1970s, but, not surprisingly, their works were considered either unreliable or uncheckable (or both). Definition of intelligence as the “missing dimension” of historiography in 1982 by Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, was followed by the foundation of inter-disciplinary academic journal of intelligence, “Intelligence and National Security”. See, *Intelligence and National Security* (Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group). At the end of the 1980s, although the intelligence archives were closed to researchers by Official Secret Acts, serious academic works began to appear which demonstrated that the materials officially released or overlooked during the censorship process were enough for the study of the development of British intelligence organizations. See, Christopher Andrew, “Historical Research on the British Intelligence Community” *Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., the USSR, the U.K. and the Third World*, 43-64. An extreme focus on the alleged centrality of intelligence in military history, which might be called intelligence fetishism, was fashionable among British academicians up to the 1980s to an extent because they did not have intelligence archives at their disposal. But afterwards historians began to broaden their approaches and put forward better studies. Martin S. Alexander’s work in which he launches efforts to scrutinize the intelligence activities directed against friends and allies by ten case studies, is a good example for much more complicated and balanced studies in intelligence discipline. See Martin S. Alexander (ed), *Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence Inside Alliances and Coalitions from 1914 to the Cold war*, (London and Portland, Ore: Frank Cass, 1998). During the 1980s, historians launched efforts to find out descriptive information about the inner world of little known secret services and their organizational dynamics. This institutionalist approach provided the ground for a more contextualist attitude- the studies on the diverse impact of secret services on particular historical events, an approach which emerged in the 1990s and is still predominant among academicians. See, Richard J. Aldrich (ed), *Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain 1945-1970*, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1998), 1-7. On the whole, however, it is plausible that British academic community, particularly discouraged by the public disclosure of Secret Service records until the mid 1990s, had to treat intelligence with little importance. British National Archives (Public Record Office) for a long time refused even to consult documents concerning some British military operations during and after World War I, for example the British occupation of Istanbul and parts of Anatolia and how Britain suppressed popular uprisings against British rule in India and Egypt. Exaggerated secrecy even about the intelligence reports relating to periods before and during the First World War paved the way for harsh criticism and the publication of official history of *British Intelligence in the Second World War* and the release of some wartime intelligence reports in Public Record Office were not enough to obviate those objections: “The proposition that the release of documents on British intelligence operations in Germany during the Agadir crisis of 1911 or in Russia before the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 might threaten national security in the 1980s is so absurd that probably only Whitehall is capable of defending it. The judgment of those ministers and officials who take this extraordinary view has, I believe, been sadly warped by ancient and irrational taboos.” See, Christopher Andrew, *Her Majesty’s Secret Service: the Making of the British Intelligence Community*, (New York: Elisabeth Sifton Books, Viking, 1985), XV.

⁵ ‘You may not see that!’ regulations, the official name of the well-known ongoing archival restrictions- the most important difficulty experienced by all historians of not only intelligence but also military operations-, posed more troubles for serious academic works in France almost until the end of the millennium. According to prominent historians of French intelligence, who had to compensate the archival obstacles by means of other sources, such restrictive laws reveal the reason behind the vague attitude of French governments towards intelligence: “Because the French services have a long history of spying on their own people, especially their political leaders, do those who pass these laws actually do so out of self-interest rather than state interests?”. See, Douglas Porch, *The French Secret Services From the Dreyfus*

Intelligence has long been a subject of immense public interest in Turkey, particularly from the early 1960s onward; its political and legal dimensions have attracted a number of columnists and experts. Writings on intelligence drew great strength from the sophisticated clashes between left and right-wing political and armed groups, which Turkey lived through roughly between 1970 and 1980. The military coup d'état on September 12, 1980, gave no stimulus to intelligence studies for a while. Under the growing influence of the policies of Turgut Özal government from 1983 onward, intelligence began to get on the scene once again. Discussions on intelligence subjects however gained momentum during the 1990s and became a popular subject of inquiry, despite diverse interpretations, particularly after the Susurluk accident on 3rd November 1996 and the process of 28th February.

During the 1990s, as specialists dealing with different dimensions of Turkish intelligence, a new term has stuck out as the most speculative and constant feature of not only intelligence studies but also of politics: “deep state”. The term generally refers to a state-within-the-state. Discussions on “deep state” accelerated the studies on intelligence, thus, increasing the relevant literature. To a great extent, hypotheses proposed have concerned, in mixed order of importance, with increasing PKK terrorism; a number of political assassinations; the military coup d'états of 1960, 1971, and 1980; the process of 28th February 1996, which came to be known as “post-modern coup d'état”; famous accident of Susurluk; the activities of and assassinations by the Armenian terror organization ASALA; international developments after 11th September; the relation between the mafia and Turkish intelligence organizations, etc...

Affair to the Gulf War (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1995), XII. But again, this attitude applies regarding not only to intelligence but also to military documents.

It is therefore not easy to propose even a basic historiographical classification of different approaches to studies on Turkish intelligence services. One may refer to a number of factors in explaining this: rapid alterations in the domestic political environment, which, in return, bring about changes in the perception of international atmosphere; debates revolving around the ‘transparency’ of governmental acts; changing public perception and debates on the politicians and statecraft in Turkey; and finally, Turkey’s geo-strategic and geo-political location, which marks her as the point of intersection between East and West.

A careful examination of intelligence studies, however, might demonstrate a number of common tendencies in the literature. Developing a proper definition of intelligence and its functions do seem to be the main question of all studies. Many of the researchers accept that intelligence permeate and dictate Republican Turkish statecraft. Nearly all works acknowledge that the mission of intelligence is to provide national security, despite the fact that there are different views on the nature of the main threats and the way Turkish intelligence services should respond to them. That there is a mutual ground of interaction between intelligence and democracy might be counted as the third common feature. Finally, each study recognizes that, as perhaps the case for all intelligence organizations, there are serious problems within Turkish intelligence organizations, despite the existence of a deep divergence of opinion on their nature.

One may conclude that intelligence studies in Turkey are generally connected to public policy issues. This, first of all, has negative impact on researchers and academicians, discouraging them to study subjects relating to intelligence, thus directly contributing to the low level of academic studies on intelligence that are far from the standards of objectivity, certainty, and self-consistency. Secondly, it leads the literature

on the subject to be composed, to a great extent, by the studies of fiction thrillers, think-tanks who have close relations with governments, and officials with extensive contacts with intelligence itself. Thirdly, since it is almost impossible for a researcher on Turkish intelligence studies to entirely distance herself/himself from the current ideological tendencies or existing political environment in Turkey, any dimension of intelligence can easily become politicized, without a proper scientific treatment. Fourthly, given the inattentive ideological atmosphere of Turkey, which encourages various forms of harsh public discussions and populist languages, daily concerns as to the ‘survival’ of Turkish Republic, inevitably become an integral part of the heated debates on current issues. One of the historical dimensions of such debates, moreover, is directly related to the military in general and intelligence services in politics both in the late Ottoman and early Republican periods. In this context, the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, naturally becomes the core issue and is highly politicized, popularized, and distorted within the framework of the literature on Turkish intelligence studies which gives the impression of a perplexed, intricate, and untidy bunch of theoretical assumptions.

B. Literature on the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* Revisited

It is imperative, at this point, to have a closer look at the current literature on the history of Turkish intelligence with a particular focus on the *Teşkilat*. Such a brief examination would also help us better understand the nature of the difficulties involved in the study of the subject and provide a crude guide for further readings and studies. Such an evaluation will inevitably involve the major sources regarding the *Teşkilat*, basically by

reference to its activities nourished mainly from Sinai, Libya, and to a lesser extent, Sudan, in Egypt between 1914 and 1916, which constitute the subject of this study.

To start with, *Teşkilat* is not usually mentioned in the standard histories of World War I that relate to the Ottoman Empire. Nor is it brought up in general works on the last century of Ottoman history.⁶ There are however some works which slightly and sometimes indirectly touch upon the subject. While discussing the *Teşkilat* around the famous Yakup Cemil case, Sina Akşin, for instance, explains the rivalry between Enver Pasha and Talat Bey⁷. Similarly, Şükrü Hanioğlu develops an interesting argument by pointing to the apparent intellectual background of some members of the *Teşkilat*. To him, some Unionist members of *Teşkilat* were affected by the ideas of Büchner, Nietzsche, and particularly those of Schopenhauer. What lay behind this interest were Schopenhauer's ideas emphasizing the need for individuals to further interfere in civilian political life.⁸ İlhan Tekeli provides a short but a balanced definition of *Teşkilat*, where he says that the *Teşkilat* was no more than a covert establishment associated with the state. He goes on to say that it had two important duties: firstly, to reunite the various internal groups by means of collecting information about the multi-segmented structure of the Ottoman Empire; secondly, to increase the political impact of the Empire in Turkish and Muslim states and those which were parts of the Ottoman Empire by supporting and organizing the local resistance groups against the existing political authorities.⁹ Stanford Shaw, a veteran on late Ottoman and early Republican era, does

⁶ This includes the classic works like those written by Bernard Lewis, Niyazi Berkes, Feroz Ahmad, Maurice Larcher, Ulrich Trumpener and many other books on the Ottoman Empire in World War I.

⁷ Sina Akşin, *100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1980), 295-297.

⁸ Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1986), 53-54.

⁹ İlhan Tekeli, Selim İlkin, *Cumhuriyetin Harcı, Birinci Kitap: Köktenci Modernitenin Doğuşu* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003), 96-97.

not directly identify the *Teşkilat* in his classic work. He, however, draws attention to the extent of its success in operations to arouse upheavals in the colonies of Entente powers by making use of Jihad. In this context, Shaw spots well what was primarily expected from the *Teşkilat* by Enver and his fellows.¹⁰ Such an attitude of not directly dealing with the *Teşkilat* in detail might be partially accounted for by the markable silence of the Ottoman officials who were responsible for keeping secret both the name of the *Teşkilat*, its activities and organization.¹¹

At this point, Eric Jan Zürcher's argument on the *Teşkilat* deserves particular attention since it constitutes a major line of argument in the literature. Zürcher discusses *Teşkilat* mainly in the context of the Armenian question.¹² Characterizing the *Teşkilat* "as the Unionist shocktroops, who did the Committee's dirty work"¹³, sometimes as a group controlling bandits, Zürcher stresses that a division of *Teşkilat* (not the *Emniyet-i Umumiye İstihbarat Dairesi* in the Ministry of Interior Affairs, which was Talat's own intelligence organization) directly supervised by Talat Bey under the command of Bahattin Şakir was made use of in order to ethnically purify the Empire by means of massacring the problematical minorities, especially the Armenians living in Eastern

¹⁰ Stanford J. Shaw, Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye, Reform, Devrim ve Cumhuriyet: Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu 1808-1975* (İstanbul: E Yayınları, 1994), 383.

¹¹ Philip H. Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar 1911-1918: Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Üzerine Bir Ön Çalışma*, (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 2003), 53.

¹² According to Zürcher, the *Teşkilat* was the official continuation of the *Fedai* supporters who operated with Enver in Tripoli and Western Thrace. See, Eric Jan Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), 59. Zürcher, however, tells almost nothing of the operations of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* outside the realms of the Ottoman Empire during World War I. In this context, he puts forward only once that "The *Teşkilat* also operated outside the empire, where it tried to fan Muslim resistance to the Russian, French and British administrations in their respective colonies." See, Zürcher, *Turkey*, 115. Also see, *Unionist Factor*, 84.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 114.

parts of Turkey.¹⁴ Zürcher bases his argument almost solely on the works by Vahakn Dadrian¹⁵ and Taner Akçam¹⁶ who are known for their detailed studies with a pro-genocide standing within the framework of the Armenian question.

In fact, this approach is understandable since it seems to serve one of the critical arguments that modern Turkish state was established on a massive ethnic cleansing.¹⁷ Thus, Zürcher, for the sake of his argument, obviously applies a method which is limited to exclusive concentration on one particular operational base of the *Teşkilat*, Eastern Anatolia. His reductionist approach, which is often derogatory, intrinsically oversimplifies and overgeneralizes the complex nature of the *Teşkilat* and its activities. It is clear, however, that such a definition of the *Teşkilat* requires further justification, which would inevitably involve questions like whether the alleged activities against the Armenian or Greek population were really the key and the only components of the *Teşkilat*. If that is the case, then it would be true by definition that such activities could alone characterize and define the nature of the *Teşkilat*. If not, one could ignore the interdependent parts of intelligence whose totality determine what the *Teşkilat* was. As the present study will, I hope, partially elaborate the complex nature of the *Teşkilat*, it cannot be fully understood in isolation from its administrative and operational experiences both within the boundaries of Anatolia and elsewhere such as Bulgaria,

¹⁴ Erik Jan Zürcher, “Jön Türkler, Müslüman Osmanlılar ve Türk Milliyetçileri: Kimlik Politikaları, 1908-1938”, *Osmanlı Geçmişi ve Bugünün Türkiye’si*, Kemal Karpat , (ed) (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, Haziran 2004), 271-273; *Turkey*, 115, 120-121.

¹⁵ Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Naim-Andonian Documents on the World War I Destruction of Ottoman Armenians: The Anatomy of a Genocide” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 18, No.3 (Aug.,1986), 311-360, also see his *The history of the Armenian genocide : ethnic conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus* (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1995) and *Ermeni Soykırımında Kurumsal Roller: Toplu Makaleler I* (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2004).

¹⁶ Taner Akçam, *Türk Ulusal Kimliği ve Ermeni Sorunu* (İstanbul: Su Yayınları, 2001); *İnsan Hakları ve Ermeni Sorunu, İttihat ve Terakki’den Kurtuluş Savaşı’na* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999).

¹⁷ Erik Jan Zürcher, “Modern Türkiye’ye Ne Oldu? Kırk Yıl Sonra Bernard Lewis’in *Modern Türkiye’nin Doğuşu* kitabı” *Savaş, Devrim ve Uluslaşma,Türkiye Tarihi’nde Geçiş Dönemi 1908-1928*, 93-95, 98.

India, Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Tunisia, Libya, and the like. The study of the *Teşkilat* thus requires far more geographical width and historical depth in order to fully grasp what it really was and what it did, than the narrow approach of Zürcher.

Doğan Avcıoğlu's evaluation of the *Teşkilat*, on the other hand, seems to have been profoundly affected by the political environment of Turkey during the 1960s. As one of the prominent figures of Yön movement, Avcıoğlu had a keen interest in contemporary politics. In relation to this, that he highlights *Teşkilat* as an Islamic revolutionary organization under the heading of "the world-wide mad war Turkey fought against English imperialism" is understandable.¹⁸ That is why Avcıoğlu exclusively concentrates on the activities of *Teşkilat* outside the realms of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹ In this context, the deep divergence between Avcıoğlu and Zürcher in their approaches on the *Teşkilat* might be a good example in revealing the problematic nature of *Teşkilat* literature.

Tarık Zafer Tunaya's classic, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, though not a general history of modern Turkey, constitutes one of the most valuable contributions to the history of the *Teşkilat*. Based on documentary evidence, Tunaya argues that the CUP was an outsized and heterogenic mass party which launched efforts, by a sort of organizational imperialism, to form subsidiary associations. Analyzing this as a common feature of the political parties which were inclined to be a single party, Tunaya maintains that the *Teşkilat* was the most important product of such an endeavor.²⁰ Despite the fact that this was one of the earliest accounts, no scholar, except Stoddard to a certain extent,

¹⁸ Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Türkiye'nin İngiliz Emperyalizmine karşı dünya çapında verdiği çılgın savaş. Gerillacı Türk Subaylarının yönetiminde bütün İslam Dünyasında antiemperyalist örgütler" *Milli Kurtuluş Tarihi 1883'den 1995'e*, Vol. 1 (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1998), 59-73.

¹⁹ Ibid., 75-98.

²⁰ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Gelişmeler (1876-1938)*, *Birinci Kitap: Kanun-i Esasi ve Meşrutiyet Dönemi (1876-1918)* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2001), 153-154.

seems to have reached the academic depth of Tunaya's understanding and portrayal of the *Teşkilat*. Written by a problematic-oriented historical perspective on the basis of nearly all the available sources, except for the records in ATASE archive, this study provides a reliable ground for more comprehensive and sophisticated discussions on issues about the *Teşkilat* such as the problems related to its foundation and founders, its administrative organization, the nature of its relation with the operations of the Ministry of War as well as the CUP, its budget, objectives, ideology, deployment of prisoners on the military fronts, the geopolitical depth of its operations, the incident of Yakup Cemil, and the interrogation of the survivors of the Unionist cadre following the war.²¹

Finally, it should be noted that the standard history of World War I prepared by *Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı* (hereafter ATASE), includes considerable amount of information on the agents of the *Teşkilat*; the platoon they were attached to as well as the quality and quantity of the soldiers the *Teşkilat* agents commanded.²² Furthermore, *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, published by ATASE for quite sometime provide the researchers with archival materials directly related to the *Teşkilat*: the methods the *Teşkilat* carried out in psychological war, the nature of its relations with the tribes in certain regions, and the intelligence reports of the agents.²³ It

²¹ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, Vol.3 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), 339-359.

²² For an example, see the information on Major Mümtaz Bey (İzmitli), the leader of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* troops in Sinai front in *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi, Sina-Filistin Cephesi-Harbin Başlangıcından İkinci Gazze Muharebeleri Sonuna Kadar*, vol. 4, part 1 (Ankara: Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Askeri Tarih Yayınları, 1979), 130-134, 137, 179, 197, 202, 225. Also, the interrogation of the survivors of the Unionist cadre following the World War I on *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* see; Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Sorgulanması ve Yargılanması (1918-1919)* (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 1998), 92-109, 166-167, 207,251, 290, 381, 393-394, 415, 428-429, 449, 488, 495.

²³ See, as an example, the insights into the activities of Süleyman Askeri, the first leader of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, in Iraq, the organization of the *Teşkilat* there, and a couple of his correspondence with Eşref Kuşçubaşı *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, no. 118 (Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE ve Genelkurmay Denetleme Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2004).

is unfortunate to see that scholars including the historians mentioned above have made nearly no use of these valuable sources in their studies.

Apart from these, there are also a number of academic works concentrating directly on the subject of the *Teşkilat*.²⁴ Obviously, an examination of *Teşkilat* literature would be incomplete without referring to the work by Philip H. Stoddard, written as a PhD dissertation at Princeton University.²⁵ This work has been acknowledged as the most comprehensive study on the *Teşkilat* since 1963 and naturally, ever since, almost every work on *Teşkilat* has made reference to it. One may even say that the current understanding of the *Teşkilat* in general in literature does not go beyond the picture drawn by Stoddard.

In his work, Stoddard evaluates the role of the *Teşkilat* largely in terms of the relationship between the Unionist government and the Arabs living in different regions such as Syria, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and Libya. In this context, the accomplishments and deficiencies of the *Teşkilat* activities with regard to its objectives and targets, the practice of its strategic and tactical skills such as propaganda and covert actions addressed to incite the populace to revolt against the existing political authorities, constitute the main themes of his study. Stoddard concludes that the *Teşkilat* was one of the most vital instruments the Unionists used in order to resist against the threats of Arab

²⁴ A number of articles stress the impact of *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* on the Republican regime. While Orhan Koloğlu discusses the transition from the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* to the *Milli Emniyet Teşkilatı*, Murat Belge argues that a considerable amount of the members of the CUP, which was no different than *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, actually took active part in the foundation of the Republican regime. Cemil Koçak, on the other hand, depending largely on the interrogation of the survivors of the Unionist cadre following the World War I and a petition of Ruşeni Bey, a member of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, comes to the main conclusion that there were two fractions in the *Teşkilat*, one was commanded by Enver Pasha, the other by Talat Pasha. See in order, Orhan Koloğlu, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’dan Milli Emniyet’e geçiş”, *Birikim*, no.93-94, 1997, 145-149; Murat Belge, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa”, *Birikim*, no.116, 1998, 16-20; Cemil Koçak, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusayı Nasıl Bilirdiniz”, *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 3, 2006, 171-214.

²⁵ Philip H. Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar 1911-1918: Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa üzerine Bir Ön Çalışma* (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 2003).

separatism and Western imperialism. Despite certain successes *Teşkilat* achieved, in the main, it did not succeed in opposing and eliminating the threats that were mounted against the very existence of the Ottoman Empire. Its eventual failure, however, was only a part of the overall breakdown of the Ottoman system that took place in the first quarter of the twentieth century.²⁶

Although Stoddard used no archival materials on the *Teşkilat*, the value of his study emanates, to a great extent, again from the sources he was able to have access to: first, the memoirs of some agents who were engaged in the activities of the *Teşkilat* and of those who were in a position to interpret the program of the *Teşkilat*; second, interviews and meetings with one of the few surviving members of the *Teşkilat*, namely Eşref Kuşçubaşı, whose activities were limited for the most part to the Arab provinces of Syria, Egypt and Libya as well as the Arabian peninsula, and with those that had first hand knowledge of the *Teşkilat*'s activities, men like Aziz el-Mısri, Zübeyde Saplı, Ahmet Salih Harb, Hilmi Musallimi, Satvet Lütfi Tozan, and Hamza Osman Erkan.²⁷ Consequently, it is possible to say that this study still has a great value as a major reference book in terms of the knowledge about not only the particular region Stoddard studied but also the conceptual explanations regarding the *Teşkilat* as a whole.

Academic studies, which appear to have increased in number in Turkey, constitute yet another set of literature that should be noted. They, however, do not seem adequate to question the problematic aspects of the subject. It is also clear that regional studies alone cannot carry the possible expansions of such a little studied and complicated subject. In this context, the study by Vahdet Keleşyılmaz which

²⁶ Ibid., 12-13.

²⁷ Ibid., 206-209.

concentrates on the Indian-Ottoman relations during World War I by depending on archival materials on the *Teşkilat*, stands out as a good example in terms of its ability to demonstrate the geo-strategic and geo-political depth of the *Teşkilat*.²⁸ Even though the study does not break away from the conceptual analysis of Stoddard, it might be considered a partial achievement in examining not only the intelligence, and irregular military activities realized in a vast geography (India, Afghanistan, and Iran), to a great extent, thanks to German-Ottoman alliance during World War I but also to the chaotic relationship between Hindus and Muslims within Indian society itself.²⁹ Prudence, however, should not be flung to the wind. For, a few explanations, no doubt refutable, could drag the specialist into an erroneous path. For instance, Keleşylmaz incorrectly evaluates *Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi* (The Office for Eastern Affairs), the *Teşkilat*'s new name given around May or June of 1915, as a separate department concerned with the eastern services of the *Teşkilat*.

The authors of the two other academic studies on the *Teşkilat*, namely Mustafa Balcıoğlu and Atilla Çeliktepe criticize Keleşylmaz on this point. Depending on an archival document, Balcıoğlu argues in his article “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa yahut Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi” that 17 November 1913 was the legal establishment date of *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* and the name *Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi* replaced the *Teşkilat* at an unknown date.³⁰ Çeliktepe accepts this explanation without examining its authenticity.³¹

²⁸ Vahdet Keleşylmaz, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa'nın Hindistan Misyonu (1914-1918)* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1999). Also see his “Kafkas Harekatının Perde Arkası”, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, no. 47, (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, June 2000), 367-394.

²⁹ For another regional case study dealing with the *Teşkilat*'s operations in Black Sea region, see; Sadık Sarısan, “Trabzon Mıntıkası Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Heyet-i İdaresinin Faaliyetleri ve Gürcü Lejyonu”, *XIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi* (Ankara: 4-8 Ekim 1999), 495-534.

³⁰ Mustafa Balcıoğlu, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa yahut Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi” *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusadan Cumhuriyet'e* (Ankara: Asil Yayın Dağıtım, 2004), 1-8.

Balcıoğlu, however, makes a couple of fundamental errors which are sufficient enough not only to indicate the apparent backwardness of the *Teşkilat* literature but also to point to serious flaws in his understanding of an academic work. For an example, Balcıoğlu does not provide the ATASE classification number of the document related to the new name of the *Teşkilat* (actually the f: 1843, d: 43, I: 79/13 filed material in ATASE archive). He apparently did so because he intentionally altered the text of the document, though he did retain its general meaning.³² Examination of the remainder of this article as well as different parts of his book reveals that he often omitted parts of the documents which appeared illegible to him.³³

Disregarding the two chapters related to the German-Ottoman alliance during World War I and the biographies of a number of *Teşkilat* agents, the study by Atilla Çeliktepe mainly consists of two parts: “Intelligence in History”, which is exclusively based on the studies of Ergun Hiçyılmaz, and “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa” which is, to a great extent, based on the studies by Stoddard and Hamit Pehlivanlı.³⁴ Despite the attractive name of the book, *The Political Mission of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, and its sub-headings, a careful examination demonstrates that Çeliktepe’s work possesses more problems than

³¹ Atilla Çeliktepe, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’nın Siyasi Misyonu* (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2003), 76, 118-119.

³² Balcıoğlu, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa yahut Umur-i Şarkıye Dairesi”, 2-4.

³³ Also, Balcıoğlu, in the second part, writes about seven different documents in the remainder of this article, but gives only one classification number for them, and this number itself is false, since such a file (f: 1846, d: 79, I: 20) does not appear to exist in the ATASE archive. Besides, he also wrongly converts the Hicri date 17 Teşrin-i Sani 1329, the legal establishment day of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, into the Gregorian date as 17 November 1913 whereas the correct translation must be 30 November 1913. Had Çeliktepe read the article of Keleşyılmaz on the establishment of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, he would not have repeated the same mistake. See, Vahdet Keleşyılmaz, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’nın Kuruluşu, Başkanları ve Mustafa Kemal” *Türkler Ansiklopedisi*, vol.8, 316-320. No need to say, Balcıoğlu does not give reference to this document in the footnote either. See, Balcıoğlu, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa yahut Umur-i Şarkıye Dairesi”, 2. One also notes in other articles by Balcıoğlu that he has altered other documents as well. See, Mustafa Balcıoğlu, “Mısırlı Teşkilat-ı Mahsusacı Abdülaziz Çaviş’in Almanya Günleri” *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’dan Cumhuriyet’e* (Ankara: Asil Yayın Dağıtım, 2004), 43-48.

³⁴ Pehlivanlı, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa: Türk Modern İstihbaratçılığının Başlangıcı mı?”, *Osmanlı* (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999).

those of Balcıoğlu. For the main part of the book, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa”, which covers pages between 71 and 119, appears to be a complete plagiarism.³⁵ The works of both Çeliktepe and Balcıoğlu, therefore, cannot be safely used for a critical and analytical study of the subject, *Teşkilat*.

There are also a number of memoirs, which provide some information about the activities of the *Teşkilat*. These were written mainly by Turkish and German officials: Kress Von Kressenstein³⁶, Eşref Kuşçubaşı³⁷, Kazım Karabekir³⁸, Ali İhsan Sabis³⁹, Ali Fuad Erden⁴⁰, Cemal Paşa⁴¹, Talat Paşa⁴², Galip Vardar⁴³, Hüsamettin Ertürk⁴⁴, Fuat Balkan⁴⁵, Arif Cemil⁴⁶, Celal Bayar⁴⁷, Mustafa Ragıp Esatlı⁴⁸. Given the shortage of secondary sources, these memoirs written by people engaged in the activities of *Teşkilat* in one way or another and the ones who can interpret the *Teşkilat*’s program and operations prove invaluable. Mainly written by officials involved in the events they give

³⁵ Compare the following pages in order: Çeliktepe, p. (73-74), (89-95), (101-102), (115-117) with Stoddard, p. (54-55, 52), (89-95), (61-62), (49-52); also compare Çeliktepe, p. (75-77), (77-78), (79), (80-83), (107-113), (118-119) with Hamit Pehlivanlı, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa”: p. (286-287), (287), (288), (289-290), (290-292), (288); Çeliktepe, p. 84 with Hüsamettin Ertürk, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, Semih Nafiz Tansu (ed), (İstanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, 1996), p. 107.

³⁶ Baron Kress von Kressenstein, *Türklerle Beraber Süveyş Kanalına* (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1943).

³⁷ Eşref Kuşçubaşı, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Arabistan, Sina ve Kuzey Afrika Müdürü Eşref Bey’in Hayber Anıları, Hayber’de Türk Cengi*, Philip H. Stoddard and H. Basri Danışman (eds), (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1997).

³⁸ Kazım Karabekir, *Gizli Harp İstihbarat* (İstanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 1998), also see his *Birinci Cihan Harbine Neden Girdik, Nasıl Girdik, Nasıl İdare Ettik?*, vol.4 (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1994).

³⁹ Ali İhsan Sabis, *Harp Hatıralarım: Birinci Dünya Harbi*, vol.2 (İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1992).

⁴⁰ Ali Fuad Erden, *Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Suriye Hatıraları*, Alpay Kabacalı (ed), (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2003); *Paris’ten Tih Sahrasına* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1949).

⁴¹ Cemal Paşa, *Hatırat* (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1996), also see; *Hatıralar: İttihat ve Terakki, I.Dünya Savaşı anıları* (İstanbul: Çağdaş, 1977).

⁴² Talat Paşa, *Talat Paşa’nın Anıları*, Alpay Kabacalı (ed), (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2000).

⁴³ Galip Vardar, *İttihad ve Terakki içinde dönenler* (İstanbul: Yeni Zaman Yayınları, 2003).

⁴⁴ Ertürk, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*.

⁴⁵ Fuat Balkan, *İlk Türk Komitacısı Fuat Balkan’ın Hatıraları*, Metin Martı (ed), (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1998).

⁴⁶ Arif Cemil, *I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1997).

⁴⁷ Celal Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım, Milli Mücadele’ye Gidiş*, vol. 4 and 5, (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1967).

⁴⁸ Mustafa Ragıp Esatlı, *İttihat ve Terakki Tarihinde Esrar Perdesi ve Yakup Cemil Niçin Öldürüldü?* (İstanbul: Hür Yayın, 1975).

account of, the memoirs by and large reflect the personal attitudes of their authors. Furthermore, it is difficult to prove the authenticity of the statements made in these memoirs. To assess their value is therefore connected to a number of factors, as Stoddard states:

1. The extent of the author's interference into the incidents he acquaints with.
2. His objectivity, intelligence, personality and his comprehension about the various dimensions that had an impact on those incidents.
3. The method of the author related to the collection and concealment of the information in hand.⁴⁹

Besides, the shallow level of our knowledge paved the way for a number of popular and semi-journalistic studies on the *Teşkilat*. Though not grounded on archival materials, the works of Cemal Kutay⁵⁰ and Ergun Hiçyılmaz⁵¹ may well be useful if approached and examined carefully.⁵² The intelligence rivalry growing out of the hegemonial strategies in the Middle East as well as the endless, habitually political debates around the role of the *Teşkilat* in the Armenian question appears to have contributed further to *Teşkilat*'s becoming a profitable subject of media. In this sense, a

⁴⁹ Philip H. Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar*, 206,207.

⁵⁰ Cemal Kutay, *Siyasi Mahkumlar Adası: Malta* (İstanbul: Tarih, 1963); *Trablus-Garb'de Bir Avuç Kahraman* (İstanbul: Tarih, 1963); *Ana-vatan'da Son Beş Osmanlı Türk'ü* (İstanbul: Kervan, 1962); *1913' de Garbi Trakya'da İlk Türk Cumhuriyeti* (İstanbul: Ercan, 1962); *Lavrens'e Karşı Kuşçubaşı* (İstanbul: Tarih, 1965); *Necid Çöllerinde Mehmet Akif* (İstanbul: Tarih Yayınları Müessesesi, 1963); *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa ve Hayber'de Türk Cengi* (İstanbul: Ercan, 1962); *Enver Paşa Lenin'e Karşı* (İstanbul: Ekici, 1955); *Şehit Sadriazam Talat Paşa'nın Gurbet Hatıraları* (İstanbul: 1983).

⁵¹ Ergun Hiçyılmaz, *Osmanlıdan Cumhuriyete Gizli Teşkilatlar* (İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1994); *Belgelerle Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa ve Casusluk Örgütleri* (İstanbul: Ünsal, 1979); *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa'dan Mit'e* (İstanbul: Varlık, 1990); *Belgelerle Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Casusluk Örgütleri* (İstanbul: Yüce, 1981).

⁵² In this context, one should also not forget to mention the works by Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Hikmet Çiçek, and Soner Yalçın. See, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Paşa*, vol. 3, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2005); Hikmet Çiçek, *Dr. Bahattin Şakir, İttihat ve Terakki'den Teşkilatı Mahsusa'ya Bir Türk Jakobeni* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2004); Soner Yalçın, *Teşkilat'ın İki Silahşörü, Biri Meşrutiyet'in Silahşörü Yakub Cemil diğeri Cumhuriyet'in Silahşörü Torun Yakub Cemil* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2001). Also see the introduction part of the book by Tuncay Özkan, *MİT'im Gizli Tarihi* (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2003).

series of articles written by Abdullah Muradoğlu in the daily *Yeni Şafak*⁵³, and the constant references to the *Teşkilat* in the famous TV series “Kurtlar Vadisi”⁵⁴, for instance, might be considered good examples of such a popular use of the subject in the sphere of public entertainment in Turkey.⁵⁵

All in all, that they do not condescend to the methods pertaining to the usage of sources; that they generally consider almost every explanation in the memoirs to be authentic; that they convey the information which can be refuted by other sources directly to their writings; and that they often make use of anonymous stories, do constitute the major characteristics of such popular studies. It is not an exaggeration, therefore, to say that the *Teşkilat*, which became a center of attention both by its administration and activities during the last decade of the Ottoman Empire, has thus (been) turned into a mysterious subject, like Pandora’s Box. Two overriding rationales might explain this:

a) Apparent lack of interest on the part of historians to the subject seems to have constituted the first rationale. Firstly, the fact that major strategic decisions were made by Enver Pasha and his colleagues, and this led to the eventual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire have, not surprisingly, attracted historians of the period much more than secondary issues such as intelligence and the *Teşkilat*. Secondly, there is the tendency to limit the study of the *Teşkilat* within the framework of espionage. Displeased by fiction-thrillers and their inspiring myths about spies, specialists have come to commit themselves to certain specific aspects with rather simplistic or

⁵³ Abdullah Muradoğlu, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa” *Yeni Şafak* (İstanbul: Diyalog Gazetecilik San. ve tic. ltd. şti., 14-25 November 2005).

⁵⁴ Serdar Akar and Mustafa Şevki Doğan (directed), *Kurtlar Vadisi*, (TV-series, 2003-2005). For more information, visit www.kurtlarvadisi.com.

⁵⁵ Burhan Gençyaşar, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Edebiyatı” *Kılavuz*, vol.31 (Ankara: Büyükharf Yayıncılık, Aralık 2005), 11-14.

reductionist approaches. This, in return, has either made historians disregard the importance of espionage or impeded research on other aspects of the activities of the *Teşkilat*. A further reason for the neglect might be the perception that the history of the *Teşkilat* is first of all a subject of military history and there is no civilian academic institute in Turkey which provides specialization in the military, particularly in intelligence. This lack of interest is coupled with certain problems related to sources used and the mental attitude developed by researchers, including historians. The latter has already been referred to at the beginning. It seems that the nature of sources and their use constitute no less a significant problem. We will be discussing this below in the following section on the sources.

b) The second rationale that further complicates matters is that the arguments on *Teşkilat* generally hover between extreme praise on the one hand and extreme denigration on the other. Even though a certain degree of inevitable subjectivity in historical studies is understandable, it brings together forms of bias in considering the role of the *Teşkilat*. On the one side, there are standardized quotations and legendary motives that cannot be recognized at first sight but are inherent in the texts. On the other, there are formulized and deprecating repetitions proposed with the pretext of objectivity.

Accordingly, it is possible to say that despite the efforts of ATASE as an archive, and of Stoddard and Tunaya as individual scholars, the literature is still quite far from satisfactorily presenting the *Teşkilat* at administrative and operational levels. The attempts, which by and large embroidered with unscholarly concerns and are far from exhausting the archival and secondary materials available, do not always bring a reasonably critical and methodological depth to the study of late Ottoman and early Republican era. It is also not easy to say that the works commonly tiding between two

extremely opposite views, mainly due to certain ideological and political concerns, does positively contribute to our current understanding of the *Teşkilat*. The shortcomings of the literature become more visible and get further complicated when this problematic and largely biased nature of the literature combined with the lack of linguistic and methodological equipments on the part of historians. The *Teşkilat*, therefore, crosses our path with its complicated inadequacies as one of the biggest black holes in Ottoman historiography.

Hence, to further the debate in this area, more case studies in a more analytical manner are needed. This study, in this context, is an attempt, through the *Teşkilat* concentration, nourished mainly from Sinai, Libya, and to a lesser extent Sudan, in Egypt between 1914 and 1916 to further our understanding of not only the details of the *Teşkilat*'s activities in these regions but also its administrative and operational characteristics, at a time when a series of drastic changes led the Empire into eventual collapse.

As for the literature on its mission and activities in the region in question, it is generally known that the *Teşkilat* was included in the Ottoman plan which was to invade Egypt simultaneously from three directions: from the east (Sinai), west (Libya), and south (Sudan). As far as this plan is concerned, the period between mid-1914 and late 1916 in particular is crucial. While the former marked the launch of the Ottoman project, the latter witnessed not only the retreat of the Ottomans in the Sinai-Palestine front and the initiation of the British counter attacks, but also the withdrawal of the forces in Libya from Bingazi to Trablusgarp and the disappearance of the civil strife in Sudan, which totally meant that the Ottoman project of rolling back the invading British army of Egypt came to an end. Nevertheless, the present level of knowledge about the plans and

operations of the *Teşkilat* forces against and in Egypt during World War I is very poor in terms of the analysis of this phenomenon at a micro level in different localities.

It is so primarily because of the fact that the role of the *Teşkilat* in the first Ottoman attack on the Suez Canal comes up only in a few studies. It is usually mentioned briefly, and as a failure incompetently mounted and carried out. The second attack, on the other hand, appears to have never taken place because of the authors' summary of events in a few sentences. The state of the literature on the concentration in Libya and to a much lesser extent in Sudan is no different. Similarly, the memoirs written typically by active politicians and soldiers of the time do not appear to be sufficient for a better understanding of the *Teşkilat* in that region either. That the operations were rarely, and often unsatisfactorily studied generally by making use of the same sources were taken into account, the fact that we have rather limited knowledge on the activities of the *Teşkilat* in this region, representing the naturally secret part of both the military campaigns, breaks out to be confusing.

At this point, it is possible to say that one of the major sources on the role of the *Teşkilat* in the region in question is again the work by Stoddard. In his abovementioned work, Stoddard focuses as case studies on the concentration of the *Teşkilat* in Libya and Egypt, including Sinai.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, it appears obvious that his analysis of some administrative characteristics of the *Teşkilat* at both central and regional level is misleading simply because most of the time he took it for granted what Eşref Kuşçubaşı told him. The same flaws can be encountered in the work by Rachel Simon, which no doubt provides one of the best accounts in terms of the operations such as covert actions

⁵⁶ Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar*.

carried out by the *Teşkilat* in Libya.⁵⁷ Moreover, both studies provide almost no information about either the cells of the organization located in different parts of the region or the *Teşkilat*'s mission to the Sultanate of Darfur in Sudan. Besides, Stoddard does not highlight the role of the organization during the second attack against the Canal and provide only little insight into the minor operations carried out by the *Teşkilat*. The other major source for the study of the region seems to be the standard history by Turkish General Staff. Based on archival materials, they include brief but significant information on the commanders of the *Teşkilat*; the platoon they were attached to, and the quality and quantity of the soldiers they commanded.⁵⁸ These works however do not always indicate the agents as members of the *Teşkilat*, but army commanders. Thus, one has to know the names of the agents in advance in order to fully benefit from these valuable sources. In this context, though written in a similar fashion, the work by Cemil Çelik, based on archival materials, might be useful with additional information on the agents and the minor operations of the *Teşkilat* during the first Canal campaign.⁵⁹ Moreover, one can use the memoirs referred to above and some other works as complimentary studies like the one by Hamit Pehlivanlı where he provides detailed information, based on archival materials, about the structure of the *Teşkilat* forces in Libya during World War I.⁶⁰ It seems also obvious that the authors working on the

⁵⁷ Rachel Simon, *Libya between Ottomanism and Nationalism: The Ottoman Involvement in Libya during the War with Italy (1911-1918)* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1987).

⁵⁸ *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi, Sina-Filistin Cephesi-Harbin Başlangıcından İkinci Gazze Muharebeleri Sonuna Kadar*, vol. 4, (Ankara: Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Askeri Tarih Yayınları, 1979); *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi: Hicaz, Asir, Yemen Cepheleleri ve Libya Harekatı, 1914-1918*, vol. 6 (Ankara: Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Askeri Tarih Yayınları, 1978).

⁵⁹ Cemil Çelik, *Birinci Dünya Savaşında Sina Filistin Cephesinde Birinci Kanal Seferi*, unpublished MA thesis, (Afyon: Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü- Tarih Anabilim Dalı, 1999).

⁶⁰ Hamit Pehlivanlı, "Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Kuzey Afrika'da, 1914-1918" *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, no. 47 (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, June 2000).

cooperation between the Sanusi and Ali Darfur of Sudan have not realized the vital role of the *Teşkilat*. Despite similar loopholes, the works by Evans-Pritchard and Jay Spaulding are indispensable in this context.⁶¹

C. Sources

Before presenting the main sources of this study in some detail, let us remember my critical evaluation of the ways the historians of the subject approached their sources. I have already referred to the problematic use of sources by the historians, while examining their works on the *Teşkilat* as a whole. Part of this problem is the fact that there is a firm belief on their part that the entire archives on Turkish intelligence services remained closed to public use. Furthermore, this in itself has become, or presented as, an excuse for the low quality of the studies produced.

It is clear, at least now, that the shelves of the Yıldız Palace archive from the reign of Abdulhamid II provide a considerable amount of materials relating to the earlier examples of intelligence activities, which eventually was incorporated into the very foundations of the *Teşkilat*. In this context, particularly the large-scale espionage network, which was established during his reign, to consolidate the authority of the palace over regular branches of government and administration as well as over certain political groups of opposition should be taken into consideration since this seems, to a great extent, to have been the Sultan's policy that triggered the CUP to set up its own

⁶¹ E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968); Jay Spaulding & Lidwien Kapteijns, *An Islamic Alliance: Ali Dinar and the Sanusiyya 1906-1916*, (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1994).

underground network. One might safely suggest that examining Abdulhamid II's intelligence organization, known as *Yıldız Hafiye Teşkilatı*, would provide fruitful insights into the inner world of the principal factors that lay behind the *Teşkilat* and its organizational culture. It is apparent, however, that the sources in Yıldız Palace, particularly the reports, called *jurnals*, to the Sultan by agents who spied on officials as well as civilians have not been sufficiently exploited. Although most of the reports were burnt by *Tedkîk-i Evrak Komisyonu* (Examination of Records Commission), established under the chairmanship of Ali Galip Bey, after the coup d'état of 1909, those that survived, whose value cannot be underestimated, have long been accessible to public through *Yıldız Maruzat Defterleri* and *Yıldız Tasnifi Defterleri* at the *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi* in İstanbul.

Ostensibly enough, documents relating to the Ministry of Interior Affairs (*Dahiliye*) have not been used effectively in examining the *Teşkilat*, which seems to have benefited from the experiences of the intelligence units of *Emniyet-i Umumiye İstihbarat Dairesi* of that ministry. Also, the materials associated with the directorate of *Kalem-i Mahsusa* in the same Ministry, consisting of documents between 1913 and 1922, are highly significant for the researcher. Similarly, archival sources with guerilla units and operations, the appointment and dismissal of state officials as well as awarding medals, might well supply the conscious specialists with constructive ideas on the interaction between these diverse intelligence organizations both at administrative and operational levels as well as the relationships between the Ministry of Interior and of the Army. It should however be noted that the materials here are only partially catalogued and the system of classification makes it sometimes difficult to trace related documents in the *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi*. In this regard, it is noteworthy to mention that

Başbakanlık Arşivi put almost all of its detailed catalogues onto the internet where they can be searched by subject, which surely encourages the researcher at the beginning of her/his study.

The role of some of the leading personalities of the *Teşkilat* particularly during the Tripolitanian and Balkan Wars have been overlooked as well despite these campaigns became subjects of a number of studies. That the groups who organized the resistance in those campaigns joined the *Teşkilat* shortly before World War I, no doubt, marks the unambiguous significance of original documents coupled with those wars. When this particular context combined with the fact that the Ottoman government benefited from the *Teşkilat* fundamentally during World War I, the indispensable significance of the archive of the Turkish General Staff, ATASE, on *Teşkilat* studies might be better appreciated. There is no doubt that a modern archive with its catalogues and qualified staff, the ATASE collections include 41,591 documents on the Tripolitanian War of 1911, 902,800 on the Balkan War of 1912-1913, and 3,671,470 on World War I,⁶² all of which have a substantial amount of files on military intelligence, in particular on the *Teşkilat* agents and its organization. World War I catalogues where a large number of *Teşkilat*'s official documents can be found (about 40,000) are arranged according to their departmental files and each file is shortly explained according to their subject. In this context, ATASE archive remains as the most significant source of information for those studying the *Teşkilat*.⁶³

⁶² Ahmet Tetik, "Askeri Arşivler ve Düünden Bugüne Genelkurmay Atase Arşivi", unpublished paper presented at the meeting of *Uluslararası Türk Arşivleri Sempozyumu* (İstanbul: 17-19 Kasım, 2005).

⁶³ In order to get a maximum benefit from this archive, the subject and key words of the research should be written carefully in all details in the application form. Otherwise, one may not access the files that are not considered by the staff as related to the research subject. The files asked for are directly installed onto the computer ATASE assigned to the researchers. It is also allowed to bring laptop computer to the archive. Finally, it might be recommended that the researcher should apply to the ATASE at least one

It is, at this point, imperative to have a closer look at the archival sources housed at ATASE. Since, despite the use of a few records found in *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi*, this study is mainly based on the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* records which are found under the category of *Şube-i Mahsusa* (Special Branch) in *Birinci Dünya Harbi Koleksiyonu* (World War I collection) at the ATASE archive, in Ankara. As mentioned earlier, a limited number of studies on the *Teşkilat* made use of this material. Nevertheless, they appear, without any exception, to be far behind being analytic and question driven. What has generally been achieved in the existing literature is in fact the alleged discovery of one operational base of the *Teşkilat* in a descriptive manner on the basis of very limited archival documents. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that these studies have no value. On the contrary, they are of vital importance in making use of the basic source materials, thus directly contributing to the efforts at bringing the subject to a state of maturity.

By exploiting a considerable amount of archival records, this study, on the other hand, firstly aims to better document the developments in this region, most of which were utilized for the first time, thus providing not only new insight into regional aspects of a crucial organization but also valuable information which might provide a ground for future comparative studies on different operational bases of the *Teşkilat*. Although a comparative analysis among various bases of the *Teşkilat* is outside the scope of this

month before his/her research project gets started since the access permission to ATASE is subjected to a security investigation which takes one to two months. For all Turkish and foreign researchers, access permission to ATASE archive is subjected to the Cabinet decision dated 31 January 2002. It might also be noteworthy to mention at this point that according to Erik Jan Zürcher, who has presumably not obtained permission to work in the archive in the early years of his career, ATASE is closed to almost all foreign and most Turkish researchers. See, Erik Jan Zürcher, “Ölümle Firar Arasında: Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı Askerinin Deneyimleri” *Savaş, Devrim ve Uluslaşma* , 176. As a researcher who does not know much about the earlier policies of ATASE, I can only point out a much more liberal attitude of the present ATASE administration in giving permission to researchers.

study, it is possible to examine various dimensions of the *Teşkilat* and measure the extent of its role in the Ottoman Empire during World War I only after studying in a comparative perspective the general relationships among different bases of the *Teşkilat* by cross checking the similarities and dissimilarities. Despite the fact that this study, at times, presents the cases in rather a descriptive way, it tries to analyze the subject with certain questions, developed to see the *Teşkilat* in its entirety. By doing this, I tried to keep away from the shortcomings of the literature highlighted earlier, while making it possible to answer a number of questions concerning the administrative and operational characteristics of the *Teşkilat*, which have long been subjects of discussion among a limited number of historians. This, of course, requires a critical re-evaluation of not only the archival material but also the secondary sources used for this study. Therefore, it might be useful to have a closer look at the *Şube-i Mahsusa* registers in ATASE archive in terms of their significance and formats which may prove significant in both understanding the nature of the main source of this study and providing a preliminary guide for further studies on the *Teşkilat*.

Şube-i Mahsusa records that comprise a fabulous wealth of history in many respects, holds one of the most significant places among the series housed in the ATASE archive. They are a kind of registers of the *Teşkilat*, which are formed by the compilation of the correspondences between the head organization of the *Teşkilat* and the Ministry of War, as well as those between these headquarters and its sub-divisions and the *Teşkilat*'s field agents. The series also contain originals of the letters exchanged between the Ministry of War and Berlin that were related to the *Teşkilat* as well as the reports concerning the internal structure of the *Teşkilat*. These records (reports, orders...etc) which constitute the main themes of the *Şube-i Mahsusa* registers give not

only fruitful insights into the distinct areas of activities concerned but also provide, all in one, a solid base for a better understanding of multifaceted structure of the *Teşkilat*.

In this context, the records in *Şube-i Mahsusa* registers are of extremely significant. First of all, they provide the historians with the important strategic and tactical decisions taken by the Ottoman government. They also supply the historians with the knowledge of the application of these decisions onto the field. Accordingly, they shed important light on the plans of the head organization of the *Teşkilat*. In addition, they contain military and political intelligence reports of the *Teşkilat*'s agents, which give profound insight into the factual developments in the field. Moreover, they are extremely valuable in examining the demands and the requests of the agents. Finally, all in all, they supply documentary evidence for the administrative machinery of the *Teşkilat* in operation.

Şube-i Mahsusa registers are kept roughly from November 1913 up to the end of November 1918 and the number of records in these registers is estimated to amount to about 40.000.⁶⁴ The records in *Şube-i Mahsusa* registers are composed of files where each file is composed of dossiers, which compile individual documents. In the registers, the summary of each file is typewritten with a single sentence and the documents were placed into the dossier chronologically. The filing of the record into the registers seems to have meant its approval, and the enforcement or the annulment of the records of any decisions in the dossiers was under the prerogative and authority of the *Teşkilat*'s chief, who was directly connected to Enver Pasha, vice-commander in chief.

In respect to their format, the documents found in this category are different in size and number of lines. No decoration can be traced on the documents and they were

⁶⁴ Hamit Pehlivanlı, "Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa: Türk Modern İstihbaratçılığının Başlangıcı mı?", 285.

typically written by *rika* script. The documents, with some exceptions, have a follow up number on the upper right corner of the paper. This is typically followed by the place the letter was forwarded to such as “*Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Riyaset-i Alisine*” (To the Sublime Presidency of the Special Organization) or “*Harbiye Nezareti Umur-i Şarkiyeye Müdüriyet-i Alisine*” (To the Sublime Directorate of Eastern Affairs). Then comes, as to the importance of the letter/correspondence, the phrases like “*gayet mahremane ve müstaceldir*” (extremely confidential and urgent) or “*bizzat hal olunacaktır*” (to be personally dealt with). The letters have dates at the end. In cases of encrypted letter/correspondence, as it was the case in most instances, it is also mentioned that the record is decrypted: “*Baş Kumandanlık Vekalet-i Celilesi’ne Roma Sefaret-i Seniyyesi’nden mevrud 11 Mayıs 915 tarihli şifrenin hallidir*” (Decryption of the cipher dispatched to the Supreme Command by the Sublime Embassy of Rome on 11 May 1915). One might sometimes come across copies of authentic records and the documents repeated (*mükerrer*) in different files. Letter/correspondence usually make it clear why and for what reasons they are written; this is generally ended with a phrase of request or notification such as “*müsterhimdir*” (requested) and “*maruzdur*” (presented). Such phrases generally indicate that the letter is written to a superior echelon; writings to the lower echelons include rather direct orders. They eventually end with the name and the signature of its author. Nevertheless, in times, it is possible to come across documents bearing no name and signs or no name and illegible signs. If the letter is forwarded to another department, it is also noted subsequently as “*ilmi haberlerinin kütalarından celbi levazımata yazılacaktır*” (summon of certificates from their detachments will be written to the quartermaster section) or “*2. Şube’ye yazıldı*” (written to the 2nd Department). The following intelligence record might represent a good example in this sense. In the report,

Nabi Bey, the ambassador to Rome, on the basis of information received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a man coming from Cairo, reports to the Ministry of War that the British forces in Egypt amounted to 100.000 and the British authorities began to exile suspicious Turks to Malta:

“Numero:720

Harbiye Nezaret-i Celilesine,

Roma Sefiri Nabi Bey'den mevrud 12 Kanun-i Evvel 1914 tarihli şifrenin hallidir.

29.9.1330

Burada dolayısıyla Hariciye Nezareti'nden icra edilen tahkikatdan ve dün Kahire'den Roma'ya gelen bir zatın ifadesinden Mısır'daki İngiliz kuvvasının yüzbine balığ olduğu anlaşıyor. Mukaddema arz olunduğu üzere işbu kuvvetin kısm-ı azamı Hintli, Avusturalyalı ve Yeni Zelandalı ve Kanadalılardan mürekkebtir. Mısır'da İngilizler Türk anasına karşı icra etmekte oldukları muamelatı son derecede teşdid ve birçok kimseleri Malta'ya sevke başladıkları işitilmiştir.

2. Şube'ye 20.9.1330

1. Şube'de sureti vardır.

1330 Kanun-i Evvel 1”⁶⁵

In respect to the region in question, there are also translated records, which were generally sent from North Africa, in particular from the Senusis. The language of such correspondences is flowery when compared to the simple and lucidly written records of the *Teşkilat*'s agents. In these records, it is possible to find out the trace of diplomatic courtesy between the Libyan religious leaders and Ottoman administration. These records, consist mostly of letters, usually starting with “*selam*” (salutation), “*ihtiram*” (veneration), “*dua*” (invocation) and ends with a short invocation. The letter is translated by leaving out this first part and instead a note of abbreviation is made like “*selam*,

⁶⁵ ATASE Archive: f: 248, d: 1031, I: 2/50.

ihitiram, dua” or “*bade’l elkab ve’d dua*”. The authenticity of these translations were checked by another person since every letter at the end bears the phrase “*aslına mutabıktır*” (*ad idem* with the original). The letter by Seyyid İdris to Enver Pasha, for instance, might prove crucial in elucidating the physical features of such a translation of reports. In the letter, Seyyid İdris tells Enver Pasha that he sent one of the closest men of Seyyid Ahmed, named Ali el-Abidin Efendi, to him in order to inform Istanbul about the details of the resistance in Libya:

“Harbiye Nazır-ı Celili Enver Paşa Hazretlerine Muhammed İdris el-Mehdi es-Senusi hazretleri tarafından 27 ? 1333 tarihiyle varid olan Arapça mektubun tercümesi:

569

9 Kanun-i Sani 1915
26.10.1330

Elkab, Halife-i Müslimine ve zat-ı sami-i fehimanelerine muzafferiyet duasından sonra:

Nezd-i devletlerine vasıl olan Ecedabiye kaymakamı ihvanımız ve dostumuz Ali el-Abidin Efendi’yi es-Seyyid Ahmet Şerif hazretleri göndermiştir. Mumaileyh bize Arafat’a tevakkufumuzdan iki gün evvel ve Avrupa harbinin ilanından sonra gelmiştir. Kendisi tarik üzerinde kağıt üzerine yazamadığı ve zat-ı devletlerine arz için bizzat hıfz eylediği birçok vesayayı hamildir. Beraberinde Şeyh-i Ekber’den [Seyyid Ahmed] acize varid olan mektubu da takdim ediyorum. Dafian bu mektubda dahi meseleye dair bir sarahat mevcut değilse de bunu ancak bu adamın nezdimizde ne derece şayan-ı itimad olduğunu ve umur-i harbde ne mertebe himmet bulunduğunu şayan eder. Bir vesika olmak üzere takdim ediyorum...Cenab-ı Hak hayatınızı münevver ve said ve sizi salim olarak daim eylesin amin...

Tercüme aslına mutabıktır.
27 Kanun-i Sani 330...”⁶⁶

It should finally be noted that the reports from the field are sometimes illegible. This is primarily because of the fact that the field agents of the region in question drafted

⁶⁶ ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 3/2.

reports in a very bad way, especially those concerning the *Teşkilat*'s concentration in Yafa. Besides, the reports were scratched out time and again on a number of occasions which might discourage the specialist from reading them. Finally, during the early classification process, the reports were filed by punching two holes from their left side and this sometimes poses an obstacle in reading words which might be extremely important.

As is already understood, the present study is primarily a contribution to the growing literature of the *Teşkilat*. It, therefore, aims to provide a reliable ground for further studies in the historiography often dominated by opposite views, and to offer authentically an Ottoman account of the historical experience in the region concerned by largely making use of archival documents, housed at ATASE. Though an analysis of a small part of a much larger experience of the *Teşkilat*, what is offered in this thesis is a critical analysis of its activities in the region in question, which, I hope, will point to an urgent need for a through revision of the entire literature on the *Teşkilat*.

Accordingly, in the first chapter of the study, an overview of the concentration of the *Teşkilat* forces in Sinai will be provided. In this context, the main characteristics of the role of the *Teşkilat* during the first and second Canal campaigns will be analyzed. Accordingly, its position in the 4th Army and emergence in different localities of the region will be dealt with. Moreover, this chapter will cover how the *Teşkilat* was involved in the activities against the British forces following the Ottoman entry into World War I. The activities of the *Teşkilat*, especially those related to the field of propaganda in Egypt, are also included in the analysis. This introductory part, furthermore, will attempt to analyze the mission and reorganization of the *Teşkilat* forces as well as its mine-laying attempts during the second campaign. All these will,

hopefully, be a contribution to the examination and evaluation of the force of the *Teşkilat* in Sinai, and of the ways the Ottoman army benefited from this.

Chapter Two is devoted to the analysis of various dimensions of the *Teşkilat*'s involvement in Libya. First of all, the Ottoman military missions to Libya led first by Süleyman el-Baruni and then by Nuri Pasha and Cafer el-Askeri will be discussed. These missions make it necessary to point to the British efforts to mediate with Seyyid Ahmed, the chief of the Senusi religious order, and the *Teşkilat*'s main means of pressure to counter the British efforts. In this context, Cafer el-Askeri's mission to get military equipment and money becomes important in indicating not only the main difficulties of the *Teşkilat* in getting the necessary means to drive the Senusis into war against the British on the western frontier of Egypt, but also how these limited means were used to organize the irregular Senusi forces. The *Teşkilat*'s efforts for a fait accompli for the invasion of Egypt, on the other hand, will partially reveal its operational features. The role of the *Teşkilat* in the cooperation of Senusis with the Sultanate of Darfur for the synchronized invasion of Egypt will also be discussed in this chapter. Nevertheless, the invasion of Egypt from the western frontier would result in the British counter attack, which induced the *Teşkilat*-Senusi forces to retreat to Trablusgarb.

On the basis of the research carried out in the first two chapters, some of the administrative and operational characteristics of the *Teşkilat*, which have long been subjects of discussions, will be assessed in Chapter Three. Accordingly, a number of questions concerning the most basic elements of the *Teşkilat* will be answered. The chiefs, details of the central and regional structure, and the operational mission of the *Teşkilat* will constitute the main themes of this chapter. Furthermore, based on the major

points and findings of the study, the role and impact of Eşref Kuşçubaşı on the *Teşkilat* will be revisited. This will be followed by a short conclusion part where the details of the thesis are outlined and the final assessments on the success of the *Teşkilat* in the region in question are made.

Finally, it should be noted that it is not the intention of this study to include all aspects of the *Teşkilat* that one could study on the basis of the existing sources. In this regard, throughout the study, maximum attention will be paid to the aspects on how the Ottoman army benefited from the *Teşkilat* in this region as a military power and a source of intelligence. Nonetheless, the propaganda and political intelligence activities of the *Teşkilat*, although briefly touched upon in passing at different parts of the present thesis, remain a subject for further study.

CHAPTER TWO

TEŞKİLAT-I MAHSUSA FORCES IN SYRIA

Since this is a study of the Ottoman special organization and its activities against the British authorities in Egypt, not of Great Britain, there is no need to provide a detailed account of domestic and international circumstances just prior to World War I. It is, however, appropriate to start with a known-fact of the British occupation of Egypt⁶⁷ and declaration of her protectorate over Egypt following the Ottoman's entrance into war.⁶⁸ The reasons for both Ottomans' declaration of war on the side of Germany⁶⁹ and their

⁶⁷ For more on the British occupation of Egypt, see; John S. Galbraith & Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, "The British Occupation of Egypt: Another View" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 9, no. 4, 1978, 471-488; Donald Malcolm Reid; "The Urabi Revolution and the British Conquest, 1879-1882" *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the end of the twentieth century*, vol. 2, (Ed.) M. W. Daly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1998), 217-238; Wm. M. Sloane, "Egypt and England" *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 3, 1904, 459-484; Alexander Scholch, "The 'Men on the Spot' and the English Occupation of Egypt in 1882", *The Historical Journal*, vol. 19, no. 3, 1976, 773-775; Sidney Peel, "British Administration and Irrigation in Egypt" *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 3, 1905, 513-534.

⁶⁸ On December 17, 1914, the following announcement was made by the British press Bureau: "His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs give notice that, in view of the state of war arising out of the action of Turkey, Egypt is placed under the protection of his Majesty and will henceforth constitute a British Protectorate. The Suzerainty of Turkey over Egypt is thus terminated and his Majesty's Government will adopt all measures necessary for the defense of Egypt and the protection of its inhabitants and interests...", see; "Egypt a British Protectorate" *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 9, no. 1, 1915, 202. Also for the period between 1882-1914, see; M. W. Daly, "The British Occupation 1882-1922" *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the end of the twentieth century*, 239-251; Mustafa Gençoğlu, *İngiliz Hakimiyetinde Mısır (1882-1914)*, unpublished MA thesis (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi SBE Tarih Ana Bilimdalı, 1997).

⁶⁹ For the Ottoman-German partnership at the beginning and during World War I, see; Ulrich Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918* (New York: Caravan Books, 1989); Joseph Pomiankowski, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Çöküşü: 1914-1918 I. Dünya Savaşı* (İstanbul: Kayıhan Yayınları, 1990); Hayati Aktaş, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri (1913-1918)*, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (Konya: Selçuk Üniversitesi, 1994); Stanford J. Shaw, Ezel Kural Shaw, 372-375.

attack on Egypt are also well known. Disregarding the significant developments of the period between 1882 and 1914, it is easy to point to the British objectives regarding Egypt. They declared protectorate in December 1914, deposed Khedive Abbas Hilmi, and installed Hüseyin Kamil as sultan simply due to their fear of the Egyptian Muslims (also Muslims elsewhere living in their colonial empire) who were expected to provide support to the Ottoman Sultan's call to *cihad*. Under the pretext of a step towards self-government, protectorate status was indeed "...a wartime improvisation to cut Egypt adrift from the Ottoman Empire without inciting Egyptians with the prospect of tightened British control".⁷⁰ However, there is more to add. The course of the war and continued occupation clarified the main intentions of Britain: firstly, she aimed to secure the land and sea routes passing through or near Egypt which was the last base of British attacks against the Ottomans in Arabia, Syria, and the Turkish straits. Britain also needed this base to maintain its far-flung imperial interests especially in India which was vital for British presence in the East. Secondly, she intended to keep a tight rein on Egypt itself for the creation of a possible 'Afro-Asian imperial constellation' following the anticipated collapse of the Ottoman Empire.⁷¹

Egypt was no Aden for the Ottomans either. Dr. P. Rohrbach, a prominent advocate of German imperialism, in the beginning of the 20th century wrote that:

"England can be attacked ... on land in one place only... in Egypt. With the loss of Egypt, England would lose not only the mastery over the Suez Canal and the link with India and Asia, but presumably also her possessions in Central and East Africa. The conquest of Egypt by an Islamic Power like Turkey, moreover, could have dangerous repercussions on England's sixty million Moslem subjects in India, and also on

⁷⁰ M. W. Daly, "The British Occupation 1882-1922" *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the end of the twentieth century*, 246.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 247.

Afghanistan and Persia ... if the need arose ... would be direct instrument ...for pressure upon England in the direction of Egypt.”⁷²

The need arose with the outbreak of war in 1914 and the Ottomans seem to have decided to put pressure on Egypt upon the German Supreme Command’s instruction intent of which was left uncertain.⁷³ Thus, the initiative against Egypt was an instruction merely expressing the general intention whose details were left to the 8th Corps in Syria.⁷⁴ Neither the German nor Ottoman correspondences concerning the attack against Egypt at the beginning and during the war did mention ‘the conquest of Egypt’. Given the width and the way of operations were carried out, this appears rather an imaginary propaganda or the other side of the medallion seen by the public; the very expected result was to detain as many British troops as possible in Egypt, the station where troops of Asian and Australian colonials were dispatched to Çanakkale and the Western frontier, simply in order to relieve the pressure on the straits and the European theatre. The Ottomans also felt compelled to deter the possibility of a British attack against Syria and Arabian Peninsula.⁷⁵ This general aim was expressed by Enver Pasha, Minister of War and Chief of the General Staff, just before he appointed Cemal Pasha, Minister of the Navy, as Commander of the 4th Army:

“Azizim Cemal Paşa, Süveyş Kanalı üzerine taarruzi bir hareket tertibi suretiyle İngilizleri Mısır’da meşgul etmek ve bu sayede garp cephesine sevk etmekte oldukları bir çok Hint fırkasını Mısır’da alıkoymaya mecbur etmekle beraber Çanakkale’ye bir çıkartma kuvveti sevklerine mani olmak istiyordum. Bunun için iki aydan beri Suriye’de bazı hazırlıklarda bulunuyordum...”⁷⁶

⁷² W. W. Gottlieb, *Studies in Secret Diplomacy during the First World War*, (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1957), 23.

⁷³ Sanders, 41-43; Sabis, 77-78; Seyit Şahin, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Dördüncü Ordunun Faaliyetleri*, unpublished PhD. Thesis (Konya: Selçuk Üniversitesi, SBE Tarih Ana Bilim Dalı, Atatürk İlke ve İnkılap Tarihi Bilim Dalı, 1997), 10-13.

⁷⁴ Erden, 11-12.

⁷⁵ Shaw, 383.

⁷⁶ Cemal Paşa, 146.

On the other hand, it was not a shoestring campaign for the Ottomans, who looked forward to a conquest if Egypt could be invaded simultaneously from three directions; Syria from the east, Libya from the west, and Sudan from the south. They believed that an invasion would be possible if the Ottoman march against the Canal; this would, in turn, trigger an anti-British Islamic revolution in Egypt, might be synchronized with the attack of Seyyid Ahmed in Libya and to a much lesser extent that of Ali Darfur in Sudan.⁷⁷ In the worst-case scenario, the Canal traffic could be cut off by sinking British ships on the sailing line and the camping force would have to turn back. If the traffic could be cut off for a long time, then the ships coming from Asia and Australia would have to rove Cape of the Good Hope, and in turn it would be too late to reach the battlefield in Europe.

This strategy constituted the framework *Teşkilat* was incorporated into. First of all, the Ottomans had not foreseen a multi-front war, in which Great Britain was an adversary. “However, with the Sinai front projected as the launching point for a major offensive, there now existed a requirement for a controlling army-level headquarters and additional troops with which to conduct the attack.”⁷⁸ Despite the deployment of fresh troops in Syria under the newly-established 4th Army, the Ottomans were well aware of the fact that they were still numerically disadvantageous against the British. It would be inconceivable at any rate for the Ottoman messengers and agents in Egypt to overlook the rapidly increasing number of Australian and New Zealand Corps (Anzac), and the brigades of the regular Indian army there. In this context, the *Teşkilat* agents, especially

⁷⁷ ATASE Archive: file (f): 248, dossier (d): 103, index (I): 1-87; f: 1863, d: 153, I: 3-3; f: 1843, d: 68, I: 1-72.

⁷⁸ Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered to die: a history of the Ottoman army in the First World War* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001), 68.

the CUP inspectors sent directly from Istanbul, were to recruit auxiliary and additional troops for the army. No doubt, the recruitment of a considerable number of Syrians would not only be fine for the Fourth Army but also a meaningful message to the British who controlled Egypt and were instigating an Arab uprising. Volunteers recruited by the *Teşkilat* were also to be charged with military intelligence and the reconnaissance facilities of all sorts in Sinai. By this, the army would mediate the hardness of the Sinai which was not encouraging for either prolonged operations or movement of large forces due to the poor condition of the terrain in terms of water and nourishment supplies. Besides, they were to leak out into Egypt to raise a revolt in support of the Turks there so that the synchronized attack on Egypt from three directions would end up with the invasion of the region. Egypt, therefore, became a target area for the special organization, the *Teşkilat*, which was greatly utilized by the Ottomans during their containment policy against Egypt.

A. The Mission of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* during the 1st Canal Campaign

1. *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* in the Turkish Plan of Attack

The idea of rollbacking the occupying British army of the Canal and Egypt turned out as a result of the propositions of the General Headquarters of Germany.⁷⁹ According to Ali

⁷⁹ According to Liman von Sanders, the advantages of the attack against the Canal was discussed in a military meeting during the second half of August 1914. Despite everyone, von Sanders was not in favor of such an attack since he thought it more useful to make the Turkish units attack between Odessa and Akkerman, which would lighten the burden of left flank of the Austrian front. See, Liman von Sanders, *Türkiye'de Beş Yıl*, (İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968), 41. According to Ziya Şakir, the idea of the attack against the Canal came out as a result of von Kress' insistence. See, Ziya Şakir, *Cihan Harbini Nasıl İdare ettik? 1914-1918*, (İstanbul: Muallim Fuat Gücüyener Anadolu Türk Kitap Deposu, 1944), 118-119.

Fuad Erden, this proposition was communicated to Enver Pasha by General von Moltke, the Chief of the German General Staff⁸⁰, on the 10th of August 1914:

“Osmanlı müttefikinin vazifesi mümkün olduğu kadar çok Rus ve İngiliz kuvvetlerini bağlamak ve sıkı bir faaliyetle İslam ihtilalini gerçekleştirmek olduğunu ve bu maksatla Kafkasya’ya karşı bir hareket yapılması ve bilhassa Mısır’a karşı bir teşebbüse girişilmesi arzu edildiğini ve Avusturya’nın yükünü hafifletmek için Osmanlı savaş bölgelerinde harekata olabildiğince erken başlanılmasının lüzumlu olduğunu...”⁸¹

The plan of attack had been prepared before Cemal Pasha came to Syria as the Commander of the 4th Army and the Governor of Syria (18 November 1914).⁸² The plan was to be enforced by the 8th Corps under the dual command of Lieutenant Colonel Kress von Kressenstein, the Chief of the Staff (27 September 1914), and Mersinli Cemal Pasha attached to the 4th Army.⁸³ There were two important issues in the operation against the forces in the Canal and Egypt: first, the preparation of the forces needed for the operation and continuous support of those forces, and second, the security of both Syria and Palestine.⁸⁴

According to the plans, the campaign force and its preparations were as follows: Initially, the entire 8th Corps (consisted of 4 infantry regiments, 2 separate battalions, 3 machine-gun companies, 7 batteries, 1 fifteen cm. howitzer battery, 1 engineer battalion; 5 brigades, 1 telegraph, 1 heliograph, and 1 telephone platoons; 3 portable hospital) was to gather in Jerusalem and its vicinity and the major division was to track the direction of Birüssebi-Biri Hasana-İsmailiye under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ali Fuad

⁸⁰ During the Marne Campaign of 1914, Moltke's health broke down and he was succeeded by Erich von Falkenhayn.

⁸¹ Erden, *Suriye Hatıraları*, 11.

⁸² For the public address of Cemal Pasha at the Haydarpaşa train station before his departure for Syria, see Şakir, 145-146. See also Appendix A for the fixed forces of 4th Army.

⁸³ Cemal Paşa, 156; Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar*, 99-100; Sabis, 117-121; Erden, *Suriye Hatıraları*, 20-23; Sanders, 60-61.

⁸⁴ *Sina – Filistin Cephesi*, 167.

(Cebesoy).⁸⁵ Subsequently, the diversionary columns of the major division was to drive the mobile tribal and voluntary units towards the directions of both Gazze-Elariş-Elkantara (consisted of 1 infantry battalion, 1 mount and 1 field batteries, 1 telegraph platoon, half medical company, and 1000 mounted voluntary Bedouins under the command of the *Teşkilat* agent Major Mümtaz Bey, the Commander of the Voluntary Detachment of the 4th Army, also an orderly officer of Enver Pasha) and Akabe-Kalatünnahl-Suez (consisted of 1 infantry battalion, 1 camel-mounted company, 1 mount battery, 1 engineer company, and 600 mounted voluntary Bedouins under the command of Captain Eşref Kuşçubaşı, (for his role in the *Teşkilat*, see Chapter Four) in order to provide the flank security and disguise the direction of the major division.⁸⁶

The campaign was to begin with the guerilla-type attack of the forward echelons of the diversionary columns (the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* forces), in order to take hold of the key points on the advance line of the army. Following this, the regular army would advance by degrees from Şam to Beerşeba, then to İsmailiye. Finally, the campaign force was to cross the Canal by a surprise attack and establish a bridgehead across. In accord with this strategy, reinforced infantry troops were to be left in Akabe for security; the 25th Division to be employed in the first echelon with two flank forces; the 10th

⁸⁵ Cemal Paşa; 158-159; Erden, *Suriye Hatıraları*, 17-19; Cemal Paşa, 158-159; *Sina – Filistin Cephesi*, 168-169; Şakir, 200-201. The Sinai desert could be traversed from three directions, 1) Gazze-Elariş-Elkantara, 2) Birüssebi-Hafirülavce-Birihassana-İsmailiye, 3) Maan-Akabe-Kalatünnahl-Süveyş. The first one is the old caravan road, used by all the emperors who had interest on Egypt. The road is generally sandy and relatively watery. Nevertheless, it is open to fire of warships. Also, any landing of troops behind the forces marching against the Canal, could cut the contact between this force and the military base. The second road, Maan-Süveyş line, is the pilgrimage road of the Egyptians. It can be subjected to the fire of warships around Akabe. Therefore, the main body of the campaign force marched through the central route, Birüssebi-İsmailiye, despite the very hard conditions of the terrain. See, Erden, *Tih Sahrasına*, 35-36; Erden, *Suriye Hatıraları*, 13-14.

⁸⁶ "...aşair Gazze-Elariş yolunu ve seyyar aşair süvari alayları Akabe-Süveyş yolunu takip ederek giderler ki bu suretle yanlar temin ve düşmanı asıl hakiki kolun nereden geleceğini anlayamacayağından... / Zeki Paşa" See, ATASE Archive: f: 126, d: 590, I: 23/7. Also for the possible plans against the Suez Canal, see; Şahin, 45-53; *Sina – Filistin Cephesi*, 95-100, 109-126, 167-168; Erden, *Suriye Hatıraları*, 12-16; Erden, *Tih Sahrasına*, 36-38.

Division to form the second echelon; the 27th Division to be reserved in the vicinity of Jerusalem; and the 23rd Division (except some units) to be allowed to stay in Syria..⁸⁷ Thus, “Jamal [Cemal Pasha] had staked everything on a surprise attack, hoping that he could hold a stretch of the canal on its bank south of Ismailiya with five or six thousand men ‘at the first rush’. He would then bring up the 10th Division, giving him a force of ten thousand rifles with which to dig on the far bank. Ismailiya would be taken and occupied for four or five days, while the 8th Division, held back at Beerşeba, was rushed across the Desert.”⁸⁸

2. Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Forces in the Region

Seized with the notion of an Egypt campaign, General Headquarters put not only the 8th Corps but also the Gendarme as well as the tribes loyal to the government under the General Commandership of the Army of the Syria and its vicinity on 19 August 1914 in order to both defend Syria and attack Egypt when required. In the second half of August 1914, General Commandership of Syria began to launch efforts to complete the mobilization of *Seyyar Jandarma Teşkilatı* (mobile gendarme organization) and take preventive measures to provide the interior region with security. Concurrently, by the assistance of the civilian authorities, the local Arab clans and tribes were tapped and the type of the organization they would get attached to was explored.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Cemal Paşa, 160-163; *Sina – Filistin Cephesi*, 167-169. For the opinions of Zeki Pasha about the measures to be taken for the campaign against the Canal, see; ATASE Archive: f: 126, d: 590, I: 23/6, f: 126, d: 590, I: 23/7, f: 126, d: 590, I: 23/8, f: 126, d: 590, I: 23/9, f: 126, d: 590, I: 23/10; Şakir, 202-206.

⁸⁸ H. V. F. Winstone, *the Diaries of Parker Pasha*, (London-Melbourne-New York: Quartet Books, 1983), 61. Also see Appendix B for the Egypt Campaign force, and the plan after the establishment of the 4th Army.

⁸⁹ *Sina – Filistin Cephesi*, 109-110.

In the meantime, Major Mümtaz Bey, an aide-de-camp of Enver Pasha, appointed directly by the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* Office in Istanbul, was sent to Syria. Mümtaz Bey, the Commander of the *Teşkilat* units of the 4th Army⁹⁰ brought his men to the region to assist him such as Captain İhsan (Mudanyalı), Captain Hacı Emin, and Gendarme Second Lieutenant Saib:

“Başkumandanlık Vekalet-i Celilesine

...Taleb ettiği [Mümtaz Bey’in] vesait kendisine verilecek ve şimdilik Amman’ı karargah ittihaz edecektir. Maiyyetinde bulunmak üzere mukaddema Derne’de olup şimdi 6. Kolorduda bulunan Yüzbaşı Hacı Emin ve...Yüzbaşı İhsan [Mudanyalı] ve Beyrut Jandarma alayından jandarma ile irtibatı baki kalmak üzere mülazım Saib efendileri istiyor. Tevziflerine müsade buyurulması...

Zeki Paşa.”⁹¹

Equipped with necessary means like certain amount of money and men influential in the region, Mümtaz Bey was ordered to form voluntary and mercenary camel and cavalry platoons from the tribes and Bedouins of Birüssebi and Gazze:

“Baş Kumandanlık Vekalet-i Celilesine

Şam’da 4. Ordu Kumandanı Zeki Paşa’dan mevrud 14 Eylül 330 tarihli şifrenin hallidir.

Birüssebi ve Gazze civarındaki aşair ve urbandan hecinsüvar ve süvariler teşkili memuriyetiyle binbaşı Mümtaz Bey, bir katip, üç zabıt, bir doktorla ma’an Hakkı Bey’le beraber bugün hareket etmiştir. Kendisine bu husus için şimdilik bin lira verildiği maruzdur...”⁹²

⁹⁰ This can be understood from not only the activities of Mümtaz Bey in Syria and the Sinai Desert but also the statements of Hüsamettin Ertürk and Ziya Şakir. See; Ertürk, 108-109; Şakir, 144. Moreover, Enver Pasha before appointing Cemal Pasha mentions that he dispatched Mümtaz Bey to Syria in order to recruit auxiliary forces from the Bedouins: “Bir taraftan da Bedeviler’den yardımcı kuvvetler meydana getirmek vazifesiyle yaverim süvari Binbaşısı Mümtaz Bey’i, Ayandan Abdurrahman Bey ve Dini Kitapları Tetkik Meclisi Reisi Şeyh Esad Şukayr Efendi’yi ve daha sair Arap büyüklerini Suriye’ye gönderdim.” Cemal Paşa, 146-147.

⁹¹ See, ATASE Archive: f: 126, d: 590, I: 21/2. Also see, ATASE Archive: f: 126, d: 590, I: 21/3.

⁹² ATASE Archive: f: 126, d: 590, I: 21.

Along with Mümtaz Bey, a number of army and civil officers appointed to the inspectorships of CUP were sent to the region as well, such as Infantry officer Sapançalı Hakkı, Çorumlu Aziz, Çerkez Ziya, Abdurrahman Pasha⁹³, Şeyh Esat Şukayr Efendi⁹⁴, and Eşref Bey (Kuşçubaşı).⁹⁵ In this context, Hilmi Müsellemi, Emir Şekip Arslan, and Nurettin Bey might be counted as the other important agents in the region. Those agents were charged with the duty of getting the support of the tribal chiefs for the attack against Egypt. They would also gain the support of the masses and recruit auxiliary forces from Bedouins and Arabs by delivering jihad declarations and gifts of Padisah-Khaliph.⁹⁶ In the headquarters of the 4th Army, there were also Şeyh Esad Şukayr Efendi for the affairs of Arabs; Fuad Selim Bey, Dr. Ahmed Fuad Bey, and Abdülhamid Bey for the affairs of Egypt.⁹⁷

Establishment of the 4th Army on 6 September 1914⁹⁸ under the command of Zeki Pasha was followed by the appointment of Mümtaz Bey as the *Urban* (Arabs) Commander on 9 September.⁹⁹ He would organize the volunteers recruited by the inspectors as guerilla units in the Damascus region and also enlist *urban* for the regular army. Some of those units would stay in Syria for a possible enemy attack, while others were going to help in keeping the Ottoman advance line against Egypt secure.¹⁰⁰ Having established his headquarters in Amman¹⁰¹, Mümtaz Bey and Abdurrahman Pasha, an

⁹³ A Syrian notable and member of *Ayan Meclisi*.

⁹⁴ The chairman of *Tetkik-i Müellefat-ı Şeriyeye Meclisi* and a Syrian notable.

⁹⁵ Ertürk, 108-109.

⁹⁶ Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar*, 99-100.

⁹⁷ Ömer Osman Umar, *Osmanlı Yönetimi ve Fransız Manda İdaresi Altında Suriye (1908-1938)*, (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2004), 211; Erden, *Suriye Hatıraları*, 165.

⁹⁸ ATASE Archive: f: 126, d: 590, I: 23-22.

⁹⁹ “Başkumandanlık Vekalet-i Celilesine / Buraya muvasalat eden yaver-i alileri Mümtaz Bey urban kumandanlığına tayin edilmiştir...” See, ATASE Archive: f: 126, d: 590, I: 21-2.

¹⁰⁰ Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar*, 99-100.

¹⁰¹ ATASE Archive: f: 126, d: 590, I: 21-2.

ayan (notable) member, embarked on negotiations with the tribes and Bedouins so as to provide the army by the required amount of camels to traverse the Sinai.¹⁰² There was also Şeyh Esad Şekiri beside Abdurrahman Pasha as his counselor.¹⁰³ Most of those camels were provided from Ibnu's Suud, Sherif Huseyin, and Ibnu'r Resid.¹⁰⁴ For instance, the *urban* Şeyhs gathered in the subdistrict of Beyt-i Hayrin by Mümtaz Bey committed their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and promised to prepare 3000 camels, 2000 cavalryman, and 250 infantry.¹⁰⁵

Mümtaz Bey and Abdurrahman Pasha also distributed gifts and military medals to the *urban* and Şeyhs of Maan, Dera, and Dürzi, and delivered speeches in order to consolidate their loyalty. Mümtaz and Hakkı Beys made similar propaganda in Kudüs and gave gifts to the *urban* and Şeyhs who confirmed their loyalty whereas Abdurrahman Pasha negotiated with the *urban* of Hama and Humus. The first act of aggression was realized on 23rd September just before von Kressenstein came to Syria; a small body of armed Bedouin crossed the frontier near Rafah. The British reply was to the dispatch of a small Egyptian Coastguard column to destroy the wells at Kalatünnahl.¹⁰⁶

Subsequently, Lieutenant Colonel Kress von Kressenstein came to Damascus on 27 September as Chief of Staff of the 8th Corps and settled down to the campaign

¹⁰² This is mentioned in a telegraph by Zeki Pasha addressed to the Supreme Command where he stresses the difficulties of the Sinai terrain and of the operation against the Canal. ATASE Archive: f: 126, d: 590, I: 23-10. See also for the amount of camels required; Erden, *Tih Sahrasına*, 43-44, 55.

¹⁰³ Aslan, *Osmanlı Tarihi ve I. Dünya Savaşı Anıları*, 330. "...ve Maan'da develerin toplanması için Abdurrahman Bey icab edenlere telgraf yazmıştır..." See, ATASE Archive: f: 4130, d: H1, I: 70A.

¹⁰⁴ Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar*, 102; Umar, 212.

¹⁰⁵ Umar; 287.

¹⁰⁶ *History of the Great War: Military Operations Egypt and Palestine from the Outbreak of War with Germany to June 1917*, compiled by Lieut.-General Sir George Macmunn & Captain Cyril Falls (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928), 13-14.

preparations without delay.¹⁰⁷ No doubt, the intelligence gathering and occupation of the Sinai desert until the Canal as well as the reconnaissance of all sorts did constitute one of the most imperative elements of those preparations. Hence, an order of high rank status by the Commandership of the 8th Corps was given to Mümtaz Bey, whose detachment formed the vanguard of the northernly flank, on 7 October.

3. *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*'s missions across the frontier: Military Activities and Intelligence

According to the order given to Mümtaz and his attendants, the frontier (although the Sinai Desert was Egyptian territory it was not occupied by the British) was to be crossed after declaration of war. Subsequently, all the wells on the way of Telelrefah-Elariş-Elkantara, Hafirülavce-Biri Hasana-İsmailiye, and Akabe-Kalatünnahl-Süveyş were immediately to be occupied and protected. In conformity with this purpose, British forces in Sinai, which had already evacuated except a few gendarmes in Elariş and Kalatünnahl, were to be cleared away by surprise attacks. Pro-British Arabs were also to be compelled to take side with Turks and the transportation and communication facilities with Egypt over Sinai were to be cut off.¹⁰⁸

Reconnaissance facilities constituted the other part of the order given to the *Teşkilat* units under Mümtaz Bey. The mission of the reconnaissance patrols charged on the lines of Mediterranean coast-Port Said, Elkantara-Elferdan-İsmailiye (Serapyum)-Şulufa station, and Madame-Ummüşşart were to gather information about the following

¹⁰⁷ Kressenstein, 16-27.

¹⁰⁸ *Sina – Filistin Cephesi*, 123.

issues: the location, forces, and condition of the British forces, fortified points on both sides of the Canal and the forces stationed there, types and numbers of the machine-guns, survey of the impediments such as wire fence and artificial water flood, the number of British and French battleships in the Canal, the situation of the middle course of the Canal, whether it was convenient for the crossing of field machine-guns and wheeled vehicles, and parts in need of repair; the location of the wells and their water condition, the quality and quantity of fuel and aliment resources in the desert if there was any. Finally, the British were to be staved off getting information about the movement of the Ottoman detachments in the desert. Accordingly, Bedouins and tourists seen in Sinai were to be apprehended.¹⁰⁹

The Commandership, in addition, ordered Mümtaz Bey to spy especially on the shores of the Suez Canal between Ummüşşart and Birüleba. British access to information via the sea route was subsequently expected to be cut off. Multitude attempts were to be made in order to enable *urban* to cross from the East to the West side of the Canal by sail boats. Once they successfully crossed the Canal, the detachments were to station in İsmailiye, in order to attack under the tail of the British army at the same time as the 8th Corps launched an attack from the East. These *urban* detachments were also expected to destroy the telegraph and railroad lines bound to İsmailiye as well as taking prisoners from British army officers.¹¹⁰ But, none of the *Teşkilat* forces under the command of Mümtaz Bey were able to make their way across the Canal during the first campaign.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 123-124. It is obvious from the diaries of Parker Pasha that the British were aware of the Ottoman reconnaissance units functioning in Sinai. See, Winstone, *Parker Pasha*, 58.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 123-124.

The most important issue for the Commandership however was to cut off the sea access in the Canal. The best way for that was to sink the dredgers vertical to the navigation route in the middle of the Canal. Another way was to shoot the shipmaster and the maritime pilot or the steersman of the British vessels in the twisted places of the Canal so that the ship would strike aground or directly crash into the land immediately. This mission was also communicated to Mümtaz Bey and his attendants.¹¹¹ All along the Canal, the rest of the voluntary detachments under Mümtaz Bey would also annoy and cause casualties to the British forces charged with the defense of the Canal by surprise and demonstration attacks. Mümtaz Bey was, moreover, charged with the duty of admonishing the *urban* on how to coerce the Muslim-British soldiers to make them capitulate or come over to the Turkish side.¹¹² Upon this detailed order, Major Mümtaz Bey with a regular and a fortified voluntary detachment, began his reconnaissance facilities on the line of Tellelrefah-Elariş-Elkantara at the same time as Captain Eşref Bey, an officer working under the command of Mümtaz Bey, launched the same facilities on the line of Akabe-Kalatünnahl-Suez as soon as he received a likely order from the Commandership.¹¹³

On the British side, all intelligence sources in the early stages dismissed the prospect of an Ottoman attack on Egypt. They preferred to regard the information to that effect as being planted for diversionary or disinformation reasons. They surmised the Ottoman military preparations as contingency plans for a military option against Russia or more likely Greece or the Balkan states. This optimistic approach, considering the Ottoman troop movements from Mesopotamia to Syria, reinforcements, and logistic

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 124.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 124-125.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 125.

preparations, a defensive response, occupied the British minds from August to mid-October when the Ottoman irregulars began their restricted passage into Sinai.¹¹⁴ Led by Mümtaz and Eşref Beys, such passages increased suspicion on the British side of the possibility of a raid by Bedouin irregulars without any formal declaration of war.¹¹⁵ It is actually after that date British began to perceive the efforts of the *Teşkilat* to recruit the tribesmen as a tangible threat.

At this point, it should be noted that all Anglo-Egyptian forces evacuated the Sinai at the end of October and withdrew to the Suez Canal defense line, leaving only a few forces as stay-behind agents, in accordance with the order given on 22 October by Lord Kitchener, secretary of state for war.¹¹⁶ Nevertheless, “Cairo correctly judged that the irregulars would be the first to take action, yet was mistaken regarding the nature of their activity, perceiving it only as a detached means of harassment rather than the initial phase of a broad attack. It was an assessment limited by a focus on local findings and a disregard for the overall context, accurately discerning ‘trees’ at the tactical level, but blind to the ‘forest’ at the operational-strategic level.”¹¹⁷ Such an erroneous perception came out, to a certain extent, as a result of the activities of Ottoman counter-intelligence, which partly rooted paucity in British intelligence. The control was to such an extent that “the Ottomans arresting a large number of Arabs on suspicion of spying” prompted “Maxwell to complain that ‘the frontier is guarded jealously by the Turks. As they have

¹¹⁴ Such actions were taken by Yigal Sheffy as efforts of the Ottoman Army, not specifically those of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, see Yigal Sheffy, *British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign, 1914-1918*, (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 35-41.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 40.

¹¹⁶ He had just been recalled to Britain from his previous post as High Commissioner for Egypt, so he knew the area.

¹¹⁷ Sheffy, 41.

seized all our agents east of the frontier it is difficult to get positive news.”¹¹⁸ However, the British air reconnaissance as a means for intelligence gathering and early warning were still a vantage point for them, although the British administration in Cairo did not realize the real advantage of using aircraft for intelligence purposes during the early days of World War I.¹¹⁹ Nevertheless, General Maxwell had access to information from within Egypt and Sinai through the spy network established by Colonel Parker¹²⁰ and Jennings Bramly who had remained in Cairo. As H. V. F. Winstone puts forward:

“They had already enrolled into Britain’s service several sheikhs of proven reliability as well as the two most successful agents of the war in the area east of Suez, the scholarly Dominicans Father Jaussen and Father Savignac. For seven years they had wandered in Sinai, Palestine and Hijaz, recording the ancient history and rock inscriptions of those regions, and much else. They operated from the Convent of St Catherine on Mount Sinai, and had already mobilized many of the monks in Britain’s service.”¹²¹

4. *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*’s Involvement in Local Conflicts

While the *Teşkilat* units were engaged in the activities referred to above, Britain bombarded Akabe on 1 November 1914, as a war action in advance of the declaration of war, which came 4 days later.¹²² This incident led to the invalidation of the order dated 7 October, and a new one was issued by the Commandership of the 8th Corps to Mümtaz

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 43.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 33-34, for more on British air reconnaissance, also see; 93-96, 125-126.

¹²⁰ Colonel Alfred Chevallier Parker: nephew of Lord Kitchener, Governor of Sinai, and military intelligence chief in the Arab Revolt.

¹²¹ Winstone, Parker Pasha, 57-58.

¹²² ATASE Archive: f: 4130, d: H1, I: 70. “The entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war on the side of Germany in November 1914 had created new intelligence needs in Egypt. By December, an Intelligence Department, though not an Intelligence Corps had been formed under a Regular artillery officer Brigadier G (later Sir Gilbert) Clayton. Its staff included Lloyd and another Member of Parliament, Aubrey Herbert, concerned with political matters, and two archaeologists, L (later Sir Leonard) Woolley and T E Lawrence, concerned with propaganda and material on the Turkish Army respectively. When the Turks moved against the Suez Canal early in 1914, Lloyd was in front line Intelligence gathering.” See, Anthony Clayton, *FOREARMED, A History of the Intelligence Corps* (London-New York: Brassey’s, 1993), 46.

Bey, now in Birüssebi, on 2 November.¹²³ According to the new order, Elariş was to be occupied by the forces under the direct command of Mümtaz Bey, and Kalatünnahl by Eşref Bey. Subsequently, these forces were to begin marching toward the Canal as soon as the main detachments of the right and left flanks set themselves up at these points. Then, they were to exhaust the forces protecting the Canal by not only organizing demonstration and surprise attacks (preferably at nights) against the cannons but also shooting the sentries stationed across the Canal. They were also expected to cut the Canal traffic off by sinking vessels or another way.¹²⁴

The Commandership thought that it was easier to destroy the railroad line between Port-Said and Elkantara so that Mümtaz Bey was ordered to organize some courageous men to cross the Canal by swimming under the protection of sharpshooters on the Eastern side, and to lead some trains astray; if that was not possible, at least to destroy a bridge or an establishment. Also, the telegraph and telephone lines (most probably buried underground) between the fortification zones and the Canal were to be cut off. The reconnaissance patrols were expected, similar to the previous order, to acquire information on the location, forces, and condition of the British forces on the Canal. The Commandership considered the establishment of relations with the *urban* on

¹²³ "...Binbaşı Mümtaz Bey'e, fevkalade mahremdir / 24 Eylül 330 tarihli talimat ahkâmının fesh olduğunu telgrafla bildirmiştim. Bunun yerine bervech-i atı talimat kaim olacaktır... / Miralay Cemal". See, ATASE Archive: f: 4130, d: H1, I: 71.

¹²⁴ ATASE Archive: f: 4130, d: H1, I: 71. By the way, a man named Abu Al-Faridun, most probably a local urban commander or a sheik, was not fond of the urban organization under Mümtaz Bey. According to him, the campaign could not give fruitful results if the irregulars of Mümtaz Bey were not put under his command or cooperate with him because most of the irregulars of Mümtaz lived in his zone of operation, the quality and quantity of which were left unspecified: "Ebu el-Faridun Bey'den mevrud 18 Teşrin-i Evvel tarihli şifrenin hallidir / Mümtaz Bey'in teşkilatını bildirmiştim. ... sizin tarafınızdan... kendisi tevhid-i mesai etmekliğimize verilir ise iş yaparız. Zira hizmet görülecek hutut kendisinin idaresindedir. Bütün meşayih mükafat ve hedaya ile idaresine almıştır. Bu bedeviler bizimle beraber çalışmazsa iyi neticeler vermez. Sonra yapabileceğimiz bilcümle hizmeti bize bırakınız. Şöyle yapınız böyle yapınız diye kati emirler vermeyiniz. Yalnız bizi hadiseden haberdar ediniz çünkü biz buraya sizden daha yakın bulunuyoruz. Mümtaz Bey'in bedevileri muhakkak bizimle çalışmalıydılar. Çünkü onlar yapacağımız faaliyetin hududu dairesinde yaşayanlardandır." See, ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 17.

the West side of the Canal vitally essential. Therefore, Mümtaz Bey was supposed to employ spies and informers, initially from those connected to British forces, by either propagating the interests of Islam or simply by paying money to them. These spies and informers were to be used both to collect and receive news from Egypt, and to create antagonism and hostility among the *urban* by all means. An instruction sheet was also sent to Mümtaz Bey with regard to the means spies could take advantage of. However, it was especially required that the instructions were not be handed to spies in writing but have them memorized.¹²⁵

An order was also sent to the Commandership of Hanyunus Detachment, the foundation column of the right flank, such that Mümtaz Bey was not under their command but directly bound to the 8th Corps. However, an intense coordination was recommended between Mümtaz Bey and Rifat Bey, the commander of the Hanyunus Detachment.¹²⁶ Eşref Bey was left under the command of the Maan Detachment, the foundation column of the left flank. On 4 November, Mümtaz and Eşref were ordered to cross the frontier and begin their missions.¹²⁷

Hereupon, a thousand men under the command of Mümtaz Bey began to raid the line of Elariş on 7 November and as a result of a surprise attack on 8 November, the town of Elariş was seized.¹²⁸ Likewise, almost six hundred volunteers under the command of Captain Eşref Bey (Kuşçubaşı) took hold of the town, Kalatünnahl, on 18 November.¹²⁹ Meanwhile, a regular infantry detachment reinforced by volunteers was dispatched to Akabe so as to defend it against a possible British attack, which could

¹²⁵ ATASE Archive: f: 4130, d: H1, I: 71A.

¹²⁶ ATASE Archive: f: 4130, d: H1, I: 1/73.

¹²⁷ ATASE Archive: f: 4130, d: H1, I: 1/76.

¹²⁸ Cemal Paşa, 156; Sabis, 217-218; Çelik, 61; *History of the Great War*, 22; Umar, 215.

¹²⁹ Sabis, 218; Cemal Paşa, 156; *History of the Great War*, 29.

threaten the southern flank of the Ottoman forces headed for the Canal.¹³⁰ Another clash took place between Katya and Kantara on 20 November. Composed of 20 men, the British Bikanir Camel Corps under the command of A. J. H. Chope was attacked at Bir en Nuss, 20 miles east of Elkantara, by 200 Bedouin. The party had casualties amounting to more than half of its total. According to British authorities, "...this affair proved that the loyalty of the camel troopers of the Egyptian Coastguard, several of whom accompanied the Bikanirs as guides, was extremely doubtful, since they allowed themselves to be made prisoners in a manner virtually amounting to desertion."¹³¹ Moreover, 30 soldiers under the command of Captain Wilson were killed and 3 of them were taken prisoners in another clash.¹³² There occurred no contact with the enemy and for the rest of the year the Canal Defenses had time to prepare and organize the troops.

5. Formation of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* Units in the Districts

Meanwhile, Cemal Pasha was appointed as governor of Syria/Damascus and the Commander of the 4th Army on 18 November¹³³ and moved to Syria on 21 November with a number of competent officials like Colonel Von Frankenberg, the Chief of the Staff of the 2nd Army, Staff Lieutenant Colonel Ali Fuad (Erden), and Staff Major Refet

¹³⁰ Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar*, 100.

¹³¹ *History of the Great War*, 20.

¹³² Çelik, 61.

¹³³ "Mekteb-i Harbiye'de İkinci Ordu Kumandanlığına / 1- Dördüncü Ordu Kumandanı Zeki Paşa Almanya'ya gidecektir. 2- İk'nci Ordu Kumandanı Cemal Paşa derakap Şam'a giderek Dördüncü Ordunun kumandasını deruhde edecektir. Suriye ve Haleb'de bulunan ve Mısır'a karşı sevkolunacak olan kıtaat vesaire kamilen müşarunileyhin maiyetinde bulunacaktır. Hicaz fırkası da Mısır'a karşı yapılacak hareket hususunda müşarunileyh ile müttehiden hareket edecektir. 3- Beşinci ve Altıncı kolordularla İkinci Orduya merbut olan sair kıtaat ve teşkilat muvakkaten Birinci orduya raptolundu. İkinci Ordu karargahı lağvolunacaktır. /Başkumandan Vekili Enver" See, Erden, *Suriye Hatıraları*, 21. Also see, Sabis, 117-121, 220-221, 320-322.

(Bele).¹³⁴ Having arrived in Syria on 6 December, Cemal Pasha ordered Colonel Vehip Bey, the Commander of the Hicaz Division, to engage in the campaign against Egypt. From that date on, the Sherif of Mecca, Hüseyin was expected to command the Hicaz Campaign Force with *urban mücahids*. Upon the request of Cemal Pasha, the Sherif sent his son, Seyyid Ali, alongside with a number of *mucahids* to Medina from where they would be transported to Maan to unite with the Ottoman forces. Yet, the attempts turned out to be useless and Seyyid Ali did not move any further from Medina and provided no support for the campaign.¹³⁵

Apart from this, Cemal Pasha asked the district commands to form voluntary detachments by cooperating with the notables or şeyhs of *urban*, whereupon a number of militia and voluntary forces were established by the *Teşkilat* agents in the region.¹³⁶ Cemal Pasha was likely not only to benefit from the religious and political impact of those forces but also to enlarge the Campaign Force. At the same time, the recruitment of a considerable number of Syrians would send a meaningful message to the British who controlled Egypt and were instigating an Arab uprising. As a result, the following voluntary units came into existence: the Caucasian Cavalry Regiment picked from Syria with a total number of 270 men; the Kurdish Cavalry Company with 100 men¹³⁷, formed by Abdurrahman Pasha and commanded by the personal clerk of Said Halim Pasha, Colonel Hilmi Musallimi; Trablusgarb Voluntary Detachment with 200 men, settled in Syria after the Italian-Ottoman War in Trablusgarb (1910-1911); Druze Voluntary

¹³⁴ Before Cemal Pasha had left Constantinople, and as soon as the possibility of a war became apparent, Sir John Maxwell was sent by Lord Kitchener to take over command in Egypt. He arrived there on 8 September 1914. See, Anthony Verrier, *Agents of Empire, Anglo-Zionist Operations 1915-1919* Brigadier Walter Gribbon, Aaron Aaronsohn and the NILI Ring, (London-Washington: Brassey's, 1995), 35.

¹³⁵ Erden, *Tih Sahrasına*, 53-55; *Sina – Filistin Cephesi*, 149-156; Şakir, 200.

¹³⁶ ATASE Archive: f: 3221, d: H1, I: 1/18.

¹³⁷ Erden tells that Kurdish cavalry company was composed of 200 volunteers. See, Erden, *Tih Sahrasına*, 56.

Detachment under the command of Şekip Arslan Bey with 110 men¹³⁸, picked particularly from Lebanon (Cebel-i Lübnan); and the Muslim-Bulgarian Detachment under the command of Nureddin Bey (later deputy of Maraş).¹³⁹ Among those units, the Trablusgarb Voluntary Detachment was included into the unit of Eşref Bey whereas the detachments of Hilmi Musallimi, Emir Şekip Arslan, and Nureddin Bey were incorporated into the Hicaz Campaign Force.¹⁴⁰ Apart from those, the *Teşkilat* recruited 137 volunteers to dig wells, 30 to adjust pumps, and 90 to cook bread.¹⁴¹

6. Concentration in Yafa

Another *Teşkilat* unit was stationed in Yafa most probably during the second half of September 1914. Composed by a headquarter (*merkez-i umumi*) of three officers- namely Gendarme Commander Major Hasan Efendi, Lieutenant Colonel Bahaeddin Bey (Manastırlı), and an officer whose name that cannot be specified-¹⁴² the organization directly received orders from Süleyman Askeri, the first chief of the *Teşkilat*, who was then in Istanbul, and was subject to the supervision of Ministry of War in terms of its actions, administration, and disposition of troops.¹⁴³ The *Teşkilat* office along with its

¹³⁸ According to Emir Şekip Arslan, his detachment was composed of 120 volunteers despite the fact that he was able to gather five hundred of them; Arslan, *Osmanlı Tarihi ve 1. Dünya Savaşı Anıları*, 337; Cihangir, *Emir Şekip Arslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa*, 37-38. According to Erden, this number was about 200. See, Erden, *Tih Sahrasına*, 56.

¹³⁹ Şakir, 201; Çelik, 76-77; Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar 1911*, 101.

¹⁴⁰ Çelik, 77.

¹⁴¹ Erden, *Tih Sahrasına*, 56; Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar 1911*, 101.

¹⁴² ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 2. According to Winstone, Bahaeddin was the Governor of Yaff at the beginning of 1915. See, Winstone, *the Illicit Adventure*, 230.

¹⁴³ “Yafa’da Jandarma Kumandanı Binbaşı Hasan Efendi’ye

Tertip ve idare üzere Mısır ihtilaline siz ve Kaymakam vekili Bahaeddin Bey ve oraca mutemed bir zatdan mürekkeb üç kişilik bir merkez-i umumi teşkili münasib görülmüştür. Mezkur merkez-i umumi Harbiye Nezareti vasıtasıyla Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa heyet-i idaresinden talimat alacak ve

various departments was meanwhile located in Cağaloğlu (Nuruosmaniye), Istanbul.¹⁴⁴

Commanded by Hasan Efendi, the main duty of this unit was to bring about an Egyptian revolution by forming guerilla bands in order to incite the populace against the British authorities. The bands initially were to be formed outside of Egypt. Once they were successfully imported into Egypt and began incitement, the native population was to be used in order to form those bands since the General Staff thought that the more the Egyptians employed in the bands, the higher the possibility of a revolution was, although the *Teşkilat* also authorized to dispatch bands from outside:

“İngilizlerin mümkün mertebe nazar-ı dikkati celb olunmayacak ve herhalde buradan tahrikat yapıldığı anlaşılmamak lazımdır.

-Yafa’da Hasan Efendiye 18 Eylül 330

Bu esas daima nazarda bulundurulurak müsait eşhasın celbleri tertib ve bunların sur-ı münasib ile Mısır’a idhali dirayetinize bırakılmıştır. Oraya kaymakam vekaletiyle Manastırlı Bahaeddin Bey gönderiliyor. Siz ayrıca oradan mutemed bir zat da intihab ederek Bahaeddin Bey’le birlikte üç kişilik bir heyet teşkil ediniz. Mısır’da yapmak istediğiniz işler hakkındaki nizamname Bahaeddin beyle gönderiliyor... Binaenaleyh siz de oradan işe yarar adamlar ihzar ve münasib vesaitle mahallerine gönderiniz. Bilirsiniz, birkaç çete maksadı temin eder... Esasen buradan çete gönderilmesine, Mısırlıları teşci ve teşvik maksadına muktediriz. Gönderdiğiniz çeteler Mısır dahilindeki teşkilatı tahrike ve oradan çeteler teşkil ve istihdamına muvaffak olunca artık buradan eşhas sevkياتına lüzum kalmaz...

Süleyman Askeri”¹⁴⁵

her hususta mezkur heyet-i idareye merbut olacaktır. Süleyman Askeri” See, ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 2/1.

¹⁴⁴ Even though most of the correspondences related to this time between North Africa and Istanbul bears at the beginning the stereotyped phrase of “To the directorate of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*” or “To the sublime directorate of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*”, this address could still be verified on the basis of a number of documents which starts with the phrase of “To the directorate of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* in Nur-i Osmaniye, Dersaadet”. See for an example; ATASE Archive, 1828-4-1. The official and direct contact of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* with the Ministry of War was used to be established by its chief. Nevertheless, this duty was begun to be undertaken by the Central Commander in Istanbul after the departure of Süleyman Askeri.

¹⁴⁵ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 2.

Thence, 300 *liras* were sent to Hasan Efendi for various expenses until the end of September by Süleyman Askeri.¹⁴⁶ Nevertheless, Hasan Efendi demanded at least 2000 or 3000 more *liras* for the measures to be taken. He also wanted bayonets, bombs, dynamites including 15 or 20 time bombs, riffles, wire fence cutters, 100 revolvers, 60 Arab swords, and instruments for the demolition of railroad lines.¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, only one third of the weaponry and ammunition was sent.¹⁴⁸ Meanwhile, the reinforcement and supply facilities were launched in Yafa in utmost secrecy. Since the action was to be taken according to the regulations Bahaeddin Bey would bring from Süleyman Askeri, Hasan Efendi sufficed to find out reliable men who could infiltrate into Egypt to form revolutionary bands. These men were to be registered not to the *Teşkilat* but to the General Commandership of Gendarmerie:

“Yafa’da Jandarma Kumandanı Binbaşı Hasan Efendi’den 1 Teşrin-i Evvel 330 tarihli mevrud şifresinin hallidir.

Gayet mühim ve müstaceldir

...Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa ikmalinde ol hiçbir vechile İngilizlerin nazar-ı dikkatlerinin celb olunmaması için son derece hafi olarak çalışılacağından merak buyurmayınız. Şimdiden mutemed bir zat intihab edilecektir. Bahaeddin bey ile vurudunda yedindeki nizamname mucibince hareket edilecektir. Mısırlıları teşvik ve teşci etmek üzere burada gayet emniyetli ve mutemed eşhasdan Mısır’a idhalleri [için] ancak şimdiden çetelerin tertibine başladım. Bunlar sizden gönderilecek çetelerden maadadır. Mısıra idhal mekasıdına mebni şimdi gayet mutemed ellerinden iş gelir mevaki-i muhtelifelerde bulunmakta [olan] birkaç zabıt buldum...Ancak şimdiden tertibatlarıyla uğraşmakda olan balada maruz tedabirin husus bulması için herhalde külliyetli para göndermekte mütevakkıfıdır. Binaenaleyh gönderdiğiniz üç yüz liralık meblağdan maada şimdilik iki üç bin liranın kemal-i süratle ve telgrafinen havalelerinin irsali mercudur. Ayrıca ekall? süngüsüyle iki bin mavzer tüfengi, külliyetli bomba ve dinamit ve bunların meyanında on beş ile yirmi saatli dinamit, tel örgülerini kesmek için kuvvetli makaslar, yüz kadar revolver, altmış kadar arap kılıncı ve suret-i

¹⁴⁶ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 2/2.

¹⁴⁷ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 2/4.

¹⁴⁸ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 12.

mahsusada şimendifer raylarının halkına mahsus alat lazımdır. Ve bunların gayet az ve malum bir müddet zarfında irsalleri lazımdır.

Binbaşı Hasan”¹⁴⁹

Bahaeddin Bey, however, came to Yafa very late, on 20 October, only ten days before the bombardment of Akabe by British forces, with a man, pharmacist Vedad Efendi, who was charged with the duty of liaison between Yafa and Egypt.¹⁵⁰

On 27 September, having been equipped with local dresses and certificates of birth, Ahmet Rıfat Efendi and his friend İbrahim Efendi were sent to Yafa by Süleyman Askeri to penetrate into Egypt. The intelligence of Ahmet Rıfat was transmitted by İbrahim Efendi to Süleyman Askeri via Hasan Efendi,¹⁵¹ who arranged and paid the man establishing the liasion between him and İbrahim Efendi.¹⁵² On the other hand, the communication and liaison between Hasan Efendi and Ahmet Rıfat was provided by hirelings.¹⁵³ Ahmet Rıfat was expected both to provide an intelligence service in Egypt and instigate the populace by forming bands.¹⁵⁴ After a short period of time Ahmet Rıfat arrived at Egypt, he dispatched a telegraph to Süleyman Askeri on 12 November, in which the location, condition, and fortified points of British forces both in Egypt and on the west side of Canal were detailed. According to Rıfat, inhabitants of Egypt were ready for an insurrection and the time was right to launch the campaign.¹⁵⁵ Besides, he

¹⁴⁹ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 2/4.

¹⁵⁰ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 12.

¹⁵¹ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 5.

¹⁵² ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 12.

¹⁵³ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 6/4.

¹⁵⁴ “Yafa’da Jandarma Kumandanı Binbaşı Hasan Efendi [29 Eylül 330] / 1- Ahmet Rıfat Efendi tarafından teşkilat yapıldıkça peyderpey para gönderilecektir. Şimdilik avdet idecek olan refiki ibrahim efendiye nezdinizde mevcut mebalığden 100 lira teslim ediniz. 2- Matlub zabitanın tarafınızdan bilintihab esamisinin ittibası. 3- Ahmet Rıfat efendinin taleb eylediği mühimmat ve malzeme-i saire derdest-i irsaldır mumaileyh ile vesait-i muhabere temin ediniz. / Süleyman Askeri” See, ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 5/3.

¹⁵⁵ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 6.

requested 2000 *liras*, 500 rifles, two men for the provisions and supplies, 4 officers,¹⁵⁶ 50 revolvers, 50 swords, wire fence cutters, ammunition, iron crowbars for the demolition of railroad lines, and dynamites to blow up the bridges.¹⁵⁷ In response to the telegraph, 100 martin and amended riffles, 300 ammunition per rifle, dynamites, iron crowbars, and a carbine were transported to Ahmet Rifat Efendi.¹⁵⁸ Besides, instead of the four officers demanded, only one was sent directly by Süleyman Askeri while the other three were to be picked up from Damascus and Beirut by Hasan Efendi.¹⁵⁹ Nevertheless, only 100 *liras* were sent via İbrahim Efendi.¹⁶⁰

These ordnances were to be transported into Egypt in the following way: Ahmet Rifat Efendi was to organize some men from the townspeople of Matraya? and Deha tribe, who lived in the region between Port-Said and Dimyat. Two of these men were to be given instructions by Hasan Efendi and introduced to the captain and crew of the sailing boat which was fully laden with various fruits, particularly oranges which covered up the ordnances underneath. Also, a man who had many relatives in Dimyat and infiltrated into Egypt with İbrahim Efendi was to be arranged so as to organize the townspeople of Dimyat. Subsequently, they were to travel to Dimyat by sea and a green lantern was to be signaled when the ship approached the coast. When the boat reached the port, the hidden ordnances were to be loaded on camels and urgently exported to the hinterland in utmost secrecy.¹⁶¹ This plan was authorized by Süleyman Askeri on 14 November.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁶ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 5.

¹⁵⁷ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 6.

¹⁵⁸ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 6/4.

¹⁵⁹ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 5.

¹⁶⁰ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 5/3.

¹⁶¹ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 10.

¹⁶² ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 6/4.

In the meantime, Eşref Bey was ordered to go under the command of Hasan Efendi at Yafa to arrange the disposition and take command of a band¹⁶³, composed of 13 Afghanis¹⁶⁴ under the command of Mirî İbrahim and 20 Circassian cavalryman.¹⁶⁵ Two *liras* per man were also deposited with Eşref Bey to meet the expenses.¹⁶⁶ Nevertheless, that Eşref Bey never made his way to Yafa was obvious in the telegram dispatched to Süleyman Askeri by Hasan Efendi.¹⁶⁷ From the telegraph Eşref Bey dispatched to Süleyman Askeri, it is understood that Eşref Bey was deficient in terms of means pertaining to both finance and ammunition as the entire *Teşkilat* units were. However, Eşref mentioned that he would not need any financial support if he could infiltrate into Egypt with his bands. That the *Teşkilat* units of Eşref Bey were supported in terms of ammunition and men by the Commander of the Damascus Gendarme Company, Captain Halil Tahir Efendi, and a man named Suavi Bey, seems evident in the telegram. It is also understood that an officer named Muhsin (Kireçburunlu) was a close associate of Eşref Bey since he requested from Süleyman Askeri both to grant a regular salary to the mother of Muhsin in Kireçburun and send an acquaintance of Muhsin, Ali (Kireçburunlu), to work under his command.¹⁶⁸

Meanwhile, Süleyman Askeri along with his staff was busy with the evaluation of the intelligence gathered in his office at Nur-i Osmaniye. Reports were flowing both from agents in Egypt, and from the consulate of Bombay and Sami Bey (brother of Eşref Kuşçubaşı)¹⁶⁹ indicating that Britain began to mobilize troops of Indian and Australian

¹⁶³ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 2.

¹⁶⁴ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 2/3.

¹⁶⁵ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 8/1.

¹⁶⁶ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 2/3.

¹⁶⁷ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 13.

¹⁶⁸ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 8/1.

¹⁶⁹ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 8/2 and f: 1836, d: 35, I: 8/3.

origin in Egypt and reinforce its forces on the Canal.¹⁷⁰ Nonetheless, that Süleyman Askeri was puzzled with the differences in the details of the reports must have been the reason why he ordered Hasan Efendi to draft the reports in three ways, “personally seen”, “reported by a secondary person”, or “wreckoned”.¹⁷¹

Fixed torpedoes were also agreed to be sent to Hasan Efendi on 3 October to be fired at the Canal.¹⁷² These torpedoes were to be transported into Egypt and fired from the western side of the Canal in order to cut off the sea traffic. Correspondences were made on whether the torpedoes were to be fired from the land or sea.¹⁷³ Nevertheless, although it was suggested by Hasan Efendi that the mission was consigned to Eşref Bey, the idea of torpedoing the ships at the Canal was dropped due to the transportation and time trouble.¹⁷⁴ On 16 October, Captain Almas was ordered to go under the command of Hasan Efendi who would send him alongside with a band into Egypt or Sudan to incite the populace.¹⁷⁵ Finally, on 25 October 1914, Hasan Efendi was ordered to enter Sinai with his bands initially and import them as soon as possible into Egypt:

“Yafa Jandarma Kumandanı Binbaşı Hasan Efendi’ye

12 Teşrin-i Evvel 330

Çeteleriniz Tur-i Sina’ya girerek faaliyet yapacaklardır. İngilizlerin... (nazar-ı dikkatini celb etmemek şartıyla tarafınızdan tertib olunan birkaç çetenin irsaliyle hemen Sina’ya idhaline çalışınız.) Çetelerinizin Mısır dahiline meccaran? sevkini tacil ve temin ediniz.

¹⁷⁰ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 8/2.

¹⁷¹ “...Mevafi-i muhtelifeden alınacak malumatın derecesine göre ya bizzat görülmüş veyahud bir diğeri tarafından ihbar olunmuş veya tahmin edilmekte bulunduğu tarzında bildirilmesi...” See, ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 8/10.

¹⁷² “Yafa’da Hasan Efendiye [20 Eylül 330] / Süveyş Kanalına atılmak üzere sabit torpiller gönderilecektir. Bunların ne suretle ve ne vasıta ile içeriye idhali ve ikmalı mümkündür, sarih tedkik ve işarı matlubdur. / Süleyman Askeri” See, ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 3.

¹⁷³ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 12.

¹⁷⁴ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 15.

¹⁷⁵ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 11.

Süleyman Askeri”¹⁷⁶

7. The Situation in Egypt

The activities in Egypt were under the responsibility of the *Teşkilat* agents who had been trained generally in Istanbul, and sent to Egypt before the War. Şeyh Abdulaziz Çaviş was the director of the cell in Egypt, located in Cairo. Çaviş was in Istanbul as early as 1912, publishing for propaganda the daily newspaper *el-Hilali’l-Osmani*, in Arabic. When this newspaper was forbidden to have circulation in Egypt, he published another newspaper, *el-Hakku ya’lu*. This was also forbidden and this time he began to publish a religious periodical, *el-Hidaye*, while he went to Egypt to organize the resistance there.¹⁷⁷ Along with Çaviş, *Teşkilat* agents like Ferit Bey, Dr. Fuat, Dr. Nasır, and Dr. Tabit Maheab, together with some 600 people employed as agents and agitators were also present in the region.¹⁷⁸ The sources on *Teşkilat* provide very limited information about the actions and participators of this group. However, there is no doubt that this group was especially made use of in both military intelligence and propaganda activities. In the sphere of military intelligence, the *Teşkilat* was charged with a duty similar to the one they carried out in Sinai. In this context, the *Teşkilat* provided the commanders and the planning staff in Istanbul, Syria, and Libya with the intelligence they required about the British, her armed forces and equipment in Egypt.¹⁷⁹ The following telegraph by the director of the intelligence department dispatched to one of the *Teşkilat*’s agent in Egypt,

¹⁷⁶ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 16.

¹⁷⁷ “Abdülaziz Çaviş”, *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, (Ankara: Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları), 187-88.

¹⁷⁸ Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar*, 68-69.

¹⁷⁹ According to Clayton, the Turks gained most of their intelligence from Egypt, where British and Imperial troop movements were easy to watch and report. Clayton, 46.

whose name cannot be specified, but most probably the head of the organization there, might represent an explanatory example in this sense:

- “1- Mısır’da elyevm ne kadar İngiliz kuvveti vardır? Ne kadarı Avustralyalı ve Hintlidir? Kanadalı asker var mıdır? Portekiz’den asker gelmiş midir? Ne kadar?
- 2- Kanal boyunca ceman ne kadar kuvvet var? Port-Said, Elkantara, İsmailiye, Süveyş’de ayrı ayrı ne kadar kuvvet vardır? Bu kasabalar civarında ve alelumum kanalın şark ve garp tarafında ve nerelerinde tahkimat yapılmıştır? Cinsi ve ebadı, tel örgüleri vesair gibi mevani-i karine varsa nerelerde ve ne kadar ebadta oldukları. Bu tahkimatta ne kadar top ve mitralyöz bulunduğu...
- 3- Kanal boyunca tevzi ve taksim edilen İngiliz kuvva-yı askeriyyesinin hangi milletlere mensup olduğu. Ne kadarının Hintli ve yerli Mısırlı olduğu.
- 4- Dahilde yani İskenderiye, Kahire, Marput, Dimyat, Zegazig, Salahiye, Feyyum...daki kuvvetin mikdarı; ne kadar topçu, süvari, mitralyöz vesaire bulunduğu. Dahilde nerelerde tahkimat var? Cinsi, topların adedi.
- 5- Telsiz, telgraf ve tayyara hangarları nerelerdedir?
- 6- Mısır’ın yerli asker ve zabitanı Sudan’a mı götürülmüştür? Yoksa Mısır’da mı kalmıştır? Ne kadarının silahı alınmış, ne kadarı elyevm İngiliz zabitanı kumandası altında ve hangi mevkilerde müstahdemdir? ...Sudanlılar dahil mi yoksa kanal boyunda mı istihdam ediliyor?
- 7- Mısır’da evvlece mevcut İngiliz kuvve-i istilaliyesi? ki... 7000 kişi idi... Mısır’da mı kalmış yoksa Avrupa saha-i harbiyesine mi gönderilmiştir?
- 8- Mısır’dan İngiliz askerleri Hindistan veyahud Bahr-ı Ahmer tarikiyle başka bir yere gönderilmiş midir?
- 9- Gerek Mısır’dan harice ve gerekse haricden Mısır’a en son olmak üzere yapılan sevkıyat-ı askeriyye hangi tarihte vukubulmuştur?
- 10- Salahiye’den Elkantara’ya bir şimendifer hattı yapılmış mıdır?
- 11- Kanalın dahilinde şimal ve cenubunda hangi sefine-i harbiye vardır?
- 12- Mısır’dan ...ya asker gönderilmiş midir? ...da ne kadar İngiliz kuvveti vardır?
- 13- Muhtelif milletlerden Mısır’a gönüllü asker gelmişmidir?
- 14- Mısır’dan Sudan’a asker götürülmüşmüdür? Sudan’daki İngiliz askeri Mısır’a celb olunmuş mudur?
- 15- Feyyum ve ... muhitlerinde vesair yerlerde kıyam vukua gelmiş midir?
- 16-
- 17- Müstakil hükümetlerde olduğu gibi Mısır’da da büyük mikyasda ordu teşkilatına başlanmış mıdır? Ahali bu teşkilatı nasıl telakki ediyor? Ordu teşkil edildikten sonra Avrupa saha-i harbiyesine gönderilecek mi ve oradan İngiliz askeri getirileceği rivayeti var mı?
- 18- Sahil muhafazaları. ...mekatâtı? tezyid edilmiş midir? İslamlardan mı yoksa sair milletlerden mi?
- 19- İslamlarda gizli silah var mı? Ne kadar? Bedevilerde ne kadar var?

20- Suriyeli Hristiyan Araplara silah tevzi edilmiş veyahud İngiliz hizmetine alınmış mı? Mısır'daki ecnebiler gönüllü olarak İngiliz hizmetine alınmışlar mı? Ne kadar?

21- Mısır ahalisinin al-i Osmanlılar hakkındaki fikirleri, İngiliz kuvva-yı askeriyyesinin ahvali...

22- Senusi ve Sudan ne halde? Senusilerin Mısır'a yürümek istedikleri ve bunun için toplandıkları ne derece doğru?

Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa'ya

Mısır'dan anlaşılması matlub mevad bunlardır.

İstihbarat Şube Müdürü”¹⁸⁰

The preparation of jihad-focused manifestos, on the other hand, was aimed at encouraging Muslim soldiers within the boundaries of the entente powers both to revolt and to support the Ottoman-German pact. Such manifestos were distributed by the *Teşkilat* and German agents not only in Egypt, but in all Muslim provinces. In this context, the Ottoman administration benefited greatly during World War I from the periodical, *el-Alemü'l-İslami*, where the liberty of the Islamic world was heavily propagated. The expenses of the periodical were directly met by the Umur-i Şarkiye Office, the continuation of the *Teşkilat*, in İstanbul.¹⁸¹

It should be noted, however, that Abdülaziz Çaviş left Egypt when the war started and went to Europe. Subsequently, he carried on to issue periodicals and newspapers, like *Islamische Welt* published in Germany and coordinated intelligence especially on the activities of the nationalist party of Egypt, *Hizb al-Vatani*.¹⁸² He also coordinated the political dimension of Indo-Egyptian Pan-Islam movement. In this context, a British Secret Service report submitted to Wingate by Philippides Bey, the

¹⁸⁰ ATASE Archive: f: 1868, d: 174, I: 1/2 and f: 1868, d: 174, I: 1/3.

¹⁸¹ For the expenses of the periodical, see for examples; ATASE Archive: f: 1839, d: 49, I:1/15; f: 1839, d: 49, I:1/17; f: 1839, d: 49, I:1/18; f: 1839, d: 49, I:1/19.

¹⁸² ATASE Archive: f: 1868, d: 174, I: 1/36; f: 1868, d: 174, I: 1/37; f: 1868, d: 174, I: 2/29; f: 1868, d: 174, I: 2/30; f: 1868, d: 174, I: 2/31.

Chief of Secret Police in Cairo, provides valuable insight into the fate of Çaviş following the outbreak of the war:

“The report showed that at the time of the Tripoli war Indian Red Crescent parties sent to provide medical aid were fertile sources of recruitment and conspiracy. Several well-known nationalists and anti-British personalities joined forces with Shawish [Çaviş], including the editor of the *Delhi Comrade*, Muhammad Ali. A number of meetings between Indian and Egyptian student nationalists and Pan-Islamites had been held in Cairo at the *Club des Ecoles Supérieures*, and in Constantinople there were Indian schools under the direction of Shawish, while in Switzerland and Germany, Egyptian Societies known as the ‘Sphinx’, supplied with money by von Oppenheim’s Eastern Bureau, offered a warm welcome to Moslems of all nationalities and the opportunity to undermine the Allied cause. The Sheikh al Islam and the Director of Public Security were among the leading members of the Pan-Islam Party in Constantinople, and two newspapers subsidized by the Government and the CUP, *Turc Pourdi* and *Al Hedayat* circulated widely in Europe, North Africa, Syria, Afghanistan and India. Soldiers in the Egyptian and Indian armies were offered attractive terms to desert to the Turks. In Geneva, *La patrie Egyptienne* carried the appeals of Shawish and the Constantinople leaders, and of Abdurrahman al Riadh their leader in Jerusalem, to Indians who might be tempted by the offer of eventual freedom from ‘imperialist yoke’ in return for support for Germany and Turkey.”¹⁸³

Who did replace Abdülaziz Çaviş in Egypt is hard to determine in the absence of documentary evidence. It is known, however, that Dr. Fuat became the director of India, Egypt, Afghan, and Arabia Department of the Umur-i Şarkiye Office and the Cavalry first lieutenant Yusuf Efendi was the director of the Egypt section in this department.¹⁸⁴ Therefore, it might be plausible to assert that the chair in Egypt was filled by one of the following three agents: Ferid Bey, Dr. Nasır and Dr. Tabit Maheab.

Whoever the chief might have been, as a result of propaganda and agitation activities, it was expected on the Ottoman part that the inhabitants of Egypt would immediately rebel, as soon as the Ottoman troops were seen on the Canal. Accordingly,

¹⁸³ Winstone, *The Illicit Adventure*, 166-167.

¹⁸⁴ ATASE Archive: f: 1846, 79, I: 13/5a.

the British forces would be attacked by not only the Egyptians, but also the Turks and Libyans on eastern and western fronts. In this context, a gossip was spread in Egypt such that an Ottoman force of 150.000 or 300.000 was about to penetrate from Elariş into Egypt.

“Ordu-yi Hümayun Başkumandanlık Vekalet-i Celilesine,

Mısır’a ait suret-i hususiyede istihsal edilen...malumat bervech-i arz olunur.

1-Yemen ve Hicaz’a memur olup Mısır’dan geçen zabitan pek ziyade calib-i nazar-ı dikkat görülmektedir. Halk arasında üçyüzbin kişilik bir Osmanlı kuvvetinin ElAriş’ten Mısır’a geçmek üzere bulunduğu söylenmektedir.
2- Suriye ve Filistin sevhilinde mütehaşşid Osmanlı askerinden ve buradan [Mısır] murur eden Osmanlı zabitanından İngilizler pek ziyade telaş etmektedir. İskenderiye’deki Türklerin kaffesi sayfi bir tarassud ve nezaret altında bulunmaktadırlar...”¹⁸⁵

During September, the signs of excitement began to appear; almost 60.000 people were crowded in the streets of Cairo to protest against the British, as well as to plunder, especially, the shops of Christians. These protests lasted at least a few days.¹⁸⁶
As expected on the Ottoman side, such disturbances in Egypt led the Italians in Bingazi to take preventive measures against the Muslims as well:

“Dahiliye Nezaret-i Celilesine

10 Teşrin-i Sani 330 tarihli ve 1696/57605 numarolu tezkere-i senaveriyye zeylidir.

Devletlü efendim hazretleri

¹⁸⁵ ATASE Archive: f: 248, d: 1031, I: 6. “Mısır’da ahval bilcümle umur ve idare İngiliz hükümetinin elinde bulunmaktadır. Her kimin üzerinde bir Türk veya Alman gazetesi bulunursa riyakaten? habş ediliyor. Ahali hükümetten katiyyen memnun değiller. Küçük bir çocuğa sorulsa ikiyüzellibin kişilik bir Osmanlı kuvvetinin Elariş ve Akabe’de tehaşşüd ettiğini söylüyorlar... Camilerde ahali ...padişah-ı akdesi? efendimize dualar ve Türklerin nusretini temenni etmektedirler... Mısır’da bir Arap “Yaşasın Osmanlılar” demiş ve hemen derdest edilerek...değnek ile darb edilmiş ve Mısır hududundan tard edilmiştir. Mısır’da gecelerin...İstanbul harbiyesine girip zabıt olmak ve Osmanlı ordusunda istihdam olunmak istiyorlar. Bugün yarın kaç tanesi gelip müracaat edeceklerdir...İstanbul ile Mısır arasındaki hutut-ı telgrafiye münkati olmuş gibi birşeydir. Mısır’dan Dersaadet’le katiyyen muhabere men edilmiştir...” See, ATASE Archive: f: 248, d: 1031, I: 2/22.

¹⁸⁶ See in order; ATASE Archive: f: 248, d: 1031, I: 6/4; f: 248, d: 1031, I: 6; f: 248, d: 1031, I: 6/3.

Mısır'daki ingilizler aleyhine vukuu melhut olan isyanın Bingazi ve havalisine sirayeti ihtimaline mebni Bingazi kumandanı cezal Ameliyo'nun taleb etdiği tedabir cümlesinden olmak üzere otuz sekiz bin muhasara topu mermisinin kanun-ı evvel efrenciyesinin yirmisine doğru Bingazi'ye irsaliyle beraber Tobruk ve Bingazi'deki kuvva-i askeriyye tezyid ve Napoli'deki Trablusgarb ve Bingazi'ye mahsus askeri deposu nevakısının dahi ikmal kılınacağıının istihbar olunduğu Roma sefiri Nabi Bey efendi hazretlerinden alınan 28 teşrin-i sani 914 tarihli telgrafnamede bildirilmiştir. İşbu telgrafnamenin bir sureti harbiye nezaret-i celilesine gönderildi efendim.

17 Teşrin-i Sani 330

Hariciye Nazırı namına müsteşar”¹⁸⁷

The British reports, too, drew attention to the increase in the activities of the *Teşkilat* during this period. The *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* Company, formed in Istanbul and led by Süleyman Elbaruni, the Ottoman senator of Jebel Gharbi, stopped by Egypt before going into Libya and struggled to form a pan-Islamic revolutionary movement there against the British during August of 1914.¹⁸⁸ “Thanks to Baruni’s status as an Ottoman senator, the group was not detained by the British but was kept under constant surveillance. The British ambassador to Istanbul protested over Baruni’s activities. Baruni, aware of British opposition to his subversive activities in Egypt, hastened to wind up his affairs there before moving on to Cyrenaica at the beginning of September 1914.”¹⁸⁹ Moreover, the British authorities, who considered the presence of Turkish officers in Egypt as a great threat, seized a letter. The letter written by one of the Turkish officers had been directed to the crew of four ships, which were to be used to transport the British soldiers, to go on strike. He also added that he would attempt to sink the ship when the soldiers went on board. Subsequently, the strike really took place.

¹⁸⁷ BOA, DHEUM.5.Şb, d: 4, g: 65.

¹⁸⁸ For the appointment of Süleyman al-Baruni to Libya, see; ATASE Archive: f: 1843, d: 170, I: 1-173.

¹⁸⁹ Simon, 156.

Furthermore, at the end of September, some armed Egyptians in Cairo provoked by Turkish officers infringed the Egyptian border.¹⁹⁰

Signs of excitement in Egypt grew further during October as the relations between Great Britain and Ottoman Empire deteriorated. Nevertheless, the British could not understand that these agents and agitators were coordinated by one organization, the *Teşkilat*. As Colonel Walther Nikolay, the chief of the German Secret Service, III-B, points out, Egypt was included in the workspace of the *Teşkilat* and the German agents there were auxiliary.¹⁹¹ In this context, the following semi-official correspondence between Sir J. Maxwell and Lord Kitchener might prove explanatory. On 16th October General Maxwell wrote:

“There is rather more nervousness in Egypt, but everything is quiet. It is part of the German propaganda that a revolution in Egypt is imminent, and that there are agents all over the country fomenting the natives against the British. We can find little evidence in support of this. There are, however, far too many able-bodied reservists, German and Austrian, all over Egypt. I have just finished a general registration and, though I have not yet the exact figures, there must be at least 600, and there must be another 200 from the crews of captured ships. This is a danger. I have wired you asking to have them all interned at Malta. They can do no harm there. On Monday I am trying before a military court an undoubted spy of Enver's. He is a German and an officer of the Alexandria Police, and he had on him when arrested a secret code, maps of the Suez Canal, and two boxes of detonators...As we are not going to hold our Sinai frontier and will destroy as many as possible, I expect all the Bedouin will join the Turks if they come over. As I cannot send out patrols I do not know much about what is going on on the frontier lines. I expect there will be raids before long. The Turks seem to be doing a lot of work in road-making, building forts, etc., all over Palestine and Syria, which looks as if they expected attack from us, but their tendency is to move south, and this can only mean attack upon Egypt. With the eight battalions from India, two

¹⁹⁰ Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar*, 65.

¹⁹¹ Col. W. Walther Nikolay, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Alman Gizli Servisi* (İstanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 1998), 37.

mountain batteries, the Bikanir Camel Corps and the Coastguard, the Canal ought to be safe.”¹⁹²

Up to the end of October, unrest grew more and with the bombardment of Akabe on 1 November, the British began to arrest and intern prominent and dangerous Turkish subjects. There was however no way to imprison the thousands of Turkish nationals in Egypt.¹⁹³ So, the Turkish Command had comparatively easy facilities for the collection of information and spread of propaganda. During October, “Sir John Maxwell had deported a large number of German agents and Austro-German Reservists, while, later, he obtained information of a plot organized by Baron Oppenheim, the German explorer, for a rising in Cairo and the murder of Europeans to synchronize with the attack on the Canal.”¹⁹⁴ Besides, within the context of martial law, it was outlawed to gather in the streets, to keep shops open and go outside after eight o’clock in the evening. The British also appointed intelligence officers all over Cairo. The Ottoman telegraph clerks and three other clerks working in the Ottoman Commissariat of Cairo were banished. Moreover, the leader of the tribes located near the Canal, Hamid Bey, was exiled to Sudan and sixty Egyptian officers who did not want to fight against the Muslims were executed by shooting.¹⁹⁵ A further decisive step was taken during December; the Protectorate over Egypt was proclaimed and Hüseyin Kamil, a pro-British, uncle of Abbas Hilmi, was made Khedive.¹⁹⁶ Twenty prominent people like princes Mehmed Ali and Aziz Pashas who did not accept the installation of the new Khedive were arrested

¹⁹² *History of the Great War: Military Operations Egypt and Palestine from the Outbreak of War with Germany to June 1917*, compiled by Lieut.-General Sir George Macmunn & Captain Cyril Falls (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1928), 15-16.

¹⁹³ The number of the Turkish nationals was estimated around 70000. See, *History of the Great War*, 16.

¹⁹⁴ Verrier, 36.

¹⁹⁵ Çelik, 96-97.

¹⁹⁶ *History of the Great War*, 17.

and taken out of the country.¹⁹⁷ Such measures taken by the British no doubt suppressed the Egyptian society and in turn limited the effectiveness of the propaganda activities carried out by the *Teşkilat*.

8. The Attack on the Suez Canal

After that date, the *Teşkilat* forces leading 2000 irregulars completed their passage into Sinai towards the end of October. This was followed by the advance in the desert and the towns of Kalatünnahl and El-Ariş were transformed into the headquarters of the communication and supply organizations established by Lieutenant Colonel Behçet Bey, Commander of the 23rd Division. The *Teşkilat* forces under the command of Mümtaz and Eşref Beys would provide the flank security while the main force began marching from Beerşeba to İsmailiye. The object of these was simply to keep the enemy in doubt as to the point at which the main attack was to be made.

It is known that Eşref Bey engaged in the demonstration attack of Mümtaz Bey against Kantara.¹⁹⁸ Available documentation, however, does not give any account of whereabouts of Hasan Efendi and his forces were dispatched. Nevertheless, if the fact that Hasan Efendi did not engage in the *Teşkilat* operations to take hold of the key points in the desert and his passage into Sinai took place a little later than that of Mümtaz and Eşref beys were taken into account, then it was more likely that Hasan Efendi engaged the Bedouin forces of the main campaign force, which consisted of almost 1500 irregulars.

¹⁹⁷ Çelik, 97.

¹⁹⁸ Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar*, 104-105.

During the first half of January 1915, Cemal Pasha ordered Mümtaz Bey to cross the Canal secretly with a few bands, reconnoitre the Port-Said line and demolish its railroad. Following this, the major part of the bands would make their way into Egypt by the Salahiye-Zegazig line and having demolished not only the railroad but also everything the British possessed, they would instigate the masses by propagandizing the Turkish army near the Canal as savior of the Muslims. He was also ordered to launch with the majority of his troops demonstration attacks against Kantara, lie in ambush and open fire against the British vessels, and demolish lantern and signal points of the Canal, and in turn detain as many British forces as possible along Kantara.¹⁹⁹ Eşref Bey, on the other hand, was charged to destroy the enemy positions deployed along the Great Bitter Lake, to the south of Ismailiye and to hinder the navigation of vessels from Suez to Ismailiye and cut off the telegraph and telephone lines. If he could cross the Canal, he would also demolish the Ismailiye-Zegazig line and instigate the population against the British.²⁰⁰ Moreover, in both of the orders, Cemal Pasha admonished them to create such an atmosphere among their forces that each one of the soldiers should feel responsible to fight to death.²⁰¹

Gradual advance in the Sinai Peninsula began in mid-January of 1915, after a month the 8th Corps departed from Damascus and the attack on the Suez Canal began on the night of 2-3 February 1915.²⁰² The success of the attack was strictly bound to the

¹⁹⁹ ATASE Archive: f: 3221, d: H4, I: 1/5.

²⁰⁰ Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar*, 104-105.

²⁰¹ See Appendix C for the disposition of the troops connected to 4th Army between 11 January and 1 February 1915.

²⁰² The British defense of the Canal had been organized by December and the force there consisted of the 10th and 11th Indian Divisions and the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade. Three mountain batteries composed the artillery of these troops. Then, two field artillery brigades of the East Lancashire Division and a pack-gun battery of the Egyptian Army were added to the defense. Three sectors for defense were prepared: Suez to the Bitter Lake, north of the Great Bitter Lake to Elferdan, and Elferdan to Port-Said.

confusion of the British forces deployed on Ismailiye and the establishment of a fortified bridgehead across the Canal, which was to be protected until the following forces reached Ismailiye. However, from the information of reconnaissance flights and of agents' reports, the British were nearly sure by the second week of January that the main attack would come through Central Sinai. The central sector attacked against the Tussum-Serapeum area between Lake Timsah and the Great Bitter Lake while the diversionary forces were aimed at the vicinity of Firdan and Kantara.²⁰³ The attempts to cross the Canal, however, were detected and most of the pontoons were destroyed. Although a few soldiers could make their way to the west bank, that was not enough to hinder the retreat of the army the following day.²⁰⁴ Besides, not only the Muslims across the Canal did not revolt but the Sanusi forces in Libya also did not attack the British from the western border as expected, which totally marked the failure of the original Ottoman plan to invade Egypt. Obviously enough, Cemal Pasha overestimated Egyptian sympathy for the Turks because he had expected that his appearance on the Canal would be followed by a rising of Egyptian nationalist: "*O sırada Mısır vatanperverleri de bu Osmanlı Ordusunun İsmailiye'yi zaptetmiş olmasından cesaret alarak umumi ihtilallere*

"With the exception of its artillery, the troops of the East Lancashire Division were not employed, as Sir J. Maxwell was averse to taking them from their training. That division, however, as well as the Australian and New Zealand contingents, formed a reserve, which could be swiftly railed from Cairo to Ismailia and thence in either direction along the Canal. The troops on the Canal Defenses were equipped with first-line transport only. In January it was decided to form a small Camel Transport Corps to act as second-line transport..." See, *History of the Great War*, 23. See also p. 31-34 for the disposition of British troops in the Canal Defenses in detail.

²⁰³ See Appendix D.

²⁰⁴ For the details of the operation, see; *History of the Great War*, 37-46; Erden, *Suriye Hatıraları*, Cemal Paşa, 160-169; 49-62; Erden, *Tih Sahrasına*, 129-177; Şakir, 207-217; Sanders, 60-63; Sheffy, 53-55; Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar*, 103-104; Sabis, 325-351; Winstone, *Parker Pasha*, 53-82. Although the campaign was a complete failure, a rumor such that the Ottoman army crossed the Canal and marched into Egypt was spread and it was even celebrated in Jerusalem and İstanbul. See for the details; Şakir, 217-221. Also see the novel on the first campaign against the Canal; Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Zeytinadağı* (İstanbul: Pozitif Yayınları, 2004). For the memoir of a soldier who engaged in both the Canal and Gallipoli battles, see; Münim Mustafa, *Cepheden Cepheye* (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 2004).

*teşebbüs edecek olurlarsa, işte hiç ümit edilmeyen bir zamanda, en ibtidai ve pek az bir kuvvetle Mısır'ın kurtarılması müyesser olmuş olurdu.”*²⁰⁵ The first Canal campaign however had a strategic value. The movement of large Ottoman forces through the central route of the desert and their subsequent attack astonished the British and compelled them for a long time to expect a renewal of the attack. This led to detaining of large British forces in Egypt, which, in turn, became an advantage for both the Ottomans preparing for the battle at Çanakkale and their partners in the European theatre of operations:

“The advance against Egypt must have disappointed Turkey and the Central Powers by the futility of expecting any important results from the proclamation of a ‘*Jihad*’ ..., but, whatever the true intention, the German higher Command may well have been satisfied. In their perspective the operation amounted to a very efficiently planned raid which undoubtedly had the effect of playing upon the nerves of the British Government to the point of inducing it to retain a disproportionate number of troops on the Egyptian front for the future. The corresponding dislocation of resources has already been shown to limit the original conception of the Dardanelles operations, upon which the British Government had by now decided to embark.”²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵ Cemal Paşa, 164. Also see, Winstone, *Parker Pasha*, 58-59. “There was no appreciable public reaction to the Turkish advance. It must have been extremely galling for Djemal Pasha to find that his miscalculation of Egyptian sentiment had been so great that the British were able to bring Egyptian artillery into open and effective action against their coreligionists during the attack on the canal, while any secret hopes he may have entertained from his pretended Francophilism were extinguished by his experience of the solid support afforded to the British by the French with all their resources.” See, Verrier, 37.

²⁰⁶ Verrier, 38.

B. The Mission of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* during the 2nd Canal Campaign

1. The Reorganization of the 4th Army and the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* Forces

After the failure of the first Canal campaign, a new phase started in Syria-Palestine. Between 15 March and 31 December 1915, the 4th Army was occupied with giving assistance to other fronts (Gallipoli, Caucasia, and Iraq), fortification and reconstruction facilities (railroads, lines, etc.), reorganization of the army, and protection of the security and public order of the interior region. In addition, preparations for the second Canal campaign were carried on and effective attempts of raids and mining were made in order to cut the Canal traffic off and prevent the British forces in Egypt from moving to other fronts.²⁰⁷ Thereby, the 4th Army was reorganized during the first half of March 1915 as follows: the 8th Corps, (mürettep) Corps, Desert Commandership, Hicaz Campaign Force, Domestic Gendarme and Depository troops.²⁰⁸ Voluntary detachments under the command of the *Teşkilat* detachments were likely reorganized as small moving columns since having seen the Turkish forces near the Canal in the first campaign, the British reinforced forces along the Canal which hindered the Turks from approaching it.²⁰⁹

In this context, Desert Commandership was formed under the command of the Colonel Kress Von Kressenstein, former chief of the staff of the 8th Corps.²¹⁰ The detachments left in the desert were given under the direct order of this commandership, whose central headquarters was in Al-Ibin. Its mission was to direct the attempts of

²⁰⁷ Cemal Paşa, 173-174; Şahin, 67-69.

²⁰⁸ ATASE Archive: f: 3221, d: H6, I: 1/29; Cemal Paşa, 169-171. See also Appendix E for the reorganization of the 4th Army.

²⁰⁹ Sanders, 60-61; Cemal Paşa, 174-175; Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar*, 106.

²¹⁰ ATASE Archive: f: 162, d: 713, I: 31; Sanders, 135.

harassment against the Canal and both to protect and conceal the preparations for the second campaign against Egypt.²¹¹ The telegraph dispatched to the 4th Army by Enver Pasha supports this point:

“4. Ordu Kumandanlığına

26 Kanun-i Sani

Dördüncü Ordunun gösterdiği gayret ve faaliyeti fevkalade takdir ederim. Bununla ordunun biavnillahi teala atiyen Kanal’ın müruruna muvaffak olacağına kanaatim daha ziyadeleşmiş ve muhakkak olmuştur. Bu hususta mümkün olan bütün vesait-i muavine ihzar olunacaktır. Su ve erzak esbabından dolayı ordunun beyan buyurulan hututa kadar çekilmesi zaruri bile olsa gene mümkün olan vesaitle Kanal’ın mütemadiyen tehdidine çalışılması lazımdır. Harekatın sükunet devresi esnasında topçu ile beraber ufak müfrezeleri Kanal’a kadar göndererek seyrüseferi menetmeye muvaffak olacağınızdan eminim. Bu kabil teşebbüsler fevkalade mühimdir.

Enver”²¹²

The cadre of the commandership was divided into three flanks: the right flank detachment under the command of Musa Kazım Bey (the volunteers of Selami Bey and Nurettin Bey were involved here), left flank detachment under the command of lieutenant Lauffer, and center flank detachment to which the volunteers of Eşref Bey (composed of men from Trablusgarp and Circassian cavalry regiment) were bound²¹³.

²¹¹ ATASE Archive: f: 3221, d: H6, I: 1/90; Sanders, 135; Winstone, *Parker Pasha*, 81.

²¹² Erden, *Tih Sahrasına*, 173-174. In response to this telegraph, Cemal Pasha guaranteed that the forces deployed along the Canal and the traffic would be disturbed as soon as the mobile columns got started to operate. Enver Pasha then also suggests that the second campaign should be launched only if the victory seems definite. Otherwise, it would have demoralising effect on the Islamic world. “4. Ordu Kumandanlığına [23 Kanun-i Sani 1330] / Kanal taarruzunda ordunun muvaffak olamaması bütün alem-i İslam üzerinde suitesir yapacağından kanala, ancak muvaffakiyet ihtimali muhakkak derecede görülürse taarruz edilmelidir. Binaenaleyh kati muvaffakiyet temin edecek vesait hazırlanıncaya kadar İngilizlerin kanal üzerindeki kuvvetlerini karşınızda tutmaklığınız ve kanaldan vapurların geçmesini tatil ile iktifa etmekliğiniz maksadı temin eder. / Başkumandan Vekili Enver”See, Erden, *Suriye Hatıraları*, 66-67; Sabis, 341.

²¹³ For the establishment of the 8th Corps in detail, see; *Sina – Filistin Cephesi*, 280-284.

Eşref Bey, however, stayed in the desert up to the end of 1915 and then was sent to Arabia in order to cope with the British influence in Hicaz.²¹⁴

The sources mention neither Mümtaz Bey, the commander of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* units and of the Voluntary Detachment of the 4th Army, nor the Voluntary Detachment under his command, during the second campaign. It is, however, known that von Kress even before the first campaign thought that Mümtaz was not qualified enough for such an important post.²¹⁵ Therefore, it seems probable that Mümtaz Bey and his forces were incorporated into the Desert Commandership as regular forces. Otherwise, he should have left a part of his forces in the desert under the command of Desert Commandership and been appointed to the commandership of the National Voluntary Battalion in Damascus formed between 15 June and 15 July 1915. Later on, Mümtaz Bey at an unspecified date, most probably at the beginning of 1916, under an unknown assignment, went to Izmit. From there, he went to Istanbul at the beginning of summer 1916 without the knowledge of Enver Pasha in order to take Yakup Cemil away from Istanbul, who was about to attempt to overthrow the government.²¹⁶ That the attempt was to happen on 26 July and Mümtaz was forced to stay at Izmit after Yakup Cemil had been tried and executed points to the fact that Mümtaz Bey did not engage in the battles of Katya (April 1916) and Romani (August 1916).

What happened to the Gendarme Commander Major Hasan Efendi is not clear either. Had he been substituted or died in one way or another, the sources, which sometimes stated even the names of the foot soldiers, would have not refrained to mention a man holding such an important post. Besides, there is no clue in respect to

²¹⁴ Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar*, 106.

²¹⁵ Kressenstein, 34.

²¹⁶ Ertürk, 68, 92-103, 108, 133-135.

whether the bands under his command were transported to another region. It seems therefore reasonable to presume in the very absence of information about Hasan Efendi that he was charged with a duty, similar to one he was given during the first campaign, in the “Mücahidin” organization formed along the coast of Syria-Palestine on 15 March.²¹⁷ Forasmuch as the fact that the “Mücahidin” organizations were composed merely of volunteers and that all the volunteers were under the direction of the *Teşkilat* commanders during the first campaign, were taken into account, this possibility becomes more likely to have happened.

Whatever happened, it is obvious that a part of the *Teşkilat* agents and detachments stayed in the desert. This is understood from both the statements of Eşref Kuşçubaşı and the quality and quantity of the operations launched during 1915. Only three days after the first campaign, Enver Pasha, aware of the forthcoming Gallipoli campaign, ordered Cemal Pasha, who would have to dispatch a considerable number of his forces to Gallipoli, to prepare portable columns to be seen near the Canal and Cemal wanted Von Kress to launch the operations immediately.²¹⁸

2. Minor Operations against the Canal

The first of those raids was the attempt of reserve Captain Gondos, a Hungarian volunteer, against the Canal. Alongside 50 volunteers from the detachment of Eşref Bey and 10 regular soldiers, Gondos was expected to destroy the oil wells at Cemza where he formerly served as an engineer. He would first traverse the Mount Sinai and arrive at

²¹⁷ Erden, *Suriye Hatıraları*, 92.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 93-95.

Tur on the southwest coast of the peninsula; then make his way to Cemza located on the African coast of the Suez Gulf by boat.²¹⁹ He departed from Kalatünnahl on 9 January and encountered the British detachment at Tur on 19 January. Having retreated, Gondos moved into the town and blew up the governmental mansion. On 4 February, he destroyed water pumps and wells, into which he threw anisole pigment to make people believe that the water was poisoned, at Karantine. Having destroyed three oil wells and mines at Cemza he returned to Kalatünnahl on 10 February.²²⁰

After this first effective attack, attempts of raids and sabotages by small units of mounted movement capability increased because the British naval forces had disappeared from the Suez Canal due to the launch of Gallipoli Campaign.²²¹ So, the Canal was to be constantly harassed in order to prevent Britain from dispatching forces easily from Egypt to Gallipoli. Thereby, Von Kress alongside with *Teşkilat* forces as well as other forms of regular units decided to attack the Canal through Kalatünnahl on

²¹⁹ ATASE Archive: f: 3221, d: H7, I: 1/26. For a detailed account of the minor operations, see; Erden, 94-108.

²²⁰ ATASE Archive: f: 3221, d: H7A, I: 1/48. "Reconnaissance planes and agents had reported that a Turkish-led force of unknown numbers had made its way to the South of Sinai and was camped in the vicinity of Tor [Tur]. Barlow, in charge of the Egyptian Garrison could not, it seemed, trust his troops to attack them. HMS Minerva was recalled to Suez/ Parker arrived at Tor on 7 February and remained ashore for an hour, where he discovered that Barlow had no definite information on the size or whereabouts the enemy force. It was known, however, that there were two German-speaking officers with the Turks and Arabs, one of whom was, in fact, an Austrian who had worked in the mines..." See, Winstone, *Parker Pasha*, 76. Also see, Winstone, *The Illicit Adventure, The Story of Political and Military Intelligence in the Middle East from 1898 to 1926*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982), 163-164. See also Appendix F.

²²¹ "The *Swiftsure*, Admiral Peirse's old flagship, *Ocean* (sunk... on 18th March) and *Minerva* had been sent to the Dardenelles. At the beginning of March the Admiral was ordered to leave Egypt in the *Euryalus* and meet *Swiftsure* and *Triumph* in the Gulf of Smyrna. He took with him the Russian *Askold* and Sir J. Maxwell's invaluable servant, the seaplane-carrier *Aenne Rickmers*, now anglicized as *Anne*. No sooner was the Admiral gone than a cable from Whitehall ordered him to send six French seaplanes to the Dardenelles, 'keeping therein Egypt.'... The force in Egypt was, in fact, deprived of its eyes, and the Turks might have doubled their troops at Beersheba without information of the fact reaching Egypt for a fortnight. Nor could their work in extending their railway in that quarter be observed. Admiral Peirse was ordered on the 15th March to return to Egypt, but without the battleships *Swiftsure* and *Triumph*, which proceeded to Mudros to take part in the attack on the Narrows. The *Anne* was during the operations disabled by the Turkish torpedo boat *Demir Hisar* but was eventually patched up and returned to Port Said." See, *History of the Great War*, 60.

15 March. This day also marked the weakening of the British defense against mine-laying because it witnessed the withdrawal of the torpedo boats. Another column under the command of Major Lauffer was to attack Elkantara at the same time. Captain Gondos, Major Vels, and Lieutenant Ahmed Mithat, alongside volunteers were used for the reconnaissance facilities and the attack began on 22 March.²²² A British patrol of nine men while following to seize two Turks at north of Elkubri, was fired upon by a number of others. Then, the British saw that there had been four or five hundred more in the vicinity. Therefore, the patrol under the command of Havildar Subar Singh fell back but two of his men were killed. Subsequently, British detachments were sent from the Gurkha Post, which was two miles away.²²³ The British panicked because

“It was known that there were some 4,000 Turkish troops with guns at Nekhl [Kalatünnahl], and the force seen might well be the advanced guard of a much stronger one, about to attack Canal. The provision of adequate floating defense was difficult; the only battleship, the old French *Henri IV*, having just been dispatched to the Dardenelles to replace the lost *Bouvet*, and all the torpedo boats being gone. *Requin*, the cruiser *Bacchante* from *Suez* and the light cruiser *Philomel* took station in the Canal. The royal Indian Marine ship *Dufferin* was already near Shallufa.”²²⁴

On that night, one troopship and cargo vessel came under fire, however, the alarmed British forces achieved to drive back the Ottoman army, which could barely harass the Canal, on 23 March.²²⁵

On the night of 7-8 April, another voluntary detachment under the command of Major Lauffer managed to lay a torpedo on the line of Elkantara. Nevertheless, because

²²² ATASE Archive: f: 3221, d: 7A, I: 1/48

²²³ *History of the Great War*, 61.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 62.

²²⁵ ATASE Archive: f: 3221, d: 7A, I: 1/48 and f: 3221, d: 7A, I: 1/52. According to the British sources, the Turks suffered 50 casualties while the British had 3 killed and 16 wounded. See also Appendix G for the raid of von Krensstein.

it was wrongly bolted, the torpedo rose up to the surface and the British demolished it.²²⁶

A successful attempt against the Canal was made on the night of 27-28. Volunteers under the command of Major Fischer and Captain Gondos laid two mines on the Acıgöl part of the Canal. Second Lieutenant Aziz, Third Lieutenant Hadi, and 6 volunteers were sent for reconnaissance along Ismailiye. The unit, under the command of Major Hungar, was composed of regular soldiers, and a considerable number of Bedouins and volunteers lead by Şeyh Atıyye, attacked on the same day from Elferdan and drove back a British camel and two speared cavalryman companies. Consequently, the British had to cut the canal traffic off the entire day on 28 March.²²⁷

Another voluntary detachment under the command of a Turkish second lieutenant engrossed a British ship which included 15 soldiers, on the night of 28-29 May. The ship was lapsed having had its furnace dynamited.²²⁸ Likewise, first lieutenant Sırrı with a mobile detachment of 50 volunteers laid mine on the line of Birekidi on the night of 27-28 June, which resulted in sinking a British ship.²²⁹ The ship swung round across the channel and blocked it completely, but the British were able to reopen it the day after. Towards the end of July, another sabotage unit crossed the Canal by swimming and demolished a train by laying mines on the railroad lying to the north of Elkantara. Similarly, a portable reconnaissance patrol demolished Elkantara-Port Said railroad and a train on 12 August.²³⁰ Such attacks were carried out until the beginning of November when British began to form reconnaissance and safety curtain on the east side of the Canal. That is why the Ottoman forces could no longer approach the Canal until

²²⁶ Sanders, 135; *History of the Great War*, 63.

²²⁷ *Sina – Filistin Cephesi*, 306-311; *History of the Great War*, 63-64.

²²⁸ ATASE Archive: f: 3221, d: H13, I: 1/10.

²²⁹ *Sina – Filistin Cephesi*, 313-316.

²³⁰ ATASE Archive: f: 3221, d: H19, I: 1/6. According to British sources, the date was 30th June and the name of the ship was the Holt Liner *Teiresias*. See, *History of the Great War*, 64.

the reconnaissance expedition of Katya in 1916. However such raids and attacks with small portable detachments and reconnaissance patrols as well as the mining attempts compelled the Canal defense forces to stand constantly wearisome on alert. At the same time, those operations invigorated the feeling of quite a few British in Egypt that they were encircled with spies, saboteurs, and commandoes. Even so, such attacks no doubt had a demoralizing effect on the volunteers since all of these attacks resulted in retreat of the Ottoman forces.²³¹

The preparations for the second Canal campaign were initiated on 26 November. The first expeditionary force was formed under the command of von Kress on 26 December and Major Kadri was appointed as chief of the staff. Ali Fuad (Erden) became the chief of the operation department. In the meantime, news was coming from the Supreme Command that the British began to reduce their forces in Egypt because they did not believe a further Ottoman attack. Accordingly, it was ordered to make the British suppose that an attack was about to be launched in the near future. However, the detachments could not manage to approach the Canal between February and March 1916. The British began to construct a railroad and waterway on the east side of the Canal, starting from Elkantara. Also, the aeroplanes found out military encampments on the line of Muhammediye-Romani-Katya and the only way to get information about them was a reconnaissance attack by land. To this end, successful Katya reconnaissance expedition was launched in April 1916. After this battle, priorities came with the Hicaz uprising (6 June 1916) and the re-attack against the Canal. Not disregarding the impact of the first issue, the Ottoman army made an attack to Romani on 4 August and the clash

²³¹ Sanders, 136.

resulted in the retreat of the Ottomans the day after.²³² It was this battle after which the Ottoman army began to retreat on Sinai-Palestine front and the British counter attacks were initiated. Meanwhile, the civic turmoil in Sudan had disappeared and the Sanusiyyas had already taken the way of Trablusgarb, which totally meant that the Ottoman project of rolling back the British army of Egypt has come to an end.

²³² For the most detailed account of the second campaign, see; *Sina – Filistin Cephesi*, 338-393.

CHAPTER THREE

TEŞKİLAT-I MAHSUSA INVOLVEMENT IN LIBYA

The responsibilities of the *Teşkilat* were not confined to create trouble only in Egypt and Sinai. Agents were also at work in Libya, seeking out weak points against the British on Egypt's western border.²³³ This time, however, they had to cope with the Italians too, since Italy had certain historic claims to a sphere of influence in Libya. Besides, "her strategic interests in the coast of Africa opposite her shores are obvious. It is easy to understand Italian feelings about Libya...they occupied it 'simply in order to be able to breathe freely in the Mediterranean- to avoid being stifled amidst the possessions and naval bases of France and Great Britain.'" ²³⁴ On the other hand, "...European states...were interested in Libya as a transit region and border district...Libya's border to the east was shared with Egypt, which was defended at that time by Britain, and in the west with Tunisia and Algeria, which were under French rule. In the south were African kingdoms (Wadai, Bornu, and Kanem) into which France was penetrating. The

²³³ "The western frontier of Egypt was at the outbreak of war not exactly defined, negotiations with Turkey on the subject having been interrupted by the Tripolitan War and then made of no avail by the cession of Tripoli to Italy, but it ran south from the coast just west of Sollum [Sellum]. Between the Nile and its Delta, to which the vast bulk of Egypt's population is confined, and this imaginary line ruled across the sands is an area of upwards of two hundred thousand square miles, which is officially part of Egypt." See, *History of the Great War*, 102.

²³⁴ Pritchard, 107.

paramount British and French interest was connected with protecting the countries they governed.”²³⁵

In order to protect the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, *Fedai Zabitan*, the group accepted as the antecedent of the *Teşkilat*, had already been involved in Libya during the Ottoman-Italian war of 1911-1912. Not surprisingly, in accordance with the Uşi treaty signed following the war, the Turkish forces began to evacuate the region, leaving only a number of stay-behind soldiers in case of a return the Ottoman rule once again in Libya. During the inter-war period, between the Tripoli and World War I, however “the local population grew more and more accustomed to independently conducting its own civil and military affairs, its readiness to re-subjugate itself to foreign sovereignty diminished, although it was prepared to receive Ottoman aid and cooperation.”²³⁶ In the third phase of the struggle, during World War I, the Ottoman policy was to subject the local elements especially the Senusis, to the Ottoman authority mostly by supplying them with military equipment and financial resources so that not only the struggle against the Italians would be intensified, but also the attack against the western border of Egypt would be guaranteed. During this period, it is possible to consider the *Teşkilat* concentration here in two regions; Bingazi in the east, and Tripoli in the west. In this chapter, as it is directly related to the Ottoman containment policy, the organization and establishment of the local resistance forces against the British on the western border of Egypt will be scrutinized, leaving out the struggle against the Italians on the western part of Libya.

²³⁵ Simon, 44.

²³⁶ Simon, 181.

A. The Mission of Süleyman el-Baruni to Libya

Notwithstanding that some Turkish officers organized resistance movements against the Italians in the interior region, the fight led by the *Teşkilat* against the British was essentially set off after a few officers of generally Tripoli and Bingazi origin had been sent to Seyyid Ahmed. The first *Teşkilat* Company for Libya was formed in Istanbul during August 1914 under the command of Süleyman Elbaruni, the Ottoman senator of Jebel Gharbi and the leader of the Ibadi tribes.²³⁷ Known as the hero of the insurrection in Jebel Gharbi in 1911-1913, Süleyman Elbaruni was experienced in the area during the Ottoman-Italian war and inter-war period. Therefore, he was sent there by the Minister of War, Enver Pasha, to support the Arab fighters in Libya and in turn to strengthen the position of the Ottomans under his leadership. This company included men like retired Infantry Major Vasfi, retired Artillery Officer Ahmet Baba, Doctor Captain Osman, and Staff Captain Tarık.²³⁸ Having left Istanbul on 13 August, the company arrived in Egypt where they struggled to form a pan-Islamic revolutionary movement against the British²³⁹. The appointment of a senior Ottoman representative of Libyan origin to lead the struggle was expected to improve Ottoman standing among internal power struggles in Libya. Nevertheless, the appointment of Baruni, who also had strong ties with the Ottoman regime, began to cause problems when he arrived in Libya on 16 September.²⁴⁰

Baruni, however, not only lacked an independent power base in Libya but also had to deal with Senusis, who had been well-established there during the inter-war

²³⁷ For the appointment of Süleyman al-Baruni to Libya, see; ATASE Archive: f: 1843, d: 170, I: 1-173.

²³⁸ *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi: Hicaz, Asir, Yemen Cepheleeri ve Libya Harekatı, 1914-1918*, vol. 4 (Ankara: Genelkurmay, 1978), 109-110.

²³⁹ This was the path that Mustafa Kemal followed when he went to Libya during the Tripolitanian War.

²⁴⁰ *Libya Harekatı*, 110.

period. Secondly, his activities to agitate the masses and train them against both the Italians and British was not met favorably especially by the Senusi leadership, whose position had considerably been strengthened after the evacuation of the Ottoman forces in 1913. Besides, “he was hardly known there...The strong backing he received from the Ottomans further increased his isolation: he was seen as an Ottoman and not as a local representative.”²⁴¹ Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, pursuit of an anti-British policy did not suit the Senusi’s purpose at that time since the survival of Senusis was based on free trade with Egypt for foodstuff, to which the British condoned to a great extent to ensure the neutrality of the Senusis.²⁴² It is also possible to say that any outbreak of hostility between the Senusis and the British was prevented during 1914 and early 1915 by the presence of large British forces in Egypt. However, as the British forces moved to other bases of war and as the battles against the Ottomans did not bring in decisive success, there began some excitement in Libya.²⁴³

Such handicaps no doubt limited the effectiveness of the *Teşkilat* but did not prevent the increase in their local followers mostly due to the financial and military help provided to them by the Ottoman government. Yet, this interdependence was not enough to hinder the conflicts which would rise after Muhammed al-Abid, the Senusi leader of Fezzan, ordered the detention of Baruni in November because of his activities to provoke the Tripolitanian and Fezzani population. Nevertheless, the enforcement of the order was not carried out until Seyyid Ahmed got on bad terms with the *Teşkilat* agents

²⁴¹ Simon, 155.

²⁴² ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 9-1

²⁴³ *History of the Great War*, 102.

like Süleyman Elbaruni, doctor Nihad, lieutenant Tarık, and Mehmet Ali Efendi²⁴⁴ who were accused of not only struggling to ruin the prudent policy of Seyyid Ahmed towards the British by attacking them, but also embezzling 10000 liras.²⁴⁵ That was why Baruni was imprisoned in the Senusi camp of Sellum for a few months and was not allowed to leave the camp until the accusations were examined by Istanbul and he was found innocent. Baruni left Libya with a German submarine in December 1915:

“Atina Sefaret-i Seniyyesine şifre

Nuri Bey’e:

Trablusgarp mıntıkasının istiklali...üzere Baruni Efendi gönderilmişti. Mumaileyh hakkında bazı mekatib vurud etti. Tedkik olundu. Mumaileyhin bu meselede su-i niyeti olmadığı ve mıntıka-i mezkureye...Şeyh Senusi’nin hareket edeceği anlaşılmış olduğundan mumaileyh Baruni Efendi’yi ilk vasıta ile Dersaadet’e iade ediniz.

5 Kanun-i Evvel 331”²⁴⁶

B. The Mission of Nuri (Kılılgil) and Cafer el-Askeri to Libya

Up to the arrival of infantry machine gun officer Captain Nuri (Kılılgil), the younger brother of Enver Pasha, the forces under the command of the *Teşkilat* units in Libya fought particularly against the Italian forces led by General Ameglio.²⁴⁷ Nuri Bey was highly-esteemed in Libya due to his relationship to Enver Pasha and was acquainted

²⁴⁴ This is understood from the letter by Cemal Pasha sent to the Supreme Command. In the letter Cemal Pasha tells that “Bingazili Abdüsselam Efendi namında bir zabıt bugün bana Seyyid eş-Şerif es-Senusi’den bir mektup getirdi... Bundan başka Süleyman el-Baruni Efendi maiyyetinde bulunan doktorumuz ve zabitanan Nihad ve Mehmed Ali ve Tarık Efendilerle beraber güya Arabanı Seyyid Ahmed eş-Şerif aleyhine tahrik ediyorlarmış...” See; ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 6.

²⁴⁵ ATASE Archive: f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-9A.

²⁴⁶ ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 30-1. Also see f: 1863, d: 153, I: 31.

²⁴⁷ For Enver’s decision to send Nuri Bey to Cyrenaica, see; ATASE Archive: f: 1849, d: 103, I: 1-100; İsrail Kurtcephe, *Türk-İtalyan İlişkileri (1911-1916)*, unpublished PhD. Thesis, (Konya: Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1990), 401.

with the region from his service within the *Teşkilat* (known as *Fedai Zabitan* at that time) in Misurata in 1912 as its commander. That was why he was chosen for this mission.²⁴⁸ In order to re-establish the Ottoman authority in Libya and bring the Libyan factor into play to divert and detain the Allied forces in Egypt as much as possible, Nuri Bey and Cafer Askeri were sent to Libya. That was, however, an extremely dangerous journey due to the strict control of Allies on sea and the British forces at the Canal that blocked the overland contact through Egypt. Having left Istanbul on 6 January 1915, they set out to Greece, which was then neutral,²⁴⁹ under the guise of diplomatic couriers to the Ottoman embassy there.²⁵⁰ Having met in Athens by Galib Bey, an Ottoman Minister, they hired a Greek rumrunner, by the contact of the Ottoman consul in Piraeus, from a Beirutian named Muhyiddin Shatila, brother of Saadeddin Shatila, who would deliver Nuri and Cafer to Libya.²⁵¹ After loading the armaments and ammunition purchased in Greece, Nuri and Cafer first stopped by Crete then went ashore in Defne, between Tobruk and Sillum, in Bingazi on 21 February 1915.²⁵² They were accompanied during the voyage by Muhammad Bey Al-Jabani²⁵³ and Hajji Kamil Efendi al-Bunduqi²⁵⁴ and received as guests of the Manfah tribe when they reached the coast of Defne.²⁵⁵

²⁴⁸ Simon, 158.

²⁴⁹ At that time Greece was divided: Prime Minister Venizelos and some members of parliament favored the Entente whereas King Constantine and his wife, who was the sister of Kaiser Wilhelm II favored Germany. That is why Greece remained neutral for so long.

²⁵⁰ Jafar Pasha Al-Askari, a *Soldier's Story, From Ottoman Rule to Independent Iraq: The Memoirs of Jafar Pasha Al-Askari*, (eds.) William Facey and Najdat Fathi Safwat, (London: Arabian Publishing, 2003), 54.

²⁵¹ Al-Askari, 55.

²⁵² ATASE Archive: f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-336; *Hicaz, Asir, Yemen Cepheleleri ve Libya Harekatı*, 111.

²⁵³ Muhammad Al-Jabani was a Bingazi notable who had furnished service for the Ottoman army during the Tripoli War.

²⁵⁴ Hajji Kamil Efendi was one of Nuri Bey's friend.

²⁵⁵ Al-Askari, 56.

Their first mission was to organize the Senusi forces to attack Egypt from the west whilst the 4th Army launched the second campaign against Egypt from the east. For this purpose, Nuri Bey also brought 10000 golden pieces.²⁵⁶ He immediately began negotiations in Sellum with Seyyid Ahmed, the leader of the Senusis. Seyyid Ahmed told Nuri Bey that he could not attack Egypt during the first Canal campaign due to lack of ammunition and provisions. He also mentioned that he had to provide forces against both the menacing Italians and French which attempted to occupy Kufra.²⁵⁷ Apart from those, having listened to his complaints, Nuri Bey insisted on Seyyid Ahmed engage in the attack against Egypt. Seyyid Ahmed, however, did not look favorably upon the offer. Although he was ready to recognize the Padiisah-Caliph as the head of all Muslims, he did not want the Senusi brotherhood and local elements to be subordinated to any authority in regional affairs, which was actually planned as the Ottoman concept of relations with Senusis.²⁵⁸

C. British Mediation

According to Turkish sources, on the other hand, the British promised to help him in every possible way and approve his independence:

“Gayet mahremane ve müstaceldir. Bizzat hal olunacaktır.

25/12/1330

²⁵⁶ ATASE Archive: f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-336.

²⁵⁷ ATASE Archive: f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-336; f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-9. Seyyid also told Ahmed Cemal Pasha that he could not move due to the lack of ammunition and provisions and demanded a large amount of money from him. See; ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 6.

²⁵⁸ Simon, 158-159.

Senusi hazretleri evamir-i devletlerini büyük bir süratle telakki ve İskenderiye havalisine kadar garp kısmı kamilen Senusiler tarafından işgal edilmiş ise de İngilizler buna muhanaanet? etmemişler ve bilakis mahtuniyet? göstermişlerdir ve hatta Senusi hazretlerine Afrika halifeliği de uhdesinde olmak üzere Mısır Sultanlığı teklif edilmiş fakat muhakkarane red eylemiştir...”²⁵⁹

Colonel Snow and Major Royle, the British officers serving as coastguard officers in Egypt and the Egyptian officer Adib Efendi paid frequent visits to Seyyid to achieve these aims and persuade him to have the Turkish officers excluded from his entourage.²⁶⁰

Seyyid Idris, the cousin of Seyyid Ahmed, seems to have played the major role in getting British assistance. As early as the beginning of March 1915, *Teşkilat* agents like Yusuf Şetvan²⁶¹ suspected that Seyyid Idris, who was in Mecca now, had concluded an agreement with the British for financial and military assistance:

“Osmaniye’den Başkumandanlık Vekalet-i Celilesine mevrud şifredir.

Gayet müstaceldir.

Abdüsselam, Şeyh’nın biraderi Muhammed Sadik ile beraber bugün hareket etdi. Kendisi Seyyid İdris’i getireceğine dair Seyyid Ahmed eş-Şerif’ten aldığı vesika ile Sahra’dan İskenderiye’ye ve oradan vapurla Beyrut’a gelmiştir. İfadesine nazaran Seyyid İdris İngilizlerle muhabere etmesi için Seyyid Ahmed eş-Şerif’e mektup yazmış ve bu mektubun vusûlünden sonra Mısır’dan bir İngiliz binbaşısı Seyyid Ahmed eş-Şerif’e gelip kendileriyle muharebe vuku bulmayacağına dair teminat alarak avdet etmiş ve İtalyanlarla harbe devam edilmesi için teşvikan bulunduğu gibi Türklerin İngilizler nazarında Almanlardan farkı bulunmadığını beyan etmiştir... Abdüsselam’a ve gerekse Muhammed Sadik’a esrar tevdi caiz değildir. Bunlarla beraber kendileriyle harbe devam için İngilizlerin Seyyid

²⁵⁹ ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 1-1.

²⁶⁰ Al-Askari, 58. “At Sollum Lieut.-Colonel C. L. Snow, of the Egyptian Coastguard, was in charge of the Western Frontier. Upon this officer, intimately acquainted with the local Bedouin, fell the hard task of negotiating with the Senussi, preventing, so far as possible, intrigues in Egypt through the channel of his followers in the country, and at the same time preserving the Moslem leader’s indubitable respect for British authority and god faith.” See, *History of the Great War*, 104.

²⁶¹ Yusuf Şetvan, an important *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* agent in North Africa, was the former deputy of Trablusgarb in the Ottoman Parliament.

Ahmed eş-Şerif'e vaki olan teşvikatını ve Seyyid İdris'i bu maksatla davet eylediğini iŝar ederek İtalyanları İngilizler aleyhine... tahrik mümkündür.

Yusuf Ŗetvan"²⁶²

Those two Senusi members who were accused of mediating between the British and Seyyid Idris, namely Abdüsselam Efendi and Muhammed Sadik, were therefore interrogated by Hulusi Bey, the governor of Syria.²⁶³ According to their statements, upon the declaration of Jihad, Seyyid Ahmed called back Idris who was influential among the Arabs around Sellum and was now based in Mecca.

The letter in which Seyyid Ahmed called Seyyid Idris back to Sellum was handed to Idris by the *kaymakam* of Ecedabiye, Ali Efendi al-Abidin, who was presented in the letter as the closest man of Seyyid Ahmed. Seyyid Ahmed also requested Idris to send Ali Efendi al-Abidin directly to Enver Pasha²⁶⁴ to whom he was going to tell the details of the resistance in Libya and present the needs of the Senusis:

“Ahmed ibn-i es-Seyyid eş-Şerif es-Senusi hazretleri tarafından es-Seyyid Muhammed İdris el-Mehdi es-Senusi hazretlerine.... yazılan mektubun tercümesi:

Bade'l elkab ve'd-dua:

Devlet-i Aliyye'ye karşı memnun ve minnettar olduğunuzu müşir mektubunuz vasıl oldu...Ecdadımız Ecedabiye Kaymakamı Ali Efendi el-Abidin sizce meçhul olmayan esbabdan dolayı bildiremediğim umur-i hurüriyeyi bildirmek için tarafınıza gelmiştir. Biz, muma leyhi ancak sırrımızda pek ketum olduğu için zatımız vekil olarak gönderdik. Zira himmet ve hizmeti emr-i İslama sarf edeceği hakkında kendisine pek büyük emniyetimiz vardır. Siz de bu adamı meşhur dostumuza [Enver Pasha] gönderirseniz kendilerine efkarımızı ariz ve amik arz eder... Aman gecikmeyesin! Siz de bade'l hacc asla tehir etmeden süratle ve herhangi hile ile olursa olsun buraya geliniz. Zira vücudunuza mütevakkıf işler pek çoktur ve bana sizin kadar elverişli de pek azdır...

²⁶² ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 8.

²⁶³ ATASE Archive: f: 1849, d: 103, I: 1-6 and f: 1863, d: 153, I: 8.

²⁶⁴ For security reasons, Seyyid Ahmed in his letter calls Enver Pasha “our famous friend”.

Tercüme aslına mutabıktır...²⁶⁵

Although the letter by Seyyid Ahmed was dated 16 September, Idris sent Ali Efendi to Enver Pasha on 8 January 1915 and the reason behind this delay was alleged by Idris to be the illness of Ali Efendi.²⁶⁶

Having received Seyyid Ahmed's letter, Idris who did not want to be stopped by the British during his journey wrote a letter back to Seyyid Ahmed, which he believed was going to be opened by the British. In the letter, Idris recommended Seyyid Ahmed not to get involved in a war against the British.²⁶⁷ However, this assertion made by the men of Seyyid Idris was not enough to make *Teşkilat* agents believe that Idris was not pro-British. Since, the agents not only have known the correspondence between Seyyid Ahmed and Idris as explained above, but they also got the letter of Ali al-Abidin, a Senusi Şeyh who seems to have worked for the Ottomans, addressed to Enver Pasha through the governor of Halep, Celal Bey, in which it was told that Idris met someone, most probably a British officer, while he was in Mecca.²⁶⁸ When this suspicion combined with the illness of Ali Efendi al-Abidin, which appears to have been a pretext, the trustworthiness of the aides of Seyyid Idris was overshadowed.

Again, according to Ottoman sources, having received Seyyid Idris' letter, which was alleged to be written for the sake of safe journey from Mekke to Sellum, Seyyid Ahmed was visited by a British major, most probably by Major Royle, who offered to

²⁶⁵ ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 3.

²⁶⁶ The illness of Ali Efendi al-Abidin, which seems to have been a mere pretext, was asserted in the letter Seyyid Idris wrote to Enver Pasha on 8 January 1915. See; ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 3-2.

²⁶⁷ ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 8. and f: 1849, d: 103, I: 1-6.

²⁶⁸ ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 9.

help Seyyid in every possible way.²⁶⁹ Seyyid Ahmed who wanted to make sure if this offer was real or not demanded a great deal of ammunition, money, and armaments. Although the demands were not met, the British closed their eyes to the provision coming from İskenderiye to Sellum and conducted themselves well with Senusi soldiers, upon which Seyyid carried on to be neutral.²⁷⁰

Meanwhile, a German spy Mannesmann was trying to persuade Seyyid Ahmed to attack Egypt while the German Consul in Morocco, Propester, at a meeting with Seyyid Ahmed in December 1915 agreed to provide him with every kind of assistance available.²⁷¹ Upon the increasing German influence,²⁷² Enver Pasha who did not like the prospect of an independent state of Senusis, ordered Nuri to cut off the communication between the Germans and Senusis.²⁷³ Enver Pasha also mentioned that all the German and Austrian officers were under the command of Nuri Pasha who was given the power to expel the officers who do not act in accordance with the instructions they were given by Nuri Pasha.²⁷⁴ Discomfort on the Ottoman side was so much that Eric Von Falkenheim, German Chief of Staff, informed the Ottoman Chief of Staff on 11

²⁶⁹ "... İfadesine nazaran [Abdüsselam and Muhammed Sadik] Seyyid İdris İngilizlerle muharebe etmemesi için Seyyid Ahmed eş-şerif'e mukaddema mektup yazmış ve bu mektubun vusülünden sonra Mısır'dan bir İngiliz binbaşısı Seyyid Ahmed eş-Şerif'e gelip kendileriyle muharebe vuku bulmayacağına dair teminat alarak avdet etmiş..." See, ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 8.

²⁷⁰ ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 9-1; f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-336.

²⁷¹ ATASE Archive: f: 1849, d: 103, I: 1-39.

²⁷² That was why Nuri Pasha was asked by the Supreme Command whether or not he wanted all the German officers related to Seyyid Ahmed out of the region. See; ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 41.

²⁷³ ATASE Archive: f: 1849, d: 103, I: 1-37.

²⁷⁴ "Atina Sefaretine [8/9/1331]: Atina'daki şifrenin Nuri Bey'e irsali rica olunur. Trablusgarp ve Bingazi'de çalışmak üzere oralara gelen Alman veya Avusturyalı memurlar kaffeten emriniz altındadır. Tarafınızdan verilecek talimat haricinde çalışan veya makasid takib eden kimseleri bulundukları mevkilerden harice çıkarabilirsiniz. Bunlar hiçbir suretle Seyyid Ahmed eş-Şerif ile doğruca...ve Seyyid Ahmed eş-Şerif'in de doğruca ve sair ile tesis-i münasebeti menut? edemezler." See, ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 28.

November 1915 that they had no political intentions in Libya and the spy Mannesmann²⁷⁵ would never be anywhere near Seyyid Ahmed:

“Cezal Fon Falkenhayn’ın Pless’den 11 Teşrin-i Sani 1915 tarihli telgrafı:

Enver Paşa hazretlerine,
Miralay Fon Losso vasıtasıyla bana bildirilen Trablus’daki muvaffakiyetlere çok sevindim. Almanya’nın Trablus’da siyasi hiç bir alakası yoktur...Mannesmann Senusi’nin yanından ayrılmıştır. Oraya avdet etmeyecektir...²⁷⁶

D. Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’s Means of Pressure

Control over the inflow and distribution of money, armaments, and equipment were the *Teşkilat*’s main means of pressure. Nuri had strict control over all the supplies provided by the Ottomans from his camp in Bir-i Vaar. It should be worth noting here that the logistical support against the British was initially provided with sail ships and boats coming from the shores of Syria, Aegean, and Mediterranean. Afterwards, the shipments were made by German submarines. The first supply campaign was made from the Kiel port. Then, the shipments were carried from the Pola port near the Adriatic shores of Austria. According to Turkish sources, these shipments reveal the close cooperation between the German Naval attaché and the *Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi*.²⁷⁷

The Senusi encampment on the other hand was in el-Masaid.²⁷⁸ Under the supervision of Muhammad Bashir al-Tunisi, there was also a munitions store here where

²⁷⁵ For detailed information on German spy Mannesmann; ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 39; f: 1863, d: 153, I: 39-1; f: 1863, d: 153, I: 39-2; f: 1863, d: 153, I: 39-3; f: 1863, d: 153, I: 39-4; f: 1863, d: 153, I: 39-5; f: 1863, d: 153, I: 39-6; f: 1863, d: 153, I: 39-7; f: 1863, d: 153, I: 39-8.

²⁷⁶ ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 27.

²⁷⁷ *Libya Harekatı*, 809.

²⁷⁸ Simon, 158-159.

arms and ammunitions were repaired.²⁷⁹ The existence of separate camps was a sign of worsening mutual relations between the Ottomans and Senusis. Furthermore, Seyyid Ahmed took some measures to weaken Ottoman influence, for instance, by dispatching Ottoman officers to the hinterland so as to isolate them. A slight improvement on the part of Ottomans realized when 35 men, most of whom were sons of local notables, returned to the region from Istanbul where they had been sent by Enver Pasha in 1912 to get an education in the military academy. He also benefited from the internal conflicts within the Senusi leadership by inciting Seyyid Hilal, one of the brothers of Seyyid, to recruit an army of his own from Egypt.²⁸⁰ Although the force was small, it constituted a threat to his brother's position. Thus, Nuri's measures coupled with the better military knowledge of Ottomans as well as the flow of Ottoman officers to Libya in increasing numbers during 1915, paved the ground for Seyyid's further dependency on the Ottomans.²⁸¹

Upon the constant insistence of Nuri, Seyyid Ahmed brought forward some conditions for the Ottomans as well.²⁸² That was expected by the Ottoman side because "he was active on Wadai front and had been fighting the Italians all along the coast of North Africa from Sillum to the Tunisian border. He could not be expected to place his army and supplies at risk before he was certain of the amount of assistance the Ottoman government was prepared to give him..."²⁸³ Nuri informed him that there was no way both to get the great amount of cannons and to make the Italians retreat by the

²⁷⁹ Al-Askari, 58.

²⁸⁰ The Ottoman government granted Seyyid Hilal a military medal for his services and loyalty. See; ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 30-1.

²⁸¹ Simon, 158-161.

²⁸² ATASE Archive: f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-336; f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-9.

²⁸³ Al-Askari, 58.

intermediation of the Ottomans. However, Nuri guaranteed to supply cannons, ammunition, and provision once enough combatants were provided:

“Başkumandanlık Vekalet-i Celilesi’ne

20 Mayıs? 331
Bizzat açılacaktır.

Seyyid Hazretleriyle müteaddid defalar görüştüm. İngilizlere karşı hareket için İtalyanların taarruz itmemesi ve mümkün ise Bingazi’den çıkmalarının tavassut edilmesini ve bundan maada top, tüfenk, cephane ve erzâğın temin edilmesini taleb ediyor. İtalyanların Bingazi’den çıkmalarının tavassut ile mümkün olmayacağını ve top meselesinin kabil olmadığını söyledim. Hükümet ancak erzak ve tüfenk ve cephane meselesini temin eder dedim...Bendeniz ve sair zabitan Sellum’de Seyyid hazretlerinin nezdinde bulunuyorum. Emrinize göre hareket edileceği arz olunur.

Nuri”²⁸⁴

Senusi’s demand of financial and military assistance had to immediately be relayed to Enver Pasha partly because some of the Tripolitanian officers like Dr. Abdul Salam were about to hand over Turkish officers to the British and partly this aid was needed by the *Teşkilat* officers in order to arrange the military structure of the Senusi army which was based on tribal lines.²⁸⁵ No appropriate person however could be found for this perilous mission and finally Cafer Askeri volunteered for it.²⁸⁶

E. Cafer el-Askeri’s Mission to Get Military Equipment and Money

Actually such a mission was undertaken by Gazzeli Cemal Efendi during early March. To get the necessary equipments for the campaign against the western frontier of Egypt, Cemal Efendi was sent to Anatolia by Nuri Pasha and Seyyid Ahmed. Having landed at

²⁸⁴ ATASE Archive: f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-336; f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-9.

²⁸⁵ Al-Askari, 58.

²⁸⁶ ATASE Archive: f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-9.

Fethiye on 9 March 1915, he settled down to work for gathering ammunitions to be transported to Libya in ten days. This is understood from the letter by Menteşe Mutasarrıfı, Müştak?, sent to the Supreme Command:

“Dün akşam Şeyh Senusi hazretleri nezdinden Gazzeli Cemal Bey bir yelkenli ile Fethiye’ye gelmiş, Mısır Ordusu Kumandanı Cemal Paşa’ya söylemek üzere, kaymakamın şifresiyle atideki ifadatı vermiştir. Muma ileyhın Muğla’ya, buradan da İstanbul’a geleceği ve binaenaleyh paraya ihtiyacı olduğunu kaymakam yazıyor. Cevaben, Fethiye’den buraya müreffehen gönderilmesini, buradan da İstanbul’a kadar mesarır-ı lazımenin temin ve ihzar olunacağını bildiririm:

Bugün Senusi hazretleri canibinden tekrar avdet etdim...Garp cihetinden hareket için verilen emr-i devletlerine gelince, cephanenin müthiş bir derecede fıkdanı hasebiyle bendelerini bir yelkenli kayığıyla mahalle-i Osmaniye’ye gönderdiler. Fethiye’ye çıktım. Harbiye nezareti vasıtasıyla bi’l muhabere mümkün olduğu kadar cephane kaçıracağım. Memurlarınızdan bitait? görmezsem, on güne kadar mühimmatı irsal edeceğim. Taarruz için oraca lazım gelen herşey ihzar edilmiştir. İngilizler Senusi hazretlerinden fevkalade korkmaktadırlar. Geçen gün Arap askerlerinin de Mısır ve İngiliz askerlerini harp ve tahkir etmeleri üzerine İngiliz ordu kumandanı... müracaat etmiş ve bazı taarruz hazırlıkları müşahade ettiğini söylemiştir. Senusi hazretleri ‘benim efendim vardır, ondan emir aldıktan sonra ben size hücumda tereddüd etmem’ cevabını vermiştir. Burada ‘efendim’ tabirinin Hükümet-i Osmaniye’ye olduğunu İngilizler idrak etmiştir. Katiyyen bir sebep ihdas etmemek için bütün kuvvetlerini sarf etmekte olduklarını, fakat, meselenin cephaneye muallak bulunduğunu arz eylerim...

Gazzeli Cemal²⁸⁷

In the meantime, however, he was ordered to travel to the headquarters of Supreme Command in Istanbul via Muğla²⁸⁸ for an unspecified reason²⁸⁹ and the expected equipments were not sent to Libya.

Having provided a document certifying that he was one of the Senusi Brethren in Kufrah going to pilgrimage with two other Senusis, namely Seyyid Muhammad and

²⁸⁷ ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 1-1.

²⁸⁸ At Muğla, he would be the guest of *Menteşe Mutasarrıfı Müştak?*. See; ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 1-1.

²⁸⁹ ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 1.

Seyyid Mustafa al-Madani, Cafer el-Askeri made his way to the headquarters of Cemal Pasha, the commander of the 4th Army.²⁹⁰ They were received in İskenderiye by one of the Senusi agents, Seyyid Muhammad al-Hani and stayed there for ten days. Having reached Yafa by an Italian steamer, they arrived at Jerusalem where Cafer al-Askeri left his companions and set out to meet with Cemal Pasha in Syria.²⁹¹ Cemal Pasha, though highly busy suppressing Arab nationalists in Syria and did not have means and time to invade Egypt, promised to meet some of the needs and provide a sailing ship for their return.²⁹² He also sent Cafer's detailed report about the Senusis and their demands after which Enver Pasha mentioned in a telegram that the supplies would begin to be sent by submarines and by all other means from time to time.²⁹³ He then went to Halep to meet the governor, Celal Bey, who was ordered by Cemal Pasha to give all logistical support Cafer demanded. There he also managed to obtain a certain amount of money order from Ali Efendi, a tradesman, to be withdrawn on his associates in İskenderiye, namely Ebubekir Trablusi and Semakiyezade Abdurrahman Efendi:

“Başkumandanlık Vekalet-i Celilesine

23 Mayıs 331

Cemal Paşa Hazretleri bir miktar erzak ve cephane verecektir. Bendeniz Yafa veyahud Hayfa civarından müşarun ileyh vasıtasıyla tedarik edilecek bir yelkenli veyahud küçük bir vapur ile tekrar avdet edeceğim. Nuri Bey'e arz buyurulan iki bin kadar muaddel martın tufengin verilmesini istirham ediyorum. Erzak için İskenderiye'de Ebubekir Trablusi ile görüşdüm. Haleb'de bulunan şeriki Semakiyezade Abdurrahman ve Ali Efendilere verilecek para mukabilinde Nuri Bey'in isteyeceği erzak ve parayı verecektir...

²⁹⁰ ATASE Archive: f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-9; Al-Askari, 60.

²⁹¹ ATASE Archive: f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-9; Al-Askari, 61.

²⁹² ATASE Archive: f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-9.

²⁹³ Al-Askari, 64.

Cafer”²⁹⁴

Following this, he met Bekir Sami Bey, the governor of Beyrut, where he obtained material support and was helped by Ali Saib Bey²⁹⁵ with the official formalities.²⁹⁶ There he purchased a sailing ship through Ahmad Pasha Sharqawi and Khalil Pasha Abdul Aal and loaded it with armaments and munitions as well as the dry foodstuffs that were sent from Şam. Then Cafer, along with his friends Prince Adil Arslan and Naji Bey al-Asil set sail to Alanya from where they reached the Port-Süleyman of North African coast in a week.²⁹⁷

Cafer, however, had been through much trouble in providing the needed materials. For instance, he once asked the Chief of Staff about the situation of the transportation vessel on which he expected to bring 600 riffles and 500 boxes of ammunition.²⁹⁸ He found out however that the ship which departed from Piraeus, laden with armaments and ammunition met a British vessel on its way and had to unload its burdens into the sea.²⁹⁹ Furthermore, his correspondence with Istanbul³⁰⁰ generally

²⁹⁴ ATASE Archive: f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-9 and f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-9A. Also see, Al-Askari, 62.

²⁹⁵ Deputy for Urfa in the Turkish National Assembly and alleged to be one of the plotters against Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's life.

²⁹⁶ Al-Askari, 62.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 63-64. For the insights of Mehmet Emin Bey, an Ottoman officer who had been engaged in the mission of Cafer Bey to get equipment and money, into this journey, see; M. Ercan Arıkan, “Dedem Mehmet Emin Bey ve Trablusgarp Hatıraları”, *Kebikeç*, no. 16, 165-198.

²⁹⁸ “Kanun-i Sani'de Pire'de [Piraeus] satın alınan küçük vapur ile kaçakçı... bir haber alınamadı. 600 kara tüfeng ile 500 sandık kara cephanesi getireceklerdi. Atina Sefareti meseleden haberdardır...” See, ATASE Archive: f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-9A.

²⁹⁹ ATASE Archive: f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-10.

³⁰⁰ During his stay in Beirut, Cafer generally corresponded with the first aide-de-camp (Harbiye Nazırı Ser Yaveri) of Enver Pasha, Kazım. “Şam'da 4. Ordu Müfettişliği'ne [3 Mayıs 331] / Cafer Bey'e mahsusdur. 4 dürbün ve üç eğer takımı yoldadır. Beyrut Müdafa Kumandanlığı'na gönderilmiştir. Süslü tabancalar hazır değildir. Yedi tane yaptırılmaktadır. Dört takım sırmalı ulema elbisesi de ısmarlanmıştır. Cemal Paşa hazretlerine ulema elbisesi gönderiyorum. Dedikleri için burada hazırlanmış idi. 150 mavzer filintasının 4. Ordu mıntkasından tefrik olunarak size verilmesi 4. Ordu Kumandanlığı'na yazıldı. Nuri Bey'in elbisesi de hazırdır. Beyrut'tan ne gün hareket edeceğinizi bildiriniz. Ana göre hareket edeyim. Size yetiştiremezsek başka vasıta arıyoruz, onunla göndeririz. / Harbiye Nazırı Seryaveri Kazım” See; ATASE Archive: f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-14.

turned out to be useless. For instance, he mentioned in a telegram addressed to the Chief of Staff, dated 12 June 1915 that the supplies he received were not what he demanded, so he wanted at least half of the supplies he ordered to be sent within the shortest possible time.³⁰¹

F. Organization of the Forces in Libya

Nuri Pasha received an order from the Supreme Command on 9 August 1915, upon which the *Teşkilat* established a military and political intelligence bureau in Sillum. Its duty was to reconnoiter, incite the populace on the eve of the invasion attempt, to make Egyptian soldiers to change sides, and presumably to get intelligence on the Egyptian Nationalist Party, *Hizb al- Vatani*, though not specified in that order. The bureau would be run, similar to the *merkez-i umumi* in Yafa, by three people, namely Captain Hasan Fehmi³⁰², first Lieutenant Mısırlı Ahmed ebu Ali³⁰³, and first Lieutenant Mısırlı Lütü Efendi³⁰⁴; they would also be promoted in rank. Lieutenant Muhammed Zeki Şükrü Efendi and Lieutenant Doctor Desuki (?) were also employed later in the bureau:

“...Enver Paşa’ya yazılan 27 Temmuz 331 tarihli tahriratın müsveddesi suretidir.

Sillum’de riyaset-i aliye tahtında bir istihbarat-ı askeriye ve siyasiye şubesi vücuda getirilip, ana göre istidlaata tevessül edilmek ve Mısır dahilinde lazım gelen tedabiri istihsal ile Ordu-yı Hümayun [4. Ordu] hareket ettiği vakit hizmet ve muavenet için Mısır’da şimdiden bir kuvvet temini teşebbüsünde bulunmak üzere bu yolda şimdiden icab eden tedabir ve tertibatın icrası lazımeden bulunduğundan bu maksad için maiyyet-i

³⁰¹ ATASE Archive: f: 1829, d: 6, I: 1-30.

³⁰² Hasan Fehmi: Captain in the *Maiyet-i Seniyye* company.

³⁰³ First lieutenant Mısırlı Ahmed ebu Ali: quartermaster in the headquarters of the Supreme Command, 1st regiment, regular 1st battalion.

³⁰⁴ First Lieutenant Mısırlı Lütü Efendi: reserve officer in the 4th company of the *Maltepe Endaht Mektebi*.

seniyye bölümünde yüzbaşı Mısırlı Muhammed Hasan Fehmi ve baş kumandanlık karagahında müstahdem olan 1. alayın müretteb 1. taburu iâşe zabiti mülazım-ı evvel Mısırlı Ahmed Ebu Ali ve Maltepe? Endaht mektebinde 4. bölükte ihtiyat zabıt namzedi Mısırlı Lütî Efendiler orada bulundukları müddetçe birer derece...rütbe mahsusatı verilmek ve Muhammed Zeki Şükrü ve ed-doktor Desuki? Efendiler itibari olarak mülazım-ı sani mahsusatıyla istihdam olunmak üzere oraya gönderilmişlerdir. Mumaileyhümadan Muhammed Hasan ve Lütî Efendilerin mahsusat-ı ilm ü haberleri yerlerine tevdi edilmiş ve Ahmet Efendi'nin ilm ü haberi ise orada ihraz edeceği rütbesinin mahsusatı buraca ailesine tesviye olunmak üzere talebi vechile burada alıkonulmuştur. Diğer üç zatın yedlerinde ilm ü haber olmayıp tahsisatları vusüllerinden itibaren oraca tesviye olunacaktır. Maksada göre icraat-ı fiiliye etmeniz menuttur?.”³⁰⁵

Also, a battalion called *nümune* was formed under the command of Captain Emir with the armaments and equipments Cafer Bey brought.³⁰⁶ In the meantime, an infantry battalion (3 infantry companies, 123 soldiers each; a heavy machine gun unit; an engineering unit) was formed under the command of the *Teşkilat* in İstanbul and arrived at Bodrum via Milas and Göcek on 16 October 1915. From there, they travelled to Libya by two sailing ships accompanied by a German submarine (U-35). In a couple of days, they went ashore on the west of Sellum and joined the Senusi headquarters at Bir-i Vaar.³⁰⁷ According to the information of Hüsameddin Bey, one of the *Teşkilat* agents, the organization of this regular battalion was as follows:

1. “Senior Captain İsmail Hakkı Efendi, the commander of the battalion
2. Captain Cafer Ulvi, the commander of the 1st company; Captain Nail Efendi, the medical officer; Captain Veli Efendi, aide-de-camp; Mehmed Nuri Efendi, paymaster and clerk assistant; lieutenant Salih Zeki, documentalist;

³⁰⁵ ATASE Archive: 1863, d: 153, I: 16 and 1863, d: 153, I: 16-1.

³⁰⁶ *Numune* was sort of a model training unit whose troops trained for junior command duties and to fulfill special tasks. See; Simon, 162.

³⁰⁷ *Libya Harekatı*, 111.

lieutenant Nazif Efendi, supply and procurement officer; assignee officer Ahmet Hulusi, quartermaster.

3. Captain Ömer Fevzi, the commander of the 1st company; assignee officers Hüsnü Efendi and Emre Efendi, assignees of the 1st unit of the 1st company.
4. Lieutenant Rüştü Efendi, officer of the 1st unit of the 2nd company; Mehmet Nuri and Muharrem Efendi, assignees.
5. Assignee officer Hüseyin Hüsnü, officer of the 1st unit of the 3rd company; assignee Hulusi Efendi.
6. Assignee officer Hasan Efendi, officer of the 1st unit of 4th company; assignee officers Mehmet Ali and Talat Efendi.
7. First lieutenant Cafer Efendi, engineer commander; assignee officer Mehmet Fahri Efendi, the commander of the 1st unit of machine gun; lieutenant Mevlüd Efendi, the commander of the 3rd unit.”³⁰⁸

This *Teşkilat* battalion sent to North Africa however had to contend with its existing cadre and could not reinforce its losses during the time they spent in Libya.³⁰⁹ The military forces in Libya were not properly organized until the Ottoman-Senusi invasion of Egypt that began in late November. Even though the tribes were encamped and trained separately under the command of a local officer, there was no supreme command to enhance the inter-unit coordination. From that date on, however, Senusi and the *Teşkilat* units and officers began to be organized under a general command. As a

³⁰⁸ Hamit Pehlivanlı, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Kuzey Afrika’da, 1914-1918” *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, no. 47 (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, June 2000), 430.

³⁰⁹ *Libya Harekatı*, 811.

result, *Afrika Grupları Komutanlığı* (Command of Africa Groups) came into existence, an establishment composed of 9 infantry battalions and a quarter's commandership:

- “Full General: *Fahri Ferik* Nuri (Kılılgil) Pasha
- Second in command: Cafer el-Askeri Pasha (Bağdatlı)
- The commander of the *hassa* battalion: Defdefi (Senusi)
- The commander of the *numune* battalion: Captain Emin
- The commander of the 2nd *nümune* battalion: lieutenant Teğmen Muhtar (Trablusgarplı)
- The commander of the Bir-i Vaar battalion: Giritli Nedim
- The commander of the 1st battalion: Abdullah Timsik
- The commander of the 2nd battalion: Captain Galip
- The commander of the 3rd battalion: unspecified
- The commander of the *münif* battalion: unspecified
- The commander of the artillery battalion: Captain Ziya
- The commander of the quarters formation: staff captain Tarık”³¹⁰

This commandership with the exception of a few Turkish men was almost entirely made up of local Senusi forces. Their training was conducted in accordance with the Ottoman army traditions and the orders were given in Turkish. Seyyid Ahmed was theoretically the supreme commander in accordance with the orders of the Sultan who granted him the supreme political, military, and administrative authority in the region. Nevertheless, Nuri Pasha in fact served as the supreme commander, with Cafer as his deputy. By the approval of Seyyid Ahmed, Nuri Pasha appointed Cafer el-Askeri as the

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 112.

commander of the regular forces and the tribes with the exception of the battalion called *Muhafiziyyah*³¹¹ and another battalion composed of 1,000 men at Bir-i Vaar under the command of Turkish officers.³¹² According to Cafer el-Askeri, the Senusi forces were composed of a regular battalion and battalions named after the tribes. Some of them were under the direct command of Turkish officers while some others were commanded by Seyyid. It was organized as follows:³¹³

Headquarters

The Regular battalion

The Bara'isa Battalion

The Manfah Battalion

The 'Awaqir Battalion

The Guards and School Battalions

The Tuareg (Tawariq) and Tabu Battalion

Machine Gun Unit

Artillery Unit

Cavalry Unit

Transport

³¹¹ *Muhafiziyyah*: In Cafer Askeri's own words: "These were 400 students of theology and the Qur'an, armed with the latest weapons. Their task was to act as the Senusi's bodyguard, and their duties also included mounting permanent guard over the Senusi *zawiyahs* or colleges. Their constant recital of Qur'an in a loud, low throaty drone throughout their period of guard duty presented an awesome spectacle of piety which deeply struck everyone who witnessed it." See; Al-Askari, 59.

³¹² This must be the regular battalion of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*.

³¹³ Al-Askari, 59.

G. Searching for a Fait Accompli

Nuri Pasha's preference was to move against Egypt as soon as possible, an idea which Seyyid Ahmed and his cousin Muhammed Idris did not share.³¹⁴ This point was made clear by Ahmed Cemal Pasha, in his telegram addressed to Enver Pasha, where he alludes that Seyyid Ahmed would not attack Egypt from the western frontier:

“...Abdüsselim Efendi ile beraber gelen iki Senusi şeyhi zat-ı devletlerine ve zat-ı hazret-i padişahiye hitaben Ahmed eş-Şerif’in bir arızasını da hamil etmişler. Senusi hazretleri bazı arabıyla beraber el-yevm Sellum’de bulunurlarmış. Şimdiye kadar İngilizler aleyhine hiç bir hareket-i tecavüziyede bulunmamış. Şimdi müşarunileyh bizden para istiyormuş. Bir buçuk ay evvel biraderiniz Nuri Bey 6000 lirayı hamilen buradan bir kaçakçı vasıtasıyla...hareket etmişti. Henüz vasıl olup olmadığını bilmiyorum. Bu defa işbu Abdüsselim Efeniyle beraber para göndermek münasib olup olmayacağını kestiremiyorum. Şayet bunlara para verip göndermek münasip ise Beyrut Osmanlı bankası vasıtasıyla kendilerine nisbet edeceğiniz miktarda para gönderiniz. Ben buradan bunları Beyrut’a izam ederim. Oradan dahi bir münasip vapurla Sellum’e giderler veyahud size ve zat-ı padişahiye ait mektupları hamilen İstanbul’a götürdeyim. Oraca meseleyi güzelce tetkik ettikten sonra icabını ifa buyurunuz. Herhalde Şeyh Senusi’nin 6 aydan beri hiç bir hareketde bulunmamış olmasını calib-i nazar-ı dikkat görüyorum. Bu adamların ahval-i umumiyesini bilmediğimden keyfiyeti takdir-i samilerine tevdi ederim.

4. Ordu Kumandanı
Cemal”

The British increased their contact with the Senusi from the time when Nuri came to the region³¹⁵; they were insomuch tolerance as that they did not do anything when a British submarine and a boat were fired and a soldier was killed. Neither did the British act against Seyyid Ahmed when they found out about the jihad declarations sent to the Muslim-Arabs and Indians. Since, the British did not want to antagonize the Arabs

³¹⁴ Ahmed Cemal Pasha, in his telegram addressed to Enver Pasha, alludes that Seyyid Ahmed would not attack Egypt from the western frontier. See; ATASE Archive: 1863, d: 153, I: 6.

³¹⁵ ATASE Archive: 1863, d: 153, I: 8; 1863, d: 153, I: 9; 1863, d: 153, I: 9-1, 1863, d: 153, I: 12.

while they were negotiating with the Sherif of Mekke to begin what became the Arab Revolt starting in the spring of 1916.

“Then there came accidentally into General Maxwell’s hands a packet of letters addressed by the Senussi to Moslem potentates and journalists all over Arabia and India, inciting them to a *Jihad* and informing them that he was the representative of the Khalif in Northern Africa. Despite all this, the High Commissioner and Sir J. Maxwell were directed to persevere in a friendly policy. Britain had no desire, especially at a moment when she was engaged in the negotiations with the Sherif of Mecca, ...to earn the enmity of any section of the Arab world. Moreover, Colonel Snow was still convinced that the Senussi himself was not really hostile.”³¹⁶

On the other hand, the only aim of the *Teşkilat* in the region was to make Seyyid Ahmed to attack Egypt either by persuading or compelling him. For this purpose, Nuri Pasha contemplated the formation of small guerilla units; composed of 15 to 20 local soldiers, led by *Teşkilat* agents to attack Egyptian posts. These units were constantly cutting British wire communications in Sellum with the east.³¹⁷

The idea behind this was simple: to incite the Senusis and other tribes to attack Egypt’s western frontier so that the British had to sustain a considerable number of troops along the front which extended from the Mediterranean to the south of Darfur. To this end, Germans were used in operations as well. On 4 November 1915, a German submarine (U-35) accompanied by Jamal al-Ghazzi that brought 10 officers, money, and 250 boxes of ammunition to Bardiya, sank a British armed steamer, named *Tara*, near Sellum and the ship’s crew were taken to Biri’l Hekim as prisoners of war.³¹⁸ The same day also witnessed the torpedoing of the British transport *Moorina*.³¹⁹ On 6 November, another German submarine bombarded Sellum and sank a British gunboat named *Abbas*,

³¹⁶ *History of the Great War*, 105.

³¹⁷ Hamit Pehlivanlı, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Kuzey Afrika’da, 1914-1918” 431-432; *Libya Harekatı*, 644.

³¹⁸ “*Tara*, a British armed boarding steamer, was sunk of Sellum on 5 November 1915 by a German submarine and the 91 surviving crew taken prisoner by the Senusi. They were later rescued in March 1916 in a daring raid by the Duke of Westminster’s armored cars.” See; Al-Askari, 70.

³¹⁹ *History of the Great War*, 106.

which belonged to the fleet of Egypt's coastal defense. This was followed next day by sinking of a British transportation vessel.³²⁰

As the preparations for the war were afoot, *Teşkilat* agents began to recruit men from the south and west. Especially contacts with the Awlad Ali tribes which spread along the coastline between İskenderiye and Sellum was fruitful³²¹ and they were effectively used in bringing the tribes inside the Egyptian territory during the invasion process thanks to the efforts of Seyyid Harun, a prominent Senusi who lived among the Awlad Ali tribes, and Muhammed Bey Jibril.³²² However, as both sides were taking measures and getting prepared for a possible clash, more important events took place.

Actually, Nuri Pasha had planned to attack Fort Sellum in June 1915 in order to cause hostility between the British and Senusis by a fait accompli. However, due to the proximity of Seyyid to the region, the attack was not carried out.³²³ This incident is verified by the British sources as well: “For example, a raid on Sollum was secretly planned for the night of the 15th June. Fortunately the Senussi heard a bugle-call and demanded its meaning. Finding out what was afoot, he sent the men back to their quarters and had the leaders flogged the next day. Nuri himself denied complicity in this affair.”³²⁴

A similar plan was made during November and a detachment of 50 volunteers was charged by Cafer el-Askeri with scouring Sidi Barani, lying 77 km. east to Sellum. “The Tripolitanian officer liuetenant Ahmad Mukhtar and Sayyid Abu al-Qasim – son of Sayyid ‘Isayi, who was the head of the Senusi zawiyah in Bingazi and one of the

³²⁰ *Libya Harekatı*, 645.

³²¹ Seyyid Ahmed informs the Supreme Command on 1 July 1915 that he had 500 recruited from the Awlad Ali tribe. See; ATASE Archive: 1863, d: 153, I: 3-3.

³²² Al-Askari, 66-69.

³²³ *Ibid.*, 70-71.

³²⁴ *History of the Great War*, 104.

Senusi's closest advisers and most influential ministers"³²⁵ were the ones ordered to undertake the mission.

The order was given on 22 November, and a successful raid was made, resulting in the British withdrawal of their forces and the Egyptian Coastguard on the western border of Egypt to a point which was closer to İskenderiye, Mersa Matruh. Upon this, Major Royle was sent to Seyyid Ahmed and asked the reason for such a raid. Ahmed got so angry with this raid launched that was beyond his cognizance that he scolded Nuri and Cafer. Following this, Seyyid Ahmed alarmed the quarters by trumpets in order to gather all of them and give an end to such incidents. The British agents supposing that it was a gathering for a general march against Sellum immediately turned to Sellum to inform their commanders. Having already suspected such an attack, the British began to evacuate Sellum, which they had fortified during the first half of November for a possible clash.³²⁶ Seyyid however sent men to the British commanders to explain. Meanwhile, Arabs hearing about the evacuation plundered Sellum during the time elapsed. After that, Seyyid charged a detachment under the command of Cafer el-Askari so as to stop the raid of Sidi Barani at the end of which lieutenant Ahmed Muhtar was killed.³²⁷ However, this was of no use for Seyyid and the flow of events compelled him to oppose the British.

“Maruz-ı bendeleridir

3 Kanun-i Evvel 331

...Seyyid Hilal Paşa hazretlerinin...hidemat-ı vatanperveranesiyle din düşmanımız olan İngiltere devlet-i aduvenesıyla hesabı görmek üzere

³²⁵ Al-Askari, 72.

³²⁶ *Libya Harekati*, 645-646. See also Appendix H for the forces of both Ottomans and the British on the western border, and the British evacuation of the Sellum.

³²⁷ ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 30.

Mısır'a taarruza istirdad olunmuştur. Bugün Nuri Paşa Matruh havalisindedir. Bilahare Seyyid Ahmed eş-Şerif bu hareket-ı taarruziyeye... iştiraka mecbur olmuştur. Bu hareketin pişdarı olan kahraman zabitanımızdan mülazım Muhtar Efendi idam etdirilmiştir...

Seyyid Hilal Paşa”³²⁸

H. Invasion of Egypt and British Counter-attack

Finally, as a result of Nuri Bey's fait accompli, the attack on the western desert started at the end of November.³²⁹ The timing of the invasion was largely determined by the beginning of the German submarine service to Libya which to a great extent increased the inflow of supplies.³³⁰ Rachel Simon, on the basis of the British intelligence and other military reports, states that:

“the invasion took place along two main axes which were divided into four sub-axes: the northern axis took in the coastal sub-axis from Solum [Sellum] to Matruh which was under the command of Nuri, and included a German chief-to-staff and Sidi Rida' al-Senusi. The second northern axis passed south of Suwani towards Daba' and Buhayrah and was commanded by Ja'far and his deputy Sidi Hilal. The southern axes included one that advanced towards Wadi Harun and another that advanced towards Siwa and Fayum, both under the command of Musa Bey. Ahmad al-Sharif was at first with the northern forces of Nuri and Ja'far and afterwards moved to the southern route.”³³¹

The *Teşkilat*-Senusi units were successful at the beginning and took hold of Sellum in November. Following this, Nuri Bey advanced to further east, to Sidi Barani, and then to Mersa Matruh and captured it. The oasis of Siwa was also taken in mid-

³²⁸ *Libya Harekatı*, 646-648.

³²⁹ ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 30; Cela Tevfik Karasapan, *Libya: Trablusgarp, Bingazi ve Fizan*, (Ankara: Resimli Posta Matbaası, 1960), 223-224.

³³⁰ Simon, 163.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, 163-164.

December.³³² In the meanwhile, the Command of Africa Groups was reinforced by a significant number of deserters from the Egyptian Coast guard as well as local population.³³³ Having seen both that such military support, combined with the growing Egyptian nationalism against the British invaders could end up with a large-scale religious rebellion in Egypt that might spread to other regions like Sudan and that they were threatened both from behind (Darfur) and flanks, the British under the command of General Payton began to attach serious forces to the western desert. During January 1916 the British launched their counter-attack and after a number of clashes, the *Teşkilat* and Senusi forces were defeated in February at Elakakir, lying west of Matruh. Nuri Bey managed to withdraw but Cafer Askeri and his men were taken prisoner. On 24 March, the British took back the control of Sellum, forcing Seyyid Ahmed to retreat to the south, to the oasis of Farfara where loyal Senusi tribes lived.³³⁴ With the loss of Sellum, there was no hope for the Ottomans and Germans to threaten Egypt from its western borders. Nevertheless, the British invaders had to concentrate troops of 40.000 soldiers in the western desert towards the end of the war,³³⁵ whose absence was largely felt on the European fronts.

I. Cooperation with the Sultanate of Darfur in Sudan

The final operational base of the *Teşkilat*, though very limited, in conjunction with the attacks against Egypt was the Sultanate of Darfur that laid to the west of the Kordofan

³³² *Libya Harekatı*, 649-674. See also Appendix I for the march of Senusi-*Teşkilat* forces against the east, the first encounter with the British forces, and the places of subsequent operations.

³³³ For the legal procedure for a deserter to join the Ottoman force, see; ATASE Archive: f: 1829, d: 7, I: 1-62; f: 1829, d: 7, I: 1-64; f: 1829, d: 7, I: 1-80; for the reinforcement see; *Libya Harekatı*, 648.

³³⁴ ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 32.

³³⁵ Simon, 167; also see, Karasapan, 223.

Province of the Sudan. Annexed to Egyptian Sudan in 1874, the autonomous Sultanate of Darfur was established following the Mahdi Rebellion (1881) by Ali Dinar. Having deserted the Dervish Army, the army of Mahdi (1881-1898), with his followers before the battle of Omdurman (1898), Ali Dinar fled to Darfur where he established his authority in the capital, El Fasher. From then, he paid to the Sudanese Government a nominal tribute, which he refused to continue after the outbreak of World War I.

This change in Ali Dinar's attitude against the British is comprehensible. First of all, he increasingly felt the French pressure of expansion to the West, upon which he expected the assistance from the Sudanese Government. Nevertheless, he would never be provided with the help he anticipated. The British turned a deaf ear to Darfur upon the occupation of the Sultanate of Wadai in 1909 and a part of Dar Masalit in 1911 by French forces.³³⁶ "These annexations worried Khartoum [the capital of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan] because no delimitation of borders between French and British controlled territories had been agreed, nor was any possible so long as Ali Dinar maintained his independence."³³⁷ The Anglo-French alliance in World War I, on the other hand, paved the way for Ali Dinar to be more explicit in his attitudes and the Ottoman entry into the war, combined with the subsequent deposition of the Egyptian Khedive stiffened his belligerent stand against British rule. Having already been ill-disposed towards British rule, Ali Dinar was further instigated through the propaganda of the *Teşkilat* mission to both the Senusis and himself personally. Thus, the origins of Ali Dinar's claim of Jihad

³³⁶ Long before World War I, as early as 1909, the records at Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi in İstanbul reveal that there was an ongoing contact between the Ottoman government and Sultanate of Darfur. For instance, one record indicates that Ali Dinar sent a man, named Mehmed Şeyh Secovi Efendi to the governor of Hicaz to take an Ottoman flag as a sign of their obedience to the Sublime Port. See BOA, DH. MUİ. 45. 1/36.

³³⁷ P. M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922: a political history* (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press), 128.

against the British Government should be sought not only in the deteriorating relations between the Darfur and Sudan Government, to a great extent, due to the Anglo-French rivalry in the region, but also in the capacity of the *Teşkilat*, being aware of the reasons grounded the aggressive posture of Ali Dinar towards the British, in taking the advantage of the circumstances.

In fact, Senusi influence extended through the desert down into Darfur and the documentary evidence proves that there was co-operation in their actions. This strategic co-operation, more explicitly, the struggle for the coincidence of the attack of Senusi against Egypt along the coast and from Siwa through the oases with an attack by the Sultan of Darfur was nevertheless not the work of Seyyid Ahmed or Ali Dinar, but of the *Teşkilat*. Although Seyyid Ahmed might have desired the creation of a Libyan state by being troublesome on the Western front with Ali Darfur, it is an undeniable fact that this was merely a part of the Ottoman-German plan to secure the retention of as much British troops as possible in Egypt. It is also true that the co-operated invasion of Egypt by Senusis from the West and Darfur from the South was originally planned to synchronize with an attack from the east, Sinai. Nonetheless, this plan could not be executed due to the campaign in Gallipoli (1915-1916), which brought further military and organizational difficulties for the Ottomans. As a result, the Ottomans had to decide on a much limited plan and the forces in Sinai would carry on threatening the Canal by guerilla attacks to give the British the impression that a large-scale attack was on the way.

“It is often said by writers, and the view seems to have been held by British intelligence, though I do not know on what evidence, that he [Seyyid Ahmed] intended to link up a revolt (November 1915) of Ali Dinar, the Sultan of Darfur in the Egyptian

Sudan, though the Sultan had never been friendly towards the Senusiya. It is quite possible that the Turks or the Sayyid, or both, had some such crazy plan.”³³⁸ says Evans-Pritchard. One should free himself/herself from this dominant viewpoint of historiography which holds that the cooperation between Ali Darfur and the Senusis was just a short-lived dream of 1915-1916 since 30 correspondences exchanged between them, spanning a time interval of 16 years (1900-1916), published by Jay Spaulding and Lidwien Kapteijns indicate that “there existed a real, passionately felt alliance, balanced in reciprocity according to changing historical vicissitudes.”³³⁹

As the war clouds drew on, Ali Dinar was concerned with the fate of the arms and ammunition he purchased from Kufra, which were never been delivered to Darfur.³⁴⁰ Most of the documents embracing 1914-1915 focus upon the collection of this debt and Muhammed Abid was held responsible for the protracted delay in this delivery. Ali Dinar was in great need of arms due to deteriorating relations with Anglo-Egyptian authorities in Khartoum. In order to establish contact with the Senusis and to collect the 10000 rounds of ammunition Muhammed Abid owed for the last three years, Ali Dinar sent Ghayt Abu Karim, a Senusi trader, to Kufra in November 1914. Nevertheless, Abu Karim was put off with excuses and Ali Dinar sent another caravan headed by Wadaian nobleman Ahmad to Kufra in July 1915. This royal committee made some purchases of ammunition and turned back to al-Fashir on 24 December. According to Ali Dinar 2500 Mauser rifles and 400 boxes of ammunition were delivered while the British spies predicted that it was just around 400 weapons.

³³⁸ E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Senusi of Cyrenaica*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 128.

³³⁹ Jay Spaulding & Lidwien Kapteijns, *An Islamic Alliance: Ali Dinar and the Senusiyya 1906-1916*, (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1994), 2.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., Documents 15, 16, 20.

The permanence of this cooperation between Ali Dinar and Seyyid Ahmed might have been supported and consolidated by the efforts of the *Teşkilat* forces. Otherwise, merely the anticipated support of the Senusis against the British in a possible war and the expectation of the collection of arms purchased from Kufra would not possibly urge Ali Dinar to revolt against the British authorities and renounce his tributary relationship to Khartoum. It is clear that the *Teşkilat* had plans as early as September 1914 to provoke the masses in Sudan. Agent Davud Bin Mahmud, for instance, informed the Supreme Command that the situation in Sudan was convenient for the provocations.³⁴¹ It must have been such intelligence reports which led Süleyman Askeri to take action towards Sudan. On 16 October 1914, he ordered Captain Almas to go under the command of Hasan Efendi (the commander of the *Teşkilat* forces in Yafa) who was ordered to send him alongside with a band into Egypt or Sudan to incite tumult:

“Yafa Jandarma Kumandanı Binbaşı Hasan Efendi’ye şifre

3 Teşrin-i Evvel 330

Yüzbaşı Almas efendinin Yafa’ya hareketle sizi görmesi lazım yazıldı. Hin-i müracatında münasib vazifede istihdamı tavsiye olunur. Bir çete ile Mısır’a izamı veya orada ihtilal ika’ etmek üzere Sudan’a gönderilmesi suretlerinden hangisi faideli ve mumaileyh hangisine daha ziyade elverişli ise oralarda istihdam ediniz.

Süleyman Askeri³⁴²

Although it does not seem possible to learn about the fate of Captain Almas in the light of the extant documentary evidence, one might argue that the Ottomans at least planned to secure the retention of British troops in the south of Egypt by provoking the Sudanese

³⁴¹ ATASE Archive: f: 248, d: 1031, I: 6-7.

³⁴² ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 11.

masses. Other official documents seem to be satisfactory enough to authenticate the existence of such a plan.

For example, Nuri Pasha dispatched a special committee during January 1915 to Darfur so as to establish contact with al-Fashir and to provide Ali Dinar's support for the campaign against Egypt. This committee consisted of three people, namely Major Tarık, Captain Ebu Şari (?), and Beşir Fuad Bey, along with 20 regular soldiers.³⁴³ They were to present gifts to Ali Dinar and during their residence there, they were to receive the arms and ammunitions Nuri Pasha would dispatch.³⁴⁴ That the ammunitions however were not sent could be understood from Nuri Pasha's reply to the decree of the Supreme Command on the attack against Egypt. In his telegraph, Nuri Pasha reported that he was still trying to dispatch the aforementioned ammunitions due to the perilous way to Darfur, which was 60 days away from Cidabiye.³⁴⁵ Up to the eve of the operation, the vital importance of Sudan against the British was apparently specified in a telegraph sent from the Supreme Command to Nuri Pasha on 1 July 1915. Therefore, Nuri Pasha was recommended to cooperate with Ali Dinar during the attack against Egypt: "...*Bu fırsattan istifade Sudan'ın zaptı pek olaydır. Seyyid hazretlerinin tensibiyle es-Seyyid İdris veyahud diğer sadatının birden bir kaç zabıt ve bir mikdar mücahidin-i sultan-ı Dinar ile müştereken hareket edilirse o havalinin yed-i küffardan zabıt ve tahlisi pek kolaydır.*" The appendix of the same telegraph further indicates that Seyyid Ahmed had already begun to dispose troops for the east of Sudan but needed artillery for its western

³⁴³ "...Darfur Sultanı Ali Dinar hazretlerine binbaşı Tarık, Heceman? Yüzbaşısı ebu Şari? ve... Beşir Fuad beylerle yirmi müselleme neferden müteşekkıl bir heyet hedaya vesaireyi tesliman yola çıkardım. Rumi Kanun-i Sani bidayetinde Kufra'dan cenuba doğru hareket etdiler..." See, ATASE Archive: f: 1834, d: 28, I: 1-2.

³⁴⁴ ATASE Archive: f: 248, d: 1031, I: 1-178; f: 248, d: 1031, I: 1-87.

³⁴⁵ ATASE Archive: f: 248, d: 1031, I: 1-87.

part: “Sudan şarkı için tertibat-ı lazime yaptık. Şeyh Muhammed eş-Şerif bu hususda bize mücadele edecektir. Sudan garbi [için] ise bize esliha lazımdır...”³⁴⁶

Even if the elucidative capacity of the official documents are disregarded, it is obvious that there was “evidence of co-ordination in the German and Turkish plans to detain British troops in Egypt [that] appeared when the same week in February which saw the advance of the Senussi from Siwa saw also the concentration on the Sudan frontier of the forces of Ali Dinar, Sultan of Darfur.”³⁴⁷ The intention of Ali Dinar to invade Sudan in conjunction with the attacks of Senusis seems to have legitimized the counter attack of the British authorities who indeed decided to occupy Darfur in July 1915. Sir Reginald Wingate, the Governor-General conducted military operations during this period with Sudanese troops. The British operation launched towards the end of 1916 resulted in the entrance of Condominium troops to al-Fashir on 23 May. Afterwards, Ali Dinar fled to Marra Mountains, carrying out fighting.³⁴⁸ Finally, he was killed on 6 November 1916 in the affair of Jebel Juba, and the civil war in Sudan disappeared.³⁴⁹ After that date on, the Ottomans began to retreat in the Sinai-Palestine front, meeting the British counter attack under the command of Sir A. Murray and it seems not possible to find any trace of *Teşkilat* concentration in Sinai. Besides, the Senusis had already taken the course of Trablusgarp and this period witnessed Seyyid İdris’ take-over of the Senusi leadership. Although, the resistance movement in Libya

³⁴⁶ ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 3-3.

³⁴⁷ *History of the Great War*, 147.

³⁴⁸ “...Ali Dinar da İngiliz zırhlı otomobilleri karşısında pay-i tahtı olan el-Faşer’i terk ile daha garbda bulunan dağlı araziye çekildi...” See, ATASE Archive: f: 1849, d: 103, I: 1-124.

³⁴⁹ “... Darfur emiri Sultan Ali Dinar hazretlerinin İngilizlerle vukubulan bir muharebesinde ikrar-ı rütbe-i şahadet eylediği tahakkük etmiştir. Müşarunileyh gibi alem-i İslamın mümtaz ve hamîyyet-şiar bir renginin ziya ve izhar-ı ...te’lim eder ve ruh-i pakına hürmeten orduca mevlüd-i şerife kıraat olunmasını tevcih eylerim.” See, ATASE Archive: f: 537, d: 2096, I: 67/3. Also see, f: 537, d: 2096, I: 67-2; f: 537, d: 2096, I: 67; f: 537, d: 2096, I: 68; f: 537, d: 2096, I: 68-1. See also Appendix J for the British campaign against Ali Darfur between 16 March and 6 November 1916.

lost power under the command of Seyyid İdris who negotiated with the Italians and British, the *Teşkilat* carried on to organize resistance in Libya, this time against only the Italians, until the end of the war. All these, in turn, marked that the Ottoman project of rollbacking the British army of Egypt has come to an end and Libya remained as a mere operational base of the *Teşkilat* in entire North Africa.

CHAPTER FOUR

ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE *TEŞKİLAT-I MAHSUSA*: AN ASSESSMENT

Were the *Teşkilat* activities in Syria and North Africa, various aspects of which have been examined and highlighted in the previous chapters, merely the outcome of the attempts of a bunch of adventurers? Or, was there a conscious and rational power behind the scenes that organized and authorized the *Teşkilat* to set up its units over a great part of the aforementioned regions and prevailed there with short interruptions between 1914 and 1916? If so, when was this organization founded and who ran it? What were its institutional and operational characteristics? What were its tasks and to whom was it responsible? What was the relationship between the central organization of the *Teşkilat* and its extensions' concentration in the distant territories of the Empire? What was the position of Eşref Kuşçubaşı whose role on and within the *Teşkilat* has instantly been emphasized? These are the questions that will be attempted to answer in the following pages by referring to and evaluating the available documentation on the *Teşkilat* and giving particular emphasis to the historical evidence related to the region concerned.

It should, however, be noted that such questions have long been subjects of discussion among historians and various attempts have been made at identifying the nature of the *Teşkilat*. Most of these attempts were summarized in the first chapter; therefore, there is no point in reiterating them here. Instead, an alternative interpretation

of the *Teşkilat* will be offered basically in the light of little-used archival materials a portion of which was partly utilized by the authors referred to in the introduction.

A. The chiefs of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*

To begin with, given the present state of research, it seems that the general framework of our understanding of the institutional features of the *Teşkilat*, which have been outlined and analysed by historians like Mustafa Balcıoğlu needs serious revision. Archival material relating to the operational bases of the *Teşkilat*, which is used in the present study along with the documents which have already been exposed and interpreted might contribute to a better understanding of the institutional characteristics of this organization and be decisive in elucidating certain points which still remain vague. Therefore, a minute examination of the chiefs of the special organization, which has long been a controversial issue of the area, might be a good starting point to offer useful insights into re-examination of the administrative framework of the *Teşkilat* while enabling historians to reconsider diverse interpretations. Certain answers to such questions were offered until the 90s by relying heavily on memoirs. Mustafa Balcıoğlu, whose writings pose serious problems deriving basically from a critical and analytical approach to the subject of the *Teşkilat*, provides the following list on the chiefs of the *Teşkilat*:

- 1- Süleyman Askeri Bey - From the establishment of the office to 14 April 1915.
- 2- Ali Bey Başhampa - 24 May 1915 – 31 October 1918.

3- Hüsametin Ertürk - 31 October 1918 – 5 December 1918.³⁵⁰

Balcıoğlu, as is the case for nearly all his works, does not usually specify on what evidence he came up with this list. It is, however, quite possible that he launched this idea by either fraudulently altering some documents or omitting parts of the documents he was not able to read.³⁵¹ This list can be supported by neither the archival evidence nor the course of events. Nevertheless, other historians like Atilla Çeliktepe and Hamit Pehlivanlı accepted his list without questioning and confirmed that Süleyman Askeri and Ali Bey Başhampa presided over the *Teşkilat*. They even verify that Hüsametin Ertürk was the last chief by relying on his memoir.³⁵² They seem, however, to provide no reasonable answer to the following questions: In view of the fact that Süleyman Askeri went to Iraq during November 1914, how could he carry on to preside over the *Teşkilat* office in İstanbul until 13 May 1915? How come could CUP expect fruitful results from the *Teşkilat*, which was responsible to operate over a number of bases, while its chief was out of İstanbul involving in clashes with the British in Iraq? What happened and in what way was the headless *Teşkilat* managed between 14 April and 24 May? On what evidence can the dates of these handovers be authenticated? Is it not possible to make allowance for the possibility that Hüsametin Ertürk overestimated his importance in the special organization by indicating himself as the last chief? If claimed that the *Umur-i Şarkiye* office was the continuation of the *Teşkilat*, then which one of the offices did they preside?

³⁵⁰ Balcıoğlu, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa yahut *Umur-i Şarkiye* Dairesi”, 4.

³⁵¹ See chapter one, 18-19.

³⁵² Çeliktepe, 76-77; Hamit Pehlivanlı, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa: Türk Modern İstihbaratçılığının Başlangıcı mı?”, *Osmanlı-Teşkilat*, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999), 286-287.

These are only a few questions Balcıoğlu and his followers could not give a sound answer. As is clearly seen, this insight, which has direct effects on the administrative features of the *Teşkilat*, could drag the specialist into an erroneous path and accordingly needs revision. At this point, let us have a look at a document, found at ATASE, on the chiefs of the special organization that might prove crucial in clarifying the problem. According to this document:

“The foundation of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa office: 17 Teşrin-i Sani 329 (30 November 1913)

The departure of Süleyman Askeri Bey to Iraq: Towards the end of Teşrin-i Evvel 330 (6-13 November 1914)

The departure of Halil Bey with the 1st Campaign Force: 6 Kanun-i Evvel 330 (19 December 1914)

The departure of Cevad Bey: In May 331 (In May or June of 1915)

The take over of Ali Bey: In May 331 (In May or June of 1915)

The illness of Ali Bey: 24 Teşrin-i Evvel 334 (24 October 1918)

The death of Ali Bey: 31 Teşrin-i Evvel 334 (31 October 1918)

The appointment of Hüseyin Tosun Bey: 31 Teşrin-i Evvel 334 (31 October 1918)

The abolishment of the office: 15 Teşrin-i Sani 334 (15 November 1918)

The appointment of Hüsametdin Bey, charged with the duty of pursuing the formalities”³⁵³

³⁵³ ATASE Archive: f: 1846, d: 79, I: 13/4. This document was firstly used by Vahdet Keleşyılmaz. It is however worth noting that he did not include the part about the appointment of Hüsametdin Bey in his article. In the article, Keleşyılmaz maintains that the chiefs of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* were, in order, Süleyman Askeri Bey, Halil Bey (Kızanıklı), Cevad Bey (Tunuslu), Ali Bey (Başhampa), Hüseyin Tosun

Examination of this document reveals that the *Teşkilat* was officially founded on 30 November 1913 and its chiefs were, in order, Süleyman Askeri Bey, Halil Bey (the uncle of Enver Pasha), Cevad Bey (Kızanıklı), Ali Bey (Başhampa), and Hüseyin Tosun Bey. Nevertheless, the reliability of the data contained in this document and to what extent it provides the researcher with the real picture of its time should be questioned since although the archival materials are relatively more objective than the other sources, it might bring together forms of bias and intolerance in considering the role of the *Teşkilat* not to cross-check their authenticity with other sources.

Pointing to Süleyman Askeri as the first chief of this organization has long been an accepted issue among historians, including the ones mentioned above. Nevertheless, none of them, except for Keleşyılmaz, could support this argument with evidence; they all base their arguments on memoirs and the study by Stoddard, which, again, exclusively relied on the memoirs and interviews with a few surviving members of the *Teşkilat*. Similarly, the materials concerning the activities of the *Teşkilat* in Syria, Egypt, and Libya suggest that the first chief was indeed Süleyman Askeri from the foundation of the office until the end of October 1914. The last correspondence of the *Teşkilat*

Bey. Even though this insight seems correct, he contradicts himself elsewhere in the article by stating that "...Kızanıklı Cevad Bey, who was interrogated within the context of the trials of the armistice period, listed correctly the people that led the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*." See, Vahdet Keleşyılmaz, "Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa'nın Kuruluşu, Başkanları ve Mustafa Kemal" *Türkler*, vol. 8, 316-320. The minutes of Cevad Bey and the statements of Keleşyılmaz nevertheless contradicts each other in that Cevad Bey listed the chiefs as follows in order: Süleyman Askeri, Halil Bey, and himself. He also added that he remained in the office as the Central Commander of Dersaadet up to the end of 1918. Thus, Cevad Bey, contrary to what Keleşyılmaz suggests, did not count Ali Bey Başhampa and Hüseyin Tosun Bey as the chiefs of the organization. See, Kocahanoğlu, 577, 581. Besides, Keleşyılmaz argues that his accuracy on the dates of handovers, which he certainly does not mention in his article, could be verified on the basis of another article by himself; see Vahdet Keleşyılmaz, "Kafkas Harekatının Perde Arkası", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, no. 47, (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, June 2000), 367-394. In this article, the argumentation which is confined into the deepnotes, nonetheless did not provide the researchers with the exact dates of handovers.

officers with Süleyman Askeri was dated 25 October.³⁵⁴ From this date until his departure for Iraq during the first half of November (sometime between 6 and 13 November) Süleyman Askeri must have been busy with military preparations as the new Governor of Basra and Commander of the Basra Division.

The chairmanship then was taken over by Halil Pasha, the uncle of Enver Pasha and the Central Commander of Dersaadet, after Süleyman Askeri had been detached from the leadership of the committee which seems to have constituted the nucleus of the *Teşkilat*. This committee formerly consisted of four people: Süleyman Askeri, Atıf Bey (Kamçıl), Aziz Bey, and Dr. Nazım Bey. The office, along with its various departments, was located in Cağaloğlu (Nur-i Osmaniye), Istanbul. Even though most of the correspondences between North Africa and Istanbul bears at the beginning the stereotyped phrase “*To the directorate of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*” or “*To the sublime directorate of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*”, this address could still be verified on the basis of a number of documents which start with the phrase “*To the directorate of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa in Nur-i Osmaniye, Dersaadet*”³⁵⁵ The official and direct contact of the *Teşkilat* with the Ministry of Army was established by its chief. Nevertheless, this duty began to be undertaken by the Central Commander in Istanbul after the departure of Süleyman Askeri. That is why Halil Bey was mentioned as the second chief in the document. It seems however not possible to say that Halil Bey had an effect on the committee as much as Süleyman Askeri. Since, the Central Commander had to personally get involved in matters of not only the *Teşkilat* but also the military police,

³⁵⁴“To the Gendarme Commander Major Hasan Efendi (330 Teşrin-i Evvel 12): Your bands are to engage in activity by going in the Sinai Desert...Provided that the British attention is not captured, make sure that some of them are dispatched into Egypt urgently. Süleyman Askeri”; ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 16.

³⁵⁵ ATASE Archive: f: 1828, d: 4, I: 1.

court martial, fire brigade and so on. Besides, his office was located in the Ministry of War. Furthermore, even Halil Bey himself qualifies his duty as one of secondary importance.³⁵⁶

The term of office for Halil Bey was rather short; on 19 December 1914, he started off with the 1st campaign force for Dagestan to incite a revolt there and expel the Russians from the shores of Caspian sea.³⁵⁷ Then he was replaced by Cevad Bey, the new central commander of Dersaadet and of the special organization. That Cevad Bey did not have an active duty in the decision-making process of the *Teşkilat* could be understood from the official inquiry of the CUP members in 1919. His mission, similar to Halil Bey, was limited to transmittance of orders he received from the Ministry of Army, Operation Department, and the Headquarter directly to the *Teşkilat* office in Nur-i Osmaniye. He was also to transmit the orders from the *Teşkilat* to the departments concerned.³⁵⁸ If the chief was not Cevad Bey, then the intelligence reports that relate to the *Teşkilat* concentration in North Africa and Syria would not be sent directly to the Central Command of Dersaadet. Besides, if the chief resided in Nur-i Osmaniye, then those correspondences would not bear at the beginning the phrase “to the Central Command of Dersaadet”.³⁵⁹

The *Teşkilat*, abolished in May of 1915, was replaced by the *Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi* which was established as an office the same month within the Ministry of War. This replacement could be followed in the correspondences addressed “to the directorate

³⁵⁶ Taylan Sorgun, *Halil Paşa, İttihat ve Terakki'den Cumhuriyet'e Bitmeyen Savaş* (İstanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 1997), 136.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 137.

³⁵⁸ Kocahanoğlu, 575-580.

³⁵⁹ For examples see, ATASE Archive: f: 1829, d: 7, I: 1/62; f: 1829, d: 7, I: 1/64; f: 1829, d: 7, I: 1/80.

of the *Umur-i Şarkiye* Office, Ministry of War”.³⁶⁰ The emergence of this office, however, did not mark a completely new intelligence system; it was rather the improvised continuation of the previous one, the *Teşkilat*. In this way, the intermediation between the office and the Ministry of War came to an end and this change, in turn, made the exchange of information system among various military departments more effective. At the same time, the possible emergence of a centrifugal force was automatically warded off by having the office as a subdivision of the general headquarters. The first chief of the *Umur-i Şarkiye* was Ali Bey (Başhampa) who presided over the office from its establishment until 24 October 1918, the date of his illness. Indeed, the intelligence reports pertaining to North Africa and Syria between the aforementioned dates were signed by “the chief of the *Umur-i Şarkiye* Office, Ministry of War”.³⁶¹

The last chief of the organization was Hüseyin Tosun Bey who replaced Ali Bey Başhampa officially after his death on 31 October 1918. He must however have stood in for Ali Bey Başhampa for a week while he was sick and dying. The term of the office for Hüseyin Tosun Bey lasted only fifteen days, until the abolishment of the office on 15 November 1918. On the other hand, the assertion that the last chief was Hüsametdin Ertürk is based on his memoirs, where he overestimated his own role in the office. First of all, Hüsametdin Ertürk has contradictory statements relating to the chiefs of the organization. According to him, the chiefs were as follows: Süleyman Askeri, Ali Bey Başhampa, and himself.³⁶² Nevertheless, elsewhere in the book, he states that he was

³⁶⁰ ATASE Archive: f: 1839, d: 49, I: 1/338.

³⁶¹ For examples see, ATASE Archive: f: 1839, d: 49, I: 1/338; f: 1842, d: 64, I: 1/12; f: 1858, d: 136, I: 3/16; f: 1858, d: 136, I: 6/5.

³⁶² Ertürk, 4.

stand-in for Ali Bey Başhampa and charged with the duty of officially abolishing the organization, whose name was to be changed into *Umum Alem-i İslam İhtilal Teşkilatı*.³⁶³ Nonetheless, the sources pertaining to the period where Hüsametdin Ertürk may have been the chief, roughly between 31 October and 15 November, do not record Hüsametdin Ertürk as “the chief of the *Umur-i Şarkiye* office” but “kaymakam Hüsametdin from the *Umur-i Şarkiye* office”.³⁶⁴ Another interesting point is that the reports sent to “kaymakam Hüsametdin” were those concerning only North Africa, not other operational bases of the organization. This fact however breaks out to be mind-bending when it is known that Hüsametdin Ertürk was the director of the North African Board, one of the subdivisions of the *Umur-i Şarkiye* at that time.³⁶⁵ Besides, Tarık Zafer Tunaya mentions that Ali Bey Başhampa and Hüseyin Tosun Bey were once the directors of the Africa and Trablusgarb Department of the *Teşkilat*.³⁶⁶ It is therefore not difficult to imagine that Hüseyin Tosun Bey must have remained in office as the director when Ali Başhampa was appointed as the chief of *Umur-i Şarkiye* and Hüsametdin Ertürk must have been appointed to the directorship of Africa Board when Hüsametdin Tosun became the last chief of the *Umur-i Şarkiye*.³⁶⁷ Finally, after the abolishment of the office, Hüsametdin Ertürk must have been charged with the duty of pursuing the abrogation process and become the chief of an underground organization which should have been the unofficial continuation of the *Umur-i Şarkiye*.³⁶⁸

1. <i>Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa</i> Office (30 November 1913)
--

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, 165-167.

³⁶⁴ ATASE Archive: f: 1855, d: 127, I: 6/1, (dated 9 November 1918); f: 1858, d: 136, I: 3/87, (dated 10 November 1918).

³⁶⁵ ATASE Archive: f: 1846, 79, I: 13/6a.

³⁶⁶ Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler*, 342.

³⁶⁷ ATASE Archive: f: 1846, d: 79, I: 13/4.

³⁶⁸ Ertürk, 166-167.

- Süleyman Askeri Bey (30 November 1913 – 2nd week of November 1914)
- Halil Bey (2nd week of November 1914 – 19 December 1914)
- Cevad Bey (19 November 1914 – May or June 1915)

2. *Umur-i Şarkiye* Office (May or June 1915)

- Ali Bey Başhampa (May or June 1915 – 31 October 1918)
- Hüsamettin Tosun Bey (31 October 1918 – 15 November 1918)
- The Abrogation of the Office (15 November 1918)

B. Central Structure

Coming back to the questions asked at the beginning of the chapter, one should go on with the *Teşkilat*'s central institutional structure, which might prove crucial in elucidating certain points. The *Teşkilat* appears to have been divided into four sections and each section was headed by a military officer. All of the sections were subordinate to the administrative committee, consisted of five people:

Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Office:³⁶⁹

1. Administrative Committee:

- Süleyman Askeri Bey, Halil Bey, Cevad Bey (chiefs)
- Atıf Bey (Kamçılı), deputy manager
- Aziz Bey, deputy manager of Emniyet-i Umumiye

³⁶⁹ This scheme is depicted from the interrogations of Cevad Bey, see; Kocahanoğlu, 576-586.

- Dr. Nazım Bey
- Dr. Bahattin Şakir Bey

2. Departments:³⁷⁰

- Rumeli Section, headed by Arif Bey
- Kafkasya Section, headed by Captain Rıza Bey
- Africa, Trablusgarb Section, headed by Hüseyin Tosun Bey and Ali Başhampa Bey
- Eastern Provinces Section, headed by Dr. Bahattin Şakir Bey and Ruşeni Bey

The transformation from the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa into the *Umur-i Şarkîye* in May or June 1915 reflected an increasing sophistication in the central organization. This time, it was divided into seven sections, each one headed by a military officer. All of the sections were in subjection to the chief, who was under the direct control of Chief of Staff:

Umur-i Şarkîye Office:

1. “Translation and Compilation Department

- Director: Infantry Major Ali Rıza Bey³⁷¹

2. “India, Egypt, Afghan, Arabia Department

- Director: Dr. Fuad Bey
- Afghan, India section: (?) Abdürrab Bey

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 587-592; Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler*, 342.

³⁷¹ ATASE Archive: f: 1846, d: 79, I: 13/5.

	• Egypt section: Cavalry First lieutenant Yusuf Efendi³⁷²
3. “Eastern Department	
	• Director: Infantry Captain Mehmet Nuri Efendi • Honorary director: Köprülüzade Fuad Bey³⁷³
4. “Eastern Africa, Western Africa, Shipment, Follow-up affairs, Personal affairs, and Courier Departments	
	• Director: Cavalry Lieutenant Colonel Hüsametdin Bey • Eastern Africa section: Reserve Paymaster assignee Nuri Efendi • Western Africa section: this as well (<i>bu dahi</i>) • Shipment section: Assistant Sergeant Major İlhami Efendi • Courier section: ...(?) Tayyib Efendi and Nefer Dürri Efendi • Follow-up Section: Assistant Sergeant Major İhsan Efendi and Platoon head Salih Efendi • Personal affairs section: Nefer Hidayet Efendi”³⁷⁴
5. “Papers and Filing Department	
	• Director: Infantry Master Captain Muhtar Efendi
6. Rumeli Department	
	• Director: Infantry Captain Fuad Efendi”³⁷⁵
7. “Accounting Department	
	• Director: Infantry Master Captain Ali Rıza Efendi”³⁷⁶

³⁷² ATASE Archive: f: 1846, d: 79, I: 13/5a.

³⁷³ ATASE Archive: f: 1846, d: 79, I: 13/6.

³⁷⁴ ATASE Archive: f: 1846, d: 79, I: 13/6a.

³⁷⁵ ATASE Archive: f: 1846, d: 79, I: 13/7.

These two structures reveal that the *Teşkilat* was an organization, which struggled to cluster in all regions that were considered to be part of the Ottoman war strategy³⁷⁷ and the organization's activities in the regions in question were the work of a conscious, rational, and an organized center in Istanbul, which authorized those groups to set up units over the distant territories of the Empire and of the Entente powers.

Besides, the modest structure of the *Teşkilat* might prove crucial to understand how it served as the basis for the development of a broader system that would come out with the establishment of the *Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi*. The emergence of this office seems to have owed much to advanced planning and improved patterns of organization. In this context, it seems possible to say that this improvisation brought in more professionalism in both monitoring the threats and taking action. Since, the increase in the formation of the subdivisions in *Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi* might be regarded as the product of not only the shifting demands of intelligence but also the growing workload, which could be dealt with only by specialization.

As is clearly seen, the *Teşkilat* was a corporate body which had its own headquarters, chiefs, directors, vice directors, and officers in charge of various regions. In respect to the administrative hierarchy, technically speaking, this body was subordinate neither to the intelligence office of the Ministry of Interior Affairs nor to the intelligence department of the Ottoman General Staff (2. *Şube*) although they often collaborated; *Teşkilat* was directly connected to the Enver Pasha, chief of the general

³⁷⁶ ATASE Archive: f: 1846, d: 79, I: 13/7a. For the other workers in the office, see also f: 1846, d: 79, I: 13/8.

³⁷⁷ Arif Cemil gives a detailed account of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* activities in Anatolia, see; Arif Cemil, *I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1997). Also see; Erdal Aydoğan, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Doğu Politikası, 1908-1918*, (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 2005), 72-102.

staff. Since, the *Teşkilat*'s program of activity and working principles were determined by him.³⁷⁸ Actual work was carried out by a triad. At the top were Enver Pasha and his staff; in the middle were *Teşkilat*'s intelligence officers in Istanbul who collated and assessed material provided by the third component, the agents-officers and intelligence gatherers who were clustered in different regions of the Empire and of the Entente powers.

C. Regional Structure

It appears that the organization had no branches in the provinces of the regions in question, but only in the fronts and borders. These branches were typically formed of a headquarter of three people. In terms of the region under examination, the very first one of those units was stationed in Yafa most probably during the second half of September 1914, its headquarters comprising of Gendarme Commander Major Hasan Efendi, Lieutenant Colonel Bahaeddin Bey (Manastırlı), and an officer whose name cannot be specified.³⁷⁹ Another one was established by Nuri Pasha in Sellum during August of 1915 as a military and a political intelligence bureau. The bureau would be run, similar to the previous one, by three people, namely Captain Hasan Fehmi³⁸⁰, first Lieutenant Mısırlı Ahmed Ebu Ali³⁸¹, and first Lieutenant Mısırlı Lütü Efendi³⁸². Likewise, the *Teşkilat* committee dispatched to Darfur by Nuri Pasha during January 1915 also consisted of three people, namely Major Tarık, Captain Ebu Şari (?), and Beşir Fuad

³⁷⁸ Vardar, 274-275.

³⁷⁹ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 2.

³⁸⁰ Hasan Fehmi: Captain in the *Maiyet-i Seniyye* company.

³⁸¹ First lieutenant Mısırlı Ahmed ebu Ali: quartermaster in the headquarters of the Supreme Command, 1st regiment, regular 1st battalion.

³⁸² First Lieutenant Mısırlı Lütü Efendi: reserve officer in the 4th company of the *Maltepe Endaht Mektebi*.

Bey.³⁸³ All these headquarters were to receive instructions from the head organization of the *Teşkilat* through the Ministry of War, and were subordinate to the same organization in all matters, as Süleyman Askeri puts forward in his telegraph addressed to Hasan Efendi: “...3 kişilik bir merkez-i umumi teşkili münasib görülmüştür. Mezkur merkez-i umumi harbiye nezareti vasıtasıyla Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa heyet-i idaresinden talimat alacak ve her hususda idareye merbut olacaktır.”³⁸⁴ The head organization on the other hand was subject to the supervision of Ministry of War, which was again under Enver Pasha, in terms of its actions, administration, and disposition of troops, so were the branches to the commander of the army.³⁸⁵

It was the central command in Istanbul that was charged with the duty of dispatching the voluntary detachments formed under the command of the *Teşkilat* to the regions. These detachments were dispatched to the army headquarters pre-determined by the instructions of the Ministry of War. Having been enlisted and supplied at the posts on their way, they were included in the army.³⁸⁶ Therefore, it is possible to visualize that the infantry battalion formed and authorized by the *Umur-i Şarkiye* Office in İstanbul during the first half of October 1915 was dispatched to Libya most probably by the mediation of the central commander, Cevad Bey, and enlisted and supplied around Muğla, where they sailed to Libya to join Senusi headquarters at Bir-i Vaar.³⁸⁷ Central command at the same time transferred orders concerning requests by the *Teşkilat* such as ammunition and equipment for those going to the fronts and those who were already at the fronts. In this context, it can be said that the *Teşkilat* was enabled to communicate

³⁸³ ATASE Archive: f: 1834, d: 28, I: 1–2.

³⁸⁴ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 2-1.

³⁸⁵ Kocahanoğlu, *İttihat*, 280-281.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 279.

³⁸⁷ *Hicaz, Asir, Yemen Cepheleri ve Libya Harekatı*, 111.

through the central command with almost all the subdivisions of the Ministry of War.³⁸⁸

It should, however, be noted that this communication was secured by the *Umur-i Şarkiye* chief after the abolishment of the *Teşkilat*.

D. Mission of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*

Another significant aspect of the *Teşkilat* was that it paid great attention to the usage of ideological expressions like pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. In North Africa and Syria, as the majority of the populace was ethno-religiously homogeneous, composed to a great extent of Muslim-Arabs, great stress was laid on Islamism by the *Teşkilat*, which seems to have been pretty knowledgeable of the social fabric of the region. Nevertheless, there seem to be no document which supports that a survey on the social constitution and cultural dynamics of the region had been carried out. Then, it might be plausible to argue that the characteristics of the region were known by experience by those who had organized the resistance there since 1910. But if the organization reconciled itself merely to the declaration of *jihad*, this would not be instrumental for the Ottomans. Therefore, the agents of the *Teşkilat* not only propagated the *jihad* but also struggled to provide armaments and money as well as promotion and gifts given by the Sultan for the local religious leaders of the region. In this context, volunteers were recruited by the *Teşkilat* commanders, who were directly appointed from Istanbul, under the cognizance of the army and the department of conscription. The recruitment of volunteers from the *urban*

³⁸⁸ At this point, the *Şube-i Mahsusa* records reveal that the *Teşkilat* was in close contact with subdivisions like *levazimat-ı umumiye*, *muamelat-ı zatiye*, *ordu dairesi*, *sıhhiye teşkilatı*, *muhasebat dairesi*, and so on. For two examples on such correspondences, see Appendix K and L.

of Nablus and Birüssebi by Mümtaz Bey, of Akabe by Eşref Bey, and of Awlad Ali tribe by Nuri and Cafer Askeri Beys might represent good examples in this sense.

Archival materials indicate that the main mission of those forces was to function as auxiliary and additional troops for the army. As it is examined in detail in Chapter Two, the first Canal campaign was launched with the guerilla-type attack of the forward echelons of the diversionary columns (the *Teşkilat* forces), in order to take hold of the key points on the advance line of the army. The situation, however, was somewhat different in Libya; the command of the Africa Groups established by the *Teşkilat* agents with the exception of a few Turkish soldiers was almost entirely made up of local Senusi forces. Thus, nearly the entire fighting force in Libya consisted of volunteers. No doubt, the recruitment of a considerable number of Syrians and Libyans as well as Egyptians would not only be comforting for the Fourth Army and Africa Groups but also a meaningful message to the British, who controlled Egypt and instigated an Arab uprising. As auxiliary and irregular forces, these troops, recruited and trained by the *Teşkilat* agents, were charged with the duties of band warfare, incursions, sabotages, demonstration attacks, demolition of telegraph and railroad lines, cutting off enemy access to Syria and Libya, and allocation of mobile forces to the areas which needed reinforcement.

On the basis of this study, it is possible to generalize about a number of missions of the *Teşkilat*. To start with, in order to gather information on the enemy, the *Teşkilat* recruited and handled agents; also apprehended and questioned refugees, and Bedouins in this region. In the field of topographical intelligence, reconnaissance patrols formed by the *Teşkilat* accumulated reports covering specific topics such as the location, condition, troop movements, and artillery of the British forces; the location of the wells

and their state of water, the quality and quantity of fuel and aliment resources across the desert; survey of the impediments such as wire fence and artificial water flood; the appropriate movement line of military items like ammunition and bridge building equipment. As detailed in Chapter Two, von Kress gave a number of orders to these effects to the *Teşkilat*. Similar missions were also undertaken by the *Teşkilat* in Libya as treated in Chapter Three. In this context, it is plausible to state that these field reports dispatched to the army commanders after being analyzed and assessed, determined to a certain extent the Ottoman order of battle and deployment in the regions in question.

In the field of counter intelligence, the *Teşkilat* was faced with problems of field security and counter espionage. In this context, the British were staved off getting information about the movement of Ottoman detachments in the desert; accordingly, people interrogated within Sinai. Besides, a number of the enemy agents were seized and employed sometimes as double agents to plant false reports and gather information on the enemy. For instance, the *Teşkilat* agents followed a long time two British spies, originally Egyptians, named Meşil? el-Salih and İbrahim Marş?. Having captured both of them at their house in Cairo, the *Teşkilat* agents found out that these spies were used in establishing an intelligence network both in Hayfa and Kahire.³⁸⁹ The *Teşkilat* was also engaged in activities for intentional disinformation. At this point, it might be helpful to remind the gossip that was spread in Egypt such that an Ottoman force of 150.000 or 300.000 was about to penetrate from Elariş into Egypt. Spies and informers were used to pick up and receive news from Egypt, and to create antagonism between the British and Muslims by all means possible. As examined in chapters Two and Three, the *Teşkilat*

³⁸⁹ ATASE Archive: f: 536, d: 2094, I: 3. For the details of these two British spies' duty, see also f: 536, d: 2094, I: 3/1; f: 536, d: 2094, I: 3/2; f: 536, d: 2094, I: 3/3.

cells both in Yafa and Sellum were charged with duties to this effect. They were also charged with the duty of cutting of the routes through which the British obtained information.

The *Teşkilat* was also engaged in psychological warfare. Accordingly, it circulated in the region propaganda materials generally prepared by local religious leaders like Abdülaziz Çaviş. The agents were also trained on how to influence or coerce the Muslim-British soldiers to make them capitulate or come over to the Turkish side. Spies and informers employed to establish relations with the populace in Egypt were also used to incite them by either exaggerated or entirely fabricated information. Furthermore, the formation of relatively small-scale *Teşkilat* units under the district commanders was aimed at not only enlarging the campaign forces but also benefiting from their religious and political impact on both the British and Muslims.

The *Teşkilat* used various sources to gather information on the enemy such as soldiers, Bedouins, refugees, tourists, defectors, informers in Egypt and Libya. Not surprisingly then, an uncertain portion of the information gathered was unreliable. It was after the flaw of such erroneous (either exaggerated or intentionally fabricated) Süleyman Askeri ordered Hasan Efendi to draft the reports in three ways such as “personally seen”, “reported by a secondary person”, or “estimated”.³⁹⁰ The intelligence of the *Teşkilat* was however acquired capability to verify information from other sources. By this way, unlike the British intelligence which relied heavily on air reconnaissance for corroboration, Ottoman intelligence did not have to rely on unauthenticated reports for a long time. The *Teşkilat*’s major means for corroboration in this region were diplomatic agents, agents of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, and of the

³⁹⁰ ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 8/10.

intelligence department of the General Staff. These reports from various informants helped to expose and neutralize the exaggerations and fabrications of the agents so that the credibility of intelligence was enhanced. In this context, it seems that the *Teşkilat* benefited greatly from the reports of ambassador to Athens, Galib Kemal Bey; of Rome, Nabi Bey; military attaché Ali Mümtaz; the director of *Emniyet-i Umumiye*, İsmail Bey; all of which were dispatched to the *Teşkilat* having been addressed to the General Staff. The intelligence sent, especially from diplomatic agents like Nabi Bey was concerned with the information on the enemy at strategic and operational levels, while the other sources generally provided the *Teşkilat* with information at the tactical and local level.

E. On the Role of Eşref Kuşçubaşı

From the viewpoint of this study, it would not be incorrect to think that the role of Eşref Kuşçubaşı in the *Teşkilat* has long been exaggerated and distorted. The information in the previous pages justify this assumption, which becomes very plausible when considering the explanatory capacity of the official documents. One of the assertions was put forth by Cemal Kutay such that Eşref Bey was the founder and the first chief of the *Teşkilat*.³⁹¹ The first assertion seems to be a generally accepted interpretation in the literature. Even in the very absence of works on the founding dynamics of the *Teşkilat* but only the memoirs of Eşref Bey, it seems still risky and difficult to suggest that the organization was shaped and founded upon the experiences of Eşref Bey in a very small-scale revolutionary party in Arabia between 1903 and 1907, and on the Libyan and Balkan fronts. This argumentation does not necessarily support the assertion but rather

³⁹¹ Kutay, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, 11-13, 19.

means to shelve the experiences of not only the *Yıldız Hafıye Teşkilatı*, which might have triggered the CUP to set up its own underground network but also of the intelligence departments of both the Ministries of Interior and War. At the same time, it means to usurp and wipe out the rights and efforts of a number of important personalities on the organization such as Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha, Süleyman Askeri, Kızanıklı Halil Bey, Tunuslu Cevad Bey, Nuri Pasha, Ali Bey Başhampa, Hüseyin Tosun Bey, İzmitli Mümtaz Bey, and others. Furthermore, it is clear that such an effort in the name of creating a hero does not make allowance for the conjunctural necessities of the time and the mentality that activated it.

The second assertion that Eşref Bey was the first chief of the organization until the outbreak of the World War I is also doubtful.³⁹² This argument cannot be supported on the basis of either the archival documents or the secondary sources, but only by relying on the memoirs of Eşref Bey. First of all, it is alleged by Cemal Kutay that Eşref Bey as the director of the *Teşkilat* along with his brother, Selim Sami and a couple of other agents, were sent to Turkestan through India to incite the inhabitants against the British rule at the eve of the war.³⁹³ This information however might well be used to refute Kutay's main argument and one might easily wonder how Eşref Bey continued to preside and run the *Teşkilat* office in İstanbul while he was out of the country, organizing revolutions at an outstation very long way off the center. One might also wonder how come CUP could expect fruitful results from the *Teşkilat*, which was responsible to operate over a number of bases, while its chief was out of İstanbul and in what way the headless *Teşkilat* was run between the departure and return of Eşref Bey. It

³⁹² *Ibid.*, 115.

³⁹³ Kutay, *Ana-vatan'da Son Beş Osmanlı Türk'ü; Birinci Dünya Harbinde Teşkilat-i Mahsusa*, 107-111.

can also be asked why thousands of official documents as well as Stoddard, who makes most of the memoirs of Eşref Bey, like Kutay, as well as the others who were engaged in the activities of the *Teşkilat* and of those that can interpret the program of the *Teşkilat*, do not indicate him as the first chief, but they point to Süleyman Askeri. These are only a few questions the late Kutay left unanswered.

Considering Stoddard's interpretations, one should be prudent too, since, a few of his explanations about Eşref Bey, no doubt refutable, could drag the specialist into an erroneous path. According to Stoddard, Eşref Bey was not the chief of the *Teşkilat* but its director of Arabia, Sinai, and North Africa.³⁹⁴ Firstly, as already pointed out, there seems to be no such post in the organization. If there was, then it would be most probably bestowed on Mümtaz Bey, leader of the *Teşkilat* forces in Syria, or Nuri Pasha, the brother of Enver Pasha who controlled all the forces in Libya. The organic structure of the organization at any rate was not proper to authorize someone at the front with such a responsibility and as explained earlier, the directors of Africa, Trablusgarb section of the *Teşkilat*, Hüseyin Tosun and Ali Başhampa Beys, resided in the central office in İstanbul. At the same time, if Eşref Bey was the director in fact, then there would be no need for Mümtaz Bey, Hasan Efendi and Nuri Pasha to receive orders directly from İstanbul but from Eşref Bey. Besides, if he were in command, then Eşref Bey would not act under Mümtaz Bey and Hasan Efendi.

In order to support his argument, Stoddard furthermore alleges that Eşref was the commander of voluntary units engaged in the Canal campaign and was, like Süleyman

³⁹⁴ Eşref Kuşçubaşı, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Arabistan, Sina ve Kuzey Afrika Müdürü Eşref Bey'in Hayber Anıları, Hayber'de Türk Cengi*, Philip H. Stoddard and H. Basri Danışman (eds), (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1997), 222-223.

Askeri, directly related to Enver Pasha.³⁹⁵ This argument also appears to be doubtful. It gives the impression that as if not only Süleyman Askeri and Eşref Bey had equal responsibility to Enver Pasha but that Eşref Bey was the commander of *Teşkilat* units in Syria. To the contrary, as the research has shown, Eşref Bey was the commander of a unit composed of 600 volunteers, which was included in the *Urban* Command which was led by Mümtaz Bey. At this point, it should be appropriate to remind that Eşref Bey was engaged in the demonstration attack against Kantara which was led by Mümtaz Bey during the first canal campaign and received orders not from Enver Pasha but from various commanders like Süleyman Askeri, Cemal Pasha, Colonel Kress von Kressenstein, and Mümtaz Bey. Maybe this was the reason why Eşref Bey gave very little information about Süleyman Askeri and Mümtaz Bey in his memoirs.

Who is Eşref Bey then? On the basis of this research, it now seems more plausible to say that Eşref Bey was no more than an important *Teşkilat* agent who had established close contact with the Ottoman ruling class during his experiences in the Tripoli and Balkan wars, and was well versed in intelligence and guerilla warfare. Because of these and his close knowledge of the terrain and its inhabitants, he contributed to the *Teşkilat* during World War I especially in the recruitment of volunteers and irregular combat. Nevertheless, he was neither the founder and first chief of the *Teşkilat* nor the director of its Arabia, Sinai, and North Africa section. Therefore, it is not incorrect to conclude that the role of Eşref Kuşçubaşı on the *Teşkilat* is highly exaggerated mainly due to the efforts of Cemal Kutay to create “a hero” and partly due to the inclination of Philip H. Stoddard towards taking for granted the greater part of the

³⁹⁵ Eşref Kuşçubaşı, 223.

information Eşref Bey provided him. Accordingly, relevant parts of these works and the works mainly based upon them should be approached with a great caution.

CONCLUSION

The *Teşkilat* has so far not constituted a major area of research, although some aspects of this subject have been examined by Stoddard, whose findings formed the central themes of the debate on the *Teşkilat* among a very limited number of historians. This debate however has been developed on the basis of historical sources which are extremely limited in number and inadequate in content. Particularly the memoirs and interviews with a few surviving members of the *Teşkilat* formed the main sources for various aspects of the debate. Nevertheless, it may not provide a firm basis for a comprehensive examination and evaluation of the *Teşkilat* before and during World War I without taking into account the elucidative capacity of the archival and secondary sources details of which have been examined in Chapter One.

Therefore, in this study, I attempted to utilize a little-known and used archival source, the *Şube-i Mahsusa* registers, where documents pertaining to the *Teşkilat* are compiled, in order to provide new ground for further discussions on the subject. In this context, this study seems to have demonstrated that the *Şube-i Mahsusa* registers, which encompass documentary evidence concerning more than fifteen operational bases of the *Teşkilat*, should be employed in studies dealing with regional case studies and administrative and operational characteristics of the *Teşkilat* as well as intelligence in the late Ottoman period in general.

Based mainly on these registers, this case study, first of all, points out the major flaws of the literature on the *Teşkilat*. In this context, I emphasized the need for further

case studies by an evaluation of primary and secondary sources on the *Teşkilat*. Subsequently, I drew attention to the fact that the present level of our knowledge about the plans and operations of the *Teşkilat* forces against and in Egypt during World War I, particularly from mid 1914 until late 1916, is very poor in terms of the analysis of this phenomenon at a micro level in different localities.

Accordingly, having depicted the strategic framework the *Teşkilat* was incorporated into the study devoted itself into unfolding different aspects of the *Teşkilat*'s concentration in Sinai, Libya, and Sudan. At this point, analysis of the *Şube-i Mahsusa* registers enabled us to better document the developments in this region, most of which were used for the first time, thus providing not only new insight into various aspects of a crucial organization, but also valuable information which is comparable to other operational bases of the *Teşkilat*. Finally, a number of questions concerning the administrative and operational characteristics of the *Teşkilat* were answered on the basis of the evaluation of the available documentation on the *Teşkilat* and giving particular emphasis to historical evidence related to the region concerned. Though an analysis based mainly on a small part of a much larger experience of the *Teşkilat*, such a discussion is expected not only to enable us to break down the main characteristics of the administrative and operational mechanisms of the *Teşkilat*, but also to draw critical attention to the flaws of the historiography, which are treated in detail in Chapter One.

In conclusion, one may ask whether or not the *Teşkilat* was successful. In terms of the realization of its objectives in the region, success of the *Teşkilat* was limited. As forward echelons of the diversionary columns, the *Teşkilat* achieved to take hold of the key points on the advance line of the army in Sinai. It also satisfactorily fulfilled the reconnaissance facilities and recruited almost 3000 volunteers as auxiliary forces for the

Canal campaigns. Besides, they seem to have been successful in counter-intelligence activities for a long time. As examined in chapter Two, strict control of the region by the *Teşkilat* prompted “Maxwell to complain that ‘the frontier is guarded jealously by the Turks. As they have seized all our agents east of the frontier it is difficult to get positive news.’”³⁹⁶ Also, the British had to concentrate troops along the canal to defend it against the Ottoman army in which the *Teşkilat* played a key role.

It is possible to say that the *Teşkilat* gained its actual success in Libya. Since, the entire organization here came into being by the efforts of the *Teşkilat*. First of all, the British plans to attract the Senusis were frustrated and Seyyid Ahmed was skillfully led to take place on the side of the Ottomans. In this context, it can be said that the raids and sabotage attempts of the *Teşkilat* were more organized and successful than those launched in Sinai. Besides, in this region, the armed forces established by the *Teşkilat* managed to make their way into Egypt, eventually occupying places like Sellum, Seydi Barani, Mersa Matruh, and the Siva oasis. At the same time, the *Teşkilat* coordinated relations between the Senusis and Sultanate of Darfur and as a result, the British had to worry about not only the Western frontier but also the south. Although the British defeated both, they had to detain a considerable number of forces on their Western frontier until the end of the war.

Despite such successes, the *Teşkilat* had certain failures. Firstly, the bands in Sinai could not leak out into Egypt to raise a revolt there in support of the Turks. Although a number of plans were made, only a few people managed to get into Egypt from the Sinai frontier. The agents in Egypt, on the other hand, seem to have been sent there before the war. In this context, the *Teşkilat* was not in a state of difficulty in

³⁹⁶ Sheffy, 43.

getting intelligence from Egypt. Nevertheless, the agitation activities showed their impact on the Egyptians only for a short time and then became ineffective through measures taken by the British. As a matter of fact, the Egyptians did not revolt when the Ottoman army was seen near the Canal. In regard to the mine laying activities, it should also be noted that the *Teşkilat* could not do more than sinking a British ship, leading the Canal traffic to close only for one day.

As a result, the Ottoman plan to invade Egypt from three directions failed. The principle cause of this failure appears to have been the implementation of such a grand design without developing the substructure needed and this seems to have formed the main basis on which the failure of the *Teşkilat* should be discussed. On the basis of this research, lack of coordination stands out above all and it was this lack of coordination between Cemal and Nuri Pashas which partially created the problem of synchronization. Yet, this failure in synchronization was, to a great extent, also caused by some other problems. During the first Canal campaign, the Senusis did not attack from the Western frontier partially because of their dependency on the British authorities for foodstuff, and partially because of the lack of arms and ammunition. When the Senusis began to invade Egypt from the western frontier, this time, the Ottomans could not manage to attack from the east due to military problems brought about by the offensive against the Gallipoli and the efforts of Cemal Pasha to suppress the Arab rebels in Syria. Another problem on the Ottoman side was the shortage of arms and ammunition. As examined in many examples, the *Teşkilat* generally could not meet even half of the equipment its local branches demanded. Thus, the weakness of the Ottoman army seriously limited the ability of the *Teşkilat*.

This does not necessarily mean that the *Teşkilat* did not make any mistakes on its own. As Eşref Kuşçubaşı puts forward, the *Teşkilat* erred in a number of judgments. First of all, it underestimated the effectiveness of the British measures taken against the Islamist propaganda. It failed in analyzing that the idea of pan-Islam was not a secret power for the Muslims of Egypt. Secondly, the *Teşkilat* wrongly assumed that the Egyptian reaction against British imperialism would automatically lead the Muslims to rebel in the name of their masters, the Ottoman Empire. The *Teşkilat* also estimated that a victory against the British on the Canal would make a refreshing effect on the morale of the Egyptians who supported the Ottoman cause. By the defeat, however, this estimation turned out to be useless. Besides, the sabotage attempts against the Canal and the efforts at placing agitators in Egypt were small scale and not well planned. This grew out of overconfidence and the lack of financial sources in Egypt. Finally, the *Teşkilat* overestimated the warring capacity, loyalty, and the religious enthusiasm of the Bedouin auxiliary forces.³⁹⁷

³⁹⁷ Stoddard, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar*, 112-113.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES:

Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, no. 117, (Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2004).

Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, no. 118, (Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2004).

UNPUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES:

Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA):

DH.EUM.5.Şb (Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti, 5. Şube),

DH.EUM.7.Şb, (Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti, 7. Şube), DH. EUM. THR (Tahrirat

Kalemi), DH.MB.HPS. (Mebani-i Emiriye ve Hapishaneler Müdüriyeti), DH. MUİ.

(Muhaberat-ı Umumiye İdaresi), Y.A.HUS. (Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Maruzat), YEE.

Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı (ATASE):

f: 126, d: 590, f: 162, d: 713, f: 248, d: 1031, f: 537, d: 2096, f: 1828, d: 4, f: 1829, d: 6, f: 1829, d: 7, f: 1829, d: 8, f: 1834, d: 28, f: 1836, d: 35, f: 1839, d: 49, f: 1839, d: 49, f: 1842, d: 64, f: 1843, d: 170, f: 1846, 79, f: 1848, d: 92, f: 1849, d: 103, f: 1852, d: 117, f: 1855, d: 127, f: 1856, d: 130, f: 1858, d: 136, f: 1859, d: 139, f: 1859, d: 141, f: 1863, d: 153, f: 1868, d: 174, f: 3221, d: 7A, f: 3221, d: H1, f: 3221, d: H13, f: 3221, d: H19, f: 3221, d: H4, f: 3221, d: H6, f: 3221, d: H7, f: 3221, d: H7A, f: 4130, d: H1.

SECONDARY SOURCES:

“Abdülaziz Çaviş”, *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, (Ankara: Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları), 187-88.

“Egypt a British Protectorate” *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 9, no. 1, 1915, 202-204.

Akar, Serdar and Doğan, Mustafa Şevki (directed), *Kurtlar Vadisi*, (TV-series, 2003-2005). For more information, visit www.kurtlarvadisi.com.

Akçam, Taner, *İnsan Hakları ve Ermeni Sorunu, İttihat ve Terakki'den Kurtuluş Savaşı'na*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999).

Akçam, Taner, *Türk Ulusal Kimliği ve Ermeni Sorunu*, (İstanbul: Su Yayınları, 2001).

Akşin, Sina, *100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1980).

Al-Askari, Jafar Pasha, a *Soldier's Story, From Ottoman Rule to Independent Iraq: The Memoirs of Jafar Pasha Al-Askari*, (eds.) William Facey and Najdat Fathi Safwat, (London: Arabian Publishing, 2003).

Aldrich, Richard J. (ed), *Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain 1945-1970*, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1998).

Alexander, Martin S. (ed), *Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence Inside Alliances and Coalitions from 1914 to the Cold war*, (London and Portland, Ore: Frank Cass, 1998).

Andrew, Christopher, “Historical Research on the British Intelligence Community” *Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., the USSR, the U.K. and the Third World*, 43-64.

Andrew, Christopher, *Her Majesty's Secret Service: the Making of the British Intelligence Community*, (New York: Elisabeth Sifton Books, Viking, 1985).

Arıkan, M. Ercan, “Dedem Mehmet Emin Bey ve Trablusgarp Hatıraları”, *Kebikeç*, no. 16, 165-198.

Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, no. 118 (Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE ve Genelkurmay Denetleme Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2004).

Aslan, Emir Şekip, *Bir Arap Aydının Gözüyle Osmanlı Tarihi ve I. Dünya Savaşı Anıları*, (İstanbul: Çatı Kitapları, 2005).

- Atay, Falih Rıfıkı, *Zeytindağı*, (İstanbul: Pozitif Yayınları, 2004).
- Avcıoğlu, Doğan, *Milli Kurtuluş Tarihi 1883'den 1995'e*, Vol. 1 (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1998).
- Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya, *Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Paşa*, vol. 3, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2005).
- Aydoğan, Erdal, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Doğu Politikası, 1908-1918*, (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 2005).
- Balcıoğlu, Mustafa, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa'dan Cumhuriyet'e* (Ankara: Asil Yayın Dağıtım, 2004).
- Balkan, Fuat, *İlk Türk Komitacısı Fuat Balkan'ın Hatıraları*, Metin Martı (ed), (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1998).
- Bayar, Celal, *Ben de Yazdım, Milli Mücadele'ye Gidiş*, vol. 4 and 5, (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1967).
- Belge, Murat, "Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa", *Birikim*, no.116, 1998, 16-20.
- Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi, Sina-Filistin Cephesi-Harbin Başlangıcından İkinci Gazze Muharebeleri Sonuna Kadar*, vol. 4, part 1 (Ankara: Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Askeri Tarih Yayınları, 1979).
- Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi: Hicaz, Asir, Yemen Cepheleleri ve Libya Harekatı, 1914-1918*, vol. 6 (Ankara: Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Askeri Tarih Yayınları, 1978).
- Cemil, Arif, *I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1997).
- Cihangir, Erol, *Emir Şekip Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa*, (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2006).
- Clayton, Anthony, *FOREARMED, A History of the Intelligence Corps*, (London-New York: Brassey's, 1993).
- Çelik, Cemil, *Birinci Dünya Savaşında Sina Filistin Cephesinde Birinci Kanal Seferi*, unpublished MA thesis, (Afyon: Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü- Tarih Anabilim Dalı, 1999).
- Çeliktepe, Atilla, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa'nın Siyasi Misyonu*, (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2003).
- Dadrian, Vahakn N., "The Naim-Andonian Documents on the World War I Destruction of Ottoman Armenians: The Anatomy of a Genocide" *International Journal; of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 18, No.3 (Aug.,1986), 311-360.

- Dadrian, Vahakn N., *Ermeni Soykırımında Kurumsal Roller: Toplu Makaleler 1*, (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2004).
- Dadrian, Vahakn N., *The history of the Armenian genocide : ethnic conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus*, (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1995).
- Daly, M. W., “The British Occupation 1882-1922” *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the end of the twentieth century*, 239-251.
- Erden, Ali Fuad, *Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Suriye Hatıraları*, Alpay Kabacalı (ed), (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2003).
- Erden, Ali Fuad, *Paris’ten Tih Sahrasına*, (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1949).
- Erickson, Edward J., *Ordered to die: a history of the Ottoman army in the First World War*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001).
- Ertürk, Hüsamettin, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, Semih Nafiz Tansu (ed), (İstanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, 1996).
- Esatlı, Mustafa Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki Tarihinde Esrar Perdesi ve Yakup Cemil Niçin Öldürüldü?*, (İstanbul: Hür Yayın, 1975).
- Evans-Pritchard, E. E., *The Senusi of Cyrenaica*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).
- Galbraith, John S. and al-Sayyid-Marsot, Afaf Lutfi, “The British Occupation of Egypt: Another View” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 9, no .4, 1978, 471-488.
- Gençoğlu, Mustafa, *İngiliz Hakimiyetinde Mısır (1882-1914)*, unpublished MA thesis, (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi SBE Tarih Ana Bilimdalı, 1997).
- Gençyaşar, Burhan, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Edebiyatı” *Kılavuz*, vol.31 (Ankara: Büyükharf Yayıncılık, Aralık 2005), 11-14.
- Gottlieb, W. W., *Studies in Secret Diplomacy during the First World War*, (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1957).
- Hanioğlu, Şükrü, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1986).
- Hayati, Aktaş, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri (1913-1918)*, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, (Konya: Selçuk Üniversitesi, 1994).
- Hiçyılmaz, Ergun, *Belgelerle Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda casusluk örgütleri*, (İstanbul: Yüce, 1981).

- Hiçyılmaz, Ergun, *Belgelerle Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa ve casusluk örgütleri*, (İstanbul: Ünsal, 1979).
- Hiçyılmaz, Ergun, *Osmanlıdan Cumhuriyete gizli teşkilatlar*, (İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1994).
- Hiçyılmaz, Ergun, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa'dan Mit'e*, (İstanbul: Varlık, 1990).
- Hikmet Çiçek, Dr. Bahattin Şakir, *İttihat ve Terakki'den Teşkilatı Mahsusa'ya Bir Türk Jakoben'i*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2004).
- History of the Great War: Military Operations Egypt and Palestine from the Outbreak of War with Germany to June 1917*, compiled by Lieut.-General Sir George Macmunn & Captain Cyril Falls (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928).
- Kahn, David, "World War II History: The Biggest Hole" *Military Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Apr., 1975), 74-76.
- Karabekir, Kazım, *Birinci Cihan Harbine neden girdik, nasıl girdik, nasıl idare ettik?*, vol.4 (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1994).
- Karabekir, Kazım, *Gizli Harp İstihbarat*, (İstanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 1998).
- Karasapan, Cela Tevfik, *Libya: Trablusgarp, Bingazi ve Fizan*, (Ankara: Resimli Posta Matbaası, 1960).
- Keleşyılmaz, Vahdet, "Kafkas Harekatının Perde Arkası", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, no. 47, (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, June 2000), 367-394.
- Keleşyılmaz, Vahdet, "Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa'nın Kuruluşu, Başkanları ve Mustafa Kemal" *Türkler Ansiklopedisi*, vol.8, 316-320.
- Keleşyılmaz, Vahdet, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa'nın Hindistan Misyonu (1914-1918)*, (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1999).
- Kent, Sherman, *Strategic intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1949).
- Kocahanoğlu, Osman Selim, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Sorgulanması ve Yargılanması (1918-1919)*, (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 1998).
- Koçak, Cemil, "'Ey tarihçi belgen kadar konuş!' Belgesel bir Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Öyküsü", *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 3, 2006, 171-214.


- Koloğlu, Orhan, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’dan Milli Eminiyet’e geçiş”, *Birikim*, no.93-94, 1997, 145-149.
- Kurtcephe, İsrail, *Türk-İtalyan İlişkileri (1911-1916)*, unpublished PhD. Thesis, (Konya: Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1990).
- Kuşçubaşı, Eşref, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Arabistan, Sina ve Kuzey Afrika Müdürü Eşref Bey’in Hayber Anıları, Hayber’de Türk Cengi*, Dr. Philip H. Stoddard and H. Basri Danışman (eds), (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1997).
- Kutay, Cemal, *1913’ de garbi Trakya’da ilk Türk cumhuriyeti*, (İstanbul: Ercan, 1962).
- Kutay, Cemal, *Ana-vatan’da son beş Osmanlı Türk’ü*, (İstanbul: Kervan, 1962).
- Kutay, Cemal, *Birinci dünya harbinde Teşkilat-i mahsusa ve Hayber’de türk cengi*, (İstanbul: Ercan, 1962).
- Kutay, Cemal, *Enver Paşa Lenin’e karşı*, (İstanbul: Ekici, 1955); *Şehit sadriazam Talat Paşa’nın gurbet hatıraları*, (İstanbul: 1983).
- Kutay, Cemal, *Hatıralar: İttihat ve Terraki, I.Dünya Savaşı anıları*, (İstanbul: Çağdaş, 1977).
- Kutay, Cemal, *Hatırat*, (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1996).
- Kutay, Cemal, *Lavrens’e karşı Kuşçubaşı*, (İstanbul: Tarih, 1965).
- Kutay, Cemal, *Necid çöllerinde Mehmet Akif*, (İstanbul: Tarih Yayınları Müessesesi, 1963).
- Kutay, Cemal, *Siyasi mahkumlar adası: Malta*, (İstanbul: Tarih, 1963).
- Kutay, Cemal, *Trablus-Garb’de bir avuç kahraman*, (İstanbul: Tarih, 1963).
- Muradoğlu, Abdullah, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa” *Yeni Şafak journal* (İstanbul: Diyalog Gazetecilik San. ve tic.ltd. şti., 14-25 November 2005).
- Mustafa, Münim, *Cepheden Cepheye*, (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 2004).
- Nikolay, W. Walther, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Alman Gizli Servisi*, (İstanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 1998).
- Peel, Sidney, “British Administration and Irrigation in Egypt” *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 3, 1905, 513-534.

- Pehlivanlı, Hamit, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Kuzey Afrika’da, 1914-1918” *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, no. 47 (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, June 2000), 421-440.
- Pehlivanlı, Hamit, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa: Türk Modern İstihbaratçılığının Başlangıcı mı?”, *Osmanlı-Teşkilat*, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999).
- Pomiankowski, Joseph, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Çöküşü: 1914-1918 I. Dünya Savaşı*, (İstanbul: Kayıhan Yayınları, 1990).
- Porch, Douglas, *The French Secret Services From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War*, (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1995).
- Ransom, Harry Howe, *The Intelligence Establishment* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970).
- Reid, Donald Malcolm, “The Urabi Revolution and the British Conquest, 1879-1882” *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the end of the twentieth century*, vol. 2, (Ed.) M. W. Daly, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1998), 217-238.
- Robertson, Kenneth G., “The Study of Intelligence in the United States”, Roy Godson (ed), *Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., the USSR, the U.K. and the Third World* (McLean, Virginia: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1988), 7-41.
- Sabis, Ali İhsan, *Harp Hatıralarım: Birinci Dünya Harbi*, vol.2 (İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1992).
- Sarısaman, Sadık, “Trabzon Mıntıkası Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Heyet-i İdaresinin Faaliyetleri ve Gürcü Lejyonu”, *XIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi* (Ankara: 4-8 Ekim 1999), 495-534.
- Scholch, Alexander, “The ‘Men on the Spot’ and the English Occupation of Egypt in 1882”, *The Historical Journal*, vol. 19, no. 3, 1976, 773-775.
- Shaw, Stanford J. and Shaw, Ezel Kural, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye, Reform, Devrim ve Cumhuriyet: Modern Türkiye’nin Doğuşu 1808-1975*, (İstanbul: E Yayınları, 1994).
- Sheffy, Yigal, *British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign, 1914-1918*, (London: Frank Cass, 1998).
- Simon, Rachel, *Libya between Ottomanism and Nationalism: The Ottoman Involvement in Libya during the War with Italy (1911-1918)* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1987).

- Sloane, W. M., "Egypt and England" *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 3, 1904, 459-484.
- Sorgun, Taylan, *Halil Paşa, İttihat ve Terakki'den Cumhuriyet'e Bitmeyen Savaş*, (İstanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 1997).
- Spaulding, Jay and Kapteijns, Lidwien, *An Islamic Alliance: Ali Dinar and the Senusiyya 1906-1916*, (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1994).
- Stoddard, Philip H., *Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar 1911-1918: Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa üzerine Bir Ön Çalışma*, (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 2003).
- Şahin, Seyit, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Dördüncü Ordunun Faaliyetleri*, unpublished PhD. Thesis, (Konya: Selçuk Üniversitesi, SBE Tarih Ana Bilim Dalı, Atatürk İlke ve İnkılap Tarihi Bilim Dalı, 1997).
- Şakir, Ziya, *Cihan Harbini Nasıl İdare ettik? 1914-1918*, (İstanbul: Muallim Fuat Gücüyener Anadolu Türk Kitap Deposu, 1944).
- Talat Paşa, *Talat Paşa'nın Anıları*, Alpay Kabacalı (ed), (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2000).
- Tekeli, İlhan and İlkin, Selim, *Cumhuriyetin Harcı, Birinci Kitap: Köktenci Modernitenin Doğuşu*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003).
- Tetik, Ahmet, "Askeri Arşivler ve Dünden Bugüne Genelkurmay Atase Arşivi", *Uluslararası Arşivler Sempozyumu*, (17-19 Kasım, 2005).
- Troy, Thomas, *Donnovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Frederick, Md: University Publications of America, 1981).
- Trumpener, Ulrich, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, (New York: Caravan Books, 1989).
- Tunaya, Tarık Zafer, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Gelişmeler (1876-1938), Birinci Kitap: Kanun-i Esasi ve Meşrutiyet Dönemi (1876-1918)*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2001).
- Tunaya, Tarık Zafer, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, Vol.3 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000).
- Umar, Ömer Osman, *Osmanlı Yönetimi ve Fransız Manda İdaresi Altında Suriye (1908-1938)*, (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2004).
- Vardar, Galip, *İttihad ve Terakki içinde dönenler*, (İstanbul: Yeni Zaman Yayınları, 2003).


- Verrier, Anthony, *Agents of Empire, Anglo-Zionist Operations 1915-1919 Brigadier Walter Gribbon, Aaron Aaronsohn and the NILI Ring*, (London-Washington: Brassey's, 1995).
- Von Kressenstein, Baron Kress, *Türklerle beraber Süveyş kanalına*, (İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1943).
- Von Sanders, Liman, *Türkiye'de Beş Yıl*, (İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968).
- Winstone, H. V. F., *the Diaries of Parker Pasha*, (London-Melbourne-New York: Quartet Books, 1983).
- Winstone, H. V. F., *The Illicit Adventure, The Story of Political and Military Intelligence in the Middle East from 1898 to 1926*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982).
- Yalçın, Soner, *Teşkilat'ın İki Silahşörü, Biri Meşrutiyet'in Silahşörü Yakub Cemil diğeri Cumhuriyet'in Silahşörü Torun Yakub Cemil*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2001).
- Zürcher, Eric Jan, "Jön Türkler, Müslüman Osmanlılar ve Türk Milliyetçileri: Kimlik Politikaları, 1908-1938", in *Osmanlı Geçmişi ve Bugünün Türkiye'si*, (ed) Kemal Karpat, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, Haziran 2004), 261-292.
- Zürcher, Eric Jan, "Modern Türkiye'ye Ne Oldu? Kırk Yıl Sonra Bernard Lewis'in *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu* kitabı" *Savaş, Devrim ve Uluslaşma, Türkiye Tarihi'nde Geçiş Dönemi 1908-1928*, 81-99.
- Zürcher, Eric Jan, *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984).
- Zürcher, Eric Jan, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London-New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003).

APPENDIX A




Source: *Sina-Filistin Cephesi*.

APPENDIX B




Source: *Sina-Filistin Cephesi*.

APPENDIX C




Source: *Sina-Filistin Cephesi*.

APPENDIX D




Source: Sina-Filistin Cephesi.

APPENDIX E




Source: Sina-Filistin Cephesi.

APPENDIX F




Source: *Sina-Filistin Cephesi*.

APPENDIX G



Source: *Libya Harekatı.*

APPENDIX J



Source: *Libya Harekatı.*

APPENDIX K

Harbiye Nezareti Umur-i Şarkıye

Dairesi Müdüriyetine

495

Levazımat-ı Umumiye Dairesi Riyaset-i Alisine

Şeyh Ahmed eş-Şerif Senusi hazretlerinin maiyyetinde zirde esamisi muharrer üç zat ba emri nezaret-penahi emrinde azimet edeceklerinden Bandırma'dan İzmir'e kadar 2. mevki şimendifer tesviyesinde itasına müsade ve lazım gelenlere emr ve havale buyurulması maruzdur.

Harbiye Nezareti Umur-i Şarkıye Dairesi Müdürü

- Senusi Şeyhi Seyyid Süleyman
- İhvan-ı Senusiyyeden Mahmud
- İhvan-ı Senusiyyeden Salih

Source: ATASE Archive: f: 1858, d: 136, I: 7/6.

APPENDIX L

Harbiye Nezareti Umur-i Şarkîye
Dairesi Müdüriyetine

Afrika Grupları Kumandanlığı Cenab-ı Alisine

Afrika Grupları Kumandanlığı mıntıkasında istihdam kılınmak üzere ba emri nezaret penahi Muamelat-ı Zatiye Müdüriyeti'nden Umur-i Şarkîye Dairesi emrine verilen merbut listede mufassal künyeleri muharrer topçu zabıt efendiler ile topçu küçük zabitan ve mektebli miralyöz kıdemli serçavuşu bu kere izam kılınmıştır efendim.

Harbiye Nezareti Umur-i Şarkîye Dairesi Müdürü

Ali Başhampa

Source: ATASE Archive: f: 1859, d: 141, I: 1/26 .