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**THREE MAIN COMPONENTS OF TURKEY’S
CHANGING POLICY
TOWARD CENTRAL ASIA AFTER 1990:
ENERGY, ECONOMY, CULTURE**

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ABSTRACT

Master Thesis

Three Main Components of Turkey's Changing Policy Toward Central Asia

After 1990:

Energy, Economy, Culture

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In 1991, when the Soviet Union demised and the Central Asian States gained their independence, entrance of multinational energy companies began to the region. The investigations proved that the Caspian Basin has considerable amounts of hydrocarbon reserves. Opening of those rich and untapped hydrocarbon reserves up to the world increased the importance of Central Asia as a region. Besides the oil and gas reserves the region possesses, its complex demographic structure, central position amid the three continents, and the significance it gained in terms of security after the 9/11 events, have made Central Asia such a region in which the global and regional actors began to rival for influence.

Turkey, due to its historical, cultural, and ethnic connections with the states of the region, emerged as an important actor in Central Asia. In this dissertation, bilateral political, economic, and cultural relations Turkey has developed with the Central Asian Republics after 1990 are examined and it is made special emphasis to 'energy' relations. Turkey's energy profile and energy policies are studied, and Turkey's place and role in the geopolitical environment shaped within the framework of Caspian hydrocarbons are evaluated.

The energy sources of Central Asia are important for Turkey's resource policy as well as pipeline policy. Caspian oil and gas, which are added as new supply sources for Turkey's increasing energy demand, will also provide transit revenues to Turkey, increase Turkey's importance and prestige in the region, and decrease the tanker traffic of the Turkish Straits. In this framework, when the policies of Turkey towards Central Asia after 1990 are examined, it is concluded that in comparison with present political, economic, cultural, and military relations, the most intense and successful relations have been developed in the field of energy.

Key Words: Geopolitics, Central Asia, Caspian Basin, Turkic Republics, energy, Turkey's energy policy, pipelines

ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

1990 Sonrası Türkiye'nin Değişen Orta Asya Siyasetinin Üç Temel Bileşeni:

Enerji, Ekonomi, Kültür

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1991'de Sovyetler Birliği'nin yıkılıp Orta Asya ülkelerinin bağımsızlıklarını kazanmaları ile birlikte bölgeye çok uluslu enerji şirketlerinin de girişi başladı. Yapılan araştırmalar Hazar havzasının önemli miktarda hidrokarbon rezervlerine sahip olduğunu ortaya koydu. Bu zengin ve kullanılmamış hidrokarbon kaynaklarının dünyaya açılması ile Orta Asya bölgesinin jeopolitik önemi ve dünya siyasetindeki ağırlığı arttı. Sahip olduğu petrol ve doğalgaz rezervlerinin yanı sıra geniş coğrafyası, karışık demografik yapısı, üç kıta arasındaki merkezi konumu, ve özellikle 11 Eylül sonrası güvenlik açısından kazandığı önem ile Orta Asya, bölgesel ve küresel aktörlerin nüfuz yarışına girdiği bir bölge haline geldi.

Türkiye, bölge ülkeleri ile olan tarihsel, kültürel, etnik bağları nedeniyle, Orta Asya'da önemli bir aktör olarak belirdi. Bu tezde 1990 sonrası Türkiye'nin Orta Asya ülkeleri ile geliştirdiği ikili siyasi, ekonomik, kültürel ilişkiler incelenmiş, bu ilişkilerde enerji boyutuna özel vurgu yapılmıştır. Türkiye'nin enerji profili ve enerji politikaları irdelenmiş, Orta Asya bölgesinin hidrokarbon kaynakları ve boru hatları çerçevesinde oluşan jeopolitik ortamda Türkiye'nin yeri ve rolü değerlendirilmiştir.

Orta Asya enerji kaynakları Türkiye'nin hem kaynak hem de boru hatları politikası açısından önemlidir. Türkiye'nin artan enerji ihtiyacına yeni arz kaynağı olarak eklenen Hazar petrol ve gazının aynı zamanda boru hatları ile Avrupa'ya taşınması hedeflenerek Türkiye'ye transit gelirleri sağlaması, bölgede Türkiye'nin önem ve prestijini arttırması, ve Türk Boğazları'ndaki tanker trafiğinin azaltılması planlanmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, Türkiye'nin 1990 sonrası bölgeye yönelik politikaları incelendiğinde mevcut siyasi, ekonomik, kültürel ve askeri ilişkilere kıyasla en yoğun ve en başarılı ilişkilerin enerji alanında olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Jeopolitik, Orta Asya, Hazar Havzası, Türki Cumhuriyetler, enerji, Türkiye'nin enerji politikası, boru hatları

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THREE MAIN COMPONENTS OF TURKEY’S CHANGING POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL ASIA AFTER 1990: ENERGY, ECONOMY, CULTURE

YEMİN METNİ	ii
TUTANAK	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZET	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
ABBREVIATIONS	x
LIST OF TABLES	xiii
LIST OF FIGURES	xiv
INTRODUCTION	1

PART I GEOPOLITICS OF CENTRAL ASIA

1.1 GEOPOLITICS	15
1.2 . THE GEOPOLITICS OF CENTRAL ASIA	23
1.2.1. Central Asia	23
1.2.1.1. The Caucasus Sub-region	25
1.2.1.2. The Caspian Basin	27
1.3. IMPORTANCE OF ENERGY	28
1.3.1. Oil and Gas	30
1.3.1.1. Oil	30
1.3.1.2 . Natural Gas	31
1.4. THE CASPIAN ENERGY RESOURCES	33
1.4.1. The History of the Caspian Oil and Gas	33
1.4.1.1. Pre-1991 Era	33
1.4.1.2. Post-Soviet Era	35
1.4.2. The Oil and Gas Reserves of the Caspian Basin	37

1.4.2.1. Middle East Oil	39
1.4.2.2. Russian Gas	43
1.5. LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN CENTRAL ASIA	45
1.5.1. The Russian Federation	46
1.5.2. The United States	49
1.5.3. Iran	52
1.5.4. China	54
1.5.5. Turkey	56

PART II TURKEY AND CENTRAL ASIA

2.1. A NEW REGION: NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES	59
2.2. COMPETING MODELS IN CENTRAL ASIA: TURKISH, IRANIAN, AND CHINESE INITIATIVES	65
2.2.1. Turkish Model: Basic Characteristics	65
2.2.2. The Iranian Model in Competition	70
2.2.3. The Chinese Model of Gradual Change	71
2.3. DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS: FROM UTOPIC ACTIVISM TO POLITICAL REALISM	73
2.3.1. 1991-1993: The Activist Period	73
2.3.2. 1993 to the Present: The Triumph of Political Realism	78
2.4. TURKEY'S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE TURKIC REPUBLICS	82
2.4.1. Azerbaijan	83
2.4.2. Kazakhstan	88
2.4.3. Uzbekistan	91
2.4.4. Turkmenistan	95
2.4.5. Kyrgyzstan	99

PART III

TURKEY'S ENERGY PROFILE AND ENERGY POLICY

3.1.	TURKEY'S ENERGY PROFILE	103
3.1.1.	The Reserves, Production, and Consumption of	
	Primary Energy Sources	103
3.1.1.1.	Lignite and Coal	104
3.1.1.2.	Oil	106
3.1.1.3.	Natural Gas	109
3.1.1.4.	Renewables	114
	3.1.1.4.1. Clean Renewables	115
	3.1.1.4.1.1. Hydropower	115
	3.1.1.4.1.2. Wind Energy	117
	3.1.1.4.1.3. Solar Energy	118
	3.1.1.4.1.4. Geothermal Energy	118
	3.1.1.4.2. Biofuels	119
	3.1.1.5. Nuclear Energy	120
3.2.	TURKEY'S ENERGY POLICY AND	
	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTIONS	122
3.2.1.	Institutions Responsible From Turkey's Energy Policy	122
3.2.2.	Turkey's Energy Policy	124
	3.2.2.1. Resource Policy	126
	3.2.2.2. Pipeline Policy	129

PART IV

TURKEY IN CENTRAL ASIA: ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES

4.1.	ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES: FROM 1991 TO THE PRESENT	137
4.1.1.	Politics	138
4.1.2.	Economy	143
4.1.3.	Energy	147
	4.1.3.1. Oil Transportation	148
	4.1.3.2. Natural Gas Transportation	150

4.1.3.3. The Analysis: What is Left for Turkey in the Pipeline Rivalry?	158
4.1.4. Education and Culture	159
4.1.5. Security	161
CONCLUSION	165
BIBLIOGRAPHY	170

ABBREVIATIONS

9/11	September 11
AIOC	Azerbaijan International Operating Company
APK	The Research, Planning, and Coordination Board
B.C.	Before the Christ
B/d	Barrel per day
Bcm	Billion Cubic Meter
BOTAŞ	Petroleum Pipeline Corporation
BP	British Petroleum
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BTC	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
CACO	Central Asian Cooperation Organization
CAR	Central Asian Republics
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DPT	State Planning Organization
DSİ	State Hydraulic Works
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
EIA	Energy Information Administration
EPİE	Electrical Power Resources Survey and Development
EDİGM	General Directorate of Energy Affairs
EMRA	Energy Market Regulatory Authority
EU	European Union
GAP	South Eastern Anatolia Project
GUUAM	Georgia Ukraine Uzbekistan Azerbaijan Moldova
IEA	International Energy Agency
INOGATE	Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JDP	Justice and Development Party
LNG	Liquified Natural Gas
MENR	Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources
MFA	Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mtoe	Million Ton(s) of Oil Equivalent
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
P.	Page Number
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PİGM	General Directorate of Petroleum Affairs
Pls.	Please
PP.	Pages
PTT	General Directorate of Turkish Post
RF	Russian Federation
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
SOCAR	State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic
TAEK	Turkish Atomic Energy Commission/Turkish Atomic Energy Authority
Tcf	Trillion Cubic Feet
Tcm	Trillion Cubic Meter
THY	Turkish Airlines
TİKA	Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency
TPAO	Turkish Petroleum Corporation
TPES	Total Primary Energy Supply
TRACECA	Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TURKSAM	Turkish Centre for International Relations and Strategic Analysis
TURKSOY	The Joint Administration of Turkic Arts and Culture
UN	United Nations
US	United States

USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Russian Natural Gas Exports	44
Table 2: Turkey's Natural Gas Purchase and Sale Agreements	111

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Map of the Caucasus and Central Asia	24
Figure 2: The Caspian Sea	27
Figure 3: World Primary Energy Demand	29
Figure 4: Map of Azerbaijan	84
Figure 5: Map of Kazakhstan	89
Figure 6: Map of Uzbekistan	92
Figure 7: Map of Turkmenistan	97
Figure 8: Map of Kyrgyzstan	100
Figure 9: Turkey's Coal Production and Consumption	105
Figure 10: Turkey's Oil Production and Consumption	108
Figure 11: Turkey's Natural Gas Production and Consumption	110
Figure 12: Turkey's Electricity Generation	115
Figure 13: The Pipeline Projects Passing from Turkey	132
Figure 14: The BTC Pipeline	149

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation analyzes Turkey's foreign policy towards Central Asia since the early 1990s. After living seventy years under the Soviet rule, the Central Asian Republics (CAR) became independent in 1991. Thenceforth, Turkey began to develop relations with the region. The most intense point of the mutual relations, which has political, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions, has been on the issue of "energy". Turkey's primary goal to become an energy corridor in the region is, in fact, a direct manifestation of its desire to position itself as a major transit country in transporting Central Asian oil and gas to the Western markets. This study examines Turkey's foreign policy towards Central Asia in general, and Turkey's energy policy in particular.

There are different definitions of Central Asia. As the local countries defined themselves on January 4, 1993, Central Asia includes Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.¹ Yet, in this study, Central Asia is taken up to include also its geopolitical hinterland: the Caspian Basin and the South Caucasus which is tied to Central Asia through the Caspian. Similarly, from time to time, "Central Asian Republics" is used in place of the "Turkic Republics" to include Azerbaijan and exclude Tajikistan. This is because Azerbaijan is ethnically and culturally Turkic despite being a Caucasus state and Tajikistan is ethnically and linguistically Persian despite being located in Central Asia.

Part I begins with the definition of geopolitics. This is necessary to better understand the geopolitical importance of Central Asia that has triumphed after the demise of the Soviet Union. The term 'geopolitics' was first used in 1899 by Rudolf Kjellen, a Swedish political scientist.² Geopolitics analyses the political behaviors of states in terms of geographic conditions and power balances.³ Sir Halford Mackinder conducted the first geopolitical study of the Central Asia region in 1904, whereby he

¹ Bircan Dokuzlar, *Dünya Güç Dengesinde Yeni Silah Doğalgaz (Orta Asya'dan Avrupa'ya)*, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2006, p. 51.

² Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "General Introduction", *The Geopolitics Reader*, eds. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge, 2nd edn., Routledge, New York, 2006 (Introduction), p. 1.

³ Dokuzlar, p. 52.

mentioned that ‘...a vast area of Euro-Asia which is inaccessible to ships...’, namely, the ‘Pivot Area’ which includes Central Asia.⁴ In 1919, Mackinder put forward his Heartland theory: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; who rules the World Island commands the World.”⁵ The Heartland “includes the Baltic Sea, the navigable Middle and Lower Danube, the Black Sea, Asia Minor, Armenia, Persia, Tibet, and Mongolia.”⁶ It is understood that Central Asia is located at the ‘heart’ of the Mackinder’s Heartland. This central position of the region has often been emphasized hitherto. What has changed is that today, when geopolitical importance of a state or a region is discussed; the natural resources are taken into consideration more than the geographical location. For this reason Central Asia has become the struggle domain of the 21st century. Its rich and untapped energy sources make Central Asia geopolitically so significant. Then, what makes these energy sources so important? Energy is necessary for the continuation of economic and social life. It sustains our daily lives through lighting, heating, transportation, communication, etc. The factors such as the increase of industrial activities, rapid urbanization, population growth etc. have increased the energy demand of the world day by day. The chief economist of International Energy Agency, Fatih Birol, says that until 2030, global energy demand will grow about 45 percent in total with an annual increase of 1.6 percent.⁷

The increase in energy demand is reflected mostly on the hydrocarbons. 80 percent of the world’s energy demand is met by fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and gas.⁸ In 2006, the shares of fuels in world total primary energy supply were such: oil 34.4%, coal 26.0%, gas 20.5%.⁹ Although coal is the world’s second most demanded primary energy source, it is not regarded as a strategic material for today. This is

⁴ Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, **The Geographical Journal**, Vol: 23, No: 4, Apr., 1904 (Pivot of History), pp. 434-435.

⁵ Halford Mackinder, **Democratic Ideals and Reality**, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1919 (Democratic Ideals), p. 150.

⁶ Charles B. Hagan, “Geopolitics”, **The Journal of Politics**, Vol: 4, No: 4, (Nov., 1942), p. 480.

⁷ “Dünya Enerji Talebi Yüzde 45 Büyüyecek”, **Milliyet**, 29.12.2008, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Ekonomi/SonDakika.aspx?aType=SonDakika&ArticleID=1034221> (10.01.2009).

⁸ “Grafiklerle Dünyanın Enerji Talebi”, 15.02.2006, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/indepth/story/2006/02/060215_energy_demand.shtml (10.01.2009).

⁹ EIA, Key World Energy Statistics, 2008, http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2008/key_stats_2008.pdf (10.01.2009), p. 6.

because coal is the most abundant fossil fuel, cost-competitive, and most importantly, located in the main consuming countries.¹⁰ On the other hand, today, oil and gas are accepted as the most strategic energy sources. This dissertation will, thus, focus on oil and gas, the resources which made Central Asia a field of struggle among the multinational energy companies and local and global actors.

Oil, or petroleum, “is a complex mixture of liquid hydrocarbons, chemical compounds containing hydrogen and carbon, occurring naturally in underground reservoirs in sedimentary rock.”¹¹ It has been used for centuries; yet, it became a commercial material in 1859 when Edwin Drake drilled the first modern oil well in Pennsylvania.¹² Owing to the technological and industrial developments, the economic and strategic value of oil has grown gradually. Today, it is the primary supply source of world energy consumption. My study continues with the history and importance of natural gas. Natural gas is a mixture of several gases but it comprises particularly methane. It is extracted from a gas field or in association with crude oil and then processed.¹³ The first natural gas leakages were seen in Iran in B.C. 6000-2000 but its first-use and transportation began in China in B.C. 900.¹⁴ Thereafter, the natural gas has been explored in different regions and has become widespread. Yet, it is just after the 1973 OPEC oil crisis when natural gas began to be regarded as an alternative energy source to oil. Oil is easy to store and transport and its area of usage is broad. It is mainly used in the transport sector. However, natural gas is cheaper and cleaner than oil. Its primary area of usage is the electricity production. The industrialized nations prefer natural gas as an alternative to oil in order to break their oil dependency. It is estimated that at least for the next 30-40 years, the hydrocarbon sources will preserve their importance; and especially natural gas will gain much more importance.¹⁵

¹⁰ <http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9023766&contentId=7044197> (10.01.2009).

¹¹ International Energy Agency, “Energy Statistics Manual”, http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/statistics_manual.pdf (19.01.2008), p. 69.

¹² İstanbul Ticaret Odası, **Küresel Petrol Stratejilerinin Jeopolitik Açısından Dünya ve Türkiye Üzerindeki Etkileri**, İTO Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p. 23.

¹³ International Energy Agency, “Energy Statistics Manual”, http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/statistics_manual.pdf (19.01.2008), p.55.

¹⁴ Dokuzlar, p. 20.

¹⁵ Dokuzlar, p. 20.

After mentioning the importance of the oil and gas in general, we change our focus on the Caspian oil and gas. There is not a broad history of Caspian natural gas. The most common information about the region's gas is the natural gas flames burning for centuries, which Marco Polo saw in the temples in Baku during his Azerbaijan trip in 1273.¹⁶ The history of the Caspian oil dates back to 7th and 8th centuries, but it was just in the mid-17th century when the oil in the region began to be extracted through mechanical methods¹⁷ mainly from the oil fields in Baku in the Apsheron peninsula.¹⁸ The first oil well in the region was drilled in 1848 in Bibi-Eilat¹⁹ and the first oil refinery was opened in 1863.²⁰ When the Russian technology in the region began to be insufficient, Nobel Brothers and Rothschild family entered into the region. After that, trade of the region's oil has begun. Baku, that was the world's most important oil centre in the 19th century, preserved its significance also in the first half of the 20th century. In both of the world wars, Baku oil formed the most critical point of the Russian-German antagonism. During the wars, Germany aimed to capture Baku oil thereby debar Russia from oil and increase the Germans' fighting power. Yet, it failed. After the Second World War (WWII), Central Asian oil started to get exploited by the Soviet Union until 1991.²¹

As a result of the insufficient Russian technology, which failed to drill deeply, it was thought that the Caspian reserves were exhausted. So, oil and gas production was canalized to different regions of the Soviet Union in the second half of the 20th century. It was only after the demise of the Soviet Union when Caspian energy sources attracted the world's attention over again. With the opening of Central Asia, the 'New Great Game' started to take shape over the hydrocarbons of the region referring the 'Great Game' between the Russian and British Empires in the 19th century. The current game includes multinational energy companies as well as local and global actors for extracting, transporting, and marketing the energy

¹⁶ Dokuzlar, p. 20.

¹⁷ Osman Nuri Aras, **Azerbaycan'ın Hazar Ekonomisi ve Stratejisi**, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001, p. 15.

¹⁸ Çağrı Kürşat Yüce, **Kafkasya ve Orta Asya Enerji Kaynakları Üzerinde Mücadele**, Ötüken Neşriyat, İstanbul, 2006, p. 140.

¹⁹ Aras, p. 17.

²⁰ Mert Bilgin, **Avrasya Enerji Savaşları**, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2005(Avrasya Enerji Savaşları), p. 156.

²¹ Dokuzlar, pp. 64-66.

resources of the region. According to BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008, at the end of 2007, the total proved oil reserves of the world is about 168.6 thousand million tones, namely, 1237.9 billion barrels; 48 billion barrels (7.0 in Azerbaijan, 39.8 in Kazakhstan, 0.6 in Turkmenistan, 0.6 in Uzbekistan) or about 4% of which exist in Central Asia. When we look into natural gas reserves of the region at the end of 2007, 268.15 Tcf (45.13 in Azerbaijan, 67.20 in Kazakhstan, 94.22 in Turkmenistan, 61.60 in Uzbekistan) of 6263.34 Tcf total world proven gas reserves exist in the region. It is equivalent to 4.3% of world's total proved natural gas reserves.²² Why has the energy sources of Central Asia have been regarded as so crucial although these rates do not indicate a great amount of hydrocarbon reserves when compared to total proven world reserves? In my dissertation, it is argued that the reason is hidden in Middle East oil and Russian gas. The Middle East is an instable region full of constant political disorder. The energy-rich countries in the region often use 'oil' as a political 'gun', thereby creating price increases. In order to achieve their energy security, the states which are dependent on the Middle East oil such as the United States (U.S.), China, Japan, and the European countries, try to find alternative supply centers. It is the reason why the oil of the Caspian Basin is regarded so important by the world. Russia's gas, on the other hand, is the 'explainer' of the importance of Caspian natural gas. Russia plays its cards well by using its gas as a political leverage. The Russian Federation (RF) has the world's largest gas reserves. It is the primary gas supplier of Europe. Many European countries' dependency on Russian gas is at very high levels, in some of them, the ratio is hundred percent. This high dependency rate together with the interruption of the gas by Russia occasionally in winters as a result of the disagreement it faces with Ukraine, create danger to European energy security. This situation also poses a risk also for Turkey, which obtains about 65 percent of its gas from the Russian Federation. The significance of Caspian gas becomes prominent here. It could become an alternative to Russian gas thereby decrease many countries' natural gas dependency on Russia.

²² BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2008, http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_review_2008.pdf (10.01.2009), p. 6, 22.

My study continues with the strategic interests and energy interests of the local and global actors that are aware of Central Asia's significance. The Russian Federation can be regarded as the most influential actor in Central Asia due to its rooted ties in the region. The well-being of the ethnic Russians living in the ex-Soviet territory, continuance of intense trade relations with the Central Asian Republics, as well as preventing the fundamentalist movements emanating from the region, and resuming the monopoly of Russian oil and gas pipelines for exporting the region's hydrocarbons are some of the main interests of the RF in Central Asia. The U.S. is also one of the primary actors in the region. Its main interests are inhibiting the Central Asia from turning into a 'bed' of political and religious extremism, deploying in the region during the 'war on terrorism', and exporting the region's energy sources to the world markets freely through multiple pipelines. Iran, a local actor in the region, wants to develop mutual beneficial economic relations with the Central Asian states and aims to transport the region's energy to Western markets via its territory. China is another principal actor in Central Asia. In the region, Beijing has many interests relating to security, economy, and energy. Its common border with Central Asia makes China anxious about separatist and fundamentalist movements that could come from the region. Yet, that common border is also advantageous in terms of trade relations. The Chinese economy and the economy of the region is complementary. As a result, Beijing has considerable commercial relations with Central Asian states. The growing energy demand of China together with the need of energy-possessor states of the region for alternative export routes increase the possibility of deepening of the bilateral relations. As for Turkey, which has common historical, ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic ties with the region, independence of five Turkic Republics in the ex-Soviet territory signified new opportunities and new responsibilities. The region was a new area to expand on: a new orientation for Turkish foreign policy; a new market for Turkish goods; a new supplier for Turkey's growing energy demand; and a new source for prestige and revenue by making Turkey an energy bridge, even an energy hub.

In the Second Part of my research, Turkey's multi-dimensional relations with Central Asia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union will be examined. After 1990,

relations with the Turkic Republics, which were halted in the Soviet era, began again. Until 1993, the relations advanced effusively. Turkey was sure of itself and it emerged as a model and a leader in the region. Yet, by 1993, it was understood that Turkey was not alone in the region; it was only one of the actors that wanted to operate in Central Asia. The limits of Turkey came to light, and Turkey began to reappraise its role in the region. Since 1995, Turkey's foreign policy toward the region has been more realistic and pragmatic.²³

In order to understand Turkey's initial approach towards the region and to compare the first phase of the relations with the present situation, it is necessary to examine the Turkish model. Then, the other competing models will be analyzed to evaluate the success of the model presented by Turkey. The Turkish model offers secularism in a Muslim country, a Western type of pluralist democratic system, and a free market economy. Turkey's experiences in achieving democracy and secularism and its successful transformation from centrally controlled economy to market economy was thought to guide the newly independent Turkic states of Central Asia. Moreover, Turkey could be a bridge between the region and the West. Yet, because of some external reasons and certain internal shortcomings of the model itself, the popularity of the Turkish model has had diminished. The detailed analysis of the model's strengths and shortcomings will be introduced. Immediately afterwards, the rival models of Iran and China will be mentioned. Iranian model offered an Islamic alternative that has anti-Western character. Yet, the leaders of the Republics were secular; and they did not want to be at odds with the West.²⁴ Therefore, the Iranian model was not attractive for them. Regarding the Chinese model, what was proposed is 'central planning propped up by market'.²⁵ It was a model that supported reform in the economic domain yet more cautious in the political area. After researching the competing models, it will be made out that neither of the models meet the expectations and needs of the Turkic Republics. Therefore, the CAR made use of all

²³ Mustafa Aydın, "Kafkasya ve Orta Asya'yla İlişkiler", **Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, ed. Baskın Oran, Vol: 2, 8th edn, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005 (Kafkasya ve Orta Asya), pp. 380-393.

²⁴ Hasene Karasac, "Actors of the New 'Great Game', Caspian Oil Politics", **Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans**, Vol: 4, No: 1, 2002, p. 22.

²⁵ Faruk Sönmezoglu, **İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası**, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p. 732.

of the models and built up their own: 'secular authoritarianism at the political level and market orientation at the economic level.'²⁶

The relations were intensive in every field from politics to education at the time Turkey presented itself as a model. Turkey, which immediately recognized all the ex-Soviet states that became independent, started to develop strong ties with the five Turkic Republics and Tajikistan. Mutual visits began. Turkey established certain institutions such as TİKA, TURKSOY, and Turkish Eximbank to improve and better coordinate relations. During that period, Turkey's self confidence was very high. It had a perspective to be a leader for Central Asia. However, since 1993, the limits of Turkey have become apparent. In the first Turkic Summit it was understood that Central Asian Republics did not aspire an extensive integration; they wanted a multidimensional cooperation based on mutual benefits. The on-going efficiency of Russia in its 'Near Abroad' together with Turkey's economic insufficiency to meet the needs of the Central Asian states and its lack of knowledge about the region, etc. proved that Turkey could not be a model country or a leader that could exclude other models and actors in the region. Therefore, Turkey's approach towards the region has advanced in a more realistic manner since 1993 to date.

After analyzing the general course of the relations, the second part of my study continues with the bilateral relations between Turkey and the Turkic Republics. Among the Republics, the most intense relations were developed with Azerbaijan. The geographical proximity, the linguistic affinity, as well as the historical and ethnic ties brought the two nations very close to each other, and even made them strategic allies. Relations that were very intense in the Elchibey era, then got interrupted for a while, and finally recovered back again. In the international arena, Turkey is the primary proponent of Azerbaijan in the Azerbaijan-Armenia dispute. Like the political relations, the economic relations are also fine. There is an important energy deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan through the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Oil Pipeline Project and Shahdeniz Natural Gas Pipeline Project. Regarding Kazakhstan, it can be said that there is a high potential for improving the

²⁶ Shireen Hunter, "Islam in Post-Independence Central Asia: Internal and External Dimensions", *Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol: 7, No: 2, 1996 (Post-Independence), p. 299.

bilateral relations. In Kazakhstan, Turkish firms and investors carry on business especially in the construction and textile sectors. Energy is also a promissory sector. Kazakhstan declared that it would join in the BTC project. Yet, the priority of Kazakhstan, in both political and economic areas, is Russia. The existing potential for taking relations forward is not exploited. Uzbekistan, the most populous and powerful of the Turkic republics military-wise, is an important Central Asian State. The economic relations between Uzbekistan and Turkey is developing. The political relations however, have been troubled as a result of certain disagreements such as Turkey's permission to Uzbek opposition leaders to enter into Turkey as well as Turkey's criticisms of Andijan events in Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan, the gas deposit of Central Asia, is very important for Turkey in terms of energy trade. Turkey and Turkmenistan are about to realize certain pipeline projects such as the Transcaspian and the Nabucco Natural Gas Pipeline Projects which will allow Turkey to transport Turkmen gas to Europe. TPAO (Turkish Petroleum Corporation) is also included in the energy development projects in Turkmenistan. Kyrgyzstan has adopted the Turkish Model most but, the bilateral relations has been improving slower. After studying Turkey's bilateral relations with the Turkic Republics one by one, it is deduced that Turkey has promising relations with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. The bilateral relations with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are not at desired level.

Part III is about Turkey's energy profile and energy policies. In this chapter, the statistical data will be used abundantly. This part begins with the reserves, production, and consumption of Turkey's primary energy sources in order to reveal if Turkey could meet its growing energy demand by its own resources. Here, in the Introduction part, statistical data will not be presented respectively for the each energy source so as to avoid repetition in subsequent parts. Turkey meets about 48 per cent of its energy demand by its own sources²⁷ but the ratio is decreasing gradually. Turkey's most abundant indigenous energy sources are lignite and coal. Oil and natural gas are the two most demanded sources in Turkey; however, their reserves are far below to meet the country's consumption, leaving Turkey a net

²⁷ R. Tuğrul Oğulata, "Energy Planning for Turkey", **Energy Sources**, Vol: 26, No: 3, 2004, p. 23.

importer of them. In Turkey, there is also a significant renewable energy potential such as hydraulic, wind, solar, geothermal and biomass. The government is trying to increase the share of renewables in the primary energy production. When it comes to nuclear energy, Turkey's nuclear energy policies have been contentious. Since the nuclear energy powerhouses can cause radioactive contamination, they are deemed risky. So, nuclear energy is often criticized and protested by the environmentalists. There have been projects to open nuclear power stations in Sinop and Mersin-Akkuyu hitherto, but they have not been materialized yet.

After studying Turkey's energy profile, my thesis continues with Turkey's energy policies. The institutions that are responsible from determination and conduct of the energy policies of Turkey will be presented firstly. These institutions are the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) and its dependent institutions; State Hydraulic Works (DSİ); the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK); the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA); and the State Planning Organization (DPT). The detailed tasks of those institutions will be introduced respectively. In my study, besides those institutions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also described as one of the main institutions responsible for energy since energy policy can not be separated from foreign policy. Energy deals with other states, joining in energy exploration and development operations in the energy-rich countries, participating in pipeline projects that transport energy via multiple states, etc. all require dialogue and cooperation with foreign countries which mean that the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has a significant role in conducting Turkey's energy policies.

The third part of my thesis continues with the energy policies of Turkey. Turkey aims to provide its energy needs without interruption and at moderate prices, with maximum energy efficiency and minimum environmental damage, hoping to become a major and player in energy trade.²⁸ In my study, Turkey's energy policy is classified into two main groups: resource policy and pipeline policy. Under the subtitle of Resource Policy, where Turkey's energy consumption and production

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<http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=tr&sf=webpages&b=enerji&bn=11&hn=12&nm=384&id=384> (30.11.2008).

rates will be presented, it will be discussed that there is a large gap between the country's energy demand and energy production. Therefore, Turkey is a net energy importer country. It imports high amounts of oil, natural gas and coal. This import dependency has caused criticisms about the resource policies of the country. Especially the natural gas policy of Turkey is highly criticized. Such high dependency to a single source-natural gas- and to a single origin country-the Russian Federation- damages Turkey's energy security. The Pipeline Policy part is about Turkey's aim of being an energy hub and energy corridor. Turkey is located in a region that possesses about 70 percent of oil and gas reserves of the world.²⁹ Under this title, the hydrocarbon reserves of the Middle East and Caspian Basin are examined and it is assumed that the geographical location of Turkey provides the country with an advantageous position. The importance of Central Asia in terms of energy emerges at this point. Unlike the Middle East, Central Asia is a landlocked region thus; it is dependent on surrounding states to export its energy sources. Herein, Turkey emerges as an alternative route for transporting the region's hydrocarbons to the Western markets. It is claimed in my study that the emergence of Central Asia as an energy-rich area at the beginning of 1990s, marked a chance for Turkey to become an energy transit country, as well as an energy hub. It is also claimed that this chance has formed the basis of Turkey's energy policy, which is the pipeline policy forming the main point of Turkey-Central Asian relations, as well. In this part, the pipeline projects that contribute to Turkey's goal for becoming an energy corridor between the East and West will be arranged in order. Yet, the ones that feed only Turkey, in other words, that carry Turkey's own oil and gas and end in the country, are excluded.

Part IV is a general evaluation of Turkey's relations with Central Asia in terms of politics, economy, energy, education, culture, and security. This part reviews achievements and failures of Turkey's foreign policy towards the region up to now. It is argued that bilateral political relations has been fluctuant. The political relations that have been conducted at leader's level have differed according to the

²⁹ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, "Türkiye'nin Enerji Stratejisi", Ocak 2008, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Turkiyenin_Enerji_Stratejisi_Ocak2008.pdf (03.06.2008), p. 2.

leaders that came to power. This situation prevents the institutionalization of the relations. If we examine chronologically, the presidency of Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel was the 'heyday' of the relations. The ideological views of the subsequent leaders and Turkey's European Union (EU) adventure affected Turkey's foreign policy towards the region. The initial enthusiasm and intensity of the relations has diminished gradually. It has settled to a more realistic framework in the course of time. Like the political relations, economic relations also began vigorously. Turkey provided credits to the Turkic Republics through Turkish Eximbank and offered financial support through state agencies. Besides, Turkish firms and enterprisers began to invest in the region. However, Turkey's economic conditions were insufficient to meet the needs of the Republics. In the course of time, it is understood that Turkey could not be an exclusive economic actor in the region; it is at most one of the economic partners of the Central Asian Republics. The trade figures reveal that the Russian Federation is the Republics' main economic partner. China's economic presence is also increasing in the region. It is inferred from the trade figures that Turkey's bilateral economic relations with the Turkic Republics is inadequate.

The most intense relations between Turkey and Central Asia is seen in the field of energy. Turkey joins in energy exploration and development in Central Asia as well as in oil and gas transportation projects in the region. Regarding oil transportation, the BTC project is of special importance. It is the first and the most important success of Turkey's pipeline policy of carrying Central Asian hydrocarbons to the West. After introducing the BTC project broadly, my dissertation proceeds with natural gas transportation. The Shahdeniz Natural Gas Pipeline Project, Turkey-Greece-Italy Natural Gas Pipeline Project, The Transcaspian Natural Gas Pipeline Project, and the Nabucco Project are the main natural gas pipeline projects of Turkey. The properties and capacities of those projects will be specified in detail. As yet, only the Shahdeniz Project and the Turkey-Greece part of the Turkey-Greece-Italy Natural Gas Pipeline Project have been materialized. The Transcaspian and the Nabucco Pipeline Projects, when completed, will contribute Turkey to becoming an important energy player in the

region, ahead of its rivals -Iran and the Russian Federation. This will provide economic benefits, and strengthen Turkey's hand against the EU. After examining the significance of those projects for Turkey, I will continue examining the Russian Federation's position in the pipeline context over the transportation of the hydrocarbons of Central Asia to Europe. In this part, Russia's energy deals and energy cooperation with the Central Asian Republics, and its place in the European energy market will be mentioned. It is confirmed by the trade figures that Europe is a very large market for Russian gas so the Russian Federation does not want to forgo its primary customer. For this reason, the Russian Federation tries to prevent the materialization of the pipeline projects that will enable Turkey be the main transport route between the East and the West. Russia actively negotiates with the region's leaders on energy and tries to channel Caspian gas to Russian pipeline system, which evidence the motivation of the Russian Federation to potentially block the actualization of the projects that will harm its pipeline monopoly. In this regard, Turkey is often criticized for not endeavoring sufficient effort to conclude the pending pipeline projects. As Mert Bilgin states, Russia continues to be a critical energy actor in Central Asia, what is left for Turkey is the BTC and the Shahdeniz Projects and the activities of TPAO in the region.³⁰

Education and culture is the second most important field after energy in bilateral relations between Turkey and the Turkic Republics. Turkey has attributed special importance to educational bridge. It has provided scholarships to the students coming from the Turkic Republics, sent students from Turkey to the region, established universities, high schools, primary schools and education centers. However, the problems in Turkey's educational policy together with the Russian educational influence that persists in the region for many years prevent Turkey from achieving cultural integration with Central Asia.

The last matter of subject in the bilateral relations is security. Turkey is not an influential actor in the security arena in Central Asia. It provides military and

³⁰ Mert Bilgin, "The Emerging Caspian Energy Regime and Turkey's New Role", **The Turkish Year Book**, Vol:14 (Caspian Energy Regime), http://www.politics.ankara.edu.tr/dosyalar/MMTY/34/1_mert_bilgin.pdf (30.11.2008), pp. 20-21.

technical assistance to the Central Asian Republics; however, its military presence in the region is far below to meet the security concerns of the Republics which include radical Islam, fundamentalist movements, terrorist activities, etc. The military presence of the RF and the West, represented by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), had persisted collaterally until the beginning of the 21st century. In this period, Turkey, acted in unison with NATO as a member. Yet, Russia faced with powerful military advance of the U.S. after the September 11 attacks when the U.S. entered into the region on behalf of the ‘war on terrorism’ and gained military bases there. Turkey, supported the existence of the U.S. as a strategic ally in the region and also increased its own presence. However, since 2005, the military presence of the US in Central Asia began to decrease while the military presence of Russia and China began to increase. In the security field, Turkey’s presence in Central Asia went head to head with the West. When the Russian presence began to increase at the expense of the West’s, Turkey’s military presence began to diminish. In the final analysis of the last chapter of my study, it is argued that Turkey is a significant player in Central Asia, however, it has never achieved to be a dominant power in the region. In nearly all spheres, the RF is the primary influential actor.

The object of my thesis is to examine Turkish foreign policy on Central Asia. I aimed to search out the dimensions and depth of Turkey’s bilateral relations with the Turkic Republics. I also tried to reveal the place of Central Asia’s hydrocarbon sources in Turkey’s energy policy. The method of the study is the legal and political text analysis in accordance with the comparative historical-interpretive method. My dissertation is mainly based on the related secondary sources. Scholarly journals and books concerning geopolitics and energy are utilized. Certain treaties as primary sources and some economic data and statistics are used, as well. Access to the official documents, articles and newspapers via Internet has been a great ease. The official web sites of certain institutions also aided me in reaching detailed information about their tasks and institutional structures. The handbooks, reviews, reports and country analysis briefs that are utilized predominantly in this study, are also obtained through Internet. This study wants to contribute to the other researchers to handle a deeper analysis in Turkish foreign policy towards Central Asia in general; and Turkey’s energy policy in particular.

PART I

GEOPOLITICS OF CENTRAL ASIA

1.1 GEOPOLITICS

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the independence of the ex-Soviet Republics, Central Asia has suddenly become one of the most prestigious regions in the world. It has become the competition field of multinational companies, and many global and regional actors. What makes the region a field of competition once more as it had been in the 19th century is its energy-oriented geopolitical importance. To study Central Asia as a geopolitical entity and to understand its place in world politics, firstly, it is essential to mention the concept of ‘geopolitics.’ So, I will first examine the meaning and historical evolution of geopolitics before explaining Central Asia’s geopolitical significance.

Geopolitics ‘has existed ever since man first engaged in politics.’³¹ Yet, the rise of global geopolitical and geo-strategic theories began with the exploration of world geography. In the second half of 19th century geopolitics had become one of the main elements in the foreign policy making mechanisms of big countries.³² The main period in the evolution process of geopolitics is between 1844 and 1943.³³ In this process, geopolitical theories helped big powers to determine their primary political aims and provided legitimacy grounds for the imperialist policies they followed in order to reach those aims.³⁴ The thinkers that have contributed to the development of contemporary geopolitics are³⁵: Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), Alfred Mahan (1840-1914), Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922), Nicholas J. Spykman (1893-1943), Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), and Halford Mackinder (1861-1947).

³¹ Jean Gottmann, “The Background of Geopolitics”, **Military Affairs**, Vol: 6, No: 4, (Winter, 1942), p. 197.

³² Ahmet Davutoğlu, **Stratejik Derinlik**, 18th edn., Küre Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004, p.102.

³³ Yüce, p. 28.

³⁴ Davutoğlu, pp. 102-103.

³⁵ İlhan, pp. 9-11.

Before examining the contributions of those thinkers to the evolution of geopolitics, it is congruous to define the term ‘geopolitics.’ Geopolitics is an interpretation of the relation between geography and politics. However, geopolitical studies are not objective and indisputable. So, the word geopolitics does not have a commonly accepted and uncontroversial definition. Like many words in politics, it has different definitions and different interpretations. Each politician, statesmen, thinker or theorist has his own understanding and description of the word. These definitions have similarities as well as important differences.

Geopolitics is ‘the politics that is based on geography’³⁶ or ‘the politics that is guided by geography.’³⁷ It is the ‘spatial study and practice of international relations.’³⁸ According to Muzaffer Özdağ, ‘Geopolitics is the discipline that assesses and emphasizes the impact of nature, of geographical position, and of existence and activity domains of nations with their encompassed resources in international relations, forming of the national power and forging the balance of power.’³⁹ In his book ‘Jeopolitik Duyarlılık’, Suat İlhan, an expert on strategy, explains geopolitics as such: ‘Geopolitics is a science that takes the varying and invariable elements of geopolitics into account in making the power assessment of a nation, a group of nations, or a region to determine a policy, and analyzes and evaluates the regional powers and the global centers of power that influence it at the time.’⁴⁰

In the book “The Geopolitics of Super Power”, Colin S. Gray states that “Geopolitics is about the ‘high politics’ of security and international order; about the influence of enduring spatial relationships for the rise and decline of power centers; and about the implications of technological, political-organizational, and

³⁶ Suat İlhan, **Jeopolitik Duyarlılık**, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, 1989, p.3.

³⁷ İlhan, p.3.

³⁸ Colin S. Gray, “In Defence of the Heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder and His Critics a Hundred Years On”, **Comparative Strategy**, Vol: 23, No: 1, 2004 (In Defence of the Heartland), p.10.

³⁹ Muzaffer Özdağ, **Türkiye ve Türk Dünyası Jeopolitiği Üzerine**, Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, Ankara, 2001, p.1.

⁴⁰ İlhan, pp.14-15.

demographic trends for relations of relative influence.”⁴¹ In “Geopolitics Geography and Strategy” Geoffrey Sloan and Colin S. Gray define geopolitics as ‘an attempt to draw attention to the importance of certain geographical patterns in political history.’⁴² It helps us to infer suggestions about the contemporary and future relevance of geographical concepts on politics⁴³ and it provides the ‘tools and guidance for political action.’⁴⁴

Despite the differences, what is common in all definitions is that in essence, geopolitics is concerned with the relations among the geography, politics and power. Since the 19th century, these relations have been studied by many thinkers and statesmen. The importance of geography on political power was emphasized many times. According to Ratzel, the founder of political geography⁴⁵ who brought the ‘Lebensraum’ theory forward, the state was a living creature and in order to maintain its existence, it should enlarge its territory and expand its borders.⁴⁶ Ratzel’s ideas had become a base for expansionist policies of imperialist powers; and affected German political geographer Karl Haushofer.⁴⁷ Alfred Mahan, an American admiral, emphasized the importance of sea power superiority for maintaining world hegemony.⁴⁸ He advised the United States acquiring overseas naval bases in order to maintain commercial and naval expansionist policy.⁴⁹ Yet, it is Rudolf Kjellén, a Swedish political scientist, who used the word ‘geopolitics’ first in 1899.⁵⁰ Kjellén focused on the power of the state, which, according to him, is determined by its

⁴¹ Colin S. Gray, **The Geopolitics of Superpower**, The University Press of Kentucky, Kentucky, 1988 (The Geopolitics), p. 4.

⁴² Geoffrey Sloan and Colin S. Gray, **Geopolitics Geography and Strategy**, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 1999, p. 1.

⁴³ Sloan and Gray, p. 2.

⁴⁴ Werner J. Cahnman, “Concepts of Geopolitics”, **American Sociological Review**, Vol: 8, No: 1, February 1943, p. 56.

⁴⁵ Although they are confused in general, the geopolitics and political geography is different from each other in terms of their focus of attention. Geopolitics gives a geographical interpretation of political phenomena whereas political geography gives a political interpretation of geographical phenomena. Political geography belongs to geography. Geopolitics, on the other hand, is broader than political geography and studies the world with a multi-dimensional point of view. Pls. See Ladis K. D. Kristof, “The Origins and Evaluation of Geopolitics”, **The Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol: 4, No: 1, March 1960, p. 36.

⁴⁶ Davutoğlu, p. 103.

⁴⁷ İlhan, p. 10.

⁴⁸ Özdağ, p. 2.

⁴⁹ Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “Introduction to Part One”, **The Geopolitics Reader**, eds. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge, 2nd edn., Routledge, New York, 2006 (Part One), pp. 21-22.

⁵⁰ Tuathail, Introduction, p.1.

geographical base, natural endowment and resources. Geopolitics works to evaluate these assets of the state.⁵¹ Spykman, the American academician and geopolitical theorist, stressed the importance of the Rimland, which comprised Western Europe-Turkey-Iraq-Pakistan-Afghanistan-India-China-Korea-Eastern Siberia, for the world hegemony.⁵² He warned the U.S. that a potential hegemony could emerge from the Rimland. He advised the American administration to prevent an enemy power to dominate the Rimland and deliberated the likely coalitions that could be formed against the possible adversaries of the United States.⁵³ It can be said that the American geo-strategy of enclosing the Heartland through the pacts such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), and SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) is based on the ideas of Spykman. Karl Haushofer, the German general and academician who published a journal called 'Zeitschrift für Geopolitik' in 1924, emphasized the location zone of the state as the most important power element.⁵⁴ He was the teacher of Rudolf Hess, who was one of the main advisors of Hitler. He was so influential on Hitler's policies that during the WWII, geopolitics was regarded almost equal to the expansionist Nazi foreign policy. Haushofer stressed that political leaders should be geopolitically trained since geopolitics is useful to provide a 'realistic insight into the world picture.'⁵⁵

Each theorist, geographer, politician, or thinker has made some contributions to the development of geopolitics. Yet, we can say that, the British geographer and theorist Sir Halford Mackinder has a special place in the history of geopolitics. His 'Heartland' theory has had stimulating effects on contemporary and subsequent geopoliticians. Mackinder's ideas have been debated, discussed, and referred a lot. Although he studied Great Britain's geopolitics, his ideas created much more reputation and repercussion abroad than Great Britain, especially in the American and German politics. Despite being filtered by the time and being criticized again and again, Mackinder's ideas are still relevant today. In my dissertation, Mackinder's

⁵¹Tuathail, Introduction, p.1.

⁵² Davutoğlu, p. 105.

⁵³ Özdağ, p.3.

⁵⁴ İlhan, p.11.

⁵⁵Tuathail, Part One, p.24.

geopolitical works are very crucial in order to enlighten the geopolitical and geo-strategic importance of Central Asia.

On January 25, 1904, Mackinder addressed his article 'The Geographical Pivot of History'⁵⁶ at the Royal Geographical Society. In the article, Mackinder informs the closing of the 400 years Colombian epoch in which geographical exploration had almost completed and expansion of Europe to remote places of the world had been realized.⁵⁷ That epoch witnessed "the domination of the Atlantic-facing maritime empires of western Europe over the much of the known world."⁵⁸ Yet, "there was always a vast continental hinterland in Eurasia that was utterly inaccessible to direct pressure from the sea."⁵⁹ Mackinder calls this area as the 'Heartland' or the 'Pivot area'. He divides the world geography into three main territories. At the centre, there lies Eurasia. Mackinder defines Eurasia as '...a continuous land ice-girt in the north, water-girt elsewhere, measuring 21 million square miles... whose centre and north...have no available water-ways to the ocean.... favorable to the mobility of horsemen and camelmen.'⁶⁰ At the centre of Eurasia lies the Heartland. The east, south, and west of the Heartland are 'marginal lands' or 'inner crescent' that includes Germany, Austria, Turkey, India, and China.⁶¹ Mackinder calls the rest of the world as 'islands of outer or insular crescent' that comprises Britain, South Africa, Australia, the United States, Canada, and Japan.⁶² In his article "The Geographical Pivot of History"⁶³, Mackinder declared the closing of the Colombian era dominated by sea power and announced the beginning of the post-Colombian age, namely, the new Euro-Asian era, in which land power would be decisive. The transcontinental railways, according to him, would be very advantageous to the continental states and would alter the existing balance of power between sea power and land power. To say by his words, 'transcontinental railways

⁵⁶ Mackinder, Pivot of History, pp. 421-437.

⁵⁷ Mackinder, Pivot of History, p. 421.

⁵⁸ Gray, The Geopolitics, p. 7.

⁵⁹ Gray, The Geopolitics, p. 7.

⁶⁰ Mackinder, Pivot of History, p. 431.

⁶¹ Mackinder, Pivot of History, p. 436.

⁶² Mackinder, Pivot of History, p. 436.

⁶³ In the book 'Democratic Ideals and Reality' (1919), and in the article 'The Round World and the Winning of the Peace' (1943), Mackinder revised his opinions.

are now transmuting the conditions of land power, and nowhere can they have such effect as in the closed heartland of Eurasia...’⁶⁴

In 1919⁶⁵ Mackinder declared: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; who rules the World Island commands the World.”⁶⁶ According to him, control of Eastern Europe opens the door to the control of the Heartland; the control of the Heartland opens the door to the control of Eurasia (World Island); and the control of Eurasia brings the conquest of the whole world. For him, the Heartland is “the vital position which, with the technical instruments of the twentieth century, could be developed and integrated into a resource and manpower base for the potential superpower of the globe.”⁶⁷

Mackinder’s views on geopolitics in general, and his Heartland theory in particular are very crucial in understanding the geopolitics of Central Asia. The Heartland, the vast territory that encompasses Eastern Europe, Russia through Siberia, and Central Asia, is ‘the greatest natural fortress on earth.’⁶⁸ In “Democratic Ideals and Reality” Mackinder defines the Heartland as:

*“The Heartland...includes the Baltic Sea, the navigable Middle and Lower Danube, the Black Sea, Asia Minor, Armenia, Persia, Tibet, and Mongolia. ... The Heartland is the region to which ... sea power can be refused access, though the western part of it lies without the region of Arctic and Continental drainage.”*⁶⁹

In 1943, Mackinder published the article ‘The Round World and the Winning of the Peace’.⁷⁰ In this article he described the Heartland as ‘the territory of the

⁶⁴ Mackinder, *Pivot of History*, p. 434.

⁶⁵ Halford Mackinder, ***Democratic Ideals and Reality***, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1919 (Democratic Ideals).

⁶⁶ Tuathail, p. 20.

⁶⁷ Donald W. Meinig, “Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History”, ***The Western Political Quarterly***, Vol: 9, No: 3, (Sep., 1956), p. 554.

⁶⁸ John Bellamy Foster, “The New Geopolitics of Empire”, ***Monthly Review***, January 2006, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/0106jbf.htm> (26.12.2007).

⁶⁹ Hagan, p. 480.

⁷⁰ Halford Mackinder, “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace,” ***Foreign Affairs***, Vol: 21, No: 4, July 1943 (Round World).

USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).⁷¹ Central Asia, once the very big component of the Soviet Union, and today the home of five independent Turkic Republics, is not an ordinary region.

It is essential to state that Mackinder's ideas have been often criticized by many contemporary and subsequent thinkers. Even Mackinder himself made several changes in his assessments.⁷² He is most criticized for attributing exaggerated importance to the Heartland. Spykman exalted Mackinder's analytical perspective but claimed that it was the Mackinder's "Inner or Marginal Crescent" rather than the 'Heartland' that was critical for the world domination. Gearoid Ó Tuathail criticizes his ideas for being geographically too deterministic, neglecting the significance of social organization in the development of power and ruling out the implications of airpower.⁷³ He adds that Mackinder's underestimation of rising power of the United States and overestimation of Russian power is a defect of his thesis.⁷⁴ British political scientist Leopold Amery is another critic of Mackinder who emphasizes the importance of industry and science rather than geographical acquisitions, for being a powerful state.⁷⁵ In his book entitled 'Türkiye ve Türk Dünyası Jeopolitiği Üzerine', Muzaffer Özdağ objects Mackinder's Heartland thesis. He states that, 'In the sixteenth century, Turks had controlled not only the Heartland but also the big part of the World Island under the administration of Ottoman-Turk, Persian-Turk, Babel, and Uzbek-Turk empires.'⁷⁶ Yet, in the course of time, these empires lost the Heartland itself, rather than achieving world hegemony through the Heartland. For Özdağ, the problem in Mackinder's ideas is taking no notice of the demographically, militarily, technologically, and economically powerful states that surrounded the Heartland.⁷⁷

⁷¹ John Bellamy Foster, "The New Geopolitics of Empire", **Monthly Review**, January 2006, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/0106jbf.htm> (26.12.2007).

⁷² Meinig, p. 554.

⁷³ Tuathail, Part One, p. 20.

⁷⁴ Tuathail, Part One, pp. 20-21.

⁷⁵ Christopher J. Fettweis, "Revisiting Mackinder and Angell: The Obsolescence of Great Power Geopolitics", **Comparative Strategy**, Vol: 22, No: 2, 2003, p. 112.

⁷⁶ Özdağ, p. 8.

⁷⁷ Özdağ, p.8.

In the Cold War era, geopolitics meant the global contest between the U.S. and the Soviet Union for creating spheres of influence and gaining access to the world's strategic resources. It was the era of globalization. During this period, it was thought that the importance of geopolitics had decreased since the world became a borderless and distanceless place. The advancements in technology, especially in the transportation technology, diminished the vitality of geography in politics because of the accessibility of the every piece of territory of the world. Moreover, advancements in military technology that peaked with the invention of the airpower, nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, etc. made the states open to the attacks from everywhere. As a result of these developments, it was thought in the Cold war era that Mackinder's Heartland thesis in particular and the geopolitics in general lost significance. Although in the 1970s geopolitics experienced a short-lived popularity by means of Henry Kissinger⁷⁸, the real revival of the term is in the post-Cold War era.

The concepts, trends, and theories rise and fall in the course of time. Geopolitics is just one of these concepts that was topical ones but later lost its importance. Even though the popularity and validity of the term has changed from time to time, geopolitics has never become completely invalid. Today, geopolitics still provides an important vision of world politics. Geography helps us to interpret the conduct of international affairs. Above all, it is the most important component of foreign policy making. Thus, geopolitics preserves its significance today. What has changed is that today's geopolitics is no more imperialist; control of territory is no more central.⁷⁹ Today's geopolitics takes place around the natural resources, especially around the oil and gas. From this point of view, the great importance attributed to Eurasia and Central Asia, by Mackinder and later by Zbigniew

⁷⁸ In 1979 Henry Kissinger published 'The White House Years' in which he used the term geopolitics as 'balance of power.' His book popularized and made the continual use of the term. Pls. See Gray and Sloan, p. 1.

⁷⁹ Matthew Edwards, "The New Great Game and the new great gamers: disciples of Kipling and Mackinder", **Central Asian Survey**, Vol: 22, No: 1, (March, 2003), p. 95.

Brezinski⁸⁰, is still valid today. However, today, the focus is not on the geographical location of the region, but on the natural resources the region possesses.

1.2 THE GEOPOLITICS OF CENTRAL ASIA

Geopolitics is concerned with the influence of geographical factors such as territory, population, strategic location and natural resources on inter-state relations.⁸¹ Central Asia, with its vast territory, complex demographic structure, the key strategic location between the East and the West, and above all, with its large amount of energy resources as well as important raw materials such as coal, gold, and copper, is the world's one of the most important regions.

Before elaborating the geopolitics of Central Asia, it is appropriate to define the region geographically. In my study, I take up Central Asia together with the South Caucasus sub-region and call the whole region as Central Asia.

1.2.1 Central Asia

Central Asia is the vast region that extends from the Caspian Sea in the west to the Altai Mountains in the east, from Karakum Mountains and Horasan in the south to the Ural Mountains and Siberia in the North.⁸² The region is nearly 4 million square metres and includes 56 million people.⁸³

In fact, there is not a commonly accepted geographical definition of Central Asia. In the past, the region was called as “Turkistan.” In the Soviet era, there was a division of the region as “Srednyaya Aziya (Middle Asia)” and “Tsentralnaya Aziya

⁸⁰ He argued that ‘it follows that America’s primary interest is to help ensure that no single power comes to control this geopolitical space’⁸⁰ since ‘preponderance over the entire Euroasian continent serves as the central basis for global primacy.’ (Edwards, p. 96.)

⁸¹ John Bellamy Foster, “The New Geopolitics of Empire”, *Monthly Review*, January 2006, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/0106jbf.htm> (26.12.2007).

⁸² Yüce, p. 44.

⁸³ Gylych Muhammed Jorayev, “21. Yüzyılın Başında Orta Asya”, No: 6, July 2003, <http://www.stradigma.com/index.php?sayfa=makale&no=45> (17.01.2008).

(Central Asia).”⁸⁴ According to this geographical division, Middle Asia comprised Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; Kazakhstan was considered as a separate region. Central Asia, on the other hand, meant the Chinese dominated eastern regions such as Mogolistan, Xinjiang, and Tibet.⁸⁵ In January 1993, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan declared that they wanted to be called as “Tsentralnaya Aziya (Central Asia).”⁸⁶ Thus, in the international arena, the region that encloses the five countries mentioned above, began to be called as Central Asia. Yet, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan are sometimes accepted as the parts of Central Asia.

Figure 1. Map of the Caucasus and Central Asia



Source: http://www.imb.org/newsletter/thetask/images/Central-Asia-map_sm.jpg

⁸⁴ Aydın, Kafkasya ve Orta Asya, p. 367.

⁸⁵ Aydın, Kafkasya ve Orta Asya, p. 367.

⁸⁶ Aydın, Kafkasya ve Orta Asya, p. 367.

Central Asia had been under the Russian domination, either by Imperial Russia or by Soviet Union, for more than a century. The intense Russification of the region began when the Russian Empire became the winner of the ‘Great Game.’ In the Cold War era, Central Asia was so isolated from the external world that, so to say, it was forgotten by the world. The demise of the Soviet empire in 1991 and the independence of former Soviet Republics marked a turning point in international relations. With the opening of Central Asia to the world, the region’s energy reserves began to be explored. It was understood that the Caspian basin, the most important sub-region of Central Asia, has considerable amount of oil and gas reserves. What makes Central Asia geopolitically so significant does not result only from its hydrocarbon reserves. The region has a central position between East and West; it is a door to Far East; and it is surrounded by very important countries such as the Russian Federation, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan and China. It is a big market for the products of the West. It is the intersection point of communication and transport networks and it links the airway between Asia-Europe-Africa.⁸⁷ Moreover, after the attacks of September 11, the geopolitics of the region has also gained a security dimension. The role played by the Central Asian states in world politics underwent a rise; and the region became a base in the fight against terrorism. Yet, it is mainly the energy resources of Central Asia that attracted the recent attention of the world and made the region so significant in contemporary world politics.

1.2.1.1. The Caucasus Sub-region

The Caucasus is the mountainous region extending from the Caspian Sea in the east to the Sea of Azov and Black Sea in the west. It is a multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic region composed of three independent republics, seven autonomous republics and three autonomous regions.⁸⁸ The South Caucasus has become the home of three independent states-Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan- after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, whereas the North Caucasus remained inside the Russian Federation’s borders. The region’s geopolitical importance arises from especially four reasons: First, it is an entry to the Central Asia. Second, it is a passage for

⁸⁷ Yüce, pp. 48-49.

⁸⁸ Yüce, p. 40.

Central Asia that provides opening to Western markets. Third, together with Central Asia, it possesses an important amount of oil and gas. Fourth, for Russian Federation, it is a link to the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean Sea.⁸⁹

The Caucasus region is a crossroads between North-South and East-West. As a result of its strategic location, the region has undergone numerous incursions throughout the history. Since the sixteenth century, the Caucasus has been the field of contest among the Ottoman, Persian and Russian Empires.⁹⁰ This rivalry continued throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and in this period, the Russian Empire expanded its territory at the expense of Persian and Ottoman Empires. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Great Britain, whose primary aim was to defend the routes that extend to India, joined the struggle over the region. When the Ottoman Empire left the region to the Russian conquest after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, the region became the field of contest between the Russian Empire and the Great Britain. The struggle over the Caucasus was in fact a part of the larger competition which lasted from the mid-nineties to mid- twenties between the two imperial powers over the Central Asia first for the control of territory but then for exploitation of the region's oil. The South Caucasus, or Transcaucasus, is a door to Central Asia and connected to the region through the Caspian Sea. It links the resource-rich Caspian basin to energy-dependent West. Furthermore, since the Caspian Sea is an inland sea and the Central Asia is a landlocked region, the value of Caspian oil and gas depends on the availability of reasonable pipeline routes; and the Transcaucasus is the most preferred export route for the West for the transport of Caspian oil and gas. The South Caucasus and Central Asia regions are so closely linked and integrated that in my dissertation, I will study the two regions as a whole and call the entire Caspian Basin as Central Asia.

⁸⁹ Yüce, p. 41.

⁹⁰ Revaz Gachechiladze, "Geopolitics in the South Caucasus: Local and External Players", **Geopolitics**, Vol: 7, No: 1, Summer 2002, p. 115.

1.2.1.2 The Caspian Basin

Figure 2. The Caspian Sea



Source: EIA, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Caspian/Background.html> (07.01.2009).

The Caspian Sea⁹¹, which is the most important component of Central Asia, is the biggest inland sea in the world with 424.300 square kilometers.⁹² It is an enclosed body of water that lies between the Central Asian states and the Transcaucasus. It is linked to Black Sea and the Baltic through Volga and Don rivers. It has economic, geopolitical and strategic significance with its considerable amount of hydrocarbon reserves.

The Caspian Sea, which was bordered only by Iran and the Soviet Union during the Soviet era, is now surrounded by the five littoral states: The Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. It connects these states

⁹¹ Although Caspian is generally accepted as a sea, actually, there is not a compromise among the five littoral states of Caspian on whether Caspian is a sea or a lake. This complicated legal status problem of the Caspian is beyond the borders of my dissertation.

⁹² N. Aras, p. 5.

with a natural link and produces an economic network in the region. The Caspian basin, which was closed to foreign exploration in the Soviet era, has opened after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and emerged as one of the largest unexploited hydrocarbon fields in the world. With the exploration of the region's considerable amount of oil and gas reserves, the commercial and strategic significance of the region has suddenly increased. It is estimated that the proven oil reserves of the Caspian Sea region range between 17 and 44 billion barrels, comparable to Qatar on the low end and the United States on the high end. The proven natural gas reserves of the Caspian Basin are estimated at 232 trillion cubic feet, comparable to Saudi Arabia.⁹³ Together with the possible reserves, the region emerges as an important source of oil and gas for the world's industrialized centres. The great geopolitical importance attributed to Central Asia arises from the Caspians's energy-oriented geopolitical significance, and the importance that is ascribed to the Caspian Basin results from the vitality and necessity of energy. Thus, to explain Central Asia's energy-oriented geopolitical significance, it is essential to mention the importance of energy first.

1.3 IMPORTANCE OF ENERGY


Existence of mankind and the continuance of industrial development depend on energy. Energy is vital for both economic and social life. It is one of the major inputs for the industry and it is the main ingredient of many vital services. It facilitates our daily lives through lighting, heating, transportation, and communication. Energy is also crucial for conducting military operations. As the economies grow and the world population increases, the total energy demand of the world increases day by day. It is estimated that overall growth in global energy demand will average 1.3 per cent per year to 2030.⁹⁴ Since the energy resources are limited and unequally distributed, the rising energy demand results in hard struggles in the regions where energy resources are produced and transported. The states find

⁹³ EIA, "Caspian Sea Region: Survey of Key Oil and Gas Statistics and Forecasts", July 2006, www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/images/caspian_balances.xls (14.01.2008).

⁹⁴ ExxonMobil, Energy Outlook, http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/energy_outlook_outlooksector.aspx (14.01.2008).

themselves in a rivalry in the energy-rich areas not only to meet their own energy needs but also to control other states' access to energy.

Figure 3. World Primary Energy Demand



Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2002,
<http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2000/weo2002.pdf> (10.11.2008).

In my study, it is focused on oil and gas since they are the most demanded energy resources in the world. It seems that in the next decades, oil and gas will continue to account for nearly 60 per cent of world energy supplies.⁹⁵ It is expected that oil demand will increase at 1.2 percent per year and gas will be the fastest growing fuel source by a 1.7 per cent demand increase per year.⁹⁶ Today, although states try to lessen their heavy dependence on oil and gas, it is difficult to achieve this in the near future since developing alternative energy sources is more expensive and needs long-term efforts. Thus, although the world tries to escape from dependency on fossil fuels, it seems that not any renewable energy source could

⁹⁵ ExxonMobil, Energy Outlook,
http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/energy_outlook_primaryenergy.aspx (14.01.2008).

⁹⁶ ExxonMobil, Energy Outlook,
http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/energy_outlook_primaryenergy.aspx (14.01.2008).

compete with oil and gas at least for the next 60 or 100 years.⁹⁷ To define in Cenk Pala's words, "The marriage between the world economy and the fossil fuels, is a Catholic one."⁹⁸

1.3.1 Oil and Gas

1.3.1.1 Oil

Petroleum is a complex mixture of liquid hydrocarbons that occurs naturally in underground reservoirs in sedimentary rock. It takes its name from Latin words *petra* (rock) and *oleum* (oil) and generally called as 'oil'.⁹⁹ Actually, oil is a resource that is known and used for centuries, but the first use of oil as a commercial product dates back to mid-nineties when in 1859 Edwin L. Drake drilled the first modern commercial oil well in Pennsylvania.¹⁰⁰ In the 19th century, oil was used mainly for lighting and did not take the place of coal as an energy resource.¹⁰¹ As a result of the industrial developments and technological advancements, oil has gained gradual economic and strategic value in the course of time. The main event that increased the value of oil was the invention of internal combustion engine by German Rudolf Diesel.¹⁰² The development of automobile industry and the rapid increase in the number of motor vehicles caused the oil to become the most demanded energy resource in the world. Although oil was more expensive than coal in that period, since it was clearer, easy to store and transport, and more effective, it was preferred to coal.¹⁰³ Moreover, the usage area of oil is broader than coal and it is the main raw material for petro-chemistry.¹⁰⁴ According to 2005 statistics of International Energy

⁹⁷ Cenk Pala, "21. Yüzyıl Dünya Enerji Dengesinde Petrol ve Doğal Gazın Yeri ve Önemi: 'Hazar Boru Hatlarının Kesişme Noktasında Türkiye'", **Avrasya Dosyası**, Vol: 9, No: 1, Spring 2003, p. 5.

⁹⁸ Pala, p. 5.

⁹⁹ International Energy Agency, "Energy Statistics Manual", http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/statistics_manual.pdf (19.01.2008), p.69.

¹⁰⁰ İstanbul Ticaret Odası, p. 23. Yet, according to Osman Nuri Aras, the first modern oil well was drilled in Baku in 1848, 11 years before the Pennsylvania oil well. (Aras, p. 17).

¹⁰¹ İstanbul Ticaret Odası, p. 42.

¹⁰² Aras, p. 8.

¹⁰³ İstanbul Ticaret Odası, p. 20.

¹⁰⁴ "Petrochemistry is a science that can readily be applied to fundamental human needs, such as health, hygiene, housing, and food." Synthetic materials, plastic, solvents, and polystyrene, etc. are the products of petrochemical industry. See <http://www.petrochemistry.net/what-is-petrochemistry.html> (11.01.2009).

Agency (IEA), oil's share in global total primary energy supply is around 35%.¹⁰⁵ Oil accounts for 43.4% of world total final consumption.¹⁰⁶

Today, oil means power and wealth, so in order to be a big power, it is necessary for states to control or at least to be involved in the production, export, transportation or marketing of oil. Since the 19th century, oil is the most valuable resource for the sake of which wars are waged, revolutions take place, and alliances are formed and dissolved. Churchill's words explain the centuries-long struggle for oil: "One drop of oil is more valuable than one drop of blood."¹⁰⁷ The importance of oil in international politics is also properly defined by Temel İskit:

*"Because most oil moves internationally, because its trade is of enormous monetary value, because huge profits are to be made, because it is a vital necessity for most importing countries, because it is of crucial importance to the economies of the oil exporting countries and the balance of payments of developing countries... oil is the most important single commodity to shape world history in the past hundred years."*¹⁰⁸

Oil was the most strategic energy source in the 20th century. It continues to be the most demanded source of energy in the 21st century, yet, it shares the 'energy scene' with natural gas now.

1.3.1.2 Natural Gas

The first natural gas leakages were seen in Iran in between the years 6000-2000 B.C. but the first use of it was in China in 900 B.C.¹⁰⁹ In the course of time, natural gas was discovered in Italy, Baku, England, and America and it became a commercial product when the first natural gas company was founded in the U.S. in 1858. Yet, the time when natural gas emerged as an important energy actor was in

¹⁰⁵ International Energy Agency, **Key World Energy Statistics 2007**, http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2007/key_stats_2007.pdf (14.01.2008), p.6.

¹⁰⁶ International Energy Agency, **Key World Energy Statistics 2007**, p. 28.

¹⁰⁷ Yüce, p.100.

¹⁰⁸ Temel İskit, "Turkey: A New Actor In The Field of Energy Politics?" **Perceptions**, <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume1/March-May1996/TURKEYANEWACTORINTHEFIELDOFENERGYPOLITICS.pdf> (24.01.2008), p. 1.

¹⁰⁹ Dokuzlar, p.20.

1970s, after the 1973 oil crises.¹¹⁰ After the crisis, the developed countries realized that in order to break high oil dependency, which means dependency to OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), a new energy source should be found. Natural gas, since it is clearer and cheaper than oil, emerged as an alternative.

Natural gas is extracted either in association with crude oil from oil fields or independently from gas fields. Its transport is conducted through pipelines or by tankers in a liquefied form (LNG). It is widely used in electricity production as well as in domesticity and industry. It is preferred since it is a clean and cheap energy source.¹¹¹ According to 2005 statistics of IEA, natural gas accounts for nearly 21% of global total primary energy supply and 15.6% of world total final consumption.¹¹² As the world moves toward more sustainable forms of energy and tries to break oil dependency, consumption of natural gas is increasing gradually. Cenk Pala, an important energy expert, says that in the places where there are pipelines or where it is convenient to lay down pipelines, natural gas will be a preferred fuel. He says that until 2050s- when nuclear energy will be used on a large scale- natural gas will be a 'transition fuel' especially in terms of environment. It is the reason why natural gas is called as the fuel of the 21st century.¹¹³ Oil is regarded as the most precious material of the 20th century. In the 21st century, oil will preserve its importance, yet, it will share its leading role with natural gas.¹¹⁴ Therefore, it can be said that today, the old 'oil game' is becoming the 'oil and gas game.'¹¹⁵

"Resources have been used in the past, and will be used in the future, as tools or targets of war and as strategic goals to be fought for."¹¹⁶ Politics is integrated with the means to exercise it; and energy is one of the most influential means of international politics. Oil, and increasingly natural gas, is the 'supremely political

¹¹⁰ Dokuzlar, pp. 20-21.

¹¹¹ N. Aras, p.13.

¹¹² International Energy Agency, **Key World Energy Statistics 2007**, pp. 6, 28.

¹¹³ Pala, p. 8.

¹¹⁴ Dokuzlar p. 187.

¹¹⁵ Deloitte, "Energy in Flux: The 21st Century's Greatest Challenge", http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/us_er_energyinflux_stanislaw_05_01_2006%281%29.pdf (15.01.2008), p.7.

¹¹⁶ Shannon O'Lear, "Resources and Conflict in the Caspian Sea", **Geopolitics**, Vol: 14, No: 50, 2004, p.162.

energy source' that is powerful enough to affect international relations.¹¹⁷ Oil and gas are very important for the world in general, and for the Central Asian States in particular. The countries of Central Asia have been dominated by outside powers and troubled by political instability and economic dependency for centuries. With the demise of the Soviet Union, these states, for the first time, have obtained a chance to determine their own destinies. In the process of nation-building, oil and gas have played an important role. They have provided boost to economies of the Central Asian States and supplied the necessary foreign currency.¹¹⁸

1.4 THE CASPIAN ENERGY RESOURCES

1.4.1 The History of Caspian Oil and Gas

1.4.1.1 Pre-1991 Era

When it is talked about the history of the Central Asia's energy sources, what is often mentioned is the history of the region's oil. The region's natural gas is often briefly mentioned by referencing Marco Polo's observations in the 13th century about the natural gas flames that were burning for centuries in Baku in Azerbaijan. Thus, here in this part, the detailed history of Caspian oil is studied; yet the history of Caspian gas is briefly mentioned.

The history of oil in the Caspian region goes back to 7th and 8th centuries. The oil, which was acquired naturally or by primitive ways in that period, began to be extracted through mechanical methods beginning from the mid-17th century.¹¹⁹ In that period, the main oil fields were on the Apsheron peninsula where Baku is located. In his book 'The Travels of Marco Polo', Marco Polo tells his North Iran visit in 1271-1273 and mentions the trade of 'naphta' in Baku at that time.¹²⁰ Until the early 1800s, only small amounts of oil were extracted, but with the region's

¹¹⁷ İskit, p. 1.

¹¹⁸ Bulent Aras and George K. Foster, "Turkey and the Azerbaijani Oil Controversies : Looking For a Light at the End of the Pipeline", **Meria**, <http://meria.biu.ac.il/books/azerbaijan.htm> (14.01.2008).

¹¹⁹ N. Aras, p. 15.

¹²⁰ Yüce, p.140.

annexation to the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 19th century, a primitive oil industry emerged in the region as a state monopoly.¹²¹ The first modern oil well in the world was drilled in Bibi-Eilat region around Baku in 1848.¹²² The first oil refinery went into action in 1863.¹²³ Yet, after a time, Russian technology became insufficient to drill deeper oil wells, and with the exploration of oil in Pennsylvania in 1859, Russia began to lose its advantageous position in the oil production.¹²⁴ As a result, Russia decided to open the region to foreign investment and capital that triggered a rapid growth in the oil sector. The number of oil wells had increased gradually and the oil industry had developed. In 1873, Robert Nobel came to Baku and with the privilege they took from the Russian Tsar, the Nobel brothers began oil industry and invented the first oil tanker in 1878.¹²⁵ Later, other foreign investors such as the Rotschids who constructed Baku-Batum railway and the Shell that took over the Baku oil's transport and sale brought the region French and British capitals.¹²⁶ At the end of the 19th century Baku had become the most important oil-producing centre in the world. 'By 1900, the Baku region produced about half of the world's total crude oil.'¹²⁷

In both world wars, Baku oil played an important part in the conduct of war. The German army in urgent need of fuel, tried to take the control of Baku region in both WWI and WWII.¹²⁸ The exhaustion of German army in both world wars is related to Germans' inability to access Caspian oil. Likewise, the success of the Soviet Union in the Second World War can also be linked to their possession of Azerbaijan's oil. Thus, it can be said that the Baku oil affected the fate of the two world wars. At the turn of the 20th century, the oil production in Baku began to decrease as a result of the big powers' competition in the region, the First World

¹²¹ Sarah O'Hara and Michael Heffernan, "From Geo-Strategy to Geo-Economics: The 'Heartland' and British Imperialism Before and After Mackinder", **Geopolitics**, Vol: 11, No: 1, 2006, p. 61.

¹²² Aras, p.17.

¹²³ Bilgin, *Avrasya Enerji Savaşları*, p. 156.

¹²⁴ Bilgin, *Avrasya Enerji Savaşları*, pp. 156-157.

¹²⁵ Yüce, p. 141.

¹²⁶ Aras, p. 20.

¹²⁷ Gawdat Bahgat, "Enerji Security: The Caspian Sea", **Minerals & Energy**, Vol: 20, No: 2, 2005, p.3.

¹²⁸ Bahgat, p. 3.

War, and the political turmoil in Russia and Azerbaijan.¹²⁹ The Bolsheviks were aware of Baku's importance for the Soviet Union and were not willing to miss the region. In May 1918, Azerbaijan declared its independence but recaptured by the Russian army in April 1920.¹³⁰ In 1923, Soviet Union nationalized all the foreign and local private companies around Baku.¹³¹ After this, the oil production in the region gradually decreased even if it experienced a steady rise from 1923 to 1941.¹³² In 1949, with the opening of the first oil well, oil production began also in the Caspian Sea. However, the insufficient technology and capital of the Soviet Union was incapable of exploring new oil reserves and drilling deep oil wells in Baku. As a result, the oil reserves of Baku were thought to be exhausted and the production turned towards other areas such as Tatarstan, Baskurdistan, and Kazakhstan that are more convenient to Russian technology. In the course of time, the Caspian basin fell from favor and the Soviet Union's oil production centers moved to first Volga-Ural and then to Siberia. While the share of Azerbaijan's oil in total oil production of the SU was 73 per cent in 1913; the proportion fell to 1.7 percent in 1990.¹³³ The central planning system, exclusion of foreign investment and capital, and the technologic and financial inadequacy of the Soviet Union gradually decreased the oil production in the region.

1.4.1.2 Post-Soviet Era

The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the independence of fifteen former Soviet Republics, the five of which were in Turkic origin, initiated a new era both in international relations and in the energy politics. The Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan emerged as important gas and oil centres. Opening of the region to the foreign exploration and investment after decades of isolation aroused excitement in the world.

¹²⁹ Yüce, p. 143.

¹³⁰ N. Aras, p. 23.

¹³¹ Bilgin, *Avrasya Enerji Savaşları*, p.161.

¹³² N. Aras, p. 27.

¹³³ N. Aras, pp. 29, 32.

Emergence of the Caspian Basin as one of the world's last major untapped oil and gas fields, restarted the energy competition in the region. This new competition is called as the 'New Great Game' making a reference to the struggle between Russian and British Empires in the 19th and early 20th centuries over the land and populations of Central Asia. The New Great Game is a competition in influence, power, hegemony, and profits; it has economic, political, religious, cultural, security and military aspects. The players of the new game are actors at state, multinational, transnational, local and regional levels.¹³⁴

The New Great Game can be summarized as thus:

*"Six new republics, predominantly Islamic but vibrantly distinct, are grouped around the Caspian Sea, the current landlords of untapped oil and natural gas reserves that rival those in the Persian Gulf. Pipelines, tanker routes, petroleum consortiums, and contracts are the prizes of the New Great Game. India and China, each with exponentially growing energy needs, are vying for access, along with Russians, Europeans, and Americans. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan have their own political, economic, and cultural interests in the former Soviet republics, where slumbering rivalries have abruptly awakened among Azeris, Armenians, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, and other long-subject peoples...it is a bloody muddle, made worse as before by outsiders."*¹³⁵

Now, the new game is multifaceted and multilayered.¹³⁶ It includes the rivalry and influence of state actors such as the U.S., the Russian Federation, China, Iran, Turkey etc., as well as non-state bodies; the supra-state organizations such as NATO, the UN (United Nations), and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), multinational companies and corporations at sub-state level, non-governmental organizations, pressure groups, Diasporas, political factions, terrorist groups, and criminal organizations.¹³⁷ Today's game is not only for the acquisition and use of energy resources; it is also for the transportation of them. Although it is entitled as the 'New Great Game', it has some important differences from the original Great Game. Besides being multi-actor and multi-dimensional, the new

¹³⁴ Edwards, pp. 83-84.

¹³⁵ Edwards, p. 85.

¹³⁶ Sarah L. O'Hara, "Great Game or Grubby Game? The Struggle For Control of the Caspian", **Geopolitics**, Vol: 9, No: 1, 2004, p. 146.

¹³⁷ Edwards, p. 89.

game is no more a simple zero-sum game.¹³⁸ It includes cooperation as well as competition.

1.4.2 The Oil and Gas Reserves of the Caspian Basin

Opening of the Caspian region to the foreign exploration once again made Central Asia a focus of attention. The oil reserves of Kazakhstan, the gas reserves of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and both oil and gas reserves of Azerbaijan attracted the attention of the world. The leading regional experts, politicians, academicians have made several evaluations and assessments about the importance of the region. S. Frederick Starr, a leading expert on Central Asia, stated that ‘Central Asia is once more a key to the security of all Eurasia.’¹³⁹ Bill Richardson, US Secretary of Energy at the time claimed that ‘The Caspian region will hopefully save us (the U.S.) from total dependence on the Middle East oil.’¹⁴⁰ In 1998, Dick Cheney, then CEO of Halliburton, stated: ‘I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian.’¹⁴¹ The region was believed to be the ‘Second Kuwait’¹⁴² or ‘Second Persian Gulf.’ As the former US Secretary of State, James Baker, remarked: ‘Caspian oil may eventually be as important to the industrialized world as Middle East oil is today.’¹⁴³

The data about the reserves, production and export rates of the Caspian region’s energy sources only deal with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan since the two other littoral states- Iran and the Russian Federation- do not have substantial amount of reserves on the Caspian shore.¹⁴⁴ Similarly, the other states of the region, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Georgia, do not have significant proven oil and gas reserves, while Georgia has a strategic importance as a transit route. With the initial enthusiasm, some exaggerated estimates were presented

¹³⁸ Karasac, p. 17.

¹³⁹ Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, “The Myth of The Caspian ‘Great Game’: The Real Geopolitics of Energy”, *Survival*, Vol: 40, No: 4, Winter 1998-99, p. 112.

¹⁴⁰ Jaffe and Manning, p. 112.

¹⁴¹ Cyrillicl Nourzhanov, “Caspian Oil: Geopolitical Dreams and Real Issues”, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol: 60, No: 1, March 2006, p. 59.

¹⁴² Karasac, p. 15.

¹⁴³ Nourzhanov, p. 59.

¹⁴⁴ İstanbul Ticaret Odası, p. 88.

about the oil and gas deposits of the Caspian Sea. In the course of time, with the subsequent explorations, these calculations have changed. According to the latest EIA (Energy Information Administration) estimates, the proven oil reserves in the region range between 17 and 49 billion barrels.¹⁴⁵ This signifies a considerable amount when compared to the U.S.' 22 billion barrels and the North Sea's 17 billion barrels proven oil reserves.¹⁴⁶ The proven natural gas reserves are estimated at 232 trillion cubic feet (Tcf).¹⁴⁷ The region is considered to have 85-271 billion barrels oil and 236-665 tcf gas in total (possible+proven).¹⁴⁸

According to BP statistics, at the end of 2006, the proved oil reserves of the Caspian Four are as it follows: 7.0 billion barrels for Azerbaijan; 39.8 billion barrels for Kazakhstan, 0.5 billion barrels for Turkmenistan, and 0.6 billion barrels for Uzbekistan. The shares of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in world proven oil reserves are 0.6% and 3.3% respectively. Turkmenistan's and Uzbekistan's shares in world proven oil reserves are less than 0.05%. The proved natural gas reserves of the energy-rich Central Asian countries was as such at the end of 2006: 47.66 tcf for Azerbaijan; 105.90 tcf for Kazakhstan; 100.96 tcf for Turkmenistan; and 66.01 tcf for Uzbekistan. Their shares in world's proven gas reserves are 0.7%, 1.7%, 1.6% and 1.0% respectively.¹⁴⁹

The estimates above evidence the importance of the energy reserves of Central Asia. However, they are limited when compared to Middle East oil and Russian natural gas. Considering the most optimistic estimates, the region's oil reserves could only meet 3% of world oil supply.¹⁵⁰ The Middle East region, on the other hand, possesses 61.5% of world proven oil reserves. Saudi Arabia, by itself, holds 21.9% of the world proven oil reserves. The gas reserves of the Middle East

¹⁴⁵ <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/pdf.pdf> (14.01.2008), p. 2.

¹⁴⁶ İstanbul Ticaret Odası, p. 88.

¹⁴⁷ <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/pdf.pdf> (14.01.2008), p. 6.

¹⁴⁸ Bilgin, *Avrasya Enerji Savaşları*, p.178.

¹⁴⁹ BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2007, http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2007/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2007.pdf (14.01.2008), pp. 6, 22.

¹⁵⁰ Bilgin, *Avrasya Enerji Savaşları*, p. 179.

account for 40.4% of world proved gas reserves.¹⁵¹ Russia, on the other side, holds the world's largest natural gas reserves, with 1.680 Tcf. It is the world's largest energy producer and exporter.¹⁵² Caspian's natural gas reserves, which are about 232 Tcf, are far below to rival with the Russian reserves. Then, what is the reason that makes Central Asia in general and the Caspian Basin in particular so important in regard to energy? In order to understand that, it is necessary to examine Middle Eastern oil and Russian gas.

1.4.2.1 Middle East Oil

The first half of the 20th century experienced two devastating world wars. During those wars, gaining control over the oil-rich regions, especially the Middle East and the Caucasus, mattered much for the fate of the war since oil was vital for military equipment. In this period oil was a necessity much for military struggle rather than economic development. Yet, in the second half of the 20th century, economic activities regained vigor and the rapid economic development continued until the 1973-74 oil shocks. However, 1973 OPEC oil crisis hindered the ongoing economic growth and price stability.

In the post-1945 period, Western oil companies started large-scale oil productions in the Middle East. The 1950s were the bonanza years for the international oil companies.¹⁵³ Yet, at the end of the decade, nationalist challenges began to rise in the region. The nationalization of Suez Canal in 1956, which interrupted the flow of oil to the Mediterranean; and 1958 Iraqi revolution pointed to a more assertive and important role for producing countries.¹⁵⁴ In order to control their resources themselves, producer countries began to establish their own oil companies or tried to nationalize the foreign ones. Their efforts were culminated in the foundation of OPEC

¹⁵¹ BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2007, http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2007/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2007.pdf (14.01.2008), pp. 6, 22.

¹⁵² EIA, "Russia Country Analysis Briefs", May 2008, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Russia/NaturalGas.html> (10.01.2009).

¹⁵³ Joe Stork, "Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis: Part Two", **MERIP Reports**, No. 21, (Oct., 1973), p. 3.

¹⁵⁴ Stork, p. 3.

in the fall of 1960 at the Baghdad Conference by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.¹⁵⁵ OPEC was a reaction to the decision of international oil companies to decrease crude oil prices and established with an aim to maintain price stability and coordinate member states' oil policies.¹⁵⁶ At the same time, the Arab nationalism was gradually increasing in the Middle East as a result of ongoing Arab-Israeli wars. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, oil-exporting countries imposed embargoes to the allies of Israel. All of these were the signs of a new era in the power relationships around Middle East oil.¹⁵⁷ Yet, the main event that made oil a political lever and a strategic weapon in international relations was 1973 OPEC oil crisis. When the petroleum exporting countries of the Gulf limited the supply of oil to make Israel withdraw from the lands that she occupied in 1967, the price of oil ascended overnight from \$3 to \$5 a barrel, and to \$11 within three months.¹⁵⁸ The sudden increase in the oil prices raised the inflation rates and disrupted balance of payments in the importing countries. OPEC crisis weakened the world's trust to Middle East oil and brought the concept of 'energy security' on the agenda. Oil companies turned towards other regions to explore new oil fields with an aim to decrease the share of Middle East oil in total energy supply of the world. Another effect of 1973 oil shock is that states initiated programs to develop alternative energy sources. The gradual increase in the natural gas consumption since 1970s is a result of these efforts.

The 1979-80 oil shocks caused by the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, the 1990 Gulf war, the September 11 attacks, the 2003 Iraqi operation, as well as many inter-state and intra-regional problems such as the Israel-Palestine conflict or the nuclear weapon proliferation efforts of Iran demonstrate the instability of the Middle East. These wars and conflicts, although not always being related with oil, have had important impacts on oil supplies and oil prices. The Middle East is one of the most instable regions in the world. This is what makes the Caspian region so important. The region is essential for energy security: 'sustainable and reliable supplies

¹⁵⁵ OPEC, "What is OPEC?", <http://www.opec.org/library/what%20is%20OPEC/WhatisOPEC.pdf> (15.01.2008), p. 2.

¹⁵⁶ Yüce, p. 74.

¹⁵⁷ Stork, p. 3.

¹⁵⁸ Deloitte, "Energy in Flux: The 21st Century's Greatest Challenge", http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/us_er_energyinflux_stanislaw_05_01_2006%281%29.pdf (15.01.2008), p.1.

at reasonable prices.’¹⁵⁹ For the survival of states, economic security is as important as military security; and for economic security, energy security is of critical importance since it is the motor of development.¹⁶⁰ Diversification of energy supplies is the goal of all industrialized nations such as the U.S., the EU, China, and Japan. Caspian oil is crucial to diversify world oil supplies and lessen dependence of global oil markets on Gulf oil.

The early foresights that the Caspian Basin can be a second Persian Gulf proved wrong. Caspian reserves are comparable to the reserves of the North Sea (16.3 billion), which means that these reserves are substantial but not vital. In other words, the region is not the ‘Aladdin’s cave’ that could compensate all the world’s energy needs.¹⁶¹ The Caspian cannot alter the world supply-demand balance by itself. Another point is the economic disadvantages of the Caspian, where the energy production costs higher than the production costs in the Middle East. The price of one barrel oil is around 6 \$ in the Caspian whereas it is around 50-60 cents in the Middle East.¹⁶² The reserves of the region are significant, but they do not match those of the Middle East. Thus, ‘the Caspian should be seen as a supplement, not a replacement, to the Middle East.’¹⁶³ Then, what makes the region a ‘panacea’ in the eyes of the world, especially in the eyes of the West? The fundamental importance of the region’s reserves is political and strategic, rather than economic.

The U.S. imports 57% of its crude oil and it is predicted that the proportion will be 70% in 2025. The gas imports of the U.S. will account for 25% of its gas consumption in 2025. The dependency of the U.S. to the Middle East is 20% and it tries to decrease that ratio.¹⁶⁴ The energy need of the European Union is also increasing day by day. The EU meets 42.7% of its total oil imports from the CIS

¹⁵⁹ Bahgat, p.3.

¹⁶⁰ Şebnem Udum, “ The Politics of Caspian Region Energy Resources: A Challenge For Turkish Foreign Policy“, **Perceptions**, Vol:6, No:4, December 2001-February 2002, p. 2.

¹⁶¹ Nourzhanov, p. 60.

¹⁶² Bilgin, Avrasya Enerji Savaşları, p. 20.

¹⁶³ Bahgat, p.3.

¹⁶⁴ Necdet Pamir, "Kafkaslar ve Hazar Havzasındaki Ülkelerin Enerji Kaynaklarının Türkiye'nin Enerji Güvenliğine Etkileri", **Türkiye'nin Çevresindeki Gelişmeler ve Türkiye'nin Güvenlik Politikalarına Etkileri Sempozyumu**, Harp Akademileri, İstanbul, 10.03.2006, <http://www.asam.org.tr/temp/temp15.pdf> (18.04.2008), p. 5.

(Commonwealth of Independent States), and 25.7% from the Middle East region. It meets 40% of its gas consumption by imports, especially by the imports from Russian Federation (24%). In fact, the EU's increasing import dependency is on natural gas rather than oil. It tries to decrease its gas dependency on the Russian Federation; and the Caspian's importance for the EU is mainly based on natural gas.¹⁶⁵ China, with its huge population and with its fastly growing economy since the 1990s, is also hungry for energy and dependent on Middle East oil.

The dependence of principal demand centres to imported oil will increase distinctly in the next twenty years. Today, the developed OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) region meets 55% of its energy consumption by imports. This ratio will reach 64% in 2010 and 70% in 2020. The estimates for Europe signify similar results; the dependency of Europe on imported oil will reach 68% in 2010 and 79% in 2020. In 2020, the oil dependency of the Pacific region will be about 93%.¹⁶⁶ Since the dependence on imported oil has reached such dangerous dimensions, 'energy security' is at stake. Unfortunately, the Middle East region, which meets the large part of the world's energy demand, is an instable and complicated region. Caspian hydrocarbons will help to ease the world's demand centres' dependency to oil imports from the Middle East. "In the new century, the assurance of not experiencing supply and price crisis arising from the Middle East will be the Caspian region."¹⁶⁷ It is estimated that in 2020, the Middle Eastern states'-which are OPEC members- share in world oil production will be about 58% and Caspian oil will take a considerable share from the rest 42%.¹⁶⁸ Thus, Caspian oil will enable supply diversification and contribute energy security of the world.

¹⁶⁵ Pamir, pp. 6-7.

¹⁶⁶ Pala, p. 17.

¹⁶⁷ Pala, p. 11.

¹⁶⁸ Pala, p. 17.

1.4.2.2 Russian Gas

Examining Middle East oil helps to understand the importance of Caspian oil. Similarly, to better understand the significance of Caspian natural gas, it is necessary to examine Russian gas.

At present, Russia meets one third of Europe's oil demand.¹⁶⁹ It supplies about a quarter of Europe's gas and about half of the region's imports, some 80% of that via Ukraine.¹⁷⁰ The dependency on Russia's gas in many European countries is at very high levels.¹⁷¹ In some, the ratio is equal to hundred percent. The Baltic states and certain CIS states, too, do import crucial amount of gas they consume, from the Russian Federation. The dependency rates to Russian gas signals that many countries' energy security is at risk. 'Energy security' implies uninterrupted acquisition of energy from reliable, clean, and different sources at proper prices at suitable amounts. It also implies the consumption of energy efficiently.¹⁷² Some European and CIS states have failed to achieve supply diversification by becoming dependent on the Russian Federation as their primary gas supplier.

¹⁶⁹ "AB'nin Rusya'ya Enerji Bağımlılığı", 16.03.2007, <http://www.abhaber.com/haber.php?id=16417> (10.01.2009).

¹⁷⁰ Ian Traynor, "The Struggle to Reduce Dependence on Gazprom", **The Guardian**, 2.01.2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/02/russia-ukraine-gazprom> (3.01.2009).

¹⁷¹ Turkey is one of the largest markets for Russian gas. Turkey, with its 65% dependency rate to Russian gas, is one of the countries whose energy security is at stake. Here, in this part, Turkey's natural gas trade with Russia is excluded since the detailed research of Turkey's energy profile and energy policies will be studied in the third chapter of my dissertation.

¹⁷² Osman Demirağ, "Enerji Güvenliği-Güvenilir Enerji", **Enerji Ajansı**, 08.08.2008, http://www.enerjiajansi.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=424&Itemid=48 (10.08.2008).

Table 1. Russian Natural Gas Exports

Rank	Country	2006 Exports (bcf/y)	2007 Exports (bcf/y)	2006 % of Domestic HG Consumption
1	Germany	1,300	1,378	36%
2	Turkey	703	827	64%
3	Italy	756	742	25%
4	France	353	346	20%
5	Czech Republic	261	247	79%
6	Poland	272	247	47%
7	Hungary	272	226	54%
8	Slovakia	240	223	100%
9	Austria	233	191	74%
10	Finland	173	166	100%
11	Romania	180	138	28%
12	Bulgaria	113	120	96%
13	Greece	95	113	82%
14	Serbia & Montenegro	74	74	87%
15	Croatia	35	35	37%
16	Slovenia	25	18	64%
17	Switzerland	14	11	12%
18	Macedonia	4	4	100%
Sales to Baltic & CIS States				
1	Ukraine	2,085	2,240	66%
2	Belarus	724	763	98%
3	Baltic States	173	243	78%
4	Azerbaijan	141	0	35%
5	Georgia	67	36	100%
Sources: "Domestic Consumption" EIA International Energy Annual, 2007; "Exports 2006 and 2007" Gazexport as cited by Energy Intelligence, March 2008; "Sales to Baltic and CIS States 2007", CIS and E. European Databook. 2006 from Gazprom Annual Report.				

Source: EIA, "Russia Country Analysis Briefs", May 2008, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Russia/NaturalGas.html> (10.01.2009).

The gas crisis experienced between Russia and Ukraine and between Russia and Georgia because of the price and payment disagreements proved the danger of such high dependency. In 2006, Gazprom¹⁷³ cut the flow of the gas to Ukraine and marked up the prices definitely. A similar case was experienced by the early 2009. As a result of the payment problems between Ukraine and Russia, Gazprom closed the gas gates on 1 January 2009.¹⁷⁴ Russia pumps 390 million m³ gas to Ukraine. Ukraine consumes 90 million m³ of it, and the rest 300 million m³ is sent to Europe

¹⁷³ Gazprom is the giant Russian monopoly and the world's biggest producer and exporter of gas.

¹⁷⁴ "Gaz Krizi Yine Kapiya Dayandı", *Sabah*, 02.01.2009, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2009/01/02/haber,FB74D9BC183D4FF3BC0594D3B411AF7E.html> (03.01.2009).

and Turkey.¹⁷⁵ The problem between Russia and Ukraine over gas seriously disrupted gas flows to several European Union countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia. In the seventh day of the crisis, Romania had lost 75 per cent of its supply; Bulgaria had only a few days' gas left; Slovakia was on the verge of declaring a state of emergency.¹⁷⁶ Turkey also gets its share from the eruption of the energy crisis between Ukraine and Russia since it takes 14 billion m³ gas per annum –30 percent of its total gas imports- from Russia through the Western line.¹⁷⁷

Russia's arbitrary treatments and its use of natural gas as a 'gun' "exposes Europe's vulnerability to the Kremlin's energy policies and highlights the dilemmas posed by Europe's attempts to wean itself off dependence on Gazprom."¹⁷⁸ The EU wants to get rid of its dependence on Russian gas, which sometimes turn into Russia's energy 'blackmail'. The EU aims to achieve energy security, and the Central Asian gas has emerged as an alternative to Russian gas. Therefore, the EU negotiates certain pipeline projects such as the Nabucco and Trans-Caspian Natural Gas Pipeline Projects for transporting Caspian gas to Europe through Turkey.

1.5 LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN CENTRAL ASIA

Geopolitics is the task of big powers, in other words, regional and global actors. Therefore, when we talk about the geopolitics of Central Asia, it is necessary to mention the geopolitical standpoints of global and regional actors such as the U.S., the Russian Federation, China, Iran and Turkey that have the capacity to influence regional politics, particularly the energy politics in the region. While studying these

¹⁷⁵ "Gaz Krizi Yine Kapiya Dayandı", **Sabah**, 02.01.2009, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2009/01/02/haber,FB74D9BC183D4FF3BC0594D3B411AF7E.html> (03.01.2009).

¹⁷⁶ "Dependence on Russian Energy Places Europe at Risk", *The Independent*, 07.01.2009, <http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/leading-articles/leading-article-dependence-on-russian-energy-places-europe-at-risk-1229945.html> (07.01.2009).

¹⁷⁷ "Gaz Krizi Yine Kapiya Dayandı", **Sabah**, 02.01.2009, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2009/01/02/haber,FB74D9BC183D4FF3BC0594D3B411AF7E.html> (03.01.2009).

¹⁷⁸ Ian Traynor, "The Struggle to Reduce Dependence on Gazprom", **The Guardian**, 02.01.2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/02/russia-ukraine-gazprom> (03.01.2009).

actors' geopolitical standpoints, we should be aware of one point: Geopolitics is not objective. Every geo-politician, statesman, nation and state has a different interpretation of the geopolitics of the world. All states have their own geopolitical cultures; so each state looks at Central Asia from its own geopolitical perspective. What is common for all actors' geopolitical views regarding Central Asia is the region's rich energy sources. The RF holds the world's first largest natural gas reserves and eighth largest oil reserves while Iran has the world's second largest gas reserves and third largest oil reserves.¹⁷⁹ Since they have large amounts of energy resources, the energy interests of the RF and Iran are not for the consumption of Central Asian hydrocarbons, but for the transport of them. Importance of Central Asia for the U.S. in terms of energy arises from the instability of the Middle East region. The U.S. wants to decrease its dependency on Middle East energy by diversifying its supply sources. Yet, because of geographical distance, the U.S. has to import Caspian oil and gas via tankers, rather than via pipelines. In this respect, the U.S. does not have a direct pipeline project in the region. In general, it supports the multi pipeline routes; and in particular, it props up the routes other than the Russian and Iranian ones. In this respect, the high American support to Turkish pipeline projects is comprehensible. China, like the U.S., wants to decrease its dependency on the Middle East energy resources. The transport routes of the Middle East energy are under the control of the U.S., so China feels that Central Asian oil and gas would be more secure for China.¹⁸⁰ Turkey, on the other hand, emerges as both a consumer and a transporter of the Caspian hydrocarbons. As we see, each actor has a certain energy interest in the region. Energy is the common interest of them, and my question is: what are their other interests; and while pursuing these interests in Central Asia, what are those actors' assets, advantages, and disadvantages?

1.5.1 The Russian Federation

Russia, which gained the control of Central Asia during the Great game, maintained and reinforced its domination in the Soviet era. As a result, Moscow's

¹⁷⁹ EIA, "Iran Country Analysis Briefs", October 2007, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/pdf.pdf> (6.11.2008), pp. 2, 8.

¹⁸⁰ Dokuzlar, p. 198.

ties with the states of the region have remained strong. Immediately after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Central Asia was regarded as a 'burden' and RF turned towards its internal economic and political problems. In this early period, the 'Atlantic school,' represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which advocated pro-Western policies and integration into Western organizations, dominated the RF's foreign policy. Yet, complaints and discontent began to rise from many sections of the society, including the Supreme Soviet, the Ministry of Defense, and the Army.¹⁸¹ Gradually, this conservative critic group, namely, the Eurasianists, which interpreted the Russian policies within a traditional balance of power framework, and saw ex-Soviet territories as a key to Russia for regaining its great power status, started to be influential in Russian foreign policy. As a result of the criticisms, the Foreign Ministry had to adopt its policies. The division between the Atlantic school and the Eurasianists began to weaken toward the end of 1992, and the idea of the "Near Abroad" began to be shared by both groups. In the summer of 1992, the deputy foreign minister in charge of near abroad affairs, prepared a report declaring all the ex-Soviet territory as the RF's sphere of influence, and claimed that Russia was responsible for the military security and stability in this region.¹⁸² Thus, since 1993, the year that RF declared its 'Near Abroad Policy,' the Russian Federation perceives the region as its 'backyard' and tries to reassert its economic, political and military influence.

The strategic concerns of Moscow in the region are to make the Central Asian States as close allies of the RF and to limit the outside powers' access to Central Asia. The security concerns of Russia in the region are the local and regional conflicts that break out along Russia's borders, the threat of radical Islam, fundamentalist movements, drug trafficking, and smuggling, etc.¹⁸³ The ethnic Russians living abroad are also one of the major concerns of the Russian Federation. At the present time, the Russian population constitutes about 40 percent of the

¹⁸¹ Idil Tuncer, "The security Policies of the Russian Federation: The 'Near Abroad' and Turkey", **Turkish Studies**, Vol: 1, No: 2, Autumn 2000, pp. 96-97.

¹⁸² Tuncer, p. 98.

¹⁸³ Lena Jonson, "Russia and Central Asia", **Central Asian Security: The New International Context**, eds. Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London; Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 2001, pp. 98-100.

Kazakh population, about 20 percent of the Kyrgyz population, 9 percent of Turkmen and 8 percent of Uzbek population.¹⁸⁴

In the economic field, the RF is still the primary trading partner of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Yet, as the Central Asian Republics' trade with Asian and Western countries increase, the level of trade with Russia lowers. In regard to oil resources, Russia has actively promoted the exclusive pipeline routes that pass through its territories. It has objected all of the pipeline projects that bypass Russia. The monopoly of the oil and gas pipeline systems is a 'card' of Russia. In order to gain economic and political maneuver power, the energy-rich Republics of Central Asia have tried to break Russian monopoly through constructing alternative pipeline routes to China, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey. In this respect, the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan project is a strong blow to Russian energy interests in the region.¹⁸⁵ Yet, there are many other pipeline projects that stay on the table but could not be realized as a result of Russian objections.

In the military sphere, according to Lena Johnson, the role of Russia in Central Asia as the 'security manager' is diminishing. She claims that although the common threat of religious extremism and international terrorism provides a security cooperation between Russia and the Central Asian Republics, the possibility of a long-term military integration is low.¹⁸⁶ In the field of security, the US grabbed the primary place after the September 11. Moscow initially welcomed the entry of US and other Western forces to Central Asia since the American fight against terrorism, fundamentalist movements, and organized crime suited with Russian interests. Yet, as the American engagement has increased, Moscow became uneasy and tried to restore its traditional military, political and economic ties with the Central Asian states.¹⁸⁷ In counterbalancing the growing US presence in Central Asia, the interests of Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran converge. Especially after 2005, the strong U.S.

¹⁸⁴ Gamze Güngörmüş Kona, "Türkiye-Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri Ekonomik İlişkileri ve Rusya Faktörü", 24.05.2008, <http://gamzegungormuskona.blogspot.com/2008/05/trkiye-orta-asya-ekonomik-ilikileritrke.html> (01.06.2008).

¹⁸⁵ Jonson, pp. 101-102.

¹⁸⁶ Jonson, p. 119.

¹⁸⁷ Rein Müllerson, **Central Asia: A Chessboard and Player in the New Great Game**, Columbia University Press, New York, 2007, p. 77.

military presence started to decrease as the American bases began to be closed as a result of the Chinese and Russian pressure through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The geopolitical assets of Russia in Central Asia are its geographic location and its centuries-long historical, commercial, economic and political ties with the region. Russia and Central Asian Republics share common security concerns and threats. The economic dependence of local countries on the Russian Federation and the considerable amount of ethnic Russians living in the region, strengthen the position of Russia in Central Asia. Russia tries to preserve these ties especially by regional organizations. Today, the RF remains a major external power in Central Asia, but in comparison to the Soviet era, its exclusive position has been undermined as other external actors began to penetrate into the region.

1.5.2 The United States

In the Cold War era, Central Asia did not have a priority in the U.S. foreign policy. It was very difficult for the U.S. to get the region out of Soviet orbit. Thus, in the Cold War era, the U.S. kept away from Central Asia but followed the nuclear tests of the Soviet Union in the region through spy planes. It was the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan that put Central Asia on the agenda of the U.S.¹⁸⁸ Nevertheless, until the mid-1990s, Central Asia had not got a special place in the U.S. foreign policy. The Gulf war, the Middle East peace process, the turmoils in the Bosnia and Kosovo, the debates on the future of the NATO, etc. all coincided with the breakdown of the Soviet Union, and the U.S. was busy with these matters. However, the Russian policy of Near Abroad, the European Union's projects of "Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA)" and "Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE)", the increasing penetration of China and the

¹⁸⁸ Çağrı Erhan, "ABD'nin Orta Asya Politikaları ve 11 Eylül Sonrası Açılımları", **Küresel Politikada Orta Asya (Avrasya Üçlemesi I)**, ed. Mustafa Aydın, Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, Ankara, 2005, pp. 16-17.

growing interests of American oil companies in the region increased the U.S.' interests in Central Asia as from the mid-1990s.¹⁸⁹

In the course of time, those mentioned below have become the main goals of the U.S. in Central Asia: the sovereignty and independence of the CAR; maintenance of a stable political environment; cessation of ethnic and civil conflicts; and establishment of market-oriented democratic economies in the region.¹⁹⁰ Preventing region from being a hotbed of political and religious extremism is another aim of Washington in Central Asia.¹⁹¹ Energy is a field that the U.S. puts special emphasis. It wants uninterrupted transfer of the region's oil and gas to the world markets. This would provide supply diversity and energy security for the U.S. that wants to decrease its dependency on Middle East oil. Moreover, Washington wants the U.S. firms take part in the extraction and transport of the energy sources of the region. It supports multiple pipelines and aims to exclude Russia and Iran from dominating pipeline decisions.¹⁹² The U.S. also aims non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which the region- especially Kazakhstan, inherited from the Soviet Union.¹⁹³ It wants to restrict and control the penetration of the Russian Federation, China, and Iran into the region. Lastly, Central Asia is important for the United State's 'war on terrorism.'

In the pre-September 11 period, the foreign policy of the U.S. towards Central Asia was mainly dominated by economic considerations. The main security concerns of Washington in that period were the nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan and the turmoil in Tajikistan.¹⁹⁴ Yet, the September 11 attacks added a security dimension to the geopolitics of Central Asia, and also increased the military importance of the region in the eyes of the U.S. In the context of 'war on terrorism' the U.S. launched

¹⁸⁹ Erhan, pp. 20-21.

¹⁹⁰ Karasac, p. 20.

¹⁹¹ Özden Zeynep Oktav, "American Policies Towards the Caspian Sea and The Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan Pipeline" **Perceptions**, Spring 2005,

<http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume10/Spring2005/OzdenOktavson.pdf> (24.01.2008), p. 22.

¹⁹² Stephen Blank, "The Strategic Importance of Central Asia: An American View", **Parameters**, Spring 2008, p. 76.

¹⁹³ Bahgat, p. 11.

¹⁹⁴ Richard Gragosian, "The US Military Engagement in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus: An Overview", **Journal of Slavic Military Studies**, Vol: 17, No: 1, 2004, pp. 45, 48.

an operation to Afghanistan and closely cooperated with the countries of the region. Since militant Islam is a serious problem for their internal security, the five Central Asian states became partners of US in its 'war on terrorism'. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan gave permission to the opening of military bases on their territories; Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan opened their air spaces to the U.S.¹⁹⁵ Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan also has close relations with the U.S. It pays close attention to U.S.' military priorities in the region. Especially after the 9/11 events, Azerbaijan began to support the U.S.' counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism efforts, opened its airspace and airports to U.S. forces, and sent troops to Afghanistan and Iraq.¹⁹⁶ It can be said that after the September 11 attacks, 'The alignment of power has changed: the United States is now the region's main economic donor and security manager.'¹⁹⁷ As Martha Brill Olcott states: "Slowly but surely the United States, as a lone superpower, is bringing this region under its security umbrella in ways that are certain to have an impact on the region's former and aspiring hegemons."¹⁹⁸ The assets of the United States- economic aids, political support, technological assistance and security provision- all facilitated the penetration of the U.S. to Central Asia. The increasing presence of the U.S. in the region affected the Central Asian States' and other foreign actors' interests and policy calculations.

However, since 2005, the situation has begun to change. China and the RF have put pressure on Central Asian States through the SCO for the eviction of US military forces from the bases in the region. On July 5, the SCO called the U.S. to set a timeline for the withdrawal of its military forces from Central Asia.¹⁹⁹ In July 2005, as a result of the strained relations between the U.S. and Uzbekistan because of the Andijon events, Uzbekistan asked the U.S. to withdraw from the Karshi-Khanabad military base that was opened shortly after the September 11 attacks, and gave the U.S. six months to complete the withdrawal.²⁰⁰ The U.S. forces left Uzbekistan and

¹⁹⁵ Giragosian, p. 51.

¹⁹⁶ http://azembassy.us/new/pages.php?name=az_us_relations (21.11.2008).

¹⁹⁷ Boris Rumer, "The Powers in Central Asia", *Survival*, Vol: 44, No: 3, Autumn 2002, p. 57.

¹⁹⁸ Denis Sinor, "Rediscovering Central Asia" *Diogenes*, Vol:51, No:7, 2004, p. 18.

¹⁹⁹ "Q&A: U.S. Military Bases in Central Asia" *The New York Times*, 26.07.2005, http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot2_072605.html (20.05.2008).

²⁰⁰ "US Asked to Leave Uzbek Air Base", 30.07.2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4731411.stm> (20.05.2008).

now its Kyrgyzstan's turn. The last single US military base in Kyrgyzstan-Gansi is on the verge of closing. As a result of the SCO's demands together with the disagreement between Kyrgyz and US authorities on the rent, Kyrgyzstan started to discuss the closure of the U.S. base in Gansi.²⁰¹ Immediately after September 11 attacks, the local leaders, striving for eliminating terror and escaping from Russian influence, welcomed American security umbrella. Yet, in the course of time, the Central Asian Republics have begun to be disturbed by the democratization discourse of American foreign policy, so they have started to turn their direction towards the RF.²⁰² Now, the developments signal a relative weakening in the U.S. position in Central Asia.

1.5.3 Iran

The geographical proximity, and the religious and ethnic ties, as in the case of Tajikistan and Azerbaijan, link Iran to the Central Asian Republics.²⁰³ At the beginning, Iran perceived the disintegration of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to strengthen the Islamic world and tried to enhance its religious and cultural ties with the newly independent republics of the region.²⁰⁴ Yet, later, Iran has given up its ideologic objectives and has moved to a more pragmatic policy. Since Iran has large groups of ethnic Azeris and Turkmens, stability in Central Asia is crucial for stability of Iran. Today, the main goal of Iran in the region is to conduct lucrative economic and commercial relations with all the countries in the region, but it has some other specific goals such as political influence, procurement of former Soviet weaponry, and the acquisition of nuclear expertise and materials.²⁰⁵ Since 2001, neutralizing the

²⁰¹ "Kırgızistan Amerikan Üssünü Kapatıyor", **Zaman**, 22.02.2008, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=655080> (23.05.2008).

²⁰² Kamer Kasım, "ABD'nin Orta Asya Politikasındaki İkilem", **Usak Stratejik Gündem**, 14.09.2007, <http://www.usakgundem.com/yazarlar.php?id=782&type=48> (23.05.2008).

²⁰³ 'Tajik ethnicity and language are of the Perian/Farsi family and almost one-quarter of Iran's population is ethnic Azeri.' See Simbal A. Khan, "Iran's Relations with Central Asia-A Strategic Analysis", **Perceptions**, <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume9/March-May2004/4SimbalKhan.pdf> (24.01.2008), p. 46.

²⁰⁴ Khan, p.48.

²⁰⁵ Rosemarie Forsythe, **The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Prospects for oil Exploitation and Export in the Caspian Basin**, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, p. 23.

increasing US military presence in the region, which Iran perceives as a threat, has also become one of the main goals of Iran.²⁰⁶

The cultural and historical ties of Iran with Central Asia and its suitable geographical location between the region and the Persian Gulf are the assets of Iran. Iran, as Turkey, wants to be an exit for the energy resources of Central Asia. It signed contracts for the transport of Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas via its territory. Actually, Iran is the shortest and cheapest outlet for Central Asia. Yet, because of its big disadvantage-the tense relations with the US- Iran can not benefit from its suitable geo-strategic location. The U.S. rejects all the pipeline projects that include Iran. The pipeline passing through Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-Europe could not be realized as a result of the U.S. opposition. Its pivotal location not only makes Iran an advantageous pipeline route. Iran, through swap arrangements, could also shorten the time for Central Asian oil and gas to reach international market. Moreover, it could be an alternative supply source for energy-poor Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, so it could decrease their dependence on Russian Federation's and Uzbekistan's energy sources.²⁰⁷ Yet, there are some obstacles to improving economic relations between Iran and Central Asia. The lack of rooted pattern of trade relations, the insufficient infrastructure for commerce and the competitive nature of Iranian and Central Asian economies prevent the further development of economic relations.²⁰⁸ Regarding security, the risks emanating from Central Asia are secessionism and extremist ethno-nationalism. The Afghan and Tajik civil wars negatively affect Iran through causing refugee problems and transborder organized crime. Iran also watches the NATO and OSCE engagement in the region anxiously and criticizes the development of security relations between Central Asian Republics and the U.S. and Israel.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁶ Khan, p.51.

²⁰⁷ Shireen T. Hunter, **Central Asia Since Independence**, Praeger, Westport Connecticut, 1996 (Since Independence), p. 130.

²⁰⁸ Edmund Herzig, "Iran and Central Asia", **Central Asian Security: The New International Context**, eds. Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London; Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 2001, p. 179.

²⁰⁹ Herzig, pp. 185-187.

Iran's pragmatic and cautious policy has eased the fears of Central Asian leaders that were worried about the probable revolutionary and ideological objectives of Iran immediately after the demise of the Soviet Union. As the Central Asian leaders have comprehended Iran's pragmatic approach, the relations between Iran and the Central Asian countries has expanded.

1.5.4 China

The first links between China and Central Asia were established nearly 2000 years ago, through the Silk Road. When Central Asia came under the rule of Czarist Russia and then the Soviet Union, the links had weakened.²¹⁰ The collapse of the Soviet Union was a chance for the revival of the historical relations. Yet, the demise of the Soviet Union aroused anxiety in China initially. The sense of ideological isolation owing to the collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union combined with the perceived threats of ethnic separatism, Islamic revival and Pan-Turkic expansionism created concerns in China.²¹¹ In order to prevent the taking place of these threats, China quickly developed ties with the newly emerged Central Asian Republics. One of the main interests of China in the region is the security and unity of its territories. China has a long border with three of the Central Asian republics, which has transnational ethnic ties: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Beijing fears that ethno-nationalism could disrupt the stability of its Northern provinces and autonomous regions. Fundamentalist Islamic movements also disturb China, which has a large Muslim population. Both the security on China's western border and her internal security in the separatist Xinjiang region, (the home of Turkic-Muslim Uighurs) depend on China's relations with her Muslim neighbours.²¹² Therefore, in its relations with the Central Asian Republics, China

²¹⁰ Chien-peng Chung, "The Shanghai Co-operation Organization: China's Changing Influence in Central Asia", **The China Quarterly**, 2004, p. 990.

²¹¹ J. Richard Walsh, "China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia", **Asian Survey**, Vol: 33, No:3, March 1993, p. 272.

²¹² Niklas Swanström, "China and Central Asia: A New Great Game or Traditional Vassal Relations?", **Journal of Contemporary China**, Vol: 14, No: 45, 2005, p. 570.

pursues 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence', namely, peace, cooperation, development, exchange, mutual prosperity, progress and understanding.²¹³

It is essential to mention the Shanghai Cooperation Organization while studying Chinese-Central Asian relations.²¹⁴ It is a cooperation forum where member countries deal with transnational security threats such as ethnic separatism, religious fundamentalism, international terrorism, smuggling, drug trafficking, etc. The SCO is an instrument of China for limiting the increasing American influence in Central Asia. It is a security shield against the eastward expansion of NATO; a safeguard to Chinese geo-economic interests in the region, namely, the Chinese energy interests; and a contributor to peace and stability of China's western borders.²¹⁵

The collapse of the Soviet Union presented not only challenges, but also opportunities as well, especially in the economic field. The economies of the Central Asian Republics on the one side, and the economy of China on the other side, are complementary. Especially the autonomous Xinjiang region of China, which has a long border with Central Asia, is promising for the expansion of economic ties. The five Central Asian Republics possess steel, timber, chemical fertilizers that China in general and Xinjiang in particular, lack. On the other hand, the Central Asian Republics need the consumer goods of China such as light industrial goods, textile products, and foodstuffs.²¹⁶ For China, Central Asia is a good market and an important energy supplier. China is a net importer of oil since 1993. The imported oil mostly comes from the instable Middle East and China wants to increase its sources of supply. The country's oil import was 60 million tons in 2000 and it is expected that it will reach 120 million tons in 2010.²¹⁷ In order to satisfy its growing energy demand, China explores the possibilities of cooperation with Central Asian States

²¹³ Guangcheng Xing, "China and Central Asia", **Central Asian Security: The New International Context**, eds. Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London; Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 2001, p. 153.

²¹⁴ The Shanghai Five meeting, which held among Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, in Shanghai in April 1996 to negotiate border disputes, formed the first ground for the SCO. The regular meetings has turned into an institutionalized multilateral cooperation organization on 15 June 2001, with the inclusion of Uzbekistan to the membership. See Chung, p. 991.

²¹⁵ Chung, pp. 998, 1000, 1002.

²¹⁶ Walsh, pp. 279-280.

²¹⁷ Chung, pp. 1000-1001.

and proposes pipeline projects that would transport Central Asian oil and gas to China. In September 2004, the Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline that will transport Kazakh and Russian oil to China's Xinjiang province, began to be constructed and was completed in December 2005.²¹⁸

China's presence in Central Asia is growing. The Chinese goods circulate in Central Asian markets, Chinese firms invest in oil and other businesses, and Chinese workers work in various sectors in Central Asia.²¹⁹ In its relations with the CAR, China has some advantages. First of all, it has geographical proximity to the region. It has high level of economic development, so it could be a model for the Central Asian Republics in transition to market economy from a planned economy. As a matter of fact, the Chinese model, namely, reforming economically without doing so politically, attracted the authoritarian leaders of Central Asia. The development of Chinese-Central Asian relations is beneficial not only for China but also for Central Asia. The projected pipelines could serve the energy-rich Central Asian States' aim of finding alternative outlets other than Russia for their oil and gas. Moreover, improvement of economic relations is also mutually beneficial. Not only Central Asia is a large market for China but China is a big market for Central Asia as well.²²⁰ "China is slowly but surely moving westward."²²¹ In the future, it seems that the relations will develop further.

1.5.5 Turkey

The demise of the Soviet Union presented Turkey a new set of opportunities as well as responsibilities. The establishment of Turkic states that have common historical, cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious ties with Turkey created a great enthusiasm in Turkey. It expected that involvement in Central Asia would bring Turkey prestige in the international arena, open new markets for Turkish goods, and

²¹⁸ Müllerson, p. 101.

²¹⁹ Müllerson, p. 102.

²²⁰ Xing, p. 159.

²²¹ Müllerson, p. 102.

provide alternative energy sources.²²² Turkey immediately recognized all the newly emerged republics and has tried to help and guide the Central Asian States in many fields. It has strived to renew and strengthen her political, commercial, and cultural ties with the region. With the support of the West, it even emerged as a democratic, secular, and market-oriented development model to these new republics. Yet, in the course of time, Turkey faced with problems to achieve her initial goal of being a really influential political and economic actor in the region. The initial enthusiasm turned into disappointment within a few years. However, when the region's substantial oil and gas reserves were discovered, a new field of cooperation between Turkey and Central Asia has emerged. Turkey has appeared as an alternative transport route for the region's hydrocarbon sources. Turkey's target of being an 'energy bridge between East and West' increased Turkey's interests in Central Asia and make her a geopolitically important actor in the energy politics.

The assets and advantages of Turkey in the region can be summarized as such: 'a considerable degree of ethnic and linguistic affinity, a relatively well-developed industrial base, a vibrant private sector, and its position as the West's chosen partner.'²²³ Yet, Turkey has some handicaps, too. Its geographical distance and its economic and political problems limit the country in the region. Despite these disadvantages, Turkey has strived for increasing its influence in Central Asia. Turkish private sector is active there, and Turkish public agencies and institutions such as TİKA and Turk Eximbank try to contribute economic and social development of the Central Asian States. Through the Turkic Summits, the relations are tried to be institutionalized. In the field of security, Turkey has concluded military-security agreements with the Turkic states, joined the NATO activities ahead, and supported the formation of modern, independent armies in Central Asian Republics. It cooperates with the Turkic Republics against organized crime, arms smuggling, terrorism, and separatism.²²⁴

²²² Gareth M. Winrow, "Turkey and Central Asia", **Central Asian Security: The New International Context**, eds. Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London; Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 2001 (Turkey and Central Asia), p. 199.

²²³ Hunter, *Since Independence*, pp. 136- 137.

²²⁴ Winrow, *Turkey and Central Asia*, pp. 199, 207, 208.

Since the mid-1990s Turkey's focus has intensified on the developments in the Caspian Basin than on Central Asia as a whole.²²⁵ Today, Turkey's Central Asian policy is energy-oriented. She aims to be an energy bridge between the energy-rich Central Asian states and energy-hungry West. The pipelines that transport Caspian oil and gas to Europe will increase Turkey's prestige in the international arena, provide alternative energy sources for its increasing energy demand, supply additional transit fees, and decrease the oil tanker traffic of the Turkish Straits.

Tentative Remarks

In comprehending and interpreting political events, geopolitics plays a facilitating role. For this reason, I began with defining and explaining the term 'geopolitics' in order to better reveal the significance of Central Asia in world politics. Then, I introduced Central Asia and the Caspian Basin geographically by referring to the region's energy reserves and tried to clarify why Caspian oil and gas is so important in world politics. I briefly compared Caspian oil and gas with Middle Eastern oil and Russian gas. Afterwards, I examined in detail the strategic and hydrocarbon interests of the main actors of the 'Caspian game'. I made out that when the interests of the global and regional powers in the region clash, the relations get tensed up. Yet, when their interests converge, there emerges a room for cooperation. It can generally be said that the strategic considerations of the players have been pursued in zero-sum terms but hydrocarbon interests include some room for cooperation.²²⁶

Here, in the first chapter, Turkey's interests in Central Asia and its relations with the region is mentioned very briefly. The detailed study of Turkey's position as a player in Central Asia, its policies and activities towards the region, and bilateral relations with the Turkic Republics will be examined in the second chapter.

²²⁵ Winrow, Turkey and Central Asia, p. 217.

²²⁶ Bahgat, p.14.

PART II

TURKEY AND CENTRAL ASIA

2.1 A NEW REGION: NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

On 8 December 1991, the Russian Federation, Belarus, and Ukraine signed the Minsk Declaration and announced the end of the Soviet Union as “a geopolitical reality” and “a subject of international law.”²²⁷ Fifteen new states emerged from the ashes of the Soviet Union, three of which are located in the Transcaucasus - Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia- and five of which are located in Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

In this second chapter of my dissertation, I sometimes used ‘Central Asian Republics’ in place of the Turkic Republics meaning to include Azerbaijan, although it is a Transcaucasus Republic; and exclude Tajikistan although it is a Central Asian Republic. The reason is that Azerbaijan, despite being located in the South Caucasus, can be regarded as a Central Asian Republic. It is one of the five littoral states of the Caspian Sea and is tied to Central Asia through the Caspian. Tajikistan, on the other hand, is culturally and linguistically Persian. Thus, in my dissertation, I will not study Tajikistan under the grouping of the Turkic Republics or Central Asian Republics.

The Central Asian Republics had been isolated from the world since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Soviet Russia. Hunter, with a reference to Churchill’s ‘iron curtain’ phrase, explains the region’s isolation as such: “The victory of Bolshevism in Russia in 1917 had already erected a similar barrier-an Islamic iron curtain-that divided the Muslim territories and peoples of the tsar’s dominions from their religious and cultural kin.”²²⁸ Now, after almost a 70-year gap, the nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia have tried to tear that so-called curtain and discover their common ties with the communities beyond the borders of ex-Soviet Union.

²²⁷ Tuncer, p. 95.

²²⁸ Hunter, Post-Independence, p. 287.

Whereas the northern republics of the USSR began to strive for independence almost two years before the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the states of Central Asia preferred gradual change. The idea of political independence was external for them. There was no serious struggle or demand for independence in Central Asian Republics, yet, once it was thrust upon them, the wind of independence blown strongly in the region.²²⁹ In the end of 1991, all of the Turkic Republics were already became independent sovereign states. They rapidly dropped on the international agenda and they attracted the attention of the world owing to their strategic and economic importance. As the substantial energy reserves of the region have been discovered, Central Asia has become geopolitically one of the most important regions in the world; and its geopolitical and geo-strategic significance increased in the wake of the September 11 attacks.

Not only of Central Asian states, but also Turkey's geopolitics experienced a further significance with the demise of the Soviet Union. The geopolitical importance of Turkey in the Cold War era aroused from her geographical position. Turkey was regarded as an anti-communist fortress, a Western barrier at the borders of the communist Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of communist threat first caused anxiety in Turkey. Turkey began to question its importance in the eyes of its Western allies. Yet, the subsequent developments showed that Turkey was still important for the West. The geographical location of Turkey once more polished Turkey's geopolitical significance. With the Soviet Union's breakdown, Turkey found itself in the middle of three unstable regions, namely, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Gulf war, the ethnic clashes in the Balkans, and the emerging 'power vacuum' in the ex-Soviet geography proved that Turkey was still important for the West. Turkey could be a source of stability in these regions, especially in Central Asia. The West, especially the United States, with the fear of Iran's possible penetration to the region, supported Turkey's presence in Central Asia. Once a bulwark against communism, Turkey then would be a bulwark against Iran's threat of Islamic fundamentalism.

²²⁹ Gregory Gleason, "Independent Muslim Republics in Central Asia: Legacy of the Past, Shape of the Future", **Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs**, Vol: 12, No: 2, July 1991, p. 361.

Thus, for Turkey, the emergence of new Central Asian Republics was a chance to restore its strategic and political importance for the West.

The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 altered the international system and opened a new era that effected many states' foreign and security policies. Turkey was one of the countries most affected by the breakdown of the Soviet Union. The five of the ex-Soviet Republics were Turkic and emergence of fellow states that has close historical, cultural, ethnic ties with Turkey brought new openings to Turkish foreign policy. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has presented Turkey new opportunities as well as new responsibilities. From now on, Turkey was a 'regional player.'²³⁰ Thus, it has to take into consideration other regional actors such as Russian Federation and Iran, and conduct its policies in the light of its new regional role.

When the five Turkic Republics emerged in Central Asia, Turkey very welcomed the discovery of 'new cousins' in the ancestral Turkish homelands.²³¹ The emergence of brother states created vigor in all sections of Turkey, but especially in the nationalist ones. The anxiety of being left by the Western allies as a result of the disappearance of the communist Soviet threat and the rejection of Turkey's request for becoming a full-member of the European Community, created a sense of isolation and insecurity in Turkey.²³² As Kramer states, with the establishment of Central Asian Republics, Turkey's relative isolation between Europe (to which Turkey wanted to be articulated but rejected) and the Arab world (of which Turkey did not see itself as a part) came to an end.²³³ By means of the emergence of fellow Turkic Republics, Turkey felt itself safer and more powerful. This was an opportunity for Turkey to acquire a new role as an influential regional player in Central Asia. The historical, cultural, religious, ethnic, and linguistic ties of Turkey with five Turkic states of the region-Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and

²³⁰ Aydın, *Kafkasya ve Orta Asya*, p. 380.

²³¹ Heinz Kramer, "Will Central Asia Become Turkey's Sphere of Influence", **Perceptions**, Vol: 1, March-May 1996, p. 1.

²³² Ziya Öniş, "Turkey and Post-Soviet States: Potential and Limits of Regional Power Influence", **Middle East Review of International Affairs**, Vol: 5, No: 2, Summer 2001, p. 67.

²³³ Kramer, p. 1.

Turkmenistan- constituted the basis for influencing and shaping their economic development, political orientation, and external relations.²³⁴ For Mustafa Aydın, emergence of fellow Muslim-Turkic states presented Turkey with a historical opportunity to enlarge its ‘zone of influence’ and the newly emerging threats of the post-Cold War era urged her to explore new openings in its foreign and security policies.²³⁵ Turkey’s traditional foreign policy, which had guided by Western orientation and conservative-defensive approach that avoided extra-territorial activities, was very challenged in the 1990s.²³⁶ The Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 cut off the interaction between the Muslim-Turkic population of the Russia and the Ottoman Empire and caused the insulation of the region from the rest of the world until the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991. In this period, Turkey’s relations with the region were very limited. The leaders of the Turkish Republic, who were careful not to revive the Pan-Turkist inclinations that were very popular in the last days of the Ottoman Empire, had not conducted official relations with the region.²³⁷ Turkey avoided any action that can be perceived as undermining by the Soviet Union. This stance of Turkey continued even in the 1990, when the breakdown of the Soviet Union was almost realized. For instance, when the Azerbaijani president visited Turkey on January 5-10, 1990, he was welcomed at ministerial level and the Soviet flag was put next to the Azeri flag.²³⁸ Similarly, then President Turgut Özal’s interpretation of the events in Soviet Azerbaijan-introduction of Soviet troops into Baku in January 1990 as a result of the Armenian-Azerbaijani disputes- as an internal affair of the Soviet Union, and his words that the Azerbaijani crisis was of more concern to Iran than to Turkey since the Azerbaijanis are Shi’a, proves Turkey’s desire to keep away from Soviet Union’s internal affairs.²³⁹ However, apart from Turkey’s official stance, for some Turks in Turkey, “Central Asia represented the hope for the future, the source of rejuvenation, and a return to

²³⁴ Öniş, p. 66.

²³⁵ Mustafa Aydın, “ Foucault’s Pendulum: Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus”, **Turkish Studies**, Vol: 5, No: 2, Summer 2004 (Foucault’s Pendulum), p. 1.

²³⁶ Öniş, p. 66.

²³⁷ Aydın, s. 2.

²³⁸ Aydın, s.2.

²³⁹ Shireen Hunter, “Bridge or Frontier? Turkey’s Post-Cold War Geopolitical Posture”, **The International Spectator**, Vol: 34, No: 1, January-March 1999 (Bridge or Frontier), # http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/iai/iai_99hus01.html#06.07.2008).

the Turkic roots of the Ottoman culture saturated with Arab and Persian elements.”²⁴⁰ A number of political analysts and certain politicians initiated a ‘rethinking’ in Turkish foreign policy, namely, neo-Ottomanism. According to Neo-Ottomanists, Turkey should free itself from the limitations of Kemalist theory or its particular cautious, non-interventionist interpretation. They envisaged, as in the words of Cengiz Candar, “the free movement of people, ideas, and goods in the lands of the old Ottoman empire.”²⁴¹ Pan-Turkist ideas also had revived in that period. Yet, this was a new version which “aimed at creating a Turkic grouping within which Turkey would play a leadership role economically and politically rather than a closely knit political union.”²⁴²

The August 19 coup against Gorbachev altered Turkey’s official approach towards the Central Asian Republics.²⁴³ When the all Central Asian and Caucasian Republics declared their independence from Moscow, Turkey welcomed the developments with enthusiasm and became the first country that recognized their independence, Azerbaijan on November 9 and the rest on December 16.²⁴⁴ Immediately after Turkey’s formal recognition of the independence of all the Caucasian and Central Asian Republics, intense relations began between the Turkic Republics and Ankara. Dating from then, Turkish foreign policy towards the region has been more active.

Mustafa Aydın divides Turkey’s changing foreign policy in the 1990s into four different periods²⁴⁵: From 1989 to 1991, Turkey’s traditional foreign policy had continued and Turkey pursued a Moscow-centered policy in this period. During the years between 1991 and 1993, Turkey pursued an active foreign policy and tried to be a model and leader in the region. This was the period of enthusiastic statements, exaggerated expectations, and excessive optimism. From 1993 to 1995, Turkey realized that Russian Federation did not have an intention to abandon the region.

²⁴⁰ Sinor, p.14.

²⁴¹ Hunter, Bridge or Frontier.

²⁴² Hunter, Bridge or Frontier.

²⁴³ After the coup, it was understood that the end of the Soviet Union was coming. See Aydın, Foucault’s Pendulum, p. 3.

²⁴⁴ Aydın, Foucault’s Pendulum, p. 3.

²⁴⁵ Aydın, Kafkasya ve Orta Asya, pp. 371-372.

Moreover, Turkey noticed its limits and insufficiencies for achieving her extensive aims and projects in the region. Thus, this period created a feeling of disappointment in Turkey and urged Turkey to reevaluate its policies towards Central Asia. Since the 1995, Turkey's foreign policy towards the region has been more realistic, pragmatic, and balanced. Hunter, like Mustafa Aydın, separates the foreign policy of Turkey towards Central Asia into four: 'period of anxiety and new thinking (1989-90)', 'unlimited expectations (1990-94)', 'setbacks and disillusionment (1994-96)', and 'renewed confidence (1996 to the present)'.²⁴⁶ Meryem Kırımlı makes a broader division and classifies the relations between Turkey and the Turkic Republics into two periods: romantic and realistic.²⁴⁷

It is certain that the sudden breakdown of the Soviet Union was unforeseen for Turkey. Yet, after the formal dissolution of the USSR, Turkey did not hesitate to recognize all of the newly independent ex-Soviet Republics. After Turkey's recognition of their independence, the presidents of the Turkic Republics were welcomed in Ankara and Turkey signed a "Friendship and Cooperation Agreement" with every visiting leader. Hikmet Çetin, the then foreign minister of Turkey, visited all the Turkic states between February 28 and March 6, 1992 and two months later, he was followed by Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel.²⁴⁸ There was a great enthusiasm in Turkey. The Turkish and Western press were full of vigorous declarations of Turkish officials as well as the declarations of the leaders of the region. In February 1992, the then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel declared the emergence of a "gigantic Turkish world stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China."²⁴⁹ In April 1992, Demirel again made an assertive speech during his visit to the region and spoke of the possibility of establishing a "Union of Turkic States."²⁵⁰ In short, by mid-1992, Turkey was at the peak of its self-confidence and so it had gave many promises in the political, financial, and economic areas most of

²⁴⁶ See Shireen Hunter, "Turkey, Central Asia, and the Caucasus: Ten Years After Independence", Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol:1, No:2, May 2001 (Ten Years after Independence).

²⁴⁷ Meryem Kırımlı, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Bağımsız Türk Cumhuriyetlerine Yönelik Türk Dış Politikası", **21. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası**, der. İdris Bal, Alfa Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001, p. 360.

²⁴⁸ Aydın, Foucault's Pendulum, p. 4.

²⁴⁹ Gareth M. Winrow, "Turkey's Relations With The Transcaucasus and The Central Asian Republics", **Perceptions**, March-May 1996 (Turkey's Relations), p. 136.

²⁵⁰ Aydın, Foucault's Pendulum, p. 5.

which remained only as a ‘promise’ rather than becoming a reality. In fact, the suggestion of Turkish model was a part of that great enthusiasm and national self-confidence.

2.2 COMPETING MODELS in CENTRAL ASIA: TURKISH, IRANIAN, AND CHINESE INITIATIVES

2.2.1 The Turkish Model: Basic Characteristics

After the demise of the Soviet Union, there emerged a ‘power vacuum’ in the ex-Soviet geography. The Russian Federation was too busy with its internal problems and economic recovery that until 1993, it kept away from the region. The newly emerged republics, which found themselves in a capitalist world that was virtually unknown to them, were desperate for economic and political support. They were in need of psychological, judicial, economic, cultural, social and political transformation. They wanted to reform the old Soviet system, but they needed a new model that they could use in place of the former one. In this point, Turkey emerged as a model and deemed itself the responsibility of guiding newly emerged Turkic Republics in their efforts for economic, political and social transformation. It could play a positive role in the stabilization of the region, and provide these states an institutional link to Western world and international organizations. It is not clear whether the Turkish model was presented by Turkey itself or by the West. Yet, even if Turkey itself put forward the model, the support of the West played an important part in the popularity and reliability of it. Moreover, owing to the support of the West, especially the U.S. to the Turkish model, Turkey could conduct its relations with the region without being exposed to the pan-Turkist accusations.²⁵¹

The Turkish model was founded on three bases: secularism in a Muslim country, a Western type of pluralist democratic system, and free market economy. The model was designed to be not only a frame model for Turkic Republics for their

²⁵¹ İdris Bal, “Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası İçin Türk Cumhuriyetleri’nin Önemi“, **21. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası**, ed. İdris Bal, Alfa Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001 (Türk Cumhuriyetleri’nin Önemi), pp. 336-337.

economic and political development, it was also a catalyst for their Westernization.²⁵² Why did not the West present itself as a model rather than presenting the Turkey as a model, which was infact a Western type of model and had democratic and economic problems? Turkey's successful incorporation of secularism and Islam, its common culture with the Turkic Republics, and its experiment in economic transformation, made Turkey an attractive model for the West.²⁵³

Iranian model represented Islamic alternative and hostility to the West while Turkey represented secularism and closeness to the West. As a Muslim country that achieved secularism and democracy together, Turkey could be a model for the Muslim- Turkic Republics of Central Asia. The US president George Bush, after a meeting with the then Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel in Washington on 13 February 1992, mentioned Turkey as "the model of a democratic, secular state which could be emulated by Central Asia."²⁵⁴ Similarly, in early 1992, the U.S. secretary of state James Baker advised the leaders of Turkic Republics the adoption of the Turkish model of economic and political development.²⁵⁵ In June 1992, the secretary general of the Council of Europe, Catherine Lalumiere, said in her visit to Central Asia that "Turkey provided a valid model of development for many a newly-independent country in Asia."²⁵⁶

Secondly, cultural affinities between Turkey and Turkic Republics were strength of the Turkish model. The common cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic ties between the Turkic Republics and Turkey constituted the basis for the positive approach and sympathy of these republics to the Turkish model. The statements of leaders of Turkic Republics indicated the attraction of the Turkish model for the Central Asian Republics. For instance, the former president of Azerbaijan, Ebulfez Elchibey, stated in an interview that Azerbaijan chose Turkey as a model. Islam

²⁵² Gamze Güngörmüş Kona, "Türk Dış Politikası İçin Orta Asya Yeniden Bir Alternatif Olabilir mi?", 01.02.2008, <http://www.turksam.org/tr/a1381.html> (01.03.2008).

²⁵³ İdris Bal, "The Turkish Model and the Turkic Republics", *Perceptions*, Vol: 3, No: 3, September-November 1998 (The Turkish Model), p. 5.

²⁵⁴ Bal, The Turkish Model, p. 5.

²⁵⁵ Kramer, pp. 1-2.

²⁵⁶ Bal, The Turkish Model, p. 5.

Karimov, the President of Uzbekistan, said in a visit to Turkey that, Uzbekistan would be established according to Turkish example. He also mentioned an economic unification, namely, the Turkish Common Market, in that visit. The president of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev, talked about Turkey as “a morning star that shows the true path to other Turks.” Other leaders of the region also made similar statements. Besides the leaders, the peoples of Turkic Republics, too, had positive feelings about Turkey; their feeling of kinship with Anatolian Turks also became a positive factor in the strengthening of the Turkish model.²⁵⁷

Thirdly, the successful economic transformation of Turkey from a centrally controlled economy to a market economy could be a good example for these republics. In the Soviet era, the economies of the Central Asian states were strictly controlled by Moscow. The Soviet system regarded Central Asia as a periphery. The region turned into a raw material producer with cotton monoculture and little manufacturing. The region was deprived of industry and investment. The centrally controlled communist system created inefficiency, technological backwardness and corruption. After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the republics of the region aimed to integrate their close economies to the world economy by adopting the market oriented system. Yet, they needed the experiences of a country that followed the same path before. It is essential to make clear that Turkey was not a socialist state as the Central Asian Republics before the 1980s. However, sixty per cent of the economy was belonged to the public sector, namely, the ‘State Economic Enterprises’ which were not allowed to decide the production, investment, and price of their products. During the Özal’s presidency, Turkey ended the import substitution policy and adopted liberal economic policies with the 24 January 1980 decisions. Thus, the Central Asian Republics could benefit from Turkey’s experiences.²⁵⁸

At first, the Turkish model was very popular for the West and for Central Asian leaders. Yet, in the course of time, the support of the West to the Turkish model and the attractiveness of the model for the Turkic Republics had declined. There were some reasons for this decline. While some of these reasons were related

²⁵⁷ Bal, *The Turkish Model*, pp. 6-7.

²⁵⁸ Bal, *The Turkish Model*, pp. 7-9.

to internal shortcomings of the model, some reasons were external. As the West's knowledge about the region and its republics had increased, the stance of the West and the US against the Turkish model began to change. The support of the West to the Turkish model was in fact dependent on the greatness of the ideological threat coming from Iran. The West had feared that Iran would try to fill the 'power vacuum' that emerged after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, by exporting its Islamic regime to Central Asia. Yet, Iran acted very differently from what the West foresaw. Iran, immediately after realizing its limits in the region, began to pursue pragmatic and realistic policies. It sought opportunities for economic cooperation and avoided from any act that could destabilize the region. Since it was understood that Iran would not be a threat in the region as the West anticipated before, the main reason for the Western support of the Turkish model disappeared.²⁵⁹ Moreover, the West understood that the Russian Federation was not willing to abandon the region. Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union the Russian Federation was very busy with its internal political and economic problems. Yet, in 1993, the Russian Federation declared its 'Near abroad policy' and proved that Russia did still regard Central Asia as its backyard or sphere of influence. "The presence of Russian troops in a number of countries, powerful economic levers (gas and electricity deliveries), and the ability to manipulate regional ethnic conflicts compel the local leaders to take heed of Russia's wishes."²⁶⁰ The Russian Federation has made its presence in the region whether through regional organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States and Shanghai Cooperation Organization or by political and military arrangements. It has involved in the internal or intra-state problems of the countries of the region in the name of providing stability. The West, demanding stability and security in the region, let Russia to carry out its policies. This meant that the West did not need the Turkish model as a stability element any longer.²⁶¹ Moreover, as the West's and the United States' knowledge about the

²⁵⁹ Yelda Demirağ, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Türkiye'nin Orta Asya Siyasetinde Gelinek Nokta", **Jeopolitik**, Vol: 5, http://www.jeopolitik.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=22&Itemid=28 (30.11.2008).

²⁶⁰ Igor Torbakov, "Ankara's Post-Soviet Efforts in the Caucasus and Central Asia: The Failure of the 'Turkic World' Model", *Eurasia Insight*, 26.12.2002, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav122602.shtml> (23.06.2008).

²⁶¹ Bal, *Türk Cumhuriyetleri'nin Önemi*, p. 338.

region and its hydrocarbon reserves has increased in the course of time, they preferred to involve directly rather than rely on regional proxies like Turkey.²⁶²

The increasing knowledge about the region, comprehension of Iran's real intentions and the returning of Russia to the region were the reasons that decreased the attractiveness of the Turkish model in the eyes of the West. What were the factors that caused a relative decline of Turkey as an ideal model in the eyes of the Turkic Republics? First of all, Turkish officials' exaggerated speeches and declarations caused suspicion and anxiety on the leaders of the region. These republics, which were newly liberated from Russian domination, were very sensitive about their independence. Some policies and nationalist declarations of Turkey caused suspicion about whether Turkey had some Pan-Turkist aims in the region.²⁶³ The Turkic Republics were in fact aiming to conduct equal relationships by Turkey and did not want an "elder brother."²⁶⁴ Another factor that diminished the attractiveness of the Turkish model for the Turkic Republics was the model's own shortcomings. Turkey, as a middle-income country, lacked the financial capacity to aid the Central Asian Republics on a grand scale.²⁶⁵ These republics' needs were exceeding the capabilities of Turkey. The Turkic Republics realized that Turkey has its own economic, political, ethnic and religious problems. The high inflation rates, budgetary deficits, interruptions in democracy, as well as Kurdish separatism and Alawite dissatisfaction showed that the Turkish model has some weaknesses. As a result, the Turkic Republics decided to adopt only the good parts of the model and began to look other possible models such as the Malaysian and Chinese.²⁶⁶ Furthermore, Turkey's stress on its good relations with the West and its possible role as a 'bridge' between the West and the Turkic Republics lost its attraction. The continual rejection of Turkey from the European Community made Turkey's role as a 'bridge' meaningless. Moreover, especially after the discovery of the region's

²⁶² Igor Torbakov, "Ankara's Post-Soviet Efforts in the Caucasus and Central Asia: The Failure of the 'Turkic World' Model", *Eurasia Insight*, 26.12.2002, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav122602.shtml> (23.06.2008).

²⁶³ For Idris Bal, the suspicion of Turkey's pan-Turkist inclinations in the region disturbed not only the Turkic Republics, but also the West and the US. See Bal, *Türk Cumhuriyetleri'nin Önemi*, p. 338.

²⁶⁴ Öniş, p. 68.

²⁶⁵ Öniş, p. 68.

²⁶⁶ Bal, *The Turkish Model*, p. 11.

potential as an energy supplier and the influx of international oil companies to the region, the states of the region began to contact intensely with the outer world, especially with the West. Thus, they noticed that they could deal with the West directly rather than using Turkey as an agent.²⁶⁷ The democratic character of Turkish model, despite its defects, was also having a problem for the authorian leaders of these republics and their well-entrenched authoritarian political structures.²⁶⁸

2.2.2. The Iranian Model in Competition

When Turkey presented its model as a roadmap for the post-Soviet states, it was not without rivals. Because of their historical, cultural, and religious affinities with the region, Turkey and Iran emerged as the important players and potential rivals in Central Asia. What were the Turkish and Iranian models offering to the newly emerged republics of the region and what were their strengths in comparison to each other? Turkey represented a modern, democratic nation-state with market oriented economy and multiparty democracy. Turkey and the Central Asian Republics were belonging to common religious sect. The majority of the populations of the Central Asian Republics-except Azerbaijan- are Sunni Muslims whereas Iran is a Shiite state. Even Azerbaijan, whose majority of the population is Shiites, has closer relations with Turkey than Iran. Common language was another strength of Turkey in the region. However, Turkey had no contiguous border with the Central Asia. Thus, geographical proximity, the main disadvantage of Turkey, constituted the main superiority of Iran.²⁶⁹ Besides the geographical proximity, Iran had another important advantage, owing to its energy revenues; it had the necessary hard currency that the states of the region were in urgent need of. Turkey lacked such a hard currency but it had more expertise than Iran in the fields of industry and manufacturing.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁷ Yelda Demirağ, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Türkiye'nin Orta Asya Siyasetinde Geline Nokta", **Jeopolitik**, Vol:5, http://www.jeopolitik.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=22&Itemid=28 (30.11.2008)

²⁶⁸ Öniş, p. 69.

²⁶⁹ Kemal Karpat, **Türkiye ve Orta Asya**, İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, 2003, p. 315.

²⁷⁰ Anthony Hyman, "Moving Out of Moscow's Orbit: The Outlook for Central Asia", **International Affairs**, Vol.69, No.2, April 1993, pp. 298-299.

Iranian model represented the Islamic alternative with strong anti-Western character. Yet, on the contrary of the Western foresights, religion was not an effective tool in Iran's relations with the region. The model of Iran was unacceptable for the secular leaders of the region.²⁷¹ Although Islam played an important role in the self-identification process of the Turkic Republics, their religiosity is very moderate.²⁷² Actually, all of the Muslim Republics emphasized their secular nature after the independence. The leaders of the region perceive fundamentalist Islam as a threat to their regime and impose tight controls on Islamic parties and some other Islamic formations.²⁷³ Another reason that undermined the advance of Iran in the region was the anti-Western character of the Iranian model. The newly emerged Turkic Republics, in an urgent need of aid and assistance, did want to establish good relations with the West and the U.S. Therefore, the so-called Iranian model was not attractive for the Central Asian states. In addition, the lack of Western support diminished the chance of the model. When Turkey and Iran appeared as rival models for these republics in their search for a path for political and economic transformation, the West took part alongside Turkey. The West, especially the United States, feared that Iran could penetrate to the region and export its radical Islamic regime to the Central Asian Republics. As a result, from the beginning, the West became the main supporter of Turkey in the region. Without the consent of the West and the U.S. –the main donors of the Republics which were in need of economic and political support- it was very hard for Iran to extend its model.

2.2.3 The Chinese Model of Gradual Change

A third model can be mentioned here, besides the Iranian and Turkish models. The Chinese model, namely, 'central planning propped up by market' was also appealing for the region's republics.²⁷⁴ The China model has two components:

²⁷¹ Karasac, p. 22.

²⁷² Bal, *The Turkish Model*, p. 7.

²⁷³ Pls. See Hunter, *Post Independence*, pp. 297-300.

²⁷⁴ Sönmezoglu, p. 732.

*“to copy successful elements of liberal economic policy by opening up much of the economy to foreign and domestic investment, allowing labour flexibility, keeping the tax and regulatory burden low, and creating a first-class infrastructure through a combination of private sector and state spending. The second part is to permit the ruling party to retain a firm grip on government, the courts, the army, the internal security apparatus, and the free flow of information.”*²⁷⁵

The leaders of the region, who wanted to reform economically without doing so politically, paid attention to the Chinese model. For instance, Uzbekistan’s president Islam Karimov occasionally claimed that “China might be a better model than that of the West.”²⁷⁶ The democratic component of the Turkish model was not so attractive for Central Asian leaders since they “didn’t have much interest in fostering broader political participation and pluralism.”²⁷⁷

“Neither Turkey, Iran, nor any other country has emerged as the dominant influence in these regions.”²⁷⁸ It was difficult for all the Turkic Republics to gather around a single model. Actually, the Turkic Republics were not a single definable group; all had different strengths, different vulnerabilities and different priorities. Moreover, it was not easy for them to put an end to the centuries-long economic and political dependency first to Russian Empire then to Soviet Union. Thus, Central Asian Republics have tried to keep all doors open by conducting good relations with all notable countries of the world such as the U.S., Turkey, Iran, Germany, Japan, and China and at the same time, they have abstained from injuring Moscow.²⁷⁹ Their overriding concern was ‘not to import a new ideology, but to develop the broadest possible economic and infrastructural ties with the world at large.’²⁸⁰ As a result, they established their own models by utilizing from all available models. According

²⁷⁵ Rowan Callick, "The China Model", **The American**, November/December 2007, <http://www.american.com/archive/2007/november-december-magazine-contents/the-china-model> (23.06.2008).

²⁷⁶ Forsythe, p. 26.

²⁷⁷ Igor Torbakov, "Ankara’s Post-Soviet Efforts in the Caucasus and Central Asia: The Failure of the ‘Turkic World’ Model”, *Eurasia Insight*, 26.12.2002, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav122602.shtml> (23.06.2008).

²⁷⁸ Hunter, *Ten Years After Independence*, p. 4.

²⁷⁹ Karpat, pp. 309-311.

²⁸⁰ Gordon Feller, “Turkey’s New Government Looking Again to the Caucasus and Central Asia”, *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, December 1997, <http://www.wrmea.com/backissues/1297/9712026.html> (24.06.2008).

to Hunter, the model that has been developed in Central Asia since independence can be entitled as ‘secular authoritarianism at the political level and market-orientation at the economic level.’²⁸¹ Yet, if it is necessary to group the Turkic Republics in terms of their closeness to Turkish model, it can be said that Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan has come closer to the Turkish model more.²⁸²

2.3. DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS: FROM UTOPIC ACTIVISM TO POLITICAL REALISM

Turkey’s relations with Central Asia have not progressed in the same direction. The relations that began over-enthusiastically have continued more realistically. According to Hikmet Çetin, it is possible to study Turkey’s relations with the region in three periods: In the period 1991-1995, Turkey’s demand to be an elder brother for Central Asia failed; after 1995 the relations became more equal and continued on the basis of reciprocal interests; yet as from 2001 Turkey’s influence in the region has diminished as a result of the increasing power of the regional actors. This is the consequence of the US’ return to the region, Putin’s coming to the power in Russia as a dynamic and single-minded leader, the indifference of Justice and Development government towards the region, and the decline of relations at the head of state level.²⁸³

2.3.1. 1991-1993: The Activist Period

Turkey immediately recognized the ex-Soviet Republics-Azerbaijan on November 9 and the rest on December 16- after they formally departed from the Russian Federation. In the early months, Turkey’s policy toward the region was restricted to the establishment formal ties, the development of infrastructural links,

²⁸¹ Hunter, Post-Independence, p. 299.

²⁸² Sönmezoğlu, p. 732.

²⁸³ Hikmet Çetin,

[http://busam.beykent.edu.tr/\(X\(1\)S\(ax2g5o45pg1nm045zxgwbp45\)\)/sayfagoster.aspx?sayfa=26&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1](http://busam.beykent.edu.tr/(X(1)S(ax2g5o45pg1nm045zxgwbp45))/sayfagoster.aspx?sayfa=26&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1) (05.12.2008).

and provision of aid and finance.²⁸⁴ In the course of time, an extensive network of political, economic, and cultural ties has developed between Ankara and Central Asia.²⁸⁵ The first upper level visits to the region were realized by Turkey and the officials of the republics conducted their first visits to Ankara. There are nearly 500 bilateral and multilateral agreements between Turkey and the CAR.²⁸⁶ From the early days, Turkey has tried to support and assist the Turkic Republics in many fields. It wished to be a 'gateway' to the West and has worked to open the doors of the international organizations and Western institutions for the Central Asian States such as the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, and the NATO Cooperation Council.²⁸⁷ Through the regional organizations, such as the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), Turkey contributed to the cooperation and stability of the region. It offered technical assistance of various kinds to the new republics. Turkish officials contributed to the training of Central Asian diplomats, administrators, managers, religious personnel, banking experts, and military officials, etc.²⁸⁸ Turkey has established some important institutions in order to institutionalize its ties with the region and conduct its relations in a regular and systematic way. In this context, we can mention three main institutions: TİKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency), the Turkish Eximbank, and TURKSOY (The Joint Administration of Turkic Arts and Culture).²⁸⁹

TİKA was established in 1992 as an agency dependent on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but later connected to Prime Ministry in 1999.²⁹⁰ It became a legal personality in 2001.²⁹¹ TİKA aims to aid the countries-especially the Turkic Republics and neighbor states- that are on the way of development; and to improve

²⁸⁴ Philip Robins, "Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey's Policy Toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States", **The Middle East Journal**, Vol: 47, No:4, Autumn 1993, p. 602.

²⁸⁵ Winrow, Turkey's Relations, p. 135.

²⁸⁶ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/Bolgeler/OrtaAsya/OrtaAsyalliskiler/ (08.11.2007).

²⁸⁷ Kramer, p. 3.

²⁸⁸ Winrow, Turkey's Relations, p. 135.

²⁸⁹ Sönmezoğlu, p. 731.

²⁹⁰ <http://www.tika.gov.tr/TR/Icerik.ASP?ID=22> (07.03.2008).

²⁹¹ Aydın, Kafkasya ve Orta Asya, p. 382.

the cooperation and bilateral economic, commercial, technical, social, cultural, and educational relations through the various projects and programmes.²⁹²

In the economic and financial field, the Turkish Eximbank is very important. The Turkish Eximbank was established in 1992 with an aim to contribute to the financing of Turkish investments and export that go towards Central Asia. It also gives loans to the republics of the region. The total amount of credits that have offered to the Central Asian Republics by Turkey is nearly \$1.2 billion and the trade volume of Turkey with the region has reached \$3 billion. There are nearly 1 thousand Turkish firms that are active in the region.²⁹³ The trade and investments of Turkey and Turkish firms in the region will keep on increasing as Turkey enters into international energy consortia and takes part in pipeline projects.

TURKSOY was established by the joint efforts of the Ministry of Culture and Ministry of National Education and is active in the fields of education and culture. Developing our cultural ties with the region is the primary aim of TURKSOY. For this aim, TURKSOY has made efforts for the transition of the Central Asian Republics to Latin alphabet, and for the opening of Turkish cultural centres and Turkish schools in the region.²⁹⁴

Beginning from 1992, bilateral relations between the Turkic Republics and Turkey have developed in many fields. Turkey's most impressive effort in the region has been in the field of infrastructure. In these four areas of infrastructure, Turkey has been most active: transport, oil and gas pipelines, telecommunications, and human resources.²⁹⁵ Since Turkey does not have geographical contiguity with Turkic Republics-except Azerbaijan- establishing aerial, railway, and land route links with the region have been essential for Turkey. In May 1992, Turkish Airlines (THY) began direct, scheduled flights between Central Asian capitals and Turkey. Turkey also tried to establish a rail network across the republics.²⁹⁶ Telecommunications was

²⁹² <http://www.tika.gov.tr/TR/Icerik.ASP?ID=23> (07.03.2008).

²⁹³ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/Bolgeler/OrtaAsya/OrtaAsyaIliskiler/ (09.03.2008).

²⁹⁴ Sönmezoğlu, pp. 731-732.

²⁹⁵ Robins, p. 604.

²⁹⁶ Robins, p. 604.

another infrastructural area that Turkey assisted the Turkic Republics. The Turkish subsidiary of Canada's Northern Telekom, NETAS, installed a digital switch in Azerbaijan in October 1992, the first digital switch installed in the former Soviet Union territories. General Directorate of Post, Telegraph, and Telephone (PTT) of Turkey developed the phone systems of the Central Asian Republics.²⁹⁷ In October 1992, Turkey established the first digital telephone exchange in Baku and donated a line of 2500 subscribers.²⁹⁸ TRT began broadcasting in the region by "Avrasya TV" channel (later it became TRT-Türk).²⁹⁹

For Turkey, the area of human resources was also very crucial to reinforcing long-term links with the region.³⁰⁰ Turkey made significant endeavors in the field of culture and education. It undertook great efforts to make the Central Asian Republics change their official script from the Cyrillic alphabet to the Latin alphabet. The agreement was reached for this in principle in 1993, but it has not achieved by all of the Turkic Republics in practice yet, due to the resistance of ethnic Russians living in these republics.³⁰¹ On December 25, 1991, Azerbaijan abandoned Cyrillic alphabet and accepted the Latin alphabet.³⁰² Up to now, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have also adopted the Latin alphabet but Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan still hesitates to do so.³⁰³ With the independence of the Turkic Republics, Turkey initiated a cultural reorientation policy and began to use educational exchange as a foreign policy tool.³⁰⁴ Turkey, either by inviting students, especially at the university level through a project labeled as "Great Student Exchange Project" or by establishing educational institutions in Central Asia, has tried to reinforce Turkish culture and language in the

²⁹⁷ Robins, p. 606.

²⁹⁸ Nazım Cafersoy, **Elçibey Dönemi Azerbaycan Dış Politikası**, Avrasya Bir Vakfı Yayınları, Ankara, 2001, p. 126.

²⁹⁹ Sönmezoğlu, p. 734.

³⁰⁰ Robins, p. 606.

³⁰¹ Kramer, p. 5.

³⁰² TİKA, "Azerbaycan Ülke Raporu", http://www.tika.gov.tr/yukle/dosyalar/ULKERAPORLARI/Azerbaycan_UlkeRaporu.pdf (11.02.2008), p. 8.

³⁰³ Sinor, p. 17. Yet, in October 2006, Kazakh leader expressed their will to replace Cyrillic script with Latin. See Marat Yermukanov, "Kazakhstan and Turkey Spearhead Integration Of Turkic Nations", Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol: 3, No: 226, 07.12. 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32300 (24.06.2008).

³⁰⁴ Lerna Yanik, "The Politics of Educational Exchange: Turkish Education in Eurasia", **Europe-Asia Studies**, Vol: 56, No: 2, March 2004, p. 293.

region. In fact, Turkey regarded educational exchange programmes as an investment to Turkish culture for yielding the elites that would be in charge of the transformation of their countries to 'Turkish model', namely, to market-oriented economy and democracy.³⁰⁵ To express by Sedat Laçiner's words, these students were regarded by Turkey as the 'building stones of the future.'³⁰⁶ Through the "Great Student Exchange Project" Turkish Ministry of National Education has granted scholarships to nearly 18.000 students coming from Central Asian Republics.³⁰⁷ In order to manage the scholarships and student traffic, Ministry of National Education established the 'Development of Overseas Education' in May 1992 within the ministry.³⁰⁸ The aim of strengthening collective Turkic identity in Central Asia is not only pursued by official Turkish institutions; certain private entrepreneurs and various foundations such as the ones that have ties with Fetullah Gülen have contributed to the promotion of Turkish culture by establishing schools in the region. Turkey, either by state or by private institutions, has established many primary and secondary schools as well as universities. Ahmed Yesevi Turk-Kazakh International University in Kazakhstan gives education since 1992³⁰⁹ and Kyrgyzstan-Turkey Manas University in Kyrgyzstan gives education since 1995.³¹⁰

In the field of religion, Turkey, despite stressing its secularity as a model, nevertheless has tried to cooperate with the states of the region. It sent religious material, and offered to train the religious functionary in these republics. In care of The Presidency of Religious Affairs, Turkey constructed mosques and cultural centers in all of the Turkic Republics; and opened Theology Faculties in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.³¹¹

³⁰⁵ Yanik, p. 294.

³⁰⁶ Sedat Laçiner, "Orta Asya ve Türkiye", **Usak Stratejik Gündem**, 18.05.2005, <http://www.usakgundem.com/yazarlar.php?id=43&type=3> (19.02.2008).

³⁰⁷ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/Bolgeler/OrtaAsya/OrtaAsyaAlliskiler/ (09.03.2008).

Yet, Turkey has taken serious criticisms for not paying the scholarships in time, for providing inadequate grants, for choosing the students randomly, etc. As a result of economic and certain political reasons, there is a general decline in the number of students that come Turkey from the Turkic Republics. For instance, while there were 9.545 students in 1997, there were 5.651 students in 2002. Yanik, pp. 295-296.

³⁰⁸ Yanik, p. 295.

³⁰⁹ <http://www.yesevi.edu.tr/#> (05.01.2009).

³¹⁰ <http://www.manas.kg/index.php> (05.01.2009).

³¹¹ Aydın, Kafkasya ve Orta Asya, pp. 386-387.

In the economic field, the region has presented Turkey lucrative opportunities for economic cooperation and economic benefits. Turkish businessmen and investors realized the potential of the region much earlier than the state institutions and Central Asia has become an important market for the Turkish industry and business. Especially in the construction sector, Turkish firms are very active in the region. They are engaged in many projects like building modern hotels, airports, or industrial plants. Turkey's trade is intense also in the textile sector. However, Russia is still the main trading partner of the Central Asian States.³¹²

Besides the economic and cultural supports, Turkey also tries to contribute the stability and security in the region. In terms of fighting against radical movements, terrorism, drug and arms trafficking, etc. it cooperates with the republics of the region and supplies them financial and material aid and military training.³¹³ It is essential to mention two important regional organizations that began to work with the initiatives of Turkey: BSEC and ECO. These organizations try to contribute economic and political stability in the region.

2.3.2. 1993 to the Present: The Triumph of Political Realism

Two events created disappointment in Turkey about its limits in Central Asia and started the realistic period in Turkey's relations with the region. While Feller and Hunter point out the overthrown of Azerbaijan's pro-Turkish President Elchibey in June 1993 as a turning point, Winrow emphasizes an earlier signal, the first Turkic Summit as the beginning of a more cautious and realistic line in Turkish foreign policy toward Central Asia.³¹⁴

The Turkic summits (The Summit of Turkic-Speaking Countries) have a special place in Turkey-Central Asian relations. The first of these Turkic Summits

³¹² Kramer, p. 4.

³¹³ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/Bolgeler/OrtaAsya/OrtaAsyalliskiler/ (09.03.2008).

³¹⁴ See Gordon Feller, "Turkey's New Government Looking Again to the Caucasus and Central Asia", Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, December 1997, <http://www.wrmea.com/backissues/1297/9712026.html> (09.03.2008); Hunter, Bridge or Frontier; Gareth M. Winrow, "Turkey and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus", *Meria Journal*, Vol: 1, No: 2, July 1997 (The Transcaucasus).

was held in Ankara on October 30-31, 1992. The presidents of Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan joined to the summit. Tajikistan, although being invited, could not participate in because of the civil war in the country. The first Turkic Summit, even if it began with great enthusiasm, turned into a disappointment for Turkey. Turkish officials intended to sign a Political Declaration, an Economic Declaration, and a Press Release at the end of the summit. In the opening statement, the then President Özal declared that the 21st century would be the century of Turks, and proposed the establishment of a Turkic Common Market and a Turkic Development and Investment Bank. He also tried to get guarantee about the future pipeline projects. However, the assertive statements and suggestions of Turkish officials frightened the leaders of the Turkic Republics, maybe except for the leader of Azerbaijan, AbulfazElchibey.³¹⁵

At the end, a single document, Ankara Declaration was signed, which mentioned the need for cooperation in various fields but did not include any of the Turkish proposals. The Central Asian heads of state refused the establishment of a Turkic Common Market and a Turkic Development and Investment Bank. Moreover, Kazak leader Nazarbayev opposed the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and all of the leaders-except for Turkish and Azeri leaders- hesitated to bring up any subject about the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In consequence, at the end of the summit, it was understood that the states of the region were in fact wanting to develop closer relations with all other states rather than undertaking such big commitments to Turkey. More importantly, these republics were still more or less dependent on Russian Federation for economic and military support, and were very careful not to annoy Moscow. As a result, Turkey went over its Central Asian policy and understood that it should adopt realistic policies.³¹⁶

Yet, the disappointment created by the first Turkic Summit did not cease the relations. The region was visited by the President Turgut Özal in April 1993, and in October 1994 the then President Suleyman Demirel visited Turkmenistan and laid

³¹⁵ Aydın, *Kafkasya ve Orta Asya*, pp. 388-389.

³¹⁶ Aydın, *Kafkasya ve Orta Asya*, pp. 389-390.

the foundation of the project that would transport Turkmen gas to Europe through Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey pipeline route. The second Turkic Summit was going to gather in Baku in January 1994, but because of the death of Özal and the sensitivity of Turkic leaders about not to seem as supporting Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia and thus not to take the reactions of Moscow, the second summit gathered in Istanbul in October 1994.³¹⁷ It was more successful. The leaders came to terms about the regular meetings of their ministries of foreign affairs, education, and culture. The declaration announced in the end determined the leaders' positive views about the transportation of the region's oil and gas via Turkey to Europe. Moreover, this time, they called Armenia to withdraw from the territories it had occupied.³¹⁸ The Third Turkic Summit assembled in Bishkek in August 1995. In Bishkek Summit, the leaders agreed on to increase economic cooperation and form joint projects especially in the field of energy. Yet, the Bishkek Declaration also expressed support to the cooperation efforts of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in economic and military spheres; but, interestingly, this cooperation process did not involve Turkey. For instance, one month before the Bishkek Summit, these three states started the operation of a 'Central Asian Bank for Economic Cooperation and Development.'³¹⁹

The leaders of the Turkic-speaking countries have continued to convene but not with regular intervals. The fourth of Turkic Summits was held in October 1996 in Tashkent and the fifth Turkic Summit assembled in June 1998 in Astana. Azerbaijan became the host of the sixth summit of Heads of Turkic States in April 2000. The participants signed the Baku Declaration in the end. In the 6th Turkic Summit, the main issue was the transportation of Caspian energy resources to the world markets.³²⁰ The leaders of Turkic speaking countries held the 7th Turkic Summit in April 2001 in Istanbul. In the meeting, the main issues were the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline project and the dangers posed by terrorism, political violence and drug

³¹⁷ Sönmezoğlu, p. 735.

³¹⁸ Sönmezoğlu, p. 735.

³¹⁹ Winrow, *Turkey's Relations*, pp. 136-137.

³²⁰ "Outcomes of the 6th Summit of Heads of Turkic States" <http://www.caspenergy.com/no4rus2.html> (12.03.2008).

smuggling, etc.³²¹ The last Turkic Summit assembled on November 17, 2006 in Antalya after a five-year interval. In the last Turkic Summit, the leaders tried to establish a concrete ground for cooperation in many fields and signed a declaration committing the Turkic states to strengthen economic and energy transport ties, to fight together against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and all organize crimes. The participants also supported the settlement of Nogorno-Karabakh conflict. They also negotiated energy security, possible energy transport routes and stressed the importance of the opening of Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline.³²²

These summits contribute to the development of relations and cooperation in various fields. Besides being a forum for discussion, they provide significant indications for inter-state relations. Unfortunately, the last summit became a signal for Turkey about its policies towards the region. To the summit, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan joined at presidency level. However, Turkmenistan sent its envoy to Ankara and Uzbekistan did not attend the summit because of Turkey's support for the United Nations' negative report about human rights violations in Uzbekistan. This incomplete participation demonstrated the problems in Turkey's Central Asian policy.

The relations between Turkey and the Turkic Republics have evolved different than the two sides had imagined. Turkey could not become a leader in the region, and the Central Asian Republics could not obtain sufficient aid that they hoped from Turkey. Turkey realized the impossibility of acting in the region despite Russia, as the Central Asian Republics understood the impossibility of getting out Russian orbit completely. In the course of time, the policies of Turkey towards the region has become more measured and calculated. Similarly, the policies of the region's republics have become more balanced and multi-directional. The main reason that prevented the determination and execution of realistic policies towards the region in the early period was the lack of sufficient knowledge about the region.

³²¹ "Turkic Summit in Istanbul", 26.04.2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1297478.stm> (12.03.2008).

³²² Mevlut Katik, "Spirit of Cooperation Dominates Turkic Summit", 20.11.2006 <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav112006.shtml> (12.03.2008).

Turkey was psychologically, theoretically, and institutionally unprepared to such a drastic change in the international environment. Turkish republic, with the aim of Westernization and with the concern of not to revive pan-Turkist inclinations, had been indifferent to the region. Thus, at the time, Turkey lacked the essential institutions that were able to analyze the new environment and produce necessary policies to conduct healthy relations with the states of the region. Moreover, in the Cold War conditions, since any interest towards Central Asia was regarded as sympathy to the communist ideology, in the 1990s, there were not enough experts that were specialized in the region. Central Asia, a region that was politically and strategically forgotten, suddenly sat on the centre of the Turkish agenda in the 1991. As a result, Turkey's early reactions towards the region were instantaneous, nostalgic and emotional. Turkish leaders' vigorous declarations created big expectations in the Central Asian Republics most of which were not realized.³²³

In the second half of the 1990s, it was understood that the possibility of Turkey being a model and a bridge for the Turkic Republics was little. According to Kramer's evaluations, Turkey's activities in Central Asia put it in a special position in terms of cultural and scientific relations with the Turkic Republics, but these were insufficient to supply Turkey a politically dominant position in the region.³²⁴ As a result, Turkey has left with an important cultural and economic role; but without much real political power.

2.4 TURKEY'S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE TURKIC REPUBLICS

In general, the main points of Turkey's foreign policy towards the region are: contributing to the strengthening of the region's republics' state structures; supporting their economic and political reforms; encouraging regional cooperation and maintaining the stability and security of the region; helping these countries to integrate to the world and to the Euro-Atlantic institutions; developing equal bilateral relations with the states of the region; and supporting the transport of the region's

³²³ Davutoğlu, pp. 488-489.

³²⁴ Kramer, pp. 5-6.

energy resources to the world markets freely and through different routes.³²⁵ Yet, since they are not a single unified group, Ankara has developed different types of relations with each of the Turkic Republics.

2.4.1 Azerbaijan

On December 18, 1991 Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union and on November 9, Turkey became the first country that recognized Azerbaijan as an independent sovereign state. It is clear that Azerbaijan has a special place for Turkey among the Turkic Republics. In the post-Soviet period, Turkey has attributed a special importance to Azerbaijan and put it at the centre of its Transcaucasus policy. In the same way, Azerbaijan regarded Turkey as the closest fellow state and tried to strengthen its ties with Turkey. This special closeness was related to historical, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural ties between two nations.³²⁶ Among the Turkic Republics, Azerbaijan is the geographically most proximate country to Turkey and the languages of the two nations are very similar. For Turkey, it is a gateway to Central Asia. Moreover, Azerbaijan and Turkey regard each other as strategic allies.³²⁷ Turkey has always supported Azerbaijan's independence and has stood by Azerbaijan in Azeri-Armenian conflict.

³²⁵ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr> (08.11.2007).

³²⁶ Cafersoy, p. 121.

³²⁷ "Turkey Azerbaijan Relations: Erdoğan Meets Aliyev", **Turkish Weekly**, 06.06.2008, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/55955/turkey-azerbaijan-relations-erdogan-meets-aliyev.html> (07.06.2008).

Figure 4. Map of Azerbaijan



Source: <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/europe/azerbaijan/> (23.01.2009).

Immediately after the independence of Azerbaijan, the two states began to assign close relations in many fields. Although the first president of Azerbaijan, Ayaz Muttalibov, had pursued a Russian-sided foreign policy, the efforts of founding good relations with Turkey were carried on at the same time. In March 1992, Muttalibov resigned by force and in the subsequent elections, Ebulfez Elchibey, the leader of Azerbaijan National Front, was elected as the president of Azerbaijan. The election of Elchibey as the president became a turning point in the Azerbaijan-Turkey relations and Turkey was seated in a special position of Azerbaijan's foreign policy.³²⁸ Elchibey many times stressed the importance of Turkey for Azerbaijan by saying that "Turkey would occupy a chief place in Azerbaijan's foreign policy."³²⁹ He was a Turkish nationalist and admirer of Atatürk and he stated in many speeches that Azerbaijan accepted the Turkish model.³³⁰ Elchibey attracted attention by his anti-communist, anti-Russian attitude, his Turkish and Western-sided manner, and

³²⁸ Cafersoy, pp. 122-123.

³²⁹ Cafersoy, p. 123.

³³⁰ Cafersoy, p. 124.

his desire to develop closer relations with the Azeris of Iran. The anti-Russian stand of Azerbaijan during Elchibey's presidency was obvious. For instance, Elchibey refused to ratify the CIS accession treaty that was signed in the previous presidency. In terms of the utilization and transportation of Azeri oil, Elchibey supported the Western/Turkish projects. Turkey and Azerbaijan signed various agreements during Elchibey period including the draft agreement of Baku-Ceyhan project that signed in March 1993.³³¹

Elchibey removed from presidency on March 4th 1993 through a coup. Although Turkey declared its support to Elchibey, it avoided from any interference since it did not want to quarrel with Russian Federation, which was behind the coup. Moreover, it can be said that Elchibey's radical Turkist speeches, which annoyed Russia, Iran and other Turkic Republics, also disturbed certain sections of Turkish administration. Elchibey was replaced by Haydar Aliyev, an old member of Soviet Politburo, and Turkey's position in Azerbaijan politics experienced a decline until February 1994, when Aliyev turned towards Turkey and the West as a result of the lack of Russian support to Azerbaijan in Azeri-Armenian conflict.³³² In the first years of Aliyev's presidency, Azerbaijan displayed a pro-Russian foreign policy. He approved joining in CIS, and signed a Common Security Agreement with Russian Federation. However, Aliyev refused the deployment of Russian troops in Azerbaijan.³³³

From time to time, there occurred some problems between Turkey and Azerbaijan. For instance, in 1995, it was understood that some Turkish citizens took part in the planning of a coup that aimed to replace Aliyev with Elchibey and this created problems in the bilateral relations. The short-term coldness in bilateral relations in the initial period of Aliyev's presidency had been gradually overcome by means of numerous visits. The May 1997 visit of Aliyev to Ankara is worth mentioning. During this visit of Aliyev, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed 7 agreements including "Strategic Partnership Declaration." According to this declaration, Aliyev

³³¹ Sönmezoğlu, pp. 710-711.

³³² Cafersoy, pp. 131-133.

³³³ Sönmezoğlu, p. 712.

accepted the marketing of Azeri oil through Turkish territory and both states decided to condemn Armenia for its attitude about Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. After this visit, Aliyev began to support Baku-Ceyhan project openly.³³⁴

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has constituted an important dimension of political relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan from the beginning. Nagorno-Karabakh, a region with 70 per cent Armenian population, was an autonomous region that was tied to Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic in the Soviet era. When the Soviet Union entered into the dissolution process, Nagorno-Karabakh wanted to unite with Armenia but it was rejected by Azerbaijan. Beginning from 1998, the tension between the Azeris and Armenians had increased and after the independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1991, it turned into an open war. In 1993-94, Armenia, with the help of Russian Federation, got a corridor and obtained the direct land tie with Nagorno-Karabakh. Still, the 20 percent of Azeri territories is under the occupation of Armenia. At the beginning, Turkey wanted to act as a neutral mediator between the parties. It tried to attract the attention of the international community to the conflict. In 1992, OSCE established the Minsk Group, which consists of 11 countries including Turkey, in order to discuss and solve the problem. However, as the war escalated, and the Azeris were killed by the Armenians, Turkey abandoned its neutrality and began to support Azerbaijan openly. Despite the efforts, the conflict has not been solved yet. It continues to influence Turkey's bilateral relations both with Azerbaijan and Armenia. Turkey stands by Azerbaijan in the conflict, and demands a just, peaceful, and lasting solution.³³⁵

Turkey and Azerbaijan has signed many bilateral agreements and protocols to improve economic and commercial relations. There are two agreements between Turkey and Azerbaijan on encouragement of investments and prevention of double taxation that lay the foundation of legal framework of bilateral economic relations.³³⁶ When we look foreign trade figures, in 2000, Turkey, with a share of 11 per cent,

³³⁴ Sönmezoğlu, pp. 712-713.

³³⁵ Aydın, *Kafkasya ve Orta Asya*, pp. 400-402.

³³⁶ TİKA, "Azerbaycan Ülke Raporu", http://www.tika.gov.tr/yukle/dosyalar/ULKERAPORLARI/Azerbaycan_UlkeRaporu.pdf (11.02.2008), p. 23.

became the second country that Azerbaijan conducted most of its imports. Actually, in the years 1997 and 1998, Turkey was the first country that Azerbaijan imported from. However, with the devaluation of Ruble in Russian Federation in 1998, Russian products obtained a price advantage in the Azeri market and the demand for Turkish products has declined relatively. As a result, since the 1999, Russia has a superiority in Azerbaijan's trade.³³⁷ Our trade volume with Azerbaijan has increased 40% on an average since 2003 and the trade balance is in Turkey's favour. Turkey's import from Azerbaijan has increased on a large scale by the realization of Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline project in May 2005.³³⁸

Azerbaijan, with its advantages for investment and commercial activity, is preferred by Turkish investors and businessmen. The primary sectors that attracted Turkish firms are energy, telecommunication, banking and insurance sector, food industry, education, textile, transportation, and building trade, etc. Turkish firms, with their experiences, play an important part in transformation of Azeri economy to market-oriented one.³³⁹ In the sectors other than energy, Turkey is the country that has realized the largest investment in Azerbaijan with a share of 45%. The sum of these investments is about \$ 2.5 billion. Also in the energy sector, Turkey exhibits an active policy and tries to participate in the projects regarding the investigation, development, operation, and transportation of Azeri oil and gas. Turkey's investments in energy sector has approximated \$ 2.5 billion.³⁴⁰ In the four of the twenty international consortiums that was established to date in order to run Azerbaijan's oil reserves, TPAO (Turkish Petroleum Corporation) has a share. (In Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli fields %6.75, in Shahdeniz field %9, in Kurdasi field %5, and

³³⁷ TİKA, "Azerbaycan Ülke Raporu",
http://www.tika.gov.tr/yukle/dosyalar/ULKERAPORLARI/Azerbaycan_UlkeRaporu.pdf
(11.02.2008), p. 24.

³³⁸

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/Bolgeler/Kafkasya/Azerbaycan/Azerbaycan_Ekonomik.htm
(06.03.2008).

³³⁹ TİKA, "Azerbaycan Ülke Raporu",
http://www.tika.gov.tr/yukle/dosyalar/ULKERAPORLARI/Azerbaycan_UlkeRaporu.pdf
(11.02.2008), p. 25.

³⁴⁰

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/Bolgeler/Kafkasya/Azerbaycan/Azerbaycan_Ekonomik.htm
(06.03.2008).

in Araz-Alov-Sark field %10 offshore).³⁴¹ Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan project, such an important project to be called as ‘The Project of the Century’ or ‘The Silkroad of the 21st Century’, occupies a significant place in bilateral economic relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey. In March 2001, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed an agreement for natural gas trade called as Sahdeniz project. Since July 2007, Azeri gas arrives at Erzurum-Horasan via Georgia.³⁴² The Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tblisi-Baku railway project designed to be finished at the end of 2008, is another project that will strengthen regional cooperation and the ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan by creating the shortest route for commercial traffic between Asia and Europe.³⁴³

2.4.2 Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is unique among the Central Asian Republics in terms of its geo-strategic, demographic, and socio-economic features. First, except for Azerbaijan, it is the only Central Asian state that has direct borders with the Russian Federation, namely, it is a gate to Central Asia for Russian Federation. Second, until 1970s, Kazakhstan was a state where titular nation consisted less than 50% of the population. Only after then, the disparity between the Russian and Kazakh populations in the country began to decline. Kazakhstan still has a huge Russian population, and as Zardykhan states, Kazakhstan’s domestic and foreign policies are largely affected by this reality. Third, Kazakhstan, formerly the most industrialized Central Asian state, was heavily affected in economic terms as a result of the collapse of the Union-wide industrial machine.³⁴⁴ Moreover, Kazakhstan is geographically the largest country among the Central Asian states. It has important oil reserves and other mineral and metal resources.

³⁴¹ TİKA, “Azerbaycan Ülke Raporu“, http://www.tika.gov.tr/yukle/dosyalar/ULKERAPORLARI/Azerbaycan_UlkeRaporu.pdf (11.02.2008), p. 25.

³⁴² <http://www.botas.gov.tr/projeler/projeler.asp#02> (06.03.2008).

³⁴³ Rovshan Ismayilov, “Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey: Building a Transportation Triumvirate?”, 07.02.2007, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav020707.shtml> (06.03.2008).

³⁴⁴ Zharmukhamed Zardykhan, "Russians in Kazakhstan and Demographic Change: Imperial Legacy and the Kazakh Way of Nation Building", *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol.5, No.1, February 2004, pp. 61, 66, 67.

Figure 5. Map of Kazakhstan



Source: <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/asia/kazakhstan/> (23.01.2009).

When Kazakhstan declared its independence, Turkey immediately recognized it. Since then, the two states try to develop their relations by reciprocal visits, and bilateral agreements. Turkey and Kazakhstan gives support to each other in regional and international organizations. Kazakhstan has been an active participant of Turkic Summits. Turkey and Kazakhstan also cooperate closely in Economic Cooperation Organization. Kazakhstan supports Turkey's United Nations Security Council temporary membership in 2009-2010 periods. In the same way, Turkey supported Kazakhstan's candidacy for term chairmanship in Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Kazakhstan took the chairmanship for 2010. Turkey also supports Kazakhstan's membership for the World Trade Organization (WTO).³⁴⁵ Yet, in Kazakhstan's political relations, the weight of Russian Federation is easily perceived. As a result of its considerable amount of Russian minority, Kazakhstan,

345

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/Bolgeler/OrtaAsya/KazakistanCumhuriyeti/Kazakistan_Siyasi.htm (06.03.2008).

sometimes reluctantly, stays within Russia's orbit. This special relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia also affects the development of Kazakhstan-Turkey relations.

Kazakhstan, both geographically and economically, is the biggest country in Central Asia. Although it was in a difficult position at the time of independence because of its economic weakness and ethnic structure, in comparison to other Central Asian Republics, it has followed a more successful political and economic policy. It has advanced in privatization and liberalization of the economy. The Kazakh economy grew about 9.4 percent in 2005, and 10.6 percent in 2006.³⁴⁶ In Kazakhstan's economy, energy and mining are the main sectors. Kazakhstan is second in the world in terms of uranium, chrome, lead, and zinc; it has also rich ore beds of copper, coal, aluminum and gold.³⁴⁷ It has important oil and gas reserves. According to BP Statistical Review, at the end of 2006, Kazakhstan's proved oil reserves are 39.8 billion barrels and proved natural gas reserves are 3.0 trillion cubic meters.³⁴⁸

Although Ankara-Astana relations have an important development potential, the relations are not at the desired level. First of all, in the energy field, the chances for cooperation have been seized by the Russian Federation. In 2006 Kazakhstan signed the agreement for the transportation of Kazakh oil by BTC pipeline project.³⁴⁹ Yet, in 2007, Kazakhstan declared that it would market its oil through Russia. This development has risked the pumping of Kazakh oil to BTC, and also negatively affected certain pipeline projects such as Nabucco.³⁵⁰ Since the independence of Kazakhstan, the trade between Turkey and Kazakhstan is increasing geometrically. In 2002, the trade volume between Ankara and Astana was only \$ 260 million. In

³⁴⁶ Sedat Laçiner, "Türkiye-Kazakistan İlişkileri", **Turkish Weekly**, 18.05.2007, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/turkce/yazarlar.php?type=3&id=255> (01.07.2008).

³⁴⁷ TİKA, "Kazakistan Ülke Raporu", http://www.tika.gov.tr/yukle/dosyalar/ULKERAPORLARI/Kazakistan_UlkeRaporu.pdf (11.02.2008), p. 11.

³⁴⁸ BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2007, [http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2007/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_ene](http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2007/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2007.pdf) rgy_full_report_2007.pdf (14.01.2008), p. 22.

³⁴⁹ "Kazakistan BTC için İmzayı Koydu", **Radikal**, 17.06.2006, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=190425> (10.06.2008).

³⁵⁰ Sedat Laçiner, "Türkiye-Kazakistan İlişkileri", **Turkish Weekly**, 18.05.2007, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/turkce/yazarlar.php?type=3&id=255> (01.07.2008).

2006, it was \$ 1.6 billion.³⁵¹ When it comes to investment figures, with nearly \$1.5 billion investment volume, Turkey is the fourth country after the U.S., South Korea, and United Kingdom that invests in Kazakhstan. According to 2004 Undersecretariat of Treasury data, Kazakhstan has been the fifth country that the Turkish capital has gone most.³⁵² Today, there are about 270 Turkish firms in Kazakhstan³⁵³, which are mainly active in construction and textile sectors.³⁵⁴ However, of Kazakhstan's total \$50 billion investment volume, Turkey's share accounts for only \$2 billion. Its share in Kazakhstan's total trade volume is about 1.2%, which is far from the Russian and Chinese shares.³⁵⁵ Today, Russian Federation is the main trade partner of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan also trades with China, Germany, and Ukraine.³⁵⁶

In short, the political and economic relations are not at desired level. According to Sedat Laçiner, the reasons are the diminishing political will of Turkey since the Özal's era, the lack of coordination and interest, the difficulties in transport, inadequate financial credits, and inefficient communications and information channels.³⁵⁷

2.4.3 Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan has some characteristics that distinguish it from other Turkic Republics. It has a considerable demographic superiority in comparison to other Central Asian Republics. In terms of geographical location, and cultural heritage, it is the centre of Central Asia. It has borders with every other Central Asian Republic. It is the leading military power of the region, the only country that has a manufacturing sector with a significant engineering component, and the only country that could

³⁵¹ Sedat Laçiner, "Türkiye-Kazakistan İlişkileri", **Turkish Weekly**, 18.05.2007, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/turkce/yazarlar.php?type=3&id=255> (01.07.2008).

³⁵² TİKA, "Kazakistan Ülke Raporu", p. 15.

³⁵³ Sedat Laçiner, "Türkiye-Kazakistan İlişkileri", **Turkish Weekly**, 18.05.2007, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/turkce/yazarlar.php?type=3&id=255> (01.07.2008).

³⁵⁴ Marat Yermukanov, "Kazakhstan and Turkey Spearhead Integration of Turkic Nations", **Eurasia Daily Monitor**, Vol:3, No:226, 07.12.2006 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32300 (24.06.2008).

³⁵⁵ Yermukanov.

³⁵⁶ TİKA, "Kazakistan Ülke Raporu", p. 13.

³⁵⁷ Sedat Laçiner, "Türkiye-Kazakistan İlişkileri", **Turkish Weekly**, 18.05.2007, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/turkce/yazarlar.php?type=3&id=255> (01.07.2008).

affect regional affairs, in this respect, the only one that could compete with Russia.³⁵⁸ According to Hyman, political stability of Central Asia depends on Uzbekistan remaining peaceful.³⁵⁹ Similarly, Cornell claims that the security of Eurasia is closely related to Uzbekistan, the only Central Asian state that follows an active and independent foreign policy.³⁶⁰ In comparison to other Central Asian states, Uzbekistan can act more independently from Moscow thanks to its advantages: it is the most populous country of Central Asia; it does not have a substantial amount of Russian minority, the majority of the population is ethnic Uzbeks; and it does not have direct borders with Russian Federation. Moreover, Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state that has its own army, an advantage that is reflected to its relations with neighbour countries.³⁶¹

Figure 6. Map of Uzbekistan



Source: <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/asia/uzbekistan/> (28.01.2009).

³⁵⁸ Michael Kort, **Central Asian Republics (Nations in Transition)**, Facts on File, New York, 2004, p. 112.

³⁵⁹ Hyman, p. 290.

³⁶⁰ Svante E. Cornell, "Uzbekistan: A Regional Player in Eurasian Geopolitics?", **European Security**, Vol.9, No.2, Summer 2000 (Uzbekistan), p. 115.

³⁶¹ Cornell, Uzbekistan, pp. 125, 127.

Uzbekistan regards itself as a regional power, and plays for the leadership among the Central Asian states.³⁶² It has relations with many considerable states such as the US, Germany, Israel, China, etc. It tries to become free from Moscow's domination but does not turn its back to Russia. Because of its central geographical position and its military capacity, after the September 11 attacks, Uzbekistan cooperated with many states in the context of fighting with terrorism. It also developed close relations with the US in the Afghanistan operation and assigned US a military base. Yet, after the Andican events, the US-Uzbekistan relations began to deteriorate. As a result of Uzbek government's demand, in November 2005, the US evacuated the Hanabad military base that was rented by the US in 2001 to support the military operation in Afghanistan.³⁶³

The foreign policy of Uzbekistan is mainly based on developing relations with international organizations that have economic focus. In the Uzbek foreign policy, economic considerations exceed the political and military considerations. It can be said that the main reason for Uzbekistan to join SCO is economic. Moreover, Uzbekistan aims to expand collective security and stability in the region. It is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme. The SCO, CIS, Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), ECO, and GUUAM are some regional organizations and alliances that Uzbekistan is a member of.³⁶⁴

In comparison to other Central Asian Republics, Uzbekistan emerges as a dynamic economy in the region due to its population, its industrial base inherited from the Soviet era, and its natural resources.³⁶⁵ Uzbekistan has considerable reserves of natural gas, oil, coal, gold, uranium, copper, silver and some other metals such as lead, zinc, tungsten, and lithium.³⁶⁶ It is the world's fifth largest cotton

³⁶² Cornell, Uzbekistan, p. 126.

³⁶³ "ABD Özbekistan Üssü'nü Boşalttı", 22.11.2005, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2005/11/051122_uzbek_base.shtml (11.02.2008).

³⁶⁴ TİKA, "Özbekistan Ülke Raporu", http://www.tika.gov.tr/yukle/dosyalar/ULKERAPORLARI/Ozbekistan_UlkeRaporu.pdf (11.02.2008), pp. 23-24.

³⁶⁵ TİKA, "Özbekistan Ülke Raporu", http://www.tika.gov.tr/yukle/dosyalar/ULKERAPORLARI/Ozbekistan_UlkeRaporu.pdf (11.02.2008), p. 26.

³⁶⁶ Kort, p. 117.

producer and second largest cotton exporter.³⁶⁷ It is the ninth largest gold producer in the world.³⁶⁸ According to BP Statistical Review of June 2007, the proven oil reserves of Uzbekistan is about 0.6 billion barrels. Its proved natural gas reserves are 66.01 tcf.³⁶⁹ Although Uzbekistan's gas and oil deposits do not match the deposits of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, its reserves are enough to meet its own energy needs, and there remains important amount of gas to export.³⁷⁰

Uzbekistan became independent on September 1, 1991 and recognized by Turkey on December 16, 1991. In regard to Uzbekistan-Turkey relations, it can be said that bilateral relations between the two countries have often been 'rocky.' There are some problems in political relations. One of the main problems has been opening the doors of Turkey to certain Uzbek opposition leaders. The granting of asylum by Turkey to Muhammed Solih, the leader of Erk movement which was prohibited, disturbed the relations. In mid-1994, Uzbekistan recalled its ambassador to Turkey and from time to time, it has also recalled the Uzbek students that receive education in Turkish universities by claiming that they were exposed to Islamic fundamentalist influence.³⁷¹ In 1997, the Uzbek government withdrew 1.298 students from Turkey. Uzbekistan also accused Turkey for harboring some Uzbek citizens that got involved in an assassination attempt against the Uzbek president Islam Karimov in February 1999 and between 1997 and 1999, it withdrew another 243 students from Turkey. By October 2002, there were only 3 Uzbek students in Turkish universities.³⁷² Moreover, the Uzbek government closed twenty Turkish schools in Uzbekistan.³⁷³ In 2004, bilateral relations got tensed up again as a result of Turkey's rejection to give Uzbekistan Aybek İbrahimov Aybek- the second-man of Uzbekistan Islamic

³⁶⁷ TİKA, "Özbekistan Ülke Raporu", http://www.tika.gov.tr/yukle/dosyalar/ULKERAPORLARI/Ozbekistan_UlkeRaporu.pdf (11.02.2008), p. 42.

³⁶⁸ TİKA, "Özbekistan Ülke Raporu", http://www.tika.gov.tr/yukle/dosyalar/ULKERAPORLARI/Ozbekistan_UlkeRaporu.pdf (11.02.2008), p.48.

³⁶⁹ BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2007, [http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2007/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_ene](http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2007/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2007.pdf) [rgy_full_report_2007.pdf](http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2007/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_ene_rgy_full_report_2007.pdf) (14.01.2008) pp. 6, 22.

³⁷⁰ Kort, p. 117.

³⁷¹ Cornell, p. 136.

³⁷² Yanik, ss. 295-296.

³⁷³ Cornell, p. 136.

Movement- that was arrested in Istanbul before the NATO summit. Turkey's criticisms about Andican events and other anti-democratic executions and human rights violations increased the tension between the two countries. Uzbekistan did not attend the last Turkic Summit that was held in Antalya on November 17, 2006.³⁷⁴ The economic relations have also been influenced from the tensions in the political relations.

Although Turkey's foreign trade with Uzbekistan has followed an unstable course, in the last years, we see an increase in bilateral trade. Turkey exports foodstuffs, medicine, machinery, and automotive to Uzbekistan and imports cotton and cotton products. Turkish firms constitute an important place in Uzbek economic life. The textile and construction sectors are the ones that attract Turkish investments most.³⁷⁵ Today, there are two basic problems in bilateral economic relations that negatively affect trade and investment: visa and foreign exchange. Turkish businessmen and investors face difficulties as a result of Uzbekistan's visa applications. Moreover, the use of Sum in foreign currency transactions, the undeveloped banking system, and the frequent current law changes make business difficult in Uzbekistan for foreign investors.³⁷⁶ To improve the relations, the communication channels should be re-opened and the political contacts should be increased in order to increase economic, cultural, and social contacts.³⁷⁷

2.4.4 Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan became independent on October 27, 1991.³⁷⁸ At the time of independence, Turkmenistan's economy and its administrative system was very backward. Under the rule of the first leader of the country, Saparmurad Niyazov,

³⁷⁴ Sedat Laçiner, "Türkiye-Özbekistan İlişkileri: Kriz Nasıl Aşılır?", 18.11.2006, <http://www.usakgundem.com/yazarlar.php?id=494&type=3> (05.03.2008).

³⁷⁵ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/Bolgeler/OrtaAsya/OzbekistanCumhuriyeti/Ozbekistan_Ekonomik.htm (06.03.2008).

³⁷⁶ Hasan Kanbolat, "Özbekistan Cumhuriyeti 15 Yaşında", 14.09.2006, <http://www.asam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.asp?ID=1141&kat1=56&kat2=> (05.03.2008).

³⁷⁷ Gökçen Oğan, "Özbekistan Türkiye'nin Orta Asya Politikasının Neresinde?", 13.06.2008, <http://www.avsam.org.tr/yazigoster.asp?ID=2248&kat1=56&kat2=> (10.07.2008).

³⁷⁸ Türkmenistan Büyükelçiliği, "Bağımsızlığın 15. yılında Türkmenistan", <http://www.usakgundem.com/makale.php?id=218> (23.07.2008).

Turkmenistan determined three major fields for developing Turkmen economy: energy sector, agricultural sector, and consumption products sector.³⁷⁹ The foundation stone of Turkmenistan's economy is natural gas. Among the Central Asian Republics, Turkmenistan has the largest natural gas reserves. According to BP Statistics, at the end of 2006, Turkmenistan's proved natural gas reserves were 2.86 trillion cubic meters.³⁸⁰ Turkmenistan's natural gas reserves have granted the country the necessary revenue for achieving its economic transformation. Yet, Turkmenistan faces with problems in collecting the gas debts of the some countries such as Ukraine and Russia that it exported natural gas. On the other hand, since Turkmenistan is a land-locked country, it is dependent on surrounding countries for exporting its gas. Until the near past, the only route for the export of Turkmen gas was the route passing through Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russia. Yet, in the recent years, Turkmenistan has begun to sign agreements with neighbor countries such as Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey for new pipeline routes.³⁸¹ There are three important projects that stay on the table of Turkmenistan. The first one is 'Centags' pipeline project that will pass through Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India. The realization of this project is closely related with the stability of Afghanistan. The second one is Turkmenistan-China natural gas pipeline project. This project is very crucial for China to saturate its growing energy demand. However, if this project would be materialized, it is uncertain that whether there will remain sufficient Turkmen gas to other pipeline projects. The third project, which is very important for Turkey's and Europe's energy security, is Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project. In 1998, the heads of state of Turkey and Turkmenistan came together in Ankara and signed the Trans-Caspian project. The realization of this project will enhance Turkey's geo-strategic significance and help Europe to prevent excessive dependence on Russian gas. This project will also influence the future of Nabucco project that will transport Azeri, Turkmen and Iran gas to Europe via Turkey. Moreover, the Trans-Caspian project

³⁷⁹ Saule Baycaun, "10 Yıllık Bağımsızlık Sürecinde Türkmenistan Ekonomisine Genel Bir Bakış", **Avrasya Dosyası**, Cilt:7, Sayı:2, Yaz 2001, p. 36.

³⁸⁰ BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2007, [http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2007/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_ene](http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2007/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2007.pdf) rgy_full_report_2007.pdf (14.01.2008), p. 22.

³⁸¹ TİKA, "Türkmenistan Ülke Raporu", http://www.tika.gov.tr/yukle/dosyalar/ULKERAPORLARI/Turkmenistan_UlkeRaporu.pdf (11.02.2008), p. 9.

will also help Turkmenistan to break Russian monopoly in the transportation of Turkmen gas to world markets. However, as a result of Russian objections, the project is now suspended.³⁸² Cotton is another important component of the country's economy; Turkmenistan is the second important cotton producer in Central Asia after Uzbekistan. The revenue obtained from cotton exports is equal to 20 per cent of total export revenues.³⁸³ In the first years of the independence, Turkmenistan lacked the textile industry that is necessary for the cotton processing. However, the number of textile factories has increased gradually. Today, Turkmenistan is the textile centre of Central Asia, and exports its textile products to more than 30 countries.³⁸⁴

Figure 7. Map of Turkmenistan



Source: <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/asia/turkmenistan/> (23.01.2009).

³⁸² Muharrem Ekşi, "Yeni Rekabet Odağı Olarak Türkmenistan Doğalgazı", 24.10.2007, http://www.globalstrateji.org/TUR/Icerik_Detay.ASP?Icerik=1223 (17.03.2008).

³⁸³ TİKA, "Türkmenistan Ülke Raporu", http://www.tika.gov.tr/yukle/dosyalar/ULKERAPORLARI/Turkmenistan_UlkeRaporu.pdf (11.02.2008), pp. 11-12.

³⁸⁴ Türkmenistan Büyükelçiliği, "Bağımsızlığın 15. Yılında Türkmenistan", <http://www.usakgundem.com/makale.php?id=218> (23.07.2008).

The majority of Turkmen population consists of ethnic Turkmen, so, Turkmenistan does not have important ethnic problems. Unlike Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, it does not have a substantial number of Russian minorities and this provides a relative freedom to the country in its relations with Moscow. Under the rule of Niyazov, the economic and political reforms progressed slowly. Although there was a relative freedom in the economic field as a result of the efforts for transition to market economy, the political arena was under strict control. Yet, the successor of Niyazov, President Gurmangulu Berdimuhammedov, plans to make reforms in many field of life and it seems that he will pursue a more flexible internal policy. Also in the foreign relations, Berdimuhammedov follows a different policy from Saparmurad Niyazov. After attaining the status of 'permanent neutrality' in the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations, on December 12, 1995, Turkmenistan pursued almost an isolationist policy and exhibited a distant approach to regional or multinational undertakings. Yet, Berdimuhammedov interprets Turkmenistan's 'permanent neutrality' as developing equal relations with all parties and this approach of him is especially reflected to pipeline projects.³⁸⁵

In the first years after the independence, Turkmenistan's main commercial partners were the member countries of the CIS. In the course of time, Turkmenistan increased its economic relations with other countries, including Turkey. In February 1997, Niyazov, during his visit in Kazakhstan, declared his will for economic integration with Turkey.³⁸⁶ Within 15 years since the independence, Turkmenistan attracted about \$ 8 billion foreign investment, and \$ 4.5 billion of those has been undertaken by Turkish firms. There about 300 Turkish firms that make business in Turkmenistan and they provide job for nearly 12.000 Turkish citizen. Turkish firms have contributed to the formation of Turkmenistan's industrial base. They are active in the agricultural technologies, banking, health, construction, and food sectors.³⁸⁷ Turkish businessmen and investors assist Turkmenistan in shaping the infrastructure of the country. They join to the construction and modernization projects of airports,

³⁸⁵ Gökçen Oğan, "Turkmenistan'ın Yeni Yüzü Berdimuhammedov ve Reform Çabaları", 13.03.2008, <http://www.asam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.asp?ID=2050&kat2=1> (13.03.2008).

³⁸⁶ Baycaun, pp. 32-33.

³⁸⁷ Türkmenistan Büyükelçiliği, "Bağımsızlığın 15. Yılında Türkmenistan", <http://www.usakgundem.com/makale.php?id=218> (23.07.2008).

water canals, and refineries, etc. Moreover, TPAO is included in the exploration and operation of Turkmenistan's hydrocarbon reserves.³⁸⁸ The energy sector promises increase in bilateral trade relations. Turkmenistan is dependent on the pipeline routes passing through Russia for the export of its gas and oil. In order to break this dependence, it searches alternative routes. The pipeline projects of Nabucco and Trans-Caspian were designed to transport Turkmen gas to Western markets via Turkey. Turkey also tries to cooperate with Turkmenistan in the field of education. Since the independence of Turkmenistan, more than 1.500 Turkmen students have been educated in Turkey.³⁸⁹

2.4.5 Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan declared independence on August 31, 1991. Askar Akayev became the first President of Kyrgyzstan and ruled the country until March 24, 2005. Immediately after independence, Akayev began reforms to create a liberal economic and political regime; a Central Asian Switzerland.³⁹⁰ Kyrgyzstan was the most developed Central Asian Republic in terms of democracy, and the one that came closer to the Turkish model most. In the early period of Akayev's presidency, Kyrgyzstan was regarded such democratic that it was called as 'Island of Democracy' in Central Asia. Yet, in the course of time, the economic and political conditions have deteriorated. The opposition began to complain about Akayev's monopoly in the key positions of the economy and his reluctance to leave his chair.³⁹¹ When the pro-Akayev deputies won the parliament elections of February and March 2005, the opposition initiated uprisings that resulted in resignation of Akayev. Kurmanbek Bakiyev was elected as the new President.³⁹²

³⁸⁸ Baycaun, s. 34.


³⁸⁹ Türkmenistan Büyükelçiliği, "Bağımsızlığın 15. Yılında Türkmenistan", <http://www.usakgundem.com/makale.php?id=218> (23.07.2008).

³⁹⁰ Hyman, s. 291.

³⁹¹ Fehim Taştekin, "En Kültürlü Devrim", **Radikal**, 28.03.2005, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=147823> (10.06.2008).

³⁹² TİKA, "Kırgızistan Ülke Raporu", http://www.tika.gov.tr/yukle/dosyalar/ULKERAPORLARI/Kirgizistan_UlkeRaporu.pdf (11.02.2008), p. 11.

Figure 8. Map of Kyrgyzstan



Source: <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/asia/kyrgyzstan/> (23.01.2009).

Kyrgyzstan is unfortunate in comparison to other Turkic Republics in terms of oil and gas reserves. In order to meet its energy demand, Kyrgyzstan is especially dependent on Uzbekistan. Although it does not have substantial energy reserves, Kyrgyzstan is anyhow significant because of its geopolitical location. It has been an area of contest between China, Russian Federation, and the US. As a result of its vulnerable position, Kyrgyzstan takes pains to develop balanced bilateral relations with all global and regional actors. On the one hand, Kyrgyzstan cooperated with the US in its Afghanistan operation and opened the Manas military base to the US. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan tries to develop good relations with Russia and China; and joined the Shangai Cooperation Organization. However, Russia dominates the first place in Kyrgyzstan's foreign relations. Kyrgyzstan is a small country with a substantial Russian population. The country has some security concerns; it is vulnerable to Uzbekistan and China, two of its larger neighbours. Furthermore, it borders Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan perceives its unstable neighbour as a threat that could spread terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime. These facts made

Kyrgyzstan dependent to Russian security umbrella.³⁹³ There is also a Russian military base in the country alongside the US military base.³⁹⁴

Turkey's presence in Kyrgyzstan could be divided into three main stages: the early 1990s was the intellectual period in which the ideas and expertise were exchanged bilaterally. In the mid and late 1990s, the economic ties gained strength. In the last stage beginning from the late 1990s, intellectual exchanges, economic ties, and educational programs have improved. Today, Turkey's involvement in Kyrgyzstan is primarily in the areas of education and trade.³⁹⁵ Although the two countries try to develop their bilateral relations in many fields, the relations are still limited. For instance, when we compare the 2007 trade volumes of Turkey with Turkic Republics, Kyrgyzstan becomes last with \$ 225.956 million.³⁹⁶ Russia's economic presence in Kyrgyzstan is obvious. Yet, China is increasingly advancing to be Kyrgyzstan's major economic partner.³⁹⁷ "Turkey's presence in Kyrgyzstan is growing, but at a slow rate."³⁹⁸

Tentative remarks

At the beginning, Turkey treated the Central Asian Republics as if they were a single entity. Yet, although the Central Asian States occupy a shared geographic area, they cannot be approached as a single group of nations. All have different

³⁹³ TİKA, "Kırgızistan Ülke Raporu", http://www.tika.gov.tr/yukle/dosyalar/ULKERAPORLARI/Kirgizistan_UlkeRaporu.pdf (11.02.2008), pp. 64-65.

³⁹⁴ It remains on the agenda that Kyrgyzstan would close the US base in the country. Russia and China put pressure on Kyrgyzstan through Shanghai Cooperation Organization as they did to Uzbekistan.

³⁹⁵ Erica Marat, "Turkey's Cultural and Economic Presence Grows in Kyrgyzstan", **Eurasia Daily Monitor**, Vol:4, Issue:145, 26.07.2007, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32896&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=405&no_cache=1 (24.06.2008).

³⁹⁶ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/Bolgeler/OrtaAsya/KirgizCumhuriyeti/Kirgizistan_Ekonomik.htm (06.03.2008).

³⁹⁷ Gordon Feller, "Turkey's New Government Looking Again to the Caucasus and Central Asia", **Washington Report on Middle East Affairs**, December 1997, <http://www.wrmea.com/backissues/1297/9712026.html> (09.03.2008).

³⁹⁸ ³⁹⁸ Erica Marat, "Turkey's Cultural and Economic Presence Grows in Kyrgyzstan", **Eurasia Daily Monitor**, Vol:4, Issue:145, 26.07.2007, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32896&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=405&no_cache=1 (24.06.2008).

characteristics and priorities. There are political disagreements, ethnic divisions, and border contests between and among them. When Turkey became aware of this, it began to develop different type of relations with each of the Turkic Republics. Turkey is more influential in the Transcaucasus. It has intense relations with Azerbaijan. In Central Asia, two countries, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, are more important for Turkey due to their crucial oil and gas reserves. Turkey, besides being a customer, is also a potential transporter of Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas to Western markets.³⁹⁹ The only Central Asian country that Ankara has distant relations is Uzbekistan. Although Turkey's bilateral relations with the Turkic Republics change from country to country, if we deal with the region as a whole, Turkey's foreign policy and economic policy towards the region is mainly based on the energy trade. It is a customer of the region's energy reserves; it joins the energy development activities in the region; and aims to transport the Caspian hydrocarbon reserves to Western markets. Since the mid-1990s, Turkey-Central Asian relations have been mainly conducted in this direction.

In the next chapter, 'energy', the essential point of Turkey-Central Asia relations, will be studied in detail. Turkey's energy profile and its energy policies will be overviewed, and the place of the energy resources of Central Asia in Turkey's resource and pipeline politics will be examined.

³⁹⁹ Gökçen Oğan, "Özbekistan Türkiye'nin Orta Asya Politikasının Neresinde?", 13.06.2008, <http://www.avsam.org/tr/yazigoster.asp?ID=2248&kat1=56&kat2=> (10.07.2008).

PART III

TURKEY'S ENERGY PROFILE AND ENERGY POLICY

3.1 TURKEY'S ENERGY PROFILE

The Turkish economy is among the fastest growing economies in the OECD. As the Turkish economy has undergone an important shift from agriculture towards the service sector and industry, its energy consumption has increased sharply.⁴⁰⁰ Turkey's indigenous energy production meets nearly 48% of the total primary energy demand, but it is estimated that it will decrease to 26% by 2020.⁴⁰¹ Turkey's indigenous energy sources are very limited so Turkey is a net importer of primary energy sources.

3.1.1 The Reserves, Production, and Consumption of Primary Energy Sources

The main energy supply sources in Turkey are oil, natural gas and coal. Until 2030, 84% of the total demand increase would be met from these sources and oil would continue to have the biggest share in total primary energy supply. At the end of 2007, Turkey's producible natural gas reserves were 7.4 billion m³ and its indigenous potential for oil was 6.72 billion barrels. The share of oil, natural gas, and coal in total energy investments is 24%, 19%, and 3% respectively. The total established power of Turkey's thermic powerhouses is 6.549 MW.⁴⁰² In Turkey, the most important indigenous energy sources are lignite and hydropower. Yet, some other primary energy sources such as oil, hard coal, asphaltite, natural gas, geothermal, wood, animal and plant waste, and solar energy; and secondary sources such as cooking coal and electric energy are also produced and presented for consumption.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰⁰ IEA, "Turkey 2005 Review", <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), p. 21.

⁴⁰¹ Oğulata, p. 23.

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<http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=tr&sf=webpages&b=fosilyakitlar&bn=220&hn=220&nm=384&id=385> (29.11.2008).

⁴⁰³ Nurel Kılıç, **Dünya'da ve Türkiye'de Enerji Sektörüne Bakış ve Jeotermal Enerji Potansiyelinin İrdelenmesi**, İzmir Ticaret Odası, İzmir, 1998, p. 30.

3.1.1.1 Lignite and coal


Coal, particularly lignite, is the most important domestic energy source of Turkey. Lignite is a kind of coal. It exists abundantly in the earth's crust. It has low calorific value, and high ash and moisture, so it is generally used as a fuel in thermic powerhouses. Hard coal, on the other hand, has high calorific value.⁴⁰⁴ The richest hard coal deposits exist in Zonguldak and in the coastline extending from Ereğli to Amasra in the north-west Black Sea coast. There are also some reserves around Toroslar and Diyarbakır. The lignite beds exist in almost all regions of Turkey. Afşin-Elbistan, Muğla, Soma, Tunçbilek, Seyitömer, Konya, Beypazarı, and Sivas are the most known basins.⁴⁰⁵ About 90% of Turkey's lignite is produced through opencast mining and the rest is through underground mining. At the end of 2003, the total proven lignite reserves were 8.4 billion tonnes; around 3.4 billion tonnes of it exist in Afşin-Elbistan. Unfortunately, 68% of Turkish lignite reserves have low calorific value.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰⁴ <http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?sf=webpages&b=kumur&bn=223&hn=12&nm=384&id=385&> (14.12.2008).

⁴⁰⁵ Kılıç, p. 31.

⁴⁰⁶ IEA, Turkey 2005 Review, <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), p. 91.

Figure 9. Turkey's Coal Production and Consumption



Source: EIA, "Turkey Country Analysis Briefs", October 2006,
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Turkey/Coal.html> (01.06.2008).

Total coal demand increased by 33% between 1990 and 2003; in 2003 it met 27% of total primary energy sources.⁴⁰⁷ In 2007, 28% of Turkey's 106 Mtoe of total primary energy consumption was met by coal. Turkey has 10.4 billion tons of indigenous lignite potential, and 1.33 billion tons of indigeneous hard coal potential. Turkey possess about 1.6% of the world's total lignite reserves.⁴⁰⁸ Yet, Turkey's hard coal production is insufficient to meet the country's coal demand so Turkey imports hard coal from abroad. Besides the demand factor, the policy of decreasing oil and gas dependency by increasing the share of coal in the total primary energy sources, thereby obtaining supply diversification, causes increase in the coal importation. Each year, Turkey imports over 6 million tons of hard coal. Coal is imported mostly from Australia, the United States, South Africa, and Russia; and mainly used for electric power, steelmaking, and cement production.⁴⁰⁹

Lignite is mostly used in electricity generation. It is also utilized in the residential and industrial sectors and in the thermic powerhouses. Yet, since the calorific value of the big part of the existing lignites is low, it is mainly consumed in

⁴⁰⁷ IEA, Turkey 2005 Review, <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), p. 94.

⁴⁰⁸ <http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?sf=webpages&b=kotur&bn=223&hn=12&nm=384&id=385&> (14.12.2008).

⁴⁰⁹ Oğulata, p. 325.

the thermic powerhouses. In 2007, of 31.6 million tons of total coal purchase, 79% was used in thermic powerhouses and 21% was used in the residential and industrial sectors. The established power of our thermic powerhouses that use lignite is 6.549 MW; 8% of Turkey's total established power.⁴¹⁰ Since 2005, the efforts for exploring new coal fields and developing the existing ones are continuing. The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources aims to decrease the use of imported natural gas in the electricity production, so it tries to increase the quantity of thermic powerhouses that burn lignite.⁴¹¹

3.1.1.2 Oil

Oil is a complex composition mainly composed of hydrogen and carbon, and it also contains small amounts of nitrogen, oxygen, and sulphur. It is the most demanded fundamental energy source in the world. By 2007, oil met 35.6% of total global energy demand. At this rate, it is estimated that the life of the world's oil reserves is about 42 years.⁴¹²

There are two opposite views about Turkey's oil reserves. Some claim that Turkey is devoid of noticeable reserves of oil while some assert that Turkey locates on an 'oil sea.' The oil exploration and drilling activities that have carried out as yet are inadequate to confirm both claims. In order to be sure of Turkey's oil reserves, the exploration and drilling works should be increased. In Turkey, oil is produced mainly in the south-east of the country, with a small amount coming from the north-west.⁴¹³ In 1926, Petroleum Law (Law No. 792) was enacted and the oil exploration authority was given to the government. Later, in 1935, MTA was commissioned by the law numbered 2804. Until 1954, the state had the right of exploring and operating oil. In 1941, Petrol Ofisi was established as a bound institution of Ministry of Trade

⁴¹⁰ <http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?sf=webpages&b=kotur&bn=223&hn=12&nm=384&id=385&> (14.12.2008).

⁴¹¹ <http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?sf=webpages&b=kotur&bn=223&hn=12&nm=384&id=385&> (14.12.2008).

⁴¹² <http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?sf=webpages&b=petrol&bn=222&hn=12&nm=384&id=385&> (14.12.2008).

⁴¹³ IEA, "Turkey 2005 Review", <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), p. 67.

to buy, sell, and stock all the oil and petroleum products. Thus, until 1954, the oil activities were conducted through these two institutions: MTA was in charge of exploration and operation of oil, while Petrol Ofisi was responsible from the importing, buying, distributing, stocking, refining, and selling petroleum and petroleum products.⁴¹⁴ However, technological and financial insufficiencies and the lack of adequate experts made oil exploration and production more difficult. As a result, liberal Petroleum Law (Law No. 6326), which opened the way for private investment, was enacted in 1954.⁴¹⁵ On 17 January 2007, the Petroleum Law (Law No. 5574), which created hot debates, was accepted in the Parliament. Yet, as a result of the veto of the President, it did not become law. The law in question is criticized for including articles that are contrary to the ‘national interests’ of the country.⁴¹⁶

The institutions that are responsible from oil in Turkey are TPAO, PİGM (General Directorate of Petroleum Affairs), and BOTAŞ (Petroleum Pipeline Corporation). TPAO was established in 1954 as the national oil company in charge of exploration, drilling, production, refining, and marketing of hydrocarbon sources in Turkey. At present, it only deals with the upstream activities of oil sector, namely, with exploration, drilling, and production. TPAO’s aim is to meet the nation’s oil need primarily from its own resources but it also takes part in oil exploration and production projects in foreign countries.⁴¹⁷ TPAO is the largest oil producer in Turkey, and accounts for 68.4% of the total oil production. There are also some other foreign and domestic companies that carry on exploration or production activities. TPAO conducts onshore exploration in many areas, especially in the south-east of the country. It also carries out offshore exploration in the Black Sea.⁴¹⁸ PİGM is a bound institution of Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources that is responsible from supervising the oil exploration and operation activities. It was established in 1954 under the name of ‘Petrol Dairesi Reisliği’ but in 1973 it was entitled as

⁴¹⁴ Çağdaş Acar and others, **Petrol ve Doğalgaz**, ODTU Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2007, p. 54.

⁴¹⁵ Acar and others, p. 55.

⁴¹⁶ For detailed information see <http://www.asam.org.tr/temp/temp308.pdf> (01.06.2008).


⁴¹⁷ http://www.tpao.gov.tr/v1.4/index.php?option=com_section&task=view&id=1&itemid=1 (03.04.2008).

⁴¹⁸ IEA, "Turkey 2005 Review", <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), p. 70.

PİGM.⁴¹⁹ BOTAŞ was established by TPAO in 1974 with the aim of transporting Iraqi crude oil to İskenderun. It executes the transport of oil and gas through pipelines. It is a state economic enterprise since 1995.⁴²⁰

At the end of 2006, Turkey's total proven, probable, and possible crude oil reserves is equivalent to 6.72 Bbls.⁴²¹ In 1940, the first productive oil well of Turkey was drilled in Raman.⁴²² As a result of the depletion of the resources, the oil production of Turkey has decreased since 1991. In 1999, Turkey produced 3.7 Mt of oil but in 2003, it was 2.5 Mt. By 2010, it is expected to decline by almost half.⁴²³ Turkey's remaining proven recoverable oil reserves are about 295 million barrels and at current production rates, these reserves will last another 18 years at the most.⁴²⁴

Figure 10. Turkey's Oil Production and Consumption



Source: EIA, Turkey Country Analysis Briefs, October 2006, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Turkey/Oil.html> (01.06.2008).

⁴¹⁹ <http://www.pigm.gov.tr/tarihce.php> (03.04.2008).

⁴²⁰ <http://www.botas.gov.tr/tarihce.asp> (03.04.2008).

⁴²¹ http://www.pigm.gov.tr/2006_petrol_rezervleri.htm (17.04.2008).

⁴²² Harun Kemal Öztürk and Arif Hepbaşlı, "The Place of Natural Gas in Turkey's Energy Sources and Future Perspectives", **Energy Sources**, Vol:25, No:4, 2003, p. 296.

⁴²³ IEA, Turkey 2005 Review, <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), p. 67.

⁴²⁴ IEA, Turkey 2005 Review, <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), p. 70.

Between 1990 and 2003, total oil demand increased from 23.6 Mtoe to 31.7 Mtoe. In 2007, Turkey consumed 31 Mtoe.⁴²⁵ Turkey's crude oil production is very small- 2.5 Mtoe. It supplied 7.9% of total oil demand in 2003, so, 90% of oil that Turkey consumes is imported from abroad.⁴²⁶ To reduce this heavy import dependence, Turkey has adopted an energy policy that aims at diversifying energy sources and suppliers and attracting private capital. The countries that Turkey imports oil are Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya, the UAE, Algeria, Syria, Egypt, and Russia.⁴²⁷ In 2004, Turkey and Iraq re-signed an import contract and Turkey began oil imports from Iraq.⁴²⁸ There are two main pipelines that transport crude oil to Turkey: one is Iraq-Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline and the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline.

3.1.1.3 Natural Gas

Turkey's acquaintance with natural gas began in the early 1970s with the start of limited natural gas production.⁴²⁹ The production of natural gas in Turkey started in 1976, and the first natural gas importation began in 1987 from Russia.⁴³⁰ For various reasons such as the price, environmental considerations, fuel diversification, energy security, and economic growth, using of natural gas is increasing all around the world, including Turkey. Turkey's total natural gas potential is about 21.86 bcm.⁴³¹ Yet, its proven gas reserves are very small. The remaining recoverable gas reserves were 8 bcm at the end of 2003. In 2003, Turkey's gas production totaled 0.6

⁴²⁵ <http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?sf=webpages&b=petrol&bn=222&hn=12&nm=384&id=385&> (14.12.2008).

⁴²⁶ IEA, "Turkey 2005 Review", <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), p. 75.

⁴²⁷ Ayhan Demirbaş, "Energy Facilities and Nuclear Power Program by 2020 in Turkey", **Energy Sources**, Vol:23, No:5, 2001, p. 405.

⁴²⁸ IEA, "Turkey 2005 Review", <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), p. 75.

⁴²⁹ Öztürk and Hepbaşlı, p. 296.


⁴³⁰ Öztürk and Hepbaşlı, p. 297.

⁴³¹

<http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?sf=webpages&b=dogalgaz&bn=221&hn=12&nm=384&id=385&> (14.12.2008).

bcm, which accounted for 3% of the total gas demand of the country. Thus, Turkey is almost completely dependent on gas imports.⁴³²

Figure 11. Turkey's Natural Gas Production and Consumption



Source: EIA, "Turkey Country Analysis Briefs", October 2006, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Turkey/NaturalGas.html> (01.06.2008).

In Turkey, natural gas transmission is under the responsibility of BOTAŞ, a state-owned company. BOTAŞ is the only natural gas importer; it has monopoly on gas importation. Turkey has eight long-term sales and purchase contracts with six different supplier countries, namely, the Russian Federation, Algeria, Nigeria, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan.⁴³³ By the end of 2007, Turkey imports gas from all of these origin countries except Turkmenistan.

⁴³² IEA, "Turkey 2005 Review", <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), pp. 99-100.

⁴³³ http://www.botas.gov.tr/dogalgaz/dg_alim_ant.asp (02.04.2008).

Table 2. Turkey's Natural Gas Purchase and Sale Agreements

Agreements	Volume BCMA (During The Plateau Period) (Billion m ³ /year)	Date Of Signature	Duration (Years)	Status
Russian Fed. (Westward)	6	14 February 1986	25	In operation
Algeria (LNG)	4	14 April 1988	20	In operation
Nigeria (LNG)	1.2	9 November 1995	22	In operation
Iran	10	8 August 1996	25	In operation
Russian Fed. (Black Sea)	16	15 December 1997	25	In operation
Russian Fed. (Westward)	8	18 February 1998	23	In operation
Turkmenistan	16	21 May 1999	30	-
Azerbaijan	6.6	12 March 2001	15	In operation

Source: <http://www.botas.gov.tr/> (23.01.2009).

One of the main aims of Turkey's natural gas policy is being a natural gas bridge between the East and the West by transporting Middle Eastern and Caspian gas to the European markets. The main gas pipeline projects of Turkey are: Turkey-Greece-Italy Natural Gas Pipeline Project, Azerbaijan-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline Project (the South Caucasus Pipeline project), Trans-Caspian Natural Gas Pipeline Project, Egypt-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline Project, Iraq-Turkey Natural Gas Project, the Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria Natural Gas Pipeline (Nabucco) Project. The agreement regarding Turkey-Greece-Italy Natural Gas Pipeline Project, which will transport Caspian, Russian, Middle East, and South Mediterranean gas to Europe within the framework of INOGATE programme of European Commission, was signed on 23 February 2003 between the governments of Turkey and Greece. On 18 November 2007, the gas transport from Turkey to Greece began. It is estimated that by 2012, the Greece-Italy part of the project will be completed.⁴³⁴ The sales and purchase contract of South Caucasus Pipeline Project that will transport the gas from the ShahDeniz field in Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia, was signed between BOTAŞ and SOCAR (State Oil Company of

⁴³⁴ <http://www.botas.gov.tr/projeler/projeler.asp#01> (02.04.2008).

Azerbaijan Republic) on 12 March 2001 and the gas consignment started in July 2007. The Transcaspian Natural Gas Pipeline Project aims to transport Turkmen gas to European markets via Turkey with a pipeline that will pass under the Caspian. The agreement was signed between Turkey and Turkmenistan on 29 October 1998, and the sales and purchase contract was signed on 21 May 1999. Yet, the project is pending. The framework agreement of Egypt-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline Project about importation gas to Europe via Turkey was signed on 17 March 2004 and later a “memorandum of understanding” was signed on 16 February 2006. The gas from Egypt will come through Syria. The pipeline is at construction stage and it is expected that gas flow will start in 2011. This project will contribute the supply diversification goal of Turkey and also make Turkey a transit state. The Iraq-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline Project aims to develop gas fields of Iraq and transport it to Turkey and then Europe. The project began in 1996 but it has interrupted from time to time. On 7 August 2007, the ministers of Turkish and Iraq governments came together and declared their will for the completion of the project. The Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project will connect Turkey with Austria via Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. It will transport Middle East and Caspian oil to Western Europe. The works for the project began in February 2002 and it is expected to be active by 2012.⁴³⁵

There are three main reasons for Turkey to prefer natural gas: the increasing electricity demand⁴³⁶ as a result of increasing living standards; the environment-friendly nature of natural gas; and its gas-rich neighbour countries such as Iran and the Russian Federation, and the gas –rich neighbour regions such as the Central Asia.⁴³⁷ As a result, the natural gas consumption in Turkey has increased year by year especially since the mid-1990s. In 2003, the total gas supply was 21.2 bcm (19.5 Mtoe), that is 23% of the total primary energy supply. The large part of the gas consumed is used in electricity generation; in 2003 the share of gas in electricity generation accounted for 45%. Total final consumption of natural gas was 7.9 Mtoe in 2003; it is estimated that gas demand will increase by about 90% between 2003

⁴³⁵ <http://www.botas.gov.tr/projeler/projeler.asp#01> (02.04.2008).

⁴³⁶ In natural gas consumption, the key sector is electricity production sector. See Dokuzlar, p. 27.

⁴³⁷ Dokuzlar, p. 162.

and 2010. The average growth rate would be 10.5% until 2010 and 3.2% thereafter.⁴³⁸ It is estimated that at the end of 2008, the natural gas consumption will reach 33.6 Mtoe by a 5.5% increase.⁴³⁹ The gas market in Turkey can be divided into four sectors: power generation, fertilizer, residential, industrial. The gas is mainly used for power generation, and the natural gas demand for power sector is increasing as the number of power plants installed in Build-Operate and Build-Operate-Transfer models increase.⁴⁴⁰

Turkey is a net importer of natural gas. The gas is procured either by pipelines in the gaseous state or by tankers in the liquified form. According to data of BOTAS, Turkey imported 36.450 million cm³ natural gas in 2007, of which 13.799 million cm³ is from Russian Federation through western line, 9.349 million cm³ is again from Russian Federation through Blue Stream, 6.158 million cm³ is from Iran, 1.279 million cm³ is from Azerbaijan, and total 5.867 million cm³ is as LNG form from Algeria, Nigeria, and from spot market.⁴⁴¹ These figures indicate that, regarding natural gas, Turkey's import dependency to Russian Federation and Iran is about 60% and 16%, respectively. The experiences prove that such a high dependency to certain countries is detrimental to Turkey's energy security. For two years, in the winter time, Iran cuts oil that it exports to Turkey occasionally. From time to time, Turkey confronts such energy cuts also from Russian Federation, although it has not reached an energy crisis. However, the RF's energy crisis with Ukraine and Georgia reminds Turkey the necessity of providing secure and uninterrupted energy.

⁴³⁸ IEA, "Turkey 2005 Review", <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), p. 105.

⁴³⁹

<http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?sf=webpages&b=dogalgaz&bn=221&hn=12&nm=384&id=385&> (14.12.2008).

⁴⁴⁰ Öztürk and Hepbaşlı, pp. 297-298.

⁴⁴¹ http://www.botas.gov.tr/faliyetler/dg_ttt.asp (18.04.2008).

3.1.1.4 Renewables

Renewable energy defines the energy kinds that take power from the sun, that do not spread emission and that are thought to be inexhaustible.⁴⁴² The increase in the use of fossil fuels created concerns about climate change and the search for alternative energy sources began. Renewables, with their environment-friendly nature, and their contribution to national security through decreasing dependency to imported energy, are accepted as clean, secure, and sustainable energy sources.

Turkey has abundant reserves of renewable energy sources such as hydraulic, wind, solar, geothermal and biomass. In 2006, the energy produced from renewable sources in Turkey is over 10.8 Mtoe, 11% of total primary energy supply. The electricity power generated from renewable sources is equivalent to 26% of general electricity production in 2006.⁴⁴³ About two-thirds of renewables used in Turkey are composed of biomass and animal waste, and the rest is being hydropower, geothermal, wind and solar energy.⁴⁴⁴ Although the share of wind and solar energy is small today, it is hoped that it will increase in near future. Our domestic potential in terms of renewables is as such: wind 8.000MW- 40.000 MW; geothermal 31.500 MW; biomass 16.9 Mtoe; and solar energy 80 Mtoe.⁴⁴⁵

The use of renewables increases steadily in Turkey, but still remains at low levels. In order to increase their use, Renewable Energy Law (2005) and Geothermal Law (2007) were enacted.

⁴⁴²

<http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=tr&sf=webpages&b=yenilenebilirenerji&bn=223&hn=223&n=384&id=387#> (29.11. 2008).

⁴⁴³


<http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=tr&sf=webpages&b=yenilenebilirenerji&bn=223&hn=223&n=384&id=387#> (29.11.2008).

⁴⁴⁴ Kaygusuz, p. 1133.

⁴⁴⁵

<http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=tr&sf=webpages&b=yenilenebilirenerji&bn=223&hn=223&n=384&id=387#> (29.11.2008).

Figure 12. Turkey's Electricity Generation



Source: EIA, "Turkey Country Analysis Briefs", October 2006,
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Turkey/Electricity.html> (01.06.2008).

3.1.1.4.1 Clean Renewables

There are important advantages of exploiting clean renewable sources: relying on domestic renewable sources would reduce import-dependency on fuels and enhance energy security of Turkey; they are environment friendly; the cost of electricity generation from clean renewables is less than many conventional technologies; and clean renewables have long operational life, they are almost inexhaustible.⁴⁴⁶

3.1.1.4.1.1 Hydropower

Turkey has important hydroelectric potential, and the government tries to develop this potential by constructing more power plants. The hydropower generated in 1990 was about 2 Mtoe (23.1 TWh). It reached 3.0 Mtoe (35.3 TWh) in 2003. The average growth rate is 3.8% per year.⁴⁴⁷ It is estimated that economic potential of hydropower in Turkey is about 124 TWh, and nearly 30% of this potential is used at present.⁴⁴⁸ Turkey wants to increase this proportion and the works for constructing more hydroelectric plants continue. Hydroelectric power stations are very significant

⁴⁴⁶ Demirbaş, p. 408.

⁴⁴⁷ IEA, Turkey 2005 Review, <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), p. 118.

⁴⁴⁸ Kaygusuz, p. 1133.

in energy production. Hydroelectric plants use water resources that are indigenous and renewable; they have no fuel costs; they are environment friendly, and their projects and constructions can be conducted by Turkish engineers and contractors without the need of foreign technology.⁴⁴⁹

The gross theoretical hydroelectric potential of Turkey is 433.000 GWh/year, 1% of the world. There is a division between the technical and economical feasibility. The technically feasible potential is about 216.000 GWh/year, but if the economical feasibility is regarded besides the technical one, this figure becomes about 125.000 GWh/year.⁴⁵⁰ During the 8th National Development Plan, Turkey aimed to increase the share of renewable sources in energy production and 5346 numbered Renewable Energy Law was legislated in 2005.⁴⁵¹ Also the 9th National Development Plan aims to increase the share of indigenous and renewable sources in energy production utmost. It also targets the realization of hydroelectric plant projects quickly and at minimum costs.⁴⁵² In this regard, the big South-East Anatolia Project (GAP), which is the most ambitious power generating, irrigation, and development project, worth mentioning. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers are very significant regarding their hydroelectric energy potential. Their potentials constitute 10% and 30% of the total hydroelectric energy potential, respectively. When the small hydroplant powers are completed besides the larger ones such as Karakaya, Keban, Atatürk Dam, the GAP region's capacity will supply 25% of Turkey's electricity and 85% of its hydroelectric energy.⁴⁵³

3.1.1.4.1.2 Wind Energy

Wind energy emerges from the movement of air masses that have different heats. It is an inexhaustible, clean, and safe source of energy. The 1% to 2% of energy comes from the sun turns into wind energy. Wind turbines turn the renewable

⁴⁴⁹ Kılıç, p. 36.

⁴⁵⁰ Kaygusuz, p. 1134.

⁴⁵¹ "Dokuzuncu Kalkınma Planı (2007-2013)", **Resmi Gazete**, 01.07.2006, <http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/plan/plan9.pdf> (14.04.2008), p. 25.

⁴⁵² "Dokuzuncu Kalkınma Planı (2007-2013)", **Resmi Gazete**, 01.07.2006, <http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/plan/plan9.pdf> (14.04.2008), p. 69.

⁴⁵³ Kaygusuz, p. 1135.

air current to electric energy. They are environment-friendly but they cover large area, create noise pollution, and sometimes produce electricity of poor quality.⁴⁵⁴

The total wind source of the world is 53 TWh/year and the established power of total wind energy is 40.301 MW. The one third of this power exist in Germany.⁴⁵⁵ Turkey has important wind energy potential. According to IEA figures, Turkey's technical wind energy potential is 88.000 MW, and its economic potential is 10.000 MW while its total installed capacity is 20.1 MW in the power plants in İzmir, Çanakkale, and İstanbul.⁴⁵⁶ There are a number of regions that are suitable for power generation. The Marmara, Aegean, and South-East Anatolia are convenient for wind power generation since wind speeds are higher than 3m/s in most of these regions.⁴⁵⁷ Turkey's first wind farm opened in 1998 with a capacity of 1.5 MW. The plans and projects for opening new facilities continue, and the projects mostly proposed for Çeşme, İzmir, and Çanakkale by private developers.⁴⁵⁸ In the areas where the annual wind speed is over 8.5 m/s the size of wind energy potential is at least 5.000 MW; and where the annual wind speed is over 7.0 m/s, wind energy potential is at least 48.000 MW. In 2004, Turkey's established wind energy power was only 18 MW. Yet, as a result of the efforts, Turkey's established wind energy power will reach 400 MW. After the Renewable Energy Law came into force, eighty new wind projects have taken license.⁴⁵⁹

3.1.1.4.1.3 Solar Energy

Turkey lies between 36-42° northern latitudes and can be regarded as lucky in terms of its solar energy potential. The average sunshine hours in Turkey are 2609 hours per year, and it changes between 3016 h and 1996 h from region to region.⁴⁶⁰ The average solar intensity is 3.6 kWh/ (m² day). For solar energy utilization, the

⁴⁵⁴ <http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?sf=webpages&b=ruzgar&bn=231&hn=12&nm=384&id=387> (14.12.2008).

⁴⁵⁵ <http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?sf=webpages&b=ruzgar&bn=231&hn=12&nm=384&id=387> (14.12.2008).

⁴⁵⁶ IEA, Turkey 2005 Review, <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), p. 123.

⁴⁵⁷ Demirbaş, p. 410.

⁴⁵⁸ Kaygusuz, p. 1138.

⁴⁵⁹ <http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?sf=webpages&b=ruzgar&bn=231&hn=12&nm=384&id=387> (14.12.2008).

⁴⁶⁰ Kılıç, p. 42.

South East Anatolian region is the most convenient region with an average solar radiation of 344.8cal/(cm² day) and sunsation duration of 8.2 h/day.⁴⁶¹ The total solar energy that is utilized is about 36.2 Mtoe per year, and 9.8 Mtoe of it is used for thermal applications. In Turkey, the duration that is available for technical and economical use of solar energy is about 10 months over 63% of the land area, and 17% of the land area can be utilized during the all year.⁴⁶²

Especially in the western and southern parts of the country, solar energy is used for water heating through sun collectors. Solar energy can be used also in the production of solar cells. Since it is an expensive technology, there is not any solar cell production in Turkey yet. However, the solar energy research and development projects continue.

3.1.1.4.1.4 Geothermal Energy

Geothermal energy is a heat energy obtained by carrying the heat accumulated in the depth of the earth through fluids and storing it in the reservoirs. It is artificially produced by hot water, steam, and dry rocks in heat. The geothermal resources arise around the active fractures and volcanic and magmatic units. It is a rather clean energy source used for heating, industry, chemical material production, electricity production, etc.⁴⁶³

The established geothermal energy power in the world is 9.700 MW and the annual production is about 80 billion KWh. The first five countries in the electricity production from geothermal energy are the U.S., the Philippines, Mexico, Indonesia, and Italy. The first five countries that use geothermal energy for heating and thermal spring are China, Japan, the U.S., Iceland, and Turkey.⁴⁶⁴ Turkey's geothermal energy potential is equivalent to 1/8 of the world's geothermal potential, and it is the 7th richest country in the world in this respect.⁴⁶⁵ Since Turkey locates in the Alp-

⁴⁶¹ Demirbaş, p. 409.

⁴⁶² Kaygusuz, p. 1137.

⁴⁶³ <http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?sf=webpages&b=jeotermal&bn=234&hn=12&nm=384&id=387> (14.12.2008).

⁴⁶⁴ <http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?sf=webpages&b=jeotermal&bn=234&hn=12&nm=384&id=387> (14.12.2008).

⁴⁶⁵ Demirbaş, p. 409.

Himalaya zone, it has a very important potential of geothermal energy. Its geothermal potential is 31.500 MW, 77.9% of which intensifies in the Western Anatolia. 13% of this potential (4.000 MW) has become ready to use.⁴⁶⁶ 88% of Turkey's geothermal energy is exploited in thermal use, and 12% is used in electricity production.⁴⁶⁷ According to IEA report, in 2003, the share of geothermal in TPES was 0.86 Mtoe, with 89 GWh of electricity generation. In fact, the Marmara and Aegean regions are rich in geothermal energy; but Turkey's operating geothermal power plant is only one, a 17.5 MWe facility in Denizli-Kızıldere. There are plans for generating more geothermal plants in south-west of the country, and among the geothermal fields, the Germencik-Aydın field is the most promising one, the power generation potential of which could exceed 100 MWe.⁴⁶⁸ The MTA continues to explore new geothermal fields.

3.1.1.4.2 Biofuels

Biofuels are renewable energy sources 80% of which composed of living organisms gathered within ten years. It is used in the forms of biodiesel, bioethanol, biogas, and biomass. Biodiesel is obtained from vegetal oils or animal fats and it is used as a fuel in the pure form or mixed with petroleum. It is safer to use, transport, and store biodiesel since it catches fire later than oil. Bioethanol contains sugar, starch, or cellulose and is obtained from sugar beet, and corn, etc. Biogas emerges as a result of the biological fission of the organic materials such as animal and vegetable waste in an oxygen-free environment.⁴⁶⁹

The biomass sources of wood, animal and plant wastes have been used in Turkey for long years especially in the rural districts for residential heating, cooking and other domestic use. Although the use of biomass declines as a result of the increase in the use of commercial fuels, it still meets 10% of primary energy consumption of the country, and 35% of energy consumption in the residences.⁴⁷⁰ Turkey's waste potential is about 8.6 Mtoe. 6 Mtoe of this potential is used for

⁴⁶⁶ <http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?sf=webpages&b=jeotermal&bn=234&hn=12&nm=384&id=387> (14.12.2008).

⁴⁶⁷ Oğulata, p. 328.

⁴⁶⁸ IEA, Turkey 2005 Review, <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), p. 121.

⁴⁶⁹ <http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?sf=webpages&b=biyoyakit&bn=235&hn=12&nm=384&id=387> (14.12.2008).

⁴⁷⁰ Kılıç, p. 43.

heating. In 2006, the total energy amount obtained from biomass is 2 thousand tons of oil equivalent.⁴⁷¹

There are also biogas and landfill gas that can be utilized for energy production in Turkey. According to IEA estimates, Turkey's biogas production potential is about 1.5 to 2 Mtoe but only two small units, in total 5 MW, are active. One new facility of 1 MW has been licensed.⁴⁷² The landfill gas that is produced by garbage storage is used in many European countries. Some municipalities in Turkey work for realizing this technology.⁴⁷³

3.1.1.5 Nuclear Energy

Nuclear energy emerges by the break up of the atomic nucleus. Nuclear reactors convert nuclear energy to electric energy. Although there have been many attempts to build nuclear power plants in Turkey since the mid-1950s, at present, there is not any in operation or under construction. In 1976, TAEK received a site license for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu Bay in Silifke. Yet, the deals for the realization of the nuclear plant became unsuccessful in the 1980s, besides the failed nuclear power plant project at Sinop on the Black Sea. In the 1990s a new nuclear project was submitted again for Akkuyu Bay, but the start-up has been postponed continuously up to now.⁴⁷⁴ Yet, the nuclear option has not been abandoned. It is planned that beginning from 2015, Turkey will put the nuclear powerhouse capacity of 5.000 MW into operation. To achieve this, the Nuclear Energy Law was enacted in 2007. The process for founding nuclear powerhouses is continuing. The license for Turkey's first nuclear powerhouse that will be established

⁴⁷¹ <http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?sf=webpages&b=biyoyakit&bn=235&hn=12&nm=384&id=387> (14.12.2008).

⁴⁷² IEA, Turkey 2005 Review, <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), p. 123.

⁴⁷³ Kılıç, p. 43.

⁴⁷⁴ IEA, Turkey 2005 Review, <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), p. 136.

in Mersin-Akkuyu has taken and the studies for taking the license for Sinop nuclear powerhouse are going on.⁴⁷⁵

When Turkey signed a bilateral agreement with the US about the “peaceful uses of nuclear energy” in July 1955, the first step for nuclear plans began. In 1956, the Turkish Atomic Energy Commission (TAEK) was established and in 1961, Turkey’s first nuclear research reactor was founded in Istanbul and it still operates.⁴⁷⁶ The elements used in commercial nuclear power plants are uranium and thorium. At the end of 1990, the total uranium reserves discovered in five fields accounted 9.129 tons; they mainly exist in Salihli-Köprübaşı and Yozgat-Sorgun. Unfortunately, Turkey’s uranium reserves are very limited in comparison to some uranium-rich countries such as Canada and Australia. Turkey also has thorium reserves of 380.000 tons in Erzincan-Sivrihisar. This is an important amount but the thorium in this field needs enrichment.⁴⁷⁷

In Turkey, the institution that is responsible for nuclear activities is TAEK. TAEK is in charge of the determination of the country’s nuclear policy, conducting all regulatory activities in the nuclear field, maintaining the nuclear and radiation safety, and conducting nuclear research and development.⁴⁷⁸ Nuclear energy is a very controversial issue in Turkey as in the world. It has opponents as well as proponents. TAEK summarizes the benefits of nuclear energy for Turkey as such⁴⁷⁹: First of all, it will contribute to Turkey’s energy security. It will lessen Turkey’s energy dependency to outer sources since nuclear energy is an energy-intense alternative; its fuel need is much lesser than the fuel needs of power plants that consume fossil fuels. It will also contribute to supply diversification efforts of Turkey. In case of any interruption in the international flow of primary energy sources, nuclear energy will be an alternative domestic source of energy. Second, the cost of electricity production from nuclear energy is lesser than producing electricity from natural gas.

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<http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=tr&sf=webpages&b=nukleerenerji&bn=224&hn=224&nm=384&id=388> (30.11. 2008).

⁴⁷⁶ Demirbaş, pp. 410-411.

⁴⁷⁷ Kılıç, p. 38.

⁴⁷⁸ <http://www.taek.gov.tr/ustmenu/gorevler.html> (16.04.2008).

⁴⁷⁹ http://www.taek.gov.tr/bilgi/elkitabi_brosur/brosurler/genel/15.html (16.04.2008).

Third, while many energy production facilities, such as hydroelectric power plants and wind turbines, are affected from climatic and environmental factors, nuclear power stations can be operated without being influenced from climate or environment. Fourth, nuclear energy will contribute to struggle with global warming since the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gasses resulted by the use of fossil fuels would decrease by nuclear energy. However, the opponents remind of the 1989 Chernobyl nuclear accident, and object the nuclear power stations mainly because of their radioactive environmental risks. They are anxious about the dreadful impacts of nuclear wastes and nuclear accidents to the safety and health of people, animals, vegetation, and the atmosphere. Besides the economic and technological difficulties, the opposition and protests of the opponents have become influential in the delay of the realization of nuclear power plants in Turkey.

3.2 TURKEY'S ENERGY POLICY AND RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTIONS

3.2.1 Institutions Responsible From Turkey's Energy Policy

The main institutions that are responsible from Turkey's energy policy are the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) and its dependent institutions; State Hydraulic Works (DSİ); the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK); the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA); and the State Planning Organization (DPT). MENR is in charge of the determination and implementation of energy policies in coordination with its related institutions and bodies such as The Research, Planning, and Coordination Board (APK), the General Directorate of Energy Affairs (EİGM), the General Directorate of Petroleum Affairs (PİGM), the Electrical Power Resources Survey and Development Administration (EİE). It prepares and implements national energy policies and supervises all energy and natural resource activities of exploration, development, production, and distribution.⁴⁸⁰ The APK of MENR executes Turkey's national energy policy, conducts energy planning, and co-

⁴⁸⁰ IEA, Turkey 2005 Review, <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), pp. 24-26.

ordinates all related institutions' activities.⁴⁸¹ EİGM is the main-policy making body within the MENR. It is in charge of co-ordinating all reform programmes regarding natural gas and electricity sector, conducts studies on energy and environmental policies.⁴⁸² PİGM is responsible from providing licenses for oil exploration, production, and refining.⁴⁸³ EİE carries out projects and does research about Turkey's electric energy production possibilities and conducts studies about energy efficiency.⁴⁸⁴ DSI is the institution responsible from planning, administration, development and operation of all of the water resources of the country. It plans, projects, constructs and operates dams and hydroelectric power plants.⁴⁸⁵ TAEK is assigned to determine the essence of nuclear policy of Turkey, it carries out research and development activities and guarantees radiation and nuclear safety.⁴⁸⁶ EMRA began work in November 2001. It has administrative and financial autonomy. Its duty is to regulate and supervise the energy market for the sufficient, fine, constant, low-cost, and environment-friendly supply of electricity, oil, gas, and LPG to the consumers.⁴⁸⁷ DPT is an advisory body of the Prime Minister. It assists the government in determining the country's economic, social, and cultural policies and aims. It prepares development plans and annual programmes. In these five-year plans, energy sector is also dealt with.⁴⁸⁸

In addition to these institutions that considered above, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also influential in determining and observing Turkey's energy policy since energy can not be isolated from politics. The energy policies are highly influenced from politics. Energy trade and the realization of pipeline politics are both political issues. The political conditions in the transit countries, and the approval of these states in the international arena, matter for the realization of pipeline projects. For instance, a pipeline that would carry Turkmen gas to Pakistan and India via

⁴⁸¹ IEA, Turkey 2005 Review, <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), p. 26.

⁴⁸² IEA, Turkey 2005 Review, <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/turkey2005.pdf> (01.06.2008), p. 26

⁴⁸³ <http://www.pigm.gov.tr/misyon.php> (17.04.2008).

⁴⁸⁴ <http://www.EİE.gov.tr/turkce/ozet/ozet.html> (16.04.2008).

⁴⁸⁵ <http://www.dsi.gov.tr/kurumsal/gorev.htm> (16.04.2008).

⁴⁸⁶ <http://www.taek.gov.tr/ustmenu/gorevler.html> (16.04.2008).

⁴⁸⁷ <http://www.emra.org.tr/> (17.04.2008).

⁴⁸⁸ <http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/dpt/> (17.04.2008).

Afghanistan was cancelled in 1998 because of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.⁴⁸⁹ Similarly, the political relations among Moscow, Tehran, Washington and Ankara are influential on the realization of pipeline projects which are planned to carry Caspian oil and gas to Europe. Their different type of relations with Washington caused the exclusion of Iran from and involvement of Turkey in many pipeline plans aimed at transporting Caspian energy. The country's growing energy needs "...necessitates certain patterns in foreign policy, such as pragmatism, flexibility, and overcoming normative concerns."⁴⁹⁰ The two main legs of Turkey's energy policy- diversifying energy sources and origin states and being an energy corridor- necessitates cooperation and amicable relations with many different states.⁴⁹¹ The deterioration of political relations with a state which Turkey deals in energy could disturb the energy trade. One clear example is the Russian Federation's use of natural gas as a 'card' in its relations with Ukraine and Georgia. Another example- a positive one- is Turkey's use of energy as a political leverage in its relations with the EU.

3.2.2 Turkey's Energy Policy

Turkey's energy policy can be summarized as such: "increasing its share in international projects, increasing its role in international energy routes, and the integration of Turkish energy system into neighbouring energy systems."⁴⁹² Officially, Turkey's energy policy is determined as obtaining the necessary energy, which the country needs for economic development and social progress, uninterruptedly and safely at minimum costs. While meeting the energy demand, environmental considerations, productivity, and economical use of energy is fundamental in all stages from production to consumption.⁴⁹³ According to Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, the main aims of Turkey's energy policy are: providing our country's energy and security at reasonable costs and while achieving this, considering environment and sustainable development; making our country an

⁴⁸⁹ Gökhan Bacık, "Turkey and Pipeline Politics", *Turkish Studies*, Vol: 7, No: 2, 2006, p. 297.

⁴⁹⁰ Bacık, p. 294.

⁴⁹¹ Bacık, p. 294.

⁴⁹² Bacık, p. 298.

⁴⁹³ "Dokuzuncu Kalkınma Planı (2007-2013)", *Resmi Gazete*, 01.07.2006, <http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/plan/plan9.pdf> (14.04.2008), p. 69.

important actor in regional and global energy trade; and improving our energy productivity.⁴⁹⁴ In order to achieve the aims listed above, Turkey started legal regulations in the energy sector. Electricity Market Law (2001), Natural Gas Market Law (2001), Petroleum Market Law (2003), LPG Market Law (2005), Renewable Energy Law (2005), Energy Efficiency Law (2007), Geothermal Resources and Mineral Waters Law (2007), Nuclear Energy Law, and Indigenous Coal Resources Law (2007) came into force.⁴⁹⁵ In 2023, in the 100th anniversary of the Turkish Republic, Turkey wants to achieve those aims: “using our indigenous coal and hydraulic resource potential fully, profiting from our renewable resources at the maximum level, to include nuclear energy as an electricity source until 2020, and taking rapid and continuous progress in energy efficiency to reach EU level.”⁴⁹⁶

Directives of European Union are effective on Turkey’s energy policy. In order to create an effective, rational, and competitive energy sector, and for better integration to EU’s internal energy market, Turkey has begun certain liberalization efforts since 2001.⁴⁹⁷ In 2001, the Natural Gas Market Law (Law No. 4646) was enacted for a competitive gas market. The 2001 Electricity Market Law (Law No. 4628) was enacted and the Energy Market Regulatory Authority established by this law. The 2003 Petroleum Market Law (Law No. 5015) liberalized oil market activities, removed the price ceilings and import quotas on petroleum products at the beginning of 2005.⁴⁹⁸ Turkey also enacted the Renewable Energy Law (Law No. 5346) to increase the share of renewable sources in the energy production.⁴⁹⁹

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<http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=tr&sf=webpages&b=enerji&bn=11&hn=12&nm=384&id=384> (30.11.2008).

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<http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=tr&sf=webpages&b=enerji&bn=11&hn=12&nm=384&id=384> (30.11.2008).

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<http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=tr&sf=webpages&b=enerji&bn=11&hn=12&nm=384&id=384> (14.12.2008).

497 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, "Türkiye'nin Enerji Stratejisi", Ocak 2008, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Turkiyenin_Enerji_Stratejisi_Ocak2008.pdf (03.06.2008), p. 8.

⁴⁹⁸ IEA, Turkey 2005 Review, pp. 12-15.

⁴⁹⁹ DPT, 9. Kalkınma Raporu, p. 25.

While official institutions define Turkey's energy policy as above, it is often said that Turkey does not have a stable energy policy. Hilmi Güler, the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, replies such criticisms by these words: "Of course, Turkey has an energy policy and this policy is based on real economy and real politics."⁵⁰⁰ He stresses the geopolitical importance of Turkey: "There are two concepts; one is 'resource geography' and the other is 'transit geography.' Here, we want to utilize 'transit geography'...because 70% of the (world's) energy resources is in the East and South of our country...That is the main element of the policy we think of."⁵⁰¹ In the light of the Minister's words, Turkey's energy policy can be categorized into two: resource policy and pipeline policy.

3.2.2.1 Resource Policy

The demographic increase, industrialization, and urbanization, etc. increase the world's energy demand day by day. This is valid also for Turkey. In 2007, Turkey's total primary energy consumption was 106 Mtoe, and its total primary energy production was 29.2 Mtoe. It is anticipated that in 2020, our primary energy consumption will reach 220 Mtoe, with a 6% annual increase.⁵⁰² The widening gap in Turkey's energy supply and demand is one of the key elements, which determines its energy policy. Turkey aims supply security and looks for diversification in terms of both energy sources and origin countries. It targets to increase the share of domestic and renewable energy resources in the energy production process.⁵⁰³ Turkey's energy sector that is established on three main columns-natural gas, coal, and hydrolic- as yet, is now being designed to include also renewables and nuclear energy. What is aimed at the end is to reduce dependency to foreign sources, to lower the negative effects of the energy consumption on environment, and improve Turkish economy's

⁵⁰⁰ Hilmi Güler, **Türkiye'de Enerji ve Kalkınma Sempozyumu Kitabı**, eds. Atilla Sandıklı and Hasret Dikici Bilgin, İstanbul, Tasam Yayınları, 2006, p. 15.

⁵⁰¹ Güler, p. 16.

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<http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=tr&sf=webpages&b=enerji&bn=11&hn=12&nm=384&id=384> (30.11.2008).

⁵⁰³ "Dokuzuncu Kalkınma Planı (2007-2013)", **Resmi Gazete**, 01.07.2006, <http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/plan/plan9.pdf> (14.04.2008), p. 69.

competitiveness and Turkish citizens' prosperity.⁵⁰⁴ Turkey searches oil and gas underground; tries to achieve 'energy agriculture' such as biodisel and bioetenol on the ground; maintains the efforts for the development of nuclear and renewable energy. It has increased the exploration and consumption of coal.⁵⁰⁵

Until the early 1990s, Turkey tried to meet its energy needs from its indigenous resources. Yet, its expanding economy, growing population, and increasing urbanization have given rise to sharp increases in the energy demand. In 1999 indigenous energy production met 36% of the total primary energy demand and it will probably meet 28% in 2010 and 24% in 2020.⁵⁰⁶ The domestic energy production is far below the consumption, so Turkey has to import from abroad.

In Turkey's primary energy consumption, oil's share is 37% and natural gas' share is 23%. Since the 1990s, demand for oil has experienced a relative decline as the natural gas demand has increased. Nearly all of the consumed natural gas and more than 90% of the consumed oil is imported from abroad. Turkey's import dependency in primary energy consumption is about 65% and this ratio is increasing. Turkey should reduce its import dependence in the energy sector to preserve its economic and national security.⁵⁰⁷

Although the official statements emphasize the improvement of Turkey's energy policy, its resource policies are often critisized. Necdet Pamir, an expert on energy, critisizes Turkey because of ignoring its indigenous sources such as lignite and hydraulic, not making enough exploration and drilling activities; being dependent on a single imported country for electricity generation; and ruling out the strategic significance of energy.⁵⁰⁸ Pamir also stresses the need for a proper planning. For him, the arrangement of production and consumption in accordance with the

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<http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=tr&sf=webpages&b=enerji&bn=11&hn=12&nm=384&id=384> (30.11.2008).

⁵⁰⁵ Güler, pp. 17-18.

⁵⁰⁶ Öztürk and Hepbaşlı, p. 294.

⁵⁰⁷ Necdet Pamir, *Kafkaslar ve Hazar*, p. 64.

⁵⁰⁸ Necdet Pamir, "Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Enerji, Türkiye'nin Enerji Kaynakları ve Enerji Politikaları", Mayıs 2003 (*Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Enerji*), http://www.metalurji.org.tr/dergi/dergi134/d134_73100.pdf (31.05.2008), p. 10.

country's needs and its domestic sources, is crucial.⁵⁰⁹ The criticisms towards Turkey's resource policy intensifies especially on natural gas. One of the main issues that is criticized is the imbalance in the supply and demand scenarios. For instance, the total natural gas demand of Turkey for 2009 is anticipated as 39.8 bcm while the total supply that has been contracted is 49.1 bcm. Similarly, the contracted natural gas supply will exceed the anticipated demand in 2010. For 2010, the anticipated demand is 43.8 bcm but the supply will be 51.1 bcm.⁵¹⁰ Here, another problem emerges: the insufficient natural gas storage facilities. The gas storage is very significant for energy security. In case of gas cuts that are imported from foreign suppliers, it would be possible to use the stored gas. At present, the only natural gas storage centre is at Silivri, which was opened in July 2007.⁵¹¹ The studies for the realization of Tuz Lake underground natural gas storage project is still continuing.⁵¹² The importance of natural gas storage facilities was proved in January 2008 energy crisis with Iran. By means of the Silivri gas store and Aliaga liquefied natural gas store, the gas cut of Iran did not affect the citizens.⁵¹³ Unfortunately, in the previous years, Turkey did not have any chance to store the remainder gas that it could not consume. Another criticized point of Turkey's natural gas policy is the sectoral use of gas. The large amount of the imported gas is consumed in power plants. According to 2007 data, 19.7 bcm of 35.1 bcm natural gas that is sold by BOTAŞ is used in the electricity production.⁵¹⁴ The price of the imported gas is also a criticized issue. In terms of price, the Blue Stream project is often criticized. Russia buys 1 thousand cubic meters gas at \$ 36 and sells it to Turkey at \$ 116. The agreement between Russia and Turkey is sharply criticized because of such high costs and intermediate agents such as Turusgaz and Itera.⁵¹⁵ Turkey's resource policy is also criticized because of origin countries that supply energy to Turkey. It is especially the natural gas policy of Turkey that faces intense criticisms. Besides the high import dependence on natural gas, the high dependence on one country is also risky. Today, Turkey's dependence

⁵⁰⁹ Pamir, *Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Enerji*, p. 11.

⁵¹⁰ http://www.botas.gov.tr/dogalgaz/dg_arztaleb_sen.asp (18.04.2008).

⁵¹¹ "Silivri Doğalgaz Deposu Açılıyor", *Hürriyet*, 05.07.2007, <http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=6835979> (19.04.2008).

⁵¹² <http://www.botas.gov.tr/> (09.12.2008).

⁵¹³ Ahmet Kıvanç, "Gaz Kesilmez, Depolar Dolu", *Radikal*, 08.01.2008, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=243839> (19.04.2008).

⁵¹⁴ http://www.botas.gov.tr/dogalgaz/dg_ticareti.asp (19.04.2008).

⁵¹⁵ Bilgin, *Caspian Energy Regime*, p. 18.

on Russian gas is about 60 percent; which is very dangerous for Turkey's energy security.⁵¹⁶

3.2.2.2 Pipeline Policy

The aim of becoming a major transit terminal in the region is a significant aspect of Turkey's energy strategy. Turkey is geographically proximate to 71.8% of the world's proven gas reserves and 72.7% of the world's proven oil reserves.⁵¹⁷ Its geopolitical location grants Turkey to become a natural (energy) bridge between the energy-rich producer countries of the Middle East and the Caspian on the one hand and the energy-hungry consumer countries of the West on the other hand.

The present projects that serve Turkey's purpose of being an energy corridor between the East and the West are: Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline Project, Turkey-Greece-Italy Natural Gas Pipeline Project, Azerbaijan-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline Project, Transcaspian Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe Natural Gas Pipeline Project, Egypt-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline Project, Iraq-Turkey Gas Pipeline Project, Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria Natural Gas Pipeline Project (Nabucco).⁵¹⁸

The Middle East region is the world's oil depot. Since oil can be transported through tankers, pipelines are not so necessary. Moreover, the Middle East is not a landlocked region; it is easy to transship Middle East oil to the world markets. Therefore, before the opening of Caspian oil and gas to the world, Turkey did not have a claim as being an energy corridor. At the beginning of the 21st century, the Caspian Basin exported only 42% per cent of its crude oil production and only 9% percent of its natural gas production. In 2010, it seems that these estimates will reach 60% and 40% in turn in order.⁵¹⁹ However, Central Asia is a landlocked region so the

⁵¹⁶ Dokuzlar, p. 201.

⁵¹⁷ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, "Türkiye'nin Enerji Stratejisi", Ocak 2008, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Turkiyenin_Enerji_Stratejisi_Ocak2008.pdf (03.06.2008), p.2.

⁵¹⁸ <http://www.botas.gov.tr/> (06.03.2008).

⁵¹⁹ Pala, p. 24.

hydrocarbons in this region have to be transported through pipelines. It is also possible to transport the region's energy first to the Black Sea and then to the world markets via tankers. Natural gas can be transported by tankers, too. Yet, in order to transport natural gas via tankers, it should be liquified; but this is a costly transaction. As a result, pipelines are preferred in gas transportation.

The existing pipeline system in the region is inherited from the Soviet era, so it is serving the RF. Those pipelines are insufficient to transport the region's present production to the world markets since they are old and neglected.⁵²⁰ Through the realization of alternative pipelines, the Central Asian States could reduce their dependency on Russia, which will enable them to realize uninterrupted export at market prices.⁵²¹ In this respect, Turkey emerges as a natural transit route for Central Asian oil and gas. It wants to benefit from its geopolitical location by transporting Central Asian energy to Europe either by pipelines or to the Pacific by tankers from a LNG terminal established Ceyhan terminal station.⁵²² The region's oil and gas are crucial for Turkey for providing supply diversification, and enabling an opportunity to TPAO for joining in the consortiums in the region.⁵²³

Caspian oil and gas have an important place in Turkey's pipeline policy. With the opening of the region's hydrocarbon sources to the world markets, Turkey caught a chance for being an energy transit route and found a new area for increasing its ties with Europe. It has realized major pipeline projects and some others are under construction. These pipelines supply the necessary oil and gas to Turkey, bring Turkey transit revenues, and increase its prestige in the international arena. They also contribute to safety and environmental protection of Turkish Straits by decreasing heavy tanker traffic passing through the Bosphorus. Around 3.7% of the world's daily oil consumption is shipped through the Turkish Straits. It is expected that 150 million tons of oil and oil products that was shipped through the

⁵²⁰ Pala, p. 24.

⁵²¹ Dokuzlar, p. 175.

⁵²² Dokuzlar, p. 169.

⁵²³ Dokuzlar, p. 175.

Turkish Straits in 2005 will reach around 190-200 million tons in 2009.⁵²⁴ Such a sharp increase in tanker traffic creates serious threats for the people and environment surrounding the Straits. Thus, Turkey's search for alternative pipeline routes is necessary for decreasing the tanker traffic of the Bosphorus. The BTC was the first realized bypass project. When finished, also the Samsun-Ceyhan by-pass oil pipeline will contribute to the relief of the traffic of the Straits⁵²⁵

The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan project, namely, the 'Project of the Century', which is the main export-route for Azeri oil, was completed on 13 July 2006. It is now in operation and Turkey tries to make Ceyhan one of the main distribution centres in the international oil market. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline that transports Azeri gas from the Sahdeniz field is active since July 3, 2007. This project is the part of Trans-Caspian Natural Gas project that will transport Turkmen gas to Western markets. Moreover, the works for the realization of the Nabucco Project, which will transport the natural gas via Turkey through Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to Austria, is continuing. Besides the East-West corridor, Turkey also attributes special importance to North-South axis. The Samsun-Ceyhan (Trans Anatolian) by-pass oil pipeline is at project stage.⁵²⁶ Realization of these projects will make Turkey Europe's fourth main artery of energy supply following Norway, Russia, and Algeria.⁵²⁷


⁵²⁴ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, "Türkiye'nin Enerji Stratejisi", Ocak 2008, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Turkiyenin_Enerji_Stratejisi_Ocak2008.pdf (03.06.2008), p. 3.

⁵²⁵ "Samsun Ceyhan Boru Hattı 1.5 Milyar Dolara Mal Olacak", **Hürriyet**, 22.06.2006, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/4628539.asp> (16.04.2008).

⁵²⁶ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/GenelGorunum/ekonomi.htm (03.06.2008).

⁵²⁷ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, "Türkiye'nin Enerji Stratejisi", Ocak 2008, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Turkiyenin_Enerji_Stratejisi_Ocak2008.pdf (03.06.2008), p. 4.

Figure 13. The pipeline projects passing from Turkey



Source: <http://www.botas.gov.tr/> (14.12.2008).

The realized and projected pipelines will secure, stabilize, and diversify the growing energy need of Turkey while at the same time contribute to Europe's energy security by linking Central Asia to the Western markets. To serve its object of being an energy corridor and an energy hub, Turkey has concentrated on the transportation of Caspian oil and gas to Western markets, on the realization of the "East-West Energy Corridor", namely, the "Silk Road of the 21st Century".⁵²⁸ The "East-West Energy Corridor" consists of three main projects: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline, the South Caucasus Natural Gas Pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline), and Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe Natural Gas Pipeline.⁵²⁹ These projects, besides providing the benefits listed above, will also make a significant contribution to Turkey's EU dream. The pipelines have achieved what we

⁵²⁸ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, "Türkiye'nin Enerji Stratejisi", Ocak 2008, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Turkiyenin_Enerji_Stratejisi_Ocak2008.pdf (03.06.2008), p.2.

⁵²⁹ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/GenelGorunum/ekonomi.htm (03.06.2008).

failed to make hitherto: “We are entering into the European Union with pipelines.”⁵³⁰ Yigal Schleifer, too, properly defines Turkey’s pipeline efforts: “Some 800 years later, Turkey is again trying to take advantage of its strategic location. Today, instead of caravansaries, it is building pipelines, and instead of silk and spices the products are less romantic: oil and natural gas.”⁵³¹

In order to be an energy corridor, Turkey should realize the projected natural gas pipelines besides the existing working ones. When the natural gas pipeline linking Turkey and Greece extended to Italy and the Nabucco Project (Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria Natural Gas Pipeline) and the Trans-Caspian Project are realized, Turkey will achieve its aim of being an energy transit country.

Tentative remarks

Until the 1990s, Turkey pursued an inward-looking energy policy and tried to meet its energy needs from its own domestic sources. Yet, the production was far below the needs of Turkey as a developing country.⁵³² Thus, the importation of energy resources from abroad began in the late 1980s. Today, since the domestic production of oil and gas is far below the demand; Turkey is a net importer of oil and gas. New reserves can be discovered if the exploration and drilling activities increase throughout the country. There are many virgin fields in Turkey that have not been drilled yet. In case of positive findings, Turkey could increase its domestic hydrocarbon production. On the other hand, Turkey has an important potential of renewable energy. If it exploits its hydropower, geothermal, wind and solar energy potential, it could reduce the share of oil and gas in total primary energy sources. Turkey has one more alternative to decrease its heavy dependence on imported resources: nuclear energy. Despite the efforts, Turkey has not achieved to establish a nuclear power plant.

⁵³⁰ Bacık, p. 304.

⁵³¹ Yigal Schleifer, "Pipeline Politics give Turkey an Edge", **Christian Science Monitor**, 25.05.2005, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0525/p06s01-woeu.html> (03.07.2008).

⁵³² İskit, p.1.

In general, Turkey's energy policy is founded on two main aims: achieving energy security by diversifying the country's energy sources and supplier states; and being an energy hub in its region. Although Turkey's official energy policy is determined as such, the governments are often criticized for the lack of a stable, coherent, and efficient energy policy. Süreyya Yücel Özden, the chief of World Energy Council Turkish National Committee, emphasizes the need for a general energy planning that will reveal the energy potential, mainly the fuel potential, of Turkey through detailed research and exploration of indigenous energy resources. According to him, Turkey's energy policy should pay much regard to national interests of the country and should focus on its domestic resources, especially on the renewables, to decrease import dependence in general, and high natural gas dependence, in particular.⁵³³ The danger against Turkey's energy security is seen especially in natural gas. The share of natural gas in total primary energy sources is increasing sharply and unfortunately, Turkey is mainly dependent on one supplier country, the Russian Federation. According to Fatih Birol, the chief economist of IEA, energy efficiency and the exploitation of its hydroelectric, solar, and geothermal potential should be the main points of Turkey's energy strategy.⁵³⁴ Sinan Oğan, the chief of TURKSAM (Turkish Centre for International Relations and Strategic Analysis), criticizes Turkey for ignoring the importance of 'energy diplomacy' as a foreign policy tool. According to him, Turkey has neither achieved supply diversity nor can it be the main outlet for Caspian oil and gas. For him, "Today, the key of Caspian region is in the hands of Russia."⁵³⁵ On the other side, there are also some who describes the country's energy policies as positive. According to Gökhan Bacık, the energy policy that is followed in recent years is successful: Turkey has liberalized the energy market through many reforms, and reorganized the energy system according to international conditions. Besides, it has cooperated with the states such as Russia, Iran, and Greece in the energy related

⁵³³ "Türkiye'nin Enerji Raporu Açıklandı", 16.03.2008, http://www.cnnturk.com/EKONOMI/GENEL/haber_detay.asp?PID=40&haberID=438472 (01.04.2008).

⁵³⁴ <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=93415> (30.03.2008).

⁵³⁵ Sinan Oğan, "Guiseppe Verdi'nin Nabucco Operası", **TURKSAM**, 06.02.2008, <http://www.turksam.org/tr/a1382.html> (16.04.2008).

issues, and it has achieved to use energy as a political leverage in its relations with the European Union.⁵³⁶

Turkey's goal of being an energy corridor in its region includes some problems. Although Turkey has the potential for being an energy bridge between East and West, the realization of this target is dependent on the others' will. If the producer and exporter countries do not prefer Turkey for the transport of their oil and gas; or if the importer countries cease their support for the pipelines passing through Turkey and begin to seek alternative routes, then, the term 'energy bridge' would not make sense. Fortunately, the importer countries, namely, the European countries, try to reduce their high dependency to Russian gas. Thus, it is rational to anticipate that the West's support for the pipeline routes passing through Turkey will continue. Yet, regarding the producer countries, Turkey's job becomes harder. The Russian Federation is a powerful rival that could by-pass Turkey's pipeline plans. For instance, the Transcaspian and Nabucco pipeline projects were postponed since Russia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan came to an agreement for the transport of Turkmen gas to the Russian Federation via Kazakhstan.⁵³⁷ Thus, an energy policy that relies on 'external will' creates difficulties. As Turkey continues to be an 'energy supplicant', it will inevitably keep on being economically and also politically dependent on other states.⁵³⁸ Therefore, the necessity of turning towards its domestic energy sources and intensifying on nuclear energy becomes clear in that point.

In this chapter, I have discussed Turkey's energy profile and its energy policies. I have studied the energy reserves, energy consumption and production figures of Turkey and examined the indigenous and imported energy sources one by one. Later, in the light of Turkey's energy profile, I have studied its energy policy and the institutions that are responsible from this policy. I have dealt with the negative and positive aspects of its resource and pipeline policies. The detailed evaluation of Turkey's pipeline policy will be studied in the next chapter of my dissertation.

⁵³⁶ Bacık, p. 303.

⁵³⁷ "Türkmen Gazı İçin Rus Boru Hattı", 20.12.2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2007/12/071220_russia_pipeline.shtml (15.04.2008).

⁵³⁸ Gareth M. Winrow, "Pivotal State or Energy Supplicant? Domestic Structure, External Actors, and Turkish Policy in the Caucasus", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol:57, No:1, Winter 2003 (Pivotal State), p. 76.

PART IV

TURKEY IN CENTRAL ASIA: ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES

The last chapter of my dissertation is a general evaluation of Turkey's foreign policy towards Central Asia since the 1990s. Here, I will examine the main achievements and failures of Turkey's Central Asian policy.

The sudden and unanticipated collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 aroused bewilderment and curiosity all over the world. Turkey was very affected by such a drastic change in world politics. Turkish policy makers were anxious about Turkey's strategic importance in the eyes of the West. Once a bulwark of the West against the Soviet communism, what will be Turkey's geopolitical importance in the absence of a Soviet threat? These concerns, together with the rejection of Turkey's full membership application to the EU, created anxiety in Turkey. That is why the emergence of sister Turkic states in the Turkish motherlands created a great wave of excitement in almost all political wings in Turkey. The big expectations and pretentious statements took part in the minds and speeches of the politicians. Turkey tried to develop close political, economic, and cultural relations with the newly emerged Turkic Republics. She even tried to be a model for them. She had big targets; yet insufficient means. Towards the mid-1990s, the gap between the aims and capabilities of Turkey came to light.

At the beginning, the demise of the Soviet Union decreased the importance of Turkey in the eyes of the West by removing the need for a buffer state against the communist threat. It had reflections also on Turkey-EU relations. Yet, the breakdown of the USSR also generated new opportunities and openings for Turkish foreign policy. By Hunter's words, "The systemic changes generated by Soviet Union's collapse produced winners and losers. Turkey, as a NATO member and an aspirant for EU membership, was certainly a beneficiary of the post-Soviet systemic changes."⁵³⁹ In this chapter, I will study achievements and failures of Turkey's

⁵³⁹ Hunter, *Ten Years After Independence*, p. 5.

economic, cultural, political, military, and energy policies towards the region and try to infer whether Turkey could benefit from the opportunities created by the decline of the Soviet Union.

4.1 ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES: FROM 1991 TO THE PRESENT

The business and investments of the Turkish firms in Central Asia, the credits that have opened to the region's states, the initiatives in the field of culture and education such as the large scholarship programs provided for Central Asian students, and the schools, universities, and cultural centers opened in the region, could be written to the achievements section. When we look to the picture of today, we see that the relations between Turkey and Central Asia intensify in the economic and cultural area. Energy forms the basis of economic relations. Turkey emerges as a client and also a transporter of the region's vast energy sources. TPAO joins in the Caspian energy development projects. In addition, Turkish companies are active in Central Asia in certain sectors such as construction and textile. State agencies like TİKA, TURKSOY and some other private institutions try to increase cultural ties with the region by establishing schools and cultural centers and offering scholarships to the students coming from the Turkic Republics.

Yet, the dream of Turkey for being a 'leader' in the region has failed as a result of the renewed Russian influence, the insufficient financial capacity of Turkey, the declined Western support, and the reluctance of authoritarian local leaders for adopting the leadership of Turkey, whose political structure has democratic components.⁵⁴⁰ Turkey, despite its activism in the first half of the 1990s, has failed to achieve the leadership role in the ex-Soviet territory as a result of its political and economic problems.⁵⁴¹ It has not emerged as the main influential player in the region either politically, ideologically, economically, or even culturally, but it has established intense political, military, economic and cultural relations with the Turkic

⁵⁴⁰ Öniş, pp. 68, 69.

⁵⁴¹ Igor Torbakov, "Ankara's Post-Soviet Efforts in the Caucasus and Central Asia: The Failure of the 'Turkic World' Model", *Eurasia Insight*, 26.12.2002, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav122602.shtml> (23.06.2008).

Republics. Turkey's influence is mainly felt in the South Caucasus, namely in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Yet, in Central Asia, Turkey has faced more Russian rivalry. It has an important presence in Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, but generally speaking, Central Asian states have developed closer ties with Russia than Turkey. Russian Federation is influential mainly in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan due to the geographical proximity, the large Russian minorities in those countries and the dependence of those states on the Russian security provision.⁵⁴²

4.1.1 Politics

The demise of the Soviet Union became a starting point in the Turkish-Central Asian relations. Emergence of Turkic States in Central Asia, which have common historical, religious, linguistic, and cultural ties with Turkey, made the region an important focus of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has four main foreign policy aims towards Central Asia: "contributing the Central Asian states' nation-building process, supporting their economic and political reform process, helping them in their incorporation to the world, and developing bilateral relations on the basis of mutual interests and equality."⁵⁴³

From the beginning of their independence, Turkey has tried to help the Central Asian States in their economic, political, and social transition. In the first years of their independence, Turkey wanted to be a democratic, liberal, and secular 'model' to them. Thus, Turkey could gain political and economic influence in the region and become effective in world politics. For Central Asian Republics, Turkey was a country that could guide and support them in their opening to the West and in transition to democracy and market economy after seventy years of closed Soviet rule. The relations began with great expectations. In many fields, Turkey and local leaders signed bilateral cooperation agreements. Through the state institutions, Turkey provided economic aid, financial credits and technical support to the Turkic Republics. Besides the state investments, Turkish private sector also run business and

⁵⁴² Hunter, *Ten Years After Independence*, p. 14.

⁵⁴³ Ertan Efeğil, "Türkiye'nin Orta Asya Politikasının Rasyonalitesi Sorunu", *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol: 12, No: 1, 2006 (Rasyonalitesi Sorunu), p. 276.

made investments in the region. Yet, the relations could not reach the desired level. In comparison to the economic and cultural relations, political relations with Central Asia has been weaker. Because of some internal and external reasons, political relations has not advanced as Turkey planned. According to Gökçen Oğan, a specialist in Central Asia, the external reasons were the increasing power rivalry in the region, the change in Russian foreign policy towards the region after 1993, and the decline in the interest of Central Asian Republics towards Turkey. The internal reasons were the lack of a determined national strategy, the economic insufficiencies, the problems faced in internal politics, and the lack of knowledge about the region.⁵⁴⁴ Although Turkey was one of the most fortunate countries in regard to establishing close relations with the Central Asian states, it has not sufficiently utilized from its potential. The relations have remained at leader's level rather than being institutionalized; and Turkey could not increase mutual dependence with Central Asian countries.⁵⁴⁵ With the beginning unpreparedness and insufficient knowledge towards the region, Turkey preferred to follow the policies of international organizations which it is a member of. This prevented Turkey from developing and executing independent national policies.⁵⁴⁶ Turkey did not notice that "Central Asian States could have particular priorities resulting from their own geography, strategies, and sociological structures."⁵⁴⁷ Turkey, as the West did, acted as if the each of the Central Asian Republics is a part of a 'whole' and lumped them together.⁵⁴⁸ Moreover, it conducted its relations with the region through 'slogan politics'. The emotional approach and the pretentious statements created suspicion in Russia and in the Turkic Republics.⁵⁴⁹ While determining its Central Asian policy, Turkey did not notice its real strength. For instance, in 1992, the sum of economic aid that Turkey promised to the CAR was eighty percent of its gross national product.⁵⁵⁰ According to Yelda Demirağ, the main reason that prevented the relations from reaching upper levels is Turkey's lack of sufficient knowledge about the region. Besides, the initial

⁵⁴⁴ Gökçen Oğan, "Türkiye'nin Orta Asya Politikası'nın Açmazları", **Stratejik Analiz**, Eylül 2006 (Orta Asya Açmazları), p.44.

⁵⁴⁵ Gökçen Oğan, "Türkiye Orta Asya Politikasını Gözden Geçiriyor", **ASAM**, 21.11.2006, <http://www.asam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.asp?ID=1242&kat1=7&kat2=> (18.05.2008).

⁵⁴⁶ Oğan, Orta Asya Açmazları, p. 39.

⁵⁴⁷ Efegil, Rasyonalitesi Sorunu, p. 286.

⁵⁴⁸ Efegil, Rasyonalitesi Sorunu, p. 286.

⁵⁴⁹ Oğan, Orta Asya Açmazları, p.41.

⁵⁵⁰ Efegil, Rasyonalitesi Sorunu, p. 287.

sentimentality, the mistaken statements, and exaggerated promises, created suspicion among the Turkic Republics, which were just broke their Russian chains. Although they needed Turkey's pioneering and support in Western institutions at the beginning, Turkey's claim for being a 'bridge' lost its value by the rejection of its membership application to the EU. Moreover, as the oil companies began to enter into the region, the Republics' need of an agent disappeared. The Russian policy of 'Near Abroad', the internal political and economic problems of Turkey and the problems of Turkey in its relations with Syria, Iraq, and Greece in that period, and the relief of the Western fears about the intentions of Iran, negatively affected the success of the Turkish model.⁵⁵¹ Oğan criticizes Turkey's policy of being a role model for the Central Asian Republics: "Ankara's relations with the Central Asian Republics is regarded as 'infrastructural works' done with the identity of a model country. Rather than activating Turkey's potential in the region, it has served the interests of others more than Turkey's own interests."⁵⁵² There are some additional points that limit Turkey's policies towards the region. First of all, Central Asia has been regarded as a substitution to the European Union⁵⁵³ rather than a complement. When rejected by the EU, Turkey turned its direction towards the East; but when it saw a green light, it orientated towards the West. In 1997, when Turkey was rejected as a full member in EU's Luxembourg Summit, the decision-makers turned towards Central Asia. Yet, when it was declared as a candidate country in 1999 Helsinki Summit, a Western orientation began to be seen in Turkish foreign policy; and Central Asia became a region that supported Turkey's EU-centered policies.⁵⁵⁴ In fact, there is an important connection point between Turkey's EU policy and Central Asian policy: energy. Turkey is of critical importance for EU's energy security since it is the country that will transport the Caspian energy to the European markets. Thus, rather than regarding the EU as an alternative to Central Asia or vice versa, Turkey should combine the policies it pursues towards these regions. Another

⁵⁵¹ Yelda Demirağ, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Türkiye'nin Orta Asya Siyasetinde Geline Nokta", **Jeopolitik**, Vol:5, http://www.jeopolitik.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=22&Itemid=28 (30.11.2008).

⁵⁵² Oğan, Orta Asya Açmazları, p. 44.

⁵⁵³ Oğan, Orta Asya Açmazları, p.44.

⁵⁵⁴ Ertan Efegil, "Ak Parti'nin Orta Asya Politikası Üzerine Genel Bir Bakış", <http://busam.beykent.edu.tr/resimy/ERTAN-EFEGİL1.doc> (18.05.2008), p. 1.

restricting point in Turkey's Central Asian policy is Turkey's dilemma on whether it should criticize the anti-democratic practices of the local leaders or better ignore them not to upset the bilateral relations.⁵⁵⁵ Turkey's deteriorating relations with Uzbekistan after the Andijon events is an example of this dilemma.

The failure of the institutionalization of the bilateral relations is another factor that has restricted Turkey. Since the Turkic Republics' political structure is akin to the presidency system, the Presidents are more active in conducting foreign relations. Thus, since the Özal's era, bilateral relations with the Turkic Republics have been executed at president level.⁵⁵⁶ The time of Özal was the most active period in Turkey's relations with Central Asia. In many areas from education to trade, the basis of relations was established in Özal's era.⁵⁵⁷ Although Özal did not achieve to initiate the 'Turkic age', he made Turkey an important player in Central Asia and laid the foundation of economic and political relations.⁵⁵⁸ To say by the words of Ruseckas, "Even if Özal's initial vision proved somewhat unrealistic, his policy and the effects it generated did set the tone for Turkish policy for the rest of the 1990s."⁵⁵⁹ Yet, the relations, which had continued to be intense in the period of Süleyman Demirel, has lost the initial excitement in the course of time. The subsequent leaders began to follow more 'self-possessed' policies.⁵⁶⁰ The President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the successor of Süleyman Demirel, was often criticized for causing a 'pause' in bilateral political relations with Central Asian countries. When Abdullah Gül became President, it was estimated that he would continue from the point that Demirel left, and he was thought to follow the line of Özal.⁵⁶¹ He made his first visit to Azerbaijan and he took the representatives of the business world with him, which denoted the state support for private initiatives and investments in

⁵⁵⁵ Oğan, Orta Asya Açmazları, pp. 42-43.

⁵⁵⁶ Abdullah Aydoğan Kalabalık, "Türkiye Dümeni Orta Asya'ya Kırdı", **Dünya Bülteni**, 15.12.2007, http://www.dunyabulteni.net/news_detail.php?id=29655&uniq_id=1202463017 (10.07.2008).

⁵⁵⁷ Sedat Laçiner, "Orta Asya ve Türkiye", USAK, 18.05.2005, <http://www.usakgundem.com/yazarlar.php?id=43&type=3> (19.02.2008).

⁵⁵⁸ Laurent Ruseckas, "Turkey and Eurasia: Opportunities and Risks in the Caspian Pipeline Derby", **Journal of International Affairs**, Vol:54, No:1, Fall 2000, p. 234.

⁵⁵⁹ Ruseckas, p. 222.

⁵⁶⁰ Ertan Efeğil, "Ak Parti'nin Orta Asya Politikası Üzerine Genel Bir Bakış", <http://busam.beykent.edu.tr/resimy/ERTAN-EFEGİL1.doc> (18.05.2008), p. 1.

⁵⁶¹ Abdullah Aydoğan Kalabalık, "Türkiye Dümeni Orta Asya'ya Kırdı", **Dünya Bülteni**, 15.12.2007, http://www.dunyabulteni.net/news_detail.php?id=29655&uniq_id=1202463017 (10.07.2008).

Central Asia. In this respect, some thought that the ‘interval’ in Turkey-Central Asia relations in Sezer’s period, has experienced a revival in Gül’s presidency.⁵⁶² According to Ahat Andican, the former State Minister responsible from Turkey’s relations with the Central Asian States, the close relations that began in the period of Özal and continued in Demirel’s presidency, become insufficient in Sezer’s period. He says that after 2001, the relations with the region has declined to the lowest level, the reciprocal visits ended, and annual meetings ceased. After 2001, the leaders of the region convened only in 2006 and only three leaders attended to that meeting. He adds that the fear of the region’s leaders from the fundamentalist movements caused them to doubt about the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) government. Besides, since the JDP followed its Central Asian policy by taking into consideration the RF, and pursued a Russia-focused Eurasian policy, it became difficult to intense the bilateral relations with the Turkic Republics.⁵⁶³

As a result of the relations conducted at leaders level, Turkey failed to institutionalize its bilateral relations with the Central Asian states. It conducted the relations on the level of presidency. On the contrary of the states such as the U.S. and United Kingdom, which have commercial, economical, and cultural representations with a sufficient staff in the region besides the embassies, Turkish state institutions such as TİKA, DTM, the Ministry of Finance, etc. each has only one representative or coordinator in the consulates or embassies in the Central Asian States. Thus, while they can always serve their citizens, businessmen, and educators in the region, and institutionalize their bilateral relations with the region’s states, Turkey has conducted its bilateral relations with the CAR on the basis of the statesmen and failed to make its bilateral relations permanent. 564 Each president or government looked at Central Asia from its own ideological perspective. While some attributed great importance to the region, others turned their face to another region. For instance, while nationalist decision-makers mentioned even the ‘political union’ with Central

⁵⁶² Barçın Yinanç, "Gül to Revive Relations", **Turkish Daily News**, 19.11.2007, <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=88982> (21.06.2008).

⁵⁶³ [http://busam.beykent.edu.tr/\(X\(1\)S\(ax2g5o45pg1nm045zxgwbp45\)\)/sayfagoster.aspx?sayfa=26&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1](http://busam.beykent.edu.tr/(X(1)S(ax2g5o45pg1nm045zxgwbp45))/sayfagoster.aspx?sayfa=26&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1) (05.12.2008).

⁵⁶⁴ Efegil, Rasyonalitesi Sorunu, p.287.

Asia, the Refah Party turned towards the Islamic countries and tried to realize a project comprising Nigeria on the one end, and Indonesia on the other.⁵⁶⁵ The necessity of institutionalized relations is also emphasized by Ahat Andican: “In order to be influential, we should make those states feel that they are the primary elements of our foreign policy. Today, we have focused to the EU and leave aside the region. Institutionalization is inevitable in order to improve the relations.”⁵⁶⁶

In the political arena, it is very difficult for Turkey to establish a political union with the Turkic Republics and to undertake the leadership of that union. There are two main conditions to achieve this: to be a geographically central country and to constitute a group of nations that are economically, politically, socially akin. Unfortunately, neither Turkey is a central country in terms of geography nor the Turkic Republics and Turkey are economically, politically, and socially so akin to each other to constitute a Union. For the present, Turkey has to be contented with establishing permanent and close political relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia in the region.⁵⁶⁷ Today, Turkey’s foreign policy towards Central Asia considers to preserve good relations with Iran and Russia and to help Central Asian states in acquiring necessary abilities to establish stability and security at home. Turkey’s official Central Asian policy is also supported by civil societal activities, namely by the businessmen, contractors, and civil society organizations.⁵⁶⁸

4.1.2 Economy

Turkey’s economic involvement in Central Asia is executed at two levels: offering technical and financial support by state agencies such as TİKA and

⁵⁶⁵ Efegil, Rasyonallitesi Sorunu, p. 287

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[http://busam.beykent.edu.tr/\(X\(1\)S\(ax2g5o45pg1nm045zxgwbp45\)\)/sayfagoster.aspx?sayfa=26&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1](http://busam.beykent.edu.tr/(X(1)S(ax2g5o45pg1nm045zxgwbp45))/sayfagoster.aspx?sayfa=26&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1) (05.12.2008).

⁵⁶⁷[http://busam.beykent.edu.tr/\(X\(1\)S\(ax2g5o45pg1nm045zxgwbp45\)\)/sayfagoster.aspx?sayfa=26&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1](http://busam.beykent.edu.tr/(X(1)S(ax2g5o45pg1nm045zxgwbp45))/sayfagoster.aspx?sayfa=26&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1) (05.12.2008).

⁵⁶⁸ Bülent Aras, "Turkish Policy toward Central Asia", **SETA Policy Brief**, No:12, April 2008, http://www.setav.org/document/Policy_Brief_No_12_Bulent_Aras.pdf?phpMyAdmin=e008732753bf014f26cf3b79aa21f1f1 (29.04.2008), p. 3.

Eximbank, and investments by Turkish businessmen.⁵⁶⁹ In the first years of their independence, Turkey eagerly tried to develop economic cooperation with Turkic Republics and assisted them technically and financially. TİKA was established to coordinate the aids that were provided to the Central Asian Republics. The infrastructure projects undertaken by TİKA in the region in the fields of education, health, transportation, and management have exceeded \$100 million.⁵⁷⁰ Turkey offered loans to the Turkic Republics for their economic development. Between 1992 and 1997, the total foreign aid and credits provided to Turkic Republics by Turkey reached \$ 1.6 billion.⁵⁷¹ Through Turkish-Eximbank credits, Turkey also provided export credits and project credits to Turkish investors that make business in ex-Soviet Republics.

Beginning from the mid-1990s, Central Asia began to get farther from Turkey. The economic crisis experienced in the 1990s and in 2001 sabotaged the deepening of Turkey's economic ties with Central Asia.⁵⁷² In the course of time, it was understood that Turkey did not have sufficient economic resource to become a leader in Central Asia.⁵⁷³ In these years, the main initiatives were undertaken by small and medium-sized enterprises and civil society organizations.⁵⁷⁴ Turkey provided Turkic Republics technical assistance, gave credits and financial aid, yet, ignored the necessity of strengthening of economic bonds and realizing export growth. The aids provided by Turkey were used in buying technical equipment from Japan or the United States so, the Republics contributed to the export of those

⁵⁶⁹ Natalia Mkhitarian, "Consolidation of the Turkic World in the Ideology and Political Practice of Official Ankara", http://www.ca-c.org/online/2004/journal_eng/cac-05/15.mkheng.shtml (18.07.2008).

⁵⁷⁰ Süleyman Demirel, "Changing Central Asia in the New World Order", **Turkish Daily News**, 19.09.2007.

⁵⁷¹ Muhammed Akdiş, "Orta Asya Türk Cumhuriyetleri ile Ekonomik Sosyal Kültürel İlişkiler-Bölgeye Yabancı İlgisi ve Beklentiler", <http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmadmin/upload/EAD/TanitimKoordinasyonDb/ortaasya.doc> (20.07.2008), p.9.

⁵⁷² Bülent Aras, "Turkish Policy toward Central Asia", **SETA Policy Brief**, No:12, April 2008, http://www.setav.org/document/Policy_Brief_No_12_Bulent_Aras.pdf?phpMyAdmin=e008732753bf014f26cf3b79aa21f1f1 (29.04.2008), p. 2.

⁵⁷³ Ümit Kumcuoğlu, "Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası", **Akşam**, 22 Aralık 2003.

⁵⁷⁴ Bülent Aras, "Turkish Policy toward Central Asia", **SETA Policy Brief**, No:12, April 2008, http://www.setav.org/document/Policy_Brief_No_12_Bulent_Aras.pdf?phpMyAdmin=e008732753bf014f26cf3b79aa21f1f1 (29.04.2008), p. 2.

countries rather than Turkey. Moreover, Turkey faced problems in taking back the credits given by Turkish Eximbank.⁵⁷⁵

From 1984 to 1990, Turkey experienced uninterrupted economic progress, yet by 1992 the economy came closer to crisis. Thus, Turkey failed to provide the promised quantities of economic aid to the Central Asian Republics.⁵⁷⁶ The Turkish Eximbank credits given to the republics were infact a ‘goodwill gesture’ since it is inadequate to be a real contribution to the local economies of the region.⁵⁷⁷ The disappointment faced by the countries of the region, experienced also by Turkish businessmen and investors since they could not take enough support. Deprived of sufficient state prop and guarantees, many of them took risks to make business in Central Asia.⁵⁷⁸

Since 1993, the foreign policy orientations of the Turkic Republics point out that Turkey is only one of the Republics’ economic partners; it does not have a prior or superior position. On the other hand, it seems that today, the Russian Federation is the main economic partner of Central Asian states. In 2006, Russia’s share in Kyrgyzstan’s foreign trade was 27.24 percent; in Uzbekistan’s, 16.39 percent, and in Kazakhstan’s 18.87 percent.⁵⁷⁹ Central Asia states have crucial economic ties also with China. In 2006 foreign trade volume of Central Asia, Russia’s share was 17 percent, while China’s was 12 percent.⁵⁸⁰ According to Under-secretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade (DTM) data, in May 2008, the place of Central Asian Republics in the sequence of the first forty countries in Turkey’s export is as

⁵⁷⁵ Gökçen Oğan, *Orta Asya Açmazları*, p. 40.

⁵⁷⁶ Gordon Feller, “Turkey’s New Government Looking Again to the Caucasus and Central Asia”, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, December 1997, <http://www.wrmea.com/backissues/1297/9712026.html> (24.06.2008).

⁵⁷⁷ Robins, p. 608.

⁵⁷⁸ Natalia Mkhitarian, "Consolidation of the Turkic World in the Ideology and Political Practice of Official Ankara", http://www.ca-c.org/online/2004/journal_eng/cac-05/15.mkheng.shtml (18.07.2008).

⁵⁷⁹ Alexander Kniazev, "Russia in Central Asia: Return", <http://www.ca-c.org/journal/2007-05-eng/03.shtml> (09.07.2008).

⁵⁸⁰ Alexander Kniazev, "Russia in Central Asia: Return", <http://www.ca-c.org/journal/2007-05-eng/03.shtml> (09.07.2008).

such: Azerbaijan-Nahcivan is the 19th and Kazakhstan is the 35th.⁵⁸¹ The rest of the CAR do not take part among the countries that Turkey has intense export ties. As for Turkey's import in May 2008, in the ordering of first 40 countries, Kazakhstan is the 15th.⁵⁸² The other Central Asian Republics do not take part in the list of first forty countries of import. The September 2008 data of the DTM indicates that among the first forty countries in Turkey's export, Azerbaijan is 20th and Kazakhstan is 33th.⁵⁸³ Again as to the DTM September 2008 data, in the sequence of the first forty countries in Turkey's import, Kazakhstan is the 21th and Azerbaijan is the 39th.⁵⁸⁴ According to those figures, among the Turkic Republics, the most intense trade relations are with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Turkey's trade with other Turkic Republics is at insufficient levels.

Until 2000, there were 1950 Turkish firms operating in Central Asia. Turkey's trade volume with the region was about \$ 8.7 billion. The sum of Turkish firms' investments in the region reached \$ 3.5 billion. The construction services were about \$ 10 billion.⁵⁸⁵ Today, Turkish investments in the region exceed \$ 4 billion, and the projects undertaken by Turkish contractors are valued \$ 15 billion. The trade volume with the region in 2006 was \$3 billion.⁵⁸⁶ Turkey's trade volume only with Ukraine is about \$ 4 billion. This indicates that Turkey's \$ 3 billion trade volume with the region's countries is so small. Of Turkey's \$ 220 billion foreign trade volume, merely 1.07 percent is with Central Asian countries.⁵⁸⁷ These figures are insufficient to make Turkey a leading economic actor in the region. To make a general evaluation, in Central Asia, the US and the European Union are the main

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<http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmweb/index.cfm?action=detayrk&yayinID=1116&icerikID=1225&dil=TR> (20.07.2008).

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<http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmweb/index.cfm?action=detayrk&yayinID=1116&icerikID=1225&dil=TR> (20.07.2008).

⁵⁸³ <http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmadmin/upload/EAD/IstatistikDb/eko06.xls> (04.12.2008).

⁵⁸⁴ <http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmadmin/upload/EAD/IstatistikDb/eko07.xls> (04.12.2008).

⁵⁸⁵ Efegil, Rasyonallitesi Sorunu, p. 279.

⁵⁸⁶ Süleyman Demirel, "Changing Central Asia in the New World Order", **Turkish Daily News**, 19.09.2007.

⁵⁸⁷ Ahat Andican,

[http://busam.beykent.edu.tr/\(X\(1\)S\(ax2g5o45pg1nm045zxgwbp45\)\)/sayfagoster.aspx?sayfa=26&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1](http://busam.beykent.edu.tr/(X(1)S(ax2g5o45pg1nm045zxgwbp45))/sayfagoster.aspx?sayfa=26&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1) (05.12.2008).

economic donors, while the Russian Federation and China are the main economic partners of the Republics.

4.1.3 Energy

Energy forms the main part of Turkey's relations with Central Asia. Turkey, with its growing energy demand, is a net customer of Caspian oil and gas. It is also an energy investor in the region. TPAO, the sole national oil company of Turkey, joins the hydrocarbon exploration, development, and production projects in the region. In Azerbaijan, TPAO has 6.75% share in Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli project; it has 9% share in Sahdeniz Project and 10% in Alov project.⁵⁸⁸ Furthermore, it has 6.53% share in BTC Co. and 9% share in South Caucasus Natural Gas Pipeline Project that will carry Shahdeniz gas.⁵⁸⁹ TPAO operates also in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan since 1993.⁵⁹⁰

Being a major energy transit country between the East and the West establishes the essence of Turkey's energy policy towards the Central Asia. In order to achieve this aim, Turkey has realized certain important oil and gas pipeline projects, and some others are at project stage. Looking Turkey-Central Asian relations within the framework of energy, it can be said that in general, the efforts made up to now are affirmative. If the planned pipeline projects are realized, together with the present operating ones, Turkish territory will be covered by the network of pipelines. To define by the words of Jeroen Van der Veer, the Chief of Royal Dutch Shell Executive Committee, "There was not any pipeline in Turkey ten years ago. Thirty years later, when we look, we will see 'a plate of spaghetti' in this geography formed from the pipelines."⁵⁹¹

⁵⁸⁸ http://www.tpao.gov.tr/v1.4/index.php?option=com_section&task=view&id=3&itemid=15 (20.07.2008).

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http://www.tpao.gov.tr/v1.4/index.php?option=com_section&task=view&id=3&itemid=15&subid=65 (30.11.2008).

⁵⁹⁰ See <http://www.tpao.gov.tr>

⁵⁹¹ "Türkiye'nin Boru Hatları Bir Tabak Spagettiye Benzeyecek", **Referans**, 14.11.2008, http://www.referansgazetesi.com/haber.aspx?HBR_KOD=110568&KTG_KOD=190 (15.11.2008).

4.1.3.1 Oil Transportation

Since Central Asia is a landlocked region, the oil and gas produced in the area have to be transported by the pipelines. This necessity causes a pipeline struggle in the region. The international energy companies and governments that make business in Central Asia propose various transit route projects. Turkey is in the middle of that pipeline struggle, and is the chief actor in many oil and gas pipeline projects. At the present time, the oil pipelines that transport the region's oil to world markets are: Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline in the East; Baltic Pipeline System in the North; Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, Baku-Novorossysk, Baku-Supsa, CPC Oil Pipeline (starts from Tengiz in Kazakhstan and ends in Novorossysk) in the West.

The oldest oil pipeline of Turkey is Iraq-Turkey Oil Pipeline (Kerkuk-Yumurtalik) that carries Kerkuk oil in Northern Iraq to the West via Turkey. The other oil pipeline of Turkey is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The BTC is of special importance. The BTC project carrying Azerbaijan's oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean via Georgia was first negotiated in 1992 between Özal and Elchibey and since then, it "...increasingly became the core of Turkish policy toward the Caspian and indeed an important priority of Turkish foreign policy overall."⁵⁹² The BTC project is designed to transport first the Azeri oil than the other oils produced in the region through a pipeline that begins from Baku and ends in Ceyhan. There, the oil is loaded to tankers and sent to world markets. The BTC oil pipeline forms the main leg of the East-West Energy Corridor. It is a big project with a total investment cost of over \$ 3 billion. The Turkish part of the project costed about \$ 1.4 billion and financed not by Turkey itself, but by the companies that joined to the project-BTC Co. TPAO is one of those companies; it has 6.53% share in BTC Co.⁵⁹³ The BTC is a very big project to be called as the most 'shining success' of the West in the Caspian energy development since the demise of the Soviet Union.⁵⁹⁴ Although the project has been often criticized for being costly,

⁵⁹² Ruseckas, pp. 226-227.

⁵⁹³ <http://www.btc.com.tr/proje.html> (30.11.2008).

⁵⁹⁴ John C.K. Daly, "Turkey Seeks to Become Energy Transit Hub", **United Press International**, 28.05.2008, http://www.upi.com/Energy_Resources/2008/05/28/Turkey_seeks_to_become_energy_transit_hub/UPI-48561212007636/ (01.06.2008).

actually, its geostrategic and political significance is bigger than its economic significance.⁵⁹⁵ It is also criticized for the gap between the demand and the supply.⁵⁹⁶ In order to be feasible, the BTC needs 50 million tons of oil per annum. At the present, it is not possible for Azerbaijan to meet it so the BTC pipeline needs also the Kazakh oil to operate at full capacity.⁵⁹⁷ In 2005, Kazakh authorities promised that they will pump 30 percent of their oil production to the BTC that will reach 100 million tons in 2010.⁵⁹⁸ It means that the BTC and the Trans-caspian pipelines are complementary. The realization of Transcaspian oil pipeline is necessary for the efficiency of the BTC. Yet, what is uncertain is whether Kazakhstan can pump enough oil both to the Caspian Pipeline System (Tengiz- Novorossiysk) and the BTC at the same time.⁵⁹⁹

Figure 14. The BTC Pipeline



Source: EIA, "Country Analysis Briefs Turkey", October 2006, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Turkey/pdf.pdf> (16.04.2008), p. 3.

In spite of the negativities, the BTC is the most significant project that Turkey hitherto achieved in the energy field. It has decreased the West's dependency on Middle East oil thereby contributed to the energy security of the West. That is why the BTC project had taken such a big support from the West, especially, from the

⁵⁹⁵ Oktav, p. 26.

⁵⁹⁶ Bilgin, Caspian Energy Regime, p. 8.

⁵⁹⁷ Bilgin, Caspian Energy Regime, p. 9.

⁵⁹⁸ "Kazak Petrolü BTC'ye Akacak", **Radikal**, 19.08.2005, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=161782&tarih=19/08/2005> (16.04.2008).

⁵⁹⁹ Bilgin, Caspian Energy Regime, p. 9.

U.S. Yet, of course, the main beneficiary of the project is Turkey. Aside from the indirect gains, Turkey, depending on the capacity, will obtain \$ 140-200 million between the 1st and 16th years, and \$ 200-300 million between the 17th and 40th years in reply to “transit duty and administrating services”.⁶⁰⁰ Especially when the BTC reached to the maximum annual capacity-1million barrels, the revenues obtained from the BTC will exceed the revenues obtained from Iraq pipeline. Moreover, besides the transit revenues, Turkey will gain from the investments that TPAO has a share. In the construction stage, the project provided employment and labour possibilities. The project increased Turkey’s geopolitical importance. Turkey emerged as a natural energy bridge between the East and the West. Thereby, while contributing the West’s energy security, Turkey also contributes its own energy supply security. The BTC has environmental advantages, too. The project has reduced the risks emerging from the traffic of the Turkish Straits.⁶⁰¹ Moreover, Ceyhan is a more secure terminal than Novorossisk, which freezes in winters.

Through achieving such a big project called as the “Project of the Century”- of course with the supports and contributions of the US- Turkey has gained strength against Russia, its main rival in the pipeline struggle. Thanks to the BTC pipeline, Turkey accomplished a good job in the transportation of oil. It wants to carry on this success also in the transport of natural gas.

4.1.3.2 Natural Gas Transportation

The pipelines that transport natural gas of the region to the world markets are: Central asia Central Pipeline through which the big part of the region’s gas is exported⁶⁰² and the Turkmenistan-Iran Natural Gas Pipeline that is in operation since 1997. Besides, there are also certain projected or planned pipelines: Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe Natural Gas Pipeline, Trans-Caspian Natural Gas Pipeline,

⁶⁰⁰ <http://www.btc.com.tr/proje.html> (30.11.2008).

⁶⁰¹ <http://www.btc.com.tr/proje.html> (30.11.2008).

⁶⁰² Gökçen Oğan, "Orta Asyalı Üreticiler Doğalgazda Fiyat Artışı Talep Ediyor", **ASAM**, 14.03.2008, <http://www.asam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.asp?ID=2054&kat1=7&kat2=> (16.04.2008).

Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Natural Gas Pipeline, Turkmenistan-China Natural Gas Pipeline⁶⁰³, and Kazakhstan-China Natural Gas Pipeline⁶⁰⁴, etc.

There are also some important projects aimed at transferring the natural gas of the region to the Western markets via Turkey. The Sahdeniz Natural Gas Pipeline Project (Azerbaijan-Turkey Project) carries Azeri gas to Erzurum via Georgia since 2007. At the beginning, it carries 2 billion m³ gas and will reach to 6.6 billion m³. Turkey-Greece-Italy Natural Gas Pipeline Project (the first step of South European Gas Ring), which would transport surrounding regions' (Russia, the Middle East, South Mediterranean, etc.) and Caspian's natural gas to European markets through Turkey and Greece, was signed in 2003. In November 2007, the dispatch of gas began to Greece from Turkey and the project is designed to be finished in 2012. It is planned that the Turkey-Greece-Italy Natural Gas Pipeline will carry 3.6 bcm/y gas to Greece and 8 bcm/y gas to Italy. The Transcaspian Natural Gas Pipeline Project (Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe Natural Gas Project) aims to transport Turkmen gas to European markets via Turkey with a pipeline that will pass under the Caspian. It will transport to Europe 14 billion m³ of 30 billion m³ Turkmen gas that Turkey would buy. The Nabucco Project seeks to pipe Middle Eastern and Caspian gas to European markets through a route passing from Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. The annual capacity of the pipeline would be 25.5-31 bcm. The latter pipelines are at project stage; their outcome is unknown at the moment.⁶⁰⁵

These natural gas pipeline projects, especially the Nabucco and the Transcaspian, attribute an important role to Turkey in materializing European energy security. If they are realized, Turkey will gain political prestige and economic benefits. The Nabucco Project will be the second natural gas door opening to Europe, after Turkey-Greece pipeline. Turkey would be an important transit country in its region and it would be possible for it to 're-export' the residual gas. The contribution of the Project to Turkish economy will be \$ 1 billion; and it will provide employment

⁶⁰³ Meftun Metin, *Politik ve Bölgesel Güç Hazar*, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2004, p. 227.

⁶⁰⁴ "Çin-Kazakistan Doğalgaz Boru Hattı", *CRI Online*, 10.07.2008, <http://turkish.cri.cn/281/2008/07/10/1s96661.htm> (05.12.2008).

⁶⁰⁵ <http://www.botas.gov.tr/projeler/projeler.asp#01> (01.12.2008).

to tens of thousands of people.⁶⁰⁶ The Trans-Caspian is also significant for the diversification of Turkey's supply sources and for strengthening its role as an energy bridge between the east and the West.

If those pipeline projects are put into life, Turkey will bypass the Russian Federation and Iran, its main rivals in the pipeline competition. At the present, although Iran has been excluded from many pipeline projects regarding Caspian reserves owing to Washington's obstructions, Russia is still a very strong rival of Turkey. Today, the main market for Russian gas is Europe. Europe meets more than half of its energy need by imports and its main import source is Russia. If supply diversification is not achieved, the share of Russian gas in European market will reach 70%. For present, eight of twenty seven EU members obtain the whole of the gas that they consume from Russia.⁶⁰⁷ Since the 1970s -the OPEC oil crisis- the EU wants to reduce its dependency to the Middle East and tries to diversify its energy supply sources. As a result, it tried to decrease the share of oil in its energy consumption and turned towards natural gas, which make the EU to incline the RF for energy provision. While escaping from dependence on the Middle East, this time the EU has become dependent on the RF. The RF wants to preserve this dependence and does not want its market to be grabbed by any other exporter. In 2007, the RF exported 182 billion m³ natural gas and 153 billion m³ of it was pumped to Europe.⁶⁰⁸ It is understood that Russia makes nearly 85% of its gas export to Europe. Thus, the RF tries to prevent other actors from selling gas to Europe. The tactics that the RF has carried out for this aim are increasing the price of the cheap gas that it sells to Central Asian States thus urging them to consume their gas in the internal market rather than export; and putting the legal status matter of the Caspian on the agenda so preventing Trans-Caspian pipeline projects.⁶⁰⁹ Similarly, Russia increased the price of the gas imported from the Central Asian countries, and promised that it will lift up the prices to the European level. It anticipated that high prices would

⁶⁰⁶ Dokuzlar, pp. 179-180.

⁶⁰⁷ "AB Rusya'ya Olan Enerji Bağımlılığını Azaltmak İçin Önlemler Alıyor", **USAĞ**, 14.11.2008, <http://www.usakgundem.com/uahaber.php?id=27066> (01.12.2008).

⁶⁰⁸ "Rus Gazına Kim Ne Kadar Bağımlı?", **Aksiyon**, 08.09.2008, <http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/detay.php?id=31127> (30.11.2008).

⁶⁰⁹ Dokuzlar, p. 196.

make Central Asian states to opt for Russian routes.⁶¹⁰ In February 2007, Putin visited Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and they agreed on to transport Turkmen gas to Europe via Kazakhstan and Russia by Near Caspian Pipeline Project (the Prikaspiyskiy Project). The Project will be concluded in 2010 and will transport 30 bcm/y Turkmen gas to Europe via Kazakhstan and the RF. This project has sabotaged the Transcaspian and the Nabucco projects and proved that in the pipeline struggle towards Central Asian gas, for the present, the winner is Russia.⁶¹¹ Why the mentioned project is more attractive for the Central Asian States? The cost of the Near Caspian Project is lower than the Transcaspian, and an important amount of the cost is undertaken by Russia, thus, it became more attractive than Transcaspian project for the Central Asian countries.⁶¹² In addition, the unresolved legal status of the Caspian, the Russian backing to the anti-democratic local regimes in the region, and acceptance of Russia the increase of the price of Kazakh and Turkmen gas made the Near Caspian Project more advantageous for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.⁶¹³ Moreover, the negotiations between Putin and Uzbekistan indicates that Uzbekistan, too, wants to make cooperation with the RF in the field of energy. All of above prove that the main route for Central Asian gas is going to be the Russian route. Since Turkmen gas will be inadequate to pump sufficient gas to all of the projected pipelines, the possibility of realization of the Transcaspian and Nabucco projects is low. Besides, acceptance of Kazakhstan to give oil to Burgaz-Dedeagaç Pipeline weakened the BTC.⁶¹⁴

Actually, in the transportation of the hydrocarbons of Central Asia, preferring alternative energy export routes other than the Russian ones is not only beneficial for Turkey, but also for the region's energy-exporter states. The pipeline system of the region was built in the Soviet era so it serves the RF. It was designed to feed the

⁶¹⁰ "Rusya'nın Orta Asya Atağı" Global Strateji Enstitüsü, 25.03.2008, http://www.globalstrateji.org/TUR/Icerik_Detay.ASP?Icerik=1403 (16.07.2008).

⁶¹¹ İlyas Kamalov, "Türkiye'yi Kendi Enerjisi Kurtarır", **Yenişafak**, 11.05.2008, <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yorum/?t=11.05.2008&i=88988> (01.06.2008).

⁶¹² İlyas Kamalov, "Avrasya'daki Enerji Oyunları ve Türkiye", ASAM, 15.05.2007, <http://www.asam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.asp?ID=1616&kat1=11&kat2=> (16.07.2008).

⁶¹³ İlyas Kamalov, "Türkiye'yi Kendi Enerjisi Kurtarır", **Yenişafak**, 11.05.2008, <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yorum/?t=11.05.2008&i=88988> (01.06.2008).

⁶¹⁴ İlyas Kamalov, "Türkiye'yi Kendi Enerjisi Kurtarır", **Yenişafak**, 11.05.2008, <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yorum/?t=11.05.2008&i=88988> (01.06.2008).

internal market and Eastern Europe so it is far from transporting the region's gas and oil to world markets.⁶¹⁵ Moreover, those pipelines are old and neglected; they are insufficient to meet the export potential of the 'Caspian Four'.⁶¹⁶ This is so especially for Turkmenistan. Transneft, the company which controls the RF's 65 thousand-long oil pipeline system, does not allocate ex-Soviet Republics more export quota than its own transport network. Similarly, 145 thousand-long natural gas pipeline system in the region is under the control of Russian Gazprom, so the energy exporting countries of the region, especially Turkmenistan, faces difficulty in transporting their gas to world markets.⁶¹⁷ While Gazprom exports its own gas to Western Europe, it channels Turkmen gas to Ukraine and Georgia, which fail to pay their gas bills to Turkmenistan.⁶¹⁸ At the present time, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan make export their gas mainly via Central Asia Central Pipeline. This line is connected to Russian pipeline system and the gas it carries is presented to European markets by Gazprom. Gazprom takes 55-60 billion m³ natural gas from Central Asian States at prices determined earlier and sells it Europe at higher prices. Gazprom buys 40 billion m³ gas from Turkmenistan and 8 billion m³ gas from Uzbekistan. It pays only \$ 130 for 1000 m³ of Turkmen and Uzbekh gas and \$ 180 for Kazakh gas for the same amount. Yet, it sells the same gas at \$ 259 to Europe. There is a cliff between the purchase and sale prices. It is very harmful for the energy exporter countries of the region, which are dependent on their oil and gas revenues for their economic and social development.⁶¹⁹ Therefore, in order to escape from dependence on the RF for energy transportation, the Central Asian states should consider different transit countries. The alternatives are Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan-Pakistan-India, and China. The Iran alternative faces strong opposition from the U.S. so it is disabled for the time being. The Afghansitan-Pakistan-India route is not opted for because of its unstable character. The Chinese route, on the other hand, has a financing problem.⁶²⁰ The remaining alternative, the Turkish route, is the most reasonable one. Turkey has made considerable efforts to achive its aim of being an

⁶¹⁵ Pala, p. 24.

⁶¹⁶ Pala, p. 24.

⁶¹⁷ Pala, p. 24.

⁶¹⁸ Pala pp. 24-25.

⁶¹⁹ Gökçen Oğan, "Orta Asyalı Üreticiler Doğalgazda Fiyat Artışı Talep Ediyor", **ASAM**, 14.03.2008, <http://www.asam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.asp?ID=2054&kat1=7&kat2=> (16.04.2008).

⁶²⁰ Dokuzlar, p. 193.

energy corridor and has signed important pipeline projects. However, certain failures in its energy policy has slowed down the realization of some projected pipelines.

According to Havva Çaha, an academician of Fatih University, Turkey's aim of being an energy corridor depends on two conditions: EU's will for providing its gas via Turkey, and Turkey's high natural gas demand.⁶²¹ She says that Turkey's natural gas demand does not encourage the region's states to build pipelines to enter Turkish market. For instance, in 2010, Turkey's gas demand will be 44 billion m³ at the most but it will purchase 51 billion m³ natural gas. Unfortunately, it is impossible to re-export the remaining gas to third countries in accordance with the buying agreements. Moreover, the Natural Gas Market Law enacted in 2001, prevents the state to give purchasing guarantee, which is necessary for the sellers to build a pipeline. These negativities dissuades the realization of natural gas pipeline projects. Thus, Turkey's desire for being an energy corridor is dependent on the other condition, the will of Europe.⁶²² However, Turkey estimated its natural gas demand more than its real demand, and did not take into consideration the foresights that Europe would not buy large amounts of additional gas before 2010. For Çaha, such incorrect estimates pushed Turkey to big pipeline projects. However, it did not take sufficient support from the EU which would not to make considerable increase in its gas demand in near future.⁶²³ The incorrect estimates and intense Russian interference as well as the rivalry among the local states⁶²⁴ prevent Turkey to conclude its projected pipelines. Among them, the Transcaspian project is significant for Turkmenistan to reduce its dependence on Russian transit routes, and also for Turkey since it would diversify its supply sources and reduce its dependence on Russian gas. However, when we look Turkey's natural gas purchase agreements, the only one that is deactivated is Turkmen gas.⁶²⁵ As a result of the unrealisation of the

⁶²¹ Havva Çaha, "Türkiye'nin Enerji Koridoru Olma Politikası : Düş mü ? Gerçek mi?", **2023 Dergisi**, No:71, http://www.enerji2023.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=99:tuerkyenn-enerj-koridoru-olma-politkasi-due-mue--gercek-m&catid=15:stratej&Itemid=36 (05.12.2008).

⁶²² Çaha.

⁶²³ Çaha.

⁶²⁴ The local states in the region regard each other as 'rivals' in transportation of Caspian hydrocarbons to the world markets, so, they can not cooperate. For instance, Azerbaijan's attitude after the exploration of Sahdeniz gas field make Turkmenistan prefer alternative export routes such as Iran and Russia rather than Azerbaijan. See Çaha.

⁶²⁵ <http://www.botas.gov.tr/> (30.11.2008).

Transcaspian Natural Gas Pipeline Project, high amounts of Turkmen gas-about 80 billion m³ is given to Russia until 2028 with a low price.⁶²⁶ The negotiations of Turkmenistan with Russia, Iran, and Armenia prove that the realization of the Transcaspian project is remote.⁶²⁷

In the region, the RF emerges as the main actor who has protected its interests most. It has followed stable policies, and developed cooperative relations with other actors. It has weakened Turkey's policies in the region and strengthened its own position. Iran, too, tries to be influential in the transport of the region's natural gas. In fact, Iran has large amounts of hydrocarbon reserves. It has 136 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, roughly 10 percent of the world's total proven petroleum reserves as of January 1, 2007.⁶²⁸ Its proven natural gas reserves is about 974 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), the world's second largest reserves after Russia.⁶²⁹ Although Iran has crucial oil and gas reserves, its production and export is low. It wants to improve its status in energy exportation and transportation. For this aim, it has developed fifteen pipeline projects.⁶³⁰ Among those, certain ones concern the Caspian region and Turkey. At the present, Turkey is the primary customer of Iranian gas. Moreover, Turkey and Iran plans to transport Turkmen gas to Europe via Iran and Turkey.⁶³¹ At the first glance, this seems as a beneficial cooperation that strengthens Turkey's position as an energy corridor. Yet, that project diminishes the possibility of the realization of the Transcaspian Pipeline Project and in fact, strengthens the position of Iran in the pipeline struggle regarding Caspian region.⁶³² Iran also wants to participate in the Nabucco pipeline project⁶³³, plans to transport turkmen gas to east of China and to Pakistan or to supply it to the market from the Gulf in the form of

⁶²⁶ Dokuzlar, p. 181.

⁶²⁷ Çaha.

⁶²⁸ EIA, "Iran Country Analysis Briefs", October 2007, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/Oil.html> (01.12.2008).

⁶²⁹ EIA, "Iran Country Analysis Briefs", October 2007, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/NaturalGas.html> (01.12.2008).

⁶³⁰ Arif Keskin, "İran'ın Doğalgaz Siyaseti ve Türkiye", **ASAM**, 14.10.2008, <http://www.asam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.asp?ID=2901&kat2=2> (14.10.2008).

⁶³¹ Arif Keskin, "İran'ın Doğalgaz Siyaseti ve Türkiye", **ASAM**, 14.10.2008, <http://www.asam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.asp?ID=2901&kat2=2> (14.10.2008).

⁶³² Cavid Veliev, "İran Doğalgazında Geçiş Pazarlığı", **TUSAM**, 28.08.2006, <http://www.tusam.net/makaleler.asp?id=628&sayfa=39> (01.12.2008).

⁶³³ EIA, "Iran Country Analysis Briefs", October 2007, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/NaturalGas.html> (10.12.2008).

LNG. For Çaha, when the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project realized, Turkmenistan will entirely become dependent on Iran and Russia.⁶³⁴ To sum up, Iran has considerable undertakings in the region, and Turkey should take Iran to heart as an influential rival in the pipeline competition towards the hydrocarbons of Central Asia. However, Turkey fails to follow efficient policies to prevent the projects that can damage Turkey's position as an energy corridor. Not only Iran and Russia, but even Greece emerges as a rival for Turkey in achieving its aim of being an energy transit country in its region. Greece, too, plans to be an energy corridor. To achieve this, it signs treaties with Iran and Armenia and Russia.⁶³⁵

In 1998, because of payments problems, the relations between Turkmenistan and Russia were tensed so Turkmenistan ceased the flow of gas to Russia. It was in fact a chance for Turkey to bypass Russia in transporting Turkmen gas to Europe. Unfortunately, Turkey's intensification on Blue Stream project, Turkey's gas trade with Azerbaijan immediately afterwards the discovery of Sahdeniz natural gas field in Azerbaijan⁶³⁶, and the Turkey-Iran natural gas agreement make Turkmenistan reconsider the RF and Iran as partners in energy transportation.⁶³⁷ As a result, Turkmenistan began to re-negotiate with Russia and Iran. In December 2000, it accepted to re-flow gas to Russia and influenced the fate of the Trans-Caspian Natural Gas Project.⁶³⁸ Iran, too, is a very reasonable route for Turkmenistan. In the east of Turkmenistan there exists rich natural gas reserves that could meet the gas need of Iran's northern regions through Korpedzhe-Kurtkui ve Artik-Lotfabad pipelines. Moreover, Iran has certain ports at the Caspian that are suitable for swapping.⁶³⁹

⁶³⁴ Çaha.

⁶³⁵ Çaha.

⁶³⁶ Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan became rivals so it became difficult to cooperate. "Azerbaijan started to use the project of Baku-Erzurum as a bargaining tool against Turkmenistan by declaring that it would allow the transit of the trans-Caspian line through his lands under the condition of using the 50% of this line. Azerbaijan wanted to use half of the capacity of the trans-Caspian line in order to sell its natural gas (15 billion cubic meters) to Turkey. Nevertheless, Turkmenistan did not want to share this line with Azerbaijan under the actual conditions." Bilgin, *Caspian Energy Regime*, p. 17.

⁶³⁷ Bilgin, *Caspian Energy Regime*, pp. 15-16.

⁶³⁸ Bilgin, *Caspian Energy Regime*, p. 18.

⁶³⁹ Bilgin, *Caspian Energy Regime*, p. 19.

4.1.3.3 The Analysis: What is Left for Turkey in the Pipeline Rivalry?

In the last analysis, it can be said that the RF preserves its superiority in the pipeline rivalry regarding the Central Asian energy resources. The undertakings that could be written in Turkey's achievements section is the BTC project in the oil transportation and the Baku-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline in the natural gas transportation. We can also add the shares of TPAO in the Caspian energy development. Yet, the projects aiming the transportation of Turkmen gas to Europe via Turkey have failed. As a result, Turkey's claim for being an energy corridor between the East and the West has weakened.

Mert Bilgin defines the energy regime of the Caspian that become solid since 2000 as such:

“Indeed, the production phase of the Caspian hydrocarbons are currently being dominated by the activities of foreign petroleum companies. The technological inferiority and financial problems of Russia appear to be the critical factors, which decreased its efficiency in the production phase. Nevertheless, Russia continues to be a very critical actor, which is being considered as a strategic partner because of the economic feasibility of its transportation system based on a complex link of pipelines, railroads, rivers, canals and marine facilities. As a matter of fact, the significance of Novorossiisk and Supsa ports started to increase by gaining Russia a strategic advantage. In addition to Russia, Iran's role is increasing in transportation phase by the opportunities it offers to AKT (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) and multinationals in terms of swapping, port facilities and existing pipelines.”⁶⁴⁰

Turkey is one of the undeniable actors in the region, yet, it is dominant neither in the energy production nor in the energy transportation. “This emerging scene explicitly implies that there are few rooms left for Turkey in the Caspian energy politics shaped along two projects both of which will be operated with Azerbaijan: AIOC's Baku-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline and Baku-Erzurum Gas Pipeline of ShahDeniz project.”⁶⁴¹ In terms of energy trade and pipeline politics, Turkey has

⁶⁴⁰ Bilgin, Caspian Energy Regime, p. 20.

⁶⁴¹ Bilgin, Caspian Energy Regime, pp. 20-21.

developed close relations with Azerbaijan but its relations with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have not developed as much as it could have been.

4.1.4 Education and Culture

The socio-cultural relations between the Turkic Republics and Turkey which ceased in the Soviet era, began over again with the demise of the Soviet Union. Turkey has tried to establish 'human bridges' with the region. It stressed the shared history and cultural roots with the Central Asian Republics, encouraged them in transition to Latin alphabet, and created institutions which highlight ethnic commonality. In this respect, education has a special importance. Today, the educational studies conducted by the state or private sector form the main axis of the relations between Turkey and Central Asia.⁶⁴²

Initially, Turkey provided ten thousand scholarships to students coming from Turkic Republics and sent Turkish students to the region. Hundreds of schools, colleges and educational centres have been opened by favour of Turkish public and private sector.⁶⁴³ Especially, the number of schools opened by Fethullah Gülen in the region is striking. Besides providing scholarships to the students, Turkey also offered various training programmes and seminars to hundreds of local diplomats and teachers coming from the Central Asian states.⁶⁴⁴ To administer the scholarships and improve educational cooperation between Turkey and the Turkic Republics, the Department of Overseas Education was established in May 1992 within the Ministry of National Education.⁶⁴⁵

The student exchange programs that began successfully deviated from its initial target in the course of time. The students, which were selected by the local administration, do not always fulfil the necessary conditions for gaining scholarship. Also, the amount of the grants provided to the students is found insufficient to meet their needs. Furthermore, Turkey failed to be interested in those students after their

⁶⁴² Oğan, *Orta Asya Açmazları*, p. 40.

⁶⁴³ Akdiş, p. 11.

⁶⁴⁴ Yanik, p. 295.

⁶⁴⁵ Yanik, p. 295.

graduation. All of the above prevented the ‘Great Student Exchange Project’ to meet the expectations.⁶⁴⁶ As a result, beginning from 1997, the number of students coming Turkey from Turkic Republics has diminished steadily.⁶⁴⁷ Besides the inherent problems of Turkey’s education policy, the powerful cultural presence persisted for years between Moscow and Central Asia also prevented Turkey’s cultural advance. The Russian television channels are watched more than the local ones, and the Russian publications are easily followed. Besides, the US and Europe also try to extend their cultural impact by opening colleges, universities, and language courses in the region. The local peoples, who wanted to be employed in foreign companies that invest in the region, applied to Western or American courses, associations, or even missionary organizations.⁶⁴⁸

There are also problems in transition to Latin alphabet. As a result of the absence of certain common sounds, it has become difficult to achieve the aim of ‘common language and alphabet’. As yet, only Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have passed to the Latin alphabet. In order to improve bilateral cultural relations, existence of common language and alphabet is necessary. It is also necessary to make the educational language Turkish. In the Manas University in Kyrgyzstan educational language is Turkish, yet, in Kazakhstan Hoca Ahmet Yesevi University, it is not.⁶⁴⁹

Although the Turkic Republics often talked about ‘one nation, two states’ expression, they re-constituted their own socio-cultural and historical structures in the process of nation-building. Thus, it became difficult for Turkey to integrate with the region culturally. According to Efegil, Turkey could have strived more to improve cultural relations; yet its efforts have remained at insufficient levels. For instance, from January to October 2004, Turkey has conducted three cultural activities in Azerbaijan and only one in Kazakhstan. However, in the same period, it

⁶⁴⁶ Oğan, *Orta Asya Açmazları*, pp. 40-41.

⁶⁴⁷ Yanik, p. 303.

⁶⁴⁸ Akdiş, pp. 13-14.

⁶⁴⁹ Muzaffer Ürekli,

[http://busam.beykent.edu.tr/\(X\(1\)S\(ax2g5o45pg1nm045zxgwbp45\)\)/sayfagoster.aspx?sayfa=26&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1](http://busam.beykent.edu.tr/(X(1)S(ax2g5o45pg1nm045zxgwbp45))/sayfagoster.aspx?sayfa=26&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1) (05.12.2008).

conducted forty seven cultural activities in Europe, ten in the Middle East, six in the U.S. and the Latin America, two in Africa, and thirteen in Asia.⁶⁵⁰

4.1.5 Security

In the security sphere, Turkey is not a determining actor in Central Asia. Gareth Winrow explains the security implications of Central Asia for Turkey as such: “Unlike the Transcaucasus, the Central Asian region is not of major strategic concern as far as the Turkish military is concerned. Delegations visit and the armed forces make training agreements but one can assume the Turkish military is aware that the Central Asian leaders wish to remain part of a loose Russian security umbrella in order to check the possible spread of religious radicalism. The Turkish armed forces are not in a position to help contain Islamic extremism emanating from Tajikistan and Afghanistan...”⁶⁵¹

By 1994, with the initiation of NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program, military contacts between the West and Central Asian states began. The republics of the region began to take technical assistance, military training and equipment from the NATO states, including Turkey. The PfP (Partnership for Peace) laid the multilateral framework, but, in fact, Turkey’s bilateral military contacts with Turkic Republics started before the PfP. Since their independence, Turkey provides military assistance to the countries of the region by training local military officers and students. Turkey’s military ties are intense especially with Azerbaijan. It undertakes the complete training of Azerbaijani military personnel.⁶⁵²

In the post-September 11 period, with the increase in US’ and NATO’s military involvement in the region, Turkey, as a NATO member and a close strategic ally of the US, increased its military presence in Central Asia. Turkey opened its airspace and bases, and sent military personnel to Afghanistan in the context of ‘war on terrorism’. It deployed military battalion in Afghanistan and assumed command

⁶⁵⁰ Efegil, Rasyonallitesi Sorunu, p. 284.

⁶⁵¹ Winrow, The Transcaucasus, p. 6.

⁶⁵² Kemal Kaya, "Turkey's New Challenges in the Caucasus and Central Asia", **Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst**, 11.07.2001, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/169> (09.07.2008).

of ISAF after Great Britain. This has contributed to the strengthening of military ties of Turkey with other Central Asian states.

However, apart from providing military training to local military officers and students, Turkey does not have a crucial military presence in the region independent from its Western allies. Turkish military presence increased when the West's, especially the US' military involvement increased in the region, and it began to decrease as the Western security umbrella began to shrink. The deteriorating foothold of U.S. in Central Asia in recent years demonstrates that the sphere of security is being gradually caught by the Russian Federation.

In general, the Tajik civil war, the security threats emanating from Afghanistan, the fundamentalist Islamic movements, etc. made Central Asian Republics develop close security ties with Moscow.⁶⁵³ Azerbaijan is the main Central Asian country that has tried to escape from Russian military influence most. It has established strong military ties with NATO and the US.⁶⁵⁴ Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, too, have pursued relatively independent policies since they do not share common borders with RF. Especially Uzbekistan, which has its own independent army, is freer than the other CAR in following its security policies. However, the other Central Asian States are more dependent to Russian security support. Kyrgyzstan is vulnerable to its larger and more powerful neighbours, -China and Uzbekistan- so, needs the security shelter of the RF.⁶⁵⁵ Similarly, the considerable amount of Russian minority in Kazakhstan and the dependence of Kazakh military apparatus to Russian support, prevent the country to get out from Russian military orbit.⁶⁵⁶

In the security sphere, it is also essential to mention the Chinese presence in Central Asia. China, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Antiterrorist

⁶⁵³ Gamze Güngörmüş Kona, "Turkey-Russian Federation-Central Asian Republics Economic Relations", 27.08.2007, <http://gamzegungormuskona.blogspot.com/2007/08/iletme-ve-finans-say-155-ubat-1999.html> (16.04.2008).

⁶⁵⁴ Cornell, Uzbekistan, p. 117.

⁶⁵⁵ Cornell, Uzbekistan, p. 124.

⁶⁵⁶ Mansour Rahmani, "Central Asian States: Balancing Opportunities and Challenges", <http://www.ca-c.org/journal/eng-02-2003/18.rahprimen.shtml> (08.07.2008).

Center, tries to contribute to the stability of the region and gives military-technical assistance to certain Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular.⁶⁵⁷ Since 2001, as a result of the establishment of SCO, Turkey's security support to the region has rather diminished.⁶⁵⁸ Turkey's military aids to the region are insufficient in comparison to the crucial military supports of the RF, the U.S. and China. Moreover, Turkey does not have a considerable amount of military personnel in the region; its military presence remained so small compared with the Russian, Chinese, and American troops deployed in Central Asia.⁶⁵⁹ In consequence, Turkey's relations with the region's republics have been confined to culture, education, and trade. In the security arena, Russia is the dominant power.⁶⁶⁰

Tentative remarks

In the light of the achievements and failures of Turkey's multi-sphere policies towards Central Asia up to now, how would be the picture in the future? How would be Turkey's Central Asian policy from now on?

According to Sedat Laçiner, an expert in Central Asia, Turkey should first form the 'philosophy' of its relations with Central Asia. The private investments and initiatives in the region should be propped up by the state. Turkey should arrange more organizations that would bring local leaders together. The quotas allocated to Central Asian students in Turkish schools, universities, and other educational centres should be increased. Turkey should develop common projects with the EU and the U.S., and should cooperate with the powers in the region such as the RF, China, Pakistan, and Iran. Laçiner also stress the need for an efficient media. The dependency on Western media sources in receiving news from Central Asia and sending information to the region should be broken.⁶⁶¹

⁶⁵⁷ Zakir Chotoev, "On Turkey's Possible Involvement in Strengthening Central Asian Security", http://www.ca-c.org/online/2004/journal_eng/cac-04/17.coteng.shtml (08.07.2008).

⁶⁵⁸ Ahat Andican, [http://busam.beykent.edu.tr/\(X\(1\)S\(ax2g5o45pg1nm045zxgwbp45\)\)/sayfagoster.aspx?sayfa=26&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1](http://busam.beykent.edu.tr/(X(1)S(ax2g5o45pg1nm045zxgwbp45))/sayfagoster.aspx?sayfa=26&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1) (5.12.2008).

⁶⁵⁹ Efegil, Rasyonallitesi Sorunu, p. 285.

⁶⁶⁰ Zakir Chotoev, "On Turkey's Possible Involvement in Strengthening Central Asian Security", http://www.ca-c.org/online/2004/journal_eng/cac-04/17.coteng.shtml (08.07.2008).

⁶⁶¹ Laçiner, Orta Asya ve Türkiye.

It is likely that in the future, Turkey will remain to be a significant player in Central Asia, especially in the Caucasus where, Turkey's capabilities and ambitions are, higher than Central Asia.⁶⁶² Yet, the possibility that Turkey would play a leading role in Central Asia is low because of Turkey's economic and political problems and the strong Russian presence in the region in almost every field. Turkey's future role in Central Asia will be shaped by the positions of Russia, China, and the U.S. and also by Turkey's economic and political performance.⁶⁶³ Yet, it seems that, as in the past, in the future, Turkey's main rival will be Russia, which will remain to be dominant in the region. The citizens of the Central Asian countries are dependent on Russia in many aspects: for temporary or migrant employment, remittances, energy subsidies, and as a primary market for their products. Most of the existing pipelines for the export of the region's oil and gas pass through Russia. In development of Central Asian gas, Russian energy industry plays the dominant role.⁶⁶⁴ Moreover, since most of the Central Asian Republics are dependent on Russian security umbrella, Russia is crucial for the stability of the region.

To apply Brzezinski's concepts of 'geopolitical pivots' and 'geostrategic players' on Turkey's position in Central Asia, Turkey, with its sensitive location and potential vulnerability, is a geopolitical pivot. Since it does not 'have the capacity and the national will to exercise power or influence beyond their borders in order to alter...the existing geopolitical state of affairs', it is not a geostrategic player in Central Asia.⁶⁶⁵ As Ruseckas notes: "Today, events in this region are being driven largely by other players. Competition between Russia and the US is shaping the geopolitical environment, while energy development is proceeding primarily on the basis of the market realities reflected in the investment decisions being made by the international oil and gas industry."⁶⁶⁶

⁶⁶² Cornell, Uzbekistan, p. 118.

⁶⁶³ Hunter, Ten Years After Independence, p. 15.

⁶⁶⁴ Fiona Hill, "Areas For Future Cooperation or Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus", Brookings, 19.09.02, http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2002/0919asia_hill.aspx (16.04.2008).

⁶⁶⁵ Winrow, Pivotal State, p. 77.

⁶⁶⁶ Ruseckas, p. 234.

CONCLUSION

This study examined Turkey-Central Asia relations beginning from the disintegration of the Soviet Union- that is when Central Asia began to emerge as a significant region. This study starts with a theoretical foundation delving into 'geopolitics' and then it moves to assess the importance of Central Asia. As one of the remarkable actors in the region, Turkey's bilateral relations with the local states, the role it has tried to undertake in the region, and the end point are all examined in the second Part. Turkey's energy profile and energy policy assessed in the Third Part is of particular importance. In the last part, a general evaluation of Turkish foreign policy was carried out and it was made out that energy is the only remained area that Turkey could really be influential.

When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, 15 new Republics in the ex-Soviet geography emerged. The Eurasia region that had been under the control of a single power for many years, turned into a multi-national, multi-ethnic geography with many newly established large and small countries. The region that had always been important geopolitically, drew more interest as with the exploration of its considerable amount of hydrocarbon reserves, which were thought as exhausted during the Soviet era were discovered. With the discovery of remarkable amounts of oil and gas in the Caspian Basin, the foreign oil and gas companies as well as regional and global actors began to influx into the region to explore, exploit, and market the hydrocarbons of the region because the energy-rich countries such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan did not have sufficient technology and capital to extract and make use of these resources. My study asserts with statistical data that the energy reserves of the Caspian Basin are far from being the second Middle East. Importance of the region's energy reserves arises from the nature of the world's oil and gas supply centres. Growing oil need of the U.S., Europe, China, India, and Japan is met from the instable Middle East region. Moreover, the Russian Gazprom has turned into an energy giant and began to use natural gas as a political leverage. What makes Caspian Basin so significant is not the existence of rich reserves, but its status of an equilibrant of the existing energy

supplying regions. This made the region a field of competition for the great powers. It is a multi-actor and multi-dimensional rivalry which is called the 'New Great Game.' One crucial aspect of that rivalry is about the transportation of the region's energy sources. This makes Turkey a potential actor of the New Great Game.

Five of the fifteen ex-Soviet Republics are called Turkic since they have common ethnic, cultural, historical, religious, and linguistic ties with Turkey. Establishment of 'brother' states in a geography at Turkey's elbow made new political, economic, and cultural openings necessary in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey showed conscious efforts to develop its relations with these countries almost in every policy realm. It organized political summits, gave economic and financial aid and provided technical and military assistance to the Turkic Republics, and tried to improve educational and cultural dialogue with the region. When bilateral relations with the Turkic Republics are examined, it seems that the most intense relations have been developed with Azerbaijan. There are close cultural, historical, linguistic ties between Azerbaijan and Turkey. Politically, Turkey gives full support to Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia. Moreover, there is a considerable amount of energy trade between the countries and this surmounted after the BTC Oil Pipeline Project and Shahdeniz Natural Gas Pipeline Project. Kazakhstan-Turkey relations is also promising. The considerable presence of Turkish investors and firms in Kazakh construction and textile sectors is undeniable. Bilateral trade relations are developing. Yet, energy stays as an untouched field of cooperation. What is observed is developing economic relations and troubled political relations when it comes to Uzbekistan. Within the context of Turkmenistan-Turkey relations, the most striking junction is the natural gas pipeline projects of the Transcaspian and the Nabucco. When realized, Turkey and Turkmenistan will become partners in the field of energy. Turkey's relations with Kyrgyzstan are very limited with matters of education and trade.

After studying Central Asia's geopolitical position and Turkey's bilateral relations with the Turkic Republics, my thesis focused on Turkey's energy profile and energy policy towards the region. Turkey, with its growing economy, increasing

population, and rapid urbanization, needs more energy increasingly. Its own energy production is insufficient to meet its consumption. Thus, it is a net energy importer country. Turkey's main indigenous sources are lignite and hard coal and renewables such as hydropower, wind power, solar energy, geothermal energy and biofuels. There are certain important hydroelectric plants in the country, and the new ones are planned to be constructed. There is an important wind energy potential, especially in the western regions of the country. Turkey has long sunshine duration, so it has a chance for utilizing solar energy through sun collectors and sun cells. Regarding geothermal energy potential, Turkey is one of the world's leading countries. Yet, in Turkey, geothermal energy is used for heating and thermal spring. Electricity production from geothermal sources is limited; it needs to be increased. Nuclear energy is a highly disputed issue in Turkey. Although different nuclear power plant projects have been proposed several times, there is none operating at the time. Oil and gas, the most demanded primary energy sources in the world, are also the most consumed energy sources in Turkey. However, Turkey's own oil and gas production and consumption are far apart. Therefore, Turkey is a net oil and gas importer country. In the light of the country's energy profile, my dissertation continued with analyzing the energy policy of Turkey. There is much dispute on Turkey's energy policy. It is argued that Turkey does not lean on its indigenous resources and, does not utilize its renewable potential. It is also claimed that there is no comprehensive national policy for energy management. What is most particularly criticized is Turkey's natural gas deals. Turkey's high dependency on a single source-natural gas-and single supplier-Russia- is found very risky. The terms of gas contracts are also another hot issue since most of its contracts set prices above world average and based on the condition of 'take or pay'. Besides its dependence on oil and gas imports, Turkey began to import coal in recent years and this has become another criticized issue.

In order to diminish its high import dependency in primary energy sources, Turkey should explore its indigenous energy reserves starting with renewable energy. In addition, nuclear energy option should be discussed. Apart from its environmental risks, nuclear energy provides a country to produce its energy self-sufficiently.

Energy importation is inevitable if the energy demand of a country can not be met by indigenous production. Yet, imported sources and countries of origin should be diversified. Turkey needs a long-term energy planning which considers the future energy production and consumption figures of the country. Also, close coordination and collaboration is necessary between the institutions that are responsible from Turkey's energy policy.

Examining Turkey's energy profile and policies in detail helps us to understand Central Asia's importance for Turkey. It is argued in this dissertation that the main expansion field for Turkey in Central Asia is 'energy'. Turkey has diversified its sources of supply by obtaining oil and gas from the region. Moreover, the pipelines carrying Caspian oil and gas via Turkish territory have not only provided transit revenues and political prestige to Turkey but also diminished the tanker traffic of the Turkish Straits. When the Central Asian Republics became independent, the landlocked energy-rich states of Central Asia, -the Caspian Four of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan,- did not have any alternative other than Russia for exporting their oil and gas to international markets. Therefore, they began to search alternative pipeline routes to break their dependency to Russia. At that point, Turkey, which is a natural bridge between Europe and Asia, emerged as a reasonable alternative route.

Emergence of Central Asia as a new energy-rich region was a chance for Turkey. As such, Turkey started shaping its energy policy around growing to become an energy corridor as well as an energy hub in the region by transporting Caspian hydrocarbons to the West. To this end, Turkey signed important pipeline projects, that were supported both by the EU, which wants to diminish its dependency to Russian gas, and U.S., which tries to find alternatives to the Middle East oil. The BTC and Shahdeniz pipeline projects have been completed so far. The Nabucco and the Transcaspian, the two other projects significant for Turkey to assume the role of a real energy corridor, have not been accomplished yet. One obstacle in front of these projects is Russia, which does not want to loose its monopoly power on the export routes. Russia often negotiates with the local leaders and makes energy deals that

endangers the completion of mentioned pipeline projects. Besides the attempts of Russia, Turkey's certain activities such as insistence on buying gas from the Blue Stream Project prevent the realization of the planned projects with Turkmenistan. Turkey should improve its relations with the leaders of the Central Asian Republics and take more support from the EU and the U.S. in order to materialize the projected pipelines.

At present, the most influential power in the region is the Russian Federation. Despite the power vacuum in Central Asia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia quickly gained a dominant role in the region. In comparison to Russia, Turkey could not develop as strong relations with Central Asia. Turkey is not economically powerful enough, its political weight is not so strong, and it does not have any considerable military presence in the region. In the field of education and culture, Russian cultural influence is still dominant. This situation also extends to military sphere, where Russia grew to be the primary power since the military presence of the U.S. that increased after the 9/11 events started diminishing 2005 onwards. Under the present circumstances, the only area that Turkey could expand is energy due to its advantages: Turkey is a natural bridge between Europe and Asia, it has close relations with the West, it has the support of the U.S. against other alternative routes, and its territories are reliable.

This study analyzed Central Asia's geopolitical importance by laying emphasis on the region's energy resources. Turkey's role in the region and its bilateral relations with the Turkic states were also examined. The energy profile and energy policies of Turkey were another point of focus. My dissertation argued that Central Asia forms the foundation of Turkey's pipeline policy. Transportation of the region's oil and gas to the Western markets has been the primary aim of Turkey's energy policy and also the determinant of Turkish foreign policy towards Central Asia.

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