

CONTAINING TITO:
U.S. AND SOVIET POLICIES
TOWARDS
YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BALKANS

A Master's Thesis

by

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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
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of
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ANKARA

September 2005

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ABSTRACT

**CONTAINING TITO:
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This thesis examines the early Cold War in the Balkans by bringing historical and regional factors into play. In particular, it focuses on the plans for a Balkan federation and the Balkan Pact.

The major actor in these cooperation attempts was Yugoslavia, and it was a privileged state in its relations with the superpowers. By putting Yugoslavia into the centre of analysis, this thesis reconsiders this period and the influence of these two regional alliances upon the regional and Cold War relations.

Balkan federation plans were the extension of historical tendencies of the contributing parties. Balkan Pact was completely a Cold War tool but its demise was triggered by non-Cold War reasons rooted in the regional relations. Early Cold War in the Balkans should be studied by treating the role of historical and regional factors as equal with the superpower policies.

Key Words: Tito, Yugoslavia, Balkan Federation, Balkan Pact, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Soviet Union, U.S.A., Cold War.

ÖZET

TİTO'YU ÇEVRELEMEK:
AMERİKA VE SOVYETLERİN
YUGOSLAVYA VE BALKAN POLİTİKALARI, 1945-1955

İşyar, Levent

Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü

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Bu tez Balkanlarda Soğuk Savaş'ın erken dönemlerini tarihsel ve bölgesel etkenleri de hesaba katarak incelemektedir. Özellikle, Balkan federasyonu planları ve Balkan Paktı'na odaklanmaktadır.

Yugoslavya bu işbirliği çabalarında temel aktördü ve süpergüçlerle ilişkilerinde imtiyazlı bir ülkeydi. Tez Yugoslavya'yı analizin merkezine koyarak bu dönemi ve iki bölgesel ittifakın bölge ve Soğuk Savaş üzerindeki etkilerini yeniden ele almaktadır.

Balkan federasyonu planları katılan tarafların tarihsel eğilimlerinin Soğuk Savaş'taki uzantısıdır. Balkan Paktı ise tamamen bir Soğuk savaş aracıdır ama çöküşünü kökü bölgesel ilişkilerde yatan Soğuk Savaş dışı sebepler tetiklemiştir. Balkanlardaki erken dönem Soğuk Savaş, tarihi ve bölgesel etkenlerin rolünü süpergüç politikalarıyla eşit muamele ederek çalışılmalıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Tito, Yugoslavya, Balkan Federasyonu, Balkan Paktı, Türkiye Yunanistan, Bulgaristan, Sovyetler Birliği, ABD, Soğuk Savaş

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

During the early years of the Cold War, every event was seen as a part of global super-power struggle and local and regional factors were removed. Accordingly, this helped historians to reach simplified conclusions based on one side's view and speculations. After witnessing the death of the Soviet Union, one has the capability to find information on the same events from different perspectives and see the parallel results. In this regard, declassification of the documents on both sides, especially the archives of the Soviet Union and its satellite states provides information on the situation in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, two major Cold War battlefields, and helps historians to revise their old and distorted knowledge of the Cold War.

This thesis covers the development of U.S. and Soviet policies towards Yugoslavia and the Balkans, in particular the cooperation plans in the Balkans between 1945 and 1955. U.S. policies regarding this region were initiated during the early phases of the Cold War as a result of Balkans' adjacency with the Soviet Union, namely for strategic reasons. In contrast, for the Soviet Union the controlling Balkans was a strategic and ideological mission as well. Nevertheless, the Cold War froze in the Balkans during the 1950s and little was achieved by the Cold-Warriors in the next decades. In this respect, the shaping of U.S. and Soviet policies will be analyzed in two phases based on their attitude towards Balkan cooperation as a wing of their Cold War policies, under the knowledge of previous attempts and alliances in

the region. The first attempt of alliance was the Balkan federation initiated by Marshall Tito of Former Yugoslavia (hereafter Yugoslavia), which would include Bulgaria, Albania and some parts of Greece. For the Soviet Union, it would possibly serve for the reconciliation of Communism in the Balkans. Eventually, the idea of a Balkan federation constituted a major element in Tito-Stalin split of 1948 since Tito and Stalin had different plans for a Balkan federation. The second attempt was the Balkan Pact of 1954, which was established by Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece, and most significantly this was the first treaty of cooperation between NATO members and a Communist state. Basically, it was directly a consequence of the containment policies of the United States, and the price Yugoslavia had to pay to the U.S. for the aid poured into Yugoslavia.

The evolution from plans towards a Balkan federation to the Balkan Pact is an extraordinary transition in the Cold War, specifically the transfer of Tito's Yugoslavia from the team Russian Bears to American Eagles. Yugoslavia is the focus of analysis in this thesis. In these alliances, Yugoslavia was the common actor and was in the center of attention of the Cold War parties, and accordingly their Cold War policies regarding this region were shaped based on Yugoslavia and its moves. In the first instance, Soviet policy towards the Balkans was materialized by Yugoslavia, and Stalin's failure in excluding Yugoslavia from the Cominform in June 1948 - the end of monolith - led to the end of Balkan federation plans and Yugoslav rapprochement with the Western bloc. Most importantly, the Tito-Stalin split changed the course of Cold War. In the second instance, U.S. policies towards Yugoslavia evolved from the preservation of Yugoslavia as an outcast towards the association of Yugoslavia with western defense. Yugoslavia maintained a fluctuating behavior towards tying itself to the West.

On a regional level, this thesis points out the regional factors in play during the crystallization and the failure of these pacts. The Cold War did not start by a single event and then spread to the world; instead it started at different places of the world at different times. For the Balkans, the situation was far more complicated than any other part of the world because the Cold War brought new dimensions to the already existing conflicts in the region. Thus, the Yugoslav version of the Balkan federation had its roots in the region's history, and was supported by its neighbors who had similar intentions for the sake of some parts of Greece. The progress towards the federation ended as a consequence of Stalin's desire to reinforce his control in the satellite states against the West.

At the same time, the Balkan Pact was a Cold War tool meaningful in East-West tensions and played a symbolic role in the Cold War. While Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece signed the Pact linking Yugoslavia indirectly with NATO, each state had different expectations other than security; in particular Turkey and Greece supposedly maintained a line parallel to U.S. interests. Yugoslavia's approach, on the other hand, was shaped by its bilateral relations with the U.S. and its problematic relations with Italy caused by the Trieste problem. Nevertheless, an unexpected and a non-Cold War factor, the rise of the Cyprus problem in Turkish-Greek relations, played a major role at the end of this alliance, equally important with the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. However, the developments towards the Balkan Pact, forward association of Yugoslavia with the West, itself caused and determined the timing of this normalization to an extent. This Pact alone represented a shift in Cold War policies and deserves to be studied – the Western Bloc making an alliance with a non-Soviet satellite Communist regime without a command economy at the height of the Cold War.

Until the end of the Cold War, historical studies about the period of these alliances mainly focused on the significance of the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan and Tito-Stalin split from the American perspective under the light of whatever was available from the existing archival data. Together with these, most of the current studies on the U.S. experience in the Cold War are limited in scope, and accordingly their treatment of this period focuses on the Tito-Stalin split and U.S. efforts towards benefiting from this event.¹ Another group of scholars, which studied Yugoslavia and the Balkans, focused on Yugoslavia's relations with the West after the split and maintained a more independent vision than Cold War historians. John C. Campbell's early work, *Tito's Separate Road*,² is in this category and as while lacking detailed information, it supplies the general framework, just like other scholars who studied Yugoslavia, Nora Beloff's *Tito's Flawed Legacy*³ and Stephan K. Pavlowitch's *Tito: Yugoslavia's Great Dictator*.⁴ The last and perhaps the most up-to-date group of scholars, who studied the whole process of Yugoslav-American relations, provide outstanding archival data on the U.S. and British foreign policy. Beatrice Heuser's book, *Western Containment Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948-53*,⁵ is a valuable study, but as it is understandable from the name of the book, excludes the regional historical background. For a good understanding of American policy

¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Melvy Leffler, *The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994); Melvyn Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952," *The Journal of American History* 71, No. 4. (Mar., 1985): 807-825.; Robert R Bowie & Richard Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Wayne S Vucinich, *At the Brink of War and Peace: the Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective* (New York: Social Science Monographs, Brooklyn College Press, 1982)

² John C. Campbell, *Tito's Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967)

³ Nora Beloff, *Tito's Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West, 1939-84* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1985), 142

⁴ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Tito: Yugoslavia's Great Dictator: A Reassessment* (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Pr., 1992)

⁵ Beatrice Heuser, *Western Containment Policies in the Cold War: the Yugoslav Case, 1948-53* (London: Routledge, 1989)

towards Yugoslavia, Lorraine M. Lees' book *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia and the Cold War*,⁶ is the best in its category.

However, all of these studies mentioned reflect the story of one side only. Concerning cooperation attempts in the Balkans, the tendency is towards the evaluation of these developments within the framework of the Cold War subordinating the influence on the regional states. Currently existing Soviet and Yugoslav archival documents help make a comprehensive analysis of the same events. On the other hand, studying two cooperation attempts in the Balkans during the Cold War provides an alternative understanding of the course of events. In this regard, this thesis will look at the early Cold War and the cooperation attempts in the Balkans under the light of existing studies and available archival data. While taking Yugoslavia as the center of analysis, it will indicate the differences of perceptions among the actors by bringing regional factors into play as an alternative to existing studies. Moreover, this thesis will argue that for the study of the 1945-1955 period in the Balkans, regional and historical relations between the states should be treated equally with the super-power Cold War policies in order to comprehend the course of the Cold War and the failure of two alliance attempts in the Balkans. The Cold War brought new factors into play for the Balkan states, but could not make local problems and conflicts disappear. Nationalism was transmuted in the Balkans by local circumstances; the same thing happened to Socialism, Communism and Western ideals as well.

The structure of this thesis will be as follows: Chapter II will first analyze the efforts on multilateral cooperation during the interwar period to provide the historical relations of Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia to point out the extent of their

⁶ Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997)

cooperation and inherent characteristics in their relations. This perception will be helpful to understand the reasons of the plans for a Balkan federation and the role of Turkish-Greek relations behind the end of the Balkan Pact. Accordingly, it will separately summarize the situation in three countries in the aftermath of the World War II. Chapter III will deal with the Balkan federation period. It will argue that Tito's federation plan was the extension of historical romanticism into the early years of the Cold War. The harmony and clash of Yugoslavia's regional expansionist plans and the Soviet Union's security interests in the region will be analyzed in detail. Then, the role of Yugoslavia's independent behavior on the Tito-Stalin split, in line with the federation plans, will be covered. Chapter IV will examine the transition period in Yugoslav-American relations beginning from the Tito-Stalin split through the signing of the Treaty of Ankara between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia in 1953. It will first underscore the impact of Yugoslavia's vulnerable situation on U.S. foreign policy and in the shaping of regional and Cold War relations. It will emphasize the evolution of U.S. foreign policy from aiding Yugoslavia towards associating it with the western defense structure. In parallel with this, the steps towards a trilateral Balkan treaty and U.S. diplomacy will be analyzed. Chapter V will be the case study of the period from the Treaty of Ankara to the Treaty of Bled in 1954, an outsider in the Cold War, namely the Balkan Pact which established a collective defense between the signatories. The death of Stalin and its impact on the Cold war and the Balkan states marked the beginning of this phase. Then, the trilateral relations and its impact on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy will be the center of analysis. The U.S. policy and the obstacles that occurred in the Balkan relations and Yugoslavia's relations with Italy will be addressed. This chapter will argue that the Balkan alliance was a paper-pact as soon as it was born. Subsequently,

the Cyprus issue, its impact on Greek-Turkish relations and on the alliance, and Tito-Khrushchev correspondence will be covered, emphasizing the timing of these developments. In conclusion, the development of U.S. and Soviet Cold War policies towards Yugoslavia and the Balkans between 1945 and 1955, accordingly the regional cooperation attempts, and the role of regional historical factors will be assessed. It will be emphasized that in order to understand the achievements of the Cold War policies in the Balkans, regional factors should be treated equally with the larger Cold War policies.

CHAPTER II

THE BALKANS UNTIL THE COLD WAR

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will delineate the causes of cooperation in the Balkans during the interwar period in order to identify the main problems and hereditary characteristics of Balkan cooperation attempts. The first part will introduce the period from the early 1920s to the Balkan Entente, and further cover the Balkan Entente process in detail. Given the background, reasons for tendency towards cooperation and alliances in the Balkans historically vary. First of all, disintegration of the Ottoman Empire had already begun in this region before World War I, and the Balkan states flourished. As a result of this, the Balkan picture changed frequently; fed by late transformation into nation-building and state-building phases in this region led to continued political clashes, border disputes and growing irredentist feelings. In addition to intra-Balkan disputes, the centuries old Ottoman Empire was losing its might in protecting its existence, and became a possible target for the Great Powers. Since the Balkans was a boiling-pot in the beginning of the twentieth century, it served as a big potential for the Great Powers to materialize their intentions regarding the Ottoman Empire.

It should be noted that, expansionism was not a unique phenomenon for the bigger states; expansionism, namely becoming “greater,” was a long-lasting trend in Europe, even small states in the Balkans had expansionist tendencies i.e. Serbian

Greater Serbia - "Nacertanije,"⁷ or Greek "Megale Idea"⁸, and thus they played a role in the European power politics. However, while trying to make territorial gains they had to protect themselves from their neighbors and the Great Powers simultaneously.⁹

Making judgments on the Balkans without having sufficient knowledge of the region has played a leading role in the development of misconclusions and clichés. As with the case of ethnicities and religious diversity in the Balkans, the situation is like an alphabet soup and the number of ethnicities and nationalities is much more than the number of states. Once the waves of nationalism hit this region, they brought to life frozen conflicts as a consequence of this multi-ethnic structure.¹⁰ Besides that, the Balkan Wars, and then the Great War caused demarcation of borders without really taking into consideration the ethnicities. The alliances made during this period were a small-scale practice of balance of power politics dominating European affairs. However, what these wars really brought to the

⁷ Essentially, *Nacertanije* can be reduced to two main goals: 1) an independent policy must imply balancing between the Great Powers and relying on those who have no direct interests in the Balkans; it is possible to rely on Russia only as regards its support of Serbian aspirations, and this should by no means lead to Serbia's subjugation to the Slavic empire's Balkan goals; 2) the development of Yugoslav co-operation in order to carry out Serbia's unification, first with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then also with Montenegro, Old Serbia and Macedonia - the predominantly Serbian-inhabited lands within the Ottoman Empire - having in mind the access to the sea through a narrow belt in the north of Albania (today's Montenegrin coastal region of Ulcinj). For Ilija Garasanin, unification with the Southern Slavic peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy was a noble task for future generations - he thought that, considering the circumstances, only active co-operation was possible, primarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina... Dusan T. Batakovic, *Ilija Garasanin's "Nacertanije": a Reassessment*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Belgrade.

http://www.rastko.org.yu/istorija/batakovic/batakovic-nacertanije_eng.html (July 4, 2005).

⁸ In January 1844, the Greek Prime Minister, Ioannis Kolettis, addressed the Constitutional Assembly in Athens: The Kingdom of Greece is not Greece; it is only a part, the smallest and poorest, of Greece. The Greek is not only who inhabits the kingdom, but also who lives in Janina, or Thessaloniki, or Seres, or Adrianople, or Constantinople, or Trebizone, or Crete, or Samos, or any other country of the Greek history of race... There are two great centers of Hellenism, Athens and Constantinople. Athens is only the capitol of the Kingdom; Constantinople is the great capital, the city, *I Polis*, the attraction and the hope of all the Hellenes. Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 262.

⁹ It should also be noted that, despite the existence of expansionist tendencies, even some illusory intentions in this period, it is odd to stereotype Balkan countries as aggressive and war-loving nations, and equally seek the beginning of the Great War in this region.

¹⁰ See, Jelavich, Barbara & Charles, *The Establishment of Balkan National States, 1804-1920* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1986)

Balkans was the disintegration of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empire meant the end of expansionism towards east and west for the Balkan states. But new borders and new states, such as Turkey, brought new problems such as relocation and exchange of populations between Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria. From a general point of view, as Christopher Cviic states, “the old Empires were by no means perfect, but the national states that followed them were almost invariably worse.”¹¹

The end of the Great War brought little new and positive to this region. While popular arguments in the international arena in this period revolved around Woodrow Wilson’s self-determination and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s version of Marxism, both of them were unable to overcome existing problems, most importantly issues like the Macedonian question.¹² Post-war settlement did not satisfy most ex-belligerents, nor the Balkan ones, which became clear in the cases of Germany and Italy. Balkan states which were torn by domestic power struggles and economic backwardness - coupled by the Great depression later- resulted in totalitarian regimes. Prior to the 1930s, designs of the European states such as Italy on the Balkans constituted the core element of the Balkan picture. In sum, status quo interest and old problems marked the borderline dividing the Balkan countries during the inter-war period, and it was exactly this cleavage, which had to be surmounted in order to come close to real Balkan cooperation.¹³

¹¹ Christopher Cviic, *Remaking The Balkans* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991): 7.

¹² Matthew Smith Anderson, *The Eastern Question* (London: Macmillan, 1966): 273-299; Fikret Adanır, “The Macedonian Question: The Socio-Economic Reality and Problems of its Historiographic Interpretations” in *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, (1985-6): 43-64.

¹³ Oral Sander, *Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye, 1945-1965* [Balkan Developments and Turkey, 1945-1965] (Ankara: AÜSBF Yayınları, 1969), 5; Wolfgang Höpken, “Balkan Cooperation Between the Two World Wars: National Self-Interest and Multilateral Cooperation,” *İki Dünya Savaşı Arasında Avrupa ve Balkanlar: İdeolojiler ve Uluslararası Politika* [Europe and the Balkans in the Interwar Period: Ideologies and International Politics] (İstanbul: Aybay Yayınları, 1994), 101.

2.2 Attempts and Extent of Cooperation after the Great War

In the early 1920s, Bulgarian leader Alexandar Stamboliiski made efforts to create some sort of a multiethnic Balkan peasant federation, but his efforts proved futile. His aim was to expand the “Little Entente,”¹⁴ which was formed by Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania in 1921, by the participation of Bulgaria, but it did not materialize.¹⁵ The main objectives of the Little Entente were the preservation of the status quo established by the postwar treaties, accordingly prevention of Hungarian revisionism and the restoration of Habsburgs. However, growing dissatisfactions from the post-war settlement became clear in the late 1920s and Bulgaria supported the revision of the minority rights in Macedonia and the passage to the Aegean Sea.

In this regard the only positive development in the Balkans can be taken as the normalization of relations and the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey in the early 1930s after both countries sorted out the reasons of friction between each other.¹⁶ In general, Turkey, wanting to preserve the status-quo, proceeded with friendly relations with neighboring states, and helped the development of peace in the region. Given the background in the early 1920s, one of the significant problems in the region was the post-war settlement between Greece and Turkey. Accordingly the question of the Greek population in Turkey and the Turks in Greece represented an example of the extent of the population problem in the region. During the Lausanne negotiations, in January 1923, a protocol was signed between the two sides regarding the exchange of these populations. Nevertheless, the problem was not finalized, and in 1926 a treaty was concluded on the status of the “etabli” (settled

¹⁴ Eliza Campus, *The Little Entente and The Balkan Alliance* (Bucharest: Bibliotheca Historica Romaniae, 1978)

¹⁵ Özer Sükan, *21. Yüzyıl Başlarında Balkanlar ve Türkiye* [The Balkans and Turkey in the Beginning of the Twenty-first Century] (İstanbul: Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Yayınları, 2001), 181-82.

¹⁶ Sander, 7-9.

Turkish or Greek populations in Greek or Turkish mainland respectively). Unfortunately, this treaty could not solve the problem, it even exists today. The relations began to improve with Venizelos' rise to power in 1928. On June 10, 1930 the two states agreed on the status and properties of the "etabli" Turks in Greece and "etabli" Greeks in Turkey. This treaty was the product of Greek Prime Minister Venizelos and Turkish President Atatürk, who consequently put signature to three more agreements on 30 October 1930.¹⁷

2.3 Balkan Entente

When totalitarianism was rising in Europe, and especially as Italy was threatening Mediterranean security; the idea of the formation of a Balkan Pact was suggested by the former Greek Prime Minister Alexandros Papanastasiou¹⁸ at the October 1929 meeting of the Association of World Peace Convention. All of the Balkan delegations accepted his proposal, and next year in October the first Balkan Conference was launched in Athens "under the obvious sign of the unanimous desire to seek ways of rapprochement"¹⁹ with the participation of Bulgarian, Greek, Rumanian, Turkish and Albanian delegations and was followed by the Istanbul Conference. The third Balkan Conference was held in Bucharest where the idea of a Balkan Pact was spelled because of the approaching threats to Balkan security

¹⁷ These agreements were Friendship, Neutrality, Consensus and Arbitration Treaty; Protocol on the Limitation of the Naval Forces, and Settlement; Commerce and Sea Traffic Convention. Fahir, Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi 1914-1980* [Twentieth Century Political History 1914-1980] (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1987), 325-327; Melek Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler" [Relations with Greece], 325-357 in Baskin Oran, ed., *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: 1919-1980: Cilt I* [Turkish Foreign Policy: Facts, Documents, Interpretations from the War of Independence to Present: Volume I] (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), 336-348.

¹⁸ Alexandros Papanastasiou served as the Prime Minister of Greece during March 12, 1924 - July 24, 1924 and May 26, 1932 - June 5, 1932.

¹⁹ Campus, 38.

caused by aggressive foreign policies of Italy and Germany.²⁰ In fact, the meaning of the Entente to the signatory parties varied; first, it was to blockade possible Bulgarian revisionism, secondly to avoid Bulgarian-Yugoslav alliance, and thirdly against aggression in the Mediterranean.

The Balkan Pact of 1933 was established after a series of bilateral treaties. Turkey signed Treaties of Friendship, Non-Aggression, Arbitration and Consensus with Rumania in October 17, 1933 and with Yugoslavia in November 27, 1933. Although Eleftherios Venizelos left his office in 1932, the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, Panagis Tsaldaris and İsmet İnönü respectively signed the Pact of Cordial Agreement (Pacte d'Entente Cordiale) between their countries on September 14, 1933. With this pact two countries agreed on guaranteeing their borders mutually. This pact created reaction and tension in Bulgaria who perceived Greco-Turkish rapprochement as a serious threat towards its revisionist claims on Macedonia. Turkish Prime Minister İnönü and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüştü paid a visit to Sofia to calm the Bulgarian leaders by offering them to join the pact and to prove that their fears were groundless and to obtain Bulgaria's adherence to the Pact.²¹

The Greco-Turkish Pact symbolized the zenith of the relations between Greece and Turkey. Just a decade before, these countries were fighting each other, but now they were cooperating against possible aggression. This Pact showed Rumania and Yugoslavia the feasibility of an alliance between Balkan countries. Furthermore, perceived the fear of Bulgaria's revisionist aims led them to agree with Turkey and increased their willingness to expand their understanding to a single Entente. When they came together in the Fourth Balkan Conference in November 1933 in

²⁰ Armaoğlu, 337-338; Tatarlı, 191-193; Sükan., 186.

²¹ Campus, 69; Armaoğlu., 338; Melek Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler," 349- 350.

Thessalonica, four countries agreed on continuing their peace efforts without Bulgaria. The conference was ended with the declaration of the hope that all Balkan countries should join a Balkan pact, thus leaving an open door for Bulgaria.²²

Bulgaria could not take the final step to join the Balkan understanding. Albania, also, under heavy Italian influence did not join these efforts. As a result, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Rumania came together in Belgrade in February 1934 and prepared the Draft Agreement of the Balkan Entente. The Agreement was signed by four countries on February 9, 1934 in Athens and put into effect. According to the agreement, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Rumania bound themselves to mutually guarantee the security of the existing Balkan frontiers and to consult with one another in case they were threatened. The sides agreed not to embark upon any political action in relation to any other Balkan state without the consent of the other signatories. And the contracting parties declared the Entente open to any other Balkan countries whose adherence would be the object of favorable examination.²³

The materialization of the Balkan Entente meant the end of the Balkan Conferences. The conferences were held with the hope that the Balkan understanding would expand gradually. L. S. Stavrianos states that “the Balkan Entente was more restricted, having been organized for the purpose of maintaining the status quo and therefore automatically directed against revisionist Balkan states.”²⁴ This characteristic of the Pact was simply the resurrection of pre-World War I alliance building mentality. This limited aim of preventing the aggression of any Balkan state, in particularly Bulgaria, and the inability of the pact to extract military commitment from any member were the basic reasons for the Entente’s short life.

²² Campus, 67-68.

²³ Sukan, Özer, 187; Fırat., 351-52; Armaoğlu., 339.

²⁴ L. S. Stavrianos., *The Balkans since 1453*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 739.

Coupled with this, the Entente began to show signs of cracking almost as soon as it was organized. “The principal reason was the pressure of resurgent Germany. German economic hegemony, which became increasingly pronounced during the late 1930s, inevitably had diplomatic repercussions. The Balkan countries could not afford to antagonize their principal customer because there was none other able or willing to purchase their goods.”²⁵ Germany acquired a dominant position in the Balkan trade as a result of the Balkan states’ decreasing trade with Italy after the latter clearly showed its aggressive aims in Ethiopia. The totalitarian regimes of the Balkans welcomed the German influence in this diplomatic situation.²⁶

Looking from the Balkan view, the Balkan Entente divided the Balkans into two camps: the signatory states on one side and Albania and Bulgaria on the other side. Exclusion of Albania and Bulgaria was a great mistake. On the other hand, as Misha Glenny says “the Pact was clearly aimed at Bulgarian revisionism. Bulgaria had never officially repudiated its claims against all four neighbours – the southern Dobrudja (Romania), eastern Thrace (Turkey), western Thrace (Greece) and northern Macedonia (Yugoslavia).”²⁷ Besides, the Pact’s vision did not go beyond that of military alliance since none of the member states had compatible foreign policy aims. For instance, Greece and Turkey’s main concern was the Bulgarian revisionism. Greece only wanted the guarantee its borders with Bulgaria, but did not want to support Yugoslavia in case of an Italian attack as it had borders with the Italian dominated Albania. Apart from the situation in the Balkans, Turkey’s most significant concern was its request of remilitarization the demilitarized Straits Zone. This potential revision heavily concerned Rumania who feared that it would increase

²⁵ Ibid. 740.

²⁶ Sander, 13.

²⁷ Misha Glenny, *The Balkans: The Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999* (New York: Penguin, 2001): 437.

Bulgarian claims to revise the Treaty of Neuilly, and in consequence change the Rumanian-Bulgarian border.²⁸

Between the years 1934 and 1936 it could be easily understood that the status quo in the Balkans could not be preserved only by means of this sort of regional cooperation since Italy became more aggressive. Mussolini's declarations about Italian aims in Asia, Italy's militarization of the Dodecanese Islands, and its conclusion of Rome Protocols with Austria and Hungary heavily disturbed the Balkan countries. After Italy's occupation of Ethiopia, it was perceived, in particular by Turkey, that Mussolini's next target would be the Balkans. The increasing German influence led Turkey to take serious steps on the way to revise the Straits regime. Thus, on July 20, 1936, the signatory states of the Lausanne Treaty met again under Turkey's initiative and agreed on Turkish control of the Straits with the Convention of Montreux.²⁹

International threats were reflected in the proceedings of the Balkan Entente Conference held in Belgrade on May 4-6 1936. This time, the main concerns of the Entente members were now to make certain that their obligations would not involve them in a war with a Great Power. To this end, Turkish and Greek representatives sought to limit the obligations of the member states as much as possible. It was agreed that the liability for mutual defense should be limited to purely Balkan exigencies and that in all other cases the obligations of the Entente members should be restricted to the action required by the League Covenant.³⁰

After signing the Montreux Convention, Turkey began try to diversify its foreign policy alternatives. While Turkey was trying to continue its cooperation with

²⁸ Ibid. 13-14.

²⁹ Dilek Barlas, "Türkiye'nin 1930'lardaki Balkan Politikası" [Turkish Policy Regarding the Balkans in 1930s] in İsmail Soysal, ed., *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç* [Contemporary Turkish Diplomacy: Progress of 200 Years] (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1999), 364-366.

³⁰ Stavrianos, 741-742.

the Balkan Entente members, it also improved its bilateral relations with the Balkan states in order to protect the Balkans. Although Turkey did not trust France and England much, it tried to improve relations with them in order to prevent possible German and Italian designs on the Balkans. Turkey's rapprochement with England did not prevent its cooperation with Greece; however, other Balkan countries began to pursue different policies. Yugoslavia signed agreements with Bulgaria and Italy in March 1937. Germany's occupation of Czechoslovakia made Turkey and Greece immediately sign a new agreement. In February 1939, the Balkan Entente members decided to extend the pact for seven more years, however, Italy's occupation of Albania two months later made it very difficult for the Pact to make healthy decisions.³¹

In this environment, on October 19, 1939 Turkey signed a fifteen-year mutual aid pact with France and England. A few months later, on February 2-4, 1940 the Balkan Entente held a meeting in Belgrade. Here Turkey made a futile effort to bring Balkan nations together, however, the other states rejected such a proposal stating their fear of Turkey's ties with France and England. They thought that it would bring Anglo-French dominance to the Balkans. "It was tacitly agreed that it was up to the various members to deal individually with the Great Powers in order to preserve their neutrality. The Balkan Entente had become a paper organization lacking unity, independence, and effectiveness."³² As seen before, The Balkan Entente and Little Entente were targeted towards regional aggression and outside powers. The common tie between the two was Romania. In 1940, Rumania came under the dominance of Germany and joined the war against the Soviet Union on Hitler's side in 1941. This put an end to the Balkan Entente for all practical purposes. Glenny asserts that,

³¹ Barlas, 366-367.

³² Stavrianos, 746-747.

“hence, both the Little Entente and the Balkan pact suffered from the same defect: they were strong alliances against the weak and weak alliances against the strong.”³³

2.4 World War II and Its Impact on the Balkans

The war brought bloodshed, civil wars, fear and calamities to the Balkans. The secret or open agreements during or after the war marked the map of the post-war Balkans. The “Percentage Agreement” on October 9, 1944, between Churchill and Stalin increased and solidified the effects of Soviet occupation of the Balkans. During the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences no real agreements were made concerning the Balkans, these conferences further increased the division of the Balkans.³⁴ Just a few years after the end of the World War II, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey would meet together again in a strictly different environment, in a new type of atmosphere more complicated and problematical than the Balkan politics, but until June 28, 1948, they had little in common except for the growing intentions of Yugoslavia on Greece. This part will summarize the situation in these three countries to the differences of circumstances and intentions at the end of World War II.

2.4.1 Turkey and the Soviet Threat

Turkey was one of the first countries that felt the Soviet threat on its security arising from the changing world order. The beginning of the Cold War is multifaceted, but one thing is clear that the problem of spheres of influence started during World War II. Until the last months of the War, Turkey maintained a relatively neutral stand.³⁵ Till the war, having combined with Turkey’s anti-

³³ Glenny, 452.

³⁴ Stavrianos, 18-21.

³⁵ For further information see Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An Active Neutrality* (Cambridge: University Press. Cambridge, 1989)

imperialistic stand, Soviet foreign policy regarding Turkey was toward preserving Turkey's sovereignty and control over the Straits. Nevertheless, Soviet policy of friendship and collaboration with Turkey, even relations between Moscow and Ankara since the period of the Turkish War of Independence, inspired guesswork, and brought less than expected in terms of cooperation.³⁶ Turkey's adherence to Western ideals and institutions played a leading role in the failure of Soviet-Turkish collaboration. At the end of the war, Soviet foreign policy indicated a slight shift with the denunciation of the Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality and Non-Aggression of 1925 with Turkey on March 19, 1945. On June 7, 1945, just a month after the German surrender, the Soviet Union notified Turkey that the restoration of friendly relations depended on Turkey's acceptance of certain prerequisites, namely the revision of the Montreux Straits Convention and establishment of a permanent Soviet base in the region of the Turkish Straits.³⁷ Detailed proposals for re-modification of the Montreux regime was presented to Turkey on August 7, 1946. The return of the districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum to the Soviet Union was also verbalized.

In particular, Nikita Khrushchev's comments on the post-war Soviet policy regarding Turkey reflects the extent of Soviet decisiveness on Turkey and its unintended repercussions; except the fact that Khrushchev wrote these after witnessing the outcomes of Stalin's foreign policy. According to his memoirs published decades later:

Stalin gave in and sent an official memorandum to the Turkish government pressing our territorial claims. Well, the whole thing backfired. Beria didn't foresee that Turkey would respond to our demand by accepting American support. So, Beria and Stalin succeeded only in

³⁶ Sunita Pathania, *Soviet Policy Towards Turkey: 1945-1965* (New Delhi: Khama Publishers, 1994), 19-52.

³⁷ Necmeddin Sadak, "Turkey Faces the Soviets." *Foreign Affairs* 27, No. 3 (Apr., 1949): 485; also see *New York Times*, June 28, 1945.

frightening the Turks right into the open arms of the Americans. Because of Stalin's note to the Turkish government, the Americans were able to penetrate Turkey and set up bases right next to our borders. Stalin ruined our relations with the Turks. Turkey has allowed the US to have military bases on its territory ever since.

Khrushchev accused Stalin's "inflexibility and the psychic disturbance which came over him at the end of his life."³⁸ For the Turkish side, those claims were unacceptable, and were taken as serious threats, and criticized seriously. Hasan Saka, the Turkish Foreign Minister, responded that the Soviet demands offered no basis for discussion as they were incompatible with Turkey's sovereignty and territorial integrity.³⁹ Ahmet Emin Yalman, the editor of daily *Vatan*, stated that "any shot on the Turkish Russian frontiers may become the first shot of the Third World War because all the nations are bound to waken to the fact that the Russian appetite can accept Trafalgar or Times Square as its final limits."⁴⁰

As a matter of fact, Soviet demands from Turkey were not unexpected from the Turkish side at the time of notification. As early as 1939, when Turkish Foreign Minister visited Moscow and in 1940, during Molotov-Ribbentrop conversations, the Soviets raised their demands on the control over the Straits. At the end of the war, Stalin's intentions became overt among his allies. For him, the Straits had great importance for Soviet security and Turkey was not strong enough to protect them. It was a matter of Soviet security.⁴¹ Western military existence in the region heightened Stalin's apprehension that "should Turkey, after refusing to accept Soviet proposals, begin to take military measures in the Straits jointly with some non-Black Sea

³⁸ Strobe Talbott, ed. & tr., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 295-296.

³⁹ *Ayin Tarihi* (July 1945): 44.

⁴⁰ *Vatan*, July 8-12, 1945.

⁴¹ Walter Bedell Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1950), 53, n.35.

powers, this would run directly counter to the interests of the security of the Black Sea Powers.”⁴²

2.4.2 Greece and The Greek Civil War

In the case of Greece, the story is more problematic. At the end of the World War I, Greece tried to invade Turkey with the dream of creating an illusory Greater Greece. Greece's Anatolia campaign ended with a complete disaster and weakened both countries' economies and human resources. As seen before, interwar Greek relations were quite smooth as a result of increasing insecurity caused by several reasons such as strengthening European dictatorships. During World War II, Greece was invaded by Italy in 1940, and then by Nazi Germany and partly by Bulgaria. The end of the War brought another war to Greece, which would be more disastrous than the former. The Greek Civil War is one of the three major 20th Century European Civil Wars along with Spanish and Russian ones. The country was divided and fell into turmoil, since Greek resistance movements, communists and royalists, who once cooperated against the invaders became enemies at the end of the war and started fighting each other. As a result of growing of East-West tensions, the Greek Civil War has been perceived as a struggle between communist and non-communist forces in the country by the historians, and the focus was on the probability of Greece's possible end, sharing the fate of Eastern European countries.

From a different point of view, Greek Civil War was a matter of domestic clash between the forces once fought against fascism while now fought for domestic control.⁴³ Stasis N. Kalydas states that identities of warring parties were very fluid;

⁴² Ferenc A. Vali, *The Turkish Straits and NATO* (Hoover Institution Press: Stanford, Calif., 1972), 269-274.

⁴³ See Haris Vlavianos, *Greece, 1941-49: From Resistance to Civil War: The Strategy of the Greek Communist Party* (London: Macmillan in association with St Antony's College, Oxford, 1992); John

“For instance, a Slavophone peasant of Macedonia could be a self-professed Bulgarian komitadji collaborating with the German occupation authorities, a member of the Slavophone guerrillas of ELAS, a member of Tito’s Macedonian partisans, or a right-wing Greek nationalist.”⁴⁴ Consequently, Greek Civil War started during the Second World War, so it is a gross-oversimplification to perceive it as a war against communism.

From a general point of view, the fate of Greece and the Balkans was determined by the famous Percentages Agreement between Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin in 1944. This was not made as a result of urgency of the situation in the Balkans, but to avoid any clash between British and Soviet troops which might provoke bigger ones since the Soviet Army was marching through Western Europe without facing an equal opponent. In the end, wartime spheres of responsibility became post war settlement itself. The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid can be taken as the final settlement of the Balkan problem because until that time nobody addressed such a clear-cut settlement.⁴⁵

Just like the post-World War I settlement, Stalin and Churchill’s approach ignored local differences and responsibilities of the Balkan people. Nonetheless, an agreement between two leaders shaped the map in this region but could not settle the local problems, as seen from the Greek case. Since the United Kingdom was not in a position to maintain order in Greece, and was even dependent on American support to stabilize its own zone in the interior, leaving Greece to its own demise was

S. Koliopoulos, *Plundered Loyalties: World War II and Civil War in Greek West Macedonia* (New York: New York University Press, 1999)

⁴⁴ Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The Greek Civil War in Retrospect,” *Correspondence: An International Review of Culture and Society*, Issue No. 4, Spring/Summer 1999, 10-11. Also see, David H. Close ed., *The Greek Civil War, 1943-1950: Studies of Polarization* (London; New York: Routledge, 1993)

⁴⁵ In Churchill’s words, (Churchill asking Stalin) “So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety per cent predominance in Rumania, for us to have ninety per cent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?” “Winston S. Churchill and Stalin Cuts Their Percentages Deal,” in Merrill, Dennis and Paterson, Thomas G. eds., *Major problems in American Foreign Relations: Documents and Essays* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 172.

unacceptable after witnessing the outcomes of Soviet involvement in Eastern Europe and continuing Soviet activities in the Middle East. As stated by Clement Attlee, the British were “backing a lame horse” in Greece and Britain simply could not afford to maintain a military force there in order to prop up an unpopular and inept government.⁴⁶

More specifically Greece had a long and strategically thin northern frontier which it was in no position to defend in case of a Soviet attack.⁴⁷ Coupled with this, Greece had border disputes with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. As a result of Marshall Tito’s semi-independence from Moscow, Yugoslavia maintained an expansionist foreign policy in the post-war environment. In the case of Greece, Tito’s intentions were much clearer, and Yugoslavia was the leading supporter of the Greek Communists guerrillas, materially. In essence, the popular obsession of the past towards becoming greater was maintained in the post-World War II environment when Tito “claimed Greek Macedonia (by calling for the ‘unification’ of Macedonia under Belgrade’s aegis), and had supported Bulgarian claims over Western Thrace,”⁴⁸ in order to create a Balkan federation centered around Yugoslavia which will be dealt in the next Chapter. Shortly, it is more appropriate to call it Greek Defense Policy, instead of Greek Foreign policy until the end of the Civil War in 1949.

The transfer of authority from the British to the Americans resulted in the more active support of Greece, together with Turkey, not because of these countries’ respective and enlightened democracies, but as a result of perceived Soviet threat in

⁴⁶ Gabriel Gorodetsky, *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991: A Retrospective* (London; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 1994), 117.

⁴⁷ Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “Security and the European Option: Greek Foreign Policy, 1952-62,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 30, No. 1 (Jan., 1995): 188.

⁴⁸ Ibid. 190.

this region.⁴⁹ According to Robert A. Larson, “given the military position of the Allied armies in 1945 and the uncertain intentions of the Soviets, the United States found itself involved in areas of the world which less than a decade earlier had ranked fairly low on the agenda of diplomatic priorities.”⁵⁰ This is much clear in U.S. foreign policy regarding the Balkans than any other case. Lastly, U.S. intervention, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Aid, also meant the blockading of the plans for a Balkan federation.

2.4.3 Tito Strikes Back

Neither Turkey nor Greece benefited more than Yugoslavia from the increasing Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union in the first decade of the Cold War. Tito had his own partisan resistance movement, established control over his country, and Yugoslavia was the only country in Europe which liberated itself at the end of the war without considerable outside help. As compared to other communist states of Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia had an independent stand from Moscow. Later, when the Balkan Pact of 1954 was signed, Yugoslavia represented complex background that made it less comprehensible than any other Balkan country again.

In detail, Yugoslav history after German invasion in 1941 and the name Jozip Broz Tito are inseparable. During the war, Jozip Broz Tito, leader and chief commander of the People's Liberation Front, faced many problems before the Allies recognized him as the anti-fascist factor in the country and not Draža Mihailović and

⁴⁹ As George F. Kennan comments on the later admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO in 1952 as: it was true that the regimes in Greece and Turkey were anti-Communist. But to make that, and that alone, admission to the pact seemed to me a dangerous precedent. Nor could they – particularly Turkey – have qualified for membership on the standard of association with our ideas of democracy and individual liberty. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950* (London: Hutchinson, 1973), 410-411.

⁵⁰ Robert A. Garson, “American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Power: Eastern Europe 1946-50,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 21, No. 3 (Jul., 1986): 347.

his Chetniks.⁵¹ As compared with Greece, polarization between resistance movements indicates great similarity, but Yugoslavs resolved their civil-war during the war. On March 7, 1945, a single provisional Yugoslav government took office with Tito as the Prime Minister. Unlike Charles De Gaulle of France, Tito had a strong-real-resistance-movement and stood against the invasion in real terms.⁵² He maintained fighting successfully in two fronts simultaneously: against the German invasion and against the Chetniks in The Civil War. More than that, he was the only leader in the region who had the bases for a new strong communist state with his own liberation army, and he was recognized by the Allies as the part of the winning side at the end of the war. One of the factors strengthening Tito's position against the Soviet Union was the issue of self liberation. The other factors can be summarized as, "Tito and his partisans fought against Hitler largely by themselves; they won their own civil war; with more help from the West than from the Red Army, though with an assist from the Red Army in Serbia; they developed a tremendous pride and confidence in themselves."⁵³ In addition, Tito took Yugoslavia on its own course and placed his intentions and his countries' needs as a priority. The Yugoslav Communists did not want to subordinate themselves to the Soviets, they believed they coped with the Nazis by themselves so they had no debt to Stalin. Even when Soviet troops entered Yugoslav territory for a brief period of time Yugoslavs had unfortunate experiences, and the existence of the Red Army led to social tensions because of numerous thefts and rapes.

⁵¹ For further information, see John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia As History: Twice There was a Country* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 196-229.

⁵² Greece and Yugoslavia were the only Balkan countries that rejected German rule, and consequently were invaded by Wehrmacht but maintained successful resistance movements against the invaders until the end of the War.

⁵³ John C. Campbell, *Tito's Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics* (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Row, 1967): 97.

Tito, as the sole ruler of his country, had a different Balkan view which would clash with Stalin's in the future. While maintaining similar measures in domestic and foreign policies like his Communist neighbors, he was a privileged person in his relations with Moscow. In the domestic affairs of Yugoslavia, he was strictly Stalinist in order to silence his critics especially in the suppression of party members, and in economic policies like aggressive collectivization of farms, heavy industry and a command economy. Taking into consideration the local factors, new Yugoslavia was very similar to the Soviets as compared to Eastern European states. As a result of its multi-ethnic structure and federative state model, Soviet methods of running the state were copied; even an artificial nation, Macedonia, was created to avoid ethnic problems. These developments were welcomed in Moscow for a while. Tito was as orthodox as Stalin in terms of ideology, personality and brutality, excluding the fact that he did not want to be dictated. His notion of Yugoslavia was different; one that the new state should have a leading regional role in the post-war Balkans.

In foreign policy issues, Tito openly followed the Soviet line and never hesitated to hide his opposition against the Western states on two occasions. One was in May and June 1945 at Trieste when Yugoslavian troops occupied the territory and stopped by Allied forces, and in 1946 when two U.S. planes were shot down in Yugoslavia. Belgrade came to the verge of open conflict with the United States.⁵⁴ The Western countries perceived, and to a certain extent they were right, Yugoslavia as an enthusiastic and loyal satellite of Moscow fulfilling Soviet intentions by provocative policies towards the West. In contrast, Tito's regional plan of creating a Balkan federation was not completely appreciated by Moscow. As Tito considered

⁵⁴ Campbell, 1.

himself as the patron leader of the region and as the major adviser of the communist parties of Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania, one can understand he had pretensions in the region as Stalin had in the wider area of Eastern Europe. During the interwar years, Comintern had a plan for the break-up of Yugoslavia and its replacement by a Balkan federation which was favored by Bulgarian Communist Party but was never initiated. As Civiic notes, the reasons were obvious in the Bulgarian support of this idea: “the possibility of reopening the Macedonian issue via the idea of a Balkan federation was attractive.”⁵⁵ At the end of the war, Yugoslavia’s position in the Balkans was totally different, but the idea of a Balkan federation never disappeared. Whereas Stalin’s vision of the Balkan federation was not Tito’s own federation system with Albania and Bulgaria and with Greece when the communists would win the civil war.⁵⁶ As stated by John C. Campbell, “the solidarity of the communist world was a fine thing to show as a façade to the West, but the reality of the Yugoslavs’ relations with the Soviet leadership was a story of disillusionment and frustration well before the break in 1948.”⁵⁷

2.5 Conclusion

During the interwar period, major obstacles that limited achieving efficient cooperation in the Balkans can be summarized as the existence of mistrust, border and ethnic disputes, and failing to achieve a form of cooperation without alienating key states. These factors could not be overcome since the Great War and led to a loose cooperation in the Balkans and ended with Axis invasion. At the end of World War II, the Balkan picture did not change dramatically, but the war did not put an end to expansionist tendencies of some states who wanted to benefit from the post-

⁵⁵ Civiic, 14

⁵⁶ This issue will be covered in Chapter III.

⁵⁷ Ibid. 97.

war environment. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria cooperated against Greece's sovereignty and tried to fulfill their earlier intentions, encouraged by the Soviet Union. Yugoslav and Bulgarian actions can be explained by historical reasons, not with the expansionist characteristic of Communism or Soviet aggressiveness.

The ethnicity issue and the resentment of the past affected Balkan politics during the interwar period, and played a role in the post-World War II policies of these states. While Tito ignored the multi-ethnic problems of his own state, ethnicity played a role in his approach to the establishment of a future Balkan federation, a federation of southern Slavic people under Yugoslav domination; in a sense, the expansion of the Macedonian question into the post-World War II environment. It is clear that Yugoslav-Bulgarian attitude in the region, when Greece was suffering from domestic chaos and Turkey was isolated and faced with unacceptable demands, strongly influenced Turkey and Greece's siding and cooperation with the West during the following years. In Chapter III, the Balkan federation issue and its impact on the region and Cold War relations will be examined in detail.

CHAPTER III

PLANS FOR A BALKAN FEDERATION

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will reconsider the efforts towards the creation of a Balkan federation after World War II. In the first place, it will cover the obstacles against an alliance in the Balkans through the end and just after the war. Then, it will examine the development of the idea of a Balkan federation until the Tito-Stalin split of 1948. June 28, 1948 was a milestone for Cold War politics, not only for the Westerners but also for the Communist camp. However, this date also put an end to Communist Balkan federation plans. In this regard, considering the lack of harmony between Yugoslav and Soviet efforts towards an alliance in this region as a leading factor in the Tito-Stalin split, this chapter will analyze the events until June 28, taking into account the impact of Balkan federation in Soviet-Yugoslav relations on the one hand and East-West relations on the other. Three important documents: The Yugoslav and Soviet reports of Tito-Stalin Conversation of May 27-28, 1946, and Report of Milovan Djilas about a secret Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav meeting of Feb. 10, 1948 will be covered considering that these meetings include immense information about Soviet and Yugoslav plans in the Balkans, and also about the causes of Tito-Stalin split.

While giving historical details, the impact of important Cold War events on regional relations, i.e. the Czech coup, the Marshall Aid and establishment of the

Cominform, will be covered. In addition, Albanian-Bulgarian-Yugoslav role in the Greek Civil War and its meaning for possible Balkan federation and on the Cold War will be emphasized. Therefore the analysis will be made at two levels; regional and global.

Yugoslav-Western relations, in particular Yugoslav-American relations and the process of Yugoslav-Soviet conflict after the secret Soviet-Bulgar-Yugoslav meeting will be dealt with to comprehend the basis of Yugoslavia's future rapprochement with the West. Until Tito's defiance of Stalin, the Western camp perceived Yugoslavia as a Communist country maintaining the Soviet path and sometimes acting more strictly than Moscow. Yugoslavia was a key and problematic state, namely privileged, for Soviet security, and would have the same significance for the Western defense system.

3.2 Initial Plans for a Balkan Alliance

Given the background, a brand new alliance in the Balkans was a matter in discussions during the Yalta conference between the Allies;⁵⁸ in turn, "the possibility of some kind of Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation had been discussed during the war between Tito and Dimitrov."⁵⁹ Just before the end of the war the discussions were still going on between Yugoslavs and Bulgarians on this subject. For Stalin, a federation would serve his long-term interests in that it would strengthen Soviet political existence in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia; but a federation should be established

⁵⁸ U.S. Department of State, *The Conferences of Malta and Yalta* (Washington, D.C., Government Printing House, 1955), 876-877, 890.

⁵⁹ Duncan Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1979), 36; also Edward Kardelj confirms that Dimitrov had wanted rapprochement between two countries during the war. Dedijer, 101.

without any interference from his Western allies.⁶⁰ “During the meeting of Foreign Ministers on February 10, 1945, however, V. Molotov [Soviet Foreign Minister] had said that this was not an urgent matter at the present time.”⁶¹ On the other hand, Duncan Wilson argues that at the beginning of 1945 the Western powers were against any form of Balkan federation, and Stalin was not ready to encourage it openly.⁶² Both of these explanations represent a part of the main issue; as a result of spheres of influence obsession, neither side wanted any sort of federation or alliance out of its control. Vojtech Mastny adds one more step for these obsessive behaviors; his explanation of the Soviet behavior indicates a different dimension of Stalin’s intentions. He links it with the general Soviet foreign policy towards the West, its representation in the international organizations and its relation with the Communist regimes:

Stalin triumphed when his country entered the United Nations as one of the permanent members of the Security Council, even cajoling the world organization into granting the Ukrainian as well as Byelorussian Soviet republics separate membership as if they were sovereign states. Even more important was the launching in 1945 of the Council of Foreign Ministers as a great-power directorate viewed by Moscow as the main safeguard to ensure that in all important international decisions its interests would be heeded. Moreover, before the war ended, the Soviet Union had succeeded in aborting projects by smaller Eastern European states that could enable them to combine their forces to better resist its

⁶⁰ Already since late 1944, the leadership of the communist parties of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, having come to power, began talks on uniting both countries into a federation. The talks were sanctioned, if not even initiated, by Stalin himself, who at the time was in favor of expediting the creation of such a body. Apparently, he had intended this as a means to significantly strengthen the “people’s democracy” in Bulgaria: first, with the help of the more stable communist regime in Yugoslavia, and second, reckoning that by uniting with Yugoslavia—a member of the anti-Hitler coalition—Bulgaria would successfully shed its status as a vanquished nation and consequently escape U.S. and British prerogatives stemming from their participation in the establishment of allied control. In early 1945, however, the Western allies, exercising these prerogatives, vetoed the establishment of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. And when Stalin in turn decided to have Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for now sign only a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the veto was extended to this as well. The matter had to be put off to follow the signing of a peace treaty with Bulgaria. See, *Soviet and Yugoslav Records of the Tito-Stalin Conversation of 27-28 May 1946*, in Leonid Gibianskii, “The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin’s Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (CWIHP) 10, (March 1998): 125, n.14.

⁶¹ Türkaya Ataöv, *NATO and Turkey* (Ankara: Sevinç Printing House, 1971), 116.

⁶² Wilson, 36, n. 5.

growing power. Instead, having already in 1943 concluded with Czechoslovakia the kind of vague treaty of “friendship and mutual assistance” Stalin preferred, Moscow proceeded eventually to tie other countries of the region to its fold with similar treaties.⁶³

Nevertheless, establishing an alliance of any sort was a difficult objective to achieve in the first years after the War. It was limited with small steps and maintained in the form of strengthening ties between Communist governments and with Moscow. In addition, as opposed to false comments such as, “during the first post-war years, the USA and Great Britain demonstrated no great interest concerning the position of Tito's Yugoslavia, which contrasted with their ongoing interest in the course of events in Poland and Czechoslovakia,”⁶⁴ the Balkans and Yugoslavia were strategically important regions for the European defense since Trieste⁶⁵ was a continuing dispute, Greek Civil War did not lose momentum and the Soviet Union maintained propaganda in non-Communist states. Therefore, it was a critical decision to establish military alliances openly in an environment causing insecurity on the other side.

There is a variety of explanations regarding the shifts in Soviet foreign policy in this period. Vladimir Dedijer points to another side of Soviet policy regarding Eastern Europe and the Balkans. According to him, Stalin's support towards a Balkan federation was a consequence of Stalin's intention towards preserving his control over Balkan affairs. Dedijer says that:

⁶³ Vojtech Mastny, “NATO in the Beholder's Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949-56,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. 35.

<http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ACFB01.pdf> (Jan. 15, 2005)

Also in April 1945, Tito had been invited to Moscow to sign a treaty of friendship and Stalin, who rarely agreed to share the limelight with anyone, did him the signal honor of sending him on a triumphal tour of the USSR and allowing him to be welcomed as a war hero. Beloff, 142.

⁶⁴ Jordan Baev, “U.S. Security Estimates on Yugoslavia (1948-1991),” *National Security and Future* 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000): 95-106.

⁶⁵ Yugoslav and Slovene armies captured Trieste on May 1, 1945. However left the territory as a result of international pressure. As dealt before, on February 10, 1947, Free Territory of Trieste was established by a treaty which divided territory into two zones.

Stalin had been toying with the idea of bringing all the East European countries, including Yugoslavia, within Soviet borders. This was to be done in two stages: first, Poland and Czechoslovakia were to form one federation, Rumania and Hungary another, and Bulgaria and Yugoslavia still a third; secondly these new states would merge with the Soviet Union.⁶⁶

In response, according to Leonid Gibianskii, “only the latter of these was the immediate goal of his comment on federations, while the reference to the previous two seems more plausible as a strictly tactical move, used to camouflage his true intentions.”⁶⁷ Later developments support Dedijer’s reasoning, except the fact that Soviet and Yugoslav versions of a Balkan federation were different and Dedijer presents the Yugoslav version of the story. Stalin’s possible federation plans were not a matter of discussion until the secret Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav meeting 10 February 1948 which will be dealt within the following parts. Additionally, Yugoslavia followed the Stalinist line in foreign policy, and “in most diplomatic and intelligence reports related to the period before 1948, the cabinet of Josip Broz Tito is regarded as the closest ally of the Soviet Union and as a ‘standard’ Stalinist communist type regime in East Europe.”⁶⁸ In contrast he had his own plans regarding the future of Yugoslavia and Yugoslavia’s neighbors, while Stalin’s behavior was changing constantly based on the developments in international affairs and driven by preserving his authority.

⁶⁶ Vladimir Dedijer, *The Battle Stalin Lost*, 101. Vladimir Dedijer was the editor of Yugoslav Communist party newspaper “Borba,” then he worked as a member of the party until 1954. He wrote several books about Yugoslavia including *Tito: a Biography*, *Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican* and *The Road to Sarajevo*.

⁶⁷ Leonid Gibianskii, “The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin’s Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948,” *CWIB* 10, (March 1998): 116.

⁶⁸ During the first post-war years, the USA and Great Britain demonstrated no great interest concerning the position of Tito’s Yugoslavia, which contrasted with their ongoing interest in the course of events in Poland and Czechoslovakia. In most diplomatic and intelligence reports related to the period before 1948, the cabinet of Josip Broz Tito is regarded as the closest ally of the Soviet Union and as a “standard” Stalinist communist type regime in East Europe. The attention of the leading circles in the United States to Yugoslavia increases considerably only when the conflict between Stalin and Tito is openly acknowledged at the end of June, 1948. Jordan Baev, “U.S. Security Estimates on Yugoslavia (1948-1991),” *National Security and Future* 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000): 95.

3.3 Moscow-Belgrade Relations: Tito-Stalin Conversation of May 27-28, 1946

Tito's design of Yugoslavia was to be the dominant state in the Balkans.⁶⁹ Furthermore, for Tito a federation with Bulgaria meant the integration of Bulgaria into Yugoslavia. "The Yugoslavs wanted to see the Bulgarian part of Macedonia (Pirin) joined to the existing Macedonian Republic, which was one of the new constituent parts of Yugoslavia. A Bulgarian Republic would then join the new federation as a seventh unit, on the same footing as the other six."⁷⁰ This sort of a federation was out of Stalin's plans, but Bulgarians and Yugoslavs had to act in line with Stalin. Since Stalin did not have a coherent idea about a possible federation from the very beginning making tactical moves based on the events, Yugoslav-Bulgarian moves which lacked coordination led to problems in their relations with Moscow. A letter from Moša Pijade to Edward Kardelj can be taken as an indicator of Stalin's unstable mood.⁷¹ Not surprisingly, until 1948 the plan for a Balkan federation had an unstable history, discussed then but could not be materialized several times, just because of lack of harmony of interests between Sofia, Belgrade and Moscow. For instance, during Tito-Stalin conversations of 1946, Tito treated a possible federation with Bulgaria and Albania negatively, or tried to look uninterested, most probably to hide his real intentions, as seen from the excerpts of conversation from Soviet documents:

⁶⁹The link with Albania and Bulgaria had been envisaged by Tito as early as 1943, and talks had started behind closed doors with the leaders of the Communist parties of these two countries in the latter half of 1944, Pavlowitch, 53.

⁷⁰ Wilson, 36; also Beloff confirms that, "whereas the Bulgarian Communists favored unity with Yugoslavia on equal terms Tito wanted to break up Bulgaria, annex its Macedonian area to the Macedonian republic of Yugoslavia, and turn the rest of Bulgaria into a seventh Yugoslav Federated Republic. For the Bulgarians too the rupture came just in time." Beloff, 143.

⁷¹ "...in January 1945, when I was in Moscow as the head of the Yugoslav delegation preparing, together with the Bulgarian federation...Stalin, during a visit both delegations paid him at the Kremlin, had supported the Bulgarian thesis of a dualistic federation –a federation in which Bulgaria would not be just one of seven south Slav republics, but one in which all six other republics would make up one unit and Bulgaria the other....two days later, he brought up the matter again, but now took the view that Bulgaria should be one of seven federal units.." Dedijer, 187.

Further, com. Stalin asked Tito whether Enver Hoxha agreed with including Albania in the Federation of Yugoslavia. Tito replied in the affirmative. Com. Stalin said that, at the present time it would be difficult for Yugoslavia to resolve two such questions as the inclusion of Albania into Yugoslavia and the question of Trieste. Tito agreed with this. As a result, continued com. Stalin, it would be wise to first examine the question of friendship and mutual assistance between Albania and Yugoslavia. Tito said that, above all, this treaty must provide for the defense of the territorial integrity and national independence of Albania.⁷²

When Stalin asked questions about the possibility of Albanian-Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement, Tito still reacted negatively, giving the impression that he was not in favor of a federation with any country in the region for simple reasons:

Com. Stalin said that it is important to find a formula for this treaty and to bring Albania and Yugoslavia closer together. Com. Stalin touched on the question of including Bulgaria in the Federation. Tito said that nothing would come of the Federation. Com. Stalin retorted: "This must be done." Tito declared that nothing would come of the federation, because the matter involved two different regimes. In addition, Bulgaria is strongly influenced by other parties, while in Yugoslavia the entire government, [though] with the presence of other parties, is essentially in the hands of the Communist Party.⁷³

Nevertheless, in November 1947 Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Assistance was signed without any reference to any sort of federation. In turn, as it shall be seen from the later developments, this treaty may be taken as the first step towards a federation and one of the major causes of conflict between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.

⁷² *The Soviet Record of the Tito-Stalin Conversation of 27-28 May, 1946*, in Leonid Gibianskii, "The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin's Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948," *CWIBB* 10, (March 1998): 119-120, 120. See Appendix I.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

3.3.1 Tito: Mission Greece!

Tito's view of Yugoslavia was not limited only to unification with Bulgaria and Albania; "Towards the south, the very concept of federation left Communist Yugoslavia open to new members."⁷⁴ Yugoslav foreign policy regarding Greece was the strongest factor in the evolution of the Cold War in Southeastern Europe. Even Yugoslav support of the Greek guerrillas had played major role in the implementation of the Marshall Plan in 1947. During this period, Stalin preferred not to get involved in the Greek Civil War directly avoiding any opposition with the West.

Neighbor states' aid to Greek communists was a well-known issue, and a matter of discussions between the West and the Soviet Union in the United Nations. As it can be understood from Tito's comments and Stalin's responses, there was a consensus between the two men on the Greek situation in 1946:

S[talin]: "Right. If you have good relations with your nor[thern] neighbor, then Greece will also look at you differently... And does Greece raise any demands with regard to Yugoslavia?"

T[ito]: "There were provocations against us, but not in recent times."

S[talin]: "The Eng[lish] maintain an army there in order to prop up the reactionary forces, and yes, possibly for other reasons as well."

T[ito]: (laughs): "We have demands against them: Aegean Maced[onia] and Salonikki."

M[olotov]: "Yes, Salonikki is an old Slavic city. You need access to the Aegean sea."⁷⁵

This dialogue verifies that Tito was not only supporting Communist guerrillas with Stalin's consent, but his territorial demands from Greece were also not limited to Greek Macedonia,⁷⁶ he was thinking of expanding Yugoslav borders to the Aegean

⁷⁴ Pavlowitch, 53.

⁷⁵ *Yugoslav Record of Conversation of I.V. Stalin and the Yugoslav Government Delegation Headed by J. Broz Tito, 27-28 May, 1946*, in Leonid Gibianskii, "The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin's Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948," *CWIHP* 10, (March 1998): 120-123, 122. See Appendix II.

⁷⁶ British Foreign Service sources indicate that: A congress of the group of the National Front of Macedonia was held on the 2nd August to the 4th August at Skopje. It was notable chiefly for a manifesto which, although it spoke of securing agreement with despotic Bulgarian Government,

Sea. Stalin's support was strongly felt in the United Nations. During the discussions, Soviet delegates had tried to show British existence as a sort foreign intervention in the Greek Civil War:

The first Greek case was brought to the Security Council's attention on January 21, 1946 by a letter from the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the General Assembly, in which it was charged that the presence of British troops in Greece constituted interference with that country's internal affairs and contributed to tension fraught with grave consequences to the maintenance of international peace.⁷⁷

In parallel with Soviet arguments, Yugoslavs maintained defending their neutrality against the Civil War in Greece. In fact, on Oct. 14, 1946, Tito gave an interview to the representatives of the *New York Times*, *Life* and *Time*, and said that while Yugoslavia has "no part in what is now taking place in Greece," it "would certainly take some action in accordance with the principles of the United Nations" to stop the present persecutions of the Macedonian people."⁷⁸

Since Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were Soviet allies, it is not wrong to argue that until the Marshall Plan, Stalin supported Greek Communists militarily too by using them, especially Yugoslavs as a cat's-paw. Report to the UN Security Council by the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents, dated May 27, 1947, indicates the relation between Greek Communists and neighboring states. The U.N. Balkan Commission concluded that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania were responsible for supporting the rebellion. According to this report:

The Greek government charged that support was being given by the Yugoslav and Bulgarian Government, through propaganda and

amounted to demand for the inclusion of the Piro district in Yugoslav Macedonia and contained strong hint that a similar claim would be laid to "Aegean" Macedonia. Clutton to Bevin, Aug. 10, 1946 Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-1965*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948 (Archive Editions: Slough, 1997), 705.

⁷⁷ Consideration of Greek Problem by the Security Council during the Year 1946, in Staff of the Committee and the Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949* (New York: Arno Press, 1971), 753.

⁷⁸ Peake to Bevin, Oct. 19, 1946 Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-1965*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 722; also, Tito Denies Plot on Greece, Pledges Resort Only to U.N.; The Quest for the Herring is a Rough One, *New York Times*, Oct. 15, 1946.

otherwise, looking towards the detachment of the providence of Macedonia from Greece and its incorporation together with Bulgarian and Yugoslavian Macedonia into the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia.⁷⁹

While Stalin's role in the Greek Civil War was different from Tito's, and not as direct as Tito's, Tito maintained his path for a greater Yugoslavia by containing Greece. "As early as October 1943, in relation to activities in Greece, he [Tito] had felt able to write to one of his top commanders: In our opinion and also in that of Grandpa's [wartime pseudonym for the Comintern] we should be in the centre of the Balkan countries, both in the military and political sense."⁸⁰ Tito's long-term interests about Greece continued after the implementation of the Marshall Plan and he continued to provide assistance to Greek guerrillas. In contrast, Stalin was aware of the fact that since the U.S. was involved in the Greek affair directly it was clear that Greece was lost to the Western camp. From a general point of view, the Marshall Plan meant the division of Europe into Soviet and American spheres. Tito was slower to get the message and the war went on in Greece.⁸¹ As opposed to Truman's open declaration, the Soviet Union vetoed the Resolution on the Greek Case Considered by the Security Council on July 29, 1947 regarding the restoration of peace in the Balkan Peninsula.⁸² Tito's support of the Greek guerrillas became systematic in time and as early as summer 1947 it was clear that it would become a problem between Belgrade and Moscow.

The influence of US intervention into the Greek Civil War by Marshall Aid was felt in the short run in Soviet-American relations. The shift in Soviet policy

⁷⁹ Report to the Security Council by the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents: Section B, Movement to Detach Macedonia from Greece, May 27, 1947, in Staff of the Committee and the Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949*, 757.

⁸⁰ Nora Beloff, 142, n. 19.

⁸¹ Ibid. 143

⁸² Resolution on the Greek Case Considered by the Security Council and Vetoed by the Soviet Union, July 29, 1947, in Staff of the Committee and the Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949*, 762.

regarding Greece is clear: “At the end of 1947, the Soviet Government was unwilling to recognize General Markos’ newly-proclaimed Provisional Democratic Government of Greece.”⁸³ Unlike Stalin, who was dealing with greater problems, Tito was determined to realize his objective, and aid to Greek guerrillas was formalized in August 1947 in an agreement between Yugoslav, Albanian and Bulgarian representatives, under which a joint Balkan Staff was formed to help the Greek guerrillas.⁸⁴

3.3.2 Yugoslav-Albanian Relations

Yugoslav-Albanian relations were the other component in Tito’s future-Yugoslavia. Just like his intentions regarding Bulgaria, Tito wanted to see Albania as the seventh constituent republic of Yugoslavia. “It was assumed that Yugoslavia’s Kosovo region, with its large Albanian component, would become part of Albania, which would in turn become either seventh unit of the Yugoslav federation.”⁸⁵ On this subject Beloff says that Yugoslav-Albanian rapprochement was reciprocal and Albanian leader Enver Hoxha was sure to subjugate his country. She adds “if we are to believe Enver Hoxha, Tito treated Albania as a ‘carbon copy’ of what Stalin had done to Yugoslavia later.”⁸⁶ This summary is a bit general, as Yugoslav-Albanian relations were closer and more complicated than what Beloff presents. Wilson makes a more detailed explanation of the big-brother relationship which was established during the war continued in the post-war environment:

The Albanian Army, economic administration and Party were controlled by men who were either nominated by CPY [Communist Party of Yugoslavia] or notoriously acceptable to it. Joint Yugoslav-Albanian

⁸³ Wilson, 37.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Pavlowitch, *Tito: Yugoslavia's Great Dictator*, 53.

⁸⁶ Beloff, 143; Dedijer says, Yugoslavia, however, in joint-stock companies at the request of the Albanians, concentrated on promoting Albania’s productive resources. Dedijer, 195.

companies for the development of Albania's resources were established in 1945-6, in accordance with Soviet practice, and in November 1946 a commercial treaty was signed which linked the Albanian economy very closely with that of Yugoslavia.⁸⁷

By any means, without Stalin's support Tito could not freely act like that towards Yugoslavia's neighbors. Besides, while Stalin was trying to strengthen his position by linking up all Communist parties with Moscow, it would be hard for Tito to Yugoslavize Albania since Soviet intelligence was acting everywhere. Ironically, Tito treated Yugoslavia's neighbors just like Stalin did Eastern Europe. It seems like being another Stalin in the Balkans was Tito's unintended fate, because there were grounds for acting like the way he did. First of all, the communist system in Yugoslavia was not established by the Soviet Union, it was not of a top-down kind. Secondly, Tito, as the sole ruler of Yugoslavia, together with his partisan comrades, established a working economy, administration, and had an army which was one of the largest in Europe at that time. Coupled with Stalin's support, Tito perceived Stalin's encouragements as a justification of his expansionist intentions in the region. Maybe he over-exaggerated his position in the Soviet orbit; because Stalin's support was limited to issues which did not involve any confrontation with the West and in line with Soviet interests in the region. A report compiled by Aleksandr Lavrishchev, the chief of the Balkan Sector in the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), "On the question of Yugoslav-Albanian Relations," summarizes Soviet cautiousness regarding the signing of pacts and alliances between Albania and Yugoslavia as, "this position was based on the need to avoid a possible negative reaction from the

⁸⁷ Wilson, 35-36; General Hoxha, with a numerous suite, arrived in Belgrade on the 23rd June. It appears that the visit is merely in the nature of a political demonstration. I have been assured by the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs that tendency to bestow friendship and co-operation was not contemplated and a Bulgarian press report of an impending Yugoslav-Albanian federation has been indignantly denied. On the other hand, Hoxha has, in a press statement, spoken of the certain conclusions of an agreement without specifying its nature. Clutton to Bevin, June 29, 1946, Belgrade Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-1965*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 693.

West which would have complicated Yugoslavia's and Albania's positions in the international arena."⁸⁸ In reality, while Stalin was cautious about his relations with the West, he did not want to go against his wartime allies, and at least wanted to protect the status quo in his relations by trying to avoid unnecessary conflicts which would arise from such cases in the Balkans.

3.4 Yugoslavia and the U.S.

In the post-World War II environment, Tito had gradually accelerated his aggression towards the United States; two American airplanes were attacked by Yugoslav fighters on Yugoslav territory in August 1946 which led to unintended tensions. In detail, on August 9, 1946, Yugoslav fighters forced down a U.S. C-47 air transport on a flight for the reason that plane had violated Yugoslav airspace. On the 10th August the United States Charge d'Affaires was handed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs a note protesting strongly against alleged unauthorized flights of American aircraft.⁸⁹ On August 19, a second C-47 was attacked for the same reason, but this time the plane crashed. Based on Ambassador Patterson's report to the State Department on August 20, Yugoslavia did not accept any responsibility for the reason that "since Yugoslav government has repeatedly drawn attention to unauthorized flights and consequences which might arise."⁹⁰ On the 19th, the U.S. Embassy rejected the Yugoslav note of protest relating to the first such incident and protested, demanding access to the passengers and crew of the first aircraft. After the

⁸⁸ Leonid Gibianskii, "The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin's Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948," *CWIHP* 10, (March 1998): 114.

⁸⁹ Peake to Bevin, Aug. 19, 1946, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed., *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-1965*, Vol. 3:1938-1948, 707.

⁹⁰ Patterson to Byrnes, Aug., 20, 1946, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS), 1946, 6:925; quoted in Lees, 14.

second incident the State Department sent the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington a particularly strong note of protest.⁹¹

Dedijer also deals with the reasons of this event as “our shooting down of American planes that had flown over our territory without permission despite numerous protest notes from our authorities.”⁹² Whatever the reason was, plane incidents would affect the Yugoslav image in the US negatively, while Yugoslavia was a country receiving aid from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation. Coupled with this, the timing of these incidents coincided with the Paris Peace Conference where Yugoslavs were not satisfied with the ongoing process about the Trieste dispute.⁹³ However, Tito’s independent moves and aggressiveness was also perceived negatively in Moscow. On the timing of these incidents Lorraine M. Lees says that “the Yugoslavs probably aimed their show of force at the Soviet Union as well as at the West, to indicate that the Yugoslavs would act unilaterally to secure their territorial demands if the Soviets did not adequately support them.”⁹⁴ Yugoslavs wanted to give the same message to the Westerners and Soviets simultaneously that they may act unilaterally if necessary. During the Paris Peace Conference, Trieste was not only a problem for the Yugoslavs. Secretary of State, Byrnes summarized the importance of this territory in his report that:

The prosperity and welfare of Trieste are linked not only with Italy but with Yugoslavia and the countries of Central Europe. It is the natural outlet of central Europe to Mediterranean. The only railroads entering Trieste come through Yugoslavia and are controlled by Yugoslavia...If the area were joined either with Italy or Yugoslavia, its political and economic relations with the other would suffer.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Peake to Bevin, Aug. 24, 1946, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-1965*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 709.

⁹² Dedijer, 92.

⁹³ For further information on the Italo-Yugoslav conflict see, Gaetano Salvemini, “The Italo-Yugoslav Frontier” *Foreign Affairs* 24, No.2 (Jan., 1946): 341-346.

⁹⁴ Lees, 19.

⁹⁵ Report by Secretary Byrnes from the Second Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers July 15, 1946: Second Part, June 15 to July 12, 1946 in Staff of the Committee and the Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949*, 81.

Nonetheless, Yugoslavs could find strong support from the Soviet Union when even Stalin did not want to enter a major quarrel with the Western powers, but Yugoslavs were not satisfied with the Trieste settlement.⁹⁶ By this instance, Tito saw the extent of Soviet support in Yugoslav relations with the Western states. On the contrary, Trieste settlement strengthened Yugoslavs' anti-Western thoughts. According to Dedijer "the conflict over Trieste in 1945" and "the American delegation's lack of understanding of our demands at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946"⁹⁷ were the main factors why relations with Washington were obstructed.

While did American side did not want Trieste to fall under Yugoslav rule and the Soviet Union supported Yugoslavia to a certain extent, Yugoslavs did not give up their claims on Trieste and avoided Soviet suggestions. If Yugoslav and Soviet documents regarding the discussion on Trieste are compared, it is seen that the Yugoslavs did not take into account the Soviet proposal about the future of Trieste. The Yugoslav record of Tito-Stalin conversation on 27-28 May 1946 shows that:

S[talin]: "The English and Americans don't want to give you Trieste!" (chuckling).

T[ito]: thanked for the support, [said] that the people send their greetings to Stalin and Molotov, [speaks] of the great political significance [of Soviet support].

Molotov: "But you still do not have Trieste..."

⁹⁶ Summary: Molotov's first proposal was that Trieste should be ceded to Yugoslavia, satellite of the Soviet Union, as a "reward" for that country's "great sacrifices" in the war. Byrnes and Bevin would have none of that. They finally agreed to the internationalization of the city under an administration to be set up by the United Nations. Molotov had to agree. His next move was to agree to internationalization, but the boundaries he proposed to draw would have converted Trieste into an enclave wholly within Yugoslavian territory. Byrnes and Bevin would have none of that either, insisting that the projected "free city" of Trieste must have a frontier with Italy, which, unlike Yugoslavia, is very much under the Anglo-American thumb. Molotov had to climb down again and agree to boundary lines proposed by Bidault, acting as mediator between the Anglo-American and Soviet representatives. "The Big Four at Paris (August 1946)" *Fourth International*, No.7 No.8, (August 1946): 242-245; Belgrade has witnessed this week two "spontaneous" demonstrations. The first took place on the 16th July as a protest against the Foreign ministers' decision on Trieste. It was organized by the trades unions and the demonstrators marched in a moist orderly manner past the French, American and British Embassies but not, of course, past the Russian. Clutton to Bevin, July 21, 1946, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-1965*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 699.

⁹⁷ Dedijer, 92.

T[ito]: nevertheless, [Soviet support] is of great pol[itical] importance...”⁹⁸

The Soviet document of the same meeting is more detailed and included Stalin and Molotov’s suggestions on the solution of Trieste problem:

At the start of the meeting com. Stalin asked Tito whether, in the instance of Trieste being granted the status of a free city, this would involve just the city itself or the city suburbs, and which status would be better – along the lines of Memel [Klaipeda, Lithuania] or those of Danzig [Gdansk, Poland].⁹⁹ Tito replied that the suburbs of the city are inhabited by Slovenians. Only the city itself would be acceptable. Though he would like to continue to argue for including Trieste in Yugoslavia. Further, Tito, in the name of the Yugoslav government, expressed gratitude to com. Molotov for the support that the Soviet delegation showed in the discussion of the question of the Italian- Yugoslav border at the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Paris.⁵ Com. Molotov gave a report on the differences in status between Memel and Danzig, pointing out that the status along the lines of Memel is more acceptable.¹⁰⁰

Yugoslav concerns regarding the United States were not limited to the Trieste issue. During the Paris Conference, the Yugoslav press concentrated on the “justice of Soviet line, and everywhere contrasted with injustice of the West.”¹⁰¹ Yugoslav perception was the same with the Soviet Union. In the Marxist-Leninist sense, Yugoslavs perceived the United States and other Westerners as ideological enemies, and mistrust was growing against every single U.S. move. Tito told Stalin that - regarding the question of economic cooperation- “Yugoslavia did not want to turn to

⁹⁸ Appendix II.

⁹⁹ Under the Versailles treaty of 1919, Dazing (Gdansk) and an adjoining region, up until that time under claim by Poland from Germany, were given a special status under the protection of the League of Nations. Danzig had the status of a demilitarized free city with its own laws and government organs, while control of its foreign relations and its water and rail transport lines was held by Poland, to whose customs system it also belonged. Memel (Klaipeda) and its adjoining region, until 1919 having also belonged to Germany but now claimed by the new Lithuanian state, was at first put under the control of the Entente, and then transferred to Lithuanian authority under the conditions of the special convention of 1924. It stipulated significant autonomy for Memel in its internal affairs, laws and executive organs, but which nevertheless had to operate under the parameters of the Lithuanian constitution. Leonid Gibianskii, “The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin’s Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948,” *CWIHP* 10, (March 1998): 123, n. 14.

¹⁰⁰ Appendix I.

¹⁰¹ Clutton to Bevin, May 18, 1946, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-1965*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 682.

the United States for credit. If America were to agree to provide loans, then this would be tied to demands for political concessions from Yugoslavia.”¹⁰² The Trieste problem and Paris Peace Conference strengthened Yugoslav anger towards the U.S.

Most importantly, Yugoslavs, too, perceived the Marshall Plan as an American move to divide the Communist camp and blockade Yugoslav interests, and most probably it was this thinking that played a role in their maintenance of support to the Greek guerrillas. As opposed to the U.S. Ambassador Patterson’s early comments about Tito and his regime,¹⁰³ Yugoslav-American relations were moving backwards. Yugoslavs openly criticized American presence in Yugoslavia, and even accused American Embassy staff of espionage and “On 17 September 1946 Ambassador Kosanović [of Yugoslavia to the U.S.]...claimed that U.S. planes had been smuggling arms into Yugoslavia to those opposed to the regime.”¹⁰⁴ In the upcoming months, Tito blamed the Americans and gave an interview on the October 14 to representatives of the *New York Times*, *Life* and *Time*, and argued that the United States Government was responsible for the present deterioration of Yugoslav-American relations.¹⁰⁵ Another example for the Yugoslav behavior is from John Moors Cabot from U.S. Belgrade Embassy:

Belgrade is about as difficult and exasperating a post as I have ever had and I must confess it is a depressing experience to be here. However I see

¹⁰² Appendix I.

¹⁰³ Ambassador Patterson: I said, Mr. President, Tito is colorful, dynamic, hospitable, a military genius, but a thorough communist and his political and economic policy is not ours. Nevertheless since he is intelligent, I would suggest that I permitted to bring him back to America for a month of indoctrination provided that the elections [for the Constituent Assembly, held in November 1945] go reasonably well; quoted in Beloff, 133, n. 10.

¹⁰⁴ Sava Kosanović to Byrnes, Sept. 27, 1947, Byrnes Papers; Byrnes to Kosanović, Sept. 28, 1947, Byrnes Papers; Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War*, 23. Also, “A ceremony on United States cemetery in Belgrade on the 30th May produced an incident when a United States officer attempted to prevent the arrest of Yugoslav engineer who had constructed the cemetery. The Yugoslavs, who were evidently afraid that the cemetery would produce anti-regime demonstrations, took careful precautions to prevent a large attendance. Clutton to Bevin, June 8, 1946, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 687

¹⁰⁵ Peake to Bevin, Oct. 19, 1946, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 722.

a few small projections in the monolithic mass which I may be able to grab hold of and I shall do my best to do so. At the moment the Jugs are conducting a charming campaign to harass, humiliate and intimidate the Embassy by pinching Jug employees, giving officers the runaround, etc. Give me, oh Lord, a long temper!¹⁰⁶

In short, Yugoslavia had been a problematic state for the US and its diplomatic personnel until the Tito-Stalin split of 1948. This was also true for other Western diplomats; Sir Charles Peake of Great Britain confirmed Cabot's feelings and made a comparison between Soviet and Yugoslav behaviors by quoting from Dean Acheson in his summary of 1946 for Yugoslavia. He also points out the fact that Yugoslav aggression had strengthened Western perception of the communist camp as monolithic:

In the sphere of foreign affairs, Mr. Dean Acheson's characterization of Russian policy as "aggressive and expanding nationalism" could as fitly be applied the views and purposes of the Yugoslav government. Throughout the year they have kept their mouths wide open, and have spared no effort to make themselves the greatest possible nuisance at every conference which their representatives have attended. That this has been so as no doubt been due partly to the fact that it suited the purpose of the senior partner in Moscow; partly to an attempt both to assuage popular discontent at home and to keep the allegiance of someone who, while unsympathetic to communism are enthusiastic for territorial expansion.¹⁰⁷

3.5 Resurrection of Cominform

The year 1947 was marked with two developments in Europe: first, the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, second, the resurrection of the Comintern – it was much larger - under the name of Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) by the Communist Parties of the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, France, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Italy and Hungary. It was not a coincidence that the Marshall Plan

¹⁰⁶ Cabot to Sidney E. O'Donoghue, Feb 20, 1947, in the Diplomatic Papers of John Cabot Moore, part 2, Europe, reel 6 (Frederick, Md., 1984); quoted in Lees, 31.

¹⁰⁷ Peake to Bevin, April 10, 1947, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed., *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-1965*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 740.

and Cominform followed each other. In 1943, Stalin dissolved the Comintern as a result of wartime conditions since “the end of the war was still far off and he thought that the masses in various countries would rally to the struggle against Germany more fervently if communist parties were allowed greater independence.”¹⁰⁸ In particular, the establishment of Cominform had different meanings. It was a reaction against the Marshall Plan; on the other hand Moscow “first considered participating in the project together with its allies, so that it could blunt the plan’s political thrust while taking advantage of its economic benefits,”¹⁰⁹ then, “the creation in September 1947 of the Cominform as an organization of their dependent communist parties designed both to supervise their campaign to destabilize the pro-American governments in Western Europe and to consolidate Soviet control of Eastern Europe.”¹¹⁰ Marshall Plan was perceived by the Soviet Union as a political offensive and their response took the same line. Andrei A. Zhdanov openly stated the doctrine, “Moscow's perception of two hostile blocs along with its determination to fight the capitalist one by any means short of war - the essence of the Cold War,”¹¹¹ during the founding meeting of the Cominform.

¹⁰⁸ Dedijer, 118.

¹⁰⁹ "Direktivny Sovetskoi delegatsii na soveshchani ministorv inostrannykh del v Parizhe" [Directives for the Soviet Delegation at the Paris Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs], June 25, 1947, 06/1947/9/214/18, pp. 4-6, AVPRF; quoted in Vojtech Mastny, "NATO in the Beholder's Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949-56," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: Cold War International History Project Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. 35.

<http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ACFB01.pdf> (Jan. 15, 2005)

¹¹⁰ The idea behind Cominform was the providing of an organ for the coordination of activity and information among the Communist Parties. However, documents discovered by Russian scholar Leonid Gibianskii in the Tito archives in Belgrade show that the idea of setting up such an organization was already discussed during the talks between Stalin and the Yugoslav leader in Moscow in May-June, 1946... Documents from Hungarian sources not only confirm that a Soviet plan to re-establish a Communist World organization was in the making already as early as March, 1946, but they also show that the implementation of the plan was postponed in order to avoid its potential negative effects during the forthcoming elections in France, Czechoslovakia and Romania as well as in the course of the ongoing European peace settlement. Csaba Békés, "Soviet Plans to Establish the Cominform in Early 1946: New Evidence from the Hungarian Archives," *CWIHP* 10, (March 1998): 135.

¹¹¹ Vojtech Mastny, "NATO in the Beholder's Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949-56," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. 35.

The establishment of Cominform centered in Belgrade was not a coincidence either. “In the initial meeting in September 1947 [Edward] Kardelj and [Milovan] Djilas were cast in star parts and Belgrade was selected as the seat of the projected Cominform secretariat.”¹¹² While Tito acted independently of Moscow, it was a good decision to establish the center of the Communist world in the Yugoslav capital and put a much closer eye on Tito. Pavlowitch comments on the Belgrade centered Cominform as Yugoslavia held an “important role in this new coordinating body of Europe’s main Communist parties, which was a good camouflage for Soviet control, and one that would help to harness the Yugoslavs’ pro-dynamism to the collective aims of the Soviet camp that was being set up.”¹¹³ According to Beloff’s perception, “Stalin still evidently hoped that he could satisfy his protégé’s appetites within the Soviet orbit.”¹¹⁴ The main objective that lied behind Cominform was not to appease Yugoslavia, but the Cominform actually allowed the Soviets to expand their control over Communist parties. The Cominform centered in Belgrade meant more control of the Yugoslav Communist Party. In this case Pavlowitch’s view is more plausible.

Till that time Tito had tried to act in accordance with Soviet foreign and domestic policy¹¹⁵ which actually fit with Yugoslavia, or harmonize his plans with Moscow; but long before the Tito-Stalin split, Tito and Dimitrov defied Stalin by

<http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ACFB01.pdf> (Jan. 15, 2005)

Pavlowitch adds that “Stalin’s strategy was not as monolithic as the West imagined, and...allowed for differences of approach, within Communist parties and within his own Soviet party, which explains the encouragement given to Tito’s radicalism by the Zhdanov faction of the Soviet leadership.” Pavlowitch, 55.

¹¹² Beloff, 144.

¹¹³ Pavlowitch, 53.

¹¹⁴ Beloff, 143.

¹¹⁵ In domestic policy: There is no doubt that Soviet influence on Yugoslavia was strong between 1945 and 1948, and that traces of it were present in the first Yugoslav constitution... Without question, Soviet influence also helped to bring out latent tendencies towards centralism and similar bureaucratic inclinations that had existed among the partisans. Vladimir Dedijer, *The Battle Stalin Lost*, 101; in foreign policy: “Tito regarded himself as the foremost representative of an expanding Communist world, not as the mere leader of a small country. The period 1945-1947 was one when Communist parties were allowed to follow whatever path to power seemed best to each one of them, while the Soviet Union tried to get the most out of the postwar settlement and of instability in Western Europe. Pavlowitch, 55.

declaring that they had agreed on signing a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance at the end of the 1947. Based on the information from a document on the secret Soviet-Yugoslav-Bulgarian meeting of February 10, 1948, the Soviets perceived this behavior as it was the first of defiance of Tito and Dimitrov of the Soviet Union.¹¹⁶ The Soviet record of the Tito-Stalin conversation of May 27, 1946, indicated clearly that Stalin was against any sort of treaty or alliance until the signing of a peace treaty with Bulgaria, but this option was outside of Soviet plans:

Com. Stalin noted that one need not fear this. During the initial stages things could be limited to a pact of friendship and mutual assistance, though indeed, more needs to be done. Tito agreed with this. Com. Molotov noted that at the present time difficulties may arise from the fact that a peace treaty had not yet been signed with Bulgaria. Bulgaria was perceived as a former enemy. Com. Stalin pointed out that this should not be of significant importance. For example; the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship with Poland before Poland was even recognized by other countries.¹¹⁷

British Foreign service reports referred to this diplomatic process as a mere technical detail. Charles Peake, on Yugoslavia's completion of treaties of mutual assistance with every country in the Soviet orbit, said that "treaties were concluded with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary as soon as the ratification of Peace Treaties made such action technically possible." He maintained that these new treaties were different from the previous ones in that "they no longer provide for common action in defense against Germany and her former or future allies and associates, but impose instead obligations of common defense against Germany or any aggressor."¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ *Report of Milovan Djilas about a Secret Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav Meeting, Feb. 10, 1948*, in Leonid Gibianskii, "The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin's Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948," *CWIHP* 10, (March 1998): 128-132, 128. See Appendix III; Leonid Gibianskii is a senior researcher at the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow and coeditor [with Norman Naimark] of *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949*.

¹¹⁷ Appendix I.

¹¹⁸ Peake to Bevin, March 5, 1948, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed., *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948* Vol. 3:1938-1948, 751.

3.6 Background to the Crisis: From Secret Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav Meeting of February 10, 1948 to the Tito-Stalin Split

Whatever the reasons of mutual assistance treaties, it is understood that they had to be signed with the consent of Moscow. Later it was observed that, Stalin's real intention was to maintain coordination with these states in Balkan affairs. In this regard, the secret meetings of three states' delegates indicated the root of the problems and reasons of Soviet dissatisfaction with Yugoslav and Bulgarian actions. Leonid Gibianskii's work for the Woodrow Wilson Institute - Cold War International History Project provides archival documents and is extremely helpful for a clear understanding of the reasons of changing Soviet behavior towards Yugoslavia and a Balkan federation, and causes of the Tito-Stalin split.

Accordingly, the first Soviet critic targeted the Yugoslav-Bulgar treaty, and the reason why it should not be signed. Molotov stated that:

The Soviet government informed the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments—and they agreed to this—that one should not conclude a treaty with Bulgaria until the expiration of limitations imposed by the Peace Treaty [with Bulgaria in 1946]. However, the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments concluded the treaty, and the Soviet government learned about it from the newspapers.¹¹⁹

This issue was presented as one of the examples of Molotov's statement of "this was already a matter of serious disagreement between them [the Soviets] and Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. These disagreements were inadmissible both from the party and the state point of view."¹²⁰ This meeting and Soviet discords were extremely important for the future of possible Balkan federation and these countries' relations with Moscow. Another example for Moscow's disagreements was witnessed after the ratification of Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty of mutual assistance in

¹¹⁹ Appendix III

¹²⁰ Ibid. Also, on the first point [of disagreements] he [Kardelj] says that it was not a treaty that was published, but only a communiqué about the discussion leading to a treaty; he adds that we [Yugoslavs and Bulgarians] were too hasty.

Belgrade, continued. Sir Charles Peake informed that, after the meeting “the speeches made no reference to the Federation or Macedonia.”¹²¹ In addition, Dedijer informed that:

...toward the end of January, Georgi Dimitrov, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, visited Rumania and at a press conference answered questions as to whether a Balkan federation or confederation would be formed. Dimitrov said the question was premature, but added, “When it comes to creating such a federation or confederation, our people will not ask the imperialists and will not heed their opposition, but will solve the question themselves, guided by their own interests bound up with the interests of other peoples and the international cooperation necessary to them and to other nations.”¹²²

As a result of this, on February 10, 1948, the Bulgarian side was accused by “the declaration of Dimitrov about a Federation of East European and Balkan countries, including Greece - lack of coordination between the USSR, on one side, and Bulgaria, on the other.”¹²³ It looked like Moscow perceived both the signing of the treaty and Dimitrov’s explanations as disturbing elements against Moscow’s stand in the Communist camp and in the international scene. In this regard, Molotov added the Soviet complaint that “comrade Dimitrov grew too fond of press conferences. Meanwhile, if Dimitrov and Tito make announcements for the press, the whole world believes that such is also the view of the Soviet Union.”¹²⁴ Milovan

¹²¹ Peake to Foreign Office Feb. 5, 1948, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed., *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries 1918-1965*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 773.

¹²² On January 29, however *Pravda* openly attacked Dimitrov: “Those countries do not need a questionable and fabricated federation or confederation, or a customs union; what they require is the consolidation and defense of their independence and sovereignty by mobilizing and organizing internally their people’s democratic forces, as was correctly stated in the well-known declaration of the nine communist parties.” Dedijer, 32.

¹²³ Appendix III. Detail of this statement: “Dimitrov’s statement to the press regarding the possibility of a federation and a customs union of East European “people’s democracies,” even including Greece, in which such a regime would be established.” Leonid Gibianskii, “The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin’s Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948,” *CWIHP* 10, (March 1998): 115.

¹²⁴ Appendix III. In the Bulgarian records, particularly Kolarov’s account, this is presented in the following manner: “It seems to us that com. Georgii Dimitrov has taken a fancy to press conferences and interviews, thus giving opportunity to be prompted with questions which ought not be discussed in the first place. This is misguided and undesirable. During the course of the interview a plan was set forth which goes too far without any attempt to consult with whomever it may concern. A question was put forth of creating a federation or a confederation, a customs union that would include both

Djilas added that Stalin jumped on the federation question and said that “the Poles who were in Moscow in those days, spoke against [the Federation].” Djilas viewed Stalin’s explanation as:

That means that the Soviet representatives first asked them what they thought of Dimitrov’s declaration. And they said that they agreed, but when Stalin told them that the Soviet Union was against it, they also said that they were against, but they had previously believed that this was a position and request of Moscow.¹²⁵

Soviet opposition to a timeless and a non-Soviet initiated federation continued through the meeting. Stalin stated “that the subsequent clarification by Dimitrov (he probably had in mind the announcement of the Bulgarian telegraph agency) explained nothing.” Even Stalin made a comparison with the previous efforts towards a customs union between Bulgaria and Serbia and said, “how Austria-Hungary had thwarted a customs union between Bulgaria and Serbia, and adds that it means - the Germans had worked against a customs union, and now we do (i.e. the Soviet Union).” Lastly, Stalin accused Dimitrov of “diverting attention from domestic issues to foreign affairs-Federation, etc.” At some point, he even said that he was aware of Bulgarian and Yugoslav perception of Soviet behavior: “the

Poland and Greece. Com. Georgii Dimitrov speaks of all these things without being granted authority by anyone concerned. This is misguided in principle and is tactically harmful. This eases the burden of the creators of the Western bloc.” And further: “We must take the position in such a way that all would know—both enemies and friends—that this is our point of view. We consider this absolutely wrong and unacceptable in the future.” This is contained in slightly abbreviated form in the Soviet record as well. Leonid Gibianskii, “The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin’s Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948,” *CWIHP* 10, (March 1998): 132, n. 4.

¹²⁵ According to Bulgarian and Soviet records this was spoken by Molotov, not Stalin. Kolarov’s account puts it in the following manner: “When we spoke with the Polish comrades, they said: We thought that this was Moscow’s opinion. Everyone thinks that if Dimitrov or Tito speaks of a number of countries, it originates from the USSR. In essence, the Polish comrades said that they are against Georgii Dimitrov’s idea and consider it misguided.” Leonid Gibianskii, “The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin’s Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948,” *CWIHP* 10, (March 1998): 132, n. 5.

Bulgarians and Yugoslavs think that the USSR stands against a unification of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, but it does not want to admit it.”¹²⁶

In this meeting, a last criticism touched the Yugoslavs. The issue was “the introduction of a Yugoslav division into Southern Albania - lack of coordination between the USSR, on one hand, and Yugoslavia, on the other.”¹²⁷ Molotov told that “they [in Moscow] accidentally learned about the entry of the Yugoslav troops into Albania. The Albanians told the Russians that they thought that the entry of the Yugoslav troops had been coordinated with the Soviet Union, and meanwhile it was not so.”¹²⁸ Furthermore, Molotov pointed out to a message from [Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia] Lavrent’ev on his meeting with Tito. According to the message, “a decision about the entry of Yugoslav troops into Albania-coordinated with Hoxha-really exists.”¹²⁹ The most interesting part of this message was “Tito said that he does not agree with Moscow that in case of an entry of Yugoslav troops into Albania, the Anglo-Americans would intervene beyond a campaign in the press.”¹³⁰ Tito maintained that “if it came to anything serious, Yugoslavia and the USSR would sort it out [raskhlebivat kashu] together, however, after the Soviet demarche about this issue he would not send a division [to Albania].”¹³¹ Molotov explains Tito’s action as a mistake: “Tito did not inform them about his disagreement with Moscow.” Molotov concluded that “disagreements are inadmissible both from the party and

¹²⁶ Appendix III; Before these statements by Stalin, the Bulgarian records, particularly Kolarov’s account, show the following remarks by Molotov: “[Czechoslovak President Eduard] Beneš’ newspaper immediately hastened to write that ‘Dimitrov puts out communist plans, and now the Czech communists must answer.’ On the other hand, this position of Georgii Dimitrov contradicts the declaration of the nine communist parties.” The same is corroborated by the Soviet record. Leonid Gibianskii, “The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin’s Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948,” *CWIHP* 10, (March 1998): 133, n. 5.

¹²⁷ Appendix III.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

state viewpoint and that disagreements should be taken out [for discussion], and not concealed, and that it is necessary to inform and consult.”¹³²

Vladimir Dedijer explained Soviet behavior as being shifty. A Yugoslav military delegation was in Moscow since the beginning of January to discuss military aid to Yugoslavia. Moscow invited Milovan Djilas with this delegation (the significance of this invitation will be discussed later) with special reference to Albania and they met before the Yugoslav-Soviet-Bulgarian meeting; late January developments played a role in the tripartite meeting:

At their first meeting Stalin told Djilas that Yugoslavia “should swallow up Albania” and ask him to cable Tito along these lines. (Later, in Belgrade, Stalin’s move was interpreted as an attempt to compromise Tito’s government as having imperialistic designs on Albania.) Stalin also promised that the military delegation would get everything it was asking, but the stalemate did not break.¹³³

Eventually, Stalin’s accusations on Yugoslav behavior looks like Yugoslav actions were ordered from Moscow first to in order to accuse Tito of aggressive behavior. Pavlowitch comments that “these were typical Stalinist moves, designed to test the Yugoslavs.”¹³⁴ This seems logical as Stalin’s other statements regarding Albania proves. At one point, Stalin drew attention to the consequences of a possible Yugoslav invasion of Albania:

The three world powers—the USSR, England, and America guaranteed Albania’s independence by a Special agreement. Albania is our weakest spot, because other states are either members of the United Nations, or recognized, etc., but Albania is not [recognized]. If Yugoslav troops entered Albania, the reactionaries in England and America would be able to use it and step forward as defenders of Albanian independence.¹³⁵

More than this focus change, Stalin proposed the opposite strategy towards Albania and said, “Instead of sending troops we should work intensely to build up

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Dedijer, 30.

¹³⁴ Stalin said half-jokingly that the Yugoslavs are afraid of having Russians in Albania and because of this are in a hurry to send their troops. Pavlowitch, 24.

¹³⁵ Appendix III.

the Albanian army, we should teach the Albanians, and then, if they are attacked, let the Albanian Skupcina [parliament] appeal to Yugoslavia for help.”¹³⁶ Actually, the Albanian issue was directly linked to the ongoing Greek Civil War and the possible invasion of Albania by Greek monarcho-fascists appeared in discussions before. When Edward Kardelj “mentioned the constant Greek provocations, the weakness of the Albanian army” Yugoslavia was “linked to Albania economically” and Yugoslavia underwrite its army,” Stalin interrupted and mentioned that “one should not have any faith in the Albanian army, and added that the Albanians must be taught and their army must be built up,”¹³⁷ he repeated his non-interventionist tone towards Albania again. Molotov was more critical on this issue when he said “they have no information about any kind of attack on Albania and wondered that we [Yugoslavs] withhold our information from them”; and argued that “the anti-Albanian campaign in Greece is worsening.”¹³⁸

In this meeting, Stalin changed his stance on the issue of assisting the Greek communists. He mentioned that he had doubts about the success of these guerillas and told “if there are no conditions for victory, one must not be afraid to admit it.” He also said that “[Yugoslavs] should not link the future of [Yugoslavia] with a victory of the guerrillas in Greece.”¹³⁹ Several times in this conversation, Stalin implied his negative behavior regarding the support of Greek communists. This was a clear warning to Yugoslavia, but they chose to sustain their support.

One last point is through the end of the meeting Stalin made one more maneuver and talked about Soviet plans of establishing three federations, and stated that “Bulgaria and Yugoslavia may unite tomorrow if they wish.” When the

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid. He [Stalin] says that one should assist Greece [i.e. guerrillas] if there are hopes of winning, and if not, then we should rethink and terminate the guerrilla movement.

Yugoslav delegate responded that Yugoslavia was “not in a hurry to unify with Bulgaria and Albania,” Stalin insisted on saying that “it should not come too late, and that the conditions for that are ripe,” he even said “one [should] even beg[i]n a discussion about the name of [a united] state.”¹⁴⁰ This kind of a shift in Stalin’s policy cannot be explained except that he wanted to know the other side’s response. Dedijer noted that Stalin’s sudden demand created question marks in the Yugoslav representatives’ minds; they “felt that something else was going concealed behind”.¹⁴¹ Dedijer also called Stalin’s move the first round of “silent strangulation” of Yugoslavia. As a result, after a session of Central Committee on March 1, 1948, Yugoslavia rejected the option of federation with Bulgaria and Stalin lost.

3.6.1 Last Phase: Cold War Crisis and the End of Tito’s Balkan Dream

Tito was suspicious of Stalin. He was invited to Moscow, but excused himself and instead sent his comrades. They returned with a treaty on mutual consultation on foreign policy matters and Moscow’s criticisms. Just like he was treating Albania as part of Yugoslavia, Stalin treated Yugoslavia as his dominion. Tito did not hate Stalin; but he wanted, at least, to control his domestic affairs independently. The situation of Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia represented the beginning of open conflict with Belgrade. Soviet officials and experts were living in Yugoslavia under better conditions than ordinary Yugoslavs. “As early as 1946 Tito had told the Soviet government that the number of Soviet specialists in Yugoslavia would have to be reduced for financial reasons.”¹⁴² Additionally, just as Yugoslavia increased its control over Albania by economic ties, Stalin tried to control Yugoslavia by

¹⁴⁰ Appendix III; When Dimitrov says there are important economic issues, Stalin cut him short by remarking that he would speak about it with a joint Yugoslav-Bulgarian government...

¹⁴¹ Dedijer, 101.

¹⁴² Ibid. 104. Dedijer informs that Soviet staff’s salaries were four times as high as Yugoslav army commanders’ and three times those of Yugoslav federal ministers.

establishing joint-stock companies totally controlled by the senior partner, exploitation through manipulating prices, and infiltration into the military and political apparatus. Dedijer made an interesting comparison with Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia and U.S. policy during the Theodore Roosevelt era; he said that:

...looking at Stalin's method in perspective, I cannot but conclude that he was not very original. Quite some time back, when American Marines were conquering some Central American state or other for the benefit of American companies, Teddy Roosevelt had said: "Speak softly and carry a big stick!"¹⁴³

Stalin started to use his stick just after Yugoslav rejection of a Moscow oriented Balkan federation. On March 18 and 19 Stalin ordered all Soviet military and civilian experts to withdraw from Yugoslavia for the reason that they were surrounded by hostility.¹⁴⁴ On March 20, the Communist party of Yugoslavia sent a letter to the Central Committee of The Communist Party of the Soviet Union trying to explain that there were misunderstandings.¹⁴⁵ On March 27, Stalin's ultimatum-letter was delivered by the Yugoslavs. It was full of accusations meaning degeneration of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and his discomfort about anti-Soviet statements in Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁶ For instance:

The majority of members of the central Committee of the party were not elected but co-opted... Capitalist elements are growing in the rural

¹⁴³ Ibid. 95-96.

¹⁴⁴ Four days before Marshall Tito was informed of the Soviet Government's decision to withdraw its advisers from Yugoslavia, the U.S.S.R. had proposed to the Western Powers that the conference to discuss navigation on the Danube, foreseen by the 1946 declaration of the Council of Foreign Ministers, should take place in Belgrade at an early date. This proposal was accepted by the Western Powers, but the Yugoslav Government, which had not been consulted, stated that the date selected was not convenient. The Soviet Government declared that, in that case, the conference would take place elsewhere, whereupon the Yugoslav objections were hastily withdrawn. Peake to Bevin, "Yugoslavia: Annual Review for 1948," March 4, 1949, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed., *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 854.

¹⁴⁵ Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, March 20, 1948, in Bass, Robert and Marbury, Elizabeth, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58: A Documentary Record* (New York: Prospect, 1959) 4-6.

¹⁴⁶ For example, "the Soviet Communist Party is degenerating," "great-power chauvinism prevails in the U.S.S.R.," "the U.S.S.R. wants to conquer Yugoslavia economically," Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to Tito et al., March 27, 1948, in Robert Bass & Elizabeth Marbury, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58: A Documentary Record*, 6-12.

districts, similarly in the cities, but the party leadership is not taking any measures to restrict them... We think that the political career of Trotsky is sufficiently instructive..."¹⁴⁷

The tone and content of letter was both warning and offensive. The Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party sent its response on April 13, addressing with all accusations, and reminding the merits and achievements of Communist Party of Yugoslavia. But the tone of their letter was softer as compared to Stalin's; in general Yugoslavs were defending themselves that everything was a result of misinformation and accordingly misunderstandings, and glorified Stalin with compliments."¹⁴⁸ On April 24, the Soviet government cancelled the treaty concerning foreign policy matters signed in February. On May 4, a much more offensive letter was received by the Yugoslavs. This time it was underrating Yugoslav communism, accusing Tito and Kardelj of their previous letter and reminding of Soviet support during and after the war:

No one can deny the merits and achievements of the Yugoslav Communist Party... But it must be said that the merits and achievements of, say, the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania are not less than those of the Yugoslav Communist Party... At a time when the people's liberation movement in Yugoslavia was in the throes of a severe crisis...the soviet Army came to the aid of Yugoslavia...If comrades Tito and Kardelj would take this [sic] circumstances into consideration as an indisputable fact, they would be less noisy about their merits and would behave with more deference and modesty.¹⁴⁹

Yugoslavia was not the only country that constituted problems for the Soviet Union. Tito and Yugoslavs were trying to appease Stalin, which meant that Yugoslav responses to Stalin were not a sort of open rebellion. In contrast, Czechoslovakia was

¹⁴⁷ Dedijer, 106.

¹⁴⁸ Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, April 13, 1948, in Bass, Robert and Marbury, Elizabeth, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58: A Documentary Record*, 13-23.

¹⁴⁹ Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Central Committee of the Communist party of Yugoslavia, May 4, 1948, in Bass, Robert and Marbury, Elizabeth, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58: A Documentary Record*, 23-35.

a more problematic country in the implementation of Soviet power. Most interestingly, the Czech government indicated its readiness to participate in the Marshall Plan, then reversed it. On February 25, 1948, Czech communists took advantage of the disorder among their political opponents and unstable social environment, and seized power in Prague.¹⁵⁰ This action and Soviet role in the coup attracted attention in the international platform. UN intervention into the event was blockaded by the Soviet Union based on the idea that the Greek Civil War was also a domestic affair. Ambassador Warren R. Austin, The United States representative in the Security Council, stated on April 12, 1948, even stated that “there are groups of men outside of Czechoslovakia who were leaders in the political life of this country prior to the coup.”¹⁵¹ Communist parties of Eastern Europe were curious about possible loss in the elections, and in these circumstances the Soviet Union intervened into the affair by every means possible. For instance, the same situation appeared in Hungary and the U.S. criticized electoral procedures and suppression of opposition in Hungary harshly. The U.S. Department of State protested this sort of activity as being “unable to achieve their political ends through normal constitutional processes, the Hungarian Communists, together with other members of the Leftist bloc” applied apolitical measures.¹⁵² Later, the U.S. representative of Allied Controlled Commission for Hungary sent a note to Soviet Acting Chairman on June 11, 1947,

¹⁵⁰ For further information see Edward Táborský, “Beneš and the Soviets.” *Foreign Affairs* 27, No. 2 (Jan., 1949): 302-327.

¹⁵¹ Statement by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, United States representative in the Security Council, April 12, 1948, in Staff of the Committee and the Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949*, 1189.

¹⁵² Statement by the Department of State, March 6, 1947, in Staff of the Committee and the Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949*, 1190.

and protested the “Soviet interference in political affairs in derogation of the continued exercise of democratic rights.”¹⁵³

Whereas, during the secret Yugoslav-Soviet-Bulgarian meeting, Stalin blocked Tito’s own plans regarding Albania and Bulgaria because of a possible Western opposition. As seen from Czech and Hungarian examples, he did not care about this much; he cared more about consolidating his control in these states to strengthen his position against Western moves. Soviet moves in the Western European states also failed. “The communist attempts to paralyze French and Italian governments by violent demonstrations and strikes failed.”¹⁵⁴ In addition to that “Soviet efforts to dissuade the Western occupation powers from proceeding with the economic separation of their zones in Germany in preparation for a political separation of the part of the country they controlled”¹⁵⁵ could not be achieved. As a repercussion, Soviet attempts fastened Western defense alliance plans and most importantly communist seizure of power in Prague had unwittingly given to Western alliance-building a sufficient reason to encourage the process.¹⁵⁶

On May 19, 1948, the Central Committee of CPSU demanded that a delegation of the Yugoslav Central Committee attend the Cominform meeting and Stalin would attend too; they also wanted Tito to attend.¹⁵⁷ Tito refused to attend, and one more provocative letter received by Tito on May 22, asserted that the Cominform had the

¹⁵³ Note from United States representative on Allied Control Commission for Hungary to Soviet Acting Chairman, June 11, 1947, in Staff of the Committee and the Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949*, 1192.

¹⁵⁴ Vojtech Mastny, “NATO in the Beholder’s Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949-56,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: Cold War International History Project Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. 35.

<http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ACFB01.pdf> (Jan. 15, 2005)

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih: 1918-1990* [Political History: 1918:1980] (Ankara: İmge, 2001), 241.

¹⁵⁷ Dedijer, 128; On June 19, one more telegram was received from the CPSU saying that “the Cominform will expect your representatives not later than June 21 in Bucharest.” This rejection can be taken as the date western diplomats became aware of the extent of Soviet-Yugoslav conflict. Lees, 49.

power to pass judgment upon the Yugoslav Communist Party.¹⁵⁸ Tito did not go to the Cominform meeting in Bucharest, chose not to defend himself, and did not witness Stalin's kick against Yugoslavia.

On June 28, 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform for several reasons, not different from those reasons stated in Stalin's letters. Ironically, the Yugoslavs were blamed for being not real Communists. The Cominform Communiqué included that "there are sufficient healthy elements, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the international traditions of the Yugoslav Communist Party and to the United Socialist front," and followed with "Their task is to compel their present leaders to recognize their mistakes openly and honestly and to rectify them; to break with nationalism, return to internationalism; and in every way to consolidate the united socialist front against imperialism." The communiqué not only expelled Yugoslavia, but also left an opening for Yugoslavs to compensate for their faults. In particular the way of Yugoslav purification Cominform suggested was to replace of the Yugoslav leaders: "Should the present leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party prove incapable of doing this, their job is to replace them and to advance a new internationalist leadership of the Party." On the contrary, Stalin's feelings about the Yugoslav administrators and their situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia were realized as "Information Bureau considers that such a disgraceful, purely Turkish, terrorist regime cannot be tolerated in the Communist Party. The interests of the very existence and development of the Yugoslav Communist Party demand that an end be put to this regime."¹⁵⁹ This part indicated that the real problem was about the Yugoslav administration, specifically Tito, not about Yugoslav communism.

¹⁵⁸ Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Central Committee of the Communist party of Yugoslavia, May 22, 1948, in Bass & Marbury, 36-38.

¹⁵⁹ Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Situation in the Yugoslav Communist Party of Yugoslavia, June 28, 1948, in Bass & Marbury, 23-35.

Furthermore, Soviet-Yugoslav conflict in the spring of 1948 was shadowed by other incidents in Eastern Europe. According to Pavlowitch, Westerners initially, and paradoxically, perceived the Tito-Stalin split as “the Soviet dictator’s attempt to rein the more reckless elements in his camp as another of his tricks to dupe his enemies, and then mistook it for a Yugoslav declaration of independence.”¹⁶⁰ Nevertheless, nobody expected the expelling of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in the summer of 1948, even Tito himself. Based on Dedijer’s notes, Tito said: “Only then did everything become clear to me. All those elements I had considered accidental, for which I had found a thousand excuses, came together to form a whole, took on their true meaning...”¹⁶¹ The Cominform Communiqué, simply, shocked the world. It was both a surprise and an invitation to suspicious behavior. For the U.S., it was a victory for the Truman Administration without any effort, without any cost, even without implementing any policy; a victory beyond imagination.¹⁶² The division in the monolithic Communist Bloc found considerable attention in the world press while people had no idea about its causes. Even George Kennan and his Policy Planning staff called this event an “entirely new problem.”¹⁶³

¹⁶⁰ Pavlowitch, 56.

¹⁶¹ Dedijer, 36.

¹⁶² John M. Cabot says that: The month before I left Yugoslavia I wrote a long dispatch...The dispatch, after discussing all the various problems and the probable results, finally said that if we played our cards correctly, there was some hope of a break between Tito and Stalin. This was in July of 1947, and when the dispatch got to one of the top officials there, he wrote something like "stuff and nonsense" on it.

John M. Cabot, Oral History, Truman Library.

<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/cabotjm.htm>

Counselor of Embassy Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1945-46, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 1947; appointed career minister, 1948; Consul General, Shanghai, China, 1948-49; Minister to Finland, 1950-52, Ambassador to Pakistan, 1952-53.

¹⁶³ Policy Planning Staff (PPS) 35, “The Attitude of this Government Towards events in Yugoslavia,” June 30 1948, Truman papers, PSF; in Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War*, 53.

3.7 Conclusion: Entirely New Problem

June 29 was a significant day for the Cold Warriors, but not for Yugoslavs themselves. The Yugoslav Communist Party maintained its defensive stance, and met in a plenary session, replied to all criticisms and accusations, and even published them together with Cominform resolution.¹⁶⁴ Between July 21-27 at its Fifth Congress, where Tito gave an eight-hour speech and repeated their achievements, the Communist Party re-elected its Central Committee and “messages of loyalty and love were addressed to Stalin,” and Tito “rounded off the proceedings with the cry ‘Long live the Soviet Union! Long Live Comrade Stalin!’”¹⁶⁵ Yugoslavs were both hailing Stalin and insisting on the rightness of their actions and communism. Looking at Tito’s Yugoslavia’s initial reactions to Moscow, Western Press’ responses proved true; on June 29 Reuters reported that “a Washington correspondent of the *New York Times* says that informed persons in Washington do not see any break between Moscow and Belgrade and that Marshall Tito will either meet the Kremlin’s demands or be replaced.”¹⁶⁶ G. Frederick Reinhardt’s confirmed that “there was a good deal of skepticism at first. In fact, there was a great deal of skepticism in the United States that this separation of Yugoslavia from the Moscow group was genuine. I think some people went so far as to say it was a trick.”¹⁶⁷ However, at the end of July 1948, the prospects of reconciliation of relations between Moscow and

¹⁶⁴ Dedijer, 132.

¹⁶⁵ Pavlowitch, 58.

¹⁶⁶ Dedijer, 137; Marshall Plan Cracks Bloc In East, Washington Holds; But Observers Appear Doubtful of Full Moscow-Belgrade Break -- Rift Found Likely to Stiffen West on Berlin: The general reaction in Washington today to the Communist Information Bureau's split with Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia was much like the reaction of Winston Churchill to the sudden arrival of Rudolf Hess in Scotland during the war. *New York Times*, June 29, 1948.

¹⁶⁷ G. Frederick Reinhardt, Oral History, Truman Library.

<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/reinhard.htm> (June 10, 2005)

During the administration of President Harry S. Truman, was a Foreign Service officer at Moscow, 1945-47; Consul General, 1947; Chief, Division of Eastern European Affairs in the Department of State, 1948-50; Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, 1950; and Counsellor of Embassy, Paris, 1951-55.

Belgrade seemed to have deteriorated, which will be dealt in the next chapter. As opposed to Yugoslav maintenance of seeking ways for the restoration of relations, Stalin maintained a different line.

For the Yugoslav leadership, maintaining a successful appeasement policy towards Moscow, and simultaneously preserving the existence of Yugoslav ruling elites, was a dilemma. Namely, to prove Yugoslav communists' correctness, and legitimize and reinforce Tito's position was a hard task on the domestic side. Pawlowitch commented that "they realized that the slightest sign of weakness would have a negative effect on their followers, and Tito himself knew what awaited him if he gave in."¹⁶⁸ The week of the Party Congress passed in the atmosphere of celebration and enthusiasm. It looked like the Congress was to prove that there was no problem regarding the Cominform issue, streets of Belgrade were decorated with huge portraits of Stalin, Lenin and Tito. Western observers noted that while Yugoslavs were passing counter- resolutions against Cominform as "inexact, incorrect and unjust," but still expressed that the Russians would come and investigate the situation in the spot"¹⁶⁹. As George Kennan said later, Tito "had taken a bold and heavy responsibility upon himself by breaking with Stalin,"¹⁷⁰ that all these efforts to maintain order in Yugoslavia were consequences of their surprised reaction.

Surprisingly, the attitude of Albania and Bulgaria towards Yugoslavia changed rapidly after witnessing the extent of the outcome of Stalin's temper. They left Yugoslavia alone just after the communiqué and joined CPSU criticisms against Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav press devoted considerable space to wordy protests at the

¹⁶⁸ Pawlowitch, 58.

¹⁶⁹ Peake to Bevin, July 23, 1948, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed., *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 812.

¹⁷⁰ George Kennan, *Memoirs, 1950-1963* (London: Hutchinson, 1973, 1972), 279.

attitude taken up by Albanian and Bulgarian communists.¹⁷¹ The Cominform communiqué itself represented the formal end of the dream of a Balkan federation, but the shift in the Bulgarian and Albanian approach to Yugoslavia meant the signal of Yugoslavia's isolation in the Communist camp. Albania cut all its ties with Yugoslavia just after the Communiqué and denounced economic and financial treaties, and implemented an anti-Yugoslav propaganda. For Bulgaria, the situation was similar, even in the end of 1948 Macedonia papers had reported that it was “a crime in Bulgaria to read ‘Nova Macedonia’ or listen to Radio Skopje.”¹⁷² Yugoslavs realized the extent of opposition against themselves and held a similar stand immediately. During the meeting of the Congress of Communist party of Yugoslavia, it was also mentioned that “the problem of Macedonia has been a serious source of conflict between the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communist Parties from the beginning of the war to the present day.”¹⁷³ The end of federation plans during the first years of the Cold War brought an end to the possible settlement of the Macedonian problem. Returning to a similar pre-World War II situation in the region, Yugoslavs accused Bulgaria of “denying national rights to the inhabitants of Pirin Macedonia,” and, in turn, Bulgarians argued that the “Yugoslav Government were not interested in South Slav federation, but only in the annexation of Pirin Macedonia.”¹⁷⁴ These moves did not only symbolize the end of the Balkan federation, but also the end of good neighborly relations. In Moscow, federation plans were automatically lifted. As D. F.

¹⁷¹ Peake to Bevin, July 12, 1948, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed., *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-1965*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 811: The Yugoslav government has sent three notes to the Albanian Government protesting against the insults to Marshall Tito, sabotage of economic cooperation and expulsion of a military liaison officer...Press published a lengthy and vigorous reply to an attack made by Yugoslav Communist party by M. Chevenkov, one of the Bulgarian Communist leaders.

¹⁷² Peake to Bevin, Dec. 3, 1948, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed., *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-1965*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 837. Also, 15 Bulgarians were mentioned as having been arrested for this was reported.

¹⁷³ Peake to Bevin, July 31, 1948, Belgrade, Ibid. 815.

¹⁷⁴ Peake to Bevin, “Yugoslavia: Annual Review for 1948,” Jarman, Robert L. ed., *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-1965*, Vol 4:1949-1965, Vol. 4, Feb 7, 1949, 857.

Fleming said, “the original Balkan federation idea which had been blessed in Moscow had now become as threat.”¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁵ D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1950* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1961): 512.

CHAPTER IV

TRANSITION PERIOD: WHEN THE DEVIL WAS SICK, THE DEVIL A MONK WOULD BE

4.1 Introduction

This chapter covers the period from the Tito-Stalin split through the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation - The Treaty of Ankara – between Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece on February 28, 1953. In this period, the U.S. implemented a new policy towards Yugoslavia just after the Cominform communiqué and overall U.S. policy had been revised based on the course of the Cold War. In this period, the first phase of relations covers the establishment of economic and military ties between the U.S.A. and Yugoslavia. The Truman Administration witnessed several problems in supporting a Communist country independent of Moscow. As John Foster Dulles commented in his book *War and Peace* on Yugoslavia as a communist country facing Stalinist rule; “Marshall Tito is a Communist. But his communism differs from Stalin’s. It is a brand that Stalin and the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party consider to be rank heresy.”¹⁷⁶ The second phase is the reorientation of Yugoslavia towards the West and efforts towards the association of Yugoslavia into the western defense structure. Overall, transformation of U.S.-Yugoslav relations played a leading role in Yugoslavia’s relations with other states. However, U.S. relations with its allies were the determining factor in the American approach to

¹⁷⁶ John F. Dulles, *War or Peace* (New York: The Macmillan Company: 1950, 1957), 153.

Yugoslavia's association with military planning, but only in a limited way with the strengthening of Yugoslavia's defense capabilities. With the establishment of NATO, the necessity of Yugoslavia's association became clearer, but the progress was very slow as a result of the timing, Italo-Yugoslav relations and NATO obligations of Turkey and Greece. In comparison, Yugoslavs were trying to avoid any political commitment in their relations with western governments, especially with the U.S. Growing relations between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia since 1950 provided a basis for Yugoslavs to attain NATO protection without making direct commitments, and for the U.S. to establish a tie with Yugoslavia. Eventually, lack of coordination between the NATO allies and the newly appointed Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' approach prevailed. The February 1953 treaty signed between two NATO partners and Yugoslavia did not include any military commitment between the signatories. In this period, American moves faced obstacles several times and Yugoslav behavior indicated a fluctuating trend towards regional arrangements. Although the final treaty did not bring military commitments to the parties, it was a significant step towards a military alliance, and provided U.S. policymakers to fill, or at least neutralize, the hole in NATO's southern flank. In this respect, this chapter analyzes the development of tripartite relations mainly based on the U.S. approach to the events since Greek and Turkish sides maintained their moves parallel with American suggestions. It will be emphasized that the pace of tripartite relations in the Balkans played a leading role in the postponement of Yugoslav association with NATO.

4.2 Difficulties of Developing a Sound Policy Towards Yugoslavia

Cominform Communiqué was the second important event in late-June 1948. In the same week, on June 24, the Soviet Army started setting up barricades in Berlin, the beginning of the Berlin blockade which lasted for 11 months. The significance of the blockade lied in the materialization of conflict between the Soviet Union and the West for the first time in Cold War history. On the contrary, as a result of Tito's growing problems with Moscow and following Yugoslav rapprochement with the Western Bloc, Yugoslavia would become the possible battleground in the first military clash. In the summer of 1948, the Soviet threat on Yugoslavia, based on Khrushchev's account, reflected the extent of Stalin's temper. Khrushchev said "I'm absolutely sure that if the Soviet Union had a common border with Yugoslavia, Stalin would have intervened militarily....He [Stalin] was afraid of the American imperialists would have actively supported the Yugoslavs."¹⁷⁷ On the contrary, Stalin was very aware of the fragility of the situation in Europe, and his main objective was to make Yugoslavs obey his orders by means of economic isolation and anti-Titoist propaganda which began long before. The probability of Soviet military intervention into Yugoslavia increased in 1949 and 1950, not in the summer of 1948. Shortly, Berlin blockade was the center of attention when the Tito-Stalin split broke out. President Truman commented on the same line:

We had to face the possibility that Russia might deliberately choose to make Berlin the pretext for war, but a more immediate danger was the risk that a trigger happy Russian pilot or hot-headed communist tank commander might create an incident that could ignite the powder keg.¹⁷⁸

As a result, American attitude had to be very carefully-designed towards the Yugoslav incident since the Berlin blockade was sensitive enough and had already raised tensions in Europe. For the U.S. policy-makers, previously Yugoslavia had

¹⁷⁷ Talbott, 181.

¹⁷⁸ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs of Harry S. Truman* (Britain: Holde and Stoughton, 1955-1956), 131.

been perceived as the most loyal state of Moscow and it open clashed with the Western governments. Besides, as it is understood from Yugoslav Communist Party's letters to the Soviet Union and the defenses published, June 28 meant no change in Yugoslavia's perception of the Western world; Yugoslavia was still hostile towards the West.

On June 30, 1948, Thomas G. Cassady, the Chief of the Special Procedures Group, sent a memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, entitled "Covert Propaganda to Exploit Tito-Stalin Split." He referred to the Cominform communiqué as "the first major open break in the satellite front which the Soviet Union has established in Central Europe." The memorandum included few points but touched the possible advantages of the Tito-Stalin split:

The situation arising therefrom tends to arouse dissension and confusion in the world structure of Communism and invites exploitation by prompt, effective propaganda measures through every available medium, with the idea of achieving:

- a. A lessening of Moscow control over satellite governments.
- b. An increase of friction between leading Communist groups and individuals, with consequent decline in the effectiveness of world Communism as an agency of Soviet expansion.
- c. Conditions more favorable to the overthrow of Communist governments in satellite nations and to the strengthening of non-Communist governments.¹⁷⁹

It should be noted that, these early premises played a role in shaping U.S. policy towards Yugoslavia. On June 29 and 30, Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter sent the first estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency to President Truman and these assessments prepared a basis for the planning of U.S. foreign policy regarding

¹⁷⁹ Memorandum From the Chief of the Special Procedures Group (Cassady) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter, Washington, June 30, 1948. Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-615, Job 83-00036, Box 4, Folder 10. Secret. Sent to Colonel Donald H. Galloway, the Assistant Director for Special Operations, for Hillenkoetter. The source text is a transcript made for the CIA Historian in December 1952, in Glenn W. LaFantasie ed., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), 717.

Yugoslavia. According to Hillenkoetter's letters, the Cominform Communiqué was a "desperate attempt" to "restore strict international Communist control over the more nationalist Yugoslav Communist Party."¹⁸⁰ There was also a section regarding the possible consequences of Yugoslav move as "the other satellites could not readily follow Tito's example, but if Tito survived it would be hard for Kremlin to discipline other "nationalist" factions within the bloc." George F. Kennan and his Policy Planning Staff's report (PPS 35) provided the basis for the development of U.S. Foreign Policy towards Yugoslavia. The report emphasized the significance of the break as:

For the first time in history we may now have within the international community a communist state...independent of Moscow...A new factor of fundamental and profound significance has been introduced into the world communist movement by the demonstration that the Kremlin can be defied by one of its own minions.¹⁸¹

This report had become National Security Council (NSC) Report No. 18, and this series guided American-Yugoslav relations and Cold-War-wedge-strategy for the next several years.¹⁸² One interesting point was "normal development of economic relations" were related to Yugoslavia "willing to adopt a more cooperative attitude."¹⁸³ Overall, supporting a Communist country outside the control of the Soviet Union became a policy concern before Yugoslavia started to experience economic problems, and sought support from the Western countries. Together with this report, NSC 20/4 of November 23, 1948 "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," represented the lines of U.S. foreign policy until the adoption of NSC 68 in 1950. One of the main clauses in this

¹⁸⁰ Hillenkoetter to Truman, 29 June 1948, ER086, Truman Papers, PSF; quoted in Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War*, 53.

¹⁸¹ Policy Planning Staff (PPS) 35, "The Attitude of this Government Towards Events in Yugoslavia," 30 June 1948, Truman Papers, PSF.; quoted in John L. Gaddis, *Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: an Interpretive History* (New York: McGraw-Hill Pub. Co., 1990), 194.

¹⁸² Lees, 53.

¹⁸³ Policy Planning Staff (PPS) 35, "The Attitude of this Government Towards Events in Yugoslavia," 30 June 1948, Truman Papers, PSF.; quoted in Lees 53.

document was, to “strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the non-Soviet nations; and help such of those nations as are able and willing to make an important contribution to U.S. security, to increase their economic and political stability and their military capability.”¹⁸⁴ Since Yugoslavia was a non-Soviet Communist country, it was in the frame of NSC 20/4, but re-orientation had to wait for a while. In contrast, under these circumstances supporting the Tito regime should become the main objective of U.S. policy towards Yugoslavia, but the problem was still lying in the materialization of a this policy. John C. Campbell informs that NSC 18/2 was the paper which included the easing of trade restrictions for export to Yugoslavia and was a very minor action, “but the symbolic importance of it was considerable because this was the beginning of the whole thing.”¹⁸⁵ Direct U.S. support had to wait for a while for a variety of reasons. The major obstacle was, as Campbell commented on the realization of the benefits of Tito-Stalin split and the difficulties of developing a clear-cut strategy towards Yugoslavia, that “it was terribly difficult to get anybody in Washington to move on this.” Campbell stated that:

It wasn't clear, of course, what we could do, because the Yugoslavs were not running to us... Many of the aspects of the quarrel which had to do more with state relations and especially economic relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia hadn't come out in the open yet. It wasn't easy for the United States to see how anything we could do or any pronouncement we could make would be useful to anybody. We simply had to wait until we got some indication that the situation was one which could be exploited in some way by the United States. But there was a tendency in Washington not really to think of it even in those terms.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁴ "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security", *FRUS*, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Department of State, 1948): 663-669.

¹⁸⁵ John C. Campbell, Oral History, Truman Library.

<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/campbell.htm> (June 14, 2005)

Specialist Eastern Europe, State Department, 1942-46; secretary U.S. delegation, political advisor Council of Foreign Ministers, also Paris Peace Conference, 1946; political advisor, U.S. delegation Danube Conference, 1948; officer in charge of Balkan affairs, member Policy Planning Staff, State Department, 1949-55.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

The Fifth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party in July 1948 was an indicator of the Yugoslav situation, where Belgrade was seeking some way of reconciliation of relations with Moscow. The Yugoslav Communist Party's efforts were towards responding to Moscow's criticisms, proving that Yugoslavia was still a Communist regime and showing their continuing respect to Stalin.¹⁸⁷ One incident can be taken as a Yugoslav move towards the West, but compared to speeches glorifying Stalin, it was less significant. During the meeting of the Congress, Sir Charles Peake reported that:

Many observers regarded it as significant of Yugoslav intentions that Tito found time during Congress to give a long interview to Mr. Olson, an ex-governor of California, to whom he said that Yugoslavia would like a trade agreement with America "but without any political strings." He also allowed himself to be photographed by the press in cheerful conversation with Mr. Olson.¹⁸⁸

4.2.1 Danube Conference and the Early Symptoms

The Fifth Congress was followed by the Danube Conference, which was planned to be held in Belgrade months ago. Based on Dedijer's account the Yugoslav position in the Conference was shaped under the slogan "Refute the accusations by our deeds." Eventually Yugoslav delegates maintained a pro-Soviet line and "voted unreservedly for all Soviet proposals, including one that the official languages of the conference be only Russian and French, not English."¹⁸⁹ While Yugoslavia was still defying Stalin, the attitude of its representatives in the Conference was the indicator

¹⁸⁷ The Yugoslav press continued to publish reports received and resolutions passed, but maintained expressing love of Stalin. King to Foreign Office, July 12, 1948, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 810.

¹⁸⁸ Peake to Foreign Office, July 31, 1948, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 815.

¹⁸⁹ Dedijer, 153.

The Yugoslav government has shown both by articles in its given press and by the behavior of its delegation that it is going to give the Eastern bloc its full support on the issue. Peake to Foreign Office, July 31, 1948, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 815.

of the extent of Yugoslavia's break with the Communist camp. Consequently, solidarity among the Communist states was perceived by the Western representatives as a means of Soviet effort to maintain a monopoly on the Danube regime.¹⁹⁰ John C. Campbell's account of the Danube conference is a summary of Yugoslav behavior and U.S. perception of the events during the Conference:

We tried to put the Yugoslavs on the spot, to see if there would be any way in which they would assert themselves against the Soviets. It was interesting that their representative there was doing quite the opposite. He was trying to be more Russian than Vishinsky, to show that on foreign policy questions they were still loyal. Tito was making speeches, at that very moment that we were meeting in the conference hall, telling Stalin that Yugoslavia was going to insist on its own independence, but that on foreign policy questions, of course, the Socialist world had to see that the imperialists didn't get any footholds in the Danube Valley.¹⁹¹

In the case of Yugoslavia, U.S. policy-makers had to wait for a more cooperative attitude until the summer of 1949, when Stalin achieved the isolation of Yugoslavia. Until that time, Tito gradually had turned to the Western governments and changed his rhetoric against the Soviet Union. For instance, in September 1948 Yugoslavia wanted to purchase oil-drilling equipment from the U.S. In late December 1948, the impracticality of a restoration of relations between Yugoslavia and the Cominform became clearer in Tito's speeches when he stated that "the Yugoslav government must sell its raw materials elsewhere in order to buy necessary machinery."¹⁹² Although these maneuvers towards the West were not an indication of a slight change in Yugoslav foreign policy, they were the first symptoms of economic problems that Yugoslavia would suffer in the future. As Pavlowitch commented, "for fear of an economic collapse creating a power vacuum, which would be filled by a regime completely subservient to Moscow, it was decided in the

¹⁹¹ John C. Campbell, Oral History, Truman Library.

<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/campbell.htm> (June 14, 2005)

¹⁹² Peake to Foreign Office, Dec. 31, 1948, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-1965*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 846.

autumn of 1948 (in the words of Ernest Bevin) to keep Tito afloat.”¹⁹³ Soviet propaganda and worsening economic conditions in Yugoslavia might result in the repetition of the outcome of events in Czechoslovakia. Naturally, in making a choice between Tito or a Moscow tool, supporting the latter - the betrayer of Stalin - was decided.

4.3 Good-bye Uncle Joe - Welcome Uncle Sam

Since the beginning of the conflict the attitude of other Cominform states was not conformist towards Yugoslavia, which means anti-Yugoslav rhetoric was not limited only to Yugoslavia's neighbors. Beginning from the Communiqué day, Cominform countries initiated anti-Yugoslav propaganda, in line with Moscow, and treated Yugoslav citizens in their countries “undemocratically.”¹⁹⁴ In the early months after the communiqué, Yugoslav reaction was quite harsh against these states as compared to their responses towards Moscow. The Yugoslav press had maintained publishing articles about the rightness of Yugoslav cause and counter-propaganda against these states to protect social solidarity. In comparison, in December *Borba* celebrated the Russian leader's birthday with a long editorial on “Sixty-nine years of the Great Stalin,” while Stalin's collected works were on the publication schedules of all Yugoslav major publishing houses. On January 20, 1949, on the anniversary of Lenin's death *Borba* wrote that the Yugoslav Communist Party had been governed by the “teachings of Lenin and Stalin and had won great victories.”¹⁹⁵ It is clear that the key to restore relations was in Stalin's hands, but as opposed to their attempts the Yugoslav situation was getting worse. It can be argued that Yugoslavs resisted more

¹⁹³ Pavlowitch, 60.

¹⁹⁴ Peake to Foreign Office, Aug. 6, 1948, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-1965*, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 817. Also see *ibid.* 822.

¹⁹⁵ Dedijer, 204.

than they could. Even, when troop concentrations near Yugoslav borders were published in the world press in the spring of 1949, Yugoslavs themselves rejected the existence of such activities.¹⁹⁶

In fact, as opposed to Yugoslav repudiation of such activities the invasion of Yugoslavia became more than a possibility in mid-1949. Beloff argued that when Stalin “discovered that he could not destroy Tito by shaking his little finger, he shook everything else he could shake.”¹⁹⁷ For instance, General Béla Király of the Hungarian People’s Army and Commander of the Infantry and also the designated commander in chief of the Hungarian contingent of the Soviet controlled multinational forces that were to invade Yugoslavia in 1949-1950, informed that, “the last year of the 1940s and the early 1950s were a period when life in Hungary was completely geared to the coming of war: politically, economically, militarily and psychologically.”¹⁹⁸ Based on Tito’s own list, taking into consideration the possibility of exaggeration in these numbers, the number of incidents near Yugoslav borders were quite high in 1950: 936; in 1951, 1,517; and in the first ten months of 1952, 1,530.¹⁹⁹

In the first half of 1949, as a result of propaganda and increasing troop deployments in Yugoslavia’s neighbors, Yugoslav attitude towards the Soviet Union gradually left its defensive character, but it was still unclear. For instance, in January 1949, “*Borba* published that it was absurd for the “people’s democracies” to make

¹⁹⁶ (Dedijer’s comment on the Soviet troop reports from Albania, Rumania, and Bulgaria), I had said “no” when asked if Yugoslavia expected an attack: no military preparations were visible on the other side of the boundary; the whole world expected something like to happen, but the Yugoslavs were not nervous...No such denials were issued in the Soviet Union. In April again the world press was full of reports about troop concentrations. Once more I wrote a denial which *Borba* published as its own: this was a creation of Western newspapermen to discredit the Soviet Union, to present it as an aggressor and identify it with the imperialistic states. Dedijer, 207-208.

¹⁹⁷ Beloff, 147-148.

¹⁹⁸ Béla Király, “The Aborted Soviet Military Plans,” in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., *At the Brink of War and Peace: the Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective* (New York: Social Science Monographs, Brooklyn College Press, 1982), 273.

¹⁹⁹ Beloff, 147-148, n. 25.

capital out of difficulties which were partly caused by the economic sanctions which they themselves were imposing.”²⁰⁰ On the contrary Soviet Army day was celebrated in February 1949 by laying wreaths on the memorial to fallen Soviet soldiers in Belgrade and concluded with the cry of “Long live the brotherhood in arms of the Soviet and Yugoslav armies.”²⁰¹

In June 1949, the Yugoslav attitude was strictly different, even the anniversary of the German attack on the Soviet Union was celebrated in rather happier circumstances than Victory Day.²⁰² In July 1949 it was clear that there was no escape from economic blockade when Poland, the only Cominform country left maintaining trade with Yugoslavia, announced its “unilateral and arbitrary” cessation of all deliveries to Yugoslavia under existing trade agreements,²⁰³ while Yugoslavs were trying to escape from economic problems coupled with a bad-harvest by establishing economic relations with non-Cominform countries. Consequentially, in July 1949 Yugoslavs lost hope about the possibility of reconciliation with the Cominform. M. Pijade’s comments reflected the mood of Yugoslav leaders in this period:

...the Soviet leaders returned in their diplomacy and their foreign policy to ‘the policy and methods of Russia before the October revolution’. Yugoslavia had no intention of becoming anybody’s ‘gubernia’ (a pre-revolutionary Russian word for ‘province’), nor was it true that small peoples must ‘jump into the mouth of one shark to avoid being swallowed by another.’²⁰⁴

²⁰⁰ Peake to Foreign Office, Jan. 22, 1949, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948*, Vol. 4: 1949-1965, 7.

²⁰¹ Peake to Foreign Office, Feb 26, 1949, Belgrade, ibid. 18.

²⁰² Peake to Foreign Office, June 24, 1949, Belgrade, ibid. 58.

²⁰³ Peake to Foreign Office, July 15, 1949, Belgrade, ibid. 67-68.

²⁰⁴ Peake to Foreign Office, July 8, 1949, Belgrade, ibid. 64-65.

4.3.1 American Support Without Strings Please!

The first American aid to Yugoslavia was initiated in September 1949. Lees wrote that beginning from May 1949 Yugoslavs had requested 200 million dollars in loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction (IBRD), the Export-Import bank, and various private institutions.²⁰⁵ Yugoslavia had been ready to establish economic relations with non-Cominform countries since December 1948, and when they completely lost hope, finding credits and funds would not be a difficult task since the U.S. administration was ready to support Yugoslavia but was waiting for a loyal attitude. Initiation of the American assistance was a matter of discussion all through the summer and before Poland cut its economic ties with Yugoslavia, Yugoslav and American representatives were discussing the possibility of American help. Most interestingly, in a conversation between Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Edward Kardelj, and U.S. Ambassador, Cavendish Cannon, which was held in early June “Kardelj confirmed that his government was not sending materiel to the guerrillas in Greece.”²⁰⁶ This was followed by Tito’s announcement of closing the Yugoslav-Greek border in July, at a time when the outcome of the Greek Civil War was already obvious.²⁰⁷ This bilateral action of Yugoslavia can be taken as a concession, or a loyal and cooperative attitude, made for the implementation of American support. It is questionable to what extent Tito’s action was loyal and cooperative, but it is clear that his action shortened the already ending conflict in Greece. In addition, on August 19 and September 28, Yugoslavia received two harsh

²⁰⁵ Lees, 67.

²⁰⁶ Cannon to Acheson, 9 June 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, 5: 896-98; quoted in *Ibid.* 67.

²⁰⁷ Peake to Foreign Office, July 15, 1949, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948*, Vol. 4: 1949-1965, 64-65.

ultimatums from Moscow accusing Yugoslavia of pursuing an aggressive policy in its region.²⁰⁸

Coincidentally, in September the Export-Import Bank granted Yugoslavia's request for a \$20 million credit and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also approved a \$3 million drawing for Tito's government, and the U.S. and Yugoslavia formally announced the licensing of a steel mill.²⁰⁹ This was the beginning of a series of aid to Yugoslavia. Financial support was followed by military aid later, and until mid-1955 the U.S. "paid out nearly \$1.2 billion to Yugoslavia in military and economic aid, of which only \$55 million was to come back in the form of repaid loans."²¹⁰ Yugoslavia was not included into the Marshall Plan since Tito was obsessive about political strings and it was nearly impossible for the U.S. Administration to advocate it against American tax-payers. So, the Yugoslav government had no debt to democratize itself, liberalize its economy and provide military support when necessary like its future allies Turkey and Greece, but this did not mean that Tito did not make any concessions. As Milan Bartos wrote in 1950, the aim of the Soviet Union in this period was clear, "an economic blockade would produce the economic collapse which mere political propaganda had failed to achieve."²¹¹ Therefore the solution lay in avoiding this possibility. Jacob D. Beam

²⁰⁸ Dedijer, 212-221.

²⁰⁹ Lees, 71; John C. Campbell states that: Yugoslavs went to private banks first. I remember that they approached the Irving Trust Company and other private banks and got some rather positive response, but they couldn't get loans of the size that they felt they needed. Sometime along the summer of 1949 they, in effect, applied for Ex-Im Bank loan, and we set about telling the president of the Ex-Im Bank that there were sound political reasons why this loan should be given. The announcement of the loan said that it was an entirely commercial business and that the idea was to facilitate Yugoslav trade with the United States for the benefit of American exports. We did everything to play down the political importance of that loan, because, again, the Yugoslavs didn't want to play up the fact that they were turning to the West in any political sense. John C. Campbell, Oral History, Truman Library.

<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/campbell.htm> (June 14, 2005)

²¹⁰ Campbell, 28.

²¹¹ Milan Bartos, "Yugoslavia's Struggle for Equality." *Foreign Affairs* 28, No. 3 (Apr., 1950): 434.

stated that the U.S. was not so concerned about Yugoslavia being a free enterprise economy as it was about Yugoslavia being independent of Moscow.²¹²

4.4 NSC 68 and the Korean War

NSC 18/4 of November 17, 1949, stressed the consequences of Yugoslavia's situation that it had improved the security of the West. Briefly, the possible loss of Yugoslavia would mean the loss of political gains in the Cold War and Yugoslavia's already increasing relations with the West. In particular, Yugoslavia's "increasing dependence" on the West would "enhance chances for a Trieste settlement, and a general accommodation with Greece and Turkey."²¹³ Although the question of economic aid to Yugoslavia was solved, the defense of Yugoslavia in case of a satellite or Soviet attack had been the matter of discussions since there was no working solution.

In 1950, two important events influenced the course of the Cold War, actually they coincided. The first was the completion of NSC 68 in April 1950, approved as a national security policy in September, which would shape the U.S. Cold-War policy in the next decades. According to this document, Yugoslavia's position as an outcast in the Cold War emphasized once more as:

The Kremlin's relations with its satellites and their peoples is likewise vulnerability. Nationalism still remains the most potent emotional-political force. The well-known ills of colonialism are compounded, however, by the excessive demands of the Kremlin that its satellites accept not only the imperial authority of Moscow but that they believe in and proclaim the ideological primacy and infallibility of the Kremlin. These excessive requirements can be made good only through extreme

²¹² Jacob D. Beam, Oral History, Truman Library.

<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/beamjw.htm> (June 14, 2005)

During the Truman administration, Ambassador Beam was a political officer in Headquarters, U.S. Forces in Germany, 1945-47; Chief, Central European Division, State Department, 1947-49; Consul General, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1950; Counselor of Embassy, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 1951-52; and Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, USSR, 1952-53.

²¹³ Report by the NSC to the president, 17 November 1949, NSC 18/4, "United States Policy Towards the Conflict between the USSR and Yugoslavia," *FRUS*, 1950, 4: 1341-48; quoted in Lees, 77.

coercion. The result is that if a satellite feels able to effect its independence of the Kremlin, as Tito was able to do, it is likely to break away.²¹⁴

Secondly, while Soviet military threat reached its zenith towards Yugoslavia, war broke out in Asia: North Korea attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950. Based on Belá Király's account "North Korea launched the war...exactly when the Soviet Bloc in Europe was ready to initiate the aggression against Yugoslavia" and "there was a direct relationship between the timing of the Korean aggression and the completion of preparations for war against Yugoslavia." He argues that, "the aggression towards Yugoslavia would surely have begun in the fall of 1950 or in the spring of 1951 at the latest had the United States and the United Nations not intervened in Korea."²¹⁵ Lees wrote that in August 1950, the NSC decided that "emergency military assistance could be provided to Yugoslavia under Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP)."²¹⁶ In November, President Truman formally asked the Congress to authorize aid for Yugoslavia and both houses approved "The Yugoslav Emergency Relief Act of 1950."²¹⁷ In June 1951, an agreement on the "rapid shipment of military goods to Yugoslavia"²¹⁸ was achieved after bilateral consultations between the American and Yugoslav sides. Yugoslav dependency on the American support reached its peak with the signing of "Military Assistance Agreement Between the United States and Yugoslavia, November 14, 1951."²¹⁹

²¹⁴ NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security.

<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm> (June 15, 2005)

²¹⁵ Béla Király, "The Aborted Soviet Military Plans," in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., *At the Brink of War and Peace: the Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective*, 286.

²¹⁶ Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War*, 88.

²¹⁷ Ibid. 94; The Congress, by sizeable majority in both the Senate and the House, voted the Yugoslav aid bill. We had a considerable number of strategy sessions in the Department about how to play it, and we decided that the best line with the public was the humanitarian one. There was a serious drought, people were going to starve, and Yugoslavia was cut off from supplies which it might get from other parts of the world. John C. Campbell, Oral History, Truman Library.

<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/campbell.htm> (June 14, 2005)

²¹⁸ Joyce to Matthews, 24 May 1951, RG 59, 768.5/5-2451; Acheson, memorandum of conversation, 18 June 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, 4(2): 1815-16; quoted in Lees, 96.

²¹⁹ Military Assistance Agreement Between the United States and Yugoslavia, November 14, 1951.

4.4.1 What about aiding a Communist Country?

It should be noted that the greatest obstacle for the U.S. support of Yugoslavia and an efficient integration of Yugoslavia into the Western defense system was the declared war against the spread of Communism. In the age of anti-Communism, it would be absurd for tough-Cold-Warriors to find general support for a Communist country and even thinking of fighting with Communism arm-in-arm with another communist. Most of the U.S. foreign-service-officers agreed on the difficulty of extending any aid to Yugoslavia in this period. For instance, James W. Riddleberger, U.S. Ambassador in Yugoslavia between 1953-1957, pointed out the extent of anti-Communism by giving an example from his experiences. On the timing of the U.S. aid to Yugoslavia he said that:

We gave it as soon as we saw there's a possibility of it... I think it took courage particularly, because these were the days of the Cold War and if you persuade any American Congress to vote money for a Communist dictator... it's a pretty rough affair. As I found out later myself when I had to come back and testify... I think Truman was absolutely right and I think it showed, as is customary with him, a lot of courage.²²⁰

Willis G. Armstrong made similar comments on the difficulty of finding support on aiding of Yugoslavia. He agreed that “in the atmosphere in 1949, with McCarthyism, this [aiding Yugoslavia] wasn't always the easiest thing to do.”²²¹ Philip Kaiser asserted that, “Truman was afraid people would say that he was soft on

<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/yugoslavia/yugo001.htm> (July 29, 2005); Appendix IV.

²²⁰ James W. Riddleberger, Oral history, Truman Library.

<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/riddle.htm> (June 14, 2005)
Chief, Division of Central European Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, 1944-47; counsellor of embassy, and chief, political section, American Military Government, Berlin, Germany, 1947-50; acting political adviser to commander-in-chief, U.S. Forces, Germany, 1949-50; political adviser to E.C.A., Paris, 1950-52; appointed a career minister, 1950; director, Bureau of German Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, 1952-53; and subsequent to his service during the Truman Presidency served as an ambassador to various countries and as director of the International Cooperation Administration.

²²¹ Willis G. Armstrong, Oral History, Truman library.

<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/armstron.htm> (June 14, 2005)
Official, Lend-Lease Administration and Foreign Economic Administration, 1941-45; War Shipping Administration, 1945-46; adviser on state trading, U.S. Dept. of State, 1946-48; asst. chief, Division of Commercial Policy, 1951-52, and deputy director, 1952-54, U.S. Dept. of State.

communism;”²²² aiding hungry-communists would be a clear signal of softness. Apart from continued war against Communism, the Korean War was still going on, and Campbell clearly stated that when searching for more aid to Yugoslavia one should be ready to face the argument of, "Why should we help a Communist? We've been fighting communism; we're fighting a war now in Korea and a Cold War everywhere else all over the world. Now you come and tell us to give special aid and send our food to keep Communists going."²²³ In addition to that, Campbell indicated the major legal obstacles on aiding Yugoslavia and he questioned the inclusion of Yugoslavia into the Military Defense Assistance Act as:

I remember we used every way around and through the existing legislation, none of which directly authorized aid to Yugoslavia. We got grain and other goods, which had been shipped to Italy, transferred from Italy to Yugoslavia. We got Butch [Adrian S.] Fisher, who was the Legal Adviser, to interpret the Military Defense Assistance Act in a way which would enable us to get food under that act on grounds that it was good for the Yugoslav army. Then, presumably, other stocks would be made available for the civilian population. This was a very dubious legal interpretation, I think, but, nevertheless, we were willing to take the chance, if Secretary [Dean] Acheson at that time approved of it. He too was willing to take the chance.²²⁴

²²² Philip Kaiser, Oral history, Truman Library.

<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/kaiserp.htm> (June 14, 2005)

Executive Assistant to Assistant Secretary of Labor in Charge of International Labor Affairs, 1946-47; Director, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor, 1947-49; Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Labor Affairs, 1949-53; Special Assistant to Governor W. Averell Harriman, 1955-58; U.S. Ambassador to Senegal and Mauritania, 1961-64; Minister, U.S. Embassy in London, 1964-69; U.S. Ambassador to Hungary, 1977-80, and to Austria, 1980-81.

²²³ John C. Campbell, Oral History, Truman Library.

<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/campbell.htm> (June 14, 2005)

²²⁴ Ibid. John C. Campbell adds that: ...this was an important start, and what it did was tide us over to the point where we could put Yugoslavia under the regular Marshall plan or ECA program, under which we then had to negotiate an economic aid agreement with them. But this was the big hurdle, getting congressional action on the food bill so that Yugoslavia was no longer a special case. It now had the approval of a congressional vote, and thereafter there was no great objection, except by some few people in the Congress, to including the Yugoslavs under the ECA legislation for the next few years, and even to providing military aid for them.

4.5 The Road to the Balkan Alliance is Opened

While the situation in the Balkans became clearer month by month in 1948 and 1949, another development affecting the course of the Cold War was on the scene: the establishment of NATO. Just after the Prague Coup in March 1948, on March 17, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom signed The Brussels treaty which in September 1948 became Western Union Defense Organization. In addition, negotiations for the Atlantic Pact began in June 1948 and concluded in December of that year. On April 4, 1949, NATO was established as a military defense organization. While the possibility of linking Yugoslavia to NATO grew later, the importance of Yugoslavia's independence from Moscow in military terms gave the Western defense system a direct advantage over the Soviet Union. For instance, "in February 1951, false reports about the presence of American and British warplanes on Yugoslav airfields jolted the Romanian general staff."²²⁵ The same possible threat was felt by the neighboring satellites.

The Bulgarians, too, constantly worried about a Yugoslav attack, building defenses and exercising troops to repel it. From unidentified sources, they received the disturbing information that in case of a Soviet attack in Central Europe NATO would retaliate in the Balkans by unleashing on them the Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Turks."²²⁶

Nevertheless, as early as June 1951 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, NATO's first Supreme Allied Commander Europe, wrote in his diary that the problem of European security would only be solved by the creation of "a United States of Europe" whose membership would include the NATO countries as well as "West Germany and (I think) Sweden, Spain, Yugoslavia, with Greece definitely in if

²²⁵ "Nota cu nevoile informative ale direcției operației referitoare la Jugoslavia," [Note on Information for the Operations Directorate Concerning Yugoslavia] Dos. 77, Nr. 59.093, Marele Stat Major, Direcția Operații, Romanian Military Archives, Bucharest, in Vojtech Mastny, "NATO in the Beholder's Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949-56," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: Cold War International History Project Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. 35.

<http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ACFB01.pdf> (Jan. 15, 2005)

²²⁶ Baev, Voennopoliticheskiye konflikt, pp. 42, 126-27,

Yugoslavia is.”²²⁷ In the same period “PPS estimated the combined forces of Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece to be greater than all of the European members of the Atlantic alliance and a ‘formidable bastion against aggression in the Mediterranean area’.”²²⁸

In August 1951, Eisenhower told US Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins, before Collins left for a trip to Yugoslavia, that “every time NATO discussed ‘plans and forces required for the defense of Southern Europe, especially Italy’ the ‘contribution that Yugoslavia can make towards the security of my southern flank is brought into focus’.”²²⁹ Eisenhower was right in his complaints but the inclusion of Southern European countries into NATO was problematic task mainly as a result of remoteness of these areas²³⁰ and the question of qualifications of these governments for the NATO membership. In the case of Yugoslavia it was the most difficult. For instance, a CIA report indicated the extent of the difficulty that the association of “Greece, Turkey, Spain, Yugoslavia and Western Germany” with NATO, which “should be consummated in the coming period will be a major increment in NATO strength.” However, the existence of “numerous political and and psychological obstacles” was pointed out delaying the full contribution of the later three countries.”²³¹ Consequently, the plans for the association of Yugoslavia into the

²²⁷ Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), 194-195.; The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XII, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1989, page 415.

²²⁸ Carlton Savage, memorandum, 23 May 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, 1:1834-40; quoted in Lees, 107.

²²⁹ J. Lawton Collins to Eisenhower, 21 August 1951, and Eisenhower to Collins, 25 August 1951, Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential Principal File, File: Collins, J. Lawton; quoted in *ibid.* 109; also see Hamilton Fish Armstrong, “Eisenhower’s Right Flank.” *Foreign Affairs* 29, No. 4 (July 1951): 651-663.

²³⁰ George F. Kennan comments about Turkey and Greece: To require them, in stead to undertake an obligation to defend the United States in case of a war between the United States and Russia would not only to prejudice, unnecessarily and unfortunately, their own neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union, but also to obscure the purely defensive nature of the pact, and to make a mockery of the term “North Atlantic” that appeared in its title. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, 411-412.

²³¹ CIA, SE-13, “Special estimate Probable developments in the World Situation Through mid-1953,” 24 September 1951; quoted in Lees, 109.

western defense system had always been supported by various people during the Truman presidency. Campbell summarized the priorities of U.S. strategy as:

Our whole approach to the military program was, first, that its principal purpose was to increase Yugoslavia's defensive strength; second, that somehow it was a very important beginning for the association of Yugoslavia with Western defense in general. Certainly from the point of view of the Pentagon, if they were supplying military equipment to the Yugoslavs and there was going to be war, they would want to see that the Yugoslavs were helping to defend the right places and not retreating to the mountains to defend themselves alone. So, there was, in the backs of the minds of many in the United States who were concerned with Yugoslav policy, the idea that somehow we would gradually bring the Yugoslavs to a closer association with NATO.²³²

To achieve this end re-orientation of Yugoslavia was necessary, and it had already begun by improving its relations with the non-communist neighbors and other states, and in media. For example, an article by Fitzroy Maclean, published in *Foreign Affairs* in January 1950, depicted Tito and Yugoslavia much differently from three years ago:

The key to what had happened and to what is likely to happen in the future must be sought first and foremost in Tito himself. Without his leadership, without his ruthless determination, without the personal devotion of which he inspires in his followers, such a rebellion would have had little chance of succeeding.²³³

In addition, on Yugoslavia's relations with other states, as early as January 1950, Yugoslav officials announced that Yugoslavia had trade with forty-six countries and had trade agreements with twenty-four.²³⁴ For instance, on January 1950, a new trade agreement was signed between Turkey and Yugoslavia.²³⁵ The problem in Greece was rapidly resolved after Yugoslavia closed its borders,²³⁶ and in

²³² John C. Campbell, Oral History, Truman Library.

<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/campbell.htm> (June 14, 2005)

²³³ Fitzroy Maclean, "Tito: a Study." *Foreign Affairs* 28, No. 2 (Jan., 1950): 245.

²³⁴ Peake to Foreign Office, December 30, 1949, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948*, Vol. 4: 1949-1965, 124.

²³⁵ *Ulus*, Ankara, January 6, 1950

²³⁶ As a result of of the Greek Army offensive in October...Greek Government forces now for the first time since the war command the northern borders of Greece. Statement by Secretary Acheson,

the first months of 1951 the two countries signed treaties about transportation. Relations between the three countries improved quickly since their threat perception was the same. Nevertheless, development of closer relations between the three countries was much faster than policy planning in the U.S. and among the NATO circles. Even, in September 1951, Marshall Tito “specifically emphasized the point that, as Yugoslavia would be ‘imperiled by an attack on Greece and Turkey’ the question of cooperation between these countries and Yugoslavia would arise in the event of aggression, and even maybe before.”²³⁷

4.5.1 Passionate Neighbors: Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia

In the early months of 1952, the possibility of a Balkan alliance was realized as a result of meetings among the representatives of the Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, without any formal proposal and agreement. In February, the U.S. Ambassador in Ankara, George C. McGhee informed the State Department that “in subsequent discussions, Venizelos and Turk officials agreed desirability their attempting jointly to develop closer relations with Yugo, with objective of reaching agreement hold secret staff discussions, probably at subordinate level, re military coordination in event of attack by Russia.” There was even the possibility that these discussions would “develop naturally within two or three months.” In addition, he also reported that, “Italian Amb recently commented that NATO command containing Italy, Greece and Turkey will present irresistible attraction to Yugo which

October 17, 1949, in Staff of the Committee and the Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949*, 773.

²³⁷ Peake to Foreign Office, Sept. 15, 1951, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948*, Vol. 4: 1949-1965, 272.

his govt hopes, of course, will result immediately in Yugo association.”²³⁸ These moves might be an excellent beginning for the U.S. policy makers to facilitate discussions among the parties, but the Acting Secretary of State responded that “our strategic planning has not yet progressed to point where coordination with Yugo may be undertaken,” and also added that the Department of State “does not wish to discourage any efforts by Grk or Turk may themselves wish to make to estab closer relationship with Yugo” and also “greater cooperation between the three countries.”²³⁹ This answer would be repeated several times in the next two years. On the other hand, the encouragement of the U.S. on the strengthening of relations between three Balkan countries was important because on February 18, 1952, Greece and Turkey became NATO members and their new status would change the meaning of trilateral relations in the Balkans.

On May 6, 1952, the U.S. Ambassador in Greece, John E. Peurifoy, following the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes’ visit of Greece, informed the Department of State that military talks between three states were possible, except the fact that Yugoslavs were waiting for “initiative for mil talks must come from Grks or Turks.” According to the information coming from Turkish and Greek representatives “Tito wants mil talks but fears to begin them because of his delicate internal sit.” In this regard members of Greek parliament planned a goodwill visit to Belgrade without delay.²⁴⁰ In fact, the Yugoslav situation was not clear enough on allying itself with Turkey and Greece. For instance, during the Greco-Turkish

²³⁸ “The Ambassador in Turkey (McGhee) to the Department of State,” Feb. 10, 1952, U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS), 1952-1954, Vol. VIII (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988): 590.

²³⁹ “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey,” Feb. 13, 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 591.

²⁴⁰ “The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State,” May 6, 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 593.

conversations²⁴¹ in Athens, Marshall Tito made it “abundantly clear that Yugoslavia is not interested in concluding any paper pacts and has explained that identity of interests is the only real and satisfactory guarantee that Yugoslavia will march with the West in time of war.”²⁴² In the same month, Yugoslavia also extended its rule of law into the Yugoslav controlled Trieste region, Zone A.

On the contrary, on June 6, the U.S. Ambassador in Yugoslavia, George V. Allen, commented on the ongoing moves from Turkish and Greek sides that “caution shld be exercised lest Greeks and Turks step on each other’s toes or make too bold approach to Yugoslavs,” but he also drew attention to the “advantage of present Yugoslav willingness to improve relations with both those two countries.” Further, Yugoslavs viewed dealing with Turkey and Greece more preferable, “whom they can meet on the basis of equality.”²⁴³ Allen was right in his comments on the momentum of talks between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia; any initiative, unplanned or without the consultation of NATO members, should be avoided and much smaller steps had to be taken. In addition, it became clear that Marshall Tito’s previous comments did not reflect the reality. In response, Dean Acheson described the situation as it is “not yet ripe to take such step in NATO, and Dept was concerned lest possible rebuff in NATO wld prejudice progress on bi or trilateral basis between Greece, Turkey and Yugo.”²⁴⁴ Parallel to this approach, the following months of 1952 passed with reciprocal-visits of military delegations and political representatives of the three countries. In addition, Yugoslavia’s American visitors were quiet significant persons in the summer of 1952. In mid-July, two high-ranking

²⁴¹ *Ulus*, May 3, 1952; *Ayin Tarihi* (May 1952): 269.

²⁴² Ivo Mallet to Foreign Office, May 10, 1951, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948*, Vol. 4: 1949-1965, 359.

²⁴³ “The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Department of State,” June 6, 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 594.

²⁴⁴ “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia,” June 7, 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 595.

officers from the United States Department of Defence, Generals Edelman and Holmstead, and then the Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Nash, and all three called upon Marshall Tito at his summer residence in Slovenia.”²⁴⁵ In August the U.S. Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace, paid a two day visit to Yugoslavia and “attended some military exercises near the capital before going on to Bled, where he saw Marshall Tito.”²⁴⁶

These visits allowed the U.S. to implement a bold approach to Yugoslavia on military matters, of course in connection with the U.K. and France. In November, the U.S. sent General Thomas T. Handy to discuss defense matters and learn about the military capabilities of Yugoslavia in detail. However, the Yugoslavs did not want to take responsibility without a clear defensive commitment from the West. In tripartite Balkan negotiations the situation was the opposite. On November 24, Ambassador Allen informed the Department of State of the implications in Belgrade that “Yugos had definite mil commitments in mind” just before the visit of Greek military delegation. In his conversation with Greek Minister Capitanides, Allen told “Yugos may hope to obtain indirect NATO commitment through getting Grks and Turks to sign reciprocal assurances of support in case of attack.”²⁴⁷ The integration of Yugoslavia into NATO military planning became a serious matter of discussions in December 1952 since three Balkan countries were moving towards some sort of a cooperation level. However, intra-NATO relations still prevailed and there was no clear plan for a Balkan alliance. Coupled with this, and probably the leading factor, it should be noted was that the presidential election was the most important event in the U.S. in the last months of 1952. On November 4, 1952, the Republican Eisenhower

²⁴⁵ Mallet to Foreign Office, July 19, 1952, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948*, Vol. 4: 1949-1965, 377.

²⁴⁶ Ibid. August. 16, 1952, 382.

²⁴⁷ “The Ambassador in Yugoslavia to the Department of State,” Nov. 24, 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 597.

won a decisive victory, and swept every region, but the South. It is questionable to what extent Eisenhower was making his plans based on his possible presidency in that period, but it can be argued that the election process itself played role in the slowing down of American dealings with the outside world.

In the Balkans, representatives from the three Balkan countries continued their visits; a Turkish military delegation visited Belgrade after Greeks, on December 20,²⁴⁸ and on December 27, a Yugoslav delegation visited Athens. The general tendency of the U.S. during these visits was towards a military commitment of forces of mentioned states “must be left to governmental decision at time emergency arises in light all circumstances and in consultation NATO allies as appropriate.”²⁴⁹ Limiting collective action with a precondition ‘whenever emergency arises’ meant the U.S. and NATO were not ready for cooperating with Yugoslavia on an alliance basis. Regarding Yugoslav delegates’ visit to Greece, Ambassador Peurifoy wrote that Yugoslavs were pressing for an agreement, namely a “formal tripartite agreement with Greece and Turkey that others will assist in case of attack upon any one of parties,”²⁵⁰ Yugoslavs’ desire to strengthen their position against Italy was seen as the constant contributory factor. In particular, Ambassador Allen related Tito’s gradually changing attitude towards “regional blocs” and “advance concept of formal military commitments on a governmental level as a precondition to further

²⁴⁸ A Turkish military delegation led by General Turnaboylu paid a much and cordially publicized visit to Yugoslavia during which it visited Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo and had talks with the Yugoslav deputy Minister of Defence, General Goshjak, and the deputy chief of the General Staff, General Dapchovich. The Turkish minister for Economy and Commerce, Mr. Gireli, also visited Yugoslavia and explored the possibility of considerably expanding Turko-Yugoslav trade. It is reported that these visits are to be followed soon by the visit to Belgrade of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Koprulu. Mallet to Foreign Office, Jan. 3, 1953, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948*, Vol. 4: 1949-1965, 415.

²⁴⁹ “The Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Embassy in France,” Dec. 5, 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 600.

²⁵⁰ “The Ambassador in Greece to the Department of State,” Dec. 31, 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 602. On Dec. 22, it was reported that the Turkish military delegation had decided, with encouragement from Ambassador Allen, to set forth a plan for Turk-Yugoslav military cooperation. Presumably it was a report of this that persuaded the Yugoslav delegation at the talks that the Turks would join a Greek-Yugoslav military agreement. *Ibid.* n. 4

progress in military talks” to Tito’s growing confidence. He also commented, making comparison to Handy talks in November, that “Tito began process of moving under NATO umbrella by attempting to secure alliances to south.”²⁵¹ It was similar to what the Americans were planning, but the progress of this should not be left to the Yugoslavs.

Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuad Köprülü, summarized his views towards the developing rapprochement between Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece after his visit to Paris, Rome and Athens, and before he left for Belgrade, to Ambassador McGhee. For him, Italy desired closer association of Yugoslavia with the West and that “their present tactics are calculated as a price for their agreement [to] a solution for Trieste favorable to themselves”, and to “regain their former position as principal outside power in the Balkans.” He also mentioned that Yugoslavs would be in a position to accept direct entry to NATO soon, and current Yugoslav moves were the consequence of intentions towards solving the Trieste problem favorable to themselves, just like the Italians. He also proposed that if direct entry into NATO would not be the case, “an alternative solution should be sought through creation of separate three-power alliance,” and requested advice from the United States just like his counterpart in Greece.²⁵²

In response, the suggested line to take with Foreign Minister Köprülü upon Yugoslavia was clear and pointed out the NATO obligations of Turkey. Based on the record, the U.S. did not have a definitive view on “encouraging Yugoslavia to join NATO” and on “a separate tripartite security organization linked with NATO,” because of the reason that these matters “must be considered at the highest level in

²⁵¹ “The Ambassador in Yugoslavia to the Department of State,” Jan 3, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 603.

²⁵² “The Ambassador in Turkey to the Department of State,” Jan. 6, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 605.

light of an evaluation of all pertinent factors,” and most importantly with other NATO members. In addition, “maximum possible progress in contingent military planning”²⁵³ on a bilateral basis was favored. On January 28, 1953, Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü informed British, French and American Ambassadors in Athens about his meeting with Tito and the latest situation of Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav negotiations: Tito assumed initiative in proposing a treaty of friendship asserting that “such a treaty would also produce helpful psychological and propaganda effect internationally vis-à-vis Soviets;” and Köprülü, in line with American suggestions, responded that such a treaty should not be “in contravention with Turkish obligations under NAT.” In this meeting, Köprülü also raised “eventual adherence of Italy,” and his sympathies regarding Italy’s “delicate position internally” regarding the Trieste issue. Köprülü also informed Ambassador Peurifoy that he “saw no reason why tripartite working level drafting party could not meet” since the proposed treaty would be an extremely simple document. In detail, the proposed treaty would involve “no specific commitments and obligations provide for tripartite consultation in event of threat to security of one of members” and “be so drafted as to make clear that none provisions proposed treaty would conflict with or derogate from obligations Greece and Turkey as members NATO.”²⁵⁴ Köprülü’s proposal on Italy’s adherence was appreciated, even leaving “the door open to later Italian adherence should the Italians be interested” was welcomed in Washington in the State Department. The proposed formula as outlined by Köprülü, which did not

²⁵³ “The Counsellor in Turkey (Rountree) to the Ambassador in Turkey - Attachement,” Jan. 16, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 610.

²⁵⁴ “The Ambassador in Greece to the Department of State,” January 28, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 613.

challenge NATO obligations nor brought extra commitments, was viewed positively.²⁵⁵

For the first time, general consensus occurred among the big-three and in their relations with Turkey and Greece on the creation of a limited agreement. Actually, a treaty not challenging with NATO obligations of Turkey and Greece would not include clauses about collective defense between the three states. However, a much bigger problem occurred after achieving this harmony, and this was the actual realization and completion of this pact. Ambassador McGhee advised the Department of State on the early completion of this pact. Based on his analysis:

- (a) If more direct association Yugoslavia with NATO not possible in immediate future, delay in any substantive step in that direction would probably tend to discourage Yugoslavs and might in fact militate against their eventual effective collaboration with west. Turks feel Yugoslavia now psychologically ripe for such a role through fear of being isolated. Notwithstanding practical limitations in terms of proposed pact, Yugoslavs should as result of pact feel more closely linked with west.
- (b) Proposed pact, although general in nature, will meet immediate need for some formal basis upon which collaboration between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia can be continued and intensified in fields of contingent military planning, economic and cultural relations, as well as in advancing general political understanding.
- (c) Proposed pact affords opportunity, apparently with little risk of effective Soviet retaliation, for positive step or 'psychological offensive' in general cold war relations. Elements within satellite countries which are hostile to Soviet domination, particularly those in Bulgaria, should be encouraged by pact.
- (d) Encouragement of three countries at this stage in development of pact should have salutary effect on our relations with them. With little advice or encouragement from western powers, three countries have on their own made commendable progress in worth while project. It is believed that we should encourage such constructively led initiative

²⁵⁵ "Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France," January 31, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 616.

which serves to relieve US of direct responsibilities and charge cold war is only US-Russian struggle.²⁵⁶

McGhee was also aware of the consequence that the creation of this pact would inevitably be perceived by Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece as a step towards Yugoslavs' association to NATO. In this regard, McGhee commented on this issue both from military and political point of views; militarily, "without assurances that there will be coordinated defense of Thrace" by these three countries, in case of a possible Soviet attack, Thrace would be lost and Turkey would be separated from its allies; politically, "proposed pact can be no more than stop-gap, since limitations upon practical effects will soon become clear."²⁵⁷ One day later, the Acting Secretary of State Matthews, pointed out the limits of this friendship agreement, regarding the relation of this treaty to the UN and NATO, and to avoid unintended results defined in the UN Charter he emphasized that the term "regional arrangement" was not the right term to label this treaty. He added that, continuing military planning should be maintained distinct from the Friendship Pact as a result of well-known "political commitment." Lastly, as a result of Köprülü's suggestion to have an American observer during military talks, he instructed to avoid the issue for the reason that "coordinating Greek, Turk, Yugoslav military planning with our own cannot be separated from larger and more complex problem integration of military planning for Yugoslavia into Western defense structure, a problem still requires considerable study by all concerned."²⁵⁸

²⁵⁶ "The Ambassador in Turkey to the Department of State, Feb. 6, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 617.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 618.

²⁵⁸ "The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece," February 7, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 619-621. It was also reported that "the British were still uninformed as of Feb. 2 about the tripartite negotiations for a Balkan Pact" while French on the other hand "favored admitting Yugoslavia to NATO "in due course." *Ibid.* n. 2.

4.6 Conclusion:

Great Expectations and Unsatisfying Results

In February 1953, tripartite military talks between Turkish, Greek and Yugoslav authorities began. Ambassador Peurifoy noted his doubts on “whether it is realistic to believe that military negotiations of character already assumed by Greek-Yugoslav conversations can avoid tendency towards creation certain implicit obligations.” Actually, Peurifoy was right in that tripartite military talks were going at a pace faster than the political ones. Then he pointed out the possible consequences of an interruption in this momentum by the U.S., UK and France at this stage. He acknowledged that avoiding undertakings of any sort by Greeks and Turks would revive Tito’s suspicion, leaving the impression that the “West intends to let him fight alone.” For Greeks and Turks, this would be another “empty gesture along lines of ineffective prewar Balkan entente.” For him, strengthening of Balkan defense was in favor of Yugoslavia’s protection in case of an attack, and the rapidness of these talks presented an advantage for NATO military authorities “to bring Yugoslavs indirectly within scope of NATO strategical planning in way that may not otherwise be possible for sometime to come.”²⁵⁹

During the tripartite-political-discussions in Athens on February 20 Yugoslav representatives presented a draft of a friendship treaty which was more likely a door opening the way towards mutual security. Article 4 of this draft comprised:

The agreements or recommendations concerning military collaboration, accepted by common accord by the chiefs of the general staffs (or their plenipotentiaries), shall, after being approved by the governments of the Contracting Parties, form part of this treaty.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁹ “The Amabassador in Greece to the Department of State,” Feb. 14, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 622-23.

²⁶⁰ Editorial Note, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 623.

Actually, the Balkan issue was one of the first tasks for the newly assigned Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.²⁶¹ In his first month in this post he had to deal with three states waiting to sign a treaty. On February 21, he instructed the Embassy in Athens that “there may be merit in argument that political accord has no significance unless formally related to military understandings,” but, he went on defending that two aspects should be separated, and NATO and other implications should be avoided by going “no farther than commitment to consult as to such common measures as might be required, and not extend to commitment to lend assistance no matter how qualified by references to the United Nations.” Further, he emphasized the importance of this issue for NATO and the necessity of consultation with the British and French. Dulles ordered that American reservations to the aforementioned treaty “must not be construed as watering down our approval of the concept of Greek-Turk-Yugoslav rapprochement.”²⁶² While both sides were ready and did not want to face a delay in the conclusion of this treaty, Dulles’ approach delay and it overwhelmed all.

On February 28, 1953, Yugoslav, Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation²⁶³ - The Treaty of Ankara - covering a five-year period of time, which would enter into force upon ratification of Greek and Yugoslav parliaments on March 23, and Turkish Parliament on May 18. The last version of the Treaty covered much less than initially expected, military provisions were carefully removed from the treaty. Even on February 28, British, French and American sides still had questions concerning NATO military planning,

²⁶¹ John Foster Dulles: Secretary of State in President Eisenhower's Cabinet from January 21, 1953, to April 22, 1959. Visit, John Foster Dulles – Biography.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/40819.htm> (Aug. 10, 2005)

²⁶² “The Secretary of State (Dulles) to the Embassy in Greece,” Feb. 21, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 624-25.

²⁶³ Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration Between the Turkish Republic, The Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Feb. 28, 1953.

<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/formulti/eu001.htm#art3> (July 29, 2005)

continuing tripartite military planning and on the NATO commitments of Turkey and Greece.²⁶⁴ Ambassador Peurifoy summarized the dissatisfaction of parties in his telegram to the Department of State on February 26, just before the signing of the treaty: Yugoslav Foreign Minister criticized the “great powers” of not fully understanding the “importance of this part of world nor necessity of organizing its defense on concrete and firm basis” since “it was clear that Greeks and Turks had made apparent to Yugoslavia that they were revising critical paragraphs at insistence of the United States and United Kingdom.” During a conversation between American and Greek representatives, the importance of organizing the defense of the Balkan area was once more emphasized, but it was repeated again as had been stressed many times in the past, “unnecessary apprehension” among NATO members as a result of “premature and hasty action” should be avoided.²⁶⁵

²⁶⁴ “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece,” Feb. 28, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 628.

²⁶⁵ “The Ambassador in Greece to the department of State,” Feb. 26, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 626.

CHAPTER V

CACOPHONY:

THE ROAD TOWARDS A MILITARY ALLIANCE

5.1 Introduction

After the Treaty of Ankara, U.S. policy became more of a determinant in the developments of tripartite military relations in the Balkans. In line with U.S. suggestions, Turkey and Greece maintained their moves remaining on contingent basis until the end of 1953. However, a crisis occurred between Yugoslavia and Italy on Trieste. The Trieste negotiations coincided with the Balkan pact discussions. It was a difficult task for the U.S. Government to harmonize the pace of these talks and seek for solutions which satisfied both parties. On the one hand, Yugoslavia would be associated with the western defense directly; on the other hand the U.S. was a mediator during the Trieste negotiations together with the U.K. In the spring of 1954, Balkan partners had already passed beyond the contingency stage. Marshall Tito played his cards well against the Italians, and he acted as the accelerator of the Balkan pact. Yugoslavia perceived this treaty as an advantage against Italy during the Trieste negotiations. In this period, the U.S. deliberately slowed down the progress in the Balkan Pact and gave priority to the settlement of the Trieste problem. However, in the summer of 1954, there was no way left for a further delay. At this stage, Tito's clever moves played a role in reaching a consensus among the Balkan partners. On August, 1954, the Balkan pact was ready after some last-minute revisions.

This chapter will focus on the major factors from one treaty to the other. It will argue that despite all work done and accomplishments achieved, the treaty itself was a dead letter, but had a symbolic meaning in the Cold-War. The last part of this chapter will consider the reasons why the treaty failed, namely the rise of the Cyprus question and Khrushchev's intervention into the growing alliance in the Balkans.

5.2 One Alliance Born, One Leader Dies

An event in the first months of 1953 seriously affected the course of the Cold War. On March 3, 1953, just a few days after the signing of the Treaty of Ankara, Stalin died. The impact of this incident on the Balkan developments was not felt immediately since Moscow was still dominated by Stalin's team, but "the death of Stalin was the most shattering experience for communists between 1945-1953."²⁶⁶ For the Yugoslavs, Stalin's death did not affect their view of Moscow and maintained their efforts towards a forward alliance. Even, after the signing of the treaty, Ivo Mallet informed that the Yugoslavs were "obviously interested in the possibility of Bulgaria and Albania being included to leave the Russian fold and join the pact so as to make Balkan unity a reality."²⁶⁷ On March 5, Tito left for a visit to England. According to Dedijer, the timing was perfect "not only because of Stalin but because he was going to London with the Pact in our [Yugoslav's] pockets. The Pact was important in case of a possible attack from the East, but also because of Italian appetites in the West."²⁶⁸

²⁶⁶ David Childs, "The Cold War and the 'British Road', 1946-53." *Journal of Contemporary History* 23, No. 4 (Oct., 1988): 551-572.

²⁶⁷ Press: It has been emphasized that Italy is free to join but at present opinion in Yugoslavia is more inclined to welcome the Agreement as a slap in the face for Italy than as a means of further cooperation with her. Mallet to Foreign Office, March 14, 1953, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948*, Vol. 4: 1949-1965, 447.

²⁶⁸ Dedijer, 323.

In the following months, Moscow implemented a peace offensive to restore its relations with other states worsened by Stalin's behavior. Soviet Foreign Ministry internal report to V. M. Molotov, prepared by M. Zimianin dated May 27, 1953, indicated that there was not even a slight change in the Soviet perception of Yugoslavia and its cooperation with the Western states in the aftermath of Stalin's death:

The internal policy of the Tito clique, after breaking with the USSR and peoples' democratic countries, aimed at restoring capitalism in Yugoslavia, at the liquidation of all the democratic accomplishments of the Yugoslav people, and at the fascistization of the state and army personnel. In foreign policy, the efforts of the ruling circles of Yugoslavia aim at broadening economic and political ties with capitalist states, first and foremost with the USA and England. This has made Yugoslavia dependent on them and has drawn it [Yugoslavia] into aggressive blocs organized by the Anglo-American imperialists....²⁶⁹

On the Balkan side, neither Stalin's death nor the dissatisfaction of the signatory parties with the existing treaty influenced the schedule of military talks. The American side was still seeking a way to adjust the maintenance of military talks by using Greece or Turkey, avoiding any linkage between NATO and the Balkan Pact. Just a few weeks after the signing of the Treaty of Ankara, in a conversation between Ambassador McGhee and Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü, McGhee asked whether the Greek side "had different concept of objectives," more specifically "conversations to result in tentative agreement to specific military plans which, after approval by appropriate NATO authorities, might be officially adopted by three governments." Köprülü stated that "certain elements in Greek Government...wanted to go much further in tripartite talks", but he added that "Turks would able insure

²⁶⁹ Also, on 29 April 1953 Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov had received the Yugoslav chargé d'affaires in Moscow, Dragoje Djuric—for the first time since 1948. The meeting lasted merely ten minutes, and only very formal diplomatic niceties were exchanged. Two months later, again at Molotov's initiative, diplomatic relations between the two countries were restored to the ambassadorial level; "About the Situation in Yugoslavia and its Foreign Policy, May 27, 1953," in Andrei Edemskii, "The Turn in Soviet-Yugoslav Relations: 1953-1955," *CWIBB* 10, (March 1998): 138.

Greeks would not go far in talks as actual agreement to military plans”²⁷⁰ since it should be a tripartite negotiation.

On May 25-28, 1953, John Foster Dulles paid a visit to Ankara and Athens and met with senior officials. When he left Ankara, *New York Times* reported that “United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles left for Greece this morning with Mutual Security Director Harold E. Stassen and other members of his party after assuring the Turks the United States favored integration of Yugoslavia into the European defense system”²⁷¹ Actually, the Dulles-Köprülü conversations were very constructive in nature and indicated the zeal of the Turkish side towards the strengthening of the Balkan alliance in line with the U.S. Dulles’ visit can be taken as a sort of control-tour to coordinate allies. Just after Dulles’ visit, on May 30, the Soviet attitude towards Turkey indicated a slight change after years of denouncing its earlier claims against Turkey. However, Turkish reaction was not as friendly as the Soviet move. *Zafer* wrote that “the abandonment of such claims does not constitute a concession on the part of the Soviet government. It can only be interpreted as a return to common sense.”²⁷² In short, the Soviet move was perceived as another Communist trick. In comparison, Yugoslavs accepted the Soviet offer to establish ambassadorial relations in June since the Tito-Stalin split. But this did not mean the reconciliation of friendly relations between the two states.

5.3 Military Talks and Turkish-Greek Competition

The second meeting of the military discussions under the tripartite pact was held in Athens on June 3-12, and established the framework of cooperation. The

²⁷⁰ “The Ambassador in Turkey to the Department of State,” March, 24, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 628.

²⁷¹ “Dulles in Turkey, Asks Yugoslav Tie; He Supports Integration of Belgrade in Europe's Defense,” *New York Times*, May 28, 1953.

²⁷² *Zafer*, June 15, 1953.

Turkish side stated in the initial meeting that the Turkish “government opposed any change” on the summary report of February meetings,²⁷³ and noted that “tripartite military consultations based on hypothesis attack against one would be considered attack against others,” and added that the Turkish government “considered it desirable this hypothesis recorded.” Greek representatives advocated that there was “no reason [to] put this assumption [in] writing.” While the discussions started to go beyond contingent basis and military conversations were proceeding on the assumption of collective defense, Greek refusal was meaningless. According to Ambassador Peurifoy, as a natural consequence of Köprülü’s recommendations to Dulles on the incorporation of Yugoslavia into NATO during his visit in Ankara, and later the Turkish proposal on the attendance of a NATO observer in the tripartite talks, Greeks found themselves “in difficult position in that they believe Turks proceeding at much too fast a pace in direction of developing friendship into firm military alliance.” But, the Greeks had to be in line with Turks because “if they appear cool towards Turkish suggestions, Yugoslavs might question depth of Greek interest.” The Greek side was also suspicious towards Turkey, and the following Greek speculation was, as stated by Peurifoy, “(colored by distrust comparatively aggressive foreign policy Balkans and Middle East)....Turks making plea for Italian support by endeavoring smoke out Yugoslavs with respect their intentions regarding defense areas adjacent Italy.” Greek dissatisfaction expressed in later discussions among the circles as Greek Foreign Office stated “Yugoslav position in closer conformity with realities of delicate NATO political problem than its Turkish position.” On the other hand, on Köprülü’s proposal regarding the participation of

²⁷³ The first meeting outlined the problems in the defense of the common areas; The Turkish Government has decided to exert strong efforts for the earliest possible integration of Yugoslavia into the European defense system. Leading policy-makers here believe quick action is necessary if the growing whispering campaign in the West against President Tito and a general slackening of Europe's rearmament are not to delay indefinitely a military link with Belgrade. *New York Times*, Jun 7, 1953.

NATO observers during these meetings, Yugoslavs responded that Greek-Turkish consultation of NATO was appropriate and there was no need for a NATO commander's presence in these meetings.²⁷⁴ As opposed to some problems, the significance of these meetings was the maintenance of discussions on the collective defense of the Balkan area in case of an attack, which indicated the firm stand of the parties against the Soviet Union when no military alliance existed. On July 4-11, another meeting was held in Athens at the Foreign Ministerial level and establishment of a Permanent Secretariat, which was proposed by the Yugoslavs, was agreed upon. Also, this development was an indicator of the consensus between the Pact members to strengthen the relatively weak pact by non-military means.

While Balkan partners were progressing in discussions, the autumn of 1953 witnessed rising of tensions from Trieste between Yugoslav and Italian troops.²⁷⁵ On October 6, "Eisenhower had approved a compromise plan with the British whereby both countries would agree to remove their troops from Zone A and place the territory under Italian control at the earliest possible date."²⁷⁶ This was unacceptable for the Yugoslavs at that time. Finally, the settlement of dispute near the border was achieved in mid-October, but a permanent solution in Trieste was still far-away since both parties were seeking a solution favorable to themselves. Accordingly, any development towards a military alliance between the Balkan partners, which would strengthen Yugoslavia's position on the international arena, had been perceived

²⁷⁴ "The Ambassador in Greece to the Department of State," June 6, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 631.

²⁷⁵ On August 30 the Italian government had moved troops to the Yugoslavian border, in the area immediately north of the free territory. The Yugoslav government had demanded the removal of these forces, threatening to mobilize its own troops in opposition (*FRUS*, 1952-1954, vol. VIII, 243; Roberto G. Rabel, *Between East and West: Trieste, the United States, and the Cold War, 1941-1954* (Durham, N.C., 1988), 146-47, in Eisenhower, Dwight D. To John Foster Dulles, 30 September 1953. In *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 441. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/441.cfm> (Aug. 6, 2004); *New York Times*, Sept. 5-6, 1953.

²⁷⁶ *Department of State Bulletin* 29, no. 747 (October 19, 1953): 529.

skeptically by the Italians. For instance, the Permanent Secretariat of the Balkan Pact was established by a treaty signed in Belgrade on November 7 and afterwards the Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister paid a visit to Ankara to discuss the Trieste issue.²⁷⁷ Additionally, Oral Sander wrote that Yugoslavia was trying to strengthen its position in the Western defense systems to provide a favorable solution for itself in the settlement of the Trieste problem. He even argued that this intention was the leading factor in Yugoslavia's signing a military alliance with Turkey and Greece in August 1954.²⁷⁸ As it will be seen from the following parts, Yugoslav hurry for signing a treaty proves Sander's assessment.

5.3.1 Full Throttle

From November 10 to 20, 1953, the third meeting of military delegates of the Balkan partners was held in Belgrade, to discuss specific military plans. A tripartite emergency plan of action, submitted by Greek representative, was adopted in this meeting. Based on the working paper, the purpose of the plan was limited to the coordination in the defense of "Yugoslavia area facing Bulgaria, Central and Eastern Greek Macedonia, Greek and Turkish Thrace" against the "invasion Bulgarian forces or Bulgar-Soviet or satellite forces."²⁷⁹ Apart from this, it is seen from Cavendish Cannon's report, the U.S. Ambassador in Greece, to the Department of State that the Greek side maintained bilateral talks with Yugoslavs and informed them of Greek perception. The Greek Foreign Minister listed the Greek views as, "Greece agrees, in principle, that military cooperation should take form of military agreement; this would be incorporated into Ankara Pact and be integral part of it; it would define

²⁷⁷ *Aydın Tarihi* (Nov. 1953): 122-123.

²⁷⁸ Sander, *Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye, 1945-1965*, 107.

²⁷⁹ "The Ambassador in Greece to the Department of State," Nov. 28, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 634-635.

conditions under which military cooperation would be possible.” Cannon also noted that Greeks, Turks and Yugoslavs “have come to believe something along these lines is essential to their national security.” According to him the reason why this time the Greek side took the initiative and needed to formulate a Greek position was “[because the] Greeks found Turkey so far in advance and so impatient [with] coordination, either with Greece or with NATO, that the formulation of a Greek position has become imperative.”²⁸⁰ The summary of evaluation of the acting Secretary of State Smith was not much different from previous views, included the importance of NATO obligations and relations between Italy and the Ankara Pact countries.²⁸¹

In the first months of 1954, rumors about likely Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement were the focus of attention among the tripartite circles.²⁸² On January 31, *New York Times* wrote “the official organ of the Cominform invited Yugoslavia today to ‘restore the ancient bonds’ with Russia.” One day later, a high ranking Yugoslav official stated that “President Marshal Tito's regime had gone so far with its economic and political decentralization that to scrap it would mean a convulsion.”²⁸³ Yugoslavia's position towards Soviet maneuvers was viewed by its partners as if nothing had changed about Yugoslavia. The Greek Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Cannon about “Yugoslavs’ eagerness conclude firm military

²⁸⁰ “The Ambassador in Greece to the Department of State,” Dec. 9, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 637.

²⁸¹ “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece,” Dec. 16, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 638-639.

²⁸² *Yugoslavs Renew Bid on Soviet Tie; Offer to 'Normalize' Relations Includes All of Cominform*: President Tito's Government that talks be held for the reiterated today it was ready to pursue “normalization” of relations with the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia's other former allies in the Cominform. It suggested establishment of rail communications. *New York Times*, Jan 29, 1954; In addition there were challenging news from Belgrade. For instance Despite official denial, some observers here think a policy divergence exists between there were Yugoslavia and her partners in the Balkan pact, Greece and Turkey. *New York Times*, Feb 6, 1954; Yugoslav Communist leaders accused Russia and her satellites today of still seeking to obtain the overthrow of President Tito's regime. *New York Times*, Feb 7, 1954.

²⁸³ *New York Times*, Jan 31, 1954; *New York Times*, Feb 1, 1954.

alliance with Greece proof Tito's good faith." Further, he informed that Yugoslavia "desired mutual assistance agreement to replace present contingent planning" and postponement of this issue would result in Yugoslavs' "cool-off towards whole scheme"²⁸⁴ and Tito's probable rapprochement with the Soviet bloc. According to the State Department, the U.S. perceived the "normalization" of relations between Yugoslavia and the Eastern bloc countries was not a threat, and "US best judgment continues to be that Tito sees balance his interest in continued cooperation with West." The Secretary stressed the solution to the "Trieste situation would permit thorough re-examination of military situation in Balkans without all political repercussions which would result if this problem were prematurely approached."²⁸⁵ Since the Yugoslavs accepted negotiating the Trieste issue, and American, British and Yugoslav representatives maintained their meetings in London from February 2 to May 31.

5.4 U.S. Increases Control and Tito's Maneuvers

While the Greek side was contemplating on the details of the extension of Ankara Pact into an alliance on their own initiative, Tito surprised the Greeks and paid a visit to Ankara on May 12-16.²⁸⁶ When the Yugoslav and Turkish representatives announced the possibility of the transformation of cooperation into a military alliance was decided, the Greek side was "shocked and hurt."²⁸⁷ According

²⁸⁴ "The Ambassador in Greece to the Department of State," Feb. 13, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 640.

²⁸⁵ "The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece," Feb. 16, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 641-642.

²⁸⁶ *Tito Reported to Have Been Told That U. S. Opposes Military Alliance Now*: Turkish leaders were understood to have told Marshal Tito today that a binding military alliance among Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia was out of the question at this time. *New York Times*, Apr. 14, 1954.

²⁸⁷ "The Ambassador in Greece to the Department of State," Apr. 20, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 643; *Greek Envoy in Ankara Angered*: Col. Gen. Koca Popovic, Yugoslav State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, announced here yesterday that Turkey and Yugoslavia had decided during President

to Ambassador Cannon, the Greek reaction included “surprise, anger and embarrassment at what they consider to be Turkish irresponsibility and conjecture regarding US position vis-à-vis Turkey.” The Greek perception was “Greeks not Turks have most at stake in developing effective military cooperation with Yugoslavs” and strongly objected “to inconsiderate action of partners in issuing statement of such importance in bilateral basis.”²⁸⁸ The pact was not the case after all. Greek-Turkish relations prevailed while Tito was watching his future-allies who competed with each other over him.

Cannon described this situation as “Turks have consistently endeavored secure political advantage with Yugoslavs by promoting alliance concept when they knew that Greece, in support US position, was endeavoring postpone action.” Also, the Greeks felt “placed in anomalous position of appearing less friendly to Yugoslavs” as a result of the Turks’ recent move. As previous and later developments had indicated, diplomatic competition prevailed between Turkey and Greece, and both sides tried to develop ties with Yugoslavia much faster than the other. Cannon also noted that this issue did not seriously threaten the Ankara Pact, but a problem occurred in the coordination between U.S., Greek and Turkish policies. Taking into consideration the delay of further developments towards a military alliance for about six months, Cannon suggested to Washington that unless the Trieste issue would be settled by fall, the “necessity of separating question of Ankara Pact military alliance from Italian question” would have to be taken into consideration. He also put forward that “identical representations should be made to all three Ankara Pact nations setting forth frankly Department’s objections to

Marshal Tito's current visit to Ankara to transform their treaty of collaboration with Greece into a binding military alliance. *New York Times*, Apr 16, 1954.

²⁸⁸ “The Ambassador in Greece to the Department of State,” Apr. 20, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 643.

excessive speed in direction of alliance.”²⁸⁹ He also warned of the possible unintended consequences of not taking preventive measures. The Italian government was also aware of the possible advantageous outcomes of a Balkan military alliance for Yugoslavia, and tried every means to blockade it. On May 13, *New York Times* wrote “Italian determination to prevent the formation of a Balkan military alliance was clearly expressed today when Foreign Minister Attilio Piccioni made a report to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber of Deputies.”²⁹⁰

5.4.1 The Question of How to Slow Down the Process

Greek-Turkish competition towards making an alliance became the driving-force of the tripartite negotiations. On May 10, it was reported that the Greeks “felt compelled to ‘match’ the Turk-Yugoslav position on a military alliance during the forthcoming visit of Tito to Greece” and acknowledged that they “no longer felt able to propound the US position on the Balkan Pact.”²⁹¹ On May 17, Dulles instructed démarches on the ground of Yugoslav-Italian relations. He appreciated the developments between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, but linked it openly to the Trieste issue. Based on the record:

US feels constrained to draw attention of Greek (Yugoslav) Government to fact that over-hasty furtherance of this cooperation at this time might well upset the very delicate Trieste negotiations which have now reached most sensitive moment and thus serve to perpetuate a situation which has represented real obstacle to the development of the very relations which the three Balkan nations and the US consider are essential in our common interest and objectives.²⁹²

²⁸⁹ “The Ambassador in Greece to the Department of State,” Apr. 20, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 643; *Ibid.* n. 2.

²⁹⁰ *New York Times*, May 13, 1954.

²⁹¹ “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece,” May 17, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 644, n. 3.

²⁹² *Ibid.* 644.

Most importantly, Tito linked the Trieste settlement and possible Italian membership to the Balkan pact, and this made Italians angrier. “Italian official circles refused to be ruffled by what is considered here to be a trap laid for them by the Yugoslav Government in connection with the Trieste issue.”²⁹³ Dulles’ instructions were in line with these developments, and he was aware of the fact that “while we do not wish to argue the question of whether or not Italian reaction could be permitted to delay the development of cooperative relations between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey...we must all recognize that the Italians will react strongly to any public indication,”²⁹⁴ shortly he expressed the pressure of time to resolve the Trieste problem before the conclusion of the pact.

Since Turkey and Greece were already NATO allies, it should not be difficult to persuade them to postpone the talks or slow it down to calm down Italy; however Yugoslavia, as a party to the Trieste dispute, was also looking for an advantageous position in the Trieste settlement, and the Balkan Pact already presented a trump for the Yugoslavs. Washington-Belgrade correspondence signified the difficult task of U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade, James W. Riddleberger, in this period. Yugoslavs perceived U.S. policy-shift as an attempt to slow-down the Balkan Alliance, while the Secretary of State had tried to assure the Yugoslav representatives of their “misunderstandings” and “misperceptions”²⁹⁵ on the nature of American thinking and motives. In Belgrade, the necessity of *démarche* was questioned by the Yugoslav Foreign Secretary, that the “Yugoslav government cannot recognize as valid US argument re formalization of alliances as the timing could not be based upon an irresponsible attitude by Italian government.” He asserted that Trieste and Balkan

²⁹³ New York Times, May 11, 1954

²⁹⁴ “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece,” May 17, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 645; *Ibid.* 645, n. 4.

²⁹⁵ “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia,” May 24, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 646.

alliance were independent of each other; and he continued criticizing Italian behavior. More clearly, Riddleberger perceived the Yugoslav approach to the *démarche* positively and reported to the Department of State that , “if as now appears probable US-UK-Yugoslavia agreement on Trieste is concluded in next few days, perhaps we can influence developments re Balkan pact in less heated atmosphere.”²⁹⁶

On May 27, U.S. Embassies in Greece and Turkey were instructed “discreetly to emphasize the desire of United States that any new military pacts entered into by those countries be submitted to the North Atlantic Council.”²⁹⁷ On May 29, Embassies in Greece and Turkey were instructed again “to request the governments of these countries to cease publicly placing the entire responsibility for the Trieste impact of Italians.”²⁹⁸ These precautions were necessary before Marshall Tito’s visit to Athens. Ambassador Cannon informed Washington that “we shall be lucky if public oratory can be kept reasonably close to level set by Ankara visit some weeks ago.” In this regard, the text of communiqué, “which should satisfy everyone,” was written in French text and “it would state alliance project determined on but details would be ‘etabli’ by meetings of Foreign Ministers,” without giving any detail about date for meeting and signature.²⁹⁹ The text was just like it was intended to be, but it was much harder to control speeches than making corrections on paper. Based on the information provided by Ivo Mallet “the official communiqué issued in Athens on June 5 announced that agreement had been reached between the Yugoslav Delegation and the Greek Government on the desirability of transforming the Balkan pact into an Alliance,” and added that, “it was agreed that a Balkan Consultative

²⁹⁶ “The Ambassador in Yugoslavia to the Department of State,” May 24, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 648-649.

²⁹⁷ “The Ambassador in Greece to the Department of State,” June 3, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 650, n. 3.

²⁹⁸ “The Ambassador in Greece to the Department of State,” June 3, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 650, n. 5.

²⁹⁹ “The Ambassador in Greece to the Department of State,” June 3, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 650.

Assembly should be established.”³⁰⁰ To the contrary, after Tito’s visit, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister stated that:

The Alliance, which would be concluded at the meeting in the first half of July, was to be formed on a broad basis between completely equal countries and that it was made necessary by the continued, although reduced danger of aggression from the East...Conclusion of this alliance was in no way related to the settlement of the Trieste problem and criticized the Italians for trying to link the two questions.

In comparison, when the Turkish Prime Minister Menderes visited Washington in the first week of June and brought the latest situation in the Balkan discussions to Eisenhower, he pointed out that “it would be a very fine thing for the safety of the region if Yugoslavia could be included in NATO” but also acknowledged that “under [the] present conditions such a development is impossible” and he volunteered to “do all he could do to promote a peaceful solution of Trieste.”³⁰¹ The first week of June was the beginning of American, British and Italian talks in London when the initial Italian reaction was cautiously optimistic about the issue.

5.4.2 Big Brothers and the Text of the New Treaty

On June 11, Balkan Alliance Working Group, composed of British, French and American representatives, met in London to discuss the process of realization of the Balkan alliance. The basic issues, again, revolved around the link between the alliance and its timing. In the first meeting, consensus was achieved on following points:

1. North Atlantic Treaty does not contain any absolute prohibition military alliance between NATO and non-NATO country.

³⁰⁰ *New York Times*, Jun 6, 1954; Ivo Mallet to Foreign Office, June 19, 1954, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948*, Vol. 4: 1949-1965, 554-555.

³⁰¹ Eisenhower, Dwight D. Confidential To John Foster Dulles, 4 June 1954. In *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 913. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

<http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/913.cfm>
(May 6, 2005)

2. NAT does not give NATO member right of veto such an alliance negotiated by other member.
3. Greek-Turk-Yugoslav military alliance inevitable and not likely be delayed indefinitely.
4. Balkan Alliance could, depending upon terms, have direct effect extending NATO commitments.
5. Development alliance terms should be closely followed with a view to corrective action in event of (a) any possible conflict with NAT and (b) any possible imbalance especially relative to NATO implications.³⁰²

The second meeting was held on June 17, and the discussions began on the limits of the geographical area alliance would cover and possible consequences. The British and French representatives pointed out their approach to a link with the Balkan Alliance and NATO. According to them, “the objective would be to coordinate military arrangements of Balkan partners with those of NATO and ensure that Yugoslav participation commensurate with benefits.” As parties were aware of the fact that this move would mean the integration of Balkan plans with those of SACEUR and it would happen probably through SACEUR. Thus, the necessity of a mediating organ, a committee or staff, was stressed. But, they did not mention any exact procedure about the timing.³⁰³

On the third meeting, on June 18, discussions began on the timing of approach to Greeks and Turks about the views of US/UK/France on the process of Balkan alliance. French representatives proposed that “Greeks and Turks should be informed that West’s ultimate objective is integration of Yugoslavia into western defense structure.” U.S. and the British representatives agreed on such a statement would go further than expected at that time. It was agreed that drafting of a “text of possible statement for use if it should be decided to make representations to Greeks and/or Turks.” Based on the record, it would include:

³⁰² “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom,” June 14, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 652-654.

³⁰³ “The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the department of State,” June 17, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 655.

...general reassurance that development of Balkan military alliance is welcomed by US/UK/France as step toward closer political and military association of Yugoslavia with West, reminder that it must be carefully and properly presented to NATO partners for consultation, explanation that US/UK/France wish to assure satisfactory handling with NATO, and, to this end, general questions or suggestions on points which are of concern to US.³⁰⁴

At about the same time, the Commissions of Balkan partners started to work out an agreed draft of the proposed Balkan Alliance. On June 28, a committee of Yugoslav, Greek and Turkish representatives met in Athens to draft this alliance.³⁰⁵ Secretary Dulles had concerns about the timing of this meeting. According to him the possibility of the conclusion of this meeting with full agreement on final text before July 5, and accordingly presentation to the NAC prior to the Belgrade meeting of Yugoslav, Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers in Belgrade between July 12 and 18 would create a great problem. "This would mean NAC discussion would occur at most sensitive times of Trieste negotiations, compelling Italy take unfavorable position on Balkan Alliance." This timing would badly effect the Trieste issue and create problems among the NATO members and Italy. Italy's stand was suspicious towards these developments. Rome perceived the coincidence of these discussions negatively, and even confidentially asked for harmonizing timing of Athens and Belgrade meetings with Trieste negotiations and for U.S. and UK support in this case.³⁰⁶ However, Dulles pursued a strategy of no comment on the Balkan alliance, namely not to undertake *démarches*, until the draft agreements became available. The tripartite Balkan committee concluded their work on July 5, and reached full

³⁰⁴ "The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the department of State," June 18, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 657.

³⁰⁵ *Ayin Tarihi*, (July, 1954).

³⁰⁶ "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece," July 2, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 660.

agreement on the text.³⁰⁷ This text was to form a basis for discussions between the Foreign Ministers of the three countries at a meeting to be held at Bled later in the month, in the course of which it was expected that the Treaty of Alliance would be signed. It was announced on July 8, and confirmed in Belgrade the next day, that the signature would take place on July 21.³⁰⁸

5.5 Happy End: Dulles' Scheduling and the Balkan Pact

On July 8, after the draft military treaty was concluded, Secretary Dulles was ready to implement a clearer strategy towards the alliance. In his telegram to the U.S. Embassy in the United Kingdom, he repeated that the Balkan alliance should not be in conflict with NATO, but support possible goals of Western solidarity. He stressed the appropriate drafting of the text would be welcome by NATO members. The main criticisms of the draft were on the “automatic” nature of the pact, which was perceived as going beyond the North Atlantic Treaty, would give greatest trouble to NATO members and “would tend to create impression in Soviet mind of division on Balkan Alliance and would present cause of friction within NATO;” and on the references to the U.N. Charter. These criticisms also stated that while there were still technical problems and unresolved issues between the signatories, presentation to NAC was “premature and prejudicial.” Dulles added that “US UK and French support for an alliance could be given if these problems resolved on expert level,” and maintained that “this may upset time table of signing treaty at Ministers meeting on July 20” but had to be done.³⁰⁹

³⁰⁷ Ivo Mallet to Foreign Office, July 17, 1954, Jarman, Robert L. ed., *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1949-1965*, Vol. 3:1938-1948, 559.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom,” July 8, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 661-662.

On the same day, Dulles instructed unilateral U.S. démarche to Ambassador Riddleberger of Yugoslavia. Apart from the substance of the proposed alliance, he once again stated the Italo-Yugoslav problem. He put more emphasis on the solution of the Trieste problem than the conclusion of the Pact, and most importantly he commented that “Trieste solution is just first step which must pave way for creation of necessary interrelationships between the Alliance, US, UK, French –Yugoslav military planning, Italian-Yugoslav planning, possible Italo-Yugoslav treaty relation...” while adding that there was no “clear-vision of how these relationships should develop.” At the end of his telegram, Dulles instructed Riddleberger how to detain Tito:

Ambassador can, by speaking of broad issues rather than directing himself to factual or drafting points in the text of the Alliance itself, accomplish...persuading Tito that we are not in fact trying to booby-trap him but are really concerned at the overall effectiveness of the regional arrangement we all wish to see created.³¹⁰

On July 14, while Ankara requested a delay in the signing of treaty and assured the U.S. representatives that they “would do all they could do to make consistent the articles of the alliance with those of the North Atlantic Pact,”³¹¹ The U.S. Embassy in Belgrade reported that “the Yugoslavs were bitter about the delay in signing the military pact and that they attributed this delay to U.S. pressure,”³¹² On July 15, a brief communiqué was issued in all three capitals announcing that the Foreign Ministers’ meeting would be postponed, as preparations for it could not be completed on time. The Yugoslav press hinted that “non-Balkan influences are responsible for this postponement and several suspicious and irritated, if vaguely worded, editorials have been published, suggesting that the delay is due to attempts to link the signing

³¹⁰ “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia,” July 8, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 665.

³¹¹ *Ibid.* n. 2.

³¹² “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece,” July 8, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 665, n. 3.

of the Alliance with the settlement of the Trieste dispute.”³¹³ In comparison, the Greek side was ambiguous; U.S. officials in Greece reported that “the Greeks were much more pessimistic about the chances for the early conclusion of a military pact than were the Turks.”³¹⁴ Secretary Dulles maintained a wait-and-see approach in these circumstances and instructed that when they saw the final draft they would support it before NATO and with Italians, but also added that “we hope Greek, Turk, Yugoslav negotiations on revised text will be terminated expeditiously in order to allow presentation to NAC a suitable period prior to Ministerial meeting and signature which we now understand scheduled for July 30.” Dulles, also instructed the Foreign Service to “suggest US representatives Athens and Ankara seek occasion express our appreciation that the Greeks and Turks accepted our observations in the spirit that they were intended, and that they successfully undertook the difficult task of bringing the Yugoslavs around to an acceptable position.” His instruction to Yugoslavia was different and included that “Greeks and Turks would now appear to be on the threshold of agreement on text which can meet NATO problem.”³¹⁵ This was called delaying, not postponing.

In particular, Turkish request for a delay about the signing of the treaty caused indignant behavior on the Yugoslav side, but was welcomed in Washington. The U.S. Ambassador in Ankara, Avra M. Warren, informed Washington that “unlike their partners Turks have shown themselves willing, largely on basis of our influence” in the timing and conclusion of the pact. For the Turks and Greeks,

³¹³ Yugoslav commentators suggested that Italy might join the Balkan Alliance as a founding member. Yugoslavia could only agree to Italy’s joining the alliance if there was evidence of fundamental change in Italian policy towards Yugoslavia; reluctant acceptance of a provisional agreement on Trieste was not enough. Returning to this point on July 16 the official spokesmen characterized such schemings as irresponsible and frivolous. He was glad to see that the Italian Government seemed to be of the same opinion. Ivo Mallet to Foreign Office, July 17, 1954, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed., *Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1949-1965*, Vol. 3:1938-1948, 559.

³¹⁴ “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece,” July 8, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 666, n. 4.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.* 666.

coordinating their policies with each other was much easier than coordinating their moves based on U.S. suggestions. As an appraisal, the major problem between Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece was not the lack of consensus among matters related to the Pact, but lack of coordination and timing as opposed to a series of meetings between each other and the U.S. For instance, as Warren reported, Italian entrance into the pact was a matter of discussions and “Balkan partners decided as long as Brione meeting Italy must be brought into pact at earliest.” While Americans had a different schedule for the pact and synchronized negotiations with the Trieste discussions, and while Yugoslavs were trying to sign an alliance as soon as possible, it was a difficult task to harmonize three Balkan states’ initiatives. Accordingly, “Turks have in fact proposed nothing to Greeks and Yugoslavs due to failure Italian Government to realize and grasp opportunity discussed with their Ambassador”³¹⁶ in Ankara. When Italians failed to respond, Turks informed their partners of these talks. On July 17, Washington instructed the Embassy in Rome to “encourage the Italians to negotiate directly with the Balkan pact parties”³¹⁷ to avoid U.S. appearance as the agent of the Italian government. Warren’s overall assessment of the situation in the Balkans was “Italian vacillations, Greek impetuosity, and Yugoslav suspiciousness have already cost the West a chance for a major victory in the Cold War.”³¹⁸

While there was a rumpus among the Balkan partners, Italians were contemplating on both Trieste and joining the alliance. The U.S. Chargé in Italy informed that Italians were not too worried about Trieste since “they had not expected Yugoslavia to cheer about their counterproposals as Italians had not

³¹⁶ “The Ambassador in Turkey to the Department of State,” July 16, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 657.

³¹⁷ “The Charge in Italy to the Department of State,” July 17, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 667, n. 2.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.* 667.

cheered about Yugoslav proposals.”³¹⁹ Americans tried to assure Italians that resolution of the Trieste issue would provide them a freer hand in many matters including joining the pact and in Yugoslav-Italian relations. However, on July 22 and 27, it was reported that “the Italians were prepared to accept the Balkan military agreement so long as provisions were made for the coordination of planning between NATO and the parties to the agreement.”³²⁰ On July 27, the draft text of the new treaty was ready and it was more consistent with the NAT. Decisions of U.S. British, and French decisions on representatives to the NAC to make independent statements at the meeting of July 29 became clear. British and French representatives had been “instructed to point out the difficulties of coordinating political decisions between the use of NATO and Balkan pact military forces.”³²¹ On the same day, it was reported that “the Turks were prepared at the NAC meeting to emphasize the necessity of political coordination between NATO and the Balkan Pact,”³²² and a Turkish communication to the NAC was transmitted “distinguishing sharply between collaboration of the Balkan pact with NATO and the inclusion of Yugoslavia into NATO.”³²³

Consequently the Balkan issue was brought to the NAC. The Greeks maintained their emphasis on the Yugoslav attachment to the West and the importance of Yugoslavia to the West, and also added that “alliance committed Yugoslavia to be on our side if attack made on other NATO power without formal commitment to Yugoslavia by NATO.” The Turkish side pointed out the necessity on taking “further steps for complete integration between Balkan alliance and NATO

³¹⁹ Ibid. 669.

³²⁰ “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom,” July 28, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 670, n. 4.

³²¹ Ibid. n. 2.

³²² Ibid. n. 3.

³²³ Ibid. n. 5.

of legal and organic character similar to that established between EDC and NATO by special protocol and arrangements for joint sessions.” Also, the Turks added Italy’ as a partner to the Ankara pact, and military alliance. According to the report by U.S. Permanent representative on the North Atlantic Council, Hughes, to the Department of State, although the Trieste issue was not settled yet, Italy stopped acting as an obstacle and “emphasized importance alliance to her in view her Yugoslav border and geographical location in relation other alliance partners.”³²⁴ After a period of cacophony, collective defense in the Balkans was formally achieved by this treaty. On August 9, 1954, Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the Turkish Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was signed, covering a 20 years period of time.³²⁵ According to the Article II of the treaty:

The Contracting Parties agree that any armed aggression against one or more of them in any part of their territories shall be considered an aggression against all the Contracting Parties, who, consequently, in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, shall jointly and severally go to the assistance of the Party or Parties attacked by taking immediately and by common accord any measures, including the use of armed force, which they deem necessary for effective defense.

This article openly established the frame of collective defense between the signatories. On the other hand, Article X made a reference to the NATO membership of Turkey and Greece. According to this article, “The provisions of the present Treaty do not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of Greece and Turkey resulting from the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949.” This simple clause drew the limits of this treaty by taking into

³²⁴ “The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council to the Department of State,” July 29, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 672.

³²⁵ Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Between the Turkish Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, August 9, 1954.

<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/formulti/eu002.htm>

consideration priority of NATO memberships of two signatories. During the NATO meeting, this article brought an end to the discussions about the Pact. In case of an aggression, NATO obligations would override the Treaty of Bled. However, in other circumstance, Yugoslavia was indirectly bound to NATO defense.

5.6 Surprising Developments in the Cold War and the Balkans.

In the summer of 1954, two independent developments affected the course of the Cold War and the relations between the signatory states of the Balkan Pact. First, the Tito-Khrushchev correspondence which began during the negotiations. Second, the rise of Cyprus issue between Greece and Turkey just after the signing of the treaty. Tito-Khrushchev correspondence can be examined in the Soviet strategy on restoring relations with other states which were broken during Stalin era. The timing of these letters indicates that the Soviet Union tried to prevent Yugoslavia's forward attachment with the West. However, the Cyprus issue was completely independent from the Cold War relations. It has been an unresolved conflict in Greek-Turkish relations.

5.6.1 Tito- Khrushchev Correspondence

In June 1954, while Dulles was trying to postpone the Balkan developments a new factor came into play, and this was Khrushchev himself. On June 22, he wrote a letter to Tito and the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. This letter was the first highest level contact from the Soviet Union since 1948. He openly indicated his desire to establish friendly relations with Yugoslavia and emphasized the change in Soviet view of Yugoslavia since 1948:

From our side, we deem regrettable the circumstance that at the time, both sides did not use all available opportunities in an effort to regulate

all contentious issues and grievances that emerged in 1948, all the more so as some facts, which were the immediate causes for the break between the CC CPSU and the CC CPY, now look different.³²⁶

Remembering the experience of 1948 and taking into account the ongoing progress towards the Balkan pact and Trieste solution, Tito had to be cautious about this Soviet offer. Also, the letter was from Khrushchev himself, not an official letter from the CPSU. According to Svetozar Rajak, Edvard Kardelj informed “Khrushchev in mid-July via the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade that Yugoslavia had received the initiative favorably, but was in no position to respond for the time being.”³²⁷ Khrushchev’s initiative followed by a letter (Cable) from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to Tito and the Central Committee of the League Of Communists Of Yugoslavia on July 24. As Rajak pointed out, the timing coincided with the closing discussions regarding the Balkan pact. Actually, before the postponements of the Foreign Ministerial Meeting of the Balkan partners, the meeting would be held in mid-July. In the second communication, CPSU displayed its understanding of the importance of the recent situation for Yugoslavia:

The CC CPSU is aware of the great importance of the question of Trieste to Yugoslavia. We too consider it propitious that it be resolved in accordance with justified interests of Yugoslavia. Should, for Yugoslavia, there exist a possibility of a resolution of this question in the nearest future then it is perfectly obvious and understandable to us that it must not be encumbered by premature publication of our negotiations.³²⁸

Two days after the signing of treaty, on August 11, Tito responded and sent his first letter to Khrushchev and Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev’s timing was determined by the further alignment of

³²⁶ Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to Josip Broz Tito and the Central Committee of the League of Communists Of Yugoslavia, June 22, 1954, in *CWTHB* 12/13, (Fall/Winter 2001): 319-320.

³²⁷ Svetozar Rajak, “Tito-Khrushchev Correspondence, 1954,” Ibid. 316.

³²⁸ Letter (Cable) from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to Tito and Central Committee of the League Of Communists Of Yugoslavia, July 24, 1954, in Ibid. 320.

Yugoslavia with the West, and as pointed before by the U.S. Ambassador McGhee NATO membership of Yugoslavia would be perceived as the next step when Yugoslavia joined in a collective defense alliance binding itself to the Western defense system. In comparison, Tito's timing was driven with the ongoing Balkan treaty negotiations, and this letter of him just after the signing of the treaty proved his real attitude to his new alliance, since the aggressor defined in the text of the treaty referred to the Soviet Union and the satellites. He agreed on the normalization of relations and emphasized his feelings towards the world socialist movement:

With regard to contacts between the CC of the Communist Party of Soviet Union and the CC of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, in principle we are not against them. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia never rejects cooperation with any organizations and movement that wish to fight for peace in the world and cooperation among nations, in particular not with socialist movements and parties. However, before some progress in normalization of government relations is achieved, the meeting you are suggesting, would not prove efficient in eliminating everything that instigates material and political damage to both countries.³²⁹

The Tito-Khrushchev letters prove that the Balkan Pact lost its significance on the day it was signed. While Tito emphasized the necessity of gradual progress towards normalization, both parties agreed on the restoration of relations. As Rajak pointed out, "this initial exchange between Tito and Khrushchev set the pace and the character of normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations: The process of normalization would be gradual and confined to improvement of government relations."³³⁰ In contrast, as seen before, Yugoslavs were more provocative in their speeches during the last stages of the Balkan pact negotiations, especially against U.S. moves towards the postponement of the signing of the treaty. The timing of the Tito-Khrushchev correspondence benefited Tito in strengthening his stand during

³²⁹ First Letter from Tito and the Executive Committee [Politburo] of the CC LCY to Nikita Khrushchev and Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Aug. 11, 1954, in Ibid. 320.

³³⁰ Svetozar Rajak, "Tito-Khrushchev Correspondence," 1954," Ibid. 318.

this period. On this matter, Rajak concluded that “Khrushchev’s offer for Yugoslav-Soviet normalization helped to solidify Yugoslavia’s position in the closing stages of the Balkan Pact negotiations.”³³¹

From a more general perspective, these letters were written long before Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade on May 26, 1955, and the Joint Soviet-Yugoslav declaration on June 2, which were taken as significant mile-stones in the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and also marked the beginning of another phase in the history of the Cold War. Therefore these letters were the first step in the process of Khrushchev’s Belgrade visit. In addition, the summer of 1954, provided Yugoslavia an environment to develop relations with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. simultaneously and a maneuvering space in the Cold War, which was to become the non-aligned movement worldwide.

5.6.2 The Cyprus Issue

Geographically Cyprus is not located in the Balkans, but as a result of its importance for Greece and Turkey it cannot be separated from Balkan politics. Given the historical background, Cyprus has been mainly populated with Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and it had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire from 1571 to the change of administration to the British in 1878. As dealt in Chapter I, Megale Idea was the driving force in Greek invasion of Asia-Minor during World War I. The vision of a Hellenic world included the attachment of this island to the Greek homeland, namely Enosis. The Greek Enosis campaign became clear after the annexation of Cyprus by the British in 1914. Since Cyprus was under British rule, the issue did not seriously affect the relations between Turkey and Greece in the

³³¹ Ibid.

interwar period, but Greek intentions about Megale Idea never disappeared. As noted by Ioannis Stefanidis, “on the eve of [the] World War II, young pupils were instructed that they, contemporary Greeks, ‘could never forget the glory and grandeur of the Greek Empire and do not cease to believe that one day the dreams of the race will be fulfillment, namely, what is usually called Megale Idea’.”³³² In the aftermath of the war, enosis demands of Greece continued, for instance on April 28, 1947, the Greek Parliament resolved on the unification of Greece and Cyprus, but these demands were rejected since Cyprus was one of the last assets of the UK in the eastern Mediterranean and consequently its strategic importance increased as a result of the Cold War.³³³ The first important sign of Enosis came from Cyprus in late 1949 by the Progressive Party of Working People of Cyprus, AKEL, brought the issue to the United Nations and accelerated efforts towards an Enosis plebiscite. On January 15, 1950, the Enosis plebiscite was held under the monopoly of Church committees, under Archbishop Makarios. On the extent of Greek nationalism during this period Stavrinides wrote that:

³³² Anastasios Lazarou, *Greek History*, Organizing for School Books Publication, Athens, 1940; quoted in Ioannis D. Stefanidis, “Pressure Groups and Greek Foreign Policy, 1945-67,” *The Hellenic Observatory*, The European Institute, London School of Economics & Political Science, Discussion Paper No. 6 (Dec. 2001): 13

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/StefanidisDiscussionPaper6.pdf> (July 20, 2005); Recently: The name of Cyprus has always been associated with Greek mythology (particularly as the birthplace of the goddess Aphrodite) and history. The Greek Achaeans established themselves on Cyprus around 1400 B.C. The island was an integral part of the Homeric world and, indeed, the word "Cyprus" was used by Homer himself. Ever since, Cyprus has gone through the same major historical phases as the rest of the Greek world (city-states led by rulers like Evagoras, who played an important role in Greek history, participation in the campaigns of Alexander the Great, Hellenistic period under his successors, Roman conquest, Byzantine Empire). After the decline of the Byzantine Empire, the island, like the rest of Greece, came under foreign conquerors, notably the [Frankish] Crusaders in 1191 and the Turks in 1571. Throughout history, however, the island's character remained essentially Greek, since neither the disadvantage of its geographical position (distance from mainland Greece), nor the incessant raids and occupations, nor the introduction of foreign languages, religions and civilizations it underwent for centuries on end, were able to alter the religion, the culture, the language and the Greek consciousness of the great majority of its people. Cyprus, Geographical and Historical Background, Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/cyprus/background.html (Aug. 15, 2005)

³³³ Oran, 596.

It is not easy to draw any definite conclusions from this event since the population was persistently urged by the nationalists to vote and the voting took the form of signing one's name under a petition in public. If a Greek was to vote on this issue at all it was as embarrassing and risky for him to vote against Enosis as to declare in public that he was not a 'True Greek'.³³⁴

For the Greek Administrations, it was a difficult period because any problem rising from Cyprus would affect its relatively smooth relations with Turkey, the UK, the U.S., and accordingly the NATO alliance. It was the same for Turkey, even in January 1950, Turkish Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak commented in the National Assembly that, “There is no such question called the Cyprus question, because Cyprus today is under the sovereignty and rule of the British and we are sure that Britain has no intention to hand over the island to any other state.”³³⁵ Actually, the Turkish Administration associated its foreign policy with NATO and preferred regarding Cyprus as a British problem. Turkey’s maintenance of a moderate policy towards Cyprus was not passivism, instead it was to prioritize its foreign policy matters. In addition, Greece had tried to achieve a satisfactory solution regarding Cyprus in its bilateral relations with the British, but could not.

However, on August 16, 1954, the Cyprus question was internationalized by the initiative of Greek Prime Minister Alexander Papagos when he brought the issue to the U.N. General Secretary³³⁶ requesting the application of the principle of self-determination to the people of Cyprus; only ten days after the signing of the treaty. The Greek Government’s move can be regarded as the beginning of decades-long Cyprus conflict between Turkey and Greece. When the Greek application was

³³⁴ Zenon Stavrinides, *The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood* (Wakefield, England: the author, 1976), 28.

³³⁵ *Ayin Tarihi* (Jan. 1950)

³³⁶ Greeks in U.N. Ask Cyprus Plebiscite; Want Island to Decide Issue of Union With Mainland -- British to Oppose Bid Greeks in U. N. Ask Plebiscite In Cyprus on the Union Issue. *New York Times*, Aug. 20, 1954.

rejected in December 1954,³³⁷ Athens switched to other means to achieve Enosis: EOKA terror -National Organization of Cyprus Fighters- started on April 1, 1955, and took many lives from both sides.³³⁸

5.7 Conclusion

When the treaty was entered into force on May 21, 1955; ratified by Yugoslavia on February 25, 1955, by Greece on April 30, 1955, and by Turkey on May 21, 1955; it was already a paper-pact. Overall, while the road to the Balkan Pact was influenced by several factors such as the Trieste negotiations, the impact of the Cyprus issue was felt immediately on the Balkan alliance. The final solution regarding Trieste was achieved in October 1954; Zones of Free Territory of Trieste were partitioned between Yugoslavia and Italy with very minor border changes. While the American side was extremely satisfied with the end of the Trieste problem, they faced another conflict in Cyprus which would affect the solidarity of the North Atlantic Alliance.

On the other hand, while the Trieste settlement was almost achieved, on September 23, Khrushchev wrote another letter to Tito emphasizing “the cause of the Soviet and Yugoslav peoples coming together is moving forward because thus demand the interests of both countries and interests of peace and socialism.”³³⁹ A Soviet report prepared by the Head of the IV European Sector of the Foreign Ministry Zimianin dated Oct. 21, 1954, concluded that “The Soviet Union's policy on Yugoslavia has produced serious positive results, has increased the influence of the

³³⁷ Ümit Haluk Bayülken, *Cyprus question and the United Nations* (Lefkoşa: Cyprus Research & Publishing C.: 1975)

³³⁸ William Mallinson, *Cyprus: a Modern History* (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005): 21-42.

³³⁹ Third Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to Tito and the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Sept. 23, 1954, in *CWIIHB* 12/13, (Fall/Winter 2001): 321.

USSR among the peoples of Yugoslavia, has helped explode the aggressive, anti-Soviet plans of the USA in the Balkans.”³⁴⁰ Eight months later, Khrushchev would be in Belgrade cheering with the Yugoslav leader. In turn, Tito was in a position to benefit from the Cold War opposition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and traveled his own path in the Cold War.

³⁴⁰ “On Recent Yugoslav Foreign Policy (second half of 1954), Oct. 21, 1954,” in Andrei Edemskii, “The Turn in Soviet-Yugoslav Relations: 1953-1955,” *CWIIHB* 10, (March 1998): 138.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The early years of the Cold War have always been a very fruitful period for historical studies and research. When the Cold War is studied in parallel with the Balkan history and relations, this combination provides very rich knowledge for the historian. The Cold War was felt in the Balkans before many parts of the world, and the early years after World War II witnessed crisis in this region caused by the Cold War policies of both sides and the inherent problems in the region. The plans for a Balkan federation and the end of the Balkan Pact verifies the continuity of historical tendencies and problems in the Cold War environment.

The first half of the twentieth century, witnessed bloodshed and series of wars in this part of the world. The gradual withdrawal of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires from the region had brought new states into play and caused continuing territorial disputes. In the end of the Great War the Balkan territorial picture was finalized with treaties, but post-war settlement could not bring an end to ethnicity and border disputes. Coupled with continued romantic expansionist feelings, the dissatisfaction of some states marked the line of status quo during the interwar years. The rise of the Nazi regime in Germany and Mussolini's expansionist tendencies increased the feeling of insecurity in the Balkans. The alliances made during this period were targeted against both inside and outside powers. Although it was a weak sort of cooperation, the Balkan Entente of 1934 was a significant alliance because it was the indicator of possible further cooperation in the Balkans. When the World

War II broke out, the Balkans fell in turmoil again. During the war, the dissatisfied belligerents of the Great War invaded their neighbors to fulfill century-long desires.

The end of the wars saw winners and losers. However, although the war ended in the battlefields, it continued between the wartime allies on the post-war settlement in other areas. A non-continental power, the U.S., was having a say in Europe. In this post-war world, the Balkan states had to take sides because of their adjacency with one of the winning powers, the Soviet Union. In addition, Yugoslavia was the only country which has no debt to the Soviet Union in its liberation. Its position was obscure during the war, even Churchill and Stalin agreed on the 50:50 deal. Marshall Tito chose Stalin's way and Yugoslavia became the leading representative of Soviet interests in the Balkans. It was perceived by the western governments as the most loyal state of Moscow.

Yugoslavia occupied a privileged state in its relations with the Soviet Union. However, Tito over-exaggerated his status in this relation. During the war, Yugoslavia, together with Bulgaria, indicated their own desires regarding the future of their states and the region. The solution of ethnicity disputes between the two states would be resolved by the merging of Macedonian parts of the two, then the establishment of a federation, and the final solution would be the annexation of northern Greece. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, together with Albania, supported the ongoing civil war in Greece to achieve this end. In the name of expanding Soviet influence in the Balkans, Stalin himself supported the intentions of these Balkan states. On the other hand, Tito's vision of a Balkan federation was simply the expansion of Yugoslav control on the other states under the label of a federation. Beginning with 1946, the divergence of opinions between Tito and Stalin started to become clear. Stalin was playing a greater game of the Cold War and had to be

careful about the moves of his satellite states, but Tito was expecting concessions on the federation subject. However, Tito maintained his path towards the materialization of his plans of a Balkan federation, or Greater Yugoslavia.

In 1947, the U.S. intervened in Yugoslavia's plans with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Aid. U.S. interference had brought a new dimension into the Cold War in the Balkans, but its meaning could not be perceived by Tito. Stalin's responses to the American move was the further strengthening of his power among the satellites and try to expand his influence by establishing the Cominform. In the beginning of 1948 Stalin openly criticized, even warned, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania of their independent moves from Moscow. Especially, these criticisms touched Yugoslavia more than others. Consequently, Yugoslavia was kicked out of the Cominform in mid-June 1948 after a series of provocative letters from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the middle of a Cold War crisis in Berlin. This incident surprised not only Yugoslavs but also the Western world. A piece of the supposed monolith was removed without any effort. In the regional politics, this was officially the end of the plans for a Balkan federation, and non-fulfillment of Yugoslav desires.

U.S. policy makers immediately perceived the Tito-Stalin split as the first sign of the possibility of getting over the Communist camp. The main line of the policy towards Yugoslavia was the support of Tito and the preservation of Yugoslavia's situation as an outcast. In a year, increasing burdens of Soviet and satellite propaganda, economic blockade and the threat of the military invasion of Yugoslavia led Tito to change his direction towards the West, specifically the U.S. This transfer in the Cold War was followed by enormous amounts of military and economic aid pouring into Yugoslavia until mid-1955. Yugoslavia's privileged status

now continued in its relations with the U.S. The American support of Yugoslavia was given without any reciprocal political and military obligations, except some concessions made by Yugoslavia such as the end of Yugoslav support in the Greek Civil War.

With the establishment of NATO, the form of the Cold War reached another dimension. The formation of a military defense organization, the ongoing military threat against Yugoslavia since 1948 and accordingly the containment policy of the U.S. necessitated the association of Yugoslavia in the western defense structure. Therefore, the plans for Yugoslav tying with the western defense initiated during the Truman administration. The reorientation of Yugoslavia had already begun by developing relations with non-Cominform countries. However, its relations with southern neighbors, Greece and Turkey, developed at a much faster pace. With the membership of Turkey and Greece in NATO, Yugoslavia's neighbors became the part of NATO's southern flank, and Yugoslavia became the hole in this flank.

U.S. policy towards the association of Yugoslavia developed gradually and aimed at the creation of this tie by the establishment of some sort of cooperation between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. The problem was, there was no opportunity for a further step as a result of internal NATO relations and political obstacles in the U.S. itself. In 1952, the increasing tensions between Italy and Yugoslavia on the Free Territory of Trieste made Yugoslavia seek a greater tie with the West which would aid its stand in international relations. In order to avoid premature and hasty action which would cause problems among the NATO members, the newly elected Eisenhower Administration pursued limiting the scope of the treaty between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. The suggested line was the maintenance of relations while discussing political and military matters separately. The Treaty of Friendship and

Cooperation - The Treaty of Ankara – between Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece was signed on February 28, 1953.

The signing of this treaty coincided with the death of Stalin. New Soviet administration applied a policy of restoration of relations with other states broken by Stalin. The first targets of this policy were Yugoslavia and Turkey. Both states maintained improving their ties with the U.S. In late 1953, the problem in Trieste reached its peak, and the necessity of a permanent solution of the problem became clear. In the spring of 1954, Trieste negotiations began between Yugoslavia, U.S. and the U.K. At the same time, military talks between the Balkan partners reached its highest level, and the necessity of the establishment of a military Balkan alliance became a major subject. Playing his cards well, Marshall Tito accelerated the pace of these talks by making moves to the Greek and Turkish sides. In the summer of 1954, when Italy was negotiating the Trieste issue with the U.S. and the U.K., the U.S. maintained a policy of postponing the establishment of the Balkan Pact before reaching a solution about Trieste. However, a further delay would possibly cause deterioration of Yugoslavia's relations with the West. Consequently, on August 9, 1954, the Balkan Pact, as a collective defense alliance, was established between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. When the treaty was signed, it was already a dead one.

The main cause for this failure lies in two factors: Tito-Khrushchev correspondence and the rise of the Cyprus question. The first Soviet move towards the normalization of relations between Moscow and Belgrade came during the early stages of the negotiations for the Balkan Pact. This development directly strengthened Tito's position at the discussion tables, and provided him an alternative

for the future. When the treaty of Bled entered into force in May 1955, Khrushchev was visiting Belgrade.

As Yugoslav relations with either Cold War party offers different cases and needs to be taken separately, the same is true for Turkish-Greek relations. During mid-1950s, Turkey and Greece entered a period of conflict over the issues arising from Cyprus, an issue older than the Cold War. Greece applied to the United Nations for a solution in Cyprus based on the principle of self-determination just a few weeks after the signing of the Treaty of Bled. Maintaining smooth relations became impossible for both Turkey and Greece when EOKA, defending Enosis, started violent activities against Turkish Cypriots. This brought an end to Turkish-Greek cooperation and became a problem in NATO and for the U.S.

As the Balkan Pact lost its significance in a short period of time, because of the rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, thanks to the efforts of the new Soviet president Khrushchev, and of the arising problems between Turkey and Greece, a new step was needed in the Balkans, but never came. Beginning with the second half of the 1950s communism began to lose its strict and solid presence in the Balkans. As Yugoslavia began to position itself among the “Neutralists” in the world, Albania chose an ‘isolationist’ policy and began to come closer to China, and Rumania tended to slide towards a more unique socialist regime different than the Soviet style the rigidity of bipolarity in the Balkans began to decrease.

Compared to Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece could not maintain a separate road in the Cold War. Besides, when Moscow made a definite attempt to reduce tension and to improve relations, Turkey had an option to develop economic relations with the Soviets while the country was experiencing budget problems in mid-1950s. Certainly, history should not be written with “should” and “might,” but in Turkey’s

case, the policy of preserving distance with the Soviet Union, while its allies were initiating relations, was a missed opportunity for Turkey's political and economic conditions. A decade later Turkey's move towards a more flexible attitude resulted in the identification of some common ground in Moscow's and Ankara's position. In the following decades, Soviet economic assistance to Turkey represented the largest program of Soviet aid to any non-communist country.

In comparison, Yugoslavia preserved its independent position in world events by maintaining ties with both the West and Khrushchev's de-Stalinized Russia. Tito, even, pursued his so-called "Policy of Nonalignment" to find more supporters outside either Cold War camps. Most surprisingly, he did. The non-aligned movement expanded to different parts of the world, to the states which did not want to be a party to the ongoing conflict between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. In addition to this third states' stand in world events, establishment of that kind of an alternative provided non-aligned states to maintain economic activities and cooperation, and diminished the possibility of a blockade threat like that happened to Yugoslavia from 1948 to 1954.

Unlike these later developments, in order to comprehend the advent of the early Cold War in the Balkans, historical, ethnic and regional factors should be emphasized as equal to the Cold War policies. This is very clear in the fate of the cooperation efforts and alliances made in this period. Bringing an alternative assessment of the aforementioned period, this thesis tried to indicate the perceptions of the all sides not limiting with to single side. It is not only relevant for the history of the Cold War, but also applicable to the history of the mentioned states.

For the history of the U.S., supporting a communist country was an extraordinary event while fighting a war against the spread of communism at home

and abroad. When studied in detail, the unexpected causes of some of the problems the U.S. faces today can be found in circumstances like the Tito affair. Yugoslavia was the same country the U.S. was seeking ways to support and laid full support in the early Cold War and viewed it as a national security matter. However, in the early 1990s, when the same country was in turmoil, and when there was no Soviet threat as an obstacle, the support came too late.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Record of Conversation of Generalissimus I.V. Stalin with Marshal Tito

27 May 1946 at 23:00 hours

Secret

Present: from the USSR side – [USSR Foreign Minister] V.M. Molotov, USSR Ambassador to Yugoslavia A.I. Lavrent'ev; from the Yugoslav side — Minister of Internal Affairs, A. Rankovich; Head of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General K. Popovich; Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Serbia, Neshkovich; Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Slovenia, Kidrich; Yugoslav Ambassador to USSR, V. Popovich.

At the start of the meeting com. Stalin asked Tito whether, in the instance of Trieste being granted the status of a free city, this would involve just the city itself or the city suburbs, and which status would be better – along the lines of Memel [Klaipeda, Lithuania] or those of Danzig [Gdansk, Poland]. Tito replied that the suburbs of the city are inhabited by Slovenians. Only the city itself would be acceptable. Though he would like to continue to argue for including Trieste in Yugoslavia. Further, Tito, in the name of the Yugoslav government, expressed gratitude to com. Molotov for the support that the Soviet delegation showed in the discussion of the question of the Italian- Yugoslav border at the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Paris. Com. Molotov gave a report on the differences in status between Memel and Danzig, pointing out that the status along the lines of Memel is more acceptable. Com. Stalin asked Tito about the industrial and agricultural situation in Yugoslavia. Tito replied that all land had been sown the intermediate crop was awaited, and that industry was working well. After which, com. Stalin invited Tito to present the group of questions which the Yugoslav delegation wished to discuss this evening. Tito put forth the following questions: economic cooperation between USSR and Yugoslavia, military cooperation, and Yugoslav-Albanian relations. Regarding the question of economic cooperation, Tito said that Yugoslavia did not want to turn to the United States for credit. If America were to agree to provide loans, then this would be tied to demands for political concessions from Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia does not have the means for further industrial development. The Yugoslav government would like to receive assistance from the Soviet Union, in particular, through the establishment of mixed Soviet-Yugoslav associations. Yugoslavia has a fair amount of mineral and ore deposits, but it is in no position to organize production, since it does not possess the necessary machinery. In particular, Yugoslavia has oil deposits, but no drilling machines. Com. Stalin said: "We will help." Regarding com. Stalin's questions,

whether Yugoslavia was producing aluminum, copper and lead, Tito answered in the affirmative, noting that Yugoslavia had many bauxite and ore deposits for the production of these metals. Com. Stalin noted that the Ministry of Foreign Trade had informed Yugoslavia of its readiness to participate in talks regarding the establishment of mixed associations, but no final answer had been received from Yugoslavia. As a result, the impression was created that Yugoslavia was not interested in forming such associations. Tito objected, stating that on the contrary, he had spoken several times with ambassador Sadchikov about the Yugoslav government's desire to create mixed Soviet- Yugoslav associations. Regarding com. Stalin's note whether it will not be necessary to allow other powers into the Yugoslav economy following the formation of mixed Soviet-Yugoslav associations, Tito answered that the Yugoslav government had no intention of allowing the capital of other powers into its economy. Subsequently, com. Stalin summarized, saying that in this way the Soviet-Yugoslav economic cooperation was being conceptualized on the basis of forming mixed associations. Tito affirmed this, stating that he was intent on presenting the following day his proposals, in written form, on this subject. With respect to the question of military cooperation, Tito said that the Yugoslav government would like to receive shipments from the Soviet Union to supply the military needs of Yugoslavia, not in the form of mutual trade receipts, but in the form of loans. Yugoslavia has a small military industry which could produce grenade launchers and mines. In a number of places there were cadres. But there were no corresponding arms, since the Germans carried them away. The Yugoslav government would like to receive some machinery from Germany as reparations for the reconstruction of certain military factories. But Yugoslavia cannot by itself provide for all of its military needs, and in this regard, the Yugoslav government is hoping for assistance from the Soviet Union. Com. Stalin said that Yugoslavia ought to have certain military factories, for example, aviation [factories], for Yugoslavia may produce aluminum given the presence of rich bauxite deposits. In addition, it was necessary to have artillery munitions factories. Tito noted that [artillery] gun barrels may be cast in the Soviet Union and then further assembly may be done in Yugoslavia. Touching upon the question of Yugoslavia's water borders, com. Stalin said that, for the purpose of safeguarding them, it was important to have a good naval fleet. You need to have torpedo boats, patrol boats, and armored boats. Although the Soviet Union is weak in this regard, we will nevertheless, in the words of com. Stalin, help you. Regarding Albania, com. Stalin pointed out that the internal political situation in Albania was unclear. There were reports that something was happening there between the Communist Party Politburo and Enver Hoxha. There had been a report that Kochi Dzodzej wants to come to Moscow in order to discuss certain questions prior to the party congress. Enver Hoxha has also expressed desire to come to Moscow together with Dzodzej. Com. Stalin asked Tito whether he knows anything about the situation in the Communist Party of Albania. Tito, appearing unacquainted with these questions, replied that Hoxha's visit to Belgrade was being proposed for the near future. That is why he, Tito, believes that the reply to the Albanians should note that Dzodzej's and Hoxha's proposed visit to Moscow will be examined following Hoxha's visit to Belgrade. Com. Molotov noted that we were trying to hold back the Albanians' efforts to come to Moscow, but the Albanians were determined in this. Com. Stalin noted that the Albanians' visit to Moscow might bring an unfavorable reaction from England and America, and this would further exacerbate the foreign policy situation of Albania. Further, com. Stalin asked Tito whether Enver Hoxha agreed with including Albania in the Federation of

Yugoslavia. Tito replied in the affirmative. Com. Stalin said that, at the present time it would be difficult for Yugoslavia to resolve two such questions as the inclusion of Albania into Yugoslavia and the question of Trieste. Tito agreed with this. As a result, continued com. Stalin, it would be wise to first examine the question of friendship and mutual assistance between Albania and Yugoslavia. Tito said that, above all, this treaty must provide for the defense of the territorial integrity and national independence of Albania. Com. Stalin said that it is important to find a formula for this treaty and to bring Albania and Yugoslavia closer together. Com. Stalin touched on the question of including Bulgaria in the Federation. Tito said that nothing would come of the Federation. Com. Stalin retorted: "This must be done." Tito declared that nothing would come of the federation, because the matter involved two different regimes. In addition, Bulgaria is strongly influenced by other parties, while in Yugoslavia the entire government, [though] with the presence of other parties, is essentially in the hands of the Communist Party. Com. Stalin noted that one need not fear this. During the initial stages things could be limited to a pact of friendship and mutual assistance, though indeed, more needs to be done. Tito agreed with this. Com. Molotov noted that at the present time difficulties may arise from the fact that a peace treaty had not yet been signed with Bulgaria. Bulgaria was perceived as a former enemy. Com. Stalin pointed out that this should not be of significant importance. For example, the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship with Poland before Poland was even recognized by other countries. Further, com. Stalin summarized the meeting, saying that what the Yugoslav government is looking for in economic questions and in military matters can be arranged. A commission must be established to examine these questions. Tito informed com. Stalin of Yugoslavia's relations with Hungary, notifying of Rakosi's visit to Belgrade. Tito declared that the Yugoslav government had decided not to raise the question of Yugoslavia's territorial demands against Hungary (demands on the Ban'skii triangle ["Baiskii triangle," the region along the Hungarian- Yugoslav border centered on the city of Baia.]) in the Council of Ministers. Tito expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia's signing of an agreement with Hungary on reparation payments. Com. Stalin noted that if Hungary wanted peaceful relations with Yugoslavia, then Yugoslavia had to support these endeavors, bearing in mind that Yugoslavia's primary difficulties were in its relations with Greece and Italy.

Recorded by Lavrent'ev.

[Source: *Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF)*, f. 45, op. 1, d. 397, ll. 107-110. Published in *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, No. 2, 1993. Translated by Daniel Rozas.]

APPENDIX II

Yugoslav Record of Conversation of I.V. Stalin and the Yugoslav Government

Delegation Headed by J. Broz Tito, 27-28 May 1946

In the Kremlin

27.V.46*, 23:00 hours.

[*Recorded by B. Neshkovich.] *[Translator's note: the brackets used in the text are from the Russian translation of the Serbo-Croatian document. Any brackets and notes by the English translator will hereafter be denoted by "trans."]*

[Present:] Stalin, Molotov, Lavrent'ev, Tito, Marko, Kocha, Vlado, Kidrich, Neshkovich.

Stalin: "Beautiful people, strong people."

[Stalin:] "A hardy nation."

Molotov: agreed.

Stalin: Asks how was our trip.

Tito [says] it went well...

Stalin (chuckling, ironically): "How is my 'friend' [Russian word used in text] Shubashich?"

Tito (similarly) [says], he is in Zagreb, in the coop. And also Grol.

Stalin (similarly): "And how is my 'friend' [Russian word used in text] Grol?"

Tito (similarly): "He's in Belgrade"...

[Tito:] "We always had measures to suppress them. The parties exist only formally, though in fact they don't exist. In reality, only the Communist party exists."

Stalin chuckled pleasantly at this.

Stalin: "What kind of crop will you have?"

Tito: "An especially good one. The land has been well sown. In the passive regions it will be good. The assistance of UNRRA will not be needed. There will be lots of fruit."

Stalin: "Have you sown everything?"

Tito: "Everything has been sown."

Stalin: "What is your plan? What would you like to raise [for discussion]?"

Tito: puts forth economic and military questions.

Stalin during the whole time: "We'll help!"

* [Stalin] "How are Kardelj and Djilas?" [* Here a line was moved from below where it is denoted by * __*.]

T[ito]: "Well. We couldn't all come, and so only half of the government is here."

S[talin]: “The English and Americans don’t want to give you Trieste!”
(chuckling).

T[ito]: thanked for the support, [said] that the people send their greetings to Stalin and Molotov, [speaks] of the great political significance [of Soviet support].
Molotov: “But you still do not have Trieste...”.

T[ito]: nevertheless, [Soviet support] is of great pol[itical] importance...

* During the time that Tito [...]*

[** Recorded by K. Popovich.]
23:00 h.

27.V.46**

...1) S[talin]: “On our part we made a proposal to your comrades, responsible for eco[nomic] questions, whether you would agree to the establishment of joint enterprises. We will hold nothing against you if you decline. Poland, for ex[ample], declined on the grounds that the Americans may, in their turn, raise questions of establishing joint enterprises.”

T[ito]: “No, such is not my opinion nor the opinion of other leaders - [on the contrary, we think] it is necessary.”

2) S[talin]: “...I agree to the establishment of these enterprises as you see fit...”.

(M[olotov]: “In those fields that are more beneficial both for you and for us...”)

S[talin]: expressed interest in where our oil and bauxite deposits are located.
“You have very good bauxite.”

T[ito] explained where the deposits were, as well as the locations Bora, Trepcha and Rasha - and that we have good coal, but not coke for house ovens.

3) M[olotov said that] one of the Italian economic arguments for receiving Rasha is the fact that without it Italy would only be able to meet 20% of its demand.

4) The army.

S[talin]: “This is right, that in the event of war, because of the difficulty of supply, that [there ought to be] as much military industry in the country as is possible. It would be good to develop the aviation industry, given the rich bauxite deposits, and, as for artillery, the forging ought to be done within the country.”

S[talin]: “For coastal defense, you need to build formations of fast, light, and mobile ships, for Italy will be left with a sufficiently strong Navy (about two squadrons).”

T[ito]: “... In Boka Kotorska ships of 30,000 tons can be stationed.”

S[talin]: “These days they build ships of 60,000 tons. Currently we are having great difficulties in naval fleet construction, but we must assist you. I agree to assist you with equipment for munitions and light firearms factories. We will also assist you with cadres, who will help to organize officer improvement schools, which would in 1-2 years be turned into an Academy (on the level of the Frunze [Academy]).

Shipments for the Y[ugoslav] A[rmy] will be made outside the framework of trade agreements - that is, free and on credit.

It is very important that you have a naval fleet. We will assist you in the construction of shipyards and bases and corresponding nav[al] cadres. We will assist you with the extraction of oil. Together with munitions factories, it is important to reestablish arsenals, with which we will also assist you. It is necessary to examine the possibility of constructing aviation-engine factories.”

5) Albania*.

[Further, two lines are crossed out:]S[talin]: “What do you think of [doing] with Albania?”

T[ito]: “Sign...”T[ito] [with regard to the naval fleet]: “We must know whether our border will be along Albania or the coast.”

S[talin]: “What exactly are you proposing?”

T[ito]: “To sign one good treaty to help Albania – a treaty to defend independence, this will help both in the given situation and with regard to the naval threat.”

S[talin]: “This is a new formulation, but it ought to be examined and worked out. You worked out a good treaty with Czechia and found a new formulation: not only against Germany and its allies during the war, but also against its future allies. But one needs to think about it more and find an appropriate formulation.

Right now is not the time for a federation (not with Bulgaria either). Most important now is the question of Trieste, and this must be decided first. But if you want a treaty right now, both are possible (Trieste and Albania) at the same time” (at this he chuckled).

T[ito]: “Three times we put off Enver Hoxha’s visit to B[el]g[ra]de, since we were planning on a meeting with you. Generally speaking, we are ready to sign an agreement with Albania assuring [its—trans.] “sovereignty.” ***.

[***Here text has been inserted from below, marked by
***** —*****.]S[talin]: “Do you know Enver? What kind of person is he?****
[**** Further text is crossed out: “They were trying to visit us, but they do not want to send Enver by himself - they want Kochi Dzodzej to accompany him.” This phrase is printed in a slightly altered form further below.] Is he a communist? Are there any internal problems of their own - what is your information on this?”

T[ito]: “I did not see Enver Hoxha [sic—trans.], he is a young man, but in the course of the war he became popular...

***** We will work out an agreement and foster circumstances for greater closeness.”

S[talin] agreed.*****

T[ito]: “...and in general, the government consists of young people. As far as we know, there aren’t any kind of special problems.”

S[talin]: “They were trying to come here, but they do not want to send Enver alone, but Kochi Dzodzej wants to come with him - as some kind of restraint. What do you know of this?”

T[ito]: “We are not aware [of this] nor of the presence of some kind of disagreements.”

S[talin]: “We are constantly putting off their visit. What do you think, should we receive them? We think that there is no need.”

T[ito]: “Yes, we can take care of everything with them.”

S[talin]: “Right now it would be inconvenient for us and for them. Better if we help them through you.”

S[talin]: after this, expressed the opinion that something is amiss in the Alb[anian] Politburo.

Marko: “Comrades in the Politburo do not see Env[er] Hoxha as a sufficiently solid party member, and thus they always insist on him being accompanied by Kochi Dzodzej as the most senior party member in the Politburo. At the April plenum they discussed the question of the

party line, especially with regard to Yugoslavia and the S[oviet] Union, and ascertained certain mistakes, and excluded Seifulla Maleshov from the Politburo as a bearer of these mistakes. Since then, the leadership has been more consistent.”

T[ito]: “We can resolve this question with them.”

S[talin]: “Good.”

6) Bulgaria.

S[talin]: “Are you currently in favor of a federation with Bulgaria?”

T[ito]: “No. Now is not the time. For they have not yet definitively resolved many things: the army, the bourg[eois] parties, the monarchy and the Bulg[arian] position on signing a peace treaty.”

S[talin]: “Correct, but they must be offered help.”

7) Hungary.

T[ito]: “We have no territ[orial] demands. Since the int[ernal] polit[ical] situation has been corrected there, we have dropped our territ[orial] demands in accordance with your advice.”

S[talin]: “Right. If you have good relations with your nor[thern] neighbor, then Greece will also look at you differently... And does Greece raise any demands with regard to Yugoslavia?”

T[ito]: “There were provocations against us, but not in recent times.”

S[talin]: “The Eng[lish] maintain an army there in order to prop up the reactionary forces, and yes, possibly for other reasons as well.”

T[ito] (laughs): “We have demands against them: Aegean Maced[onia] and Salonikki.”

M[olotov]: “Yes, Salonikki is an old Slavic city. You need access to the Aegean sea.”

S[talin]: “Damn it* [*Russian words used in document.] Many comrades have gone to Bulg[aria], but things are not moving, not developing as they should. The com[munists] have influence, but they do not hold corresponding positions in the state apparatus. We should have told them to remove Stainov. Currently we have there the Sec[retary] of the Min[istry] of For[eign] Affairs.”** [*Russian word used in document.]

T[ito]: “I later explained to Rakosi that we demanded Petchui because of strat[egic] reasons and in order to help the Hung[arian] communists, since the reactionary forces were beginning to raise their heads.”

S[talin]: “And did they really believe you?..”

S[talin]: “And what further plans have you for tonight?”

T[ito]: “We don’t have [a plan].”

S[talin] (laughing): “Leadership, but without a state* [*Russian word used in document.] plan!” (laughing).

Vlado: “We accommodated ourselves to meet with you.”

S[talin]: “Then we can have a snack.”** [*Russian word used in text and alongside in brackets an explanation in Serbo-Croatian is given: “to eat something”.]

M[olotov]: “If you are inviting us, then with great pleasure.”

At the villa***

[*** Russian words used in text with explanations in Serbo-Croatian alongside in brackets.]

S[talin]. Regarding Togliatti: theoretician, journalist, can write a good article, a good comrade, but to gather people and “guide” them - this he cannot do; he has difficult circumstances there.

Torres [Thorez] and Duclos: good comrades.

Jose (Diaz) 43 was good, intelligent. Passionaria is not the same, she cannot gather and lead; at this difficult time she is in no condition to govern. In Rumania there are good young comrades.

In Germany F. is a good leader, Pieck - "the father"***** [*****Russian word used in document.], is gathering people and resolving various questions... Germans are nothing without orders.

The International - there's nothing to say.

Referenda - "but it's nonsense"*****

[***** Russian words used in quotes in the document.]

Warlike people are trying to draw in the Greeks.

"Do you want another war, to have your backs beaten again, to have Slavs lose another ten million? - If you do not want this, then the Slavs must unite in a single front with the Sov[iet] Union."

The idea of revenge in Italy.

Realism and idealism of Benes: realist, when shown strength, but would be an idealist if he felt he was in possession of strength (this is an answer to Tito's remark: Benes is an English person, though a realist).

"Firlinger will go with the communists."

Relations between Czechia and Poland: Entertaining as a pre-election maneuver; fact is, they did not undertake any dip[lomatic] steps.

Yugoslavia is a democracy* [*further crossed out: "new"] of a special type (non-Soviet type), different from all others.

"We are Serbs, Molotov and I ... we are two Serbs..."** [**Phrase composed of Russian words.]

"Slovenian*** [***Russian word used in text.] mercenary intelligentsia.

Eucalyptus.

"Tito must take care of himself, that nothing would happen to him ... for I will not live long ... laws of physiology..., but you will remain for Europe..."

Churchill told him about Tito..., that he is "a good man." - St[alin]: "I don't know him, but if you say so, that means he must be good. I will try to meet him."

Let Djido come, so I could rest under his care... "I will cure my migraine under his care." "Bevin - an English Noske" Vlado inquired about Marko, and after Marko, about Vlado...

"Beria - Marko - who will subvert whom?"

[Source: Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita. Fond Kabinet Marsala Jugoslavije. I-1/7. L. 6-11. Original. Manuscript. Document obtained and translated into Russian by L. Gibianskii; translated into English by Daniel Rozas.]

APPENDIX III

Report of Milovan Djilas about a Secret Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav Meeting

10 February 1948.

Kardelj and Vacaric arrived in Moscow on Sunday, February 8, and until Tuesday, February 10, nobody gave them any news. On Tuesday before noon Baranov phoned to say that Kardelj and the others should stay put, because in the evening, at nine o'clock we would be invited to the Kremlin. Lesakov told us that the Bulgarians arrived on Monday, but stressed that these were "the top guys" from Bulgaria—Dimitrov, Kolarov and Trajco Kostov. Indeed, we were invited to the Kremlin at nine o'clock in the evening. We arrived punctually, but since the Bulgarians were late, we sat for 10-15 minutes in Stalin's reception room, and when they joined us, we walked in [to Stalin's office]. So, the meeting took place on Tuesday, February 10, at 9:15 Moscow time, and it lasted about three hours. When we entered [the room], Soviet representatives were already there. Those present at the meeting were: Stalin (at the head of the table), Molotov, Malenkov, Zhdanov, Suslov and Zorin (to the right side from Stalin along the table), and Dimitrov, Kolarov, Kostov, Kardelj, Djilas, Vacaric (to the left side from Stalin along the table). Molotov spoke first. At first, he stressed that this was already a matter of serious disagreement between them [the Soviets] and Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. These disagreements were inadmissible both from the party and the state point of view. As examples of the serious discord he gave three: firstly, the conclusion of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty of Union—lack of coordination between the USSR, on one hand, and Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, on the other hand; secondly, the declaration of Dimitrov about a Federation of East European and Balkan countries, including Greece—lack of coordination between the USSR, on one side, and Bulgaria, on the other; thirdly, the introduction of a Yugoslav division into Southern Albania (Korcha)—lack of coordination between the USSR, on one hand, and Yugoslavia, on the other. As to the first point, he stresses that the Soviet government informed the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments—and they agreed to this—that one should not conclude a treaty with Bulgaria until the expiration of limitations imposed by the Peace Treaty [with Bulgaria in 1946]. However, the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments concluded the treaty, and the Soviet government learned about it from the newspapers. With regard to the second point he stresses that comrade Dimitrov grew too fond of press conferences. Meanwhile, if Dimitrov and Tito make announcements for the press, the whole world believes that such is also the view of the Soviet Union. At this moment, Stalin cut in to remind [us] that the Poles who were in Moscow in those days, spoke against [the Federation]. That means that the Soviet representatives first asked them what they thought of Dimitrov's declaration. And they said that they agreed, but when Stalin told them that the Soviet Union was against it, they also said that they were against, but they had previously believed that this was a position and request of

Moscow. Stalin adds that the subsequent clarification by Dimitrov (he probably had in mind the announcement of the Bulgarian telegraph agency) explained nothing. Stalin quotes from this announcement that says how Austria-Hungary had thwarted a customs union between Bulgaria and Serbia, and adds that it means—the Germans had worked against a customs union, and now we do (i.e. the Soviet Union). Stalin adds that Dimitrov diverts attention from domestic issues to foreign affairs—Federation, etc. Then Molotov passes to a third point of disagreement and stresses from the very beginning that they [in Moscow] accidentally learned about the entry of the Yugoslav troops into Albania. The Albanians told the Russians that they thought that the entry of the Yugoslav troops had been coordinated with the Soviet Union, and meanwhile it was not so. At that moment Molotov began citing some sort of dispatches, and Stalin told him to read them aloud. He asks Stalin which message he should read. Stalin leans [over] and points out [one]. Molotov reads a message from [Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia] Lavrent'ev about his meeting with Tito. From this reading, it becomes clear that the message is an answer to the question of the Soviet government if there is a decision about the entry of Yugoslav troops into Albania, and it says that such a decision—coordinated with Hoxha—really exists, that the motive comes from the notification about a probable attack against Albania; then the message points out that Tito said that he does not agree with Moscow that in case of an entry of Yugoslav troops into Albania, the Anglo-Americans would intervene beyond a campaign in the press. Tito, according to the message, said that, if it came to anything serious, Yugoslavia and the USSR would sort it out [raskhlebit' kashu] together, however, after the Soviet demarche about this issue he would not send a division [to Albania]. At the end, Molotov points out that Tito did not inform them about his disagreement with Moscow. He stresses that disagreements are inadmissible both from the party and state viewpoint and that disagreements should be taken out [for discussion], and not concealed, and that it is necessary to inform and consult. One must be cautious with regard to press conferences. Following Molotov, Dimitrov spoke. He, as well as the other Bulgarians and Kardelj (he was the only one among the Yugoslavs who spoke), did not give his reasons coherently, because Stalin kept interrupting him. He said that what Yugoslavia and Bulgaria publicized at Bled was not a treaty, but only a statement that a future treaty had been agreed upon. Soviet representatives affirm that they learned about this affair from newspapers, etc. Dimitrov stresses that Bulgaria's economic difficulties are so serious that it cannot develop without cooperation with other countries. It is true that he got carried away at a press conference. Stalin interrupts and tells him that he wanted to shine with a new word, and that is wrong, and it is a mistake because such a Federation is not feasible. Dimitrov says that he did not target the USSR by his assertion that Austria-Hungary had blocked a Bulgarian-Serb customs union. He stresses, at last, that there are essentially no disagreements between the foreign policies of Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. Stalin interrupts and asserts that there are substantial differences and there is a practice of the Leninists—to recognize differences and mistakes and to liquidate them. Dimitrov says that they make mistakes because they are only learning foreign policy, but Stalin replies to this that he [Dimitrov] is a senior political figure who had been engaged in politics for forty years, and in his case it is not mistakes, but a different perception [than the USSR's] (he [Stalin] said it two or three times during the meeting, addressing Dimitrov). As to the repeated emphasis by Dimitrov on the fact that Bulgaria must get closer with other countries for economic reasons, Stalin says that he agrees if one speaks of a customs union between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria,

but if one speaks of Romania (later, as I recall, he also mentioned Hungary), then he is against it. In general, when he spoke about such ties of Bulgaria with which the Soviet Union disagreed, most often [he] cited Romania as an example. It happens as a result of a clause about the customs union in the Bulgarian-Romanian treaty and because, I believe, that the joint Bulgarian-Romanian communiqué calls for coordination of plans between Romania and Bulgaria. These issues were raised at the meeting and often referred to by Soviet representatives. They have in mind a forthcoming conclusion of the treaties between Bulgaria and Hungary, and [Bulgaria and] other countries. Thus, Soviet criticism of Romanian-Bulgarian relations touches on future Bulgarian-Hungarian relations, and, obviously, on the relations of Yugoslavia with Hungary and Romania. Then Kolarov began to speak. He says about this part from the Bulgarian announcement regarding a customs union between Serbia and Bulgaria, where nobody meant to hint at the USSR, and as to the customs union between Romania and Bulgaria, the Romanians are also all for it. Besides, the Romanian-Bulgarian treaty had been earlier sent to the Soviet government and it already made only one amendment so that an article [on the joint defense] against any aggressor would be replaced by an article against Germany or a power that could be in alliance with it, and there were no comments on the Bulgarian-Romanian customs union. Then a brief exchange between Stalin and Molotov occurs. Molotov confirms what Kolarov says. Stalin stresses again that he is against the Bulgarian-Romanian customs union, although Bulgarians have a reason to think otherwise, on the basis of dispatches. He stresses that he did not know that there was an article about a customs union in the Romanian-Bulgarian treaty that had been previously sent to the Soviet government. Dimitrov says that that it was the very cause why in his statement he went further than necessary. Stalin says to him that he [Dimitrov] wanted to surprise the whole world and adds that it looked like the secretary of the Comintern was explaining tediously and meticulously what should be done and how. [Stalin] says that this gives food to American reactionaries [reaktziia]. He then speaks about the significance of the American elections and [says] that one should be careful to do nothing to give the reactionaries arguments that could facilitate their victory. In his opinion, we should not give the reaction anything to snatch at [nikakoi zatsepki]. The current American government still contains itself, but money bags [denezhniie meshki] and sharks can come to power. The reactionaries in American, when they hear such statements, say that in Eastern Europe there is not only a bloc in the making, but [the countries] are merging into common states. He tells Dimitrov and the others that they are overdoing it [perebarshchivaiut], like the Young Communists and then like women take everything to the streets. Then he makes a linkage to the issue of Albania. The three world powers—the USSR, England, and America guaranteed Albania's independence by a Special agreement. Albania is our weakest spot, because other states are either members of the United Nations, or recognized, etc., but Albania is not [recognized]. If Yugoslav troops entered Albania, the reactionaries in England and America would be able to use it and step forward as defenders of Albanian independence. Instead of sending troops we should work intensely to build up the Albanian army, we should teach the Albanians, and then, if they are attacked, let the Albanian Skupcina [parliament] appeal to Yugoslavia for help. He makes an example of China, where nobody can reproach the USSR, but the Chinese are fighting well and advancing; he then adds that the Albanians are not worse than the Chinese and they must be taught. Then he adds that we should sign a protocol about joint consultations. He says that the Bulgarians and the Yugoslavs do not report anything [to the Soviets], and they [the Soviets] have to find out

everything on the street, usually ending up faced with a fait accompli Kostov then begins to complain how hard it is to be a small and undeveloped country. He would like to raise some economic issues. Stalin cuts him short and says that there are competent ministries to do it, and this is the discussion of the differences Kardelj starts to speak. On the first point [of disagreements] he says that it was not a treaty that was published, but only a communiqué about the discussion leading to a treaty; he adds that we [Yugoslavs and Bulgarians] were too hasty. This triggers an Exchange similar to that when Dimitrov made the same point. [Andrei] Zhdanov intervenes and says that they [in the Soviet Union] learned about this matter from the newspapers. On Albania he says that not informing them on that was a serious error. Stalin cuts in and says that we [in Yugoslavia] oversimplify this matter, but it is a complicated matter.¹⁸ Kardelj then mentioned the constant Greek provocations, the weakness of the Albanian army, and that we are linked to Albania economically and that we underwrite [soderzhim] its army. Two or three times Stalin interrupted. For instance, regarding a Greek invasion of Albania, he said that it was possible. Then he asked if the situation was really such that one should not have any faith in the Albanian army, and added that the Albanians must be taught and their army must be built up. Molotov says that they have no information about any kind of attack on Albania and wondered that we withhold our information from them. Then, reacting to Kardelj's explanation that the anti-Albanian campaign in Greece is worsening, Stalin demanded [to know] if we believe in the victory of the Greek guerrillas. Kardelj responds that we do. Stalin says that recently he and the rest of his collaborators have had grave doubts about it. He says that one should assist Greece [i.e. guerrillas] if there are hopes of winning, and if not, then we should rethink and terminate the guerrilla movement. The Anglo-Americans will spare no effort to keep Greece [in their sphere], and the only serious obstacle [zakavika] for them is the fact that we assist the guerrillas. Molotov adds that we are constantly and Justifiably blamed for assistance to the guerrillas. Stalin says that if there are no conditions for victory, one must not be afraid to admit it. It is not for the first time in history that although there are no conditions now, they will appear later. Then Kolarov speaks and tells that the American, British and French embassies appealed to them [Bulgarians] with a warning not to recognize the government of Markos. Kolarov says that the American ambassador is courteous, but the British ambassador is arrogant. Stalin cuts in and says that it means that the American is a great scoundrel and they [ambassadors of the US and UK] always trade roles. Stalin also said that we should not link the future of our state with a victory of the guerrillas in Greece. On Dimitrov's comment that a victory of the Monarchists-Fascists would seriously aggravate the situation in the Balkans, Stalin says that it is not proven. Then Dimitrov and Kolarov spoke about other matters that did not relate to the agenda of the meeting. Among other things, Molotov cited a paragraph from the Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty which read that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria would act in the spirit of the United Nations and would support all initiatives directed at the preservation of peace and against all hotbeds of aggression. Molotov cites from the treaty to reject Dimitrov's attempts at a linkage between the struggle against "hotbeds of aggression" with the actions of the United Nations. Stalin adds that it would mean a preventive war which is a Komsomol [i.e. juvenile stunt, a loud phrase, material for the enemy. Stalin then tells a story, hinting at the Komsomol behavior, that there was a seaman in Leningrad after the revolution who condemned and threatened the whole world by radio.² Molotov then spoke about oats that Albania asked the USSR for, and that Tito had told Lavrent'ev that Yugoslavia would give

oats, and after that the Yugoslavs are instructing the Albanians to buy oats in Argentina. Stalin said half-jokingly that the Yugoslavs are afraid of having Russians in Albania and because of this are in a hurry to send their troops. He also said that the Bulgarians and Yugoslavs think that the USSR stands against a unification of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, but it does not want to admit it. Molotov raised some kind of a point from the Bulgarian-Romanian communiqué about the coordination of plans and mentioned that it would have been essentially a merger of these states. Stalin is categorical that this is inconceivable and that Dimitrov would soon see for himself that it is nonsense, and instead of cooperation it would bring about a quarrel between the Romanians and Bulgarians. Therefore mutual relations should be limited to trade agreements. Then Stalin laid out a Soviet view that in Eastern Europe one should create three federations—Polish- Czechoslovak, Romanian-Hungarian and Yugoslav-Bulgarian-Albanian. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia [he said] may unite tomorrow if they wish, there are no constraints on this, since Bulgaria today is a sovereign state. Kardelj says that we were not in a hurry to unify with Bulgaria and Albania, in view of international and domestic moments, but Stalin reacts to it by saying that it should not come too late, and that the conditions for that are ripe. At first, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria must unite, and then let Albania join them. This should be agreed upon through People's Skupcina [parliaments], by the will of the peoples. Stalin thinks that one should begin with political unification and then it would be difficult [for the West] to attack Albania. As to a Bulgarian-Yugoslav unification, Stalin repeatedly stressed that this question has ripened, and one even began a discussion about the name of [a united] state. Then Kardelj returned to the issue about what after all one should do in Albania, but [Stalin's] answer boiled down to what Stalin said earlier, i.e., the Albanian army ought to be taught, and that Albania should ask for assistance in case of aggression. As to oats, Kardelj says that it is possible that the enemy interfered to spoil Yugoslav-Soviet relations (Molotov kept silent). Then Kardelj says that he does not see any big differences between Yugoslavia and the USSR in foreign policy. Stalin interrupts him and says that it is incorrect, that there are differences and that to hide them would mean opportunism. We should not be afraid to recognize differences. Stalin stresses that even they, Lenin's pupils, many times disagreed with him. They would have a quarrel on some issue, then talk it over, work out a position and move on. He believes that we should put the question more boldly about the guerrillas in Greece. Then he mentions the case of China again, but now he raises another aspect. In particular, that they [the Politburo] invited the Chinese comrades and considered that there were no conditions for successful uprising in China and that some kind of "modus vivendi" [with the Guomindang] had to be found. The Chinese comrades, according to Stalin, in words agreed with the Soviet comrades, but in practice kept accumulating forces. The Russians twice gave them assistance in weapons. And it turned out that the Chinese, not the Soviet comrades, were right, as Stalin says. But he does not believe that the case of the Greek guerrillas falls into the same category. On China he says that they [the Soviets] do not have their people there, except in Port Arthur [Lushunkov] which is a neutral zone according to the treaty with the Chinese government. He spoke about the tactics of the Chinese who avoided attacking cities until they had accumulated sufficient strength. Kardelj speaks again and says it was a mistake that we [the Yugoslavs] failed to inform them. Stalin interrupts him and says that it was not a mistake, it was a system [a policy] and that we do not inform them on anything. Then Stalin and Molotov propose a protocol on mutual coordination of foreign affairs. Kardelj agrees with that. Stalin proposes that we inquire of them [the Soviets]

on all questions of interest to us, and that they would also inform us about everything. Then Dimitrov diverted the conversation to economic and other issues. When Dimitrov says there are important economic issues, Stalin cut him short by remarking that he would speak about it with a joint Yugoslav-Bulgarian government. During subsequent discussion Stalin raised a question about how the Albanians would react to such a union, and Kardelj and Djilas explained to him that the Albanians would accept it well, because it would be in their national interests, considering that eight hundred thousand Albanians reside in Yugoslavia. Stalin also said with regard to Albania that one on our side [u nas odin] has already committed suicide, and that we want to overthrow Hoxha and that it should not be done hastily and crudely—"the boot on the throat"—but gradually and indirectly. Stalin says again that at first Yugoslavia and Bulgaria ought to unite, and then Albania should join them. And Albania must declare itself about its desire to join. Then Kostov raised the question that the [Bulgarian-Soviet] treaty about technical assistance, also about patents, licensing and authors' rights, is not favorable for the Bulgarians (he failed to mention if this treaty has already been signed). Molotov said that this matter will need consideration, and Stalin said that Kostov should submit a note [to Molotov]. Then we discussed the answer of the Sovinformburo to the slander of the Americans regarding [their] publication of the documents on Soviet-German relations. Kardelj gave a positive assessment to the answer published in Pravda and Dimitrov says that the Western powers wanted to unite with Germany against the USSR. Stalin replies that he had nothing to hide [on vse vynosit otkrito], and the Western powers did not speak openly, in particular that Europe without Russia means against Russia. Molotov remarks during the conversation that the Bulgarians do not put enough camouflage on the number of their troops and that it exceeds the clauses [about limits] in the Peace Treaty, and the Bulgarians may be criticized for it. Dimitrov said to this that, on the contrary, the number is even below the limit stipulated by the Peace Treaty. Molotov was satisfied with that [answer] and did not mention it again. Dimitrov raised the issue about the conclusion of a treaty on mutual assistance between the USSR and Bulgaria. He stressed that it would be of great significance for Bulgaria. Stalin agreed with this, but added that among the Quisling countries [the USSR] would first conclude treaties with neighbors: with Romania—this treaty is almost ready, with Hungary and Finland. Then Stalin underlines that we (i.e. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) must build up our economy, culture, army, and that a federation is an abstraction. Suddenly Stalin asked about "our friend Pijade," Kardelj told him that he is working on our legislation. Kardelj asked [the Soviets] about their opinion what answer should be given to the Italian government who asked the Yugoslav government to support Italian claims to govern their former colonies. Stalin said that these demands must be supported and asked Molotov how [the Soviet side] responded. Molotov says that they still have to respond and that he believes they should wait. Stalin told them that there is no point in waiting and the answer should be sent immediately. He said that former Italian colonies should be put under Italian governance [trusteeship] and remarked that kings, when they could not agree over the booty, used to give [disputed] land to a weakest feudal so they could snatch it from him later at some opportune moment, and those feudal lords invited a foreigner to rule them so they could easily overthrow him when they become fed up with him. On this note the conversation ended. I would remind [napominaiu] that the criticism of Dimitrov by Stalin, although rough in form, was expressed in friendly tones. This report was composed on the basis of notes taken at the meeting and from memory.

[Source: Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, Fond Kabinet Marshala Jugoslavije I-3-b-651, II.33-40. Translated by Vladislav Zubok (National Security Archive)]

APPENDIX IV

Military Assistance Agreement Between the United States and Yugoslavia.

November 14, 1951.

The Governments of the United States of America and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia;

Desiring to foster international peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations through measures which will further the ability of nations dedicated to the purposes and principles of the Charter to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in support of those purposes and principles;

Reaffirming their determination to give their full cooperation to the efforts to provide the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated by the Charter and to obtain agreement on universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate guaranty against violations;

Taking into consideration the support that the Government of the United States of America has brought to these principles by enacting the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949,(2) as amended, and the Mutual Security Act of 1951,(3) which provide for the furnishing of military assistance to certain nations;

Desiring to set forth the conditions which will govern the furnishing of such assistance;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. The Government of the United States of America will make or continue to make available to the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia equipment, materials, services, or other assistance in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed. The furnishing of such assistance shall be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Such assistance will be furnished under the provisions, and subject to all of the terms, conditions and termination provisions, of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, acts amendatory and supplementary thereto and appropriation acts thereunder. The two Governments will, from time to time, negotiate detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the provisions of this paragraph.

2. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia will use the assistance exclusively in furtherance of the purposes of the Charter the United Nations for the promotion of international peace and security and for strengthening the defenses of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia against aggression.

3. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia undertakes not to transfer to any person not an officer or agent of that Government, or to any other nation, title to or possession of any equipment, materials, information, or services, received on a grant basis, without the prior consent of the Government of the United States of America.

4. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia will provide the United States of America with reciprocal assistance by continuing to facilitate the production and transfer to the United States of America in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed on, of raw and semi-processed materials required by the United States of America as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in Yugoslavia. Arrangements for such transfers shall give due regard to requirements of Yugoslavia for domestic use and commercial export.

Article II

1. Each Government will take appropriate measures consistent with security to keep the public informed of operations under this: Agreement.

2. Each Government will take such security measures as may be agreed in each case between the two Governments in order to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified military articles, services or information furnished pursuant to this Agreement.

Article III

The two Governments will, upon request of either of them, negotiate appropriate arrangements between them respecting responsibility for patent or similar claims based on the use of devices, processes, technological information or other forms of property protected by law in connection with equipment, materials or services furnished pursuant to this Agreement. In such negotiations consideration shall be given to the inclusion of an undertaking whereby each Government will assume the responsibility for all such claims of its nationals and such claims arising in its jurisdiction of nationals of any country not a party to this Agreement.

Article IV

1. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia undertakes to make available to the Government of the United States of America diners for the use of the latter Government for its administrative and operating expenditures in connection with carrying out this Agreement. The two Governments will forthwith initiate discussions with a view to determining the amount of such diners and to agreeing upon arrangements for the furnishing of such diners.

2. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia will, except as otherwise agreed to, grant duty free treatment and exemption from taxation upon importation or exportation to products, property, materials or equipment imported into or exported from its territory in connection with this Agreement or any similar Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the government of any other country receiving military assistance.

Article V

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia agrees to receive personnel of the Government of the United States of America who will discharge in its territory the responsibilities of the Government of the United States of America under this Agreement and who will be accorded facilities to observe the progress of the assistance furnished pursuant to this Agreement. It is understood between the two Governments that the number of such personnel will be kept as low as possible. Such personnel who are United States nationals, including personnel temporarily assigned, will, in their relations with the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, operate as a part of the Embassy of the United States of America under the direction and control of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, and will have the same status as that of other personnel with corresponding rank of the Embassy of the United States of America who are United States nationals. Upon appropriate notification by the Government of the United States of America full diplomatic status will be granted to an agreed number of the personnel assigned thereto.

Article VI

1. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia reaffirms that it will continue to join in promoting international understanding and goodwill, and in maintaining world peace; to make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities, and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world; and to take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defense capacities.

2. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia undertakes to take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension.

3. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia agrees to take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilization of the economic and military assistance provided by the Government of the United States of America.

Article VII

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature and will continue in force until one year after the receipt by either Party of written notice of the intention of the other Party to terminate it, provided that the provisions of Article I, paragraphs 2 and 3, and arrangements entered into under Article II, paragraph 2,

and under Article III, shall remain in force unless otherwise agreed bar the two Governments.

2. The Government of the United States of America reserves the right at any time to suspend its assistance to Yugoslavia made available pursuant to this Agreement, including deliveries of all supplies scheduled but not yet transferred.

3. The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them consult regarding any matter relating to the application of this Agreement or to operations or arrangements carried out pursuant to this Agreement.

4. The terms of this Agreement may at any time be reviewed at the request of either Government or amended by agreement between the two Governments

5. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Done at Belgrade, in duplicate in the English and Serbo-Croat languages, this fourteenth day of November, 1951.

APPENDIX V

Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration Between the Turkish Republic, The Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia February 28, 1953

The Contracting Parties,

Reaffirming their faith in the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations;

Being resolved to live at peace with all nations and to contribute to the maintenance of international peace;

Desiring to strengthen the friendly relations existing between them;

Being determined to defend the liberty and independence of their peoples as well as their territorial integrity from any compulsion from without;

Being resolved to unite their efforts to render more effective the organization of their defense against any foreign aggression, and to consult one another and collaborate on every matter of common interest, particularly on matters concerning their defense;

Being convinced that the common interests of their peoples and of all peaceful nations require appropriate measures to safeguard peace and security in this part of the world, pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,

Have decided to conclude the present Treaty, and their Heads of State have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries:

who, having presented their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article I

In order to ensure their permanent collaboration, the Contracting Parties will consult on all problems of common interest. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Contracting Parties, shall meet regularly in conference once a year, and more often if it is considered necessary, in order to study the international political situation and to take the necessary decision, in conformity with the purposes of the present Treaty.

Article II

The Contracting Parties intend to continue their common efforts for the safeguarding of peace and security in their area and to pursue in common the study of the problems of their security, including common measures of defense the need for which might arise in the event of unprovoked aggression against them.

Article III

The General Staffs of the Contracting Parties shall continue their collaboration in order to submit to their Governments recommendations concerning questions of defense that are formulated by mutual agreement, with a view to the making of co-ordinated decisions.

Article IV

The Contracting Parties will carry on their collaboration in the economic, cultural, and technical fields; in cases where it is considered advisable, appropriate agreements shall be concluded and the necessary agencies shall be established to resolve economic, technical, and cultural problems.

Article V

The Contracting Parties undertake to settle any dispute between them by such peaceful means as are specified in the Charter of the United Nations, and in a spirit of understanding and friendship; each Contracting Party also undertakes to refrain from any interference in the domestic affairs of the other parties.

Article VI

The Contracting Parties will refrain from concluding an alliance or from participating in an action directed against any one of them or of such nature as to prejudice its interests.

Article VII

The Contracting Parties declare, in so far as they are respectively concerned, that none of the international commitments now in force between them and one or more other States is in contradiction with the provisions of the present Treaty; furthermore, they assume the obligation not to sign in the future any international commitment that might be in conflict with the present Treaty.

Article VIII

This Treaty does not affect and cannot be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of Turkey and Greece under the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949.

Article IX

After the entry into force of the present Treaty, any other State whose collaboration is considered by all the Contracting Parties to be useful for the

accomplishment of the purposes of this Treaty may adhere to it under the same conditions and with the same rights as the three Signatory States.

An adhering State will become a party to the Treaty by depositing an instrument of accession.

Article X

The present Treaty, the French text of which shall be authentic, shall be ratified by each of the Contracting and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary of State of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Belgrade; it shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the last instrument of ratification.

At the end of five years after the entry into force of the present Treaty, a Contracting Party may cease to be a party to this Treaty by a declaration addressed, one year in advance, to the Governments of the other Contracting Parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done at Ankara, this 28th day of February, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-three, in three originals, one of which has been delivered to each of the Contracting Parties.

APPENDIX VI

Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Between the Turkish Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, August 9, 1954

The Contracting Parties,

Reaffirming their faith in the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to contribute, by co-ordinating their efforts, to the safeguarding of peace, the strengthening of security and the development of international cooperation;

Resolved to ensure in the most effective manner the territorial integrity as well as the political independence of their countries in accordance with the principles and provisions of the United Nations Charter;

Animated by the desire to widen and reinforce the bases of friendship and cooperation established in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between their countries, signed at Ankara on February 28, 1953, which proved to be an extremely effective instrument;

Having in view that the said Treaty has always been considered an initial step toward an alliance;

Considering that the conclusion of such an alliance is necessary;

Convinced, furthermore, that the institution of a system of collective security among them through a treaty of alliance would not only constitute a decisive factor for their own security and independence, but would also benefit all the other countries adhering to the cause of a just and equitable peace, especially those situated in their area;

Have decided to conclude the present Treaty and, for this purpose, have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries:

who, having exhibited their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

Article I

The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to settle by peaceful means any international dispute in which they may be involved, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II

The Contracting Parties agree that any armed aggression against one or more of them in any part of their territories shall be considered an aggression against all the Contracting Parties, who, consequently, in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, shall jointly and severally go to the assistance of the Party or Parties attacked by taking immediately and by common accord any measures, including the use of armed force, which they deem necessary for effective defense.

The Contracting Parties undertake, without prejudice to Article VII of the present Treaty, not to conclude peace or any other arrangement with the aggressor in the absence of a prior mutual agreement between the Parties.

Article III

To ensure in a continuous and effective manner the attainment of the objectives of the present Treaty, the Contracting Parties undertake to assist each other to maintain and strengthen their defensive capacity.

Article IV

With a view to ensuring the effective application of the present Treaty, it is agreed as follows:

1. There is hereby established a Permanent Council to be composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and any other members of the Governments of the Contracting Parties whose presence might be required by the needs of the situation and the nature of the subjects to be treated.

The Permanent Council shall meet regularly twice a year. It may hold additional meetings whenever the Governments of all the Contracting Parties deem this necessary

When the Permanent Council is not in session, it shall perform its functions through the Permanent Secretariat of the Treaty of Ankara according to a procedure to be determined.

The Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs provided for in Article I of the Treaty of Ankara shall be replaced by the Permanent Council.

Decisions of the Permanent Council on substantive matters shall be taken by unanimous agreement.

2. The General Staffs of the Contracting Parties shall continue their common task begun in application of Articles II and III of the Treaty of Ankara, with due regard to the provisions of the present Treaty.

Article V

As soon as the situation envisaged in Article II of the present Treaty occurs, the Contracting Parties will consult immediately and the Permanent Council shall meet at once in order to determine the measures which should be taken in addition to those already adopted pursuant to the aforesaid Article II, referred to above and which it would be necessary to take jointly in order to meet the situation.

Article VI

In the event of serious deterioration of the international situation, and more particularly in the areas where such deterioration might have a negative effect, whether direct or indirect, on the security of their area, the Contracting Parties will consult each other with a view to examining the situation and to determining their attitude.

The Contracting Parties, recognizing that an armed aggression against a country other than one of them may, by spreading, threaten directly or indirectly the security and the integrity of one or more of them, agree as follows:

In the event of an armed aggression against a country toward which one or more Contracting Parties has or have, at the time of signature of the present Treaty, obligations of mutual assistance, the Contracting Parties will consult each other regarding the measures which should be taken in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations and in order to meet the situation thus created in their area.

It is understood that the consultations referred to in this article might include an emergency meeting of the Permanent Council.

Article VII

The Contracting Parties will immediately inform the United Nations Security Council of any armed aggression against them, and of the measures of self-defense which have been taken; they will discontinue the said measures when the Security Council has effectively applied those mentioned in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Likewise, the Governments of the Contracting Parties will immediately make the public statement provided for in United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 378 (V) A of November 17, 1950 (2) relating to the duties of States in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, and they will act in accordance with the said Resolution.

Article VIII

The Contracting Parties reaffirm their decision not to participate in any coalition directed against any one of them and not to make any commitment incompatible with the provisions of the present Treaty.

Article IX

The provisions of the present Treaty do not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

The provisions of the present Treaty do not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of Greece and Turkey resulting from the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949.

Article XI

The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation concluded between the Contracting Parties at Ankara on February 28, 1953 shall remain in force in so far as it is not modified by the provisions of the present Treaty.

The Contracting Parties agree to apply the provisions of Article XIII of the present Treaty in respect of the duration of the Treaty of Ankara.

Article XII

The provisions of Article IX of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of February 28 shall apply to the present Treaty under the same conditions.

Article XIII

The present Treaty is concluded for a period of twenty years.

If none of the Contracting Parties denounces this Treaty one year before its expiration, it shall automatically be extended for one more year, and so on until it is denounced by one of the Contracting Parties.

Article XIV

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. It shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the last instrument of ratification.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Greece.

The Treaty shall be registered with the United Nations.

It has been drawn up in the French language three identical copies, one of which is to be delivered to each of the Contracting Parties.

In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries of the Contracting Parties have affixed their signatures hereto.

Done at Bled, August 9, 1954.