

**T.C.
SAKARYA UNIVERSITY
MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE**

**TRANSFORMATIONS OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL
MOVEMENTS IN THE POST ARAB REVOLUTIONS
PERIOD: THE CASE OF EGYPT**

PHD DISSERTATION

Badriya RAWY

Department: Middle Eastern Studies

Supervisor: Doç. Dr. İsmail Numan TELCİ

February – 2025

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THESIS APPROVAL

This work headed “TRANSFORMATIONS OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN THE POST ARAB REVOLUTIONS PERIOD: THE CASE OF EGYPT” which has been prepared by Badriya Rawy, is approved as a Ph.D. thesis by our jury in

Date of Acceptance: 03/03/2025

JURY MEMBERS	OPINION
Prof. Ismail Numan Telci	Successful
Dr. Hamdullah Baycar	Successful
Dr. Hatice Rümeysa Dursun	Successful
Prof. Ali Balcı	Unsuccessful
Dr. Mehmet Rakipoğlu	Unsuccessful

Approval

I approve that the signatures above belong to the aforementioned teaching fellows.

.../.../....

Institute Director

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis fully complies with scientific ethics. The use of other people's work in the form of references has only been done in accordance with scientific norms, as all cited data is free from falsification. This thesis is my original work and no part of it has been submitted as another thesis to this or any other university.



Badriya Rawy

February 2025

﴿الَّذِينَ أُخْرِجُوا مِنْ دِيَارِهِمْ بِغَيْرِ حَقٍّ إِلَّا أَنْ يَقُولُوا رَبُّنَا اللَّهُ﴾ وَلَوْلَا دَفْعُ اللَّهِ النَّاسَ بَعْضَهُمْ بِبَعْضٍ لَفُتِنَتِ صَوَامِعُ وَبِيَعٌ
وَصَلَوَاتٌ وَمَسَاجِدُ يُذْكَرُ فِيهَا اسْمُ اللَّهِ كَثِيرًا وَلَيَنْصُرَنَّ اللَّهُ مَنْ يَنْصُرُهُ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَقَوِيٌّ عَزِيزٌ﴾

[They are] those who have been evicted from their homes without right - only because they say, "Our Lord is Allah." And were it not that Allah checks the people, some by means of others, there would have been demolished monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques in which the name of Allah is much mentioned. And Allah will surely support those who support Him. Indeed, Allah is Powerful and Exalted in Might.

(Al-Hajj: 40)

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Badriya Rawy
Middle East Institute
Sakarya University
February 2025

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Author: Badriya Rawy

Supervisor: Doç. Dr. İsmail Numan TELCİ

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After the 25 January revolution in Egypt, Islamist movements have been heavily involved in public affairs. For the first time in Egypt's history, a representative reached the presidency. This interaction was marked by shifts in Islamists' ideas and political practices. The first trend was towards greater engagement in democratic and national frameworks. After the 2013 coup, there was a new shift towards violence. The thesis explores the manifestations and consequences of these shifts during the period 2011-2024. The researcher examines the depth and seriousness of these shifts. The thesis assumes that the determinants that created these shifts are a combination of external pressures and some of the leaders of Islamic movements own conviction, while claiming that this conviction was also generated by the same pressures, and that these shifts are not fundamental. These pressures are: Domestically, authoritarianism and the nature of the state in Egypt. Internationally, the contexts related to the war on terror and the Islamophobia agenda. Between the local and the international are the interests of the counter-revolutionary forces. The researcher argues that it is best to combine several perspectives to understand the determinants that led Islamists to undertake these transformations. One is the religious approach, i.e. by recognizing their sharia-justified goals. And secondly: The theory of rational choice, represented by the jurisprudence of interest, and the perspective of the conflict lens to understand the repercussions of repression and exclusion that these movements face locally or internationally. The thesis constitutes an addition to the literature on revolution and Islamic movements, and serves a large segment of the oppressed in the Arab world who fight against tyranny and Western hegemony.

Keywords: Islamism, Political Islam Movements, Arab Revolutions, Egypt.

Sakarya Üniversitesi, Ortadoğu Enstitüsü Yüksek Lisans /Doktora Tez Özeti

Tezin Başlığı: ARAP DEVRİMLERİ SONRASI DÖNEMDE İSLAMİ SİYASİ HAREKETLERİN DÖNÜŞÜMLERİ: MISIR ÖRNEĞİ

Tezin Yazarı: Badriya Rawy

Danışman: Doç. Dr. İsmail Numan TELCİ

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Anabilim Dalı: Ortadoğu Çalışmaları

Mısır'da 25 Ocak Devrimi'nin ardından İslamcı hareketler kamu alanında etkili bir aktör haline gelmiştir. Ülke tarihinde ilk kez İslamcı bir temsilci cumhurbaşkanlığı makamına ulaşmıştır. Bu süreç, İslamcılarının fikirlerinde ve siyasi pratiklerinde yaşanan değişimlerle şekillenmiştir. İlk eğilim, demokratik ve ulusal çerçevelere daha fazla katılım yönünde olmuştur. 2013 darbesinin ardından ise şiddete yönelim gözlemlenmiştir. Bu tez, 2011-2024 yılları arasında İslamcı hareketlerde gözlemlenen dönüşümlerin tezahürlerini ve sonuçlarını incelemektedir. Araştırmacı, bu değişimlerin derinliğini ve ciddiyetini ele almakta, bu dönüşümlerin dış baskılar ile İslamcı hareketlerin bazı liderlerinin kişisel kanaatlerinin birleşimiyle şekillendiğini varsaymaktadır. Ancak, bu kanaatin de söz konusu baskılar neticesinde şekillendiğini savunarak, bu dönüşümlerin köklü olmadığı sonucuna varmaktadır.

Bu baskılar; yerel, uluslararası ve her iki düzeyin kesişim noktasındaki unsurlar olmak üzere üç gruba ayrılmaktadır. Yerel düzeyde, Mısır'daki otoriter yönetim ve devlet yapısının doğası belirleyici olmuştur. Uluslararası düzeyde ise terörle mücadele politikaları ve İslamofobi gündemi önemli bir baskı unsuru olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bunların yanında, yerel ve uluslararası faktörler arasındaki kesişim noktasında yer alan karşı-devrimci güçlerin çıkarları da bu süreci etkilemiştir.

Araştırmacı, İslamcılarının bu dönüşümleri gerçekleştirmesine yol açan faktörleri anlamak için birden fazla bakış açısının birleştirilmesi gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Bunlardan ilki, dini yaklaşımdır ve İslamcılarının şariat tarafından meşrulaştırılan hedeflerini tanımaya dayanmaktadır. İkinci olarak, rasyonel seçim teorisi kapsamında maslahat (çıkart) anlayışıyla hareket etme eğilimi ele alınmaktadır. Üçüncü olarak ise çatışma perspektifi çerçevesinde, bu hareketlerin yerel ve uluslararası düzeyde maruz kaldığı baskı ve dışlanmanın sonuçları analiz edilmektedir. Bu tez, devrim ve İslamcı hareketler literatürüne katkı sağlamak ve Arap dünyasında zulme karşı mücadele eden geniş bir kesime hitap etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Islamism, Political Islam Movements, Arab Revolutions, Egypt.

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INTRODUCTION

The Arab revolutions that broke out at the end of 2010 have not come to an end, their waves are still reverberating in Sudan, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Tunisia. This is an observation in accordance to what is confirmed by the news coming out of these countries and according to the definition of revolution and its historical models.¹ To some extent, this observation applies to Egypt as well. Despite the fall of Morsi administration and the establishment of the Sisi regime, the revolutionary aspirations of Egyptian public continue. However, a government of a military strongmen is the major obstacle for these aspirations. All the presidents of Egypt since the coup against the monarchy in 1952 have been military generals. The Free Officers' organisation "Al-Zoubat Al-Ahrar" led that coup, and to this day there is overwhelming evidence that the military and security establishment have the upper hand in Egypt.²

Islamic political movements played a role in the revolution against Hosni Mubarak's regime, although they did not light the fuse of the revolution in their official capacity. On the contrary, caution and reluctance to participate in the Egyptian uprising was the official rational choice of these groups, based on the regime history of repression with them.³ Their greatest role, however, came after the fall of the Mubarak regime. Through their broad and multiple interactions with the other revolutionary movements and with the military council. For the first time in Egypt's history, a member of these Islamic political movements has come to power, and for the first time, members of movements that previously rejected political participation and democracy in general have entered parliament.

Therefore, any observer of the Egyptian politics will notice that there are changes in the activities of these groups. But what are these changes? Who has made them? And in what direction? As mentioned earlier, the revolution - as a project - often extends over a period of time, especially when it is exposed to what is known as the counter-revolution. During this period, the reactions of Islamic political groups have diversified and formed.

¹ Charles Tilly, **European Revolutions**, 1492-1992, New Jersey: Blackwell Publishing, 1995. p. 16.

² See: Zeinab Abul-Magd, **Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business, and Revolution in Egypt**, New York: Columbia University Press, 2017.

³ Khalil Al-Anani, "Islamic Streams in the Era of Arab Revolutions", **Siyassa Dawliya Magazine**, (27 July 2011), <https://www.siyassa.org.eg/News/1580.aspx>

Accordingly, divisions and splits have emerged within the same group. Some of these groups want to move towards a more democratic framework, while others are moving towards violence or insisting on remaining peaceful. Each has its own reasons and considerations.

What this thesis is looking for is the transformations of Islamists in Egypt during and after the January 25, 2011 revolution. The manifestations and signs of this transformation. In order for the researcher to be able to measure the extent of these transformations at the beginning, it was necessary to adopt a comparative approach between what these groups were like before January 25, 2011 and after. By examining their diverse literature and tracking their practices as well. And by presenting the intellectual basis on which the idea of "Islamism" was based.

At the beginning, the thesis divides the Islamic political movements in Egypt into two main currents: the Brotherhood current and the Salafi current. This is because these two currents are the ones in which the study monitored the changes. The thesis does not address Sufi groups, for example, which do not have any significant political participation, nor those Salafi groups that refuse to engage in political issues in the first place, and focus their efforts on their own religious call. The fact that these groups did not participate in the revolution or in the political process does not negate the fact that they may be employed in projects that serve the authorities, nor does it prevent their members from engaging individually in these political activities. It also divided the trends of change or transformation into two parts, a shift towards political participation and democracy, and a shift towards violence. With a focus on the outcomes of these transformations within each trend.

It is easy for the observer of these changes to place them in the category of "pragmatism" or "rational choice" in this critical historical period in the history of Egypt and the Middle East. However, the reality is that a wide range of reasons, factors and contexts overlap in the making of these positions and practices. These are "the determinants" that were collected and classified under several sections.

Firstly, it focusses on the impact of the Arab revolutions on Islamic political movements in general, and "25 January Revolution 2011" in particular. The "Jasmine Revolution 2010" in Tunisia inspired the Egyptians in their revolution, and the overthrow of Hosni

Mubarak with a massive participation of street protests. The Islamic movements realized the meaning of "street power" if it is united. Secondly, the characteristics and specificity of the Egyptian state, and the competition between the state and the movements of political Islam is another determinant to be explored. The Egyptian military institution excels in its influence, and controls all state institutions and segments of society, including patterns of religiosity, but it is in a state of constant competition with the model of "Islamism", even if it witnessed calm in some periods. Third determinant is the counter-revolution, and what it represented in terms of a conflict of projects in the region. At the local and regional levels, there is two competing projects, Arab authoritarian regimes and hereditary regimes versus projects of "democratic transformation" or "Islamism projects". At the international level, projects of international actors to prefer achieving security and stability at the expense of any democratic transformation or human rights and freedoms, to protect their interests in the region. Fourth determinant is the war on terror and its repercussions on Islamic political movements, before and after the revolution. According to observers and researchers,⁴ the war on terror has had the effect of supporting the manufacture of "moderate Islamism" through which is called the processes of "moderation and integration " or "moderation and inclusion". Finally, the rise of Islamophobia, as a Western plan and industry to confront Islam in general and political Islam in particular. Although Islamophobia in many of its definitions is formulated as a reaction towards Muslims and immigrants in the West due to "terrorist" acts and the threat to identity. However, it is an effective tool in containing "Islamism" as well.

Hypotheses

In the past, many Egyptian Islamist movements have discussed and revised their approaches and strategies according to the developments and contexts of the stage they are going through, or as a reaction to some of the ideas of some of their pioneers.*⁵ However, the major 'leap' in change and in ideas and practices came with the 25 January Revolution and its aftermath. The thesis assumes that the huge revolutionary events that took place in the Arab region crystallized Islamists' ideas towards new options, and the disappointment at the failure of this "democratic" experiment by counter-revolutionary

⁴ See: Abdul-Ghani Imad, **Islamic movements in the Arab world**, Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2013

⁵ Such as: the responses of the Brotherhood's leader-guide, *Al-Hudaybi*, to *Sayyid Qutb*, in which he rejected Qutb's interpretations of '*Alhakimiyyah*' or the reviews of the 'Islamic Group,' in which it retreated from using violence against Egyptian state institutions and men.

forces pushed towards contrary options as well (in both directions). The researcher claims that external pressures are playing a role in these transformations. There are four other hypotheses in this study:

1. The political transformations of Islamic political movements in Egypt after the 25 January Revolution represent a response to local contexts, including the 25 January Revolution, repression and competition with the Egyptian state paradigm. They are also influenced by regional and international pressures, including the counter-revolution, the war on terrorism, and the rise of Islamophobia.
2. The directions of transformation are towards political participation and towards violence, at different levels.
3. The pattern of these changes is non-substantive and non-inclusive. These are tactical, not fundamental strategic changes
4. The driving factors towards these changes are a combination of subjective beliefs and external pressures. However, it is the external pressures that have generated and channeled these subjective beliefs.

Research Questions

The main research question of this thesis is the following: What are the determinants that led to the transformation of Islamists in Egypt after the 25 January revolution? It is suggested that the Islamic political actors in Egypt switched their strategies during their struggle for political leadership. So, the second question of this study follows as “are these changes fundamental and strategic changes or superficial and tactical changes?”. The third question focuses on the motivations of these changes, “Were these changes made out of conviction or driven by external pressure?” Finally, “How do these changes relate to the following conflict dichotomies? The secular nationalist model versus the Islamist model of governance. The democratic model versus the authoritarian hereditary model of Arab regimes, national interests versus the interests of Western hegemony”.

Objectives and Significance

The thesis aims to identify the reasons and factors that led Islamists to take different political positions after the 25 January 2011 revolution and the June 2013 coup d'état. It

explores whether these changes were fundamental or not. The issue addressed in this study is contemporary, and important for a large segment of society in the Arab and Islamic world. The repercussions of the 25 January revolution are ongoing. Therefore, this study improves the ongoing debates and the work of those still engaged in the Arab revolutions for freedom and social justice in the Middle East. The importance of this study lies in its enrichment of scientific research in this field. It gives practitioners and researchers in the field a deeper understanding of the Islamist movement. Knowing the tools of authoritarian regimes and their strategies for encircling popular revolutions and revolutionary movements would contribute to supporting the path of liberation from them. It also leads these movements to create their own counter-strategies, instead of remaining only reactive.

Research Methods

The study delves into complex levels of analysis that combine the trilogy of thought, history and movement of Egyptian Islamists. The study focuses on the determinants of the political transformations of Islamist movements in the era of revolutions. Therefore, the thesis relies on a series of analytical approaches:

The qualitative approach includes a case study. The case study of Islamists in post-revolutionary Egypt aims to explore ideas, concepts, and experiences in their contexts, allowing for a deeper understanding of the factors influencing their transformations and the forms of these transformations. By analyzing the content of Islamist literature and theorists, their statements, electoral programs, and their stated positions in various media and platforms. This helps to understand the evolution of their ideas and concepts, how they have changed, and the level of change. The thesis also includes number of interviews with the figures from the Islamic movements. By conducting interviews with leaders, founders and members of Islamic movements, as well as political analysts and researchers specialized in these groups, the thesis presents valuable insights into the drivers of the transformations, and how Islamists themselves interpret these transformations.

The comparative approach strengthens the methodological side of the thesis. The study compares two major groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi movement with the aim of exploring their responses, strategies and transformations during the post 2011 revolution. This comparison is needed to identify the common factors that led to these

different pathways of transformation. The temporal comparison follows the literature and policies of Islamist movements before and after the 25 January 2011 revolution, and after the 2013 coup, and analyses how their strategies and positions changed during this period.

Theoretical Framework

Despite the importance of many theories and approaches in explaining the study of Islamist movements, the reality is that explaining the complex phenomenon of Islamist changes requires a theoretical structure that integrates the political, economic, social, cultural, religious-confessional, and even psychological fields. Each of these aspects explains some of the underlying causes of these transformations at different levels (collective and individual). The thesis suggests that there are three approaches and theories that are most relevant to this explain the issue and that may contribute to a deeper understanding of the determinants of the transformations of Islamist movements, the religious approach, rational choice theory,⁶ and conflict theories.

The religious approach has been adopted by many thinkers, both Arab and Orientalist.*⁷ This approach considers that the motives and references that call for the establishment of a social movement are religious motives. In Islamic civilization, religion is the ‘reference point for change.’ This is unlike Western civilization, which makes economic or identity factors the source of social movements, because they are inspired by secular values that separate religion or politics or make religion a negative factor rather than a source of social action. In Burhan Ghalioun's study, ‘The Political Sociology of the Islamic Movement: An Attempt to Understand and Explain,’ he links the growth of Islamist movements in Arab societies to a set of spiritual and religious values inspired by the Islamic religion. Richard Demkjian also considers that the ‘Islamic resurgence’ was closely related to periods of turmoil and danger that threatened the existence of the Islamic nation and its spiritual cohesion, saying “any intellectually sound approach to the topic of Islamic resurgence requires a culturally realistic perspective based on the doctrine of Islam, its history, and the writings of Islamic theorists.”⁸

⁶ James S. Coleman and Thomas J. Farraro, **Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critical**, Newbury: Sage Publications, 2001, pp. 292-299 and pp. 220-228.

⁷ Such as: Burhan Ghalioun, Wael Hallaq, Richard Dekamjian, and others.

⁸ Kamal S. Habib, “Islam and Islamic Parties in Turkey: A Case Study of the Welfare Party 1983-1997”, (**PhD Dissertation**), Faculty of Economics and Political Science in Cairo University, 2006, pp. 10-105.

The emergence of Islamist movements, according to this approach, is due to the relationship between the ‘Sultan and the Quran’ or what is called the state and the religious approach. This is also called the basic frame of reference for explaining the emergence of social movements in Islam. The more the state responds to the religious approach, the more cohesive the Ummah will be with it, with all its sects.⁹ In this context, the Islamic groups in Egypt are an example of this, as they are political-religious movements, but they emerged in the perspective of social and political change, which is called the ‘intermediate frame of reference’ for their emergence. The intermediate frame of reference is the social, political and economic context in which Islamist social movements emerged. That is, a framework that explains the reasons for their emergence. On this basis, a distinction between factors of existence and causes of diffusion becomes necessary. The explanations offered by Marxists in the 1960s and 1970s, which centered on poverty, the economic crisis and the 1967 defeat, were all factors that helped the spread of Islamist movements, but they are essentially a cultural phenomenon due to the specificity of Arab-Islamic culture and the nature of the Islamic religious text. It is these factors that represent the factors of this existence.¹⁰

The Islamic movements agree on the reference of the Islamic religion in change and the attainment of their goals, the most important of which are “calling for the establishment of an Islamic state”. However, they differ in the methods and means used and the form of their system. Some have a reformist approach, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated groups. Others have a revolutionary approach, using the street and resorting to non-peaceful means if necessary. Reformist movements call for the “Islamisation” of society from below by calling for the establishment of socio-cultural movements, ‘spreading awareness’. It adopts gradualism as a means of achieving its goals. This is the approach followed by Hassan al-Banna, who does not accept revolution until after peaceful means of pressure have been exhausted. According to Hassan al-Banna “if the government becomes alien to its nature, to the extent that it exceeds the Sharia, then it becomes the right and indeed the duty of the individual to take control of it.”¹¹ Note that

⁹ Habib, p. 95.

¹⁰ Amr Al-Shobaki, “Is it possible to build a democratic Islamic movements”, **Democracy Magazine**, Vol. (12), No. (10), (Oct 2003), p. 112.

¹¹ **Muslim brotherhood related web (ikhwanwiki)**, Revolution in the thought of Imam Hassan al-Banna, (Undated), https://www.ikhwan.wiki/index.php?title=%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9_%D9%81%D9%89_%D9%81%D9%83%D8%B1_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85_%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7 (29 January 2022)

some of al-Banna's statements may contradict this, and lead the reader to confusion, as the details of the study will show later. However, it can be summarized that this is the Brotherhood's approach to change.

Rational choice theory*¹² is based on a set of basic assumptions that explain how individuals make decisions. The main ones are rationality and self-interest. They evaluate the available options and choose the one that maximizes their benefit.¹³ In other words, these Islamist movements make choices based on a systematic assessment of costs and benefits. This theory is based on the premise that humans make choices that maximize or guarantee their self-interests and benefits under the constraints they face. Based on accurate calculations and available information, they weigh up the costs and benefits. They represent the “rational actor.”¹⁴

This theory can be applied in the social, political, economic and criminal sciences. It can be used to analyze voter behavior, such as voting, lobbying and policymaking. Politicians, bureaucrats and voters are all assumed to behave in ways that maximize their self-interest. This framework can help explain why certain policies are adopted or why politicians make certain decisions. It also contributes to understanding social interactions, collective action, and norm formation. This theory is a good framework for explaining the decisions of Islamists during the revolutionary era. Especially if we know that the jurisprudence of many Islamist groups is based on what is known as the jurisprudence of interest*¹⁵ or the jurisprudence of balancing between interests and disadvantages.

The main criticisms of this theory are that it is 'unrealistic', overly focused on self-interest and limited in scope. There is no empirical evidence that an individual's choices and decisions are based on pure rationality and can be influenced by ideological biases and emotions. And rational choice theory often ignores the social and cultural factors that influence the decision-making process. Social norms, values and beliefs play a role in

¹² Rational choice theory has its roots in classical economics, where early proponents such as Adam Smith emphasized the ‘invisible hand’ of market forces that directs individual choices towards outcomes beneficial to society.

¹³ Marwa El Badry, “The Theory of Rational Choice and the Alternatives in Foreign Policy and International Relations”, **Siyasat Arabiya**, Vol. (41), (Nov 2019), pp. 74-88.

¹⁴ See: Hans-peter Blossfeld and Gerald Prein, **Rational choice theory and large-scale data analysis**, UK: Routledge, 1998.

¹⁵ Jurisprudence of interest in Islamic jurisprudence: a fundamental principle in Islamic law that aims to achieve the interests of the servants in this world and the hereafter. It is based on bringing benefits and preventing disadvantages, while balancing interests and disadvantages to provide the most likely interests and avoid the greatest disadvantages.

individual preferences and choices. - Decision-making at the individual level differs from that of groups and organizations.¹⁶

Conflict theory offers a powerful framework for examining the underlying causes and consequences of conflicts and challenges across different contexts, from individual to societal and international interactions. This theoretical lens invites us to explore the complex interplay between competition and power asymmetry, which often leads to conflict. It is emphasized that the theory has evolved considerably since its inception, primarily through the work of Karl Marx and subsequent theorists who have extended its application beyond class conflict. In qualitative research, conflict theory provides a framework for understanding the dynamics of power, oppression, and social inequality. It prompts researchers to investigate how conflicts shape social and political interactions and transformations of institutions and norms.

In the mid-20th century, scholars such as Ralph Dahrendorf emphasized that conflict is not only a consequence of economic inequalities, but also a natural aspect of social life. They explored how conflicts arise from different interests between different social groups, including those based on race, gender, and political affiliations.¹⁷ Dahrendorf points to the inability of Marxist theory to explain reality because it links economic, social and political power to the ownership of the means of production in a crude way, where economic variables play the only factor in the process of social conflict. This is why Dahrendorf defines social classes as organized or unorganized groups of people who share apparent or latent interests that arise from their positions in the power structures in which they find themselves. In his view, class conflict is simply any inter-group conflict that arises from power relations. Dahrendorf's model combines elements of equilibrium and stability with elements of conflict and change. Thus, we find that he cared about social conflict and accepted the general form as conceived by Marx, but at the same time he rejected its content to present a new content in which he replaced economic determinism with political determinism.¹⁸

¹⁶ Geoffrey M. Hodgson, "On the Limits of Rational Choice Theory", **Economic Thought**, UK: University of Hertfordshire Business School, Vol. (1), (2012), pp. 94-108.

¹⁷ Ralf Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. (2), No. (2), (Jun 1958), pp. 170-183.

¹⁸ Muhammad Abdul Karim Al-Hourani, **Contemporary Theory in Sociology**, Amman: Majdalawi Publishing, 2008, pp. 88-96.

In his understanding of the concept of social conflict, Dahrendorf also starts from the concept of authority, which means the possibility of certain people obeying the leader of a certain group, pointing out that society often consists of two opposing groups, one dominant and one subordinate, between which conflict usually occurs due to the existence of dissatisfaction over how material resources such as power, income and property are divided. The existence of so-called 'cultural symbols' is one of the reasons that lead to harmony between humans or to conflict, and conflict in this context may manifest itself in disagreement over the concept of material power. The question of who has the right to power and authority, and why, is a question that allows for conflict to arise. Ralph Dahrendorf focused on the concept of conflict as a continuous and ongoing state between classes and individuals that will inevitably lead to a permanent state of social change, but this does not prevent the existence of periods of harmony and concord that guarantee some social stability. "If we recognize the existence of a permanently stable society, we fall into utopia. The existence of a society that is constantly in conflict and change means a society that is decaying, broken and devalued."¹⁹

Dahrendorf's conflict theory has been criticized, mainly that his definitions of his key concepts of class and conflict are unclear. Conflict theory has also been criticized for oversimplifying complex social dynamics by focusing primarily on competition and conflict. Critics claim that it may neglect the cooperative aspects of social life and the role of consensus in maintaining social order. In addition, considering conflict as the basis of social order and history in general carries with it the seeds of a self-destructive doctrine that generalizes contemporary social theory.

Structure of the Thesis

The first chapter focuses on the literature review and the conceptual framework. The previous literature includes a review of the most prominent studies related to Islamists' interactions with the Arab revolutions and those that deal with each Egyptian Islamist group or movement during and after the 25 January 2011 revolution. The thesis criticizes these studies in general, and some of them in particular if the thesis objectives require it. The second section of this thesis defines the conceptual framework of the study. It explains what Islamism is and who Islamists are. It emphasizes the historical context in

¹⁹ Al-Hourani, pp.88-96.

which it was born as a phenomenon and the foundation on which it was built intellectually, which is firm and solid. The researcher explains the relationship between Islamists and the state in the ideology from which they started. This is Islamic political jurisprudence. The researcher explains the relationship between Islamists and the state in the ideology from which they started, namely Islamic political jurisprudence. It also elaborates on the concept of change and transformation, and sheds light on the principle of “intellectual revisionism” among Islamists as one of the transformations that took place before the Arab revolutions. The concept or theory of “post-Islamism” clearly demonstrates another type of transition or shift in the direction of Islamism, so the researcher includes it in the end of this chapter as well.

The second chapter is an observational study of all forms and types of transformations that occurred in Egyptian Islamist movements and currents during and after the revolution of 25 January 2011. This is at the level of thought, practice, and organization (i.e. within any Islamist group or movement). The researcher identifies two sections, the first is towards political participation, establishing parties for the first time and entering parliament. The second, in the direction of violence, and the emergence of a very noticeable number of jihadist and revolutionary armed organizations. A conclusion related to the two trends is the divisions and splits within these groups, which have been categorized under a larger umbrella, the Muslim Brotherhood, including groups or personalities, such as Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, and the Salafi movement, including groups and parties. A historical account is also given for before and after the 25 January Revolution, and a comparison between these two currents.

The third chapter is an in-depth examination of the direct and indirect factors and causes of these transformations, namely the determinants. The first of them, the interaction of the Islamist movements with the 25 January revolution and its dazzling and surprising model. The absence of a prior revolutionary project influenced their initial effectiveness, and the advancement of non-ideological demands of non-Islamist revolutionaries. This is what the study calls the influence of local contexts. The competitive relationship between Islamists and the Egyptian state, with its characteristics of being a Praetorian state, i.e. a state ‘in which the army became part of the bureaucratic state.’²⁰ In the context of the

²⁰ Amos Perlmutter, Egypt: **The Praetorian State**, New Jersey: New Brunswick, 1974, p. 4.

conflict between the Egyptian state, represented by the military actors, and the changing Islamist movements, the researcher explores the authorities' strategies to strengthen their legitimacy after the coup and their tools to tighten control. Third, the impact of counter-revolutions, including the pressure exerted by regional and international actors to fail political Islam and remove it from governing Egypt. The fourth factor is the war on terrorism and the final factor is employing Islamophobia.



CHAPTER 1: PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part explores the literature related to the general topic of the thesis. Accordingly, the thesis monitors the scholarly content related to the Arab revolutions in general. In particular, the 25 January 2011 revolution in Egypt and the counter-revolution it faced. The thesis also highlights studies related to the political interactions of Egyptian Islamist and Islamist groups during the period between 2011 and 2024.

The second part is related to the conceptual framework of this thesis. The concept of 'Islamism' is explained with a focus on its origins, goals, and the solid common ground on which the various 'political Islam' movements are based. The study then deals with the concept of changes or transformations in the discourse and behavior of some of these groups and currents, in a comparative manner. It refers to what is known as the 'intellectual reviews' of Islamist groups before the Arab revolutions and the transformations within the framework of the 'Arab revolutions'. The thesis then sheds light on the so-called 'facets or stages' of Islamism. To understand the form and content of this movement of change, the study explores whether it is a new process or a recurring case, or a recurring case with different forms and new actors.

1.1. Literature Review

The study of the 'Islamist phenomenon' in its political dimension is not new. There is more written about it than can be counted. The literature on Islamism, Islamists, and the Arab revolutions, whose waves and repercussions are still unfolding in some Arab countries, is growing annually. This literature ranges from books, dissertations, and peer-reviewed articles to grey literature,^{*21} each of which addresses a related question or concepts such as the contexts, the actors, or the repercussions and consequences at different levels. What is highlighted in this section is the most prominent ideas and arguments in the literature on the Arab revolutions in general and the Egyptian revolution in particular. The literature on political Islamist groups in Egypt between 2010 and 2024

²¹ Grey literature refers to a body of material and information that is produced outside of traditional channels of publication and distribution: such as reports, working papers and white papers that provide information or analysis on a particular topic.

examines the effects of the Arab revolutions on Egyptian Islamists. This is completed in a flowing manner from the macro to the micro level.

1.1.1. Arab Revolutions Implications

To begin with, much of the literature focuses on the surprise of the Arab revolutions to Arab peoples, Islamist movements, and observers of the Middle East and the speed with which they spread. Asef Bayat emphasizes this by mentioning that the real surprise, in his opinion, lies in the special characteristics of the revolutions, their ideological orientations and political trajectories. His article discusses the main unexpected features of the revolutions and claims that the Arab uprisings occurred in new ideological times.²² Nawaf Al-Qadimi agrees, claiming that the idea of revolution for freedom and democracy was not within the deliberative space of the theses that studied the Arab reality and foresaw its future. He argues that if some recent studies and articles that have commented on the Arab revolutions have adopted Lenin's theory that 'no revolution can arise in a country that has not been in a state of revolution'. He asks the following question, "Why didn't scholars before the revolutions talk about this state in the Arab world, nor did any of them recognize its existence?"²³

Azmi Bishara, in several of his publications, addresses topics related to understanding revolution in the Arab context, and aims to present a critical theory that redefines the concept of revolution in a scientific and contemporary manner. He argues that Revolution in the Arab heritage did not include the modern meanings, as words such as 'revolt against the ruler' and 'sedition' were used instead of 'revolution'. Bishara compares the rebellion in the Islamic state, which has its own rules and regulations, to the revolution against the rulers in the modern nation-state, as they are two different contexts.

Bishara also discusses the idea of 'susceptibility to revolution,' which is the necessity of awareness of injustice as an abnormal state, which creates the conditions for a revolutionary act.²⁴ He claims that the revolutionary must be a reformist who leads reform in the end, and the reformist can lead a revolutionary transformation."²⁵ Revolutions are

²² Asef Bayat, "The Arab Spring and its Surprises", **Development and Change**, Vol. (44). No. (3). (May 2013), pp. 587-601.

²³ Nawaf Al-Qadimi, **Islamists and the Spring of Revolutions - The Productive Practice of Ideas**, Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, 2012, pp. 1-2.

²⁴ Azmi Bishara, **On Revolution and the Possibility of Revolution**, Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, 2012, p. 7.

²⁵ Bishara, *On Revolution and the Possibility of Revolution*, p. 31.

on their “democratic path” to achieve their goals. ‘Modern democratic revolutions’ are constitutional revolutions according to the “American Revolution” model, not “obsolete” national and social revolutions according to the model of the French, Russian, and other revolutions.

The thesis includes here an exceptionally important work of Asef Bayat from 1998, ‘Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution’ in which he explored how political environments shape their democratic path.²⁶ Bayat explored how different political environments shape the nature and effectiveness of Islamist movements, “while both Iran and Egypt have witnessed significant Islamist activism, the outcomes and trajectories of these movements have been shaped by their unique historical and political contexts. In Iran, the Islamist movement succeeded in mobilizing a broad coalition that led to a revolutionary change of government. The Iranian revolution was characterized by a clear ideological framework that sought to establish an Islamic state. In contrast, Islamist movements in Egypt, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, operated in a more repressive political environment that limited their ability to bring about revolutionary change. Instead, they focused on gradual reform and social activism.”²⁷ This comparison, written more than 12 years before the Arab revolutions, illustrates the repercussions of the reformist approach on reformist groups in a time of revolution that they did not anticipate or work for.

Rougier and Lacroix provide valuable insights into the complexities of Egypt's ongoing struggle for democracy and social justice. They discuss the unity among protesters from different backgrounds and ideologies that was crucial to the initial success of the 25 January revolution. They then assess how different political entities, including the military, liberal and Islamist groups, competed for control. It was questioned that “How some of these forces - the military - exploited divisions and societal fears to regain power?”. The collaborative effort of the contributors to “Egypt's Revolutions: Politics, Religion, and Social Movements” offers diverse perspectives on how political ideologies, religious affiliations, and social movements intersected during a pivotal moment in Egyptian history. However, it delves deeper into analyzing the popular movements that

²⁶ Asef Bayat, “Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing Islamist Activism in Iran and Egypt”, **Comparative Studies in Society and History**, Vol. (40), No. (1), (Spring 1998), pp.136-169.

²⁷ Bayat, *Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing Islamist Activism in Iran and Egypt*, pp.136-169.

characterized these revolutions, and how these movements were often leaderless and fragmented, affecting their ability to maintain momentum after initial successes.²⁸

Regarding models of democratization in the context of the Arab Spring, “The Routledge Arab Spring Handbook” explores how revolutionary movements have shaped views on democratization in the Arab world. The work examines the regional and international impact of the Arab Spring on neighboring countries, including those with different political traditions, such as Iran, Israel and Turkey, as well as its effects on global actors such as the United States and the European Union.²⁹ Here, it is worth commenting on the use of the term “Arab Spring” instead of “Arab Revolutions” in much of the literature, not just Routledge's. The author favors the use of the term ‘Arab revolutions’ for a number of reasons, including what is stated in the introduction to ‘Islamists and Arab Revolutions’ by Al-Hroub and Baaboud,³⁰ which includes a large number of elite specialists in this field. They argue that “What took place in the Arab countries since late 2010 are real uprisings, whose causes are deep and decades-old, and whose premises are local and regional, and in which millions of people participated and hundreds of thousands of victims fell”. The term ‘Arab Spring’ carries connotations and analogies imported from the European experience in the twentieth century. In addition, it carries political and ideological baggage related to the Cold War climate and the Western liberal agenda, which included revolutions, especially in Eastern European countries, in the context of its struggle with the Soviet Union at the time. The use of this term forcibly transfers the movement of the Arab revolutions to the path of ‘virtual democratization’ led logically by the United States of America, thus depriving the people of these revolutions and those who died for them of their exclusive ownership of them.³¹

Khalil Al-Anani’s “After the Arab Revolutions” is a complex critique of democratic transition theories on the one hand and critics of the “transition model” on the other, as well as a revision of this model in light of the Arab experiences, with the aim of raising Arabs’ central social and humanitarian issues to a position of equality rather than

²⁸ See: Bernard Rougier and Stéphane Lacroix, (Eds.), *L'Égypte en revolutions*, **Proche-Orient**, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2015.

²⁹ See: Larbi Sadiki (Ed.), **Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization**, U.K: Routledge, 2014.

³⁰ Khaled Al-Haroub and Abdullah Baaboud, **Islamists and the Arab Revolutions**, Amman: Al-Ahlia Publishing and Distribution, 2024, pp. 1-60.

³¹ Al-Haroub and Baaboud, pp. 1-60.

dependence.³² In the same context, Al-Anani and others examine the traditional frameworks of democratic transition theory, challenging the ‘transition model’ that often uses successful democratic transitions in one region (A) to another region (B). This ignores the complexities and specificities of Arab politics, whose revolutions have had varied and different outcomes. Understanding why certain movements succeed and others fail can help enrich broader studies on democracy and democratic transition. The work also highlights the role of civil society and external influences in shaping political outcomes.³³ Indeed, this multifaceted approach has contributed to a comprehensive analysis that recognizes the interplay between domestic and international factors in the democratization process.

Entering Revolution and Authoritarianism explains how the military has maintained its influence throughout different phases of governance, including during the brief period of Muslim Brotherhood rule. The contributors argue that narratives about Islamism and nationalism have been manipulated by state actors to justify authoritarian measures. Military power dynamics succeeded in marginalizing civilian political movements.³⁴

Lacroix and Jean-Pierre Filiu present the Arab uprisings as important ‘revolutionary moments’ whose outcomes were shaped by different actors and contextual factors. They examine the impact of military power dynamics on political stability, reform and democratization. It also examines the external factors that influence these transformations, including international support for various regimes and movements within the region. Perhaps the most important feature of this work is that it challenges simplistic interpretations.³⁵

“The Age of Counterrevolution” by Jamie Allinson focuses on three important themes, the importance of counter-revolutions, the popularity of counter-revolutions, and the international dimension of counter-revolutions. He frames the Arab revolutions as a period dominated by successful counterrevolutions rather than failed ones.

³² See: Asef Bayat and others, **Beyond the Arab Revolutions: Rethinking the Theory of Democratic Transition**, Doha: Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, 2023.

³³ See: Abdelwahab El-Affendi and Khalil Al-Anani (Eds.), **After the Arab Revolutions: Decentering Democratic Transition Theory**, UK: Edinburg University Press 2021.

³⁴ Fourmont-Dainville and others, *Egypte: Entre révolution(s) et autoritarisme*, **Moyen-Orient**, Paris, 2014, pp. 15-69.

³⁵ See: Stéphane Lacroix and Jean-Pierre Filiu (Eds.), **Revisiting the Arab Uprisings: The Politics of a Revolutionary Moment**, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Counterrevolution is seen as a collective and interactive effort to defend the status quo against significant threats from revolutionary movements. It claims that the counterrevolution is not simply a restoration of the old order, but often leads to the creation of a new order, which still includes changes influenced by the revolution it opposed. It is deeply embedded in the social fabric and political context in which it arises.³⁶ Overall, this analysis may point to the enduring importance of counterrevolution as a lens through which to view endeavors for political and social change.

Hamzawy and others argue that modern authoritarian regimes have become increasingly adaptable to revolutions as they reformulate strategies to maintain control. The book also addresses geopolitical influences, stating the important role that geopolitics plays in shaping domestic politics, through a counter-front to the Arab revolutions,³⁷ while Koçar discusses how ruling elites are increasingly exploiting sectarian divisions to exacerbate conflicts and consolidate power. He examines the reasons that exacerbated the political polarization between secularists and Islamists in post-revolutionary Egypt, and analyses the role of this polarization in the failure of the democratization process.³⁸

In a very in-depth examination of counter-revolutions, Clark claims, after examining an original dataset of counter-revolutions from 1900 to 2015, that violent revolutions are less likely to be undone than nonviolent ones, because they produce regimes with strong and loyal armies capable of defeating counter-revolutionary threats. While examining this data confirms that revolutions involving more violence are less prone to counter-revolution, this does not preclude the emergence of counter-revolution at all. He illustrates this by comparing Cuba's 1933 nonviolent uprising which succumbed to a counter-revolution and its 1959 revolutionary insurgency which defeated multiple counter-revolutions. He argues that nonviolence may often be superior to violence when it comes to overthrowing autocratic rulers, but it is less effective in bringing about lasting change and ensuring that these autocrats never return.³⁹

³⁶ Jamie Allinson, **The Age of Counter-Revolution: States and Revolutions in the Middle East**, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 2022, pp. 29-65.

³⁷ Lisa Blaydes, Amr Hamzawy, and Hesham Sallam, (Eds.), **Struggles for Political Change in the Arab World: Regimes, Oppositions, and External Actors after the Spring**, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2022, pp. 27-49.

³⁸ Furkan Koçar, "The Impact of Secular-Islamist Polarization over Democratization in Post-Mubarak Egypt", (**Master thesis**), Department of International Relations, Turkey: Dokuz Eylul University, 2022. pp. 85-114.

³⁹ Killian Clarke, "Revolutionary Violence and Counterrevolution", **American Political Science Review**, Vol. (117), No. (4), (Nov 2023), pp. 1344–1360.

In a related context, the book 'The January Revolution. A Critical Perspective'⁴⁰ addresses the absence of a narrative and ideological project at the beginning of the revolution. He argues that this absence is not the issue, as an alternative or ideological project is usually completed at later stages of the revolution. Rather, revolutionary forces failed to engage in a struggle for radical political, economic, and social change, and were content with a reformist and developmental discourse that focused on getting rid of the corrupt and curbing police violence, without attempting a deeper change in the method of governance or questioning the form of the state and its institutions. Reformist perceptions triumphed over more radical ones.

Telci also traces the progression of revolution and counter-revolution in Egypt, highlighting the role of internal and external actors in the counter-revolution against the rule of President Mohamed Morsi. He claims that during the period when the coup regime conducted crackdowns, revolutionary Islamist and non-Islamist actors such as the April 6 movement and the Revolutionary Socialists were erased from the political scene, through open support by regional and Western actors for the Sisi administration, who preferred to invest in the stability of their interests in the region rather than ensuring human rights and democratic transformation.⁴¹

1.1.2. Egyptian Islamists and January 25 Revolution

Al-Anani et al. delve into how the Arab revolutions reshaped Islamist ideologies and strategies. They emphasize that Islamist groups have adapted their strategies in response to the changing political landscape after the Arab revolutions in two directions, pragmatic in some contexts and radicalized in others. The book also explores how globalization and socio-economic changes are affecting Islamist ideologies, suggesting that these forces are reshaping not only political strategies but also cultural identities within the region.⁴²

Rethinking Political Islam, edited by Shadi Hamid and William McCants, contributes to the understanding of contemporary political Islam in the context of the Arab revolutions and their aftermath. It argues that pivotal events such as the Egyptian coup in 2013 and the rise of the Islamic State in 2014. These events forced many groups to adopt a different

⁴⁰ Amr Abdel Rahman (Ed), Amr Ismail Adly, Mahmoud Hadhoud, and Ali Al-Rijal. **The January Revolution: A Critical Perspective**, Cairo: Dar Al-Maraya for Cultural Production, 2019, pp. 6-130.

⁴¹ Ismail Numan Telci, **Egypt: Revolution and Counter-Revolution**, Istanbul: SETA, 2017, pp. 175-266.

⁴² Khalil Al-Anani, **Islamism and Revolution across the Middle East: Transformations of Ideology and Strategy after the Arab Spring**, U.K: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021, pp. 11-186.

approach to avoid the fate of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.⁴³ According to the author, the fate of IS was also avoided, especially for groups close to it such as al-Qaeda.

Away from Egypt, and closer to the topic of the thesis, Al-Huwaiyrini examines the transformation of Salafi Islamists in Saudi Arabia from 9/11 to the Arab revolutions. He claims that after 9/11, they were subjected to great political and security pressures that led to a change in their ideas and strategies. In his -own vision- the shifts are divided on 3 types, “Positive shifts, which are the changes in some of the Islamists' methods and mechanisms, based on their scientific reference represented by the Salafi methodology. The ambiguous transformations, which are the changes that divided opinions about them, those who see them as cognitive maturity and intellectual openness, or as concession and regression, or a combination of both. Negative shifts, according to the author, the negative shifts are those in which the owners, through their questioning, have adopted ideas that are opposed to the principles of Islamic law, or are openly liberal.”⁴⁴

Abou Rumman's book also sheds light on ‘transformations within Islamist movements and their responses to contemporary challenges,’ explaining the concept of post-Islamism as a major shift within Islamist movements that represents a departure from traditional Islamist ideologies and adopts a more pragmatic approach that is compatible with democratic principles and the needs of society. The book critically examines the credibility and validity of the post-Islamist narrative, questioning whether it represents a genuine ideological evolution or merely an ideological illusion.⁴⁵

Olivier Roy argues that post-Islamism is a condition or consequence of political Islam's failure to fulfil its promises and its transformation into a form of neo-fundamentalism that lacks the capacity to unify or significantly influence the Muslim world. He argues that the aspirations of political Islam have not been realized, leading to its decline, and that instead of creating a coherent political movement, political Islam has disintegrated into various forms that are often contradictory and ineffective.⁴⁶ He argues that the political influence of groups is exaggerated, as they do not have the power to significantly alter

⁴³ See: Shadi Hamid and William McCants, (Eds.), **Rethinking political Islam**, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

⁴⁴ Walid A. Al-Huwaiyrini, **Transformations of Islamists from the Flames of September to the Spring of Revolutions**, KSA: Al-Bayan Magazine, 2014. p. 15.

⁴⁵ Mohammad Abou Rumman (Ed.), **Post-Islamism: A New Era or Ideological Illusions?**, William Joseph Ward (Trans.), Germany: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2018, pp. 9-20.

⁴⁶ Olivier Roy, *L'Échec de l'islam politique*, Paris: Esprit (1940-), 1992, pp. 106-129.

state structures or geopolitical dynamics. He claims that the demand for democracy in Muslim-majority countries often exceeds Islamic ideals, and claims that the ‘Arab Spring’ movements were more interested in democratic governance than in implementing Islamic laws.⁴⁷ His conclusions may underestimate the potential of Islamist movements to regain influence, and underestimate the challenges they face, as exemplified by what happened in Syria in December 2024, and the ability of Islamist movements to topple the regime of Bashar al-Assad after the right local and regional conditions came together, which they successfully exploited.

Asef Bayat presents the concept of post-Islamism - which has fueled its spread - as a shift away from traditional Islamist ideologies towards more pluralistic and democratic frameworks. Bayat notes that Islamist parties, such as Ennahda in Tunisia, are evolving towards more democratic frameworks, accepting pluralism and secular governance while continuing to rely on Islamic values.⁴⁸

Gomez explores the tension between nationalism and Islamism, claiming that while Islamist movements struggle to achieve their goals, there has been a notable revival of nationalist sentiments. She agrees that this shift reflects broader societal desires for stability and identity that transcend religious affiliations. Gómez argues that the failures of political Islam may lead to the emergence of new forms of governance that are less ideological and driven by religious principles. Instead, there may be an emergence of governance models that prioritize democratic principles while accommodating religious identities in more pluralistic frameworks. Luz argues that the Arab revolutions challenged some of the theoretical foundations that formed the basis of the post-Islamist discourse, which claimed the decline of political Islam as a viable political alternative.⁴⁹ Perhaps the most important point in her article, according to the researcher, is that “post-Islamism” is a theory imposed from the North on the South.

Ahmed Zaghloul Shalata discusses the Muslim Brotherhood's experience in power after the January 2011 revolution, and claims that the reasons for the failure of the experience are due to several reasons, the most important of which are the lack of administrative

⁴⁷ Olivier Roy, *L'Échec de l'islam politique*, pp. 106-129.

⁴⁸ See: Asef Bayat (ed.), **Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam**, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013.

⁴⁹ Luz Gómez García, “Post-Islamism, the Failure of an Idea: Regards on Islam and Nationalism from Khomeini's Death to the Arab Revolts”, **Religion Compass**, Vol. (6), No. (10), (Oct 2022), pp. 451- 466.

vision, crises of thought and organization, including their inability to manage societal diversity, and how to interact with other political forces. He highlights the challenges of realizing the concept of the 'Islamic State', due to the absence of a practical model for this concept in the Brotherhood. It also discusses the impact of post-revolutionary events on the group's trajectory and its interactions with various political and religious parties, including the experience of judgement on the Muslim Brotherhood itself.⁵⁰

In the same vein, Al-Anani's article analyses the Brotherhood's behavior and strategy since their assumption of power in June 2012 and explores the main factors that led to their downfall in 2013. Al-Anani argues that the Brotherhood's downfall can be attributed to three main factors, its lack of a revolutionary agenda, the Brotherhood's organizational stagnation and inertia, and its leaders' incompetence and lack of experience in governance.⁵¹

Regarding the post-coup situation, Barbara Zollner's article sheds light on how the Muslim Brotherhood adapted to their post-coup circumstances and the crackdowns they were subjected to. She claims that the organization has shown remarkable resilience and adaptability in the face of government repression. The organization has changed its strategies to maintain its influence and support among the population, indicating a level of political ingenuity in dealing with a repressive environment.⁵² Zollner's article also claims that the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted to its post-coup circumstances.

As Al-Anani's article claims, collective and individual responses to repression cannot be explained by focusing solely on structural and institutional factors (i.e. organization, ideology, leadership, etc.). Rather, members' personal experiences, memory, emotions and traumas play a key role in shaping their response to oppression. The article thus examines the formal and informal effects of repression on Islamists.⁵³

⁵⁰ See: Hamad Shalata, *Islamists in Power: The Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt*, Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2017.

⁵¹ Khalil Al-Anani, "Upended Path: The Rise and Fall of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. (69), No. (4), (Fall 2015), pp. 527-543.

⁵² Barbara Zollner, "Surviving Repression: How Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Has Carried On", *Carnegie Middle East Center*, 18 March 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/03/surviving-repression-how-egypts-muslim-brotherhood-has-carried-on?lang=ar¢er=middle-east>. (10 Oct 2023)

⁵³ Khalil Al-Anani, "Rethinking the Relationship between Repression and Dissent: Assessing the Muslim Brotherhood's Response to Repression in Egypt since the 2013 Coup", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. (26), No. (8), (June 2019), pp. 1329-1341.

Authors Annette and Yaghi analyze how structural changes and ideological divisions within the Brotherhood have led to significant shifts in its operational framework and 'radical' tendencies. They examine the factors that influenced radicalization within the group, including external pressures and internal ideological conflicts. She also examines the implications of these divisions for Egyptian politics and society, and the impact of these changes on wider regional stability.⁵⁴ Al-Anani also analyses the complex dynamics that led individuals to sever their ties with the Muslim Brotherhood after the 2013 military coup.

Hoigilt and Nome discuss how the Salafi movement moved from a marginal religious ideology to an important political player during this period. The authors claim that engaging in politics led to a re-evaluation of Salafi beliefs and strategies, adapting them to the new political context. This engagement has implications for their ideological framework and their relations with other political entities in Egypt. They also highlight the diversity within Salafi thought and practice, demonstrating that the movement is not monolithic.⁵⁵

Cavatorta and Merone explore how Salafi movements have shifted towards greater political participation, forming parties and participating in electoral processes in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen. This shift represents a significant deviation from their historical reluctance to engage in institutional politics, raising questions about the future trajectory of Salafi ideology and practice.⁵⁶ The contributors to "The Politicization of the Salafi Movement" concur, explaining how some factions maintain jihadi ideologies, while others seek to achieve political legitimacy through democratic means. The work of Hamming argues that through this entanglement, Salafi groups risk losing legitimacy within their religious and political constituencies.⁵⁷

In contrast to the 'de-culturised' global Salafism model, the International Institute for Salafism claims that Salafism is now taking a three-pronged opposite direction,

⁵⁴ Annette Ranko and Mohammad Yaghi, 'Organizational Split and Radicalisation Within Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood', *Washington institute*, 4 March 2019, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/organizational-split-and-radicalization-within-egypts-muslim-brotherhood> (10 Oct 2023)

⁵⁵ Jacob Hoigilt and Frida Nome, "Egyptian Salafism in Revolution", *Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. (25), No. (1), (Jan 2014), pp. 33-54.

⁵⁶ See: Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone (Ed.s), *Salafism after the Arab Awakening: Contending with People's Power*, London: Hurst, 2017.

⁵⁷ Tore Hamming, "Politicization of the Salafi movement: The emergence and influence of political Salafism in Egypt", *International Affairs review*, Vol. (22), No. (1), (2013), pp. 2-18.

localization, re-education and politicization, which includes a growing immersion in local dynamics and a revision of exclusionary, isolationist and non-participatory behaviors. The International Salafi Institute proposes a series of case studies and cross-case comparisons both at the center (Algeria, Tunisia and Syria) and on the periphery of the Mediterranean region (Mauritania, Mali/Nigeria, Ethiopia and faraway Cambodia) to demonstrate that this trend is not limited to a specific geographical area, including Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority countries. Through in-depth ethnographic and qualitative research, the authors observed a trend towards revising the exclusive Salafi position by reinventing its ways of dealing with society on the religious, political and cultural levels, which represents an unprecedented break with ‘globalized’ Salafism.⁵⁸

Lounnas’ article “Shifts in Salafi-Jihadi Paradigms” supports this shift. He emphasizes that the Al-Qaeda model has undergone a major transformation, and that this shift reflects changing dynamics in jihadi thought, influenced by events in Syria, the rise of ISIS, and broader geopolitical factors. It also examines how these models have adapted to new contexts, particularly in Idlib and Raqqa, which have become central to contemporary jihadist discourse and strategy.⁵⁹

Contradicting the content of these transformations, or at least the transformations of some Salafi-jihadists, as discussed above, Selim's doctoral thesis claims that after the Salafi Dawa entered politics through the Al-Nour Party, the movement reproduced its old rhetoric of social and political change. It achieved this by introducing changes to the form of its discourse, while maintaining its core content. The thesis emphasizes ‘continuity and consistency’ in the main discourse of change adopted by the party. It concludes that the broader movement and the specific political party are intellectually and structurally interconnected.⁶⁰

Ahmed Z. Shalata writes with Lacroix about the complexities and internal divisions within the heterogeneous Salafi community. They argue that these transformations were unexpected. They also examine the fluctuating dynamics between the Salafis and the

⁵⁸ Théo Blanc and Olivier Roy, “Post-Salafism: From Global to Local Salafism”, **Mediterranean Politics**, Oct 2024, pp. 1-20.

⁵⁹ Djallil Lounnas, “The Shifts in the Jihadi-Salafi Paradigms: From the Peshawar and Jalalabad Paradigms to Those of Idlib and Raqqa”, **Terrorism and Political Violence**, Vol. (33) No. (3), (2019), pp. 441–465.

⁶⁰ Hebatullah N. S. Selim. “Religionising politics: Salafis and social change in Egypt”, (**Ph.d Dissertation**), Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, 2017, pp. 266-286.

Muslim Brotherhood. Initially there was cooperation between these groups, but tensions arose as each sought to assert their dominance within the Islamic political sphere. He argues that while their political participation has allowed them to gain visibility and influence, it has also led to internal conflicts and challenges regarding their traditional religious authority.⁶¹

In Lacroix's article "Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism" it was argued that the Nour Party has adopted a pragmatic approach to politics, often making concessions that contradict traditional Salafi doctrine. This flexibility was seen as necessary to maintain influence, protect their religious agenda, and survive in the changing political landscape.⁶²

This research significantly advances the understanding of the triggers, factors and contexts influencing Islamist shifts in Egypt after the revolution. This shift had taken place in both directions, towards political participation and towards violence. For example, some previous literature examines the Salafists' shifts towards political participation without addressing the motives of this shift. Is it a shift out of conviction, a result of external pressures, or both, which is what this thesis examines. Nor have previous studies addressed the Islamists' own view of these shifts, from the perspective of the Islamists themselves, are they personal convictions of the leaders of these movements or pragmatic tactics of necessity? This is what the study sought to do by conducting personal interviews with the leaders of these new movements and parties. It also surveyed many written and filmed interviews of other leaders and the youth of these Islamist movements.

Similarly, the studies that highlighted the counter-revolutions did not link them to the factors of these transformations. Those studies focused on the angle of knowing their role in obstructing the democratic transition and the motives of the counter-revolutionary forces. The thesis also claims to be the first to address the religious approach in a preliminary way to understand the transformation of Egyptian Islamists and the determinants of this transformation to different positions after the revolution. Unlike the

⁶¹ See: Stéphane Lacroix and Ahmed Zaghloul Shalata, **The Rise of Revolutionary Salafism in Post-Mubarak Egypt, Egypt's Revolutions. Politics, Religion, and Social Movements**, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

⁶² Stéphane Lacroix, *Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism*, *Brookings Institution*, 2012. pp. 1-5.

previous reviews which generally utilised the theories of social movements or historical analysis.

1.2. Conceptual Framework

Terms like Islamism, Political Islam, Islamic Fundamentalism, Islamic Activism, Resurgent Islam, Islamic Extremism and Islamic Revivalism represent Islamic revivalist movements around the world. Often, these terms are used interchangeably to indicate the same phenomenon and making it a threat to the West. Such conceptualizations fail to distinguish between various approaches and strategies adopted by the Islamic movements. Scholars overlook the underlying variety and complexity within Islamism across the globe. Many scholarships have called such a monolithic approach into question.

The concept of 'Islamism' is composed of two elements, 'Islam' and 'ism'. The former stands for a religion and a civilization with its specific history, and the latter indicates a non-Islamic suffix. The composition of these two elements refers to a bi-pillar construction, composed by religion and ideology. Islamism is a complex phenomenon with multiple dimensions and various ramifications. Like other political doctrines, Islamism, in its contemporary shape, is an 'ideology', a 'movement-organization' and a 'form of government.'⁶³ Many Muslim scholars prefer to use the term "Islamic phenomenon" rather than "Islamism", although the latter is more prevalent globally, especially among Western scholars, the authors of the term and its ideological connotations. They argue that the term "Islamic Phenomenon" is more neutral and freer of any negative connotations.⁶⁴

'Islam' and 'Islamic' have become the most frequently used terms by western islamologists, orientalist and political scientists. This replacement is very clear indeed among a huge number of western writers of multiple disciplines, from Ignaz Goldziher (1850–1921), Arnold Toynbee (1852–83), Max Weber (1864–1920), Oswald Spengler (1880–1936), Fernand Braudel (1902–85), Claude Cahen (1909– 1991), Ann K.S. Lambton (b. 1912), Henri Laoust (d. 1976) and William Montgomery Watt (1909–2006)

⁶³ Mehdi Mozaffari, "What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept", **Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions**, University of Aarhus, Vol. (80), No. (1), (Mar 2007), pp. 17–33.

⁶⁴ Robbert A F L Woltering, "The roots of Islamist popularity", **Third World Quarterly**, Vol. (23), No. (60), (2002), pp. 1133–1143, P.1140.

to contemporary scholars such as Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama. We do not find the word 'Islamism' in the index of their works. Prior to the Islamist revolution in Iran in 1978–79, the terms 'Islamism' and 'Islamists' are also practically absent from the vocabulary of newspaper reporters.⁶⁵

Many western writers argue that “after the Iranian revolution, the term thus acquired new meanings reflecting the arrival/emergence of an Islamic opposition to modernity, an opposition that is reactionary, medieval and irrational in narrative and disposition.”⁶⁶ Edward Said has rightly put it that “the deliberately created associations between Islam and fundamentalism ensure that the average reader comes to see Islam and fundamentalism as essentially the same thing.”⁶⁷ The role of Western media was crucial in this regard. Journalists instead of scholars appropriated and popularized such extravagant statements.⁶⁸

In addition, there is a change that can be observed in the works of scientists, and in particular in the books and articles written after September 11. For example, two eminent French islamologists, Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel, previously used both 'political Islam' and 'fundamentalist Islam' extensively whereas they now tend to use 'Islamism' more and more often. The term appears neither alone nor besides 'neo-fundamentalism' or 'political Islam'. Actually, the latter term is not equivalent to 'Islamism' in Olivier Roy's terminology. 'Political Islam' designates a failed project in his works, whereas Islamism' denominates the new form of activist Islam.⁶⁹

The Sudanese Hasan al-Turabi who is one of the “Islamists” from the Islamic world. When he discusses different fractions among Muslims in his book “Islam and Government [Al-Islam wal Hukm]”, he uses Islamiyyûn to designate 'political Muslims for whom Islam is the solution, Islam is religion and government and Islam is the Constitution and the law.'⁷⁰ Islamism is coming from one source but is far from being a

⁶⁵ Woltering, pp. 1133-1140.

⁶⁶ Husnul Amin, “From Islamism to Post-Islamism: A Study of New Intellectual Discourse on Islam and Modernity in Pakistan”, (Ph.D. Dissertation), **International Institute of Social Studies**, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2016. pp. 11-17.

⁶⁷ See: Edward. Said. *Covering Islam: How the media and the experts determine how we see the rest of the world*. London: Routledge & Regan Paul, 1981, in Amin, pp. 11-21.

⁶⁸ Amin, pp. 11-21.

⁶⁹ Olivier Roy, *L'Échec de l'islam politique*, pp. 106-129.

⁷⁰ Hasan Al-Turabi, **AI-Islam wal-Hukm**, London: Al-Saqi, 2003, p. 49.

monolithic movement. He further suggested that “despite the global aspirations of their ideologues, Islamists have no center; there is no overall pan-Islamic radical leadership.”⁷¹

Sometimes authors used ‘Islamic totalitarianism’ also to describe ‘the tendency to view Islam not merely as a “religion” in the narrow sense of theological belief, private prayer and ritual worship, but also as a total way of life with guidance for political, economic, and social behavior’. Therefore, this takes the form of the claim that Muslims should have an ‘Islamic state’, ‘that is, a state in which all law is based on the Shari’a’.⁷²

1.2.1. Emergence of Islamism

Examining the transformations or movement of political Islamists during the Arab Spring revolutions requires looking at the context in which this idea, project or ideology, as it is variously called in the literature, was born. This linkage helps in a deeper understanding of the transformations and their direction. Burgat and Matthew trace the roots of the idea of Islamism to the nineteenth century, not just the 1970s with the Iranian revolution. They emphasize that this Islamist mobilization has taken different forms: legal, revolutionary, authoritarian, and sometimes democratic, depending on the historical and political context of the different countries in which they were active. They position this Islamist mobilization as a reaction to Western cultural hegemony.⁷³ Burgat also argues that the roots of tensions between the Western and Islamic worlds are primarily political rather than ideological. He argues that understanding these dynamics is critical to understanding the rise of political Islam. He also criticizes Western interventions in Muslim-majority countries, arguing that these interventions fail to address the underlying political conflicts faced by Muslims.⁷⁴

For example, Frampton asserts that the Muslim Brotherhood's hostility towards the West was rooted in historical grievances, including the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and subsequent Western interventions in the Middle East. Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, saw these developments - the fall of the caliphate and the subsequent occupation, partition and Westernization - as existential threats to Islamic

⁷¹ Michael Whine, “Islamism and Totalitarianism: Similarities and Differences”, **Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions**, Vol. (2), No. (2), (2001), pp. 54-72.

⁷² Juan J. Linz, “The Religious use of Politics and/or the Political use of Religion”, in Hans Maier (Ed.), **Totalitarianism and Political Religions**, London: Routledge, 2004. pp. 107-108.

⁷³ See; François Burgat and Matthieu Rey (Eds.), *Histoire des mobilisations islamistes, d’Afghani à Baghdadi*, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2022.

⁷⁴ See: François Burgat, **Understanding Political Islam**, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020.

identity and governance. Frampton uses extensive American and British archival research, as well as Muslim Brotherhood writings, to build a detailed account of the strained relationship between the West and the Muslim Brotherhood until the eve of the Arab Spring in 2011. At the same time, he does not deny that there is ambivalence in the Muslim Brotherhood's approach, due to its oscillation between hostility to the West and the practical need to engage with Western powers.⁷⁵

Shadi Hamid argues that the political landscape in Muslim-majority countries cannot be fully understood without recognizing the historical and religious foundations of Islam. He suggests that the legacy of the Caliphate, which was abolished in 1924, continues to influence modern political dynamics. This historical context shapes contemporary conflicts and models of governance, making the direct adoption of Western-style secularism unlikely.⁷⁶

Relatedly in his book “Voice of the South”, Burgat explores how colonial legacies and post-colonial state-building efforts have influenced the evolution of Islamist ideologies.⁷⁷ Like Carré in ‘Islamic Utopias’, he discusses the interplay between religious ideals and social realities, and how these idealized visions influence contemporary political movements, taking into account factors such as nationalism, colonialism and modernity.⁷⁸

In 1922, the Turkish People’s Assembly decided to abolish the Ottoman caliphate. Immediately afterward, some Muslims institutions, groups, and senior personalities called for restoring the Caliphate, for this was not just an internal Turkish affair. In addition, Egypt’s mosque university of Al-Azhar and India’s Caliphate Society were among the early advocates of reviving the Caliphate.⁷⁹

For political Islam movements, politics is a central necessity of the call to Islam, in the sense that it is an existential condition. Because of this, the definition of Islam becomes embedded in the state, and the slogan "Islam is a religion and a state" becomes their

⁷⁵ Martyn Frampton, **The Muslim Brotherhood and the West: A History of Enmity and Engagement**, London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2018, pp. 1-56.

⁷⁶ Osman Baş, “Shadi Hamid. Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle over Islam Is Reshaping the World”, **Divan Disiplinlerarası Çalışmalar Dergisi**, Vol. (23), No. (44), (July 2018), pp. 175-178.

⁷⁷ François Burgat, **Political Islam: The voice of the south (1988)**, by Loren Zakari (Trans.), *Dar Al-Alam Al-Thalh*, 2012.

⁷⁸ See: Olivier Carré, **L'utopie islamique dans l'Orient Arabe**, Presses de Sciences Po Academique, 1991.

⁷⁹ Ahmed Ali Salem, Challenging Authoritarianism, Colonialism, and Disunity: The Islamic political reform movements of Al-Afghani and Rida, **American journal of Islamic social science**, Vol. (21), No (2), (Spring 2004), p.45.

favorite slogan, and thus the call and the state become a single structural entity.⁸⁰ And, the best statehood model that Islamists have kept pure, has remained within the confines of the idealized model derived from the jurisprudential historical codes, namely the experience of the Prophet (PBUH) and the Rashidah Caliphate.

1.2.2. Intellectual Basis of Islamism

It should be clearly understood in the very beginning that Islam is not a jumble of unrelated ideas and incoherent modes of conduct. It is rather a well-ordered system, a consistent whole, resting on a definite set of clear-cut postulates. Its major tenets, as well as detailed rules of conduct, are all derived from a logical connection with its basic principles. All the rules and regulations that Islam has laid down for the different spheres of human life are in their essence and spirit a reflection, an extension and corollary of its first principles. The various phases of Islamic life and activity flow from these fundamental postulates exactly as the plant sprouts forth from its seed. Therefore, whatever aspect of the Islamic ideology one may like to study, he must first go to the roots and look to the fundamental principles. Then and then alone he can have a really correct and satisfactory understanding of the ideology and its specific injunctions and a real appreciation of its spirit and nature.⁸¹

In his book *Islamic Political Theories*, Al-Raiis states that “Islam is not only a religion, but also a political system. Although in recent times - after the fall of the Caliphate - some self-described modernist Muslims have tried to separate the two aspects, the whole edifice of Islamic thinking has been built on the basis that the two aspects are inseparable”.⁸² Abdul-Qader Awdah states that “Islam created the Islamic state out of nothing, extended its limbs in all directions and made it a majestic state”.⁸³

According to Adlan “most of those who wrote about Islamic political jurisprudence from the ancients relied on the consensus and the actions of the Prophet (peace be upon him) to prove that the Imamate - the Islamic state - is obligatory. They cited evidence from the Qur'an and the Sunnah sporadically, and often cited them as the basis for consensus. They

⁸⁰ Abdul-Ghani Imad, "Post-Islamism: Ideological delusions and sociological realities", *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, Vol. (12), No. (3), (2019), pp. 3-20.

⁸¹ Abul A'la Al-Mawdudi, *The Political Theory of Islam*, In: Mansoor Moaddel, Kamran Talattof (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Islam*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, pp 263–271.

⁸² Muhammad Diaa al-Din al-Rais, *Al-Nazariyet alsiyasiya alIslamiya*, Cairo: Dar Al-Tanweer, 1955, p. 29.

⁸³ AbdulKader Awadah, *AllIslam Wa Awda'una Assiyassiya*, Mukhtar Book, 1979, p.114.

did not pay much attention to it, so the political Fiqh appeared as if it lacked the evidence from the Qur'an on the obligation of the Imamate - the obligation of the political system in Islam. This is what some writers relied on to deny the existence of the Islamic political system and describe Islam as a religion without a state. They relied on an origin from which they had previously branched out, namely their denial that "ijma" consensus is an authority on this issue".⁸⁴

For Islamists, politics is one of the central necessities of Da'wa, in the sense that it is an existential condition. Because of this, the definition of Islam becomes synonymous with the state. According to the Islamic political theory, "Islam is a religion and a state" and thus the dawah and the state become one and the same. With or without an Orientalist outlook, almost none of them disagree with each other that the Islamists' ultimate goal is "the establishment of the Islamic state".⁸⁵

At this point the thesis refers to the solid foundations of Islamism. These are ideas or theories associated with Islamism. Anyone who denies - in absolute terms - the idea of the state in Islam and that Islamic law includes the general rules of Islamic governance cannot be an 'Islamist' according to the above definitions. This has nothing to do with the discussion of sharia law, the question of takfir, or the issue of the caliphate, whether it is a matter of jurisprudence or belief. Rather, it is a descriptive discussion of Islamists that contributes to understanding the shape and magnitude of their transformations.

1.2.3. The State in Islamic Political Thought

The evidence for the existence of the state and its foundations in Islam is numerous and numerous, and the thesis has tried to categorizes them into groups. At the verbal level, the Holy Quran contains many linguistic terms with a political meaning, whether related to governance or the ruler, such as;

- Weelayah: There is a guardianship for the rightful God who is the best reward and the best punishment - Surah Al-Kahf 44.
- Ruling: It was not for a man to give God the Book, the Wisdom and the Prophethood and then say to the people, 'Be my servants' - Surah Al Imran 79.

⁸⁴ Atiya Adlan, *AlAhkam Alshariya fi Alnawazeel Alsiyassiya*, 3, Cairo: Al-lajna Ashariya lel Hukuk wal Islah, 2011, p. 28.

⁸⁵ Abdul-Ghani Imad, *Post-Islamism: Ideological delusions and sociological realities*, pp. 3-20.

- Mulk: Mentioned in 42 verses, including: Or do they have a share of the kingdom, and if they do not give the people a share, they do not give them a share - Surah al-Nisa 53.
- Sultan: It is mentioned in 24 verses, all in the sense of judgement, not ruler, including the saying: 'My servants have no authority over you: My servants have no authority over you, and your Lord is sufficient as a steward - Surah Al-Israa' 65.

Some of these words are related to the ruler itself, such as;

- Wali: used in 33 verses. The word waliya is used in 34 verses. Example: Almighty Allah says: If Allah wills evil against a people, there is no way out of it, and they have no guardian without Him - Surah Al-Ra'd 11.
- Imam: On the day we call each person by their Imam - Surah Al-Asraa 71: And we will make them Imams and make them heirs - Surah Al-Talaqs 5: And we will make them heirs.
- Khalifa: which is mentioned in 3 verses, including: 'And your Lord said to the angels, "I will make in the earth a caliph" - Surah Al-Baqarah 30.

The Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), also contain a lot of evidence and instructions related to governance. The first group, in which the Holy Qur'an stipulates through many verses on justice, shura, obedience, congregation and commitment to the authority, in a series of verses that can only be applied by establishing a state and a political system based on the rules and rulings.⁸⁶ The enactment of such rulings prerequisites the necessity of the Imamate and the establishment of the Islamic state in the Muslim society, as it is a prerequisite to the enactment of the rule of the Imamate. This leads us to conclude that the necessity of the Imamate and the establishment of the state in the Islamic society is one of the axioms and necessities of Islamic law.⁸⁷ Such verses include, but are not limited to, the Almighty saying "And their command is Shura among them", Shura 38. The establishment of the concept of Shura requires the establishment of an Islamic state that applies it.

⁸⁶ Abdul Karim Zaidan, *Majmouat alBouhous alFighiyah*, Beirut: Al-Risala Foundation, 1402 Hijri, p. 12.

⁸⁷ Abdullah O. S. Al-Damijji, *Al-Imama Al-Ouzma Zenda Ahli Sunnah wal Jama'ah*, 1, Riyadh: Dar Taybah, 1987, p. 49.

The second group consists of a large group of Qur'anic verses that can only be implemented if a state exists. They are verses that address a nation with a system of government. They are related to the provisions of “hudud” (punishment), such as the limit of theft, the limit of adultery, the limit of slander, the limit of “haraba”, the provisions of “qisas” (punishment for crimes), blood money, and the rest of the penal system. From this group, the verses that regulate behavior and transactions, such as selling and renting, gift, will, quarantine, bankruptcy, mortgage, agency, and sponsorship. Other issues of so-called civil law include verses that regulate the economy and administration, and verses that legislate the rules of marriage, divorce, breastfeeding, alimony, custody, betrothal, counting, and other provisions related to the family, which can be called personal status law. Verses that require the collection of zakat from the people of zakat and its disbursement in a form specified by the Holy Quran. Others are for solidarity, social solidarity and co-operation for good. All of these things can only be carried out by governments and states.⁸⁸ Similarly, all these criminal, financial, international and constitutional provisions cannot make sense unless the Qur'an requires Muslims to organize the government and establish the state. It does not make sense for Islam to present these provisions in its book to a state that does not believe in it or is not based on its doctrine and principles.⁸⁹

The third group of verses commands Muslims to unite on the truth and reject division. The command to preserve this group (Ummah) is found in a large number of verses. For example “and hold fast to the rope of Allah, and do not divide”, Surah Al-Imran 13. The study metaphorically calls these verses “the verses of the Islamic Nation”.

In the fourth group of verses, Allah has promised His believing servants that He will inherit the earth, and that He will succeed them in it and empower them. This can only be done with a state, a system, an army and a force. One of these verses is “And We have written in the Zabur after the remembrance that the earth will be inherited by my righteous servants”, Surah Al-Anbiya 105.

The fifth group of verses are the inferences made by the scholars from various verses. For example, Allah says, “O you who believe, obey Allah, obey the Messenger and obey

⁸⁸ Abdul-Kader Awdah, *Al-Islam wa Awd'ouna Assiyasiya*, Cairo: Mukhtar Book, 1979, p. 88.

⁸⁹ Muhammad al-Moubarak, *Nizam Al-Islam wal Houkoum wal Dawla*, Cairo: Dar al-Fikr, undated, p.15.

those who are in authority among you”, Surat al-Nisa 59. The reasoning behind this verse is that Allah has made it obligatory for Muslims to obey Him. In other words, Allah has made it obligatory for Muslims to obey their parents, who are the Imams. The command to obey is a proof that it is obligatory to install a guardian because Allah does not command obedience to those who do not exist.⁹⁰

The Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) also contain evidence and instructions related to governance. The first group of the hadiths regulate the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, requiring the ruler to do justice and protect his subjects, and the subjects to listen, obey, and be patient. For example, the Prophet (peace be upon him) said that “Seven whom Allah will shade in His shadow on the Day of Resurrection, on the day when there is no shadow except His shadow: A just imam.”⁹¹ There are a number of hadiths in which the Messenger of Allah addresses the subjects, i.e. the people. In another hadith the Messenger of Allah said “obedience to an Imam is a right for a Muslim unless he orders against Allah, but if he orders against Allah, then there is no obedience to him.”⁹²

Like the Qur'an, the Sunnah contains detailed rulings on transactions, hudud, qisas, selling, buying, pawning, sponsorship, endowment, will, inheritance, marriage, divorce, separation, quarantine, bankruptcy, debts, guarantee, zakat, jihad, treaties and other rules and laws that regulate the internal affairs and external relations of the state. This can only be done through a system that complies with the rulings of these issues, otherwise what is the value of mentioning them in the Sunnah? The most important element is that Islam became a state in Medina. It had all the elements of a modern state, regardless of the projection of the modern concept of the state onto the state of Medina: ‘a group of people, submission to a specific system, a specific territory, authority, sovereignty over this territory, and moral personality.’⁹³

The consensus (Ijmaa)*⁹⁴ on the obligation of the Imamate and the establishment of the Islamic State is considered one of the highest levels of consensus, because it is the

⁹⁰ Al-Damijji, p. 47.

⁹¹ Al-Bukhari, *Sahih AlBoukhari*, Book of “Al Azhan”, chapter “Salatu alJama3a wal Imam”, Part 2, Hadith Nu. 6806.

⁹² Tammam Al-Razi, *AlFawa’ed*, Riyadh: AlRasheed Library, Part 1, Hadith Nu. 68, p. 37.

⁹³ Wahbi al-Zuhaili, *AlFiqh Al-Islami wa Adelatouh*, 4, Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1997, p. 6311.

⁹⁴ Ijmaa is one of the sources of Islamic legislation and is the third source of legitimate sources of judgements in general after the Book and the Sunnah, and its emergence was due to the new issues that arose after the death of the Prophet and became a source of necessity, and because the Prophet warned against division and disagreement and urged meeting

consensus of the Companions. And because it is the consensus of the Islamic nation - in knowledge and practice - over the long centuries until the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate. It is recognized that Consensus “Ijmaa is the strongest tenet in the rules of the Shari'ah and is the means to a conclusive auditory belief.”⁹⁵ The consensus of the Companions, was not doubted by any of the respected Muslim imams on this issue. Similarly, the consensus of the nation after them in knowledge and practice has not been disputed by anyone who has any weight in the religion of Allah. Those who belonged to Islam, despite the dispersion of sects and different demands, agreed on the establishment of the Imamate,⁹⁶ and only the Najdat of the Kharijites and Al-Asim of the Mu'tazilites deviated from this consensus. No one has said that such anomalies harm the consensus. Especially since the consensus was held during the time of the companions and followers before the emergence of these people.⁹⁷

1.2.4. Islamists and the Nation State

The principle of sovereignty to Sharia or the application of Sharia “Al-Hakimiyyah” means that the ruler and the people adhere to the principles of the political system. The ruler and the people are committed to the fundamentals of the political system and the governing principles of sharia politics governed by Islamic law. This is because the state in Islam is founded on the principle of sharia and its foundation, the obligation to fulfil people's rights and rule with justice. It is the responsibility of the state to establish the principle of the supremacy of ‘Sharia law’ from the Holy Qur'an, the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), and Ijtihad. It is argued that to the extent that the caliph adheres to the principle of legitimacy, he must be obeyed, as he is a ruler bound by the rules and judgements laid down for him by the Sharia.⁹⁸

In other interpretations, the basis for God's sovereignty “Al-Hakimiyyah” is “The whole earth is God's, and He is its Lord and controller of its affairs, as believers believe.”

in many hadiths. Ijma' must be based on a source from the Book and the Sunnah, which are the revelations and the first two basic sources of legislation.

⁹⁵ Al-Jouwayni, *Ghiyathu el-Oumam fi el-Tiyath al-Zoulam*, Alexandria: Dar Al-Da'wah, 1400 Hijri, p. 16.

⁹⁶ Al-Jouwayni, p. 16.

⁹⁷ Atiya Adlan, *AlAhkam Alshariya fi Alnawazeel Alsiyasiya*, pp. 55- 56.

⁹⁸ Abu al-Yazid Ali Al-Matit, *Political Systems and Public Freedoms*, 3, Alexandria: University Youth Foundation, 1982, P.12.

According to Mawdudi's vision,⁹⁹ “command, legislation and governance are reserved for God alone, and no individual, family, class, nation or people, or indeed the entire human race, has any authority to command and legislate.”¹⁰⁰ However, this brief and inclusive definition does not negate the differing opinions about the definition of this concept of “governance” and its rooting among Islamists and others. There is a view that this concept expresses the essence of Islamic political and legal theory. It has roots in the Quran and the Islamic heritage. What Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb did was to “reveal the existence of this concept.”¹⁰¹ In other words, before the fall of the last Islamic state, there was no need to talk about this concept.

On the other hand, supporters of the non-Islamic movement argue that this concept is not fundamentalist, but rather a product of certain historical and social circumstances, and that the first people who put forward this concept were the Kharijites,¹⁰² in the battle of Siffin, in opposition to the incident of arbitration between Imam Ali and Muawiya bin Abi Sufyan, when the Kharijites went from the idea of the rule of God alone to rejecting the principle of human arbitration.¹⁰³ Then it appeared again at the hands of Abu al-Ali Mawdudi, as a result of the political and social conditions in which the Muslim minority was living in the Indian subcontinent, as a result of the political and social conditions in the Indian subcontinent.

Al-Mawdudi divided al-Hakimiyyah into two parts, political al-Hakimiyyah and legal al-Hakimiyyah. As for the legal “Al-Hakimiyyah”, it belongs to God Almighty alone. Al-Mawdudi argued that the Prophet Muhammad was the representative of this “Al-Hakimiyyah”. The prophets and messengers are the means by which we learn what the law or sharia law has laid down for us. For this reason, Islam ordered Muslims to fully obey the Messenger of Allah. He made this principle a categorical one of his principles. As for the political “Al-Hakimiyyah”, God has also made it for himself as the supreme

⁹⁹ Abul-Ala al-Mawdudi is an Islamic thinker and founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami in India (1903-1979). He is one of the most important advocates of the revival of Islam as a comprehensive approach to life: Qur'anic interpretation, jurisprudence, history, and politics.

¹⁰⁰ Abul-Ala al-Mawdudi, *Minhaj al inqilab al-Islami*, 3, Cairo: Dar Al-Arouba for Printing, p. 19.

¹⁰¹ Waleed Salem Mohammed, *The Political Participation of the Islamic Movement in Contemporary Arab Political Systems*, Beirut: Dar Al-Nahda, 2014, pp. 90-91.

¹⁰² Abdul-Ghani Imad, *Hakimiyatu Allah w Sultan Al Faqih*, 2, Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 2005, p. 12.

¹⁰³ Mohammed Abu Zahra, *Tarih al Mazahib Al-Islamiyyah fi Siyassa wal Akaed*, Baghdad: Dar Al-Ittihad Al-Arabi for Printing, Undated, pp. 65-71.

ruler, but he sees the nation as his deputy in the caliphate.¹⁰⁴ This is a reference to the role of the nation in implementing these rulings, contrary to the idea of the Kharijites.

For Sayyid Qutb, “Al-Hakimiyyah” implies the truth of the relationship between God, the universe and man, and the submission of the universe and man to the will of God. He is the Creator, and therefore the knower of the conditions and qualities of his creation. Therefore, according to the theory, departing from this “Al-Hakimiyyah” under the pretext that it is not in accordance with the interests of humans and establishing human legislation to which they adhere without the divine law is ‘delusion and disbelief.’¹⁰⁵ According to this concept “Al-Hakimiyyah”, Sharia does not deny the right of human beings to make ijtiḥād to manage the affairs of their lives, but according to the conditions established under divine “Al-Hakimiyyah” in matters where there is no text.

In the same context, the Islamic theory's focus on divine “Al-Hakimiyyah” is due to the perceived departure of society from the Islamic approach due to the colonial situation and the subsequent intellectual invasion, which distorted the scales and values in favor of the colonialist and his legacy. This resulted in the suspension of Islamic law and the adoption of a non-Islamic or secular path by the national authorities that came to power after independence.

1.2.5. Islamist Groups and Governance: Between Acceptance and Reservation

In fact, the concept of governance was expanded by Mawdudi and Qutb, and further expanded by the Islamic groups that adopted it. It took on various dimensions and overlapped with other concepts such as: “Jahiliyyah”, disbelief and faith. Mawdudi and Qutb introduced this concept to confront the secular political project of independence states after the departure of direct colonization. A large number of Islamist groups have adopted the idea of legal “Al-Hakimiyyah”, such as the Islamic Group and the Jihad Group in Egypt, and forbade entering parliaments until the January 25 Revolution. Hizb ut-Tahrir believes that democracy is a blasphemous principle that contradicts Islam, because Allah is the sole legislator who set the human order and made the state part of the rulings of Islam. The party differentiates the difference between sovereignty “Al-Hakimiyyah” and authority. Sovereignty belongs to the sharia and power belongs to the

¹⁰⁴ See: Abul-Ala al-Mawdudi, *Minhaj al Inqilab al-Islami*.

¹⁰⁵ Waleed Salem Mohammed, *The Political Participation of the Islamic Movement in the Contemporary Arab Political System*, Beirut: Dar al-Nahda al-Arabiya, 2014, p. 59.

nation. In this way, the party agrees with the opinion of the existing opinion in taking legal and political governance. He expressed legal “Al-Hakimiyyah” as the sovereignty of the Shari'ah and made it belong to God Almighty. As for political “Al-Hakimiyyah”, according to Al-Mawdudi, it is God Almighty and its representation on earth - the Caliphate - considering that this power or authority is restricted by a higher law that it has no right to change.¹⁰⁶

Despite the adoption of the concept in this formulation, it met with strong and severe opposition from some political Islamist thinkers, especially due to its consequences, “takfir” and “violence”. For example, the second General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan Al-Hudaibi, initially responded to Sayyid Qutb through dialogues he held with the Qutbist movement inside and outside prisons.¹⁰⁷

Al-Hudaibi - and a number of Islamic groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood - believe that God Almighty has left many of the world's affairs for people to organize according to what their minds see, based on the purposes and objectives set by God, and ordered to achieve them, provided that they “do not prohibit haram and do not prohibit halal”. This is the Muslim Brotherhood's understanding of the issue of “Al-Hakimiyyah”, which resulted in their acceptance and even demand for parliamentary elections and entry into parliament, even before the January 25 Revolution.

Al-Qaradawi, in his memoirs, says “the idea of governance has been misunderstood by many, and they have included in its concept what its owners did not see. What Mawdudi and Qutb meant was, “Al-Hakimiyyah” in the legislative sense. It is not an invention of theirs, but an authentic Islamic idea. In the sense that God is the legislator of His creatures, permitting and forbidding them. However, it does not deny that human beings have the ability to legislate. Rather, it prevents them from having unauthorized legislative independence, such as purely religious legislation. In this context, we note that the question of the application of Sharia is one of the most debated issues in the era of the Arab revolutions, between Islamists and other leftists or liberals, revolutionaries and non-revolutionaries.

¹⁰⁶ Abul-Ala al-Mawdudi, **The Codification of the Islamic Constitution**, Muhammad Assem Haddad (trans), in *The Theory and Guidance of Islam in Politics, Law and Constitution*, Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1946, p. 152.

¹⁰⁷ Radwan A. S. Al-Shaibani, **Islamic Fundamentalist Movements in the Arab World**, Cairo: Madbouly Library, 2006, pp. 220-221.

If sovereignty in Islam is for God alone, it is without a partner. The ruler who governs the people, be it a caliph, the Commander of the Faithful or otherwise, is in Islam the representative of the nation, its agent, its caretaker, and the guardian of its interests. Ibn Khaldun mentioned the right of the nation to choose the ruler or the Imam, “He speaks of the installation of the Imam as one of the duties of sufficiency. The majority of the nation has the right to choose the ruler.”¹⁰⁸

Shura in the Islamic political system is the consultation of the opinion of the nation or the people of the solution and contract, or those with specialization and expertise in general matters in which the opinion has an entry point to extract the best opinion expressing the will of the nation and put it into practice. The Almighty said, “And their command is a shura among them, and their command is the matter of governance or the issue of the Imamate.”¹⁰⁹ This is the issue that is often debated when discussing the issue of democracy, which we will elaborate on in the next chapter.

If the Ummah is the holder of the authority (choice) and the Imam is its agent and deputy, then the relationship between them is not just a relationship between a principal and an agent. Rather, it is a relationship of complementarity under the supremacy of the Shari'ah. The Imam has duties towards the subjects and the subjects have duties towards the Imam, and the accurate scale that defines rights and duties, decides in case of dispute, and is referred to in case of disagreement, is the Quran and the Sunnah. The Holy Quran has established this relationship in two verses of its book, “Allah commands you to pay the trusts to their rightful owners, and if you judge between people, judge with justice, for Allah is a blessing that He exhorts you, for Allah was hearing and seeing. O you who believe, obey Allah, obey the Messenger and those who are in authority over you, and if you dispute something, refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if you believe in Allah and the Last Day, that is the best and best interpretation”, Surah An-Nisa, 58 - 59.

The scholars said, the first verse was revealed about the rulers (rulers) who have to pay the trusts to their people. The second verse is revealed in the shepherds, from the armies and others, who must obey the rulers unless they are ordered to disobey, for there is no obedience to a creature in disobedience to the Creator. If they differ on anything, they

¹⁰⁸ Ibn Khaldun, *AlMuqaddimah*, Alexandria: Dar Ibn Khaldun, undated, p. 193.

¹⁰⁹ Atiya Adlan, p. 87.

should refer it to the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace.¹¹⁰

Muslims today are increasingly developing their own history as an ethical practice. This does not mean that any of their main discourses are calling for the restoration of sharia in its traditional form, institutions, practices and interpretations. Rather, it means that Muslims still find in their history a source on which they can build to meet the challenges of the modern project.¹¹¹ Al-Huwaiyrini claims that the West is well aware that Islamic culture explains - to a large extent - the failure of the idea of democracy and liberalism and its conflict with Islamic fundamentalism. For the West, the nation-state is the pinnacle of political loyalty, while in the Islamic world, many Muslim thinkers believe that the idea of the modern nation-state may conflict with the idea of the governance of Allah and the priority of achieving the interests of the Islamic nation.¹¹² This is what Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, Bernard Lewis and other Western theorists have stressed.¹¹³

Especially since the Islamic political theory is based on humanitarian ethical foundations in a way that achieves its distinctiveness and reflects on human life in its various dimensions.¹¹⁴ Wael Hallak emphasizes the organic connection between Sharia and its ethical dimensions. He argues that Shari'ah cannot be understood and cannot function in any social context without its ethical implications. Shari'ah without a moral society is not Shari'ah. The origins of legal, social and other ethics are, in his view, largely due to the scientific power of the Five Pillars. These performative acts establish morality, which enforces voluntary submission to the authority of the law. Excluding these pillars from jurisprudence means removing the moral foundations of the law and depriving it of the strongest motives of legal obligation and commitment.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰ Ibn Taymiyyah, *Asiyassa Ashariya fi Islah AlRa'I walRa'ya*, Basheer Ouyoun (Ed), Damascus: Dar AlBayan, 1985, p. 6.

¹¹¹ Ibn Taymiyyah, p. 48.

¹¹² Al-Huwaiyrini, pp. 1-25.

¹¹³ See: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

¹¹⁴ See: Ahmet Davutoglu, *Political Philosophy*, Ibrahim Bayoumi Ghanem (Trans.), Cairo: Al-Shorouk International Library, 2006.

¹¹⁵ Wael Hallaq, *the Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity's Moral Dilemma*, Amr Othman (Trans.), Doha: Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, 2014, p. 220.

Indeed, this moral and ethical dimension of the Islamic political theory and the principles it carries derive from the fact of believing in monotheism and the fact that man is subject only to the authority of God alone. Islamic political theory is characterized by its symbiotic and cooperative dimension among the members of the nation compared to the Western theory, which has not been able to limit the abuse of power by some socio-economic groups. The symbiotic view involves a great deal of moral solidarity that is determined by a comprehensive worldview and a universal law that makes zakat, for example, a right of the poor over the rich: Zakat is a right of the poor over the rich.¹¹⁶

Rabie determines that ethics governs the ruler and the ruled, the individual and the state. He also believes that the principle of justice remains at the center of individual behavior for the ruler and the ruled. For him, justice must be viewed from two perspectives: Firstly, justice is a function. That is justice becomes one of the goals or tasks that the political group seeks to achieve, i.e. a fixed goal of the political system. Secondly, the justice of the system consists of a set of procedures, guarantees and institutions.¹¹⁷

Despite all of the above, the implementation of this project is fought. It imposes challenges and conditions on the holders of this project in order to be internationally accepted. Otherwise, counter-revolutions or international intervention will be present.

Wael Hallak -for example- starts from the premise that the concept of the 'Islamic State' is unrealizable. This is due to the fundamental difference between the philosophical and moral foundations of the modern state and those of Islamic law. He points out that the modern state relies on the principle of sovereignty, which separates moral and religious values, while Islamic law is based on divine moral foundations. Consequently, any attempt to Islamize the modern model of the state will face structural crises due to the modern state's lack of a moral foundation that provides a good life for human beings.¹¹⁸ In doing so, he offers a critical vision of the modern state on the one hand, and emphasizes the impossibility of integrating it with traditional Islamic concepts of governance on the other. He also emphasizes the uniqueness of the Islamic project.

¹¹⁶ Ahmet Davutoglu, **The Islamic World in the Blow of Civilizational Transformation**, Ibrahim Bayoumi Ghanem (Trans.), Cairo: Al-Shorouk International Library, 2006, p. 53.

¹¹⁷ Fahed Al-Zumai, **On Islamic Political Theory - A Critical Analytical Study of the Paths of Development in the History of Sunni and Shiite Political Thought**, Kuwait: Nohoudh endowment for Development Studies, 2018. pp. 160-196.

¹¹⁸ Hallaq, p. 220.

Moreover, the challenges of this project are great, including the political, economic, security and cultural challenges that prevent the establishment of this Islamic state.¹¹⁹ These challenges are not independent of each other, because the military power centers are almost the same as the sources of cultural and economic domination, represented by the United States of America and its allies. Therefore, Islamic rule as an existential entity will always be under mortal threat.¹²⁰ This raises the question, what is the strategy and how can the holders of this project follow in order to reach their goal? Reform and gradualism, or revolution and violence, or shifting between them according to the exigencies of the stage and confrontation, or something else? Or through a set of intellectual and political changes and transformations?

1.3. Islamists intellectual Revisions

Terms like “transition”, “transformation”, “change”, “shift”, “convert” and “fluctuations” are interconnected through their implications of movement or alteration within systems, whether they be physical, economic, psychological or intellectual. But what is the specific term can be used to describe the status of political Islamic movements through and post Arab revolts (2010-2024)?

Change means to become different, or to make someone or something become different.¹²¹ If you change from one thing to another, you stop using or doing the first one and start using or doing the second.¹²² Transition means a change or shift from one state, subject, place, etc. to another. Or, a period or phase in which such a change or shift is happening.¹²³ A passing or passage from one condition, action, or (rarely) place, to another; change.¹²⁴ Transform means to change the form of; to change into another shape or form; to metamorphose. The action of changing in form, shape, or appearance; metamorphosis.¹²⁵ To change in composition or structure. To change the outward form

¹¹⁹ Hallaq, p. 26.

¹²⁰ Hallaq, p. 270.

¹²¹ **Cambridge dictionary**, Change, UK: Cambridge press, undated. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english-turkish/change> (7 May 2023)

¹²² **Collins dictionary**, Change, Glasgow: HarperCollins, undated. https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/change#google_vignette (7 May 2023)

¹²³ **Merriam Webster dictionary**, Transition, Massachusetts: Merriam Webster, undated, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transition> (7 May 2023)

¹²⁴ **Oxford English dictionary**, Transition, UK: Oxford University Press, undated, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/transition_n?tab=meaning_and_use&tl=true#17951425 (7 May 2023)

¹²⁵ **Oxford English dictionary**, Transformation, UK: Oxford University Press, undated, <https://www.oed.com/search/advanced/Entries?sortOption=AZ&textTermOpt0=WordPhrase&dateOfUseFirstUse=false&page=0&jumpTo=transform> (7 May 2023)

or appearance of, to change in character or condition.¹²⁶ Convert means to change the appearance, form, or purpose of something.¹²⁷ To bring over from one belief, view, or party to another.¹²⁸ Shift means if someone's opinion, a situation, or a policy shifts or is shifted, it changes slightly.¹²⁹ Or to exchange for or replace by another, change. Or to change the place, position, or direction of move.¹³⁰ Switch means to change from one thing to another.¹³¹ A shift from one to another. Or, a change from the usual.¹³² Fluctuation means is an act or instance of fluctuating, an irregular shifting back and forth or up and down in the level, strength, or value of something.¹³³ Or, constant change; vacillation; instability.¹³⁴

What these terms have in common are change of state and dynamic processes. They all refer to some form of change or modification. Each term refers to a dynamic process rather than a static state. However, this does not eliminate the differences between them. For example, in physics and chemistry, 'transitions' can refer to phase changes where substances change their state due to external conditions such as temperature or pressure. In economics, 'changes' and 'transitions' describe evolving market conditions, which can lead to new business dynamics. In psychology, the concept of 'fluctuations' may be associated with periods of instability that precede significant developmental shifts or personal growth.¹³⁵

The processes described by these terms often exhibit non-linear characteristics. For example, in systems theory, important changes may not occur incrementally but through

¹²⁶ **Merriam Webster dictionary**, Transform, Massachusetts: Merriam Webster, undated, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transform> (7 May 2023)

¹²⁷ **Cambridge dictionary**, Convert, UK: Cambridge, undated, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english-turkish/convert> (7 May 2023)

¹²⁸ **Merriam Webster dictionary**, Convert, Massachusetts: Merriam Webster, undated, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/convert>. (7 May 2023)

¹²⁹ **Collins dictionary**, Shift, Glasgow: HarperCollins, undated, <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/shift> (7 May 2023)

¹³⁰ **Merriam Webster dictionary**, Shift, Massachusetts: Merriam Webster, undated, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/shift>. (7 May 2023)

¹³¹ **Cambridge dictionary**, Switch, UK: Cambridge, undated. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english-turkish/switch>. (7 May 2023)

¹³² **Merriam Webster dictionary**, Switch, Massachusetts: Merriam Webster, undated, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/switch>. (7 May 2023)

¹³³ **Merriam Webster**, Fluctuation, Massachusetts: Merriam Webster, undated, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fluctuation> (7 May 2023)

¹³⁴ **Collins dictionary**, Fluctuation, Glasgow: HarperCollins, undated, <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/fluctuation> (7 May 2023)

¹³⁵ Olga Nosova, "Transformation Shifts in Economy: Basic Approaches", **Eurasian Journal of Higher Education**, Vol. (1), No.(1), pp.1-16.

sudden shifts or critical fluctuations that signal a transition point.¹³⁶ This is evident in many complex systems where small changes can lead to significant outcomes - gradualism. The transformation of a system involves multiple shifts and fluctuations as it adapts to new conditions or challenges.¹³⁷

Ultimately, transitions, changes, transformations and fluctuations share a fundamental connection by representing the processes that involve change and adaptation within different systems. They also highlight the fluidity and complexity inherent in both natural and man-made environments. Some may see a fundamental difference between them, arguing that change is the normal response to external forces, while transformation is a fundamental rearrangement that may include changing core beliefs, central assumptions, driving values, and even one's sense of identity. However, transformation is not the same as change. Change is when something new begins. Transformation is the opposite. It often happens when something old falls away. It happens after a crisis, when something we have learnt to rely on is gone. Not all crises, of course, lead to transformation. When something we've grown accustomed to or addicted to be taken away, it either turns bitter or transforms.¹³⁸

According to all the previous definitions, are what happened with the Islamists during and after the revolution considered real fundamental shifts or temporary tactics? Are they due to internal convictions, external pressures, or both? Have they overthrown what they were ideologically before, and there is no going back to them afterwards? Are these shifts going in a straight line towards a goal that may take them out of the circle of 'Islamism' to something new, or is it a development within Islamism itself, or random, irregular and aimless swings imposed by reality? Can the thesis conclude that these transformations are the result of accumulations from before the revolution?

1.3.1. Intellectual Reviews of Egyptian Islamists

The nature of history is a permanent movement, and societies, groups and individuals are the representation of this movement, so their positions and discourses change according to many variables and influences. In this context, the phenomenon of 'revisions' among

¹³⁶ Hayes AM and others, "Change is not always linear: the study of nonlinear and discontinuous patterns of change in psychotherapy", *Clin Psychol Review*, Vol. (27), No. (6), (July 2007), pp. 715 – 723.

¹³⁷ Cue Math, Transformations, <https://www.cuemath.com/geometry/transformations/> (23 Feb 2024)

¹³⁸ Jonathan Merritt, "The Difference Between Change and Transformation", *Jonathan Merritt website*, Feb 2022, <https://www.jonathanmerritt.com/article/2022/2/2/the-difference-between-change-and-transformation> (23 Feb 2024)

Islamic movements or some intellectual symbols can be understood with this principle. Especially after the 1990s, these movements changed their discourse and political practice in parallel with the development of their ideas and political practice, and in light of a number of regional and international variables, such as the Iranian revolution, the end of the Cold War (1991), the second Gulf War (1991), the events of 11 September 2001, the invasion of Iraq (2003), the aggression against the Gaza Strip (repeatedly), the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, and the Arab Revolutions.

The history of revisions within Islamic movements dates back to the 1940s, which was led by Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, himself when some members of the private organization departed from the group's ideas and purposes, forcing al-Banna to clarify all this through statements and private letters, clarifying the concepts of his call. The thesis also presented the response of the second General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Hadibi, in his book 'Preachers Not Judges', which is considered one of the intellectual revisions within the Brotherhood as well.

The most prominent intellectual revision in the history of Islamist movements was in the late 1990s, when the Islamic Jihad issued an initiative to stop violence. In 2002, the Egyptian authorities responded favorably to these revisions, leading to the dissolution of the two groups and the release of thousands of detainees. However, the release did not include Tarek al-Zumar and his cousin Abboud al-Zumar, who were accused of assassinating former Egyptian President Mohamed Anwar Sadat, despite their revisions in 2005 and al-Zumar's publication of the book 'Revisions, Not Retractions', as they declared their commitment to exercising their political rights. The author conducted an interview with Tarek al-Zumar in Istanbul 2021. The author discussed these revisions, leading up to the establishment of the Building and Development Party, which was headed by Tarek al-Zumar after the 25 January Revolution. Tariq al-Zumar's ideas and perceptions in his last book in 2005 were not presented in revisionist books before, especially since he called for political participation by Islamist movements, which was unacceptable to the Salafist and jihadist movement in particular. Al-Zumar emphasized that the initiative launched by the Islamic group in 1997, which called for the cessation of military operations in Egypt, did not mean a defeat of the Islamic project or a withdrawal from society, but rather a realignment of the situation and priorities of the awakening and the Islamic movement, he said. He pointed out that the most important

mistakes of the past 15 years in the history of the 'Islamic movement' are due to the failure to accurately read the changes in the surrounding reality, especially at the international level. He pointed out that there are a number of challenges resulting from the new reality, the most important of which is the American unilateralism in leading the international system and considering the war on terrorism as one of the priorities of this system, which put Islam in the face of the world. As for the situation after the Arab revolutions, the Brotherhood did not hesitate to establish the party, run for parliament and participate in the Constituent Assembly for drafting the constitution in March 2011.¹³⁹

Within Islamist movements and groups, there have also been revisions towards democracy, politics, and citizenship. The Al-Wasat Party, which represents some representatives of the seventy-something generation that emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood through an accumulated critical process that took place within the body of the group and then broke with it, and the Badil Movement, which represents the ninety-something generation that is now crystallizing its proposal away from the group's old foundations. There are also revisions from individuals who are considered at the center of the Islamic movement, but who have moved away from its organizations, who did not agree with the previous revisions and issued relatively different revisions, such as the revisions of Abboud al-Zumar. However, the space for revisions widens with regard to the Islamic reference point, and there are the revisions of converts from other currents, such as Abdel Wahab al-Misiri, Munir Shafiq, Tariq al-Bishri, and others. There are also partial revisions on the position on heritage, such as the revisions of Dr. Zaki Naguib Mahmoud, who some Islamist thinkers claim has retreated from his secularism towards fundamentalist thought.¹⁴⁰

Accordingly, the revisions can be divided into several axes, including: The transition from military jihadism to the peaceful option, the transition from revolutionary action to political participation, and the post-political participation revisions, the last of which is the newest, if you will, represented by the Ikhwan movement in general. These groups include the Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, the Ennahda

¹³⁹ Tarek al-Zumar, the Chairman of the Building and Development Party – "Islamists in Egypt and the January 25 Revolution", Istanbul: (22 July 2021).

¹⁴⁰ See: Bilal Telidi, **Islamist Revisions: A Study in the Transformations of the Political and Epistemological Paradigm**, Beirut: Nama' Centre for Research and Studies, 2013.

Movement in Tunisia and its party, and the Movement for Unification and Reform and its Justice and Development Party in Morocco.¹⁴¹

On the other hand, these reviews or transformations take on a negative meaning among their opponents, amounting to accusations in religion, retreat from constants, complete submission to the compulsions of reality, and humiliating response to the demands of the security authorities. According to a number of observers in this regard. Others, according to what the author observed in the comments on the content dealing with the reviews, believe that ‘the so-called “reviews” are a setback due to a lack of planning or tactical defeat. Instead of re-planning and continuing strongly on the same path - as the coup military did in Egypt - you see them turning on their heels and dressing this withdrawal in deceptive and hollow names that only benefit the authority.’¹⁴² At the very least, they come as a result of the ‘revisions’.

Or, at the very least, they come as a response to external factors, as they argue that ‘even if we believe that the intellectual reviews of the Islamic group came from within without direct influence from the outside, and that they are the result of scientific maturity and reflections provided by the opportunity of ample time in prisons. This would not deny that it is an experience influenced by the reality of imprisonment and defeat in the face of the power of the authority, as it is not conceivable that the prisoner's intellectual revisions could be customized to the size required by the jailer. This result is easy to visualize if we turn a blind eye to all the means of violence, oppression and torture that accompanied this imprisonment. No matter how much those who write intellectual reviews imagine that it is a purely subjective work, it is in fact part of the authority's program to ‘codify’ groups that oppose it, and intellectual review can only be a way out of prisons when the authority itself believes that it has achieved its purpose from these reviews and that they come exactly to its size.’¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Atiya Adlan, - the chairman of Al-Islah Party - “Islamists in Egypt and the January 25 Revolution”, Istanbul: (1 Mart 2020).

¹⁴² As those Comments written below this article: Arabi21, ‘Islamist Revisions: A Retreat from the Constants or a Rational Self-Correction?’ (Arabic). 31 October 2017.

¹⁴³ Mohamed Elhamy, “Intellectual Revisions: Can they be the hope of detainees in Egyptian prisons A reading of the experience of the intellectual reviews of the Egyptian Islamic Group”, *Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies*, March 2020. <https://eipss-eg.org/author/%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A/> (22 Nov 2024)

1.3.2. The Transition from Islamism to Post-Islamism

In an interview in 2011 Olivier Roy, the French researcher who is deeply involved in political Islam, stated that “Islamist movements like Ennahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt can no longer even be called Islamists, they are conservatives analogous to the religious right in the US.”¹⁴⁴ This is what he calls "post-Islamism", much like socialist parties in Europe abandoned Marxism at some point in the 1970-80s, and Islamist movements have abandoned a pure Islamist framework by combining "a religious reference" with democracy in a plural political space. They cannot impose themselves, and they do not necessarily deal with issues such as women's rights in terms of Sharia, but in terms of family values.

Are some Islamic groups and movements still within the framework of Islamism? Or have their transformations led them to something different, new or opposite? There are three main perspectives on post-Islamism, the first assumes that political Islam has fundamentally failed to deliver on its promises, leading societies to look for alternatives. The second view suggests that political Islam is not static, but rather ‘evolves’ based on specific social and political contexts. It's like a historical stage. The third view claims that the post-Islamism phase represents a reshaping of Islamist ideas, not their outright failure, or the end of one era and the beginning of another.

Amin argues that the Islamists belief and practice of creating an Islamic order, Islamisation of state institutions and social organization has created enormous confusion, ambiguity and crisis, giving birth to a new trend called post-Islamism.¹⁴⁵ Actually, Post-Islamism was born in Europe in the early 1990s when two French authors, Olivier Carré and Olivier Roy, popularised the concept at the same time. But, in 2001, Olivier Roy recognised that it was Olivier Carré who first used the term.¹⁴⁶ For Olivier Carré, post-Islamism was primarily a historical paradigm and the great forgotten tradition of Islam.¹⁴⁷ He claims that post-Islamism as the longest period of Islam, the period between the tenth and nineteenth centuries when both Shiite and Sunni Islam were characterised by the separation of the political-military sphere from the religious sphere, both in theory and in

¹⁴⁴ Olivier Roy, [Les matins], Paris: France Culture Radio, (2011).

¹⁴⁵ Amin, P 17.

¹⁴⁶ Olivier Roy, *Les islamologues ont-ils inventé l'islamisme?* Paris: Esprit, 2001, p. 137.

¹⁴⁷ Olivier Carré, *L'Islam laïque ou le retour à la Grande Tradition*, Paris: Armand Colin, 1993. p. 21.

practice.¹⁴⁸ He argues that the twentieth century witnessed a departure from this path with the emergence of a new Hanbalism in Muslim societies and among Muslim scholars.

Olivier Roy argues that post-Islamism is a condition or consequence of the failure of political Islam to fulfil its promises and its transformation into a form of neo-fundamentalism that lacks the ability to unify the Muslim world or influence it in a form as a whole.¹⁴⁹ It claims that the aspirations of political Islam have not been realized, leading to its decline, and that instead of creating a cohesive political movement, political Islam has disintegrated into various forms that are often contradictory and ineffective. This failure is attributed to internal divisions and conflicts, especially between Sunni and Shia factions, as well as ethnic differences within the Muslim world. The political influence of the groups is exaggerated, as they do not have the capacity to change state structures or geopolitical dynamics significantly. Rather, the demand for democracy in countries with predominantly Muslim populations exceeds Islamic ideals, and claims that the ‘Arab Spring’ movements were more in pursuit of democratic governance than law enforcement. Roy describes fundamentalist Islam as a modern form of protest rather than a return to medieval ideologies. He suggests that it represents a combination of traditional Islamic principles and contemporary social and political issues.¹⁵⁰ The author believes that his conclusions may underestimate the potential of Islamic movements to regain influence and underestimate the challenges they face, distracting them from realizing their long-term project.

In 1996, Bayat gives this term a huge boost by his controversial essay “the Coming of a Post-Islamist Society.”¹⁵¹ Then he argued that some of the social and political scholar had been using this term in many ways and occasion to describe or analyze phenomenon, trends, endeavor related to political Islam movements. Everyone uses it on a new version. But, for him, post-Islamism is a conscious attempt to conceptualize and strategize the rationale and modalities of transcending Islamism in social, political, and intellectual domains. Yet, post-Islamism is neither anti-Islamic nor un-Islamic or secular. Rather it represents an endeavor to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty.

¹⁴⁸ Olivier Carré, *L'Islam laïque ou le retour à la Grande Tradition*, p. 22.

¹⁴⁹ Olivier Roy, *L'Échec de l'islam politique*, pp. 106-129.

¹⁵⁰ Olivier Roy, *L'Échec de l'islam politique*, pp. 106-129.

¹⁵¹ Asef Bayat, “The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society”, *Critique: Critical Middle East Studies*, Vol. (9), (1996), pp. 43–52.

It is an attempt to turn the underlying principles of Islamism on its head by emphasizing rights instead of duties, plurality in place of singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scriptures, and the future instead of the past. It wants to marry Islam with individual choice and freedom, with democracy and modernity, to achieve what some have called an “alternative modernity.”¹⁵² At the time of the Arab revolutions, Bayat notes that Islamist parties, such as Ennahda in Tunisia, are evolving towards more democratic frameworks, accepting pluralism and secular governance while continuing to rely on Islamic values. This development, he argues, indicates the possibility of co-operation between religious principles and democratic practices.¹⁵³ Post-Islamist theorists argued that Islamism would eventually be replaced by an individualised version of Islam based on the defence of civil rights and the separation of political and religious legitimacy.

As for post-Islamism, it is as a whole a “post” term characterized by a very liquid in terms of definition, philosophically, that the “post” refers to the end of certain trends without succeeding in the establishment of others, or too profound transformations within the phenomenon of intellectual and social predictors of their development on Towards heterogeneous origins of composition.¹⁵⁴ Western analysts used the term to refer to the end of the stage of militant Islam and the beginning of a new phase in which Islamists tended to adopt elections as a substitute for Weapons and bullets. It is indisputable that the horizon of the emergence of postmodernism falls within the framework of the Western American-European situation after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dismantling of the socialist system, the announcement of the end of the Cold War, and the rejoicing in the ideology of the end of history that heralds the inevitability of the advent and supremacy of liberal democracy.¹⁵⁵

After decades the development of the theoretical framework of post-Islamism faces the challenge of having to confront the Arab revolutions of 2011. The revolutions challenged the theoretical foundations that served as the basis for post-Islamist discourse, which called for the decline of Islamism as a viable political alternative.

¹⁵² Asef Bayat, **Islam and Democracy, what is the real question?** Leiden: Amsterdam University Press, 2007, p. 5.

¹⁵³ See: Asef Bayat (Ed.), *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*.

¹⁵⁴ García, pp. 451-466.

¹⁵⁵ Francis Fukuyama, **the End of History and the End of Mankind**, Hussein Ahmed Amin (Trans.), Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Translation and Publishing, 1992, p. 62.

What is clear a decade after the revolution is that the post-Islamist optimists and theorists at the beginning of the Egyptian revolution either miscalculated or the events of the revolution were more violent than the dreams of consensus (the consensus between Islamists and secularists). The post-Islamist theory is no longer able to explain the scene in Egypt on its own. This emphasizes once again that the post-Islamism thesis is more of a descriptive model than an explanatory or predictive one. It is also a description that cannot be generalized to all Islamist cases around the world.¹⁵⁶



¹⁵⁶ Mohamed Fattouh, **Who Fills the Void? Religious and Cultural Entities in Egypt after the Revolution**, Kuwait: Nuhoud Centre for Studies and Research, 2021, p. 17.

CHAPTER 2: ISLAMISTS CHANGES AFTER THE JANUARY 25 REVOLUTION

This chapter examines the signs of change in Islamist currents, movements and personalities in Egypt after the 25 January 2011 revolution. The first section explores the shift towards political participation or more democratic participation, meaning the formation of parties and participation in the democratic process. The second section explores the shift towards violence, the groups that adopted it and their goals. The repercussions of these changes at the level of thought, practice, and institutions (organizations), as she observed divisions and splits within many Islamist movements. The author divided Islamist movements and personalities based on their ‘ideological’ orientations, the Brotherhood stream and the Salafi stream.

One of the most important indicators of political participation is running for political and administrative office, the right to vote, joining interest groups or civil society organizations, running for public office, holding political positions and participating in public political meetings.¹⁵⁷ What are the Islamist movements that experienced this trend for the first time, or that had previously engaged in political participation, but after the revolution they experienced another level of engagement in the democratic process.

2.1. 2.1. Political Participation of the Salafi Movement

One of the clearest signs of the ideological changes that emerged in the Salafi movement after the 25 January 2011 revolution was the interaction and political participation of groups described as Salafi. By presenting the nature of Salafi thought and the activity of Salafi groups in Egypt before and after the 25 January revolution, the shape and size of this change or transformation becomes clear.

In the traditional definition of leading Salafi preachers in the modern era, such as Ibn Baz,^{*158} the Salafi call is “the call to what God sent His Prophet Muhammad is the call to adhere to the great Qur'an and the Sunnah, and to follow the path that the Prophet used in Mecca and then Medina, from communicating the call to Muslims and others, and guiding people to goodness, through teaching them what Allah sent His Prophet with,

¹⁵⁷ Mohammed Adel Othman, “Conceptualizing Political Participation”, *Arab Democratic Centre*, 21 Aug 2016. https://democraticac.de/?p=36026#_ftn12 (27 Oct 2021)

¹⁵⁸ Grand Moufti of Saudi Arabia from 1992 until his death in 1999.

including the monotheism of Allah, devotion to Allah, faith in His Prophet Muhammad, leaving polytheism, doing what Allah and His Prophet commanded, and leaving what Allah and His Prophet forbade, may Allah bless him and grant him peace.¹⁵⁹ It is clear from his words that the core of the Salafi call is the following main principles:

- Tawhid: Belief in the oneness of God and His names and attributes as revealed in the Qur'an and Sunnah. This is a very important issue and is prior to everything else.
- Following the Sunnah: Adherence to the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions without change.
- Staying away from Innovations: The rejection of any practices or beliefs that are considered outside the scope of the original teachings of Islam.

Fundamentalism is synonymous with Salafism in the research literature, especially among Western researchers. However, fundamentalism is not unique to Islam, structurally or historically, as counterparts and parallels can be found in Judaism, Christianity, and other religions. The English term originates in the US. In the beginning of the twentieth century, American Protestant churches in Southern California began to advocate for a return to religious “fundamentals” in response to burgeoning modernization and secularism. It is no wonder that American academic research on fundamentalism, which proliferated during the 1980s and 1990s defines it as “a strategy or set of strategies, by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group.”¹⁶⁰

Fundamentalism is a way of thinking, a perspective, and an approach. This contemporary concept of fundamentalism, typically translated into Arabic using the word *uṣūlī*, is completely at odds with the traditional Islamic usage of that word. *Uṣūlī* in classical usage is not taken from social science scholarship. Rather, it is an adjective referring to the fundamentals of jurisprudence (*uṣūl al-fiqh*), namely the method or “science” guiding the

¹⁵⁹ **Ibn Baz's official website**, Fatwas, <https://binbaz.org.sa/fatwas/14512/%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%B0%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8> (27 Oct 2021)

¹⁶⁰ Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Eds.), **Introduction to Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance**, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. p. 3.

development of practical legal rulings on matters of worship or daily conduct based on the fundamental principles of the Islamic Shari‘a.¹⁶¹

In practice, Salafism can be divided into three branches: Quiet Salafism, whose followers avoid political activism and focus on individual proselytization of Islam and its teachings. Political Salafism, which emphasizes political engagement as an integral part of Islam through debates and writings. Rarely they participate in parliamentary participation or establish political parties, as happened with some Salafis in Kuwait decades before the revolutions. Salafis participated in Kuwait's elections for the first time in February 1981. Two Salafi leaders, Jassim al-Awn and Khalid al-Sultan, ran in these elections and managed to win two seats in the Majlis.¹⁶² Jihadi Salafism, whose followers seek political change through jihad or violence.

The Salafi movement considers that the main goal of the Salafi movement is to establishing a state that applies Islamic law. They share similar views on the rejection of democracy, but differ on the judgement of those who adopt it. While some consider participation in the political process through elections to be acceptable (from the procedural point of view only), others believe that democracy contradicts the principles of Islam and considers it ‘haram’ or ‘kufr’.¹⁶³ Despite their participation in political processes within the framework of the nation-state, Salafi parties often maintain a long-term goal of ‘Islamizing’ public life and governance according to their interpretation of Islamic law. They may accept democratic mechanisms but reject the basic principles of liberal democracy, deeming them incompatible with their ideological goals.¹⁶⁴

Salafi pioneers believe that Islamic societies must first learn the correct basic beliefs of Islam, as this is the correct understanding of God and his religion and the cause of victory. In other words, the purification of doctrine and the daily practice of worship will

¹⁶¹ Joas Wagemakers, “On Salafism: Concepts and Contexts by Azmi Bishara”, **Journal of Islamic Studies**, Vol. (35), No. (2), (May 2024), pp. 286–289.

¹⁶² Mohammed Badri Eid, The Salafi stream in the State of Kuwait: Reality and future, Doha: *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*, 2012, <https://studies.aljazeera.net/sites/default/files/articles/reports-ar/documents/20125291235539580Salafi%20movement%20in%20Kuwait.pdf> (10 Dec 2023)

¹⁶³ Jaafar Mohammed Hussein, “Political Islam Movements”, **Al-Bayan Magazine**, Vol. (304), (Dhul-Hijjah 1433H), (Oct-Nov 2012).

¹⁶⁴ Tarek al-Zumar, - the Chairman of the Building and Development Party - “Islamists in Egypt and the January 25 Revolution”, Istanbul: (22 July 2021).

And, Atiya Adlan, - the chairman of Al-Islah Party - “Islamists in Egypt and the January 25 Revolution”, Istanbul: (1 Mart 2020).

ultimately bring profound fundamental change to society and the state.¹⁶⁵ The Salafi pillars include several key aspects, return to the original texts, monotheism, as mentioned earlier and the rule of Islamic law. Here, the author highlights two important issues that have been directly linked to the political debates and literature of Salafi groups, especially jihadist ones. They are the issue of “takfir” and the issue of “loyalty and innocence”. They have resulted in policies and strategies.

As for “takfir”, it is the attribution of a person to disbelief, which means judging them to be outside the fold of Islam.¹⁶⁶ On the issue of ‘takfir of rulers who do not apply Islamic law’, Salafi opinions were divided, and practices such as armed operations were based on it.¹⁶⁷

- The first could be said to be that of the "Murji'a", who would not pronounce “takfir” over such acts at all, since they excluded acts from faith altogether. This means that they believed neglecting to apply the sharī‘a had no effects on a Muslim’s faith.
- The second position would be that of some Salafis, who argue that not applying Islamic law is a major sin and thus a form of minor unbelief, except when it is supported by believe “i‘tiqād” or regard as lawful “istiḥlāl”.
- The third position is held by other Salafis, who agree with the second position but hold that some rulers’ application of non-Islamic laws is so structural and systematic that it constitutes a total exchange “tabdīl” of laws, thus ensuring that no further proof of that ruler’s unbelief is necessary to label this act major unbelief and to apply “takfir”.

According to Ibn Baz's definition, “al-Wala'a wa al-Baraa” means loving the believers (Muslims) and being loyal to them, and hating the disbelievers, being hostile to them and being innocent of them and their religion. As Allah says in Surat al-Mutanah “We have had a good example for you in Abraham and those with him, when they said to their

¹⁶⁵Jonathan Brown, “Salafis and Sufis in Egypt”, *Carnegie Middle East Centre*, Dec 2011. pp. 3-4. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/wps/ceip/0023950/f_0023950_19493.pdf (10 Oct 2024)

¹⁶⁶Egyptian Dar al-Iftaa website, Takfir, <https://www.dar-alifta.org/ar/Articles/2869/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%83%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%88%D8%B6%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7%D9%87> (27 Dec 2024)

¹⁶⁷ Joas Wagemakers, “ ‘Seceders’ and ‘Postponers’? An Analysis of the ‘Khawarij’ and ‘Murji’ a’ Labels in Polemical Debates Between Quietist and Jihadi-Salafis”, *Contextualising Jihadi Thought*, (2012), pp. 145-164.

people that we are innocent of you and what you worship besides Allah, we have disbelieved in you, and there is enmity and hatred between us and you forever until you believe in Allah alone.”¹⁶⁸

In practice, Salafis use “al-walā’ wa-l-barā’” in many ways:¹⁶⁹

- “al-walā’ wa-l-barā’” includes a political interpretation of the concept, which states that Muslims must never engage in asking non-Muslims for help “al-isti’āna bi-l-kuffār” or give help to non-Muslims against fellow-believers “i’ānat al-kuffār”, especially in times of war.
- The legal one, which states that Muslims’ loyalty to God should also extend to his laws, meaning that the sharī‘a should be applied in full and that “man-made laws” should be rejected outright.

During the past three decades, the area occupied by the Salafis has expanded from the map of Islamic currents. Salafism became an umbrella that includes many Islamic currents that are combined with intellectual and juristic differences. Therefore, ideas and visions varied until they reached the Salafi case to the point where it is difficult to work in a hierarchical organizational manner in which they engage and manage their call affairs. The Salafi literature does not have the word ‘organization’ at all, but rather replaces it with the term ‘collective action’.¹⁷⁰

2.1.1. The Political Attitudes of the Salafi Movements Before January 25 Revolution

Some academic literature tends to divide Salafism in Egypt into three categories (quiet, political, and jihadist) that are distinguished by methodological differences. This is particularly the case especially with regard to their relationship with the Egyptian state. Other studies divide it differently, Salafis of Method and Faith, Scientific Salafism,

¹⁶⁸ Ibn Baz Official website, “The concept of loyalty and disbelief and its importance, According to Ibn Baz”, Undated. <https://islamqa.info/ar/answers/337640/%D9%85%D9%81%D9%87%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87> (27 Dec 2024)

¹⁶⁹ See: Joas Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi*, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

¹⁷⁰ Mohammad Abu Rumman, *I Am A Salafi A Study of The Actual And Imagined Identities of Salafis*, Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014, p 74.

Movement Salafism, and Jihadi Salafism, in addition to the so-called independents. This thesis examines these currents from a single angle, namely their political ideas and their relationship with the Egyptian authorities before the 25 January 2011 revolution, as this helps in monitoring and understanding the extent and form of change after the revolution.

2.1.1.1. The Salafis of Method and Faith

There are two major subgroups under this group of Salafis, The Legitimacy Organization (Al-Jamia al-Shareyah) and the Sunni Advocates (Ansaru al-Sunna Muhammadiyah). The first group is founded by Sheikh "Mahmoud Khattab El-Sobky" in 1912 under the name "The Sharia Association for the Cooperation of the workers by Quran and Sunna".¹⁷¹ The association was established to achieve the vision of its founder in line with the turbulent Egyptian reality in light of the colonialism that resulted in the removal of Islamic law from public life, the change of the course of education and its curricula, the beginning of the Westernization campaign that appeared in that period, and the calls that accompanied it to reduce the value of women, and the status of the law Islamic in social, political and economic life, the emergence and spread of heresies and myths.¹⁷²

The advocates of the Shareyah Association are based on the Quran "Pure Religion" by Sheikh "Mahmoud Khattab El-Sobky", which is considered a basic reference for them as it is a huge jurisprudence encyclopedia that reminds most of the juristic views of its evidence and then suggests one of them. Therefore, it adopted organized collective work that is far from politics. This prevented the government from opposing its activities, but it seems that the association deviated from the philosophy of refraining from politics. It published the opposition-oriented "Al-I'tisam" magazine. Then, the association issued a magazine called "Al-Tibyan" while it was revealed that the association deviated from the rule of "Mahmoud Khattab Al-Sobky's " to be far from politics". The association aims - according to its approach, which it promotes- for the Islamic Ummah to emerge from the

¹⁷¹ **HC**DR, AlJam'iyah Alshar'iyah, undated, المجلس الإسلامي - مصر - العالمي للدعوة والإغاثة

¹⁷² An interview with Sheikh Mohammad Al-Sagheer Egyptian Azhar Scholar, What do you know about the general Salafi movement in Egypt and the Al-Shar'iyah Assembly? on Mekameleen TV, [T.V program], (2017).

problem of delay due to the heresies and myths that entered into religion, and to purify the religion from these heresies in order to return to the nation for its glory.¹⁷³

Although the Society shied away from direct politics, it had balanced positions towards Sufism and the Muslim Brotherhood. It took a negative stance towards political participation but did not prohibit it.¹⁷⁴ The moderation of the Shari'ah Society is due to several factors. First factor is emphasizing in its membership conditions on not being intolerant to a particular school of thought. All schools of thought of “Ahl al-Sunnah” are based on a correct understanding of the texts. They emphasize the Salafism of the doctrine and do not judge those who disagree with them as corrupt or innovative, as long as they believe that God is not like anything. Second factor is the Society's “Ash'arite” origins, the predominance of Al-Azhar's sons in its presidency, and the nature of Sheikh al-Subki's upbringing, which is reconciled with Sufism, is what leads some Salafis to challenge that the Shari'ah Society is Salafi. Third factor is the group's lack of involvement in politics, which made it far from any political or partisan rivalries.

The second group Sunni Advocates (Ansaru al-Sunna Muhammadiyah) is founded by Sheikh Muhammad Hamid al-Faqi - (1310-1378 AH / 1892-1959) - he was a pioneer of the Sharia Society group (Al-Jamia al-Shareyah), but he disagreed with them on some issues of doctrine, and it is said that he was greatly influenced by the heritage of Ibn Taymiyya, his student Ibn al-Qayyim, Ibn Hajar, and Shatibi. Thus, it is a ‘Sunni Salafi reformist’ organization on the doctrine of “Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah”. It seems that it is the ‘Wahhabi arm’ in Egypt since its inception in 1926. Al-Faqi was a scholar of Al-Azhar and a member of the Sharia Society, but he disagreed with its elders on a doctrinal issue, because the Sharia Society was initially far from the Wahhabi ideology. Al-Faqi rejected the 1919 revolution. He believed that the solution is not in demonstrations in which women go out in makeup and without liberating the doctrine of loyalty and

¹⁷³ An interview with Sheikh Mohammad Al-Sagheer Egyptian Azhar Scholar, What do you know about the general Salafi movement in Egypt and the Al-Shar'iyah Assembly? [Mekameleen TV], (2017).

¹⁷⁴ Ammar Fayed, “Salafis in Egypt: From the Legitimacy of Fatwa to the Legitimacy of Elections”, Doha: *Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies*, 2012. Pp. 2-10. <https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/reports/2012/07/201271103413876925.html> (27 Dec 2024)

allegiance to God and His Messenger, but by returning to the Sunnah of the Prophet and rejecting innovations.¹⁷⁵

The approach of the Ansar al-Sunna Muhammadiyah group was based on calling people that Islam is a religion and a state, worship and governance, and valid for every time and place, and then the call must be made to establish a Muslim community, and to judge what God has revealed. The group also believes that the establishment of the Islamic state can only be achieved by spreading pure monotheism “tawheed”. It is a condition for the fulfillment of God's promise of victory and the return of the caliphate, and strongly rejects armed action against governments, and considers it a departure that will only result in the widening circle of “Feetna”.

The group also believes that the democratic system is an “infidel system” as it gives the human the right to legislate which is a pure right of God. Islam is a special system. It has nothing to do with modern Western systems. Despite that, the group considers that elections by nomination and by voting are permissible means in their own right. They thought competing with “the people of democracy” to reduce their evil in general elections and other things is permissible, taking into account the legal controls if interests are favored.¹⁷⁶ In 1967, the Egyptian government decided to merge the "legitimate association" with the "Ansar al-Sunna" group in one association because of their unification in Wahhabism.¹⁷⁷

It is worth noting that the group witnessed an internal conflict that erupted between its currents following the issuance of the book “Governance and Sharia Policy among Ansar al-Sunna scholars” by Sheikh “Adel al-Sayyid” in 2009*¹⁷⁸ in which he accused the political Salafists, the school's advocates of Alexandria, and even the Salafist jihadist of penetrating the ideological approach of Ansar al-Sunna, taking advantage of the political conditions, and the local as well as international levels that the country is going through, to discredit true Salafism by mixing the political with the beliefs “aaka’ed” among the members of the Ansar al-Sunna group.

¹⁷⁵ Ammar Fayed, p. 3

¹⁷⁶ **Ansaru al-Sunna Muhammadiyah official website**, “The goals of the *Ansar al-Sunna Muhammadiyah* group”, undated. <https://www.ansaralsonna.com/web/pageother-658.html> (27 Dec 2023)

¹⁷⁷ Mohammad Hamed Abdel-Wahab, **Salafists in Egypt**, Cairo: Al-Ansar library, 2011. p. 454.

¹⁷⁸ The book is: Adel Al-Sayyid, “*Alhakimiya w alsiyasa alshariya*”, Cairo: Dar al-Ummah, 2009.

2.1.1.2. Scientific Salafism

Scientific Salafism focuses on teaching and preaching according to a scientific approach based on the understanding of the Qur'an and Sunnah by the understanding of the righteous Salaf. This movement was founded by a group of scholars and preachers who were influenced by well-known sheikhs such as Muhammad Nasser al-Din al-Albani and Abdul Aziz bin Baz. Originated in the 1970s, by a group of students. It is similar to the Union of Preachers “duaat”, and the most prominent of them Muhammad Ismail al-Muqaddam¹⁷⁹, Ahmed Farid, Saeed Abdel-Azim, Muhammad Abdel-Fattah, Yasser Barhami, and Ahmed Hutaiba. All of these prominent figures of the group all met at the Faculty of Medicine at Alexandria University. Scientific Salafism spread in all governorates of the country and they call themselves as “Salafi Dawa of Alexandria”.¹⁸⁰ Alexandria has also emerged as a central location for Salafism in Egypt, largely due to increased interactions with Saudi Arabia, which has reinforced Salafi ideologies through the influence of returning expatriate workers and Saudi scholars.

In Egypt, this large Salafi movement grew influence from the 1980s onward, not only because of its organizational structure and resulting power to mobilize but also due to favorable political circumstances. Because of its apparent lack of interest in politics, the Egyptian security apparatus generally considered the Da‘wa as more benign than most Islamist groups. The Da‘wa was generally subjected to less pressure than the Muslim Brotherhood and jihadi groups at times, the government even saw the Da‘wa as a useful counterforce.¹⁸¹

The growth of Salafism in Egypt was particularly quick in the 2000s. From 2006 onward, the government gave broadcasting licenses to Salafi channels, starting with al-Nas channel and later al-Rahma channel. Again, the government likely saw them as politically useful, because it assumed they drove conservative Muslims away from the politicized discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood and jihadi groups.

¹⁷⁹ **Official website of Sheikh Mohammed Ismail Al Muqaddam**, <https://almukaddem.com/ar>

¹⁸⁰ Atiya Adlan, - the chairman of Al-Islah Party - “Islamists in Egypt and the January 25 Revolution”, Istanbul: (1 Mart 2020).

¹⁸¹ Stephane Lacroix, “Egypt’s Pragmatic Salafis: The Politics of Hizb al-Nour”, *Carnegie Middle East Centre*, 2016, pp. 4-18, <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/11/egypts-pragmatic-salafis-the-politics-of-hizb-al-nour?lang=en>

2.1.1.3. Movement Salafis (Assalafia al-Harakia)¹⁸²

At the same time as the Salafi Da'wah in Alexandria arose, a movement later called "Assalafia al-Harakia" in the Shubra district of Cairo by a group of youth. Among its most prominent symbols are Fawzi Al-Saeed, Muhammad Abdel-Maksoud, Dr. Syed Al-Arabi, Fawzi Al-Saeed, and Nashat Ibrahim.¹⁸³ The method of Assalafia al-Harakia is almost identical to the approach of the Salafi Da'wa, "The School of Alexandria", but the Assalafia al-Harakia are not only satisfied with the ruling of the atonement of the ruler only, but they go to expiate it by name. If the ruler does not rule on what God has revealed (Asharia), and they are (before revolution) against the participation in Parliamentary assemblies in Egypt for that or using the power against the non-Islamic governors.¹⁸⁴

2.1.1.4. Jihadi Salafism and the Jama'a al-Islamiya

The Jama'a al-Islamiya emerged in the 1970s in the permissive climate that president Anwar Sadat (1970–81) fostered. The movement began to grow on campuses, becoming extremely intertwined in the political proceedings of student groups on campuses around Egypt in opposition to Sadat's political platform, strongly outnumbering leftist groups and organizations.¹⁸⁵ At the time, it comprised members of what would later become the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which split from the Jama'a after 1981. The Jama'a al-Islamiya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad engaged in a comprehensive revision of their ideological foundations "Mourajaat" from 1997–2005 onwards, an experience unique to Egypt and these Islamist groups. With the adoption of this revisionist thought, the Jama'a al-Islamiya and EIJ left the jihadi movement and joined the Salafi camp, once they had given up the armed struggle, they became like other Salafi movements in Egypt.¹⁸⁶

The same Islamic concepts that once were used to justify violence have been redefined to sanction and urge nonviolent social and political activism. Revisionist documents outline a careful cost-benefit analysis that effectively rules out the use of violence to achieve the

¹⁸² Hassan Abu Haniyeh, "Arab Jihadism - A Merger of Dimensions: Spite and Empowerment between the Islamic State and Qa'edat el-Jihad", *Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies*, 2001.

¹⁸³ Ammar Fayed, p. 4.

¹⁸⁴ Ayman Al-Sisi, **America and political Islam movements**, Cairo: Al-Arabi Publishing. Undated, p.39.

¹⁸⁵ **Stanford University website**, "mapping militant organisations: AlJama'a AlIslamiya", undated, <https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/265#cite2>

¹⁸⁶ Ali Bakr, "A Panoramic Perspective on Islamist Movements in the Middle East", **Institute of development studies Bulletin**, Vol. (47), No. (3), (2016). <https://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/index.php/idsbo/article/view/2731/HTML>

groups' goals. A variety of factors prevented al-Jama'a and al-Jihad from fully implementing these reformed views, such as the Egyptian regime's refusal to allow members of either group to reintegrate into the country's political and social fabric.¹⁸⁷

To conclude, Salafi movements of all sorts underwent an atypically rapid shift, entering politics from all directions, despite having refused the political process illicit in the past. Therefore, if Salafis do not fight this war, they will have wasted a valuable opportunity to see the implementation of Islamic law, establish an Islamic state, and move closer to achieving the cherished dream of a greater Islamic state under the caliphate. Salafi movements may have joined the political process out of what they viewed as legitimately exigent circumstances.¹⁸⁸

2.1.2. The Politicization of Salafi Movements after the 25 January Revolution

In general, although the Salafi movement is diverse, in the period leading up to the 25 January Revolution, and for several decades, it remained ambiguous about its strength and ability to mobilize and direct citizens, especially as the vast majority of its components were limited to proselytizing. For reasons related to jurisprudential visions, or because of balances or understandings with the ruling regimes. The isolation that the majority of the Salafi movement has accepted has led to the formation of a stereotypical image of them, which ignores their true diversity and shows them as a single mass that cannot be sorted or categorized. The Salafi movement moved from a marginal religious ideology to an important political player during the era of the Arab revolutions.¹⁸⁹ This involvement had repercussions on their ideological framework and their relations with other political entities in Egypt.¹⁹⁰

Salafists have founded several parties, participated in parliamentary elections by voting and running, allied with non-Islamist parties, included women on their lists, and tilted their discourses towards greater patriotism and participation. All Salafist parties in Egypt

¹⁸⁷ Amr Hamzawy and Sarah Grebowski, "From Violence to Moderation: Al-Jama'a al-Islamiya and al-Jihad", *Carnegie Middle East Center*, 2010, pp. 2-14. <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2010/04/from-violence-to-moderation-al-jamaa-al-islamiya-and-al-jihad?lang=en>

¹⁸⁸ Ali Bakr, (no pages), <https://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/index.php/idsbo/article/view/2731/HTML>

¹⁸⁹ Jacob Høigilt and Frida Nome, pp. 33-54.

¹⁹⁰ Tore Hamming, "Politicization of the Salafi movement: The emergence and influence of political Salafism in Egypt", *International Affairs review*, Vol. (22), no. (1), 2013, pp. 2-18.

shares some common goals. For example, they all seek the implementation of Sharia law to protect Egypt's 'Islamic identity' from westernization and secularization. Moreover, they all also reportedly address the major 'social realities' in Egypt, rejecting the corruption, dictatorship, and social inequality that led to the 2011 revolution. They reportedly also engage with the widespread popular demand for popular sovereignty, in the sense of regular elections and a separation of powers to prevent autocratic rule. They have therefore started to engage with 'some' democratic principles, thereby setting themselves apart from 'conventional notions of politically Quietist and Jihadi Salafists known for their anti-democratic outlook'.¹⁹¹

2.1.2.1. Al-Nour Party

The revolution against former president Hosni Mubarak took the Salafī Da'wa by surprise. The sheikhs had never believed that any genuine change could come through politics, so they first reacted by denouncing the event as a fitna (chaos, sedition) and advising their members not to participate in the protests.¹⁹² And, many of Salafi leaders declared such activity as religiously "harām". But, indeed most of them participated in the January 25 revolution.¹⁹³ Salafism has proven remarkably flexible in its adaptation to the new political reality in Egypt-something that contradicts established accounts that categorize it as a rigid, theology-focused movement.¹⁹⁴

One key debate that has divided the Egyptian political scene since the revolution is that of the nature of the coming state. Salafis have, in their statements, staunchly opposed the concept of a civil state "dawla madaniyya," a term which they consider to be a rhetorical trick invented by their liberal foes to make the idea of a "secular state" more acceptable. Despite sometimes paying lip service to the formula, Salafis are also critical of the now widely accepted notion of a civil state with an Islamic reference, "dawla madaniyya bi marja'iyya islamiyya", advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood, among others. For them,

¹⁹¹ Annette Ranko and Justyna Nedza, "Crossing the ideological divide? Egypt's Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring", *Studies in conflict and terrorism*, Vol. (39). No. (6), (2015), pp. 1–23.

¹⁹² Ana Salafy official website, "Judgment on participating in the 25th January revolution", (21 Jan 2011), <https://anasalafy.com/ar/23685-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-25-%D9%85%D9%86-655>

¹⁹³ Tarek al-Zumar, - the Chairman of the Building and Development Party – "Islamists in Egypt and the January 25 Revolution", Istanbul: (22 July 2021).

¹⁹⁴ Jacob Høigilt and Frida Nome, pp. 33-54.

there exists a distinctive Islamic model of statehood which, they insist, is not perfectly compatible with the modern state.¹⁹⁵

Regarding the political system, the Nour Party explicitly defends democratic mechanisms (i.e. elections at all levels, separation of powers, freedom of speech, etc.). They are keen, however, to stress that they distinguish between the “procedures of democracy,” which they accept, and the “philosophy of democracy,” which they reject. For them, ultimate sovereignty cannot be held by the people, but only by God. At the economic level, The Nour Party advocates more “left-leaning” policies than the Muslim Brotherhood. In particular, they seem more prone to stressing the redistributive role of the state. This position is consistent with the rhetoric used on the ground to attract the support of the lower classes.

For Nour Party, citizenship is linked to a person’s ‘quality and quantity of creed.’ Despite the fact that Nour Party states that non-Muslims would be granted the ‘same rights and same duties’ as Muslims, their view on citizenship means that there is no equality before the law for all individuals, especially not for non-Muslims. In interviews, Salafi figures have advocated a much stricter framework than that put forward by the Muslim Brotherhood. While the latter recognizes the concept of citizenship and is ready to proclaim the political and legal equality of all citizens. Salafis tend to favor the traditional Islamic system of protection “Aljizya”, which existed during the period of the Caliphate. According to this system, Christians and Jews living under an Islamic state are not asked to serve in the military and receive protection from the authorities, but are required to pay a special tax, the “jizya.”¹⁹⁶ The Nour Party also had to include Christians as founding members of the party, a move that the sheikhs of Alexandria had originally considered reprehensible. Not long after, the Nour Party declared that it was considering a parliamentary alliance with non-Islamist parties, including Coptic businessman Naguib Sawiris.¹⁹⁷ This again prompted severe reactions from Burhami (the Dawa Leader), who insisted that “any alliance with groups that oppose God’s Law is absolutely forbidden”.

¹⁹⁵ Atiya Adlan, - the chairman of Al-Islah Party - “Islamists in Egypt and the January 25 Revolution”, Istanbul: (1 Mart 2020).

¹⁹⁶ Group of researchers, **The Controversies of Social Integration and State and Nation Building in the Arab World**, Arab center for research and policy studies, Doha: Doha Institute, 2014.

¹⁹⁷ Emad Abdel Ghafour statement: There is no objection to Copts assuming leadership positions in the “Al-Nour party”, 30 Jan 2012, «حزب النور», (20 March 2023)

Nour Party went on to earn—as part of an “Islamic coalition” in which it was the senior partner—about 25 percent of the votes in the parliamentary elections, making it the second-largest political party in Egypt after the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party. Pragmatism has been a constant in al-Nour since its creation. Yet, the rationale for that pragmatism changed in late 2012. From 2011 to 2012, Nour Party’s pragmatism was comparable to that found among mainstream Islamist parties elsewhere—in that they revised (or put aside) some of their doctrinal conceptions as they adapted to the political game. This evolution is related to what some scholars have termed the “inclusion-moderation” hypothesis.¹⁹⁸ Though this short episode did not produce any genuine doctrinal revisions on the part of Salafis, it nevertheless gave birth to a political discourse that was carried by a new type of actor, the Salafi politician. That the proponents of this line ended up forming a party called (Hizb al-Watan) the party of the “Nation/homeland” is in itself quite telling.

Overall, the Salafi Dawa and its party, the Nour Party, adopted a pragmatic approach to politics and strategies that included electoral participation and seeking influence within newly formed political institutions. This was seen as necessary to protect their social and cultural interests amid changing political dynamics. Political participation is essential to their survival and relevance in the changing political landscape.¹⁹⁹ The Salafi Dawa has reproduced its old discourse of social and political change. It has achieved this by introducing changes to the form of its discourse, while maintaining its core content. The broader movement and the specific political party remain intellectually and structurally interconnected.²⁰⁰

2.1.2.2. Al Watan Party

Emad Abdel Ghafour, who resigned as chairman of the Salafi Nour Party, established his new Islamist political party²⁰¹, after a gap in thinking and management between him and the sheikh Yasser Burhami the first Da’wa Leader. To achieve their political goals in the

¹⁹⁸ Frederic M Wehrey, **Beyond Sunni and Shia: The Roots of Sectarianism in a Changing Middle East**, UK: Oxford University Press, 2017, p 11.

¹⁹⁹ Essam Abdel-Shaffy, Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies and IRA Academy Chairman, *Islamists in Egypt and the January 25 Revolution*, Istanbul: (5 June 2022).

²⁰⁰ Hebatullah N. S. Selim, pp. 266-286.

²⁰¹ **Egypt Independent**, “Nour Party dissidents establish Watan Party”, (5 Feb 2013), Nour Party dissidents establish Watan Party - Egypt Independent

first party had established (Nour Party), Abd al-Ghaffour had endorsed moving away from the contentious religious discussions that were so prominent in the Salafi Da'wa. He constructed a political discourse that in many ways was quite unexpected, leading the party to pledge respect to the procedures and rules of democracy.

Then, the relationship between Abd al-Ghaffour and Burhami continued to deteriorate steadily, for many and different political and ideological reasons. The party Nour proudly retained its Islamic identity and continued calling for the implementation of shari'a (Islamic law), but it insisted on a gradual and benign process, and Abd al-Ghaffour was adamant about focusing on politics, not theology. He even rejected the label "Salafi" for the party, arguing that it is a "party for all Egyptians".²⁰²

In 2012, the party split into two factions: those loyal to party president Abd al-Ghaffour and those loyal to Da'wa strongman Burhami. The split did not simply revolve around the power dispute between Abd al-Ghaffour and Burhami as there was a more profound issue at stake. For Abd al-Ghaffour and his associates, Nour Party was to be a political party like all others, meaning that it would fully embrace the rules of the political game. It still saw itself as a religious party, but it was open to myriad alliances to advance its goals and be a government party with an applicable political program. To draft that program, Abd al-Ghaffour even put together a team of mostly non-Salafi academics. Abd al-Ghaffour believed his goal could only be achieved by making the party fully separate from the Da'wa. As one close aide of Abd al-Ghaffour argued, "We may consult the Da'wa sheikhs, whom we deeply respect, if we need a "fatwa" from them on a specific issue, but we don't want them to meddle with the party's daily business because this is politics and politics is not their specialty."²⁰³ Burhami had a different plan for the party. He believed the party's gains should benefit the Da'wa (the interest of the Da'wa) should be the party's main consideration in determining its positions.

After that Abdel Ghaffour announced the formation of the "Free National Alliance", an electoral coalition to be led by former presidential hopeful Hazem Salah Abu Ismail for

²⁰² Interview with Emad Abdel Ghafour, [*Bila Hudud*], Egypt: Aljazeera TV, (4 Jan. 2012).

²⁰³ Interview with Emad Abdel Ghafour, [*Bila Hudud*], Egypt: Aljazeera TV, (4 Jan. 2012).

the House of Representatives election in 2011.²⁰⁴ The party considers itself more inclusive and open to Christians than other Salafi parties and more open to non-Salafi Muslims.

On the electoral level, the Salafists benefited from the natural appeal of Islamist parties among Muslim voters. There are several reasons for this attraction. First, the last few decades (1990s-2000s) have witnessed a “quiet revolution” in Egyptian society marked by the increasing hegemony of conservative Islamic discourse.²⁰⁵ The two other parties in the Salafi coalition have not been as successful in terms of organization. The Assala Party got into a conflict with another Salafi group, the Fadila Party (The Virtue Party), from which the Assala Party had originally split. The Building and Development Party, meanwhile, was handicapped by internal disputes among the leadership of its parent organization, al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya. These weaknesses did not, however, greatly affect the prospects of the Salafi coalition, as most of its campaigning was carried out by the Nour Party. At their presence in Parliament, their elected representatives were above all active when it came to trying to counter the adoption of laws which they considered contrary to Islamic shari‘a.

At a time when the majority of Salafi parties and currents (Al-Fadila, Al-Assala, Al-Islah and Al-Watan), in addition to the Salafi Front, were united behind Morsi against the Salvation Front formed by civilian forces, the Nour Party lined up with the Salvation Front in opposition to President Mohamed Morsi. Before announcing its participation in the 3 July 2013 coup, the rest of the Salafi forces continued their alliance with the Brotherhood behind the ousted president and participated in the Rabaa al-Adawiya and Nahda sit-ins.

Since 2013, Nour’s pragmatism has derived from a different source. There are two common explanations for Nour’s support for the military takeover on July 3, 2013. The first supposes that Saudi Arabia is the main backer of Nour.²⁰⁶ Thus, that al-Nour acted on Saudi orders. According to the second explanation, the Salafi Da‘wa’s allegedly close

²⁰⁴ **Egypt Independent**, “A conversation with Salafi political leader Emad Abdel Ghafour”, (10 Jan 2013). A conversation with Salafi political leader Emad Abdel Ghafour - Egypt Independent

²⁰⁵ See: Patrick Haenni, *L'Islam de Marché: L'Autre Révolution Conservatrice*, Paris: Seuil. 2005.

²⁰⁶ **Al Jazeera English**, “Saudi king backs Egypt's military”, (17 Aug 2013), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/8/17/saudi-king-backs-egypts-military>

ties with the security apparatus under Mubarak explain Nour's stance. The party's stances were not merely opportunistic or driven by external interests, there was a clear logic behind them, defending what was perceived as being in the interest of the Da'wa, whatever the political cost.

Despite initially gaining great powers, the Nour party's alignment to support the military has forced considerable political concessions, caused cracks within the party, and more seriously, has damaged their grassroots support.²⁰⁷ The legislative elections (of October-November 2015) were boycotted by almost all of the Islamist political forces, most of them finding themselves in any material incapacity to campaign due to the repression which has taken place. Formerly the second political force in Parliament behind the Muslim Brotherhood with 112 seats in the People's Assembly - won only 11 elected representatives.

These results must however be put into perspective by the fact that the voting system - unlike what happened in 2012 - this time disadvantaged this party. Finally, the Nour party this time campaigned without any ally, the only representative of the Islamist political forces participating in these elections. Therefore, it's hard to know what the weight of other Salafist organizations in Egypt is today, including the Watan party, which has never faced the verdict at the polls since then. However, it seems certain that a large part of the Islamist voters preferred to boycott the ballot than to vote for the Nour party, accused of having betrayed political Islam by joining an oppressive regime.

Some Salafis seems that they are forced to adopt stances that contradicted their doctrinal beliefs. This time, however, those were justified through arguments of necessity, as when Nour's president argued that the party was forced by the electoral system to have Christians on its lists or that it had to weigh benefits and harms. Although those justifications have caused some discomfort among grassroots Salafis, the Da'wa's base largely accepted them.

The study claims that this passive pragmatism is unlikely to produce doctrinal revisions, despite all the political concessions Nour Party has been willing, and will probably

²⁰⁷ Kristen McTighe, "The Salafi Nour Party in Egypt", Doha: *Aljazeera center for studies*, (26 March 2014), p. 8, The Salafi Nour Party In Egypt | Al Jazeera Centre for Studies

continue, to make. The paradox between the party's political pragmatism and its rigidity at the doctrinal level, therefore it seems sustainable in this manner.²⁰⁸

2.1.2.3. The Building and Development Party

On June 20, 2011, the Egyptian al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, announced the establishment of its official political wing, al-Banna' wa al-Tanmiyya (The Building and Development Party). The party has participated in the Egyptian parliamentary election, 2011–2012 as part of the Alliance for Egypt (Islamist Bloc), led by the Salafist Al-Nour Party.²⁰⁹ This experience is a major transformation at the level of the Islamic Group, but it was not an unlikely move, if their previous reviews are examined, specifically the reviews of Tariq Al-Zumar, who will later become the head of this new party.

Politically, their goals can be considered as follows “supporting a new political system based on the principles of freedom, justice, plurality, equality, and peaceful rotation of power.”²¹⁰ Additionally, “promoting legal, constitutional, and political reform, such as greater judicial oversight over the national security apparatus” is another goal of the party. Finally, the party also aims at “supporting solutions to social, political, economic, and strategic challenges that come from Islam and the modern application of Islamic law”. Preserving Egypt's Islamic and Arab identity and challenging any attempts at Westernization and secularization is also another objective of the party. It is suggested that the Building and Development Party is also seeking for “establishing strong Islamic values in society to combat injustice, corruption, and moral decay. Supporting the roles of the family and women in society in accordance with Islamic principles. And, spreading the political concepts and values of Islam and combating smear campaigns against Islam.”

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The researcher claims that the personality and thought of Tariq al-Zumar played a pivotal role in the positions and policies of the new party, similar to what the personality of Abdul Ghafour did in the Nour Party and then the Watan Party that split from it. The text on the

²⁰⁸ Frederic M Wehrey, p. 282.

²⁰⁹ **Library of Congress**, Building and Development Party – Egypt, undated, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/8/17/saudi-king-backs-egypts-military> (3 July 2024).

²¹⁰ Tarek al-Zumar, - the Chairman of the Building and Development Party – “Islamists in Egypt and the January 25 Revolution”, Istanbul: (22 July 2021).

²¹¹ **Carnegie Middle East Centre**, “Building and Development Party”, (20 September 2011), Building and Development Party | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

modern application of Islamic law (shari'a) also gives a distinctive dimension to this experience, in terms of its adherence to the basis - which is the application of Islamic law - but in a way that is different from the traditional image.

Following Morsi's ouster in mid-2013, al-Jamaa al-Islamiya sided Muslim Brotherhood, joining a so-called national coalition that rejected post-Morsi rule. However, On December 2018, the BDP officially announced that it was no longer a member of the National Alliance to support legitimacy.²¹² They accused the Muslim Brotherhood of monopolizing the political process and not dealing with the other parties in good faith. Noted that, the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy is a coalition of Egyptian Islamist organizations formed by the Freedom and Justice Party, to counter protests organized by the Egyptian Tamarod Movement. After July 3, 2013, the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy called on its supporters to protest against the military coup.

On 30 May 2020, the Egyptian court decided to dissolve the Building and Development Party. After the Egypt's political parties affairs committee filed on June 2017 a petition with the high administrative court to dissolve the BDP, freeze its funds and uncover its financier. The committee has referred a memo to the prosecutor general to investigate the party's violation of Article no 4 of political parties law over electing Tareq al-Zumar, as "fugitive terrorist", the party's chairman. The court also has issued a sentence against Zumar in absentia over Muslim Brotherhood "armed protests" in Nasr City's Rabiaa al Adawya Square.²¹³

2.1.2.4. Al-Fadhila Party and Al-Assala Party

This is a Cairo-based party, which was founded in March 2011. It was the first Salafist political party in Egypt. Differently than al-Nur, al-Fadila takes a relatively relaxed approach to the implementation of Sharia law. A few months later, in July 2011, Adel Abdel-Maksoud Afifi, then head of the Virtue Party, announced his resignation and founded the Assala Party. A number of prominent Salafi preachers also announced their support for the Assala Party, including popular preachers such as Sheikh Mohamed

²¹² **Arabi21**, "Official of the Islamic Group in Egypt: That is why we withdrew from the legitimacy coalition", (9 Dec 2018), ... مسؤول الجماعة الإسلامية بمصر: لهذا انسحبنا من تحالف

²¹³ **Egypt Today**, "A petition to dissolve Building and Development Party", 21 JUN 2017, A petition to dissolve Building and Development Party - EgyptToday

Hassan, Mohamed Abdel-Maksoud, Mohamed Abdel Salam and others. The party's stated goal was to spreading the values of justice and equality, and restoring Egypt's leadership role in the world in accordance with the principles of Islamic law. The party's program included supporting the establishment of a religious Islamic state in Egypt, supporting reforms that would move the Egyptian state and society towards Islam. Treating all Egyptian individuals fairly, regardless of their political or religious views. Fighting corruption and prosecuting anyone who commits a crime against the Egyptian people. Emphasize the freedom of the media, but within the restrictions imposed by Islamic law - a restricted freedom. On the international level the party aims to work to restore Egypt to its leading position in the Islamic world, through an Islamic renaissance, and to reject or recognize the Camp David Accords and peace with Israel.²¹⁴

Thus, the Al-Fadhila Party seems to have been one of the most explicit parties with its purely Islamist goals, the application of Islamic law and the restriction of certain rights and freedoms that may contradict or exceed the limits of Islamic law. It is notable for its nationalist dimension in its endeavor to strengthen Egypt's role and position at the heart of the Islamic world. It also has a clear and firm view towards the Zionist occupation. In general, the shift in Cairo's Salafism may be limited to political participation without any ideological changes. They take from democracy only its procedural aspect - elections - based on the authenticity of the principle of "Shura" in Islam.

2.1.2.5. Al-Islah Party

The Reform Party (Al-Islah) was founded by Dr. Attiya Adlan, a Salafi leader who left Egypt for Turkey after the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013. He is one of the founders of the National Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Egypt and the former president of the Egyptian Community Union in Turkey. What distinguishes his party from others is that it has a youthful character. It aims to develop youth cadres. It has an Islamic reference point like other Salafi parties, but it differs from them in performance, presentation of visions, and achieving the requirements of the street. Al-Islah demands the implementation of Islamic law, not just a symbolic demand. It also calls for the

²¹⁴ Carnegie Middle East Centre, "Al-Assala Party", 20 Sep 2011, <https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2011/09/asala-party?lang=ar> (15 Apr2023)

preservation of the Islamic identity and offers new visions for the economy, ending the issue of informal settlements and achieving social justice.²¹⁵

The Salafi movements' shifts in Egypt after the revolution were clear in the direction of political participation and peaceful activism. However, this does not indicate deep ideological changes towards democratization as well as secularism. Rather, it is an evolution in their adaptations to local contexts. Nor does this negate ideological changes at the level of the members of these movements, especially the youth. The Salafi movements' shifts towards greater political participation, party formation, participation in electoral processes, and democratization - such as participation in constitutional committees - represent a deviation from their historical reluctance to engage in institutional politics. Some Salafi leaders have been criticized for compromising their principles in the pursuit of political power. While the Salafis have established a foothold in Egyptian politics, their long-term viability will depend on their ability to deal with internal divisions and external pressures from secular forces and rival Islamist groups.

2.2. Political Participation of the Brotherhood Stream

The thesis refers to the idea of the Brotherhood Movement in Egypt, the Brotherhood and any groups or individuals that have branched off from it such as Hazem Salah Abu Ismail. The issue of political participation such as entering parliament or practicing political activities is not new to this group and was not even forbidden, but this does not mean that they have a special view towards this participation. Although, in the author's opinion, it was unclear on several issues. Even counsellor Tariq al-Bishri stated that the approach to change by founder Hassan al-Banna was not clear when he was saying "Al-Banna never resolved in his call whether he meant reform or revolution, and if revolution is sedition, how can radical changes in government be made?"²¹⁶

Although the official website of the Muslim Brotherhood states that the Muslim Brotherhood's approach is peaceful and centrist, far from violence and its tools and forms. The group defines itself as "an Islamic group that aims for political, social, economic and

²¹⁵ Atiya Adlan, - the chairman of Al-Islah Party - "Islamists in Egypt and the January 25 Revolution", Istanbul: (1 Mart 2020).

²¹⁶ Sameh Naguib, **The Muslim Brotherhood: A Socialist Vision**, Cairo, Centre for Socialist Studies, 2006, p. 21.

all aspects of life from a comprehensive Islamic perspective in Egypt and the countries in which it spreads, and is part of the fabric and entity of the state that lives on its land and works for its sovereignty and independence politically, economically, culturally and militarily.” The Muslim Brotherhood believes that a constitutional system of government is a peaceful and moderate approach that is far from violence and its means and forms. The Muslim Brotherhood also believes that the constitutional system of government is the closest system of government in the whole world to Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood respects their own nationalism as the first basis for the desired advancement, and they see nothing wrong with each person working for his homeland and putting it above all others, and then they support Arab unity as the second link in this advancement, and then they work for the Islamic Union as the complete fence of the general Islamic homeland.²¹⁷ The first issue with the Muslim Brotherhood’s vision is that it is the closest system of government in the whole world to Islam.

The first issue in the Muslim Brotherhood’s vision of the Egyptian state, according to Mohamed Affan, is “the traditional issue of the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood recognizes the legitimacy of this state in light of its adoption of the restoration of the Caliphate as an ultimate goal.” Since Hassan al-Banna’s early writings in which he clarified his acceptance of the idea of nationalism, he redefined these values and concepts in a way that is compatible with the primacy of loyalty to the Islamic identity, making these affiliations part of this identity and not a substitute for it. The second issue is that the Brotherhood adopts radical and comprehensive change visions, and at the same time pledges to achieve them by gradual and constitutional means, under a repressive and undemocratic regime, and in an unfavorable regional and international context.²¹⁸

2.2.1. Establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party

Soon after the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, Brotherhood leaders promised not to run for presidential elections and not to compete for more than one third of the seats in the parliament. Despite its initial pledge, the Brotherhood nominated candidate in the first

²¹⁷ **Official website of the Muslim Brotherhood**, “Who We Are”, undated, <https://ikhwan.site//ar/about> (15 Apr 2023)

²¹⁸ Mohamed Affan, The Muslim Brotherhood and the State in Egypt, *Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies*, Feb. 2022. https://eipss-eg.org/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d8%ae%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%86-d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b3%d9%84%d9%85%d9%88%d9%86-%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d9%85%d8%b5%d8%b1/#_ftn3% (15 Apr 2023)

presidential election and heavily dominated the seats in the parliament. This was one day before the closing of the nomination period, fearing that the candidate Khairy al-Shater, one of the Brotherhood's most senior leaders, would be disqualified.²¹⁹

The establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) by the MB group, after rejecting the idea of establishing a party decades ago, is an indication that they have embraced the option of peaceful participation more than ever. And, it seems that it is a rational choice imposed by the post-revolutionary reality, despite the MB's internal dispute over the establishment of the party. On June 6th, the MB's political wing Freedom & Justice Party – FJP (Hizb al-Horriya wa'l-Adala) was officially recognized by the state. In establishing the FJP, the MB has attempted to show its populist and liberal credentials by giving voice to women and naming Dr. Rafiq Habib, a Coptic Christian, to be the vice president of the party.²²⁰

While Islam remains the party's chief frame of reference, the FJP platform has introduced several amendments to the draft platform the MB unveiled in 2007. Perhaps the most prominent difference between the two platforms is the omission of the provision giving clerics a formal role in politics and lawmaking. Since, the MB's 2007 program called for the formation of a committee of senior religious scholars, chosen in national elections, to advise parliament and the president, thereby creating a system which many found to be akin to the Iranian one.²²¹

When the Muslim Brotherhood was in power between 2012 and 2013, it adopted a market-oriented vision that encouraged the private sector, liberalized the economy, and attracted foreign investment. As a socio-political movement, the Brotherhood tried to find a balance between its electoral base, which is rooted in the lower, middle and upper classes, and its commitment to neo-liberal policies. However, this contradictory balance weighed heavily on the movement and affected its popularity. It seems that the Muslim Brotherhood's neo-liberal tendencies can be explained by three main factors, the

²¹⁹ BBC, "Egypt's presidential elections: Brotherhood pushes new candidate, administrative court bans Nour from running", (7 April 2012), https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2012/04/120407_egypt_elections (15 Apr 2023)

²²⁰ Andrew Black, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: Internal Divisions and External Challenges in the Post-Mubarak Era," Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. (9), No. (29), (July 2011), pp. 7-11.

²²¹ Khalil Al-Anani, Egypt's Freedom & Justice Party: to Be or Not to Be Independent, *Carnegie Middle East Centre*, (1 June 2011), <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2011/06/egypts-freedom-and-justice-party-to-be-or-not-to-be-independent?lang=en> (10 May 2023)

movement's pragmatism, its 'religious bourgeoisie', and the call for international acceptance and recognition.²²²

Despite his diplomatic correspondence to Shimon Peres during his reign, Morsi moved quickly to establish close ties with the ruling Muslim Brotherhood branch in Gaza, Hamas. He also held a rally to support the Syrian revolution against Bashar al-Assad, one of the regional guarantors of Israel's security. These moves alarmed Western administrations. The Muslim Brotherhood's dominance in parliament and its attempts to draft the new constitution in line with Islamist ideals have polarized Egypt's political landscape, an Islamist-liberal polarization.

After the High Court dissolved the FJP party the "General Office of the Muslim MB" in Egypt announced their adherence to the revolutionary work to bring down the military coup. And, they confirmed that he will not form a party after the military coup is dropped, and will act as a national trend with an Islamic background without partisan rivalries.

The establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the presidential campaign, and the accompanying adjustments and adaptations constituted a significant development in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood immersed itself in more democratic frameworks but did not break away from the main issues it espoused, including the 'internationalist dimension' that international counter-revolutionary forces turned against it. The Muslim Brotherhood remains internally divided over its political strategy and key questions about violence.²²³

2.2.2. The Experience of Hazem Salah Abu Ismail

Hazem Salah Abu Ismail's revolutionary and political experience is considered influential in the Egyptian scene. Abu Ismail did not hesitate to support the revolution from the beginning, unlike the hesitation of other Islamist movements at the official level. He presented himself as a presidential candidate before the Brotherhood even announced its own candidate. In contrast to all potential presidential candidates, Abu Ismail led the

²²²Khalil Al-Anani, "Religious Neo-Liberalism? Interpreting the socio-economic perspective of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its policies", *Journal of Politics and Religion*, Vol. (13), No. (4), (Dec 2020), pp. 748-767.

²²³ Marc Lynch, *In uncharted waters: Islamist parties beyond Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood*, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016. p. 31.

attack on the military council at all times.²²⁴ He was also the first to warn of what would later become known as the counter-revolution. He refused to leave Tahrir Square after Mubarak's removal, arguing that the revolution was not over until all heads of corruption were toppled and the military council was removed from power. He insisted on holding early presidential elections before drafting the constitution. Because the constitution will be drafted in a way that strengthens the powers of the military.

After the military council issued a statement that it would stay in power for two years instead of six months due to the instability of the country. Abu Ismail and his supporters staged mass demonstrations to put pressure on the SCAF, prompting the SCAF to announce that the elections in which he was running would be brought forward. His short-lived campaign came to an end when it was revealed that his deceased mother held a US passport. According to Egyptian election law, the parents and spouse of a presidential candidate can only hold Egyptian citizenship. For his part, Abu Ismail denied that his mother had any citizenship other than Egyptian by stating that "I consider this response from the US State Department to be a forgery." Abu Ismail's exclusion angered his supporters, who protested in the streets demanding his right to run.²²⁵ Abu Ismail stated that he was motivated to run. He found that the visions presented on the scene are only scattered ideas and not an integrated project to build a state with a comprehensive methodology and vision. Therefore, he decided to present his vision as a presidential candidate with a clear Islamic reference point.

His campaign focused on implementing strict Sharia law and criticized military rule following the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak. He garnered significant support due to his anti-American rhetoric and promises to uphold Islamic values. These challenges did not prevent Abu Ismail from continuing his revolutionary and political activities, and he sought to establish a party, first called the Egyptian Nation Party, and then the Al-Raya Party. This party is based on the principles of Islamic law.²²⁶ He repeatedly warned

²²⁴ **AlBayan Magazine**, "Hazem Abu Ismail: Salafi-backed ex-Brotherhood", 21 Feb 2012, albayan.ae/one-world/arabs/2012-02-21-1.1596887

²²⁵ **Middle East Eye**, "Egyptian Islamist leader Hazem Abu Ismail has spent his life agitating against military rule", (12 Feb 2015), <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/profile-hazem-abu-ismail> (10 May 2023)

²²⁶ **Daily news Egypt**, "Abu Ismail initiates Al-Raya Party", (27 Feb 2013). <https://web.archive.org/web/20170321044901/http://www.dailynewsegypt.com:80/2013/02/27/abu-ismail-initiates-al-raya-party/> (10 May 2023)

against Sisi's coup. Hazem Salah Abu Ismail was arrested on 5 July 2013, right after the coup. He has since gone through a series of trials, but his supporters have continued their revolutionary work. They have been dubbed 'Hazemoun'. Since its establishment, the Hazemoun movement has sparked a state of controversy within Egyptian political and Islamist circles, as it is considered the first group of an Islamist movement based on a single person who switched from the "Brotherhood status" to "Salafism status" and has been accused of violence and terrorism.

2.3. The Shift towards Violence

According to UN Organizations political violence is determined as "violence that is denounced condemned or prohibited by the laws of states or the laws between states". This means that violence is the use of force and violence (by people or agents of the state) against people or things in order to achieve political goals. It may be considered a form of psychological violence."²²⁷ In another words political violence is defined as "hostile, aggressive or violent acts motivated by political objectives or a desire to directly or indirectly affect political change or change in governance". As a phenomenon, political violence includes a range of political acts from mass protest, riots, coups, rebellions, uprisings and terrorism to violent acts committed by state and non-state actors, including pogroms, ethnic cleansing, and genocide.²²⁸

Political violence is defined as "a generally organized collective action aimed at challenging the legitimacy of governing regimes". Political violence often involves groups or movements rather than isolated individuals, and unlike spontaneous acts of violence, political violence tends to be more systematic and strategic. It provokes a strong reaction from the ruling authorities, thus creating cycles of resistance and repression. Political violence is not just a series of isolated incidents but a symptom of deeper societal issues, including inequality, disenfranchisement and systemic injustice. Understanding these underlying causes is critical to addressing and mitigating the effects of political violence. Mars proposes a scale to measure the severity of political violence within a

²²⁷ UNESCWA, "Political Violence", undated, <https://www.unescwa.org/sd-glossary/political-violence> (10 May 2023)

²²⁸ UNDRR, "Violence", undated. <https://www.undrr.org/understanding-disaster-risk/terminology/hips/so0006> (10 May 2023)

country based on its ability to inflict harm and challenge the stability of the government.²²⁹

Human societies, at various stages of development, have witnessed patterns of violence, as violence is one of the means of conflict. These patterns can be divided into four:²³⁰

- **Irrational Violence:** It is that pattern that lacks any objective goals against which it revolts, and is usually carried out to serve the purposes of some instigators who play a pivotal role in establishing it.
- **Extended Violence:** This type of violence also lacks any objective goals. The political authority may play a role in establishing it as a result of some actions that cause anxiety and tension, or when it moves consciously to discharge the stored tensions so as not to leave them an opportunity to mature into a revolutionary action that may be able to overthrow this political authority, and the aim of this pattern may be to create a higher degree of adaptation by discharging as much tension as possible.
- **Emotional Violence:** It is a type of emotional explosion that expresses accumulated tensions and feelings that have their causes. Although it has objective goals, they are not yet defined, so that they can become the basis for a rational action. Its events are usually short-term in which propaganda and rumors play a pivotal role, and emotional violence may be expected after the explosion, but it usually occurs again in the future if the factors generating the tension remain the same, and if its causes persist and its occurrence is repeated, it will portend a shift to the rational pattern.
- **Rational Violence:** This is the most mature pattern. This is because it has a clear framework. It contains within it specific goals and means, and the participants in this pattern are usually fully aware of these events. They are usually reluctant to participate in riots, and this pattern of violence erupts for clear objective reasons

²²⁹ Perry Mars, "The Nature of Political Violence", **Social and Economic Studies**, Vol (24), No. (2), (1975), pp. 221-238.

²³⁰ Boudour Jamal, "Political violence", **The Political Encyclopaedia**, 2021, <https://political-encyclopedia.org/dictionary/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%81%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A>

such as inconsistency in the social structure, the effects of unemployment, and aims to impose some demands that contribute to its elimination.

In his book *Revolutionary Change*, Chalmers Johnson considers political violence as one of the aspects of revolution and that any attempt to separate the concept of revolution from one or several acts of violence is futile, so for Johnson, revolution is a continuum of violent behavior.²³¹ Johnson defines revolution as the purposeful use of a strategy of violence to influence a change in social structure.²³² Among the most important forms of political violence assassinations and assassination attempts, coups and coup attempts, rebellion, insurgency, arrests for political reasons, riots, judgements related to political issues, the use of security forces or military units to confront acts of political violence, civil wars, and wars.²³³

2.3.1. The Muslim Brotherhood: The Reformist Approach and Pacifism

Some political entities classify the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist or extremist organization.²³⁴ However, there are signs of moderation when compared to jihadist groups. Others categorize the Muslim Brotherhood as a moderate Islamist group. This is the Muslim Brotherhood's self-description. It rejects terrorism and its approach is moderate.²³⁵ However, this does not prevent pointing out an issue with the Brotherhood, which is embodied in what may be perceived as a contradiction between their literatures or between some of their literature and their practical policies.

Firstly, the thesis emphasizes that the place of jihad in the Muslim Brotherhood's thought has been known since the group's founding in 1928, despite their slogan "peaceful and

²³¹ See: Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, USA: Stanford University Press, 1982.

²³² Donald J. McCormack, "Revolutionary Change by Chalmers Johnson", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. (84), no. (3), (Sep 1969), pp. 515-516.

²³³ Boudour Jamal.

²³⁴ For Zionist and Israeli organisations or campaigns like: Jewish virtual library, Stand with us.

See also: 'Muslim Brotherhood and Terrorism: Facts and Evidence.' *Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research*, (2017), <https://www.ecssr.ae/en/publication/muslim-brotherhood-and-terrorism-facts-and-evidence/>. (10 May 2023)

²³⁵ Mohamad Yousef, "Syrian Brotherhood: 'Designating the group a "terrorist" will not support the stability of the region', *Anadolu Agency*, 2 May 2019. <https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9/1467808>. (20 May 2023)

peacefulness”²³⁶ which the Brotherhood adopted after the 2013 coup. Despite years of civil-social participation in Egypt,²³⁷ the Brotherhood did not abandon its call for jihad in general, nor in its private speeches²³⁸ and literature.²³⁹ When we return to the literature of the Muslim Brotherhood,²⁴⁰ we find that the group’s founder Hassan al-Banna made jihad one of the ten pillars of the pledge of allegiance.²⁴¹ Al-Banna also dedicated one of his letters to jihad. Al-Banna devoted one of his letters to jihad in order to clarify its obligation by mentioning a group of verses from the Holy Qur'an and the hadiths that talked about jihad, and then talked about the ruling of jihad among the jurists of the Ummah.²⁴²

Despite all the advice, softness, and calls for reform, Hassan al-Banna remained vigilant that the enemies of Muslims would violently oppose his call and his group with all force, and would use all forms of aggression, so he saw that it was inevitable to form a trained and prepared military apparatus, spiritually, physically, militarily, and security-wise, to confront the enemies of the Islamic nation. Therefore, the aim of this military entity and jihad is to protect this project, so the “Special Organization” was established.²⁴³ Sheikh Said Hawa (from the Syrian Brotherhood) does not deviate from the general framework set by Al-Banna in terms of the comprehensiveness of the tools that must be used in the process of social and political change, nor even in terms of the idea of reform and gradual

²³⁶ **On Al-Jazeera Youtube Channel**, “Muhammad Badie statement: Our revolution is peaceful and will remain peaceful ... Our peace is stronger than bullets and tanks”, 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rEVvC0v2ewE> (20 May 2023)

²³⁷ Imad Eddin Hussein, “The Brotherhood ... From Farouk and Nasser to Sadat and Mubarak”, *Deutsche Welle*, 25 Aug 2016, <https://www.dw.com/ar/%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%82-%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83/a-19497858>. (20 May 2023)

²³⁸ Atiya Adlan, - the chairman of Al-Islah Party - “Islamists in Egypt and the January 25 Revolution”, Istanbul: (1 Mart 2020).

²³⁹ Hassan Al-Banna, **The letters of Hasan Al-Banna**, International Islamic Federation of Students Organizations, undated, pp. 217-261.

²⁴⁰ Hassan Al-Banna, *The letters of Hasan Al-Banna*.

²⁴¹ **Muslim Brotherhood related website (Ikhwanwiki)**, Letter of Education, undated, رسالة التعليم.pdf - Ikhwan Wiki | الموسوعة التاريخية الرسمية لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين (25 May 2023)

²⁴² **Muslim Brotherhood related website (Ikhwanwiki)**, Letter of Jihad, undated, رسالة الجهاد - Ikhwan Wiki | الموسوعة التاريخية الرسمية لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين (25 May 2023)

²⁴³ Badriya Rawy, The State among Muslim Brotherhood Theorists, *Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies*, 26 Aug 2019. <https://eipss-eg.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%8F%D9%86%D9%91%D9%8E%D8%B8%D8%B1%D9%90%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D9/> (1 Aug 2023)

change in the system. This is what he wrote in some of his important books in this field including “Soldiers of God, the Planners” and “Soldiers of God, the System”. Sheikh Said Hawa also wrote about the duties of the Party of God, and the forms of organization and planning that they must follow and surround themselves with in order to gain the strength and ability - material and moral - for social and political change.²⁴⁴

These writings were then translated into reality with the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood’s special military organization, “al-Tanzim al-Khas”,²⁴⁵ which was the nucleus of a real force to confront the Jews and the British at that time in the 1940s. It formed battalions and prepared ‘mujahedeen’, ‘revolutionaries who had the honor of jihad in Palestine.’²⁴⁶ However, ‘the Muslim Brotherhood is a collection of nationalist groups with different visions. The different factions disagree on how best to fulfil their mission. But all reject global jihad while embracing elections and other features of democracy.’²⁴⁷

Despite this extensive literature that emphasizes confronting oppressors by force, if necessary, the official position of the Muslim Brotherhood since the January revolution and after the coup, and even after the dispersal of Rabaa and Nahda in August 2013 by military force, is ‘peacefulness’. “The option of peacefulness is neither a tactic nor a maneuver, but a basic option based on Islamic jurisprudence, realistic awareness, and a correct reading of history and the experiences of nations and peoples.”²⁴⁸ This was the Brotherhood's statement in September 2013. The slogan ‘peaceful until the end’ was the approach expressed by Dr. Mohamed El-Beltagy, a prominent Muslim Brotherhood leader and member of the Supreme Council of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), who is currently detained, in his 2013 article published in the British newspaper The Guardian in which he emphasized that the Brotherhood would not resort to violence.²⁴⁹ At the same

²⁴⁴ Badriya Rawy, *The State among Muslim Brotherhood Theorists*.

²⁴⁵ See: Mahmoud Al-Sabagh, **The reality of private organisation and its role in Al-Daawa- of the Muslim Brotherhood**, Egypt: Dar Al-Itissam, 1986.

²⁴⁶ **The Official website of Muslim Brotherhood**, “Palestine in ‘the thought of the martyr Imam Hasan Al-Banna’”, فلسطين في فكر الإمام الشهيد حسن البنا - إخوان أونلاين - الموقع الرسمي لجماعة الإخوان المسلمون (1 Aug 2023) And, MB and the Palestine war, الموقع الرسمي لجماعة الإخوان المسلمون (1 Aug 2023)

²⁴⁷ Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. (86), No. (2), (Mar- Apr 2007), pp. 107-108.

²⁴⁸ **The Official website of Muslim Brotherhood**, “Muslim Brotherhood' Official statement”, 13 Sep 2013, سلمية.. إخوان أونلاين - الموقع الرسمي لجماعة الإخوان المسلمون - "رسالة من الإخوان المسلمين" سلمية.. سلمية (1 Aug 2023)

²⁴⁹ **The Guardian**, Muhammad Al-Baltaji statement, “The Muslim Brotherhood Will Not Turn to Violence to Fight the Coup in Egypt”, 21 Aug 2013 . <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/21/muslim-brotherhood-violence-egypt>. (1 Aug 2023)

time, however, he warns that demands are emerging within the ranks of the Brotherhood's youth to take up arms for self-defense.²⁵⁰

There has been an internal Brotherhood debate about 'using force or escalating the confrontation' against the coup political regime. Sources in the Brotherhood - in separate conversations - told Anadolu Agency in (2014) that there is a disagreement within the group's senior leadership over the path of confronting the current authorities, with some talking about escalation and retribution, while others insist on peacefulness as a means of confronting repression. This is one of the reasons that led to the emergence of two leaders of the Brotherhood, each of which considers itself the holder of the 'legitimacy' of the leadership of the group and is responsible for it.²⁵¹ Especially as the Brotherhood youth see that the road is blocked for them as the political regime cancels any margin or hope for peaceful change, in addition to facing death sentences and the arrest of tens of thousands of others.²⁵² Multiple reasons and factors led the Brotherhood's youth to a state of despair and frustration with the Brotherhood's leadership's insistence (in prisons) on the peaceful option and refusal to listen to the voices of youth demanding revenge and retribution, as well as the depletion of its central institutions.²⁵³

The depletion of its central institutions has also led to deep divisions within the group, an uncommon issue for an organization that has traditionally derived much of its strength from its unity. As the group's institutions became dysfunctional, the question of who should lead the group became a central debate, leading to the emergence of two camps that now compete for followers and the right to use the group's name. The main disagreement in the Muslim Brotherhood at the time centered on the use of violence against the Sisi government. Ezzat's camp called on Brotherhood members to remain peaceful, emphasizing that the group had survived several waves of repression in its long history by sticking to its distinctive strategy, a non-violent, evolutionary approach to

²⁵⁰ **AlJazeera Net**, Do Egypt brothers tend to violence?, 1 Sep 2013, الجزيرة نت | أخبار | العنف؟ | هل يتجه إخوان مصر للعنف؟ (1 Aug 2023)

²⁵¹ **Anadolu Agency**, "Peacefulness and violence trigger a 'legitimate' crisis between an old and a new leadership of the Egyptian MB", (28 May 2015), "السلامية والعنف", "شرعية" يفجران أزمة "السلامية والعنف" (1 Aug 2023)

²⁵² **Amnesty**, "Egypt Has Launched Most Vicious Crackdown since Sisi Came to Power", 2 Oct 2019. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/10/egypt-largest-wave-of-mass-arrests-since-president-abdel-fattah-al-sisi-came-to-power/>. (5Aug 2023)

²⁵³ **Al Jazeera Channel on Youtube**, "In Seven Years documentary", 27 Jan 2019, <https://youtu.be/4tTdlSziANo> (5 Aug 2023)

promote gradual change from below. This camp also aims to recreate the ‘ordeal’ culture, or the collective sense of grievance that has helped the MB control its members and marginalize violent dissidents in the past (for example, during Nasser’s government crackdown in the 1950s and 1960s.) The group appears to have a remarkable resilience and adaptability in the face of government repression. In February 2014, the youth - who were increasingly demanding revolutionary action, succeeded in pressurizing the Brotherhood to hold internal elections to restructure its administrative bodies and address the leadership vacuum. This allowed them to take a more active role in internal leadership. The revolutionary camp is preoccupied with reinterpreting the legacy of founder al-Banna, focusing on the militant episodes in his and the Brotherhood’s history.

However, the second camp has departed from this tradition and has sought to reinvent the Muslim Brotherhood as a revolutionary movement, one that is allowed to use violent tactics against the Sisi government if necessary. The legitimization of violence is not based on the jihadist concept of “takfir”. Instead, the group uses the sharia concept of “qisas”, punishments, relying on a 2015 fatwa that legitimizes violence in the exceptional context of Egypt’s extreme repression. According to observers, a return to the rules of the old guard may lead to the departure of many of the organization’s youth, tired of receiving instructions that they were not consulted on but are required to pay for on the ground.²⁵⁴ Criticism of the old guard and its responsibility for what the group has become has increased.

The construction of a religious framework to justify the use of violence took place only after many of the organization’s youth became involved in violence. The increasingly violent activities of some angry Muslim Brotherhood youth led the new leadership to formulate an ideological framework to organize this wave of violence. The text, titled “Jurisprudence of Popular Resistance to the Coup” was only published in early 2015. More than 18 months after the Brotherhood was ousted from power.²⁵⁵

²⁵⁴ Georges Fahmi, “The Struggle for the Leadership of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood”, *Carnegie Middle East Centre*, 14 July 2015. <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2015/07/the-struggle-for-the-leadership-of-egypts-muslim-brotherhood?lang=en¢er=middle-east> (1 Sep 2023)

²⁵⁵ Georges Fahmi, “**The debate over the use of violence within the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after 2013**”, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Italy: European University Institute, 2018. pp. 7-8. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcjpcglclefindmkaj/https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/52544/RSCAS_PP_2018_01.pdf?sequence=1 (1 Sep 2023)

Indeed, more recently, the new rules set by the new leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood have succeeded in keeping the organization together and keeping the level of violence low, but they have weakened the leadership's ability to make pragmatic political choices, such as reaching a political settlement with the regime. While some of the new leaders recognize that at some point a political compromise will be needed, they cannot demand it of their lower-ranking members.

2.3.2. The Emergence of Violent Groups after the June 2013 Coup

In the 1990s, Egypt witnessed many violent attacks that ended in major crackdowns and arrests. Then there was the cycle of revisionism, which was discussed in the study. Some qualitative attacks in Sinai by jihadist groups, mainly associated with al-Qaeda between 2004 and 2006. However, after the coup against President Mohamed Morsi in 2013, several new groups emerged that adopted violence. These groups have emerged from the youth of the major Islamist currents, and sometimes from other, unaffiliated revolutionary youth. These groups are united by the goal of overthrowing the military regime in Egypt led by al-Sisi, but they differ in their rhetoric, tactics, targets, and level of violence. In this part of the thesis, organizations accused by Egyptian security and the media of being affiliated or affiliated with the Brotherhood will be analyzed.

One of the newly armed groups calling themselves 'Sawaed Misr' or 'Hasm' have emerged, launching armed attacks across Egypt with small arms, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, kidnappings, executions, complex attacks, ambushes, and targeted assassinations.²⁵⁶ Unlike ISIS in Sinai, *Hasm* has targeted high-ranking figures in Egypt's judiciary and police and their collaborators. The peak of its attacks occurred after its launch in 2016, but the organization was significantly weakened by the Egyptian security forces. Nearly a decade later (2020), the militants continued to target army personnel and interests in North Sinai almost non-stop, albeit at a lower frequency than during the peak period.²⁵⁷ The organization is currently inactive.

²⁵⁶ **Egypt Today**, "MB-Affiliated *Hasm* Terrorists Busted Targeting Egypt's National Security", 22 January 2020, <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/79893/MB-affiliated-Hasm-terrorists-busted-targeting-Egypt-s-national-security> (2 Oct 2023)

²⁵⁷ Allison McManus, "The Egyptian Military's Terrorism Containment Campaign in North Sinai", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 30 June 2020. <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/82218>. (2 Oct 2023)

Hazemoun Stream is another violent organization. The exact size of the Hazemoun movement is unknown, and its members may not be directly connected to each other or under a unified leadership. As the thesis noted, they are supporters of the detained presidential candidate Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, a former Brotherhood member who has been rallied around by Salafists and non-Salafists. This movement has been condemned by the Egyptian judiciary as a ‘terrorist group’ and its supporters have been sentenced to death.²⁵⁸ What distinguishes this movement is that its activism against the military establishment began before the coup.

There are also groups whose exact orientation is not known, and others with a Salafist orientation. The Popular Resistance Movement is one of such groups. It appeared in 2014 and was the first non-Salafist group to use violence. The Popular Resistance Movement’s ideology is said to be ‘religious nationalism’ rather than jihadism, while some argue that it has conservative Salafist and anti-capitalist tendencies. This shows that the choice of violence has not been monopolized by any particular movement. The group does not appear to have a clear leadership, nor does it have a clear number of members. However, it is active throughout Egypt, and its modus operandi is to carry out low-violence attacks, generally using rudimentary weapons. Over time, however, it has become increasingly sophisticated, violent, and sophisticated. They have shifted from attacking government and police targets to economic targets as well

Revolutionary Punishment is another armed group established after the 2013 coup. It is a group founded in January 2015. By September 2015, the group reportedly carried out around 150 attacks in sixteen governorates, killing dozens of security forces. The group’s tactics include planting IEDs targeting infrastructure and police convoys, setting up armed ambushes of police checkpoints, and assassinating senior police officers. While there is little evidence to suggest that the group has Islamist leanings, there are reports that there is a risk that it could be influenced by Islamist elements. The group is also believed to be the most organized of the new non-Salafist violent groups. It has recorded

²⁵⁸ **Egyptian Justice Committee**, “Hazemoun Terrorist Group”, 17 May 2013, <https://www.cfjustice.org/ar/pcalendar/%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-2/> (3 Oct 2023)

all the attacks it has carried out, suggesting that it may have a centralized command and access to a logistical network and funding.²⁵⁹

The global phenomenon of Islamic State had also been active in Egypt. ISIS emerged in 2015, when it claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Italian consulate in Cairo. It has carried out numerous attacks. One of its branches is the “Islamic State in the Sinai Peninsula” (formerly known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis), which was established in 2014. It carried out many attacks, most notably the attack on the city of Sheikh Zuweid against the Egyptian army and the bombing of the Russian airliner. This led to the death of 224 people. There are also attacks on non-Muslim targets, such as the Alexandria and Tanta church bombings. These operations continued until 2022. They completely disappeared during the period of the aggression on Gaza between 7 October 2023 and early 2025.

Ajnad Misr was founded in Cairo in 2014. The group considers the post-coup Egyptian government to be the main enemy. It has referred to its attacks as ‘retribution is life’. While Ajnad Misr appears to adhere to a hardline Salafist ideology, it does not refer to anyone as an infidel or apostate. The group refers to the police, army and security services as ‘criminal apparatus’ that must be avenged. Ajnad Misr “operates as an ideological hinge, as a representative of the hardline Salafi movement, it opens the door to non-Salafis by linking its call for jihad to retribution.”²⁶⁰ The size of Ajnad Misr remains unclear.

Al-Furqan Brigades has taken violence to a different level, attacking commercial ships in the Suez Canal using rocket-propelled grenades in 2013. Ideologically, the group believes that the current government is illegitimate, as it does not apply Islamic law. While Hurras al-Aqeeda group, an al-Qaeda organization, was not on the same level as other organizations such as Wilayat Sinai group, its military activities were limited. Its rhetoric also differed from that of the Islamic State.

The most violent Islamist groups took center stage in the countries of the Arab revolutions, especially Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt, but to a lesser extent, and have largely disappeared since late 2022 in Egypt. Jihadist organizations in Iraq and Syria

²⁵⁹ Mokhtar Awad and Mustafa Hashem, “Egypt’s escalating Islamist insurgency”, *Carnegie Middle East Centre*, 2015. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_58_Egypt_Awad_Hashem_final.pdf (3 Oct 2023)

²⁶⁰ Annette Ranko and Justyna Nedza, pp. 1–23.

controlled a geographical area larger than some European countries. However, Egypt's security strategies and the orientation and capabilities of their leaders have limited them.

It seems that the emergence of these violent groups 'is the inevitable result of decades of inactivity, intellectual decline, and the failure of social and economic policies in large parts of the Muslim world, especially in the Arab region.' The military coup against the democratically elected president's government and the ensuing crackdown played a major role in the emergence of these groups, and the security grip and torture in prisons played a role in their subsequent disappearance to a large extent.

2.4. The Phenomenon of Splits and Divisions

It is worth adding that the phenomenon of leaving the peaceful group to establish groups that adopt violence was not the only direction for defectors. Rather, there are those who defected to more pragmatic or democratic options, in the sense of a 'post-political participation shift' towards options that are more open to other currents. Overall, this split has several dimensions including identity transformation, state repression, and contextual factors. The broader political landscape, including the decline of the Muslim Brotherhood's influence and internal divisions, contributed to members's decisions to leave the organization.²⁶¹ The process of disengagement is not simply a withdrawal from an organization, but often involves a profound shift in personal identity and political beliefs. The post-coup crackdowns led many members to reconsider their affiliation as they faced increased risks and challenges. These collective and individual responses to repression cannot be explained by focusing solely on structural and institutional factors (i.e. organization, ideology, leadership, etc.). Members' personal experiences, memories, emotions and traumas play a key role in shaping their response to repression.²⁶²

Some of the reasons for the choice of non-violence based on the exigencies and repercussions of the Arab Revolutions era include the following factors. Firstly, the successful model of the January Revolution. The January 25 Revolution greatly

²⁶¹ Mustafa Menshawy and Khalil Al-Anani, "Becoming an Ex: Dynamics of Disengagement from Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood after 2011", **Middle East Law and Governance**, Vol. (13), no. (2), (June 2021), pp. 215-231.

²⁶² Khalil Al-Anani, "Rethinking the Relationship between Repression and Dissent: Assessing the Muslim Brotherhood's Response to Repression in Egypt since the 2013 Coup", **Journal of Democracy**, Vol. (26), No. (8), (2019), pp. 1329-1341.

influenced the political consciousness of the people, including Islamists, and became the ideal model for change until that period, before the severe repression by the regime. This is evidenced by their descent after the coup and their call for peace and the restoration of legitimacy by peaceful means. This speech was even an option for those who joined the state later when they saw the official response from the regime. Even today, Islamists and liberals all seek to mobilize again and endeavor to restore the January model.²⁶³

In order not to repeat the Syrian or Libyan civil war model. The phrase ‘so we don't become like Syria or Iraq’ is not new to Egyptians. It was used during the election campaign of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, where the media and his political supporters promoted the idea that not electing him would mean facing the violence of ‘armed militias.’²⁶⁴

Disavowal of the ISIS mode is another factor. The image in which ISIS represented Salafi jihadism caused fear among political Islam groups in general and the Salafi movement in particular, and even the countries in which this movement originated, such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq. Consequently, everyone was quick to disavow ISIS and its counterparts, even Saudi Arabia²⁶⁵ was one of the first countries to support the war on terrorism and the international coalition against ISIS. Consequently, a number of Islamist currents in Egypt chose to wait and warn against acts of violence that could be categorized as ISIS. In addition, these currents, even Salafi ones, disagree with ISIS and its actions. In addition, Egypt is a member of the international coalition to defeat ISIS.²⁶⁶ In this context, Elhamy argues that ‘We can say that the phase of the Arab revolutions pushed forward the moderate al-Qaeda discourse, and then the phase of the counter-revolutions pushed forward the ISIS discourse. Especially during the period of its rise and the strength

²⁶³ Atiya Adlan, - the chairman of Al-Islah Party - “Islamists in Egypt and the January 25 Revolution”, Istanbul: (1 Mart 2020).

²⁶⁴ **AlJazeera**, “Like Syria and Iraq: Sisi's Scarecrow for the Egyptians”, (6 Sep 2014), <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2014/9/6/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%81%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86>. (20 Dec 2023)

²⁶⁵ **Saudi Embassy in Washington website**, “Saudi Arabia and Counterterrorism Statement”, Mar 2019, SAUDI ARABIA AND COUNTERTERRORISM.pdf (20 Dec 2023)

²⁶⁶ Jacob Olidort, “The Al-Nour Party: A Salafi Partner in the Fight Against Terrorism?”, *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, 2015, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-al-nour-party-a-salafi-partner-in-the-fight-against-terrorism>. (20 Jan 2024)

of its media production, which was reflected in fierce battles between ISIS and al-Qaeda in Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Libya.²⁶⁷

However, research has shown that religiosity can have both positive and negative effects on attitudes towards ‘terrorism’. While it can promote social cohesion and harmony, it can also contribute to the justification of violence under certain interpretations. A study that examined data from several Muslim-majority countries found that religiosity and political Islam show differential associations with support for terrorist acts, and these associations vary significantly across different national contexts.²⁶⁸ The likelihood of justifying terrorism is influenced by the social and political context in which individuals reside.²⁶⁹ This suggests that the interaction between both religious beliefs and political and social grievances plays a crucial role in shaping public opinions. While religious ideology can influence attitudes towards terrorism, many scholars argue that political and economic grievances are often more important motivations for supporting violence.²⁷⁰ Individuals facing socio-economic hardship or political exclusion may be more likely to justify terrorist acts as a form of resistance or expression of discontent.²⁷¹

Islamist movements in Egypt have adapted their strategies in response to the changing political landscape after the January 2011 revolution and the 2013 coup. This has taken place in two directions, pragmatic in some contexts and violent in others. Islamists faced increasing repression from the coup regime. This affected their ability to influence the political scene. This has pushed groups of them towards non-peaceful means. Pivotal events such as the Egyptian coup in 2013, the failure of the Brotherhood experiment and the rise of the Islamic State in 2014 have had a major impact.

²⁶⁷ Mohamed Elhamy, “Hourasou ASharia: ‘Al-Qaeda’ enters Egypt with a new face”, *Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies*, (7 Nov 2017), <https://web.archive.org/web/20231003070239/https://eipss-eg.org/%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF/> (20 Jan 2024)

²⁶⁸ Suat Cubukcu, Huseyin Cinoglu, and Suleyman Ozeren, “Religiosity and Political Islam: Divergent Influences on Support for Terrorism”, *International Annals of Criminology*, Vol. (61), No.(3-4), (2023), pp. 243-264.

²⁶⁹ Clara Egger and Raül Magni-Berton, “The Role of Islamist Ideology in Shaping Muslims Believers' Attitudes towards Terrorism: Evidence from Europe”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol.(44), no.(7), (2019), pp. 581-604.

²⁷⁰ Clara Egger and Raül Magni-Berton, pp. 581-604.

²⁷¹ Adamczyk Amy and Gary LaFree, “Religion and Support for Political Violence among Christians and Muslims in Africa”, *Sociological Perspectives*, Vol. (62), No. (6), (2019), pp. 948-979.

These changes and transformations, in both directions, revealed deep divisions between different Islamist currents and within the same group, with new and traditional currents competing for religious and political legitimacy. Despite their newfound political participation, many Salafi factions have faced challenges in consolidating their authority. These internal divisions, different strategies, and a lack of coherent leadership have hindered their ability to effectively influence the political scene, especially after the 2013 coup.

The study also argues that understanding these groups that chose violence cannot be done without examining the context in which they emerged, including their conflict with Egypt's political system and sometimes society, and the community in which they grew up. This struggle takes place against a complex backdrop of issues in the Arab and Islamic worlds, including different patterns of modernization and the emergence of new social and cultural phenomena, the emergence of the modern state and its crisis under authoritarian regimes, the emergence of sectarianism, the complex relationship between memory and history, the national question, issues of integration, the question of occupation in Palestine, and the question of rebellion against multifaceted Western domination,²⁷² which will be elaborated in the next chapter.

²⁷² See: Azmi Bishara, *On Salafism: Concepts and Contexts*, USA: Stanford University Press, 2022, <https://www.sup.org/books/middle-east-studies/salafism/excerpt/chapter-1-excerpt>

CHAPTER 3: THE DETERMINANTS OF ISLAMISTS TRANSFORMATIONS IN POST JANUARY 25 REVOLUTION

The study in this chapter examines the factors and reasons that prompted Islamist-oriented currents, groups and individuals to undertake actions that were categorized as transformations or reviews. The study examines the factors and reasons that led Islamist-oriented currents, groups, and individuals to undertake actions that have been categorized as transformations or revisions. It is emphasized that the study examines the specific factors, during the period of the 25 January 2011 Revolution up to 2024 only. These Egyptian Islamist groups may enter a different context in the future that affects their policies and strategies. The determinants are categorized into 4 sections, the interaction of Islamist movements with the 25 January Revolution, Islamists and the Egyptian state: A competitive relationship, the struggle with counter-revolutionary forces and the war on terrorism and the Islamophobia plan.

3.1. The Interaction of Islamist Movements with the January 25 Revolution

Firstly, Aristotle defines a revolution as “a fundamental and sudden change in the political system or governing structure of a state.”²⁷³ This change often leads to the replacement of an existing government or constitution, usually through force or mass unrest. Revolutions arise when there is a breakdown of the existing order and a shift in the balance of power within society. Aristotle distinguishes between two main types of revolutions, corrective revolutions, which aim to achieve the common good by correcting injustices within the political system and non-corrective revolutions those led by specific factions that seek to gain power without regard for the common good.²⁷⁴ There are other classifications of revolutions, such as political or social revolutions that may take place after popular uprising. Other categorizations include modern democratic revolutions, which are constitutional revolutions according to the ‘American Revolution’ model. And the ‘obsolete’ national and social revolutions according to the model of the French, Russian and other revolutions.

²⁷³ Azmi Bishara, *On Revolution and the Possibility of Revolution*, p. 7.

²⁷⁴ Leslie Friedman Goldstein, “Aristotle’s Theory of Revolution: Looking at the Lockean Side”, *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. (54), No. (2), 2001, pp. 311-331.

In political science, a revolution is defined as a rapid and fundamental transformation of a state, its class, or its ethnic or religious structures. A revolution involves an attempt to change political systems, mass mobilization, and efforts to impose change through non-institutional means such as mass demonstrations, protests, strikes, or violence.²⁷⁵ As for susceptibility to revolution, it is the necessity of recognizing injustice as an abnormal condition, which creates the conditions for revolutionary action. The revolutionary approach differs from the reformist approach in that a revolution aims to radically change the system, while reform is done within the existing framework, which makes reform insufficient in the face of tyranny.²⁷⁶ How did Islamists in Egypt react to such a huge event as the January 25 Revolution? How did this socio-political phenomenon affect their ideas, practices and discourses?

In the flurry of successive revolutions, whether in the Arab world or in recent history in Eastern Europe, there is an immediate and emotional impulse for political movements to imitate the revolution in a neighboring country. Considering the perception of the effectiveness of religious fervor, and what is said about the predominance of emotions among many Islamists, the conclusion leads to the expectation of an immediate, comprehensive and emotional involvement in any revolutions in Arab countries in order to imitate them.²⁷⁷ However, the participation of Islamists in the Arab revolutions does not fully fall under the description of irrational imitation, as each individual experience suggests. The ‘imitation’ of this or that revolution, or the participation of this or that Islamist movement in the revolution by other Islamist movements, varied in degrees, demands and mechanisms, and in some cases did not happen at all.

Many factors overlapped, from political, economic and social grievances, to a technological revolution and a surge in the use of social media in mobilization to spread the revolutionary state, after Bouazizi set himself on fire in December 2010. The lack of knowledge of the identity of the driving force behind these revolutions, which varies from country to country, may be one of the reasons for their success, as they are undeniably popular revolutions. Society, in many of its components, has been the main sponsor of

²⁷⁵ Jack Goldstone, "Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory", *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. (4), No. (1), 2018. p. 139.

²⁷⁶ Azmi Bishara, *on revolution and the potential for revolution*, pp. 6-8.

²⁷⁷ Armando Salvatore, "New Media, the "Arab Spring," and the Metamorphosis of the Public Sphere: Beyond Western Assumptions on Collective Agency and Democratic Politics", *Constellations*, Vol. (20), No. (2), Feb 2013, pp. 217-228.

the revolutions. Hence, the revolutionary legitimacy that is supposed to become a common heritage for all. The January 25 Revolution in Egypt was not the creation of a specific political movement or ideological current, but rather the result of a collective action, at a specific moment in time, that ignited the revolutionary moment. Therefore, the political discourse of these new forces not only exceeded in its vocabulary, equations, and demands the discourse of the traditional opposition forces, but also served as an inclusive discourse that spoke for everyone in an unusual state of spontaneous unity among the components of the nation.

There are several approaches²⁷⁸ in assessing the experience of Islamists during and after the Arab revolutions. With regard to Egypt in particular, there is the position that Islamists seized the opportunity and rode the wave of the revolution to seize power especially since some of them are not revolutionary, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. This led some to criticize the behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood in its stance on the protests against Mubarak, as they did not clearly decide on their position until after a long period of time, when they were sure that Mubarak was beginning to fall. According to the second approach the revolution which started as a mass uprising against corruption and injustice, involved Islamists from the very beginning of the events, through sympathetic and active youth in these movements. Whichever of the two views prevails, it is certain that the Islamists were the ones who gave the revolutionary movement the impetus, Islamists lined up with the youth of the revolutionary movement for change, given the extent of the repression they suffered from the dictatorial regimes in the region, which benefited from the support of the West, and used the fight against terrorism and the fight against Islamists accused of terrorism to stay in power.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁸ Many observers, especially from the secular left, have criticised the Islamists' attitudes towards the revolution and their negative attitude towards revolutions in general. Among those who tracked the Brotherhood's movement and its fluctuating political behaviour was the researcher Hossam Tammam, see Hammam Sarhan, 'Hossam Tammam: 'The Brotherhood extends one hand for dialogue and raises the flag of disobedience with the other,' see for example: *Swissinfo*, 9 Feb 2011.

<https://www.swissinfo.ch/ara/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D9%81%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%89/29442394> (1 March 2024)

²⁷⁹ Burhan Ghalioun and Philip J. Costopoulos, "The Persistence of Arab Authoritarianism", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. (15), No. (4), (2004), pp. 126-132.

The revolutionary project was absent for most Islamists in Egypt before the revolution. In this context, Assef Bayat compared the political landscapes of Iran and Egypt during the late twentieth century, with a particular focus on the 1979 Iranian revolution and the ongoing political dynamics in Egypt (prior to the January 25 Revolution). He argues that while both countries experienced significant Islamist activism, the outcomes and trajectories of these movements were shaped by their unique historical and political contexts.²⁸⁰ In Iran, the Islamist movement successfully mobilized a broad coalition that led to a revolutionary change in government. The Iranian revolution was characterized by a clear ideological framework that sought to establish an Islamic state. Islamist movements in Egypt, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, operated in a more repressive political environment that limited their ability to bring about revolutionary change. Instead, they focused on gradual reform and social activism. Therefore, the revolutionary environment allowed for the consolidation of power among Islamist groups in Iran, while in Egypt, constant repression led to a constant cycle of mobilization and demobilization among activists. Activism in Iran was more centralized and ideologically driven, while in Egypt - prior to the January 2011 revolution - it was often fragmented and focused on social issues rather than an overarching political agenda. This distinction highlights how the lack of a coherent revolutionary movement in Egypt led to different forms of activism that were often “reactive rather than proactive.”²⁸¹

Muslim Brotherhood has more reformist approach throughout its existence. This is the case during the January 25 Revolution period and its aftermath. The interaction with the revolution was governed by the movement’s formative origins based on education, gradual reform, and a categorical rejection of the idea of resorting to violence. It did not have the proactive awareness to take the initiative at the moment of the ‘revolutionary tremor’ promising real change. As for the Salafi movement, although it was not reformist, it was far from politics in terms of participation and effectiveness, except for those jihadist groups that used violence repeatedly but did not reach the threshold of moving the street behind them or gaining support for their actions. Although some of them have a

²⁸⁰ Asef Bayat, *Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing Islamist Activism in Iran and Egypt*, pp. 136-169.

²⁸¹ Asef Bayat, *Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing Islamist Activism in Iran and Egypt*, 136-169.

revolutionary project, they did not have an incubating environment in Egypt at the time of the revolution, such as al-Qaeda, for example.

The revolutionary project or ‘the idea of revolution for freedom and change’ was not part of the deliberative space of the theses that studied the Arab reality and foresaw its future.²⁸² The speed and spread of the “Arab Revolutions” surprised almost everyone, including those who carried them out. But the real surprise crystallized in the specific features of the revolutions, their ideological orientations and political trajectories.²⁸³

It can be said that the contributions of these movements in igniting the Arab revolutions were limited, compared to their organizational and movement status. Some may attribute the weak presence of Islamists at the beginning of the Arab revolutions to the intelligence of their leaders and their realization of the sensitivity of the revolutionary moment and its calculations, fearing the tried and tested repression of these political regimes, thus killing the revolution, as happened in Algeria in the early 1990s. However, this does not negate the weakness of the political imagination of these movements and their failure to recognize the revolutionary momentum early on. Perhaps the most important evidence for this hypothesis is the lack of revolutionary imagination among the Islamic currents, as a result of their negative experience with the ruling regimes, as is the case in Egypt (the historical clash between Nasser and the Brotherhood, as well as the continuous confrontation between Mubarak and the Islamic Group). They have been devoid of the vocabulary of revolutionary action such as change, toppling regimes, disrupting constitutions.²⁸⁴ Additionally, the participation of Islamist movements in the revolution was not a matter of choice or an organizational decision, but a fait accompli imposed on them by the developments of the revolutionary action, which was rapid and everyone tried to catch up with it.

3.2. The Impact of Local Contexts

The Arab revolutions were the result of a collective action that transcended the classical organizational, ideological and political frameworks, and expressed new forces and currents that did not know party work in its traditional form. This is fundamentally different from the nature and structure of the Islamist movement’s discourse, which is

²⁸² Nawaf Al-Qadimi, *Islamists and the Spring of Revolutions - The Productive Practice of Ideas*, pp. 1-60.

²⁸³ Bayat, *The Arab Spring and its Surprises*, pp. 587-601.

²⁸⁴ Al-Anani, *Islamic Streams in the Era of Arab Revolutions*.

characterized by extreme centralization and ideological and organizational commitment. Here, Islamist movements had one of two options, either participate in the Arab revolutions, but according to the conditions and rules of the game determined by the revolutionary street, or not to participate, which would lead to a political and societal loss not only among their bases and members, but also among the general public. It is true that there was a presence of some symbols of Islamist currents in the revolutionary scene, but it was a presence committed to the general revolutionary current, not distinct or separate from it.²⁸⁵

On the other hand, the Arab revolutions accelerated the pace of ‘ideological adaptation’ and the development of the conceptual apparatus of the Islamist currents, and there was a great difference between what some Islamists were saying twenty years ago and the level of the current moment. Although they vary, they are not a homogeneous bloc and do not have a unified vision. Here, the author refers to the concept of post-Islamism, which is ‘a major shift within Islamist movements, representing a move away from traditional Islamic ideologies and adopting a more pragmatic approach that is compatible with democratic principles and the needs of society.’²⁸⁶ The local manifestations of post-Islamism have become more widespread and diverse.

The orientation of the emerging post-revolutionary Salafi parties was also molded in this context. There was a three-pronged trend, localization, re-education and politicization. Additionally, a growing immersion in local dynamics and a revision of exclusionary, isolationist and non-participatory behaviors, and a retreat from the exclusive Salafi position were also observed. By reinventing its methods of dealing with society at the religious, political and cultural levels,²⁸⁷ Islamist movements have adapted to some extent to the new contexts.²⁸⁸

The revolution gave Islamist movements a legitimate and legal status that enabled them to operate freely and openly at the political level. It also opened the social and movement space for them to assert and consolidate their popular presence, which meant the possibility of grassroots expansion socially and culturally. However, this was completely

²⁸⁵ Al-Anani, *Islamic Streams in the Era of Arab Revolutions*.

²⁸⁶ Abou Rumman, *Post-Islamism: A New Era or Ideological Illusions*, pp. 9-20.

²⁸⁷ Théo Blanc and Olivier Roy, *Post-Salafism: From Global to Local Salafism*, pp. 1-20.

²⁸⁸ Lounnas, pp. 441–465.

reversed after the 2013 coup. With the exception of some parties, whose role has declined significantly? But they were not subjected to what the Brotherhood and its allies opposed to the coup were subjected to. The revolution brought both gains and challenges, the most important of which are explained below.

Firstly, Islamist movements used to mix proselytizing and politics, and there were no boundaries between the religious and social role of these movements and their political activity. However, they established parties and endeavored to separate the preaching from the political, despite the conflicts and divisions that occurred due to this separation. For example, the disagreement between the leadership of the Nour Party and its founding Salafi Da'wa, which prevented their separation and even led to the defection of the Party's head, Imad Abdel Ghafour. This was also the case in Tunisia. The Ennahda group separated the Da'wa from the political. Secondly, the Arab uprisings did not fundamentally affect the traditional division of Islamists, but they revealed the dissatisfaction of Islamists' bases and some of their younger segments with the leadership. The youth and changeable segments faced what can be described as the 'deep party' that rejects change within the Islamist currents.²⁸⁹ Finally, after the revolution, these movements did not remain entrenched in their religious and intellectual theses without opening up to other more progressive and moderate currents, visions and ideas, otherwise they would lose their supporters. The opposite is also true for those who advocate violence in the face of oppression and tyranny in the period of the victory of the counter-revolution.

3.2.1. Islamists and the Egyptian State: A Competitive Relationship

Before examining the details of the strategies and tools of the existing Egyptian state in its struggle with Islamist movements, it must be noted that the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist allies in ruling Egypt revealed issues that contributed to strengthening the power and presence of their rivals, who exploited them to their advantage.²⁹⁰ Firstly, the absence of an administrative vision, as the Muslim Brotherhood did not have a clear vision or an effective mechanism to move from managing the organization to managing the state. Secondly, the crises of thought and organization, and

²⁸⁹ Al-Haroub and Baaboud, pp. 1-60.

²⁹⁰ See: Shalata, *Islamists in Power: The Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt*.

how their practices affected political performance, including their inability to manage societal diversity. Thirdly, it was not clear for the movement regarding how to interact with other political forces. The Brotherhood has closed in on itself to some extent, instead of opening up to other civil and Islamist forces, which increased the state of political polarization and promoted what is known as the “Ikhwanization” of the state. The Brotherhood’s behavior and strategy since assuming power in June 2012 shows that it lacks a revolutionary agenda due to its primarily reformist approach, which they continued while in power instead of revolutionary thinking, as without the January 25 Revolution and its repercussions, they would not have come to power. It is also due to the incompetence of their leaders and their lack of experience in governing and managing the country.²⁹¹

In addition to these serious mistakes, another aspect of the failure of this experiment is the deep state’s hostility towards the new government. The power struggle between the administration of new President Mohamed Morsi on the one hand and the police, army and judiciary on the other showed that the secular forces gradually began, especially after the state’s poor performance in the parliamentary elections, to sharply oppose the Islamists and de facto align themselves with the army and judiciary. This alliance created a structure called the “deep state” and hindered the progress of the officially democratically elected state.²⁹²

3.2.1.1. Egypt State Characteristics

One of the most prominent authors in the second generation of historical sociology, Michael Mann, believes that the state generally possesses two powers in organizing the affairs of the territory on which it is based. First, it is authoritarian power, which refers to the set of actions that elites are empowered to take without routine and institutionalized negotiations with civil society groups.²⁹³ Thus, the state does not emerge from society, rather, it exercises its agenda through agencies or by relying on the aristocracy.²⁹⁴

²⁹¹ Khalil Al-Anani, *Upended Path: The Rise and Fall of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood*, pp. 527-543.

²⁹² Mehdi Zibaei, “Deep State in Egypt: From Revolution to Dictatorship”, *The Quarterly Journal of Political Studies of Islamic World*, Vol. (8), No. (31), (Fall 2019), pp. 97-112.

²⁹³ Michael Mann, *States, War and Capitalism*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988, p. 5.

²⁹⁴ Clifford Ando, Seth Richardson, *Ancient States and Infrastructural Power: Europe, Asia, and America. Empire and After*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017, p. 309.

Second, he claims that there is another form of state power, which he calls structural power. This refers to the ability of the state to actually penetrate civil society. This refers to the state's ability to effectively penetrate civil society and logistically implement political decisions throughout the kingdom. It reflects the institutionalized capacity of the state, whether authoritarian or democratic, to enact policies that are not only imposed but also supported by societal structures. This form of power allows for a more pervasive impact on everyday life, because it enables the state to engage with citizens in ways that facilitate compliance and participation in governance.²⁹⁵

The terms 'structural power' and 'authoritarian power' have been used 'to identify the two different ways in which a governmental apparatus acquires and uses centralized power.'²⁹⁶ The goal of an authoritarian state is to combine authoritarian power with structural power in a way that allows it to maximize its influence on social life. The two types of power exist in tension in weak states, structural power requires a level of cooperation and compromise between institutions that generally undermines authoritarian power.²⁹⁷ According to Mann, the two governmental systems highest in structural power are bureaucratic states and authoritarian states.²⁹⁸

Given the nature of the republic established in Egypt following the Free Officers Movement of 1952, the Egyptian state can be defined as a 'Praetorian State', a state in which the military has become part of the bureaucratic state and an essential force in creating the middle class.²⁹⁹ Or it is a state ruled and sometimes 'dominated but not ruled' by the military. This state, as described by Nazih al-Ayoubi, is a 'predatory state' in the sense that it is 'so at odds with society that it can only deal with it through coercion and the use of overt force, hence the labels: Police State, Security State, and Intelligence State.'³⁰⁰

²⁹⁵ Turgay Kahvec, "Comparison of Michael Foucault's Governmentality and Michael Mann's infrastructural Power", *Journal of Individual & Society*, Vol. (14), No. (1), (Jun 2024), pp. 44-60.

²⁹⁶ John Agnew, *Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics*, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005, pp. 437-461.

²⁹⁷ John Lucas, "The tension between despotic and infrastructural power: The military and the political class in Nigeria, 1985-1993", *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. (33), No. (3), (1998), pp. 90-113.

²⁹⁸ Kahvec, pp. 44-60.

²⁹⁹ Amos Perlmutter, pp. 4-5.

³⁰⁰ Nazih al-Ayoubi, *Inflating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*, Amjad Hussein (Trans.), Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2010, p. 881.

Thus, the clash between the Egyptian state and the Muslim Brotherhood can be portrayed as a clash between the state bureaucracy, led by the armed forces, which is the most organized institution of this bureaucracy, and society, led by the most organized societal forces the Muslim Brotherhood, with the aim of subjugation or dismantling.³⁰¹ This authoritarian and monopolistic nature of the Egyptian state explains why, throughout the seven decades of the Republic in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood remained a security, not a political, file, even during the short period of containment (March 2011 - July 2013) that followed the January revolution during which the group and its party were granted legal status and were allowed for the first time since their founding to hold senior executive positions, this was interpreted - according to one of the security leaders - as a necessary tactic resorted to by the Military Council of the Armed Forces in order to control the “chaos of the revolution”, as is usually the case when similar security disturbances occur.

In the same context, a number of observers believe that the actor and driver of this type of state is the deep state.³⁰² As defined by the Cambridge Dictionary, the deep state is “organizations such as military, police, or political groups that are said to work secretly in order to protect particular interests and to rule a country without being elected. The idea that there is a deep state governing behind the scenes is dismissed by some as a conspiracy theory.”³⁰³ Or “it is an alleged secret network of especially nonelected government officials and sometimes private entities (as in the financial services and defense industries) operating extra legally to influence and enact government policy.”³⁰⁴

In contrast, some argue that the term deep state has been appropriated by populists and conspiracy theorists to describe a network of interests working to defeat or thwart the will of the public. From the United States to Egypt, many people believe in the idea of the ‘deep state’, with research indicating that a significant portion of the American public

³⁰¹ Omar Ashour, “Collusion to Crackdown: Islamist-Military Relations in Egypt”, *Brookings Doha Centre Analysis Paper*. Vol. (14), 2015, pp. 4-33.

³⁰² Mohamed Affan, *The Muslim Brotherhood and the State in Egypt*.

³⁰³ **Cambridge Dictionary**, Deep state, UK: Cambridge, undated, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/deep-state> . (1 Mar 2024)

³⁰⁴ **Merriam Webster Dictionary**, Deep state, Massachusetts: Merriam Webster, undated, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deep%20state> (1 Mar 2024)

believes in a deep state conspiracy. More recently, this belief has been associated with political movements and events such as the Capitol Riots on January 6th.³⁰⁵

The deep state appears clearly in periods of democratic transition, either to shackle this process, which explains its support for the previous existing political system, or to leave or ride the wave of popular revolutions to topple the head of the regime whose interests conflicted with it to put another one that serves its interests.³⁰⁶ This is why the concept of the deep state resonated with the Arab revolutions and its aftermath through what is known as counter-revolutions.

It seems that the pillars of the deep state are the security and military apparatus, the judiciary, the media, the private sector and businessmen, and cultural and religious elites. The strategies of the deep state are secrecy and ambiguity, interlocking interests, wide-ranging alliances, the use of force and pressure, and thwarting democratic change.³⁰⁷

3.2.2. Strategies to Enhance Legitimacy after the Coup

The new political regime (the coup regime) has resorted to strategies and means that enable it to strengthen its legitimacy and tighten its control over society and its various segments, especially the revolutionary and Islamist movements. This makes it imperative for these movements to adapt to them as required by their interests at every stage. In other words, these ‘repressive, oppressive and exclusionary’ policies push them towards certain choices, as the author presented in the previous chapter such as more violence or a tendency towards political compromises.

Since the military overthrew President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, the regime of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has engaged in a systematic repression of the Muslim Brotherhood, its allies and opponents. The regime has done so by implementing policies that are generally considered an effective means of decapitating hierarchical organizations.*³⁰⁸

³⁰⁵ Kathryn Olmsted, Simon Willmetts and Daniel Vergano (Eds.), State Secrecy Explains the Origins of the ‘Deep State’ Conspiracy Theory, *Scientific American*, 6 Feb 2024. <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/state-secrecy-explains-the-origins-of-the-deep-state-conspiracy-theory/> (1Mar 2024)

³⁰⁶ Dallah Abdul Malik Mohammed, “The phenomenon of the deep state in Arab countries, a case study of Egypt 2011/2018”, (Master Thesis), Faculty of political science and law, University of Kasdi Merbah Ouargla, Algeria, 2020, p. 26.

³⁰⁷ Dallah Abdul Malik Mohammed, *The phenomenon of the deep state in Arab countries, a case study of Egypt 2011/2018*, pp. 26-27.

³⁰⁸ As hundreds of Humanitarian reports, articles and news declaimed.

The authorities have arrested members of the Guidance Bureau and the Shura Council, the two highest collective bodies in the organization, as well as elements of the Building and Development Party. Only a few leaders were able to flee abroad. The regime then expanded the persecution and ‘cleansing’ in other areas (public services, the army, the judiciary, trade unions, NGOs, media outlets, universities, and neighborhoods), all with the aim of reducing the Brotherhood’s influence among the middle class and parts of the elite. Egyptian authorities have also confiscated the assets of the Brotherhood and its allies. They shut down the Brotherhood’s huge social welfare organizations. Through these tactics, the regime emphasized its determination to defeat the Brotherhood politically and limit its ability to build new bases. In subsequent judicial trials, thousands of revolutionaries faced accusations of involvement in terrorist organizations, and many remain detained without arrest warrants or have disappeared.³⁰⁹

The military has promoted the war on terrorism as a narrative to justify its authoritarian stance. In 2013, the head of the armed forces (later President al-Sisi) gave a speech in which he called on the Egyptian people to give the military ‘a mandate to confront violence and terrorism.’³¹⁰ The security discourse gave the military government free rein to dismantle the Muslim Brotherhood and other political opponents. The close alignment between national interests and national security allows the military to discredit those who support pluralism, civilian institutions, and civilian politics. The military portrays civilian leaders as lacking the capacity to protect the nation and provide for the well-being of the country. Moreover, civilian groups are portrayed as opportunistic and pursuing their own interests. In contrast, the military is portrayed as a true nationalist capable of stabilizing Egypt.

Egyptians are led to believe that there are no credible alternatives to the army. Through statements such as “the president is working, but some institutions and agencies are limiting the success of his policies”, “the president is the only one who realizes the magnitude of the responsibility on his shoulders and that is why he only sleeps for a few hours a day” are repeated in public and private media controlled by the security services to reinforce the narrative that the president is a savior and build a personal cult around

³⁰⁹ **HRW**, “We Do Unreasonable Things Here”. Torture and National Security in al-Sisi’s Egypt”, (Sep 2017), [egypt0917_web.pdf \(hrw.org\)](#). (3 May 2024)

³¹⁰ Joyce Van de Bildt, “The quest for legitimacy in post-revolutionary Egypt: Propaganda and controlling narratives”, **The Journal of the Middle East and Africa**, Vol. (6), No.(3–4), (2015), pp. 253–274.

him. Moreover, the military and security services are also portrayed as those who fight corruption in civilian institutions and steer policies towards greater efficiency.³¹¹

Narratives of Islamism and nationalism have also been manipulated by Egyptian state actors to justify authoritarian measures. It enabled them to escape constitutional, legal, and political accountability. The military also utilizes notions of religious and nationalist populism to control society. It promotes certain religious narratives that elevate the president to a level where he becomes a ‘moral exemplar’ and thus has the right to speak in the name of religion. The government uses official Islamic and Christian institutions to impose its own interpretations of religion on society. The generals claim that the government-promoted understanding of religion is moderate, and therefore anything that contradicts it can be labelled as extremist. Generals use religious symbols and statements in the public sphere to justify repression and human rights violations and demand popular support for the messiah in uniform.³¹²

Decades ago, Derek Hopwood explained that in post-independence Egypt, three main types of societal expressions of Islam in the public sphere can be distinguished, official Islam represented by Al-Azhar and scholarly institutions, popular Islam rooted in society with a dominant Sufi character and political Islam espoused and advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood, which is more radical and inclusive. Therefore, the state’s strategy since Nasser has been to work systematically to control the first two modes while striving to get rid of the third.³¹³

Indeed, Egypt’s Al-Azhar institution played a complex role in the political events that followed the January 25 revolution. During the revolution, Al-Azhar took a balanced stance, calling for restraint and not issuing a fatwa calling for adherence to the Mubarak regime. However, after Morsi’s ouster, Al-Azhar began to show clear support for the military council.³¹⁴ The Sheikh of Al-Azhar called for the country’s stability and the

³¹¹ Amr Hamzawy, “Legislating authoritarianism: Egypt’s new era of repression”, *Carnegie endowment for international peace*, Mar 2017, pp. 6-9. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/16/legislating-authoritarianism-egypt-s-new-era-of-repression-pub-68285>

³¹² Amr Hamzawy, *Legislating authoritarianism: Egypt’s new era of repression*. pp. 6-9.

³¹³ Derek Hopwood, **Egypt 1945-1990: Politics and Society**, New York: Routledge, 1993. p. 95.

³¹⁴ Al Jazeera News, “The Sheikh of Al-Azhar and the Pope support the army’s decisions”, 3 Jul 2013, <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2013/7/3/%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%A4%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA> (10 May 2024)

return of security, which was seen as an indirect support for the counter-revolution. Al-Azhar also participated in dialogues with various political forces to form a vision for Egypt's future. Despite its support for the military council at times, Al-Azhar's scholars raised the flag of the institution's independence from the state and rejected the encroachment of authority on it, calling for the rewriting of the Al-Azhar Law to strengthen its independence.³¹⁵ Al-Azhar did not only support the military council, but also the Al-Azhar Council.

Even today, it is engaged in a battle with political Islam, represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, for example on 17 May 2022 Egypt's Dar al-Ifta announced the distribution of an important and documented report in English to all members of the British House of Commons and House of Lords on the Muslim Brotherhood. The report concluded that the group's extremist approach and its association with organizations, led by ISIS, and the group's use of Islam and religious texts as a tool against society in order to achieve political gains. The report noted that the Brotherhood was working with two faces, the first face is the face they present to the public and the masses where they present themselves as social reformers and an opposition force, while the second face is the establishment of the secret apparatus of the group.³¹⁶ This reinforces or may justify the rise of Islamophobia towards Muslims in the West, especially those working in the institutions of these Islamic groups.

At the beginning of the revolution in Egypt, Pope Shenouda III called on his followers not to participate in the demonstrations because their goals were not clear, but many Coptic youth ignored this call and joined the protesters.³¹⁷ After the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, Copts began to become more involved in political life. They formed several Coptic organizations to express their political and social demands. The sectarian incidents that occurred after the revolution, such as the bombing of the Saints Church, contributed to this political engagement, as Copts took to the streets to demand their

³¹⁵ **Dar Al-Ouloum**, "Al-Azhar's role in the Arab revolution", Dec 2011, https://www.darululoom-deoband.com/arabic/articles/tmp/1556793816%2019-Alam-Islam-1-2_1433.htm (10 May 2024)

³¹⁶ **European Centre for Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence Studies**, "The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe - What is the Brotherhood's relationship with 'jihadist' groups?" 2 Jun 2023. <https://www.europarabct.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%80-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF/>. (15 May 2024)

³¹⁷ May Moujib, "Outside the Church: Copts' relationship with Egyptian political life after the January Revolution", 2012, *Siyassa Dawliya Magazine*, 21 Mar 2012, <https://www.siyassa.org.eg/News/2208.aspx> (18 May 2024)

rights.*³¹⁸ After the ouster of President Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood accused the church of being part of a conspiracy against him.³¹⁹

Conversely, various elites, including political, intellectual and economic leaders, largely stopped calling for democratic reforms or accountability after the 2013 coup. Among the Egyptian parties that participated in the counter-revolution against Morsi or supported the military's narratives were liberals such as the Free Egyptians Party and the Reform and Development Party, which included figures who were supporters of the old regime. Salafists, such as the Nour Party, in order to preserve the interests and nationalists, such as the National Movement founded by Ahmed Shafiq, Mubarak's last prime minister. The Future of Watan Party which was founded after the revolution in 2014 and has gained significant representation in parliament. The Tamarod movement which was born out of the anti-Mubarak Kifaya Movement, is believed to have gained the most momentum in bringing down the regime of Mohamed Morsi. The movement used grassroots strategies to mobilize support across the country.

Given its lackluster performance in terms of improving the deteriorating economy or security, the Egyptian government is unable to justify its repression. Consequently, it resorts to a plethora of narratives to justify its approach. This includes conspiracy theories and defamation of individuals who criticize the state. Through public and private media organizations controlled by the security services, the government blames its failures on opposition movements. Conspiracy theories are used to accuse civil society organizations of serving the interests of foreign governments. Smear campaigns are used to discredit youth activists and other dissidents. 'In a public space where free expression of government failures and excesses is not allowed, these narratives amount to a systematic effort to brainwash the population and permeate debates on public affairs with misinformation, fake news and outright lies.'³²⁰

³¹⁸ Based on news received at the time.

³¹⁹ **Carnegie Middle East Center**, "The Coptic Church and Politics in Egypt", 22 Dec 2014. <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2014/12/the-coptic-church-and-politics-in-egypt?center=middle-east&lang=ar> (18 May 2024)

³²⁰ Amr Hamzawy, *Legislating authoritarianism: Egypt's new era of repression*, pp. 6-22.

3.2.3. Regime's Tools of Control

3.2.3.1. Military Infiltration

The Egyptian army is highly respected because of its association with the collective memory of the Egyptian people. It played a pivotal role in building the state and its national independence. It also played a role in protecting society from external enemies. As was the case in the 1956 Tripartite Aggression against Egypt and in the three wars with Israel. Therefore, the army is considered a refuge and savior in the face of external and internal challenges. Influenced by these factors, the Egyptian military institution sees itself not only as a guardian of the country but also as a protector of national interests and a guardian of the country's identity and institutions.³²¹ The military has been close to the government since 1952. After the coup, the 2014 constitution granted a special status to the military.

The dominant and privileged position of the public sector, especially the military-controlled part, in the economy is the main reason why Egypt has largely failed to develop a dynamic private sector.³²² The military does not play this role independently. It is an integral part of the current system that governs Egypt, albeit one element of a broader bureaucracy that also includes senior civil servants, security officials, judges, state economic managers and technocrats.

It is estimated that up to 40 per cent of the Egyptian economy is controlled by the military, but these estimates vary widely, with some claiming that the military controls only 1.5 per cent of GDP.³²³ The military operates through the National Service Projects Organization, which was established in 1979 by presidential decree. There is no information on the revenue, profits or tax compliance of the NSPO. According to a Transparency International report published in 2018, the armed forces and President Sisi prioritized mega-projects. Projects such as the second Suez Canal and the new administrative capital are under the direct control of economic organizations linked to the military, and thus escape any demands for transparency or accountability.

³²¹ See: Hani Suleiman, "Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Transition in Egypt after the 25 January Revolution", *Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies*, 2015.

³²² George T. Abed, "The Egyptian Economy: In the Clutches of the Deep State", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 26 Oct 2020, <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/10/the-egyptian-economy-in-the-clutches-of-the-deep-state?lang=en¢er=middle-east>. (20 May 2024)

³²³ **Transparency International**, "The officers Republic: the Egyptian military and abuse of power", 23 Mar 2018, <http://ti-defence.org/publications/the-officers-republic/> (20 May 2024)

Military affairs researcher Yazeed al-Sayegh's report on Egypt's military economy contains a wealth of new data, including empirical evidence from official documents and interviews. Through contacts with officers and other insiders within the Egyptian armed forces, he was able to make a number of important new observations, including the recognition that much of the military's involvement in the economy is informal.³²⁴ At another level, military retirees are infiltrating various state apparatuses. In parliament, retired officers have become heads of blocs and sub-committees. The dominance of former military and police officers in the legislative and judicial branches of government has eroded checks and balances in the political system and facilitated the passage of repressive and other laws. Former civil servants also occupy senior positions in the civil service. Oversight agencies such as the Central Auditing Agency lack the authority to hold the military accountable. The military can dismiss auditors and judges who cannot be controlled.³²⁵

The 'state apparatus' worked with all its resources to plunge the new president into a state of failure, employing all its institutions, including the media, the judiciary, and security institutions. Former Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim stated that he worked to restore the State Security apparatus to its former glory. He also admitted in an interview after the coup that he was not carrying out the instructions coming from the presidency, and former intelligence agent Tharwat Gouda admitted that the General Intelligence Service did not give a single piece of correct information to President Morsi.³²⁶ The Egyptian army did not repeal the emergency law imposed since 1981, nor did it stop the trial of civilians in military courts, nor did it seek to dismantle the 'notorious' security apparatus, but rather allied with it after taking control of it, and immunized its officers accused of corruption from prosecution (Law No. 45 of 2011).³²⁷

3.2.3.2. Exploiting the Judiciary

It seems that the Legislative Council enacted several laws that enabled the authorities to target their opponents, restricting their movement and posing a threat to them including

³²⁴ Yazid Al-Sayegh, *Guardians of the Republic: Anatomy of the Egyptian Military Economy*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019, p. 155-186.

³²⁵ Transparency International, *The officers Republic: the Egyptian military and abuse of power*.

³²⁶ **AlJazeera Youtube Channel**, "in video - Egyptian intelligence deliberately misled Morsi", 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mcbbKi46yNc> (20 May 2024)

³²⁷ Bishara, *Egypt's revolution: from revolution to coup*, pp. 60-80.

the Protest Law, the Penal Code, the Non-Governmental Organizations Law, the Terrorism Law and the Military Court Law.³²⁸ The Protest Law has effectively eliminated the right of citizens to assemble and demonstrate peacefully. In November 2013, interim President Adly Mansour used his interim legislative powers to issue a law regulating the right to public meetings, processions and peaceful demonstrations. Under the Protest Law, citizens are required to give days' notice before a demonstration, and the government can ban demonstrations it deems disruptive to community peace. The law also authorizes the police to use violence to disperse demonstrations deemed unpeaceful. As a result, there has been an increase in the use of violence to disperse protests.³²⁹

The Penal Code under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's regime in Egypt has undergone significant amendments and has been utilized as a tool for repression, particularly against dissent and political opposition. In 2014, Article 78 of the Penal Code was amended under the legislative authority of interim President al-Sisi. The amendment enabled the government to criminalize many acts without defining them in an objective legal manner. For example, Article 78 enables the government to blur the distinction between those who work in civil society to promote human rights and freedoms and those who have committed acts of terrorism. In 2021, authorities escalated the use of the abusive Emergency State Security Courts to prosecute peaceful activists and critics who joined thousands of dissidents already in Egypt's congested prisons. Courts issued death sentences in mass trials, adding to the sharply escalating numbers of executions.³³⁰ Amnesty International said that Egypt ranked third-worst in numbers of executions worldwide.³³¹

Law on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which the authorities consider seditious elements, especially those concerned with human rights. The new law signed by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, imposing unprecedentedly harsh restrictions

³²⁸ **Amnesty**, "Egypt: Human rights crisis deepens one year after national human rights strategy launched", 21 Sep 2022. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/09/egypt-human-rights-crisis-deepens-one-year-after-national-human-rights-strategy-launched/> (20 May 2024)

³²⁹ **Amnesty**, "Egypt: New protest law gives security forces free rein", 25 Nov 2013. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2013/11/egypt-new-protest-law-gives-security-forces-free-rein/> (20 May 2024)

³³⁰ **HRW**, "World Report 2022 - Egypt Events of 2021", 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/egypt> (21 May 2024)

³³¹ **Amnesty**, "Death penalty 2020: Middle East and North Africa dominates list of world's top executioners", 21 Apr 2021. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/04/death-penalty-2020-middle-east-and-north-africa-dominates-list-of-worlds-top-executioners/> (21 May 2024)

on NGOs, could be a death sentence for human rights groups in the country, Amnesty International said.³³² Law 70 of 2017 gives Egypt's NGOs one year to comply or face being dissolved in court. Among its restrictions are a ban on field research and surveys without government permission, forcing NGOs to adapt their activities to government priorities and plans or face up to five years in prison. The law also gives the authorities wide powers to dissolve NGOs, dismiss their board of administration and subject their staff to criminal prosecution based on vaguely worded terms including harming national unity and disturbing public order.³³³

Another newly introduced legal mechanism was the Terrorism Law. In 2015, the Law Regulating Lists of Terrorist Entities and Terrorists, also known as the Terrorism Law, was passed. This law allows the government to monitor and legally punish individuals and organizations involved in peaceful activities that oppose the government's policies. Terrorism charges can be widely used without legal restrictions against opponents of the government.³³⁴ The terrorism law is deeply flawed, as it is overly vague and allows legal culpability for constitutionally-protected actions. According to Article 1 of the new law, "a terrorist entity is any group which disrupts public order or threatens the safety, security or interests of society, or harms or frightens individuals or threatens their lives, freedoms, rights or security or harms national unity." Here, any organization that the Egyptian government claims has 'disrupted public order,' 'threatens the interests of society,' 'frightens individuals,' or 'harms national unity' can be labeled a terrorist organization. In reality, any organization which publicly expresses displeasure with the social or political status quo in Egypt could foreseeably fall into one of these categories.³³⁵

The Military Court Law was also used as an instrument by the regime to oppress the opposition. Since 2014, the military has been authorized to assist the police in securing and protecting public institutions, offices and facilities. Such locations, which include public universities and government-owned industrial facilities, fall under the jurisdiction

³³² **Amnesty**, "Egypt: Amendments to repressive NGO law little more than token 'cosmetic' changes", 16 July 2019, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2019/07/egypt-amendments-to-repressive-ngo-law-little-more-than-token-cosmetic-changes/> (21 May 2024)

³³³ **Amnesty**, "Egypt: NGO law threatens to annihilate human rights groups", 30 May 2017, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2017/05/egypt-ngo-law-threatens-to-annihilate-human-rights-groups/> (21 May 2024)

³³⁴ **HRW**, "Egypt: Counterterrorism Law Erodes Basic Rights", 19 Aug 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/19/egypt-counterterrorism-law-erodes-basic-rights> (23 May 2024)

³³⁵ Ryan J. Suto, "Egypt's New Terrorism Law", *Atlantic Council*, 12 Dec 2014, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/egypt-s-new-terrorism-law/>

of the military court system. Egypt's recent approval of Law No. 3 of 2024, on 'securing and protecting public and vital facilities', raises concerns about the increasing dominance of military authority over civilians in the country—which amounts to the militarization of the state, the Committee for Justice (CFJ) said.³³⁶

During the transitional period (February 2011 - July 2013), the relationship between revolutionary currents, especially Islamist ones, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) fluctuated between calm, tension, and clashes. During the Brotherhood's rule, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the judiciary witnessed successive crises and acute tensions, which were manifested in the attempt to issue a new law to regulate the judiciary, the crisis of the Attorney General, the immunity of the Shura Council and the Constituent Assembly of the Constitution. It went as far as insulting and attacking the judiciary and calling for demonstrations under the slogan cleansing the judiciary.³³⁷ Through this, Sisi is working to consolidate his regime by marginalizing or eliminating the existence of a viable opposition, empowering state institutions to work in his favor, and providing strong protection against any threats to his authority.³³⁸

3.2.3.3. Media Control

The Egyptian media used various strategies to oppose the rule of President Morsi and the rise of Islamist movements. Many new media channels appeared, claiming to be revolutionary, but in fact they are an extension of the media line loyal to the previous regime. There were number of tactics successfully used such as containment of revolutionary media, emphasizing “Ikhwanization”, spreading rumors, ridiculing, and calling for demonstrations against President Mohamed Morsi. Intimidation, trivialization and the use of religion.³³⁹ The success of the Egyptian media loyal to the Mubarak regime

³³⁶ **Committee For Justice**, “CFJ: New law on securing public facilities in Egypt amounts to ‘militarization’ of the state”, 12 Feb 2024. <https://www.cfjustice.org/cfj-the-new-law-on-securing-public-facilities-in-egypt-is-a-militarization-of-the-state-and-calls-for-stopping-it-because-it-violates-international-and-un-conventions/> (23 May 2024)

³³⁷ **Encyclopedia of the Muslim Brotherhood**, “The relationship of the Muslim Brotherhood with the regimes in Egypt: From the Royal Era until 2021”, Tayarat for research and studies, 24 Aug 2022, <https://trendsresearch.org/ar/product/%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7/> (22 May 2024)

³³⁸ Sophie Polgar, “Egypt: Dictatorship or Democracy?”, *The Chicago Journal of Foreign Policy (CJFP)*, UNC, 14 Feb 2022, <https://www.cjfp.org/egypt-dictatorship-or-democracy/> (22 May 2024)

³³⁹ Osama Al-Rashidi, “Egyptian Media Strategies during Mohamed Morsi's Rule and After the Coup”, *Siyasat Arabia* Vol. (2), No. (6), (2014), pp. 101-116.

in returning to the forefront again, influencing Egyptian public opinion and controlling the media space. A number of Egyptian media outlets engaged in inciting speeches against opponents of the coup and the protesters in Rabaa and Nahda squares, who were subjected to mass killings. After the coup, the media turned into a propaganda media.³⁴⁰ The state exercises strict control over the media, leading to a climate in which dissenting voices are silenced. Egypt is one of the most dangerous places in the world for journalists, with many facing harassment or imprisonment for their work. The media landscape in the new era has been shaped by businessmen whose money has flowed in unprecedented amounts, especially towards satellite broadcasting while the traditional networks of the Mubarak era invested in expanding their activities.³⁴¹

All this serves to illustrate the magnitude of the penetration of the Egyptian state, represented by the military establishment or the military class, into society and its control over it. How this directly affects the Islamists and their decisions and strategies. The relationship between the Brotherhood and its revolutionary allies and the political regime that emerged after the 30 June revolution (under interim President Adly Mansour and President-elect Abdel Fattah al-Sisi) has been characterized by confrontation for survival. Despite its ‘peaceful’ slogan, the Brotherhood rejected all steps of the transitional phase, including the constitutional referendum, legislative and presidential elections and their aftermath, and remained committed to calling for what is known as the return of legitimacy. Other Islamist forces, including the Brotherhood’s allies, the Salafists, were also subjected to repression. Unlike those who sided with Sisi, such as the Nour Party, the political arm of the Saudi-backed Salafi Da’wa.

3.3. The Impact of Counter-Revolutions

The idea of ‘revolution and counter-revolution’ is perhaps well known in political history and in the history of political theory. Although the tools of the counter-revolution are sometimes known, the counter-revolution does not materialise in the form of known and exposed political forces against the forces of the revolution. The counter-revolution is one

³⁴⁰ Osama Al-Rashidi, pp. 101-116.

³⁴¹ **AlJazeera**, “Militarisation of the Word’: the Story of How the Egyptian Media Turned into Intelligence Fronts”, 8 Dec 2017
<https://www.aljazeera.net/midan/reality/politics/2017/12/8/%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A> (23 May 2024)

of the obstacles to achieving the goals of the revolution. Revolutionaries must confront it in all ways. It affects them in some way. Counter-revolution is defined as political activity that happens as a reaction to an earlier political change.³⁴² A counter-revolution is a revolution that is intended to reverse the effects of a previous revolution.³⁴³

It is an opposition or resistance to a revolutionary movement, and its goals are different from the revolution that preceded it. The term encompasses many movements and actions that seek to restore the old order or principles. It can refer to attempts to defeat a revolutionary movement before it takes power.³⁴⁴ The counter-revolution relies on ‘top-down’ (elite-driven) and ‘bottom-up’ (mass support)³⁴⁵ strategies, as the study presented the strategies of the Egyptian authorities against Islamist movements in the run-up to the military coup and its aftermath. It aims to rebuild a semblance of the old order albeit often in new forms and faces. ‘This reconstruction involves a combination of politics, repression and popular mobilization against the fundamental structural changes proposed or initiated by the revolutions. It is through narratives, identity and social expectations that counter-revolutionary movements form and succeed. This means that counter-revolution, like revolution, is deeply embedded in the social fabric and political context in which it emerges.’³⁴⁶

Some analysts suggest that “the defeat of the Arab revolutions was, in part, the result of the failures of the revolutionaries themselves and more so of the successful strategies adopted by those who adopted the counter-revolution to thwart political change. Counter-revolutions intervene between the revolutionary attitudes produced by mass uprisings from below. For example, supporting the Tamarod movement and the June 30, 2013 demonstrations. Especially with the great differences between Islamists and secularists in Egypt, counter-revolutionary forces capitalized on them.”³⁴⁷ Popular counter-revolutionary support and international alliances played a role in shaping the outcome of the counter-revolution.

³⁴² **Cambridge Dictionary**, Counter Revolution, UK: Cambridge press, undated. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/counter-revolution> (25 May 2024)

³⁴³ **Collins dictionary**, Counter Revolution, Glasgow: HarperCollins, undated, <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/counter-revolution> (25 May 2024)

³⁴⁴ Killian Clarke, pp. 1344–1360.

³⁴⁵ Allinson, p. 31.

³⁴⁶ Allinson, pp. 29-65.

³⁴⁷ Koçar, pp. 115-121.

There is an abundance of literature on counter-revolutions, specifically the counter-revolution in Egypt, but the thesis here deals with the role and impact of these counter-revolutions as a factor in the transformation of Islamists. The main strategies of the counter-revolutionary forces in Egypt have varied including controlling the media and propaganda, using the security forces, political engineering in the sense of creating new political parties in line with the state's interests. Economic strategies, such as the regime bargaining for economic reforms while offering lucrative contracts to foreign companies to secure international support. This approach aimed to achieve economic stability while reinforcing the loyalty of military elites to the regime.

Egyptian counterrevolutionary forces also relied on alliances with regional powers, particularly the Gulf States, which provided financial and political support. This integration into international networks helped legitimize the regime's actions domestically and internationally. The Egyptian regime also created an Egyptian opposition, and more precisely supported and strengthened it. This was done to legitimize its actions against genuine revolutionary movements. This tactic involved mobilizing anti-revolutionary crowds under manipulated conditions, echoing historical precedents in the Egyptian political scene. The author elaborated on some of these strategies and tools of the conflict and competition between the Islamist movements and the Egyptian regime in the previous section. The following section examines the strategies and tools of regional and international actors in empowering counter-revolutionary forces, in order to understand its implications for Islamists.

3.3.1. Counter Revolution and the Regional Actors

Hundley argue that ideological cleavages increase the likelihood of conflict between states, but it does so specially by increasing the risk of regime disputes, as opposed to other conflicts like those over territory. She identifies two dynamics that cause leaders to see states with different ideologies as potential threats to their domestic hold on power and states with similar ideologies as at a minimum not threatening and possibly even bolstering their rule.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁸ Lindsay Hundley, "Ideology and international conflict", (PhD Thesis), Department of Political Science, Stanford University, California, 2020, p. 2.

First, when states legitimate their rule according to different principles, leaders are more likely to fear correctly or incorrectly that the other has regime revisionist preferences. Even if ideologically disparate states are temporarily enjoying good relations, there is little to guarantee that states would not support domestic challengers that they are ideologically sympathetic to if the opportunity arose. In fact, the potential for such ideological activism can lead states with no inherent normative commitments to spreading their ideology to subvert ideological others. States that share a common legitimating ideology, by comparison, are not threatened by the possibility that the other has such ideological preferences. Second, ideologically disparate states might conflict with one another to prevent demonstration effects from each other's success. Several studies show that political upheavals tend to spread across borders, and these cascades are often ideological in nature. States may therefore seek to undermine ideologically opposed regimes to remove the threat of contagion at its source. Further, even if a state has little chance of overthrowing another's government, they may still seek to fuel unrest in their ideological competitors to make them less appealing models for domestic audiences to try to replicate. By contrast, the threat of political contagion will motivate ideologically similar states to prop each other up and to refrain from using subversion against each other when pursuing other foreign policy interests.³⁴⁹

In the field of the international relations, there are three primary usages of the term ideology. The first uses ideology to refer a system of values that lead an individual's policy preferences to correlate across different political, social, and economic issues. The second major conceptualization, refers to the set of principles on which a political regime legitimates its rule domestically. These principles help dictate how much authority a government should have over society, who is able to participate in politics, and the ends to which government action is designed to serve.*³⁵⁰ The third way ideology is frequently used is to refer to different principles and belief systems about the nature of international politics.³⁵¹

³⁴⁹ Lindsay Hundley, p. 3.

³⁵⁰ Consider the U.S. example. The Democratic and Republican parties represent clearly different political ideologies according to the first definition. However, regardless of the party in power, the U.S. government legitimates its rule according to the "capital L" Liberalism that is, rule is legitimated by through the will of the people and a commitment to advancing individual liberty.

³⁵¹ Lindsay Hundley, pp. 4-6.

Some Arab countries supported their ally Hosni Mubarak at the beginning of the revolution in Egypt, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. They are allied with Egypt in what might be called the ‘Sunni Arab Coalition’ against Iran and its allies in the region. The balance of power in the region, supported by the United States, Egypt and the Gulf monarchies, has formed an important strategic alliance, or Sunni coalition. Egypt is among the largest recipients of economic aid from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). For these hereditary monarchies, a democratic change in Egypt would benefit political Islamist groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, whose ideologies and aspirations pose a threat to them. They feared that this would challenge their domestic legitimacy and the basis of their regional supremacy. Especially if the revolution is exported to those countries where there are multiple currents of supporters of this ideology of change or reform. Moreover, the Brotherhood’s access to the rule of a country the size and role of Egypt poses a challenge to Saudi Arabia’s leading position in the Islamic world. Moreover, the model it represented in governance combines ‘Islamism and democracy’ in some way. This is the most dangerous aspect of exporting the revolution to hereditary states and kingdoms. The Muslim Brotherhood and its influenced undercurrents have branches in most Arab and Islamic countries. These countries realize the extent of the group’s popular support in the Gulf States and other Arab countries.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were the first to declare their support for the military coup against the Islamist rule, and had previously played a role in supporting the counter-revolutionary forces. They also rushed to help the new regime with a huge aid package. The overt and covert support that the military regime received from Western countries and many Arab countries also succeeded in giving it legitimacy. These countries refused to recognize what happened as a coup d’état, despite the fact that it was a coup according to local and international conventions.³⁵²

President Morsi’s policy of rapprochement with Iran clearly angered the Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia. He visited Iran and participated in the Non-Aligned Movement summit after a break in diplomatic relations between Iran and Egypt since the overthrow

³⁵² Badriya Rawy, “Political Coups in International Charters”, *Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies*, 29 July 2019. [https://eipss-eg.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9% \(26 May 2024\)](https://eipss-eg.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9% (26 May 2024))

of the Shah. This in turn was a source of great concern for both Israel, the West and the Gulf states, both ideologically and geopolitically. The politicization and rise of Salafi movements have also been a source of provocation for countries with Salafi societies, such as Saudi Arabia, although some of these Salafi movements later sided with the coup, such as the Nour Party. Some Saudi Salafists had already expressed their dissatisfaction with the monarchy and started demanding political representation in a democratically elected parliament. This new ideology, which enables ‘Islam and democracy’ to coexist, could pose a serious threat to the legitimacy of the Gulf monarchies if not contained.³⁵³

Not surprisingly, Saudi Arabia and the UAE supported politically and financially the counter-revolutionary forces in Egypt to contain this wave of liberalization. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi supported the Egyptian army and the coup authorities with a \$12 billion aid package. It was part of their competitive strategies with Iran in the region. The numerous military interventions carried out by Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been supported by financial aid to secure their foreign policy objectives, especially through aid packages to Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.³⁵⁴ This is equivalent to the UAE’s aid to Egypt from 1971 to 2014, including \$3 billion deposited by the UAE in the Central Bank when Sisi came to power, followed by \$4.9 billion in aid in October of the same year.³⁵⁵ Some observers claim that Mohammed bin Salman’s policies are a reaction to the Arab Spring rather than a direct cause of it. They aim to suppress democratization efforts in the Arab region by providing economic support to authoritarian regimes and engaging in military interventions.³⁵⁶

Egyptian observers consider that ‘the UAE’s view of Egypt is to try to control it and take advantage of it and its army to form part of the security system of the Gulf and the UAE, and as an arm to achieve its foreign goals, which can be clearly seen in the Egyptian dealings with the Libyan crisis and the extent to which it intersects with the UAE’s vision towards the crisis. On the other hand, the UAE aims in its policy towards the Muslim

³⁵³ Ayfer Erdogan, “Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt: The Role of External Actors”, *Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi*, Vol. (7), No. (1), (Jun 2020), pp. 169-202.

³⁵⁴ Rafeef Ziadah, “The importance of the Saudi-UAE alliance: notes on military intervention, aid and investment”, *Conflict, Security & Development*, Vol. (19). No. (3), (2019), pp. 295-300.

³⁵⁵ Obaid Amer, “The roots of hostility - Why is the UAE spending huge budgets to fight the Islamists”, *AlJazeera*, 16 June 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.net/midan/reality/politics/2017/6/16/%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%81%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B0%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%A9> . (21 May 2024)

³⁵⁶ Lisa Blaydes and others, pp. 27-49.

Brotherhood in Egypt to eliminate the group by pushing for its weakening and continued restriction so that it cannot later come to power or to participate in political life again. In addition to its huge investments in Egypt, it has acquired sectors and land. Most recently, holding acquired the Ras al-Hikma project on Egypt's northern coast for \$35 billion, which includes the construction of two seaports and an international airport. The UAE's Al Dahra has taken over wheat farming in Egypt, cultivating 28,000 hectares within Egyptian territory and is the largest producer of wheat and corn in the private sector in Egypt.³⁵⁷

For example, reports indicate that the Tamarod movement, which led the protests against Morsi, received direct Emirati funding. Leaks of conversations between Egyptian military leaders confirmed that there was a UAE-funded bank account to support the movement. The need for funds from this account was mentioned in conversations between General Abbas Kamel, Sisi's chief of staff and then-Chief of Staff Sedky Sobhi. There was also coordination between Emirati and Egyptian intelligence to support the movement, with figures such as Mohammed Dahlan being used to relay messages and funds to collaborators in the Egyptian army.³⁵⁸

In the context of this conflict, the historical enmity between Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt must also be noted. The historical contexts in which each ideology emerged formed differences that over time represented for both sides' foci of identity and differentiation, leading to increased barriers that hinder any possibility of cooperation or coordination between the two sides on issues that may represent common interests.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁷ **AlArabiya**, "UAE's Al-Zahira plans to buy 90,000 acres in Egypt", 19 Nov 2024, [https://www.alarabiya.net/aswaq/companies/2024/11/19/-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B7-%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-90-%D8%A3%D9%84%D9%81-%D9%81%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-\(21%20May%2024\)](https://www.alarabiya.net/aswaq/companies/2024/11/19/-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B7-%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-90-%D8%A3%D9%84%D9%81-%D9%81%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-(21%20May%2024))

³⁵⁸ **AlAraby**, "70 Minute Leaks: UAE funded Tamarod", 1 Mar 2015, [\(24%20May%2024\)](https://www.alaraby.co.uk/70-D8%AF%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%88%D9%91%D9%84%D8%AA-%22%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%91%D8%AF%22%24%20May%2024))

³⁵⁹ Murad Sharif, "Wahhabism and the Brotherhood. The Story of the Struggle over the Representation of Sunni Islam", *AlJazeera Net*, 11 Oct 2018, [\(24%20May%2024\)](https://www.aljazeera.net/midan/intellect/sociology/2017/7/6/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%84.(24%20May%2024))

Although the first years of King Abdullah's reign did not differ from his predecessors, with time, especially in 2011 after the outbreak of the Arab revolutions events, the coup phase began, as some demands for reform emerged that were adopted by the Brotherhood, which prompted the Saudi regime to turn against the Brotherhood and stand against their rise to power in Egypt, where the Kingdom blessed the ouster of Brotherhood President Mohammed Morsi and supported the current regime to withstand the face of the Brotherhood.³⁶⁰ In some of his international meetings, Prince Mohammed bin Salman emphasized that "the Muslim Brotherhood is the greatest danger", as the group knows that the Middle East region is following a good strategy against them in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Jordan and many other countries.³⁶¹

The Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman even told the New York Times in 2020, "The Brotherhood has always been the root of terrorism. If you look at Osama bin Laden, he was a Muslim Brotherhood. If you look at al-Baghdadi in ISIS, he was also from the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, if you look at any terrorist, he was from the Muslim Brotherhood." He further argued that "their main goal is to radicalize the Muslim communities in Europe, they hope that Europe will become a Muslim continent after 30 years, and they want to control the Muslims in Europe."³⁶² This prompted the General Bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood to launch a sharp attack on Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, accusing him of seeking the throne "under Zionist-American auspices and with humiliating concessions."³⁶³

³⁶⁰ Muhammad Mukhtar Qandil, "The Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia: From Then to Now", *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, 2018, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/muslim-brotherhood-and-saudi-arabia-then-now> (24 May 2024)

³⁶¹ **Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper**, "Saudi Crown Prince: The Brotherhood is the greatest danger... and Iran is behind the problems of the Middle East", 6 Apr 2018, <https://aawsat.com/home/article/1228821/%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A-D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%87%D8%AF-D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A-D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-C2%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%C2%BB-%D9%87%D9%85-D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%B8%D9%85-D9%88%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%83%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7> (24 May 2024)

³⁶² **Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper**, "The Muslim Brotherhood and the Saudi state", , Nov 2020. <https://aawsat.com/%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%82>

³⁶³ **RT**, "The Muslim Brotherhood launches a sharp attack on Mohammed bin Salman", 2018. https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/936971-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%86-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86/?ref=mnshor.net (24 May 2024)

3.3.2. Counter Revolution and International Actors

In contrast to their political willingness to use influence and association to integrate post-communist states in Eastern Europe, the EU and the US pursued an inconsistent policy towards Egypt during its turbulent transition. Western foreign policy formulation was based on maintaining the existing structure and balance of power in the region to preserve Western interests. Western actors remained reluctant to advocate and promote political reforms in favor of democracy for fear that elections would bring Islamists to power and ultimately lead to a deviation from the status quo. They have pursued often contradictory policies towards Egypt. Despite emphasizing democracy in their political rhetoric, Western governments have not imposed any conditions for continued financial aid and have not imposed any sanctions on Egypt because of the coup.³⁶⁴

The Obama administration and the EU opted for quiet diplomacy in dealing with the NGO crisis and did not want to jeopardize bilateral relations with Egypt. The Trump administration chose not to focus on human rights, but rather prioritized counter-terrorism in its relations with Cairo.³⁶⁵ Hosni Mubarak's regime served the security interests of the US and Israel immensely as the military and successive Egyptian presidents with military backgrounds played a dominant role, governing in a way that obstructed and neutralized Islamists. It was also a partner in the global war on terrorism. It has ensured its naval access to the Suez Canal for its geopolitical interests in the region. It is clear that neither human rights nor freedoms were the main reason that shaped the attitude of Western international actors towards the Egyptian revolution and coup, but rather whether Egypt under Islamist rule would pose a threat to Western interests, change the balance of power in the Middle East, or threaten Israel's security.

The US favored regional stability over change in the region. Therefore, the US pursued a policy of restricting the Egyptian state under Morsi's leadership, withholding the usual massive financial aid and using the excuse of linking financial support to cooperation with the International Monetary Fund rather than to progress in the democratization process. The thesis emphasizes that this aid is linked to the peace agreements with Israel. In the context of Israel, the study emphasizes that the main motivation for US action

³⁶⁴ Ayfer Erdogan, pp.169-202

³⁶⁵ Saskia Brechenmacher, **Civil society under assault: Repression and responses in Russia, Egypt, and Ethiopia**, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2017, pp. 37-64.

against Morsi's rule was the demands by Islamist parliamentarians for the Egyptian government to review the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and Israel's attack on the Gaza Strip - Operation Pillar of Defense 2012. Thus, the US' main priority was to return the old regime forces to the political arena and restore their sphere of influence in Egypt. This was confirmed by the Qatari channel Al Jazeera, after reviewing dozens of US federal documents that confirm Washington's support for entities, personalities and campaigns aimed at toppling President Morsi. Several reports indicated that the Mossad requested detailed information about Morsi because of concerns about the impact of his rule on Israeli interests in the region.³⁶⁶

The United States did not consider what happened in 2013 to be a coup, although it condemned the crackdown. Rather, Washington saw the military regime as a guarantor of US political and security interests. The Egyptian military, with its pro-Western agenda, has proven to be a reliable strategic ally for decades. Although the US Congress conditioned the provision of military aid on improved human rights and a democratic transition to a civilian government in 2012. The US Congress waived this condition and resumed the delivery of weapons and military aid shortly afterwards. This is exactly what the Trump administration did in 2017. This was one of the worst periods for human rights in Egypt, according to international reports. So did the Biden administration, which initially expressed a desire to promote human rights and democracy. Biden tweeted in July 2020 about Trump's 'favorite dictator', referring to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. However, the first US-Egyptian strategic dialogue was held under Biden after years of interruption, and was seen as an opportunity to enhance cooperation on issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, developments in Sudan, and the issue of the Renaissance Dam. He discussed US-Egyptian military cooperation and bilateral economic relations.³⁶⁷

³⁶⁶ **Arabi21**, "Clayton Swisher: Why did Mossad ask for detailed information about Morsi?", 25 Feb 2015. <https://arabi21.com/story/812858/%D9%83%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%8A> And, The official website of the Muslim Brotherhood, "The Zionist role in the 3 July coup", 2022, <https://www.ikhwanonline.com/article/254750> (24 May 2024)

³⁶⁷ **Asharq Alawsat newspaper**, "First US-Egyptian strategic dialogue under Biden to be held today", 2021. <https://aawsat.com/home/article/3291951/%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%87%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%86->

For decades, the EU's main priorities under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership have been opening export markets, controlling irregular migration, and sharing information. Interestingly, EU aid to promote democratization constituted only a fraction of the total EU foreign aid to Egypt (€1.2 billion from 1996 to 2006). The bulk of it was devoted to economic reform.

On the security file the EU has allocated a significant amount of funds to control the flow of illegal migration from the southern Mediterranean. However, despite the inclusion of conditional clauses in the Association Agreements within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Program, they were not activated and no EU aid was suspended in cases of clear human rights violations and repression during the Mubarak era. Regarding the military coup and the mass killings at Rabaa and Nahda, the EU did not recognize the junta's intervention as a coup. On the contrary, Catherine Ashton, the EU's foreign policy chief at the time, visited Sisi and announced the EU's support for his government's June 30 roadmap. Several institutions, such as the Carter Center and the European Union, sent small groups of experts to monitor the referendum process, as the military government was keen to establish legitimacy shortly after the military coup.³⁶⁸ All these steps have reinforced the legitimacy of the regime in Egypt.

3.4. Counter-Terrorism Impact

Observers believe that the events of September 11, 2001 led to the invocation of Islamism and its aftermath, in order to search for a strategy to confront and contain the 'rising Islamist jihadism and al-Qaeda'. The US and European administrations have adopted an approach based on separating moderates from extremists. The proliferation of the post-political Islam thesis indicates that after 9/11, the US sought to utilize political Islam movements within the framework of post-Islamist transformations, meaning engaging with the authoritarian national state structure and accepting democracy and pluralism. This, they claim, constitutes a protective wall against extremism, violence and terrorism. Theories of political inclusion and moderation have emerged.³⁶⁹ They push for more

%D9%8A%D9%8F%D8%B9%D9%82%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85?page=3 (24 May 2024)

³⁶⁸ Michele Dunne, "Legitimizing an undemocratic process in Egypt", *Carnegie endowment for International peace*, 9 Jan 2014, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/09/legitimizing-undemocratic-process-in-egypt-pub-54138> (24 May 2024)

³⁶⁹ Hassan Abu Haniyeh, "The Problem of Political Inclusion in the Arab World", *AlRai newspaper*, 7 Nov 2011, <https://alrai.com/article/1023831/>

participation of these Islamist movements. They present them as a successful model that came to power through the ballot box and peaceful means. Thus, they have the potential to bring about the desired change. On the other hand, these Western institutions emphasize that Islamists represent a potential alternative to totalitarian regimes in the Islamic world, especially in the Arab world, and that these Islamists are the most capable of confronting the radical threat of violence. It may be a new option instead of costly military confrontations for Western administrations.³⁷⁰ Some authors claim that the creation of a ‘moderate Islam’ with specific intellectual specifications has been promoted through the establishment of several Western research institutions and study centers that have been planted in the Arab region such as RAND Corporation, which collaborated with American political and intellectual figures including Henry Kissinger, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice and Francis Fukuyama.³⁷¹ This does not mean that these groups or movements are agents or conspirators, but rather that some Islamic movements are sometimes lured into the danger of political employment as a result of lack of political experience, inflation of worldly purposes or misinterpretation of the jurisprudence of interests and disadvantages, in addition to the flaw in the methodology of assimilation of other currents among some Islamic movements, and sometimes their interests intersect with the interests of the Western project. As happened in the experience of the Arab mujahedeen in Afghanistan.³⁷²

Indeed, ‘moderation perspectives have led to the emergence of post-Islamism. In line with its democracy promotion agenda, the US launched various programs aimed at building bilateral cooperation with Egypt, empowering Egyptian civil society and promoting democracy such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI). However, from 2005 onwards, the US gradually abandoned this agenda. This can be explained by a number of political developments. In Egypt, political reforms and judicial oversight of parliamentary elections gave the Muslim Brotherhood unprecedented power in parliament after the 2005 legislative elections. Similarly, the

[https://alrai.com/article/1023831/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8/%D8%A5%D8%B4%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AC-D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A% \(25 May 2024\)](https://alrai.com/article/1023831/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8/%D8%A5%D8%B4%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AC-D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A% (25 May 2024))

³⁷⁰ Al-Huwaiyri, pp. 64-68.

³⁷¹ Al-Huwaiyri, pp. 64-65.

³⁷² Al-Huwaiyri, pp. 64-68.

Bush regime's democratization agenda gave power to militia-backed Shiites in Iraq's parliament and political Islamists in Saudi Arabia's 2005 local elections. In Lebanon, the 2005 general elections provided an electoral boost to Hezbollah, while Hamas won an electoral victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections.³⁷³ These elections reflected the dilemma of Islamic democracy as the US deviated from its democratic rhetoric when Islamist groups rose to power. Therefore, Arab and Islamic authoritarian regimes returned to controlling the paths of inclusion. This process is what Samuel Huntington called 'the exchange between participation and moderation'. It is a kind of democratic bargain in which opposition groups become eligible to benefit from political openness only if they commit to moderation in tactics and policy. By agreeing to renounce violence and any other commitment to the revolution. And by accepting the leading form of social, economic and political institutions.³⁷⁴

As a result of the revolutions across the Arab world, the United States and the dominant elites in the Arab world have recalibrated the hegemonic-conquering equation. The new strategic objectives of both have become to define a new balance of hegemony and coercion that ensures the continued political, economic and military control of the United States in the region and maintains the continued rule of the Arab elites who profit from these measures and are committed to them. It supported the coup and its accompanying violations, and avoided mentioning the obstruction of human rights and democratization in Egypt. Similarly, the European Union, in its 2007 action plan, avoided any reference to the constitutional amendments that represented a regression in the field of individual rights and civil liberties. Today's deliberations between US policymakers and their Arab clients no longer revolve around the limits of democracy or autonomy that the Arab peoples should enjoy, but rather the appropriate combination of hegemony, oppression and complementary corruption necessary to produce the right balance between love and fear that ensures the stability of the same hegemonic arrangements that have governed the region since the beginning of US imperialist rule.³⁷⁵

³⁷³ Emiliano Allesandri, Oz Hassan, and Ted Reinert, **US Democracy Promotion from Bush to Obama**, EUSpring, Working Paper, 2015, p. 242.

³⁷⁴ Samuel Huntington, **the Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century**, Abdel Wahab Alloub (Trans.), Cairo: Dar Souad Al-Sabah, 1999, p. 250.

³⁷⁵ Joseph Massad, "Love, Fear, and the Arab Spring", **Public Culture**, Vol. (26), No. (1), (2014), pp. 127–152.

In the context of the Arab revolutions and its aftermath, ‘the role of terrorism entered a new phase where the design and protection of the regional status quo was implemented within the overall securitization project based on the full politicization of terrorism. Regional securitization has been built against moderate political Islam represented by the central actor, the Muslim Brotherhood. It is perceived as a threat to the security of the Gulf monarchies and Israel based on allegations of terrorism. Israel’s securitization based on the rhetoric of the ‘existential threat of Palestinian terrorism’ has been extended within the framework of regional securitization led by US hegemony in the post-Arab spring context. The alignment between Israel and regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the same security expectations based on shared threat perceptions has increased Israel’s hegemonic power through US support. Consequently, Israel’s security policy in Palestine has been substantially justified by the approval of the leaders of these Arab states, and legitimized by Trump’s peace plan, the so-called ‘deal of the century’, which includes the annexation of the West Bank by Israel, followed by the latest ‘peace’ agreements between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain.³⁷⁶

It is important to point out a move that is contrary to the Islamist retreats in the region after the counter-revolutions, but also within the framework of recruitment. In the recent Jordanian elections (10 September 2024), Islamists won the highest percentage of seats in the parliament, with the Islamic Action Front party leading the results with 31 out of 138 seats, or 22.5 per cent of the seats. The other parties followed.³⁷⁷ There are two aspects to analyzing this victory. First it is a punitive vote and a cry of protest against the general political and economic situation, especially in relation to the position on the war on Gaza. This has also been seen in a poll conducted by the Centre for Strategic Studies in November 2023 that 86 per cent of Jordanians expressed their dissatisfaction with the positions of Arab governments on the war.³⁷⁸ The second aspect is that the Jordanian

³⁷⁶ Esra CAVUSOGLU, “Assessing Terrorism as a Hegemonic Conception within the Context of Securitization”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. (12), No. (2), (2020), pp. 349-368.

³⁷⁷ Arab center for Research and Policy studies, “**Parliamentary Elections in Jordan: A Reading of Contexts and Results**”, 16 Sep 2024, Pp. 1-5.

³⁷⁸ **Centre for Strategic Studies**, “Public Opinion Poll Results: Israel's Raging War and Aggression on Gaza”, Nov 2023, <https://jcsc.org/5949/%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AC-D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A3%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%>

authorities somehow made room for them, in response to Western pressure on Jordan for not accepting plans to relocate Palestinians to Jordan.

Promoting democratization was more or less on the foreign policy agendas of Western countries, which found it in their security interests to strengthen their relations with secular authoritarian regimes loyal to them because of their own interests in the region. These interests included ensuring the security of oil supplies and energy corridors containing Islamic fundamentalism and the security of Israel. In line with this logic, the US and the EU supported the Mubarak regime for decades. The US and the EU were concerned about the security issues associated with Islamist empowerment in Egypt. Fearing an Islamist takeover, they prioritized relationships with the ruling authoritarian elite rather than non-state actors to promote civic activism and democracy.

In contrast, Gulf participation in the US-led strikes against the Islamic State in the so-called Global Coalition of 2014 has enabled Saudi Arabia and the UAE to intensify their efforts to continue fighting the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam, in the absence of a clear definition of terrorism.³⁷⁹

The political, social and ideological pressures on political Islamist movements to be labelled as terrorists are varied. Many Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood and some Salafi movements and individuals are classified as terrorist organizations and figures in some countries, which hinders their ability to operate politically and leads to their marginalization and local repression, as was the case with the Brotherhood in Egypt. This categorization contributes to Islamophobia and increases the pressure on these movements to justify their existence and goals, both locally and internationally.

As the study shows, authoritarian regimes use the ‘scarecrow of political Islam’ to justify political repression. This authoritarianism hinders any attempt at political reform and exacerbates the conflict between Islamist movements and ruling regimes, which contributes to the spread of violence and extremism as if it were a vicious circle, authoritarianism breeds violence, violence breeds security and military campaigns that

³⁷⁹ **The Global Coalition official website**, “The Global Coalition against Daesh”, undated. <https://theglobalcoalition.org/ar/>

breed violence again.³⁸⁰ And, this complicates the efforts of moderate movements to distance themselves from violence and makes it more difficult for them to be accepted in the political arena.

The concept of securitization plays a crucial role in understanding how political narratives about terrorism are constructed. The War on Terror is often portrayed as a necessary response to the existential threat posed by political Islam. This narrative has facilitated the implementation of exceptional security measures and justified military actions in predominantly Muslim geographies.³⁸¹ This approach not only distorts the nature of many Islamist movements, but also exacerbates tensions between Western countries and Muslim communities globally.

Islamist movements face challenges in obtaining the necessary funding to support their economic and social projects, especially after they come to power. This hinders their ability to offer effective economic alternatives to the communities they serve. Consequently, they have to submit to international and regional wills, or face a counter-revolution.

All these pressures push for intellectual review and self-criticism within Islamist movements, to dismantle extremist ideas that may lead to violence, or the exact opposite, which is for more radical groups to splinter off, with no way to change other than by bullets. It makes it difficult for Islamist movements to interact positively with the international community. Locally, many of the communities where Islamist movements are active suffer from poverty and social deprivation, which increases the susceptibility of young people to be attracted to extremist groups. The West is perceived to be responsible for these conditions due to its economic and trade policies, fueling hostility towards it.

The relationship between political Islam and the War on Terror is characterized by a dynamic interplay between ideology, politics and security concerns. While political Islam encompasses a wide spectrum of beliefs and movements, the War on Terror has often sought to frame these complexities within a narrative of conflict. Research suggests that there are divergent influences between religiosity and political Islam in relation to support

³⁸⁰ Omar Karboussa, "Islamist Movements and the Problem of International Terrorism", (**PhD Dissertation**), Faculty of political science, University of Algeria, 2013, p. 345.

³⁸¹ Cavusoglu, pp. 349-368.

for terrorism. While some individuals may derive justifications for extremist violence from their religious beliefs, others may be motivated by political grievances or socio-economic conditions.

3.5. The Islamophobia Agenda

When examining Islamophobia as a determinant and factor in Islamists' transformations following the Arab revolutions, it is necessary to study the historical context in which it arose. Islamophobia is a concept of an old phenomenon that is renewed under different names, and thus the relationship of this phenomenon to the conflict between its promoters and Islam and political Islam specifically can be understood. Firstly, the term Islamophobia refers to fear, prejudice and hatred directed towards Muslims and Islam. The term gained prominence in academic discourse after the Runnymede Trust's 1997 report which described it as unfounded hostility towards Islam and fear or hatred of all or most Muslims. The concept encompasses various forms of discrimination, including hate speech, hate crimes, and social and political discrimination against individuals perceived to be Muslim.³⁸²

Historically, the term emerged at the end of the twentieth century, but there are historians who take the concept - without the word - back even further, recalling the long history of tense relations between Christianity and Islam since the Middle Ages, and the outbreak of the First Crusades, which was fueled by papal rhetoric charged with ancient theological hostility to the Islamic religion and faith, as part of the historical struggle between the Islamic and Western civilizations.³⁸³ The European colonization of most Muslim countries between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when Islamophobia increased due to European expansion into Muslim countries, was also a period of European colonization. This phase was characterized by the spread of hegemony and influence of the colonial powers at the political and cultural levels. Islam was distorted and portrayed as a reactionary, anti-progressive religion that hindered enlightenment, which justified the colonialist idea itself. The French historian Claude Cahin, in response to a question

³⁸² Rebecca Kulik, "Islamophobia", Britannica, Jan 2025, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamophobia> (25 May 2024)

³⁸³ See: Mohamed Amara, *The Phenomenon of Islamophobia - Historical Roots and Expected Endings*, Dar Al-Bashir for Culture and Science, 2018.

about the causes of Islamophobia said one of the factors behind the great interest in writing the history of the Crusades is that there is a constant desire in the West to assert itself in the face of the East, Arabs and Muslims. The return of the West to the identity and logic of the Middle Ages is stronger than in some countries of the Islamic East, and this return increased after the demise of the socialist camp and the emergence of the need for the countries of Western civilization to find a new adversary through which to evade solving their chronic problems of Arabs and Muslims in general.³⁸⁴ The third station extends from the immediate post-colonial period to the present day, and the events of September 11, 2001 played a catalyst for its re-emergence through the global media.

Therefore, among the definitions of Islamophobia is the reference to ‘a form of cultural panic that may occur after the spread of waves of public caution towards a country, a political movement, a religious call or a parallel or contemporary civilization, such as the panic against Nazism during the Second World War, the fear of the Western capitalist world of socialism during the rise of the former Soviet Union and the ability of the communist regime in China, Eastern Europe and Cuba, including the fear of Islam.’³⁸⁵

Salvatore claims that “just as anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiment has historically developed in response to the politicization of Islam or what might be called the Islamic State.”³⁸⁶ The contemporary phenomenon of Islamophobia has also grown as a result of the rise of political Islam, or what is referred to today as Islamism.³⁸⁷ This analysis also confirms the words of Western writers (the aggression, discrimination and humiliation faced by Muslims in the West has increased significantly since the turn of the century.) These phenomena have formed the broad categories of what has been described as Islamophobia. Similar to the historical evolution of anti-Islamic sentiment towards Muslims. Contemporary Islamophobia has also emerged as a genre associated with

³⁸⁴ Saleh Al-Hamarneh, Ghassan Abdel Khaleq and Abdul Hameed (Eds.), **The Second Arab Renaissance: Challenges and Prospects**, Oman: Shouman Foundation, 2000, pp. 119-123.

³⁸⁵ **The Arab Democratic Center for Strategic**, Political and Economic studies, “Islamophobia in Europe: Discourse and Practice”, Berlin, 2019, p. 13.
https://ia801905.us.archive.org/10/items/20200713_20200713_0424/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%88%D9%81%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%20%D9%81%D9%8A%20%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A8%20%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A9.pdf (24 May 2024)

³⁸⁶ Salvatore, pp. 217-228.

³⁸⁷ Mozaffari, pp. 17–33.

political Islam or what is referred to today, especially since the last decades of the 20th century as Islamism.³⁸⁸

On a legal level the Council of Europe rejects ‘Islamism’ and mentions it as part of its rejection of Islamophobia towards European Muslims. In other words, it makes it a cause of Islamophobia. The Parliamentary Assembly in the Council of Europe, in its Resolution 1743 (2010), Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe, declared that “the Assembly recalls that Islamism is the view that Islam is not only a religion but also a social, legal and political code of conduct. Islamism can be violent or mainstream and peaceful, but in both cases, it does not accept the separation between religion and state, which is a fundamental principle of democratic and pluralistic societies. The Assembly also recalls that discrimination against Muslims is unacceptable and must be combated. A great majority of European Muslims share the principles at the basis of our societies and it is essential to fight against Islamophobia, which stems mainly from lack of awareness and from negative perceptions associating Islam with violence. Failing to address these issues, many European governments pave the way to the rise of extremism.”³⁸⁹

In the context of the Arab revolutions, some observers believe that Europe has become a different continent than it was at home and in its foreign policy before 2011. He attributes much of what is happening in Europe, such as Britain’s exit from the European Union, the change in the foreign policy of European countries and their appeasement of authoritarian rulers in Arab countries, and the rise of the extreme right in the continent, to the impact of the Arab revolutions.³⁹⁰

Internally, for example, the French authorities announced the formation of a committee to investigate the presence of political Islam in France, track its roles, influence and activities in practice and theory, determine the extent of the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the country, and prepare a comprehensive report on this matter, as part of

³⁸⁸ Adis Duderija and Halim Rane, **Islam and Muslims in the West: Major Issues and Debates New Directions in Islam**, Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 23-24.

³⁸⁹ **Parliamentary Assembly - Council of Europe**, “Resolution 1743, Final version :Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe”, 23 June 2020, <https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17880> (24 May 2024)

³⁹⁰ **Al Jazeera News**, “Foreign Policy: The Arab Spring changed everything in Europe”, 25 Dec 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/2020/12/25/%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%BA%D9%8A%D9%91%D8%B1-%D9%83%D9%84-%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A1> (24 May 2024)

the French government's efforts to combat what it describes as Islamic separatism.³⁹¹ 'Islamic separatism' here means 'Islamism' and what it advocates. Austria also banned the group's logo, not because of its connotations, but as a policy 'aimed at criminalizing them and thus excluding them from the public sphere'. Austria was the first European country to officially ban the Muslim Brotherhood. It also extended the law banning symbols of extremist organizations to include organizations such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, the Turkish Grey Wolves, the Lebanese militias Hezbollah and Hizb ut-Tahrir.³⁹² The study points out that the link between Islamophobia and Islamism is not exclusive to these European countries, but also to some Arab countries, as indicated by reports from the United States and Europe, and as the author presented in the statement distributed by Al-Azhar to the British Lords.

On the external level, the thesis presented these policies in two frameworks, supporting counter-revolutionary forces and the war on terrorism. Tarek Othman claims that "in the midst of the evolving politicization of religion - the rise of Islamism - Islam itself has come under suspicion. This has led large sections of well-connected observers, especially in the West, to view Islam as a religion that tolerates violence - and for some, embodies it. There is a strong sense in many quarters that Islam is an intellectual adversary of humanism and liberalism."³⁹³

³⁹¹ **Arabi 21**, "What are the dimensions of France's formation of a committee to study "political Islam" headed by its former ambassador to the Emirates?" (14 May 2024), <https://arabi21.com/story/1597609/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%82-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA> (27 May 2024)

³⁹² **European Center for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies**, "Political Islam in Europe - Criteria for Prohibition and Countermeasures", 21 Aug 2021, <https://www.europarabct.com/%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%80-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%8A%D8%B1-2/> (27 May 2024)

³⁹³ Tarek Osman, "The Tragedy of Political Islam: A Century of Experiments with Modernity", *Cairo Review of global affairs*, The American University in Cairo, 2015, <https://www.thecaireview.com/arabic/%D9%85%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A/> (27 May 2024)

Therefore, Europe has used the narrative of Islam as a threat to justify discriminatory policies, including mass surveillance and legal restrictions against Islamic practices.³⁹⁴ The impact of Islamophobia on political Islamist movements is multifaceted, affecting both their perception and operational dynamics, both in the Arab world in general and in foreign countries in particular. Islam has been increasingly framed as a threat to Western values. This perception has been exacerbated by the actions of extremist groups such as ISIS. This not only leads to various waves of vilification of Islam and Muslims in the West, but also complicates the discourse surrounding political Islamist movements, which often seek to navigate the intersection of faith and governance.

In Europe, state-sponsored Islamophobia has manifested itself through policies aimed at curbing so-called “political Islam”. For example, French anti-separatist legislation has been criticized for targeting Islamic organizations under the guise of preserving secularism, depoliticizing Muslims and reinforcing negative stereotypes. Such measures create an environment in which political Islamist movements are marginalized, limiting their ability to operate freely and advocate for their communities.

Islamophobia also affects how political Islam is perceived within Muslim communities. The fear of being associated with terrorism or radicalization can lead to a distancing from political Islamist movements. It can stifle civic engagement among Muslims who might otherwise support political Islam initiatives.³⁹⁵ Moreover, it can lead to a backlash against conservative expressions of Islam in public life, further isolating sections of society. Political Islam movements find themselves in a precarious position as they navigate these hostile political landscapes while trying to assert their rights and identity.

Some studies indicate that there is an existing industry around Islamophobia, with media institutions and organizations deliberately spreading misleading or distorted information about Islam for political or economic gain. This includes the funding of some think tanks and organizations that adopt anti-Islamic rhetoric and promote discriminatory policies. Islamophobia is also used as a strategic tool in the foreign policies of some countries, where fear of Islam is used to justify military intervention or economic control over

³⁹⁴ **Georgetown University website**, “What Is Islamophobia?”, undated, <https://bridge.georgetown.edu/about-us/what-is-islamophobia/>

³⁹⁵ Salih Tuzer, “The impact of islamophobia on the education and religious identity of Muslims in the USA”, **Türkiye Din Eğitimi Araştırmaları Dergisi**, Vol. (17), (2024), pp. 131-143.

Muslim countries, through which wars or military interventions against those Muslim-majority countries can be justified on the basis of fighting “extremism” or “terrorism”, thus promoting certain strategic agendas. The Islamophobia industry involves research, policy and communications centers and media organizations that produce, fabricate and disseminate this fear with precision. In this industry, both consumers and end-users are victimized. In *The Islamophobia Industry*, Nathan Lane explores a world of conservative bloggers, right-wing talk show hosts, evangelical religious leaders and politicians united in their efforts to demonize Muslims as the new enemy of Western civilization.^{*396} Lin reveals their scare tactics, traces their funding sources and reveals the ideologies that drive their lucrative propaganda machine. He details Trump’s campaign and presidency, and traces the rise to power of some of the most extreme figures in the Islamophobia industry. The link between the episodic and the strategic in understanding the phenomenon of Islamophobia and its historical development leads to some conclusions, including Islamophobia as a path and a strategic plan that its proponents have been working on for a long time, is not isolated from the clash of civilizations thesis put forward by the American scholar Samuel Huntington. The relationship between the episodic and the strategic is also a dialectical relationship, each feeding into the other, as the episodic and contingent events triggered by regional and international tensions that lead to hostile behaviors against Islam and Muslims serve the strategic objectives of Islamophobia, which bets on cumulative action. Moreover, these strategic objectives cannot be achieved once, but rather by employing occasional events and phenomena in order to build a strategic pattern that strengthens the path and serves the plan in the medium and long term.³⁹⁷

It is clear that the concept of Islamophobia is addressed within the framework of the conflict between Islam and Western civilization or the conflict between right and wrong. There is a belief that Islamophobia is intentionally produced. Islamophobia is deliberately produced by imperialists, Western civilization and Zionists in particular. The goals of these groups have always been to oppress Muslims and force them to make the changes they want in order to dominate the world, to prevent conversion to Islam in Europe, and

³⁹⁶ for example, see; Nathan Lane, *The Islamophobia Industry How the Right Manufactures Fear of Muslims*, London: Pluto Press, 2012.

³⁹⁷ Uğur Ülger, “the view of political Islam on Islamophobia: the example of the National outlook Movement”, **Polish Political Science Review**, Vol. (7), No. (2), (Dec 2019), Pp. 52-67.

to create public opinion to justify their war against Islam. This in turn, like the war on terrorism, puts Islamists in a quandary and pushes them towards certain policies, especially when they are weak.



CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed to identify the factors and reasons that led Islamist political movements in Egypt to make some political changes in their ideas and practices during and after the January 25 revolution, particularly during the rule of President Mohamed Morsi. That is, when the Islamists were in power, and when they were overthrown by the coup on July 3rd, 2013 and the subsequent campaigns of repression and exclusion from the political and social scene.

Firstly, the author prefers to use the term 'changes' rather than 'transformations' in relation to Islamist changes in Egypt. This is because what happened was not so profound as to overthrow the Islamists' previous ideas and replace them with new ones. They are still the same old ideas and methods. What has changed are the means used and the tactics used to reach power and survive in the aftermath.

During the democratic political process after the revolution, there were multiple signs of these changes, as well as other evidence in various cases that indicate that this change is neither fundamental nor strategic. Rather, they are interim changes driven by the pragmatism of rational choice and the realization of interests. This is with reference to the relative difference in these changes between the Brotherhood and the Salafi movement and between the leaders, individuals and supporters of these two movements. For example, when the Muslim Brotherhood chooses a Christian as vice president of its new party, this is considered a sign of change for observers, especially since it is the first time. However, this Christian actor cannot be a candidate for the presidency of the Egyptian Republic by the Brotherhood or Islamists in general. This is based on certain jurisprudential principles and rules. The first one is the principle that it is forbidden for an infidel to take over the affairs of Muslims. In fact, this issue - openness to non-Islamic and non-Muslim forces - has raised issues and controversy between the Nour Party and its base, represented by the Salafi Call and its leader Barhami, as previously presented. The Nour Party allowed Christians and women to run on its lists to avoid being dissolved as a religious party, as the constitution prohibits the establishment of political parties on a religious basis. There are many other examples discussed in the thesis.

The most noticeable trend was the trend towards political participation ‘politicizing Salafism’. Or towards more political participation, as in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood. This movement has a history of political participation, and a group of them founded a political party for the first time before the revolution, after they were expelled from the Brotherhood, they formed al-Wasat Party under the leadership of Brotherhood rebel Abu al-Ila Madi in the 1980s. In contrast, multiple groups of different ideologies turned to non-violent means. The coup and the repression that accompanied it was the catalyst for this violence. But it was not the only factor.

The political changes of the Islamist movements in Egypt during the era of the Arab revolutions were a response to the local context, from revolution to coup and authoritarianism, in a context of intense competition between the Egyptian state and Islamist movements. This phenomenon is also influenced by regional pressures, which clearly crystallized in their support for the counter-revolutionary forces. International pressures include participating in the counter-revolution, sponsoring the war on terrorism, and investing in the growth of Islamophobia. Therefore, it can never be asserted that the factors driving these changes are purely subjective convictions. Rather, they are a mixture of external pressures and internal convictions driven by the same external pressures.

Islamists have realized the power and effectiveness of the Maidan in toppling political regimes, in the revolution that toppled Mubarak and the counter-revolution that toppled Morsi. The Mubarak era was full of tensions and challenges for Islamists, and they saw the fall of Mubarak as an opportunity to fill the vacuum. They established parties and participated in parliamentary and presidential elections. The absence of a revolutionary project affected their progress in the revolution initially, but they recovered by responding to the requirements of the stage and coming to power. This prompted some scholars to famously say that Islamists hijacked the popular revolutions.

The military has a huge influence over all the institutions of the Egyptian state.³⁹⁸ This includes the parliament and the presidency. The military has a great ability to exploit opportunities, adapt and change its alliances to maintain its hegemony over society, the state and politics. The military ousted Mubarak and Morsi, and military retirees entered parliamentary committees as elected representatives. The military has absolute control

³⁹⁸ See: Zeinab Abul-Magd.

over land investments, industries, and the media. It also controls the judiciary through legislation that serves its agenda. The study elaborates on the coup regime's strategies for enhancing its legitimacy and its tools for controlling its opponents and society in general. The peculiarities of the Egyptian state and its rivalry with Islamist models of change played a major role in shaping the positions of Islamists during and after the revolution.

Perhaps the direct aim of the counter-revolution in Egypt is to protect the interests and goals of some regional and international actors. These include preventing the export of the revolution, preserving their Sunni leadership in the region, preventing democratization, ensuring Israel's security and protecting supply lines to the West. However, the repercussions of the counter-revolution are still affecting how Islamists are dealing with the current situation. The Nour Party and its founding group, the Salafi Da'wa, sided with the coup, citing the protection of the Da'wa's interests and the mistakes of the Brotherhood, their traditional rival, the Wahhabi/Ash'ari rivalry.

In the context of the post-2001 War on Terror, the US administration adopted a strategy of 'moderate inclusion' in the Middle East, with the aim of reducing the appeal of extremist groups. By supporting democratic reforms in the region that allow for inclusive participation. Observers see it as the reason for the victory of many Islamist political movements at the beginning of the 21st century, before retreating from it later, with the end of the major campaigns on terrorism and the rise of Islamists against their rivals in a number of countries, including Egypt, Palestine and Jordan.

There are several schools of thought towards political Islam movements in the United States. One of them is the containment school which suggests that the strategy of appeasement and encouraging democratic development. The exclusionary school relies on a strategy of confrontation and siege. The consensual structuralism school is based on seeking a compromise between confrontation and pacification. All of them have been reflected in the US strategy and foreign policies in its dealings with political Islam movements. Here, the role of think tanks in employing these visions and crystallizing them for the American decision maker, including the Brookings Institution, the Rand Corporation, and others, comes to the fore. It is worth noting that in every American think tank there are supporters and opponents of each of the three currents (containment,

exclusion or compromise) in dealing with political Islam movements.³⁹⁹ This, in turn, puts pressure on political Islamist groups that are supposed to interact and adapt to these Western strategies in different ways each time, making it necessary for them to constantly change their tools, policies, and perhaps their ideas, in proportion to the reality of the situation. This is the approach that continued during the revolution, with the coup, and afterwards.

The terms ‘Islamism’, ‘political Islam movements’ or ‘Islamist movements’ suffer from the predicament of quantitative synonymy, conceptual inflation, and political employment locally and internationally. Islamists also suffer from a crisis of contradiction. They seek to apply the unique Islamic model of governance within the framework of the modern nation-state model, which is contradictory to it. The Islamist movements adopt the procedural aspect of democracy such as elections and establishment of parties, but not its full philosophy, at different levels among themselves. For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood movement is more proactive and open to democratic frameworks than the Salafi movement, which is new to the democratic political experience and more conservative about its sales.

The intellectual basis on which Islamic political groups are based is solid and clear in terms of the goal, which is ‘the establishment of an Islamic state and the rule of Islamic law’. It is flexible in terms of the mechanisms to reach it and the forms of its application, provided that it does not violate the general rules of Islam. Renewal is an inherent idea in Islamic political thought, and it has its own controls. The manifestations of change adopted by Islamists in Egypt during and after the revolution are major tactical changes, not deep and fundamental transformations, and they can be reversed based on the facts of the stage that Islamist movements are going through. They did not affect the traditional division of Islamists. They are also cumulative from the time before the revolution. The option of violence remains on the table for members of the Islamist movement, and all groups have their own literature supporting it. However, the conditions calling for it differ.

³⁹⁹ Amr Abdel-Aati, “A review of the report America and Political Islam. A shift from militarization to integration and alliance”, *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*, 20 Jan 2011, <https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/reports/2011/2011721233711562974.html> (27 May 2024)

The January 25 Revolution and its repercussions were the most important factor in the emergence of Islamist changes in Egypt. The absence of a prior revolutionary project pushed them towards greater openness and coordination with non-Islamist revolutionary forces to get rid of their common enemy. Leading figures had a major role in these changes. These figures were Imad Abdel Ghafour from the Salafi Da'wa, Hazem Salah Abu Ismail from the Muslim Brotherhood (Later, he left the organization), and Tariq al-Zumar from the Islamic Jihad.

The systematic repression of Islamist forces after the coup led to the emergence of armed groups that varied in their goals and capabilities. It also led to the disappearance of most of them after years of using the tight security grip. The same reasons led to the revision of jihadist groups that had previously used violence. This emphasizes that the relationship between repression and violence has different outcomes if catalyzed by other factors. In other words, repression generates more violence as well as less, depending on other factors.

The characteristics of the Egyptian state, which can be defined as a Praetorian state, have played a role in Egyptian Islamists' adaptations to events since late 2010. The military was so deeply entrenched in all institutions that it repelled the influence of others. It encircled the Islamist movements through effective strategies and tools, or what the thesis calls Trilogy, security, media and the judiciary. This is part of the counter-revolutionary strategy of the old regime. Counter-revolutionary regimes are constantly evolving their tools, requiring revolutionary forces, including Islamists, to change and develop their methods as well. After coming to power and making other mistakes, this approach allowed the counter-revolutionary forces to topple the rule of the Brotherhood and its allies in Egypt.

The counter revolutionary forces received support from outsider actors as well. Some Arab hereditary regimes supported the coup against Islamist rule, fearing the export of the revolution to them and democratization. Western countries favored the coup regime as a guarantee of stability in the region, rather than supporting democratic transition and ensuring human rights and public freedoms violated by this regime. The importance and priority of Israel's security in the process of overthrowing Islamist rule in Egypt through the strategic ally of the US in the region, the Egyptian army.

One of the difficulties that forced the author to be more precise is that the transformations witnessed by the Egyptian Islamist movements are characterized by two different currents in many intellectual issues and in political and jihadist history. Every conclusion must take into account these details. For example, the shift towards political participation for the Salafi movement is larger and more noticeable than for the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood's changes lie in some new practices, such as establishing a party for the first time or running for office and some of their youth demanded more openness to liberals and other revolutionary forces. The youth of the Salafi movement were more reserved, and even considered that a number of their leaders had lost their legitimacy because of these changes, which they considered concessions.

Before finalizing the analysis, the author proposes a number of research questions that may be addressed in future research. Examining the transformations of Islamists at the individual level, particularly through a psychological approach would be useful to better understand these transformations. Such approach can be preferred to delve into the role of the psychological factor in these processes. While evaluating the experience of Islamists within the framework of these transformations and the results that led to them, in line with the strategic objectives of these Islamist movements one can ask the question of did these transformations serve the general project or did they constitute reverse steps? Finally, how has the shift towards greater political participation, immersion in national frameworks, and renunciation of violence contributed to shaping the relationship with the Egyptian state and Western countries?

This thesis contributes to the literature on revolution and Islamist movements in the contemporary reality. January 25 Revolution was not a success in the sense that it did not make a significant change both politically and economically. The main demands of the revolution were bread, freedom, and social justice. None of them were achieved. This thesis emphasizes the right of peoples to revolt against injustice, tyranny and a failed ruler who fails to secure the most important elements of livelihood and social justice. It emphasizes the need to change or develop the means of confrontation. Moreover, the Islamists were not allowed to continue their experience in government for more than a year, and their inexperience and the surveillance of their rivals played a role in their early downfall. This thesis provides content that Islamist movements can utilize to prevent future failures. The persistence of tyranny, the denial of people's rights under miserable

social, economic and political conditions, as well as the exclusion of large segments of society, such as the Islamist incubator, constitute time bombs that will explode over time, threatening peace and security in the region.



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Interviews

Atiya Adlan, - the chairman of Al-Islah Party - “Islamists in Egypt and the January 25 Revolution”, Istanbul: (1 Mart 2020).

Essam Abdel-Shaffy, - Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies and IRA Academy Chairman-, Islamists in Egypt and the January 25 Revolution”, Istanbul: (5 June 2022).

Saif Abdel Fattah, - Political thinker and President Mouhamad Morsi' Consultant-, “Islamists in Egypt and the January 25 Revolution”, Istanbul: (1 June 2023).

Tarek al-Zumar, - the Chairman of the Building and Development Party - “Islamists in Egypt and the January 25 Revolution”, Istanbul: (22 July 2021).

C.V

Educational Background

University of Sakarya. (2017 – Feb 2025)

PhD candidate in Middle Eastern Studies. GPA: 3.58

Thesis Title: “Transformations of the Islamic Political Movements in the post Arab Revolutions Period: The case of Egypt”.

Beirut Arab University. (2013-2017)

Ma in Public Law. Very Good.

Thesis Title: “The Humanitarian Relief in International Law”.

Lebanese University (2007-2011)

Ba in Political and Administrative Sciences. Good.

Work Experiences

Strategic Thinking Group	Youth Projects Manager and Editor	2020 - 2021
Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies	Researcher	2018 - 2020
Awrak Media Production	Projects Manager	2017
Islah High school	Teacher	2013 – 2014

Publications

Journal Articles

Badriya Rawy, “**The Lebanese landscape after the Beirut port explosion**”, Rouyya Türkiyya, SETA, Vol. (9), No. (4). Nov 2020. pp. 203 – 217. DOI:10.36360/1560-009-004-011

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Studies

Badriya Rawy, “**Al-Hakimiyyah Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb**”, Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies (EIPSS), May 2019.

Badriya Rawy, “**Political Coups in International Charters**”, Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies (EIPSS), July, 2019.

Badriya Rawy, “**The State among Muslim Brotherhood Theorists**”, Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies (EIPSS), Aug 2019

Conferences

Presented a paper at the International Congress, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Türkiye, December 2019.

Presented a paper at the Middle East Congress, Sakarya University, Türkiye, November 2018.

Scientific Awards

First place in the diploma of the International Institute of Human Rights – Strasbourg

Languages

Arabic: Native **French:** Fluent **English:** Very Good **Turkish:** Good