

**AN APPRAISAL OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN
POLICY ON CAMEROON (2010-2022)**

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**TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASININ KAMERUN ÜZERİNDEKİ EKONOMİK
ETKİLERİNİN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ (2010-2022)**

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SUMMARY

This thesis explores the economic impact of Turkish foreign policy on Cameroon from 2010 to 2022, focusing on the various stages of Turkish-African ties. The research uses secondary and primary data sources and World Systems and Middle Power theories as theoretical frameworks. The study highlights the crucial role of Turkey in Cameroon's economy, particularly in trade and socio-cultural progress. Türkiye's strategic actions towards Africa have evolved from the "Opening Up to Africa" plan in 1998 to more sophisticated methods such as "The Year of Africa" in 2005 and the Africa Partnership Policy in 2014. The socio-cultural effects of Turkish foreign policy include tourism, education, infrastructure development, and media assistance. However, the study also highlights difficulties such as external pressures, resource depletion, and economic imbalances. The study concludes that Turkish economic initiatives in Cameroon are crucial for ongoing cooperation and navigating the complex geopolitical environment of Africa's developing economies. Despite the success of Turkish textiles entering the Cameroonian market, 15.83% of participants consider dumping, resource depletion, and negative balance of payments as serious obstacles.

ABSTRACT

AN APPRAISAL OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TURKIS FOREIGN POLICY ON CAMEROON (2010-2022)

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Over the past decade and counting, Ankara's footprint within Africa and including Cameroon has paid off. In 1998, Ismail Cem unveiled the "Opening Up to Africa Policy," but it failed to bear fruits because of the lack of institutional frameworks and resources. In 2005, the AKP coined a novel foreign policy document for Africa baptized "The Year of Africa," which became a new cornerstone, taking off from where 1998 failed. "Opening up to Africa" began by propping up institutional restructuring and organizing resources for the plan. In 2014, Türkiye' crafted the Africa Partnership Policy which is currently in operation via all spheres. This thesis examines the foreign policy impact of Türkiye on Cameroon, focusing on the historical epochs of Turkish-African relations. It argues that Ankara's strategic policy, "Türkiye's Opening Up to Africa," is a blueprint for catapulting Africa-Türkiye relations, particularly with Cameroon. The problem of the statement rest on the fact that despite evolved Türkiye-Africa relations due to changes in Turkish foreign policy, a succinct assessment of the economic relations between Türkiye-Cameroon relations on Cameroon was lacking. The aim of the were to identify the historical roots of Turkish-African/Cameroon relations, examine the motivations of Turkish involvement in Cameroon from 2010-2022, and to assess the economic effects on Cameroon alongside the challenges Ankara faces in her relations with Cameroon. Both secondary and primary sources of data collection were utilized in terms of data collection. The theoretical yardsticks used in this work are the World Systems and Middle Power theories. The research uses a multidimensional approach, incorporating diplomatic, economic, and cultural aspects. A concluding remark is Ankara-Yaoundé's ties signifies economic gains and challenges within the CEMAC region with future potentials.

Keywords: Cameroon, Economic Effects, Türkiye, Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkish-Africa.

ÖZET

TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASININ KAMERUN ÜZERİNDEKİ EKONOMİK ETKİLERİNİN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ (2010-2022)

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Danışman: Prof. Dr. Bülent Açma

Geçtiğimiz on yılda, Ankara'nın Afrika'da ve Kamerun da dahil olmak üzere ayak izi ödüllendirildi. 1998 yılında, İsmail Cem, “Afrika'ya Açılma Politikası”nı açıkladı, ancak kurumsal çerçevelerin ve kaynakların eksikliği yüzünden sonuç vermedi. AKP, 2005 yılında Afrika için “Afrika Yılı” olarak adlandırılan yeni bir dış politika belgesini hazırladı ve bu da 1998'in başarısız olduğu yerden başlayarak yeni bir köşe kaynağı oldu. “Afrika'ya açılma” planı, kurumsal yeniden yapılandırmayı desteklemek ve plan için kaynakları organize etmekle başladı. Türkiye, 2014 yılında, şu anda tüm alanlarda yürürlüğe giren Afrika Ortaklık Politikası'nı hazırladı. Bu tez Türkiye'nin Kamerun üzerindeki dış politika etkilerini inceliyor ve Türk-Afrika ilişkilerinin tarihi dönemlerine odaklanıyor. Ankara'nın “Türkiye'nin Afrika'ya Açılması” stratejik politikasının, özellikle de Kamerun ile Afrika-Türkiye ilişkilerini katapulte etmek için bir plan olduğunu savunuyor. Bildirinin sorunu, Türkiye-Afrika ilişkilerinin Türkiye dış politikasındaki değişiklikler yüzünden gelişmesine rağmen Türkiye-Kamerun ilişkileri ile Kamerun arasındaki ekonomik ilişkilerin kısa bir değerlendirmesinin eksik olduğu gerçeğidir. Görüşmenin amacı, Türkiye-Afrika/Kamerun ilişkilerinin tarihi köklerini belirlemek, 2010-2022 yılları arasında Türkiye'nin Kamerun'a katılımının nedenlerini incelemek ve Ankara'nın Kamerun ile olan ilişkileri açısından karşılaştığı zorlukların yanı sıra Kamerun üzerindeki ekonomik etkileri de değerlendirmektir. Verilerin toplanması açısından hem ikincil hem de birincil veri toplama kaynakları kullanıldı. Bu çalışmada kullanılan teorik bahçe çubukları Dünya Sistemleri ve Orta Güç teorileridir. Araştırma, diplomatik, ekonomik ve kültürel yönleri kapsayan çok boyutlu bir yaklaşım kullanıyor. Sonuç olarak, Ankara-Yaoundé ilişkileri, CEMAC bölgesinde gelecekteki potansiyellerle ilgili ekonomik kazançlar ve zorluklar anlamına geliyor.

Anahtar Kelimeleri: Kamerun, Ekonomik Etkiler, Türkiye, Türk Dış Politikası, Türk-Afrika.

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DECLARATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND RULES

I certify that I have adhered to all ethical principles and the rules established by the university, and I have also agreed to any legal implications that may contradict this statement.

Tekang Paul KWACHUH

06-27-2024

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Anadolu Agency
AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
AFDB	African Development Bank
AFO	African Economic Outlook
AKP	Justice and Development Party
AU	African Union
CAF	African Football Confederation
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CS	Civil Society
CTBC	Cameroon-Turkish Business Council
DEIK	Foreign Economic Relations Board-Türkiye
DIYANET	Director of Religious Affairs
DS	Daily Sabah
TEB	Turkish Exim Bank
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EAC	East African Community
EU	European Union
FETÖ	Fethullah Terror Organisation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIFA	International Federation of Football Association
FP	Foreign Policy
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
G-20	Group of 20
GNP	Gross National Product
HOs	Humanitarian Organisations
İHH	Humanitarian Relief Foundation
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development Partners Forum
IFZ	Industrial Free Zone
IR	International Relations
IMF	International Monetary Fund

LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Türkiye
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MUSIAD	Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
NA	North Africa
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OIC	Organization of Islamic Countries
SMEs	Small and Medium Sized Enterprises
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TACSS	Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies
TADD	Friends of All Africa Association
TAO	Turkish Aid Organisation
TASAM	Turkish Asian Centre for Strategic Studies
TE	Turkish Eximbank
TFP	Turkish Foreign Policy
THY	Turkish Airlines
TIKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
TIM	Turkish Exporters Assembly
TMF	Turkish Maarif Foundation
TOBB	Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges
TRC	Turkish Red Crescent
TURCABA	Turkish-Cameroonian Businessmen's Association
TUSKON	Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industry and Business Association
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference for Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
USA	United States of America

USSR	Union of Socialist States Republic
YEF	Yunus Emre Foundation
YTB	Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities
WTO	World Trade Organization
WW1	World War One
WW2	World War Two
WFP	World Food Program



CHAPTER ONE

1 INTRODUCTION

The era towards the ending of East-West divide, during which France, Britain, and United States America were consistently identified solely as external forces with huge motives within sub-Saharan Africa has ended. (Shively, 2005: 394). Affirmatively, the Republic of Türkiye is one of the newcomers into the continent with a huge foreign policy appetite in recent years which is spreading across the continent like summer ‘wildfire’ framed gigantically. According to Tepeciklioğlu (2021: 1), the African Continent not only houses nations with rapidly rising economies, but it also has abundant resources in the likes of natural gas, oil, and precious minerals. These elements have facilitated Africa’s transformation into a pivotal battleground for traditional powers such as the USA, EU, and emerging countries like Russia, China, Japan, and India. Oh & Zholamanova (2021) argue that Ankara’s burgeoning motives on the African continent has skyrocketed, leading to stronger links between Türkiye and many African states. This has inevitably affected the Turkish academic area. Türkiye’s engagement with the continent is driven by its economic interests, political considerations, and external influences.

Muyo (2012: 1), stated that this explains why recent, growing capitalist tendencies have engulfed even the formerly branded eastern ‘Communist States’. This is obvious in their ever-increasing drive to control the global market and, using this economic power, chase additional wins on the international stage that are political and sociocultural in character. The growth and diversification of Ankara’s foreign policy footprints in the last decade have sparked vibrant discussion among many stakeholders, including diplomatic officials, political analysts, academicians, reporters, businesses elites, civil society organisations among others. Their argument centres on various alteration of Türkiye’s foreign policy playbook in response to significant transformation in terms of international and regional power dynamics. Kalin (2012: 7), postulated a range of questions, some of which are based on solid knowledge while others are more rhetorical in nature, in order to evaluate Türkiye’s position in world politics. It appears that Türkiye’s novel foreign policy roadmap for Africa was divided into 2-phases when we examine the past two decades: During the initial phase, which commenced in 2005, Türkiye implemented African Initiative Policies to establish a

presence on the African continent. In phase two, commenced post-2014, was designed so as to fortify its institutional frameworks and build partnerships with African states through the implementation of Africa Partnership Policies. Moreover, Türkiye's robust presence in Africa is being rivalled by strategic states with the likes of UAE, Iran, India, Qatar, Russia, China, and France (Orakçi, 2022: 8).

Kragelund (2012) argued that Africa's diplomatic connections have seen significant changes in recent times. China, India, and Türkiye, which are non-traditional state players from outside the Western world, are renewing their relationships with nations on the continent, as well as with the conventional state actors. According to Dahir (2019: 6), Türkiye's connections with Africa have in depth historic-cultural origins beyond the Ottoman era. Nevertheless, the last two decades Ankara actively pursued substantial connections with the European continent. According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Türkiye's former Foreign Minister Ali Babacan stated that Africa holds great importance in Turkish foreign policy. Consequently, Türkiye catapulted its political and diplomatic representation in Africa by establishing Fifteen additional Embassies (MFA, 2008). Subsequently, Türkiye strengthened her influence within Africa by significantly enhancing collaboration with African nations. The 2011 African Economic Outlook, which was jointly compiled by the African Development Bank, UNDP, and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), identified Türkiye as a significant player in Africa.

Kali (2023) said that after its establishment as a republic in 1923, Türkiye actively cultivated strong economic and military alliances with western nations, along with its aspiration to transform into a contemporary, secular state. However, within two decades in office President Erdogan's governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) aimed to redefine Türkiye to be an independent and influential global player. Türkiye sprang from the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, which lasted for six centuries, included three continents, and governed the Islamic world along with parts of Europe. The territories have seen centuries of war and interaction between influential influences, including the East and West, Christianity and Islam, as well as modernism and tradition. Present-day Türkiye is shaped by these influences, while simultaneously striving to establish itself as a sovereign force with a

distinct national character. The nation has established a strong alliance with Western countries by becoming a member of NATO and strengthening its trading connections with the EU. Nevertheless, it has encountered growing conflicts with them due to its decline in democratic standards, its dealings with Russia, and several other matters.

In an era characterised by growing interconnectedness, the interactions between local and global forces mutually influence one another, resulting in the emergence of novel synergistic effects. Türkiye's adaptation after the cold war plus globalization complexities as seen in several ways, depicted increased vulnerability feelings accompanied by novel waves of nationalism, as well as a willingness to embrace globalisation and pursue innovative diplomatic and economic strategies. Throughout the majority of the Cold War, western allies viewed Türkiye as an ally on a military front under North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). However, unpredictable emergence of globalisation and various modernities has compelled Türkiye to transform itself into a fresh political, economic, and diplomatic force. (Kalin, 2012: 8 citing Barkey, 2011). Despite little success from the year 2005, Türkiye actively expanded its foreign policy playbook towards Middle East, Asia, Africa, and South America, while also participating the regional matters of these blocs. In addition to its ongoing pursuit of EU membership as a strategic objective. Türkiye leverages soft power based on its economic growth, population, cultural connections with countries in the Balkans and Middle East (Kalin, 2012: 8 quoting Bilgin et al, 2008).

Türkiye's geostrategic position between Asia and Europe, harbours a significant leverage over the Caucasian states, Central Asia, EU, the Mediterranean, and Middle East. According to the 1936 Montreux Convention, Ankara has authority over the navigation of the following Straits, consisting of the Bosphorus Bosphorus, Marmara Sea Marmara, plus the Dardanelles. All these waterways pivotal are crucial since they tie-up the Black and Aegen Seas thus facilitate commercial transportation of hundreds of millions of tons of goods annually. As a secular state and a middle power, Türkiye has microscopically shaped its foreign policy framework for the SSA region over a decade through a variety of political, diplomatic, military, and socioeconomic facets. This paves the way for building beneficial connections with African states through these channels. Kalin (2012: 9) argued that new Turkish foreign policy crafters seek to achieve a compromise by blending *realpolitik* and

what could be referred to as “idealpolitik.” It provides a fresh perspective on the reasons for as well as the implementation of FP in an evolving 21st century international landscape.

Süsler (2019: 4) argued that as the international system undergoes a significant transformation, with power dynamics shifting towards non-Western countries, there is increasing debate about whether multipolarity will shape a new global order. This raises questions about if rising economies would stand against or support present liberal global order. At the moment scholarly discourse mostly focuses on analyzing the consequences of BRICS+ (comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa as founding members) in challenging the US led international order. In contrast, developing powers like Türkiye get little focus. As the cold war came to an end, Turkish policymakers actively resulted in promoting the notion that Türkiye can assume that central position within the emerging global order. Scholars have also begun to depict Türkiye as a “middle power,” similar to Brazil and India, highlighting Türkiye’s aspirations to influence global politics.

The rising world has been characterised by pundits and politicians are utilizing terminologies like “multipolar,” “polycentric,” and “non-polar.” The terms “neo-polar,” “apolar,” “post-American,” “G-zero,” or “no one’s world” are used to describe different geopolitical scenarios. (Fareed et al., as referenced by Amitav in 2014, page 1). The world is undergoing a significant transformation, moving towards a more diverse and complex state. The dominant belief in liberal hegemony, promoted by staunch American and European advocates under the pretext of foreign policy, is gradually coming to an end. Amitav (2014: 7-8) argued that in a world with various complex factors, the process of creating and controlling order is increasingly varied and decentralised. This involves the participation of existing and developing states, states, from international, regional organisations, and transborder non-state players. The first category consists of reputable global civil society organisations and individuals who actively promote and establish norms. The latter category, on the other hand, comprises malicious actors that consists of Al-Qaeda, drug cartels, people traffickers, and profit-driven businesses (but corporations may exhibit both positive and negative behaviour).

According to Orakçi (2022: 3-4), Africa’s diverse international relations give rise to conflicting viewpoints. China is often seen as a significant investor, yet, it is also regarded

as neo-colonialist in disguise through the use of the “debt trap” technique. African states such as Angola, Kenya, Ethiopia, among others are facing difficulties in repaying their debts to China. These nations are confronted with the dilemma of either paying with oil or relinquishing significant sea or air ports to Chinese companies. In a separate instance, African nations seem to be prepared to overlook Israel’s illegal practices against immigrants and Palestinians in order to recruit more Israeli investment. Nevertheless, despite the significant hazards involved, it is evident from key external players in Africa all are implementing strategic mechanisms to spread their influence across the continent in all spheres from commerce, cultural, and diplomatic/political. Hence, the coexistence of several actors gives rise to a setting where the interests of Asian, Western, and Middle Eastern states sometimes clash with one another.

Traditional theories of IR and international political economy are premised on the assumption that a state is a defined entity that acts according to its policies and decisions in the international arena. Internal political dynamics influence the conduct of nations within a pre-existing global system that is already organized. Ulusoy (1998: 4) argued that in the context of inter-state interactions, state interests may be broadly categorised under high and low politics (politics and economic). Nevertheless, current context under global politics, debates have recognised a nation’s economic pursuits cannot be separated way political objectives, likewise for economic objectives. In this era of globalisation, the nexus between political and economic interests are intricately interconnected and mutually supportive. Politics is influenced by economic power. Likewise, the economic effects one country has on another plays a crucial role in the political realm of power. It is evident on the This in African countries, as they place great emphasis and focus on their economic advancement as a way to extricate themselves from enduring cycles of poverty. The crucial objective is to find an ideal combination that directs economic influence towards serving political objectives.

According to Smith et al. (2008: 2-3), many IR scholars believe that rapid globalisation, interdependence of the 1990s weakened the state as a primary player. As a result, states’ foreign policy took a back seat while explaining international relations compared to post-World War II dynamics. However, contrary other views of some researchers, globalisation

and interdependence did not result in the downfall of the state. Instead, they caused the state to become more limited in its actions while still increasing its importance. The state's freedom to act as it pleased became more limited due to a growing number of constraints. Globalization led to a network of nexus as it weakened the countries' control over their destiny. However, the state's importance has grown even further due to the fact that citizens are increasingly relying on the state to address the consequences of globalisation. This reliance now extends to a wider variety of political issues than ever before, ranging from inward investment to climate change.

In addition, many African nations saw Türkiye to be a puppet of the USA, and enforcing western imperialism. As a result, they often chose to have little or no collaboration with Türkiye. Nevertheless, during the last several decades, Turkish government leadership, foreign policy players, and bureaucrats have shown little interest in formulating or documenting any strategic foreign policy for Africa, as their focus has been primarily directed towards other areas. To solidify this argument, Uchehara (2008: 44) contended that discussing the connections between Türkiye and African nations might be relatively challenging. This is because Türkiye's primary focus was on burgeoning ties with the EU, Caucasus, Balkan states, Middle East, USA, South Asia and Pacific nations. Over the last twenty years, tremendous transformation and adjustments have occurred within the structural mechanisms of Ankara's foreign policy and interests (Kalın, 2011: 7-17; Aras, 2009; Baudner, 2014; Özcan, 2017). However, others argued that Türkiye's ambitious foreign policy extends to a far wider range of geographical locations, in contrast to the previously restricted regions listed. Various scholars have analyzed the factors driving this shift in foreign policy, including global political changes, domestic influences such as European conditionality, and considerations of security and material interests (Sayari, 2000: 17, Aydın & Acıkmese, 2007, Ipek, 2015: 174).

Turkish foreign policy, which was historically linked and matched itself with Western states, has undergone a significant paradigm change and now prioritizes extensive engagement across Africa, South America, Central Asia, and Middle East. These new strategies in Ankara's FP are premised on national politics, specifically AKP party's dominance since the early 2000s. It is also influenced by the geopolitical shift towards a

multipolar world order, where the traditional powers of the Trans-Atlantic region are losing their influence (Kalmoy, 2021: 1). Kalin (2012: 9) states that the changing geopolitical landscape of the 21st century has forced nations, such as Türkiye, to reassess their strategic goals and adapt to the evolving dynamics of various modernities and multidirectional glocalisation. Significant changes have occurred in three closely connected sectors after the Cold war period: the global regime system, international economy, plus social order. Currently, African countries are reevaluating their diplomatic ties prioritising their national interests. Türkiye including China have also joined this trend by rebranding and diversifying their diplomatic connections in order to get economic benefits.

The Republic of Türkiye has established itself as an increasingly powerful player in the world politics and across Africa. Ankara's massive size and breadth of participation on the African continent, particularly in Cameroon, which has quickly emerged as a powerhouse in the CEMAC area, is a clear sign. Türkiye's reawakening to the continent can be described as the "last dice" in her foreign policy agenda, stemming from her desire to achieve not only regional status but also global power, joining the ranks of others, particularly France, which has had a firm grip on the continent, particularly in the geographical sphere of France, with an active foreign policy package for more than six decades and beyond. Interestingly, in contemporary Türkiye-Africa ties, African leaders seem to welcome Türkiye with open arms, presenting a nexus of economic, social, and humanitarian incentives. The Turkish government is effectively communicating the concept of improved diplomatic advantages via a "win-win" pipeline complemented by significant economic benefits.

Africa's significant area, abundant subsurface resources, and substantial workforce have always made it a focal point in the foreign strategies of major global powers. Despite the occurrence of the slave trade in the area for millennia, as well as the presence of colonialism and independence movements in the 1960s. Despite possessing a developed civilisation, abundant natural resources, a skilled workforce, and a sizable market, its position in global politics and economics continues to be highly desired. Furthermore, Africa is now characterized by the prevalence of violence, poverty, and illnesses. As a result of the interconnectedness brought about by globalization after the Cold War, Africa's focal point has triggered novel interests from international entities. In the aftermath of the collapse of

the Cold War, and especially in the 2000s, developing nations like China, Brazil, and India started engaging with Africa. Türkiye has also shown a growing interest in this regard.

Türkiye's fascination in Africa is deeply ingrained in its historical background. The African continent had significant strategic importance in the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman expeditions to the continent were motivated by religious and strategic factors, which may be further explained by considering the strategic importance of the North African territories at that time and in the present day. For almost four centuries, the Ottoman empire has cultivated strong ties with the African continent, which has a substantial Muslim population, and has had a beneficial impact on the area. Although the Republic of Türkiye was founded after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, it did not show any interest in Africa until the late 1990s (Mohamed, 2020: 1).

Türkiye's growing role in Africa reflects a significant and dynamic transformation in recent decades. It is evident in the recent Türkiye-Africa IV Business and Economic Summit and Africa-Türkiye Partnership Summit held in October 2023, which demonstrate Ankara's expanding influence on the continent. While scholarly works on Türkiye-Africa relations have primarily focused on Somalia, Sudan, and the Northern African states, there is currently a growing discussion among scholars and others about Türkiye's motivations and new expansions into sub-Saharan Africa, including Cameroon. This shift in Ankara's FP is driven by the country's to actively take a driving seat on the global stage, which necessitates engaging with the continent for a mutually beneficial relationship. Ankara is aggressively enhancing its global ties by participating in regional groups focused on security and economic agreements, as well as increasing its engagement in international organizations.

According to Oran (2006: 3-4), the concepts of status quo and westernization were pivotal in grasping conventional FP dialectics of Türkiye. Türkiye's traditional FP was premised on two models: firstly, cementing prevailing boundaries and balances to sustain established order, and secondly, the pursuit of a foreign policy aligned with Western interests. At now, Turkish foreign policy may be characterized as dynamic, strategic, timely, constructive, adaptable, and self-assured. It largely relies on soft power and public diplomacy, with less reliance on hard force, and has moved away from certain traditional foreign policy approaches. As per Levin's (2019: 3) findings, Turkish construction industry

and fixed investments have contributed immensely towards the development, growth, and enrichment of clients of regimes. These economic activities have been supported by the import of energy from similar-minded regimes, making them significant drivers of the country's foreign policy. Contrary to Levin's perspective, Türkiye's ongoing economic growth, development, and industrialisation necessitate a recalibration of its foreign policy to priorities economic considerations in a highly competitive era of the rise of globalization. This is especially significant given the intense competition for economic ties with African countries, which offer valuable raw materials and markets.

Ozkan (2016: 8) stated that the actors involved in this process in Türkiye include different branches of the state such as (state agencies, Embassies, Business Council Meetings, and holding of summit), which cooperate with non-governmental organisations and aid agencies (such as the World Food Programme and the Turkish Red Crescent), as well as state-owned companies and Türkiye's private sector. The aforementioned elements delineate the cooperation and interaction of Turkish entities across Africa, as they use their 'geostrategic awareness' to obtain an advantage over potential rivals. It is a well-established fact that Western powers established economic and political influence in Africa many years ago. Türkiye's recent engagement with Africa seems to be driven by certain competitive factors, which are understood by its foreign policy experts. China, a major participant, has implemented an African strategy from the 1960s that has proven to be very successful. Türkiye seems to be following a similar approach by adopting the Ankara Consensus Model. Burak (2021) argued that if Africa's ascent is really occurring, it is also true that Türkiye is experiencing a rise in Africa. Currently, there is a significant and vigorous exchange between Türkiye and African nations in terms of commerce, business, and diplomacy, despite the presence of rival countries. In recent years, Türkiye has been more prominent in Africa, while Africa has played a significant role in Türkiye's comprehensive and assertive foreign policy during the last 15 years. Türkiye aims to enhance its influence on the continent by using various channels of diplomacy, commerce, investment, education, health, security, while and military cooperation, as well as employing soft power instruments such as culture and history.

The thesis, titled "An Appraisal of the Economic Effects of Turkish Foreign Policy in Cameroon from 2010 to 2022," explores the complex interplay between Türkiye's foreign

policy and its influence on Cameroon's economy throughout a span of twelve years. The motivation for this research stems from Türkiye's historical connections with Africa and its current strategic decision to increase its involvement on the continent, namely in Cameroon. The study examines the problems and possibilities in the bilateral relationship between Türkiye and Africa, with a special emphasis on trade dynamics, patterns of foreign direct investment (FDI), and sector-specific economic development driven by Turkish companies. It acknowledges Türkiye's significant Ottoman heritage in Africa.

Economic relations between Türkiye and Africa have evolved over the years in recent decades as a result of changes in Turkish foreign policy dictum globally and towards Africa. Despite their historical and geopolitical significance, most scholarly research principally powers attention towards Türkiye's relations towards Sudan, Somalia, and northern African states with limited research on Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, a succinct assessment of the economic relations binding Cameroon and Türkiye as a result of a shift in Turkish foreign policy towards SSA was lacking especially within the CEMAC region hence propelling the research to delve into this study which would become a cornerstone for other researchers.

The research aims to gain complete knowledge of the influence of Türkiye's changing foreign policy stance on Cameroon's economic growth trajectory by closely examining trade agreements, investment patterns, and diplomatic activities throughout the provided era. Furthermore, the primary goal of the thesis is to make a valuable contribution to the wider academic discourse on international economic relations, specifically focusing on the interactions between growing powers like Türkiye and African countries. The objective is to examine the intricacies of Türkiye's political and economic approaches in Africa, emphasizing the possible advantages and difficulties linked to enhanced bilateral collaboration. The research aims to provide useful insights into changing global economic dynamics and their impact on developing nations like Cameroon, specifically in light of Türkiye's growing influence on the international arena utilizing the holding of business and economic summits.

1.1 Research Questions

The research questions consist of:

- What are the historical genealogies that account for Turkish African/Cameroon relations?
- What motivations account for recent Turkish interest in Africa in the case of Cameroon?
- What are the economic effects accruing from these bilateral relations on Cameroon?
- What are those challenges Türkiye faces with her relations with Cameroon?

1.2 Aims of the Study

- To identify the historical links of contemporary Turkish-African relations.
- To examine the primary motivations and aims of Turkish involvement in Cameroon/Africa from 2010 to 2022.
- To assess the economic impact of Turkish foreign policy on Cameroon throughout the review period.
- Lastly, the thesis seeks to evaluate the challenges Ankara faces with her relations with Cameroon.

1.3 Purpose and Importance of the Thesis

Türkiye, classified as a “middle power”, is increasingly establishing itself as an emerging global force due to its growing industrial capabilities in the global economy. It is also actively engaged in international politics and participating in multilateral organisations at both the global and regional levels. Therefore, it is imperative for every nation, including Cameroon and other sub-Saharan African governments, to acknowledge the significance of Türkiye in today’s world due to the strong and enduring relationships that Türkiye has established with them. In order for Cameroon to achieve its Vision 2035, it must disentangle itself from France and instead rely on Türkiye by implementing strategic diplomatic and economic policies. This would allow Cameroon to fully benefit from its existing links with Türkiye. Türkiye must align its economic capabilities with the resources and market opportunities in Cameroon as it expands its relations with Africa and aims to assert itself as a middle power amid global affairs. The significance of this thesis revolves on these monumental aspects;

- First, the thesis clearly depicts the historical periods that prompted and reinforced Türkiye's presence in Africa, including Cameroon.
- Second, the thesis is crucial because it maps out the economic elements that affect Cameroon-Türkiye relations, taking into consideration Türkiye's commercial interests in Cameroon.
- Thirdly, the thesis is crucial because it predicts economic repercussions, problems, and the future of this bilateral relationship.
- Fourthly, the thesis should prompt Cameroon's diplomatic and economic foreign policymakers to engage in future economic engagements with Türkiye, and Solomonian economic policy decisions.
- This study examines Türkiye's use of summit diplomacy, business, and economic forums to improve economic connections with African governments, including Cameroon.
- Finally, the thesis would contribute to the scarce literature and the current hot discussions over Türkiye-Africa relations, including Cameroon in the CEMAC region.

It is important to acknowledge that there is limited research on this topic, and the focus is primarily on the Turkish presence in Africa, particularly in Somalia, Sudan, South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and North African states. There is little to no academic information available about other African countries with which Türkiye has diplomatic relations. Many of these states have had close ties with Paris for many years. The majority of the material that has been published may be sourced from the media and conference reports provided by institutions. This study is currently relevant.

1.4 Research Methodology

In this thesis, a well-structured research design was adopted with the utilization of both quantitative and qualitative methods of collecting data. A case study design was adopted which focused solely on Cameroon. In terms of the qualitative method of data collection, secondary sources were derived from desk review of published and unpublished materials

such as books, journals, news sources, websites and articles of relevance and reliability- using content analysis.

Also, in terms of the quantitative research methods employed, I used primary sources which evolved the administering of semi structured and closed-ended questionnaires. A sample size 150 questionnaires were administered and 120 respondents were received hence it was satisfactory. The questionnaires were electronically distributed to individuals living in and outside of Türkiye and in some cases face-to-face contact took place. In Türkiye, Cameroonian businesspeople residing in cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Eskisehir etc., were administered. Additionally, I personally visited Cameroonian business owners in Maryland-USA, who sell Turkish textiles and footwears who filled the questionnaires. The participants were adequately chosen using a snowball sampling approach. The quantitative data was analyzed using SPSS software in the form of descriptive statistics. The findings were then presented in the form of percentages, graphs, bars, pie-charts, and diagrams.

Due to the use of quantitative data collecting methods, namely questionnaires (120 in all), purposive sampling techniques were implemented for the thesis. The use of purposive sampling is crucial in this thesis since the researcher deliberately picked participants for the study based on particular criteria that are directly pertinent to the research inquiries. Other sampling techniques consisted of;

- Expert sampling: the researcher chose experts with case study knowledge. The researcher was certain that these respondents would provide significant insights and a broad viewpoint on this issue.
- Snowball sampling: Snowball sampling: current participants referred individuals to the study. In this context, the researcher asked participants to recommend relevant persons.
- Maximum variation sampling: the researcher selected participants with a wide range of relevant characteristics to ensure a diverse and diverse sample.
- Criterion sampling: to make the study acceptable, the researcher selected participants who fit the research criteria based on demographic, experience, or other aspects.

Since Cameroon is diverse, multiethnic, and multicultural, the respondents who live and own businesses in Türkiye and beyond are from these diverse backgrounds, making the purposive sampling techniques important.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

There are many international relations theories in addition to theories from foreign policy analysis and international economics, which have led to comparative foreign policy and economic relations studies. They include realism, liberalism, Marxism, functionalism, neo-functionalism, global system theory, etc. Policymakers and scholars debated the post–World War II socio-economic and political drawbacks of ex-colonies emerging states. Political development consists of comparative politics, international relations, and international political economy all under the rubrics of political science (Ishiyama and Breuning, 2011: 327). The world system theory and middle power theory underpin this idea.

1.5.1 World Systems Theory

Dependency-based work emerged after World War II and gained momentum during the late 1960-70s (Amin, 1977; Collier & Gunning, 1999; Ercan Yilmaz, 2008; Gunder Frank, 1966). This coincided with the rise of modernization as the prevailing approach to development and growing concerns in academia and policymakers about the future of one-time colonies. The world-systems theory originated around the 1970s as a historical-sociological approach that brainstormed on understanding the concept of reliance by examining lengthy cycles in history. It specifically focuses on the impact of the most recent cycle on emerging nations.

The global system and developing middle power approaches are the theoretical yardsticks used in this study. In general, proponents of historical structuralism contend that the international market system promotes underdevelopment and reliance in the southern regions while promoting supremacy in the northern regions (Spero, 1990: 150, Khutkyy, n.d.; Martínez-Vela, 2001). The global system theory, a kind of historical structuralism, a major sociological viewpoint aims to elucidate “capitalist world economy” within a social system web comprehensively social (Martinez-Vela, 2001: 1). The writings of Samir Amin, Andre

Gunder Frank, and Wallerstein Immanuel made the world systems approach to gain prominence in the 1970s (Kay & Gwynne, 2000; Makalesi & Balkiliç, 2018).

They developed the ideas and provided an analytical history of the current world system (Chase-Dunn, 2001: 61). The first significant expression and archetypal illustration of this methodology is linked to Immanuel Wallerstein, who in 1974 released “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts of Comparative Analysis” (Cohn, 2003: 133). The foundation of the approach is rooted in the views espoused by dependence advocates and is strongly associated with Wallerstein’s writings in (1974). This theory, despite its historical origins, is considered to go beyond traditional disciplinary boundaries. This is because it takes into account the entire world, rather than focusing solely on political, economic, sociological, or historical perspectives (Ishiyama and Breuning, 2011: 331).

Ishiyama and Breuning (2011: 332) asserted that two well defined classification of this approach: world empires and world economies. For them world empires are characterised by centralized governmental power that governs the whole system and a prevailing culture that frequently exerts influence on outlying regions. Within global economies, there exists a prevailing economic framework that governs the relationships between states and fosters a cohesive system of production. This system leads to a division of labour based on industrial capabilities, notwithstanding the absence of a singular political authority. The contemporary world-system, known as a global economy, emerged throughout Western Europe in the era of the 16th century. This period witnessed the Spanish exploration in 1492 in the Americas and ends with the 1648 peace of Westphalia. At this time, the center of influence switched from traditional Mediterranean region to Europe’s northwest. Due to this alteration, former dominant region (Mediterranean) was reclassified as a semi-periphery, which is a newly defined category for emerging countries that will be further explained later. Latin America and eastern Europe, which were economically significant at that time, subsequently assumed a peripheral position. The 1789 revolt in France became a pivotal moment in shaping the present approach because it established a new tenet of liberalism to become a prevailing core ideology, hence introducing novel geo-culture.

Also, French liberalism introduced universalism, a significant idea that emphasizes equality in the access of citizens in a system through law implementation. Wallerstein (1974)

argues that although the key nations typically adhere to these ideals, they are not always widely embraced or encouraged elsewhere, culminating to inequity within the system. The current global system reached its peak in the late 19th century as previously unconnected regions of the world became economically linked through colonization and industrialization. This led to a greater demand for resources at reduced prices. World-systems theory deviated from the dominant belief that the current global order was shaped by World War II and its aftermath by highlighting long decades of economic and political advancement. Instead, it suggested that this order had been gradually developing over 500 years. Within the modern global system, a recently proposed categorization of states, referred to as the semi-periphery, has been established to delineate the dynamics between the core and the other parts of the world. The semi-periphery consists of countries that possess the capacity to participate in both core and periphery-type manufacturing. Core-type enterprises provide goods that incur higher prices but also possess more value. They function in a similar manner to manufacturers in developed countries by exploiting nations on the periphery. On the other hand, peripheral firms focus on producing low-cost and less value goods, such as raw materials and agricultural products and core countries often exploit these areas.

World-system theory, as conceptualised by Wallerstein, is based on three key philosophical foundations: the Annales School, Marxism, and Dependency theory (Martinez-Vela, 2001: 3). The origins of world system theory may be traced back to the Annales School, with Fernand Braudel being one of its prominent figures due to his historical perspective (Martinez-Vela, 2001). Wallerstein derived his emphasis on the long term from Braudel's concept of *La Longue Durée* (Martinez-Vela, 2001). He acquired the skill of concentrating on geo-ecological areas as the primary units of study, with a particular emphasis on Braudel's concept of the Mediterranean. Additionally, he developed a strong interest in rural history and relied heavily on empirical data provided by Braudel. The Annales have a significant influence on the overall methodological level. Wallerstein acquired several key insights from Marx. Firstly, he understood that social conflict is a fundamental reality among groups of people based on material factors. Secondly, he recognised the importance of considering the entire relevant context when analysing social phenomena. Thirdly, he acknowledged that social forms and theories about them are temporary and subject to change. Fourthly, he

grasped the central role played by the process of accumulation and the competitive struggles between different social classes that arise from it. Lastly, he adopted a dialectical perspective that emphasized motion through conflict and contradiction. Wallerstein's objective has been to reevaluate Marxism itself ((Martínez-Vela, 2001b)

World system theory is mostly a modification of dependence theory (Chirot and Hall, 1982; Martínez-Vela, 2001b). Wallerstein extensively utilises the concepts of dependence theory, which is a neo-Marxist account of development processes. dependence theory is widely accepted in the developing world, especially in Latin America. One notable individual associated with this theory is Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a Brazilian scholar (Cohn, 2003: 32). Dependency theory examines the relationship between the core and periphery regions, with a particular emphasis on peripheral areas such as Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Many modern criticisms of global capitalism are rooted on the viewpoint of dependence theory (Martinez-Vela, 2001: 3). Two other significant inspirations in Wallerstein's work, which continue to be relevant in modern world-system study, are Karl Polanyi and Joseph Schumpeter. The global system's interest in business cycles stems from the latter, while the concept of three fundamental modes of economic organisation, namely reciprocity, redistribution, and market modes, originates from the former (Chase-Dunn & Grell-Brisk, 2019; Chirot & Hall, 1982).

These may be compared to Wallerstein's notion of mini-systems, global economies (ibid). Contrary to the dependence theory, the global system theory is comprehensive and adaptable. It has a global perspective, unlike the dependence theory which is restricted to peripheral states (Chirot and Hall, 1982: 84). World systems theorists focus on the exploitation of peripheral states, as well as the interplay between core states and the emergence and collapse of dominant states. The citation for this information is from Cohn's work in 2003, specifically on page 33. World system theorists analyse the historical development of capitalism, starting from the 16th century, to explain how the core exploits the periphery. They examine the global economic structure and study cyclical fluctuations, including economic depression, recession, upswings, and booms.

Marx and Engels characterise the global system as a unified division of work with numerous cultural systems. According to Christopher Chase-Dunn (2001: 60), the current

global systems may be conceptually analyzed as a stratification system consisting of economically, culturally, and militarily powerful core civilisations, which are in rivalry with each other, along with dependent periphery and semi-peripheral areas. Wallerstein defines a world system as a “world economy” that is connected through the market rather than a political center. In this system, two or more regions rely on each other for necessities such as food, fuel, and protection, and two or more political entities compete for dominance without a permanent single center emerging ((Agnew, 2020; Corbridge, 1986; Heiskala, 1998; Martínez-Vela, 2001c). World system theories see the capitalist global economy as the primary focus of study. According to these theories, states are not seen as significant players in their own regard, but in relation to their place in the world economy and the ongoing dominance of industrial economies. They hold the belief that the internal and exterior strength of a state cannot be considered apart from its place in the global economy.

The impact of this global system has therefore resulted in the establishment of a worldwide economic structure that surpasses any previous extent. It is founded on capitalist economic principles, with its main objective being the accumulation of wealth for its own sake. In order to priorities this objective, the system is distinguished by a global division of labour, where the economic structure (core, periphery, semi-periphery) is determined by the specific combination of economic activities in a country or region. Each zone is then rewarded differently by the world economy, with the core receiving the highest levels of surplus and income. The contemporary global system is inherently characterized by inequality, where the core, due to its superior wealth and state authority, is capable of exploiting the periphery and semi-periphery in order to secure its own ongoing enrichment and advancement (Ishiyama and Breuning, 2011: 332).

Wallerstein (2004) subsequently revised his thesis to include what he regards as the present crises of the contemporary world-system. The crisis originated from the cultural shocks of 1968, which involved extensive social unrest in the central, peripheral, and semi-peripheral regions due to growing disillusionment with the perceived failure of capitalism and democracy to effectively promote economic growth, political stability, and social fairness. According to world-systems theory, people in the periphery and semi-periphery have come to doubt that investment from the core countries is the solution for development.

Instead, they see it as a way for the core to maintain its power. Consequently, a significant number of those who are exploited and their supporters no longer believe that if they wait patiently, the system will reward them as it does the core.

World system theorists have faced criticism from classical and Marxist thinkers, such as Vladimir Lenin, for placing excessive stress on the “relations of exchange” between core, semi-peripheral, and periphery nations, rather than focusing on the “relations of production” between capitalists and workers (Cohn, 2003: 134). Realists like Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr argue that global system theorists priorities economic linkages above the function of the state. Wallerstein was criticized of making a naive assumption that ‘strong states’ are inherently present in the core and ‘weak states’ are often located on the periphery (ibid). Counterexamples have been presented that undermine these conclusions by arguing that several “strong states” in the Sixteenth century, such as Sweden and England, really had comparatively “weak state” structures (Skocpol, 1977: 88).

However, notwithstanding the challenges faced by the global system theory, it remains pertinent in the examination of international political economy. World system theorists have shown their adaptability as a collective, being capable of modifying their theoretical perspectives in response to critiques. World system theorists, unlike many other schools of thought, provide a comprehensive and extended historical perspective on social, economic, and political transformations (Cohn, 2003: 134). This research investigates the correlation between Türkiye and Cameroon using the global system approach. This methodology enables the researcher to concentrate on the historical outlook of the social, economic, and political advancements in both nations and how these transformations have impacted their connections. Currently, there are disputes between proponents of globalization and opponents of globalization around the globe. Anti-globalists are promoting deglobalization and disengagement from the global economy. They aim to establish stronger, more cooperative, and self-sufficient social connections in less developed regions. On the other hand, there are those who are trying to gather support for new or improved institutions of democratic global governance (Chase-Dunn, 2001). While self-reliance may be a natural response to exploitation, it is unlikely to provide a lasting solution to humanity’s problems.

1.5.2 Emerging middle power theory

Pieterse and Rehbein (2008: 2) said that we are on the verge of significant worldwide changes. A new era of globalization has begun, whereby low-cost manufacturers and service providers in East Asia, China, India, and Latin America are surpassing the United States, Europe, and Japan. Their ascent is facilitated by a confluence of factors including meagre salaries, technological progress, favourable demographics, economies of scale, and high-quality education. The realisation of long-held ambitions, such as enhanced collaboration among countries in the Global South, is now slowly materializing in commerce, energy, and financial transactions. The dominance apropos of American imperialism and the international financial institutions centered in Washington is rapidly diminishing. Undoubtedly, the rising economies contribute to the dynamic and energetic nature of company growth, yet relying only on this enthusiasm might be misleading.

Middle powers are countries that possess a moderate level of international strength, capability, and influence. They have a tendency to actively encourage unity and stability within the global system. Although there have been difficulties in categorising them, it is widely agreed that countries like Australia, Canada, Norway, and Sweden are considered intermediate powers (Jordaan, 2003a; Yalçın, 2012a). Nevertheless, the recent addition of countries like Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Malaysia, South Africa, and Türkiye to the middle-power group is eroding the previously established agreement on the designation of middle powers. Nevertheless, the inclusion of countries as varied as Brazil and Canada, or South Africa and Sweden, in the same category brings into question the effectiveness of the middle-power concept and runs the danger of weakening its analytical capacity (Allan & Dauvergne, 2013; Chapnick, 1999; Jordaan, 2003b).

The notion of the middle power originated in the late 16th century, when Giovanni Botero, an Italian Renaissance philosopher, classified governments into three categories: *grandissime* (empires), *mezano* (middle powers), and *piccioli* (little powers). In the field of international relations, Organski's power transition theory (1958) gained popularity in the mid-20th century. This theory suggests the existence of a power hierarchy consisting of dominating, major, moderate, and little powers (Jordaan, 2003a; Yalçın, 2012b). Organski's typology identifies the middle power grouping as states that have the ability to exert influence

on a regional and, to some extent, global level. However, his analysis tends to view states in this category as less significant actors and instead focuses on the dominance of more powerful states in global politics. The phrase ‘middle power’, similar to great power or minor power, categorises a state based on its standing to determine the kind of actor it is. More precisely, the word informs us about the general agreement on a state’s position in the global order of national strength. Certain indicators, such as the quantifiable levels of military and economic capabilities, have always been acknowledged as crucial metrics for assessing a country’s relative strength. Four widely accepted categories for rating nations are great power (or polar power), major power, medium power, and minor power (Schweller, 2017: 1; (Edström & Westberg, 2020; İlişkiler et al., n.d.; Shin, 2015).

The emergence of new ideas, such as the rising power theory, gained relevance in the international system after the end of the Cold War, particularly in the fields of international business and politics. According to Öniş and Kutlay (2017: 16-17), the term “emerging middle power” refers to the recognition of a state’s capabilities and limitations. The success of states in this group in terms of making a positive impact on global governance depends on their ability to avoid a mismatch between their expectations and capabilities (Paulo et al., n.d.; Susler B., 2019; Yücekaya, 2024). Alden and Vieira (2005) argued that the international system after the Cold War is preoccupied with the global power structure and actively aims to question the dominance and underlying beliefs of the major nations in the global North. Although the term “emerging power” is commonly used in international relations theory, there is a lack of agreement among academics on how to define a country as an emerging power. Some scholars argue that a country can be considered an emerging power when it significantly expands its economic and political influence, surpassing other countries. This viewpoint is supported by Harrison (2004) and Toromoren (2015).

Türkiye’s international position has been widely assessed optimistically due to the conclusion of the Cold War, the emergence of a new generation of political elites, and Türkiye’s relatively successful economic growth over the previous decade. Türkiye’s aspiration to become a major global power and the “epicentre of world politics” has served as a guiding concept for several transformations and efforts in its foreign policy. Considerably, this optimism has also permeated academic circles, where heightened foreign

policy engagement is generally seen as evidence of Türkiye's expanding global or, at the very least, regional significance. Previously classified as a middle power, Türkiye is now recognised as a regional power with the potential to become a regional great power. It plays a crucial role in shaping the world order and is considered a pivotal leader in its region. Some even view Türkiye as a regional hegemon or a global power. The conclusion of the Cold War, the emergence of a new cohort of political leaders, and Türkiye's comparatively prosperous economic growth over the last decade have led to a prevailing sense of optimism over Türkiye's global influence. Türkiye's aspiration to become a major global power and a central player in international politics has served as a guiding concept for several transformations and efforts in its foreign policy. Considerable optimism has also permeated academic circles, where the heightened foreign policy engagement of Turkey has often been seen as evidence of its expanding global or, at the very least, regional significance. In the past, Türkiye was considered a middle power, which was not well-defined in theory. However, it is now viewed in different ways, not only as a regional power but also as a potential "regional great power." It is seen as a significant middle power that influences the destiny of its region and plays a crucial role in shaping the global order. Some even consider it a leading force in its region or a global power (Bagdonas, 2015; 3Toromoren, 2015).

The traditional middle powers often include Canada, Australia, the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), and the Netherlands. These nations are often known as caretakers of the global power balance, with the responsibility of preserving peace and upholding order in the international system (Holbraad, 1984: 205; Buzan & Waeber, 2003; Jordaan, 2003c; Patience, 2014; Susler, 2019). Commonly, countries like Canada, Australia, the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), and the Netherlands are seen as exemplary examples of middle powers. These countries are often seen as guardians of the global equilibrium of power, responsible for maintaining peace and order in the international system (Holbraad, 1984: 205; Buzan & Waeber, 2003; Jordaan, 2003c; Patience, 2014; Susler, 2019). They are widely acknowledged as facilitators, endeavouring to establish connections between different coalitions of nations based on distinct interests and concepts. Additionally, they have a reputation for actively seeking agreement and promoting collective approaches to global issues. They use the notion of

‘good international citizenship’ as a guiding principle for their diplomatic endeavours (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993: 19). Under the leadership of Nehru, India actively engaged in inter-bloc diplomacy and made a substantial contribution to the Non-Aligned Movement, with the goal of reducing tensions among major nations during the Cold War. Mid-level powers use “niche diplomacy” by concentrating their efforts and resources on certain topic areas that are expected to provide the most advantageous results. This approach is necessary because of their constrained resources to pursue an all-encompassing global plan (ibid.: 19, 145). For instance, the Norwegians have assumed the role of a mediator in complex global matters and are strongly dedicated to using their Scandinavian character as a neutral country to participate in diplomatic efforts for peace-making.

The geographic positioning and national sense of self of a middle power may further bolster its capacity to act as an intermediary or catalyst between various factions. For instance, Turkey claims to be a middle power based on its geographical position and its lack of presence in the international order, aligning with the conventional notion that middle powers are situated in the centre. Due to its geographical location, Turkey naturally serves as a connecting route between the Eastern and Western areas. Moreover, the contradictory elements of Turkish Islam and Kemalist secularism, which are the basis of its national identity, position Turkey as an ideal political and intellectual mediator between Islam and modernity. The Islamic environment in Turkey exhibits notable diversity, including a wide range of concepts and institutional frameworks. Furthermore, it exhibits a higher susceptibility to political manipulation and a greater willingness to engage in concessions as compared to same situations in other nations. Therefore, Turkish Islam might be seen as an exemplar for Islamic democratic movements on a global scale (Schweller, 2017: 5). In the field of International Relations (IR), Süssler (2019: 5) contends that there is a contentious debate around the concept of a “middle power” and its efficacy in classifying and differentiating states based on their varying degrees of capabilities and resources.

Generally, a medium power refers to a nation that lacks the status of a big power but also does not fall into the category of a small power. However, a notable problem with this classification is the presence of a diverse array of countries that may potentially qualify for the intermediate ranking category. This presents a difficulty in providing a fully satisfactory

representation of what a force that is neither large nor little seems to be. The core tenets of emerging countries include restrained levels of advancement, incremental adoption of democratic procedures, and their readiness to undertake subordinate roles in handling global affairs. Turkey, a country that is a member of many international governmental and nonprofit organisations such as the United Nations, G20, and NATO, may be classified as a “emerging middle power.” Goldman Sachs states that the conversation about emerging markets focuses on nations that have the capacity to move towards the centre in terms of their economic and institutional progress.

Keohane (1969: 295-296) argues that the evaluation of states is determined by the degree of their influence within the international system. Middle powers are nations whose influence in global affairs is fundamentally reliant on alliances and multilateral coalitions. They are sometimes called “states that affect the system”. He further said that a middle-power is a nation whose leaders acknowledge that it lacks the capacity to independently act with efficacy, but may have the potential to exercise influence within a restricted group or via an international agency. Like players with little influence, medium powers likewise want a strong international legal framework. Their desire is for international politics to mirror domestic politics, where the rule of law prevails and sets strict limitations on the use of power (Ikenberry 2001). Cooper et al. (1993) suggest that medium powers may be distinguished by their foreign policy activities. Black (1997) has emphasised the essential circularity involved in identifying intermediate powers. More precisely, medium powers are distinguished by their foreign policy conduct, which in turn exposes commonalities in the essential attributes of middle-power nations. This statement elucidates that the defining qualities have a direct impact on the foreign policy of middle-power countries, thereby completing the circle of understanding. Researchers have been discussing Türkiye’s desire to increase its influence in adjacent areas since the end of the Cold War. This objective has been often referred to as the concept of a middle power.

The examination of Türkiye’s participation in the global system was conducted by Müftüler and Yüksel in 1997, as well as by Hale in 1992. Hale (2013: 1) argues that the term “middle power” is the most precise way to understand Türkiye’s international position and clarify its policies. According to Hale, power is the ability to force other nations to do acts

they wouldn't have taken otherwise, while simultaneously being able to withstand pressure from other states to do the same. Given their unique position within the global system, middle powers are prone to adopting a specific governing strategy that promotes global stability via the establishment of alliances, serving as intermediates, and participating in activities such as UN peacekeeping to effectively manage and resolve international disputes. Statecraft relies on the combination of business acumen, technical expertise, and the capacity to establish diplomatic ties in certain domains where a nation has abundant resources and a favourable reputation (Cooper 1997). In addition, this approach to governance is founded on the notion that middle powers possess both the moral obligation and the capacity to protect the global system from all possible dangers, irrespective of their origin in either big or little nations (Schweller, 2017: 6).

Fonseca et al. (2016: 51-52) said that a nation's increasing influence may be recognised by its diplomatic efforts aimed at altering or reevaluating the global system, supported by concrete facts to substantiate its claims. This behaviour pattern is often associated with a lack of adherence to the established rules of the world order. Studies on intermediate states or middle powers largely agree that states are situated within a certain power structure among nations. Süssler (2019) highlighted that while Turkey may not be seen as a prominent global power, it has a substantial ability to function independently, endure external pressure, and exert influence as a regional actor. The tremendous economic growth seen by Turkey in the 2000s may be credited to the knowledge and strategic choices made by its foreign policy elites, which have raised the nation to the rank of an emerging power. Turkey has been an important global and regional participant in international affairs by extensively charting in Turkey-Africa, particularly in Cameroon. It has firmly established itself as a middling power.

1.5.2.1 Features/tenets of the emerging middle power

Emerging countries see international law as advantageous to their interests, but they lack the ability to exert influence over the global geopolitical environment. International institutions are essential for promoting global communication by enforcing international law, which guarantees equal participation of all nations in decision-making processes. Emerging countries often use a confident and refined approach while becoming involved in global affairs, such as humanitarian, military, and economic challenges.

- They refrain from becoming involved in conflicts, and if they do, they support the use of international mediation via different channels and institutions. Emerging powers do not provide a danger to the existing global order in terms of economic, military, and political systems, and they abstain from attacking liberal democracy.
- They symbolise the growing economic prospects that arise from the adoption of neoliberalism, while simultaneously making significant contributions to humanitarian and aid endeavours.
- Developing nations' foreign policy transcends their physical borders, and their altruistic pursuit of advantageous results establishes them as reliable global players, as shown by Turkey.

Türkiye's main objective is to gain recognition as a global participant or a "pivotal state," as stated by Davutoglu (2001: 91). This is apparent in their exhibition of behaviour aimed at acquiring or demonstrating social status. Emerging nations has the capacity to bolster idols by using their reservoirs of soft power. Various viewpoints have been considered in the ongoing analysis of traditional middle powers and emerging middle powers. Traditional middle powers are often described as prosperous, politically secure, and socially egalitarian social democracies that actively promote a liberal international order. Emerging middle powers refer to countries that have embraced internationalist positions in the period after the Cold War.

These nations often have lesser levels of development and little experience with democratisation. Furthermore, emerging middle powers often occupy semi-peripheral positions within the global economy, accompanied by significant wealth gaps inside their own nations. They often examine global governance in relation to the international power hierarchy, expressing concerns about its structure (Alden and Vieira, 2005: 1081). Furthermore, they could hesitate to support the promotion of liberal internationalism. Öniş and Kutlay (2017: 2) express a dilemma in which they are both sceptical of the current liberal system dominated by Western countries and yet have a desire to participate in an international order based on liberal principles.

Türkiye exemplifies a nation that has successfully faced this dilemma: Turkish politicians often express their disdain of the Western-dominated global system, primarily owing to its inherent inequalities, while yet seeing the advantages of increasing their power within the same system. Turkish authorities have regularly voiced their dissatisfaction of decision-making processes in international institutions, such as the United Nations, due to their perceived inability to adequately tackle the Israel-Palestine problem (Erdogan, 2018d). The phrase “The World Is Bigger than Five” coined by President Erdogan symbolises the Turkish government’s critique of the existing global order, particularly targeting the permanent members of the UN Security Council who possess veto power. Erdogan (2018c) argues that this phrase represents a strong resistance against global injustice and the exploitation of the global economy. However, while showing disdain of the existing system, as pointed out by Kirişçi and Bülbül (2018), Turkey has gained substantial benefits by participating in the free international system. Türkiye’s growing soft power during the early 2000s may be attributed to its participation in NATO, the G-20, the World Trade Organisation, and other connections with the trans-Atlantic alliance. In addition, in his speech at the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly and in an article published in *Foreign Policy*, Erdoğan explicitly endorsed the principles of multilateralism and free trade. He also voiced his disapproval of the actions taken by the Trump administration that undermined the liberal international order (Erdoğan, 2018b, 2018a).

Over the last decade, Turkish foreign policy has shown behavioural characteristics that are consistent with those of an emerging middle power in several respects. Jordaan (2003: 172-73; 2017: 404) states that expanding middle powers often exhibit passion and active engagement in regional groups, often being acknowledged as regional powers. One of the main objectives of Turkish foreign policy during the Justice and Development Party (“AKP”) period has been to position Turkey as a leading power in the region and increase its involvement in both regional and global initiatives. To accomplish this objective, Turkish authorities exerted attempts to strengthen Türkiye’s diplomatic ties with Middle Eastern nations that have largely Muslim populations. In addition, they aimed to enhance their alliance with regional entities such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and used Türkiye’s rich historical and cultural legacy to exercise influence and acquire soft

power. This programme was very successful in the early 2000s, especially when the Turkish government successfully improved Türkiye's status as a model for the Muslim world. However, it faced significant challenges as a result of the AKP's declining economic performance and its efforts to build democracy (Öniş and Kutlay, 2017: 815; Kuru, 2015).

Turkish foreign policy makers have sought to use niche diplomacy by using Türkiye's unique geographical and cultural position as a mediator between the East and the West. Davutoglu often emphasised Türkiye's capacity to establish connections with both the global north and south. Davutoglu (2013a, 2013b) emphasised that mediation and humanitarian diplomacy are essential for Turkey to enhance its influence in global governance. Wohlforth et al. (2017: 533) argue that middle powers use a strategy of formulating policies that present them as a "virtuous power" with foreign policies that include a moral dimension, with the aim of bolstering their position. Turkey exemplifies how Turkish officials have strived to improve the moral dimension of Turkish foreign policy by investing in Türkiye's image as a mediator and a catalyst for humanitarian endeavours. Turkey has aggressively assumed the position of a mediator in several international issues, mostly in its neighbouring area, and has passionately participated in global initiatives aimed at fostering peace. In 2008, it played a major role in starting peace talks between Israel and Syria. In 2010, it helped negotiate a nuclear agreement with Iran, along with Brazil. Also in 2010, it collaborated with Finland to establish the Group of Friends of Mediation within the UN framework, aiming to promote peaceful conflict resolution and prevent disputes.

Turkish policymakers have prioritised the improvement of Türkiye's "humanitarian diplomacy" by increasing assistance to less developed nations and tackling major global humanitarian emergencies (Davutoglu, 2013a; Çavusoglu, 2016). Turkey actively engaged in international endeavours focused on deliberating the global humanitarian system. For instance, it orchestrated the first-ever World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 and underscored its position as a humanitarian contributor in global deliberations. Turkey is home to the biggest population of refugees in the world, with a special focus on hosting nearly 3.5 million Syrian refugees (Hürriyet Daily News, 2016, 2018). The Turkish government emphasised the humanitarian side of its foreign policy while engaging with the developing countries. According to Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu (2016), humanitarian diplomacy plays a crucial

role in Türkiye's approach to Africa. Scholars have highlighted the transition of Türkiye from a recipient of assistance to a provider of aid. Türkiye has been characterised as a "new humanitarian power" (Ali, 2011; al Ozkan, 2013b; Özkan, 2013a; Habiyaemye and Oğuzlu, 2014). The government bolstered its "humanitarian diplomacy" by adopting a strategy aimed at improving trade and cultural exchanges with African nations. As a result, Ankara's approach gained Turkey considerable influence and was particularly appreciated by African nations that largely depended on Turkish aid.

According to Önis and Kutlay (2017: 3), it is crucial for emerging middle powers to have the ability to serve as role models in foreign policy by using their soft-power assets, such as their strong developmental and democratic qualifications. In recent years, Turkey has seen notable internal failures, including a deterioration in both democratisation and economic performance. These obstacles have diminished Türkiye's attractiveness on the international platform and constrained its capacity to use soft power in its foreign policy to exert influence on politics beyond its boundaries (Kuru, 2015). The depreciation of the Turkish Lira, along with the government's consolidation of power, has diminished Türkiye's standing as a middle power and its capacity to serve as a role model for others. Prior to the Arab Spring, the Turkish foreign policy diverged from its current approach. During that time, Turkey sought to expand its influence in neighbouring nations, sparking debates in Western popular and academic spheres about the possibility of Middle Eastern countries adopting the "Turkish model" of democratisation and economic progress. Ülgen (2011) and Taspınar (2012) examined the potential for Türkiye's experience to have a beneficial influence on neighbouring nations.

1.5.2.2 Criticisms of middle power theory

- States in the developing middle power category might lose their position if they deviate from the traditional hegemony paradigm.
- Concerns over human rights.
- One critique of this notion about Turkey is that it fails to align words with deeds, meaning it lacks the ability to fully match its foreign policy rhetoric. For instance, the crises in Syria and Libya, the ongoing conflict in Cameroon, and the persistent turmoil in Egypt.

Ultimately, the task of rising influence in global affairs is prompted by global events that compel action, thereby necessitating recognition in order to address the disparity between major countries and little ones. The idea of a middle power offers a valuable analytical framework, particularly when considering the current trends in Turkish foreign policy. It helps to elucidate Türkiye's involvement in the international system and its efforts to enhance its global position. It is important to recognise that effective middle powers have the capacity to influence both regional and global affairs, and they hold the capability to set the international agenda. Despite Türkiye's political inclination to assume a middle power position, its capacity to exert influence on global affairs and determine the course of international politics is significantly constrained (Süsler, 2019: 10).

The concept of a "emerging middle power" has become a useful tool for analysing Ankara's foreign policy strategies in Africa, particularly in Cameroon. This posture allows Turkey to establish itself as a significant global actor. Turkey indeed exhibits the characteristics of a rising power, notwithstanding the shortcomings related to its internal politics, democratisation, economic disputes, and human rights. If Ankara were a member of the EU, the issues that experts have used to belittle her emerging and middle power capabilities would have no impact on her, allowing her to fully exhibit her global potential. To summarise, Amitav (2014: 59) posited that the terms "emerging powers" and "rising powers" recognise the growing economic, political, and strategic impact of a cluster of nations, some of which are still categorised as part of the "third world" or "global south". The identification of people who belong to these groupings is both adaptable and undisputed. These terms often include countries such as BRICS+ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), as well as Indonesia, Mexico, Argentina, Australia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Türkiye. Andrew Cooper has observed that the depiction of rising powers has been comprehensive, dynamic, and prone to controversy...There is no one acronym that is the most prominent in the profession.

1.6 Assumption and Hypothesis

The thesis rest on these principal assumptions which are;

1.7 Main Assumptions

- ❖ The acquisition of raw materials, markets and trade deals from Cameroon could be a motivation for Ankara's recent interest.
- ❖ The economic growth and development are contributions made by Türkiye accruing from Cameroon-Turkish relations.

1.8 Other Assumptions

- ❖ The thesis assumed that a historical genealogy that accounts for Turkish African relations stems from the Ottoman period.
- ❖ The French sphere of influence in Cameroon could be a setback for Türkiye's economic interest in Cameroon.

1.9 Literature Review

Several authors have presented different viewpoints on numerous subjects concerning the connection between Turkey and Africa, along with other relevant issues. The majority of these experts have conducted extensive study on several historical epochs, with a particular emphasis on Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, South Africa, and other North African nations. Nevertheless, they have consolidated the remaining nations without conducting autonomous investigations on them. Orakçi (2022: 2) asserts that the African continent is now experiencing rapid transformations in the 21st century, including both its physical characteristics and its prospects. Moreover, the international contacts of African states are becoming more complex as new entities establish connections with them. Aside from Western nations, China, Japan, India, and Russia, as well as Middle Eastern regional powers such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel, are now competing to gain control of Africa's resources, markets, and strategic positions. They are doing this by offering loans at reasonable rates, making financial investments, or selling completed items. Consequently, Africa has been a significant focal point for summits and forums, which are often seen as crucial methods to improve involvement with the continent. According to scholars such as Pádraig Carmody (2011), the intricate and multifaceted connections between African nations and foreign countries can be viewed as a contemporary

reflection of the historical scramble for Africa in the 19th century, or as a present-day parallel to the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, it is certain that Africa's appeal to various powers is a significant topic that warrants more examination (Orakçi, 2022: 2).

Rudincova (2014) argues that the recent Turkish involvement in Africa is a result of Türkiye's change in foreign policy. Turkey has transitioned its focus from primarily prioritising Europe and the United States to aggressively engaging with its neighbouring region and other geographical locations. Kali (2023) asserted that the territorial limits of modern-day Turkey were established after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the course of World War I. The triumphant Allies, notably Britain and France, took charge of the area with the aim of partitioning a significant portion of the empire among Armenians, Greeks, and Kurds. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a renowned leader of Turkish nationalists, vehemently opposed the idea and aggressively fought for independence, resulting in the formation of Turkey as an autonomous republic in 1923. Atatürk, the first president, made extensive endeavours to secularise the public domain and promote his vision of modernization inspired by the Western paradigm. His foreign policy, known as "peace at home, peace in the world," aimed to protect Türkiye's independence while forming partnerships with its previous enemies.

Dahir (2019: 6) said that Turkey employs four primary strategies as strategic engagement tools in Sub-Saharan Africa: politics and diplomacy, economics, education/culture, and assistance. Türkiye's historical connections to North Africa, which was formerly under Ottoman control, have led to the development of partnerships with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in the latter half of the 20th century, aligning with the decolonization process. Since 2002, Turkey has implemented a strong and unified foreign strategy to enhance its relations with the governments in Sub-Saharan Africa. The AK Party-led administrations have strategically enhanced their political and diplomatic engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) via the expansion of their foreign missions, frequent high-level visits, and the organisation of Türkiye-Africa cooperation summits. In addition, Turkey is resolute in its efforts to enhance its commercial links with other African nations. A significant turning point in the economic ties between SSA-Türkiye occurred in 2003 with the

implementation of “The Strategy on the Development of Economic Relationships with Africa.” From 2003 to 2017, Türkiye’s commerce with Africa increased thrice, reaching a total of \$18.9 billion. This consisted of exports valued at \$11.6 billion and imports amounting to \$7.1 billion.

In addition, Turkey has notably intensified its commitment to Africa, namely in the areas of education and cultural diplomacy. These accomplishments were achieved by providing scholarships to African students, establishing Turkish schools, exporting the Turkish movie industry (Yesilcam) to Sub-Saharan Africa, and creating research groups with a particular focus on Africa. In addition, Ankara has strengthened defence and security collaboration with nations in Sub-Saharan Africa via the establishment of military training facilities, engagement in counter-piracy missions, and support in combating terrorism throughout the continent. Turkey aims to strengthen its influence in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) by providing humanitarian and development support to the local population. Turkey, a rising middle power, has been actively involved in the humanitarian sector in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years, offering innovative approaches to humanitarian aid and state building. From 1923 until 1960, the Turkish Republic did not establish direct diplomatic ties with any African nations.

The presence of colonial domination presented substantial obstacles in establishing diplomatic ties in these countries. Nevertheless, while other nations experienced a loss of their sovereignty, Ethiopia managed to preserve its position as a sovereign and independent nation. Turkey opened its first mission in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa in 1926 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024e). The “Sevres Syndrome,” which poses a significant challenge to Ankara’s foreign policy, stems from the influential role of the military in Türkiye’s administration, as well as in bordering countries characterised by political instability and a lack of democratic values. These factors hindered Türkiye’s ambitious efforts to increase its influence on the African continent.

Tekir (2022: 2) said that Türkiye’s position towards African nations throughout the decolonization era had significant significance. Africans from developing nations saw Turkey as an alternative to Western powers during the Cold War. Turkey started its engagement with Africa in 1998, but faced challenges due to local political barriers. Since

the beginning of the twenty-first century, Türkiye's internal revolution and global dynamics have led to a more confident and proactive approach in its foreign policy. In 2005, the Turkish government formally declared it as the "Year of Africa" and later arranged a "Türkiye-Africa Cooperation Summit" in 2008. The termination of the IMF Standby Programme in Turkey in 2008, coupled with a shift in Türkiye's domestic political landscape, led to a significant enhancement of Türkiye's ties with Africa.

Any nation located between Greece and Japan might have been seen as a crossroads of Eastern and Western cultures at some stage. However, Türkiye's distinct intercontinental landscape forms a particularly strong connection with this caricature. In the context of Turkey, there has been a use of terminology that contrasts the Eastern and Western areas, including language that contrasts Islam with democracy. The convergence of physical location in both Europe and Asia has been closely linked to the historical context of being both Muslim and democratic, or conversely, both Muslim and secular. The many identities of Turkey have been the focal point of debates on its internal and external affairs, both inside the nation and within the international academic community. In recent years, there has been uncertainty over the language used to describe the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) due to its religious roots and the continuing discussion about its essence (Danforth, 2008: 2).

Throughout the National Independence War and the period between the two world wars, the Turkish ruling elites formulated Turkish foreign policy based on a realist approach and gave significant importance to considerations of security. Türkiye's unwavering alignment with Western nations was readily apparent throughout the Cold War, a time characterised by a global power structure divided into two opposing poles. Following the end of the Cold War, NATO engaged in a process of evaluating its goals via "The New Strategic Concepts," while the European Union implemented extra political requirements for prospective members. The reorganisation of international bodies and governments was initiated by changes in the global system. Turkey has implemented a new strategy in its foreign policy agenda, using inventive techniques throughout the AKP administration era (Tekin, 2012: 18). The AK Party's foreign policy orientation might be seen as deviating from the traditional realism perspective of the Republic, as a result of the changes in the world structure and circumstances after September 11, 2001. The primary objective of foreign

policy is centred on the well and prosperity of people, rather than the acquisition of land or territory.

The primary goal of foreign policy is to enhance the economic, political, legal, and cultural well-being of its population. Turkish foreign policy has mostly prioritised Türkiye's membership in the European Union, settling the Cyprus problem, and cultivating positive ties with Greece. Furthermore, the progress and expansion of civil society in Turkey may be seen as a manifestation of this concept (ibid). Furthermore, it is expected that concerns pertaining to foreign policy will be resolved by the use of diplomacy and non-coercive influence, rather than relying on military might. Turkish authorities frequently emphasise their adherence to international norms and regulations, as well as the validity of UN Security Council resolutions, to show that Turkish leaders do not take independent actions in foreign relations without a legitimate UN Security Council resolution.

Contemplations on global politics are often influenced by momentous occurrences that have led to substantial change, particularly those linked to mass acts of violence. Undoubtedly, the global battles that occurred in the twentieth century and the more recent 'war on terror' are significant events that had a tremendous impact on the trajectory of history. The Cold War, which lasted for more than four decades, was characterised by the potential for widespread and devastating conflict. The field of International Relations (IR) emerged to analyse the fundamental causes of war and the factors that foster peace, particularly in the aftermath of World War I. An essential aspect of International Relations has been the emphasis on understanding the prerequisites for attaining peace (Lawson, 2012: 1). This new paradigm of global governance results in a revitalised competition for investment and trade opportunities inside the international economic framework. States have strategically altered their foreign policy perspectives to explore new markets and generate cash. The primary objective of these structural modifications is to entice foreign investors, exert authority over external financial assets, and regulate the distribution of anticipated advantages. Thus, Turkey chose to adopt a comprehensive and diversified strategy in its foreign policy engagements to address the complex difficulties posed by globalisation and redefine its perspective on economic conflicts (Enwere and Yilmaz, 2014: 8).

In 1998, İsmail Cem, who served as the Foreign Minister at the time, unveiled Türkiye's first "Africa Action Plan" (Habiyaremye and Oğuzlu, 2014: 79). This action plan will serve as the fundamental basis for Türkiye's foreign policy strategy towards Africa during the next twenty years. Ahmet Davutoğlu, who previously held the position of Foreign Minister and then assumed the role of Prime Minister, would make some alterations to it by implementing his renowned "zero-problems" strategy. Nevertheless, Türkiye's foreign policy towards Africa saw significant expansion and diversification in the early 2000s, which happened at the same time as the AKP's rise to power. The ascent of the AKP in authority has significant consequences for both Türkiye's domestic politics and its external relations. Ten years ago, İbrahim Kalın posed the question: "What is the driving force behind the transformation of Turkish foreign policy?" (Kalın, 2011: 8). There is no doubt that Türkiye's foreign policy, both in a general sense and specifically towards Africa, has experienced significant changes since the AKP party assumed power. Furthermore, Kanat (2014: 67) noted substantial changes in the mechanisms of foreign policy decision-making in Turkey after the AK Party administration's seizure of power.

The AKP has greatly improved Türkiye's involvement in the process of globalisation by its proactive participation in activities inside international organisations. Throughout the process of accession to the European Union, the Turkish Government implemented many reform packages and adhered to the conditions outlined in the IMF Standby Agreements. These rules enabled Türkiye to participate in the process of globalisation. Türkiye's incorporation into the process of globalisation is apparent in several areas, including privatisation efforts, the influx of foreign investment, the rise in trade imbalances, Türkiye's substantial involvement in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and its designation as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Türkiye's designation as a strategic partner of the African Union in 2008 will be seen in this context. Davutoğlu devised his strategy by cultivating diplomatic ties with surrounding countries and broadening his global outlook in the formulation of foreign policy. This idea advocates for the practice of conducting foreign policy actions without any restrictions imposed by geographical boundaries. Turkey is enthusiastic in establishing strong diplomatic relations with nations outside its immediate neighbours. The objective of the strategy of

compatible global connections is to establish a foreign policy framework that views international contacts as a whole entity, without any restrictions or divisions. Türkiye's wide-ranging involvements, spanning from Chile to Indonesia, Africa to Central Asia, and the European Union to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), would be unified under a comprehensive foreign policy framework. (Davutoğlu, 2007: 96).

Kupchan, as referenced by Amitav in his 2014 book "The Myths of Liberal Hegemony" (p. 50, chapter 3), argues that the emerging powers of the present are pursuing distinct trajectories towards modernity, influenced by their own political, demographic, geographical, and socioeconomic circumstances. Consequently, they are creating adaptations of Western modernism. By integrating cultural elements, emerging nations would be motivated to follow their own paths of development and embrace their own viewpoints on domestic governance and the most effective structure of the global system in the twenty-first century. The Türkiye-Africa IV Economic and Business Forum, initiated by the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Türkiye (DEİK) in partnership with the African Union (AU), began in Istanbul on October 10, 2018. The event seeks to strengthen Türkiye's business and investment ties with African nations and the whole continent. The event is organised with the support of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and has been ongoing till the most recent occurrence in October 2023.

At the Turkey-Africa II Economy and Business Forum, remarks were delivered by the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the President of Ethiopia, Dr. Mulatu Teshome, the Prime Minister of Rwanda, Edouard Ngirente, the Minister of Trade of Turkey, Ruhsar Pekcan, the Commissioner for Economic Affairs of the African Union Commission, Victor Harison, the President of DEİK, Nail Olpak, and the Vice-President of the Pan-African Chamber of Commerce, Melak Ezezew. This event convenes political leaders, high-level decision-makers in Africa, and influential portfolio managers and corporate individuals. President Erdogan highlighted the importance of Türkiye's partnership with Africa during his speech at the Türkiye-Africa II Economic and Business Forum. He clearly and unambiguously stated:

Our objective is to strengthen our partnerships in all areas via a mutually respectful cooperation that is fair and beneficial to both parties. Since taking office, we have been

actively working to improve our cooperation with the whole African continent, without any favouritism or discrimination. Especially during my time as Prime Minister in 2005, we formally declared it as the “African Year”. He said that the speed has increased since that time. When we took office, we had a grand total of 12 embassies located in various countries around the continent of Africa. Currently, we have a total of 41 embassies, and this number will continue to increase in the future. He further promoted the idea that Türkiye’s Africa initiative has gained extensive recognition and respect across the continent. African countries have always reciprocated the kind gesture shown by our country. As we have increased our diplomatic presence across the continent, African countries have also increased their diplomatic presence in Turkey from 10 to 33. The African nations have strongly supported Türkiye’s legitimate efforts to promote global peace and justice at international platforms like the United Nations and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (Anadolu Agency, 2018).

Türkiye’s foreign policy towards the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, and South America has seen substantial transformations during the last two decades. What factors precipitated the alterations in Türkiye’s foreign policy? Joerg Baudner argues that the Turkish foreign policy stance has been influenced by its historical process of constructing a nation-state (Baudner, 2014: 85). Thus, throughout the first phases of the republic and during the cold war, Türkiye’s foreign policy was mostly influenced by its internal political goals and its alliance with Europe and the United States. Turkey had any aspirations for geopolitical influence in global affairs beyond its local region. In addition, the foreign policy before the AK Party has been characterised by a propensity to blindly adhere to Western directions and an uncritical embrace of Western stances (Gürpınar, 2020: 8). During this time, Turkey adopted a pragmatic stance in its foreign policy. As a result of the security threats presented by the Soviet Union during the Cold War period, Turkey was compelled to align its geopolitical interests with those of Western nations. Furthermore, according to Gürpınar (2020: 4), the Turkish foreign policy orientation can be seen as an extension of debates on national identity. As a result, Turkey has positioned itself as a secular, Western, and non-oriental state on the global political platform, which has had a deliberate impact on its foreign policy.

However, there was a significant change in Turkish foreign policy in the early 2000s, leading to intense debates among diplomats, analysts, academics, and journalists, both inside and outside of Turkey (Kalin, 2011: 7). The AKP government's alteration in Turkish foreign policy has led to a clash of interests with its Western allies about geopolitical issues in Syria, Libya, the Mediterranean, and Aegean Sea. The reference provided is "Kalmoy, 2021: 4". As to Ibrahim Kalin, a former spokesperson for the Turkish president, Turkey is now engaged in a period of self-reflection in the context of global geopolitics, influenced by the simultaneous effects of globalisation and regionalization. Consequently, there was a repositioning process that situated Türkiye within a wider geographical framework (Aras, 2009: 130). Consequently, beginning in the early 2000s, Turkey has redefined its position and function in worldwide politics. Türkiye's former foreign policy, which prioritised national security, has recently transitioned to a more liberal approach with a distinct Turkish impact.

Akcay (2012: 89) said that Türkiye's efforts to expand its commercial connections in Africa resulted in the Turgut Ozal administration being the first Turkish prime minister to provide foreign assistance to Africa in 1985. This measure facilitated a new era of commercial cooperation with present-day African states. According to Tekin (2012: 3), Turkey has enhanced its connections with regional groups in Africa. In 2005, Turkey became a "observer" in the African Union and in 2008, it was accepted as a non-regional member of the African Development Bank. The Turkish Embassy in Abuja received diplomatic recognition from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2005. In 2008, Turkey became a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Partners Forum (IGAD). In January 2008, the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa formally recognised Türkiye as a "strategic partner." The Türkiye-Africa Cooperation conference concluded with the endorsement of "The Istanbul Declaration" and the "Türkiye-Africa Partnership Framework Document". These publications emphasised the crucial role of trade and investment in fostering African development. The occurrence happened in the year 2008. In addition, the Turkish Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam received formal acknowledgment from the East African Community (EAC) in 2010.

In 2005, Turkey intensified the expansion of its foreign policy in Africa. Turkish embassies and humanitarian groups were seeing significant growth in their presence throughout remote states and geographies on the continent (Özcan, 2017: 11). Furthermore, Turkey was actively broadening its foreign policy tools in African countries via the provision of scholarships, humanitarian assistance, strengthening governmental capacities, increasing infrastructure, and executing other social initiatives. Kara and Sözen (2016: 55) observe that Turkey was skillfully using its historical and geographical ties with Africa in its foreign policy pursuits. Furthermore, Turkey has used a diplomatic approach in Africa that is founded on the principle of responsibility, as stated by Kara and Sözen (2016: 63). Türkiye's remarkable effectiveness has enabled it to establish diplomatic missions in every African country. Furthermore, Ozkan asserts that the Turkish foreign policy in Africa was driven by a clear-cut principle: giving priority to economic affairs over political factors (Ozkan, 2010: 536). Ozkan asserts that Türkiye's efforts have unequivocally fostered amicable ties with African corporate and political leaders, thus leading to enhanced commercial linkages not just with Cameroon but also with the whole continent.

The Anatolian Tigers, prominent business magnates in Turkey, are tasked with overseeing these economic connections. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Somalia in August 2011, during his tenure as Prime Minister, was a momentous occasion that attracted extensive media coverage. This was the first visit of a Turkish Prime Minister to Somalia in three decades. Moreover, during that same time frame, the Horn of Africa, namely the region of Somalia, saw severe damage as a result of famine. Erdoğan's visit precipitated a critical juncture that finally resulted in a global humanitarian endeavour in the area. In 2017, Turkey established its first overseas military installation in Somalia, consolidating its position as a prominent geopolitical player in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea areas. Furthermore, Turkey has established strong and effective humanitarian and cultural organisations across the countries in the Horn of Africa. This has positioned Turkey as a matter of great geopolitical importance for established powers in the region, including the UK, the United States, France, and China. Türkiye's involvement in Somalia functioned as a standard and indication of Türkiye's diplomatic initiatives over the wider African continent, and it shown to be a prosperous diplomatic undertaking (Kalmoy, 2021: 5). Türkiye's primary diplomatic

presence in Africa is located in Somalia, where it has established its biggest diplomatic centre. Additionally, Turkey has a significant military base in the Indian Ocean. Since 2011, Turkey has been a prominent geopolitical actor in the region. Türkiye's supply of educational scholarships, humanitarian aid, capacity building, and cultural exchanges has increased its diplomatic prominence and popularity within the Somali people and the wider Horn of Africa region.

Turkey has developed a comprehensive foreign policy that takes into account several factors, while still maintaining its historic relationship with the Western world. A notable feature of the AK Party administrations during the last 15 years is the strengthening of relationships with neighbouring regions, such as Russia, the Balkans, and the MENA region. Ankara has broadened and diversified its ties with Sub-Saharan Africa via trade, aid, procedures for resolving conflicts, and the creation of governmental organisations (Dahir, 2019: 8). Since 2004, Turkey has consistently been among the top 20 economies with the highest growth rates globally. The objective is to achieve a gross domestic product (GDP) of \$2 trillion and accomplish \$500 billion in exports by the year 2023, which marks its centenary (Daily Sabah, 2018). The significant economic potential of Africa has attracted the attention of both Turkish government and enterprises (ibid). Turkey now maintains 43 functioning embassies around the continent, representing a significant increase from only 2 two decades ago. According to Orakçi (2022: 5), Turkey ranks fourth among the most influential countries in Africa, behind the United States, China, and France.

Turkey highly values economic collaboration and trade relationships throughout the continent. Turkey often hosts Turkey-Africa economic and commercial conferences in collaboration with the African Union (AU) to promote and strengthen trade relations between Turkey and African countries. The first event in 2016 included trade and economic ministers from 42 African states and over 2000 firms in Istanbul. In 2018, the second conference was held with the theme "Investment on the Sustainable Future Together." During the same year, Türkiye established the Türkiye-ECOWAS Business and economic conference to enhance its trade and economic ties with West African countries at a regional level. This effort sought to enhance Türkiye's economic and financial relations with the nations indicated, as documented by Sahin (2018) and cited by Orakçi (2022: 5). The latest economic and

commercial conference of Türkiye occurred in Istanbul in October 2021 and 2023, functioning as a normal practice to foster high-level economic cooperation with the continent. The map below depicts the advancements achieved by Türkiye in Africa from 2005 to 2018, under the guidance of former president Abdullah Gul and current president Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This achievement was accomplished via several methods, including official visits, the formation of Embassies, business alliances, efforts by TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), and the participation of Turkish Airlines.

The Turkish government's dedication to formulating and implementing policies with African nations is elucidated in the 2003 Development Strategy, referred to as the "Strategy for Enhancing Economic and Commercial Relations with Africa," as stated by Kizilarslan (2011). This strategy was formally adopted in 2003 by the Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade of the Republic of Türkiye, specifically by the Head of the Department of African Countries & Regional Organisations. The main objectives of the Strategy are as follows:

- a) The goal is to increase Türkiye's participation to the total trade volume of African countries to 3% within a three-year timeframe. Presently, Türkiye's contribution to the total commerce volume of Africa, which reached 567 billion dollars in 2005, is at 2.1%.
- b) To enhance market entry for our small and medium-sized enterprises, empowering them to extend their operations into adjacent countries.
- c) To bolster Türkiye's competitive edge in certain sectors, it is suggested to pursue either collaborative investments or direct investments in Africa with the corresponding countries.
- d) To streamline the dissemination of technologies from Turkey to adjacent countries in the region.
- e) To enhance the market penetration of Turkish construction, consulting, and engineering firms in African markets.
- f) To mitigate poverty by making strategic investments in African countries with the objective of stimulating economic activity and fostering more value creation within their domestic economies. The Strategy includes the following significant tools:

To initiate frequent contact, it is recommended to create a Joint Economic Commission (JEC) or other comparable venues that facilitate high-level discussions and decision-making on economic matters.

- g) To promptly conclude the essential agreements that would provide the legal basis of our collaboration with the African states.
- h) To form preferential trade arrangements and Free Trade Agreements with African states, in line with Türkiye's obligations to the EU and other international commitments.
- i) The objective is to provide African governments technical assistance in the development and implementation of trade policy instruments that conform to global standards.
- j) To support African states in their aspirations to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In order to create favourable conditions, it is necessary to regularly organise introductory events such as fairs, displays, buyers' missions, and trade missions.
- k) To establish more Commercial Counsellor offices in African countries. The aim is to support Turkish technical consulting firms in structuring their operations in target nations and to promote the initiation of new projects in African countries via the provision of attractive terms for grants and loans.

The goal is to improve the functioning of Turkish banks in African countries. Türkiye's objective is to provide African countries technical assistance and educational support in areas where it has significant experience (Kizilarslan, 2011: 20-21). Turkey has decided to concentrate its foreign policy efforts on Cameroon, considering important factors such as the economic condition, political stability, foreign trade volume and nature, availability of natural resources, growth potential, strategic location, and regional integration initiatives. It is crucial to study African nations by categorising them into North African countries and Sub-Saharan countries. The Strategy initiated targeted study on countries in North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Soft power, in its commonly accepted definition, pertains to a diplomatic strategy that focuses on elements such as diplomacy, culture, dialogue, cooperation, mutual economic reliance, and historical comprehension. Turkish foreign policy has not completely ignored

the use of military force and still depends on maintaining a “balance” between military might and non-military influence. Nevertheless, the use of soft power approach has had a substantial impact on shaping Türkiye’s policy towards the Middle East and its adjacent areas (Davutoğlu, 2008).

Yeşiltaş and Balcı (2013: 11) reported that the number 86 was referenced. A trading state is a state that synchronises its foreign policy with its trade policy and formulates its foreign policy according to economic dynamics. Türkiye’s trading state idea entails the deliberate effort to enhance its economic ties with surrounding nations, hence stimulating bilateral commerce and promoting increased economic interdependence. The objective of this method is to augment the level of commerce and strengthen economic connections between countries. Ankara sought to expand its influence across the continent and progressively intensified its endeavours in soft power engagements. Türkiye’s augmentation of soft power in Africa, including humanitarian endeavours, religious and cultural diplomacy, scholarships, and business transactions, has established it as a prominent player in the region. Türkiye has shown a renewed inclination to take on a more prominent position in the military domain, as seen by recent occurrences. Previously, Türkiye’s involvement in Africa’s security landscape mostly included providing military instruction and deploying a small number of troops to United Nations peacekeeping missions. With the exception of Libya, Turkey has traditionally refrained from participating in military operations in Africa and has continuously steered clear of becoming involved in the continent’s conflicts (Tepeciklioğlu et al. 2022: 2).

Türkiye is now seeing the effects of its ability to influence others via non-coercive means on its diplomatic strategies. Governments use soft power to exert influence on other governments, with the aim of aligning their interests with their own. The legitimacy of a state’s authority is established by its capacity to use soft power, which is rooted in diplomacy, economy, culture, and identity as seen by external actors. Soft power relies on acquiring consent rather than using coercion (Keyman, 2010: 5). As of 2020, Türkiye’s foreign policy towards Africa has achieved substantial outcomes. The trade volume between Turkey and African nations has increased fourfold during the 2000s. throughout addition, the number of Turkish embassies throughout Africa has risen from 14 to 43. Moreover, Turkish institutions

today host over 200,000 foreign students, a significant portion of them are from Africa, and they are all recipients of government scholarships. These results stem from a change in the Turkish foreign policy frameworks and paradigms (Kalmoy, 2021: 2). These results, along with others, are clear indications of Türkiye's extension of foreign policy onto the African continent, coupled with a well-financed cultural diplomacy, which enhances Türkiye's importance.

Ankara's foreign policy towards Africa covers economic, political, social, and cultural components. The objective of the Türkiye-Africa framework is to enhance relations with Cameroon via formal governmental visits, commercial and trade collaboration, as well as the provision of humanitarian aid and educational assistance. Tekin (2012: 4) noted that in 2012, Turkish officials pledged their dedication to African states. They promised that if these countries supported Türkiye's candidature for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, Turkey would give priority to and highlight the challenges faced by the African continent in the international arena. Turkey effectively obtained the support of African states to become a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the years 2009 and 2010, due to the equal voting authority of African governments and their sway in the UN General Assembly. Turkish authorities have officially announced Türkiye's nomination for a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council for the duration of 2015 and 2016. They had expected to get substantial backing from African governments, but regrettably, their attempt was unsuccessful.

Turkish leaders have given high importance and actively supported African interests in global organisations, resulting in a substantial growth in Türkiye's involvement and impact on the African continent. In May 2011, Turkey hosted the Fourth United States Conference on the Least Developed States (LDC-IV) in Istanbul. The main objective of this conference was to give priority to the interests and aspirations of the least developed nations. Cultural diplomacy, usually referred to as public diplomacy, is a powerful instrument in the realm of international relations and politics. It functions via soft power strategies and has a substantial impact on altering diplomatic and geopolitical processes globally. The primary goal of this organisation is to awe and engage huge audiences and foreign individuals with the aim of promoting and endorsing a certain country. The purpose of this is to influence

public opinion and encourage conversations on the national interests involved in diplomatic accords. Schneider (2006: 191-192) defined cultural diplomacy as the utilisation of creative expressions and the exchange of ideas, information, and personalities to foster mutual understanding in diplomatic interactions. She claims that cultural diplomacy emerges at a time of upheaval. Governments demonstrate cultural diplomacy via the implementation of scholarship programmes and acts of humanitarianism.

Erdogan's visit in 2011, together with the introduction of scholarship schemes and the initiatives of NGOs like TIKA and DEIK, have formed a new diplomatic framework in Africa, including Cameroon. Cultural diplomacy refers to the deliberate and planned efforts made by governments to strategically promote and represent themselves in diplomatic encounters, with the ultimate goal of improving their image and reputation. In order to wield influence via soft power, Ankara substantially boosted its incentives and rewards throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia, including lucrative methods, cultural exhibitions, governmental tactics, and efficacious measures. The laudable efforts carried out by members of TADD, TUSIAD, TIM, DEIK, MUSIAD, Turkish Maarif Foundation, and other organisations have been included into the plans of Turkish Foreign Policy since 2010. These endeavours significantly helped to the expedited development of bilateral relations on favour of Turkey. It is crucial to note that Ankara's influence has markedly escalated as a result of the many actions and potent effect of these governmental institutions.

Tepeciklioğlu et al. (2022: 1) argue that Türkiye's involvement with Africa in 2021 has been very dynamic. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Angola, Nigeria, and Togo in October, during which he signed many cooperation agreements with these countries. The agreements included several sectors, including bilateral investments, hydrocarbon resources, mining activities, and renewable energy sources. Although this is not Erdoğan's first visit to Africa, he has undertaken more than 50 journeys to African cities throughout his tenure as both prime minister and president. Nevertheless, this specific journey has attracted substantial attention from the media. Türkiye's increasing influence in Africa via several diplomatic channels, together with talks on the sale of Turkish-manufactured unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), usually referred to as Turkish drones, added to the importance of the visit. These drones have become very popular in African

markets. Türkiye's revival in Africa and its commitment to reestablish a fair and balanced relationship with the continent after a long period of neglect. The historical interaction between Turkey and African states was characterised by a tumultuous pattern of substantial oscillations. The policy interest in Africa was driven by pressing foreign policy objectives, including the need to terminate Türkiye's international isolation and get diplomatic support from Africa. Turkey regularly sought the endorsement of African states in global forums, especially when its relationships with its usual allies, such as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), were tense.

In 2016, Turkish President Erdogan highlighted the need of expanding economic and commercial connections with African nations. He said that Turkey is a friend, compatriot, and partner of Africa, emphasising three primary factors that make Africa important: its youthful and vibrant population, plentiful natural resources, and enterprising mentality that has the potential to turn Africa into an economic hub. Amidst the period of globalisation, some nations have opted to rebrand themselves as a means to forge profitable diplomatic alliances. Ryan (2016: 29) contends that given the current state of global politics, participating in a cultural dialogue is the only feasible approach to get favourable outcomes. In Africa, the present diplomatic scenario has shown that soft power mechanisms, cultural diplomacy, and the alignment of geopolitical interests are the most effective tools for diplomatic strategy (Bodomo, 2009: 173; Ryan, 2016: 35-38). China, Turkey, and Russia have recently shown exceptional proficiency in executing these policies in Africa, solidifying their positions as influential geopolitical powers. The Turkish diplomatic strategy in Africa is a recent development that has largely replicated China's approach, leading to significant accomplishments (Habiyaremye and Oğuzlu, 2014: 83). In addition, Turkey does not have a documented history of colonising sub-Saharan Africa. However, it is worth noting that the cultural and religious connections of this may be traced back to the Ottoman Empire in the Red Sea and Eastern Coast of Africa. Türkiye's diplomatic ties are very advantageous in countries like Somalia, Chad, Libya, Niger, Sudan, and Mozambique. Cameroon has recently been a significant contributor.

Based on Mohamed's study (2020: 4), the diplomatic relations between Türkiye and these African nations have resulted in a substantial surge in Turkish investments in Africa.

Furthermore, the total value of bilateral commerce exceeded \$25 billion in the year 2015. These partnerships permitted the investigation of markets and employment prospects in African nations, so helping to the reduction of unemployment. Undoubtedly, the persistent issues in Africa persist due to the absence of peace and security, which are desperately required by the continent. Hence, the absence of peace and security in African nations would hinder their progress, irrespective of any assistance or agreements. Africa is divided into five distinct geographic regions: North, East, West, South, and Central Africa. Previous study and statistics constantly show that North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa are the main regions of the continent. This truth has been widely covered by Western media outlets and specific scholars. Due to their majority Muslim population and the substantial influence of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks have a profound comprehension of North Africa in terms of both religion and culture.

The concept of Northern Africa being a shared habitat with the broader Middle East promotes a sense of unity. As a result, North Africa has considerable significance in Ankara's considerations about foreign policy. However, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has recently been a focus of Türkiye's foreign policy discussions and initiatives on the continent, primarily due to the involvement of renowned thinkers. Meanwhile, the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region, which includes nations such as Cameroon, has been grappling with several challenges related to socio-cultural, economic, and political issues.

The phrase "Cameroon-Türkiye ties" denotes the diplomatic connections between Cameroon and Türkiye. The historical relationship between the two nations may be traced back to the 1960s, when Cameroon's former President Ahmadou Ahidjo was in power. At first, this relationship was tense because Ahidjo used the police and state security apparatus to eliminate political opponents. During the first years of Biya's administration in the 1980s, there was a significant enhancement in the bilateral ties between Cameroon and Turkey. Biya attempted to transform the country into a more democratic state and vigorously advocated for the values of freedom of speech and press. Currently, Turkey is offering assistance to Cameroon for the enhancement of schools and infrastructure initiatives. However, in 1984, there were conflicts between Yaounde and Ankara due to an attempted coup in Cameroon.

This coup was a result of the severe suppression of dissidents, mostly Muslims from the Northern region.

The current phase of Cameroon-Türkiye ties spans from early 2020 to late 2021. According to the Cameroon Tribune, on March 12, 2020, Adoum Gargoum, the Minister Delegate to the Ministry of External Relations responsible for Cooperation with the Islamic World, had a meeting with Ayse Sarac, the Turkish Ambassador to Cameroon. The conference aimed to discuss ways to strengthen the bilateral relationship between the two states. During her speech, she expressed her gratitude to the Minister for their kind and kind reception. Turkey and Cameroon have established a strategic relationship and actively collaborate in several cultural areas, both domestically and internationally. She said that they had a thorough discussion on how to enhance these collaborative collaborations. Ayse Sarac visited the Ministry of External Relations on January 28, 2020. While visiting, she extended an invitation for the Türkiye-Africa Summit and reaffirmed her country's commitment to supporting the peace building efforts in Cameroon. The process was initiated by the establishment of the Major National Dialogue, with the aim of addressing the problem in the English-speaking regions. Unfortunately, the dialogue was not fruitful due to unforeseen circumstances.

The diplomatic relations between Cameroon and Türkiye are amicable, characterised by mutual formal visits conducted by both Presidents to each other's countries. In March 2010, Abdullah Gul, the former President of Turkey, visited Cameroon, while in March 2013, Paul Biya, the President of Cameroon, visited Turkey. These journeys significantly enhanced and strengthened the camaraderie between the two countries. As a result of the strong and friendly relationship between the two countries, several collaboration agreements have been established in various sectors such as healthcare, education, security, and infrastructure. The Japoma stadium in Douala, located in the Littoral region, was primarily financed by the Türk Exim bank, which provided 75 percent of the overall cost of the project. Cameroon attended the Türkiye-Africa III and IV Business and Economic Forum as well as the Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit in Istanbul.

These events took place in October 2021 and December 2023, respectively, and were sponsored by the President of Turkey. Recep Tayyip Erdogan's involvement confirms the

mutually advantageous relationship between Turkey and Africa, highlighting the robust and ongoing friendship between the two countries. Cameroon's participation in the Franc Zone may have some limitations, however Paul Biya's economic strategy of Communal Liberalism has facilitated increased commercial engagement with countries such as Türkiye. The economic relations between Turkey and Cameroon have significantly improved in the last decade due to the adoption of a more globally-oriented market economy. The dedication of both nations to fostering mutual trust, promoting trade growth, and facilitating economic cooperation has resulted in the establishment of robust and advantageous business relationships between the two countries.

Nevertheless, the Cold War and its consequences unavoidably caused both governments to focus on their immediate surroundings rather than formulating foreign policy goals that included many continents. However, the disintegration of the Communist Bloc signified the conclusion of the Cold War period and presented fresh prospects and obstacles for enhancing state cooperation, rendering the ideological division insignificant. Türkiye's new economic strategy, which places a high importance on international commerce and collaborative business ventures, has fostered a favourable environment for enhancing its connections with longstanding allies such as Cameroon. Cameroon is the country with the highest population density in the CEMAC area. It also has the biggest economy and market in that economic zone on the continent. This exemplifies the strong connection between Cameroon and Türkiye.

According to Uchehara (2008: 53), Africa has been a primary area of interest for partnerships with international institutions and regional alliances like the European Union (EU). Turkey has been aggressively pursuing the improvement of commercial connections with African nations, specifically focusing on Cameroon. The reciprocal visits of top-level officials and the formation of collaborative economic alliances have strengthened the links between Türkiye and African nations, fostering trade and economic endeavours. It is worth mentioning that throughout the tenures of prime ministers Mesut Yilmaz, Tansu Ciller, and Bülent Ecevit, the diplomatic ties between Turkey and African nations remained hostile. The strengthening commercial connections between Cameroon and Türkiye may be attributed to a decade of strong and energetic involvement.

Dahir (2021: 2) said that Türkiye's expanding Africa strategy has had significant levels of involvement in the current year of 2021. Turkey has received visits from more than 10 African dignitaries and heads of state, including the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, the chairman of Sudan's Sovereign Council, and the chairwoman of the African Union Commission. In October, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Angola, Nigeria, and Togo. During his journey, he engaged in discussions with leaders from Burkina Faso and Liberia. In the same month, Istanbul, the main city in Turkey, held the 3rd Africa-Turkey Business and Economic Forum. The event garnered more than 2,000 attendees, including leaders from 45 African nations, regional economic groups, and business sector representatives from both sides. The Forum, in coordination with Erdoğan's recent trip to Africa, served as a platform for laying the groundwork for the 3rd Türkiye-Africa partnership. The cooperation is a prestigious event held in Istanbul, where African leaders and Turkish officials, together with representatives from regional economic organisations and international institutions, convene. Dahir (2021) said that detractors of Türkiye's increased involvement with Africa often claim that Ankara is actively pursuing an assertive neo-Ottoman agenda, generally characterised as 'anti-western' and "Pan-Islamism" throughout the African continent.

1.10 Conceptual Framework of Terms

1.10.1 Foreign policy (FP)

The examination of foreign policy within the field of international relations (IR) had its origins in the mid-1950s and early 1960s. Foreign Policy (FP) has evolved into Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), which has emerged as a prominent area of specialization for dedicated scholars in this expansive and diverse topic. Foreign policy is relevant to the study of international politics in two ways. The first pertains to the global political agenda after the events of 9/11 and the subsequent resurgence of interest in foreign policy itself. The second aspect pertains to a scholarly exchange between the bodies of knowledge on foreign policy and international relations (IR) (Smith et al., 2008: 2). Foreign policy is often shaped by internal conflicts related to subnational identities, and the state is not a unified entity. This has resulted in several conceptions of foreign policy (Kosebalaban, 2011: 17).

According to Walter Carlsnaes, foreign policy refers to the actions taken by government representatives on behalf of their sovereign communities. These actions are aimed at achieving specific goals, influencing conditions, and impacting both governmental and non-governmental actors that exist outside their territorial jurisdiction. (Carlsnaes, 2002: 335). Hill (2003: 3) argued that foreign policy refers to the collective official interactions carried out by an autonomous entity, often a nation-state, in the context of international relations. Hill (2003: 7) provided a definition of foreign policy as intentional actions taken to advance the interests of a certain political community or state. Hudson (2007: 12) defined foreign policy as the strategy or approach chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its relations with external entities and this includes decisions to do nothing. Kaarbo et al., (2002) defined foreign policy as the actions, strategies, and decisions directed at actors outside the borders of a domestic political system (i.e., a state). That the primary intended target of policy is external to the domestic sphere distinguishes foreign from domestic policy. In other words, as Breuning (2007: 5) puts it, foreign policy is “the totality of a country’s policies toward and interactions with the environment beyond its borders”. A state’s foreign policy covers a variety of issues ranging from the rather traditional security and economic areas to environmental and energy issues, foreign aid, migration, and human rights. The actors that initiate foreign policy actions, and those who are the targets of the actions, are often states but not always.

1.10.1.1 Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)

Uchegara (2008: 45) defines foreign policy analysis as the study of how different actors, especially governments, participate in and execute interactions within the global system. Foreign policy analysis involves the study and evaluation of diplomacy, intelligence, business agreements, and cultural relations. Foreign policy analysis primarily examines the distinction between the external environment outside the nation-state and the internal or domestic environment, which encompasses many sources of influence at the sub-national level. Foreign policy analysis (FPA) originated as a separate area of study within the subject of international relations. The main reason for this was because FPA first focused on the actual implementation of interactions between states and was motivated by a need to set standards.

Kesgin (2011) defined FPA as the comprehensive scholarly analysis of foreign policy, including several fields of study such as comparative foreign policy and foreign policy decision making. Hudson (2007: 14) posited that Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is a distinct subfield within the broader discipline of international relations. The primary aim is to elucidate foreign policy or the conduct of foreign policy by using the theoretical framework of individual and collective decision-makers. Sargent (2017) contends that foreign economic policy involves the facilitation and regulation of economic activities across distinct nations. Foreign policy analysis, as defined by Uchehara (2008: 48), is the study discipline that studies foreign policy. The primary emphasis of this field of study is the intentions and actions of states in relation to the international community, as well as the responses of other actors, mostly countries, to these actions.

1.10.2 Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC)

The Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) is comprised of six states: Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), Republic of the Congo, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea. The establishment occurred in the year 1999. Boasting a population of 37 million, this region covers an expansive surface area of around 3 million square kilometres. Aside from the larger Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), there exists the mostly inactive Economic Community of the Great Lake Countries (CEPGL). CEMAC is a regional community in Central Africa established to promote cooperation and facilitate the exchange of ideas and resources among its member nations. The primary goal of CEMAC is to promote coordinated economic development among its member countries within the framework of a single market.

The primary goals of this institution are to improve the competitiveness of economic and financial operations by establishing standardised standards to regulate them. - Coordinating economic policies and integrating budgetary measures with the shared monetary policy to ensure sustained economic and financial performance. - Creating a cohesive market that enables unrestricted mobility of people, commodities, finances, and services. - Coordinating national sector policies in several domains including agriculture, research, livestock, fisheries, industry, commerce, transport, telecommunications, energy,

environment, research, education, and professional training. This entails the execution of collaborative endeavours and the adoption of shared policies.

The primary responsibility of the CEMAC Commission is to compile the necessary documentation for the implementation of the international monitoring system. Reliable socio-economic data are crucial for evaluating national accomplishments and comparing local situations within the sub-region. The primary goal of the CEMAC Commission is to improve the quality and uniformity of statistics in member states, as well as broaden their scope (CEMAC, 2024). Cameroon, as a part of this regional economic bloc, wields substantial hegemonic influence owing to its large population, expansive markets, rich national resources, and other advantageous features. Therefore, Cameroon was chosen for this thesis instead of other countries.

1.11 Contribution of the Thesis to Current Scientific Knowledge

This thesis is notable for its unique organisation and is supported by a concise theoretical framework. This study examines the historical trends and underlying elements that shape Türkiye's foreign economic policy in Cameroon. This article examines the impacts, challenges, and potential outcomes of these relationships. Hence, the literature evaluation offers a systematic arrangement and timeline of events related to the development of the thesis, serving as the basis for the formation of alliances among these countries. This thesis makes a substantial contribution to the current scientific understanding by aiming to initiate new conversations in academic circles in Cameroon, Türkiye, and other places. This highlights the historical lack of attention and indifference towards the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region in academic studies on Ankara's foreign economic policy and diplomatic influence, specifically in relation to Cameroon.

Furthermore, there has been a lack of research on Turkish foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, namely in Cameroon, on the execution of Turkish soft power strategies. This thesis will make a significant scholarly contribution to the existing knowledge on the relationship between Turkish foreign policy and the economy. The study would primarily focus on analysing the connection between Türkiye and Cameroon as they strengthen and expand their bilateral ties.

In addition, those who are engaged in the study or profession of Turkish foreign policy and possess a specific inclination towards Africa may strategically enhance their expertise by delving into unexplored domains and doing comprehensive research via the examination of many case studies in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is particularly significant as Turkey expands its influence in this area.

1.12 Scope and Limitations of the Thesis

This thesis analyses Türkiye's economic interests in Cameroon within the context of its foreign economic policy approach. This study examines the causes, effects, challenges, and potential outcomes of this association. The project would include the timeframe from 2010 to 2022, which covers a duration of ten years. Nevertheless, materials that were widely used both before to and during this specific period were exhaustively employed.

The study mostly focuses on the geographical expanse of Cameroon. Additionally, it takes into account significant details on Türkiye's involvement in Africa, namely within the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), where Cameroon has a position of regional dominance.

The thesis case study analyses the economic aspects of Turkish foreign policy objectives in respect to Cameroon. A thorough analysis was carried out within this framework, commencing with the establishment of the Republic of Türkiye in 1923. This study included several historical epochs that precipitated a change in Türkiye's foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa. Furthermore, the present dynamics of these alterations were also considered. However, despite the difficulties involved in studying these processes that have occurred over almost a century, this literature review will provide a thorough analysis based on the core principles of Turkish foreign policy. The study will fill up the historical knowledge gaps, examine Türkiye's participation in international bodies, and provide a thorough evaluation of Turkish foreign policy towards Africa, specifically focusing on Cameroon.

A possible drawback in the thesis was the limited availability of scholarly literature on Cameroon and the absence of access to resources from different embassies, foreign ministries, and organisations that may have improved the scholarly rigour of this research. Furthermore, interviews served as a crucial means of data collection for the thesis, in conjunction with the materials that were examined. The interviews were not done due to

administrative impediments and a lack of information access, which hindered development. The participants for the thesis interviews were to be selected from a range of institutions, such as the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, TRT World, Daily Sabah (DS), Foreign and Economic Relations Board (DEIK), Anadolu Agency (AA), Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), Friends of All Africa Association (TADD), Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MÜSİAD), among others. The research sought to include the Ministry of External connections, TURCABA, the Embassy in Ankara, business individuals, and other pertinent organisations engaged in fostering connections with Turkey in Cameroon. To improve the quality of the work, we meticulously included up-to-date data from sources beyond 2022 to specifically address this problem. The purposeful obfuscation and lack of reaction from the government in providing information for interviews and material collecting have greatly hindered the progress of this argument. To surmount this impediment, the researcher chose to use 120 questionnaires as a method of addressing the problem. Moreover, because French is widely spoken and the majority of official documents are in French, the researcher enlisted the assistance of translators/interpreters when his proficiency in both French and Turkish, which is limited due to his Anglo-Saxon educational background, was inadequate. Ultimately, as a result of insufficient financial support, the researcher himself assumed the expenses for cash, travel, and energy, with aid from his sisters and friends.

1.13 Feasibility of the Thesis

The thesis was considered feasible because of the meticulous utilisation of scholarly and non-scholarly sources in English, French, and Turkish. This comprehensive approach significantly increased its practicality. In addition, the researcher effectively distributed 120 questionnaires to the relevant participants, thereby making up for the inability to conduct the intended interviews. However, the surveys had a substantial impact on this view. The researcher undertook many expeditions to Istanbul and Ankara, where the provision of housing was a fundamental need. Thankfully, my sisters played a crucial role in helping me get the required materials for my thesis. Ultimately, the jury members offered insightful, helpful, and evaluative input on this piece.

1.14 Organisation of the Thesis

The thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter of the thesis begins with a comprehensive introduction, followed by the problem statement, research questions, assumptions and hypotheses of the thesis, the purpose and significance of the thesis, the research methodology, the theoretical framework, the literature review, the thesis's contribution to existing scientific knowledge, the scope and limitations of the thesis, the feasibility, and finally, the organisation of the thesis. The second part of the thesis examines the historical genealogies of the relationship between Turkey and Africa. It clearly outlines the four distinct phases of this engagement with the African continent. The thesis explores the historical epochs of diplomatic connections between Cameroon and Turkey, scrutinises the many identities and orientations of Turkish Foreign Policy, assesses them with a critical lens, and concludes with a final section. Chapter 3 of the thesis analyses the factors that sparked Turkish interest in Cameroon, as well as the country's diplomatic and economic policies from Ahidjo to the economic consequences and challenges of Turkish-Cameroonian ties in Cameroon, which get primary focus in Chapter 4. Chapter five comprises a comprehensive examination of the data, results, recommendations for policy, and a final summary.

CHAPTER TWO

2 HISTORICAL GENEALOGIES OF TURKISH-AFRICA/CAMEROON RELATIONS

To have a deeper understanding and diverse range of relationships between nations, particularly with Africa, it is necessary to examine these connections throughout history. This section of the thesis focuses on the historical nature of the relationships between Turkey and Africa, namely Cameroon. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of this study. Tekin (2012: 1) asserts that African Studies in Turkey is a field of limited scientific papers, as shown by the works of Cannon & Donelli (2024), Donelli (2022), Eyice Tepeciklioğlu et al. (2024), and Neba (2019). Originally, the objective of his thesis was to concentrate on certain topics pertaining to the relationship between Africa and Türkiye. In his thesis, Tekin (2012) aimed to create a comprehensive database for African studies in Türkiye by examining the Türkiye-Africa interactions at a macro level. However, he encountered a lack of relevant data in this area. Therefore, the relationship between Cameroon and Turkey, which is crucial for this thesis in terms of economic relations, will not only contribute to but also initiate current discussions on Türkiye's involvement with this Sub-Saharan African (SSA) nation, drawing from the existing data on Turkey-Africa relations.

Burak (2021: 1), Cannon & Donelli (2024), and Donelli (2022) argue that Türkiye's foreign policy has seen significant transformations since its inception, influenced by both internal and external influences. In the field of International Relations (IR), foreign policy is often understood as the collective set of official interactions carried out by an autonomous entity, typically a nation-state, in the context of international relations (Hill, 2003: 3). The geographical location of Türkiye has a crucial role in influencing Turkish foreign policy (Ataman, 2023). Turkey is strategically located at the intersection of three crucial regions: the Balkans, the Caspian region, and the Middle East. According to Burak (2021: 2), Turkish foreign policy has significant value for both Europe and the United States. In contrast, Duina & Buxbaum (2008) argue that nations often prioritise their immediate interests above the collective regional advantages. Many nations see the losses of other states as advantageous

for themselves. According to the traditional realist view, international relations may be described as a state of constant rivalry and conflict (Laciner: 2016: 1).

Turkish involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has had a significant rise over the last 15 years, garnering more global attention and becoming a noteworthy subject of debate. Türkiye's recent significant efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are a consequence of its diversified foreign policy approach, which involves shifting its focus from primarily engaging with Western countries to actively engaging with countries in the Global South. This shift is driven by the evolving geopolitical landscape and changing alliances in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Additionally, Turkey aims to enhance its global presence and take on a more proactive and prominent role in international affairs. Türkiye's assertion of intent to challenge the present global order, namely regarding the reform of the UN Security Council (YÜCEL, 2022), is evident. The paper demonstrates Türkiye's mutually beneficial approach towards SSA, as outlined by Dahir (2018: 5). Fidan (2023: 17) said that Our African Partnership Policy exemplifies our multifaceted, entrepreneurial, and compassionate foreign policy. It is founded on a comprehensive, all-encompassing, equitable collaboration, and reciprocal regard. Turkey is actively supporting the African continent in dealing with major political, economic, social, and security concerns. These actions are exclusively founded on reciprocal advantages and in alignment with the notion of "African solutions to African problems." Turkey asserts that the continent should have a significant role in global decision-making, which is why we wholeheartedly backed the recent inclusion of the African Union in the G20 (Fidan, 2023).

According to Uchegara (2008: 44), discussing the connections between Turkey and African nations might be challenging. Türkiye's primary focus is in its connections with the European Union, Caucasus, Balkans, Middle East, United States, Southern Asia, Far East, and Pacific nations (Uchegara et al., 2008). In order to have a deeper understanding of Türkiye's present policy towards African nations and Cameroon, this part of the thesis examines the historical trends of Turkish involvement with Africa. The process begins by delineating these connections starting with the age of Ottoman empire's military might, extending through subsequent periods, and culminating in the current administration under the presidency of Recep Tayip Erdoğan. The chosen timeline explicitly presents Türkiye's

foreign policy towards Africa from the 16th century to 2022. This is based on the works of Altunışık (2023), Çelik-Wiltse (2023), Coşkun (2023), Dursun-Özkanca (2023), Ilgıt (2023), Müftüler-Baç (2023), “One Hundred Years of Turkish Foreign Policy (1923-2023)” (2023), Özkeçeci-Taner & Akgül Açıkmeşe (2023a, 2023b), and Uchehara et al. (2008). According to Okumus (2021: 63), Türkiye’s connections with Africa may be divided into three phases, taking into account diverse historical epochs, including the Ottoman experience. The Ottoman Empire, which ended in 1923, the era from 1923 to 1998, and the time after 1998. Nevertheless, this thesis has categorised these historical epochs into four distinct phases, as shown below, and examines the significant events that occurred throughout each time, beginning with the Ottoman Empire.

Ahmet Davutoglu, who previously served as senior foreign policy adviser to President Erdogan and then as Türkiye’s foreign minister since 2009, has effectively expressed the significance of history and geography as a valuable strategic resource (Petroni, 2023). In his book “Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu” (“Strategic Depth: Türkiye’s International Position”), Davutoglu posited that a nation’s strategic depth within the intricate network of global relations is contingent upon its adept utilisation of its geostrategic location as well as its historical and cultural heritage (Qantara.de, 2009). Turkey is strategically located at the intersection of the geopolitical and civilizational boundaries that connect the Eurasian continent with the Middle East and North Africa (Cannon & Donelli, 2024). According to Fidan (2023), the global order in the 21st century would be influenced by changes in this area, offering Türkiye a distinct chance to establish itself as a regional force. President Abdullah Gul and Erdogan have both emphasised this issue often (Davutoglu, 2008). Türkiye’s proximity to the continent makes its effect on Africa significant (Donelli, 2022). Turkey has actively pursued efforts to enhance its influence on the continent via visits, conferences, and discussions throughout Africa. Turkey, with a desire to have a more influential presence internationally, recognises significant possibilities and prospects for collaboration with Africa. As a result, Türkiye has implemented a specific Africa strategy since 2005, and during the last ten years, its influence on the continent has been increasingly prominent (Dahir, 2019). Since its engagement in 2011, Turkey has successfully executed several development projects in Somalia, surpassing previous efforts (Reuters) (Cagaptay et

al., 2022). The venue has successfully conducted three Africa summits, with the last one taking place from 16th to 18th December 2021 (Orakçi, 2022: 2-3).

2.1 The Different Historical Phases of Türkiye's Presence in Africa

2.1.1 The Ottoman period-1923

To provide a brief historical context for this thesis, we can examine the historical relationship between Turkey and Africa, specifically Cameroon. The Ottoman Empire's initial contact with the continent occurred in the 16th Century when Ottoman Sultan Yavuz Sultan Selim defeated the Memluks in 1517. This victory marked the Turks' presence on the continent and initiated various periods of Turkish involvement in Africa (Akkoyunlu, 2021; Ataman, 2023). According to Okumus (2021: 63), the significance of Africa in international and domestic affairs may be traced back to the existence of the Ottoman Empire on the African continent. During this time, since the Ottoman Empire had already expanded beyond its natural boundaries, it would be more appropriate to shift our attention towards sub-Saharan Africa. Relations with Cape Africa, Central, and Southern Africa were established, but not extensively (Brummett, 2012; Imber, 2002). The term "Afrika-yi Osmanli" refers to the Ottoman Empire's presence in Africa and its relationships with African countries outside its borders (Altunışık, 2023; Ilgıt, 2023; Uchehara et al., 2008).

According to Enwere and Yilmaz (2014: 2-3), the Ottoman empire had significant economic connections with Africa. These connections played a crucial role in facilitating the rapid growth of economic cooperation and commercial contacts between Africa and contemporary Turkey. In 1518, the Ottomans gained control of Egypt, which allowed them to establish a significant presence in the African economic system. They deliberately extended their economic influence farther into the interior of Africa. The Egyptian districts gained strategic and economic significance within the Ottoman Empire due to their sizable population, fertile agricultural lands, and trade connections with Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Additionally, the presence of a sublime port granted the Ottomans strategic dominance over the Nile valley and the East Mediterranean (Enwere, 2014). According to Orakçi (2022: 4), Türkiye's presence on the continent may be traced back to the 16th century, when the Ottomans first landed in North Africa. Subsequently, the Ottoman Empire's

dominion extended to include the coastlines of the Red and Mediterranean oceans, as well as the Sahel area. The Ottomans exerted their authority over Africa over a span of four hundred years, during which they built distinct governing bodies in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Eritrea. Nevertheless, in 1912, Ottoman soldiers withdrew from the continent, relinquishing control of its strongholds to European colonial powers (Alloul & Martykánová, 2021; Quataert, 2003). Although the academic community is wealthy, there is still a shortage of detailed study on the historical impact of the Ottomans on the continent. Furthermore, throughout the Republican period, Türkiye's attention switched towards the Western countries.

Tekin (2012: 1-2) argues that the Ottoman Empire had control over whole or partial territories of Muslim countries until 1918, with a specific emphasis on North Africa. The last Ottoman province to be surrendered was Trablusgarb, which was formally transferred in 1918. The Ottomans continually strived to protect the African continent from European colonialists as long as they had the potential to do so (Palabiyik, 2012; Tanvir Wasti, 2020). The partitioning of Africa was formally concluded in 1920 by European powers, resulting in the continent's isolation from the rest of the world until the era of decolonization. Türkiye's foreign policy during this time consistently adhered to the interests and alliances of Western nations, as dictated by the Cold War era. The Ottoman Empire initiated diplomatic ties with African sultans throughout the sixteenth century with their arrival in Egypt, situated in North Africa, in 1517 (Brummett, 2012). The Ottomans' influence and their relationship with the African sultans endured until the Turks withdrew from Tripoli in 1917 with the downfall of their empire at the end of World War I (Dursun-Özkanca, 2023). In addition, the Ottomans effectively established diplomatic relations with the rulers of those countries, including political, economic, social, and religious dimensions. This claim is supported by a substantial number of Turkish assets that remain in North African countries (Mohamed, 2020: 7). The Ottoman Empire had a strong economic relationship with Egypt via a proactive trading policy, which allowed them to tap into the economies of many African nations, namely those in North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa (Palabiyik, 2012).

The Ottoman Empire engaged in commerce with the nations of Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria in the North African area (Altunışık, 2023). The Ottomans had a significant

economic impact on sub-Saharan Africa due to their favourable geographical position (Uchehara et al., 2008). The Ottomans had established commercial ties with nations like Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia. The Ottomans established commercial links and formed a strategic alliance with the Kanem Bornu Empire, including the present-day regions of Northern Nigeria, Niger, and Chad, in the northern sub-Saharan region (Cagaptay et al., 2022; Turhan, 2021). The Kanem Bornu region obtained military equipment via imports from the Ottoman Empire, while also exporting valuable solid minerals (Hazar, 2000:109-110). The Turks engaged in a protracted struggle to maintain their presence in Africa, which lasted from the 9th century until the early 20th century. Turkish troops made their first arrival in Africa as Muslim forces transitioning from Iraq and Syria to Egypt. Subsequently, the Turks took control of the governance of Egypt and founded the Tulunoğulları State (868-905).

The İhşidiler dynasty, which ruled from 935 until 969, was the second Turkish dynasty to be formed in Egypt. Throughout the Fatimiler period (909-1171), the Turks maintained their position as a formidable military presence within the Fatimi army. Between 1171 until 1250, the Turks provided assistance to the Selahaddin Eyyubi dynasty. The Eyyubi State expanded its jurisdiction from many regions in North Africa to Yemen. Throughout history, troops originating from the Caucasian and Transoxiana regions, often known as “Memlük,” progressively gained power over the Eyyubi State and founded the Memlüklüler State, which lasted from 1250 until 1517. The Memluks exerted their control over the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Yemen, and expanded their authority as far as the border of Transoxiana during a span of more than three centuries. The Ottoman Empire, led by Sultan Yavuz Sultan Selim, swiftly conquered the Memluks and thereafter gained control of North Africa, Yemen, and East Africa (Cannon & Donelli, 2024; Dahir, 2019; Donelli, 2022; Eyice Tepeciklioğlu et al., 2024; Neba, 2019). In 1517, the Ottoman Empire gained control of Egypt, followed by Algeria in 1520, Tunisia in 1534, and Tripoli in 1551. Although the Ottomans gained control of Morocco in 1554, they could not sustain their influence in the region and never expanded their authority beyond eastern Algeria. The Ottoman Empire developed an interest in Northern Africa as a result of two primary considerations. Initially, the disintegration of the Andalus Empire in Spain resulted in the emigration of Muslims from Spain to North Africa,

and reports of this reached Istanbul. In addition, the Crusaders began the occupation of the Southern Coasts of the Mediterranean, a development that also captured the interest of the Ottomans (Kavas, 2006 as quoted in Tekin, 2012: 12).

The Ottoman Empire had significant territorial expansion from Morocco to Somalia during the sixteenth and twentieth centuries, including the present-day territories of 13 states (Uluişik Arabacı, 2022). Given the vast expanse of the region, it was impractical to administer it directly from Istanbul. As a result, the Turkish nobles, who received the Sultan's mandates, established strong provincial administrative systems and functioned as relatively independent entities. The Karamanlı period in Tripoli, the Hüseyinler period in Tunisia, and the Kavalalı and Hidivs period in Egypt might be seen as times where semi-independent administrations had more favoured positions (Hume, 1980; Pennell, 1989). During the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire was divided into 32 provinces based on geographical boundaries. Out of these provinces, four were located in Africa, namely Egypt, Tripoli, Tunisia, and Algeria, where Arab residents lived (Brummett, 2012; Kritoboulos & Riggs, 1970; Quataert, 2003). In the same century, the Ottoman Empire established the Abyssinia province in the East Africa region, namely in what is now recognised as Ethiopia. During the same century, the Ottoman Empire exerted influence over the bulk of the Muslim people in Africa.

These territories, including Sudan, Ghana, Mali, Kanim Bornu, Songay, Timbuktu, Cano, Darphur, Vaday, Hara, and Zengibar sultanates, were situated in the southern parts of the Great Sahara Desert (Altunışık, 2023; Coşkun, 2023; Ergun, 2023; Özkeçeci-Taner & Akgül Açıkmeşe, 2023b). The Ottoman Sultan was recognised as the Caliphate in these regions, and sermons in mosques were delivered on behalf of the Caliphate. The Zengibar sultanate, which governed Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, and the eastern coast of Africa including Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Malawi, and Madagascar, dutifully fulfilled their responsibilities to the Ottoman Caliph, as did the Muslim population living in South Africa. This situation endured for over four centuries until the start of the twentieth century. Ottoman governors in Africa autonomously used their own resources to cultivate their domain, without any fiscal backing from the capital (Kavas, 2006 as cited in Tekin, 2012: 12-13).

The historical connection between Türkiye and Africa has profound origins (Cannon & Donelli, 2024; Donelli, 2022). Their social and cultural ties predate the formation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and may be traced back to its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire (Dahir, 2019). At its peak, the empire included vast territories throughout North Africa. The Ottomans started their presence in Sudan during the late nineteenth century via their association with the Mamluk dynasty in Egypt, although belatedly (Reid, 2022). It has already spread to many parts of West Africa in the western direction. Even in cases where it did not have a physical military or bureaucratic presence, it nonetheless managed to establish diplomatic and political ties, as shown by its association with the Sultanate of Zanzibar (Enwere, 2014). The Ottoman Empire, often referred to as Kânum Bornu or The Sultanate, has the distinction of being the oldest and most enduring governing authority in central Africa, with a history spanning almost a millennium (Uchehara: 1999). Formerly, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Ethiopia were regions that were part of the Ottoman Empire. However, they were divided and separated when they were sent to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy (Hess, 1973: 55).

Orhonlu (1996), as cited by Tekin (2012: 13), states that the Ottoman geographers identified Abyssinia as the region situated between Sevvakin and Babul Mendeb. In fact, it spanned from Egypt to Mombasa. In 1525, the Ottoman fleet seized control of these beaches by destroying the Portuguese strongholds. Furthermore, they accomplished a noteworthy achievement by skillfully traversing Babul Mendeb and ultimately reaching the Indian Ocean. Due to Abyssinia's possession of coasts on both the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, it had considerable significance as a central point for trade in the eastern area (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024e). The Ottoman Empire's interest in East Africa was driven by two main objectives: firstly, to establish trade routes on both land and along the East African coast, and secondly, to engage in profitable activities such as slave trade and the trading of precious metals and gold, which had attracted Portuguese seafarers. Moreover, the Ottomans aimed to protect the Red Sea from Portuguese intervention in order to prevent them from accessing the Kaaba (Ferguson, 2019; Montana, 2023). The Portuguese's attempts to establish trade centres along the Red Sea were thwarted by the resistance from the Ottoman

Empire. The Abyssinia Province of the Ottoman Empire was established in 1555 and lasted until 1560 (Erdem, 1996).

It may be argued that the Ottomans were driven to establish stronger connections with some regions in Africa because of the presence of a Muslim population and the discovery of substantial gold and diamond resources in certain African nations (Barkey, 2005). Some scholars have proposed that the expansion of the Ottoman empire in the 14th century had an indirect impact on the exploration of southern Africa and the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope (Chirot, 2001). Based on the aforementioned study, it can be deduced that diplomatic relations between Türkiye and African nations were formed many centuries ago, namely in the 16th century (Spies, 2019). Multiple African nations were under the dominion of the Ottoman Empire. A comprehensive evaluation indicates that the Ottoman Empire had more robust and intimate connections with Sub-Saharan Africa (Martin, 2022). The previously existing historical, cultural, economic, administrative, and military links between the Turks and Sub-Saharan Africa have ultimately vanished. Without a doubt, the end of this partnership may be attributed to a shift in political leadership and personal characteristics on both sides. Nevertheless, Turkey has actively endeavoured to reestablish its historical connections with Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years (Uchehara, 2008: 51).

According to Çaycı (1995: 3), the Ottoman Empire was self-assured in its capacity to safeguard its North African provinces, known as Garp Ocakları, without relying on European armies for help. As a result, it allowed these provinces to maintain their independence. Regrettably, the Ottoman Empire's annexation of Algeria resulted in a shift in their position towards Garp Ocakları. The African regions of the Ottoman Empire saw a gradual decline and were gradually deserted throughout the early 19th century. France started military campaigns in Algeria in 1830 and invaded Tunisia in 1881. In 1882, England launched a military attack on Egypt and Sudan. During the early 1900s, England, France, Belgium, Spain, Germany, and Italy established colonies over the whole continent, including Biladu's Sudan and Abyssinia province. Özkan (2010: 4) had a unique perspective on the matter. Türkiye's relations with Africa may be divided into three main eras. The first phase covers the Ottoman state's dealings with Africa until the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923. During this time, the Ottomans had significant connections with Africa. The Ottoman Empire

exerted dominion over Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria, either wholly or partly, within the North African region. Sub-Saharan African states such as Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Niger, and Chad experienced partial subjugation under the authority of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans sent both religious officials and diplomats to the area (de Carvalho & Swanepoel, 2023).

During its four-century presence on the continent, the Ottoman Empire avoided forcefully forcing its own culture on the inhabitants in a violent and imperialistic manner. As a result, the Turkish language is primarily used in only a small number of localities throughout the former provinces, such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli. One of these groups is the Kuloğlu branch, which has ancestral ties to the Ottoman Empire. French is now the official language of 25 African states, but English is widely used in several more countries. However, in several former colonies of Portugal and Spain, the official languages are the languages spoken in those nations. Each country exclusively recognises its indigenous languages as national languages, strictly prohibiting the teaching or use of any other languages. Despite the ability of even the tiniest tribe to preserve its own cultural traditions under the Ottoman Empire, African people were deliberately denied the fundamental chance to develop reading skills in their native language (Kavas, 2006). The time span from 1923 to the 1990s, including both the period before and after the Cold War, is designated as 2.1.2.

Currently, I want to depict the significant historical connections between Türkiye and the African continent, commencing with the establishment of the Turkish state after the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, and continuing into the post-Cold War era. Tekin (2012: 14) contends that the time span from 1923 to 1998 may be regarded as the second stage, characterised by little or non-existent contacts between Turkey and Africa. The foreign policy of the newly formed Republic was influenced by the Kemalist legacy, which emphasised “non-intervention, a Western orientation, and careful protection of national independence.” Prior to the early indications of the Second World War, Turkish foreign policy aimed to achieve several important objectives, including maintaining neutrality by avoiding conflicts, aligning with Europe and the West, and safeguarding its territorial integrity. Turkey started its attention towards Africa during the Cold War era, establishing commercial and political ties with countries in North Africa. Nevertheless, these linkages were influenced by the

circumstances of the Cold War's bipolar nature, and as a result, often conflicted with the prevailing popular opinion towards the continent.

Akçay (2012: 89) said that Özal's foreign policy connections included the all-encompassing aspect of globalisation, with a special emphasis on the economic dimensions of production and consumption. The Özal policy towards Africa exhibited both a structuralist and opportunist approach, with a focus on the economics as the central aspect in its foreign political engagements with developing countries. During the Özal's administration, the first occurrence of foreign aid was sent to the continent of Africa. Turkey used a pragmatic economic diplomacy approach, which led to a rise in aid to Africa. In 1985, Turkey sent food aid to Sub-Saharan Africa as a reaction to a severe drought situation in the region. This help was delivered as part of the United Nations plan. The assistance provided was valued at USD 10 million. Okumus (2021: 640), citing Ogurlu (2018: 66), states that the second era begins with the formation of the Republic and may be described as a period when the level of connections with Africa was at its minimum. The "New Republic" adopted a restrained approach to foreign policy in its first years, with the state's capacities and economic conditions playing a crucial role in executing this plan.

During this period, engagements with the African continent were limited in their extent. Relations with the nations in the northern half of the continent were stronger due to a common history and religion. The interactions with African states during this period were shaped by the conditions of the Cold War. From the wake of World War II until the early 1960s, the independence movements in Africa endured, reaching its culmination with the eventual independence of the whole continent. Türkiye was embroiled in a cold war standoff with Western countries, which is why the movements in Africa did not get support from Türkiye. For instance, Algeria, a country that had one of the most intense struggles for its independence, did not get support from Turkey. Instead of supplying Algeria with arms and ammunition, Turkey provides them with assistance. Furthermore, it exercised its right to vote in the United Nations Resolution on the self-determination of Algeria. After Algeria gained independence in 1962, Turkey quickly established its embassy in 1963 to establish diplomatic relations with Algeria.

Furthermore, Turkey has opened its diplomatic missions in cities located in sub-Saharan Africa, such as Ghana. Nigeria is a sovereign nation. We want to establish bilateral relations with Senegal, Kenya, Egypt, and Morocco. Turkey temporarily closed some of its embassies in Africa, namely in the sub-Saharan region, as a result of political, economic, and other considerations. Nevertheless, these embassies were later reinstated throughout the late 2000s (Mohamed, 2020: 21). In addition, Ankara has formally recognised the recently formed state of South Sudan, which achieved independence on July 9, 2011. Ankara also plans to recognise other rising nations in Africa, including the former British Southern Cameroons, also referred to as Ambazonia. The area is now involved in an armed war with the primarily French-controlled government of Cameroon. Ankara's recognition of these nations is grounded in international law and the idea of recognising states in a timely manner.

Sönmezoğlu (2006: 192-193) said that African states have a significant influence on the ratification process in the UN General Assembly, in addition to their economic and commercial connections. The Non-Alignment Movement was founded with the objective of promoting cooperation among nations in the Global South while maintaining a distance from the power dynamics of the Cold War alliances. Presently, every African country is a member of the Non-Alignment Movement. In 1945, the South African Union, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Liberia were the only African states to participate in the San Francisco Conference, when they obtained the title of being founding members of the United Nations. By 1960, the United States had admitted 20 African states as members, and this number had risen to 35 by 1964. African countries, after their independence, used the United countries General Assembly as a platform to promote the elimination of apartheid and discuss issues pertaining to their own self-determination.

The Colombo Conference, coordinated by a consortium of five countries, sent invitations to 25 African and Asian nations, including delegates from both the Asian and African continents. The first arrangements for the summit were successfully completed, and it was decided to hold it on 18 April 1955 in Bandung. Turkey first participated in the non-alignment movement at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the Turkish foreign minister, was present at the conference and advised the participating states to align themselves with the Western alliances and maintain unwavering support. Furthermore, Zorlu

vehemently and publicly objected to the non-alignment policy, expressing his discontent with the notion that Turkey was serving as a representative and advocate for the Western countries. The conclusions reached at the end of the conference showcased the victory of the anti-Western non-alignment group in implementing its ideas. The meeting in question laid the foundation for the future conference, which occurred in Berlin in 1961. The Berlin Conference enabled the formation of the Non-Alignment Movement. Archbishop Makarios attended the convention as a delegate from Cyprus and argued for receiving support for their uprising against the British. Cyprus was granted inclusion at the Berlin Conference, enabling the Cypriot Greeks to enhance their standing within the Non-Alignment Movement and get backing from the UN General Assembly for Cyprus-related issues (Tekin, 2012: 15-16).

According to Sönmezoğlu (2006: 174-176), the second Non-Alignment Movement Conference occurred in Cairo in 1964 and had the attendance of 47 states. Türkiye had chosen to send two Turkish diplomats as observers to the Conference in preparation for the upcoming deliberation on the Cyprus issue before the UN General Assembly. Despite the rejection of Türkiye's proposal by the organisers, Makarios successfully convinced the participating states to endorse the case of the Greek Cypriots. Consequently, a phrase in the declaration of the Conference on the Cyprus crisis endorsed Makarios' argument. Roughly half of the non-Alignment members consisted of states from Africa. The third Conference occurred in Lusaka in 1970, and was followed by another one in Algeria in 1973. Although Makarios strongly advocated for a statement at the closing declarations of the Conferences, he had challenges in gaining support at the Colombo Conference in 1976 since the Greek Cypriots government had already been recognised as the legitimate representative of Cyprus in 1974. Turkey failed to prevent the inclusion of negative statements on the Cyprus issues in the final declarations of the Colombo Conference in 1976 and the Havana Conference in 1979. Sander (2000: 288-289) argues that in 1964, the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) consisted of 60 member countries, representing half of the total number of sovereign governments globally.

This achievement was reached during the third Non-Alignment Conference, consolidating the ideology of non-alignment. By 1986, when the number of countries reached 101, they accounted for 60% of the world's independent states. At the end of the Cold War,

the growth of the movement had stopped. Nevertheless, the ideas of “non-alignment” and “neutrality” were extensively embraced as the diplomatic ideology throughout Asia and Africa. Fırat (2010: 170-175) claims that in 1965, Ankara sent three goodwill teams consisting of politicians, diplomats, journalists, and academics to several African states. The objective was to convince these governments to support Türkiye’s stance on the Cyprus issue before the UN General Assembly. The original group carried out trips to Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Senegal. The second committee conducted visits to Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, Central African Republic, and Chad. Finally, the third committee travelled to Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Malawi, Madagascar, Sudan, Libya, and Tunisia. Although Foreign Minister Hasan Esat Işık claimed that Türkiye’s efforts were aimed at resolving the Cyprus problem and establishing strong ties with Africa, it became clear that Turkey failed to gain support from African nations in the UN General Assembly and did not succeed in expanding its influence in Africa.

Özal’s president saw the effective execution of the economic reforms that he had undertaken while serving as prime minister. By the late 1980s, the Turkish economy had undergone significant changes, becoming more vibrant, focused on exporting, and deeply integrated into the global economy. Özal quickly saw that many bordering nations of Turkey has the potential to become lucrative markets for Turkish exports. Furthermore, he comprehended that enhancing political alliances would be the rational first step in establishing a profitable business collaboration. Özal exhibited his commitment to promoting Türkiye’s economic interests by accompanying a significant contingent of entrepreneurs throughout his overseas trips, so underscoring the significance of Türkiye’s regional connections (Danforth, 2008: 7). The post-Cold War era ushered in substantial changes for all actors in the global system, and Turkey was no exception. Türkiye’s principal foreign policy direction throughout the time after the Cold War continued to prioritise the United States and NATO. Turkey saw substantial transformations in both domestic politics and foreign policy dynamics throughout the 1990s.

Similar to the leadership of Reagan in the United States and Thatcher in Britain, the Turgut Özal period in Turkey established the foundation for the emergence of neoliberal policies. In the 1990s, Turkey adopted a foreign policy approach that included actively

pursuing diplomatic partnerships with other countries. Türkiye's relationship with Europe was undergoing substantial changes. In 1987, Turkey formally applied for full membership in the European Community. During the Helsinki summit in 1999, the European Union formally acknowledged Türkiye as a candidate for membership (Burak, 2021: 5).

Turkey and African nations have established official diplomatic ties at both the consulate and embassy levels. Turkey officially recognised and established diplomatic relations with all the newly sovereign African states in the 1960s, and it still acknowledges and maintains diplomatic relations with successive African governments. Turkey now has 43 representative offices in several African countries, operating as embassies, as well as honorary consulates. Turkey was granted the status of "observer" in the African Union on April 12, 2005. To showcase the robustness of these alliances, Nigeria, Tunisia, South Africa, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Ethiopia, Senegal, Sudan, Libya, and other African countries all eagerly created their own embassies to advance their own interests and strengthen their links. Mohamed (2020: 16) asserts that Türkiye's foreign policy, spanning from the inception of the Republic to the present, may be seen as a seamless extension of the foreign policy followed in the latter years of the Ottoman Empire. After the Ottoman Empire was dissolved, the Republic of Türkiye established and deliberately isolated itself from Islamic, Arab, African, and other nationalities. Türkiye's main emphasis was solely on the western orientation, namely towards Europe. Since the 1950s, especially after the 1960s and 1980s, and particularly after the 1970s with Erbakan and the 1980s with Turgut Özal, there has been a notable change in aligning Türkiye with its geographical location. Nevertheless, the most prominent trend became evident after the AKP took government in 2002. This trend was rather characteristic, considering that Turkey had a significant and enduring impact on the region, especially during the era of the Ottoman Empire. From the thirteenth century onwards, the Ottomans exerted a substantial influence throughout the Mediterranean region.

After the Cold War, Türkiye's foreign policy focused mostly on the newly formed Turkic republics in Central Asia. However, the internal political structure, the existence of coalition governments with several parties, economic crises, and military intervention in Turkey led to a decline in its attractiveness and impact on the Central Asian republics. Since 2002, Turkey has had political stability as a result of a government controlled by a single

political party. The stability has resulted in substantial domestic and global policy reforms in the nation. After this change, Africa became an important centre of attention for Turkish foreign policy (Tekin, 2012: 2). On April 12, 2005, the African Union bestowed to Turkey the status of a “observer”. Uchehara (2008: 52) states that African countries have 10 representative offices in Turkey, which function as embassies and honorary consulates general. The mentioned embassies include the diplomatic missions of Nigeria, Tunisia, South Africa, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Ethiopia, Senegal, Sudan, and Libya. Recently, Turkey has been making strides in reestablishing its ties with African states, with significant diplomatic visits taking place between Turkey and several African countries.

After the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy was based on many crucial factors, such as political and diplomatic features, which serve as the basis for the current political relations between Africa and Turkey. This component of relationships has had a gradual improvement, especially since the mid-2000s. Specifically, with Türkiye’s declaration of the “Year of Africa” “in 2005, two cooperation summits between Türkiye and Africa were held in 2008 and 2014. This reveals a common real desire to develop interrelations in the political sphere, as well as a kind of positive mutual understanding between the two sides (Mohamed, 2020: 19). However, Türkiye during the decolonisation process in Africa, Türkiye tried to rekindle the flame of itself-power by recognising the sovereignty of all newly independent countries through the establishment of a resident embassies in number of them. The strategic objective of this soft power approach was to present itself to Africa as defender of national sovereignty and a vanguard against imperialism, so as to secure a penetrative linkage to participate in the allocation of economic values in Africa. But this form of Türkiye’s soft power outcomes was cowed by the superior soft power of China and America which had become a source of attraction, driving the economy of Africa because of their increasing roles as global superpowers that seem appealing to Africa states. This hegemonic influence of America and China’s soft power brought about a strategic reduction of Türkiye’s soft power (Enwere and Yilmaz, 2014: 13).

It is necessary to see the root cause of Turkish approach towards the Middle East and African countries in 60s and 70s as a maneuver to balance its relative isolation in the Western axis and to prove its relative “value” to the West. However, this strategy did not adequately

work, and Türkiye could not receive the support it expected from countries from the Middle East and Africa. Therefore, Africa would not be in the Turkish agenda for a long period of time until the late 1990s due to the debilitating instability in Türkiye's political and economic spheres. Through the new multi-dimensional foreign policy vision launched by then minister of foreign affairs, İsmail Cem in 1998, Africa was included in the radar of Turkish foreign policy once again (Mehmet and Birol, 2010: 533). Still on the same lane, Afacan (2013: 48) purported that Cem spearheaded the "Africa Action Plan" that could be considered as a new road map for the political, commercial and cultural cooperation between Türkiye and African countries. Some of the proposals of the plan like opening of new embassies, and improving political and commercial contacts later formed the basis of the "Year of Africa" policies to be launched by the AKP government in 2005.

The "Opening Africa" policy, also known as the Action Plan for Africa, was introduced by Turkish foreign policy makers in 1998. Initially, efforts to establish political, economic, and social ties with African countries were in their early stages. However, the actual implementation of this plan began in 2002 with the rise of the AK Party. Turkey leveraged its religious, cultural, and historical connections, rooted in its Ottoman history, to strengthen its relationship with African countries and position itself as a regional power and global actor. Despite some initial slow progress, Türkiye's strategic importance to the African continent has resulted in increased engagement with its people. Therefore, it is essential to analyse Türkiye's Opening Africa policy within the framework of the thesis "An Appraisal of the Economic Effects of Turkish Foreign Policy in Cameroon 2010-2022".

Joseph S. Nye, the originator of the notion of soft power, provided the following definition: soft power refers to the ability to persuade others to share your desired objectives. Put simply, it is influencing people to reach a desired outcome without coercing them. Soft power relies on the ability to exert influence and shape outcomes through means such as diplomacy, the dissemination of ideas, economic aid, the promotion of democracy, and cultural exchange. It is a form of power that enables states to persuade other countries to align with their objectives by leveraging their political values and cultural identity, rather than relying on coercive measures like military force, threats, or economic sanctions. While Turkey promptly acknowledged the newly sovereign African nations during the

decolonization period in the late 1950s, it failed to effectively or actively enhance its ties with the continent. During the Cold War, Turkey placed a high importance on its alliance with the Western countries, particularly the United States. It made a strong commitment to the political and security institutions of the West in order to ensure its own existence. This decision was possibly the most significant strategic proposal made by Turkish policy makers in the history of the country. Consequently, the importance of links with other areas, such as Africa, was seen to be of lesser significance and so, to some degree, unimportant. Nevertheless, the Cyprus conflict that arose in the 1960s and 1970s compelled Turkey to undertake new endeavours and prompted Turkey to cultivate fresh alliances, particularly in the Middle East and Africa (Afacan, 2013: 47-48).

Mohamed (2020: 20) analyses the slow progress of Türkiye in establishing connections with Africa, highlighting the importance of establishing solid diplomatic and political contacts. These interactions are influenced by a system of political objectives and interests that both sides maintain towards each other. For Turkey to effectively advance its political objectives on the global stage, particularly within the United Nations, it is crucial for Turkey to develop strong diplomatic relationships with African nations. Africa, as a whole, requires Türkiye's assistance in addressing and resolving its numerous challenges and concerns within the global community. This is because Türkiye holds a prominent position in both the international and regional arenas, specifically as a significant regional power in the Middle East. Since the AKP took control in 2002, Turkey has been actively seeking alternative political connections outside of the European Union, which has rejected Türkiye's entry since 1997. After the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, Turkey began to view Africa from a new perspective. Therefore, it is crucial for all African nations to adopt a policy of non-discrimination, as the previous focus was mainly on the Northern and Southern regions. Turkey has acknowledged the importance of establishing strategic relationships with all African nations based on shared interests. Consequently, Africa has been a major priority in Turkish foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.

2.1.2 Pre-and Post-Cold War Era (1923-1990s)

2.1.3 The new millennium 2000

Ankara initiated strategic efforts to establish closer ties with the African continent, specifically focusing on Cameroon, when the new century started in 2000. After these countries were liberated, Türkiye emancipated itself from its complex connections with the Western world and returned to its original geographical location. Turkey and Africa have several prospects to establish partnerships at various levels. After gaining independence, Türkiye expanded its influence in Africa and has been acknowledged as a strategic ally of the African Union since 2008. The resurgence of Türkiye's strategic influence has resulted in the formation of key goals. At that time, there was a condition of political seclusion, economic bankruptcy, substantial external debts, reliance on Western nations, and general susceptibility. According to Mohamed (2020: 17), Türkiye's main emphasis was on domestic matters.

The post-Africa Initiative Plan of 1998, referred to by Okumus (2021: 64) as the third stage, covers the period after 1998. Furthermore, he said that Türkiye's efforts to execute the Africa Initiative Plan, which was first announced in 1998, have been impeded by the country's constrained resources and economic conditions, hence limiting its capacity to fulfil the requirements of this initiative. Since assuming power in 2002, the AK party has implemented a comprehensive and substantial shift in foreign policy, resulting in the development and expansion of diplomatic relations with African countries. After Türkiye became an observer member of the African Union in 2005, there was a notable rise in Türkiye's involvement with Africa. In the same year, Turkey officially proclaimed it as the Year of Africa. In 2008, the African Union upgraded the observer status to that of a strategic partner, and the Türkiye-Africa Cooperation Summit occurred in Istanbul. In the 2000s, there was an emphasis on enacting comprehensive policies that tackled several aspects. Africa had a crucial influence in the establishment and advancement of bilateral relations. The African Initiative Policy in Turkish foreign policy was discontinued in 2013 and replaced by the African Partnership Policy.

2.1.3.1 The 2005 “year of Africa”: trade and politics

The AKP came into power in late 2002 after the November elections, during which several prominent political personalities were ousted from their positions as a result of the profound economic crisis that had significantly affected the nation. The political calculus of Turkey. On the other hand, the AKP faced a scenario where the credibility of its past association with Islamism was being questioned. Thus, while it achieved power alone, breaking the long-standing trend of coalition governments, its political legitimacy was dubious among secular factions. Moreover, during their first two years in power, the party encountered substantial and pressing obstacles in the field of international relations, such as the 2003 Iraqi War, the Cyprus dispute, and relations with the European Union. As a result, Africa did not get significant attention or importance on the foreign policy agenda until 2005 (ibid).

Although Türkiye initiated the “Development of Economic Relations Strategy with African Countries” in 2003, substantial advancements were not made until 2005. By 2005, the AKP government had successfully built and enhanced its reputation to a certain degree, both inside the country and on the global stage. Consequently, it took advantage of the opportunity to tackle issues that were deemed less significant on the government’s list of priorities, such as the African opening. In contrast to the Iraq war or the Cyprus dilemma, the African openness lacks the capacity to engender ideological differences inside the nation. Nevertheless, the fact remains that prioritising the improvement of political, cultural, and economic relations with Africa was not done. On the contrary, it was explicitly designed as a “secondary” tool to support other central foreign policy initiatives, such as the zero-problems with neighbours and multidimensional foreign policy. Likewise, the trading opportunities in Africa served as substantial catalysts for economic growth for conservative corporate networks referred to be “Anatolian Tigers”. The AKP relied on these networks as the fundamental basis of conservative support (Afacan, 2013: 49-50).

The website of the banned non-governmental organisation (NGO), African Opening, has importance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), who are considered the driving force behind economic growth. Conservative business organisations like the

Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (MÜSİAD) and Turkish Confederation of Businessmen have significant prominence.

Industrialists achieved notable progress, especially in the domain of exports to Africa. These two groups often include of small and medium-sized industrial and manufacturing enterprises. The listed firms' enthusiasm and drive to develop in Africa is clear, despite the perception of higher risk and unfamiliarity associated with doing business in Africa compared to well-established markets such as Europe and the U.S., particularly in Turkey. For instance, the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that have been prohibited have organised a total of seven conferences titled "Türkiye-Africa Foreign Trade Bridge" starting from 2005. The eighth matchmaking trade conference had the participation of 350 entrepreneurs from 54 African countries. During the event, a total of 10,000 bilateral business interviews were performed.

Consequently, their efforts laid the groundwork for achieving a trade volume of 5 billion U.S. dollars. In actuality, Türkiye's African initiative is a strategic policy that enables the growth of export numbers, the creation of more job opportunities within the country, and the broadening of the portfolios of the "Anatolian Tigers," which have been consistently growing since Turgut Özal first facilitated their entry into global markets. Without a doubt, the rise of these conservative firms played a part in the AKP's success in three successive general elections. The growing conservative bourgeoisie in Anatolia has taken on the task of balancing the established secular corporate elite, represented by the Turkish Industry and Corporate Association (TÜSİAD), in both political and economic spheres (Afacan, 2013). The African openness in 2005 was not driven by a desire to enhance foreign policy alternatives or any sense of responsibility, as was the case in the 1970s and 1998.

The African initiatives in the 1970s and 1998 were primarily motivated by the sense of seclusion encountered at the global stage. The 2005 African openness is a crucial element of the AKP government's comprehensive foreign policy strategy. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the action plan developed in 1998 and 2005 do not have different scopes. The "Year of Africa" in 2005 acted as a motivator for executing the action plan that was not possible in 1998, while also assisting in the development of strategies that are in line with Türkiye's material capabilities and expertise. For example, the 1998 action plan highlighted

the need of expanding the number of embassies in Africa. However, due to unfavourable economic conditions at the time, it was not feasible to carry out this plan. The objective of creating further embassies was mostly accomplished in the subsequent years (Afacan, 2013: 51-52).

2.1.3.2 The first international Turkish African summit

The first international summit convened by TASAM in Istanbul, Turkey, on 23-24 November 2005, was the first occasion of analysing the relations between Turkey and Africa. At the conference, Turkey has officially declared 2005 as the “Year of Expansion into Africa”. The main goals of the first international Turkish and African summit were: (a) to strengthen the economic, social, cultural, and political connections between Turkey and the African nations, (b) to suggest practical solutions to the existing issues in Africa, and (c) to create a structure for managing the relations between Turkey and the African states (Uchegara, 2008: 53). This conference was a noteworthy accomplishment, compensating for the years of disregarded relations between Africa and Turkey. The first step they took was to close the gaps and acquaint themselves with the surroundings.

2.1.3.3 The second international Turkish African congress

The Turkish-African Congress held its second edition from December 12th to December 14th, 2006. The congress aimed to analyse the issues related to economic cooperation, development aid, and investment opportunities between Turkey and African countries, while also providing necessary information to support future collaboration. The conference included a representation from over 30 African countries, with a total of 550 delegates including businesspeople, ministers, and high-ranking government officials. Similarly, more than 1,300 Turkish businesspeople took part in the conference. The summit’s significance stems from its ability to provide a thorough picture of all parties involved. The conference served as a forum for Turkish and African entrepreneurs to participate in discussions and forge business deals. The summit sessions resulted in notable advancements, as Turkish and African businesses successfully concluded economic deals (Uchegara, 2008: 54).

2.1.3.4 The third international Turkish African congress

The third international Turkish and African conference was hosted by the Turkish Asian Centre for Strategic Studies (TACSS) and held in Istanbul on 4 December 2007. The gathering functioned as a forum for strengthening partnership between Turkey and the African states. As a consequence of this summit, a TİKA coordination office was established in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and later, TİKA offices were also established in Sudan and Senegal. Without a doubt, this opportunity emerged as a result of the 2005 agreement between TASAM and the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (Mogus, 2007: 2).

2.1.3.5 The fourth international Turkish African summit

The fourth Türkiye and African summit, held in İstanbul in 2008, was attended by about 3,500 African and Turkish businesses from 45 countries. At the summit, Kürşad Tüzmen, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Trade, explored the potential benefits that the African market presents to Turkey. He stressed the need of Turkey developing a stronger connection with African states. According to Atilla Kızılaslan, a representative from the Turkish foreign trade undersecretariat, the conditions are very advantageous for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Africa. Ali Babacan, the ex-Turkish foreign minister, stressed that Turkey places great importance on its ties with Africa because of its vast potential. Türkiye's diplomatic relations with African states are based on the principles of reciprocal exchange, friendship, cooperation, and brotherhood. The nature of these interactions might be characterised as mutually advantageous. Türkiye's trade and investment with African countries have seen significant growth, reaching unprecedented levels. According to data from the Turkish Institute of Statistics (TURSTAT), in the first quarter of 2008 Türkiye's exports to Africa had a substantial increase of 42.9 percent compared to the same period in 2007 (ibid).

2.1.4 The period from 2010-2022

The 2005 African Opening, although considered a continuation of the 1998 "African Action Plan," surpassed earlier eras in terms of its effectiveness in presenting and

assimilating trade data, creating new embassies, and enhancing political relations. Since 2010, Africa-Turkey relations have seen a substantial change, mostly as a result of Türkiye's integration of public diplomacy, soft power articulation, and smart power into its foreign policy.

Afacan (2013: 47) said that experts and policymakers worldwide have mostly focused on the significant transformations in Türkiye's domestic politics and international relations throughout the last decade. Türkiye's involvement in the Muslim-majority Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is intricately connected to the policies of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has been in power since 2002. Türkiye's increased participation in the region amid the turbulent events of the Arab Spring has bolstered its standing as a significant actor in the area, notwithstanding certain constraints. Nevertheless, it is crucial to acknowledge that Türkiye's interests extend beyond the Middle East. Turkey has indeed expanded its political and economic influence in another region, namely the African continent. Türkiye's nation. The "African initiative," which has been increasingly prominent, especially after 2005, has had excellent outcomes. The increasing amount of trade, recent formation of embassies, cultural and political connections, and the rising presence of Türkiye in Africa demonstrate a firm political resolve.

Turkish foreign policy has three distinct focal points for its involvement with Africa. The primary emphasis is on strategy, trade, and economics. Turkey aims to achieve a prominent and important position in both the regional and global arenas. Turkey is a crucial partner for African countries, which together have a population over one billion people. The reason for this is because the African continent consists of 54 nations. Turkey, known for its exemplary performance in Africa, aims to provide a strong basis for the efficiency of these countries. Therefore, Turkey aimed to gain the confidence of African countries on the international platform and serve as their representative, with the goal of protecting their interests. Moreover, Turkey has great global importance, and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will intervene to identify and provide aid to Turkey. On the other hand, boosting the Turkish economy via involvement with Africa entails using natural resources, developing new markets, and, most importantly, establishing strong commercial links with the continent. Türkiye's main goal in this approach is to substantially enhance the trade

volume with African countries. Turkish products, renowned for their cost-effectiveness and exceptional quality, are often consumed at a faster rate in comparison to expensive Western goods or inferior Chinese ones. Turkey has developed ways to increase commercial transactions and is also committed to actively engaging in the peace process and resolving security problems and conflicts in Africa. The relationship between Africa and Türkiye is based on the concepts of parity and reciprocal advantage. It is noteworthy that just the economic side would arise from China, Brazil, and India (Mohamed, 2020: 22-23).

The Africa Expansion Action Plan, devised during a series of talks in June 1998, has been executed using many approaches including political, economic, social, and military dimensions. Here are a couple of these measures summarised. Regarding the political measures adopted. A decision was taken to increase the diplomatic representation in Africa, which had previously been insufficient, and to reopen embassies that had previously been closed for various reasons. Moreover, there was consensus recognition of the essential need of organising high-level reciprocal visits with African states, in addition to strengthening connections with international institutions. However, a suggestion was made to create a platform for political engagement with these countries. Regarding the plan for growing into the African market. Turkey has started arranging tours for senior military leaders from Africa and providing African students with opportunity to study in Turkey. Turkey has agreed to send Turkish military personnel to Africa in order to share their knowledge. Turkey will simultaneously contribute to the promotion of peace operations in Africa and actively participate in the United Nations' endeavours to avoid and settle conflicts in the area. The strategies used to promote business connections include the implementation of trade, technical, and scientific collaboration agreements. The African trade ministers were explicitly tasked with examining the prospects for partnership between industry and education ministries. Additionally, they were extended an invitation to visit Türkiye. In addition, Africa has agreed to receive short-term specialist training and research trips for African professionals in several sectors. Africa has also extended an invitation to Turkish experts to visit Türkiye (Mohamed, 2020: 23-24).

Dahir (2021: 3) said that Türkiye's Africa strategy has shown substantial engagement in the present year of 2021. Over 10 African dignitaries and heads of state, such as the Prime

Minister of Ethiopia, the Chairman of Sudan's Sovereign Council, and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, have visited Turkey. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan travelled to Angola, Nigeria, and Togo in October. Throughout his journey, he had talks with the presidents of these countries.

The stated nations are Burkina Faso and Liberia. Istanbul, the biggest city in Turkey, hosted the 3rd and 4th Türkiye-Africa Business and Economic Forum in the same month. The event attracted over 2,500 participants, including delegations from 45 African states, regional economic organisations, and representatives from the business sector on both sides. The Forum and Erdoğan's recent Africa travel were carried out in anticipation of the 3rd Türkiye-Africa collaboration. This cooperation is a momentous assembly in Istanbul that will include esteemed leaders such as Heads of States and Governments from African nations and Turkey, along with delegates from regional economic communities and international organisations.

According to Okumus (2021: 64-65), Türkiye's Africa policy, which began with Türkiye's Africa Initiative and continues to the present, was developed with the guiding philosophy of "African solutions to African problems" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye). The Africa-Ankara link has been enriched by many philosophies and historical epochs, resulting in mutual benefits for both parties. This relationship is continuously expanding at a fast pace. Government agencies such as MUSAID, DEIK, and other governmental bodies are now facilitating the creation of commercial and economic agreements between Turkey and African states. These entities prioritise enhancing Ankara's economic and commercial ties with Africa.

2.2 Different Identities, Different Directions of Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkish foreign policy towards Africa and other parts of the globe is clearly shaped by the many ideological identities present within Türkiye's domestic political landscape. Hence, it is essential for this thesis to expeditiously analyse certain key ideological frameworks in Turkish politics. The Kemalist ruling class has substantial influence over Turkish foreign policy, primarily via the cooperative efforts of the military and the foreign policy establishment. The military's subordinate allies, as cited by Sakallioğlu (1997: 151-166, as noted in Aras, 2004: 18), contribute to this collaboration. According to Aras (2004:

18), different elite identities result in specific demands and efforts to exercise influence on Türkiye's foreign policy. Highly exclusive factions exert substantial effort to influence the foreign policy of Turkey. However, in a broad context, the most dominant identities are Kemalist and Islamist, along with nationalist and conservative identities. Hence, it is essential for historians to unravel the profound influence that these ideologies have had on Turkish foreign policy. Since 2002, AKP governments have constantly pursued a policy of actively accepting and incorporating many identities in both domestic and foreign affairs. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has emerged as an emblem of a new manifestation of conservative modernism in Turkey. His objective is to merge the nation's tradition of centralised modernization with principles like as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Simultaneously, he maintains his dedication to the conventional conservative principles of Turkish-Islamic culture (Kalin, 2012: 12).

For instance, Erdogan successfully mobilised the conservative segments of the Turkish populace to support Türkiye's accession to the European Union in 2004 and 2005, and to enhance connections with Muslim nations and communities worldwide. Erdogan's successive victories in the 2002, 2007, and 2011 national elections illustrate the extent to which his progressive conservatism has been adopted, indicating a new understanding of Türkiye's role in global politics in the 21st century. Various Turkish stakeholders, including politicians, diplomats, NGOs, businessmen, journalists, and others, have shifted their attention from just concentrating on Europe or the Middle East to adopting a more comprehensive global outlook. This change in perspective has led to a fresh geopolitical vision that is broadening Türkiye's strategic perspectives. By leveraging Türkiye's favourable geographical location, their aim is to surpass traditional boundaries such as the dichotomy between the eastern and western regions, Europe and the Middle East, and other comparable disparities. The "Africa opening," which was announced in 2008, is a conspicuous illustration. To strengthen Türkiye's ties with Africa, Türkiye has increased its diplomatic engagements and trade relations with African countries. It has also lifted visa restrictions, opened more than twelve new embassies, and hosted several African summits (Kalin, 2012: 12 citing Ozkan, 2011).

Bozdağlıoğlu asserts that the identity of Türkiye has been influenced by three prominent forces: Kemalists, Nationalists, and Islamists. These forces have not only exerted influence on the state, but they have also engaged in relationships with one another. This interactive exchange elucidates the different perceptions of Turkish identity in connection to a wide range of foreign policy stances. Bozdağlıoğlu (2004) asserts that the influence of internal events on the state's identity is significant. This is consistent with liberal-pluralist ideas, which highlight that the identity of the state is influenced by internal struggles between many groups, each pursuing an identity that corresponds to their own values. This study will provide many views on the foreign policy identity of Türkiye and emphasise the ways in which these ideas differ from those presented in the existing literature.

2.2.1 Official Identity

The primary identity or identities of the elite establishment were influenced by its own interpretations of national interest in the context of international affairs. The Kemalist identity originated throughout the 1920s and 1930s as a consequence of a practical and diverse worldview. The late 19th century saw the impact of Ottoman intellectuals who adopted Comterm positivism and supported the process of westernisation. The fundamental tenets of the Kemalist identity are the repudiation of the historical heritage of the Ottoman Empire and the eradication of the involvement of Islam in public matters, hence prohibiting the use of Islamic influence as a foundation for political power. This is an analysis of citizenship that focuses on the state from an ethno-linguistic and geographical perspective, excluding non-Muslim minorities.

While promoting more modernization and westernisation to align Türkiye's economy with other countries, the official position nevertheless admits an increasing distrust and underlying animosity towards the West inherited from the Ottoman ruling elite. "Peace at The concept of Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, which emphasises "Home, Peace in the World," has consistently been a prominent rallying cry. As a result, foreign policy makers adopt an introverted and cautious approach when formulating international policies. The mainstream media strongly aligns with the ideological perspectives of the foreign policy elite, consistently seeking to validate the regime's position. Türkiye's nationalist foreign policy takes a cautious and hesitant stance towards the EU's position, primarily in response

to demands for greater democratisation and adherence to human rights standards in the country. The European Union's reluctance to provide military weapons to Turkey has caused significant tension. Turkey finds it easier to interact with the United States, as the United States refrains from scrutinising Türkiye's internal affairs or domestic politics, unlike the European Union (Aras, 2004: 18).

The Turkish population harbours a deep-rooted nationalist fear, referred to as the 'Sevres Syndrome', that centres around the belief that the nation is surrounded by enemies and is constantly in danger of falling apart or being divided. This distinct Turkish outlook on international matters continues to have a substantial impact on the perspectives and positions of nationalist policymakers in the field of foreign policy.

Domestic politics often influence foreign policy, and certain groups that were excluded from shaping the Kemalist identity play a role in this influence. These groups tend to have a negative impact on foreign policy decisions because they prioritise the interests of the established identity. During the country's founding phase, the Kurdish Rebellions gave the founders an opportunity to suppress resistance. This led to the development of a rigid political culture where any significant dissent or disagreement with government programmes was seen as treasonous. Ultimately, this narrowing of ideological perspectives in domestic politics results in a more inflexible and less responsive foreign policy. The increasing influence of the military in shaping foreign affairs aligns international policy with a narrow focus on security.

As said, Turkish foreign Ministry staff work under the military's oversight as compliant friends of the military. While there may be disparities between military and Turkish political agendas, the military's influence on Turkish politics effectively nullifies these discrepancies. Following the 1960 coup and further solidifying its authority following the 1982 coup, the National Security Council, which is mostly composed of military personnel, has assumed a dominant role in Turkish politics since the soft-postmodern coup on February 28, 1997. The Turkish military saw itself as the bold protector of the republic and the custodian of the secular Turkish government. The military's strength is partially derived from the longstanding respect it has garnered in Turkish political culture. Despite the constitution, the military has significant influence over political life and maintains a

privileged position. If the national security council desires, it has the capability to readily ascertain the primary objectives of the Turkish government. Government entities seldom disregard the recommendations of this council, despite its status as a purely consultative entity as defined by the legislation. The scope of this council's interests includes not just security matters, but also includes education, the economy, tourism, and even sports. The supporters of the measures implemented on 28 February and influential military officials who were in power thereafter developed a manner of action that resembled the radical Kemalist ideology and the leftist Kemalism of the 1970s. Over time, they have grown more integrated into everyday political life (Aras, 2004: 19).

2.2.2 Islamist Identity

Contrary to the official position of Turkey, Islamist and Nationalist elites advocate for a more forceful approach to foreign affairs. The influential Islamist class strongly advocates for more unity with international Islamic organisations and positions Turkey as a possible leader in the global Islamic community. The leading faction of Turkish political Islam, formerly known as the Welfare Party, advocated for the establishment of a new entity named the Developing Eight (D-8). This organisation would consist of Islamic parties from various countries and serve as an alternative to the Group of Seven (G-7), which mostly consists of industrialised nations with a Western orientation. Typically, Islamist groups prioritise foreign policy objectives that highlight Islamic identity more than Turkish nationality. In order to achieve this goal, several Islamic groups have made significant investments in Quranic schools, as well as the construction of mosques and neighbourhood centres in former Soviet nations, with the aim of enhancing Islamic awareness. These educational institutions advocate ideologies rooted on Turkish nationalism rather than Islam. Gulen's influence extends from the Balkans to China, as he moulds the intellects of aspiring elites who look to Turkey as their example (Yilmaz, 2002 as reported by Aras, 2004: 20).

Political Islamists in Turkey have undergone a remarkable metamorphosis, placing more emphasis than ever on the good aspects of integration with the world, EU membership, democracy, and pluralism. The quick change of the Islamic masses resulted in the establishment of a new political party, the Justice and Development (AK) Party, which has embraced a conservative democratic ideology. In the October 2003 elections, this party

secured a majority of the votes and subsequently took up a governmental role in Türkiye. The Grand Union of Party, a political Islamist group, prioritises its connections with Turkish Republics and Islamic nations, while exercising prudence in its approach towards Western countries. During their time in power, Political Islam has shown a nationalist and insular approach. While political Islam has mostly faced challenges from the non-elected ruling class in Turkey, it is important to examine why it has been unable to overcome its insular perception while garnering significant support and legitimate representation within society. It is noteworthy that the AK party successfully took the lead and questioned the existing state of affairs on the Cyprus issue, highlighting its shift away from an Islamic identity and adoption of a new conservative democratic identity (Aras, 2004: 20).

Another faction within the Islamist community is made up of influential members known as “independent intellectuals.” They primarily express their ideas through the *Yeni Safak* newspaper and Kanal 7 television channel. This group is particularly concerned with the Palestinian issue and the relationship with Israel, advocating for stronger ties with Islamic nations. Their foreign policy ideas are guided by Islamic principles and adhere to ethical standards. They hold significant influence over the Muslim population. Ahmed Davutoglu, along with other important figures, became the top adviser to the prime minister in the AK Party government in 2003. His extensive knowledge in international affairs has played a major role in shaping policy decisions (Aras, 2004: 21).

2.2.3 Nationalist Identity

Nationalist elites often endorse an expansive kind of Turkish nationalism that extends beyond the territorial nationalism of Kemalism. They advocate for collaboration and potential assimilation with what they regard as the ancestral homeland of the Turkish population. The first proponents of pan-Turkism saw the East as a promising avenue for reviving the Ottoman Empire. The expansive region, populated by individuals of Turkish descent, was referred to as Turan by the pan-Turkists, deriving its name from the legendary ancestral homeland of the Turkish population. According to the idea of pan-Turkism, those who speak Turkish are seen to be essentially one unified group, extending from Asia Minor to the furthest reaches of Asia. To have a deeper understanding of nationalist foreign policy, it is beneficial to examine the National party (NAP), which has significant popularity among

nationalist supporters in Türkiye. The NAP formed a coalition after the legislative elections in 1999. Nevertheless, this triumph was short-lived, as the NAP's backing plummeted below the 10% national threshold in the subsequent election, resulting in the party's exclusion from the parliament. With international policy, NAP makes a deliberate effort to avoid making any compromises with Türkiye's Kurdish policies. It is reasonable to expect that accusations of human rights violations, particularly from EU nations, will persist, thus placing NAP in a difficult position. The development of NAP may also stimulate a more proactive foreign policy in the Balkans and the former Soviet Turkish states. NAP's stance on the European Union will undoubtedly be shaped by its longstanding claim that the EU is actively promoting the actions of the PKK on the global stage and assisting the PKK in establishing a political presence in international politics (Aras and Bacik, 2000: 21).

The EU aims to establish an independent Kurdish state inside Turkish borders, a move that the NAP views as a breach of Turkish sovereignty (ASAM, 2002 as reported by Aras, 2004: 21). The NAP party leadership maintains a stringent stance on the issue of Cyprus. Turkey considers the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) to be of crucial strategic significance. The NAP firmly supports the idea of a single nation-state and will reject any proposal that goes against this core political concept. Therefore, the party wholeheartedly supports Türkiye's growing diplomatic relations with Israel, recognising its significant role in advancing Türkiye's national interests in the Middle East. Alparslan Türkeş, the previous head of the party, had strong connections with Israel. The Zionist lobby in the U.S. provides support in countering the anti-Turkey political groups in the U.S. The presence of the Armenian diaspora, specifically, has caused Turkish nationalists to develop a more favourable attitude towards Israel. NAP also promotes a range of strategic partnerships with the neighbouring regions of Turkey. These include friendship and cooperation agreements with the Caucasus, nations in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the formation of an East Mediterranean Alliance involving Türkiye, Jordan, Israel, Egypt, and Palestine. Furthermore, NAP aims to create a unified marketplace across the Turkish republics, as a component of a Eurasian initiative backed by a newly-formed ministry focused on advancing the interests of the Turkish community. Turkey has the potential to become a prominent

nation in the Eurasian area, which is being seen as an alternative to the EU due to the lack of confidence in the EU.

2.2.4 Conservative Identity

Tracing the origins of the conservative identity, which extends deep into Turkish history, is more challenging compared to other movements and political-social attitudes that have been explored so far. After the Second Constitution, the four main political-ideological movements in Turkey, namely Ottomanism, Westernism, Islamism, and Turkism, assigned different degrees of significance to safeguarding specific ideas and institutions that had historical significance. This statement has been less accurate when it comes to the conservative identity. Among these people, there is no specific conservative movement that can be accurately described as “conservatism” according to the definition used in political literature. Conservatism, in this context, has not manifested as an independent movement or political party, but rather as a perspective or position. The ideology of conservatism has been more apparent in Turkish politics throughout the years since the establishment of the Turkish Republic.

As a mindset, it is characterised by the combination of embracing a multiparty political system based on the Democrat Party’s legacy and aligning with the neo-conservatism of former president Turgut Ozal, particularly focusing on a market economy. However, this expression has not materialised as a separate, self-contained, and independent entity, but rather as a mindset or framework for policy that has been observed in various situations. Two distinct conclusions can be drawn regarding this matter:

- (1) The conservative identity became more firmly established throughout the Republican period.
- (2) The conservative identity is not a self-contained and independent movement or identity with clear boundaries, like the idealised Islamist Kemalist, Westernist, and Nationalist identities. Instead, it is an identity that becomes evident through its various activities and presence in different situations.

The emergence of conservatism following the establishment of the republic suggests that its political and social demands are not fundamentally at odds with the fundamental principles of the Republic and the state. Instead, they fall within the prescribed boundaries

of the new regime and do not seek to surpass those boundaries. Specifically, the new order is recognised, and requests are restricted to the boundaries of that order. It is crucial to acknowledge that despite the conservative identities of some personalities (such as Yahya Kemal, Ahmet Hamdi, Tanpınar, Peyami Safa, Nurettin Topcu), who have ideals and goals that directly oppose those of the new administration, they have developed a new alternative order. Their main objective is to enhance the current system by adopting a new perspective that incorporates historical context. This entails viewing Islam as an aesthetic-cultural concept, highlighting Ottoman-Turkish customs and traditions, and ensuring that Islam aligns with the local values and norms of Turkish society.

The concept that conservatism is an attitude provides insights into its political aspect. Consequently, the conservative political identity lacks clearly defined beliefs. Instead, it involves expressing specific requests within a procedural framework, which may be perceived as pragmatic. Similar observations can be made about conservative identity in relation to foreign policy. The Islamist identity prioritises the Islamic globe, or “ummah,” and advocates for transnational Islamic unity as its guiding principles in foreign policy rhetoric and actions. The Nationalist Idealist identity is linked to the Turkish world and promotes the concept of “Turan.” Both of these groups adopt a discerning approach towards the countries that remain from the Ottoman empire, with a particular focus on the regions that align with their distinct ideologies (Aras, 2004: 23).

The Kemalist society has always adhered to a foreign policy vision that is based on the geographical region where the new administration was established, namely the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli). Unlike other movements, conservatism does neither align itself with a particular location nor does it have a political discourse based on a defined set of beliefs. The term “Islamist identity” may be used to describe individuals or groups who identify strongly with the Islamic world. The Islamist identity might be associated with the Turkish sphere, whereas the Kemalist identity is linked to Anatolia and the National Pact. However, conservatism does not have a specific geo-cultural point of reference. Conservatism may primarily be identified as an attitude that is particularly evident when it comes to matters related to foreign policy. The bold policies articulated by Özal towards the Turkish world and the status of Northern Iraq (Mosul) exemplified the kind of assertiveness discussed here.

The conduct of conservative politicians and intellectuals towards the Balkans and the ethnic Turks residing there, as well as their stance on EU integration, is based on the belief that it is acceptable as long as the Turks preserve their local and authentic identity and safeguard their culture. These rules, albeit varying in terms of time and individuals involved, may be referenced in this context (ibid).

Aras (2004: 24) argues that the constructivist approach to identity, international relations, and foreign policy implies that Turkish foreign policy will gradually and consistently shift from the control of the nationalist elite to being more influenced by societal demands in the future. The key factor in understanding Turkish politics in the early 21st century is the conflict between globalists and nationalists. The polarised composition of influential groups within the elite is crucial for explaining the divisions and alliances among different identities that will shape the future of Turkish politics.

2.3 New Turkish Foreign Policy Domestic Context

Discussions on conflicts and the expression of self in Turkish politics and foreign policy often portray different identity claims as a natural consequence of opposing positions. Two initiatives have actively promoted the formation of an Islamist identity rather than a Kemalist one, revealing that the fault lines in Turkish politics arise from clashes between these conflicting identities. Furthermore, the conservative identity and the individuals it represents have been overlooked. The 28 February process has caused subtle divisions within the declared identities, resulting in the emergence of two dominant groups - globalists and nationalists - who exert influence on Turkish politics through internal disagreements and agreements among the elite.

For instance, the bureaucrat who supports maintaining the current state of affairs approaches the European Union with caution, fearing that it may undermine the principle of complete independence. This cautious approach can be likened to a sectarian who sees the EU as a continuation of the Crusades, rather than the viewpoint of the Foreign Minister who argues for the Kurdish minority's right to use their own language. It has been noticed that the interests of the bureaucrat and the sectarian tend to coincide. Similarly, the alignment between the Head of the Court of Appeal's commitment to advancing human rights and democracy and the conservative businessmen of Central Anatolia's drive of economic reform

to boost exports can be seen. The newspaper Yeni Mesaj asserts that Muslims who have positive views towards Christians and Europeans are either lacking in knowledge or are betraying their own community. Furthermore, an ex-military leader authored a book that argues that efforts to join the European Union are really part of a plot to dismantle Turkey (Ilhan, 2000 as referenced by Aras, 2004: 25). What is particularly intriguing in this context is that, based on a poll of 2027 individuals performed in 17 cities, 68.7% of the Turkish populace express their support for entering the European Union, while just 9.9% reject it (Elekdag, 1999 as reported by Aras, 2004: 25). According to one observer, the majority of practicing Muslims support Türkiye's membership in the European Union, which was formerly seen as a Christian organisation. This support is seen as a reflection of the public desires for globalisation and democracy. In support of this argument, a well-known Islamic scholar highlighted that the Copenhagen criteria align with the concept of *amr bil ma'ruf* (ordering the good) (Bulac, 2000 as quoted by Aras, 2004: 25).

- Since 28 February, the differences between the democrat-globalist and republican-nationalist identities have been more evident. Nevertheless, the underlying circumstances that led to the need for democrat-globalist policies in Turkish politics have remained intact.
- The all-encompassing impact of globalisation on every aspect of life;
- The worldwide acknowledgment and acceptance of the ideals and concepts of human rights, democratisation, civil society, and free markets;
- The European Union's prerequisites for restructuring in economic, political, cultural, and social areas, with the objective of promoting societal unity.
- The most notable factor is the revelation of the prevailing spirit of the time by persons who were not affiliated with the Republican establishment. Although they had the ability to take action, their progress was impeded by the barriers that were deliberately put in their way.

During the period from 1983 to 1993, Turkey, led by Turgut Ozal, showed first signs of the domestic, economic, and international policy frameworks it planned to use in the future. Ozal significantly altered both the economy and politics, resulting in the emergence

of a distinct “other” Turkey in these areas. This not only led to the coexistence of individuals identified as “white” and other Turks, but also brought about a profound transformation in Turkish society that exceeded the expectations of the ruling class. Over the past two decades, the emergence of a new economy, particularly originating from Anatolia, along with the establishment of new political centres and cultural spheres, has brought the nation to a significant and irreversible turning point. The growing parallel world is expected to form alliances within the differences in the Kemalist establishment and compel the inefficient state apparatus to reduce in size and align with the global community (Aras, 2004: 25-26).

A coalition of the military, bureaucracy, nationalist political parties, and their overt or covert allies in the media is emerging as a nationalist and pro-establishment bloc. The connection between media patrons and some sections of the government administration has been revealed via many instances of corruption, such as the involvement of media organisations in the ownership of failed banks. However, the current leaders in these institutions, particularly in the last twenty years, who prioritise democracy and global integration more than previous generations, are facing opposition from the prevailing views inside their own organisations. It is simple to identify columnists and pundits who diverge from the prevailing ideological stance, even in relation to the media, which is often associated with the established order. The impressions associated with the events of 28 February have posed challenges for those who identify as conservative and Turkish Islamic idealists in maintaining their allegiance to the nationalist bloc (Aras, 2004: 26).

2.3.1 Analysis of New Turkish Foreign Policy Domestic Context

Foreign policy analysis is the examination of how various players, particularly nations, engage in and implement interactions within the global system. Foreign policy analysis includes the examination of diplomacy, intelligence, commercial negotiations, and cultural interactions. Foreign policy analysis focuses on the demarcation between the external environment outside the nation state and the internal or domestic environment, which includes many sub-national sources of influence. Foreign policy analysis (FPA) emerged as a distinct field of study within the discipline of international relations. This was primarily because FPA first concentrated only on the practical execution of interactions between states

and was driven by a desire to establish norms. International relations researchers focused on interpreting the overall characteristics of the international system, whereas FPA experts concentrated on analysing the actual behaviour of states and the factors influencing their decision-making. In addition, researchers in the field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) saw their role as normative, meaning that they attempted to improve the decision-making process of foreign policy in order to help nations obtain more favourable results and, in some cases, even increase the likelihood of peaceful relations between states (Uchegara, 2008: 45). Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is based on the interactions between states, whether through direct bilateral connections or through multilateral organisations like the United Nations (UN). FPA follows the realist paradigm, which views the state as a unified entity, so it is not necessary to examine the different branches of government (such as the executive or legislative) to understand a state's foreign policy. Within this framework, a key concept in FPA is the 'national interest'. In his 2006 work, Christopher Hill defined foreign policy as the intentional and strategic actions taken to promote the interests of a particular political community or state.

In the age of globalisation, economic and political interests are interdependent since economic power directly influences political authority. Likewise, the economic impact of one nation on another country affects its political power there. This is especially applicable in African nations, since they place great significance and focus on their economic development. The crucial aspect is to discover the optimal arrangement for directing economic influence towards political objectives (Uchegara, 2008: 56). Turkey aims to annually sell US\$500 billion to African nations from 2010 to 2023, as reported by the Turkish Weekly Journal. The examination of foreign direct investment (FDI) and its potential influence on economic growth, particularly in developing nations, has been a significant focus of analysis in the disciplines of international economics and development. This aligns with the prevailing belief that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has the capacity to significantly impact economic growth in a favourable manner. The United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) strongly endorses this perspective, asserting that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) serves as a powerful tool for integrating economies into the globalised world economy. FDI accomplishes this by bringing a

comprehensive set of resources, such as capital, technology, managerial expertise, skills, and access to foreign markets (UNCTAD, 1996: 11). An analysis of Türkiye's soft power would provide valuable understanding of the direction of Türkiye's foreign policy in recent times and add to the continuing scholarly discussion on this subject. While discussions on soft power have mostly centred around the United States and the European Union.

An examination of Türkiye's soft power, a country of moderate size without a history of imperialism but with the potential to impact events in its region, would undoubtedly enrich discussions on this subject (Oguzlu, 2007: 1). The increasing influence of Turkey can also be deduced from the economic diplomacy pursued by the current administration. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan holds the record for being the Turkish prime minister who has travelled the most. He has not only visited established Western nations to persuade wealthy Westerners to invest in Turkey, but he has also visited several underdeveloped countries to strengthen economic ties (Oguzlu, 2007).

2.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the historical interactions between Türkiye and the African continent, spanning from the Ottoman Empire to the pre- and post-Cold War eras, and finally the period from 2010 to 2022 in the 21st century. This chapter provided an overview of the economic and political relations between the continent and Turkey, focusing on the most significant and traditional occasions. The literature examines the sluggish progress of Turkish involvement across different historical eras, potentially reflecting the "too late Hewett Syndrome" in Ankara's foreign policy approaches. Furthermore, the thesis explores how the presence of several political parties in Turkey and the diverse range of political ideologies have shaped both internal and international policies towards Africa, adding a distinct character to the research. Ankara's foreign policy has undergone recent changes, highlighting crucial aspects of foreign policy analysis.

CHAPTER THREE

3 THE MOTIVATION BEHIND TURKISH ECONOMIC INTEREST IN CAMEROON

This chapter seeks to examine the factors that contribute to Türkiye's increasing interest in establishing diplomatic ties with Cameroon throughout the timeframe covered by the thesis. The factors generally pertain to the economic, political, and socio-cultural aspects. There is often a strong correlation between high-level politics, which encompasses diplomatic and political interactions, and low-level politics, which encompasses trade and economic interactions. These two features often co-occur. This chapter provides an analysis of Cameroon's foreign and economic strategy, with a special emphasis on the bilateral relationship between Cameroon and Turkey. Various factors may contribute to Turkish interest in Cameroon. Undoubtedly, Ankara is having a substantial impact on Africa, both via direct means and indirectly through bilateral economic relations. This study primarily examines the impact of Ankara fabric in Cameroon. As stated by Bilgic and Nascimento (2014: 2), Türkiye has increased its political involvement with Africa, leading to a strengthening of commercial and trade connections between Türkiye and some African nations. From an economic perspective, both parties get advantages from enhanced commerce and collaboration in development since it generates job opportunities and attracts investments. Economic participation may be categorised into commercial relations and development assistance.

Enwere and Yilmaz (2014: 7) argued that throughout the Ottoman Empire, there were two geographical perspectives on Africa that significantly shaped the economic perception and identity of Africa in present-day Türkiye. The origin of this notion was influenced by historical events in the Ottoman Empire, resulting in the division of Africa into North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. North Africa (NA) was considered the main hub of commercial operations in Africa, while sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was seen as the peripheral economic equivalents that were to be economically exploited. Due to their long-standing trading contacts with the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has strong economic ties with North African nations. North Africa has a pivotal role as a strategic hub for the expansion of the Turkish economy and trade opportunities, not only in Africa but also in the Middle East. Türkiye's

industrial goods and services have a diverse economic range and market, resulting in several advantages for the country.

The growing connection between Turkey and Africa may be attributed to Türkiye's internal reform endeavours and shifts in the global political economy. Türkiye's internal developments have posed challenges for its previous economic partners and have sought to expand its trade prospects in accordance with shifts in global power dynamics. Countries have been compelled to choose their own interests in response to changes in the global system. Turkey has responded to these developments by formulating a comprehensive foreign policy and cultivating economic and political ties with both its neighbouring countries and other regions and continents. Türkiye's Africa strategy plays a vital role in its revamped foreign policy. So far, this innovative strategy has been based on combining increased economic collaboration, substantial funding for development, and aid for humanitarian reasons. The reference is sourced from Ozkan's 2016 paper, specifically on pages 7-8.

Türkiye's Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) has established 45 business councils throughout several African nations with the aim of fostering bilateral commerce and promoting mutual investment. The bilateral trade volume between Türkiye and Africa has seen a substantial increase, rising from 3 billion dollars in 2003 to 26 billion dollars in 2021. The entire amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) from Turkey in Africa is around \$10 billion. Turkish private enterprises are carefully observing Africa for potential investment and business prospects. Turkish Airlines (THY), the flag airline of Turkey, now provides air travel to 61 distinct locations throughout 40 African states across the continent (Orakçi, 2022: 5).

Davutoğlu emphasised the need of strengthening and enhancing Türkiye's involvement in Davutoğlu, as it is one of the key geographical regions of the country. He said that this engagement should be expanded and strengthened, mirroring Türkiye's interaction with other areas like as Central Asia, Europe, and Asia. During Davutoğlu's leadership, Turkey underwent a process of reevaluating and clarifying its policy goals, frameworks, and core values in relation to Africa. The redefinition was carried out in accordance with seven primary criteria outlined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye in

2011. The main objective was to enhance political relations by facilitating more frequent visits at a senior level and advocating for the rights and interests of African nations during Türkiye's engagement in bilateral and multilateral discussions at the United Nations and other global forums, effectively representing the African perspective. The second objective is to provide economic support to African nations, enabling them to surmount their difficulties and issues via reciprocal help, commerce, investment, and humanitarian aid. The third aspect was offering diplomatic and personal aid upon request, particularly in efforts to advance peace and resolve conflicts. The fourth objective was to provide foreign assistance to Africa with the intention of mitigating barriers and fostering advancements in the realms of democracy and good governance. The sixth objective was to provide assistance to African nations in their efforts to achieve regional integration. The sixth included active involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa. The seventh committed to the principle of advocating 'African solutions for African concerns' in line with the agenda of the African Union. The constructivist understanding of these principles, referred to as values, has created several possibilities for the development of a fresh approach in Africa's foreign policy.

According to Ozkan and Akgun (2010), the Ottomans and contemporary Turkish policy officials saw Ankara's expansion into sub-Saharan Africa as a distant region plagued by issues such as starvation, illnesses, and civil upheaval. The current Turkish policymakers have deliberately neglected economic involvement with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) owing to their pessimistic outlook. In 2005, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's official visits to Ethiopia and South Africa successfully altered the prevailing unfavourable perception of the area under the AKP's governance. There is a clear and growing inequality in Ankara's relationship with the continent, particularly in its relationship with Cameroon, as seen above. Predictably, a substantial portion of the conversation and exchange of ideas at high-level meetings about the Africa-Turkey connection focuses on the strategies African countries can adopt to support Türkiye's prominent role in global leadership. There is a strong focus on the significance of African economies not just accepting but also embracing Turkish investments, in order to reap the advantages of south-south collaboration.

Afacan (2013: 10) argued that Türkiye's engagement with Africa in the post-2000s signifies a significant departure from its previous foreign policy, since Africa had not been a

major focus of Türkiye's Foreign Policy (TFP) before to that period. Despite being regarded as an Afro-Eurasian state, Turkey originally had a belated engagement with Africa. Turkey saw Africa as physically distant and economically sluggish, hence deeming it less significant in comparison to its other foreign policy objectives. However, Türkiye's Africa policy has significantly transformed since the start of the century. It has shown great excitement after a lengthy period of inactivity, which was consistent with the approach taken under the Ottoman Empire. Türkiye's approach to the Middle East and Europe has been uneven and concentrated on certain regions. However, its engagement with Africa, namely Sub-Saharan Africa, has been consistently dedicated since 1998. The Turkish interest in Cameroon may be attributed to several causes, including the desire to acquire natural resources, promote south-south cooperation, and establish business alliances to access untapped markets in Cameroon. Furthermore, the subsequent components are comprehensively elucidated, while also tackling social and political obstacles.



Figure 3.1. Political Map of Türkiye (Nations Online, 2024)

Figure 3 displays the political map of Türkiye, emphasising Ankara as the country's capital and including additional provincial capitals like Istanbul, Izmir, and Antalya. It denotes several municipalities, important airfields, and the extensive road and rail networks of the nation. The map clearly delineates the geopolitical boundaries of Türkiye with Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, as well as its marine boundaries, which include the Black Sea, Aegean Sea, and Mediterranean Sea. The map also features noteworthy geographical landmarks such as Mount Ararat and significant bodies of water, offering a comprehensive perspective of Turkey and its adjacent regions, including Cyprus with its capital, Nicosia. The map of Turkey highlights its strategic location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, underscoring its connectivity and potential for global relationships, especially with African nations like Cameroon. While the map does not expressly show Africa, the fact that Türkiye is located near the Mediterranean Sea implies the possibility of naval ties. Türkiye's advantageous geographical position and well-developed infrastructure facilitate its expanding political, economic, and cultural connections with African nations such as Cameroon. The presence of a comprehensive road, rail, and airport infrastructure on the map clearly indicates the facilitation of bilateral commerce, diplomatic contacts, and joint initiatives.



Figure 3.2. *Political Map of Cameroon (Forniès, 2018: 6)*

Table 3.1. *List of State Actors and Non-State Actors Responsible for Turkish Economic Interest in Cameroon*

State Actors	Non-State Entities
The Republic of Türkiye	MUSAID
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs	DEIK
The Ministry of Commerce/Trade	CTBC
Turkish Development and Cooperation Agency (TIKA)	TURCABA
YTB	YeniGun Construction
Maarif Foundation	ESER Construction
Turkish Embassy Yaoundé-Cameroun	GROUPERDEM
	AGS Metal

Table 3.2. *Summary of Respondents' Views on Knowledge of Cameroon-Türkiye Relations*

Response	N	Percentage %
Absolutely	67	55.8%
Fairly well	33	27.5%
Not at all	4	3.3%
Vaguely	16	13.3%

According to Table 3.2, 55 to 80 percent of the respondents strongly agreed that they were aware of the bilateral relations between these two nations in all aspects. Meanwhile, 27 to 50 percent of the respondents claimed to have a moderate understanding of these relations. Meanwhile, 13.30% of the respondents indicated having little understanding of the Ankara-Yaoundé bilateral ties, while 3.30% had no awareness of Cameroon and Türkiye being bilateral partners in any aspect.

3.1 Motives Behind Turkish Interests in Cameroon

Dahir (2021: 5) offers many pragmatic reasons for the notable progress of Türkiye's Africa policy throughout the successive governments headed by the AK Party since 2002.

These causes include the need to investigate new economic opportunities in the Sub-Saharan region and position itself as a prominent regional and global player apart from traditional Western entities in the continent.

Türkiye's connection with Cameroon has steadily strengthened since the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AK Parti) came into power in 2002. Türkiye's present Africa policy is mostly driven by the European Union's (EU) rejection of Turkey as a potential member in 1997. After being rejected, the political elites of Türkiye started to consider several options to expand its foreign policy. The main focus of this reorientation effort was on areas that have been traditionally neglected, such as Africa, Latin America, and Asia (Ozkan, 2016: 8). The bilateral relations between Cameroon and Türkiye have achieved a zenith, leading to a substantial surge in trade and diplomatic ties. In addition, Turkish Airlines, the national airline of Turkey, offers flights to both the political and economic hubs of Cameroon.

3.1.1 Strengthening of south-south ties

Sönmezoğlu (2006: 192-193) said that African states played a pivotal role in the ratification process at the UN General Assembly, not just in relation to economic and commercial ties. The Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) was formed to promote cooperation among nations in the Global South and to preserve autonomy from the power rivalries of the Cold War factions. Presently, every African country is a member of the Non-Alignment Movement. In 1945, the South African Union, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Liberia were the only African states that took part in the San Francisco Conference, so attaining the distinction of being founding members of the United Nations. By 1960, the United States had welcomed 20 African states as members, and this number had grown to 35 by 1964. African countries used the United countries General Assembly as a platform to promote the elimination of the apartheid regime and declare their desire for self-determination.

According to former President Abdullah Gül of Türkiye, Türkiye's objective is to create links with Africa in significant areas like health, education, agriculture, environment, infrastructure, and capacity development (Gül, 2008: 2). In 2010, Former president Gül travelled to Cameroon as part of his African tour, with the objective of strengthening bilateral ties. The deteriorating diplomatic ties between Turkey and established regional powers such

as Egypt, as well as with the European Union (EU), can be seen as reasons that led Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu to announce in early 2015 that Africa would gain greater importance as a region of interest for Turkey (Daily Sabah, January 5th, 2015). Sub-Saharan African countries has the capability to conform to Türkiye's worldwide policies, even if they sometimes conflict with the policies of both Western and emerging states. Türkiye's significant engagement with the African continent, particularly Cameroon, as a component of its global agenda via south-south cooperation, is seen as a strategic manoeuvre to achieve a position of global influence. Türkiye's successful candidature for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council during 2009-2010 was achieved by the backing of other African states. Turkey received support from all African nations, with the exception of two, in its effort to get a temporary seat on the UN Security Council for the 2009-2010 term.

Turkey made significant efforts to convince African nations to support its nomination for the 2015-2016 term. It emphasised that Türkiye's participation on the council would provide Africa an extra voice. Turkey actively engages in collaborative endeavours to combat terrorism, piracy, and other associated difficulties. Türkiye's aspiration to become a member of the European Union (EU) seems to be an increasingly elusive one. Furthermore, the shifting alliances in the Middle East have significantly impacted Ankara's engagement in the region. The relationship between Türkiye and Egypt worsened after the ousting of Egypt's first democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi, who belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood, in 2013. President Erdogan of Turkey declined to recognise the validity of the Cairo administration led by Abdel Fatah el-Sisi (Shinn, 2015: 6). However, in spite of Ankara's firm rejection of the governing government in Cairo, The Republic of Türkiye has formally established diplomatic ties with the Arab Republic of Egypt in 2023.

Turkey is resolutely committed to increasing its influence in Africa for a considerable duration. The current Turko-African relations were initiated in the 1960s, a period often known as Africa's decade of decolonisation. In 1968, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia made an official visit to Türkiye, which was reciprocated by President Cevdet Sunay the following year. Turkey sought to establish economic and political connections with Africa by recognising the newly sovereign African countries and supporting the decolonization process. As a result, Ankara opened diplomatic missions in many additional African

countries, like as Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya, and Senegal. Türkiye's engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa was largely neglected in the next two decades due to several circumstances, such as the 1974 Cyprus crisis, economic difficulties, numerous military takeovers, and the rise of the PKK-led separatist movement (Dahir, 2021: 3). In 2010, Turkey established an Embassy in Yaoundé, Cameroon. Subsequently, TIKA, YTB, and other organisations that promote political and commercial relations also became involved. Turkey has transitioned from being an inexperienced participant in Cameroon to being a significant contributor in Cameroon's development endeavours, using the Ankara consensus as an alternative to the development models of Beijing and Washington.

Furthermore, the Turkish model actively contributes to Ankara's assertive foreign policy, which seeks to challenge the prevailing global order. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Türkiye is well-known for his support of United Nations reforms, arguing that the UN Security Council has been ineffectual in ensuring global peace and justice. He coined the phrase 'The World is Bigger than Five', which refers to the five members of the UN Security Council. Erdogan argues in his book "A Fairer World Is Possible" that the UN Security Council has a vital role in causing the existing global inequalities. The five permanent members include of states from Asia, Europe, and the Americas, however they lack representation for African issues. During his most recent visit to Africa in 2023, the Turkish leader emphasised that the prevailing global inequity will have a substantial influence on Africa. He asked African states to join forces with Turkey in calling for a comprehensive restructuring of the United States. From this perspective, the purposeful state policy of promoting the Turkish economic model in Africa aims to garner support from the 54 African states for Ankara's plea for a fairer world. Turkey seeks to explore new economic opportunities by aggressively engaging with Africa. The commerce volume of Ankara in 2020 reached \$25 billion, marking a substantial growth compared to the \$5 billion figure recorded in 2003. Ankara's increasing interactions with the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) area are expected to fuel the ongoing growth trend in the future.

Cameroon's development strategy, known as "Vision 2035," seeks to enhance its partnership with Türkiye. The visit of President Paul Biya to Türkiye from March 25th to March 28th, 2013 was the first visit of a Cameroonian President to the country. This visit

greatly improved and solidified our bilateral relations. As a consequence of this visit, there has been a significant increase in the Cameroonian public's interest in Türkiye due to the quick development in our bilateral relations. In recent years, the two countries have entered into several cooperation agreements and have taken measures to complete the legal framework of our relationship.

The establishment of diplomatic relations has resulted in a surge in exchanges and visits between the two countries. The latest visits from Cameroon to our country were undertaken by Minister of Defence Joseph Beti Assomo and former Minister of Employment and Vocational Training Zacharie Perevet on January 28-21, 2018 and February 20-22, 2018 respectively. Cameroon has undertaken several infrastructure and transformational projects and initiatives in line with President Paul Biya's objective to elevate the country to the status of an emerging economy by 2035. Turkish companies have shown increasing enthusiasm and have been actively participating in this process. Turkey is offering development aid to Cameroon in many sectors via the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024c).

Before the event, the two Heads of State participated in confidential discussions, which were then followed by the signing of seven cooperation agreements between the two countries. The accords included several sectors, including mining, hydrocarbons, diplomacy, communication, and military. President Abdullah Gül commended the strong partnership between the two countries, noting that commercial links had grown by 75% since his trip to Cameroon in 2010. President Paul Biya said that Cameroon is now experiencing a modernization process via the implementation of the Greater Accomplishments plan. This strategy focuses on carrying out extensive projects in sectors like as infrastructure, energy, mining, and agriculture. He invited Türkiye to join Cameroon in this mutually advantageous endeavour. After a hectic morning at the Presidency, President Paul Biya paid a visit to the President of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, Honourable Cemil Cicek, as a kind gesture. At the meeting, both leaders affirmed their commitment to strengthening the collaborative connection between their respective countries. President Paul Biya extended an invitation to the person to visit Cameroon. The Head of State also had a meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and both leaders underlined their

commitment to improving ties between the two countries. The visit continued to the OSTIN industrial zone, where the Head of State was welcomed by the business community in Ankara. The President and his guests-initiated discussions centred on a projection of the activities and potential of the industrial zone (Presidency of the Republic, 2024).

The development of south-south cooperation became evident with the establishment of the neutrality bloc during the cold war period. Ankara has effectively used this bloc to strengthen its ties with many nations, including Cameroon. The establishing of diplomatic ties between Ankara and Yaoundé has laid a solid groundwork for the advancement and expansion of their partnership, leading to a surge in Turkish investments and the importing of finished goods. Therefore, Türkiye's economic strategy in Africa is to enhance its status from a traditional ally of North Africa to an active and advantageous contributor to the economy of sub-Saharan African countries. Ankara's strategic economic philosophy expanding into Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Cameroon, as a result of the failure to get EU membership in 1999 and the strained ties with North African governments, which were formerly crucial to the Ottoman economy.

Table 3.3. *List of Turkish Ambassadors that have served in Yaoundé-Cameroon from 2012-2021*

Names of Ambassadors	Years of Service
<i>Volkan Işıkcı</i>	<i>15/03/2021-</i>
<i>Ayşe Saraç</i>	<i>15/01/2019-23/02/2021</i>
<i>Hüsnü Murat Ülkü</i>	<i>01/10/2015-30/12/2018</i>
<i>Ömer Faruk Doğan</i>	<i>01/07/2012-10/02/2015</i>
<i>Atılay Ersan</i>	<i>11/01/2010-01/07/2012</i>

Table 3.4. *List of Cameroon's Ambassador(s) that have served in Ankara-Türkiye*

Names of Ambassadors	Years of Service
Victor Tchatchouwo	13.12.2018-present

3.1.2 Increase economic ties

In the post-Cold War era, Türkiye has made tremendous attempts to dispute and refute the negative perspective it had of the African economy during the Cold War. Following the conclusion of the Cold War, Türkiye's foreign policy embarked on a purposeful endeavour to expand its economy by adopting the strategic philosophy of Neo-Ottomanism. Turkey intentionally enhanced its economic influence on the Western world, namely the United States and European Union, using a systematic and deliberate approach. Nevertheless, when faced with the task of deciding its membership in the European Union, Turkey took the initiative to send representatives to Africa in order to explore new opportunities for economic and trade cooperation. Thus, a comprehensive and global plan was devised to solidify Türkiye's status as a pivotal state with substantial sway in African politics and economy, with a special emphasis on Türkiye's commercial ties with Africa. However, Africa's yearly economic growth rate of 5% offers a favourable prospect for economic advancement. Türkiye's international identity has prompted a reassessment, transitioning from a Western ally to an active and beneficial contributor to the African economy (Enwere and Yilmaz, 2014: 9-10).

Between 2004 and 2015, the annual trade volume between Türkiye and Africa had a significant growth, rising from \$5.5 billion to \$23 billion. According to a report by Hürriyet Daily News (cited in Ozkan, 2016), Turkish investments in Africa have surpassed \$6 billion. The Foreign commercial Relations Board of Türkiye (DEIK) has established eight business councils with the aim of bolstering commercial cooperation with Africa. Türkiye's objective is to increase its trade volumes with Africa to around \$50 billion by 2023 (Ozkan, 2016: 12-13). Highlighting this aspect, Shinn (2015: 5) said that Türkiye's growing influence in Africa is a deliberate manoeuvre to position itself as a prominent global player with a refined foreign policy. Its involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa is wide and varied. The growing focus on the region is mostly motivated by the desire to explore economic opportunities via trade. This has prompted investigations on the advantages that the SSA countries may get from this link.

Turkey has thus been forced to concentrate other aspects of the relationship, such as investment and help, which provide more immediate benefits for the countries involved because of their limited exports to Turkey.

The Second Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit occurred in November 2014 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. The Turkish group, headed by President Erdogan and Foreign Minister Mevlüt Cavusoglu, included around 200 entrepreneurs. Around 30 African countries were in attendance, with seven of them being represented by their respective presidents. The participants issued a comprehensive declaration entitled the ‘New Model of Partnership for the Strengthening of Sustainable Development and Integration’, but, they did not make a definitive formal statement. The discussion of a limited number of joint ventures was also postponed to a later date (Shinn, 2015: 7). Turkey seeks to enhance its business ties with Africa in order to get access to unexplored markets for its manufactured goods in the continent. Turkish products are becoming popular in African consumer markets because they provide higher quality than Chinese goods and are reasonably priced compared to European products. Turkey is aggressively pursuing African markets in order to boost its construction industry.

Turkish construction companies have successfully completed significant infrastructure projects in the area. These include the construction of Rwanda’s largest indoor sports facility in East Africa, a high-speed railway that stretches 336 km in Tanzania, a 400 km railway in Ethiopia, and a groundbreaking 51 km railway project in Senegal, which is the first of its kind in the West African nation. Turkish companies have implemented infrastructure projects in Africa for a combined total of \$71 billion, including \$19.5 billion specifically designated for the Sub-Saharan African region. Turkish construction companies are praised for their willingness to share technology, flexibility in enabling the host country to supervise projects, and the use of English as a universal language, which sets them apart from their Chinese counterparts (Dahir, 2021: 7).

In recent years, Ankara has been exporting a diverse range of commodities to Cameroon, including as iron and steel, manufactured goods, food items, textiles, cement, plastics, industrial products, and furniture. In addition, Ankara has also entered into energy cooperation agreements with Cameroon and other nations in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2011,

Turkey and Mauritius reached a free trade agreement (FTA), as stated by Ersoy (2013). Presently, Türkiye is engaged in deliberations with Cameroon, the DRC, and Seychelles. Nevertheless, the pace of advancement in some conversations has been slow. Turkish items, such as textiles, home appliances, furniture, and construction materials, are already entering African markets in large quantities. In 2008, the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Türkiye and the Union of African Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Agriculture and Commodity Exchanges forged a pact to establish the Turkish-African Chamber. The main goal of this programme was to improve economic dialogue and cooperation between the two areas. The member states include of Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, and Uganda. However, the organization's accomplishments so far seem to be little. The Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK) of Türkiye has actively encouraged the establishment of bilateral business councils with African counterparts. More than 20 councils of this kind have been established, including nations like Cameroon, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Mozambique, and Senegal, all of which opened offices in 2014-15 (Shinn, 2015: 12).

Prior to Ankara's economic ambitions in Africa, the media extensively covered arguments over its intentions, especially from voices dubious of French engagement in the region. Before 2011, influential African states saw Türkiye's emerging engagement in African politics as motivated exclusively by economic motives. Consequently, they placed more importance on short-term benefits rather than considering the possible future contributions from the Turkish government. Ankara's stance towards Somalia had a crucial influence in changing the perception of African leaders towards Turkey, both at the national and regional levels (Harper, 2014 as cited by Ozkan 2016: 17). President Erdogan has expressed that Türkiye's economic partnership with Africa aims to establish a relationship of friendship and cooperation, focusing on the exchange of resources and technology, rather than exploiting the continent's gold mines or natural resources. This partnership seeks to create essential frameworks for mutual benefit. According to the annual figures for 2019, the entire value of our country's exports to Cameroon is \$151 million USD, while the value of our imports from Cameroon is around \$54 million USD. This leads to a bilateral trade volume

of \$205 million USD. This amount excludes the carrying of luggage, which is carried out by citizens of Cameroon using Turkish Airlines planes. Cameroonians are drawn to the luggage trade because of the frequent delays and excessively high customs fees at Douala Port (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024d).




Figure 3.3. *Turkish Exports and Services to Cameroon 2016-2022 (CEIC, 2024)*

The trend of Turkish exports and services to Cameroon from 2016 to 2022 is shown in Figure 7, using data sourced from CEIC (2024) and the Turkish Statistical Institute. The data shows a consistent fluctuation in export values over the course of seven years. Between 2016 and 2017, there was a substantial surge in figures, rising from 47,399,235 to 59,466,647. The trend steadily increased, reaching its peak at 96,728,030 in 2019. However, there was a significant decline, with exports dropping to 54,500,513 in 2020 and reaching a lowest point of 28,532,143 in 2021 as a result of the worldwide COVID-19 epidemic. In 2022, there was a significant recovery, as the export values surged to 73,467,846. The significant volume of Turkish imports from Cameroon, regardless of the oscillations seen during the seven-year period, serves as substantial proof of Turkish engagement in Africa.

3.1.3 Deepening of cooperation

The main goal of the collaboration is to promote and accelerate self-sufficient economic development. In 2005, Türkiye established the Turkish International Cooperation

and Development Agency (TIKA) in Addis Ababa. TIKA was established in Khartoum and Dakar in 2006 and 2007, respectively, with the purpose of offering support for development projects in Africa. In 2008, TIKA launched the African Agricultural Development Programme in over thirteen African countries, in partnership with the Turkish Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Livestock. The main goal of this plan was to improve agricultural development in Africa. Turkey has contributed to Africa's economic development by providing direct financial aid through its business organisations, such as the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), The Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD), and The Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM). The main goal of these business groups is to promote strong economic connections with African countries, enable cooperative investment and economic collaboration, and organise business events for Africans in Turkey. In addition, their goal is to encourage Turkish investors to participate in Africa, thereby promoting the ideas of economic reciprocity (Enwere and Yilmaz, 2014: 12).

Furthermore, the Turkish Religious Foundation (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı) has been actively engaged in fostering cooperation in the religious domain across many African nations, under the guidance of the Turkish president. Their aim is to disseminate the concepts, ceremonies, and adherence of Islam. Collaborating with Turkish and local non-governmental groups, they aim to support Muslim individuals throughout the sacred month of Ramadan by supplying necessary items for breaking the fast, such as milk, wheat, rice, tea, and other basic food items. The Ottoman Empire used religious secularism as a strategy to exercise control and manage the commerce of goods between Africa and Europe. This strategy sought to secure the endorsement and cooperation of both Muslim and Christian populations. A bridge was built to promote peaceful coexistence and independence between Muslims and other religions, allowing the Ottomans to build friendly business connections and become one of the most prominent economic nations worldwide. The Ottoman Empire used a soft power strategy to strengthen its economic supremacy in Africa by actively preventing European colonial expansion into the continent (Enwere and Yilmaz, 2014: 13). The Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) has recently been instrumental in fostering economic cooperation between Türkiye and other nations. DEİK had a notable impact on the 4th Türkiye-Africa

Business and Economic Forum, which took place in Istanbul on October 12-13, 2023. The event, which was attended by African government and private companies, was planned with the support of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

3.1.4 Ankara's quest for raw materials and trade

Turkey and Cameroon signed a “Agreement for Encouragement and Protection of Mutual Investments” in Ankara, as Turkey aims to acquire raw materials from Cameroon to meet its industrial requirements. The agreement was signed by Economy Minister Zafer Caglayan representing Türkiye and by Foreign Minister Pierre Moukoko Mbonjo representing Cameroon. The signing ceremony occurred at the Economy Ministry in Ankara. Zafer Caglayan conveyed his positive outlook on the agreement's capacity to generate reciprocal advantages for both countries in his address at the event.

According to Caglayan, Cameroon acts as a conduit for Türkiye to enter Central and Western Africa, and the country is a strong commercial and economic partner of Türkiye. Caglayan highlighted the Turkish government's dedication to enhancing its relations with Cameroon to the highest degree in all domains.

Cameroon aims to become the dominant country in its region by 2035. Caglayan expressed confidence that Cameroonians, due to their advantageous geographic position, will successfully accomplish their objective. We have certain goals that we want to accomplish by the year 2023. The developing countries are expected to have substantial economic expansion in the near future. Caglayan stressed the need of tight collaboration in order to successfully attain our aims. Caglayan further said that the agreement achieved today will result in a significant increase in investments, leading to a rise in production, employment, tax income, and trade volume. Pierre Moukoko Mbonjo said that the agreement achieved today will enhance the bilateral relations. Cameroon is a country that highly esteems and maintains the concepts of liberty. Mbonjo underscored that the rules and regulations in Cameroon are advantageous for investors. Cameroon's economy has seen substantial expansion in recent years. Mbonjo extended an invitation to Turkish investors to visit our country. In 2011, the trade volume between Türkiye and Cameroon amounted to 150 million USD, as reported by the Anadolu Agency in 2012.




Figure 3.4. *Products Exported to Türkiye from Cameroon (Organisation of Economic Cooperation, 2024)*

The value of Cameroon's exports to Türkiye in 2020 was \$40.8 million. The main exports from Cameroon to Türkiye were Sawn Wood, with a value of \$16.6 million, Cocoa Beans, with a value of \$16.3 million, and Scrap Vessels, with a value of \$3.21 million. Cameroon's exports to Türkiye have shown a steady annual growth rate of 6.73% over the last 25 years. Starting at \$8.01 million in 1995, the exports have increased to \$40.8 million in 2020, according to the Organisation of Economic Cooperation (2024).




Figure 3.5. *Other exported products from Cameroon to Türkiye (Organisation of Economic Cooperation, 2024)*

The value of Cameroon’s exports to Türkiye in 2020 was \$40.8 million. Cameroon exported three main goods to Türkiye: Sawn Wood, with a value of \$16.6 million, Cocoa Beans, with a value of \$16.3 million, and Scrap Vessels, with a value of \$3.21 million. Cameroon’s exports to Türkiye have shown consistent growth over the last 25 years, with an average annual rate of 6.73%. In 1995, the exports amounted to \$8.01 million, and by 2020, they had reached \$40.8 million (Organisation of Economic Cooperation, 2024).




Figure 3.6. *Other Exports from Cameroon to Türkiye (Organisation of Economic Cooperation, 2024)*

As of the year 2020, the total value of Cameroon’s exports to Turkey was \$40.8 million. The principal commodities that were exported from Cameroon to Turkey were sawn wood, which had a value of \$16.6 million, cocoa beans, which had a value of \$16.3 million, and scrap vessels, which had a value of \$3.21 million together. Cameroon’s exports to Turkey have had a continuous annual growth rate of 6.73 percent over the course of the last quarter century, increasing from \$8.01 million in 1995 to \$40.8 million in 2020 (Organisation of Economic Cooperation, 2024).




Figure 3.7. *Trade between Cameroon and Türkiye (Organisation of Economic Cooperation, 2024)*

3.1.5 Promotion of Ankara Consensus

In its attempts to promote its development model, which entails combining economic growth with humanitarian help, Turkey is persistent in its efforts to export it to not just Africa but also to a large number of other developing nations. Following the declaration of 2005 as the “Year of Africa,” Turkey made a number of measures that positioned Ankara as a significant ally in continental and regional groups. These organisations include the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the African Union. The fact that almost half of the 57 countries that make up the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation are African states is something that should be taken into consideration. Turkish intervention in Somalia for humanitarian reasons in 2011 and subsequent attempts to create a stable government in the country have greatly enhanced Türkiye’s influence in Africa. Despite this, Türkiye’s

influence in Africa has been significantly strengthened. As a direct result of this, the paradigm of Turkish development and humanitarian aid, which is also referred to as the Ankara Consensus on occasion, has become more prominent in academic circles.

Donelli (2018: 58) states that the peculiar set of prescriptions that Turkey promotes in sub-Saharan Africa based on its own development experience could be considered a mix between democratic liberalism (Washington consensus) and authoritarian capitalism (Beijing consensus). This model, which is both an alternative approach to African sustainability problems and a useful political discourse to foster Turkish ambitions as an emerging global power, explains the peculiar set of prescriptions that Turkey promotes.

In the context of Africa, Turkish officials often use narratives of solidarity within the Global South. These narratives highlight the peculiarity of the Turkish model by highlighting the significant emphasis placed on mutual respect. Erdoğan designated a specific aim for the allocation of cash. According to Dahir (2021: 6), the model contributes to the enhancement of Türkiye's anti-colonial rhetoric, notably in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is brought about by the presentation of Turkey as a supporter and collaborator in the development of Africa. Taking this stance is in opposition to colonialism, imperialism, and other forms of exploitation. Türkiye's public diplomacy towards Africa makes use of anti-Western sentiments in order to successfully offset the influence of colonial powers such as France and other European nations.

The Ankara Consensus is, in the views of the administration of President Biya, a wonderful model to embrace in order to fulfil the 2035 vision of his nation with little or no strings attached. This is in contrast to the exploitative patterns of Western economic models, notably those of the French and, of course, those of the Chinese.

Table 3.5. *List of Turkish Companies Operating in Cameroon*

Names of Companies	Areas of Operation
Yenigun	Construction Company
Dantella	Construction
Metzem	Cement production
Cimpor Cameroun SA.	Cement production
Erdem Group	Infrastructure and Construction
AGS Metal	Infrastructure and Construction
ESER Construction	Infrastructure and Construction
Istanbul Restaurant	Cuisine (Turkish Food, drinks, Ayran)
Izmir	Cuisine (Turkish Food, drinks, Ayran)
Maarif Foundation	Education

It is important to note that the Turkish Development and Cooperation Agency, also known as (TIKA), operates in tandem with the Turkish Embassy in Yaoundé, Cameroon, to facilitate the operation of Turkish companies that are interested in investing in the country. Additionally, TIKA is responsible for organising trade and business conferences with DEIK and other Turkish partners, which include both state and private business owners.

3.1.6 Military cooperation

Türkiye's growing involvement in Africa may be ascribed to its interest in identifying a prospective market for the Turkish military and weaponry industry. Turkey now has seven military enterprises that are ranked in the top 100 worldwide. The Turkish military and weaponry industry is gaining worldwide attention, notably from Africa, due to its increasing reputation. Turkey produces military equipment, such as armoured vehicles and firearms, which it has sold to many African countries, including Senegal, Kenya, and South Africa. Ankara has entered into bilateral agreements with five Sub-Saharan African states to engage

in cooperation on the production, acquisition, and upkeep of defence and military equipment, with the objective of extending the reach of its weapons industry into untapped areas. This category includes the much-praised Turkish drone programmes, which have recently attracted African interest owing to security issues in various parts of the continent. Tunisia and Morocco have officially decided to acquire a significant number of Bayraktar TB2 unmanned drones from Türkiye. The arrangement with Tunisia has a value of \$80 million, whilst the pact with Morocco has a value of \$69.6 million. Recent sources indicate that Ethiopia has just acquired Turkish drones (Dahir, 2021: 8-9).

President Erdoğan utilised reports from reputable media sources and Turkish media outlets regarding the achievements of Turkish military drone programmes and other military advancements to strengthen military collaboration with African nations during his recent state visits, particularly in the context of counterterrorism efforts. Due to the Boko Haram stronghold in Nigeria and the ongoing instability in Angola, both governments have made a commitment to get unmanned aerial vehicles built in Turkey. This move aims to combat terrorism and insecurity inside their borders and abroad more effectively. Undoubtedly, Turkish military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), often known as armed drones, have shown their exceptional value in conflict areas. This is evident from their effective utilisation in many volatile regions such as Libya, Nagorno Karabakh, Ethiopia, Syria, and Ukraine. Cameroon and Türkiye have been collaborating to facilitate military dialogues, as indicated on the official website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latest visits from Cameroon to our nation were conducted by Minister of Defence Joseph Beti Assomo from 28-21 January 2018 and former Minister of Employment and Vocational Training Zacharie Perevet from 20-22 February 2018 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024a).

Amidst the ongoing conflict in the Anglophone region of Cameroon (also known as Southern Cameroons or Ambazonia), where separatists have been effectively targeting and neutralising government forces' barracks, it is probable that the Yaoundé regime will seek military support from Turkey. This would involve acquiring Turkish-made drones, which are renowned for their lethal capabilities, in order to locate and eliminate the hideouts of the Ambazonia restoration forces. This move would be pursued once the government exhausts its current military supplies from China, Russia, the United States, and France.

3.1.7 Turkish internal politics

Ankara's internal political dynamics are directly responsible for the growing engagement of Turkey with African countries during this time period. Immediately after the failed attempt at a coup in 2016, the Turkish government has made a concerted effort to eradicate the worldwide influence of the Fethullah Terror Organisation (FETÖ). This organisation has been accused of planning the unlawful act with the intention of overthrowing the Turkish government. Following this, Turkish lawmakers have been making a concerted effort to get African governments to implement stringent sanctions against the many educational institutions and business networks that are affiliated with FETÖ. As a consequence of this, the group's influence on the continent has been steadily declining as a consequence of the closure of many schools and the capture of some of its members by the Turkish government. The Turkish Maarif Foundation, which was founded in the wake of the attempted coup, has successfully acquired 216 educational establishments linked with the FETÖ movement in 19 different African countries. Furthermore, a number of African countries have either removed the members of the group from their territory or extradited them to Turkey. Both of these actions have been taken. According to Dahir (2021: 8-9), Türkiye's participation in Africa is primarily focused on fighting the impact of the Gulen Movement in the African continent. This considerably enhances the relevance of the Gulen Movement for Turkish policymakers.

The fact that these schools in Cameroon, which were among the most prominent in the country's economic and political capitals, are now under the supervision of the Turkish Maarif Foundation is a clear indication that the FETO's influence over these institutions has completely disintegrated. As a result, the Maarif Foundation has been able to achieve success in terms of educational and recreational programmes for children and students in the nursery, primary, and secondary educational sectors in Cameroon. These programmes have been developed in collaboration with the Authorities of Basic and Secondary Education Ministries.

Table 3.6. *Summary of Respondents' Views on the Factors/Driving Force behind Turkish Interest in Cameroon*

Factors	N	%
Exploit raw materials to feed their home industries	11	9.2%
For greater international influence (other countries included)	1	0.8%
Political Influence in Cameroon	9	7.5%
Promotion of South-South Cooperation	23	19.2%
Ready market for Turkish goods and services	70	58.3%
Transfer of Technology	6	5.0%

The opinions of the respondents are reflected in the table that is located above, and they are expressed in terms of the reason that is accountable for Ankara's interest in Cameroon. In light of this, 58.30% of the respondents were of the view that the economic presence of Turkey in Cameroon is dependent on the availability of a ready market for Turkish products and services, and 19.20% of them regard the development of South-South Cooperation to be a driving force behind the relationship between Cameroon and Turkey. The exploitation of raw materials to feed their home industries is responsible for Ankara's economic interest in Cameroon, according to 9.20% of the respondents. On the other hand, 7.50% of the respondents believed that Ankara is motivated by political influence, which is why it is speeding up its relations with Cameroon as a hegemonic state in the CEMAC region. This is a remarkable percentage of respondents. In the meantime, five percent of those who participated in the survey cited the transfer of technology as the reason for this relationship. Additionally, eighty percent of those who participated in the survey believed that Ankara is seeking to strengthen its ties with Cameroon in order to increase the international influence it intends to exert in global politics and African affairs, just like the other traditional major powers.

Table 3.7. *Summary of Respondents' Views on Turkish Economic Operations in Cameroon in terms of how respondents categorize it*

Factors	N	%
Cooperative	29	24.2%
Dishonest	6	5.0%
Friendly	60	50.0%
Honest	12	10.0%
Innovative	7	5.8%
Trustworthy	4	3.3%
Unreliable	2	1.7%

As can be seen in the table above, fifty percent of the respondents believe that Turkish business operators in Cameroon are friendly, twenty-four percent believe that they are cooperative, and 5.8% believe that they are inventive. In the meanwhile, 10% of them claim that they are honest in their business transactions, 5.80% consider them to be dishonest, 3.30 percent consider them to be trustworthy, and 1.70 percent consider them to be unreliable.

3.2 Economic and Foreign Policies of Cameroon

Cameroon is the outcome of the amalgamation of the Former British Southern Cameroons, formerly referred to as West Cameroon, and La Republique du Cameroun, previously known as East Cameroon. The former British Southern Cameroons achieved independence on October 1, 1961, but La Republique du Cameroun attained independence on January 1, 1960. As a result, the Federal Republic of Cameroon was established in 1961. In 1972, the Federal form of government was abolished and replaced with a Unitary system, referred to as the United Republic of Cameroon. In 1984, the nation underwent a name change to the Republic of Cameroon, driven by the dominant French-speaking administration, amid resistance from the English-speaking minority.

Consequently, violent warfare has ensued in the English-speaking areas as they strive to reclaim the sovereignty of the Former British Southern Cameroons, often referred to as Ambazonia. Cameroon is located in Central Africa, at the mouth of the Gulf of Guinea. It

shares borders with Chad to the north, the Central African Republic to the east, Congo, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea to the south, and Nigeria to the west. Cameroon is a populous country with a population over 25 million people. It is characterised by many prominent metropolitan areas, including Yaoundé, which serves as the political capital, and Douala, which is the primary commercial centre.

3.2.1 Cameroon's economic policy

Upon gaining independence, Cameroon exhibited certain characteristics often seen in African nations, particularly in terms of its adherence to the French colonial model. Having a history of colonisation, a diverse population with multiple ethnicities and religions, a fragile economy heavily reliant on a small number of exports, and a population demanding swift progress, this coastal state faced numerous economic, social, and political challenges, many of which were similar to those faced by neighbouring countries (Muyo, 2012: 57). The creation of a Ministry dedicated to the Economy and Financial Affairs can be traced back to 1957, when Cameroon was under the joint control of Britain and France as a United Nations Trust territory. However, since 1960, in accordance with decree No. 60/2 which established the first government of a sovereign and autonomous Cameroon, the responsibilities of this ministry have remained largely unchanged (MINFI, 2010).

The Finance ministry, empowered by presidential decree No. 2008/365 on November 8, 2008, is responsible for a wide range of tasks. These include formulating and implementing government policies in financial, budgetary, fiscal, and monetary matters, drafting financial laws, preparing and executing the budget, privatising and rehabilitating public enterprises, managing treasury, interior and exterior debt, promoting the company saving scheme for economic development, monitoring financial institutions, insurance companies, and stock exchange markets, as well as overseeing issues related to the International Monetary Fund (ibid).

The primary role of the ministry has been to implement policies that align with the policy preferences of the ruling class throughout time. This has operated under the two governing systems that have been in power since gaining independence, with distinct but comparable economic agendas. During President Ahmadou Ahidjo's tenure (1974: 55), the economic strategy was focused on attracting foreign investments and was closely intertwined with the

political affairs of the state. His intention was for the state to function like a corporate entity, operating in collaboration with European nations and other international financial institutions. He unveiled this economic strategy during the 4th Union Camerounaise (UC) Congress held from July 4-8, 1962 in Ebolowa (Adeh 2006: 68).

President Ahidjo implemented a statist approach that involved combining social welfare service delivery and economic management through a repressive state mechanism. Administrative officials, lacking a defined political ideology and national resources, played a practical role under the close supervision of France (op cit: 93). Regarding external economic connections, during President Ahidjo's tenure, Cameroon had a strong focus on the Western world, with France being its primary commercial partner. The commercial ties between Cameroon and China were greatly influenced by the Cold War, since China was already under communist governance at that period. The growth in trade, help, and investment between the two countries has greatly risen in recent decades due to this cause (Muyo, 2012: 58).

The economic paradigm used by President Paul Biya, called Communal Liberalism, is distinguished by its emphasis on unrestricted business activity, unity among the country, and inclusive decision-making processes. This model places agriculture as a top priority, provides assistance to small and medium-sized enterprises, encourages the advancement of heavy machinery, highlights the importance of scientific and technological expertise, wants to enhance efficiency in services, and seeks to achieve national economic self-sufficiency. The economy has maintained its focus on external markets, but over time, the Biya administration has reduced the state's involvement in providing social services, delivering public services, and managing the economy. However, it has kept the regulatory tools established by the Europeans. Under President Biya's leadership in the 1990s and early 2000s, Cameroon underwent a shift from a mostly state-controlled market economy to a more liberalised economy. As a result, most state companies were privatised and rehabilitated. Furthermore, there was an emphasis on fostering the expansion of the private sector via modifications in taxes, tariffs, labour, and commerce. In addition, a nationwide Industrial

Free Zone (IFZ) was formed (Economic Development-Cameroon, 2011). When examining Cameroon's economic policies, it is essential to recognise that Cameroon

is a member of the Franc Zone (FZ). This region is controlled by various principles, which include the adoption of a single currency among its members, the establishment of a uniform foreign exchange policy towards non-members, the pooling of foreign reserves from member countries, and the full ability to convert the CFA Franc to the Euro through the “Operations Account” held at the French treasury. According to Khan and Baye (2008), this account contains a minimum of two-thirds of the revenues from foreign reserves of member nations. Being part of the FZ means that the common Central Bank (BEAC) is responsible for making monetary policy choices, while the national branches, which have a significant level of autonomy from national governments, implement these decisions.

This allows for the control of inflation throughout the region, but throws a greater burden on other policy instruments to maintain the balance of payments for individual countries, particularly fiscal and wage policies (ibid). Despite the potential limits imposed by Cameroon’s involvement in the Franc Zone, Paul Biya’s economic theory of Communal Liberalism has enabled enhanced commercial cooperation with nations like China. With the rise of globalisation and the shift towards a more market-driven economy, the economic relationship between Turkey and Cameroon has significantly improved in the past decade. Ankara is now recognised as an emerging global economic power. The dedication of both nations to fostering mutual goodwill and trust, promoting trade expansionism, and fostering economic cooperation has facilitated the establishment of robust and advantageous economic connections between the two states. Turkey has established adaptable economic relations with Cameroon, marked by growing trade agreements and Cameroon’s active participation in economic, commercial, and trade summits held by Turkey and its affiliated organisations linked to the Republic of Turkey. There is a growing trend in the export of unprocessed goods, such as timber, charcoal, cocoa, and cocoa beans, to Türkiye. Likewise, there is a growing trend in the importation of iron and steel, textiles, cement, and food goods from Türkiye.

3.2.2 Cameroon’s foreign policy

Cameroon employs a diplomatic and low-key strategy in its interactions with other countries, adhering to the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and prioritising assistance to underdeveloped countries. Through the implementation of this

foreign policy plan, Cameroon establishes a favourable reputation among other African and rising states about important issues. Cameroon is a member of the African Union (AU), the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), the Francophonie, and it joined the Commonwealth of Nations in November 1995. Cameroon actively engages in the United Nations Organisation and its voting record demonstrates its commitment to issues such as maintaining international peace, enforcing legal principles, protecting the environment, and fostering economic progress in poor nations (Muyo, 2012: 60). Under President Ahidjo's leadership, Cameroon's foreign policy was shaped by the ideas of national sovereignty, non-alignment, and global collaboration. Nevertheless, Ahidjo's leadership was greatly impacted by a strong pro-Western, namely pro-France, position (Ngoh, 1987). After achieving independence, the Ahidjo administration engaged in 10 key treaties with the French. The agreements encompassed various domains such as diplomacy, economics, finance, currency, treasury regulation, technical cooperation, personnel affairs, civil aviation, aerial navigation, air bases, meteorology, military technical assistance, cultural conventions, and consular and legal conventions. He embraces a very conservative, pragmatic, and incremental approach. The influence of Ahidjo on the formulation and execution of the country's foreign policy was undeniable (Kofele-Kale, 1981).

Ahidjo's approach to foreign policy was marked by discreet discussions, sometimes referred to in diplomatic terminology as "quiet diplomacy." Cameroon's significant foreign policy choices were made subsequent to the prior declaration of stances by other African nations (ibid). This strategy consistently conveyed the perception of a prosperous foreign policy, however opponents like Kofele-Kale (1981) and Forje (2010) saw it as a deficiency in a "mobilising ideology" that might empower Cameroon to respond to events by taking decisive actions.

Cameroon, under the leadership of Biya, has consistently pursued a low-key and non-confrontational foreign policy that avoids alignment with any one group or country. Biya's (1987: 134) last three goals for Cameroon, as outlined in his foreign policy orientation, have remained consistent throughout his leadership, reflecting Cameroon's stance in international affairs. Based on these factors, Cameroon is dedicated to safeguarding its autonomy and sovereignty as a component of its all-encompassing strategy of abstaining from meddling in

the internal matters of other countries and fostering harmonious cohabitation. There is no text provided. Given the fragmented state of Africa, it is evident that the continent lacks the capacity to bring about any significant changes in the world order. Therefore, we strongly advocate for Cameroon to use all its resources in actively promoting the advancement of African unity at the continental, regional, and sub-regional levels. Cameroon will remain actively engaged in the non-aligned movement, since non-alignment does not entail rejecting all partners or denying partnerships. True non-alignment is consistently protecting the ability and flexibility to negotiate new partnerships while relinquishing old ones. Our nation should strive for unrestricted and fair economic and cultural collaboration, while making every effort to strengthen the unified front of the third world (Muyo, 2012: 62).

3.3 Summary of Chapter

Since the 2000s, and especially in the last decade, the Republic of Cameroon and the Republic of Türkiye have consistently kept robust and amicable bilateral ties. Ankara's decision to enhance its ties with Yaoundé is primarily influenced by south-south alliances, economic cooperation, the quest for natural resources and trade, as well as political and diplomatic factors. The foreign and economic policy orientations of Cameroon have been clarified in the context of the current and past presidents' leadership, considering the aforementioned objectives. Both countries have been cultivating a constructive and growing diplomatic relationship, especially in recent decades. Both countries have market economies that prioritise international commerce. They support noninterference in the internal affairs of other governments and aggressively encourage collaboration among emerging countries. Cameroon, led by Presidents Ahidjo and Biya, has always adopted a non-confrontational foreign policy, fostering amicable relations with both capitalist and communist economies.

From 2010 to 2022, the Turkish government effectively transitioned its economy from a centralised state economy to an open market economy, but with some governmental oversight, while facing economic difficulties. Turkey has effectively developed a robust foothold in many African nations and has received a warm reception from their administrations, including Cameroon. Turkish foreign policy is achieving favourable outcomes on the international stage, as seen by the relationship between Turkey and

Cameroon. Turkish corporations are making substantial advancements in Cameroon, particularly since they are accountable for implementing the majority of the country's infrastructure development initiatives. Cameroon and Türkiye have had a substantial number of high-level diplomatic meetings in the last several decades, with both nations receiving visits from senior officials.



CHAPTER FOUR

4 ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND CHALLENGES OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN CAMEROON

This portion of the thesis aims to uncover the economic impacts that Yaoundé benefits from its diplomatic relations with Ankara, as well as the obstacles that impede the smooth economic cooperation between Ankara and Yaoundé. This chapter provides an evaluation of the economic impact, including both advantages and disadvantages, that this relationship has on Cameroon. It also explores how this relationship helps to Cameroon's economic growth and development, leading up to the attainment of Vision 2035. When evaluating the economic effects of these interactions on Cameroon, the researcher considered the contributions in terms of investments, development of trade infrastructure, and the commercial relations between Cameroon and Turkey. The main emphasis of this study is the economic component. Nevertheless, the social and humanitarian aspects related to health, sports, education, and culture, as well as the political component in the context of diplomacy, play a role in this segment. Given that this thesis covers a period of ten years, it considers significant events that took place before 2010 and after 2022, up to the submission of the thesis. This includes important information from 2023/24. However, this chapter of the paper analyses the problems that hinder diplomatic and economic cooperation between governments, based on the results.

Türkiye's engagement with Africa has significantly expanded since 2005 in several domains including diplomacy, trade, investment, aid, education, religion, culture, security, and crisis management. Türkiye's involvement in North Africa has more importance for its economy than its participation in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In 2012, Algeria was the 24th largest country that Türkiye exported goods to and the 20th largest country that Türkiye imported goods from. In terms of exports and imports, Nigeria was placed 53rd, while South Africa was ranked 55th for exports and 38th for imports, according to the Organisation of Economic Cooperation in 2024. Ankara has strengthened its relations with Yaoundé as a result of its rapidly growing economic might, while maintaining its existing business connections with old allies like as South Africa, Nigeria, and Sudan. Kizilarıslan (2012: 19) argues that Türkiye is the optimal nation to support African nations in overcoming the cycle

of poverty and promoting global economic and commercial ties. Türkiye's dedication to equitable commerce via unrestricted trade, along with its close proximity to Africa and historical ties to some African nations, accounts for this. These aspects are pivotal in the development of economic and commercial ties.

Dahir (2019: 12) asserts that the main Turkish exports to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) encompass coal bitumen and petroleum products, transportation machinery, cereal products, textiles, fertilisers, machinery, steel, rubber, furniture, mechanical and electrical devices and their spare parts, voice recording devices, food, tobacco products, visual equipment, musical instruments, clocks, measurement devices, and plastic products. Türkiye's main imports from Sub-Saharan Africa encompass a diverse array of commodities, including seeds, fruits, sesame, sugar and sugar derivatives, unfinished leather, lac, Arabic gum, resin, volatile oils, cotton, tea, coffee, spices, cocoa, textile fibres, fish, and raw materials for dye and paints. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Türkiye is mostly focused on sectors like as agriculture, construction, textiles, and manufacturing. While large Turkish businesses consider the African market to be inadequate for their economic pursuits, small and medium-sized Turkish firms (SMEs) have invested in Africa and are developing niche markets in the technology, construction, and agricultural sectors. According to Hammoura (2016), Turkish investments in Africa in 2014 resulted in the creation of the most job possibilities (16,593) compared to other foreign direct investments in the area. Currently, African countries provide 21 percent to the total business volume of Turkish contractors, with 19 percent originating from North Africa and the remaining amount from Sub-Saharan Africa (ibid).

Table 4.1. *Summary of Respondents' Views on How Successful are Turkish Businesses Pursuing their Economic Interests in Cameroon*

Factors	Respondent's Views	Percentage %
Moderate	19	15.8%
Successful	78	65.0%
Unsuccessful	6	5.0%
Very successful	16	13.3%

The researcher asked respondents how Turkish enterprises in Cameroon pursue their economic interests. 65.00% of the respondents said that the Turks are effective in achieving their economic interests, while 15.80% of the respondents expressed that they are somewhat successful in this regard. Meanwhile, 13.30% of respondents reported being very successful, whereas 5% indicated a lack of success in achieving their economic goals in Cameroon. This questionnaire was administered before examining the underlying rationale for Ankara's interest in Cameroon and the subsequent impact of these interactions on Cameroon's economic and political landscape, considering both the advantages and disadvantages. The following are the economic impacts of this connection on Cameroon.

4.1 The Economic Effects on Cameroon

4.1.1 Frameworks for industrial investments in Cameroon

In an endeavour to encourage increased investment by Turkish companies in Cameroon, H.E. Victor Tchatchouwo, Ambassador of Cameroon to Turkey, convened meetings with the senior executives of the following Turkish firms in September 2020:

- Cemsan-Makina is a company that specialises in the development, design, and fabrication of state-of-the-art systems for slaughterhouses and butcheries. They concentrate on the integration and processing of flesh, which encompasses paddocks, cattle, cows, and sheep.
- Astor is a company that specialises in the production of a variety of products, including dry-type cast resin transformers, air-insulated modular cells, concrete and sheet transformation substations, RMUs, and metal conduits. Gürbağ Construction S.A. is a corporation that specialises in the production of industrial structures, prefabricated construction, and the installation of concrete facilities that are ready for use.
- The Oyak Cement Concrete Paper Group is a company that specialises in the production of cement and concrete paper. In Turkey and other countries, they possess an annual production capacity of 32.6 million tonnes. Turkey occupies a prominent position in Europe and is one of the top six nations globally in the cement sector. Furthermore, Karpowership is a corporation that specialises in the development of

innovative energy initiatives and is the sole proprietor, operator, and constructor of the world's first floating power station, Powership.

- Aktif Bank is a prominent private investment bank in Turkey that offers a diverse array of expedient banking services to exporters in support of their business operations in Africa.

The Ambassador elucidated the rationale for investing in Cameroon and encouraged these firms to not only establish collaborations in Cameroon but also to consider the possibility of establishing a presence in our nation during these discussions. He narrated a compelling narrative that lent character to the discussion. The establishment of a meaningful and intimate connection will be facilitated by the development of a narrative that is unique in character and appeal for potential consumers. This is evident in minor idiosyncrasies, such as the choice of words or expressions. Rather than relying on the firsthand experience of another individual, articulate your own viewpoint. A lack of authenticity and a lacklustre narrative will ensue if an attempt is made to write with a broad target audience in mind. Interest will not be charged. Compose content that is tailored to the specific needs of a single recipient. According to Ambacam Turquie (2024a), if an item is genuine for one individual, it is also genuine for all others.

4.1.2 The volume of trade in terms of export to Cameroon

This indicator is essential for evaluating the economic dynamism of trade between Ankara and Cameroon when examining the degree of commerce in terms of export from Türkiye to Cameroon. The relationship between these two nations represents a catapulting within a decade. Ankara's expanding market presence in the major cities of Cameroon is demonstrated by its exports to Yaoundé, as evidenced by statistics. Ankara's economic diplomacy has gradually advanced as it transitions into a global actor, with a focus on identifying advantageous opportunities within the African economic cycle, including Cameroon. The mutual connection that has been established as a result of the increased economic engagement is evidenced by the accelerating tempo of Turkish exports to Cameroon. The market in Cameroon has been flooded with Turkish products, including textiles, machinery, and construction materials, which have capitalised on the growing

consumer demand and infrastructure development in the country. The following figures illustrate Türkiye's exports to Cameroon.




Figure 4.1. *Exports from Türkiye to Cameroon (in 2020) (Organisation of Economic Cooperation, 2024)*

Türkiye's exports to Cameroon in 2020 reached a total value of \$159 million. Türkiye's main exports to Cameroon consist of Cement, valued at \$24.7 million, Iron Blocks, valued at \$11.7 million, and Pasta, valued at \$11.4 million. Türkiye's exports to Cameroon have seen a steady yearly growth rate of 15.8% over the last 25 years. Starting at \$4.02 million in 1995, the exports have increased to \$159 million in 2020, according to the Organisation of Economic Cooperation (2024).




Figure 4.2. Comparison of trade between Türkiye and Cameroon on product basis (Organisation of Economic Cooperation, 2024)

The figure above depicts a comparative examination of commerce between Turkey and Cameroon, concentrating on products traded by both nations. Turkey had a high trade surplus with Cameroon in 2020, exporting metals (\$39.4 million), machines (\$27.8 million), and mineral products (\$26.6 million). Cameroon had a considerable trade surplus with Turkey in 2020, with exports of wood products (\$20.2 million), foodstuffs (\$16.3 million), and transportation (\$3.21 million) (Organisation of Economic Cooperation, 2024).

Table 4.2. Summary of Respondents' Views on How worthy Turkish Products are to be Purchased in Terms of Prices and Quality in Cameroon

	N	%
Agree	60	50.0%
Disagree	2	1.7%
Neutral	25	20.8%
Strongly agree	32	26.7%
Strongly Disagree	1	0.8%

To assess the durability of Turkish items in relation to their costs and quality, 50.00% of the participants acknowledged that Turkish products are worth buying, taking into consideration their quality. Additionally, 26.70% of the participants highly agreed on the favourable combination of quality and prices. Meanwhile, 20.80% of the individuals expressed a neutral opinion on this matter. Furthermore, a mere 1.70% of the participants expressed their disagreement on the quality and costs of Turkish items, with an even smaller 0.8% strongly disagreeing with this viewpoint.

4.1.3 TİKA supporting poultry farming in Cameroon

Ankara's impact on the agricultural industry in Cameroon, a nation with a strong concentration on agriculture, is significant and crucial for its economy. TİKA has provided the chicken Cooperative in Ngaoundere, Cameroon with the machinery and equipment required for the production of chicken feed. TİKA provided Jaynitaare Cooperative with a feed grinder and mixer, a weighing machine, and technical equipment and supplies for packing. This was undertaken as a component of a project aimed at augmenting the production capacity of the poultry cooperative. Volkan Işıkçı, the Turkish Ambassador to Yaoundé, Burak Özden, TİKA's Coordinator of the Programme Coordination Office in Yaoundé, and members from Jaynitaare Cooperative were present for the distribution ceremony of the products. The goal is to reduce the excessively high expenses associated with chicken feed to more affordable levels and increase the amount of chicken meat produced, the cooperative's earnings, and the production capacity in the region via the provision of commodities (TİKA, 2023).

4.1.4 TİKA supporting pineapple production in Cameroon

TİKA showcased benevolence by building a warehouse and providing equipment to a cooperative in the hamlet of Kôndômeyô, situated in the central region of Cameroon, due to the substantial contribution of agriculture to the country's economy. This effort seeks to augment productivity in the agriculture domain. A storehouse was built for the cooperative that grows pineapples on a 1.5-hectare area of land in the hamlet of Kôndômeyô. The

warehouse serves the function of facilitating the storage of the farmed pineapples, ensuring their preservation and protection from environmental factors to avoid spoiling. The installation of solar panels on the top of the warehouse will adequately meet the energy needs of both the warehouse and the existing chicken coops. The project aims to increase pineapple production from 3 tonnes to 5 tonnes by providing necessary equipment and supplies. It also aims to improve transportation efficiency to the market by employing a three-wheeled cargo scooter and minimise waste. In addition, using formerly unproductive areas for production has led to an increase in the cooperative's staff, therefore creating additional job opportunities in the region.




Figure 4.3. Bar-chart showing the views of respondents in which economic sectors Turkish companies operate in Cameroon (Field work researcher, 2023)

The bar chart that is seen above demonstrates that 49.2% of respondents believe that the presence of Turkey in Cameroon can be felt in the tertiary sector, while 27.5% consider the secondary sector of production to be the most significant. In the meanwhile, other respondents held 10.8% of the population, which is the primary sector. 9.2% of them chose the quaternary sector of production, and 3.3% of the respondents went for the quinary sector, which is the area in which Turkey can be seen playing an economic role in Cameroon.

Table 4.3. *Summary of respondents' views on Turkish investments in Cameroon leading to Economic development or Vision 2025 of the Country*

Factors	N	%
Agree	41	34.2%
Disagree	10	8.3%
Neutral	58	48.3%
Strongly agree	8	6.7%
Strongly disagree	3	2.5%

According to the table above, 48.30% of the respondents were undecided as to whether Turkish investments in Cameroon contribute to the country's economic development in accordance with Vision 2035, an emergent economic-development plan. At the same time, 34.20% of the respondents concurred that the investments made by the Turks in Cameroon have contributed to the country's Vision 2035, while 8.30% of the respondents disagreed with this assessment. Additionally, 6.70% of them expressed their agreement that Turks are contributing to the economic development of Cameroon through their economic engagement with the country, while 2.5 % vehemently disagreed with this assertion.

4.1.5 Formation of Turkish-Cameroonian Businessmen's Association (TURCABA)

TURCABA is an internationally recognised Turkish-Cameroonian non-profit organisation. It has been officially authorised by the State of Cameroon by the decree of September 25, 2009, with the reference number 00151 /A/MINATD/ DAP / SDLP. The primary goal of TURCABA is to facilitate investments and foster commercial contacts between entrepreneurs from Turkey and Cameroon. The association is autonomous and not-for-profit, receiving assistance from its members. The financial resources required for its operations are derived from the donations and membership fees paid by its members. TURCABA's objectives, as stated in TURCABA (2024), are as follows:

- Facilitating the worldwide integration of entrepreneurs from Cameroon and Turkey
- Providing support to delegations and businesses from both countries in their trade

activities. Facilitating contact and cooperation between the industrial sectors of Turkey and Cameroon.

- Enable the movement of skilled individuals in technical and industrial fields. The objective is to provide a forum for reflection and the interchange of ideas and specialised knowledge among participants.
- Promote proactive solidarity among individuals.
- Facilitate the harmonisation of Turkish and Cameroonian policy in the domains of labour law, trade, and commercial liberties.
- Participate in every public discourse on the industry, improving the business climate, and developing the capacities of small and medium-sized firms.
- Support or promote social causes Engage in cooperation with both public and commercial groups to strengthen economic links between the two countries.
- Act as a facilitator for business meetings and act as a spokesperson for Turkish organisations and institutions.

The strong economic ties between Ankara and Yaoundé, together with the existence of the Cameroon Türkiye Business Council (CTBC), emphasises the significant contribution of non-state organisations in promoting the economic and developmental goals of both nations. The formation of TURCABA plays a crucial role in spearheading trade and economic development for both Türkiye and Cameroon. TURCABA is a constituent of the Cameroon-Türkiye Business Council (CTBC), a consortium that comprises other constituents. CTBC has arranged trade exhibitions in Cameroon and has also taken part in business and economic conferences in Türkiye and other places, including the recent 2023 IV Türkiye-Africa Business Forum.

Furthermore, Kizilarslan (2012: 12) said that to strengthen the bilateral ties between Turkey and African countries, Joint Economic Commission (JEC) meetings were held with nine particular nations: Senegal, Djibouti, Cameroon, Morocco, Libya, Algeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Tunisia. These conversations led to the creation of substantial concrete initiatives. Trade missions, buyers' missions, fairs, and other intensive programmes held in

Algeria, Morocco, Libya, South Africa, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Cameroon led to substantial development in Turkish exports to these countries.

4.2 The Socio-cultural Effects on Cameroon

Mehmet Nuri Ersoy, the Minister of Culture and Tourism of the Republic of Turkey, stated in the report titled “2020 Turkish Development and Assistance,” which was published by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) in 2021, that Turkey has experienced significant economic and social development outcomes due to its political stability since the early 2000s. This statement was made in the report. As a consequence of this, Turkey has developed into an important participant on both the regional and international levels. Through the execution of reforms in the banking sector, our country has made progress towards achieving macroeconomic stability. In addition, we have seen rapid economic growth as a result of the establishment of robust economic relations with countries all over the globe, starting with those that are located in close proximity to us. The accomplishments of Turkey in terms of development have been lauded by a number of countries, and they have served as a source of motivation for the development policies of those countries.

Turkey takes an active role in development cooperation projects, with a particular focus on the eradication of poverty and the promotion of sustainable development for the purpose of achieving a more hopeful future. Following the toppling of the Taliban regime, Turkey made the rebuilding of Afghanistan, the supply of critical services, and the restoration of domestic security two of its highest priorities. Between the years 2005 and 2009, the amount of official development aid (ODA) that Turkey provided to Afghanistan was three hundred million US dollars. TIKA has three field offices in Afghanistan, and they work closely with the Turkish Embassy in Kabul to accomplish their mission.

The purpose of Türkiye’s foreign policy is to broaden its participation beyond its immediate proximity and make an effort to address issues that are prevalent on a global scale. In the year 2002, the African Union bestowed upon Turkey the title of “Observer,” and in the year 2005, it built its first TIKA office in the country of Ethiopia. Turkey was given the title of “Strategic Partner” by the African Union after it played host to the “Türkiye-Africa Cooperation Summit” in Istanbul in the year 2008. Agriculture, healthcare, education, water

and sanitation, vocational training, institutional capacity development, and humanitarian relief are the principal areas of partnership that Turkey is working on in Africa. Turkish assistance is also being provided. “Africa Agricultural Development Programme,” “Africa Health Programme,” and “Africa Vocational Training Programme” are all examples of multi-country efforts that have been intended to cater to the specific needs of African countries. In order to improve the physical infrastructure necessary for social services, Turkey is participating in TİKA programmes. These programmes include the construction of schools and hospitals. As of 2006, the total amount of official development assistance that Turkey provided to Africa was 51.73 million USD. This figure represents a fivefold increase over the amount that was sent in 2005. The nation is dedicated to improving these numbers across the country. A number of international agencies, including as the OECD, UNDP, UNIDO, and FAO, receive donations from Turkey on a voluntary basis (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024f). Turkey also cultivates good working connections with foreign groups.

4.2.1 The support to tourism and hotel management in Cameroon

TİKA has successfully provided the practice restaurant that is affiliated with the Department of Tourism and Hotel Management at the University of Yaoundé I in Cameroon with the necessary culinary equipment and supplies. The Practice Restaurant, which is part of the Department of Tourism and Hotel Management under the Faculty of Arts, Languages, and Social Sciences at the University of Yaoundé I, a prestigious educational institution in Cameroon, was officially launched after the successful completion of the equipment project that was carried out by TİKA. A group of individuals, including Volkan Işıkcı, the Ambassador of Turkey to Yaoundé, Professor Maurice Aurelien Sosso, the Rector of the University of Yaoundé I, and Professor Christiane Felicite Ewane Epouse Essoh, the Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Languages, and Social Sciences, presented their credentials. Burak Özden, who serves as the Yaoundé Programme Coordinator for TİKA, was present at the opening ceremony that took place at the institution. Additionally, other staff members and students were also present.

While delivering his speech at the ceremony, Ambassador Işıkcı drew attention to the expanding partnership between Turkey and Cameroon, two countries that are known for their friendly relations. He underlined that students will be able to improve their personal growth

and development via the process of participating in this project. The event was further elevated by the mesmerising dance acts that were performed by local artists. On behalf of the educational establishment, Rector Sosso expressed his gratitude to Turkey and its people, highlighting the fact that the restaurant would make a major contribution to the education of students. Burak Özden, who serves as the Coordinator of TİKA, stated his contentment in expressing his support for the development of the practice restaurant. In addition to its role as a cafeteria, this facility will also serve as an important resource for the practical training of students. Within the scope of the project, the restaurant received a shipment of various items, including furniture, major appliances, culinary equipment, and tools. The simultaneous completion of internships by ten students was made possible as a result of this.

Over 20,000 students and 300 faculty members are served at the restaurant that is managed by students from the Department of Tourism and Hotel Management. The University of Yaoundé, which was established in 1962, has the distinction of being the nation's oldest educational institution specialising in this field. As a direct result of the reform that was carried out in 1993, it was split into two distinct entities, which were established as Yaoundé I and Yaoundé II each. As to TİKA (2021b), the University of Yaoundé I is comprised of four colleges, seventeen departments, and an estimated student population of more over sixty thousand individuals. Burak Özden, the Head of TİKA in Cameroon, and Prof. Maurice Aurelien Sosso, the Rector of the University of Yaoundé 1, were present at the inauguration event. TİKA provided the practice restaurant associated with the Department of Tourism and Hotel Management at the University of Yaoundé I in Cameroon with cooking equipment and supplies. The pictures below show both of them on their respective occasions.

4.2.2 Educational Assistance by TİKA and YTB

4.2.2.1 *Nyambaka High School Modernisation*

TİKA has effectively renovated Nyambaka High School in Ngaoundéré, Cameroon as part of its educational assistance efforts. This year, the school was designated as a bilingual high school. Consequently, two more classrooms were built, the existing structure underwent repairs, and the library building was renovated (TİKA, 2021a). Furthermore, the project

included the allocation of textbooks to the school library and the construction of a football pitch called Ankara pitch for the students. By implementing a solar power system for the water well and incorporating new fountains and landscaping activities, the school community and nearby people are guaranteed quick access to potable water that is free from contaminants. In attendance at the inaugural ceremony were Ayşe Saraç, the Ambassador of the Republic of Türkiye to Yaoundé, Dr. Mehmet Yazgan, the District Governor of Nyambaka, Mayor Abbo Aboubakar, Bia Houdou, the Chairperson of the Development Committee of Nyambaka, and approximately 2,000 pupils, teachers, and parents (TİKA, 2021a). The Turkish authorities expressed gratitude for the improvement of friendly relations between Turkey and Cameroon, and bestowed the title of “honorary citizens of Nyambaka” onto Ambassador Saraç and TİKA’s Coordinator Yazgan. The high school, which has been officially classified as a bilingual institution for both French and English, now has a total of 600 students (TİKA, 2021a).

Dahir (2018: 14) said that the Turkish Maarif Foundation, which was founded by the Turkish Parliament after the unsuccessful coup attempt in 2016, now runs 17 schools around Africa, catering to over 9,000 students. Maarif was founded with the aim of outperforming educational schools controlled by the FETO (Fethullah Terror Organisation), which Turkey has accused of organising the July 15 Coup attempt. Maarif is the only approved company that offers educational services on a worldwide scale. The diplomatic post has made measures to boost collaboration between Cameroon and Türkiye with the aim of improving socio-cultural connections in the sphere of education. In pursuit of these endeavours, H.E. Victor Tchatchouwo, the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Cameroon in Türkiye, convened with Mr. Nkwah Akongnwi Ngwa and Mrs. Mboukem Ndjaheu Christiane to confer with Prof. Dr. Yusuf Tekin, the Minister of National Education of Türkiye, on Thursday, December 30, 2023. The main goal of this important meeting was to deliberate and enhance cooperation in the field of education between our two countries. Both sides have agreed on the significance of completing the process of establishing a legislative framework that would regulate collaboration in the sphere of education between Cameroon and Türkiye. This framework would streamline the sharing of knowledge and the mobility of students, professors, administrative, and technical personnel across institutions,

among other benefits. The audience took place in a friendly and cooperative atmosphere, reflecting the diplomatic relations between our two countries, and ended on a positive note, with promising prospects for the future (Ambacam Türkiye, 2024b).

4.2.3 Contribution to the campaign to combat urban waste

In Cameroon, the Ministry responsible for the Environment and Nature Protection has been working closely with TİKA, which has been a collaborative effort. For the purpose of a project to fight urban garbage, TİKA has provided the city of Maroua, which is located in the Far North Region of Cameroon, with various pieces of equipment and supplies. The initiative, which is being referred to as “Clean Maroua,” has the objectives of lowering the amount of pollution in the environment, improving the physical infrastructure of the municipality, and increasing public awareness about the need of preserving a clean environment.

4.2.4 Support to Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV)

The Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV), a government-owned broadcasting service, has been at the vanguard of the broadcasting industry since its inception, surpassing the views of other private-owned stations on a national scale. TİKA has made considerable material donations to assist the media industry in Cameroon, with a particular focus on enhancing the broadcasting capabilities of CRTV. This encompasses the renovation of the primary studio hall of CRTV, which functions as the official publication organ of Cameroon. The following are photographs of His Excellency Victor Tchatchouwo, Ambassador of the Republic of Cameroon to Turkey, and Prof. Dr. Yusuf Tekin, Minister of National Education of Türkiye.

4.2.5 Sports and recreational infrastructure projects

Yenigun Construction, a Turkish firm, built the Japoma stadium in Douala, Cameroon. It was renowned as one of the country’s most expansive football stadiums. The Japoma sports complex include a stadium, which is the largest in Cameroon, with a seating capacity of up to 50,000 people (Anadolu Agency, 2016). Furthermore, it included a sports facility with a gymnasium, a swimming pool of Olympic proportions, two training grounds, and tennis courts. Japoma has undergone a transformation, becoming the most opulent and lavish

stadium in Cameroon. Tahsin Tufan Sercan, the Projects Director of Yenigun Africa, confirmed in an interview with Anadolu Agency that the project, initiated in March 2017, has been successfully completed (Anadolu Agency, 2016). The stadium's completion signified the conclusion of the project, including the finalisation of all associated infrastructures and any remaining supplementary requirements (Anadolu Agency, 2016). The initial contract value for the project was \$232 million, but due to unanticipated expenditures and extra requirements, the ultimate cost of the project climbed to \$254 million. Japoma has undergone a transformation, becoming the most opulent and lavish stadium in Cameroon. Sercan confidently proclaimed that the stadium, which hosted the Africa Cup of Nations in January 2022, would be the foremost venue for the event and would showcase significant matches. Sercan highlighted that prior to this undertaking, the skills and abilities of Turkish entrepreneurs had not been acknowledged by Cameroonians.

The Japoma stadium often garnered praise from FIFA, CAF, and Cameroonian authorities. The expertise and skill of Turkish firms impressed Cameroonians. Sercan says that Turks and Turkish firms have undergone a total transformation. According to the director, Yenigun Construction hired over 2,000 workers for the project, with Cameroonians comprising 70% of the workforce. Eximbank, a Turkish financial institution, supplied the necessary funds for the expenses related to the investment. The African market is now garnering substantial interest. Sercan reported a significant decrease in the global market and emphasised that the African market had become the main area of focus. Africa has emerged as a prominent market, offering several economic prospects across multiple sectors in different nations on the continent (Anadolu Agency, 2016).

The Turkish Eximbank has partnered with SSA public agencies and the private sector to increase trade between the two countries. Türkiye's announced desire to join the Africa Exim Bank highlights the level of cooperation between Sub-Saharan African states and Turkey (Dahir, 2018: 13). The 50000 Capacity Japoma Stadium in Douala, which hosted the 2021 African Cup of Nations in Cameroon, where Senegal emerged as the champions, deserves attention. CTBC reports that Turkish enterprises have made a substantial contribution to the development of Cameroon's infrastructure. They have actively

participated in several infrastructure and construction projects, contributing to the development of remarkable structures and facilities around the country. Some notable companies in this industry include ESER construction, GROUPERDEM, YENİGUN, and AGS Metal. Türkiye's main exports to Cameroon, as indicated on the LinkedIn page of the Cameroon Türkiye Business Council, include construction materials, iron or steel components, cement, steel profiles, insulated cables and wires, pasta, iron and steel wire, plastic pipes, yeast, plastic packaging materials, iron and steel gases or liquefied gases, containers, furniture, aluminium construction and building components, cigarettes, foundry chemicals, scarves, carpets, air conditioners and steel cookers.

4.3 Political Effects

The second strategic agency attempt includes African political actors wielding power via partnership with Turkey, with the goal of diversifying economic and political relationships in order to reduce dependency. African nations have attempted to create new political and economic ties with Turkey throughout time, while maintaining their partnerships with old Western powers. Türkiye was granted observer status by the African Union in 2005, followed by strategic partner status in 2008. In the same year, İstanbul held the first-ever Turkish-Africa Cooperation conference, with participants from 50 African states. These measures have increased Türkiye's political and economic involvement with Sub-Saharan Africa, primarily via the enlargement of foreign missions, regular high-level visits, and the founding of Türkiye-Africa cooperation summits. African nations are strategically using Turkish economic activity to achieve the African Union's Agenda 2063, which seeks to promote inclusive growth and sustainable development throughout the continent. Furthermore, these nations want to reduce their dependency on conventional Western players and China. (Gökhan 2021, referenced in Dahir, 2021:10). The picture below shows Ambassador Ayse Sarac, who served as the Turkish Ambassador to Cameroon until February 2021 and was later granted the Commander of the Order of Valour medal on April 1, 2021.

The connection between Cameroon and Turkey was evaluated by the Minister of External Relations, Mbella Mbella, and the Turkish Ambassador, Ayse Sarac, with the aim of enhancing and consolidating it, as reported by the Cameroon Tribune (2020). The Turkish

ambassador was given a meeting by the Minister of External Relations on September 24, 2020. Ambassador Ayse Sarac said that she had in-depth discussions with the Minister about all aspects of the bilateral ties between the two countries during their one-hour meeting. Engaging in discussions with the Minister of External Relations over many facets of our partnership is a delightful experience. She conducted a thorough analysis of the interrelationships in the political, economic, and social spheres, emphasising the mutually beneficial contacts between the two nations. Cameroon and Turkey have formed a comprehensive collaboration, marked by many agreements in the fields of health, education, and infrastructure (Amabo, 2020).

Turkey has made the effort to broaden and enhance its diplomatic and political arsenals, which has culminated in the country organising the inaugural Antalya Diplomacy Forum in the year 2021. Ankara has established this as a diplomatic tradition, with the most recent one taking place in March 2022 and bringing together prominent officials from across the world. On the website of the Cameroon Embassy in Ankara, it was revealed that on June 19, 2021, the Minister of External Relations, His Excellency Mbella Mbella, met with the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, His Excellency Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. The meeting took place at the NEST Congress and Exhibition Centre in Antalya. At a meeting that took place on the fringes of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, His Excellency Mbella Mbella and his Turkish counterpart discussed the current Forum as well as the bilateral ties between the two countries. The accomplishments of Turkey in terms of the effective organisation of the Forum, the relevance of the issue, and the quality of the panel discussions and themes were praised by Cameroon. According to Ambacam Turquie (2024b), the two Ministers expressed their appreciation for the high level of collaboration that exists between Cameroon and Turkey. They also said that the ties between the two countries, which are founded on trust, mutual understanding, and solidarity, have been fast developing over the last few years.

Table 4.4. *Summary of the respondent's views on the positive economic effects of Turkish Cameroon relations on Cameroon*

Factors	Respondents' Views	Percentage %
Economic growth and development	23	19.2%
Improved Infrastructure	17	14.2%

Table 4.4. table continued

Improved trade relations	56	46.7%
Increase Investments	18	15.0%
Others	2	1.7%
Presence of industries	4	3.3%

The bar chart demonstrates that 46.7% of the respondents held trade relations positively impactful and 19.2% of them pursued economic growth and development in order to ascertain their opinions regarding the positive effects of Turkish-Cameroon relations on Cameroon. In the meantime, 15.0% of the respondents reported that Turkish companies' increased investment in Cameroon is a positive indicator of the relationship. Additionally, 14.2% of the respondents identified improved infrastructural development as a positive effect of the relationship on Cameroon. 3.3% of the respondents perceived the establishment of Turkish companies in the cement, iron, and steel sectors as a positive effect on Cameroon. Finally, 1.7% of the respondents identified other factors that suggest Turkish positive effects on Cameroon as a result of bilateral relations.




Figure 4.4. Pie chart above indicates the viewpoints of the respondents in relation to the impact of Turkish investments on the economic growth of Cameroon (Researcher computation (Questionnaire) 2023)

While the main focus of this dissertation was not to analyse the influence of Turkish presence on economic growth and development in Cameroon, the researcher found it necessary to collect the viewpoints of the participants on this issue. Based on the study, 36.70% of the participants said that it has led to the development of tangible assets. In addition, a notable 25.80% of the participants expressed the belief that the creation of Turkish-owned newborn businesses had a substantial influence on the economic growth and development of Cameroon. Additionally, 18.30% of the participants said that it has resulted in the dissemination of technological knowledge. Meanwhile, 13.30% of the participants highlighted the significance of investigating natural resources, but just 5.80% acknowledged alternative components as vital for the economic advancement and expansion in Cameroon. Nevertheless, they recognised the substantial influence of the aforementioned elements for

Cameroon's economic growth and development, attributed to the bilateral relations with Türkiye.

Table 4.5. *Summary of Respondents' Views on the Negative effects of Turkish-Cameroon Relations on Cameroon*

Factors	Respondents' views	Percentage (%)
Dumping	30	25.00%
Exploitation of raw materials	7	5.83%
Insignificant transfer of technology	10	8.33%
Killing of local firms	40	33.33%
Negative balance of trade	33	27.50%

The data from the table indicates that 33.33% of the participants believed that the Turkish economic presence in Cameroon has a detrimental effect on local industries, while 27.50% believe it contributes to a negative balance of payment (BOP) in Cameroon's trade. Surprisingly, 25% of the participants believed that dumping has a negative impact on this relationship. Additionally, 8.33% thought that it leads to an insignificant transfer of technology, which is detrimental to Cameroon. Furthermore, only 5.83% of the respondents viewed the exploitation of raw materials as a negative aspect affecting the bilateral ties between Turkey and Cameroon.

4.4 Challenges of Turkish-Cameroon Relations

Between 2010 and 2022, the interaction between Ankara and Yaoundé was hindered by significant obstacles, indicating a state of confusion and disorder in terms of the difficulties and possibilities in these connections. The relationship between Turkey and Cameroon in the last ten years has been influenced by several reasons, including changes in geopolitics, regional dynamics, and internal events inside their own borders. The cordial relationship between Cameroon and its trading partners is being tested by various factors that are hindering the country's development and growth. These include pressure from France due to the France-Afrique Accord, the growing presence of Turkish goods in the market,

negative balances of payment, depletion of natural resources, and differences in governance approaches. To fully understand the complexities of the relationship between Ankara and Yaounde during this specific time period, it is necessary to conduct a detailed examination of the bilateral dynamics, the geopolitical and regional interests in Africa, particularly in the CEMAC region, as well as the prevailing trends in that area. Below, I will discuss the specific issues and complications that have been identified earlier and how they significantly impact these relationships throughout the specified time period.

4.4.1 Pressure from France

Türkiye encounters obstacles in accessing several sectors of Cameroon's economy as a result of the France-Afrique Accord. These sectors are exclusively dominated by unseen French influences that originate from the historical colonial domination and persist via neocolonial practices. The enduring agreement between France and its former African colonies, especially Cameroon, has significantly influenced the economic progress and advancement of Cameroon. Within this agreement, Paris has significant influence and intervenes in the economic well-being of Cameroon, which hinders the independent economic potential of Cameroon and other countries involved. Due to significant intervention, the economic relationship between Yaoundé and Ankara is negatively impacted.

Sylla (2017) argues that the CFA franc, created by General de Gaulle on 26 December 1945, is seen as a vestige of colonialism. It is now being used in many Francophone African nations. For those aiming to export products that can compete effectively, get fair financing, encourage the integration of business throughout the continent, or support the liberation of Africa from imperialist control, the CFA franc is an antiquated and outmoded currency that should be gradually and deliberately phased out.

France, like other colonial empires such as the UK's pound zone or Portugal's escudo zone, too had its own franc zone. The CFA franc, formerly referred to as the French African Colonial franc, was officially formed on 26 December 1945 by a decree issued by General de Gaulle. The currency is a result of France's intention to encourage economic integration among its colonies, with the aim of gaining influence over their resources, economic frameworks, and political systems. Furthermore, Paris' interference and influence in

Yaoundé's economy have led to significant repercussions in key sectors like as banking, telecommunications, and the exploration of valuable resources such as minerals, oil, and forestry, among others. Paris has malign influence on Cameroon, manipulating its resources and economic sectors, so hindering Cameroon's capacity to diversify its economy and promote innovation with other partners like Türkiye. Hence, the substantial assistance offered by France impedes competition and innovation, hence decelerating the economic growth and development of Cameroon, as elucidated in their 2035 Emerging Plan.

Furthermore, this agreement significantly undermines the viability of domestic businesses in both Cameroon and other African nations, since it places greater importance on advancing French interests rather on supporting these governments. France benefits from preferential treatment, as seen by the favourable treatment and easy acceptance of French companies when bidding for contracts and investments. This results in the partial exclusion of other appropriate partners, such as Türkiye, which puts them at a disadvantage. Therefore, Turkish enterprises face a hindrance that limits their ability to enter the economic and trade markets in Cameroon, which in turn hampers their economic engagement with the country. This obstacle acts as a stumbling block to the development of bilateral economic ties. Cameroon has additional challenges due to the France-Afrique Accord, which complicates the establishment of a mutually advantageous connection between Türkiye's diplomatic and commercial leaders and Cameroon, primarily due to the influence of Paris. Given France's intervention and Türkiye's recent activities in the CEMAC zone and Africa, there is a possibility of conflicts emerging between the Yaoundé and Ankara areas over important matters. To counter France's meddling in Cameroon, it is necessary to either nullify the Accord or reconsider its contents. Additionally, Cameroon should have an autonomous foreign and economic strategy that focuses on the country's economic diversification and interests.

4.4.2 Increased Turkish presence in Cameroon

Due to the bilateral links between Turkey and Cameroon during the last ten years, there has been a notable rise in Turkish involvement in the commercial activities of Yaoundé, with little or no political intervention. The growing influence of Ankara in Cameroon is evident via the formation of Turkish enterprises, investments, and the

significant flood of Turkish products and services into the Cameroonian market. This poses a danger to Cameroon's economy by influencing local industries and businesses. Furthermore, the growing prominence of Turkish organisations and businesses in Cameroon's economic landscape has detrimental impacts on domestic enterprises. Turkish enterprises expanding their operations in Cameroon will get advantages from economies of scale, technical supremacy, and low manufacturing costs. Under these circumstances, it might stimulate market competitiveness, resulting in market saturation, which may force local firms and emerging industries to expand beyond their current capacity and resources in order to successfully compete with Turkish enterprises.

Furthermore, the Turkish industries' involvement in the manufacturing, construction, and commerce sectors of Cameroon's economy is facilitated by their government's assistance, allowing them to easily enter the Cameroonian market and pursue their economic objectives. As a result, this has negative consequences for Cameroon, including market saturation, dumping, price pressures, and a decrease in market shares for domestic companies that are unable to compete. This leads to a decrease in profits and, in some cases, the eventual closure of local and small- to medium-sized enterprises in Cameroon, as has been observed with Chinese and French companies. Furthermore, a significant obstacle to Cameroon's economic sector lies in the disruption of local enterprises. Cameroonian markets are seeing a significant surge of textile items from Türkiye, resulting in an overwhelming abundance of these products in the textile industry. Consequently, this leads to the exclusion of local producers from the market, hinders their growth, causes unemployment, discourages skilled labour, and hampers grassroots entrepreneurship.

Furthermore, the establishment of Turkish enterprises, such as cement factories, in Cameroon has led to the emergence of several concerns related to labour, environment, corporate social responsibility, and government involvement. Given the ample resources of these Turkish companies, Cameroon faces difficulties in enforcing its labour laws, environmental regulations, and corporate governance standards. Consequently, these companies often exploit workers, contribute to environmental degradation, and occasionally create tensions with indigenous communities, as they fail to fulfil their social corporate responsibilities. Overall, the growing presence of Turkish companies in Cameroon's

economy is expected to pose a threat to the long-term viability and expansion of emerging sectors. Therefore, authorities should promptly address this issue by considering the concerns of local firms

4.4.3 Depletion of Resources

The study conducted on Chinese economic operations in the exploration and manufacturing sectors in Cameroon clearly demonstrates that the depletion of resources by Chinese enterprises has resulted in a negative perception of China in both Africa and Cameroon. The establishment of Turkish enterprises in Cameroon, evident via their functioning in several economic areas, presents a significant obstacle to the sustained growth of the host country, Cameroon. Cameroon's abundance of natural resources, including oil, lumber, and minerals, has attracted the interest of international firms, particularly from Western countries. This has led to rivalry with other countries such as Turkey and Russia. As Turkish enterprises concluded commercial agreements with the government of Cameroon, resulting in the growth of their activities, these corporations need natural resources to initiate their production capabilities, including land, water, and raw materials. In a competitive economic climate such as Cameroon, the strong need for resources leads to excessive use, deterioration, and exhaustion of local resources. This has detrimental impacts on the environment, ecosystems, and long-term economic sustainability.

Furthermore, if Turkish enterprises develop an interest in extracting natural resources by fully utilising their resources and skills, they may disregard the environmental laws that regulate sustainable resource extraction. This leads to the occurrence of pollution, deforestation, habitat degradation, and several long-term adverse consequences for rural communities and their ecosystems. The depletion of resources in Cameroon may have economic implications since it may decrease the availability of resources required by small and medium-sized firms and local populations. This can lead to increased competition and higher pricing for some important goods. Furthermore, this would hinder the development and market competitiveness among local enterprises and industries, in addition to the current competition between Turkish industries and Cameroonian ones.

Additionally, the agricultural, industrial, and tourist sectors of Cameroon's economy may have severe consequences as a result of resource depletion. For instance, the forestry

operations conducted by the French and Chinese have resulted in widespread deforestation due to excessive logging. This has had a detrimental impact on agricultural output, leading to a shortage of food and causing farmers to lose their earnings. While Türkiye has not yet made a significant impact in the forestry sector in Cameroon, it does have a presence in the cement manufacturing industry. However, this activity has the potential to cause pollution, which can contaminate water sources and negatively impact the health, agriculture, and development of tourist sites that possess natural resources. In addition, the depletion of resources would result in disparities and social unrest inside the nation where the resources are located. Due to the presence of Turkish enterprises in the extractive and manufacturing sectors, their repatriation leads to the emergence of inequality, which in turn fosters conflict and anger about land, resources, and limited economic prospects.

4.4.4 Negative Balance of Payment (BoP)

The concept of a negative or positive balance of payment (BoP) is of great importance in the field of economics and trade between states, as it is an economic parameter that is used to evaluate a country's financial transactions in relation to the rest of the world. Trade, investments, and financial flows comprise these transactions. A country experiences a negative balance of payments (BOP) when it allocates a greater amount of its revenue to importation, debt servicing, and other international financial obligations than to earnings from exports, investments, and other sources, such as foreign exchange. In the context of our discussion regarding the relationship between Cameroon and Turkey, there are specific factors that may result in a negative balance of payments (BoP).

The initial consequence of the mass importation of Turkish products in the form of commodities and services is the creation of trade imbalances. This is due to the fact that Yaoundé permits substantial imports from Turkey in comparison to its exports. This is apparent in the textile industry, where a significant number of Turkish products are entering the Cameroon market, displacing products from China, France, and other foreign countries in terms of other foreign goods and services. Consequently, the necessity to satisfy external obligations has an impact on Cameroon's foreign exchange reserves.

Secondly, the BoP would be exacerbated by the heavy investment and financial infusion into Cameroon by Turkish companies, which would result in the repatriation of

profits and dividends to Turkey as a result of the influx of Turkish companies into the market as a result of economic agreements. Furthermore, the negative balance of payments (BOP) will be further exacerbated by the obligations associated with servicing these debts if Cameroon obtains loans to finance domestic infrastructure projects and establishes other partnerships with Turkey. An illustration of a project that Türkiye implemented in the infrastructural sector is the Japoma Stadium, which served as the venue for the 2021 African Cup of Nations. Yenigun Company, a Turkish organisation, emerged victorious in the tendering process, surpassing the French.

Thirdly, the BoP of Cameroon may be significantly affected in the context of its economic relations with Turkey as a result of currency fluctuations, particularly the dollar and euro, which are the result of exchange rates, geographical factors, and global economic malaise. This does present a challenge for the relationship between Cameroon and Turkey, as it is influenced by global market forces that are under the control of international financial institutions and agencies that provide credit. The frequent and high borrowing costs that result from Cameroon's frequent reliance on foreign financing to address trade inequalities limit access to the international capital markets, indicating concerns regarding the country's creditworthiness and debt sustainability.

Fourthly, the exacerbation of trade deficits may impede domestic development and industrial growth in Cameroon in the event of a negative BoP in these relations with Cameroon, which could pose a challenge for the country's economy. The continued mass importation of specific products from Turkey would inevitably erode the competitiveness of indigenous firms and manufacturers in Cameroon. This is due to the fact that domestic firms would be compelled to compete against affordable Turkish products in the Cameroonian market, resulting in unemployment, a decline in investment, industrial stagnation, vulnerability, external shocks, and a supply chain breakdown that would have a negative impact on the country. Also, the macroeconomic stability of Cameroon would be impacted by the negative balance of payments (BoP), which is a result of frequent current account deficits that are the result of excessive imports from Turkey. Cameroon would be unable to attract foreign investments, adhere to fiscal stability, and execute monetary policies, which has a negative connotation. All of these factors contribute to the creation of inflationary

economic pressures, currency depreciation, and imbalances in the macroeconomic realm, thereby undermining the confidence of investors and the potential for economic growth and development in Cameroon.

Table 4.6. *Summary of Respondents' Views on the Challenges Faced by Cameroon as a Result of its Relations with Türkiye*

Factors	Respondents' Views	Percentage %
Depletion of Resources	19	15.83%
Increase Turkish Presence	31	25.83%
Negative BOP	19	15.83%
Other	6	5.00%
Pressure from France	45	37.50%

The table above depicts Cameroon's obstacles in her relationship with Türkiye. According to the figures, 37.50% of respondents believe that pressure from France as a result of the France-Afrique Accord is a serious impediment to Cameroon's economic development and prosperity, preventing full interchange and involvement with Turkey. 25.83% of them said that growing Turkish presence may be a problem for Cameroon. Also, 15.83% viewed a negative BOP on Cameroon as a setback, another 15.83% saw resource depletion as a barrier for the nation, and 5% identified other variables as obstacles for Cameroon while maintaining bilateral relations with Turkey.

Table 4.7. *Summary of Respondents' Views on How the Economic Future of this Relationship with Türkiye will be like in Cameroon*

Factors	Respondents' Views	Percentage %
Remarkably increase	31	25.8%
Same	17	14.2%
Slight decrease	7	5.8%
Slightly Increase	65	54.2%

Source: Field work (questionnaire) researcher, 2023

The table above displays the distribution of respondents' perspectives on future economic connections. These viewpoints will serve as guidance for policy makers in Cameroon. Approximately 54% of the participants believed that the relationship between Yaoundé and Ankara will see a little boost. 26% of the respondents expressed that the ties

between the states would significantly improve, while 14% believed that the relations would remain same. Additionally, 6% of the respondents believed that the relations would somewhat deteriorate.

4.5 Conclusion

Presently, the trajectory of Turkish-Cameroonian ties is poised to persist and advance rapidly. This part of the thesis has discussed the economic benefits that Cameroon gains from its interactions with Türkiye. Furthermore, the political and socio-cultural advantages that Yaoundé gains from its links with Ankara are emphasised. Ankara's economic engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa, namely in Cameroon, is a consequence of its enduring political, economic, and social activities on the international stage. In the future, there is a high probability that commerce, investment, and political and diplomatic connections will significantly advance and expand. Therefore, the influence of past colonial powers will be replaced by Türkiye as a dependable ally, along with China, Brazil, India, and Russia inside the continent. Furthermore, this part revealed the difficulties that Cameroon has in its relations with Türkiye, which mostly arise from the following crucial factors: influence exerted by France, growing Turkish involvement in Cameroon's economy, resource depletion, and an unfavourable balance of payment (BoP). This is confirmed by the figures obtained from reliable sources and survey from participants.

CHAPTER FIVE

5 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter provides a concise overview summary of the findings, the resulting conclusion, and, most significantly, offers recommendations for potential policy choices.

5.1 Summary of Findings

With focus on the economic impact in Cameroon resulting from the ties between Türkiye and Cameroon from 2010 to 2022, as well as the potential benefits for Yaoundé in these interactions, much was uncovered in this study.

The data collected and analysed indicate that there are three major motivating factors (amongst other minor factors) behind Ankara's recent interest in Cameroon. Firstly, Türkiye aims to strengthen south-south relations with Cameroon. Secondly, Türkiye seeks to enhance economic ties and cooperation with Cameroon in order to establish itself as a global economic powerhouse. Lastly, Ankara is motivated by its quest for raw materials and trading opportunities with Cameroon. In addition, a small element involves the fabrication of the Ankara Consensus and the establishment of military collaboration.

In addition, findings revealed that Türkiye's middle power status offers it a chance to strategically positioning itself as a middle power in global affairs. Historical ties and economic power help it expand its influence in Cameroon and elsewhere. Türkiye seeks to position itself as a dependable ally in economic growth and diplomatic affairs by implementing a free-market economic system and prioritizing humanitarian foreign policy. This method differs from the conventional practices of colonial powers, providing Cameroon with an alternative collaboration that encompasses infrastructural initiatives and economic investments. As a result, it broadens Cameroon's international connections beyond its past affiliations with other states mostly especially with France.

More so according to the findings, Cameroon has seen economic advantages as a result of its association with Türkiye. Turkish firms have a substantial impact on Cameroon's infrastructure development initiatives, making valuable contributions to the country's economic expansion and employment opportunities as Cameroon seeks to become an emerging economy by 2035. This engagement highlights Türkiye's expanding economic

influence in Sub-Saharan Africa and its contribution to promoting coalitions amongst countries in the global south. Cameroon's relationship with Türkiye offers prospects for varied economic alliances that go beyond typical Western influences, despite constraints such as past colonial links and economic weaknesses.

Furthermore, findings from the research indicates that Cameroon has been and continues to benefit from the bilateral connections with Türkiye. Cameroonians now have access to a variety of Turkish products in the market, breaking away from the previous dominance of Chinese and other products, particularly in the textile industry. The development of necessary infrastructure, particularly in sports and recreation, is finally being realised without the usual delays associated with European countries, mainly France. Additionally, Turkish companies are offering various programmes that provide opportunities for the local population. Cameroonians have taken advantage of self-employment prospects by participating in the trade of Turkish consumer goods. Many of them run large scale and retailing of textiles shops, as well as e-commerce businesses with products from Türkiye.

The study focuses on the difficulties that Cameroon faces in its contacts with Turkey, as well as the controversies surrounding these interactions. These issues include economic reliance, the hazards of excessive exportation, and the impact of previous colonial powers such as France. Furthermore, despite Turkey's significant economic contributions, Cameroon faces economic challenges arising from its colonial past and the balance of payments. The vulnerable domestic export firms are encountering a substantial menace from the substantial flood of cost-effective Turkish produced products. This threat encompasses the immediate peril of dumping, the outflow of money, a negative balance of payments, and the prospective hazard of resource depletion resulting from the introduction of Turkish enterprises in the manufacturing sector. Based on this setting, the researcher arrives at his conclusion. These problems highlight the subtle intricacies of developing economic alliances, as well as Cameroon's ambitions to attain emerging economy status by 2035.

To summarize, Turkey's changing foreign policy in Cameroon mirrors larger changes in global power dynamics, providing economic prospects but also posing strategic problems that Cameroon must carefully negotiate in order to attain long-term economic growth and development.

5.2 Conclusion

The researcher's objective was to ensure that all readers of this study comprehend the importance of not simply analysing the relationship between Turkey and Cameroon. Turks are renowned for their commitment to conventional principles and secular ideologies. Turkey operates under a centralised state-controlled political system, despite the presence of many political parties. Furthermore, it implements a free market economic system that is rapidly expanding on a global scale. Nevertheless, Turkey has a long and conventional economic relationship with Western nations, including the European Union.

Analysing Turkish-Cameroon relations via the lens of global system theorists is advisable for a comprehensive understanding. These thinkers acknowledge both the exploitative relationship between core states and periphery states under capitalism, as well as the rise and fall of dominating powers and the difficulties that come with being a superpower. Moreover, the Middle Power theory is relevant in this context, and Turkey, as an emerging middle power, is strategically using its natural attributes to successfully establish itself as a middle power on a global scale. From this standpoint, one may comprehend the motives for Türkiye's engagement in Cameroon, along with the nation's expanding economic sway and the tactics it utilises to preserve its status as a middle power state. Turkey combines its position as a prominent nation with a robust humanitarian foreign policy and substantial global assistance contributions.

Against this context, this study concludes that Cameroon is reaping advantages from its relations with Turkey. However, this stance is marred by controversies for an economy like Cameroon, which aspires to become an emerging economy by 2035. This is due to the fact that the economic data and statistics, which are crucial for this growth and development, indicate a challenging economic situation for Cameroon due to its colonial pact with France and the potential risks of dumping.

Conclusively, the initial chapter of the thesis commences with a thorough introduction, followed by the problem statement, research questions, assumptions and hypotheses of the thesis, the purpose and significance of the thesis, the research methodology, the theoretical framework, the literature review, the thesis's contribution to existing scientific knowledge,

the scope and limitations of the thesis, the feasibility, and lastly, the organization of the thesis.

Also, chapter two analyzes the historical connections between Turkey and the African continent, covering the time from the Ottoman Empire to the pre- and post-Cold War periods, as well as the years from 2010 to 2022 in the 21st century. This chapter presented a comprehensive summary of the economic and political connections between the continent and Turkey, with a specific emphasis on the most important and longstanding events. The literature analyzes the slow advancement of Turkish participation across many historical periods, which may indicate the presence of the "too late Hewett Syndrome" in Ankara's foreign policy strategies. Furthermore, the thesis examines how the existence of several political parties in Turkey and the wide array of political ideologies have influenced both domestic and foreign policy towards Africa, adding a unique quality to the study. Ankara's foreign policy has recently undergone transformations, emphasizing the importance of foreign policy analysis.

Furthermore, the analyses in chapter three demonstrate that during the 2000s and particularly in the last decade, the Republic of Cameroon and the Republic of Turkey have constantly maintained strong and friendly bilateral relations. South-south alliances, economic collaboration, the pursuit of natural resources and commerce, and political and diplomatic considerations largely drive Ankara's intention to strengthen its relations with Yaoundé. Given the aforementioned goals, we have elucidated Cameroon's foreign and economic policy orientations in light of the leadership of both current and previous presidents. Both nations have been fostering a positive and expanding diplomatic connection, particularly in the last several decades. Both nations possess market economies that prioritize global trade. They advocate for noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations and actively promote partnership among rising countries. Cameroon, under the leadership of Presidents Ahidjo and Biya, has always pursued a non-confrontational foreign policy, cultivating friendly connections with both capitalist and communist economies. Between 2010 and 2022, the Turkish government successfully transformed its economy from a centrally controlled system to a market-oriented one, but with some degree of government supervision, while encountering economic challenges. Many African countries, including Cameroon, have

warmly welcomed Turkey's successful establishment of a strong presence. Turkish foreign policy is yielding positive results on a global scale, as evidenced by the bilateral ties between Turkey and Cameroon. Turkish companies are making significant progress in Cameroon, especially since they are responsible for carrying out most of the country's infrastructure development projects. Over the last several decades, Cameroon and Turkey have engaged in many significant diplomatic encounters, with top officials from both countries paying visits to each other.

Currently, Turkish-Cameroonian relations are set to continue and progress quickly. Chapter four of the thesis has examined the economic advantages that Cameroon derives from its ties with Turkey. Furthermore, the thesis highlights the political and socio-cultural benefits that Yaoundé gains from its connections with Ankara. Ankara's economic involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Cameroon, is a result of its persistent political, economic, and social endeavours on the global platform. In the future, it is quite likely that there will be considerable advancements and expansions in business, investment, and political and diplomatic relations. Therefore, Turkey, along with China, Brazil, India, and Russia within the continent, will replace the dominance of former colonial powers as a reliable partner. Moreover, this section emphasized the challenges Cameroon faces in its interactions with Turkey, primarily due to the following significant factors: France's exerted influence, increasing Turkish engagement in Cameroon's economy, resource depletion, and an unfavorable balance of payment (BoP) data from reputable sources and the individuals who participated in the poll corroborate this.

5.3 Recommendations

Given the preliminary nature of this study in this field, it is only fitting that exceptional recommendations be provided for policy options regarding an issue that affects the daily economic life of the Cameroonian economy.

- The Turkish government contributes to the budgetary income of Cameroon by paying tariffs and company taxes. However, the Cameroonian government is experiencing a decrease in tax revenue as a result of the consistent closure of local businesses, which has led to an increase in unemployment rates within the country. Therefore, it is

imperative that the government develop strategies that not only protect, but also promote the expansion of domestic manufacturing, particularly in the textile sector. It is evident that textile products from Turkey are being introduced into the marketplaces of Cameroon, as indicated by the data collected from the surveys. This presents a substantial obstacle for small-scale Cameroonian enterprises, as they are unable to effectively compete with Turkish product suppliers. The issue of rising youth unemployment would be substantially addressed through a comprehensive reform of the tax law that encourages local economic activity.

- It is advisable to implement the indigenization policy that is currently in place in Nigeria in order to address the issue of limited transfer of technology. The Turks frequently import approximately 85% of their workforce from their homeland, while only 15% of local personnel are employed to execute their projects, a practice that is comparable to the conventional Chinese approach. The implementation of policies similar to those in Nigeria regarding technological transfer by the Cameroonian government and parliamentarians would not only increase employment opportunities for highly educated Cameroonians, but also address the issue of skill transfer from technologically advanced countries such as Turkey to Cameroonian workers without the necessity of them travelling to Turkey for training. A more visionary FP should be implemented at the national level, which will not only take into account the substantial benefits that are currently derived from Turkish-Cameroon relations. It is undeniable that Turkey is a burgeoning economic powerhouse with a middle power status, and it is impossible to ignore the global footprints of Ankara in the present day. However, it is crucial for Cameroon to recognise Türkiye's Ankara consensus as a core state that is gradually establishing itself in the global economy and humanitarian diplomacy, diverting attention from the West's dominance. I suggest that Ankara-Yaoundé strengthen and deepen bilateral trade ties, facilitate market access for unique products, and address trade barriers to promote greater economic cooperation in order to strengthen bilateral relations and deepen trade agreements on multiple fronts. Furthermore, policymakers should consider the establishment of comprehensive monitoring and evaluation bureaus to monitor the extent of progress

and the impact of Turkish foreign policy footprints in Cameroon. This can be achieved by strengthening, monitoring, and evaluating mechanisms. This would result in the efficient execution of economic development initiatives, accountability, and transparency enforcement.

- An additional suggestion is that the government of Cameroon should encourage investment by implementing investment promotion mechanisms and strategies to attract more Turkish investments in critical sectors of the country's economy, including energy, mining, timber, agriculture, and manufacturing. This will help to stimulate economic growth and create employment opportunities for young Cameroonians. Moreover, the support for sustainable development projects and capacity-building schemes in Cameroon, with Turkish support, is necessary to navigate inclusive growth, environmental sustainability, and social welfare for Cameroonians.
- Finally, on the political and diplomatic dimension, there is a need to promote seasonal diplomatic engagements in which Ankara and Yaoundé can hold joint diplomatic high-level dialogues, joint economic commissions and forums, speed mutual understanding, and map out new terrains for future economic cooperation.

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APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear Sir, / Madam,

I am Tekang P. Kwachuh, a final year Ph.D. fellow at Anadolu University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science and International Relations, writing my dissertation on “An Appraisal of the Economic Effects of Turkish Foreign Policy in Cameroon 2010-2022” in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) degree in Political Science and International Relations. Your names are not required and consequently I would be most grateful should you answer the questions truthfully and factually. The information you would provide will be treated with confidentiality and will be solely used for this academic purpose. I count on your cooperation to make this research endeavour a success.

Thanks for your understanding.

Section A: Demography (Tick the Box below)

Identification of Respondent.

1. Gender

Male

Female

2. Age

24-35yrs

36-45yrs

46-55yrs

56-65 yrs

66 yrs+

3. Nationality

- Cameroonian
- Other

4. Educational Level

- Primary Education

- Secondary Education
- Higher Education

5. Occupation

- Government Employee
- Private Employee
- Business owner
- Other (please specify)

Section B. Cameroon-Turkish Relations

(Please respond to the questions in this section by selecting one option)

- Do you have any idea about Turkish-Cameroon Relations?
 - Absolutely
 - Fairly Well
 - Vaguely
 - Not at all
- Do you support diplomatic relations between these two states?
 - Yes
 - No
- What is your impression of Turkish Economic operations in Cameroon generally?
 - Trustworthy
 - Cooperative
 - innovative
 - unreliable
 - Other
- In your opinion, what is the driving force (motivation) behind Turkish interest in Cameroon?
 - Promotion of south-south cooperation
 - Exploitation of raw materials to feed Turkish home industries
 - Ready market for Turkish goods and services
 - Transfer of technology

- Political influence in Cameroon
 - Other
- 10.** In your opinion, how successful are Turks pursuing their economic interests in Cameroon?
- Very successful
 - Successful
 - Moderate
 - Unsuccessful
 - Very Unsuccessful
 - Other

Section C. Economic Impact

- 11.** Are you involved in any economic business with Turks?
- Yes
 - No
- 12.** What kind of products/goods and services do you purchase from Türkiye?
- Textiles
 - Pharmaceuticals
 - Household Utensils
 - Construction materials
 - Agriculture
 - Other
- 13.** Are Turkish products worthy to be purchased in terms of quality and prices?
- Strongly Agree
 - Agree
 - Neutral
 - Disagree
 - Strong Disagree
- 14.** In which economic sectors do Turkish companies operate in Cameroon?
- Primary (Agriculture, Energy and Infrastructure)
 - Secondary (Manufacturing, Transportation and Telecommunications)

- Tertiary (Health, Education, Tourism and Finance)
 - Quaternary (Research and Development, Information Technology and Consulting)
 - Quinary (Fifth economic sector)
- 15.** What are the positive economic effects of Turkish-Cameroon relations on Cameroon?
- Improved trade relations
 - Increase Investments
 - Improved Infrastructure
 - Economic growth and development
 - Presence of industries
- 16.** What has been the impact of Turkish investments on the economic growth of Cameroon?
- Natural Resources
 - Physical Capital
 - Technology Transfer
 - Infant Industries
 - Other
- 17.** Are Turkish investments in Cameroon culminating towards the economic development/Vision 2035 of Cameroon?
- Strongly agree
 - Agree
 - Neutral
 - Disagree
 - Strongly disagree
- 18.** What are the negative effects of Turkish-Cameroon relations on Cameroon?
- Dumping
 - Killing of local firms
 - Negative balance of trade

- Insignificant transfer of technology
 - Exploitation of raw materials
- 19.** What possible economic challenges could Cameroon be facing or will face as a result of this relation?
- Pressure from France
 - Negative BoP
 - Depletion of resources
 - Increased Turkish presence
 - Other
- 20.** In your opinion, how will the economic future of this relationship be in Cameroon?
- Remarkably increase
 - Slightly increase
 - Same
 - Slightly decrease
 - Remarkably Decrease

Thanks for your cooperation