



REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
ALTINBAŞ UNIVERSITY
Institute of Graduate Studies
Business Administration

**ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATION OF TURKISH
AND IRAQI WOMEN IN LABOR MARKET**

Rwzan Abed Habeeb

Master's of Thesis

Supervisor

Assoc. Prof. Bengi YANIK İLHAN

Istanbul, 2022

ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATION OF TURKISH AND IRAQI WOMEN IN LABOR MARKET

Rwzan Abed Habeeb

Business Administration

Master's Thesis

ALTINBAŞ UNIVERSITY

2022

The thesis titled ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATION OF TURKISH AND IRAQI WOMEN IN LABOR MARKET prepared by Rwzan Abed Habeeb and submitted on x/x/2022 has been **accepted unanimously** for the degree of Master of Science in Business Administration.

Assoc. Prof. Bengi YANIK İLHAN

Supervisor

Thesis Defense Committee Members:

Assoc. Prof. Bengi YANIK İLHAN

School of business
administration,
University

Academic Title - First/Last Name

Department,
University

Academic Title - First/Last Name

Department,
University

I hereby declare that this thesis meets all format and submission requirements of a Master's thesis.

Submission date of the thesis to the Graduate Education Institute: ____/____/____

I hereby declare that all information and data presented in this graduation project has been obtained in full accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare all unoriginal materials and conclusions have been cited in the text and all references mentioned in the Reference List have been cited in the text, and vice versa as required by the abovementioned rules and conduct.

Rawzan Abed Habeeb

Signature

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to thanks my 'ALLAH' all mighty who is lord of the whole universe that he gives us the courage to complete our master research project successfully; otherwise, it cannot be easy for us to do this difficult job.

I have no words to thank my sweet 'Mother' for her prayers and kindness for her trust in me. I am also pleased to my father and siblings for their continuous encouragement that results in my dedication for work.

I am also taking this opportunity to express our deep sense of gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Bengi YANIK İLHAN, for his cooperation and guidance to complete this thesis.

ABSTRACT

ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATION OF TURKISH AND IRAQI WOMEN IN LABOR MARKET

Habeeb, Rwzan Abed

M.Sc., Business Administration, Altınbaş University,

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Bengi YANIK İLHAN

Date: Month/Year

Pages: 137

This research report analyzes women's labor force participation in Turkey and Iraq. Both countries are developing countries struggling for their economic growth. A comparative study aims to compare women's labor force participation in economic development. The current study is qualitative in nature and data is collected from secondary source. A vast literature review is done in chapter 2. Labor force participation of Iraq and Turkey have been compared in the current study.

The timeline of comparison of Labor force participation of Turkey and Iraq is 2000-2020. Economic growth is also elaborate due to women's labor force participation. After comparison it is concluded that Turkey, women's labor force participation is 26.23 times higher than Iraq, as Iraq struggles with its economy after a long war. Overall, women's empowerment is low in Iraq. However, some NGOs are working for women's empowerment in Iraq. There is still a great need for awareness about the women's labor force. That's why women's labor participation is very low in Iraq. Regardless, the situation in Turkey is better for women's empowerment than

in Iraq. Turkey's policy on women's empowerment has lately evolved. Women may now work in any area with the same freedoms as men. Because of the male-dominated society in Iraq, there are still some restrictions on women's employment. There is little improvement in the women's labor force rate from the past. In the future, Iraqi women will contribute more to the economic growth of Iraq.

Keywords: Labor force, GDP per capita, Economic Development.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Pages</u>
ABSTRACT	4
LIST OF TABLES	10
LIST OF FIGURES	11
1. INTRODUCTION.....	12
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY	12
1.1.1 Relationship between Women's Participation and Fertility.....	18
1.1.2 Overview of Women labour Force in Turkey.....	22
1.1.3 Overview of Iraq's Women labour Force	24
1.1.4 Impact of Syrian Immigration in Turkey and Iraq Labour Force	26
1.1.5 Women Employment in Agriculture and Manufacturing Turkey and Iraqi.....	28
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT	31
1.3 AIM OF RESEARCH.....	31
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES	31
1.5 MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY	32
1.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY	33
2. LITERATURE REVIEW	35
2.1 EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN THROUGH PUBLIC WORKS	35
2.2 PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN LABOR FORCES IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES	37
2.3 OVERALL LOOK AT WOMEN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION WORLDWIDE	40
2.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: DETERMINANTS	44

2.5 U-SHAPED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE LABOR FORCE	49
2.5.1 Impact of Education in Women labour force participation	50
2.5.2 The level of women' work is likewise significant for economic development	53
2.6 GENERAL COMPARISON OF TURKEY AND IRAQ.....	55
Source: (worlddata.info, 2021).....	55
2.7 ANALYSIS OF WOMEN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ	60
2.7.1 Iraq Profile	60
2.7.2 National framework and policy for women labor force participation in Iraq	64
2.7.3 Contribution of Iraqi Women to The Economy	65
2.7.4 WOMEN'S ROLE IN IRAQ'S AGRICULTURE SECTOR.....	67
2.7.5 Women's Role in Iraq's Industrial Sector	68
2.7.6 Analysis of Women's Employment Perception	69
2.7.7 The 2015 Iraq Labour Law	70
2.8 WOMEN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION TURKEY	71
2.9 TURKISH WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.....	73
3. RESEARCH COMPARISON OF TURKISH AND IRAQIAN WOMEN LABOR FORCE.....	75
3.1 RESEARCH COMPARISON.....	75
3.2 LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION TREND	75
3.3 Turkish Labour force women participation (Source: World bank, 2021)	77
3.4 IRAQ WOMENLABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE	78
3.5 IRAQI WOMEN CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.....	79
3.5.1 IRAQI WOMEN SITUATION IN SOCIETY	79
3.5.2 Iraqi women participation in Labour market (world bank, 2020)	81

3.6 TURKISH WOMEN CONTRIBUTION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	83
3.6.1 Annual Gross Domestic Product in Turkey.....	83
3.6.2 Gross domestic product of Turkey according to sectors	84
3.6.3 Worker pay developed by 9.6 % in 2020.	86
3.7 ANALYSIS OF TURKEY LABOR MARKET POLICIES.....	86
3.7.1 Coronavirus Social Protection Programs.....	86
3.7.2 Help to the Labour Market Under COVID-19.....	87
3.7.3 Previously, then after the fact the Pandemic, Turkey's Unemployment Rate	88
3.7.4 In 2020, Turkey's Labor Market Programs.....	89
3.8 ANALYSIS OF IRAQ LABOR MARKET OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES	90
4. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION	93
4.1 IMPORTANCE OF WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF TURKEY	93
4.2 IMPORTANCE OF WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQ	98
4.3 COMPARISON OF RATIO OF LABOR FORCE IN TURKEY AND IRAQ.....	101
4.4 DISCUSSIONS ON WOMEN CONTRIBUTION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF TURKEY	102
4.5 DISCUSSIONS ON WOMEN CONTRIBUTION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQ	104
4.6 COMPARISON BETWEEN TURKEY AND IRAQI WOMEN CONTRIBUTION IN GDP	105
4.7 COMPARATIVE DISCUSSIONS ON TURKEY AND IRAQI WOMEN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION	106
4.8 RECOMMENDATIONS	107

4.8.1 Recommendations for the labour Market Of Iraq	107
4.8.2 Recommendations for the labour Market of Turkey	108
4.9 CONCLUSION	110
REFERENCES	113



LIST OF TABLES

	<u>Pages</u>
Table 2.1: General Information	55
Table 2.2: Population	55
Table 2.3: Quality of Life value 0 (bad) to 100 (good).....	56
Table 2.4: Economy	56
Table 2.5: Infrastructure.....	57
Table 2.6: Energy Balance	58
Table 2.7: Telecommunication	58
Table 2.8: Healthcare system	59
Table 2.9: Native Lanuages.....	59
Table 2.10: Religion.....	60
Table 3.1: Turkish labor force women participation	77
Table 3.2: women contribution to GDP of Iraq.....	81
Table 4.1: Women(15-64years) labor force rate in Turkey and Iraq.....	101
Table 4.2: GDP per Capita Iraq and Turkey (Source world Bank)	105

LIST OF FIGURES

	<u>Pages</u>
Figure 1.1: Turkey and Iraq labor force participation and fertility rate.	19
Figure 1.2: Relationship of fertility rate and women's labor (World Bank, 1995).	20
Figure 3.1: Female labor Force Participation In Iraq from 2000 to March 2020 (World Bank, 2022)	78
Figure 3.2: percentage of men who think that they have specific rights to do certain tasks Source: Ministry of planning, Central statistical organization (2012: 57).	80
Figure 3.3: Female contribution in Iraqi organizations (source: World Bank economic survey 2018)	83
Figure 3. 4: GDP of Turkey per Capita Source: (World Bank, 2021).	84
Figure 3.5: GDP according to sectors Source: Institute of Turkey statistic	85
Figure 3.6: Social Protection Responses to the Pandemic of COVID-19 (Gentilini, 2020).	87
Figure 3.7: Comparison of unemployment rate in Turkey And Iraq from 2000-2020 (World Bank, 2022).	88
Figure 3.8: Labor market growth in Iraq.	91
Figure 4.1: Per capita GDP of both Countries.	105

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Women play an important role in unpaid household labor. According to a worldwide study, women spent more than 50 minutes a day on paid and unpaid labor in 2011. However, Turkey has taken essential steps to integrate with the global economy by shifting to a growth strategy oriented on exports from an import-substituting industrialization model and increasing women's labor force participation. The important regional changes in these rates indicate that the integration of women into the labor market still has several ways to attain the level of European Union countries. Turkey (2015–2021) had a GDP of \$856.8 billion and a labor force participation rate of 30.4 % for women, accounting for 1.16 % of the world economy. It is discussed in several studies that economic growth influences women's employment participation. Still, these studies only analyze their interdependent relationship and restrict the relationship of sectorial GDP growth and women's labor participation.

Women in the authority area accounted for barely 17% of the Arab labor force in 2016. They are frequently energetic, accomplished, and unmarried. Women's labor force inclusion falls drastically after marriage and afterward increments among bereaved, separated, or isolated more seasoned women. The participation of Arab women in the workplace was the lowest among the six emerging sectors in the 1990s. In the Arab World, Arab women's mobility rates are 21% lower than men's. This is discernibly lower than the East Asian locale's 80% women-to-men movement rate. The rate is less than the Sub-Saharan pace, which is 56, and less than Latin America, at 37, and South Asia (at 37) (Sattinger, 1995). If we analyze the general rules of the labor force, we will come to know that Arab countries have been focusing on women's empowerment since the 1970s. Increasingly, the labor force is dominated by women. This trend is especially seen in Syria, Tunisia, Sudan, and Kuwait, where women work side-by-side.

When we examine Arabian women's labor, we can see the degree of word-related isolation is somewhat high, with women establishing only a small minority in most occupations. Nearly half of all women employed in the region are limited to low-wage jobs such as typists or agents. Women, on the other hand, are under-represented in expert and board jobs. A few women fill in

as untalented cleaners or couriers in the manual classifications, but generally, they barely work as gifted or even semi-talented regular representatives. The power of word-related disconnection, as shown in Egypt, Kuwait, Jordan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, among various spots, is perceived by the two laborers and the organizations' reported tendency for explicit kinds of work held by men or women. These tendencies are an eventual outcome of social comparisons. It is muddled how these inclinations are shaped for sure causes impact their turn of events. Financial experts don't hypothesize inclination advancement or worldly varieties (Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos, 1989).

Arab women are relocating; they account for 67% of the total women's power in Egypt, half in Iraq, and 45% in the Syrian Arab Republic. This rate of expansion in the Gulf nations and Jordan showed 92% in Bahrain and 89% in Jordan. 99.9% in Kuwait, 98.9% in Qatar, and 94% in the United Arab Emirates. The proportion of female workers in the organization's region is greatest in cordial and individual organizations; during the 1980s, it showed up at 60% in Bahrain, 56% in Egypt, 78% in Jordan, 92% in Kuwait, 98% in Qatar, and 91% in the United Arab Emirates (O'Neill, 1992). A few Arab women work in the association and on the board. Women hold 5.2 and 1.6% of all pioneer and administrative positions, respectively, in the Gulf nations of Kuwait and the UAE. 6% and 7% of all administrative circumstances in Algeria and Tunisia, respectively. In Syria and Iraq, the rates are 8 and 10, separately. Egypt has a speed of 10%, Sudan has a speed of 2.4%, and Jordan has a speed of 5%. These numbers are lower than the 40% limit in industrialized countries and the 15-20% figure in helpless nations. Women in expert and specialized fields, like nursing, instructing, social and administrative work, have a higher rate. Their degree of outright master and concentrated delegates changes from 18% in Tunisia to 26-28% in Syria and Egypt, independently, and more than 33% in Jordan and Iraq (Ribar, 1995).

More than 1 million Arab women work in the collecting business. They are moved in Egypt, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia, by and large in materials, weaving, and moment pieces of clothing, but also in manufactured organizations, food preparation, and metallurgy, to a lesser extent (Tienda et al., 1992). In Egypt, for example, materials, dress, and calfskin rank first, with women addressing 58% of outright gathered laborers and a large part of the advanced women labor

force; in Jordan, 70% and 62%, and in the Syrian Arab Republic, 74% and 64%, independently. The extra women's power spread throughout the subsoil, mining, and food regions. Women are allotted positions in the modern world that request either conventional women's-like capacities or an undeniable degree of precision and tolerance, the two of which are regularly associated with women (Moghadam, 1993).

With a little piece of the pie and moderate instructive and professional fulfillment, they procure a little of the generally acquired pay. Women's level of acquired pay in most Arab countries is essentially under 20%. Bahrain's and Saudi Arabia's stakes are 12 and 7% separately. Women acquire 17.7% of full procured pay in Iraq, Morocco, 16%, Kuwait, Sudan, 18%, and Lebanon (22%). Those unobtrusive offers show that women's work in market exercises is downgraded; useful women's components are not compensated similarly to men's identical useful attributes. This thought is upheld by experimental proof dependent on miniature level information (Miller, 1993).

Existing numbers don't address the true measure of women's commitment since only women's work in the conventional area is recorded. Their inclusion in the casual modern area, for example, pay creating at home (conventional sewing handiworks, food readiness, etc.), isn't tended to. Women who work in the casual area will come from oppressed foundations, with low instructive accomplishment and terrible financial circumstances. They are generally youngsters whose families have recently moved from rural to metropolitan settings. A commission on Western Asia's economic and social development The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) supported a study in Egypt that showed an extensive yet unknown number of women working in the informal economy (ESCWA, 1989). By far, 80% are from low-pay families with practically no tutoring and are between 14 and 34. Most women who work in the informal sector are originally from rural regions and have recently relocated to metropolitan areas. Farming employs an enormous number of individuals in the informal economy. This is generally because of mechanical issues brought about by information-gathering thoughts, strategies, and instruments.

The activities of women who work for the family without being paid are excluded from the measurements, notwithstanding their huge commitment to family income. In Egypt, for instance, women made up 11% of the labor force. In 1990, investigations of country homes in Lower Egypt tracked down that a portion of the spouses furrowed and evened out the ground, and somewhere in the range of 55 and 70% were dynamic in farming yield. In Upper Egypt, somewhere in the range of 34% and 41% were occupied with rural creation, while 75% were occupied with creature cultivation (Nelissen, 1990). Most women who work in agribusiness are not redressed. As per an exploration led by an Egyptian people group, women chipping away at family cultivated without pay represent around 60% of the space's female labor force. They regularly participate in horticultural delivery errands that are associated with their family. Minority female workers represent around 84% of all provincial female representatives in Morocco. The comparative number in Tunisia is 74% (Borjas and DeFreitas, 1993). Specialists represent more than 40% of all dynamic women in Syria's provincial and metropolitan areas combined (Zabel, 1993). Women's expansive assortment of financial errands in rustic Yemen falls inside the standard division of work. The chickens and cows are taken care of by the woman. They sell the milk they gather. Cottage cheese, paneer, butter, and desi ghee are all made from milk in India. In addition to sowing seeds, composting, and harvesting, women labor in grain fields.

Women's farming work in Saudi Arabia keeps on being significant in harvests like wheat, horse feed cutting, and certain palm tree work. Each of their exercises is focused on the family. Some Saudi women work in the assembling of specialties available to be purchased in the souk-controlled market, where women merchants will, in general, be older than 40, ruined, uninformed, and bereaved since local area principles forbid unmarried young women from selling on the lookout (Engerman, 1992). Constraints on Employment Demand and supply concerns impede Arab women's businesses.

Requesting boundaries for women's work adds to the Arab economy's low degrees of work ingestion, harming both male and female labor force members. This reflects, to some degree, the full-scale level issue of expanded capital power in the economy and, to a limited extent, a shortcoming in asset use. For example, Middle Eastern economies consistently yielded

approximately six % of their capital. In contrast, late industrialized countries (e.g., Korea and Singapore) consistently yielded around seven % (Keithly and Deseran, 1995). A couple of Arab nations' slow capital-yield extents fell in the scope of 1970 and 1987. Jordan's ICOR was 4.5 in 1971, but it climbed to 7.15 by 1987. Fosu (1995) noted that Egypt's Incremental Capital Output Ratio moved from 2.38 to 5.5, while Tunisia's ICOR extended from 4.1 to 8.22 (Fosu, 1995). All through the last twenty years, the premium for work has failed to keep pace with strong work supply advancement, and sectoral improvement has failed to remain mindful of the growing number of new job hopefuls.

In urban labor markets, population growth reached a midpoint of roughly 3.5 %, while growth in modern and administrative regions was less than 1% (Karshenas, 1994). The stagnant development of the modern and administrative areas is owing to how numerous Arab nations kept up with import-replacement approaches, which protected both effective and inefficient endeavors from the unfamiliar competition and hampered imports of innovation. These exchange approaches might have brought about a lower manageable pace of usefulness development than would have been reachable if more prominent rivalry and commodity-driven arrangements had been taken on. As well as straightforwardly affecting work interest, quick population increment has come down to the educational system's ability to convey fitting instruction. High population extension in different Arab countries brought about congestion in study halls and overburdening of educators, while dropping genuine income debilitated instructors' spirits, driving truancy and the mission for supplemental wellsprings of procuring and backing. Since schooling is a vital route for women to work in the conventional area, population increment can quickly influence the powerful (size and quality) interest in women's education, bringing down women's financial contribution. A third powerful restriction is the association of the public area, where work rules might have hampered efficiency advancement and eased back worldly work request expansion in Arab nations. In many countries, the public sector has briefly extended its whole business level through ensured business programs, the security of long-lasting work, and an engaging bundle of advantages that incorporate hearty government-backed retirement plans. This might have influenced work usefulness in two ways:

the first is connected with public assistance estimation issues; and the second with expanding organization and guidelines, which inconveniently affect private area efficiency.

Overabundance work interest in the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) countries influenced sending nations' inner requirements for women's work throughout the 1970s and mid-1980s. Transitory propensities produced work deficiencies in the sending countries' labor markets, resulting in specific cases in the horticulture area being overwhelmed due to women laborers. On the other hand, men are looking for other options. Women are dominating the labor force. In a few countries, women overwhelmed the working-age population in provincial locales. The provincial oil blast changed farming and labor markets in Egypt. Before voyaging abroad, around 64% of all rustic travelers worked in horticulture, and almost close to 100% of provincial transients were men. During the 1980s, around 30% of the general rural work force was occupied with overseas relocation sooner or later (Peracchi and Welch, 1994).

Global relocation has expanded the capital force nearby while diminishing work-ingestion prospects. Compensation expansions in the GCC countries drew the absolute most prominent vintages of human resources to Jordan, Egypt, and Sudan, making compensation in trading nations develop. Manufacturers responded by consuming excess money with more versatile work and higher pay through capital expenditures. That response supported the accessibility of minimal expense acquiring because of controlled loan fees. Besides, the displacement cycle brought about the supplanting of leavers with less qualified staff, limiting their capacity to develop their functional areas (Riddell, 1995). On the inventory side, helpless inclusion in the cutting-edge area is connected to an absence of schooling and abilities, as well as high richness rates, social limitations, and home obligations. The continuation of gender gaps in tutoring is a basic hindrance to upgrading women's labor force support.

As per the neoclassical hypothesis, education is a basic factor in women's labor force support. The higher the level of education, the greater the association of women in the labor market (Mincer and Polachek, 1974). According to the most recent data, Middle East women's educational achievements fall short of their counterparts: More than six out of ten Arab women were illiterate in 1990. However, young Arab women who have made significant contributions

to education despite poor educational achievement should not be obscured. The overall adult proficiency rate in Arab nations has more than doubled in the last two decades, rising from 30% in 1970 to 54% in 1992. Between 1960 and 1991, the number of people enrolled in essential and auxiliary programs grew from 8 million to 46 million. More than half of all school-aged girls now attend grade school, up from a twenty-year average of 55% (Riddell, 1995).


However, despite the advances achieved over the last two decades, education is still lacking. Ninety-two women out of every 100 men enlisted at the basic level in 1992; 77 women and 65 men enlisted at the tertiary level. Despite this, it's important to remember that enrollment rates may not perfectly reflect. According to Cornell (1989), the dropout rate for Egyptian primary school women is more than 30 percent. Dropout rates for primary school students are lower in Gulf nations, while dropout rates for female secondary school students may reach as high as 20%. (Khinchuk, 1987). Some young women are still being turned away from the educational system. Fakhro states that more than 20% of young women aged 5 to 19 do not attend school in Bahrain.

1.1.1 Relationship between Women's Participation and Fertility

The most important aspect of Arabia is its high rate of fertility, which often requires six children. Using World Bank data from twelve Arab countries, Figure 2 compares general fertility rates with different forms of women's labor availability (1995). More than six children were born to women in Algeria's southern regions, whereas fewer than four were born to women in the northern regions. From Beirut to Fayoum, the geographical variations in Lebanon are evident. Differences in wealth across nations may result from divergent national policies about responsibility for one's family.

The fertility rate in Turkey in 2020 was 2.0, while the fertility rate in Iraq was 3.5. So, these statistics support the findings of Bloom et al. (2007) that the higher total fertility rate is linked with a lower women's labor force participation rate in the labor market of the country. According to the statistics of the World Bank (2022), the fertility rate of Turkey is 2.0. That demonstrates a lower fertility rate in Turkey and a higher rate of female labor force participation in the labor

market of Turkey in comparison to Iraq, since the statistics show a higher total fertility rate than Turkey, which results in lower female labor force participation in the labor market of Iraq.



Source: International Labour Organization (via World Bank), United Nations – Population Division (2019 Revision)
OurWorldInData.org/female-labor-force-participation-key-facts • CC BY

Figure 1.1: Turkey and Iraq labor force participation and fertility rate.

As of 2009, there were 6.9 million female workers in Turkey; working to support their families. Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Palestine, and Iraq adopted Turkey's 24 percent economic mobility rate. Contradictory results were obtained when trade direction and feminization in Turkey were examined during the mid-1980s. Le and Diop (2010) looked at actual Turkish assembly techniques for much of the 1980s. Fosu (2000) believes that although trade policy favors women entrepreneurs, increased capital power reduces women's employment.

It is also possible to link the decline in the appeal of higher education with the shift away from traditional 9-to-5 job schedules that began in the mid-1990s. Günseli Berik (1997) warns women's activists against blindly relying on information gathered from surveys. The Arab Area's most critical part is its typically high fertility rate; six children are typically needed to do one task on average. According to the latest data, the number of Arabs with a bachelor's degree

in adulthood affects women's work. Figure 3 compares women's labor supply fertility among 12 Arab countries, based on data from the World Bank (1995). While the fitted line recommends that work supply generally develops as a woman's adulthood, the chart shows a deviation from the pattern in two of the twelve countries' information focuses. Sudan, for instance, had a high fertility pace of 5.7 in 1993 and a women's work interest pace of 23%, both of which are higher than the locale's normal rates. Syria's fertility pace of 5.8 is comparatively high, and a woman's work investment rate (practically 20%) is more pronounced than the locale's normal of around 17%.



Figure 1.2: Relationship of fertility rate and women's labor (World Bank, 1995).

Varieties in the construction of creation, like the conspicuousness of fundamental monetary exercises, may bring about country contrasts in women's work support. The pattern investigation may likewise be hampered by joint-assurance. Education, a human capital aspect that contributes to a decline in productivity, may also increase women's commitment in the traditional workplace. Fluctuations in richness might happen from geological disparities in living conditions (e.g., rustic destitution and instructive holes) or between class variations in asset circulation inside a similar country. For instance, women brought forth more than six kids in the south of Algeria but fewer than four in the north. Despite its small size, Lebanon has unmistakable geological contrasts, from Beirut (2.3 kids per woman) toward the north (4.3 kids per woman). The average family has 3.6 kids in Port Said and 8.2 kids in Fayoum (Facione, 1994). Declining fertility may likewise be brought about by "improvement" and institutional impacts. The need for high fertility may be lessened if, for example, improvements in common

health principles reduce infant mortality and provide joint assurance of wealth and infant mortality (Leppel, 2005). Contrasts in national responsibility and family policies may lead to differences in the wealth of countries. As an example, look no further than the government of Tunisia's accumulated efforts in this area. That country's comprehensive set of laws considers the utilization of contraceptives, which are almost free. Adulthood has been sliced down the middle over the last 20 years due to public promotion of contraception and an ideal climate (Sattinger, 1995). However, Bahrain and Kuwait have worked hard to increase the number of jobs available for local women to lessen the country's reliance on traveling labor. In any case, it ought to be perceived that family-arranging projects might have potentially negative side-effects that limit women's work cooperation. As per Zuraik and associates (1994), family arranging programs that focus on fertility decline without considering the potential consequences for moms and kids may unintentionally hurt moms' well-being and weaken a woman's capacity to connect effectively in the labor market.

The present research study compares women's labor force participation in Turkey and Iraq as both countries are developing countries and have some social boundaries regarding women's labor force. Especially in Turkey and Iraq, where most crimes against women are committed, Turkish women continue to be victims of rape or honor murders. Researchers and government authorities have found that domestic violence is frequent among Turkish citizens and those living abroad. There are several historical instances of Turkish women active in public life and activism despite the country's patriarchal tradition. In the workplace and, in certain areas, in school, women in Turkey endure substantial prejudice. Turkish women make up half of the labor force, compared to the EU average of 50%. Despite various successful efforts to encourage women's literacy, there is still a gender divide in secondary school. Another objective is to identify countries in which women's empowerment is high. Another purpose is to analyze the participation of women in the labor market and their relationship with economic development as measured by GDP/capita for the 2000-2020 periods in Turkey and Iraq.

1.1.2 Overview of Women labour Force in Turkey

The regulation of the men-centric agreement, which harms women's employment, is not unique to the Middle East and North Africa. After Turkey's 24% economic movement rate in 2009, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Palestine, and Iraq followed suit. Turkey's real profits, in addition, decreased dramatically from 40% in 1980 to 15% in 1990. Turkey has hosted meetings since approximately 1985 due to the EU's strong and relentless support for women's development and the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women's (CEDAW's) push for consistency. Turkey's moderate and stringent legislative concerns have risen dramatically since 1997; thus, the rates that suggest a return to tradition may have arisen over time. Turkey's EU promotion trusts have also considered minor enactment improvements and significant progress in women's education.

In 2009, the whole female labor force was 6.9 million representatives, of which 2 million were unpaid family workers, with agriculture representing 91% (1.86 million) in Turkey (Grzywacz et al., 2009). On the grounds that Turkey was the only one of these nations to use the Extreme Light Infrastructure (ELI) strategy, 1980 was chosen as a benchmark year for correlation. However, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Palestine, and Iraq were yet to commence their respective Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Palestine, and Iraq immediately followed Turkey's 24% economic movement rate in 2009. (UN, 2010). The regulation of the men-centric agreement, describing the disparity in power between men and women as a group, which adversely affects women's work, isn't extraordinary to the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region.

Durmaz-Aslan, M (2020) in his study found that the proportion of Turkish women in the labor market moved from 12% in 1980 to 24% in 2009, while their work expanded from 15% to 22% throughout a similar period. However, women's support in power, gas, and water, mining and quarrying, and building sectors has expanded to a lesser extent. Significantly, two examinations on trade direction and feminization in Turkey were published during the mid-1980s. Le and Diop (2010) inspect real Turkish connecting insights from the main portion of the 1980s and find that the product didn't bring about obvious feminization. Fosu (2000) inspects plant-level

information for the same period and views that even though trade direction supports women's business, higher capital power brings down women's work. Checking out the subject throughout a more extended timeframe, the developing extent of women in manufacturing

Dissimilar to most Middle East/North Africa (MENA) countries, Turkey doesn't approach oil-related benefits through traveler settlements since the two nations don't share the everyday language of Arabic. If European nations' enormous labor market development between 1950 and 1970 led to an increase in settlements from Europe, which may have helped maintain the man-provider household. As per the Ministry of Labor, unionization was 54% in 1980 and 29% as indicated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (James Burdumy, 2005). In the 1976–80 period, these projections were over 15% for South Korea, 19% for Mexico, and 20% for Brazil (David G. Blanchflower, 2006). Later measures for Turkey recommend a critical fall in unionization rates during the 2000s, to around 8%–10% (James Burdumy, 2005). Real earnings in terms of added fell from 40% in 1980 to 15% in 1990, a dramatic decrease. Information on the movement in the production of Turkey's commodities from low-value-added enterprises focusing on labor to businesses with a higher focus on capital is available here (Ahmet el al., 2007).

Turkey has been an EU member state since 1985, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), to which Turkey has been a signatory since 2003, was a major factor in its removal from the Civil Code in 2003. As a result of strong and persistent support for women's growth and a desire to conform to EU norms and a gathering in Turkey since 1985, the two unjust items were removed from the Civil War Code in 2003.

Past research has investigated the impact of the spouse's joblessness status, with inconsistent findings on whether women assume a part as extra or debilitated representatives, and the overall force of these two impacts (Tansel, 2001). The debilitated specialist impact alludes to people who have stopped looking for a paid occupation since they have lost any expectation of finding one; therefore, they are presently not named jobless and are relegated to nonparticipants. The additional laborer sway alludes to the affirmation of family individuals into the labor market to

make up for the primary provider's pay deficiency. Accordingly, more representatives change from nonparticipant to member status (either employed or jobless).

The declining draw of advanced education may likewise be identified with the exit from any 9-to-5 work strategy carried out in the mid-1990s. To represent this effect, (Stephan et al., 2009) rehashed the investigation with prime-age (25–44) working women and found practically identical drops in the proportion of the chances for college and secondary school graduates, from 42 and multiple times in 1988 to 36 and multiple times in 2008. Comparable peculiarities have been found in the MENA region, where expanded genderual orientation equity in schooling has not translated into a decrease in the gender hole in labor force cooperation rates, as it has somewhere else (World Bank 2004; Stephan Klasen and Francesca Lamanna 2009).

Günseli Berik (1997) warns against the unquestioning utilization of overview-produced information in women's activist examinations, guaranteeing that it denies scholastics a chance to investigate the subtleties of financial reality. She advances the assortment and usage of personal information, using subjective ways to make more reliable quantitative information. Marlene Kim (1997) underscores the other experiences of women's activist participatory field research, particularly involving women's gatherings and study subjects. Turkey has had an enormous ascent of moderately strict legislative issues starting around 1997, so the rates recommending traditionalism might have developed over the long run. Simultaneously, Turkey's EU promotion trusts have considered moderate enactment changes, just as a prospering women's development and critical accomplishments in women's education. Given that the Prime Minister of Turkey's public statements encourage women to have three kids in 2010, the connection between "at least three kids" and women's labor force investment is worth focusing on.

1.1.3 Overview of Iraq's Women labour Force

In Iraq, gender relationships are governed by various social, political, and cultural elements, including geography, rural divides, class, nationality, clan ties, and even age. In Iraq, one's gender identity significantly impacts one's vulnerability and susceptibility to harm. 4 % of Syrian pariah women in the KR-I were employed, despite 24 % of them expressing a desire to

work. Working in sectors deemed "dangerous" by the Minister of Labor is prohibited for women in the Key Risk Indicator (KRI) under Labor Law.

Gender relations in Iraq are controlled by complex social, political, and economic circumstances that change as indicated by factors like topography, metropolitan rustic divisions, class, nationality, clan connection, age, and religion. Gender orientation plays a huge effect on weakness levels and openness hazard in Iraq, which are deteriorated by previous imbalances in people's admittance to privileges and qualifications, instruction, and financial freedoms. Existing gender standards and force elements present significant obstacles to women's admittance to occupations and potential economic outcomes, lessening the economic dependability they need to remake their lives and return to society. Women were affected by the struggle to stand up to different hindrances to work, including confined economic choices, individual and local area level boundaries, legal imperatives, and elevated weakness, particularly for uprooted people and women-headed families. Legitimate imperatives, an absence of social help, elevated weakness, and expanding measures of neglected work may all give additional difficulties to struggling influenced women, particularly those who are dislodged or lead some-headed homes.

Women's labor force interest in Iraq is low: simply 10.6 % of Iraq's utilized population is female in 2020. 19 years of savagery and occupation in places like Diyala and Salah al-Din have impacted women, young women, men, and young men. Research indicates that pervasive gender orientation standards in struggle-influenced bunches are based on a division of work that appoints men's errands as watchmen and suppliers and women's homegrown jobs and obligations focused on home prosperity. The inconvenience of radicalized gender orientation standards during the IS takeover built up this gendered division of work significantly further by requiring the complete detachment of women from irrelevant men in open settings. As a result, men accepted full accountability for home arrangements and confronted significant difficulties in satisfying these hopes. Women in KRI face similar issues. As per the latest enumeration, 86.8 % of women are jobless, while 37.4 % of men are. Around 75% of women in the labor force work in the public area, yet men's work-related status is more assorted: 44% of dynamic men work in the public area, 12% in the private area (8% are private area representatives, and 4 %

are bosses), 21% are independently employed, 21% are everyday laborers, and 2% are (neglected) family labor. Advanced education is frequently an assurance of work in the public area: 92% of women with an optional or advanced education work in the public area, compared with 57% of women with an essential, halfway, or fundamental education and 25% of women with no degree. Furthermore, a 2018 study uncovered that only 4% of Syrian outcast women respondents in the KR-I were working, despite a craving to work communicated by 24%. World Bank research on women's work in KRI found that recruiting separation plays a part in women's admittance to private area occupations, with bosses choosing competitors with equivalent qualifications over female candidates.

Furthermore, women working in the private sector advantage from feeble authoritative assurance for women and families in the work environment, for example, more limited maternity leave than worldwide principles (72 days contrasted with 18 weeks), an absence of child care support (childcare endowments or administrations to representatives in the private area are not ordered by law), and legitimately commanded work limitations. The Labor Law in Key Risk Indicator (KRI) limits a woman's work in fields considered "challenging" and "hazardous," with the Minister of Labor having the power to characterize these areas. Finally, one of the main issues to be addressed is inappropriate behavior in the workplace. Women say that lewd behavior is profoundly broad and occurs in all settings, including public areas. There are no administrative principles or norms set up to boycott or indict the inappropriate behavior of the working environment.

1.1.4 Impact of Syrian Immigration in Turkey and Iraq Labour Force

While violence raged on in the country's north, many Syrian refugees fled to Turkey's south-east. Many people who lost their part-time jobs have either given up or are actively looking for employment. Official business and unemployment have risen, while residents' employment participation has dwindled.

The common Syrian conflict, which started in March 2011, brought about a significant flood of constrained relocation from northern Syria to Turkey's south-eastern regions, which has real financial and political consequences for the MENA area and quite a bit of Europe. This

examination exploits this regular test to measure the effect of Syrian displaced people on Turkish nationals' labor market results. Utilizing a distinction in-contrasts procedure, Ceritoglu et al. (2017) observe that movement essentially affects locals' business results while small affects compensation results. Because of evacuee inflows, we see critical employment misfortunes among casual workers. As a result of the extended social administration in the area, formal work expanded marginally. The majority of the people who lost their casual occupations have stopped working in the labor force or are searching for work. Formal business and joblessness rates have increased. However, locals' inclusion in the labor force, casual business, and pursuit of employment have diminished. More youthful specialists and laborers with less instruction have been excessively affected. Due to the predominance of everyday work in Turkish job advertisements, the adverse consequence of Syrian evacuee inundation on locals' labor market execution has been emphasized. Generally, the effect of Syrian evacuee appearances on Turkish labor markets has been insignificant, inferring that expected expenses for European and other impacted labor markets will be negligible also (Ceritoglu et al., 2017).

While the Syrian emergency has generally centered on local outcast reactions around Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, little is known regarding the predicament of Syrian evacuees in Iraq. At present, Iraq is home to more than 250,184 Syrian displaced people out of an aggregate of 5.6 million (4.4 %) across the Middle East. Most of them are Kurdish origins and showed up in Iraq in 2012 and 2013 because of battling. Around 98.8% of Syrian displaced people in Iraq are enrolled in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), which incorporates the governorates of Erbil, Dahuk, and Sulaymaniyah. The leftover Syrian outcasts are enlisted in Iraq's focal and western territories. Given that conditions in Syria are not helpful for wilful return insecurity and pride, it is important to acquire a more profound understanding of Syrian exiles' chance to track down a drawn-out arrangement in Iraq. Accordingly, this review analyses the opportunities for near-joining in Iraq by assessing:

- Syrian outcasts' advancement toward neighborhood incorporation utilizing the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) standards for long haul arrangements, just as the Iraqi local people's turn of events.

- The empowering and confining components influence Syrian exiles' ability to adjust to their new networks.
- The Syrian displaced people's ideal long-haul enduring arrangement and independent direction

1.1.5 Women Employment in Agriculture and Manufacturing Turkey and Iraqi

In Turkey and Iraq's agricultural and industrial sectors, women make up a small %age of the work force. Agribusiness is a vital source of income for the impoverished and those unsure about their food supply. Improving women's business is critical in Turkey because an obscenely large gender gap characterizes the labor force. A grant of \$1.95 million from the World Bank Group, the Government of Iraq, and the Government of Canada was announced today to support Iraq's efforts to improve frameworks and implement programs to involve women in economic and political capacities. "Gender orientation and Social Protection in Iraq: Towards Economic Empowerment" is the title of this project, which will take place in Iraq.

Following quite a while of war and social distress, Iraq is going up against various difficulties that influence all areas of the economy: the decay of the social and financial framework; the social structure holding the system together; and expanded dependence on oil, which represents around 66% of GDP and virtually all commodities and economic incomes. Iraq is gaining ground in settling its economy, yet much work must be done to expand its creation base and increase the living expectations of its kin. After the war, the rural area fell farther behind, attributable to enormous harm to the water system and waste foundation, rustic correspondence, robbery of various offices, and a huge debilitating institutional structure. Agribusiness is a critical type of revenue for poor people and food is uncertain, just as it is the essential wellspring of pastoral work. Agribusiness's commitment to GDP (the second biggest after oil income) tumbled from around 9% in 2002 to 3.3 % in 2008 and 3.6 % in 2009, despite utilizing 20% of the labor force.

In Turkey, where the labor force is characterized by an impressive gender gap with low women's cooperation and occupation possibilities for women, improving women's business has become necessary. Women make up over a portion of the population (40 million). Yet, their work

interest rate is 34.5 %, while men's work support rate is 71.8 %, as indicated by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUK) measurements in July 2019.

While most women avoid the labor force, many take part in the casual area. From the ILO's perspective, admittance to business openings, just as occupation quality and working conditions, is basic to the association's overall point of nice work for everybody.

The World Bank Group, the Government of Iraq, and the Government of Canada announced a \$1.95 million award today to help Iraq's endeavors upgrade frameworks and execute projects to monetarily and politically engage women. The program "Genderual orientation and Social Protection in Iraq: Towards Economic Empowerment" has two reciprocal parts: the principal will build up long-haul administrative and institutional limits regarding gender mainstreaming; At the same time, the following will introduce programs to help the economic and political strengthening of women in Iraq, including ambitious projects for the poor and weak women.

"We are excited to team up with the Government of Canada to support women's strengthening in Iraq," said Saroj Kumar Jha, World Bank Mashreq Regional Director. "We are committed to helping women in Iraq, and we will work steadily to ensure that Iraqi women can completely participate in all parts of life and contribute to the financial development of Iraq."

Turkey's female labor force support has logically expanded lately, though moderately low. Schooling gains have driven more women into the field, affirming what we've seen in different countries. Women who spend more time in school are bound to find a job when places that match their capacities become accessible. Many have found work in Turkey's thriving help area. Developing longings for a complex working-class way of life has become an additional driving force for women to join and remain in paid business. Nonetheless, another issue has arisen in the homegrown conversation over women's economic strengthening: could the development of work choices lead to a drop in richness?

Gender correspondence advocates see a danger that natalist talk would frustrate the little advances women have made in Turkey's labor market. Despite high development in agricultural countries, the overall women's labor force support rate (age group 15+) has dropped over the

past twenty years, tumbling from 51.3 % in 1998 to 48.5 % in 2018 (ILO demonstrated assessments, <http://www.ilo.org/ilostat>). Despite how more than 307 million women have entered the labor force over the last 20 years, women represent simply 39.2 % of the overall labor force. As the worldwide pace of tutoring enrolment has expanded, the pace of labor force contribution among young people has diminished (a positive pattern for both young men and women). Thus, despite dropping women's labor force support rates, the genderual orientation hole has contracted barely, from 27.5 rate focuses in 1998 to 26.6 rate focuses in 2018 (International Labor Organization (ILO) demonstrated assessments, age group 15+).

As per projections, the female labor force cooperation in Turkey will keep on contracting over the next decade or something like that, arriving at a low of 45.9 % in 2030. This fills in as a brutal notice that state-run administrations will battle to develop labor force results for women further until strategy measures turn around patterns. Women's commitment differs significantly more than men's support across immature countries, and developing business sector economies are more disaggregated. Under 30% of women aged 15 and more seasoned participate in the labor force in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. Notwithstanding, from 1998 to 2018, investment rates in the Middle East and North Africa climbed while rates in South Asia fell. Moderate cultural perspectives restrict women's chances of working outside the house in three regions.

Regardless of the public authority of Iraq's most noteworthy endeavors to battle genderual orientation disparity, the circumstances for Iraqi women progressively decayed beginning around 2003. Iraqi women represent half of the general population and lead one in every ten Iraqi families; 80% of these women's heads are empty, separated, isolated, or focused on weak spouses. They are one of the weakest segments of the population, and due to their lower absolute pay levels, they are more inclined to neediness and food insecurity. Likewise, they are seriously troubled about schooling, admittance to work, and adequate lodging. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) indicates that only 2% of women-headed families inspected are utilized and get consistent compensation. In comparison, the other 6% maintain odd sources of income and don't create normal pay.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

According to World's population, women are more than men. They are more concerned about feeding their families. The participation of women in the labor market was low in the past, but now it increases day by day. Turkey continues efforts for women's empowerment. Iraq had gone through war, and they lost labor mostly. Now women are encouraged to work for their families. The study aims to compare Iraqi and Turkish women's participation in the labor market

1.3 AIM OF RESEARCH

This study examines the involvement of women in the labor force in Turkey and Iraq. Both nations are in the process of developing economically. Comparative research is being conducted on the role of women in the labor force on economic growth. Data from the World Bank for Iraq and the Turkish Statistics Agency are used to gather this information for the years (2000-2020).

This research examines women's engagement in the labor force. The research also examines the relationship between GDP growth and the contribution of women to the industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy. We're looking at how women are distributed throughout different sectors of the Turkish economy and among countries in the EU and OECD.

As Iraq's economy continues to suffer after a protracted conflict, more women in Turkey participate in the labor force than in Iraq. Iraq has a low level of women's empowerment in general. Women's empowerment in Iraq is supported by certain non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Awareness of the women's labor force is still lacking. Iraqi women face many constraints. As a result, in Iraq, women have extremely low work participation.

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This study investigates the participation of women labor force in Turkey and Iraq labor market. The main objective of the study is to examine the female labor participation in Turkey and Iraq labor market and make the comparisons.

1.5 MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY

The Global Gender Gap study was released in 2016 and investigated the disparity between men and women. Turkey showed a substantial gender gap for equal pay, top officials, managers, and female parliamentarians in the country's legislature. According to this study, it's critical to examine the nature of employment and promote women's advancement in the labor force.

Women comprise nearly half of the total population, while their contribution to economic activity is less than their potential. In 2016, the report of the Global Gender Gap examined the gap between women and men and reported that Turkey ranks 130th in the global index, 129th in economic opportunity and participation, 109th in the attainment of education, and 113th in the empowerment of politics among one hundred and forty-four countries. Turkey demonstrated a splayed gender gap for equality of wage, senior officials, managers, and female members of parliament. This gender gap gives me an idea to conduct a study on this topic.

It shows that if we remove all the barriers that women face, then the opportunity to work increases in different sectors. As a result, the economic rate also increases because women's economic empowerment allows effective utilization of government funds in education as employed women are usually involved in decision-making associated with the health and education of their children, creating positive externalities in terms of the welfare of future generations.

Women's labor force association changes essentially between countries, reflecting inconsistencies in economic turn of events, social principles, schooling levels, fertility rates, and accessibility to childcare and other supporting administrations. The connection between women's labor force support and these qualities is confounded. The U-formed connection between economic development and women's labor force cooperation is one part that has gotten a ton of consideration (Golden, C, 1995).

Reducing these obstacles is essential since women's labor force investment is essential to supporting a comprehensive turn of events and achieving SDG 5 ("Achieve genderual orientation equity and enable all women and young women"). Past the sheer numbers,

nonetheless, there is a substantially more squeezing issue about the sort of business that women seek after. The current study examines the intricacies of women's labor force support in agricultural countries and gives results on the significant patterns and determinants that impact women's labor force investment and admittance to occupations. It dives into interesting examples from Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey. Most importantly, the paper underlines the need to inspect the nature of work and empower women's further developed labor markets.

1.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The 19th International Conference of Labor Statisticians (ICLS) established extensive rules for estimating work. The ICLS Resolution allows recording various acts, but it also creates hurdles for governments to combine information collection and inquiry. Since quite a while ago, the scholastics (and, progressively, policymakers) have recognized that women's labor force cooperation is unmeasured and undercounted (Hirway, I., Jose, S, 2011). Notwithstanding upgrades in information gathering, these remaining parts are a critical boundary to assessing true insights obtained utilizing labor force and other family studies. Another requirement comes from study identification. Labor force studies undercount women's contributions since enumerators are inadequately prepared, especially when working at-home or on the homestead. Enumerators can't completely test for the financial needs of women family individuals, a trouble exacerbated by how men are frequently the overview respondents in nations with low women's labor force support rates.

Time-use reviews have been upheld as a strategy for gathering more precise and useful information on the idea of a woman's work all through the home, including resource creation and casual business (Hirway, I., Jose, S, 2011). The issue is that time-use overviews are costly and hard to perform consistently.

The Resolution on Labor of the nineteenth International Conference of Labor Statisticians (ICLS) sets up extended standards for estimating work, incorporating a smaller business meaning. While this presents obstacles for countries as they blend their information gatherin

and investigation, the nineteenth ICLS Resolution likewise offers a chance to record a wide range of actions.



2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN THROUGH PUBLIC WORKS

The Iranian labor market is characterized by high unemployment and low participation rates, especially among women. While the jobless rate for women has risen from 17.1 % in 2005 to 18.9 % in 2018, male unemployment has only risen from 10.0 % to 10.4 % during the same time period, according to the latest statistics from the Labor Force Survey (LFS). As a result, women's economic engagement has declined from 17.0 % to 16.1 % during the same time period, whilst men's economic participation has remained almost constant (from 64.7 % to 64.8 %). According to the MENA and OECD averages, female labor force participation appears to be significantly lower than that of neighboring countries like Afghanistan (49%) and Turkey (24%), as well as significantly lower than the rate observed in the MENA region as a whole (20%) and the OECD (52%) regions (World Bank, 2018). As a result, Iranian employers frequently take extreme measures to avoid hiring women and giving them the same benefits as their male counterparts. To compound this, women who are actively searching for a job are demoralized by a high unemployment rate (Mollahosseini, 2008). This essay makes an attempt to better understand the debate over the link between unemployment and the participation rate by focusing on the unique characteristics of the Iranian female labor market.

Examining the relationship between unemployment and labor force participation has risen to the top of the list of concerns for national and regional policymakers concerned with the labor market. Because of the discouraged-worker effect, the unemployment rate's informative value may not be reliable as an indicator of the state of the labor market through time and economic cycles (Tansel & Ozdemir, 2018). The long-run rate of long-term unemployment is unaffected by changes in capital stock or labor supply, while the unemployment invariance hypothesis implies the opposite (Karanassou & Snower, 2004). Unemployment rates are not affected by external variables, such as pay sets or labor demand and supply, since they are countered by these market reactions (Gumata & Ndou, 2017). As a result of these political concerns, an increasing amount of empirical research has focused on the relationship between unemployment and the participation rate in both developed and developing nations. This focus may be seen in

both wealthy and developing countries. Results from previous studies have been equivocal and disputed. For example, when it comes to Sweden and the United States, for example, the unemployment invariance hypothesis has not been proven (Osterholm, 2010). (Emerson, 2011). However, Tansel et al. (2016) found no long-term link between these factors, which supports the unemployment invariance theory for Turkey and Romania. There is a long-term relationship between the number of jobless women in Iran and the participation rate, which this study provides new evidence for. If the unemployment invariance hypothesis holds true for Iran, we examine whether or not the women's labor market in Iran is similar to that of other developed and rising countries. A regional approach is also used, which implies that the great geographical variety within Iran is taken into account. There is evidence that the provinces of Iran are analogous to local labor markets in that they have their own distinct economies of scale. Located here is an important geographic factor for companies and workers alike (Cheratian et al.). (2019). Social and cultural norms, as well as structural and socioeconomic factors, impact the unemployment and labor force participation rates of Iranian women. After the revolution of 1979 and the eight-year war with Iraq, state policies pushed women to limit their involvement in economic activities and place them in the home. They were now in a subordinate position as a result of this. When it comes to seeking jobs, men have had an advantage over women due to the conflict and a decrease in overall economic activity (Alaedini & Razavi, 2005). The fact that more women have been attending college, delaying their entrance into the laborforce, and facing greater barriers to finding work that suits their skills and interests, has had a detrimental influence on both the unemployment rate for women and overall economic activity since the 1990s.

Though it's been extensively studied in rich and developing countries alike, the relationship between unemployment and participation hasn't been examined in Iran's labor market, despite the importance of this issue. Consequently, we investigate the long-term connection between women's unemployment rates and participation rates in Iranian provinces by using data from 2005Q2 to 2019Q1 and focusing on the interval between those two periods. According to our study, there is no long-term equilibrium between the participation rate and the unemployment rate for women in 25 of Canada's 28 provinces. There are several panel cointegration tests that

get the same result. Iran's labor market supports the theory of unemployment invariance, but this is not true in industrialized nations. The article's structure is laid out as follows. Section 2 (the theory and the literature review) follows. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data and procedures used. Next, we'll present and discuss our econometric results, and then we'll wrap things up.

2.2 PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN LABOR FORCES IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES

A great deal is happening in the nations of the southern Mediterranean right now. Recently, significant progress has been made in reducing gender errors in education and health outcomes. This progress has led to women's involvement in the financial sector having yet to take off. Women's economic, social, and political considerations might be addressed in the future. Many people believe that men-dominated nuclear households limit women's mobility and business opportunities.

As a result, women are financially reliant on men. Women's work support rates are somewhat low because families can afford to keep their female relatives at-home and out of the laborforce.

Most of the southern Mediterranean countries are encountering considerable changes. Demonstrators are rampaging, requesting social and financial changes just as occupation creation drives. The social and financial possibilities for this space are hopeless.

Regardless, the future might allow working on women's economic, social, and political considerations. Lately, huge advancement has been made in limiting gender errors in schooling and wellbeing results. This headway, be that as it may, has not yet brought about more women's commitment in financial life:

- Women's labor force interest rates in the space keep on being a lot lower than in other arising and created countries.
- Young labor force participants, particularly young women, stand up to remarkably high rates of joblessness. Women's joblessness rates in a few countries in the region are as high as half. (World Bank, World Development Report 2012).

- High joblessness rates stop women from joining the work force and cut off their financial choices.
- Informal area occupations might hide women's underemployment while giving negligible advantages and little work dependability. They may likewise underutilize the capacities of teaching women who have not gotten into formal-area business.

Women's unemployment in the MNA area is constantly high, despite the fact that women's participation in the labor market differs from nation to nation. As many as 58 % of women in Qatar, 57.5 % in Kuwait, and 55.5 % in Djibouti participate in the laborforce. On the other hand, the FLFP rate in Jordan is 14 %, while it is 12 % in the Syrian Arab Republic and 6 % in the Yemeni Republic. 1. The FLFP in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2017 was 12.2 %, 12.7%, 13.1%, 14.8%, and 13.8%, respectively, according to labor force and demographic surveys. 2. At least twice as many women are out of work as men in almost every country in MNA, according to this study. The 2017 unemployment rate for women in Iraq was three times higher than the 2017 unemployment rate for men, coming in at 31% compared to 10%. 3. Social norms and cultural beliefs constrain behavior in ways that affect these crucial outcomes, such as a woman's capacity to engage in public life, access to economic opportunities, financial control, educational achievement, and the opportunity to pick her health care provider (Banerjee et al., 2018). Despite the MNA region's increased efforts to encourage more women to join the labor market beginning in 2009, studies suggest that social and cultural barriers to female labor market participation persist. This and the articles that followed, including *Opening Doors: Gender Equality and Development in MNA*, were critical to the recognition of informal institutions as substantial constraining constraints on the route to gender equality in MNA (World Bank, 2013). Women's decision-making processes in the workplace are also highly impacted by their roles as mothers and wives. The duties of the family, such as caring for a child, may make it difficult for them to work longer hours. A recent study shows how men's and women's perceptions about gender roles might be a barrier to the participation of women in the laborforce. As a result of statistics from the Arab Republic of Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, and West Bank and Gaza, a majority of men feel that the most important function for a woman is to care for the family and that it is their responsibility to monitor and manage

women's movements. A large majority of males in the research felt that they have a responsibility to keep tabs on women's activities. These beliefs have been ingrained in the public, and it seems that the majority of women in various countries are prepared to accept male guardianship (El Feki et al., 2017).

Furthermore, social norms are distinct from moral and legal standards in that they are defined by the term "social." Evidence suggests that women's economic participation is influenced by their firmly held beliefs about the world around them. People's views are formed by cultural concepts that are passed down from generation to generation. These viewpoints also serve to filter the "facts" that the general public accepts as true and is capable of grasping (DiMaggio, 1997). 5. For example, both men and women may believe (either correctly or incorrectly) that certain industries are more inviting to women than others. They may be motivated by ideas like the importance of transportation, safety, and the required level of expertise. Being in scenarios with people of different genders or being the household's only earner may have given them fundamental sensitivities that they have internalized (Dildar, 2015; Evans, 2016). They may have different opinions on working in the private sector than they do on working in the public sector, and this might deter them from seeking jobs in the private sector altogether. Additionally, in a work market where women face increased competition, additional psychological roadblocks may stand in the way of full participation. When it comes to finding a job, women may have a harder time navigating the labor market than men do. These problems may be overcome, however, with the help of specialized strategies, according to current study findings. In order to overcome the gap between what you want and what you really do, it may be good to plan and create realistic goals. The process stages need to be broken down to achieve this (Rogers et al., 2015).

Women's equality has been a hot topic in the news recently, and with good reason. Many recent studies have been conducted on this topic, utilizing a broad variety of research approaches. All of those experts have concluded that women have been seen as the property of their husbands in various civilizations over the ages. An elderly woman, who was no longer allowed any civil rights in public and was unable to make any undertakings or be followed by any means, could no longer even create a will due to her inability to disclose any property that had been

bequeathed to or owned by her. Another option is to never disclose any property that she has received or is hers in any way. As time passed in the second half of the eighteenth century, the issue of women's rights began to take center stage in the political debate of many nations. Throughout the nineteenth century, women made progress toward gaining the right to work for pay, to vote, and to own property. Combating gender-based violence and sex discrimination is a top priority, even in our modern day and age. Read on to learn why. Intimate partner violence, which may take the form of physical or verbal abuse, affects women disproportionately around the world. Women are prevented from fully participating in society as a result of cultural and religious barriers. The United Nations Human Rights Council has produced records that show that acts of violence may take many different forms. Rape, domestic violence, abortions, and female circumcision are all instances of this sort of abuse. This violates a considerable number of human rights. The heavenly revelation traveled throughout the vast Baran of Arabia with a message that was clean, noble, and appropriate for everyone on the planet during one of the most trying eras in human history. You were created by God from a single soul, and from it came a single partner (of the same sort), and from them came a great number of men and women, the Bible tells us. "O Mankind, fulfill your responsibilities to your LORD!" A quotation from the Qur'an, verse 4:1. In the Quran, Allah says that he has given you partners who are like you, children and grandkids, and that he has taken care of your necessities. Is their faith in Allah, the Most High, for nothing because they reject His Grace? In light of these discoveries, the major emphasis of this effort is located there. However, as a consequence of this, the chasm between the ideal depicted in Islamic teachings and the reality of women's rights in our society today has become much greater than it was before. Social, legal, economic, and political freedoms have grown significantly since the seventh century. The vast majority of academics who have studied Islam in depth believe that Islam was the first religion to provide women with this level of power.

2.3 OVERALL LOOK AT WOMEN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION WORLDWIDE

East Asia has a larger proportion of working women than South Asia. As these nations grew rapidly in the twentieth century, workers, notably women, shifted from the rural to the industrial

sectors. Overall, women in these countries were pushed into new positions by educational advancements and the rise of commodity-based assembly (Gaddis and Klasen, 2013). Even while Indonesia has a lower proportion of female laborforce involvement than other Southeast Asian nations, it is commonly cited as an example of the added specialized benefit. When economic crises struck East Asia between 1997 and 1998, the majority of males lost their enterprises. For the most part, women contributed to the smooth operation of their family's work supply by working in the casual sector and in horticulture, respectively. As a result, the %age of Indonesian women in the laborforce increased from 49.9% in 1997 to 51.2 % in 1999. (Das, 2016).

Over the previous two decades, the share of women in the laborforce has remained largely steady. Training enrollment rates have climbed, but young people's levels of support have declined. According to the authors, moderate cultural views regarding women in the workplace prevail in each of the three domains (Gaddis and Klasen, 2013). (Gaddis and Klasen, 2013). In Sri Lanka, the share of women in the work force has remained steady at about 33 % from 2003 to 2012. (De Silva and Fernando, 2016).

Since 1999-2000, the proportion of women engaging in the laborforce in India has declined from 34.1 % in 2011-2012 to 27.2 % in 2011-2012. In 2012, Latin America and the Caribbean's women's labor force participation rate were predicted to reach 54.2 % . East Asia has a bigger %age of female employees than South Asia. For the most part, women's labor in the informal sector and horticulture permitted harmonious family utilisation of their work supply.

The total women's laborforce support rate has been reasonably consistent over the last twenty years, declining somewhat to the overall women's working-age population for fifteen years plus, from 52.2 % to just 1.4 % in 1992 and 2012, respectively.

Despite how 370.5 million women have joined the labor over the previous 20 years, women constitute just 39.8 % of the entire laborforce. Besides, the gender cooperation hole has decreased insignificantly, from 27.8 rate focuses in 1992 to 26.0 rate focuses in 2012 (15+). Be that as it may, although training enlistment rates have grown, support rates among young people have dropped (a good trend) (a positive pattern). Simply checking out those aged 25 or more

and excluding the influence of expanding instructive enrollment, the general women's job market collaboration rate rose from 53.1 % in 1992 to 54.2 % in 2012. At the same time, the genderual orientation differential among people 25 and more established has reduced from 32.5 rate focuses in 1992 to 29.5 rate focuses in 2012.

Immature nations and growing business sector economies are more dispersed when it comes to women's dedication than men's collaboration. Women in the Arabian nations, particularly in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, who are at least 25 years old are underrepresented in the laborforce. Since 1992, the trend has progressed with it in North Africa and the Middle East, while it has decreased in South Asia. This is evident from this perspective. Each of the three areas is dominated by moderate cultural viewpoints on women in the workplace (Gaddis and Klasen, 2013).

Despite this, even in regions where women make up a small %age of the labor force, there is a wide range of outcomes (Figure 2.2). In contrast to Pakistan's women's involvement %age of 20%, which is the highest in the region, Nepal's rate is at 80%. They might indicate serious changes in the financial situation. Despite the fact that most Nepali women work in resource agribusiness, which is influenced more by poverty than by choice, there are less cultural constraints for women in Nepal. Many South Asian nations have seen a rapid increase of their female laborforce, which may be seen in the rise of ready-made apparel and animal farming (associated with access to microcredit) (Morrill and Morrill, 2013). Sri Lanka's labor force participation rate for women has remained stable despite the incorporation of key financial data. From 2003 to 2012, it was regularly estimated at 33%. (de Silva and Fernando, 2016).

Research in South Africa found that those who took the time to write down their objectives, think through challenges, and imagine how to overcome them had a better likelihood of getting a job and used more formal channels in the process of getting a job than those who didn't (Abel et al., 2017). A greater amount of "grit" and persistence on the part of female job seekers may be required if they are going to be successful (Duckworth, 2016). This is where setting goals may assist, as it can be used to both set realistic objectives and act as a reminder to follow through on those goals after they have been set. Private sector employment in the Kurdistan

Regional Government (KRG) was prioritized and expedited by the KRG in 2016. Kurdistan Regional Government, 2016. Because of this, there are several roadblocks in the way of increasing women's participation in employment. As an example, a higher level of education among women in the area hasn't resulted in a rise in labor force participation since there has been a decrease in public sector employment prospects. As a result, the region's women have not been able to keep pace with their male counterparts in terms of educational attainment (Assaad et al., 2018). A large majority of women are still seeking work in government. For a variety of reasons, women are more likely than men to favor working for the government. The high %age of postsecondary education completion in the area is a significant contributor. Working circumstances, including reduced hours, job stability, and fringe benefits, can have a role in attracting people to the industry (Assaad and Barsoum, 2019). There is also a smaller income disparity between men and women in government than in private enterprise (Said, 2014). According to demographic and labor force surveys, women's participation in the private sector in KRI has been steadily growing over the last several years, although these rates are still very low. According to polls of the laborforce and the general public, the participation rate was 20.1 % in 2012, 14.9 % in 2013, 20.6 % in 2014, 24.2 % in 2015, and 24.3 % in 2017. (compared to about 55 % for men in all of these surveys). Furthermore, little is known about women's and men's cultural standards and individual views on the issue of women working in the private sector. The future of labor supply decisions may rely on your capacity to understand various views. Our research adds a great deal to the corpus of knowledge already available. Research in behavioral science and unique primary data sets from Iraq's Kurdistan Region are used to reach conclusions (KRI). An important objective of this project is to examine and explore in depth a variety of possible social, cultural, and psychological barriers that women may encounter while determining whether or not to engage in the laborforce. To better understand the barriers that women face in the workplace in KRI, we're looking at which ones are more limiting and which ones are more prevalent there. Research in KRI has attempted to quantify individual, family, and social psychological obstacles in relation to FLFP, but no one has attempted to do so consistently and statistically before. "[Citation is required] [Reference required] [Reference required] "[Citation is required]" "[Citation is required]" "[Citation is required] The following citation is required: The following is the rest of the paper. To begin, we'd like to offer a few observations on the current

state of employee participation in KRI's public and private sectors. As a follow-up, we'll discuss the systematic measurement of attitudes, including social norms and cultural beliefs of individuals and counterparts, on the use of women in private sector work and on the labor force generally. It's going to be open to both men and women to participate. Afterwards, we identify other barriers that hinder women from working at KRI, drawing on a comparable study of barriers that keep women from finding jobs. The last portion of our study includes a discussion of possible remedies and lessons learned for future policy.

The patterns of women's participation in the labor sector in India have been especially astonishing in recent years. In 2011-2012, women's involvement declined to 27.2% from 34.1% in 1999-2000. There are a few studies in India that suggest a decline in the number of young women enlisting in the military after high school and a lack of business opportunities for women. The salary gap and the mismeasurement of laborforce support for women are opportunities for women (Dey, 2020).

But the propensity in India is abysmal; it's not a good case study at all. There has been a decline in the %age of women in Turkey's laborforce, from 36.1% in 1989 to 23.33% in 2005. (Klasen and Pieters, 2015). As families relocated from rural to urban areas, husbands left farming, which resulted in a decrease in the number of women in the laborforce (which mirrors the increased participation of women in domestic responsibilities) (Klasen, 2019). But when socioeconomic circumstances improved after 2005, Turkish women began to return to the laborforce. There was an increase in support rates to 29.5 % in 2012. Middle Eastern and North African nations have low contribution rates, although they haven't made a quick progress in this area.

2.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: DETERMINANTS

Despite the fact that social norms and ideals are difficult to quantify and sometimes misinterpreted, they are frequently ignored. For example, when discussing "social norms," "culture," and "conventions," these phrases are often used interchangeably. They are not well known how these ideas interact with each other on three different levels: the person, family, and society. Establishing a conceptualization framework that can be used to test and validate societal norms, cultural beliefs, and intrahousehold expectations of women's conduct would make it

simpler to adopt an effective plan for expanding women's engagement in the economy. Because of this, examining and evaluating cultural norms and values is very important. 4. There are commonly held opinions about how members in a group should behave and how they should act because of our social nature. These viewpoints are referred to as "social norms." These standards arise as a result of social interdependence, an unwritten code of conduct, and a widely held interpretation of that rule. They're also a result of our society's interdependence. A lot of our actions and choices are influenced by social norms, which are unofficial systems of governance. Societal "glue" or "cement" is a term used to describe social conventions because of this (Elster, 2003). "Social norms" are the rules that govern conduct in a certain social group. These criteria may change as a result of changes in the reference group. Acceptance or disapproval and punishments, in particular by members of the appropriate reference group, are the primary means through which social norms are established and maintained. When we speak about human sociality, we are referring to the tendency of individuals to form ties with one another and act in ways that are consistent with their position as members of social groupings. With such a propensity, civilizations or organizations run the risk of falling victim to harmful or negative collective patterns of behavior, which they then perpetuate (World Bank, 2015).

Forced migrants are the primary focus of this comparative study since their legal position in the nine countries examined differs from that of other migrants. In the countries of the European Union that were examined, refugees and asylum seekers are generally two groups that are legally defined. Asylum seekers are those who have applied for international protection and are now going through the asylum process. Individuals who have been granted refugee status or subsidiary protection as a consequence of a successful application for international protection are known as international protection beneficiaries. People awarded international protection are also known as international protection. We use the word "refugees" to refer to those people in EU member states who are now receiving international protection of one type or another (which is obviously an oversimplification). A refugee is a person who has been forcefully relocated; consequently, the word "refugee" refers to people who have been forcibly relocated rather than those who have certain legal status, as it does in EU-governed states. RESPOND Each and every EU member state that was surveyed found that primary school attendance is mandatory for all

children, regardless of their nationality or legal status. Only in Turkey and Iraq are refugees (of different statuses) not compelled to attend school in the countries studied. We found that the age ranges for obligatory education in each of the nine countries we studied differed. Germany, Sweden, and Poland are the only nations in the world where pupils must attend school for the entire 18 years; Turkey is the closest, with students attending school for 17 years, but it is not mandatory. Students are no longer compelled to attend school in various countries at the age of 16 (as in the United Kingdom and Italy) or 15 (in the Czech Republic). (Greece, Austria). Iraq was said to have the shortest compulsory schooling period in the world, lasting just six years for children aged six to twelve (six grades of primary education). Some countries in the RESPOND research have mandated that asylum seekers and refugees be enrolled in school, but there are still a number of barriers in place that make it difficult for children to attend. The findings of RESPOND's research have confirmed the findings of previous studies on the various difficulties that refugees face while attempting to get admission to higher education (Koehler, 2017; Ferede, 2018). The main impediments were the complicated and often impossible procedures for recognizing certificates from the countries of origin of refugees (especially in Poland and the United Kingdom). The difficulty of communicating across cultures was compounded by the limitations imposed by the language barrier (in all the researched countries but especially Greece and Turkey). In spite of the inclusion of Iraq in the RESPOND research, it is almost impossible to compare the country to the other countries because of the country's current economic and political difficulties. This must be stated again. Rather than focusing just on initiatives for refugees in Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries, more attention should be paid to the growth of these countries as a whole.

The rights and duties that are associated with a person's legal status have a significant impact on their ability to participate in the job market. However, asylum seekers in many countries do not have the same employment rights as refugees, who are given access to the national labor market much later (after a few months) and with more restrictions (for example, when they do not receive a final decision in their asylum procedure within the legally stipulated deadline). Many restrictions and impediments prevent asylum seekers in EU member states from gaining access. Asylum seekers face a number of barriers to employment, including a lack of access to

the labor market, a lack of access to certain vocations and professions, and a lack of access to certain industries and sectors. Refugees are often put in a more vulnerable position than those seeking asylum. Although to varying degrees and in various circumstances, EU member countries adhere to the Common European Asylum System and its implications for the labor market integration of asylum seekers and refugees. Since neither Iraq nor Turkey is a member of the EU, they are subject to the laws of their own countries in this regard. Asylum seekers and refugees, in general, are eager to go to work as soon as possible in any new nation, even whether they face legal restrictions, trauma, a lack of language skills, or a lack of cultural understanding. Although the conditions make it tough for them to work, this is nonetheless the case. Jobs that don't require a high degree of competence are often held by those who have been given international protection and have been able to find work. Both the literature review and the RESPOND project research found evidence to support the statement that this trend is constant across all of the countries examined. The majority of individuals seeking asylum and those given international protection wish to work in informal settings. For example, in Iraq and Turkey, this is the accepted practice. Most refugees in foreign countries work as unskilled workers or artists. The "issue of qualification mismatch" that refugees face in these nations stems from the presence of low-skilled workers employed in fields unrelated to their own (Ibrido and Marchese, 2020). Refugees in all of the countries studied were able to get some form of aid throughout the process of integrating into the laborforce. Governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are responsible for most of this aid. There is a critical need for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to fill the gap left by the government's inadequate resources for refugees in countries such as Iraq, Greece, Italy, and Poland. When it comes to refugee integration, official institutions play an important role in countries like the UK, Sweden, and Austria, while non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are the only ones that assist the work of state institutions. A lot of the time, the only assistance available at the national level is registering with the organization that acts as the country's version of a job placement service. People who are unemployed are matched with employment prospects through this organization, as well as being provided with training and language instruction. Refugees and asylum seekers who sought employment via wider social networks were mostly unsuccessful in their efforts in the majority of countries. Universities are also responsible for the recognition of degrees, which puts them

in jeopardy. This procedure, on the other hand, was seen as difficult and time-consuming in every nation, especially by individuals who had not brought their original documentation with them. The mapping of asylum seekers' skills, as done in Sweden, is important in these cases since it allows for the development of an individual plan for establishing oneself. A last point to make is that, because the state does not provide services like legal help or language instruction, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a critical role. Nine countries studied found that the amount of time required to complete an asylum claim was a substantial barrier to employment. For asylum seekers, returning to the laborforce is far more difficult if the process is prolonged (sometimes by several years) and they have no or very limited access to the job market for the duration of their procedure. As a result of our research, we discovered that male and female refugees and asylum seekers face significant gender disparities in the workplace and in the sectors they work in. More women than men work in the informal sector, which includes care and cleaning services, as well as housekeeping and domestic service. There is just a little change in this situation after being awarded protected status.

When discussing women's labor collaboration in agricultural nations, it is essential to point out how financial difficulties affect women's sensible judgments and their capacity to engage in labor.' The most important thing to remember is that the opinions covered in the essay should be evaluated often (Gaddis and Klasen, 2013), (World Bank, 2018):

- Economic improvement level
- Academic accomplishment.
- Social variables, for example, accepted practices that impact marriage, fertility, and women's job outside the home.
- Obtaining credit and different sources of info.
- Household and life partner qualities
- Institutional setting (laws, assurance, benefits).

2.5 U-SHAPED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE LABOR FORCE

There has been some debate over the validity of the speculation, despite the obvious U-shaped link shown in Figure 3. This debate has focused on the conjecture's adaptability to various informational indexes and techniques. Using dynamic summation strategies for minutes of General Membership Meeting (GMM) board information methods, the U-formed affiliation is not strong, according to one investigation (Gaddis and Klasen, 2013). Furthermore, historical results could not be used to leverage more recent and accurate data on the labor force. The U-model has not been widely embraced by all nations as their economies have grown. Even though Bangladesh is a low-income nation, the %age of women employed in Bangladesh increased from 23.9 % in 1990 to 36.0 % in 2010. (Particularly in rural regions). As a result, attributing nations' increased per capita GDP to improved gender labor force collaboration obscures the reality of other factors at play. According to Lechman (2014), the number of women in the labor force has a U-shaped relationship with economic advancement. When a country is wiped out, women are often forced to labor in agriculture or local crafts. As a country's economy expands, its economic policy switches from agricultural to industry, resulting in a disproportionate gain for males.

Economic development and the participation of women in it form a U-shape connection. As a result, the U-model has not been adopted by all countries as their economies have expanded. Although Bangladesh's labor force is dominated by males, the %age of women working has climbed from 23.9 % in 1990 to 36 % in 2010.

Many studies have shown a U-shaped link between economic growth and the participation of women in the work market, as has been widely discussed (Lechman, 2014). When a nation is destroyed, women are forced to work in agriculture or other local businesses because they have no other choice. A country's economic policy shifts from agriculture to industry as its economy grows, benefiting males disproportionately. As a result, education levels rise, wealth declines, and social humiliation fades, enabling women to take advantage of more family-friendly and accessible jobs in the support field. These fundamental alterations may be depicted at the family level using the neoclassical work supply model. When a woman's husband earns a raise, she

loses out on the opportunity to earn a higher salary. However, the replacement effect will lead women to increase their labor supply as their remuneration rises.

Many countries' GDP and female work force are shown to be linked by a U-shape, although the nonlinear pattern line does not suit the data very well because of exceptions in the data (Figure 2.3). According to India and Turkey, some nations with similar employment levels have lower pay rates than other countries. For example, Brazil and China have higher rates of female labor force collaboration than the benchmark for their degree of financial turn of events.

2.5.1 Impact of Education in Women labour force participation

As schools are their major point of contact with the society in which they are living, access to education is especially important for the integration of immigrant children. Here, we provide some of our results from the RESPOND project's research on refugee integration into educational systems and job markets across nine countries. Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Iraq are the nations included in this list (Atto et al., 2020). Another purpose is to understand and discuss the significance of education and work in the process of integrating refugees. Using the examples, this will be accomplished. There are significant similarities and differences in both the laws and practices of the countries reviewed in this context. Since the national reports on integration included multi-level interviews as a part of their methodology, this inquiry is based on their findings. Quantification of qualitative interviews from the RESPOND study in eleven countries also went into the comparative quantitative analysis. In addition to the nine nations already mentioned, this list also includes Lebanon, whose Integration Report was not included in the overall study. A total of 474 interviews with asylum seekers and refugees were conducted at the micro-level, with more than 220 interviews conducted with meso-level stakeholders involved in migration governance (central governments, local governments, non-governmental organizations, schools, and social welfare institutions). More than a thousand interviews have been conducted by the country's teams (of different statuses). We were able to observe the challenges and opportunities refugees encounter in school and the job market through a wide range of lenses thanks to the same methodological standards and similar interview questions tailored to each type of

respondent (both macro and micro). We were able to compare and contrast the cases from different countries and find commonalities and differences between them. Despite the lack of a representative sample in the empirical research, this study provides light on the most critical aspects of the issues previously described. However, these results cannot be extended to the whole immigrant population.

Because of Europe's alleged refugee crisis, there has been an increase in the number of people researching issues related to asylum seekers, refugees, and their integration into European countries. An integration strategy has been spurred by the rising number of refugees wanting to migrate via Europe to reach certain nations. Ager and Strang highlight education and the job market as two of the five indicators that indicate integration (2004). Developing a sense of economic security, improving mental health, and making it easier for asylum seekers to assimilate into society if their asylum claim is successful are all benefits of the first step. Unable to fully integrate into the job market without having their credentials recognized and being fluent in the local language of the host nation, immigrants often find it difficult to communicate with their new colleagues on a day-to-day basis. Whether the relocation is voluntary or forced, a working understanding of the local language is often required in order to get access to education and employment opportunities in a new place.

In migration studies, the issue of integration has been a major concern for researchers from the field's inception, both as a method and as a matter of policy. There has been a lot of work done in this field, and new approaches are being created all the time. It doesn't change the reality that "integration" and "integration policy" have no widely agreed meaning to this day, and that practical understandings and concepts are usually restricted by the history of a certain scientific subject (such as sociology, anthropology, economics, law, political science, and public policy). It is important to recognize that the term "integration" encompasses a broad range of issues and players, both state- and non-state-sponsored, in the society that is hosting those who are considered to be (im)migrants/foreigners/newcomers/refugees. One of the most often mentioned sources when attempting to provide an academic definition of integration is Rinus Penninx's work (on which he has also collaborated with a number of other experts) (Penninx, 2013). Both the RESPOND initiative's theoretical, conceptual, and methodological foundations and the

project itself bear this fact. According to Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas' "open non-normative analytical definition," integration is "the process of becoming an accepted part of society" (2016). There are three parts to this process: political-legal, socio-economic, and cultural-religious elements. The state, the market, and the nation are each represented by one of these dimensions (Entzinger 2000; Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas 2016). It's critical to consider how migrants fit into each of these categories. Since each of these dimensions is important in and of itself and is also susceptible to a separate set of criteria and circumstances, it is difficult to give priority or propose which of these dimensions is better: In addition to the unique characteristics of each individual immigrant (such as age, gender, education, language proficiency, legal status in the host country, and physical health), the relative importance of these two factors can also be affected by circumstances beyond the control of the migrants themselves, such as political and economic conditions in the host country (attitudes towards receiving migrants, basic macroeconomic indicators, etc.). However, their value might change based on the situation.

Many countries throughout the globe are concerned about the high %age of unemployment. The global unemployment rate seems to have reached a new phase, with more than one billion people out of work. Structural problems in affluent industrialized countries have gotten worse year after year, despite the recovery and economic development, despite the fact that the economy has rebounded. High unemployment rates may have a severe influence on the stability and cohesion of society, especially in countries like Iraq. The Iraqi Ministry of Planning statistics show a 3 % increase in the population, and the number of people without work continues to rise year after year. This makes the situation much worse. Over the last five years, there has been an estimated rise of 5 million people in the population of the country. Males make up 51% of the population, while women make up 49%. As well as weaker production conditions and transitions to market economies were cited in the discussion. Concerns about poverty and other negative social repercussions, as well as the likelihood of hidden low-productivity unemployment in productive and service-oriented activities, follow the concomitant drop in job prospects in the public sector. However, they do not contribute anything to the economy and do not engage in any kind of productive work, even if they are engaged in a variety of non-practical and parasitic duties. Unemployment is likely to be high if the issue of hidden unemployment is addressed.

Unemployment is a major problem for the Iraqi economy because of the economic, social, and political consequences it has. As a result, Iraq's poverty rate rises, a dangerous business climate develops, human capital is wasted, and human resources with the ability to contribute to Iraq's economic progress are lost. Many aspects of the Iraqi economy are suffering because of the real issue of unemployment, including the failure of Iraq's labor market to absorb university graduates, which has serious consequences for society and impedes building, growth, and prosperity. Increased product and service investment in light of Iraq's people and material resources will alleviate the issue of unemployment if legislative frameworks, development programs, and thorough planning are in place to connect the outputs of education and the Iraqi labor market. This assumes, however, that Iraq has the necessary people and material resources. Since this piece focuses on the terrible realities of high unemployment rates in this period, it is a worthwhile read (1990–2018). Also explored here are the causes of the growing unemployment situation in the Iraqi economy. It examines the effects of unemployment on Iraq's economic and social structures, and it offers suggestions on how to minimize or improve Iraq's unemployment problem. Iraq's labor market has to be bolstered with innovative human energies capable of growing and investing, and this essay provides a complete examination of how to increase its operating volume. In addition, the number of Iraqi workers will grow as a result of this study.

2.5.2 The level of women' work is likewise significant for economic development

When comparing RESPOND country reports, it is important to keep in mind that each country has its own unique set of experiences. This is because each country has its own unique set of circumstances. They vary in their degree of completeness and precision, which restricts the capacity to draw conclusions from the meta-analysis. The data was processed logically and extensively using a qualitative content analysis method using themes and categories as analytical tools. Examples were given via the use of first-person accounts. The following is a breakdown of the report's structure: To begin, the first section of the paper presents some theoretical hypotheses about integration in the fields of education and work. A comparison of educational opportunities for refugees, both children and adults, will be presented next. In the third phase, the language of the host nation receives a lot of attention. This study is primarily

concerned with the difficulties and rewards of learning the language of a foreign nation. In addition, we'll provide advice on how to make it simpler to pick up the native tongue of the country you're visiting. This study's fourth segment focuses on the employment market access of asylum seekers and refugees. There are several aspects to consider when it comes to economic integration, including the different legal systems and their consequences. According to the method used to examine educational gaps, we will now discuss the primary facilitators and obstructions that refugees have uncovered, as well as proposals for further investigation. Some of the nations under consideration have found solutions to the challenges refugees encounter in learning the language and breaking into the employment market of the country they are being accommodated in. Policymakers and practitioners working on refugee integration in education and the laborforce may find the last section of the report particularly useful. Good practices, even though we know they can't be replicated no matter how unique a circumstance may be, have been included in this section.

It is important for non-industrialized countries to know whether their businesses employ women, as well as what the financial results are. Even in countries with similar expenditures in their labor force, there is a wide disparity in workplace conditions and promotion prospects. Low- and middle-income countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East have a surplus of horticultural workers. Finding job in a conventional profession is 25.6% more likely if you have a higher degree, according to an Indonesian survey of women. While studies of women's work support rates that take into account a variety of views, such as regional variations, national trends, and interest rate considerations, are useful, they sometimes miss the target when it comes to looking beyond the two-person perspective of this labor market indicator. However, in non-industrial nations, it is essential to develop whether or not women work, as well as the business outcomes for women who take care of business.

Even in nations where laborforce investment rates are near to equal, the type of employment and the opportunities for better vocations continue to be inconsistently divided across individuals (Venkata Ratnam, 2001). Working as a woman in a non-industrial country means being paid less (due to the noteworthy gender pay gap), getting low-paying jobs, and forgoing time with family or starting small businesses. Gender discrimination in the workplace is a global

issue that affects every country (World Bank, 2018). A last point: sloppy labor will not likely increase women's financial power; rather, it is predicted to provide the appearance of women's submissive standing at home. There is a gender disparity in the workplace because more women than males contribute to their families' financial well-being. Approximately 33% of working women in South and Southeast Asia, as well as in Northern and Southern Africa, reported neglecting family responsibilities in 2012. This left many of these women in a precarious situation as they tried to balance both work and home life (Venkata Ratnam, 2001). Some of the world's most impoverished regions are home to a large number of female horticultural workers.

2.6 GENERAL COMPARISON OF TURKEY AND IRAQ

Source: (worlddata.info, 2021)

Table 2.1: General Information

	Iraq	Turkey
Region:	Western Asia	Western Asia
<u>Area:</u>	435,052 km ²	785,350 km ²
Official language:	Arabic	Turkish
Government form:	Federal parliamentary republic	Parliamentary republic
Independent since:	1932 AD	1923 AD
<u>Capital:</u>	BaghdadAnkara	BaghdadAnkara

Table 2.2: Population

	Iraq	Turkey
Population:	41,179,000	85,043,000
<u>Inhabitants/km²:</u>	94.7	108.3

<u>Life expectancy males:</u>	Ø 69 years	Ø 75 years
Life expectancy females:	Ø 73 years	Ø 81 years
<u>Average age:</u>	Ø 21.2 years	Ø 32.2 years
Birthrate:	28.14 ‰	15.53 ‰
Deathrate:	4.71 ‰	5.48 ‰
Migrationrate:	-0.68 ‰	-1.55 ‰

Table 2.3: Quality of Life value 0 (bad) to 100 (good)

	Iraq	Turkey
Political stability:	16	32
Civil rights:	12	38
Health:	42	64
Climate:	37	62
Cost of Living:	75	60
Popularity:	34	50

Table 2.4: Economy

	Iraq	Turkey
<u>Currency:</u>	Iraqi Dinar (1 IQD = 1000 Fils)	Turkish Lira (1 TRY =100 Kurus)
<u>Unemployment rate:</u>	14.2 %	13.4 %

Inflation rate:	6.04 %	19.60 %
<u>Cost of Living:</u> (USA = 100%)	36.76 %	29.33 %
Commercial taxes and contributions:	30.80 %	42.30 %
<u>Average income:</u>	5,040 US\$	9,830 US\$
<u>Corruption index:</u>	77 (very bad)	62 (bad)

	IRQ: total	per 1000 inh.	TUR: total	per 1000 inh.
Gross domestic product:	207,889 M US\$	5.05 M US\$	815,272 M US\$	9.59 M US\$
Gross national product:	207,345 M US\$	5.04 M US\$	836,295 M US\$	9.83 M US\$
Exported goods:	50,613 M US\$	1.23 M US\$	281,555 M US\$	3.31 M US\$
Imported goods:	54,723 M US\$	1.33 M US\$	285,555 M US\$	3.36 M US\$

Table 2.5: Infrastructure

	IRQ: total	per 1000 inh.	TUR: total	per 1000 inh.
Roadways:	59,623 km	1.45 km	67,333 km	0.79 km
Railways:	2,272 km	0.06 km	10,378 km	0.12 km
Waterways:	5,279 km	0.13 km	1,200 km	0.01 km

Harbours:	68	0.002	1,217	0.014
<u>Airports:</u>	102	0.002	98	0.001

Table 2.6: Energy Balance

	IRQ: total	per inh. 1000	TUR: total	per inh. 1000
Energy consumption:	38.46 bn kWh	933,963.24 kWh	231.10 bn kWh	2.72 m kWh
Energy production:	75.45 bn kWh	1.83 m kWh	261.90 bn kWh	3.08 m kWh
Energy export:	0.00 kWh	0.00 kWh	1.44 bn kWh	16,956.18 kWh
Energy imports:	11.97 bn kWh	290,679.67 kWh	6.33 bn kWh	74,433.16 kWh
CO2 emissions:	188.14 m t	4,568.79 t	412.97 m t	4,856.03 t

Table 2.7: Telecommunication

			Iraq	Turkey
International dialing:			+964	+90
Internet domain:			.iq	.tr
	IRQ total	IRQ per inh. 1000	TUR total	TUR per inh. 1000
Landlines:	4,166,461	101	12,448,604	146

Mobile cellulars:	36,946,600	897	82,128,104	966
Internet server:	26	0	7,093,000	83
Internet users:	19,853,827	482	65,505,783	770
Broadband Internet:	6,254,099	152	16,734,853	197

Table 2.8: Healthcare system

	Iraq	Turkey
Hospital beds per 1000 pop.:	1.32	2.85
Physicians per 1000 inh.:	0.82	1.76
Diabetes:	8.8 %	11.1 %
Tuberculosis:	0.3 %	0.2 %
Tuberculosis cure rate:	94.0 %	83.0 %
Smokers:	18.5 %	30.7 %

Table 2.9: Native Languages

	Iraq	Turkey
<u>Turkish:</u>	n/a	87.6 %
<u>Arabic:</u>	77.2 %	1.4 %
<u>Kurdish:</u>	19.0 %	10.6 %
<u>Azerbaijani:</u>	1.7 %	n/a

<u>Assyrian:</u>	0.8 %	n/a
<u>Persian:</u>	0.8 %	n/a
other:	0.5 %	0.4 %

Table 2.10: Religion

	Iraq	Turkey
<u>Islam:</u>	97.0 %	99.0 %
<u>Yazidism:</u>	1.3 %	0.1 %
<u>Christianity:</u>	0.8 %	0.2 %
<u>Jewry:</u>	0.1 %	0.1 %
<u>Buddhism:</u>	0.1 %	n/a
<u>Hinduism:</u>	0.1 %	n/a
other:	0.6 %	0.6 %

2.7 ANALYSIS OF WOMEN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ

2.7.1 Iraq Profile

More over 39 million people are believed to live in Iraq. In Iraq, women make up half of the population and are the primary breadwinners in one out of every ten Iraqi households, with 80 % of those women being widows. 71% of Iraqis reside in urban areas, and 13% of households have 10 or more members working in different vocations at any one time.. 58.71 % of Iraq's population is under the age of 24 (11,736, 897 males and 11,217, 392 women), making it one of the nations with the highest %age of young people ("Iraq," 2017). Iraq's ethnic minorities include Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Assyrians, and Yazidis, all of whom adhere to stringent ethnic traditions. It is estimated that 96 % of Iraqis are Muslim. Iraqis have had to deal with the

consequences of economic stagnation and restricted access to basic amenities for a long time due of wars, legal, and confrontations. Young Iraqi women have been in a long-term fight, with extended spells of acquiescence and assaults on their rights. From the 1960s through the 1980s, women and young girls made considerable progress in gaining access to education, health care, and employment. However, with the start of the Iran and Iraq wars, their status has deteriorated dramatically (1980-1988). War was authorized by the UN, and the first Gulf War broke out in 1991. For the Iraqi people, it brought a variety of hardships. During the US fight that began in 2003, women's position and security suffered significantly (Donovan et al., 2015). After the conflict ended, the Islamic State of Iraq needed to be developed extremely seriously. Iraq's Islamic region, from 2014 to 2017, required a huge cost on society, with women facing direct and backhanded mercilessness and limitations.

Iraq's economy is mostly state-run, with the oil industry accounting for more than 90% of government revenues and 66% of gross domestic product. However, just one % of the laborforce is employed in this business. Iraqis are heavily reliant on the public sector, which employs over 40% of the country's total population (60 % of the positions for women). It has been a long time since Iraq's civil war and social struggle, and the country's economy has been affected by a variety of challenges, the most prominent of which is the widespread corruption of social and financial structures, as well as societal standards that are out of step with reality (Mueen, 2003). Combined with a very male-dominated society, these features render women much less capable of dealing with these circumstances.

In 2018, Iraq is in an unstable state. Having emerged from barbarism, it now has the daunting task of reconstructing the country's core structure and providing public aid to 39 million people (Podiotis, 2020). There were \$118.3 billion in government expenditures in 2013, an increase of 18 % over 2012, according to UN Inter-Agency and Research Analysis Unit (IARA) data. Separately, a budget's total expenditures may be broken down into three major categories: energy; security/protection; and social administration, each accounting for 21% of the whole budget. Thus, Iraq's expenditures are mostly focused on renewable energy and military activities, rather than on incremental development projects. In reality, around 60% of Iraqi households need one or more of the following: access to safe water and sanitation, daily use of

the public network, electricity for 12 hours or more, and food security. In 2015–2016, just 5.7% of Iraq's government expenditure went toward education, making it the Middle Eastern country with the worst performance in that year (Lesch, 1996).

Many countries throughout the globe are concerned about the high %age of unemployment. The global unemployment rate seems to have reached a new phase, with more than one billion people out of work. Structural problems in affluent industrialized countries have gotten worse year after year, despite the recovery and economic development, despite the fact that the economy has rebounded. High unemployment rates may have a severe influence on the stability and cohesion of society, especially in countries like Iraq. The Iraqi Ministry of Planning statistics show a 3 % increase in the population, and the number of people without work continues to rise year after year. This makes the situation much worse. Over the last five years, there has been an estimated rise of 5 million people in the population of the country. Males make up 51% of the population, while women make up 49%. As well as weaker production conditions and transitions to market economies were cited in the discussion. Concerns about poverty and other negative social repercussions, as well as the likelihood of hidden low-productivity unemployment in productive and service-oriented activities, follow the concomitant drop in job prospects in the public sector. However, they do not contribute anything to the economy and do not engage in any kind of productive work, even if they are engaged in a variety of non-practical and parasitic duties. Unemployment is likely to be high if the issue of hidden unemployment is addressed. Unemployment is a major problem for the Iraqi economy because of the economic, social, and political consequences it has. As a result, Iraq's poverty rate rises, a dangerous business climate develops, human capital is wasted, and human resources with the ability to contribute to Iraq's economic progress are lost. Many aspects of the Iraqi economy are suffering because of the real issue of unemployment, including the failure of Iraq's labor market to absorb university graduates, which has serious consequences for society and impedes building, growth, and prosperity. Increased product and service investment in light of Iraq's people and material resources will alleviate the issue of unemployment if legislative frameworks, development programs, and thorough planning are in place to connect the outputs of education and the Iraqi labor market. This assumes, however, that Iraq has the necessary people and material resources.

Since this piece focuses on the terrible realities of high unemployment rates in this period, it is a worthwhile read (1990–2018). Also explored here are the causes of the growing unemployment situation in the Iraqi economy. It examines the effects of unemployment on Iraq's economic and social structures, and it offers suggestions on how to minimize or improve Iraq's unemployment problem. Iraq's labor market has to be bolstered with innovative human energies capable of growing and investing, and this essay provides a complete examination of how to increase its operating volume. In addition, the number of Iraqi workers will grow as a result of this study.

Social, economic, and demographic changes in the 1980s had an influence on employment and market relations (Allen, 2016). Global markets have been influenced by liberalization and a concentration on exports since the 1980s, when neoliberal policies were put in place. This technique was followed by Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as Turkey, when they were only emerging economies. In order to maintain their laborforce's level of knowledge, some countries choose flexible employment, which is required by the labor market. Demographic shifts in the work force are an important factor to consider as well (Koval, Polyezhayev & Bezkhlibna, 2018). The aging of the population is happening in tandem with a decrease in the number of births in countries that are growing economically. In the near future, these countries might lose their status as young and rapidly populous nations. As time went on, the populations of these two age groups started to decline. This tendency persisted for a long period. As a result, the active population is expected to decline over time. Youth unemployment is still a problem in these countries' labor markets, and unemployment rates in these countries may be said to be on the rise. There is a lack of skilled workers in these countries, which is a major challenge. Women's participation in the laborforce is rapidly increasing throughout these countries, prompting governments to implement measures to address the problem and capitalize on the trend (Doepke, Hannusch, Kindermann & Tertilt, 2022). In many countries, informal economies account for a large share of the economy, making low-wage jobs (without benefits) one of the most common labor difficulties. There has been a decrease in the number of agricultural occupations, while there has been an increase in positions in the service sector.

2.7.2 National framework and policy for women labor force participation in Iraq

As an administration in 1932, Iraq became a republic in 1958 with a one-ruler system of presidents until 2003, when a US-led attack on the country was approved by the UN Security Council and wiped away Saddam Hussein's association. In 2011, UN personnel were still in the country. 275 individuals were chosen for the central Council of Representatives in December 2005 after a nationwide referendum. A new constitution was demanded in October 2005. The division of powers was established by the constitution (executive, legislative, and judiciary). It's been a democratic regulatory republic ever since, with an ever-changing number of socially conscious individuals and states. The country is split into 18 provinces, three of which are part of the Kurdistan Region, which restricts freedom and is governed by a communal association. "(Counting a parliament, an agency, and a legitimate structure).

As stated in the new Iraqi Constitution, the practice of gender discrimination is outlawed (Article 14). Despite Iraq's participation in a number of international agreements protecting civil rights, obstacles to domestic compliance with Iraq's obligations under agreements continue.

According to the Iraqi Constitution of 2005, all Iraqis are equal in the eyes of the law, and no distinction is made for gender in Iraq (Article 14). According to the Constitution, Islam is the primary source of sanctioning and prohibits the sections of laws that dishonor its "established principles." Iraq's most severe relationships are able to govern their own special-status initiatives under Article 41 of the Iraqi Constitution. As a consequence, women's lives in Iraq are just as heavily influenced by Islamic law as are the goals and understandings of males in high-level positions of authority. While Iraq signed the CEDAW Convention in 1986, it has yet to ratify the Optional Protocol on Violence against Women. Iraq ratified the CRC in 1994 and the ICCPR in 1971, the two international treaties addressing civil and political rights. Even though Iraq is a party to a number of worldwide agreements on civil freedoms, as shown in this paper, significant and long-standing obstacles continue to Iraq's domestic compliance with its agreement responsibilities. Religious insurance alone is not enough to guarantee women's rights in Iraq, as shown by the country's discriminatory administrative legislation. Until Iraq achieves complete parity with separation instruments and specific women's corresponding advantages, it

has to undergo authoritative change connected to strong authorization procedures. Women in Iraq should be protected from a broad spectrum of abuse. When it comes to changing or abolishing laws and norms that harm women, Iraq has misgivings. In the same way, Iraq is unable to ratify the Convention's Optional Protocol on Children's Rights on its own will (QJ, 2017).

One of the most well-known typical change game plans for protecting women's worth is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). In 1979, it was put forth for recognition and has since been approved by 180 nations. Because of the settlement's worldwide acceptance, the show aims to defend the ideals and legal demands for women's fundamental rights. A global bill of rights for women is often referred to as such. A 30-part series that begins with an introduction and shows how women are oppressed and then culminates in a public event aimed at ending this inequality.

2.7.3 Contribution of Iraqi Women to The Economy

According to World Bank estimates based on International Labor Organization (ILO) data, the participation rate for women in the labor force was 21.7% in 2017. Middle-income nations have a rate of 63%; high-income countries have a rate of 77%; and low-income countries have a rate of 87%. As a whole, the %age of women in the labor force is much lower than in other countries. Overall, it has the second-lowest share of the world's population, after only Syria (along with Iran). 68 % of the world's population is obese, compared to 32 % of Arabs globally. Prior to 2005, this %age was far higher, and it has steadily though slowly grown from 19.6 % in that year (Zhang and Huang, 2018).

The neediness %age, according to the World Bank, increased from 19.8% in 2012 to 22% in 2014. Every tenth home in Iraq is headed by an Iraqi woman, representing half of the country's total population. Only around 20% have been married for more than ten years and are still in the process of finding a new man to share their life with. Iraq has the second-lowest proportion of working women in the Middle East, behind Syria (along with Iran). Globally, the figure is 68%. However, the average for the Arab globe is merely 32%. A far greater proportion was recorded in the years before to 2005, when it increased to a peak of 20.6 %.

As reported by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Iraqi women continue to give more money to their households and organizations than Iraqi males do (OECD). The GDP will rise by 3% when the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) says that 10% more children will attend school, and when the data is evaluated, we discover that women own over 10% more arable land than males, resulting in over 10% higher agricultural yields. An unprejudiced, fair society and Iraq's economic success can only be achieved by investing in women's groups and strengthening them (Bajtelsmit and Bernasek, 1997). Only 2% of the private sector's experts are women, with the majority working in the oil industry (Bettauer, 2011). The majority of women who work in agriculture in rural areas have little or no formal education. If Iraq doesn't exploit some of its human resources, its possibilities of economic and social progress are being smothered (Bokovi, 2017). 14 % of women work solely or fervently to get a job, compared to 73 % of males. When compared to active males, women are unemployed at a rate of 21%. A whopping 27% of rural-dwelling women's incarceration rates are attributed to their work in the agricultural industry. It is estimated that the unemployment rate for young Iraqi women has risen to 41 %, according to the Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN 2011). Women with four years of college education had a greater incidence of breast cancer (68 %). As a result, women in Iraq face a variety of barriers and challenges that prevent them from becoming more prominent investors in the private sector, such as financial obstacles (finance and property; occupations; transportation); admission to well-being; legal principles and cycles (separation; marriage; separate property; and so on); public interest and portrayal in dynamic discussions (courts; and so on); wrongdoing and weakness. There are also severe social and cultural barriers that prevent women from working in the private sector, such as limitations on women's mobility and the arrangement for males.

However, despite the fact that the 2005 Constitution mandates that Iraqi women have equal labor rights, various unfair elements of the law that restrict women's economic options are still in effect. Some laws and interpretations of such laws prohibit women from working in jobs that explicitly call for long hours, night shifts, or dangerous conditions. Iraqi society, on the other hand, perceives women as servants and parental figures in their day-to-day roles. As a result, 66

% of young people support women's freedom to work, compared to only 42 % of their elders, according to all reports (Qaramah, 2019).

To have a stable economy in Iraq, it is necessary to concentrate on the employment of each individual. Increasing women's financial opportunities is one of the most fundamental driving factors behind the economic turn of events and destitution alleviation ("Vital Signs: Internal Medicine Getting Closer to Gender Parity," 2009).

2.7.4 WOMEN'S ROLE IN IRAQ'S AGRICULTURE SECTOR

It is difficult for women to cultivate a smaller area because of the dry season and desertification. Agriculturists in 2011 made up 49 % of the laborforce, while just 17 % were males. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 43.7 % of women and 16.7 % of men worked in agriculture in 2017. Even though 43.7 % of agricultural work in Iraq is performed by women, their assets and financial activities are seldom held accountable. A woman's capacity to make a livelihood might be adversely affected by the male head of the household's one-sided opinions.

Among rural experts in 2011, women accounted for 49 % of the laborforce, while males accounted for 17.1 %. More women than males were employed in agricultural businesses in 2017 (43.7 % of women and 16.7 % of men), compared to 2016. (Figure 2.4). Rural women "are destined to be more financially linked than urban women," according to UNDP, "although they also face greater food requirement, more impediments to instruction, and take an interest in the casual—and hence unprotected by Iraq's similar chance laws—economic sector." Women in rural areas are more likely to become destitute and less likely to engage in high-skilled jobs than women in urban areas. Non-agricultural vocations and other important administrations have been negatively impacted by rural women's inability to attend to school due to strategic and security issues (al-Noori, 2018).

Although women do 43.7% of pastoral labor in Iraq, they rarely take responsibility for the assets and economic transactions associated with farming (setting the value, venturing out to the market to buy and sell, dealing with the economic pieces of the organization). Realistically, even

if financial aid or loans are given to women, they often wind up in the hands of their husbands or male relatives.

Since males have traditionally been considered the breadwinners and forefathers of their families, they often make choices that benefit the household and the women who depend on them. It is possible for a woman's whole life to be affected by choices made by her husband, including her ability to work. The most common kind of control that women confront is a life partner who wants to know where the women are and requires that the women get his permission to seek medical treatment (66.9 %). In addition, males are more inclined to see the need to limit women's financial commitments as a need than women ("violence-related Mortality in Iraq from 2002 to 2006," 2008). Women's financial responsibility might be a contentious issue since it runs counter to popular perceptions of males as primary breadwinners. If a woman has the freedom to keep and utilize her money whatever she wants, she might undermine the man's position as the family's go-to expert.

Numerous women joined the profession due to a lack of compensation, but they aren't really more involved and instead confront new forms of mistreatment that force them to labor with no control over their salary or working conditions, as well as fulfill their gendered roles in the home. The majority also agreed that, as conditions improved and current social and normal practices were maintained, women's financial exercises that don't adapt to existing gender jobs (such as childcare, baking, catering, hand-made trimmings, and so on) would eventually come to an end, preventing the current commitment of women to paid exercises from becoming a genuine change in the work market and women's work discernment. It's also worth noting that the majority of participants brought up an important distinction between the financial initiatives of a widow and those of a divorced woman. The final choice is often scolded for working outside the home, whether or whether it is a need.

2.7.5 Women's Role in Iraq's Industrial Sector

Despite the fact that each nation is at a distinct point in its economic development, the crisis has a detrimental influence on all of them. After the financial crisis, the job situation in Asia's rising nations was affected. In all three nations, the employment rate increased while the

unemployment rate decreased throughout the period from 2010 to 2019. A lot of progress has been made in the economy since the financial crisis. In all three nations, unemployment decreased and employment increased after the year 2010. From 1999 through 2019, this research uses data from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Turkey to investigate main labor market indexes in those countries. Each country's labor market statistics are taken into account. Including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Turkey

The vast majority of Iraq's recent activities have been tied to the oil industry, including refinement and the production of synthetic materials and composites. Assembling employs around 8% to 10% of the total labor force, and the employees are mostly male (84%) and teenage (26%) in age. In the private sector, there are some independent ventures, but 79 % of the partnerships are owned by the public sector, most of which are in the metal and furniture industries. Other current activities include the manipulation of foodstuffs and materials, such as leather products and concrete and other development materials.

The development accounts for 15% of Iraq's private land occupations. There are two contemporary sub-areas in Iraq (along with food handling) where private mobility is vital, and these are construction materials and associated organizations (among others). As Iraq's renovation and restoration of its long-discontinued foundation gets underway, the shared interest in development work and associated administrations might support a large scope, private-area driven company growth in the near future.

2.7.6 Analysis of Women's Employment Perception

According to the results of the poll, 10.9% of women aged 15 to 54 worked during the time period under consideration. Of Iraqi women surveyed in the private sector, 49.2 % said males were paid less than women, compared to 32.4 % who said men were paid more than women in public. When women are away from their families, they are subjected to harsh critiques. NGO workers, attorneys, and professionals in the Kurdistan Region who have been trained and have the necessary skills to do their duties leave and stay at home.

Only 10.9 % of Iraqi women between the ages of 15 and 54 were employed for pay throughout the survey period; 57.8 % of those women who were not employed proved that this was due to specific reasons: There were 17.1% who blamed a lack of skill, and 12.9% who blamed financial difficulties for their difficulty finding job. These findings shed light on the biggest roadblocks young women and women of color encounter while trying to get into the laborforce. Some of the reasons why women are not working include conventional conceptional commitments, lack of education and competencies as well as a lack of remuneration and limited access to commercial sectors. Non-working women are eager to work if a good opportunity presents themselves, and 7.3% of them want to join in labor market preparation programs, according to the findings of the poll (in Kurdistan Region, the number was 10.6 %).

According to the discussions at the center gathering, accepted practices harm women's financial interests by imposing difficult gender jobs on women and limiting their ability to participate in activities outside the family, especially with managers' lack of arrangement of nurturing support administrations (childcare). Women's desire to work is further hampered by societal norms that place a low value on their continued presence outside the house or upcoming adventures. When women are separated from their children, they are subjected to a barrage of skepticism. Women in the Kurdistan Region are more encouraged than in the rest of the nation to seek for jobs and a calling, according to respondents.

2.7.7 The 2015 Iraq Labour Law

Iraqi Work Law No. 37 of 2015 covers all working relationships in Iraq, with the exception of those in Iraqi Kurdistan. Everyone who is capable of working has the option to do so under conditions and with freedoms that are on par with those in Article 2. A fine of one million IQD and up to six months in prison are the penalties for separating. Iraq's Work Law No. 37 of 2015 governs employment relationships (besides the Iraq Kurdistan Region). Iraq Labor Law No. 71 of 1987 remains substantially unchanged in the Kurdish parliament (When Sales 101 Isn't Enough, 2009). Article 2 of the Labor Law 2015 allows all inhabitants who are eligible to work, regardless of their general orientation, nationality, language, or religion, to do so under the same circumstances and with the same freedom. Under the 2015 Labor Law, women may not be hired

to do dangerous or strenuous job, as specified in government instructions. Women can't work after 5 p.m., with the exception of jobs related to government or business, health and welfare, leisure, and transportation. Advances in general orientation communication and restrictions on employment and enrollment segregation were made possible by the 2015 Labor Law.

2.8 WOMEN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION TURKEY

Turkey's labor market is characterized by low levels of female worker participation and female-owned businesses, as well as high rates of female unemployment. This graph shows Turkey's laborforce investment and all out business, overall joblessness as well as non-agricultural unemployment rates for chosen years. Rural unemployment in Turkey is quite low since family-run companies account for the majority of the economy. It was 36.1 % in 1989; by 2005, it was 23.3 %; and in 2015, it was 31.5 %, the highest level ever recorded. Investing in women's work accounted for 55.1 % of the province's investment in 1989. 33.9 % was the %age in 2005.

As recently as 1955, just 29% of the population resided in urban areas. From 44% in 1980 to 59% in 1959 and finally 77% as recently as 2012. The position of women in rural areas is impacted by the changing definitions of farming and family-run businesses. It's possible that rural women's interest in the laborforce grew from 33.9 % in 2005 to 36.7 % in 2013. According to Figure 2, Turkey has a huge working-age population but only a tiny fraction of them have a college degree. Low-maintenance occupations in Turkey climbed from 5.3% in 2005 to 12.5% in 2013.

The Turkish labor market is characterized by low female worker participation and company ownership, as well as significant female unemployment. Not only is Turkey's 2015 female laborforce investment rate low when compared to other rising nations, but it is also low when compared to other developing countries. Using gender incongruities and patterns in the labor market as a criterion, Figure 2.6 depicts Turkey's laborforce investment, all-out business, total unemployment, and non-agricultural unemployment rates for selected years. Between 1989 and 2015, we witness a decline in both males and women's investment and employment rates. Association and employment rates for women have declined at a faster rate than those for males.

While women's participation in the labor force has increased over the last decade, just 31.5% of women are employed compared to 71.6% of males, and only 27.5% of women are employed compared to 65.0% of men by 2015. Turkish families are characterized by huge gender discrepancies when it comes to labor force investment and business rates. In most households, men are the primary breadwinners. Gender-based biases aren't clearly visible in Table 2.6's joblessness rates, as they could be in laborforce investment and business rates (Corak and Piraino, 2011). During the period from 1989 to 2005, the absolute joblessness rates for men and women were equal. Overall joblessness rates for men and women were 3.4 % and 3.4 %, respectively, in the United States in 2015.

As Ilkcaracan Ajas (2012) argues, all-out work request development was insufficient to compensate for the country's overflow of women who had been freed from farming and were now looking for employment. As a result, metropolitan women laborforce cooperation rates remained stable, while women laborforce support rates generally fell until the mid-2000s. These women who moved from provincial locales became full-time housewives, jobless, or financially connected again by working in the metro economy like homegrown work or work concentrated casual enterprises. Farming and family-run organizations have changed in significance throughout time, and this has had a significant impact on women's roles in rural communities. From 41.3% in 2000 to 30.5 % in 2006, the %age of independent household heads engaged in agriculture fell dramatically in rural regions (Kawaguchi and Miyazaki, 2007).

Flexible working hours to balance job and home duties may be another factor determining women's participation in the labor market in companies with low support. As you can see in Table 4, from 2005 to 2013, low-maintenance vocations dominated in Turkey. 9 The proportion of Turkey's laborforce comprised of low-gifted experts rose from 5.3% in 2005 to 12.5% in 2013. 10 We can show that the increasing frequency of low-support work in the complete women's organization may be one of the foundations for the growing pattern in women's labor force venture by looking at the measure of low support work. If you live in rural areas, this may not be as big of an issue, as most women are seen as household workers. However, minimal support businesses in urban areas may provide the probability of acknowledging prolonged working hours and combining work and home duties to those who live there. A majority of

Turkish women perform low-stress jobs, and this trend has been more common among urban women in the previous decade. In 2005, 8.9 % of women employed in urban areas performed low-support jobs, and by 2013, that figure had risen to 15.1 %.

2.9 TURKISH WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Butikofer, Kawaguchi, and Miyazaki discovered that Japanese males with working moms were more likely to find successful relationships. Female contributions to the laborforce are substantially impacted by their own and their significant other's mother's former labor market positions, according to Morrill and Morrill (2013) results. According to Carro et al. (2014), a woman's chances of finding work are decreased if her mother is a wage earner. They found that the mother's former economic status had a considerable impact on the child's current situation.

When it comes to a woman entering the laborforce, there is no longer any sense in diminishing returns. Investing in a career is influenced by women's intergenerational connections. Age, education, family structure, and marital status have all been examined in the context of studies.

A lot of attention has been devoted to the intergenerational links in the fields of incomes, educations, and jobs for a long time by market experts.

As a surrogate for the female labor supply that immigrants contribute to their host countries, these studies utilize the verified laborforce affiliation of women from the country of origin (Fernandez, 2007). Migrant women from countries with a high women's work supply are more likely to work than those from countries with a low women's work supply, according to the researchers. In essence, Fernandez and Fogli (2005) demonstrate that second-age settler women in the United States' interest in the labor and fertility rates at the nation's beginning had a significant impact on the supply of employment and wealth choices. This group of researchers found that the results on women are influenced by gender roles and attitudes of women's roles in the house. They report on the behavior of women in the labor market based on gender views, but only in the context of foreigners.

Intergenerational links in gender job convictions and their influence on women's labor market behaviour have been examined in the ensuing strand. Among other things, Farre-Mena and

Ljungqvist (2013) and Johnston (2013) relied on information sources that made it easy to discern the thoughts of working women of different ages (2013). An investigation on the intergenerational transfer of gendered beliefs was carried out by Göksel (2013) using data from a longitudinal study conducted in the United States.



3. RESEARCH COMPARISON OF TURKISH AND IRAQIAN WOMEN LABOR FORCE

3.1 RESEARCH COMPARISON

Women labor force participation rates of both countries are being compared and its time line is 2000 to 2020. The per capita GDP of Turkey and Iraq and the Percentage of women working in agriculture and industry at the sectorial and combined levels are being compared. According to World Bank research, the country's GDP per capita is US \$2010, and the %age of women in the labor force is equal to the %age of the labor force that is employed and unemployed. The period 2000-2020 is covered by the

Research that describes the features of a population is referred to as descriptive research. It gathers data to address a broad variety of questions about a certain population or group.

An investigation of the disparity between men and women was conducted in the Global Gender Gap research. In terms of equal pay, senior officials, managers, and lawmakers, Turkey had a significant gender imbalance. This report says that women's development in the labor force has to be examined and promoted. Women's employment participation and occupational entry are influenced by various factors, which are examined in this article. Various case studies from throughout the world are discussed in depth. What's most significant, though, is that the report emphasizes empowering women to achieve greater success in the labor market.

3.2 LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION TREND

The Bureau of Labor Statistics tracks why people aren't working, including those who need a job but haven't looked for one in over a month and are ready to work. Female participation in the labor force has been steadily decreasing since the late 1990s. There is an annual growth of 0.5% and 0.528 % in the %age of women who participate in the labor force, respectively. Males dominate Iraqi society, and their culture, which emphasizes their dominance, is firmly established in the social fabric. There were 9 million people employed in Iraq in 2015; 86 % of them were males, while 14 % were females.

In 2014, women contributed 5.72 % of the 56.26 % of "Gross Domestic Product" that this segment provides. The raw petroleum trading 'income' (or rather lease) previously included in GOS has been removed. According to annual GDP estimates, the steel volume list in 2020 increased by 1.8 % over the previous year. In the wake of the COVID-19 controversy, the gap between straight people and gay people has become wider, increasing the number of young people who are unemployed and living on the streets. At some point, state-run agencies began to expand existing social insurance programs, including unemployment benefits, family assistance, and disability compensation.

Prosperous nations like the United States and Germany have taken various paths and introduced new aid programs under certain circumstances. After being impacted by COVID-19, Turkey's traditional labor market fared better than a few other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations. There was a dramatic increase in Colombia's jobless rate from 10.85 % to 21.12 % between February and May. Due to the massive prevalence of dangerous illnesses, the return of 1.6 million Iraqis to their homeland is in jeopardy. Iraq's Return and Recovery Unit (IOM Iraq) assists the government in improving circumstances for long-term recovery in 15 governorates.

on-MLAs made an average salary of USD 460, while NLAs made an average salary of USD 289. Only 5.7% of job seekers said they were interested in a career in the food business. According to key witnesses, rural initiatives were more likely to express strong interest.

Between January and April 2020, the labor force cooperation rate for all kinds of people fell by multiple rates. Nonetheless, as various in-person exercises stopped in the earlier year, word-related areas generally overwhelmed by women, for example, recreation and friendship, instruction and wellness administrations, and retail trade, were particularly seriously affected.

The Bureau of Labour Statistics monitors why people aren't working, including the individuals who need a task and will work, yet haven't searched for one over a month. People have very different purposes behind not searching for work, as indicated by the information. When contrasted with women, men made up more than 60% of those "frustrated with professional possibilities" in November 2021. Almost 66% of the people who referenced "family obligations"

as a justification for leaving the business were women. Furthermore, women were 1.5 times more likely than men to be "on an every day schedule."

Coronavirus, then again, has recently exacerbated an existing general pattern: women have been leaving their places of employment for over 20 years. Since the last part of the 1990s, women's contribution to work power has consistently declined. However, women's labor participation has since declined to 56% in 2021. Men's association in the two years was 75% and 68%, individually.

3.3 Turkish Labour force women participation (Source: World bank, 2021)

Table 3.1: Turkish labor force women participation

Series Name	Labor force participation rate for ages 15+, female (%) (national estimate)	
year	Rate in %	
2000	28.09	
2001	28.48	
2002	29	
2003	26.78	
2004	24.98	
2005	24.46	
2013	26.79	
2014	27.63	
2015	29.56	
2016	30.35	The data in this indicates the rate of Women
2017	30.95	
2018	31.11	
2019	32.45	
2020	27.45	

participation in labor market in Turkey from the year 2000 to 2020. In 2000 the women rate was 28.09 that gradually increased in next few years and then start declining. The Women

participation in labor market in Turkey was 31.11% in 2018 and it was the highest Rate from 2000 to 2020. At the end of 2020 the Women rate was 27.45% and it was even less than 2000.

There has been a 0.259 % increase in Turkey's women's labor force participation rate to 33.275 %. Compared to 2017, the rate in 2018 was 33.016 %, indicating an increase. The participation rate of women increases by 0.5% and 0.528% annually.

According to the current statistics of World Bank the women labor force participation rate was 33.275%, which shows a 0.259% improvement from the 2018 rate. Similarly, in 2018 the rate was 33.016%, showing the increased rate from 2017. It shows a 0.26% improvement. In 2017 the rate was 32.756%, and in 2016 the participation rate was 32.256%. Every year the women's participation rate improves. It shows an increase 0.5% and 0.528%, respectively.

3.4 IRAQ WOMEN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE

The rate of participation of female labor in Iraq in 2020 was reported 12.39% according to the sources of World Bank. Following figure depicts the scenario of rate of participation of female labor in Iraq from 1998 to March 2022.




Figure 3.1: Female Labor Force Participation In Iraq from 2000 to March 2020 (World Bank, 2022)

Here is line graph of the above data from the year 2000 to 2020. The crest and trough of the line graph shows that rate of women labor in Turkey in 2000 was high and start declining and in 2018 it was the highest among all the years.

3.5 IRAQI WOMEN CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

3.5.1 IRAQI WOMEN SITUATION IN SOCIETY

The argument focuses on women's roles in the workplace and society on a deeper level. The 'Individual Status Law 188 for 1958' will be changed by the current administration and parliament. As a result of its logical contradictions, the constitution is seen as further undermining the standing of women (and children) in society. Table 1 reveals that women contribute US\$ 8.52 billion, or 8.12 %, of non-oil GDP, with a 13.93 % employment rate in the labor force. In 2014, oil accounted for more than 45 % of GDP, but just 1 % of the total labour done in the United States (Hirmis, 2002).

Women in Iraq contributed 5.72 % of the 56.26 % of GDP not derived from oil in 2014, contributing to GOS, GMI, and other non-oil evaluations. Only 6.8% of organisations are led by women, but no one knows how many of these groups are comprised only of women.

The current conversation in Iraq spins after rising degrees of viciousness against women, as shown by the numerous portrayals made to high-positioning specialists, just as political pledges to shield women from attack. Three. The contention focuses on women's jobs in the business and society at a more profound level because of disparities in the 2005 constitution. The current government and parliament intend to change the 'Individual Status Law 188 for 1958.' The constitution's logical inconsistencies are considered as further subverting women's (and minors') status in the public eye. For quite a while, the state of women doesn't appear to have adjusted a lot. Coming up next are removed from the 2018-22 National Development Plan (NDP) 4, which give an outline of women' jobs in the public eye and the labor market:




Figure 3.2: percentage of men who thinks that they have specific rights to do certain tasks Source: Ministry of planning, Central statistical organization (2012: 57).

The gender partition in the public eye unleashes ruin on progress establishments. The men-arranged (their) culture, which underscores the power of man and is certainly settled in Iraqi social texture, restricts the place of women.

- In 2015, Iraq's labor force was projected to be 9,000,000, with 86 % of men specialists and 14 % of women representatives
- In 2015, Iraq's labor force was relied upon to be 9,000,000, with 86 % of men specialists and 14 % of women laborers;
- In 2014, the men joblessness rate was 8.4 %, while the women joblessness rate was 21.9 %
- In 2014, the private area utilized 29% of utilized women, while the public area utilized 46%

The three methodologies pointed toward further developing Iraqi women' status in the public eye and the economy – the '2013-17 National Strategy to Stop Violence Against Women,' the '2014-18 National Strategy to Improve Women Situation in Iraq,' and 'The Rural Women Strategy' (on the same page) – have not been carried out adequately.

Women in Iraq face various difficulties, including the inability to carry out laws pointed toward enabling women; the end of the service of the state for women and the service of basic freedoms,

the two of which served to enable women in the public arena and the economy; a huge expansion in the marriage of minors, notwithstanding the way, that this is illicit (and despite the 'Individual Status Law'); the public government spending plan isn't delicate to engaging women; and, to wrap things up, there is a huge expansion in the (p. 237) (Vilardo, V., & Bittar, S., 2018).

3.5.2 Iraqi women participation in Labour market (world bank, 2020)

Table 3.2: women contribution to GDP of Iraq.

Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+) (modeled ILO estimate)	
Series name	Rate in %
2000	9.574
2001	9.901
2002	10.238
2003	10.585
2004	10.942
2005	11.309
2006	11.69
2007	12.082
2008	12.01
2009	11.938
2010	11.866
2011	11.79
2012	11.716
2013	12.608
2014	13.552
2015	14.012
2016	14.484
2017	11.193

2018	11.287
2019	11.338
2020	11.066

The commitment of women to non-oil GDP is assessed here. In the Iraqi economy, GDP from unrefined petroleum exports GDP from human resources exercises. In 2014, oil represented north of 45% of GDP yet scarcely 1% of complete work (Hirmis, 2002). Shows that with an interesting pace of 13.93 % in the labor market, women contribute US\$ 8.52 billion, or 8.12 %, to non-oil GDP. Because of accessible information, this is a genuine circumstance. The figures introduced here give an impressionistic viewpoint of Iraqi women's commitment to non-oil GDP since accessible information isn't genderual orientation-based, and solid suspicions were made. On a ceteris paribus premise, an ascent in women's support rate will consistently prompt an expansion in GDP.

Notwithstanding, a counterfactual, consider the possibility that the situation assesses an arbitrary 40% support rate, bringing about a commitment of US\$ 24.72 billion out of 2014, or 23.58 % of non-oil GDP. The objective of this diagram is to feature the effect of a significant expansion in women's labor force interest on GDP. The initial phase in our calculation is to isolate the 'worker pay' part. Women's commitment to non-oil GDP in 2014 was simply 5.72 % of the 56.26 % that this part gives to non-oil GDP. In a counterfactual situation wherein the interest rate is expanded to 40%, the commitment to non-oil GDP moves to 18.96%. The following stage is to separate the 43.74 % of GDP comprised of Gross Operating Surplus (GOS), Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI), and assessments short sponsorships. GOS and GMI ought to, by all accounts, reflect the gender split as in 'pay of laborers,' then again. GOS contains enormous 'income' (or rather lease) from raw petroleum trades, which has been eliminated from GOS, as found in Table 1 above. Nonetheless, figures from the 2018 World Bank's 'Economic Survey' (figure 6 beneath) show that men hold by far most of the organizations in Iraq.

Firms with female participating in ownership	6.8
Firms with majority female ownership *	n.a.
Firms with female top manager	2.3
Proportion of permanent full-time female workers	8.6
Proportion of permanent full-time female production workers **	3.3
Proportion of permanent full-time non-production female workers **	1.2

Figure 3.3: Female contribution in Iraqi organizations (source: worldbank economic survey 2018)

Most GOS and GMI (profit, interest, and property rentals) would likely go to men-possessed organizations. Women possess just 6.8% of organizations, yet the size of such organizations is obscure. In case women made around 5.0 % of GOS and GMI, the absolute worth would be US\$ 2.53 billion.

3.6 TURKISH WOMEN CONTRIBUTION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

3.6.1 Annual Gross Domestic Product in Turkey

There is little doubt that Turkey's reaction to the flood of Syrian refugees is outstanding, and it serves as a model for other nations that facilitate migration. In the wake of the COVID-19 controversy, the gap between straight people and gay people has become wider, increasing the number of young people who are unemployed and living on the streets.

Since the mid-2000s, Turkey's financial and social advancement has been extraordinary, bringing about expanding business and profit and lifting the country to the upper center pay class. Turkey immediately urbanized all through this period, keeping up with strong macroeconomic and financial arrangement structures, opening up to worldwide business and money, blending various laws and guidelines with European Union (EU) standards, and significantly growing admittance to public administrations. It additionally bobbed back rapidly from the 2008/09 worldwide economic emergency.

Turkey's response to the surge of 3.6 million Syrian evacuees has been extraordinary, and it fills in to act as an illustration for different countries facilitating travelers. Just 2.5 % of evacuees are as of now living in camps because of Turkey's savvy plan. In any case, rising economic

weaknesses and a more troublesome outside climate have taken steps to fix these achievements lately. Likewise, there has been an easing back in changes in different areas, which, when joined with financial shortcomings, undermines fixing a portion of the increases achieved up to this point.




Figure 3. 4: GDP of Turkey per Capita Source: (world bank, 2021).

Given developing expansion and joblessness, declining venture, expanded business and economic area weaknesses, and lopsided execution of restorative arrangement measures and changes, the by and the large macroeconomic picture is turning out to be more unsound and indistinct. There are likewise significant outside obstacles because of the subregion's steady international worries. The COVID-19 issue has extended genderual orientation partitions, raising youthful joblessness and destitution rates. Disparities have been on the ascent, too. Turkey is expected to experience huge economic and cultural ramifications because of the scourge.

3.6.2 Gross domestic product of Turkey according to sectors

At current prices, the country's GDP would reach 5 trillion 46 billion 883 million TRY in 2020, an increase of 16.9 % from the previous year. As compared to 2019, worker pay accounted for 33.1 % of all-out gross value added in 2020.

In 2020, the steel volume list of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) moved by 1.8 % over the earlier year, as indicated by yearly figures. Gross domestic product by creation approach rose by 16.9% over the earlier year, arriving at 5 trillion 46 billion 883 million TRY in 2020 at current costs. With 19.1 % of the portion of the overall industry in 2020, the assembling area was the most prevailing. With 12.4 % and 7.9 %, separately, the assembling business was trailed by discount

and retail trade and transportation and capacity, as shown in figure 4.8. Family benefits as bosses represented the littlest part of GDP.




Figure 3.5: GDP according to sectors Source: institute of Turkey statistic

3.6.3 Worker pay developed by 9.6 % in 2020.

Worker compensation moved by 9.6%, while gross working excess/blended pay expanded by 19.5 % in 2020 contrasted with the earlier year, as indicated by the GDP by pay strategy. Worker compensation represented 33.1 % of gross worth added. Worker compensation represented 33.1 % of all-out gross worth added in 2020, contrasted with 34.8 % in 2019. In 2020, the extent of networking excess/blended pay in esteem added was 49.3%, contrasted with 47.4% in 2019. Gross worth-added parts dependent on the income technique, 2019, 2020.


3.7 ANALYSIS OF TURKEY LABOR MARKET POLICIES

3.7.1 Coronavirus Social Protection Programs

At current prices, the country's GDP would reach 5 trillion 46 billion 883 million TRY in 2020, an increase of 16.9 % from the previous year. As compared to 2019, worker pay accounted for 33.1 % of all-out gross value added in 2020.

The COVID-19 emergency has once again introduced social wellbeing nets into the public awareness, as states had to intercede to alleviate the impacts of the financial droop on their populations. Because of the plague, countries all around the globe have attempted three unmistakable sorts of social insurance measures focused on different socioeconomics. These are the accompanying:

- 1) Wage endowments, joblessness advantages, and commitment exceptions are instances of labor market strategies.
- 2) financial exchanges; and
- 3) Benefit enhancements that are simply momentary (Zhongyuan, 2020).



Most countries focused on giving prompt financial aid to manage the pandemic's initial impacts, for example, Tunisia, where the public authority broadened the current cash move program to help poor people and generally defenseless. As the emergency advanced, state-run administrations started to develop existing social insurance programs, including joblessness benefits, family help, and handicap benefits, just as presenting new friendly help programs in specific conditions.

3.7.2 Help to the Labour Market Under COVID-19

Notwithstanding, when the proper area workers began to confront the danger of losing their positions, the main class of advantages featured in Figure 1, labor market measures, for example, wage sponsorships and joblessness benefits, turned out to be more fundamental in short to medium term. During this time, a certain qualification arose between nations with varying labor market approaches to battle the pandemic. The United States and Germany, two prosperous countries, have embraced different strides, as per the Washington Post. In Germany, the enactment of the Kurzarbeit (transient business program) allowed laborers to keep up with their positions (Schmidpeter, 2020). Rather than firing laborers, this drive urges organizations to cut their representatives' functioning hours by 60%. In return, the public authority finances those representatives who work fewer hours. The US joblessness benefit technique, then again, is to delay until an organization fires representatives before jobless laborers are qualified for

government joblessness benefits. As a result, joblessness rates in the two countries were disparate in mid-2020 (Miloğlu et al., 2021).




Figure 3.7: Comparison of unemployment rate in Turkey And Iraq from 2000-2020 (World Bank, 2022).

3.7.3 Previously, then after the fact the Pandemic, Turkey's Unemployment Rate

Prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in February 2020, Turkey had the third-highest joblessness rate in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2021). Greece and Spain were the two nations with greater joblessness rates in February 2020, when Turkey's unemployment rate was 12.6%.

I arranged an outline utilizing a comparative method for seeing where Turkey remains as far as joblessness rate in 2020 contrasted with the other OECD countries. As per OECD measurements, Turkey had the third most noteworthy joblessness rate among OECD countries before the COVID-19 plague struck most nations in February 2020 (OECD 2021). In February 2020, Turkey's joblessness rate was 12.6%; Greece (15.9%) and Spain (13.50%) were the main countries with higher joblessness rates. In February 2020, the OECD normal was 5.21 %, not exactly 50% of Turkey's joblessness rate (TAŞKIN and KANDİL İNGEÇ, 2018).

Despite having one of the most noticeably awful joblessness rates before the pandemic, Turkey's conventional labor market fared better than a few other OECD countries after being hit by COVID-19. Colombia's joblessness rate, for instance, rose from 10.85% in February to 21.12% in May, making it one of the greatest on the planet. Essentially, the joblessness rate in the United States expanded from 3.5 % in February to 14.7 % in April, making it more prominent than that of Turkey

for the long stretch of April. Turkey's jobless rate, then again, expanded by 1.7 %, hitting a high of 14.3 % in June (“Conventional Signs and Abbreviations,” 2021)

This isn't to infer that Turkey's joblessness rate isn't high. Nations, for example, Czechia, are perceived for their pre-and post-pandemic labor market laws, which assisted them with keeping up with joblessness rates around 3% for the most part. While joblessness in Turkey is generously more prominent, the country's joblessness rate has stayed consistent.

3.7.4 In 2020, Turkey's Labor Market Programs

Efforts to implement a "decreased hours work programme" (kisa Calisma ödeneii) in 2020 are the most important. Representatives in the private sector may be able to reduce their weekly working hours by as much as two-thirds.

Before long, the country's first COVID-19 case was accounted for on March 11; Turkey started dispatching labor market support programs pointed toward expanding pay and ensuring occupations. The "decreased hours work program" (kisa Calisma ödeneği) is the greatest drive that will be reached out in 2020. (ISKUR 2021). The public authority disallowed cutbacks under this plan and began offering endowments to private-area managers to support worker pay. Representatives in the private area may decrease their week after week working hours to something like 2/3 of their full-time position.

Consequently, the public authority would finance 2/3 of the wages of taking part in private-area laborers. Representatives can keep their positions through the plague, yet at a lower wage. Initially, the program was stretched out for a long time, but it has since been broadened ordinarily and is currently dynamic until February 2021 (Kasap and Janušonis, 2021).

In April 2020, the public authority dispatched a new "cash help" (naked secret design) program for utilized individuals to battle pay misfortune (ISKUR, 2021). This drive is focused on people who are as yet working; however, they have been furloughed by their managers, inferable from a lack of cash or business terminations brought about by the COVID-19 flare-up. Subsequently, the public authority pays these laborers half of their underlying pay. This program has been broadened commonly and is presently basically through March 2021.


As of late, the Ministry of Trade has made various help programs for little endeavors that have been affected (either totally or somewhat) by COVID-19 (Hekim & Yılmaz, 2020). Private ventures will get 1000 Turkish lira (139 US dollars) for a very long time under the as of late presented "loss of pay support" (gelir kaybı design), and independent companies will get 750 Turkish lire (104 US dollars) for quite some time under the as of late presented "lease support" (Kira design). At last, to battle the pestilence and diminish the measure of cutbacks, the Turkish government has been giving assessment exceptions and low-premium credits to organizations using freely possessed banks.

3.8 ANALYSIS OF IRAQ LABOR MARKET OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

Due to the existence of hazardous circumstances, the return of 1.6 million Iraqis is in jeopardy after the end of threats against ISIL. Iraq's Return and Recovery Unit (IOM Iraq) assists the government in improving circumstances for long-term recovery in 15 governorates. Non-MLAs made an average salary of USD 460, while NLAs made an average salary of USD 289. Only 5.7 % of job seekers expressed interest in the position. According to key witnesses, rural businesses were far more likely to report significant interest from possible employers Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL). International Organization for Migration (IOM) Iraq's Return and Recovery Unit helps the public authority improve conditions for long haul recuperation in 15 governorates and help a goal to the country's dislodging issue. Local area framework redesign, business help, and local area support our intercessions.

The IOM's people group contribution technique has been improved through an intelligent learning interaction, and it consolidates partner interviews into the plan of maintainable job drives. IOM plans to make comprehensive business sectors at the individual, cultural, and institutional levels, perceiving that the private area is a development driver.

In Iraq, a progression of Labor Market Assessments (LMAs) was done to build market-drove improvement drives and furnish accomplices with ideal, dependable data on market conditions. Individual meetings and center gathering conversations are utilized to make the LMAs. A blend of quantitative and subjective activities was utilized to direct the review with key witnesses, work searchers, youth, buyers, and managers.



Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. Note: UMIC= upper-middle-income country. PPP = purchasing power parity. See report for details on computation.

BROOKINGS

Figure 3.8: Labor market growth in Iraq

As per IOM's LMA information amassed at a general level, among surveyed respondents: Around 70% of occupation candidates might want to begin their organization, demonstrating an inclination for a business venture. Generally, work searchers like to get money-related help for their living (74%). When inquired about whether there were any occupations, they would not desire to do so. Just 5.7 % of occupation searchers said OK.

- The normal pay for gifted specialists was USD 289 in Nanosatellite Launch Adapter System (NLAs) and USD 460 in non-Member of Legislative Assembly non-MLAs. Pay rates for the untalented were USD 158 in NLAs and USD 263 in non-MLAs.
- Development, food, and assembling were among the businesses with the most significant compensation. There is a measurably critical distinction. Rural endeavors were considerably more prone to report substantial interest.

As per key witnesses, the food area (desserts and different kinds of food readiness, particularly at-home); the administration's area (styling, beauty parlors, yet in addition photography and 'wedding administrations'); materials (fitting and sewing); and exchange (particularly in the retail of women'

clothing and beauty care products) were the most widely recognized instances of women inclusion in the economy. Women also work in agribusiness creatures, including steers reproducing, dairy creation, and honey creation.

- Nonetheless, the development and material businesses are accounted for to be bound to utilize verbal exchange as an enrollment technique in struggle impacted regions.
- The most well-known kind of buyer credit is casual credit. In the metals business and in areas where the request is low
- Bosses in line governorate areas are undeniably bound to have a strong interest, not have customer obligation issues, and use more formal employing strategies.

IOM has a field presence in Iraq, with sub-workplaces the nation over, mutually oversaw Community Resource Centers, and a presence inside Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs sub-workplaces, considering a local area-driven way to deal with recovery and improvement.

4. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION

4.1 IMPORTANCE OF WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF TURKEY

Women in Turkey have a wide range of legal liberties, yet the proportion of women employed is smaller. In 1985, Turkey became a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The nation is also in the running to join the European Union.

In the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Report 2021, women in Turkey are ranked 133rd out of 156 countries. Working with the government, civil society, corporate sector, the media, other UN offices and people from a wide range of backgrounds, it aims to guarantee that women enjoy the same freedoms as men. It works with the government. Iraq Foundation and United States Institute of Peace convened organization meetings in 2006 to explore the economic growth of Iraqi women. Iraq Foundation chairman Sever al-Rahim said women must take charge of their own core social and political structures as well as their finances.

The Project and Contracting Office (PCO) of the Army set out to help women's organizations that had come forward. In the aftermath of PCO's work, various agreements were achieved with organizations run by women. More than \$250 million has been contributed to Iraqi women's groups as of February 2006, according to official estimates. U.S. officials believe that the administration's financial backing for these exercises has been rapidly reducing. It's necessary to preserve both public and private neighborhood associations.

Any change in the political or juridical position of Iraqi women would reinvigorate initiatives to assist them earn more money. The Turkish economy has a lot of potential that hasn't been explored yet. Strategy improvement around the globe is to ensure that women and men are treated with in the same method. Only 15.2 % of Turkish organizations' leader blocks are female, which is a minimal ratio. Iraq has one of the lowest labor force participation rates in the world, lower than Turkey.

7.5 % of the world's GDP was lost because to gender-based segregation, which cost six trillion dollars. Iraq adopted Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1986, although the agreement has no effect currently. Per capita GDP is a

measure of how much money each individual in a country is worth. Although both countries have a GDP per capita of \$4145.9, Iraq's is substantially lower than that of Turkey at \$8536.4. In Turkey, 39.2 % of the work force is female, but in Iraq, 48.5 % of the labor force is female.

Since 2003, Iraq has been beset by a myriad of challenges as a consequence of the violence and strife that has occurred there. Since May of this year, more than 2.1 million individuals have been forced out of the houses they once called their own. There is a significant gender gap in the Cabinet and other positions of influence within the government. In the future, the progression of the private sector and the formation of new occupations should pay particular attention to young people. In order to do this, specific programs that are geared toward educating young people for future involvement in the labor market will be required. It is crucial and highly suggested that public speculation be expanded, especially in pre-essential and essential education (high-quality instruction for all children aged three to 25). This is because grounds of competence support such an action.

Women face significant barriers to entering the labor force in Turkey. Those who have finished their primary and secondary schooling are faced with a work market that is not very robust (which includes high school). Women who have low levels of skill face unreasonably high opportunity costs in comparison to the low wages they may anticipate receiving. The economy of Turkey, which has been likened to a vast open-air bazaar, is made up of an uncountable number of small companies that operate across the country. There is no reasonable compromise that can be made at the appropriate site (legitimate contrast between different classes is restricted).

Despite the growth of women's participation in the economic world, political arena, and public sector, these areas continue to fall short of truly empowering women. Even if there was an increase in the number of working women in Turkey from 23 to 29 %, according to the strategy system documents, the amount of people in need would still go down by 15 %. This number is intended to reflect the combined economies of the United States of America and China.

Due to the fact that women account for almost half of the world's family units, efforts that were made to better women's standing in society and to provide them more personal freedoms were beneficial to the advancement and development of women. It is a fact that women face greater obstacles than males in all social systems, regardless of how long ago they were established or

how recently they were established. Regardless of this, individuals living in developing countries and underdeveloped nations have a whole distinct set of rights and opportunities. It is expected of women in every nation from West Africa to Central Asia that they would be wonderful mothers, wonderful partners, and wonderful housewives. The best approach for women to alter the way that other people see them is for them to become more involved in the economic life of the community. Fairness in terms of gender and sexual orientation is perhaps the most important aspect in the advancement of women's employment opportunities in the public and private sectors. This indicates that every person has the ability to develop their skills and make judgments without being constrained by generalizations or proclaims in their thinking. A fundamental freedom is equality of privileges for all types of individuals, which is also the primary factor that enables a society to function on the basis of voting. It was mentioned that Turkey is one of the places on the world where women's employment opportunities are changing quickly. As a result of the legal and institutional frameworks put in place to combat gender-based orientation isolation and the inexcusable treatment of women, more women have been landing employment. This is a positive development. Women in Turkey have a significant number of legal liberties. However, the %age of women who are actively participating in the labor force in the United States is far lower than in many developed countries and, shockingly, in several non-industrial nations. The %age of people above the age of 15 who are participating in the work force is 50.5 %. In 2014, this %age was at 71.3 % for males while it was just 30.3 % for women. This is possibly the lowest participation rate for women in the labor force among all of the countries that are members of the OECD. The current state of women's business in Turkey is an indication of long-standing gender-based divisions that are present in the country's labor market. These gender-based divisions are the result of Turkey's economic development, changes in the law, and social changes. Although Turkey has witnessed a lot of change in the way that individuals think about general orientation jobs as a result of these factors, Turkey has also seen a lot of change in the way that individuals think about jobs as a result

Around 83 million individuals call Turkey home. It has 4 million individuals who have been given worldwide and impermanent security. Turkey is an individual from the UN, NATO, the OECD, the G-20, and the OIC. It is additionally an applicant country for EU enrollment. In 1934, Turkish women were a portion of the primary women in Europe to have the option to cast a ballot and campaign for office, and they were additionally the first. The nation has a resilient women's

development, and women's basic freedoms activists have driven missions against savagery against women the nation over and helped pass gender uniformity regulation.

Turkey joined the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1985. In 2002, Turkey marked the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, added to the CEDAW 2002. In the first place, it marked the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Fighting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence in 2011. Then, at that point, it approved the settlement the following year (Istanbul Convention). On March 20, 2021, Turkey said that it would presently don't be involved with the Istanbul Convention. UN Women's proclamation on the withdrawal can be viewed as here.

Turkey's eleventh National Development Plan for 2019 to 2023 has objectives and measures to help women, stop oppression, and ensure women have similar privileges, openings, and offices as men. Likewise, the National Strategy and Action Plan on Women's Empowerment (2018-2023) was endorsed. The National Action Plan on Combating Violence and Women (2016-2020) and the National Action Plan on Women's Employment (2016-2020) were likewise endorsed (2016-2018).

Notwithstanding laws and strategies, general orientation imbalance is an issue in many spots. Women in Turkey are positioned 133rd out of 156 nations in the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Report 2021. They are likewise positioned 101st in instructive accomplishment for women, 114th in their political power, 140th in economic cooperation and opportunity, and 105th in wellbeing and endurance.

As of late, there have been a ton of changes in Turkey's labor market cooperation and political and financial navigation.

- It's around 35% for women to work sooner or later in their lives.
- Women make up 22% of organization supervisors, 18% of board individuals, and 11% of top leaders.
- Just 17% of Parliamentarians are women, 3% civic chairmen, and 11% city councilors are women.
- Women make not as much as men, by 15%.

For multiple million Syrians, Turkey was their impermanent home. 46% of them were women or young women, and 47% were under 18. Foreigners genuinely should have the option to remain

legitimately in Turkey. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection, just as the Temporary Protection Regulation, gives a solid lawful system.

As indicated by the Turkey Country Chapter 2021–2022 – Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan, Syrian women and young women, including women-headed families, face critical hindrances to meet their essential requirements, recuperate from war injuries, and adequately take an interest in Turkey's social and economic life. Despite this, the Government of Turkey and its accomplices have done a ton to help.

The UN Women Turkey Country Office is situated in Ankara, the capital of Turkey. Starting around 2012, the workplace has been dealing with projects. UN Women Turkey works with the public authority, common society gatherings, private area organizations and business affiliations, media, the scholarly world, other UN offices and improvement accomplices, and individuals from varying backgrounds to ensure that women have similar freedoms as men.

UN Women in Turkey has three fundamental objectives:

1. Women run, take an interest in, and get similar advantages from administration frameworks as men.
2. All women and young women ought to have the option to carry on with their lives without being mishandled in any capacity.
3. Women and young women assume a greater part and have more power in building long-haul harmony and strength. They get similar advantages from forestalling catastrophic events and clashes and philanthropic guides.

UN Women Turkey centers around projects here:

- Authority and association in the political world
- Ensuring that women and young women aren't maltreated
- Individuals meet exiles' necessities.
- Gender comprehensive preparation and planning, as well.
- Associations with the private area and with men

4.2 IMPORTANCE OF WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQ

In 2006, the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) and the United States Office for International Development (USAID) organized meetings to examine the economic growth of Iraqi women. Women's social and political power is the focus of most of these efforts. The Project and Contracting Office (PCO) of the Army set out to assist women's groups that had come forward. This program has trained more than 1,000 Iraqi women via 54 courses.

Efforts will be made to emphasize Iraqi women's financial and entrepreneurial acumen in the push. Eventually, they'll find out how to start businesses, get their names out there, and collaborate with other early-stage entrepreneurs in the United States of American. Soul of America has made an effort to increase the financial security of Iraqi women.

The job of women in the financial improvement of Iraq is vital. The worldwide local area and Iraqis need to focus on how women can assume a major financial part. USIP has been facilitating a progression of gatherings as of late in which individuals discussed the current circumstance for women in Iraq and what's on the horizon. A while later, a study by the UN and the World Bank observed that even though women made up around 55% of Iraq's population, they just made up 23% of the labor force.

The worldwide local area and Iraqis have given a ton of consideration to working on the situation with women in Iraq from that point forward. Most of these endeavors have been pointed toward working on women's social and political power. Full fair solidification in Iraq can occur, assuming women also play a major economic part in Iraq. It was a joint exertion by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the U.S. Office for International Development (USAID) to hold gatherings in 2006 to discuss the economic advancement of women in Iraq, just as the difficulties and choices for what's to come. These gatherings occurred on February 1, February 22, and April 19, 2006.

Just as Iraqi women activists, a wide scope of government and non-government authorities were there. A senior program official in the Center for Peace and Stability Operations at the United States Institute of Peace, Beth DeGrasse, drove the conversation. There has been a ton of taking care done on women's problems with Iraq, yet they need to manage their fundamental social and

political constructions. Sever al-Rahim, the leader head of the Iraq Foundation, said this toward the beginning of the gathering.

"Women in Iraq don't live in an air pocket." Iraqi al-Rahim said that "Society, in general, should be engaged."

This is a direct result of this: many women work in Iraq's administration, well-being callings, and colleges today. Nonetheless, "We don't see numerous women working in the private area, even though awards were given to women possessed organizations." As per al-Rahim, the main thing that prevents women from working in the private area is that they aren't aware of loaning openings, how to get cash, or how to maintain a business. Business abilities are not something those numerous Iraqi women have, so they can't work in the financial area or run organizations in the private area. Al-Rahim said that 'future' preparing should zero in on issues like using time effectively and the abilities that are significant for women to assume a major part in the private area in Iraq."

The United Nations, U.S. government offices, and non-governmental associations have all begun projects to help women drive organizations and land more women into positions in underrepresented fields and exercises. As a component of its central goal, the Army's Project and Contracting Office (PCO) planned to help women claimed organizations straight by empowering Iraqi women possessed organizations in reproduction projects through direct contracting or subcontracting outlets. Eventually, the PCO's work prompted a wide scope of agreements with women-possessioned organizations, from large development undertakings to convey materials and administrations. What's more, the PCO made the Subcontracting Excellence Program Database an electronic device to monitor the advancement of these agreements. The information base permits PCO to monitor the number of subcontracts to Iraqi women possessed organizations and the number of significant project workers who have recruited and prepared Iraqi women.

As of February 2006, more than \$250 million has been given to Iraqi women claimed organizations. The PCO thought of a one-of-a-kind women' drive program in the water area that gives Iraqi women from the Ministries of Municipalities and Public Works and Water Resources the instruments they need to work on their abilities and move up in their positions. More than 1,000

junior, center, and senior-level women in the services have been prepared through 54 courses during this program. There have been 64,228 preparing hours for these women.

This is the thing that USAID did in Iraq: It attempted to make every one of its projects in public and private areas, just as in horticulture, more general orientation adjusted. Because of these projects, it has had the option to encourage Iraqi women to do bookkeeping, start organizations, get cash, and that's just the beginning. USAID is additionally beginning microfinance projects that will help women and women claimed organizations, and they will encourage women how to loan as a component of these undertakings. Through U.S. NGO accomplices on the ground in Iraq, the State Department is encouraging women to construct a popularity-based society, cast a ballot, bring in cash, and speak with the media.

The drive will put more accentuation on showing business and economic abilities to women in Iraq in the following year. They will figure out how to begin organizations, get acknowledged, and work with U.S. business pioneers as tutors. A gathering called the Iraqi women's majority rule government drive will continue to help the investment of Iraqi financial specialists in worldwide economic meetings. This will allow them the opportunity to meet and coordinate with other business pioneers from around the world. There are additionally non-benefit bunches that influence this. Soul of America, for instance, has attempted to help Iraqi women become all the more financially strong by zeroing in on things like PC preparing and childcare habitats for women's focuses and sewing focuses. They give Iraqi women the ability to be important for their business.

Members said that most tasks done so far have zeroed in on engaging taught women and not on supporting the bigger number of unskilled women who are unskilled, have inabilities, or live in distant regions. They said that activities ought to go outside of the enormous urban communities in Iraq and into the country's rural regions to connect with women who aren't very much addressed. Members said they would rather not do exactly the same thing repeatedly, and they were concerned that a few associations had effectively done likewise for a portion of similar individuals. Members of the U.S. government said that the administration subsidizing these exercises has been consistently diminishing. They additionally called for more private-area contributions in preparing. It's vital to keep public and hidden area associations solid and assist individuals with systems administration and find support. Iraqi women ought to have the option to get more credit and financing.

At last, everybody concurred that the law ensuring women's freedoms in Iraq should be set up. Any adjustment of Iraqi women's political or legitimate status will return endeavors to assist them with bringing in more cash.

4.3 COMPARISON OF RATIO OF LABOR FORCE IN TURKEY AND IRAQ

The current labor force participation rate in Turkey is 33.275%. It is a significant ratio as Turkey has changed its policies about women's empowerment. Turkey women are significantly playing their roles in women participation. At the same time, the current rate of women labor force participation for Iraq is 13.38%. Iraq's labor force participation is very low due to gender inequality and cultural reforms.

Table 4.1: Women(15-64years) labor force rate in Turkey and Iraq.

Years	Women labor force Rate in Turkey	Women labor force Rate in Iraq
2020	38.15%	11.92%
2019	37.45%	11.78%
2018	36.15%	15.28%
2017	34.86%	14.76%
2016	33.45%	14.28%
2015	33.13%	13.35%
2014	31.68%	12.5%
2013	31%	12.57%
2012	29.59%	12.67%
2011	27.81%	12.78%
2010	26.12%	12.88%

2009	25.12%	12.98%
2008	25.02%	12.54%
2007	25.18%	12.12%
2006	25.16%	11.71%
2005	27.95%	11.32%
2004	29.29%	10.93%
2003	28.39%	10.55%
2002	27.87%	10.17%
2001	31.29%	9.81%
2000	30.64%	9.45%

4.4 DISCUSSIONS ON WOMEN CONTRIBUTION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF TURKEY

Even though there aren't many women looking for work, the women's unemployment rate is greater than the men. Due to their roles as stay-at-home moms and other family caregivers, the vast majority of these women do not have day jobs. Only around 15.2 % of the leaders of Turkish organizations were women, which isn't a lot of women. According to the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) 2019 Global Report, even though many countries have made progress toward more homogeneity in terms of general orientation, social norms continue to target women. 7.5 % of the world's GDP was lost owing to gender-based segregation, which cost six trillion dollars.

Women in Iraq are drawing inspiration from and building on the country's storied history of women's rights, and they're doing it in the open. CEDAW, an agreement that Iraq signed on to in 1986, has no effect on Iraq's current legislation.

Turkey has seen an ascent in both the population and the number of individuals working there. Notwithstanding, the quantity of women in the labor force in Turkey is extremely low. Generally,

they are monetarily reliant upon their spouses and have relatively little schooling. The creators say that more exploration is expected to work on the economic status of women the nation over. This is an issue that should be settled both socially and financially.

Women actually should be more associated with the labor force in Turkey, as shown by the main 33.6 % of individuals in the labor force are women.

One of the fundamental objectives of strategy improvement Grove et al. (2012) said that the Turkish economy has a great deal of potential that hasn't been utilized at this point; however, there's not even a shadow all over the planet is to ensure that women and men are dealt with something similar. It just so happens that Turkey 2023, the G20's 25 by 2025, and the EU 2020 objectives share a ton for all intents and purpose with one another regarding women's freedoms.

As indicated by the Women Statistics 2018 information from the Turkish Statistical Institute, women working in Turkey is 28.9%, which is equivalent to the year before.

Gârdan and Gârdan, (2016) the women joblessness rate is higher than the men joblessness rate, even though there aren't numerous women searching for work. Collectively with 30 million individuals, just 8.6 million have occupations, and a couple of more are searching for work. These numbers show that just about 20 million working-age women aren't working or going to class. Out of the 20 million women, the greater part isn't working since they are homemakers and guardians for their families. Around 33% of women believed to be working are neglected family laborers in the farming area. This is additionally obvious. Concerning women who own organizations, 8.8% of them have occupations. There is a normal business rate for women in the European Union around 60%. There is a normal work rate for men that is around 70% (OECD, 2005)

In 2018, just around 15.2% of Turkish organizations' leader blocks were made of women, which isn't a lot. When the initial 100 Turkish organizations opened up to the world, 16.6 % of their CEOs were women, which is up from 14.1 % in 2017 (Cengiz, 2016). If the enrollment dependent on the family relationship ties isn't considered, this proportion drops to 3.8%. Women make up 17.3% of senior administration positions. At the high level of the public area in Turkey, just 11% of the positions are held by women (Malcom, 2017).

Many individuals believe that general orientation fairness is significant, yet progress is excessively lazy and not even. As indicated by the Organization for Economic Co-activity and Development, there is as yet far to work on women's freedoms, openings, and interest in open life and significant level positions (OECD). The Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) 2019 Global Report says that despite numerous nations having gained ground in general orientation uniformity, social and social standards in the public arena keep the pattern of victimization of women and young women going. Six trillion dollars, or 7.5 % of the world's GDP, was lost due to gender-based segregation all over the planet, says the report (Larcher, 2019).

4.5 DISCUSSIONS ON WOMEN CONTRIBUTION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQ

In Iraq, labor force participation is significantly low, even lower than in Turkey. However, Iraqi women and young women have been vital in the fights that have been happening in Iraq since October 2019. They have rampaged in enormous gatherings to call for genderual orientation uniformity and to challenge the more extensive social, political, and financial conditions that permit and legitimize men-centric brutality in the country. To break with heteronormative gender jobs dependent on family life and accommodation, they undermine them. They are also championing themselves in the open arena, taking thoughts from and expanding on the long history of the developments of Iraqi women's privileges.

Many individuals imagine that the October Revolution in Iraq was a major advance forward in the battle for gender uniformity in the country. Authoritative changes are consuming most of the day. CEDAW, a settlement that Iraq endorsed in 1986, doesn't make a difference in today's numerous Iraqi laws. Individuals frequently don't observe laws that follow the CEDAW. What's more, women and young women who have been casualties of gender-based savagery (GBV) need to manage many issues when they attempt to get equity.

In Iraq, there are many justifications for why women and young women aren't dealt with well by the law and are exposed to man-centric savagery. As a general rule, they can be separated into three primary gatherings: the constancy of man-centric standards, the idea of the comprehensive Iraqi set of laws, and the shortcoming of government organizations.

4.6 COMPARISON BETWEEN TURKEY AND IRAQI WOMEN CONTRIBUTION IN GDP

Table 4.2: GDP per Capita Iraq and Turkey (Source world Bank)

Countries	GDP per Capita
Iraq	4,145.9
Turkey	8,536.4

Per capita GDP is a worldwide proportion of how rich nations are. It is utilized by business analysts to sort out how rich a nation is depending on its financial development.

There are a couple of ways of sorting out how prosperous a nation is. Per capita GDP is the most widely recognized because its parts are monitored worldwide, making it simple to compute and utilize. Pay per individual is one more method for looking at worldwide flourishing, yet it isn't utilized as much as different measures.




Figure 4.1: Per capita GDP of both Countries.

At its most fundamental level, per capita GDP shows how much financial worth can be connected to every individual in the country? This could likewise be a proportion of the nation's abundance since GDP market esteem per individual is a decent method for sorting out how rich a nation is.

Iraq's GDP per capita is 4145.9, while Turkey's higher GDP per capita than Iraq's is 8536.4. It shows a significant difference in the GDP of both countries.

4.7 COMPARATIVE DISCUSSIONS ON TURKEY AND IRAQI WOMEN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION

Since 1998, the %age of women in the labor force (aged 15 and over) has decreased from 51.3% to 48.5%, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, less than 30% of women who have reached the age of 15 or older are actively employed. There has been an ever-increasing number of problems for Iraqi women since the conflicts and viciousness began in 2003. Still, women remain underrepresented in the Cabinet and in leadership roles. It is the goal of the United Nations Women organization to promote gender equality and empower women, especially as part of the Sustainable Development Goals.

Despite high development in agricultural countries, the overall women labor force support rate (age bunch 15+) has dropped over the past twenty years, tumbling from 51.3 % in 1998 to 48.5 % in 2018 (ILO demonstrated assessments, <http://www.ilo.org/ilostat>). Despite how more than 307 million women have entered the work field over the most recent 20 years, women represent simply 39.2 % of the overall labor force. As the worldwide pace of tutoring enrolment has expanded, the pace of labor force contribution among young youths has diminished (a positive pattern for both young fellows and women). Thus, despite dropping women labor force support rates, the general orientation hole has contracted barely, from 27.5 rate focuses in 1998 to 26.6 rate focuses in 2018 (ILO demonstrated assessments, age bunch 15+).

As per projections, the women labor force cooperation of Turkey will keep on contracting over the following decade or something like that, arriving at a low of 45.9 % in 2030. This fills in as a brutal notice that until strategy measures turn around patterns, state-run administrations will battle to develop labor force results for women further.

Women's commitment differs significantly more than men's support across immature countries and developing business sector economies at a more disaggregated level. Under 30% of women matured 15 and more seasoned participate in the work power in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. Notwithstanding, from 1998 to 2018, investment rates in the Middle East and

North Africa climbed while rates in South Asia fell. Moderate cultural perspectives restrict women's chances to work outside the house in every one of the three regions.

They have been having an ever-increasing number of issues beginning around 2003 because of wars and viciousness. The Iraqi public is believed to be more than 39 million. Starting around 2014, there has been a great deal of furnished clash in Iraq. There are an expected 5.8 million Iraqis who have been driven away from their homes due to the contention. As of May 2018, more than 2.1 million individuals have been constrained out of their homes. More than 250,000 Syrian exiles were additionally enlisted in Iraq, with 37% living in camps and the rest living in urban communities and humble communities.

Women have a 25% share in the Iraqi Parliament on the 2005 Constitution. This is viewed as the main thing for Iraqi women. Tragically, this rate isn't very similar in different parts of the force. Women are still underrepresented in the Cabinet and the leading positions. In 2015, the Ministry of Women's Affairs, which should deal with gender fairness and women's strengthening (GEWE), was abolished. The GEWE record was separated among various government offices. This is what occurred.

The present circumstance has made it more significant for UN Women to help Iraq. It likewise shows that it is essential to work for gender equity and the strengthening of women, particularly because the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and general orientation uniformity is a focal piece of these objectives.

According to the women labor force participation rate, Turkey women have more participation than Iraqi women.

4.8 RECOMMENDATIONS

4.8.1 Recommendations for the labour Market Of Iraq

As a part of the development and creation of private sector jobs, young people should be included. Preparation should be concentrated on areas that are likely to see future demand. In order to enhance the overall work environment, non-profit organizations should advocate for proven methods. To advance market-based job possibilities, programming should consider current economic situations. Until further notice, specialized preparation should focus on regions with

unsurprising future market interest, such as food administration and planning and development, like electrical work, plumbing, and PVC establishment.

NGOs ought to work together with the public authority to propel a more extended term plan that accentuates comprehensive private area development in East Mosul and decreases reliance on the public area, especially for youth and women. The public authority will keep on being the essential financial motor in East Mosul and will be liable for fostering the city's and nation's drawn-out economic strategy. Consequently, NGOs ought to stay dynamic in approaching arrangement conversations about early recovery and modifying, as these strategies are made to guarantee the association of powerless and impeded gatherings. Youth, specifically, should be a piece of future private area advancement and occupation creation and will require explicit projects to set them up for active labor market cooperation.

Talk with nearby government authorities to learn the conventional essentials for business enlistment. While attention to correct approach or guidelines doesn't dispose of the chance of debasement, it gives those without solid interpersonal organizations more influence to battle low-level defilement when it shows. Periodically, an absence of information makes individuals more vulnerable to trickery. Business preparing, fire up reserves, or potentially mentorship should remember data for business enrollment. NGOs should work with neighborhood state-run administrations to clarify these strategies and limit the capability of obstacles for individuals from explicit populations. Where cycles are unnecessarily bulky and subsequently keep specific gatherings from enrolling their organizations, NGOs should campaign for worked-on techniques to improve the general climate for carrying on with work.

4.8.2 Recommendations for the labour Market of Turkey

Assign the decade of the 'education decade' to all educational efforts. By addressing 'under-support traps,' we can increase women's employment and employment rates, particularly among poor and moderately educated women. The difficulty in implementing good work norms is compounded by the prevalence of casual enterprise, which employs half of the labor force. When administrative barriers to employment creation are broken down, small and medium-sized businesses may be pushed to expand and undertake big business.

Focus all endeavors on the schooling framework, assigning the next decade as the 'education decade,' determined to give top-notch instruction to all.

This incorporates expanding the span of necessary essential instruction to 12 years, guaranteeing that everybody gets a base degree of professional schooling and preparing before leaving school and entering the labor market, and focusing on gender correspondence across different kinds and levels of education, professional instruction, and grown-up schooling. Young women will move from optional general or professional schools with a similar employability as young men, with further developed vocation exhortation and guiding administrations, just as better instruction and preparation that is more applicable to labor market requests. Expanded public speculation, especially in pre-essential, essential, and auxiliary education (great instruction for all kids matured three to 25), is basic and advocated for reasonableness and proficiency reasons. Early school leavers (and low-talented workers) make some harder memories benefitting from grown-up instruction since they have a helpless load of human resources on which grown-up ventures can create and be beneficial.

Each of the figures in this report shows that women are to a great extent prohibited from the labor market, attributable to a blend of financial, social, and social variables hindering the country's financial turn of events and wasting the expected commitment of women HR to a better quality of living. Women's place in the public arena and economic freedom are marks of a majority rules government and impact society's and youthful ages' prosperity. Education at the rudimentary and auxiliary levels (counting upper school) has a moderately helpless labor market as an incentive for women in Turkey. Unlike in different countries, auxiliary school doesn't work on women's employability or work possibilities. For lower-gifted women, opportunity costs are restrictively high in contrast with the low pay expected, and there is little admittance to the framework important to empower a work-family balance (limits on low maintenance occupations or adaptable working time courses of action, shortage of great modest-quality childcare offices, even powerless public transportation). Furthermore, man-centric goals limit women to the homegrown domain, load them with all family and family obligations, and recognize the low-wage errands attempted by women.

Address casual work issues and reduce the extent of the economy utilizing a blend of 'carrot' and stick measures for organizations. The pervasiveness of casual business (which represents half of the labor force) is a huge hindrance to the execution of any effective work guidelines.

By definition, a big part of the functioning population is prohibited from the legislative arrangement and federal retirement aid, regardless of low business rates, helpless women support, and huge youthful joblessness. As indicated by the OECD, familiarity is principally a sign of an absence of confidence in open foundations, a negative perspective on the state's job, and a restricted handle of the upsides of government-backed retirement. It demonstrates a penetrated common agreement, hindering high-esteem added practical development. Killing administrative boundaries to work creation, especially by building up an empowering climate for miniature and little ventures to thrive and venture into the proper area, may urge them to extend and do great business. Diminished assessment loads on work through work cost decreases may significantly increment enrolled business, especially at the lowest pay permitted by law level, since high work charge wages favor the nation's stagnant conventional work advancement.

Lessen labor market division into formal and casual, public and private, and essential and auxiliary work advertises and advances work portability for more proficient asset redistribution.

4.9 CONCLUSION

Solid public arrangements, a detailed approach, and a long-term duty are all required when engaging with women. The Global Gender Gap Report of the World Economic Forum examined the progress made by 149 countries toward equality of genderual orientation. Long-term financial and social progress necessitates the sealing of economic, political, and social cracks. However, Iraq has a lower %age of women in the labor force than Turkey, which has a far greater participation rate. It is necessary to ensure that women in Iraq have a specific financial stake if the country is to have a fully representative vote. Like UNAMI and other civil society organisations, UN Women works closely with the Iraqi government. Women's economic, political, and social strengthening is important for long haul financial and social advancement. Engaging women's requests solid public arrangements, an extensive methodology, and a drawn-out responsibility. Also, gender explicit perspectives should be fused from the beginning of strategy and program

advancement. While women's commitment to financial, political, and public activity has expanded in Turkey, it is deficient in enabling women completely.

The OECD Gender Data Portal gives quantitative proof of imbalance in education, business, business, administration, wellbeing, and improvement, just as an appraisal of how far we are from gender fairness and where our drives should center. In 2018, the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Report evaluated 149 nations' advancement toward genderual orientation equality along with four topical aspects: financial consideration and opportunity, instructive accomplishment, wellbeing and endurance, and political strengthening. As per the 2018 examination, assuming present patterns proceed, it will require 108 years to connect the overall genderual orientation hole. The most troublesome holes to close are economic and political strengthening, requiring 202 and 107 years of exertion, separately (Ratcheva, 2017).

Given Turkey's low women labor force support rate compared to other OECD countries, helping women's labor force investment is one of Turkey's best switches for GDP improvement. As indicated by a McKinsey examination, assuming Turkey's women labor force support rate was expanded from 33% to the OECD normal of 63%, the country's GDP would develop by 20% in 2025 (Jones, 1999). According to a similar gauge, accomplishing gender equality will bring about 28 trillion USD in yearly GDP in 2025. This aggregate is equivalent to the consolidated economies of the United States and China. In Turkey, strategy system papers declared that regardless of whether women's labor force interest developed from 23 to 29 %, neediness would fall by 15%, assuming all positions were all day, and by 8%, assuming that all positions were low maintenance (Klasen, 2019).

As indicated by a UN/World Bank survey performed following Saddam Hussein's fascism breakdown, women made up around 55% of Iraq's population; however, only 23% of the labor force. Albeit the global-local area and Iraqis have put forth critical attempts to advance women's situation in Iraq, most of these endeavours have fixated on women's social and political strengthening. A complete vote-based combination in Iraq must be acknowledged by guaranteeing that women assume a certain financial part in the country. The essential hindrance to women entering the private area is an absence of crucial information about financing choices, credit

accessibility, and advance conditions, just as an absence of business abilities. Iraqi women do not have the business capacity to enter the financial area or run private area organizations.

Women's cooperation in harmonious talks and compassionate arranging is basic to guarantee that international agreements are not restrictive and upheld and supported by the country. Iraq is the main Arab country to take on a National Action Plan because of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. UN Women is likewise working together intimately with the Government of Iraq, UNAMI, and common society associations to expand women's commitment in harmony and security-related exercises, according to Iraq's obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Both countries have low participation of women in the labor market. But Turkey's participation rate is far better than Iraq. Iraq has more barriers for women than Turkey. But now, most NGOs are working to better Iraqi women's empowerment. It is expected that changing policies of both countries about gender equality and education for all will improve the women's participation rate in the labor market for both countries.

REFERENCES

- A study on substitutive employment relationship between the Older and young labors (2015): A Focus on the interaction of a rate of Low-wage work - Employment data analysis of OECD 20 countries -. Korean Journal of Gerontological Social Welfare, null(70), 293–318.
- Abel, M. et al., 2017. Bridging the Intention-Behavior Gap? The Effect of Plan-Making Prompts on Job Search and Employment. Policy Research Working Papers. World Bank, Washington DC.
- Ager, A., Strang, A. 2008. Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework, Journal of Refugee Studies, Volume 21, Issue 2, June 2008, Pages 166– 191, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fen016>
- al - Noori, B. S. (2018). Teaching English as a Foreign Language in Iraq. Iraqi Administrative Sciences Journal, 2(4), 409–446.
- Alaedini, P., & Razavi, M. R. (2005). Women's participation and employment in Iran: a critique. Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, 14(1), 57-73.
- Alpagut, U., Ugurlucan, M., Sayin, O. A., Tireli, E., and Dayioglu, E. (2010). Infrarenal aortic coarctation. Wiener Medizinische Wochenschrift, 160(13–14), 372–375.
- Alsaedi, M. A., Albaker, B. M., Dawood, H. A., Abd Aoun, H., and Tayeh, Z. K. (2017). Quadcopter Based Object Detection and Localization. Iraqi Journal for Computers and Informatics, 43(1), 40–44.
- Assaad, R. & Barsoum, G., 2019. Public employment in the Middle East and North Africa. IZA World of Labor.
- Assad, R. et al., 2018. Explaining the MENA Paradox: Rising Educational Attainment, Yet Stagnant Female Labor Force Participation. IZA Discussion Paper No. 11385.

Assessment of Pregnant Women Knowledge and Practices Concerning Iron Deficiency Anemia at Al-Amara City/Iraq. (2020). Medico-Legal Update. Published.

Association between chemerin rs17173608 polymorphism and obesity in Iranian women. (2014). International Journal of Biosciences (IJB), 166–171.

Atto, N., Hirst, C., Hall, V., 2020. Integration Policies, Practices and Experiences – United Kingdom Country Report (RESPOND Working Papers Series No. Paper 2020/56), Global Migration: Consequences and Responses. Zenodo, Uppsala. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3945509>

Bajtelsmit, V. L., and Bernasek, A. (1997). Why Do Women Invest Differently than Men? SSRN Electronic Journal. Published.

Banerjee, A., Ferrara, E.L. & Orozco-Olvera, V.H., 2019. The Entertaining Way to Behavioral Change: Fighting HIV with MTV. Policy Research Working Papers no. WPS 8998. World Bank, Washington DC.

Baslevent, C., and Onaran, O. (2003). Are Married Women in Turkey More Likely to Become Added or Discouraged Workers? Labour, 17(3), 439–458.

Berrebi, C., and Ostwald, J. (2013). Terrorism and the Labor Force: Evidence of an Effect on Women Labor Force Participation and the Labor Gender Gap. SSRN Electronic Journal. Published.

Bettauer, R. J. (2011). United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1956–1958 on Iraq. International Legal Materials, 50(2), 172–180.

Bisin, A., and Verdier, T. (2001). The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 97(2), 298–319.

- Bisin, A., and Verdier, T. (2001b). The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 97(2), 298–319.
- Blau, F. D., Kahn, L. M., Liu, A. Y. H., and Papps, K. L. (2012). The transmission of women's fertility, human capital, and work orientation across immigrant generations. *Journal of Population Economics*, 26(2), 405–435.
- Borjas, G. J., and DeFreitas, G. (1993). Inequality at Work: Hispanics in the U.S. Labor Force. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 46(4), 733.
- Bošković, T. (2017). http://www.librietliberi.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2017-03-25-Libri_et_Liberi_5_2_06_PRIKAZI_03_WEB.pdf. *Libri et Liberi*, 5(2), 488–490.
- Brücker, H., Kosyakova, Y. & Schuß, E. (2020a). Fünf Jahre seit der Fluchtmigration 2015: Integration in Arbeitsmarkt und Bildungssystem macht weitere Fortschritte. IABKurzbericht 4/2020. Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB). Nürnberg. <http://doku.iab.de/kurzber/2020/kb0420.pdf> [retrieved February 2, 2021]
- Bulut, E. (2016). The labor force participation of Arab women in the United States. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 55, 10–17.
- Butikofer, S., Dettori, J. M., Vemulakonda, G. A., and Slabaugh, M. (2013). Enterobacter cloacae Postsurgical Endophthalmitis: Report of a Positive Outcome. *Case Reports in Ophthalmology*, 4(1), 42–45.
- Cengiz, H. (2016). Corporate Governance and Firm Profitability: Evidence from Turkey. *International Journal of Trade, Economics and Finance*, 7(6), 238–241.
- Ceritoglu, E., Yunculer, H. B. G., Torun, H., and Tumen, S. (2017). The impact of Syrian refugees on natives' labor market outcomes in Turkey: evidence from a quasi-experimental design. *IZA Journal of Labor Policy*, 6(1).

- Cheratian, I., Golpe, A., Goltabar, S., & Iglesias, J. (2019). The unemployment-entrepreneurship nexus: new evidence from 30 Iranian provinces. *International Journal of Emerging Markets*, 15(3), 469-489.
- Christiansen, T. (2002). Out of the shadows: The general secretariat of the Council of Ministers. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 8(4), 80–97.
- Clark, R. L., and Anker, R. (1993). Cross-National Analysis of Labor Force Participation of Older Men and Women. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 41(3), 489–512.
- Contents Page. (2014). *The World Bank Research Observer*, 29(2), NP.
- Conventional signs and abbreviations. (2021). *OECD Quarterly International Trade Statistics*, 2020(2).
- Corak, M., and Piraino, P. (2011). The Intergenerational Transmission of Employers. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 29(1), 37–68.
- Cornell, L. L. (1989). Age at marriage, women labor force participation, and parental interests. *Annales de Démographie Historique*, 1989(1), 223–231.
- Das, K. (2016). *Industrial Clusters, Migrant Workers, and Labour Markets in India* edited by Shuji Uchikawa, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, xiii + 238 pp. *The Developing Economies*, 54(4), 313–316.
- de Silva, W. I., and Fernando, D. N. P. (2016). Changing causes and consequences of labour force participation trends among the elderly in Sri Lanka. *Sri Lanka Journal of Advanced Social Studies*, 3(2), 3.
- Dey, J. (2020). *Emerging Challenges of International Labour Organization (ILO)*. SSRN Electronic Journal. Published.

- Dijkstra, A. G., and Hanmer, L. C. (2000). Measuring Socio-Economic GENDER Inequality: Toward an Alternative to the UNDP Gender-Related Development Index. *Feminist Economics*, 6(2), 41–75.
- Dildar, Y., 2015. Patriarchal Norms, Religion, and Female Labor Supply: Evidence from Turkey. *World Development*, 76, pp.40–61.
- DiMaggio, P., 1997. Culture and Cognition. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 23, pp.263–287.
- Donovan, J. D., Topple, C., Naidoo, V., and Milner, T. (2015). Strategic Interaction and the Iran-Iraq War: Lessons to Learn for Future Engagement? *Digest of Middle East Studies*, 24(2), 327–346.
- Duckworth, A., 2018. *Grit: The Power of Passion and Perseverance*, New York, NY: Scribner.
- El Feki, S., Heilman, B. and Barker, G., Eds. (2017) *Understanding Masculinities: Results from the International Men and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES) – Middle East and North Africa: Executive Summary*. Cairo and Washington, DC: UN Women and Promundo-US.
- El-Shobaky, G., and Youssef, A. (1978). Chemical activation of charcoals. *Surface Technology*, 7(3), 209–216.
- Elson, D. (2009). Gender Equality and Economic Growth in the World Bank World Development Report 2006. *Feminist Economics*, 15(3), 35–59.
- Elster, J., 2003. *The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Emerson, J. (2011). Unemployment and labor force participation in the United States. *Economics Letters*, 111(3), 203-206.
- Engerman, S. L. (1992). Coerced and free labor: Property rights and the development of the labor force. *Explorations in Economic History*, 29(1), 1–29.

- Evans, A., 2016. The Decline of the Male Breadwinner and Persistence of the Female Carer: Exposure, Interests, and Micro–Macro Interactions. *Annals of the American Association of Geographers*, 106(5), pp.1135–1151.
- Facione, N. C. (1994). Role overload and health: The married mother in the waged labor force. *Health Care for Women International*, 15(2), 157–167.
- Farre-Mena, J., and Ljungqvist, A. (2013). Do Measures of Financial Constraints Measure Financial Constraints? *SSRN Electronic Journal*. Published.
- Fendel, T. (2019). Die Arbeitsmarktintegration geflüchteter Frauen. *WISO DIREKT* 02/2019. Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Abteilung Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/wiso/15115.pdf> [retrieved June 26, 2020]
- Ferede, M.K. (2018) Paper commissioned for the 2019 Global Education Monitoring Report, Migration, displacement and education: Building bridges, not walls. UNESCO. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/> (Accessed: 29 December 2020).
- Fernandez, R. (2007). Don Bosco Fernandez. *BMJ*, 334(7599), 907.4-907.
- Fernandez, R., and Fogli, A. (2005). An Empirical Investigation of Beliefs, Work, and Fertility. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. Published.
- Fernandez, R., Fogli, A., and Olivetti, C. (2004). Mothers and Sons: Preference Formation and Women Labor Force Dynamics. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(4), 1249–1299.
- Fossey, E., Harvey, C., Mcdermott, F., and Davidson, L. (2002). Understanding and Evaluating Qualitative Research. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry*, 36(6), 717–732.
- Fosu, A. K. (1995). Labor Force Participation of Black and White Married Women: Evidence from Urban Labor Markets. *The Review of Black Political Economy*, 24(1), 45–64.

- Fosu, A. K. (2000). Labor Force Participation of Married Women: Do Regions Matter? *The American Economist*, 44(1), 70–80.
- Gaddis, I., and Klasen, S. (2013). Economic development, structural change, and women's labor force participation: *Journal of Population Economics*, 27(3), 639–681.
- Gaddis, I., and Pieters, J. (2016). The Gendered Labor Market Impacts of Trade Liberalization. *Journal of Human Resources*, 52(2), 457–490.
- Gârdan, I. P., And Gârdan, D. A. (2016). The Role Of Chances Equality And Social Inclusion In Terms Of Economic Development. *Annals of "Spiru Haret". Economic Series*, 14(4), 37.
- Goldin, P. R. (1994b). Reading Po Chü-i. *Tang Studies*, 1994(12), 57–96.
- Göksel, D. (2013). Womenlabor force participation in Turkey: The role of conservatism. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 41, 45–54.
- Grove, E., Lapierre, E., and Tikjha, W. (2012). On the global behavior of . *Cubo (Temuco)*, 14(2), 111–152.
- Grzywacz, J. G., Rao, P., Gentry, A., Marín, A., and Arcury, T. A. (2009). Acculturation and Conflict in Mexican Immigrants' Intimate Partnerships: The Role of Women's Labor Force Participation. *Violence Against Women*, 15(10), 1194–1212.
- H. Alfatlah, "A Systematic Review on The Circular Economy Initiatives Through the Sustainability Reporting: A Socio-Cultural Approach," *Turkish Journal of Computer and Mathematics Education (TURCOMAT)*, vol. 12, no. 7, pp. 1892-1906, 2021.
- Half of All U.S. Women with Newborns Are In the Labor Force. (1989). *Family Planning Perspectives*, 21(1), 37.
- Halman, T. S., and Erman, N. (1997). Her gün yeni doğarız. *World Literature Today*, 71(2), 451.

HEKİM YILMAZ, D. (2020). BÖLGESEL TİCARET ANLAŞMALARI(BTA)'NİN GELİŞİMİ VE DERİN TİCARET ANLAŞMALARI: TÜRKİYE'NİN SERBEST TİCARET ANLAŞMALARI (STA) AÇISINDAN BİR ANALİZ. TESAM Akademi Dergisi, 39–64.

Hirmis, A. (2002). UK regional competitiveness: A complementary note. Regions Magazine, 241(1), 12–17.

<http://www.innspub.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/IJB-V4No1-p158-166.pdf>. (2014).

International Journal of Biosciences (IJB), 4(1), 158–166.

<http://www.innspub.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/IJB-V4No1-p158-166.pdf>. (2014).

International Journal of Biosciences (IJB), 4(1), 158–166.

Ilkcaracan Ajas, I. (2012). Work–Family Balance and Public Policy: A cross-country perspective. Development, 55(3), 325–332.

Iraq volume 75 Cover and Back matter. (2013). Iraq, 75, b1–b2.

Iraq. (2017). IMF Staff Country Reports, 17(252).

<https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484314999.002>

İlkaracan, P. (2012). Why so Few Women in the Labor Market in Turkey? Feminist Economics, 18(1), 1–37.

James-Burdumy, S. (2005). The Effect of Maternal Labor Force Participation on Child Development. Journal of Labor Economics, 23(1), 177–211.

Jansen, H. (2007). Hoezo kwalitatief? Specificeer! KWALON, 12(2).

Johnston, S. S. (2013). Response to Leibowitz et al. Genderually Transmitted Diseases, 40(7), 582–583.

Jones, P. (1999). Hotel Productivity: The McKinsey Global Institute Study. Tourism and Hospitality Research, 1(2), 178–181.

- Kandiyoti, D. (1988). Slave girls, temptresses, and comrades: Images of women in the Turkish novel. *Feminist Issues*, 8(1), 35–50.
- Karanassou, M., & Snower, D. J. (2004). Unemployment invariance. *German Economic Review*, 5(3), 297-317.
- Karanassou, M., & Snower, D. J. (2004). Unemployment invariance. *German Economic Review*, 5(3), 297-317.
- Karaoglan, D., and Okten, C. (2015). Labor-Force Participation of Married Women in Turkey: A Study of the Added-Worker Effect and the Discouraged-Worker Effect. *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade*, 51(1), 274–290.
- Karshenas, M. (1994). Environment, Technology and Employment: Towards a New Definition of Sustainable Development. *Development and Change*, 25(4), 723–756.
- Karshenas, M. (2001). Agriculture and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 25(3), 315–342.
- Kasap, G., and Janušonis, V. (2021). Dokumentų Apyvartos Pokyčiai Sveikatos Priežiūros Organizacijose: Atvejo Analizė. *Health Sciences*, 30(7), 91–96.
- Kawaguchi, D., and Miyazaki, J. (2007). Working mothers and sons' preferences regarding womenlabor supply: direct evidence from stated preferences. *Journal of Population Economics*, 22(1), 115–130.
- Kawaguchi, D., and Miyazaki, J. (2007b). Working mothers and sons' preferences regarding womenlabor supply: direct evidence from stated preferences. *Journal of Population Economics*, 22(1), 115–130.
- KEITHLY, D. C., and DESERAN, F. A. (1995). Households, Local Labor Markets, and Youth Labor Force Participation. *Youth and Society*, 26(4), 463–492.

- Khinchuk, K. (1987). AGRICULTURAL LABOR FORCE IN THE SOVIET UNION. *Soviet Geography*, 28(2), 90–115.
- Klasen, S. (2019). What Explains Uneven Women Labor Force Participation Levels and Trends in Developing Countries? *The World Bank Research Observer*, 34(2), 161–197.
- Klasen, S. (2019). What Explains Uneven Women Labor Force Participation Levels and Trends in Developing Countries? *The World Bank Research Observer*, 34(2), 161–197.
- Klasen, S., and Pieters, J. (2015). What Explains the Stagnation of Women Labor Force Participation in Urban India? *The World Bank Economic Review*, 29(3), 449–478.
- Koehler, Cl. (2017) Continuity of learning for newly arrived refugee children in Europe. 1.
- Korstjens, I., and Moser, A. (2017). Series: Practical guidance to qualitative research. Part 4: Trustworthiness and publishing. *European Journal of General Practice*, 24(1), 120–124.
- Kosyakova, Y., Saar, E. & Dämmrich, J. (2017): Institutional change and gender inequalities at labour market entry: A comparison of Estonia, Russia, and East and West Germany. *Studies of Transition States and Societies*, 9, 2, 17-40.
- Krämer, A. & Scherschel, K. (2019). Flucht in die Aktivierung. In: Binner, K. & Scherschel, K. (Eds.), *Fluchtmigration und Gesellschaft. Von Nutzenkalkülen, Solidarität und Exklusion*. Weinheim: Juventa Verlag, pp. 169-189.
- Larcher, G. (2019). Multilateralism and global challenges: “The work of the OECD is vital.” *OECD Observer*.
- Layard, R., Layard, P. R. G., Nickell, S. J., & Jackman, R. (2005). *Unemployment: macroeconomic performance and the labour market*: Oxford University Press on Demand.
- Le, K., and Diop, A. (2010). Participation of women in Qatar’s labor force. *Qatar Foundation Annual Research Forum Proceedings*, 2010, AHO5.

- Lechman, E. (2014). Women Labor Force Participation and Economic Growth. Re-Examination of U-Shaped Curve. SSRN Electronic Journal. Published.
- Lee, S., and No, S. (2020). China's Overseas Financial Direct Investment (ODI) in European Football Clubs: Revisiting ODI in the Context of Sport Industry. *Journal of Global Sport Management*, 1–15.
- Lee, Y. (2010). Communications procedure under the Convention on the Rights of the Child: 3rd Optional Protocol. *The International Journal of Children's Rights*, 18(4), 567–583.
- Lenderink, T. (2012). Boekbespreking van: Wim Derksen, Kennis en beleid verbinden: Praktijkboek voor beleidsmakers, Den Haag: Boom Lemma uitgevers 2011. *Beleidsonderzoek Online*. Published.
- Leppel, K. (2005). Labor force plans and labor force status. *Demographic Research*, 12, 173–196.
- Lesch, D. W. (1996). *The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq: How Peacemaking Changed*, by Cameron R. Hume. (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy) 269 pages, documentary annex, notes, bibliography, index. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. \$29.95 (Cloth) ISBN 0-253-32874-8. *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin*, 30(1), 104–105.
- Malcom, S. (2017). Global leaders: Gender equality and diversity in the United States. The SEA Change program – an overview of objectives and strategy. *STEM Gender Equality Congress Proceedings*, 1(1), 385–411.
- McCormack, G. (2018). Why 'Doing Business' with the World Bank May Be Bad for You. *European Business Organization Law Review*, 19(3), 649–676.

- Meyer, M., Bindelglas, E., Kupferman, M. E., and Eggermont, A. M. (2020). <https://ecancer.org/en/journal/article/1096-cancer-treatment-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-in-the-kurdistan-region-of-northern-iraq>. *Ecancermedicalsecience*, 14.
- Miller, C. F. (1993). Actual experience, potential experience or age, and labor force participation by married women. *Atlantic Economic Journal*, 21(4), 60–66.
- Miloğlu, Z., Yılmaz, A. B., Güller, M. T., And Subaşı Aksakal, B. (2021). Psikotrop İlaçların Bruksizm Etiyolojisi Ve Tedavisindeki Etkisi: Güncel Bilgiler Işığında Bruksizme Genel Bakış. *Atatürk Üniversitesi Diş Hekimliği Fakültesi Dergisi*, 1.
- Mincer, J., and Polachek, S. (1974). Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of Women. *Journal of Political Economy*, 82(2, Part 2), S76–S108.
- Moghadam, R. (1993). Labor Market Issues in Belgium: An International Perspective. *IMF Working Papers*, 93(32), 1.
- Moghadam, V. M. (2008). Editorial. *International Social Science Journal*, 59(191), 5–7.
- Molecular genetic characterization of animal genetic resources. *FAO Animal Production and Health Guidelines*. No. 9. FAO. Published in 2011, 85 pp. ISBN: 978-92-5-107032-1. Available at <http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2413e/i2413e00.pdf>. (2011). *Animal Genetic Resources/Ressources Génétiques Animales/Recursos Genéticos Animales*, 49, 114.
- Mollahosseini, A. (2008). Gender and employment in Iran. *Indian Journal of Gender Studies*, 15(1), 159-162. doi:10.1177/097152150701500110
- Morrill, M. S., and Morrill, T. (2013). Intergenerational links in women labor force participation. *Labour Economics*, 20, 38–47.
- Morrill, M. S., and Morrill, T. (2013). Intergenerational links in women labor force participation. *Labour Economics*, 20, 38–47.

- Mueen, S. (2003). War in Iraq. *The RUSI Journal*, 148(3), 26–31.
- Musa, A. S. A. (2012). Development Challenges for Iraqi Economy. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. Published.
- Nelissen, J. H. M. (1990). The effect of increased labor force participation of married women on the distribution of family income in the Netherlands. *De Economist*, 138(1), 47–62.
- ÑOpo, H., Daza, N., and Ramos, J. (2012). Gender earning gaps around the world: a study of 64 countries. *International Journal of Manpower*, 33(5), 464–513.
- O’Brien, B. C., Harris, I. B., Beckman, T. J., Reed, D. A., and Cook, D. A. (2014). Standards for Reporting Qualitative Research. *Academic Medicine*, 89(9), 1245–1251.
- O’Neill, J. (1992). A flexible work force: Opportunities for women. *Journal of Labor Research*, 13(1), 67–72.
- O’Sullivan, C. (2004). Observations on the Role of the United Nations in Iraq in the Coming Year. *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, 03(4), 83–91.
- Österholm, P. (2010). Unemployment and labour-force participation in Sweden. *Economics Letters*, 106(3), 205-208.
- Penninx, R. 2013. Research on migration and integration in Europe: Achievements and lessons. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Penninx, R. and B. Garcés-Mascareñas. 2016. “The Concept of Integration as an Analytical Tool and as a Policy Concept”, in B. Garcés-Mascareñas and R. Penninx (Eds.), *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe. Contexts, Levels and Actors*. Springer:, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London: 11–30.
- Peracchi, F., and Welch, F. (1994). Trends in Labor Force Transitions of Older Men and Women. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 12(2), 210–242.

Podiotis, P. (2020). Sentiment Analysis of the CIA World Factbook. SSRN Electronic Journal. Published.

Podiotis, P. (2020). Sentiment Analysis of the CIA World Factbook. SSRN Electronic Journal. Published.

Psacharopoulos, G., and Tzannatos, Z. (1989). Womenlabor Force Participation: An International Perspective. *The World Bank Research Observer*, 4(2), 187–201.

Qaramah, M. K. (2019). <http://fto.ro/altarul-reintregirii/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/14.-Andrei-PETRACHE-AR3-2019.pdf>. *Altarul Reîntregirii*, 3, 149–161.

QJ, F. (2017). Prevalence and Life Style Determinants of Hypertension among Women in Iraq. *Open Access Journal of Pharmaceutical Research*, 1(4).

Ratcheva, V. S. (2017). Conclusions, insight and recommendations from the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 2016. *STEM Gender Equality Congress Proceedings*, 1(1), 603–647.

Rethinking Human Development: The UNDP Human Development Report 2010. (2010). *Development*, 53(1), 138–139.

Ribar, D. C. (1995). A Structural Model of Child Care and the Labor Supply of Married Women. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 13(3), 558–597.

Riddell, W. C. (1995). The Measurement of Labor Force Dynamics with Longitudinal Data: The Labour Market Activity Survey Filter. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 13(2), 351–385.

Rogers, T. et al., 2015. Beyond good intentions: Prompting people to make plans improves followthrough on important tasks. *Behavioral Science & Policy*, 1(2), pp.33–41.

Rosche, D. (2016). Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals: gender equality at last? An Oxfam perspective. *Gender and Development*, 24(1), 111–126.

- Russell, C. K. (2003). Evaluation of qualitative research studies. *Evidence-Based Nursing*, 6(2), 36–40.
- Said, M. (2014) “Wage formation and earnings inequality in the Jordanian labor market” In: Assaad, R., , . (eds). *The Jordanian Labour Market in the New Millenium*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Salikutluk, Z., Giesecke, J. & Kroh, M. (2016). Geflüchtete nahmen in Deutschland später eine Erwerbstätigkeit auf als andere MigrantInnen. *DIW Wochenbericht*, 35, 749-756. <https://dnb.info/1153610973/34>
- Sattinger, M. (1995). General Equilibrium Effects of Unemployment Compensation with Labor Force Participation. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 13(4), 623–652.
- Sattinger, M. (1995). General Equilibrium Effects of Unemployment Compensation with Labor Force Participation. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 13(4), 623–652.
- Schmidpeter, B. (2020). The Long-Term Labor Market Effects of Parental Unemployment. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. Published.
- Shoo, R., and Acaye, G. (2015). Strengthening Community Based Health Care Provision Capacity is Critical for Emergency Preparedness – Lessons from Iraq and Uganda. *Emergency Medicine - Open Journal*, 1(1), 15–16.
- Tansel, A., & Ozdemir, Z. A. (2018). Unemployment invariance hypothesis, added and discouraged worker effects in Canada. *International Journal of Manpower*, 39(7), 929-936.
- Tansel, A., & Ozdemir, Z. A. (2018). Unemployment invariance hypothesis, added and discouraged worker effects in Canada. *International Journal of Manpower*, 39(7), 929-936
- Tansel, T., Toker, A., Yilmazbayhan, D., Gullluoglu, M., and Dayioglu, E. (2010). Primary endobronchial schwannoma. *Journal of Pediatric Surgery*, 45(11), 2241–2243.

Tienda, M., Donato, K. M., and Cordero-Guzman, H. (1992). Schooling, Color, and the Labor Force Activity of Women. *Social Forces*, 71(2), 365.

Velez-Grajales, V., and Velez-Grajales, R. (2012). Intergenerational Mobility and Income Effects for Entrepreneurial Activity in Mexico. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. Published.

Venkata Ratnam, C. (2001). Book Reviews : International Labour Organization, Termination of Employment Digest. Geneva: ILO, 2000, 402 pp., Sw.frs.50. *Global Business Review*, 2(1), 142–143.

Verick, S. (2014). Womenlabor force participation in developing countries. *IZA World of Labor*. Published.

Verick, S. (2014). Womenlabor force participation in developing countries. *IZA World of Labor*. Published.

Vilardo, V., & Bittar, S. (2018). Gender Profile-Iraq: A situation analysis on gender equality and women's empowerment in Iraq.

Violence-Related Mortality in Iraq from 2002 to 2006. (2008). *New England Journal of Medicine*, 358(5), 484–493.

Violence-Related Mortality in Iraq from 2002 to 2006. (2008). *New England Journal of Medicine*, 358(5), 484–493.

Vital Signs: Internal Medicine Getting Closer to Gender Parity. (2009). *Internal Medicine News*, 42(10), 2.

Weichselbaumer, D. (2020). Multiple discrimination against female immigrants wearing headscarves. *ILR Review*, 73, 3, 600-627. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793919875707>

When sales 101 isn't enough. (2009). *Development and Learning in Organizations: An International Journal*, 23(3).

World Bank World Development Report 2018: Learning to Realize Education's Promise
Washington, DC: World Bank, 2018. \$60.00; \$39.95 (pbk.). (2018). Population and
Development Review, 44(2), 404–405.

World Bank, World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development. (2012).
Population and Development Review, 38(1), 178–179.

Y. M. A. Al-Wattar, A. H. Almagtome, and K. M. AL-Shafeay, "The role of integrating hotel
sustainability reporting practices into an Accounting Information System to enhance Hotel
Financial Performance: Evidence from Iraq," African Journal of Hospitality, Tourism and
Leisure, vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 1-16, 2019.

Zabel, J. E. (1993). The Relationship between Hours of Work and Labor Force Participation
in Four Models of Labor Supply Behavior. Journal of Labor Economics, 11(2), 387–416.

Zhang, N., and Huang, H. (2018). Assessment of world disaster severity processed by Gaussian
blur based on large historical data: casualties as an evaluating indicator. Natural Hazards,
92(1), 173–187.

Zhongyuan, L. (2020). Social Protection Management: Anti-Fraud Technologies. Journal of
Advanced Research in Dynamical and Control Systems, 12(04-Special Issue), 1687–1693.