



**SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA**

**INSTITUTE FOR AREA STUDIES**

**MASTER OF AFRICAN STUDIES**

**TURKEY-AFRICA RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR**

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **TURKEY-AFRICA RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR**

**ABDUSSAMET AKAN**

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This thesis addressing the Turkey-Africa relations during Cold War Period seeks to offer a historical perspective to the reader in order to comprehend Turkey's foreign policy approach towards the continent in the years between 1945 and 1989 and provide a framework to make better sense of current relations between Turkey and Africa.

When Turkey's policies towards Africa are examined, it is seen that there have been ups and downs over time. It can be said that the African continent has attracted little interest in Turkish academic circles during the Cold War years, despite Turkey's close linkages to the Africa continent in terms of historical, cultural, and geographical ties. In this regard, this study analyzed the Turkey-Africa relations during the Cold War in light of archival sources. In this direction, official documents from the Presidential Directorate of State Archive were examined and it was observed that Turkey has signed more than 100 agreements with North African countries and also signed 64 agreements with Sub-Saharan African countries in terms of economic, commercial, medical, and military topics. Within this context, interviews were made with Turkish former ambassador to Abuja (Nigeria) Numan Hazar as well as an academican and Turkish ambassador to Dakar (Senegal) Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kavas who has penned important books and articles about specific topics related to the continent. At the end of our evaluations during the thesis, it was

concluded that throughout the Cold War, relations between Turkey and Africa have shown a remarkable advancement.

**Keywords:** Archive, Africa, Independence, Turkey, Foreign Policy, Turkish Foreign Policy.



## ÖZET

### SOĞUK SAVAŞ DÖNEMİ TÜRKİYE-AFRIKA İLİŞKİLERİ

ABDUSSAMET AKAN

Afrika Çalışmaları Tezli Yüksek Lisans Programı (İngilizce)

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Soğuk Savaş dönemi Türkiye-Afrika ilişkilerini ele alan bu tez çalışması, 1945-1989 yılları arası Türkiye'nin Afrika'ya dönük dış politikasının incelenmesi sağlamak ve günümüz ilişkilerini daha iyi anlamlandırmak amacıyla okuyucuya tarihsel bir perspektif sunmaktadır.

Türkiye'nin Afrika'ya yönelik politikaları incelendiğinde, zaman içerisinde iniş ve çıkışların yaşandığı görülmektedir. Türkiye'nin tarihsel, kültürel ve coğrafi açılardan yakın olduğu Afrika kıtasına Soğuk Savaş döneminde yeteri kadar çalışmanın yapılmamış olması Türk akademi literatüründe de büyük boşluk oluşturmuştur. Buradan hareketle çalışmada arşiv kaynakları ışığında Soğuk Savaş dönemi Türkiye-Afrika ilişkileri analiz edilmiştir. Bu doğrultuda Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivliği'nden belgeler incelenmiş ve Türkiye'nin ekonomik, ticari, sağlık, kültür ve askeri alanlarda Kuzey Afrika ülkeleriyle 100'den fazla; Sahra-Altı Afrika ülkeleri ile de 64 anlaşma imzaladığı tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca çalışma kapsamında Afrika konularında önemli eserler veren eski Nijerya Büyükelçisi Numan Hazar ile akademisyen ve Senegal Büyükelçisi Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kavas ile mülakat yapılmıştır. Yapılan değerlendirmeler neticesinde Türkiye-Afrika ilişkilerinin Soğuk Savaş döneminde kayda değer ölçüde gelişim gösterdiği kanaatine varılmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Arşiv, Afrika, Bağımsızlık, Türkiye, Dış Politika, Türk Dış Politikası.

## **ABBREVIATIONS**

**AARDO:** Organization for African and Asian Rural Development

**AP:** Justice Party (Adalet Partisi)

**CHP:** Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)

**DP:** Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti)

**DSA:** Directorate of State Archives

**EU:** European Union

**FAO:** Food and Agriculture Organization

**ILO:** International Labor Organization

**NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**NGO:** Non-Governmental Organization

**OIC:** Organization of Islamic Cooperation

**ROC:** Republic of Cyprus

**TAF:** Turkish Armed Forces

**TSK:** Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri)

**TUBITAK:** The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey

**TUIK:** Turkish Statistical Institute

**UK:** United Kingdom

**UN:** United Nations

**UNDP:** United Nations Development Program

**UNESCO:** United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

**UNGA:** United Nations General Assembly

**UNHCR** United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee

**UNITAF:** Unified Task Force

**UNOSOM:** United Nations Operation in Somalia

**UNSC:** United Nations Security Council

**USA:** United States of America

**USSR:** The Union of Soviet Union Socialist Republics

**ZANU:** Zimbabwe African National Union

**ZAPU:** Zimbabwe African People's Union

## INTRODUCTION

The Turkish presence in the African continent dates back to the ninth century (Kavas, 2006). During the Ottoman period, the relations with this continent continued. Particularly the northern part of the continent was under the reign of the Ottoman Empire. The borders of the Ottoman Empire further expanded to cover some parts of the Sub-Saharan Africa region. The historical, cultural, and economic ties directed the Turkish-African relations that were established during the period starting with the Ottoman Empire's conquest of the continent and eventual ceding of these lands at the end of the 19 century. Therefore, it is not overstatement to claim that Turkey has deep-rooted historical, cultural, and humanitarian with Africa.

Having entered a new era with the declaration of the Republic in 1923, Turkey had to minimize its relations with Africa. Although relations with North Africa were maintained at a certain level, it was not the case for Sub-Saharan Africa. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who defined Africans as "*Oppressed Nations*", decided to open an embassy in Ethiopia in 1926 (Akkaya, 2012). Although it was known that Atatürk attached much importance to this continent, it was not possible to establish a close relation with the continent due to the conditions of the day. There were many underlying reasons for that situation. The first and the most important reason was the fact that almost the whole Sub-Saharan Africa was under the influence of the European colonial states until the end of 1950s. Another reason the newly founded Republic of Turkey ignored relations with Africa was the fact that Turkey firstly focused on its own development and later felt Soviet Union threat.

After the Second World War, Turkey had to refrain from supporting the independence struggles of North African nations. Rather than being the preference of Turkey, this situation stemmed from the fact that Turkey was a member of NATO and a part of the Western alliance. For instance, Turkey was on the same side with the UK which intervened in Egypt during the Suez Crisis. At the UN voting on the independence of North African countries, Turkey was on the same side with France by

abstaining from voting over the issue of Algerian self determination and independence (Akkanlı, 2011). Another factor for Turkey to stay distanced from Africa was that Ankara invited the African states to follow a Western-oriented policy. Deputy Prime Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, who attended the Bandung Conference in 1955, stated to the representatives of Third World countries that they should support Western alliance against the danger of Communism and that their security could be maintained within the framework of NATO (Murat, 2018). However, this policy towards Africa was not an obstacle for Turkey to recognize the African countries and to establish diplomatic relations with them. Furthermore, Turkey provided indirect support for the independence struggle of some African countries. For example, Turkey provided financial contributions to the national liberation movements of Namibia and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) (Şengül, 2015). While Turkey abstained from supporting the independence of Algeria at the UN voting in 1958, it provided arms aid to this country in October 1957 under the guise of “scrap material” (Hürriyet , 1999). Turkey established embassies in African countries in order to upgrade its diplomatic ties. Although that the embassies did not substantially change Turkey’s policy towards Africa, they were important in sustaining relations at the diplomatic level.

During the Cold War, the political situation in Turkey affected its foreign policy. One of these events, and perhaps the most important one, was the Cyprus Issue. Being under the NATO umbrella, Turkey could not get the international support regarding Cyprus. Turkish officials questioned their pro-Western posture when non-aligned countries in Africa and the Middle East supported the Greek Cypriots. Turkey accordingly sought to promote its relations with Arab and African countries. Delegations consisting of politicians, diplomats, journalists and academicians were formed in 1965. These delegations visited several African, Asian and Latin American countries to seek support in the Cyprus Issue (Fırat, 2009). The first delegation to Africa visited North and West African countries, namely Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Senegal; the second one visited Cameroon, Gabon, Democratic Congo, Central African Republic and Chad in Central Africa; and

the third one visited Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Malawi and Sudan in East Africa. They held multiple meetings with relevant authorities. Although these visits are important in terms of being the first attempts, they did not bring any concrete outcomes in the viewpoints of African countries about Turkey. Nevertheless, Turkey understood the need to attach more importance to the relations with the Middle Eastern and African countries. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit expressed that Turkish foreign policy should concentrate on the Middle East and African countries in order to achieve its goals (Ecevit, 1974). Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün, the Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1978- 1979 years, prepared an action plan to accelerate the relations between Turkey and African countries, but the plan was not implemented to full extent.

In the 1980s, Turkey entered a new era under Turgut Özal's leadership. The new leadership adopted an economy-oriented approach (Bayram, 2014). In this context, close relations were pursued not only with Western countries but also with the African countries. One of the most important developments of that time was Özal's apology on behalf of Republic of Turkey to Algeria over the abstention of Turkey regarding Algerian self-determination and independence at the UN. Henceforth, the relations between Turkey and Algeria were softened and entered into a different phase (TRTHaber, 2019).

## **1. Theoretical Framework**

Turkish foreign policy progressed in a realist and pragmatist framework after the proclamation of the Republic. In this regard Turkey had a deep institutional experience was based on a realistic and rational base rather than ideological orientation. In the bipolar system formed after the Second World War, there was the thought of being integrated into the international system as required by a realistic policy and it created one of the main foreign policy strategies of Turkey (Şener, 2013). In other words, Turkey's traditional foreign policy philosophy based on realism and a policy aimed at protecting the existing system. During the Cold War, Turkey's primary concern was to

maintain the existing balance of power and to turn the power balance in the bipolar system to its favor. Perceiving the threat of Soviet Union since the end of the 1930s, Turkey struggled for ensuring its security by forming an alliance with the US. This situation continued during the Cold War, until the collapse of the Soviet Union. For this reason, African policy of Turkey during the Cold War period is handled in this study from the perspective of realist theory.

## 2. Research Question and Methodology

When the Turkish-African relations are examined, it is seen that academical studies generally focuses on the Ottoman Empire rule in the continent and Turkey's relation with Africa before the Africa Action Plan of 1998 is generally overlooked. The aim of the dissertation is to analyze the reflection of the Turkish foreign policy towards African countries during the Cold War period. The role of Turkey and its contributions to the process of Africa's independence will be better revealed in this study.

As the onset and development of Turkey's relations with Africa during the Cold War period is scrutinized, archive documents, official correspondences were used in the study. In this direction, official documents from the Presidential Directorate of State Archive were examined. In addition, meetings were held about the subject with diplomats and academicians. Within this scope, interviews were made with the retired Ambassador Numan Hazar and the Turkish Ambassador to Dakar, Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kavas. While examining the Turkey-Africa relations during the Cold War period, the publications and works available at the library of universities were examined and websites were made use of. The main works referred in the study while examining the foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey are as follows: "*Atatürk Türk Dünyası ve Mazlum Milletler*" by Barış Doster, "*Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*" by Faruk Sönmezoğlu, "*Türk Dış Politikası*" edited by Baskın Oran, "*Türkiye-Afrika İlişkileri ve Sovyet Tehdidinin Gölgesinde Türk Dış Politikası: Kuzey Afrika Örneği*" by Numan Hazar. "*Geçmişten Günümüze Afrika*" by Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kavas was also made use of.

This study consists of four chapters as “*The Turkish Foreign Policy from a Realistic Perspective during the Cold War Period*”, “*Turkey-Africa Relations during Cold War Period*”, “*Beginning of Turkey-Africa Relations: An Archival Research*” and “*Interview with Ambassador Numan Hazar and Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kavas*”.

In the first chapter, the determinants of the Turkish foreign policy in the Cold War period will be discussed. The details of Turkey’s foreign policy towards Africa after the Second World War in the bipolarity of the international system will be discussed. Turkey positioned itself within the Western Bloc in the bipolar world formed after the Second World War. In this positioning, both Westernization policy practiced for nearly a century and the continuous security threat imposed by the Soviet Union played an important role. The compliance between the Turkish national interests and the US regional interests caused Turkey to take part in the Western security system. Having determined the threat of Soviet Union as the priority of its agenda, Turkey made its first concrete attempt on 25<sup>th</sup> July 1950 by dispatching troops for the Korean War (TRTHaber, 2018). Participating effectively in Korea, Turkey found a significant advantage for entering NATO. However, after becoming a member of NATO in 1952, important problems were on the way for the Turkish foreign policy. Among the main items on the agenda, there was Cyprus and the relations with Greece. In this section, Turkey’s pro-Western position and its detrimental effect on Cyprus are handled. Besides, the role of Turkey in the regional pacts with the US support during this period is discussed.

In the second chapter, Turkey’s foreign policy that positioned itself at the side of the US due to security concerns in the polarization between the US and the Soviet Union as well as its effect on the Turkish-African relations, is examined. In this section, Turkey’s Western-oriented policies following to NATO membership is also examined. In this section, how the Cyprus Issues affected Turkish Foreign policy towards Africa is analysed. In the same section, Turkey’s recognition of African countries, as well as the establishment of Turkish embassies in those countries will be explained. In the final part

of the section, Turkey-Africa relations that entered a new phase with Turgut Özal's policies since 1980s are discussed.

In the third chapter of the study, Presidential archive documents regarding the relations between Turkey and African countries during the Cold War period are examined. The military, cultural, commercial, defense and aid agreements made during this period are examined in detail. In addition to agreements, reciprocal visits by head of states, ministers, and statesmen, in addition to decrees leading to inauguration of embassies are viewed separately.

In the fourth section, interviews made with the retired ambassador Numan Hazar, known for his works on Africa and Turkey's Ambassador to Senegal Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kavas are presented.

The following questions were asked during the interview:

- 1) Why is Africa important for Turkey?
- 2) After Turkey declared 2005 as the year of Africa, a great interest has aroused for Africa. This situation is felt in all relevant government institutions. When we look at the history, it can be said that the relations of the Ottoman Empire with Africa were powerful. How do you think this situation changed during the Cold War?
- 3) During the Cold War, even though Turkey-Africa relations are accepted to be at lower level, we see that Turkey recognized the independence of African countries and inaugurated embassies in Libya (1952), Morocco (1957), Tunisia (1957) and Ghana (1957), then opened embassies in Nigeria (1962), Algeria (1963), Senegal (1963) and Kenya (1968), respectively. In 1970s, we see that the Democratic Republic of Congo (1974), Somalia and Tanzania (1979) were added to the countries where embassies were inaugurated by Turkey. However, the academics, authors, journalists or researchers tell or write that during the Cold War period, Turkey was not generally present in Africa. Do you agree with this?

4) In the Algerian independence vote in 1958 at the UN, Turkey abstained from supporting Algeria. Subsequently, this decreased Turkey's prestige in the eyes of African states. However, President Turgut Özal visited Algeria in 1985 and submitted apologies due to Turkey's abstaining vote against Algeria? What do you think about the subject?

5) In order to get support from the relevant African countries about Cyprus Issue, Turkey formed goodwill delegations of politicians, diplomats, academics, and journalists to visit Africa in 1965. The goodwill delegations visited many African countries and explained Turkey's thesis about the Cyprus Issue. However, Turkey's opening to Africa was not effective. Why did African countries support Greece against Turkey? What do you think about this issue? Why do you think African countries did not support Turkey?

The independence struggle of African countries is similar to the struggle of Turkey in the 1920s. One of the most important aspect of this similarity is that their fight was against imperialist countries. When Turkey's policy towards Africa is examined, the importance of developments in the Cold War period further increases. The developments in this period provide a better understanding of Turkey-Africa relations.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **1. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR: A REALIST PERSPECTIVE**

#### **1.1. The Rise of Realism After the Second World War**

The developments in the international arena after the First World War foreshadowed that the world was being dragged into a new war. As a result, idealism lost its power, and realism began to dominate International Relations after 1919. The ineffectiveness of the League of Nations against the expansionist policies of Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini and Joseph Stalin showed that the idealist theory was ineffective in explaining international relations. Realism that found its essence in the Great Depression and the destruction during the war which became a powerful theory of international relations (Carr, 1946). Realism was influential in explaining the events that took place in the international system during the Cold War through basic concepts such as balance of power, inter-state struggle, interest, and power.

Realism is divided into two in itself as classical realism and neorealism. In Classical Realism, the main actor of international relations is the state. For this reason, the developments are evaluated through state-centered approaches. In Classical Realism, every state takes care of itself in emergency situations since there is no authority to be consulted in the international system. In other words, every state is responsible for its own security for survival. It is possible to say that Turkish foreign policy following the Second World War was shaped by this understanding.

Kenneth Waltz set the framework of neo-realism in his study titled "*Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*". When a state increases its power, other states try to predict the possible outcomes of it, and as they do not know the actual intention of the state in question, they also increase their power. The result of this dilemma is called as "*the security dilemma*" (Arı, 2004). For instance, the distrust of the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War period increased the military investments at both sides As stated by Waltz, all states try to predict the possible behaviors of other states in order to

realize their own actions in the best manner In this respect, Waltz admits that the structure of the international system is anarchic (Baylis, 2008). Within this structure, the primary purpose of every state is to maintain its existence. In this context, from the Second World War till 1990s, Turkey perceived threats concerning spread of communism from the Soviet Union and pursued a Western-oriented policy to sustain its existence.

## **1.2. Threat Perception in the Turkish Foreign Policy and Realism**

There are a lot of factors that led Turkey to adopt a realistic approach. Turkey's geostrategic position, perception of constant threat from the Soviet Union and the First and Second World Wars pushed Turkey into a realist policy implementation. Besides, after the proclamation of the Republic, the ambiguous international system pushed Turkey into an active neutral policy. During the Cold War period, the bipolar system forced Turkey to take part in the Western camp (Balçı & Kardaş, 2017). Turkey's policy towards Africa during the Cold War period was shaped in this scope.

Although Turkey declared its neutrality in the Second World War, it could not eliminate the influence of great powers. Especially in this period, the threat of Soviet Union put the Turkish rulers in trouble in making decisions. In fact, the signs of the threat of Soviet Union predated the Second World War. The Soviet Union questioned the Neutrality and Non-Aggression Agreement signed in 1925 with Turkey following the Second World War. The Soviet Union wanted to renew the agreement, and in parallel, claimed rights over Kars and Ardahan in the Eastern Anatolia region. This situation increased Turkey's concerns and paved the way for closer relations with the West. Although the Soviet Union emphasized that they had no claim on Turkish lands in the direction of "*Peaceful Coexistence*" policy in 1953, Turkey had doubts about the "*real*" intention of the Soviet Union (Ercan, 2010).

One of the biggest threats from the Soviet Union was the status of the Straits. While the legal ground for İstanbul and Çanakkale Straits started with the Lausanne Straits Convention in 1923, it was finalized with the Montreux Convention in 1936. However, the control of the Straits was given to an international system by restricting Turkey's sovereignty by Lausanne Convention, the Montreux Convention regarding the regime of the Straits gave the sovereignty to Turkey again. The Soviet Union was never fully

satisfied with the arrangements by Montreux. However, they had to deal more with the German and Italian threats that occurred at that time. When the Second World War started to turn to the Soviet Union especially after the decline of Germany in 1943, the Soviet Union adopted an expansionist policy. The Soviet Union, who desired to have an access to the warm seas, was a threat for Turkey's security in the Mediterranean this time. This situation caused the US to be concerned on that region as they had their own interests.

In the scope of its policy trying to access to the Mediterranean, Soviet Union applied pressure on Turkey claiming new rights on the Straits and tried to convince the allies that the legal status of the Straits accepted in the Montreux Convention was not a solution and a change was required (Ercan, 2010). The Soviet Union mentioned their request at Yalta and Postdam Conferences in 1945 and got a positive feedback from several Western countries. Turkey could not show more resistance to this pressure and accepted the idea of an international conference to discuss the status of the Straits. But such a conference could not convene due to the continuing tensions between the US and Soviet Union since 1945 (Ercan, 2010). Nevertheless, the pressure applied by the Soviet Union on Turkey continued increasingly after 1946.

The Soviet Union tried to exercise control not only over Turkey but also over other countries. The Soviet Union sent a note to the US, the UK in addition to Turkey, asking to amend the provisions of Montreux Convention. That note caused the US to enter into a rapid decision-making process. The Soviet Union note of 7<sup>th</sup> August 1946 divided US's rulers into two. Some supported the idea of giving a protest to the Soviet Union and leaving face to face to Turkey and the Soviet Union alone, and some had the idea of supporting Turkey no matter what the consequences would be. The US chose the second option and sent their naval forces to the Mediterranean. The naval forces showed solidarity with Turkey and the US wanted to increase their efficiency in the Mediterranean (Gönlübol, 1996).

### **1.3.The Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War**

Turkey declared neutrality at the Second World War and cut its economic and diplomatic relations with Germany by 2<sup>nd</sup> August 1944. Before this decision, the US and the UK guaranteed Turkey to become allies. Therefore, it was not very difficult for

Turkey to break off its relations with Germany. Another factor in Turkey's decision was the Soviet Union expansionist policy. The aim of the Soviet Union was to maintain its influence both in the Balkans, Straits region and the Caucasia. Due to its geostrategic position, Turkey always had an important place and wanted to balance the situation by taking part in Western Bloc against the Soviet Union in order to be effective in the region. The UK aimed to attract Turkey to its side since the danger of Soviet Union in the Middle East after the Second World War. However, the UK Prime Minister Churchill was disturbed by the unwilling behaviours of the Turkish politicians to the war. During a meeting with Stalin in October 1944, Churchill, in order to give a message to Turkey, stated that the Montreux Convention might change (Göktepe & Seydi, 2015, p. 199). This situation was interpreted as a sign that Turkey might be alone against the Soviet Union. The UK's behaviour was influential in Turkey's moves. Afterwards, Turkey chose to remain silent on many issues concerning its own issues. One of these issues was the future of the Dodecanese Islands and Meis Island. Turkey did not go into any serious attempt to get those islands back. In other respects, Greece felt the comfort of receiving a guarantee from the UK that these islands would be given to them in the first years of the Second World War. Especially the status of Meis Island was interestingly given to Greece that showed that the UK was quite influential in the policy decisions of Turkey. Although almost all countries agreed for the Island of Meis to remain in Turkey, the UK wanted the island to remain in the Greeks, as Turkey did not enter the Second World War (Göktepe & Seydi, 2015, p. 199).

Towards the end of the Second World War, after it became clear that the Allies would now win the war, the winning and losing countries looked at the agreement to be made. The decisions to be taken in Turkey have caused great concern. Existence of threat of Soviet Union and distrustful attitudes of the UK left Turkey in a difficult situation. When the US, the UK and the Soviet Union convened in Yalta from 4<sup>th</sup> to 11<sup>th</sup> February 1945 for the post-war reconstruction of Europe, the talks between Churchill and Stalin about Turkey caused a deep anxiety for Turkey. Turkey had not fulfilled the demands of UK about entering into the war. Especially when the UK Minister of Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden proposed to give assurance to Turkey that they would not attempt to cause issues with Turkey before heading to the Yalta Conference, Churchill's response was harsh. Churchill said that *"I tried to convince Turkey to take*

*steps in the last two years in the right direction, but they refused, I would not want them to get on the train at the last moment”* (Göktepe & Seydi, 2015, p. 199). However, this was Churchill’s emotional reaction. When Britain’s interests in the Mediterranean are considered, Turkey had always been a very important state. The Foreign Secretary Eden persuaded Churchill, who reacted emotionally, to change his decision about Turkey.

The most important decision on the founding member states of the UN was taken at the Yalta Conference. In order for a country to become a founding member, it had to declare war on Japan and Germany until 1<sup>st</sup> March 1945 (Oran, 2013, p. 472). Therefore, Turkey cut its diplomatic relations with Japan six days before the Yalta conference to join as a founding member to the UN conference. In addition, after Yalta Conference, Turkey had declared war against Germany and Japan on 23<sup>rd</sup> February 1945 (Oran, 2013, p. 472). However, this decision was symbolic in terms of UN membership and did not contribute to Turkey's security.

Turkey could not get the outcome it hoped at the Yalta Conference. The lack of support expected mainly from the UK was also disappointing for Turkey. On the one hand, the increasing economic problems in Turkey, despite not entering the Second World War, and on the other hand, the Soviet Union request for amending the Montreux Convention put the Turkey in a difficult position (Göktepe & Seydi, 2015, p. 200).

Turkey’s declaration of war on Germany and Japan to enter the UN was not welcomed by the Soviet Union. After this attempt, the Soviet Union Minister for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov invited Turkey’s Ambassador Selim Sarper to his room on 19<sup>th</sup> March 1945 and said that the Neutrality and Non-Aggression Agreement signed with the Soviet Union on 17<sup>th</sup> December 1925 would not be extended. Molotov sent a note declaring the termination of this agreement in accordance with the provisions of the protocol dated 7<sup>th</sup> November 1935 due to the developments brought by the conjuncture of the Second World War (Hale, 2013, p. 80). As the justification for this note, Molotov showed the international changes that took place after the Second World War (Küçükvatan, 2011). Turkey asked for a solution from the Soviet Union and suggested a new agreement. Molotov did not intend to make a new agreement, and when he met with Sarper, their demands from Turkey were not different and he asked the following:

- 1) Amending the Montreux Convention regarding the regime of the Straits in favor of the Soviet Union and giving a military base to the Soviet Union in the Straits.
- 2) Claiming that during the First World War around one and half million Armenians were exiled from Turkey and requested them to be returned to their homelands and giving Kars and Ardahan that he claimed they belong to Soviet Union Armenia (Göktepe & Seydi, 2015, p. 200).

İnönü's response to Soviet Union requests was harsh, stating that *"We have no obligation to hand over the Turkish territory or the rights of Turkey to anyone (...) We live with our honor and die with our honor."* (Oran, 2013). The attitude of the Soviet Union to Turkey caused serious concerns for the US and the UK Foreign Office. The main objective of the Soviet Union was to push Turkey towards isolation by breaking its ties with the West and boost its activities in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The US and the UK seemed to understand the importance of Turkey's territorial integrity better but did not exhibit a strong reaction in the face of intense pressure from Moscow to Ankara (Göktepe & Seydi, 2015).

#### **1.4. Truman Doctrine and its Impact on Turkish Foreign Policy**

After the Second World War, Turkey tried to take a part in the Liberal Bloc (at the US side). The ongoing westernization policy that started during the Tanzimat Reform period was a reason for taking part in the Western camp. However, after the Second World War, the targeted West was the US instead of Europe and developing relations with the US became one of the most important policies. Turkey also became a country to be given more importance for the US after the Second World War. The first indicator was that in March 1946, Turkey's Ambassador to Washington, Münir Ertegün's funeral was sent to Turkey with the largest armored battleship Missouri (Oran, 2013). The arrival of a battleship named Missouri to Istanbul was a message given to the Soviet Union as well. The President İnönü and the Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu visited the ship that was at the Istanbul port until 9<sup>th</sup> April 1946 (Akalın, 2003, p. 6). It was also a message that in case of a possible Soviet Union attack, Turkey was not alone or it was understood by Turkey in that way. The quote from the famous American journalist Walter Lippman in Cumhuriyet newspaper also confirms İnönü's view: *"Missouri*

*means recognition of US as an independent power, not an auxiliary state in the Mediterranean. Stalin must understand this” (Akalin, 2003, p. 4)*

Similarly, US President Truman emphasized that the Middle East and the Straits are very significant for US in terms of its economic interests. Truman also emphasized that the US could help to the countries, including Turkey in this region in case of any attacks coming from the Soviet Union (Oran, 2013).

The US understood better the Soviet Union policy on Turkey as of 1946. In fact, this was a situation related to the implementation of bipolar system to be formed in the future rather than the developments seen in Turkey. In addition to the influence of the Soviet Union on Eastern Europe, the Soviet Unions’ support for the Greek civil war where the communists were effective, caused the US to be more interested in the Mediterranean countries. The US public also believed that Communism was a serious threat to the US interests. The US wanted to fill the gap created by the UK’s inability to deal with the region due to its economic difficulties (Göktepe & Seydi, 2015).

The US started to see the Soviet Union as a threat to its own interests and to the world as of 1947. The Soviet Union was seen as the “*Red Danger*” in the public, and for the first time it was said in the speech of President Truman at the Congress that the world was now turning into a bipolar system (Oran, 2013, p. 528). In the doctrine, to be later referred as the “*Truman Doctrine*”, Truman emphasized that Greece had a demand for financial aid and therefore this aid was necessary for them to have a free Greece. Truman also said that Turkey was as important as Greece (Oran, 2013, p. 529).

After Greece, Turkey also demanded financial aid not only from the US but also from the UK to realize the modernization it needed and to ensure national unity. However, the UK could not provide the financial aid to Turkey since the difficult financial situation it was in. The only remaining option was the US who attended the Congress to discuss the situation about Turkey. Truman believed Turkey was an important partner and a US ally and tried to convince the Congress for the necessity of financial aid to Turkey (Armaoğlu, 1996). In this context, \$400 million military aid was requested for Turkey and Greece as Truman thought that any possible conflict in Turkey and Greece might spread to the Middle East and harm the interests of the US. These issues were discussed at the Congress, and the Congress accepted to provide 300

million dollars of military aid to Greece and 100 million dollars of military aid to Turkey on 22<sup>nd</sup> May 1946 (Hale, 2013). As an outcome of these developments, the debates about the status of the Straits ended with the note given by Turkey to the Soviet Union on 18<sup>th</sup> October 1946 (Göktepe & Seydi, 2015, p. 203). After the Truman aid, the US started to have a word on the Turkish foreign policy. After US's goods entered the Turkish market, this caused the US culture to dominate in Turkey. American lifestyle started to be effective in Turkey as well with the Truman aid. The public considered it a privilege to use US's goods, started to watch US movies, and even children started to read US's comic book heroes at an early age (Oran, 2013, p. 537).

In conclusion, when the US started to be more effective in the Middle East, Turkey developed its relations with the US as a new ally. Turkey wanted to make use of Truman aid to solve its economic problems. The Soviet Union's efforts to spread its ideologies around the world and Turkey's feeling of threat from the Soviet Union had negatively affected Turkey's foreign policy. In such an environment, Turkey preferred the Western axis. In this context, Turkey did not find the opportunity to deal with African countries in the early years of the Cold War period. However, in the future, the relations would begin with the independence of African countries.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **2. TURKISH-AFRICAN RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR: PRE AND AFTER CYPRUS ISSUE**

#### **2.1. Turkish-African Relations Until the Cyprus Issue**

The changes in the international system after the Second World War showed that the European colonialist powers could no longer maintain colonialist actions in Africa. With the economic crisis faced by the colonialist states after the Second World War, they focused on internal issues which encouraged African nations for independence. While the influence of imperialist states like France and the UK gradually weakened in Africa, a competition was formed in the direction brought by the international system dominated by the US and the Soviet Union (Brzezinski, 2005, p. 126).

Soviet Union policy towards Africa was targeting expansionism in the economic, political and military fields, while the US policy towards Africa was to halt the Soviet Union's gain of foothold in the continent and to narrow the influence of Moscow. This situation caused the two superpowers to trigger conflicts in the continent, there are many examples of such kind of conflicts: the wars in Angola and Mozambique, the transformation of efforts to establish political and social balance in South of Africa, and the national independence wars of Eritrea (Hazar, 2016).

Having found itself under the Soviet Union threat after the Second World War, Turkey, adopted a policy of alliance with the West as a guarantee of its security. In this respect, Turkey preferred to move with the Western alliance in the decolonization process by clearly refraining from providing support to the independence of African countries (Hazar, 2016). However, in the following years after the Cyprus Issue Turkey changed its foreign policy and Turkey was the first countries to recognize the independence of African countries.

## **2.2. The Attitude of Turkey against African Countries at the UN and Other Platforms Before Cyprus Issue**

The attitude of Turkey about the independence of African countries, especially North African ones, in the early 1950s caused many discussions. At the UN General Assembly, Turkey voted for postponing Morocco's independence in 1951 and 1953. Similarly, in 1952, while negotiating the independence of Tunisia, Turkey considered it as a matter between France and Tunisia. In the Suez Crisis that emerged as an outcome of the attempt of the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956, Turkey sided with the UK and France, a move that caused Turkey's relations with Egypt to decline. As for Angola among sub-Saharan countries, Turkey preferred to act with "*NATO allies*". Considering free elections in Rwanda and Burundi, as well as regarding the independence of Mauritania, Turkey tried to prevent any damage to its relations with France by using abstention votes (Türkkaya, 1975).

On the occasion of condemning the racist oppression of minorities in South Africa, Turkey voted in favor since the general environment dictated so. However, according to the permanent representative of Turkey at the UN, granting independence and national sovereignty as well as the provisions regarding free elections in South Africa were found to be "*excessive*" by the Turkish side (Tepeciklioğlu, 2012) .

During the 1950s and 1960s, Mahmut Dikerdem, one of the prominent ambassadors representing Turkey in African countries, expressed that the Turkish government officials were not aware of the resulting independence movements in Africa after the Second World War, and even government officials thought that the only change was the change of the sovereignty of these colonies among the Western states. As stated by Dikerdem, the instructions given to the Turkish Foreign Affairs during this period were to use the same vote as the US in the sessions held at the UN regarding the future of African countries, and to be on the same side with France when the Algerian issue came to the agenda (Dikerdem, 1977, p. 66). According to Dikerdem, any opposite view could not be dominant among the senior officials, given the fact that Adnan Menderes and his government were so dependent on foreign aid.

Turkish foreign policy in this period caused tense relations with many African countries, especially with North African countries. As a result, the relations with

countries in the continent did not improve until the Cyprus Issue. The principal reason was that Turkey refrained from supporting the independence struggle of these countries. In addition, Turkey's pro-Western statements at the Bandung Conference in 1955 negatively affected its relations with African countries (Tepeciklioğlu, 2012, p. 68). This conduct of policy would impact Turkish interests in the years to come. Especially on the Cyprus Issue, Turkey could not get the international support it desired.

### **2.3.The Impact of Bandung Conference to Turkish Foreign Policy**

Newly independent Third World states wanted to join neither the Eastern nor the Western Bloc. The newly independent African and Asian countries thought that, by uniting their power as the third one, they could better preserve their independence and achieve a balance between the two blocs. In light of this, they came up with the idea of a conference that was first proposed by Indonesian Prime Minister Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo. Before the actual conference, a preliminary meeting was held in Colombo, the capital of Ceylon, on 28<sup>th</sup> April 1954 (Murat, 2018). All African and Asian countries that gained their independence attended the conference, and the agenda was determined. This comprehensive conference was going to be organized by the “*Non-Aligned*” or the “*Asia-Africa Bloc*” that emerged as a new grouping in international politics.

The Bandung Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia, from 18<sup>th</sup> to 24<sup>th</sup> April 1955. The conference resulted from Indonesia's efforts, a country that gained its independence in 1949 as an outcome of independence struggle after 1945, before that it was a colony of the Netherlands (Armaoğlu, 1996). The city of Bandung, founded at the skirts of a mountain in Indonesia, hosted one of the most important conferences ever held in Asia. Approximately 1500 delegates representing 29 states<sup>1</sup> attended the Bandung Conference that convened to ensure unity and solidarity of the newly independent African and Asian countries against two great nuclear powers (Armaoğlu,

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<sup>1</sup> Kingdom of Afghanistan, Union of Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Dominion of Ceylon, People's Republic of China, Cyprus, Republic of Egypt, Ethiopian Empire, Gold Coast, Republic of India, Republic of Indonesia, Imperial State of Iran, Kingdom of Iraq, Japan, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Kingdom of Laos, Lebanese Republic, Liberia, Kingdom of Libya, Kingdom of Nepal, Dominion of Pakistan, Republic of the Philippines, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Syrian Republic, Sudan, Kingdom of Thailand, Republic of Turkey, State of Vietnam (South), Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North), Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen.

1996). Another purpose of the conference was to take measures to increase goodwill and cooperation between Asian and African states, to examine the common economic and social issues of these states, as well as to discuss the problems of national domination, racism and colonialism. Political, economic, and social issues regarding approximately 1.400.000 people living in Asia and Africa were discussed at the conference (Dursun, 2020). Representatives of communist states such as Red China and North Vietnam also attended the conference. Among the states that opposed the bloc structure or did not want to enter any bloc and that were present at the Conference were India, Burma, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq attended the conference as countries representing the Western world. Nationalist China, South Korea, and Israel were not invited to the conference (Murat, 2018, p. 368).

### **2.3.1. Declaration of Egypt in the Bandung Conference**

At the Bandung Conference, Turkey tried to persuade the Asian-African countries to side with the Western Bloc against the Soviet Union threat. A group formed by countries such as Egypt and China, argued that neutrality should be kept equidistant from both blocs. The declaration of Egypt on this subject had a great impact. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser avoided the struggle between East and West in his speech and focused on the issues of Palestine, North Africa and South Africa. Nasser, a prominent figure of Arab nationalism, did not mention Communism at this conference, and invited the African-Asian countries to unite against colonialism (Murat, 2018). Nasser stated that his government respected the UN, but the Palestinian territories were very sensitive for them and the region. He stated that the UN should consider the dignity of Egypt when making decisions about the region. However, he also stated that these lands were violated in a way that is contrary to human rights (Cumhuriyet Newspaper, 1955). Nasser especially stated that the policy of Israel should be discussed seriously at this conference, adding that they were also watching with concern the racist regime in South Africa (Murat, 2018, p. 370).

### **2.3.2. Declaration of South Africa in the Bandung Conference**

The South African Prime Minister Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom stated in his speech that Chinese and Indian ideas dominated the Bandung Conference. Similarly, South Africa questioned the interests of Asia in Africa and criticized the African policies of

China and India. Strijdom said that the aim of the Bandung conference was not only to maintain the peace through cooperation between African and Asian countries, but also to save Asian countries from Western imperialists. He claimed that Africa was not that much discussed. He emphasized that only non-Europeanized African countries were invited to the conference as evidence of this situation. Strijdom underlined that such an approach would create a negative situation for the future of African countries (Murat, 2018).

### **2.3.3. Declaration of the Turkish Delegation in the Bandung Conference**

Turkey was among the countries invited to the Bandung Conference. The reason for inviting Turkey was not the foreign policy it followed but the fact that the majority of its land was in Asia and it was accepted as an Asian country. Since the Bandung conference was organized by the neutral Third World countries, Turkey considered itself in the Western Bloc and refused the invitation at first. Turkey believed that adopting a neutral policy was not possible under the conditions of the day. However, after the insistence of the US in March 1955 and despite Ankara's unwillingness to participate in the conference (Tuncer, 2013), Turkey participated in the Bandung Conference at the level of Deputy Prime Minister. Turkey was the only NATO country that participated in the meeting (Dursun, 2020).

The mission of Turkey at the Bandung Conference was to call the neutral Third World countries to side with the US by mentioning the international threat of communism (Dikerdem, 1977). The US was behind this mission. In other words, the Bandung Conference provided an opportunity for the US to convey its message through Turkey. The views of the Democrat Party administration were in the same direction with those of the US.

Turkey undertook a Western mission at the conference and emphasized that African - Asian countries that were out of the two blocs needed to make a choice. Turkey stated that this choice should include a Western oriented policy. Accordingly, Deputy Prime Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu made a proposal to all Third World leaders to cooperate with the US. Zorlu thought that neutrality could not be successful under the conditions of the day. Zorlu stated that Third World countries' membership in an international organization such as NATO was very important for their security

(Tepeciklioğlu, 2012). Zorlu stated that he could not understand why “*Living Together in Peace*”, an important slogan of the Soviet Union for the Non-Aligned Movement was sympathetic to the Third World countries. Zorlu saw this principle as an unlikely goal.

In his speeches delivered in different sessions of the Bandung Conference, the head of the Delegation to Turkey, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu emphasized the “*Threat of Communism*” on African - Asian countries and tried to draw attention to the possible consequences of neutrality in the face of such a danger. He cited the Czechoslovakian state as a negative example of neutrality policy and asked the conference delegates to warn their governments about the dangers of such a “*Politics of Compromise*” (Tepeciklioğlu, 2012). In a similar way, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu emphasized that countries could not fight alone against the Soviet Union threat: “*Freedom, independence and peace are not blessings obtained without any effort, but they are ideals whose realization and defense impose heavy responsibilities on each of us. Failing to realize these truths, tolerating a weak resistance and danger, and hoping the attainment of security is a kind of action that endangers not only those who act like this, but the whole community*”. Zorlu also stated that there was enormous pressure on Turkey applied by the Soviet Union, but Turkey resisted it alone and that self-defense was a natural right that could not be denied and used by persons to protect them, a proposition grounded in the UN Charter.

Zorlu emphasized that the issue of colonialism and racial discrimination should be completely erased from the world, and the primary duty should be to protect the independence gained (Murat, 2018). Turkey saw the Soviet Union as a colonial country. Zorlu tried to make other African-Asian countries accept the view that if they stood at the Soviet Union part, it would have no other meaning than undergoing a new occupation (Tepeciklioğlu, 2012). In addition, he stated that African states should follow a realistic path against the Soviet Union slogan of “*living together in peace*”. Zorlu pointed out the critical role played by NATO in maintaining peace and emphasized that all kinds of weapons must be reduced in order for a real peace to be established (Akşam Newspaper, 1955). Zorlu made a declaration saying that the Bandung Conference ended with great success and international peace could be achieved with disarmament under international control. The outcomes of the Bandung Conference brought about intense discussions. While African and Asian countries were

disturbed by the attitude of Turkey at the conference, Western countries found the performance of Turkey successful.

Following the return of Deputy Prime Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu as an attendee of the conference on behalf of Turkey, there were some debates at the Turkish Parliament about his attendance to the conference. Zorlu explained on 2<sup>nd</sup> February 1956 that participating at the Bandung Conference was the outcome of the insistence of the Allies:

*“We went there at the last minute. This neutralist group had prepared for more than a year. Yes, our allies wanted it very much, they said ‘oh go’. They said it would be bad unless you did not go. What was going to happen, friends? Neutralists say, “Do not use atomic weapons”. Conventional classical weapons would be used when we did not use it, but it was not used in the war of defense. We hold on to the millions of armies in the hands of the communist world only in terms of atomic weapons thanks to the great power of our friend US. Now in this situation we went there. Were we alone there? No, we had many friends there. There was Iraq, there was Pakistan, there was Iran, there was Lebanon, and there was Sudan. Our friend Ziyad Ebüzziya talks about Islam. Pakistan is the largest Muslim state with a population of nearly 100 million. Iran is there with us; Sudan is a Muslim country, it is also with us ... And as my friend said, we did not defend the explicit ideas there” (Murat, 2018).*

According to Mahmut Dikerdem the Turkish side attended the Bandung Conference to act as the spokesperson of the US and to warn the other countries not to be cheated by “*International Communism*”, and the US clearly asked the Turkish authorities to play this role. Dikerdem stressed that this stance caused Turkey to be labelled as an “*American satellite*” (Dikerdem, 1977). However, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu made the independent countries participating in the conference accept the principle of “*being against all kinds of imperialism*” (Anadolu Agency , 2018). Semih Günver emphasized in his work titled “*Story of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu*” that at the Bandung Conference it was challenging and very successful for Turkey to follow a consistent policy. He stated that Zorlu was the “*Shining star of the meeting*” (Günver, 1985). He stated that Zorlu condemned colonialism at the conference and stated that the Turks were the first nation to oppose colonialism. Similarly, Cemal Fersoy stated in his work “*Devlet ve Hizmet*

*Adamı Fatin Rüştü Zorlu”* that Zorlu’s name was remembered with respect in the capitals from Washington to Jakarta. Likewise, Fersoy stated that the famous French magazine, L’Express, wrote *“While everyone turned their attention to Subandrio at the Bandung conference, where all Asian diplomats gathered and Western undersecretaries followed very closely, Zorlu was the only star of the conference with all its brilliance.”* The Turkish media stated that the principle of *“being against any kind of imperialism”* was underlined by Zorlu for all the independent countries at the conference (Anadolu Agency , 2018).

Foreign policy writers of European newspapers also mentioned Zorlu in their columns and hailed him as the *“Great international political leader”* (Fersoy, 1979). Besides, the newspapers wrote that Zorlu raised Turkey’s prestige at the Bandung Conference, his name was frequently mentioned over the world and led to the strengthening of relations between Europe and Turkey (Ayabakan, 2007).

#### **2.4. The Impact of The Suez Crisis to Turkish Foreign Policy**

Although Egypt was a sovereign state in the 1950s, the control of the Suez Canal was in the Canal Company. Many Western European states, especially UK and France, were procuring oil from the Gulf countries through the Suez Canal. In Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power after the Free Officers’ coup in 1952. Abdel Nasser started to strengthen Egypt in military terms and gain a superior position against Israel. For this reason, he established close relations with the Soviet Union and bought weapons from Czechoslovakia. In addition, Nasser, who wanted to finish the Aswan Dam and ensure the economic development of the country, needed a large amount of financial assistance for them. Although they tried to get loans from the US and UK, these two countries did not provide loans since Egypt bought weapons from the Soviet Union and supported anti-Israel militants. Abdel Nasser, who could not get the desired loan, decided to nationalize the Suez Canal on 26<sup>th</sup> July 1956 to meet the financial needs (Özen & Yeşilyurt, 2018).

Although the Canal Company announced that it would pay the value of its shares to the states that own it, this decision received a huge reaction from UK and France. For these two states, the Suez Canal was very important for the transportation of oil they bought from Gulf States. For this reason, the control of pro-Soviet Union Egypt over the

Suez Canal posed a great danger for Western powers. In addition, the UK and France did not want to transfer their shares to Egypt in the profitable Canal Company. Following this development, about three months later, on 22<sup>nd</sup> October 1956, French, UK and Israeli government officials held secret meetings for three days in Sevres. As an outcome of these negotiations, these three states agreed on a coordinated attack on Egypt with the Sevres Protocol that was concluded on 24<sup>th</sup> October 1956 (Özen & Yeşilyurt, 2018). The Suez Crisis became an international item on the agenda.

#### **2.4.1. Effects of the Suez Crisis on the Relations Between Turkey and Egypt**

Turkish Egyptian relations were not at the desired level even before the Suez crisis. The two countries experienced a diplomatic crisis from time to time. In the Suez Crisis, Turkey supported UK and followed a Western oriented policy during the crisis. For this reason, Turkey received reactions not only from Egypt but also from the other Third World countries. However, before these events, a recent crisis occurred between two countries. Hulusi Fuat Tugay, Ambassador to Cairo, was invited to a dinner where all members of the Revolutionary Council were. During the dinner Tugay openly suggested to the Council members to compromise with the UK. After that, Tugay did not shake his hand with Abdul Nasser from Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council that caused a diplomatic crisis between the two countries (Bardakçı, 2013). In addition, as Tugay's wife was a relative of the Egyptian royal family, the atmosphere got tenser. After the revolution, when the royal family property was expropriated, Tugay's wife criticized Nasser and a dispute broke out between them (Oran, 2009). The official institution of the Egyptian government, "*El Cumhuriyye*" also published an article declaring Tugay "*persona non grata*" (unwanted person) and accused of Turkey following a policy of supporting imperialists and trying to connect Egypt to a bloc, establishing diplomatic and trade relations with Israel (Tepeciklioğlu, 2012). However, Turkey followed a policy to include Egypt in the defense system to be established in the Middle East in 1954. Even though an ambassador was declared as *persona nongrata* for the first time in the history of Turkey, Turkey avoided escalating the crisis. As an outcome, the tension was not continued and a joint declaration was issued by both countries expressing the sorrow mutual felt (Oran, 2009).

Twenty-one countries using the Suez Canal attended the conference organized in London in 1956, Turkey was also invited. In fact, Turkey supported the recommendations titled Dulles Plan. Turkey defended the thesis for the establishment of an international commission for the regulation of the Suez Canal (Bağcı, 2004). While defending that thesis; Turkey thought that it was not an attack on the sovereignty of Egypt. Therefore, Turkey was among the 18 countries defending that the Suez Canal should be under international control. Turkey was not alone in this proposal. Iran, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and US supported this proposal. Disturbed by the attitude of Turkey, Egypt's President Nasser accused Turkey of being the "*Police of Imperialism*" as it was acting in the same direction with Western countries (Tepeciklioğlu, 2012). On another note, Greece took a step that was welcomed with great sympathy in all Non-Aligned Movement countries and especially in Egypt. Regarding the Suez Crisis, Greece received great appreciation from Egypt by not attending the London Conference and for saying that it respects Egypt's national interests. That attitude of Greece was appreciated by Egypt and other Arab countries (Bağcı, 2004). In addition, this attitude of Greece and its attitude for the independence of Arab and African countries provided a great advantage when the Cyprus Issue was brought to the international agenda in the following years.

## **2.5. Cyprus Issue and The Relations Between Turkey and African Countries in 1960s**

### **2.5.1. Cyprus Issue and Its impact to Turkish Foreign Policy**

The Cyprus Issue between Greece and Turkey took international status with the instigation of Greece in the 1950s, when the latter occupied the Turkish foreign policy for a long time. The problem was solved temporarily with the 1960 agreements, but the Greeks did not fully comply with the provisions written in the treaty. The Greek leader Makarios III (Mikhail Khristodolou Mouskos) saw the Republic of Cyprus as a step towards Enosis and started to work in this direction. Therefore, he made provocative activities to fundamentally change the 1960 Agreements (Vatansever, 2012).

The provocations of Makarios were effective in a short time and Greeks carried out terrorist activities in Cyprus Island. In addition, Greek administrators violated the rights of Turks by violating the constitutional rules. Thereupon, the Republic of Turkey

warned the Greeks about constitutional violations since 1961. However, Makarios, who ignored these warnings, announced on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1964 that he unilaterally terminated the 1960 Agreements. This declaration encouraged both the Greeks and their supporters to attack. In addition, the Greek administration and Greece caused the issue to become international (Vatansever, 2012).

Turkey got prepared for an intervention in Cyprus since the agreements were violated. Even the possibility of any intervention strained the relations between Turkey and Greece. In addition, the crisis between the two NATO members Greece and Turkey disturbed US for a war between these two countries could reduce the effect of the US in the Mediterranean area as well as it could lead the Soviet Union to get over the control of the region.

As an indication of US's discomfort about the Cyprus problem, the famous notes known as "*Johnson Letter*" was sent to Turkey in 1964 that warned the latter not to military intervene in Cyprus and left a negative impact on the Turkish foreign policy (Oran, 2009, p. 685). Turkey had to meet the US request and gave up the idea of intervention in Cyprus. In those times it was witnessed once again that the US were, so effective on the Turkish foreign policy. However, since the intense Greek attacks, Turkey resorted to the UN Security Council on 13<sup>th</sup> February 1964. After the application, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü stated in the General Assembly that they wanted this issue to be resolved by the parties, but they applied to the UN since the negotiations were prolonged and no solution was found (Gönlübol, 1974). On the 4<sup>th</sup> of March 1964, the UN Security Council decided to establish a "*UN Peacekeeping Force*" with the approval of the Government of Cyprus and send the peacekeeping force to the island with its resolution no. 186 (Vatansever, 2012).

At the beginning of the 1960s, after the military coup of May 27 in Turkey, the new administration felt discomfort about the policies followed by the independence of the African countries. In particular, the Cyprus issue, Turkey did not get support from US and Europe therefore Turkey began to make changes its foreign policy. The new military administration planned to take new steps towards developing its relations with Middle East and African countries. While developing these plans, the new power evaluated in the former Ottoman Empire countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and

Algeria from the perspective of “*Muslim brotherhood*” (Türkkaya, 1975). However, the relations aimed with the Muslim sensibility conflicted with the national interests of the Turkish foreign policy. In this period, although the members of the National Unity Committee were in favor of supporting nationalist groups in North African countries against France, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not favor confrontation with France, a NATO ally. Therefore, the support of Turkey to Algeria and other North African countries were confidential (Hürriyet , 1999).

After the 1965 elections, the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi - AP) came to power and made a decision to follow a multidimensional foreign policy towards the African countries. In the new era Turkey took some concrete steps to improve its relations with African countries to erase the negative image in the eyes of African countries. Among these, the trade agreement signed between the Turkey and Egypt in 1965, Haluk Bayülken’s visit to Egypt in 1966, Foreign Ministry Secretary General of Justice Party (AP), and the visit of President Cevdet Sunay to Tunisia in the same year were the indicators of the importance attached by Turkey to the region (Şahin & Sarı, 2017).

When comparing Turkey’s image of Sub-Saharan Africa with that of the Northern African countries, the former is seen to be weaker. It can even be said that there was a discrepancy between the declarations and actions of the new power. This can be seen in Turkey’s policies oriented for the South Africa that applied to the racist Apartheid policies in their own country. Turkey followed the same policy with France and UK as an ally with West and avoided supporting South Africa about South Africa’s removal from the International Labor Organization. But later, at the voting decision on condemnation of oppressive rule imposed in the country by the Apartheid regime that was racist and oppressive towards the minorities, Turkey voted in favor following, so the general trend or complying with the added pressure (Tepeciklioğlu, 2012). Nevertheless, Turkey’s Permanent Representative to the UN of the time stated that he found South Africa’s national sovereignty and independence and free elections too much. Turkey did not sign the letter to be sent to the UN Secretary-General for releasing Nelson Mandela who fought for the independence and equality in South Africa and was sentenced for many years, and the UN resolutions condemning racism and inequality in South Africa was only approved in 1967 (Yılmaz M. , 2016).

In the beginning of the 1960s, the years of decolonization in the African continent, Turkey informed the UN that it would recognize the independence of African countries and started diplomatic relations by opening embassies in some African countries. As an attempt to change the foreign policy after the decolonization process in Africa, although Turkey made an expansion plan in 1970, it missed the opportunity to develop political, economic, and commercial relations with Africa permanently. Since the mentioned plan was postponed due to the Cyprus problem that left Turkey in difficulty in its relations with Western allies. In fact, the main reason for the deficiencies in building stronger relations with Africa was the lack of information and strategies of Turkey about what to do in Africa (Karagül & Arslan, 2013).

### **2.5.2. Attitude of Turkey in the Independence Process of Algeria**

Turkey's unsupportive attitude towards the independence of Algeria influenced its relations with African countries. Throughout Algeria's struggle for independence, Turkey was a hope for Algerian nationalists as it had itself fought for independence in the past. In this regard, the African countries expected Turkey to be the most supportive country. However, Turkey avoided giving support or express sympathy to Algeria during its struggle for independence against France. In addition, the country supported the arguments of the French in the declarations of the the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where it stated that the issue was an internal matter of France (Tepeciklioğlu, 2012). One of the reasons behind Turkey's abandonment to Algeria was that it did not want to be in conflict with France, avoiding possible political oppositions with France (Hazar, 2016). Another reason was that Turkey did not consider Algeria as a colony of France but as a province of France. For these reasons, during a meeting held at the UN General Assembly on Algeria's struggle for independence, Turkey abstained from voting along with 30 other countries. Notably, Turkey's votes in other UN meetings were against Algeria even when France was withdrawing (Tepeciklioğlu, 2012). In another voting, Turkey, again, voted for abstention. The attitude and actions of Turkey towards Algeria disturbed many African countries. In this context, Ahmet Davutoğlu declared that the only interest in North Africa after losing it following the Tripoli fight was to support the French colonialists against Algerian Muslims in order to register Turkey's membership of the West (Davutoğlu, 2016). Regardless of this declaration, the retired Ambassador Numan Hazar clarified that Algeria had equal voting in favor and against, and that the

abstention of Turkey cannot be held responsible for the delayed independence of Algeria. Therefore, although Turkey did not support Algeria at the time, its abstention did not have any effects. In addition, in his work titled “*Küreselleşme Sürecinde Türkiye – Afrika İlişkileri*” the retired Ambassador Numan Hazar explains the issue as follows, making use of the UN General Assembly minutes on the issue:

*“The Resolution Draft on the Algeria issue in the UN General Assembly was set for voting on 13<sup>th</sup> December 1958. The Resolution Draft was accepted with 35 votes against 18 votes. 28 countries including Turkey refrained from giving a vote. After the voting, the Chairman of the General Assembly made a declaration that the Resolution Draft could not achieve the required 2/3 majority and was not accepted in this regard.”* (Hazar, 2016).

The tense relations between Turkey and Algeria during the independence process of Algeria began improving in the next years. Throughout September 1961 to February 1962, Turkey voted in the favour of Algeria at the UN General Assembly on the issue of Algeria’s independence. Following the votes given during this duration, Algeria gained its independence in 1962. Respectively, Turkey opened an embassy in Algeria in 1963. However, in 1985, President Turgut Özal made an official visit to Algeria when he was a prime minister at the time; he stated that the abstention of Turkey on Algeria’s matter in 1958 at the UN was wrong (Milliyet Newspaper, 1985). The Algerian officials stated that this page was now closed and that they would be pleased with the improvement of relations between the two countries. Besides, confidential aids by Turkey during the period when Algeria was fighting for its independence was an evidence of Turkey’s attitude against colonialism. In the first aid, with the instructions of President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, weapons were sent to Algerian nationalists through Tunisia. In the second aid, Turkey sent communication equipment to Algeria. The information in question later appeared in the press during the visit of President Süleyman Demirel to Algeria in 1999 (Hazar, 2016). Although Turkey was against colonialism, it refrained officially from supporting the African nations fighting for their independence. As a result of its attitude, Turkey was left alone in Cyprus dispute in 1960s.

### **2.5.3. Effects of the Cyprus Issue on Turkey - Africa Relations**

Turkey avoided providing direct support to the newly independent African countries in order not to damage its relations with Western allies. It even waited for the allies to take action in starting diplomatic relations with the countries in the continent. However, when the Cyprus problem occurred during the 1960s, Turkey needed an international support; especially the support of the African countries that gained their independence recently. Any positive vote from these countries on the Cyprus problem was critical to form an important quorum at the UN (Tepeciklioğlu, 2012, p. 73). Therefore, Turkey's orientation for Africa was necessary for foreign policy. Nevertheless, the negligence of Turkey towards African countries in the past years and its attitude at the Bandung conference in 1955 resulted in the lack of support of these countries to Turkey. The majority of the African countries supported the Greek and Makarios at the UN voting on Cyprus Issue. As a consequence, the importance of Turkey's relations with African countries was highlighted; the country revised its policy towards the African countries in the mid-1960s and, finally, commenced an African initiative for the first time in 1965 (Firat, 2009, p. 2).

### **2.5.4. Sending Goodwill Delegations to Africa**

After 1964, when the Cyprus problem was presented at the UN General Assembly, Turkey needed to produce new policies for the African states, especially for those that were members of the Non-Alignment movement as they supported the Greek propositions. Hence, in 1965, Turkey formed a goodwill delegation consisting of politicians, diplomats, journalists, and academicians to be sent to various African, Asian, and Latin American regions to explain the Turkish ideas, thesis, and opinions about the Cyprus Issue (Firat, 2009).

Three of the delegations were sent to African countries. The first delegation was sent to the West African countries Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Senegal. The second delegation was directed to the Central African countries Cameroon, Gabon, Democratic Congo, Central African Republic, and Chad. The third delegation was sent to the East African countries Abyssinia, Kenya, Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Malawi, Madagascar, and Sudan. The third delegation additionally visited Libya and Tunisia.

Hasan Esat Işık, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the period, emphasized the importance of these goodwill committees saying that:

*“I would like to make it clear that three of the 7 goodwill delegations that we sent to various countries of the Third World went to Africa, and as an outcome of the regional division between them, care was taken not to leave any African country they did not come into contact with. The duty of the goodwill committees is not only limited to the Cyprus Issue, but also to act positively to enhance the sincere and close relations in our cooperation with the young countries of Africa. We hope that these constructive activities that we expect from the goodwill delegations will affect the good relations we maintain with the Asian and Latin American countries in the same direction. Likewise, we strive to be represented in as many countries in these two continents by increasing the number of countries that our current representation offices as in Africa.” (Yılmaz M. , 2016).*

The negotiations of goodwill delegations did not bring success in the short run. In 1965, on the Cyprus Issue voting at the UN General Assembly, the African countries did not withdraw their support from Makarios, one of the important names of the Non-Aligned movement. In the history of the Turkish foreign policy, when this sole initiative towards Africa was unsuccessful, the relations with Sub-Saharan Africa remained limited (Firat, 2009). During this period, although the problems or international demands of the African countries could not be resolved, if Turkey had adopted a neutral policy like Greece did with the African countries, the former’s relations, especially with sub-Saharan African countries, could have been better. However, as a result of the goodwill delegations, Turkey started to be more actively interested in the problems of Africa. Having improved its actions towards Africa, Turkey set in motion the following attempts and efforts:

- Turkey headed the UN Council of Namibia created under the auspices of the UN and was the acting chairman in its operations (Hazar, 2016). In the framework of Namibia Council operations, Turkey supported the process of Namibia’s independence and provided financial aid.
- Turkey signed the report drafted in the favor of Mozambique under the control of Portugal.

- Turkey provided indirect support to Eritrea to gain its independence.
- Turkey provided a large amount of medicines to combat the diseases in Zimbabwe.
- Turkey also provided weapons and communication material to pro-independence groups in Algeria through Tunisia (Hazar, 2016).

Following these attempts, it can be claimed that Turkey started to exist concretely in the region. However, in the early 1970s, the Cyprus crisis came back on the agenda. At this period, Turkey set a military intervention in Cyprus. Consequently, the US clearly opposed and implemented an arms embargo on Turkey. At this difficult time, the relief for Turkey came from Libya, a North African country. The Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi provided US-made weapons and aircraft to Turkey in addition to exporting oil and natural gas to the country below market value (Gül, 2011).

## **2.6. Turkish Aid to Africa After the Cyprus Issue**

Throughout different developments and various political operations in the world, UK's plans to establish dominance in Cyprus and Greece's efforts to make the island its own territory was an indispensable subject of the world's agenda. Turkey could not remain silent for Cyprus where thousands of Turks lived, but the US constant interference in the Turkish foreign policy restricted Turkey's field of operation. As a result, Turkey sought for support in its favor on the island. Turkey realized that the African continent was important not only in terms of its potential resources and material wealth but there were also other politically serious international issues. It is important to note that Turkey provided occasional assistance to some of the African countries in this period; some of which were the UN's body and others were implicit supports. However, the aid and support provided were neither evident enough nor frequently brought to the agenda.

In the African policies of Turkey, the aids had an important share. In the African continent that had a lot of economic troubles, the intensive workflow of the Turkish government institutions and civil society organizations had an important effect. During natural disasters, Turkey provided food and financial aid to various countries through Red Crescent. After the recent civil war in the 1970s, Turkey shipped medications, blankets, and medical supplies to Zimbabwe. To date, this aid is still acknowledged by the leaders of the country (Hazar, 2016).

Additionally, Turkey contributed to the relevant UN organizations, particularly the UNDP for the implementation of technical assistance programs carried out in the framework of developing countries. These programs were directed by the State Planning Organization. Short-term study tours, meetings, seminars, and training opportunities in the fields of agriculture, health, industry, small and medium-sized enterprises were provided to African experts participating in the program. As a consequence, the provided technical assistance contributed to the recognition of Turkey by the African countries (Hazar, 2016).

In 1984, Turkey provided \$10 million within the framework of the Islamic Conference Organization, a fund that aimed assistance to the Sahel countries. These countries form the lower belt of the Sahara Desert extending from Senegal to Ethiopia and are affected by droughts (Hazar, 2016). Turkey's aid program started with food and medicines sent to Somalia. Later, with the continuation of this project in the form of technical assistance, it was decided that it would further be coordinated by the State Planning Organization. The Development Bank of Turkey was appointed as the implementing agency.

After visiting the countries, namely Guinea, Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Mali, Sudan, Chad and Niger, a foundry was built in Gambia, an irrigation facility in Senegal and a hospital in Sudan. These aids were, again, coordinated by the State Planning Organization. In addition, 368 people from 42 countries participated in the Group Training Programs organized under the coordination of the State Planning Organization within the scope of technical assistance. Experts were also sent from Turkey to provide training in several fields (Hazar, 2016, p. 238).

In 1979, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gündüz Ökçün, made immense efforts to get closer to the countries in the Non-Alignment Movement. As an outcome of these attempts, Turkey supported Mozambique during its fight against Portugal for independence, in addition to supporting the Eritrea and the Muslim Moro side in the African horn (İncesu, 2020). As a consequent, Turkey became the first head of the UN Council for Namibia that was in the status of South Africa's colonial and provided significant financial contributions here. Additionally, Turkey supported the national liberation struggle, donating 300,000 dollars to each of the organizations of ZANU and

ZAPU that were fighting against the white minority rule in Rhodesia that was to be named Zimbabwe after gaining independence. However, as Baskın Oran said, financial aid became meaningless as it was distributed to many African countries. Moreover, following their independence, serious political relations could not be established with most African countries, and the aid to Eritrea led to the alienation of Ethiopia that had an ethnic, political, and cultural union. As an outcome of the foreign policy pursued by Turkey for African countries, the relations with these countries remained at a certain level until the 2000s. Nevertheless, Turkey's strategic, political, and economic indifference to the continent shaped its foreign policy and ensured a new dimension to be adopted (Oran, 2009). Notably, under the leadership of Turgut Özal, Turkey gave priority to the Middle East and did not ignore the importance of Africa. Later, Turkey undersigned agreements that would lead to common economic developments with African countries.

## **2.7. Relations Between Turkey and African Countries After Cyrus Issue**

In the 1980s, the leadership of Turgut Özal brought Turkey to a new era where it started to adopt an economy-oriented eclectic approach instead of a static foreign policy approach. In this context, Turkey established close relations with both Western and Islamic countries (Zenginoğlu, 2018, p. 485). After this period, Turkey accelerated its efforts to improve its relations with Africa. For example, in January 1982, the Sudanese President Mohamed Nimeyr visited Turkey and, in the same year, Somalia Economic and Technical Cooperation Treaty (TET) was signed, and the African Studies Graduate Program was established at Gazi University in Ankara, Turkey (Alkaly, 2016, p. 40).

During Turkey's attempts to strengthen economic relations, Turgut Özal regime started to implement the aid program issued on 5 June 1985 to foreign countries, mainly oriented for the Sub-Saharan African countries under the scope of the Assistance Act No. 9573. Therefore, Turgut Özal became the first Turkish Prime Minister to give foreign aid to Africa in 1985 (Njuafac, 2016). This attempt helped change the negative opinions of some Turkish economic experts who thought that economic partnership with Africa was a waste of time, resources, and energy. The economic steps initiated by Özal towards the African continent paved the way for the adoption of the 1998 Africa Action Plan and the declaration of 2005 as the year of Africa.

For many years, the debated Turkey-Algeria relations started to improve with the Prime Minister Turgut Özal's visit to Algeria in 1985. During a visit, Prime Minister Turgut Özal apologized to the country on behalf of Turkey's negative stance against Algeria that was exhibited in the UN (Bayram, 2014). Another visit to Algeria at the Presidency level in 1988 prepared the ground for the strengthening of relations between the two countries.

The revisionist character of the Turkish foreign policy in the Özal period was evident mainly throughout 1987 to 1993. However, the approach named "*Neo-Ottomanism*" constituted an area that includes North Africa for Turkey. Since the theoretical framework of this approach was not well prepared, it remained a difficult goal to be achieved (Bayram, 2014).

#### **2.7.1. Sending Turkish Soldiers to Somalia**

During an unresting period in Somalia following the breakdown of Mohammed Siad Barre regime in 1991 that had come to the rule in 1969, the tribes in the region incited conflict for the purposes of gaining power. This situation resulted in the loss of many lives, migration, and inability to deal with agriculture. After the breakdown of the Siad Barre regime, political authority could not be re-established for a long time due to conflicts between the tribes in Somalia. On the other hand, several armed groups united by ethnic tribal identities quickly filled this gap and established their own regional authorities. The lack of state authority left people alone with their fate, and the country became vulnerable to crises. The division of the United Somali Congress in Mogadishu that rebelled against Barre further increased the conflict. The country that witnessed the mutual conflict between Muhamed Farah Aided and the armed groups under the administration of Ali Mahdi Muhamed gradually drifted away from stability (Orakçı, 2018). When drought further accompanied the conflict situation within the same period, Somalia experienced one of the most serious famines in the history. The country came to the brink of a great disaster; thousands of people lost their lives due to famine and various diseases. While it was reported that approximately 300 thousand people lost their lives due to famine, conflicts, and diseases in 1992 alone, more than 450 thousand Somalians died of hunger and diseases in the perceding years (Çam, 2018).

When the humanitarian crisis in Somalia reached terrible levels, international organizations such as the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the African Union, and the UN took necessary actions. Various decisions were made in the UN Security Council; an arms embargo was imposed to prevent conflicts in the country and calls were made for humanitarian aid.

As the tragedy in Somalia progressed, it put the UN under pressure to intervene in the country; the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)-I Peace Force was sent to Somalia on 24<sup>th</sup> April 1992 with the UN resolution no 751. The mission of UNOSOM-I that was assigned for observing the ceasefire process between the conflicting groups in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, also performed some humanitarian duties. With the resolution no 775 issued in the same year, the task of ensuring the safety of food convoys and food distribution centers was also added to the mission of UNOSOM (Orakçı, 2018). However, in Somalia, the situation got worse. For this reason, it was decided to establish Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the coalition power led by the USA, in the context of the resolution no. 794 made on 3<sup>rd</sup> December 1992. As an outcome of this decision, a large military group consisting of 36,000 soldiers, mostly US people, was sent to Somalia. The UNITAF had the duty to ensure security in Somalia and then transfer this duty to UNOSOM. This military operation called “*Return of Hope Operation*” with a cost of \$1.5 billion annually was the largest operation in the history of the UN (Orakçı, 2018).

#### **2.7.1.1. Turkey’s Participation in the UN Operations in Somalia**

Turkey had first participated in the Somalia disaster with the establishment of UNITAF. During this period, the UN asked Turkey to be actively involved in this task. Turkey dealt with more strategic moves towards Africa, and after the intervention of the US in Somalia to ensure peace in the country, it started to be involved in the military and civilian actions formed at the UN level. Turgut Özal who wished to improve Turkey’s relations with Africa ordered the Turkish Armed Forces to participate in UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II military troops of the UN Security Council on 28<sup>th</sup> August 1992 to resolve the internal chaos that had occurred in the country (Koçer, 2006, p. 51). In accordance with the resolution no. 794 of the UN Security Council, Turkey took part in the humanitarian and peace-keeping operations under the name of Unified

Task Force-UNITAF from 2<sup>nd</sup> January 1993 to 22<sup>nd</sup> February 1994 with a mobile unit (TAF, 2020).

Complying with the demands of the UN, Turkey allocated a troop for Somalia operation to the UN. On 9<sup>th</sup> December 1992, 10 days after the US soldiers landed in Mogadishu, the TCG Derya logistics ship and TCG Ertuğrul ship accompanied by the TCG Fatih frigate moved from Mersin Port to Somalia (Orakçı, 2018). Upon arriving to Somalia after a journey of 15-days, the Turkish soldiers undertook the task of protecting Mogadishu Airport. With the reorganization of the UNITAF operation as UNOSOM II, a Turkish lieutenant general commanded the peacekeeping force throughout 4<sup>th</sup> May 1993 to 18<sup>th</sup> January 1994. This army was led by Çevik Bir as the army commander from April 1993 to January 1994 (Sheehy, 1993). With this event, the Turkish soldiers were assigned outside Turkey for the second time after the Korean War.

The participation of Turkey in Somalia's events at a commander level under the UN showed important developments in terms of future planning related to Africa, since its relations with the African region were not yet as desired. The events of the poor Muslim country Somalia raised awareness on the importance of diplomatic and bureaucratic relations with African continent and Sub-Saharan Africa. General Çevik Bir, who was the commander of the peacekeeping force established as UNOSOM II emphasized on his duty in Somalia in his book titled *"Somali'ye bir Umut"* saying that *"It helped to gain great experience and international reputation that cannot be measured with money at every level of our state"* (Bir, 1999).

Turkey-Africa relations were slightly progressed in the 1990s. During this period, several official visits were made between African countries and Turkey. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cameroon Jacques Roger Boone visited Turkey in 1991. The President of Turkey Özal paid the visit back to Cameroon in 1993 during which he had also stopped by Senegal. In 1996, Kenyan President Daniel Moi took important steps in accomplishing mutual visits to Turkey (Alkaly, 2016). During this period, the visit of the Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to Nigeria for the D-8 structuring in 1996 was the highest-level visit between the countries after the independence of Nigeria (Toprak, 2019). This visit was one of the first steps of a new era for Turkey-Nigeria relations. Erbakan's visit to Nigeria proved to be one of the most rewarding visits of a Turkish

Prime Minister to a sub-Saharan African country. The success of the conservative Erbakan in persuading one of the most important countries in Africa, such as Nigeria, to join the D-8 in a short time with his visit provided signs to the Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy about opportunities in Africa and the possibility of finding new and strong allies there. As a consequence, these developments laid the basis for the “*Africa Action Plan*” that Ismail Cem had put into operation when he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1998.



## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **3. BEGINNING OF TURKEY-AFRICA RELATIONS: AN ARCHIVAL RESEARCH**

After the Second World War, the Third World countries gained their independence, and the colonial order throughout the world started to disappear gradually. The independence wars were against colonial movement, and the movements of African countries opened doors for future developments. It is also thought that Turkey had to contribute to the African countries to gain their independence indirectly.

Turkey-Africa relations begin in the 1950s. Following the decolonization process, especially after gaining independence, Turkey immediately recognized the African countries and began to establish diplomatic relations. Since the period of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey was merely interested in African countries, especially North Africa. Connections were established not only with North African countries but also with South Africa during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit. The Ottoman Empire collapsed in the First World War that broke out in the first quarter of the 1900s, and Turkey began fighting against the imperialist countries under existential struggle. The Republic of Turkey was founded after the War of Independence. After this process, except for a few countries, diplomatic relations between African countries and Turkey could not be established until the 1950s. However, Turkey was in contact with North Africa during the period of the Republic; while in Sub-Saharan Africa, diplomatic relations could only be established with Ethiopia. In 1912, the relations started with the consulate set by the Ottoman Empire in the city of Harar in Ethiopia, followed by the establishment of the first resident embassy in Adis Ababa in 1926 (MFA) during the Republican period. In 1933, Ethiopia also opened an embassy in Turkey; however, it had to be closed in 1984 by the Communist administration of Ethiopia but was later reopened on 21 April 2006.

Although Turkey was a NATO member and an ally of Western side during the Cold War and the Soviet Union threat, it looked at Africa from a Western perspective and provided the liberty movements in Africa in the background. The First İnönü Government of Turkey that came to power at the beginning of the 1960s informed the UN that Turkey would recognize the independence of the African countries and

establish permanent embassies. The Justice Party that came to power later opened embassies in countries that gained their independence in Africa and took the first steps of diplomatic relations by making high-level visits (Şengül, 2015).

Turkey joined the international organization established along the African and Asian countries and played a leading role. Notably, in 1961, Turkey was also a part of a meeting that was held in New Delhi on the Organization of African and Asian Rural Development, where Turkey played an active and constructive role in the formation of the organization. The Organization was recognized by the UN Institutions and supported by the FAO. The organization aimed to cooperate with the member states and other relevant organizations to handle technical aspects of the development of the villages and rural areas of the region in the the member states. It also aimed to ensure that the member states are offered with all kinds of assistance and cooperation of the UN, FAO, and other organizations. Although Membership to this organization required the country to be of African or Asian origin, Turkey was declared to be a member with the General Assembly resolution as it had attended the first meeting among the founding countries (AARDO, 2020).

Turkey played an active role in the organization of Africa and the Asian Rural Development Organization and gained the sympathy of the member states. In addition, Turkey's own development policies for rural areas were followed by the member states of this organization. Turkey's rural policies became an inspiration for the rural development projects in the African and Asian countries. In view of the African-Asian Rural Development Organization, the Secretary General Ckrishan Chandda inspected rural development activities in Turkey and argued about the issue of being a member of the organization; he visited Ankara three times throughout 1965-1967 and made interviews with relevant ministries in Turkey to receive information about the studies (DSA:030.18.01.02.186.32.9)

### **3.1. ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES**

#### **3.1.1. Turkey-Libya Relations and the Relevant Agreements**

Libya was one of the most important countries of Africa and the Middle East due to its geopolitics and underground treasure. Fighting for independence after the Second World War, Libya signed a Peace Treaty with Italy that was experiencing a great economic collapse. As per Article 23 of the Peace Treaty signed with Italy on 10<sup>th</sup> February 1947, Italy accepted that it gave up all its legal rights to Africa. Although this was an important step for Libya's independence, Libya did not gain independence immediately after this treaty. According to Article 3 of the respective peace treaty, Libya was targeted to be ruled by the US, France, UK, and Soviet Union (Russia) for a year. However, since these four states could not make a joint decision regarding Libya, the case of Libya went to the UN. Libya found a suitable opportunity for its independence and sought help from the independent countries in the UN. On 11<sup>th</sup> May 1949, a telegram signed by Libya Independence National Council President Mansour Kaddarato was sent to the Turkish President İsmet İnönü at the UN Headquarters in New York, seeking support for Libya's integrity and independence (DSA:030.10.00.267.800.19).

Turkey considered the request and responded positively. Turkey supported Libya at the General Assembly although the support was indirect. According to the decision taken in the General Assembly on 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1949, the UN decided for Libya to become an independent state by January (DSA:030.18.01.02.127.100.8). Following this decision, Libya declared its independence on 24<sup>th</sup> December 1951, and was later recognized by many states, especially Britain, US, and Italy. After Libya's independence, Turkey sent a telegram congratulating Libya's King and the prime minister and started diplomatic relations with the country (DSA:030.18.01.02.127.100.8). In 1954, the relations were developed at ambassadorial level, and an honorary consulate was established in 1955 in Derne, the port city of Libya (DSA:030.18.01.02.141.97.11).

#### **3.1.1.1. First Turkish Origin Prime Minister of Libya**

Although Libya gained independence, it faced issues for many areas. The country faced difficulty in complementing its basic infrastructure deficiencies. In addition, one of the most highlighted issues was the unreadiness and inability of the state bureaucracy to find good administrators. The Libyan President King Sunusi had a meeting with Sadullah Koloğlu, grandson of Ottoman Empire soldiers settled in Libya during Ottoman Empire times, who was a retired governor and held important positions in Turkey. During the meeting, King Sunusi thought that Libya needed experienced administrators and offered Sadullah Koloğlu to be the vice president. The retired governor did not consider the offer at first, but upon the insistence of the Libyan King, Koloğlu informed Turkey about the situation. Turkey responded positively to the request, and Koloğlu became the first Prime Minister of Libya (DSA:030.18.01.02.121.101.20).

Koloğlu served Libya for 3 years as a Prime Minister and contributed to the development of relations between Turkey and Libya. Moreover, in reverence and respect of his duties to the country, a hospital in Benghazi was named after him after his death (Trakyanet, 2009).

#### **3.1.1.2. Friendship Treaty**

Following Libya's independence, the country tried to increase its recognition and prestige. In this context, the King of Libya visited Turkey to develop relations with Turkey. The visit resulted in a friendship treaty that was signed between Turkey and Libya as led by Turkey's Ambassador in Libya, Celal Tevfik, in October 1953 (DSA:030.18.01.02.133.85.18). This treaty also laid the basis for other treaties to be signed. The friendship treaty aimed to improve relations between the two countries, and messages of solidarity were exchanged within the scope of relations.

Turkey supported the development of Libya in every field and provided humanitarian aid at times of natural disasters in the region. Due to the lack of medical staff, Libya requested support from Turkey, and the country sent a 10-person medical team consisting of healthcare providers, doctors, nurses, and technicians. The team worked at a hospital in Libya's Tarhuna Center (DSA:030.18.01.02.234.35.5). In 1954, Libya was in danger by famine as the season was dry and there were constant desert

storms; this prevented people from getting crops that year. Turkey was not indifferent to the events in Libya and sent 2,000 tons of wheat to meet Libya's needs of wheat and barley (DSA:030.18.01.02.136.52.3).

#### **3.1.1.3.Visit of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to Libya**

The relations between Turkey and Libya began during the İsmet İnönü government and progressed during the period of Adnan Menderes. In February 1957, the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes visited Libya in account of the relations between the two countries. Menderes was welcomed with a great ceremony in Tripoli, Benghazi and Cebel al-Ahdar, and had a meeting with the Libyan King Idris Sunusi. Later, Menderes visited the tomb of Turgut Reis in Tripoli, one of the most important Ottoman Empire symbols of Libya. During this visit, Menderes found out that the tomb was worn out and gave instructions for the restoration of the tomb. Turgut Reis tomb was then restored by the General Directorate of Foundations in 1960 (DSA:030.18.01.02.154.90.1). Libyan Prime Minister Mustafa Bin Halim expressed his satisfaction in his speech about the visit of Adnan Menderes. In his declaration, he credited the services of the Ottomans and Turks to Islam and praised the historical leadership of the Turks. Libyan prime minister Ahmed Bin Halim also emphasized that Turkey was the first country to officially visit Libya after its independence (DSA:030.01.00.00.3.19.2.12). Halim also stated that those developments would contribute towards stronger mutual relations.

#### **3.1.1.4.Developments in Education and Culture Between the Two Countries**

Turkey continued its contributions in different developmental areas of the newly independent Libya. In view of the education sector, Libya had a shortage of teachers. In 1954, Turkey sent 10 teachers working in different regions of the country (DSA:30.18.01.02.136.54.12). Additionally, Turkey provided opportunities to Libyan students in different fields. From 1954 to 1958, Turkey provided trainings to 63 Libyan students; 21 of whom were high school students, 8 at university level, 26 at divinity schools, and 8 at military academies. Later, when these students returned to their countries, they served in important positions in Libya. In order to implement student exchange programs in a more systematic way and to improve the existing cooperation between the two countries, a cooperation and culture agreement was signed on 9<sup>th</sup>

February 1959 in Tripoli (DSA:030.18.01.02.645.015.3.205). The agreement, consisting of 6 articles, provided various opportunities to the two countries in the field of education and culture. According to the 2<sup>nd</sup> article of the agreement, it was agreed to exchange experts and teachers through mobility programs aimed at examining the scientific life and education issues of the two countries.

Similarly, in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the agreement, associations were established to develop friendship and brotherly relations between the Turkish and Libyan people based on the expression that *“Opening mutual institutions for the publications of all kinds of culture, science and sports and for the two countries to know each other.”* The first of these associations was the Turkish-Libyan Brotherhood Association established in 1962 in Izmir (DSA:030.18.01.02.165.34.15). The aim of the association was to introduce the history, culture, and geography of the two countries and to organize seminars and conference events for the accomplishment of the aim. In 1975, a Culture and Promotion Agreement was signed between the two countries in Ankara to update these associations and to cooperate in different fields (DSA:030.18.01.02.366.39.4). In addition to this agreement, new associations were established in different cities of Turkey based on Turkey-Libya friendship. For example, in 1977, a second Turkish-Libyan Friendship Association was established in Istanbul (DSA:030.18.01.02.369.78.5). Moreover, the Turkish-Libyan Friendship Brotherhood and Culture Association was established in Ankara in 1978 to carry out international activities. Furthermore, another association was established in Adana for the purpose of developing friendship between Turks and Libyans and strengthening social and cultural relations (DSA:030.18.01.02.371.110.19).

#### **3.1.1.5.Libyan Prime Minister Abdussalam Ahmed Callud’s Visits to Turkey**

The steady relations between Turkey and Libya were further improved with the agreements made in 1960 and the developments in 1970. The presence of the two countries in the Mediterranean region, their historical, social, and cultural similarities, and the fact that both countries were Muslim strengthened the bilateral relations. High level visits stimulated stronger political connection between the countries. Additionally, several prime representatives from Turkey also participated in activities related to Libyan independence. The former Minister of Finance Deniz Baykal’s attendance in

Libya's independence ceremonies in 1974 was very crucial given the conditions at the time (DSA:030.18.01.02.325.5.16).

In January 1975, the Libyan Prime Minister Ahmet Callud was invited to Turkey, where critical negotiations regarding bilateral relations were held. The Libyan Prime Minister held negotiations with Turkey's Prime Minister Sadi Irmak and evaluated previous agreements between the two countries. Subsequently, the two Prime Ministers signed the Joint Protocol and the Mixed Commission, in addition to signing agreements on different issues such as trade, economy, education, culture, scientific and technical cooperation, health, military and veterinary medicine (DSA:030.18.01.02.326.12.10). Additionally, military developments between the two countries also took place. Later, the Libyan and the Turkish Prime Ministers discussed oil issues; it was decided that a Turkish delegation must be sent to Libya for oil investigation purposes and thus reach to an agreement on oil.

After the visit of Libyan Prime Minister Ahmed Callud, officials from Turkey also visited Libya. In 1977, the Deputy Prime Minister Alparslan Türkeş was invited by the Libyan government to hold negotiations on behalf of Turkey (DSA:030.18.01.02.369.77.10). In 1978, Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren and the Minister of Labor went to Libya in the same year to converse with their counterparts. On 26 January 1979, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit was invited to the country by the Libyan Prime Minister (DSA:030.18.01.02.377.206.6).

#### **3.1.1.6.Joint Protocol**

Upon the Libyan Prime Minister Callud's visit to Turkey in 1975, a protocol was signed between the two countries in Ankara to improve the commercial, technical, scientific, and cultural relations. Notably, the most important issue discussed in the protocol was the economic cooperation agreements between the countries. Accordingly, the following items were in the foreground in the joint protocol:

- Turkey and Libya will set up a joint bank in accordance with their legislations. This bank will operate in the supply of banking funds and deal with commercial transactions.
- Turkey and Libya will encourage private companies and public enterprises to enhance economic cooperation to invest in their country. In this article, Libya requested the Turkish investors to specifically carry out projects related to housing, hotel

construction, highways, railways, port construction and other areas of social and economic infrastructure.

- Turkey and Libya will be encouraged to participate in development projects in oil, residence, tourism, industry, and agriculture.
- Turkey and Libya will take all measures to facilitate bilateral maritime transport.

#### **3.1.1.7. Establishment of the Joint Commission and Works in the Field of Maritime**

In accordance with the Joint Commission agreement signed between the two countries on 5<sup>th</sup> January 1975 in Ankara, the duties of the commission included the following:

- To implement the agreements signed between the two countries.
- To provide suggestions for the development of commercial, economic, scientific, and technical relations between the two countries.
- To exchange information on long-term development plans.

After deciding that the joint commission should meet regularly, it was aimed to establish a joint bank with the Libyan Prime Minister in accordance with the legislation of the two countries. It was agreed that the respective bank would provide banking, financing, and carry out commercial transactions, in addition to ensuring joint development and investment activities between the two countries (DSA:030.18.01.02.326.12.10, 2020). The joint bank was established between Turkey and Libya on 19<sup>th</sup> February 1975. Upon the operation of the bank, the activities of the bank were followed up by conducting regular mixed commission meetings.

Following the joint protocols agreed between Libya and Turkey as two Mediterranean countries, a Libyan delegation under the leadership of Libyan Sea Transportation Vizier, Mansour Bed Libyan came to Turkey on 24<sup>th</sup> May 1975 for taking measures such as facilitating maritime transport, establishing a joint shipping company, making ships to Libya in the Turkish shipyards, and for issues such as providing Libyan students education opportunities in the Turkish maritime schools. In consequence of the negotiations between the Turkish authorities and the Libyan delegation, an agreement was reached on the following issues (DSA:030.18.01.02.334.43.8):

- To establish a joint marine company for Turkey - Libya;
- To establish a shipyard facility in Libya;
- To build a ship in Turkey for use in Libya.

Similarly, as an outcome of the articles included in the joint protocol, a Cooperation Agreement was signed in Istanbul in the Marine Affairs and Maritime Transport Areas that would ensure the coordination of maritime relations between the two countries and would strengthen the economy in the maritime transport fields. This agreement facilitated marine transportation between the two countries. In addition, marine transportation made the export and import of goods between the two countries safer. After the agreement period, there was a problem due to the lack of sufficient ships in the marine transport. Since the import and export of goods agreed between Turkey and Libya was made over marine transportation rather than airways, the authorities signed an agreement to establish a joint ship and establish a company in 1979 to expand the scope of maritime transportation. Notably, the establishment of joint shipping companies was estimated to cost 40 million US dollars, where half of this amount was to be afforded by Turkey while the other half would be met by Libya (DSA:030.18.01.02.379.238.14).

#### **3.1.1.8.Trade Relations**

Turkey began developing valuable relations with North African countries, particularly Libya, during the rule of the Justice Party. The visits of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in 1957 and the Libyan Prime Minister Ahmet Callud in 1975 were important for the development of the two countries. One of the most discussed subjects in the held negotiations was trade. After his visit to Libya in 1968, the Minister of Foreign Affairs İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil signed a trade agreement with Libya (DSA:030.18.01.02.222.49.18, 2020). The trade agreement consisting of 7 articles aimed to strengthen the two states economically. In Article 6 of the Agreement, a mixed commerce commission consisting of representatives from the two countries was decided to be established for the purpose of facilitating commercial operations between the two countries. The mixed commission was established to control the agreements signed for different fields, and the members met regularly twice a year. The main aim of the

commission was to control the implementation of the trade agreement signed between the two countries.

At the periodic meeting of Turkey-Libya Mixed Economic Commission held in 1978, Turkey was represented at Ministerial level. On this occasion, the Turkish-Libyan Business and Financial Cooperation deals were signed. After this agreement, the private companies in Turkey started to invest in Libya. Notably, investments in the field of construction played a big role in the development of Libya by contributing to the country's economy through increasing the trade volume of Turkey. In addition to the regular meetings of the joint committee, Turkey sent participants at ministerial level to the international events in Libya. In 1979, Libya organized an International Trade Fair to seeking for new markets, build a reputation, and represent itself better to the world. Teoman Köprülüler, the Minister of Trade at the time, attended the fair upon invitation from the Libyan Trade Minister (DSA:030.18.01.02.378.220.3, 2020).

In addition to expanding its trade volume, Turkey also set initiatives in different fields. The country held negotiations with Libya for the import and export of living animals and animal products. There were a series of regulations on health conditions with regard to the breeding of these animals. Notably, a Veterinary Cooperation Agreement was signed on 25<sup>th</sup> January 1979 between the veterinary institutions of both countries in order to facilitate the import and export of living animals and animal products and prevent the entry of epidemic animal diseases that may arise from the export (DSA:030.18.01.02.379.239.17, 2020).

### **3.1.1.9.Labor Agreement**

One of the subjects discussed during the visit of Libyan Prime Minister Ahmed Callud to Turkey in January 1975 was the labor of the Turkish workers in Libya. After Libya had gained its independence, its workforce was required for the country's development. Libyan Prime Minister Ahmet Callud called the Turkish businessmen to invest in Libya and met the Turkish officials to discuss the issue. However, with the investments to be made in Libya, the high need for labor, especially in the construction field, was discussed. The Libyan Prime Minister requested workers from Turkey due to the lack of a young population in Libya, and the demand was positively responded by Turkey. Afterwards, a labor force agreement consisting of 14 articles was signed

between the prime ministers of the two countries to regulate a Turkish labor flow to Libya (DSA:030.18.01.02.326.11.3). Prior to the labor agreement, there were four to five thousand Turkish workers in Libya. Following the agreement, the rights of the Turkish workers in Libya were regulated and the official status of the Turkish workers to go there was prepared. The Turkish workers were also granted the right to use the benefits given to other foreign workers in Libya. In June 1975, with the Social Security Agreement signed between the two countries in Tripoli, a new agreement was made on the guarantees of the Turkish citizens.

#### **3.1.1.10. Developments in the Military Relations**

Following Libya's independence, the country was constantly in contact with Turkey on a military approach. During the Ottoman Empire period, Libya occupied a very important place in military and troops from Istanbul were sent for security. During the First World War, in order not to lose Libya as the last territory of the Ottoman Empire, officers sent there called the public for a righteous resistance. After the declaration of Republic, Turkey was not indifferent to the developments in Libya and sent military officers to the region. After gaining independence, Turkey sent commanders for duty in Libya (DSA:030.18.01.02.135.21.14). In addition, Turkey granted two thousand infantry mortar shells to Libya in 1956, which contributed to the strength of the Libyan army (DSA:030.01.00.00.62.382.4).

Libyan Prime Minister Ahmed Callud also held negotiations on the defense field during his visit to Turkey. Callud specifically demanded training to be provided by the Turkish Armed Forces for Libyan military personnel in order to strengthen the Libyan army. Turkey responded positively to this request and a Military Training Cooperation agreement was made between Libya and Turkey on 20<sup>th</sup> March 1975. Notably, a protocol was signed with Libyan Air Force personnel to be trained at the Turkish Air Forces (DSA:030.18.01.02.377.207.15). The Military Training Cooperation Agreement was made for a period of four years, and the plan was to send fifty Libyan military personnel and students to Turkey every year. In the agreement, it was decided that the training program should include war preparation training, pilot training, and basic vocational training to Libyan military personnel and students. Moreover, the agreement also aimed to provide Turkish education to these staff and students. During this period,

the military officials from Turkey constantly visited Libya. In July 1979, Minister of National Defense Neşet Akmandor went to Libya to examine the agreements made with the the country and discuss issues related to weapons, ammunition, marine vehicles, and mapping (DSA:030.18.01.02.380.255.10). In the same year, Turkey's Air Force Commander and the Naval Commander went to Libya to hold negotiations.

### **3.1.2. Establishment of Turkey-Egypt Relations and the Relevant Agreements**

Egypt is one of the most important countries of North Africa, Middle East and the Arab world and has always been known for its strategic location. Throughout history, Turkey was in continuous contact with Egypt. The relationship between Egypt and Turkey started after the Ottoman Empire period. Egypt was ruled by the Ottoman Empire for about four hundred years and came under the protection of the UK after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. This process did not last long and the country was declared a separate state in 1922. After the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, Turkey-Egypt relations started with the establishment of the Turkish embassy in 1925 in Cairo. Although Turkey and Egypt being two regional powers in the Middle East started relations in 1925, serious diplomatic crisis occurred sporadically between the two countries. The different foreign policies of Turkey and Egypt and the effect of imperialist powers developed such crises. Differences in the relations between the two countries were also manifested in the Cold War Period. As Turkey took part in the Western side in 1950s and Gamal Abdel-Nasser came to power in Egypt and adopted socialism and Pan-Arabism policy, the relations could not be kept as desired.

After the declaration of Republic, Turkey applied the principle of secularism to separate the state and religious affairs from each other. Turkey forbade the works and publications that could be dangerous to the legitimacy of the regime in the country and prevented any magazines, books or articles that could be a risk to the principle of secularism. Notably, many religious books coming from Egypt were found to be dangerous in Turkey. For instance, "*Nizal el Ekrad*" (DSA:030.18.01.02.117.50.3) that was printed in Arabic in Egypt's capital Cairo was forbidden in Turkey in 1946. Similarly, "*Tarih-üd Düvel vel Emaretül Kürdiye*" in 1950 and "*Sabahülhayır*" magazine published in Egypt in 1958 were also banned (DSA:030.01.02.14925.10).

Turkey did not want the works of Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's largest movements, to be allowed into the country as they posed a threat to the existence of the regime. In this context, Sayyid Qutb's book "*Verasatul İslamiye*" as well as Enis Ahmed al-Haccaci's "*El Imam*" were banned in 1965 (DSA:030.01.02.185.23.20).

Although the relations between the two countries were not very advanced until the 1960s, agreements that could be considered important were signed. Delegations from Turkey and Egypt made mutual visits to develop trade relations and exchanged opinions on trade issues. At the end of the negotiations, a Trade and Payment Agreement was signed between the two countries in Cairo in 1953 (DSA:030.18.01.02.133.74.9). However, a serious diplomatic crisis broke out between the two countries one year later. The Turkish Ambassador was invited to the opera show chaired by Gamal Abdul Nasser whose guests were welcomed individually, while a short discussion took place during the welcome of the Turkish Ambassador. The Turkish Ambassador criticized Egypt's cooperation with the Soviet Union and stated that Egypt would be heading for a disaster. Later, this debate quickly grew and gradually turned into a crisis. After the eventful opera performance, the Turkish Ambassador was declared "*persona non grata*" (Bardakçı, 2016). In addition to the close cooperation with the Soviet Union, adoption of Pan-Arabism policies by Abdul Nasser, and Turkey's collaboration as a Western ally were also factors that intensified the crisis. Within the framework of Pan-Arabism, Egyptian President Nasser collaborated with Syria in 1958 to establish the United Arab Republic; however, the union did not last long and collapsed in 1961. The weak diplomatic relations between Turkey and Egypt were discontinued after the collapse of the Arab Republic and a political relationship was not established until 1963.

There was no connection established between Turkey and Egypt from 1961 to 1963. However, several situations took place and induced improvements in the relations. Turkey was aware of the flood disaster of the construction of Aswan Dam prepared by the UNESCO. Turkey contributed 3 thousand dollars for the protection of historical artifacts in the flooded Nubia region (DSA:030.18.01.02.162.50.7). Although problems occurred in the relations between Turkey and Egypt in the early 1960s, the common points of the two countries reunited the parties. Notably, with the change of power in Turkey in 1965, a new dimension started in Turkey-Egypt relations.

Administrators from Turkey and Egypt shared the opinion that regardless of the different ideological views, cooperating on commercial and economic issues would be in the favor of the two countries.

In 1963, Turkey re-established diplomatic relations with Egypt. Following the visit of the Foreign Ministry Secretary General Haluk Bayülgen to Egypt, the process of normalization started, and a trade agreement was signed between the two countries (Sander, 2002, p. 789). In the 1970s, mutual negotiations between the two countries increased. Notably, trade-related negotiations and protocol agreements progressed in the 1970s. In the negotiations held in Cairo in 1972, the articles in the previous agreement were updated and new articles were added. In 1978, an economic and technical cooperation agreement between the two countries was signed, and the trade was expanded to different areas (DSA:030.18.01.02.374.160.7). Turkey achieved stable relations with North African countries, particularly Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria and signed agreements in different fields. In 1974, a health protocol was signed between Turkey and Egypt for the purpose of ensuring cooperation on health issues. Similarly, another protocol related to the Narcotics and Illicit Trafficking was signed in Cairo in 1978 for the security of the two countries (DSA:030.18.01.02.374.165.6).

Because the Turks and Egyptians lived together for many years in history, the Muslim identity of both communities was reflected in culture. There are cultural similarities between the two countries in many areas. Based on the common values shared by Turkey and Egypt, cultural exchange programs were carried out between the two countries in 1981 (DSA:030.18.01.02.584.637.2). Notably, within the scope of cultural programs, the International Turkish Arts Congress was held in Cairo, the capital of Egypt, in 1987. In terms of the field of trade, neo-liberal transformation was experienced during the 1980s that was export-led, and the relations between Turkey and Egypt were closer compared to Sedat and Nasser periods. Later, significant leaps were seen in the trade volume between the two countries. With the visit of Egyptian president Enver Sedat, concrete steps were taken in Turkey-Egypt relations. For example, in 1983, as the Anavatan Party came to power with Turgut Özal, another dimension was brought to the relations. According to the data provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK), when the first export from Turkey to Egypt was examined, it was found that the e-first export was started in 1962, with a volume of 1 million dollars. In

1970, when the economic dimension was prominent in Turkey's relations with the Middle East countries, the export volume to Egypt reached 50 million, with an increase by over 100 percent in 1979. Notably, the biggest volume of export to Egypt was observed in 1982 with an estimate of 145 million dollars (Sariaslan, 2019). These positive developments also contributed to other activities between the two countries. For instance, in November 1982 in Cairo, a "*Turkish Week*" program was organized, and The Minister of Trade of Turkey attended the opening ceremony of the program (DSA:30.18.01.02.466.572.8). However, in 1983 there was a drop in Turkey's export figures. After the fall, a mixed economic commission was established and developments in exports were evaluated. Until 1990, exports continued at an annual level of approximately 150 million dollars.

In view of the trade relations between Turkey and Egypt, new agreements were made between the countries, while senior government officials paid mutual visits. In January 1986, President Kenan Evren's visit to Egypt was effective in bilateral relations with Egypt (DSA:030.18.01.02.547.435.6). After the visit, a tourism cooperation agreement was signed between Turkey and Egypt in the same year. Similarly, with regard to the field of technology, the parties agreed on scientific and technical cooperation between TUBITAK and the Egyptian Scientific Technology Institution.

While there was progress in the agreements and mutual negotiations in the fields of trade, economy, culture, education, health, military, several important steps were also taken. In 1987, the Military Training and Cooperation Agreement were signed between the two countries. This agreement included training programs for the soldiers of the two countries. Even after the ending of the Cold War, the relations of Turkey and Egypt continued with mutual visits. President Turgut Özal visited Egypt in 1990 and 1992, while the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak visited Turkey in 1996 (Sariaslan, 2019).

### **3.1.3. Establishment of Turkey-Tunisia Relations and the Relevant Agreements**

By the end of the 1950s, after the African countries had gained their independence, Turkey took steps by recognizing these countries and starting diplomatic relations. Notably, Turkey's relations with North African countries continued despite some fluctuations. Tunisia, another country of North Africa, declared its independence with the France-Tunisia protocol signed in Paris on 20<sup>th</sup> March 1956. With this protocol,

France recognized the independence of Tunisia. Turkey expressed its contentment with the independence of Tunisia and sent a congratulatory telegram to recognize the independence of Tunisia. In May 1956, Turkey decided to open an embassy in Tunisia to improve relations at ambassadorial level and establish diplomatic relations with Tunisia (DSA:030.18.01.02.143.51.18).

After Tunisia's independence in 1957, Turkey opened an embassy in Tunisia and sent representatives to the ceremony on the first anniversary. At the ceremony that held a distinct importance for Tunisia, a delegation from Turkey headed by the Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was also present (DSA:030.18.01.02.145.120.12). With the attendance of the Turkish Foreign Minister to the ceremony, concrete steps were taken to establish Turkey-Tunisia relations. The relations started with trade and cultural agreements and progressed with those in the transportation field. While an airline agreement was signed between the two countries in 1968, a Marine Transportation Agreement was also signed a year later to improve transportation and economic relations between the two countries (DSA:030.18.01.02.239.59.14). With this agreement, it was aimed to overcome the difficulties that may arise while both countries ensured the development of maritime traffic in the Mediterranean. In addition, it was also agreed that the two countries would implement the same method applied to their national ships for the ships that carry the flag of the other at their ports.

### **3.1.3.1.Trade Agreement**

Turkey signed a series of agreements with Tunisia to ensure long-term and permanent relations. The trade agreement was the most important among all the agreements. For further contribution to friendly ties between the two countries, the Trade Agreement was signed between Tunisia and Turkey on 17th April 1958 that aimed at developing economic and trade relations (DSA:030.18.01.02.149.25.12). The import and export rules and products were evaluated in the respective agreement. In 1967, an additional protocol regarding the economic cooperation of both countries was signed.

The protocol signed between the two countries stated that the following goods would be supplied from Turkey to Tunisia;

- Industrial plants such as raisins, figs, peanuts, walnuts, tea, sugar, alcoholic beverages, cotton, wheat, tobacco, frozen meat, fish, marble, apparel, refrigerator, meerscham, agricultural tools and machines, musical instruments, pumice stone, raw marble, toiletries, saffron, and timber.

Whereas the following products would be supplied from Tunisia to Turkey.

- Phosphate, hyper-phosphate, lead, fertilizer, iron, barrel, drums, alcoholic beverages, sports shoes, marble, machine oils, rubber and aluminum household goods (DSA:030.18.01.02.211.71.13).

These goods were being updated according to the needs of the two countries by making additional protocols to the trade agreement. Similarly, according to the 5<sup>th</sup> article of the supplementary protocol made in 1967, a mixed commission was established to review the commercial relations between the two countries.

Following the 1980 coup in Turkey, there was a short-term stagnation in the relations with North African countries. However, after the coup, when Turkey passed to civil administration again in 1983, Turgut Özal's government came to power and the recession was replaced by a multi-oriented policy. Turgut Özal's leadership showed a significant increase in Turkey's policy towards Africa. Turgut Özal adopted liberal policies with Turkey and this was reflected in its relations with Tunisia. In 1992, a trade, economic and technical cooperation agreement was signed in Ankara for the purpose of pursuing trade and economic relations with Tunisia, (Ada, 2014, p. 48). This agreement gave rise to the establishment of a free trade zone between Turkey and Tunisia in later years.

### **3.1.3.2. Education and Culture Agreement**

On account of the projects of UN agencies, Turkey contributed by sending experts and teachers to Africa. In 1958, while Tunisia had a shortage of teachers in the field of education, Turkey sent teachers to village schools in Tunisia under UNESCO's cooperation. In 1961, a press Release on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1961 was made in order to follow developments in Tunisia, and under the leadership of the Ministry of Tourism, Turkey also established a news bureau. Later, "*Old Turkish Miniature and Manuscripts Exhibition*" was held in Tunisia and Morocco in 1965 to introduce the two countries to one another. The exhibition presented Turkey and the Turkish culture and also

pioneered and promoted advanced interactions for the future. Additionally, Islamic artwork and Turkish literature were also showcased at the exhibition (DSA:030.18.01.02.188.49.18). Both parties were contended with the exhibition and a cultural agreement was needed for the continuation of such events. Hence, a cultural agreement was signed on 1st December 1966 to ensure friendship and solidarity between the two sides. Along with agreement, promotion programs were systematized. In addition, the agreement developed programs that would promote intercultural activities and encourage developments in the fields of science, technology, arts, culture and sports in schools between both states. It was also decided to organize conferences, concerts, and sports competitions at universities to promote the recognition of the two countries (DSA:30.18.01.02.203.13.20).

### **3.1.3.3.Military Agreements**

Turkey made military alliances with North African countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya through military agreements. Notably, in 1965, the Turkish Naval Academy spared a certain quota every year for the naval students of these countries. (DSA:030.18.01.02.183.4.1). Moreover, bilateral agreements with several countries were also made. Turkey provided training to Libyan soldiers and occasionally sent military supplies to the country. Furthermore, Turkey possessed a distinct attitude towards Tunisia. As Tunisia aimed for safety in the Middle East, Turkish authorities and Tunisian officers signed a military agreement in 1968 for which the non-commissioned officers and military personnel would receive training in Turkey (DSA:030.18.01.02.217.20.9). The Tunisian soldiers who would complete their training would be assigned to ensure the security of Tunisia.

Turkey also sold military supplies to the Tunisian army at a lower price and donated materials. In 1969, weapons and ammunition such as infantry rifles, flying guns, and bullets that were surplus in the Turkish Armed Forces were sold to Tunisia for a price lower than their original value (DSA:030.18.01.02.238.53.9). Similarly, in 1969, training aid materials such as military masks, training bullets, and cartridges that were surplus in the Turkish Armed Forces were donated to the Tunisian Government (DSA:030.18.01.02.239.60.8).

In summary, in view of the diplomatic relations between Turkey and Tunisia, many agreements were signed in different areas. Although the negative circumstances that resulted from the Cold War created fluctuations in relations, there were no interruptions in bilateral relations and new agreements were signed. Notably, upon an official invitation by Tunisia in 1973, Turkey's foreign minister went to Tunisia and a Friendship Agreement was signed between the two countries (DSA:030.18.01.02.335.46.8). In the agreement, it was decided not to intervene in the internal affairs of the parties and respect the national sovereignty and territorial integrity that were the basic articles agreed by the two countries. Another important point in the agreement was that both countries would act in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN law. It was also emphasized in the agreement that any initiative that would contribute to the development of friendly relations between the citizens of the two countries would be promoted.

#### **3.1.4. Establishment of Turkey-Algeria Relations and the Relevant Agreements**

Turkey followed the developments in Africa after the Second World War. The country took the necessary steps to develop political, commercial, economic, and cultural relations with the young African states that gained their independence. In addition, as African countries gained their independence and joined the UN after the 1950s, they were considered for the basic principles of the Turkish Foreign Policy.

Algeria, one of the most important countries of North Africa, gained independence after a long period of struggle with France. Turkey's attitude towards Algeria's independence was very controversial. Initially, Turkey was an ally to the US; under the influence of countries like the UK and France, Turkey saw Algeria as a province of France. However, in the following years, immediately after Algeria gained its independence on 5<sup>th</sup> July 1962, Turkey sent a congratulatory message to A. Fares, the Provisional Chief Executive Officer of Algeria. Shortly after Algeria's independence, Turkey sent the Algerian officials a message regarding its desire to open an embassy in Algeria and initiate diplomatic relations. The request was welcomed by Algeria (DSA:030.18.01.02.168.9.16) and a decision to open a Turkish embassy in Algeria and form diplomatic relations with confirmed in 1963. Following this decision, Turkey sent participants on the Algerian independence days and national holidays. Turkey's

ambassador in Madrid, on behalf of Turkey, attended the event held on the first anniversary of Algeria's independence in July 1963. Additionally, a delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Hasan Dincer also participated in the National Day ceremonies of Algeria held in October in the same year (DSA:030.18.01.02.174.55.16). Similarly, in 1965, Turkey attended the second Afro-Asian conference in Algeria with a delegation headed by the Prime Minister Suad Hayri Ürgüplü. In July 1972, Algeria's tenth independence anniversary ceremony was attended by the Secretary of the President İlhan Öztrak (DSA:030.18.01.02.284.49.12). As Turkey remained a part of Algeria's events, relations between the two countries remained consistent and many mutual agreements were made.

#### **3.1.4.1. Cultural Agreement**

Upon developing diplomatic relations with Algeria, Turkey carried out a series of agreements, one of which was on cultural grounds. In 1967, a cultural cooperation agreement was signed between the Algerian authorities and Turkey; however, the agreement came into force in 1971 (DSA:030.18.01.02.262.14.9). The agreement aimed to organize projects and programs on cultural, art, sports, education, and research issues in order to strengthen the friendship of the Turkish and Algerian people. A mixed culture commission was also established to control the aim of article 15 of the respective agreement. In 1975, the plan of cultural exchange programs between the two countries was found suitable for both sides. This exchange program reflected a mutual interaction between academicians, teachers, and students in educational institutions.

#### **3.1.4.2. Trade Agreement**

Although Turkey could not deal with Northern Africa countries during the Republican era, the common parties of the two countries came together after World War II. Prior to the independence of Algeria, Turkey had been making commercial exchanges with the country but the trade relations were limited. However, Turkey participated in programs held in Algeria and took part in negotiations related to trade products. In 1959, the Ninth Congress of Vine and Wine took place in Algeria; the event was attended by Turkey's Izmir director of the Agricultural Research Institute, where the two countries negotiated on issues related to grapes and wine (DSA:030.18.01.02.153.50.15). After the independence of Algeria, both countries

developed diplomatic relations; the commercial issues between the two sides became more systematic and concrete steps were taken regarding the issue. Notably, a comprehensive trade agreement was signed between the two countries on 27<sup>th</sup> July 1967 (DSA:030.18.01.02.211.71.12). In this agreement, the goods to be exported and imported between the two countries were determined. The following industrial products were decided to be exported from Turkey to Algeria;

- Tobacco, raisins, hazelnuts, tea, sugar, rice, wheat, fabrics like silk and cotton, porcelain, and meerschaum mercury.

Whereas the following products were to be exported from Algeria to Turkey:

- Cement, crude oil, sulphate, phosphate, iron, handicrafts, and cork.

With this agreement, the officials of the two countries remained in constant communication. In 1974, Algeria participated in the International Algeria Fair to grow from a young state and enhance its reputation and prestige in order to find new trade partners around the globe. The fair was attended upon invitation from Turkey's trade minister. The trade minister evaluated the trade agreements between the two countries and updated the agreement of the export-import goods made in 1967 (DSA:030.18.01.02.320.63.15).

### **3.1.5. Establishment of Turkey-Morocco Relations and the Relevant Agreements**

Morocco holds a significant position in the Islamic world due to its geographic location in the Middle East, Africa and the Mediterranean region, in addition to the intensity of the religion being pursued in the country. For these reasons, Morocco and Turkey share common features that give rise to the development of a strong relationship between the two countries. Notably, the relations of Turkey and Morocco started with a joint declaration of both countries' authorities on 17<sup>th</sup> April 1956 following Morocco's independence from France.

After the independence of Morocco, Turkey took steps to re-establish historical ties between the two countries by making friendship and cultural agreements with Morocco. In this context, a cultural agreement between the two countries was initiated in 1960 (DSA:030.18.01.02.157.30.8). Although both countries agreed on the agreement, the agreement was completed in 1965. In the respective agreement, the two

countries agreed to provide the necessary facilities in the recognition of science, literature and fine arts books, and to correct any limitations exhibited by the two countries in their respective course books. In addition, it was planned to organize conferences, concerts, and theater events to promote the culture of the two countries and increase communication with radio. In addition, professors, students, writers and artists of the two countries agreed to promote practical scientific programs. Moreover, activities such as youth work and establishing sports organizations were also included in the agreement (DSA:030.18.199.71.8). In 1965, the first concrete event was held in Morocco where a large exhibition called "*Old Turkish Miniature and Manuscripts Exhibition*" was organized. The exhibition took place in Istanbul at the Turkish and Islamic Arts Museum where Quran, the Court of Suleyman Mukubi, Hüsrev and Sirin, Miktel El Rasul, the Turkish miniatures and manuscripts as Hilyei Saadet sent to Morocco from Istanbul were all exhibited and helped in the promotion of Turkey (DSA:030.18.01.02.188.49.18).

Following cultural operations between Turkey and Morocco, other developments also took place between the two countries. For instance, Turkey had signed visa exemption agreements with the majority of European countries except Soviet Union countries. The country also tried to strengthen bilateral relations by signing visa exemption agreements with North African and Asian countries. Notably, a three-month visa exemption agreement was signed with Morocco in May 1966, where travel between the two countries facilitated efficient interactions (DSA:030.18.01.02.202.4.1). One of the main reasons to sign the respective agreement with Morocco was to solve the issues of the Turkish citizens who had visa problems due to the absence of a Moroccan Embassy in Ankara. It is important to note that the cultural and visa exemption agreements facilitated progressive relations between the two countries. For example, this progress had contributed to the development of trade relations between the two countries. In commercial terms, a trade agreement was signed between Turkey and Morocco in 1972. A mixed commission was also established after defining the export goods in the trade agreement (DSA:030.18.01.02.282.41.9).

Overall, the relations between Turkey and Morocco have always been of vital importance especially for the development of Morocco. While Turkey increased the volume of trade with Morocco, it also voiced support for UN projects in Morocco. The

UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) sent experts and material resources devoted to both regions (DSA:030.18.01.02.166.38.13). Notably, mutual visits by the two countries had contributed to the study of relations with Morocco. For example, Morocco was considered a reliable country in terms of the meetings of the Islamic Cooperation Organization or the developments in the Islamic world. Hence, in May 1979, Turkey's Foreign Minister Gündüz Ökçün joined the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers Meeting held in Morocco. Later in 1984, President Kenan Evren attended the summit conference of Islamic countries held in Morocco, and at the time, the developments in Islamic countries were not ignored (DSA:030.18.01.02.500.170.9).

### **3.1.6 Establishment of Turkey-Sudan Relations**

Sudan declared its independence on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1956 and was recognized by Turkey after that. In this regard, diplomatic relations between Turkey and Sudan started in 1957 following the establishment of Turkish embassy in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan (DSA:030.18.01.02.146.26.9). Later, Sudan opened a consulate in Ankara followed by another consulate in Istanbul. There was no significant improvement in relations between the two countries until the end of the 1970s. In 1979, Turkey sent delegations to discuss trade and economic cooperation issues with Sudan (DSA:030.18.01.02.378.212.17).

At the end of the delegations' negotiations, the first commercial agreement was signed between the two countries in 1980. Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiry and President Kenan Evren came together in Istanbul after the trade agreement. As a result of the negotiations between the two leaders, agreements on commercial, cultural, technical, and scientific issues were signed between the two countries. 1988, an agreement was signed to use properties to improve the financial capital and develop Sudan's trade, where Turkey provided a loan of \$ 40 million (Devecioğlu, 2017).

Turkey participated in international programs organized in Sudan and closely followed developments related to Sudan as a result of Turkey's facilities. In 1981, the Islamic Development Bank's Fifth Annual General Assembly meeting was held in Sudan's capital, Khartoum, where Turkey's participation was, again, marked. Meanwhile, the UN participated in meetings between Turkey and Sudan Industrial Development Organization.

After 1990s, Turkey - Sudanese relations gained momentum within the scope of the foreign expansion policy of President Turgut Özal. Number of protocols was signed between the two countries in different fields, especially economy and education, throughout an eight-year period from 1990 to 1998. Following these protocols, the Turkish companies started to appear in the Sudanese market by 1995 and increased their investments in the country.

### **3.2. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

Following the Second World War, the Sub-Saharan African countries gained their independence after a long struggle against the colonial states in the late 1950s. The independence of Ghana, a West African country, from the UK in 1957 had a domino effect in Africa and the winds of independence blew across the whole continent. Under the leadership of Nkrumah in 1957, Ghana was also the premise of independence movements in Africa. In this process, Turkey recognized the independences of Sub-Saharan African countries and began diplomatic relations with them.

Turkey, who fought in the War of Independence against the colonial power in 1923, was taken as an example by the sub-Saharan African countries. Notably, Atatürk, who had a great role in Turkey's independence, inspired many leaders in Africa and gave them the courage to fight. As there was no colonial history in the region of Turkey, it experienced difficulty in establishing diplomatic relations with Sub-Saharan countries.

#### **3.2.1. Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with West African Countries**

Turkey recognized Ghana after its independence from the UK in 1957 and Ghana played an important role in the Non-Aligned Movement. In 1960, Turkey opened an embassy in Accra, the capital of Ghana, to begin diplomatic relations. Ghana was also represented in Ankara with the accreditation of Rome Embassy. However, because Ghana was a young country with economic problems and institutions that did not have an order, in addition to the pressure of the Cold War period, its relations with Turkey were not as desired. As an outcome, there was no political, commercial, economic, or cultural development between the two countries. In addition, due to the fall of the founding leader of Ghana, Nkrumah, the country started to lose its former power in the

region that entered an unstable period. Due to developments in Turkey and a decision made with economic measures, it has decided to close its embassy in Accra in 1981 (DSA:030.18.01.02.428.318.8).

Nigeria, another important country in West Africa, has had a large share in the economy of Africa due to its demography and rich mineral deposits. Nigeria, a member of the UK League, had a population of 36 million when it gained independence in 1960. With its predominantly Muslim population, Nigeria gained a significant potential for the leadership of sub-Saharan Muslim countries. Turkey and Nigeria relations began with a positive conversation among the Nigerian and Turkish delegates at the General Assembly of the UN. The Nigerian delegates, in conversation with the Turkish counterpart, were mentioned with great praise for their long independence struggle in the Turkish War of Independence. After the UN had declared Nigeria as an independent country, Turkey also recognized Nigeria's independence. Consequently, Turkey promoted its consulate general in Lagos to the level of embassy that it established in 1956 (DSA:030.18.01.02.157.27.4). The Turkish Embassy in Lagos was then shifted to Nigeria's capital Abuja in 1991. Turkey's Embassy in Lagos has also established its representative office in West Africa.

Moreover, Turkey launched diplomatic relations by conjugating the embassy in Lagos with eight West African countries. Turkey continued its relations with West Africa through Nigeria from 1960 until 2000. Meanwhile, Cameroon gained its independence on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1960 and was shortly recognized by Turkey. In 1962, in a decree issued by the Lagos Ambassador to Turkey, Fehmi Moses was authorized to represent Turkey in Cameroon (DSA:30.01.02.166.47.5). Similarly, after Cameroon gained its independence from France in 1960, Turkey established diplomatic relations with Gabon that gained independence from France in 1960. In 1962, it was decided that the Ambassador of Turkey to Lagos would also be represented in Gabon.

The West African countries were unable to draw a stable line due to the civil wars and military coups they experienced after gaining their independence. This situation affected the Turkey-Nigeria relations. There was no significant development between the two countries until the early 1980s. However, Turkey has contributed to Nigeria's development through international institutions. In 1973, the agricultural

development of the region was supported by sending experts to the projects carried out within the body of the Food and Agriculture Organization that was under the UN (DSA:030.18.01.02.309.102.9). In addition, a cultural agreement was signed between the two countries in 1976.

In 1979, Turkey started to develop trade relations with six Saharan - African countries; Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan, and delegations were sent to each country to meet their counterparts (DSA:030.18.01.02.378.212.17). In 1979, a meeting took place with Nigerian representatives in Ankara and a trade agreement was signed between the two countries (DSA:030.18.01.02.379.238.2). With this agreement, the Turkish companies started to partner with companies established in Nigeria. Notably, in the 1960s, the number of countries that gained their independence in Africa gradually increased. In this process, Turkey considered West Africa and opened its representative offices in Ghana and Nigeria. The common problem of these countries was that they were English speaking African countries; this situation resulted in the lack of representation of Turkey in the region.

It is evident that most of the West African countries were French colonial countries. For this purpose, opening an embassy in the former French colonies of Senegal gained great importance for Turkey since Senegal's ownership of the largest port played a critical role in the economy of the region (DSA:030.18.01.02.168.9.16). In this regard, Turkey sent senior officials to the activity of Senegal's independence. In 1968, a cultural agreement was signed between the two countries (DSA:030.18.01.02.235.40.4). The Turkish Embassy in Senegal was also represented in Turkey. Similarly, Gambia, one of these countries located within the borders of Senegal, has had a great strategic importance due to the location of Gambia River. The diplomatic relations between Gambia and Turkey began shortly after Gambia's independence. The relations between Gambia and Turkey continued with the Visa Exemption Agreement signed on 16<sup>th</sup> June 1966 in order to facilitate the travel of the citizens of the two countries (DSA:030.18.01.02.198.58.3). According to this agreement, the Turkish citizens would be able to travel to Gambia from anywhere without a visa requirement and stay in the country for at least three months. Similarly, the Gambian passport would permit travel of the Gambian citizens to Turkey without a visa requirement.

Turkey tried to form its position in West Africa by developing relations with the majority of the African countries. It gave importance to diplomatic relations with the most important countries of West Africa from the very beginning. Western Ivory Coast, another important country in Africa, gained independence from France in 1960. Turkey was one of the earliest countries recognizing Ivory Coast's independence. Turkey's relations with Ivory Coast started with a decision taken on 27<sup>th</sup> June 1964 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1965, Turkey's Ambassador to Ghana, Mahmut Dikerdem, was chosen to represent Turkey (DSA:030.18.01.02.184.9.10). Notably, Turkey sent representatives to ceremonies held on the anniversary of Ivory Coast's independence. In 1967, relations between the two countries continued at an embassy level.

The relations between Turkey and Ivory Coast remained consistent at an embassy level throughout 1967 (DSA:030.18.01.02.202.8.8). In addition to countries such as Nigeria, Senegal and Ghana that were most prominent in the region, a connection was also established with the relatively mid-level countries after the declaration of their independence. For example, Turkey made diplomatic initiatives with Liberia and Guinea-Bissau in order to increase its recognition and influence in the region (DSA:030.18.01.02.205.25.1). After 1 year, Turkey's Ambassador to Dakar, Orhan Conker, was chosen to act as the Ambassador to Liberia. Guinea-Bissau gained its independence shortly later than the other African countries. Notably, the Portuguese colonial countries had also gained their independence late. Turkey recognized Guinea-Bissau's independence in 1974. Afterwards, diplomatic relations were established following negotiations made between the two countries. Similarly, the Dakar Embassy was accredited to Guinea-Bissau on 2<sup>nd</sup> August 1974 (DSA:030.18.01.02.332.33.6).

### **3.2.2. Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with East African Countries**

As Turkey started relations with sub-Saharan and West African countries, it started to interact with other regions as well. Unlike other regions in Africa, Turkey's relations with East Africa dates back to the Ottoman period. During that period, The Turks had a presence in East African countries, especially Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, which is why contact with this region remained consistent for approximately four hundred years. However, with the start of colonialism, the East African region had also

suffered like the other African countries. After the Second World War, the independence movements in Africa continued and the East African countries gained their independence long after.

Ethiopia, one of the most important countries of East Africa, has a very important place in the history, economy, and development of Africa. The relations between Turkey and Ethiopia date back to the sixteenth century. At the time, the Ottoman Empire that had established an authority in the region with the conquest of Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula by Yavuz Sultan Selim initiated their first connections with Ethiopia, formerly Abyssinian. Notably, bilateral relations between the Turks and Ethiopians became evident during the reign of Abdulhamid II and Menelik II, emperors of the two regions at the time.

One of Turkey's foreign policy is to be against all forms of colonialism and respect the sovereign rights of countries. In this context, Turkey supported Ethiopia's policy against Italy, and a friendship between the two countries' leaders, Atatürk and Haile Selassie was established. As a result of this bond, Turkey's first embassy in Sub-Saharan Africa was opened in Addis Ababa in 1926, and Ethiopia's embassy was opened in Ankara on 1933 (MFA, 2020). With the breakout of the Second World War, there was no progress between Turkey and Ethiopia. However, in 1967, relations between the two countries were resumed with Haile Selassie's visit to Turkey President to meet President Cevdet Sunay. During the meeting, the leader of Ethiopia defended Turkey on the Cyprus Issue between Greece and Turkey. Notably, the Armenians, with the provocations of the Greeks, stated that they were working against the Turks around the world and that they would be careful not to affect the Ethiopian people in this direction, considering the presence of this ethnic group in Ethiopia (Milliyet Newspaper, 1967). In 1969, President Cevdet Sunay also made an official visit to Ethiopia, where he was warmly welcomed by Ethiopia and negotiated commercial and economic agreements with the country. From the beginning of the 1970s, Turkey sent delegations for the implementation of the respective agreement in Ethiopia (DSA:030.18.01.02.378.212.17). However, the emergence of power struggles and instability in Ethiopia remained inconclusive since these negotiations were not implemented.

Turkey was indifferent to the post Second World War developments in the new order, thus aimed at establishing expansive multidimensional foreign policy by laying the foundations of links with the African countries. In this context, it contacted other East African countries that had recently gained independence but could not establish diplomatic relations. Turkey started diplomatic relations with Kenya, one of those East African countries, by opening an embassy in 1967 (DSA:030.18.01.02.207.40.12). Later, Turkey opened embassies in other countries in the region to ensure its recognition and develop diplomatic relations. In 1979, diplomatic relations with Tanzania, Malawi, Uganda, and Zambia started by an accreditation in the Kenyan Embassy. In addition, after a decision taken in 1979, Turkey initiated diplomatic relations with the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros and Djibouti (DSA:030.18.01.02.378.224.20).

Somalia, one of the most strategic countries in East Africa, gained its independence on 1<sup>st</sup> July 1960. Turkey recognized the independence of Somalia but delayed the development of diplomatic relations till 1979. However, in 1964, Turkey attended Islamic Conference held in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu. In this conference, the Turkish delegates were warmly welcomed by Somalia due to Turkey's struggle against colonial state. This laid the first step to the Turkey-Somalia relations. However, diplomatic relations between the two countries could not be established until the late 1970s due to reasons such as military coups, civil war, and instability in East Africa.

### **3.2.3. Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Central African Countries**

Turkey started diplomatic relations with Africa by opening new embassies in the African countries who gained independence. In sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey ensured its representation by opening its embassy in Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria in West Africa, and Ethiopia and Kenya in East Africa. Notably, Turkey was the first country in the Central African diplomatic initiatives which began in 1962; it developed diplomatic relations with Gabon by accreditation to Turkey's embassy in Lagos (DSA:030.18.01.02.165.37.20). Later, Turkey developed its relations with the Democratic Republic of Congo, one of the most important and largest countries in the Central African region. Congo, a country that makes a name for Africa with its natural riches, has always been a country with an important potential for the future of Africa.

A small number of Turkish citizens dealing with trade resided in the Republic of Congo following its independence on 30<sup>th</sup> June 1960. However, with the prolonged instability of the country post-independence, it was hard for Congo to resettle its difficult period. In this process, Jean Richard Bolombo, who was appointed by the Congolese government and claimed to be the leader of the people's movement, sent a letter to President İsmet İnönü on 13<sup>th</sup> August 1963 and asked for support for his movements (DSA:030.01.00.00.8.44.15). Turkey's response to this request remains unclear but its relations with Congo were of particular importance.

Turkey also took some measures to protect the rights of the citizens in Congo. In 1965, an Honorary Consulate was opened in Elisabethville, the center of Congo's Katanga state, to protect the rights of the Turkish citizens and carry out their official transactions. Oktay Türegün, who lived in that region for many years and engaged in trade, was appointed as the Honorary Consul (DSA:030.18.01.02.187.37.16). With the opening of honorary consulates, Turkey took the first step in its diplomatic relations with Congo and decided to establish an embassy in Congo due to the presence of the Turkish citizens dealing with trade. In addition, Congo had a policy based on cooperation against West that increased Turkey's interest in this country. For these reasons, Turkey decided to open an embassy following the foundation of Democratic Republic of Congo in 1968 (DSA:030.18.01.02.228.89.10).

Turkey, with an aim to gain new dimensions in foreign policy, endeavored to establish new relationships with the Mid African countries. As result of its efforts to develop relations with African countries, Turkey initiated diplomatic relations with Congo. In 1960, diplomatic relations with the Central African countries began with the Republic of Chad. However, diplomatic relations between Turkey and Chad were officially developed with a decision taken in 1969 (DSA:030.18.01.02.242.81.6). Moreover, Turkey also started relations with Burundi and Rwanda in 1979, and Equatorial Guinea, Mid-African Republic, Sao Tome and Principe Republic in 1980. Turkey was represented in these countries by accreditation in the embassy in Lagos.

#### **3.2.4. Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with South African Countries**

While Turkey's relations fluctuated in other regions of Africa, its relations with the countries of South Africa remained consistent. This was because Turkey is located

far from these countries and there were few Muslims in the country of South Africa. Notably, the independence of South African countries has influenced their relations with Turkey. Nevertheless, within the framework of development policy relations with all South African countries that have gained independence, Turkey took initiatives for the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Most of the Turkey-South Africa relations were through accreditation transactions. This former Portuguese colony of Angola and Turkey established diplomatic relations in 1980. Relations between the two countries began with the accreditation of Turkey's Embassy in Lagos (DSA:030.18.01.02.397.99.7). In the same manner, Turkey started to interact with the People's Republic of Mozambique, Botswana and Swaziland Kingdom where it had no diplomatic relations. In 1980, Turkey was provided the accreditation of the respective countries through the opening of the Embassy of Turkey in Darussalam, Tanzania, and, hence, started bilateral relations (DSA:030.18.01.02.410.192.7). Turkey recognized Zimbabwe, one of the most important countries of the region, after its independence in 18<sup>th</sup> April 1980 and developed diplomatic relations with the country through the Embassy in London. However, this had resulted in no benefit, and diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe later started with the accreditation of Darussalam Embassy in 1982 (DSA:030.18.01.02.454.490.9).

In 1932, South Africa, one of the most important countries in Africa, gained its independence from the UK that it was a colony of, but this was due to the independence of the white class in the country rather than a real independence. From this period until 1994, the country was ruled by South African whites. In this context, the whites in the country ruled oppressively by racially separating people with the racist apartheid system they established in 1948. The relations between Turkey and South Africa were initiated in the second half of the Nineteenth century when Muslims in South Africa requested for a cleric from the Ottoman Emperor Abdulhamid II. In response, the Ottoman Empire sent Ebu Bekir, a religious scholar, to Cape Town. Later, a consulate was opened in Johannesburg where Mehmet Remzi was assigned as a counselor, and Political relations were initiated between the two countries.

During the Cold War Era, when South Africa was ruled by the racist apartheid regime, almost no concrete steps were taken for the relations between Turkey and South Africa. However, in 1943, attempts were taken in terms of military, where 16 officers from South Africa were sent to Turkey for hunting of bombardment courses (DSA:030.10.00.00.46.297.19.2). During the Cold War Period, there was no silence against the racist and repressive apartheid regime in South Africa, and demonstrations and congresses were held. Notably, a large-scale congress was held in South Africa on 25<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> June 1955. The Congress was organized by the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress, and the South African People of Color and Democracy Congress. Issues such as freedom of Africans, racism, imperialism and poverty prevention were discussed with the representatives of all African countries. In order to create international awareness at the congress, the congressmen sent a letter to Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and asked him to support the Congress from Turkey. However, Turkey remained silent on this support and this did not change the current state of South Africa in 1994. Conversely, struggles against the racist apartheid system led by many political movements continued for years and a major regime change took place in 1994. With this change, South Africa passed into democracy. After this period, Nelson Mandela became South Africa's first political head of state.

Nelson Mandela's management brought major changes to South Africa. In 1993, diplomatic relations were initiated with Turkey by the establishment of South African embassy in Ankara and a Turkey embassy in Pretoria a year later.

### **3.3. TURKISH AID ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA**

Turkey contributed to the African countries that recently gained their independence by allocating aid budget for their development and providing funding to international aid organizations. In addition, it provided aid to countries affected by natural disasters through its related organizations. Especially for their development, Turkey made financial assistance to the sub-Saharan countries, and at the same time, it was engaged in the UN training activities under the project of sending experts. Notably, experts were sent to Uganda in April 1965 within the framework of the UN Implementation and Administrative Staff Recruitment OPEX program (DSA:030.18.01.02.186.25.10). These experts' work with officials in Turkey and the

projects they carried out in Uganda were found in various training programs in consultation with civil society organizations, and the tasks given by the UN were fulfilled. In view of the agriculture field that was very important in the development of sub-Saharan African countries, Agricultural Engineer Davut Aris was sent as an expert to Zambia in November 1965 under the supervision of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization to support agricultural operations (DSA:030.18.01.02.190.66.14).

### **3.3.1. Visit of Malawi Minister of Transport to Turkey**

On 10<sup>th</sup> March 1965, Malawi Minister of Transport, J. D. Msonthi, visited Turkey whereby important negotiations were held. Msonthi held a series of meetings with the Ministries of Transport, National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Public Works, Health and National Education. During the interviews, he made the following demands:

- In his meeting with the Ministry of Transport and Public Works, Msonthi gave information about the railways that were under construction in Malawi and the highways they were building around Lake Nyasa; he asked the Turkish companies, engineers, and technicians to aid in these tasks.
- He stated that they were considering re-establishing Malawi army and requested training from the Ministry of National Defense of Turkey.
- During Msonthi's meeting with the Turkish Minister of Education, Msonthi stated that Malawi had a major shortage of technical staff. In addition, Msonthi has requested scholarship for Malawian students from the Minister of Education. The Ministry of Education also stated that they will provide scholarships for Malawi students from art schools in Turkey and the Middle East Technical University. (DSA:030.01.00.00.23.131.2.2).
- Msonthi also met with the Minister of Health and requested doctors to be sent to Malawi saying that they needed practitioners to work in the healthcare system.

Msonthi finally met with the Turkish Prime Minister Suat Hayri Ürgüplü and specified the transport, education, national defense, and health care demands to him. The Prime Minister stated that this request would be met in line with the opportunities of Turkey (DSA:030.01.00.00.23.131.2.3).

### **3.3.2. Humanitarian Aid**

Turkey also helped people affected by conflict and countries affected by natural disasters that occurred in North Africa. Via the Turkish Red Crescent, Turkey sent twenty tons of sugar in 1958, ten tons in 1961, and ten tons in 1962 to Algerian refugees who took refuge in Tunisia during the conflicts between France and Algeria (DSA:030.18.01.02.161.38.2, 2020). Likewise, Turkey helped the Algerian refugees by sending 50 thousand Turkish Lira to the UNHCR in 1961 (DSA:030.18.01.02.161.34.17). In 1979, the Turkish Red Crescent also provided material aid worth 125 thousand Turkish Lira in response to the flood disaster that occurred in Tunisia, in addition to 5 thousand tons of wheat aid for the people of Ethiopia affected by famine as a result of drought.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND AFRICA DURING THE COLD WAR ERA

#### INTERVIEW

- **Prof. Dr. Ahmet KAVAS/** Turkey's Ambassador to Senegal

- **Numan HAZAR/** Retired Ambassador

- **What is the importance of Africa for Turkey in your opinion?**

**Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kavas:** *Due to Africa's strategic and geopolitical location, its 1.5 billion population that is estimated to reach 2.5 billion in the next 30 years, fertile lands, underground resources, young and dynamic human resources, and attention given by 54 countries, it has become a necessary for Turkey to invest in Africa. Africa has historical ties with a large part of the continent, including north and east, even partially inland, if not entirely. In other words, it is very difficult to go to this geography, to exist there. Turks have been more or less influential for about a thousand years between the ninth to twentieth centuries. There are historical buildings, customs, traditions, and communities of Turkish origin that bear traces of the past centuries. The Republic of Turkey and surrounding neighbors struggled for decades on many issues. It could not find the opportunity to be interested in distant geographies. During the prime ministry and presidency of Turgut Özal for the first time in the 1980s, a serious movement started. Necmettin Erbakan's short-term coalition government also gave a certain direction to this process. Turkey's onset of a new orientation in foreign policy in the 2000s took place to bring attention to this continent. While historical ties are clear, it has become a necessity to turn to this huge geography as a requirement of the current politics."*

**Numan Hazar:** *Africa is itself an important continent. It is a continent that catches attention by international politics due to its various problems. For an international researcher, Africa looks like a laboratory in my opinion. All international issues in the current world today are in Africa. Africa faces problems such as backwardness, poverty, lack of democracy, mismanagement, migration problems, and genocide issues. It is a continent that should be given importance in international politics; that is why Africa is important for Turkey. The second situation is that the Ottoman Empire is an African state. The Ottoman Empire had provinces in many places in Africa. It had ruled in very important geographies, especially North African countries including Sudan and a part of Ethiopia. That's why we, as Turkey, are not a foreign country for Africa. As we do not have a colonial past, Africans reach out to us in their difficult time. Another reason is that there are 55 independent countries in Africa today; this situation reflects a very important rate in 193 member states in the UN. Turkey has already given importance to Africa in the past, especially on Cyprus, supporting it through the UN vote since it wanted to improve its relations with Africa. Another reason is that Turkey began to show a certain sense of economic growth for about 20 or 25 years. Therefore, Turkey felt obliged to find new commercial and economic partners.*

Kavass emphasized that the history of Turkey-Africa relations dates to the past, hence bilateral relations were strong. He also stressed that relations were not well in the beginning of the Cold War period. However, many concrete developments were carried out between Turkey and North Africa by the end of 1970's. Hazar stated that African countries began to become independent states in the 1950s. Following their independence, they started to gain an advantage of voting in the UN. Thereafter, Turkey-African relations started on international platforms.

- **Turkey developed great interest in Africa after it declared 2005 as the year of Africa. This situation portrays itself in all relevant government institutions. When we look at history, we can say that we are in a very good condition in the relations of the Ottoman Empire with Africa. How do you think this happened during the Cold War?**

**Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kavas:** *“The Republic of Turkey could not show any interest in African countries despite desiring to do so during the Cold War Period. A large part of the continent was colonized by France, the UK, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, and Italy. They would not allow the slightest move to remind the Ottoman Empire to be initiated with an Ankara-centered policy. Only independent states that needed to open embassies were required. The African states with established institutions had to get out of the European equipage and fell under the influence of the Soviet Union. The governments, opposition groups, internal conflicts, military coups, and constant regime changes did not allow engaging in this geography. Until the 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, a serious relief began in the continent. In the same period, India and China started and left all foreign powers behind with their rapid attacks in a short time and turned this geography into a center of attraction. By the end of 1990, there was an economic and political shift. Turkey opened embassies in 11/12 different countries, mainly in North African countries that gained their independence. These developments happened during the Cold War period; however, Turkey could not open a new diplomatic mission until the 1980s and 1990s and even until the 2010s. Those existing from diplomatic missions provided very limited interaction. In 1970s, a new area of interaction opened up with the investments of the Turkish contractors in Libya. This area was later moved to different Middle Eastern countries and when the Soviet Union collapsed. Laleli Bazaar that was established to appeal to Libyan traders then began to appeal mainly to those coming from all former Soviet Union republics and Eastern Europe and Balkan countries. In short, the Cold War period did not provide much contact, although it was not like the colonial period in terms of the Turkish-African relations.”*

**Numan Hazar:** *It is needed to compare the current power of Turkey with its power during the Cold War. Cold War Turkey was passing through troubling situations. Following the Second World War, there were demands from the Soviet Unions with regard to the straits. They wanted the city of Kars and Ardahan. There was a Soviet Union threat. At that time, Turkey’s economic situation was not well. Turkey’s entered into the war and drew great economic hardship to remain neutral. Turkey had to improve its relations with the West. It could not establish relations only with the African continent but also other regions. To ensure security and wellness, Turkey allied with the*

*West seeking to ensure the safety of entering NATO. Then, he turned to the internal developments in Turkey and how the Democratic Party was founded. He directed to economic developments but could not open up too much.*

Kavas stressed that Turkey and Africa relations were not as desired in the early years of the Cold War. Moreover, he stated that there has not been any initiative as almost every country in Africa had been under the influence of Western powers. However, throughout the 1970s, Turkey became effective in Africa and invested in Libya in the many sectors. According to Hazar, Cold War period left Turkish foreign policy left difficult situations in many regions. In particular, Soviet Union threatened the territorial integrity of Turkey by asking Kars and Ardahan to adopt Western oriented policy, and Turkey experienced severe economical crises. Hence, Turkey could not attempt negotiations in African and Middle East countries in the beginning of the Cold War period.

**-During the Cold War, even though Turkey-Africa relations have been accepted as being at the lower level, Turkey has immediately recognized the independence of African countries. Turkey was represented at the ambassadorial level in important African countries like Libya (1952), Morocco (1957), Tunisia (1957), and Ghana (1957). Then, we see that it opened embassies in Nigeria (1962), Algeria (1963), Senegal (1963), and Kenya (1968), respectively. Then, in the 1970s, we see that the Democratic Republic of Congo (1974), Somalia, and Tanzania (1979) were added to the countries where the Turkish embassies were opened in Africa. However, academics, writers, journalists, and African researchers in Turkey are often not able to indicate any presence of Turkey during the Cold War in Africa. Do you agree with this?**

**Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kavas:** *“This view is correct in terms of the capacity of interactions in general. It is not correct to say that it was not accomplished. However, the first local rulers of the countries that tried to stand on their new feet were those who had studied in the countries of the former colonists and had received education in different fields. There was no thought in their head about Turkey. In our country, in the mid-2000s, many academicians, bureaucrats, and ordinary people were saying what we are doing*

*in Africa. Naturally, this was a mentality, although it was not very accurate to say that it existed, even at a certain level. Of course, the Turkish products might have reached many African markets, but rather European traders were marketing them. Yet the continent's struggle for independence in Algeria, for example, as well as Turkey's criticisms that the obstacle was going to give an opinion to the French side in close contact. Economically, we had neither trained staff nor powerful capitalists to establish and maintain bilateral or regional contacts. When our 12 diplomatic representatives examine, the records from that period show the extent of this more clearly. Notably, the matter of the Cold War years to alleviate the burden of colonialism in Africa in terms of the new balance of power in Turkey was not conducive to those in the 2010s to make similar moves."*

**Numan Hazer:** *"It would be wrong to say that Turkey did not have relations with Africa in the Cold War period. Turkey had always given importance to the African continent. Although Turkey could not be opened only with the current economic and business opportunities, it looked more politically to Africa. In some parts of Africa, it used expressions such as Turkey did not matter until today. However, there were only 3 contemporary states in Africa at that time; these were South Africa, Liberia, and Ethiopia. Others were all colonial; some of them were indirectly and some were directly colonial. Egypt became independent on paper in 1922, but until the revolution in 1952, its defense and foreign policy was entirely UK. Notably, Africa, in the first 3 years after the proclamation of the Republic, opened embassies in Africa, Ethiopia, and Turkey in 1926. This shows the importance given by Turkey to Africa. The next stage in the Arab African countries has been independence, which Turkey recognizes immediately. Later, the UN adopted a decolonization bill on 14th December 1960. After this bill, all African countries became independent one by one. Turkey also contributed to the independence of these countries and opened embassies in most of these states. An example of Turkey's contribution to the independence of the sub-Saharan countries is Namibia. Namibia, formerly South West Africa, was a German colony. After the Second World War, it was given to the South African Union by the tutelage method. However, as designated by the UN to win Namibia's independence, Turkey has participated directly in the subject. He also chaired the Namibia committee.*

*Turkey has always supported the independence of African countries. Indeed, in activities related to the independence of the UN resolutions, Turkey supported the independence of Black African countries. Therefore, it has opened embassies to the extent that economic opportunities arised. It begin opening for the first time in the Arab countries in North Africa. Others were opened after the UN's independence decision. In countries such as Tanzania, Congo, and Somalia, it started to open up like a straw flame, especially in 1978. Additionally, we sent aid materials to these countries at that time. The embassy in Zimbabwe was formally opened in the struggle against racism in South Rhodesia.*

Kavas pointed out that the UK and French management style had an impact on the leaders of African countries. So, when these countries became independent, they got system problems. Then, the majority of African leaders adopted UK and Franceh management model for their countries' rules. Therefore, they were not interested in Turkish rule models. Moreover, during this period, the Turkish goods were placed in Africa but the marketing part was made by European traders. Kavas stated that the actual commercial move made by Turkey towards Africa continent was after the 2000s. Hazar empathized that Turkey attached importance to Africa during the Cold War period in general. However, in some periods, the interest of Turkey has been indirectly towards Africa. Nevertheless, Turkey had contributed to the process of independence of Sub-Saharan African countries.

- **For Algeria's independence in 1958, Turkey abstained at the UN vote, which was a lack of support for Algeria. Subsequently, this lowers Turkey's prestige in the eyes of African states. However, President Turgut Özal visited Algeria in 1985; the UN has submitted an apology due to the use of Turkey's vote against Algeria. What do you think about the subject?**

**Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kavas:** *I gave some information about this subject in the previous question. Turkey determined its direction to the West. Due to its participation in the Korean War and then joining NATO, it had to act in partnership with member states. The Algerian war of independence created a dilemma in Ankara's heart to behave in favor of Algeria's independence, but its political contacts were in the favor of France.*

*There were many rumors that NATO weapons were delivered to those who struggled for independence. The education of intellectuals and most influential politicians in West at that time and Algeria's detachment from the Ottoman Empire as early as 1832 did not leave traces in memories like the Tripoli War. However, as it was an old Ottoman Empire, Muslim people and millions of the Turkish origin people would require the expression and follow-up of interest here. This behavior caused unforgettable wounds, especially for Algerians. There are even a small number of people who react today saying don't interfere with our cause when we want to share in Algeria's suffering against colonial France. The late Turgut Özal realized that we owe an apology to the people of this country as the only remedy to forget the depressing years of the past and take a step ahead. However, we still haven't shared their pain, and we think it only attracted the people of this country. The situation in Algeria is focused on the same point. However, it was us who gave the most soldiers martyrs there. They were also Algerians in public. When the French sent back our Anatolian soldiers by ships, there was no professional army left to defend the area. This incident originally centered on bilateral joint pain. Not only Turkey but also the Algerian government limits their proximity for more than three centuries with Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa and a few famous names.*

**Numan Hazer:** *As you have mentioned Turkey's policy towards Algeria has important information. I reviewed the archive correspondence of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding this issue. There are some overlooked developments in this regard. Algeria's matter arose when Turkey itself was already under a serious threat from the Soviet Union. As I said before, the Soviet Union wanted the city of Kars and Ardahan as land, and a base was also requested in the Straits. The face of this threat in Turkey itself desperately wanted to take part in Western Alliance. In such an environment, the Algerian problem arose.*

*Another issue that everyone ignores is that France sees Algeria as a national part. This is different from Morocco, Tunisia, and other Black African countries. In the 5th article of the Washington agreement that established the NATO agreement in 1949, Algeria was seen as a part of the territorial integrity of France. This dates back to the history of the NATO treaty when Turkey was trying to join the NATO. Such a process is France's attitude towards Turkey has also been similar. However, nobody mentions this. Since*

*this situation has become more of a domestic policy, it has been an element of competition between the Democratic Party and the CHP. NATO member Turkey has been a Democrat party during the period although CHP has made the first attempt.*

*Turkey voted against the independence of Algeria only once at the UN. However, this situation has been exaggerated. When Turkey-Algeria relations subject came up, Turkey taking the side of France was extremely wrong. All subsequent voting on Turkey has always abstained. The abstentions of Turkey were very important since France was uncomfortable, and these abstain votes threatened the territorial integrity of France. Another ignored issue is that Turkey sent military equipment to Algeria. All these were done secretly with the instructions of President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. Ships carrying weapons fled from France and sailed through Libya and Tunisia.*

*Turgut Özal admitted that they did wrong but did not directly apologize to Algeria. However, there is something else Özal said and no one mentions it. He stated "Turkey's attitude at that time was the necessity of conditions." For me, apologizing is a bit extreme. Then, contradicting the Algerian situation with Turkey is another thing. After watching a western Turkey independent policy, Algeria was followed by an impartial and independent policy aligned. For this reason, it participated in the Non-Aligned Operation. Contradiction with Turkey is for this reason also. Hence, Algerian people are always close to us, and that is why the apology is exaggerated. They did not exaggerate on this issue anyway. When I go to Algeria, people do not have such thoughts in mind. They are feeding hostility to Turkey. This is a situation that we have created entirely in our domestic policy."*

Kavas commented on the decision of the Algerian issue and linked conditions of the independence process of Algerian at the UN. Turkey's support to France in the Algerian independence process has not resulted in a permanent outcome. The relations between Turkey and Algeria started to develop in the following years. Numan Hazar emphasized that there was a lot of information in this process and that the event was in a different dimension when looking at archive sources. According to the 5th article of the Washington agreement that established NATO in 1949, Algeria was considered a part of the French territory. Additionally, Algeria was seen by France as an indivisible part

of it at the time. He also emphasized that the abstention decision of Turkey cannot be said to have delayed the independence of Algeria. Therefore, Turkey's abstention did not have any effect. Turkey voted against the independence of Algeria only once at the UN. However, this issue has been exaggerated. In all the subsequent voting, Turkey has generally abstained from voting.

**-In 1965, politicians, diplomats, journalists, and academics formed a goodwill delegation from Turkey to get support from African countries about the Cyprus Issue sent to Africa. Many good intentions leading to the delegations of African countries told the thesis defended by Turkey's Cyprus Problem. However, they supported Turkey's moves did not find wide resonance in Africa and African countries against Turkey to Greece thesis. What do you think about this issue? Why do you think African countries did not support Turkey?**

**Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kavas:** *Probably when one says Turkey, they would think of colonialists in Africa such as the UK, France, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, and Germany. The island of Cyprus was also under the influence of the misinformation instilled by the Greek state in the international arena as colonialists. No African ruler and bureaucrat knew the position of this place in the history of Islam as a part of the Ottoman Empire until the 1880s when it was taken by the Ottoman Empire in 1571. They considered it as a land of today's Greece and other European powers of the period, as in Ancient Greece and the middle Ages. Of course, we have not explained the Cyprus Issue here, but in African countries, 27 of which are African states, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation with 57 members, Asia, even Europe, the American continent. As Anatolian people, even those born in the 1970s do not know what is happening in Cyprus. These kinds of issues can only be possible if the relevant state informs their interlocutors intensely. It is no use waiting for a move on your own from the other side. Even African countries have not once listened to what we defended in the Cyprus case. I do not think that goodwill committees are well equipped in this regard. The issue is that they simply do not submit the official documents to the counterpart and use a few diplomatic languages. The goal is to present convincing documents, files, videos, documentaries, whatever comes to mind. In short, anyone who*

*talks about this issue must first be well-equipped on Cyprus. Personally, when I meet and talk to a Turkish Cypriot, I understand how far I am from this issue. Here, it is not enough to address African statesmen and bureaucrats once or twice.*

**Numan Hazar:** *“When it comes to the issue of the UN General Assembly meeting in Cyprus, Turkey waited for support from member countries. It also expected support from African countries, but African countries did not know the Cyprus Issue. At that time, especially in 1967, Greek attacks on Turks increased in Cyprus. There was a military intervention in Turkey, in this case foreign policy in Africa, sent in good faith to Asian countries. In particular, Turkey sent ambassadors, ministers, academics. These delegations have asked their support by explaining Turkey’s Cyprus policy. At the same time, they pulled the ground to improve economic relations between African countries and Turkey. However, we cannot say that goodwill committees are successful.*

*In 1974, after making peace operations in Cyprus, once again, the delegation was sent to get the support of African countries since the number of African countries that are members of the UN is very high. Their vote was very important to get support for Turkey. Today, it is a very important factor that out of 193 member countries of the UN, 54 of them are African countries. In the Cyprus Issue, it emerged that Turkey had no policy in Africa. The Cyprus Issue was effective in the opening of the Africa Action Plan. At the end of the 1990s, it came up again with the desired support from African countries, but it is not in the Cyprus Issue, and Turkey’s Africa policy is a necessary step that appeared on it. And then, with the Africa Action Plan, I wrote, a new dimension in relations with Africa.*

Kavas emphasized that African leaders do not know Cyprus and the history of Cyprus sufficiently. He also thought that some part of African countries saw Turkey as a colonial state; hence, they supported Greek’s side against Turkey. The chance of the goodwill delegation sent to Africa to be successful was very difficult in such a situation, as Turkey was not well prepared for the defense of the Cyprus issue. Hazar has linked the failure of the goodwill delegation sent to Africa with the absence of a clear policy of Turkey towards Africa. Turkey had been unsuccessful in goodwill delegation process,

but this issue makes source of the Africa Action Plan prepared by Turkey in the following years.



## CONCLUSION

Turkish-African relations during the Cold War period were analyzed in this dissertation. During the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy was carried out with a Western orientation. The most basic reason is that for many years, Turkey felt itself under threat from the Soviet Union. Pro-Western foreign policy has progressed in this line Turkey's policy towards Africa. In this framework, we have sought to answer how the Cold War affected Turkish-African relations. To answer this question, Turkish Presidency Directorate of State Archives were used. Benefiting from such sources, archival documents, information related to Turkey's relations with Africa are seen in the articles written, books, and other publications. Besides, current events experienced in this study, based on archive documents and in light of findings different perspectives of Turkey-Africa relations were provided to us rather than the dominant approaches in the literature.

Turkey has a common history with most of the countries in the African continent, especially North African ones. However, after the Ottoman Empire lost its power in the nineteenth century, it had to transfer its African lands to European colonial powers. The subsequent outcome of the War of Independence under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Since its establishment, the Republic of Turkey followed a pro-Western foreign policy and distanced itself from the lands remaining from the Ottoman Empire. The basic foreign policy parameters were determined within the framework of the national borders rather than the Ottoman Empire's borders. However, this does not mean that Turkey completely turned its back to Africa. Indeed, three years after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, Turkey's first embassy in sub-Saharan Africa was inaugurated in Ethiopia.

Turkey's pro-Western foreign policy during the Cold War can be analyzed from two views of point. First of all, Turkey was unwilling to enter into any conflict with the

victorious Western powers after the Second World War. Second, Turkey wanted to ensure its development by taking the West as an example. During the Cyprus Issue, Turkish-African relations were not at the desired level as most of African countries had not gained their independence yet, and they were the colonies of Britain and France, the victors of the First and Second World Wars. Then When the Cyprus Issue break out in the agenda of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey changed its policy towards African nations. Once African nations were decolonized, Turkey recognized and established diplomatic relations with them. Despite official diplomatic relations, the progress in relations was not at the desired level until the 1980s. Turkey realistically tried to be integrated into the bipolar international system. Ankara's main concern was to protect the existing balance of power. This restricted Turkey's manoeuvring area. The turmoil in Turkey's domestic politics also prevented close relations with remote parts of the world until the 1980s. Nevertheless, several official visits and social, cultural, economic, military, and commercial agreements during the Cold War paved the way for future relations between Turkey and African countries.

The most significant turning point that affected Turkey-Africa relations during the Cold War was Cyprus Issue. After the incidents in 1963 between the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, the problem got complicated, and both Turkey and Greece were affected. When the issue could not be resolved, it was taken to the UN. Turkey developed a new strategy after the African countries supported the Greek side at the UN. Turkey created three separate delegations consisting of academics and journalists and sent them to Africa before the UN General Assembly to be held on the Cyprus Issue. African countries did not welcome Turkey request for support about the issue. There are two main reasons for this situation. First, Turkey sided with the US in the bipolar system formed after the Second World War. Turkey's pro-Washington stance led to a negative image especially at the Bandung Conference in which most of the Asian and African countries participated. The second reason was the fact that Turkey abstained from supporting the independence of North African countries at the UN. These two reasons caused estrangement between Turkey and African countries. Although Turkey could not

get the desired support from Africa after sending delegations, these negotiations started new initiatives.

Turkey understood the importance of launching new initiative in Africa especially Cyprus Issue. Then-Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit stated at the Parliament in July 1974 that Turkey needed to be present in Africa in economic, social, cultural, and commercial fields. Turkey's domestic politics was considerably stabilized in the 1980s when the Motherland Party led by Turgut Özal opened the economy to the outer world in the frame of neo-liberal economic policies. In this context, Turkey implemented foreign aid projects in Africa, Balkans, and Asian countries. Besides, it provided military support to peacekeeping missions to prevent conflicts in Africa. Soon after the end of the Cold War, Turkey provided humanitarian assistance and support to peacekeeping missions in Somalia with the resolution of the UN Security Council. In this mission, the Turkish Armed Forces was the commander of the peacekeeping force for a period. Hence, tangible progress was observed in Turkish-African relations following the end of the Cold War.

As a result of the examination of archival sources, it can be said that Turkey's political, economic, commercial, and social relations with African countries developed during the Cold War to a limited extent, especially after the independence of African countries. It was found that these relations were more intense in North African countries.

The analysis of archival sources indicates that sub-Saharan African countries saw Turkey source of inspiration in their development. There are three main reasons for sub-Saharan African countries to take Turkey as an example. First, the fact that Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country facilitated its relations with African countries. The second reason is related to the effect of historical ties. The existence of the Ottoman Empire in North Africa for about four centuries brought about a rapprochement with North African countries. Ottoman sultans' connection with important religious leaders in sub-Saharan Africa was also an important factor. The third reason is that Turks did not have a colonial past. These reasons contributed to the initiation and progress of a secure relationship between Turkey and African countries. Finally, after the

examinations of archival sources since the foundation of Turkey, its relations with African states can be said to have started during the Cold War. Bilateral relations in this period continued increasing until today.



## ATTACHMENTS

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ  
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ  
Yeniden Kuruluşu için  
Halk Hareketi  
M.P.R.C.  
Posta Kutusu 328  
LEO-LIMETE

*Yabancı  
Mektup*  
Léopoldville, 13 Ağustos 1963

Ekselâns İnönü  
Ankara (Türkiye)

Ekselâns İnönü,

Türk ihtilâlini büyük bir aikketle takip ettik. Bir ihtilâle bu kadar önem vermeğe bizi sevkedən şeyin ne olduğı sorusunu her halde kendinize soracaksınız. Her şeyden evvel şâze, Kongo (Léopoldville) milliyetinden olduğumu söylemek isterim. Kongo'da bir Halk Hareketi'nin Başkanlığını deruhte ediyorum ve halen iktidarda bulunan arkadaşlarımızın, cemiyette kendilerine lüks bir mevki sağlamak için, Kongo milletinin iyiliğini hiç te düşünmeden, iktidarı kötüye kullanmalarını içimiz parçalanarak müşahade ediyoruz. Kongo'nun iktidara gelişinde Belçika kapitalizminin karşı mücadelesini etmiştik. Fakat bu kapitalizmden daha şâi bir kapitalizmin, yani Kongolu kardeşlerimiz tarafından idare edilen bir kapitalizmin kucacağına düştük. İalınız bir zümre imtiyazlılar, istiklâlimizin ~~istiklâlimizin~~ nimetlerinden-eğer nimetleri varsa- faydalanmaktadırlar. Kongo halk kütlesinin büyük bir kısmı sefalet içerisinde yüzerken bunlar, büyük bir zenginlik içerisinde hayat sürmektedirler. Kongonun Yeniden Kuruluşu için Halk Hareketi, bugünkü duruma ~~şâ~~ deva bulmak gayesini güden bir harekettir.

Bu sözlerimle hangi noktaya varmak istediğimi Ekselânsularının tahmin ettiğini zannediyorum. Kongonun Yeniden Kuruluşu için Halk Hareketi, bir ihtilâl hazırlamakta ve hareketimizin en iyi neticelerle sonuçlanması için bize bilgi vermenizi istemektedir. Sizinle devamlı olarak mektuplaşabileceğimi kuvvetle ümit ediyorum.

Mektubuma müsbet bir cevap vereceğiniz ümidi ile en derin saygılarımı sunarım, Ekselâns.

Jean-Richard BOLOMBO,-

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TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ  
DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI

Ankara, 7 HAZİRAN 1965

No. 545.263-Kons/II - 274 DEVLET ARŞİMLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ  
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

B A Ş B A K A N L I Ğ A

Konu : Elisabethville'de Fahri Konsolosluk açılması ve bu görevi Oktay Türegün'ün tayini

İlgi :

Kongo (Leopoldville)'de diplomatik temsilciliğimiz ve muvazzaf Konsolosluğumuz mevcut olmadığından bu memlekette ve bilhassa Katanga eyaletinde bulunan vatandaşlarımızın haklarının korunması ve müracaatlarının karşılanması için Katanga Eyaletinin Merkezi Elisabethville'de bir Fahri Konsolosluk açılması düşünülmüş ve bu göreve, 1954 yılından beri Elisabethville'de ticaretle uğraşan vatandaşımız Oktay Türegün'ün tayini uygun görülmüştür.

Yapılan tahkikat sonunda, Oktay Türegün'ün memleketimizi Fahri Konsolos olarak temsil etmek hususunda gereken liyakatı haiz bulunduğu, malî durumunun ve mahallî Hükûmet nezdindeki itibarının iyi olduğu öğrenilmiştir.

Diğer taraftan, Elisabethville'de bir Fahrî Konsolosluk açmak ve bu göreve Oktay Türegün'ü tayin etmek için diplomatik kanaldan Kongo Hükûmeti nezinde istimzaçta bulunulmuş ve alınan karşılıkta bu talebimizin uygun görüldüğü bildirilmiştir.

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
T. C.  
BAŞVEKÂLET  
KANUNLAR VE KARARLAR  
Tetkik Dairesi

Karar Sayısı

4

KARARNAME

10991



Dahilde istihşâl olunan şekerlerden yirmi tonunun, Tunus'ta bulunan Cezayirli mültecilere yardım maksadıyla, Türkiye Kızılay Cemiyeti tarafından ihracına müsaade edilmesi; Maliye Vekâletinin muvafık mütalâasına dayanan Sanayi Vekâletinin 8/11/1958 tarihli ve 4/17837 sayılı yazısı üzerine, 6747 sayılı kanunun 16 ncı maddesine dayanılarak, İcra Vekilleri Heyetince 20 /II /1958 tarihinde kararlaştırılmıştır.

REİSİCUMHUR

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630 18 01 150 53 2

Dosya No:

39-11  
1309

Başvekîl

Devlet Vekîli

Devlet Vekîli

Devlet Vekîli ve  
Münakalat V.V.

Devlet Vekîli ve  
Çalışma V.V.

Adliye Vekîli

Millî Müdafaa Vekîli

Dahiliye Vekîli ve  
Hariciye V.V.

Hariciye Vekîli

Maliye Vekîli

Maarif Vekîli

Neftin Vekîli

Ticaret Vekîli

Sıh. ve İc. Mua. Vekîli

Güm. ve İn. Vekîli

Ziraat Vekîli

Münakalat Vekîli

Çalışma Vekîli

Sıh. ve İc. Vekîli

Bay-Yay. ve Turz. Vekîli

İmar ve İskân Vekîli

Koordinasyon Vekîli

Bütün Afrika milletleri temsilcileri  
nin iştirakiyle 25-26 Haziran 1955 te  
Güney Afrika'da yapılacak olan büyük  
kongrede, Afrikalıların hürriyeti mev-  
zuu, ırk farkı meselesi, emperyalizm  
ve sefaletten kurtarılması görüşüle-  
cektir.

Bize müracaatlarından maksat,  
kendilerini destekler mahiyette bir  
yazı göndermemizdir.

my.

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TELEPHONE 33-9192

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ  
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

P.D. BOX 1943

# NATIONAL ACTION COUNCIL OF CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE

A4

**Sponsoring Organisations:**

AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
S.A. INDIAN CONGRESS  
S.A. CONGRESS OF DEMOCRATS  
S.A. COLOURED PEOPLES ORGANISATION

*W. H. K. - 10/10/55*  
*6-11-10/10/55*

37 West Street,  
Johannesburg,  
South Africa.

17th May 1955.

The Prime Minister,  
Government of Turkey.

Dear Sir,

The African National Congress, South African Indian Congress, South African Congress of Democrats and the South African Coloured Peoples Organisation are jointly convening a great assembly of elected representatives of the people of South Africa for the purpose of drawing up a Freedom Charter, on the 25th and 26th June, 1955. For the first time in the history of this country, millions of people, regardless of race or colour, and from all walks of life, will be able to participate in the framing of a Charter of their own rights. Through their elected delegates they will be able to express their aspirations and write their demands in it. These demands will, therefore, be of signal importance to South Africa; they will guide the people forward in their struggle for a better and happier life.

The government of the Union of South Africa is not based upon the expression of the broad will of the people. A minority of the population has arrogated to itself the exclusive right to govern. The practice of race discrimination by successive South African governments has resulted in untold suffering and servitude for the non-white people. This has become naked oppression under the apartheid regime of the present government, which blatantly and unashamedly upholds the obnoxious ideology of *herrenvolkism* and white dominance.

Persecution on an unprecedented scale provoked resistance on the part of the people. The Defiance Campaign of 1952, and other actions against the government, strengthened the liberation front. Under the pretext of curbing the resistance of the people, the government has in recent years usurped fascist powers and has converted the country into a police state. Today all sections of the people are adversely affected; for fascism transcends even the barrier of race and colour.


We are heartened at the trend of international events. The determination of the Asian-African Conference to eradicate any trace of racial discrimination is of great significance. Expression of warm sympathy and support for the victims of racism in South Africa has been a source of inspiration to the people of this country. Race discrimination, imperialist domination and colonial exploitation can no longer be tolerated and their obliteration from the face of the earth is a noble cause in which all nations and men of goodwill can and must unite for the purpose of ending oppression and misery.

The main task of the CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE will be to draw up a FREEDOM CHARTER for all people and groups in South Africa. From such an assembly will come a declaration which will inspire our people with fresh hope for the future. We in South Africa are aiming at consolidating and broadening the perspective of democracy and freedom, and it is in this spirit that we approach you, on the eve of the Congress of the People, as an important participant in the Asian-African Conference, to send us a message of support.

Thanking you in anticipation for your reply,

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T. C.  
BAŞBAKANLIK  
KANUNLAR VE KARARLAR TETKİK DAİRESİ



Sayı: 6/ 6927

K A R A R N A M E

20/12/1965 tarihli ve 6/5742 sayılı Kararname ile verilen yetkiye dayanılarak 16/Haziran/1966 tarihinde Hükümetimizle Gambia Hükümeti arasında mektup teatisi suretiyle imzalanan ilişik "Vize Muafiyet Anlaşması"nın (16/Temmuz/1966 tarihinde yürürlüğe girmek üzere) onaylanması; Dışişleri Bakanlığının 5/8/1966 tarihli ve Kons/1-350.020-331 sayılı yazısı üzerine, 31/5/1963 tarihli ve 244 sayılı Kanunun 3 üncü maddesine göre, Bakanlar Kurulunca 22/ 8 /1966 tarihinde kararlaştırılmıştır.

Ekl

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| Başbakan<br>                    | Devlet Bakanı<br>            | Devlet Bakanı<br>        | Devlet Bakanı<br>          |
| Devlet Bakanı<br>               | Adalet Bakanı<br>            | Millî Savunma Bakanı<br> | İçişleri Bakanı<br>        |
| Maliye Bakanı<br>               | Millî Eğitim Bakanı<br>      | Bayındırlık Bakanı<br>   | Ticaret Bakanı<br>         |
| Güm. ve Tekel Bakanı<br>        | Tarım Bakanı<br>             | Ulaştırma Bakanı<br>     | Çalışma Bakanı<br>         |
| Enerji ve Tabii Kay. Bakanı<br> | Turizm ve Tanıtma Bakanı<br> | İmar ve İskân Bakanı<br> | Sağ. ve Sos. Y. Bakanı<br> |
|                                 |                              |                          | Sanayi Bakanı<br>          |
|                                 |                              |                          | Köy İşleri Bakanı<br>      |

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