

**Turkey’s “Benevolent Expansion” in Somalia:
Development Gifts and Power Resources
of an Emerging Country**

by

Erdem Kayserilioglu

A Dissertation Submitted to the
Graduate School of Social Sciences & Humanities
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Sociology



KOÇ ÜNİVERSİTESİ

June 30, 2022

ABSTRACT

Turkey's "Benevolent Expansion" in Somalia: Development Gifts and Power Resources of an Emerging Country

Erdem Kayserilioğlu

Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

June 30, 2022

This dissertation analyzes Turkey-Somalia development partnership from a comparative historical and relational perspective, while addressing gift theories to interpret Turkey's aid politics. Emerging donors introduce new discourses, practices, and institutions into international aid architecture, and they are assumed to be transforming North-South hierarchies. Turkey has gained an emerging donor reputation and Somalia is the most comprehensive example to analyze Turkey's changing aid politics. I argue that aid modalities change historically, but states use foreign aid to expand their power resources. I compare post-colonial Italian development aid, Cold War Soviet military aid, and Turkey's humanitarian aid to post-state collapse Somalia. I question the relation between donor states' expansionist interests and their aid politics. After the World War 2, former colonist Italy used development aid to restore its plantations, to monopolize Somali banana trade, and hence to actualize a neo-imperial expansion. During the Cold War, the USSR wanted to counterbalance the US presence in Ethiopia, and provided arms to Somalia to access its naval facilities; thus, Moscow achieved a geopolitical expansion through military aid. After two decades from Somalia's destructive 1991 civil war, Turkey responded to the country's severe drought crisis with a humanitarian intervention in 2011, and humanitarian aid created an unexpected opportunity for an emerging country to accumulate power resources in a "failed state." To compare Turkey's aid politics to Italian and Soviet aid regimes, I question the relation between humanitarian aid and material gains. I establish that Turkey's state-led aid campaign incorporated foreign policy interest, the humanitarian imperative, and Islamic charity ethics. Based on parliamentary archives between 2002-2015, I show that Turkey's AKP government firstly approached Somalia to leverage its regional leadership claims, but later 2011 humanitarian aid campaign discursively concealed Turkey's foreign policy objectives with a compassionate rhetoric of saving lives. Relying on expert interviews conducted with Turkey's official and faith-based NGO actors, I establish that Islamic ethics and nationalist aspirations informed the making of aid projects, where charity and foreign policy concerns blended disinterested and self-interested motives. By addressing theories on gift exchange, I define Turkey's aid politics as a "benevolent expansion". In the last chapter, I interpret Somali community's positive and negative responses toward Turkey's endeavors through in-depth interviews conducted with Somali scholarship students, entrepreneurs, and academics in Turkey and elsewhere. Turkey's scholarship programs triggered a student migration, and graduates initiated diasporic networks in Turkey. I conclude that access to economic gains determines the perception of transnational Somali community toward Turkey either as a win-win partner or as a foreign actor accumulating unequal benefits.

ÖZETÇE

Türkiye’nin Somali’deki “Hayırsever Genişlemesi”:

Kalkınma Hediye­leri ve Bir Yükselen Ülkenin Güç Kaynakları

Erdem Kayserilioğlu

Sosyoloji, Doktora 30

Haziran, 2022

Bu araştırma Türkiye-Somali kalkınma ortaklığını karşılaştırmalı tarihsel ve ilişkisel yöntemlerle inceliyor, Türkiye’nin yardım siyasetini hediye kuramları ile yorumluyor. Yükselen ülkeler uluslararası yardım sistemine yeni söylem, pratik ve kurumlar getirdi; bu değişim Kuzey-Güney hiyerarşisinin dönüşümü olarak değerlendiriliyor. Çalışmanın iddiasına göre, yardım modelleri tarihsel olarak değişse bile uluslararası yardım donör devletin güç kaynaklarının genişlemesine yarar. Buna dayanarak Somali’nin uluslararası yardım tarihi içindeki üç başat donör ülkenin yardım siyasetini karşılaştırıyorum: sömürge sonrası İtalyan kalkınma yardımları, Soğuk Savaş içinde Sovyetler Birliği’nin askeri yardımları, devlet çöküşünden sonra ülkede etkin hale gelen Türkiye’nin insani yardımları. Donörlerin dış politika ihtiyaçları ve yardım siyasetleri arasındaki ilişkiyi inceliyorum ve yardım rejimlerinin donör ve alıcı ülke için karşılıklı etkilerini değerlendiriyorum. İtalya, eski plantasyonlarını restore etmek, İtalyan yatırımlarını desteklemek ve güney Somali’deki tarımsal üretimi tekelleştirmek için kalkınma yardımlarını kullandı; ekonomik yardımlar ile neo-emperyal bir genişleme sağladı. Doğu Afrika’daki ABD nüfusuna dengelemek isteyen Sovyetler Birliği, Somali’nin stratejik limanlarına ulaşmak için askeri yardımı kullandı. Soğuk Savaş silah desteği Moskova için Doğu Afrika’da jeopolitik bir genişleme doğurdu. 1991’deki yıkıcı iç savaştan yirmi yıl sonra, Türkiye, 2011’deki kuraklık krizine insani müdahaleyle yanıt verdi ve “başarısız devlet” olarak anılan Somali’de yükselen bir ülke için beklenmedik ticari ve jeopolitik fırsatlar elde etti. İnsani yardım siyaseti ve genişleme arasındaki ilişkiyi iki düzeyde araştırıyorum. Önce, 2002-2015 arasındaki parlamento tutanaklarını inceliyorum. AKP hükümetlerinin dış politika söyleminde Somali ilk olarak bölgesel güç ve liderlik hedefleri çerçevesinde yer buldu. Fakat 2011 insani müdahalesinin harekete geçirdiği şefkat söylemi ve insancıl siyaset baştaki çıkar siyasetini perdelemiş, nüfuz kazanımını meşrulaştırmış oldu. Sonra, yardım projelerinde görev almış resmi kurumların, yardım derneklerinin ve İslami STK’ların temsilcileri ile gerçekleştirdiğim mülakatlara dayanarak Türk aktörlerin yardım, partnerlik ve yatırımı nasıl kavradığını, proje yapımı ve ortaklık ilişkilerini hangi etik ve politik niyetler ile anlamlandırdıklarını yorumluyorum. İslami hayır etiği ile dış politika ihtiyaçlarını iç içe geçiren Türkiye’nin Somali’deki yardım siyasetini hediye teorilerinden yararlanarak “hayırsever genişleme” olarak tanımlıyorum. Son bölümde, uluslararası Somali topluluğunun eğitim, sağlık, yatırım ihtiyaçları için Türkiye’ye gelmesinin arkasında yatan kurumsal ve sosyal süreçleri Somalili burslu öğrenciler, yatırımcılar ve akademisyenler ile yaptığım derinlemesine görüşmeler ışığında inceliyorum. Somali topluluğunun Türkiye’ye dönük pozitif ve negatif algılarının ekonomik arka planını tartışıyorum.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank my advisor Assoc. Prof. Erdem Yörük and thesis monitoring committee members Prof. Çağlar Keyder and Prof. Bahattin Akşit. They were always open about their critiques and hesitations regarding my dissertation topic. Still, by providing cautious comments and supportive research strategies, they let me pursue my initial inquiry. I learnt a lot from them in this period. Defense jury members Asst. Prof. Başak Can Bulut and Assoc. Prof. Lee Cassanelli provided rich insight and productive suggestions for improving several thematic gaps along the text. I thank all of them for their guidance.

I am grateful to all Somali friends, who shared their stories with me. They generously helped me by reaching out their close environment and convincing them for further interviews during the pandemic restrictions. I was unable to carry my research out to Somalia for a field study, that is why their experiences and interpretations provided me a roadmap to follow the ways in which the transnational Somali community was affected by (and also effected) the ten-year bilateral relationship. I sincerely appreciate their contribution to this study. Nuruddin Farah's *The Gift* has been an inspiration as well as a point of reference for me while writing about the constraining power of aid, the interplay between arrogant and humble feelings going around everyday exchanges, and their connection to transnational processes. I hope I fairly represented the Somali experience in this analysis of foreign aid relationalities in contemporary Somalia.

While writing the dissertation, I worked as a researcher in Prof. Mahir Şaul's "Migration from Sub-Saharan Africa to Turkey and Mediterranean Basin" project, funded by TÜBİTAK 2232-A program. It was not only a financial support, but more importantly it provided me a new research interest. I thank Prof. Şaul for some themes in the last chapter came out as a result of my dialogue with him.

Aybike Alkan read the first draft of introductory sections and warned me beforehand about several inconsistent points. Rahmi Can Yamanoglu helped me in processing voice recorded interviews. I thank both of them for their interest and time.

I am always indebted to Deniz Kocaoğlu, my dearest, for all her help, support, and encouragement.

Lastly, my family, who were almost more anxious than me while due dates were approaching. I thank my parents for supporting their children's decisions, me and my brother, though this was not what they had expected from us, maybe.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables	viii
List of Figures.....	ix
Chapter 1 Introduction	1
1.1 Turkey's new foreign aid regime: Is disinterested aid possible?	9
1.2 Aid and development in history and theory	14
1.2.1 Development or dependency: A world-system critique	17
1.2.2 Third World alternatives: Solidarism, Pan-Africanism, self-reliance	19
1.3 South-South Cooperations: A challenge or a myth?	21
1.3.1 Studying Turkey as an emerging donor: A critical review of literature.....	24
1.4 Aid as gift: From local exchanges to international flows	27
1.4.1 The gift of the state: Humanitarian reason and power resources	32
1.5 Chapter outlines	35
Chapter 2 Italian Development Aid: A Neo-Imperial Expansion, 1950-1969.....	39
2.1 Somalia: History, culture, and imperial partition.....	41
2.2 Italy's belated imperialism in East Africa.....	45
2.3 Italian Trusteeship: Development aid for neo-imperial restoration	53
2.3.1 AFIS: Somalization in Italian-built economy and politics	55
2.4 Italian dictates on development plans	63
2.5. Conclusion.....	68
Chapter 3 Soviet Military Aid: A Geopolitical Expansion, 1963-1978	70
3.1 Cold War rivalry in the Horn of Africa.....	71
3.1.1 Soviet realpolitik in the Horn	71
3.1.2 Arms for ports: Ethiopia-US vs. Somalia-USSR military agreements	73
3.2 Soviet Union in socialist Somalia: A geopolitical expansion	77
3.2.1 The Soviet legacy in Somalia's political culture and economy	78

3.2.2 The Soviet legacy in Somalia's military and foreign policy	85
3.3 A new geopolitics in the Horn: Switching superpower alliances	89
3.3.1 Soviet-Ethiopia alliance after the Ogaden War	91
3.3.2 Somalia returns to the West.....	95
3. 4 Conclusion.....	97
Chapter 4 Somalia in Turkey's Foreign Policy Discourse: Interests and Compassionate Politics	99
4.1 Turkey's Africa policy: An ambitious engagement after a long delay	100
4.1.1 Changing political economy and new foreign policy objectives	101
4.2 Somalia in foreign policy discourse: From sarcasm to national interests	106
4.3 The crisis in Somalia and an emerging power's humanitarianism	115
4.4 Humanitarian reframing of Somalia: Compassionate politics of interests.....	120
4.5 Conclusion.....	127
Chapter 5 Turkey's Benevolent Expansion in Somalia: Development Gifts and Power Resources.....	129
5.1 From humanitarian aid to investment: Is disinterested aid possible?	133
5.1.1 An emerging donor's making of development: Goals and concerns	137
5.2 Public-NGO collaboration: Expanding the organizational network	141
5.2.1 NGO's moral and political responsibilities: Aid for God and Nation.....	145
5.3 Benevolent expansion through development gifts: "Keeping-while-giving"	150
5.4 Conclusion.....	155
Chapter 6 Somalia Agency and Partnership: Experiences, Expectations, Critiques.....	157
6.1 Somali students in Turkey: An unexpected journey	160
6.1.1 Student unions and proto-nationalist imaginations	165
6.2 Partnership in dispute: Win-win or a dependency to come?.....	170
6.2.1 Positive legitimations: Personal expectations and collective gains.....	171

6.2.2 Negative legitimations: Political interests, disproportional gains, and dependency	177
6.3 Diasporic connections: Between engagement and disengagement	180
6.4 Conclusion.....	184
Chapter 7 Conclusion	186
7.1 Overview of the chapters	186
7.2 Contributions of the research	190
Bibliography	194



LIST OF TABLES

Ownership distributions for cultivable land, 1933.....	51
Somali banana production and export, 1950-63.....	58
Expenditures and revenues under AFIS.....	60
Grant aid to Somalia, 1960-1963.....	64
Soviet Union's trade with Ethiopia and Somalia.....	76
Balance of payments, 1974-79.....	80
Development expenditures, 1971-73 plan.....	81
Soviet trade with Somalia and Ethiopia, 1970-78.....	82
Crops and industrial production outputs, 1970-79.....	83
Sectoral allocation of public expenditures (% of total), 1975-79.....	84
Military assistance to the Horn, 1961-70.....	85
Soviet naval visits in the Indian Ocean, 1967-76.....	86
Military capacities of Somalia and Ethiopia, 1969-1977.....	87
Turkey's ODA in total and to Africa, 2006-2010.....	104
NGO development aid flows, 2005-2011.....	105
Turkey's official aid expenditure in Africa.....	114
Turkey's trade with Somalia, 2001-2021.....	120

LIST OF FIGURES

Colonial boundaries in the Horn of Africa, 1925.....	44
Turkey’s humanitarian aid flows, 2005-2017.....	124
Number of Somali students in state and private universities, 2013-2020.....	162



ABBREVIATIONS

AFIS, *Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana in Somalia* (Italian Trusteeship Administration in Somalia)

DAC, Development Assistance Committee

ODA, Official development assistance

SSC, South-South cooperation

TİKA, Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Foreign aid is usually considered as a topic of international relations discipline studying foreign policy interests of donor states on certain aid geographies to win opportunity resources, allies, and hence a space of maneuver in international politics. This relates to the basic formulation of who gives aid to whom, and for what reason and aim. Or, in more technical terms, foreign aid appears as a cold field of measurement assessing donor states' aid effectiveness for certain development goals. This addresses the question of whose aid assets and targets are more effective for ameliorating the effects of regional problems on global processes. Here the question is whose aid modality is more valid to sustain certain global governmental concerns; say it poverty, food crisis, environment, or security. This equates foreign aid to the issue of a donor state's credibility and prestige to attract others for its own leadership; in other words, foreign aid becomes an issue of soft power, in the language of international relations.

Grasped within such general trends, foreign aid seems as if it is only about the state that gives, and outcomes it aims to reap. But, what about the recipient? And, what about the character of the relationality between donor and recipient states? Partnership may be a deceptive rhetoric concealing patronage of the donor state, but aid is an inter-state relationship that creates spatial interactions and symbolic exchanges. These intersubjective encounters effect the way aid intervention is legitimized, interpreted, organized, and applied. Such interactive grounds also initiate socio-psychological environments that mobilize feelings of solidarity, mutuality, suspicion, or resentment,

which can be more influential than aid money in effecting state's long term interests.¹ Analyzing foreign aid as a relationality is peculiarly important when we study emerging donors and their impact on local and international levels.

Growing literature on emerging donors provides a fruitful ground to interpret contemporary North-South and South-South hierarchies. Emerging donors have different names, such as non-traditional donors, Southern donors, non-Western donors, or non-DAC (members of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD) donors. Despite the variety in naming, there are several commonalities within the burgeoning South-South cooperations (SSCs) literature. First, the literature usually approaches new actors exclusively from the donor's side. Second, there is a lack of empirically grounded research on emerging donors' actual impact on recipient state and society. Lastly, there is a weak comparative historical curiosity in SSCs literature. This formalist account limits a historical insight about continuity or change between traditional and emerging donors' aid regimes. Because of these factors, SSCs literature is loosely linked to history of dependency in international politics, and case studies reluctantly follow the foreign aid history of recipient nations.

The practice of foreign aid goes back to imperial and colonial grants, but the idea of aid for development appeared as a global paradigm after the World War 2. Since then, the development thinking gone through different conceptions and challenges. Seen from this historical point of view, aid and partnership of the Global South should not be understood as a contemporary phenomenon. Starting with the 1950s, postcolonial politicians in Africa, Asia, and Latin America perceived foreign aid coming from postwar superpowers as a new form of economic colonialism, and they responded it with alternative organizational and intellectual models aiming a solidaristic answer to the question of development (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Tafira, 2019). Bandung Conference, Non-Aligned Movement, Tricontinental Conference, and the establishment of New International Economic Order have been historical examples of continuing "Southern" initiatives for economic and political collaboration in given international systems. That is why, South-South cooperation is a broad and heterogeneous term, as Gray and Gills (2016, p. 557) states, addressing key concept and practices of solidarity, mutuality, and

¹ See, for example, the professor of international development and the World Bank regional specialist Phyliss Pomerantz arguing that "The quality of the relationship may, in fact, be more important in influencing policy directions and ensuring successful outcomes, than the money itself" (2004, p. 8).

transformative politic of development vis-à-vis the exploitative legacy of the Global North. Middle power countries enter into the same platform by using similar rhetorical elements and appear as ambitious donors and mediators. They become as influential as previous Southern actors in partnership, infrastructure agreements, and peacekeeping operations especially in Africa. Multiple actors complicate aid geographies, introduce new institutions and moralized discourses into development landscape, and pursue different geopolitical agendas to expand their power resources. During the last two decades, Turkey has become one of these middle power countries.

Somalia is an interesting case to study Turkey's changing politics of foreign aid and new interests as an emerging donor. Until Justice and Development Party rule (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), who stayed in the government since 2002 general elections, Turkey neither had strong relations with the African continent nor organized a foreign aid program to build partnership. Turkey traditionally supported post-Soviet ethnic communities in Central Asia and East European countries because of historic and cultural ties to Ottoman era. However, during the AKP rule Africa became a prime importance to win regional allies and expand its export market, and Turkish government adopted a new foreign aid policy to back up this foreign policy shift. Somalia became the most concrete example of this endeavor combining aid and investment motives in Turkey's new politics of aid. Two decades after the 1991 civil war and state collapse in Somalia, Turkey's Justice and Development Party government candidly responded to the dramatic drought crisis on 19 August 2011. Then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan mobilized an extensive donation campaign at home during the holy month of Ramadan to save lives in Somalia. Official aid agencies and ministries, Islamic NGOs, and business groups played key roles in operating the relief campaign. In the following years Turkey's private and state investments in Somalia included education, health, agriculture, transportation infrastructure, and military training. Since the 2011 humanitarian intervention, Turkey channeled large sums of aid and investment, and reaped market and geostrategic advantages in return, while legitimizing its stay in Somalia as a candid development partner. In the end, Somalia gained a symbolic status in Turkey's official foreign aid discourse, as Erdoğan stated: "Somalia has become the symbol of the relationship we

want to establish with our African brothers. With Somalia, the Turkish type of aid model has become accepted in the literature”.²

Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that the compassionate politics to save lives, state-led humanitarian campaign, and Islamic charity brought about unexpected opportunities for an emerging country to accumulate power resources in a so-called “failed state.” Despite this centrality of the Somalia case for Turkey’s emerging donor practices, there is still a wide gap in understanding its political, organizational, and ideational components. This dissertation considers three elements as essential to meaningfully interpret Turkey’s aid regime as an emerging donor. Firstly, Turkey’s strategic involvement in Somalia came after the AKP government’s new proactive foreign policy objectives to achieve its regional leadership claims. Therefore, the first question should be how foreign policy interests of emerging donors effect their foreign aid programs. Secondly, Islamic NGOs became key actors not only during the 2011 humanitarian intervention but also in the following years with their infrastructure projects in Somalia’s health, education, and agriculture sectors. Islamic humanitarianism challenges the idea that humanitarianism is a Western project, and South-South relations make the global rescue landscape more complex with diverging practices, non-Eurocentric moral codes, and political ideologies (See Feldman, 2015, p. 276). That is why, we need to question how Turkey’s Islamic NGOs perceived aid and partnership in the Somali context, how religious ethics and political motives informed the making of infrastructure projects, and how faith-based NGOs influenced Turkey’s long-term presence in Somalia.

Thirdly, our analysis should not end up as a formalistic and isolationist explanation, as recent studies did. In the current SSCs literature, it is not uncommon to repeat the statement that emerging donors use foreign aid as a soft power tool to attract regional actors for their own foreign policy goals. This shorthand explanation unfortunately does not offer any adequate answer to how emerging donors build their aid policies, what interactions they cause on aid-related environments, and what concrete outcomes these encounters generate for long term interests of donor and recipient nations. Turkey is not the only example using aid as a diplomatic tool, and emerging donors more

² *Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Türk tipi yardım modeli kabul görür hale geldi.* (2016, February 23). Anadolu Ajansı. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-turk-tipi-yardim-modeli-kabul-gorur-hale-geldi/526062>

increasingly adhere to their claims in international peacekeeping and global humanitarian industry (Amar, 2012). That is why, instead of relying on taken-for-granted assumptions about the attractiveness of aid as a soft power asset, we need to question the ideational, material, and organizational components of Turkey's foreign aid regime, and their relational outcomes for both the donor and recipient states. By these elements we can give an answer to the question of whether traditional and emerging donors are different from each other; i.e. through a comparative historical inquiry and relational analysis of emerging donor politics and their aid practices at site-specific locals.

This dissertation analyzes Turkey-Somalia development partnership by using comparative historical and anthropological methods, while addressing theories on gift exchange to explain Turkey's aid and investment politics. Relational analysis is crucial to interpret subject positions, symbolic exchanges, and the impact of ethical and political lifeworlds on the making of aid projects. At this point, I follow development anthropologist Mosse's argument that foreign aid is not only a monetary or a technical enterprise, but it creates complex social and political effects involving "the interaction and intermediation of extensive actor networks, with different logics and life-worlds" (2013, p. 228). Considering the comparison of historical aid regimes, sociologist Bhambra's "connected history" approach is fruitful. Bhambra rejects ideal typical constructions and postmodernist particularism in comparative studies. Instead she argues that global processes have to be systematically reconciled while letting "the reconstruction of theoretical categories and in the incorporation of new data and evidence" (Bhambra, 2010, p. 140). This approach, I believe, secures our research from formalist and isolationist descriptions of different donor state's aid politics as idea types, and at the same time it provides an openness for categorical reinterpretation and theoretical contribution through adding new data into the interconnected history of global processes. Through Bhambra's "international interconnectedness" perspective, we can take Somalia's foreign aid history as a ground where different aid regimes have territorialized, operated, and decomposed in line with historical determinants, which have influenced the formation and dissolution of Somalia's state and society structures.

In sum, this dissertation focuses on Somalia's transnational history of foreign aid, and it compares three major donors and their dominant aid regimes: post-colonial Italian development aid, Cold War Soviet military aid, and post-state collapse humanitarian aid by Turkey. I question the relation between donor state's expansionist interest and their

foreign aid politics, and I inquire impacts of different aid regimes on Somali state and society. I mainly argue that emerging donors bring new aid modalities to the international aid architecture, yet foreign aid serves for expanding the donor's power resources while maintaining unequal exchange.

After the World War 2, European states used economic aid to reconstruct their hegemony over their ex-colonies. Similarly, Italy returned to its ex-colony of Somalia through development aid and pioneered in agricultural grants. Starting with the trusteeship administration in 1950, Italian aid exclusively favored Somali agriculture in order to restore previous plantations and favor Italian enterprises in southern Somalia. In the end, development aid led Italian capital to monopolize Somali banana production and export. Exclusionary support to a single crop regime deteriorated national economy and made it more dependent on foreign aid to compensate budget deficit and import items. In the end, Italy's aid to its ex-colony re-opened Somali agriculture to Italian firms while creating an economic dependency on Italian capital and imports. I define postcolonial Italian development aid regime as a neo-imperial expansion since it restored pre-war colonial status quo and weakened nascent Somali economy and bureaucracy by making them dependent on Italian grants. After only nine years from its independence, democratic government was toppled by General Siad Barre's bloodless coup in 1969.

Siad Barre closed down all political parties, and he declared scientific socialism as the new official ideology. Both Cold War rivalry in the Horn of Africa and Barre's socialist rhetoric initiated a closer relationship between the USSR and Somalia. Unlike economic objectives, Cold War competition prioritized political clientelism and geopolitical influence. In order to counterbalance the USA's alliance with Ethiopia, Moscow used military aid to access Somalia's strategic naval facilities. Massive arms assistance made Somalia the fourth largest military force in Africa during the 1970s, and accordingly Moscow solidified its presence in the Horn. However, the heavy militarization of two archenemies Ethiopia and Somalia by two Cold War competitors, Washington and Moscow, ignited a game changing border war in Ogaden in 1978. Somalia's irredentist campaign against Ethiopia was in contradiction with the USSR's East Africa diplomacy, and Moscow suddenly left Somalia alone by switching its arms support in favor of Ethiopia during the Ogaden War. By that, the Soviet Union secured its geostrategic presence in the Horn, but Somalia lost its superpower ally in the middle of escalating economic and political crises at home. Galvanizing clan-based uprisings

against Barre's authoritarian regime ended up with a civil war toward the late 1980s and eventually disintegrated the nation. I define Soviet military aid regime as a geopolitical expansion, which provided Moscow a gateway to Somali coasts and a geostrategic advantage against the USA, but simultaneously created detrimental consequences for Somalia's regional and domestic stability.

Unlike development or military assistance, Turkey entered post-state collapse Somalia through humanitarian aid, which provided an opportunity to open up Somalia's strategic sectors for investment and hence to accumulate prestige, trade, and geostrategic advantages. I argue that Turkey's aid politics incorporated foreign policy interests, Islamic humanitarianism, and market expectations. To compare Turkey's aid politics to Italian and Soviet aid regimes, I question how humanitarian aid, an apparently disinterested act to save lives, provide material gains for long-term state interests. At first, the juxtaposition of self-interest in foreign policy and disinterestedness in humanitarian aid may appear contradictory. The former necessitates a calculative mind expecting future benefits, whereas the latter promises a selfless act of sacrifice in the name of saving lives of others. Nevertheless, the tension between intentions (foreign policy and compassionate sentiments) is not a conflict of interest, but in fact this apparent duality reveal the organizational and ideational characteristic of Turkey's aid politics in Somalia.

If we approach aid as a gift relationality, the conceptual tension between aid and investment will be resolved into a meaningful co-existence of joint motives. Marcel Mauss argues in his seminal essay *The Gift* (2002 [1925]) that gifts appear as disinterested acts of exchange, but they are always given for an expectation of a counter-return either as a gratitude, status, or better relationships for trade and protection. It is an economic action based on non-market principles of wasting or sacrificing resources. It is a contractual relationality between two parties without having written obligations. It is also a quest for power, where the claim for moral and material supremacy is disguised in selfless offers. This interest/disinterest blend embedded in gift exchange remarkably influenced studies on economic anthropology (Osteen, 2013), global humanitarianism (Silk, 2004), charity and humanitarianism in Islam (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, 2003; Kochuyt, 2009; Tugal, 2017; Mittermaier, 2019), and studies on foreign aid and international political economy (Bataille, 1988; Dillon, 2003 [1968]; Furia, 2015; Hattori, 2001; Heins et al., 2018; Perroux, 1954).

Gift exchange initiates inter-societal relations. These relations contain symbolic domination when generous acts and services cannot be reciprocated, but when a social reproduction is sustained gift exchange also strengthens social ties and initiates an encompassing communitarianism (Berking, 1999; Gudeman, 2001). Spatial aspect of gift exchange can serve as a diplomatic tool of expansion for states. Humanitarian intervention and solidaristic aid, for example, offer extra-regional connections and creates geopolitical links when orchestrated by state interests (Brković, 2020). Disasters and relief operations, therefore, create strategic opportunities for states to deploy humanitarian gifts as an instrument of intervening new zones and hence opening up new options for territorial control and market investment (Swamy, 2017). NGO aid and solidarist donations play a key role in this assemblage of compassionate acts and discourses, where disinterest and self-interest, aid and investment become congealed in state-led humanitarian campaigns.

The blend of disinterest and self-interest in humanitarian aid, therefore, is not a tension or a conflict between state strategies and aid actors' life worlds, but it is a peculiar characteristic of humanitarian aid as gift, where apparently contradictory logics of solidarity and investment (market and geopolitical) co-exist. This is true for Turkey's humanitarian-led expansion in Somalia, as well. By addressing gift theories to explain the co-existence of solidarist and market logics, I define Turkey's aid politics as a "benevolent expansion" in Somalia as comparison to Italian neo-imperial expansion and Soviet geopolitical expansion in related periods. Benevolent element addresses the solidarist motives and disinterested charity of Turkey's faith-based NGOs, which aimed to ease the suffering of the oppressed in the name of God and Nation. Simultaneously, ethical and political concerns of aid actors provided valuable assets for Turkey's long-term state interests in Somalia for economic and geostrategic gains. Therefore, benevolent expansion defines Turkey's aid politics in Somalia as the blend of disinterested and self-interested motives in a state-led humanitarian campaign and later investments.

In following pages, I first give a detailed account Turkey's outreach to Somalia, donation campaign and humanitarian intervention, and its aftermath for Turkey's strategic interests. In what follows, I start a conceptual and historical inquiry to locate emerging donors in the global politics of aid. I provide an intellectual and political history of foreign aid starting with post-WW2 development paradigm and its Third World critiques. I turn to Southern development alternatives claiming solidarist, self-reliant, and

Pan-Africanist solutions against and postcolonial aid dependencies and Cold War dictates by superpowers. After framing the economic and geopolitical elements of hegemonic foreign aid architecture, I give a detailed account of the emergence of Southern development partners and Turkey's position in SSCs debate as an emerging donor. I outline the limits of soft-power approach to Turkey's politics of aid, and offer a reinterpretation of gift theories aiming to scale up local non-market exchanges to inter-state flows on the one hand, and to go beyond symbolic domination thesis by incorporating the economic element embedded in aid/investment and disinterest/self-interest blend in humanitarian aid as gift. The last section provides chapter outlines.

1.1 Turkey's new foreign aid regime: Is disinterested aid possible?

Starting with the 2000s, emerging economies of the Global South showed remarkable growth performances, and they took active roles and responsibilities as economic and political vectors in global and regional levels (Gu et al., 2016, p. 11). BRICS economies are not constrained by OECD and DAC standards, and they are taking new institutional organizations and aid practices into the picture while undermining the control of Northern donors on aid flows (Asmus et al., 2017, p. 3). In order to reach out new zones and presume regional leadership, emerging powers use development cooperation as an instrument of "alliance-building and as a tool for advancing a country's 'soft' power, and hence its international standing" (Sidiropoulos et al., 2012, p. 5). Economic and diplomatic influence of SSCs reignited the North vs. South debate and polarized the literature as those arguing Southern partnerships as a neo-Third Worldism on the one hand, and those defining Southern actors as a part of existing capitalist development paradigm (Gray & Gills, 2016, p. 559). To development geographer Mawdsley, Southern donors embrace a win-win discourse highlighting mutual benefits and non-interference diplomacy, which symbolically distinguish them from Northern actors for a "diplomatic solidarity and economic opportunity" (Mawdsley, 2012, p. 264). On the other hand, critical researchers perceive dominant Southern actors within the BRICS bloc as a neocolonial wave targeting African nations, aiming to reap benefits from the continuing international division of labor (Ayers, 2013, p. 249). Despite the polarization in the literature, Mawdsley cautiously argues that Southern donors are not to leave their new roles in international development, and traditional donors emulate some of their rhetorical and policy characteristics, which gradually establishing a "Southernization" trend in international aid architecture (Mawdsley, 2018).

Turkey as a middle-power country catches attention in SSCs analyses. In two decades, Turkey ambitiously expands its diplomatic and market initiatives in Africa, and provides increasing volumes of humanitarian and development aid to regions that has previously remained outside of its foreign policy interests. Turkey's high growth rates during the early 2000s effected an assertive foreign policy agenda to expand its influence in Middle East and Africa, which scholars interpreted as a performance similar to BRICS countries (Öniş, 2011). Parallel to this transformation in foreign policy, Turkey's official aid flows gradually increased and geographically varied. Turkey's official foreign aid first channeled to post-Soviet Turkic states in Central Asia for technical cooperation, and later in the mid-2000s Turkey increased its development and humanitarian aid flows to post-crisis zones such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Turkey's official aid usually prioritized small-scale social infrastructure projects by supplying equipment assistance to educational and medical facilities, and Turkey also utilized aid for the reconstruction of cultural artifacts in former Ottoman regions in Eastern Europe as a diplomatic tool. Yet, before the 2002 electoral victory of the AKP government and its opening to Africa policy launched in 2005, Turkey's foreign aid remained both narrow considering its small budget and symbolic because of its prestige-driven restoration projects. In this picture, 2011 humanitarian aid campaign to Somalia and following development projects became a turning point for Turkey's appeal to less developed states in Africa, as well as to other global donors. With the AKP government, Turkey increased its energy "to become more visible in Africa and SSCs", and Somalia development partnership turned into "a laboratory for Turkey's new engagement in African policy" (Özkan, 2017:66).

In 2011, when a severe draught disaster hit Somalia after twenty years of civil war, state collapse and isolation, Turkey's then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan initiated an extensive charity campaign in Turkey by mobilizing business, faith-based NGOs, and popular media figures, and later he visited war-thorn capital Mogadishu, being the first non-African leader visiting the country for almost two decades. Despite Somalia's reputation as a "failed state," Turkey emerged as an ambitious and benign actor in Somalia offering assistance and partnership. After the humanitarian relief campaign, the rapid implementation of infrastructure projects fortified Turkey's prestige and credibility in the region that paved the way for gaining a geostrategic presence in East Africa. In five years, bilateral agreements covering trade, education, military training, and

energy sectors made Somalia the second largest recipient of Turkey's foreign aid. Now, Turkish firms run Mogadishu airport and seaport. Turkish Armed Forces train and equip Somali National Army in its largest overseas military base at Mogadishu. Turkey built Somalia's largest hospital in Mogadishu and now trains Somali medical experts. The number of Somali university students in Turkey multiplies every year while Turkey's Islamic charity foundations continue their infrastructure projects in Somalia to ameliorate social, medical, and productive sectors. As Turkey celebrates its conspicuous humanitarian efforts by claiming to be the most generous in global humanitarian assistance, Turkey has increased its exports to Somalia from \$39 to \$273 million between 2011-2020.³

With this close engagement, Somalia became a state-making attempt for Turkey. Somalia represents the most comprehensive example to analyze Turkey's policy interests in Africa, aid organization, and consent mechanisms as an emerging donor. For Turkey, Somalia is a legitimate ground both to contest traditional donors and appeal to less developed countries for partnership. In 2018, during a meeting with coordinators of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı, TİKA), President Erdoğan stated that Western and oil-rich Muslim countries have always offered too much aid, yet, he argued, they pursued nothing but their own gain while discarding the prosperity of poor countries: "They only help regions that will serve their own political, economic, regional, and global policies."⁴ In contrast, Erdoğan argued, what Turkey achieved in Somalia was a totally new approach to development partnership. Concluding his speech, Erdoğan magnified his stress on Turkey's disinterested aid politics and stated that Turkey is the heir of the Ottoman benevolent mission to protect the vulnerable without expecting a return:

Throughout history, as a state and nation, we have always been generous in terms of sharing what we have at hand, thereby protecting the legacy of our ancestors. ... TİKA has never been an institution haphazardly selecting its projects and acting for self-interest. ... On behalf of myself and my nation, all I want from you [coordinators] is to enter those hearts. Let others do their tricks for their interest, oil, minerals, gold, soil, or cheap labor; we will never resort to such hypocrisy.

³ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Trade. *Somali Ülke Profili* (Somalia country profile, annual reports)

⁴ *TİKA Koordinatörlerini Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma*. (2018, April 10). Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı. <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/92347/tika-koordinatörlerini-kabulunde-yaptiklari-konusma>

Whatever we do we will do it from the heart and find a way to win a place in those hearts, we will do it for Allah.⁵

The disinterested and communitarian understanding of aid have been prevailing themes in Turkey's official foreign aid discourse. In 2016, during a joint press conference with Somalia's then President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Erdoğan announced that Turkey's official aid agency TİKA would build a parliament building in Mogadishu as a "gift" to Somalia: "We finished the plans for Somali Federal Parliament building with a new and different project, which our Somali brothers will be proud of. ... When finished, it will be a gift to Somalia from the Republic of Turkey and Turkish nation." In addition to the generous language of gifts, Erdoğan underlined that offering a helping hand to Somalia was a religious duty coming from the ethics of solidarity among Muslim believers. To Erdoğan, this constituted the backbone of Turkey's aid and partnership politics in Africa:

When we launched our opening policy to Africa and lent a helping hand to Somalia in 2011, some claimed that this was a passing fancy. They hoped that we would give up in the face of difficulties and leave these places after a short while as they did. Thank God, we did not give up. As our Prophet says "A mü'min's bond to a mü'min is like a wall of stones clasped to each other". Here, we continue our actions with this understanding. ... Do not forget that with faith, perseverance, and decisiveness much better days will come. Effort from us, tawfik from Allah.⁶

What does this overemphasis on disinterested generosity and religious communitarianism tell us about Turkey's policy interests, aid practices, and legitimacy mechanisms in its humanitarian-led expansion to Somalia? There is a dual strategy of legitimation. On the one hand, Turkey's official discourse aims to create a consent among domestic audience about the government's moral responsiveness to global problems, its diplomatic and resource capacity to reach out those in-need, and about its critique against self-seeking legacy of other international actors. On the other hand, this discourse wants to legitimize Turkey's new regional and material interests in least developed nations as a non-exploitative, disinterested, and fair emerging development partner.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ "Mü'min" is a believer of Islam, and "tawfik" is God's approval for mü'mins' acts of charity and good deeds, a divinely power given to achieve charity intentions. For the interview, see *Uluslararası Aktörler ve Bölge Ülkeleri Somali'ye Destek Olmalı* (2016, June 3). Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı. <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/44264/uluslararasi-aktorler-ve-bolge-ulkeleri-somaliye-destek-olmali>

Solidarism and disinterestedness are two explicit elements in Turkey's official development partnership discourse, yet this can neither be an explanatory tool only by itself nor be easily discarded as a rhetorical gesture. Instead, we need a comprehensive theorization of market and non-market interests in Turkey's aid politics in Somalia. I argue that this formulation is attainable through a gift approach to humanitarian aid and development partnership. Turkey's humanitarian aid initiated a development partnership with Somalia and opened its strategic sectors for Turkey's official and private investments.

Below sections conceptually and historically locate Turkey's humanitarian-led involvement in Somalia as an emerging donor. First part illustrates the emergence of post-World War 2 (WW2) development paradigm. Postwar superpower United States promoted development thinking to achieve international economic growth and regional progress in productive and civil structures. For the former colonists of Europe, however, providing development aid to ex-colonies was a legitimate way to rebuild their control within the postcolonial political currencies in Africa, Asian, and Latin America. During the Cold War, ideological and geopolitical rivalry between the US and USSR became more important than economic gains. Superpower competitors instrumentalized military aid to postcolonial states to win allies and sustain clientelist relations. However, decades long development aid and military assistance to the Third World did not bring prosperity and wealth but it created a debt burden while turning fragile polities into despotic rules, which were militarily and diplomatically supported by Cold War superpower rivals.

Next section turns to the emergence of Southern donors while the development paradigm dissolves with the end of the Cold War and frequenting debt and humanitarian crisis in the least developed countries. This part traces the historical examples of Third World solidarity since the 1950s first, and then it discusses the return of Southern actors to the international development landscapes with the 2000s. Following part discusses supportive and critical perspectives on the rise of SSCs, and provides a critical literature review on Turkey's foreign aid practices as an emerging donor. It highlights the limits of current soft power approach, and instead of taken-for-granted assumptions within the dominant soft power paradigm, final part of the Introduction offers gift perspective for a relational inquiry of Turkey's aid regime in Somalia. The reinterpretation of gift literature provides a useful analytical setting to apply gift thinking in inter-state level resource flows

and local level interactional encounters. Final section gives a summary of following chapter outlines.

1.2 Aid and development in history and theory

Within Europe's intellectual and political history of aid, altruism for development and self-interest for profit went hand in hand throughout colonial and imperial history in the name of civilizing the native for moral and material progress. However, development as an international problem emerged for the first time after the WW2, when European economies collapsed and anti-imperialist nationalist movements emerged in ex-colonies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. However, development problem signaled different priorities for the US, Europe, and the USSR.

With the President Truman's famous "Point Four" inauguration speech in 1949, United States introduced the totalizing discourse of "underdevelopment" to world politics as an economic category for intervening and controlling non-Western geographies. Underdevelopment discourse shifted the paternalist civilizing mission of European colonialism, and it transformed development from a problem of the uneducated native to a global problem of industrial division of labor. For the first time in history, Truman stated, humanity had the required skills and resources to triumph over "hunger, misery, and despair" of underdeveloped peoples if developed nations were to follow US leadership and make democratic and technical principals of industrial societies available to the free peoples of the world. To Truman, that was a break from old imperialism in favor of "democratic fair-dealing" in the new international order under the US hegemony (Rist, 2008, pp. 69-75). Resonating the postwar ideological rivalry and economic requirements, Edward C. Banfield (1963), a US political scientist and advisor to Republican presidents, lists diverging aims of the US aid doctrine, while specifically underlining the importance of aid politics' impact on public opinion, in a long but illustrating quote:

The doctrine of direct influence, that is aid should make its effect directly by influencing governments or public opinions and not indirectly by transforming cultures and institutions, takes several distinct forms:

1. *Quid Pro Quo*. The aid is part of a bargain between two governments in which there are clearly specified advantages to both sides. For example, we might agree to build a system of highways in return for assurances that the Soviet Union would not be allowed to penetrate the country. Bribery

is a special case. Here the bargain is with politicians in the underdeveloped country who act from personal interests rather than duty.

2. *Business Friendship*. The aid is given to create or maintain with a government a relationship, that is expected to have mutual advantages over a period of time. The aid is, so to speak, a payment on an open account, it being tacitly understood that political advantages will be given in return.

3. *Maintenance of Friendly Governments*. The aid is intended to strengthen and to keep in power a government which is friendly, or at least not unfriendly. This may be done by undertakings, including of course economic development, that will increase the prestige of the recipient government or increase the confidence of its public in it.

4. *Prestige*. The aid is intended to exhibit dramatically the power of the giver and thereby to increase it. As Hobbes said, "Reputation of power is power, because it draweth with it the adherence of those that need protection."

5. *Good Will*. The aid is intended to make the recipient feel well disposed toward the giver and to put him under an implied obligation to return kindness for kindness. Governments are seldom thought to be moved by sentiments such as gratitude, but it is sometimes thought that public opinion may be so moved and that this may have some effect on the policy of governments.

6. *Moral Force*. The aid is expected to affect public opinion by exerting moral force. The giver expects that the nobility of his action will inspire the recipient to act upon equally high moral principles. (Banfield, 1963, pp. 18-19)

From the perspective of Europe's former imperialists, the problem of postwar underdevelopment was a legitimate reason to restore their control on former colonies through development aid. Postwar European powers provided aid to underdeveloped countries as a continuation of the relationship between the metropolis and colonies (Ohlin, 1966, p. 26). France and Britain prioritized aid to their former colonies in order to control postcolonial political elites, and they "saw development as the key means by which they could re-establish imperial legitimacy" (Cooper, 2010, p. 12). Quantitative studies show that colonial past still considerably affects foreign aid flows more than political institutions or economic performance of recipient states (Alesina and Dollar, 2000).

The development question put foreign aid and transfer of technical and industrial knowledge at the center of controlling postcolonial states in order to maintain Cold War alliances and control former colonies. However, the definition of aid has never been an undisputed topic since it contained an inconsistent mixture of grants and loans, tying elements, and political expectations. Western aid providers established the Development

Assistance Committee (DAC) under OECD in 1960 in order to decide on a standardized definition for official development aid (ODA), and hence to differentiate altruistic aid for development from self-interested aid for profit (White, 1974; Kingsbury *et al.*, 2008; Hynes and Scott, 2013).⁷ However, postwar aid from the USA and former European colonists aimed at developing infrastructure for private investment, deployed conditionalities and tied elements to aid for increasing export items, and to control political change in postcolonial states. Therefore, development by foreign aid did evolved in contrast to moral claims of rich nations toward poorer ones, and it restored an imperialist dependency between donor and recipients states (Richards and Richards, 1977).

With the Cold War between the USA and the USSR, development problem turned into a geopolitical battle demanding political loyalty to aid providing superpowers. The true path of development and rational means to measure, apply, and achieve it became an ideological competition in the postwar bipolar world system. To respond the US Marshal Program, the establishment of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (later OECD), and Western technical aid to Third World countries, Soviet Union replied with establishing Center for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), which aimed to guide developing countries toward socialist trade and diplomatic partnerships. Military supplies became another source for the US and the USSR to attract alliance, and Moscow used its post-WW2 military surplus armaments to spread socialist cooperation in the Third World (Power, 2019, p. 125, 128, 130). Therefore, Cold War superpowers tied political conditionalities for aid in order to achieve their security, geostrategic, and ideological interest against their rivals.

The rise of the Soviet Union as an industrial and military power on the one hand, and China's growing rivalry against Soviet communist leadership on the other, made larger parts of Asia, Africa, and Europe more open to the ideological influence of Soviet

⁷ OECD revised the definition of "grant equivalent" as a discount rate from the future value of a monetary transaction and identified it as "gift" portion: "If the value of expected future reflows in today's money is lower than the amount extended today, then the difference represents a 'gift'. This gift portion is called a grant equivalent if expressed as a monetary value, and a grant element if expressed as a percentage of the amount now extended. For example, grants have a grant element of 100% as they are fully provided as 'gifts'." However, there is a qualitative difference between calculated transfers or discounts and transfers that suspends calculation. Gifts and their perception as such are of the latter kind, they aspire a swift transfer with non-market gestures. For the full text on the DAC definition of "grant equivalent" as gift, see *Modernisation of the DAC statistical system*. OECD. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/modernisation-dac-statistical-system.htm>

and Chinese development doctrines. Different ideologies, models, and sources for development aid created a competition for alliances for donors, and a “battle for friends and favor beyond Europe” for postcolonial nations (Engerman, 2017, p. 3). In order to counter growing political attraction of socialism in anti-imperialist struggles in the Third World and Eastern Europe, United States sponsored capitalist model of development. US credits, technical cooperation grants, and Cold War arms deals gained a global coverage incorporating Asian and African states. The geopolitics of the Cold War competition made foreign aid an instrument for supporting client politicians taking side of the Western or Eastern bloc (Griffin, 1991, p. 668).

In sum, the problem of placing postcolonial nation states within the new international order without leaving them to rules of self-regulating markets created multiple discourses, institutions, and geopolitical alliances under varied development doctrines. Despite shifting perspectives on causes of underdevelopment and goals of aid programs, a set of ideological assumptions and standardized measures came to represent a “development orthodoxy” regulating postwar international order (Cooper and Packard, 1997). Superpowers US and USSR provided generous offers to win regional allies, and Cold War competition for influence made foreign aid more accessible for recipient states. East access to credits and tied aid eventually created a burdening debt problem and it weakened domestic economies; yet, in general, all actors perceived development as a realist goal to be achieved. Postwar international aid architecture maintained North-South dependency and unequal exchange in economic, intellectual, and political spheres, and hence second half of the twentieth century turned development thinking into a paradigm of modern politics (Schuurman, 2000).

1.2.1 Development or dependency: A world-system critique

Development paradigm faced several critiques and resistance from different intellectual and political circles. Theoretically, since late 1960s, dependency school and world system approaches challenged the political economy of postwar international order and its modernist developmentalism. This was historically paralleled by a political resistance arising from the Third World, and it embraced solidarism, Pan-Africanism, and self-reliance as development alternatives against the neo-colonialism of foreign aid. Among the Marxists scholars, Andre Gunder Frank’s famous essay “Development of Underdevelopment” became a milestone representing dependency theory. To Frank,

modernist liberalism conceived history and development as universal stages in human societies, but it was misleading since “the now developed countries were never underdeveloped” (Frank, 1969, p. 4). Underdevelopment emerged as a result of centuries of plunder and capitalist exploitation, which modernization theory discarded. To Frank the so-called backwardness of underdeveloped nations was not about archaic institutions or a capital shortage, but it was about the persisting capitalist accumulation and domination that continuously limited the development of underdeveloped states, and hence perpetuated the development of underdevelopment.

Pioneered by Wallerstein (2006, 2003), Arrighi (2010), and Amin (1977, 1992), world system scholars defined development aid as the postwar restructuring of capitalist world economy under the new US leadership. Aid flows wanted to implement necessary technical, productive, and administrative infrastructure in postwar Europe and postcolonial Asia and Africa in order to create a peripheral labor, restore global value chains, and reboot an effective demand. Therefore, system theorists argued, foreign aid and development was the realization of a new material expansion phase in the capitalist world economy. It opened up new frontiers for US corporate capital while establishing a new cycle of accumulation and hegemony within the long history of capitalism. World system theorists criticized two major aid politics of postwar capitalist reconstruction under the US leadership: technical assistance for industrial production and military assistance for cold war protection. Countering modernist development theses highlighting the importance of technological transfer for prosperity, Samir Amin argued that technology “can only reproduce the relations of unequal development within the imperialist system” since it presupposed capital-intensive production and hence made Third World economies more dependent on foreign aid (Amin, 1977, p. 173). Considering political impacts of military assistance, Wallerstein argued that the postwar economic and military aid created clientelist relationships and dictated political alliances: “... economic reconstruction helped create clientelist obligations on the part of nations receiving U.S. aid; this sense of obligation fostered willingness to enter into military alliances and, even more important, into political subservience” (2003, p. 16). Therefore, the world system critique of development paradigm rejected humanist or moralist claims on foreign aid, and defined development problem as an incorporation process of the post-WW2 economic and geopolitical order.

1.2.2 Third World alternatives: Solidarism, Pan-Africanism, self-reliance

Cold War geopolitics turned the question of aid and development into a rivalry between capitalist and socialist blocs. Against ideological and economic dictates attached to aid, countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America came together to build an alternative development model. The autonomist call for solidarity among the Third World paved the way for a new international collaboration with the Bandung Conference and Non-Aligned Movement. Bandung Conference in 1955 aimed economic cooperation, self-determination, and condemnation of new forms of imperial interventions, and it recognized the nonalignment as a reflection of Third World solidarity. After the Bandung, Non-Aligned Movement gained an institutionalized form of alliance in 1961 Belgrade Conference, which represented the autonomist claims of Afro-Asianism from Soviet and the US interventions (Lee, 2010, pp.14-17). For postcolonial states, Bandung was a pioneer event that embraced Third World as a political project. Bandung and Non-Aligned diplomacy rejected foreign aid dictates as a part of neo-colonial endeavors, and prized international solidarism as a solution to the problem of underdevelopment (Weber, 2016, p. 154).

The central question for the Third World politicians was should the postcolonial nations accept aid from former imperialists or emerging communists. Aside from ideological compartmentalization, it was not certain whether aid would bring real development for their own national goals. Pan-Africanism and self-reliance ideologies provided challenging answers to the question of whose aid and whether postcolonial nations receive it. Writings of anti-imperialist leaders and intellectuals of postcolonial nations reveal that they perceived foreign aid as a Janus-faced gift. Ghanaian Pan-Africanist Nkrumah's thoughts on the struggle of African states against the threat of neo-colonialism is exemplary in this regard. To Nkrumah, foreign investment for industrialization was a concrete need for widening technical skills and development unless the development plans served national interests and secured political independence. Otherwise, he stated, "the pattern of imperialist aid to Africa" would trap them with divide and rule politics of neo-colonialism and alienate the spirit of African unity through balkanization in the African continent (Nkrumah, 1964, p. 108, 111; 1966, p. 253). Nkrumah argued that independence and prosperity "can only be achieved by close economic association between the African states themselves[.]" (1964a, p. 184). He warned African statesmen seeking solutions and resources from non-African powers:

“We must beware of the gift of fictitious independence and refuse falsities of encumbered foreign alliances” (1964a, p. 193).

Similarly, Tanzanian President Nyerere suggested the policy of self-reliance as an African development model that was based on “ujamaa”, or “brotherhood”, seeking a populist communitarianism and redistributive socialism among African societies. Nyerere’s famous “Arusha Declaration” written for Tanzania’s TANU party gives a clear account of what self-reliance model suggests against the domination of foreign aid. Nyerere stated in the Declaration that historically Tanzanian people and politicians had the false belief in money, that they altogether enunciated that “If we get money we shall develop, without money we cannot develop” (1968, p. 18). The government, Nyerere continued, always complained about the lack of tax money and investment money; and they always turned to external finance to get extra money that came in the form of loans, private investment, or as “free gifts” by foreign states: “This means that another government gives our government a sum of money as free gift for a particular development scheme” (1968, p. 21). But as I noted above, foreign aid gifts had a dual character; one that helps development and the other that threatens real improvement and captures sovereignty by dependency. To Nyerere, gift aid might be free of charge but it was not free of endangering their independence, which is self-reliance.

Independence means self-reliance. Independence cannot be real if a nation depends upon gifts and loans from another for its development. ... Gifts which increase, or act as a catalyst, to our own efforts are valuable. Gifts which could have the effect of weakening or distorting our own efforts should not be accepted until we have asked ourselves a number of questions. (1968, p. 23-24)

These statements, together with other examples of Third World solidarity, give us a picture about the aid and its effects on ideologies, diplomatic endeavors, and economic interests in the countries of development. The pressure of industrial advancement made foreign aid a necessary resource for a quick advancement of local markets and integration to global production chains. But the outcome was not always bringing progress in development and self-reliance because aid given for development functioned as an instrument of economic imperialism on the one hand, and donor states’ geopolitical interests obliged their client politicians for political subservience on the other. The conception of aid was similar to a Janus-faced gift in the political mindset of postcolonial intellectuals and statesmen; aid was a necessary available resource for rapidly taking the steps of development, but it was simultaneously a jeopardizing threat

against economic and political sovereignty. From late 1940s to the end of 1970s, foreign aid became the most widespread tool of foreign policy shared by Western and non-Western politicians that either enforced certain development schemes on the recipient or offered a collaborative initiative for reciprocal benefits. Third World critique brought new concepts and institutions that challenged Western development thinking and its multilateral organization. However, self-reliance and solidarist initiatives did not lead these nations to extricate themselves from capitalist world system and Cold War geopolitics. Their economies could not resist sinking under increasing foreign aid imperialism that radiated from different sources as a “new form of domination through giving” (Rist, 2008:134).

1.3 South-South Cooperations: A challenge or a myth?

Starting with the early 1980s, decades long tied aid and financial loans created a heavy debt burden, and it deepened budget deficits, poverty, and informalization in the less developed countries. On the one hand, the fall of the Soviet Union and the raise of neoliberal globalization changed the development thinking from state-centered industrial objectives to financial credits for open market readjustments. On the other hand, extreme poverty and fragile socio-economic conditions in indebted Third World countries led grandiose development projects of the 1960s to turn into food and humanitarian aid in the 1980s. Between 1982 to 1992, which is often called “lost development decade,” OECD countries’ ODA dropped from 0.38% to 0.22% of donor GNP, although the United Nations had targeted in 1970 0.7% of ODA/GNI target for Western donors (Thorbecke, 2000, p. 33). Declining Northern foreign aid flows redefined aid as the provision of basic needs such as food aid, anti-poverty programs, and relief aid.

Declining aid volumes had two main reasons behind. One was the loss of a belief in aid. Instead of development and prosperity, postwar aid flows created malfunctioning national economies, corrupt political systems, deteriorated natural resources, and deepened inequalities in recipient states. The other factor was the end of Cold War geopolitical competition after the fall of the Soviet Union, and accordingly the end of ideological rivalry between capitalist and socialist development discourses. Disappointing results of fifty years of development thinking in the Western world created “a sense of malaise with foreign aid” that was labelled as “donor fatigue” (Lancaster, 2007, p. 40). As official aid flows and global contest for development have gradually

narrowed so as the ideological narratives characterized the period from 1950 to 1990 (Kingsbury, 2004, p. 21). The postmodern critique of development thinking came along in this period of dissolving hegemony of development paradigm in international governance. Throughout the 1990s scholars mostly coming from anthropology discipline deconstructed the idea of development as a discursive power regime based on technical expertise, managerial knowledge, and Eurocentric representations about the “underdeveloped”. They argued that development discourse constructed Third World as an object of knowledge that reified, essentialized, and controlled non-European societies through standardized, naturalized, and de-politicized schemes of development interventions (Ferguson, 1994a; Escobar, 1995; Crush, 2005; Mitchell, 2005). The deconstructive turn in development thinking offered “post-development” as a critique of cultural imperialism and economistic mindset of Northern aid and development paradigm. After the prevailing fatigue in aid flows from North to South and the disintegration of hegemonic development thinking, emerging donors from the South reignited the debate on development and politics of aid in a changing global order.

Emerging economies’ high growth rates, increasing aid to infrastructure projects in Asia and Africa, and expanding diplomatic engagements among Southern states fueled an academic interest about the non-traditional donors. Southern donors accelerated the competition in aid diplomacy and they introduced new governmental and non-governmental actors, ideas, and organizational practices to the international aid system. Emerging donors’ performance confused analysts of international development about whether Southern aid would be an alternative path to elevate development and eradicate poverty, or substitute former Northern hierarchies. Southern donors brought new complexities and diverging aid practices. For example, China and India used loan-based infrastructure projects and productive sectors for widening their partnership network in Africa, whereas South Africa prioritized mediatory roles in its close geography. Despite differences, emerging donors provided a space of maneuver for African political elite in accessing to aid (Kragelund, 2008, 2011, p. 559). Scholars have provided positive and negative viewpoints about their prospective outcomes. For the critiques, non-traditional donors equaled the aid level of DAC countries in the mid-2000s, but the new reality of aid exacerbated the volatility and fragmentation of aid objectives; therefore, it was a potential danger against aid effectiveness for a sustainable growth (Kharas, 2007). Accusing China and India, critiques argued that their concessional loans were a threat

against DAC donors' decades long efforts to control debt and manage democratic reforms in recipient states (Manning, 2006). For this perspective, SSCs does not embrace good governance and human rights concerns of the Western donors, and Southern donors use aid for market and geostrategic advantage rather than global development goals. Those rejecting this polarized interpretation state that rather than dichotomous judgments we need to pay attention to "how geopolitical specificities shape the manner in which South–South exchange and cooperation shape the possibilities of development" and try to understand how emerging donors corresponds to market and infrastructure needs of recipient countries (Lee & Gray, 2016, p. 311-12).

Positive approaches to SSCs, on the other hand, state that critiques against emerging donors wrongly believed that Western aid was morally superior and more effective, and this led them to define Southern aid as a new form of colonialism and African states receiving aid by non-traditional donors as "helpless victims". In contrast, optimistic accounts argue, aid by non-traditional donors gives "African states a choice about who to turn to for investment and aid for the first time since the end of the Cold War" (Tan-Mullins et al., 2010, p. 875). In that sense, the raise of non-traditional and postcolonial states as donors represents a real challenge against Northern domination over aid and development paradigm (Six, 2009). Ngaire Woods, for example, states that non-traditional donors are more generous and attractive as opposed to Western donors, and their competitive expansion is alarming a challenge against the hegemony of traditional donors. To Woods, it is a "silent revolution" in global economy and aid architecture because Southern donors are "weakening the bargaining position of western donors in respect of aid-receiving countries, exposing standards and processes thar are out of date and ineffectual" (Woods, 2008, p. 1206).

Considering the heterogeneity of actors within the "Southern" camp and mutually exclusive viewpoints on their injuries or remedies in development initiatives, we should note the danger of essentializing both "North" and "South" as a taken-for-granted terms (Haug, Braveboy-Wagner and Maihold, 2021). Obviously, these are geographic metaphors with varied units of analysis inside, and the Manichean positioning of middle power donors as good or bad helps little to understand emerging aid regimes, relational environments they create in aid zones, and historical change in aid flows and partnership geographies. In order to avoid guaranteed judgments, clichés about raise and fall dynamics, and formalist descriptions on new donors, there is a need of empirically

grounded analysis on emerging donors in site-specific locales. This perspective can illuminate the continuing and changing patterns in foreign aid flows considering transformations in North-South relations.

1.3.1 Studying Turkey as an emerging donor: A critical review of literature

Today, the literature on the Southern aid mostly focuses on “what” rather than “how” questions. It investigates aid practices, market options, and diplomatic gains of non-traditional donors, but does not ask how they make aid politics and how ideas and values shape actors’ engagements with the recipient society in aid zones. Besides, the literature exclusively focuses on Southern aid from a donor-based perspective, while discarding what actual impacts and transformations emerging donors cause in site-specific localities. This results with a lack of comprehensive and comparative investigation both within Southern donors and between Northern and Southern aid politics. Despite heightened attention on Southern aid and speculations about shifting aid architecture, skeptical scholars argue that the SSC literature exaggerates the transformative potential of Southern agency, and in fact it reproduces the cliché of declining North without providing in-depth empirical outcomes (Kiely, 2015:174). Chin and Quadir, for example, argue that mainstream approaches to emerging donors are not enough to understand complex constituents and outcomes of new aid modalities, and they suggest an grounded research agenda “that compares the intentions and aims of the rising donors, and the outcomes of their intervention” (Chin & Quadir, 2012, p. 495). Similarly, Bergamaschi and Tickner (2017) argue that students of emerging donors usually rely on official statements and discourses about Southern donors’ aid policies. This is partly understandable, because not all of non-OECD donors provide reliable data for their official aid flows, and it limits the research. However, Bergamaschi and Tickner warn researchers that this attitude creates “the risk of a lack of critical distance vis-à-vis the claims of Southern donors themselves and of the perpetration of some myths associated with SSC” (2017, p. 8). In order to avoid high expectations and myths associated with unsubstantiated claims about Southern aid phenomenon, they suggest site-specific field studies to understand the “*politics* of SSC – that is, its political foundations, assumptions, and articulations with domestic politics in provider countries – and assess its sociopolitical effects in recipient countries through a dense, context-specific, and interactional account of its inner workings” (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017, p. 10).

I believe, this research agenda brings us back to the proposal at the beginning of this chapter, i.e. the interactional and interconnected sociohistorical study of aid relationalities. Turkey, as an emerging donor country, is relatively understudied in current SSCs literature, but there is a growing attention on Turkey's aid and investment in Africa in general and in Somalia in particular. However, the current literature on Turkey's aid politics relies mostly on soft power analysis, which remains as a one-sided explanation. From the soft power perspective, researchers argue that Turkey's AKP recollected the religious and historical heritage of Ottoman Empire and combined it with democratic experiences, which gave Turkey distinguishing soft power assets in its engagement with Africa (Kalin, 2011, p. 10). Similarly, authors argue that the AKP embraced a "humanitarian diplomacy" in its foreign affairs, and used humanitarian aid as soft power strategy (Ozkan, 2010, p. 98). Though these shorthand references to Turkey's soft power does not prove if it is really perceived as such by the recipient at all, still others embraced the term as an explanatory tool. Akpınar, for example, states that Erdoğan's visit to Somalia and following humanitarian aid served as a soft power representing Turkey as a benign actor: "Turkey has successfully crafted a benign image in the country over the past seven years through the utilization of its soft power assets" (Akpınar, 2017, p. 3). Focusing on policy rhetoric, Langan states that the AKP stresses Ottoman heritage and identifies itself as a "virtuous power" in its relations with the Global South, and this Ottomanist discourse mobilizes aid as a soft power tools: "Turkey promises in this neo-Ottoman phase to utilise soft power instruments (such as aid) to improve the lives of neighboring, and distant, peoples" (Langan, 2017, p. 1403). In addition to soft power explanations of diplomacy, discourse, and cultural components, scholars analyzing the role of NGOs in Turkey's new aid politics argue that faith-based NGOs relief services in Africa increased Turkey's soft power in Muslim underdeveloped countries (Atalay, 2013). Specifically in Somalia, Turkey frames its relationship "in terms of a shared religious-cultural heritage," which provides an easy "acceptance of Turkish state agencies and NGOs by locals" since "shared religious heritage helps to facilitate the ability of public and private Turkish organizations to successfully interact with local clans as legitimate and non-threatening partners" (Murphy & Woods, 2014, p. 13).

Considering general trends in the literature on Turkey's foreign aid politics, there is a neglect of processes in the making of aid projects on the one hand, and in the formation of aid relationalities on the ground on the other. This is an intrinsic problem of

the weak conceptualization of soft power. The founder of soft power concept, Joseph Nye defines it as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye, 2004, p. x). Attraction, to Nye, includes culture, values, and foreign policy ideas. However, this way of framing “attraction” does not necessarily mean winning the consent of a recipient by building a hegemony. Soft power is widely used, but it is a vague concept. First, it presumes the attractiveness of certain liberal values without explaining their turning into tangible power resources. Second, Nye does not provide an explanation for the transition and interdependence between hard and soft power, which blurs the distinction (Kearn, 2011).

Turkey’s humanitarian aid to Somalia is a good example to depict this vagueness. Researchers analyzing Turkey’s engagements with African countries usually highlight the humanitarian diplomacy and aid as effective soft power tools to appear as a benign and responsible actor for recipient societies. It is a shared epistemic jargon in the literature to claim Turkey has increased its soft power in the Global South “thanks to the gradual involvement of new state and non-state actors along with the adoption of novel frameworks, such as cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy and humanitarian diplomacy” (Donelli & Gonzalez-Levaggi, 2016, p. 109). When we take such generalized assumptions to the Somali case, this formulation of aid as a soft power tacitly defines the Somalis as passive recipients of Turkey’s cultural and religious appeals. In fact, we see that scholars address soft power as an epistemic guarantee to explain Turkey’s aid politics, and this epistemic prejudice assigns Somalis a single task in the so-called development partnership, which is to welcome Turkey’s humanitarian, benign, and religiously motivated offers while letting an emerging donor to pursue strategic gains due to its attractive appeals for partnership. This bias is a result of a lack of critical distance to emerging donors’ official aid discourses, and hence a myth that academic work produces, just like Bergamaschi and Tickner argues.

Cultural codes, aid diplomacy, and discursive appeals have the potential to win the recipient’s consent, but the important point here is that soft power approach presumes a guaranteed power resource coming from the vague term of attraction. Thus, although prevailing and accepted as a valid explanation, soft power accounts on Turkey’s politics of aid has two problems. First, it does not question reciprocal processes of why and how an attraction happens, if happens at all, between donor and recipient agents, and, second, it is incapable of explaining how humanitarian sentiments and aid practices provide

opportunities for the state's long term market and geopolitical interests. In order to answer these two questions, this dissertation analyzes Turkey's humanitarian-led expansion to Somalia from a gift perspective that argues the blend of disinterested and self-interested acts of aid and investment. In contrast to one-sided explanations of soft power literature, gift perspective provides a wholistic approach to analyze reciprocal relationalities, moral and material interests, and legitimacy mechanisms in Turkey's politics of aid.

1.4 Aid as gift: From local exchanges to international flows

Marcel Mauss's essay *The Gift* (2002 [1925]) became a seminal work influencing different branches of social theory and research. Based on a dense interpretation of ethnographic works on archaic gift exchange, Mauss argued that utilitarian conception of market exchange was only a modern phenomenon. To Mauss, gift exchange is a wholistic social institution, which he defines as total social prestations, interlinking law, religion, politics, and economy together. Mauss states that gift giving appears as free and unreciprocated act of generosity but it is competitive, stimulated by prestige interests, and carries obligations to reciprocate to protect social honor. By that, the gift represents complex juxtapositions of generosity and interest, voluntary acts and obligations, and persons and things. That is why Mauss defines gift exchange as "apparently free and disinterested but nevertheless constrained and self-interested" (Mauss, 2002, p. 4). Reciprocating gifts, sacrificing wealth, and conspicuous consumption regulate social codes of status, and they function as symbols of one's wealth, power, and trustworthiness. Gifts may seem disinterested, but there is always an expectation of counter-returns either as a gratitude, status, or economic and political benefits arising from social bonds. Therefore, "the whole idea of free gift is based on a misunderstanding," as Mary Douglas states (2002, p. ix) in her preface to *The Gift*. To Mauss, giving and reciprocating gifts is both an obligation to become a part of and benefit from social services, and because of that it is a form of unwritten contract regulating solidarity and security within and among communities (Sahlins, 2017).

Mauss's interpretation of gift exchange opened rich research interests for economic anthropology. For example Caillé argues that utilitarian conception of human behavior undermines the drive for gift giving which has the function "of recognition and of building of individual and collective identities" (Caillé, 2013, p. 48). Similarly, Godbout states that gift and market exchange are different since market exchange is based

on the unilateral liquidation of debt by payment, while gift exchange is based on reciprocity and contains “mechanisms for maintaining the debt, and norms for the non-extinction of the debt” (Godbout, 2000, 43). Market vs. gift framework has produced intriguing interpretations about the motives and interests of individual actors in everyday transactions. From a Marxist interpretation of Mauss, Gregory states that commodities and gifts create two different cultures of exchange, since commodity exchange is based on price-based objects alienated from collective processes, whereas gifts are inalienable for they are tied to interpersonal bonds and demand a return for the initial gift (1982, p. 19). The anthropological inquiry of gift has progressed toward polarizing gift and commodity, but different scholars argue that gift is not vanished in capitalist societies and hence “gifts and commodities represent not exclusive categories, but poles defining a continuum” (Carrier, 1991, p.132), things go through different “value regimes” and transition from gift to commodity is context-dependent (Appadurai, 1986), and gifts work as a “symbolic alchemy” euphemizing objective reality since they represent the accumulation of symbolic capital as generosity, good will, and disinterested acts, that is why gift exchange is a collective misconception, a “reality-denying reality” (Bourdieu, 1990a, 1990b, p. 110).

The rich insight, however, focuses too much on local exchanges that happen between individual actors, and it is restricted too much with symbolic aspects of reciprocity while discarding material and economic motives and strategies. This problem originates from a limited attachment to the reciprocity principle in gift literature. To reinterpret gift in the inter-state context, first, we need to scale locality to transnational processes, and, secondly, go beyond symbolic realm to non-market transactions at the inter-state level.

Anthropological theories on the gift usually subscribe to the principle of counter-returns due to Mauss’ Durkheimian formulation of gift exchange. Mauss perceived gift as a moral law with collective constraints, and this led him to define gift exchange in terms of the law of reciprocal obligations (to give, receive, and reciprocate). However, critiques of Mauss’ conception of the gift argue that he does not provide a definition of “gift”, but only explains a theory of exchange based on obligations to circulate objects and social services a gift (Testart, 1998). Maussian theory of gift exchange is illuminative to study structural binds tying different institutions in the social universe (culture, myths, religion, economy, law, and politics). His idea of reciprocity and the illustration of this

constellation of social institutions lead Mauss to define gift as the “total social fact”. However, Mauss’ insistence on the law of reciprocity puzzled scholars about the first gift, that is supposed to be free since there would not be any obligation at the beginning. Parry (1986), for example, argues that expectations toward “pure gift” and “self-interest” ideologically demarcated market and non-market/altruistic spheres. The idea of “balanced reciprocity” imposes a formalism and it demands an “economic truth” about giving and counter-return (Berking, 1999, p. 40). To Osteen, this economism in gift theory inevitably neglects interests behind a donors’ gift since it “eliminate[s] any motive or sanction other than reciprocity and desire for repayment”, and what he proposes is to “redirect our gaze from reciprocity toward other principles and motives” (Osteen, 2013, p. 7).

In this dissertation, I use gift theory to study market logic inherent in aid, and argue that despite an apparent contradiction logics of market and non-market transactions co-exist. The first problem awaiting us is the gift-commodity duality in the anthropological inquiry of everyday economic actions. Carrier (1991) and Appadurai (1986) prove that gift and commodity are not polar opposites of a value system, as if one stands at the altruistic and the other at the calculative side of the expenditure universe. Rather, there are transmutations between gift and commodity logics depending on the social context of exchange, and interlinkages between non-market and market fields. For example, a bulk of grain food can turn into a bulk of aid cargo, and it can be transferred to an extra-national local in the form of humanitarian aid. Political will and the organization of aid (with actors, motives, and legitimations) actualize a transfer, and mediate an interrelational network going around aid actors, projects on the ground, and recipients. Therefore, commodities and gifts create a non-market space of interaction at the inter-state level, that have a potential to initiate different forms of investments, like symbolic, economic, or geostrategic.

Therefore, if we follow Maussian gift formulation as “total social fact” as a wholistic system of exchange binding apparently isolated spheres of social life (Gofman, 1998), dividing market, morality, and interstate system would be a mistake. Against this limited conception of gift confined to local and interpersonal exchanges, Gregory Mallard argues that Mauss had always an international inquiry when trying to understand archaic gift exchange. To Mallard, Mauss utilized gift in order to respond to the crises of his time, i.e. the World War 1 and disintegration of ties between the European metropolis and colonies, but the modern evolution of economic anthropology is detached from this extra-

local focus: "... this focus on everyday forms of 'commodity fetishism' ... contrasts deeply with Mauss's interests in understanding international exchanges between sovereign entities, and in pursuing a dialogue with legal theorists on the role of evolving conceptions of sovereignty in changing forms of trade and commerce" (Mallard, 2019, p. 1). While Mauss was working on *The Gift*, Europe entered the World War 1, postwar reparations ignited a debate between supporters of debt forgiveness and war reparations, and emerging anti-colonial uprisings was signaling the end of "white man's burden" to aid. With the 2000s, a number of scholars re-interpreted Mauss's texts on gift exchange with his political writings on war, debt, and the future of colonies (Hart, 2007, 2014; Liebersohn, 2010; Mallard, 2011, 2018). Paralleling this re-orientation in Maussian studies, scholars returned to the idea of gift to study foreign aid as a non-market governance of the international system and inter-state hierarchies.

Right after the World War 2, gift theories started influencing theories on international relations and postwar development problem, but this epoch does not attract much attention in the aid as gift literature. Philosopher Bataille states in his provocative book *The Accursed Share* (1988, first published in French in 1949) that postwar condition requires a "general economy" understanding, where the stagnant growth and useless surplus demands a consumption of excessive resources without a counter return if further growth is needed. Giving away the surplus becomes a necessity for it cannot be translated into further production and growth; thence, it must take the form of a glorious destruction of wealth, squandering of profits without expecting any return. To Bataille, the US Marshall Plan and its competition against the USSR aid represented this principle of waste, power, and development. He illustrates "general economy" in the context of USA and India, where development is impossible for the latter due to the lack of resources, and further growth is blocked for the former due to useless surplus capital unattainable to invest in restrictive economy: "General economy suggests, therefore, as a correct operation, a transfer of American wealth to India without reciprocation" (1988, p. 40). Similar to Bataille, development economist Perroux (1954) interpreted the gift-quality of postwar grants, and their benefits to reboots world capitalist market. To Perroux, postwar aid was a transfer of capital without expecting a counter payment in economic terms, and it was a trial for global solidarity and altruism in social terms. Postwar reconstruction of industrial markets demand capitalist logic to make use of gifts, Perroux argued: "Capitalism cultivates the gift, it puts its mark on it, makes of it its creature. It is thus

methodologically sound for capitalism not to show that the sums given away would redress the logic of the system, correct the vices of its functioning, or indicate a compromise between egocentric and altruistic behaviour” (Perroux, 1954, p. 20).

This combination of market and non-market logics, the transfusion of gifts into commodities and their servicing for the growth of interest-driven market relations is of great importance for our study. Foreign aid as gift literature inspired from this gift-commodity blend, however, emerging literature remained restricted to symbolic domination thesis, which usually discards donor states’ motives for economic and material returns. In other words, recent literature does not provide us an answer to see how gift aids provide opportunities for states to spatially incorporate new regions for their long term interests, diversify market and prestige options at the international system, and hence expand their power resources.

The prime example of contemporary foreign aid gift literature is Hattori, who analyzes the US foreign aid flows and postwar restoration of North-South hierarchies through foreign aid. Hattori states that US postwar aid contained more grants rather than loans, which was in contrast to the Soviet aid strategy. Grants did not required repayments and appeared as generous efforts of the US for international development. However, to Hattori, grants played a symbolic role in postwar world order, which “euphemized a social relation of domination” between donor and recipient (Hattori, 2001, p. 646). Similarly, Hattori argues that state and non-state donations to Northern humanitarian NGOs constitute unreciprocated gifts within the international system. Despite NGOs rhetoric of disinterestedness assistance, Hattori argues, “foreign aid works not to mitigate but rather to euphemise the existing material hierarchies between the North and the South” (Hattori, 2003, p. 246).

Hattori’s works and hence the symbolic domination thesis have become a standard reference in foreign aid as gift literature. To Eyben, Western NGO aid seems disinterested but in its journey toward the Global South aid produces power hierarchies, where “donors are able to reinforce their material and political dominance while disguising this as a generous gesture” (Eyben, 2006, 89). Furia (2015) cites the same scholarly canon, and argues that Northern aid represent gifts to the South but argues that historical hierarchies are maintained and fortified through foreign aid gifts (p. 111). Analyzing the long and complex journey of Northern NGO aid to their Southern counterparts, Stirrat and Henkel

(1997) argue that initially free and disinterested donations represent a gift from North to South, but NGOs impose technical constraints and patronage over the use of donations, which contaminate voluntary donations and turn aid into a tool of symbolic domination over Southern NGOs and recipients.

The new international-turn in gift approach, however, is weak as to two aspects. First, as noted previously, it deals too much with the symbolic aspect while discarding how non-market transfers initiate market and geostrategic returns for the donor state. Second, the literature almost exclusively focuses on aid from North to South, neglecting the phenomenon of emerging donors from the South, and hence maintains the biased conception of the South as passive victims of a Northern aid design. However, aid architecture is changing and there are new discourses and practices of partnerships. Therefore, to have a new interpretation of aid as gift, we need to go from local to inter-regional exchanges, from symbolic to economic motives and outcomes of gifts, and incorporate Southern donors in the changing non-market flows in humanitarian and development aid. This framework is attainable thanks to Mallard's re-orientation of Mauss' *The Gift* as well as gifts to international relations:

... Mauss's model of the gift ... serves to understand heterogeneous systems of international trade and finance which intersect across multiple sovereignties, traversed by various systems of law and varied forms of political sovereignty, in which contracting parties follow self-interested as well as disinterested motivations. (Mallard, 2019, p. 8)

1.4.1 The gift of the state: Humanitarian reason and power resources

Turkey's humanitarian-led expansion to Somalia and later building a strategic foothold in the country's vital sectors is a good example to formulate the relationship between aid as gifts and power resources of emerging donors. Here, we need to consider the relation between humanitarian aid and opportunities for states to expand their spatial, market, and geostrategic presence in an extra-national local. Somalia's former major donors and their dominant aid regimes used different aid modalities to achieve this outcome. Italy used economic aid and development programs to control agriculture and monopolize banana export, which realized a neo-imperial expansion. Later, the Soviet Union used military assistance to reach out Somalia's strategic naval facilities, with the central aim of counterweighing the US presence in Ethiopia and Horn of Africa. Soviet military offers to Somalia provided Moscow a geopolitical expansion in the Horn. Political interests of donors and their foreign policy objectives effected their aid politics

and modality provided to Somalia. The question is, then, how Turkey's humanitarian aid is related to a political economy of inter-state relations, and whether Turkey's aid regime is different than Somalia's previous aid regimes in terms of its reciprocal outcomes for donor and recipient state.

From a restricted political economy perspective, where investment is conceived in terms of calculated expenditure of monetary resources, the impact of humanitarian aid on market advantage seems inconsistent with each other. That is why the *quid pro quo* of humanitarian aid and solidarist expenditures (sacrifice, donation, charity etc.) may appear contradictory to state and business interests. However, when seen from a gift perspective, disinterested solidarity and self-interested investment is not mutually exclusive. In the case of Turkey, we need to locate humanitarianism as a sovereign act to deploy self-interested projections in the name of saving lives, and additionally we must clarify the role of Islamic humanitarian NGOs have played in this process of inter-state aid relationalities.

State-led humanitarian aid is different from economic interventions, at least in principle, since it appears as a moral call to help without requesting a counter-transfer, "thus represents a complicated reworking of sacrifice, one extending beyond a gift economy or a volunteer ethos" (Redfield, 2012, p. 203). Plus, Turkey's aid organization largely benefited from Islamic faith-based NGOs. Their ethical and political concerns shaped the making of aid projects on the one hand, and, on the other, it provided organizational and logistical advantages for Turkey's official aid agencies on the ground. Islamic aid organizations gained a global reach. Islamic NGOs embrace a political agenda and they criticize Western relief NGOs for carrying European foreign policy interests on the one hand, and creating an aid industry out of mediatizing images of those in-need on the other (Benthall, 2007, p. 6). At the same time, Islamic NGOs legitimize their political activism as a legitimacy of religious responsibilities. Islamic practice of *zakat* and *sadaqa* commands giving away your surpluses or sacrificing a required amount of your wealth for protecting vulnerable Muslims. Islamic charity ethics aims a solidarist communitarianism among Muslims, and in the case of Islamic NGOs it mobilizes "governments or groups that invite Muslims to help their 'brothers' in religion, in the name of defence of the community" (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2003, p. 69). Therefore, the pious generosity and "believer's gift" to its community revitalize communitarian

dispositions, which summon contemporary forms of giving blending market and non-market motives (Tuğal, 2017, pp. 3-4).

We can argue from a gift perspective that disinterested solidarity and self-interested investment is not mutually exclusive. Political theorist Fassin makes this connection more explicit in his interpretation of humanitarian reason as a sovereign act. Humanitarianism is seen as a sacrificial expenditure in the name of saving the lives of others, and this voluntarist appeal in the political landscape casts humanitarian reason as a disinterested, unpolitical, and as a moral call devoid of self-interested expectations. However, Fassin (2012) argues, humanitarian intervention manifests a politics of live, which lives to be saved, and through which methods, while compassionate discourse legitimizing the intervention. Humanitarianism may appear as devoid of political calculations due to its saving lives rhetoric, but “... rather than becoming separate, humanitarianism and politics are tending to merge – in other words, humanitarianism is indeed a politics” (Fassin, 2012, p. 224). But at this point, Fassin’s formulation of the humanitarian reason remains inadequate, because he focuses solely on the ideational level and never questions how the compassionate politics of humanitarian sentiments initiate an economic mind, or vice versa. As he defines, humanitarian reason is “an illusion of a global moral community”, it is “a secular imaginary of a communion” that momentarily imagines an egalitarian ethics while forgetting political calculations in it (Fassin, 2013).

Without question, ideas are crucial in the making of foreign policy decisions, but in order to understand the geographic and economic impact of interstate interventions, we need to integrate non-market framework of solidarist exchange into market framework of capitalist exchange. In my opinion, Harvey’s analysis of the capitalist logic of power offers us this possibility for a theoretical innovation in aid-investment/sacrifice-accumulation nexus. Harvey (2003) argues that “capitalism must perpetually have something ‘outside of itself’ in order to stabilize itself”, and this “outside,” he continues, can take different forms in different historical periods. Colonial labor, reserve army of unemployed, or opening up non-market territories for investment are some of examples where the non-capitalist elements promulgate accumulation within the capitalist logic of power. Harvey highlights the role of non-capitalist social formations in opening up new accumulation channels as follows: “... capitalism does indeed require something ‘outside of itself’ in order to accumulate[.] ... But capitalism can either make use of some pre-

existing outside (non-capitalist social formations or some sector within capitalism[])] or it can actively manufacture it.” (Harvey, 2003, p. 141).

I argue that the gift logic embedded in humanitarian reason is one of non-capitalist social formations fitting to Harvey’s interpretation of “the other” within the capitalist accumulation. Anthropologist Swamy’s research on post-tsunami NGO aid to coastal fishery communities in India’s Nagapattinam proves the mutuality between humanitarian gift and accumulation. Swamy argues that altruistic action is perceived as an uneconomic endeavor, but the state and NGO collaboration to deliver housing aid to coastal fisheries in fact turned into a post-disaster investment for the government to control population and open up traditional fishery to neoliberal programs. Therefore, Swamy states, 2004 tsunami disaster became an opportunity for the government to mobilize compassionate sentiments and incorporate humanitarian aid as an expansionist tool of its economic and political agenda. Through the strategic deployment of “compassionate optimism of the humanitarian imperative,” Swamy concludes, “the NGO gift of housing to beneficiaries buttressed a structure of accumulation that combined the state’s acquisition of land with the symbolic values realized from the giving of the gift” (Swamy, 2021, 11). Similar to Swamy’s framing of humanitarian gift economy, Turkey’s appearance on the Somali in 2011 drought crisis followed an ambitious foreign policy during the AKP rule. The AKP government mobilized a compassionate spirit at home and initiated a nation-wide donation campaign. Following 2011 humanitarian intervention became an opportunity for the government to open up East Africa for strategic investments, and to actualize its candid claims for becoming a regional actor to increase Turkey’s trade and geopolitical network. I define Turkey’s humanitarian-led intervention and later building a geostrategic presence in Somalia through collaborating with faith-based humanitarian NGOs in the making of development projects as a benevolent expansion. Following chapters analyzes Turkey’s appearance on the Somali scene as an emerging donor following the countries almost fifty years of failed incorporation into the capitalist world system due to devastating consequences of previous major donors’ politics of aid, namely Italian development aid for neo-imperial expansion and Soviet military aid for geopolitical expansion.

1.5 Chapter outlines

First chapter analyzes the formation of Italian Somalia, decline of Italian East African Empire, and Italy's turning back to the Horn after the WW2 as the administrator of the UN Trust territory of Somalia in 1950. In the following years, Italy became the major provider of development aid to Somalia, and it used aid to restore its pre-war plantations while turning Somali agriculture into its monopoly after Somalia's independence in 1960. Unlike its European competitors Britain and France, Italy had constant resource shortages but it achieved to acquire Eritrea, southern Somalia, and Ethiopia following in 1935. But the Italy's long-aspired East African Empire quickly dissolved in 1941 with Italy's defeat in World War 2. When Italy returned Somalia in 1950 for a ten-year Trusteeship Administration, Italian development aid almost exclusively targeted Somalia's agricultural sector in fertile river valleys, where Italian colonial firms had acquired most of the land and monopolized banana production. In this period, foreign aid to Somalia served as a neo-imperial expansion for Italy by direct support to agricultural projects under the monopoly of Italian firms. Italian development plans made Somalia's productive sector dependent on one single crop, banana. However, since Somali banana was not competitive as to its counterparts in the international market, Italian aid eventually made Somalia more dependent on foreign grants and credits. In the end, Italian aid to Somalia created a neo-imperial expansion for Italy in the Horn of Africa while building an economically dependent post-colonial state.

Second chapter investigates the Cold War arms race in the East Africa where superpowers competed for geopolitical advantage through military aid. Somalia's post-independence democratic state was toppled in 1969 by General Siad Barre, and he stayed in power until the Somali state collapsed in 1991. When he came to rule, Barre declared socialism in Somalia and aimed to develop a stronger relationship with the Soviet Union in order to obtain a strong military against threats coming from Ethiopia, which was a candid ally of the United States in East Africa. Improving its engagements with the communist bloc, Barre's Somalia signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in 1972 and this started a huge military assistance by the Soviets. Soviet Union secured its access to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean through military aid, and achieved a geopolitical advantage to counterbalance the US naval bases in Eritrea. However, Somalia's growing military capacity triggered the political elite's irredentist aspirations for reinvigorating "Greater Somalia" by incorporating Ogaden region in Ethiopia. When Barre launched a devastating war against Ethiopia, Somalia not only economically dissolved but it also lost

its only superpower ally. The Soviet Union punished Barre's hostile nationalism by changing side in favor of Ethiopia. After the war, Barre lost its legitimacy and increased state violence against the opposition clans resisting against his autocratic regime, which escalated into Somalia's bloody civil war. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, protected its geopolitical expansion by switching its side to Ethiopia and starting massive military aid to Ethiopia's new socialist junta leader Mengistu. Therefore, second chapter argues that Cold War competition between the Moscow and Washington used military assistance to buy client regimes in Somalia and Ethiopia to reach naval facilities in East Africa's strategic posts, thereby aid during the Cold War functioned as a tool of geopolitical expansion for the Soviet Union.

The third chapter analyzes Somalia's post-state collapse development partner, Turkey. Turkey during the AKP rule pursued an emerging actor policy to increase its trade and diplomatic engagements with its close neighbors as well as with new partners in Africa. Third chapter analyzes how Somalia entered the AKP's foreign policy objectives through the analysis of parliamentary debates. The AKP utilized multilateral grounds and joint-military missions in order to increase its regional activism, its responsible image in global problems, and receive a prestige in international platforms. With this aim, the government supported a motion to send naval forces to Indian Ocean and Red Sea for a joint-UN mission against piracy off Somalia coasts. In line with its multilateral and securitized foreign policy discourse, the AKP government defended sending troops in light of Turkey's new foreign policy objectives aiming international responsibilities and regional power. However, with the 2011 humanitarian disaster in Somalia, the discursive analysis of parliamentary discussions reveals that the AKP shifted its multilateral security framework toward a compassionate solidarist framing of Turkey's humanitarian responsibilities to protect the oppressed. This chapter argues that humanitarian disaster in Somalia provided an opportunity for the AKP government to mobilize compassionate politics and a humanitarian solidarism to cloak long term state interests and its interest-driven foreign policy objectives.

Next chapter analyzes how compassionate politics and the mobilization of faith-based humanitarian NGOs influenced the making of development projects. Through semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted with representatives of Turkey's state and non-state aid agencies, I interpret how official and NGO perception and practice of aid differ, at what points they collaborate and support their organizational network on the

ground, and how religious and political concerns guide NGO actors' understanding of aid and partnership. Through the concept of "inalienable possessions" I argue that official and NGO activities inform the making of aid projects as development gifts, but moral concerns of actors abstain them from handing over the gift to Somalis, which creates relations of patronage on the one hand, and political concerns of actors open Somalia for Turkey's long term interests, which legitimize the coexistence of disinterested aid and self-interested investment in Somalia's strategic sectors

The final chapter turns the attention to Somali agency in the partnership. In this part I use in-depth interviews I conducted with fifty Somali students, both active and also graduated, who came to Turkey with official and NGO scholarships since 2011. I question how aid interventions shape the perception of recipient agents, how scholarship programs influence diasporic identity formations, how the cultural environment in the new settlement affect students' perspective toward the future of Somalia and the development partnership with Turkey. This chapter traces the formation of diasporic networks, and interprets how they shape the Somali community's interests, expectations, and critiques toward Turkey. Scholarship programs mobilized different waves of student flows to Turkey on the one hand, and as the number of graduates increased in time they invited the transnational Somali diaspora to Turkey for different purposes, on the other. Turkey's closer engagement with Somali diaspora made Turkey a meeting point for the Somalis, who had been dispersed to different parts of the world after the civil war, for education, touristic, and business interests. However, as I show in this section, as the Somali community in Turkey grew and their activities changed from a scholarship student to middle scale entrepreneurs, Somalis have become a target of rising xenophobia, discrimination and hate speech in Turkey. The chapter notes a recent transformation in the Somalis' perception of Turkey's presence in Somalia from a "brotherly" humanitarian actor to a foreign state benefiting disproportional gains while hindering the Somalis receive the same opportunities.

CHAPTER 2

ITALIAN DEVELOPMENT AID:

A NEO-IMPERIAL EXPANSION, 1950-69

Abdi Ismail Samatar states that among the historiographical studies on postcolonial African states, Somalia is one among the least studied nations because of scarce historical materials and adequate data (1989, p. xiii). Despite the scarcity, Somali historiography is an enriching source to understand the role of foreign aid in the formation and dissolution of Somalia's economy and politics. Following the state collapse in 1991, Somali scholars produced varied explanations to formulate causes behind a self-destructing society and the role of external actors in it. The clannist perspective states that the segmentary lineage system created an exclusive kinship network that have recurrently functioned as a divisive and conflict-driven cause within the history of Somali politics. (Lewis, 1994). Political economy perspective, in contrast, analyses the revival of clannism in post-independence Somali politics as a result of the colonization and underdevelopment of traditional pastoral and agrarian communities. This process, they argue, alienated rural population from politics, hindered the commodification and the state's territorial power, and hence created a rentier-type of politician who seized foreign aid funds for self-interests and politicized cultural identities for a clan-based clientelism to gain power (Samatar, 1989, 2013).

Others also listed foreign aid as one of the central factors in the Somali crisis. To these authors, the availability of external assistance during Cold War created a geostrategic battle among superpowers over Somalia. When Cold War ended in the 1980s it left the country only in intensified corruption, a heavy debt crisis, and instability

(Menkhaus, 1997). Somali scholars who read these suggestions as one-way explanations to a complex phenomenon argue that Somali crisis has a deep-rooted history where foreign aid, cultural elements, geopolitical shifts in the region, and the authoritarian Somali state entangled into a social, economic, and political process of disintegration (Abdurahman, 2017; Samatar, 2000). This chapter embraces the last viewpoint while allocating a special attention to the role of foreign aid in the shaping of postcolonial Somalia's economic and political crises.

Somali Republic established in 1960 as the combination of former Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland. Economy and state capacity were weak and budget deficit was hindering development and security interests of the new ruling elite. Foreign aid became a necessary external resource to pursue these goals. Cold War competition for regional influence made finding external assistance easier for the first Somali democratic government. Not only former imperialists Italy and Britain, but also post-war superpowers the United States and the Soviet Union, appeared as candid donors of Somalia with varied amounts of grants and loans offered. Though the country had few advantages for economic benefits, Somalia's geostrategic position lying in between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean attracted many foreign powers to build a regional influence by buying client politicians from the nascent East African state. However, multiple sources of foreign aid did not solely pursue the geopolitical mindset of postwar international scene. When we focus on Italian development aid, the largest donor of post-independent Somalia, we see that Italy primarily utilized development aid for the restoration of its imperialist agenda based economic interests.

In this chapter, I analyze motivations and neo-imperial strategies of Italy's aid politics in Somalia starting with the colonial invasion in the late nineteenth century to the post-World War 2 development aid. The chapter starts with a brief history of Somalia's imperial partition and proceeds with the formation of Italian colony in southern Somalia. I analyze ideological and material interests of Italian colonialism in Somalia during the fascist rule, and I examine the impact of aggressive expansion of Italian banana plantations on the incorporation of southern Somalia to the world market. Somalia had been partitioned into five colonies, and after the World War 2 the future of Italian Somalia at the south and British Somalia at the north became a diplomatic dispute among the world powers. The United Nations appointed Italy as the administrator of the Trust Territory of Somalia in 1950 in order to prepare the south for economic and political independence

until 1960. Italian trusteeship used aid to restore former Italian plantations and following the independence Italian aid turned Somali banana production and export into a monopoly controlled by Italian enterprises. This became detrimental for post-independent Somalia's economic and political structures in less than a decade. The chapter ends with analyzing the impact of Italian politics of aid on the legitimacy crisis of the Somali state, which ended up with the bloodless 1969 coup by General Siad Barre.

2.1 Somalia: History, culture, and imperial partition

Three European imperialists Britain, France, and latecomer Italy started colonizing East Africa in the middle of nineteenth century. Before the imperial partition, Somali nomadic pastoralists had inhabited the arid plateaus of the Horn of Africa. Ethnic Somalis under numerous subclan families expanded toward inland regions covering today's Djibouti, southeastern parts of Ethiopia, and northern districts of Kenya. Sharing the same ancestral origin, customary laws called *xeer* (heer) and Islamic religion, Somalis secured a cultural and linguistic unity. Despite commonalities, clan loyalty and patrilineal genealogy functioned as divisive social mechanisms that hindered the formation of a political unity among Somali communities (Lewis, 2008, p. 27). Although clanship have transformed into a cultural nationalism during anti-colonial Dervish Resistance between 1900-1920 and throughout post-colonial political movements, clan consciousness has survived and still influences current political crises of fragmented Federal Republic of Somalia.

Four main pastoralist clans were Dir, Darod, Hawiye and Isaq, and they covered the three-fourths of the Somalis in the Horn of Africa. The remaining population included two agrarian clans, Digil and Rahanweyn, who inhabited arable lands on fertile Jubba and Shabelle river valleys in southern Somalia. In addition to pastoralist and agropastoralist clans, non-Somali former slave communities from East Africa had settled in lower Jubba valley as smallholder agrarian families. The majority of Somali clans lived a nomadic pastoralist life sporadically on interior grazing lands, but they were not detached from trade in coastal towns. Somali and non-Somali traders lived in coastal towns ranging from Zeila at the north to Mogadishu at the south. From the sixteenth century onwards, northern towns Zeila and Berbera have always been active markets for exotic animals and ostrich feather, livestock based on mainly camel and goat, hides and skin, and coffee as well as slave trade (Samatar, 1993, p. 5). Ecological factors and especially the cycle of dry and

rainy seasons shaped Somali pastoral economy and culture. In dry seasons, nomadic pastoralists were reaching towns to sell hides and skins, and during rainy seasons families were concentrating on grazing lands for meetings, rituals, and weddings. Therefore, the dispersal and concentration patterns depending on seasonal movements as well as trade networks merging inland and coastal towns created fluid territorial boundaries between pastoral clans since the tenth century onward, stretching toward Ogaden region at the west, next to Christian Abyssinian Kingdom (Lewis, 1993, pp. 49-55).

Facing the Arabic peninsula, and frequented by merchants from Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean, coastal towns of northern Somalia were commercially and culturally interactive destinations. Islamic faith was the cementing cultural element among Somali clans, and geographic proximity with Arabic peninsula helped the migration of Islamic communities toward Somali hinterland. As Islam in East Africa started to spread with the fifteenth century, pastoral communities gradually organized around Muslim territorial sultanates, which accelerated wars against Christian Abyssinian Kingdom. In the mid-sixteenth century, to repress Muslim invasions toward Amhara, Abyssinians demanded support from the Portuguese, who was then trying to establish its dominance on the Red Sea region. Muslims including Somali pastoralists, in return, received military aid from Ottoman Empire following the Ottoman occupation of Massawa in 1557, a port town in present-day Eritrea. Ottoman Empire nominally incorporated the trade in northern coasts of Zeila and Berbera, and parts of Eritrea, until the arrival of European colonialist in the nineteenth century. From seventeenth to nineteenth century, northern Somalia gone through a competition for control among Ottomans, Portuguese, and Omanis (Cassanelli, 1982, pp. 98-100, 119; Lewis, 1988, pp. 27-33). With the opening of Suez Canal in 1869 these port towns gained a strategic value attracting the imperial gaze of European colonizers.

In southern Somalia, the city of Mogadishu in the Banadir region was the most prominent trade center by the eighteenth century. In fact, Muslim traveler Ibn Battuta's notes from the fourteen century show that Mogadishu was known to be a large and prosperous city with its vibrant commerce and abundant livestock (Battuta, 2004, p. 361; Samatar, 1993, pp. 8-9). With rich agricultural and fishery resources, southern Somalia became a destination for merchants from Egypt, Persia, Arabic peninsula, and other territorial African sultanates. Since the fourteenth century, the rule of Mogadishu and Banadir region changed hands from the Ajuran Sultanate to the protection of Oman.

When the Sultan of Zanzibar gained control of southern port cities of Somalia regional actors from Africa, Middle East and Arab nations were not the only visitors of Somali towns. European explorers from Britain, France and Germany started reaching to the Horn by the 1820s and wrote their observations on culture, hinterland, resources, and possible revenues to be gained by incorporating Somali peripheries into their international trade networks. Strategically tying Red Sea and Indian ocean, geographic benefits of Somali coasts became the target of a heated scramble of Africa in the middle of the nineteenth century.

Britain's colonial plan for northern Somalia was rather simple. Britain acquired Aden port in Yemen in 1838, and it wanted to exploit livestock resources of Somali pastoralists at the north. This would help British colonists to control livestock trade in parts of the Indian Ocean and transfer meat supplies from northern Somali towns to its possessions in Aden and India. For that aim, Britain established its protectorate at the northern Somalia in 1887 (Lewis, 1988, pp. 40-41). France, the imperial rival of Britain, located its garrisons in the port of Obock of today's Djibouti in 1859 and acquired a strategic location connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. France aimed to expand its foothold from East African coasts towards the west so that it could cut through Britain's north to south geographic reach extending from Egypt to South Africa (Samatar, 1993, p. 11). Claiming its protectorate on coasts of today's Djibouti populated by ethnic Somalis, France signed trade agreements with Ethiopian Empire and proposed to construct a railway line in order penetrate more toward Ethiopian hinterland at the west.

Italy's appearance on the East African scene as a latecomer imperialist was an opportunity for the British government to weaken French expansion in the region. Italy claimed Eritrean coasts of Assab in 1885. Later in 1892, Italy acquired southern Banadir region including Mogadishu from the Sultan of Zanzibar in return for an annual rent, which initiated the first steps of Italian colony of southern Somalia. By the time, Ethiopia's King Menelik II was trying to seize Somali-populated grazing lands of Haud and Ogaden with constant raids. Christian Ethiopia's increasing attacks against Somali clans casted King Menelik as an archenemy of growing Somali nationalism toward the beginning of the twentieth century. More importantly, with the military aid of Russian Empire, Ethiopia emerged as a nascent expansionist state competing with Britain, France, and Italy in the Horn of Africa. Through raids and signing treaties with European powers,

Ethiopian Empire wanted to control both grazing lands habituated by Somali pastoralists and trade routes reaching coastal towns.

Somali-inhabited territories of the Horn of Africa eventually partitioned into five colonies by the turn of the nineteenth century. Britain occupied northern Somaliland and in following decades expanded its territorial control on Kenya-Somali line, which has been called Northern Frontier District. France acquired northeastern regions covering today's Djibouti. At the south, Italian garrisons and firms started colonizing Mogadishu and inter-riverine lower Jubba and Shabelle region. Lastly, Ethiopia claimed Ogaden at the middle-west. Multiple interventions created five colonies over Somali populated regions of the Horn of Africa.




Figure 1.1: Colonial boundaries in the Horn of Africa, 1925.

Source: Samatar (1988, p. 17).

Approaching to the twentieth century, imperial partition of East Africa divided Somali-inhabited territories. Different colonizers pursued varied long term economic and geopolitical interests. However, Italy's emergence in southern Somalia as a latecomer

imperialist appears as an anomaly against the organized colonialism of French and British Empires. Why did Italy pursue an imperial expansion in Somalia, although its economic potentials were scarce and regional competitors had already established their foothold? Italy's colonial expansion in East Africa emerged as a result of civilizational fantasies, prestige desires, and economic motivations for developing a true colony.

2.2 Italy's belated imperialism in East Africa

The literature on nineteenth century European imperialism often tend to neglect Italy or define it as an exception due to its uneconomic rationality, prestige-driven policies, and rapid decline (Labanca, 2018). In contrast to economic and geopolitical dynamics behind Britain and France, Italy's desire for overseas expansion appears as an anomaly against the classical theories of imperialism. Hobson's (2005) and Lenin's (1989) formulations define European imperialism as a result of the combination of big bourgeoisie interests for new markets and strong state authority for mobilizing public budget to open up new frontiers for outsourcing capital and exploit overseas resources. Italian imperialism, in contrast, emerged when Italy newly accomplished its national unification without a strong public budget and in the absence of an entrepreneurial class having excessive capital. Italy, Europe's belated imperialist, appeared on the African scene as a result of external and internal factors. At the geopolitical level, Italy's imperialism was a state policy for taking the advantage of competition between France and Britain on East Africa. That would also gave Italy an advantageous position to reap the benefit of the declining Ottoman power in the Mediterranean (Segrè, 1996). At the demographic level, Italian colonialism was a response to the problem of surplus population and poor peasantry in southern Italy. Underdevelopment and poverty behind Italy's expansionist desires was so explicit that Lenin defined it as "poor people's imperialism" (Lenin, 1974) or as others call it "ragamuffin imperialism" that "did not have any real capability of exploitation had less of an opportunity to promote the social, economic and institutional operations which [...] characterized colonialism in general" (Tripodi, 1999, p. 5).

Despite its belatedness and resource shortages, only a short time after its national unification in 1870, Italian liberal government proclaimed its first colonies on Eritrea's Assab and Massawa coasts in 1882 and 1885, and later in 1892 Italy's first commercial enterprises entered southern Somalia. When Italian garrisons grasped a place in the sun

Italy had already missed the heydays of aggressive imperialism of the 1860s. Compared to British and French imperial networks, Italian colonialism was more uneven and restricted in terms of geography and duration. In addition to these obstacles, it remained stagnant as to the exploitation of land resources due to constant capital shortages and the absence of an organized colonial policy (Palumbo, 2003). Yet, for the Italian government colonialism was more of a quest for international prestige in order to be acknowledged as one of European imperialists. Without a strong public support at home for grandiose imperial endeavors, in 1896 Italy's liberal government launched a burdensome invasion toward Ethiopian hinterland from small East African coastal colonies. The aim was to establish Italian Empire in the Horn of Africa and open the land for exploitation and settler colonialism. However, The Battle of Adwa between Italy and Ethiopian Empire turned out to be a landmark defeat for Italy as well as a loss of national honor for his aspired imperialist outlook. After two decades of disorganized colonialism, when fascist Italy returned to its possessions the prime cause was not the surplus of economic capital again, but a surplus of "national energies", which promised revenge, prestige and a glorious future in the ongoing scramble for Africa (Langer, 1935).

Comparing capital shortages and uneconomic drives behind Italy's colonial mission to Britain and France, scholars of Italian imperialism highlight two factors: nationalist ideology and demographic concerns. For Italy's official ideology under the fascist era, the aim of imperialism was not solely an exploitative adventure, but a cultural and political project for the spiritual elevation of the new nation (Ferrari, 2013, pp. 125-26). Under Mussolini rule, restoring Italy's expansion from Mediterranean to East Africa was vital for reanimating nationhood and strengthening colonies that would put Italy "at the center of a new supra-continental economic and political order that would hinge on the exploitation of Africa" (Ben-Ghiat & Fuller, 2005, p. 2). With the beginning of the 1920s under fascist ideology, Italy started remembering Adwa defeat not as a shame but as a nationalist feeling of reawakening "that could be avenged only through an equal if not greater enemy defeat" (Triulzi, 2003, p. 105). Taking the revenge of Adwa was not only a key to reclaim national prestige in the imperialist competition but it was also a geostrategic aim to combine small colonies of Eritrea and southern Somalia with Ethiopia under the aspired Italian East African Empire. This would pave the way for increasing the range of exploitable land and initiating settler colonialism by transferring Italy's poor peasant population onto colonies. The combination of nationalist and demographic

concerns, therefore, shaped Italian colonial policy during the fascist regime. To achieve this, the Fascist government squandered enormous money for war preparations and the conquest of Ethiopian Empire until its successive invasion in 1935.

In fifty years from the 1880s to 1935, small Italian colonies articulated into the Italian East African Empire, yet Italy was far from achieving its initial goals. Fascist propaganda machine decorated Italy's possessions in East Africa with myths of a flourishing nature embracing unlimited potentials for exploitation. The aim was to create an enthusiastic geographic imagination of "Italian Africa", and hence to encourage its population to emigrate to colonies (Polezzi, 2014). However, the reality beyond fascist myths was the opposite: the exploitable land was limited and dispersed, and the government support for the necessary infrastructure was inadequate. Unplanned land confiscations and forcing local smallholder communities to slave-like labor on plantations did not help creating a profitable land to transform imperial hinterland into a settlement colony. Despite the huge cost of military expeditions and administrative budgets, only two percent of Italy's total import came from the Empire in 1938 (Atkinson, 2005, p. 91). Besides proving economically unprofitable, Italian colonialism failed demographically as well by attracting no more than few hundreds of Italian expatriates in Ethiopia in 1940. Due to the shortage of government capital, the lack of infrastructure, and problems of finding plantation labor, Italian settlers tended to turn back to homeland rather than staying in the colonies (Larebo, 2005).

Although fascist propaganda promised utopian infrastructure projects and prosperity at colonies, Italy's belated East African Empire came into existence in a few decades and it rapidly fell down after the World War 2 without a significant economic and demographic return. Italy started claiming the Horn of Africa coasts of Eritrea and southern Somalia in the late nineteenth century, it incorporated Ethiopia in 1935, and Italy's ambitious East African Empire eventually dissolved in 1940. In sum, Italian imperialism was a disorganized colonial aspiration that had ever lacked necessary resources to create a lucrative colony. It was more of a quest for national identity seeking international prestige and a demographic project to encourage settler colonialism. In sum, Italian colonialism in East Africa "flowed from political, strategic and even psychological rather than economic motives" (Maggi, 1997, p. 68).

2.2.1 Italian colonization, 1880-1940

Nevertheless, Italian colonization in southern Somalia triggered two important transformations: one considering the colonial history of Italy, and the other considering the history of colonialism in East Africa. Firstly, Italy wanted to turn Somalia into a true colony and hence pursued an aggressive and intensive plantation policy over the fertile inter-riverine basin of the south. In addition, Italy invested on urban infrastructure, city planning, and social services, which made Mogadishu a representation of Italy's civilizational fantasies. Italy established extensive plantations by land grabs, enforced labor, and intensive farming. Italian government provided subsidies to plantation companies, and eventually Somalia banana production became an Italian monopoly enterprise. Such aggressive interventions turned southern Somalia a central theme within Italy's colonial discourse, and Somalia became the only profiting colony within the Horn of Africa. When we turn to the history of colonialism in East Africa, Italian colonialism produced the first anti-colonial political organizations again from the south. The repressive fascist administration at the colony ignited an anti-imperialist ideology and a modern nationalist spirit among the Somali educated youth. Southern Somalis built the first civic association Somali Youth Club in 1943, which evolved into a vast political party, Somali Youth League (SYL), in 1947 with more than 25,000 members toward the 1950s. The emergence of modernist political ideologies and the connection of banana production to the European market eventually initiated the peripheralization of southern Somalia within the world capitalist system while other colonies controlled by Britain, France, and Ethiopia lagged behind without experiencing an aggressive transformation similar to Italian colonization. Italian colonialism created a uneven geography of development, and southern Somalia became the focal point of social, economic, and political transformations for the ethnic Somalis in the Horn of Africa.

As stated above, postcolonial Somalia was founded by the combination of Italian and British colonies. Therefore, the comparison of two colonial legacies reveals crucial insight to understand the foundations of Italy's postcolonial aid politics in Somalia on the one hand, and economic and political crises it triggered in Somalia's uneven development on the other. British administration primarily concerned with the transfer of Somali livestock to its possessions in India through the Aden port. In order to keep Somaliland colony "cheap and small", British administration "did not intervene into the pastoralists' world so long as the caravan routes and the general peace went undisturbed" (Samatar, 1989, p. 50). To British administration, Somaliland was strategically important but

economically unattractive, and hence British colonists never engaged in an organized development plan. In the 1910s, British administration built only one municipality, three schools for Indian and Arab merchants, and only a single elementary school for Somalis within the entire colony. Apart from building some water reservoirs and a veterinary school, which was built in 1924 for improving standards in hides and skin production in order to meet demands from leather industry in the US and the UK, there was no significant colonial project to intervene traditional pastoralism.

Another obstacle in front of British colonization was the anti-colonialist Dervish resistance. In the beginning of twentieth century, Somali religious leader Sayyid Mohammed united local clans with an Islamic, traditionalist, and nationalist rhetoric and declared a holy war against European intruders and Ethiopia (Samatar, 1982). Between 1900-20, the Dervish Resistance under Sayyid Mohammed's charismatic leadership targeted mainly British and Ethiopian forces, and twenty years of armed resistance became the biggest source of expenditure for the British administration. As Sayyid Mohammed became the symbol of emerging Somali nationalism, the Dervish Resistance also encouraged local resentment against colonists. British administration faced grassroots challenges from clans when it tried to implement educational and fiscal policies on the ground. Efforts to levy taxes on livestock trade, for example, ended up with an uprising among local clan members where a British colonial commissioner was killed. Thus, the lack of economic interests combined with regional and local resistance created a "neglect of development" in British administration and this attitude continued after the second world war, as well. Only at the beginning of the 1950s, British administration started experimental farming with small agricultural loans and conducted several hydrological surveys in the Somaliland protectorate (Samatar, 1989, p. 42-70). When two former colonies were joined, British Somaliland significantly lagged behind the outcome of intensive colonization process in Italian Somaliland.

In a sharp contrast, Italian Somaliland at the south experienced an intensive colonization period especially during the fascist rule following the 1920s. Italy recognized Somalia as an opportunity to build up a lucrative colony. Despite its being a latecomer and having constant fiscal shortages, Italian government escalated the colonization of Somali rural and urban sectors. Italian firms and colonists reached Mogadishu and Somalia's arable lands in Afgoye and Jowhar around fertile Shabelle and Jubba rivers during the 1910s. However, before the fascist regime, Italian government

was never able to fully support a full scale intervention, rather it encouraged chartered companies, such as Filonardi and later Benadir companies, to build up plantations by private capital. Besides their being economically unfruitful, these private enterprises endured slavery and forced recruitments from Bantu and Somali speaking small agricultural groups living along the riverine basin. Italian government and international circles accused such mistreatment and slavery methods of Italian companies, yet they continued forced labor in production, construction and settler sites (Pankhurst, 1969, p. 42-88).

Italians believed that Somalia offered economic potentials unlike other colonies in East Africa. A recommendation report written by an Italian commission in the early twentieth century portrays the Italian ambitions for investing in Somali agriculture and build a true colony: “Our firm conviction is that the future greatness of the Colony [of Somalia] lies in the development of agriculture. There is no longer any question that all of the land from the middle Shabeelle valley to the left bank of the Jubba is susceptible to the greatest agricultural exploitation.” (Cited from Cassanelli, 1982, p. 177) However, for chartered companies the most important problem was finding and controlling plantation labor. Because of this chartered companies continued violent interventions into the social fabric of agrarian communities, and simultaneously this situation created a civilizing myth of valorizing the colony. Italy embraced a civilizing discourse and turned southern Somalia into a laboratory for experiments in “valorizzazione” and “compartecipazione”, which meant “giving value” to fertile lands through the “collaboration” between Somali subjects and wise Italian management. This developmentalist and civilizing discourse served Italian colonists to justify violent methods in plantation labor and dispossession of Somali agrarian communities. Aiming to control labor and production in plantations, Italy’s fascist administration intensified land grabs and legalized forced marriages among Somalis in the name of monitoring farmers and prevent them fleeing the land (Urbano, 2017).

When fascist cadres succeeded former colonial administration in 1923, governmental support to plantations and infrastructure projects rapidly and assertively increased. During this period, the Società Agricola Italo-Somala (SAIS) became the most important example of Italy’s economic colonization, which was established in 1920 at Jowhar as a private enterprise by the Italian Duke of Abruzzi. SAIS invested on the cultivation of cotton and sugarcane, and later banana became the main crop of production

and export. SAIS started exporting banana to Italy in 1927. However, high transportation cost of Somali banana was making it uncompetitive as to its counterparts in the international market, that is why Italy deployed tariffs to block non-Somali banana imports and support Italian companies in the colony. Under the protection of the fascist government, Italian-owned banana plantation lands expanded from 17 folds to 3,975 hectares between 1929-36. With the establishment of state enterprise Royal Banana Plantation Monopoly and the disposal of seven ships for the transfer of export items, Italian government encouraged private investment and banana plantations in southern Somalia (Laitin, 1993, pp. 122-23). However, the biggest problem of finding plantation labor continued, and firms obliged to turn to wage-labor contracts with farmer communities, which prevented neither Italians' enforcements nor Somalis' fleeing from plantations. Contractual farming demanded one half of the produce for the company while letting the other half for the personal use of local producers, and this served SAIS expanding its land concessions up to 30,000 hectares (Laitin and Samatar, 1984).

Table 2.1: Ownership distributions for cultivable land, 1933.

Nationality	Number of owners	Hectares
Italian	175	72,842
Arab	1,061	15,000
Indian	1	5
Somali	0	0

Source: Samatar (1988, p. 50).

With the fascist administration's pervasiveness and Italian companies' forceful measures, Italy expanded its exploitation channels economically and logistically by building railway lines connecting Mogadishu port to Afgoye and Jowhar, two regions infiltrated by Italian concessionaries including SAIS. Considering radical territorial and economic penetration of the fascist administration, historians of Italian colonialism defined the fascistization period as "the second conquest of Somalia" (Prunier, 2010, p. 41). During this period, the administration constructed numerous wells, irrigation canals for subsidiary farmers, a network of dispensaries, and a school of training for Somali hospital orderlies. As the number of settlers increased during the 1930s (reaching to 8,000 in 1941), Italian administration built elementary schools for Italian and Somali children, built mosques, and constructed a big cathedral in Mogadishu (Lewis, 1988, pp. 96-97).

To sum up, the high level of colonial intervention during fascism had two path changing consequences in southern Somalia. In economic terms, the heightened land expropriations, the single crop agricultural regime dictated by banana exports, and the deterioration of traditional farming under extensive plantations concluded with the eradication of traditional agricultural routines. Plantations alienated smallholder communities from the land and they tried to flee from plantations whenever possible, which started a decline in the amount of output served to the local market. Thus, export-oriented banana plantations reduced subsistence farming and created a food shortage at the end of the 1930s (Menkhaus, 2003, p. 143). This inevitably made Somali colony more dependent to imports and revenues from Italy. Secondly in political terms, the fascistization of colony led to the creation of a new type of Somali when the new administration started recruiting Somalis as salaried officials in administrative, security, and civil service tasks. Educated in Italian schools, competent with Italian language, and experienced the crude methods of Italian personnel, these new urbanite Somalis generated a political consciousness that gradually voiced a Pan-Somali nationalism. Unlike the south, Somalis under British protectorate “saw little state intervention, political oppression, and economic restructuring in the rural sectors, conditions which were central to the rise of nationalist movements in the south” (Samatar, 1989, p. 76). Deepening divergence between two colonies towards the end of 1930s had determining outcomes for economic and political life of post-independence Somali state. As the founder of Somali studies I. M. Lewis states, violent but progressive Italian colonialism showed its impact in the following years: “In public buildings and roads, and in the plantation industry, the foundations of a modern colony had been created, the benefit of which, despite the many injustices committed against them, Somalis were to reap in the future” (Lewis, 1988, p. 112).

The fascist rule in colonies ended when the World War 2 forced Italian troops to withdraw from its East African possessions. Italy, after invading Ethiopia, seized British Somaliland in 1940, but the temporal unification of Somali territories under the Italian Empire did not even last for one year when British imperial troops drew Italy out of northern Somaliland. Italy's second conquest of Somalia triggered historical transformations in agriculture and civil life, but it never achieved to build a profiting colony for its firms and settlers. Disorganized land expropriations, budget supports to an uneconomic banana export, and continuing negative balance between the colony's

expenditures and revenues made the initial ambitions impossible. Although SAIS showed some increase, overall colonial income in 1934 was 29 million lire which remained far behind the 74 million lire of expenditures (Lewis, 1988, pp. 100-101). When Italian troops left their foothold in East Africa, British Military Administration took the control of northern and southern territories up until 1950. In contrast to Italy's paternalist colonialism, British deployed libertarian gestures by letting civil associations to hold their meetings, which Italian administration had banned for perceiving them as a threat against its presence. Somali Youth Club inaugurated in 1943 started its nationalist campaign, and when it evolved into the nation's first political party of Somali Youth League Pan-Somalism, anti-clannism, modernist developmentalism, and anti-imperial independence became dominant ideological appeals among the educated Somalis in the south. Italy's postwar diplomacy to turn back to its former colonies was not only a challenge against the international community, but it was also a challenge against raising Somali nationalism and strong anti-Italian sentiments awaiting the former colonist in Somalia.

2.3 Italian Trusteeship: Development aid for neo-imperial restoration

When Italy's short-lived East African Empire came to end and Italians withdrew from colonies, the postwar condition of Italian ex-colonies started a diplomatic controversy among new powers of the emerging international system. After Italy denounced his colonial rights after the war, four powers including Britain, France, United States and Soviet Union started negotiating the future of the colonies under a United Nations special commission. The Commission required that four powers had to agree on a joint decision about the future of Italian colonies; and if they failed, they would accept the final decision of the United Nations General Assembly. The bargain over the future of ex-Italian colonies were hardly related to economic interests. When British Military Administration took over Italian Somaliland, observers defined the economic situation of Somalia in the mid-1940s as "a more economically unenviable country could hardly be imagined;" prospective administrator powers "would also have bills to pay, for the country can pay nothing" (Longrigg, 1945, p. 366). Unlike the economic prospects, Italian colonies in Libya, Eritrea, and Somalia laid at the geostrategic posts connecting East Africa, Mediterranean basin, and Indian ocean. Having a direct or indirect influence on them would be a vested interest for four powers within the postwar geopolitical competition. Therefore, Cold War atmosphere attributed former colonies a new strategic importance. Benjamin Rivlin, a UN specialist on East Africa, underscored in 1949 the

importance of colonies in the postwar East-West divide: “It is clear that the reasons for the bitter struggle over the Italian colonies will have to be found in fields unconnected with economic considerations. The answer lies in their strategic importance and prestige value” (Rivlin, 1949, p. 462).

When four powers started negotiations, Britain and France already secured their presence in the northern Somaliland and Djibouti. Neither of the four was willing to uphold the liabilities of economically scars conditions in Eritrea. That is why when Ethiopia easily annexed Eritrea it did not create a conflict of interest among postwar powers. Following 1947, Italy lost the diplomatic battle to control Libya and the country declared independence in a short while. In the end, southern Somalia was still on the table and it became Italy’s only option to recover its status and power, notwithstanding economic and political weight of this adventure. Firstly, Italy’s postwar economy had shattered and in the same period it started receiving the US Marshal foreign assistance. Second, political liberties offered to Somali organizations under British Military Administration nurtured emerging nationalism and its turning against Italy’s return plans. Somali Youth League’s (SYL) strong anti-Italianism was becoming popular and the idea of “Greater Somalia” gaining mass support, which claimed to unite all five Somali-inhabited territories from Djibouti to Northern Frontier District. SYL’s raising domination in local politics and harsh anti-Italian climate was the biggest obstacle in front of Italy’s eager diplomacy to convince the four power commission for its candidacy for the administration of the trusteeship. For the US and Western members of the commission thought that Italy might be useful to balance power dynamics in the Mediterranean to pacify the threat of communism, but the Soviet Union rejected the suggestion for Italian trusteeship in the name of supporting anti-imperialist currents in the region. (Haines, 1947, p. 431).

In the end, the commission failed to offer a joint decision, and after a series of negotiations and a hard diplomatic bargain, UN General Assembly decided to assign Italy as the Administrator of the Trust Territory of Somalia for a predefined period of ten years. Starting with 1950, Italian Administration would be responsible for the improvement of productive and administrative units to prepare Somali nation to independence in 1960. Though accusations against Italy’s fascist legacy in the colony and warnings for its neo-imperial agenda, publications by Italian Africanists of the era reveal that Italy tried to legitimize its return to colonies as a humanitarian task. Leva, for example, stated that

postcolonial Somalia was a burden, a “dead weight”, and Italy would prove its civilized merits by accepting the UN Trusteeship resolution:

It would be utterly ludicrous to label the Italian return to Somaliland as a renewed imperialistic move. Italy can now avail herself of none of her pre-war advantages. Under present conditions, Somaliland is a dead weight. From the point of view of the terribly hard problems Italy is now facing owing to lack of raw materials and surplus of population, the Somaliland agreement is no solution at all. On the other hand, by accepting the trusteeship on Somaliland, Italy undertakes a political and humanitarian task above all, which should bestow upon her a new title of merit in the history of civilization; secondly the activities that the Italians are to carry out in Somaliland should find peaceful and advantageous development extending beyond the borders of Somaliland. (Leva, 1950, p. 27)

Despite the humanitarian rhetoric, Italy's politics of aid both during the trusteeship and post-independence pursued the restoration of Italy's former banana plantations by favoring development plans supporting Italian enterprises. However, when Italy returned Somalia it not only had to recover destructed plantation sector and infrastructure services but it also had to incorporate growing Pan-Somalism targeting Italian presence and embracing the nationalist unification under Greater Somalia. Therefore, in order to understand the progression of Italy's postcolonial politics of aid we need to analyze Italy's interests in development plans on the one hand, and internal and external dynamics behind the formation of Pan-Somali nationalism on the other. Following pages illustrate the restoration of Italian imperialism through foreign aid, while analyzing Somali responses to external actors' involvement in domestic and regional politics.

2.3.1 AFIS: Somalization in Italian-built economy and politics

In 1950, Italian Trusteeship Administration of Somalia, AFIS (Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia), initiated several development projects to achieve “Somalization” in administrative and economic fields. For ten years of mandate, AFIS would be responsible for economic development, improving social services including health and education, transforming traditional clan-based social mechanisms by introducing a modern representative system, and hence preparing the ultimate transition from the Trust Administration to prospective Somali government. AFIS aimed to transform traditional clan structures, and quickly implemented political and economic administrative units as well as cultural investments. When AFIS started its term in office, there were only 29 primary schools, very few teachers, and no higher education

institutions. AFIS education program started constructions for schools and deployed scholarship sending teachers to Italy to give them required level of expertise (Tripodi, 1999b, p. 59). In September 1950, the Administration opened a School of Political and Administrative Preparation, and later it set up a school of law and economics in 1954. With scholarship programs and joint university schedules affiliated to universities in Italy, AFIS planned to cultivate new ruling cadres under the influence of Italian culture.

Thanks to schooling and education programs, Italian cultural elements became a dominant influence in “Somali schools, professional training, health, culture, and in the nomenclature of cities” (Ahad & Gerrand, 2004, p. 18). Mogadishu’s first city plans had been designed by Italian experts during the fascist colonial rule in the late 1920s with imposed square grids, a gigantic cathedral (being the largest in the Indian Ocean region), and government buildings, which made the city resemble “a mediocre Italian provincial town” (Arecchi, 1984, p. 223). With these imprints in language, elementary and higher schooling infrastructure, mundane elements in urban life, Italy’s return to Somalia under the UN tutelage included a cultural agenda, as well, where AFIS exported Italian system of law, education, and political codes to postcolonial Somalia.

The political restructuring of Somali society went through a similar transformation under AFIS policies. Italian administration initiated territorial councils as a representational system aiming to dismantle clan-based functioning of the society, which also paralleled SYL’s anti-clannist party program. In the mid-1950s, territorial councils covered larger districts and provinces, and then became the foundation for a municipal organization. Later on, councils became autonomous units controlled by Somali officials and in 1956 they turned into a legislative assembly. Growing popularity of SYL cadres reflected its domination in the first municipal elections in 1954 and then in the assembly. SYL affiliates gained half of 281 seats in the municipal rally, and they dominated 43 of 70 seats in the assembly. SYL embraced an inclusive Pan-Somali nationalism and claimed to be representative of all Somali clans, yet the majority of SYL seats were filled by the Darod lineage, which created a clan-based power imbalance in representation just at the beginning (Lewis, 1988, pp. 142-45).

On paper, there was a progress in education and politics. However, Italian administration perceived the political power of SYL and its anti-Italian diplomacy as a threat against its own presence in Somalia in the long run. In order to counterbalance

SYL, Italy supported so-called pro-Italian political parties, including Hisbia Digil-Mirifle (HDM). HDM represented in the first assembly with only 13 seats. The party was an extension of two agrarian clans Digil and Rahanweyn, who had been historically closer to Italian agricultural projects in the southern riverine basin. Italy, in order to weaken SYL, strategically encouraged pro-Italian organizations, and played one against another. This strategy deepened clan-based cleavages in the emerging body politic of postcolonial Somalia. Observers of the era defined HDM's pro-Italianism as a form of backwardness or reactionism in opposition to modernist nationalism and anti-imperial awakening of SYL. However, pro-Italianism among agrarian clans was primarily a strategy for securing their access to land within the rising competition over agricultural resources. Traditionally, the use of land and resources had been identified with clanship, and SYL's anti-clannists propaganda became a source of threat for agrarian communities. Agriculturalist clans wanted to protect their land rights under HDM, but explicit Italian support to them ended up their being excluded and marginalized in the parliament by SYL cadres as a reactionary and anti-nationalist attitude (Urbano, 2016). In addition to Darod-dominated clan division within SYL, clan lineages continued functioning as a divisive mechanism among emerging political parties and the new ruling elite. After the first elections, Italian administration recognized the hardship in weakening SYL's power and changed its attitude for a more collaborative stance. SYL cadres also softened their radical position against Italy, and AFIS programs in schooling, universities, and Somali graduates returning from Italy played a positive role in this shift. Their anti-Italian politics prevailed, but SYL representatives trusted the UN's ten-year mandate in avoiding Italy's plans to remain in control. Relatively cooling anti-Italianism, AFIS penetrated more into agriculture with reconstruction and infrastructure plans to strengthen former plantations.

During the trusteeship, Somalia received ten million dollars of annual subsidies not only from Italy but from different bilateral and multilateral sources.⁸ In 1954 seven years development plan, almost half of the 13 million dollars of the plan budget went to agriculture, the improvement of livestock trade, the reconstruction of transportation infrastructure, while the rest was allocated to communication, urban development, and projects on social services (Castagno, 1959, pp. 374-75). In this period, irrigation farming in plantation zones improved, arable lands expanded, the condition of subsistence farmers

⁸ Among quantitative resources, there are different representations for Somalia's early development performance. Here, I follow I.M. Lewis (1988), Alphonso Castagno (1959), Strangio (2012), and Abdi Samatar (1989) for the description of aid amounts, project fields, and returns.

relatively bettered, and a series of reconstruction projects ameliorated the devastation of war in former water basins, canals, and roads. The UN observatories were conducting strict reports on plantations about labor regulations and treatment of Italian enterprises against Somalis in order to avoid the resurrection of previous enforcements under the fascist administration. Though Italian firms complained about such restrictions, for Somali subsistence farmers of the Juba valley deployment of small scale development projects in a controlled environment brought a short term wellbeing. With the construction of hundreds of wells, health centers and schools in rural farming lands, small agricultural communities lived the “golden age of development” during the early years of AFIS (Menkhaus, 2003, p. 145).

In the following decade, increasing amount of development finance during the AFIS multiplied the value of agrarian production and land ownership became a lucrative business. Somali smallholders could not compete against raising speculation over land, and during the AFIS rule Italian concessionaries restored their commercial advantage by expanded production. AFIS channeled high proportion of development funds to former Italian banana enterprises and helped the exponential growth of banana production in a few years.

Table 2.2: Somali banana production and export, 1950-63.

Year	Production				Exports		
	Area (ha)	Tons	Tons/ ha	Tons	% Of total banana production	Value (thousands of So. Sh.)	% Of all banana exports
1950	2.800	28.000	10.0	22.065	78.8	—	—
1951	3.600	34.000	9.4	25.200	74.4	—	—
1952	3.800	40.000	10.5	32.030	80.1	—	—
1953	6.200	60.000	9.7	30.178	50.3	—	—
1954	6.700	55.000	8.2	43.389	78.9	—	—
1955	8.000	73.400	9.2	48.278	65.8	—	—
1956	8.800	65.000	7.4	36.515	56.2	—	—
1957	8.600	60.000	7.0	42.565	70.9	45.859	44.2
1958	8.498	83.000	9.9	55.848	67.3	58.960	45.3
1959	8.500	85.000	10.0	58.763	65.7	65.000	44.6
1960	9.100	91.000	10.0	73.735	81.0	74.430	45.3
1961	11.000	98.000	8.9	84.316	86.6	90.267	48.0
1962	12.000	107.000	8.8	75.555	70.6	80.149	44.1
1963	11.000	110.000	10.0	94.512	85.9	101.000	45.0

Source: Strangio (2012, p. 63).

In 1955 Italian banana export almost reached an annual level 50,000 tons which was five times higher than the total output in 1937, and in 1957 banana export amounted

to the 60 percent of total exports of the trusteeship. In this period former Italian state enterprise of Royal Banana Plantation Monopoly was established again by AFIS under the name Banana Plantation Monopoly to support Italian firms from any market disadvantage (Lewis, 1988, pp. 142-43). At the end of Trusteeship in 1960, banana production reached to 73,7 tons which corresponded to 81% of overall annual exports (Samatar, 1989, p. 90). This means that banana production was almost quadrupled during Italian trusteeship, but it simultaneously became the single most export crop that tied Somalia's national production and budget.

Numeric increase in the production and export of Somali banana showed some success, which was almost completely controlled by the Italians, but economic return of banana market continued to have a negative impact. Just like the fascist administration's economic failure in the 1930s, the restoration of Italian-owned banana monopoly under AFIS did not prove economically successful. Somali banana costed high in price due to climatic and transportation conditions, and it remained uncompetitive as to its counterparts in the global market. To protect banana monopoly in Somalia, Italian government continued using tariffs and enabling financial support to Italian enterprises through the Banca d'Italia. AFIS also opened Credito Somalo in 1954, a local financial unit to distribute credits to Somali farmers to encourage agriculture, which was mostly tied to banana at that time. Plus, AFIS development plans targeting agriculture and transportation proved an achievement in declining the production cost of Somalia banana during the trusteeship.

Table 2.3: Average banana price in Somalia ports, 1949-1960.

Year	Lire/kg
1949	155
1950	140
1955	112
1960	94

Source: Strangio (2012, p. 71).

With these fiscal and development support, Italian government and AFIS aimed to protect Somali banana production and export. Italy's banana imports from Somalia continued to increase from 60 to 553 in quintals between 1950-59; however, Somali banana still remained almost 50 percent more expensive than banana reaching to

European market from West Africa and Canaries (Strangio, 2012, p. 47, 69). Therefore, regardless of increasing agricultural production, revenues remained low due to uncompetitive prices and single export destination tied to Italian market. Hence, Italian subsidies became a permanent foreign asset in territorial revenues to balance the deficit of trade, which equaled almost the same amount of territorial revenues by the end of the trusteeship mandate.

Table 2.4: Expenditures and revenues under AFIS (in \$US million).

	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957
Banana export	5.2	6.2	5.7	6.6	8.0	5.7	6.4
Total export	8.0	10.4	8.6	9.2	11.4	10.9	10.7
Commercial revenues	1.9	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.2
Total revenues	4.8	4.8	4.3	5.2	5.8	6.2	6.9
Italian subsidies	13.5	9.4	8.5	7.1	8.2	8.7	7.2
Total expenditures	18.3	14.2	12.8	12.3	14.0	14.9	14.1

Source: Samatar (1988, pp. 55-56).

In sum, Italian development programs during AFIS brought about a numeric increase in agricultural output, but it tied production regime to banana exports monopolized by Italian firms, never achieved a competitive advantage in the international market, and hence budget deficit remained as a vital problem for Somalia while approaching to independence in 1960. Therefore, Italy's politics of aid during the trusteeship primarily benefited former Italian enterprises in Somalia and served for the restoration of pre-war economic imperialism. Somalia became not only dependent on export to Italian market for the maintenance of international banana trade, but it was also tied to import from Italian market for the supply of machinery, foodstuff, and manufactured goods. With these, imports from Italy represented 76 percent of total imports of the Trust Territory of Somalia by the end of the trusteeship in 1959. As the period of mandate ending, major industries including banana sector was owned and managed by Italian firms, and Italians remained the dominant commercial class in Somalia (Castagno, 1959, pp. 378-81).

Italian Trusteeship did not better economic or political conditions of the former colony of Somalia, but rather it was an imperial restoration process via foreign aid. AFIS utilized aid coming from Italian and other sources to rebuild and secure interests of Italian firms in agricultural sector. Expanded banana production and single crop export regime protected by the Italian government, in the end limited post-independent Somali government's economic alternatives. It deepened the problem of budget deficit and made emerging domestic economy more dependent on external resources to maintain national budget for public investments. Beside agriculture, Italian administration also helped Italian companies to enter Somalia's strategic industries in energy, telecommunication, and medical sectors, and Italian companies exempted from several tax payments during the trusteeship. The lack of any a serious economic development favoring Somalis was a result of Italian strategy to use development aid for restoring the pre-war situation and desire to secure Italian interest in productive fields (Tripodi, 1999a, pp. 377-79). Regarding the political impact of AFIS, the situation was not different. Despite a relative "Somalization" in the organization of administration and government, Italian strategy to pacify SYL in fact deepened clan cleavages among rival political parties. Pan-Somalism established its hegemony in domestic politics, but clan-based favoritism and marginalization persisted within and outside of SYL.

Towards 1960, southern Somalia was preparing to take over the government from Italian administration; nationalist spirit was high and the new ruling elite tried to stay diplomatically neutral as to the multiple sources of aid offers within the Cold War competition for regional influence. In contrast, northern British Protectorate stayed relatively remote from ongoing postwar transformations in the south. British neglect of development only showed a small change after the 1950s. The local resistance against European methods endured, and pastoralists and a small number of merchants at the coasts never really engaged with British colonial bureaucracy. Unlike the south, there was no clue of a nationalist cause among. Administrators of the protectorate started some agricultural plans and experimental farming after 1953, by initiating only a few of machinery and building small water bunds for agropastoralists. Although an agricultural loan program came to appear to attract commodified farming, only 72 loans were distributed by the British administration amounting no more than 1000 pounds. Education level in the north was also quite behind; the total number of students in primary and secondary education did not even count two thousand in the late 1950s, almost fifteen

times lower than enrollments in the south during AFIS (Samatar, 1988, pp. 68-73). Apart from some small civic associations initiated by merchants of coastal trade, there was no extensive political organization similar to SYL.

However, an international event transformed the nationalist outlook of northern and southern Somali organizations in 1954 that accelerated the reach of Pan-Somali ideology for national unification in different regions of Somalia. In 1948, Britain signed agreements with Ethiopia to transfer Ogaden to the control of the latter as an extension of postwar diplomatic deals guaranteeing Ethiopia to recover its imperial sovereignty. After six years in 1954, another Anglo-Ethiopian agreement declared the withdrawal of British control over Haud, a rich grazing land frequented by Somali pastoralists in the north, and its transfer to Ethiopia. Taken together, British postwar diplomatic maneuvers energized a nationalist cause for northern Somalis for the first time. The small organization of Somali National League, founded in 1947 and represented by northern Isaq clan, gained a momentum after losing Ogaden and Haud to Ethiopia, the archenemy of Somalis for centuries. Eventually, the resentment against British alignment with Ethiopia over Somali-inhabited lands brought about a demand for independence and unification with southern Somalia. This did not bother British administration since the northern protectorate's strategic value for livestock trade in the Indian Ocean diminished when India gained independence after the war. Keeping the northern colony, therefore, meant no advantage for the British. After the transfer of Ogaden and Haud and anti-British resentments at the north, the process of decolonization and the unification of two Somali territories went along without any disruption (Samatar, 1988, p. 79).

On July 1, 1960, two former colonies were joined to establish the Somali Republic. The unification of two territories was smooth but the emerging political landscape was fractious. Two different colonial legacies with diverging levels of colonization brought about an uneven development. Southern incorporation of banana export into the world market and emerging ruling elite educated in Italy was almost completely foreign to Somalis at the north, who secured their material life under a non-interventionist colonist. Beside economic discrepancies and political maturation, the unequal power sharing in the first parliament also reflected the uneven geography of development. SYL prevailed its domination in politics and Darod and Hawiye lineage occupied important chairs in the government, while Isaq clan's SNL, and Digil and Rahanweyn clans' HDM, and other opposition parties achieved only a limited

representation in policy making. Therefore, the inauguration of Somali Republic was based on a heavy burden of chronic budget deficit, foreign aid dependency, and clan-based political tensions despite Pan-Somalism in domestic political landscape.

In foreign affairs, political parties were hesitant about interests of Western aid providers. Italy had never been welcomed by Somalis for its violent past. Britain lost its appeal to Somali ruling elite after Ogaden and Haud transfers to Ethiopia. The US provided some technical assistance but never offered the aid it gave to other African countries, plus it signed military arms deals with Ethiopia. Signals of turning away from Westernism became more visible when Western powers showed a resistance to provide military aid to Somalia, whereas the prime objective of SYL was to unite Somali territories in the Horn under Greater Somalia idea. The ruling elite demanded military aid from Western powers to improve the military for security and irredentist interests. Perceiving the reluctance of the West to provide military aid, the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries started showing more interest in Somalia for trade, aid, and security deals in order to raise their advantage in East-West competition for influence. Towards the end of trusteeship, this raised questions in the Western world about Somalia's proposed neutral stance against Cold War rivalry (Castagno, 1959, p. 383).

2.4 Italian dictates on development plans

At the beginning of independence, Somali Republic's public budget was dependent on grants and subsidies coming from Britain and Italy. In a short while, the number of donors increased including bilateral and multilateral providers of aid. The US and USSR supplied commercial and credit loans with varied terms of lending; China, Arab states, and European countries of the Eastern bloc offered soft loans and tied-aids connected to export deals; and several UN agencies supplied technical assistance and grants with mostly small amounts. An early study on the effectiveness of multiple aid interventions defines Somalia as a "rare case", where one of the poorest countries of the postwar order received foreign aid almost more than three times higher than any other developing countries in the 1960s (Mehmet, 1971). Somalia's first five year development plan for 1963-67 collected a large sum of foreign grant and loan aids. Somalia's strategic outpost was an instrumental asset for the new ruling elite and the negative balance of trade required external assistance to pursue public investment in development plans. With Cold War aid coming from Western and Eastern camps, "Somalia had earned the

reputation of being successful in attracting one of the largest transfusions of foreign aid per capita of any developing country” (Samatar, 1988, p. 78).

American aid aimed to support infrastructure projects for a port in southern Kismayo and for several experimental farming projects. Russian aid, mostly in the form of commercial loans, was utilized for the construction of state farms aiming to initiate canning industry in meat and fishery. Italian grants and loans, on the other hand, continued to support former civil service units in education and health fields, and channeled monetary support to agriculture, irrigation farming, transportation infrastructure tying Italian factories in Jowhar to the port city of Mogadishu. However, aid came mostly in project-tied forms and prioritized low-priority schemes, which did not contribute to development of productive sectors but served for the political advantage of donor states (Mehmet, 1971, pp. 40-42). Within the almost \$100 million budget plan, the USSR was the biggest loan provider covering more than the 60 percent of financial loans. In terms of grants aid, Italy was one of the leading grant provider of Somalia together with the US (Samatar, 1988, p. 96).

Table 2.5: Grant aid to Somalia (in \$US million), 1960-1963.

	1960	1961	1962	1963
Italy	4.25	7.25	6.9	7
USA	1.25	4	2	8.75
UK	2	3.65	3.75	

Source: Samatar (1988, p. 64)

Tied-aid by foreign states defined the allocation of resources for specific sectors in the first development plan. Italy prioritized the transportation, agricultural and irrigation schemes for its interests, which together represented the more than fifty percent of total public expenditures. Second largest share belonged to industrial development plans, with almost 16 percent of the total plan budget, where Soviet loans expected to the implementation of state farms in meat and fishing processing. In this picture, no specific importance was given to the development of livestock and traditional small-scale agrarians. The uneven development geography continued to persist, even fortified with the allocation scheme dictated by foreign assistance. Transportation and agricultural development funds aimed to benefit Italian-owned big agricultural units and to reduce the cost of export items to make them more competitive for global demand. By discarding

the traditional sectors, the half of the first public development budget in the end used for the private interests of Italian enterprises while hindering Somalia from generating alternative economic assets. State farms also did not contribute to the transition to a stable economy. They aimed to commodify livestock and hence provide a solution to food-importer status of the nascent state by increasing domestic production. However, unplanned allocation of project schemes did not consider the role of traditional value of livestock for pastoral communities. Having a large herds represented status in the material life of pastoralists, and livestock is a precious reserve to cope with the hardship of cyclical dry seasons and famines. Although state farms were introduced by Soviet loans, pastoral communities resisted to the commodification of their reserves (Samatar, 1989, p. 97-103). Heavily loaded program of the first development plan, regardless of attracting multiple donors, ended up with a failure accomplish its development goals. Despite traditional resistance, the biggest obstacle was the tied-character of aid and dictates by donor states to utilize Somali public budget for their interests; Italy for banana and sugar industries, and the Soviet Union for state farms.

Another factor behind the failed program was bureaucratic corruption, which rapidly spread within the nascent Somali state. Ineffective administrative organization and officials trying to gain personal benefits from burgeoning foreign aid money resulted with slow implementation and unfinished projects that wasted much but built nothing. By the end of 1967, only a quarter of total estimated projects had been accomplished. Following these failures, second development plan determined to carry out the goals of the first plan between 1967-69. But in 1969, the number of completed projects remained at 35 percent of the total schemes, while 41 percent was in under construction and the rest did not even start (Mehmet, 1971, p. 43). The second plan, almost entirely funded by foreign aid, far from achieving a domestic accumulation it ended up as a pool of reserves serving for donor interests.

This had two consequences for the Somali Republic. Cold War competition made finding foreign aid easy for the first and second development plans, but massive amounts of external revenues turned into a struggle among rent-seeking bureaucrats and self-interested politicians of the first government. Pan-Somali rhetoric of political parties cloaked clan conflicts and the war on controlling land resources. In the absence of an organized political agenda to achieve Pan-Somali interests, party politics stuck to clan-based clientelism to gain support and win a profitable seat in the parliament. In 1964

elections, twenty-four parties run for seats, and in 1969 parliamentary elections the number of parties reached to sixty-two. Political competition for self-interest “masked a process of internal colonialism” where deputies and bureaucrats speculated on land to access foreign aid funds. This turned agriculture into “rental heavens for an opportunistic class of civil servants and top political figures from the capital” (Menkhaus and Craven, 2003). Petty bourgeoisie politicians’ corrupt measures to manipulate aid funds endured the country’s dependence on foreign resources, that came mostly in the form of loans. Therefore, the political crisis of the first government articulated an economic crisis increasing the state’s reliance on foreign aid, and vice versa (Samatar, 1988, p. 110-15). The struggle for land and attracting aid funds, in other words, continually undermined structural deficiencies of Somalia’s dependent economy and corrupt politics (Cassanelli, 2003). The spread of corruption and rentier politicians on the one hand, and the accumulation crisis of the state deepening national debt and dependency to foreign aid on the other, eventually brought about the legitimacy crisis of the first democratic Somali state just nine years after its inauguration. The first democratic government of Somalia was toppled by a bloodless military coup lead by General Siad Barre. This opened another phase in the foreign aid history of Somalia, where Western actors lost their ground while the Soviet Union reaped benefits of the new regime’s socialist and pro-Soviet rhetoric.

In 1969, democratic government of Somali Republic was toppled by General Siad Barre because of the declining economic profile of the government and dissolving ideological ground of the new-born state. When came to rule, Barre declared scientific socialism in Somalia and this opened more space for evolving Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa. As of mid-1960s, Soviet Union started to become an influential actor in Somalia’s domestic affairs with infrastructure projects supporting fishery and meat canning industries, and state farming projects in southern Somalia. But more importantly, Soviet Union was a candid military assistance provider and begun the construction of a large military airbase in Somalia. Western states and the US were more hesitant in providing military assistance to Somalia because of the US military support in favor of Ethiopia, and the armament of two archenemies would exacerbate the postwar geopolitics in the Horn (Ware, 1965). However, Soviet Union responded to Barre’s calls for arms support and Somalia’s new socialist junta achieved signing friendship treaties with the Russians. Following with the 1970s, Soviet Union increased its presence in Somalia

through development loans and more specifically with the aid of military assistance to Barre's Somalia.

Italian foreign policy during the 1970 and 1980s tried to accommodate itself to changing power rivalries in the Horn. Ethiopia under US assistance, and Somalia under Soviet assistance carried repercussions of the bipolar world to East Africa. Paralleling the cold war aid competition between superpowers, Italy also felt the necessity to support Ethiopia, and it became the second largest recipient of Italian aid to sub-Saharan countries, after Somalia. At the end of the 1970s, Italy increased its aid budget and Italian assistance involved more than 77 countries. Italy's aid policy became a disputed topic in domestic politics, and Italy's Radical Party accused the government's aid initiatives as too extensive with ineffective projects and with insignificant results. Yet, Italy's escalating foreign aid policy made the country the most effective donor state in sub-Saharan Africa. In the 1970s Italy had never such a high rank among donor nations, yet starting with the 1980s Italy became the second largest donor country following France and leaving US behind in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the Italian money consumed in the name of aid and development actually channeled into Italian companies through Italy's official international aid institutions such as the Department for Cooperation for Development (DIPCO) and Italian Aid Fund (FAI). Italian Parliament established these institutions for the provision of emergency relief programs and the distribution of food aid and humanitarian needs in crisis zones. However, the Cooperation and FAI sponsored large infrastructure projects, which were mostly too costly, unplanned, and ineffective. In the mid-1980s, when Barre's state violence escalated against the opposition, the Cooperation and FAI channeled billions of lire to Somalia "devoted to building useless structures, which predominantly benefited Italian politicians, businessmen and members of the Somali establishment" (Tripodi, 1998, p. 62).

Increasing foreign aid budget of Italy led to a cycle of corruption where Italian government and coalition parties as well as business partners got involved. Even when Barre regime escalated oppressive violence after the 1980s against resistance groups and clan opposition, Italian development programs continued to pour enormous monetary support to Somali government to the cost of securing contracts for Italian firms.⁹ Five

⁹ See, Ahtner, W. (1993, January 24). The Italian connection: How Rome helped ruin Somalia. The Washington Post. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1993/01/24/the-italian-connection-how-rome-helped-ruin-somalia/cd843c56-6443-42e4-98b6-0f0a9147cee3/> These contracts under the

decades of Italian foreign aid to Somalia, in the end, started a neo-imperial expansion for Italy. But similar to its first initial phase during colonial expansion, Italy's neo-imperial expansion through development aid remained uneconomic considering the insignificant economic return of Somali banana, and the devastation of Somali economy under Italian agricultural aid. What Italian aid achieved was to support its business groups in Somalia. SAIS was the first example of this unplanned but consistent aid policy for Italian assistance to Somalia's agricultural development made the company a monopoly on banana export. Later in the 1980s, Italian construction and energy firms turned Somalia into a playground for party-business coalitions at the metropole that went along the state's development cooperation programs. Italy's escalating foreign aid cooperation after the 1980s declined in the early 1990s when judicial interrogations under Clean Hands investigations included corruption scandals where development cooperation programs, politicians and Italian firms involved (Rhi-Sausi & Zupi, 2009, p. 336).

2.5. Conclusion

When General Barre came to rule after a military coup, he stated that "Italian colonialism could not see beyond bananas, practically it didn't develop anything beyond bananas. It was a kind of colonialism that did not even look after its own interests: In other words, it was short-sighted".¹⁰ What seeming like an obsession, Italy's banana production in Somalia from colonialism to development thinking had destructive impacts on Somalia state and society. On the one hand, from the Italian perspective, the colony fueled Italian national and geographic imaginations and triggered aspirations for an international prestige. The duty, hard work, and collaboration motives constituted a developmentalist rhetoric for Italian colonialism. The national energies behind Italy's expansion toward East Africa promised a prosperous living for the excessive Italian population in the colonies with rich resources and well-developed production and transportation infrastructures, but most of the small number of projects had failed both demographically and economically due to fascist Italy's hostilities and unplanned expenditures. On the other hand, from the Somali perspective, Italian colonialism created an intense intervention in the region's economic and political structures, and southern Somalia under fascist Italy experienced epochal transformations compared to other

name of development cooperation later inquired by Italian judiciaries as acts of fraud and corruption in public administration (Tosone, 2011).

¹⁰ Quoted in Strangio (2012, p. 39) from Del Boca, A. (1992). *L'Africa nella coscienza degli italiani Miti, memorie, errori, sconfitte*. Roma: Laterza.

Somali-populated colonies under British and French rule. However, Italy's trusteeship between 1950-60 continued exploitation of resources in favor of Italian firms rather than rehabilitating damages of colonialism and war. Hence, Italy fortified its economic interests during the trusteeship and after the independence, thus creating a neo-imperial expansion through foreign aid. The detrimental effects on Italian monopoly on banana production built up the deep-rooted structural deficiencies of Somali economy, society, and politics in general, as analyzed in above pages.



CHAPTER 3

SOVIET MILITARY AID:

A GEOPOLITICAL EXPANSION, 1963-78

This chapter analyzes the Soviet Union's strategic utilization of military aid to Somalia for a geopolitical expansion in East Africa. During the trusteeship and following years of independence, Italy utilized development aid for restoring the monopoly of Italian banana enterprises, and this politics of aid served for a neo-imperial expansion following the World War 2. Postcolonial politics and increasing Cold War competition in East Africa forced external actors to take geostrategic decisions for an indirect control over client states. In this period arms agreements became a tool to gain the support of local politicians. Through 1953 military agreement with the United States, Ethiopia became an ally of the Western bloc. Thanks to diplomatic support of the US, Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie annexed Eritrea in 1962 without any serious objection from the international community. In Somalia, on the other hand, Siad Barre desired to counterbalance its archenemy's alignment with the US and turned to the Eastern Bloc during postwar compartmentalization of East Africa. Starting with the early 1960s, Somalia welcomed Soviet economic and technical assistance, but 1963 military agreement with Moscow became a breaking point in Somalia's relationship with the Western bloc. Somalia's rejecting a narrow Western military aid in favor of a more generous Soviet arms and military training agreement opened a new era in the Cold War history of geopolitics in East Africa.

For postwar superpowers, the quid pro quo of foreign aid was military aid in return of access to Ethiopia's and Somalia's port towns for expanding their naval and communication networks over the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Therefore, this chapter analyzes how conflictual interests of local actors interlinked with rival interests of international actors. As the chapter concludes, the identification between local and international dynamics ended up with the militarization of aid in East Africa on the one hand, and it shifted the ground of expansion from economic to geopolitical interests.

3.1 Cold War rivalry in the Horn of Africa

In order to understand the progression of Soviet-Somalia relations since 1961 and its becoming a turning point for Cold War geopolitical competition in the Horn of Africa in 1978, we need to analyze power conflicts at the local and international levels. At the local level, the border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia over Ogaden region resulted with the conflict of two expansionist designs. During the imperial partition, Somali-inhabited Ogaden region changed hands from Britain to Ethiopia, and finally Italy grasped the control of the region. When the fascist Italy invaded Ethiopia, Ogaden became a part of Italian East African Empire in the early 1930s, however when Italy was defeated in the World War 2, British administration at the northern Somalia seized Ogaden, and later in 1943 it was transferred to Ethiopia. The vast grazing lands of Ogaden region constituted almost the one-fourth of Ethiopia's imperial territory.

3.1.1 Soviet realpolitik in the Horn

Following the postwar reconfiguration in international politics, Ethiopia quickly aligned with the US leadership. Emperor Haile Selassie wanted to control Eritrean coasts and the Red Sea line on the one hand, and desired to convince its Western allies to inhabit Somalia's irredentist claims on Ogaden. In order to protect its expansion towards Eritrea and Ogaden, Ethiopia established strong ties with the Western bloc. After its independence in 1960, Somali government desired to realize its nationalist aspirations for revitalize Greater Somalia, which aimed to unify all Somali-speaking former colonies in the Horn. For Somalia's young nationalist political elite, postcolonial boundaries were artificial designs violating the right for self-determination of ethnic Somalis' in Djibouti, Kenya's northern frontier district (NFD), and in Ogaden region. Therefore, Somalia's Somali Youth League (SYL) cadres prioritized a nationalist agenda to achieve liberation and sovereignty under one flag. However, unlike the military aid supplied to Ethiopia,

Somalia never achieved to convince Western states to provide necessary military assistance. The US and former imperialists Britain and Italy thought that this would encourage Somalia's irredentist project and jeopardize the postwar border status quo in the Horn. Helping Somalia militarily would ignite Ethiopia's resentment against the West and could lead Selassie to seeking an alliance from the communist bloc.

The local conflict between Ethiopia's and Somalia's expansionist designs for Ogaden reflected itself on the superpower rivalry during the Cold War. To conceive the complicity of the international dimension of the conflict, we need to analyze the history of diplomatic approaches of the USSR and the US since the postcolonial era. In the colonial era, Russia had closer connections with Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia. However, British control in the region until the mid-1940s hindered Russians to widen their influence. When Italian colonists and British administration withdrew from East Africa, the USSR found new diplomatic opportunities to turn back to the Horn. Although there was a mutual distrust, the Soviet Union and Ethiopia increased their contacts, but this resulted only with Washington's giving more priority to win Ethiopia over (Yordanov, 2016, pp. 2-7).

Postwar geopolitical rivalry entered in the Horn with the problem of ex-Italian colonies. The future of Libya, Eritrea, and Somalia became a disputed topic among postwar powers because of their geostrategic locations combining the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean. In 1945, four powers including the US, the USSR, Britain, and Franc created a commission of investigation for designating a diplomatic solution. Negotiations continued for four years, and the Soviet delegations pursued a flexible and pragmatist diplomacy whenever local politics enabled Moscow to change its suggestions. In order to impede Britain's future power in the Horn, Moscow rejected British Foreign Minister Bevin's plan, which for the first time offered the unification of all Somali-speaking territories under Greater Somalia. Instead, the USSR diplomats at first supported the return of all colonies to Italian trusteeship. But this suggestion was quickly rejected by the powers' commission as well as both by Ethiopia and Somalia. Italy's potential return to colonies would disrupt Ethiopia's postwar desire to control Eritrea and secure the Red Sea line, and for Somalia's new nationalists it would mean the resurrection of fascist regime and neo-colonialism.

The next proposal by Moscow offered a USSR-US-British joint-trusteeship model excluding Italy, but this conflicted with the US and British interests. Then, Moscow proceeded with a Soviet-Italian trusteeship suggestion for Libya's Tripolitania, but it was quickly removed from the table again by the US-Britain coalition. Soviet diplomats attempted to play Ethiopia card by offering the transfer of Eritrea to Ethiopia, so that Moscow could gain Ethiopia's favor which potentially widen the influence of the communist bloc in African states due to Ethiopia's symbolic leadership image among Africa's new rulers. Obviously, the Western bloc refrained from providing Moscow this chance, and negotiations were again blocked. When the commission meetings came to end in 1948, the USSR returned to its initial offer of giving colonies back to Italian trusteeship. The four power commission failed to reach an agreement and the UN General Assembly decided on Libya's independence, Eritrea's federation to Ethiopia, and southern Somalia's transfer to Italy under a predefined ten-year trusteeship. Only after Russia exhausted chances for materializing its geopolitical strategies on the table, "did the Soviet Union demand immediate independence for Libya, Somalia and Eritrea, trying to gain influence over the rising national liberation movement" (Mazov, 2003, p. 75).

3.1.2 Arms for ports: Ethiopia-US vs. Somalia-USSR military agreements

After the UN resolution, Moscow and Washington started a geopolitical competition in the Horn which centralized on military agreements and arms flows. At the beginning of the 1950s, Ethiopia was mainly a feudal society and Somalia's young political elite were not equipped with necessary resources to turn the nation into a class society. Putting ideological formulas behind and pursuing flexible maneuvers guided by realpolitik concerns, Moscow wanted to remain in contact with the Horn in order to access the Red Sea-Indian Ocean line. Yet, ex-Italian colonies eventually did not give the USSR that option. The US, in contrast, gained remarkable geostrategic benefits from the UN resolution. The US supported Britain's decision to transfer Ogaden and Haud to Ethiopia, and it gave a diplomatic help to Ethiopia's annexation over Eritrea. Washington supported Ethiopia in order to reach out Eritrea's Kagnew Station, a strategic satellite installation observing the traffic of naval forces, oil shipment, and intelligence communication along the Red Sea and Suez Canal. In 1953, the US signed an early military agreement with Ethiopia in return for access to satellite and naval stations at Eritrea's Kagnew. By this agreement, until 1977, Ethiopia dominated Eritrea through US military assistance, and Washington guaranteed access to Kagnew (Schmidt, 2013, p. 145). Beside its

communication and naval advantages, patrolling oil traffic is also vital for the US to secure its allies in Western Europe and Middle East. Europe and Israel were dependent on oil supplies coming from the Persian Gulf, and a potential blockade over the Red Sea by the Soviet Union would jeopardize the economic stability of Washington's allies. Therefore, controlling the Red Sea communication and oil traffic was a crucial priority for the US during the 1960s (Schwab, 1978, pp. 7-8). An annual military assistance to Ethiopia's Selassie provided the US this superiority in the Horn geopolitics on the one hand, and maintained its leadership claim over its international allies on the other.

The US established its connection with the Horn, but regional volatilities continued to prevent its hegemony. First, diverging foreign policy interests of the US was a self-destabilizing element. For example in the mid-1950s the US-Egypt relations started to progress with a financial aid for the construction of Aswan dam on Nile. However, this was in contrast with Ethiopia's interests since Aswan dam would increase the diplomatic and infrastructural power of Egypt on the Nile and it would eventually worked against Ethiopia's long-term interests. Therefore, aid programs always carried a risk of wining one side to the risk of losing another. Second, postcolonial leaders used nonaligned diplomacy to form new partnerships and attract more aid from different channels, and this multifaceted diplomacy complicated Cold War strategies. In 1955, for example, Bandung Conference brought together the leaders of nonaligned states, Moscow tried to recover its diplomatic relations with Ethiopia in order to weaken the US influence in the Horn. The Soviet Union increased its anti-imperialist rhetoric to appeal in favor of national liberation movements in Africa, and perceived winning Ethiopia as an advantage to expand its ideological influence. As diplomatic relations between Moscow and Addis Ababa showed some progress, Washington gave a diplomatic response by approving London's suggestion in 1959 for the unification of northern and southern Somali territories, which would increase the centralization of power among Somalis and threaten Ethiopia's interests in East Africa. As a reaction to the US, one year before Somalia's settled independence in 1960, Ethiopia's emperor Haile Selassie visited Moscow. Being the first African leader visiting the Soviet Union, Selassie signed a \$100 million loan agreement with the Soviet Union, which became so far the largest credit provided to sub-Saharan Africa by the USSR (Yordanov, 2016, pp. 13-17). Moscow desired to detach Ethiopia from the US leadership in the Horn through generous loan offers, but Ethiopia did not

want to violate the alliance with the Western bloc. Instead, Selassie played the Soviet card whenever possible as a way to attract the US for more military aid (Patman, 1990, p. 45).

When Somalia gained independence in 1960, Ethiopia had already guaranteed its control over Eritrea and Ogaden. Considering Somalia's economic and political weaknesses, superpowers gave more importance to Ethiopia and it was able to receive support from different camps. However, as political scientists Lefebvre's (1998) analysis reveal, Somalia's approaching to independence created a puzzling dilemma for the Western bloc. The Soviet Union, China, and Arab countries perceived the independent Somalia as an opportunity for reconnect with the Horn through foreign aid. If Somalia gained strength that would eventually jeopardize the US and Britain's control on Ethiopia and Kenya, that is why Western powers could not leave Somalia to the aid coming from their rivals. However, if they provided aid, that would contradict with Ethiopia's interests and simultaneously weaken Washington's power on its client regime. Therefore, at the eve of Somalia's independence, "the dilemma confronting Washington was how to render aid to either Ethiopia or Somalia without offending the other" (Lefebvre, 1998, p. 614).

In the early 1960s this dilemma increased its pressure. Border disputes between the Horn countries turned into an armed conflict at the eve of 1960s, and Kenya's and Ethiopia's soldiers, trained and equipped by Western assistance, clashed against Somali tribesmen supported by Somali state in the name of their self-determination. First, Washington enforced a ban on arms supply to Somalia, but when it convinced the danger of letting rival powers to provide arms to the Somali government, the US decided to give a modest military aid of \$8 million to Mogadishu government. However, when Britain took Kenya's side against Somalia's apparent objections, Somali government broke ties with Britain and this terminated Western military aid offer on the table. Although Ethiopia pushed its Western allies to keep Somalia out of military support, SYL government visited China and the Soviet Union for arms agreements. The US perceived Somalia's increasing bargaining power in the Horn and increased its military aid bid to \$18 million, which, however, did not satisfy Somali government's national security requirements (Ofcansky, 1993; Lefebvre, 1998). The US offer was aiming to increase Somalia's military capacity up to 5000 men on the condition that its use would be limited only with domestic affairs. In the final round of military aid diplomacy, in November 1963 Somalia officially rejected Western military assistance in favor of a better and untied Soviet military deal consisting of \$30 million aid package and the training of 10,000 soldiers.

Renowned scholar of Somali studies I. M. Lewis (2008) interprets Somalia's break up with the West as a natural outcome of the period. Pan-Somali ideology at home combined with foreign actors' assistance to Ethiopia, inevitably led Somali political elite to seek alternatives:

With pan-Somali nationalism exerting such an influence and with American and Western military support for Ethiopia and Kenya, it was natural that the Somali Republic should reject an offer of limited defensive arms from the West in favour of a more generous and open-ended Soviet arms commitment. This Russian military connection, which did not at the time lead Somalia to move far from its neutralist but generally pro-Western stance, was to have far-reaching effects later. (Lewis, 2008, p. 37)

1963 Soviet arms deal put the USSR in the middle of Somali-Ethiopia border dispute, but Moscow aimed a neutralist stance to take advantage of both sides. The Soviet Union recognized Ethiopia's diplomatic superiority compared to Somalia. Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa hosted the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) headquarters. Therefore, Moscow knew that its strategic interests in the Horn would be perished if the Soviet arms supply would deepen clashes in Ogaden. Considering this, the Soviet government first tried to appear in the Horn as a peace-maker and did not hurry for solidifying its foothold in Somalia with military aid. Moscow launched the training of Somali soldiers but balanced its engagement with Somalia by increasing economic relationships with Ethiopia (Yordanov, 2016, pp. 44-48). In sum, 1963 Soviet-Somali arms deal introduced the USSR into the Horn, but Moscow's desire to remain distanced from local rivalries resembled more of a strategic engagement rather than a rapid militarization of its client Somali state.

Table 3.1: Soviet Union's trade with Ethiopia and Somalia (in millions of roubles).

	1960	1963	1966	1969
Ethiopia	1.2	2.8	7.4	5.8
Somalia	0	6.3	7.8	1.9

Source: Patman (1990, p. 91). Moscow's trade volume with Somalia mostly consisted of exports.

The crucial point here for us is that, unlike Italian ambitions to make Somalia a true colony, Somalia has never been the first priority of the Soviet geopolitical agenda during the 1960s. Its balancing diplomacy represents itself in bilateral trade volumes, as well. To balance its presence in East Africa, Moscow defended Somalia's claim for

unification as an anti-imperial claim for national liberation. Simultaneously, Moscow did not turn its back to Ethiopia and voiced its support to non-aligned movement, territorial integrity of African states, and Pan-Africanism (Allison, 1988, p. 71). This shows that Soviet Russia pragmatically focused on slowing down the US expansion in the region, and it tried to strengthen its ties with Somalia for realpolitik concerns rather than ideological goals. However, after the mid-1960s, the convoluted crises in the region forced Moscow to leave its balancing diplomacy in favor of supporting Somalia for its long term geostrategic interests. In the mid-1960s, Ethiopia's decade long domination and assimilation over Eritrea started an armed uprising by Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). Ethiopia's counter-insurgency forces trained by Israeli units achieved success against ELF, at first. But, in 1964, Russia's ally Syria declared its military assistance to ELF guerillas. The transfer of Soviet-made weaponry into the hands of ELF brought an end to the Soviet Union's mediator image in the Horn and its balancing endeavors in Ethiopia. Losing its claims for a neutralist diplomacy, Moscow started to give more importance to Somalia starting with the late 1960s. Popularity of Russian influence started to gain a momentum among Somali government, but it reached its peak with Siad Barre's 1969 coup declaring scientific socialism in Somalia (Patman, 1990, pp. 50-57).

3.2 Soviet Union in socialist Somalia: A geopolitical expansion

Somali Republic pursued a pro-Western stance until the 1963 military deal with Moscow. As analyzed in the first chapter, Somalia could not solve accumulation and deficit problems due to the undermining impacts of foreign aid on nascent Somali state's productive and political fields. Despite poor domestic performance, successive SYL governments mainly focused on foreign policy to achieve the nationalist Greater Somalia project. For that aim, until 1967, Somali politicians supported armed guerillas fighting against Kenya's and Ethiopia's soldiers, although lost the diplomatic support of the international community and nourished an anti-Somali attitude in the African continent. In 1967, the Prime Minister Egal diverged from Somalia's traditional irredentist foreign policy and instead declared a policy of détente in order to open a diplomatic space for negotiations. SYL's shifting from the Pan-Somali project into a détente articulated into a combined legitimacy crisis in Somali state. Declining economic profile, widening clanship and corruption in politics, and lately the détente decision appeared as the weakness of the democratic government in handling domestic and international affairs. Though SYL won the last elections in March 1969 with a landslide victory, the President

Shermarke's assassination in October quickly brought about a regime change. One week after the assassination, General Siad Barre, a Darod educated in Italian schools, put an end to democratic government with a bloodless coup on 21 October 1969 (Lewis, 2008, pp. 36-38). With Barre's coming to power, Somalia went into a process of internal and external reconstruction under Soviet military and financial aids.

3.2.1 The Soviet legacy in Somalia's political culture and economy

When coming to power, junta leader Barre abolished all representative and legislative organs in the new Somali Democratic Republic (SDR), and he established Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) and National Security Service (NSS) instead of former governmental bodies. NSS was established with the support of the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) as a part of state surveillance mechanism to protect the new regime from dissidents (Ofcansky, 1993, p. 217). Barre opened all top offices to his own clan lineage and Darod sub-clans gained important positions in SRC and NSS as the new political elite. The socialist regime promised to eradicate clan favoritism with a new nationalism and collectivist program, but, in fact, Darod lineage protected its domination in Somali politics while excluding northern Isaq and southern agrarian clans. In the first anniversary of the coup, Barre declared scientific socialism as the new direction of Somali state. With this, the regime put several cultural and organizational reforms into effect. To eradicate clanship in administration, SRC banned the usage of clan-affiliated appeals like "cousin" or "uncle", instead the word "jaalle," meaning comrade, was integrated into everyday communication. It also turned into a rhetorical element in political campaigns, which represented Barre's socialist leadership with the slogans and posters saying "Jaalle Markis, Jaalle Lenin, Jaalle Siyad". The new regime aimed the revival of a popular nationalism blended with collectivist themes by discursively highlighting togetherness, self-reliance, and self-help. The adaptation of such themes by the socialist military junta, as Lewis states, "reflected the army's growing dependence on Russian equipment and advisors" (Lewis, 1988, p. 209).

Socialist rhetoric gained prevalence with Barre's one-man rule in the country, but his socialism was in fact an eclectic policy and discourse combining Islamist, nationalist, and Africanist elements, which occasionally shifted within each other. In his early speeches, Barre underlined that Somalia was an Islamic state and socialism was not an obstacle for it. Barre defined socialism in abstract common sense as justice, equality and

improving the life standards, and Islamic values could only be equivalent of these goals, he argued: “The reactionaries and stooges of imperialism claim that religion and socialist principles are contradictory. ... If socialism advocates peace, social justice and equality, does that contradict the Islamic faith?” (Barre, 1971b, p. 151). Beside the eclectic socialism of SRC, collectivist and self-reliance motives constituted a central place in Barre’s speeches. Through modernist reforms in social services, Barre aimed to cultivate a collectivist spirit by initiating orientation centers, which planned to replace clan functions in ritualistic gatherings and weddings, and youth centers, a community development project for orphans. During a speech for the opening of a youth center, Barre spoke to orphans and street children gathered in the center by underlining the new regimes’ motivations for collectivism and self-reliance: “We are going to teach you here to be united, to love each other, to fear God and to avoid what is bad. Your enemy is the enemy of Somalia. ... Our enemy is the person who says that Somalis should not rely on themselves” (Barre, 1971e, p. 127). In terms of public education, SRC established for the first time the official Somali script based on Latin alphabet and launched a massive literacy campaign in 1973. SRC organized a nation-wide education program and planned to send almost thirty thousand students to rural areas for an encompassing mass-literacy project. However, one of the severest draughts in the nation’s history disrupted this self-help program in 1974.

In the field of economics, SRC put two development plans in use until 1977 and pursued the nationalization of private industries. The US, West Germany, and Italy canceled their financial aid for development projects against the pro-Soviet attitude of the Barre regime. However, Arab funds as well as loans coming from China and the Soviet Union filled this credit gap. The first 1971-73 development plan aimed to decrease the country’s dependency on food imports by a series of nationalization measures. Italian-owned sugar industries and some energy companies were taken under the state control. Similarly, SRC nationalized foreign banks owned by Italian, British, and Egyptian finance. However, despite apparent socialist rhetoric, the nationalization did not include two major income sources of the state, which were banana enterprises under Italian monopoly at the south and livestock trade controlled by Somali merchants at the north.

The state under SRC rule tried to compensate its limited intervention in productive sector by fiscal regulations. Two states agencies, Agricultural Development Agency and National Banana Agency, were established in order to enforce price and distribution

controls in agricultural production (Samatar, 1988, pp. 87-90). However, in a short while, when the state's price controls fell behind increasing inflation rates small producers restrained from planting low income crops, which worsened state's dependence on foreign imports. The first program eventually did not bring a significant weakening of the status quo of Somalia's economic organization. Banana plantations remained untouched and livestock trade continued under private control of coastal dealers. Barre's nationalization leap remained limited and minimal that "nationalization was more showmanship than a radical change in the economy" (Laitin, 1993, p. 126). Barre's socialism was far from building industries or transforming traditional production toward a class society. SRC's measures resembled more of a "state capitalism", as famous Africanist Basil Davidson (1975, p 28) argued, rather than a radical socialist intervention. As a result, Somalia's budget deficit problem and its import dependency continued by worsening during Barre's one man rule.

Table 3.2: Balance of payments (in millions of Somali Shilling), 1974-79.

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Import	155.6	163.9	177.8	208	278	398
Export	64.6	89.6	81.8	72	110.5	107
Deficit	-91	-75.3	-96	-136	- 167.5	-291

Source: Samatar (1988, p. 122).

Despite limited interventions, SRC targeted improving agricultural techniques and introduced new industrial facilities. In agricultural production, the government started crash programs and created cooperatives. With the second development plan for 1974-78, SRC enacted a land law declaring the nationalization of land tenures. Changing land regulations gave the officials the right to appropriate soil and water resources while obliging small farmers to register into renewable concessions. SRC's state centralism banned clannism on paper, but the new land law served in favor of the clan-based political elite coalition within the new regime. Barre's clan Marehan and other Darod-related subclans took advantage of state-owned lands in Gedo, Middle and Lower Jubba, which consisted of southern Somalia's most fertile arable lands. In the end, SRC's tacit clannism exploited state measures in the name of scientific socialism while dispossessing smallholders and accumulating personal gains over resources (Cassanelli, 2015, p. 26). Despite official's abuse of state power, the number of cooperatives increased until 1978,

but the outcome was far from actually developing the food crops production. 1974-75 drought devastated rural sector and livestock reserves of nomads. Barre declared a state of emergency and called the international community for action. Moscow responded with sending air and road transportation vessels to evacuate nearly 90,000 nomads into settlements near state farms. Soviet Union provided agricultural equipment and channeled \$52 million credit for the development of cooperatives in agriculture and fishery (Patman, 1990, p. 180). With the Soviet assistance, Somali government eased the devastation of draught but massive internal migration effected agricultural programs. It became an overburden both for ineffective cooperatives and state's scarce public budget.

The picture in industrial schemes was not different, either. Government expenditures for the first 1971-73 program shows that SRC put relatively more importance to industrial development than traditional economic sectors. With the second 1974-78 development program, new industries were added to old ones. There were meat and fishery canning factories established during the democratic government through Soviet credits. New manufacturing units included a cigarette and match factory, a packing unit for the production of boxes and bags, a flour processing factory, fruit and vegetable canning plant, and few mining and energy facilities for iron extraction and petroleum refining.

Table 3.3: Development expenditures (in millions of Somali Sh.), 1971-73 plan.

Sectors	Expenditure	Allocation (% of total)
Fishery	4.5	0.7
Livestock	51.1	7.8
Agriculture	83.2	12.7
Industry	117.5	17.8

Source: Samatar (1988, p. 90).

Though state investment on industrial production was relatively higher, the short term outcome of industrial schemes was not different from agricultural crash programs. The number of industries increased from 14 to 53, and the GDP share of industrial production increased from 9 to 15 percent, but the new program could not achieve ending import-dependency by increasing national production (Samatar, 1988, pp. 93-99). The deepening import dependency on consumption items reveal itself in Somalia's trade with the Soviet Union. Starting with 1970, Somalia's trade volume with the USSR showed a

remarkable increase. Total trade between two countries multiplied almost sixfold between 1970-78. However, considering the restrained developments in Somalia's industrial production, total trade between two states served more profit to Moscow by making Somalia an export market. Moscow's export to Somalia grew from 2.8 million rubles in 1970 to 20 million rubles in 1978, while imports from Somalia slightly increased from 0.4 to 2.9 in the same period. When Somalia declared war against Ethiopia in 1978, Moscow cut its commercial and military ties with Somalia, and this pulled the trade volume down to the level of zero in 1978.

Table 3.4: Soviet trade with Somalia and Ethiopia (in millions of roubles), 1970-78.

	Somalia				Ethiopia		
	Export	Import	Total		Export	Import	Total
1970	2.8	0.4	3.2	1970	1.3	0.8	2.1
1973	11.5	1.1	12.6	1973	1.6	2.2	3.8
1975	22.2	4.3	26.5	1975	3.2	2.1	5.3
1977	20.1	2.9	23.0	1977	22.4	1.5	23.9
1978	0	0	0	1978	0	0	0

Source: Patman (1990, p. 208).

This graph reveals another important element in the Soviet interests toward East Africa. As noted above, Somalia has never been an indispensable ally for Moscow, but a gate to stay in East Africa and geopolitically counterbalance the US power. Trade volumes with Somalia and Ethiopia reiterates this conclusion. Though Moscow initiated arms agreements, Soviet Union tried to maintain its balancing diplomacy toward Ethiopia through economic contacts. One year before the Ogaden war in 1978, we see from the Table 4 that Russia opened a trade diplomacy in order to switch side smoothly and reclaim its neutralist role. Therefore, unlike Italian aid aiming neo-imperial restoration and economic monopoly, Soviet politics of aid focused on military sector and aimed to achieve a geopolitical expansion through aid.

Why did the socialist regime fail in economic programs despite its domination over politics, resources, and propaganda channels? The ecological impact of 1974 drought certainly effected the result of public investment in agriculture and industries.

Other than that, three other factors prepared the failure of the socialist regime's development program. First, the lack of skilled personnel to manage the planning and implementation of programs hindered effective outcomes. Starting with the 1960s, Somalis, especially Isaq members from the north, tended to migrate to Arabic peninsula for work because of their resentment against the southern domination in state services. However, with the 1970s the number of Somalis joining this migration pattern increased to almost 200,000 and they composed mostly of educated and skilled workers trying to find better employment chances in Arab countries (Gundel, 2002, p. 263). After the coup, this created a lack of personnel with adequate merits to monitor development schemes, and accordingly it led to an inoperative implementation of projects. The higher education in Somalia was not ready to supply the required reserve for skilled tasks, and most of Somalis in the administration came from foreign universities under varied bursary programs. Therefore, beside the lack of adequate personnel, those who were present had difficulties in communicating and coordinating projects on the plan. In a speech given to civil servants in the first anniversary of the revolution in 1970, Barre interpreted this problem of communication among educated Somalis as the lack of a commitment for the national cause:

We want our civil servants to know each other well. The unity of the Somali people cannot be achieved by words alone. Our graduates come from many countries, China, the Soviet Union, Britain, America, the Arab countries, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and each one has a high opinion of his education and himself. ... It is a vital importance that we bring them together so that they can mix with each other and understand each other for the common good of a united and progressive Somalia. ... We want to instill a better sense of nationalism in our leaders. Civil servants also will be given an orientation course. (Barre, 1971, p. 43)

Scarce budget capacity became the second factor behind negative outcomes of two development plans. The state's increasing budget deficit during the military rule became a major obstacle for financing development schemes. The budget gave a deficit of 91 million Somali shillings in 1974 and the negative balance of payments reached to 291 million, as the Table 2 illustrated above. With the lack of necessary monetary resources, state incentives to increase agrarian and industrial production ended up with constant decrease in the production of crops and manufacture goods.

Table 3.5: Crops and industrial production outputs, 1970-79 (in thousands of tons).

Agriculture	1970	1975	1979	Industry	1975	1979
Sorghum	158.1	134.7	140.1	Sugar	30	21.1
Maize	122.2	103.6	108.2	Canned meat*	14.4	1.5
Sesame	43.4	37.3	40.6	Flour*	7.85	5.80
Sugar cane	450.5	370	265	Canned fruit	0.94	1
Export crops	145.5	106	72.2	Textile*	5.5	9.93
				Packing units	5.2	5.2

* In millions of tones for meat and flour, and millions of yards for textile. Combined data was gathered from Samatar (1988), pp. 94, 99.

As the above table shows, except a small improvement in textile, food crops and industrial production either decreased or remained stagnant during Barre's rule until Ogaden War. The prime cause behind this ineffective result was that Barre gave the highest attention to the defense sector by channeling the majority of public budget to military expenditures rather than productive sectors. Barre promised a new developmentalism based on self-reliance and collectivism, but the regime recognized military both as a symbol of rejuvenating nationalism and also as the guarantee of sovereignty against external threats. Therefore, Somalia under military junta increased its annual government expenditures for military while decreasing yearly support allocated to productive schemes.

Table 3.6: Sectoral allocation of public expenditures (% of total), 1975-79.

Sectors	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Economic services	17.9	18.1	13.0	11.0	10.5	10.0	10.0
Social services	22.5	24.7	25.8	16.7	18.2	16.5	15.0
Defense	25.6	25.5	25.9	37.1	39.6	41.6	43.0

Source: Samatar (1988, p. 101). As Samatar notes, Ogaden war starts in 1978 and it effects an acceleration in the government's military expenditures. But previous data also shows that the regime has gave more than equal importance to defense expenditures than economic and social services.

Eventually, low investment and unproductive outcomes pushed Somalia's import-based economy into a severe debt crisis at the end of the 1970s. During the first decade of Barre's rule, Somalia's national debt increased from \$174 million in 1975 to \$383 million in 1978. Despite deepening debt, the gross national product only reached to \$300 million in 1977 from a limited budget of \$200 million in 1970 (Patman, 1990, pp. 103,

134). After the Ogaden war in 1979, the total amount of Somalia's debt reached to almost \$545 million. Soviet credits constituted the largest financial burden with \$109 million, which is followed by China's \$87 million and Saudi Arabia's \$81 million loan debts (Samatar, 1988, pp. 123-24). As the multiplying debt to non-Western creditors illustrates, Barre did neither end the country's consumption economy nor reversed Somalia's dependency on foreign aid, rather, as Laitin defines, "he has changed the country on whom the Somalis are dependent" (Laitin, 1976, p. 459).

3.2.2 The Soviet legacy in Somalia's military and foreign policy

Soviet foreign aid in the Horn proved its largest impact on Somalia's military capacity during Barre's state socialism. Between 1961-70, the US provided annual military assistance to Ethiopia, which equaled to \$104 of total \$126 million military aid given to Ethiopia. Whereas Somalia could only receive \$58 million of military aid during the 1960s, and 47 of it came directly from the Soviet Union.

Table 3.7: Military assistance to the Horn, 1961-70 (in \$US million).

	<i>Ethiopia</i>	<i>Kenya</i>	<i>Somalia</i>	<i>Sudan</i>
USA	104	4	1	2
USSR			47	63
France	7			7
United Kingdom	6	20	5	31
Czechoslovakia				1
German Fed. Rep.	7	3	4	53
Other	2	1	6	12
Totals	126	28	58	136

Source: Henze (1991, p. 101).

After Barre's coming to power and declaring scientific socialism, Soviet military assistance gained more volume and became a game-changer for the ongoing geopolitical competition in East Africa. However, Barre's socialist rhetoric was only a minor element in the Soviet Union's decision to increase military aid. Rather, Soviet attention to Somalia settled only after interconnected realpolitik battles in order to sustain presence in North Africa and to hinder China's rivalry in East Africa.

In 1972, Moscow lost its connection with north Africa, when Egypt's Anwar Sadat angered by the Soviet reluctance to provide already-promised armament. Sadat

expelled Soviet military advisors in the country, which amounted to nearly 15,000 Soviet personnel. Beside loosing Egypt, Moscow's claims for a leadership in East Africa was continually challenged by China. Somalia, therefore, was not only exposed to US-USSR competition but also to Sino-Soviet rivalry for regional influence, which leaders exploited one against another to obtain advantageous assistance agreements. To secure aid flows from different directions, it has been a common strategy for Ethiopia and Somalia to play East-West and Soviet-China rivalry in the Horn, though it had always complicated regional tensions (Touval, 1963, p. 180). Similarly, Barre's visit to China brought fruitful results to receive additional development aid. China offered a \$110 million credit for Somalia's North-South highway construction, being the largest infrastructure project so far, and China pledged a support to several social infrastructure projects such as building a stadium in Mogadishu and small productive enterprises in agriculture and fishery. However, Somalia's pragmatic foreign policy disturbed Moscow after being expelled from Egypt, because Somalia was a secure gate to access the Red Sea-Suez line. To hamper China's strategic aid and investments, the Soviet government decided to increase its support to Somali army. Between 1971-74, Soviet contributions rapidly expanded Somalia's defense capacity. Somali army obtained large number of Soviet aircrafts and tanks, and the number of Soviet military advisors reached to more than 1,500 in a few years. Beside air and land forces, Moscow increased Somali naval capacity by expanding the Berbera port in 1972 for the arrival of naval forces as a transit destination over the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.¹¹ Soviet engagement with Somalia through military aid made Somalia's strategic ports Moscow's most frequented naval destination over the Indian Ocean.

Table 3.8: Soviet naval visits in the Indian Ocean, 1967-76.

Country	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1967-76
Somalia	0	0	2	7	22	20	42	61	54	75	283
S. Yemen	0	0	4	5	15	7	14	37	34	18	134
Iraq	0	0	4	1	2	8	15	17	8	12	67
Sri Lanka	0	1	2	1	0	6	2	5	6	6	29
Mauritius	0	0	1	7	1	9	1	2	2	1	24
India	0	0	1	6	2	0	3	2	4	2	20
Kenya	0	0	1	4	0	0	2	4	1	0	12

Source: Patman (1990, p. 83).

¹¹ For a detailed account of Soviet aid diplomacy in East and North Africa, and its outcomes for Somalia's military agreements, see Patman (1990, pp. 114-117), and Yordanov (2016, pp. 93-97).

Somalia's new regime welcomed these improvements as a sign of reconstruction of the nation's prestige and power in the region. However, for the Soviet Union, these developments were necessary strategic maneuvers after losing Egypt. When Moscow's connection with Egypt ended, the Soviet Union could not risk Somalia's leaning toward China. Considering the US control on Ethiopia, that would mean a total failure for the Soviet strategy in the Horn. Therefore, Moscow's wanted to secure Somalia from rival powers, and hence to keep its strategic presence in the Horn by accessing Somalia's ports connecting strategic naval traffic lines between the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. To achieve this, until the Ogaden war in 1978, Soviet Union provided an enormous amount of light and heavy military equipment to Somalia including aircrafts, automatic guns, tanks, and transport vehicles. Accordingly, Somalia's military quick doubled in personnel size, though has remained far behind that of Ethiopia. As the below table illustrates, socialist regime's closer connection with the Russian military aid accelerated Somalia's long awaited desire for having a strong army, and Barre regime allocated larger GNP percentages for defense expenditures.

Table 3.9: Military capacities of Somalia and Ethiopia, 1969-1977.

	1969-1970		1973-1974		1976-1977	
	Somalia	Ethiopia	Somalia	Ethiopia	Somalia	Ethiopia
Population	2,9m	25,2m	3m	26,5m	3,2m	28,6m
GNP*	\$200m	\$1.6b	\$182m	\$2.07b	\$300m	\$2.9b
Total army	12,000	45,400	17,300	44,570	25,000	50,800
Defense budget*	\$9m	\$35.9m	\$11.4m	\$40.5	\$15m	\$84m
Defense expenditures as % of GNP	4.6	2.1	16	2.8	20	3.6

* Estimated amounts. Abbreviations "m" for million and "b" for billion in related categories. The data is combined from Patman (1990, pp: 103, 134, 183, 260-61). It is important to note that 1977 was the year Somalia started Ogaden war against Ethiopia, and lost the Soviet support in the aftermath.

Above table reflects Russian legacy in Somali military. With Russia's military assistance, Somalia's total military capacity in 1977 doubled more than its initial level in 1969. The economic progression was slow, which added only \$100 million in 1977 onto its already scarce position eight years ago. Despite the large credit entries, debt burden, and stagnant local revenues, Barre's Somalia exponentially increased its military

expenditures from 4.6 percent to 20 percent in a few years. These expenditures and capacity improvements made Somalia army the fourth largest military in Africa after Nigeria, Zaire, and Ethiopia (Putman, 1990, p. 181). Although Ethiopia had more military personnel, in terms of the equipment range and modern inventory Somalia has overwhelmed Ethiopia's army thanks to Soviet arms deal during the 1970s. By 1975, Somalia had 52 aircraft and 250 tanks as opposed to Ethiopia's 37 combat planes and 62 tanks. The rapid military development in Somalia was a source of prestige for the Soviet Union, too, since it showed to postcolonial African states that Moscow was a more candid partner for arms diplomacy compared to slow responses of the US in Ethiopia (David, 1979, p. 73).

Beside its international outcomes, growing Somali army demonstrated domestic impacts, as well. Barre's SRC was the only elite faction holding control on politics and economy. The rapid growth of the military capacity simultaneously meant the growth of a security state. This was also in line with Barre's perception of the army as the vanguard of society to educate Somalis and protect scientific socialism. In 1970 speeches, Barre underlined the leadership of the army for self-assistance programs and the future of revolution: "The army today is the revolutionary vanguard because all its members come from the people, who are also the vanguard of the Revolution. ... GREATER participation by the Armed Forces in the self-assistance programmes, and in all other spheres of the nation's political, economic and social life" (Barre, 1971c, pp. 90-91). In a different speech in 1975, when the military truly became a symbol of Somalia's long-awaited key for independence, Barre identified the army's duty as the protection of the regime and its goals in justice and equality in the new nation:

The Officers of the force, high or low-ranking, should, if they have any love for the force and the nation, see that justice prevails and that every member should get his rights. ... The important thing is the mastery of the subject of scientific socialism and this is your duty if you want to defend the share of the responsibilities that have been allotted to you. (Barre, 1977)

During the Barre rule, Somalia also improved its diplomatic engagement with regional states and multilateral organizations. Barre's new nationalism blended with collectivist tones never ceased to be a part of his foreign policy, but he arranged a pragmatic diplomacy discourse which tied pan-Africanist and pro-Arab elements while keeping eulogies to socialism. Barre joined the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa in 1971, and he declared his country's faith in

the Organization. He defined OAU as “a bastion against the evil designs of the imperialists, who have a craving for exploiting our riches, and in doing so, of destroying our unity”. While appealing to African unity, Barre also underlined Israel’s occupation of Palestine, and called OAU to “condemn Israeli aggression and give unqualified support to the efforts of the United Arab Republic in regaining all its territories” (Barre, 1971d). Three years later, Somalia reaped the benefits of its pragmatic diplomacy. In February 1974, Somalia became a member of the Arab League and achieved access to credits from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This pro-Arab step in Somalia’s foreign policy worried Moscow because of the anti-Soviet attitude of the Arab League on the one hand, and the potential raise of Islam in Somali politics on the other. However, Barre continued pursuing its multifaced diplomacy by playing different cards against each other.

In the same year, Somalia hosted Organization of African Union (OAU) summit in Mogadishu and developed its prestige in the African continent. In July 1974, Somalia became the first African state signing a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. Somalia’s gaining prestige and regional power through arms and diplomatic engagements pulled the Soviet Union to deploy more serious efforts in Somalia. The Treaty included articles on technical cooperation, debt-rescheduling, and mutuality in diplomatic affairs. Moscow provided additional military equipment including artillery, tanks, and missile systems. Simultaneously, it cancelled Somalia’s \$80 million military and \$45 million commercial debts to the Soviet Union. While both sides declared their interests in friendly relations, some articles aimed to limit Somalia’s connections with China and Arab states (Patman, 1990, pp. 146-47). With the Treaty Moscow protected its strategic alliance with Somalia but bilateral relations continued to evolve under the pressure of Somalia’s pragmatic shifts between conflictual aid providers. Therefore, Moscow’s interests in Somalia were driven mostly by strategic rather than ideological commitments. Despite widening military and commercial agreements, the Soviet Union quickly abandoned Somalia in 1978 when Barre’s irredentism conflicted with Moscow’s geopolitical design in East Africa.

3.3 A new geopolitics in the Horn: Switching superpower alliances

During the 1970s, the Soviet Union increased its geopolitical expansion in the Horn by providing military assistance to Somalia. Barre’s Somalia took advantage of Soviet efforts in the Horn militarily and diplomatically. However, it was not because of

Barre's socialist rhetoric or ideological engagement with the communist bloc, rather Moscow wanted to keep access to Somalia's ports to secure its regional outreach on the one hand, and to balance the power of the US in Ethiopia on the other. Due to Somalia's aggressive image in the continent and its war-prone irredentism, Moscow wanted to appear as a mediator in regional conflicts supporting the rights of Somalia as well as Ethiopia. In all its steps, therefore, Moscow tried to maintain its diplomatic and commercial relations with Ethiopia open. In the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union found a chance to achieve a peaceful penetration to Ethiopia when the Emperor Selassie went into a turbulent era due to ecological and political crises.

First, in 1970, a dramatic draught severely hit Ethiopia and jeopardized rural production, which caused a dead-toll reaching almost 100,000. Selassie's failure to handle the humanitarian crisis and the economic decline following the draught triggered urban uprisings against the Emperor Selassie headed by students and labor unions. Secondly, ongoing suppression of Eritreans eventually exploded into an armed resistance against Addis Ababa regime. Eritrean liberation armies gained the support of Arab countries including Syria, Iraq, and Libya, while the regime received military backup from an Israeli counter-insurgency team to suppress Eritrean armed guerillas. When the resistance spread, Arab-Israeli conflict entered to the Horn, which further complicated regional power struggle. The weakening of Ethiopia under the turmoil provided a chance for Somalia to launch its irredentist agenda for incorporating Ogaden. The chaos in Ethiopia not only weakened Selassie regime, but the introduction of Arab military assistance to Eritrean forces became an opportunity for Somalia to seize Ogaden in the middle of ongoing decline in Addis Ababa.

Selassie faced another challenge by its long-time ally United States. In 1973, the US declared the transfer of its naval and communication bases from Kagnaw to Diego Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean. The US decision to leave Kagnaw signaled that securing the Selassie regime had vanished its strategic value in the Horn. Moscow perceived the declining power of Selassie's regime, but its military support to Somalia prevented a two-way engagement with two archenemies of East Africa. However, a series of local transformations opened Ethiopia's doors to Moscow. In September 1974, Ethiopia's military overthrow Selassie from his throne arguing the radicalization of domestic conflicts. The new Derg rule under General Mengistu Haile Mariam announced a socialist regime in Ethiopia. By the time, armed uprisings spread among different ethnic

groups, and the escalation of guerilla fights in Tigray, Afar and Oromo-populated regions put Ogaden also at the risk of entering into a separatist path.

With the widespread uprisings receiving military support from Arab states, socialist Derg turned to the US for an immediate and extensive military support. For the US, however, militarily supporting Derg regime's violent and instable rule would be a waste of resources especially after the decision of evacuating Kagnew. But, at the same time, leaving its client state helpless in the middle of a crisis would encourage General Mengistu to welcome Soviet military assistance, which would end up by letting Moscow incorporate Ethiopia into its geopolitical control in East Africa. In order to cancel out this option, the US increased its military assistance to the Derg regime with an all-time high amount. Until 1974, the US provided Ethiopia an annual military aid of \$10 million and it reached to \$26 million in 1976, but geostrategic dilemma in the Horn pushed the US to raise its arms assistance up to \$135 million in 1976-77 in order to keep the Derg regime away from any Soviet connection (Patman, 1990, p. 177).

However, the Horn diplomacy has never been one-sided, and proving that, actors found out that Mengistu had made a secret weaponry agreement with the Soviet Union while accepting the US military assistance. The Derg revolution and later Soviet agreement did not disrupt the US' strategies in the Horn, since Washington had already decided to transfer its naval and intelligence stations to Diego Garcia. When Mengistu terminated nearly twenty five year long diplomatic ties with the US, Washington showed no attempt to reverse the situation, but started accusing Derg regime's human rights violations against the opposition and ethnic communities (Lefebvre, 1992, p. 12). The status quo in the Horn started to transform in light of local regime changes and shifting superpower alliances. As a reply to the Soviet support to Ethiopia, Carter administration declared that it would provide arms to Ethiopia's rivals including Somalia (Schmidt, 2013, p. 147).

3.3.1 Soviet-Ethiopia alliance after the Ogaden War

For the USSR, Somalia was a strategic ally, who have neighbored regional that were closer to either the USA (Ethiopia) or European states (Kenya to Britain and Djibouti to France). However, with the Selassie's decline from power and the establishment of a socialist military junta in Ethiopia, Soviet Union found new chances to elevate its East African diplomacy by a peacekeeping round between Ethiopia and

Somalia. In March 1977, Fidel Castro visited Barre and Mariam to convince them for a Soviet-supported resolution of border conflict over Ogaden. Evolving transitions provided an opportunistic condition for the Soviet Union since both Ethiopia and Somalia had embraced socialist tones, they were almost equal in military capacity, and the USA was withdrawing from Kagnaw. Moscow desired to set up a *Pax Sovietica* in East Africa by aligning Ethiopia and Somalia, in a time when the former was having domestic conflicts and not prepared to respond a border war and the latter was confident on itself to achieve its long-awaited goal of unification (Clapham, 1981, p. 212).

However, Soviet plans did not work and *Pax Sovietica* failed before its reaching to negotiations. Regional dynamics and local histories limited Moscow's opportunist diplomacy in the Horn. Somalia perceived Ethiopia's internal conflicts as an advantage to seize Ogaden. Barre started supporting local armed units, and Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) gained offensive achievements in the region, while Ethiopian forces managed to secure a number of cities inside. Somalia's support to WSLF disrupted ten years of détente between two nations, but Moscow thought that it can convince Mengistu and Barre for a peaceful solution. According to Soviet Union, two rulers were consuming their energies and resources for a hostile nationalism, but the present situation could be reconciled given that two countries were ruled by two socialist regimes. Therefore, neglecting Barre's aggressive opportunism for a while, Moscow prioritized protecting Mengistu's rule by equipping Derg forces against guerilla groups. In 1977, Moscow quickly replaced US military presence in Ethiopia by providing 200 tanks, 48 aircraft, and several missile units which amounted to \$385 million military assistance. In addition to armament supplies, Cuban advisors arrived Ethiopia to train peasant army troops in insurgency zones (Schwab, 1978, p. 17).

The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union was to keep two socialist rulers in government and persuade them for joining into a socialist federation in East Africa, which would include Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, and Djibouti. In March 1977, Moscow assigned Cuban leader Castro to achieve a mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia for pacifying WSLF's attacks and ending Somali invasion of Ogaden. Castro's visits to Mogadishu and Addis Ababa eventually proved fruitless, because from the Somali viewpoint Soviet design was in favor of Ethiopia's interests since it was hindering the right for self-determination in Ogaden. Besides that, Soviet-Ethiopian arms agreement in 1977 had already upset Barre. He responded to the Soviet Union's new strategy in the

Horn by signing a \$400 million military agreement with Saudi Arabia in September 1977. Saudi military aid obliged Somalia to cut off its ties with Soviet military and technical cooperation. Eventually, ongoing military bargains complicated shifting alliances and aid bid carried confrontations to a breaking point. When Soviet-Cuban alliance raised its military support to Derg regime in October, Somali government unilaterally terminated the Soviet Treaty of Friendship by expelling all Soviet personnel in the nation and blocking Soviet navies to access Berbera port.

This became a turning point in the Cold War history of geopolitical competition in East Africa. When WSLF attacks in Ogaden evolved into a full-scale war between Ethiopia and Somalia, the Soviet Union abandoned Somalia and decisively switched its side in favor of Ethiopia. Barre insisted on the military campaign, but when the US and Saudis refrained from providing arms to Somalia, Barre fell into a severe isolation in the middle of the Ogaden war, which Somali political elite had been longing for two decades. On the Ethiopian side, Russia quickly recovered Mengistu's equipment needs by heavy loads of armament and additional Cuban advisors and troops who fought against the Somali army. Deprived of its military and diplomatic channels, and unable to balance Ethiopian counterattack supported by Russian armament, Somalia's ambitions Ogaden invasion resulted with a rapid decision of retreat while leaving nearly 25,000 deaths behind in less than a month (Samatar, 1988, pp. 132-35). Barre was upset from the reluctance of Arab states, and the African perspective continued to favor Ethiopian cause in the Ogaden war. After Somalia's fifteen year of close contact with the Soviet influence ended with a nightmare, Western states arrived at the scene in order to fill the gap Soviet Union left. When Somali forces retreated from Ogaden, the relations with the US and West European countries started to show some improvement but mostly in economic terms. Somalia's high aspirations for a glorious military victory over Ogaden ended up losing its superpower ally to its archenemy Ethiopia on the one hand, and obliging to accept Western aid which it had rejected in 1963 in the name of building a strong military with Soviet assistance on the other.

Barre regime totally lost its legitimacy after the war. Ogaden campaign triggered a massive refugee crisis and it totally dismantled the malfunctioning economy. In a few years clan organizations started to build armed resistance groups. Barre responded with violent measure to suppress the opposition, and the conflict between clan-based armed factions and the regime evolved into the civil war at the end of the 1980s. After the

Ogaden war and rapid decline of Barre's legitimacy afterward, broke up the mutuality between Somalia and Soviet Union. Somali political elite needed Soviet arms deliveries to protect its status in border dispute, and Moscow needed Somalia in order to counterbalance the US power in the Red Sea/Indian Ocean line. However, the Soviet Union had always approached Somalia's pragmatic diplomacy with the Arab League and China, and perceived Barre's irredentism as a potential hazard for the Soviet long term strategies in the Horn. Therefore, when Moscow swiftly switched its side in favor of Ethiopia after the war, the Soviet Union secured its geopolitical presence in East Africa. Therefore, it was not a mutuality in ideological or economic levels, but Somalia and the Soviet Union stayed together because of a mutuality in strategic needs (David, 1979, p. 77).

Detachment between Mogadishu and Moscow, and the latter's engagement with Ethiopia, became a breaking point in the geopolitical history of the Horn. Therefore, Soviet military aid brought a new element into the Horn politics by turning Somalia from a peripheral actor into a strong military state (Brind, 1983, p. 84). For Moscow, the quid pro quo of foreign aid carried more than an access right to Somalia's naval ports in the Red Sea. Six months after the Ogaden war, in November 1978, the Soviet Union and Ethiopia signed a Treaty of Friendship. In the aftermath, Moscow deployed a series of development projects in agriculture, technical training, together with hospital and dam projects. Soviet advisors went to Ethiopia for technical cooperation, and Moscow supplied new military equipment to Mengistu's rule. Soviet influence over Derg regime showed its early benefits in 1980 when Ethiopia became one among three countries who voted against the termination of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan during the UN Assembly meeting (Patman, 1990, pp. 265-68). However, the Soviet involvement in Ethiopia was not without conflict. Mengistu's violent nationalism combined with excessive armament supplied by Moscow, targeted ethnic communities and opposition groups, which was condemned by the international community. Secondly, the draught in 1984 attracted an international response with generous charity campaigns, but simultaneously it revealed Ethiopia's incapacity to handle domestic crisis. With deepening humanitarian situation and severing of internal conflicts, Ethiopia's Mengistu declined toward a vulnerable situation in the late 1980s and pushed Soviet Union to suppress internal dissent. Mengistu's state terror led Moscow to consider that further assistance to Derg regime would not improve socialist steps but worsen anti-Soviet tendencies within Ethiopian

society, and the Soviet government decided to retreat from supporting Mengistu regime at the end of the 1980s (Yordanov, 2016, pp. 225, 246). Mengistu's socialist rhetoric had never actualized into a true societal orientation, and his human rights abuses pushed the relations with the Soviet Union to a breaking point. When Moscow cut its enormous support to the regime, Mengistu lost its seat in 1991, which marked the date when Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa ended once and for all (Schmidt, 2013, 154).

3.3.2 Somalia returns to the West

After the Ogaden War regional politics resulted with superpowers' leaving their long term allies and switching sides. Similar to Moscow's taking the seat in Ethiopia left by the US, Washington filled the vacuum in Somalia after Moscow's strategic departure. However, unlike Russia's firsthand military engagement, the US prioritized developmental and commercial aid, though Barre early seized more military aid to restore its power on borders. At the beginning of 1980's Barre signed a standby program with the IMF which obliged the end of state's control on the market and price regulations. The IMF demanded privatization, eliminating civil service expenditures, and allowing liberalization in finance. In the same period, the US provided economic support funds for several infrastructure and technical training programs targeting agriculture and livestock marketing. However, although such deregulatory measures relatively decreased Somalia's budget deficit, the output in manufacture, exports, and GNP per capita declined altogether (Laitin, 1993, p. 134). Overall, post-Ogaden US assistance to Somalia prioritized economic aid rather than military aid to Somalia. When military assistance deployed, it was mainly for defense purposes. By 1987, the US financial credits to Somalia equaled four times higher than its military assistance (Rawson, 1994). However, the burden of the IMF standby agreements, together with the already crumbling national economy, increased social pressures over Barre regime.

Barre's power started shattering in the mid-1970s due to the declining economic performance of scientific socialism, and the regime's SRC and NSC became repressive state apparatuses suppressing the oppositional within bureaucratic and civil circles. Barre's expulsion of Soviet personnel and later declaration of the war energized nationalist feelings, and sustained Barre's charismatic leader image. However, the rapid failure of Ogaden invasion eroded Barre's legitimacy. His diplomatic zigzags, failure in economic programming, and wasting state revenues for a humiliating defeat in Ogaden,

left Barre's regime in the middle of severing opposition. In addition to the increasing social dissent, the war triggered a massive internal refugee crisis that pushed Barre to declare a state of emergency, which turned Somalia into a police state to maintain authority. Barre, despite his apparent anti-clan rhetoric, restricted policy and security mechanisms with a clan-based closed circuit. The new clan confederacy consisted of his own clan Marrehan, his mother's clan Ogaden, and his son-in-law clan lineage Dulbahante, which became a nickname, MOD, during Barre's last years in dictatorship (Lewis, 2008, 46).

Post-Ogaden uprisings and escalating state terror created clan-based armed fractions fighting against the regime for regional autonomy. First, in April 1978, a group of military officers from Majerteen clan staged a coup attempt against Barre, but the government suppressed the attempt and executed seventeen military personnel related to the failed coup. Political trials pushed opposition groups to carry their activities to abroad, and many anti-regime groupings located their headquarters in Ethiopia, Kenya, or London. Best known opposition groups were Somali Salvation Democratic Front affiliated to Majerteen clan, Somali National Movement formed by the Isaq clan, and United Somali Congress initiated by Hawiye clan. The clan-based and regional segregation of the opposition eventually caused the state to stretch its brutal security measures and violence to a nation-wide level. The warfare between militias and regime forces worsened when Barre fled from the capital Mogadishu in 1991, and civil war turned Somalia into a ground of lawlessness, terror, and endless competition among bandit groups for a control on resources. In this void, clan identity became the only source of security as well as threat, and warlords exacerbated clan-based violence into a "communal violence, perpetrated and suffered by people who shared geographical and social space as neighbors, acquaintances, friends, maternal relatives, and in-laws" (Kapteijns, 2012, p. 3).

Ruinous escalation of Somali civil war became a multilateral problem after 1991. Isaq-populated northern Somalia declared its independence under Somaliland Republic, which established the end of a thirty-year joint-administration with the south. Southern cities of Mogadishu and Kismayu, on the other hand, rapidly fell into an anarchy where two factional leaders Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi started a destructive war for authority. Regional actors as well as United Nations tried to mediate between political figures within warlords and tried to keep humanitarian corridors open for relief operations. Peace

conferences brought no fruitful results for ending the fight, but a ceasefire in February 1992 temporarily gave a space for peace talks. The UN Security Council deployed a humanitarian relief mission under UNOSOM I. By the time, the hunger and health crises on the one hand, and the termination of cease fire on the other, worsened the political and humanitarian situation on the ground, and finally in November 1992 the US President George Bush decided to launch a military intervention. However, the clash between the UN peacekeeping troops and militias controlled by Aideed prepared to lead to the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident. The US forces started an operation to capture Aideed in Mogadishu, but the counterattack by Somali militias killed 18 US soldiers and shot down two helicopters, where US soldiers were dragged along the streets.

Black Hawk Down event pushed the UN and US forces to leave the ground, and it put the people of Somalia into an international isolation. By that, Somalia, with its dissolved institutional and social fabric, came to be identified as the exemplary case of a “failed state.” The civil war created a massive migration wave headed to Europe, the US, Canada, Australia, and other destinations, while failed military interventions left hundreds of thousands internally displaced and homeless. In the end, emerging diasporic activism and the foreign intervention became regular elements in the post-state collapse Somalia’s reconstruction efforts. When the Soviet Union disintegrated and the Cold War ended, the geopolitical value of Somalia has vanished and the continuing civil war and isolation made Somalia a “dead land,” as political geographer defines the post-Cold War disconnection of several African states from the world capitalist system:

Without the Cold War to attract even minimal attention from US governments and other powerful global actors, many other countries now face the possibility of actually dropping out of the world economy altogether, retreating into more localized economic zones with only limited connections to the globalizing world. ... [T]he countries of these regions had potential leverage in the omnipresent threat posed by the former Soviet Union and its political-economic ideology. This has now passed and with it has gone the incentive to stimulate investment in large areas that are consequently the most extensive “dead lands” of the current world: without either economic or geopolitical advantage within the globalizing world economy. (Agnew, 2001, p. 147)

The dead land Somalia, however, may attract emerging powers’ unconventional interests for prestige and material power, which we will discuss in the following two chapters.

3. 4 Conclusion

This chapter argues that Soviet politics of aid in Somalia aimed a geopolitical expansion in East Africa by instrumentalizing military aid to maintain clientele relationships with local politicians. 1961 commercial agreements and later 1963 Somali-Soviet arms deal opened a new era in the Horn. The Soviet Union aimed to counterbalance the Ethiopia-US alliance by providing Somalia military aid, which they had long awaited to achieve their irredentist agenda of incorporating Ogaden back into national borders. Both the US and the USSR wanted to reach out their clients' port cities in Kagnaw in Eritrea, and Berbera in northern Somalia. The important point is that, Moscow never approached Somali exclusively, and never prioritized its irredentist agenda. Rather the Soviet Union pursued a balancing diplomacy to keep diplomatic and commercial channels open with Ethiopia and infiltrate into Ethiopian politics through aid agreements whenever it had the chance. The Ogaden War provided Moscow this chance to switch side and protect its geopolitical control in East Africa, while leaving its former ally Somalia under a huge debt crisis and shattering post-war political system.

In the previous chapter, I analyzed that Italian politics of aid primarily aimed to restore its former plantation investments by development grants in order to rehabilitate agrarian production, irrigation infrastructure, and transportation routes. Italy used foreign aid for economic purposes with the intention of turning Somali banana production into an Italian monopoly while opening Somalia's banking, energy, and construction sectors for Italian firms. Therefore, within Somalia's transnational history of foreign aid, Italian politics of aid is based on a neo-imperial expansion. In contrast, the Soviet Union politics of aid was primarily a geopolitical design. It on the one hand aimed to control strategic naval traffic in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea line, and on the other hand it wanted to counterbalance the US presence in Ethiopia. In addition, for Moscow, keeping Somalia under control meant to hinder China's ambitious plans to challenge the Soviet leadership within the communist bloc. Therefore, Soviet Union responded to Somalia's call for a military aid and made the Horn country one of the strongest armies in Africa. But, as noted above, Moscow's alliance with Somalia was not ideological or economic, but it was strategic mainly for securing its geopolitical power in East Africa. Next chapter discusses why the post-state collapse Somalia, a dead land "without either economic or geopolitical advantage" as Agnew stated, became an important foreign policy goal for an emerging country Turkey.

CHAPTER 4

SOMALIA IN TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE: INTERESTS AND COMPASSIONATE POLITICS

This chapter analyzes how Somalia entered into Turkey's new foreign policy objectives during Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) governments since 2002. Following Somalia's fifty years of failed peripheralization and its eventual isolation from the international community, Turkey appeared on the Somalia scene as an emerging donor. During the AKP's early years in rule, Turkey gone through a rapid economic growth and the government pursued an assertive foreign policy to assume new regional responsibilities and benefits. The AKP desired to increase Turkey's market and diplomatic alternatives, and it mobilized official aid agencies, business, and faith-based NGOs to reach out new regions. In this period, Turkey utilized foreign aid as a diplomacy tool for building up relationships with Middle East and Africa, while diverging from its traditional foreign aid support to post-Soviet Turkic states in Asia and Caucasus. The government's new emerging power diplomacy, therefore, necessitated a reform in Turkey's politics of aid both regionally and instrumentally. Somalia appeared in Turkey's foreign policy agenda in light of this transforming foreign policy interests, but with the 2011 humanitarian aid operation it became a turning point for Turkey's official aid discourse and practice.

The AKP's opening to Africa started in 2005 and the government prioritized multilateral grounds to increase its prestige and regional contacts. Turkey's route to Somalia fallowed this path. In 2009, Turkey joined a UN security mission against piracy

off Somalia coasts. Despite opposition parties' critiques, AKP cadres discursively legitimized Turkey's involvement in Somalia by defending the diplomatic benefits of multilateral grounds on the one hand, and arguing for Turkey's security interests on the other. However, 2011 humanitarian crisis in Somalia provided an opportunity to the AKP MPS to disguise political calculations within a compassionate and solidarist discourse. This chapter investigates this shift from interest-driven multilateral and securitized conception toward humanitarian and solidarist framing of intervention to Somalia. Through the content analysis of parliamentary discussions between 2002-2015, I analyze how the debate among the government and the opposition led the AKP to use different discursive strategies to legitimize its intervention to Somalia. Content analysis of parliamentary debates reveals that the AKP's opening to Africa policy first prioritized multilateral and security objectives for regional activism, and Somalia's appearing on the scene came as an extension of this foreign policy in East Africa. However, 2011 humanitarian crisis in Somalia provided an opportunity to the AKP MPS to disguise political calculations within a compassionate and solidarist discourse.

4.1 Turkey's Africa policy: An ambitious engagement after a long delay

Until the AKP rule, Turkey did not show a serious and consistent interest for a strategic partnership in Africa. Turkey joined the Bandung Conference in 1955, which symbolized postcolonial solidarism of third world countries, but Ankara did not aim to build an early engagement with African nationalist movements, rather it wanted to solidify its Cold War alliance with the Western bloc. Turkey represented NATO's side in the meeting and criticized non-aligned diplomacy as a part of Soviet threat to international peace (Hazar, 2018, p. 144). Later in the 1970s, Turkey tried to compensate its neglect of Africa when the Cyprus conflict pressured Ankara to win new allies for its Mediterranean policy. However, decades of rejection did not bring expected returns from African states. The lack of diplomatic action and more importantly Ankara's lack of ambition, knowledge, or strategy about Africa hindered Turkey's outreaching the continent (Ozkan, 2010).

In June 1985, Turkey launched its first official foreign aid program with a \$10 million capacity building package for Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, Somalia, and Sudan. However, when the USSR disintegrated and the international system had transformed, Turkey readjusted its foreign aid objectives toward

Caucasus and Central Asia for assisting post-Soviet Turkic states' transition toward liberal market.¹² With this aim, Turkey established its official aid agency Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (Türkiye İşbirliği ve Kalkınma Ajansı, TİKA) in 1992. In 1998, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem aimed to relocate Africa to Turkey's foreign policy agenda and initiated the first strategic opening program. However, due to the 1999 earthquake and then the 2001 economic crisis, the Africa Action Plan stayed inactive unless the AKP came to rule in 2002. After that, Turkey's new single party government extended its commercial and diplomatic engagement with Africa similar to other emerging countries by seeking active roles in multilateral organizations, encouraging bilateral trade and investment, and increasing state-sponsored assistance programs (Wheeler, 2011).

4.1.1 Changing political economy and new foreign policy objectives

Turkey's emerging interests in Africa during the AKP rule paralleled its rapid economic growth and new foreign policy activism to enlarge its commercial and geopolitical influence in alternative geographies. The AKP came to government as an extension of political Islam in Turkey and represented the interests of conservative commercial classes. However, the AKP's hegemonic project transformed Islamic demands in civil society and combined it with neoliberal free market principles (Tuğal, 2009). Turkey's new capitalism under the AKP rule gone through a transformation in terms of its state-business relations, and the AKP put its political support on conservative bourgeoisie in order to widen the role of religion both in the new government-business relations and also in the state's public services (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014).

The AKP's foreign policy to activate its trade and diplomatic relations with the Middle East and Africa provided new market opportunities to Turkey's conservative bourgeoisie. The AKP supported the transnationalization of new interest groups by inviting them to bilateral diplomatic visits and multilateral trade summits. Fethullah Gülen's business network, TUSKON,¹³ became an important actor in the government's

¹² *Turkey's Development Cooperation: General Characteristics And The Least Developed Countries (LDC) Aspect*. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-s-development-cooperation.en.mfa>

¹³ TUSKON (Türkiye İş Aadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu, Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists) was a business group affiliated to Fethullah Gülen network in Turkey, and TUSKON and the AKP mutually supported each other in Turkey's new trade and diplomatic opening to Africa. Beside business initiatives, Gülen network has covered relief associations and schools, which have actively spread their influence among the children of bureaucratic and political elite of African countries. After the July 2016 failed coup attempt organized by the Gülenist cadres in the military,

desires for expanding commercial and cultural influence in Africa. When the AKP declared a “Year of Africa” in 2005, and initiated diplomatic visits with African countries, TUSKON pioneered several trade summits bringing African diplomats, entrepreneurs, and Turkish businesspeople together (Cagaptay, 2020, p. 239). As Turkish conservative capital increased its foreign investment, Turkey’s total trade with sub-Saharan Africa raised from \$1 billion in 2002 to nearly \$6 billion in 2008, while continuing high-level official visits to African states provided a diplomatic support for growing business initiatives (Kirişçi & Kaptanoğlu, 2011, p. 714). The interaction between the new bourgeoisie and the AKP’s ambitious regional activism represented the foreign policy of a “trading state”, as Kirişçi argues, which enabled Turkey to include new trade destinations and hence increase its total export from \$21.6 in 1995 to \$107 billion in 2007 (Kirişçi, 2009, p. 48).

Turkey increased its trade with Middle East and Africa in this period, but the AKP government simultaneously tried to strengthen its relationship with the European Union as a conservative government in rule. The AKP branded itself as a “conservative democratic” movement, that argued embracing liberal market values while protecting the religious and traditionalist core of society, and the AKP casted Kemalist establishment as the major obstacle in front of the country’s progress. In order to weaken the ideological and bureaucratic power of Kemalism, Erdoğan’s AKP passed several legislative and constitutional reforms which provided a relative liberalization in domestic politics. With the economic and liberal performance of the government, the market-led transformation of political Islam in Turkey came to be identified as the “moderate Islam” of the “Turkish model” (Tugal, 2016). The AKP policy makers embraced “Turkish model” rhetoric as a justification for their aspired leadership for the Muslim world. Turkey’s growing trade performance, therefore, enabled an ideological reformulation of Turkishness and Islam in foreign policy, and simultaneously provided realpolitik opportunities to develop relations with the Islamic populations in Middle East and Africa. The proactive and multidimensional foreign policy of the government aimed to “strengthen Turkey vis-à-vis global turmoil through enhanced strategic partnerships with various actors in different

Erdoğan and Gülen broke up their ties and the Gülenist organization and its worldwide school network were officially defined as a terrorist organization in Turkey. Gülen-affiliated education network is still active in several African states, and Turkey’s diplomatic battle to close or transfer them to state-owned Maarif Foundation still continues. See. Yıldırım, Ö. (2021, October 18). *Türkiye Maarif Vakfı, Afrika'da 25 ülkede eğitim veriyor*. Anadolu Ajansı. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/egitim/turkiye-maarif-vakfi-afrikada-25-ulkede-egitim-veriyor/2395379>.

areas of the world” (Keyman & Gümüşcü, 2014, p. 73). As an important part of its strategic engagement with Africa, the AKP prioritized taking new responsibilities in multilateral grounds, and aimed to develop its relationships with international institutions (Parlar Dal, 2016, p. 1438).

Starting with the mid-2000s, Turkey developed its diplomatic engagement with Africa in two ways. First, Erdoğan’s government paid a special attention on multilateral activism. The AKP declared 2005 as the Year of Africa, and in the same year Turkey gained an observer status at the African Union and three years later Ankara obtained the title of a strategic partner. In 2008, Turkey became a non-regional member of the African Development Bank, and in the same year it hosted the first Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in Istanbul. In the event, participant states signed a declaration for cooperation in investment, health, infrastructure, education, security, and energy sector. Turkey’s new strategic approach to Africa proved its benefits in 2008, when Turkey was elected as a temporary member of the UN Security Council for 2009-2010 with the support of 50 out of 53 African states. Ali Babacan, who served as the AKP’s Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, underlined the importance of Africa for Turkey’s new UN chair: “The fact that we have intensified our work on Africa in recent years will give us significant advantages. Because we will sit there as a country that begins to understand Africa better.”¹⁴

Turkey also embraced a mediatory role to in international platforms for African affairs. In May 2010, Turkey hosted a UN conference on Somalia. The Istanbul Conference was a continuation of former Djibouti Agreement, and it reiterated support to Somalia’s Transitional Government, commitment to peace and reconciliation, and the reconstruction of public services. The conference brought together Somali private sector actors as well as different regional organizations, such as representatives of the UN, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), the Intergovernmental Authority of Development (IGAD), and the League of Arab States.¹⁵ Through these conferences and summits the AKP wanted to establish its international recognition as a mediatory state taking responsibilities in regional problems. Similarly, in May 2011, Turkey hosted the fourth UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries. To fortify its emerging donor

¹⁴ Türkiye BM’de geçici üyeliğe seçildi. (2008, October 18). CNN Türk.

<https://www.cnnturk.com/2008/dunya/10/17/turkiye.bmde.gecici.uyelige.secildi/497124.0/index.html>

¹⁵ Istanbul Conference on Somalia is a breakthrough for all stakeholders. (2010. May 24). Relief Web. <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/istanbul-conference-somalia-breakthrough-all-stakeholders>

image, Erdoğan pledged in the Conference that Turkey will increase its annual assistance to the least developed countries to \$200 million.¹⁶ With these pragmatic steps, the AKP effectively involved in multilateral platforms and pursued material gains as an emerging power (Korkut and Civelekoglu, 2013).

Secondly, in addition to multilateral activism, Turkey showed bilateral efforts in Africa by increasing the number of its embassies in sub-Saharan Africa. Since 1994, Turkey had embassies in 12 African states and the 13th could be opened after fifteen years in 2009. The number Turkey's embassies in Africa reached to 20 in 2010, and to 33 in 2013.¹⁷ Turkey showed a similar enthusiasm for increasing the number of TİKA coordination offices in Africa. Since its inauguration in 1992 until the mid-2000s, TİKA projects were limited to the restoration of Ottoman artifacts in Eastern Europe, technical assistance to post-Soviet Turkic state in Central Asia, and cultural cooperation for widening Turkish language in those regions (Aydın, 2010, pp. 380-82). However, with the AKP's multitrack foreign policy TİKA multiplied its overseas activities. The number of TİKA program coordination offices increased from 12 in 2002 to 20 in 2008, three of them being in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Senegal, and it reached to 36 country offices in 2013, including those new offices in Kenya, Libya, Egypt, Niger, Somalia, and Tunisia. Turkey's new multilateral and bilateral engagements with Africa reflected in its official development aid flows (ODA) to the continent.

Table 4.1: Turkey's ODA in total and to Africa, 2006-2010 (in \$US million).¹⁸

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Total ODA	714.5	602.2	780.3	707.1	967.4
Africa total	24.7	30.9	51.7	46.9	38

Turkey increased its ODA flows to Africa until 2008, because that year Turkey wanted to gain African states' votes for its candidacy for the UN Security Council membership. The AKP's ambitious foreign policy objectives in multilateral grounds and

¹⁶ Güler, H. & Özkaya, S. (2011, May 10). *Günde 1.2 doların altında olan var, 'En Az Gelişmiş'lere yılda 200 milyon dolar göndereceğiz*. Hürriyet. <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/gunde-1-2-dolarin-altinda-olan-var-en-az-gelistmis-lere-yilda-200-milyon-dolar-gonderecegiz-17747924>

¹⁷ Umudik, M. Ö. (2021, October 17). *Türkiye'nin 'Afrika açılımı' büyükelçilik ağıyla genişliyor*. Anadolu Ajansı. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/turkiyenin-afrika-acilimi-buyukelcilik-agiy-la-genisliyor-/2394828>

¹⁸ Numbers for official development aid flows are from TİKA, Türkiye Kalkınma Yardımları Raporu, 2010, p. 13. Yearly numbers for total official development assistance to Africa are from TİKA annual activity reports 2006-2010.

in African affairs changed TİKA's neglected status. Until 2004, TİKA conducted the 35 percent of its overall projects in Central Asia, 19 percent in Caucasus, 17 percent in Eastern Europe, and only the 3 percent in Africa.¹⁹ However, Turkey's candidacy for the UN Security Council membership led to an increase in aid flows to Africa, as the table above illustrates. In 2008, Africa ranked as the third geographic region in Turkey's official aid expenditures by attracting 10 percent of overall assistance budget, coming after Asia with 53 percent and Europe with almost 25 percent of total aid expenditures.²⁰ Turkey's claims for becoming an emerging power, therefore, paralleled a simultaneous claim for becoming an emerging donor in Africa (Özkan, 2013, p. 141).

Despite visible increase, Turkey's projects in Africa were mostly small-scale and prestige oriented. Turkey's official agencies focused on sanitation and water drilling projects. Besides, TİKA collaborated with Islamic NGOs in Africa for local projects. Turkish NGOs' most frequent projects were medical examinations and cataract surgeries for locals in Ethiopia, Guinea, Niger, Tanzania, and Sudan. However, with these constant visits to Africa, Turkish religious NGOs increased their field experience and collaboration with official aid agencies, as well as they elevated Turkey's official records in NGO aid flows.

Table 4.2: NGO development aid flows (in \$US million), 2005-2011.

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
NGO aid	56.7	78.2	45.6	72.3	109	105.6	199.5
Aid to Africa			14.8	29.3	41.5		60.8

Source: TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance, 2013. p. 77

With official and NGO contributions, Turkey's interest in Africa started to gain consistency and volume. With the AKP's second term in office, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's geopolitical vision became the main element in Turkey's foreign policy activism in Africa and Middle East. Davutoğlu believed that multipolar world order necessitated Turkey to break away from its Cold War peripheral position toward becoming a regional actor utilizing its cultural, geographic, and economic assets (Davutoğlu, 2008). Davutoğlu's "strategic depth" doctrine aimed a leadership position in

¹⁹ T.C. Başbakanlık Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, TİKA Faaliyet Raporu 2004, p. 99.

²⁰ T.C. Başbakanlık Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, TİKA Faaliyet Raporu 2008, pp. 11-12.

former Ottoman regions and pursued a multi-dimensional foreign policy. This new geopolitical imagination necessitated a reformulation of Turkish identity recollecting Asian, European, African, and Mediterranean elements. As Anatolian bourgeoisie and Islamic NGOs increased their influence in Turkey's relations with the Muslim world, the AKP's foreign policy ambitions appeared as a threat to Turkey's secular opposition. According to the opposition, the AKP was isolating Turkey from Europe by favoring relations with the Middle East and Arab world, and Turkey was drifting toward an "axis-shift" in foreign policy and national identity. The shift was an extension of the AKP's export-led economic model and cultural codes. By mobilizing new interest groups and expanding its commercial network in the post-hegemonic world order, the AKP's Turkey appeared as "strategic medium power" maneuvering over different regions for its existential interests (Oran, 2012). At the same time, the AKP assumed a mediatory role in the Muslim world by raising its voice against Israel on Palestine conflict on the one hand, and by providing humanitarian assistance to natural disasters in Pakistan and Indonesia on the other.²¹ As the AKP deepened its involvement in political and humanitarian crises in the Muslim world, Turkey's new foreign policy gradually became a domestic conflict. The government constantly highlighted Turkey's independent and responsible foreign policy and embraced the image of a "globalist" benign actor, while the opposition appeared as the "defensive nationalist" status quo (Öniş, 2011, p. 57). Turkey's involvement in Somalia fell into the middle of this dispute against the AKP's foreign policy activism. In order to increase Turkey's opportunities in multilateral grounds, the AKP government wanted to send troops to the UN naval mission in 2009 against piracy off the Somali coasts in the Red Sea. The analysis of parliamentary debates in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey reveals that the AKP's multilateral initiatives in the North and East Africa faced strong criticism from the opposition parties due to its adventurism and wasting national resources for superpower interests.

4.2 Somalia in foreign policy discourse: From sarcasm to national interests

When Somalia's civil war had started, Turkey joined the UN peacekeeping operation in 1993, but after that, Somalia decayed from Turkey's foreign policy

²¹ See, Serin, A. (2005, January 16). *Tarihin en büyük yardım seferberliği*. Hürriyet. <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/tarihin-en-buyuk-yardim-seferberligi-289184>; *Pakistan'a en büyük deprem yardımı Türkiye'den*. (2006, February 22). Hürriyet. <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/pakistana-en-buyuk-deprem-yardimi-turkiye-den-3971060>

orientations and it ceased to exist as a topic of interests in parliamentary debates.²² During early years of the AKP rule, Somalia appeared in parliamentary meetings only as a rhetorical analogy of backwardness, as a representational other of Turkey's development goals. Opposition parties discursively referred to "Somalia" as an exaggerated metaphor of underdevelopment and argued that the government's wrongdoings in administration could have only taken place in a backward society like Somalia. In February 2004, for example, an apartment in Turkey's Anatolian city Konya suddenly collapsed because of miscalculated construction plans, which left 92 deaths behind. The event outburst a debate on the responsibility of municipal authorities for permitting the construction without observing technical requirements and hence letting a human-made disaster to take dozens of lives. For the main opposition party in the parliament, Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), the apartment disaster was emblematic of the AKP's irresponsible administration, as the CHP MP Büyükcengiz argued:

This is not a disaster. ... This result necessitates obtaining a modern, honest, impartial, and scientific understanding of local government. ... We are living in the 21st century information age and trying to enter the European Union. This event was broadcasted live on television by both national and international media channels. I hope those who watched this event on BBC did not feel for Turkey the same feelings as we have while watching African children in Somalia, Ethiopia, or Uganda with skinny bodies and bloated bellies.²³

The opposition in the parliament continued rhetorically using Somalia's agonizing image in order to dramatize public injuries and push the government for admitting responsibility. A similar example happened in November 2006 when a flood disaster hit Turkey's eastern Anatolia region and caused 39 deaths. Approaching to the microphone from the opposition seats, Motherland Party's MP Hüseyin Güler criticized the unscientific irresponsiveness of authorities, while comparing the shocking case in Turkey to that of Somalia: "There is a branch of science called meteorology. It can more or less shape week-long processes. In what age do we live that we have 33 deaths? Please tell me, which country is this, is this Somalia?"²⁴ The parliament's attention on Somalia was

²² In this study, I do not include parliamentary archives for the 1993 intervention. Similarities and differences between Turkey's previous and recent foreign aid regimes, and Somalia's discursive and operational place in it, is another topic of research, which is important but not in the scope of this chapter due to time constraints.

²³ From the Journal of Minutes (Tutanak Dergisi, TD) of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM), legislative term (LT) 22, legislative year (LY) 2, meeting number (M) 50, date (D) February 10, 2004, journal page (P) 14. From now on, the citation method for related Journal materials is as follows: TBMM TD, (LT) x. (LY) y. (M) z, (P) n. (D) date.

²⁴ TBMM TD, 22.5.14, p. 76. November 2, 2006.

so narrow that it only rhetorically appeared as a sarcastic gesture in the discourse of opposition parties' for demeaning the AKP government's capacity to rule. Beside this limited discursive scope, Somalia was in fact an alien country for Turkey's diplomatic experience. A strange example of this unfamiliarity between two nations happened in October 2006, when a Somali crew, introducing themselves as the representatives of Somali government, asked for an appointment from Turkey's Ministry of Treasury and the chair of Central Bank. The Somali crew managed to visit top official authorities and negotiated improving bilateral relations, but soon the Ministry of Interior found out that the crew had no actual legal authority and warned state departments for any false pretense by Somali actors in Ankara.²⁵ CHP MPs were quick to translate this strange incident to parliamentary disputes between the government and the opposition. CHP MP İnce, while accusing the government due to a local corruption case, sarcastically pressed the AKP cadres to pay attention to the opposition's objections: "You are even having a meeting with the nonexistent chair of Somalia's Central Bank, but will you not meet with the main opposition party's MPs?"²⁶

Starting with the mid-2000s, the AKP's new multitrack foreign policy changed the discursive framing of Somalia in the parliamentary debates from a sarcastic rhetorical reference to a national security framework. The AKP utilized multilateral peacekeeping missions in order to increase Turkey's visibility in international grounds on the one hand, and to multiply its foreign policy tools in Middle East and Africa on the other. For this aim, the parliament passed two motions with the support of the AKP MPs. In June 2006, the parliament passed a government-sponsored motion for sending troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to maintain local security during election time. In September, another motion allowed the government to send troops to Lebanon under a UN task force to keep ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israeli forces. For the government, both motions would enable Turkey to show its capacity to solve regional problems, and its collaboration with the Northern supranational institutions will ease Turkey's accession to the European Union. Plus, they would bring benefits for the AKP's new multi-track foreign policy by expanding Turkey's regional influence through security means.

²⁵ *Unakitan ve Yılmaz sahte heyetle görüştü.* (2006, October 6). Milliyet.

<https://www.milliyet.com.tr/ekonomi/unakitan-ve-yilmaz-sahte-heyetle-gorustu-173170>

²⁶ TBMM TD, 22.5.5, p. 26. October 10, 2006.

Because of the limited duration and risks, the DRC mission did not create a serious spilt between government and opposition parties, and it passed with a majority support.²⁷ However, the motion for Lebanon created a public dissent as well as several objections from opposition parties. According to the CHP MP Önder Sav, the AKP's support for the motion wanted to gain the sympathy of the US to the cost of pushing Turkey into a conflict against Muslims in Lebanon: "You want to ingratiate yourself with the United States, Israel, and the United Nations. Well, how are you going to look at the face of Muslims all around the world? ... Are you going to bring security to Turkey when you send troops to Lebanon?" The AKP's multilateral initiatives carried new conflicts into the parliament. The AKP cadres, however, defended their willingness for overseas security missions by addressing Turkey's previous military involvement in Somalia under the UN mandate. The AKP MP Egemen Bağış, for example, supported the Lebanon motion as a step for achieving international prestige and regional power, while legitimizing the motion by referring to previous Somalia and Afghanistan operations:

The AKP has brought Turkey to a respected position in its region and in the world. ... Today, we are talking about the reputation of Turkey, you cannot say let's not help or touch, let's stay isolated. ... Let me ask: Is Lebanon less important than Somalia, is it less strategic, or is it less dangerous than Afghanistan? ... We must go to Lebanon, with the responsibility and consciousness of being a great nation.²⁸

The government's new foreign policy objectives relocated Somalia's appearance in parliamentary debates from a sarcastic rhetorical troop to an element of Turkey's new security framework. The AKP's ambitious foreign policy utilized multilateral grounds as a way to reestablish a contact with Muslim-populated regions which had been a part of former Ottoman reign. Also, the government pursued an active role in transnational security field to reach out Africa and to establish itself as an emerging country. The government defended multilateral peacekeeping missions in the name of accumulating prestige and regional power. For example, Erol Cebeci from the AKP seats reiterated the government's belief in multilateral activism as follows: "You will live in this region, you will have a claim for economic, political, and military power in this region, and you will say 'it is none of our business.' ... Sending troops obviously increases our reputation."²⁹

²⁷ *Türkiye, Kongo'ya asker gönderecek.* (2006, June 27). Hürriyet.

<https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/turkiye-kongoya-asker-gonderecek-4657652>

²⁸ TBMM TD, 22.4.124, pp. 97-105. September 5, 2006.

²⁹ TBMM TD, 22.5.116, p. 11. May 29, 2007.

For the opposition, however, Turkey's ambitious involvement in international problems was serving for superpowers' interests, not for a national cause, as CHP MP Haluk Koç argued considering sending troops to Lebanon: "We will only become a part of what great states' strategies expect from us."³⁰ Two main opposition parties, Kemalist CHP and far right Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP), criticized the government's new multilateral security framework for favoring hegemonic Western powers. Yet, they still voted for the AKP's motions by highlighting Turkey's responsibilities toward its international allies in the UN and the NATO. Despite critiques and disagreements, the AKP continued increasing its expansionist policies for diplomatic and economic gains.

Turkey's route to Somalia appeared as a result of the AKP's ambitious multilateral activism and assuming new regional roles within the security framework. In 2009, the government brought another motion to the parliament suggesting sending naval troops to a joint-UN mission against piracy attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The motion signed by the Prime Minister Erdoğan addressed threats of piracy against international security as well as Turkish commercial ships using Somalia coasts. The motion recollected Turkey's previous multilateral experiences, and it stressed Ankara's new responsibilities as a member of the UN Security Council:

Being aware of the duties and responsibilities of our country's temporary membership in the United Nations Security Council as of 1/1/2009, it is seen as a requirement of our international and national responsibilities to provide effective support to international efforts to combat against piracy and armed robbery, which endanger international peace and stability and negatively effect our national interests.³¹

With this motion, Somalia gradually found a new place in the parliamentary debates. In fact, piracy attacks at the Red Sea effected a small number of Turkish commercial ships, and the AKP MPs supported this motion in order to protect Turkey's commercial activities and national interests in overseas regions. Suat Kınıklıoğlu from the AKP seats argued that as Turkey expanded its geographic and commercial capacity, regions such as Somalia was no more a distant place to Turkey, but a close concern for its emerging activities: "The incidents in the Gulf of Aden, off Somalia, and the Arabian

³⁰ TBMM TD, 22.5.116, p. 15. May 29, 2007.

³¹ TBMM TD, 23.3.55, p. 20. February 10, 2009.

Sea might appear as if they are far away and not a concern for us, but in fact they are very serious security issues and concern us closely.”³²

Opposition parties represented different standpoints against the motion to send naval units to Somalia coasts. Main opposition parties CHP and MHP approached to the motion with reservations about whether Somalia had such an importance for Turkey to send a military force, yet they still voted for the motion. Unlike CHP and MHP, however, pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP) criticized sending troops to the Gulf of Aden and voted against the motion arguing that it was contrary to national priorities and not ameliorating social causes behind piracy. According to the BDP MP Selahattin Demirtaş, if the motion passed, Turkish troops would be collaborating with actors who had created Somalia’s current conflicts: “Who are we going to work together there? Our troops will work together with countries who have been responsible for turning piracy into a sector in Somali society.”³³ Despite objections, the motion passed from the parliament, and it was annually voted for the extension of the mandate. In 2010, the BDP once again voted against the extension mandate by arguing that Turkey was not protecting its national interests in Somalia but a group of foreign merchant ships. To the BDP MP Kaplan, Turkey’s military expenditures in Somalia were a waste of national resources:

Let those corporates and holdings establish their own protection, create their own security legions and mercenaries to defend their own commercial ships. ... We begrudge this expenditure from TEKEL workers,³⁴ but how much budget we are allocating to protect Chinese, Indian, American, or Russian ships off Somali coasts?

Main opposition parties, the CHP and the MHP, showed their support to upcoming motions, as well, on the basis of international cooperation. But, while letting the motion pass, they warned the government to take wise diplomatic decision to win the same support from the international allies for Turkey’s own terror problem, as the CHP’s Elekdağ argued: “The combat against international terrorism requires a comprehensive collaboration and solidarity. Turkey is a state that has seriously taken its responsibilities

³² TBMM TD, 23.3.55, p. 29. February 10, 2009.

³³ TBMM TD, 23.3.55, p. 26. February 10, 2009.

³⁴ TBMM TD, 23.4.55, p. 28. February 2, 2010. TEKEL was a state-owned tobacco factory and its workers went on a collective strike when the AKP government included TEKEL into its privatization acts, which would decrease salaries and social security rights of the workers. In 2009 December, hundreds of TEKEL workers settled tents and protested against the government for more than two months at the city center of Ankara.

in this field, but it is also a fact that Turkey could not see the same responsibility and cooperation from the Bush administration.”³⁵ Ultranationalist MHP similarly voted for the motion to send troops to Somali coasts, and MHP MP Kürşat Atılğan highlighted the geostrategic importance of the region for oil traffic: “... this motion, which enable our naval units to join the international forces to prevent piracy in the Gulf of Aden, is in fact a part of the oil security and the oil game in the world.” For Atılğan, the motion was not only taking Turkey in the middle of this geostrategic competition on energy sources, but it was also assigning Turkey a historical mission to fulfill its civilizational duty for bringing peace and protection to peoples of Africa oppressed by the former imperialists:

People live there by the standards of the Middle Ages. That is why, we need to think bigger in order to fulfill the mission that Allah has given to the Turkish nation, since it is our duty to bring justice, peace, and prosperity to these regions in the future, just like we did in the past. For it is the imperialists who had ruled these regions and brought us to these days by creating the most intense humanitarian tragedies, it will be a historic mission incumbent on the Turkish nation.³⁶

Though the opposition had certain critiques based on national priorities and global power hierarchies, they still voted in favor of sending troops off Somalia coasts on the basis of Turkey’s responsibilities toward its international allies on the one hand, and as a reflection of Turkey’s civilizational mission to protect the oppressed, as MHP MP Atılğan articulated. The AKP’s emerging country performance reached out Africa and found its route to Somalia through multilateral and security channels, and the AKP MPs discursively legitimized the government’s desires for expansion by addressing prestige and security gains of such multilateral missions. For example, according to the AKP MP Vahit Erdem, the chaotic global conjuncture required Turkey to expand its regional interests: “In the time we live, the world is in a transitionary and dynamic evolution[.] Obviously, Turkey cannot stay static in this environment, and it has to expand its areas of interests.”³⁷ Similarly, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu argued the new international system brought risks as well as opportunities for Turkey. If Turkey could assume a leadership in international crises, it would not only increase its regional power but also protect its national interests in front of emerging challenges. To Davutoğlu, Turkey’s distinguishing cultural and geographic assets enabled it to pursue the task of rejuvenating its historical power from China to Somalia:

³⁵ TBMM TD, 23.3.55. p. 24. February 10, 2009.

³⁶ TBMM TD, 23.3.55. p. 23. February 10, 2009.

³⁷ TBMM TD, 23.4.55, p. 40. February 2, 2010.

In this international conjuncture, there are serious risks but at the same time great opportunities for a country like Turkey lying in the middle of Afroeuroasia, unless it can utilize the geography and historical assets it owns. ... With our powerful history, we live with our neighbors reaching from China, Asia, to Somalia, and these societies have serious expectations from Turkey. ... [We] are not taking an effective action in these crises only for prestige. If we do not take part, and if we do not contribute them with guiding solutions, Turkey's national survival will go under a threat[.]³⁸

With the 2009 motion, Erdoğan's government opened up East African coasts for Turkey's increasing involvement in joint-peacekeeping missions. Turkey's foreign policy discourse toward Somalia was based on a security framework, and the AKP cadres legitimized their multilateral activism for increasing Turkey's international prestige as a regional actor. Two multilateral meetings hosted in Turkey, 2010 Somalia Conference in Istanbul and 2011 UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries (LDC), reflected Turkey's new aspirations for becoming an emerging power. During the 2010 Somalia Conference, Davutoğlu reiterated Turkey's commitment to sustain peace and order in the Gulf of Aden: "We express our support for establishing security in Somalia. Somalia's security is no longer limited with Somalia, but it is related to the whole of East Africa and navigation in Indian Ocean. The agreement signed between the Republic of Turkey and Somalia is an example of this."³⁹ In a similar context, during the opening ceremony of 2011 UN conference for LDC, the President Abdullah Gül underlined Turkey's rising status in international diplomacy and global development endeavors. Gül defined Turkey as a strong supporter of South-South cooperations. Besides Turkey's commitments to international security, Gül highlighted Turkey's emerging donor profile thanks to increasing humanitarian activities of Turkish NGOs in Africa:

Helping to the least developed countries cannot be evaluated only from a security perspective. In fact, investing in the least developed countries, which own large populations and rich natural resources, is at the same time a commercial decision which would bring mutual benefits. We can create a win-win situation out of this. ... Turkey is an important supporter of south-south cooperations. ... With the support of Turkish civil society organizations, our development aid is about to reach an annual level of 2 billion dollars.⁴⁰

³⁸ TBMM TD, 23.4.35, p. 95. December 18, 2009.

³⁹ *Sayın Bakanımızın İstanbul Somali Konferansı Sonrası BM Genel Sekreteri ile Yaptığı Ortak Basın Toplantısı*, 22 Mayıs 2010. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-istanbul-somali-konferansi-sonrasi-bm-genel-sekreteri-ile-yaptigi-ortak-basin-toplantisi_-22-mayis-2010.tr.mfa

⁴⁰ *Türkiye Daha Adil Bir Dünya Düzeni İçin Elinden Geleni Yapacaktır*. (2011, May 9). Abdullah Gül. <http://www.abdullahgul.gen.tr/haberler/170/79789/turkiye-daha-adil-bir-dunya-duzeni-icin-elinden-geleni-yapacaktır.html?c=584>

As the President Gül expressed, Turkey's securitized engagement with Africa at the diplomatic level was supported by an NGO activism at the grassroots level. Somalia fell into the radar of Turkey's Islamic charities by the mid-2000s. Turkey's faith-based NGOs, in this period, became an important tool for Turkey's new foreign policy objectives in Africa through collaborating with TİKA and expanding Turkish aid agencies information and organizational network on the ground (Turhan & Bahçecik, 2021, pp. 7-8). Through their grassroots activities in crisis zones, faith-based humanitarian NGOs became the visible face of Turkey's engagement with Africa (Aras and Akpinar, 2015). Turkey's faith-based NGOs started including Somalia into their projects in Africa. In 2007, religious NGOs conducted a technical training for medical personnel in Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Niger, and Nigeria. Also, Islamic charities built eight mosques in Asian and African countries including Somalia. Next year, NGOs provided educational support to 7500 orphans in Asia and Africa, and they included Somalia again into their programs. With opening wells, conducting cataract surgeries, restoring mosques, and deploying orphan care programs, Turkey's religious NGOs continued visiting Somalia in the following years as a part of their operations fields in Niger, Sudan, Ethiopia, Guinea, Chad, and many others.⁴¹ Though NGO aid flows gradually increased, these humanitarian relief operations mostly consisted of small-scale projects for locals, without aiming long-term infrastructure developments. With these small but continuous efforts, Somalia started receiving a constant amount of aid from Turkey's official and NGO channels.

Table 4.3: Turkey's official aid expenditure in Africa (in \$US million).

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010			
Total ODA	712	602	780	707	967			
Africa total	24.79	30.97	51.73	46.96	38.08			
	Sudan	15.4	Sudan	13.2	Sudan	14.5	Sudan	11.2
	Somali	3.5	Somalia	7.5	Somalia	5.6	Somalia	5.8
	Ethiopia	1.8	Mauritania	4.1	Ethiopia	4	Ethiopia	5.8
	Niger	1.4	Ethiopia	2.9	Kenya	2.3	Niger	2.1
			Chad	1.6	Senegal	1.6	Senegal	2
			Niger	1.6				
			Senegal	1.3				

⁴¹ For detailed explanation of NGO aid activities for related years, see TİKA Kalkınma Yardımları Raporu 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010.

Source: Total ODA expenditures, TİKA Turkish Development Assistance, 2013, p. 9. ODA to Africa and country data are gathered from TİKA annual activity reports 2006-2010.

If we sum up, Somalia entered into Turkey's parliamentary debates during the AKP rule firstly as a sarcastic rhetoric reference that the opposition parties utilized for demeaning the government's performance. However, in light of the AKP's new foreign policy objectives Somalia's discursive status in the parliament has changed. Somalia became a part of the government's new multilateral activism and international security framework, and Turkey's route the East African nation followed the same foreign policy path for regional influence and material gains. Though the opposition criticized the AKP's overseas adventures, they supported military motions to send troops to Lebanon or Somalia on the basis of Turkey's responsibilities toward its international allies. However, 2011 aid campaign radically shifted Somalia's place in the AKP's foreign policy discourse from an interest-driven security framework to a humanitarian ground. Erdoğan's AKP mobilized a solidarist spirit at home with charity and donation campaigns, and it heightened a humanitarian rhetoric. Ankara's new compassionate politics portrayed Somalia mission as a disinterested sacrificial endeavor to protect the oppressed, and it eventually cloaked the AKP's expansionist foreign policy interest for regional power.

4.3 The crisis in Somalia and an emerging power's humanitarianism

2011 drought put almost ten million at risk in the Horn of Africa countries, but the political turmoil in Somalia made crisis more desperate. Poor rain falls had decreased agrarian output, but political factors also worsened the situation. Since 2010, al-Shabaab had blocked food assistance agencies of the UN in southern Somalia due to the distribution of expired food items and economic downturn in local farmers' earnings.⁴² Reaching to the mid-2011, the dire situation in drought-hit regions of Somalia climbed to its peak. The UN commissioners defined the ongoing crisis as "the worst humanitarian disaster in the world," and they called for a "massive humanitarian assistance inside Somalia" to organize a relief campaign for thousands of refugees fleeing from drought, malnutrition, and sickness.⁴³ However, despite the deepening crisis, the UN agencies were complaining about a "donor fatigue" and the lack of commitment from the

⁴² *Somali militants order U.N. food agency to leave.* (2010, March 1). CNN. <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/03/01/somalia.food.threats/index.html>

⁴³ *In Somalia, UN official urges massive response for world's 'worst humanitarian disaster'.* (2011, July 11). UN News. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/07/381262>

international community for collecting a required amount of humanitarian assistance. Somali refugee flows overloaded two major refugee camps located in Kenya and Ethiopia borders, but the UNICEF spokesman for East Africa Michael Klaus stated that they could only obtain the half of targeted assistance budget: “If there was a silver bullet, I think one could mobilize major donors to put their efforts into this. Unfortunately, that is not the case.”⁴⁴

Southern Somalia was the most severely effected region. According to the UN agencies the malnourishment of children reached to 80 percent and there was an urgent need to access clean water and medical supplies in refugee camps.⁴⁵ On July 20, the UN declared a famine in Somalia while stating that the half of Somali population, nearly 3.7 million, was at risk. Highlighting security problems on the ground, the UN Food Programme director Josette Sheeran stated that “operations in Somalia are among the highest risk in the world,” yet despite insecurity and urgency on the ground the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon complained about the continuing lack of international commitment.⁴⁶

In contrast to the current donor fatigue within the international community, Turkey approached to the Somali crisis with a rapid state-led collective response. Turkey’s then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signed a circular in the early August during the holy month of Ramadan, declaring a nation-wide donation campaign to help Somalia and calling public and private institutions as well as faith-based NGOs to participate. The circular assigned the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı, AFAD) as the official coordinator of the donation campaign, which had been affiliated to the Prime Minister’s office then. In a short while, other state institutions like TİKA and the Presidency of Religious Affairs started joint donation programs with the help of major media companies and charity organizations. The circular signed by Erdoğan specifically noted the spiritual importance of Ramadan for solidarity and assistance, and he defined helping Somalia’s “desperate struggle for survival” as a “debt to humanity”:

⁴⁴ Gachenge, B. (2011, July 1). *Donor fatigue hits Horn of Africa aid efforts*. Reuters <https://www.reuters.com/article/estafrica-drought-aid-idAFLDE7600DO20110701>

⁴⁵ *UN delivers relief to Somalia as response to Horn of Africa drought gathers pace*. (2011, July 15). UN News. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/07/381702>

⁴⁶ *UN declares famine in two regions of southern Somalia*. (2011, July 20). UN News. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/07/382072-un-declares-famine-two-regions-southern-somalia>

It is obvious that countries cannot fight against disasters with such a magnitude alone. With this conception and as a debt to humanity, it is a necessity to act urgently for a humanitarian assistance. During the holy month of Ramadan, when the sense of mutual help and solidarity felt intensively, also in line with expectations of our people, the Republic of Turkey will provide any aid and assistance to Somalia and other African nations facing the danger of hunger. Launching an aid campaign for this aim is decided as appropriate.⁴⁷

Simultaneously, Turkish media channels started donation campaigns and spread the call by broadcasting stereotypical images of African children and mothers carrying dusty empty bowls. TİKA and Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay) worked together with Sabah daily to increase public attention to ongoing campaign and attract charity and philanthropist flows. In a commentary acclaiming Sabah newspaper's contribution, Erdoğan renewed his call to NGOs, businesspeople, and individual donors to support Turkey's aid efforts for Somalia by recollecting that helping has been a civilizational heritage of Turkey: "We are the representatives of a deep-rooted waqf tradition and we shall carry goodness and compassion to the world. It is such a happiness that Turkey is known today as the hope country of the world, as the island of compassion."⁴⁸

Turkey's Fethullah Gülen network played an important part in the aid campaign. Gülen organization's TV channels and faith-based relief associations carried charity campaigns during Ramadan. Gülen's Samanyolu TV and Kimse Yok Mu association organized a late night live charity program titled "Humanity is not Dead" which lasted until sahur time before the dawn. Celebrities from sports, business, and music industry joined the charity event and encouraged people to show solidarity against the crisis in Somalia.⁴⁹ In two weeks, individual and corporate donations reached to 150 million Turkish liras, where the Presidency of Religious Affairs collected 75 million, Kızılay 28 million, and Gülenist Kimse Yok Mu raised 25 million lira (the price of one US dollar was 1.65 Turkish lira in August 2011).⁵⁰ Business groups donated record level money both to charity campaigns and official agencies. According to numbers published in newspapers, Turkey's top business groups Koç, Sabancı and Doğan holdings donated an

⁴⁷ Genelge 2011/9. (2011, August 6). *Somali ve Açlık Tehlikesi Yaşayan Diğer Afrika Ülkelerine Yardım Kampanyası*. Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette], no: 28017.

<https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2011/08/20110806-8.htm>

⁴⁸ Bosta, Y. (2011, August 5). *Bu kampanya umut ışığı olacak*. Sabah.

<https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2011/08/05/bu-kampanya-umut-isi-olacak>

⁴⁹ *Türkiye Afrika için seferber oldu*. (2011, August 13). Yeni Şafak.

<https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/turkiye-afrika-icin-seferber-oldu-335298>

⁵⁰ *Somali'ye yardım kampanyası devam ediyor*. (2011, August 15). Cumhuriyet.

<https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/somaliye-yardim-kampanyasi-devam-ediyor-274382>

aggregate amount of 4 million lira, while those smaller but known to be closer to the AKP government Doğuş and Çalık holdings provided 750 and 500 thousand liras, and Ağaoğlu group pledged to donate the highest amount with 2,7 million lira during the aid campaign.⁵¹ On August 17, one day before his historic visit to capital Mogadishu, Erdoğan carried his call to the international level during the Organization of Islamic Cooperation meeting in Istanbul, and encouraged the members for taking responsibility and increase commitment for the Somali crisis. During the meeting, Erdoğan once again stressed the disinterested generosity of Turkish contributions to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia:

We have never regarded Somalia with state interests, and we will never do. We have never perceived Africa as a land for exploitation and colonization, as others have done throughout the history. We regard Somalia and Africa with brotherhood and show this sensitivity today since we prioritize the value of humanity. ... Now, the responsibility is on us, those who gathered here around the table of compassion and brotherhood during Ramadan. ... Today, the urgent thing to do is to extinguish the fire in Somalia. But, at the same time, we must think about its aftermath, we must consider carrying structural and persistent services there such as opening wells, improving livestock and especially fishery.⁵²

After the meeting, Erdoğan went to Mogadishu, being the first non-African leader visiting the capital in two decades, with a large crew including popular media figures, entrepreneurs, cabinet members and their families. To Erdoğan, Turkey's high-profile support to Mogadishu's transitional government in a dire situation of need was "a test for civilization and contemporary values." Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu expressed that their visit would be a call to the international community to end the isolation of Somalia. Turkey's commitment would continue after the relief campaign, he stated, with long term economic development plans: "We came to Somalia to show our solidarity with the brothers and sisters of Somalia, but this is not just for one day, we will continue to work for our brothers and sisters and we will never leave them alone."⁵³

In fact, Turkey became a permanent actor in Somalia after the 2011 visit. The extensive aid and charity campaign at home mobilized state, business, and faith-based

⁵¹ *Somali'ye bağış yağdı.* (2011, August 21). Akşam. <https://www.aksam.com.tr/guncel/somaliye-bagis-yagdi-62614h/haber-62614>

⁵² *Erdoğan: Her lokmada o çocukların hakkı var.* (2011, August 17). NTV. <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/erdogan-her-lokmada-o-cocuklarin-hakki-var.NKw8WBkSuEioNuHCeebrHQ>

⁵³ *Somalia famine: Turkish PM Erdogan visits Mogadishu.* (2011, August 19). BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14588960>

NGOs, and Turkey's ambitious humanitarian intervention brought about several bilateral agreements covering trade, education, military training, and energy sectors. The deployment of large scholarship programs and the rapid implementation of infrastructure projects such as airport and road renovations, as well as building schools and hospitals, fortified Turkey's prestige in Somalia that paved the way for Turkey to gain a geostrategic presence in East Africa. In five years, Somalia became the second largest recipient of Turkey's foreign aid.⁵⁴ Now, Turkish firms run Mogadishu airport and seaport. Since then, Turkish Airlines increased its flights to African countries from 5 to 40 destinations between 2005 and 2021,⁵⁵ and Somalia became one of the most profitable destinations of Turkish Airlines, as the company's Kenya country manager told to Reuters in 2017.⁵⁶ Turkish companies manages Mogadishu's airport and seaport, while construction firms signs contracts for urban infrastructure projects. Beside commercial gains, Turkey enters Somalia's security field by training and equipping the Somali National Army within Turkey's military training camp in Mogadishu. Turkey built a fully-equipped 200-bed hospital in Mogadishu and now trains Somali medical experts in coordination with Turkey's Health Sciences University's local campus inaugurated in Mogadishu. With generous scholarship programs welcoming hundreds of Somali students to Turkish universities on the one hand, and NGO activities on social, medical, and educational sectors on the other, Turkey fortified its humanitarian image in Somalia. Beside this sacrificial appearance, Turkey reaped material benefits, as well, by increasing its exports to Somalia from \$39 to \$273 million between 2011-2020.

⁵⁴ *Türkiye'de 170 ülkeye kalkınma yardımı.* (2017, December 17). Yeni Şafak.

<https://www.yenisafak.com/ekonomi/turkiyeden-170-ulkeye-kalkinma-yardimi-2937611>


⁵⁵ *Interview: Turkish Airlines Chairman Dr. Ahmet Bolat.* (2022, May 22). Airways Magazine.

<https://airwaysmag.com/turkish-airlines-chairman/>

⁵⁶ *Turkish Airlines profits in Africa, where others fear to fly.* (2017, September 12). Reuters.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkishairlines-africa-idUSKCN1BN1CZ>

Table 1. Turkey's trade with Somalia, 2001-2021 (in \$US million).



Source: Export and import data come from Republic of Turkey Ministry of Trade, Somalia country profile 2019, 2022. The data for Turkey's ODA to Somalia was obtained from OECD, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a]. <https://stats.oecd.org/>

Turkey's humanitarian intervention was welcomed by the international Somali community. Jama Ali and Sharif Mohamud, former deputy prime minister and former ambassador of Somalia, wrote in Guardian that Turkey won the hearts and minds of Somali people by a "sincere assistance directly and immediately to those who are most in need."⁵⁷ Somali scholar Afyare Elmi acclaimed Turkey's initiatives since 2011, and he wrote that Turkey brought a new assistance model by combining unconditional development and relief aid, which, he argued, "donor countries must consider adopting it for Somalia."⁵⁸ Journalist Jamal Osman reported that Western and Arab nations having difficulty to understand the popularity of Turkey in Somalia, but for Osman the answer was obvious, the answer lied in "their arrogance and their determination to keep Somalia in a subservient position," whereas Turkey's visit "lifted Somali morale and brought much needed global attention to the crises."⁵⁹

4.4 Humanitarian reframing of Somalia: Compassionate politics of interests

⁵⁷ Ali, O J. & Mohamud, M. S. (2012, January 26). *Only Turkey is showing solidarity with Somalia's people*. Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jan/26/un-somalia-crisis>

⁵⁸ Elmi, A. (2017, March 19). *Ending famine in Somalia, the Turkish way*. Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/3/19/ending-famine-in-somalia-the-turkish-way>

⁵⁹ Osman, J. (2017, October 12). *Somalia and Turkey reap rewards from mutually beneficial relationship*. TRT World. <https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/somalia-and-turkey-reap-rewards-from-mutually-beneficial-relationship-11296>

The AKP's mobilizing a compassionate spirit and solidarity with Somalia created a prestige and political capital. The AKP's state-led compassionate response to the Somali crisis, however, came only as a result of Turkey's new foreign policy objectives during the AKP rule. Humanitarian reason, as Fassin (2012, p. 244) argues, encourages collective emotions for helping the other, thereby it legitimizes an interest-driven international intervention in the name of saving lives. Humanitarian sentiments feed "a secular imaginary of a communion" that momentarily imagines an egalitarian ethics while forgetting political calculations in it (Fassin, 2013, p. 37). Humanitarianism's moral call to save lives, therefore, creates a discursive façade that present humanitarian intervention and politics as two separate grounds, that humanitarianism is devoid of self-interested projections. Similar to this effect, the AKP discursively used 2011 humanitarian campaign in Somalia as a disinterested moral act to ease the pain of a suffering nation, while forgetting the foreign policy initiatives that opened up Somalia for Turkey's regional interests.

This does not mean that Turkish actors, diplomats or NGOs, wanted to disguise their long-term interests during the aid campaign. Turkey's high-level official visit to Somalia in 2011 was in deed a shock to many within the crew, and it triggered humanitarian emotions to contribute more. Turkish politicians on the ground did not expect such a magnitude of disaster when they arrived in Mogadishu and visited destitute conditions in refugee camps. After the visit, the AKP MP Bekir Bozdağ shred his Mogadishu notes and the AKP's future plans with the parliament. During his speech at the parliament, Bozdağ vividly illustrated human tragedies in camps, and bullet holes on apartments surrounding the dirty city. The visit was also a chance to know Somalia better, to understand how a society pulled itself into a catastrophe. Bozdağ depicted some episodes from his talks with Somali local authorities about why they do not clean the cities, why they do not use medical equipment properly, or why they do not carry struggling children to hospitals immediately. He repeated what the authorities told him that they did not have proper infrastructure to terminate garbage, no ambulance to carry sick children, or no personnel with merit to use medical equipment. Bozdağ told the parliament that the scope of human calamity was way bigger than what they had expected initially. He also stated his own explanation for the cause of disaster after his observations and discussion with authorities: "The people are in a great distress not because of a lack of opportunities, but because of a great ignorance. ... Everyone is almost equaled in the

lack of opportunity and lack of remedies. That is why, those who witnessed that scene agreed to show more attention and provide more aid[.]” Bozdağ concluded that the total amount of donations had reached to more than 500 million liras, and he underlined the voluminous contribution by the Turkish people: “... all of the assistance came from the treasure of our nation’s hearth, public expenditures are close to nothing, because this is a great assistance based on our nation’s generosity and its sense of helping the oppressed[.]”

The generous tone of foreign policy became a prevalent element in the AKP MPs speeches at the parliament. For the government, Turkey’s disinterested generosity in Somalia was unlike of other powers in the region, who have distributed aid only for their own benefits. AKP MP Çonkar repeated the AKP’s new compassionate politics in Somalia and argued that Turkey was increasing its development aid for humanitarian orientations alone:

Countries interested in Africa seek benefits from its riches rather than providing sustainable solutions for Africa’s problems, and this attitude distinguishes Turkey from others. Turkey is providing humanitarian and technical assistance and we are supporting development programs in line with our humanitarian approach to the continent. Today, we are building our Somalia politics completely on humanitarian grounds.⁶⁰

After the 2011 humanitarian campaign, Turkey left its previous diplomacy actions and discourse behind. On the one hand, the government started to build a bilateral relationship with Somalia diverging from previous multilateral efforts. On the other hand, instead of former security discourse emphasizing national interests and prestige gains, the AKP exclusively centralized a humanitarian discourse stressing Turkey’s disinterested motives to help the oppressed. New compassionate politics toward Somalia, therefore, provided a cover for the initial foreign policy doctrine aiming regional power resources, which in fact opened the route to Somalia. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s “zero problem” strategy became the symbol of the AKP’s realpolitik engagements with Egypt, Syria, and Libya. Davutoğlu’s geopolitical design, therefore, desired a strategic expansion of Turkey’s power hinterland by reactivating its soft power assets and attracting its neighbors for Turkey’s leadership in Middle East (Ozkan, 2014). Despite its expansionist interests, the AKP’s new compassionate politics provided a discursive shift in the formulation of “zero problem” doctrine. Then Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan’s

⁶⁰ TBMM TD, 24.3.53, p. 8. January 16, 2013.

speech at the parliament represented this shift from an interest-driven geopolitical strategy toward a humanitarian discourse cloaking political calculations behind:

“Zero problem” does not mean staying silent and approving without reaction. We showed the highest effort to establish peace, especially within our region, in every platform and in every chance. ... We got mobilized for Africa, for Somalia, Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia. ... We protected the rights of man only for humanitarian values without regarding his religion, color, or oil and diamonds underneath.”⁶¹

The discursive shift from interest-driven security framework to disinterested framing of humanitarian sentiments transformed Turkey’s approach to joint-naval operations against piracy off Somali coasts, which Turkey has taken part since 2009. The new humanitarian framing of Turkey’s foreign policy toward Somalia brought about a discursive rearticulation of multilateral activism and its objectives. The discourse on multilateral action shifted from a strategic engagement for material and prestige gains toward a moral call to help the others. In January 2012, government renewed the motion for extending the maritime mission in the Gulf of Aden, and the Ministry of National Defense İsmet Yılmaz portrayed Turkey’s overseas interests as an extension of its humanitarian responsibilities toward people of Somalia:

[W]e have to support this motion not upon another country’s requests, but upon the request of the Somali people. We have to support it upon the call of the Somali Government, we have to support it in order to keep an international navigation route open. Every person, who owns a little sensitivity to those children in Somalia, has to ensure the security of aid delivered to Somalia. ... Piracy off the coast of Somalia is a cruelty and therefore a threat. It is our humanitarian duty to prevent it. Those who do not feel a pity for Somali children cannot understand the purpose of this resolution.⁶²

The compassionate politics embraced by the government reflected itself in foreign aid flows, as well. However, beside Somalia, there was another factor effecting Turkey’s escalating humanitarian aid flows. After the 2011 campaign, Turkey found itself at the middle of the Arab Spring, and deepening civil war in Syria, which triggered a massive influx of migration toward Turkey. Turkey defended a regime change in Syria and actively involved the internal conflict by militarily supporting anti-government militias near to its borders in Syria. However, facing the ongoing refugee waves toward its borders, the AKP rapidly multiplied humanitarian aid flows to Syria for stability and

⁶¹ TBMM TD, 24.2.31, p. 77. December 8, 2011.

⁶² TBMM TD, 24.2.56, p. 28. January 25, 2012.

security concerns (Altunışık, 2014, p. 340). In this period, continuing relief operations in Somalia on the one hand, and the avalanching refugee crisis on the other, created a magnifying growth in Turkey's humanitarian aid flows that reached to its all-time high.




Figure 4.1: Turkey's Humanitarian aid flows, 2005-2017 (in \$US million).

Source: TİKA, Türkiye Kalkınma Yardımları Raporu, 2017, p. 22.

With the turbulent transformations in the Middle East, Davutoğlu's "zero problem" and "strategic depth" doctrines required a recalibration. Arab Spring revolutionized regional politics and triggered massive refugee waves, and when Turkey's expansionist foreign policy objectives were challenge by the ongoing transformation the AKP policy makers reoriented their regional leadership claims into a moral leadership to protect the oppressed. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu formulated this shift as Turkey's new "humanitarian diplomacy". To Davutoğlu, Turkey's claims for becoming a regional actor in the new international climate depended on "country's human-oriented attitude in crisis zones" (Davutoğlu, 2013, p. 867). In order to achieve success, he continued, Turkey's new diplomacy for power had to speak to humanitarian values and conscience, and Turkey's comprehensive response to the crisis in Somalia with its public and civil organizations reassembled the core of "humanitarian diplomacy", as Davutoğlu argued:

Humanitarian diplomacy is based on a critical equilibrium between conscience and power. In this equation, if a state has conscience but no power, it shows weakness. If it has power but no conscience, it becomes a tyranny. Our idea is for Turkey to be a compassionate and powerful state. One will be compassionate if one's conscience dictates where one should go and to whom one should reach, as can be seen from the examples of our aid to Somalia and Syrian refugees. (Davutoğlu, 2013, p. 866)

Dautoğlu's quick adaptation of "power and conscience" formula into its "strategic depth" doctrine found a support from the AKP cadres. The government's new compassionate discourse legitimized the AKP's active engagement with to the political turmoil in Egypt and Syria during the Arab Spring, as AKP MP Abdullah Çalışkan illustrated in his speech at the parliament: "Turkey is the voice of democratic values in Egypt, justice in Syria, and humanity in Somalia."⁶³ However, Turkey's compassionate politics came only as a result of an expansionist desire for opening up new spheres of economic and political influence, and neither Somalia nor Syria had been a central priority in the AKP's turn to humanitarian discourse and aid politics.

Nevertheless, Turkey's involvement in crisis zones and increasing aid expenditures in the name of humanitarian assistance galvanized the opposition parties' anger. Unlike their former supportive approach to military motions for multilateral missions, parliamentary opposition radically opposed the government's new humanitarianism for its wasting public resources to help others while neglecting the poverty at home. The CHP MP Leven Gök, for example, criticized the government for making a showcase out of its Somalia campaign while not showing the same sympathy with the those having economic hardship in Turkey: "By using Turkish people's money, you are trying to brand yourself on hunger and poverty in Somalia, but why don't you feel the agony of thousands in Ankara, right next to you, who go to bed hungry every day?"⁶⁴

The CHP's continued criticizing the AKP's humanitarian-led involvement in Somalia by addressing the government's inadequate response to public events in Turkey. In October 2011, Turkey's eastern city Van was hit by an earthquake in winter and it killed more than 600 people. A few months after Erdoğan's visit to Somalia and his pledging more assistance, the earthquake in Van and the government's slow response to the disaster raised the CHP's objection against the AKP for discarding national priorities. The CHP MP Refik Yılmaz argued that the government should have cared for Van residents similar to its endeavors in Somalia: "Do you believe that you show the benevolence and care you have offered to the starving people in Somalia to the earthquake victims in Van?"⁶⁵ In a familiar context CHP MP Tanal stood against the government's

⁶³ TBMM TD, 24.4.32, p. 41. December 15, 2013.

⁶⁴ TBMM TD, 22.2.7, p. 18. October 13, 2011.

⁶⁵ TBMM TD, 24.2.19, p. 25. November 16, 2011.

ongoing care for Somalia when a dramatic mine explosion had taken more than 300 lives in Turkey's southern province Soma in 2014. Soma residents were mostly miners, and the explosion inevitable deprived local economy, left people unemployed, and in an economic hardship. To Tanal, the AKP's Somalia campaign was an irresponsible favor to foreigners while the disaster at home urging for a response: "Our President talked about a construction plan in Somalia without solving the victimhood of our people and their state of hunger. Those in Soma have no house. Why are we building houses in Somalia before resolving the victimhood and housing problem of our own people in Soma?"⁶⁶

In addition to CHP's economically based critiques, ultranationalist MHP also turned against the AKP's new politics of aid, but for them the real problem was not economic but ethnic. MHP MPs argued that the government's new politics of aid in Middle East and Africa alienated TİKA from its initial principles for assisting the Turkic states in Central Asia and former Ottoman communities in Eastern Europe. The MHP MP Sinan Oğan argued that TİKA has to be reoriented toward its foundational aims:

TİKA is no longer an institution that supports Turkish republics and kinship communities. ... Today, we see that TİKA primarily operates in Somalia, Palestine, and Africa, whereas it should provide primary support to Meskhetian Turks, Crimean Turks, Iraqi Turkmen, Gagauz Turks, Uyghur Turks, Bulgarian Turks, and Western Thrace Turks. ... We will be in those places too, but we will not forget one thing: Turkish republics, Turkish kinship communities are the founding activity grounds of TİKA, they are its founding philosophy.⁶⁷

The government's opposition to the AKP's closer engagement with Somalia, its compassionate politics to save lives and ameliorate conditions, eventually made Somalia a politically compartmentalized topic in parliamentary disputes. The opposition perceived the government's actions as in contrast to economic and national priorities, while the government defended their moral response and growing development investments in Somalia on the basis of humanitarian sentiments. Yet, Somalia became a foreign policy theme that the opposition parties rejected and the AKP embraced strongly. An emblematic example of this polarization of Turkey's domestic politics on Somalia is the CHP MP Akar's critique. In 2015, Akar appealed to the parliament about his critiques against the AKP's policies on education and increasing the number of universities in Turkey. Because of this unplanned expansion of university numbers, Akar argued, youth

⁶⁶ TBMM TD, 24.5.48, p. 32. January 28, 2015.

⁶⁷ TBMM TD, 24.2.33, pp. 23-24. December 10, 2011.

unemployment in Turkey was simultaneously expanding. President Erdoğan made a statement about this debate by saying that it was a personal problem of graduates, where the state has no responsibility to provide an individual if he or she has a university degree. To the CHP MP Akar, this was such an irresponsible statement for domestic problems that it could only be made by a foreign leader. To Akar, Erdoğan was no longer the President of Turkey but of Somalia:

... we are finding difficulty to find a job for our youth who have graduated from university. Our Prime Minister of the past, and the President of today said: "Do we have to find a job for every university graduate?" He was right, because he was the prime minister of Somalia, not the prime minister of the Republic of Turkey. Only the prime minister of Somalia would not consider himself responsible for finding jobs for children in Turkey.⁶⁸

4.5 Conclusion

Turkey's engagement with Somalia is widely acknowledged as a humanitarian concern. Turkey's official aid agencies and faith-based NGOs argue that Turkey acted with disinterested initiatives in the name of a moral call to save lives in Somalia. However, this chapter illustrates that Turkey's route to Somalia followed its new foreign policy objectives during the successive AKP governments. The AKP's new political economic model brought a rapid export economy and foreign policy activism for increasing Turkey's diplomatic and commercial gains. Especially for its African policy, the AKP assumed new responsibilities in multilateral grounds, organized international summits for partnership and reconciliation, and involved in joint-military missions. Somalia appeared on Turkey's foreign policy agenda in light of these new expansionist interests, but only after 2011 humanitarian aid campaign Somalia's discursive framing within Turkey's foreign policy gained a non-political and unconditional appearance. Erdoğan's visit to Mogadishu in the middle of serious security risks contrasted with the international community's belated response and donor fatigue, and the AKP's Turkey found an opportunity to fortify its benign partner image in Africa.

However, the organization of humanitarian aid necessitated a political power to act against public and economic restraints at home. The AKP's humanitarian-led expansion to Somalia with larger volumes of aid and investment led the opposition to radicalize its objections against the government's expenditures in Somalia. Therefore, the

⁶⁸ TBMM TD, 24.5-79, p. 99. March 18, 2015.

post-2011 transformation in Turkey's politics of aid in Somalia went along with the political compartmentalization of Somali issue in Turkey's domestic politics. The AKP defended Turkey's widening involvement in Somalia in the name of humanitarian responsibilities and a benign leadership to protect the oppressed in Muslim world, while the opposition perceived the government's expenditures as a waste of public resources and jeopardizing Turkey's traditional foreign policy priorities. In sum, Somalia's entry into Turkey's foreign policy discourse and objectives started with a neglect and sarcastic rhetoric element in parliamentary debates, but it became a central topic of Turkey's new foreign policy objectives during the AKP era tying security, humanitarian, and geopolitical interests together. Next chapter analyzes grassroots implications of the AKP's compassionate politics by mobilizing humanitarian and moral sentiments, and it explains the making of Turkey-Somalia development partnership on the ground.

CHAPTER 5

TURKEY'S BENEVOLENT EXPANSION TO SOMALIA: DEVELOPMENT GIFTS AND POWER RESOURCES

Previous chapter analyzed the formation of Turkey's interests in Somalia as a continuation of the AKP government's new foreign policy goals for regional influence. First, the AKP supported Turkey's conservative bourgeoisie and Islamic NGOs to increase its trade and cultural relationships with the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Second, the AKP utilized multilateral conferences and joint-security missions to assume prestige and international responsibilities in regional conflicts. Turkey's route to Somalia appeared as a new destination of these multi-track foreign policy endeavors. Turkey initially pursued its interest in East Africa through multilateral channels and within security framework. The humanitarian crisis in Somalia, however, provided the AKP an opportunity to win an international recognition for its new foreign policy engagements. Shifting from multilateral to bilateral and from security to humanitarian framework, the AKP started a new phase for Turkey's opening to Africa with the Somalia aid campaign in 2011. Turkey's humanitarian intervention to Somalia led to a regional and instrumental change in Turkey's politics of foreign aid. Turkey's official aid flows to Africa tended to increase and the share of humanitarian aid expenditures grew. After the Somali campaign, Turkey's AKP government praised its progressive steps in East Africa as a unique approach to development partnership, and branded its cooperative foreign policy as "humanitarian diplomacy

Turkey's gaining a geostrategic seat in Somalia gathered official development aid, Islamic NGOs, and business groups on the same ground. Turkish actors worked together during projects and mutually supported their activities to overcome security, communication, and coordination problems in a crisis zone. Turkey's state and charity organizations constructed schools and hospitals in Mogadishu, they cleaned streets and built roads in the capital, and business agreements gave Turkish firms opportunities to run airport and seaport. Despite al-Shabaab attacks against Turkish officials and construction firms, Turkey's initial humanitarian intervention quickly turned into a development partnership with bilateral agreements in trade, energy, and security fields. Since 2011, Somalia became a "laboratory", as Özkan (2017) states, for Turkey's candid emergence as a non-traditional donor in Africa.

This chapter argues that in post-state collapse Somalia hit by a dramatic drought disaster, Turkey's humanitarian intervention created an opportunity to win the consent of Somali people while opening up a space for Turkey's market and geostrategic interests. The AKP government mobilized Turkey's official agencies and Islamic NGOs with a compassionate and solidarist discourse, and instrumentalized disinterested acts of giving to achieve Turkey's long-term interests. Therefore, Turkey's emergence as a non-traditional donor in Somalia materialized as a blend of the humanitarian imperative, Islamic ethics of charity, and foreign policy interests which worked together within Turkey's benevolent expansion to Somalia through humanitarian and development aid.

Emerging donors attract an academic attention about their impact on the Southernization of development finance (Mawdsley, 2018), and their use of development partnership to challenge the Northern hegemony on global governance (Kiely, 2016). However, there is still a lack of qualitative knowledge about motivations, ideas, and interests that carry institutions and actors of these states to crisis zones in the name of aid, and their overall impact on the recipient society. To Bergamaschi and Tickner, the investigation of emerging donors requires the assessment of "sociopolitical effects in recipient countries through a dense, context-specific, and interactional account of its inner workings" (2017, p. 10). Similarly, Chin and Quadir underline the lack of "empirical research that compares the intentions and aims of the risings donors, and the outcomes of their interventions" to understand how they reshape power relations at the local and international levels (Chin & Quadir, 2012, p. 495). This chapter aims to fill this gap by analyzing Turkey's politics of aid through the interactional ground of "narratives,

players, and sites via which aid relations are organized and instantiated” (Gould, 2004, p. 11). Turkey took a bold step by entering into Somalia in 2011 unlike other international organizations, but both independent observers and Somali actors argued that Turkey’s peculiar “boots on the ground” approach achieved to win public favor as well as strategic and commercial benefits (Wasuge, 2016).⁶⁹ Some stated that Turkey’s assistance to Somalia became an important example of its new “humanitarian state” that prioritized “acting solely on the needs of beneficiaries without any kind of political motive or self-interests” (Keyman & Sazak, 2014, p. 6). Contrastingly, others argued that Erdoğan’s government selectively approached Somalia “as a launching pad for Turkey’s desired role as a player on the international stage” and Turkey’s main aim was “political and diplomatic capital it receives outside of Somalia and the region” (Cannon, 2016, p. 99).

These explanations represent a contradiction between disinterested and self-interested acts of assistance, but I argue that two logics are compatible with each other if we approach aid as a gift relationality. Humanitarian aid appears as generous givings devoid of political calculations, whereas a strategic partnership instrumentalize development aid for self-seeking investment and patronage benefiting the donor state. Instead of this duality, if we look from a gift perspective – that free gift is impossible since gifts always carry disinterested and self-interested acts of exchange – we see that humanitarian aid and formal economy are not detached in the inter-state context. As anthropologist Swamy’s studies on post-disaster relief and political ecology reveals, humanitarian crises provide opportunities for states to open up new zones for incorporation by “mobilizing and deploying [humanitarian] affect primarily through the act of gift giving, in order to facilitate state plans to rebuild a devastated region” (Swamy, 2017, p. 354). In the case of Turkey’s humanitarian-led intervention to Somalia, official aid and Islamic charity coalesced in the making of development partnership, and Turkey incorporated humanitarian solidarism to legitimize its stay in Somalia and long-term strategic interests in Africa. In sum, we fail to understand Turkey’s wining symbolic, market and geostrategic power in post-state collapse Somalia as an emerging country if we isolate the logic of solidaristic exchange and the logic of capitalist exchange. In order to conceive how two seemingly contradictory logics work together, we need to analyze

⁶⁹ See also Ali, A. (2013, September 30). *Turkish aid in Somalia: the irresistible appeal of boots on the ground*. *Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/sep/30/turkey-aid-somalia-aid-effectiveness>

the making of Turkey's development projects in Somalia and how solidarist motivations legitimized power and patronage in the so-called partnership.

Based on development anthropologist Mosse's approach to ethnography of foreign aid, this chapter analyzes Turkey's politics of aid in Somalia by asking how development projects work and how success is produced in the ground (Mosse, 2005, p. 8). For this, I selectively focused on Turkey's development projects in Somalia's health and education sectors. By that, we can trace the collaboration between official agencies and Islamic NGOs on the ground on the one hand, and we can interpret how Turkish actors perceived the meaning of aid and charity in the Somali context, how motivations and morals informed their conception of solidarity with and patronage over Somalis, on the other. In order to interpret the role of ideas, discourses, and organization in project-making processes, I conducted semi-structured expert interviews with the representatives of TİKA, the Ministry of Health, and the University of Health Sciences. To understand the coordination among Turkish actors and how they shared responsibility and partnership with their Somali counterparts, I made an interview with Turkey's ambassador for Mogadishu Kani Torun, who worked on the ground between 2011-2014 as Ankara's first appointed envoy after the state collapse in Somalia. Considering Turkey's humanitarian and faith-based NGOs, I carried out a series of in-depth interviews with local coordinators and managers of five main humanitarian and faith-based aid organizations, which are Turkey's Red Crescent (Kızılay), İHH Humanitarian Relief Association, Yardımeli Association, Hasene Relief Association, and Beşir Association. I arranged these interviews between February 2020 and March 2021, and except a few, all interviews were conducted online via Zoom because of the COVID-19 lockdown measures.

Two aspects gain importance as to the activities of humanitarian NGOs. These NGOs started their activities in Somalia with humanitarian relief operation but they turned to infrastructure projects to contribute Somalia's development. For most of these NGOs, infrastructure projects they accomplished in Mogadishu were their first and largest overseas experience in the development framework. Another aspect is that there was a collaboration between NGOs and official agencies on the ground, and they mutually supported each other in terms of sharing knowledge and expanding the organizational network of Turkish actors. NGOs needed official agencies for diplomatic and security backup, while official agencies needed NGOs for their experience and social network on

the ground. This mutuality in the making of Turkey's development projects shaped created an interactional networks, and, as development anthropologist Mosse defines (2013, p. 228), these networks carry logics and life-worlds of social actors that shape an aid relationality between partners. Unlike previous major donor's neo-imperial and geopolitical utilization of aid, Turkey's peculiar benevolent expansion through aid is a result of this interactional network between Turkish and Somali actors.

5.1 From humanitarian aid to investment: Is disinterested aid possible?

After his Mogadishu visit, Prime Minister Erdoğan organized a meeting in Istanbul for the coordination of Somalia aid campaign. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, AFAD, and TİKA were invited to the meeting as official agencies. Besides, Turkey's top business groups TÜSİAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association), MÜSİAD (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen), and the Gülenist TUSKON (Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists), as well as multiple aid NGOs Doctors Worldwide (Yeryüzü Doktorları), İHH (İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri), Yardımeli (Helping hand), and the Gülen-affiliated Kimse Yok Mu (Isn't there Anyone to Care) took part in the meeting to discuss sectors to be targeted in Somalia.⁷⁰ Erdoğan, in the meeting, underlined Turkey's distinguishing "boots on the ground" approach in Somalia, while criticizing international actors for being hesitant to intervene: "While many countries were hesitant to go to Somalia and carry out aid activities there for security reasons, we actively stood by Somalia. With this visit, we showed to the whole world that Turkey has mobilized both with its government and aid organizations."⁷¹

Turkey's state and NGO actors started their relief and assistance projects immediately after the August visit. TİKA opened its coordination office in Mogadishu in September, and Turkey opened its embassy in late 2011, when there were only a few operational embassies within Mogadishu that represented Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen, and Sudan.⁷² TİKA started its projects with the help of the Ministry of Health, the General Directorate of Highways (Karayolları Müdürlüğü), the State Hydraulic Works (Devlet Su

⁷⁰ *Başbakan Erdoğan'dan Somali açıklaması.* (2011, August 20). Milliyet.

<https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/basbakan-erdogandan-somali-aciklamasi-1429284>

⁷¹ *Başbakan'dan Somali değerlendirme toplantısı.* (2011, August 20). Beyaz Gazete.

<http://beyazgazete.com/haber/2011/8/20/basbakan-dan-somali-degerlendirme-toplantisi-603077.html>

⁷² *Turkey opens consulate in Somalia.* (2011, November 11). Hürriyet Daily News.

<https://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/turkey-opens-consulate-in-somalia-7237>

İşleri), and the Housing Development Administration (Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı, TOKİ). In cooperation with related state organs, TİKA rehabilitated and constructed more than thirty kilometers city roads with solar paneled streetlights, and it conducted water drilling operations in the capital to maintain access to clean water in operation zones. Turkey's Ministry of Health opened four field hospitals, where more than 350,000 patients were treated by 360 Turkish doctors who worked in rotation until June 2014. In 2015, TOKİ built a 200-bed hospital in Mogadishu, which replaced a previous Italian hospital called Digfer. New research and training hospital carried the name of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and TİKA provided its full medical equipment.⁷³ New 200-bed research and training hospital was agreed to be run jointly for five years by Turkey's Ministry of Health and its Somali counterpart, and Turkey pledged to hand over the hospital at the end of the five-year protocol on mutual agreement, but both parties decided to renew the protocol and joint-administration still continues.

Beside health and urban projects, TİKA ameliorated electronic infrastructure of Mogadishu airport, and provided technical training for Somali civil aviation experts to prepare it for international flights, which later developed into a Civil Aviation Training Center constructed by TİKA in 2015. Turkish Airlines started direct flights from Istanbul to Mogadishu in 2012, which facilitated a connectivity for Somali diaspora, entrepreneurs, and diplomats. Ongoing improvements encouraged Turkish firms, and first in 2013 Favori LLC company took over the administration of the Mogadishu airport from a Dubai based company, and later in 2015 Albayrak Group signed a contract with the Somali Federal Government to operate Mogadishu seaport.⁷⁴ In a few years TİKA projects produced tangible outcomes for locals, and Somalia's then President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud defined these developments as a "change of game in Somalia," and praised TİKA's efforts as follows:

⁷³ TİKA Somalia 2016. (Date of publication is not given). TİKA.

<https://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2016/Prestij%20Eserler/SOMAL%C4%B0%20YEN%C4%B0.pdf>

⁷⁴ There was a bribery allegation against Favori LLC company accusing the firm of transferring money to the Somali President's wife before the management contract, which was rejected by the company later on. See, Zenginli, K. (2013, September 19). *Kardak gazisi askerin Somali Havalimanı'nda rüşvet savaşı*.

Star. <https://www.star.com.tr/ekonomi/kardak-gazisi-askerin-somali-havalimaninda-rusvet-savasi-haber-790587/> For a brief post-civil war history of the Mogadishu international seaport, and Albayrak Group's taking over the management of the facility, see *Albayrak Group to operate Somali's Mogadishu Port*. (2015, August 24). Daily Sabah. <https://www.dailysabah.com/business/2015/08/24/albayrak-group-to-operate-somalis-mogadishu-port>

TİKA is not the agency that puts the most money in Somalia, according to statistics. But in terms of impact on the ground, on the life of ordinary Somalis, I can say there is no other agency we can compare, with the impact of the TİKA projects making on the Somalia people[.]⁷⁵

However, not all the Somalia perceived Turkey's intervention as a progressive step, and according to radical Islamist al-Shabaab it was in contrast to Somalia's interests and incompatible with Islam. As Turkish official and business actors widened their influence and investment, al-Shabaab started organizing terrorist attacks against Turkish firms and embassy building. Despite security risks, Turkish actors continued their projects by improving their network in Somalia. After the al-Shabaab attack, Albayrak company started building a new embassy complex in Mogadishu, being the largest in the world, and TİKA took a symbolic step by undertaking the construction of Somali parliament building, which Erdoğan announced the project as "a gift from Turkish state and nation to Somalia."⁷⁶ In addition, Turkey's Diyanet Foundation and Gülenist Kimse Yok Mu provided scholarships to hundreds of Somalis for high school and university education in Turkey. Beside health, education, and transportation infrastructure projects, Turkey opened a military training camp for the development of Somali National Army.

As the humanitarian intervention turned into a state-making project, Turkey's humanitarian and Islamic charity NGOs contributed to this process by increasing the scope of their activities from relief campaign to sustainable infrastructure projects. Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay) opened a tent city hosting 3000 families and providing daily food service to the internally displaced in Mogadishu. In cooperation with Istanbul Municipality, Kızılay cleaned Mogadishu streets from solid waste, removed small huts and rubble on the main streets, and implanted a bone and chemical waste combustion unit to maintain cleaning services in Mogadishu.⁷⁷ Almost all faith-based NGOs entered the ground with humanitarian relief campaigns, but IHH, Yardımeli, and Hasene quickly evolved their charity into development projects. IHH opened water wells and started an agricultural school in Mogadishu which offered four-week boarding education in seed

⁷⁵ "Interview With Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud" in Somalia 2016. (Date of publication is not given). TİKA.

<https://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2016/Prestij%20Eserler/SOMAL%C4%B0%20YEN%C4%B0.pdf>

⁷⁶ "Global actors and regional countries should support Somalia". (2016, June 3). Presidency of the Republic of Turkey. <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/44264/uluslararasi-aktorler-ve-bolge-ulkeleri-somaliye-destek-olmali>

⁷⁷ *Somali İnsani Yardım Operasyonu, Ekim 2015*. (Date of publication is not given). Türk Kızılayı. https://www.kizilay.org.tr/upload/Dokuman/Dosya/03101983_ekim-2015-somali-insani-yardim-operasyonu.pdf

breeding for subsistence farming. The project evolved into a partnership with Somalia's Zamzam University and it turned into a faculty of agriculture in 2014 with additional branches opened in Baidoa and Jowhar in 2017 and 2019 respectively. Yardımeli Association overcame the emergency period by delivering relief aid, and they decided to improve their help with a sustainable infrastructure project of children's and maternity hospital in Mogadishu. Using charity aids and in cooperation with TİKA, Yardımeli opened the 100-bed hospital in 2016 together with its local NGO partner Menhal Association. Similarly, being two relatively new NGOs, Beşir proceeded with turning their initial relief operation into an orphanage and Germany-based Hasene evolved from charity expenditures to initiating the construction of a marine and fishery school. Both associations took this decision in consultation with Turkey's official channels on the ground. Ambassador Kani Torun mediated between Hasene and Somalia's private City University for the establishment of the marine school, and TİKA helped Beşir in finding a local NGO partner for the construction of the orphanage.

Turkish actors' engagements on the ground for good deeds, the rapid implementation of development projects, and increasing strategic investment made Somalia a prestigious asset for Turkey's appeal to African countries for cooperation. To Erdoğan, Somalia was the prime example of Turkey's approach to development partnership: "Somalia has become the symbol of the relationship we want to establish with our African brothers. With Somalia, the Turkish type of aid model has become accepted in the literature."⁷⁸ Since then, Turkey brands its efforts in Somalia as a peculiar model of development partnership, and TİKA's President Serkan Kayalar defines its characteristics as "unconditional, transparent, fair, win-win based."⁷⁹ Turkey's former Foreign Minister Davutoğlu underscores foreign policy benefits of TİKA and argues "TİKA prepared the way for diplomacy" in Africa:

Turkey is the fastest emerging donor country. [TİKA] is the most important tool for this[.] When you say TİKA in Africa ... first they smile, and then they open all kinds of areas with the thought

⁷⁸ *Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Türk tipi yardım modeli kabul görür hale geldi.* (2016, February 2). Anadolu Ajansı <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-turk-tipi-yardim-modeli-kabul-gorur-hale-geldi/526062>

⁷⁹ Kayalar, S. "Önsöz" in *TİKA 2019 Yılı Performans Programı*. p. 11. (Date of publication is not given). https://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2019/Faaliyet%20Raporu%202018/TİKA_PerformansProgrami2019/TİKA_PerformansProgrami2019SWeb.pdf

that help will come immediately. Because our African brothers and sisters know that we did not go somewhere with any other concerns but with the idea of humanitarian aid.⁸⁰

But, is disinterested aid possible? If it is, how was it organized and transferred in the case of Somalia? If not, what discourses and practices made it feel like that for Turkish actors? Or, if humanitarian aid has been a foreign policy tool, how did “brotherhood” work on the ground and how did partnership serve for Turkey’s long term state interests?

5.1.1 An emerging donor’s making of development: Goals and concerns

When I conducted my interviews, Turkey’s sectoral activities in Somalia were already established and there was not much of a project traffic as before.⁸¹ Umut, TİKA’s chief administrator for Somalia country office in Ankara, told me that there used to be up to six personnel but now only two remained in Ankara and one in the Mogadishu coordination office. Umut previously went to Mogadishu for several times as a TİKA engineer, but in time, he says, the project load has decreased: “At first, there were projects for food aid and opening wells. Now, it is mainly construction work because Somalia is a country without necessary infrastructure.” When I ask Umut, why Turkey provided aid to Somalia, he rejects the simplicity of my question:

2011 visit was not a mere humanitarian aid, it meant to tell the Somali reality to the world. Turkey went there while no others went, and it became a milestone. We have historical ties with Somalia since the Ottoman era, as well, and it is almost a hundred percent Muslim country in need of help. Somalia is a very strategic post, but it is forgotten, it had been made a forgotten place.

His sensitivity on historic and humanitarian causes and showing a tone of solidarity against Somalia’s isolation does not prevent Umut from remaining realist, and he warns me that Somalia is a complicated place, where different actors try to cut the ground from under other’s feet. To him, we should not assume a “pure trust” when talking about diplomacy: “Rather than a pure trust, there are relations based on economic interests. Somali government may trust you, but there are clans and al-Shabaab, which are more influential than the government. Somalia is a country where different countries operate, and they try to block your way.” Seher, another TİKA officer previously worked in the Somalia office, also speaks from the same realist standpoint. Seher echoes TİKA’s official discourse on Turkey’s aid as “nonreciprocal and without any expectations,” but

⁸⁰ For Davutoğlu’s speech at the 5th Ambassadors Conference focusing on “humanitarian diplomacy,” see “TİKA, Türkiyedir”. (2013, January 3). TİKA. https://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/tika_turkiyedir-3545

⁸¹ I gave anonymous names to NGO volunteers and officials working at public institutions.

she immediately adds: “I guess, Turkey was highly emotional at the beginning, China or England is not like us. Somalis were persistent on demanding, as well. They asked for anything without knowing Turkey’s limits.”

Speaking with Umut I returned to my question about Turkey’s intentions to involve in Somalia and whether TİKA’s approach was different than other international actors. Umut answers by addressing “Turkish-type development model” and depicts its characteristics as disinterested and single-handed assistance without intermediaries: “First, Turkey provides aid completely for the benefit of other party without expecting any interest or return, away from commercial concerns, and solely on the basis of its historical and humanitarian ties. Secondly, Turkey undertakes the project by itself and provides financial support to the project owner, not to intermediary institutions.” He stresses non-economic and cultural attachments, but Umut repeats with a diplomatic language that Turkey is not the only option for the Somalis. Yet, he argues, Somali people perceives Turkey different than other foreign actors since Turkey has never been driven by self-interest:

Somalis work with anyone and make demands on everyone. They developed this consciousness coming from colonialism, they question you like will he use me or exploit my resources; you have financed me but what are you going to get in return? That is why they prefer Turkey because there is no such questioning toward Turkey. The projects made there did not aim at any benefit or exploitation. They see this too, and a sincerity has been captured.

TİKA’s Ankara experts embrace a solidarist discourse by emphasizing Turkey’s disinterested aid, but they keep an objective distance against emotional exaggerations about the partnership rhetoric. Despite TİKA officials’ concerns and objections against romantic accounts of “brotherhood,” we understand that Turkey accumulated a social capital in Somalia through TİKA’s and NGOs “boots on the ground” approach. TİKA’s project-making processes take several steps. Large scale project demands may come from Turkey’s or Somalia’s public institutions. When the origin is official channels, projects usually reach directly to TİKA’s Ankara office, and TİKA administrators get in contact with Turkey’s related ministries and state institutions for technical cooperation. For example, a project for building a canned fish factory comes to TİKA. TİKA analyzes the project as to its security, sustainability, and expertise requirements. If the first two is attainable, then TİKA demands engineers and experts from state institutions responsible for related fields in order to build required energy and production infrastructure. TİKA

may also invite Turkish companies for investment and industrial knowledge transfer, and it aims a win-win outcome for Turkish and Somali counterparts. When the project design is finalized, the overall organization of budgeted transfers and actors on the ground is coordinated by TİKA, without letting intermediaries and local NGOs in. At the end, TİKA may provide furnishing or supplementary equipment if the project demands. Fish canning company example was actually one of TİKA's intended but not achieved projects, as Umut told me. TİKA wanted to develop a fish farming unit integrated to canned food industry, and they invited Turkey's well-known company Dardanel; however, Umut states, the lack of energy infrastructure in Somalia overwhelmed their intention: "We thought about a canned fish plant, and even had a meeting with Dardanel, but the energy problem hindered the project. When there is no infrastructure, you cannot go one step further."

Beside large-scale projects initiated by TİKA, any private actor or local NGO can take its project to TİKA's local office in Somalia. In this case, TİKA's Mogadishu coordinator, Kemal, analyzes the project on the basis of above mentioned criteria, and if the project is considered as having a public benefit they transfer the demand to the Ankara office, and the same coordination network is run by TİKA. Along this interactional chain of checks and balances, Seher states that what TİKA considers most is the institutional reliability of the source: "The most important thing here is institutionalism. Can we work with these people? Demanders should not turn out FETO⁸² members afterwards, or the aid money should not pass to Shabaab. So the most important thing is reliability." Similarly Umut remarks the importance of Turkey's organizational network on the ground to check if a project is reliable and feasible. To Umut, what distinguishes TİKA's approach from other international development agencies is field experience and grassroots knowledge about local actors, which enable TİKA to eliminate projects on the basis of public interest:

Our first goal in projects is public interest and impartiality. In some projects coming from Somalis, we can see the opposite. For example, a public officer brings a project but it only benefits his own region or clan. Our task is to eliminate them and to protect the public interest. Here lies the most important feature of TİKA. Other organizations do not leave the airport, they only provide financial support to local NGOs. Since they cannot follow the project in the field, they cannot

⁸² FETÖ, Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü (Fethullah Terrorist Organization). After the failed coup attempt in July 2016 organized by Gülenist cadres within the military, Turkey's official discourse toward the Gülenist organization has shifted toward a terror and security concept. Here, Seher addresses possible attempts of the Gülenists to re-infiltrate state projects after their being purged following the coup attempt.

control where the money is spent. But TİKA makes its projects by itself, it does not offer financial support and walk away.

TİKA's excluding intermediary actors and establishing a monitoring power on project making is partly in contrast to how OECD countries distribute aid to recipient nations. Turkish actors work with local Somali NGOs, but they neither transfer responsibility in project-making nor assign full management rights to Somali intermediaries when projects finish. Somali NGOs assist Turkish actors in field logistics and communication with authorities, but the project-making, construction, and management processes always continue under the gaze of Turkish actors, which is operationally different than Northern NGO practices. Rosalind Eyben, an anthropologist with a career in international development policy, illustrates that development aid follows a chain of intermediary transactions starting from taxpayers to donor state's official aid agencies, then it is distributed to national NGOs for project-making, and finally it is channeled toward the recipient's local NGOs for the application. Eyben defines this complex as the "aid web" which carries not only aid funds but also unequal power relationships from donor to recipient organizations (Eyben, 2006a). Similarly, Stirrat and Henkel (1997) argue that Northern aid to South initially starts with citizen donations in the form of "free gifts." But since aid is transferred through intermediary NGOs, the initially free character of aid turns into a calculated, programmed, and interest-driven transaction to Southern NGOs. The aid for "development gifts," therefore, "becomes entrapped in a system of rules and regulations that are antithetical to the spirit of the free gift" (Stirrat & Henkel, 1997, p. 76).

TİKA has bypassed these intermediary actors in Somalia through collaborating with Turkey's Islamic NGOs. But does this mean that aid is not contaminated by interest and patronage since it is transferred without third party mediation; in other words does Turkey give development aid as a "free gift"? Islamic NGOs are an important soft power instrument for Turkey's foreign policy objectives since their charity and relief operations establish grassroots networks, create local connections, and accumulate first-hand field knowledge about needy groups (Akpınar, 2013, p. 743). Turkey's Islamic NGOs increased their capacity with the AKP legal reforms that de-securitized religious activism and eased religious NGOs' fund raising campaigns (Çelik & İşeri, 2016, p. 439; Tabak, 2015, p. 199). TİKA also provided material and organizational support to NGOs, and held seminars aiming a collaboration between official agencies and NGOs for developing

Turkey's public diplomacy objectives (Çomak, 2011). By these measures, Islamic NGOs developed both their organizational capacity and also their advocacy for a transnational solidarity among Muslims in the world. AKP's neo-Ottoman geopolitical vision and its attempt for a leadership in the Islamic world paralleled the activities of faith-based NGOs, and they mutually supported each other's interests. Therefore, faith-based NGOs made religiously-driven aid a valuable humanitarian asset for Turkey's new expansionist foreign policy (Atalay, 2013, pp. 183-84; Çevik, 2015, p. 121).

Turkey's humanitarian NGOs like Kızılay and Islamic NGOs like IHH, Yardımeli, Hasene and others have contributed to Turkey's presence in Somalia in three ways. First, they expanded TİKA's and other official agencies' organizational network, and became key actors for both bypassing local intermediaries and monitoring infrastructure projects. Second, NGOs did not only mobilize charity givers and volunteers keeping an eye on projects, but their real impact was mobilizing moral and political responsibilities. On the one hand, Islamic NGOs identified aid with the religious duty to give sadaqa and zakat, which informed their conception of development projects as caring for the Muslim community. On the other hand, humanitarian and faith-based NGOs perceived Turkey's intervention to Somalia as a political and civilizational mission, which they identified with the recollected image of Ottoman Empire as a benevolent protector of the Islamic community. Therefore, thirdly, the blend of religious, nationalist, and humanitarian values encouraged NGO volunteers to enter into Somalia despite al-Shabaab attacks and political instabilities. Their moral and political commitment legitimized Turkish NGOs' control and patronage over development projects both for protecting the khayr works in the name of religious duties and for widening the benevolent legacy of Turkey in the name of nationalist attachments.

5.2 Public-NGO collaboration: Expanding the organizational network

NGO volunteers increased the organizational capacity of Turkey's official agencies from the very beginning. Both Turkey's Ambassador Kani Torun and TİKA's long-term Mogadishu coordinator were chosen by the state officials considering their previous NGO background and voluntary work in crisis zones. Before his service as an envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Torun worked in different parts of Africa as a humanitarian aid volunteer for Doctors Worldwide. He stated during our interview that

former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu offered him this position because of his experiences in Africa as an NGO volunteer:

I knew Ahmet Davutoğlu since we were students. He called me when Turkey was about to open the embassy in Mogadishu. He said, this is not a place for career diplomats, they cannot do anything here, we need someone who knows Africa and can work in the field. He offered my name to Mr. Erdogan, and after he considered this as appropriate, they decided to appoint me.

Similar to Ambassador Torun, TİKA's local coordinator Kemal was also an NGO volunteer of İHH before. He was appointed to this position in 2014, but before that he went to Mogadishu for the first time in 2011 as an agricultural engineer volunteer of İHH. By using his annual leaves, he visited Somalia for relief and charity campaigns. But later, when İHH's agricultural school project started, İHH managers advised Kemal to Turkey's Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ, who was then heading the Somalia aid coordination committee, and TİKA decided to recruit Kemal relying on his field experience and dedication to the ongoing aid operation. Kemal tells his personal story as follows:

While discussing the agricultural school project, our İHH coordinator brings this issue to government officials. Bekir Bozdağ says, "The project is very good, but how will you carry it out? We are having difficulty finding personnel to assign there". Our coordinator tells him about me, and Bozdağ approves me; I have been told that he said "We carry those volunteers on the top of our head, we want them" [Oraya gönüllü giden adamı biz başımızda taşırız]. Since I knew the region, TİKA president requested me to become the coordinator in 2014, and this is how my TİKA adventure began. Before, I thought TİKA was an organization renovating mosques and protects artifacts of our ancestors in the Balkans, but I did not know that it was doing social projects like this. Thanks to an opportunity given by the history and the state, I have been carrying out this task for six years.

Public-NGO collaboration proceeded in two ways in Somalia. First, humanitarian and Islamic NGOs became a facilitator for official agencies to enter into the field. NGO volunteers that I conducted interviews defend themselves as more candid to enter into crisis zones than officials. Yardımeli Association volunteer Mert, for example, went to Mogadishu for the construction of maternity hospital's electronic infrastructure and stayed there for eight years with his wife. He states, "NGOs are like fingers, we get into the public." Another Yardımeli volunteer, Ahmet, who was responsible for the construction of hospital building between 2011-2016, argues that there is a difference

between practices of NGO volunteers and that of public officials, but, Mert states, they mutually support each other in operation zones:

NGOs were on the ground before 2011, but with government support the activities have multiplied. In fact, NGOs encouraged public agencies to go into the field, but in the same way, public institutions increased the effectiveness of NGOs with the material and diplomatic support of the state. However, the public and NGO reflexes are not the same. Permission processes in the public sector are slow, whereas NGOs act with the conscience of the society, with a reflex of conscience, so they can act faster.

Ahmet's point on NGO's helping official agencies enter into the field is also valid for the partnership between Kızılay and Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, İBB). Through this public-NGO partnership, Kızılay and İBB conducted several projects in Mogadishu's municipal services by cleaning streets, implementing waste burning and asphalt production units, and building city roads. During our interview, Kızılay's local coordinator Saffet explained me why İBB wanted to get involve in Somalia campaign, and how Kızılay, being a humanitarian NGO, managed a partnership with İBB:

At that time, İBB wanted to contribute Somalia campaign, but it had no field experience. They know how to make an asphalt road, but they have no experience in making it in a conflict zone, that is why they made a partnership with Kızılay. The budget came from İBB and Kızılay implemented the project with its experience in aid campaigns. In this way, we started to work on municipal services and city superstructure.

Secondly, in addition to NGO-led collaborations, Turkey's official agencies initiated NGO's activities, as well. As Turkish officials expanded their operational network and field experience, official agencies such as TİKA or the embassy assisted NGOs in their campaigns and projects in terms of knowledge sharing, introducing local actors, and providing diplomatic support in their contacts with Somali authorities. Two faith-based NGOs Beşir Association and Germany-based Hasene Association, for example, were relatively new actors in the field of humanitarian missions, and Turkey's Somalia campaign in 2011 became their first and largest overseas work. The biggest problem for them was to find a local NGO partner to be able to manage logistics, to identify needy groups, and to decide on the sector to invest their long term project plans. Beşir Association had been operative as a charity organization since 2004 under a different title, but in 2011 they developed the previous association into a humanitarian-oriented NGO. Just after the establishment of Beşir Association, Turkey's Somali

campaign erupted and it caught the attention of charity providers, as the Chair of Beşir Association Fatih states. After the relief campaign, Beşir Association built an orphanage. In our interview, Fatih underlines the impact of high-level state presence in Somalia on gaining confidence to take action despite security risks:

When our association was founded, the Somali crisis emerged and there was a serious interest from the public. In the first days of our establishment, we entered Somalia, which was our biggest operation back then. We were skeptical of the security risks in Somalia, but the presence of our Prime Minister and government institutions gave us a sense of self-confidence. We consulted first to TİKA, and they contributed the most to our activities. We found our local partner through TİKA, as well. Somalia's government structure is very weak and you do not know anyone there, so TİKA and our Embassy helped a lot in terms of information.

Similarly, Germany-based Hasene Association benefited a lot from Turkey's official channels in Somalia. The foundation of Hasene Association goes back to Turkish immigration to Germany in the 1960s, and its social roots rely on the formation of Islamic movement in Europe under Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş (IGMG). IGMG worked on korban and social care projects for Muslim immigrant communities across Europe as a transnational Islamic organization (Ozkan, 2012). In 2010, IGMG cadres established Hasene International Association as a humanitarian relief organization, and since they had historically been in contact with mosques and Muslim community in Europe, they easily transferred their experience in assistance projects into their new Hasene Association, as the Chair of Hasene Mesud narrates during our interview. In our online meeting, Mesud told that Turkey's official aid campaign in August created a grassroots pressure from donors to take action in Somalia, and Hasene decided to join in the humanitarian aid operation though they were a young NGO in 2011. When the emergency phase diminished, they decided to proceed with a sustainable infrastructure project. At that point, Mesud states, biggest help came from Turkey's official channels at that point. Since they loosely knew necessities and actors in Somalia, official advice and consultation shaped their decision to build a marine and fishery school, Mesud states:

When the Somali crisis started, there was a great demand from our donors and we collected a large budget. But the marine school project came after our consultation with TİKA and our Embassy. Ambassador Torun introduced us to City University in Somalia, which started running the school after the construction had finished. In my opinion, NGOs should use state assurance and state diplomacy in such operation zones, whether it is a daily aid provision or a development project, because sometimes you may find yourself unattended [sahipsiz] there.

5.2.1 NGO's moral and political responsibilities: Aid for God and Nation

The mutual collaboration between official agencies and NGO actors increased Turkey's organizational network in Somalia. Since Somalia's state capacity is not adequate to provide public services, education and health sectors are almost completely controlled by the private sources. In order to fund private services, Somali entrepreneurs run or collaborate with local NGOs to collect donations from Somali diaspora and Gulf-based NGOs (Le Sage, 2007). Therefore, Turkish NGO's entrance into the public like "fingers" provided them an advantage of quickly learning demand groups and sectoral actors, which helped Turkish officials' deepening their field knowledge and enlarging their network. However, as noted above, the real impact of humanitarian and faith-based NGOs was not mobilizing a human capacity into operation zones, rather it was mobilizing moral and political responsibilities. Turkish NGOs blended Islamic ethics and humanitarian sentiments in their development projects, and this moral conception ideologically casted aid as disinterested giving devoid of political expectations. At the same time, Turkish NGOs perceived caring for the oppressed as a civilizational duty of Turkey's benevolence, and hence they discursively loaded charity and humanitarian acts with nationalist motivations, which legitimized Turkish actors long-term stay and control on development partnership. The blend of disinterested and self-interested motivations in NGO practices, therefore, is shaped through the blend of religious and nationalist elements in Turkey's politics of aid and partnership. For the empirical investigation of this argument we need to go beyond "partnership" rhetoric and try to interpret how Turkey's Islamic and humanitarian NGOs perceived aid, and how this ideological framework amalgamated with the state's long-term economic and political interests.

Levent from Yardımeli Association provides insight on the conception of Islamic NGOs about Turkey's aid to Somalia, and volunteers' individual role in it. Levent went to Mogadishu for the first time in 2011 as a Yardımeli Association volunteer, and before that he was a graduate of religious high school in Turkey and later studied health management. While working as a laboratory expert in a public university, he joined Yardımeli Association's relief campaign in Somalia's refugee camps by using his annual leaves in 2011 and 2012. When Yardımeli's maternity hospital opened, the association made a protocol with TİKA for registering Levent as an official TİKA personnel responsible for the administrator of the hospital for one year seat. From an NGO volunteer, Levent became a temporary TİKA official, which is in fact a usual protocol

that TİKA offers to NGOs as a part of state-NGO cooperation in aid projects. In our interview, Levent states that humanitarian activities are a part of worship for Allah's mercy, therefore material expectations have no place in aiding according to Levent. He highlights that the religious obligations to God morally guide NGO volunteers working on the ground for protecting zakat and achieving optimum benefit:

Normally I work as a public servant, but at the same time I live among the people and care for the poor, I do it as a worship. Volunteers have this peculiar thing: you look at the issue from such a humanitarian and pure perspective that you leave any prejudice, any financial or promotional expectation behind. If you are a volunteer, you do it for worship. You collect zakat and Allah will hold you accountable for this. Since you are doing this as a worship, you try to achieve maximum results with minimum expense.

The same emphasis on the identification of moral responsibilities and disinterested humanitarianism is also made by Faruk, a volunteer and district manager of Hasene Association living in Austria. Faruk makes periodic visits to Mogadishu in order to check the marine school for its needs and consult with their local partners in Somalia's City University. Despite his years-long engagement with the Somalia campaign, he states that Somalia is not a place that you can spend longer periods, unless you feel responsible for Allah's call to serve for the community:

No financial power can keep you in a place like Somalia for more than a month or two. For this, you must have a love of service, you must seek the consent of Allah [Allah rızası] at the end of the matter. Without volunteerism, no matter what reward you receive, a person would not stay in a place where he is in danger.

At first glance, charity, voluntarism, and interstate development partnership may appear as different grounds, but beyond institutional reductionism what mediates these interactional and inter-organizational transfers is a "global economy of giving", as anthropologist Bornstein defines (2012, p. x). As religious NGOs become a part of development projects, religious framework starts to "inform the way development is planned, conceptualized, motivated and instituted" (Bornstein, 2003, p. 2). Therefore, charity, i.e. sadaqa and zakat, becomes a constitutive element in the conception and making of development aid. When conceived as an outcome of zakat, infrastructure projects are not only developmental units for capacity building, but they are also objects of khayr given to those in-need. Yardımeli's Mert makes this point explicit when he tells the connection between charity, development thinking, and transformation of charity works into a maternity hospital in Somalia:

Turkey is the mother of goodness. We never question people's race or religion but only assist the oppressed. However these activities may be difficult for those who do not dedicate themselves, who have no fear of God. If we are hammering a nail in this hospital, we are doing it for the khayr of this place [buranın hayrı için], for having a sawab, if God permits. What interest do we have here, other than the consent of Allah [Allah rızası]?

Religious responsibilities to care for the oppressed function as a moral framework for NGOs to identify zakat ritual in Islamic ethics of solidarity with infrastructure projects in Turkey-Somalia development partnership. However, Islamic NGOs never isolate doing good in the name of Allah from doing good in the name of the nation. Recollecting Ottoman Empire's legacy as a civilization mission, Turkey's humanitarian and faith-based NGOs ideologically conceives Turkey as a benevolent protector of the oppressed. Religiously motivated NGO aid in Somalia, therefore, is shaped by the blend of humanitarian, Islamic, and nationalist motivations which incorporated moral responsibilities with political ones. The Chair of Hasene Association Mesud's views illustrates this blend. Mesud, during our interview, complaints about one of his observations about African people, that they are not enthusiastic enough to act for themselves unlike Turkish actors trying to help them. Mesud states that this is a "systematic problem," which he addresses colonialism and global aid industry. As he argues, zakat projects aim their breaking through from the mental domination of "the system" and let them restore their excitement for working and development:

I see this in Africa and I feel sad. No one has the excitement of working hard and getting paid [çalışıp alın terinin karşılığını alma heyecanı yok]. Because some others have never let them to experience it. Those people do not have the excitement of making the hard work of a day, either saving an earning or offering it to someone else, because that feeling has not been allowed to live. A man says, "what will happen, anyway" and he neglects working, because he knows that some people will bring something whether he works or not. This is not a personal problem, this is a system problem; the system is based on exploitation, taking their possession, taking away the underground riches. With our zakat projects we want to keep that excitement alive. With the zakat we collect, we distribute electric coffee cars, set up workshops, and provide their equipment. In order to resurrect this excitement we want to build permanent projects there so that what we give today will let them earn tomorrow, and they will feel the pleasure of spending their own earnings with their families and friends, and they will continue developing on that.

Islamic humanitarian NGOs actions rely on a political form of solidarity among fellow believers of Islam, the ummah. With their discourse and practices, Islamic NGOs approach to the problem of development by "Islamizing" the issue by claiming the

religious obligation to protect and serve for the transnational Muslim community (Petersen, 2015, p. 8). Therefore, giving and receiving aid in the context of Islamic humanitarian NGOs have both a moral and a geopolitical meaning (Kaag, 2007, p. 99). During my interviews, I did not come across with an explicit discursive reference to the ummah. However, the solidarist mindset reveals itself through anti-Western discourse. When Turkish actors differentiate their endeavors from Western politics of aid they discursively legitimize their investments on the ground through a critique of the dominant aid industry and its historical ties to European colonialism. Mesud's above emphasis on the "systemic problem," for example, represents how he conceives zakat as solution for ameliorating the damage of decades long European colonialism on the Somalis' self-confidence. Therefore, to Mesud, aid does not only aim the development of human capacity, but it is also a treatment for the injuries imposed on Somalis by former Western powers, which discursively casts aid practice as a political responsibility to care for the oppressed. From the same perspective, İHH manager and volunteer Özgür describes the main goal of their agricultural school project as mental transformation aiming to rehabilitate Somalis' relationship with the land:

Our main goal in the agricultural school project was to reconcile farmers for reengaging with the soil, who had turned their back on agriculture after the civil war. We aimed to break this "there is nothing to do" mentality. It was ingrained in peoples' memories during the colonial period. With our project slogan "There is a solution despite everything," our aim was to revive hope.

İHH's agricultural school project started in cooperation with TİKA as a four-week boarding education for selected students. İHH opened water wells to support the project, and the target was to widen small-scale agricultural production through knowledge transfer and the usage of wells in peripheral regions for subsistence farming. Additionally, İHH provided scholarships to Somali students and encouraged them for a higher education in Turkey in related agricultural university programs. Rather than periodic food aid, the İHH aimed to establish a sustainable project that aimed to fight against future drought and hunger crises on the one hand, and to cultivate experts and engineers for the country's future agricultural policies. The initial plan achieved a level of success, too; the school evolved into a faculty of agriculture run by Somalia's private Zamzam University, and hence the project advanced its teaching capacity with academic and experimental studies. However, former İHH volunteer and later TİKA coordinator Kemal tells the hardship they faced at the beginning of the project. He states that their approach to development aid contradicted with the global aid industry, which is based on the delivery

of daily consumption items rather than sustainable production plans. According to Kemal, since Somali NGOs are also adapted to work within this aid industry, they could not comprehend IHH's long-term education and sustainable production design:

Aid operations across Africa continue with the concept of distributing relief items, which relies on the concept of purchase and sale. Somali partners are accustomed to this, too. They buy goods with the aid money from local markets and distribute it to needy groups. Then, NGOs took some images and share it on the social media, and when the product is consumed nothing changes afterwards. This concept must change, and projects based on education and production needs to be improved. That is why, when we come up with a different concept, we could not convince our Somali partners, they could not understand how agricultural education would be and what we should do together. This is because of the way the system works.

Turkish NGOs critique of the aid industry and its systematic damage on Somalis sometimes take more explicit forms addressing European imperialism. According to Yardimeli coordinator Ahmet, Turkey's benevolent approach differs from how the Western agencies use aid money for political interests in Somalia: "Turkey does not aim to dominate Somalia like Western countries do. Today, if Turkey uses aid funds to steer politics, we oppose this, too, we are not imperialists. Turkey is the country of compassionate and conscientious people." Turkish official and NGO aid agencies perceive their aid and development investment as a disinterested and morally engaged transfer. The ideological conception of aid in terms of moral and political responsibilities provide a justification for Turkey's economic and strategic gains in Somalia. Since the prime motive is disinterested unlike Western agencies, Turkish actors argue, any material or immaterial gain is not a one-way benefit but a return of gratitude. Therefore, the moral and political discourse conceals the interest factor by legitimizing Turkey's strategic investments as a return gift of partnership offered by Somalis in the form of gratitude and trust to Turkish actors. Kızılay coordinator Saffet's interpretation of the relation between aid and investment gives us the insight to understand how the gift logic embedded in humanitarian aid legitimizes the co-existence of the self-interested economic exchange and disinterested solidarist exchange:

We do this from a humanitarian perspective. You invest in something and you receive something else in return. But we made operations in such regions that no other Turk will visit there again. Our companies are now operating the airport and seaport, but believe me, this is not the return of such investment. If you think what British and Italians receive for their investment, Turkey's gain is nothing compared to that. What Turkey gains here is actually spiritual [manevi] because we gain the people's sympathy. People say, Turks did this for us, they did it without any expectation. There

emerges a consciousness among the people, which you cannot buy with money. Maybe it does not contribute materially, but thanks to our spiritual gain, people trust us and they hand over anything to us with a peace of mind. If those companies can do business there today, it is because of the work done by Kızılay.

5.3 Benevolent expansion through development gifts: “Keeping-while-giving”

As noted above Turkey expanded its organizational network in Somalia by public-NGO cooperation on the ground. Two factors played an important role in the widening of Turkey’s presence in Somalia. First, Turkish NGO volunteers entered into crisis zones and increased their field experience by establishing direct contacts with needy groups and sectoral actors, which accumulated a logistical resource for Turkey’s official and NGO actors to bypass local intermediaries. Second, Turkey’s official agencies incorporated the spirit of voluntarism, which is associated with NGO activism. The fact that Turkey’s ambassador and TİKA’s coordinator have come from an NGO background is only one dimension of the role of voluntarism in Turkey’s politics of aid. More than that, voluntarism made its biggest impact on Turkey’s permanent stay in Somalia through carrying religious and nationalist responsibilities. Charity codes and nostalgic attachments to Turkey’s benevolent heritage put project-making process in a religious and nationalist framework. What is crucial here is that the moral and political responsibilities to care for the needy concealed Turkey’s long-term business and strategic investments within a benevolent discourse. This discourse legitimized Turkish actors’ control and patronage over development projects. Therefore, Turkey gave Somalia infrastructure projects as development gifts by simultaneously rendering them as inalienable possessions in order to secure their moral and political claims.

NGO-led infrastructure projects exemplify this paradoxical logic in inter-state exchange. Levent argues that Yardımeli Association’s hospital was in fact given as a “gift to Somali people,” but, he adds, because of Somalia’s self-destructive clan politics the hospital has to be kept in Turkish hands, or it will perish quickly due to divisive clan conflict over resources. Plus, Levent continues, the hospital project is an outcome of charity donations, and they have a responsibility to protect it to be accountable for God’s judgement on their good deeds. For the benefit of Somalis and to fulfill religious obligations, Turkey has a duty to protect the gift of maternity hospital given to Somalis from Somalis themselves; in other words, they should never fully receive the gift given to them. To my question on how Turkish and Somali actors cooperate in the project

making and how they share responsibility in the management, Levent tells his concerns about the Somalis' potential danger to Turkey's infrastructure projects, and defends to keep them inside Turkish hands:

We built this hospital as a gift to serve the people of Somalia. We had a five-year management protocol with our local NGO partner and we will renew it depending on their performance. We have regular consultation meetings with our stakeholders, but Turks make the last decision. In such an environment as Somalia, transferring the entire administration to the Somalis means ruining the whole investment. If you leave this place to the Somalis before solving the clan problem, you can no longer call it a Turkish institution, but a construction once built by the Turks. The hospital becomes Somali with everything it has, his administration becomes tribal, and in two years it completely turns into the opposite of what it is right now. Therefore, these investments require observation, we should not leave them by saying "this is our grant to you." These are the things we did with zakat and sadaqa given by the people. If the zakat has turned into something permanent, it is not as simple as saying I have distributed my alms and returned, otherwise it would be a waste [yazık olur].

Philosopher Gerald Moore states that "the motive for [gift] exchange is not internal to the objects exchanged, but a product of the social imposition of obligation" (2011, p. 5), and Levent's interpretation of religious charity reveals a moral regime regulating his idea of aid practice as a gift giving. The development gift, either the maternity hospital or others, represents the social obligations attached to it, that is why Levent underlines their moral duty to protect it from detrimental effects, namely Somalia's internal political instabilities, for keeping its value as a khayr work. Given objects also represent the identity of the giver that is imbursed within infrastructure projects. Mert from Yardımeli repeats Levent's thoughts on protecting development projects. He states that if Turkey abandons development projects before the Somalis develop themselves up to a level, that would not only ruin khayr works but also make Turkey no different than what Europeans do, i.e. give and leave:

We must stand at the head of these institutions unless educated Somalis return and take over them, otherwise all investments will disappear. Europeans give the money without controlling it, whereas for us it is essential to protect these projects as the deposit of charity givers [hayır sahipleri]. If we do not take the aid to the Somalis by ourselves, we will be no different than the Europeans.

Similarly, Mesut from Hasene Association state that they have no plan to transfer the marine school either to the Somalis or Turkish state, since the project is a charity work and carries the moral responsibility to protect it in the name of Allah: "We do not think

to transfer this project neither to Turkish nor to Somali authorities since it is a deposit to us by our donors. This is how we perceive a charity [hayır] institutions. We do not want to be embarrassed in front of our donors, and we want to rightfully give our account to Allah.”

As noted above, Stirrat and Henkel’s (1997) argued about “development gifts” that they start their journey as “free gifts” by citizen donations, but when it is entrapped by calculative transactions from Northern to Southern NGOs the disinterested character is lost since intermediaries create asymmetrical relationships and patronage. However, Turkey’s unmediated development aid to Somalia through official and NGO agencies on the ground similar effects, as well. Therefore the patronage is not about the North-South paradigm, but it is about the ideological and practical components of the relationship that donor and receiver parties generate during the making of aid politics. The unequal power relationship we are discussing here is not related to the power of technical knowledge that dominates non-Western societies through a development discourse, as critical development studies mostly investigates (Ferguson, 1994b; Escobar, 1995), but it is a patronage in the name of charity and solidarity – a benevolent power enforcing its control over infrastructure projects for fulfilling Islamic obligations of charity ethics as well as for protecting the recipient from its self-destructive dynamics.

Aid projects create interrelational grounds for multiple interests, and the solidarist exchange embedded in humanitarian motivations cloaks power asymmetries going around these encounters between Somali and Turkish actors. The development gift given to the Somalis creates a relationship of control in the name of religious and political attachments, and hence it is desired to be kept inalienable under the control of Turkish agencies. In other words, Turkey gives development gifts to Somalia, but not really gives them. Anthropologist Anette Weiner points out this paradox in her seminal work “Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-While-Giving” (1992). Weiner’s account for the role of “inalienable possessions” in social exchange systems is illuminative for our debate here. Weiner defines the desire to keep some things out of exchange as follow: “Some things, like most commodities, are easy to give. But there are other possessions that are imbued with the intrinsic and ineffable identities of their owners which are not easy to give away” (Weiner, 1992, p. 6). Weiner interprets that actors want to keep these “inalienable possessions” out of the gift cycle since they represent the power and the way it is distributed in a given society.

Inalienable possessions are embedded with culturally authenticating ideologies associated with mana, ancestors and gods that give shape and drive to political processes. They are imbued with history composed of their own exceptional trajectories and the beliefs and stories that surround their existence. These encompassing ideologies are active forces that both validate the absolute value of inalienable possessions and verify the difference among individuals who own these coveted objects. (1992, p. 150)

For our example, Weiner's interpretation of "encompassing ideologies" shaping the force of inalienable possessions are moral and political responsibilities that Turkey's official and NGO actors feel both for Somalis and also for their own identities. That is why, Turkish aid actors want to keep infrastructure investments in Turkish hands away from Somalia's potentially harmful local dynamics, and they desire to do it without ceasing to be like Europeans, who built the abusive "aid system" for their own interests. This attempt to keep infrastructure projects as "inalienable possessions" under their control, in the end, endures Turkey's organizational and interactional network in Somalia as a permanent stay, while turning development gifts into strategic investments for long term interests – moral, political, as well as economic. Therefore, the solidarist framing of development is always open to self-interested framing of partnership. Turkey's hospital diplomacy is a good example of this logic. TİKA and TOKİ built Mogadishu's largest hospital, and Turkey's Ministry of Health runs the institutions in cooperation with their Somali counterpart. Both parties recently agreed to renew previous five-year partnership protocol on mutual agreement. When terminated, Turkey's and Somalia's official authorities will decide again either to continue with joint-administration or Turkey will transfer the hospital to the Somalis. I conducted an interview with the Deputy Director of the Ministry of Health's Directorate of Foreign Affairs, Irfan, in order listen to why Turkey built a hospital in Somalia, how Turkish and Somali doctors work together, and how the hospital contributed to Turkey's and Somalia's expectations from the development partnership. Irfan explains me that in line with Turkey's "humanitarian and entrepreneurial foreign policy" TİKA builds hospitals, and the Ministry of Health provides personnel and expertise for the management of them. According to Irfan, these hospitals represent Turkey's humanitarian touch: "What distinguishes Turkey from others is its entrepreneurial and humanitarian foreign policy. When we go to different parts of the world, we see that the human side of our work outweighs." But Irfan equally makes explicit the entrepreneurial objectives of the humanitarian side, and states that experts trained in Mogadishu hospital are bridging commercial activities by branding Turkish

medical products: “When a Turkish doctor explains his own treatment method in these hospitals, he also advertises medicines and medical materials produced in Turkey. When Somali trainees transfer to another hospital, they want to use those products that they see in the Turkish hospital.”

Speaking of the interstate level, humanitarian motivations are never isolated from interest-driven investments. Somalia relief campaign provided this opportunity to Turkey to pursue its long-term state interests in trade and diplomatic influence by mobilizing a humanitarian sentiment to intervene in the name of caring for the oppressed. Turkey’s emotional, discursive, and organizational framework merging public, NGO, and business actors euphemize economic interests as an auxiliary return, as a bonus, of sacrifices made in the name of humanitarian endeavors. I would like to conclude this chapter by turning back to İHH’s agricultural school project. As noted above, the agricultural project started in cooperation with TİKA and later İHH proceeded with its local partner, Zamzam Foundation, for turning the project into a faculty of agriculture at the university level. As the number of faculties increased with two additional branches, the project reached to a level of sustainability. Together with students graduating from Turkey, İHH’s small infrastructure plan evolved into long-term investment to educate future agricultural engineers and maybe policy-makers. İHH’s local volunteer Reşat, who is an agricultural engineer giving lectures at the faculty, states that these projects are in favor of Turkey, too, since Turkey is dependent on agricultural imports and Somalia is a rich potential for investment in crops production. He tells me during our interview that they had a contact with Turkey’s Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, but the officials were more interested in Sudan at that time rather than Somalia, according to Reşat. Nevertheless, Reşat argues that Turkish companies should take risks to enter and invest in Somalia, or others will reap its benefits: “We cannot bring Turkish companies here because of security problems, but they should take risks. We need to find partners here and sell Turkish goods, agriculture has a tremendous potential here. If Turkey does not take advantage of this, ten years later the Italians will continue as they did before.”

Despite the lack of attention from official channels, Reşat personally worked on organizing an international agricultural fair in order to bring Turkish and Somali entrepreneurs together and advertise equipment and seeds produced in Turkey. He defined their voluntary works in Somalia as an “ignitor” for encouraging young engineers to develop agriculture in their country, similar to İHH manager Özgür’s emphasis on

mental transformation and reviving hope among farmers. For Reşat, the agricultural fair would be a chance for young faculty students to reach out business actors in the sector, and it would provide necessary resources to develop Somalia's agricultural infrastructure. He managed to organize the event, invited Turkish firms and Somalia's big agrarian investor families, but ten days before the fair Italian entrepreneurs set another symposium gathering credit providers and Somalia's big producers together. For Reşat, obviously this was an upsetting event since it hindered his efforts and, in a way, stealth the attention that Turkish fair would create ten days later. In the end, the fair started but it did not meet Reşat's initial expectations. This small event is actually a blueprint of motivations and expectations of Turkish actors involved in the Turkey-Somalia relationship. Reşat's voluntary spirit to "ignite" a spirit among young Somalis for agricultural production and development, his individual efforts to open Somalia's lucrative agrarian market to Turkey, and his nationalist aspirations to protect Turkish investors from European intruders actually portray how disinterested and self-interest blend, the gift logic embedded in aid, shape the making of development projects in the context of Turkey-Somalia development partnership. Reşat narrates the story of the agriculture fair as follows:

In order not to lose this market, Italians held a symposium ten days before our fair, bankers and statesmen came there, and they made some loan offers. Some of the Somalis said, "The Italians are giving these, what are you offering us?" and they wanted to make a bargain. Of course, we said what we had to say: "We don't give anything, we give our brotherhood. If you want you can take it, if you don't want, the Italians are there to welcome you." Such things will inevitably happen, we are too much for certain people here. We are coming to a market that others once owned, who had made business here. Now we are coming and we are giving a lot of things without expecting anything in return. You cannot see such a thing in Europe, they always take the reward even of a single aid. There is no such thing in Turkey's aid, it is entirely based on brotherhood. Of course, it is difficult both for the West and the world to understand this. Now Somalia has seen this, and anyone having a problem but not a solution comes to our door, because they know that Turkey is the only country that will help them without expecting anything in return. They know that Turkey will find a solution without making any economic calculation.

Erdem: But it seems like a dependency, isn't it? Or it seems like Turkey is assigned too much of a responsibility.

Reşat: We do these things voluntarily. We stand together not only with the Somalis but also with all the oppressed around the world. It is not a problem, Alhamdulillah we have this power.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the making of Turkey's politics of aid on the ground by analyzing the meaning world and interaction of Turkish official and NGO actors. Turkey's official discourse brands its activities in Somalia as a peculiar model of development, which is based on disinterested, unconditional, and humanitarian-oriented assistance. TİKA's official personnel working in Somalia country office parallel this official rhetoric, but they take a distance against romantic "brotherhood" rhetoric. Yet, when we analyze ideals, values, and expectations of actors' on the ground, we see the blend of disinterested and interested motives in the making of development projects. First, NGO volunteers enter the ground and provide assistance by humanitarian and religious motives, yet their close collaboration with official agencies expand Turkey's organizational network in Somalia. Turkish actors share knowledge, regions, and local actors, and official and NGO actors mutually support each other to maintain Turkey's activities and protect infrastructure projects. Second, humanitarian and religious NGOs imbure moral and political responsibilities into development projects, that they are freely given to the Somalis in the name of charity yet they had to be protected by the Turks. This "keeping-while-giving," as Weiner formulates, makes development gifts as inalienable possessions that Turkish actors keep at hand in the name of protecting the Somalis' long term interests. Therefore, on the one hand expanding their organizational and interactional network on the ground, and on the other hand excluding Somali counterparts to take over infrastructure projects, Turkey sustains a long-term presence in Somalia. Turkish actors moral and political responsibilities to protect khayr works in the name of God, and secure development projects from the Somalis' self-destructive clannism serves as a benevolent expansion that gives development gifts, but not really gives them. This logic legitimizes Turkey's long term stay on the one hand, and justifies the economic returns of humanitarian sentiments. Next chapter analyzes how Somali actors perceive Turkey's aid and investment initiatives in their country.

CHAPTER 6

SOMALI AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP: EXPERIENCES, EXPECTATIONS, CRITIQUES

Turkey's Africa policy under the AKP rule seeks to expand its diplomatic, commercial, cultural, and military influence on the continent. Somalia is a special case for Turkey considering its turning into a state-making project. The multidimensional relationship between Turkey and Somalia has been a matter of national and international attention since 2011. The relationship left a decade behind and it went through different phases and sectoral interests, yet the question of "What is Turkey doing in Somalia?" is still valid. Instead of shorthand references to soft power or humanitarian diplomacy, we need to comprehend the impact of bilateral agreements on human mobility, relational networks, and reciprocal exchanges, both material and symbolic, between two countries. The question of what Turkey is doing in Somalia is, therefore, related to what the fragmented Somali community wants to do with Turkey. Therefore, if we want to understand the interactional space created by the development relationship, we need to consider how the transnational Somali community responds to Turkey's strategic involvement in their country. In the previous chapters, I discussed how Somalia entered into Turkey's foreign policy objectives during the AKP rule, and how Turkey organized and practiced its aid politics on the ground. This chapter analyzes the Somali agency within the partnership in light of their experiences, expectations, and critiques.

I focus on Turkey's scholarship programs as the main cause behind the Somali student mobilization toward Turkey since 2011 in order to illustrate the flow of peoples

and ideas between Turkey, Somalia, and the Somali diaspora living in Europe and Northern America. Student mobility started during the 2011 humanitarian aid campaign first by the Gülenist associations and then by Diyanet Foundation. First scholarship programs were based on collective selection but later in 2012 scholarship application and review processes were standardized by Turkey's official international scholarship program, Turkey Scholarship (Türkiye Bursları, organized by the Presidency For Turks Abroad And Related Communities [Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, YTB]).

The effect of different scholarship programs on the migration experiences of students provides us an insight to interpret identity formation processes. Scholarship students multiplied and early graduates initiated small businesses, cafes, and consultation offices, which encouraged their relatives living in the diaspora to come to Turkey for their children's education or investment interests. Within this interrelational network reaching diasporic ties, this chapter answer a series of questions. How did scholarship programs shape students' migration experiences, what expectations and hopes they triggered for the young Somalis who suddenly found themselves in Turkey? Why has Turkey become an attractive spot for the Somali youth? What is the impact of scholarship programs on the formation of a Somali cultural identity in Turkey? How do students relate to Somali diaspora in Europe and North America, and why Turkey is attractive for them? How does the large and fragmented transnational Somali community perceive Turkey's intervention to Somalia, and how it has changed in time?

I will discuss these questions by analyzing identity formation, diaspora activism, and their impact on the Somalis' positive and negative judgements about Turkey's actions in Somalia. But before the analysis, the first question needs to be asked is whether we can define the Somalis in Turkey as a diaspora? In simple terms, diaspora begins when citizens of a country leave their homeland voluntarily or by force, and spread to different parts of the world. Although it has traditionally been identified with the historical experiences and inter-geographical movements of Jewish and African communities, the term began to be used as a metaphorical category to describe the migration journey of many ethnic, religious, and cultural groups especially after the second half of the 20th century (Safran, 1991). During the debates along the 1990s about the raising globalization and declining nation-state, scholars perceived diaspora as a fruitful concept for examining transnational cultural formations and hybrid identities. However, critical writers claimed

that the increasingly flexible usage of the term eroded the historical and categorical ground of the concept of diaspora (Tölölyan, 1996: 8). Nevertheless, the difference of diaspora is that it functions as a community that aspires a connection to the homeland through identity protection mechanisms (Brah, 1996, pp. 179-181). Diaspora formation, diasporic consciousness, and diaspora activism are indicators of an effort to maintain ties with the homeland left behind, and they function as mechanisms of protecting the identity boundaries of the diasporic community.

Robin Cohen states that for a migrant group to form a diaspora it must imagine itself as a transnational community, having a collectivity in mobility and organization, which shapes a “diasporic consciousness” (Cohen, 2009: 13). This social organization builds diasporic spaces. Diasporic ties and spaces offer solidarity networks and also they can become the focus of diplomatic and economic activities aiming to influence the country left behind (Bruneau, 2010: 37; Dwyer, 2010: 89-90). With the 2000s, the World Bank and OECD countries realized the transformative effects of diaspora organizations in the economic, cultural and political fields and added the diaspora element to their migration control and international development policies. This new awareness has begun to attach special importance to the diaspora-development nexus by considering transfers from the diaspora to the homeland in the form of remittances, human capital, and ideas and values (Faist, 2007: 21-22). To sum up, the concept of diaspora is related to the transnational formation of cultural identities on the one hand, and it potentially effects development processes of the country of origin.

In this context, I am not claiming that Somali students constitute a diaspora in Turkey, because Turkey is a temporary residential spot for them, where they neither have permanent residence permits nor full citizenship rights. Despite this temporality, there are three factors that make Turkey a diasporic post for the problem of identity formation and development. First, student mobilization toward Turkey has continued since 2011 aid campaign, and it created organizational outcomes effecting Somalia’s internal dynamics. The Somalis formed student clubs and representative organizations in Turkey’s various cities and in Mogadishu, and graduates started to take active roles in Somali politics at the level of ministries. Second, educational, touristic, and business interests of the Somali diaspora made Turkey a meeting point for the Somalis living in different parts of the

world. Third, Turkey initiated the formation of Global Somali Diaspora (GSD) in Istanbul in 2014, as an organization representing the Somalis living in different countries.⁸³

This chapter focuses on the effects of Turkey's different scholarship programs, deployed after the 2011 humanitarian intervention, on Somali student migration from the perspective of identity formation, diasporic networks, and development. On the one hand, I examine migration experiences and their effects on Somali cultural identity in Turkey, on the other hand, I evaluate new trends in the mobility of transnational Somali diaspora initiated by Somali scholarship students.

In the first part, I examine scholarship programs, students' migration experiences, and their impact on the formation of Somali cultural identity in Turkey. In my fieldwork, I conducted in-depth interviews with 10 female and 43 male Somalis, including graduates and active students, both with and without scholarship, living in different cities of Turkey. I started my interviews in Summer 2020, and most of them were online meetings due to the pandemic restrictions. Interviews with firstcomer students, who came in 2011, became life histories, and they provided qualitative data not only on migration stories but also on students' emotional and intellectual transformations. With the change in scholarship policies, student groups and their expectations have also changed. In 2011-12, the first scholarships were distributed by Gülenist organizations and Turkey's Diyanet Vakfi, which mostly provided scholarship in groups and without strict measures. In the second phase, YTB scholarships standardized Turkey's bursary policy, and individual application and review processes made student preferences more decisive, unlike the first group. In the third phase, students coming from diaspora became more prevalent. In recent years, Somali families living in Europe and North America send their children to Turkey for elementary education due to religious and cultural reasons. In the third part, I examine the causes behind this tendency, while discussing the formation of diasporic networks in Turkey. Lastly, I consider economic and social aspects of partnership that shapes the Somali community's positive and negative judgements about Turkey's strategic investments.

6.1 Somali students in Turkey: An unexpected journey

⁸³ See, Global Somali Diaspora Conference Opens in Istanbul. (2014, June 20). Hiraan Online. https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2014/Jun/55287/global_somali_diaspora_conference_opens_in_istanbul.aspx; Somali Global Diaspora holds conference in Istanbul. (2019, June 19). Daily Sabah. <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2019/06/19/somali-global-diaspora-holds-conference-in-istanbul>

Turkey's first scholarship program took place during the 2011 aid campaign. Gülen affiliated Kimse Yok Mu association gave scholarship to 309 students, and they opened a high school in the capital Mogadishu.⁸⁴ A few months later, in February 2012, Diyanet Foundation, which is affiliated to the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey, selected a second group students, and it provided 90 scholarships for medical vocational high schools, 60 students for maritime and agriculture vocational high schools, and 100 for religious high school, which is called "imam hatip" in Turkey.⁸⁵ In the same year, Turkey's official scholarship program came into effect, and the application and qualification processes were moved from collective to individual procedures. In 2012, Turkey gave scholarship to 3914 international students from various countries, and Somalia was the country that benefited the most from Turkey's official scholarship program with 301 students.⁸⁶ In 2013, the number of Somalia students enrolled in Turkey's universities was 638, and in 2020 it reached to 8141.⁸⁷ First group of students established the Somali Association of Turkish Graduates in Mogadishu in 2016 to maintain interactions among alumni and candidate students, as well as to spread their network in economic and political affairs. Somali alumni and Turkish diplomats come together regularly in Turkey's Mogadishu embassy and work to increase cooperation for mutual benefits.⁸⁸ One of the prime examples of this chain of interactions is the Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Somalia Abdulkadir Muhammed Nur, who was a finished Ankara University's Faculty of Political Science with Turkey Scholarship, and came to this seat after his service as the Minister of Justice.

⁸⁴ *Somalili öğrenciler 'hayalleri için' Türkiye'de.* (2011, September 28). Haber Türk.

<https://www.haberturk.com/yasam/haber/673789-somalili-ogrenciler-hayalleri-icin-turkiyede>

⁸⁵ *Somali'nin 'beyaz melekleri' Türkiye'de yetişiyor.* (2015, July 14). Haber Türk.

<https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1115773-somalinin-beyaz-melekleri-turkiyede-yetisiyor>

⁸⁶ Öztürk, A. (2012, November 13). *En fazla burs Somali'ye.* Anadolu Ajansı.

<https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/egitim/en-fazla-burs-somaliye/309952>

⁸⁷ For the official source of student numbers, see footnote 89.

⁸⁸ *Somali Türkiye Mezunları Derneği TİKA Tarafından Yenilendi.* (2018, July 16). TİKA.

https://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/somali_turkiye_mezunlari_dernegi_tika_tarafindan_yenilendi-45618




Figure 6.1: Number of Somali students in state and private universities, 2013-2020⁸⁹

In contrast to current state of institutionalized connections, the weakness of diplomatic relations made visa, admission, and document accreditation processes difficult for Somali students before 2011. Turkey had been a hotpot for Somali migrants on their way to Europe at that time, and Kumkapı district in Istanbul was known as “Somali neighborhood.”⁹⁰ However, we cannot talk about a student mobilization similar to Somali immigrants. Abdirahim, who came to Turkey in 2014 for a master’s degree, sheds light on students’ hardship to go abroad, and how Turkey’s 2011 intervention became a breaking point:

It was very difficult for us to go abroad for educational purposes. Since our education system has collapsed in the civil war, nobody recognized us. I applied to Özyeğin University in 2009, and they replied, “we cannot accept you for we do not have diplomatic relations there.” In other words, even the education system in Turkey did not recognize us back then. Of course, there were Somali refugees, but that was not as much as students who came later on.

Beside the weakness of diplomatic relations, cultural familiarity between two countries was also quite limited. Somali students had a vague opinion about Turkey from Islamic history courses in high school, where students read general definitions about the Ottoman Empire and the caliphate. Also, Turkish TV series with Arabic voice-over

⁸⁹ Data for the distribution of international students as to nationality and university types are gathered from Yükseköğretim Kurulu (YÖK, the Council of Higher Education) online annual statistics. See, Higher Education Information Management System, <https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/>

⁹⁰ See, Siebert, S. (2011, September 5). *On Somalia Street, Istanbul, African migrants seek a new life*. The National News. <https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/europe/on-somalia-street-istanbul-african-migrants-seek-a-new-life-1.395710>; Kireklo, G. (2011, May 19) *Kumkapı'daki Somali*. Sabah. <https://www.sabah.com.tr/yasam/kumkapidan-duz-git-sola-don-somalidesin-1851369>

introduced Istanbul and the fictional lives of Turkish characters to the Somali youth before 2011. For example, Mahad, who received the Diyanet Foundation's scholarship in 2012, says he did not know much about Turkey before but only some fuzzy ideas coming from TV series: "There was a series, *Gümüş*. Kivanc Tatlitug was playing there. Everyone was watching the show in Somalia, it was very popular, you see Istanbul and the Bosphorus all the time. That became something like an "American dream" for those who want to come here." The Turks had also a quite limited knowledge of Somalia, which was based on ongoing donation campaigns broadcasting stereotypical images of women and children suffering from hunger and drought. 2011 humanitarian aid operation and later scholarship programs brought two social geographies closer to each other rapidly. After Erdoğan's visit to Mogadishu, announcements were made in a short time about scholarship exams to be held in different regions of Somalia. Duty security concerns every step had to be taken faster, but unfortunately some students became the target of the al-Shabaab terrorist attack, when the militants exploded a bomb near a crowd and killed 70 Somalis waiting scholarship examination results.⁹¹ Because of this rapidity, students could not obtain necessary information about Turkey and education in there. Most of the students arrived in Turkey without knowing about where they were going exactly, what high school or region they would be enrolled. Mohamud, who started "imam hatip lisesi" (religious high school) in Kırklareli with a Diyanet scholarship in 2012, says that everything developed suddenly when his mother grabbed and took him to the exam:

I was in English class. My mother came, "come Mohamud," she said, "we will go out." I had no idea about where we were going. Then we got in line for the scholarship exam. "What are we going to do here," I said, "you will take the exam, if they give scholarship you will go to Turkey," she replied. I had never known what kind of a country Turkey was before that.

Similarly, Faduma, who received the Gülen association's scholarship in 2011, explains her confusion in the middle of rapid student selection processes: "Nobody gave any information. After the exam, I saw flags in the streets. I even asked my friend, I remember, which country's flag is this. My friend said, it is a Turkish flag." Kemaal, who started university with a Gülen scholarship in 2011, says that no one knew about Fethullah Gülen or what his organization signifies in the context of Turkish politics: "At that time,

⁹¹ Ibrahim, M. & Gettleman, J. (2011, October 4). *Truck Bomb Kills Dozens in Somalia's Capital*. The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/world/africa/truck-bomb-kills-dozens-in-somalias-capital.html>

everyone from Turkey was the same for us, we did not know who represents or supports whom. We just thought Turkey is welcoming us, that we got the Turkey scholarship. Nobody told us nothing about the Gülen movement.” The rapid and collective bursary selection process urged Somali students to act fast if they want to catch the flight to Turkey. Daahir, who received a high school scholarship in 2011, says that they found themselves in Turkey just in a matter of days:

When this unexpected connection between two countries emerged, we came Turkey with this exam, which we never thought about before. Suddenly, we found ourselves in Turkey. I took the exam in Galkayo, the next day the exam results were announced, suddenly they brought me to Mogadishu and the next day we came to Turkey. Everything developed so suddenly. They were calling our families like “your child won the exam, prepare him, he is leaving tomorrow.” I remember, when I arrived in Mogadishu, I didn't have a passport, it was prepared just in one day.

Student immigration to different countries is not a new phenomenon in the history of Somalia. Former colonizer Italy offered scholarship and joint-university programs starting with the 1950s in order to secure its cultural hegemony on the nascent Somali ruling elite and bureaucrats (Lewis, 1988, p. 141). The Soviet Union, aiming to counterbalance the influence of Italy, Britain and the United States in East Africa, started accepting Somali students under different scholarship programs since the 1960s (Ivanova, 2019). In addition to student immigration, the Somalis, especially in the north, have been going to the Arabian peninsula as worker immigrants since the 1960s (Gundel, 2002). As Somalia's internal conflict increased in the 1980s, Somali bureaucrats and high-income groups, and well-off immigrants in Arab countries, began to send their children to North America and Europe for education. This "first wave" migration to the global north was followed by the "second wave" when the civil war erupted in 1991, and different age, income, and clan groups followed this migration chain (Kapteijns and Arman, 2008). After the civil war, students continued to go to Sudan, Malaysia, or India, and Turkey became another destination in the student migration history of Somalia after 2011.

Despite all its uncertainties, students and their families preferred this new education destination to the current conditions in their homeland. However, students entered into an unknown social universe since they were neither familiar with nor informed about the high school system and different school types in Turkey. They tried to figure out the necessary information only from the notes attached onto their passports. Osman, who received a Diyanet scholarship in 2012, thought that he would receive a

standard high school education, but during the flight to Turkey he learned that it would be an “imam hatip lisesi.” “In the airport, they gave us a piece of paper with the letters I-H-L on it. I did not know what the IHL was. Later on I realized that it is a religious school, but it was not my choice.” The rapid selection process brought a rapid transformation in the education life of first group of Somali students. When they came to Turkey, this confusion continued for a while, too. For example, Ayaan, who was one of the first students with Diyanet scholarship in 2012, was first enrolled in a girls' vocational high school. However, since they were not informed before what a girls' vocational school is and what its difference is from a standard high school, it created a major problem that could only be resolved through bureaucratic channels:

There was a note on our passports saying, “girls' vocational high school.” They registered half of the girls to vocational school and the other half to medical vocation school, but we did not know what they were. When we arrived in Turkey, we asked to officials what this girls' vocational school was. We talked to our Embassy in Ankara. All of us wanted to go to the medical vocational school because we thought it was more important, and we wrote petitions to change it. I called my father, and he said, “write a petition, if they don't accept it, turn back and study whatever you want here.” We waited a week or two for a decision, then officials said we can choose whatever we want.

6.1.1 Student unions and proto-nationalist imaginations

Because of such uncertain and disorganized measures, high school students felt a lot of pressure and anxiety during their early months. High school students were mostly busy with intensive Turkish courses for six-months, and their communication with their families were restricted to weekend phone calls. Cultural, seasonal, and communication problems in their daily interaction with their Turkish teachers and friends put additional burden onto young Somalis. While talking to Ayaan about her high school years, she laughs out loud about funny situations they were in at those times, yet she still remembers the pressure of adaptation during her early education in Ankara: “We were almost alone in the school. First months, my God, it was very bad, it passed with tears. Older Somali sisters, who came a year before us, were visiting us and trying to reassure us by saying that this will pass.” Turks approached to Somalis with their limited knowledge based on the dramatic language of aid campaigns. Therefore, Somali students had to answer such questions as whether there is water in Somalia, or is everyone a pirate there, or why there is no food in their homeland. Rapid selection process, uncertainties expecting students, and everyday hardships drove many of the students to despair about their future in Turkey.

The idea of leaving education and emigrating to Europe began to spread among Somali students. However, though it was an emotional deprivation, being in a foreign country alone simultaneously encouraged Somali students to collaborate. First group Somali students left the fragmented social environment of the civil war behind, and they had to act together within the cities they live in small numbers. In order to create solidarity and guidance among students, they started to form small student clubs, which spread to different cities and gained an organizational character representing Somali students in Turkey. Abshir, who started his university career in Ankara in 2011 with the Gülen scholarship, says that this idea of forming student unions appeared as an outcome of students' everyday problems and increasing tendency for illegal immigration to Europe at that time:

I think that neither the Turkish nor the Somali authorities could understand our problems at that time, and we all missed an important opportunity. I remember those times very vividly. I was talking to my brother living in England, he was trying to calm me down, he told me that every student goes through these problems when they go to a foreign country. But some students did not have such an opportunity, no one told them to hold on for a few more months, and they felt an intense pressure. As they watched their friends leaving, many of us thought, "there's nothing we can do." It was during this period that we decided to establish a student union and tried to control this flow. Because rumors were spreading like dominoes: "You know this person, you know that person, he is in the UK now, he is in Sweden, that person went back and he is working now." It became a story circulating among students. So a couple of us, who noticed the problem and had time to reach out, came together and started this union. We tried to do some celebrations, like Independence Day celebration.

Students desired not only to persuade those leaving their education and prevent the immigration trend, but they also aimed to develop discourses and practices that would stimulate a spirit of community through celebration events and orientation gatherings for new comers. Somali students' encounters with the Turkish national education and their daily interactions in a new cultural environment triggered proto-nationalist feelings for an encompassing and unifying Somali identity. As Somali students increased their symbolic interaction with the codes and rituals of Turkish nationalism, such as flag ceremonies in schools or everyday statist discourses, students found themselves in a position to reflect on the meaning of clannism, nationalism, and state. This became an inspiration for discovering their own Somali identity within the environment they were situated in. Daahir, for example, came to Turkey's southern city Manisa in 2011 and completed his high school and undergraduate in political science there, but he was also

quite active in the formation of the city's Somali student club. To him, the students' experiences with daily nationalist conducts became informative for cultivating a nationalist consciousness, which they never came across before, as Daahir argues:

You have a saying, "my soil" [toprağım]⁹², we do not use something like this. Soil is nothing but a piece of sand for us. I was the president of the student union in Manisa, and we used to celebrate our Independence Day and organize national flag days. But those coming to these celebrations had never attended such meetings and never embraced these values before. They were the children without the love of the flag and the love of the country. When we started organizing such meetings, it has changed for all of us. Those dates became something we eagerly awaited. In that sense, I realized the love of the country in Turkey.

Similar to the ideological effects of everyday nationalist discourses, such institutional rituals as weekly flag ceremonies in school became a source of inspiration for the Somali students to think about the value of nation and state. In primary and elementary schools in Turkey, there is weekly flag raising ritual that gathers all students and teachers at the school yard for singing the Turkish national anthem "İstiklal Marşı" [Independence March] and saluting the flag. For Somali students, this weekly event was a boring obligation, that they felt no identification obviously, and tried to escape or discard at first. But as the medical vocational school student Ayaan notes, their perception of the flag ceremonies gradually changed and they came to find a meaningful value in it:

Turks were singing the national anthem, but it was something too simple for us. You know Somalia, there is war, there is no flag ceremony like here. So, at first, it did not mean anything to us, we did not know what that word "istiklal" means. We did not understand its importance back then. But our ideas have changed in time. When we finished high school, I went to Somalia, my father runs a school there. I went to that school, and I volunteered to sing our national anthem, we hung flags in classrooms like in Turkey. With these steps something really starts to happen, Somalia starts to raise again. Maybe wars will continue, but people will understand, the state will be stronger. This is really important, Somalia has improved a lot by then.

Development thinking is not limited to actual calculable progression of a state's institutional capacity, but it first necessitates a desire and imagination for development. Fantasies of development, in other words, preserves the promises of development thinking alive (De vries, 2007). Ayaan's narration of the relationship between the flag ceremony and her vision for Somalia's development highlights a symbolic exchange energizing a desire for development. In the larger context of Turkey-Somalia

⁹² An informal expression of greeting similar to "my man," but specifically connotating familiarity based on a shared geographic identity. An approximate translation can be "you from my soil."

development partnership, bilateral agreements and scholarship programs created an everyday interactional space for the first group Somali students. Within this interactional ground mediated by bilateral agreements, students started to encounter, reject, or accept cultural codes, discourses, and institutional rituals of their social surrounding. Especially for the Somalis of the post-state collapse generation, material and immaterial elements of everyday Turkish nationalism became a source of curiosity to reflect on the idea of nationhood and development. Hodan, who started medical vocational high school in Ankara with Diyanet scholarship in 2012, tells how their perception of Turkish nationalism became a challenge as well as an inspiration for her generation to come together under a shared identity:

Turkish people's love for their country seemed very strange to us. You know, Somalia has been in civil war since 1991, and we were the children born during the war. Our parents and grandparents saw peace and the state, they know what the love of the country means, but we have never seen it due to the civil war. We grew up in a period of struggle for survival. Therefore, the meaning of patriotism, why a person loves his country, why she loves her flag, why such things have a value for them, these all seemed very strange to us, because for us the only valuable thing was the family. This is how the idea of founding student associations came to our minds. As high school students in Turkey, we thought, why don't we establish such a community among ourselves.

Sociologist Brubaker states that there are three common elements in the literature on diasporic formations: dispersion in space, an imaginary or real orientation to homeland, and an effort for boundary-maintenance in the new settlement (Brubaker, 2005, p. 5). Considering Somali students early experiences in Turkey, we can define the desires and motivations leading them to start such community activities as a diasporic formation in light of Brubaker's classification. However, Kleist argues (2008, p. 308) that diaspora "might be at once *claimed by* and *attributed to* different groups" and since the Somalis in Turkey do not yet claim themselves as a diaspora, a conclusive judgement can only be an attribution we make here. Generally speaking, the transnational Somali community identify diaspora with the "Somali Westerner" who have citizenship rights in a Western country and have credentials of "mobility, economic, and social agency" differentiating him or her from a regular migrant (Mursal, 2015, p. 51). All in all, when we think about the rapid relocation of students in Turkish cities, their encounters with Turkish nationalism as a post-war generation, and discovering a way to interpret their own identity and history as Somalis resemble a process of diasporic identity formation. According to Stuart Hall, diasporic identity is not the recovery of "something which

already exists, transcending place, time, history, and culture” but it is a productive process, where diasporic consciousness imagines itself as part of a historic origin in its new environment. Therefore, Hall states, it is a situated cultural identity produced and reproduced by heterogenous surrounding elements (Hall, 1990). First group students’ experiences, as Hall describes, led students to an internal questioning of their own personal and national history, and they constructed a cultural identity through an interaction with their new settlements. Surely, there were others, who defined bursary programs as a diplomatic tool that they benefit for their personal future careers. Similarly, some of the students did not identify themselves with a nationalist discourse and criticized such club activities as a waste of time, and as a playground to make entrepreneurial networks in Turkey. However, taking the risk of generalization, I argue that such encounters with the “nationalist ecology” in Turkey was an interesting factor, if not decisive, for the Somali youth in Turkey to imagine themselves under a shared national identity.⁹³

In the end, these small clubs became a widespread student network with varied directions. Tevfik Association in Ankara prioritizing religious values, We Are One community in Istanbul emphasizing a supra-clan Somali nationalism, and Somali Voice carrying out social responsibility projects and donation activities, became well known pioneers among many other student-led organizations in Turkey. In general, what firstcomer Somali students wanted was to keep the expanding student flow together and to preserve their cultural identity in the new social environment. Nationalist ecology surrounding them, in sum, had two important effects on the formation of a new Somali identity in Turkey. First, proto-nationalist feelings led first group students to put a distance against clannism and embrace a wholistic conception of being a Somali. By this, students managed to reach out those living in other cities and provided a rich social network for new commers. Second, the nationalist conception of identity effected students’ perception of the state and motivated their desire for development and restoration of state capacity. In our interview, Kemaal, the founder of We Are One

⁹³ Poul Gilroy defines the spatial dimension of cultural exchange between the place of residence and place of origin as the “social ecology of identification,” where “intercultural and transcultural processes and forms” shape the sense of diasporic belonging in the new social environment (Gilroy, 1997, p. 329). I use “nationalist ecology” with reference to Gilroy’s “social ecology” in order to underline symbolic interactions and intercultural transitions that influenced Somali students’ perception of nationalism and being a Somali in Turkey.

initiative in Istanbul, who came in 2011, narrates the motivations behind their efforts to leave clannism behind and establish a fair state:

Somali politicians used to visit us when they came to Turkey, and they would say “you are the future of this country.” I thought a lot about it when I was a student, what can I do if I am the future of this country? I cannot prevent terrorism or find a solution to hunger, but maybe we can fight against the causes behind them, ignorance and clannism. This is how the idea of “We Are One” was born. We organized talks against clannism, we wanted that if these students would take seats in the parliament one day, they should rule the country with a nationalist perspective. When I say nationalist, it is not to offend other people, but to love your country, love your nature, love your land, love your people, these are very important. And love everyone equally, do your work fairly. For example, to me justice is nationalism, if you do justice to your country, if you serve people fairly, if you hire people fairly, that is also nationalism. I learned these from Turkey.

6.2 Partnership in dispute: Win-win or a dependency to come?

Somali students’ early interactions in Turkey brought about a transformation in the mindset of young Somalis about the meaning of nationhood and state. Especially for high school students who were born in post-civil war Somalia, this romantic idealization of Turkish nationalism was more appealing. Although they suffered from uncertain and unplanned aspects of early scholarship programs, Turkey’s nationalist ecology inspired firstcomer Somali students to initiate a solidarity network for preventing illegal migration on the one hand, and for spreading a communitarian spirit informed by developmentalist desires and emotions on the other. As these small unions became widespread, the organization among Somali students turned into an informal social network welcoming newcomers without letting them to fall into the same despair and confusion. Second group of Somali students followed this informal network. Unlike the first group, they were not selected in groups by Turkish institutions but newcomer Somalis individually applied to Turkey Scholarship. Farah and Barack (2019) analyze strategies of Somali students when selecting a country scholarship, and they argue that although Turkey being an emerging power uses scholarship programs as a soft power tool to attract African students, Somali students make their decision through the informal communication network among students reaching from Turkey to Somalia through friends and relatives. Farah and Barack underline the student agency in rationalizing and choosing scholarship options; however, I argue that students’ expectations about future benefits of scholarship programs are not limited to exchanging information within the student network, but it is primarily situated by the nature of bilateral relationships. As Turkey’s institutional and business network

have grown in Somalia after 2011, newcomer students perceived having an education in Turkey as an economic advantage for Somalia's job market. Increasing effectiveness of Turkey's official, civil, and business investments in Somalia, therefore, influenced Somali student applicants' career and income expectations. Strengthened diplomatic relations and the allocation of larger scholarship quotas, growing investments and opportunities in the job market, and of course Somali student network in Turkey, all together served as pull factors for second group of Somali students that made Turkey an attractive spot for university and career life.

In other words, students access to scholarship programs in Turkey is a larger topic than an academic plan, but it is related to how Somali students perceive bilateral relations between Turkey and Somalia, what expectations the partnership generates for Somali applicants, and how students interpret Turkey's involvement in Somalia and Somalia's future response to that. Therefore, the simple question I asked to Somali students "why did you come to Turkey" reveals insight about Somali students' interpretation of positive and negative outcomes of Turkey's presence in Somalia. In a Manichean way, we can divide the Somali perception of Turkey's interests into two: those defending it for win-win solutions benefiting both nations, and those approaching it as a form of dependency because of Turkey's disproportional gains. Somali students defending the former argue that the partnership with Turkey eased younger generations' access to the Western world, increased opportunities in the job market. Those opposing, on the other hand, claim that real beneficiaries of the partnership are not Somalis but Turkish entrepreneurs and exporters. Somali actors do not and will not have the same advantages as Turkish investors have in Somalia, they state. Scholarship programs and private universities still attract many Somalis, but we understand that the future of partnership will be different than how the first group of Somali students had perceived in a romantic communitarianism.

6.2.1 Positive legitimations: Personal expectations and collective gains

Ahmed, for example, came to Turkey in 2018 for a master's degree with Turkey Scholarship, but during his undergraduate education he was working in the Mogadishu port operated by Albayrak Group. For him, Turkey's 2011 intervention and later investments were a remarkable progress in Somalia. His personal story reveals the juxtaposition of informal student network and interstate institutional networks, which

effects applicants' expectations and hopes for going to Turkey. He tells multifaceted impacts of Turkey's strategic interventions and its benefits for the future plans of young Somalis like him:

Our university professors were among the first returnees who graduated from Turkish universities with scholarship. They introduced us this scholarship because at that time Somali students did not have much chance to go abroad. India, USA, England, France, Italy, if you wanted to go there you had to go to Ethiopia or Kenya for a visa. But the Turkish embassy was the only Western country at that time where you could get a visa directly from Mogadishu. Also, I was working in Albayrak company, and I did not know Turkish language or culture. Maybe, I thought, if I graduated from Turkey, I could find a better job at the port when I came back. That's why I decided to apply.

Aaden won two scholarships from China and Turkey, but preferred turkey with the expectation of a more guaranteed job in the future and started his undergraduate program at Sakarya University in 2017 with official scholarship. He tells his point of view that if he could learn Turkish, he would have a more advantageous CV when he returned to Somalia: "I won a scholarship from both China and Turkey. I thought, if I go to Turkey and do a master's degree, I will learn both the language and the country, and how Turks live generally. So I chose Turkey, thinking that it would be easier to find a job when I return to Somalia." Similarly, Hasan's story shows that students' economic expectations and informal student network equally informed candidates' perception of the benefits of coming to Turkey. Hasan, who started his graduate program in Sakarya University in 2018 without a scholarship, says that he specifically came to Turkey to find a job in Somalia and his old friends became an example for him to take this decision:

To be honest, I never thought about doing a master's, my first plan was to find a job in Somalia. But I couldn't find the job I wanted, and at that time I had many friends who graduated from Turkey. Somali students often compare countries like Malaysia and India for master's degrees. You know, Turkey's relationship with Somalia continues and people think it will continue in the future. That's why everyone was telling me, "your friends are studying in Turkey, they found a job right away when they returned, maybe you'll get the same opportunity if you go there and get a master's degree." I consulted with my friends there and decided to do my master's in Turkey instead of staying idle here.

Beside personal projections, students favoring Turkey's involvement also address long term developmental outcomes that will benefit Somalis collectively. For example, Faaris, who started his master's in the Informatics in Istanbul with Turkey Scholarship in 2018, argues candidly that Turkey's official scholarship is comparatively better than others since it is grant-based and aims a cooperation between donor and recipient society

by increasing human capacity of the latter: “Turkish Scholarship is like ‘win for your own country, for your own self, maybe in the future if we need you, you can help us’.” Faaris is also quite realist about Turkey’s self-interested returns. He states that there is no free help, but since Somalis also benefits from Turkey’s investments it serves for a win-win outcome for both states:

When a country helps you, they need some ratio, no one helps you without getting something from you. But if Turkey gets something from us, we are happy for it, because they are doing something for us and they are giving for us. I think, Turkey wants us to be like them in the future. They want to improve our country by education, because they know that in ten years I will help them back, because I know Turkish institutions, its universities, and companies. Maybe in the future I will be in the government, and welcome Turkey’s institutions to Somalia, so I will be a connection between two states. We come to a win-win condition, we are getting improved in our sectors and also Turkey getting the profit of it. It is a profit for two states.

Though Somali students usually praise Turkey’s aid and investment, students coming from Somaliland have different concerns. Turkey’s activities mostly concentrate on the south, and it is almost limited with Mogadishu. Self-proclaimed independent state of Somaliland criticizes Turkish actors for favoring a centralism in Somalia and investing only in the south. Ayub, who worked at the Somaliland Ministry of Justice before coming to Turkey, summarizes the Somaliland’s perspective on Turkey as follows: “The Somaliland community’s perception of Turkey’s engagement is not positive and it is based on facts. It has no tangible efforts in Somaliland. We do not have historical relations with Turkey similar to the ones with the United Arab Emirates.” Abdulhakim, who also came from Somaliland for a PhD in International Relations with a Turkey Scholarship, says that Turkey has a biased relationship with the establishment in Mogadishu: “Turkey believes that Somalia is a one country and the capital is Mogadishu, and everything will be in Mogadishu. That is why Somaliland government believes that Turkey makes a bias with the south.” All in all, Albulhakim compares Turkey to other regional actors in the Horn of Africa, and argues that Turkey is actually better than others in terms of investments.

Turkey supports mostly the Somali government of the south. But Turkey gives the same education opportunity to Somaliland citizens in the name of Somalia. Others do not make such investments. Saudi Arabia, China, Ethiopia, they do not make any investment at all, and Emirates only makes the Berbera port at the north. So, I think Turkey is better than other countries, because it makes more investments than others.

Turkey's scholarship diplomacy creates geopolitical favors, as well, in the mindset of Somali students. Students legitimize their positive accounts toward Turkey's aid and investment in terms of personal and collective benefits regarding their future careers and Somalia's development. However, a large portion of young Somalis still come to Turkey for illegal migration to Europe and both generous scholarship opportunities and private universities making a profit out of international students making this process easier for Somali migrants. Ilham is in Turkey since 2015 with scholarship, and she says that among the crowd number of students, there are those coming by issuing fake visas for a transit migration to European countries. She says that due to bribery and nepotism in Somalia, some students easily buy visas and arrive in Turkey:

Since there is a lot of corruption in our country, you cannot know who has official visa who has not. If you have an uncle living abroad, he sends a few thousands of dollars for visa, then you come to Turkey for immigrating to Europe when you have that opportunity. That is why Turkey has already reduced its scholarship, it is trying to get more master's or doctoral students.

Those coming in the second phase of student mobilization toward Turkey, took advantage of the scholarship and visa opportunities between the two countries. They were sometimes motivated by friends and sometimes by economic expectations, but as Ilham notes a remarkable number of students preferred Turkey as a safe way of arriving in a transit migration zone. In fact, Migration Minister of Greece announced at the end of 2020 that Somalis enters Turkey with student visa and they use this line for illegal migration to Europe. The Greek official said that 142 of the 214 migrants who reached the island of Lesbos between November and December were Somalis.⁹⁴ Abdirizak runs an education and visa consultancy firm in Istanbul, where he does his second master's in a private university without scholarship. He stayed in Turkey after finishing his education, and transferred his experiences into an investment when he realized the growing student mobilization from Africa to Turkey. Abdirizak says that many students still use this educational network in Turkey as to immigrate to Europe:

Most African students want to go to the UK, the US, or Canada, but the visa issue creates problems. Now Turkey has become a second option for them. I visited a private university recently, they said they had received 250 admissions, but only fifty of them got registered so far. So where are the other two hundred? Maybe some were rejected later on, but the rest just paid the registration fee and fled to Greece and Europe.

⁹⁴ See, *Greece says Turkish 'student visa' loophole used for trafficking*. (2020, 8 December). Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/europe-migrants-greece-idUKKBN28I1V5>

Second group of students, therefore, are different from the first group of Somalis, who came with varied scholarship programs at an early age and they were selected and registered as groups without their informed consent. The second group, in contrast, arrived in Turkish universities in light of their own individual decisions and long term goals. Besides, newcomers mostly preferred private universities due to the rising competitiveness of scholarship programs. Together with those coming for transit migration, the number of Somali students continued to multiply during this phase. Graduates started to open consultancy firms, cafes, and restaurants, and newcomer Somali students entered into an environment where the Somalis became socially economically organized among each other, unlike the firstcomers' loneliness and hardships. This transformation in the Somali student profile did not go unnoticed by the first group students. Explaining such differences between his own 2011 cohort and the newcomers, Abshir says that Somali students' relationship with the Turks have become professionalized and commercialized:

As the number of students increased, the relationship between Somalis and Turks became more professional. Somalis have their own restaurants and places to spend time. The newcomers also mostly meet with their Somali friends. Those who have been here for a long time and speak Turkish fluently have opened offices, they are meeting with Turkish investors, and arranging real estate deals for those coming from diaspora. In the past, there used to be a closer relationship between us and the Turks, but now ordinary friendships have turned into investment talks.

As Abshir illustrates, Somali students' turning their experience into a social capital and starting investments in the service and consultancy sectors made it easier for the Somali diaspora to learn about the life and sectors in Turkey. First student group adapted the language, culture and institutional matrix in Turkey, that they have become gatekeepers for small and middle size investors. Both Turkish exports trying to enter into Somali market and Somali entrepreneurs seeking options for investing in Turkey approached each other through the student network in Turkey. Abdullahi, who came to Sakarya University with a Turkey Scholarship in 2016, explains how the entrepreneurial channels works through student's agency:

Since the Somalis here speak the language, they can be an intermediary when someone reaches them for investment. For example, someone from the family wants to start a business in Turkey, he calls my father and reaches me afterwards. He comes here and we make him meet with companies. They are mostly interested in exporting clothing, furniture, medical equipment, and

consumption goods to Somalia. In the past, such products used to come from Dubai or China, but now Turkey is much cheaper.

Similarly, Faduma, who came to Turkey in 2011 and continued his master's degree in Istanbul, says that Turkish graduates create market opportunities for the investors of both countries. Faduma helps her relatives and businesspeople in translating their conversation with Turkish counterparts. She talks about the role of Turkish graduates in binding business agreements between two sides:

After my friends graduated, they immediately opened an office and signed contracts with Turkish companies and found Somali businessmen. Of course, in this process, those Somalis who did not study in Turkey and do not speak Turkish are marginalized. But the relationship between two countries contributes a lot to Turkey graduates. Students who used to go to Egypt, Sudan, or Kenya now prefer Turkey and this creates commercial advantages. For example, I went to Beyazıt a while ago, they manufacture purse there. I saw at least fifty Somalis, they were loading cargo to send it to Somalia. I talked to Turkish businessmen there, and he said that it is a great advantage for us that Africans come and study here.

If we compare the two periods in the Somali student mobility toward Turkey, we can say that firstcomers' experiences were based on unexpected encounters, symbolic interactions with Turkish actors, and a proto-nationalist imagination influenced by Turkey's nationalist ecology. As the number of students increased rapidly during the second phase, personal expectations and entrepreneurial projections became more prevalent. Unlike the first group, Somalis arriving in the second phase had more professional and business-oriented contacts with Turkish actors. In this process, the Somali identity in Turkey underwent a transformation. Local-scale symbolic exchanges, such as the appealing power of flag ceremonies or everyday expressions like "troprağım," left their place to a transnational-scale of market exchange between Turkish exporters and Somali diaspora entrepreneurs. In this transformation, the first group Somali students played a gatekeeper role in binding business connections thanks to their fluency in language and decade-long experience Turkey's institutional and sectoral matrix.

We cannot discard the role of bilateral agreements assuring diplomatic protection and Turkish Airlines' logistical benefits for such transnational economic activities in the triangle of Somali diaspora, Turkey, and Somalia. However, small-scale interpersonal ties accumulate a strength of bridging micro and macro process which can create more widespread and productive connections (Granovetter, 1973). In this framework, Somali students became a human capital allowing Turkish exporters and Somali investors to meet

on the same ground. For Somalis favoring Turkey's aid and investment, such economic activities represent proofs for win-win outcomes and legitimizes partnership rhetoric in the name of mutuality of interests.

6.2.2 Negative legitimations: Political interests, disproportional gains, and dependency

However, not all Somalis think like that. Somaliland students, for example, speak about Turkey's bias in favor of the southern Federal Government. Apart from this diplomatic conflict of interest, there are everyday expressions against the unequal exchange between Turkey and Somalia. Negative legitimations oscillate between a critique of Turkey's disproportional gains and a threat of dependency. I should note that the overwhelming majority of Somalis I interviewed share similar affirmative ideas about Turkey's actions: it arrived in Somalia in a time of need while others have neglected, Turkey's approach to aid was different from previous actors for it produced tangible outcomes for Somali people, and it was a selfless act of solidarity, or as Faaris noted previously, even if Turkey receives a profit out of Somalia it is a win-win exchange where both parties gain. Therefore, we can say that the symbolic power of Turkey's benevolent image and its solidarist appeal to the Somali community secures a prestige for it, in other words Turkey's "development gifts" keeps on giving. Ismail, a Turkey Scholarship doctoral student since 2019, reveals the power of this prestige in the eyes of the Somali community. When I ask Ismail if Turkey is different than other countries providing aid, he first quite objectively states that interventionist countries always pursue their own political agenda. However, Ismail suddenly cuts his objective standpoint when he recollects 2011 events, and argues the polar opposite of his initial narrative:

Turks have interests in Arab countries, in Muslim countries, and in Africa. They are making assistance for these political objectives. Plus, Turkey is not the only one, there are Americans and British, they all want to control Somali territory by creating conflicts among the community. They never serve for exact needs of the Somali community, but their own political interest. But in 2011, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Mogadishu without condition and he announced that we are brothers we have to support each other. Without condition, he helped Somali community ever thinking, he provided opportunities for education, he built roads, he built schools, he made everything for the support of Somali people. We felt brotherhood, not for political interest, not for economic interest, not for a special interest. Somali people believe that Turkey and Somalia have a close relationship not only the interest of Turks but also a mutual interest of both nations. But Western nations have their own interest, they were not fulfilling the exact needs of the Somali community.

This duality in aid and interests is a central topic of this dissertation and it keeps on circulating in the meaning world of both Turkish and Somali actors. Though it is hard to decide whether a state-led aid operation is solidarist or self-interested, we do not need to, either, because two logics are not exclusionary when you approach aid as a gift relationship. Ismail's shift from describing Turkey as a politically-motivated interventionist toward a brotherly nation helping "without condition" represents the coexistence of two logics. It is also a contest for the donor to maintain its prestige and its selfless image, and after a decade this image is being challenged by the Somalis' raising suspicions. During our talk with Osman, who first came Turkey for high school education in 2010 with a Diyanet Scholarship, he was telling how previous expectations of ordinary Somalis in Turkey have failed after ten years of relationship between two countries. When he arrived in Turkey he was in his early youth, and after more than ten years he now studies law, but he says that the system in Turkey never lets foreigners in. He states that the increasing disillusionment of the Somalis feeds critiques against Turkey's disproportional gains in Somalia.

The system in Turkey is somehow preventing your integration. For example, I am studying law, but I cannot be a lawyer here, because I need to have a citizenship. Students like us cannot plan a future here. Even after ten years, we are still facing difficulties in obtaining residence permits or renting a house, and we may come across with mistreatments from officials in the migration directorate or hospitals, as well as from ordinary people. It is said that students are a bridge between Turkey and Somalia, but if it continues like this, students will become obstacles because these frustrations are now started to be spoken out loud. Students began to think that Turkey does not meet their expectations. This creates a critique against Turkey's gains in Somalia, because people think that they cannot even rent a house here but Turkish actors are entering any field they want there. Even if Somalis open shops and restaurants here, a Turk will never come there, so Somalis earn money only from Somalis here, whereas Turkey's situation is just the opposite, they win from us. What kind of a win-win is this? It is more like win-lose. Turkey wants you to go to a shopping mall, be a tourist, do cargo trade, stay at the hotel, and then get on Turkish Airlines if possible and leave.

Though Osman criticizes Turkey for not allowing Somalis in but opening every investment field for itself in Somalia, Osman still believes Turkey is a savior for the Somalis: "Turkey is definitely a savior. Whenever an explosion happens you see that Turkey sends an aircraft to take those injured to Turkey for treatment, no other country does this." Turkey's benevolent image, therefore, covers Turkey's economic gains, but it is not certain how far Somalis will accept this tension between caring while accumulating.

In one of his recent essays, renowned Somali scholar Abdi Ismail Samatar expresses his observation that in Mogadishu there is “near unanimous approval of Turkish engagements” yet, he argues, “the cosy relationship may perhaps have a soft underbelly.”⁹⁵ Samatar notes the importance of Turkey’s development infrastructure and scholarship programs, yet argues that Turkey’s market and military investments starts to marginalize Somalis in terms of knowledge transfer and economic benefits, and it is becoming more prone to worsen political instabilities. My field study also reveals similar reflections. Somalis are more suspicious about whether the future of the partnership will be the same as its past, and these hesitations reveal themselves where Turks and Somalis work together regularly, such as in the Mogadishu hospital. Najma, for example, speaks about such questions triggering her doubts about her country’s relation to Turkey. Najma came to Turkey in 2012 with a Diyanet scholarship and started medical vocational school, then she proceeded with an education in the faculty of medicine. I asked her whether Turks and Somalis can work together in the Mogadishu hospital, how they cooperate, or what benefits it brought to the locals so far. She replies to my plain questions with a deeper insight about the injuries of aid on the self-reliance of the recipient society:

I have never worked at that hospital, but, of course, when you think in short term, you can see it positively. I am not sure if it is development really or trade, you name it. But if you look at in long term, you realize that when you gain something you lose something, you really need to understand this. I don’t mean that these are negative things, but they always made me question. I am not saying that Turkish people are doing evil to Somalia, when you look at how things are progressing, you can make the difference. But we need to substitute the word “within” with “after,” we need to ask what will happen after five years, rather than asking what happened within five years. For example, what kind of psychological environments we are creating? And one more thing, dependency is not a good thing, really. One has to be free. There is actually a lot to understand here. In my opinion we are not a free society, there is a fear inside people, but they are normally brave. Think of it like, this person is not afraid to die but he is afraid to do something alone. What I call freedom is that you can do something without another person. At your current situation, you need to be able to do something with whatever you have.

Since the state collapse, Somalia’s development problem became a transnational issue not only due to continuing bilateral and multilateral interventions, but also because of migration flows and diaspora activism arising from new settlements (Farah et al., 2007, p. xi). Diaspora remittances and lobbying acts are main elements for the transboundary

⁹⁵ Samatar, Abdi I. (2021, April 11). *Horn of Africa: Turkey’s cosy relationship with Somalia may have an underbelly*. Daily Maverick. <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/author/abdi-ismail-samatar/>

character of Somalia's development. However, diaspora is a process of identity formation, and social transformations that diasporic communities experience in their new environment shape their perception and actions for development (Kusow, 2007, pp. 35-37). Through tracing the life history of Somali students in Turkey, we on the one hand trace such social transformations they have gone through during the last decade, and on the other hand we interpret students' positive and negative judgements about the so-called development partnership. The change from a romantic collectivism to a professionalized individualism has a tendency to spread among Somali students, and the transformation of Somali student profile supports this transformation. However, the question of whether critiques against the unequal exchange between two countries will reach a point of detachment for the Somalis is still early to answer. While I conducted these interviews, Turkey's economic crisis and its anti-immigrant and xenophobic repercussions were not as radical as it is now in mid-2022. Under these conditions, we can speculate that such suspicions, frustrations, and disillusionments have probably increased in the meantime.

6.3 Diasporic connections: Between engagement and disengagement

Despite increasing visibility of critiques, Somali diaspora has been frequenting Turkey in recent years for various purposes. Somali diaspora in North America, Europe and Gulf countries come to Turkey for investment, tourism, or to send their children to Turkey's private schools. Some articles state the number of Somali investments has reached over a hundred small and medium-sized firms, which operate in such sectors as cargo shipping, real estate and visa consultancy, restaurants, and hairdressers.⁹⁶ Liban Obsiye, the Coordinator of the Ministry of Finance of Somalia, argues that the increasing number of business and real estate investments in Istanbul is an indication that the Somalis are starting to become permanent in Turkey.⁹⁷ There are three important points for our discussion here. First, diaspora Somalis create a new pattern in the student mobilization. Diaspora children are different from previous two waves of Somali student

⁹⁶ For news and commentaries on Somali diasporic activities in Ankara, see Demirci, Z. (2019, January 5). *Somali mutfagını Başkent'e taşıdılar*, Anadolu Ajansı. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/yasam/somali-mutfagini-baskente-tasidilar/1356449>; *Somali businesses in Turkish capital flourish as community grows*. (2021, April 12). Daily Sabah. <https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/expat-corner/somali-businesses-in-turkish-capital-flourish-as-community-grows>; Mobahmed, Bishar A. (2021, September 3). *Inside Somalia-Turkey health relations*. Daily Sabah. <https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/inside-somalia-turkey-health-relations>; Sayid, Abdiwali M. (2021, September 7). *Somali diaspora flourishes in streets of Turkey*. Daily Sabah. <https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/somali-diaspora-flourishes-in-streets-of-turkey>

⁹⁷ Obsiye, L. (2019, May 23). *Turkey's growing soft power at display in Somalia*. Anadolu Ajansı, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/opinion-turkey-s-growing-soft-power-at-display-in-somalia/1485368>

mobilization both as to its geographic origin and social class. Most of diaspora children come to Turkey in their early ages for primary and elementary school, and they usually come with their mothers while the father stays in diaspora for earning the family income. They hire or buy a house near to the school, and the father visits the family in Turkey in vacations. Educational and touristic interests bring larger family members occasionally together in Turkey, and hence, as a second aspect, Turkey becomes a common meeting ground for the Somalis worldwide. But, why did diaspora families start to prefer Turkey for the education of their children?

Somali diaspora prefers Turkey for their children's education, because they think that the younger diaspora generation is under the risk of losing moral and cultural identity. Somali scholar Yusuf Omar from SOAS studies the diaspora, and he notes that migrant families feel a moral panic about their children's adaptation to Western culture, which they perceive as an assimilation and corruption of national and religious values (Omar, 2016, p. 73). Turkey, with its Muslim culture and dense Somali population, appears as a secure environment for conservative Somali families living in the diaspora. As a result of this new trend, there emerged a number of private schools in Turkey answering to this transnational call, and one of them is in Ankara, Hamidiye School. Hamidiye was funded as a joint-investment by Turkish and Somali entrepreneurs, and I had a chance to make an interview with the Somali executive assistant of the school, Abdissamed. Previously a Turkey graduate, Abdissamed first came to Turkey in 2012 with Diyanet Scholarship, and he took an active role in the foundation of Tevfik Association in Ankara, one of Somali student unions. Now working as a vice manager at the Hamidiye School, Abdissamed states that the first concern of Somali diaspora is that Western education corrupts Somali youth since the curriculum on gender relations teaches students homosexual contents. Abdissamed explains diaspora families' concerns and how Hamidiye School emerged as follows:

Families choosing this school think that their children are in a moral danger. The primary school curriculum in England legitimizes homosexuality, which is troubling for Somali families. They want their children to grow up in a place with European standards, but under moral protection. They were looking for a safe place, where they can hear the adhan [call to prayer]. Our Turkish investor of the school was in the tourism business before, he saw that people from Somalia and other Muslim countries were coming to Istanbul and Ankara, and there was such a demand. For this purpose, the idea of establishing a school came to the fore.

The school has a capacity of eight hundred students, and it provides education from kindergarten to high school inside a large complex with sport yards and social activity saloons. There are students coming from Sudan, Pakistan, and Iraq, but the majority of students is Somali. The teaching language is English, education and examination procedures are accredited to internationally recognized systems, and students take course materials that are required for a university education in the UK. However, the main attraction of the school for Somali diaspora families is that it combines the modern curriculum with an Islamic education. There are required courses on religious history and moral education, and students learn reading the Qur'an by taking Arabic language courses from the first grade to the end of high school. By this mixture of international and Islamic education, Hamidiye School increases its popularity among Somali families in the Northern Europe. Abdissamed also highlights the importance of religious education for the moral life of believers in the Somali diaspora:

Somalis are a nation of strong faith. You can see Somalis all over the world, because our elders say, if the child's faith is strong, he or she can save his life somehow. If I were in their position, I do not know whether I would send my child here, after all, they have better conditions there. But families have such reservations, they want their children to grow up in an Islamic society. Of course, they can open community schools there, but children are affected by their close environment.

In broad terms, the first scholarship programs initiated a Somali student mobilization toward Turkey, in time the student profile has changed, and now with the diaspora connections it gains a transnational character. First comers Somali students play an important role by their professionalized contacts with Turkish entrepreneurs, and they fill interstitial spaces connecting diaspora mobility, Turkey, and Somalia. With this new trend, the cultural identity of being a Somali in Turkey is about to gain another aspect, where transnational networks brings more Somalis from different parts of the world. I took Professor Yusuf Omar's expert opinions about this diasporic engagement with Turkey. Relying on his previous scholarly works on Somali migration and diasporic culture, Professor Omar told me in our interview the factors and motivations that influenced Somali diaspora for a closer interconnection with Turkey:

This movement did not happen all at once, it is a process that developed over ten years. It started with the aid in 2011 and Turkish Airlines flights to Mogadishu became very important for diaspora mobility. In this way, Somalis had the opportunity to spend a few days in Turkey and get to know this place. Going to Somalia used to be a very long and tiresome route. I remember, I could not

believe my eyes when I saw “Mogadishu” on the screen while waiting for my flight in London airport. Secondly, Turkey is a country where Muslims can find Western standards without having problems for accessing halal food or mosque. Being able to hear the adhan during the day gives you a psychological healing. If you come from Western countries as a Muslim, you may feel lonely and deprived of your right to worship, Turkey can respond to these feelings of the Somalis. Another factor is tourism. In the past, the Somalis in the diaspora used to go to Nairobi, Dubai, or London for a vacation, but now most of them are going to Turkey. As more and more people go to Turkey for health, tourism, education or family reasons, Turkey has become a meeting point for Somalis. In my opinion, Turkey is now the only country where you can meet Somalis from all over the world. This trend continues to evolve.

As Omar states, this trend continues to evolve, but recently Somalis are facing challenges in Turkey and their expectations turns to daily frustrations. Turkey’s economic downturn igniting anti-migrant discourse and xenophobic practices recently. Somali businesses in Ankara became a target of increasing public and official hostility against foreigners in recent years. In Ankara’s city center Kızılay, Somalis had opened restaurants, cargo companies, and hairdressers. However, they became a target of hate speech in national media. *Sözcü* newspaper portrayed Somali shops in Kızılay as a cultural invasion with an anti-immigrant discourse. *Sözcü* daily narrated the news as follows: “The heart of Ankara became Somalia. Businesspeople and asylum seekers from the East African country of Somalia have completely turned two streets in Kızılay, the heart of Ankara, into their own countries.”⁹⁸ Though most of the Somali shopkeepers were former scholarship students graduated from Turkish universities,⁹⁹ Somali businesses in Kızılay faced with constant police investigations and eventually most of them were forced to leave their shops and their cultural environment at the city center.

There are other Somali-run restaurants in a peripheral neighborhood Keçiören, where a dense Somali population lives and buys houses. Afrika Sofrası (Africa Cousin) is one of those Somali restaurants. The owner of the restaurant Bashir states during our interview that they face a lot of pressure in Ankara, unlike Turkish entrepreneurs entering into Somali market freely. Bashir first came to Turkey for his children’s education in 2018, but when he realized the emerging trend from the diaspora to Turkey, he decided

⁹⁸ Yıldırım, C. (2021, April 15). *Ankara’nın göbeği Somali oldu*. *Sözcü*.

<https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2021/gundem/ankaranin-gobegi-somali-oldu-6374193/>

⁹⁹ Turkey’s state-run news agency Anadolu Agency reported the same event with a welcoming tone, as a success story of Somali students. Despite this embracing rhetoric calling Turkish people to explore the Somali cousin, official channels remained silent when the intimidating hate speech targeted the same Somali restaurants in Ankara.

to start an investment, and he owned an apartment in Keçiören, where he runs a hotel at the top floors, the Afrika Sofrası at the entrance, and a market at the ground floor. His expressions reveal that despite the continuing enthusiasm of transnational Somali community to start a living in Turkey, their support and trust to the partnership is not guaranteed any more:

There is a big difference between what we do here and what Turkish companies can do in Somalia. There, companies can enter any sector they want and earn big money, and nothing happens to them. However, there is a lot of pressure on us here. Despite our investment and our economic contribution to the tradesmen in the surrounding area, we are treated like the Syrians. This was the case at Kızılay, too. Yes, we love this country and have no intention of going anywhere else, but if the conditions continue like this, we may have to leave.

6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I analyzed Somali perspective on Turkey's strategic investments by focusing on the recent history of Somali student mobilization toward Turkey. Turkey's scholarship initiatives since 2011 started this mobilization and initiated a diasporic identity formation for young Somalis. First group of students were selected in groups and without providing required information. The despair and hardship they faced in Turkey led firstcomer Somali students to establish student unions. These student organizations provided a rich social network for future applicants and simultaneously they spread a proto-nationalist communitarian spirit among the Somali youth, which appeared as a result of close encounters with the nationalist ecology in Turkey. The second group of students benefited from the informal communication network among Somali students on the one hand, and preferred Turkey in light of their personal expectations. In time, the number of Somalis multiplied, first graduates turned into economic actors, and Somali students' relationship became more professionalized. In this process, Somali identity in Turkey transformed toward a more trade-oriented entrepreneurship while leaving romantic idealization of Turkish nationalism behind. Somali beneficiaries of this process identify Turkey's initiatives and the ongoing partnership between two countries as a win-win outcome. Whereas those left outside this economic field, perceives Turkey's growing power in Somalia as an unequal exchange and as a potential threat of dependency.

The engagement of Somalis continues to evolve with diasporic connections for educational and investment plans. However, this progression makes above critiques more explicit for the Somalis arriving in due to the rising xenophobic mistreatment and

administrative pressure Somali investors face in Turkey. The engagement is continuing now but it has a potential to move forward toward disengagement if the transnational Somali community continues to perceive that Turkey will no longer meet their expectations for an equal partnership. Therefore, through a recent history of Somali student mobilization, it is possible to uncover how recipient society interprets the donor's politics of aid and partnership, which reveal an emerging donor's limits in handling reciprocal outcomes of an aid relationality.



CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This dissertation is about Turkey's politics of aid in Somalia. Scholarship on Turkey's foreign policy toward Africa and its aid relationship with Somalia mostly defines the AKP government's strategies in the soft power framework. This one-sided perspective discards a grounded analysis of processes, ideas, motivations, and values shaping the making of foreign policy and aid. I argued in this dissertation that emerging donors is a global phenomenon and represents a historical trend in international aid architecture. Therefore, we need to question how emerging donors build their politics of aid and what actual site-specific transformations they initiate. For this, I pursued a comparative historical and relational analysis of the formation and application of Turkey's aid politics in Somalia. I focused on Somalia's transnational history of foreign aid history as an internationally interconnected ground to compare the aid politics of Somalia's major donors, namely postcolonial development aid provider Italy, Cold War military aid provider Soviet Union, and post-state collapse humanitarian aid provider Turkey. I mainly argued that though foreign aid takes different forms historically, it enables donor states' expanding their power resources.

7.1 Overview of the chapters

Former imperialist Italy channeled development aid to Somalia's agriculture and road infrastructure in order to restore former banana plantations and to reduce production and transportation cost. Italy's postcolonial politics of aid functioned as a tool to restore Italian-owned banana plantations, to monopolize production and trade of Somali banana,

and mobilize Italian firms to Somalia's domestic market. Somali banana was hardly a profiting crop, yet Italian neo-imperial restoration made it the single export item for Somalia's nascent domestic economy, which created a budget deficit and low accumulation problems. Italian aid between 1950-69, in sum, provided a neo-imperial expansion for Italy by restoring and monopolizing former plantations, while creating an under-accumulation crisis in young Somali state on the one hand, and deepening its dependency to foreign aid on the other.

Somalia's second major donor, the Soviet Union, entered Somalia through military aid. Due to the irredentist ambitions of the young Somali political elite, Western donors were reluctant to offer provide arms and technical assistance for Somali military. Moscow took advantage of this gap and strategically invested in Somalia's military in order to penetrate East Africa and geopolitically counterbalance its US and European rivals. The US and Soviet Union used military aid to win client politicians in rule, and the quid pro quo of military assistance was to reach out Ethiopia's and Somalia's naval facilities facing the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. The intensive militarization of two archenemies Ethiopia and Somalia by Cold War rivals the US and the USSR ignited the Ogaden War in 1978. Barre's irredentist war to incorporate Ogaden back to Somali territories contradicted with Moscow's long term plans in East Africa, and the Soviet Union punished Somalia by switching its side to Ethiopia. While Somalia entered a phase of economic and social disintegration after the Ogaden war, the Soviet Union protected its geopolitical presence in East Africa with the armament and technical support provided the new military regime in Ethiopia. Therefore, Soviet politics of aid in Somalia in particular and East Africa in general used military aid for its geopolitical expansion during the Cold War, which aimed control Red Sea and counterbalance the US presence.

In the third and fourth chapters, I analyzed how Somalia entered Turkey's new foreign policy objectives and how Turkey organized its politics of aid. In the third chapter, I analyzed parliamentary archives between 2002-2015 in order to illustrate Turkey's changing foreign policy discourse on Somalia, which developed from an interest-driven regional leadership claim to a compassionate politics of humanitarian mission. Somalia's entrance into the AKP government's foreign policy radar in 2009 followed the AKP's new multilateral and securitized foreign policy objectives, and as the parliamentary debates reveal the government legitimized sending troops to Somalia considering its international responsibilities, prestige and reputation as a responsible actor, and

commercial interests by securing shipping trade from piracy. Despite opposition in the parliament, the government cadres candidly supported a militarized engagement with Somalia to achieve a new regional status and elevate its expansionist design defended by then Foreign Minister Davutoğlu's strategic depth doctrine. 2011 crisis in Somalia shifted Turkey's discourse toward a humanitarian framework. Humanitarian crisis became an opportunity for the AKP to mobilize a compassionate and solidarist spirit at home, and compassionate politics served the AKP to cloak its foreign policy objectives aiming to expand Turkey's market and diplomatic interests. Therefore, humanitarianism serves as a state policy to pursue interest-driven objectives although humanitarian reason present itself as a disinterested sacrifice to save lives. Plus, this policy and discursive analysis establish that Turkey's humanitarianism cannot be formulated as a soft power, since hard resources and long term material interests foregrounded its emergence as a diplomatic tool.

After the textual examination of parliamentary archives and a discursive analysis of the AKP's foreign policy toward Somalia, in the fourth chapter I pursue an anthropological inquiry of Turkey's aid regime in Somali through expert interviews. I interpret which ethical, political, and economic concerns motivate Turkey's official NGO actors to develop aid projects in Somalia, and I question how they meaningfully frame aid, partnership, and benefits emerging from the so-called partnership. I establish that state-NGO partnership on the ground serve official agencies to expand their organizational network in aid zones through voluntary and solidarist engagements of Turkey's humanitarian and faith-based non-governmental actors. However, rather than being a mere human resource, humanitarian and faith-based NGOs carried moral and political concerns to Somalia, and they blended Islamic ethics, foreign policy concerns, and economic expectations in the making of aid projects. Public-NGO partnership on the one hand, and the parallelism between Islamic and state-led humanitarianism in Somalia on the other, shaped the principal characteristic of Turkey's aid regime, which I define as the co-existence of disinterested and self-interested motives of aid and investment. Faith-based NGOs identified aid for development with aid for charity, and hence claimed a persistent control on aid projects unless the Somalis leave their clan conflicts and reach a development to take over infrastructure projects. Disinterested giving, however, simultaneously brings about a claim for longer stay in Somalia in order to protect charity works from waste and destruction. This, I argued, resemble a "keeping-while-giving" that

Turkey gives development gifts but not actually gives in the name of servicing the Somali community and sustaining a fair partnership, while actually solidifying a permanent stay and opening strategic sectors for further investment beyond health and education fields, such as military training, port management, construction agreements, exploring hydrocarbon reserves in Somalia.

In the last chapter, I questioned the limits of partnership in the context of emerging donors by problematizing the Somali agency as to their experiences, expectations and critiques arising within Turkey's strategic investments. Through in-depth interviews conducted with Somali students, academics, and entrepreneurs, I analyzed positive and negative judgements of the transnational Somali community toward Turkey. Scholarship programs initiated a student mobilization toward Turkey, and increasing number of Somali students shaped a cultural identity and diasporic connections in Turkey. Diasporic connections made Turkey a common meeting point for the transnational Somali community's expectations for education, tourism, and business interests. However, as my field work illuminates, the Somali community's perception of Turkey is at a turning point. Turkey is in an economic crisis and growing xenophobia and discrimination targets Somali residents and entrepreneurs. Turkey's engagement with Somalia continues to grow at different levels and at different scales, but for the Somali community Turkey's image is about to shift from a benign humanitarian actor helping for "brotherhood" toward an external actor gaining disproportional advantages in Somalia while hindering the Somalis benefit equally.

Non-traditional donors become a stable actor in international aid flows and they continue to effect cultural and political formations in emerging partnership geographies. This dissertation contributes to SSCs literature by analyzing Turkey's aid and investment politics in Somalia, and it question transformative outcomes of the partnership for Somalia and transnational Somali community. Turkey's engagement with Somalia has passed a decade now. Though it is early to make conclusive judgements about Turkish and Somali counterparts, this dissertation provides a macro and micro insight to situate interests and limits of an emerging donor. Comparison of different aid regimes in a site-specific case provides detailed illustration of similarities and differences between traditional and emerging donors. As I highlighted in the dissertation, Turkey's foreign aid to Somalia functions as a foreign policy tool of expanding power resources, similar to Italian and Soviet aid. However, Turkey's humanitarian-led aid modality is different from

Italy's development grants and loans and Soviet military assistance. Despite this difference, micro level analysis of practices and motivations of aid actors reveal that humanitarian aid neither detached from political calculations nor disconnected from market benefits. Rather, I argue that gift perspective undercovers the coexistence of apparently two distinct logics, that is the solidarist aid and self-interested investment. Turkey's state-led humanitarian aid provided an opportunity to open up a zone for an emerging power's desires expanding its market and diplomatic opportunities in the posthegemonic world order.

7.2 Contributions of the research

This study provides three contributions. First, considering Turkey as an emerging donor, it illuminates processes in the AKP government's foreign policy objectives and discourse toward Somalia. This constructivist approach to foreign policy analysis is supported with an anthropological study of processes in the organization of aid politics, actors involved in the making of aid projects, and moral and political value systems informing aid and infrastructure projects. Turkey's engagement with Africa has accelerated during the AKP rule and it varied sectors from export trade, agriculture agreements, arms trade, and diplomatic battle to acquire Gülen's school network. However, ten years ago Turkey had only a small influence in the fields listed. Somalia case provided Turkey a remarkable credit as an emerging donor to brand itself in the continent as a reliable and problem solving emerging actor. Turkey's AKP government promoted a benign image in contrast to the exploitative and self-seeking legacy of Western colonial heritage and Northern aid industry. Its capacity to mobilize a compassionate politics with the help of Islamic humanitarian NGOs provided a shell that ideologically supports a claim for disinterestedness. Turkey's new foreign aid politics strategically targeted social sectors, such as education, health, sanitation, and public services like medical screening.

However, this does not lead us to a biased conclusion that Turkey is more humanitarian than previous traditional donors. Rather, what I established in this study is that humanitarianism is never detached from self-interest. It is a state-led moralized form of politics that target bodies to save lives and operates a territorial logic to stay, persist, and act in support of the recipient. This intervention appears disinterested while simultaneously opens up the aid zone for further investment and strategic alliances, which

aims to deterritorialize former donors while territorializing its own symbolic and practical claims for partnership. Aid modalities change from economic, militaristic, to humanitarian aid when we follow different governance forms in the history of international aid system from developmental, Cold War, to emergency relief paradigms. Accordingly, I argue that similar to developmental and Cold War aid regimes, emerging donors and humanitarian aid serve for the same purpose for the donor state's long term interests by creating a spatial opportunity to open up the aid zone for further economic and geostrategic investment, i.e. to expand its power resources. Because of the co-existence of disinterested and self-interested logics, I define Turkey's aid politics in Somalia as a "benevolent expansion" amalgamating solidarist and investment motives in the conception and practicing of development partnership. The limits of its balance and its exploitative nature will be decided by the Somalis, which I discussed in the last chapter.

Second contribution is that the dissertation fills an important gap about the agency of recipient society in emerging development partnerships. The history of foreign aid goes back to colonial times, yet it is almost impossible to include experiences and voices of the recipient due to lack of archival material or scarcity of oral history about traditional donor's aid regimes. However, Turkey's engagement with Somalia, scholarship programs and educational migration waves, and students initiating diasporic networks in Somalia provides this chance for researchers to listen to how the Somali community responds to an emerging donor aid and investment strategies. Certainly, Somali identity cannot be homogenized neither as a migrant group for it has transnational differences across different countries and socio-cultural contexts, nor as a political community for continuing cleavages, tensions, and historical traumas between clan-based identity conflicts. Yet, diasporic networks in Turkey offers a chance to elaborate on the impact of scholarship programs on the formation of a new Somali cultural identity in Turkey on the one hand, and about changing migration patterns and expectations of transnational Somali community deciding to live in Turkey for a while for educational and other interest. Therefore, tracing new paths and patterns in Somali diasporic networks in Turkey gives researchers a door to pursue in-depth research on how different generations perceive Turkey's aid politics, what causes determine positive and negative legitimations toward Turkey's actions as a development partner, and what experiences lead the Somali community to approach or leave Turkey. With its cultural and economic outcomes

(schooling and language imprint, residential investments, and cargo trade from Turkey to Somalia), there is a suitable environment to carry further research on the recipient's agency in a development partnership. This dissertation provides a initial step with an in-dept interpretation of experiences and expectations of the Somali community in Turkey.

The last contribution is methodological. In contrast to formalist and one-sided explanations of emerging donors, this dissertation on the one hand provides a historically integrated account of unequal exchange in the context of SSCs, and on the other hand it reveals actual transformations and impacts of an emerging donor's site-specific aid and investments. It establishes a comparative historical and relational research to study three aid regimes within three international systems (developmental governance, Cold War subservience, and humanitarian control), and the dissertation offers a theoretical reinterpretation of gift literature to explain aid motives and outcomes. Aid as gift may sound as a naïve argument in front of brutal and arrogant state mechanisms, sometimes answering to fluid entrepreneurial demands of business groups and other times responding to atavistic feelings of glory and status, nostalgic energies desiring to be recognized as a potent force. This imperial mindset motivated Italy to turn back to its former colony with economic aid and legitimized its return as a mission to prove its merits in partnership, unselfish support to postcolonial nations, and contribute to development goals of the postwar international system, except the fact that the result proved the opposite of a selfless interest in aid. Soviet Union, though strategic concerns overwhelmed, provided arms to Somalia in the name of leading the anti-imperial and solidarist struggle in the Third World. Moscow's ideologically appealing rhetoric of march to liberation from neo-colonial domination cloaked its realpolitik maneuvers in geopolitical alliances. Comparative inquiry of Somalia's changing aid regimes reveals that the humanitarianism of Turkey as an emerging donor does not alter this aid/investment framework. The analysis of Turkey's humanitarian-led expansion to Somalia from a gift perspective proves that aid and self-interest are not detached from each other. Despite the qualitative difference between aid regimes, foreign aid serves for expanding donor state's power resources and maintains the unequal exchange under new spatial configuration of aid and investment flows. Therefore, the dissertation argues that gift perspective does not euphemize self-interest and material gains, rather it gives us a methodological ground to analyze how self-interest and material gains can work together to create and sustain inter-state transactions (both market and non-market). Maybe, with

a better language, unlike Bourdieu's misconception thesis and his obtruding "reality-denying-reality" terminology, the correct question is how aid actors (policy makers and NGO volunteers) legitimize the coexistence of good will and strategic calculations when aid policy and discourse is orchestrated by the state.

There are two limits effecting the overall architecture of the dissertation. First, I could not take the qualitative research to Mogadishu, and I could not support my anthropological inquiry of aid policy by an ethnographic analysis of local interactions going around Turkey's investment and infrastructure projects. I hope, further research will fill this gap with innovative and critical studies on changing and continuing aspects of emerging aid relationalities in contemporary Somalia. Second, as readers have already noticed, comparative inquiry of Italian, Soviet, and Turkish aid regimes is rather weak. The dissertation can be read as a formalist depiction of economic, military, and humanitarian aid regimes and their reciprocal outcomes for Somalia, but this is inadequate considering a comprehensive historical comparison of Somalia's previous and emerging aid regimes, which should have illuminated common patterns and causes. This, however, requires an expertise in donor state's language and archival research on foreign policy and the making of aid projects, whereas I could only accomplish this task for Turkey. Further research should utilize archives on Italian and Soviet aid politics in Somalia in order to have a clearer depiction of to what extent motives for disinterested aid and expansionist investments parallel each other in developmental and Cold War aid relationalities.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdurahman, A. (2017) *Making Sense of Somali History: Volume 1*. London: Adonis and Abbey Publishers.
- Agnew, J. (2001) 'The New Global Economy: Time-Space Compression, Geopolitics, and Global Uneven Development', *Journal of World-Systems Research*, 7(2), pp. 133–154.
- Ahad, A.M. and Gerrand, V. (2004) 'Italian cultural influences in Somalia. A reciprocity?', *Quaderni del '900*, IV, pp. 13–24.
- Akpınar, P. (2013) 'Turkey's Peacebuilding in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian Diplomacy', *Turkish Studies*, 14(4), pp. 735–757.
- Akpınar, P. (2017) *From Benign Donor to Self-Assured Security provider: Turkey's Policy in Somalia*. IPC Policy Brief, December 2017. Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center.
- Alesina, A. and Dollar, D. (2000) 'Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?', *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5(1), pp. 33–63.
- Allison, R. (1988) *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment in the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Altunışık, M.B. (2014) 'Turkey as an "Emerging Donor" and the Arab Uprisings', *Mediterranean Politics*, 19(3), pp. 333–350.
- Amar, P. (2012) 'Global South to the Rescue: Emerging Humanitarian Superpowers and Globalizing Rescue Industries', *Globalizations*, 9(1), pp. 1–13.

- Amin, S. (1977) 'The "Transfer of Technology"', in *Imperialism and Unequal Development*. New York: Monthly Review Press, pp. 169–177.
- Amin, S. (1992) *Empire of chaos*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Appadurai, A. (1986) 'Introduction: commodities and the politics of value', in A. Appadurai (ed.) *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective*. Cambridge University, pp. 3–63.
- Aras, B. and Akpinar, P. (2015) 'The Role of Humanitarian NGOs in Turkey's Peacebuilding', *International Peacekeeping*, 22(3), pp. 230–247.
- Arecchi, A. (1984) 'City profile: Mogadishu', *Cities*, February, pp. 221–228.
- Arrighi, G. (2010) *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times*. Verso.
- Asmus, G., Fuchs, A. and Müller, A. (2017) *BRICS and Foreign Aid*. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3027620. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.
- Atalay, Z. (2013) 'Civil society as soft power: Islamic NGOs and Turkish foreign policy', in *Turkey between Nationalism and Globalization*. London: Routledge, pp. 165–186.
- Atkinson, D. (2005) 'Constructing Italian Africa: Geography and Geopolitics', in R. Ben-Ghiat and M. Fuller (eds) *Italian Colonialism*. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 14–26.
- Aydın, M. (2010) 'Kafkasya ve Orta Asya'yla İlişkiler', in B. Oran (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikası 2. Cilt: 1980-2001: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*. 12th edn. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 366–439.
- Ayers, A.J. (2013) 'Beyond Myths, Lies and Stereotypes: The Political Economy of a "New Scramble for Africa"', *New Political Economy*, 18(2), pp. 227–257.
- Banfield, E.C. (1963) 'American Foreign Aid Doctrines', in R.A. Goldwin (ed.) *Why foreign aid? Two messages by President Kennedy and Essays*. Rand McNally & Company (Rand McNally Public Affairs Series), pp. 10–31.
- Barre, M.S. (1971a) 'Address to civil servants', in *My Country and My People, Vol. II*. Mogadishu: The Ministry of Information and National Guidance, pp. 39–44.

- Barre, M.S. (1971b) 'An outline of socialism', in *My Country and My People, Vol. II*. Mogadishu: The Ministry of Information and National Guidance, pp. 149–153.
- Barre, M.S. (1971c) 'Army anniversary', in *My Country and My People, Vol. II*. Mogadishu: The Ministry of Information and National Guidance, pp. 87–91.
- Barre, M.S. (1971d) 'Jaalle Siad at OUA summit in Addis Ababa', in *My Country and My People, Vol. II*. Mogadishu: The Ministry of Information and National Guidance, pp. 133–139.
- Barre, M.S. (1971e) 'President Siad opens youth camp', in *My Country and My People, Vol. II*. Mogadishu: The Ministry of Information and National Guidance, pp. 125–131.
- Barre, M.S. (1977) 'Tribute to Somali Air Force', in *My Country and My People - Selected Speeches of Jaalle Siad, Chairman of the SRC 1975*. Mogadishu: The Ministry of Information and National Guidance, pp. 27–32.
- Bataille, G. (1988) *The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy, Volume I*. Zone Books.
- Battuta, I. (2004) *İbn Battuta seyahatnâmesi: I. Cilt*. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.
- Ben-Ghiat, R. and Fuller, M. (2005) 'Introduction', in R. Ben-Ghiat and M. Fuller (eds) *Italian Colonialism*. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–12.
- Benthall, J. (2003) *The Overreaction against Islamic Charities*. Isim Review, 20(1), 6-7. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/17206>
- Benthall, J. and Bellion-Jourdan, J. (2003) *The Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World*. Bloomsbury Academic.
- Bergamaschi, I. and Tickner, A.B. (2017) 'Introduction: South–South Cooperation Beyond the Myths - A Critical Analysis', in I. Bergamaschi, P. Moore, and A.B. Tickner (eds) *South-South Cooperation Beyond the Myths: Rising Donors, New Aid Practices?* London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 1–27.
- Berking, H. (1999) *Sociology of Giving*. SAGE Publications.

- Bhambra, G.K. (2010) 'Historical sociology, international relations and connected histories', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 23(1), pp. 127–143.
- Bornstein, E. (2003) *The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality, and Economics in Zimbabwe*. New York: Routledge.
- Bornstein, E. (2012) *Disquieting Gifts: Humanitarianism in New Delhi, Disquieting Gifts*. California: Stanford University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1990a) 'Symbolic Capital', in *The Logic of Practice*. California: Stanford University Press, pp. 112–121.
- Bourdieu, P. (1990b) 'The work of time', in *The Logic of Practice*. California: Stanford University Press, pp. 98–111.
- Brah, A. (1996) *Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities*. London: Routledge.
- Brind, H. (1983) 'Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa', *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 60(1), pp. 75–95.
- Brković, Č. (2020) 'Gift', in A.D. Lauri (ed.) *Humanitarianism: Keywords*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 79–81.
- Brubaker, R. (2005) 'The "diaspora" diaspora', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28(1), pp. 1–19.
- Bruneau, M. (2010). 'Diasporas, transnational spaces and communities', in R. Bauböck and T. Faist (eds) *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 35–50.
- Buğra, A. and Savaşkan, O. (2014) *New Capitalism in Turkey: The Relationship between Politics, Religion and Business*. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Cagaptay, S. (2020) *Erdogan's Empire: Turkey and the Politics of the Middle East*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Caillé, A. (2013) 'Anti-utilitarianism, economics and the gift-paradigm', in S. Zamagni and L. Bruni (eds) *Handbook on the Economics of Philanthropy, Reciprocity and Social Enterprise*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 44–48.

- Cannon, B. (2016) *Deconstructing Turkey's Efforts in Somalia*. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2872980. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.
- Carrier, J. (1991) 'Gifts, Commodities, and Social Relations: A Maussian View of Exchange', *Sociological Forum*, 6(1), pp. 119–136.
- Cassanelli, L. (2003) 'Explaining the Somali Crisis', in C. Besteman and L. Cassanelli (eds) *The Struggle For Land In Southern Somalia: The War Behind The War*. London: Haan Publishing, pp. 13–26.
- Cassanelli, L. (2015) *Hosts and Guests: A historical interpretation of land conflicts in southern and central Somalia*. London: Rift Valley Institute.
- Cassanelli, L.V. (1982) *The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600-1900*. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Castagno, A.A. (1959) 'Somalia. International Conciliation, 32, 339-[ii].', *International Conciliation*, 32, pp. 339–400.
- Cohen, R. (2009) *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*. London: Routledge.
- Cooper, F. (2010) 'Writing the History of Development', *Journal of Modern European History*, 8(1), pp. 5–23.
- Cooper, F. and Packard, R. (1997) 'Introduction', in F. Cooper and R. Packard (eds) *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 1–41.
- Crush, J. (2005) 'Introduction: Imagining Development', in J. Crush (ed.) *Power of Development*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 1–21.
- Çelik, N. and İşeri, E. (2016) 'Islamically oriented humanitarian NGOs in Turkey: AKP foreign policy parallelism', *Turkish Studies*, 17(3), pp. 429–448.
- Çevik, B.S. (2015) 'The Benefactor: NGOs and Humanitarian Aid', in B.S. Çevik and P. Seib (eds) *Turkey's Public Diplomacy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US (Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy), pp. 121–152.

- Chin, G. and Quadir, F. (2012) 'Introduction: rising states, rising donors and the global aid regime', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25(4), pp. 493–506.
- Clapham, C. (1981) 'The Soviet Experience in the Horn of Africa', in E.J. Feuchtwanger and P. Nailor (eds) *The Soviet Union and the Third World*. London: Macmillan Press, pp. 202–224.
- Çomak, İ. (2011) 'Türkiye'nin Afrika Politikası ve Sağlık Sektöründe Çalışan Türk STK'ların TİKA'nın Desteğinde Afrika'da Yürüttüğü Faaliyetlerin Bu Politikaya Etkisi', *Avrasya Etüdleri*, 40(2), pp. 10–31.
- David, S. (1979) 'Realignment in the Horn: The Soviet Advantage', *International Security*, 4(2), pp. 69–90.
- Davidson, B. (1975) 'Somalia: towards socialism', *Race & Class*, 17(1), pp. 19–37.
- Davutoğlu, A. (2008) 'Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007', *Insight Turkey*, 10(1), pp. 77–96.
- Davutoğlu, A. (2013) 'Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy: objectives, challenges and prospects', *Nationalities Papers*, 41(6), pp. 865–870.
- De Vries, P. (2007) 'Don't compromise your desire for development! A Lacanian/Deleuzian rethinking of the anti-politics machine', *Third World Quarterly*, 28(1), pp. 25–43.
- Dillon, W.S. (2003) *Gifts and Nations: The Obligation to Give, Receive and Repay*. New York: Transaction Publishers.
- Donelli, F. and Gonzalez-Levaggi, A. (2016) 'Becoming Global Actor: The Turkish Agenda for the Global South', *Rising Powers Quarterly*, 1(2), pp. 93–115.
- Douglas, M. (2002) 'Foreword - No free gifts', in Mauss, M., *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. ix–xxiii.
- Dwyer, C. (2010) 'Diasporas and economies', in K. Knott and S. McLoughlin. (eds) *Diasporas: Concepts, Intersections, Identities*. London: Zed Books, pp. 87–90.

- Engerman, D.C. (2017) 'Development Politics and the Cold War', *Diplomatic History*, 41(1), pp. 1–19.
- Escobar, A. (1995) *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Eyben, R. (2006a) 'Introduction', in *Relationships for Aid*. London: Earthscan, pp. 1–18.
- Eyben, R. (2006b) 'The Power of the Gift and the New Aid Modalities', *IDS Bulletin*, 37(6), pp. 88–98.
- Faist, T. (2010) 'Diaspora and transnationalism: What kind of dance partners?', in R. Bauböck and T. Faist (eds) *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 9–34.
- Farah, A.O. and Barack, C.O. (2019) 'The quest for Turkish scholarships : African students, transformation and hopefulness', *African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development*, 11(7), pp. 883–892.
- Farah, A.O., Muchie, M. and Gundel, J. (2007) 'Introduction', in M. Muchie, A.O. Farah, and J. Gundel (eds) *Somalia: Diaspora and State Reconstitution in the Horn of Africa*. First Edition. London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd, pp. xi–xviii.
- Fassin, D. (2012) *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Fassin, D. (2013) 'The Predicament of Humanitarianism', *Qui Parle*, 22(1), pp. 33–48.
- Feldman, I. (2015) 'Anthropology and humanitarianism in the Middle East', in S. Altorki (ed.) *A Companion to the Anthropology of the Middle East*. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 262–281.
- Ferguson, J. (1994a) 'The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development" and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho', *The Ecologist*, 24(5), pp. 176–181.
- Ferguson, J. (1994b) *The Anti-politics Machine: 'development,' Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. U of Minnesota Press.

- Ferrari, C. (2013) *The Rhetoric of Violence and Sacrifice in Fascist Italy: Mussolini, Gadda, Vittorini*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Frank, A.G. (1969) 'The Development of Underdevelopment', in *Latin America: underdevelopment or revolution: Essays on the Development of Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy*. New York: Monthly Review Press, pp. 3–17.
- Furia, A. (2015) *The Foreign Aid Regime: Gift-Giving, States and Global Dis/Order*. Springer.
- Gilroy, P. (1997) 'Diaspora and the Detours of Identity', in K. Woodward (ed.) *Identity and Difference*. SAGE Publications, pp. 301–343.
- Godbout, J.T. (2000) 'Homo donator versus homo oeconomicus', in A. Vandeveld (ed.) *Gifts and Interests*. Leuven: Peeters Publishers, pp. 23–46.
- Gofman, A. (1998) 'A vague but suggestive concept: the "total social fact"', in W. James and N.J. Allen (eds) *Marcel Mauss: A Centenary Tribute*. Berghahn Books, pp. 63–70.
- Gould, J. (2004) 'Introducing Aidnography', in *Ethnographies of Aid - Exploring development texts and encounters*. Roskilde University, Roskilde: Roskilde Universitet, pp. 1–14.
- Granovetter, M.S. (1973) 'The Strength of Weak Ties', *American Journal of Sociology*, 78(6), pp. 1360–1380.
- Gray, K. and Gills, B.K. (2016) 'South–South cooperation and the rise of the Global South', *Third World Quarterly*, 37(4), pp. 557–574.
- Gregory, C.A. (1982) *Gifts and Commodities*. London: Academic Press.
- Griffin, K. (1991) 'Foreign Aid after the Cold War', *Development and Change*, 22(4), pp. 645–685.
- Gu, J. et al. (2016) in J. Gu, A. Shankland, and A. Chenoy (eds) *The BRICS in International Development*. Springer.

- Gudeman, S. (2001) *The Anthropology of Economy: Community, Market, and Culture*. Wiley.
- Gundel, J. (2002) 'The Migration–Development Nexus: Somalia Case Study', *International Migration*, 40(5), pp. 255–281.
- Haines, C.G. (1947) 'The Problem of the Italian Colonies', *Middle East Journal*, 1(4), pp. 417–431.
- Hall, S. (1990) 'Cultural Identity and Diaspora', in J. Rutherford (ed.) *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*. London: Lawrence & Wishart, pp. 222–237.
- Hart, K. (2007) 'Marcel Mauss: In Pursuit of the Whole. A Review Essay', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 49(2), pp. 473–485.
- Hart, K. (2014) 'Marcel Mauss's economic vision, 1920–1925: Anthropology, politics, journalism', *Journal of Classical Sociology*, 14(1), pp. 34–44.
- Harvey, D. (2003) *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hattori, T. (2001) 'Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid', *Review of International Political Economy*, 8(4), pp. 633–660.
- Hattori, T. (2003) 'The Moral Politics of Foreign Aid', *Review of International Studies*, 29(2), pp. 229–247.
- Haug, S., Braveboy-Wagner, J. and Maihold, G. (2021) 'The “Global South” in the study of world politics: examining a meta category', *Third World Quarterly*, 42(9), pp. 1923–1944.
- Hazar, N. (2018) *Sovyet tehdidinin gölgesinde Türk dış politikası : Kuzey Afrika örneği*. Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü.
- Heins, V.M., Unrau, C. and Avram, K. (2018) 'Gift-giving and reciprocity in global society: Introducing Marcel Mauss in international studies', *Journal of International Political Theory*, 14(2), pp. 126–144.
- Hobson, J.A. (2005) *Imperialism: A Study*. New York: Cosimo Classics.

- Hynes, W. and Scott, S. (2013) *The Evolution of Official Development Assistance: Achievements, Criticisms and a Way Forward*. Paris: OECD.
- Ivanova, L. (2019) 'Somali Students in the Soviet Union (1960-1978)', *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies*, 18(1).
- Kaag, M. (2007) 'Aid, Umma, and Politics: Transnational Islamic Ngos in Chad', in B.F. Soares and R. Otaeyek (eds) *Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, pp. 85–102.
- Kalın, İ. (2011) 'Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey', *PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs*, 16(3), pp. 5–23.
- Kapteijns, L. (2012) *Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Kapteijns, L. and Arman, A. (2008) 'Educating Immigrant Youth in the United States: An Exploration of the Somali Case', *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies*, 4(1).
- Kearn, D.W. (2011) 'The hard truths about soft power', *Journal of Political Power*, 4(1), pp. 65–85.
- Keyman, E.F. and Sazak, O. (2014) 'Turkey as a "Humanitarian State"', *POMEAS Policy Papers*, 2, pp. 1–15.
- Keyman, F. and Gümüşcü, Ş. (2014) *Democracy, Identity and Foreign Policy in Turkey: Hegemony Through Transformation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kharas, H. (2007) *The New Reality of Aid*. The Brookings Institution Report. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-new-reality-of-aid/>
- Kiely, R. (2016) *The Rise and Fall of Emerging Powers: Globalisation, US Power and the Global North-South Divide*. Springer.
- Kingsbury, D. (2004) 'Introduction', in D. Kingsbury et al. (eds) *Key Issues in Development*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–21.

- Kingsbury, D. *et al.* (2008) *International Development: Issues and Challenges*. Macmillan International Higher Education.
- Kirişçi, K. (2009) 'The transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The rise of the trading state', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 40(Special Issue on Turkish Foreign Policy), pp. 29–56.
- Kirişçi, K. and Kaptanoğlu, N. (2011) 'The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 47(5), pp. 705–724.
- Kleist, N. (2008) 'Mobilising "The Diaspora": Somali Transnational Political Engagement', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 34(2), pp. 307–323.
- Kochuyt, T. (2009) 'God, Gifts and Poor People: On Charity in Islam', *Social Compass*, 56(1), pp. 98–116.
- Korkut, U. and Civelekoglu, I. (2013) 'Becoming a Regional Power While Pursuing Material Gains: The Case of Turkish Interest in Africa', *International Journal*, 68(1), pp. 187–203.
- Kragelund, P. (2008) 'The Return of Non-DAC Donors to Africa: New Prospects for African Development?', *Development Policy Review*, 26(5), pp. 555–584.
- Kragelund, P. (2011) 'Back to BASICS? The Rejuvenation of Non-traditional Donors' Development Cooperation with Africa', *Development and Change*, 42(2), pp. 585–607.
- Kusow, A.M. (2007) 'From Mogadishu to Dixon: Conceptualising the Somali Diaspora', in M. Muchie, A.O. Farah, and J. Gundel (eds) *Somalia: Diaspora and State Reconstitution in the Horn of Africa*. First Edition. London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd, pp. 34–42.
- Labanca, N. (2018) 'Exceptional Italy? The Many Ends of the Italian Colonial Empire', in M. Thomas and A.S. Thompson (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire*, pp. 123–143.
- Laitin, D.D. (1976) 'The Political Economy of Military Rule in Somalia', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 14(3), pp. 449–468.

- Laitin, D.D. (1993) 'The Economy', in H.C. Metz (ed.) *Somalia: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, pp. 121–148.
- Laitin, D.D. and Samatar, S.S. (1984) 'Somalia and the World Economy', *Review of African Political Economy*, (30), pp. 58–72.
- Lancaster, C. (2007) *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Langan, M. (2017) 'Virtuous power Turkey in sub-Saharan Africa: the "Neo-Ottoman" challenge to the European Union', *Third World Quarterly*, 38(6), pp. 1399–1414.
- Langer, W.L. (1935) 'A Critique of Imperialism', *Foreign Affairs*, 14(1), pp. 102–119.
- Larebo, H. (2005) 'Empire Building and its Limitations: Ethiopia (1935-1941)', in R. Ben-Ghiat and M. Fuller (eds) *Italian Colonialism*. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 83–94.
- Le Sage, A. (2007) 'Islamic Charities in Somalia', in J.B. Alterman and K.V. Hippel (eds) *Understanding Islamic Charities*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Lee, C.J. (2010) 'Introduction - Between Moment and an Era: The Origins and Afterlives of Bandung', in C.J. Lee (ed.) *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives*. Athens: Ohio University Press, pp. 1–42.
- Lee, J.-W. and Gray, K. (2016) 'Neo-Colonialism in South–South Relations? The Case of China and North Korea', *Development and Change*, 47(2), pp. 293–316.
- Lefebvre, J.A. (1992) 'The Geopolitics of the Horn of Africa', *Middle East Policy*, 1(3), pp. 7–22.
- Lefebvre, J.A. (1998) 'The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali-Soviet Arms Deal: Containment and the Balance of Power Dilemma in the Horn of Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36(4), pp. 611–643.
- Lenin, V.I. (1974) 'Imperialism and Socialism in Italy', in *Lenin Collected Works*. Progress Publisher, pp. 357–366. <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/aug/x03.htm> (Accessed: 14 May 2021).

- Lenin, V.I. (1989) *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. New York: International Publishers.
- Leva, A.E. (1950) 'The Italian Trusteeship on Somaliland', *East and West*, 1(1), pp. 23–27.
- Lewis, I.M. (1988) *A Modern History Of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*. Boulder & London: Westview Press.
- Lewis, I.M. (1993) *Understanding Somalia: Guide to Culture, History and Social Institutions*. HAAN Associates.
- Lewis, I.M. (1994) *Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society*. The Red Sea Press.
- Lewis, I.M. (2008) *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society*. Columbia University Press.
- Liebersohn, H. (2010) *The Return of the Gift: European History of a Global Idea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Longrigg, S.H. (1945) 'Disposal of Italian Africa', *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 21(3), pp. 363–369.
- Maggi, S. (1997) 'The Railways of Italian Africa: Economic, Social and Strategic Features', *The Journal of Transport History*, 18(1), pp. 54–71.
- Mallard, G. (2011) "'The Gift' Revisited: Marcel Mauss on War, Debt, and the Politics of Reparations', *Sociological Theory*, 29(4), pp. 225–247.
- Mallard, G. (2018) 'The gift as colonial ideology? Marcel Mauss and the solidarist colonial policy in the interwar era', *Journal of International Political Theory*, 14(2), pp. 183–202.
- Mallard, G. (2019) *Gift Exchange: The Transnational History of a Political Idea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Manning, R. (2006) 'Will "Emerging Donors" Change the Face of International Co-operation?', *Development Policy Review*, 24(4), pp. 371–385.

- Mauss, M. (2002) *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Mawdsley, E. (2012) 'The changing geographies of foreign aid and development cooperation: contributions from gift theory', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 37(2), pp. 256–272.
- Mawdsley, E. (2018) 'The "Southernisation" of development?', *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*, 59(2), pp. 173–185.
- Mazov, S. (2003) 'The USSR and the Former Italian Colonies, 1945–50', *Cold War History*, 3(3), pp. 49–78.
- Mehmet, O. (1971) 'Effectiveness of Foreign Aid-The Case of Somalia', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 9(1), pp. 31–47.
- Menkhaus, K. (1997) 'U.S. Foreign Assistance to Somalia: Phoenix From the Ashes?', *Middle East Policy*, 5(1), pp. 124–149.
- Menkhaus, K. (2003) 'From Feast to Famine: Land and the State in Somalia's Lower Jubba Valley', in C. Besteman and L. Cassanelli (eds) *The Struggle For Land In Southern Somalia: The War Behind The War*. London: Haan Publishing, pp. 133–153.
- Menkhaus, K. and Craven, K. (2003) 'Land Alienation and the Imposition of State Farms in the Lower Jubba Valley', in C. Besteman and L. Cassanelli (eds) *The Struggle For Land In Southern Somalia: The War Behind The War*. London: Haan Publishing, pp. 155–177.
- Mitchell, T. (2005) 'The Object of Development: America's Egypt', in J. Crush (ed.) *Power of Development*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 125–151.
- Mittermaier, A. (2019) *Giving to God: Islamic Charity in Revolutionary Times*. California: University of California Press.
- Moore, G. (2011) *Politics of the Gift: Exchanges in Poststructuralism*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

- Mosse, D. (2005) *Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice*. London: Pluto Press.
- Mosse, D. (2013) 'The Anthropology of International Development', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 42(1), pp. 227–246.
- Murphy, T. and Woods, A. (2014) *Turkey's international development framework case study: Somalia*. Istanbul: IPC-Mercator Policy Brief, p. 36.
- Mursal, F. (2015) 'Disclaiming the Diaspora: Somali Forced Migrants in Cairo and "the Other Abroad"', *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies*, 14(1).
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. and Tafira, K. (2019) 'The invention of the global South and the politics of South–South solidarity', in E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and P. Daley (eds) *Routledge Handbook of South-South Relations*. New York: Routledge, pp. 127–140.
- Nkrumah, K. (1964a) 'Neo-colonialism in Africa', in *Africa Must Unite*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, pp. 173–193.
- Nkrumah, K. (1964b) 'Towards Economic Independence', in *Africa Must Unite*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, pp. 107–117.
- Nkrumah, K. (1966) 'The Mechanisms of Neo-Colonialism', in *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. New York: International Publishers, pp. 239–254.
- Nye, J.S. (2004) *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Nyerere, J.K. (1968) 'The Arusha Declaration', in *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 13–37.
- Ofcansky, T. (1993) 'National Security', in H.C. Metz (ed.) *Somalia: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, pp. 181–225.
- Ohlin, G. (1966) *Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered*. Paris: Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

- Omar, Y.S. (2016) 'Identity and Sense of Belonging of Young Somali Men in a Western Context: Case Studies from Melbourne and Minneapolis', *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies*, 16(1).
- Öniş, Z. (2011) 'Multiple Faces of the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique', *Insight Turkey*, 13(1), pp. 47–65.
- Oran, B. (2012) 'Preface: A Proactive policy with Many Hunches on the Back', in K. Öktem, A. Kadioğlu, and M. Karli (eds) *Another Empire?: A Decade of Turkey's Foreign Policy Under the Justice and Development Party*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi yayınları, pp. xv–xxiii.
- Osteen, M. (2013) 'Gift or commodity?', in M. Osteen (ed.) *The Question of the Gift: Essays Across Disciplines*. New York: Routledge, pp. 229–247.
- Osteen, M. (2013) 'Introduction: Question of the gift' in M. Osteen (ed.) *The Question of the Gift: Essays Across Disciplines*. New York: Routledge, pp. 1–42.
- Ozkan, B. (2014) 'Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism', *Survival*, 56(4), pp. 119–140.
- Ozkan, M. (2010) 'Turkey's Rising Role in Africa', *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 9(4), pp. 93–105.
- Ozkan, M. (2012) 'Transnational Islam, immigrant NGOs and poverty alleviation: The case of the IGMG', *Journal of International Development*, 24(4), pp. 467–484.
- Özkan, M. (2013) 'Does "rising power" mean "rising donor"? Turkey's development aid in Africa', *Africa Review*, 5(2), pp. 139–147.
- Özkan, M. (2017) 'The Turkish Way of Doing Development Aid?: An Analysis from the Somali Laboratory', in I. Bergamaschi, P. Moore, and A.B. Tickner (eds) *South-South Cooperation Beyond the Myths: Rising Donors, New Aid Practices?* London: Palgrave Macmillan
- Palumbo, P. (2003) 'Introduction', in P. Palumbo (ed.) *A Place in the Sun: Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to the Present*. California: University of California Press, pp. 1–14.

- Pankhurst, E.S. (1969) *Ex-Italian Somaliland*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Parlar Dal, E. (2016) 'Conceptualising and testing the "emerging regional power" of Turkey in the shifting international order', *Third World Quarterly*, 37(8), pp. 1425–1453.
- Patman, R.G. (1990) *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Parry, J. (1986) 'The Gift, the Indian Gift and the "Indian Gift"', *Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, 21(3), pp. 453-473.
- Perroux, F. (1954) 'The Gift: Its Economic Meaning in Contemporary Capitalism', *Diogenes*, 2(6), pp. 1–21.
- Petersen, M.J. (2015) *For Humanity Or For The Umma?: Aid and Islam in Transnational Muslim NGOs*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Polezzi, L. (2014) 'Description, appropriation, transformation: Fascist rhetoric and colonial nature', *Modern Italy*, 19(3), pp. 287–303.
- Pomerantz, P.R. (2004) *Aid Effectiveness in Africa: Developing Trust between Donors and Governments*. Lexington Books.
- Power, M. (2019) *Geopolitics and Development*. New York: Routledge.
- Prunier, G. (2010) 'Benign Neglect versus La Grande Somalia: the Colonial Legacy and the Post-colonial Somali State', in M.V. Hoehne and V. Luling (eds) *Peace and Milk, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society, and Politics: Essays in Honour of I.M. Lewis*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 35–49.
- Rawson, D. (1994) 'Dealing with Disintegration: U.S. Assistance and the Somali State', in A.I. Samatar (ed.) *The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal?* London: L. Rienner Publishers, pp. 147–187.
- Redfield, P. (2012) 'Sacrifice, Triage, and Global Humanitarianism', in M. Barnett and T.G. Weiss (eds) *Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 196–2014.

- Rhi-Sausi, J.L. and Zupi, M. (2009) 'Trends in the Debate on Italian Aid', in O. Stokke and P. Hoebink (eds) *Perspectives on European Development Cooperation: Policy and Performance of Individual Donor Countries and the EU*. New York: Routledge, pp. 336–377.
- Richards, L. and Richards, L. (1977) 'The Context of Foreign Aid: Modern Imperialism', *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 9(4), pp. 43–75.
- Rist, G. (2008) *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith*. Zed Books.
- Rivlin, B. (1949) 'The Italian Colonies and the General Assembly', *International Organization*, 3(3), pp. 459–470.
- Safran, W. (1991) 'Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return', *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, 1(1), pp. 83–99.
- Sahlins, M. (2017) 'The Spirit of the Gift', in *Stone Age Economics*. Taylor & Francis.
- Samatar, A.I. (1988) *Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality*. London: Zed Books.
- Samatar, A.I. (1989) *The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia, 1884–1986*. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Samatar, A.I. (2000) 'The Somali Catastrophe: Explanation and Implications', in E. Braathen, M. Bøås, and G. Saether (eds) *Ethnicity Kills?: The Politics of War, Peace and Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa*. London: Macmillan Press, pp. 37–67.
- Samatar, A.I. (2013) 'The Production of Somali Conflict and the Role of Internal and External Actors', in R. Bereketeab (ed.) *The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security*. London: Pluto Press, pp. 156–177.
- Samatar, S.S. (1982) *Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism: The Case of Sayid Mahammad 'Abdille Hasan*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Samatar, S.S. (1993) 'Historical Setting', in H.C. Metz (ed.) *Somalia: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress (Area handbook series), pp. 1–53.

- Schmidt, E. (2013) *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Schwab, P. (1978) 'Cold War on the Horn of Africa', *African Affairs*, 77(306), pp. 6–20.
- Segrè, C. (1996) 'Italy and Classical Theories of the "New Imperialism": the Missing Italian Case', in C. Ghezzi (ed.) *Fonti e Problemi Della Politica Coloniale Italiana: Atti del Convegno, Taormina-Messina, 23-29 ottobre 1989*. Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali, Ufficio centrale per i beni archivistici.
- Sidiropoulos, E., Fues, T. and Chaturvedi, S. (2012) 'Introduction', in S. Chaturvedi, T. Fues, and E. Sidiropoulos (eds) *Development Cooperation and Emerging Powers: New Partners or Old Patterns?* London: Zed Books, pp. 1–10.
- Silk, J. (2004) 'Caring at a distance: gift theory, aid chains and social movements', *Social & Cultural Geography*, 5(2), pp. 229–251.
- Six, C. (2009) 'The Rise of Postcolonial States as Donors: a challenge to the development paradigm?', *Third World Quarterly*, 30(6), pp. 1103–1121.
- Stirrat, R.L. and Henkel, H. (1997) 'The Development Gift: The Problem of Reciprocity in the NGO World', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 554, pp. 66–80.
- Strangio, D. (2012) *The Reasons for Underdevelopment: The Case of Decolonisation in Somaliland*. Berlin: Physica-Verlag.
- Swamy, R. (2017) 'Humanitarianism and Unequal Exchange', *Journal of World-Systems Research*, 23(2), pp. 353–371.
- Swamy, R. (2021) *Building Back Better in India: Development, NGOs, and Artisanal Fishers After the 2004 Tsunami*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Tabak, H. (2015) 'Broadening the Nongovernmental Humanitarian Mission: The IHH and Mediation', *Insight Turkey*, 17(3), pp. 193–215.
- Tan-Mullins, M., Mohan, G. and Power, M. (2010) 'Redefining "Aid" in the China–Africa Context', *Development and Change*, 41(5), pp. 857–881.

- Testart, A. (1998) 'Uncertainties of the "obligation to reciprocate": A critique of Mauss', in W. James and N.J. Allen (eds) *Marcel Mauss: A Centenary Tribute*. New York: Berghahn Books, pp. 97-110.
- Thorbecke, E. (2000) 'The evolution of the development doctrine and the role of foreign aid, 1950–2000', in F. Tarp and P. Hjertholm (eds) *Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future*. London: Routledge, pp. 12–35.
- Tosone, L. (2011) 'Italy's Policy of Cooperation for Development: A "Natural Vocation" for Rhetoric?', *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, (25), pp. 125–144.
- Touval, S. (1963) *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*. Harvard University Press.
- Tölölyan, K. (1996) 'Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment', *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, 5(1), pp. 3-36.
- Tripodi, P. (1998) 'Italy and Somalia: a Singular Relationship', *International Relations*, 14(1), pp. 51–64.
- Tripodi, P. (1999a) 'Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia's Troubled Independence', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 32(2/3), pp. 359–380.
- Tripodi, P. (1999b) *The Colonial Legacy in Somalia: Rome and Mogadishu: from Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope*. London: Macmillan Press.
- Triulzi, A. (2003) 'Adwa: from monument to document', *Modern Italy*, 8(1), pp. 95–108.
- Tuğal, C. (2009) *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Tugal, C. (2016) *The Fall of the Turkish Model: How the Arab Uprisings Brought Down Islamic Liberalism*. London: Verso Books.
- Tugal, C. (2017) *Caring for the poor. Islamic and Christian benevolence in a liberal world*. New York: Routledge.

- Turhan, Y. and Bahçecik, Ş.O. (2021) 'The agency of faith-based NGOs in Turkish humanitarian aid policy and practice', *Turkish Studies*, 22(1), pp. 141–159.
- Urbano, A. (2016) "'That is why we have troubles": The Pro-Italia Movement's Challenge to Nationalism in British-Occupied Somalia (1946-9)', *The Journal of African History*, 57(3), pp. 323–344.
- Wallerstein, I. (2006) *World-systems Analysis: An Introduction*. Duke University Press.
- Wallerstein, I.M. (2003) *The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World*. New Press.
- Ware, G. (1965) 'Somalia: From Trust Territory to Nation, 1950-1960', *Phylon* (1960-), 26(2), pp. 173–185.
- Wasuge, M. (2016) *Turkey's Assistance Model in Somalia: Achieving Much With Less*. Mogadishu: The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies.
- Weber, H. (2016) 'The Political Significance of Bandung for Development: Challenges, Contradictions and Struggles for Justice', in Q.N. Phạm and R. Shilliam (eds) *Meanings of Bandung: Postcolonial Orders and Decolonial Visions*. London: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 153–164.
- Weiner, A.B. (1992) *Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-While Giving*. University of California Press.
- Wheeler, T. (2011) 'Ankara to Africa: Turkey's outreach since 2005', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 18(1), pp. 43–62.
- White, J. (1974) *The Politics of Foreign Aid*. London: Bodley Head.
- Woods, N. (2008) 'Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in development assistance', *International Affairs*, 84(6), pp. 1205–1221.
- Yordanov, R.A. (2016) *The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War: Between Ideology and Pragmatism*. Lanham: Lexington Books