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“TURKEY- EU RELATIONS AND IT’S FUTURE”

**The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University**

by

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

TURKEY- EU RELATIONS AND IT'S FUTURE

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This thesis analyzes the process of both the European integration process from the beginning till now and the Turkey- EU relations. It also analyzes the existing situation in the lights of the past and gives knowledge to the readers the developments that had happened throughout this long process. In addition, it tries to make anticipations about the future of European Union and Turkey- EU relations.

Keywords: EU, Turkey- EU Relations, Future of EU

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE-AB İLİŞKİLERİ VE GELECEĞİ

Yaycıoğlu, Zeynep

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Yüksel İnan

Aralık 2004

Bu çalışma başlangıcından bugüne kadar olan Avrupa bütünleşme sürecini ve Türkiye- AB ilişkilerini analiz ediyor. Bunun yanı sıra, geçmişin ışığında a su an içinde bulunan durumu anlatarak okuyucuya bu geniş dönemdeki gelişmeleri anlatıyor. Ayrıca, bütün bunlardan yola çıkarak hem AB ‘nin geleceği hem de Türkiye- AB ilişkileri hakkında geleceğe yönelik tahminler yapmaya çalışıyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AB, AB- Türkiye İlişkileri, AB’nin Geleceği

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AP	:	Accession Partnership
CEES	:	Central and Eastern European States
CFSP	:	Common Foreign and Security Policy.
EC	:	European Community
ECSC	:	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	:	European Defense Committee
EEC	:	European Economic Community
EFTA	:	European Free Trade Association
EPC	:	European Political Committee
ESDP	:	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	:	European Union
EUMC	:	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	:	European Union Military Staff
EURATOM	:	European Atomic Energy Community
NATO	:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NP	:	National Program
OECD	:	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PSC	:	Politic and Security Committee
TRT	:	Turkish Radio Television
UN	:	United Nations
USA	:	United States of America

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Turkey isolated herself from the West till the end of the 1920's due to the War of Independence and certain events that had lead Turkey to stand against the West. For example: Mosul Case, Etablis Dispute, etc.

At the end of the 1920's, as the revisionist states started to display their policies, Turkey turned its face to the West by the end of the 1920's and became a member of The League of Nations. This line of being a member of the Western block foreign policy has continued in pre and post war periods and has become one of the foreign policy objectives of the Turkish Republic. Consistent with this aim, Turkey became an almost original member of the Council of Europe. This political link paved the way for military alliances with the West: Such as full membership to NATO, and later at the end of the 1990's to Western European Union as an associate member.

The political integration of Turkey, which started by the Council of Europe, later turned out to an economic integration by the conclusion of the Ankara Agreement in 1963 by the EEC. As the EEC developed and started to turn out to be a political union, Turkey's relations with this organization also continued. Despite certain interruptions resulted from Turkish domestic and foreign policy objectives and economic problems, Turkey raised its clear desire to be a part of the this new identity. Turkey, in 1987, when this new identity was not ready for enlargement,

applied to be a member to the ECSC, EEC, and to the EURATOM. However, its application was refused on the grounds that the organization was not ready for a new enlargement till the establishment of a single market among its members. This decision did not discourage Turkey and it renewed its application to the EU for full membership in 1997. This desire of Turkey was positively responded in 11-12, December 1999 by declaring it as a candidate state, on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states.

Although the process of Turkish membership is slow when compare with the others and involves much more complexity due to its *sui-generous* character of this relationship, it has been evolving. However, not only the nature of this relationship has been evolving but also the actors and their preferences have been changing depending on internal and external circumstances. It is clear that EU membership is a desired outcome of Turkey's long lasting foreign policy objectives and also a consistent one. Therefore, from Turkey's point of view there is no problem and all the domestic arrangements have already being made for the realization of this process under the light of "Annual Progress Reports". However, from the EU point of view, the story is different and much more problematic. As it is clearly known, EU has been facing dilemmas and uncertainties regarding its role in the international conjecture and despite the clues, and some attempts; no formal and binding action, which indicates the EU's sincerity, has been taken place yet to prove the EU's sincerity to answer clearly. The members still did not reach to a consensus about the future of EU. Some remarking developments were done and further developments are still planned to be done but nothing seems clear and fully agreed yet, till the

approval of the European Constitution, by its members according to their domestic law procedures.

By taking these realities into consideration, in order to be objective, this study while examining these relations, also tries to analyze the dynamics of the Union. It should be noteworthy that as it is mentioned in the constitutional, and also in some formal documents of the Union, an admission of a new member does not only depend on the fulfillment of the required political and economic criteria but also depends on the conditions of EU itself, as an international identity and most probably to the domestic factors of this identity. As Romano Prodi mentions, the EU has to decide on what kind of a Union the EU desires. EU has to develop its own identity and clarify the future role of the EU, which everybody agrees on.¹ Therefore, the preferences and choices of EU in accordance with the conditions of international system will be one of the determining factors in this relationship.

This research aims to give knowledge to the reader and to the researchers, the developments that had happened throughout this long process. In addition, the timing of this research also seems appropriate, as the time is getting closer for the EU to decide upon for the accession negotiation with Turkey leading to membership. In addition, the systematic changes within the international environment have indeed gained a momentum after September 11. Turkey, after these events, now regained the opportunity to preserve its pre-strategic importance that it used to have during the Cold War. This reality has not only affected the relationship between EU and Turkey but also the preferences of these actors. Therefore, their preferences specifically the

¹ Robert J. Guttman, *Europe In the New Century: Visions of an Emerging Superpower*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, foreword

preference of the EU regarding its future will establish the destiny of Turkey and EU relations.

This dissertation aims to reflect, the developments that had happened since 1960's between the parties. In addition, by analyzing the past, by emphasizing the recent developments, it will also try to anticipate the future. This research, no matter it has a general and a descriptive nature, also reflects when a necessity arises my own personal views related to the issues in order to make this study an analytical one.

In the first part of this study, European Integration Theories will be explained and if necessary will be criticized to give the reader the opportunity to choose their choices or even to create their own by using the hypothesis of the existing ones. In the second part, the process of the EU integration will be explained in order to evaluate its current status and anticipate its future status in international conjecture. In the third part, a brief history of Turkey- EU relation will be summarized in order to give the reader a background information. After analyzing the history, in the fourth part, the current situation of the EU will be explained in order to display the reasons of the idea of “ New Europe”, which has a tendency to be an influential political identity in addition to its economic nature. All the internal and external causes and factors will be examined to foresee its future. In the fifth part of this study, EU's attempts and efforts, which they try to overcome these internal and external problems, will be classified. In this part, more emphasis will be put on the Constitution for Europe signed on 29, October 2004, which aims to give the EU a political and a legal legitimacy. Furthermore, this document will increase the EU's influence in political affairs and in a competitive power. In addition, this chapter will also try to examine

the barriers that the EU has to come across will also be summarized. Then, the future of the EU-Turkey relation will be anticipated by examining the difficulties, that Turkey will face and also the benefits it will receive through membership.



CHAPTER II

THEORIES ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The European Union since its establishment has been one of the major concerns of theoreticians due to its sui generis character and structure. It has not been the only international institution in the international system but its aim of the establishment was different from the existing other ones; such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations. In the existing international organizations, members are independent on each other on certain issues. The nature of co-operation within the organization has certain limits and clear boundaries. The existing ones are "interdependent organizations", in which national governments co-operate on certain issues without any interference with the other states policy-making. However, the European Union is an "integrated institution", in which a supra national body is created and the member states voluntarily transfer some policy decisions to this body.² It is important to differentiate the meaning of integration and interdependence. In integration, unlike in interdependence, the members of the organization transfer their degree of sovereignty and authority to a supra-national body, like it was in the European Coal and Steel Community. The main aim behind the efforts of establishment of the European Union was the federalization of Europe without setting up a federal European state. Owing to this peculiar structure, the European Union has become the case study of some of the theoreticians.

² Martin J. Dedman, *The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-95*, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, p. 7

There is no doubt that European Coal and Steel Community had been unique experience likewise the European Economic Community (EEC) was. European Union is the most unique international organization, which is the continuation of European Coal and Steel Community. It might be a sign of things to come. As Ernst Haas in the *Uniting of Europe* described, Western Europe as a "living laboratory" for the study of the collection action between members states.³

There have been many theories to explain the integration of EU, and also the policy making of EU. In this paper, these theories will be briefly explained, analyzed and also criticized. The aim is: to present the reader the different ways of studying European Union and European integration. Among those, ways of theoretical explanations are one of the most important ways. Theories are the small and minor part of the big picture in which too many figures might be seen. Theories of International Relations, in particular theories of EU, by taking some of these figures and variables in account have been trying to explain just the small part of the international system. It will be wrong to expect from one paradigm to explain every thing. Theories only provide us the clues about the politics by using their own peculiar concepts and variables. It is our job to select or analyze and even to combine the most appropriate and useful one for our small part of the picture.

Regarding the European Union, there exists mainly two different types of theories. However, theories divide into the waves according to the EU's integration process. Each wave has it's own theories depending on the periods they are raised. The first

³ Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968, p.4

waves of theories are: neo- functionalism and intergovernmentalism. The theories of the second wave are mainly liberal intergovernmentalism and new institutionalism.⁴

2.1 FIRST WAVE THEORIES

2.1.1 NEO-FUNCTIONALISM

It is the continuation and the revised or better to say re-evaluated version of the Mitrany's functionalism. Although on one hand the means, variables, and the end (the dissolution of territorially based authorities) are the same, on the other hand the main actors of integration generally change in neo- functionalism. Their perspectives of integration are still alike. The biggest difference is neo-functionalism by focusing on technical co-operation and by avoiding political debates tried to create a regional organization. The most influential functionalist work was the David Mitrany's work of " A Working Peace System". Jean Moonet and Robert Schuman, who were the fathers of the European integration project, were inspired by this theory.⁵

What Mitrany desired in his book was a universal solution to the problems of world politics. He opposed the idea of creating just a regional organization. According to him, nationalism and the territorial organization of power were threats to peace.⁶ What the member states do by uniting among themselves is the transfer of the territorial problems to the European level, nothing more than this. He thought that " peace not be secured if we organize the world by what divides it. ⁷ To sum up, it is difficult to enhance the political will to create a new constitution.

⁴ Ian Bache and Steohen George, *Politics in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.6

⁵ Laura Cram, "Integration Theory and the Study of the European Policy Process" in Jeremy Richardson (ed.), *European Union: Power and Policy- Making*, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, p.40

⁶ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*, Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966, p. 82

⁷ D.Mitrany.,op.cit., p.96

Secondly, he differentiated the political- constitutional co-operation and technical-functional co-operation. He mentioned that we should work for co-operation but by touching as little as possible to the points of divergence, which was nearly impossible in political- constitutional tasks.⁸ He proposed technical international organizations for the welfare of societies. According to him, it was the rules, experts and the principle of technical self- determination can lead to the decline of ideological conflict and the fall of nationalism, which at the end leads to peaceful co-operation at the world level.⁹

To sum up, he tried to create a functional international organization, which might create a peaceful environment at the world level. This functional organization might dilute differences through learned habits. He was not against the formation of political union but he thought that this end is too ambitious.¹⁰

Neo- functionalism has developed mainly to fill the gaps and to answer the non-answered questions of functionalism. As Laura Cram mentions, it is a mixture of intellectual parentage.¹¹ The father of neo- functionalism advocated his study to the process of integration rather than the background conditions of integration. As Haas mentioned in his book " The Uniting of Europe" the aim of neo- functionalism.

"Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre- existing national states."¹²

⁸ Ibid, p.58

⁹ D.Mitrany, op.cit., p.72

¹⁰ Ibid, p.97

¹¹ Laura Cram, *Policy - Making in the EU*, London and New York: Routledge, 1997,p.12

¹² E. Haas, op.cit., p.16

Unlike functionalism, neo- functionalism takes the states, as territorially based units, and as the main actors taking part in this process. States have been trying to integrate by forming new territorially based international organizations. Western European states tried to integrate by forming European Coal and Steel Community. As Haas emphasized the organization, which is capable of maximizing the powers of members, are the key components in this theory.

Ultimate goal of this integration theory is the creation of a political community with the help of the " agent" of integration.¹³ International organizations can serve as a channel to facilitate the transfer of loyalties to the European level. ¹⁴

Neo- functionalism accepts the social actors and technical experts as major actors who behave according to their national interests at the first stage. The actors' behavior appears to be driven by instrumental self- interest, largely conceived of in economic terms. ¹⁵However, unlike Mitrany, he attaches importance to the national political elite who can lead to further political integration. As it was mentioned earlier, the ultimate goal of this school of thought is to establish political community, which is the continuation of economic integration. Neo-functionalism proposes two-step integration model initially economic and then political integration follows either federal or confederate state.¹⁶ However, it is different from federalism because neo-functionalism aims at creating a supranational political community through economic integration.

¹³ E. Haas, op.cit, p.29

¹⁴ Ernst Haas, *Beyond the Nation- State: Functionalism and International Organization*, Standford: Standford University Press, 1964,p.524

¹⁵ James Casporaso, "Regional Integration: Understanding Our Past and Anticipating Our Future.", *Journal of European Public Policy*,5(1), p.9

¹⁶ Cinar Ozen, " Neo-Functionalism and The Change in the Dynamics of Turkey-EU Relations", *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, Vol III- Number3, and September- November 1998.

Haas has divided the political field in two parts: "high politics", which involves security issues, defense and diplomacy; the second is the "low politics" which involves economic and technical issues. He proposed a model in which integration in low politics can spread to high politics. This is called "spill over effect". The related political bodies from different national governments co-operate in economic or technical issues. They transfer some degree of loyalty to this supra-national organization. Then, through the learning process, which they can attain in that organization, facilitate the co-operation in other issue areas. This is functional spill over: how integration in one policy- area leads to spill over to the other issue area. Haas focused on the linkages between sectors, which can increase the possibility of political community. It makes "snowball effect".¹⁷ Through this integration process, interests of these different groups and elite will be re-defined at regional rather than national level.¹⁸ Supra- national organization leads the actors to upgrade of common interests. This was political spill- over: how the existence of supra- national organization might generate a self- reinforcing process of institution building. In addition he mentions the geographical spill over as well. Co- operation among group of states might affect others group of states. ¹⁹This has been what really happened the EU in enlargement process.

Neo- functionalism is really good at explaining the earlier stages of integration: It is a self- sustaining process. Establishment of European Coal and Steel Community, then ECSC spilled over European Economic Community and the European Atomic

¹⁷ L.Cram., op.cit., pp.15-17

¹⁸ Cinar Ozen, " Neo- Functionalism and the Change In the Dynamics of Turkey-EU Relations", *Perceptions Journal of International Affairs*, Vol 3, Number3, 1998

¹⁹ E.Haas., op.cit., p.317

Energy Community. However, EU experienced what I call a stagnation period, which cannot be explained by the assumptions of neo- functionalism. The reason of this was as Cinar Ozen mentions in his article was it's ignorance of "peripheral" factors based on international conditions and it's ignorance of "cultural" factors.²⁰

2.1.2 INTERGOVERNMENTALISM

Intergovernmentalism is the second integration theory, which tries to explain the European integration. We can test the validity of the realist assumptions by this theory. The spirit of realism really dominates this integration theory. States are the main actors in international politics. Issue areas are hierarchical and military security is the number one priority for all states. Politics is based on power and the goal of every nation is to maximize their national interests. As Morgenthau mentioned "Politics is struggle for power".²¹

Stanley Hoffman, who was the main figure of intergovernmentalism, developed his theory on the grounds of realists' assumptions; however, he rejected the realist assumption that states are the unitary actors. At the same time, it is the critique of neo- functionalism. As it was mentioned in neo- functionalism one of the fallbacks of neo- functionalism is it's ignorance of international environment; unlike this theory, Hoffman stressed the importance of international environment and the global system. Moreover, he focused on the impacts of national states in the global system. He took states as the actors who pursue their self- interests and in the global and conflictual environment. States put more emphasis on the importance of " purely local or purely

²⁰ Ibid, pp.1-13

²¹ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th edition, New York: Knopf, 1967

global " concerns than the regional ones. He mentioned, " Regional subsystems have only a reduced autonomy".²²

Furthermore, he found that co-operation has a "contingent nature".²³ When the reasons for co-operation disappear, there was a risk of reversal of transnational co-operation. The interests of national governments are more influential in European integration and national governments are resistant to this process. This can prevent the snow- ball effect from taking part in the integration process. It can be concluded that integration occurs as long as states parallel to their national interests desire it to occur.

He implicitly accepted the two kinds of politics: high and low politics. Then he argued that "Monnet Method" was underestimating the " logic of diversity".²⁴ According to him, in the areas of high politics, states are less likely to co- operate where national interests are at stake because states cannot compensate the losses in these issue areas by the gains in other issue areas. Decision- making in the European integration was a zero sum game. It was the interests and actions of European states, which lead to European integration. Hoffman defined integration as:

"Russian roulette is fine only as long as the gun is filled with blanks...Functional integration's gamble could be won only if the method had sufficient potency to promise an excess of gains over losses, and of hopes over frustrations. Theoretically, this may be true of economic integration. It is not true of political integration (in the sense of " high politics)"²⁵

²² Stanley Hoffman, *Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of The Nation State and The Case of Western Europe*, Daedalus95, p.865

²³ Ibid, p.895

²⁴ Ibid, p.882

²⁵ Ibid, p.882

To sum up, intergovernmentalism put the national interests of the states at the center of the European integration and according to this approach co- operation can only exist and continue as long as the states want it and this is difficult to achieve in high politics. This theory is good at explaining the De Gaulle period and the stagnation period of the European Economic Community.

2.2 SECOND WAVE THEORIES

These theories have begun to emerge after the Single European Act (1989). This Act leads to the formation of European Economic Community, and a single market and the Maastricht Treaty (1992). Although there have been new developments in the European integration process, the essence of this debate has remained the same. The research questions are: Who is the main actor in integration process and what is the expected end? Theoretical debates lack behind the process itself. For example, only Wallace touched upon the enlargement process. Mainly, two theories have achieved to develop new assumptions about the European policy making and the integration process. These are "revived neo- functionalism" and " revised intergovernmentalism"

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2.2.1 LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM

Andrew Moravcsik is the architect of liberal intergovernmentalism. As Hix mentions, he divided the European integration process into two stages. In the first stage; like in neo- functionalism, national elite, domestic economic and social actors owing to their self-interest requires integration. These actors compete for their own interests represented, defended by national governments in European Union level. In

²⁶ Lykke Friss and Anna Murphy, "*An Ever Larger Union? Conceptualizing Enlargement*", Danish Institute of International Affairs, workshop, 23-25 June 2000

the second stage, national governments, like in intergovernmentalism, have begun bargaining for their own national interests. This had lead to European integration. For example, it was the bargaining between France and Germany and France in this issue was the key factor in the formation of Single European Act.

States are unitary and supra-national institutions have limited effects on eventual decisions. States do their best to protect their national interests and less likely to transfer their high degree of sovereignty to the supra national institutions.²⁷ However, by bargaining among themselves, they can produce positive- sum outcomes. Because as it has been in the regime theory, institutions can reduce transaction costs and minimize the uncertainty.²⁸

In addition, unlike the realist school of thought, state preferences are not fixed and exogenously given. He believes that domestic factors are the most important factor in the formation of state preferences. He gives more importance to economic interests rather than the geopolitical ones.²⁹ He mentions, " State behavior reflects the rational actions of governments constrained at home by domestic societal pressures and abroad by their strategic environment".³⁰ On the other side of the coin, he produces a concept " agency slack".³¹ This generally occurs when the domestic factors delegate their level of discretion to the governmental agents. If the interests of the domestic societal factors do not converge, the agent gains a room for maneuver. International institutions gain importance here, because states agents in order to maximize their room for maneuver, use the EU institutions. National governments can use EU

²⁷ Simon Hix, *The Political System of the European Union*, London: Macmillan Press, 1999,p.15

²⁸ Andrew Moravcsik, " Negotiating The Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft In The European Community", *International Organization* 19-56, 1991, p.45

²⁹ Simon Hix, *The Political System of the European Union*, London: Macmillan Press, 1999,p.15

³⁰ Andrew Moravcsik, " Preferences and Power In The European Community: A Liberalgovernmentalist Approach", *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31:4,(473-524), 1993, p.483

³¹ Ibid, p.488

institutions " to manipulate their own domestic constituents into accepting common policies".³²

To sum up, by combining some elements of realism and neo- functionalism, he produced two steps of European integration and by doing this; he tries to increase the importance of international institutions unlike intergovernmentalism.

2.2.2 REVIVED NEO- FUNCTIONALISM

One of the most important revived neo- functionalists is Paul Pierson, who is inspired by one of the theories of political science: historical institutionalism.³³ He proposed a three-step model. At the initial stage, by considering the existing preferences, a policy decision is made and institutional rules are chosen. States cannot predict their preferences at the second stage. At the latter stage, new strategic environment leads the formation of new and common preferences of states and supra- national institutions. This finally leads the emergence of new rules and political competence at the European level. At the final stage, a new policy decision is made and this "locks" the process of integration into a particular path. At these stages, states have imperfect information.³⁴ To sum up, he mentions that state preferences are not fixed and they are not being formed due to the high uncertainty. They are formed, unlike in neo- functionalism, in accordance with institutional context and " the logic of appropriateness" ³⁵

³² Andrew Moravcsik, *Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation*, Chicago: Paper presented to the Conference of Europeanists, 31 March-2 April, 1994, p.45

³³ S.Hix., op.cit., p.15

³⁴ Ibid, p.16

³⁵ Thomas Risse, " Let's Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics", *International Organization*, Vol 54, No.1, 2000, p.4

Other revived neo-functionalists are: Sandholtz and Zysman. They, unlike neo-functionalists and like Pierson, take the international environment into account.³⁶ They accept that the dynamics of international context might change. For example, the rise of Japan and the relative decline of United States of America had caused the adoption of the Single European Act.³⁷ Secondly, he plays attention to the domestic factors as well. The formation of preferences can be formed by domestic elements as well. The domestic and international conditions are interdependent. To quote Sandholtz:

"The national interests of European Community states do not have independent existence; they are not formed in a vacuum and then brought to Brussels. Those interests are defined and redefined in an international and institutional context that includes the European Community. States define their interests in a different way as members of the European Community than they would without it."³⁸

Revived neo-functionalism by accepting the main tenets of neo-functionalism try to explain the dynamic developments in European integration and European policy making. They take the domestic and international factors, and environment as independent variables, which continuously affect each other, forms preferences of national governments.

2.2.3 CONSTRUCTIVISM

The other important paradigm, which is quite new compare to the others, is the Wendt's Constructivism. The constructivist approach sees states as social actors whose actions follow international or domestic rules. From this perspective, state behavior is driven by rules, norms, institutions, and identities. Constructivism is a

³⁶ L.Cram., op.cit., p.23

³⁷ W. Sandholtz and J. Zysman, " 1992: Recasting the European Bargain", *World Politics* 42:1,1989, p.100

structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material; (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics.³⁹

Two main constructivist propositions have an important role in explaining European integration. The first is that the elites chose specific policies, policy ideas and interests because they are consistent with more general collectively held ideas, discourses. This proposition emphasizes the reciprocal interaction between the agents and the structure. Actors' policies emerge out of interaction with the external environment, which can vary in response to social interaction. Therefore, this school opens the black box in order to test the changes of national preferences owing to interaction. The latter one is that through socialization and learning process common norms can be formulated because state preferences are not accepted as exogenously given and formulated through social processes. States through interaction can formulate different norms, policies because their practices might affect their priorities. This proposition makes this school long lived because through socialization the preferences of new generations can vary as well.⁴⁰

³⁸ W. Sandholtz, "Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht", *International Organization* 47:1, 1993, p. 3, 1993

³⁹ Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review*, 88 (June 1994), p. 385

⁴⁰ Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark? Constructivism and European Integration", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6:4 Special Issue (1999), pp. 669-671

There are many situations and aspects of European integration where the constructivists' assumptions can be useful. For example, meetings of the European Council or the interstate bargaining that can explain the interaction between agent and structure and the level of importance of structure (environment) in the interactions of states in decision-making. Moreover, informal communication in working groups of the Council of Ministers, European-level policy networks centered on the Commission indicates the significance of social interaction through learning process and through socialization. Furthermore, the emergence of one common Constitution explains the probability that through socialization state preferences can change and through common practices, common accepted norms can emerge.⁴¹

The biggest contribution of Constructivism to European studies is its ideas about the possible role of collective ideas and socialization in European integration. Of course the other paradigms have made implicit references to these variables but not that much in explicit manner. European integration theories gain important variables, which in my opinion will become more important in the future, with the help of constructivism.

It should be remembered that theories cannot explain everything with their own concepts. They try to explain the minor part of the complex environment. None of them are completely wrong or completely right. They only make assumptions and generalizations but their assumptions can be wrong or insufficient but this does not mean that they are invalid theories. Good theories are falsifiable as well. All the

⁴¹Jeffrey Checkel, "Social Construction and Integration", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6:4 (1998), pp. 545-60

theories above are good at explaining their part of the picture but in order to understand the whole system, we should learn all of them in order to have different perspectives and to have an idea of the whole picture.⁴² By using intergovernmentalism, we can understand the De Gaulle period; by applying neo-functionalism, the formation of European Community from European Coal and Steel Community can be explained; by Moravcsik Liberal Intergovernmentalism, the negotiation period of Single European Act can be understood; and finally by applying Sandholtz, Pierson and Zysman, the formation of national states and the new and latest attempt of forming the political union might be understood. Important thing is to know the places where these alternative theories can be used, and applied.

⁴² Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Boston: Little and Brown, 1977, p.307

CHAPTER III

HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION

European Union is a *sui generis* international organization. It was the sign of integration to come when it was first established and its uniqueness has continued though it has continued to be the sign of things to come. Therefore, as usual to better evaluate the current developments it is necessary to understand the stages, which have created today's EU. In order to anticipate the future of the European Union, its history should be taken into account.

3.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF ECSC

Before the Second World War, the idea of integration with which we are so familiar today was nearly an impossible goal to achieve, it was only a dream, may be an utopia. Nations protected their national sovereignty and tended to co-operate only through intergovernmental agreements. However, the Second World War and its consequences changed the ideas of most of the Europeans. After long and devastating wars, the leaders realized that the only way to have a long lasting peace in Europe was the economic and political unification.

As a reflection of this idea, Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950 made his announcement, which he proposed the formation of ECSC, a supranational organization. The idea of creation of ECSC belonged to two brilliant statesmen: Jean Monnet (Director of French Planning Organization) and Robert Schuman (Foreign Minister of France). Their main aims were to renovate French economy and control

Germany to reduce the risk of war.⁴³ By taking the steel and coal under the control of a high-authority, they aimed at preserving peace in Europe because these two materials were the bulks of the military equipments. These two combined the geology, economics and foreign policy and created circumstances for economic integration. Through this co-operation, the historical rivalry between France and Germany was somehow solved. The ECSC required the establishment of a "High Authority" who controlled the production of coal and steel and enhance the supply of coal on equal terms inside a common market. This international organization would be open to all European states that were willing to participate. The Treaty of Paris (1951) established this organization and Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Netherlands became the initial members.⁴⁴ Besides this, the main importance of ECSC was politic rather than economic because it was the proof that if the leaders wanted to co-operate, they could.

3.2 EURATOM AND EEC

The ECSC was successful and it really improved the relations between Germany and France, and the French policy of integration and co- operation rather than isolation worked. Even before the acquisition of sovereignty of Germany in 1954, they had begun to make plans to improve economic relations. Despite the unsuccessful attempts of European Defense Community (EDC)⁴⁵ as a political and security integration, the attempts of economic integration continued. One of the parts of EDC became influential. This was the one which called for the members of ECSC to abolish quotas and tariffs among themselves, establish a joint external tariff, unify

⁴³ Martin J.Dedman, *The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-95*, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, p.57

⁴⁴ Ibid, pp.58-62

trade policy toward the rest of the world, devise common policies for other sectors, and finally to organize a single internal market.⁴⁶ Monnet found this unrealistic, he preferred sectoral integration and he proposed the establishment of European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), which was structured in the same way of ECSC, and promoted the aim of European federation. He knew that the importance of steel and coal began to erode and nuclear energy has begun to take the place of these two. Monnet had to resign due to his sense of dissatisfaction of the European integration and Paul - Henri Spaak, who was the Belgium's Foreign Minister, followed his ideas of sectoral integration and enhanced the formation of a committee in Messina 1955 which worked on the possibilities of further integration. The report, which was presented, in Venice in 1956 proposed that the two objectives of sectoral integration (atomic energy) and wider economic integration (a common market) be realized in separate organizations with separate treaties. After this meeting in an intergovernmental conference, it was decided to establish EURATOM and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. They decided to create a single market and to manage the use of nuclear energy in supranational style besides these, in accordance with the provisions of Rome Treaty, common policies were established in the fields of agriculture, transportation and antitrust policies. Custom duties were dismantled; and most importantly the four famous freedoms of European integration were guaranteed: free movement of persons, goods, capital, and services.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ It was a project, which aimed to civil and military integration besides economic integration. It was a French proposal but French rejected this proposal upon the decision of French National Assembly

⁴⁶ Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, p. 29

⁴⁷ *ibid*, pp.29-33

3.3 ENLARGEMENT WAVES

In 1967 the institutions of the three European communities merged. Since then on, Europeans have had one Commission, one Parliament and one Council of Ministers. Their aim was to create "an ever closer union among the people of Europe".⁴⁸ This aim gained momentum within the Community with the first enlargement by the membership of Denmark, United Kingdom, and Ireland. Moreover, by the Werner Report Europeans decided to initiate to create an economic and monetary union.⁴⁹ In June 1979, European citizens through general suffrage elected their own representatives to the European Parliament. Then, after those developments, Portugal and Spain applied for membership. Greece later became a member of the European Community in 1981. EEC became very attractive that in 1986 the applications of Portugal and Spain were accepted and they became members in 1986. This was the third and the last wave of enlargement before the formation of European Union, in Maastricht, in 1992.⁵⁰ A detailed analysis of enlargement will be made in part 4.2.2.

3.4 SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT

The European integration has been a dynamic process that not only domestic factors but also international factors can take part it. One of these was the decrease in the price of oil in the mid 1980s. This crisis led Jacques Delors (the President of the European Commission) to propose a "new solidarity deal" to the European Community members. This deal required the creation of a single market without internal borders by January 1, 1993. Moreover, he proposed to fill the economic gap

⁴⁸ David Arter, *The Politics of European Integration In the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1993, p.145

⁴⁹ Martin J.Dedman, *The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-95*, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, p.123

⁵⁰ European Commission, *The European Union: A Guide for Students and Teachers*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1999, pp. 4-5

between the rich and the poor community members through a financial support program. Thereafter, they signed the Single European Act on February 17, 1986 to create a single market in goods, capital and services and the guarantee of free movement of people. It was the first major review of the Community Treaties. It involved the goal of improvement of European integration after the enlargement waves. It also called for closer co-operation on the environment, on research and development and put European political co-operation on a legal footing. Moreover, they extended the use of majority voting among members. This implied that all efforts for the "harmonization" of agreements were made by a qualified majority voting rather than unanimity.⁵¹ Furthermore, in order to be more democratic and to create an ever-closer union, they increased the power of the European Parliament.

This new treaty, as Jacques Delors thought, might have had a spill over effect. A single market could be a motivating force to achieve political co-operation. To enliven this, Delors tried to persuade the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the French President François Mitterrand to the need for a single currency. He was successful, Helmut Kohl supported this idea but he emphasized the need for politically integrated Europe at the expense of powerful Deutsche Mark. Therefore, Europeans agreed on revising the treaty in Maastricht.⁵²

3.5 THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (1993) (MAASTRICHT)

Maastricht is the most important treaty in the history of European integration. Its negotiations were harsh because the member states had to face with the challenging

⁵¹ Martin J. Dedman, *The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-95*, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, p.127

external factors such as the collapse of Soviet Union, the ethnic wars in Eastern Europe. To cope with these difficulties, which were happening at their backyard, they had to strengthen their position. Despite Margaret Thatcher's objection that personally did not believe in the spirit of integration, the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 and officially entered the force in 1993. In Maastricht, countries decided to adopt the new title, "European Union". It took the process of European integration one step further. This was the official birth of European Union, which is known today. What Maastricht introduced was: laying down a schedule for the introduction of the single currency (Euro), completion of single market, lifting of trade restrictions, giving new legal rights in terms of the notion of citizenship (right to vote, right of petition and right of appeal to the European Ombudsman), broadening the power of European Parliament: co-decision with the Council. In addition, Maastricht created the three-pillar structure of the European Union in order to increase the co-operation among members within the union on foreign policy, security and defense, and in justice and home affairs. It paved the way for a Common Foreign and Security policy. However, the main emphasis was put on the issue of economic and monetary union since this has been their prior goal.⁵³

On the other hand, Maastricht had a divisive impact among members as well. The idea of multi-speed Europe was born. From the initial days and during the enlargement, it was known that there was no economic equality among the members. Due to this, some of the members like the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark and Greece opted out. They, mainly due to the economic conditions or domestic unwillingness to Euro or better to say sensitiveness towards their national currencies,

⁵² Elizabeth Pond, *The Rebirth of Europe*, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, pp.39-44

decided to join lately. The issues of common foreign and security policies, defense policies were delicate issues at that time to the countries to transfer their sovereignty.

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The European Union has been a good project that non- member states wanted to join to the Union. In 1995, three neutral countries, which are: Austria, Finland and Sweden became members to the EU and EU had 15 members. Besides these new members, most of the Central and Eastern European countries have been waiting for membership.⁵⁵

3.6 THE AMSTERDAM TREATY (1997)

Owing to this external pressures and insufficient structure of the Union, Europeans realized the need to review some of the provisions of the existing treaties not only to be powerful and increase efficiency but also to fulfill the expectations of civil Europeans. The Amsterdam Treaty was signed in October 1997. The new treaty tried to achieve the following goals.

- To be closer to citizens, their expectations and their concerns and to assert their rights.
- To remove obstacles to free movement while making Europe an area of security.
- To enable Europe to make its voice better heard in the world.

⁵³ European Commission, *How Does the European Union Work?*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000, pp.11-12

⁵⁴ Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, London. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, pp. 175-180

⁵⁵ Gerda Falkner, "Enlarging The European Union" in Jeremy Richardson (ed.), *European Union: Power and Policy- Making*, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, pp.233-237

- To make Union's institutions more efficient for its next enlargement. ⁵⁶

The Amsterdam Treaty tried to strengthen the Community in the areas of social affairs, the environment and public health. In terms of internal politics, they decided to increase their collaboration on terrorism, drugs and crime. Moreover, in terms of external relations, they decided to formulate common strategies to guide the Union's action. Furthermore, in terms of institutional framework, the extension of co-decision procedure, which means the inclusion of European Parliament in more decision-making procedure. Shortly, the Amsterdam Treaty extends Community competence over Justice and Home Affairs and pronounces a date for completion of " an area of freedom, security and justice." This means that European policy makers have begun to realize the new necessities of the international system. ⁵⁷

⁵⁶ European Commission, *How Does the European Union Work?*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000, p.13

⁵⁷ Ibid, pp.13-15

CHAPTER IV

RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Since its establishment Turkey has followed Western-oriented policies. Especially after 1923, Western types of democratic, and economically market-oriented states were accepted as model. The desire of Turkey to be a member to the Union is the natural outcome of Western-oriented policies. It became the member of the United Nations, NATO, OECD and associate member of Western European Union.⁵⁸ Thanks to the international circumstances and its geographical location, it gained so much importance that it managed to establish close relations with the Community in those days. As a natural outcome of these policies, Turkey as a powerful player in the European defense and as the only Muslim secular state, Turkey has wanted to be a full member to the European Union.

It has been forty-five years; Turkey made its first application for membership to the system. Turkey made its first application in 1959 to the European Economic Community. Since that day, Turkey has had an intense but peculiar relationship, which has covered ups and downs, and has not reached the desired point yet. This relationship can be analyzed in two time periods, which has its own characteristics. First phase had began with the first application of Turkey to the EEC and continued till the beginning of 1980's. The second phase began in the beginning of 1980's and has continued till 1987. In the first phase, owing to the international conjuncture,

political factors overrode the economic dynamics of Turkey. Whereas, during the second phase this equation has changed, the economic parameters have taken the leadership due to the variations in the international system. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet system gave an end to the Turkey's political importance.⁵⁹ Since the main topic of this paper is the future of the European Union and its probable effects to the European Union and Turkey relations, the historical background of these relations will be briefly explained.

4.1 FIRST PHASE (1959- 1980)

After the Second World War, parallel to the policy of westernization and secularization, Turkey has followed a strategy of rapprochement to the West. In the bipolar world, in which the risk of war was imminent, at those days EEC served as a magnitude to most of the countries, which wanted to be a member of a powerful club. Therefore, just after the establishment of EEC in 1957 and after the Greece's application for an association agreement⁶⁰ Turkey applied for full membership to the Community in July 1959.⁶¹ At those days, Turkey in order to defend itself against Greece's claims related with the Aegean and Cyprus problems, and in order to minimize the risk of suppression from an international organization, Turkey formulated this foreign policy: participation to the same organizations. In addition, as another foreign policy formulation, Turkey in order to protect itself from Soviet threat followed a policy of rapprochement to the West. Under those days, this relation was involved reciprocity in the sense that Turkey was an important strategic

⁵⁸ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>

⁵⁹ Cinar Özen, " Neo-Functionalism and the Change in the Dynamics of Turkey-EU Relations", *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, Vol III- Number3, and September- November 1998.

⁶⁰ It was a traditional Turkish policy of being member to all of the organization, in which Greece was a member

partner due to its geographical location to the West despite the insufficient economic conditions. Turkey served as a buffer zone for Europe against Soviet threat. In return, Europe with the support of USA had been protecting Turkey against Soviet threat of conventional and unconventional attack. Europe or better to say Western alliances had been Turkey's guarantee to survive under these risks of war conditions.⁶² None of the actors had a chance of taking any risk. This reality had brought up close relations between these actors and Europe in order to protect the delicate balances preferred to continue the ongoing relations. So did the EEC but mainly on economic bases.

However, these conditions were not enough to set up a relationship based on full membership. So the EC rejected Turkey's obligation on the existing ground. They proposed to establish an association; Turkey accepted this offer. Till the beginning, Turkey insisted on neo- functionalist model of integration as the same applied to Greece in 1961 by the Agreement of Athens. ⁶³In addition, Turkey's insistence on this model was due to the fact that this was nearly the same model that the EU had applied to itself. Therefore, on 12 September 1963 Ankara Agreement was signed between the parties. The Agreement envisaged a stage-by- stage integration culminating in full membership of Turkey.⁶⁴These stages were: preparatory⁶⁵,

⁶¹ Ziya Onis, " An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relation With the European Union in Comparative- Historical Perspective", *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol 7, Number1, 2001, p.105

⁶² Cinar Ozen, " Neo-Functionalism and the Change In the Dynamics of Turkey-EU Relations", *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, Vol III- Number3, September- November 1998.

⁶³ European Economic Consultancy Center, *Profile 2001: Turkey- EU Relations*, Ankara: European Economic Consultancy Center for Publication, 2001, p.27

⁶⁴ Meltem Muftuler Bac, " The Never Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union", *Middle East Studies*, Vol.34, No.4, October 1998, p.241

⁶⁵ This stage was supposed to be 5 years but upon the request of Turkish government it took more years. As stated in the Article 3 of the Agreement, the purpose of this stage was to strengthen Turkish economy in order to fulfill the obligations of the following stages.

transitional⁶⁶, and final.⁶⁷ With the provision of this association agreement, Turkey had become partner to the EEC. In addition, as it had been mentioned in the 28th article the aim has been full membership.⁶⁸

Later, in accordance with the Ankara Agreement, an Additional Protocol was signed in 1970, which foresaw the establishment of Customs Union within the twenty- two years.⁶⁹ Moreover, with this Protocol, EEC has begun to give financial assistance to Turkey.

Turkey made an important mistake by not applying to full membership to the EEC at the same time with Greece. As Mr. Guvenen mentions in his article there would be three probabilities if Turkey applied and in none of these probabilities Turkey would not have to pay these high alternative costs and would not have to face with most of the difficulties it has now. These three possibilities were: Either Turkey would be member in 1981 with Greece, or would become member at a later date at the same time with Greece or most pessimistically only Greece would become member at a later date. If Turkey did not make this political mistake at those days, now Turkey would not have Cyprus problem, Southeast problem and could be easily reach the EU economic standards.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ This stage was the corner stone of the Association regime. This stage was required the establishment of a customs union between the parties. During this stage, all the parties were under the obligation of undertaking reciprocal obligations towards each other.

⁶⁷ This stage was based upon the customs union. This stage aimed Turkish accession to the Community as a full member.

⁶⁸ Association Agreement, Article 28, see Appendix A

⁶⁹ Onur Oymen, *Türkiye'nin Gucu*, Ankara: Dogan Kitapçılık, 1999, p.207

⁷⁰ Orhan Guvenen, " Türkiye 1 Ocak 1981'de " Avrupa Ekonomik Toplulugu" Uyesi Olabilir miydi?", *Dogu Bati Dusunce Dergisi*, Agustos- Eylul- Ekim 2003, pp.290-291.

Until 1980's relations had continued despite of some problems, delays and difficulties. The Community did not meet some of Turkey's demands like an increase in the amount of financial protocol, lifting the barriers in textile. However, the EEC accepted the Turkey's request for the delay of Turkish obligations. However, 1980 was one of the freezing points in this relationship. This is due to the two main reasons. First one was the Greece application for full membership and the acceptance of Greek application by the EC. Turkish policy of being member to all of the organization with Greece had become unsuccessful. Although as the Foreign Minister Hayrettin Erkmen said at those days, the declarations were supposed to be made in Spring, 12 September military coup prevented Turkey from applying to the Community.⁷¹ With this coup, the relation between the Community and Turkey was frozen. These were the signals of initiation of second phase in this relationship. Slowly, the parameters have begun to change.

In that period, this relationship had been tried to carry out on the basis of neo-functional model of integration. The parameters of Cold War put Turkey in such a position that made Turkey unavoidable for the West that in spite of the insufficient economic conditions of Turkey, formal relations had begun and continued on political bases. However, the end of Cold War changed the parameters and the second phase began.

4.2 SECOND PHASE

4.2.1 TURKEY'S APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP: FIRST APPLICATION OF TURKEY (1987)- LUXEMBOURG (1997)

⁷¹ Ibid., p.208

Due to the inefficiencies of Turkey to fulfill its obligations and the military coup in Turkey in 1980, the relations since then deteriorated but in 1987 with the Turkish application, it aimed to revive the relations and with this unilateral effort the second phase of relationship began, in which unlike the initial phase the economical factors have had priorities and in which the political factors have lost its importance. However, the eventual goal of Turkey has remained the same.

Turkey in 14 April 1987 applied for full membership to the EC after the amelioration of the relationship. As a response to this application, European Commission published its Avis (Opinion) in 1989 and the Commission mentioned that Turkey was eligible for membership but on the other hand, they declared that the Community was neither politically nor economically ready to accept new members till the establishment of single market in 1992. Later, in 1990 the European Council approved this opinion.⁷²

The issue of enlargement gained importance and took its place in EU agenda after the completion of Single market and with the probable applications of Central and Eastern European States (CEES). However, the emphasis was put on the completion of Customs Union by the Union. Therefore, the Customs Union was signed in 6 March 1995 after the required conditions were fulfilled. This Agreement was put into force in 1 January 1996.⁷³

After this establishment, EU in every occasion stressed the eligibility of Turkey as a member. EU made this relationship dependent on a number of issues: Cyprus,

⁷² AB Komisyonu Türkiye Temsilciliği, *Avrupa Birliği Genişleme Sürecinde Türkiye*, Ankara: AB Komisyonu Türkiye Temsilciliği, Eylül 2003, p.7

Greece and human rights and they mentioned this in the last Association Council of 29-April-1997. However, in 1997 EU Commission published its famous report of "Agenda 2000". In this document, roadmaps of EU's future policies were explained and enlargement was one of the most important ones among these.⁷⁴ Agenda 2000, unlike the expectations of Turkey, implicitly eliminated Turkey from enlargement process by not making any reference to Turkey. EU distinct Turkey from other candidates and made the evaluation regarding Turkey just in one paragraph. They once more found Turkey eligible for membership but cited a number of political issues as preconditions for improving the relations.⁷⁵

EU by Agenda 2000 had given the initial signals of their response that they had made in Luxembourg Summit. This document made clear that the 1990's would be a period of isolation and exclusion of Turkey from membership.⁷⁶ EU by "Copenhagen Criteria" had not closed the doors to Turkey, but Agenda 2000 did this. Therefore, in 12-13 December 1997 in Luxembourg, EU declared their exact position with regard to Turkey. They mentioned that Turkey was eligible for membership and Turkey will be judged on the basis of same criteria as other applicants. They made references to the human rights violations, minority rights while they were rejecting Turkey's application. In addition, they mentioned the Cyprus problem and the Greece relations as the international disputes, which had to be solved before membership.⁷⁷ Moreover, they rejected our application, but decided to initiate negotiations with CEES in 1998

⁷³ Ibid, p.7

⁷⁴ European Economic Consultancy Center, *Profile 2001: Turkey- EU Relations*, Ankara: European Economic Consultancy Center for Publication, 2001, p.58

⁷⁵ European Economic Consultancy Center, *Profile 2001: Turkey- EU Relations*, Ankara: European Economic Consultancy Center for Publication, 2001, p.140

⁷⁶ Ziya Onis, "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relation With the European Union in Comparative- Historical Perspective", *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol 7, Number1, 2001, p.116

⁷⁷ For Luxembourg European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix A

despite of the fact that they were under the Turkey's level or nearly the same level in terms of the EU criteria. This attitude proved that Turkey- EU relationship could be categorized by disequilibrium between its economic and political components.⁷⁸ Although due to the Custom Union Agreement, Turkey has had the most advanced economic relationship, it has the lowest level of political relation relative to the other applicants. EU states offered Turkey only a special status "European Strategy", which was rejected by Turkey. EU's affirmative decision disappointed and frustrated Turkey and Turkey decided to freeze its relation with the Union.⁷⁹

4.2.2 LUXEMBOURG (DECEMBER 1997)- HELSINKI (DECEMBER 1999)

During the 6 months following the Luxembourg Summit (December 1997) till the following EU Summit, Turkish politicians began to expect the correction of this mistake in Cardiff under the head of the United Kingdom. Although Cardiff Summit (1998) created better circumstances and ameliorate the relationship, the mentality behind the Luxembourg decision was still perceived.⁸⁰ The wordings of the decisions were neither negative nor positive. Moreover, Cardiff did not change the Europeans application of double standard to Turkey. However, in Cardiff Presidency Conclusions Turkey, for the first time explicitly accepted as “ candidate for membership”.⁸¹

Following these developments, after the Cardiff Summit, the social democrats began to come to power in most of the European countries but this did not affect the EU's negative decision to a great extend at a time when Turkey had tensions with Greece

⁷⁸ Ali Karaosmanoglu, *The Current Situation: Policies, Motives and Limitations*, p.232

⁷⁹ Rıdvan Karluk ve Ozgur Tonus, *Avrupa Birliği Kapısında Türkiye*, Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2002, pp. 15-17

⁸⁰ Ibid., p.17

and Italy. The report that was prepared before the Vienna Council involved the reflections of these tensions. In Vienna Summit (December 1998), Turkey could not be the 12th candidate. They only decided to prepare a European Strategy for Turkey.⁸²

The real change in this relation would occur in Helsinki (December 1999). Helsinki European Council produced a breakthrough in Turkey- EU relations. On 10-11 December 1999 Helsinki Summit after hard and tough diplomatic maneuvers, Turkey was accepted as a " candidate member".⁸³ Although it was a positive development, it could not be that much important because EU had not decided to open negotiations yet. However, it should be accepted that the preparation of Accession for Partnership in accordance with the provisions of Helsinki Summit opened a new period between European Union and Turkey.⁸⁴ After the full implementation of Copenhagen Criteria, Turkey will be member to the EU. What was different and interesting at that point was EU, unlike the other candidates and members required from Turkey the implementation of these criteria as a pre- condition for the initiation of membership process. Whereas, the other candidates began to implement them after the complementation of membership process.

4.2.3 HELSINKI (DECEMBER 1999)- COPENHAGEN (DECEMBER 2002)

According to Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, the Commission started to prepare an Accession for Partnership for Turkey. After years, the Association Council meeting took places and eight sub- committees were set up to

⁸¹ For Cardiff European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix A

⁸² Onur Oymen, *Türkiye'nin Gucu*, Ankara: Dogan Kitapçılık, 1999, p.209

⁸³ For Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix A

carry out the screening process. At the end, on March 8th, 2001, Accession Partnership (AP) was adopted. Like the others, this document clarified the short and the medium term priorities and the requirements of the Union from Turkey, which were expected to be done. As a next step of membership, Turkey after the approval of Accession Partnership by the EU, prepared its National Program (NP). In this document, Turkey clarified how it adapted itself to the short term (2001) and medium term priorities of the AP and gave a calendar for the requirements. NP consisted of three criteria: political, economical, and the capacity to fulfill the membership requirements. It is worth to mention that in the AP the main emphasis was put on the political criteria since it has been the most difficult one. In addition to these, every year as part of the Union Enlargement Strategy, Union publishes "The Progress Report" to evaluate the developments in the countries parallel to AP. It should be remembered that after Turkey had gained a candidate status, Progress Reports were published in every year beginning with 1998 December. The Progress Reports, which were published before Helsinki, always involved the same logic that Turkey had made progress but these progress were not enough to meet the Copenhagen Criteria; mainly the political ones.⁸⁵

The Progress Report 2000 was different because it served as a roadmap of AP. This report stated that Turkey has not yet fulfilled the Copenhagen Political criteria especially the matters related with human rights and democracy. They appreciated the progresses that were made but on the other hand they found the implementation of institutional reforms in order to take the democratic and rule of law state under

⁸⁴ Rıdvan Karluk ve Ozgur Tonus, *Avrupa Birliği Kapısında Türkiye*, Ankara: Turhan Kitapevi, 2002,p.21

⁸⁵ AB Komisyonu Türkiye Temsilciligi, *Avrupa Birliği Genişleme Sürecinde Türkiye*, Ankara: AB Komisyonu Türkiye Temsilciligi, Eylül 2003,pp.8-11

guarantee slow. As usual, they criticized the role of military in politics as well. As a response in order to deepen the political reform process before at the adoption of NP, Turkey amended thirty four articles of it's Constitution, which were related with the human rights, rule of law and institutions in 2001.⁸⁶

Consistent with Progress Report, despite the progress at the reforms in Turkey, the EU some how ignored the importance of Turkey in Nice Summit (December 2000). In the Nice Summit, on one hand EU tried to make reforms and necessary adjustments regarding itself and on the other hand EU with its decisions disregarded Turkey from the newly planned internal reforms and as a matter effect from the enlargement process till 2010. Briefly, Nice Treaty (February 2001) clarified the weighted votes of the members and the candidates in the Council of Ministers, and decided to increase the numbers of the parliamentarians of the existent members and plus newly participant candidate members. While deciding the weighted votes, Turkey was not mentioned. They only took care of Turkey just in one paragraph.⁸⁷

However, in spite of the expectations, the Progress Report, which was declared on 13 November 2001, did not include positive opinions with regard to membership. They did not even pass to the screening process, which means the initiation of negotiations. They rather deepened the analytical examination process. Moreover, they again, like the report of 2000, appreciated the reforms, especially the ones, which allowed Kurdish language broad casts, and the one, which increased the number of civilian officers in National Security Council. However, they underlined

⁸⁶ Rıdvan Karluk ve Ozgur Tonus, *Avrupa Birliği Kapısında Türkiye*, Ankara: Turhan Kitapevi, 2002, pp.55-60

⁸⁷ For Nice European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix A

the fact that these were not enough and at the desired level. Furthermore, the Union emphasized the need for an urgent result in the violations of human rights and Cyprus problem, which has been taken place in the short-term political criteria in AP.⁸⁸

In the following Summit, EU attitudes had become a little more moderate. In Laeken Summit (December 2001), EU stated the prospect of the opening of accession negotiations for Turkey for the first time. Besides this, Turkey gained a right to participate to the Convention for The Future of Europe on equal footing with the other members and candidates. However, Turkey still could not begin to the accession negotiations.⁸⁹

In 2002, on the way of political criteria, Turkey took very important steps through legislative packages. In February 2002, by the first package, by amendments in the related matters of Constitution extended the scope of freedom of thought. In addition by the second package of April 2002, Turkey extended the scope of freedom of thought and expression, the freedom of press, the freedom of association and peaceful assembly. It reinforced measures for the prevention of torture and ill treatment.⁹⁰ These reforms were welcomed in the Seville European Council (June 2002) and the Council stated that they would be deciding the next stage of Turkey's candidature in the light of the developments between the Seville and Copenhagen

⁸⁸ Rıdvan Karluk ve Ozgur Tonus, *Avrupa Birliği Kapısında Türkiye*, Ankara: Turhan Kitapevi , 2002, pp.60-61

⁸⁹ For Laeken European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix A

⁹⁰ [http:// www.mfa.gov.tr/](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/)

European Councils.⁹¹ Therefore, EU underlined the importance of this interval. Turkey had time to complete the reforms till Copenhagen Summit.

After Seville, Turkey passed its third package in August 2002, which was crucial owing to radical reforms. Turkey with this package abolished the death penalty, lifted the restrictions on individual cultural rights, reinforced legal guarantees on freedoms of expression and press, ensured the right to property of community foundations belonging to minorities in Turkey, provided the legal basis needed for the activities of foreign foundations in Turkey. In addition to this package, the new government adopted two more legislative packages before the Copenhagen Summit in order not to risk the membership. On 3 December 2002, the reform process was reinforced and ambiguities in implementation of reforms were eliminated. The government stated their intolerance to torture and ill- treatment. The latter package on 4. December. 2002, the scope of re-trial was extended and the disciplinary actions against university students were revoked.⁹²

However, the Union underestimated the reforms, which have been made. In the Progress Report (2002), Union characterized the reforms as fundamental steps. However, like the other former expressions, EU decided that Turkey has not fully met the political criteria and underlined the deficiencies in implementation. Moreover, in this report, EU declared its Strategy Paper for the future stages of relations. They recommended the deepening of Customs Union, revision of AP. However, Turkey expected the initiation of negotiations for membership.⁹³

⁹¹For Seville European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix A

⁹² AB Komisyonu Türkiye Temsilciliği, *Avrupa Birliği Genişleme Sürecinde Türkiye*, Ankara: AB Komisyonu Türkiye Temsilciliği, Eylül 2003, p.8

⁹³ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/>

As it was understood from the Progress Report, EU frustrated Turkey in Copenhagen Summit (December 2002). EU accepted Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia, and Slovakia as new members. This conclusion did not meet Turkey's expectations. With regard to Turkey, they stated that: " If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open negotiations with Turkey without delay."⁹⁴

4.2.4 COPENHAGEN (DECEMBER 2002) - PRESENT

The Copenhagen Summit, like all the Progress Reports prepared by the Commission, did not open negotiations with Turkey for full membership but it decided to open negotiations with Turkey if Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria. It has been obvious that this was not the decision Turkey wanted to be taken but it opened a new stage in this relationship. This has made the job of Turkey more difficult because the EU organs, especially by the Commission, follow all the developments.

Since all the Accession for Partnership and National Programs are dynamic by nature, they can be revised in accordance with the developments and progress. Therefore, by taking into consideration the recent progress, the Commission prepared the revised Accession Partnership on 26 March 2003. Further, this report was accepted by the member states on 15 April 2003.⁹⁵ As a normal procedure of

⁹⁴ For Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix A

⁹⁵ Press Release of Foreign Minister of Turkey is available on the Web,[http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/aid/Gul12 Dec2003.htm](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/aid/Gul12%20Dec2003.htm)

membership, Turkey also prepared its revised National Program, in which Turkey gave a time table for the short and medium term goals.⁹⁶

These documents are important in the sense that they involve some clues regarding the upcoming decisions of the Union. The revised AP appreciated the progresses that have been made by Turkey but it underlined the problem of applicability of legislative packages. Moreover, as usual, they put the problem of Cyprus and border disputes under the political dialogue and political criteria headings. So did the Progress Report of 2003.⁹⁷ It can be concluded that the main problems regarding Turkey are: the political criteria and the applicability problem of the reforms, which have been legally adopted. As it had been mentioned in Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions, Turkey has only one left year ahead to solve these problems.

In accordance with these documents, finally the EU in Brussels Summit (December 2003) once more underlined these facts. EU welcomed the progress and the revised AP. However, they then found it insufficient. They clarified that progress should have been made in strengthening the independence and functioning of the judiciary, the overall framework of fundamental freedoms, the alignment of civil- military relations with European practice, the situation in the Southeast of the country and cultural rights and the macro- economic imbalances. As they mentioned in the AP, in the presidency conclusions they called for urgent political settlement in the Cyprus.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Available on the Web, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adc/AccessionPartnership2003.pdf>

⁹⁷ Progress Report 2003 is Available on the Web, <http://www.ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ab/uyelik/ilerle03.pdf>

⁹⁸ For Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix A

After these developments, Turkey has given momentum to the EU Adaptation Laws and efforts. Turkey did its best in the settlement of Cyprus problem and one of the political barriers eroded. Moreover, TRT has begun Kurdish casting, which is an important step in showing the Turkish capacity to apply the reforms that has been made. Furthermore, Democracy Party (DEP) parliamentarians were released after the adoption of necessary legal amendments within the Criminal Law. These are really important steps with regard to Copenhagen Political Criteria.⁹⁹

To sum up, in December 2004, the question of whether the EU will open negotiations with Turkey or not will be answered in this summit. The membership to the EU should be seen only as a step to be one of the most influential actors in the system. It is not an end in itself. Therefore, it is necessary but not an issue of live or death. It is an issue of time. Owing to some mistakes that had been made in the past, now it is more difficult for Turkey to be member and its bargaining power has been decreasing. If Turkey wants to use the factor of time efficiently, it should exploit these times to make necessary reforms to achieve its goal of being a developed country in the long run. However, unconditional surrender to the EU should not be an option. It is important to maintain sustainable and long term outward policies.

⁹⁹ Amanda Akcakoca, "Turkey's EU Ambition: Implementation of Reforms and Cyprus are the Answer" *Europe Policy Center*, Brussels, December 2003

CHAPTER V

CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE PROBABLE FUTURE OF THE EU

As it has been always said when the European Union was first established, it was clear that it would be an experiment due to two reasons. Firstly, it would demonstrate to the public and politicians that whether it would be possible to create a peaceful continent by forming a regional organization? Secondly, it would be an experiment to understand whether a regional organization can develop, and enlarge. Shortly, would it gain dynamism owing to internal and external factors?

In order to find an answer to these crucial questions, self- criticism would be inevitable for the Union. Unintentionally, as Caporaso argues " EU went beyond its original task it set for itself."¹⁰⁰ The original task of creating peace among members would be successful on one hand. On the other hand, the accumulation of internal and external factors, and sudden expected and unexpected results has pushed EU further to be a political and more effective union. Therefore, EU politicians have rethought the role of EU in the existing system. By taking the assumption of " The EU is a sub- system of international system" as exogenously given, the internal and external factors¹⁰¹, which obliges the EU to rethink its role will be explained.

¹⁰⁰ James A. Caporaso, *The European Union: Dilemmas of Regional Integration*, Boulder: Westview Press, 2000, p: 49

5.1 EXTERNAL FACTORS

5.1.1 STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

5.1.1.1 QUESTIONING UNIPOLARITY

5.1.1.1.1 UNIPOLARITY: AMERICAN HEGEMONY

When the rules and the environment of Cold War World Order disappeared, obviously the system of international system has also changed. One of the two super powers had disappeared; dissolved and lost its political and military power. This left only one super power, who through the agreements and pacts established ties with West Europe after the Second World War and strengthened its position and impact during the Cold War. The results imposed that the winner was United States of America and its values: liberal world order mainly democracy and free market economy. From then onwards, the international system was no more bi-polarity but unipolarity. This new system has presented the USA as a hegemon power, who has been the absolute protector, supporter and the leader of Western Europe.

The new system has introduced one actor to the system as an ally of the hegemon as well. This has been the European Union. Today's Europe is the combination of work of the Americans and the Europeans. European integration was mainly an American project, which designed to reinforce the American dominance by diminishing the role and weight of the Europeans in the world stage and to make Europe developed economically in order to stabilize the region.¹⁰² As it has been generally pointed out without the American willingness and American security guarantee it was nearly impossible for European states to integrate. America has served to Europe like a Ministry of Defense, protected Europe both against external threats and internal

¹⁰¹ Barry Busan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford Press, 2000,p: 338

threats. America played a key role in the solution of German Question. Fischer summarized these views. He emphasized the importance of two historic decisions, which were the tenets of the European integration. These were the USA decision to stay in Europe although there is no more Soviet threat and the latter one was the France and Germany's acceptance and adherence to the principles of integration.¹⁰³ I agree with him that it was the combination of these two created the current situation to Europe, They were both interrelated and interlinked.

As a reflection of these realities, EU and USA have tried to set up strong relationships among themselves through Trans- Atlantic Agenda. At the first stages of this relation, everything had clear and they had effectively and efficiently collaborated with each other. Especially, they have had close economic ties. Explicitly, Washington supported the idea of Monetary Union and the acceptance of Euro as a single currency. As Clinton in 1991 realized: the world has no more dominated by the forces and parameters of geo- politics but governed by the rules of geo- economics.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, America has supported the idea of enlargement. However, the Union with twenty- one members in 2004 will catch up the USA in terms of trade parameters and economic power. Euro has already placed the Dollar in international trade and the union has become the second big trader in international trade. These are the signals that in the near future, the EU and America will become competitors and at the same time partners. Their economic competition has not created serious problems among themselves because both of them have had absolute gains and more important than this, owing to enlargements and economic disparities

¹⁰² Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness", *Policy Review*, no: 113, June 2002 p.10

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p.11

¹⁰⁴ Martin Walker, "The Future of Europe's Foreign Policy" in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), *Europe In the New Century*, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p.69

among EU member states, EU has had budget problems. In conclusion, the implication of same means and the acceptance of same end in economic matters decreased the existence of tensions between two partners.

5.1.1.1.2 AMERICAN HEGEMONY: CRITICISED

However, things have begun to change. Especially after the recent USA decision to attack Iraq without the authorization of UN really shook the delicate balances and created tensions between these two allies. This unipolar structure has continued because the other actors have recognized the hegemony of USA. Through various open channels of contact the other actors can affect the decisions of the USA government before¹⁰⁵, but this example underlined the fact that this has not been possible if USA is decisive and its national interest at stake. Till now, USA did not make any action, which hesitate the other countries and act as a liberal hegemon. It acts in accordance with the principles of liberal hegemon. Through diplomacy, has tried to persuade other states and through various channels of contact it gave importance to the other opinions and policy options. Therefore, especially the EU has begun to question the actions of USA and has not supported its actions. This has decreased the level of recognition of USA as "hegemon".¹⁰⁶ In an anarchic world, great powers, hegemonies do only fear from the rules, which can constrain their capability to make maneuver.

Naturally, it is nearly impossible to change the structure of the system in the short-run, but as long as EU has tried to stand its own and the arbitrary actions of USA have continued, EU can gain the capability to counterbalance the USA in the near

¹⁰⁵ R.Keohane, op.cit., p.43

¹⁰⁶ Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness", *Policy Review*, No: 113, June 2002, p.5

future and might change the structure to bipolarity in the long run. The theory of hegemonic stability¹⁰⁷ has begun to work in the opposite direction. Will the Europe be that much powerful? That question has dominated the future in accordance with the developments. I agree with Huntington that the EU would be "the single most important move" in the world and that move might produce the system to multipolarity.¹⁰⁸ USA hegemony is a reality but long-lasting hegemony requires the acceptance of this status by others both implicitly and explicitly. The recent arbitrary behaviors of United States of America have weakened its status in international relations because the reasons of other states to accept the hegemony of United States unconditionally have suddenly disappeared.

Before September 11 and Iraqi War, America was a tolerant ally which respected to the values of other states, principles of United Nations and its Charter, rights and freedoms of individual and regarding Trans-Atlantic Relationship respect to contradictory arguments and open to discussions to find the optimal best solution or answer. As Robert Keohane has pointed out in his article, the hegemony of USA is unique in the sense that there are many channels of contact to the relevant actors in the USA, which the other actors get into touch. Moreover, open channels have increased the chance and possibility of minimizing the opinion between these actors. When the other actors can find opportunities and in the past this was usually happen,¹⁰⁹ USA was willing to listen other ideas and more willing to act together in order to increase the legitimacy of the decision or behavior and to emphasize the spirit of co-operation. It is understandable for a country like USA to have a capability to act and decide unilaterally but all kind of unilateral action decrease the degree of

¹⁰⁷ This theory claims that the existence of hegemon in the international system bring stability.

¹⁰⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," *Foreign Affairs*, March- April 1999

reliability and the confidence in this long- lasting relationship. USA has been a hegemon or super power as long as the other sates accept it as a hegemon. Especially, in the long run this is very dangerous because the second power that operates in the opposite direction has a chance to be seen as an alternative. This has been what has happened in the international scene now. The unilateral actions and decisions of United States have hesitated the other actors and their reliability to the United States. Legitimate hegemony covers the recognition of others. This is the real reason behind the close relationship of USA and Britain.¹¹⁰ Whenever Britain psychologically and practically had accepted the increased power of America, it preferred to be an ally of it rather than compete to it.

5.1.1.2 ANARCHIC STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

EU, with the help of the USA, could achieve its primary goal. The aim behind the establishment of such an organization was: by creating interdependencies among member countries, minimizing the risks of war and conflict. The ultimate goal is to create a peaceful world. Although the ultimate and final goal is sound political, the means are economic, apolitical, and pragmatic. This is an ideal way of solving problems. The neo-liberal version of international politics. EU has been really good at achieving this. Since its establishment, world has never confronted with the risk of war or conflict in Europe, among members. Europeans have accepted this way of life as general principles, which have a universal character

The acceptance of Europeans method in the whole world is clear because that's the way it should be in the twenty first century. However, outside the Europe, world is

¹⁰⁹ R.Keohane, op.cit., p.46

still anarchic. Only in Central and the Eastern Europe, the Europeans became successful. By giving these countries financial aid and through democratization packages through peaceful means, they could absorb these Communist states into the Western Europe. On the other hand, they could not prevent the bloody disintegration of former Yugoslavia. Even they failed to understand the essence of the reasons of disintegration of former Yugoslav states. Without the American persistence and without the help of NATO forces, Europe did not manage to prevent it. The essence of the problem is that the Europeans are overconfident to their ways of settling disputes and solving problems.¹¹¹ Plus, they believe that these can work in everywhere. By applying their methods they think that they can create a method of peace. They make ambitions to convert the world into a peaceful place like themselves. However, their rules work only in Europe. Their rules do not have validity in an anarchic and conflictual world.

What they have achieved really deserves appreciation but the Europeans have really closed their eyes to the realities of outside world. Europeans live in Kant's Perpetual Peace; whereas the others live in Hobbesian world, where there has been always risk of war and power dominates. At this stage, Americans view is more efficient especially towards rogue states. Although the Europeans insist on the validity of their means, the practices and current events prove just the opposite. It is obvious that Europeans do not prefer to interest with the issues, which are not purely European in nature.¹¹² EU generally followed isolationist policies to the outside world and ignore

¹¹⁰ Barlett, *The Special Relationship: A Political History of Anglo- American Relations since 1945*, London: Longman, 1992, pp. 174-175

¹¹¹ Ibid., p.8

¹¹² Ibid., p.9

the realities of this world, which has not been possible for EU as an actor planning to be more influential.

EU has been living peace in the world, where the external environment it operates remains anarchical and will continue to remain like this. It is impossible to speak politely with the ones who have guns in their hands have waiting to fire. I think it is a utopia to establish this way of life in the Middle East, where there are lots of conflicts have been take place. In addition, in Yugoslavia, their way of life did not work. Even the UN had faced with problems in Kosovo after they have set up dispute and established the local government. It is a utopia to live in a peaceful world in every region. To reach this phase, Europe had experienced two world wars and only manages to enhance peace and stability with the help of USA.

However, the inclusion of Central and Eastern European countries to the Union will indicate the world that will it be possible to transform the anarchical and conflictual world to the peaceful ones. EU accepted Slovenia to the union in May 2004.¹¹³ The developments in other CEEC show the probabilities to the world. The incapability of the Union to solve the problems at the backyard of the Union and the out of its area have proved the Union that it can no more behave in the same manner in every region.

To sum up, as a group of states living prosperously among themselves, they have decided to open up their eyes to the outside. They have come up with realities. These realities have forced the EU to take up measures. We will see how they will act in an anarchic world? Will they continue to live like this or will they look like USA?

5.1.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN USA AND EU

As it was mentioned above, the relationship between these two actors today is not as strong as it used to be in the past. I agree with Robert Kagan "it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share the common view of the world, or even they occupy the same all important question of power."¹¹⁴ In this part, the reasons of this shift in this relationship will be analyzed. These are mainly: the existence of different strategic cultures and the existence of power gap between USA and EU.

5.1.2.1 DIFFERENT STRATEGIC CULTURES

From the beginning of this relationship, we can talk about two different strategic cultures belonging to each actor. However, it was not that much talked about because no occasion existed, which makes this issue that much important. Under normal conditions, which mean there are no war or risk of war; or ethnic conflict, their relations protect the usual course. The problem occurs whenever there emerges a probability of the danger of war or ethnic conflict, briefly, whenever the issues of hard security issue are at stake, the tensions began to break out among these two actors.¹¹⁵ In hard security issues, the delicate balances have begun to shake and the breaking point has been approaching although complete separation and complete deterioration of relations will almost impossible. The parameters of USA- EU relations are very crucial to capture the idea that whenever the balances in this relation have the risk to shift downwards, this strong relations have deteriorates.

¹¹³ For Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix B

¹¹⁴ Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness", *Policy Review*, No: 113, June 2002, p.1

¹¹⁵ Stephen M. Walt, "The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart", *The National Interest*, Number 54, Winter 98/99, pp.3-11

As Kenneth Waltz claims, the alliances endure as long as the balance among them is clear and has clear boundary, as long as they share common perceptions towards themselves, as long as they are dependent on each other, as long as they have a common threat.¹¹⁶ Under the light of these reasons, it is very logical to understand the reasons of long and strong alliance, but on the other hand, it is very logical to understand the reasons behind the tensions in this relationship.

Both the USA and the EU agree on what kind of world they want to live, their strategic culture is really different in the sense that Americans live in the Hobbesian world, where the power politics dominates. In comparison, Europeans live in Kant's Perpetual Peace, where they are prosperous and international law has priority. The main difference between the United States of America and the European Union is their means, methods to solve the problems in the world. Europeans have produced a new strategic culture in order to eliminate the risks of turning to old devastating days. Robert Cooper in one of his article in Observer explained this evolution as " Europe today lives in a post modern system that does not rest on a balance of power but on the rejection of force and on self- enforced rules of behavior." Morality takes the priority in international system.¹¹⁷ For example, they solved the German Question by co-operating with Germany and by integrating with Germany economically rather than isolating it. European strategic culture gives more importance to the rules of international law, diplomacy, negotiation, and commercial ties and on multilateralism. Whereas, Americans prefer to use the means of realists power politics, more likely to use force, less patient to negotiate, less likely and more powerful to use the principles of diplomacy and more likely to govern in a unilateral

¹¹⁶ Stephen M. Walt, " Why Alliances Endure or Collapse?", *Survival*, Vol.39, Spring 1997, pp.156-179

world. This sharp distinction became obvious in the recent USA attack against Iraq. Americans tendency to use force versus Europeans resistance to use force divided the world into two blocks. This war proved that the Americans and the Europeans in the security issues do no more share the same means.¹¹⁸ Americans want to spread the democratic values and Western ideas by using more assaultive ways, whereas the Europeans try to spread their own ways of Westernization: these are more peaceful, democratic and attach more importance to economic means. Europeans have tried to spread their own experience, which came about with the help of Americans, who is now their counter part.

On the other hand, the historical perceptions of Americans: Munich, Pearl Harbor, Vietnam and newly added September 11 still nominates the formulation of foreign policy objectives, which are the corner stone of possible foreign policy actions.¹¹⁹ I think, USA has been experiencing a big paradox at this stage. On one hand owing to the role it imposes on itself and the roles imposed on it by others, it is open to all kind of devastating attacks. On the other hand, these attacks and the responses of USA towards these make the USA more assertive and decrease the legitimacy of its status and recognized hegemony. All these experiences remembered the USA that either it has to or it wants to it has to be powerful and continue to live with Hobbesian rules of the world although they believe in the Kantian spirit of governance. If the Europeans helped Americans or the Europeans could help Americans to cope with these hard security issues, may be the Americans this time would insist on the magic of international law, diplomacy rather than force.

¹¹⁷ Robert Copper, *Observer*, April 7, 2002

¹¹⁸ Steven Everts, " Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe?: Managing Divergence in Transatlantic Foreign Policy", *Center for European Reform Working Paper* , February 2001

¹¹⁹ Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness", *Policy Review*, no:113, June 2002,p.12

Americans have used to live the possible dangers of the enemies and have tried to formulate precautions. The only deterrent option for the Americans, since they have the opportunities, is to follow different strategic culture.

Current events indicated that none of these two actors have intentions to deviate from their means. Americans are one step further because they do not fear from Europeans. Plus, they know that in spite of the difficulties and divergences in this relationship, Europe is still dependent on Americans will and capacity to deal with political problems especially security ones. American foreign policy of squeezing Europe to Europe with small capabilities has worked well. However, this situation has to change owing to the will of the both sides and the dynamism of the international structure. Firstly, the wars in the Balkans emphasized the fact that at least for some issues Europe has to stand on its own including military capabilities as well.¹²⁰ Americans are less sensitive to the issues, which are not that important to them than the Europeans. Balkan Wars (especially Bosnian War) were important turning stones. It proved that Europeans should no more follow inward looking policies only. They did not only stressed the military incapability of Europeans but also proved that there exists some issue which are critical, vital and essential for European security but not that much vital in the eyes of the Americans. At the same time, just the opposite may exist as well.

5.1.2.2 POWER GAP BETWEEN EU-USA

Some of the theoreticians claim that the reasons of these differences among these two actors is the differences in the levels of military capabilities of USA and EU. As

¹²⁰ Nicole Gnesotto, "Lessons of Yugoslavia", *WEU Institute for Security Studies*, Chaillot Paper 14

Kagan in whole of his article points out, the main reason is this; the others are less important compare to this. He claims that it is a problem of power.¹²¹

It is obvious that USA is militarily strong relative to the EU not only technologically but also quantity. USA has both the quantity (more number of materials) and the quality (technology) relative to EU. Europe has been militarily weak since the World War and after the World War II; it has not felt the need to gain military power due to the world, in which the Europeans have been living. Moreover, this gap has been increasing as well as a reflection of foreign policy means of these two actors. Furthermore, in most of the issues Europeans rather than developing of forming their own operational units choose to be dependent on the USA especially in hard security issues.¹²² This is due to the experiences, most of the time USA did the job on behalf of the EU as well. However, this situation might change because problems have begun to emerge among them.

USA faces with dilemmas in here. On one hand, it gives more importance to power to preserve its status quo; but on the other hand, its existing power leads to Americans to increase them continuously. Not only due to the responsibilities which are imposed on the super power but also due to the self-imposed perceptions of the Americans, Americans have to be more powerful and decisive. It is a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Americans behave as if they are the sheriffs of the whole world and they are responsible from protecting the good guys from the bad guys. Moreover, it should be remembered that one has to fulfill this role in order to leave the others available peaceful circumstances, which the Europeans set up with the help of

¹²¹ Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness", *Policy Review*, No: 113, June 2002, pp.4-5

Americans after the devastating wars. As a current example, EU criticized the Americans violent attitudes towards Iraq, especially the decisions to attack Iraq unilaterally.

In addition to these, USA as a super power has to enhance the conditions of the theory of deterrence. To have strong military capabilities and advance technological military capabilities are necessary but not sufficient to use force. The sufficient condition, in terms of the physiological effects it has on state, is the political will to use force. This is the most important point missing in the EU. In order to deter the bad guys in the world where the threats change their nature, good guy should have the sufficient material capability, will and persistence to use this material capabilities and finally it should be aware of who is the bad guy? The difference between the Americans and the Europeans are firstly, the Americans have more military power and secondly, even if the Europeans have enough power, they lack enough political will to use it.

5.1.2.3 DIVISION OF LABOR

From these realities we can make the following assumptions: 1) although USA power and attitudes are that much criticized, this is a necessary element of the anarchical world in order to live in a peaceful world against rogue states. 2) Undeliberately and regarding some issues deliberately, the current main actors in the system clarify the points of collaboration. Americans and Europeans share the international problems among themselves. On one side, Americans mainly deal with hard security problems and rogue states and terrorism. On the other side, the

¹²² Martin Smith and Graham Smiths, *Building A Bigger Europe: EU and NATO Enlargement in Comparative Perspective*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2000, pp.113-114

Europeans try to solve the soft security problems, humanitarian problems like poverty and the economic problems. The European Union is the biggest aid provider to outside world, more than the USA.¹²³ Through many programs, it tries to establish democratic systems to the undemocratic areas. Whereas, USA is mainly dealing with the unidentified terrorist groups, built technological missile systems and if the means of democracies do not work, using force towards rogue states and bad guys.

The power gap requires a division of labor between these two actors. This division of roles was clear and is accepted by all the sides till the September 11 attack, after that some voices have begun to be heard. Since none of the European capitals or cities have not confronted with this kind of an attack and they do not aware of the risks of being a political super power, post September 11 behaviors of USA could not be understood by Europeans. However, due to the results of terrorist attack and deaths of many civilians, and the inefficiency of Europe to have one effective voice, European tried to tolerate these behaviors. The attitude of European Union towards bombing Afghanistan was felt but not clear. This division became relatively intolerable when the USA decided to attack Saddam without any express resolution of UN Security Council and without the consent of the European Union by ignoring the diplomatic means and the works of the UN officials in Iraq. Despite the existence of negative attitudes towards USA, EU could not prevent USA from attacking Iraq and could not rely much against an American insistence to resort force. USA by itself arbitrarily decided to do what it wanted to do. USA ignored the opinions of others owing to power it has.

¹²³ European Commission, *The European Union and the world*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001, p.28

To sum up, EU acts as a weak organization, which does not have enough power and will to act decisively and as an organization believe the applicability of peaceful methods. Whereas, the USA act as a super power, who does enough capability and will to use them. The main reason for this difference is the power gap among them. In what manner the EU will act when it will achieve that capability is another research question.

What the Europeans need is the political will, neither than the capability if the American support and the recent decision of Americans which allow the NATO assets to be used by Europeans within the European Security and Defense Identity without the authorization of Americans. NATO assets could be used for purely European operations that did not require U.S. troops, under the formula that NATO such European missions and forces would be "separable but not separate" from NATO.¹²⁴ To create this will, Europe has to have one voice. The splits within the EU should disappear and they should find common points regarding the vital EU interests. In addition, to achieve these they should remember as Kagan point out the memory of power, international influence, and national ambition. I agree with him that the American attitudes and inclination to act unilaterally might create some energy to Europeans to speak with one voice. EU is at a point, where its choice will determine the following ones. EU has to decide whether to tolerate the arbitrary actions of USA and remain only as an economic giant or to formulate of it's own policies consistent with it's own means and be an alternative and a balancing force against USA. History has been repeating itself. America again is one of the factor that leads to the unification of Europe either consciously or unconsciously. In the

¹²⁴ Martin Walker, "The Future of Europe's Foreign Policy" in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), *Europe In the New Century*, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p.75

past, it did for economic unification consciously, now for political unification but unconsciously.

5.1.3 GLOBALIZATION

Globalization is the most controversial phenomena of the twentieth and also the twenty first century. It can be defined as " A series of transnational economic processes making the world into large market place, and in doing so undermining the authority of, and need for, the nation state."¹²⁵ As it can be depicted from this definition globalization is generally conceived as an economic phenomena rather than a political one. Due to this conviction, no consensus can be reached upon the definition of this concept and its outcomes. Although the debate about the scope and effects of globalization has continued, its non-negligible impacts on the international system are clear and feasible. As an extension of this debate, now its impacts on the European Union are discussed, as it will be done below.¹²⁶

European Union and the globalization can be taken as a two interrelated phenomena in international relations and world governance. What makes them that much important, non- negligible and powerful is their common point, that is: states are no more the sole actors in the international system. EU by decreasing the power of nation states, who transfers some level of their sovereignty to a high authority; and globalization, by putting more emphasis on the impacts of non state actors and by decreasing the power of nation states in the decision making structures, introduce alternative actors to the system. These are mainly international organizations and

¹²⁵ Chris Rumfold, *The European Union: A Political Sociology*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, 2002, p.16

non- state actors like transnational organizations, elite and bureaucrats. States are not taken as granted and not treated as black boxes. Plus, I think what will make them correlated is their starting point. As it is known, EU entered that process initially with the ECSC: with economic aims; like the initial stage of globalization. EU can be a case study in order to understand the effects of globalization and measure the impacts of variables.

Now, there are two different existing types of understanding, if their effects are accepted.¹²⁷ One of them supports the idea that: in order to be competitive in the global world, integration is necessary. This is mainly an economist model of explanation. The latter one accepts that the relationship between globalization and that European Union is interrelated.¹²⁸ It is impossible to deny the truths in these two types of believe. However, if the improvements are taken into consideration, both the reciprocal and complementary nature of relationship between the globalization and European Union cannot be ignored.

5.1.3.1 THE ECONOMIST MODEL OF EXPLANATION

The economist model of explanation involves the realities and the initial stages of both the European Union and globalization. This model accepts EU and other organizations as agents of integration because in that environment states can no longer perform effectively in a highly competitive market which involves many players and which is created by globalization. Reduced transaction costs and

¹²⁶ Hudson and Williams, " Re-shaping Europe: The Challenge of New Divisions Within a Homogenized Political- Economic Space", in Hudson and Williams (eds.), *Divided Europe: Society and Territory*, London: Sage, 1999, p.5

¹²⁷ Some of the theoreticians do not believe in the effects of globalization. However, in this study effects of globalization are accepted.

¹²⁸ Chris Rumfold, *The European Union: A Political Sociology*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002, p.20

improved technology enhance the non-state actors to trade among each other in a competitive liberal economy. As a natural outcome of this, states loose their power and sub- national regions have begin to gain more importance. Global financial flows give momentum to states to increase their level of integration in order to tackle down the hazards of globalization like the European Union.¹²⁹ Countries in order to increase their benefits from this increased transaction prefer to form blocs like the European countries in the EC and in later EU especially with their common trade and monetary policies. Moreover, by forming blocs they increase their level of security. These are mainly two reasons for regional integration against globalization. European Commission in 1993 legitimized the attempts of further integration by presenting the globalization as a challenge to be met. In brief, this model takes the globalization as an independent variable, which by forcing the states leads the creation of blocs like the European Union. Delanty accepts the process of European integration and the Maastricht Treaty as reflections of globalization and globalize world order.¹³⁰ Even some of the theoreticians think that the variables in equation have changed, the need for peace and economic reconstruction as causes of integration have begun to leave its place to globalization as a motivating factor.

5.1.3.2 SECOND MODEL OF EXPLANATION

The second argument about the correlation between the EU and globalization is a more flexible one. This one accepts the globalization and the EU as variables but their status, place in the hypothesis can change depending on the circumstances and

¹²⁹ Mehmet Ugur, " Globalization, Regional Integration and EU-Turkey Relations", *Koc Lectures*, 3-10 March 2003

¹³⁰ G. Delanty, " Social Theory and European Transformation: Is there a European Society?", *Social Research Online*, also available on the Web: <http://www.soresonline.org.uk/>

the interpretation.¹³¹ In this argument, EU and globalization accepted as interrelated variables and the relation between them is too difficult to distinguish. There is a continuous interaction among them. Castells explains the European integration process not only as an answer and choice to globalization but also as its "most advanced expression."¹³² In addition to him, some like Ross argues that the EU is the motivating force of globalization rather than just the opposite. At that point it is worth to mention that nearly most of the regional integration arrangements were founded or reorganized while the debate about the globalization breaks out.¹³³ This argument does not explicitly interpret this process as purely economic but not explicitly deny the impact of economics in this process as well. They cannot do this. What they try to do is to adjust this process and commends to the practices and realities of the world. They by not clearly ignoring the other sides of globalization and by not drawing the clear and definite boundaries of the EU and globalization remain more open to analyze the current situations. The idea of whether the chicken had come out of an egg or vice versa can not explain the attempts of the European Union to enlarge and deepen and the effects of globalization on this decisions only by itself by eliminating the other factors and by taking the globalization as an only factor. They had put this debate aside focus on the relationship between these two variables.

¹³¹ Chris Rumfold, *The European Union: A Political Sociology*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002, pp.20-25

¹³² M. Castells, *End of Millenium: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture*", Volume 3, London: Blackwell, 1998,p.33

¹³³ Mehmet Ugur, " Globalization, Regional Integration and EU-Turkey Relations", *Koc Lectures*, 3-10 March 2003

5.1.3.3 WHICH ONE FOR EU?

In this paper, the debate about which one can be the exact independent or dependent variable will not be considered. From my point of view, the emergence and the remote causes of this process are to make this processes highly related and indispensable. Like in every debate, both of these two arguments are good at answering their own research question. First one, the economist model since its more emphasis on economics is right at accepting the globalization and its consequences of European Union and its developments. I agree with them, in all regional integration arrangements initial idea have been economic. EU has enhanced its members to compete more and gain more by its highly institutionalized institutions and economic power otherwise especially the less developed countries can manage. As Mehmet Ugur argues, EU decreases the transaction cost of trade and set the optimum tariff barrier.¹³⁴ However, this model is not sufficient in explaining the other sides of the globalization and its continuous relation with the European Union. Since the globalization and its consequences cannot be ignored like the existence and power of the European Union. As Beck argues it is logical to accept the dynamics of globalization and try to shape this by being active in this process. Being only a recipient decrease the power of the European Union and make it very passive which in the future will make the European Union meaningless.¹³⁵ They do not neglect the idea of competition as a main reason of European integration but they try to explain the EU as a step in the process of globalization. I think through the formation of regional arrangements, the power of nation states will decrease and by creating less powerful actors in numbers, decision making procedure will become easy and less

¹³⁴ Mehmet Ugur, " Globalization, Regional Integration and EU-Turkey Relations", *Koc Lectures*, 3-10 March 2003

¹³⁵ U. Beck, *What is Globalization?*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000,p.158

complex and naturally they will go through the stages of globalization not only in economic terms.

As a real subject of this research paper, I believe that not only globalization leads to the formation of European Union but also EU can be seen as one of the "most advanced expression" of globalization.¹³⁶ Due to this fact, globalization can be taken as one of the factor that forces the European Union to rethink its role and the place in the world. In a global world order for an international organization like the European Union adaptation of new conditions and dynamism are the inevitable and necessary conditions to be effective. The EU should prefer to be an active participant rather than a passive recipient. Under these existent conditions as a conclusion, not only EU can be seen as a participant of globalization but also it can be affected from the terms of globalization.

5.2 INTERNAL FACTORS

5.2.1 DYNAMISM OF EU AND ITS INSTITUTIONS

Like all the other international entities, international organizations have a reason for their existence. States generally are not close to the idea of setting up an international organization without a reason. These reasons can be found within the constitutional agreements of each organization. According to their reasons of existence, they define their purposes. For instance, the reason of the establishment of NATO was security and main purpose is to protect the Western European states against Soviet threat.¹³⁷ However, depending on the changes in international circumstances, to protect its

¹³⁶ M. Castells, *End of Millenium: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture*", Volume 3, London: Blackwell, 2000, p.348

¹³⁷ Martin Smith and Graham Timmins, *Building A Bigger Europe: EU and NATO Enlargement in Comparative Perspective*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000, pp. 13-15

status and weight, international institutions has to reevaluate its role and weight in international politics. Lacking of this vision was one of the main reasons of the steady decline of the NATO in recent past. The answer of the question of why does the alliance endure needs to be renewed depending on the conditions.¹³⁸ Otherwise, after they achieved their goal, they are supposed to de facto disappearing. EU as a dynamic organization has managed to do these revisions. By nature, these revisions bring the deepening and enlargement on the top of the EU agenda. Deepening and the enlargement of the union not only makes the union dynamic but also make it more powerful and effective in international politics with more member states and with more democratic institutions, and responsibilities. In relation to this paper, the main issues which directly and indirectly lead to evolution of the union is: enlargement, the idea of Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common security and Defense Policy.

5.2.2 ENLARGEMENT

When the ECSC was established in 1951 as an initial idea of European integration, it consisted of only 6 states and it was an economic institution. The coal and steel industry of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg came together under the control of " High Authority".¹³⁹ As it was mentioned several times they tried to stabilize the region, achieve economic recovery and normalize the relations between states by transferring their authority to a high supra- national authority in one of the key economic issue. They have been successful. The establishment of European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Community by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 further enhanced the adherence of these

¹³⁸ Stephen M. Walt, " Why Alliances Endure or Collapse?," *Survival*, Vol.39, Spring 1997, pp.156-179

¹³⁹ Elizabeth Pond, *The Rebirth Of Europe*, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, p.27

six to the idea of European unity through economic integration.¹⁴⁰ Later, the EEC, which is an organ functioning as a common market, became the European Community. These serious and efficient developments took the attraction of the non-member states not only due to the feeling of involvement to a powerful organization, club but also due to the benefits they can get from this organization.

As a response to the demands of the candidates and the Community and Union, till now EC\ EU has decided to enlarge four times. After Helsinki, this process has gained momentum and the Union is supposed to have approximately 27 members by the fifth enlargement in 2004. This process has been essential in the sense that changes in the number of member states require the adoption of existing EC\EU policies and institutions.

5.2.2.1 FIRST ENLARGEMENT

As a brief historical background, the first enlargement took place in 1973 when United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland were accepted as new members. There is no need to mention that acceptance of Britain, as a new member was something that should have happened when the ECSC was first set up. As a country who applied for membership and whose application delayed till the 1973 due to French opposition, Britain really gave concessions. I think this wave had not created too many difficulties to the Community in terms of the effects on Community because these are the states traditionally equivalent of member states: they had working democracies, market economies. In addition, under those days existing mechanisms and institutions of the community were efficient enough to handle the intended and

¹⁴⁰ Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, p.38

unintended results of enlargement. In this wave, the economic interests of both sides had the priority over political considerations. It was normal in the sense that EC was mainly an economic community, which only has an implicit desire to be a political union. There had considerable changes in the economic considerations of the Union. Thanks to these changes and as a result Britain was accepted as a member. Britain was capable of solving this slump in the union with the help of its agriculture sector, which could give boost to the EU economies. The application of Ireland and Denmark were closely related to the Britain's desire to be a member because these two states had strong trade relationship with Britain.¹⁴¹

With this enlargement, the Community increased the number of member states from 6 to 9. Since the main institutional structures were formed by the Treaty on European Union, at this time first enlargement made no important institutional changes within the Community. The effects of this enlargement on the Community are demonstrated on the Table 2.¹⁴²

5.2.2.2 SECOND ENLARGEMENT

The second enlargement, which is known as Mediterranean Enlargement, took place in 1981 and in 1986.¹⁴³ Unlike the first wave and the third wave, the main reason of admittance of these states was political. I think this decision of the community began to give the indications of the idea of politicization of the Union because when the tenets of the enlargement waves are considered except the first wave, we confront with the reality that the economies of all the second wave candidates have been

¹⁴¹ Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, pp. 64-67

¹⁴² See at Appendix B, Table 2

below the EC\ EU level and the main aim of this decision was so as to democratize these candidates and spread of Western values. The main reason behind the second wave enlargement was to ensure the stability on the southern periphery of Western Europe. This political and security reason lead the Council to accept these members in spite of the negative report of the Commission covering these states.¹⁴⁴ Needless to say, the members of the Community could not tolerate any undemocratic, authoritarian regime in the areas in its periphery and they decided to accept these states. Political factors overrode economic factors regarding the all three of them: Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986. The membership of these countries with their poor economic standards might set a precedent for the membership of CEES.

With this enlargement, the number of member states was increased to 13. With respect to institutional structures at those days, like the first wave, these new inclusions did not create important institutional problems. The changes of this enlargement are demonstrated in the Table 2.¹⁴⁵ However, it should be noted that these enlargements have put great economic burdens on the EC/EU.

5.2.2.3 THIRD ENLARGEMENT

The third wave enlargement included the countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA): Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. *EFTA countries felt this need due to the decrease in the investment in their countries. The determination of EU member states regarding the creation of a single market threatened the economies of EFTA countries. Despite the efforts of both sides to solve this problem and*

¹⁴³ Ian Bache and Stephen George, *Politics in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.409

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, pp.410-411

¹⁴⁵ See at appendix B, Table 2

establish more close links among them without participating the community officially, they did not succeed on this. Mainly, the businessmen did not satisfy with the idea of European Economic Area because their main concern was foreign direct investment and they believed that this idea could not met their needs and not take enough precautions. They insisted on membership. As a response to this request, EU by taking the wealth of the EFTA states into consideration accepted their membership. EFTA enlargement had occurred mainly due to the need of EU to decrease the pressure on the budget, which might have created troubles with the Central and Eastern European enlargement.¹⁴⁶

The changes that this enlargement was made on the Community are shown on the table?¹⁴⁷ The main importance of this third wave enlargement was it was the first time that the discussions about the institutional structure of the union came to question. These discussions mainly cover the weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers, extension of the practice of Qualified Majority Voting, and the size of the commission.¹⁴⁸ This enlargement pointed out the hazards of enlargement. When the new and increasing number of states becomes member to the EU, it becomes more difficult for EU to formulate policies and rearrange decision-making procedures.

5.2.2.4 CURRENT ENLARGEMENTS

Till now, enlargement processes took place without many problems. Even the participation of economically less developed countries did not put many burdens on

¹⁴⁶ Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, pp. 104-109

¹⁴⁷ See at appendix B, Table 2

the architecture and the decision making of the Union. Only some complaints have been made regarding the too much money going to Spain and Portugal. The main problems have begun with the idea of the Central and Eastern European enlargement. After the sudden collapse of communism and the decision of the European Commission to co-ordinate aid regarding the post Communist countries and the construction of Phare Program, firstly to the Poland and Hungary and after the total collapse to all Central and Eastern European states in 1989.¹⁴⁹ This program aimed at to assist these states economically and politically. Two years later, in accordance with the aim of the post communist states of being "European", EC signed Association Agreements with them, which after the completion of adoption process give them the opportunity to be member of the club. The commitment to open negotiations also covered Malta and Cyprus. In 1993, European Council evaluated their request for membership and put their conditions, which are known as Copenhagen Criteria.¹⁵⁰

"Copenhagen Criteria approved the principle of the enlargement but not unconditionally. EC\ EU laid down three main criteria for membership. The first one is political criterion: An applicant must have:

- Stable institutions guaranteeing democracy
- The rule of law
- Human rights and the protection of minorities.

The second one is the economic criterion: An applicant must have:

¹⁴⁸ Ian Bache and Stephen George, *Politics in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.409

¹⁴⁹ Martin Smith and Graham Timmins, *Building A Bigger Europe: EU and NATO Enlargement in Comparative Perspective*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000, pp. 22-23

¹⁵⁰ European Commission, *Glossary: Institutions, Policies, and Enlargement of The European Union*, Luxembourg, Office for the Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000, p.5

- A functioning market
- Economy
- The capacity to cope with competitive pressures within the single market of the EU.

The last one is a criterion relating to the *acquis communautaire*¹⁵¹: An applicant must be able to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union."

Just after the declaration of Copenhagen Criteria, the applications began with Poland, and Hungary. Later, during the German presidency specifically with the encouragement of Germany, lots of supports were given to Czech and Slovak Republics. In 2003, 12 candidates were waiting for membership at the EU gates. EU initially preferred to put them in equal footing, but later depending on the candidates' peculiar circumstances this decision was ignored. In 1997, the Commission prepared and announced the famous document of Agenda 2000.¹⁵² Plus, they attached their opinions on the applicant states' preparedness for membership. After the evaluations, they proposed to begin negotiations with the best-prepared candidates. Their proposal was accepted in the Luxembourg Council (1997) and the applications of Cyprus, and Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia were prioritized. The other five (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia) and the Malta, who withdrew membership and re applied in 1998, were the second group. EU in 1999 decided to open negotiations with them as well.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ It is the body of common rights and obligations, which bind all member states together within the European Union.

¹⁵² European Commission, *How Does The European Union Work?*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, p.15

For EU, acceptance of these states as members has not been an easy decision as accept them as candidates for membership. This is not only because of the scope of the enlargement comparing to pervious waves or the economic burden of this decision on the budget but also because of the unprepared institutions of the EU. Dating from the Maastricht, EU institutions have tried to adopt their own structures to the future enlargement before admitting new members to prevent any inefficiencies of the decision-making dynamism.¹⁵⁴ However, EU was not decisive enough to apply this decision. Therefore, in order to speed the application of this decision up and fill in the gaps of the Maastricht decisions, member states convened in Amsterdam Intergovernmental Council. These were all the essential documents but as it can be easily understood from the former information, the main document, which put great emphasis on enlargement, was the Agenda 2000. This document aimed to prepare the EU and its institutions for enlargement but the main decisions, which requires the urgent implication of previous decisions, was given in the Nice Treaty. The Nice Summit of EU (December 2000) aimed to reform the structure of the Union in preparation for the admission of up to 12 new states. This meant limiting the number of policy areas where unanimity is required (the question of national veto), the size of the blocking minority, the weighting of votes under Qualified Majority Voting, and the size of the Commission. They achieved some degree of success but not as much as expected, only at a degree, which was enough to keep open the prospect of enlargement.¹⁵⁵ Now, after the completion of all the procedures with the decisions of EU Council of Ministers in the Brussels Summit (December 2003), EU will have 10 more members (Czech Republic, Estonia,

¹⁵³For Luxembourg European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix A

¹⁵⁴Croft et al, op.cit, p.8

¹⁵⁵Rıdvan Karlıuk ve Özgür Tonus, *Avrupa Birliği Kapısında Türkiye*, Ankara: Turhan Kitapevi, 2002,pp.29-30

Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia) on 1 May 2004. Plus, EU clarified that they are ready to accept Bulgaria and Romania as full members in 2007, if they are ready.¹⁵⁶

Likewise in the issue of globalization, the question of whether the decision of enlargement forces the Union to rethink its role or the EU enlargement because it has been rethinking its role has included controversial aspects. The dynamism of EU and the unintended and unpredicted events in the international system have led the EU to enlarge so as to spread its democratic values; however, any increase in the number of members has put new responsibilities on EU shoulders not only in economic terms but also in political terms. Every enlargement varies the geography and the geographical boundaries of the union, political balances among the members, balance of budget and the decision-making mechanism of the Union.¹⁵⁷

Enlargement imposes not only internal, institutional changes but also external, geographical burdens on the Union. Firstly, it leads changes in security and defense objectives of EU. Needless to say, EU clearly has a commitment to promote stability in Central and Eastern Europe and incorporate its peoples into the West. If we take this commitment as the main reason of EU in Central and Eastern Europe, the decision of enlargement is consistent with this aim. In order to enhance the stability in this region, the best way is the inclusion of these states in the union. By this method, EU can better control these states and spread democratic values because the aims of the Union not only includes the government agencies but also the public and public agencies. Secondly, changes in the threat perceptions in the new conjuncture of the system have decreased the role of NATO. The end of the Cold War and the

¹⁵⁶ For Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix A

¹⁵⁷ For detail information, see Appendix B List of Tables

current threats has proved the assumption that the main threats are mostly under the scope of soft security issues. It is necessary to have military capabilities and will to create pan- European security order but not sufficient in itself. In addition to military needs, economic and social contexts are also required in current pan- European order, which is the aim of the EU.¹⁵⁸ Therefore, by enlargement EU has tried to solve the problem of economic insufficiency, undemocracy by its own methods. Thirdly, parallel with all of the reasons above, EU has to formulate sufficient policies and adopt credible policy actions by considering the number of its members and extended geographical boundaries. Enlargement, having more members requires additional policies, actions and more responsibilities.

The impacts of the most important enlargement are demonstrated in the Table 2.

5.2.3 IDEA OF COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

The idea that the European Union should speak with one voice in world affairs is old as the European integration process itself. But the union has made less progress in forging a common foreign and security policy over the years than in creating a single market and a single currency.¹⁵⁹

As it can be understood from this phrase: Although it has not been achieved yet, the attempt to make this union politically integrated has begun nearly at the same time of creating an economic union. Efforts of creating a political union in spite of the slow developments will be analyzed and criticized within the contents of Common Foreign and Security Policy.

¹⁵⁸ Martin Smith and Graham Timmins, *Building A Bigger Europe: EU and NATO Enlargement in Comparative Perspective*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000, pp.168-170

5.2.3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF CFSP

The first step on the way towards forming a political union was an attempt in 1954 to create a European Defense Community¹⁶⁰. This attempt had not been realized due to the veto of French National Assembly. This desire was delayed till the 1969 Hague Summit. In this summit, EC states expressed their desire of adding a political dimension to the community and they set up European Political Co-operation (EPC). EPC was like a negotiation forum among members of the community but did not have a binding effect and operated through adopting common positions. It can be argued that the success of the EPC was depending on the will and the intention of the members. The intention of the members had priority over common position because legally EPC was not part of the community architecture.¹⁶¹ Therefore, foreign policy co-operation was not institutionalized.

5.2.3.2 SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT

What made the foreign policy co-operation institutionalized was the 1987 Single European Act. By this act, EC members linked the EPC into the framework of EC. This did not only enhance a legal framework to the actions of the EPC but also legitimized the possible actions under the framework of common positions. In order to increase the legitimacy of their common positions they changed the decision-making apparatus of foreign policy to "constructive abstention."¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹ <http://www.europa.eu.int/pol/cfsp/overview>

¹⁶⁰ Werner Weidenfeld, "Upheaval in Europe", in Werner Weidenfeld and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), *Europe From A to Z Guide to European Integration*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997, pp.8-9

¹⁶¹ Ibid., pp.8-9

¹⁶² Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, p. 114

However, what was fastened this desire of the members was the events taken place in the international structure. The fall of Berlin Wall, collapse of communism and the Soviet Union, the regional conflicts at the backyard of the EC\ EU in former Yugoslavia, and lastly the danger of international terrorism in recent years were pushed the issue of forming a political union through Common and Foreign Policy to the top of the EC agenda.

What has made these events that much significant is: they showed that EC could not remain only as an economic union, if it wants to be an effective international institution.¹⁶³ These events proved that by giving financial aids, not all the solutions could be solved in terms of international politics. The inadequacy of EPC within the framework of Single European Act had become an unavoidable reality with the Gulf Crisis and Yugoslav Civil War.

5.2.3.3 THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

After the realization of this, EU leaders decided to arrange an Intergovernmental Conference to fill the gaps in the application of foreign policy. The Maastricht Treaty (The Treaty on European Union) concluded this conference in December 1991. By Maastricht, EPC was transferred into the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) as a second pillar of the EU. It can be said that the Treaty on European Union introduced CFSP in Article J.1 of this treaty clarified the famous 5 objectives of the Union. These are:

¹⁶³ Gabriela Thornton, " The Future of European Union External Relations: From a " Pass-the- Buck" Strategy to a Common Voice?", *Jean Monnet/ Robert Schuman Paper Series*, Vol.1, No.7, September 2002

- To strengthen the common values, interests and independence of the Union
- To strengthen the security of the Union it's member states in all ways
- To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter
- To promote international co-operation and
- To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.¹⁶⁴

In addition to these goals, Maastricht (TEU) reformed the decision-making procedures of the CFSP. Commission has been responsible from the issues on foreign policy. Directorate- General for External Policies was set up to perform this function on day-to-day basis. European Parliament only had a consultative role in CFSP. Further more, they introduced two policy instruments: “common positions” and “joint actions”. Common positions are decided through consensus among members, with the informal constructive rule applying. Member states are free to implement this position. The latter policy instrument is the joint actions. The actions, which require joint actions, are decided by the Council by unanimity and than its implication are done by qualified majority voting. This was the first time that qualified majority voting has been pronounced as a voting system in terms of foreign policy. However, it cannot be said that these are binding on members as well.

¹⁶⁴ Treaty on European Union, Article J.1. Available on the Web: <http://www.europa.eu.int/>

Moreover, as another pillar of foreign policy, the issue of defense was mentioned in the Maastricht. The EU and Western European Union (WEU) would co-operate in the defense issues and WEU was integrated to the EU as a part of this existing architecture. Their aim was mainly to "strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance".¹⁶⁵

5.2.3.4 THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM (1997)

In order to achieve this goal, they decided to reform CFSP and this issue became the central tenet of the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference. However, the war in former Yugoslavia proved the inefficiency of CFSP. The aim of CFSP written into the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 has proved elusive. Its implementation has lagged behind the implication of forming a single market. To fill the gaps and to increase the implementation capacity of CFSP, they have developed the CFSP. Firstly, Amsterdam Treaty of 1996 decided to appoint "Mr. or Ms. CFSP", who is responsible from the implementation of EU actions. Javier Solana was appointed to this job in 1999. The main aim behind this decision was to attribute a personality to the EU on foreign policy matters. He or she on behalf of the Union has represented the EU on CFSP matters. Beside this, this was the symbolic indication that in spite of the criticism EU could speak with one voice. Secondly, Amsterdam introduced "common strategies" as an additional instrument of CFSP.¹⁶⁶ On the basis of proposal of foreign ministers EU Council decides to adopt them through common positions or joint actions. Thirdly, in order not to create ambiguities in the voting system of decision-

¹⁶⁵ Simon Hix, *The Political System of the European Union*, London: Macmillan Press, 1999, pp.343-346

¹⁶⁶ European Commission, *The European Union and the World*, op.cit. p.6

making structure, Amsterdam clearly drew a line between the CFSP principles and general guidelines, and the adoption of joint actions, common positions and implementing decisions. It was clearly stated that the voting system of the first one is unanimity and the latter one is qualified majority voting.¹⁶⁷ This division was made in order to enhance the proper function of the CFSP. Moreover, Article 15 of the Treaty has separated the content of the common positions and joint actions. Joint actions require where necessary upon the decision of the Council specific operational action. Whereas, common positions are planned to be used in less clearly definable situations, " of a geographic or thematic nature". *Fourthly*, Amsterdam formalized the system of the second pillar of the structure as a " constructive abstention". Although all CFSP decisions are taken by unanimity, they decided to count the abstention votes as not negative in order to enhance the unity. Therefore, the member states, who do not share the same perception has an opportunity to abstain rather than opposing the decision legally. *Therefore, they are not obliged to take an action parallel to the given decision.* Finally, as a complementary element of CFSP, Amsterdam reaffirmed NATO as the central defense organization of Europe but mention the possibility of integration of WEU to the EU.¹⁶⁸

These are all the legal institutional developments with regard to CFSP. They look well on the paper but the same command cannot be made about the practice of these developments. Despite these improvements, the issue of CFSP is still an intergovernmental policy area and due to this fact, as the Commissioner

¹⁶⁷ Amsterdam Treaty is available on the Web, <http://www.europa.eu.int/>

¹⁶⁸ John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg, *Decision Making In the European Union*, London: Routledge, 1999, pp.230-231

Responsible for the External Relations mentions, it has been "a common policy, not a single one."¹⁶⁹

5.2.4 EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

The developments in the former Yugoslavia and the humble architecture of the Union in responding these developments showed that reaction is nothing without the capacity and the intention to act.¹⁷⁰ The conditions of the theory of deterrence were missing in the union's CFSP. To fill this gap in their policy of external relations, EU since 1999 decided to create a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) within the CFSP. In addition, from the beginning of efforts of co-operation in the CFSP; foreign affairs, security and defense has constituted the two components of it as mentioned in Treaty on European Union (1992). Therefore, developments and concerns about the CFSP have been valid for CSDP to some extent.

5.2.4.1 THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

The main step at this direction was taken at Maastricht. They decided to formulate a common security policy and declared the WEU as the institution to implement the security and defense policies.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁹ Chris Paten, *A Voice for Europe? The future of the CFSP*, IEA, Dublin, Brian Lenihan Memorial Lecture, 7 March 2001, Speech /01/111.

¹⁷⁰ Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, p.509

¹⁷¹ Christopher Hill and William Wallace, "Introduction- Actors and Actions", in Christopher Hill (ed), *The actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, p:13

5.2.4.2 THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM (1997)

The Treaty of Amsterdam reformulated the existing provisions and added Petersberg Tasks as new aspects.¹⁷² These tasks have been incorporated into Title V of the Maastricht Treaty and they involve: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making. The reason of enlarging the scope of the aspects of CSDP was to show the determination of the member states to safeguard security through operations especially at a time when there was a risk of local conflicts at the backyard of the Union in the former Yugoslavia, which might have spread to other regions. Besides these, Amsterdam established highly closed ties between the EU and WEU without incorporating them. However, these arrangements were not able to enhance the adaptation of a common defense policy and the unanimity rule in the decision making process¹⁷³

However, the success of the Petersberg Tasks depends on the collaboration with the NATO because approximately all the material capabilities and materials are supposed to be given by NATO to the EU; such as, military capabilities, operational planning capabilities, and so on. Therefore, EU has tried to strengthen the material capabilities. Consistent with this goal, in Helsinki in December 1999 member states introduced the military component of the CSDP. EU established a "headline goal" in Helsinki, which is, the Union's capacity to deploy within 60 days, and sustain for at least one year (by the year 2003), and up to 60000 persons (even some of the candidate countries participate with

¹⁷² Amsterdam Treaty, Article 17 is available on the Web, <http://www.europa.eu.int/>

¹⁷³ John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg, *Decision Making In The European Union*, 1999,p.234

military forces) to fulfill Petersberg Tasks: mainly to response to international crisis where NATO as a whole militarily not engaged.¹⁷⁴

5.2.4.3 NICE SUMMIT

To implement these tasks, EU reformed the military structure in Nice Summit (2000) and developed the military capacity of the union. The most important one was the creation of the ESDP

Replacing the Political Committee, the PSC keeps track of international developments; helps define policies and monitors implementation of agreed policies. Composed principally of national representatives, it is the lynchpin of crisis management activities. To ensure its smooth operation, the PSC is assisted by a politico-military working group, a committee for civilian aspects of crisis management, as well as the Military Committee (EUMC) and the Military Staff (EUMS). The EUMC gives military advice to the PSC and the High Representative while the EUMS, which is part of the Secretariat of the Council, is responsible for early warning, strategic planning and situation assessment.¹⁷⁵

Moreover, at the same day, EU established the Rapid Reaction Mechanism to enhance the Union's civilian capacity to intervene effectively in the crisis situation in third countries.¹⁷⁶ Furthermore, in Nice (2000), EU removed the Article 17 of the Amsterdam and clarified that enhanced co-operation cannot be used for defense matters, which does have military components in it.

¹⁷⁴ Nice Presidency Conclusions is available on the Web <http://www.europa.eu.int/>

¹⁷⁵ Cengiz Okman, "AGSK ve NATO Uzerine Radikal Donusum Iklilemi", *Karizma*, Nisan/ Mayıs/ haziran 2001, pp.108-112

As it can be depicted from these decisions, EU has tries to establish its own defensive capabilities but these are not enough to formulate a CSDP in a full scale. As the EU High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana said: " NATO will continue to be the cornerstone of the collective security of the European countries. The European security and defense capacity will reinforce and revitalize NATO."¹⁷⁷

In the new future according to the EU actions, it's success and failures of CFSP and CSDP will be better evaluated. Whether these policies will be formally recognized and implemented or whether these policies if are accepted in a legal document, remain on the paper. Future will show the world and also to their own members of this unique club that the success of the attempts are for a political union. Will the EU pass this test as well or fail?

¹⁷⁶ Commission of the European Communities, " Summary of the Treaty of Nice", *Memorandum to the Members of the Commission*, Brussels, January 18, 2001, SEC (2001) 99, p.13

¹⁷⁷ Javier Solana," Towards a Stronger Alliance", *European Affairs*, Brussels, 12-04-2000
<http://ue.eu.int/solana/details.asp>

CHAPTER VI

EU AS A GLOBAL POWER

It was nearly fifty-three years since Robert Schuman had proposed the establishment of ECSC and now the EU is the final project of these efforts. Schuman's small community has been growing. Now, the EU is the largest single market in the world and the largest international trader.¹⁷⁸ EU's influence in the world has been increasing parallel to the developments of the policies. The process of integration, acceptance of Euro as a single currency, and the attempts of developing the idea of CFSP have contributed to this continuous increase of EU. After that, EU will be accepted not only as an economic giant but also as a political giant.

International expectations about the EU that by using its economic power, EU might have been a political power were frustrated by the internal arguments and as a reflection of these internal debates.¹⁷⁹ The Union's economic objective of protecting its competitiveness by promoting global commerce through liberalization of world trade rules work very systematically and practically. Whereas, the Union's objective of establishing a stable Europe with a stronger voice remains open to discussions owing to the incapability and indecisiveness of the EU. EU's actions indicated the unwillingness of EU and EU was accepted mainly as a commentator rather than a player in the system. From political point

¹⁷⁸ Christopher Patten, "The European Union and the World" in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), *Europe In the New Century*, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p.79

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, p.80

of view, after the bloody disintegration of former Yugoslavia, EU realized that it should have not continued to underestimate its potential power not only in Europe but outside Europe as well.¹⁸⁰ Political dimension of the Union's external activities lagged behind the level of expectations. After the realization of these realities, EU decided to be stronger in foreign policy, reinforce political capabilities.¹⁸¹

To sum up, in order to destroy its weaknesses, EU decided to develop and speak with one voice either internally or externally. One of the tangible indicators of these ideas is the Draft Constitution for the Future of Europe.

6.1 A CONSTITUTION FOR THE EUROPE

In Laeken Summit (2001) parallel to the plans of the Union, EU decided to establish a convention to work on the future of the Union and to propose a constitutional draft.¹⁸² It was really a turning point in the history of the Union because by having a constitution, it owes one of the necessary components of being a state. This reflects the seriousness of the Union on the way towards being a political institution besides its economic character. In order to be both decisive and powerful both within the union and outside the union, the convention was expected to answer the following questions:

- 1) How to bring citizens closer to the European Design and European Institutions.

¹⁸⁰ Lionel Barber, "The New Transatlantic Agenda" in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), *Europe In the New Century*, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p.99

¹⁸¹ European Commission, *The European Union and the World*, op.cit, p.3

¹⁸² The Laeken Declaration is available on the World Wide Web:

http://www.europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/offtext/doc151201_en.htm

- 2) How to organize politics and the European political area in an enlarged Union
- 3) How to develop the Union into a stabilizing factor and a model in the new world order.

The common points of all these questions are all of them require a more powerful organization internally and externally. In order to re-think, readjust and reinvent the system, Valéry Discards D'estaing as the President of the Convention mentioned, they established Convention worked and completed their proposal text to be declared in an IGC.¹⁸³ They prepared their draft and accepted by a broad consensus on 13 June 2003. They submitted and proposed to the Council in Thessaloniki on 20 June 2003. This draft hoped to be a treaty, which in the future might transform to a constitution. In this paper, mainly this draft constitution will be examined in terms of its probable impacts on the Union's future and special focus will be made on the unions external relations since it will affect it's relation with Turkey.

6.1.1 CFSP and CSDP

Under the provisions of existing treaties and legal documents, EU had mainly three devices for the implication of external activities. These were: trade policy, development aid and the political dimension, which was under the average compare to the other policy instruments.¹⁸⁴ With these attempts, EU has tried to strengthen the political policies as a policy instrument. In order to be more involved in security issues as it's role and geography impose on the union and to

¹⁸³ European Policy Center, " The IGC and Institutional Reform", 05 December 2003, p.1 (running notes)

¹⁸⁴ European Commission, *The European Union and the World*, op.cit, p.3

be more active in world scale, the Convention gave much importance to the CFSP and CSDP.

In addition to the institutional changes it requires, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Defense Policy take the biggest part in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe and are central to the text. However, the member states had not agreed on the draft of the Constitution during the Italian presidency.¹⁸⁵ Besides this, I think they would not be able to reach a consensus during the Irish presidency as well. I guess that the main aim of this attempt has not been by establishing a closer relationship solving the problem of democratic deficit because by solving another problem, which is the institutional balance within the Union by treaties, the Union can handle this problem. There are easier ways of solving this problem. However, the main reason is political. EU is at a time to define its future and act in this direction. Member states are well aware of the fact that the union has been evolving to meet the challenges of political integration besides economic integration.¹⁸⁶ This is the main difficulty in the draft text.

By the Treaty of Rome (1957), Union decided to extend the scope of their activities. One of them was foreign policy and security. In order to achieve this goal, in this draft the members of the convention tried to give a momentum to this decision. They tried to do this by making institutional reforms, by reforming the decision-making and policy formation system. It should not be understood that this paper will simplify the Constitutional Treaty by only focusing these

¹⁸⁵ "Constitution Talks Collapse", *Euobserver*:
<http://www.euobs.com/index.phtml?aid=13891>, 13.12.2003

¹⁸⁶ The IGC and Institutional Reform, 05 December 2003, European Policy Center, p.1

changes, in the necessary places especially to the ones regarding the external activities of the Union, will made.

Firstly, there has been a widespread opinion that EU has been undergoing significant institutional reforms. It is true that attempts are really historical and radical¹⁸⁷ but not that much important compare to others. There is a risk and tendency of over estimating the importance of institutional reform. The major success will be evaluated when this treaty will be ratified and implicated by all member states. The success of this draft and the acceptance of it depend on the will of the member states rather than the written institutions and they're written responsibilities.¹⁸⁸ This reality can be well understood when the intergovernmental institutions and the relative role of the Parliament are taken into consideration. The recent Iraq Crisis revealed the limits of loyalty and mutual solidarity of the Union. Draft Constitution will show whether the necessary lessons have been taken or not?

One of the activities of the Union, which indicates the sincerity of the Union to adopt and to use these measures, is external relation. The so-called CFSP and CDSP. The Constitution for Europe separated nearly 22 pages to the external affairs. Main principles are explained as: strengthening multilateral co-operation, good global governance, sustainable development, free trade, and conflict prevention and eradicating poverty.¹⁸⁹ Consistent with these general

¹⁸⁷ European Convention, *Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe*, Luxembourg: Office For Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title IV Part I, p.23

¹⁸⁸ Martin Walker, "The Future of Europe's Foreign Policy" in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), *Europe In The New Century*, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, pp.77-78

¹⁸⁹ European Convention, *Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title I Part I, pp.10-11

principles, the European Council will be responsible from defining the strategic interests and objectives of the EU and from providing regular threat assessments.¹⁹⁰ By this article, EU explicitly recognizes that the outside world is still anarchic and it has to have deterrent measures and will to live in this world. Moreover, the member states are expected to collaborate in harmony regarding CFSP in a spirit of loyalty and refrain from any action contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to diminish its effectiveness in international relations.

6.1.1.1 INSTUTIONAL REFORMS REGARDING CFSP

As Grevi mentions, strengthening the role of EU in foreign and security policy domain and support this by credible actions and policies towards to the outside of Europe will determine the level of the future integration of Europe.¹⁹¹ There has been a real development in the articles of the external affairs but not enough to cope with the challenges of the global and unidentified hard and soft security threats. Main development is the recognition of these new threats and presentation of instruments to handle them both in military and political terms. Especially, "mutual solidarity clause" deserves much attention.¹⁹² In addition, the attempts for further integration by having their own external representation. On the other hand, main short-backs in this draft and in the newly proposed and rejected draft are: the complicated mechanisms in decision- making and the creation of the post of a double-hatted EU Foreign Minister, which might be both an advantage and disadvantage.

¹⁹⁰ European Convention, *Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title IV Article 20, p.25

¹⁹¹ Political will and institutions: A chicken Egg Dilemma in EU Foreign Policy, Giovanni Grevi, 02 Dec 2003; p.1

¹⁹² For further information look at: European Convention, *Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title V Article 42, p.53

6.1.1.1.1 EU FOREIGN MINISTER

In order to show the world that there will be "more Europe" in world affairs, Members of the Convention proposed the appointment of a EU Foreign Minister. He will be appointed by the European Council, by taking the opinions of the President of the Commission.¹⁹³ He is responsible for developing common foreign policy, and common security and defense policy by preparing proposals. To fulfill these tasks under the provisions of Article 27-2, he will work with the Council of Ministers. Besides this, as a Vice President of the Commission, he will co-ordinate all the aspects of external action of the Union and handles external relations of the Union.¹⁹⁴ At this post, he has a power of initiating policies regarding Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The post of the Foreign Minister of the Union was created so as to enhance synergy in foreign policy making. Union tried to merge the functions of External Relations Commissioner and the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. He has a double-hatted position.¹⁹⁵ The Minister will have to work both with the Commission and the Council. This aims at enhancing cooperation between the Council and Commission but I think that introducing one more player to this complex structure will make especially the policy formation difficult. The Minister illuminates with wide range of powers and in practice he or she has more power than the President of the Commission if his or her power of policy initiation in the field of CFSP and CSDP is taken into consideration. It

¹⁹³ European Convention, *Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title IV Article 27-1, p.34

¹⁹⁴ European Convention, *Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title IV Article 27-3, p.34

¹⁹⁵ Political will and institutions: A chicken Egg Dilemma in EU Foreign Policy, Giovanni Grevi, *European Policy Center*, 02 Dec 2003; p.3

should be noteworthy to remember that in the other external relations' fields, the Commission has a power of initiation, whereas in the foreign policy and security field this power is delegated to the Foreign Minister. This really threatens the power and authority of the President of the Commission in external relations. The ability to co-operate will depend on the will and personal abilities of these two. Moreover, since he is appointed by the Council, which is an inter-governmental organ, might be dependent on the national governments might have his own priorities and might decide on national basis. By the elaboration of the right of initiation of the Commission, The Council can define the policy guidelines.¹⁹⁶ On the other hand, this post really strengthens the Union in terms of external representation. The Minister will represent the Union to the outside world, establish political dialogues with third countries and act for the Union in international organizations on behalf of the Union when the Union can produce a common position, and represent the EU at international conferences, which is related with CFSP.¹⁹⁷ To sum up, CFSP will be mainly defined by the Council and implemented by the Minister.

6.1.1.1.2 PRESIDENT OF EU COUNCIL

Second important institutional reform in this Constitutional Treaty, again related with CFSP is the creation of the post of the President of the EU Council. The President will be elected by a qualified majority to chair the Council for the period of 2.5 years. He will represent the Union externally on the issues

¹⁹⁶ European Convention, *Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title IV Article 20, p.25

¹⁹⁷ European Convention, *Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title IV Article 27, p.34

concerning CFSP without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Minister.¹⁹⁸

This means that EU Council remains as the most essential institution in this policy area. This involves great paradoxes because the divisions of task between the Minister and the President of the Council is not clear due to the unclear position of the Minister. Therefore, the personal characters of these two and their ambitions will determine their ability to work under this ambiguous structure. In addition to this, Article I-23 indicates the impact of European Council over the Council.¹⁹⁹ This in practicable terms prevents the Commission from proposing and coordinating policies. The relationship between the President of the Commission and the President of the Council creates ambiguities in terms of the conflict in their area of influence and power, authority distribution. The triangular relationship between the Minister, the President of the Council and the President of the Commission might block the foreign policy and implementation process and lead to ineffectiveness of the system. In addition to all, in this convention the executive and legislative function of the Council of Ministers is separated;²⁰⁰ however, this is not a clear separation. Again, the Treaty creates a double-hatted situation, which will increase the need for coordination. However, this does not affect foreign policy so much because the Foreign Affairs Council will be chaired by the Foreign Minister.

¹⁹⁸ Constitutional Declaration, Stanley Crossick, *European Policy Center*, 14 Dec 2003; p.5. Also available at:

<http://www.epc.com/>

¹⁹⁹ European Convention, *Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title I Article 23, pp. 27-28

²⁰⁰ Ibid, pp.27-28

6.1.1.1.3 DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES

The decision-making procedure was changed by the Draft Constitution as well. The instruments of Common Strategies and Joint Actions are replaced by Decisions that commit member states to pursue the agreed EU policy.²⁰¹ Every Member State and the Foreign Minister have a right to submit proposals to the Council, which is subject to the approval of more than a third of weighted votes in order not to be failed. However, the rule of Qualified Majority System only valid for implementing decisions, unanimity is general rule but abstention is possible. The extend of QMV can be enlarged by the unanimous votes of the Council with the exception of defense matters. Although the QMV is the main rule, CFSP according to the provisions of Article 24 subjects to unanimity.²⁰² Therefore, the Convention is not present fundamental quantitative changes regarding the decision-making mechanism in this field. This is one of the main obstacles in terms of CFSP field because especially after the enlargement will take place, how the Union will be able to decide by unanimity with 25 members?

6.1.1.2 INSTUTIONAL REFORMS REGARDING CSDP

6.1.1.2.1 DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES

Regarding CSDP, the rules are stricter and decisions are more difficult to be made although this text proposes to increase in the Union's capacities. The Constitution for Europe states, " The Union shall have competence to implement

²⁰¹ European Convention, *Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title V Article 39, pp. 47-48

²⁰² European Convention, *Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title I Article 24, p.28

progressive common defense policy.”²⁰³ Paragraph 2 of the same article clarifies the steps need to be taken. This article emphasizes the importance of the Council in defense matters, which will decide by unanimity to adopt Common Defense Policy. Article 15 underlines its abilities and decisiveness of preserving security by military means and calls the members to act in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. Moreover, member states under the “structured cooperation” within Union framework make more binding commitments to each other.²⁰⁴ Furthermore, more powerful states implicitly become more effective in this domain. Because the Council may ask a group of members "with necessary capability and desire" to undertake certain tasks on behalf of the Union. They can enter into structured cooperation and accept more binding commitments. Furthermore, it is decided to establish a European Armaments Agency to monitor the capability commitments of Member states and promote the harmonization of the projects.

6.1.1.2.2 THE SCOPE OF EU TASKS

Plus, by Article III-210, the scope of Petersberg Tasks is expanded to include joint disarmament operations, military advice and post-conflict stabilization. The EU increases its level of intervention by this article. This article even gives the right to EU to intervene to a civil war when it thinks it is necessary. EU does not clarify the limits of extra-territorial military operations undefined, which gives the opportunity to the Union act more flexible. In this Constitutional Treaty, EU defines its attitude towards terrorism clearly especially by "the

²⁰³ European Convention, *Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title I Article 11, p.17

²⁰⁴ European Convention, *Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title V Article 43, p.54

Mutual Solidarity Clause".²⁰⁵ This means that EU realized the existence and the dangers of soft threats and decides to fight against them militarily as well. Article 42-1 declares the world that in the case of confronting a soft threat, which is defined in this article of its members, all members will co-operate by military means as well. By all these articles, EU shows its capability to have its own military structure. Plus, they mention that in necessary environment they can use the military capabilities. Article 39 and 40 summarize these as " Where the international situation requires operational action by the Union, The Council of Ministers shall adopt the necessary European decisions."

These are all radical steps in the field of CSDP within the context of CFSP. However, during the Italian presidency this Draft Constitution was not accepted and the external affairs is one of the reasons of this rejection. I argue that these articles do not provide a powerful base for the Union to handle the challenges on the global world. The member states independent variable in this hypothesis does not match. Different perceptions create the same results but this is mainly due to the coincidences and the pressures both within and outside on members to be more active in the world affairs. To fight against terrorism is not the same thing with the liberalization of economies or setting up democratic institutions. It requires both the power and capabilities but much more than this: will and belief. As Dinan says the word "common" is not the exact word for these fields: CFSP and CSDP. " Co-operation" is a better one.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵ European Convention, *Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title V Article 43, p.54

²⁰⁶ Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, p.508

6.2 BARRIERS AGAINST BEING A MORE INFLUENTIAL ACTOR

European Union is one of the most significant international organizations, as an actor in the international system, especially in economic terms. EU member states achieved their goal of creation of a single market, a single currency and formation of a monetary union. Besides these achievements, the goal of forming a political union has gained momentum after September 11 both due to the internal and external factors, which were explained in Chapter V. Owing to these factors, there has been a consensus in the Union to make their voice heard in the international system. They agreed on the idea and the need of "more Europe"²⁰⁷; however, they have not agreed on how they can achieve this and turn them into effective action unanimously is not clear and great disagreements have been taking place among members regarding this issue. This situation is well expressed by Solange Villes in her article "The path to Unity". She says:

"European leaders face" both the greatest challenge and the greatest opportunity of their lives: to achieve in the earliest stages of the twenty-first century the political unification of Europe. These leaders are closer than ever to fashioning a political Europe that would fulfill its responsibilities in defense and security, that would be able to translate its economic clout into a real political power on the world stage." ²⁰⁸

Needless to add anything to these worlds. It is impossible to agree with except this. Big projects sometimes bring good results but in order to get the optimum and the best results, challenges have to be tackled down. Great risks have to be taken. In this part, the challenges of this desire will be analyzed by grouping them under three headings: Economic, Political, and Geopolitical Difficulties.

²⁰⁷ http://www.europa.eu.int/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm.

6.2.1 ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES

It is always said that European Union is an economic giant and a political dwarf.²⁰⁹ It is really an economic super power when the universal rates of 21% in imports, and 20% in exports are taken into account.²¹⁰ Its economic power is highly appreciated by the outside world owing to the programs it prepares towards the third world countries and to the ones who are in real need. As Lennon points out, the Union is the biggest donor by the percentage of 56% to developing countries.²¹¹ This increases its power in terms of legitimacy.

The Union manages to do this due to its economic power, but the recent enlargements, which took place in May 2004 and which will take place in 2007, have composed a great challenge to the Union not only economically but also politically. The other factor, which makes the EU economically more powerful and integrated, is the balance within the Union. Through many policies, the Union tries to balance the economic parameters of all members to a certain degree, which is above the level of many non- member states. Owing to economic power of EU, EU is that much powerful. However, these enlargement decisions might change the situation by worsening the economic situation of EU as a whole and situation of each member state.

Being powerful enough in politics require economic power but under these circumstances it will be difficult for the Union to spend on the development of

²⁰⁸Solange Villes, "The Path To Unity" in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), *Europe In the New Century*, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p. 16

²⁰⁹ Gabriela Thornton, " The Future of European Union External Relations: From a " Pass-the- Buck" Strategy to a Common Voice? ". *Jean Monnet/ Robert Schuman Paper Series*, Vol.1, No.7, September 2002

²¹⁰ http://www.europa.eu.int/external_trade.htm

its defense forces and spend it's energy on this issue. If the statistics of new members are interpreted, which are under the average of EU, it will be certain that EU will have to solve the probable economic difficulties it will have internally. Its internal balance will be deteriorated at the initial phases. What a coincidence nearly at the same time Union wants to increase its role in the world politically. The Union will have to fight in two fronts: one is economic and the other is political. It is such a difficult task to handle. With recent enlargement EU will increase its common market area and will try to balance the economic parameters between the new members and old ones. The difficulties will be explained by figures.

Firstly, inclusion of new members means an increase in overall population of EU. Approximately; 115 million new people became EU citizen. And this will increase the gross product per capita only by 3%. The average GDP/ capita of new members is 5,600 \$. Whereas, the average of the Union is 24,000 \$. With another data, 39 million Poles had a per capita of 1/3 of this amount.²¹² Another fact, which worsens the situation, is the distribution of funds. The more amount of money EU has to allocate for funds within it, the lesser the GNP of EU will be. Therefore with new members, the GNDP of the Union will decrease by 13 % with the enlargements.²¹³ According to some calculations, it is expected that

²¹¹ David Lennon, "The European Union: A Leader in Humanitarian and Development Assistance" in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), *Europe In the New Century*, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p.127

²¹² Martin Walker, " Enlargement of the Union: How New EU Members Will Change the Shape of the Europe" in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), *Europe In the New Century*, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p. 62

²¹³ "More Funds Needed for regions in enlarged Europe", Euobserver:
<http://www.euobs.com/index.phtml?aid=6165>, 07.05.2002

only the membership of the 10 last members will cost Europe approximately 1,3 trillion Euro.²¹⁴

Secondly, the inclusion of 110 million people to the Union, who are mainly dealing with agriculture, will change the way EU financed its budget and bring about the reformation of some policies especially the Common Agriculture Policy. This is one of the biggest challenges the EU faces; because it has been the first time that the Union has accepted new members, whose population's 25 % farmers.²¹⁵ That is something that the Union is unfamiliar with. This will damage the general budget system. Moreover, this will put too much burden to the contributing countries like Germany and France. For instance, Germany contributes to the budget with a percentage of 30 but only receive 15 of it in return. The major contributors want to correct this system since they perceive themselves only as contributors. Furthermore, the recipients, mainly Greece and Portugal, have begun to complain because their share and also the amount of money they have got from the structural funds will decrease.

To sum up, as an organization whose power has come from its economic power: on one hand decided to take a risk but on the other too much economic burden in Copenhagen 2002, on the other hand decided to combine its economic power with political power by ensuring the political integration. I think this is paradoxical because while trying to do these things, its economical power will

²¹⁴ Christian Keushning and Wilhelm Kohler, " Eastern Enlargement to the EU: Economic Costs and Benefits for the EU Present Member States?," *Final Report on Study XIX/ B2/9801*, September 1999

²¹⁵ EU Agriculture commissioner Franz Fischler, *EUROPE Magazine*, April 1998

diminish at a certain degree. Therefore, whether it will be that much influential is unclear. It will be seen in the future.

6.2.2 POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES

Since the Union has gained a degree of supra-nationality in economic fields by establishing a monetary union and accepting Euro as a single currency, finding solutions to the economic difficulties is easier than finding solutions to the other problems especially than the political difficulties. Finding the optimum solutions to the economic ones is easy task since all the members make their calculations in terms of absolute gains and due to the high level of interaction and interdependence. However, political ones are more delicate and controversial because they are closely related with the concept of "sovereignty". Moreover, these problems are more difficult to tackle down if this problem has an ability and capacity to change the political balance and structure of the system.

In below these difficulties will be explained. The divergence of members on the question of " What kind of a union they want to be?" The problem of "capability- expectation gap"²¹⁶ will be analyzed under this one. The latter one is again the Trans- Atlantic Relationship. These two main ones will be accepted as two main difficulties in this research paper.

6.2.2.1 VIEWS OF SOME MEMBERS

The idea of "more Europe" with establishing powerful political identity is an accepted idea between the members. However, their actions on the way of this road are full of ambiguities and dilemmas. In my opinion, with the

Constitutional Draft, the Union has indicated its will of being powerful in politics by forming CFSP and CDSP. On the other hand, the members left the kind of political identity they want to foresee open to interpretations. It is neither a federation nor a confederation of states is not clear. In order to enhance consensus and conclude a text, this point has been missing. They prefer to use a mixture of both, which will slow down the momentum of these policies as explained above while analyzing the draft constitution.

It is obvious that members still have different perceptions and attitudes towards forming a political union in order to have just a single voice. The main reason of this is, as Dale argues, historical and cultural differences.²¹⁷ For example, Scandinavian countries prefer much more transparent institutions, they are against the formation of " mutual defense clause", more inclined to use diplomacy and peaceful means²¹⁸. As another example, due to historical rivalries between France and Germany, the smaller countries in between these two countries prefer central institutions and having common political policies to preserve the balance and stability in the continent. .²¹⁹ As constructivists claim, countries own unique histories have led to the emergence of different political perceptions, which have determined their attitudes towards integration and policy making in the union.²²⁰

²¹⁶ Simon Hix, *The Political System Of the European Union*, London: Macmillan Press, 1999,p.346

²¹⁷ Reginald Dale, " Differing Views On a United Europe " in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), *Europe In the New Century*, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p. 31

²¹⁸ "Neutrals Protest Against Mutual Defense Clause", *Euobserver*:
<http://www.euobs.com/index.phtml?aid=13815>, 08.12.2003

²¹⁹ Reginald Dale, " Differing Views On a United Europe " in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), *Europe In the New Century*, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p. 32

²²⁰ Martin Smith and Graham Smiths, *Building A Bigger Europe: EU and NATO Enlargement in Comparative Perspective*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2000, p. 154

Moreover, as briefly mentioned above, there is a difference between the ideas of founding member states and other members concerning the level of integration.²²¹ It can be said that the Union is the child of six founding states; therefore they want to bring up their child by enlargement and deepening. The Union is the product of their efforts and even sometimes the outcome of big concessions. Due to their long- lasting experiences, these six states are more likely to accept further integration. This is what has been called in those days: the concept of "core Europe", "two- speed Europe". This implies the complementation of integration by these core European states earlier than the other members. This idea is supported by France, Germany, and Belgium.²²² Besides their experiences in integration, these countries have the opportunity, capability and the will for further integration. Since twenty-five members became members at different time series, their economic and political level of integration varies from each other. By making references to these, these six states have expressed their will to give the momentum for further integration firstly among themselves. According to their thesis, the others especially the new thirteen members²²³ are practically not ready to these developments. This sudden, radical change might create some internal problems both within the member states and within the Union as well. This idea gained momentum among these six, specifically, after the collapse of Constitution talks on December 13 2003. The logical explanation of this idea was made by the French President Jacques Chirac. He said " I continue to think that it is a good solution

²²¹ Reginald Dale, op. cit., p.36

²²² "Prospect of a Multi- Speed Europe Grows", *Euobserver*:
<http://www.euobs.com/index.phtml?aid=13892,13.12.2003>

²²³ These are the new 10 members and 3 candidates. New members are: Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. Candidates are: Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey

because that will provide a motor, that will set an example. I think that it will allow Europe to better go faster and further."²²⁴ However, this is not a wholly accepted offer especially for Poland, Luxembourg and Italy.²²⁵ If all the members do not prepare a final draft for ratification during the Irish Presidency too, France and Germany might push EU integration forward by eliminating the other less likely and capable states. At the end, all members will be forced to make a choice between accepting the EU constitution and living in a European Union ruled by a core- club of countries.²²⁶ To create such a powerful organization, I think that on papers, and in theory, this idea might work well. However, in practice it will not work because this does not mean to have just a single voice. This means to impose these policies to non-core European states by isolating them in decision-making structure, which will decrease the legitimacy of action.

The roots of these divergent views go back to the initial stages of integration. From the beginning of the establishment of this institution, main argument has taken place between inter-governmentalist countries and community method, which is another barrier behind integration. Since in political issues priorities are given to national interests, most of the states prefer inter-governmentalism. The recent voting system, which was proposed by the Constitutional Draft, has created disagreements in the EU as a reflection of this disagreement. Mainly, Spain and Poland have opposed the double majority system.²²⁷ Under this

²²⁴" Constitution Talks Collapse", *Euobserver*:

<http://www.euobs.com/index.phtml?aid=13891>, 13.12.2003

²²⁵ "Luxembourg and Italy Opposed To Core Europe", *Euobserver*:

<http://www.euobs.com/index.phtml?aid=13945>, 22.12.2003

²²⁶ Lisbeth Kirk, 15.12.2003

²²⁷ " Constitution Success Hangs on Vote Weighting issue", *Euobserver*:

<http://www.euobs.com/index.phtml?aid=13811>, 09.12.2003

system, decisions can be taken by at least half of the EU states, representing at least 60% of the EU population. Therefore, the impact of these countries will decrease in decision-making. They have insisted on the continuation of the Nice Summit decisions, in which they have 27 votes in Council. They have not agreed on the creation of balance of power in the Union. This implies that still national interests have priority and the EU has a long way of producing a "European Political Identity". If EU were able to create a political identity, member states concerns about supra-nationalism would go down.

Furthermore, national interests are at stake in the political issues especially in CFSP and CSDP. As neo-liberal intuitionists claim, speaking with one voice is easier in the soft security ones than the hard security issues. That's why the member states cannot reach a consensus in these matters. There is a consensus on having a common EU Foreign Minister and commencing a common EU defense.²²⁸ However, when time comes to take the necessary steps, means to implement them, they have not agreed on. For instance, four neutral countries (Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Austria) of the union have been against the "Mutual Defense Clause", which is contrary to the principle of non-alignment.²²⁹ These four want to leave the option of help, and assistance to their own discretion. This has been hesitated especially the Britain, France, Germany and Belgium. If we accept the constitution as a major step of forming a political union, we confront with the fact that foreign policy goes right to the heart of what it means to be a

²²⁸ "An EU Constitution Short of one line", *Euobserver*:

<http://www.euobs.com/index.phtml?aid=13906>, 16.12.2003

²²⁹ "Neutrals Protest Against Mutual Defense Clause", *Euobserver*:

<http://www.euobs.com/index.phtml?aid=13815>, 08.12.2003

sovereign state.²³⁰ The other political difficulty is the non- existence of enough political will to overcome the other difficulties. Some of the members recognize these difficulties as excuses to postpone or/and delay the creation of a political union.

The legal and material difficulties are not the main reason, these are all that can be settled by the enough and combined will, desire of the members. If all the members had a political will, they would pass the Constitutional Draft during the Italian Presidency and Irish Presidency as well under these circumstances. One EU diplomat underlined this fact by simply saying "There is no political will to conclude a draft."²³¹ I do not totally agree with this statement. I believe that the level of will among the members do vary and enough and sufficient will has not been constructed yet and some members have resisted to do this at those days, at a time when the enlargement has taken place and Europe has been under economic difficulties and prepare to make institutional reforms.

6.2.2.2 AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLITICAL INTEGRATION

The long- lasting relationship between these two powerful actors has gone well. America since the beginning of the idea of European integration has given various supports to the members and sometimes even encouraged them. This attitude of America sometimes appreciated and sometimes criticized by the members. By Trans-Atlantic Agenda, they implicitly determine their area of

²³⁰ Chris Pattern quoted by Timothy Garton Ash in his article " Europe Has One Voice, And Another and Another," *New York Times*, September 22, 2002)

²³¹ " Ireland to put Constitution on hold until Spring", *Euobserver*:
<http://www.Euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=13894>, 13.12.2003

business and the principles of this business. However, the international system has undergone tremendous changes in terms of the nature of threats and the structure. This has sometimes created implicit and explicit tension in this relationship. Although it has not been declared explicitly and officially by the USA, the existence of strong and decisive Europe with political power, supported by military power might hesitate America because this will create a barrier to America, which will prevent USA from acting unilaterally and arbitrarily.

From the beginning, EU has divided into two. They are the Atlanticist²³² and the Europeanists²³³. First group has overestimated the USA support in the matters, which not interested USA. On the other hand, the second group wants to stand its own but not enhance the necessary condition and support from the others to achieve this. They always confront with the anti-thesis of the first group. America should not be disturbed. It acts on behalf of EU as well. EU has managed to form a security community, which means the inconceivability of war between community members.²³⁴ They have created this by desecuritization and they claim that this means the re-securitization of the Union. But the latter group is right in the sense that as long as the EU does not have a common voice without political power and will, and also the military power, the EU cannot be a superpower.²³⁵ However, the recent events, which have been taken place in the international environment fastens the process of politicization.

²³² This group supported the idea of maintaining the status quo of USA preeminence in Europe.

²³³ This group supported the idea of maximizing Europe's collective security identity and capability.

²³⁴ Martin Smith and Graham Smiths, *Building A Bigger Europe: EU and NATO Enlargement in Comparative Perspective*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2000, p. 150

²³⁵ Christopher Patten, "The European Union and the World" in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), *Europe In the New Century*, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p. 87

Although USA has not showed reaction to EU in an explicit manner, the New National Security Strategy of W.Bush administration might prevent Europe from being politically strong. This new strategy underlined the fact that "the president has no intention of allowing any foreign power to catch up with huge lead the United States has opened since the fall of the Soviet Union more than a decade ago."²³⁶ For this reason it wants to remain as the only super power in the international system as it has been under the current world situations and wants to act in its own, and unilaterally. The differences in the mentalities of the US and the EU and their different visions of world governance were explained while explaining the factors, which have lead the EU to reconsider its role so in these section there is no need to go in details.

EU, as an organization, which has a tendency to be more influential in the system, has to make a choice between preserving its power and influence at this level or developing its level of influence by increasing its political capabilities.²³⁷ The Draft Constitution and the recent divergence between the actors have given strong signals that EU chose the latter one. It has decided to be a political union despite the existence of barrier like USA, and strong advocates of collaboration with the USA.

I think although the USA and its attitudes seems as if it constructed barriers against the political EU, psychologically it can be evaluated as a motivating

²³⁶ David E.Singer, "Bush Outlines Doctrine of Striking Foes First," *New York Times*, September 20,2002

force. Needless to say, EU has and will face with strong difficulties. However, now EU has captured a good chance to be a political union owing to political barriers. These difficulties have proved that if the Union does not catch up the train, the number of barriers will increase. Now, the EU realized that in some issues it might not be in the same opinion with the USA and the conflictual international system does not leave any other choice. These factors encourage the members of the Union to compose a single voice which otherwise will be more difficult to compose. They should not preserve their status quo or wait the decline of the USA as argued by defensive realists.²³⁸ They should do their best to cope with barriers by showing their decisiveness, which at the end improve the EU political identity and might counter balance USA in foreign affairs.

6.2.3 GEOPOLITICAL DIFFICULTIES

As Umit Ozdag said "EU is a civilization model and has a geopolitical reality just like all the other civilizations"²³⁹ With the last two waves of enlargement, its current geopolitics has been enlarging and as a result of these, EU has to form its new geopolitics.

With the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta and Southern Cyprus; and the following probable inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 has changed the geopolitics of the Union. As a natural outcome of EU policies towards Central and Eastern Europe, EU has

²³⁷ Gabriela Thornton, "The Future of European Union External Relations: From a "Pass-the-Buck" Strategy to a Common Voice?", *Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series*, Vol.1, No.7, September 2002

²³⁸ Ibid.

gained a continental characteristic.²⁴⁰ EU had an area of 3.238.062 km² but now it has 3.973.072 km², and by June 2004 has had an area of 4.321.482 km² in 2007, with the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria²⁴¹. This increased the EU area of influence and it will be more difficult to enhance governance in such a big area. There is no doubt that the bigger EU has the area to govern, the more influential EU has to be.

Moreover, these enlargements have changed the neighbors of the Union as well. Now, EU became neighbors with Baltic Sea neighboring states in the north, Mediterranean in the South, Russian Federation, and Ukraine in the East and with Western Trace in the southeast. The opinion of Mr. Ozdag contradicts with mine. I think that this enlargement cannot form a real opportunity for the EU to construct a political identity. He would be right if the EU had enough will and capability to govern these areas. However, EU under these circumstances has not been ready to control the problematic neighborhoods and new members. I agree with him in the sense that it is a necessary condition (geography) to be a super state but I think the EU is not ready to cope with bigger and more problematic areas.

To sum up, geopolitics is one of the factors, which needs to be considered during policy formation, and now the EU has a more difficult job. As the EU enlarges, it has to take more responsibility not only in economical terms but also in political terms. Therefore, this geography, for me, is a barrier for the Union in being a more powerful political actor, but if the EU enhances stability and

²³⁹ Umit Ozdag, *Türkiye- Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri: Jeopolitik İnceleme*, Ankara: ASAM, 2002, p. 18

²⁴⁰ Ibid., p.19

economic growth in these regions as it claims, then this barrier might turn out to be an opportunity to the Union.



²⁴¹ <http://www.eurostat.com/>

CHAPTER VII

FUTURE OF TURKEY-EU RELATIONS

From the beginning of this relationship, it has been said that this is "yes but when" relationship. Although Turkey has not yet been a member to the club, it is the only country, which has Customs Union with the Union. This means that economic integration has almost been achieved and Turkey proved that it could cope with the difficulties of liberal and competitive economy. However, due to the over emphasis placed by the EU regarding Turkey on democracy and human rights, especially after the Maastricht, this relationship has been mainly carried on political factors. As it was mentioned, the most problematic part of the AP is the compliance by the bases of political criteria. The EU in its annual progress reports has always appreciated the developments realized by Turkey but not find them efficiently implemented by Turkey. This is the explicitly stated barrier before the Turkish membership. By taking into account the realized reforms into consideration, the Union will presumably decide to begin negotiations with Turkey in December 2004.

However, I think that although the Union will give a date for commencement of the negotiations, the acceptance of Turkey as a member to the Union will possibly be realized the earliest in 2014. The EU has faced with dilemmas regarding the membership of Turkey to the Union. By enlarging, the EU placed itself under a great economic burden. In addition, EU will also face the additional problems in the short-run when it will accept Turkey as a member.

These could be economic and demographic problems. However, on the other hand, in accordance with the Union decision to increase its political weight through CFSP, Turkey will be a political and also a military asset for the Union?

7.1 DIFFICULTIES OF TURKISH MEMBERSHIP

7.1.1 ECONOMIC

EU has been the one of the most powerful economic power in the world with the USA. However, with the inclusion of new members to the Union, it has come across with some economic difficulties as mentioned in the Chapter 3. Some of the economic difficulties that the EU might face in the case of Turkey's accession to the Union will be analyzed below. Needless to say, Turkey with its current economic parameters will add more burdens to the existing economic problems of the EU.

Firstly, the recent enlargement decreases the GDP per capita in EU with 13% and will cost the Union approximately 1,3 trillion Euros.²⁴² Therefore, EU will need 10-12 years to solve these economic problems and back to the current economic parameters. This means that the EU will be ready to face with new economic challenges at the earliest in 2018-2020. According to statistics, the probable Turkish membership will cost the Union nearly 50 billion Dollar.²⁴³ This is the greatest amount comparison to other candidates or new members. From these figures, it can be concluded that for the Union, Turkish membership will be a highly expensive one so the exclusion of Turkey from membership can be the best solution. Because, through the Custom Union, the Union can carry out

²⁴²"Eastern Enlargement...", Eylül 1999

²⁴³ Umit Ozdag, op.cit., p.7

it's trade relations with Turkey and under current situation EU is the beneficiary rather than the contributor in this relation.

Secondly, the Turkish inclusion to the Union will increase the burden sharing on the Common Agricultural Policy of the Union. The 34% of the Turkish population is still working in the agriculture sector, which means more structural funds will be needed for Turkey.²⁴⁴ However, this is not possible under these circumstances because the contributors have complained about the amounts of funds that they have contributed. The basic contributors, such as Germany, France and Italy, have been trying to close their own budget deficits.²⁴⁵ Moreover, due to this reason, neither the old nor the new members will want Turkey's membership to the Union since their share will inevitably decrease.

7.1.2 DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS

Within the framework of EU institutions, the population is the determinant factor in terms of representation and decision-making. Therefore, any change in the structure of population or any increase in the numbers can lead unavoidable institutional problems for the EU and will decrease the role of the EU in world affairs. Now, the European countries have been facing with big demographic problems.²⁴⁶ The probable membership of Turkey will increase the seriousness and also the dimension of these problems.

²⁴⁴ Umit Ozdag, op.cit., p.8

²⁴⁵ Business Week, 3 July 2002, p.20

²⁴⁶ Sedat Murat, " Türkiye'nin Karsılaştırılmalı Nufus Yapısı" in Mustafa Aykac and Zeki Parlak (eds.), *Tüm Yönleriyle Türkiye- AB İlişkileri*, İstanbul: Elif Kitabevi, 2002, p.45

Under current situation, the EU has had the first place in terms of the average age in the world. Now, the EU population is the most qualified one. However, Europe has begun to loose its place. There is a widespread trend in the EU countries: their populations have been continuously getting older. Due to this, Europeans are afraid from the young Turkish population. Any decrease in young and qualified population will decrease the production capabilities and also the quality of labor. Whereas, any increase in the old population necessitates a dramatic increase at the level of production, which at the end decreases the welfare of the society. ²⁴⁷On the other hand, the young generations population rates have been increasing in Turkey. According to statistics, the percentage of child and young population in Turkey was %57,26 and the percentage of olds is % 4,15. This number is three times less than EU member states. ²⁴⁸This creates another demographic problem for EU: birth rates have been decreasing. This will further increase the affect of the Turkish population in the EU, if the increase in birthrates is taken into consideration. This means a decrease in the qualified young population in Europe.

Second problem is the density of population. In 2025, Turkish population will be 82 million, which, is the expected value of 17% of total EU population. In addition, it is expected that the EU population will begin to decrease: whereas, the Turkish population will increase.²⁴⁹ EU neither psychologically nor economically can cope with that much population. EU has perceived Turkey with these demographic parameters as a strategic threat. If Turkey becomes a

²⁴⁷ Teitelbaum and Martin, " Is Turkey Ready for Europe?", *Foreign Affairs*, May/ June 2003, pp.97-111

²⁴⁸ Council of Europe, *Recent Demographic Developments in Europe*, Belgium, 1997, p.27

²⁴⁹ Umit Ozdag, op.cit., p.15

member, it will be the second country in terms of population and according to the draft Constitution, which restrict the number of parliamentarians to 732, will have right to have more than 72 parliamentarians in the parliament.²⁵⁰ This is less than Germany but more than France, Italy, and England. For example: in 2000, Turkish population was 70 million: whereas, the total of number of other 12 candidates was only 106 million.²⁵¹

To sum up, the structure and the density of Turkish population are perceived as a strategic threat to EU. This is due to the two main reasons. Firstly, Turkish membership changes the balance of power within the EU institutions. Secondly, Turkish membership will create social problems to the EU due to the different population structures by taking the first or the second place in the European markets due to the need to increase production.

7.2 BENEFITS OF TURKISH MEMBERSHIP

7.2.1 POLITICAL

It is obvious that the EU has been moving towards being a more powerful political actor in the globalizing world. Although it is such a hard objective to attain, it is not impossible by making rational decisions and by formulating them as effective policies. In addition, it is a necessary condition for EU at least to preserve its status quo. Turkey at this point can have a capacity to compensate the difficulties that it might create to the EU with its political advantages. Especially, it will be more realistic for Turkey to be a small partner with EU as

²⁵⁰ Rıdvan Karluk, op.cit., pp.155-158

²⁵¹ The World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, 2000

middle sized EU countries rather than being a partner with a super power:
USA²⁵²

The geographic location of Turkey can enhance some additional degree of political power to the EU, and will be able to complement with one of the strands of EU CFSP. Since EU realized the need for more accurate and effective foreign policy tools in order to be a political power in the world, it has to be more engaged in all areas, and has to put more emphasis on problematic areas. These areas are no more CEEC States. These areas are the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Balkans. To reflect their decisiveness, EU has decided to include crises management and crisis prevention under the scope of CFSP in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). Moreover, their policy tools of economic aid or development programs are not supposed to work in there and these are the areas, where control is necessary at any time.). These tasks require effective control mechanisms, which can be done by the existence of not only with will but also with capability. To achieve these by minimum costs, EU needs to be close to these areas. At this stage, Turkey's geographical location gains importance like it had during the Cold War. It will be better to have Turkey within Europe, contributing to its stability than a Turkey outside the EU.²⁵³ Turkey can serve as a "springboard" to the EU so that EU can have control over these regions.²⁵⁴ For instance, Turkey's geography and close historical and political relations with the Middle Eastern countries will attach a more political role to the EU. Therefore,

²⁵² Danger with US, future with EU, *Turks.US*, 11 April 2003

²⁵³ Michael Evans, "EU Expansion: The Case for the Admission of Turkey", *Strategic Review*, Vol XXVI, No 4, Fall 1998, p.19

²⁵⁴ Ali Karaosmanoglu, "AGSK Acısından Turkiye- AB Iliskileri", p.158

it will be better to contribute to the EU's efforts of being politicized. This can enhance European influence in the Middle East and Caucasus.²⁵⁵

In addition to the above to the stability, EU has not yet formulated an effective CFSP owing to the lack of will and capability. Turkey's membership will decrease the costs of formulating and implementing policies in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Their capacity will increase as well. They can both gain time and simplify the implementation of policies. At this point, as it has been pronounced, Turkey will contribute to the EU's acting togetherness with the help of its geography and experiences to the Union. In any case, EU needs Turkey to be effective politically. It is their choice how to achieve this? It will be misleading to evaluate this relation on bilateral basis, by excluding the other parts of its periphery.

Finally, various circles in Europe and also in Turkey accept the religion of Turkey as the reason of Turkey's exclusion from membership. They take this as a case, which has some elements of Huntington's "Clash of Civilization". It will create problems for the EU, which tries to be more democratic, and transparent. Plus, this exclusion on the basis of religion can hamper the EU relations with the other Muslims as well. The acceptance of Turkey might prevent the clashes of civilization.²⁵⁶ On the other hand, the Union will be able to demonstrate that "diversity within unity" is possible as stated in the draft Constitution.²⁵⁷ EU possible decision in this direction will increase the legitimacy of the Union in

²⁵⁵ Nathalie Tocci, "New Doubts and Uncertainties in Turkey- EU Relations", *CEPS Commentary*, October 2000

²⁵⁶ Ziya Onis, *op.cit.*, p.106

the other parts of the world, especially when compared with the decrease in the legitimacy of the USA.

7.2.2 SECURITY

EU till the formation of CFSP and acceptance of Turkey as a candidate accepted Turkey as a "security consuming" country.²⁵⁸ They were afraid that Turkey could carry the risks of instability due the neighbors: therefore, the EU would find itself in the instabilities since Turkey was its member. That was something, which the EU escaped. However, their attitudes have changed. Now, Turkey should be seen as a " security producing" country.²⁵⁹

To support such views we can firstly state that, within the scope of ESDP, Turkey has the capacity and potential of effective and modern military power. Europeans due to their unique strategic culture preferred not to have those much powerful army. Some of the EU countries like France, Britain are of course exceptions. Plus, Turkish army is the second biggest army within NATO and has lots of experiences to contribute the Petersberg type of operations. The main reason of the EU's insufficiency in the crises in former Yugoslavia was the lack of military capability independent from NATO sources. Under any circumstances, EU will be dependent on NATO but to achieve a degree of knowledge and capability is a must for the Union. Turkey with its modernized

²⁵⁷ Sedat Aoglu, " Choices for The Future of the European Union and Turkey.", *Turkish Time*, 15. October/ 15.November 2003

²⁵⁸ Huseyin Bagci, " Turkey's Relations With the EU After the Copenhagen Summit", *An AICGS Issue Report*, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 2003

²⁵⁹ Huseyin Bagci, "Turkey and Europe: Security Issues", in Michael Radu (ed.) *Dangerous Neighborhood*, New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2003, p.56

army can give this opportunity to the Union.²⁶⁰ Turkey's contribution to Kosovo and Afghanistan really deserves appreciation.

Secondly, EU can be accepted as a newly emerging political power in the security field. Thanks to the American power and indecisiveness among its member, it preferred to be passive. However, now it has tried to be active. As France and Britain mentioned in the Saint- Malo meeting "the Union have must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises."²⁶¹ In order to achieve that goal, EU has to adopt itself to the newly emerging threats. The most important and dangerous one is the Weapons of Mass Destruction, especially the states, which do not legally have a right to acquire them and the terrorist groups, who have the money and capability to produce them. Moreover, the technology and the range of these weapons increased: therefore, the EU will be under the scope of these weapons. At this stage, the USA and the EU has tried to develop defense mechanisms in close cooperation. Turkey is the most suitable country to locate these mechanisms due to its geography.²⁶² From the perspective of Turkey, to take these risks will only be possible in the case of membership, as a candidate these risks are more risky.

²⁶⁰ Heinz Kramer, *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States*, Washington Dc: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, p.216

²⁶¹ Huseyin Bagci, "Turkey and Europe: Security Issues", in Michael Radu (ed.) *Dangerous Neighborhood*, New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2003, p.57

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

As it can be clearly understood, EU has been trying to expand its area of influence in the world, but its strategies in that way has not been clear yet. Through the CFSP, it has tried to increase its legitimacy by attributing itself a political character in the international arena. EU really desires this, but it has not achieved this goal yet. Although The Constitutional Treaty has accepted, I think that still Europeans cannot speak with a single voice and probably will not be able to achieve this goal particularly in political issues at least in the coming 3-5 years. Still the issues, which can make the Union politically worldwide has involved intergovernmental structures that each member state has to decide on the basis of their own national interests, rather than for the interest of the Union. In addition, inclusion of new members, which will experience the spirit of integration, needs time to absorb this mentality and will need time to understand the realities of the Union. Naturally, as a new member they want to be the beneficers and they are unfamiliar with the mentality of acting as a whole. Most recent examples to these will be the Poland's reaction to the newly established voting system, which made the process of the adoption of the Constitution more difficult as explained in previous chapters. Therefore, the EU will need time to compose a single and harmonious voice.

²⁶² Ali Karaosmanoglu, " AGSK Acısından Turkiye- AB Iliskileri", p.162

Moreover, European policies involve great dilemmas. The first dilemma is an economic one. EU has tried to increase its political power, which can be gained through by becoming an economic and potential power. On the other hand, by the recent enlargement decisions, it has decreased its economic power. All the parameters have been going down. Needless to say, EU in the following years will probably face with economic problems, which leads to the emergence of various voices within the Union. Besides the economical side of the dilemma, EU will most probably have a great political paradox. Consistent with the EU's desire to be influential in political arena, the EU will have to spend some energy and sources to the fields of CFSP and to the CSDP. The difficulty in here is, on the one hand the EU increased the number of member states and on the other its policy areas. This involves a dilemma because having more members means difficulties in policy- making, decision- taking. In addition, it means an increase in the geopolitical area and more number of people to be satisfied with the limited sources, and capabilities. Furthermore, to be an influential political union will make the Union more open to threats and political problems, which are impossible to solve and handle with the existing values and mentalities, which the EU had in the past and now has. To remind, the EU reached its current desired status with its democratic values and through the peaceful methods it has been applying. In addition, it established the security community in Europe through the process of "deseuritization". Therefore, as a natural outcome, to protect its power and integrity the EU will begin for resecuritization, which might in the future create insecurity within and outside the Union for itself. Therefore, a new political and security approach should have been formulated by taking the realities into consideration

The EU has to ask itself: who are they and what they will want to be in the future? It has two options. The first is to preserve its status quo and the second is to remain as an economic giant and try to be politically effective as one of the biggest aid providers, and to be an international influential political power under which the probability of Turkey's membership would be more likely.

Consistent with this decision, EU will decide to include or exclude Turkey from membership. The destiny of Turkey depends on the destiny of the future of the EU. On the basis of bilateral relations, there is no problem. Turkey tries to do its best to fulfill its obligations, which are mentioned in the legal documents. Moreover, to increase its know-how capability, Turkey follows close relations with its European counterparts. There is no doubt that some of the Europeans have doubts about Turkey and Turkey mostly was excluded from the European definitions of history and geography. However, now they realize that the continuation of this exclusion will create more problems to the EU in the future. As the strategic importance of Turkey increases and the desire of the EU in order to be a political power continues, the level of realization of this goal will also increase. However, the question of Turkish membership cannot be evaluated just on the basis of bilateral relations. Preferences of the EU and the problems it will have should be taken into account.

To sum up, if the Union decides to preserve its status quo, this will probably make the process of Turkey's membership more difficult, because the Union might not want to take additional economic burdens to the already existing ones.

Moreover, EU under the current situation owing to the Customs Union, has been benefiting from Turkey's capability and resources. If they accept and declare the commencement of Turkey's accession negotiations for membership, Turkey will give much more than the EU will contribute to it. However, if the EU will decide to be an international political power, they will need Turkey within their system. Under these circumstances, the benefits they will receive from Turkey's membership will compensate the economic burdens that they will face. This does not mean that Turkey will become a member to the Union within three or five year's time. According to the existing data and events, under the best and optimistic conditions, *Turkey can be a member to the EU in the years 2012-2015*, because without making the necessary and required reforms in all the political and economic fields, laid by the *acquis* of the EU, membership will be impossible for Turkey.

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Appendix A

LATEST EUROPEAN COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS RELATED TO TURKEY

LUXEMBOURG EUROPEAN COUNCIL (12-13 DECEMBER 1997)

EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT

1. The Luxembourg European Council has taken the decisions necessary to launch the overall enlargement process.
2. The task in the years ahead will be to prepare the applicant States for accession to the Union and to see that the Union is properly prepared for enlargement. This enlargement is a comprehensive, inclusive and ongoing process, which will take place in stages; each of the applicant States will proceed at its own rate, depending on its degree of preparedness.
3. As a prerequisite for enlargement of the Union, the operation of the institutions must be strengthened and improved in keeping with the institutional provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty.

The European Conference

4. The European Council decided to set up a European Conference which will bring together the Member States of the European Union and the European States aspiring to accede to it and sharing its values and internal and external objectives.
5. The members of the Conference must share a common commitment to peace, security and good neighbourliness, respect for other countries' sovereignty, the principles upon which the European Union is founded, the integrity and inviolability of external borders and the principles of international law and a commitment to the settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means, in particular through the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Countries which endorse these principles and respect the right of any European country fulfilling the required criteria to accede to the European Union and sharing the Union's commitment to building a Europe free of the divisions and difficulties of the past will be invited to take part in the Conference.
6. The States which accept these criteria and subscribe to the above principles will be invited to take part in the Conference. Initially, the EU offer will be addressed to Cyprus, the applicant States of Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey.

7. The European Conference will be a multilateral forum for political consultation, intended to address questions of general concern to the participants and to broaden and deepen their cooperation on foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs, and other areas of common concern, particularly economic matters and regional cooperation.

8. The Conference will be chaired by the State holding the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. At the Presidency's invitation, Heads of State and Government and the President of the Commission will meet at the Conference once a year, as will the Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

9. The first meeting of the Conference will be in London in March 1998.

The process of accession and negotiation

10. The European Council has considered the current situation in each of the eleven applicant States on the basis of the Commission's opinions and the Presidency's report to the Council. In the light of its discussions, it has decided to launch an accession process comprising the ten Central and East European applicant States and Cyprus. This accession process will form part of the implementation of Article 0 of the Treaty on European Union. The European Council points out that all these States are destined to join the European Union on the basis of the same criteria and that they are participating in the accession process on an equal footing. This process, which will be evolutive and inclusive, will comprise the following elements.

a. The framework

11. The accession process will be launched on 30 March 1998 by a meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the fifteen Member States of the European Union, the ten Central and East European applicant States and Cyprus. A single framework for these applicant countries will be established.

12. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the fifteen members of the European Union will meet their opposite numbers from the ten Central and East European applicant States and Cyprus as the need arises. Technical ministerial meetings could also be envisaged, bearing in mind experience with the structured dialogue.

b. The enhanced pre-accession strategy

13. The enhanced pre-accession strategy is intended to enable all the applicant States of Central and Eastern Europe eventually to become members of the European Union and, to that end, to align themselves as far as possible on the Union *acquis* prior to accession. With the Europe Agreements, which remain the basis of the Union's relations with these States, the strategy centres on accession partnerships and increased pre-accession aid. It will be accompanied by an analytical study of the Union *acquis* for each applicant State taken individually.

(i) Accession partnerships

14. Accession partnership is a new instrument, the key feature of the enhanced pre-accession strategy; it will mobilize all forms of assistance to the applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe within a single framework.

15. This single framework will cover in detail for each applicant the priorities to be observed in adopting the Union acquis and also the financial resources available for that purpose, in particular the PHARE programme. In that context financial assistance would be linked to the applicants' progress and, more specifically, to compliance with the programme for adoption of the acquis.

16. The Council will decide unanimously on the establishment of the partnerships as the key element in the pre-accession strategy. On that basis it will then decide, by a qualified majority and by 15 March 1998 at the latest, on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives, significant adjustments and conditions applicable to each individual partnership. When an element essential to the continuation of pre-accession assistance is missing in an applicant State, the Council will take appropriate measures by the same procedure.

(ii) Increased pre-accession aid

17. Pre-accession aid will be increased substantially; alongside the PHARE programme, which will already have been refocused on accession priorities, it will, as from the year 2000, comprise aid for agriculture and a structural instrument which will give priority to measures similar to those of the Cohesion Fund.

Financial support to the countries involved in the enlargement process will be based on the principle of equal treatment, independently of time of accession, with particular attention being paid to countries with the greatest need. The European Council welcomes in this connection the catch-up facility envisaged by the Commission.

18. Without prejudice to decisions on the financial perspective for 2000-2006, the PHARE programme will focus on accession by setting two priority aims: the reinforcement of administrative and judicial capacity (about 30% of the overall amount) and investments related to the adoption and application of the acquis (about 70%).

19. Some Community programmes (e.g. education, training and research) will be open to applicant States and this will enable them to familiarize themselves with the Union's policies and working methods. Such participation will have to be determined case-by-case, with each applicant State making a steadily increasing financial contribution of its own. PHARE will, if necessary, be able to continue part-financing the applicant States' national contributions. Such financing should remain at around 10% of the PHARE appropriation, not including participation in the research and development framework programme.

20. The applicant States should be allowed to take part, as observers and for the points which concern them, in the management committees responsible for monitoring the programmes to which they contribute financially, under specific arrangements adapted to the case in question.

21. The Community agencies in which applicant countries will be able to participate will be determined on a case-by-case basis.

22. A specific pre-accession strategy for Cyprus will be based on:

- participation in certain targeted projects, in particular to boost judicial and administrative capacity and projects in the field of justice and home affairs;
- participation in certain Community programmes and agencies (as in the approach followed for the other applicant States);
- use of technical assistance provided by TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office).

c. Commission opinions and accession negotiations

23. The Commission's opinions on the applicant States constitute a sound overall analysis of each applicant State's situation in the light of the membership criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council. The prospect of membership is a unique incentive to the applicants to speed up the implementation of policies which comply with the Union *acquis*. Incorporation of the *acquis* into legislation is necessary, but is not in itself sufficient; it will also be necessary to ensure that it is actually applied.

24. The European Council noted the link between the applicant States' ongoing efforts in that direction in sectoral policies, in particular the internal market and related policies, and the harmonious operation of Community policies after accession.

25. Compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria is a prerequisite for the opening of any accession negotiations. Economic criteria and the ability to fulfil the obligations arising from membership have been and must be assessed in a forward-looking, dynamic way.

26. The decision to enter into negotiations does not imply that they will be successfully concluded at the same time. Their conclusion and the subsequent accession of the different applicant States will depend on the extent to which each complies with the Copenhagen criteria and on the Union's ability to assimilate new members.

27. The European Council has decided to convene bilateral intergovernmental conferences in the spring of 1998 to begin negotiations with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia on the conditions for their entry into the Union and the ensuing Treaty adjustments. These negotiations will be based on the general negotiating framework acknowledged by the Council on 8 December 1997.

At the same time as the above, the preparation of negotiations with Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria will be speeded up in particular through an analytical examination of the Union *acquis*. This preparation may also be discussed at ministerial-level bilateral meetings with the Member States of the Union.

28. The accession of Cyprus should benefit all communities and help to bring about civil peace and reconciliation. The accession negotiations will contribute positively to the search for a political solution to the Cyprus problem through the talks under the aegis of the United Nations which must continue with a view to creating a bi-community, bi-zonal federation. In this context, the European Council requests that the willingness of the Government of Cyprus to include representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community in the accession negotiating delegation be acted upon. In order for this request to be acted upon, the necessary contacts will be undertaken by the Presidency and the Commission.

d. Review procedure

29. From the end of 1998, the Commission will make regular reports to the Council, together with any necessary recommendations for opening bilateral intergovernmental conferences, reviewing the progress of each Central and East European applicant State towards accession in the light of the Copenhagen criteria, in particular the rate at which it is adopting the Union acquis. Prior to those reports, implementation of the accession partnerships and progress in adopting the acquis will be examined with each applicant State in the Europe Agreement bodies. The Commission's reports will serve as a basis for taking, in the Council context, the necessary decisions on the conduct of the accession negotiations or their extension to other applicants. In that context, the Commission will continue to follow the method adopted by Agenda 2000 in evaluating applicant States' ability to meet the economic criteria and fulfil the obligations deriving from accession.

30. A dynamic approach should be maintained in assessing the progress made by applicant States in the regular reports which the Commission will submit to the Council.

A European strategy for Turkey

31. The Council confirms Turkey's eligibility for accession to the European Union. Turkey will be judged on the basis of the same criteria as the other applicant States. While the political and economic conditions allowing accession negotiations to be envisaged are not satisfied, the European Council considers that it is nevertheless important for a strategy to be drawn up to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union in every field.

32. This strategy should consist in:

- development of the possibilities afforded by the Ankara Agreement;***
- intensification of the Customs Union;***
- implementation of financial cooperation;***
- approximation of laws and adoption of the Union acquis.***
- participation, to be decided case by case, in certain programmes and in certain agencies provided for in paragraphs 19 and 21.***

33. The strategy will be reviewed by the Association Council in particular on the basis of Article 28 of the Association Agreement in the light of the Copenhagen criteria and the Council's position of 29 April 1997.

34. In addition, participation in the European Conference will enable the Member States of the European Union and Turkey to step up their dialogue and cooperation in areas of common interest.

35. The European Council recalls that strengthening Turkey's links with the European Union also depends on that country's pursuit of the political and economic reforms on which it has embarked, including the alignment of human rights standards and practices on those in force in the European Union; respect for and protection of minorities; the establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey; the settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the International Court of Justice; and support for negotiations under the aegis of the UN on a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

36. The European Council endorses the guidelines that emerged from the General Affairs Council of 24 November 1997 on future relations between the Union and Turkey and asks the Commission to submit suitable proposals.

CARDIFF EUROPEAN COUNCIL (15-16 JUNE 1998)

ENLARGEMENT

62. Noting that the Luxembourg European Council assessed the candidatures addressed in Agenda 2000 and took the decisions necessary to launch the overall enlargement process, the European Council welcomes the substantial progress made since Luxembourg in preparing for enlargement.

63. The Union's priority is to maintain the enlargement process for the countries covered in the Luxembourg European Council conclusions, within which they can actively pursue their candidatures and make progress towards taking on the obligations of membership, including the Copenhagen criteria. Each of these candidate countries will be judged on the basis of the same criteria and will proceed in its candidature at its own rate, depending on its degree of preparedness. Much will depend on the efforts made by the candidate countries themselves to meet the criteria. All will benefit from strengthened relations with the EU including through political dialogue and tailored strategies to help them prepare for accession.

64. The European Council welcomes the Commission's confirmation that it will submit at the end of 1998 its first regular reports on each candidate's progress towards accession. In the case of Turkey, reports will be based on Article 28 of the Association Agreement and the conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council.

65. The European Council welcomes the launch of the Accession Process in Brussels on 30 March. It is an evolutionary and inclusive process. A productive further meeting of the Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs of the 15 Members of the

European Union with their opposite numbers from the 10 Central and East European applicant states and Cyprus was held on 28-29 May. Further Ministerial meetings will take place as the need arises.

66. The European Council encourages the Commission to pursue rapidly the delivery of assistance within the Accession Partnership framework. Pre-accession aid will be increased substantially. In this context it endorses in general terms the legislative framework proposed by the Commission, and invites the Council to continue its work. The priorities for projects financed by these instruments should reflect the priorities for agriculture and the environment and transport established in the Accession Partnerships. Effective coordination between these instruments and Phare, as well as with operations funded by the EIB, EBRD and other international financial institutions will be essential. The European Council notes that the basis of funding for the countries included in the enlargement process was set out at Luxembourg.

67. Following the opening of accession negotiations on 31 March 1998 with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the European Council notes that the screening exercises for seven chapters of the *acquis* have been completed. It also welcomes the opening of the analytical examination of the *acquis* with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia.

*68. The European Council also welcomes the Commission's communication of 4 March 1998 on taking forward the European Strategy to prepare Turkey for membership. It agrees that, taken as a package, this provides the platform for developing our relationship on a sound and evolutionary basis. The European Council invites the Commission to carry forward this strategy, including the tabling of any proposals necessary for its effective implementation. The Strategy can be enriched over time, taking into account Turkey's own ideas. The European Council further invites the Presidency and the Commission and the appropriate Turkish authorities to pursue the objective of harmonising Turkey's legislation and practice with the *acquis*, and asks the Commission to report to an early Association Council on progress made. Recalling the need for financial support for the European Strategy, the European Council notes the Commission's intention to reflect on ways and means of underpinning the implementation of the European strategy, and to table appropriate proposals to this effect.*

69. The European Council welcomes the first meeting of the European Conference held in London on 12 March 1998, and its conclusions. The principles of participation in the Conference and its initial membership were agreed at the meeting of the European Council in Luxembourg.

VIENNA EUROPEAN COUNCIL (11-12 DECEMBER 1998)

ENLARGEMENT

58. The European Council had a thorough discussion on all aspects of the enlargement process. It welcomes the fact that the overall enlargement process launched in Luxembourg is now well under way. The European Council welcomes the Commission's first Regular Progress Reports on the basis of its conclusions in Luxembourg and Cardiff and endorses the annexed Council conclusions of

7 December 1998 on European Union enlargement. The European Council stresses that each country will continue to be judged on its own merits. The European Council invites the Commission to present its further progress reports in view of the Helsinki European Council.

59. The European Council notes with satisfaction that the six Accession Conferences with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia have entered into substantive negotiations and reached the first concrete results. It urges the Council, the Commission and the candidate countries to maintain the momentum in order to permit intensive negotiations in the first half of 1999.

60. The European Council also welcomes progress in preparation for accession negotiations with Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria as described in the Commission's reports. It notes that the transition from the multilateral to the bilateral phase of the analytical examination of the *acquis* as from the beginning of the next year will confer new dynamism to the process and thus foster preparation for negotiations.

61. The European Council welcomes Malta's decision to reactivate its application for European Union membership and takes note of the intention of the Commission to present at the beginning of next year an updating of its favourable opinion of 1993.

62. The European Council reiterates the Union's willingness to continue to provide pre-accession aid throughout the process. It welcomes the broad political agreement, in the terms of the Council's report on Agenda 2000, on the pre-accession instruments which remains however subject to overall agreement on Agenda 2000.

63. The European Council underlines the great importance it attaches to the further development of relations between the EU and Turkey taking forward the European Strategy to prepare Turkey for membership. In this context it recognises the central role of the further implementation of the European strategy in line with its conclusions in Luxembourg and Cardiff.

64. The European Council took note of the work of the European Conference as a forum for political consultation on questions of general concern to the participants. One meeting at Foreign Ministers level will take place in 1999.

65. The European Council will consider the future role and membership of the European Conference at Helsinki in the light of a report by the Council on the work in the Conference and other fora engaged on similar work. Meanwhile it confirmed the invitation of Switzerland as a "member elect".

COLOGNE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (3-4 JUNE 1999)

ENLARGEMENT PROCESS

57. The European Council notes with satisfaction that the accession negotiations have further gathered momentum and are on the right track. It welcomes the positive results of the second round of substantive negotiations in the first half of 1999 with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia on a number of

important and complex areas. The European Council emphasizes its resolve to continue to maintain the momentum of negotiations. To that end the European Union will open negotiations in all areas covered as early as possible next year.

58. The European Council welcomes the fact that the analytical examination of the "acquis" with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia has now moved on from the multilateral phase to the crucial bilateral phase, which will allow those countries to speed up their preparations for membership. The Helsinki Council will examine the progress made by the accession candidates and draw the necessary conclusions.

59. It emphasises once again the conclusions reached by the European Council in Luxembourg that decisions on the opening of further negotiations can only be taken on the basis of the criteria established by the Copenhagen European Council. At the same time it highlights the importance also attaching to the prospect of accession for applicant countries with which negotiations are not yet under way. For this reason it invites the Commission, in its next progress reports, to consider measures, which can help, crystallise that prospect for all applicant countries. The European Council welcomes the constant progress in the candidate countries and encourages them to continue their reforms and adjustment efforts.

60. The European Council emphasizes the importance of high standards of nuclear safety in Central and Eastern Europe. It stresses the importance of this issue in the context of the Union's enlargement and calls on the Commission to examine this issue thoroughly in its next regular progress reports on the applicant countries, due in autumn 1999.

61. The European Council welcomes the fact that, on the basis of the Commission's updated opinion on Malta's accession application, it has now been possible to make a start on analytical examination of the Union "acquis" with Malta. The Commission will also submit a report, in good time for the Helsinki European Council meeting, on Malta's progress in preparation for accession, to form the basis, together with the corresponding reports on the other applicant countries, for any decisions to be taken by the Helsinki European Council.

HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL (10-11 DECEMBER 1999)

ENLARGEMENT PROCESS

3. The European Council confirms the importance of the enlargement process launched in Luxembourg in December 1997 for the stability and prosperity of the entire European continent. An efficient and credible enlargement process must be sustained.

4. The European Council reaffirms the inclusive nature of the accession process, which now comprises 13 candidate States within a single framework. The candidate States are participating in the accession process on an equal footing. They must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make

every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. Moreover, the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union.

5. The Union has made a firm political commitment to make every effort to complete the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reform by December 2000, to be followed by ratification. After ratification of the results of that Conference the Union should be in a position to welcome new Member States from the end of 2002 as soon as they have demonstrated their ability to assume the obligations of membership and once the negotiating process has been successfully completed.

6. The Commission has made a new detailed assessment of progress in the candidate States. This assessment shows progress towards fulfilling the accession criteria. At the same time, given that difficulties remain in certain sectors, candidate States are encouraged to continue and step up their efforts to comply with the accession criteria. It emerges that some candidates will not be in a position to meet all the Copenhagen criteria in the medium term. The Commission's intention is to report in early 2000 to the Council on progress by certain candidate States on fulfilling the Copenhagen economic criteria. The next regular progress reports will be presented in good time before the European Council in December 2000.

7. The European Council recalls the importance of high standards of nuclear safety in Central and Eastern Europe. It calls on the Council to consider how to address the issue of nuclear safety in the framework of the enlargement process in accordance with the relevant Council conclusions.

8. The European Council notes with satisfaction the substantive work undertaken and progress which has been achieved in accession negotiations with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia.

9. (a) The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General's efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion.

(b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.

10. Determined to lend a positive contribution to security and stability on the European continent and in the light of recent developments as well as the Commission's reports, the European Council has decided to convene bilateral intergovernmental conferences in February 2000 to begin negotiations with

Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta on the conditions for their entry into the Union and the ensuing Treaty adjustments.

11. In the negotiations, each Candidate State will be judged on its own merits. This principle will apply both to the opening of the various negotiating chapters and to the conduct of the negotiations. In order to maintain momentum in the negotiations, cumbersome procedures should be avoided. Candidate States, which have now been brought into the negotiating process, will have the possibility to catch up within a reasonable period of time with those already in negotiations if they have made sufficient progress in their preparations. Progress in negotiations must go hand in hand with progress in incorporating the *acquis* into legislation and actually implementing and enforcing it.

*12. The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as noted in the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reforms towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a). Turkey will also have the opportunity to participate in Community programmes and agencies and in meetings between candidate States and the Union in the context of the accession process. An accession partnership will be drawn up on the basis of previous European Council conclusions while containing priorities on which accession preparations must concentrate in the light of the political and economic criteria and the obligations of a Member State, combined with a national programme for the adoption of the *acquis*. Appropriate monitoring mechanisms will be established. With a view to intensifying the harmonisation of Turkey's legislation and practice with the *acquis*, the Commission is invited to prepare a process of analytical examination of the *acquis*. The European Council asks the Commission to present a single framework for coordinating all sources of European Union financial assistance for pre-accession.*

13. The future of the European Conference will be reviewed in the light of the evolving situation and the decisions on the accession process taken at Helsinki. The forthcoming French Presidency has announced its intention to convene a meeting of the conference in the second half of 2000.

SANTA MARIA DA FEIRA EUROPEAN COUNCIL (19-20 JUNE 2000)

ENLARGEMENT

13. The European Council reaffirms the priority for the Union of the enlargement process and notes with satisfaction the substantive progress in the negotiations since the Helsinki European Council (*see Annex II*). In particular, it welcomes the launching of accession negotiations with Malta, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, and the first concrete results already achieved. The European Council considers that it should be feasible to open negotiations in all areas of the *acquis* with the most advanced of these candidates as early as possible in 2001.

14. The European Council furthermore welcomes the fact that all areas of the *acquis*, except "Institutions", have now been opened for negotiations with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. It also notes that considerable progress has been made in several areas already under negotiation.

15. The European Council reiterates the commitment of the Union to maintain the momentum of the accession process. All candidates will continue to be judged on the basis of own merits. In line with the principle of differentiation, it is possible for candidates to catch up with those which started their negotiations earlier.

16. The European Council recalls that, in addition to finding solutions to the negotiating issues, progress in the negotiations depends on the incorporation by the candidate States of the *acquis* in their national legislation and especially on their capacity to effectively implement and enforce it. While progress has already been made, this calls for important efforts by the candidates to continue their domestic reforms, in particular strengthening their administrative and judicial structures. The Union will closely monitor the performance of the candidates. To this end, the Commission is invited to report to the Council on its findings. The European Council at Nice will review progress on enlargement and consider how to take forward the accession process.

17. With respect to Turkey, the European Council notes this candidate's initiatives to meet the accession criteria. In accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, the European Council looks forward to concrete progress, in particular on human rights, the rule of law and the judiciary. The Commission should report to the Council on progress in preparing the process of analytical examination of the acquis with Turkey. The Commission is also invited, in the light of the above, to present as soon as possible proposals for the single financial framework for assistance to Turkey as well as for the Accession Partnership.

18. The European Council stresses the importance of securing continuing support for enlargement and, to that effect, the need to provide appropriate information for the general public in Member States and candidate countries alike.

NICE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (7-9 DECEMBER 2000)

ENLARGEMENT

6. The European Council reaffirms the historic significance of the European Union enlargement process and the political priority which it attaches to the success of that process. It welcomes the stepping up of accession negotiations with the candidate countries, which has brought very considerable progress, particularly in recent months.

7. The European Council believes that the time has now come to lend fresh impetus to the process. It endorses the General Affairs Council conclusions of

4 December 2000 concerning the strategy proposed by the Commission. It is pleased to see that the principle of differentiation, based on each candidate country's own merits, and allowance of scope for catching up are reaffirmed in those Council conclusions. The road map for the next 18 months will ease the way for further negotiations, bearing in mind that those countries which are the best prepared will continue to be able to progress more quickly.

8. In the European Council's view, that strategy, together with the completion of the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reform, will place the Union, in accordance with the objective set by the European Council in Helsinki, in a position to welcome those new Member States which are ready as from the end of 2002, in the hope that they will be able to take part in the next European Parliament elections. In Göteborg, in June 2001, the European Council will assess progress in implementing that new strategy, in order to give the necessary guidance for the successful completion of the process.

9. The European Council appreciates the efforts made by the candidate countries to establish the conditions for adoption, implementation and practical application of the *acquis*. The candidate countries are requested to continue and speed up the necessary reforms to prepare themselves for accession, particularly as regards strengthening their administrative capacity, so as to be able to join the Union as soon as possible. The European Council calls upon the Commission to propose a programme for the frontier regions in order to strengthen their economic competitiveness.

10. The European Council takes note of the Council report on candidate countries' exchange-rate strategies, which identifies an exchange-rate strategy compatible with accession to the Union, followed by participation in the exchange-rate mechanism and finally adoption of the euro. It welcomes the establishment of economic and financial dialogue with the candidate countries.

11. The European Council welcomes the progress made in implementing the pre-accession strategy for Turkey and is very pleased at the agreement reached on the framework Regulation and on the Accession Partnership at the Council meeting on 4 December 2000. It highlights the importance of that document for establishing closer relations between the Union and Turkey along the lines mapped out by the Helsinki European Council conclusions. Turkey is requested swiftly to submit its national programme for adoption of the *acquis*, basing it on the Accession Partnership.

12. The meeting of the European Conference at the level of Heads of State or Government on 7 December 2000 provided an opportunity for discussion in depth of institutional reform and the operation of the European Union in the longer term. The European Council regards the European Conference as a useful framework for dialogue between the Union's Member States and the countries in line for membership. It proposes that the countries covered by the stabilization and association process and the EFTA countries be invited to attend as prospective members.

GOTEBERG EUROPEAN COUNCIL (15-16 JUNE 2001)

ENLARGEMENT

5. Significant breakthroughs have been achieved in the accession negotiations under the Swedish Presidency. Determined efforts by all parties have made it possible to meet and surpass the objectives set out at Nice for the first half of 2001.

6. The Council conclusions of 11 June detail the substantial results achieved in a number of key areas. Candidate countries have made impressive progress in meeting the accession criteria. More than two thirds of the negotiating chapters have been provisionally closed with some candidate countries. All negotiating chapters will be opened before the end of June with some of the candidate countries that started negotiations only last year. The road map has proved to be an ambitious and realistic framework for the negotiations. During the incoming Belgian and Spanish Presidencies the European Union will pursue the road map with undiminished vigour.

7. This new momentum must be matched by continued progress in the candidate countries in transposing, implementing and enforcing the *acquis*. They will have to pay particular attention to putting in place adequate administrative structures, to reforming judicial systems and the civil service, as well as to the situation of minorities. Special efforts will be devoted to assisting Bulgaria and Romania.

8. Candidate countries will continue to be judged solely on their own merits. The principle of differentiation applies. This allows the best prepared countries to progress more quickly in the negotiations, and other candidates to catch up. Agreements – even partial – reached during the course of the negotiations may not be considered final until an overall agreement has been established.

9. The enlargement process is irreversible. Based on the progress achieved so far, the European Council reaffirms the road map as the framework for the successful completion of the enlargement negotiations. Provided that progress towards meeting the accession criteria continues at an unabated pace, the road map should make it possible to complete negotiations by the end of 2002 for those candidate countries that are ready. The objective is that they should participate in the European Parliament elections of 2004 as members.

10. The decisions in Helsinki have brought Turkey closer to the EU and opened up new prospects for her European aspirations. Good progress has been made in implementing the pre-accession strategy for Turkey, including an enhanced political dialogue. The presentation by Turkey of its National Programme for adopting the acquis is a welcome development. However, in a number of areas such as human rights, further progress is needed. Turkey is urged to take concrete measures to implement the priorities of the Accession Partnership, which is the cornerstone of the pre-accession strategy. The Council is invited to adopt the single financial framework for pre-accession assistance to Turkey by the end of the year at the latest. The economic programme agreed with the IMF must be vigorously implemented to create the conditions for economic recovery.

11. Taking account of their particular situations, candidate countries are invited to translate the Union's economic, social and environmental objectives into their

national policies. The intention of candidate countries to adopt the eEurope+ initiative is a successful example. Starting from Spring 2003, the Commission will begin covering the candidate countries and their national policies in its annual synthesis report.

12. The European Council notes that the Commission, in line with the Nice conclusions, will shortly present a communication on the question of the frontier regions in order to strengthen their economic competitiveness.

LAEKEN EUROPEAN COUNCIL (14-15 DECEMBER 2001)

ENLARGEMENT

7. The Commission document entitled "Making a success of enlargement", the regular reports and the revised partnerships for accession are a solid framework for the success of the accession process, which is now irreversible. The Berlin European Council established the financial framework permitting enlargement.

8. In recent months considerable progress has been made in the negotiations and certain delays have been made good. The European Union is determined to bring the accession negotiations with the candidate countries that are ready to a successful conclusion by the end of 2002, so that those countries can take part in the European Parliament elections in 2004 as members. Candidacies will continue to be assessed on their own merits, in accordance with the principle of differentiation. The European Council agrees with the report of the Commission, which considers that, if the present rate of progress of the negotiations and reforms in the candidate States is maintained, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and Slovenia could be ready. It appreciates the efforts made by Bulgaria and Romania and would encourage them to continue on that course. If those countries are to receive specific support, there must be a precise framework with a timetable and an appropriate roadmap, the objective being to open negotiations with those countries on all chapters in 2002.

9. The candidate countries must continue their efforts energetically, in particular to bring their administrative and judicial capabilities up to the required level. The Commission will submit a report on the implementation of the plan of action for strengthening institutions to the Seville European Council in June 2002.

10. The roadmap drawn up by the Nice European Council remains fully applicable. At the beginning of 2002 the Commission will propose common positions on the agriculture, regional policy and budgetary chapters on the basis of the present acquis and of the principles decided on in Berlin. Proceedings on the drafting of the accession treaties will begin in the first half of 2002.

11. The European Council welcomes the recent meetings between the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and would encourage them to continue their discussions with a view to an overall solution under the auspices of the United Nations consistent with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

12. Turkey has made progress towards complying with the political criteria established for accession, in particular through the recent amendment of its constitution. This has brought forward the prospect of the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. Turkey is encouraged to continue its progress towards complying with both economic and political criteria, notably with regard to human rights. The pre-accession strategy for Turkey should mark a new stage in analysing its preparedness for alignment on the acquis.

SEVILLE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (21-22 JUNE 2002)

ENLARGEMENT

18. Decisive progress has been made in the accession negotiations during the first six months of the year. The negotiations are now entering their final phase.

19. The road map adopted in Nice has been followed with the adoption of common positions concerning the chapters on "Agriculture", "Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments", "Financial and budgetary provisions" and "Institutions". Financial and other questions which were not dealt with when common positions were finalised on these chapters will need to be settled as soon as possible, while taking account of the conclusions of the General Affairs Council on 17 June 2002.

20. As regards compliance with the accession criteria, the European Council stresses that it is important that the candidate countries should continue to make progress in the implementation and effective application of the acquis. The candidate countries must take all necessary measures to bring their administrative and judicial capacity up to the required level. In this connection, the European Council welcomes the Commission report on the specific action plans in this area and on the follow-up of commitments undertaken during negotiations, singling out in particular the conclusions of the Council on 10 June 2002 in the fields of justice and home affairs and of the veterinary and plant health acquis.

21. Taking account of all these factors and in order to enable the European Council to be held in the coming autumn to decide which will be the candidate countries with which negotiations can be concluded at the end of 2002:

the Council will have to take the appropriate decisions in order to communicate all the items lacking in the financial package to the candidate countries in early November, and

the Commission will have to draft appropriate recommendations in the light of the regular reports.

22. The European Council reaffirms that, if the present rate of progress in negotiations and reforms is maintained, the European Union is determined to conclude the negotiations with Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia by the end of 2002, if those countries are ready. The principle of differentiation must be fully complied with until the end of the negotiations. Drafting of the Treaty of Accession should continue so that it can be completed as soon as possible after the conclusion

of the accession negotiations. It would seem reasonable to expect that the Treaty of Accession could be signed in spring 2003. The objective remains that these countries should participate in the elections for the European Parliament in 2004 as full members. However, this common aim can be realised within the time frame envisaged only if each candidate country adopts a realistic and constructive approach.

23. Bulgaria and Romania have achieved considerable progress over the last few months. The European Council encourages them to pursue their efforts and reiterates its commitment to give them full support in their preparation for accession. An updated road map and a revised and enhanced pre-accession strategy should be adopted in Copenhagen for the candidate countries still engaged in negotiations. An increase in pre-accession financial aid could also be contemplated. Furthermore, if the current pace is maintained, a more precise timetable could be set for these countries' accession process by the end of the year.

24. In respect of the accession of Cyprus, the Helsinki conclusions are the basis of the European Union's position. The European Union's preference continues to be for the accession of a reunited island. The European Council fully supports the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and calls upon the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to intensify and expedite their talks in order to seize this unique window of opportunity for a comprehensive settlement, consistent with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, hopefully before conclusion of the negotiations. The European Union would accommodate the terms of such a comprehensive settlement in the Treaty of Accession in line with the principles on which the European Union is founded: as a Member State, Cyprus will need to speak with a single voice and ensure proper application of European Union law. The European Union would make a substantial financial contribution in support of the development of the northern part of a reunited island.

25. The European Council welcomes the reforms recently adopted in Turkey. It encourages and fully supports the efforts made by Turkey to fulfil the priorities defined in its Accession Partnership. The implementation of the required political and economic reforms will bring forward Turkey's prospects of accession in accordance with the same principles and criteria as are applied to the other candidate countries. New decisions could be taken in Copenhagen on the next stage of Turkey's candidature in the light of developments in the situation between the Seville and Copenhagen European Councils, on the basis of the regular report to be submitted by the Commission in October 2002 and in accordance with the Helsinki and Laeken conclusions.

BRUSSELS EUROPEAN COUNCIL (24-25 OCTOBER 2002)

6. The Union welcomes the important steps taken by Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen political criteria and the fact that Turkey has moved forward on the economic criteria and alignment with the *acquis*, as registered in the Commission's Regular Report. This has brought forward the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. The Union encourages Turkey to pursue its reform process and to take further concrete steps in the direction of implementation, which will advance Turkey's accession in accordance with the same principles and criteria as are applied

to the other candidate States. The Council is invited to prepare in time for the Copenhagen European Council the elements for deciding on the next stage of Turkey's candidature, on the basis of the Commission's Strategy Paper and in accordance with the conclusions of the European Councils in Helsinki, Laeken, and Seville.

COPENHAGEN EUROPEAN COUNCIL (12-13 DECEMBER 2002)

Turkey

18. The European Council recalls its decision in 1999 in Helsinki that Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states. It strongly welcomes the important steps taken by Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria, in particular through the recent legislative packages and the subsequent implementation measures, which cover a large number of key priorities specified in the Accession Partnership. The Union acknowledges the determination of the new Turkish government to take further steps on the path of reform and urges in particular the government to address swiftly all remaining shortcomings in the field of the political criteria, not only with regard to legislation but also in particular with regard to implementation. The Union recalls that, according to the political criteria decided in Copenhagen in 1993, membership requires that a candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.

19. The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.

20. In order to assist Turkey towards EU membership, the accession strategy for Turkey shall be strengthened. The Commission is invited to submit a proposal for a revised Accession Partnership and to intensify the process of legislative scrutiny. In parallel, the EC-Turkey Customs Union should be extended and deepened. The Union will significantly increase its pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey. This assistance will from 2004 be financed under the budget heading "pre-accession expenditure".

THESSALONIKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL (19-20 JUNE 2003)

ENLARGEMENT

Following the signature in Athens on 16 April 2003 of the Accession Treaty, where we proclaimed that "accession is a new contract between our peoples and not merely a treaty between our states", the results of referendums in Malta, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic lend additional momentum to

the ratification process. This process must be completed in time for the ten new Member States to join the Union on 1 May 2004. In the coming months, the ten acceding States are encouraged to keep up their efforts so that they are fully prepared to assume the obligations of membership by accession. This also includes the necessary translation of the Community acquis. With a view to making a success of enlargement, the monitoring of these preparations has been intensified on the basis of reports submitted regularly by the Commission.

Bulgaria and Romania are part of the same inclusive and irreversible enlargement process. Following the conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen and depending on further progress in complying with the membership criteria, the objective is to welcome Bulgaria and Romania as members in 2007. To this end, the pace of negotiations will be maintained, and these will continue on the same basis and principles that applied to the ten acceding states with each candidate judged on its own merits. Building on significant progress achieved, the Union supports Bulgaria and Romania in their efforts to achieve the objective of concluding negotiations in 2004, and invites them to step up their preparations on the ground. Discussions or agreement on future policy reforms, or the new financial perspective, shall neither impede the pursuit and conclusion of accession negotiations nor be prejudged by the outcome of these negotiations. The European Council in December 2003, based on the regular reports from the Commission and the strategy paper, will assess progress achieved with a view to setting out the framework for the conclusion of accession negotiations.

The European Council welcomes the commitment of the Turkish government to carry forward the reform process, in particular the remaining legislative work by the end of 2003, and supports its on-going efforts made in order to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria for opening accession negotiations with the Union. Taking into account progress achieved, significant further efforts to this end are still required. With a view to helping Turkey achieve this objective, the Council adopted recently a revised Accession Partnership, which sets out the priorities that Turkey should pursue, supported by substantially increased pre-accession financial assistance. In accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, fulfilment of these priorities will assist Turkey towards EU membership. The Accession Partnership constitutes the cornerstone of EU-Turkey relations, in particular in view of the decision to be taken by the European Council in December 2004.

BRUSSELS EUROPEAN COUNCIL (12 DECEMBER 2003)

ENLARGEMENT

Turkey

The European Council welcomes the considerable and determined efforts by the Turkish government to accelerate the pace of reforms, many of which are significant in political and legal terms. The legislative packages so far adopted, the first important steps taken to ensure effective implementation, as well as the progress in addressing many priorities under the Copenhagen political criteria and in the revised Accession Partnership have brought Turkey closer to the Union. Turkey has also made significant progress in meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria. However,

further sustained efforts are needed, in particular as regards strengthening the independence and functioning of the judiciary, the overall framework for the exercise of fundamental freedoms (association, expression and religion), the further alignment of civil-military relations with European practice, the situation in the Southeast of the country and cultural rights. Turkey also has to overcome macro-economic imbalances and structural shortcomings.

The European Council underlines the importance of Turkey's expression of political will to settle the Cyprus problem. In this respect a settlement of the Cyprus problem, based on the principles set out in section IV. below, would greatly facilitate Turkey's membership aspirations.

The European Council encourages Turkey to build on the substantial progress achieved so far in its preparations for launching accession negotiations and underlines its commitment to working towards full implementation of the pre-accession strategy with Turkey, including the revised Accession Partnership, in view of the decision to be taken by the European Council in December 2004 on the basis of the report and recommendations of the Commission.

Cyprus

In line with its relevant conclusions, the European Council reiterates its preference for a reunited Cyprus to join the Union on 1 May 2004, in order to allow all Cypriots to enjoy a secure and prosperous future and the benefits of EU accession. It considers that there is a good prospect of reaching a just, viable and functional settlement by 1 May 2004, consistent with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The European Council therefore again urges all parties concerned, and in particular Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, to strongly support the UN Secretary General's efforts and, in this context, calls for an immediate resumption of the talks on the basis of his proposals. The Union reiterates its willingness to accommodate the terms of a settlement in line with the principles on which the EU is founded. In this context, the European Council welcomes the Commission's willingness to offer assistance for a speedy solution within the framework of the acquis. Following a settlement, the Union is ready to provide financial assistance for the development of the northern part of Cyprus and the Commission would be called upon to prepare all necessary steps for lifting the suspension of the acquis, in accordance with Protocol 10 to the Act of Accession.

Appendix B

COPENHAGEN EUROPEAN COUNCIL 12 AND 13 DECEMBER 2002 PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS

The European Council met in Copenhagen on 12 and 13 December 2002. The meeting was preceded by an exposé by the President of the European Parliament, Mr Pat Cox, followed by an exchange of views concerning the main items on the agenda.

The European Council heard a report by President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing on the progress of the Convention's proceedings. In the light of that report the European Council held an exchange of views on the development of the discussions. The Convention will present the result of its work in time for the European Council in June 2003.

ENLARGEMENT

The European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 launched an ambitious process to overcome the legacy of conflict and division in Europe. Today marks an unprecedented and historic milestone in completing this process with the conclusion of accession negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The Union now looks forward to welcoming these States as members from 1 May 2004. This achievement testifies to the common determination of the peoples of Europe to come together in a Union that has become the driving force for peace, democracy, stability and prosperity on our continent. As fully fledged members of a Union based on solidarity, these States will play a full role in shaping the further development of the European project.

The Union endorses the result of these negotiations as set out in document 21000/02. The financial consequences of enlargement are set out in Annex I. The comprehensive and balanced outcome provides a solid basis for the smooth integration of ten new Member States, while safeguarding the effective functioning of the enlarged Union. The agreement reached will provide the acceding states with the necessary transitional arrangements to cope successfully with all obligations of membership. The result achieved in the accession negotiations ensures the continued functioning of the internal market as well as the various EU policies, without prejudging future reform.

Monitoring up to accession of the commitments undertaken will give further guidance to the acceding states in their efforts to assume responsibilities of membership and will give the necessary assurance to current Member States. The Commission will make the necessary proposals on the basis of the monitoring reports. Safeguard clauses provide for measures to deal with unforeseen developments that may arise during the first three years after accession. The European Council welcomes furthermore the commitment to

continue the surveillance of progress with regard to economic, budgetary and structural policies in the candidate States within the existing economic policy coordination processes.

All efforts should now be directed at completing the drafting of the Accession Treaty so that it can be submitted to the Commission for its opinion and then to the European Parliament for its assent, and to the Council with a view to signing the Treaty in Athens on 16 April 2003.

By successfully concluding the accession negotiations the Union has honoured its commitment that the ten acceding States will be able to participate in the 2004 European Parliament elections as members. The Accession Treaty will stipulate that Commissioners from the new Member States will join the current Commission as from the day of accession on 1 May 2004. After the nomination of a new President of the Commission by the European Council, the newly elected European Parliament would approve a new Commission that should take office on 1 November 2004. On the same date, the provisions contained in the Nice Treaty concerning the Commission and voting in the Council will enter into force. The necessary consultations with the European Parliament on these matters will be concluded by the end of January 2003. The above arrangements will guarantee the full participation of the new Member States in the institutional framework of the Union.

Finally, the new Member States will participate fully in the next Intergovernmental Conference. Without reform the Union will not fully reap the benefits of enlargement. The new Treaty will be signed after accession. This calendar shall be without prejudice to the timing of the conclusion of the IGC.

The current enlargement provides the basis for a Union with strong prospects for sustainable growth and an important role to play in consolidating stability, peace and democracy in Europe and beyond. In accordance with their national ratification procedures, the current and the acceding States are invited to ratify the Treaty in due time for it to enter into force on 1 May 2004.

Cyprus

In accordance with the above paragraph 3, as the accession negotiations have been completed with Cyprus, Cyprus will be admitted as a new Member State to the European Union. Nevertheless the European Council confirms its strong preference for accession to the European Union by a united Cyprus. In this context it welcomes the commitment of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots to continue to negotiate with the objective of concluding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem by 28 February 2003 on the basis of the UNSG's proposals. The European Council believes that those proposals offer a unique opportunity to reach a settlement in the coming weeks and urges the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to seize this opportunity.

The Union recalls its willingness to accommodate the terms of a settlement in the Treaty of Accession in line with the principles on which the EU is

founded. In case of a settlement, the Council, acting by unanimity on the basis of proposals by the Commission, shall decide upon adaptations of the terms concerning the accession of Cyprus to the EU with regard to the Turkish Cypriot community.

The European Council has decided that, in the absence of a settlement, the application of the *acquis* to the northern part of the island shall be suspended, until the Council decides unanimously otherwise, on the basis of a proposal by the Commission. Meanwhile, the Council invites the Commission, in consultation with the government of Cyprus, to consider ways of promoting economic development of the northern part of Cyprus and bringing it closer to the Union.

Bulgaria and Romania

The successful conclusion of accession negotiations with ten candidates lends new dynamism to the accession of Bulgaria and Romania as part of the same inclusive and irreversible enlargement process. The Union welcomes the important progress achieved by these countries, which is duly reflected in the advanced state of their accession negotiations.

The Union looks forward to consolidating the results achieved so far. Following the conclusions of the European Council in Brussels and depending on further progress in complying with the membership criteria, the objective is to welcome Bulgaria and Romania as members of the European Union in 2007. The Union confirms that accession negotiations with these countries will continue on the basis of the same principles that have guided the accession negotiations so far, and that each candidate country will be judged on its own merits.

The roadmaps put forward by the Commission provide Bulgaria and Romania with clearly identified objectives and give each country the possibility of setting the pace of its accession process. It is essential that Bulgaria and Romania seize this opportunity by stepping up their preparation, including fulfilling and implementing the commitments undertaken in the accession negotiations. In this context, the Union underlines the importance of judicial and administrative reform that will help bring forward Bulgaria's and Romania's overall preparation for membership. This will ensure that the process will be successfully brought forward on the basis of the results reached so far. Future Presidencies and the Commission will make sure that the pace of accession negotiations on all remaining chapters, including chapters with financial implications, is maintained and matches the efforts of Bulgaria and Romania.

The Union underlines its resolve to assist Bulgaria and Romania in these efforts. The Union endorses the Commission's communication on roadmaps for Bulgaria and Romania, including the proposals for a significant increase in pre-accession assistance. The high level of funding to be made available should be used in a flexible way, targeting the priorities identified, including in key areas such as Justice and Home Affairs. Further guidance in their pre-

accession work will be provided by the revised Accession Partnerships to be presented to them next year.

Furthermore, Bulgaria and Romania will participate in the next Intergovernmental Conference as observers.

Turkey

The European Council recalls its decision in 1999 in Helsinki that Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states. It strongly welcomes the important steps taken by Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria, in particular through the recent legislative packages and the subsequent implementation measures, which cover a large number of key priorities specified in the Accession Partnership. The Union acknowledges the determination of the new Turkish government to take further steps on the path of reform and **urges in particular the government** to address swiftly all remaining shortcomings in the field of the political criteria, not only with regard to legislation but also in particular with regard to implementation. The Union recalls that, according to the political criteria decided in Copenhagen in 1993, membership requires that a candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.

The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.

In order to assist Turkey towards EU membership, the accession strategy for Turkey shall be strengthened. The Commission is invited to submit a proposal for a revised Accession Partnership and to intensify the process of legislative scrutiny. In parallel, the EC-Turkey Customs Union should be extended and deepened. The Union will significantly increase its pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey. This assistance will from 2004 be financed under the budget heading "pre-accession expenditure".

The European Union and the acceding States agreed on a joint declaration "One Europe" on the continuous, inclusive and irreversible nature of the enlargement process (see doc. SN

369/02), which will be annexed to the final act of the Accession Treaty.

The enlarged Union and its neighbours

The enlargement will bring about new dynamics in the European integration. This presents an important opportunity to take forward relations with neighbouring countries based on shared political and economic values. The Union remains determined to avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union.

The European Council recalls the criteria defined at the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 and reaffirms the European perspective of the countries of the Western Balkans in the Stabilisation and Association Process as stipulated by the European Council in Feira. The Council underlines its determination to support their efforts to move closer to the EU. The European Council welcomes the decision by the incoming Greek Presidency to organise a Summit on 21 June in Thessaloniki between EU Member States and countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

The enlargement will strengthen relations with Russia. The European Union also wishes to enhance its relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the southern Mediterranean countries based on a long-term approach promoting democratic and economic reforms, sustainable developments and trade and is developing new initiatives for this purpose. The European Council welcomes the intention of the Commission and the Secretary General/High Representative to bring forward proposals to that end.

The European Council encourages and supports the further development of cross-border and regional cooperation inter alia through enhancing transport infrastructure, including appropriate instruments, with and among neighbouring countries in order to develop the regions' potential to the full.

TABLE 1

AGGREMENTS, WHICH HAS ESTABLISHED EU COMMUNITIES AND MEMBER STATES

A.Aggrements (With the dates put into force)

- 23 July 1952 Treaty of Paris/ ECSC
- 1 January 1958 Treaty of Rome/ EEC
- 1 January 1958 Treaty of Rome/ EURATOM
- 1 Janaury 1973 Accession Agreements of Denmark, Ireland, and England
- 1 January 1981 Accession Aggrement of Greece
- 1 January 1986 Accession Aggrements of Spain, and Portugal
- 1 July 1987 Single European Act
- 29 October 1993 Treaty of Maastricht
- 1 January 1995 Accession Aggrements of Austria, Sweden,and Portugal
- 1 May 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam
- 2001 Treaty of Nice

B.Founding Members

Federal Germany, Belgium, Holland, France, Italy, Luxembourg

C.Enlargements

- 1973: England, Denmark, Ireland
- 1981: Greece
- 1986: Spain, Portugal
- 1995: Austria, Sweden, and Finland
- 2004: Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithunia, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovekia, Slovenia

TABLE 2
The Ever Wider Union

Original Member States	First Enlargement(1973)	Second Enlargement(1981)	Third Enlargement(1986)	Fourth Enlargement(1995)	Fifth Enlargement(2004)
Belgium France Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherlands	Britain Denmark Ireland	Greece	Spain Portugal	Austria Finland Sweden	Czech Republic Estonia Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Hungary Malta Poland Slovenia Slovakia

TABLE 4
CHANGES REGARDING THE NUMBER OF SEATS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AFTER RECENT ENLARGEMENT

MEMBER STATE	ACCORDING TO NICE TREATY*
Germany	99
England	72
France	72
Italy	72
Spain	50
Poland	50
Romania	33
Holland	25
Greece	22
Czech Republic	20
Belgium	22
Hungary	20
Portugal	22
Sweden	18
Bulgaria	17
Austria	17
Slovakia	13
Denmark	13
Finland	13
Ireland	12
Litvania	12
Letonia	8
Slovenia	7
Estonia	6
Southern Cyprus	6
Luxembourg	6
Malta	5
TOTAL	732

(*): Came into force till June 2004

TABLE 5
CHANGES REGARDING THE WEIGHTED VOTES IN THE EU COUNCIL

MEMBER STATE	WEIGHTED VOTES ACCORDING TO NICE TREATY(*)
Germany	29
England	29
France	29
Italy	29
Spain	27
Poland	27
Romania	14
Holland	13
Greece	12
Czech Republic	12
Belgium	12
Hungary	12
Portugal	12
Sweden	10
Bulgaria	10
Austria	10
Slovakia	7
Denmark	7
Finland	7
Ireland	7
Litvania	7
Letonia	4
Slovenia	4
Estonia	4
Southern Cyprus	4
Luxembourg	4
Malta	
TOTAL	345

TABLE 5
CHANGES REGARDING THE WEIGHTED VOTES IN THE EU COUNCIL WITHOUT NEW MEMBERS

MEMBE STATE	WEIGHTED VOTES ACCORDING TO TREATY ON EU	WEIGHTED VOTES ACCORDING TO NICE TREATY(*)
Belgium	5	12
Denmark	3	7
Germany	10	29
Greece	5	12
Spain	8	27
France	10	29
Ireland	3	7
Italy	10	29
Luxembourg	2	4
Holland	5	13
Austria	4	10
Portugal	5	12
Finland	3	7
Sweden	4	10
England	10	29
TOTAL	87	237

(*) will come into force on 1 January 2005

TABLE 6
The Impact of Enlargement

	1958	1973	1981	1986	1995	2004
Area (000km)	1,167	1,524	1,658	2,252	3,234	3,971
Population (million)	185	273	287	338	370	448
Member States	6	9	10	12	15	25
Official Languages	4	6	7	9	11	-
Commissioners	9	13	14	17	20	20
Members of EP	142	198	434	518	626	535
QMV/Total number of votes in the Council		41/58	45/63	54/76	62/87	72/237