

**REMEMBERING THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OF THE 1968
ERA IN TURKEY**

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**Thesis Submitted to the
Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts**

in

Comparative Studies in History and Society

**Koç University
September 2011**

ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyzes the discursive transformations that have occurred in remembrance of the social movements of the 1968 era in Turkey by focusing on the selected works produced respectively in 1978, 1988, 1998 and 2008. I argue that in each epoch we see the emergence of a new discourse to represent the 1968 era which is both shaped by and speaks to its political milieu. In 1978, the struggle was presented to be between self-sacrificial honorable and the dishonorable people, reflecting the atmosphere of intensifying inter-communal conflicts of the late 1970's. In 1988, a new discourse emerged which represented the 1968 era as the struggle of idealists who were likened to new entrepreneurs of the neo-liberal age with their common thrust for novelty and change. In 1998, the dominant discourse presented the social movements as the struggle of Kemalist youth against those who opposed the Kemalist modernization project, mainly the Islamist social movements, thus revealing the contours of political conflicts of the 1990's in Turkey. For 2008, I analyze the TV series *Hatırla Sevgili* which represented the conflicts of the last decades in general and the conflicts of the 1968 era in particular as primarily resulting from the machinations of deep state. I argue that this discourse on deep state makes possible to imagine a pre-violence community of cohesion where people from different religious, ethnic, status groups and classes can harmoniously live together. I argue that this naturalized unity is an ideological fantasy disguising the reality that the national space is dominated by inequalities and injustices resulting from imbalances of power. Hence, via the analysis of each work I aim to demonstrate that new dominant discourses on the national polity have developed in specific historical contexts.

Keywords: Discourse analysis, social movements, Turkey, national polity, neo-liberalism, Kemalism, Multiculturalism, ideological fantasy, class, deep state, conflict.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE’DE 1968 DÖNEMİ SOSYAL HAREKETLERİNİ HATIRLAMAK

Bu tez Türkiye’de 1968 dönemi sosyal hareketlerinin hatırlanmasındaki söylem değişimlerini sırasıyla 1978, 1988, 1998 ve 2008 yıllarından seçili çalışmalar üzerine yoğunlaşarak incelemektedir. 1978 yılında, 1968 yıllarının mücadelesi mutlak bir biçimde ikiye ayrılmış namuslu ve namussuzlar arasında tanımlanıyor ve böylece toplumsal iç çatışma yıllarının etkisi altında bir söylem pratiği vücuda gelmiş oluyor. 1988 yılında ortaya çıkan yeni söyleme göre, 1968 yılları aktivistleri darbe sonrası Neoliberalizm döneminin genç girişimcileri ile toplumsal değişim istekleri ve statüko karşıtlıkları üzerinden benzeştiriliyor. 1998 yılına geldiğimizde, egemen söylemin 1968 yıllarını Kemalist gençliğin mücadelesi olarak tanımladığını görüyoruz. Böylece 1990’lı yıllardaki Kemalist modernleşme projesinin özellikle İslami toplumsal hareketler tarafından tehdit altında olduğu algısı 1968 döneminin hatırlanmasında köklü bir değişikliğe neden oluyor. 2008 yılında Hatırla Sevgili televizyon dizisinde ise 1968 yıllarında vuku bulan çatışmalar, daha genelde Türkiye tarihindeki belli başlı tüm şiddet olayları derin devlet planlaması olarak betimleniyor. Dizideki derin devlet teması tüm şiddet olaylarını gizli bir örgütün eseri olarak göstererek, toplumsal yapının kendisini büyük ölçüde şiddet sarmalının ve şiddet üreten mekanizmaların dışında tanımlıyor. Bu anlatının etnik, dinsel ve sınıfsal farklılıkları içinde barındıran çok kültürlü bir barış ve refah toplumu portresi çizdiğini gözlemleyebiliyoruz. Dizideki egemen söylemin toplumsal yapıda hüküm süren eşitsizliklerin, adaletsizliklerin ve şiddetin üstünü örten bir ideolojik fantezi olduğunu iddia ediyorum. Böylece, bu tezde incelediğim eserler kendi ortaya çıktıkları

dönemin politik olaylarının etkisinde ve aynı zamanda bu olayları etkilemeye yönelik olarak Türkiye’de toplum inşası açısından farklı bir baskın söylemin ortaya çıkışını belgeliyorlar.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Söylem analizi, sosyal hareketler, Türkiye, Neoliberalizm, Kemalizm, Çokkültürlülük, ideolojik fantezi, sınıf, derin devlet, toplum, çatışma.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my thesis advisor Aslı Niyazioğlu and my thesis jury member Murat Yüksel who helped me with their insightful criticisms and their encouraging comments while devoting large portions of their time to my thesis in the last two years. I am also thankful to Sibel Yadımcı who accepted to take part in my thesis jury. I am grateful to Ayşecan Terzioğlu who read an earlier draft of my thesis and motivated me with her constructive commentaries. I am deeply thankful to all my friends at the Comparative Studies in History and Society program with whom I have so gratefully shared many stimulating conversations and moments of fun. Special thanks surely goes to my family; Hasan Zorlu, Filiz Zorlu and my sister Selen Zorlu, who have always been very supportive of me. I might have been able to finish this thesis without the support of the above mentioned people, yet, without them, the writing of this thesis would have been a dull if not purposeless act.

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INTRODUCTION

In this thesis I analyze the discursive construction and the transformations that have taken place in remembrance of the events of the 1968 era. I argue that there occurred significant changes in the representation of this period in works devoted to its remembrance which run parallel with the changing socio-political state of affairs in Turkey. I also argue that particular works of remembrance not only reflect their social settings, but also constitute and reproduce discourses that are in circulation in their time of production (Rofel, 1994, p. 714). I will analyze and compare the selected works, taking into consideration the immediate historical background that has informed their narrativization of the events. In this respect, in one of its aspects this is a historical comparative study in its approach, aiming to uncover the social transformations in Turkey. Thus, my aim is to deconstruct and subsequently reconstruct the analyzed narrative, displaying the underlying discursive truth claims and ultimately placing the meaning of production into its larger historical context (Curtain, 1995, p. 23-24).

I focus on selected works produced with ten year intervals. These are respectively Orhan İyiler's *Öldükleriyle Kalmadılar* (1978), Alev Er's *Bir Uzun Yürüyüşü* 68 (1988), Bedri Baykam's *68'li Yıllar: Eylemciler* (1998), and the television series *Hatırla Sevgili* (2008). I argue that works of remembrance about the 1968 era, as exemplified by each chosen work, are chiefly based upon a dichotomy. Each work presents the era as the story of a conflict between two irrevocably opposed groups. However, the axis of division drastically changes from one period to the next, thus this dichotomy is reflective of the historical context within which each work is produced. Thus, in my analysis of the selected works, I focus on these changing imagined dichotomies that cut across the polity. I believe it is through them that the remembrance of the 1968 era is appropriated by a prevalent contemporaneous

discourse and that these dichotomies legitimize the truth claims of the discourses about the history of polity in Turkey.

Briefly, in 1978 in the work of Orhan İyiler, the 1968 era is remembered as a vital conflict between honest, benevolent, self-sacrificial activists and dishonest people who only think of themselves and their personal benefits. This latter group of people is presented as the essential source of oppression and violence that the activists of the 1968 era were facing. Rather than as a struggle of people with different political projects, the period of struggle thus is narrated in moralizing terms. I will argue that this narrative reflects the atmosphere of intensifying inter-communal conflicts of the late 1970's in Turkey between left and right wing groups and the governmental forces.

In 1988, Alev Er represented the social movements of the 1968 era as the struggle of young idealists who were following their dreams against those who were in favor of status-quo. Even though the activists are praised for their relentless idealism and devotion to societal transformation, their particular aims are metaphorically depicted as unrealistic. Activists failed in their particular aims, but with their idealism they led to a positive change of consciousness in Turkey by setting an example to be followed by future generations. In this narrative, the activists are likened to a new class of entrepreneurs who flourished under the dictates of the neo-liberal world order in the 1980's. Both the activist of the 1968 era and the young entrepreneurs of the 1980's were presented as embodying the spirit of adventurism with their thrust for novelty and change. I demonstrate that the emergence of this new narrative is informed by a discourse that developed in Western Europe on the remembrance of the 1968 era which claimed that neo-liberal capitalism signifies not the failure but the ultimate achievement of the 1968 era social movements (Ross, 2002). Furthermore, I argue that the emergence of this new discourse is closely related with the post-coup environment of Turkey

as the revolutionary utopias of the left-wing activists were largely set aside following the 1980 coup (Göle, 1994).

Bedri Baykam's book published in the year 1998 is a primary example for a new discourse on the representation of the 1968 era that developed in the 1990's especially under the effect of Islamist and Kurdish challenge to the discursive truth claims of Kemalist ideology (Yashin, 2002; Özyürek, 2004). In this new narrative, the remembrance of the 1968 era endorsed a strictly Kemalist world view. The 1968 youth movements were presented as a significant moment in the old and still continuing struggle between modernist progressive and backward (gerici) people in Turkey. According to this discourse, this struggle has its beginnings in the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and continued in the 1990's with an added intensity. I tried to demonstrate in this part that resolutely Kemalist perspective employed in the representation of the 1968 era that lasted until today, has in fact its essential beginnings in the political atmosphere of the 1990's, where the rising Islamist social movements were endeavored to be countered with an aim to protect the Kemalist modernization project against perceived attacks to its bases.

Hence, after constructing an overview, based on selected works, of the discursive transformations that have occurred in the remembrance of the 1968 era from 1978 to 1998, in this thesis I will primarily focus on a new discourse that has emerged in the remembrance of the 1968 era in the 2000's by analyzing the TV series *Hatırla Sevgili*. I believe this latter part of the study will contribute to our understanding of the contemporaneous Turkey. In this vein, I aim to demonstrate, through a discursive analysis of the series *Hatırla Sevgili*, the constitution of a particular liberal discourse about the national community in the present day Turkey.

Therefore, I will focus on the analysis of the constituencies of this new discourse; the chief characteristic of which is that the society and the deep state are presented as binary opposites. Thus, instead of any dichotomy that divides up the society, as it was the case in earlier 1968 era representations, the dichotomy is presented to have existed between the society and the deep state. It is implicitly and explicitly claimed that it has been this secretive, mysterious yet powerful deep state which organized, provoked or aggravated every major deed of violence in Turkey's history. Rather than any social mechanisms, lasting conflicts and resulting violent deeds were presented as the making of the deep state. Thus, the deep state is presented as an outsider to the national community and that without its interfering schemes, all the members of the national community can live in peace and prosperity.

This discourse is built upon the claimed existence of an imagined national community based on love as its common ground that over-powers ethno-religious, ideological and class differences of its member. I will argue that by explaining virtually all past violent deeds in the Turkish history as the machinations of the secretive forces, including those that occurred in the 1968 years, this particular discourse naturalizes the imagined harmony of the society. The nation is depicted as of a family in which subjects are naturally united primarily thanks to their love. Nostalgic reference to utopic past days then serves the purpose of showcasing an imaginary age when the terrible violent deeds of the last decades were not present. Hence, the remembrance of the violence of the deep state is juxtaposed to the remembrance of the pre-violence period of social cohesion.

This narrative positions the social movements of the 1968 era in that meta-narrative about the ultimate dichotomy between the deep state and society. The youth of the 1968 era were likened to right wing militants as well as the members of the Democrat Party. All of them, despite their conflicting political convictions, are presented to have shared a passionate love for their countries and suffered because of the deep state instigated military coups.

Drawing on Timothy Mitchell (1990), I will propose that state and society distinction of this discourse is a new mechanism for securing power and hegemony in the present age. This discourse maximizes the role of secretive forces in initiating the social conflicts of the past and thus presents a sanitized picture of normative social order.

Based on Slavoj Žižek's conceptualization of ideological fantasy, I will argue that ideological fantasy can be effectively used in the analysis of this new discourse on the 1968 era. This discourse about the imaginary past in *Hatırla Sevgili*, the time when subjects were living harmoniously with their differences, can be seen as an ideological fantasy which speaks to the contemporaneous age. Simultaneous narrativization of the past violence caused by the deep state and the utopic imaginary past age then is directed to envision and construct a multi-cultural national polity devoid of conflicts and violence in Turkey.

Hence, in this thesis I rather than studying the 1968 era itself I focus on the creation of works of remembrance in specific historical contexts. Thus, my concern is not what happened, but what is thought to have happened and how it transformed with changing socio-political concerns. In this way, I plan to demonstrate contemporaneous socio-political issues that give shape and are affected by each particular work of remembrance that I analyze. Thus, I will show that the changes in narration about what happened during the 1968 era social movements reveal the essential characteristics of prevalent contemporaneous discourses on the history of national polity. Therefore, this study primarily aims to analyze discourses that these selected works proliferate.

This thesis then rests on the premise that the representations of the social movements of 1968 era fitted the lived experiences of this period into the ideological propositions of a prevalent new discourse. Thus, it is through the representation of the 1968 era that contemporaneous political struggles are waged in each analyzed work. In this vein, tracing the

history of the 1968 remembrances, I believe, will allow us to take note of the societal transformations which occurred over the decades in Turkey.

I have to stress that there existed multiple ways to remember the 1968 era at each particular historical epoch that I will analyze. At any time since the occurring of events, numerous discursive tropes have been invoked simultaneously. The 1968 era has more than one set of meaning over which everybody could come to a total agreement. There always existed different, contesting and contradictory ways to represent the 1968 era social movements at every historical moment.

However, I believe new discourses have emerged in representing the 1968 era over time and the vital aim of this study is to analyze these emergent discourses which represent the 1968 era in a strikingly different way than previous representations of this period. Therefore, each chosen work is selected as it showcases the emergence of a new discourse which conceptualizes the same sequence of events differently via re-considering lived experiences under the effect of contemporaneous political issues.

In that respect, the discourse of Hatırla Sevgili is about only one particular way of remembering the 1968 era among others. Yet, the analysis of the series will present a distinct narrative in the remembrance of the 1968 era, and more importantly, it will inform us about a prevalent new discourse in the “imaginary institution” (Castoriadis, 1997) of national polity in the present day Turkey.

CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE

REVIEW

I. Remembering and Forgetting

The rich literature on remembering and forgetting will guide me throughout this thesis. As it is often pointed out remembering the past should not be seen as a replica of the past but as a new interpretation of it. (Rider, 1995, p. 15) In this respect, Janine Rider (1995) argued that: "...how and what we remember and think are dependent on when and where we live. Even our memories are formed by the world around us." (p. 6) Alessandro Portelli (1991) noted that memory can not be considered "a passive depository of facts"; as it is in fact "an active process of creation of meanings" (p. 52) Hence, as our memories are shaped by our immediate entourage and by the social context in which we live, it is also true that our knowledge of the present is shaped and informed by memory as it "determines our interpretation of and our choices in our world". (Rider, p. 15) As such, works dedicated to remind the past simultaneously are both shaped by and speak to the existing socio-political situation in a society.

Memory is imbued with certain ideological, political and moral lessons and imperatives that form essential parts of an idealized normative order. (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994, p. 9) As James V. Wertsch (2002) points out "Instead of being neutral, or asocial, the textual resources employed in collective remembering bring with them a social position and perspective" (p. 172). In that vein, Paul Connerton (1989) contends that particular imaginings of the past legitimizes a particular social order. (p. 3) It can further be argued that they may also serve to de-legitimize an existing social order in favor of an alternative socio-political project; hence, in both case, reflecting a certain "social context" (Wertsch, p. 172). Thus, it is

plausible to argue that works of remembering on the 1968 era serve to legitimize and de-legitimize certain ideologies of their contemporaneous age.

Written and organized according to a particular social perspective, there is an intimate connection between remembering and power (Ostovich, 2002, p. 240), since remembering and forgetting the past is also constitutive of the power relations in the contemporary social order. Memory provides people with the stories, beliefs and symbols with which to understand and dominate others (Bodnar, 1994, p. 76). Therefore, through acts of remembering the collective subjectivities are built and sustained along with the power relations that they are embedded in. As it is argued, memory shapes everyday life, institutional settings and processes of decision making as well as beliefs and values (Confino, 2002, p. 7). It can be argued that remembering the past, in this case the 68 period, and trying to monopolize the remembering of this period in a certain way, is about re-manufacturing existing power relations in the society.

These aspects of the memory owe much to a careful choice of the elements of the past that are considered to be worth remembering. As it has been pointed out that remembering is based upon the absence of the past; the real past being no longer available (Ankersmit, 2002, p. 11). And it mostly fills this absence through constructing coherent set of narratives that link the present epoch with the past fitting in a meaningful picture. This effect is achieved by a selective appropriation of the elements of the past, from which, another person might construct a different meaningful picture. Maurice Halbwachs (1992) argues that in an effort to reconstruct we distort the past, because we wish to introduce greater coherence in it (p. 183). This process entails choosing among the store of recollections, eliminating some of them and arranging others according to an order conforming with our ideas of the moment (Halbwachs, p. 183). Remembering is “selective, subjective, and inscriptive, and responsive to a changing present” (Cressy, 1994, p. 71). Hence, “the simplification and impatience for

ambiguity and complexity that are characteristic of collective memory” (Wertsch, 2002, p. 76).

Therefore, we can argue that remembering and the attempts of creating singular narratives about the past are selective in so far as they try to achieve narrative coherence in the present and they narrate through a particular political perspective so that a specific world vision can be promoted in the contemporary political debates. In the same vein, remembering the 68 era in Turkey is meant to make certain political statements about the contemporary socio-political conditions, thus they are responsive to and constitutive of an ever-changing present. In this line of thought, I believe each selected work on the 1968 era can be seen as an attempt to intervene in the recent political developments with an aim to sustain and reproduce certain prevalent discourses while delegitimizing others.

A. Memory Studies

Memory studies have gained an impetus after the World War II and the Holocaust (Ross, 2002; Neyzi, 2011; Waters, 2010). It has become an increasingly studied subject matter of social sciences in the 1960’s especially with the development of oral history which has been effectively used by the scholars who wanted to record the memories of the Holocaust survivors (Neyzi, 2011, p. 3). In this respect, the studies on the World War II and the Holocaust have given rise to a “memory industry” which examines, re-interprets and locates the traumas of this period (Waters, 2010, p. 6).

It is argued that memory studies constitute a new and developing field of study in Turkey (Neyzi, 2011). Memory studies have focused on the violent and traumatic events of the past in the Turkish case as well. The emphasis is given to the issues that are forgotten especially in respect to traumatic experiences of Christian, Jewish, Kurdish and Alevite communities residing in Turkey; groups of people who are often considered as the “other” of

Turkish national subject. Specific violent events that these communities have suffered, which include the Armenian Massacres of 1915, the attacks against the Jewish community of Thrace in 1934, Dersim Massacre of 1938 and the Istanbul Pogrom of 6-7 September 1955, are specifically worked upon by academicians working in the field of memory studies.

Besides focusing on the specific events, the method of oral history is also used in the form narrating the life stories of minority populations aiming to shed light to their daily lives and injustices that they have endured. For instance, the books *Hatırlıyorum: Türkiye’de Gayrimüslim Hayatlar* (Koçoğlu, 2002) or *Azınlık Gençleri Anlatıyor* (Koçoğlu, 2001) investigate the treatment of Armenian, Jewish, Greek and Assyrians in Turkey by listening to their own narrations. These memory studies rest on the belief that modern day Turkey is populated with people whose memories are considerably different from each other. Especially for the case of oppressed minority communities, people who constitute the “other” of the Turkish national subject, it is no doubt true that they have their “other” histories to tell.

Individual memories are believed to have remained buried in the face of hegemonic forms of narrating the past, the reason why the method of oral history has frequently been used. In this vein, oral history is often perceived as a potential source for countering the official histories as individual narratives can be counter-posed and made use of in countering the hegemonic truth claims of official history. As such, the narratives of individual witnesses often are thought to be sites of resistance against the official narratives.

However, memory studies do not solely focus on the experiences of the repressed communities with an aim to uncover their untold stories or their versions of the past. For this study it is crucial for me to demonstrate the link between the particular ways in which the past is remembered and the establishment of hegemonic discourses in the present. Several scholars working in the field of memory studies have also pointed out that even the individual

memories, which are supposed to be sites of resistance against official history, can in fact be largely informed by the truth claims of hegemonic discourses.

For instance, Cihan Tuğal (2006) demonstrates how the individual memories of the Armenian survivors of the massacres of 1915 are framed within certain pre-established or official forms of narrating the past. As he points out, individual memories attain their meaning when made part of a prevalent historical discursive schema or part of a particular official history narrative (Tuğal, p. 147).

Rebecca Bryant (2011) studies another violent episode in history; the Cyprus dispute for which there has developed contradictory sets of official narratives in the Turkish and Greek sides of the conflict. Bryant analyzes the memories of the Cypriot Greek and Cypriot Turkish women's individual memories in regard to the partition of the Island. She argues that the belief in the counter-hegemonic, thus liberating nature of unofficial or un-hegemonic forms of memories can be misleading (Bryant, p.69). These individual stories are in relation with and carry the traces of hegemonic narrations (Bryant, p.69). She points out that several works have been produced by the academicians, journalists and activists in the search of counter-hegemonic unofficial forms of memories in Cyprus. But according to her, these stories can be seen as local interpretations of the official histories; in fact official histories are accepted as legitimate and infuse to the consciousness of everyday life through these local histories (Bryant, p.69). Therefore, she argues that there is no necessary dualism or conflict between the official history and private remembering acts which has often been seen as the site to counter-hegemonic memories.

Memory studies also demonstrate that aside from discursive re-construction or re-interpretation of experiences by the hegemonic narratives, even the specific lived experiences themselves can be altered by the subsequent history making. Alessandro Portelli (1991) points out that a young Italian worker named Luigi Trastulli who died by a police bullet during the

anti-NATO demonstration in 1949, in which demonstrators were rallying against Italy's entrance to NATO, later was remembered as a martyr of worker demonstrations which actually had taken place in the year 1953. Even though several newspaper reports showcase that he died before the worker demonstrations which emerged as the large number of steel workers lost their jobs, he is remembered to be shot during these demonstrations that had taken place years after he died. Portelli argues that Italy's entrance to NATO was no longer a major issue of political opposition in later years but the worker demonstrations continued to be a primary source of political mobilization, the reason why Trastulli has his place in the collective memory as the martyr of the demonstrations for workers' rights.

In a similar case of memory work, Biray Kolluoğlu (2005) analyzes the Turkish collective memory of the Great Fire of Smyrna (Izmir). Turkish official history writings blame Greeks and Armenians for the fire, whereas the official history writings of Greeks and Armenian blame the Turkish army for burning the city. In the Turkish official narrative, it is often claimed that the Turkish army stepped in to the city which was already on fire, burned by Greeks and Armenians, thus saving it from total destruction. The Turkish interviewees whom she spoke with, who had been at the city during the fire, present a picturing of events in line with this official narrative. Yet, as she argues, irrespective of which side might have started the fire, it is definitively the case that it started after not before the entrance of the Turkish army into the city. Thus, even for those who have witnessed the fire itself, memories of the event can be in line with the representations of the official history. As Biray Kolluoğlu (2005) argues, both these incidents testify to the fact that “acts of remembering are always already acts of forgetting” (p. 28)

These studies clearly demonstrate that the very remembrance of certain events and the slippages that occur in the remembrance of them speak to the contemporaneous issues and even the intimate memories of the witnesses can be shaped by the official history making.

What and how people remember thus is a political act (Tuğal, p. 149) in the sense that individual memories are shaped by the contemporaneous hegemonic forms of narrating the past.

Leyla Neyzi (2008), on the other hand, in her oral history study about the Smyrna fire, points out that there is more than a single discourse to represent that tragic event in history. She showcases that as well as the discourse of official history, there is also the Izmirian discourse which mourns for the destruction of the imagined cosmopolitan life of the old city and resents the carelessness of the Turkish authorities in the face of the city's dreadful burning. Neyzi claims that this particular emphasis on the Izmirian discourse in the narrative of an eye witness to the fire has a lot to do with the contemporaneous transformation in Turkey where the traumatic historical episodes have started to be increasingly highlighted with a nostalgic lamentation for the imagined past cosmopolitan life (p. 109). Therefore, the historical context directly informs the way the Smyrna fire is remembered according to Neyzi and that there is more than a single discourse to represent the same event in history.

To summarize, hegemonic narratives play a tremendous role in the formation of memory of particular events to the point that they can even distort the memory of lived experiences of people who were witness to them. Yet, there often are different or even contradictory discourses employed in the remembrance of the same past events. And thirdly, the historical context significantly affects the remembrance practice as it can determine which of the contradicting discourses in circulation is accentuated.

II. Discourse Analysis

This study is based upon and speaks to the existing literature that brings into attention the role of discourse and discursive truth claims in the creation, reproduction, transformation

and perception of the socio-political life. Stuart Hall (1997) argued that discourse is a system of representation and is “a group of statements which provide a language for talking about ...a particular topic at a particular historical moment.” (p. 44) Discourse is also defined as “a communicative event including written texts, images and any other ‘semiotic’ or multimedia dimension of signification.” (Wodak and Chilton, 2005, p. 18) As Michel Foucault argues, discourse defines and produces the objects of our knowledge, establishing the way a topic can be meaningfully talked about. (Hall, 1997, p. 44) Discursive studies thus focus on the internal characteristics and processes of signifying systems (Wollacott, p. 108) which prescribes certain ways of thinking and excludes others. (Hall, 1997, p. 44)

Therefore, we can only make sense of the socio-political world through its appropriation in discourse and via the representational practices of the discourse (Hall, 1982, p. 70-71; Dunn, 2010, p. 80-82). Discourses are reactive to the contemporaneous state of affairs and the main tenets of discourses are determined by the conditions in response to which they are formed and performed (Smith, 1980). Furthermore, in the guidance of these discourses that we come to constitute our subjectivities (Dunn, p. 82). Discourses have their political implications as they enable subjects to ‘know’ the socio-political circumstances, but they also urge subjects to act upon what they ‘know’ (Dunn, p. 81- 82). Inevitably, discourses in the works that I will study do not only inform subjects about the social circumstances but also urge them to act in line with their truth claims. Therefore, these narratives as discursive structures form, in the words of Althusser (1970) interpellate subjects and urge them to act accordingly. In this vein, the narrative structures employed in remembering the 1968 era are in line with the prevalent discourses of their time of production and yet simultaneously they also function as discursive representations of the past which interpellate subjects.

A. Discourse Analysis of TV Serials

Television as a medium does reach simultaneously to wider audiences than newspapers, journals or books (İnal, 2010, p.35). Thus, television, as the most popular mass medium, is considered to have its role in the project of building a modern nation (Çakmak, 2008, p. 2). One primary component of television broadcasting in contemporary Turkey is the TV serials. Turkish TV serials rose in numbers by the 1990's and it is even argued that they constitute the primary cultural endeavor in national scale since then (Tanrıöver, 2008, p.11). Indeed, as Çelenk (2005) argues, especially after the year 1999, Turkish dramas have dominated the television channels operating on a national scale by often receiving highest rating scores (p. 321).

TV serials play an important role in placing particular ideologies and discourses about the nation into public conversation. (Giroux, 2006) We can thus consider the “popular culture as a site” (Rofel, 1994, p. 703), of which the TV serials are a crucial component, where disputing views on the nation and nation state contest and negotiate with each other (Duara, 1995). Purnima Mankekar (1999) argues that long-running popular TV serials like *Hatırla Sevgili* end up being part of the collective memory of entire groups of the population (p. 66). In this respect, historical TV series like *Hatırla Sevgili* have a significant influence in shaping the understanding of past as well as the present age.

Furthermore, the reception of the Turkish series by its audience demonstrates that the narrated events are often considered not as mere fictional stories but as reflections of the social reality itself. In one of the extreme examples, a group of young people made a symbolic funeral for a fictional character who died in a Turkish series. Later that fictional character was commemorated on the fourth anniversary of his death by an advertisement to a local

newspaper. (“Kurtlar Vadisi; Sadece Bir Kurgu mu Yoksa Daha Ötesi mi?”, Milliyet, 20 February 2006.)

In the case of *Hatırla Sevgili* even the production team affirms that they acted with an intention to remind and to “settle with the past” of Turkey (Hürriyet Pazar, 22 November, 2009). For instance, alongside the frequent usage of archival footage to support that claim to reality, at a season break, in the last scene before the summer interlude, it is written that: “*Hatırla Sevgili* is going to continue reminding the past by the stories of its characters with its new episodes.”¹

Thus, the narrated historical events of the series are presented as if they are parts of nation’s history or our history waiting to be remembered² (Mankekar, p. 66). Audience reception of the series also demonstrates that viewers take note of this claim to narrate the past reality with several of them praising the series for teaching them the history of Turkey that they did not know of before.³

Finally, it can be argued that discourse analysis in general and the discourse analysis of a popular TV serial like *Hatırla Sevgili* in particular is an important object of analysis because, as Norman Fairclough (2005) argues, more general processes of social change often are initiated and driven by changes in discourse (p. 1) and that popular TV serials both provide an impetus to and reflect social changes in a society. TV series thus constitute a vital field to evaluate the prevalent yet competing discourses about the national polity in the contemporary Turkey.

In this respect, several popular TV series produced in the 2000’s have been analyzed by social scientists in Turkey. For instance, in her analysis of the series *Asmalı Konak*,

¹ Episode 58 “*Hatırla Sevgili* yeni bölümlerinde kahramanlarının hikâyeleriyle geçmişî hatırlatmaya devam edecek”

² Here I use Mankekar’s point that the TV news have such a function of presenting the events that they narrate as happening to us all as nation. I believe with its claim to narrate the past *Hatırla Sevgili* has a similar effect.

³ For instance, one viewer asserts that the series “teach the history to the young people of my age” (benim yaşımdaki gençlere tarihi öğretiyor.) DiziFilm.com Forum.

Zeyneb Feyza Akınerdem focuses on the dichotomous representation of the modern and traditional in the series. Traditional and modern is embodied especially by the two passionate lovers whose love story that the series chiefly narrates. She argues that this modern versus traditional dichotomy is handled by resorting to the natural; to the love which is yet associated with the modern. Hence, the series, according to her, presents love as the force which provides a solution to the conflict between traditional and modern lives and selves. Thus, she argues that through love that the time of modernity is promulgated in the series.

Similarly, Melisa Çakmak (2008), in her analysis of *Sıla*, another popular TV series produced in the 2000's, argues that the series is based upon a dichotomy between the traditional and the modern. She claims that all major conflicting situations arise between characters because of this dichotomy. But these conflicts are resolved by submitting principally to love, to the rule of law and socio-economic development instead of tribal customs (*töre*). As such the series favors the modern, associated with love, rule of law and development, over the traditional, associated with the tribal customs. It is ultimately the submission to the modern which resolves social conflicts in both of these series and love is ascribed a special status as the bearer of modernity. Hence, these two studies demonstrate the fact that TV series as popular cultural works re-produce prevalent discourses on the national polity; in these two cases by promulgating the discourse of modernity opposing it to de-valued "traditional customs".

More importantly for this thesis, in her study on the TV series *Hatırla Sevgili*, Zeynep Güzel (2009) focuses on the representation of the military coup of 12 September 1980 in the series by comparing it with the diversity of the experiences of the leftists' children in regard to this period. In pointing out the differences between the representation of the series and the individual memories of the leftists' children, she categorizes the former to be "memory as representation" and the latter as "memory as experience" (p. 117). The narration of the story

in *Hatırla Sevgili*, presenting both left wing and right wing activists as innocents, depicts the deep state as the villain and avoids an “effective confrontation with the past” (Güzel, p. 118). She also argues that, based on the comments of the scrip-writer and consultants of the series, *Hatırla Sevgili* fulfill young people’s need of holding to an idea or to a group in the present age. However, that nostalgic rendering of the story in the series puts aside the varieties of experiences and narratives about the coup in Turkey (Güzel, p. 118). She argues that leftists’ children memories, which are derived from their personal experiences, can potentially subvert the dominant narratives about the political past of Turkey.

III. Remembering the 1968 Era

Leyla Neyzi (2011) has pointed out that there has been a growing interest in Turkey towards the past since the 1980’s as a result of which numerous memory works in the form of biographies, autobiographic novels, documentary films and television series have come into existence (p. 9). In this respect, large number of the memory works narrating the events of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s are also produced after the 1980’s. (Günay-Erkol, 2011, p. 46) There are limited numbers of biographic and autobiographic works during the period of 1970-1980 chiefly because of the continuing social conflicts of that age and the related pressures exerted on the activists (Günay-Erkol, p. 46). Later academical works on the representation of this period mostly analyze the memory of the 12 March 1971 military intervention in the written sources and the narrativization of the subsequent violence the political dissidents in Turkey have endured.

The existing academic studies in Turkey on the 1968 do focus on the events themselves rather than an analysis of its remembering. Different aspects of the events of the 1968 era have been investigated by the social scientists. For instance, Bağış Erten (2003)

analyzed the 1968 era social movements in Turkey comparing it with the simultaneous youth movements that have developed in European and the American continents. İrem Tunçer (2008), on the other hand, studied the peculiar features of particular left wing political groups which came to existence especially in the latter part of the 1960's in Turkey comparing them with each other. Yet, in the end, these works aim to study the events themselves whereas I study the changing representations of them.

In fact, studying the changing remembrance practices in regard to the 1968 is a relatively new approach in the 1968 studies in the world. The classical work on this issue is Kristin Ross' book *May '68 and Its Afterlives* first published in 2002. Ross specifically focuses on the French case and analyzes the subsequent emergent official memory of the 1968. She does not follow a comparative approach that might have uncovered the changing notions that are used in the narration of the 1968 era. She emphasizes what she argues to be the forgotten essence of the 1968 events which were disguised by the hegemonic official history making propagated by the writers, journalists and even by ex-activists. Yet, she adds that this essence "has endured, resisting annihilation, insisting or asserting its eventfulness against the forms of social amnesia and instrumentalization that have sought to undo it" (Ross, p. 1). Thus, the aim of her study is to display this essence which "has been overtaken by its subsequent representations" (p. 1).

She points out that May 1968 was the largest mass movement in French history, the biggest strike in the history of the French worker's movement and the first general strike that extended to include workers in the service, communication and culture industries with nine million people across all sectors of public and private employment stopped working (p. 3-4). She further argues that there remained no region, city or even village in France that has remained untouched by this general strike (p. 4). Despite these, she argues that 1968 is represented in the official history by "defiguring strategies" as merely constituted of a

generational revolt of the young against the “structural rigidities that were blocking the ... cultural modernization in France.” (p. 4-6). Hence, she argues that the May movement in France is depicted by the official history to be in line with the capitalist modernization by erasing the history of largest worker strike in the history of France and the anti-capitalist character of the revolts in general.

More recently, studies that are focusing on the changing representations of the 1968 have emerged. The book titled as *Memories of 1968: International Perspectives* published in 2010 combine the works of scholars analyzing the representations of the 68 movement in different contexts. It is argued that as diverse as the national characteristics of 1968 changing from one context to another so are the national memories and narratives of this time period in different countries (Klimke, 2010). One of the authors of the book, Daniel A. Gordon (2010), makes an overview of the debates about 1968 in France as expressed with 10 years of time intervals in 1978, 1988 and 1998 with the bulk his chapter analyzing what was and what was not new in the 2008 commemorations (p. 50).

In a similar vein, I will make an overview of the representations of the 1968 era in 1978, 1988 and 1998 in Turkey before I focus on the analysis of a new discursive framework that has emerged with the serial *Hatırla Sevgili*. Therefore, in this study I aim to demonstrate that the memories of the 1968 can be appropriated by competing and contradictory discourses which have come to prevalence in different historical episodes. And that the appropriation of the memory of the 1968 era by varying discourses is not only shaped by the historical context of production but can be seen as a call for social mobilization in the contemporaneous age.

A. Constructing the National Polity

As Esra Özyürek (2006) points out, “in contemporary Turkey representations of the past have become metaphors through which individuals and groups define their cultural

identity and political position” (p. 2-3). Representations of the past are often used with the intention to understand and control the present with competing groups of people waging their political struggles in the present via memory work (Özyürek, p. 2). Scholars who are working on the representations of the past in Turkey aim at exploring the ways in which “people challenge, reaffirm, or transform the concepts of history, nation, homeland and Republic through acts of memory” (Özyürek, p. 2-3). Hence, memory studies often investigate the construction of national space and national subjectivities in the present age.

Therefore, memory work produce, reproduce and maintain the national polity and it is a site of struggle for competing discourses on the national space. In this vein, I argue that to remember the social movements of the 1968 era has become a way to wage contemporaneous struggles on the Turkish national polity. In my analysis of the representations of the 1968 era from 1978 to 2008, I basically aim to show that each work presents the social movements as a struggle between two unequivocally opposing sides. In each work there is an “other” against whom the struggle is waged. This other respectively is the self-interested dishonorable who possesses the means of violence in the chaotic atmosphere of 1978, the other is the one who defends the status quo against the rising tide of novelty and change of neo-liberal global capitalism in 1988. In 1998 the other is the backward people who oppose the Kemalist modernization project. Lastly in *Hatırla Sevgili*, it is the deep state which harms the naturalized peace and unity of the people of Turkey with all their differences. In each of these cases, the representation of the other also construes a different national subjectivity and reflects the desire for the establishment of a particular national polity.

In the second part of the thesis, my analysis of the *Hatırla Sevgili* will benefit from the literature which focuses on the role of the remembrance of the past violent events in the national community formation in the present. Cihan Tuğal for the Armenian case, Aletta Norval and Lars Buur for the South African, and Gyan Pandey and Purnima Mankekar for the

Indian case analyze the construction of the national polity via the representation of the traumatic and violent deeds of the past.

Gyanendra Pandey (2001) argues that remembrance of the violent events of the past might serve to the function of imagining a unitary community that is thought to have existed in the days before the violence. In that vein, Tuğal (2006) argues that the remembrance of the violence of the “alien” or the “other” has the role of uniting the Armenian community which is otherwise divided geographically and also on the basis of different religious sects and classes (p. 135). Armenian narratives mostly present their life before the year 1915 as a “lost heaven”, referring to a time when they were living in a peaceful solidarity as of a united community (Tuğal, p. 147).

Lars Buur (2001) and Aletta J. Norval (2001) analyze the workings of Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the South Africa which investigates the atrocities and human rights abuses that had taken place during the Apartheid period. Both argue that the commission serves to the purpose of uniting the South African people against the apartheid by presenting it to be the common enemy which harm all South Africans. Norval (2001) writes that the unity of the people in post-conflict South Africa depends on the presence of this enemy. As Buur (2001) points out the commission entails a memory work which creates a shared sense of past suffering for South African people who are presented as the “rainbow nation”, constituted of different colors but yet united as a whole. Therefore, in this latter case, the other is presented not as a particular national community or group but the past regime itself.

Purnima Mankekar (1999) studies the representation of the violence of partition of the India in the Indian television romance. She puts forward the idea that the prevalent theme of the Indian TV romance is the representation of a united Indian society by reminding viewers the harmonious days of the past. The essential reason of violence is presented as the

manipulations of an opportunistic elite (Mankekar p. 305). She argues that the TV series is centered upon the imagery of national re-integration which consists of welding of different communities who populate modern day Indian state into one national community (p. 238).

Similarly, I argue that the narrative of the series *Hatırla Sevgili* is centered upon the idea that Turkey is consisted of people with different ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural backgrounds, all of whom are naturally united despite their differences. Just like the apartheid state in South Africa or the ruling opportunistic elite in India, the deep state is put forward in the series as the “other” of the Turkish national community. The series does focus on the depiction of imaginary past times when people of Turkey could happily live together with their differences.

Stemming from this literature on the community constituting effects of the representation of the past violent deeds, I will principally base this study on the theoretical propositions made by Timothy Mitchell, Sarah Ahmed and Slavoj Žižek. I believe it is plausible to combine the arguments made by these thinkers in regard to the social organization of power in the modern world as a major theoretical underpinning of this study. Briefly put, Mitchell (1990) puts forward the idea that the binary opposition between the state and society is a new technique of securing power in modern times. It is through the imagined existence of an inner social realm, which is argued to have been formed without, and thereafter remained outside, the influence of the relations of power that this dichotomy is constructed. There exists the dichotomy of an inner realm of purity; that of the society and the outside world shaped by the power relations; the realm of the state.

Sarah Ahmed (2004), on the other hand, pointed out in her analysis of the multi-cultural discourse that it is through the emotions that the very effect of boundaries is created to distinguish an inside and outside to national space (p. 10). Thus, national space in this new

discourse is maintained through resorting primarily to emotions and especially to love that national subjects have for each other and for their countries.

Slavoj Zizek (1989) argues that through the ideological fantasy that people are subjugated to their very conditions of oppression. He points out that ideology in this sense obscures the real kernel of society and puts in its place a fantasy that structures its own reality built upon the erasure of the real kernel; that of class antagonisms, inequalities and injustices.

I will argue, following Mitchell, that the discourse of the series provides a binary as the realm of the deep state in opposition to the realm of a united family where peace and serenity reigns which represents an a-historical, multi-cultural and united nation. This family is represented to be formed and remained outside the interference of power relations and that its unity is based not on ethnicity, culture or race but on the emotions, specifically on love, as Ahmed points out. Following Zizek, I will claim that this depiction of family, or nation-family as I will name it, is an ideological fantasy that serves to the purpose of obscuring the real kernel of the society; that there exist antagonisms, inequalities and imbalances of power in the very constitution and maintenance of the society.

Combination of these theoretical propositions in the analysis of the TV serial *Hatırla Sevgili*, I believe, shed light into a prevalent multi-cultural discourse about the national polity in Turkey that has developed in the 2000's.

IV. Research Methodology

In the field of communication studies there are three essential ways to analyze a written or an audiovisual work. The discursive studies can be classified according to which of these three ways of analysis that they focus on: the producers and the production process of the text, the discursive content of the texts themselves and the reception of the text, the

particular ways in which the text is read by the audience (Tanrıöver, p. 11). For the first part of the study I focus merely on the discursive content of analyzed works. When I conduct the analysis of the TV series *Hatırla Sevgili* in the second part, I focus on the last two layers as I analyze both the content of the work and its reception.

There are studies on TV series where the researcher examines audience reception by conducting an ethnographic fieldwork as a participant observer, including the studies by Purnima Mankekar (1999) and Zeynep Güzel (2008). However, as the series *Hatırla Sevgili* has ended about one year before I started working on it, I use the viewers' comments on internet forums dedicated to it. My analysis is based upon the comments made by viewers in two selected mainstream internet sites. One of them is <http://www.eksisozluk.com> with around 32.4000 registered users and the other one is <http://www.dizifilm.com/forum/>, an internet forum dedicated to discuss the TV serials with 275,564 registered members at the time this study is being prepared. These internet sites present an opportunity that I could not have found if I were to conduct interviews after the end of the series; that of acquiring immediate viewer thoughts as high majority of the comments date back to the times when the series was being aired.

I also use numerous interviews published in daily news papers or magazines with the producers, scenarists, actors and actresses who had individually taken part in the production of the series. Data collection in this study is based on the tradition of Grounded Theory where data collecting is not a phase that must be finished before analysis starts but an ongoing procedure which continues throughout the study (Wodak and Chilton, 2005, p. 18).

Sarah Goldman, et al. (2011) argued that the discourse analysis “is a method for describing the ideas and the relations among the ideas that are present in a text” (p. 106). Hence, I try to lay bare the ideas embedded in each analyzed work as the relations among

them is constitutive of the discursive coherence of the work and “make it more than the sum of its parts” (Goldman and Wiley, 2011, p. 107). This point will especially be important in the analysis of *Hatırla Sevgili*, as my examination of it is based upon exploring the interconnectedness of the several discourse segments such as the concepts of family, nation and the state. As it is argued “meaning of two or more discourse segments... cannot be described... in isolation... because of this coherence relation that the meaning of two discourse segments is more than the sum of its parts” (Sanders et al., p. 2). In the same vein, I will consider the series as including discourse segments which together produce a discursive structure.

I largely follow Critical Discourse Analysis as an approach to discourse analysis studies. A primary assumption of it is that all discourses are historical and can therefore only be understood with reference to their context (Wodak and Chilton, p. 15). Thus, it does not limit its analysis to specific structures of a text or talk, but systematically relates these to structures of the sociopolitical context (Wodak & Meyer 2001). The primary objective of critical discourse analysis “is to uncover the ideological assumptions that are hidden” in written or in visual texts (Fairclough, 1989). Exploring the relationships between discursive practices, texts, and events and wider social and cultural structures, critical discourse analysis “strives to explore how these... relationships are a factor in securing power and hegemony” (Fairclough, 1993), which is an essential aim of this study. A related important aspect of the Critical Discourse Analysis, which will be especially useful in the analysis of the *Hatırla Sevgili*, is that it aims at exposing the unequally distributed power and power relations in a society which are masked by a claim to societal reconciliation (Wodak, 2002, p. 12).

A. The choice of work and medium

Critical discourse analysis studies mostly deal with only small corpora which are usually regarded as being typical of certain discourses (Wodak, 2005, p. 25). In a similar vein, I will use the selected works of analysis as typical examples of prevalent discourses in their times of production. Thus, my criterion of selection of each specific work that I analyze is that it demonstrates and is an example of the emergence of a new contemporaneous discourse in the narration of the social movements of the 1968 era in Turkey.

Besides the works that I analyze with ten years of time intervals, I also have decided to include Harun Karadeniz's book titled *Eventful Years and the Youth* published in 1975 as an additional work to this study. Karadeniz had been an active figure in the youth movements from the early 1960's to late 1960's and later because of his political choices and health problems had not taken an active place in the youth movements. He provides the reader with a chronology of the youth movements that he had been part of starting from the early 1960's to 1970's. He demonstrates the notable transformations that have occurred in the objectives of the youth movements over that decade arguing that youth movements attained distinct features in the late 1960's which separated them from earlier social movements. In this respect, I believe, Karadeniz's book is an important groundwork to reflect upon the later emerging discourses about the 1968 era.

In my analysis, I use three different mediums; first books prepared by individual authors narrating their memoirs of the period, then books based on interviews where there is multitude of voices edited by the compiler. Lastly, I analyze the TV serial *Hatırla Sevgili* which addresses a significantly larger population than previous works. I decided to work on these three different mediums because I believe the change in the medium from 1978 to 2008 signify and testify to a change of perspective in the narratives of the 1968 era. I believe

change in the medium itself over time points to a change of perspective in the way that era has come to be perceived and narrated. Invoking the famous proposition of Marshall McLuhan (1964); “medium is the message” itself. In this respect, the emergence of new mediums that are used in the representation of the 1968 era reflects the change of perspective in regard to this period and simultaneously the introduction of new mediums like popular TV series considerably affect the remembrance itself.

In memoirs a single author presents his or her arguments about that era, narrating her or his individual experiences. In the works based on interviews with ex-activists, several people could voice their own personal experiences of the period. In this second type, one can seemingly bear witness to multiple stories and the viewpoints. Hence, instead of the opinions of a single writer, at least seemingly, such books contain the voice of multiple individuals. Lastly, the 68 era is narrated through TV serials, which explicitly try to narrate this period from a claimed position of neutrality with an aim to reach the largest possible audience, right wing as well as left wing persons. With this aim in mind, not just the experiences of left-wing activists but the stories of right-wings too were included in the narration. Thus, the events of the 68 years have in time started to be narrated through mediums with potentially open to a larger audience. Therefore, it might be plausible to suggest that we are being witness to “popularization” of narration of the 68 era, in the sense the TV serials both tell the story of, and address a larger part of the Turkish society.

It can be argued that individual and possibly distinct experiences of multitude of ex-activists became a greater subject of interest with the passage of time. In this respect, I find books based on interviews to be particularly interesting as sites of interaction, where the different point of views and narratives about the same historical period come together. Yet, one principal aspect of such books is that they often start with what can be termed as the

meta-narrative presented by the author of the interviews. With this part, the author call the readers to approach the interviews through this particular perspective. Thus, on the one hand interview books can be claimed to be reflections of individual and subjective experiences. On the other hand, presentation of these experiences is also shaped by the discursive framework presented by the author. The introduction does not encapsulate what the interviewees say, but it serves as a point of reference and provides, if not a totalistic, a general scheme of meaning to the readers to make sense of the interviews.

Furthermore, authors of these books direct their interviewees by the questions that they ask. In different works prepared with large time intervals, as is the case in the two works that I examine here, one can encounter completely different questions which are in close relation with the prevalent discourses of their time. The frequently repeated questions then embody and illustrate the particular discourses that the author puts forward as the legitimate ground to theorize what happened in the 1968 era. The introductory note and the insistently asked questions, I believe, constitute the “preferred readings” of the events and that “they structure possible telling and impose interpretation, producing the object of which they speak; thus linking discourse ... with ideology” (Eyerman, 2004, p.162). Hence, in the analysis of such works, I focus on these important introductory parts and the writer’s questions rather than the answers of the interviewees.

CHAPTER II: DISCURSIVE TRANSFORMATIONS IN REMEMBERING THE 1968 ERA, FROM 1978 TO 1998

I. “Eventful Years and the Youth”

Harun Karadeniz’s work titled “Eventful Years and the Youth” (Olaylı Yıllar ve Gençlik) which was first published in the year 1975 shortly before Karadeniz passed away in the same year at the age of 33 due to an illness he got when he was in prison. Harun Karadeniz had been a well-known youth leader beginning from the early 1960’s onwards. Born in the year 1942, he was older than most of the leading youth activists in the 1968-71 era and was a witness to and active instigator of the youth movements of the early and late 1960’s. In the book, thus, he brings together his individual experiences and points of view about the nature of youth movements starting from the early 1960’s to the early 1970’s. In fact, his emphasis is on the transformation of the youth movements in Turkey over that decade. He mainly argues that the youth movements started to acquire distinct features in the 1965-1969 period, which were clouded by the subsequent developments, especially by the rise of armed conflict. Instead of a portrayal of a unitary youth movement which we have come across in much of later written narratives, he presents disputes between activists and the transformations that had occurred in the nature of youth movements from the early 60’s to early 70’s from an insider’s perspective.

According to Karadeniz youth movements of the era aimed to bring an end to the deep rooted injustices and exploitation in the country. Exploitation of the people by the usurpers who possess the means of violence is central to his narrative and we see that this issue of injustice and exploitation is directly linked to the American imperialism. According to

Karadeniz, the real cause of the exploitation was economically related, and the chief concern of the activists was its elimination.

He starts his history of youth movements and the transformations of them from the May 27th 1960 military coup. He argues that youth movements of the early 60's had been dominated by the support given to the military coup of May 27 1960 (Karadeniz, p. 104). By removing the right wing Democrat Party from power, which had been increasingly taking oppressive measures against oppositional politics, it was believed that the military coup had paved the way for freedom. He writes that: "We, the young people of the 1960's, were rightists by mindset in the beginning. We were interested in the problems of the country alone. Yet, these problems made us socialists in time"⁴ (Karadeniz, p.7). He argues that only after the year of 65 that the youth movements had started to put some distance between themselves and the military coup, and in this era that they started to divert their attention from the often used "terminologies that are not really loaded in content like 27 May and freedom"⁵ (p. 137) and they had started to come up with "more concretized aspirations"⁶ (p. 145).

What Karadeniz means by concretization is that youth movements, while distancing themselves to a degree from the 27 May military coup, discovering economic issues as the chief causes of exploitation and injustices, and that they notice the crucial importance of economic development to ease poverty in the country. As such, he argues that developmentalism (kalkınmacılık) had been the most discussed issue in the youth circles and that the socialist models of developmentalist politics had often been praised as the ideal ones. Arguably, socialist world view had spread among youth circles, before than any other reason, as it purportedly offered more effective developmentalist projects than the existing ones in the capitalist system. As such, youth movements went beyond what is offered to them by the

⁴ "Biz, 1960 sonrası gençleri başlangıçta kafa yapısı olarak sağcıydık. Yurt sorunlarıyla ilgilendik sadece. Fakat o sorunlar bizi aldı ve yoğura yoğura sosyalist yaptı."

⁵ "...içi pek dolu olmayan 27 Mayıs, Hürriyet terimlerinden"

⁶ "daha fazla somutlaşan istekler".

existing political structure (p. 123) and tried to eradicate the injustices, poverty and exploitation along with the causes of them.

Certain essential characteristics of the youth movements of the era, according to Karadeniz, were: they first of all started to pursue more concretized ends like the economic development of the country and aimed to eliminate the sources of exploitation. The main concern of the activists had been to pursue class based politics in order to eliminate economic exploitation and to struggle against the American imperialism which by then had been seen as one of the primary reasons for the country's under-development.

Karadeniz also claims that socialist views had spread among university students to an unprecedented scale towards the year 1968. He writes that in the year 1966 they were afraid to tell that they were socialists. But in the year 1968 nobody in the Istanbul Technical University could easily claim that they were rightists, as by then it is considered to be a shameful act. (p. 246)

Karadeniz's description of the evolution of the youth movements of that era can be counter-posed against the writings which present the category of youth activism as if it does never change and as it is homogenous in time and space. It also provides us a different view about the nature of the youth politics of that period. As opposed to the later developed literature which argues that the 68 movement was in essence trying to achieve several and often blurry, abstract causes, he claims that the aims and motives of the youth activists, growingly through the 60's, had become more focused, single-minded and concrete in their content. In opposition to the literature developed especially during the 1990's which has totally encapsulated the social movements of the era in a Kemalist pro-army stance, he claimed that by the latter part of the 1960's they started to put a distance between the army and themselves and numerous activists have by then relentlessly countered ideas in favor of cooperation with the army. And he also delineates the youth movements of that era as

constituting both continuity and simultaneously a break with the previous social movements in Turkey's history; thus having its specific dispositions and objectives.

II. 1978, “They Did Not Die For Nothing”

Orhan İyiler's⁷ book “They Did Not Die for Nothing” (Öldükleriyle Kalmadılar) first published in the year 1978.⁸ In this book, author narrates the events that had taken place in the aftermath of the death of Sinan Cemgil, one of the leading youth activists of the time, in the nearby village of the mountain where he was killed during an exchange of fire with the military. Sinan Cemgil became the de-facto leader of the militant organization called THKO (Turkey People's Army of Salvation)⁹ following the capture of three of its leading activists Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnan and Yusuf Aslan. The author, as a close family friend, accompanied Cemgil's father and mother on their visit to the village to take care of Sinan Cemgil's funeral.

The latter part of the 1970's were the years in which inter-communal conflict between the right and left wing groups had accelerated. It is estimated that the armed conflicts between 1970-1980 had caused the deaths of more than five thousand people. More than 15,000 people had been wounded as a result of the conflicts in the 1975-1980 period. (Günay-Erkol, p. 47) Erik Jan-Zürcher (2004) claims that until the year 1977, 230 people died because of social conflict related reasons. In the year 1979 this amounted to as many as 1,500 persons (p. 276).

⁷ Born in the year 1935, Orhan İyiler had been a member of the Turkey Workers' Party in the 1970's. He wrote several books beside *Öldükleriyle Kalmadılar*, including *Generaller Kışında Yaşam Kaynakçaları* (1989), *Birgün Bile Yaşamak* (1992), *Yeni Dünya Gerçeği* (1996) *Devrimci Ado'nun Ölümsüzler Katında Yargılanması* (1998), *Sana 21. Yüzyıl Raporumu Sunuyorum* (2005), *Generallerin Zabıt Varakaları* (2008) and *Aklın Lirizmi* (2011). İyiler also authored several theatrical plays.

⁸ Orhan İyiler (1991) *Öldükleriyle Kalmadılar*, Karınca Yayınevi. The copy that I study on is produced in the year 1991 as the fourth edition with an additional introductory text written by İyiler himself.

⁹ Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu

İyiler's book, published in 1978, thus is produced in this atmosphere of the intensifying armed conflict and carries the traces of an ongoing struggle.

I think that as there was an actual struggle going on between right wing and left wing groups and also against the governmental forces; the language of an acute, continuing struggle was the dominant theme in the book. And as it is often the case, the language of a conflict, when invoked by somebody who feels belonging to a side in it, reflects the clear-cut opposition of the conflicting parties. In that sense, it depicts a black and white picture in which we can clearly see and separate the benevolent and malevolent sides in the story that is being told. For instance, İyiler writes that: "Just like in any other place in the whole country, honorable and dishonorable people were separated as if with a knife. The dishonorable people had in possession of every means that can frighten a person"¹⁰. (p. 139) Speaking of the terrible atrocities committed against those who are honorable, he says that people who were responsible for that were: "those who only think of themselves".¹¹ These lines are clearly illustrative of a narrative that carries the traces of an ongoing struggle, as I claimed before. This is the struggle between honorable and dishonorable people before anything else according to the author.

As the title suggests, the main emphasis throughout the book relies on the point that those who died in the struggle would be remembered by their acts. Even though they have been killed and were unsuccessful in achieving their objectives, their acts would serve as keystones in the continuing struggle and possibly would pave the way of success for their followers. This theme remains essentially the same, both in the original writing that the author produced and the following additional introductory passages that are later added to this original text. This testifies to the point that I have made before, once emerged certain

¹⁰ "Ülkemizin her yerinde olduğu gibi namuslular ve namussuzlar bir bıçak gibi ikiye bölünmüştü. Namussuzların elinde insanın gözünü yıldırayabilecek her şey vardı..."

¹¹ "Salt kendilerini düşünenler."

narrative types can continue to have explanatory power over time and can still be evoked with little or no modification.

İyiler writes that the deeds of the activists have not only been remembered by the coming generations, but they have been and would be a source of inspiration for the fight against the oppressors. He writes that: “Those who seemingly obtained the victory in 1971 have also prepared the inevitable conditions of their future defeat”¹² (p. 14). Then he continues: “Whom they killed, in a surprising way, make the society earn experiences in the struggle and help people find effective ways to continuously fight against the slavery”¹³ (p. 15).

In this narration people who are presented to be at the opposite sides of the conflict are depicted to have inherently opposing personal characteristics, which is also claimed to be the reason why there is a conflict in the first place. We can read the descriptions of the personalities in the book in parallel, juxtaposed to each other. In fact, the character analyses of the author rely on the juxtapositions of the characters that he met throughout his journey in the village. On the one hand, there are those dishonorable and self-interested people; on the other hand we see the depictions of honorable ones. There are people in the village who “clearly stumble in cowardice and unreliability”¹⁴ (p. 140), “but there were also courageous people and would always be”¹⁵ (p. 140). The village that he visits then ends up being a microcosm to evaluate the situation of Turkey in the sense that we can see there the opposing sides of the conflicts which sweep across the entire country.

In the early parts of the book İyiler mentions about the discontent that has grown against the activists among the populace, especially as the media has viciously propagated

¹² “...1971’in görünürde yengisini elde etmiş olanlar, hemen ardından başlayan gelecekteki yenilgilerinin kaçınılmaz koşullarını da hazırlamış demektirler.”

¹³ “Öldürdükleri insanlar şaşılacak bir biçimde topluma yenilgileriyle, ölümleriyle edimlerini kazandırmakta, köleliğe karşı direnişin geçerli yöntemlerini bulmalarına sürekli yardımcı olmaktadır.”

¹⁴ “...titrekliğin, kaypaklığın içinde bocalayıp durduğu besbelli”

¹⁵ “...ama yiğit kişiler de vardı, olacaktı da her zaman.”

against them. He fears that there might be reactions and even violence against them in the village as they would go there to take care of Sinan Cemgil's funeral. Yet, in the village he faces a completely different picture; most of the villagers in fact sympathized with Sinan and his friends and wholeheartedly felt sorry for their death. Furthermore, he come across people who themselves were actively struggling against the ruling Justice Party, thus in the author's perspective embodying the benevolent side in the conflict. He writes that: "Most of the villagers were at their side..., together they were preventing the actualization of the schemes that the human conscience can not accept"¹⁶ (p. 140). Yet, they are faced with the governing Justice Party's and its local governors' plots that he claims to be aimed: "to prevent spreading of the ideas in favor of people, which develops along with people"¹⁷ (p. 140).

At times his portrayal of the people he came across in the village becomes ambivalent in nature. He says that he used to distrust peasants, mainly because of a supposed remark made by Lenin: "When we were fighting in the village, much of the villagers were praying in the church for the salvation of their masters"¹⁸ (p.136). Yet, through his actual contacts, he started to have a more accurate image of the peasantry, he says. Speaking of a personage that he encounters, he says that: "he was very reassuring with his bare, simple peasantry like the soil."¹⁹ (p. 185) At other parts of the book, we can come across the affective usage of language when speaking about the villagers; identifying himself with them and referring to them as our people: "Our people..., when scrolled down to the deep darkness of pain...look to the soil continuously"²⁰ (p. 137).

I think it is possible to sort out certain general characteristics of this categorization, which at times differently termed as "the people", "our people" or "the Turkish people". In

¹⁶ "Köylülerden büyük bir bölüm onlardan yanaydı..., insan vicdanın kabul edemeyeceği tertipleri etkili olmaktan çıkarıyorlardı."

¹⁷ "halktan yana halkla gelişen düşüncenin önünü alabilmek".

¹⁸ "Biz köyde savaşırken köylülerin çoğu efendilerinin kurtulması için kilisede dua ediyordu."

¹⁹ "Toprak gibi yalın köylülüğü ile çok güven vericiydi."

²⁰ "Bizim insanımız... acının derin karanlığına vucarlandımı...sürekli toprağa bakar."

this remote town, relatively away from the machineries of governmental propaganda, they are truthful, decent, in essence honorable people so long they remain not fooled by the tools of governmental propaganda. Yet, these are not the only characteristics that are attributed in homogenized manner to the people of the village. He writes that: “Everybody in the town went mad out of fear. Even at the darkest corner of the street, they disappear away in hiding after an exchange of a couple of words”.²¹ (p. 188) They are decent and benevolent but they lack one essential quality of the activists that sharply separates them from the latter group; as idealists, activists can risk their lives for their country and their people. This is what differentiates and puts Sinan and his friends into a higher position from the Turkish people who are claimed to be benevolent in essence.

He further adds that: “When humans get so subdued, tyranny of the crude and unjust extends further”²² (p. 188). This is why I presume Sinan and his friends and their struggle have had tremendous importance on that day and have remained so according to the author; they were needed because they were the only persons who have the courage to openly fight against the sources of injustices and the tyrants. They have been important and would long be remembered because they had done what the majority of people could not in their terribly subdued conditions, as to end the rule of dishonorable, self-interested people who are in minority, but who possess the means of exercising violence against their opponents. Therefore, heroism, bravery and idealism, in order to achieve objectives that are not motivated by individual benefits, emerge as the chief characteristics of the activists which differentiate them from the rest of the country. Activists are then praised for their distinct characteristics which separate them from the masses of people. As the author contends: “They were reacting everything in a straightforward manner...But to show up with a collectivist

²¹ “Herkes korkudan çıldırmış bu kasabada. Karanlığın göz görmeyen köşe bucağında iki laflayıp hemen siperliye siperliye savuşuyorlar.”

²² “İnsanlar böylesine yıldınlştırıldı mı kaba ve haksızın zorbalığı gittikçe artar.”

point of view against the armed usurpers of the regime of exploitation...that would indeed require bravery, to really risk death”²³ (p. 144).

İyiler stresses the invincibility of the young activists even when they are dead. For instance, he narrates the scene in which he comes face to face with Sinan’s recently murdered body in his funeral: “He smelled nice and clean. Death could not have defeated his vigorous youthfulness, fearful of doing anything else just departed away. His smile was more identifiable as if fixed towards a great hope. His grave clothes were put on his smiling face.”²⁴ (p. 204-205). Even death was helpless in the face of vigorous determinism of the activists personified in the dead body of Sinan Cemgil. And even death can not really stop them from striving to realize their hopes as Cemgil is presented to be looking forward to future victory with a smiling face.

Last passage of the book is more than ever indicative of the fact that the book was written and published in the atmosphere of a continuing struggle. The essential points of the book is summarized and illustrated in a single sentence at the end of the book; İyiler writes that:

12 May 1972 –A young railroad worker, as he puts flowers to the graves of Yusuf Aslan, Deniz Gezmiş and Hüseyin İnan²⁵ laying side by side, is caught by the military polices who are in duty of checking the graveyard and was sent to the tribunal of martial law with the documents... -the End-²⁶ (p. 248).

²³ “...her şeye doğrudan doğruya karşı çıktılar... Ama sömürü düzeninin silahlı gaspçılara karşı toplumcu bir görüşle ortaya çıkmak... işte bu gerçekten yiğitlik, gerçekten ölümü göz alabilmeyi gerektiriyor.”

²⁴ “Mis gibi kokuyordu. Dipdiri gençliğini yenememişti ölüm, daha başka bir şey yapmaktan ürkmüş çekip gitmişti. Gülümseyişi bir büyük umuda yönelmiş gibi daha da belirlenmişti. Kefenini gülümseyen yüzüne çektiler.”

²⁵ Yusuf Aslan, Deniz Gezmiş and Hüseyin İnan had been three leading activists of the militant organization THKO (Turkish People’s Army of Salvation) of which Sinan Cemgil was de-facto leading after their capture. They were hanged at 6 May 1972.

²⁶ “12 Mayıs 1972 – Genç bir demiryolu işçisi yan yana yatan Yusuf Aslan, Deniz Gezmiş ve Hüseyin İnan’ın mezarlarına çiçekler koyarken mezarlıkta nöbet tutan ilgili inzibatlar tarafından yakalanıp Sıkıyönetim mahkemesine evraklarıyla birlikte...-Son-”

In this sole sentence, we can see the all participants of the conflict being fitted in a single picture; those leading youthful idealists who died but who would be remembered, one worker, somebody from the category of “our people”, who remember them possibly to follow their pathway, and the machineries of oppression and violence, namely police forces and the tribunals, that have been used by the ruling party and those dishonorable people against honorable dead and living ones. Furthermore, the text ends with the three dots as to signify that this story has not yet really ended, as the struggle is continuing inconclusively. The end is just an end for the story of the author’s experiences after Sinan Cemgil’s death and during his visit to the village to take care of his funeral, but this is not an end to the larger still continuing conflict between the oppressors and the oppressed, of which Sinan Cemgil and the author himself are only a part.

Hence, I think it can be argued that, rather than being a struggle among people with differential political aspirations and objectives, this is a moral struggle of the good against the evil, honorable against the dishonorable, selfless against the self-interested. This might seem to us as reminiscent of simplistic narrative that we can come across in varieties of circumstances in which there are seemingly unsolvable conflicts among different groups of people. This is a narrative of a person who believes that the conflict can only be ended by the ultimate defeat of the opposite side. The general narrative of the book, as I previously claimed it to be, is based upon the ongoing fight between the two groups of people who are, according to the author, sharply separated by each other “as if by a knife”.

We do have an axis of evil that is linked to each other by a chain of hierarchical order: There is American imperialism at the highest order of rank linked with its internal cooperators, namely the existing government Justice Party and their local party governors, along with those “self-interested, dishonorable” local agents “who care about money the

most”²⁷ (p. 180). These different orders of the same chain of evil together constitute, for the author, the group of people against whom the youthful idealists, who only think of people’s benefits, waged a war. This former group has immense power and abuses it to its limits and commits several violent deeds against the latter group.

III. 1988, “68 Was A Long March”

In this part I will study the book titled as *68 Was A Long March* (Bir Uzun Yürüyüşü 68) written by Alev Er.²⁸ Er’s book is published with an aim to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the events of 1968. The book is compiled of a number of interviews alongside an introductory and an end note. What differentiates Alev Er’s book primarily from the previous writings is that it is written in a historical context in which the ongoing struggle had very much lost its heat by this date. Following the brutal crash of the left-wing social movements by the 1980 military coup and with the rise of neo-liberal policies in the 1980’s revolutionary hopes of the left wing activists had vastly diminished (Güzel, p. 17). Dreams of seizing the state power by the left wing social movements have come to an end with the military coup (Güzel, p. 30). Besides that, even developing opposition to mainstream neo-liberal policies became difficult (Güzel, p. 30). Er’s book then is written at a time when future-oriented revolutionary political utopias largely lost their appeal (Göle, 1994). Thus, the events of the 68 period were re-evaluated in the light of the abrupt changes that the society is going through.

²⁷ “işbirlikçi, namussuz, en çok paraya değer veren”

²⁸ Alev Er has been a journalist and a reporter. He also worked as the executive editor of the Journal Aktüel, the newspaper Star and has been the executive director of the newspaper Taraf alongside Ahmet Altan. Aside from his book on the 1968 era, *68 Was A Long March*, Er also translated several books to the Turkish language.

As I claimed before, any narrative about the 68 years includes in it remembered and forgotten elements selected from a large pool of events which might enable for another person to craft another narrative about this period. The main tenet of his arguments is that activists were rebellious and were fighting against the established authority. What characterizes the activists of the era is that they were trying to change the society in which they were living in. The defining mark of the period was that burning desire to change the society; yet to what end and why the activists were trying to do so seems to be negligible for this narrative.

He uses several metaphors as to describe the undertakings of the youth activists of the day, for instance describing it as: “conquest of the sky”²⁹ (p. 8). He writes that there were sparkles at every level of the society and “...a generation who was born in the 47’s were compiling a fire out of these sparkles to put them to the sky as to make it even brighter. That was the 68 rebellion.”³⁰ (p. 7) What I principally notice in this narrative about the 68 era is that, firstly, Er describes it as a struggle between those who dream of a better world, however it might be defined, and the existing established order in the country.

The binary picture of struggle, as it is presented by İyiler, was a conflict in which the opposing parties were defined as those who are honorable and who are not. However, in Er’s narrative it is replaced by another binary, definitive equation; that was a struggle between who are rebellious, idealists who want to drastically change everything around them for better and those who are defender of status quo, guardians of the established order. Hence, the emphasis is given to the act of being a pioneer of change for better and the desire to achieve it, instead of any specific goals that are pursued by the activists of the era.

Therefore, we are also presented a different picturing of events in this narrative if we are to compare it with that of Harun Karadeniz’s. Karadeniz argued before that youth

²⁹ “gökyüzünü fethetmek”

³⁰ “...1947’lerde doğan bir kuşak bu kıvılcımlardan bir ateş derleyip gökyüzüne tutuyordu daha bir aydınlansın diye. Bu, 68 başkaldırısıydı.”

movements of the early 60's had been dwelling on abstract issues that are mainly focused on the 27 May 1960 military coup. Freedom was the most frequently used terminology of the day, yet it was rather a shallow term according to him which has never been loaded with concrete desires and aims. However, increasingly in the second part of the 1960's those abstract terminologies had started to be replaced by more realistic and concrete aims. Injustices and exploitation then had been identified as the chief causes of revolt and those who were identified as exploiters were the ones against whom the struggle was waged. Thus, instead of dwelling on abstract terminologies, the 68 years was aiming to solve concrete issues. Indeed, the often revoked terminology of the day was "concrete analysis of concrete situations"³¹ (Karadeniz, 1975).

Yet, in Er's narrative about this era, the attempt of achieving the impossible is praised, as it is illustrated by his metaphorical descriptions. There are no clear aims in Er's narrative, as the author gives emphasis to the point that 68 activists had tried to transform what is there, the content of which matters less, to something new, the content of which is negligible.

Besides his introductory note, his questions to the informants are also revealing. His questions are changing from one interviewed person to the other, yet some questions are repeatedly asked to several informants. For instance, in one of his interviews Er asserts that: "Some social scientists claim that the 68 generation had given to the Turkish people a spirit of adventurism which they have never possessed before and perhaps today's young businessmen can be seen as testimonies to the point that this insemination of adventurism has taken root"³² (p. 59-60). At another interview he asks: "what is the role the 68 spirit which aim the conquest of the sky in the creation of Turkish "yuppies"?"³³ (p. 45) In another interview, in a similar vein, he noted that: "there are views which claim that a new type of entrepreneur has emerged

³¹ "somut durumların somut tahlili".

³² "Bazı sosyal bilimciler "68" kuşağı'nın Türk insanına o zamana kadar hiç sahip olmadığı maceralık ruhunu aşıladığına ve belki de bugünün... genç işadamlarına bakarak 68 maceracılık aşısının tuttuğunun söylenebileceğini ileri sürüyor."

³³ "Türk Yuppie'lerinin oluşmasında 68'in enginleri fethetme ruhunun ne kadar dahli vardır?"

in the 80's, businessmen who, eliminating the imagery of moderate Turks satisfied with what they have, opened up to the wide seas with their briefcases in hand and that the spirit of 68 had a tremendous role in achieving this.”³⁴ (p. 145)

This insistence on presenting the activists primarily as adventurous people and thus providing a linkage between the new age entrepreneurs of the 1980's can partly be seen as a result of de-politicizing environment of the post-coup Turkey. Ayşegül Devecioğlu argued that military coup has led to the emergence of an era of de-politicization in which dissidents of the political system were marginalized (Güzel, 2008). According to Devecioğlu, even literature and art are deemed to be valuable if cleared of its political content (Güzel, 2008). Therefore, in this new era, instead of their specific political projects activists are praised for their adventurism and their embrace of novelty as opposed to status-quo, just like the entrepreneurs can be praised as adventurers who are not content with what they have.

I think it is also important to take note of the similarity of the words that are used in describing the acts of both of these groups; the youth activists of the 1968 were trying to achieve the “conquest of sky” whereas the young entrepreneurs were opening to the “wide seas”, thus both are presented to be acting in an adventurous spirit. One obviously can not conquer the sky but one can actually open to the wide seas, thus it can perhaps be claimed that though united in their quest for adventurism, the latter group is presented to be following more rationalized aims than their predecessors who nonetheless inspired them in the first place.

Er also repeatedly asks to his informants that: “What did 68 add one by one, that is to say, what did it bring to people in terms of their personal characteristics one by one?”³⁵ (p. 145) I believe, this is both related with other questions and shorthand explains the general

³⁴ “80’li yıllarda yeni bir müteşebbis tipi doğduğu, bazı işadamlarının ‘mutedil, olanla yetinmeyi düstur edinen Türk’ imajını yıkarak, elde çanta, engin denizlere açıldıkları ve bunda 68 ruhunun büyük payı olduğunu ileri süren görüşler var...”

³⁵ “68, tek tek insanlara neler kattı, yani kişisel özellik olarak neler getirdi tek tek insanlara?”

narrative of the book. In this narrative, 68 is perceived as a driving force of personal change and praised for its power to bring forth personal development especially in terms of personal adventurism. In this respect, the narrative of the book is in line with the social-political atmosphere of the 1980's in which cultural climate was increasingly promoting individualism especially through the rise of new trends of self-expression driven by the mass media (Güzel, 2008, p. 106; Gürbilek, 1992). So it comes as no surprise that the author presents the supposed links between the new class of entrepreneurs of the neo-liberal era and the 68 generation as their predecessors with their adventurous spirit.

It can be argued that instead of the failed objectives, the author thus gives the emphasis to the idealism of the activists and their desires to change the society. Since the revolutionary aims of the activists had not been fulfilled, and seemed not going to be fulfilled in any short while, the particular aims of the activists mattered less. Instead of activists' particular projects, the act of being an activists and the act of trying to change the society mattered the most in this narrative.

In this respect, it can also be claimed that the activists were depicted as the people who wished to achieve the impossible from the start. Activists have not pursued any solid path; instead, they were willingly trying to pursue unrealizable objectives, they were trying to achieve the "conquest of the sky". Thus, it is only natural that they have not achieved the expected consequences. Yet, by setting an example of adventurism they paved the way for the emergence of new generations who do not follow their political projects but their quest for exploration. Thus, the idealism is at the center of the narrative, while specific targets of the activists are discarded.

Previous narratives about the 68 period told us that the solid reasons or solid injustices have been motivating the student activists to pour into the streets and later to have armed clashes against the right wing groups and the government forces. As Karadeniz tells,

everywhere they turn their gaze upon as students they come to see another form of injustices and exploitations (Karadeniz, p. 75). Activists were rebelling mainly because they found the existing situation in the country unbearable and full of injustices that they felt themselves obliged to fight against them. The outward reasons and the newly developed ability of the activists to grasp them and to understand their causes push the activists into the field of struggle. These were the chief causes of the revolt, taking precedence over any innate quality that one can attribute to the activists. Rather than their idealism it was the callousness of the exploitation in the country that pushed them to be activists. Yet, in this new narrative issues like injustices and exploitation were largely left aside. Instead the author focuses on the idealism of activists who were trying to make things better. Therefore, this is an individual centered narrative in which the causes of the revolt are first and foremost related with the individual dreams of the activists. It is chiefly related with their individual characteristics rather than the communal reasons like country wide exploitations. The author praises that desire to change the society, at what direction is unspecified; in fact pursuing unspecified or even unrealizable aims is elevated as testimonies to their adventurous idealism.

Er's narrative is fairly similar to a discourse that has developed especially in Western Europe in representing the 1968 era and is clearly informed by it. In this discourse which has been widely endorsed especially from the 1980's onwards in the Western world, neo-liberal capitalist society is often argued to be representing not the failure of the May movement's aspirations but "the accomplishment of its deepest desires" (Ross, p. 6-7). According to that view, the 1968 era is marked principally by "transformation of consciousness" which entails the revolt of the young people against structural rigidities of the society (Ross, p. 6-7). This has led to the recasting of political aspirations as an ethical transformation, as a "spiritual transformation" that the activists were undergoing (Ross, p. 12).

Er similarly represented the 1968 era in Turkey as the age when there occurred groundbreaking change of consciousness; when adventurous young people challenged the existing rigid social system and in doing that set an example for future entrepreneurs. He thus emphasized the personal transformation that the 1968 era has brought about first to the activists then to their followers. Therefore, in both these cases, the 1968 era has come to be represented, under the auspices of a new global order, as a predecessor or an inspiration to the contemporaneous wave of social and political transformations.

Even when there is no direct link established between the events of the 1968 era and the current political system, the activists in Turkey were often remembered as people who followed unrealizable objectives in the 1980's. For instance, Öner Yağcı (1989) presented such a picturing of the events of the 1968 era in his book titled as "*The River Flowing to the Sky*" (*Gökyüzüne Akan Irmak*), which was first published in the year 1989. He wrote that his book "narrates 12 March youth's passion to conquer the sky" (Yağcı, 1989).³⁶

Yağcı also draws a portrayal of the activist Sinan Cemgil in his work. Differing from Orhan İyiler's depiction, Cemgil is fittingly described in this book as an idealist person who seeks to achieve the impossible, again "to conquer" what is naturally outside direct human control. For instance, Yağcı wrote that: "Sinan looked up to the sky and to the snowy mountains astringently. He squeezed his fists. He said 'I'm coming to you, to conquer you'!"³⁷ (p. 196)

Hence, the deeds of the activists have been metaphorically presented in both of these works as an attempt to "conquer" or to take control of the nature, to take control of the skies or the highest tips of the mountains, which are not in any human's capability. In this respect, it can be claimed that the post-1980 period has significantly altered the remembering of the

³⁶ "...12 Mart gençliğinin gökyüzünü fethetme sevdasını anlatıyor."

³⁷ "Karlı dağlara ve gökyüzüne buruk buruk baktı Sinan. Sıktı yumruğunu. 'Size geliyorum.' dedi, 'sizi fethetmeye!'"

events in the 1968 era in Turkey. First the coup itself and then the rise of a new global order has arguably led to the representation of the activists as young people who were metaphorically described to be in war with the forces of nature, trying to overpower them. The failing of their objectives is thus only natural.

IV. 1998, “The Years of 68: Activists”

In this part, I will analyze the book titled as “The Years of 68: Activists” written by Bedri Baykam.³⁸ Baykam’s book consists of interviews with 18 people in total from the 68 generation and the book is first published in the year 1998 on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the 1968 events. The book consists of 620 pages, more than three times bigger than Alev Er’s work. Baykam writes that one of his interviews lasted for about six hours, and by the sheer size of the book it can be said that it was a daring work. There are six common interviewees in these two books, yet the questions that informants were asked abruptly changed in Baykam’s work as well as his introductory note which is meant to frame the events of 1968.

In order to better evaluate the context within which this work has come into emergence I am going to briefly mention about the political atmosphere of the 1990’s in Turkey. The period of the 1990’s was marked with the rise of Kurdish and Islamic identity politics (Yashin, 2002; Çınar 2001; Özyürek 2004). The islamic oriented Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) gradually augmented its power base through the 1990’s; it won 19.1 per cent of the votes in the municipal elections of 27 March 1994 (Zürcher, p. 295). Its vote has steadily increased, attaining 21.4 percent in the elections of 24 December 1995 and then

³⁸ Bedri Baykam is renowned painter and artist who opened 71 personal exhibitions. He has also published numerous books including “27 Mayıs İlk Aşkımızdı” (1994), “Mustafa Kemaller Görev Başına” (1994), “Ödünsüz Laik Türkiye” (1995), *Korku İmparatorluğuna Son* (2004) and *Sivil Diktaya Hayır* (2010).

further increased its strength by receiving more than 30 per cent of the votes in 1996 (Zürcher, p. 298-299). Kemalist secularist circles mobilized on the memory of Kemalist modernization project with an intention to defend it against the challenge of Islamic and Kurdish social movements (Özyürek, 2006, p. 181). On 28 February of 1997, the Turkish Army presented the cabinet of Welfare Party with a list of demands aiming at curbing the influence of Islamists inside the state apparatus, starting a process which has come to be known in Turkey as the “first postmodern coup”, which eventually caused the leader of Welfare Party, Necmettin Erbakan, to step down from the government (Zürcher, p. 300). The 1990’s was also the era in which the war between the Turkish Army and the PKK gained further impetus. Thus, Baykam’s work can be read by situating it in this historical context and as a work which speaks to the present socio-political conflict between Kemalists and the Islamic and Kurdish social movements.

Baykam emphasizes what he claims to be inherently and essentially the Kemalist character of the social movements of the era throughout the book. The questions that he asks direct his informants to speak on the issues related with Kemalism. In fact his choice of interviewees is clearly informed by this concern; those activists who do endorse a liberal critical stance in regard to the Kemalist ideology are not interviewed.³⁹

Baykam mainly claims that the 1968 era youth were following in the footsteps of those who founded the Turkish Republic. He wrote that: “Youth and army were side by side collaborating since the foundation of the Republic in 1923” (p. 14). As such, he places the youth movement of the 1968 era in Turkey in a line of continuum, extending back in time to the foundation of the Turkish Republic and reaching the contemporaneous epoch. Activists of the 68 period were, as he notes, “leftist youngsters who love their country and their flag” (p.

³⁹ Baykam also speaks in a negative tone for those ex-activists. For instance, he says that Cengiz Çandar, a country wide known journalist and ex-activist: “had the seeds of his present behavior in those days.” (“Cengiz Çandar’da o zamandan bugünkü görüntüsünün tohumları varmış yani”) (p. 62)

16). He establishes a unity of aim between the so-called guardians of the established order, namely military, and the youth of the 68 movement: “Army and youth: two old lovers of the 68” (p. 13).

Different political subjects who lived at a time period of about 100 years ended up being unified under certain chief characteristics that they all have come to share. In this way, the 1968 social movements also lose virtually all of their oppositional characteristics that have come to define them universally. On the contrary, the social movements of the era are considered to be on the same side with the established power holders of the time. As such, their distinct political and social aspirations are appropriated and channeled into the mainstream nationalist, Kemalist political discourses, and that their aims are presented as essentially in the same line with the foundational ideology of the Republic.

It has been argued that national histories have often been imagined to be consisting of “small pockets of highly eventful periods interspersed among long stretches of seemingly empty ones” (Olick, 2003, p. 315). These national histories also often have a “myth of origin” (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994, p. 58) or a “founding moment” which serves to mark the onset of the nation-state in a new beginning (Çınar, p. 368). As Alev Çınar argues, in Turkey the founding moment of 1923 is presented as the historical rupture which marked the beginning of the new nation-state (Alev Çınar, p. 368). In this vein, Baykam takes as this mythical point of origin the foundation of the Turkish Republic in the year 1923. He then connects in a line of continuity, what he considers to be, certain crucial episodes in the history of the nation. In this way, the 68 movement stops being a distinct period in the history of the country with its particularities, but ends up being an important part in that line of continuum that extends back in time and reaches to today.

Furthermore, Irwin-Zarecka claimed that the national history writings have the heroes, “who provide the essential exemplars of core moral beliefs” (p. 58). Baykam brings

together and stresses the interrelatedness of the early years of the Republic, 27 May military coup and 68 movement and present the political actors in each period as heroes who provide the core moral beliefs as national subjects. In each of these distinct periods, even though the actors and circumstances have changed at a great deal, aims of the subjects have remained essentially the same. Putting that period into a line of continuum neutralizes the event as it becomes in congruence with the mainstream political discourse in the country.

Baykam contends on the issue of why the Republican People's Party has lost its "natural communication with the youth" (p. 12), assuming that there has to be a natural connection between the "youth" of 68 and the Republican People's Party. It is, I think, plausible to argue that Baykam identifies the Republican People's Party, military and youth as the progressive agents of the Turkish society, and as such it is only natural that there has to be a close co-operation between them. That view, I think, clearly reflects the contemporary political positioning and also demonstrates the way Baykam assigns a historical depth to these contemporaneous political struggles.

According to Baykam, the military coup of 12 March symbolizes the break-up of a long tradition of collaboration between the army and the youth. He explains the reasons of this break-up in the following way:

The Army... of course can not ignore the fact that youth has involved itself in the acts of terror...As certain incidents ends with mortality, attention gets directed towards Turkey in the international arena. The military feels itself in a vulnerable position as trying to prevent the anarchy and to protect foreign diplomats and guests in the country...The rest is the 12 March "sledge hammer" operation...Hence, there enters coldness between the revolutionary youth and the army in this unlucky year of 1971 ⁴⁰ (p. 14).

⁴⁰ "Ordu... gençliğin doğrudan terör olaylarına karışmasını tabi ki görmezden gelemiyor... kimi olayların ölümle bitmesi, dünyanın gözünün Türkiye'ye çevrilmesine neden oluyor. Silahlı Kuvvetler ise, içeride anarşiyi dizginlemeye çalışan, yabancı konuk ve diplomatların topraklarımızdaki can

Therefore, it was after all unintended consequences and bad luck that has caused the dismantling of the long-standing tradition of co-operation between the youth and the military. In this way of picturing the events, the military is portrayed as the benevolent actor of Turkish politics, whereas much appraised Turkish youth is now being criticized for directly being involved “in the acts of terror”. That line of argument not only makes invisible state violence against the political dissidents and activists in the country, but also turns the guilt towards the youth who committed these acts of “terror” in the first place. Hence, the military is left devoid of any major culpability for the violence of this period.

As I argued before, practices of recollection are made under the influence of present social milieu, and also serve to make political and social statements in regard to the period one lives in. Thus, it can be argued that this narrative of leaving the army without any guilt for the violence of the period in question, stressing the long standing “friendship” between the army and the youth, hence making them natural partners, is a way to make statements about the political conditions of the time this book is published. Unity of the military and the youth is asserted to be not only natural, but the continuing divide between the two is presented to be based on not unsolvable problems. After all, both follows the same aim of progress and have had conflicts as a result of the unintended consequences of the events following the year 1971.

The year 1971, thus, constitutes another point of origin, yet one in which this natural bonding is harmed. This split between the youth and the army leads to undesirable situations, and this is how Baykam seems to identify as the reason of unpleasant state of affairs in Turkey. Previously, the collaboration of the army and youth had produced progressive results

güvenliğinden fire veren bir konuma düşmüş hissediyor kendisini. Gerisi 12 Mart balyoz harekâtı... O şanssız 1971 yılında devrimci gençlik ve ordunun arasına buzlar, kara kediler böylece giriyordu.”

in the country. As the dates 1923, 1960 and 1968 point to a chain of positive events, 1971 signifies the breaking of this chain.

Hence, one can derive the conclusion from this text that to re-establish this broken unity would be a desired solution for the country's current problems, according to Baykam. However, it also has to be pointed out that, the way Baykam assigns roles in this unity also inherently is apt to create hierarchies of power, in which the youth is advised to follow the lead of the army. As the army is not considered to be guilty, but the misconduct of the youth, even though performed in good intentions, is considered to be causing the break-up, then one is inclined to think that this unity can be achieved by having the army in control, whereas the youth would inevitably be its faithful followers. It can be argued that this presents "a picture of paternalism", a bond between the oppressor and the oppressed, which obscures under a veil the totality of power (Portelli, p.205).

I think it is possible to have a glimpse of what form of national subjectivity is sanctioned in this narrative by making a close reading of the text in hand. Baykam writes that: "Istanbul was incomparably a more civilized city than it is today in 1968. In the demonstrations of 19 May (a national holiday in Turkey), golden haired girls would wear mini-skirts and they would not be any different in the streets of the city. State was a serious institution. Religious fanatics are encountered once in a while".⁴¹ (p. 15)

Inhabitants of Istanbul are praised as they demonstrate modern and civilized façade of the Turkish society. This process of constructing ideal forms of subjectivity also entails exclusion of other forms of being. Thus, Baykam not only speaks to current political debates through his work of remembrance, but also cherishes a particular form of subjectivity, in which those who conform to its norms become national subjects who embody a civilized form

⁴¹ "68'lerin İstanbul'u, bugünle kıyaslanamayacak kadar uygar bir kentti. 19 Mayıs gösterilerinde altın saçlı kızlar mini etek giyer, sokakta ondan aşağı kalmazlardı. Devlet ciddi bir kurumdu. Yobazlar karşımıza kırk yılda bir çıkardı."

of being and living. These modern Turks were the markers of the civilized form of life in the 68, whereas people who do not conform to this prescribed form of living are excluded from the picture.

No doubt workers and peasants, for whom the struggle was waged according to several previous narratives about the 68 era, too have no place in this description of the civilized form of life. As such, they are to be inevitably defined as forms of existence that need to be transformed. In fact, this is what unifies in space and time the homogenized Turkish youth with the Turkish military and the Republican People's Party; they all aim in the formation of a civilized, modern Turkey for Baykam. They all are progressive agents of the country in the face of the backward elements that Baykam clearly identifies especially with "religious fanatics".

In Baykam's narrative, we come across with yet another binary picture in which the axis of the main conflict in the country is re-defined. In the first book that I analyzed the main axis of the struggle was between honorable and dishonorable people, in the second period that I analyzed the struggle was between the idealists and those who support the status quo. The struggle is waged now between the progressive forces, mainly military and the youth, and the backward, religious oriented sections of the country.

By equating the social and political aspirations of the people who were activists at the time to a generalizable characteristic, that of belonging to progressive Turkish youth, homogenized and unified in aims through time, his narration of events conceals the distinct features of this period. In other words, his emphasis on Turkish youth does not only homogenize people who were activists at the time, but also presents this concept of Turkish youth as an unchanging element of the Turkish political life, with clearly identifiable aims and wishes across time. Such a narrative of the past, as I argued, obscures from the view the distinct political aspirations, as well as the incongruities and disputes, of those who were

involved in the Turkish 68 movement. That carries us to the earlier remark that works of memory often entail forming up of coherences in the narration and establishment of continuities between the past sequence of events and the present. Baykam's narration of the 1968 social movements gives us a coherent picture, in which the actors of this period are appropriated and linked with a historical narrative that extends back in time to present.

It is noteworthy to remind the publishing date of the book and contemporaneous political situation in order to reflect on the distinct turns the narration of the 68 era has taken in this work. Baykam says in the introduction section that it was written as a result of the two years of study in which he conducted interviews with several activists. Baykam had started to prepare his book when the Welfare Party was in power and published it when the so-called post-modern coup took place, in which the Welfare Party lost its place as the main coalition party in the government.

Navaro Yashin and Alev Çınar have demonstrated that during the 1990's nation-statist discourses in the face of rising Islamic and Kurdish identity politics were ardently employed and gradually used in the realm of civil society on the basis of volunteerism (Çınar, 2001; Yashin, 2002). I believe Baykam's book can be associated with this trend of the 90's in which the nation-statist discourses are promoted outside official, state directed channels but via the initiative of civilians devoted themselves to defend the secular Republic. Hence, the narrative here serves the purpose of re-producing the nation-statist discourses and re-establishing the sacredness of the "founding moment", which is the foundation of the Republic in 1923, in the face of Islamic and Kurdish challenge to the Kemalist modernization project.

As such, a distinct narrative has come to emergence, which can clearly be distinguished from the previous writings about the same period. This narrative surely borrows or is based on certain themes that are evoked in the 68 period, as Kemalist aspects of the 1968

movements are pointed out.⁴² Yet, Baykam presents them in a new framework that has to do more with the problems of the 90's than the problems of the 70's. He occasionally refers to much used slogans of this era, but presents them in a new light, while leaving aside other aspects of the 68 years. For instance, as I pointed out before, there is no reference from Baykam to class-based politics and to the issues of economic injustices and exploitation that Karadeniz claimed as the primary motivations for the rise of waves of protests.

Just like it is the case with other analyzed works, the discursive formulation in the narration of 1968 in this book is not to be considered as a singular, isolated incident or merely the ideas of a single author. Instead, it is a new discourse that has come into existence in the political atmosphere of the 1990's in its conceptualization of the events of 1968. Different works with similar narrative schemes are published followingly and this discourse has its resonance in contemporary Turkey as well.

In that respect, Haşmet Atahan's work titled as *68 Uprising* published in 2008 is a case in point in its similarity of discursive framework compared to Baykam.⁴³ This book is compiled of a collection of authors' 41 articles on the events of the 1968 era written in different times mainly from 1998 to 2008. Atahan first of all praises the military coup of 27 May 1960 stressing the collaboration of youth and the army in actualizing it: "It was the combination of youth and the army which brought freedom by toppling down the fascist Democrat Party rule in 27 May"⁴⁴ (p. 24). He also resents that the natural unity between the youth and the army has been harmed and according to him the cause of this situation is the 12 March coup and the events following it (p. 85). Reminiscent of Baykam's narrative, Atahan, in an article dating the year 2000 from his book, shifts the blame for the 12 March coup from

⁴² See Neyzi (2001)

⁴³ See Haşmet Atahan, *68 Başkaldırısı*, Sosyal İnsan Yayınları, 2008

⁴⁴ "27 Mayıs'ta Faşist DP iktidarını devirerek özgürlüğü getirense, Ordu-gençlik kaynaşmasıydı."

the military to the acts of the youth which he argues have provoked it and asks: “why those who have embraced the mistake of armed struggle only accuse the army for this process?”⁴⁵ (p. 76) By putting the blame on the deeds of activists, the Turkish army is again largely left devoid of culpability for the unleashing of violence which followed the military coup. Atahan wrote that: “Soldiers were rightfully disapproving and resenting that young people have started armed struggle when there exists the army of the Turkish Republic, and continued their armed struggle even after they (the army) changed the ruling government by the 12 March coup.”⁴⁶ (p. 85)

The only major difference between these two works is that in Atahan’s narrative so-called post modern coup of 28 February 1997 and the 1968 era has been directly linked in a work dedicated to the memory of the 1968 era. Atahan resents that: “Soldiers who have played an active role in the formation and actualization of 28 February decisions can not find enough civilian support in the struggle against backwardism”⁴⁷ (p. 75). Atahan further problematizes the issue that contemporary revolutionary youth movements fail to support the Turkish military and asks that: “how long this alienation which has started with the 12 March process, this break-up/enmity which has stabilized by the fascism of 12 October will last?”⁴⁸ (p. 76)

Thus, it can be argued that to remember the events of 1968 is to remember before the military coups of 12 March 1971 and 12 October 1980 which have damaged the naturalized link between the youth and the army. It is in the meantime, if not to forget, to set aside the violence the activists have endured during the coups. It is to reinstitute as a historical

⁴⁵ “...silahlı savaş yanlısına düşenler, ...sürecin faturasını neden yalnızca askerlere çıkarıyor?”

⁴⁶ “Askerler Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin ordusu dururken, ...gençlerin... silahlı mücadeleye girmesini, hele hele 12 Mart’ta muhtıra vererek hükümeti değiştirmelerinden sonra da... silahlı mücadeleye devam etmelerini haklı olarak onaylamıyor ve tepki duyuyorlardı.”

⁴⁷ “28 Şubat kararlarının alınması ve bu kararların uygulanması için aktif tavır sergileyen askerler, gericiliğe karşı mücadelede yeterli ‘sivil’ destek bulamamaktadır”

⁴⁸ “12 Mart süreci ile başlayan bu yabancılaşma, 12 Eylül faşizmi ile tamamlanan bu kopuşma/düşmanlaşma daha ne kadar sürecek?”

reminder that the chief progressive forces, as of army and the youth, should be standing in unity against the backward forces, typically characterized by the ruling Islamic oriented Welfare Party and its supposed associates. Hence, there needs to be civilian support for the ventures of the Turkish Army against the elected governments; the chief source of this lacking support is instated as the young people who would defend the Kemalist modernization project following the lead of the Turkish Army.

As much as the content of the work, the writing time of each of these articles which together constitute the book, is particularly revealing; of all those 41 articles only 3 of them are written in the year 2008. The overwhelming majority, 35 articles, dates back to the period of 1998-2000. The remaining three articles are written in 1993, 2001 and 2002. For a book which made its first publishing in the year 2008, it might seem surprising to have so many articles from the year 1998 and so little from the latter part of the 2000's. I believe we can use this point to make two parallel comments on this staunchly Kemalist discursive model used to represent the 1968 era. First of all, the latter part of the 1990's was an era which, as it has been suggested, was marked by the enormous civilian initiative developed without the direct interference of state officials to defend the Kemalist modernization project. It can be argued that in this era the remembrance of the 1968 events, works produced with that aim, became part of that civilian enterprise to defend the Republic. Especially by stressing the supposed natural unity between youth and the army, which are presented as the essential guardians of the regime, it is explicitly and implicitly claimed that the regime is in danger and needs to be protected.

The second point to draw is that this discourse stressing the vulnerability of the Kemalist regime in the face of perceived attacks to it from the backward groups is still part of the political life in Turkey, but to a decreasing degree. The period of 2000's has seen the

emergence of a new prevalent discourse used to narrate the 1968 era, which will be the subject matter of the next chapter.

CHAPTER III: 2008, “HATIRLA SEVGİLİ” AND CONSTRUCTING A MULTI-CULTURAL COHESIVE NATION

In this chapter I will analyze a new discourse which has developed for the narration of the 1968 years shaped by and responsive to the contemporary political issues of Turkey in the late 2000's. Principally, I will argue that family in the series is a metaphor for the nation; in this respect the latter is described as being founded on love and that it has a naturalized unity. Love emerges as the formative bond that defines the national subject and unites members of the nation with their ideological, ethno-religious, status and class differences. This also presents us a picturing of a near utopic world about the past, in which people can co-exist and live happily with their differences. This narrative is operationalized and receives affective value by the inclusion of the deep state in this portrayal, the “other” of the nation which harms the unity and is suggested as the essential cause of violence in the history of Turkey. In fact, this very duality serves to construct the nation as a safe heaven and the deep state as its other, deforming the former.

Therefore, my analysis of the series is centered on closed examination of the concepts of love, family, or what I will be calling nation-family, and the deep state. These concepts of love, nation-family and the deep state are interrelated and deeply embedded. It is impossible to think of any of them separately since they are in fact productive of each other. Shortly put, it is primarily love which constitutes the nation-family and the nation-family is the terrain for love to develop. And the deep state constitutes the nation-family as a harmonious unity, in return through the display of harmony in the nation-family that the deep state is invested with violence. In fact, this interrelatedness is what constitutes the underlying new discourse, providing the essential message of the entire narrative plot in the series. I argue that in its

essence, the discursive schema of *Hatırla Sevgili* correspond to attempts at re-defining a national subject in the present age.

Hence, none of these concepts can be thought about and analyzed independently in and of themselves. They together constitute their own universe of meaning within which the history of the 68 years or the Turkish history as such is explained in a new discursive form and a particular national subjectivity is created. Yet, for the sake of analysis, I will study these three concepts under three different sub-chapters, while displaying their inter-embedded nature.

In this new narrative, the 1968 era is no longer represented to be a conflict between two inherently and inevitably opposing groups of the Turkish society, albeit how differently these groups can be seen and named. In this narrative the state, but growingly the deep state as an autonomous organism within the state, emerges as an institution which is capable of and commits deeds of violence, regardless of which particular government is in power. In the preceding works, the strife and the violence of the period are blamed on a particular government but not the state as such. They were specifically blaming the ruling Justice Party and its supposed associates for the violence. In fact, especially in the work of Baykam, the state had an elevated status. However, in this new narrative scheme certain institutions of the deep state are displayed as agents of violence, the ultimate binary other of not only the youth activists of that era but the society in its entirety.

Thus, the series seems to intend on producing a more or less acceptable version of history, which would not identify any political and social group as the binary other. This aspect of the serial can also be seen in the comments made by the serial's creators as well. Tomris Giritlioğlu, the chief executive of the project, after when one of the ex-activists who worked as a counselor for the series lost his job, said in an interview that the *Hatırla Sevgili* "is being prepared with the assertion to reflect the common consciousness and right

mindfulness of the society and the near history; and they try to do so without offending, hurting and judging”⁴⁹ (Giritlioğlu, Bianet, 21 September 2007). Thus, the issue with this ex-activist was that “there was a disagreement over this concern of neutrality”.⁵⁰ She further asserts that: “...this ‘common consciousness’ that we pay great attention, dominates virtually every scene of our series”⁵¹ Hence, it is plausible to infer that, unlike previously analyzed works about the 1968 era, the serial is not based upon a story of oppositions and the ensuing conflicts arising from them, but rather the nature of oppositions themselves are reconsidered with an aim to address the “common consciousness” that is supposed to inhere in the people of Turkey.

At another instance, Giritlioğlu stated that: “We can not build a secure future without questioning our past. We are producing these series with a great love of country. Consciousness of patriotism brings such a responsibility.”⁵² (Hürriyet Pazar, 22 November, 2009) Thus, the narrative of the series first of all centered upon facing the last decades in the history of the Turkish Republic, which remained untold by the official history. They created this work because they love their country and have a responsibility towards it to fulfill, which is to help build a secure future through remembering the history. In this vein, to remember the past is meant to serve to the purpose that the violent deeds of the past are not going to re-occur.

⁴⁹ “...toplumun ve yakın tarihin ortak vicdanı ve sağduyusunu yansıtmaya iddiasıyla” hazırlandığını; bunu ‘kırmadan, incitmeden ve yargılamadan’ yapmaya çalıştıklarını söyledi.”

⁵⁰ “...bu tarafsızlık kaygısı sırasında görüş ayrılığı yaşandığını belirtti”.

⁵¹ “...bu çok önemseydiğimiz ‘ortak vicdan’ dizimizin hemen her sahnesine egemen olmuştur.”

⁵² “Geçmişimizle hesaplaşmadan sağlam bir gelecek kuramayız. Bu dizileri ekip olarak büyük bir memleket sevgisiyle yapıyoruz. Yurtseverlik bilinci böyle bir sorumluluk getiriyor insana.”

I. Summary of Hatırla Sevgili

The TV serial *Hatırla Sevgili* (Remember Lover) was broadcasted on the private television channel ATV starting at 27th October 2006 and came to an end at 6 June 2008. It consisted of 68 episodes, each lasting approximately 90-100 minutes without including advertisements. The serial is the work of a group of people who had previously and after produced several of such serials about historical topics, all of them being created in the 2000's. The first of these series was *Kurşun Yarası*, the story of nation-wide known bandit on whose name there is a famous song, *Çemberimde Gül Oya*, about the events preceding and following the coup of 1980, *Kara Yılan*, again about a nation-wide known heroic figure who fought against the French occupation of South Eastern parts of Turkey following World War I. Lastly, shortly after *Hatırla Sevgili*, they broadcasted another historical project which was presented as the continuation of *Hatırla Sevgili*. The new serial was named “*Bu kalp Seni Unutur Mu?*” (Would that heart forget you?). Like “Remember Lover” it again indicated the importance of remembering the past starting from its title. This new series begins where the *Hatırla Sevgili* came to an end, the 1980 military coup and was to continue until 2002 elections which brought the Justice and Development Party to power. Thus, considered together these two serials were going to narrate approximately half a century of Turkey's history. However, this latter series could not succeed like the former and ended long before its planned ending.

The story in *Hatırla Sevgili* unfolds over twenty years, starting just before the 27 May 1960 coup and ending just after the 12th September 1980 military coup. In its narration of such a long period of more than twenty years, there are frequent chronological jumps. But more importantly for my analysis, there are three long chronological jumps which provide us important clues about the nature of the serial. First of such a time leap occurs after the

narration of the military coup of 1960 and the following events related with it. Thereupon the serial starts to recount its story from the year 1967, as a prelude to both the youth activism of 1968 to early 1970's and the military coup of 1971. There occurs just another of such chronological leap from the early 1970's into the late 1970's, this time to narrate the unfolding of the events that lead up to the military coup of 12 September 1980.

Hence, this narrative type follows a recurrent pattern. In each of these three parts the audience is first presented with the preceding events that lead up to major events of the narrated period, especially military coups, and then we are presented with the consequences of these occurrences. And as one part comes to an end with a symbolically loaded event, in the first case the hanging of Adnan Menderes and in the second case the hanging of Deniz Gezmiş, there then occurs the major chronological jump of a couple of years. Yet, it needs to be stressed that these three different parts are not narrated as consisting of a series of disparate events, but they are firmly linked to each other. In each part, the military coups, the events leading up to these coups and the brutal consequences of them occupy the center stage. Yet, the main interest of the serial is to narrate the flow of events surrounding the 68 era as there are more episodes for this era than the other two parts combined.

During twenty years that the series narrates, new characters are introduced, some of the main characters pass away, and small children grow up to emerge as leading figures of the serial. Yet, the two lovers, Yasemin and Ahmet, upon whose turbulent but never ending love story that the series are supposed to build upon, from the beginning to the end are constant figures in the serial just like many others from their close entourage. These two lovers are the children of two close childhood friends, who later develop grievances towards each other because of the political choices that each has made. One of them becomes a leading member of the governing Democrat Party, who at the time is pretty close to Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. The other is a notable judge and opponent of the Democrat Party. He later becomes

one of the judges who work in the trial of Menderes and the other Democratic Party members, including his childhood friend. This politically motivated enmity prevents lovers getting together and causes much suffering for both of them.

Yet, this unhappy coincidence later turns into a regular occurrence for the other love stories that developed throughout the serial, with different members of the family falling in love with people belonging to opposing camps. For instance, Yasemin's sister falls in love with a right-wing activist to the much astonishment and protest of his left-wing cousins and Theo, the descendant of a Greek family who used to live in Istanbul, falls in love with the sister of his close friend, Necdet (Ahmet And Yasemin's childhood friend), facing harsh protests of their conservative father. Hence, these love stories that crisscross ideological or ethno-religious boundaries and suffering these causes is a much repeated theme of the story. Indeed, love turns out to be described as an enduring feeling despite much suffering and as it happens, at times, despite its own impossibility to reach a happy ending in this romantic fiction.

Another point which I think needs emphasis in this introductory passage is the large family of the serial. Yet, the concept of family should not be merely understood as that of a conjugal family or a large patriarchal family. Instead, it is better to see it as a large group which includes beside lovers from several generations, their children and close friends. Some of them pass away in time and new members join the family, all of them being caught up in turbulent and violent times. This large familial atmosphere serves as a refuge from the upheaval of the outside world. And in here, despite occasional disputes, the audience could witness that people from all walks of life with their political, religious, gender, class and generational differences could come together and deeply love each other. Hence, family can easily be thought of as representing a panorama of people living in the country and through it

the serial creates a protected space where everybody can live happily amidst the turmoil and violence of the outside world.

No longer narrating the story of the 1968 youth alone, the events of the 1968 era are narrated by situating them within a line of continuity by providing its linkages with events that precede and follow it. In this respect, the events of the 68 youth movements are narrated not merely as the story of youth activists but as a constitutive part of the history of Turkey. This may first seem similar to the work of Baykam, but in the latter case there were two inherently and inevitably opposing sides facing each other in a bitter conflict which still continued. Thus, his book solely is addressed and devoted to one side in this ensuing conflict. However, in the case of *Hatırla Sevgili*, one can hardly find any social division that overpowers seemingly naturalized bond within the nation that is supposed to be based upon what Giritlioğlu has referred to as the “common consciousness and right-mindedness”. The serial is produced with an acknowledged aim to encompass all parts of the Turkish society, and the 1968 era turns out to be a formative period in the history of Turkey.

II. Nation as an Emotive Community of Love

A. Society and Emotions

In this section I will analyze the sense of national community that the series creates through the frequent use of emotive language. The serial is based upon the frequent displays of emotionally loaded moments aside from being initially a story of romance. In varieties of scenes sharp feelings of happiness, love, anger, despair, sadness etc. are displayed at length with the possible aim of trying to inaugurate these emotions in the audience. I aim to demonstrate how this strong emotive language serves as a foundational unit in the establishment of a naturally united national community.

The role of emotions in creating and sustaining the sense of a community has long been a topic investigated by social scientists. Emile Durkheim claimed emotions to be “what holds or binds the social body together” (Ahmed, p. 9). Max Weber (1978) wrote that a political community derives its force as well as its legitimacy from its emotional foundations. For John Stuart Mill, a significant degree of fellow-feeling among co-nationals is a necessity for a representative democratic system (Berezin, p. 34). Arguing for the socially constructed nature of emotions, Michelle Z. Rosaldo (1984) wrote that: “Feelings are not substances to be discovered in our blood, but social practices organized by stories that we both enact and tell.” (p. 34). As social practices, deployment of emotions is an essential component of discourses and politics. (Berezin, 2002, p. 34). Emotions play an organizing role in thought and meaning systems and that, emotions are systematically related to a variety of sociocultural and historical phenomena in each community (Levy, 1984, p. 216). Thus, instead of considering emotions merely as internal psychological states of individuals, I am indebted to the work of scholars who have demonstrated that emotions are formed through social and cultural phenomena and are also a constitutive element of societal relations (Lutz, 1986).

In this respect, I think the scenes in which shared quality of emotions are displayed are as particularly important as the specific emotions themselves. The sharing of emotions unites members to each other. In fact, each specific emotion is always shared in the series; one’s suffering is the cause of other people’s suffering, the moments of happiness are those times when people who dispute re-unite, and even anger is shared by the people from the opposing sides in conflicts. In that vein, I think frequent display of emotive scenes alone serve to the purpose of creating a sense of unity.

B. The Discourse on Love

I have pointed out the role of emotions, and the crucial subject of sharing of these emotions in the narration of the story. In this section I will focus on the specific role of love and suggest that love serves as a foundational ground for the national co-existence. I will introduce a merely analytical separation as love of country and love of subject. Former means the love subject has for the country and the latter is the love for another subject who can be a spouse, friend or family member. These two interrelated forms of love assure that the nation is capable of living together and surpasses times of great difficulty especially as they play a pivotal role in reconciling disputing groups in the country. I will also argue that love of country and heightened scenes of its display entitle individuals to national subject position. Groups of people who were often considered as not belonging to national space and seen as the “other” of the national subject earn the right to national subjectivity by displaying their love. On the other hand, ideological disputes get illegitimated by demonstrating that they harm the emergence, development or continuity of “love of subjects”.

The series often exhibits that the left-wing political activists deeply love their country. Yet, the crucial point is that this feeling of love of country is also the essential substance which also connects the activists with their ideological rivals from the past and present. In an example from the series, after the military coup of 1960, as he is detained and is being trialed, we see Adnan Menderes speaking to a picture of his brother that he holds in his hands. He tells in this monologue that: “Ah Ethem, is it our business to deal with politics? We have tried to serve the country with all our best efforts and sincerity, look what we did to our country!”⁵³ Although this monologue takes place when he is being trialed for capital punishment, which would eventually be executed, his priority is not his own conditions. He is more worried about

⁵³ Episode 11. “Ah Ethem bizim neyimize gerek politika? Bütün gayretimizle, bütün samimiyetimizle memlekete hizmet etmeye çalıştık, bak ne hale getirdik memleketi!”

the situation of the country and that his presidency that he thinks played a role in the contemporaneous turmoil.⁵⁴

In this respect, stories of the deputies of both the Democrat Party who were trialed following the military coup of 1960 and the activists of the 1968 youth movement are narrated in a positive light. Their devotedness to Turkey and its well-being was what unite these otherwise opposing political actors. Indeed, perhaps for the first time in the history of the 1968 era writings, the trials and related sufferings of the members of the Justice Party are likened to the trials and suffering of the youth activists of the 1968 generation.⁵⁵ In this way, the viewer is invited to have their sympathies for both these groups of people, who were often presented as bitter foes in the earlier 68 writings. Beside the similar dramatic narration of the trials, the same song accompanies to the narration, which says: “Our love is one long regard. Dear country, dear noble dream, winter has come to our lives.”⁵⁶ This is the second most played song, played at varieties of scenes beside the trials during popular street protests and in the scenes displaying sufferings of activists, left wing or right wing. It underscores the point that the country is a shared object of love for both the activist and the Democrat Party members. Hence, it is suggested that, through different methods and in the guidance of different ideological convictions, both these groups of people only loved, worked and suffered for their country.

The same commonality based on the love of country is also established between the contemporaneous ideological rivals. Both disputing left and right winggroups share a common love for their country which is actually the reason why they are in conflict with each other. At one scene from the series, two childhood friends, right wing militant Yaşar and left-wing militant Harun faces each other when Harun is kidnapped by right wing militants as an

⁵⁴ Furthermore, since this conversation took place in private, there is no question of doubt about the sincerity of his remarks about his sorrow.

⁵⁵ Usage of the same song in the trial scenes of both Deniz Gezmiş and Adnan Menderes can be seen illustrative of this point.

⁵⁶ “Sevdamız bir uzun bakış, Ey memleket ey soylu düş, ömrümüze girip oturdu kış.”

act of retribution of one kidnapped right wing militant by left-wing militants. Harun tells Yaşar: “We are childhood friends Yaşar, how did we end up like this?”⁵⁷ Then Yaşar unties his hands and offers him a piece of bread to eat. After this, we see each of them accusing the other of being complicit respectively in the American and Soviet imperialisms which threaten Turkey. In this instance it is shown that both characters truly and whole-heartedly believe in the rightfulness of their actions, and they do what they do because of a perceived threat to their beloved country. They have sympathies for each other as childhood friends, yet they do what they think must be done for the good and benefit of their country, which push each of them to opposing camps in the ensuing conflict. Therefore, *Hatırla Sevgili* serves to reconcile feuding parts of the society and constitute them as parts of a singular body of people thanks to their common love for their countries.

Through their love for their country, the youth of 1968 era is re-integrated into the fabric of the Turkish society and become national subjects. Love of country emerges as a means to carve up a space for the 68 youth in the national imagery. Even though they might have committed nominally criminal acts like robbing banks and also having armed struggle with military and police, the audience is presented with the view that they had done so out of love. Committing what might be seen for many as unacceptable acts, turns out to be excusable on the condition that it is done for the love of country and not for private benefits.

Alongside the activists, ethno-religious minorities too become national subjects by displaying their love. Another notable example is Greek Theo’s mother who had been living in Greece since she was forced out of the country years ago. She also becomes part of the community and acquires her subjectivity through her passionate love of the lands she was forced to leave. Similarly, a space is carved for her in the national imagery through her acute

⁵⁷ Episode 39. “Biz çocukluk arkadaşınız Yaşar, bu duruma nasıl geldik?”

demonstration of the love she has. In Greece, she still very much lives with the memory of the country she left behind. When she gets ill, Theo and his friends pay a visit to her. Theo's aunt recounts for them the life of her sister; telling that she was yearning to see and was missing greatly her lands. They bring her soil in a vase from her own garden in Istanbul. Then, the aunt presents her guests a photo-album and demonstrates that all the pictures inside it are from Istanbul, adding that: "She has put her heart into this album".⁵⁸

Claim of belonging to the nation is justified and national subjectivities are built through love. Love entitles individuals to belong to the realm of the national community irrespective of their ethno-religious or political stance. In this respect, I think that the discourse about living happily together in diversity, a prevalent theme in *Hatırla Sevgili*, can be likened to ideals of the discourse of multi-culturalism. In writing about the role played by the theme of love in multi-culturalism, Sarah Ahmed (2004) argues that: "Love here sticks the nation together; it allows cohesion through the naming of the nation or political community as a shared object of love... it becomes the 'shared characteristic' required to keep the nation together... It is love, rather than history, culture or ethnicity that binds the multicultural nation together" (p.135).

People who have previously been presented as the other of the national body, because of their ethnic-religious or political identities, become part of the national community on the condition of their persisting and passionate love even when they suffer much because of it. Hence, individuals are defined as national subject first and foremost through their love of country which integrates different communities to national body. Moreover, in a sense, as they become national subjects, they become "bodies that matter"; and the sufferings in their lives are started to be considered as "grievable" (Butler, 2010).

⁵⁸ Episode 43. "Kalbini bu albüme koydu"

Furthermore, the community itself is considered to be formed by individuals who share an essentialist love, where all of whom get implicitly codified as loving subjects. Sarah Ahmed describes national subject formation on the basis of love as “being through feeling” (p. 2). In this respect, the left-wing activists and their rivals are not merely united thanks to their common love of their countries, but they are also coded as loving subjects who are capable of deeply loving other subjects around them. They passionately love their friends, spouses and their families. For instance, Yasemin remarks her worries for her left-wing activist nephew Deniz, saying that: “He is filled with so much love; he can be such a great father, I am so afraid that something is going to happen to him”⁵⁹ Ideological disputes lead to Deniz’s eventual death, so he could never be a loving father and spouse for his family. As right wing activist Yaşar tells in another scene: “Ideologies separate people Metin, they even destroy great love stories”.⁶⁰ In this second case, Yaşar eventually has to break up with his left-wing lover whom he loved much. Loving subjects are definitively separated from each other because of ideological obstacles. Ideologies and ideological disputes then emerge as obstacles which harm the relations of love between loving national subjects.

Whereas love of country converts people to national subjects, love of subject has the potential capability to put aside political differences which separate national subjects. For instance, when Greek Theo wants to marry with the daughter of pious old man, he tells him that: “...We do have different beliefs, different value systems, different culture, I know these are a problem for you...But I have loved Lale for so long...she loves me too, you have to understand us.”⁶¹ In another scene, we see Yasemin’s father, long time right wing Democrat Party member crying and praying with his hands open in the funeral of his socialist, non-

⁵⁹ “Öylesine sevgi dolu ki, öyle iyi bir baba olabilir ki, başına bir şey gelmesinden çok korkuyorum.”

⁶⁰ Episode 67. “İdeolojiler insanları ayırıyor Metin, büyük aşkları bile yıkıyor.”

⁶¹ Episode 49. “...başka inançlarımız, başka değer yargılarımız, başka kültürümüz var, bunların sizin için problem olduğunun farkındayım...Lale’yi uzun zamandır seviyorum...ama o da beni seviyor bizi anlamamız lazım.”

believer friend.⁶² Hence, political differences can separate loving subjects but yet it is only love which can unite them as it can over-power obstacles of belonging to different camps.

The construction of the subject also constitutes the social collectivity around particular set of values as a particular collectivity (Sirman, 2000, p. 251). In the narrative of *Hatırla Sevgili* emotions and especially love become attributes of collectives around which the national community is formed (Ahmed, p. 2). In this respect, Alev Çınar (2001) wrote that:

The construction of history serves to locate the national subject in time, which is ascribed a particular continuity. Within this continuum identity is consolidated around an essential quality that is claimed to manifest itself as a sameness over time, an integrity that transcends and endures the destabilizing effects of temporal change... the composition of national histories involves the creation of time frames in which such constitutive qualities can be instilled as traceable, continuous, and enduring feature (p. 366-367).

I argue that in the series the constitution of the national subject and national community is based upon love as the primary, “traceable, continuous and enduring” value which makes possible the imagination of a continuous history of an enduring community. Love is the essential quality, a transcendental integrity which keeps the nation together.

Hence, beside its claimed role of educating new generations of the country’s past, I think it is plausible to suggest that the series is successful in creating a commonly acceptable version of history, a history in which “common consciousness of the society” reigns thanks to the usage of a deeply emotive language. The series gives the underlining unity of the long historical period that it deals with, starting from the late 1950’s to the early 1980’s. Love is presented to be the foundational principle of the society and naturally resides in each subject. The naturalness of the emotions also naturalizes the existence of the “society as well as the family, and ...the subject” (Sirman, p. 254). By presenting love as the natural and inherent

⁶² Episode 52.

property of the national subject, the series presents us both a sort of a historical document, a proof of unity from the past and through it “a common project to build through reconciliations and amalgamations of national sectors cast as lovers destined to desire one another” (Sommer, 1990, p. 110). Hence, I argue that it is the theme of love and its naturalization which creates the sense of a common history, an underlying unity of and the fictitious nature of oppositions that divide up the Turkish society.

The love story of the main couple in the serial is full of sufferings, disappointments and occasional break-ups mostly related with political issues outside their control. There are more than ten other love stories, some never fulfilled because of the structural barriers, while some eventually reached happy endings. This element of persisting love despite obstacles and sufferings that it causes might be said to be a prevalent theme in the television romance. Yet, I think it serves here to another function; love itself gets codified as a process that leads to suffering and that true love is demonstrated only by its persistence even when it causes much suffering.

Similarly, love of country might cause much un-happiness to its bearer, yet it persists even in times of great turmoil and despite shocking deeds of violence. In this respect, it is possible to argue that the concepts that are used to value true love in romantic relationships are being transferred to the love of country; just like romantic love, love of country is put to the test so its persistence becomes proof of its validity.

III. Nation-family

A. Family as a Metaphor of Nation

I argued before that the narration is based upon the story of survival of the nation despite several obstacles on its path thanks to the love national subjects inherently possess. In this section I will focus on the locus of this love, on the family. It is in the family that emotive language finds the most comfortable place as the emotionally intense scenes mostly take place in the environment of the large family or conjugal families as its sub-groups. I believe it is plausible to create an analogy between the concepts of family and the nation in the series. In this respect, I will use the notion of “nation-family” introduced by Doris Sommer (1990) to illustrate this link between the family and the nation. According to this terminology, family emerges as a metaphor and a miniature form of the nation while nation itself is presented as if it constitutes a large family, members of which are connected to each other by love. In this respect, I will argue that the conflict-ridden story of the large family serves to the end of creating an imagery of unified national community surviving terrible odds. .

Doris Sommer (1990) claims that a story about the nation-family or romance “provides a model for... non-violent national consolidation during periods of internecine conflict” (Sommer, p.76). Mankekar (1999) claims that, in the family dramas, especially large patriarchal family emerges “as a trope for the nation” (p. 74). She argues that “the consolidation of the extended patriarchal family serves as a trope for the construction of the fragile, post colonial nation” (p.112). I believe the large family of *Hatırla Sevgili* and its consolidation in times of conflict similarly can be read as a metaphor for national consolidation.

The large family of *Hatırla Sevgili* does not have any fixed boundaries, being always ready to absorb new members. Indeed several new faces are always added to its protective and loving realm throughout the serial. We can see a panorama of the Turkish society in this

family; with the inclusion in it people from almost all the major social, class, ethno-religious and political groups of people. In this respect, the large family of Hatırla Sevgili can be seen as a signifier for the nation. The large family in the Hatırla Sevgili survives the violent disputes and preserves its unity, symbolizing the nation which has maintained its existence despite turmoil, conflict and violence. This large family ensures that love and intimacy develop among these otherwise disputing members, constituting them as a collectivity with essentially the same interests. And in return, as Doris Sommer (1990) argues, the existence of nation-family gets legitimized through the invocation of the theme of love (p. 76).

Scenes of re-unification and family gatherings, especially on occasions of family meals, are especially important as in these scenes that family members come together after a politically motivated break in their relationships. We can consider these scenes of family meals as linking the domestic life with the political realm (Mankekar, p. 47). Through the practice of traditionally charged collective endeavors like family meals, which are directly related with the domestic life, an image of cohesive nation is built, which transcends and eases the politically related disputes. In the words of David Morley (1992), these serve to the end of constructing “an image of the unified nation, built around the experiences that we are all assumed to share, as members of families” (p. 255). In this respect, these family meals can also be considered as instances of communal celebration of re-establishment of socio-cultural solidarity and order (Propp, 1966). These are the opportunities when several of the major characters in the serial, many from the disputing parts of the society, come together happily, accompanied by feel-good music in the background, facing the violence of the outer world, and in a way challenging the divisive, conflict and violence ridden nature of this latter realm.

A large part of such gatherings occur following the scenes in which actual newspapers from the narrated days are showcased, demonstrating the conflicts in the public realm and giving hints about even more violent days. These scenes together demonstrate to the viewer,

where the source of problems lies; the realm of divisive politics, and the place which is largely devoid of it; the realm of family. The sphere of family constitutes the only real refuge from the violence of the outer world of politics, mutually intensifying the effects of each of these spheres; the latter being the realm of oppositions and conflicts, the former is a safe heaven promising moments of ever lasting happiness. The political realm thus continuously challenges the naturalized unity of the nation-family. One of the characters in the series tells that: “I suppose somebody is testing us to see how long we can endure”.⁶³ Hence, unity of the nation-family despite obstacles emerges as a proof to the implicit claim of a solidaristic and liberal nation, in which members can respectfully co-exist despite their differences.

The theme of passionate romance in the series can also be considered to be in relation with the re-unification of nation. Doris Sommer (1990) speaks about this “romantic rhetoric” that organizes historical stories (p. 76) and claims that: “...the romances are invariably about desire in young...heroes...and...young heroines in order to establish conjugal and productive unions which represent national unification and which can be frustrated only by illegitimate social obstacles” (p. 82). Passionate love stories of numerous couples in the series continuously face difficulties of politically motivated nature, which are illegitimated in the process. Moreover, couples are often able to overcome these difficulties and end up forming conjugal families which arguably represent the national unification despite obstacles.

Thus, the nation is a family composed of individuals with different sets of ideological stance and ethno-religious, social backgrounds, yet is also a young hero and heroine whose love is not consumed by the passage of time, neither by the lack of return from the love object. Nation thus is both a historical unity as a large family is, but also a young, passionate, energetic lover always ready to sacrifice for the sake of love. Nation is kept together as a

⁶³ Episode 58. “Biri bizi imtihan ediyor galiba, daha ne kadar dayanabiliriz diye”

historical unity of a large family and also with the passionate love of a young lover. The calm and enduring love of a large family is matched by a young lover's passionate love.

Evrin Yörük (2010) has pointed out that TV series in Turkey often evolve around the story of a large family (p. 320). Narrativization of family life can be seen as a common feature of the TV serials in Turkey. Plus, family in the TV series is often portrayed as a place of refuge against all the dangers of the outside world (Yörük, p. 322). However, what differentiates *Hatırla Sevgili* from these series, where family occupies the center stage in the story, is that this common feature is being used to promote a prevalent multicultural discourse that developed in the 2000's in Turkey. Family is a refuge from the outside world, but this outside world now symbolizes the ideological disputes that separate the united community and more so the deep state which inflicts violence on it with the family symbolizing the multicultural always already united nation. Therefore, the series, on the one hand, is centered upon a much evoked theme of the TV series, but on the other hand, transforms it to fit into a new ideological premise.

B. Nostalgia for a Lost Utopia: Finding the Utopia in the Past

The series depicts the nation-family as a timeless essence, which pre-dates conflicts and maintains its stability despite violence. Focusing on this timeless essence at the background of eventful and violent days, the series presents nation-family to exist at “a time outside time, a time without time” (Portelli, p. 61). The time of nation-family is outside chronological time, a realm outside the chronological rendering of events, and it is a time without time because there is neither a beginning nor an end to it. Hence, while the series' explicit aim is to remember the past events, it implicitly involves a “confrontation with time” (Portelli, p. 61); a confrontation with the passage of time by stressing the timeless essence.

In its depictions of the nation-family, the series shows an idealized epoch of human relations that has been eroded yet not totally destroyed because of the successive violent events. It creates a fantasia exalting the utmost purity of this nation-family as a higher form of living which is hard to find in the contemporary world of corruption, but still can be revived and prevented from being completely destroyed. In the words of James Scott, this nation-family “represents an alternative moral universe...an existentially true and just one, which helps unite its members as a human community and as a community of values” (Mitchell, p. 563). The serial finds an essentialized truth about the nation-family as a united community of values. National solidarity thus is based upon the existence of what Jurgen Habermas (1998) calls the “pre-political fact of a quasi natural people” (p. 406).

As the series comes to its end, in the last episode, the actor who played the fictional character Necdet talks about the significance of the series and describes Hatırla Sevgili to be such a lamentation to past innocence saying that: “cries are shed after a lost purity”.⁶⁴ Through the nostalgic description of more humane times, the series presents an epoch when the purity is not yet lost. Audience is reminded of more innocent times than today, how life has been before this turmoil and conflict.

The utopist depictions of this large family, in which all members love each other wholeheartedly, are also a frequently mentioned theme by the audience in several internet forums. For instance, a viewer commented on the “beautiful family relations that we are missing greatly... full with the lived experiences and events”.⁶⁵ Another viewer explains that the series has its affective value through the effectual display of family:

For long there was as if a beautiful and peculiar side to the series that I was not able to solve out what it was. I could have only understood it when I was watching the last episode. There was such a family in the series in which everybody loved each other like

⁶⁴ Episode 68 “...yitirilmiş bir saflığın arkasından gözyaşı döküldü”

⁶⁵ Ekşi Sözlük. “...özlemini duyduğumuz çok güzel aile ilişkileri.”

fools. Mother-daughter, twins, bride and mother-in-law...even the past spouses, new spouses of the past spouses and their children etc...⁶⁶

Such scenes about the happy family life might also be a way to understand the fact that the series is watched and appreciated by a large cross ideological audience in Turkey. For instance, in one such internet commentary, a self-declared idealist (ülküçü)⁶⁷ again referring to the last episode of the series, wrote that: “I am as an idealist thankful to all those who have worked on the series...I am especially applauding on my feet the final episode of the last night”⁶⁸, referring to the scenes about the utopic descriptions of happy co-existence.

Interestingly enough, the advertisement agencies are also quick to grasp this underlying narrative of the series about the nostalgic rendering of the past populated by loving subjects. In the advertisement of the İş Bank, during one of the episodes of the series, it is said that: “Don’t let your longing be limited to the warmth of a single cup of tea. All the warmth of Turkish people is waiting for you, so that you can feel warmer. Because we are you.”⁶⁹ The advertisement thus calls the audience to pay a visit to the İşbank because this is where they are going to find “all the warmth of Turkish people” from the past days, which would cease their “longing” for it. The “warmth” is described as a naturalized property of Turkish people but which is not in place in the contemporary Turkey, so that there is a longing for it. The usage of cup of tea is significant, firstly because it points to a sameness and a connection between past and present. But since the longing can only be satisfied with a cup of tea, it tells

⁶⁶ Ekşi Sözlük. “...çözemediğim hem güzel hem de garip bir yanı vardı sanki bu dizinin. Kendimce ne olduğunu ancak final bölümünü izlerken kavrayabildim. Bu dizide oyle bir aile vardı ki herkes birbirini deli gibi seviyordu. Ana-kız, iki kız kardeş, kari-koca, gelin-kaynana..., hatta eski eşler, eski eşlerin yeni eşleri, onların çocukları...”

⁶⁷ Self-given group nickname to right wing ultra-nationalist sympathizers in Turkey

⁶⁸ <http://rizaaskar.blogcu.com/hatirla-sevgili-sevdamiz-bir-uzun-bakis-soz-mp3/1121481> “...ben bir ülkücü olarak emeği geçen herkese teşekkür ediyorum... hele ki dün geceki finali ayakta alkışlıyorum...”

⁶⁹ Episode 56. “Özleminiz bir çayın sıcaklığıyla sınırlanmasın. Türk insanın tüm sıcaklığı bekliyor sizi. İçiniz daha çok ısınsın diye. Çünkü biz siziz.”

that the present is devoid of the warmth of the past. It is the İşbank which can truly satisfy the longing; after all, İşbank is you, the Turkish people who inherently possess “warmth” as its foundational characteristic.

As the viewers frequently pointed out, the last episode of the series is indeed filled with scenes depicting a utopia-like world, where the happy co-living and emotional bond the characters have with each other is stressed. In one of the last scenes of the last episode, all living major characters come together for yet another large family meal in an open garden, covering the entourage of a long table (Fig. 1). Shared meal is followed by joyful dance of characters from different generations (Fig. 2). This particular scene can be interpreted as a confirmation that, after much suffering and death during long years of social-political conflict which is still continuing, they preserve their love and care for each other in a familial utopia-like world.



Fig. 1: An intra-generational and over-ideological display of utopic happy times from the last episode, from the early 1980's.



Fig. 2

Viewer comments demonstrate that this utopic portrayal of the past is not only about the intimate realm of a particular family or about family as an institution. Instead, family of the series serves as an emblem or a miniature form of the national order in the past: “Perhaps we are so much attracted to the series because it demonstrated to us always already chic ladies, refined gentlemen, and more naïf times than today when people love and respect more each other.”⁷⁰

A parallel view is that the depiction of the national order in the past testifies to the fact that nation with all its different members is a coherent and united whole. Another viewer of the series shortly after the broadcasting of the final episode argued that the main lesson to be drawn from the series is that such respectful co-existence is not only possible or desirable but a normal outcome:

⁷⁰ Ekşi Sözlük. “...her daim şık ve kadın hanımefendilerin, kibar beyefendilerin, insanların birbirini daha çok sevdiği daha çok saydığı... daha naif zamanları gösterdiği için bu kadar bağladı belki de kendisine bizi.”

Let us consider what we have understood from the series. I have understood that, the Anatolian people who could not have been destroyed through warfare is tried to be divided up by absurd separations...I saw that we could share the same bread so long that no discord is introduced...I can not take any sides with this knowledge.⁷¹

The term “Introduction of discord” in regard to secretive forces not only gives credence to the idea that without it there would be peace and happiness, but also used as a reference to times past when there was no discord. And arguably it is also about imagining a possible future where it would be gone, since the sole reason why such disputes exist is the scheming of third party actors. Thus, the past becomes a vehicle to imagine a utopia-like future where co-existence without strife would be possible. Hence, peaceful co-existence is not only wishful thinking or a desirable outcome but it is what normally should have been, as if the seeds of such happy co-existence lie dormant in the nature of social life in Turkey.

In this vein, narration of the story also implicitly points to an imaginary time of before, to a time when the conflicts, oppositions and violence of the last decades that series narrate were not present. In this imaginary time of before, subjects can happily co-exist despite their differences. I argue that in this imaginary time of before, the series presents us the time of utopia. Hence, this realm of family-nation starts being a utopia unto itself. This is the place I think the series finds the antidote to division and conflicts of the politics.

I named this special realm in the series as “alter-utopia”. At a time when utopist projects aiming the abrupt transformation of the society for the formation of a better social order have fallen out of grace, the utopia is being found in the past. To put it differently, as the future oriented utopist ideals of the youth activists of the 1970’s have for many lost their

⁷¹ DiziFilm.com Forum. “Diziden genel olarak ne anladığımızı düşünelim. Ben şunu anladım ki; açılan savaşlarla yok edilemeyen Anadolu halkı, olur olmadık ayrımlarla bölünmeye sürükleniyor... Ben, bizlerin araya nifak girmediği sürece aynı ekmeğin sorunsuz olarak paylaşıldığını gördüm. Bunu biliyorken hiçbir şeye taraf olamam...”

appeal and are largely considered to be unrealizable, utopia-like world is imagined lying in the pages of history.

This aspect creates an interesting change in the narration of the 1968 era; before then being the story of people who are striving to change the existing world for better, or people who try to achieve the un-realizable, now the 68 years is elevated primarily for what it had been rather than what it had tried to achieve. 1968 era activists are then chiefly embraced because they had been part of this utopic world. They are valued because they acted in accordance and in the guidance of love as the primary foundational instrument which constituted this utopian space.

It can be argued that this constitutes the crystallization of one particular way in which the 1968 era activists have come to be perceived. Onat Kutlar once wrote that: “Young people of the 68 generation have been representatives of a dream for us. Interests of everyday life were of no concern for them; they were indifferent to the relations of self-interest the life force upon people... In this respect, whenever we think of them we remember a pure and uncorrupted symbol of youth”⁷² (Çubukçu, 1992, p. 61-62). I believe *Hatırla Sevgili*’s representation of the 1968 era activists is centered upon this imagery of purity and uncorrupted devotedness of the young people to the well-being of their loved ones; the country and its people. In the series, this imagined characteristic of the activists is appropriated by, made part of and even becomes the foundational element for the discourse of multi-cultural nation based on love.

Therefore, as one continues to watch the series the title, “Remember Lover” (*Hatırla Sevgili*) starts to gain another usage other than to remind a beloved one of their past stories of

⁷² “68 kuşağının gençleri bizler için... bir rüyanın... bir düşün temsilcileriydi. Yani onlar için günlük çıkarlar söz konusu değildi, yaşamın insanı zorladığı çıkar ilişkileri söz konusu değildi... Bu bakımdan ne zaman onları düşünssek, saf ve bozulmamış bir gençlik simgesi gelir aklımıza.”

love. It starts to be a general call to all the audience to remember Turkey's past. And what is to be remembered in the past is not just the chronological flow of events, conflicts and violence but also romanticized "old happy days", as the song "Remember Lover"⁷³ says, when subjects could have lived in harmony with their differences and when young people were acting for the sake of love leaving aside their personal interests.

This is also the reason why this song is played not only in the scenes when heterosexual couples get together, but in virtually every scene where happy co-existence, like in family meals, and especially re-unification of people who separated because of political disputes are displayed. In one such scene, we see that fathers of the main couple get together after long years of politically motivated disputes. They ride bicycles and fish together as they used to do in the past when they were little children with the song Remember Lover accompanying these happy moments.⁷⁴

The series thus calls its audience, referring to them as lover; to remember their past. And in return for it, this act of remembering creates the love object and its story that needs to be remembered: the nation. By answering this call of remembering, the audience is initiated to have the idea that what is being remembered is part of their individual life stories and what is narrated is informative about the present age as well. And through such identification with people whose lives are being narrated, the audience can feel themselves as part of this large family, where solidarity and happy co-living seem to have existed since time immemorial, but yet harmed.

Aletta J. Norval argues that "reconstructing collective memory and instituting new foundation myths do more than 'deal with the past'; they act as legitimizing moments for and shape the character of new regimes" (Norval, 2001). Nation-family emerges as a historical motivation for and proof to the idea that the happy co-existence in the present is realizable. In

⁷³ "O eski mesut günleri".

⁷⁴ Episode 36.

this respect, the series aims for the “construction of an imagined community with a strong ideological commitment to pluralism and democracy” (Evans, 1992, p. 750). This objective of creating a national community dedicated to pluralism is achieved by finding an example to it from the past. Using the past both as an inspiration to and legitimization for an aspired socio-political order in the present and future, by imagining the existence of a forgotten utopia-like world in the history, the serial serves to reflect the objectives about the present age to the past. And it is from this experience of loss of more “innocent days” that present day Turkey needs to be refigured and recovered (Prakash, 1997, p. 541).

C. Country: A Premise Waiting to Be Fulfilled

“Our love is one long regard. Dear country dear noble dream, winter has settled in our lives....”⁷⁵

Nation-family is not merely the cohesive structure that loving subjects together form, but it also is the framework for a collective project waiting to be built. As the second most frequently played song of the series tells, country is a noble dream waiting to be materialized by the national subjects. In this respect, the last scene of the series is highly remarkable as a metaphor for the country which awaits realization. There is an old house which has often been frequented by the characters from different generations. Young people have their plans about this half broken house to be eventually their home in the future. The old house signifies and is the locus of the dreams about the happy days they hope will arrive in the future.

However, even though the old house is visited from the beginning of the series to the end by several characters, the plans of renovating it never materializes. At first, it is thought that this is the secret place of the two lovers Deniz and Defne and their close friend Harun, but

⁷⁵ “Sevdamız bir uzun bakış, Ey memleket ey soylu düş, ömrümüze girip oturdu kış.”

as we later learn it is the secret place for an older generation of lovers as well, Necdet, Yasemin, Ahmet and others (Fig.1). Then, this old house is continued to be visited when they grew older. At one scene, we see Deniz, Defne, Işık and Harun in front of the old house as adults, repeating the exact words of premise about their loyalty towards each other that they uttered in the same spot when they were children (Fig.2). In the last episode of the series, there are in total six different scenes displaying the old house. In one of them we see the two lovers, Harun and Işık, who would have to abandon Turkey because of the 1980 coup (fig. 3).

In the last scene of the series, in the early 1980's, we see the children of a newer generation playing around this same house, repeating the same words of premise that we heard earlier back in the late 1950's. Previously of this scene the violent consequences of the 1980 military coup is demonstrated citing the number of people who are killed, tortured or arrested with the help of archival footage. In this last scene, two little children in front of the old house repeat the exact words of premise uttered years ago: "I swear that I am going to sacrifice everything for my team, protect them my whole life..."⁷⁶ (Fig. 4).

I think it is possible to consider this house as a metaphor to country, old and half-broken but still staying there as a premise of happy future days. Each generation has their dreams about it which never materialize, but the old house is never left to forgetfulness either and continues to be visited. Waiting to be taken care of and once re-built, it would house happy days. The old house, just like the country that it symbolizes, stands there as a premise waiting to be accomplished.

⁷⁶ Episode 68. "Takımım için her türlü fedakarlığı yapacağıma, onları hayatım boyunca koruyacağıma... and içerim".



Fig. 1: A scene from episode 3, from the late 1950's, Deniz, his future wife Defne and Deniz's cousin Işık who will marry the right wing activist Yaşar



Fig.2: Deniz, Defne, Işık and Harun in front of the old house as adults in a scene from the late 1960's.



Fig. 3: From the early 1980's, this is the last look of two lovers to the old house.



Fig. 4: The last scene of the series, from the early 1980's. Two children affirm their devotion to each other.

A viewer also commented on the significance of the old house in a similar line of thought: “Despite all the ugliness of the twenty years that the series tries to narrate, the last owners of the abandoned house Mehmet Sinan and Ela’s repeating of that naïf premise was as if symbolizing the hope of living together in a society with multiple identities, multiple

cultures, multiple languages and multiple religions that the scenarist Nilgün Öneş mentioned about.”⁷⁷

Therefore, there is a recurrent pattern in which hopes and dreams of a generation are transferred to a newer generation, alongside with their love and devotedness towards each other. Yet, the critical issue that makes possible this ideal to continue as a premise is the fact that it never gets materialized. Sarah Ahmed argues that the failure of the nation to deliver its promise for a good life actually works to increase the investment in the nation (Ahmed, p. 131). She wrote that: “One loves the nation, then, out of hope and with nostalgia for how it could have been”. Embracing the future for the eventual accomplishment of the ideal, in the words of Ahmed, “national love places its hope in the next generation”, since “the postponement of the ideal sustains the fantasy that return –realization of good life- is possible” (p. 131). In this respect, Roland Barthes (1978) wrote that even though the theme of waiting can be seen as encapsulating the powerlessness of the lover, it also holds out the promise of power (p. 88), of being validated in a particular way. The country then is the ultimate endeavor, the proper re-construction of which would provide one with a good life and national fulfillment.

For the series, the country, and its metaphor the old house, do not get demolished over the years but stand there waiting to be repaired and remain as the ultimate premise of an idealized good life if taken care of. And the hopes about a good life in the country is transferred from one generation to the next

⁷⁷ Ekşi Sözlük. “...dizinin yansıtmaya çalıştığı 20 yılda yaşanan tüm çirkinliklere rağmen metruk evin son sahipleri Mehmet Sinan ve Ela'nın o eski naif yemini tekrarlamaları sanki senarist Nilgün Öneş'in bahsettiği çok kimlikli, çok kültürlü, çok dilli ve çok inançlı bir toplumda bir arada yaşama şansına dair bir umudu simgeliyordu.”

IV. Deep State as the Constitutive Other

“They are not human but monsters”⁷⁸

“What kind of people are they, what kind of a power is this, who are they, who are you?”⁷⁹

As the story unfolds, we are being frequently reminded that the real cause of the acute conflict lies elsewhere. There are secretive forces which organize and instigate all the acts of inter-communal conflict in the series. There exists a realm distinctly and sharply different from the realm of family-nation where human interactions are primarily guided by love. There is the depiction of an ultimate “other” against whom people of nation-family with their innate benevolence and love naturally unite. This is the realm of the deep state with its secretive schemes, which organizes from the top all the major violent deeds. In this chapter I will argue that the concepts of the deep state and nation-family are mutually constitutive of each other.

Aletta J. Norval (2001), in the context of South Africa, claimed that without the immediate presence of an ‘enemy’, the apartheid state, it would have become more difficult to hold together “the people”, “for the unity of people depend, at least in part, on its opposition to the forces of oppression.” In this line of thought, on the one hand, subjects of the nation-family in *Hatırla Sevgili* unite in their common love against the forces of oppression. On the other hand, love based national space delineates and identify the deep state as the ultimate other which harms the harmonious life.

In one of the emotionally charged scenes of the series, left-wing activist Defne was taken into custody after the coup of 1971 along with her mother who is unrelated with any social movement of that epoch. In fact, she used to have confused opinions about the recent

⁷⁸ Episode 52. “Onlar insan değil canavar”

⁷⁹ Episode 52. “Nasıl insanlar bunlar, nasıl bir güç bu, kim bunlar, kimsiniz siz?”

military coup, saying that the army stepped in because there was anarchy in the country. Now in custody she became first hand witness to the cruelties committed by the people of the state towards their own citizens. The particularly important part for me in this scene is the implicit description of what I consider to be irreconcilable differences between the private realm of nation-family and the cold and violent face of the state. Especially for somebody who has long inhabited in the relative peace and security of the former realm and has never fully seen the violence of the latter, it becomes a terrifying and shocking experience. She says: “They are not humans but monsters. How could one human do these things to another human?”⁸⁰ State officials committing these horrendous acts thus commit the incomprehensible, unimaginable; what can not be thought to ever take place so long one remains within the borders of the private realm of family. Thus, state and its institutions constitute the ultimate binary opposite to the protective and warm realm of nation-family.

The display of state violence in the series is not limited to this scene alone. On the contrary, it is presented that behind all major inter-communal conflicts in Turkey’s history, in every major event ended with human death, there was either state planning or complicity. It is possible to give extensive examples from the series to this point. But more importantly than several of such specific cases are the scenes about the nature of state planning are explicitly showcased. During the events of the 1968 era the audience is introduced to an un-named state official without any specified position, yet clearly sitting in a governmental office with a Turkish flag and Atatürk portrait on the wall. He seems to have been involved in and controlled each and every major communal acts of violence, inciting different groups to attack each other, organizing atrocities with other state officials under his command or superior to him. In the first scene when he is presented to the audience, he accepts a leading right-wing youth activist Metin, friend of Yaşar, to his office. He advises Metin to be more active and to

⁸⁰ Episode 52. “Onlar insan değil, onlar canavar. Bir insan diğerine bunları nasıl yapar?”

fight in order to take control of the streets from the left wing activists. As Metin leaves his office, in what might be a surprising scene, we see him coming face to face with a left-wing activist waiting at the doorstep of this same state official. Both these men guide their followers under the directives of this state official, who desires to have only more intense struggle being waged in the country.

From the previous scenes we know that these two right wing supporter friends, Yaşar and Metin, have often times disputed because while Yaşar seeks more peaceful ways of activism Metin is a proponent of aggressive means. It is significant, in this respect, that the right wing youth activist who has so far defended violent acts turns out to be guided by that state official. And similarly, we also come across a left-wing activist who is informed and guided by the same official, demonstrating to the audience that at the root of violence between right and left wing activists was laying the preordained plans and direction of people who clearly were affiliated with the state machinery.

This always unnamed official then re-appears after the serial's time leap into the late 1970's. In this time it becomes even clearer that his purpose is to create an appropriate atmosphere for the upcoming military coup by trying to intensify the inter-communal conflict. In the late 1970's, the massacres of Maraş and Çorum are all planned and organized by him and his associates. Yet, it is also demonstrated that he is far from being a leader. Instead there are numerous other higher and lower ranking state officials that he is shown to be in constant contact. Even though the massacres of Maraş and Çorum are of his and his associates' plan, they could not proceed without approval from higher ranking state officials. At one such scene, he delivers a file to an even more mysterious higher ranking official, whom we can not see but only hear. On the cover of this file is written Maraş and he strongly advises that it is necessary to go on with this pre-established plan, saying that if they are not to pursue it they

might fall short and late of the scheduled plan, clearly talking about the already scheduled upcoming coup. And then the Maraş massacre takes place.

At the end of the series, Necdet, who is by then a deputy in the senate, identifies him as a man of the secret state. They have a face to face talk, where the official says to him that the country is full of external and internal enemies seeking its destruction and they should be fought against as to protect the country. Necdet replies to him that there is no need for enemies as the real enemies are them, and adds that “nobody can harm the nation as much as you have given harm to it.”⁸¹ The deep state is claimed as the chief responsible for violence of the past, which might otherwise be solved in non-violent means, and a thus a common enemy of the nation.

As he is identified as a man of the secret state by Necdet he would have to leave his office for good. But as he leaves he tells Necdet that individuals are not important; thus his exposure and resulting departure from office is insignificant. We are then shown that a new un-named official takes his place as if to demonstrate that nothing really changed, and there stands on his desk, upon a pile of files, a certain file where is written “Necdet Aydemir”. Thus, we understand that Necdet becomes a primary target of this secretive deep state organization. Hence, we are shown that the issue is not about the specific office holders. The exposure of a single official, in the chain of higher and lower ranking officials, has little effect on this deep state mechanism.

In this respect, the series, aside from its reconciliatory aspects, is also about the exposure of what is presented as the essential causes of conflicts in Turkey’s recent history. Reconciliation of previously combating sides by displaying their unifying essence is one aspect of the story and it serves to present disputing groups to a wide audience from varying political backgrounds as figures to empathize with. The latter aspect is the secretive deep

⁸¹ Episode 68. “Sizin verdiğiniz zararı kimse bu millete veremez.”

state, which is the only ultimate winner of all conflicts in the country. It is this force that all the opposing parts of the society in reality faced, which is displayed to be away from the reach of their power and their perception as of an enemy.

Left and right wing activists along with the “common people” are divested from the deeds of violence as the chief responsibility for these lies with these secretive forces. Whenever there are such scenes in which cruelties are committed by masses of people, these are relegated to the deep state directed provocateurs leading them. Such were the cases of the Çorum and Kahramanmaraş massacres in the late 1970’s. Shortly after the Kahramanmaraş massacre a character says: “Now, I also don’t think the people of Kahramanmaraş are responsible for what happened. There are other forces...”⁸² Another character confirms this point: “Ideological murders did not suffice them...Now they try to put society into despair with sect related conflicts.”⁸³ In fact, according to this narrative there needs to be deep state planning for each mass scale act of violence. The deep state official tells on one occasion that: “There needs to be a way to involve people into the atmosphere of violence”⁸⁴, implying that without the deep state provocation, “people” or the national subjects are not capable of committing violent deeds.

The series, linking these violent episodes to a controlling mechanism, thus making the national subject devoid of responsibility, demonstrates that subjects together were victims of the violence of the “other”, the deep state. In the words of Mankekar, the clear implication is that “left to themselves, the ‘common people’ would have lived in perfect harmony” (p. 305). The inter-communal conflict of different groups, in this respect, is presented as “deformations of the essential goodness of the people” (Buur, p. 9). Hence, there is a clear axis of evil

⁸² Episode 64. “Burada olanlardan Kahramanmaraşlıların sorumlu olduklarını artık ben de düşünmüyorum. Başka güçler var...”

⁸³ Episode 64. “İdeolojik cinayetler onlara yetmedi...Şimdi de mezhep kavgasıyla toplumu çaresizliğe sürüklüyorlar...”

⁸⁴ Episode 63. “Halkı şiddet ortamına dahil etmek için mutlaka bir yol lazım.”

responsible for all the major acts of communal violence in the series which obtains the state power by pushing different parts of the society to collide with each other.

A. Constitution of the Discourse on Deep State

I think this binary opposition of the deep state against the people is highly reminiscent of and can be likened to much evoked narratives of the nationalist discourse in Turkey in which virtually all the conflicts of past and present has been explained away via relating them to the intriguing all-mighty imperialist Western powers. In both cases, the crucial similarity is that there are secretive forces who are presented to be chiefly responsible for virtually each and every conflict in Turkey, instead of any social and political mechanism. Hence, society is presented to be a conflict-free realm without the intriguing schemes of third party secretive forces. Each conflict and related violent deeds are the consequences of pre-planned designs of these enigmatic forces.

For instance, one viewer asserts that the series reminds that just like Mexico can never get loose from the drug barons, Turkey also has its own malevolent actors from whom it can not break free.⁸⁵ Several viewer comments also demonstrate that the series is understood by a considerable number of its viewers as highlighting the past in which the role of secretive forces, which can be external or internal malevolent actors, are emphasized in “confusing” the country. For instance, a viewer claims that: “Special thanks to our series which reminds us that we should not forget the games that have always been played against our country especially in these days.”⁸⁶ There are also viewers who succumb more noticeably to the narrative about the external enemies of Turkey which bring harm to the nation. For instance, one viewer emphasizes the direction of external forces in leading the country into a turmoil

⁸⁵ Ekşi Sözlük. “Meksika nasıl uyusturucu baronlarından bir türlü kurtulamıyorsa, Türkiye'nin de kurtulamadıkları var, hatırlatan dizidir.”

⁸⁶ DiziFilm.com Forum. “Özellikle de şu günlerde bu ülke üzerinde hep oynanmış ve oynanmaya devam den oyunları unutmamız gerektiğini bize hatırlatan dizimize çok teşekkürler...”

and writes that: “how certain people or institutions controlled from outside deceived and pushed people to attack each other” and according to that viewer the series needs to be appreciated primarily because it demonstrates “with the cliché wording, the games that have been played on our country today as well as in the past”.⁸⁷ Thus, referring to the “games” of the third party forces is a much revoked theme in the way the series is perceived.

Viewers’ responses also suggest that despite depictions of violence of the state and the role its institutions play in initiating inter-communal violence, the series can still be enveloped within a nation-statist frame of interpretation. For instance, one of the viewers wrote about the importance of remembering “our past” at a time when “Atatürk’s Republic is under the threat of being annihilated”.⁸⁸ Another viewer writes that: “...for the memory of those people who truly loved this country and their people and who wished to do something for them –Mustafa Kemal Atatürk being the chief example-, beware of the games played upon our country...⁸⁹ Hence, despite heavy criticisms of it, the state or “Atatürk’s Republic” emerge as needing safeguarding against those un-identified others who are willing to inflict harm upon it. These I think demonstrate how the work in hand might be read in such a way as to make it possible of being informed about the violence of the state without really transforming the idea of the nation state as demanding protection, and also continuing to revere the core elements that are supposed to symbolize it, like the paternalistic figure of Kemal Atatürk.

Hence, the state’s responsibility in the acts of violence in the series gradually gets reduced to a mysterious yet powerful secretive deep state organization, left without supervision of any lawful mechanism. This downplays the role of regular politics in initiating conflicts in the society, since conflicts are narrated primarily as the work of the deep state.

⁸⁷ DiziFilm.com Forum. “O zaman da bu zaman olduğu gibi dışarıdan kumandalı bazı kişi ya da kuruluşların insanları nasıl kandırdığını ve birbirine kırdırdığını... demode söyleyişle ülkemiz üzerinde oynanan oyunları...”

⁸⁸ DiziFilm.com Forum. “Atatürk Cumhuriyeti yok edilme tehdidi altındayken...”

⁸⁹ DiziFilm.com Forum. “...bu ülkeyi ve insanlarını gerçek anlamda seven ve bir şeyler yapmak isteyenlerin anısına -başta Mustafa Kemal Atatürk olmak üzere-, ülkemiz üzerinde oynanan oyunların farkında olunuz...”

Once regular politics of the state are largely discarded, it becomes easier to dissociate the nation-state itself and founding myths of it along with its preeminent symbols of the continuing existence from violence. I think this is a plausible way to understand the frequent theme in the audience comments about the emergence of the nation state as needing protection against the secretive forces trying to harm it.

It is implicitly claimed that not the state, but an autonomous organism within the state, operating largely independently of regular state apparatuses, is the principal cause of the conflict and violence in the society. Hence, the deep state cleanses the state itself from the past crimes in history and re-constructs it as a viable social structure which needs protection against the deep state.

At that point, I think Timothy Mitchell's arguments about the workings of modern power can provide particularly useful insights on the matter of how the frequent depictions of brutal tortures and outright murders of the state do not lead to disillusionment with the nation-statist ideology. Mitchell (1990) argues that modern forms of power work through constructing a seemingly dualistic world (p. 547) in which there is a clear distinction "between a public...acquiescence and a realm of private...autonomy" (p. 551). We can equate this realm of private autonomy with the realm of nation-family in the serial, which is being corrupted by the forces of politics yet still manage to sustain its existence. Mitchell argues that in this model of thought, arguably just like it is the case in *Hatırla Sevgili*, there exist the latent notion of subjectivity or self-hood of individuals that supposedly pre-exists and is maintained against this objective, material world (p. 562). In this scheme, exercise of power is conceived as a force that aims to penetrate from outside to this non-material subjectivity, realm of private autonomy (p. 562).

Mitchell argues that according to such a perspective, power is opposed to a pre-existent self and truth, which are considered to be outside the dynamics of power (p. 564).

And this “creates the effect of power as a system...that exists as something external to ordinary life” (p. 567). According to him this is the result of the desire to present certain political groups as self-formed subjects “who preserve against an essentially physical coercion a space of mental autonomy” (p. 573). Similarly, the nation-family in the series is presented as if it is a self-formed unit constituted of loving subjects who preserve their space of mental autonomy against the realm of divisive politics but more importantly against the coercive powers of the deep state. This distinction delineates a separate realm of nation, which has been presented as if formed independently of the structuring effects of the state. To put it more simply, the claimed essence of the society seems to lie outside the sphere of influence of the state. Thus, it can be said that the nation is portrayed as if to pre-date and even exist despite policies of the state. It does so, as several audience comments also demonstrate, by reproducing the sense of a historical unity of a cohesive nation, which has come under attack by the outside forces, specifically by the deep state.

However, Mitchell (1990) argues that: “it is the invention of this two-dimensionality that makes it possible to imagine such an antecedent unity...” (p. 566) as of nation-family. In the case of *Hatırla Sevgili*, the discourse about the deep state enables the constitution of the nation-family as an “antecedent unity” living harmoniously. As all the violent deeds are primarily rested upon the mysterious, secretive yet powerful organization called the deep state, national community could be presented as a realm where national subjects with all their differences could harmoniously live together. Nation-family emerges as a realm of “private autonomy”, which has remained relatively protected from the corruption, confusion and violence.

Therefore, I argue that the deep state and nation-family are mutually constructive of each other. They are constitutive elements of a new discourse which comes into existence during the 2000’s. This new liberal discourse, as it draws a picture of peaceful solidarity

amidst the difference in the national community, needs the deep state as the ultimate other, which is depicted both as the essential reason of inter-communal violence of the past and also as a communal enemy for national subjects to unite against. This new discourse works through creating such sites of supposed autonomy as nation-family and the deep state as the binary other of national community. Hence, dichotomy between the state, or the deep state, and society is the effect of a new discourse of power (Yashin, p. 135).

It can further be argued that as the unity of people living in Turkey is naturalized and presented as pre-dating the constructive effects of the state, the state starts to symbolize “the inescapable unity of one people on one soil” (Easton, 1953, p. 111-112). As the effects of the state in the construction of the national community are disguised, and hence the community is presented to be as a self-formed natural unity, the state emerges as a correlative of the always already cohesive nation. In that respect, every obstacle that the loving subjects encounter also heightens the love for the possible nation-state in which loving subjects could happily live⁹⁰ (Sommer, p. 127). It is this possible nation-state that the national subjects would wholeheartedly be devoted to. Hence, it can be claimed that in this new discourse there is an objective for the creation of a new nation-state which would be cleansed of the deep state elements which harm both the nation-state and the national subjects.

Relating the entire violence to deep state also serves to create a narrative of common pain. The period of twenty years is described to be composed of the common suffering experienced by all the national subjects. Unlike much of the previous writings about this era, it is implicitly claimed that every political group has their share of suffering, and there is no monopoly over it by any group in the society. In this way, suffering of the past is no longer of use to the formation of oppositional group identity. On the contrary, as the conflicting parts of

⁹⁰ Sommer uses this argument specifically for the heterosexual couples, their love leads to the love of the nation-state as the place where love gets consummated.

the society are together constituted as victims, the articulation of their suffering becomes the groundwork for the constitution of a new, reconciliatory subjectivity emphasizing their commonality (Rofel, p. 707). Suffering is turned into a shared memory through which everybody is united via their memories of pain and loss against their common enemy; the deep state.

This claim to mutual suffering is neither limited to *Hatırla Sevgili* nor to the narration of the 1968 era in the 2000's alone, but seems to be a prevalent way to deal with the traumatic past events in contemporary Turkey.⁹¹ Through that discourse about mutual pain, which ultimately does not blame or aim to offend any sub-grouping in the society, the least problematic route to narrate the traumatic events of the past is preferred. The sense of unity of the community with all its members is maintained as well by constructing a singular narrative of common pain.

As it has been the case in the truth and reconciliation commissions, the primary aim in the series is to create a singular, largely acceptable story of the past. Thus, *Hatırla Sevgili* aims “to construct a common national history based on ‘truth’ about the past human rights violations” which would serve to the purpose of creating “a shared sense of the past in the midst of an extreme diversity of experiences” (Buur, p. 149). With this objective, particular stories are selected for narration in the series and to constitute the country's history.

Arguably, the primary value of creating a more or less unitary history about the past is that the past would no longer be a source of conflict and would no longer remain as an open wound that continues to bleed in the present and would continue to bleed in the future. Once turned into a common history, the past would symbolize a singular journey “leading into a common future” (Buur, p. 157). Hence, just like love, past memory of suffering, once

⁹¹ See Taha Akyol (2009) *Ortak Acı 1915 Türkler ve Ermeniler*, Doğan Kitap
Akyol narrates the forced expulsion and resulting massacres of Armenians in the year 1915 as constituting a period of common pain in which both communities suffered greatly.

presented to be a shared characteristic of every group in the society, serves to the end of creating the imagery of a unified nation.

B. Masked Inequalities and Violence

This narrative about a cohesive nation can make invisible actual inequalities which can be argued to have motivated the social conflicts and the conflicting interests of different social classes in the society. For instance, class struggle in the Marxist sense of the term refers to unsolvable conflict between the bourgeoisie owning the means of production and the working class who are dispossessed by the former. In *Hatırla Sevgili* there are scenes in which the desperate life conditions of people from the working class are demonstrated to the audience, yet these scenes are subsumed under the unifying discourse of the nation. Unfavorable life conditions of workers are shown to be mostly the result of not any un-solvable class conflict but the abuses of certain industrialists and institutions. The struggles of the working class people are considered to be resulting from the intolerable behavior of certain facilities that they work in, but not to a clash of interests between different classes.

House keeper woman is a good example of this point; having later married a worker activist, she is still part of the family and shares a common destiny with the other members of it. Sarah Ahmed (2004) writes for the case of the multi-cultural ideal in Britain that: “Migrant communities and working class white communities must give up their love for each other - a love that gets coded as love of themselves...- and love those who are different...” (p. 138). Similarly, house keeping woman is expected to love other members of the nation-family, and she perfectly does so, having her part in the family as just yet another “different” member of it. Hence, this seemingly all-embracing discourse of love and sense of unitary community founded by it may serve to “mystify the inevitable inequities of any social order” (Lincoln,

1989, p. 4). Any societal conflict based on the forms of inequality can easily be neutralized and obliterated under a unitary language about a cohesive nation.

Furthermore, as Mankekar argues, such “un-critical and romantic celebrations of community” can veil the fact that the community can also be a site of violence against “others”. (p. 218). She claims that such representations based on finding a culpable for the past deeds of violence prevents an understanding of some of the most terrifying aspects of collective violence by eliding the complex ways in which “the ordinary people” perpetrate atrocities on each other (Mankekar, p. 306). Veena Das (1995) points out that such nostalgic descriptions of the community also hide from view the role of violence in the formation and in defining the community; hence they present “a sanitized picture of tradition and community” (p.51). In this respect, domination and exercise of power in the society, according to Mitchell, is sustained by the taken for granted assumptions about the existence of this “distinct metaphysical realm of structure or meaning that stands apart from what we call material reality” (Mitchell, 1990, p. 561). Therefore, claims about an all cohesive and harmonious nation, as this new discourse propagates, can well turn out to be a mechanism through which imbalances of power, related inequalities and forms of violence are disguised from view. Different forms of injustices, inequalities and the everyday forms of violence would be over-shadowed by that claim of a cohesive nation.

V. Multicultural Nation as a Historical Fantasy

In this section, I will principally follow the literature which disrupts the common sense split between fantasy and the ideological reality as two different realms uninformed from each other (Walkerdine, 1986, p. 192). Fantasy is not merely the work of individual imagination irrespective of the ideological reality that surrounds the subject. As Zizek (1989) argues

“ideology is not dreamlike illusion that we build to escape insupportable reality; in its basic dimension it is a fantasy-construction which serves as a support for our ‘reality’ itself” (p. 45). In this vein, ideological fantasy of the series will be treated in this thesis as a constitutional element in the way particular ideologies and the picturing of reality that they present attain their coherence.

Aletta Norval (2001) portrays the changing concepts of nationhood as forms of social fantasies circulating among citizens, and also demonstrates the importance of these social fantasies for the nation states. Social fantasy makes use of history to provide identification between past and present actors, thus constituting them as subjects by displaying a transcendent set of traits which unite them (Scott, 2001, p. 287). Therefore, I define and make use of the concept of social fantasy in this study as the mean by which relations of identification between past and present are forged, and thus as a process that forms and sustains subjectivities (Scott, p. 287).

It can be argued that there emerged new narrative forms by the 1980’s in which the history of the 1968 era have been encapsulated within particular political discourses reflecting and shaping the political struggles of their contemporaneous age. In them, the history of the 68 era is directly incorporated and made part of ongoing political disputes which have their claimed historical basis extending back before the 1960’s. The events of 68 are presented to be as a Notable Avenue in these age old struggles that marked the Republican Era.

Not just *Hatırla Sevgili*, but each work that I have so far analyzed had an underlining narrative scheme, a discursive form with shorthand explanatory power of the whole period in question. Each work employs a fantasy element around which the entire narration is centered upon. Respectively, as I before pointed out, this is the struggle of an adventurous idealist or of the Kemalist Republican citizen. Lastly, it is the struggle of the nation itself against the secretive deep state. I believe this sharp change in the narration from one period to the next

can be explained by making use of the concept of ideological fantasy and its use in the creation and maintenance of particular ideologies. Hence, I will consider these discursive forms that underpin the works as ideological fantasies, enabling authors to speak to their contemporaneous age

Slavoj Žižek (1989) wrote that: "...the multitude of floating signifiers...is structured into a unified field through the intervention of a certain 'nodal point' which quilts them...and fixes their meaning" (p. 87). The multitude of events that have occurred during the 68 era are re-organized around a "nodal point" which make them part of an over-arching discursive schema. This "nodal point" in the work of Bedri Baykam is the common progressive values of the Republic, army and the youth as opposed to backward people, the Democrat Party and also the contemporaneous Welfare Party led governments. In the case of the latter discourse, the past, or specifically the 68 era, became a vehicle to express a liberal fantasy about Turkey in which "nodal point" is the depiction of a utopia-like world of nation-family as opposed to the deep state. Narrated events had their historical basis but they become national fantasies as they are structured "to fit a collective dream of the kind of nation" and national subjects these works try to create (White, 1987, p. 2). They try to achieve a coherent picturing of national history in which the history of national polity is provided a historical depth and continuity (Scott, p. 287). Thus, the narration in either example is an imaginative activity that responds to the present, plays with what is given, but creates a totally new meaning from the lived experience of the 1968 era (Westkott, 1977, p. 2).

A. The Series *Hatırla Sevgili* and the Ideological Fantasy

In this section, I will focus on the discourse about a united, cohesive society based on love considering it as a foundational element of the liberal, multi-cultural ideology as presented in the series. Analyzing it as a historical and political fantasy, I will focus on the

issue of how this fantasy establishes its ideological coherence. Focusing on this new discourse as it is portrayed in *Hatırla Sevgili* is important because it demonstrates that the present age is a contested historical moment in regard to how the future for the citizens of the nation-state is being fantasized by making use of history (Rofel, p. 715).

This fantasy of cohesive society as nation-family provides us with a vision of the future that is rooted in a truth claim about a naturalized, multi-cultural national community that we have preserved from the past (Jay, 1973, p. 179). This fantasy of a multi-cultural society based on love assures that people from different class, ethno-religious and social status can live together and feel themselves as members of a united community as it puts forward in a dramatic story form, what it means to be a national subject (White, p. 2). Hence, fantasy fosters the solidarity of the national community, consolidates national identity, and animates national desire (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008, p. 8). It serves to inspire and legitimate contemporary political action in line with this discourse by finding precedents and inspiration for it in the past (Scott, p. 286). Therefore, we can describe what I have so far called as nation-family to be an outcome of ideological fantasy, which constitutes the backbone for the multi-cultural ideology of the series.

Fantasy at one and the same moment drifts between three periods of time: past, present and future (Freud, 1963, p. 21-28). Fantasy is occasioned by events in present day Turkey, which can briefly be named as the contemporaneous struggle against the deep state, the issue of de-militarization and the desire to establish a viable multi-cultural society, one in which the deeds of inter-communal violence of the past would not re-occur, to be built in the present. From there fantasy wanders back to the past in which this wish was fulfilled, the realm of nation-family which is devoid of such conflicts and where people could happily live with their differences. Fantasy then emerges as a future-oriented project waiting to be fulfilled by the

example set by the memory of nation-family (Westkott, p. 4). Thus, memory serves to connect present longing with the wish for future gratification (Jay, p. 179). It is this “imaginary promise of recapturing our lost/impossible enjoyment which provides the fantasy support” (Glynos & Stavrakakis, p. 7) for this liberal political project endorsed by the discourse of multi-cultural, loved based social order.

Joan W. Scott’s (2001) view of ideological fantasy is highly informative about this liberal, multi-cultural fantasy. She wrote that:

Fantasy, in fact, envisions the end of difference, the recovery of "a lost territory" and the end of the divisiveness, conflict, and alienation associated with individuation. It is a utopian fantasy of sameness and harmony (p. 293).

In this respect, this fantasy about the cohesive national space is occasioned by the very lack of it. Dean MacCannell (1999) wrote that modern people are condemned to look elsewhere to discover their authenticity as subjects, to see if they can catch “a glimpse of it reflected in the simplicity...chastity or purity of others” (p.41). In this vein, the series presents an authentic national subjectivity for the people of Turkey portrayed through the “simplicity, chastity and purity” of its characters. The series also presents an imagery of genuine national solidarity of its chaste and pure characters, as private lives of the characters were principally marked not by the conflicts but by the love that they had for each other.

The series is based upon the repetition of the scenes which evoke the basic narrative about this fantasy of genuine national solidarity to the point that, in a sense, “repetition replaces history” (Scott, p. 290). Sarah Ahmed (2004) demonstrated that social forms are effects of repetition and as Butler claims it is through the repetition of norms that social space materializes (p. 12). Repetition of this basic narrative produces the fantasy of cohesive multi-cultural national space, which “evokes, erases, and thereby resolves social antagonism”

(Scott, p. 290). Hence, these acts of repetition function as a sort of ritualized reaffirmation of the belief in the inherently coherent national space and thus reflect social aspirations in the present (Radway, 1984, p. 198).

However, the crucial issue here is that without the deep state as an ultimate corruptive force of the nation-family, the entire discourse would fall apart. It is only the deep state which can explain the lack of what the discourse about the nation-family premises: the realization of good life. Thanks to the discourse about a secretive third party force, as powerful as is mysterious, and an alien organism amidst the national space; the deep state, that fantasmatic narrative can provide “a convincing explanation for the lack of total enjoyment” (Glynos & Stavarakakis, p.8), as several viewer comments also demonstrate. As it is argued by Glynos and et al, credibility and salience of any object of identification, any process of national subject formation, relies on the ability of the fantasmatic narrative to provide a convincing explanation for the lack of total enjoyment and the cause of the lack of enjoyment is attributed to someone who has ‘stolen it’ (Glynos & Stavarakakis, p. 7). Therefore, this dualism about the nation and the secretive forces consolidates each side as an undifferentiated whole and “effaces the differences that produce hierarchy and conflict among ‘us;’ articulating a longing for enjoyment that it is beyond the ability of any ideological system to provide” (Scott, p. 289).

Fantasy then is a mechanism for the articulation of historically specific discourses, like the discourse about the liberal cohesive nation which has come into emergence in the present day Turkey. Yet, in its self-representation, this discourse is transcendental of historical specificity and can shorthand explain nearly the entire Republican history on an absolute dualism between the nation and the secretive forces (Scott, p. 288).

B. Erasure of the “Real Kernel” through Ideological Fantasy

I define the concept of ideology not as a mask which prevents us seeing the reality behind it, but as a fantasy that discursively creates and shapes the reality itself (Wollacott, p. 105). Žižek (1989) wrote that: “The fundamental level of ideology...is not an illusion masking the real state of things but that of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring the reality itself” (p.33). In this respect, ideological fantasy of the series structures a particular picturing of essentialized reality about the history of Turkey, based on the absolute dualism between cohesive nation and its other, the secretive forces.

Denis Riley (2000) describes fantasy as “sustained metaphoricity”, meaning that fantasy provides that subject could continually live “as if” (p. 13). Subject can live as if the realm of national community is conflict-free without the provocations of secretive forces embodied by the deep state. The concept of cynicism is informative about how this issue of living ‘as if’ is made possible. Žižek uses this term in circumstances where the subjects act with the full prior knowledge of what they are doing, of what the ideology is supposed to keep hidden from them. In other words, they perfectly know what is hidden behind the mask of ideology, but that does not stop them from acting in the way to uphold the ideology.

This view is in sharp contrast with the orthodox Marxian term of “false consciousness”, in which subjects do what they do only because they do not fully know what they are doing, and would cease to do so once they are made aware of it, aware of what the ideology disguises from them. In the way Žižek summarized the cynical behavior: “they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it” (p.28-29). Thus, subject is aware of what is hidden behind the mask of ideology and recognizes the distance between the ideological mask and the reality, but still finds reasons to retain the mask (Žižek, p. 29). Thus, for cynically acting subjects there is no mask to lift to expose the true face of ideology since they already know what is hidden behind it but continue to believe in the ideological fantasy.

I argue that this realm of fantasy in *Hatırla Sevgili* is created largely thanks to the series of cynical representations of the past. In this realm of nation-family, there are no lasting conflicts or enmities; only political disagreements are the causes of struggles and that even they could have been easily solved if the deep state willingly tried to escalate the political divisions. One viewer commented on this idealization of the family pointing out that nobody in such a large did ever gossip or talked negatively about each other, adding that: “you could have been realistic while creating the ideal family.”⁹²

Indeed, virtually all problems stem because of the machinations of the deep state. The series provides the impression that without its interference there would only be social cohesion. Social and political divisions are at worst just temporary frictions in the continuum of love and affection that characters feel for each other. Thus, in this scheme, there is no place for lasting disputes; society is not formed by the conflicting interests of different groups nor would there be any deed of violence in the society left to its own.

The depiction of the 1968 youth movement similarly is described via presenting them to be all unified in aims and working in a brotherly fashion. There is no way one can even have a glimpse of the heavy disputes and the resulting divisions that have emerged within the 1968 movements that one can see especially in autobiographical works of ex-activists.⁹³ The entire movement is represented as a solid block, virtually without any internal dispute, all aiming and acting for the same desired consequences. Furthermore, it is sometimes difficult to separate even the right wing and left wing activists except from the clothes that they wear. Rather than sharply different political programs they are in favor of, both groups are essentially presented through their common love for the country and neutralized by it. This helps constructing first a unitary idealistic 1968 era youth movement and secondly an equally

⁹² Ekşi Sözlük. “...bu kadar geniş aile içinde hiç kimse mi birbirinin arkasından konuşmaz...’ideal’ aileyi yaratırken de hiç olmazsa gerçekçi olabilirsiniz.”

⁹³ For instance, See Selçuk Polat *Mahşerin Beyaz Atlısı* Kibele, İstanbul 2009

idealistic right wing movement as exemplars of what people in the past have endeavored to do for the love of their country.

Thus, the series resorts to cynicism as to create a convincing picture of ideological fantasia, a picturing of Turkey without any lasting, unsolvable conflicts, so long it is undisturbed by the machinations of the deep state and its internal and external collaborators. Yet, this is only possible through cynicism, by denying the existence of conflicts and struggles waged in the society because of various sources of inequality, injustices and conflicting interests. Žizek (1989) claims that “ideology designates a totality set on effacing the traces of its own impossibility” (p. 49). Here, in this case, multi-cultural ideology of Hatırla Sevgili is constructed through effacing the traces of conflicts of various sorts which would render impossible the imagining of this seemingly all-inclusive totality of utopic rendering of the national space.

Žizek (1989) wrote that ideological fantasy is “an illusion which structures our effective, real social relations and thereby masks some insupportable, real, impossible kernel”, thus “the function of ideology ...is to offer us the social reality itself as an escape from some traumatic, real kernel” (p. 45). In a similar line of thought, I believe the ideological fantasy of the multi-cultural nation is centered upon the erasure of the “traumatic, real kernel” that reigns in the society. It is based upon the erasure of the fact that the society consists of different classes whose interests are unequivocally in conflict with each other and the erasure of the fact that what is romantically described as the inherently peaceful community is the site of struggle where different ideologies and interests clash with each other. Subjects can transcend the lived realities of everyday life structured by the social inequalities, injustices and struggles through resorting to this all-cohering, all-uniting discourse of multi-cultural nation. Hence, ideological fantasy uses “history to solidify identity and thereby build constituencies across

the boundaries of difference” (Scott, p. 303). However, this camouflages the real kernel of the society; the fact that it is a realm of conflicts, exploitations and inequalities.

CONCLUSION

In this study I have focused on four different works produced in ten years of time intervals from 1978 to 2008 and I tried to demonstrate that the remembrance of the 1968 era has been significantly transformed from one decade to the next. I have analyzed each work as representative of a new discourse that has emerged in the historical context of its production, as a work which simultaneously both influences and yet is affected by the contemporaneous socio-political conditions. In this vein, this study both analyzes selected works by taking into consideration the time when they are produced and simultaneously, I argue, these selected works reveal important information about their social contexts of production especially in regard to prevalent contemporaneous discourses on the national polity. Herein, my chief concern was to investigate the differing constructions of national polity and national subjectivities via the remembrance of the 1968 era in the conflicting discourses of these four works.

All these four works presented the 1968 era as an epoch of struggle between two irrevocably opposing groups, yet the axis of separation of opponents has shifted from one work to the next. In the work of Orhan İyiler, published in 1978, the struggle is presented as a conflict between honest and dishonest people instead of a conflict between people pursuing different political projects. I argued that this moralizing discourse, by depicting opponents as self-sacrificially benevolent and egoistically malevolent people, reflected the conflict-ridden atmosphere of the late 1970's when armed conflicts between left and right wing activists as well as the clashes with governmental forces were commonplace and were further intensifying.

Yet, a more remarkable change in the narration has occurred after the 1980's following the military coup of 12 September, the rise of the neo-liberalism and the

accompanying decline of socialist revolutionary hopes. After then, the representation of the 1968 era is appropriated by and legitimized differing contemporaneous prevalent discourses used to construe the national polity and its history.

In Alev Er's work produced in the year 1988, activists of the 1968 era were likened to and perceived as the predecessors of the new class of entrepreneurs of the neo-liberal age with their common adventurism, thrust for novelty and dislike of status-quo. While the 1968 era activists are depicted as people who pursued unrealizable objectives from the start, they nonetheless were a vital source of inspiration with their relentless idealism. They paved the way for the emergence of young entrepreneurs who, being no longer Turks content with what they have, "opened to the wide seas" to do business. In this new discourse, the 1968 era has signified a notable break in the Turkish history; the activism of the 1968 era has triggered change of consciousness and paved the way for Turkey's coming to terms with the developed Western world by voluntary inclusion into the globalization project. I have also demonstrated that this narrative is clearly inspired by a contemporaneous discourse formed in Western Europe in regard to the 1968 era which claimed that the neo-liberal social order signified not a failure, but the ultimate consummation of the ideals of the 1968 era social movements.

In my analysis of Baykam's work published in 1998, I have demonstrated that the remembrance of the 1968 era in this period was severely affected by the contemporaneous political conflicts on the basis of the rise of Islamist and Kurdish social movements. I argued that this staunchly Kemalist discourse has developed in response to the challenge posed by the Islamist and Kurdish social movements against the Kemalist modernization project. As such the work itself can be considered on par with the civilian initiated campaigns of the 1990's defending the Republic especially against the rise of Islamist political parties. In this line of thought, the narration is centered upon the claim of a naturalized unity of the Turkish Army

and the youth as progressive agents in opposition to backward people who are trying to inflict harm on the national polity.

Haşmet Atahan's writings on the 1968 social movements, originally published in the late 1990's, directly cherish the so-called post-modern coup of 28 February 1998 as a progressive movement in Turkish history and, similar to Baykam, he links it with other progressive moments of Turkish history; the foundation of the Republic in 1923, the military coup against the Democrat Party in 1960 and the 1968 social movements. Plus, both authors presented the year 1971 as the most regrettable time when the naturalized unity between the army and the youth was harmed. I have thus argued that to remember the 1968 era activism in these works is essentially directed at remembering the time before the military coups of 1980 and 1971. It is meant, by putting aside the violence of the coups, to remember the time when there was a supposed organic unity between the army and the youth in the 1968 social movements before the coups. This narrative then backs up and tries to gather support for the contemporaneous actions of the military especially against the Islamist social movements.

In the second part of the thesis, I have analyzed the TV series *Hatırla Sevgili*. Borrowing Doris Sommers' terminology of "nation-family", I have claimed that the series narrates the story of a united family, constituted of people with different ethno-religious, cultural and class backgrounds, as a metaphor of the multi-cultural nation. I have then based my analysis of the series essentially on the theoretical propositions of three thinkers; Timothy Mitchell, Sarah Ahmed and Slavoj Žižek. Drawing on Timothy Mitchell, I have argued that the narration in the series is built upon a dichotomy as of the deep state and the multi-cultural nation. That multi-cultural nation is presented as a self-formed organism which in essence retained a sphere of peaceful autonomy from the conflict and violence of the outside world. The political conflicts, armed struggles and the massacres are always either started or

aggravated by the schemes of a mysterious deep state apparatus which in fact work totally against the interests of an otherwise cohesive multi-cultural nation.

Following Sarah Ahmed, I have claimed that it is the emotions and particularly the love that the series puts forward as the constitutive element of that multicultural cohesive nation instead of ethnicity, race, religion or culture. It is through the demonstration of inherently possessed love towards the country and other subjects that people attain their subjecthood and become part of the national polity. It is also through the love that the national subjects can be delineated from the vicious state officers associated with the deep state who lack such an emotional bond. It is also plausible to suggest that this new discourse about a love based national polity has developed in contestation of the more exclusionary discourses on national subjects in Turkey.

This study also aimed to show that the ideological fantasy is a vital part of the way in which particular ideologies and subjectivities are constituted, contested and re-formulated. Based on Žižek's conception of ideological fantasy, I argued that this implicit claim about an always already cohesive multi-cultural nation presents an unhistorical fantasy. This fantasy, by creating and picturing a reality of its own as of multicultural, love based family-like nation, erases the real kernel of the society; that it is constituted of social antagonisms, inequalities and injustices. It obscures class based exploitation by a claim to peaceful harmony. Plus, this fantasy about the nation-family prevents, as Zeynep Güzel (2009) argues, an effective confrontation with past violent deeds by relating each and every violent deed with the secretive designs of the deep state (p. 118) and, as Mankekar argues, by putting aside the fact that romanticized community itself can be a site of violence.

The representation of the 1968 era youth activists accordingly took a distinct turn in the series; activists were likened to the contemporaneous right wing activists and also to the Democrat Party members who were deposed by the coup of 1960. All these groups who were

pursuing different political objectives were united in their common victimhood in the face of the deep state initiated military coups. Thus, opponents of the past are reconciled and re-united again via their shared emotive bond; that of their common suffering.

I also argued that the representation of the left-wings activists in the series in particular capitalized on an already existing view about them. The series presented the left wing activists primarily as the embodiment of uncorrupted purity, love and naivety. Yet, in this case, that long existing perception of the activists was made to perfectly fit them into the utopic nation-family as they became the forerunner representatives of this fantasy world by their youthful purity. Then, their relative corruption, like their direct involvement in violent deeds, and their suffering because of the secretive forces arguably started to symbolize the partial corruption and the suffering of the nation-family which awaits repair and restructuring.

Lastly, drawing on the arguments of Aletta Norval, Lars Buur, Gyan Pandey and Purnima Mankekar about the community constitutive effect of remembering the past violence, I argued that the narrative of *Hatırla Sevgili*, or the contemporaneous liberal multi-cultural discourse that I believe the series both is affected by and proliferates, needs the deep state as its constitutive other. It is only by finding a third party culprit and by maximizing its role in the long and brutal history of conflicts and violence of Turkey's past that one could have, borrowing Castoriadis' term, imaginarily instituted a pre-existent multi-cultural community living in peace and harmony. Capitalizing on the role of the deep state in the past violence, by making possible the existence of a past nostalgic community of serenity, not only legitimizes the contemporaneous visions for the establishment of a liberal multi-cultural national polity, but also presents it as a natural rather than a possible outcome. The present age then emerges as a contested moment, one in which the elimination of the deep state and its associates will bring forth what naturally has to exist: a multi-cultural cohesive national community without any lasting social conflicts.

This focus on the deep state also cleanses the state itself from the violence and serves to re-conceptualize it as a viable institutional form for the national community to inhabit. Hence, there is a double discursive work; the atrocities of the past are being narrated as the result of the machinations of an outside force to the cohesive national community: institutions of the state. Yet, the emphasis on the deep state also serves to de-criminalize the state itself; the former being depicted as a cancerous cell within what can otherwise be a healthy organism. Thus, the regular institutions and mechanisms of governance of the state are legitimated by delineating the cancerous “state within state” from the regular state machine.

As a concluding remark on this multi-cultural discourse and this thesis, I believe Michael Kammen’s view of the memory is highly informative. Kammen wrote that “memory is more likely to be activated by contestation, and amnesia is more likely to be induced by the desire for reconciliation” (Kırlı, p. 41). The narrative in the series does this double work simultaneously through remembering and forgetting; on the one hand it is an attempt at reconciliation of groups separated on the basis of ideology, ethno-religious and class differences in Turkey by reminding them of their common essence and that all major deeds of violence that polarized the cohesive national polity were the work of deep state. On the other hand, by pinpointing the deep state as the ultimate instigator of all major social conflicts, it also chose to forget what can harm this naturalized unity: class based inequalities that dominate the social order and the fact that violence of the past can not simply be relegated to the scheming of secretive forces but points to a more collective responsibility and guilt. Therefore, the multi-cultural discourse of history, on the one hand, focuses on remembering the violence of the past associating it completely with the deep state as it seeks a contestation with and the eventual elimination of the deep state and its corollary military coups from the Turkish polity. On the other hand, it forgets the social mechanisms which produce inequalities, conflicts and violence to achieve communal reconciliation in the present.

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