

**OCCIDENTALISM AND THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY:
A CASE STUDY ON THE DEMOCRAT PARTY ERA**

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

The present study analyzes the Democrat Party (DP) era (1950-1960) from the framework of development. Taking development as a system of power, a body of knowledge and a discourse that emerged after the World War II and through the analysis of expert reports, scientific studies, official documents, newspaper coverage and secondary sources, a number of arguments are made. It is argued that the relations between Turkish governments and development institutions contained an element of power that crystallized in the legitimacy and use of science and expertise. Through the configuration of Turkey as a “developing” and “modernizing” country and the definition of its needs, certain points of intervention and certain possibilities for the transfer of knowledge, capital and expertise were created. It is also argued that within the relations development, Turkish governments pursued their own agendas, and through their agency, they opposed and transformed the impositions and suggestions of the US government and international development institutions to some extent. The thesis also demonstrates, via its employment of the notion of Occidentalism, how the discourse of development provided intellectual elites with the legitimate language to think and speak about social change and make political claims about Turkey with reference to an imagined West and western modernity.

Keywords: The Democrat Party, development, Occidentalism, agency, expertise, modernization theory, Celal Bayar’s 1954 visit to United States, Turkish-American relations.

ÖZET

Bu çalışma, Demokrat Parti dönemini (1950-1960) kalkınma çerçevesinde incelemektedir. Kalkınma, II. Dünya Savaşı ertesinde ortaya çıkan bir güç sistemi, bir bilgi bütünü ve bir söylem olarak kabul edilir ve uzman raporları, bilimsel çalışmalar, resmi belgeler, gazete kayıtları ve ikincil kaynakların incelenmesiyle bir dizi iddiada bulunulur. Türk hükümetleri ve kalkınma kurumları arasındaki ilişkilerde bilim ve uzmanlığın meşruluğu ve kullanımında belirginleşen bir güç unsuru olduğu savunulur. Türkiye'nin "kalkınan" ve "modernleşen" bir ülke olarak kurgulanması ve ihtiyaçlarının belirlenmesiyle bazı nüfuz alanları ve bilgi, sermaye ve uzmanlık transferi imkanları yaratılmıştır. Türk hükümetlerinin, kalkınma ilişkileri içerisinde belirli bir ölçüde kendi gündemlerini takip edip, faillikleri vasıtasıyla Amerikan hükümetleri ve uluslararası kalkınma kurumlarının dayatma ve önerilerine karşı çıkıp onları dönüştürdüğü iddia edilir. Çalışma, Garbiyatçılık kavramını kullanımıyla, kalkınma söyleminin Türkiye'deki entellektüel elitlere tasavvur edilen bir Batı ve batı modernitesi vasıtasıyla toplumsal değişim hakkında düşünmek ve konuşmak, ve Türkiye hakkında politik isteklerde bulunmak için meşru dili sağladığını da iddia eder.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Demokrat Parti, kalkınma, Garbiyatçılık, faillik, uzmanlık, modernleşme teorisi, Celal Bayar'ın 1954 Amerika ziyareti, Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri.

INTRODUCTION

I. Outline

This study is a modest attempt to interpret postwar (1945-1960) Turkish politics from the framework of (post-)development studies. After World War II (WW II), developmentalism emerged as the major international political framework around which relations between the North and the South were organized (McMichael, 1996). Development was not only a set of measurable processes (such as improvement in economic indicators, educational or industrialization levels),¹ and a set of practices (transfer of knowledge, expertise and capital), but, as the post-development studies literature shows us, also a set of discursive statements (the birth of the notions “underdeveloped,” “Third World,” “poor nations” and so on) and a system of power (Escobar, 1996; Cooper and Packard, 1997). Thus, in this thesis, I take development as a system of power, a body of knowledge and a set of discursive statements that emerged in the postwar era in addition to certain practices.

Throughout the thesis, I analyze how Turkey entered the postwar relations of development and I study it on the three grounds indicated above. I analyze how the postwar Republican People’s Party (RPP) and the Democrat Party (DP) governments, both pursuing developmentalist policies (that placed economic development above all other political concerns), entered into these relations through economic and military aid and credit agreements, how Turkey emerged as a “developing” and “modernizing” country through

¹ Development was defined as economic growth measured in terms of per capita national income in the early postwar period. Its definition was modified several times under the influence of ideological changes in the world economy (e.g. the notion of “participation in the market” propagated by the World Bank in the 1970s) as well as social scientists’ and developing countries’ critiques against the dominant paradigms (e.g. “human development,” a concept which includes health and educational indicators in addition to economic ones and which was introduced by the United Nations). For an account of how the meaning of development as a material process has changed throughout the postwar period, see McMichael (1996).

knowledge production, and how the discourse of development pervaded the accounts of intellectual and political elites in Turkey in this era.

In terms of time frame, President Celal Bayar's visit to the United States in 1954 lies at the center of the analysis in my thesis. Accompanied by a number of prominent state officials, Celal Bayar left the country on January 18, 1954, arrived in New York on January 26, and toured the United States from east to west and north to south for over a month, travelling more than 10,000 miles, and returned to Turkey on March, 10, 1954. Bayar's visit was organized as a slideshow of the signifiers of American modernity: he visited factories, dams and film studios that portrayed the achievements of technology; universities that were the powerhouses of knowledge production; and nuclear plants and military bases that displayed the military strength of the US. These occasions provided Bayar and Turkish journalists covering his visit with various opportunities to reflect on life in the US and on Turkey's position as a "developing and modernizing country." The visit also coincided with an important dispute in Turkey's relations with the World Bank (WB), one of the most important development institutions of the postwar era. I focus on this visit, the events that surrounded it, and both journalistic and academic writing produced in the same period because I believe that all of these taken together present a moment in which development(alism) was crystallized in Turkey's endeavor to become modern in the postwar period. The events and writings surrounding this visit will also allow me to delineate development as a discourse and a system of power.

The first chapter is devoted to a review of the relevant scholarly literatures. In this chapter, I first lay out a historical account of wartime and postwar Turkey and the political legacy of the DP. In this part, I discuss the relevance of the framework of development to postwar Turkish

politics and I show that both Turkey's entanglement within the international relations of development and the circulation of the development discourse in its cultural realm has been poorly addressed in existing scholarship. I argue here that relations of development were one of the major determinants of Turkish postwar politics. Then, I lay out my theoretical framework, first explaining my usage of the notion of Occidentalism in the analysis of how the development discourse pervaded the way political and intellectual elites imagined social change in Turkey. Occidentalism, as defined by Ahiska (2003: 366), describes a "set of practices and arrangements justified in and against the imagined idea of the West in the non-West." Here, in order to trace the historical formation of Occidentalism, I follow the trail of how European (western) thinking about the non-West changed from the colonial to the post-colonial periods, especially paying attention to the notions of "the West and the Rest," Orientalism, developmentalism and modernization theory. Finally, I present my argument about the role of social science and expertise in the relations of development. I argue in this part that the relations between Turkey and development institutions contained an element of power that was crystallized in the "non-political" and "a-historical" legitimation of science and expertise that social scientists and development experts claimed to possess.

In the second chapter, I show that through economic and military aid, and the transfer of knowledge and expertise, development as a system of power greatly affected Turkish politics in the postwar era. While showing this, I argue that even though the postwar Turkish governments took part in these relations, they pursued their own agendas, and through their agency (their capacity to make choices, their capacity to act on their choices and influence the outcome of these relations) in these relations, they diverted and transformed the impositions and suggestions of the US government and international development institutions to some extent. Contrary to the suggestions and impositions of development institutions and the US

administration, I show that the DP government pursued industrialist and inflationist economic policies, heavy public spending, a fierce quest for foreign aid and credit.

In terms of knowledge production, I show in the second chapter that Turkey was configured as an “underdeveloped” and “traditional” country in the postwar era, first through an analysis of expert reports prepared by the World Bank and US government officials, and then through an examination of studies by American social scientists on Turkey. I thus argue that in this process, certain points of intervention and certain possibilities for the transfer of northern knowledge, capital and expertise were created. By analyzing expert reports, official documents and scientific studies, I show how science, expertise and politics were interrelated in the postwar era, how this entanglement was materialized in Turkish-American relations, and how Turkish governments took over the discourse of development and employed it.

In the third chapter, I analyze how the discourse of development fostered certain political subjectivities in Turkey. As a case that reveals how “the developed” and “development” were perceived by political and intellectual elites in Turkey, I study in this chapter the media coverage of Celal Bayar’s 1954 visit to the US. Through the analysis of articles on the American lifestyle written by journalists who toured America with Bayar, I show how the discourse of development appeared in the accounts of these journalists as they discussed the pathways of development in Turkey, and how this discourse was employed in their arguments as they made claims about a particular “Turkish identity” and “culture.” By using the framework of Occidentalism, I argue that by making references to a “developed” and “modern” US from within the discourse of development, these journalists were making political statements about Turkey and Turkish politics.

It must be stated that neither these arguments nor the thesis itself are meant to constitute an all-inclusive evaluation of Turkish politics between 1946 and 1960. Rather, they are attempts to fill some gaps in the scholarship on this era and approach certain processes through a different conceptual framework. The significance of the study arises from its attempt to apply the framework of development as used in post-development studies (e.g. Escobar, 1995) to postwar Turkish politics; its effort to show the agency of the “underdeveloped” party in the international relations of development and contribute to the recently growing literature in this field. This thesis also seeks to contribute to the field of post-development studies through its analysis of the dissemination of the development discourse via knowledge production in and on Turkey, the subjectivities that this discourse helped create; and to the literature on the politics of expertise and science (e.g. Mitchell, 2002; Goldman, 2005) by showing the power of expertise and science in Turkey’s relations with the US government and US-based institutions.

In terms of the literature on the DP, my study differs from previous accounts of the DP era for it shows the effects of Turkey’s position and agency within the Cold War and the relations of development on Turkish politics and it analyzes how the discourse of development was circulated and employed in the accounts of journalists and politicians. The thesis also demonstrates, via its employment of the notion of Occidentalism, how this discourse provided the legitimate language to think and speak about social change and make political claims about Turkey with reference to an imagined West and western modernity. Moreover, I show in this thesis the role and the power of science and expertise in Turkey’s relations with development institutions and American administrations in the postwar era. Another important contribution I seek to make is to bring into conversation with each other expert reports,

scientific studies, official documents, media coverage and secondary sources for the first time, putting under scrutiny an extensive array of data.

II. Research Design and Methodology

Conducting my research, I benefited from a variety of sources. First, I reviewed relevant secondary sources on development studies, modernization theory, post-development studies, and studies on the politics and economics of the DP era. I then analyzed official documents of the era between 1945 and 1960 that pertained to Turkish-American relations and relations between the Turkish governments and the World Bank. I reached these documents at the Prime Ministry General Directorate of the State Archives (*Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri*) in Ankara. I conducted content analysis of these documents and, in the second chapter, I supported my account of the activities of postwar Turkish governments within international relations of development through these documents.

In addition, I analyzed American experts' reports that were produced in the late 1940s and the early 1950s, and social scientific works that were published throughout the 1950s. In the second chapter, I sought to show the entanglement of social science, expertise and politics by investigating how these studies analyzed Turkey from the perspective of development and modernization.

Studying Celal Bayar's visit, I analyzed the Turkish newspapers *Cumhuriyet*, *Vatan*, *Zafer*, *Yeni Asır* and *Yeni İstanbul* published in the first half of 1954 as these were the only newspapers that sent their reporters to the US to cover his visit. I reached these newspapers in the Bayazıt Public Library in İstanbul and the National Library (*Milli Kütüphane*) in Ankara. I conducted content analysis of the newspaper sources, and in my analysis, I used the non-

probability-judgmental sampling method and latent coding. I used this analysis in the third chapter, in my analysis of subjectivity and Occidentalism.

In my discussion of the data I collected, I adopted a narrative approach, which in the words of Abbott (1990: 147), sees historical processes as “whole stories” that are “fundamentally discontinuous.” Supported by an emphasis on temporality and on the way local and temporal events change the course of long-term processes or generalities, the narrative approach helped me to address the gaps in the literature and make theoretical sense of the particularities of the Turkish case. The narrative approach is helpful in order to address the particular ordering, temporality and locality of events, their varying degrees of importance and their convergence with discourses, agency, subjectivities and representations, for as Abbott (1990: 147) holds, in the narrative approach, “causality flows differently in different cases, perhaps at different rates, certainly in different patterns.”

CHAPTER I: A FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING THE DEMOCRAT PARTY ERA: OCCIDENTALISM AND THE DISCOURSES OF DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION

I. Literature Review

I.A. Wartime Turkey

The period that is analyzed in this thesis is marked by the consequences of the Second World War (WW II), both in Turkey and in the international arena. Even though Turkey did not actively participate in the war, war conditions had negative effects on its social fabric (Karaömerlioğlu, 2006; Metinson, 2007). It can be argued that most social classes and groups in Turkey experienced major setbacks during the war. In wartime, the conscription of males and draft animals, mandatory work and forced purchases of products below market prices alienated the peasantry; the capital levy and etatist economic policies disturbed the landowners and the bourgeoisie; the negative impacts of tax policies, legalized overwork and mandatory work affected wage and salary earners; and hoarding speculations, the high defense budget, price inflation and the censure on the press all contributed to growing social discontent (Karaömerlioğlu, 2006). Wartime economic conditions caused subsistence problems, shortage of food and housing, worsening work and public health conditions and decreasing real wages and inflation (Metinsoy, 2007). Added to these were price controls, the rationing of bread, the National Defense Law (1940) that gave the state limitless control on the organization of the economy and the working life, the Agricultural Products Tax (1942), which negatively affected small landowners and subsistence peasants, the Capital Levy (1942) that brought an extra fiscal burden mostly on non-Muslim minorities, and the Land Reform Law (1945) which alienated large landowners.

I.B. Postwar Turkey

As a consequence of the social unrest that arose during wartime, a multi-party system was instituted in 1946 and the newly established DP won 62 out of 465 seats in the 1947 elections that were highly contested due to rumors of extensive electoral fraud.² The initial party program of the DP slightly varied from that of the RPP, that slight variation being DP's adherence to the primacy of private capital. The RPP's return to multi-party politics coincided with its other postwar efforts to approach the "Western Bloc" and articulate with the capitalist world system. The Truman Doctrine (1947), the Marshall Aid (1948) and Turkey's accession to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (1947) and the World Bank (WB) (1947) during the postwar RPP government constituted the institutional bonds that Turkey formed with the Western bloc. The RPP government, after WW II, also adhered to a more liberal political and economic policy; the trade regime was liberalized in 1947 and the Turkish lira was devaluated in order to join the IMF.

Another significant incident in this era was the abandonment of the five-year industrialization plan of 1945 for an alternative economic development plan in 1947. This new plan represented a very close entanglement with foreign resources and development institutions (Tekeli and İlkin, 2009). According this plan, in accordance with the foreign advice the RPP received during this era, the estimated percentages of public spending during 1948-1952 would be 44 percent for transportation and communication, 8 percent for industry, 16 percent for energy and 16 percent for the agricultural sector. In a telling manner, the plan foresaw that 49 percent of the money that would be spent during these years would be acquired through foreign sources, namely foreign aid and credit. Such an agenda meant that by 1947, economic policies of the RPP had already moved in the orbit of postwar developmentalism propagated

² Elections were held according to an open vote - secret count system and ballots were destroyed after the results were declared.

by the United States, and even though the plan was not implemented in full, it heralded the RPP's future economic endeavors.

As I will attempt to do so in the following chapter, one way of delineating the extent of the relation between the postwar Turkish governments and the US government and US-based development institutions is to analyze the impacts of expert reports of foreign missions that visited Turkey in this era. Three reports that were prepared by American experts and technicians, namely Hilts (1948), Thornburg (1949) and Barker (1951), aimed to direct the aid that was flowing to Turkey through the Marshall and Truman aid schemes and to reorganize the Turkish economy in accordance with the policies of the American Administration and the WB. In general, these reports proposed agricultural modernization, trade liberalization, support for private enterprise and foreign investment, minimized and controlled public investment and delaying of heavy industrialization. Even though both the RPP and the DP governments time and again carried out contrasting policies, these reports had significant national and international policy implications as well.

I.C. The DP between 1950 and 1953

The DP replaced the RPP as the ruling party in 1950 by winning 53.5 percent of the total votes. The transition to multi-party system and the following peaceful change of government signified the end of the 27-year reign of the RPP, and according to Kahraman (2007, 2008), by replacing the *historic bloc*, namely the alliance between intellectuals, the military and the bureaucracy, constituted the backbone of the future political structure of Turkey. Still, the differences between the RPP and the DP in terms of policy were little. The DP, like the postwar RPP government, adhered to a developmentalist economic policy and in its first three years at helm, the DP oversaw a remarkably high level of economic growth.

The opening up new land for cultivation, agricultural mechanization, the favorable price conjuncture of the Korean War, favorable weather conditions, the flow of foreign aid and an aggressive agricultural credit and investment policy contributed to the significant leap in every aspect of macroeconomic indicators, as well as infrastructural modernization and increase in the availability of consumption goods (Boratav, 1988). The DP partly kept up with the American advice on devoting public resources to building road networks and purchasing agricultural machinery, and met the demands of the petty producers in agriculture. But it also followed an extensive investment program of industrialization against American advice. In line with the American advice on liberal trade policies and agricultural supports, the export-import equilibrium which had registered surpluses since 1930 (except 1938), registered 21.3 million dollars of deficit in 1947 and by 1960, it rose to 147.4 million dollars. Newly opened fields were now cultivated with the help of tractors (1,000 in 1946; 40,000 in 1955) and artificial fertilizers. Between 1950 and 1953, GDP per capita rose by 28 percent, the ratio of foreign commerce to GNP rose steadily until 1952 (up to 19.21 percent) and started to fall sharply after 1954 (14.31 percent by 1954, 4.50 percent by 1958). In the period between 1946 and 1954, rises in production averaged 13 percent per year (Oran, 2001). When we look at industrialization, we see that against the suggestions of the Barker, Thornburg and Hilts reports, the DP government had eleven sugar factories, nineteen cement factories, five dams, and three thermoelectric power plants built (Demirer, 2005). The DP exceeded the five-year investment level target of the Barker Report by 55 percent between 1951 and 1955 and by 116 percent between 1956 and 1960.

I.D. The DP after 1954

At the 1954 elections the DP won the majority of votes by 57 percent and consolidated its political power, but in this year, due to the surmounting level of debts caused by immense public spending, the paucity of tax revenue from the peasantry and the uncontrolled flow of aid and credit, economic policies began to change (Balkanlı, 2002; Boratav, 1988; Kepenek and Yentürk 1994). The DP government, during the 1954-1960 period, opted to apply a more controlled foreign trade regime and import substitution industrialization (ISI) that was financed through public investment. Because of the unregulated implementation of developmentalist spending until 1954, economic indicators showed signs of alarm in that year. Foreign aid and credit ceased to flow in since international organization did not consider the state of the Turkish economy as viable, debts had accumulated, agricultural production was decreasing and due to excessive money printing and the negative effects of trade liberalization, the economy arrived at a bottleneck.

The advice of the IMF at this stage was to liberalize the trade regime, devalue the Turkish lira and end subsidizing agriculture through above-market prices. The DP, on the other hand, opted to reinforce the National Defense Law and expand its developmentalist spending. This signified that public spending was right on its course as before, but with greater power (Boratav, 1988). After 1954, public spending and state administration ensured that the DP held together the coalition of interests that was previously summoned together under the liberal trade regime. This coalition of interests had provided a way to support capital accumulation under a mixed economy, in which *etatist* and liberal aspects were found together.

In the 1957 elections, the DP received 47 percent of the total votes, and even though it stayed in power, its support had decreased since the 1954 elections. In the face of surmounting debt and inflation, the DP finally gave up on its economic agenda and signed an agreement with the IMF in 1958. Inflation rose from 3 percent in 1950 to 20 percent in 1958 and by 1960, total foreign debt reached 1.5 billion dollars, which was one fourth of the gross national product. In accordance with the terms of the IMF, the DP resorted to devaluation, rescheduled its debts and received a loan package. In 1959 and 1960, in its final years in government, the DP even approached the Soviet Union for aid and credit after ten years of anticommunist propaganda and exploitation of the “Soviet Threat” in its relations with the US in order to receive more economic and military aid (Oran, 2001).

1.E. Political Legacy of the DP

The Turkish economy in this era was attached to the workings of the international political framework of developmentalism. By means of utilizing economic and military aid by the US government, credit agreements with the WB and other international development agencies and the transfer of knowledge and expertise through expert reports and “scientific” studies, the postwar RPP and DP governments founded their economic policies in accordance with the predominant developmentalist international agendas of that period. Both parties followed developmentalist policies, pursued economic growth by both benefiting from the international relations of development and using their agency to embark upon heavy industrialization and excessive public spending that opposed the advice of the US and development institutions.

In this thesis, I am using development (or developmentalism) not only as some measurable material process (such as economic growth, industrialization, better health care or educational levels in a society), but more significantly, as a set of practices and a set of discursive

statements, which are all intertwined with each other. The power system that regulates the practice of development in the postwar era was dominated by the US and US-based institutions, but as I emphasized above, “underdeveloped” countries also had a certain degree of agency in this process. The discourse of development locates the comparative position of certain societies within a continuum of development and defines and legitimizes certain pathways for societies to become developed. In this thesis, I am arguing that the DP (and the RPP, albeit to a lesser extent) acted and spoke from within this discourse, with its references, policies and ideology.

Analyzing the literature on the political legacy of the DP, one finds that the framework of development is absent from most studies of the DP governments. Among the works of political scientists and sociologists who studied the DP era, development as an international system of power and as a discourse is given a residual (or relational) role and the DP’s political and economic policies are evaluated through notions such as populism, patronage relationships and nationalism. It has been argued that both in the power system that regulates the practice of development and in the circulation of the development discourse, development is altered, diverted, and used for a range of different purposes in different localities (Cooper and Packard, 1997; Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1990). As I have stated above, this was also the case with postwar Turkish governments, and especially the DP. In some studies on the DP, developmetalism is analyzed as a part of the DP’s social policies, but it has neither been analyzed within the international political framework of development, nor as a field within which the agency of the DP becomes visible in this framework. DP’s agricultural policies, its excessive public spending and its relationship with urban power holders are considered to be indicators of party patronage and populism (Demirel, 2005; Sunar, 1996; Taşkın, 2007); DP’s economic policies are considered to be an anti-doctrinaire stance that allowed it to steer away

from doctrinaire attachments and hold on to its wide electoral support by forming temporary relationships with different groups (Taşkın, 2007); and furthermore, DP's policies are also assessed in terms of nationalism (Bora and Canefe, 2002; Insel, 2002). Even though such arguments support rather than oppose my argument that development was altered and diverted within the hands of the DP governments for specific political purposes, studies on the economic history of the republic and on the political legacy of the DP fail to consider development as a system of power at the international level that had visible effects in the politics, society and culture of Turkey in the 1950s.

I.F. The DP, Populism, Patronage and Liberalism

Analyzing the political aspect of DP's economic policies, Demirel (2005) argues that DP's economic policies signified a populist development policy that was aimed at producing patronage relations with the electorate. According to Demirel, providing cheap agricultural inputs, expensive purchase of agricultural outputs, infrastructural investments for villagers, providing cheap credit, incentives, and tax exemptions for tradesmen and businessmen, using the state apparatus in public investment and using the state administration to produce private capital accumulation were all parts of DP's populist policies that fell into the category of party patronage. In this context, for Demirel, the DP's distance from economic liberalism should also be evaluated in terms of its awareness that the state, with its institutions, banks and with its capacity of regulation in the economic field, was the most powerful tool in sustaining political support or in weakening the opposition (2005).

In a similar vein, Sunar (1994) argues that patronage relations (which, according to Sunar, had already existed during the single party era but their spread to public services and resources was prevented through control and coercion) were set in vertical motion by the DP

administration. According to Sunar, wide social-based economic development and state-society integration were the two policies that DP turned into electoral support. He argues that the policy that would sustain the broad-ranging coalition that had brought DP to power could only be broad-based economic development, and that this policy, even though it encouraged private investment, was not based on a liberal economic model, but was established with a populist economic approach that contained *etatism* (1994).

I.E. The DP, Modernization and Nationalism

On the ideological side of the matter, according to Taşkın (2007), the choice of articulating with the capitalist system without forming a doctrinaire view and making do with a populist discourse of development in fact became the most important strategic inclination of the central right governments beginning with the DP era. Central right governments like the DP consciously steered away from pursuing doctrines such as liberalism, Islamism or nationalist conservatism due to the complex web of interests formed between the society and the central right governing cadres. What the DP did, according to Taşkın, was to popularize conservative modernization (what Taşkın configured as a midway between Kemalism and tradition) and the promise of benefiting from the fruits of development. In this argument, according to Taşkın, the DP could stay clear from ideological and political commitments as far as the economic structure allowed it to do so, and after 1958, when the economic structure was demolished, the DP resorted to authoritarian mechanisms to hold on to its electoral base (2007).

The “populist” policies of the DP have also been studied in their relation to nationalism.

For Bora and Canefe (2002), the DP’s opposition toward the *etatism* and centralism of the RPP governments in the name of the nation was combined with a dependency on the public

sector. They argue that public resources and public finances were turned into the arsenal of populism and patronage in the DP era. In a similar manner, İnel (2002), when tracing the points of convergence between nationalism and developmentalism, argues that the most important factor that enabled the convergence of nationalism and developmentalism in the DP era was patronage relations. In his argument, the DP governments considered development as the arena where the three principles of the republic, etatism (*devletçilik*), populism (*halkçılık*), and revolutionism (*inkılâpçılık*) were manifested. İnel (2002) says that patronage relations enabled the local elites and peripheral powers that remained outside of the political center in terms of cultural values and economic power to benefit from the fruits of DP's developmentalism in a more accelerated fashion.

As it can be inferred from these studies, neither the postwar international political framework of development which essentially set the tone of social change for most of the "Third World" after WW II nor the relation of the DP's developmentalism to this framework is given due reference in the scholarly literature on this era of Turkish politics. Even though the political implications of developmentalism have been analyzed, neither the international arena from which developmentalism as a policy and development as a discourse sprang nor the political opportunities that were provided to the DP by the international political framework of development are put into question. By analyzing the processes of institution building and knowledge production in Turkey in relation to the postwar relations of development, I will tackle these gaps in the literature in the second chapter of this thesis.

II. Theoretical Framework

In the Introduction, with reference to Escobar (1995), I argued that the discourse of development helps the fashioning of subjectivities as it circulates in a locality. I will analyze

subjectivity in this thesis (with reference to Meltem Ahiska's notion of Occidentalism, and in line with the way she uses the term subjectivity) in the following way. It is an interpretation of "subject positions" in Foucault's terminology in which subjects place themselves in specific positions within the discourse, from where the discourse makes most sense and from where they best relate to the power that is inscribed in a particular discourse (Foucault, 1972, 1980). The study of subjectivities creates a space to analyze how development was perceived, circulated and employed (by elites) in Turkey in the postwar era and in relation to existing political and cultural struggles. The framework of Occidentalism in this respect provides an opportunity to analyze subjectivities that were formed within the discourse of development and with reference to an imagined West and an imagined modernity. Such an analysis is also absent in the literature on the DP era and, in this thesis, I will conduct this analysis through an examination of Turkish media representations of American life with the help of the articles written by journalists who accompanied Celal Bayar in his 1954 visit to the US.

II.A. Occidentalism

Celal Bayar's visit took place at a time when the US replaced Western Europe in Turkish political culture as the pinnacle of modern social and political organization (Bora, 2002). After WW II, the ambition of "becoming a little America" became prevalent in the ruling elites' longtime aspiration for progress-through-westernization, and the US became a point of reference for assessing Turkey's economic development, political regime, social organization and cultural values. This not only had to do with the postwar relations between the US and Turkey and how the US was imagined in Turkey, but also, and with far greater importance, it had to do with how a certain Turkish national identity was (re)defined and (re)constructed by Turkish political and intellectual elites with reference to an imagined West and an imagined Western gaze (Ahiska, 2005).

The manner in which these references were made and the references themselves can be studied as part of practices of power and representations of subjectivity outside the West which were in constant relation (and negation) with how the West was simultaneously trying to define what belonged to the West and what belonged to the East, to manifest the authenticity of itself as a model (Ahiska, 2005). In order to study the historicity of the non-western in relation to the West, Ahiska proposes to use the concept of Occidentalism (2003, 2005), which I will use in the third chapter when analyzing media representations of the US in Turkish newspapers that appeared during Bayar's visit.³ In doing so, I will show how the discourses of development and modernization were inscribed in the framework of Occidentalism, and, in turn, how Occidentalism permeated the language used by the journalists. By using the notion of Occidentalism, I will reveal how the journalists' portrayal of American lifestyles and social organization provided them with the opportunity to assert political claims about a certain "Turkish identity," "culture," or a certain economic policy.

In Ahiska's use of the term, the notion of Occidentalism "attends to questions of modernity in a non-western context and aims to evoke the historicity of the non-western other rendered invisible in the hegemonic conceptions of western modernity, and even in some existing social theories that attempt to analyze these conceptions" (2003: 353). Within this historicity, one can both analyze the subjectivity of the other that still operates within the discursive realm of western constructs, and how these constructs in a non-western setting are attached to existing power struggles, prevailing discourses and competing claims over national identity.

³ James G. Carrier (1995), Couze Venn (2000) and Buruma and Margalit (2004) also make use of the framework of Occidentalism. Buruma and Margalit study anti-Westernism through the framework of Occidentalism; Venn traces Occidentalism within Western philosophy and psychoanalysis, analyzing the categories of the West and the Modern; and Carrier is the editor of a series of articles that analyze how the West was pictured in the non-West, regarding questions of representation and definitions of identity. Ahiska's use of the term differs from these studies for it allows the study of the historicity of the other, circulation of the discourse, and the inconsistencies inscribed in the separation of the West and the non-West.

Occidentalism, thus, carves out a space for studying the historicity of the other. It describes a “set of practices and arrangements justified in and against the imagined idea of the West in the non-West” (Ahiska, 2003: 366).

The Occidental framework that Ahiska describes operates in the discursive realm of how the West sees the non-western but it opens up a field for the representations and practices of the non-West. While the Occidental gaze (looking at Turkey with reference to an imagined Westernness, through the lens of an imagined West) is shaped by Orientalism to a certain extent, how it is put into use in Turkey can provide insights for national political and cultural struggles. In this sense, “just as the West always refers to the notion of the East to assert its hegemony, Turkey reproduces the reified images of the West to justify its regime of power in its boundary management of dividing spheres, regions, and people along the axis of East and West” (Ahiska, 2003: 368). When the DP era is considered, I argue that this justification of the power regime took place through the discourse of development for it was put into practice in Turkey by political and intellectual elites in their pursuit for political gains. On the other hand, it was the main power-knowledge axis on which unequal relations between the US and Turkey took shape. Imagining the West through development and modernization -and assessing Turkey with reference to the West through development and modernization - thus, should be understood as a way to relate to power.

Ahiska’s framework is helpful in bringing out the inconsistencies in the divide between the West and the non-West and the power struggles inscribed in the “border management” of these two spheres. Yet, her use of the categories of the West and non-West lack explanatory power for they refer to a West that is attributed different meanings and qualities in different discourses. In this thesis, the terms *West* and *non-Western*, as well as the terms *the Orient* and

the East, will be used only because they appear as such in the discourses that are analyzed. Thus, I take these concepts not as real entities but discursive entities. My aim in using and analyzing these discursive entities in the study of the Turkish case is to show the role of this historical divide in the postwar relations of development.

While the literature on the historicity of the East/West divide is vast, Turkey's "uneasy relation to colonialism and its consequent invisibility in postcolonial theories" (Ahiska, 2003: 359) is striking when analyzing this literature. For example, the Ottoman Empire is absent from the framework of one of the founding studies on the subject, Edward Said's *Orientalism*, and Turkey is mostly invisible in postcolonial studies. Still, analysis of the Ottoman Empire as a colonizer throughout most of its history and its relations with European colonizers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries should provide fruitful insights to examine the fragility of such divides, upon which modernity was historically constructed.⁴ Likewise, a similar study of Turkey's relations with Europe and the US using the framework of Occidentalism should display the power struggles, inconsistencies and conflicts involved in discourses of development and modernization that pertain to and reinforce such divides. In order to be able to contextualize the example of Turkey, it is helpful to trace the history of binarisms like the West and the Rest, developed and underdeveloped, and modern and traditional. In the following sections, I will trace the history of these binarisms in the discourses inherent first in colonial exchanges, and then in postwar relations of development and modernization.

⁴ A study that constitutes an exception that has been helpful in constructing my theoretical framework is Ussama Makdisi's *Ottoman Orientalism* (2002), where Makdisi, by "looking at how Ottomans represented their own Arab periphery as an integral part of their engagement with, explicit resistance to, but also implicit acceptance of, Western representations of the indolent Ottoman East" (2002: 768), strives to portray the agency and historicity of the Other.

II.B. Colonial Discourses

Similar to the way in which the roots of developmentalism can be found in colonialism and in the demise of colonial empires, historical formation of discourses and ideologies that organized the relations between the West and the non-West can be traced back to colonial exchanges. As Preston notes (1996: 137), “the images of the non-European world which were established over the period of these exchanges have continued to influence the ways in which social scientists, policy analysts, and political agents in the First World have comprehended the situation of the Third World.” The image of the “Third World” that provided a scheme for relating with the non-West in the postwar era is a late example of binarisms that is inherent in the historical formation of modernity. Studies on modernity traditionally extend the roots of modernity back to the Enlightenment, and as Stuart Hall argues (1996), the separation between “the West and the rest” that emerged with colonialism was already inscribed in Enlightenment thought.

According to Preston (1996: 140), taken as a whole, the process of European expansion required the establishment of a material base of global system through industry, trade, finance, the construction of machineries of control and order such as the colonial state, the colonial city and the colonial society, and finally, the elaboration of legitimating ideologies. These ideologies asserted the supremacy of the colonizers and as European expansion continued, binarisms such as “the noble and the ignoble savage,” “the refined nations and the rude nations” together formed a discursive formation that produced the West as an idea and a concept. In time, new discourses drew on and articulated to others, i.e., the discourse of “Europe” articulated to the discourse of “Christendom” and “the West” emerged as a point of reference against “the Rest.” Hall (1996: 186) argues that in this process, the concept “the West” functioned in several ways. First, it was a tool to think with allowing the

characterization and classification of societies into different categories. Secondly, it was a set of images that condensed a number of different characteristics into one picture and that functioned as a part of a language, a “system of representation.” Thirdly, it provided a standard or model of comparison to explain *difference* and fourthly, it provided criteria of evaluation against which other societies are ranked and around which powerful positive or negative feelings are clustered.

These functions, by helping to create a framework through which “the social” could be studied and understood, greatly influenced Enlightenment thinking and later conceptions of modernity. In this framework, societies and peoples were classified according to their ranks in the ladder of civilization. According to Hall, the binarisms created in the process of colonization provided the Enlightenment thinkers with a certain map to see progress and social change. It can be argued that binarisms as such were intrinsic to the creation of modernity, and to the identification of the West and modernity. From the Enlightenment to grand sociological theories of the nineteenth century and to postwar discourses of development, such binarisms created a legitimate ground for unequal exchanges between the better-off and the worse-off of the world. “The West” was celebrated during the Age of Enlightenment and afterwards as the point of reference for rationality and progress but this celebration only became possible after “the Rest” was defined as uncivilized, irrational and a-historical. In Hall’s terms, “the Rest was critical for the formation of western Enlightenment - and therefore for modern social science. Without the Rest (or its own internal “others”), the West would not have been able to recognize and represent itself as the summit of human history” (1996: 221).

This recognition and representation constituted the ideological pillars of unequal material exchanges that occurred between European empires and their colonies. It provided the West with legitimate causes and intentions in its effort to relate to and transform the Rest. One of the most important frameworks introduced to study how colonial empires related to the non-West in the post-Enlightenment period is Edward Said's *Orientalism*. Examining Orientalism as a discourse, Said provided a point of departure for understanding how "the West" formed a hegemony over "the Orient" by describing, imagining and acting upon it. Said (2000: 69) puts it as thus:

[t]aking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient-dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.

Said formulated his notion of Orientalism as a discourse for he wanted to show how a certain way of thinking about "the Orient" was formed by a number of authors, in a long period of time, in different settings. Using Foucault's framework, he was able to display how a vast number of statements and representations contributed to the establishment of a power-knowledge axis. In addition, Said also demonstrated how this certain discourse prevailed above others, by forming a *hegemony* in western social imagination. Making use of Gramsci's theorization of hegemony, he was also able to display how Orientalism gained institutional support, academic validity and cultural acceptance.

Even though Foucault's and Gramsci's frameworks were not closed systems, Said's use of the notions of the West and the Orient makes his argument rather problematic. While Said presents the Orient as a homogenous category, his notion of the West is also static and idealized. The same criticism can be made, to an extent, for Hall's argument as well, for his

definitions of categories are imprecise. Differences in time and place affect the content and the circulation of a discourse. Statements and representations about the non-West change in time and in relation to changing global power balances and the power-knowledge axis of the colonial rule also transformed as colonies gained their independence.

Said argues that (2007: 70), “from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the end of the World War II France and Britain dominated the Orient and Orientalism; since World War II America has dominated the Orient, and approaches it as France and Britain once did.” But since the US started to dominate the Orient in the postwar era, even if it might be argued that the essence of its approach to the Orient was similar to that of European empires, the form of its approach changed radically. In fact, even before the colonial empires were demolished in the wake of WW II, during the crisis of colonial empires in the 1930s and the 1940s, the nature of the relations between the empires and colonies had started to change. According to Cooper and Packard (1997: 7), “[w]hat was new in the colonial world of the late 1930s and 1940s was that the concept of development became a framing device bringing together a range of interventionist policies and metropolitan finance with the explicit goal of raising colonial standards of living.” Until the mid 1940s, before colonies gained their independence and the US undertook the mission of developing the “underdeveloped parts of the world,” according to Wallerstein (2004: 1), “development was a set of concrete actions effectuated by Europeans to exploit and draw profit from the resources of the non-European world.” However, after WW II, the term took on a completely new meaning. Apart from being the main international political framework through which material exchanges between the North and South were established, development, as a discourse, fostered and legitimized these exchanges. The emergence of development, in this double sense of the term, coincided with postwar decolonization and the US’ rise to global hegemony. As Escobar (1995: 30) puts it,

“[i]t is possible to speak of the invention of development in the early post-World War II period.”

II.C. Postwar Discourses: Development

II.C.1. Post-Development Studies

Critical approaches to development arose in the 1990s with works that may together be loosely called post-development studies (e.g. Sachs, 1992; Latouche, 1993; Escobar, 1995). These studies changed the conception of development from merely a set of measurable social and economic indicators to a system of power and a set of discursive statements that regulated the relations between the North and the South starting in the immediate postwar era. In other words, development started to be interpreted as “both a set of institutions (e.g., capitalist markets, global organizations) and discourses (i.e., fighting poverty through capital investment) that combine to engender and legitimate the highly exploitative social relations between the world’s wealthy and the poor” (Goldman, 2005: 23).

The sum of practices, institutions, projects and agreements that came into being in the name of development in the postwar era frames a set of material exchanges. On the other hand, these exchanges establish a “discursive practice that sets the rules of the game: who can speak, from what points of view, with what authority, and according to what criteria of expertise; it sets the rules that must be followed for this or that problem, theory, or object to emerge and be named, analyzed, and eventually transformed into a policy or a plan” (Escobar, 1995: 41). The development discourse primarily suggested an inevitable historical pattern of social change in which “underdeveloped” and “traditional” societies were assumed to prosper through infrastructural, industrial and social modernization, and by the transfer of capital and

knowledge of the “developed” and “modern” nations. This pattern entailed the categorization of societies (e.g. underdeveloped, poor, malnourished, illiterate) with reference to industrialized western societies, and the configuration of social change in technical, uniform and universal terms.

In this thesis, taking my hint from Escobar (1995: 10), I analyze development on three grounds: “the forms of knowledge that refer to [development] and through which it comes into being and is elaborated into objects, concepts, theories, and the like; the system of power that regulates its practice; and the forms of subjectivity fostered by this discourse, those through which people come to recognize themselves as developed or underdeveloped.” But when doing this, I try to steer clear off the pitfalls of post-development studies. Escobar (1995: 44) argued in his work that “[d]evelopment was— and continues to be for the most part— a top-down, ethnocentric, and technocratic approach, which treated people and cultures as abstract concepts, statistical figures to be moved up and down in the charts of ‘progress.’” His configuration of development as a top-down process that signified an absolute domination of the North over southern resources and cultural realms failed to attribute due value to the agency of the “underdeveloped” parties in the relations of development. It also failed to see how the development discourse became meshed with existing local discourses, political and cultural struggles, and how fostered certain subjectivities. Goldman (2005: 23) asserts that

in emphasizing how the North imposes its will on the South, exercising power from top to bottom and from core to periphery, these [post-development] scholars construct a historical narrative of inevitable and unidirectional expansion. In this highly deterministic history, we lose the sense of a variegated landscape with diverse sites of production, resistance, instability, and political opportunity. With such an imposing history, it is hard to see spatial and temporal unevenness, historical raptures and structural crisis, or alternative politics and social change.

In order to present the ruptures, political opportunities and instabilities inherent in the relations of development, I analyze the agency of postwar Turkish governments as they diverted, ignored or transformed the suggestions and impositions of the US government and US-based development institutions. I further demonstrate that the circulation and employment of the development discourse in the cultural realm was dependent on and was affected by existing political and cultural struggles. Doing so, through my historical analysis, I approach and contribute to the more recent anthropological accounts of development (e.g. Elyachar, 2005; Edelman and Haugerud, 2004) that underline the *agency* of the “underdeveloped” and analyze the local uses and transformations of both practices of development and the development discourse.

II.C.2. Historical Formation of Development

The early postwar era witnessed the creation of concepts such as “underdevelopment” and “the Third World,” which came to existence through a series of economic “definitions” and “inventions.” Such inventions included the 1948 definition by the World Bank which defined countries with annual per capita incomes below \$100 as “poor,” the inaugural address of US President Henry Truman in 1949 when he built on this definition of the poor and, in the name of the US, promised to solve the problems of the “underdeveloped countries” with the help of “modern scientific and technical knowledge,” and the emergence of the field of “development economics” which carved out a “scientific” space for studying and justifying asymmetrical exchange. The economic yardstick became available at a time when Europe needed to be restructured, ties with former colonies needed to be strengthened, and “the need to expand and deepen the market for U.S. products abroad, as well as the need to and new sites for the investment of U.S. surplus capital, became pressing” (Escobar, 1995: 32).

The postwar era was indeed marked by the need to re-build the capitalist world system under the guidance and leadership of the US. Efforts such as the implementation of grand programs such as the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the Point Four Program, and the foundation of the Bretton Woods institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were aiming to get Europe back on its feet, strengthen the ties between the first and the Third World and to expand the military power of the “Western Bloc” in its fight against communism. Escobar (1995: 71) sums up the necessities that the US faced in order to save the capitalist world system in the postwar era as:

[t]o keep the existing core nations of the capitalist system together and going, which required continuous expansion and efforts to avoid the spread of communism; to find ways to invest U.S. surplus capital that had accumulated during the war (particularly abroad, where the largest profits could be made); to find markets overseas for American goods, given that the productive capacity of American industry had doubled during the war; to secure control over the sources of raw materials in order to meet world competition; and to establish a global network of unchallenged military power as a way to secure access to raw materials, markets, and consumers.

The birth of development in the postwar era as the primary international political framework was due to these pressing needs and the policy of containing the “Soviet threat,” and the main instrument and goal in establishing market ties and achieving containment was “economic development.” Economic development in the Third World was to prevent the spread of communism and what the development discourse advocated was that economic development was possible in the underdeveloped areas of the world with adequate help, guidance and planning. In the postwar era, the postcolonial state assumed the role of “developing” its peoples, albeit with the help of the “developed” countries, contrary to the colonial times when only the colonizers possessed the privilege of developing colonial peoples. Thus, development lent a newly-found legitimacy to the Third World states as well. Gilman (2003: 24) asserts that in this period, “leaders everywhere sought the solution to the political problem of

decolonization in the economic sphere. ‘Economic development’ became a key slogan of the postwar world because it represented the nexus between the demands of the postcolonial political leadership and the capacities of the United States.”

As displayed, development was conceived mostly in economic terms in the early postwar era and the concern with development was dominated by the views of economists, especially development economists, who sought to improve Third World economies with the help of economic models and theories that advocated economic growth, industrialization, and transfer of foreign capital and expertise. In Latham’s (2000: 42) words, “because they [economists] defined ‘development’ largely in terms of raising the overall level of economic equilibrium between supply and demand, the primary matter appeared to be one of simply finding the proper fiscal instruments and putting them to work.” This view was in line with the newly established international economic system, in which Bretton Woods institutions set the terms for trade and finances. This regime encouraged nation states to follow developmentalist policies which served the consolidation of European and American economies (Escobar, 1995).

Thus, the scientific analysis of development defined the content of the discourse of development in circulation in the postwar international political arena. The main axis of the development discourse can be found in the works of growth theorists who analyzed the conditions of rapid economic growth in Third World settings and development economists who constructed and construed the “underdeveloped economy” in a certain way that would necessitate the transfer of western knowledge and capital (Escobar, 1995; Leys, 1996; Preston, 1996). Escobar (1995: 73) contends that “the ten years between 1948 and 1958 saw the rise and consolidation of development economics as a practice concerned with certain

questions, performed by particular individuals, and entrusted with given social tasks.” In this era, growth and development economists aimed to achieve rapid growth through capital accumulation and industrialization with the help of external aid and planning. This was actually an effort to replicate a western pattern of economic growth in the Third World in the postwar era, an effort that failed to bear the results that were expected in the underdeveloped countries. Leys (1996: 7) argues that “‘development theory’ was originally just theory about the best way colonial, and the ex-colonial, states to accelerate national economic growth in this international environment.”

Diffusing into southern societies by labeling them as underdeveloped economies or the Third World, and making them visible and penetrable through the lens of economic criteria, the discourse of development became the ultimate phase of the discourse of the West and the Rest in the mid-twentieth century. Escobar (1995: 52) argues that

[d]evelopment fostered a way of conceiving of social life as a technical problem, as a matter of rational decision and management to be entrusted to that group of people— the development professionals— whose specialized knowledge allegedly qualified them for the task. Instead of seeing change as a process rooted in the interpretation of each society’s history and cultural tradition ...these professionals sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to make societies fit a preexisting model that embodied the structures and functions of modernity.

This effort to transform Third World societies and economies according to alleged traits of modern social and economic organization not only presupposed a limited view of social life and social change, but it also disqualified local and indigenous social organizations as backward or underdeveloped in comparison to western standards and experience. Through the creation of certain standards and normative assumptions about “the developed” by economists, the transfer of science, capital and expertise to the Third World was made

possible. According to McMichael (1996: 35), some of the normative assumptions inscribed in developmentalist recipes were that

1. [l]iving standards can be quantified, or measured, with a monetary index.
2. Monetization of a society is a common destiny, and an ever-expanding world of commodities is desirable.
3. Non-monetary, or non-commodified, social systems of activity are “backward” and are not an appropriate basis of societal modernization.
4. Development policy should aim at reducing the living standards gap between the West and the Third World, with the West as the standard.
5. Each national society should pursue these goals individually (assisted with foreign aid).

Here, it must be asserted that the way development emerged as a technical, scientific and non-political panacea for all social ills in the postwar era had a lot to do with the transformation in the field of economics that occurred in the mid-century. In Gilman’s (2003: 35) words, “in the late 1940s, the economics profession was completing a disciplinary revolution. Marginalist microeconomics and Keynesian macroeconomics had transformed economics from a form of social criticism into a discipline geared toward empirical verification through mathematical modeling.” Together with the birth of other disciplines such as development economics and statistics, economists turned “the economy” into a separate and unitary social realm that functioned according to the scientific laws of economics. Empirical verification through modeling meant a separation between an objective and real world (Mitchell, 2002) that gave economics a scientific legitimacy, and which provided northern politicians, scientists and experts with the power to direct and transform southern economies with the help of the power of science and expertise they held. In this sense, as Callon (1998, 2007) argues, economics emerged as a field which described and constructed, in other words, *performed* “the economy.”

In order to achieve economic growth in underdeveloped countries, development economists put forward economic schemas and models which they believed to be universally applicable

due to their scientific nature. Modernization theory, in part, grew out of the fragility of this self-proclaimed scientificity of economics. It aimed to replicate the postwar European experience in the Third World, but as Gilman (2003: 53) maintains, “few economists at first challenged the notion that industrializing an agricultural or extractive economy might require a different approach from that needed to revive a war-damaged industrial economy.” It was toward the end of the 1950s that the “economic” view of development started to be questioned in the face of a series of failed development projects implemented in the Third World and as Gilman (2003: 53) puts, “it was this lacuna that provided the primary theoretical opening for modernization theory.”

Even though the goal of modernization was inherent in development in the first place, it was conceived in more technical terms until modernization theory became the dominant paradigm in political and academic circles. Modernization theory was an American answer to why Third World societies were not responding to the orthodoxy of economic development theories (Leys, 1996: 9), which propagated that “foreign aid and investment on favorable terms, the transfer of knowledge and production techniques, measures to promote health and education, and economic planning would lead impoverished countries to be able to become ‘normal’ market economies” (Cooper and Packard, 1997: 2).⁵

⁵ It must be asserted here that developmentalism and modernization did not necessarily oppose each other and that developmentalism as an international project did not show signs of failure as a whole until the late 1960s (McMichael 1996). Rather, the framework of modernization expanded the reach of development from the economic to the social. It must also be acknowledged that development and modernization were not the only international discourses that circulated in the postwar era, but they were “hegemonic discourses” that set the tone of how social change was imagined on national and international levels. The US, the Soviet Union and most of the Third World governments adhered to the ideals of development and progress in the postwar period, fostering the power of development both as a political framework and as a discourse (Escobar, 1995; Cooper and Packard, 1997).

II.D. Postwar Discourses: Modernization

Failure to achieve rapid economic development in most of the Third World countries cast doubt on the validity of the tools of development in the US, “leading many economists to the conclusion that, because the problems of “emerging” economies were significantly different from those currently confronting the already industrialized West, the same remedies simply would not work” (Latham, 2000:42-43). At this point, with the help of structural-functionalist theories of society and the initiatives of the US government, possibilities of economic development started to be evaluated from within a wider spectrum, in which societies, with their cultural values, social practices and political organizations, were judged by their distance from an imagined standard of western modernity.

It can be argued that modernization theory brought development out of the constraints of “the economy” into the social. While early development theories evaluated the “underdeveloped” societies in terms of what they lacked in economic aspects with comparison to the industrialized West, modernization theorists problematized the “traditional” social and cultural aspects of the non-industrialized world. They embraced a more holistic view of development that put into perspective modern cultural values, political practices and social organization that corresponded to necessary conditions of the capitalist market as it came to be described in the neoclassical view of the economy and the market. Modernization theory grew out of a context where postwar academic endeavors in the US in the field of social sciences were strictly in line with US foreign policy. A body of work that grew around the study of the industrial society was pervaded by structural-functionalist analysis (à la Talcott Parsons). This body of work analyzed the working conditions and qualities of modern/industrial society and built upon the classical binarisms of grand sociological theories. Another body of work was generated under Area Studies, which grew out of the

need of the US to gather information about newly independent states and it found enormous political/institutional support in the postwar era since the ability to produce knowledge about the non-West was the primary step in forming hegemony over it. As Kırılı (2003) demonstrates, the emergence of Area Studies coincided with the rise of postwar US hegemony and Area Studies constituted an example of how power and knowledge were bound together in the postwar environment.

Modernization theorists, in brief, set a vision of American society that functioned as the epitome of what modernity encompassed as a notion, and at the opposite end of “the modern,” they placed “the traditional.” Modernity was constructed as a holistic phenomenon that encompassed social, political and cultural traits. Traditional societies could evolve and become modern in time, with the help and guidance of modern societies. Latham (2000: 3) outlines four assumptions on which modernization theory was built:

- (1) “traditional” and “modern” societies are separated by a sharp dichotomy; (2) economic, political, and social changes are integrated and interdependent; (3) development tends to proceed toward the modern state along a common, linear path; and (4) the progress of developing societies can be dramatically accelerated through contact with developed ones.

Through the process of modernization, modernization theorists believed that a new society and a new individual could be built. The qualities of this society and individual were based upon a very specific vision of the American society and the American individual. Thus, it was both a political claim about the qualities of the American society which was influenced by national political and cultural struggles, and an image of a utopian society that was put before the Third World to be taken over and promoted by Third World political and intellectual elites in their quest for power.

As I will demonstrate in the third chapter, the way modernization theorists envisioned the modern/American society was strikingly similar to how Turkish journalists conveyed it to the Turkish public, taking their clues from European intellectual history and mid-twentieth-century sociology. Gilman (2003: 13) contends that for modernization theorists, American modernity meant “materialism without class conflict, secularism without irreverence, democracy without disobedience.” This vision converged with the fears and sensitivities of Third World political and intellectual elites and as will be seen in the accounts of Turkish journalists, it was echoed in their discourses in very similar terms. Modernization theorists helped construct the notion of “the modern society” in holistic and concrete terms, just as they established the traits of “the traditional society” without due reference to unequal exchanges between the First and Third Worlds, and the historicity and meanings of indigenous social practices which the dichotomy of modern versus traditional fails to explain.

In the accounts of modernization theorists, Gilman (2003: 15) maintains that

modernity suggested a God-fearing but secular society in which race and gender were of little import; a privately run full-employment economy of well-paid workers, all of whom owned a house and a car and lived in a nuclear family; and a formal democratic system in which consensus existed about societal goals, the details of which would be worked out by technically trained public service elites.

This perfect society, in the accounts of modernization theorists, could be reached in the modernization process. Invoking older binarisms in the dichotomy of traditional versus modern, societies were placed in a continuum where the ultimate point of modernity was represented by the US. In the modernization process, the guidance of the US was crucial, and the transfer of knowledge and expertise was believed to be essential in the creation of a new and rational man and society. In the words of Latham (2000: 66), “[i]n addition to providing external investment, the “advanced” state could furnish scientific technology and training,

provide instruction in the virtues of democratic systems, help produce more efficient forms of business organization, and even instill a new spirit of rationality.”

The construction of this goal of modern society was related to scientific and political trends of the postwar era. The modern society manifested in the image of the US grew out of studies on the industrialized society. Patterns and traits of modern society found in the works of Talcott Parsons (1902-1979) and Edward Shils (1910-1995) served the purpose of differentiating modern societies from traditional ones. In the accounts of modernization theorists, “modern society was cosmopolitan, mobile, controlling of the environment, secular, welcoming of change, and characterized by a complex division of labor. Traditional society, by contrast, was inward looking, inert, passive toward nature, superstitious, fearful of change, and economically simple” (Gilman, 2003: 5). The scientific roots and examples of modernization theory can be found in postwar economics, sociology, and political science, and its discursive roots, as I have done above, can be traced back to enlightenment thought where binarisms that constitute the pillars of modernity can be found.

II.D.1. Modernization Theory and the Social Sciences

As argued above, the first academic discipline to formulate a theory to regulate social change in the former colonies and the Third World was development economics. As Latham (2000: 41-42) contends, “[w]here sociologists and political scientists had found themselves searching for a larger, integrative model of change, most economists believed that they already had one.” This model, built on the premise that “the economy” was a concrete and separate field that functioned via scientific models and that could be directed through intervention, was handy for politicians and economists of the First World who sought to relate to Third World

resources. Another discipline that borrowed the framework of modernization was political science. During the 1950s, especially after the foundation of the Comparative Politics Committee by Social Science Research Council in 1953, political science moved toward the comparative analysis of political institutions across the globe and along the spectrum of modernization (Latham, 2000: 39-40).

The discipline that had the most impact in the shaping of modernization theory was sociology and the structural-functionalist school. As Latham (2000: 30) maintains, “the scientific claims of post-World War II modernization theory first appeared in the field of sociology, and they were, from the start, an American creation.” Structural-functionalism, in this period, provided the necessary tools to build a theory that would thoroughly explain the organization of industrialized society. The “pattern variables” such as achievement versus ascription, universalism versus particularism or self orientation versus collectivity extended the use of the dichotomy of modern versus traditional by providing specific points of intervention.

II.D.2. European Roots of Modernization

Gilman (2003: 32) asserts that “for a few isolated exceptions, the term modernization was never used in reference to a society as a whole before World War II. In general the term applied only to specific technical or administrative systems, not to entire social systems.” Even though the term acquired its specific meaning in the postwar period, its dichotomous structure was inherited from discourses that pervaded colonial relations and early grand theories of sociology. In their attempt to place every society in a continuum with reference to certain assumed qualities of western modernity, scholars who applied modernization theory reshaped and redesigned colonial discourses that legitimized and regulated unequal

exchanges. In Latham's (2000: 14) words, "American modernizers drew on elements of an earlier worldview to articulate one suited to their times. Although not a mere appropriation, the ideology of modernization, in both its intellectual and institutional forms, incorporated and revised much older perceptual frameworks"⁶

The reappearance of these frameworks was due to the growing concern among politicians and scholars to understand and direct social change in the Third World in the postwar period, with a view to protecting these areas from the spread of communism. To appease this concern, modernizers turned to the earlier frameworks that regulated colonial exchanges. In Gilman's words (2003: 30):

European history and social theory provided a means of dealing with the cognitive crisis that postwar American scholars faced as they began to try to understand the world outside the North Atlantic in a systematic, scientific manner. Indeed, modernization theory would represent itself as the direct heir of the Enlightenment crusade to establish reason, empiricism, science, universalism, progress, individualism, toleration, freedom, secularism, and the uniformity of human nature.

II.D.3. Modernization Theory and Politics

Apart from its apparent political nature, modernization theory was attached to politics in a number of ways. Its emergence was dependent on government funding, its development was directed by policy concerns, and it was the official foreign policy of the US in the 1960s (Preston, 1996; Leys, 1996; Latham, 2000; Gilman, 2003). According to Gilman (2003: 32-33), there were three reasons why the meaning of the term modernization changed radically in the postwar era. The first reason was decolonization, the second was the availability of

⁶ Gilman (2003: 28) contends that there was a difference between the discourse of modernization and earlier colonial discourses: "Whereas the European late colonial project aimed at maintaining differences between imperialists and colonial subjects, the American postwar modernization projects both denied and sought to undo these differences. Where modernization theory and policies echoed earlier colonial discourses, therefore, this echo was usually unwitting."

resources in the US and the last one was the increasing influence of the Soviet Union. These reasons necessitated a more organized and holistic analysis of “underdeveloped areas,” which modernization theorists would strive to achieve. Similarly, Leys (1996: 9) maintains that modernization theory was constructed by “sociologists and political scientists involved in the rapidly expanding research and teaching programmes established by the US government to equip the country with the regional expertise it needed to exercise its new role as a superpower.” These social scientists traced the transition from traditional to modern in the West, and they “envisaged modern values being diffused through education and technology transfer to the ‘elites’ of the periphery” (Leys, 1996: 10). It must be said that this framework in which modernity was imagined to be transferable through certain channels provided policy makers with legitimate grounds for intervention.

As Latham (2000: 6) holds, “in the years following World War II, academic research was increasingly shaped by federal funding.” Social sciences in the US in the postwar era, after overcoming doubts about its “practical use” in opposition to the physical sciences, became more entangled with US foreign policy thanks to the self-alleged objectivity, practical value and value-free character of modernization theory (Latham, 2000: 48-50). The foundation of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for International Studies (CIS) (whose members were later employed by the White House during the Kennedy administration) in 1952 with funding from the Ford Foundation and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), support from Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations to social scientific studies of traditional societies, and the establishment and funding of Area Studies programs were examples of the bonds between politics and academics (Latham, 2000; Gilman, 2003; KIRLI, 2003). According to Gilman (2003: 45), “postwar federal funding of universities sought to promote industry, particularly the kind of industry that could be useful in the cold war

struggle” and “no social scientists were more astute at judging this possibility than the modernization theorists. In this way the military-industrial complex quickly became the military-industrial-academic complex.”

Social scientific research and political concerns complemented each other at many levels. Leys (1996: 10-11) notes that “very few [modernization theorists] at the time publicly questioned the identification of modernization studies with the aims of US foreign policy. In the 1950s and early 1960s the CIA regularly ‘debriefed’ US scholars returning from Third World fieldwork and the State Department frequently sought their advice.” Politics and academic research were so entangled that in one of the pioneer texts of modernization theory which will be analyzed in the second chapter, Daniel Lerner’s *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1958), the data for the study was collected by members of the United States Information Service in Turkey.

III. Conclusion

It can be argued that modernization theorists recreated the binarisms inherent in the emergence of the idea of modernity (Leys, 1996; Latham, 2000, Gilman, 2003). Their approach to the other, in this respect, shared a number of assumptions with earlier discourses. But modernization theorists approached and “analyzed” the other in a more holistic sense. In their works, they also “proceed to attempt to elucidate matters by deploying a further set of dichotomous constructs such as agricultural and industrial, rural and urban, religious and secular, literate and pre-literate and so on” (Preston, 1996: 172). These dichotomies helped define new areas of intervention for the transfer of capital and expertise and, as Preston (1996: 172) holds, “overall, it seems clear that what we have in these schemes of modernization is an

attempt to construct a descriptive general policy science which characterizes the process and goal of modernization and identifies specific points of intervention.”

In the case of Turkey, these points of intervention became concrete in the transfer of capital and expertise through economic aid and loans that were repaid to US-based companies in US dollars, obligatory policy changes inscribed in aid and credit agreements that limited the Turkish governments’ legislative sovereignty, military aid and modernization programmes that secured a long-time unequal financial relation between two governments, and knowledge production on Turkey that directed, legitimized and analyzed the effects of these relationships.

In order to make theoretical sense of how these postwar interventions functioned and add to the arguments of Leys, Preston, Gilman and Latham on modernization theory, I argue that the relations between Turkey and the US and the US-based institutions contained an element of power that became concrete in the use of science and expertise (Mitchell, 2002). Through the power of science and expertise, Turkey was situated in a continuum of modernity and development. Even though the reports and suggestions of experts and scientists were taken over and implemented by Turkish governments only to the extent that they converged with the agendas of these governments, foreign experts who possessed the legitimate knowledge of science defined Turkey’s needs, planned its economy by applying scientific methods, and took part in legislative processes.

Experts and scientists produced uniform images of Turkey in terms of what it lacked and in terms of what the US and the WB expertise and northern capital could do for Turkey. Social and political issues of inequality or political powerlessness were excluded from these images,

together with the role of foreign expertise in the creation of the image itself. As long as Turkey's needs were described with reference to the developed or modern West, suggestions of development agencies such as the WB would only stress the need for the transfer of northern technology and expertise instead of emphasizing local social and political inequality. As Mitchell (2002) argues, the definition of problems in development projects inevitably affects the production of the solutions. The discourse always has an impact on the shaping of the object of analysis, and in the case of postwar Turkey, it can be argued that Turkey's problems were more often defined in managerial and technical terms that are universal and a-historical, rather than in social and political terms embedded in local social and historical relations of power. In the next chapter, I will analyze how Turkey entered these schemes of development and modernization through postwar knowledge production, and how this contributed to the building of certain institutions. I will particularly focus on expert reports and "scientific" studies on Turkey produced in the late 1940s and the 1950s. I will also show how Turkish governments carved themselves an arena for agency in the realm of international relations of development.

CHAPTER II. PRACTICES OF DEVELOPMENT AND KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION

It has been no secret among my friends there that I was pleased with the outcome of the elections in 1950, which seemed to me to be a turning point in your recent history.... I have presumed to address you in the hope that you might indicate someone in your government who would assist me in making this article as useful as possible in our mutual national interests (Max W. Thornburg's letter to Celal Bayar, BDA: 21.10.1953, 030014023814).

This is how Max W. Thornburg, the Petroleum Adviser to the US Department of State, Chairman of the Board of Engineers of the Standard Oil Company of California and Vice-President in charge of its Middle and Far East subsidiaries addressed the President of the Turkish Republic, Celal Bayar, in 1953, when he needed to acquire information about the current state of the economy in Turkey for his article that was to be published in *Reader's Digest*.

Thornburg and other American students of Turkey during the 1950s had two points in common that placed them in a complex web of relations. First, their affiliations spread over to government, academia, international organizations and businesses, which displayed the intricate entanglement of these spheres in the mid-century. Second, their writings were policy oriented and they shared a common framework of development and modernization. Their works and affiliations displayed the bonds between science, expertise and politics in during the 1950s.

It was argued in the previous chapter that in the postwar era, Turkey became a part of the relations of development and modernization, which constituted both a set of material processes and a set of discursive statements. I argued that both the RPP and the DP pursued developmentalist policies, sometimes in accordance with and sometimes in opposition to

foreign advice. I also maintained that Turkey become the object of a knowledge production process that placed it within the discursive framework of development and modernization, a process which also fostered certain political subjectivities in Turkey. As introduced earlier, I analyze development and modernization relations in this thesis on three grounds: a system of power that regulates the practice of development, the forms of knowledge that refer to development, and the forms of subjectivity fostered by the discourse of development. In this chapter, I will make a modest attempt to show an aspect of the power relations and knowledge production processes surrounding development. I will do so first through an analysis of expert reports and a discussion on politics and expertise, and then discuss the political agency of Turkish postwar governments within the relations of development. Finally, I will review several academic studies on the “modernization” of Turkey within the context of scientific knowledge production.

I. Science, Expertise and Politics

Northern science and expertise had two distinct influences in Turkey during the 1950s. One was the policy implications of expert reports commissioned by US-based development institutions, aid committees and government offices. Some of these reports made their way into national laws while some were disregarded by the DP. The other was the influence of US-based academic scholarship on Turkey which shared certain assumptions with expert reports (like the necessity of American aid, the presumed path to development, and the urgency of such matters) but which also placed Turkey within the scientific discourses of development and modernization. As displayed in the first chapter, such studies were entangled with the foreign policy of the US and shaped by the necessity of producing knowledge on the Third World in order to stop the spread of the “Soviet threat.”

I.A. The Hilts Report

Expert reports on Turkey that were completed in the late 1940s and early 1950s displayed the continuity between the RPP and the DP administrations, informed how the American aid would be used in the 1950s, and revealed how Turkey was positioned within the Cold War map of the US. The first report that had direct policy influence was prepared by a committee headed by H.G. Hilts, the deputy president of the Federal Bureau of Public Roads. The report, which is known as the Hilts Report (1948), was prepared in order to define a pathway for Turkey in terms of road building. The importance of road building in Turkey was emphasized in most of the expert reports of this era and roads were crucial when the position of Turkey was considered in the Cold War map. Turkey was strategically located next to the Soviet Union, and in the early postwar era, as it will be revealed, Turkey was configured as an agricultural export base by experts and US government officials. Both in terms of defense and agricultural modernization, road building was crucial.

The recommendations in the Hilts Report (1948) can be summarized under three headings. First, the report defended the necessity and superiority of roads and highways over railroads, advocated that the focus of the Turkish administration should shift from railroad building to road building and proposed the foundation of a General Directorate of Public Roads that would be autonomous from the Ministry of Transportation, with a law-guaranteed annual budget that would ensure a certain amount of road building for every year. Barker (1948: 28), asserted that Turkey's size, location and climate resembled the city of Denver in the state of Colorado, and made his calculations about Turkey according to the present road situation of Denver. Second, the report laid out the foundations of a rational administration of road building, including propositions for new methods of personnel recruitment, education and evaluation. Coordination with military forces and practical methods regarding the

implementation of road building were also included in these propositions. Finally, the report suggested that the changes inscribed in the report would be best handled if Turkey employed American engineers, contractors, managers and machines, and sent Turkish students to Washington DC, to the Federal Bureau of Public Roads for technical training.

As will be clearer in other reports, American experts in this period mainly suggested that Turkey pursue light industrialization with special focus on agricultural products (for exporting to Europe) instead of heavy industrialization. In this regard, roads would be an important asset in the transportation of agricultural products within Turkey, and to Turkish ports for export. On the other hand, roads were necessary for the transportation of armies, especially when the NATO forces were concerned. Road building was a priority for the RPP and the DP governments as well, and after this report was published, in line with Hilts' advice, the General Directorate of Public Roads was established under the Ministry of Public Works. This incident represented the direct influence of the Hilts Report in particular, and a point of convergence between US and Turkish interests and priorities in general. It must also be stated that the implementation of this report constituted a break in railroad building, and had a long term effect of aggravating Turkey's dependency on highway transportation and imported petroleum.

I.B. The Thornburg Report

Unlike the limited scope of the Hilts Report, the Thornburg Report (1949) was a more comprehensive analysis of the Turkish economy and politics. The study was conducted by Max W. Thornburg (research director) and his research associate Graham Spry⁷ for "The Twentieth Century Fund." The reason for the study was to direct the upcoming American aid

⁷ Spry was a Canadian politician and businessman who had assisted Sir Stafford Cripps (British Chancellor of the Exchequer 1947-1950) during World War II and on his mission to India (Thornburg, 1949: VI).

and to acquire information about Turkey that would be valuable in the defense against the “Soviet threat.” The executive director of the fund Evans Clark (1949: v) defined very clearly the objective of this study in his foreword:

Geographically, of course, Turkey is a key bastion in any defense that may be required against further Communist encroachment. Yet its economic and political organization, and the intellectual temper of its people, are very different from what we are accustomed to here in the United States. All of which makes a clear understanding of Turkey and the Turks by the American people an absolute must for effective American aid.

As laid out in the first chapter of this thesis, US based research on “underdeveloped areas” was linked with government interest, private research funding and overseas opportunities for business. In this regard, this study demonstrated this entanglement of interests. In Clark’s (1949: vi) words, the effort that had gone into preparing this report was made in order to “produce the raw intellectual material out of which a more effective U.S. foreign economic policy may be fashioned-not only for the U.S. government but for private businesses as well.” Thornburg’s expert knowledge, at this point, proved to be valuable, for - in line with Mitchell’s (2002) argument- throughout his refashioning of the needs and interests of Turkey and its “economy,” Thornburg carved out a space for the transfer of American capital and knowledge. This transfer occurred through multiple channels throughout the 1950s. Not only did the expert reports in this era propagate privatization, and legal and political initiatives for foreign investment and trade liberalization, but also most of the American aid was transferred to Turkey on the condition that it be spent to buy American products. The knowledge that was produced by these expert reports can be said to have paved the way for and formatted the direction of material exchanges in the postwar era between the US and Turkey. Thornburg (1949, x), in his preface to the study, made it known that “what we [the research group] saw and reported as Turkey’s deficiencies were to us, first of all, opportunities for help through America’s resources.”

For Thornburg, the first condition for Turkey to develop its economy was to create “a favorable climate” for foreign investment. Thornburg (1949: 185) argued that “if Turkey wishes Americans to participate in this type of endeavor [investment], it must create the conditions which Americans have learned from their own experience make success possible.” The replication of the American experience, as discussed in the first chapter, was a part of the discourse of development planners and modernization theorists in the mid-century. To replicate this experience, Thornburg contended that agriculture be transformed. He (1949: 185) stated that “Turkish agriculture is primitive in technique and is at a low level of productivity...Even if modern implements and methods were at hand, the lack of good roads and transport and the scarcity of well-organized distributive channels would obstruct the flow of market for any additional output.” To overcome these obstructions, Thornburg argued that duty was firstly of the state, in the form of producing public works. “A nation-wide system of all-weather roads” and irrigation systems had to be built for this matter, and when building these facilities, Thornburg argued (1949: 187), “American resources and skill would be of great assistance. Modern construction equipment may be imported; technicians and management experts having long experience in work of this kind can give advice.”

Parallel to the advice of the Hilts Report, Thornburg also contended that the first step for Turkey should be road building, investing in basic infrastructure and doing them with American help. The second step in “building a sound economy” for Thornburg (1949: 187), was the “creation of light industries of miscellaneous variety,” which included “foundries, machine shops, factories for producing simple agricultural utensils, wagons and other elementary means of transportation, plants for the assembly and repair of agricultural, road-building and other essential machinery, the manufacture of building materials” (1949: 254). It is visible in the accounts of Thornburg and others that in the postwar era, development of the

Turkish economy was configured to refrain from heavy industrialization, import necessary industrial products from the US, focus on agricultural output and export surplus production to Europe and the Middle East. To achieve this, Thornburg noted that a burgeoning private enterprise sector was a must. In his account (1949: 187), “such [light] industries have developed in young and growing economies throughout the world, on the basis of private initiative and capital” and “Turkish people are not stupid, and the negative results of the state enterprise are as apparent to the more observant as are the benefits of the Revolution” (1949: 194).

To develop private enterprise, Thornburg asserted that a law reform was essential, and with the inception of multi-party rule, he believed that these changes were on their way. He argued that Turkey’s primary need was not capital, but know-how. He (1949: 254) was of the belief that the argument of lack of national capital, which provided legitimate ground for the RPP’s statist economic policies, could no longer hold true, and argued that “in order to lay the foundations for progress Turkey’s need is not mainly for money capital. Domestic capital is available if it could be brought out of hiding.” Thus, the greatest obstacle in Turkey’s way was adequate expertise. In Thornburg’s (1949: 254) words, “[t]he greatest need which Turks themselves cannot yet fill is that for trained advisers, good managers, competent technicians, industrial and commercial know-how. This is a need which Americans can supply, provided the opportunity is offered for them to exercise their talents.”

Thornburg’s (and Hilts’) analysis of the Turkish economy was part of the expertise reports that aimed to direct the US economic aid of to the “underdeveloped” world. In the case of Turkey, these reports represented a convergence with the goals and capabilities of the US government and businesses, and as they analyzed the best possible ways that Turkey could

benefit from the American aid, they did so with reference to what Turkey lacked how these lacks could be filled with the transfer of Northern science, capital and expertise. In these reports, development experts often claimed that their methods had certain positive qualities that fostered the power of science and expertise, and that the societies they examined had certain negative qualities. For example, Hilts believed that with scientific and objective methods of administrative planning and the expertise of American technicians, the road system of Turkey could be developed. Thornburg (1949: 253), on the other hand, believed that Turkey remained “by the standards of western Europe or the United States, largely undeveloped” and that the single party bureaucratic machine fostered arbitrariness and corruption, which were obstacles in the way of the growing of free enterprise, or, in other words, capitalism. As Thornburg attributed qualities of arbitrariness and corruption to the single-party “bureaucratic machine,” and rationality and scientificity to the institutions and know-how of the US, he was echoing the binarisms that were inherent in the discourse of development that legitimized the transfer of capital and knowledge from the North to the South. Thornburg (1949: 210) argued that

[f]aced with Turkish laws and customs which leave power to make arbitrary decisions with government officials, the conservative and conscientious investor will turn elsewhere. The unscrupulous man or company will resort to the age-old protection against arbitrary power-bribery. This is an ugly word, but to write so bluntly is no aspersion on the character of the Turkish people; in every country and in every period, the possession of arbitrary power by officials has gone hand in hand with corruption.

I.C. The Barker Report

Shortly after the Thornburg report was published, the RPP government headed by Şemsettin Günaltay asked the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to send an economic survey mission to Turkey to investigate the economic situation in Turkey and

prepare a development plan. The mission arrived in Turkey on June 18, 1950, shortly after the DP rose to power, and the report was published on June 5, 1951. Out of the three reports prepared by American experts, the Barker Report, which was prepared by a mission composed of fifteen members headed by James M. Barker, was the most comprehensive one in terms of its scope. The report was in accordance with the Hilts and Thornburg reports in advocating the priority of public financed agricultural development and technical training over industrialization. However, the report also included detailed policy and technical suggestions encompassing most of the economic activity that took place in Turkey during the early 1950s.

The suggestions in the report included the limitation and coordination of public spending and investment, short term stabilization of public finances, focusing on national capital, delaying heavy industrialization, ceasing railroad and port investments, developing electricity production, supporting private enterprise, reorganizing public administration with the help of foreign expertise, expanding the tax base and raising tax rates, adjusting exchange rates with growing production rates and receiving help from the IMF, decreasing the level of foreign aid, credit and debts due to the burden they create on the economy and reforming the legal system in order to attract direct foreign investment (Albayrak, 2004).

Overall, it can be argued that these three reports converged on their suggestions and methods. They envisaged a developing, liberal, agricultural economy guided by American expertise. They saw the state involvement in areas where private enterprise could blossom as insupportable and suggested that public spending be limited to infrastructural and social investments. They stressed the importance and power of national capital and played down the necessity of American aid whereas they saw the transfer of American know-how as

indispensable and the involvement of American businesses in the Turkish economy as rewarding for both parties. Finally, they saw certain social and political practices that existed in Turkey as obstacles on the way to rationalization, effectiveness and a working capitalist system. The reports were held to be objective/scientific by their authors, for they were prepared by experts who applied scientific methods. The authors presented their arguments and analysis as outcomes of scientific, non-political research processes, but their arguments contained overtly subjective and political suggestions. Development planning, as argued in the first chapter, grew out of the mid-century transformation in the field of economics, and the “scientific” methods of economics in this era provided northern experts with the power and authority of modern science (Mitchell, 2002). Development, thanks to this power, was represented as a technical and non-political phenomenon in both ends of the development nexus, and this phenomenon can also be displayed in the correspondences between the WB and Turkish Government officials in this era.

In a letter to President Celal Bayar, Eugene R. Black, president of the World Bank (BDA: 15.5.1951, 030014124312) presented his views on the Barker Report in the following words:

In the opinion of the Bank, the Report provides an *objective, unbiased analysis* of Turkey’s major economic problems and lays the foundation of a sound program for economic development...We share the hope expressed by Mr. Barker in his letter of transmittal that the Report will be widely studied and discussed from an *objective, non-political viewpoint*, so that its major implications may be fully understood and so that actions based on it can enlist broad support from the Turkish people. Only with such full understanding and support can the Mission’s recommendations be translated into a Turkish national development program...It is my sincere hope that the Report will prove of lasting value in furthering the economic development of Turkey and in improving the standard of living of its people (emphasis mine).

It becomes clear in this quote what has been argued above. Black attributes an objective and unbiased quality to the report while warning the Turkish government that it should evaluate

the report from a non-political viewpoint, a warning that considered Barker's study as a report of technical expertise, rather than a report full of political arguments and propositions. Barker himself was of this belief as well, for when he arrived in Turkey with his mission and visited Celal Bayar, he asserted that their study and report would be "functional" and "practical" in whole (BDA: 20.6.1950, 03001412421). It must be stated that such a view was shared by the Turkish government as well, and this becomes apparent in Prime Minister Adnan Menderes' (BDA: 8.1951, 03001885511) letter to WB Vice President R.L. Garner. Regarding the Barker report, Menderes wrote:

The report of the Barker Mission has been passed over to a group of *technicians* for an *objective analysis*... With this report, we have observed once more how strong our financial and economic views are. Generally, this report conforms fully to the opinions that the DP has defended since its establishment and that I have brought up in my speeches here and there (emphasis mine).

The previous quote reveals to a certain extent how the knowledge on development produced in the postwar era gained the status of an objective truth that was reached by scientific and unbiased methods, and thus was applicable in very different settings. The latter quote, on the other hand, reveals how the Menderes government also bought into this idea, and justified its political positions thus. It must be taken into consideration that the knowledge that was produced by experts in this period served a specific purpose. These reports were prepared at a time when American aid was starting to arrive in Turkey and information regarding how this aid could best serve the interests of both parties was needed. In this regard, they were born out of the necessity to direct the American aid to Turkey. After they were published or presented to respective parties, they had (partial) policy implications for both Turkey and the US. In Turkey, some of the advice that the reports contained were enacted into laws or adopted by the RPP or the DP administrations as economic policies. Still, as argued in the first chapter, some of them were disregarded, and the Turkish governments between 1946

and 1960, pursued economic policies which to some extent contrasted with the advice they received from American experts and development and aid institutions. This contrast can be analyzed as an instance demonstrating that Turkish governments were not only passive recipients of such advice, but were active agents within the international arena of development.

II. The Agency of the “Underdeveloped”

In this part of the chapter, I will analyze the agency of Turkish governments within the relations of development in mid-century on three grounds. One will be the above-mentioned contrast between the economic policies pursued by the Turkish governments and the advice they received from development and aid institutions. The second will be the agency of Turkish governments in their articulation to and usage of the discourse of the “fight against communism” and the “threat of the Soviet Union” in aid negotiations as a bargaining tool. The last aspect of my analysis will be the relationship between the IBRD and the first Menderes government that ended in the deportation of the IBRD representative and the shutting down of the IBRD office in Turkey on the demand of the government just as Celal Bayar was visiting the US and celebrating the peak of the relations between the two countries.

II.A. Contrasting Visions

Overall, it can be argued that the RPP and the DP governments between 1946 and 1960 only partially kept up with the development advice they received from the US. In fields such as agricultural modernization and mechanization, building road networks, distribution of land and seed, and improving legal and political conditions for private enterprise and foreign investment, the RPP, and especially the DP governments worked in accordance with the reports and advice of US-based institutions. But, in certain fields, there was a visible contrast

between the views of the two parties. For example, an extensive investment program of industrialization was followed against American advice in this era. Against the advice of the Barker, Thornburg and Hilts reports, the DP government had eleven sugar factories, nineteen cement factories, Sarıyar, Seyhan, Hirfanlı, Demirköprü, Kemer dams, and Çatalağzı II, Soma and Tunçbilek thermoelectric power plants built during its term (Demirer, 2005). Also during the DP reign, Ereğli, Haydarpaşa, İzmir-Alsancak, İnebolu, Mersin, Samsun, Salı Pazarı, Trabzon and Zonguldak ports were built against the advice of the expert reports (Albayrak, 2004). In terms of investment targets, the DP exceeded the five-year investment level target of the Barker Report by 55 percent between 1951 and 1955 and by 116 percent between 1956 and 1960 (Demirer, 2005).

In the financial field, the DP governments failed to adhere to US advice, and neither the banking nor the tax systems were developed according to propositions in the Barker Report, such as the abolition of Sümerbank and Etibank's bank privileges and the expansion of the tax base. The developmentalist economic policy of the DP also prevented it from decreasing the amount of foreign credit it received and the sum of foreign debt rose from 2,402 million TL in 1950 to 9,342 million TL toward the end of its term of office. Due to heavy public spending and investment, the deficit in the balance of payments also rose from 23 million TL in 1950 to 185 million TL in 1955 (Boratav, 1988; Albayrak, 2004). Even after the policy change in 1954 that was explained in the first chapter, the advice of American institutions was still ignored in certain fields. In Boratav's (1988: 88) words, "despite the suggestions of the IMF to implement a stabilization regime based on the liberalization of foreign trade, implementing deflationist measures and devaluating the Lira, the DP reinstituted the National Protection Law (*Milli Koruma Kanunu*) and resorted to market and price controls, insisted on expansionist and inflationist policies." With hardly any space left to maneuver in the liberal

trade regime, the DP begun to use the state apparatus more widely and frequently after 1954. This policy continued until 1958, when the Menderes government finally felt obliged to hand the first “letter of intention” to the IMF (Boratav, 1988). In 1958, inflation and import and export levels were at their worst position since 1949. The government devaluated the Turkish Lira from 2.80 to 9.00 against the dollar, acquired \$250,000,000 of new credit and rescheduled \$600,000,000 of foreign debt. But the DP government did not comply with the requirements of the IMF letter of intention, either and Turkey became the first country to get indebted beyond its official quota, and the first country to ask for postponement at the time of debt re-payment in the history of the IMF (Oran, 2001).

It can be inferred from the evidence put forth that American institutions (and governments) and the Turkish governments in the postwar era possessed contrasting visions about the kind of economic policy that should be pursued in Turkey. The material set of relations in the postwar era that is summoned under the term development did not display an image of complete domination, in which the Turkish governments quietly accepted and implemented the plans, policies and programs that were presented to them. On the contrary, they altered, reconfigured and diverted these plans and suggestions, to whatever political end they saw adequate. The DP government occasionally used the state apparatus to intervene in economic matters, did not control or plan foreign aid and credit, made extensive public spending and attempted to create heavy industries, all to pursue its short and long term political interests. The policies on which American and Turkish governments converged can be analyzed from a similar perspective as well. For example, the agricultural aid was handy for the DP government in supporting its electoral base with agricultural credits, distribution of land, seeds and tools, whereas military aid and modernization had in fact strengthened the army and provided the DP more room to maneuver when conducting its foreign policy.

Under the DP reign, heavy industries, port constructions and other public investments ensured long term employment, loose control of public spending enabled the government to supply for most urgent needs of the economy and the fierce quest for foreign aid and credit allowed for the continuation of developmentalist economic policies. What some authors have evaluated as the populist economic policy of the DP in the literature (Demirel, 2005; Sunar, 1996; Taşkın, 2007), from this perspective, can also be analyzed as the political agency of the DP in the international relations of development. This agency of the DP becomes visible in many instances, and it will be clear in the analysis below that it was very much related to national politics, not only due to the material effects it created in the economy, but also for its ideological impact. One example for this phenomenon can be found in the way newly built ports which were constructed against US advice were used in the discourses of DP officials in their election campaign trips. The election campaign for the May 2, 1954 elections can provide ample evidence for this argument.

The campaign of the DP for the 1954 elections was no less than a slideshow of symbols of development. Celal Bayar, who returned from his visit to the US on March 10 and joined the election campaign of the DP visited the construction site of the Sarıyar Dam on March 21 (Zafer, 1954a). On March 28, Gediz and Akçay dams and hydroelectric power plants were contracted (Zafer, 1954b); on March 31, a groundbreaking ceremony for Karabük roller and steel mills was held (Zafer, 1954c); on April 2, the Mersin port was contracted (Zafer, 1954d); on April 4, a groundbreaking ceremony for the Samsun port was held with the attendance of Celal Bayar (Zafer, 1954e); on April 18, groundbreaking ceremonies were held for the Haydarpaşa port (with the attendance of Bayar, who, on this occasion, promised the public that a bridge would be built in İstanbul under the next government's term) and the

Salıpazarı port. Further ceremonies were held for the Susurluk sugar factory on April 19 (Zafer, 1954f); for the Mersin port on April 25 (Zafer, 1954g); and the Burdur sugar factory on April 26 (Zafer, 1954h). On April 29, the Demirköprü dam was contracted (Zafer, 1.5.1954i); and on April 30, Kemer and Hirfanlı dams and hydroelectric power plants were contracted (Zafer, 1954j).

These major investments, most of which were completed with the help of foreign credit and expertise, constituted the backbone of a developmentalist economic policy. Dams, power plants, factories and ports, which could only be constructed with a concentration of capital, work force and expertise, were symbols regarded by the DP government as milestones en route to economic development. The DP benefited from the US aid as long as and as much as it could, but when the American aid ceased to flow, it immediately searched for other sources, as evident in the case of Gediz dam, which I discuss below. The political value of these investments was not limited to the spending or employment they produced. They also had an ideological impact, for they were taken by the DP as symbols of development and progress.

The election campaign of the DP was designed with a view to stressing the ongoing development in the country, with speeches and meetings organized parallel to groundbreaking ceremonies. The journalist Metin Toker (1954a), who was traveling with Celal Bayar on his way to Samsun for the groundbreaking ceremony of the Samsun Port, recorded this impact in the words of a villager: “the DP is supposedly building our port to win the elections! My God, is carrying out a job considered a crime? Of course it will build the port and win the votes. If the other one [the RPP] did it, it would have won them.” This political impact derived its strength from the image of development, and as put in the first chapter, in this era, the

ultimate point of development was concretized in the image of the US in the discourses of DP officials. This became evident as Metin Toker (1954b) quoted Celal Bayar asserting that “Turkey will be an America on its own in thirty years” in his speech in Samsun.

During the campaign, Bayar employed the image of the US not only in his political discourse but also in the symbolism of some of his practices. Bayar travelled during the election campaign riding in a Jeep that was given to him as a gift in Toledo by Willys Motors, while he was traveling around the US (The United States Information Service, 1954). On the face of it, this phenomenon itself might be regarded as insignificant, but considering the economic situation of Turkey during the early postwar period, it signified a drastic change. According to an exchange of letters (BDA: 0301019935911) between the Minister of Health and Social Aid Kemali Bayazıt (BDA: 8.1948, 03010199359117) and Prime Minister Hasan Saka (BDA: 8.9.1948, 0301019935911), it is understood that Jeeps were scarce and in high demand in the years preceding the DP government. In Bayazıt’s letter to the Prime Ministry, he requested that the 1947 ban (order date: 9.12.1947, order number: 5/15-4707/6-3117) on the use of jeeps by public offices be removed. He explained that the eight jeeps that belonged to the Commission for Fighting against Trachoma, the Commission for Fighting against Syphilis and the Düzce and Vezirköprü public health centers were recently confiscated by the state, but that they were filling a crucial need in the fight against social and contagious illnesses and were vital in the transportation of patients from rural areas to nearby hospitals. Bayazıt requested the reinstitution of these jeeps that were “vital in the preservation of public health,” but Prime Minister Hasan Saka declined this request due to the scarcity of these vehicles. It can be seen from this example that a vehicle which was an essential and scarce service tool turned into a symbol of development and wealth in a few years, under a regime that set “becoming like the US” the major goal for itself.

The analysis of the political agency of the DP so far in this part of the chapter shows that development relations had a very fluid and political nature. The DP adhered to American advice in the areas that it saw fit, and ignored it where a more preferable outcome could be seized by applying different measures. Overall, both the US and the DP governments proposed developmentalist policies for Turkey, with different focuses. In a complex way, the DP followed a policy of heavy public spending and industrialization to which the US was opposed to, Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes propagated this policy through their ambition to become like the US during the election campaign, with Bayar riding a Jeep that symbolized this ambition. Development, both in its material and discursive sense, in this instance, proved to be a common ground on which the US and Turkey could pursue their political interests.

II.B. “The Soviet Threat” and Anticommunism

The major political interest of the US in this era was to contain and stop the Soviet influence in the Third World, and development was regarded by the US government in the postwar era as the most effective path to achieve this (Escobar, 1995). Aid was configured as the main instigator of development, and for countries like Turkey that shared borders with the Soviet Union, economic and military aid went hand in hand to achieve development. Of course, aid and credit came together with the transfer of Northern knowledge and capital, thus opening up certain points for Northern intervention in social and political fields. The aim of military aid was strengthening the Third World armies through the modernization of equipment and machinery, and the rationalization and modernization of the military organization. The efforts made to contain the so-called “Soviet threat” and anticommunism, at a broader level, were the single most important ideological on which the US and Turkish governments converged in this era.

Yet, it can be said that this ideological kinship did not prevent the postwar Turkish governments from exploiting Turkey's important geo-strategic position on the border of the Soviet Union in aid negotiations with the US government and development institutions. Nor did it prevent them from employing this discourse in their fight against the left in national politics. As Oran (2001: 497-498) asserts, the DP's strategy was to exaggerate a so-called communist threat in order to find foreign aid for a bankrupt economic regime. Even though the position of the Soviet Union changed completely in its relations with Turkey only a couple of years after its 1945 demands on the straits, Kars and Ardahan, the DP governments did not take this change into consideration, ignored the Non-Aligned Movement and constantly tried to stir the Cold War. But when the DP government lost all its hopes of receiving aid from the western bloc, it decided to approach the Soviet Union. On 26 November 1959, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu hosted a formal dinner for Ambassador Rijov, a mission headed by Minister of Health Lütfi Kırdar visited Moscow in December, 1959, and Adnan Menderes declared that he would visit Moscow on 15 June 1960, a visit he never achieved due to the military take-over on May 27 (Tellal, 2001: 520).

Pursuing military aid was a priority for the RPP government as well, and this was another point of continuity between the two governments. The RPP government employed a similar discourse as the DP, and this can be traced in the minutes of a meeting between Prime Minister Hasan Hüsnü Saka, the US General Bradley, the US Ambassador to Turkey Wadsworth, French General Lecheres and British Marshall Slim that took place in October 1948, where military aid to Turkey and its possible future accession to NATO was discussed (BDA: 14.10.1948, 03001603738). In this meeting, Saka argued that due to the location of Turkey, it always had to devote a hefty amount of its budget to military expenses, and that

Turkey was not receiving the aid that it deserved, considering its strategic importance for the western bloc. Saka (1948) asserted that the

[u]nderdevelopment of our country, the economic deprivation and misery, and the very low living standards do not derive from the incapacities of this nation, but from the necessities of the geographic area in which it is situated and from its historical requirements. The ultimate evidence for this fact is that we have been devoting more than 50 percent of our budget to military expenses for years... There is no other state that devotes this big an amount of its national income to military endeavors... In order to strengthen the joint front, the aid that will be given to Turkey, which possesses such capacity, character, and military potential, will be much more appropriate and effective than that which will be given to any other country.

Clearly, any kind of appropriation of the budget is a purely political decision, bonded to existing political struggles and interests. Here, in line with Oran's argument (2001), it can be argued that the geographic location of Turkey –being neighbors with the Soviet Union- was highlighted by Saka as a bargaining tool and as an excuse for “underdevelopment.” As will be more evident in the next quote from the DP era, positing that Turkey was underdeveloped due to its military obligations was a common argument for postwar Turkish governments. It can be said that this showed a double movement within the discourse of development. First, the underdeveloped party was exploiting the discourse of the “Soviet Threat” that was employed mainly by the US, and second, the underdeveloped party was achieving this from within the discourse of development, which was firstly employed by the US as well: Turkey was underdeveloped because it was guarding the Free World against the Soviet Threat, and therefore, it had be more urgently and generously helped by the US in order to be developed and guard the Free World better.

In the memorandum (BDA: 6.3.1951, 03001603733) which the Turkish government sent to Washington after a meeting with Russell H. Dorr, Chief of the Economic Corporation Administration (ECA) Special Mission to Turkey, concerning a possible additional aid to Turkey, the argument of the Turkish government became clearer. In the memorandum, the

Turkish government openly stated that “since the inception of foreign aid, Turkey has defended the thesis that when evaluating the economic body and development opportunities of a country, it must be taken into consideration the military spending that a country does, that is not only for itself, but for the good of all [the free world], in face of the peril that the world finds itself in.” For the DP government, it was a “fact that does not need explanation” that in order to protect the countries faithful to the United Nations Charter, “Turkey, amidst all its economic problems, spent most of its efforts for national defense, and thus did not properly achieve economic development.” The memorandum further read that “so presented the situation, the aid that Turkey received from the Marshall Plan is very low regarding other countries, when its national income, its need for economic development and its military expenses are considered.”

The memorandum concluded that Turkey needed 88 million TL of military aid in kind and 336 million TL of financial aid “that would be equal to Turkey’s military expenses, thus preventing Turkish economy from weakening and showing inflationist tendencies” (BDA: 6.3.1951, 03001603733, 6). This memorandum and the minutes discussed above show that postwar Turkish governments made use of the discourses that pertained to development in order to get the most out of American aid. Two main –and related- concerns/discourses of the US governments, development and anticommunism, were employed by Turkish politicians along with historical and political arguments to receive more aid. As Oran (2001) asserts, these arguments had little, if anything, to do with the actual nature of relations with the Soviet Union, and considering the discussion in this thesis, this demonstrates an important element of the agency of Turkish governments in the relations of development.

II.C. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

In the postwar period, development relations between Turkey and the US were sustained through different means. The Marshall Aid was directed by the ECA, the economic and military aid resulting from the Truman Doctrine was presented directly, a certain amount of aid and credit was received through inter-governmental agreements and, in terms of credit, the most important institution was the IBRD. The IBRD was the original institution and the main part of the World Bank Group, and together with the IMF, it was founded by the Bretton Woods agreements that were signed by the Allied nations in July 1944. Internationally, the postwar global economic relationships were marked with the birth of Bretton Woods institutions and, in the words of Thomas and Allen (2000: 204), “they were set up essentially to regulate the global economy under the sponsorship and direction of the US, initially with the acute needs of war-damaged Europe in mind.” In this period, the IMF’s main duty was to prevent the shrinking of international trade due to instabilities in countries’ foreign payments and to block inflation in the international arena. While the IMF provided short term credit to ease national transactions, the WB provided long term credit and investment-oriented loans to states or private firms to better adjust countries to the international capitalist system (Oran, 2001: 482). In other words, “the IBRD would guarantee European borrowing in US financial markets, and the IMF would smooth the flow of repayments” (Thomas and Allen, 2000: 204).

Goldman (2005), in his study of the WB, names the era between 1944 and 1968 “the reluctant banker era” of the WB. He notes that the WB started off its career in a selective and cautious manner with the potential client base selected as Europe. But when the Marshall Plan jumpstarted the European economy, the WB had to reinvent itself as a bank for the non-European countries, and launch a postcolonial discourse of development (Goldman, 2005). Even then, in its first twenty years, the WB did not become involved with contemporary

pillars of development (such as public education, health, housing) and promoted only the most direct investments (roads, ports, power plants) that were acknowledged to be the most financially sound investments. But the reluctant and cautious manner in which the WB operated was challenged with the demands of the US political corps. Due to the close bond between the US government and the WB,⁸ the government applied constant pressure upon the WB's decision making process with a view to push the bank to act according to the interests of the US. In Goldman's (2005: 58-59) words,

[w]hereas McCloy's [president of the WB between 1947 and 1949] Bank preferred strict and unforgiving loan policies based on "economic" criteria, the US government insisted that the Bank work only with countries identified as friends of the United States.... Because of US's political power, Turkey, Egypt, and brutal authoritarian regimes in Latin America received generous and unscrutinized loans that were matched by substantial U.S. military and foreign aid, while more "economically worthy" countries received none.

Similarly, Thomas and Allen (2000: 205-6) assert that "until the late 1960s, the Bank was constrained by a policy of project lending. This meant that it could only lend for specific schemes, such as a dam. In each case an argument had to be made that the project was "needed."

It can be argued that, out of the gray area left between the contrasting visions of the WB and the US government, and due to the project lending mechanism of the WB, the DP governments carved out a space for credit negotiation and political maneuver. A document (BDA: 21.6.1950, 03001412421) reads that Turkey first applied to the IBRD in 1948, and until 1950, presented 125 uncoordinated projects and asked for 125 million dollars of credit. The IBRD only took into consideration three of these projects, namely ports (Samsun, Trabzon, Alsancak, Haydarpaşa and İskenderun), silos and the Seyhan Dam. Out of these

⁸ The US controlled much of the WB's stock and the voting power which is based on a weighting of each country's financial contribution (Thomas and Allen, 2000: 204).

projects, it can be inferred from official documents⁹ that the construction of the Seyhan Dam caused lengthy controversy between the Turkish government and the Bank, which could only be overcome in two years, after a series of correspondences, visits of expert commissions and the involvement of the International Engineering Company based in San Francisco, US, which worked as the adviser to the Turkish government in their planning of the project. A similar set of issues could not be overcome in the Gediz Dam project though, and this would lead to a break off in the relationship between the DP and the IBRD in 1954, just when Celal Bayar was conducting his visit to the US.

As argued above, the IBRD was an important source of credit for the DP government in this era, and considering the developmentalist economic policy of the DP, its position was crucial for the funding of the DP's projects that required heavy investments. The DP and the bank had a close relationship, and upon the advice of the WB, The Turkish Industrial Development Bank was founded in May 1950 (BDA: 12.5.1950, 030180102122412, decision no: 3/11203), for the "the establishment of new private industry and expanding and modernizing the existing ones, participation of national and foreign capital to the growing industry in Turkey, and dealing with bank operations concerning such matters." In his letter to Prime Minister Şemsettin Günaltay, WB President Robert L. Garner (BDA: 9.5.1950, 030015246) congratulated him for the establishment of the bank and stated that the WB would send experienced technicians to Turkey to help set it up. The World Bank also had an office in Turkey, and in July 1952, Pietr Lieftinck, former finance minister of the Netherlands, was appointed as a special representative to the president of the World Bank in Turkey. Garner (BDA: 28.1.1952, 030015256), in his letter to Adnan Menderes, stated: "I am sure that you

⁹ BDA: 9.5.1950, 030015246: Letter from Robert L. Garner to Şemsettin Günaltay; BDA: 15.5.1951, 030014124312: Letter from Eugene R. Black to Celal Bayar; BDA: 28.1.1952, 030015256: Letter from R.L.Garner to Adnan Menderes; BDA: 8.1951, 03001885511: Letter from Adnan Menderes to R. L. Garner.

will find that a man of his [Lieftinck] wide experience in financial and economic matters will, with his help and counsel, be of the greatest value to your government in the development tasks that lie ahead of your country, and in working out a continuing co-operative relationship between Turkey and the Bank.” Menderes (BDA: 19.1.1953, 03001181051), on the other hand, in his response to Lieftinck’s New Year greeting, wrote, “I want to avail myself of the opportunity in assuring you that you may rely on a full support and collaboration on our part in the execution of your mission in this country.” His assurance, indeed, would prove to be worthless when the agenda of the Bank contrasted that of Menderes.

As demonstrated above, the relationship between the DP and the Bank was flourishing in the early 1950s and the DP relied on the credit that would be provided by the Bank for a number of projects. As the general elections of May 2 1954 were approaching, one project that was believed to create a considerable political impact was the Gediz Dam, and the DP administration worked and lobbied hard to make the Bank declare that it was going to fund this project before the election date, so that the DP could use it in its propaganda. The DP failed to convince the WB due to the worsening economic condition of Turkey, and the DP did not hesitate to close the Bank office in Turkey and deport Lieftinck once the final decision of the Bank was clear. The decision of the DP government was so strong that Adnan Menderes sent the decision letter to Celal Bayar for him to deliver to the Bank representatives, while he was traveling in the US, the historic visit that was held so dear by the DP government. It can be argued that considering the relations between the US and Turkey, this was a bold political maneuver that signified the agency of the DP in development relations.

Among the state officials who accompanied Bayar during his visit, only Feridun Cemal Erkin, the Turkish ambassador to Washington has written an account of this visit. In his memoirs, Erkin (1987) explains that he made two attempts in 1953 to discuss the Gediz Dam project with WB president Eugene Black and vice president Robert Garner, and they refused the project in both attempts. On the other hand, according to Menderes' parliamentary group speech in 1958 (Demirer, 2005), these rejections were not the only reasons behind the DP's decision to break off relations. According to Menderes, during 1953, the WB demanded from the Turkish government to establish a committee that would oversee the implementation of the Barker Report, that would include foreign experts, and that would be exempt from constitutional control. In addition to that, the WB asked the government for Liefstinck to work as an undersecretary of state, which would mean he surpass related institutions of the DP in economic affairs. In Menderes' account, when, on top of all these, the WB rejected to fund the Gediz Dam, he decided to write a letter to Celal Bayar while he was still in the US, telling him that the government wanted to expel Liefstinck and close down the WB office. Upon receiving this letter, Erkin (1987) noted that Bayar sent Erkin and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu (the Foreign Minister of Turkey, who was accompanying Bayar during his visit) to the WB Headquarters to discuss the matter for one last time. Zorlu stated to WB officials that the economic situation in Turkey was improving and that the Gediz Dam project was of high political importance for the DP on the eve of general elections. After a final refusal, Zorlu handed the letter to WB officials and the relations between the DP and the WB came to an abrupt end, while Bayar was still touring the US, praising the smooth economic and political bonds between the two countries.

This incident can be taken as a final example of the agency of the postwar Turkish governments in relations of development. The DP's will to impose its own political priorities

and its own agenda of development becomes evident when the significance of Bayar's visit in terms of Turkish-American relations and the importance of the IBRD as the major credit source for the DP's existing and future projects are taken into consideration. It can be argued that the DP government's policy of heavy public spending and industrialization, its use of the discourse of the "Soviet Threat," and its relations with the IBRD show that whereas the DP government adopted and made use of the discourse of development that pervaded its relations with the US and US-based institutions, it followed its own priorities in these relations, followed the advice it received when it fitted its own agenda, and disregarded it when it did not. Overall, inferring from the examples analyzed above, it can be said that the power relations inscribed in development were not an all-encompassing phenomenon where the underdeveloped had no say in it, but rather, even though the existence of unequal relations based on a power-knowledge nexus was evident, these relations functioned according to the separate agendas, agencies and priorities of both parties.

On another note, it must also be stated that Turkey was not an isolated example in terms of its agency in the relations of development, its agenda of industrialization or in terms of the social and economic policies that postwar Turkish governments pursued. As McMichael (1996) demonstrates, in the postwar era, there were many countries in the Third World that pursued economic policies which were in tension with the proposed developmentalist path of US-based institutions. Economic nationalism and import substitution industrialization were two widely adopted policies (especially in the Latin America, and with the guidance of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)) that were in contrast with the American suggestions on free trade. In other words, the agency of the postwar Turkish governments within the postwar relations of development was not a unique phenomenon, but was in line with the ideals and policies that existed in many parts of the Third World in this

era. Interestingly, the telling story of the Gediz Dam bears a resemblance to the story of the Aswan (High) Dam in Egypt, which constitutes one of the examples in which Third World governments played both sides of the Cold War to reach their political goals.¹⁰

III. Modernizing Turkey

The three reports that were analyzed at the beginning of this chapter can be said to reflect the views of the American government and institutions when the postwar relations between the US and Turkey were blossoming. They were pathways produced for Turkey that were assumed to lead Turkey to development, as defined by the US government and institutions. At this stage of relations, as discussed in the first chapter, development was seen as a largely economic phenomenon in the US government, academia and institutions, and economic development was believed to be attainable through scientific modeling and proper guidance and planning. The reports analyzed fell mostly in this category for they aimed to reorganize the Turkish economy and transform it with the help of American expertise. As development relations progressed, by the mid-1950s, the economic framework of development started to be questioned in the face of development failures in the Third World, and modernization theory, as discussed in the first chapter, arose from within the discourse of development. Aiming to collect information about the Third World countries and produce a holistic theory of social change in order to properly develop them against the Soviet Threat, scholars and experts in this era reflected on the traits of the industrialized American society, on the traits of the underdeveloped Third World societies, and on the effects of the American aid in these countries, and came up with a broad framework in which multiple traits of societies were evaluated according to an index of modernity. In the case of Turkey, in contrast to the reports

¹⁰ The construction of the dam was to be completed with British and American financial help, but both sides refrained from their promises after the “neutral” Jamal Abdel Nasser government approached the Soviet Union. The Suez War broke out after the Suez Canal was nationalized in 1956 and the Soviet Union funded the dam project in 1958 (Mitchell, 2002).

analyzed above, these studies pertained to the whole of the Turkish society, culture and politics, rather than only its economy and public administration. In the examples below, I will first analyze a report which has a negative perspective on the prospect of economic development in the Turkish countryside and the impact of agricultural mechanization (Robinson, 1952); a study that focuses on the new-found agency of villagers in Turkey (Reed, 1953); one of the key texts of modernization theory that exemplifies how Turkey was imagined within the framework of modernity (Lerner, 1958); and finally, a study that analyzes the effects of the American military aid to Turkey from within the framework of modernization (Lerner and Robinson, 1960).

III.A. Tractors in the Village: The Aftermath of Agricultural Modernization

As presented in the first chapter, scholarship, business and politics were deeply entangled in the US during the 1950s. Scholarship was directly and indirectly influenced by the concerns and interests of the US government and major companies. In line with the foreign policy concerns of the US government, some scholars in this period went on to analyze the effects of American aid to the Third World. As the expert reports showed earlier, the main economic policy that was configured for Turkey was agricultural mechanization and development in the late 1940s. In line with the suggestions of these reports, the DP government pursued a policy of agricultural mechanization in the 1950s, importing nearly 50,000 tractors during the decade.¹¹ The social implications of this mechanization then became a concern for Richard Robinson¹² (1952), and in his academic study, he analyzed the effects of the arrival of

¹¹ There were nearly 1,000 tractors in Turkey by 1946 (Boratav, 1988).

¹² Robinson's interest in Turkey started in 1947 (Robinson, 1994), and throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, he was an active figure who produced extensive knowledge about Turkey, mainly for American audiences. Between 1947 and 1960, he served as a staff member of the Institute of Current World Affairs, foreign observer for the American Universities Field Staff, representative of the Chicago Daily News Foreign Service, Area Specialist and Research Assistant with the Economic Survey Mission sent to Turkey by the IBRD (Barker Mission), Consultant to the World Bank, Ford Foundation and the US Department of Commerce, Lecturer in Business Administration at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, and Staff Member of the Harvard

tractors in the Turkish village. Robinson's focus was the Çukurova region, where he believed the tractors made the most impact.

The reason Robinson (1952: 451) chose Çukurova was that cotton was the main produce in this area and that "it was to increase the production of this foreign exchange-yielding crop that the Marshall Plan turned the Çukurova into the most heavily mechanized area of comparable size in Turkey, perhaps of the Middle East." According to Robinson (1952: 451), "of the 6,500 tractors imported into the country since 1948 under ECA auspices, between 1,200 and 1,500 have found their way to the Çukurova... 3,720 machines are now at work on Çukurova farms. This total represents a 460 per cent increase over the 1948-1952 period." In the face of this drastic transformation, Robinson was curious as to how the villages in this area were affected. Robinson and his assistants studied fifteen villages in the region and reported some general patterns that they came across.

According to Robinson, there was little new land to open to cultivation in the Çukurova region and that all government-owned lands had been distributed to the villagers. With mechanization, Robinson (1952: 452) argued that income per-unit of land and the value of land in relation to labor advanced considerably, "making it doubly difficult for the ordinary small village-operator to augment his current property holdings." Despite the growing incomes, he added that no one was obliged to pay taxes for soil products. It can be argued that Robinson's findings, as will be analyzed below, contrasted the presuppositions of modernization theory and displayed the shortcomings of the developmentalist policy pursued by the DP and supported by the US government. Robinson (1952: 456) argued that mechanization had four tangible effects on village life (alteration of the land tenure system, a

Center for Middle Eastern Studies (Robinson, 1952, 1958, 1994). Similar to Max W. Thornburg and other figures who contributed to the growing knowledge on Turkey in mid-century, Robinson's affiliations spread over the academia, international organizations, government and business.

decrease in the amount of labor required in the villages, a cut- back in total village income, and a weakening of village morale) and that they were all negative effects.

In terms of land tenure, Robinson (1952) asserted that sharecropping was replaced by hired day labor. He argued that mechanization ceased the need for sharecropping, and increased cotton yields and prices provided the landowners with the chance to increase their own income while maintaining the croppers' at the same level. In this situation, Robinson (1952: 457) argued that "[l]andowners and tractor-drivers both prosper; the ex-sharecroppers (who by their very position in life probably cannot finance the purchase of a tractor) find themselves employed only as seasonal labor to weed and pick, the two jobs not yet mechanized."

As one of the more controversial points of his study in regard to the assumptions of the modernization theory and the existing scholarship on Turkish history, Robinson asserted that the "lowered labor requirement" caused by mechanization did not necessarily result in migration to the city. From his observations, he (1952: 458) quoted that "to a number of villagers who complained most bitterly of what the tractors were doing, the query was addressed, 'Why don't you move into the city?' 'We have a house here', they answered; 'in the city we would not. We have no money to move. In the village at least we can live.'" Robinson argued that the villager who lacked training and capital to satisfy the need for goods and services in the cities would also lose the chance to take credit from the Agricultural Bank or other agencies in case s/he moved to the city and very few villagers took the risk to start from scratch. In his (1952: 461) view, "[m]echanization has come so fast that no large-scale rural-urban movement has had a chance to form."¹³

¹³ Robinson's views changed over time, and in 1958, he asserted that urbanization became one of the more pressing problem in Turkey (Robinson, 1958).

In terms of village income, Robinson argued that as day labor replaced sharecropping, the increasing village income accumulated in the hands of the big landowners and as the land-tenure system changed, the greater share of the income was channeled to the city. In Robinson's (1952: 459) argument, "[i]t is the rich, not the poor, who are moving out of the villages." Apart from changing the social structure in the villages, the arrival of tractors also lowered the morale of the villagers. Robinson (1952: 459) asserted that in Çukurova,

[o]ne senses resentment against landlord and city-dweller not common elsewhere in Turkey. Further, the emotional bond linking the peasant with his land is being broken as more and more are forced to day labor. A sense of insecurity seems to be penetrating these villages, for a number of persons now claim that they would move into urban areas if they felt any hope of prospering there.

Robinson inferred from the results of his study that unless a village was a newly developing one where the land was not divided by inheritance and there were new arable lands available, the arrival of tractors would adversely affect the village society. He argued that in most of the villages, after a generation of fragmentation of the land, the pattern reversed, and some city-dweller or better-off villager bought, defragmented and let the land out on sharecropping. After the arrival of the tractors, sharecropping was replaced by hired daily labor with little pay. Robinson (1952: 455) asserted that a similar situation existed in most villages and noted "it is not surprising that of the 15 villages studied, the general reaction in only five seemed favorable to the ECA-financed tractor program; five others adopted a neutral attitude; the remaining five showed hostility." The villagers were apparently well aware that the recent transformation in the village was a result of the Marshall Aid, and Robinson (1952: 454) noted that there was "little wonder that one of the villagers drew his finger across his throat, saying, "The Marshall Plan is doing this to us."

Overall, it can be said that Robinson's study was a field analysis of whether the predictions of development theory held true. As will be clearer at the end of the chapter when analyzing the article he coauthored with Daniel Lerner, it can be argued that the so-called scientific studies in this era were actually reports assessing the uses of American aid. While the expert reports of the late 1940s and the early 1950s aimed to direct the economic and military aid, these academic studies aimed to analyze the effects of the aid in the areas in which they were put into use. On another level, it can also be argued that Robinson's study constituted another example of how expertise and "science" were entwined in this era.

An embracing take on the results of modernization in the postwar era can be found in the account of Howard A. Reed, a scholar from McGill University in Canada, who published widely on Turkey during the 1950s and studied mostly village life and religion in Turkey, supporting his analysis with data that he collected traveling in Anatolian villages. In his studies, Reed developed an account of social transformation in postwar Turkey that had little relation with foreign aid, and more with local social processes. One example of this approach was present in his article "A New Force at Work at Democratic Turkey" (1953).

III.B. A New Force at Work in Democratic Turkey: The Benefits of Democracy

Similar to other American scholars who published on Turkey during the 1950s, Reed was a scholar who was enthusiastic about the changes brought about by the multi-party system. In his article, he formed a bond between economic progress and the multi-party system and displayed this bond in his picturing of a modernizing village that started to receive material benefits in return for its votes. Reed (1953: 35) presented the agency of the peasant in the multi-party system as thus:

The bashful peasant is delighted with this recognition [of the value of his vote]. He has quickly sensed his pivotal role, the vital importance of HIS vote which those in power are now asking for instead of contemptuously

telling him how to cast. Mehmet, the Turkish peasant, is artful. He is demanding service in return for his vote. He is getting service, as never before, in the form of land if he needs it, roads, agricultural machines and extension service, clean, abundant water, lighter (or at least more indirect) taxes, better schools, more teachers, midwives, health officers, and cash to pay for more substantial homes, perhaps even a radio, bicycle, and an occasional trip to town. He is enjoying the erstwhile unusual thrill of having his representative in the Grand National Assembly, the provincial governor, and a host of lesser officials visit his village to ask him and his elders what are their most pressing community needs. He is politely, but energetically, expressing his wants and views, subtly parrying questions as to his political allegiance, which no one can foretell. Knowledgeable women in villages and in cities in Turkey also emphasize that many wives and daughters quietly voted as they wished in the last election, not as the family patriarch dictated.

It can be inferred from this quote that Reed saw the multi-party system, not the foreign aid, in the heart of the social and material transformation that occurred in the Turkish village. Services like the provision of roads and water, economic prosperity that would allow the purchase of radios and bicycles, subtle demolition of patriarchy, all of which constituted necessary components of a modern social organization, were presented as outcomes of the recent change in the Turkish political system. Reed argued that the peasant, who had always been told how to cast in the past, was now the engine of social and political change, thanks to his newly found political power. In these arguments, Reed was in line with the modernization theory as he configured “the traditional peasant” as a powerless figure in the society who, in the past, neither had political agency, nor had been able to ask for it due to his/her constricted perspective on life. This perspective enlarged as the peasant found a way to convey his demands and ideals in the modern political system. Reed (1953: 44) asserted that “most realize that in essence this enthusiastic demand [of the peasant] for a better share of the material and cultural benefits of life is to be welcomed as healthy evidence that the Turkish peasant is enlarging his horizon of ideas and wants.”

Even though Reed portrayed the arrival of modern social organization as the motor of social change and portrayed a stagnant past in which the villager had no say in political processes, his underlining of the importance of the multi-party system in particular and local social and political processes in general is vital for the argument of thesis. Analyzing how Turkey entered the stage of development relations must always be considered in relation to the multi-party system in Turkey. In contrast to most countries that received development aid in this era, electoral democracy was in place in Turkey and it had an important influence in the shape which development relations between the US and Turkey has taken in the postwar era. What existing scholarship on the DP era calls populism, and what I have been pinpointing as the “agency” of the DP in development relations in this thesis so far, must both be analyzed within the conditions of a competitive political system in which the DP had to hold onto its wide electoral base to stay in power.

The two studies analyzed above were aimed at reflecting on the social transformation that took place in Turkey in the postwar era. Robinson sought to analyze the effects of agricultural mechanization in the rural areas whereas Reed studied the implications of the multi-party system in village life. They both studied the rural, for they believed that the most tangible implications of social transformation could be spotted there as Turkey was back then a predominantly rural society. The image of the village was important, for in the framework of modernization theory, it represented tradition, the universal point zero from where the journey of modernization began. Even though these two accounts were not written from the perspective of modernization theory, they argued that since the US aid started to flow in 1948, and together with the change in government toward democracy, the old order was gradually replaced by the new one in the village, both in terms of mechanization and social organization. Whereas Robinson and Reed spotted the significance of local processes and

existing structures in the outcome of this postwar transmission in Turkey, Daniel Lerner, one of the founders of modernization theory, envisaged a universal pattern.

III.C. The Passing of Traditional Society: From Tradition to Modernity

Daniel Lerner was arguably the most influential American scholar of his era who conducted research on Turkey in the 1950s. He was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)¹⁴ that focused mainly on problems of the Middle East and the MIT Center for International Studies. His study that will be analyzed, *The Passing of Traditional Society* came out in 1958, but its research was completed in 1954. In this book, Lerner combined historical, sociological and anthropological analysis and made a sweeping argument about social change. He put forward that in the modernization process, as traditional people moved to cities and expanded their horizons through literacy and communication, they would become aware of better things in life, build a certain level of empathy and break off from “the constrictive self” of the traditional. Once modern tools and concepts were introduced to traditional people, Lerner believed that the desire they would feel for a better life would be the motor of social change. In his (1958: 28) words, “desire, once stirred, is not easily stilled.”

Lerner’s study started with a story about Balgat, then a village near Ankara. Lerner (1958: 18) believed “the story of the Middle East today is encapsulated in the recent career of Balgat” and indeed, “the personal meaning of modernization in underdeveloped lands can be traced, in miniature, through the lives of two Balgati-the Grocer and the Chief.” the Grocer (*bakkal*) and the Chief (*muhtar*), in Lerner’s account, signified two distinct personalities. The Chief of the village was the old, traditional soul, who was skeptic to change, attached to the ideals of the

¹⁴ Other members of the Council included Dankwart Rustow and Lucian Pye who were prominent theorists of modernization, George C. McGhee who was an oilman and a public officer who served as the US ambassador to Turkey between 1951 and 1953, Max Thornburg, and Allen W. Dulles who was the longest serving director of central intelligence between 1951 and 1963.

early republic set forth by Mustafa Kemal and grateful for what he had and what he had achieved in life. The Grocer, on the other hand, signified “the Transitional,” who was yet to be modern, but was aware of what was going on outside the village, wanted better things in life such as civilized clothes and a bigger grocery and a house in the city, was open to change, and would be willing to live in the US, for he had heard “that it is a nice country, and possibilities to be rich even for the simplest persons” (Lerner, 1958: 25).

Lerner’s interest in the life-histories of Balgatis emerged in the fall of 1950, when he read interviews of five Balgatis, conducted in the spring of 1950 (1958: 19). From these interviews, Lerner ciphered out a burgeoning clash between the modern and traditional that took place in a “traditional” village of Turkey. His re-interpretation of these interviews generated a picture in which the Grocer constituted a focal point from which modern ideals diffused to the village, much to the disapproval and scorn of the villagers, and most importantly, The Chief. In 1954, Lerner visited Balgat himself, and he was astonished by the signs of modernization he witnessed, such as a regularly operating bus that went to Ankara via a newly built road, new water pipes, electrification of the village, a vast workforce working in factories in Ankara, and most importantly, a changed *mentality* which approached that of The Grocer and which embraced modern values that were transferred to Balgat, thanks to the four-year reign of the DP.

Lerner (1958: 35) believed that the story of the Grocer symbolized a universal path to modernity and it was the Grocer, “who dramatized most poignantly the personal meaning of the big change now under way throughout the Middle East.” Lerner (1958: 36) argued that the Grocer’s struggles against tradition were no different than those of Europeans of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries:

Maybe it [the struggle of The Grocer] was the 18th century field-hand of England who had left the manor to find a better life in London or Manchester. Maybe it was the 19th century French farm lad, wearied by his father's burdens of *taille* and *tithe*, who had gone off to San Francisco to hunt gold and, finding none, had then tried his hand as mason, mechanic, printer's devil.... Maybe it was the 20th century Polish peasant crossing continent and ocean to Detroit, looking for a "better 'ole" in the new land.

Evidently for Lerner, postwar development in Turkey converged with the historical pattern of European modernity. As a result of this development, by the mid-1950s, Lerner (1958: 111) asserted that "Turkey is not yet a Modern society in our sense; but it is no longer a Traditional society in any sense." In his account, Turkey's progress was a result of its introduction to modern tools, concepts and organization, thus the American aid and the policies of the DP administration that put this aid into proper use. In a way, it can be argued that Lerner's portrayal of Balgat in particular, and Turkey in general, was in line with the political agendas of Turkish and American governments of the time. Lerner's article was an approval and encouragement for the DP policies that promoted a developmentalist path to progress, and a documentation of success for the US foreign policy that sought to prosper and modernize underdeveloped areas through the transfer of capital, knowledge and expertise.

Within a broader framework, Lerner's study was an important part of the knowledge production on Turkey and on modernization. It defined who were traditional and who were modern, it configured how modernity could be achieved via modernization and it established a broad framework from which contemporary societies could be ranked, social change could be theorized and political intervention could be legitimized. As Latham (2000: 37) put it, "presented with a striking level of confidence, Lerner's universal, sequential stages implied that all societies would inexorably move toward the common endpoint of the 'modern' West." This move, as discussed, could be started, guided and expedited with the transfer of capital, knowledge and expertise according to Lerner. In the case of Turkey, this transfer

occurred through economic and military aid. In the next and final example, I will analyze a study on the effects of the US military aid to Turkey that Lerner and Robinson conducted together (1960).

III.D. A Hammer and a Screwdriver: Modernization via Military Aid

It can be argued that Lerner and Robinson's study borrowed Lerner's framework of modernization and applied it to Turkey, constructing the army as a modernizing force. In Turkey's quest to create a modern man and society, Lerner and Robinson argued that, the army, with its newly acquired democratic and egalitarian organization, modern equipment, and its mission as an educational institution, all thanks to US aid, played a central role.

According to the authors (1960: 29), when the American military aid first arrived in Turkey in 1948, "the Turkish military forces were so steeped in tradition that any change was difficult to introduce without reorganizing and remanning the officer corps. Organized along rigid, Prussian-like caste lines, the forces had no personnel policy; rarely were men assigned to tasks on the basis of ability." In the historical part of the article, the authors acknowledged the role of the army in the late-Ottoman and early Republican history as an agent of modernization, and yet, by 1948, they believed that it was "steeped in tradition." They likened its organization to the Prussian army, which was in fact, one of the first "modern" armies in history. In addition, modernization movements in the Turkish army started with the employment of Prussian Generals whose job was to introduce "modern" organization and machinery of the Prussian army to the Ottoman army (Altınay, 2004). The authors, in short, perceived anything that did not emanate from the US as "traditional."

The Turkish army, according to the authors, was lacking both equipment and organization. The traditional character created an inefficient and irrational army that was ruled by old and

conservative officers who were threatened by change. The authors attributed the “traditional” flaws of the army to the policies of former RPP governments, and they (1960: 30-31) argued that a “shake-up” towards modernization was only possible through a government change:

These men had to be taught the difference between a hammer and a screwdriver. They had to be taught how to use equipment of a type which they had never seen or heard before. They had to learn how to participate in a modern military formation. Fortunately, this new mission coincided with a change in the Turkish political regime (resulting from the 1950 general election), which made possible shake-up in the general staff and the consequent elimination of some of the older and more conservative officers.

According to Lerner and Robinson (1960: 31), young boys who were recruited to the army were introduced to modern machinery, basic education and modern social organization, which were provided by US aid, and which were traits of modernity that would first change the perspectives of these boys on life, and then change the perspectives of the households and villages in which they would reside when they were discharged. Within this framework, the army that was steeped in tradition in 1948, due to the arrival of American methods and rationality, was now imagined as a generator of modernity. The acquisition of this modernity though, according to the authors (1960: 31-32), required nothing less than the “reshaping” of Turkish people:

Out of this process emerged widespread recognition that Turkey’s primary need was the rapid and steady increase of its “capacity for absorption”-this involving nothing less than the reshaping of the Turkish people and their perspectives on the world. The thousands of young Turkish farm lads... acquired more than a skill in the maintenance and operation of modern machinery. Many also acquired some degree of literacy and, along with it, the widening of outlook... They acquired new habits of dress, of cleanliness, of teamwork. In the most profound sense, they acquired a new personality. Along with the physical and social mobility opened to them through the military training program, they acquired also the habits of *psychic mobility*.

The quote suggests that the theory of modernization found an applicable ground in the traditional Turkish army, where young traditional boys would be transformed into modern men who possessed the knowledge of modernity that enabled them to transform their environments in return. These boys could neither “become” modern on their own, nor

“achieve” being modern through their introduction to modern tools and social organization. They had to be “reshaped” by those who possessed modernity, in order for them to break off from tradition and be modern. The reshaping of a traditional Turkish boy in the army produced “a qualified modern soldier and, upon his return to civilian life, a qualified modern man” (1960: 33). On the other hand, it was argued by the authors (1960: 33) that the higher ranked officials, who were sent to the US for training “accelerated transmission throughout Turkey not only of Western military and technical skills, but also of modern political and social concepts.” Apparently, the army was conceived as the generator of modernization by the authors, through its newly acquired modern characteristics that were brought about by the American aid. They believed that military aid, in this regard, did not just instigate modernization in the army, but in the society as a whole.¹⁵ In this context, the authors believed that the separation between the economic and military aid became questionable.

The accounts of the authors display that the relation between development/modernization and military power is an ambiguous one. The role of the army in a “modern” society that embraces “democratic” measures, even by the American standards of the 1950s, is, by definition, limited to the task of guarding a country against foreign aggression. What modernizers and developers sought to achieve in the underdeveloped/traditional countries on the other hand, was to increase the power of armies against a perceived Soviet threat, and present the American intervention in this process, and the role of the army in the society, as modernizing elements. This phenomenon, parallel to growing military power, has led to military coups in numerous countries, after which development and modernization theorists failed to attribute any responsibility to the American military aid that strengthened these

¹⁵ The gender dimension to this argument becomes visible in these accounts, for the authors assumed that the spread of “modernity” would be realized only through men.

armies. In the following quote, Lerner and Robinson (1960: 38-39) discuss how military aid can be best planned with the intention to produce the best development results.

Perhaps there is in the Turkish experience something of general import for American policy in economic development. One suspects that the distinction between economic aid and military assistance can easily be exaggerated-and is, in any case, ambiguous. We can deliberately plan, and help others to plan, our military assistance for maximum effect upon the economic and social development of the recipient countries. For example, foreign military personnel coming to this country for professional or technical training should perhaps also be exposed to our economic process, political institutions, and social practices. Indeed, the army, the public school, the industrial enterprise, and the economic planning organization of an underdeveloped country tend to converge on common objectives. In such a situation, professional military training may well come to differ somewhat from that which is most appropriate in the United States or Western Europe. Perhaps, learning from the Turkish experience, we can help other countries to harness their national motivation to be strong, via military organization, more directly to the drive for accelerated development.

Turkey, as a generic underdeveloped country, provided Lerner and Robinson an example that displayed how the army could be configured as a modernizing force through which American military aid could “reshape” people, even if it came to “differ somewhat from that which is most appropriate in the United States or Western Europe.” Deliberately planning military aid to produce “maximum effect upon the economic and social development of the recipient countries,” Lerner and Robinson believed that American aid could be channeled more efficiently, without problematizing the political role played by the army in these countries. The only negative aspect of military modernization was cast as the phenomenon of “rising expectations” of the newly modern men fresh out of the army, whose needs the civilian government failed to satisfy. Similar to the way Lerner configured “desire” as a modernizing force in *The Passing of Traditional Society*, “rising expectations” in this article was constructed as an observable social fact, which caused problems for the civilian governments for they were unable to satisfy the demands of the “modern” men out of the army. For Lerner and Robinson (1960: 34), the exposure to social and material goods in the army stirred

frustration in men who returned to civilian life, for their modernizing force met social and political barriers in the society:

All of this new egalitarianism [in military training] takes place within the context of what is to illiterate and impoverished boys from the villages an overpowering “materialism.”... The “revolution of rising expectations” is motivated largely by the ever spreading desire for more of the good things of life among people who, through most of history, neither had nor expected to have these things.... What happens when a young Turk returns to his village after having served his two years in the army?...Clearly, if army living standards are superior to those prevailing in much of the surrounding civilian society-as nor seems to be the case-the young discharged soldier is likely to find his traditional society inadequate to sustain his new level of expectations. A sense of frustration stimulates the young man to apply his army-acquired skills to promote civil innovation and “progress.”

For Lerner and Robinson, this was a very common phenomenon in the underdeveloped world. Taking Turkey as a generic example, they (1960: 44) argued that “[t]he Turkish experience vividly illustrates the constant challenge to civilian leadership posed by a rapidly developing society in which the democratic tradition is new...The new nations-in-a-hurry seek to accomplish in decades the modernization that was achieved over centuries in the West.” Lerner and Robinson’s argument was that the military takeovers in “developing” societies emanated from “rising expectations” that the introduction of modern tools, notions and organization caused in these societies. Having defined modernity and modernization as goals that were universally desirable and attainable, and having configured the army as the motor of modernization in Turkey, Lerner and Robinson were in a position to question the role of the US military aid in the instability that was created in the political regime and the consequent military take-over. They problematized neither the nature of the measures taken en route to modernization even when they somewhat differed from what was appropriate in Western Europe and the US nor the military intervention itself. For Lerner and Robinson (1960: 39), the military take-over was a natural step en route to modernity, a by-product of the modernization process that was inevitable and desirable by definition.

The Turkish army has been nourished by, and in turn has nourished, that type of modern materialism which places a high value upon personal well-being. This “revolution of rising expectations,” which has been spreading rapidly around the world, has turned out to be extremely treacherous in many areas. Expectations are raised long before they can be satisfied. The result is, quite often, a “revolution of rising frustrations.” In one underdeveloped area after another, the inadequately satisfied or inhibited aspirations of the new literates have cumulated into a persistent discontent that makes stable parliamentary government under civilian political leadership impossible. This has led, in one country after another, to military take-over and the imposition of stability by coercion.

Lerner and Robinson’s article, together with Lerner’s *The Passing of Traditional Society*, display how Turkey entered the schema of modernization in the realm of postwar academic knowledge production. As introduced in the first chapter, they reflect an effort to theorize and understand social change in the Third World, their arguments are in line with the concerns of US foreign policy, and they borrow the binarisms inherent in the definition of modernity and take a particular narrative of Western European history as a historical pattern in their theorization of modernization. Doing so, they carve out specific points of intervention and legitimize the transfer of northern knowledge, expertise and capital in the name of modernization.

CHAPTER III: OCCIDENTALISM AND THE DISCOURSES OF DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION

My first words as President of the Republic of Turkey are that the people of Turkey are filled with gratitude for the generosity shown us by your country. I assure you and the people of the United States that the memory of your noble deeds will live forever in the heart of every Turk. The extension of military and economic aid to the peace loving countries of the world by the United States Government has no parallel in the history of the world, either in essence or in quantity. I am convinced the significance of your action will be recorded in history as the most important event of the of World War II period (*New York Times*, 1954a).

So began Celal Bayar his address before the joint meeting of the United States Congress on January 28, 1954. Throughout his speech, Bayar emphasized Turkey's efforts "to resist the destructive forces which threaten our civilization" and assured that the Turkish nation, "faced with a danger common to us all, remains upright, steadfastly holding to her material and moral forces at one of the most critical spots of the world." Military and economic aid provided by the US was crucial in this respect, for Turkey occupied "an extensive area on the ramparts of the free world," and Bayar used this opportunity to "assert without equivocation that Turkey has been at last one of the recipients who put your [American] aid to the best possible use" (*New York Times*, 1954a: 3). Bayar's words referred to the system of power that regulated the practice of postwar development, which was an unequal exchange of economic and military gains. The ways in which Bayar's historic visit to the USA was organized, portrayed and evaluated on the other hand, presents a space for the study of the forms of knowledge that were fostered by postwar development and the forms of subjectivity fostered by the discourse of development (Escobar, 1995).

In this chapter, I will discuss how the discourse of development as it pertained to Turkey was disseminated to reading publics in Turkey. Particularly, I will analyze newspaper articles

about life in America written by Turkish journalists accompanying Bayar on his historic visit to the US. My focus will be on the constructing of subjectivities fostered by the development discourse. I will particularly argue that these journalists were making political statements about Turkey as they were depicting the “developed” and “modern” US. I will make use of the concept of Occidentalism in my analysis to show how the journalists were stating their claims about a particular Turkish “identity” and “culture” by making reference to an imagined West and an imagined Western gaze.

I. Bayar’s Historic Visit to the United States

President Celal Bayar, accompanied by a number of prominent state officials,¹⁶ left the country on January 18, 1954, arrived in New York on January 26, and toured the United States from east to west and north to south for over a month, making more than 10,000 miles around the US, and returned to Turkey on March, 10, 1954. Bayar’s visit was organized as a slideshow of the signifiers of American modernity: he visited factories, dams and film studios that portrayed the achievements of technology; universities that were the powerhouses of knowledge production; and nuclear plants and military bases that displayed the military strength of the US. These occasions provided Bayar and Turkish journalists covering his visit with various opportunities to reflect on life in the US and on Turkey’s position as a “developing and modernizing country.” Likewise, Bayar’s speeches and his portrayal of Turkey gave American journalists, officials and politicians the chance to comment on Turkey’s cultural, economic and political situation, as they viewed it from the US.

¹⁶ Celal Bayar was accompanied by Mrs. Bayar; Cevat Açıkalın, Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Feridun Cemal Erkin, Turkish Ambassador to the United States; Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Turkish Representative to the North Atlantic Council; Lt. General Mustafa Rüştü Erdelhun, Commander of the 18th Corps of the Turkish Army; Fikret Belbez, Chef de Cabinet; Lt Col. Nurettin Fuad Alpkartal, Aide to President Bayar; Orhan Eralp, Director Manager to the Second Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (The United States Information Service, 1954).

The media coverage of, and the speeches of politicians taking part in, this visit constitute an arena in which the discourse of development becomes observable. Also important is the fact that newspapers were a medium through which elements of the development discourse were disseminated and thus sought to be popularized and legitimized in the eyes of the public. It has been argued that in the postwar period, the development discourse and modernization theory together heavily influenced how societies and social change was imagined (Escobar, 1995; Preston, 1996; Leys, 1996; Latham, 2000; Gilman, 2003). The separation of the world between the first, second and third worlds, between the underdeveloped and the developed, and between traditional and modern displays the ways in which relations between the world's wealthy and the poor were imagined according to "Western" binary constructs during the postwar era. Such separations, by establishing a certain way of thinking about the "Rest" of the world, formed the basis of a power-knowledge axis via which material exchanges between the developed and underdeveloped countries took place. Military and economic aid and transfer of knowledge and expertise, as in the case of Turkey, was established through the discourse of development and modernization.

In the previous chapter, I argued that within this unequal relationship that operated through a power-knowledge axis, the Turkish government exercised some agency to shape its form. When the development/modernization discourse that was used to legitimize this relationship is considered, a similar argument can be made. I argue that the diffusion, spread and circulation of this discourse cannot be viewed in a manner in which the discourse produced in "the West" was taken over by Turkish political and intellectual elites in its totality. By using Ahiska's concept of Occidentalism, I argue that the influence of the US in the 1950s cannot be formulated as a confined, one-way ideological stream. By analyzing the media coverage of Bayar's visit to the US, I will display that the representation of the US in Turkey and the

evaluation of Turkey against the yardstick of the US was indeed tantamount to a cultural and political struggle over the definition of a national identity, a struggle that took place through certain identifications, signifiers, subjectivities, and one which was influenced and shaped by existing discourses, political tendencies and social and cultural sensibilities.

II. Letters from the US

When tracing the spread and diffusion of a discourse in a historical study, written material is generally the primary source of data. For the first half of 1954, Turkish newspapers contain an ample amount of data in this respect. Narratives of journalists who toured the US accompanying Celal Bayar reveal how the image of the US was transmitted to the reading publics in Turkey. Here, rather than taking the discourse of development as a concrete set of ideas and assumptions imposed on “the underdeveloped/the traditional” by “the developed/the modern,” my preference will be to analyze how the US, and in return, Turkey were imagined, constructed and experienced by Turkish journalists. In this task, I will employ the framework of Occidentalism.

In the next four parts, I will argue that in these journalists’ articles, modernity and development were expressed in the image of the US through four categories. **First** was a belief in the modern society that was governed by the *rule of reason*, a society in which social interaction was rationally organized. This belief was manifested in the journalists’ description of the orderliness and efficiency that they found in social relations in the US and which they thought were lacking in Turkey. **Second** was a trust in the *modern capitalist market mechanism* and its social and cultural implications. This trust became visible in how the journalists depicted the capitalist market mechanism in the US as a system that provided everyone who was willing to work with equal opportunities. They believed that the young

Americans happily embraced their obligation to start working at an early age in order to survive, because they believed in the working of the capitalist system. **Third** was a certain developmentalist take on *how to become developed and modern*, in other words how to become like the US. The journalists believed that a developmentalist economic policy that would be followed with the guidance of the US would change the fortunes of Turkey in a very short time. The **fourth** and final one was a cultural/political concern about the *compatibility between what the journalists perceived as American modernity and Turkey*. This concern became evident in their description of relations between men and women in the US.¹⁷

I will analyze the articles written by three of the four journalists who accompanied Bayar throughout his visit, who were editors of prominent newspapers (Şevket Bilgin of *Yeni Asır*, Ahmet Emin Yalman of *Vatan* and Habib Edib Törehan of *Yeni İstanbul*) and who, apart from reporting the visit, wrote separate series of articles pertaining to their impressions about life in the US and their thoughts about the relationship between the US and Turkey. The fourth journalist was an accomplished reporter for, and the brother of the editor of, another prominent newspaper (Doğan Nadi of *Cumhuriyet*) who reported the visit with little commentary. I could not reach any information about how these journalists' travel costs were covered, but their separate arrival and departure dates, the lack of mention of any sponsors in their articles, and their complaints about prices in the US give me reason to believe that the costs of their visit were covered by their newspapers. For the year 1954, it can be argued that *Yeni Asır* was the fiercest supporter of the DP among these four newspapers.¹⁸ *Vatan*, for this period was an avid supporter of the DP, even though in the later years of DP's reign, *Vatan*

¹⁷ Here, the class positions of the journalists and the existence of contrasting views should be acknowledged. These journalists were the editors of major newspapers and their elite social class and status might have influenced their stance towards the US. It must also be stated that opposing views about the US existed in Turkey. Even though such views were absent in the mainstream newspapers in 1954 and they were not voiced by the political parties in opposition, they can be found in non-elite sources, magazines and documents.

¹⁸ Şevket Bilgin, the editor of the newspaper, was offered a ministry by Adnan Menderes if he ran for the DP in 1954 elections. Even though he rejected, his brother ran in his stead and became the minister of Agriculture.

turned against this party due to what it perceived as its anti-democratic stance. Yalman was prosecuted by the DP officials for false propaganda and he was sentenced to 15 months of imprisonment. He was freed after the coup of 1960 and then he was rewarded with The Great Courage Award by the University of California and University of Georgia (Yalman, 1997). *Yeni İstanbul*, for the year 1954, also favored the DP, and the newspaper in general was a supporter of economic liberalism.

Apart from these journalists, I will also make use of articles written by a Turkish journalist/social scientist, Nermin Abadan (later Nermin Abadan-Unat). During Bayar's visit, Abadan published twelve articles (between January 6 and 26) about university life in the US in *Cumhuriyet*. *Cumhuriyet* can be said to have a more "in-between" stance towards DP for the year of 1954, but for the period of Bayar's visit, the newspaper had a supportive and optimistic attitude toward the visit. Abadan was a Fullbright exchange Ph.D. student attending the University of Minnesota during the academic year of 1953-1954 and before then, she had worked as a journalist for the daily *Ulus* while continuing her academic studies (Abadan-Unat 1998). Abadan was enrolled at the Faculty of Political Science (*Mülkiye*) of Ankara University at the time. Upon her return from the US, Abadan became the first female political scientist in Turkey and her works in public opinion, migration studies and women's studies are considered as pioneers in their respective fields in Turkey (İçduygu, 2001). Comparing Abadan's articles with the journalists', it can be said there was a striking similarity between the "academic" and "everyday" accounts of the US in 1945. Abadan's presence in the US also reflected another important phenomenon of the 1950s, which was the growth of exchange programs for academicians, technicians, teachers and bureaucrats between the US and Turkey. According to Bedri Gürsoy, the dean of the Faculty of Political Science (1954), 27

professors and ten administrators were scheduled to travel to the US between 1954 and 1957 for educational purposes, thanks to various bilateral agreements.

Before I start the content analysis of the newsreports, a final caveat is in order. Although I am focusing on the “positive” accounts of American life in Turkish newspapers in 1954, this does not mean that there may not have been more critical perspectives. Small-circulation journals published by leftist groups, to which I did not have access during my thesis research, are likely to have taken very negative attitudes towards Bayar’s visit and the capitalist lifestyle in the US. But my concern in this chapter is to discuss how the dominant discourse of development propagated by the US was disseminated, and how it helped the articulation of subject positions among the Turkish elite. In this vein, a word about the class position of the journalists I am talking about is in order here. As the editors of major newspapers and a PhD student studying in the US, these people belonged in an elite social milieu in Turkey, which must have informed their stance towards the US.

II.A. “Dressing Porters:” The Rule of Reason

Most of the journalists who toured with Bayar arrived in the US a week before him in order to get a sense of the atmosphere in the US. One of them was Habib Edip Törehan. Upon his arrival to the New York airport, he (Törehan, 1954a) wrote:

One does not come across the slightest disorder while planes with lots of passengers from every corner of the world land here every minute. The porters with red hats and dark suits are all black. They do their jobs quietly. They do not stare at your face asking how much you will pay them. Every item has its price tag.

In our train stations, the attitudes and fights of porters who supposedly do not ask for money but accept what you offer is not just a disgrace in the face of foreigners, but also a source for the most disastrous propaganda against our country. We have been arguing over this porter issue for forty years. Sometimes we dress them in uniforms and believe that all is taken care of.

As days, months and years go by, it has become impossible to hide that the situation has become worse.

Turkey today is not a country of superstitions but it is yet to be modern. Still, there are very beautiful things to like about it. When foreigners who have little information about our country or who are under the influence of old tales and bad propaganda see our porters, all of our efforts to please them may be neutralized.

If we benefit from our friendship with the US and learn about their work systems, especially about organization and discipline, and apply them in our country, we will reach the goals that we set and achieve good results.

Törehan was not only impressed with the orderly and standardized behaviors of American porters, but he was also frightened that porters in Turkey would justify the “old tales” about Turkey, diminishing the effects of the very little that Turkey had to offer for foreigners. To him, Turkey could not overcome this problem by dressing its porters in uniforms that would signify rational and standard behavior, in the end; it would have to adopt the knowledge of organization and discipline from the US. Törehan’s portrayal of “the modern,” through the signifiers of orderliness and standardization, is followed by a gaze at Turkey from the point of view of the western, and “the superstitious” is constructed according to American standards. In order to achieve these standards and become modern, Törehan suggests that Turkey should learn about the work systems, organization and discipline of Americans and apply them.

Törehan was not the only one impressed by the orderliness of things in the US. The editor of *Vatan*, Ahmet Emin Yalman, (Yalman, 1954a) displayed his admiration for the accuracy and certainty of social interaction as he wrote about the press meeting before Bayar’s visit he attended upon his arrival:

Two things grabbed my attention in this meeting. One is the order, maturity and pace in the working of the human machine ... No words are wasted, there is no trace of conflict or hesitation. With maximum effort aimed towards the purpose, positive and definite decisions are taken. Personal efforts habitually complement each other. The second one is the value given to time ... Everything is calculated in minutes, even seconds. Every measure is taken for the ceremonies, rituals, dinners and speeches to flow as a

chronometer. I leave the meeting with the conviction that having an exact domination over time is one of the foremost necessities of civilized life ... We have a lot to learn in this field.

The classical narrative of modernity is the quest of the human reason to dominate “the natural” and “the social.” To succeed in this quest, Reason must dominate the rules of the intellect which is manifest in “science,” and control and organize the natural and the social in the most effective and beneficial manner. In 1954, this discourse becomes visible in Yalman’s narrative through the organized flights of airplanes, the order, maturity and pace in the working of persons, the certitude and exactness in social interaction and the domination over time. This innate knowledge of modernity that becomes visible in traits like orderliness, standardization, maturity, pace and exactness, as modernization theorists and these two journalists suggest, can be “learned.” Traits of modernity as such do not exist in a social vacuum though. In the accounts of these journalists, they can only be found in modern political organizations, where modern social rules of conduct, inter-personal relations, technology, work ethic, morals, and educational systems exist, and where law-abiding, hardworking, kind and fun-loving individuals live. Attributing generic and timeless attributes to the “Orient,” the “traditional” and the “underdeveloped” has been a particularity of Orientalism, of the modernization literature and many aspects of center-periphery relations in the globe. In these articles, one can observe how such generic qualities are attributed to the “Occident,” the “modern” and the “developed.”

Ahiska (2003: 364) contends that “if Orientalism is a representation that is informed by historical and material power configurations but also conveys the desire of the Western subject, how the “Orientals” answered back to their representation by the West brings to view a complex field of subjectivity.” Through the framework of Occidentalism, it is also possible to analyze how the discourse of development was diffused into this complex field of

subjectivity. The forms of subjectivity fostered by the discourse of development can be analyzed through the representations of development and modernity in the accounts of these journalists. The two previous quotes displayed a belief in the modern society that is ruled by reason. The next six quotes will reveal how significant a belief in the capitalist market mechanism was inherent in the portrayal of modernity, which was manifested in the social organization of the US.

II.B. “Mink Coats and Tuxedos:” The Almighty Capitalist Market Mechanism

A concurrent theme in these accounts is the conviction that the capitalist market in the US provides equal opportunities to citizens and that people rise and fall within this system based on their merit. In Şevket Bilgin’s (Bilgin, 1954a) words:

Land, climate and character made the American adventuresome and enterprising. Thus, they all believe that they can achieve wealth and prosperity by improving their conditions if they use their intellect and energy wisely. If they cannot achieve their goals, they do not attribute the fault and guilt to others, but search for it in themselves. In the United States, there is a ladder of values in multiple fields. Climbing this ladder is only possible by acknowledging the supremacy of energy and intellect. And there is no one who can not rise to the top of that ladder when possessing this supremacy.

This belief in the market mechanism constitutes the most important pillar that economic liberalism stands upon. Even when people fail to earn their living in the market -in other words, when the market fails to create a living for people- this failure is explained not through the shortcomings of the market, but through the misdeeds of individuals. But while economic liberalism readily accepts the possibility of such failures, these failures did not make it into the accounts of Bilgin, Törehan and Yalman. On the contrary, it is impossible to come across any negative sides to American society, culture or politics. For example, according to Törehan (Törehan, 1954b), “it is very rare to come across a beggar on the street or a poor in miserable

conditions. Everyone has their own lifestyle in the US and the adequate income to support it. This situation is now urging the US to cross its borders to reach out and help foreign lands as well.” Similarly, Bilgin (Bilgin, 1954b) argued that “the US is experiencing an unprecedented era of wealth and growth. There is everything in this country except class conflict; for people have already attained a higher level of the social security that they could wish for.”

After WW II, the US replaced Western Europe as the high point of western civilization in the Turkish Republic’s lifelong ambition to catch up with contemporary standards of modernity (Bora, 2002: 152-3). These standards, in the account of these journalists, not only entailed a modern political body, but some social and cultural characteristics as well. The efficient and democratic functioning of the capitalist market in the US depended on some generic qualities of the American society according to Turkish journalists. These social traits of modernity complemented each other in generating a society that worked according to reason, had control over time and space with the help of technology, worked for the good of every single individual, possessed the knowledge of working together while being individualistic, and as a result, was wealthy, kind, honest, moral and law-abiding. Only the presence of such qualities assured the proper functioning of capitalism and democracy. This framework fits perfectly to the picture of the “modern society” that modernization theorists drew in the postwar era. As argued above, modernization theorists were influenced by the structural-functionalist analysis of the industrial society, which presented a harmonious view of the capitalist social organization. The origins of this view can also be extended to Weber’s notion of the protestant ethic and Durkheim’s concept of organic solidarity.

According to these journalists, mechanization and the advance of technology (another trait of modernization) worked for the good of the society. It eased laborers’ burden, generated more

jobs, increased creativity, and most of all, with the advance of mass production and standardization, served society's daily needs in the best way. Adding on top the work ethic of individuals, this created a working atmosphere where everyone was happy. Bilgin described this atmosphere in three different articles:

It is a pleasure to have breakfast or drink tea in the afternoon in cafeterias. Though what is really important about these cafeterias is how they function. Fruit juices and coffees, teas and various foods are all prepared by machines. Girls in neat clothes are always busy dealing with the jacks of these machines. They work like a chronometer. Dirty dishes are put in the dishwasher and taken back instantly, clean and dry (Bilgin, 1954c).

From insides of houses to offices, a magnificent technique has come to life to make the labor of those who work at constantly mechanizing jobs more efficient ... Even though it may be thought at first sight that mechanization decreases the need for skilled labor, this is a wrong guess ... Standardization is dominant in American agriculture. Various fruits are separated according to standard types and then sold. It increases your appetite. Today, the American is on the way to realize all his wishes. He believes that there is no job that cannot be done with human labor (Bilgin, 1954d).

What makes the daily life charming and enticing in the US is the addiction of its people: joy and sincerity ... Another thing that draws attention is the true sincerity in the smiles of salesmen, laborers, waiters and elevator boys. They are all proud to serve and they almost take pleasure out of creating an atmosphere of constant confidence and trust around them ... This country does not believe that a man who cannot dare to look at life with optimism can be successful (Bilgin, 1954e).

This optimist atmosphere derives from the belief in the market mechanism. Because everyone is convinced that the market offers equal opportunities and merit-based rises in the career ladder, they are willing to take up and perform any job with high spirits. Young Americans readily accept the working of this mechanism in the early years of their lives and they happily embrace the fact that they have to work in order to survive independently. The obligation for high school children to work in order to go to college or feed themselves is taken as a sign of a "realist" education by these journalists. Bilgin (Bilgin, 1954f) puts it as follows:

In this country where there are equal opportunities for the young and the aged, it is important for high school children to start working and making money ... The weight of the household is not on the shoulders of the father. Women, men and children all work as a family and earn money according to

their abilities. This unique realist educational system positively affects the development of the US.

This “realist” educational system thus teaches a person to become an individual who takes the strings of his/her own destiny in his/her own hands and starts to act according to the needs of the market – thus, acts rationally. This rational individual who bears a sheer resemblance to the rational homo economicus should be calculating, hardworking and creative in order to achieve success. These persons who pass infancy and become individuals are the constituents of a modern capitalist society. According to Törehan (Törehan, 1954b) societies that are not made of such independent individuals are doomed to stay “primitive”:

We have some misleading traditions such as the responsibility of one family member to earn for the whole family. It is a very dangerous idea to expect everything from the government or expect someone to feed us ... [When we give up this habit] the parasitical lifestyle of the people who are a burden to the society will not be tolerated and the obligation for everyone to work for themselves will arise. For a nation that tries to transcend being a primitive society, it should be a must to work, create, and finally, live off the yield of its labor.

Törehan’s views correspond to an unshakable belief in the capitalist market and the “civilizing” effect of capitalism. Replicating one of the binarisms inherent in modernization theory, Törehan contends that the path from the “primitive” to the “modern” is the market mechanism in which every individual is responsible for his/her own survival. Similar to Bilgin and Yalman’s arguments, Törehan speaks from within the discourse of modernization, with the help of “Western” constructs, and looking to Turkey through the lens of this discourse, he establishes his own political agenda for Turkey with reference to an imagined West and an imagined modernity. A similar take on the capitalist market can be traced in Nermin Abadan’s articles. Abadan, too, is sympathetic toward the obligation of young people to work in order to earn a living. In one of her articles, she (Abadan, 1954a) asserts that the youth in the US took the obligation to work with great “maturity.”

It is seen that going to university in the US is a matter of funds as well as a matter of ability and knowledge. American youth accept this reality with great maturity and understanding. They believe it is reasonable to pay a price to the university for it to function well. They reject being a burden on their families in acquiring this money. Girls and boys in the US believe that their primary goal in life is to be able to live without being dependent on anyone after they are fifteen.

In another article, she argues that this maturity of the youth derived from their belief in the capitalist market. According to Abadan (Abadan, 1954b), young people worked to earn their college education with the belief that this education will provide them with wealth and success. The example she gave was the students who worked part-time in the university's concert hall. Some of them parked cars while some collected tickets. The "confidence" she observed in the behavior of young men and women, taken together with their "maturity," are traits of a well-working market that helps generate mature adults with confidence in themselves and the society in which they live:

The interesting point is the attitudes of the young men who park Cadillacs filled with women in mink coats and men in tuxedos. With the great confidence they have in themselves, these boys are convinced that the days they will attend concerts in a similar manner are not far away. Until that day comes, they spend their days with their girlfriends whom they meet after the concerts. Some of the girls who collect tickets or wait the cloakroom have fathers who own such Cadillacs. But no one in the US lives off of the fortune of their fathers or relatives. Thus, a girl like this prefers working with her friends to buying an expensive seat [at the concert] with her father's money.

II.C. "Simple Arithmetics:" How to Become the Little America

The accounts of these journalists who indicated their belief in a modern society ruled by reason and in a capitalist system governed by the rules of market can also be evaluated as examples of Occidentalism. When the journalists were describing "the modern" in their aspiration for Turkey to become so, they were at the same time describing "the traditional." In their description, they were writing from within the discourse of modernization and

development, in which such dualities are inscribed. As Ahiska (2005: 98) holds, Occidentalism “is the basis of a social fantasy that makes power and political subjectivity possible.” The political subjectivities present in these narratives thus can be studied in their relation to power.¹⁹ As argued above, such subjectivities, in the postwar era, were shaped by the discourse of development and modernization for they provided the adequate frameworks and languages to think and speak about the West. As the next three quotes will reveal, how these journalists portrayed the US was very much related to how they portrayed modernization and social change in Turkey. Becoming like the US through developmentalism was the visible goal in their accounts, and they were not alone in this respect. Celal Bayar, upon his return from this very visit to the US, gave a well known speech in which he promised the Turkish public: “We will make this country the little America.” While Bayar came up with a promise upon his return, journalists who followed him throughout his visit came up with plans and suggestions on how to make this promise a reality. In their every comment on the US, there was a recipe for development of Turkey. Witnessing the results of a half century of rapid growth in the US, they were optimistic about Turkey’s chances of development, for they believed that with the example so vividly standing in front of them, the only way was ahead for Turkey if only it followed the footsteps of the US. For Bilgin (Bilgin, 1954g), the issue was clear-cut:

There is nothing as absurd as talking about poverty for nations who live on naturally fertile lands. The example that the US sets as having squeezed its glorious development into half a century, shows us that countries that are thirsty for progress can walk on the same line with success, if only they benefit from the same climate of liberty that does not waste human value.

For Bilgin, any nation that was geographically situated on fertile lands was to flourish just as the US once did, only if people were given adequate value in a climate of liberty. For the

¹⁹ I borrow Ahiska’s use of the term *subjectivity* with a Foucauldian interpretation, in which I construe these journalists to locate themselves in certain subject positions within the discourse of development, through which they relate to the power and meaning of this discourse.

1950s, this was obviously a very idealized, if not naïve, statement concerning the US (given, for instance, the existence of legal racial segregation), but it was a very tactfully constructed political statement about Turkey. Apparently, for Bilgin, the 27-year reign of the RPP was responsible for preventing human potential and creativity in Turkey from exploiting fertile lands and thus from bearing the fruits of development. By following the “same line” that the US crossed, Bilgin implied that the DP government could succeed just as well as the US.

Bilgin was not the only one who saw the adequate path for development so clear in the recent history of the US. The footsteps that the US left behind en route to development were easily traceable according to all these journalists. By tracing these footsteps, the knowledge of development could be “transferred” from the US to Turkey. One of the aspects of this transfer was a climate of liberty in which human value was not wasted, or in other words, from which private initiative could arise. Another aspect of this transfer was in terms of capital and expertise, the two grand pillars of development. The possibility of this transfer was so obvious in the eyes of the journalists that Yalman blamed the ones who opposed it as Russian spies. In his (Yalman, 1954b) words:

The reason why the United States has gained the power to help the world and carry its problems upon its shoulders is that it provides an infinite field of progress for the initiative and energy of its people. It would be beyond imagination for the United States to arrive at this current advanced phase if it had a central administration that tried to administer affairs within confined measures ... The way to rapidly advance our backward country is to provide opportunities for free initiative in line with public interest and to call foreign capital and expertise to action. Those who think we may achieve progress through our own means either possess no judgment, find benefit in exploiting backwardness and creating xenophobia, or are spies with masks and people who fall into their traps.

“The climate of liberty that does not waste human value” in Bilgin’s account corresponds to “providing opportunities for free initiative” in Yalman’s account and the “countries that are thirsty for progress” corresponds to “our backward country.” The only difference is that while

Bilgin simply describes the path to follow as walking on the same line as the US, Yalman depicts it more clearly, as calling foreign capital and expertise to action. Yalman's fierce defense of foreign expertise can be evaluated from two perspectives. First, his narrative is in almost complete accordance with the discourse of development. Yalman is absolutely convinced that Turkey cannot achieve progress through its own means and that it is in certain need for foreign capital and expertise. This is the very basis of the idea of development as something that can (only) be transferred. It is the prevalence of this idea that makes possible the intervention of foreign capital and expertise into the "Third World," and it is the approval of such a claim that establishes the legitimacy of the ideological and material dominance that we observe in the relations of development. Secondly, Yalman's account, similar to Bilgin, is an attempt to empower certain power groups, support certain claims to national identity and influence public opinion in Turkey. Taken together with Bilgin's account, the RPP era is constructed as a bureaucratic machine that is nurtured with central planning, single party rule and etatism, a machine that prevented development and caused backwardness.

On the one hand, it can be argued that this belief in the transfer of modernity and development, and the manifestation of key elements of the development discourse in these accounts, to a certain extent, showed the strength of this discourse in the 1950s. On the other hand, it showed the multiple ways and struggles at work in its diffusion. In the accounts of these journalists, one does not only come across a certain way of thinking about modernity and development, but also a variety of political struggles in which the language of development appears as a tool with which the authors support their arguments. Development, thus, appears as the primary axis through which the Occidental gaze imagines the West and modernity, and in return, assesses Turkey against this imagined yardstick. It is also the

hegemonic language that provides the necessary and legitimate vocabulary to think about social change. From the accounts of Bilgin, this argument can be extended further.

The matter of development is, in a way, a matter of having roads. As our roads grow longer, our country will grow and the growing size of economic activity will open the doors of the wealth that we wish for (Bilgin, 1954h). Seeing how North America has changed its fortunes in a quarter century, there can be no reason why Turkey cannot achieve the same. Road, water and electricity constitute the hope and glory of the mankind, just like the gods of earth, fire and water in which ancient people believed. On this path, Turkey possesses all of the opportunities that have made other countries wealthy. This success will cease to be a dream as long as brave enterprises which we have lacked so far will follow one another (Bilgin, 1954i). The true spirit of the case lies in the scientific system that gives matter motion and vitality and opens the windows of the mind to infinite horizons (Bilgin, 1954g).

The proposed developmentalist path to modernity is apparent in this account as well. On a wider level, it can also be argued that these three quotes, in a way, reflect the historical conceptualization of “Western civilization” in a nutshell. Men’s control over matter that is manifest in the concept of “science” leads to material prosperity for it allows people access to infrastructure, thus raising the chances for economic growth and market exchange. Brave enterprises that emerge from societies which can control matter and organize the social symbolize the “climate of liberty” that naturally exists in such societies and are also seen as the moving force of the social system (capitalism). When witnessing in the US men’s control over land, water and electricity, followed by mechanization and standardization, these journalists agreed that Turkey, under the rule of the DP and the guidance of the US, could develop in a short time. This development, for the most part, entailed receiving expertise and capital from the US and (rapidly) replicating its historical experience.

Still, they also wrote about optimism, sincerity, maturity, a realist educational system, a climate of liberty and a scientific system. They were well aware that the “technical” side of modernity was not the only -or the driving- force behind the social organization of the US.

They were aware that certain cultural elements were inherent in the working of social organization. From well organized meetings to mature and confident young people, certain cultural traits were overtly related to the emergence and use of coffee machines, airplanes and Cadillacs. The three editors believed that given the opportunity, human initiative could control matter, transform nature and give order to the individual and the society. The crucial question here was: “which order?”

II.D. “True Art:” Turkey and American Modernity

The narratives of these journalists demonstrate that while they observe American modernity as a complex set of relations which pertain to various types of social interaction, they propose a rather developmentalist policy in order to “catch-up.” In their articles, signifiers of modernity are placed on a very wide spectrum that ranges from the shapes of fruits to attitudes of porters, and from electrification to the beliefs of college students in the capitalist market. While they appear to take modernity to be a holistic phenomenon that diffuses to almost every vein of the society, as I will attempt to show in this part of the chapter, they are mostly not convinced about the compatibility of its cultural aspects with the Turkish society. To better put it, what one can infer from their accounts is that while they take the technical aspects of modernity such as control over time and space and the parts of the social body which regulate this control such as the legal and political system, individualism, entrepreneurship, order, discipline, work ethics and organization (the alleged foundations of capitalism) as essential ingredients that Turkey must obtain by itself or through transfer, they approach the cultural aspects of American modernity with a certain hesitation. Even though they seem to be aware that technology and economic “development” are closely related with culture, this hesitation makes itself felt in many of their writings. One way in which this hesitation becomes visible can be found in Bilgin’s (Bilgin, 1954j) effort to defend the moral

values of American people while portraying the relatively open nature of relations between women and men.

Women and men, Americans are cheerful people. They love talking. In trains, there are separate cars for smoking and drinking. Passengers end their trips talking and having fun as if they were in a living room. As a particularity of American lifestyle, strongest friendships take start during such travels. On our way to Chicago, we witnessed how easily a remarkably beautiful young woman and an airman met. Our press attaché to Washington, Nüzhet Baba, searched for a way to speak to this beauty goddess. Before he could, the young airman must have attracted the attention of the girl thanks to his smiling looks, for they found a quicker way to meet. As we reached Chicago, they were as far as holding hands. Seeing this, Nüzhet Baba said: "This is the American youth. They meet and become friends this quickly. But have faith in this, if these two young people did not find common points in their conversations that created an intellectual and sentimental companionship, their smiles would be ephemeral, their friendship would not last for five minutes ... As someone who has lived in this country for a long time, I must say that moral values are still very strong in the US. Two important elements that prevent prostitution are sports and the very powerful teaching of family manners, character and frankness.

In Bilgin's efforts to defend the conduct of the American youth, one discerns his uncertainty about the compatibility of the modern American lifestyle with Turkish society. In this very gendered instance, Bilgin is afraid of the reaction that the relative social liberty of women would receive in Turkey, and almost instinctively, he informs the Turkish readers that this is indeed an intellectual and sentimental companionship, with reference to the words of his friend. His friend, on the other hand, first searches "for a way to speak to this beauty goddess." While the scope of his intentions in searching for a way to speak is uncertain, after his failed attempt, he retreats quickly to defend the moral values of these two young people. For the airman did exactly what Baba tried to do at first place, he actually only defends the moral values of the woman, by asserting that she is indeed not a prostitute. Recent literature on gender and nationalism has shown that the formation and re-formation of a national identity is closely related with how women who are members of a particular nation are defined within these processes (Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989). While judging the moral values of a culture

or a nation with reference to the moral virtues of its women is quite common, judging the moral virtues of a woman with reference to her relation with men is another. Women's role in society is indeed a very common concern in the narratives of these journalists. Prostitution is a certain point that journalists like to be very clear about. Bilgin's sensitivity demonstrates that this kind of an intimacy may appear as something else to Turkish readers. In another article by Bilgin (Bilgin, 1954k) in which he depicts the night life in big cities, he repeats his sensitive approach to women's involvement in social life, but at the same time, he also asserts that even such sensitivity is considered to be against civilized manners in the US.

Even though American people generally prefer family life, people in the big cities have fun all night long. When the movie hours are over, a rush to shows and night clubs starts. The dance halls are crowded until the early morning. But the important thing is that according to latest statistics, prostitution is very rare. People in this country are so accustomed to respect each other's liberties that every gossip and every intervention into somebody else's life is considered to be a behavior that civilized manners would despise. The truth is that the American has a clean conscience and is honest in his public life. He has no time for deception. It is impossible for a needle to be stolen in a hotel.

In both of the accounts, Bilgin seems to bring a certain sensitivity to what he observes. For a journalist who glorified American values so generously in a total of thirty four articles, this alarmed tone and the immediate need to explicate is noteworthy. It is also noteworthy that in this second instance, Bilgin infers generic qualities of the American people (e.g. honesty) from a perception about the rareness of prostitution. In the development discourse and in modernization theory, the desirability of the goals of development and modernization were held to be self-evident. As discerned from the accounts analyzed so far, it was not only the desirability that was self-evident, but the transferability of them through the transfer of capital and expertise as well. Still, this developmentalist take on modernization did not prevent the journalists to observe the social and cultural traits of American modernity. The hesitation that

journalists feel when narrating these traits show that the desirability of these traits are not as self-evident as development/modernization itself.

Bilgin had certain doubts about the kind of reaction that this relatively open nature of relations between women and men would receive from Turkish readers. He was apparently concerned about the meaning of this openness, but at the same time, he was concerned that he was concerned. He felt it was necessary to assert to Turkish readers that prostitution was rare in the US, even though the people were dancing all night long. At the same time, he felt that it was also necessary to assert that even the talk of prostitution, in the US, was in fact an offense to people's personal lives. The very thought that this intense nightlife, this openness of inter-sexual relations would lead to prostitution, was against civilized manners. Bilgin chose to make it known that there was no prostitution, even if such a statement itself was considered to be against civilized manners. He went as far as to claim that not a needle could be stolen in hotels to prove the high moral standards of "the modern."²⁰

Bilgin, as the editor of a prominent newspaper, was well aware of the history and the tendency in the Turkish political and intellectual elite to oppose the "immoral" and "dangerous" effects of too much Westernization. The idea of taking the "good" and the "compatible" out of the West ("the technique") and leaving out the "bad" and "incompatible" (culture) has always been popular among a host of Turkish intellectuals and politicians of different political hues. From Namık Kemal (1840-1888, nationalist poet and playwright who greatly influenced early Turkish nationalists) to Ziya Gökalp²¹ (1876-1924, influential sociologist who combined

²⁰ It should also be noted here that Bilgin considers prostitution, which presumably pertains to the regulation of public morality, to belong to the same level of law enforcement as the protection of private property ("not a needle can be stolen").

²¹ It is an interesting note that one of the journalists, Ahmet Emin Yalman, was an assistant to Ziya Gökalp in Istanbul University between 1914 and 1916 (Yalman, 1997).

Turkish, Islamic and Western “values” in his thought), from Mehmet Akif Ersoy (1873-1936, nationalist poet and the author of the lyrics of the national anthem) to Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar (1901-1962, prominent author who dealt with the feeling of being caught up between the East and West in his writings) and from Mustafa Kemal (1881-1939, founder of the Turkish Republic) to İsmet İnönü (1884-1973, former Prime Minister and President of the Turkish Republic), Westernization was most often configured as a basket from which the good could be picked and transferred and the bad could be left out in order to preserve the essence of a certain Turkish culture. In Ahiska’s (2005: 87) words,

[t]he lacks of the population would be filled with techniques and tools coming from the West, but in the meantime, the incompatibilities that are projected to the West –such as excessive-modernity, liberalism, immorality, dangerous ethnic or class conflicts- should be smoothed and taken under control. The antidote of these incompatibilities is a pure, monolithic, essential Turkish culture that the population is assumed to possess.

The first half of the 1950s, in this regard, provided a political opportunity to deviate from this system of thought. In the global political arena, the hegemonic discourse of development propagated a rather limited view of economic development. In Turkey, the DP government was at helm, and in the postwar years, the US had replaced Europe as the pinnacle of Western civilization in political culture. The “value free” definition of development that envisaged an opportunity for progress devoid of any cultural implications was taken over by the “conservative” and “populist” DP, putting aside an ideal of a European influenced Westernization that was historically invested with a cultural interpretation, and that was assumed to contain harmful elements for Turkish culture. Within such a political atmosphere, it can be argued that Bilgin, through Occidentalism, was expressing a political subjectivity and was trying to establish that development, manifested in the image of the US, did not have any social implications that would be hazardous to the assumed traits of Turkish culture. Still, the

obvious hesitation and sensitivity found in these accounts implied that the pieces indeed did not fit perfectly.

A final example will refine this argument and will help interpret Bilgin's sensitivity when portraying the role of women in American society. While Bilgin was having trouble to find a way to convey the true nature of relationships between men and women to the Turkish audience, around the same week, Törehan (Törehan, 1954c) was involved in a situation where the gender roles were reversed in a way that will clarify from where the doubts in the accounts of the Turkish journalist arose. Törehan, upon his arrival in the US, heard about a Turkish dancer who had moved to New York and was now working at a night club. At a time when Bilgin was defending the moral values of American women who worked, had fun, and met men during train travels, Törehan came across a "Turkish girl" who was working in a night club in New York. Törehan, who advocated the obligation for every member of the society to work in order for Turkey to transcend being a "primitive society," struggled to fit himself into the picture:

A friend of mine told me that this Turkish girl was dancing at a night club. I invited him and a couple of other friends. The neighborhood was not located in one of the famous areas of New York. Because everything is judged by its surroundings in here, I was a little upset. We finally arrived at this stuffy, bar-like place. There was a piece of paper on the table, indicating that everyone was supposed to spend at least four dollars. After a few acts, this Turkish girl arrived. Her dressing style was similar to our mother Eve. After one or two standard dance moves ... she sang a couple of songs in English. In any case, I whole-heartedly wish for this Turkish girl who works in order to earn a living in a place like the US to be successful. Because nothing much is expected in this club in the name of art, my wish may well become true. But my heart cannot stop wishing to see this Turkish girl succeed in true art.

This final quote can be taken as an example of how the discourse of development circulated, spread and transformed in bits and pieces, dependent on subjectivities and political and moral struggles. It is striking to see how Törehan, who defended a universal obligation to work, was

so sensitive when it came to see a “Turkish girl” dancing that he became uncomfortable even with the surroundings and decoration of the place that she worked in, not to mention the job that she performed. Apparently for Törehan, there were jobs in the US that are appropriate for everyone but Turkish girls. His “wish” to see the “Turkish girl” succeed in “true art” did not go for any other dancers in this club but the “Turkish girl.” The “Turkish girl,” as the materialized form of Turkish national identity, the crystallized image of Turkish culture and as the mother who will pass Turkish values onto next generations, was “enough” modern to be working and earning a living but “too much” modern because she was working as a dancer in a nightclub; so Törehan wished her to succeed in “true” art. The moral standards –and maybe the artistic standards as well- of the imagined Turkish identity were apparently too high for a “Turkish girl” to work as a dancer at a nightclub.

Using Ahiska’s formulation, it can be said that Törehan made a claim to Turkishness, or Turkish national identity, with reference to an imagined West -or modernity- that was not compatible with certain characteristics of Turkish culture and identity. In Ahiska’s (2005: 73) use of the term, the formation of Occidentalism is related both with Orientalism and technologies and practices that accompanied the expansion of capitalism. At the same time, though, it was formed in relation to the “institutional legacy of the state, other discourses such as nationalism, and arrangements and assumptions pertaining to gender regime.” Thus, it can be taken as a basis of power that justifies certain practices of power with reference to an imagined West. As can be traced from the accounts of the journalists, the US (the imagined West) was displayed as a regime in which capitalism did not create any inequalities and generated favorable living conditions for all American citizens, who each possessed flawless attitudes, and who found every opportunity to realize their potential by putting their energy and initiative into use for the good of themselves, and thus for the good of society. Still, not every

trait of this perfect society proved to be compatible with the high ideals and aspirations of Turkish men and women, even though becoming like the US (development) was configured as the ultimate and indisputable goal for the whole society. Such mismatches and inconsistencies that can be found in these narratives, I argue, should not be evaluated as phenomena that are distinctively Turkish. They arise from the inconsistencies in binarisms inherent in the definitions of the West, of development, and of modernity.

In this regard, it is helpful to use Occidentalism as “a theoretical framework that claims to analyze the gaps and mismatches that emerge on the boundaries of interconnected projections of the Occident and the Orient” (Ahiska, 2003: 353). Through such a framework, it becomes possible to analyze the historicity and subjectivity of the Other which makes representations of Westernness, modernity and development disputable. These subjectivities of the Other generate from within the discourses of modernity and development but they are also parts of local political and cultural struggles. In other words, “the other’s inhabiting the space of the other and speaking for itself occurs in the same universe of signification.” (2003: 365). In the Turkish case, these subjectivities, with reference to an imagined West, make a political statement about existing power divides, inequalities, and differences. If the idealized “modern” and “developed” American society which is found to possess some traits that would be unfit for a “Turkish girl,” or if the relatively open nature of modern inter-sexual relations cause hesitation in narration even if the reading public is assumed to aspire to achieve modernity, this is in part possible because “Occidentalism makes the conflicting statements possible, justifying every act and statement with reference to an imagined Westernness” (2003: 368).

I argued in this chapter that the development discourse provided the journalist who accompanied Bayar with the vocabulary and imagination to think and speak about social

change. Through their portrayal of life in the US, they underlined the picture of the perfect modern society, sketched earlier by development and modernization theorists and experts. Their narration of a rationally organized social interaction, an egalitarian and efficient capitalist market mechanism, and their proposed path to become developed, resonated with the major assumptions of development and modernization discourses. By employing the notion of Occidentalism, I argued that as the journalists were writing about life in the US from within the discourse of development, they were at the same time making political claims that pertained to existing political and cultural struggles in Turkey. Occidentalism, in my analysis, helped me to bring about the historicity and particularity of the “underdeveloped” Other, showing how the development discourse was circulated and employed in conjunction with existing discourses, struggles and sensitivities in Turkey. In my account, this became clear, for instance, when the journalists blamed the previous RPP government for authoritarian economic policies that stifled free enterprise and supported DP’s developmentalism, and as they hesitated on the compatibility between Turkey and American modernity when portraying the relations between men and women in the US.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I analyzed how Turkey entered the international stage of development in the immediate postwar era and I tried to address specific gaps in the scholarly literatures on this period. In the first chapter, I argued that development as a system of power, as a discourse, and as a body of knowledge has not been adequately addressed in the literature on postwar Turkish politics. I showed through my review of works on the political legacy of the DP that the previously studied notions of patronage, populism, liberalism, modernization and nationalism can and should also be analyzed from within the framework of development.

In the second chapter, I analyzed practices of development and knowledge production on Turkey in the postwar era. Studying the practices of development, I specifically addressed the problems of agency and expertise. Contributing to recent anthropological accounts of development that focus on the agency of the “underdeveloped” groups and populations, I demonstrated that Turkish governments, as the “underdeveloped” party in relations of development, possessed and used the agency to ignore, divert or transform the suggestions and impositions of the US government, and US-based institutions and experts. Through my analysis of this agency, I showed that development was not a top-down, uniform process of domination but a set of relations within which both parties pursued short and long term benefits.

I argued that the element of power inherent in development relations was crystallized in the legitimacy of science and expertise. Through the analysis of expert reports and scientific studies in the early postwar period, I demonstrated that science and expertise were entangled with politics and had an ideological use in the relations of development. The knowledge of modern science that was attributed to American experts and scientists provided them with the

authority to place Turkey within a continuum from tradition to modernity, and define its problems, needs and the solutions to these, thus creating points for intervention and the transfer of US capital and expertise. I hoped to contribute to the growing literature on the politics of science and expertise by demonstrating the role of science and expertise in postwar Turkish politics, an academic endeavor that was previously not attempted.

In the third chapter, I discussed how the discourse of development was disseminated to reading publics in Turkey through an analysis of newspaper articles. Particularly, I focused on the shaping of subject positions within this discourse as it pertained to Turkey. Making use of the accounts of journalists who toured the US with President Celal Bayar in 1954, I demonstrated how the development discourse pervaded the writings of these journalists and their way of imagining social change. In order to theorize how the “underdeveloped” imagined development and the “developed,” I used the concept of Occidentalism. I argued that when the journalists were describing the US from within the discourse of development, they were also making political claims about Turkey in interaction with existing local discourses and political and cultural struggles. The scholarly contribution of this chapter is the historical analysis of the circulation of the development discourse and the employment of the notion of Occidentalism for studying Turkish politics in the 1950s. By showing how the development discourse provided the legitimate language to speak of an imagined West and westernness in this era, I sought to extend the utility of the notion of Occidentalism, and show its relation to the process of postwar development.

Taken as a whole, this study constitutes a challenge to the existing scholarly literature on early postwar Turkish politics and it represents a gateway for future studies on the social and cultural history of republican Turkey. Critical studies of development, expertise and

Occidentalism may provide us with fruitful theoretical frameworks not only for the study of postwar republican history but also for the anthropology of development. I believe that there is ample ground for original future research along these lines, considering the long-lasting power of the developmentalist rhetoric in national politics and the role of expertise in this rhetoric, Turkey's experience with developmentalism, foreign aid and credit institutions, and its preoccupation with the West and modernity. I hope that my thesis was a first step in that scholarly direction.

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