

TYPOLOGY OF THE CENTER-RIGHT IN TURKEY

A Ph. D. Dissertation

by

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The Department of Political Science

İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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June 2014

To Mahmut and Arın...

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Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
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June 2014

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ABSTRACT

TPOLOGY OF THE CENTER RIGHT IN TURKEY

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This dissertation analyzes the center-right in Turkey regarding its domestic politics and discourse through three main parameters which are democracy, state and secularism. A set of theoretical explanations helps to delve into the issue more deeply. In that regard, the three main connotations of the left and the right which arose out of the French Revolution, the socioeconomic reading and post-materialist vs. materialist divide would shed light onto the dynamic and instable nature of these concepts. Then, underlining the contextual differences influencing the interpretation of the left and the right as well as the significance of the concept of the center, the center-right in Turkey is analyzed through three parameters.

Regarding the center-right's position on democracy, this dissertation argues that the Turkish center-right is eager to employ democracy as a procedural tenet rather than a substantial one. Thus, the Turkish center-right parties are eager to concentrate on winning the elections, catching the people, representing the majority's expectations and struggling for the will of nation rather than putting emphasis on the ends of a democratic system, equality related issues and so on. The center-right parties have an affinity to take democracy as the rules of the game.

Center-right parties' relationship with the state in Turkey is analyzed within two subtopics. First of all, in terms of power, center-right parties, represent the periphery, located in opposition to 'center' which brought about a reciprocal suspicion between these parties and the center. Changing the character of the system also toyed with the very concept of the center which was occasionally dominated by the CHP, bureaucracy, military and so on. Secondly, the allocation of state resources and the state's position on the economics set another characteristic of the center-right parties. These parties intensively stress liberal economic options in their programs and discourses. Nevertheless, until ANAP tenure, the reflection of that discursive position to the policies was quite limited. On the other hand, as service-oriented parties, center-right in Turkey to a large extent deals with development and technical progress which differs from the cultural and symbolic developmentalist insistence of the left. On the other hand, center-right parties engage in cliental or patronage relationships through the utilization of service for political gains. All in all, regarding both power and economics axes, the center-right's position *vis-à-vis* the state brings us the conclusion that it was actually a love and hate relationship.

Given the militant character of the very Republican ideology in Turkey, center-right digresses from that compulsive secularism and tries to lift the bans on religious oppression by trying to liberalize the visibility of religion in the public sphere, adopt new schooling, banking and other such measures to support religious followers, and to perceive religion as a cultural instrument through which it may communicate with the people. Nevertheless, the center-right in Turkey is very aware of the fragility of the secularism issue and does not promote a state system based on religion. On that subject, the center-right parties in Turkey tend to introduce a passive version of secularism and stay within the boundaries of the regime without challenging the state structure at all.

In conclusion, the procedural employment of democracy, a love and hate relationship with the state and passive secularism are three main defining notions of the center-right in Turkey. If these parties move toward from these main three principles, they lose their ground and begin to collapse. In other words, if any of the following options occurs, it will stand as a proof of having moved beyond these three principles, and the center-right parties will be weakened: The drastic increase of authoritarianism without concerning democracy (even its procedural or majoritarian means), paying much more emphasis on the love side of the coin regarding its relations with the state and positioning next to the militant secularism.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE’DE MERKEZ SAĞIN TİPOLOJİSİ

Kaya Osmanbaşoğlu, Gülsen

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç Dr. Berrak Burçak

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Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de merkez sağın iç politika ve söylemini, demokrasi, devlet ve laiklikten oluşan üç ana parametre üzerinden analiz etmektedir. Birtakım teorik açıklamalar da, konuyu daha derinden incelemeye yardımcı olmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, sağ ve sol kavramlarının Fransız İhtilali’nden doğan, sosyo-ekonomik okumaya dayanan ve mataryalist - post-mataryalist ayrışmasını baz alan üç temel çağrışımı, sağ ve sol kavramlarının dinamik ve değişken doğasına ışık tutmaktadır. Akabinde, sağ ve solu

yorumlamada bağlamsal farklılıkların etkisinin ve ‘merkez’ kavramının öneminin altı çizildikten sonra, Türkiye’de merkez sağ, bu üç parametre (demokrasi, devlet, laiklik) üzerinden analiz edilmiştir.

Merkez sağın demokrasi hususundaki pozisyonu göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, bu tez, Türkiye’de merkez sağın demokrasiyi zengin (*substantial*) demokrasi anlayışından çok, prosedürel bir akide olarak ele aldığını iddia etmektedir. Böylelikle, Türkiye’de merkez sağ partiler, demokratik sistemin sonuçları, eşitlikle ilgili meseleler ve buna benzer konulardan ziyade, seçim kazanmaya, kitleleri yakalamaya, çoğunluğun beklentilerini temsil etmeye ve milli irade için mücadele etmeye konsantre olmaktadır. Merkez sağ partiler, demokrasiyi ‘oyunun kuralları’ şeklinde yorumlama eğilimindedirler.

Türkiye’de merkez sağ partilerin devletle olan ilişkisi iki alt başlıkta incelenmiştir. Öncelikle, güç eksenini ele alındığında, merkez sağ partiler, ‘merkez’e karşı ‘perifer’i temsil ederler ve bu da, merkez sağ partiler ile ‘merkez’ arasında karşılıklı bir güvensizliği beraberinde getirir. Sistemin sürekli karakter değişimine uğraması, bahsedilen bu ‘merkez’in kimi zaman CHP, kimi zaman bürokrasi ve kimi zaman da asker vb. tarafından domine edilmesine neden olmaktadır. Diğer yandan, devlet kaynaklarının dağıtılması ve devletin ekonomideki rolü, merkez sağ partilerin bir başka yönünü ortaya koyar. Bu partiler, program ve söylemlerinde liberal ekonomik tercihleri yoğun biçimde vurgulamaktadırlar. Ne var ki, ANAP dönemine kadar bu söylemsel pozisyonun hayata geçirilmesi oldukça sınırlı kalmıştır. Ayrıca, hizmet odaklı partiler olarak, Türkiye’de merkez sağ, solun kültürel ve sembolik gelişme konusundaki ısrarından farklı olarak, büyük ölçüde kalkınma ve teknik gelişme ile ilgilenmiştir. Öte

yandan, merkez sađ partiler, hizmetlerini siyasi kazanca d n şt rmek adına, patronaj iliřkileri kurmuřlardır. Sonu olarak, hem g  hem de ekonomi eksenlerinde merkez sađın devletle olan iliřkisi bize bu iliřkinin aslında bir ařk-nefret iliřkisi olduđu ıkarımına g t rmektedir.

T rkiye’de Cumhuriyet ideolojisinin laiklik konusundaki militan karakteri hatırlandığında, merkez sađın bu řekilde zorlayıcı bir laiklik anlayışından uzaklařtığı, din  zerindeki baskıları bir nebze olsun azaltmaya alıřtığı, dinin kamusal alanda g r n rl ğ n   zg rleřtirdiđi, dindarlar iin alternatif okul, banka ve bunun gibi farklı seeneklerin yaygınlařtırılmasını benimsediđi ve dini, kitlelerle iletiřim kurmaya yarayan k lt rel bir aygıt olarak algıladıđı g r lmektedir. Diđer yandan, T rkiye’de merkez sađ, laiklik meselesinin kırılganlığının farkındadır ve dine dayalı bir devlet modelini desteklememektedir. Bu veheden bakıldığında, T rkiye’de merkez sađ partilerin genellikle pasif bir laiklik anlayışını benimsediklerini, devletin laik yapısına meydan okumadıklarını ve rejimin sınırları iinde kalmaya  zen g sterdiklerini s ylemek m mk nd r.

Sonu olarak, demokrasinin prosed rel biimde ele alınması, devletle geliřtirilen ařk-nefret iliřkisi ve pasif laiklik, T rkiye’de merkez sađın tanımlayıcı   ana nosyonudur. řayet bu partiler bu   prensipten ayrılırlarsa, temellerini kaybederek  kme tehlikesi ile karřı karřıya kalırlar. Diđer bir deyiřle, merkez sađ partilerin bu   nosyondan uzaklařmalarını iřaret edecek ařađıdaki seeneklerden herhangi birinin gerekleřmesi durumunda, bu partiler zayıflarlar: Otoriterleřmenin ciddi biimde artarak, (presed rel ya da zengin (*substantive*) olduđuna bakılmaksızın) demokrasiyi g z ardı etmeleri,

devletle olan ilişkilerinde aşk tarafının ağır basması ya da militan bir laiklik anlayışının yanında yer almaları.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CHP-RPP: Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)

DP: Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti)

AP-JP: Justice Party (Adalet Partisi)

ANAP-MP: Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)

HP: Freedom Party (Hürriyet Partisi)

MP- NP: Nation Party (Millet Partisi)

AK Party- JDP: Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Purpose of the Study

This dissertation has the goal of exploring the nature and motives of center-right politics¹ in Turkey from the beginning of the Republic. Special emphasis is placed on the political activities—not only policies and people, but also discourses, ways of framing the world—of three major center-right parties: the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti – the DP), the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi – the AP) and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi – the ANAP) until the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – the AKP/ the AK Party²) as the candidate for the new representative of center-right politics in the early twenty-first century. Analyzing the complex nature of center-right mentalities in Turkey, the focus of the thesis will be on the positions of party politics regarding (1) democracy, (2) the state and (3) secularism. In order to define center-right understandings in Turkey, it is also necessary

¹ Throughout the dissertation, I refrain from referring to a “center-right ideology” since the center-right in Turkey was not an ideologically coherent and bounded concept. Instead of ideology, I prefer to use mentality, policy, perception or understanding to emphasize the softer nature of center-right mentality rather than a rigid manifest.

² Use of either AKP or AK Party as abbreviations for the Justice and Development Party corresponds to the positive or negative attitude of my sources. That is, in the public domain in Turkey, critics of the Justice and Development Party tend to use AKP, whereas party supporters advocate for the use of AK Party. The reason behind my own use of AK Party throughout this dissertation has to do with the officially accepted nature of that abbreviation.

to draw the lines between the center-left and center-right and then indicate the divergences between the center-right and the radical right. To that end, these three categories help to delimit center-right politics and discourse. Analyzing the characteristics of Turkish center-right mentalities, these three categories also help to answer the question of why the classical center-right parties could not survive in the political arena.

After having identified the characteristics of the Turkish center-right shaped around the center-right parties' stance towards democracy, the state and secularism, I will pursue a broader understanding of the nature of center-right mentalities in Turkey by questioning the reasons behind the diminished prominence of the classical center-right parties in Turkey after the 1990s. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to fill a gap in an abandoned area of interest, the Turkish center-right, by evaluating the issue in a historical, procedural context of transformation. This dissertation sheds light on the basic tenets and discourses of center-right politics and how these tenets transformed when the various center-right parties took power.

1.2. Why Study the Turkish Center-Right?

The Turkish political spectrum demonstrates particular structural characteristics, especially regarding the perception of center-right and center-left terminologies that do not map easily onto international norms and identifications³. Not aloof from the

³ Even some scholars also interpret this sui-generis positioning of the left and the right in Turkey as a complete absurdity. According to İdris Küçükömer, for instance, in terms of international perceptions, the Turkish right corresponds to the left and the Turkish left corresponds to the

Ottoman heritage considering the state and society structure, Turkey experienced a top-down modernization with the incentive of a political elite which was also greatly supported by the bureaucracy and state apparatus, did not share a similar history neither akin to the French Revolution –in which the left and the right conceptualization began to emerge nor to a socioeconomic reading of the left and the right that has to do with the maximization of certain social classes’ interests. The political struggle, which was just started in the second half of the 1940’s after a certain degree of consolidation of the Kemalist regime, was based on a competition between two parties (namely the CHP and the DP) dominated by the elites who had more common points than divisions. One of the main themes of that struggle was the DP’s opposition to the CHP’s insistence on utilizing privileges of being the real owner of the state that sometimes led to an eagerness to disregard very naïve democratic means. In that regard, the center-right mentality, which was represented by the DP (despite they did not use “the right” terminology in those years), arises from a demand for further democratization of the country, which meant the institutionalization of free and fair elections as well as the elected government’s domination in the political realm. Apart from the criticism caused by the unification of the CHP and the state, the DP also tried to represent different interests in the society on both economic and social grounds in contrast with the CHP’s blind eye to the variety of interests in the society with a non-realistic populist appeal.

right, derogatively (1994). To him, the real progressive parties in Turkey are generally those from so-called “rightist” versus Islamist parties that are positioned as “left” in terms of a more global classification. From the very beginning of the Entente Liberal Party (*Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*-1911), the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*-1924) and the Free Party (*Serbest Parti*-1931), followed by the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti* - the DP-1946) and the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi* - the AP-1961), these parties, Küçükömer notes, initially belonged to a leftist movement, whereas the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*- the İTC) and the Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* - the CHP-1923) correspond to Jacobean, elitist and rightist movements.

Another significant division point between the DP and the CHP was their position towards the Republican Revolution's cultural aspect of which the former occasionally criticized some reforms, especially the ones related to the suppression of religion, which were not enthusiastically embraced by the people. Nevertheless, this difference should not be understood as a pro-Republican and anti-Republican cleavage since both of these parties are the sons of the Republican regime and they hold quite a bit of respect for the regime. Thus, from the very beginning the CHP and the DP cleavage portrayed a center-left and center-right division that is to an important degree *sui generis* for the Turkish case.

The 1960 military intervention changed the composition of the ones who held the state power and strengthened the position of some partners such as military, civilian bureaucracy and universities while the CHP's earlier dominance to some extent decreased. The AP, as the successor of the DP tried to survive in the first half of the 1960's without loudly representing its very main political position. It is possible to argue that the priority of the center-right in those years was concentrated on lifting the ban and punishment of the former DP members. In the second half of the 1960's, the AP gained the chance to govern the country as a single party government and defended the concept of 'the will of the nation' with a majoritarian tone rather than a pluralist one. In doing so, while accusing the CHP of serving Communism, the AP criticized the supreme power of the unelected power holders, which to the AP, impeded the operation of a democratic system. On the other hand, while introducing the left-of-center terminology in the wake of the 1965 elections, the CHP began to advocate promotion of

lower class interests under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit and to be distinguished slightly from the bureaucratic center.

The 12 March 1971 Memorandum, with its poor grounds for attempting to make such an intervention, again changed the political atmosphere, and this time, the AP preferred to take a stance almost in-line with the military in order to share the power with a considerable decrease in its will of nation rhetoric. This so-called pragmatic preference decreased the popular support of the AP⁴, and the AP could not get a majority to form a single-party government on its own⁵. Throughout the 1970's, the AP engaged in Nationalist Front governments with the nationalist and Islamic far-right that resulted in an increase of the AP's nationalist and statist stance with an overused anti-communism discourse. The CHP on the other hand began to express a more socialist rhetoric that attracted the votes of the working class and peripheral masses in the big cities. In a move that digressed a great deal from the militant secularist mission of the previous CHP, Ecevit's CHP did not project the consolidation of the secularization mission as the premier priority. In that respect, the CHP also formed a coalition government with the National Salvation Party (as the representative of the Islamic far-right in those years), but even this collaboration lasted less than a year. So, in the 1970's, the left and the right cleavage to a certain degree moved into a socioeconomic reading of these concepts. However, the polarization and political turmoil in the country caused the marginalization of both the center-left and the center-right parties that constituted a pretext for a new military intervention in the year 1980.

⁴ In 1965, 1969, 1973 and 1977 elections, the AP won 52,8; 46,5; 29,8; 36,8 per cent of votes respectively.

⁵ In 1979, the AP formed a single-party government with the support of the far-right parties but it was a minority government.

ANAP as the new bright representative of the center-right mentality throughout the 1980's promised to cool down the polarization in the country with the help of an available arena in which all rightist and leftist elements were purged from the political realm. Despite claiming to merge and represent all divergent leanings ranging from liberalism to conservatism, from nationalism to leftism, in fact the representation of left-wing ideologies under the ANAP umbrella was quite limited. As the strong center-right actor, ANAP focused on economic development and technical modernization issues similar to its predecessors, but with a great motivation. The unity of the nation was stressed with a tolerant tone, but these notes of tolerance were limited when it came to its rivals. Some crucial steps towards the liberalization of economics inspired from those times' new-right manifest were taken throughout the ANAP governments. Furthermore, the visibility of alternative living styles in the society, especially the conservative ones, were increased with ANAP's religion-friendly politics throughout the 1980's, which still managed to never challenge the secularist system.

Although both the center-left and center-right experienced some particular splits previously, the dominant center-left and center-right parties were without any doubt highly visible up until the late 1980's. However, this time, the split in the center-left and center-right was deeper and considerably divided the political support of those parties. In that regard, after the relief of the political bans of the former politicians of the 1970's, the DYP (True Path Party – *Doğru Yol Partisi*) became a major center-right rival against ANAP. On the other hand, the center-left was represented by different

parties such as the SHP⁶ (Social Democratic Populist Party – *Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*) and the DSP (Democratic Left Party – *Demokratik Sol Parti*) whose stances were far more leftist in comparison to the Kemalist CHP on the topic of accepting the ethnic and sectarian pluralities in the society as well as in the area of emphasizing socioeconomic equality for the benefit of the lower stratum. Nevertheless, the SHP joined to the CHP in 1995 as a response to a call for unity in the center-left from their supporters, which led to a loss of representation of social-democratic tenets under the CHP roof. On the other hand, established in 1985, the DSP could not get electoral success in its early times and eventually, after the failure of the center-right alternatives, the DSP was eventually capable of forming a coalition government with a center-right (ANAP) and a nationalist far-right (the MHP) partners in the late 1990's.

As suggested above, throughout the 1990's, Turkish politics suggest a complicated positioning. In the center-right, Mesut Yılmaz from ANAP adopted the former DYP leader Süleyman Demirel's approach while Tansu Çiller from the DYP tried to take former ANAP leader Turgut Özal as role model. However, these parties could not adequately represent the classical center-right stance especially on the grounds of economics. Furthermore, communicating with the people was a center-right strategy to get the majority's support, which in 1990's was actively utilized and even developed by the Islamic far-right parties. These parties also adopted the center-right's service-oriented strategy as well. Nevertheless, the rise of the Islamic far-right was tried to be hindered with party closures as well as the February 28 process.

⁶ The SHP was founded with the juxtaposition of two leftist parties (The Public Party and Social Democracy Party) in 1985.

In a nutshell, the split and failure of the center-right and center-left parties under an economic crisis and the AK Party coming from the Islamic far-right genesis emerged as the new representative of the center-right mentality in the early 2000's and gained considerable electorate support. Thus, the Turkish case offers an important degree of particularistic and complex left-right placement of political parties, which does not easily fit with certain left-right connotations.

As for the functional explanation (socioeconomic reading of the issue), the left is eager to flirt with socialism and revolution while the right tends to perceive these ideologies as a threat. Recent reports and research reveal that, in general, the electoral base of the left is comprised of relatively wealthier people, whereas the social base of the assumed “center-right” draws on poorer people for its support (Çarkoğlu and Avcı, 2002; Rienner, Esmer and Sayarı, 2002; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; Çaha, 2009; Hale and Özbudun, 2010), which may support the different positioning of these concepts in the Turkish-context thesis on the basis of a socioeconomic reading of the left-right cleavage. In Turkey, the country's founding party, the CHP, is to a large extent perceived as the representative of the center-left, commonly supported by the urban, bureaucratic upper middle classes, whereas, ironically, the center-right parties to a large extent receive their public support from the periphery (Esmer, 2002:100-102; Tosun, 1999; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; Özbudun, 2013). Supporting this uncommon positioning of left and right in Turkey, a great proportion of the radical leftist parties are often reluctant to perceive the CHP as a leftist party due to its restrictive position toward the expansion of freedoms, the protection of the lower classes, and its promotion of militarism and nationalism. In that vein, it is hard to categorize the Turkish center-left,

as represented by the CHP except from the late 1960's and 1970's as a semi-socialist party sensitive to the lower classes. On the contrary, the perception of the Turkish center-left is rather that it is generally eager to serve the class interests of its urban, educated, and bureaucratic base to protect the existing state ideals, especially militant secularism, and to continue with its poorly formulated social programs.

On the other hand, the center-right perception seems to embrace the masses, especially the lower classes, with a robust populist voice (Esmer, 2002; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2007; Hale and Özbudun, 2010; Heper, 2003; TÜSES, 2002; Dağı, 2006; Yavuz 2006). However, lower class support for the center-right has rarely come from the poorest and most marginalized elements. Instead, the center-right appears to attract those who passionately want to improve their living standards, are open to economic and personal betterment and eager to interact with other classes so as to expand their social milieu⁷.

As Kirsheimer's (1966) conception of a catchall party envisages, Turkish center-right parties generally aim to maximize their votes and, for this reason, try to capture the heart of the majority. Rather than feeling wedded to the protection of the state's principles and mission, center-right parties to a large extent rely on pragmatic projects and viable economic development programs. They also tend to deploy an understanding of 'the national will' that contrasts with a status quo variously linked to the CHP, the center, or the civil or military bureaucracy. Furthermore, without advocating a theocratic system,

⁷ For example, the studies conducted by Özbudun and Kudat separately indicate that in the late 1960's and early 1970's, villages with telephone lines, at least one market and a road usually supported the center-right parties vis-a-vis more isolated villages, which preferred to vote for the center-left. See Ergun Özbudun. 1975. "Political Participation in Rural Turkey," in Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds). *Political Participation in Turkey*. Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 44-4; Ayşe Kudat. 1975. "Patron-Client Relations: The State of the Art and Research in Eastern Turkey," in Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds). *Political Participation in Turkey*. Istanbul:Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 61-87.

center-right parties typically advocate for freedom of conscience by lifting historic bans on religious practices in the public domain.

Yet the functional explanation of the left-right cleavage explains only one dimension of it, and is far from comprehensive. In other words, as implied above the secular vs. religious and the post-materialist vs. materialist connotations of the left-right cleavage should be evaluated through a particular case. Therefore, it is hard to endorse the idea that all right-left positionings in Turkey are conflictual and inimical because, in some ways, right and left echo the general global understanding. For instance, a global understanding of the new right as characterized by liberalism in economic policies and conservatism in cultural policies to a large extent resembles the political agenda implemented by the Turkish center-right (Sezal and Dağı, 2001; Acar in Heper and Sayarı, 2002; Öniş, 2004; Cizre and Yeldan, 2005; Mert 2007:10). The secular vs. religious divide, meanwhile, has typically served to distinguish left and right tendencies. Considering the left-right constellations, the Turkish context, which experienced a top-down modernization in the 1920's and 1930's, later became an arena of the competition between the ones who enacted modernization and the ones who sided with the people while in some ways criticizing the strategy of that modernization. Thus, the nature of the left and right cleavage in Turkey is rooted in more cultural means than economic means.

Thus, the concept of the center-right in Turkey is marked by a significant degree of complexity, discrepancy, and ambiguity. The fundamental complexity of the Turkish case of positioning the center-right merits further investigation. Thus the central aim of my dissertation, which is to explore the characteristics of center-right politics in Turkey

through a particular, empirically grounded study of how different parties have understood democracy, the state, and secularism, as well as how they have acted politically on these understandings across the past seven decades.

The center right, in other words, is a determining and significant semantic category in the Turkish context, and has received far less academic interest than it deserves. The sum of the right wing parties has usually been more than the sum of the left wing parties, with the exception of one election (21 June 1946). In only two other general elections did the main leftist party win the election, but the cumulative vote share of the left was never more than 50 per cent, with the exception of the rather dubious 1946 elections. According to research results, many Turkish people still prefer to define themselves as “rightist” (Esmer 2002; Coşar and Özman 2004; Çarkoğlu 2007). Statistical data from the 2007 elections also reveals that the base of the Turkish right is broader than that of the left. Especially after the 1990’s, this tendency increased; according to the World Values Survey, 2011 was the peak year in terms of the percentage of Turkish people defining themselves as being on the right wing of the political spectrum (Esmer, 2011). Another important characteristic of Turkish politics is volatility (Özbudun, 1981:237-245), yet severe changes are not observed across the left-right spectrum in general, which may be a result of the significant degree to which left-right identity maps onto a secular vs. religious cleavage. Volatility thus largely occurs not across the left-right divide, but within the left and right camps respectively (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005:138). The Turkish voter who positions himself on the right also tends to consistently vote for rightist parties. That said, some thinkers refrain from

utilizing these categories because of their imperfect alignment to the Turkish case⁸. Despite lingering doubts about the utility of a left-right categorization, many scholars, policy makers, media, civil society organizations and casual people nevertheless commonly deploy such a categorization in contemporary Turkey.

Regarding the Turkish context, although there exists an abundant literature analyzing the left, the far Islamic right and the far nationalist right, for various reasons the “center-right” mentality has not yet been studied adequately—and this is despite its having ruled the country more than any other ideology. Thus this study of the Turkish center-right will contribute to a much-needed space in the literature on Turkish Politics through the analysis of a relatively untouched realm and through a nuanced historical exploration of the changing nature of the center-right across many decades of its critical influence on Turkish politics.

1.3. Research Questions

Given the vague characteristics of the left and the right in the Turkish context, having identified the electoral superiority of the center-right parties as well as the center-right as a relatively understudied area, “What does center-right correspond to in Turkey?” is a starting point for my dissertation. In order to answer this question, I asked further questions. In order to understand what the center right mentality corresponds to, I

⁸ In order to indicate the absurdity of the left-right constellations in the Turkish context, Cemil Meriç stated that “when I exclaimed in the court that I was Marxist, I had not shaken even one workers’ hand” Cemil Meriç. 2005. *Bu Ülke*. 26th ed. İstanbul: İletişim, 96. Meriç asserts that without experiencing the Western historical process that gave rise to the left-right constellation, Turkey does not need to use these terms.

believe that it is necessary to look both at the politics and discourse of the center-right parties. Thus, what are the basic characteristics of the center-right politics and discourse in Turkey? Under what parameters/notions can we formulate the center-right understanding in Turkey?

One of the most recurrent questions for political scientists studying Turkey is the debate over continuity or rupture in the analysis of Turkey's modernization—particularly, the transition from the late Ottoman Empire to the early Turkish Republic (Ford, 1939; Lerner, 1958; Berkes, 1998; Lewis, 1968; Yalman, 1973; Hale, 1980). I shall apply the same framework in analyzing center-right politics in Turkey. Throughout this dissertation, by exploring different parties' approaches to democracy, the state, and secularism, I ask, what are the continuities (similarities in policy and discourse) and ruptures (radical breaks or changes, transformations) across the different instantiations of center-right politics in Turkey? As the first representative of the center-right mentality, the Democratic Party constitutes a ground for this analysis, and the subsequent parties' positions (continuity or rupture) on the same ground provide some particular implications on the basis of identification of the center-right mentality. This investigation enables us to elucidate the Turkish center-right mentality up until the 2000s. After that period, though, marked by the filling of the center-right vacuum by the AK Party, another set of questions are needed, namely: why did the classical center-right parties leave the center-right arena to the AK Party? Through the three main categories guiding my analysis (democracy, the state, secularism), I argue that when the center-right parties began to abandon these principles of center-right politics in Turkey through increasing authoritarianism and/or seizing state power and/or forsaking the

passive secularist understanding, they encountered trouble both from the state elite and from the public. Consequently, one of the problematiques of this dissertation has to do with why these parties did not endure in the long run.

Although there are various possible answers to these questions, asking and trying to answer them will contribute to our understanding and consciousness of one of Turkish politics' dominant actors, namely, the Turkish center-right.

1.4. Methodology

My dissertation relies on empirical case studies to analyze the center-right concept. Regarding conceptual analysis, Tilly and Goodin draw attention to the fact that an analysis depends on the context of its place, time, explanation mechanisms, existing culture, history, psychology, population, technology and the philosophy of the researcher (2006). Unit of analysis, method and other contextual factors also significantly influence the definition of the left and right distinction, making it essential to pursue this research accordingly. In that regard, before analyzing the nature of center-right politics in Turkey, it is necessary to examine the ideological connotations of the left and right, considering such particular variables as time and context. Since the focus of the work will be Turkey and the unit of analysis its center-right political parties, it is necessary to compare the divergent parties of the center-right with each other as well as to compare their distinguishing policies and ideologies to those of their center-left and far-right contenders.

I chose to analyze political parties as the agents of center-right ideology because, in a country like Turkey that still could not adequately consolidate its democracy in liberal pluralist terms, political parties enjoy a significant degree of dominance in the political terrain. As Linz states, “there is also considerable agreement, in both established and unconsolidated or unstable democracies, that political parties are essential to the working of democracy” (2002:291). Linz also notes, “In parliamentary systems, political parties relatively play a more efficient and active role than the presidential systems” (2002:292). Political parties are thus one of the best instruments for analyzing political traditions in the Turkish case due to its parliamentary system as well as the incomplete implementation of democracy. Neumann states that a political party is “the articulate organization of society’s active political agents...the great intermediary which links social forces and ideologies to official governmental institutions” (Neumann 1963:352). Building on an understanding of parties “as a vehicle with which to understand the polity” (Reiter 2006:614) this study takes parties as the main unit of analysis.

In studying party politics, locating parties on the left-right spectrum has been identified as the most important dimension by many scholars (Laponce, 1981; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990; Knutsen 1998; Volkens and Klingemann 2003; Klingemann in Thomassen, 2005; Freire, 2006). Fuchs and Klingemann state that, “At the individual level, the division between left and right functions as an instrument to reduce the complexity of the political universe; on the systemic level, it functions as a code of communication” (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990:205). Klingemann, who studies voter alignments, argues that utilizing a left-right scale is quite advantageous, especially for studies of Western Europe, since almost every election study considers this scale and

almost all respondents are able to define themselves on this spectrum (Klingemann 1995:183-206). Verifying Klingemann's argument, many other studies of political parties and electoral behavior suggest that individuals' left-right self-placement is one of the major indicators of their voting choices—hence the continuing importance of this cleavage in the study of many countries in recent decades (Freire 2004, 2006:360; Gunther and Montero, 2001, Franklin *et al.*, 1992; Eijk *et al.*, 2005, Niemi and Norris 2010).

Methodologically, the study first tries to understand the origin and the transformation of the concept of the center-right in Turkey. The search for the genesis of the concept of a left-right cleavage helps to underline the various connotations of these concepts. Evaluating the Turkish case within such a conceptual framework, I selected three major notions/parameters—democracy, the state, and secularism—because of their unique significance in political debates and thus their ability to help us understand the main dynamics of and divergences within the center-right in Turkey. In doing so, by scrutinizing the sometimes blurred, sometimes clear lines between the center-right and center-left, as well as between the center-right and far-right, we will have a better grasp on what uniquely defines the center-right in Turkey and how the concept of the center-right has been deployed, with its all complexity, across different conjunctures and contexts.

Primary sources of analysis include official party programs and documents, government programs, Parliamentary records, leaders' speeches, media records and statistical data. That said, the self-proclamations of a party are far from sufficient data sources on their own, as there may be—indeed, most likely *are*—considerable gaps between the portrait

they drew and the policies they pursued, between explanation and action. Secondary sources—existing studies, newspaper columns, biographies and autobiographies—will be utilized to balance the possible biases of official party pronouncements. While drawing on such a wide range of materials, this dissertation not only focuses on concrete instruments such as implemented laws and policies. It also aims to integrate speeches and policies, perceptions and concepts—consonant with my interest in understanding different political mentalities, and different instances of how “language is action” (Brown and Yule 2000:5)—to contribute to the definition of the nature of center-right ideology in Turkey. The priority of the viewpoint throughout this dissertation is domestic politics and discourse of the center-right rather than anything else.

In any effort to interpret policies and speeches for the purpose of conceptualizing the Turkish center-right context matters considerably. In that regard, it is possible to observe some certain non-linear trends in center-right politics during conjunctural transformations. For instance, as was seen in 1960 and 1980 military breakdowns, even institutional frameworks were by and large altered. However, as Isard observes, discourses “do not merely depend on the context for...interpretation, they change that context” (1975:377). Thus, the theoretical approach followed in this dissertation sees a mutually constitutive relationship between conjunctural conditions or context and the discursive or interpretive acts of specific center-right parties. In other words, different parties, in their historical context, are both the result of and the reason for their contextual conditions. For this reason, policies of the Democratic Party -as the founder of the origins of the center-right mentality- and the subsequent parties who all acted in

divergent atmospheres, naturally influenced the conjunctures as well as were influenced by the conjunctures.

Integrating historical analysis and discourse analysis, the main aim of this dissertation is to formulate an empirically grounded understanding of the center-right by analyzing the politics and discourses of three major center-right parties, through an approach that emphasizes the heterogeneity and complexity inherent in the very concept of center-right.

1.5. Roadmap of the Study

The first section of this dissertation involves delineating the ways in which the meanings of left and right are understood at a more global level. To that end, three main versions of the left-right cleavage will be evaluated. The first concerns the significance of left and right in the context of the French Revolution, based on secularism vs. religion and emancipation from tradition vs. protection of the existing order. The second version draws on comparative analyses of the state's role in the economy concerning issues of equality. The third version deals with recent debates within politics that revolve around the distinction between post-materialism and materialism; these debates bear traces of older debates while also adopting new issues on the left-right spectrum. Then, while underscoring the importance of context in studying the left and the right, I shall provide a short history of the left-right cleavage in Turkey, followed by a review of existing studies on center-right ideology in Turkey.

In the third, fourth and fifth chapters, after clarifying the three categories central to my analysis—namely, democracy, the state, and secularism—I will analyze the policies and discourses of three major parties with regards to these three categories. In doing so, it seems that the Democratic Party gained the most extended space due to constituting the very initial typology of center-right politics and discourse in Turkey, whose was then followed by subsequent parties.

As for democracy, having identified the procedural and subsequent conceptualizations of the term, I point to a general affinity of Turkish center-right parties towards the endorsement of the procedural merits of democracy as a means for resisting certain institutions framed as tending to ignore the national will. In general, an emphasis on heeding the national will and winning elections while building warm relations with the public was observed in the Turkish center-right tradition. Center-right parties also show certain limitations in their understanding of democracy, for example, in relations with the opposition and with the press. Overall, a picture of the Turkish center-right emerges that suggests that the longer these parties stay in power, the greater their authoritarian inclinations tend to be.

The next chapter builds on the concept of center-periphery differences as an explanatory framework and evaluates the Turkish center-right's love-hate relationship with the state. It diagnoses an overall predilection: the Turkish center-right, though nurtured from within a dichotomy pitting the state against the public, in time developed a demand for controlling, possessing or at least sharing state power instead of a policy to minimize the state systematically. The chapter further considers both the relationships between the center-right and bureaucracy, and the ways in which various center-right parties have

employed economics in opposition to the statist principle of Kemalism. Despite drawing heavily on a liberal rhetoric of economic issues, until the ANAP years, center-right parties were unable to successfully implement a considerable liberalization project. Nevertheless, the center-right tradition maintained a pragmatic focus on economic development as a main priority *vis-à-vis* the cultural modernization priorities of Kemalism.

I then turn to the issue of “passive secularism” in opposition to “the assertive Kemalist *laïcité*” in the eyes of the center-right by focusing on the pro-religious and pro-secularist aspects of these parties, which attempted to lift the ban on religious practices as well as to protect the secular Republican regime without favoring a religiously oriented system. This chapter also draws a distinction between the center-right and the Islamic far right on the basis of the former’s sincerity in endorsing secularism.

In the final step of the dissertation, following a series of concluding remarks, I point to the various ways in which this historical study of center-right politics has ramifications for our understanding of contemporary Turkish politics. Specifically, three dynamics—namely the favoring of procedural democracy, a love-hate relationship with the state, and passive secularism—help to explain the characteristics of the Turkish center-right. As long as these parties stay in power, increased authoritarianism at the cost of democracy, trying to seize and use state authority instead of diminishing it, and adopting an assertive secularist position in certain cases, especially after the late 1990’s, might lead to the collapse of the classical Turkish center-right parties. In the very beginning of the 2000’s, the AK Party, distinct from far-right actors, was able to attract the support of

the center-right parties by pursuing a policy and mobilizing a discourse reminiscent, to an important degree, of its center-right predecessors.

CHAPTER II

THE LEFT-RIGHT CLEAVAGE AND THE TURKISH CASE

2.1. Left and Right: Far From Frozen

Political positioning is no straightforward matter. In order to simplify its inherent complexity, scholars, journalists, and ordinary people often employ such schematized divisions as left-right, liberal-conservative, conservative-progressive and so on. Among these categories, left-right is one of the most widespread and historically grounded ideologies, known almost everywhere in the world. Downs, one of the premier scholars of left-right theory, maintains that political parties in every society can be ordered on the left-right scale (1957:142). To him, it is the universal dimension of the left-right distinction that makes these categories important. Others have similarly argued that the social factors of left-right categorization in politics are perhaps the most important such division within the hierarchy of cleavages (Sani and Sartori 1983; Noel and Thelen 2008: 12).

However, the precise referents of the right-left division—their connotations and repercussions—are not the same in every context. The nature and connotations of the left-right conceptualization is not frozen, monolithic and universally agreed upon.

Instead, “Left and right do not represent two sets of fixed ideas, but rather an axis which shifts considerably from one generation to the next” (Cameron 1996:ix). This axis “functions as a memory tool because it is open” and “creates continuity in histories that are discontinuous” (Noel and Therein 2008:12). Underlining the changing nature of the left-right distinction, Bobbio states “Some conflicts become less important, or even disappear, while others emerge” (1996:35). In other words, as the conjuncture changes, new issues also become a source of dispute, and through acts of political and social debate, get worked into existing categories and vocabularies of left and right.

As proof of the dynamic nature of left and right, Steven Lukes suggests three varieties of left and five varieties of right that have evolved over time. The first left aimed to expand the achievements of the French Revolution without rejecting the bourgeoisie-liberal order. The second left came in the late 19th and early 20th century and emerged from the working class struggle. The third left, which emerged after the 1960’s, has emphasized matters of identity, gender and ecology over economic concerns. The first two categories of the right were shaped in opposition to the first two lefts: the first one defended the ancient regime against the French Revolution and the second one supported limited government intervention in economics and a generally pragmatist approach to politics. The third type of right arose in the context of nationalist movements while the fourth emerged after World War II and favors a populist, anti-immigrant discourse. The fifth right emerged in the 1980’s, and is synonymous with neoliberalism’s economy-focused agenda (Lukes 2003).

Lukes is not the only scholar to have commented on the historical transformation of what people understand of the concepts of left and right⁹. Synthesizing this scholarship, we can categorize the various connotations of left and right under three headings: the left-right cleavage in the context of the French Revolution, left-right cleavages resulting from socioeconomic differences, and left-right debates that mirror materialist vs. post-materialist debates. These three main categories, it should be said, are not necessarily exclusive and overlap in some respects.

2.1.1. Left and Right in The Context of the French Revolution

Any study of the genealogy of left and right must begin with the French Revolution. As is well known, the very terms left and right emerged during the French Revolution, and began, according to Bobbio, as a “banal spatial metaphor” when two different revolutionary blocks took seats on different sides of the French National Assembly (1996:33). In the rightist reading of the Revolution, the deputies, defined as Girondins, tried to establish a regime similar to the English version without utterly destroying the ancient regime. In other words, the right wing advocated maintaining the existing order and social institutions with respect to religion and tradition. They accused the leftist Jacobins of violence and cruelty (Doyle, 2001:17). The story begins at this juncture

⁹ Among the most important contributions are Jean A. Lapointe. 1981. *Left and Right: The Topology of Political Perceptions*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; Ronald Inglehart. 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Oddbjørn, Knutsen. 1998. “Expert Judgements of the Left-Right Location of Political Parties: A Comparative Longitudinal Study,” *West European Politics* 21(1):63–94; Peter Mair. 2007. “Left-Right Orientations,” in Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds). *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; André Freire. 2006. “Bringing Social Identities Back In: The Social Anchors of Left–Right Orientation in Western Europe,” *International Political Science Review* 27: 359–78.

according to the right wing position. Yet from the point view of the left, all the revolutionary strategies, including the use of violence, were necessary to achieve liberty, to end arbitrary rule, and to improve human rights by means of accusing the Right of violating basic individual rights. This left-right distinction continued in the 1791 Legislative Assembly as well. In the aftermath of the coup d'état of 1793, some of the Girondins were arrested; the rest moved to the center. After the Thermidorian Reaction of 1794, the far left was trimmed in the Parliament setting in motion an era of relative moderation (Gauchet 1997:241-18). Nevertheless, this moderation process did not last long; immediately after the Restoration in 1814-1815, the left-right camps reemerged. The royalist deputies again preferred to sit on the right side of the Assembly whilst the socialist deputies preferred the left. This seating tradition after the 1850s came to be understood as a representation of political ideology and in the Third Republic Era after 1871, the metaphors of left and right began to be commonly used to identify parties (Laponce 1981 56-8; Gauchet 1997:242-7).

Thus, the struggle between the defenders of the Ancient Regime and reformers generated the initial vocabulary of left and right. Given the significant place of religion—the clergy, religious nobles, religious institutions and hierarchies—in the Ancient Regime, much of what defined the right was their defense of those institutions. On the other hand, challenging discipline, authority, inequality and the superior position of the Church, the left demanded liberty, individualism, and the principle of equal vote within a secular state structure. Whilst the left was eager to win emancipation from tradition and religious hegemony, the right advocated the perpetuation of religious domination. Their very different attitudes toward religion also informed the stance that

religious figures took on each side. Studying the semantics of left and right in eleven languages, Laponce claims that the right is usually associated with moral virtue and is portrayed as “signifying strength and dominance while religious beliefs [add] to the term the connotations of superiority and legitimacy” (1981:100). In the Christian religious realm, the right has usually been more welcome, a point that Bobbio also ties to religious spatial metaphors “where the good sit on the right of the Father and the evil on the left” (1996:41). Similarly, in the Islamic tradition, the right symbolizes the “correct” side; “good” things such as eating, writing, and holding the holy book should be done with the right hand. Thus, the righteousness of the right, so to speak, was underscored by deeply naturalizing metaphors in the religious realm, resulting in the smooth mapping of the secular vs. religious duality onto that of political left and right. This pattern persists in some cases; research conducted by Laponce suggests that secularists still to a large extent lean left while more traditional and religious people continue to advocate for the right (1981).

In addition to secularism, demands for democratization and libertarian ideals were also central to the left until the emergence of Socialism as the dominant leftist ideology. According to Noel and Thérèse, “the parliamentary left was defined primarily by its support for the republic, for democracy, and for laicism, against a right still attached to the monarchy, to limited enfranchisement, and to state support for religious institutions” (2008:15). If the right stood for the protection of the extant order and praised hierarchy and discipline, the left arose in favor of equality and emancipation from tradition. Some scholars also postulate that the struggle against injustice is seen as a left wing tenet while the right embraces roots, loyalty to a nation, common destiny and history (Bobbio

1996:47; Confrancesco, 1993). In the left-right continuum, secularism and one's approach to religion continue to play the role of an identification marker on the basis of this distinction. Nevertheless, the individualistic and libertarian stance of the left to an important degree shifted after socioeconomics began to be perceived as the main cleavage in society. Contemporary debates pitting post-materialism against materialism or libertarian against authoritarian views shift the nature of the left considerably from its original sense in the context of the left-right cleavage emerging from the French Revolution.

2.1.2. The Socioeconomic Reading of the Left-Right Cleavage

Another group of scholars point to socioeconomic stratification as the main stake in left-right divisions, especially after the rise of Socialism. To Marx and Engels, any social analysis should focus on socioeconomic conditions since material conditions disproportionately create and shape ideologies, religion and philosophy; socioeconomic classes—a main unit of analysis for Marx—are also determined by the mode of production (1970). Although he does not employ a vocabulary of left and right in his work, Marx's starting point was the moral critique of Capitalism, which profoundly inspired virtually all subsequent leftist literature. The general tendency among Marxist philosophers of equating left-right ideologies with a conflict between the bourgeois and the proletariat gained ascendancy particularly after the rise of Socialism and the consolidation of industrial society. This tendency has in turn thrown into question the nature of power, the proper extent of state control over the economy, and the role of

government with regards to the distribution of economic resources, private property, collective action, individualism and social equality. In this new context, generally the right has been equated with the advocacy of free market economies, unrestricted private property rights, and defense of the status quo. The left, meanwhile, is typically associated with state investment, the protection of workers' rights and robust public social policies. By the 20th century, the composition of the left-right cleavage changed considerably, as the metaphors of left and right traveled beyond the borders of France and spread across Europe. The revolutionary vision, secularism and focus on equality that characterized the left in the French Revolution are still associated with the left, but the main emphasis has shifted to economic matters¹⁰.

Until the 1970's, the socioeconomic reading of the left-right cleavage remained the predominant perspective in the discipline of Political Science. For example, Anthony Downs, who wrote on the concepts of left and right in 1957, represented this cleavage in terms of the role of government in the economy and the scope of the private sector's room for maneuver. For Downs, degree of state intervention is a key factor in identifying left and right positioning. Bartolini's historical analysis of the distinguishing features between left and right, meanwhile, linked three dynamics to class cleavage: social constituency, ideological orientation and organizational structures (2000). According to Bobbio, the left prefers a more equal and egalitarian society while the right perceives hierarchy as necessary and favors inequalities (1996:46). Will Kymlicka, in an analysis of political philosophers, classifies them according to their position on a left-

¹⁰ Regarding the French case, Noel and Therein assert that, in the beginning of the 20th century, the former center composed of Old Republicans moved to the right while the left dealt with the representation of social class (2008: 15).

right spectrum that corresponds to equality and socialism versus freedom and capitalism (1990:1–5). Similarly, Peter Mair, focusing on the genesis of parties, argues that parties are left or right oriented according to the specific histories of their emergence:

In short, left-right divisions, which predated but at the same time were cemented by the political mobilization of the working class in early twentieth-century Europe, and which came to focus principally on the question of the degree of government intervention, have proved sufficiently flexible to endure as well as to absorb, and have thus acted as a fundamental force for continuity. For all the changes experienced in recent years, it is clear that left and right not only remain the major organizing principles in modern west European politics, but also help to create a uniform foundation for contemporary patterns of policy competition (1997:27).

Hence, despite further changes in historical circumstances, the functional explanation of the left right still presents one of the most powerful explanatory mechanisms in Political Science, but it is not the only one. Studying such European countries as the United Kingdom, Germany and Austria, Fuchs and Klingemann amalgamate the first and the second senses described above of the left-right distinction and settle on the idea of class and religious cleavages as constitutive of the differences between left and right (1990). By the same token, analyzing European party systems, Lipset and Rokkan reveal that political cleavages were crystallized in the established parties along social lines of Protestant vs. Catholic, rural vs. urban, and center vs. periphery where the functional cleavage also perpetuates its importance as well (1967; 1990). Many subsequent researchers have made use of the dichotomies of socioeconomic stratification and state vs. market to help distinguish left and right.¹¹ In sum, the early social vocabularies of

¹¹ See for instance Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.) *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: Free Press; Peter Mair. 1997. *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Ian Budge, Hans-Dieter

revolution vs. order and secular vs. religious characteristic of the left-right division in the context of the French Revolution gradually gave way to a functional explanation of the left-right cleavage. And though the socioeconomic reading of the differences between left and right is still utilized and tailored to specific conjunctures, such an explanation began to lose its importance after the 1970s.

2.1.3. The Post-Materialist Conjuncture

After the 1970's, skepticism grew as to whether the left-right distinction is as important as was previously thought. Today, when post-political politics¹² is a matter of public discussion, to some scholars, the left-right distinction has lost its distinguishing function. One of the main themes of scholars critical of the analytical utility of the left-right distinction points to its limits in accounting for the political world today. According to this point of view, the end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War era, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the domination of market economy and similar political events amounted to a paradigm shift that chipped away at the relevance of the left-right dichotomy. According to this view, recent political and social transformations have

Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum (eds). 2001. *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Arendt Lijphart. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945–1990*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1990. "The Left-Right Schema," In M. Kent Jennings, Jan van Deth, et al. (eds). *Continuities in Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three Western Democracies*. Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter; Alain Noël and Jean-Philippe Thérien. 2008. *Left and Right in Global Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Oddbjørn Knutsen. 1998. "Expert Judgements of the Left-Right Location of Political Parties: A Comparative Longitudinal Study," *West European Politics*. 21(1): 63–94; Scott C. Flanagan. 1987. "Value Change in Industrial Society," *American Political Science Review*. 81:1303-1319.

¹² To Žižek, the post-political identifies the displacement of particular demands by the rise of universal ones. To Swyngedouw the rise and utter prevalence of "sustainability" in ecological discourse is another instance of the post-political condition (2006).

rendered the left-right distinction obsolete and ill-equipped to make sense of new global problems.

Bell's theory suggests that the emergence of welfare states and the widespread development of the service sector (which acted to diminish socioeconomic class conflicts) alongside the growth of secularism (which decreased emotional attachments to religion as an issue of political conflict) amounted to the end of ideology, including the collapse of the left-right cleavage (Bell 1960). To him, consonant with the collapse of socialism as the main alternative theory of economic administration, which brought consensus to debates over the role of the welfare state and political pluralism, the most important cleavage between left and right has to a large extent evaporated.

The Green movement is among those tricky ideologies offered as an example of the outdatedness of the left-right cleavage¹³. To some scholars, the Green movement presents a challenge of categorization if the distinction between left and right is perceived in a dichotomous way, since "in calling for an ecological, nonviolent, non-exploitative society, the Greens transcend the linear span of left-to-right" (Spretnak and Capra, 1985:3). In line with this view, the green movement is beyond left and right insofar as it claims that both left and right are a part of industrialism, the super ideology of both

¹³ Yet for some scholars, such examples as the Green Movement cannot be reduced to instances of the uselessness of the left-right distinction. As Bobbio points out, Greens may be seen as a transversal movement that shifts from one camp to the other without rejecting the existing left-right categories (1996:10). By the same token, in the post-1980s period, there emerged both an ecological left and an ecological right, linking the concerns of environmentalism to both left and right ideologies, as detailed in the studies of Joe Weston and John Gray. Joe Weston is the editor of *Red and Green*, a book published in 1987 that promotes a Socialist and Environmentalist platform. John Gray also developed the concept of conservative environmentalism and may be called a right wing environmentalist. See Joe Weston (ed). 1987. *Red and Green: New Politics of the Environment*. Michigan:Pluto Press; John Gray. 1993. *Beyond the New Right: Markets, Government and the Common Environment*. London: Routledge.

political positions (Porritt and Winner, 1988:256; Dobson 2000:180). Giddens thus argues that globalization, environmental issues, and transformations in personal life paved the way for the search for a third alternative in the political realm rather than taking positions in the classical left-right spectrum (1994, 1998). To Giddens, especially after the demise of Socialism as an alternative system to capitalism for managing the economy, capitalism has come to be seen as *the* unrivaled ideology—part of the demise of the grounds of the left-right distinction (Giddens 1998:138). Nevertheless, one of the common points among scholars who think that the left-right distinction should be ousted is their tendency to that distinction as a functional cleavage.

Yet other scholars have resisted the tendency to link a shift in high-agenda issues to the collapse of the left-right distinction.¹⁴ Clark, Lipset and Rempel argue, for instance, that the importance of social classes decreased with the rise of the welfare state but reject the claim that this automatically signals the irrelevance of left and right in contemporary politics (1993). Ronald Inglehart argues that the left-right distinction did not disappear after the 1970s; it rather transformed into a division in the political realm between materialists and post-materialists. By such a distinction, Inglehart means to point to the changing priorities of people, especially in advanced industrial societies. For him, materialist values give priority to matters of personal and economic security, economic growth, and law and order over social and democratic participation, freedoms,

¹⁴ See for example: Ronald Inglehart. 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Ronald Inglehart. 1984. "The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society," in Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck (eds). *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?* Princeton: Princeton University Press; Scott C. Flanagan and Russell J. Dalton. 1984. "Parties Under Stress: Realignment and Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Societies," *West European Politics*. 7(1):7–23. Herbert Kitschelt. 2004. *Diversification and Reconfiguration of Party Systems in Postindustrial Democracies*. Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung; Herbert Kitschelt. 1990. "The Left-Right Semantics and the New Politics Cleavage," *Comparative Political Studies* 23(2): 210-238.

individual improvement, environmental sustainability, health, and so on (Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1997; Inglehart and Abramson, 1999). As long as the economic security and stability endure, he describes the shift as follows:

But despite the fact that middle-class status has generally tended to be associated with a preference for relatively conservative political parties, the newly emerging type of value priorities seems likely to be linked with support for radical social change. Under given conditions, we believe, this can lead to massive shifts to the political parties of the Left on the part of younger middle-class groups. Conversely, working-class respondents would be relatively likely to have underlying value preferences which make them potential recruits for conservative parties despite their traditional association with parties of the Left. These individuals have attained a certain level of prosperity relatively recently, and apparently continue to place a comparatively high value on defending and extending their recent gains (1971:992).

In relation to this point of view, individuals' self-placement on the left-right axis has three significant variables tied to social status, values and partisan loyalties, which cover all the issues above (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976:244-2). To Inglehart, value orientations—particularly questions of lifestyle—are dominant on the left-right identification in contexts marked by long-term economic stability. By contrast, Freire suggests that partisan loyalties are the main determinant of left-right identification today. He also underscores the importance of the relative weight of social factors in explaining individual left-right alignments by suggesting a new specification based on socio-structural divisions and their organizational and identity expressions (Freire 2006:361). In other words, Freire attempts to connect the socioeconomic reading of the left-right cleavage to the left-right arisen from the new issues. On the other hand, Van der Eijik and Kees Niemöller also suggest that the cleavage between the left and right continues, and has been transferred to newly emerging issues in accordance with voters'

substantive political worldviews considering the domination of the impact of culture (Eijk and Niemöller 1994; 2008).

For Lukes, the left-right cleavage is the greatest fundamental dichotomy of the 20th century, determining one's position on both how to see the world and one's place in that world (2003). In opposition to the idea that the left-right distinction is incapable of explaining contemporary issues, he asserts that almost every issue (abortion, same-sex marriage, nuclear weapons) can unambiguously be categorized along a left-right spectrum (Lukes 2003). Along similar lines, rejecting the argument that changing issues in politics have emptied the analytical value of left and right, Mair claims that while not as radical as they were in the past, it is still unusual for a Catholic party to advocate a pro-abortion policy due to its historical orientation (Mair 1997:21).

In recognition of the dynamic character of the left-right cleavage, another wave of scholarship emerged that attempted to assess and measure left and right. Leonard W. Ferguson suggested a method of questioning subjects about such issues as censorship, birth control, evolution, law and order, communism, theism, war, punishment and patriotism as a means to measure left-right tendencies (Ferguson 1942). Ferguson's study was transformational for Political Science, leading to the development of a 1-10 scale to assess leftism or rightism, a method pursued by Castels and Mair (1984). Following this tradition, Huber and Inglehart studied political language, political conflict and other substantive political issues in order to evaluate the political orientation of parties and experts (1995). Interestingly, the schema of Huber and Inglehart's study suggest that almost 65 per cent of the left-right constellation was still based on economics or class conflict (Knutsen, 1998; Klingemann, 1995; 2005). Expanding the

use of the 1-10 scale and Huber and Inglehart's techniques, Budge *et al.* utilize another detailed scale consisting of 56 categories that essentially measure party election programs. They interpret the results of such a scale as “right-wing” if a party supports traditional morals, existing laws and order, a market economy, a limited welfare state and strong military power. On the other hand, if a party favors democracy, a planned or mixed economy, larger state welfare provisions, peace, respect for other cultures, gender issues and so on, they locate that party on the left. As these divergent studies indicate, the functional cleavage constitutes one of the main indicators of the left-right division. However, as Giddens observes, today, the conservative stance is nearly synonymous with neoliberal attitudes towards economics though it rejects a liberal stance on particular issues like abortion, drugs and family (1998:21). Stances towards new issues also underscore the validity of the secular/religious divide, since one’s position on many issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage is, to an important degree, related to one’s position towards religion. These three versions of the left-right divide thus intersect and overlap on many points.

2.2. On The Necessity of the Center

The ambiguity of party systems in diverse contexts complicates any facile application of the left-right division as a set of dichotomous, mutually exclusive categories. To explain the institutional reality of many parties requires that we acknowledge spaces apart from these two camps, underlining the necessity of the concept of the “center” as an explanatory tool. In this perspective, the left-right distinction is important but is

insufficient to explain the contemporary world; insofar as it represents a “stark choice between revolution and reaction,” it is a simple and overly generalized illustration of values (Heywood 2003:27). Diverging from Orthodox left-right thinkers who perceive the world in a dyadic fashion, many other scholars, especially those conducting statistical research, suggest that the concept of a political “center” is indispensable for an adequate understanding of social reality.

The existence of the center can be explained in two ways. The first corresponds to an ideological position that favors consensus and refrains from radicalism. Along these lines, Bobbio notes the inclusive character of the center as distinct from the strict, mutually exclusive character of the left-right division (Bobbio 1996:5). With such an understanding of center, we can interpret the terms center-left and center-right as moderate versions of left and right. Giddens similarly distinguishes radicalism from moderation and argues that the center may pursue so-called radical policies such as ecological problems and emancipatory politics but they are able to command consensus (1998:142). For Giddens, then, the moderation attached to the center does not necessarily rest on the content of the issues advocated, but on the methods or political strategies of the center, which tend to avoid radicalism and strictness.

At the same time, other scholars reveal that the quantity composed of the eclectic majority or the “cafeteria of center” corresponds to the center without dealing with ideological propositions (Almond 1990:24; Noel and Therein, 2008:66). In studying the Israeli center, Hazan asserts that the majority’s placement around the center indicates stability (Hazan, 2007; Coşar and Özman 2004). Nevertheless, it is hard to portray the center as a universal term since contextual differences change its scope, repercussions,

and content. For instance, the French center does not necessarily correspond to the United States center in its ideology and policies. The extent of clustering around the left, center or right differs from one country to another.

As Noel and Therein suggest, according to the data of a 1-10 scale of left-right self-placement gathered from the 2001 World Values Survey, while the Israeli center (the sum of 5 and 6 points in the 1-10 scale) includes only 27.8 per cent of respondents, these rates are 58.3 and 41.2 per cent in the UK and the Netherlands respectively. In a later survey (2005-2008), the rates for center were 56 per cent in Great Britain, 37,9 per cent in the Netherlands, 45,2 per cent in France, 19,9 per cent in Italy, 55,5 per cent in the United States and 21,7 per cent in Turkey.¹⁵ In comparison to many Western democracies, Turkey appears to have gradually become a more polarized country, as suggested in the figures below:




Figure 1: Self-positioning in Turkey in 1990 Source: WVS

¹⁵ No data for Israel is found for the 2005-2008 period.




Figure 2: Self-positioning in Turkey in 1996 Source: WVS




Figure 3: Self-positioning in Turkey in 2001, Source: WVS




Figure 4: Self-Positioning in Turkey in 2007, Source: WVS

In a polarized country like Turkey, the nature of the center can be defined both by its ideological moderation and its capacity to attract voters. The ideological position of the center-left and center-right usually does not directly challenge the preserved notions of the state such as secularism, nationalism and populism. In the beginning of the two party system, a conversation between İsmet İnönü and Celal Bayar reveals that any serious discrepancies between the DP and the CHP amounted to matters of foreign policy and achievements of the Republican Revolution (Özbudun, 2011(2):34; Toker, 1991a:81). In the following years, however polarized, it is hard to claim that neither the center-left nor the center-right raised a radical agenda intended to change the existing system. Yet it is also hard to claim that the Turkish center-left and center-right were eager to seek consensus; indeed, so little so that their disagreements sometimes resulted in military interventions. Furthermore, considering voter alignments, a swing from center right to center left is less common than a swing from center right to far right or vice versa.

The Turkish center-left and center-right generally obtained the majority of votes in elections, though this trend to some extent diminished in the 1990s. Today, the AK Party is seen as the representative of center-right politics based on its election victories more than its ideology. Compared to the general concept of the political center, it is possible to argue that the Turkish center-right is both ideologically moderate and is able to gather the majority's votes. That said, considering its political strategies, it is hard to assert that the Turkish center-right works for consensus with the opposition.

2.3. The Relevance of Context

These three categories for defining left and right definition help to simplify our understanding of these terms, though in reality, the issue is far from clear, coherent, and monolithic. Context is an important factor for how we conceptualize, give meaning to and use the terms left and right.

As the history of the left-right division is closely linked to French political history, even today, this historical and political legacy continues to shape contemporary French politics. On the centrality of secularism in French politics, Doyle observes, “traumatized by the experience of the 1790s, which included the first attempt in history in 1793 to stamp out religious practice entirely, and The French Revolution, then the renunciation by the Convention the next year of all religious affiliation”, this tumultuous history influenced the emergence of the *sui generis* connotation of left and right in the French context that continues to this day (Doyle 92-93). The French right thus emerged as relatively more secular, less religiously affiliated, and less resistant to strong state

control of religion in comparison to the universal alignment of the right. For instance, in 2011 both the French left and the French right agreed upon a law banning women from wearing veils that cover their faces (*The Guardian*, 19.09.2011). The right may be expected to lift such a ban on religious practices, and the left may be expected to advocate freedoms. However, the assertive interpretation of secularism dominant in France (McClay, 2002; Kuru, 2009) led both the right and the left to take a restrictive position on this issue. This event may also be interpreted as evidence of a xenophobic attitude towards immigrants and minorities unexpectedly shared by the new Left. Influenced by militant secularism, neither the left nor the right took a liberal stance on this issue.

The left-right distinction in Italy is also closely linked to historical stratification where political dispute between agricultural and industrial groups was a source of elitism (Barnes 1971:162-2). Barnes notes three aspects in Italian politics that have shaped the left-right cleavages and provided their ideological content and continuity—namely, socioeconomics, religious policy, and foreign policy (Barnes 1971; 1997). Allan Cameron alludes to the marginal character of Italian politics, which during its Marxist uprising, for instance, experienced the left and right cleavage more acutely. Moreover, in the 1980s when the left began to weaken, Italy quickly came together in opposition to the left (Cameron 1996:vii-viii). It is worthwhile to note that in contrast to the French case, the far-right vs. far-left legacy of Italy paved the way for further fragmentation of its political parties, as seen in the 2013 Italian elections.

Throughout the Cold War era, the United States maintained its position as the center of right politics, democracy and capitalism in opposition to the Soviet Socialist Republic

and, to a large extent, adopted a right-wing policy without being strictly located on either the left or the right. In the US, while the left and the right are associated with liberal and conservative standpoints, they do not map easily onto the first two left-right categories. In contrast to France, the American left is closer to the global understanding of centrist politics, whereas the American center resembles the global perception of the right.

Freire's study, relying on data from the 1990 World Values Survey and the 1999 European Values Survey shows that the extent of the determinacy of social factors, partisan loyalties and value orientations changes across contexts. The data showed, for instance, that in Spain and France the weight of social factors was stronger than in other cases, whereas in Italy and Germany, partisan loyalties were quite strong. Value orientations composed of left-right materialism, religion and issues of new politics were very high in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, whereas in Portugal the weight of value orientations decreased from 3 per cent to 1.9 per cent from 1990 to 1999 (Freire 2006:368). Freire also underscores the differential impact of the structural, organizational, and identity components of social factors in different countries. In that sense, the identity component was strong in Spain, France and the Netherlands while very low in Austria. Germany displayed the highest results in the organizational component in 1999, while the determinacy of its identity component was 1.9 per cent in the same year (Freire 2006:364). Assessing respondents' left-right orientation through questions on equality, competition and the role of government, Noel and Thériault found a strong correlation in Turkey, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, Sweden and many other countries. In other cases such as Iran, Israel, Mexico, Brazil,

Hungary, Portugal and Ireland, no correlation was observed (Noel and Therin 2008:47-51). The same study showed that most of the countries sharing similar historical experiences (such as the former-Soviet states) have to a large extent developed similar attitudes with regards to the meaning of left and right (Noel and Therin 2008:47-51). Despite appearing to be a universal norm, in other words, the specific characteristics of the left-right distinction may differ across contexts.

In sum, almost every context has developed different understandings of the left-right concept in response to a unique combination of socio-historical and political circumstances. In the context of Turkey, the first Muslim secular democratic country, although it did not experience the industrial revolution as the West did, nor have a similar socioeconomic class system, nor encounter until relatively late the influences of the French Revolution, Turkey did nevertheless witness the emergence of its own specific left-right cleavage—one that occasionally varies significantly from the widely accepted versions of left and right. Before we turn to the analytical heart of this dissertation, which is on the domestic politics and discourse of the Turkish center right in light of its approach to democracy, the state, and secularism, it is first necessary to briefly situate the concepts of left and right within Turkish political history.

2.3.1. What Does the Left-Right Cleavage Refer to in Turkey?

Turkey not only began to use the concepts of left and right in ways that diverged from their main global connotations; is also began to utilize these concepts relatively late. Despite today's perception of the Democratic Party of the 1950s as the pioneer of right-

wing politics in Turkey, in the final analysis, these terms began to be used commonly only after the 1960s (Çarkoğlu, 2010:255; Çınar, 2009:498; Demirel, 2009:213, 450). Still, even before the terms gained widespread currency, the formative political forces behind their content began decades before with the founding ideology of Turkey. Specifically, another set of cleavages—between center and periphery, secularism and religion, and authoritarian and majoritarian democracy—played a significant role in the formation of the center-left and the center-right camps in Turkey.

In a manner quite different from functional explanations, it was the disjuncture in values separating those who conducted the reforms from those subjected to these reforms (Mardin 1991) that created the main cleavage in Turkey. Considering the nature of the Turkish Revolution, Özbudun states that the “Turkish Revolution was not a social revolution and (...) did not produce clearly identifiable coalitions of class interest” (1997:83). This fact has led the Turkish left and right to seek alternative approaches in identifying their ideology, basing it on social factors other than class. Pursuing a topdown modernizing mission in the absence of civil and industrial society, the telescopic nature of the CHP and the state in the very beginning led to the continuation of the center and periphery cleavage¹⁶ which in turn became the main determinant of the center-left and the center-right in Turkey. Furthermore, revolutionary strategies of the

¹⁶ This issue shall be evaluated in more detail in later chapters on democracy and the state. Also see Edward Shils. 1961. “Centre and Periphery,” In D. R. Gadgil (ed). *Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays in Honor of Michael Polanyi*. New York: Glencoe. Shils’ concept of center and periphery has been adapted to the Turkish case by Şerif Mardin. See Mardin. 1973. “Center–Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” *Daedalus* 102(1):169–90, where the author aims to explain the discrepancy of the modernizing state elites *vis-à-vis* civil society or the masses as the object of this modernization. For further details, see Ergun Özbudun. 2013. *Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Chapter 1; Metin Heper. 1980. “Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: With Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century,” *International Political Science Review*, 1:81-105; Ali Rıza Güngen and Şafak Erten. 2005. “Approaches of Şerif Mardin and Metin Heper on State and Civil Society in Turkey,” *Journal of Historical Studies* 3:1-14.

Kemalist regime along with the denial and elimination of the Ancient Regime with an assertive secularist mission bears slight resemblances to the left under the impact of the French Revolution¹⁷.

The far left and communism were perceived as threats by the existing major parties in the 1940s and 1950s, and none of the parties (neither the CHP nor the DP), explicitly defined itself as right-wing or left-wing. At a certain level, the distinction between the Republican People's Party and the Democratic Party resembled the opposition between the Democratic Party and Republican Party of the American system, which would have theoretically made the DP a center-left party; however, in Turkey the DP has typically been perceived as a right-wing party (Ağtaş, 2007:194). The founding cadre of the DP was composed of previous CHP members that worked in CHP circles for years but who successfully gained the support, during the DP's establishment, of peripheral opposition groups such as disgruntled conservatives, liberals, and leftist intellectuals. For instance, the DP cadre early on developed strong relations with two Socialist intellectuals, Sabiha Sertel and Zekeriya Sertel, as a means of opposing the CHP. Similarly, the predecessors of the DP, Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar and Fuat Köprülü promised to write for *Görüşler* magazine, published by Sertel couple (Sertel 1987). Interestingly, the Democratic Party of the late 1940s was accused of being the instrument of Communists as well as of receiving aid from Socialist Russia throughout its establishment (Demirel, 2009:416). The DP in turn accused the CHP of engaging with communists without

¹⁷ Here, the scope of similarity should not be overestimated. In a manner quite different from the French understanding of the left as eager to change the existing system through mobilizing viable public support for the purpose of breaking the *status quo*, the CHP, operating in the name of the center-left in Turkey, emerged as the heir of the Young Ottomans (*Jön Türkler*) and the Committee of Union and Progress, and framed its activities as "saving the state" in an elitist and intellectual structure (Gültekinil, 2009:13-14

openly demarcating the CHP as a leftist party (Demirel, 2009:418). During the founding years of the Democrat Party, Celal Bayar defined his party as somewhat to the left of the CHP in certain aspects and somewhat to the right of the CHP in others (Bayar, 1968:48; Toker, 1991a:80). All of these details point to the indeterminate nature of right and left in Turkey in the late 1940s and 1950s.

The center-left, represented by the CHP, the founding party of the Republic, maintained an elitist, authoritarian, centralist, secular and statist image up until the 1970s. The six basic principles of the CHP were nationalism, populism, republicanism, revolution, secularism and statism; yet three in particular, secularism, statism and nationalism, were the main dynamics of the CHP. Its high degree of nationalism and eye towards developmentalism mixed with populism¹⁸, which envisaged a classless society rid of certain conflicts, hindered the CHP from articulating a sincere claim to social democracy (Parla 1991; Uçan Çubukçu 2009:520-532). Emphasizing the undemocratic, solidarity and corporatist character of the populist tendency of the CHP, Özbudun also points to an interventionist state mentality behind the vision of accomplishing these tasks without being situated within the Capitalist or Socialist block (2011(1):103-2).

Given the highly central place of Turkish nationalism, secularism and statism in the Republican project—which until quite recently was beyond criticism and open discussion—it is almost impossible for a party to frankly define itself as “anti-nationalist”, “anti-secular” or “anti-statist” in Turkey. It is thus unrealistic to expect either the DP or its center-right successors to introduce a radically controversial program

¹⁸ This populist approach remains a part of the Turkish center-left. Comparing the ideologies of the DSP in the 1990s and the SHP, Hasan Bülent Kahraman pointed to populism as the main impediment of the DSP from being a leftist party in a global sense (Kahraman, 1993:199).

regarding these principles embedded not only in a single party (the CHP) but in the very structure of the state. The center-right mentality, in other words, represents not a profound shift from the dominant state mentality but rather a variation on the principles instituted by the CHP. Indeed, very limited differences were observed in the early party manifestos of the CHP and the DP (Ahmad 1977:30,40; Özbudun, 2011(1):120).

Although these two parties did not clearly define themselves as “right” or “left” in those days, the 1960 turnover and the political processes in the aftermath of the coup profoundly transformed Turkish politics. Consonant with the rise of the left worldwide after the mid-1960s, the CHP began to define itself as a center-left party, particularly emphasizing this identity after Bülent Ecevit’s leadership. The former DP and its predecessor the AP, as the main rival of the CHP, in turn came to identify as center-right parties, with the DP inventing a tradition¹⁹, so to speak, to ground its center-right leanings in an ostensibly deeper history. Nevertheless, the AP (Adalet Partisi - the Justice Party), with only four of its eleven founding members coming from the DP (Levi in Heper Landau, 1991), tried to create an amalgamation of conservatism, liberalism, Islamism, and nationalism. In light of these political transformations, the 1965 elections were thus described as a conflict of party value systems and as a struggle between left and right politics (Abadan, 1966). In the run up to the 1965 elections, İsmet İnönü described the CHP as “structurally a statist party and with this specification, it also has a left-of-center perception” (Abadan, 1966:156). Particularly after the 12 March coup,

¹⁹ Hobsbawm takes “‘invented tradition’ to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past” (1983:1). Hobsbawm’s thesis on the “invention of tradition”—which we can detect in the ways in which center-right parties after the DP attempted to link themselves to its history—echoes the rightization of the DP in the Turkish context.

Demirel began to portray his party as right of center, as opposed to İnönü's left of center description of the CHP (Çakır and Göktaş, 1991:17). In the 1970's, the CHP also adopted a more social democratic rhetoric focused on social policies, the interests of disadvantaged groups; it also considerably abandoned the populism of the former CHP and its ambitions of cultural transformation. The center-right, meanwhile, began to collaborate with nationalists. And the AP developed, in opposition to the CHP, a more market-oriented political agenda and made frequent mention of the 'national will' as informing their politics. Here we should note that, in the post-1971 memorandum process, right of center aligned with nationalist elements and an embracing of the status quo and the state to a degree unlike the relatively liberal and democratic center-right of the 1960s. By the late 1970s both center-left and center-right were far from centrist or moderate, as their uncompromising polarization suggests.

The trend towards polarization was interrupted by a new coup in 1980. At that time, the Motherland Party emerged as the main representative of the center-right, and claimed to amalgamate four tendencies: liberalism, conservatism, nationalism and leftism. It goes without saying that the leftism was by far the most under-represented of these four predilections. The ANAP, in an attempt to join a number of divergent interests under one political umbrella, defined the new direction of center-right politics. The True Path Party also emerged in the 1980s, and arose as another option in the center right, but unlike the DP, the AP, or ANAP, the party was not able to win a majority in elections to form a single-party government. While the True Path Party claimed to be the heir of both the Democratic Party and the Justice Party, the Motherland Party identified itself as the continuation of the DP while rejecting the AP heritage entirely (Acar in Heper and

Landau, 1991; Ergüder in Heper and Landau, 1991). In the beginning of the 2000s, the AK Party has also constructed its conservative democratic identity based on the traditions of the DP and ANAP.

Across the 1990s, at the same time that center-right parties gradually lost their power, an Islamist trend began to influence politics in Turkey. There are various hypotheses such as the “economics and service” explanation, the protest-vote hypothesis and the thesis of ideological polarization in the country’s history of Islamism and secularism. According to some scholars, the failure of the old center-right parties paved the way for far-Islamist and far-nationalist right parties to act as coalition partners in the 1990s. Thus Sayarı and Esmer note that “since the center-right parties that had traditionally defended the religious sensitivities of the periphery became less interested in representing their claims, the void created by the populist politics was filled mainly by the RP/FP and the MHP” (2002:154).

Despite the changing nature of the center-right’s perception of secularism and its religious understandings, one may argue that its stance toward democracy and the state also accelerated the collapse of the center-right during the 1990s though this claim requires further unpacking. Tanju Tosun suggests that corruption and abuse of power led to the center-right’s decline during the 1990s (1999). Others have pointed to the rise of service-oriented and dialogue-based forms of political mobilization as having enabled the rise of far-right Islamic parties by distinguishing them from the idleness of the extant center-right parties (White 2002; Navaro-Yashin 2002). In analyzing the Turkish center-right, then, one must account for the fuse of Islamist and nationalist tendencies as crucial

strategies by which later representatives of the center-right attracted the votes of previous parties.

In studying the radical right, Goodwin notes that it is necessary to also include mainstream political parties—not just fringe elements—in such analyses in order to grasp the issue adequately (Goodwin, 2009:325). The same is true for studying center-right politics in Turkey; it is necessary to consider radical-right parties in order to understand the divergences across parties. Lipset defines the radical right as “anti-pluralist and politically moralistic and conspiratorial as well as ideologically anti-elitist and anti-statist, sociologically marginalized and dispossessed” (1971) which occasionally fits with the Turkish case. In the Turkish context, the radical right typically has two allies. The first is Islamist political parties that fit with Lipset’s categorization to a certain degree. The Turkish Islamic far right has pursued a moralistic and anti-elitist project with a nationalist tone. The second partner of the radical right is ultranationalist and statist. Flirting at times with both extremes, the center-right parties in Turkey insist on staying within the borders of the system and sharing authority if possible (Cizre 1993; Mert, 2007; Tosun, 1999). In other words, despite deploying Islamist and ultranationalist discourses to woo sympathetic voters, the center-right has almost never expressed an intention to destroy the secular structure of the state or to pursue a politics based heavily on Islam or Turkishness—with the possible exception of the AP’s Nationalist Front governments in 1970s. Hence, the Turkish center-right differs from the Islamist and nationalist far right ideologies on the basis of violence and on the center-right’s system-oriented structure targeting almost all ethnic groups and religious affiliations (Taşkın, 2003). As Cizre postulates, one of the most appropriate terms to

describe the Turkish center-right is pragmatism—calculating one's acts towards specific aims tailored to a specific conjuncture (1997).

Intra-party issues such as leader domination and undemocratic organization are present in almost every party in Turkey and do not correspond to party dividing lines.

In a basic sense, the borders of the Turkish center-right are drawn by the relative soft position of its various representative parties on the three categories that guide this dissertation's analysis. Populist in leaning, the Turkish center-right generally supports democracy and the people's voice in a majoritarian tone. References to a national will play an important role in center-right discourse, which prioritizes the preferences of the ostensible majority over a pluralist embracement of the different motives in society. Despite being undoubtedly more democratic in comparison to the CHP ideology and displaying strong links with the procedural tenets of democracy, the center-right has been unable to adequately defend and expand substantive democratic ideals.

The strict statist and secularist policies and discourse of the center-left ideology have also provided center-right parties with much political fodder in constructing an oppositional platform. The center-right saw the links between the CHP and the civil and military bureaucracy as a major threat and an obstacle in realizing the national will. Thus, minimizing and making more efficient the state apparatus are usually high on the list of priorities in the programs of the center-right though this was rarely actualized. In line with their pragmatic approaches to politics, the AP, after the 1971 coup, sought collaboration with the military, and ANAP, in the beginning of the 1980s, avoided challenging the dominance of the military regime in the interests of preserving its own

power. Furthermore, the longer center-right parties stay in power, the more they tend to not only shape the state but also to be shaped by—internalize the interests of—the state. Another characteristic of center-right parties in their relation to the state is their tendency to foster technocrats in an effort to oppose the power of bureaucratic elites. The center-right also favors minimizing state investments and promoting private enterprise in their programs and discourses. Their ability to realize such aims was quite limited until Özal's tenure in the 1980s. However, economic development and the improvement of living standards has been one of the strongest platforms of the Turkish center-right, pitting material development against the cultural engineering projects of the Kemalist Revolution.

Advocating the free and open practice of religion as a means to oppose the militant secularism of the CHP was another pinpoint of center-right politics, distinguishing it from the Islamic right, as the center-right did so while still endorsing secularism—thus the increased use of religious terms, rituals and symbols in the political realm by agents of the center-right. In conclusion, the Turkish case offers an alternative reading of the left-right constellation with its particular conjuncture and political history. The disproportionate importance given to the center-periphery cleavage and the specific approach of the center-right to matters of democracy, state and secularism, which make up the focus of this study, altogether make the Turkish center-right a curious case in the global comparative literature.

2.3.1. Approaches to the Left-Right Cleavage in Turkey

Scholarly approaches to defining left and right in Turkey tend to be influenced by the explanatory frameworks favored by the researcher in question. In more general political analyses of different party systems, four main cleavages have been identified as helping to distinguish different political approaches—namely, matters of center and periphery, state and church, functional and materialism vs. post-materialism (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967:47; Klingemann *et al.* 1994:6). In the study of Turkey, the first three have been seen as especially significant in the formation of the center-left and center-right.

Regarding the functional cleavage, İlkey Sunar sees the emergence of a left-right separation as a result of the disruption of a coalition between the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy (Sunar, 1974). As Özbudun notes, in those years, it is difficult to point to the existence of an influential bourgeoisie, given their high degree of dependency on the state (2011(2):30). To Keyder, because the Ottoman social structure lacked extensive landownership and a settled aristocracy, in many ways it cannot be defined as feudal, making it hard to categorize the Ottoman Empire and the early Republic within a post-feudal class framework. Bureaucracy was a different class juxtaposed with the bourgeoisie in the Republican Era during which political power developed a capitalist investment tenet, and in Keyder's view, the Turkish proletariat remained a passive actor, largely forced to observe rather than influence the changes occurring around it (Keyder, 1987). Even so, especially in the late 1960s and across the 1970s, the left and right began to represent the socioeconomic stratification in the society (Özbudun, 1976; Ayata and Ayata, 2012; Cizre, 1992). In the 1980s, ANAP's neo-liberal policies also echoed a broader world trend in terms of a socioeconomic reading of the left-right

cleavage (Öniş, 2004; Cizre and Yeldan, 2005; Aydın, 2005). Analyzing the contemporary context, Ali Çarkoğlu asserts that: “The left and the right as reflected in the determinants of self-placements along the L-R scale have no tangible socioeconomic basis such as economic deprivation but have instead bases in ethnic and sectarian differences” (Çarkoğlu, 2007:267). It is essential to note here that, in studying Turkey, party allocations might differ from the self-placements of individuals.

Thus, in terms of a functional understanding of left and right, according to many scholars, Turkish politics is an exceptional case, meaning that it is difficult to classify left-right connotations in Turkey so as to perfectly line up with economics. In that vein, the center-periphery cleavage is more helpful in elucidating the definitions of center-right and center-left parties. Şerif Mardin proposed the center-periphery cleavage to explain the Turkish case, a definition that favors the distinction of those who hold power and those subjected to that power without giving priority to economic patterns. In relation to the 1960s, especially for the DP (in its opposition to the CHP) and the AP (in its opposition to the state), Mardin’s thesis helps to explain the center-right understanding in Turkey and its rhetoric of the nation’s will. The leftist intellectual Mehmet Ali Aybar also formulated a similar duality, that of the bureaucracy vs. the masses, as a source of left-right cleavage (1998). Yet the center-periphery cleavage has its critics (e.g. Wuthrich, 2013). Avner Levi (1991) questions its explanatory power for the Turkish case, pointing to the structural presumption of the cleavage and to the fact that neither the center nor the periphery is composed of static bodies. On the contrary, they are dynamic and multifaceted since they are subject to internal conflicts (Levi in Heper and Landau, 1991; Heper, 1980; Özbudun, 2013). Nevertheless, many scholars

continue to defend the explanatory power of such a distinction between a center that holds power and is largely unconcerned with the interests of the periphery. In a statistical study, Çarkoğlu and Avcı state that: “Continuing along a multidimensional explanatory framework, we argued that Mardin’s center–periphery construct still maintains the overall salient characteristics of Turkish politics that shape and reshape the modern-day party system’s constellations of electoral preferences” (2011:27). Ersin Kalaycıoğlu’s analysis of the data gathered in the 1990 Turkish Values Survey also reveals “the continued importance of the conflict between the values of the centre versus the values of the periphery,” which largely comes down to religiosity (1990:24). In a recent study, Özbudun also notes the continuing explanatory power of the center-periphery cleavage, with the periphery divided along religious-conservative and ethnic-cultural-geographic lines and the center maintaining its secularist and nationalist outlook (2013). In addition to the center-periphery cleavage, the emphasis of Özbudun and Kalaycıoğlu on the secular vs. conservative cleavage is in some respects reminiscent of the left-right cleavage in the context of the French Revolution.²⁰

Apart from party politics, ethnic and sectarian identity and religiosity also play a role in determining right-left alignments though the nature of these different modes of identification is quite volatile when it comes to voting patterns among the Turkish citizenry (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005:138; Sayarı and Esmer, 2002; Hale and Özbudun, 2010). In ‘The Nature of the Left-Right Ideological Self-placement in the Turkish Context’ Çarkoğlu’s statistical study (2007) focuses on three categories of Turkish society,

²⁰ As Mardin saw it, the center periphery cleavage was not only a null spatial metaphor. Rather, it involved a certain degree of the conflicts of value systems, such that the secular vs. conservative/religious became a dynamic variable of the center-periphery cleavage.

center, right and left, and emphasizes the significance of religion as a catalyst of left and right identity. To Çarkoğlu, more tolerant, progressive and democratic individuals identify with the left, while happier, more authoritarian and less democratic individuals define themselves as rightists in Turkey. Employing a leftist perspective, Tanıl Bora also identifies nationalism, Islamism and conservatism as three phases of the Turkish right, which represent, respectively, the solid phase, liquid phase and gaseous phase that all might juxtapose to each other (Bora, 1999). In light of this categorization, Bora comes up with that the leitmotiv of the Turkish center-right is to a large extent conservatism, which enables the center-right to adopt and adapt other ideas with ease. Furthermore, Bora postulates that the volatility within the far-right and the center-right in Turkey might be explained by the intersections and co-transformations of these three characteristics of right ideology. Nevertheless, the transactions between the center-left and center-right and even between the center-left and far-right are not considered by Bora the fact of which led him to categorize both under the umbrella of “right”; however, this dissertation asserts that it is very necessary to divide the center-right from the far-rights due to the *sui generis* of the center-right from its counterparts. On the other hand, what Bora initially looks at are the ideological debates and intellectual representatives of the right-wing ideology without paying much attention to political parties. Bora also looks at the issue from a leftist point of view that in some ways leads to negative value judgments of the author towards the issue.

Beşir Ayvazoğlu, from a rightist point of view, explains what being rightist correspond to in Turkey as the representation and expression of divergent affiliations of “the real mass” (1991:32). For him, consisting of the great majority of the population, “the real

mass” is the one that was ousted from the power realm as well as the one that is perceived to be obliged to pay taxes without intervening in the active political discussions (1991:32-2). Looking at the intellectual literature rather than party politics, Ayvazoğlu concentrates on two main lines of the right in Turkey which are Islamist/conservative and nationalist, which occasionally overlap with each other. Furthermore, what Ayvazoğlu disdains is implicitly the center-right with its partially democratic, occasionally statist and brutally opponent character *vis-a-vis* the reactionists that holds the political and economic power (1991:32). Despite accepting the center-right position as one of the components of right-wing ideology in Turkey, he does not deal with the center-right in particular. Similarly, Süleyman Seyfi Öğün concerns himself with conservatism²¹ and nationalism as two main pillars of right-wing ideology through focusing more on the sociological aspects without considering the center-right ideology and politics separately. Ali Yaşar Sarıbay also renders the religio-Islamic dynamics within the right-wing ideology, but he still does not distinguish center-right either. Therefore, the prevailing understudied status of the center-right in Turkey is extant in the right-wing intellectuals’ studies too.

As one of the rarest studies that completely focuses on the center-right in Turkey, Nuray Mert, in “*Merkez Sağın Kısa Tarihi*” (A Brief History of the Center Right in Turkey), asserts that being at the center, for a political party, connotes being legitimate (2007:7). She furthermore reveals the dual function of the center right in Turkey: Its goals are to represent ‘the nation’s will’ and to get the approval of the masses on behalf of the Republican regime. In other words, Mert reveals that the center-right parties have been

²¹ For example, Süleyman Seyfi Öğün. 1998. “Türk Muhafazakârlığının Açık İkilemleri Üzerine”, *Doğu Batı Dergisi* 3(3): 75-77.

capable enough to attract the people without threatening the regime. One of the main differences of Mert's study from this dissertation is Mert's tendency to compare the center-right mentality with the Islamic and nationalist far-right approaches per se without paying attention to the division and integration lines of the center-right and the center-left. Furthermore, identifying the strategies of the center-right towards the "economic development" as a means for the modernization of the center-right as well as the representation of the masses' values is without any doubt justifiable. However, reducing the center-right political strategies to these two concepts may lead to an incomplete understanding of the center-right in Turkey, so that is why this dissertation introduces three main parameters, which also occasionally overlap with these two. Though it offers some critical points, Mert's study is largely a descriptive political history with a prevailing negative judgment of the center-right. Basing her choice of research methods on the premise that Political Science jargon could not evaluate the center-right issue adequately, she utilizes chronological explanations more (e.g. Mert 2007, Chapter 1). What I offer instead in this dissertation is a Political Science perspective that facilitates a comprehension of the center-right in Turkey with the help of its conceptual and analytical framework.

Ümit Cizre is also interested in center-right politics, especially the post-DP period, yet she does not compare the concept to center-left and far-right ideologies. Cizre contributes to the study of the center-right by adding such terms as pragmatism, spontaneity, conjunctural policy making and ambiguity. She critically reconsiders the characteristics of the center-right and its various relationships to the state. Nevertheless, without engaging in comparison, she sometimes attributes as particular to the center-

right aspects of Turkish politics that are far more general and widespread. For instance, she argues that one of the main characteristics of the Turkish center-right is leader dependency, but this is likely true for other ideologies as well. On the other hand, she makes her operationalization on the basis of parties rather than mentality or ideology, which is different than this dissertation²².

Analyzing the fragmentation of the center-right, Tanju Tosun argues that in the post-1980 coup period, Turkish politics became an apolitical arena under the economy-oriented influence of neo-liberalism (1999). Although they represented distinct sociological and ideological coalitions in the 1970s, center-right parties later began to seek legitimacy in the eyes of the state instead of society, which raised questions of reliability. Without internalizing conservatism, nationalism and liberalism, the center-right commonly utilized these ideologies on the popular level, and to Tosun, those ideals were then obtained by their real possessors (1999). Tosun's study is useful in its analysis of the failure of classical center-right parties as well as its theorization of what center-right indicates in the Turkish context.

Another scholar who builds his study on the basis of political parties is Tanel Demirel. Tanel Demirel's two books on the Justice Party and the Democratic Party are significant sources for evaluating these two parties' politics and discourses with special reference to the center-right in Turkey. His works offer an integration of a broad scope of methods. Yet Demirel's account ends in 1980, and does not deal with the Motherland Party and its key role in center-right politics in Turkey.

²² As stated above, the main objective in this dissertation is to investigate and to formulate what center-right mentality is in Turkey, and the political parties are just a unit of analysis.

Any picture of the literature review on the Turkish center-right would be incomplete without a reference to İdris Küçükömer. According to Küçükömer, who likens the left-right distinction to a progressivist vs. elitist and traditionalist vs. revolutionist cleavage, the Turkish right corresponds to the left and the Turkish left corresponds to the right when being compared to standard international conceptions of left and right (Küçükömer, 1994). If we are to look for a correlation between socioeconomic background and ideological positioning, research measuring political behavior reveals that, in general, the base of the left is comprised of relatively wealthier and more educated people whereas the social base of the right is comprised of poorer and less-educated people, which may to some extent support Küçükömer's diametrical opposition of left and right in Turkey (e.g. Çarkoğlu and Avcı, 2002; Rienner, Esmer and Sayarı, 2002; Esmer, 2002:100-102; Tosun, 1999; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; Çaha, 2009; Hale and Özbudun, 2010).

Despite these debates and the sometimes contradictory divisions of left and right, we should not conclude that the terms left and right are entirely antagonistic and contrary to more global understandings of these terms; to do so would risk introducing a reductionist way of using these terms to analyze Turkey. What is crucially revealed across these discussions is the blurred and bizarre utilization of right and left in the Turkish context, which requires further operationalization of these terms to make them more analytically powerful. In order to simplify this operation, in what follows I shall suggest utilizing three main perspectives that may distinguish center-right politics and discourse in Turkey: democracy, state and secularism.

CHAPTER III

DEMOCRACY AND THE TURKISH CENTER RIGHT

3.1. The Content of Democracy

Before evaluating the Turkish center-right in the context of democracy, it is first necessary to establish what democracy refers to through a consideration of its various interpretations. Specifically, two main lines of investigation inform our consideration: the procedural vs. the substantive employment of democracy. The former requires universal participation (that everyone is enfranchised), the principle of equal vote and a degree of responsiveness towards general expectations during periods when the majority obtains the power to rule. The substantive interpretation of democracy, meanwhile, attends to democratic ends as well as democratic means, and entails assuring the well-established principle of the rule of law, the earnest protection of basic liberties and the prevention of the abuse of majority rights—all with an eye to social and economic equality. Defining these two categories will give clarity to our evaluation of the Turkish center-right's approach to democracy, which was largely procedural rather than substantive.

In the minimalist explanation of procedural democracy, elections are given particular weight. Such a theory of democracy dates back to Aristotle's reflections on democracy as a method of achieving a "well-ordered commonwealth" and refers at a basic level to allowing the people to make decisions that directly affect government (Aristotle 1981). Schumpeter's reinterpretation of democracy points out some of the unsatisfactory dimensions of classical democracy: that it conflated rule by the people with the obscurity of the content of the common good, of the procedures to reach that common good, of people's willingness to reach the common good. Schumpeter also thought that classical democracy failed to specify exactly who 'the people' are regarding their social stratification, sex, age and so on (Schumpeter 2006:243-245). These and other shortcomings led him to propose a more comprehensive concept of democracy. To begin with—and we must keep in mind that democracy is largely procedural in the Schumpeterian approach—he argues that the main dynamic of democracy is the "free competition for a free vote" (2006:271). He also calls attention to the necessity of additional measures to make democracy more viable. 'The people' central to the concept of democracy, he argues, must have a developed sense of morality and capacity, which in turn links up to four further prerequisites: the scope of decision making allotted to politicians should be restricted by the parliament, decision-making procedures on particular issues should be left to specialists and to a loyal and talented bureaucracy, the democratic self-control of politicians should be guaranteed without intervening in their political power, and tolerance and respect for different opinions should be well-established (Schumpeter, 2006:290-5).

Along similar lines, for Przeworski, democracy “is but a framework within which somewhat equal, somewhat effective, and somewhat free people can struggle peacefully to improve the world according to their different visions, values, and interests” (2010:16). He emphasizes that, in addition to certain economic, political and institutional conditions, the quality of democracy is critical to its very survival (2003:16). To describe the transformation of the concept of democracy across time, Przeworski compares two editions of the Encyclopedia Britannica (1771 and 1955) and identifies an important divergence. The former focuses on the principle of government by the people whereas the latter considers free elections, representative institutions, responsibility, the liberty and equality of the people and the method of governing as central to democracy (Przeworski, 2010:4-2). Thus, our expectations of democracy have expanded over time, pushing its definition beyond a simple electoral system. Przeworski’s argument for increasing the quality of democracy also points to four challenges that inhibit democracy today: “(1) the incapacity to generate equality in the socioeconomic realm, (2) the incapacity to make people feel that their political participation is effective, (3) the incapacity to ensure that governments do what they are supposed to do and not do what they are not mandated to do, and (4) the incapacity to balance order and noninterference” (Przeworski, 2010:1-2). Democracy emerges from his account as an imperfect, unstable theory requiring continual improvement to address unmet needs and weaknesses (1999; 2010). Along similar lines, Rustow postulates democracy as a learning process entailing shared attitudes among both politicians and citizens, and democratic consolidation comes only after a habituation phase (Rustow 1970).

Linz and Stephan also focus on the consolidation of democracy, and note how, in the absence of behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional challenges to the democratic system, democracy has become the “only game in town” (1996:5). Consolidation assumes the existence of a state, freedoms promoting a viable civil society, an autonomous political society, rule of law, a bureaucratic structure capable of implementing democratic norms and an “institutionalized economic society” acting between the state and the market (1996:7,11). Similarly, for Diamond, the presence of a constitutional system, along with free, fair, regular and multiparty elections, assure an electoral democracy—which cannot be said to exist in a satisfactory fashion either in the absence of the rule of law, pluralism, accountability and individual freedoms or in the presence of reserved domains for military, bureaucracy or oligarchical powers (2003:34-35). Against the fetishization of elections in democracies, Terry Karl warns that elections generally exclude the preferences of a considerable proportion of the electorate compelling them to choose one among many strong alternatives—what Karl dubs the “fallacy of electoralism” (1986).

As the scope of democratic expectations gradually increased in the academic realm, at the same time, the emphasis of discussions turned to the substantive side. Pseudodemocracy (Highhey and Gunther, 1992), quasidemocracy (Haggard and Kaufman, 1992), protodemocracy (Kohli, 1993), facadedemocracy (Lipset, 1994) and similarly skeptical terms for democracy underscore that free and fair elections alone are not enough to evaluate the degree of democracy in a particular context. Rather, many dynamics—the absence or weakness of civil liberties, public participation in decision-making procedures, accountability of rulers, the rule of law, a well-established checks

and balances system, institutional maturity, a coherent political culture, economic well-being, the existence of reserved domains and arbitrary rule—must be considered.

Despite advocating procedural democracy in his 1956 dated *Preface to Democratic Theory*, Dahl argues that the substantive aspects of democracy are as significant as the procedural ones, but he notes that in the contemporary world, emphasis is usually on broadened procedural tenets (1989). Nevertheless, his former position leads Dahl to coin the term polyarchy. Evaluating many existing democracies, Dahl distinguishes polyarchy from democracy²³ as a more realistic system defining polyarchy as a consensus on the presence of opposition, participation and civil liberties (1971). Dahl asserts the need to secure for citizens the right to formulate and make clear their choices, which should be equally valued in the eyes of government (1971:3). Without reducing polyarchy to a basic definition of procedural democracy as the presence of free and fair elections, Dahl argues that inclusive suffrage, the right to be elected, freedom of expression, freedom of association and access to alternative sources of information should be present in a polyarchy (1989:221). Defending polyarchy, O'Donnell adds the stipulation that one should also consider accountability and the rule of law in comparing existing systems (2010). Fishkin also underscores the importance, in the context of voting, of extensive political participation for a well- running democracy (1995:28). He also offers a schematic definition of substantive democracy based on five prerequisites: equal access to accurate information, a substantive balance of divergent thoughts, diversity, equal consideration of all positions and conscientiousness (1995).

²³ To Dahl, democracy consists of two dimensions, contestation and inclusion (1971).

Unsatisfied with the narrow procedural perception of democracy, which he terms “politics as zookeeping”, Benjamin Barber calls for a more participatory “strong democracy” that

[R]ests on the idea of a self-governing community of citizens who are united less by homogeneous interests than by civic education and who are made capable of common purpose and mutual action by virtue of their civic attitudes and participatory institutions rather than their altruism or their good nature. Strong democracy is consonant with -indeed it depends upon- the politics of conflict, the sociology of pluralism, and the separation of private and public realms of action (1984:117).

Regarding the presence of various conceptualizations, Gutmann comes up with six alternative definitions of democracies considering their institutional strength, inclusiveness and provision of justice. The six definitions are Schumpeterian, populist, liberal, participatory, social and deliberative democracies (1993). Lijphart also distinguishes between majoritarian and pluralist democracies regarding their institutional framework and cultural structures. He sees pluralist democracies as better able to provide a broader space for participation, inclusion and consensus (Lijphart, 1999). In addition to the institutional prerequisites for a well-running democracy, Putnam emphasizes the crucial role of social capital, which transforms gradually alongside institutional changes (1993). Similar to the scholarship on procedural democracy, students of substantive democracy have also pointed to a number of dimensions that impact the outcomes of democracy, including economics, gender equality, ethnic dimensions, social conditions and participation factors (e.g. Basette, 1980; Cohen 1997; Phillips, 1999; Benhabib, 1996).

In general, whereas procedural approaches to democracy are a methodological tenet, a substantive perspective stresses the outcomes of democracy. While the former carries the risk of leading to a tyranny of the majority, substantive approaches are often criticized as inefficient. Substantive democracy tends to be more inclusive and egalitarian than procedural democracy. As we shall see in the following sections, this distinction sheds important light on the relationship of the Turkish center-right to democracy.

3.2. Democracy in Turkey

A persistent theme in the literature on procedural democracy is the centrality of free and fair elections to a democratic system. Thinking in terms of very basic procedural democracy, then, small steps on the road to democratization began in Turkey just before the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Unlike the Western tradition wherein the history of democratization rested on medieval feudal traditions composed of “a legally defined and mutually binding division of powers between a relatively weak central authority and well-entrenched local centers of power” corresponding to the relative autonomy of the guilds, the church and cities, the Turkish experience did not actively possess such catalysts—namely political pluralism and a representative²⁴ tradition—for the rapid development of democracy (Özbudun in Brown, 1996:143-2). Eventually, following the preliminary spread of elections for the lower local councils in

²⁴ Özbudun postulates that, though consultative bodies seemed to constitute a tradition of representation, in fact they functioned as the supportive bodies of the government without being representative. The establishment of the Grand Council of Justice during the era of Mahmood the 2nd could be seen as a first step, encouraging the discussion and preparation of new laws regarding representation (Özbudun in Weiner and Özbudun 1982:329).

1867, the first Ottoman Constitution of 1876 began to introduce a degree of representation. Yet in the absence of a multiparty system, the first Constitutional period preserved the Sultan's superiority by declaring that "the Sultan was irresponsible for his acts"; sovereignty and the right to declare a state of siege remained, in other words, the sole power of the Sultan (Devereux, 1963:63-2). Thus, despite the fact that the constitution was still valid, the representative system was shut down within a year, and the Sultan did not reconvene the Chamber of Deputies for three decades until transition to the Second Constitutional Era (1908-1913), which was launched by the 1908 Young Turk Revolution²⁵.

As Özbudun observes, the shift to a constitutional form of government was not the result of a widely supported mass movement but of a struggle of a small elitist group, which did not lead to any considerable reaction by the people against these changes (in Özbudun and Weiner 1982:333-2). With an outcome of the single-party regime of the Committee of Union and Progress (the İTC), the Second Constitutionalist Era also led to reciprocal coups, suppression of the opposition and the manipulation of 1912 elections termed as "elections with a stick" (Özbudun in Weiner and Özbudun, 1982:335; Ahmad, 1993:6-2; Frey, 1965:299-2). However, by the Second Constitutionalist Era, Ottoman politics experienced, for the first time, a system of competitive political party

²⁵ For a detailed analysis of the Young Turks, see: Şükrü Hanioglu. 1995. *The Young Turks in Opposition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Şükrü Hanioglu. 2001. *Preparing for a Revolution: The Young Turks 1902–1908*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Sina Akşin. 1980. *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki* (The Young Turks and the Union and Progress). İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi; Carter V. Findley. 1980. *Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire: the Sublime Porte 1789–1922*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chp. 6 and 7; Erik Jan Zürcher. 2010. *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building*. London: I.B. Tauris.

representation²⁶ despite the fact that the government, under İTC, occasionally set limits on the opposition. Thus, what the Ottoman heritage to Turkish politics provided was a partial institutionalization of democratization—elections and political parties—though the Second Constitutional Era did foster a degree of political citizenship and political mobilization in the traditions of Turkish politics (Kayalı, 1995:283-2).

A year after the last Ottoman Chamber of Deputies elections, the Grand National Assembly was elected in 1920 during conditions of war yet with considerable representation and freedoms. Given the ethnically, socially and occupationally cosmopolitan character of the first Assembly, Frey describes it as a “remarkably heterogeneous, cantankerous, and insecure body” (1965:306). To overcome the prevailing heterogeneity and unpredictability of the composition of the first Assembly, Mustafa Kemal, a successor of İTC thinking, organized more loyal deputies under the roof of the *Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti* (Defence of Rights Group) in 1921. A heterogeneous *Second Group* splintered from the first group and mainly rested on opposition to Mustafa Kemal’s authority. The former group captured 197 deputies compared to the second group’s 118, and 122 deputies belonged to neither group (Frey, 1965:307). By the end of 1923, as war conditions ended, a new Assembly was elected by a two-stage system,²⁷ composed to an important degree of members of the *Müdafaa-i Hukuk Grubu*, which then evolved into the *Halk Fırkası* (Republican People’s Party, the

²⁶ Nevertheless, among the six elections conducted in the Ottoman times, the 1912 elections as an exemption was called as “*sopalı seçimler*” (big stick elections) due to lacking competitiveness. On the other hand, this election proliferated the political mobilization. See Hasan Kayalı. 1995. "Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27: 265-86.

²⁷ In fact, this was a continuation of the Ottoman Electoral Law of 1908 that only abolished the taxpaying requirements to become an part of the electorate. Franchise was also lowered to 18 year old males and in 1930 included women for municipal elections, which expanded in 1934 for the General Elections for women who were now also been elected (Özbudun in Weiner and Özbudun 1982:337).

CHP). In other words, Mustafa Kemal, who cautiously determined the candidates for the new Assembly, purged the opposition from the parliament while his party appropriated all the assets and local organizations of the *Müdafaa-i Hukuk Grubu* (Zürcher, 2004:160). The CHP center also continued to determine candidates in the following years. Despite a small shift after the 1931 elections, only a few nominees—gradually increasing from four to 30—were allowed by independent candidates in a largely symbolic gesture (Özbudun in Weiner and Özbudun, 337-2; Frey, 1965:344-2). Thus, the Turkish experience until 1946 was based on a single-party regime neither more competitive nor more representative than the Second Constitutionalist Era²⁸.

In a single-party system, it is obviously impossible to adequately consolidate and strengthen democracy. After the establishment of the Republic, there were two early and short-lived attempts to shift to multiparty politics: the first attempt followed the declaration of the Republic in 1923 and the second followed the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 and the resulting adoption of the 1924 Constitution. As part of the new Constitution, a new party, the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Partisi*, or the TCP) emerged from intra-party opposition within the People's Party (Halk Partisi –the CHP-) in response to the less centralist and transformationist—instead of revolutionist—tenets established on 17 November 1924. Political and economic liberalism, decentralization, the regulation of the election system and respect for religion were central to the TCP's programme²⁹. As Ahmad suggests,

²⁸ Despite two brief attempts in the transition to a multiparty system, in fact, neither the TCF nor the SP were able to participate in general elections. The 1923, 1927, 1931, 1935, 1939 and 1943 elections thus all effectively represent a single-party regime (Özbudun in Weiner and Özbudun 1982:337).

²⁹ According to Article 6 of the TCP programme, “The party is respectful to the religious thoughts and beliefs” (*Fırka, efkar ve itikad-ı diniyyeye hürmetkardır*). This in turn became the rationale for the closure of the party. For further details about the TCP, see Erik Jan Zürcher. 1991. *Political Opposition in the*

excluded groups in the new Turkey, mostly consisting of religious elements, found an alternate place to represent themselves with the establishment of the TCP (1991:71).

After the Sheikh Said rebellion (a rebellion that took place in 1925 to revive the Islamic Caliphate through utilizing Kurdish nationalism), the new party was accused of colluding with this rebellion, given the widespread perception of the party, among CHP circles as a reactionary malformation. The TCP also rejected the Law on the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*) along with martial law provisions that provided extensive rights to the government. With the power gained by this law, the government eliminated opposition groups, media and the TCP on the grounds that they were supporting the rebellion and exploiting religion for political purposes (Zürcher, 1991:172). The party was closed down hastily on 3 June 1925.

The short experience of the TCP is important in many senses, not the least of which is the story it tells of the emergence and definition of a center-right in Turkish politics, which arose from opposition to and conflicts over particular issues related to representation, economy, religion and the nature of the state. Furthermore, the demand for democracy and liberation for suppressed groups grew with time. Because the TCP's politics were also based on pragmatism (Ahmad, 1991:79), another shared position of the TCP and the Turkish center-right tradition has to do with the mass-oriented political strategies they followed in pursuit of political power. Despite possessing certain

Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925. Leiden: Brill; Feroz Ahmad. 1991. "The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925," in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (eds). *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*. London: İ.B. Tauris; Tarık Zafer Tunaya. 1952. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler: 1859-1952*, İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi; F. Hüsrev Tökin. 1965. *Türk Tarihinde Siyasi Partiler*. İstanbul: Elif Yayınları.

similarities with successor center-right parties and serving as a source of inspiration, the TCP represents a brief and inexperienced attempt to govern the country.

In the years following the renewal of the Law of the Maintenance of Order, which lasted until 4 March 1929, the austere political atmosphere in Turkey prevented the formation of other opposition parties. In the course of the repeal of the Law on the Maintenance of Order as well as the general social discontent brought about by the 1929 Great Depression, there emerged a new, more vigilant opening for a multiparty regime. With the support of Mustafa Kemal for a “loyal opposition party with the twin aims of channeling the social discontent and of shaking up the lethargic RPP” (Zürcher, 2004:178), the Free Party (*Serbest Fırka*) was founded. Regarding the party programme, it is necessary to note here that the party defended republicanist, secularist and nationalist tenets while pursuing a more liberal economic framework³⁰. Similar to the previous opposition party TCP, the Free Party suggested a more liberal agenda than the CHP focusing on individual rights as well as liberal economic policies³¹. The implementation of direct elections rather than a two-tier system, popular control over administration and the liberalization of foreign investment and economic development were among the party’s expectations (Emrence, 2006:73-3; Frey, 1965:340). The ruling elite of the party³² was furthermore composed of Mustafa Kemal’s friends, distinguished by their opposition to İsmet İnönü rather than to the Kemalist republic. Moreover,

³⁰ For further details about the Free Party, see Walter F. Weiker. 1973. *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and Its Aftermath*. Leiden: Brill; Cem Emrence. 2006. *99 Günlük Muhalefet: Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

³¹ Democratic Party leader Adnan Menderes also first became active in politics in the Free Party. To Menderes and Akyol, this clearly indicated the liberal-conservative stance of Menderes and the DP (2011:10).

³² As Frey interestingly notes that, in comparison to the CHP elite, both the Progressive Republican Party and the Free Party elite were less local, more intellectual and more likely to have been born abroad (1965:329-13).

although the party gave no place to Islamist or Kurdish precepts in its official documents, it became an alternative for opposition groups (Weiker in Heper and Landau, 1991:88-2). In the 1930 elections, the Free Party won roughly 6% of municipalities in an overtly suspicious election environment. This was also the time of the Menemen Incident, which is widely interpreted as a reactionary movement demanding the return of Sharia. In the aftermath of the election and the Menemen incident, Mustafa Kemal could no longer remain impartial paving the way for the closure of the party by the party chairman Fethi Okyar who was also his friend.

Thus, the single-party tenure in Turkey shows limits in its capacity to serve as a competitive, representative and suitable arena for political participation and mobilization. The period appears to have been a process of institutionalization and consolidation for the young Republic and its secular and nationalist principles. The era of 1923-1945 was, so to speak, a period of training or an apprenticeship that the Republican regime used to experiment with educating the masses and refining the details of its civilizing mission (Özbudun in Özbudun and Weiner, 1982:339; Göle, 1996:57-5).

According to the existing literature on Turkish politics, the democratization of Turkey is synonymous with the transition to a multiparty period after May 1945 (e.g. Zürcher, 2004; Ahmad, 1993; Özbudun, 2000; Heper *et al.* 1998; Goloğlu, 2013; Burçak, 1979). This process is defined as a consequence of “apocalyptic days” and particular disappointments (Lewis, 1968:487). As a result of domestic economic problems and the international conjuncture following the Second World War, the CHP was obliged to propose a political alternative that thereby paved the way for the democratization

process in Turkey with the rise of multipartyism. The international environment, foreign influences and domestic socioeconomic changes combined with the rise of a commercial bourgeoisie made this transition more feasible (Zürcher, 2004; Eroğul, 2003; Koçak, 2010). Alongside the external political and internal economic factors, the opposition's moderation and enthusiasm also likely expedited the process of change. In particular, İsmet İnönü's positive and mature attitude towards the transition to democracy greatly facilitated the transformation (Heper 1998; Özbudun in Weiner and Özbudun, 1982:341; Burçak, 1979:53). Hence, any picture of Turkish transition to democracy would be incomplete without considering "the spread of intense, personally salient democratic conviction over important portions of the Turkish elite" (Frey, 1965:349). Turkish transition to democracy can be said to have taken place in a relatively peaceful, conflict-free environment. However, it is hard to describe the process as swift as even after the transition, some authoritarian figures from the CHP such as Recep Peker tried to limit opposition activities (Özbudun in Özbudun and Weiner, 1982:341).

Alongside five overt or covert military interventions such as those in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997 and 2007 and the persistent domination of the bureaucratic classes, the imperfect attitudes of civil politicians also paved the way for the spread of democratic dissensus in Turkey. The positions of the various center-right parties on matters of democracy are relatively consistent and coherent and constituted the backbone of the establishment of Turkish democracy as these parties ruled the country for years. We can thus analyze how the Turkish center-right implemented democracy in two main domains: 1) the extent to which pro-democratic policies and discourses—which emphasized both

elections and the national will— were intended to foster close relations with the masses and establish the center-right as the representative of the periphery and 2) the relatively limited implementation of democratic reform, due to the parties' reliance on a procedural democratic ideal rather than a pluralist, substantive and inclusive one. To further understand the Turkish center-right's perception of democracy, it is necessary to analyze more closely the policies and discourses of the Democratic Party, Justice Party and Motherland Party since these three right-wing parties were capable of ruling the country as one-party governments for years.

3.3. The Democrat Party and Democracy

DP's policies and discourses stressed representation of the periphery, mobilization of the masses, advocating the national will and the institutionalization of free, fair and competitive elections. The DP took a number of steps towards the further democratization of the country with regards to freedom of speech, social cohesion and the abandonment of arbitrary state rule. Nevertheless, the DP could not develop a comprehensive liberal and substantive democratic framework. Tanel Demirel notes that, without considering checks and balance mechanisms, a classical understanding of democracy as the "freedom to do everything unless disturbing other individuals" was at the core of the DP mentality (2011:65). Sütçü evaluates the DP's approach to democracy with special emphasis to Menderes and Bayar as a minimalist interpretation of democracy (2011). This dissertation also argues that, despite representing a more democratic alternative compared to its center-left and far-right alternatives, there were

particular limits to the DP's espousal of democracy, which occasionally impeded the spread of a more robust form of democracy. Procedural explanations as well as majoritarianism may help to explain DP's relationship to democracy. To analyze both sides of the coin, it is possible to evaluate the issue under two main headings: the democratic policies of the DP on the one hand and, on the other hand, limits of the DP's perception of democracy.

3.3.1. Democratic Policies of the DP

Before the establishment of the DP, the intra-party opposition within the CHP, out of which the DP rose, was also to some extent related to differences of opinion on the function of a political party and on what is to be expected from politics. During the period of one-party rule, a second group arose from the CHP and proposed what it called *Dörtl  Takrir* (the Memorandum of the Four) in order to address what it saw as a democratic deficit in terms of rule of law, political rights and liberties and national sovereignty. Having future implications on the DP's perception of democracy, the Memorandum of the Four states that it is necessary "to search for the measures necessary to enable Parliament's supervision (over the executive) in accordance with not only the form but also the spirit of the Constitution given that the parliament's authority to control the government is the most natural result of the principle of national sovereignty" as well as "[t]o provide the opportunity for the citizens to use the political rights and freedoms granted in the 1921 Constitution (*Teşkilat-ı Esasiye*)" and "[t]o restructure the party studies in accordance with the aforementioned objectives" (S t  

2011:39). After the rejection of the proposal³³, three of the four deputies in question, namely Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü and Refik Koraltan, were ousted from the CHP. Celal Bayar, the fourth member of the Memorandum and a close friend of Mustafa Kemal, decided to resign from the party. These people were also the founders of the Democratic Party and the backbone of Turkish center-right politics, which from the outset emphasized representation of the masses in the prevailing center-periphery cleavage.

To some scholars, beyond democratic demands, it was The Land Reform Bill (Agrarian Law) that was central to the debates within the CHP. This law, it has been argued, was behind the desire of Menderes and his friends to establish a new party (Eroğul, 2003; Aydemir, 1976; Zürcher, 2004; Ahmad, 1993). In addition to economic concerns, the rejection of the Land Reform by the founders of the DP was also closely related to the acceptance of particular social interests against the populism of the CHP, which echoes the struggle between a monolithic center vs. heterogenic periphery duality. Yet the DP founders' opposition to land reforms was not solely economic in nature. Rather, they opposed the reform on constitutional grounds framing it as a violation of property rights³⁴. Thus a statist vs. liberal opposition, along with a center-periphery cleavage, was present from the very foundation of the DP which nourished the DP's democratic stance³⁵.

³³ According to Metin Toker, President İsmet İnönü demanded the rejection of this proposal as a tactical move meant to force these four deputies to form a new party (1991a:67) .

³⁴ For details of the discussions, see: *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* 01.06.1945, 04.06.1945 and 11.06.1945.

³⁵ This dissertation is close to the idea that the rise of the DP as a new party was closely linked to the center-periphery cleavage. Nevertheless, there are various readings on the existence of the DP. As suggested above, to Ahmad, Eroğul, Zürcher and Aydemir, the foundation of the DP was strongly related to the socio-economic concerns that rested on social class. For example, Eroğul analyzes law number

When the DP was first established, Celal Bayar responded to claims of collusion by stating “Our sincere desire is that: it is very necessary to realize the national will and national sovereignty in accordance with the laws” (*Son Posta*, 08 Ocak 1946). The DP program, which aligned itself with liberalism and democracy (Eroğul, 2003:31), reserved a prominent place for a number of issues related to democracy: serving for the improvement of democracy (Article 1), perceiving democracy as the most proper principle for realizing national interest and human honor (Article 3), dealing with matters of human rights and liberties (Article 4, 8), the right to found associations (Article 7) and being neither outside nor above the nation (Article 19).

After the contested 1946 elections, in the 1950 elections, the DP obtained 53.3 percent of the votes which corresponded to 83.57 percent of the seats in the parliament, namely 408 deputies out of 487 (Koçak, 1989:153)³⁶. As a result of this victory, the DP became the party in power. On this period, Samet Ağaoğlu wrote “the victory of the Democrat Party means the victory of democracy and of liberty, which is also consonant with a world trend” (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 02.06.1950 p.94). To the Democratic Party mentality, their party represented the “will of the nation” in opposition to the RPP and its elitist cadre.³⁷

4785 regarding the nationalization of all forests accepted on 09.07.1945 and the land reform debates as a breaking point of the DP from the CHP (2004:19, 26-2). Utilizing Marxist jargon, Eroğul states that: “The DP was the comprador; the main feature of the party was this” (2004:273). Islamist Necip Fazıl on the other hand argues that the establishment of the DP depended on a simple antithesis of the CHP rather than a grounded worldview. He states that the DP “Unified around the thoughtlessness thought” (Fazıl 1993:48) To Hakan Yılmaz, the foreign influence was the main motive on the formation of the DP. See Hakan Yılmaz. 1997. “Democratization from above in Response to the International Context,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 17(4)1-38.

³⁶ In the same elections, the CHP gained 69 seats with 39,9 percent of the votes.

³⁷ Certain skepticism towards the will of nation is evident in the works of elite who were close to the CHP. Aydemir for instance describes the post-1950 elections by saying “now the speech belongs to the crowds” with an implied suspicion towards the rationality of the masses (1976:157).

In the first DP Government Programme, which emphasized respect for human rights, rule of law and a balanced and stable system based on the principle of separation of powers, Menderes declared that, as the first government in Republican history coming to power by the national will, the party should rebuild the institutional framework to ensure the national will and citizen rights (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 29.05.1950 p.30). Motivated by having come to power with great national support, the DP took specific steps towards the democratization of the country. Among these changes, the DP abandoned the extensive privileges of the government related to control of the press and ended arrests without trial in 1950.³⁸ Furthermore, the DP changed Law Number 5545 by introducing the principle of examination and approval by the Higher Election Council (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu –the YSK) during elections³⁹ allowing the extension of religious rights⁴⁰ and abolishing certain arbitrary laws such as the so-called road tax.⁴¹ The DP government issued an amnesty on 14 July 1950 that applied to a number of significant intellectuals and artists such as Nazım Hikmet, who was a well-known left-wing poet. This can be evaluated as a step towards the institution of social peace and tranquility.⁴² To the DP, the aim of this law was to initiate a process of reconciliation and to rebuild social cohesion after some of the more regrettable instances of the past few decades, during the democratic transition, the Republican reforms or the years of the Second World War, for instance (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* 13.07.1950, p.1-8). Nevertheless, such measures, however much they aimed to enhance the democratic

³⁸ Law Number 5687. See debates related to this law: *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 14.07.1950, p.721-21.

³⁹ On 17 February 1954 this change was made with Law Number 6272.

⁴⁰ These issues will be evaluated in the Secularism chapter.

⁴¹ Road Tax enforced the citizens to work on the road construction processes unless they paid a large amount of money. See Assembly discussions related to abandonment of this law: *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 25.02.1952.

⁴² This Law was interpreted as an attempt of the opposition to eface the CHP heritage. (e.g. Eroğul 1993:101)

atmosphere, were simply not enough to establish a liberal and substantive democratic framework. Despite making frequent mention of “the national will” and democracy in speeches and documents, one may argue that the discursive position of the DP with regards to democracy was not adequately reflected in its policies after the early 1950s.⁴³

The DP’s waning enthusiasm for democracy was reflected in the policies of subsequent government programmes as well⁴⁴. The 2nd Menderes Government Programme (1951), for instance, defined the main duty of government as the protection of the “14 May 1950 Reform”, which was basically composed of the protection of a very minimalist form of procedural democracy as well as some attention paid to freedom of conscience and freedom of thought. Unlike the first programme, this programme introduced certain limits on the freedom of the press (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* 30.03.1951 p.61-2). The 3rd Menderes Government Programme (1954) emphasized the abuse of the democratic atmosphere by the opposition party and the press (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 24.05.1954 p.23), which was reflected in the following programmes as well. Again unlike the previous Menderes government programmes, the 5th Menderes Government Programme (1957) began with issues of economic development rather than democracy (a pattern followed by DP’s center-right successors) (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 25.11.1957). When center-right parties were unable to formulate considerable pro-democratic policies, they

⁴³ In that sense, Demirel notes that to the DP, coming to government with great national support and removing the CHP from the government were perceived as the indicators of a perfect democratic system whereas the expansion of liberties was not in the core of the DP agenda (2005:499).

⁴⁴ Despite losing the enthusiasm to liberalize the democracy, one may argue that up until the 1960 military intervention, the DP continued to utilize national will and sovereignty rhetoric. In that regard, on 18 May 1960, Menderes declared in his Turgutlu speech that “the ones who assault the government, are in fact resisting the national sovereignty” (Burçak 1998:734). After the 27 May military intervention, to the officers trying to arrest him, Celal Bayar stated that “I am here by the will of the nation; only the will of the nation may remove me from here” (Ağaoğlu 1972:145).

preferred to focus on economic development and economic growth issues, in which they are generally successful.

As reflected in the party programmes, the emphasis that the DP placed on substantive democratic change decreased in time. In other words, perceiving democracy as a means to obtain power, DP struggled to establish an idea of sovereignty belonging to the nation rather than to the state. In the eyes of the DP, the excessive rights enjoyed by CHP and the state were to be transferred to the will of the nation while granting absolute power to the representative of the masses (Zürcher 322-2)⁴⁵. The problem was the party's facile understanding of "a minimalist procedural approach to democracy" that concentrated all power in the hands of the governing party simply on the grounds that they were elected. For this reason, Menderes was sometimes accused by the opposition of trying to establish a regime of irresponsibility (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* 04.12.1957 p.58-2) without concerning itself with checks and balances.

Democracy discourse of the DP was also molded with a considerable amount of romanticism⁴⁶ along with mysticism as well. The tendency to perceive democracy as a sacred thing was observed in the speeches of the DP members. While describing the establishment period of the DP between the years of 1946-1950, Ahmet Hamdi Başar noted a belief among party members that "democracy, like other sacred things, may survive only if it is faithfully respected" (Koraltürk, 2007:24). Menderes often compared democracy to "an exotic flower which requires additional things to make it

⁴⁵ It is necessary to mention here that the existing 1924 Constitution during the DP reign did not provide domains for balancing mechanisms such as a second Assembly or the Constitutional Court. For a detailed analysis of the 1924 Constitution, see Ergun Özbudun. 2012. *1924 Anayasası*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

⁴⁶ In those years, an article justifying that kind of romantic perception of democracy was published. See John M. Anderson. 1950. "Romantic Democracy," *American Quarterly* 2(3): 251-258.

survive” (Ağaoğlu, 2004:117). Ağaoğlu also described the National Assembly as a sacred and holy place and suggested making the 14th of May a national festival (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 02.06.1950 p.96-5). Similarly, on 6 September 1958 Menderes described the CHP’s “intention...to assault our holy Kaabe, the Grand National Assembly (...) and come to power without elections” (Aydemir, 1976:315). And in the 3rd DP Government Programme (1954), again employing a mystical language to talk about democracy, Menderes pointed to a combination of respect and aspiration in the hearts as the steadiest guarantee of democratic administration (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 24.05.1954 p.23-2). The DP understanding of democracy thus deployed a mystic and romantic rhetoric occasionally even linking this attitude with patriarchal themes—for instance, in the motto that likened their political struggles not to “an issue of democracy but...an issue of blood feud” (Aydemir, 1976:309). In the second DP congress on 20 June 1949, the DP declared the “violation of the ballot equal to the rape of our decency” (Tunaya, 1952:676; Eroğul, 2003:76), which suggests a predilection to use such combatant rhetoric to communicate their understanding of democracy.

Hence, in these early years of Turkish democracy, the DP’s perception of democracy, at least if assessed in relation to substantive democracy theory, was far from satisfactory. And indeed, as we saw above, their approach to procedural democracy also could have been expanded and improved. The DP, however, did not deal much with such improvements and anchored its sense of democracy to two main points: 1) establishing close relations with the people so as to position themselves as the representative of the national will resulting in both popular support and a degree of responsiveness to the demands of the masses and 2) emphasizing free and fair elections, which helped to

consolidate the institutionalization of elections in Turkey. That said, there were clear shortcomings in the DP's approach to democracy—specifically, in its relations with the opposition, the press, universities and the issue of the Committee of Investigation. Nevertheless, structural deficits and the CHP's relatively more authoritarian perspective made the DP the most viable defender of democracy at the time.

3.3.1.1. Forging Close Relations with the People: the DP as the Representative of the “National Will”

The Turkish center-right, unlike its center-left rivals, was able, to a considerable degree, to mobilize masses with the claim of representing their interests far more than the CHP blind attitude to the existence of particularistic social interests. Appreciating the center-periphery cleavage—which preceded and was strengthened during the DP's tenure—is of central importance in understanding how center-right parties were able to establish close relations with the masses as well as how they differ from the center-left.

Adapting Shils's center-periphery metaphor⁴⁷ to the Turkish case, Şerif Mardin argues that the center represents a set of core values that enable the state to work accordingly. The periphery, meanwhile, corresponds to social, institutional and geographic spaces beyond the center. Informed by a state mentality and by a fascination with rational bureaucracy, the Young Turk Movement and the *Müdafaa-i Hukuk Grubu* during the War of Independence, which, as noted above, eventually became the CHP, became the default representative of the center. At the time of the War of Independence and the

⁴⁷ To Shils, every society has a “center” composed of influential values and authority that provides its institutions an important space to maneuver. The state, in most cases, conveys and constitutes the center.

Turkish Revolution, the social composition that produced the CHP could be defined by the alliance of the military, bureaucracy, intellectuals and local notables (Özbudun, 1981:82; 1976:43), largely opposed to the periphery.

As proof of the center-CHP amalgamation, in the 4th General Assembly meeting of the CHP on May 2, 1935, the party acknowledged the unification of party and state; the Minister of the Interior became the Vice Chairman, and governors were appointed to provincial chairmen of the CHP. On 13 February 1937, the six arrows of the CHP (Republicanism, Statism, Secularism, Nationalism, Populism and Reformism) were written into the Constitution. Summarizing the function of the CHP, Frey notes that “not surprisingly, the standard Kemalist attitude toward the role of the political party was to view it primarily as *a mechanism for social control from above*” (1965:304). Therefore, before the transition to multiparty politics, the CHP was an instrument for introducing top-down reforms rather than a mediator between the government and the public. With the establishment of the DP, this perception began to change; the DP began to seek popular support, which altered (however slightly) the CHP’s vision of what a political party should be⁴⁸.

Following the transition to multiparty politics, the existence of the DP was cause for concern for the CHP and its bureaucratic allies. The suspicions of the bureaucrats towards those who gained political power through the DP rested on a belief that the country needed to be governed by a skilled and experienced cadre, more than by populist politicians, so as to develop much-needed public policies (Heper, 1976:516;

⁴⁸ During the 1945-1950 period, the CHP, under ballot pressure, pursued more compromising policies with the periphery, especially in the religious realm. More on this in the chapter analyzing the center-right’s approach to secularism.

1992:175). The CHP, meanwhile, was reluctant to concede offices to the Democrats so suddenly in the 1946 elections. In other words, given the Kemalist modernization project's denial of mobilization and social commitment as essential elements of political strategy, the CHP espoused "the old Ottoman idea of the state being solicitous of the interests of its subjects: the protective state disturbing justice on the one hand, and abundance on the other. But this time it was the periphery who had preempted this stance" (Mardin, 1973:184). Illustrating the attitude of the CHP to the masses, İnönü rhetorically asked, "Was it ever heard of that any dictator travelled from one place to another one in order to be approved by the citizens?"—the subtext being, he was not a dictator because he worked to gain the support of the public (Burçak, 1998:43). Further interpreting this statement, one may argue that the CHP perceived the propagation of their policies as somewhat degrading, even in the election process. Similarly, across DP governments, the CHP elite stated that "It is enough! We [have] suffered too much from the government depending ignorant majority" (Ağaoğlu, 1972:186). Similarly, in the course of the 1950 elections, İnönü made it a point of pride that he did not reestablish the Independence Tribunals and was tolerant of criticisms and discussion (Burçak, 1998:45)—which hints at the poor perception of the CHP's democratic record. The state-party equation of the CHP and their elitist and condescending attitude towards the masses gave rise to the DP, who managed to reach the masses through successful methods of communication and interaction further bolstering their claim to be the true representatives of the periphery.

In an effort to win the support of the periphery, the DP claimed that no single class or ideology united DP supporters since it was 'the people', not a platform, that constituted

the core of the party (Ağaoğlu 1972:46, Tunaya 1952:649, Bayar 1968:41-2; Koraltürk 2007:20-2). The DP intended to embrace the periphery—that is, all who were excluded from participation in governance during CHP’s tenure. Yet the periphery, one may recall, was not homogeneous; DP supporters included peasants, workers, new intellectuals, tradesmen, people with hybrid identities and would-be rural-urban migrants (Sencer, 1971:232-8; Ağaoğlu 2004:63; Aydemir, 1976:220; Eroğul, 2003; Sarıbay in Heper and Landau, 1991:121, Demirel, 2011:37, Zürcher, 2004:329).⁴⁹ Stressing the diverse character of the periphery, Özbudun states that “The DP was able to unite the peripheral, cultural (i.e. religious), and socio-economic (i.e. bourgeois) oppositions” (1976:55). Celal Bayar has also written about how the suppression that CHP introduced in certain rural areas to get the support of the people had a boomerang effect, and the DP enjoyed widespread support in such areas (1969:72-2).

The DP thus resonated with many who felt previously disregarded and excluded. Analyzing the emergence and ascent of the DP, Ağaoğlu lists, as important factors, the DP’s ability to reach small villages as well as to listen to public and articulate the demands of the people (Ağaoğlu, 1972:7-2). Similarly, Ahmet Hamdi Başar notes that peasants unable to enter the office of the district governor during the CHP period began to come to Ankara and share their problems with ministers—even the prime minister—during the DP’s rule (Koraltürk, 2007:288). Metin Toker also relays an example from *Cumhuriyet* on 8 June 1950, an announcement stating that formal requests are no longer required to see the President: “Anyone who wants to visit Celal Bayar may see him in the Çankaya Palace” (1991a:45). Other center-right leaders adopted the same policy.

⁴⁹ To Eroğul and Sencer, the DP was primarily a bourgeois party, yet they also accepted the cosmopolitan character of the DP supporters.

When the Assembly was on holiday, DP deputies were expected to travel to the regions they represented to listen to local problems, something above and beyond simply greeting the public, and quite uncommon before DP rule (Burçak, 1998:79). Ağaoğlu also notes that, in order to witness the court case of a DP member subjected to arbitrary state punishment due to his political leanings, Ağaoğlu himself walked for six hours to reach Erzurum on a cold winter night, an act that greatly impressed local citizens. In Ağaoğlu's account, the respect that people developed for him and for the DP more generally had to do with their efforts to defend the national will *vis-à-vis* the state (1972:80-2, 1992:316). The DP tenure, in short, brought about unprecedented forms of mobilization and involvement of the masses in politics.

In the view of the DP elite, the party was determined to carry out transformation from the bottom up. Celal Bayar contrasted this determination to a style of top-down rule in place since Sultan Selim III (1969:41). The party claimed to respond to the demands of the people rather than trying to shape them according to the state's expectations. Framing itself as responsible to the national will, the DP likened itself to and allied itself with the masses and portrayed itself as the true representative of the nation. Menderes thus declared it "almost impossible to remove the power of liberty from the heart of the Turkish nation... If you are able to expunge the Democratic Party from this country, first of all you should remove the burning love of liberty from every citizen's heart" (Esirci, 1967:74). Tevfik İleri thus equated Menderes' probability of defeat on the 16 September 1951 mid-term elections to the "defeat of the country" if such a thing were to occur (Toker, 1991a:145). As the well-known DP motto "Enough, the word belongs to the nation" (Enough, now the people have their say –*Yeter! Söz milletindir!*) suggests,

the party conscientiously positioned itself in opposition to arbitrary bureaucratic rule, which can also be interpreted as a shift of power from statist to political elites (Sarıbay in Heper and Landau, 1991:119; Özbudun, 1995:16-2; Demirel, 2011:55). The ascent of the DP, in other words, “can be interpreted as the victory of the periphery” (Özbudun, 1976:52).

The cosmopolitan origin of the DP elite (composed of farmers, artisans, intellectuals and professionals who opposed the military-bureaucratic structure of the CHP) enabled the DP to become more convincing in the eyes of the people. In comparison to the CHP elite, the DP elite was younger, less experienced in politics, more local, likely to have been born in the Aegean and Marmara regions and more likely to have pursued professional occupations instead of working in the public sector. The number of bureaucrats and soldiers was low among DP deputies, while the number of lawyers and businessmen was quite high (Frey, 1965:351-2; Özbudun, 1995:9; Zürcher, 2004:21). Despite being a former CHP notable, the economist Celal Bayar was different than İnönü and Atatürk in that he was raised in a religious family without obtaining a higher education degree; he also did not come from a military background (Aydemir, 1976:176-3; Frey, 1965:351). In Menderes and Akyol’s terms, Celal Bayar was “the unique civilian portrait of the early Republic” (2011:143). Similarly, Adnan Menderes was a large-scale farmer and landowner with a good understanding of the problems and conditions of the periphery. His interests were largely in land and productivity rather than bureaucracy. These interests were far from irrelevant for Turkey in the 1950s,

when the majority of the population lived in rural areas and worked in agriculture⁵⁰. Representing the periphery and establishing close relations with the masses not only depended on the occupations and social backgrounds of Democrats but also on the ability of DP elites to successfully craft a public image. As stated above, the DP elite visited rural areas, even villages, and made efforts to enter into the daily lives of the masses. DP members in leadership positions, especially Menderes, tried to show that their daily life practices resembled those of the masses. Thus Ağaoğlu states that “Menderes’ attitudes and behaviors resemble those of an Anatolian peasant, different than arrogant, educated city dwellers. In that regard, Menderes does not prefer to go to the cinema, opera or such of activities by himself” (2004:35-2). By the same token, Menderes’ principal clerk Yavuzalp also notes that on foreign visits Menderes did not go shopping for luxury goods and preferred a modest menu (Yavuzalp, 1991:60,110-2). Menderes also frequently visited the construction areas of state investments and drank tea with the workers (Menderes and Akyol, 2011:135), which became a tradition for subsequent center-right leaders, especially Demirel, Özal and Erdoğan.

Compare this, however, to the fact that Menderes graduated from the American College; attending the college implied an extraordinary background in those times. His wife also belonged to a noble family composed of politicians, men of letters and intellectuals. Both he and his wife had a modern outward appearance as well. However, what differentiated the DP elite from the CHP was their capacity to adopt and strategically deploy both traditional and modern styles of living. This shifting, pragmatic nature of

⁵⁰ However, the distinction between the DP and CHP elite should not be reduced to such basic elements as regime and Republic. Since many of them came to the DP after having held CHP chairs, the DP elite generally opposed neither the Republican regime nor the basic tenets of Kemalist reforms.

the DP and, more generally, of the Turkish center right helped the DP and its successors gain a reputation for being the authentic representatives of the periphery.

A main dynamic differentiating the DP from the CHP was the human factor—by which we mean both party members and supporters (Ağaoğlu, 1972:46; Tunaya, 1952:649; Aydemir, 1976:174). Positioned on the crowded peripheral wing rather than the bureaucratic center and pursuing a political strategy to please the people made the DP the forerunner of democracy in the Turkish context and enabled the party to mix easily with the masses. The party's main *problematique* from the outset focused on democracy, which primarily referred to the national will and the ideal of national sovereignty *vis-à-vis* the center's domination. Briefly, the DP's approach to democracy emphasized people's increased involvement in politics, even if the scope of this involvement largely had to do with voting and developing personal relations with policy-makers. Since CHP was not concerned with winning the support of peasants to expand its popular support (Özbudun, 1976:44, 53; Dodd, 1983:81), the DP successfully capitalized on this situation and fostered a peasant-noble collaboration via the mobilization of the masses. The DP explained its rule through a slogan declaring that “sovereignty belongs to the nation and the nation elected the DP; thus the DP represents the nation”, which resulted in the conclusion that the sovereignty belongs to the DP. In the eyes of the DP, then, free and fair elections were one of the most significant instruments to realize the national will. Along these lines, to better understand the DP's relationship to democracy, we should consider how the DP employed free and fair elections.

3.3.1.2. The Question of Free and Fair Elections

Even the most minimalist procedural theory of democratic theory recognizes the significance of the institutionalization of free and fair elections. To the DP, free and fair elections were one of the most important indicators of the establishment of national sovereignty. Emphasizing free and fair elections in the Party Programme, the DP states that any behavior that blemishes the freedom of the elections should be counted as a crime against national sovereignty (Articles 9 & 10). Immediately following the establishment of the DP, the party struggled to guarantee free and fair elections. The CHP, as the state party, meanwhile, made use of vast government privileges during the municipal and general elections of 1946, which was harshly criticized by the DP. Analyzing various instances of transition to democracy, Joseph employs the concept of “democracy as deception” (1998:56,59). Schedler similarly interprets this concept as saying that when authoritarian rulers “stand for elections not to lose power but to legitimize their continuity in office, they commonly try to distort and control the electoral process in order to minimize the risk of defeat” (Schedler, 2002:103). It is possible to argue that the CHP followed the same strategy during the 1946 elections, which provided one more term in office for the party. Nevertheless, this deceptive democratic experience only aggrieved the DP and laid the groundwork for the party to build its image around the demand for free and fair elections, which were framed as essential to the actualization of the nation’s will and true democracy.

The 1946 election process is crucial to understanding the insistence of the DP on free and fair elections, and thus deserves further attention. Debates and suspicions in fact

began before the elections. The ruling party threatened to cancel the multiparty elections—a threat, of course, to the DP. Nihat Erim from the CHP warned, in an attempt to legitimize the arbitrary election process, that “in the event of disturbance in the social structure, it is then necessary to cover the god of liberty with a shawl (temporarily forget about liberty)” and to construct a top-down authority (*Ulus*, 30.05.1946). Just before the elections, on June 5th, the Election Law was changed, and the date of the election was declared just 18 days before voting, in an effort to limit the advance of the newly emerged opposition party (Bayar, 1969:56). Thus, with law number 4918, single-stage elections with an open vote and secret counting principles were carried out without any judicial oversight while election councils, composed of people close to CHP, were authorized to announce the results (Albayrak, 2004:84-2). Thus the ruling party’s unfair supremacy on the election process led, in turn, to widespread suspicions among the public and the opposition.

Menderes also weighed in on these elections, arguing that the governing party’s precautions were meant to complicate the increasingly favorable light in which much of the country viewed the DP as well as to suppress the masses via governors, the changing of the election date, and weakening the DP (Vatan, 18.07.1946). In order to indicate the extent of the unreliability of the election process, Celal Bayar, along with many DP deputies, argued that the CHP utilized fake election documents. CHP interference in the elections also included monitoring phone calls and written communication between DP members, restricting communication between the DP center and party organizations and removing of DP placards (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* 21.02.1951; 26.08.1946 p.95; Bayar, 1969:55-2; Ağaoğlu 1972:119-11). Fuat Köprülü further notes that CHP attempts to

control the elections even included burning the votes of the opposition (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 26.08.1946 p.120).

Another criticism of the absence of free and fair elections accused the CHP of taking advantage of its access to state opportunities to attract public support in the elections. For instance, Bayar argues that, before the elections, the Ministry of Interior propagated flyers supporting the CHP and criticizing the DP via *Türk Kuşu* planes belonging to the state (1969:72). Köprülü has shown that district governors had village headmen take an oath to work for the benefit of CHP before the elections (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 26.08.1946 p.121). Some of these arguments were also verified by state administrators. Istanbul governor Lütfi Kırdar acknowledged the pressure on him to modify the 1946 election results in favor of the CHP (Sarol, 1983:224). The 1946 elections were, thus, far from free and fair and would continue to be discussed in the following years as well.⁵¹ Even though the DP won the government, the DP continued to refer to the 1946 elections in its political rhetoric. In 1953 for instance, Menderes recalled the 1946 elections with these words: “They lost in the 1946 elections but they did not. They could not win in 1946 but they won with intervention that enabled them to stay in power. In 1950, they lost in the face of the great national mutiny” (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 04.12.1953 p.175). Hence, this issue remained a point of political contention in the following years.

In short, when the DP emerged as a new political actor, the one-party state system and its privileges were still in force with the first elections between CHP and DP ending in a

⁵¹ These criticisms generally took place in the Assembly meetings and public speeches of the DP. Media sources could rarely relay these discussions due to government pressure. The newspapers *Yeni Sabah* and *Gerçek* were closed, for instance, after they published Celal Bayar’s claims related to the 1946 elections (Albayrak 2004:90-2).

failure of democratic means. In such a circumstance, the DP saw elections as one of the most important requirements of democracy and maintained that only the establishment of a free and fair election system would bring about the power and legitimacy of the DP. The unfair defeat of the DP in the 1946 elections also helped to accelerate its attempts to increase its public identity (Bayar, 1969; Burçak, 1970; Demirel, 2011). As the aggrieved party in the elections, the DP built its image on a concern for free and fair elections since the party both relied on and respected the nation. In the Party Programme, the DP underscored this stance stating that the party “believes in the political maturity of the Turkish nation” (Article 3). The Democrats also frequently condemned the CHP’s perception of the people. Köprülü notes “In contrast to the DP, the CHP doubted the rationality of the electorate on the pretext of their low education level and underdeveloped consciousness” (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 26.08.1946 p.120). The DP began to frame itself in contrast to the purported elitism of the CHP. Presenting their own party as egalitarian Democrats, the DP rejected the inequality of votes⁵² and derided CHP as the party of the aristocratic intelligentsia as opposed to their party’s support of democracy (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* 26.08.1946 p.192). And from the beginning of multiparty politics in Turkey, Menderes had declared the need for introducing a secure and reliable election law to be one of the major issues facing the country, which constituted the core point of struggle for the DP (Menderes in Kılçık, 1991: 420).

Central to the DP’s understanding of democracy, the election issue occupied a significant place in the first great congress of the DP on 7 January 1947 where demands

⁵² Equality of votes is perceived as the “right of rights”, a *sine qua non* of any democratic system. See Jeremy Waldron. 1999. *Law and Disagreement*. New York: Oxford University Press.

were voiced calling for clear structural changes to the election system⁵³. Despite setbacks, the very fact that the party was able to hold the congress was seen as a victory in the eyes of the Democrats. At the congress, Ağaoğlu stated “The desire for liberty collected us here. The decision to end one-man and oligarchic rule also brought us here” (Ağaoğlu, 1993:43). The *Hürriyet Misakı* (The Freedom Pact), which consisted of the decisions made during the aforementioned congress, was declared on 19 January 1947. In the Freedom Pact, the DP demanded:

1. The abolition of undemocratic laws
2. Specific changes to the election system for the purpose of ensuring national sovereignty and the protection of the votes of citizens
3. The separation of the roles of head of state and head of party (Bayar, 1947: 12-2, Bayar, 1969:70-2, Zürcher, 2004:214, Ağaoğlu, 1972:49-2, Eroğul, 2003:48-3). Bayar summed up the first DP congress stating “I understood democracy, I endorsed democracy, I justified democracy and I will justify democracy” (1969:68). Thus, while the question of free and fair elections maintained a prominent place in the party’s agenda, procedural tenets more and more informed the DP’s approach to democracy.

The DP continued its insistence on free and fair elections by boycotting the local elections on 17 October 1948 on account of a lack of judicial oversight and the undemocratic nature of the existing election law. On 20 July 1949, the DP convened its second congress and approved the *Milli Teshanüt Andı* (National Solidarity Oath). The

⁵³ Throughout the congress, the DP encountered a number of obstacles. The party congress took place in the Ulus Cinema after hotels and congress centers refused to accommodate the DP under pressure from the governing party. Moreover, hotel reservations of delegates were cancelled, forcing them to stay in the homes of DP members based in Ankara (Bayar1969:67). Similar problems occurred during the AP era.

oath emphasized heeding the national will and again stressed the importance of free and fair elections (Bayar 1969:98). The press and people close to CHP dubbed this act the Oath of Enmity since the DP argued that as long as the CHP rejected a free and fair election process, the people would be the enemy of the CHP (e.g: Eroğul, 2003:76). Another motto of the Turkish center-right, *sine-i millete dönme* (returning to the people or the common folk), also emerged at this time.⁵⁴ In a dispute between Peker and Menderes, the Democrats raised the stakes of their protest against the CHP circles and boycotted parliament meetings.⁵⁵ They argued that, rather than join the Assembly, they would prefer to turn back to the country as the true representative of the people. Facing such a threat, President İsmet İnönü sought consensus between the DP and the CHP and published a declaration on 12 July.⁵⁶ In the declaration, İnönü supported the legitimacy of the opposition party as well as the necessity to guarantee the perpetuation of its activities. İnönü's declaration not only legitimized the existence of the opposition and the multiparty system, but also by and large implied the impartiality of the President (Zürcher, 2004:214, Aydemir, 1976:230, Bayar, 1969:78-8, Ağaoğlu, 1992:414,455)⁵⁷. Following the declaration, Peker's cabinet was replaced by Hasan Saka's, and by a program that included democratization measures. Nevertheless, the government did not survive this ordeal and eventually Saka called "none of the previous laws passed by

⁵⁴ "Returning to the people" was a concept that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk deployed at the start of the Independence War. The DP adopted the phrase in their own political rhetoric, and subsequent center-right parties routinely used the same concept when referring to go to the elections or referendum.

⁵⁵ Discussing the 1947 budget, Prime Minister Recep Peker portrayed Adnan Menderes as a psychopath whereupon the Democrats left the assembly and boycotted its meetings for a number of days. For details, see Aydemir 1976:193-6; Zürcher 2004:214; Özbudun in Weiner and Özbudun 1982:341.

⁵⁶ Shaw and Shaw argue that the need for foreign aid played a more crucial role than domestic factors in this declaration. See Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw. 2006. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye Cilt 2*, İstanbul:E Yayınları, p.469.

⁵⁷ After this declaration, some DP members were dissatisfied and deviated from the DP as *Müstakil Demokratlar* (the Independent Democrats) and formed the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*, or MP) (Eroğul 2003:66-2).

Parliament antidemocratic” (Bayar, 1969:91). We thus see that, before coming to power, the Democratic Party struggled with an unfair election system while clearly aligning itself with the people and thereby creating a political project based on “the national will” in the course of the transition to a multiparty system.

The DP’s insistence on the establishment of a fairer and freer election system continued with intensity until 16 February 1950, when Law Number 5545 was approved, introducing a new election system resting on a single, equal and secret ballot majority system and the principle of open classification. The 14 May 1950 elections were carried out in accordance with this law, and the DP won the elections. This encouraged the DP in their belief that it had identified the significance of the establishment of a fair and competitive election system, such that on 29th May 1950, in his first government speech, Menderes stated that “With the 14 May elections, the most significant reform in the country was attained which cannot be compared with the previous reforms” (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, p.24). After a considerable struggle to convince others of the importance of voting as a political instrument, the Democrats acted accordingly, especially in their early terms. Bayar points out that the top leadership of the DP, and Menderes in particular, had a great deal of respect for the vote and for elections; considering intra-party conflicts, even when in the minority, he abided by the will of the majority (Bayar, 1969:61). The same position can be observed in the pre-1954 election period as well. In response to the opposition party’s complaints about dubious election conditions, Menderes gathered together the General Administrative Board of the party and declared that the elections were to take place in a secure atmosphere that would raise no doubts. In that regard, he demanded that the opposition party was to be

provided with a copy of the register of electors, that the election records were to be approved by the YSK (Higher Election Board) instead of the Grand National Assembly and that the radio would ensure fair and equal broadcast time to all parties (Burçak, 198:191).

The DP's concern for free and fair elections occasionally combined with intolerance to criticism regarding election practices. The DP was proud of the lack of complaints received regarding the elections; only ten appeals were received related to elections, all of which had to do with potential procedural mistakes (Burçak 1998:292-2). The DP also took many precautions to prevent the spread of negative rumors about the elections. For instance, in the summer of 1955, CHP General Secretariat Kasım Gülek was arrested after having accused the DP of manipulating the results of the 1954 elections (Toker, 1991b:138; Sarol, 1983:916-3).

Without trying to increase representation in the Assembly, the DP, as the representative of the masses, benefited from the existing electoral system, which promoted majoritarianism. Despite not winning a significant number of votes from the CHP, the DP gained a majority in the Assembly thanks to the election system, especially in the 1957 elections. Yet the DP's demand for free and fair elections existed in a fragile political environment. People were prohibited from nominating a candidate who had been a candidate in another party before, and the 1956 elections were postponed in light of the DP's interests in institutionalization. Similarly, in the early 1960's, the DP was not eager to set an election date, which, according to some, helped to act as a catalyst for

the military intervention (Koraltürk, 2007:573-6; Eroğul, 2003:247; Aydemir, 1976:392)⁵⁸.

In sum, the DP's emphasis on free, fair and competitive elections as one of the most important requirements of democracy is strongly felt in its platform, yet its reticence to enact liberal democratic improvements in other realms may raise questions about the nature of the DP's approach to democracy—which, in the last analysis, was not a project of fostering inclusiveness, consensus and equality. The manipulation of the election system in the late DP period underscores that a limited sense of democracy—namely, elections—informed the DP's approach and brought it to power. Burçak cites Menderes' idea that the rule of liberty is equal to rule by popular vote and relays this quote: "In a democratic country, the elections precisely mean acting on liberties and protecting freedoms" (1998:131). Tanel Demirel also quotes an election campaign flyer from the DP stating that "if you are able to give your vote to whomever you want, this is democracy" (Demirel, 2011:151). If we consider that free and fair voting is the ultimate legitimacy of the democratic decision-making process (Waldron, 1999), then devoting more attention to elections than anything else (assumed to be the main requirement of democracy) portrays the scope of the DP's espousal of democracy, which concentrated on procedural dimensions democracy and was far from a substantive understanding.

⁵⁸ Nevertheless, DP circles believed that this demand was not innocent as it threw into question the legitimacy of the DP as a political actor (Sarol 1983b:1070-2; Ağaoğlu 1972:117).

3.3.2. Limits of the DP's Perception of Democracy

Distinguishing liberal democracy from its electoral form, Karl offers the concept of the “fallacy of electoralism”, by which she means to call attention to the ways in which procedural democracy perceives elections as the most important indicator of democracy without attributing equal significance to other political dimensions (1986; 1995). Similar to Karl, Powell thinks that “majoritarianism uses elections to bring [the] power of the people to bear on policymakers” (2000). In this regard, the DP's perception of democracy largely matches the procedural description of democracy rather than the substantive one. Lijphart's two models consisting of majoritarian (Westminister) vs. consensual (pluralist) democracy may also help to explain the DP case.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the scope of the negative aspects of majoritarian democracies differs from case to case. The United Kingdom and New Zealand were categorized under the majoritarian framework, yet these countries have certainly adopted a more liberal democracy than the Turkish version of the DP tenure. Dahl also devised two dynamics—inclusion and a degree of public contestation—as crucial to a well-functioning polyarchy. Inclusion refers to the equal participation of people while contestation describes government tolerance of protests and criticism as well as its degree of liberalization⁶⁰ (1971). The DP was lacking especially in the latter case. Briefly, we observe in DP policies and discourse a minimalist version of procedural democracy concentrating on elections and

⁵⁹ The two-party system based on a left-right cleavage with limited protections of minority interests as well as an election system based on plurality rather than proportional representation, and a strong centralized system with an extensive parliamentary sovereignty are all observed in majoritarian democracies. Thus, while the consensual models are more open to inclusion and maximization of the number of the ruling majority, majoritarian modes tend to be more authoritarian (Lijphart 1999:33).

⁶⁰ To fulfill these two requirements, Dahl elicits eight conditions: 1) freedom to form and join organizations, 2) freedom of expression, 3) franchising, 4) eligibility for public office, 5) the right of politicians to compete for support, 6) availability of alternative sources of information, 7) free and fair elections and 8) institutionalization of the system (1971).

seeing voting as the main role of the masses rather than fostering a free public sphere to develop public opinions that might influence the policy-making process and an absence of concern for the ends of democracy. An uncompromising and intolerant attitude towards the opposition and the press as well as hostility towards specific institutions was also observed in DP policy and discourse.

Regarding the 1950 elections, a DP member posited that “the first national edict” (*ferman*)⁶¹ was realized in history” (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 02.06.1950 p.100). Here, using such an authoritarian terminology while referring to elections might be perceived as a small early sign of the future authoritarianism of the DP, which some even was likened to dictatorship.⁶² Evaluating the position of the DP, Mete Tunçay argues that, especially in the post-1957 term, authoritarianism is probably more accurate than dictatorship since although the DP was not located along a pluralist-liberalist spectrum, the party continued to depend on ‘the will of the nation’ (Tunçay in Akşin, 1989:184)⁶³. Tunçay’s argument deserves more explanation in line with the concept of procedural democracy since the DP frequently legitimized its authoritarian stances, especially regarding elections, on the pretext of representing the nation’s will.

Parallel to the procedural democratic worldview, winning an election was seen as the main gateway to rule the country. Interpreting this principle in a broad way, the

⁶¹ *Ferman* is a type of imperial edict authorized by Ottoman Sultans.

⁶² For instance, Ahmet Hamdi Başar defines the DP government as “a dicta-regime depending on the national will” (Koraltürk 2007:291), which was supported by a previous DP deputy Fahri Belen in his remark that the “dictators of our era have national assemblies” (Belen 1960:46). Similarly, Lijphart provides an example of majoritarian democracy: “Because of the concentration of power in a dominant cabinet, former cabinet minister Lord Hailsharo (1978, 127) has called the British system of government an “elective dictatorship” (1999:12).

⁶³ Aydemir argues that the iron white horse (*Demirkırat*-the DP) corresponds to Adnan Menderes and the DP ruling elite since the elites of the DP learned politics in the one-party system’s authoritarian atmosphere and they reflected this authoritarianism when they held power (Aydemir, 1976:161-3).

extensive power of other domains such as judiciary or bureaucracy was not tolerated since they did not catch the electoral support. Without appreciating the principle of the separation of powers, to Bayar, the 1924 Constitution—which had no such principle—was more democratic than subsequent Constitutions (1969). In this line of thinking, the separation of powers together with the authorization of superior institutions was the main means of sharing a nation’s rule. The parliament ought to be the utmost sovereign body that is responsible to the nation from which its power is derived. Otherwise, granting significant rights to non-elected bodies would invite trouble and threaten the oligarchic power of the few. The 1961 Constitution, for instance, provided some institutions such as the Senate, Constitutional Court, National Security Council, the autonomous university and the State Planning Organization a degree of sovereignty not approved by Bayar (1969:11)⁶⁴. To Bayar, the Assembly should depend on a strong majority for powerful governments and on a stable system, and the election system should rest on majoritarianism rather than proportional representation. He posited that unless all political powers are closely guarded, weaknesses in the state administration would be inevitable (Bayar, 1969:42,108,164). Similarly, for Ağaoğlu, allowing proportional representation in elections “might bring chaos to the extent of anarchy” (Ağaoğlu, 1972:63). For Menderes, getting just one more vote than one’s competition was enough to procure legitimacy and did not require any concern over opposition groups.⁶⁵ This affinity of the DP was also criticized within DP circles. According to

⁶⁴ Some DP members such as Samet Ağaoğlu criticized Bayar for this stance. Ağaoğlu argues that DP circles were not entirely against a degree of checks and balances such as the Constitutional Court (Ağaoğlu, 1972:59-3).

⁶⁵ Before the confidence vote of the second Menderes government, a DP deputy Enver Adakan suggested that Menderes resign from party leadership. Menderes declared that “if I am able to get a single more vote, I will continue to serve” (Burçak 1998:82). This anecdote demonstrates how Menderes legitimized

Menderes and Akyol, one of the mistakes of the DP was the underestimation of CHP's votes and public support, which corresponded to at least 36 percent of votes. The DP never dealt with or tried to explain this significant percentage of the population (Menderes and Akyol, 2011:78)⁶⁶.

The DP was very reluctant to share its power. The party, especially after the 1954 elections and even more so after the 1957 elections, turned into a less tolerant, less inclusive actor as reflected in its policies and discourse. To complete the picture, it is necessary to evaluate the DP's attitudes towards the opposition, press, universities and its implementation of *Tahkikat Komisyonları* (Committees of Investigation).

3.3.2.1. Weak Relations with the Opposition

Dahl distinguishes democratization from the polyarchy in terms of the development of a public opposition. Whereas the former demands responsiveness to citizens' preferences, the latter requires a more inclusive system (1971:1-2). In the light of this distinction, we can suggest that the DP could not permit the development of public opposition by liberal means. In fact, not only the DP and center-right representatives, but also the Turkish political elites in general could not develop a tolerant attitude towards oppositional forces (Kalaycıoğlu, 1988:54; Mardin, 1965:375-13, Frey, 1975:45-19; Özbudun, 2000:74). Nevertheless, as the parties that based their identity on advocating for

his authority within a majoritarian framework. This perception also structured the DP's relationship to its opposition.

⁶⁶ Lijphart employs Rae's term "manufactured majorities" in explaining majoritarian democracies: "This system tends to produce highly disproportional results... 'manufactured majorities' that are artificially created by the electoral system out of mere pluralities of the vote" (Lijphart, 1999:15; Rae 1967:74).

democracy, the center-right parties' intolerant attitude towards the opposition can be evaluated as a shortcoming for the establishment of a substantive and inclusive democracy.

In that regard, the DP did not begin with harsh attitudes towards the opposition. In the 1950 election and the beginning of their period of rule, the DP promised to refrain from questioning and investigating the actions and policies of the single-party period (avoiding *Devr-i Sabık*). It seemed that the DP intended to establish a tolerant and peaceful understanding while in office with a fresh start instead of dealing with previous issues. This promise was quite important for the consolidation of democracy in the country since previous CHP governments, as founders of the state, at times engaged in arbitrary acts. A period of revenge might have brought further problems and chaos to the country. By the same token, after the DP Program was read in Parliament, the CHP demanded time to evaluate the program, which was a demand the DP accepted. This was an important reconciliation step if we consider that when the party program of the Peker government was being read after the 1946 elections, Menderes criticized the new government for having neither shared the program before the vote nor provided time for consideration after the program was declared (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 14.08.1946 p.60). Regarding the attitudes of the opposition party, Menderes justified the right to speak for the opposition declaring that his government welcomed criticism as a requirement of a democratic system (Bayar, 1969:154; Menderes and Akyol, 2011:19).

However, such diplomatic attitudes towards the opposition did not represent the general stance of the DP in the following years.⁶⁷

During ten years of DP rule, President Bayar and the opposition leader İnönü met once (Aydemir, 1976:263). And just as they met infrequently in person, they also rarely saw eye to eye in terms of ideas. In particular after the autumn of 1952, government relations with the opposition weakened. On 5 October 1952, in his İzmir speech İnönü argued that CHP's political security was threatened. The DP interpreted this statement as a serious provocation, prompting CHP to accuse the government of fostering chaos. İnönü said "I am warning that I am seeing a threat" (Burçak, 1998:122-3)⁶⁸. The transfer of some CHP assets to the state treasury and the closure of Public Houses (*Halk Evleri*) were two significant sources of the increasing tension resulting in major crises between DP and CHP.

Eroğul perceives the revocation of the privilege of immunity of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın (CHP's Kars deputy) due to an article Yalçın published in *Ulus* on 18 April 1952 as the first signal of the DP's tendency towards shifting to a "tyranny of the majority" (2003:124). The DP's attitude towards the Secretary General of the CHP Kasım Gülek

⁶⁷ One should also note that government-opposition party relations did not gradually worsen. It is possible to talk about at least four terms of reciprocal tolerance and peace in these relations (Burçak, 1998; Toker, 1991a; 1991b). To Menderes and Akyol, the number of these periods was roughly seven (Menderes and Akyol, 2011:81-2). During these terms, the opposition party members also met with Menderes. Menderes also spoke about the unity of the government and the opposition party's stance as being beyond the common values of the two parties. On 18 January 1953, for instance, Menderes declared that "the CHP was a party molded by the soul of national unity and it is necessary to accept that what dominated the CHP is patriotism" (Burçak 1998:131). To Belen on the other hand, in the course of the intra-party crisis, the DP fostered such periods of peace with the opposition party as a political strategy in order to deal quietly with internal problems (Belen 1960:53-2).

⁶⁸ This attitude of the opposition parties continues today. Turkish center-right and far-right parties are usually criticized by the opposition parties as damaging the regime under the name of a "threat". Even in the 2009 elections, a headline in the pro-CHP daily *Cumhuriyet* asked "Are you aware of the threat?" harking back to CHP-DP relations.

was also problematic. He was arrested in Zonguldak, and while being transferred to Istanbul he was subjected to harsh treatment by the police (Aydemir, 1976:155; Toker, 1991b:138). Even İnönü's visits and meetings were sometimes impeded, and he was subjected to physical and psychological violence at times as in the case of the Kayseri and Uşak incidents (Zürcher, 2004:349; Öymen, 2013:335-6; Eroğul, 2003:238-2; Aydemir, 1976:155,263; Burçak, 1998:508,518). The DP's intolerance of the opposition occasionally extended to taking severe precautions to limit the self-expression of the opposition. Long ignoring the proposals of the opposition party deputies and refusing to discuss them in the Assembly (Burçak, 1998:626-4)⁶⁹, limiting CHP's open-air meetings (Eroğul, 2003:194-2; Öymen, 2013:337-2) and prohibiting, just before the military intervention, the political activities of the opposition outside of the Assembly on 18 April 1960 (Zürcher, 2004:349) were among the more remarkable instances of DP's intolerance.

This behavior of the DP towards the opposition was not limited to the CHP. Before coming to power, the party supported CHP's efforts to close the Turkish Socialist Worker and Peasant Party and all periodicals and newspapers close to this party (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 16.12.1946). Nor did this position change during the DP's rule. On 27 January 1954 The Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*) was closed in a single night as though it was "an ordinary association" without a second thought on the pretext of its purported opposition to Atatürk and his reforms (Eroğul, 2003:129). The secret procedure carried out in this case was also criticized by the opposition (Burçak, 1998:136). The Turkish Peasant Party and The Republican Nation Party declared before the 1954 elections that

⁶⁹This issue was discussed in the National Assembly on 15 February 1960. For further details see *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*.

they would not join the elections because of the undemocratic stance of the DP government (Burçak, 1998: 228). Not surprisingly, seeing this protest as inconsequential, the DP made no effort to reach a consensus with these parties.

Osman Bölükbaşı, a former DP deputy and chairman of the Republican Nation Party defeated the DP in the 1954 elections in Kırşehir, though this victory was suppressed by the DP by changing the province's status to town despite the many serious critiques against this action by much of the CHP (See *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 30.06.1954 p.357-4).⁷⁰ Just before the 1957 elections, Kırşehir became a province again, but Osman Bölükbaşı was arrested as well as his privilege of immunity revoked in the pre-election process (Eroğul, 2003:198; Öymen, 2013:72-2). Similarly, İnönü's election region, Malatya, was also divided into two, and Adıyaman became a new province after the 1954 elections.

Although this undemocratic stance of the DP towards the opposition was sometimes criticized within the DP, the party leadership supported by a strong president usually justified the necessity of these decisions in a demagogic manner. The DP leadership wanted to control and make decisions with as much independence as possible, which would also prevent lenience to intra-party opposition. In that regard, trying to restrict all political activities of the previous DP members who went against their party, ousting dissident members from the party, and forcing all ministers to resign in 1955 despite remaining the prime minister and delaying the party congress due to intra-party problems are among the antidemocratic methods used by the DP leadership against

⁷⁰ Interestingly, in the village headman (*muhtar*) elections following this incident, the DP won 74 out of 76 villages in Kırşehir (Burçak 1998:231).

intra-party opposition ⁷¹ (Toker, 1991b:115; Burçak, 1998:430-7, Aydemir, 1976:268,311; Karaosmanoğlu, 1968:226). An absence of a delegation of authority and a dearth of trust for party members, which can be seen reflected in a lack of consultation and discussion within the party, were embedded DP practices.⁷² The DP elite were thus eager to exclude all forms of opposition including intra-party opposition, CHP opposition, other opposition parties and opposition from the press.

3.3.2.2.The DP and the Press

There is no clear-cut story to the relationship between the DP and the press. Especially before coming to power, the DP followed a liberal inclination regarding freedom of the press though this was not sufficiently pursued while in office. During the opposition years of the DP, the CHP's pressure on the press and on journalists who were close to the DP also motivated the party to struggle for freedom of the press.⁷³ Initially, the DP supported changing Article 50 of the Press Law, which previously granted the government the right to close newspapers and periodicals in the case of any disturbance of the country's general politics (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 13.06.1946 p.285; Topuz, 1972:170; Eroğul, 2003:43). One of the earliest attempts of the DP government was also to limit the government's sweeping authority over the press through Law Number 568 in addition to introducing Press Courts. On 13 June 1952, another law (number

⁷¹ For the evaluation of intra-party discipline procedures in the DP, see Ergun Özbudun. 1968.*Batı Demokrasilerinde ve Türkiye'de Parti Disiplini*. Ankara: Başnur Matbaası. pp.219-3.

⁷² Mistrustful of others and reluctant to delegate authority, Menderes' son also acknowledged that Adnan Menderes dealt with very minor things as a prime minister. For instance, he states that his father watched over the repair of street lamps in Florya because he wanted to follow up on things himself (Menderes and Akyol 2011:85).

⁷³ For details, see Alpay Kabacalı. 1994. *Türk Basınında Demokrasi*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları.

5953) meant to regulate the working rights and improve the social conditions of press members was passed. Such concrete attempts of the DP were strengthened by the liberal statements of party elites regarding freedom of the press. On the same topic, just after becoming prime minister, Menderes stated that “the freedom given to the press would make it possible to clarify all the prevailing problems in the country and see the realities” (Bayar, 1969:114). He also suggested that democracy could only be improved if the press were free (Toker, 1991a:34). The DP elite thereby emphasized that compared to the pre-1950 period arbitrary rule over the press had been considerably lessened (Ağaoğlu, 2004:132; Bayar, 1969:149). Bayar even claimed that the “liberty of receiving and publishing news was not as free as in any place of the world as it was in post-1950 Turkey” (1969:149).

In time, the liberal position of the party changed, and the DP espoused a more authoritarian tone in its relations with the press. To the DP elite, the main reason behind this change was the press’s insistent attention to the so-called abuse of liberties by the DP (Bozdağ, 2004:183; Bayar, 1969:184; Ağaoğlu, 2004:135). Thus, the DP elite developed an intolerant pattern of repressing criticism. In order to expedite the judicial process directly through judges, law number 6123 provided the right to prosecute critics of government policy regardless of the appeals of ministers (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* 23.06.1953). On 6 June 1956, Law number 6733 was debated in the Assembly. That law established limitations on the freedom of the press and made censorship easier. In this meeting, the DP group explained the necessity of the law in this way: “in the name of critique and discussion, every kind of aspersion, gossip, and insult (...) was done as a continuous and systematic threat against the government

activities [and] against the people of administration (...) which also blemished the harmony of the community”⁷⁴ (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 06.06.1956 p.97). In 1956, the Right to Propose (*İspat Hakkı*) became another matter of conflict for the DP. The Right to Propose aimed for the abolition of the right to prove the claims of the press against DP ministers especially regarding corruption and abuse of their positions. The DP government under the leadership of Menderes decided to abandon this right which led to a split with the party and led to the formation of the Freedom Party (the *Hürriyet Partisi*, or HP) (Öymen, 2013:163-6; Ağaoğlu, 2004:118; Toker, 1991b:104-8; Burçak, 1998:325-6).

After these institutional changes, journalist arrests increased. Ahmet Emin Yalman, Nihat Erim, Bedii Faik and Cahit Yalçın were sentenced for committing libel against the government (Ağaoğlu, 1972:222,233; Koraltürk, 2007:297; Burçak, 1998: 258)⁷⁵. Toker describes the absurdity of his arrest in the spring of 1955 due to an article he published in *Akis*. His arrest was based on the pretext of “making publications in order to defame the government and showing *probability* to repeat this crime” (Toker, 1991b:96-3)⁷⁶.

⁷⁴ This explanation did not satisfy the opposition party, and İnönü interpreted this law as proof of the transformation of the regime into a closed and scandalous one (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 06.06.1956 p.100).

⁷⁵ Menderes and other Ministers such as Mükerrrem Sarol granted clemency to some such as Nihat Erim, Sefa Kılıçoğlu and Falih Rıfkı Atay. However, President Bayar typically resisted Prime Minister Adnan Menderes’ forgiving attitude towards the press (Burçak, 1998:624-2; Ağaoğlu, 2004:134).

⁷⁶ Whatever its defensive stance toward the press, some people close to the DP justified the government’s pressure on the press. For instance, Menderes and Akyol complained about the broad scope of criticisms, especially those in *Akis* and *Akbaba* across the DP years (2011:94).

Apart from introducing considerable press restrictions, the DP also took advantage of government privileges to benefit from media power.⁷⁷ In 1951, a decree regulated the allocation of official advertisements. This enabled the government to use economic means to support some members of the press and punish others who were critical towards them (Tunçay in Akşin, 1989:179). The government prevented other parties from broadcasting during the election period despite widely expressing itself by radio. During the 1957 elections, the state radio began to broadcast on behalf of the government at the end of the elections at approximately 14:30 pm. This was illegal and might have influenced the election process (Toker, 1991b:115). Furthermore, announcing that people had joined the Fatherland Front (*Vatan Cephesi*) over state radio (Öymen, 2013:457-9; Zürcher, 2004:348) could be interpreted as the utilization of the media by the DP for political purposes.⁷⁸

In conclusion, despite certain positive steps in the beginning, the DP's overall record on freedom of the press is inadequate. While in power, the party pursued an intolerant and exclusive attitude, reflected in its legislation, in the arrest of journalists and in the promotion of government supporters.

⁷⁷ Mükerrerem Sarol reports that Menderes was aware of the power of the press. To him, labeling the press as the fourth power corresponded to an underestimation of the press (Sarol, 1983:177).

⁷⁸ On 12 October 1958 Manisa speech, Menderes declared that it was necessary to organize a Fatherland Front against the dissention front (*nifak cephesi*) of the opposition. To Menderes, the purpose of the Fatherland Front was unifying the citizens around progress and democracy that in practice turned into the arbitrary rule of the government (Öymen 2013:461-5).

3.3.2.3.The DP and Universities

Similar to its dealings with the press, in the early years, the DP developed a very positive relationship with universities. This relationship later devolved significantly. Article 38 of the DP Program emphasized the scientific and administrative autonomy of universities along with the necessity of improving the quality of university education and the significance of scientific research (1946:11).⁷⁹ The importance that the party program attached to universities was reciprocated by university elites, who supported the party until it took hold of the government (Eroğul, 2003:32; Burçak, 1998: 157). In its first term in power, the DP increased the budgets of universities dramatically and initiated an effort to spread universities to the east of Turkey (Bayar, 1969:116).

Yet despite their initial support, universities came to take the government to task for its authoritarian tendencies and for making universities disreputable. DP elite countered that despite their positive attitudes towards and respect for the university, it was impossible to soften the conservative mentality and *idee fixe* embedded in universities (e.g: Bayar, 1969:116 and Burçak, 1998:642). To Bayar, in the eyes of the university, the legitimacy of the government depended on obeying the university's thoughts because the university elite perceived themselves as a shareholder of the state (1969:15). Embracing the majoritarianism without almost any effort to provide inclusiveness, the government proved itself, in the case of its relationship to universities, unwilling to share its ultimate power with other institutions.

⁷⁹ On 18 June 1946 the CHP government passed a law (Law Number 4936) and provided a degree of autonomy to the universities.

A number of institutional changes also catalyzed the dispute between the government and universities. On 21 July 1953, a new regulation banned university staff from engaging in political activities even as it expanded the scientific autonomy of the universities (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 21.07.1953, p.935-31).⁸⁰ In the relevant Assembly meeting, Köprülü endorsed the new law, saying “the purpose of the law was not to restrict freedom of thought; instead, this law provides universities a chance to accomplish their institutional duties” while also underscoring the economic dependency of the universities to the state (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 21.07.1953 p.948). Another law was implemented on 5 July 1954 stipulating that university staff be taken under the authority of the Ministry of National Education with the Senate’s approval.⁸¹ A Professor of law Hüseyin Nail Kubalı⁸² became one of the first victims of this law after criticizing changes to the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure (Burçak, 1998:538-2; Öymen, 2013:598-3). In December of 1956, the Dean of the Faculty of Political Science, Turhan Feyzioğlu, was taken under the Ministry of National Education on account of his engaging in politics, which was an act protested by the other university members (Eroğul, 2003:193). Tensions grew in the pre-military intervention years; some professors, such as Sıddık Sami Onar, were even exposed to physical violence (Öymen, 2013:653-2; Karaosmanoğlu, 1968:236; Aydemir, 1976:415). The tension soon spread to university youth. On 28 April, an uprising against the government took place at a number of universities along with the motto “Menderes resign, hurray Turkish

⁸⁰ For details see: Law Number 6185 and Law Number 4936.

⁸¹ Law Number 6435. This law also covered all officers except soldiers. The main target of the law was interpreted to be university professors (Aydemir, 1968:171).

⁸² The same professors such as Hüseyin Nail Kubalı would inspire the organization of the DP protests in the universities in the aftermath of the 1960 military intervention (Öymen, 2013:645).

soldiers”. Rather than trying to solve the problem through more moderate measures, the government introduced martial law (Sarol, 1983:966-5; Koraltürk, 2007:596-3).

In conclusion, the DP government could not articulate a tolerant attitude towards the criticisms coming from the universities. Addressing the universities, Menderes declared that “we, as a cadre rules the whole country, will we be defeated by two streets of İstanbul and Ankara?” (Aydemir, 1976:414). In that regard, perceiving the issue as a “capability to control” without allowing criticism escalated the problems among the DP government and the universities.

3.3.2.4. Committee of Investigation (Tahkikat Komisyonu)

The DP’s unsuccessful management of its relationship with the opposition, the press and universities, especially in the post-1957 period, caused a considerable degree of social unrest, which led the DP to take more and more harsh precautions. In response to CHP’s negative claims about the DP damaging human rights and judicial security, its utilization of state radio for political purposes and its partisan administration of and pressures on the press, the DP government accused the CHP of trying to eliminate the DP by making use of illegal and underground methods (Eroğul, 2003:241-2; Ablayrak, 2004:530; Aydemir, 1976:412). İnönü’s remarks on the illegitimacy of the government were read by the DP as a clandestine agreement between İnönü and a probable military intervention (Karaosmanoğlu, 1968:227). In order to determine whether the opposition activities were illegal and destructive or not and to determine the motive behind the

activities, a Committee of Investigation composed of 15 people was established on 18 April 1960⁸³. During the Assembly meetings on the Committee of Investigation, both the government and the opposition party reciprocally utilized an uncompromising language which escalated the tension (Öymen, 2013:527-15)

The Committee had extensive and exclusive rights, including the right to make independent judicial decisions, close and collect publications and documents, ban political meetings and demonstrations and take any sort of precaution, regardless of objections, if it felt necessary (*Resmi Gazete* 10491, 28 April 1960 Law Number 7468; Eroğul, 2003:244; Ağaoğlu, 2004:142). A considerable number of professors of law denounced the committee's work as unconstitutional. The government reacted by taking disciplinary action against these professors (Zürcher, 2004:240). Forming such a Committee was interpreted by CHP circles as an effort to eliminate the opposition. People close to the DP, however, claim that the main aim of the commission was a simple precaution rather than the closure of the CHP (Menderes and Akyol, 2011:100; Burçak, 1998:661-14). Whatever the aim, in the event of a crisis, the DP preferred to take severe measures rather than seek a more moderate form of consensus. The DP banned the broadcast and publication of Assembly Meetings at the time. İnönü was obliged not participate in the 12 Assembly meetings after having criticized the forming of the commission (Öymen, 2013:619-6; Zürcher, 2004:350; Burçak, 1998:686-2). Thus, operating on a very minimalist vision of procedural democracy, the DP believed it could do whatever it wanted justifying itself in the legitimacy of being the elected government. After realizing that the party preferred to limit and ban almost all threats against

⁸³ For further details, see: *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 18.04.1960.

government authority including any group critical of it, the opposition, the press, intellectuals, the university elite and university students mobilized against the DP laying the ground for military intervention on 27 May 1960.

3.4. The Justice Party and Democracy

The center-right tradition in Turkey was first formed in the DP years. The left-right issue became more pronounced after the mid-1960s. But to properly understand this history, it is necessary to evaluate another pivotal center-right actor, the Adalet Partisi (the Justice Party – the AP), with special reference to its single party government era (1965-1971). Obtaining the support of the majority in the 1965 and 1969 elections, the party reflected its mentality in its policies with more comfort when it was the single party in power.⁸⁴ The AP then formed the Nationalist Front (*Milliyetçi Cephe*) coalitions with two partners, one nationalist far-rightist and one Islamist far-rightist. Coalition governments could not make good on the promises of each party, and a coalition partner could at best only *share* control of the decision-making processes (Laver and Shepsle 1990).⁸⁵ Therefore, one would be strained to try to analyze the actions of the Nationalist Front governments as wholly representative of the center-right mentality in Turkey. A cosmopolitan coalition of the right wing, in those years the dose of far-right rhetoric considerably escalated even in AP discourse. Nevertheless, the reasons behind the loss of the parliamentary majority of the AP in the 1973 and 1977 elections also deserves further analysis within the framework of democracy. Before

⁸⁴ In 1961, the AP engaged in a coalition with the CHP which lasted seven months although only under the strict observation of military rule.

⁸⁵ Italics added.

considering the AP's uses of a discourse of democracy, it is first necessary to clarify the political-historical conjuncture of the 1960s.

The increased authoritarianism of the DP was a pretext, in a political culture that could not seek a smooth consensus among the governing and opposition parties, for the upsurge in tension in the late 1960s in Turkish politics. Student demonstrations on 28 and 29 April 1960 paved the way for the declaration of Martial Law and were "the perfect opportunity for military intervention" (Ahmad, 1977: 159). In fact, the center's displeasure due to their loss of power, prestige and income brought about the 1960 military intervention (Özbudun in Diamond, 1994:198). Carried out by middle rank soldiers, this intervention was obviously welcomed by the bureaucratic center, the press, intellectuals and university circles. The 1960 coup might thus be explained by the center-periphery cleavage as well (Özbudun in Özbudun and Ulus, 1980:61; Demirel, 2004:27; Sherwood, 1967:54), which was basically a reaction of the center against the elected DP government who claimed to represent the interests of the periphery.

In a tragic outcome, the former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes along with his two ministers, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan, were executed on September 17, 1961. Levi succinctly summarizes the issue: "Thus while Menderes and two of his ministers, who enjoyed strong support in parliament and with the electorate, were convicted and hanged for violating the constitution, the same constitution was declared void by non-elected officers, advised by non-elected professors" (Levi in Heper and Landau, 1991:135). Far from being exemplary of a democratic framework, the 1960 military intervention can be read as the challenge of the center aimed at elected civilians.

In addition to capital punishment, many pivotal DP politicians were arrested and banned from active politics. Even if some Generals called for the release of certain DP parliamentarians, professors did not allow this on the justification that “all of them are potentially guilty” (Levi in Heper and Landau, 1991:135). In beginner-level democracies, authoritarian power holders may wish to control the democratization process and retain certain guarantees for shares of power, and when they see necessary, they might interrupt the regime (Özbudun, 2000:105-11) even in the name of preventing “potential” crimes that had not yet taken place. This intervention represented such an exit guarantee in favor of the center. Those upset by the recent events were mostly the peripheral masses that supported the DP in the previous years. Despite the undemocratic character of the coup and its subsequent effects, this intervention had little reverberation in Turkish intellectual circles at the time. After the military intervention, a military-academic-bureaucratic collaboration prepared a new constitution, which provided a number of vigorous exit guarantees against possible threats in the future.

By the time of the arrival of the 1961 Constitution, the National Security Council—composed of the president as the head of the Council, ministers to be determined by law, the chief of the General Staff and representatives of the army, navy and air forces—was founded to assist the Council of Ministers during the decision-making process. The 1961 constitution further provided the 23 members of the National Unity Committee the privilege of being lifetime deputies of the Senate of the Republic. Even the election of General Cemal Gürsel to the Presidency took place under considerable military pressure over Parliament (Özbudun, 2000:112-2; Zürcher, 2004:242). Despite the National Unity Committee’s initial promise to remain an above-party administration, the

subsequent process proved such claims of impartiality to be meaningless. It became clear that the National Unity Committee was openly opposed to the dissolved DP. The CHP on the other hand enjoyed close relations with the military after the military left government to civilians in 1961. In that regard, thanks to the election procedure, the Senate was largely dominated by CHP (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009:15). After the closure of the DP, new elections were conducted and did not provide an opportunity for the organization and unification of the electoral base of the DP. The CHP thus emerged as the strongest party.⁸⁶

All in all, the 1961 Constitution was a product of increased suspicion of the center towards elected politicians despite the enhanced civil liberties and social rights granted to citizens (Özbudun, 2000:54). The 1960 coup thus initiated a new era in Turkish politics, which provided checks and balances for democratic means including constitutional review, judicial independence, a bicameral system, and also introduced exit guarantees and reserved domains to the center through sharing the power of elected officials. The 1960 military intervention was also exempted from judicial process. Hence, at the cost of undemocratic means and strengthening the position of the center *vis-à-vis* those who were elected, individual rights expanded by the 1960 regime.

⁸⁶ However, the AP and the New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi—the YTP) who tried to win over the DP base successfully obtained 34.7 and 13.7 percent of votes respectively *vis-a-vis* 36.7 percent of the CHP.

3.4.1. The AP as Successor of the DP

In an atmosphere wherein sympathy for the DP was considered a reason for exclusion from the political sphere dominated by the junta regime and its alliances, the AP was founded on 11 February 1961 with the less explicit claim of being the heir of the DP. In fact, the founders of the AP were a heterogeneous group composed of disgruntled soldiers, secondary rank DP politicians and even some opponents of the DP (Demirel, 2004:30-2). Ragıp Gümüşpala and other ex-military staff also joined the AP and played a pivotal role in the party along with people on the extreme right (Levi in Heper and Landau, 1991:136-2). However, the AP primarily consisted of secondarily important DP members who could not gain significant positions in the DP but who were sincere supporters of the party. Many closed DP organizations reshaped and reemerged as AP organizations, and many former party members resumed similar positions in the local branches of the AP.

Karpat suggests that “the Justice Party appeared as the victim of the old ruling groups while the intelligentsia and even the Republican Party appeared unwilling to abide by popular will” (1972:364). Thus, the AP carried on the DP’s mission of representing the periphery and continued to frame this position in contrast to the center—a strategy that this time proved even more powerful. As in the case of the DP, the prevailing government was undecided regarding the survival of the AP. The party was unable to even find a central place to hold their first great congress (Turgut, 2000:175; Demirel, 2004:33-2). When the congress finally materialized, the spokesmen of the party pointed to the imprisonment of the former DP elite as an example of a deficit of democracy. Delegates demanded amnesty for those branded as political criminals claiming that to

them amnesty was more necessary than bread and water (*Milliyet*, 01.12.1962). Ironically, the party positioned itself as not apposed to the 1960 military intervention and stressed that they did not seek vengeance (*Milliyet*, 03.12.1962). The reason behind this position without any doubt was the party's fear of the 27 May alliance. The probability that the AP would be excluded by the center to a significant degree limited the maneuvers of the party at the outset. The AP thus went about its method of opposition in a rather silent way. For instance, on April 9, 1963, 117 AP deputies refused to join the Assembly meeting to mark the 27 May as an official festival (Ahmad and Ahmad, 1976:260; Cizre, 1993: 59). Instead of voting against the regulation openly, the majority of the party preferred not to attend the parliament. Thus, until nearly 1965, the AP tried to legitimize itself in the eyes of the state elite even as the party tried to communicate a message to the DP base that the AP was the heir of the DP. Until the reestablishment of the Democratic Party in 1970, the AP mostly represented the DP legacy as the main center-right political actor.⁸⁷

The military perceived Ragıp Gümüşpala—a retired soldier—the first chairman of the party, as an insurance against the potential demands of the AP in case it sought revenge against the DP (Ahmad in Kasaba, 2008:243). The death of Gümüşpala opened a new avenue for AP self-expression, and Süleyman Demirel's election to AP leadership in 1964 also accelerated the AP's ideological and political identification.⁸⁸ Demirel, as a prominent DP technocrat, resigned from his prestigious position after the military

⁸⁷ After the 1960 intervention, in order to attract the DP base, the New Turkey Party was also founded by Ekrem Alican, who had previously founded the Freedom Party in 1955 after disagreements with Menderes. Nevertheless, the scope of influence of the New Turkey Party was notably less than that of the AP. Alican's party gathered 13.7 percent of votes in the 1961 elections. This rate decreased to 3.7 in 1965 and 2.1 in 1969 (Ahmad in Kasaba, 2008:242).

⁸⁸ In fact, Demirel represented a more Western, more moderate image than his contender Sadettin Bilgiç. He quickly settled on the center-right heritage.

intervention and chose to work in the private sector rather than continue with the Junta elite (Cılızoğlu, 1988:3). He joined the AP in 1962 and declared that if such a military breakdown did not occur, he would prefer to stay away from politics. He underscored that what attracted him to politics was to a large extent the aggrieved position of the DP elite (Cılızoğlu, 1988:13). Criticizing the 1960 intervention for disregarding the free will of the nation and for attempting to discuss the place of the nation (1975:10), Demirel posited that his party's politics were the only certain continuation of the DP. The ambivalent position of the AP regarding the claim of the DP legacy thus ended with Demirel's clear statement. He postulated that "after the DP period, the vote gained meaning and Turkish citizens began to be considered as a pivotal element of administration" (Demirel, 1977:34). In his election speeches, Demirel reminded his audience of the corruption of the 1946 elections (*Milliyet*, 22.09.1965), in an effort to claim a DP heritage, as the 1946 elections had been a repeated source of conflict throughout the DP tenure. Demirel also changed the emblem of the AP (which was previously a book and a rising sun) into a prancing white horse, since the masses knew the DP by the phrase 'iron horse' (*Demirkırat*).⁸⁹ In the election campaign, the AP effectively made use of the image of the white iron horse. Demirel's car entered cities following a galloping white horse (*Milliyet*, 22.09.1965). Furthermore, close relatives of the former DP elite also supported the AP in the 1965 elections.⁹⁰ Thus, Demirel, from the very beginning of his leadership, tried to clearly communicate to the masses an organic link between his new party and the former DP mentality.

⁸⁹ The state elite focused their criticism on this change. For instance, President Gürsel said "What is the purpose of the AP? I do not think that this horse is a glorified animal. I do not need any other cautions" (Donat, 2005:7).

⁹⁰ Ahmad notes that, in addition to two well-known persons, Celal Bayar's daughter Nilüfer Gürsoy and Adnan Menderes' son Yüksel Menderes, Refik Koraltan's son, Samet Ağaoğlu's wife and sister and Namık Gedik's wife also struggled under the banner of the AP for the 1965 elections (1977:237).

3.4.1.1. The Justice Party and National Will

Similar to the DP, the AP founded its ideology on the prior and pivotal place of the national will in a populist fashion. Populism appeals to the people against the established system (Taggart, 1996; Canovan, 1999). The AP dealt with the legacy of the 27 May intervention, and the new regime reformulated how it made use of the ‘national will’ in discourse by significantly transforming the system. The strengthened position of the center in opposition to the periphery and the civilian governments with the 1961 Constitution was usually defined, in the eyes of the AP, as an important handicap before the AP government’s representation power. Populism was thus an efficient remedy with which the AP could rally the masses against the dominant center. The AP as a pragmatic actor, on the other hand, tried to evade drastic confrontation with the 27 May elite. Thus, the national will as the most innocent card was played often in an attempt to garner the support of the masses.

In the official platform of the AP, the main goal of the party, under the ‘general principles’ section, was described as an effort to “serve the national unity and the establishment and realization of the true national will” (*Adalet Partisi Tüzüğü*, Article 2 1969:43). Similarly, the party portrayed itself as “an outcome of national sovereignty” (Demirel, 1973:37) while implying the CHP was a product of the center instead of the nation. In a similar vein, Demirel criticized those who evaluated the national will as an ignorant majority of voters (1973:81), and underscored that his AP “expects respect for

the nation” from those who would dismiss such a will (Demirel, 1973:31). Against the center’s dominance of the policy-making process, he also underlined that “no one should argue that he is smarter than the nation (..) The purpose is (..) being with nation and staying within the nation” (Demirel, 1973:34). Thus, the AP enthusiastically linked its project to and justified it with reference to the national will.

The national will thus emerged as the ultimate panacea for a range of problems. In that light, Demirel said that “If it is believed that sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation and its requirements are fulfilled unconditionally, all complications disappear. All sorts of crises could be easily avoided” (Demirel, 1973:227). To Demirel, “amongst all reforms, being aware of accepting national sovereignty is the greatest” (1973:16). He stated that “If any other factors besides the national will are playing a role in determining political authority, then this cannot be called democracy” (Demirel, 1973:94). Thus, the leitmotiv of the AP’s perception of democracy was shaped around the question of national will. However, the deployment of the national will by the AP contained a problematic aspect as well: The party portrayed itself as the representative of the nation, which predicated the idea of the nation as if it were a homogenous entity in opposition to dominant state elite (Demirel, 2004:128; Komsuoğlu, 2008:281). The party was thus conceptually ill-equipped to embrace the minorities and differences that constituted the nation— reminiscent of DP’s majoritarianism.

The phrase “Democratic Republic”, though it did not draw on the concept of republic per se, was embraced by the leader of the AP to imply that the prevailing Republic lacked democracy and that a Republican regime without democracy was null (Demirel, 1973:22; 1975:17). Demirel was explicit on this point, stating that “calling [something]

a republic is not enough, it is necessary to say democratic republic based on human rights and national will” (Demirel, 1973:37). To Demirel, a democratic republic entails the equality of rulers and ruled (1973:225). Nevertheless, this perception of equality did not refer to a substantial democratic equality. Instead, what Demirel meant was to a large extent composed of the equal vote principle and a criticism of the concept of the superiority of the center over the people.

The AP pursued an ambivalent attitude towards the 1961 Constitution; the party criticized the extensive powers of the judiciary and the bureaucracy while trying to stay within the boundaries of the regime (Özbudun, 2000:55; Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009:17). To Demirel, the judicial and bureaucratic domination of the political realm almost made the national will void, such that the AP government, as the representative of the national will, would be severely restricted. Demirel noted that “according to the 1961 constitution, governments have duties but have not authority and rights” (Demirel, 1973:309). In many cases, having decried the principle of the separation of powers, to Demirel this principle enabled unauthorized entities to share in the national will. Ironically, in other cases he also posited that the separation of power, along with free universities and a free press, also hindered the establishment of a dicta-regime (*Milliyet*, 21.09.1965). Criticism of the Constitution was far from coherent. And it is worth noting that this incoherence was reflected in AP policies as well. Though there were many Constitutional weaknesses to the AP elite, Levi notes that “On one point only, and this only with the help of the RPP, was the constitution amended. It concerned the political rights of ex-DP members” (Levi in Heper and Landau, 1991:145).

All in all, while demanding the further realization of national will and blaming the constitution for hindering its realization, the AP acted within the limits of the Constitution. When Demirel became Prime Minister, he often recalled Menderes and his tragic end due to accusations of violating the Constitution, and in response, Demirel typically carried the Constitution in his pocket and tried to act accordingly (Donat, 2005:266).

3.4.1.2. Close Contact with the People

Establishing direct and close contact with the periphery is doubtless one of the main tenets of the Turkish center right, which reached a peak during the AP era. Following the DP's practice of visiting many provinces, even villages, and listening to people's problems and expectations, the AP made use of close personal contact with the masses as an efficient political instrument.

The leadership of Demirel, in terms of both his personal history and his idiosyncratic style of politics, was also a considerable factor in the establishment of a direct and sincere link with the masses. Arat describes Demirel as "the first prominent Turkish leader of truly peasant origins" (Arat in Heper and Sayarı, 2002:87) since even those previous members of the DP elite hailing from the countryside were also the elites of the periphery. As "a self-made man" (Zürcher, 2004:250; Ahmad, 1977: 236), a smart son of a modest peasant family, Demirel won scholarships early on in his high school years and attended Istanbul Technical University, one of the most prestigious universities in Turkey. Eligible for Fulbright and Eisenhower scholarships, he continued his successes

in the United States. His brilliance was noticed by the DP as well and he became a prestigious technocrat. As a construction engineer, he built successful dams, which were crucial for Turkey in those years due to long droughts. His occupation also differentiated Demirel from previous leaders. Being an engineer also corresponds to a specific pragmatic and service-oriented mentality that entails problem-solving skills and technical and logical approaches instead of abstract ideologies (Göle, 1990:172-3). Therefore, Demirel's educational background improved the classical Turkish center-right to consider a material development of the people rather than a cultural and symbolic one.

Süleyman Demirel with his rural origin, peasant accent and mastery of the art of oration was capable of convincing people easily and quickly. A smart man aware of the significance of the role of images in politics, he said that "80 percent of politics is appearance. In other words, image... You should give an outlook that 'this man could do this'. For sure, knowledge, education, experience and merit are important as well. But these all add up to only 20 percent. 80 percent is... the influence you made in the eyes of the public" (Donat, 2005:276). This awareness is reminiscent of the DP elite; Demirel could act either as a refined gentleman or a peasant according to the circumstances. Portraying himself as a poor village boy who earned his success, the status shift in his personal life was one of the pivotal messages that Demirel delivered. As a prominent figure, Demirel represented a hope for disadvantaged groups. Only Demirel, as a role model, nearly an idol, could create the circumstances whereby they might enjoy a similar socio-economic transition.

The results of the 1969 elections also indicate that those villages that supported AP were to a large extent relatively developed or open to development suggesting that the parochial voting support of the AP correlated with rural modernity (Özbudun, in Akarlı and Ben Dor 1975; Kudat, in Akarlı and Ben Dor 1975:52-2). Özbudun and Kudat's studies in particular suggest that those villages that were completely isolated did not demand change, and they preferred to support the CHP while those villages that were open to the world, the populations of which could obtain at least a primary education, and could form party organizations, demanded change in their living styles. Thus, the AP and certainly its eminent leader Süleyman Demirel, with his unique biography, were perceived as signals of future prospects for change and progress.

Albertazzi and McDonnell state that populism “pits a virtuous and homogenous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who were depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice” (2008:3). The concept that Alberazzi and McDonnell are describing was skillfully practiced by Süleyman Demirel. The AP leader frequently asserted that “I am the son of this territory, who well knows your problems and who sincerely seeks solutions to your problems” (Donat, 2005:8-2). In the 1965 elections, the AP made use of the motto “whoever loves the public should be close to the public”. This was an attempt to distinguish AP's stance towards the masses from the elitist CHP.⁹¹ The AP visited more than 20 cities during the campaign. During AP's tenure, the integration of peasant masses into politics expanded to a considerable degree. In election meetings,

⁹¹ In fact, the CHP in those years experimented with making reference to leftist ideology in an effort to attract the votes of workers and rural migrants. Nonetheless, the AP preferred to position the CHP in the elitist wing of the political structure.

Demirel pronounced village names, even the names of village headmen, and generally asked questions about local problems in an interactive way (Donat, 2005:288-2) in another attempt to assure the masses that Demirel knew them very well. He insisted that a regime would not weaken so long as it was close to the public; it would only gain strength (Demirel, 1973:243).

Hence, the AP, following the DP tradition, was a direct party, wherein the leader and local branches developed strong relationships without devoting significant tasks for intermediary branches such as the Secretary General (Güler, 2003:43-2). Like Menderes, Demirel painted himself as an accessible leader giving people the sense that local branches of the AP and the popular masses could easily arrange to visit him. Demirel's image of accessibility increased his followers' personal attachment and loyalty to him (Acar in Heper and Landau, 1991:189; Demirel, 2004:125-2). He saw this approach as a good model for a wider party policy as well: "I suggest my friends catching the [attention of the] citizens, if the citizens won't come to us, we should go them" (Demirel, 1973:174). Thus, trying to establish strong and sincere relations with the masses, the AP pursued one of the most effective election strategies in party politics.⁹²

⁹² To Magleby and Nelson, candidates who pay great attention to personal contact with the masses stand a higher chance of gaining votes. For further details, see: David B. Magleby and Candice Nelson. 1990. *The Money Chase*. Washington: The Brookings Institute. p.62.

3.4.2. Democracy as a Procedural Virtue

No picture of the Turkish center right would be complete without analyzing various parties' tendencies to perceive democracy on a merely procedural merit. The AP, similar to the DP, pointed to democracy as the fundamental principle of the party. AP policy and discourse also indicates more importance given to the procedural tenets of democracy than to its substantive aspects. Along these lines, in the first Article of the party program, the goal of the party was defined in this way: "the AP works to make the Turkish nation a democratic, progressive and affluent member of the Western liberal world" (*AP Programı*, 1969:3). In Article 2, it was stated that "we perceive the Western⁹³ democratic order as befitting human honor, respect to citizens' freedom of thought, freedom of movement and freedom of conscience; realization of...human welfare and happiness, virtuous, the most progressive and perfect social order" (*AP Programı*, 1969:3). Unlike the DP, the AP also reserved a place for decentralization in the party program's description of a viable democratic system (Articles 4 and 87). The party further emphasized the necessity of the principle of the rule of law (Article 3). However, in the discourse of the protagonists of the party, "a democratic rule of law should be based on the nation['s] will" (Demirel, 1973:35), and thus they heavily criticized the extensive scope of the judicial powers.

Similar to the DP, elections were the main instrument that provided power for the AP in the legitimate democratic realm. What differentiated the AP from the DP—the latter's demand for the presence of free and fair elections—was already institutionalized in the

⁹³ Cizre posits that the emphasis on 'the West' in AP discourse was a strategy of legitimizing the AP and an attempt to differentiate the party from the DP (1993:39). The party also utilized the concept of "modern Western civilization" (*çağdaş Garp medeniyeti*) in the first party programme of 1961.

AP's term. Therefore, the AP's main *problematique* was the probability of state elites underestimating (but not tampering with) election results. For instance, following the 1961 elections, the AP's considerable election success was not seen as a sufficient reason to grant the party a role in sharing governmental power. Even after the 1965 election victory, Demirel was unsure whether state elites would allow him to form a government.

These experiences made Demirel especially suspicious of the limits of governmental power—to a different degree than Menderes. Considering that the reserved domains of state elites and the new Constitution would not permit the AP to dominate all realms of politics, the AP government put in place a number of specific amendments to enjoy majoritarian democracy even as they stressed the value of elections and vote. In this vein, when the AP took power, the TBMM elections relied on a d'Hondt version of proportional representation while Senate elections relied on a majority system. Both majoritarian Senate and d'Hondt versions of Parliament election rules changed after the AP's emergence as the candidate most capable of drawing the majority's support (Özbudun in Weiner and Özbudun, 1987:344). As a party whose pragmatism was prized far more than its democratic credentials, the AP was also crucially set against the representation of minor parties in the parliament. On election procedures, Demirel usually reacted negatively to the national remainder system⁹⁴ (*milli bakiye sistemi*) which he interpreted as an instrument for the domination of minorities over the national will (*Milliyet*, 21.09.1965). To Demirel, the purpose of this system was to prevent the

⁹⁴ Only the 1965 elections were carried out according to the national remainder system; this regulation was abandoned on 01.03.1968.

establishment of a strong single party government by eroding the national will (*Milliyet*, 26.09.1965).

As a procedural democrat, Demirel usually emphasized the value of votes: "...ballot is not simply a piece of paper. Conceptions of national sovereignty and national will, as the cornerstones of the regime, become applicable through the voting institution (...) after voting, a citizen should follow its vote, should possess it all" (Demirel, 1973:178). Apparently, what he understood from the vote was not every single vote, but rather majority votes. Against criticism of the populist vote approach, Demirel posited that: "concern for votes is the fundamental element of democracy. If the vote were to disappear, there wouldn't be an electorate, and if [the] electorate were to disappear, there wouldn't be [a] democracy. If the concern [for the]vote were to disappear, there wouldn't be responsibility and effort" (Demirel, 1973:38-2). Clearly, votes and working to win elections were the fundamental requirements of the AP's approach to democracy. Demirel was also proud that the AP was able to gather the votes of a wide range of society comprised of peasants, workers, merchants and businessmen (Demirel, 2004:79). As a party that relied on such broad popular support, one of the particular demands of the AP was to introduce the referendum procedure for conflictual issues. Demirel stated that the "referendum should be a way of directly using the right of national sovereignty in every necessary conjuncture" (Demirel, 1973:275), which verifies Westlind's hypothesis that the referendum is perceived by populist leaders as a means of direct democracy (1996:209). The AP experience, with its emphasis on the ballot box as the most apparent and dominant factor of democracy constituted a classical center-right attitude, which tended to reduce democracy to elections.

3.4.2.1. Limited Perception of Democracy

Its partially inflated, procedural perception of democracy led the AP to see nothing wrong with limiting individual and group rights and freedoms. Thus, AP policy and discourse sometimes veered in a more authoritarian direction, which was unacceptable for either a substantive or a liberal democratic structure.

The AP elite tended to accuse the 1961 Constitution of overtly expanding individual rights such as freedom of publication, freedom of congregation demonstration and protest, freedom to establish associations and political parties without the government approval, and freedom of the expression of thought—all of which were, according to the AP a threat to the regime and brought chaos to the country (Demirel, 1973:13-2). Holding such basic liberties as a handicap before the regime was an obvious sign of the limits of AP's democratic perception. In this regard, the AP government tried to set limits on the scope of freedoms. For instance, on March 1969 the autonomy of TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Institution) was restricted by accusing TRT of becoming “a state within a state” (Ahmad, 1977: 245). With this regulation, if the government found it necessary, it obtained the right to change the head of TRT. Furthermore, the content of the broadcasts were rewritten according to the ‘values’ of society, for the protection of the people against dangerous ideologies (*Milliyet*, 20.03.1969). Students protested this draft and were concerned about the government's intention to use TRT for its own political aims (*Milliyet*, 22.03.1969), which unsurprisingly did not change the government's decision.

As stated in the second chapter, a dominant assumption in democracy theory suggests that a viable and robust civil society is one of the essential preconditions for the consolidation of a liberal democracy through broadening political participation and enabling more efficient control of the elected by the people. In that regard, satisfying only the most procedural tenets of democracy, the AP was reluctant to share its governmental power with civil society. In Article 77 of the party program, which took for granted parliament's role as the fundamental institution of public administration, the party openly rejected the intervention of interest groups and other institutions in government and posited the freedom of government, free of all external influences, as a *sine qua non* for democratic order (1969:32-2). Thus, a majoritarian appeal to democracy dominated the AP mentality, which was ready to ignore civil society entirely. A similar disposition can be detected in the discourse of Demirel: "neither opposition outside the parliament nor interest groups are the partners of sovereignty" (1973:314). Thus, elections were perceived as the main instrument of political participation (Demirel 2004:226) and the power obtained via the elections was not to be shared by any other forces.

Apart from the instrumentalization of TRT and the reluctance of the party to grant the right of speech to non-elected bodies including civil society, leftist movements enjoyed one of the largest gains from the AP's limits on democracy. We have identified that DP's ambivalent and flexible self-positioning in the left-right spectrum, a shade to the left of CHP on some issues and a shade to the right of CHP on others in the very beginning. Nonetheless, the DP then also began to indicate the left wing ideologies as a threat. As the perpetuation of this tradition, the AP, clearly represented itself as a right

wing party, describing communism, in official party documents, as one of the greatest threats to the unity of the nation. To the AP, the left represented the internationalist, anti-traditionalist and less religious wing that aimed to damage the values of the nation as well as the democratic system. In that vein, the AP government did not refrain from suppressing the left, and even relied on police violence (Demirel, 2004:245). One of the tragic outcomes of this attitude occurred in February 16, 1969 with the death of two leftist activists who, in an anti-imperialist discourse, protested the 6th fleet's arrival to İstanbul (*Milliyet*, 16.02.1969). The AP also tried to close down the socialist Turkish Worker's Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi* – the TİP); some AP deputies tried to lynch TİP deputy Çetin Altan in the TBMM (Demirel, 2004:246). That the leftist trio Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnönü and Yusuf Arslan were subjected to capital punishment further demonstrated the vengeance of the trio Menderes, Polat and Zorlu in AP circles (Demirel, 2004:248). The head of the court Ali Everdi, who ordered the execution of Gezmiş, İnönü and Arslan was furthermore awarded by the AP, which named him a deputy. Such an intolerant attitude of the AP towards the left can also be seen in their approach to workers' unions. As a rival to TURK-IS, a moderate workers' union,⁹⁵ a more left wing union was founded under the name of the DISK (Confederation of the Revolutionist Workers' Union). AP passed a Trade Unions Law in 1969 and 1970: “a strike was permitted only after the conflict had been discussed in a special court (...) resignation from a trade union could become valid only if it was registered by a public notary; a confederation could receive the right to represent the workers of a certain branch only if more than 50 per cent of them were its members” (Levi in Heper and

⁹⁵ In the mid-1970's, TURK-IS lost its close relationship with the AP by accusing the Nationalist Front governments of disloyalty to the regime.

Landau, 1991:143). Hence, the AP restricted the representative power of DISK, which acted on behalf of TURK-IS. Thus, one may argue that AP, deprived of revealing a certain opposition against the 27 May elite and against the institutions founded by the coup directed its hostility towards the far-left.

The AP's attitude towards the left did vary from period to period. The leader of the party sometimes struggled with intra-party opposition; Demirel, as a relatively moderate leader, refrained from despotic measures against the left. Nevertheless, the soft attitude of Demirel was rarely interpreted as an earnest response to the demands of the left by the AP members. Thus, in 1968, one of Demirel motto's emerged from an intra-party conflict over the student movements. In an Ankara Province Congress, a delegate accused the government of remaining silent on the issue of leftist student meetings and protests. Demirel supported the freedom of protest and of assembly as a Constitutional right, and said that "the roads would not be eroded by walking" (*yollar yürümekle aşınmaz*), and unless the groups engaged in violence, they could comfortably make use of their right to protest (Donat, 2005:10-2; Demirel, 1973:39-2). Similarly, Cizre suggests that Demirel refrained from strict authoritarianism in order to save the party from the same tragic fate of the DP (Cizre, 1993:64-2). This motto can also be interpreted as an apathetic leaning of Demirel, ignoring youth demands (Arat in Heper and Sayarı, 2002:95). In other instances, he made clear his position to such protests: "to whom and why to resist in a country where liberties are widely exercised?" (Demirel, 1973:55). The AP believed that liberties were sufficiently widespread in Turkey since, along with the guarantee of basic rights, institutionalized elections determined who would govern the country. With self-confidence in the perpetuation of such a system,

the AP saw no harm in either the suppression of the leftist opposition or apathy towards their expectations.

The AP's intolerance towards the opposition was not only reserved for the left. The AP also took issue with the Islamic far-right. For instance, Necmettin Erbakan, a pro-Islamist figure was elected as chief of TOBB (the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges) despite the government's clear efforts to prevent this. As a reaction to Erbakan's election, the AP set limits on TOBB's right to set export quotas (Demirel, 2004:228). It is worth noting here that the government's resistance to Erbakan was not reducible to Erbakan's Islamic identity. It had more to do with the divergent economic worldviews of the AP and Erbakan. Before being elected, on May 1968 Erbakan harshly criticized the government for making Turkey an open market for Europe and America, resulting in the government taking a hostile stance towards him (Ahmad, 1977: 245). Erbakan's election thus shows again the AP government's lack of tolerance for oppositional forces.

Demirel was also reluctant to provide political rights to former DP members, as proposed by İnönü in 1969 (Demirel, 2004:47). Waiting until November 1969 for the Constitutional change granting the political rights to the Democrats—despite the promulgation of an amnesty law in 1966—suggests that the main reason behind this delay was Demirel's predilection to eliminate his political rivals and in particular to prevent Bayar's political reappearance in AP circles.⁹⁶ At the same time, AP senators rejected this Constitutional change under the pressure of the military, which was

⁹⁶ As a response to the AP's indolence, a new pressure group called "Our Home" (*Bizim Ev*) under the leadership of Celal Bayar was founded.

interpreted at the time as a major appeasement (Cizre, 1993:79-2; Demirel, 2004:48). As a result of this process, symbolically important people such as Bayar's daughter Nilüfer Gürsoy and Samet Ağaoğlu's wife Neriman Ağaoğlu resigned from both the AP and deputyship and Bayar called for former DP supporters to refrain from voting in the 1969 elections, which led to a small decrease in AP votes (Ahmad, 1977: 244). After the elections, Demirel founded a self-made cabinet without concerning the intra-party opposition's demands that convened around Sadettin Bilgiç. This group did not give a vote of confidence to the new AP government which led to the immediate resignation of the government (Demirel, 2004:58). The AP responded by simply expelling those deputies from the party. Thus by the end of the 1960's, both the former DP cadre and the intra-party opposition were ousted from the AP as a result of the party's exclusive mentality—all of which foretold a forthcoming further polarization within the party.

Gradually the AP began to abandon its democratic concerns after the 1969 elections. In its 1969 government program, the AP began to stress the necessity of being vigilant of the abuse of rights and liberties.⁹⁷ The party now began to challenge the 27 May regime more openly by criticizing of the scope of its approach to democracy, accusing it of being too liberal instead of questioning the legitimacy and the approach of the 27 May coup. Nevertheless, the 1971 memorandum was a milestone after which the AP's perception of democracy contracted significantly.

⁹⁷ In the previous government program, the party positioned itself as loyal to the 27 May regime while also trying to garner respect for a civilian government.

3.4.2.2.The 12 March Memorandum and the Weakening of the AP's Emphasis On Democracy

The increased authoritarianism of the AP to some extent resembled DP's position. Yet the AP showed its intolerance to the opposition in more subtle ways than the DP until the 1971 coup, if only because the AP could not win as significant of a parliamentary majority as the DP during its period of rule. In spite of using authoritarian means to some extent, in the last analysis neither the DP nor the AP governments deserved such military interventions. In fact, what prepared the grounds and gave ostensible justification for the 1971 intervention had to do with the inability of the AP government to adequately deal with the current situation it faced.

In the 1969 elections, popular support for the AP dropped to 46.5 percent, corresponding to 256 out of 450 seats in Parliament. Especially after the 1969 elections, Demirel to some extent lost his credibility within the party. This was also a result of Demirel's reluctance to reinstate the political rights of former Democrats and to share governmental power with the intra-party opposition centered around Bilgiç. Turkey was also influenced by more worldwide changing political dynamics. Left and right wing workers and university students were polarized. In addition to increased levels of political violence, even some landless peasants attempted to occupy the lands of large landholders (Özbudun, 2000:33). The mass media began to note the deficiencies of the AP government. The political instability of the government complicated governmental efforts to deal effectively with the growing instability. On 11 February 1970, Demirel resigned from the prime ministry. The AP's arithmetical weakness undermined further government shifts until 1971.

On 12 March 1971 a memorandum was published by the military allegedly to end anarchy, strife and economic unrest, placing the responsibility for the current chaotic situation on the government and parliament. Interestingly, the timing and motives of the memorandum were not well grounded and the justification of the memorandum was quite weak (Ahmad, 1977:205). The military urged civilian politicians and especially the governing AP that unless they could found a “credible” government, the military would seize power.⁹⁸ In the following two years, supra-party governments composed largely of bureaucrats and technocrats ruled the country.

Demirel stated that “On 12 March 1971, they did not take the government from my hands, instead, they took the core of the regime, they deteriorated democracy” (Donat, 2005:86). Such complaints by Demirel and the AP notwithstanding, the party in fact did not take a clear side against the memorandum and tried to survive with a hope of at least sharing governmental power. The AP thus supported the further actions of the interim governments of 1971-1973 through providing ministers from the AP to these governments, supporting the emerging Constitutional amendments and speaking positively of the military. Within a two-year period, 55 Articles of the 1961 Constitution were changed and the AP supported a great majority of these amendments (Cizre, 1993:111). Hence, with the support of the AP, some particular liberties were restricted while the executive and the military aspects of government were empowered (Özbudun, 2000:34, 57; Harris in Heper and Evin, 1988:188). Without seriously taking a position against the memorandum, the AP seemed to be thankful to the coup elite,

⁹⁸As Cizre suggests, even Süleyman Demirel’s moderate attitude towards the military and his willingness to respond to almost every military demand could not prevent the memorandum. It could only have perhaps been prevented through punishing the culprits of the 1960 coup and taking precautions to encourage discipline within the army (1993:85).

seeing that they did not close the AP—a fact that considerably bolstered the military’s role in Turkish politics in the subsequent years (Cizre, 1993:94). Apparently perceiving the military as a natural political actor, Demirel stressed the importance of a harmonious relationship between the military, government, and the parliament (Cizre 1993:96).

In addition to keeping silent on the empowerment of the military as a political actor, Demirel also condoned unfair attempts at targeting the AP. For instance, as the champion of elections in the past, the AP did not challenge any sort of unfair practices against it. Levi shed light on this, saying “In different elections, the High Election Council invalidated the JP candidates after the elections, when they were already winners. In many cases, the RPP candidates who lost in the elections received the nomination. Against these decisions, the JP could do nothing (...)” (in Heper and Landau, 1991:146). Furthermore, buttressing the State Security Courts (*Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri*)⁹⁹ and martial law procedures strengthened the AP’s collaboration with the 12 March regime and its suppression of the Kurds as well as far-leftists (Cizre, 1993:133). Thus, accepting the exceptional role of the military in a system and leaving unchallenged the unfair measures taken against the AP, the party moved away from its previously strong democratic rhetoric.

As a party that claimed to be the heir of the DP, that justified itself with reference to the national will, and that was recently injured by a military memorandum, the silent and moderate attitude of the AP could be explained by the party’s miscalculation of the means by which it could stay in power. The AP had hoped for a future AP government

⁹⁹ These courts were abolished in 1976 but were reintroduced after the 1980 intervention and lasted until 2004.

and took for granted the support of the masses. Thus, the party pragmatically planned to develop unproblematic relations with the 12 March elite—precisely what later was seen as the major handicap of the AP government, since in Turkish politics, nothing can be taken for granted, including public support.

So, the AP largely abandoned its democratic discourse and tried to collaborate with the military. This can be interpreted as suggesting that the main concern of the AP was to stay in power or at least to share in power rather than to end the crisis in democratic rule. Such an apparent stance cost the party votes: specifically, a decrease of popular support down to 29.8 percent in the 1973 elections. Even in the 1977 elections, the AP could not regain its previous position, and received only 36.9 percent of votes. In addition to the AP's changing stance on democracy, the increased polarization of the left-right division accelerated the nationalist right, the Iranian Revolution influenced Islamic uprisings, and the former Democrats reorganized under the flag of the Democratic Party as a center right rival. All these factors played a significant role in the AP's loss of support.¹⁰⁰ Turkish politics shifted from a stable and moderate two-party political system to a more fragmented, volatile and polarized one (Özbudun, 2000:74; Ergüder and Hofferbert in Heper and Evin, 1988: 84-5). In the subsequent years, AP continued in its role as the major partner in coalition governments or as the main opposition party concerned with matters of security and the democratic authority of the state, or of defending the country against communism, having largely abandoned its concerns with the expansion of democracy and the representation of the national will.

¹⁰⁰ One of the main reason for the split of DP from AP was the latter's ambivalent attitude towards granting political rights to former Democrats. This protracted process ended with a suggestion of the President and some AP senators rejected a bill granting those rights in 1969.

In other words, following the 1973 elections, a new composition of the parliament brought two clear outcomes. First, no stable single party government was able to rule Turkey until the 1980's. Second, the political right in Turkey was mostly fragmented and the AP was no longer the only possible option for the right-wing electorate. After the unsuccessful coalition attempts of CHP and MSP, Demirel asked the fragmented right wing parties to form a coalition of the right.¹⁰¹ Demirel thus returned to the prime ministry supported by the rightist Nationalist Front (Milliyetçi Cephe).

The Nationalist Front resembled to a more tragic version of the Fatherland Front experience of the DP, considering their confrontational and harsh rhetoric. Yet the quarrel now slid more into the emerging rifts between left and right.¹⁰² A strong defense of rightism began for AP when Demirel remarked that the rightist wings could never harm the country because their national responsibility prevented them from creating chaos (Demirel, 2004:72). The main motive of the Nationalist Front was described as democracy, nationalism, hostility to communism as well and the struggle against poverty (Ahmad, 1977:347). Hence, alongside AP's increasing nationalism, the anti-socialist identity of the party outweighed its classical center-right democratic stance. The AP thus developed a more confrontational attitude towards the left and began to drift towards a position calling for a strengthened state mission at the cost of democracy. In that vein, blaming Ecevit and the CHP for supporting radical left and Kurdist

¹⁰¹ Different than far-nationalist and far-Islamist parties, the DP under the administration of Ferruh Bozbeyli as the center-right alternative of the AP did not want to join such kind of coalition. This setback led to the longest ministerial crisis of Turkish politics, which lasted for 213 days (Ahmad, 1977:348). Then, as a reaction to Celal Bayar's resignation from the DP, a great majority of the DP deputies decided to support Demirel's Nationalist Front coalition.

¹⁰² Especially after the year 1965, the entrance of TİP into parliament with 15 deputies and CHP's positioning itself to the left of center in the 18th Grand Congress accelerated AP's identification as right wing.

separatists the AP elite began to report the CHP to the military (Özbudun, 2000:37-2; Cizre, 1993: 236-2). Hence, though it did not develop similar relations with the religious right, the AP did see no harm in mobilizing and supporting nationalist youth in opposition to the “communist threat”. Engaging and spearheading such a coalition linked the AP ever more tightly to the nationalist far right.¹⁰³ Ahmad suggests that the asymmetrical power of MHP in the streets in comparison to its very limited power in parliament provided useful energy for the AP (Ahmad, 1977: 347). The AP thus broadened its nationalist discourse even criticizing Ecevit for his use of the term *Türkiyeli* (an inclusive territorial identification simply meaning ‘one from Turkey’) instead of *Türk* (Turk, a word with ethnic and racial connotations, at least within its nationalist uses). We thus see that during the 1970’s polarization on the basis of a left-right cleavage escalated in Turkey and the AP’s policies and discourses to an important degree became more marginalized in comparison to the AP of the 1960’s.

In the pre-1980 period, anarchy, Kurdistan, and secessionism created rifts in Turkish politics and made it difficult to seek reconciliation among AP and CHP. Although martial law handed over police power to the military, as a result of which a restrictive administration was introduced, no positive outcome resulted (Özbudun, 2000:35). Tensions escalated in particular because of the hopeless process of electing a new President as well as the reluctance of AP and CHP to form a coalition government. The political crisis, which rejected all possibilities for compromise, along with the increasing chaos in the streets meant that the governments of late 1970’s were unable to handle the situation. The military in that vein saw it right to interrupt civilian politics.

¹⁰³ The main distinction between the AP’s and MHP’s nationalism probably comes down to the fact that the former had a western outlook and was less localist and more moderate (Cizre, 1993: 39).

3.5. ANAP and Democracy

A classical center-right procedural understanding of democracy was also apparent in ANAP policy and discourse, especially during the prime ministry of Özal, but with more of an emphasis on liberalization. Far from being a passive president, Özal paved the way for the considerable expansion of a liberal democratic framework in Turkey. In addition to ANAP, he also worked with the DYP- SHP coalition as well. Before his death, Özal, as the most prominent leader of ANAP, raised his criticisms towards ANAP due to its authoritarian and undemocratic inclinations. Without any doubt, ANAP under the influence of Özal took significant steps towards the further democratization of Turkey. Yet in ways no different than its predecessors, ANAP also had clear limits to its approach to democracy. Before considering ANAP's relationship to democracy, it is first necessary to consider the context within which ANAP took power.

As previously mentioned, the 1980 coup tended to see almost every civilian political actor as responsible for the crisis, which unsurprisingly eliminated all civilian political parties and other significant political actors from the political realm. This purge covered mayors and municipal councils as well as parliamentarians and installed the National Security Council as the main power holder and Kenan Evren as the self-proclaimed head of state (Zürcher, 2004:278). After the intervention, the military—without distinguishing military rulers from active commanders of forces (Hale, 1994:249)—enjoyed a great scope of power under martial law and strictly controlled the press, education, trade unions and almost all segments of political life.

As a result of the intervention, though ideological polarization and violence decreased, the military elite—now the political elite—reshaped the political structure entirely by introducing a new constitution written by the Consultative Assembly, which endured beyond the intervention. The Consultative Assembly (wherein state elites had the ultimate power) was less representative than the House of Representatives of the 1961 Constitution. But this time, the Consultative Assembly was more dependent on the National Security Council (Özbudun, 2000:58; Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009:19). The main theme of the new Constitution was composed of two incentives. First, the extended rights and liberties granted by the 1961 Constitution were to be restricted such as freedom of speech, freedom of association and the rights of trade unions. Second, as a reflection of mistrust of civilians, presidential power was strengthened. Thus, high court judges and university rectors began to be appointed by the president since the military regime viewed both the judiciary and universities as crucial institutions (Özbudun, 2000: 59). Having hindered many forms of opposition propaganda and made voting compulsory,¹⁰⁴ the Constitution was accepted with 91.3 per cent yes votes on 7 December 1982, which also automatically made Evren the president of Turkish Republic for the next seven years.

In such a context, where all political life was under the control of the 12 September regime, the approval of the military elite played a crucial role in any party's sustainability. In this context, Özal was the technocrat behind the 24 January decisions implemented in 1980 and meant to combat economic shortfall and to some extent

¹⁰⁴ To demonstrate the undemocratic nature of the referendum process, Zürcher notes that: "Voting was made compulsory and anyone who chose not to – or neglected to – vote, not only had to pay a fine but also lost his or her right to vote for five years" (2004:281).

integrate the isolated Turkish economy into the world economy. This process also enabled the rise of Özal to the position of undersecretary in charge of economics in the AP government. Özal had the opportunity to give briefings to high-ranking soldiers to explain this program before the intervention. His image was that of an intelligent and smart economist after the intervention, and since economics was an overlooked area within the military, Özal was invited into the military government as deputy prime minister to manage economic matters. Despite his resignation after two years of collaboration with the military regime, in 1983 he founded ANAP with the approval of President Kenan Evren (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:143).¹⁰⁵ This was crucial for the survival of the party, since all other parties were closed down by the junta government except ANAP and two other parties. ANAP was thus able to participate in the 1983 elections as a party that was approved but not supported¹⁰⁶ by the military elite.

Consequently when ANAP won a parliamentary majority with 45.1 per cent of votes¹⁰⁷ and 211 seats, the conjuncture of Turkey was far from a completely civilian political atmosphere. Even the place of the prime minister within the state protocol was seventh in rank, behind four council members—an open absurdity for a liberal democracy. Predictably, Özal was not sure whether Evren would give the right to form the government to himself or not. In such an atmosphere, Özal was invited to the Presidency, and in his first meeting, he kissed the cheeks of Evren, which was an extraordinary act and attitude for a state official. Some observers have suggested that

¹⁰⁵In spite of approving of ANAP, the military regime was far from allowing the free organization of ANAP. Seven founding members of the party were vetoed. Evren stipulated that Özal not allow far rightist and far Islamist people to join the party (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:160,181).

¹⁰⁶Evidently, Kenan Evren announced that he would support General Turgut Sunalp's Nationalist Democracy Party just before the elections (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:188-2). However, the image of 'having not been supported by the junta elite' might increased popular support for ANAP.

¹⁰⁷In the 6 November 1983 elections, HP and MDP obtained 30,4 and 23,2 per cent of votes respectively.

this attempt was the first sign of the civilianization of Turkish politics (Birand and Yalçın, 2009). However, things were not so straightforward. The composition of the cabinet had changed in accordance with the president's suggestions (Cemal, 1983:66-2). Even the National Security Council was abolished on 13 December 1983. Martial law, suppression of the press and of trade unions continued along with two significant cases, namely the DISK case and the Turkish Peace Association case (Dağı in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:252; Hale, 1994:253). As a result, particularly until the 1984 local elections, the scope of power available to the civilian Özal government was quite limited. In the 1984 elections, ANAP obtained 41.5 per cent of votes which corresponded to almost 1000 municipalities across the country (Cemal 1989:193). After the local elections, ANAP government's self-reliance expanded and began to be less dependent on the 12 September regime.

3.5.1. National Will Emphasis as the Heir of the Center-Right

Despite the party's own identification as neither left nor right, but rather a combination of different tendencies, a study conducted by *Cumhuriyet* in 1987 found that 85 per cent of the electorates perceived ANAP as being on the right of the political spectrum (Cemal 1989:187, *Cumhuriyet* 06.11.1987). Furthermore, 50 per cent of people who voted for ANAP in the 6 November elections previously voted for AP in the 1977 elections.¹⁰⁸ With regards to the 36 percent showing of AP in the 1977 elections, it is possible to argue that almost 75 percent of AP electorates voted for ANAP, seeing the party as the

¹⁰⁸ Another 28 per cent voted for the CHP, 15 per cent voted for the MSP and 5 per cent voted for the MHP in 1977 (Cemal 1989:79).

successor of, or at least the most suitable alternative after, AP. However, Özal refrained from claiming any ties to the AP heritage which was probably the result of the different nature of the DP's and the AP's bitter ends, of which the former one was a victim of an undemocratic military intervention whilst the latter one following the 1971 military memorandum, somehow accepted to become the puppet of the soldiers. Instead, he emphasized the need for change, offering the concept of 'new politics'. When he did link his party to the past, he preferred to frame it as the heir of DP rather than AP.

Similar to DP and AP, ANAP founded its ideology on the concept of the national will. In the first article of its party program, ANAP placed national sovereignty and the superiority of the nation along with national unity and integrity above all else (*Anavatan Partisi Programı* 1983:17), which takes on more meaning after a military intervention. ANAP's emphasis on national will was thus also wrapped up in a mission of fostering national integrity and reducing the polarization and political terror experienced in the late 1970's. Özal stated:

Rejecting from the start the dichotomy inherited from the past and which it felt had no relevance to the present, the Motherland Party took general reconciliation as its starting point. It accepted into its ranks adherents of old movements in order to form, with their participation, a new synthesis, while at the same time trying to establish cordial relations with the other political parties (1991:305).

Özal's famous gesture of locking his hands on his head also gave the message of unity and togetherness. In the government programs, the party claimed to be the representative of everyone rather than of ANAP electorates per se (e.g. *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 19.12.1983 p.62). ANAP thus claimed to be a conglomeration of different and sometimes confrontational dispositions where liberals, nationalists, and Islamists found

a place. Despite some arguments to integrate the left under ANAP's umbrella as a fourth tendency, in practice, the left was not sufficiently represented. But this argument was largely intended to foster social peace and to decrease political tension in the country (Sezal in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:167). Nevertheless, the anti-communist discourse of DP and especially of AP was abandoned during ANAP times. In that vein, Çetin Altan, a former TİP deputy was a close friend of the Özal family, an important symbolic gesture suggesting the end of a war against Socialists (Cemal, 1989:309). By the same token, despite the criticisms both within and outside the party, former TİP leader Behice Boran's official funeral was permitted by the ANAP government (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:215). In the non-official funeral in Istanbul, the public representation of Socialism was also allowed (*Milliyet*, 19.10.1987). Similarly, Cem Karaca, a famous singer, who had a warrant issued for him during the intervention years due to his "separatist and leftist thoughts", was allowed to return to Turkey at the invitation of Özal (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:224-3). The ANAP government was thus relatively more tolerant towards different ways of thought, including Socialist ones. Portraying anarchy and terror as the main threats against national integrity, ANAP's vision of national will and sovereignty targeted the entire nation, with the exception of "terrorists".

Thus, the party's emphasis on national will to some extent differentiated it from DP's and AP's invocation of the term. The DP and the AP of the 1960's explicitly framed the will of the nation as something very much opposed to the center and the status quo. What these parties referred to as the national will to a large extent corresponded to the electoral majority. ANAP, without ignoring these differences, rather tried to attract all

people. And the party never raised its voice against the 12 September elite, unlike DP's and AP's initial stance. In a conjuncture wherein the military regime did not allow many parties to participate in elections, defending the national will went hand-in-hand with expressing gratitude to the military. Hence, the first ANAP government program expressed appreciation for the military for protecting the national sovereignty of the nation (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* 19.12.1983 p.63). In the same program, ANAP promised to join the national and state will—a new idea in center-right ideology. Despite the fact that AP tried to seize and make use of state authority, especially in the 1970's, it did not refer to such a combination of national and state will. Yet ANAP, coming to power after a period of political turmoil, envisioned closing the prevailing gap between the center and the periphery in the interests of social peace.

Similar to DP and AP, a procedural understanding of democracy carried into ANAP's approach, though with some additional expansions. In ANAP's government program, national sovereignty was identified as the only fundamental principle of democracy (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 19.12.1983 p.67). In that vein, very similar to its antecedents, ANAP did (like its predecessors) toy with the election system, which helped the party to remain in power.¹⁰⁹ For instance, despite receiving 8.6 per cent fewer votes in the 1987 elections in comparison to the 1983 elections, ANAP gained 80 more deputies in 1987. Citing the need for stability as pretext, these kinds of arbitrary amendments on the part of ANAP suggest a vision of democracy as a procedural virtue, which may have

¹⁰⁹ Among the amendments to the election system, one may consider Law No: 2972 on 18.01.1984; Law No: 3270 on 28.03.1986; Law No: 3330 on 19.02.1987; Law No: 3370 on 23.05.1987; Law No: 3403 on 10.09.1987; Law No: 3404 on 17.10.1987.

provided short term benefits to the party but estranged the party from liberal democratic ideals.

3.5.1.1. Democratic Reforms

One of the main peculiarities of Özal's policies was his emphasis on economic development as a prerequisite for a viable liberal democracy. Hence, during his prime ministry, liberalization largely focused on the economic realm. After his presidency, he increasingly emphasized political democratization. Our analysis of ANAP's democratic policies considers three main areas: the civilianization of politics, the expansion of individual rights, and the emphasis of collective and ethnic freedoms.

Özal was aware of the necessity of the civilianization of politics for a liberal democracy. This explains his wish for linking the Chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of National Defense (*Milli Savunma Bakanlığı* - the MSB), appointing the assistant secretary of the MSB from the ranks of civilians rather than the military, and demilitarizing the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) (Cemal, 1989:224). Yet because of the 1980 military intervention, none of the reforms were carried out satisfactorily during Özal's reign. For instance, Özal appointed Hıram Abas, a civilian, to head MIT, but this did not last long. For the civilianization of politics, the ANAP government changed the place of the prime minister within the state protocol or state hierarchy by eliminating the four Council member generals above the prime minister. In 1987, against the planned appointment of the Chief of the General Staffs, Özal acted courageously and appointed Necip Toruntay to this position (*Milliyet*, 30.06.1987).

This was an extraordinary initiative and went against the established practice of the army, which paved the way for the civilianization of politics. Özal's decisions underscored the superiority of governmental power and lowered soldiers' expectations of future political positions.

Another significant step in the ANAP period for the civilianization of politics was the election of Turgut Özal as president. As a country accustomed to seeing ex-Generals as presidents, Özal made an effort to break this tradition. Before and after he declared his candidacy, the press and secular groups resisted his presidency, since, with his religious practices and his informal style, he could not be the head of the Turkish army (Cemal, 1989:260). In fact, it is possible to find a link between Celal Bayar and Turgut Özal's presidencies insofar as Bayar became the first civilian president elected after the democratization process in Turkey. Celal Bayar, though hailing from a Kemalist ideological background, was distinguished from his predecessors Atatürk and İnönü on the basis of his background as an economist. Turgut Özal also opened the way for the civilianization of the presidency in Turkey after a major breakdown in the democratic process. Civilianization also had an impact on center-periphery relations. Having largely transformed the center to the military, the 1982 constitution formulated a strong president who would hail from the center and protect the state from the periphery, yet Özal's presidency interrupted this plan. Winning the presidency as a civilian, he paved the way for the subsequent election of civilians to this position. In a sense, then, Özal reinstated the gains of DP's tenure with regard to the presidency.

On the expansion of individual rights, ANAP aimed for universal standards through signing a number of conventions, although it was often unable to adequately implement

their conditions. In the course of its application to full membership in the European Community (the EC), ANAP accepted the individual right of appeal to the European Commission on Human Rights, although the main motivation was to show that Turkey was “politically mature enough to be a full member of the EC” (Dağı, 2001:34). The European Social Charter and the Paris Charter were also signed in this term (Özbudun in Sezal, 1996:109). By the same token, in response to the West’s criticism of Turkey on matters of torture and maltreatment, ANAP first founded a commission to study these claims and then accepted the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment as well as the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Cemal, 1989:315; Dağı in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:274). In line with these conventions, ANAP abolished Articles 140, 141, 142, 163 of the penal code and initiated a significant process of political liberalization (Özbudun in Sezal, 1996:108; Birand and Yalçın, 2009:329-2), which also ended the ban on speaking Kurdish. Furthermore, though unable to abolish the death penalty, capital punishment largely stopped during ANAP’s rule.

The 1982 Constitution set certain limits on the development of a viable plural civil society. ANAP was simply unable to reshape the institutional structure. Despite two amendments by ANAP in 1988 and 1991, the legal framework was still far from satisfactory for a liberal democracy. Nevertheless, in practice, the Özal family tried to be a role model for society with Semra Özal’s initiatives such as founding The Association for the Empowerment of Turkish Women in 1986.¹¹⁰ Furthermore,

¹¹⁰ This association is also accused of spreading a clientelistic network, due to the fact that the association collected considerable amounts of donations and in turn distributed a number of grants to its members (Cemal, 1989:140-2).

changing political dynamics, in the atmosphere of globalization, such as the growing expectations of Islamic and ethnic groups' *vis-à-vis* pro-secularist protectionism (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003:223) along with ANAP's tolerance to the expression of divergent thoughts paved the way for an increase in the scope and number of civil society associations during ANAP rule.

Beyond these transformations, ANAP's symbolic incentives promoted pluralism in society. In addition to a number of gestures to leftist intellectuals and musicians mentioned above, ANAP also abolished the stage ban on Bülent Ersoy, a transsexual singer banned in the aftermath of the 1980 coup.¹¹¹ Turgut Özal and his wife even attended Ersoy's night club concerts (Cemal, 1989:140), an apparent indication of the respect of the Özal family of her identity. Matters of gender often have been an index of left-right cleavage, especially in the post-materialist context.¹¹² In that vein, ANAP's support for Ersoy, which included passing a law allowing her to obtain a pink (female) identity card, could be seen as reformist politics. ANAP also made abortion a legal and routine operation in state hospitals (*Milliyet*, 07.01.1984). Abortion is often considered a litmus test separating left and right in the post-materialist literature, which suggests that right wing parties are usually reluctant to accept or expand abortion rights (e.g. Inglehart, 1990; 1997; Eysenck, 1976, Nolan, 2000). In this regard, ANAP was far a

¹¹¹ For details about the legal struggle of Bülent Ersoy throughout the 1980's, see Öncü Keçeli. 2010. *Constructing Morality For Turkey: The Moral Campaign of the 1980s as a Novel Technique of Governing*. Unpublished PhD Dissertation. Ankara: Bilkent University, pp.139-10; Rüstem Ertuğ Altınay. 2008. "Reconstructing the Transgendered Self as a Muslim, Nationalist, Upper-Class Woman: The Case of Bulent Ersoy," *Women's Studies Quarterly* 36(3&4): 210-229.

¹¹² For a broad evaluation of relationship of the political right to transgenderism and transphobia, see: Patrick Califia. 2003. *Sex Changes: Transgender Politics*. 2nd ed. San Francisco: Cleis Press.

typical conservative rightist party. Instead, in many ways it exemplified a party of change, tolerance and pluralism.

One of the most telling democratic contributions of the ANAP government and especially Özal's presidency was indubitably opening the door for discussion of the Kurdish issue. This was a courageous step for the Turkish Republic due to the nationalist and Turkist-Kemalist founding ideology's strict approach. However, it is hard to argue that ANAP pursued a singular line on this issue. First of all, the party framed the issue in economic means. After the presidency of Özal, the cultural aspect of the issue began to be considered, which brought, to an extent at least, a softening of government policies with regards to Kurds and Kurdish politics.

ANAP tended to see the question as a primarily a matter of economic backwardness, and thus popularized the idea that if the eastern region were to develop economically, there would be no need for ethnic uprisings. With this incentive, and in parallel to a party program that envisaged decentralization as a solution to the implementation of quick and efficient policies, the government granted certain rights to municipalities and expanded their economic status. For instance, the authorization of public development and construction (*imar yetkisi*) was delegated to the municipalities, and municipal expenditures rose from 111.5 billion dollar to 1 trillion 298 million dollars between 1981 and 1987 (Cemal, 1989:321-2). However, the security structures of the state were also strengthened in this era. In 1985, a temporary *koruculuk* (village guard) system was introduced, and continued for years to be a dubious problem-solving mechanism. Additionally, in 1987, Martial Law Governance (*OHAL Valiliği*) and the Public Order Army Command (*Asayiş Ordu Komutanlığı*) were founded to struggle against separatist

Kurdish fractions (Gençkaya in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:109). The position of ANAP—their views on economic development along with the continued militarized approach to the PKK—to some extent continued in Özal's presidency period. In 1990, the *Southeastern Anatolian Project* (*Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi* or GAP) began to promote the economy of the region by building multiple dams to enable irrigation for agriculture and energy production. A law introduced in 1990 also envisaged the compulsory resettlement of people living in eastern villages (Gençkaya in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:109). We should note here that in general Özal preferred neither compulsory resettlement of the Kurds nor their voluntary migration (Heper, 2007: 136). As GAP projected, the initial intention was to keep people in their own regions while the state fostered economic development. ANAP only considered resettlement when the government could not cope with terror.

Especially after Özal's presidency, the Kurdish issue became more pronounced.¹¹³ Having distinguished the individual and collective rights of Kurds from separatist terror, Özal also offered to discuss such collective matters as opening local TV stations and allowing for education in Kurdish (Heper, 2007:135-2; *Milliyet* 19.08.1992). Approaching ethnic and cultural diversity as a source of richness, Özal began to emphasize Islam as a unifying source (Gençkaya in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:129). He tried to build dialogue with representatives of the Kurdish movement. In that vein, he invited

¹¹³ Apparently, the main reason for this transformation was not the presidency position. As time passed, economic liberalization was consolidated, which for Özal was a sine qua non for cultural liberalization. Furthermore, the international conjuncture also influenced his stance. On the influence of the Gulf War on Özal's Kurdish policies, see also Ömer Faruk Gençkaya. 2001. "Turgut Özal'in Güneydoğu ve Kürt Sorununa Bakışı," in Ihsan Sezal ve Ihsan Dağı (eds). *Kim Bu? Özal, Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*. İstanbul: Boyut, pp.143-3; Birand and Yalçın, 2009. *The Özal...* pp.451-2.

HEP deputies to Çankaya¹¹⁴ in a show of his willingness to allow payment of HEP from the state treasury. He also sent messages to Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK movement, in an effort to end the violence (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:455). He met with Barzani, the Kurdish leader in Northern Iraq and allowed such Kurdish activists as Kemal Burkay and Ahmet Türk to meet with Öcalan (Birand and Yalçın, 2009: 475-2). As a result of these negotiations, the PKK declared an armistice that lasted for two years. Unlike previous politicians, Özal also broached the subject of federalism, even while underscoring that he did not find this a feasible option (Heper, 2007:133; Birand and Yalçın, 2009:454-4). Such a liberal attitude was further strengthened by Adnan Kahveci's report, presented to Özal in 1992, that foresaw military approaches to the so-called Kurdish question as liable to push the country into civil war and underlined the necessity of recognizing Kurdish identity and specific cultural rights (Heper, 2007: 138).

Before ANAP won the 1983 elections, the military regime passed a law banning Kurdish in everyday speech and in publications. This law was abandoned on 12 April 1991 by the ANAP government¹¹⁵ (Özbudun in Sezal, 1996:108; Birand and Yalçın, 2009:476). Justifying the implementation of such a law as a significant step for democratization, ANAP deputies portrayed the former ban as a backwards measure, in hopes that this would bring a much-needed social peace (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 11.04.1991 p.401). Opposition deputies accused ANAP of exploiting the sensitivities of Kurdish citizens by taking measures to promote Kurdish (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*,

¹¹⁴ It is necessary to note here that the relations between Özal and HEP relations were not always smooth. For instance, after a terrorist attack, Özal accused HEP and said "They should not be under the roof of the TBMM" (*Milliyet*, 26.12.1991).

¹¹⁵ See Law No:2932 that bans speaking all languages except Turkish. The basis of this ban further rested on Articles 26 and 28 of the 1982 Constitution, with the required constitutional changes to come.

11.04.1991 p.387). By the same token, a broad amnesty was introduced that freed many Kurdish activists (*Milliyet*, 13.04.1991). Yet we should note that even if the policies and discourses of ANAP regarding the Kurdish issue were rather reformist considering the conditions of the late 1980's and the early 1990's, classical center-right pragmatism was present in ANAP policies as well. For instance, one of the rationales for tolerating a Kurdish party in the Assembly was motivated by the goal of dividing the electoral base of the SHP on the left. Furthermore, despite passing an amnesty law in 1991, in 1988 the same Özal and ANAP government opposed a very similar proposal by SHP and accused the party of negotiating with terror and separatist movements (Gençkaya in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:136). It is thus hard to claim that the priority of ANAP and Özal was further democratization. Yet even if the main concern of the party was on pragmatic calculations, ultimately these policies gradually helped to initiate the normalization of the Kurdish issue in the future.

Özal also conducted a second transformation program composed of a draft constitution that framed the state in terms of technical rather than ideological functions (Bozkurt in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:190). The same position could be observed in the DP and the AP in the 1960's as well; both spoke of the state as a service oriented paradigm rather than an ideological apparatus. Özbudun also notes that his proposed constitution was to a large extent composed of a bill of rights (Özbudun, 2000:60). Three liberties—freedom of thought, of conscience and of enterprise—were typically the main paradigms of the ANAP mentality. As Barlas says, in order to evaluate the Özal period adequately, it is first necessary to look at the pre-Özal period. Color TV was banned by the DPT so as to not waste money, possessing Marlboro or whisky was considered a crime; private

communication was restricted for not using digital network (Barlas 1994:259-21). The scope of the democratization policies of Özal did not consist of these three headings per se. The considerable transformations of lifestyles and their visibility in the public realm along with a developmentalist mentality also paved for the rise of a more free society. However, as observed in DP and AP, ANAP did not hesitate to place limits on democracy as well.

3.5.2. Limits on Democracy

The most apparent shortcoming in ANAP's understanding of democracy had to do with the relationship between the government and its opposition. Despite efforts to integrate Turkey into the West and liberalize its system, ANAP did not, in fact, represent a sufficiently mature attitude towards the opposition. Recalling that the 12 September regime eliminated all but three parties from the political scene, ANAP often made use of the coup conditions as a pretext to hinder other parties' competitiveness. As a party nurtured by a considerable dose of pragmatism, the ANAP gave a bad exam in that respect.

The first example of ANAP in this regard can be seen in the party's reluctance to issue a bill that would allow SODEP, the DYP and the RP to participate in the 1984 local elections. The party showed an apathetic attitude towards demands from the opposition. However, after polls indicated that ANAP could win even if these parties entered the elections (*Milliyet*, 06.01.1984), the ANAP government eventually passed a bill, just two months before the elections, that allowed opposition parties to compete with them in

the local elections. ANAP thus prevented to a significant degree newcomer parties from sufficiently preparing for the elections, such that the ruling party received 41.5 percent of the votes.

Another feverish debate at the time concerned the ban on prominent leaders from the pre-intervention period, particularly Süleyman Demirel of the DYP, the center-right rival of ANAP. In a reference to articles that introduced five and ten year bans on former leaders, Özal said “I entered politics relying on the provisional clauses of the constitution. Otherwise, I would not make politics” (Cemal 1989:23). This phobia of Özal persisted even after he won one general and one local election. After 1985, demands for the repeal of the bans on former leaders became more pronounced. Özal continued to claim that the President was the main handicap for the required amendment. Eventually, disturbed by Özal’s implications, Evren acknowledged on 7 May 1986 that he was in favor of the repeal, leaving Özal no room to escape (Cemal 1989:213). As a political engineer, before responding to the pressures on him to restore the political rights of the former leaders, Özal first went to a by-election on 28 September 1986 (for 11 deputyships) before Demirel’s entrance to the political arena and obtained 32 per cent of votes.

Özal then pursued an undemocratic process while deciding to take the decision to a referendum, with the excuse that “the public made this ban, and if necessary the public should abandon this ban”. As stated above, the referendum conditions of the post-intervention period were far from free and the public was more or less forced to vote in favor of the 1982 Constitution. In spite of this, ANAP subjected the former leaders’ right to engage in politics to a referendum instead of accepting this issue as a natural

democratic right. This incentive was far too undemocratic and unnecessary (Özbudun, 2000:62; Yayla in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:438).

More importantly, ANAP's position throughout the referendum process was a great trouble. Despite initially promising to remain impartial, with time the party clearly opposed granting these politicians political freedom. Operating the debate as the ANAP against the all other parties' coalition, Özal expected to benefit from such confrontation. Özal therefore announced on television that he would vote against the measure (Cemal, 1989:213). The party furthermore made frequent use in their propaganda of the color orange (the color of no). For instance, Güneş Taner from ANAP wore orange T-shirts with the word "no" to political rallies, where squares were decorated with orange banners (Cemal, 1989:215). Suggesting that a vote for "yes" would mean a return to the nightmare of violence and chaos that had provoked military intervention" (Ahmad, 1993:196), Özal suggested that voting "yes" was by no means related to democratic motivations. The campaign of the ANAP was largely successful and the "no" votes were almost equal to the "yes" votes, with less than 1 per cent margin. Although the political rights of the former leaders were restored, ANAP demonstrated the limits of its pro-democratic stance and drew serious criticisms from liberals.¹¹⁶

Regarding intra-party relations, ANAP under Özal represented a different style of policy making. In Turkey, given the prevalence in nearly all parties of leader domination regardless of left or right, Özal transformed the contents of leader domination. Without spending much time in the office, especially until 1987 Özal governed the country

¹¹⁶ For instance, Nur Vergin, who declared her previous votes went to ANAP, harshly criticized ANAP's attitude towards this issue as a break in the party's links with liberal democracy (*Nokta*, 01.05.1988:27; Cemal, 1989:309-2)

primarily from his home alongside his family. Surrounded by close friends, he preferred to pass decree laws (*Kanun Hükmünde Kararname* – KHK) from the cabinet instead of engage in Assembly legislation, thus bypassing dispute in the parliament.¹¹⁷ In contrast to Özal's liberal and tolerant image, he occasionally preferred to establish an oligarchy of sorts while governing the country. In that vein, Özal saw no harm in arbitrary changes. One of the most telling examples was the rejection of the head of the Assembly under the suggestion of Özal to call an extraordinary meeting to annul the early 1987 elections proposed by 100 deputies which was contrary to the procedures (Cemal, 1989:248). Even after his presidency, when Semra Özal became the Istanbul chair of the party, Turgut Özal tried to manipulate the policies, lists, and candidates of ANAP through his wife.

As part of a new generation of politics, ANAP actively utilized the media. A monthly TV programme called *İcraatın İçinden* (From within the Accomplishments), meant to share the government's activities with the masses, began to broadcast during the Özal era. The party thus found a space for self-propaganda. Similarly, before the 1987 elections, the disproportional use of the media by ANAP resulted in unjust representation. Hasan Cemal reports that before the 1987 elections, ANAP appeared on the screen for 65 minutes, compared to 11 minutes for the SHP and 10 minutes for the DYP and the DSP (Cemal, 1989:252). It is also worth noting that the first private TV station was founded by Özal's son Ahmet Özal and his partner Cem Uzan which also helped to expand support for ANAP.

¹¹⁷ Cemal notes that almost one third of the bills introduced during ANAP's tenure consisted of KHKs (Cemal, 1989:349).

In comparison to its predecessors, ANAP built longer-standing and better relationships with the press, particularly by the end of the 1980's. Özal called columnists on the telephone and discussed the prevailing debates in the country directly with them. He also tolerated many disdainful caricatures of himself. That said, on the other hand, press censorship proliferated during his tenure. After Özal's by-pass surgery and the intense opposition of some columnists to ANAP's attitude to restoring former leaders' political rights, relations between ANAP and the press became more problematic. The one-time tolerance towards journalists and intellectuals gradually diminished. For instance, Bekir Coşkun's research into the Özal family was halted by resorting to the court to stop publication of this research (Cemal, 1989:270).

Furthermore, the scope of a bill entitled "*küçükleri muzır neşriyattan koruma yasası*" (the bill on the protection of children from harmful publications) was extended twice during ANAP's tenure. The aim of a publication, the message it delivered, images, and the scientific (*ilmi*) value of a publication were all investigated within this law. Newspapers that published risqué photographs of celebrities were closed as well (*Milliyet*, 31.05.1986). Many books were withdrawn from circulation, many publishers and intellectuals paid considerable penalties and more than 2700 intellectuals, including very well-known names such as Ahmet Altan, Duygu Asena and Pınar Kür, were judged after the implementation of the amendments of this law (Cemal, 1989:312-2). Similarly, during Metin Emiroğlu's tenure at the National Education Ministry, reading Voltaire, Moliere and Camus was prohibited at schools on account of those authors' negative views about the Turkish nation (Cemal, 1989:163). Thus, a center-right attitude that

might favor conservative social norms over freedom of thought is sometimes observed in ANAP as well.

3.6. Conclusion

All in all, losing its astonishing position after the presidency of Özal, ANAP was dissolved after Özal's death and became a minor party in the center-right. As president, Özal criticized ANAP and the DYP for being too conservative, as those parties could not attract votes in the eastern part of Turkey, resisted change, and were hesitant to introduce new politics. As Lipset envisages, the longer a party stays in power, the more probability its authoritarianism (1960). This was observed in all center-right parties in Turkey, which might be a somehow natural result of their stay in power so long, they began to place some limits on their prior democratic stances. The ANAP also increased its limits on democracy especially after 1987 and engaged in few substantive aspects of democracy. Thus, in the late periods of its government in 1990's, the party grew closer to the status quo against the nation will.

In the subsequent years, the center-right parties engaged in a number of coalition governments. As Tosun observes, corruption claims along with the will of sharing the state power took the place of claims to represent the will of the nation. This resulted in the center-leftization of these parties in terms of their employment of democracy (1999). In that vein, identity politics (which promised a more ideological framework than the center-right) began to catch on with more people with its Islamist, Kurdist, and Turkist options. Islamic parties successfully mobilized the masses by combining a conservative

populist worldview with a service-oriented policy—which had been pursued by center-right parties before—as well as strong personal one-to-one or door-to-door interaction¹¹⁸. Public support for the National Outlook tradition was halted by a military intervention (called as “post-modern coup”) in 1997. That process accelerated the center-leftization of center-right parties in terms of their repositioning within the secular vs. religious cleavage. Especially ANAP lost ground, having kept silent about the repression of religion in the public sphere in the aftermath of the 28 February process, but so did the DYP. The National Outlook movement also split into a more moderate and a more Islamist camp, from which the Innovators led by Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül founded the AK Party in 2001. The center-right’s basic claims to represent the will of nation, respect election results, guarantee basic rights (including the religious rights), and establish close relations with the people through contrasting peripheral representation to state domination were to a large extent collapsed in the center-right parties’ attitudes. All these principles were also successfully endorsed by the AK Party. One of the last suicides of the center-right took place during the 27 April 2007 crisis wherein party leaders Erkan Mumcu and Mehmet Ağar decided to take a stance against the AK Party regarding the issue of presidential election, allegedly approving the military’s initiative. The center-right parties thus violated one of their most basic claims, the defense of the will of the nation, and hence moved closer to the center. All in all, the already diminished public support for those parties completely dissolved after this event. Süleyman Soylu, who represented one of the most promising classical center-

¹¹⁸ For a successful analysis of the rise of Islamic mobilization in Turkey, see: Jenny B. White. 2002. *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

right leaders, also became the leader of the Democrat Party (a unification of center-right parties), joined the AK Party in 2012.

In a nutshell, the center-right parties in Turkey were close to the procedural understanding of democracy that gave importance to national will, free, fair and competitive election, and respect for the majority's decisions while building close contact with the masses. They were usually an accessible organization for the periphery, which had been overlooked by the center for decades. Especially after Özal's tenure, the procedural understanding of democracy shifted from a minimalist interpretation to a broader understanding. Nevertheless, the Turkish center-right did not deal with substantive means of democracy which was observed in these parties' relationships with opposition parties, intra-party oppositions, the press, minorities and so on. Along with other political dynamics taking place in the 1990's, the former center-right parties affinity to slide into semi-authoritarianism, and their eagerness to abandon the national will rhetoric and embrace the center's interests instead of the periphery led to a considerable loss of their public base, which was eventually filled by the AK Party in 2002.

CHAPTER IV

THE STATE AND THE CENTER-RIGHT IN TURKEY

4.1. PART 1: In Terms of Power

The center-right in Turkey maintains a ‘love-hate’ relationship with the state. On the one hand, the center-right parties frequently deploy a critical discourse and policy in regards to the state; on the other hand, they never give up exerting efforts to take charge of it. It should be stressed straightaway that the strategies of the ANAP were more innovative than those of the DP and the AP and the center-right parties acted in accordance with the tides of the conjuncture. To unpack this a bit; whereas the DP struggled against the founding ideology of CHP and the AP dealt with the Constitution of 1961 that strengthened and expanded state control via institutions such as the National Security Council, the Supreme Council of Judges, radio, academia etc.; the ANAP endeavored to establish a modest relationship with the two guardians of the state - a strong president and a constitution reinforced by the military coup of 1980. In this context, given the transfer of power from state elites to the political ones and vice versa, the political elites of the center-right strived to extend their spheres of influence without running counter to the state elites. Before dwelling upon how the center-right in Turkey assesses the state and the ways with which it copes with it in view of the above-

mentioned three parties, first of all, it is necessary to present brief information on the state tradition in Turkey. This will be followed by an examination of the interactions between the state and the center-right in Turkey: firstly, the focus will be on the interactions between the center-right and bureaucracy (the civil and military bureaucrats) and secondly, the onus will be put on the economic assessments of the politics put into practice by the center-right.

A variety of perspectives stretching from rational choice to behavioralist theory and post-modernism present differing views on state. This study, which will not pursue these lines of inquiry, approaches the concept of state on institutional grounds stressing its “greater independence...vis-a-vis other associations or collectivities” (Heper, 1985:86; See also J.P. Nettl, 1968; Evans *et.al.*, 1985; Akarlı in Akarlı and Ben-Dor, 1975). Given the *par excellence* achievement of the Ottoman experience in this regard (Heper, 1985), the state tradition in Turkey was to a large extent influenced by that of the Ottoman Empire.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹ One of the major debates in the discipline of Political Science in Turkey revolves around the question of whether there is continuity or rupture between the state of the Ottoman Empire and that of the Turkish Republic. With respect to the strong state tradition, many scholars assume a correlation between the two, see: Metin Heper. 1985. *The State Tradition in Turkey*. Walkington: Eothen; Metin Heper. 1976. “Political Modernization as Reflected in Bureaucratic Change: The Turkish Bureaucracy and a 'Historical Bureaucratic Empire' Tradition,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 7: 507-21; Ergun Özbudun. 1996. “The Continuing Ottoman Legacy and the State Tradition in the Middle East,” in Carl Brown (ed.). *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*. New York: Columbia University Press; Ergun Özbudun. 1983. “State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey,” in Larry Diamond (ed.). *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, 189-210). Boulder: Lynce Reiner; Şerif Mardin. 1969. “Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 11:258-281; Stanford J. Shaw and A. Ezel Kural Shaw. 1977. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. London: Cambridge University Press; Erik J. Zürcher. 1993. *Turkey: A Modern History*, London, I. B. Tauris; Paul Dumont. 1984. “The Origins of Kemalist Ideology,” in Landau (ed.). *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 25-44; İlter Turan. 1984. “Continuity and Change in Turkish Bureaucracy: The Kemalist Period and After,” in Jacob Landau (ed.), *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 99-125.

The Ottoman state was a strong one, where the Sultan held the absolute power and a system called “circle of justice”¹²⁰ prevailed. From the outset, the Ottoman center was separated from the periphery with a clear-cut distinction between the two on the basis of function within the Ottoman polity and tax paying function. The ruling elite residing in the former versus the masses (*Reaya*) located in the latter. The ruling elites (*Askeriler*) were more or less functioned as the instruments of imperial power up till the 19th century. In light of Findley’s analysis,¹²¹ it is convenient to categorize the ruling elites of the Ottoman Empire in three main groups; bureaucratic representatives of the supreme power of the Sultan (*ehl-i kalem*), protectors and administrators of the state (*ehl-i örf/ehl-i kılıç*) and the protectors of the moral order (*ehl-i şer*). The *ehl-i kalem* composed of the bureaucrats related to diplomacy, state treasury, and official records of the state and so on. The *ehl-i şer* contained the judges as well as the religious scholars (*Ulema*) who were responsible for the education of the new scholars for maintaining justice. The *ehl-i örf* constituted the military-administrative establishment: the men of the sword (*Seyfiye*), servants of the Sultan, and the royal family.

As there was no viable civil society and socio-economically defined classes to play an intermediary role between the ruler and the ruled, to a significant extent, the Ottoman

¹²⁰ This mechanism functioned in accordance with “[the] old Oriental maxim that a ruler can have no power without soldiers, no soldiers without money, no money without the well-being of his subjects, and no popular well-being without justice.” (İnalçık, 1964: 44).

¹²¹ Carter V. Findley. 1980. Chapters 6 and 7. In *Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire: the Sublime Porte 1789–1922*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Erik Jan Zürcher. 1989. Chapters 1 and 2. In *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building*. London: I.B. Tauris; Carter V. Findley 1989; *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

state was autonomous¹²² in that the Sultan concentrated the entire power in his hands via the loyalty of his ruling elites, devoted to the state rather than any individualistic concern or group interest (Özbudun in Brown, 1996:145-3; Özbudun in Diamond, 1994:190; Heper, 1985; 16, 94; Heper in Heper, 1991:95; Black and Brown, 1992:50).¹²³ Even at the height of his rule, the Sultan consulted with these loyal elites and shared a degree of state power with them.¹²⁴ Whether the Sultan began to share his supreme power with interest groups or not was a question of inquiry that, at the last instance, gave an idea about the nature of the ‘Sultanic power’.¹²⁵ It was never shared with any social class except the devoted elites of bureaucracy. That's why the Deed of Alliance (*Sened-i İttifak* - 1808) was not a *Magna Carta Libertatum* since it did not adequately share the supreme power of the Sultan with the *ayans* (Shaw and Kural Shaw, 1977:3). In this context, in the late Ottoman era, it is fair to claim that an

¹²² On the concept of autonomy, see: Özbudun in Brown, 1996:134-2. See also, Theda Skocpol. 1985. Introduction. In Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing State Back In*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Ellen Kay Trimberger. 1978. *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books; Eric A. Nordlinger. 1981. *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State*. Cambridge M.A: Harvard University Press. On the economical aspects of state autonomy, see also: James Malloy (ed.) 1977. *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press; Alfred Stepan. 1978. *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹²³ Obviously, the Turkish state is different from that of the Ottoman Empire on various structural aspects, especially with respect to secularism and nationalism. For a detailed inquiry, see: Ergun Özbudun. 1996. “The Continuing Ottoman Legacy and the State Tradition in the Middle East,” in Carl Brown (ed.). *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*. New York: Columbia University Press, 133-157.

¹²⁴ On the tradition of consultation in the Ottoman Empire, see: Özbudun in Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1995:222.

¹²⁵ Tanel Demirel discerns a similarity between the powers of the Sultan and that of the Republican leaders, namely Atatürk and the National Chief, İsmet İnönü on the grounds of their uniqueness and greatness. In his account, just like the Sultan embodied not only the religion, but also the state; in the early Republican era, the nation and the state were embodied by Atatürk and İnönü (Demirel, 2011: 164).

autonomous strong state tradition was maintained without any real power sharing with civil society.

Nevertheless, the changing composition of the ruling elite soon altered the political balance. Findley proposes that at the end of the 19th century, while the religious and military establishments started to lose their grips on power due to various reforms, a civil bureaucracy (*Mülkiye*) began to emerge, mainly as a result of “a desire within the ruling class to acquire safeguards against the dangers inherent in its traditional slave status, and in the process, to take on the privileges typical of a European official aristocracy. The pursuit of this desire in a period of cultural change gave the elitist apparatus of the ruling class” (1980:16). Accordingly, *Kalemiye* or *ehl-i kalem* transformed into *Mülkiye* and the power grip of this new form of strengthened bureaucracy that avoided representing any kind of personal interest, stretched beyond the servants of the palace and the men of religion. Kazancıgil observes that “what Weber called the ‘traditional status oriented attitude of the bureaucracy towards rational economic profit’ was reflected in the modernizing *Tanzimat* elites’ lack of interest in economic matters, which they only considered in connection with the improvement of the finances of the state” (Kazancıgil in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981:46; See also: Weber in Roth and Claus eds., 1968:1109). Akarlı also points out that during late Ottoman era, those government employees’ “official earnings were in principle tax-exempt, a clear indication of the privileged position enjoyed by government employees within Ottoman society” (Akarlı, 1992:456). Such tax exemption might be interpreted as more than a privileged position: it might also be considered as an identification of government employees’ with the state. As the state gradually slipped away from the

grasp of the Sultan, the civil bureaucrats or the ‘center’ dominated by *Mülkiye* became the real owner of the state to a large extent.¹²⁶ Metin Heper concisely explains this transition below:

It is tempting to identify the person of the sultan with the state. One may be justified in doing so with respect to the classical period when the sultans ruled as well as reigned. It becomes difficult, however, to see an identity between the sultan and the state in later centuries when at times the sultans became puppets in the hands of military, civil, and/ or religious bureaucracies, and/or of various cliques in the palace itself. *The ruling groups in time became the servants of the state rather than those of the sultan*¹²⁷. (...) The state was seen as the provider of nizam (order). By ‘center’ we mean here those groups or persons who tried to uphold the state's autonomy and supremacy in the polity (1980:85).

The paternalistic features of this tradition penetrated into the Turkish state as well. As a result, ‘bureaucratic ruling tradition’ was consolidated in the Ottoman-Turkish experience, where the state elites as the guardians of the state deemed they knew the best for the masses (Özbudun in Diamond, 1994:194; Heper, 1976:508; Rustow, 1967:79). As all-knowing agents, these state elites were also skeptical about the rationality, capability and intention of the masses. Ahmad pointsf to a connection between the single party, “which includes within the whole nation and not just a section” and the paternalistic features of the state, guiding people impartially (In Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981: 157). It was difficult for the masses to challenge such a paternalistic state, since it was a common belief that the state could think for its citizens better than they could think for themselves (Heper, 1985:103; Özbudun in Brown,

¹²⁶ For an alternative reading, see: Gencay Şaylan. 1974. *Türkiye’de Kapitalizm, Bürokrasi ve Siyasal ideoloji*. Ankara:TODAİE Yayınları. Şaylan suggests that bureaucracy emerged as a dominant social class right after the establishment of the Republic.

¹²⁷ My italics.

1996:137). Özbudun summarizes this mind-set as “a feeling of respect for a strong but benevolent state” (In Brown, 1996:138).

Having mapped out the terrain on which the strong, autonomous and paternalistic state features were transferred to the Turkish experience let me turn to the persistence of state elites’ supremacy throughout the early Republican era. The Kemalist state, generated by state elites in the course of a ‘revolution from above’ (Trimberger, 1978: 41-42), paved the way for Turkish politics to be shaped as ‘elite politics’ (Frey, 1965). At the time, state elites introduced the ideology of state as a project of modernization to the periphery. Nelson succinctly emphasizes the significance of ideology in relation to the concept of state as below:

To these basic structural characteristics of territoriality, sovereignty, centralized government, and coercive law, must be added some corresponding form of state consciousness or ideology of legitimation. While theoretically a state could exist in the structural sense without it, in reality no state could survive without some operative myth that legitimized it. And it is characteristic of all states that the legitimizing ideology is framed in terms of some myth of foundation by which they were initially formed, by the Gods in the earliest states or, in the modern state, by an act of rational consent (2006:8).

Thus, the state elites, who “could decide rationally that is through enlightened debate, what was best for the country” (Heper in Heper, 1991:17), now began to construct a new Turkey that was planned to consist of citizens capable of “acquir[ing] the capacity to reach consensus not through multiple confrontations, but by attaining a higher level of rationality” (Heper, 1985:64). The ideological shift from a religious one to a rational and secular one, which had its roots in the period of *Tanzimat*, was at this time more

pronounced.¹²⁸ In the context of a single party system, the state party CHP had a great advantage for the indoctrination of the people with respect to the principles of Kemalism.¹²⁹ In Sakallıoğlu's words, the early Republican era was a scene for "the superimposition on society of the political ideals of the state bureaucracy entrenched in the ruling party, the RPP" (1992:712). The 'Turkification' of the masses along with the precedence of secularism formed a deeper gap between the state elites (center) and the periphery. As a consequence of the autonomous, strong and paternalistic state tradition described above, masses remained reluctant in making use of democratic means as a way of revealing their discontent, except the ballot box.

4.1.1. Bureaucracy and the Democrat Party

One of the prominent features of the center-right in Turkey has its origins in controversial relations between the center-right parties and bureaucracy.¹³⁰ As previously noted the bureaucratic center and the statist CHP were the ones that mainly shaped the parameters of politics in Turkey prior to the forming of center-right governments. The CHP displayed an exemplar of Huntington's "exclusionary one-party systems," where the party, detached from society, was suppressing any societal

¹²⁸ Şerif Mardin. 1991. "The Just and the Unjust," *Daedalus* 120(113-129); Niyazi Berkes. 1998 (1964). *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press, pp. 94-2.

¹²⁹ For more accounts of anthropology, see also: Esra Özyürek. 2006. *Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey*. Durham: Duke University Press; Yael Navaro Yashin. 2002. *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey*. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹³⁰ This is not unique to the case of Turkey: right wing parties are usually supported by non-bureaucratic elements. For instance, Kornhauser (1959) states that independent entrepreneurs are more likely to side with the right-wing rather than bureaucrats given their lack of involvement in decision-making processes under the rule of the latter.

opposition (Özbudun in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981:94; Sayarı in Akarlı and Ben-Dor, 1975:121). That being the case, where the political arena was taken hold of by the state elites *per se*, the transition to the multi-party system revealed clearly the depth of the cleavage between the center and the periphery.

Following the establishment of the DP on January 7, 1946, the CHP was faced with a real rival for the first time in the political arena and this led to a gradual decrease in its monopoly on the decision-making processes. In view of insights gained from Roos and Roos (1970:69), as competition gained impetus in the political system, bureaucracy started to lose its grip on power in Turkey following the first free and fair elections held in 1950. It is possible to frame this period in light of the concept of “de-bureaucratization” or in Heper’s terms, ‘anti-bureaucratization’ (1985:94). Hence, “not only did official elites lose their once preeminent presentation in parliament and their strong ties with political elites but their overall influence, status, prestige, security, and income declined sharply as well” (Özbudun in Diamond, 1994:198).

In order to view the issue from an alternative angle than the one provided by Roos and Roos – namely, when competition rises in a political system, the power of bureaucracy declines – one can consider Huntington’s account as well. He argues that the decline of bureaucracy might also stem from the relative increase in the political engagement of the periphery. According to Huntington (1968:74-2), this is apparent in “ruralizing elections” held following the decline in the power of center. The elections of 1950 in Turkey conformed to his argumentation.¹³¹ Despite the fact that CHP pursued an

¹³¹ Leslie L. Roos and Noralou P. Roos. 1971. “Chapter 9,” In *Managers of Modernization: Organizations and Elites in Turkey, 1950-1969*. Cambridge: Mass; Metin Heper, 1976; Özbudun in Akarlı and Ben-Dor,

election campaign in the villages via the motto of “Do not oppose the state” (Bayar, 1969:73); the DP’s triumph indicated to the fact that people sided with the civilian politicians rather than those of the state.¹³² When considered from this point of view, the elections held in 1950 amounted to a turning point in Turkish politics since these elections, not only differentiated between the state elites and the civilian ones, but also made it clear that the latter was perceived as the representative of the periphery.¹³³

It goes without saying that the periphery or the society was not a monolithic entity. The major common ground uniting the periphery was its lack of power, which was utilized by the center *per se*. On this point, Özbudun asserts that:

The Committee of Union and Progress and the RPP represented the authoritarian domination of the bureaucratic center, and the victory of the DP in 1950 can be interpreted as the strong reaction of the periphery to such domination when it was given a free choice for the first time. This explains both the strong electoral appeal of the DP throughout the 1950s (and that of its successor, the JP in the 1960s) and the heterogeneity of its social base of support (in Weiner and Özbudun, 1987:346).

Building on Özbudun’s point, it is fair to claim that the success of the DP derived from its competence in melting various problems experienced by diverse groups into a single pot, in the shape of a popular consensus against the bureaucratic center. It was indeed

1975; Akarlı in Akarlı and Ben-Dor, 1975. Schneck, Russel and Scott’s study (1974) also suggests that non-bureaucratic and rural middle-class prefer to follow right-wing ideologies.

¹³² At this point, the concept of “ruralization” is taken up as the increasing influence of the periphery *vis-a-vis* the state elites. In many eyes, the CHP had also rural support especially in the East and Southeastern Anatolia in the 1950’s. On this matter, see: Daniel Lerner. 1958. *The Passing of a Traditional Society*, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, pp.33-2; Özbudun in Akarlı and Ben-Dor, 1975, p.35.

¹³³ The politics of Turkey continued to be mainly controlled by elite politics during DP’s term as well, yet elites from the DP displayed features more similar to those of the periphery. Comparing the elites of the CHP and those of the DP, Frey asserts that elites of the latter were younger, displayed indigenous characteristics with respect their hometowns, meager educational or military training along with scarce administrative competence (1965:351; 356-2; 380).

such a melting pot that even the illegal Communist Party supported the DP in the elections of 1950. Taking the extent of the support for the DP in these elections into account, Keyder describes the cleavage between the center and the periphery as “a mass-elite confrontation, because the political contestation of the time was a declaredly populist one: ‘the people’ had been politically dominated, socially oppressed and economically exploited by the bureaucratic-bourgeois bloc” (Keyder, 1987:122). In the context of such a fragmented political climate, it hardly needs pointing out that the relations between the DP and the state were tense at the outset.

4.1.1.1. Mutual Suspicion

The political elites of the DP and the state elites were vested with a considerable amount of suspicion towards each other. State elites mistrusted the elected politicians on the presumption that ‘while the politicians reflect upon the next elections; bureaucrats envision the next generations’¹³⁴. Such mistrust stemmed mainly from the defeat at the ballot box, which not only led to a psychological discontent among the state elites, but also, to a certain extent, brought about a necessity to revise their self-evaluations as the ‘omniscient agents of modernization.’ Heper speculates that “the delineated set of norms imposed upon and adopted by the civil bureaucracy gave it a sense of cultural guardianship in the society. As such it did not have a favorable attitude toward the emergence and development of new social groups with (potential) political leverage” (Heper, 1976: 513). Therefore, to a significant extent, state elites, considering

¹³⁴ This phrase is commonly utilized by Metin Heper throughout his courses at İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University.

themselves as the prominent agents of the modernization project, perceived the electoral success of the DP as the defeat of the reforms and modernized life-styles this project endeavored to give rise to. Demirel quotes Bedii Faik's observations right after the elections of 1950.¹³⁵ In Faik's account, the boulevards and avenues of Ankara, where people were previously arrayed in top hats and modern clothes, were 'occupied' by peasantry, with all their costumes and vehicles (Demirel, 2011:145; Faik, 2001:77). Faik's description reveals the psychology of the center at the time: the owners of the state began to feel suppressed by the periphery, not only in the political arena, but also in the social space.

The DP reciprocated state elites' mistrust as well, fearing from a possible intervention on part of the center into their power realm. This fear echoed in DP's party program of 1951, in which the party underlined that every direct/indirect abuse of authority regarding the enactment of public services was going to be ended (*Demokrat Parti Tüzük ve Programı* 1951, Article 25). What's more, in the immediate aftermath of DP's rise to power, a serious purge aimed at the provincial Generals and Governors followed suit. The government, not only suspected a possible military intervention projected by these generals, but also considered the strong ties between these governors and the CHP as worrying (Demirel, 2011:132; Burçak, 1998:53; Tunçay in Akşin, 1989:178; Toker, 1991a: 41). Hence, the DP endeavored to take precautions in order to secure the subsequent maneuvers of its government.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ Ankara is habitually considered as 'the heart of the Republic.'

¹³⁶ Nevertheless, the government formed by the DP neither dismantled bureaucracy, nor it was capable of creating absolute control over the bureaucrats. According to various scholars, the DP indeed endeavored to establish an easy-going relationship with the bureaucracy by avoiding conflicts (Demirel, 2011; Eryılmaz, 1998:159-2). Demirel, not only provides examples of many bureaucrats, who retained their

Despite coming to power by rallying great support, the DP was not confident about the optimal operations of the democratic procedures. The government formed by the DP usually accused the state elites of their plea for reserved domains in the name of securing the country. Such accusations set the tone of the Assembly Meeting of the Parliament held in the autumn of 1952. In the meeting, Celal Bayar, the President, stated that the ones, who argued that the reforms were in danger, were as harmful as the reactionary ones (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 01.11.1952). By this logic, the DP made its position clear: the party was not only against the ones who claimed that the state was in a so-called crisis, but also in opposition to the ones who threatens the principles of the state. Therefore, the DP did not oppose the state, itself but opposed to those who claimed to be the guardians of the state. The discourse of the DP accompanied by its certain initiatives such as the replacement of old-timer bureaucrats aroused anxieties on part of the center and gave rise to a vicious circle of suspicion.

4.1.1.2. The ‘Dream’ of the DP: A Small, Yet Strong State

According to the elites of the DP, the fundamental difference between the DP and the CHP evolved out of their contradictory mentalities concerning the state. For the DP, the real owner of the state was the nation; for the CHP, it was the military and the intellectuals (Bayar, 1969: 9-2). Since CHP’s identification of the party with the state was a deep-rooted threat, the DP strived to reserve the political sphere for the masses,

office despite their discontent with the DP, (2011:134), but also notes that there was a significant number of bureaucrats who were eager to comply with all the commitments of the DP as well (Demirel, 2011:137).

instead of the components of bureaucracy, either civil or military. Such a reservation had repercussions in the party programs of the 1946 and 1951. The Article 11 of the Party Program of 1946 stated that the party was against the political activities of all government employees, with the exception of academicians.¹³⁷ The government formed by the DP deemed government employees as civil servants rather than the owners of the state. Similar arguments were advanced in the Article 19 of the Party Program of 1951. This article, not only underlined the necessity of abandoning ‘the bureaucratic mentality’, but also sought to limit the power of the civil servants in order to prevent them from any sort of arbitrary rule (*DP Programı*, 1946; *DP Tüzüğü ve Programı*, 1951).

The conventional motto, ‘people for the state’ was reversed in the party programs of the DP. In these programs, the main objective of a good administration was defined not only as providing the security of the citizens in all of their activities, but also setting firm grounds for reliability and thrust between the citizens and the state (*DP Parti Programı*, 1946; *DP Tüzüğü ve Parti Programı*, 1951, Article 19). Similar objectives appeared in the government programs under Menderes as well, and underlined the necessity of rationally restructuring the state apparatus.¹³⁸ When he was in office, Menderes frequently complained about the privileged positions of the bureaucrats. On immunity, he stated that “under the rule of law, all power is absolute. All sorts of power reclaimed

¹³⁷ The government formed by the DP later banned the political activities of the academicians as well (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 21.07.1953). In the following years, this ban was followed by a law that compelled public officers to resign at least six months before their declaration of candidacy in order to restrict public officers’ political engagements. For further discussions on the political engagements of civil servants, see: *Milliyet*, 09.07.1953.

¹³⁸ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 29.05.1950; 29.03.1951; 24.05.1954; 14.12.1955; 04.12.1957.

by public officers bring along certain responsibilities” (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 13.05.1957). On the status of public officers, Menderes affirmed that not only exaggeration, but also underestimation would be equally dangerous. What made the public officers’ position unique, in his account, was their duty to serve the nation (*Milliyet*, 09.07.1953). In this respect, according to the DP, the significance of the status of ‘public officer’ did not derive from any sort of superiority *vis-a-vis* masses, rather it stemmed from the duty of public officers to serve the nation.

On the other hand, in the Article 23 of 1946 Party Program, the government pledged to improve the living standards of the civil servants on the basis of merit and hard work. For doing so, it sought ways to get rid of the burden brought about by the abundant salaries of the government employees (*DP Programı, 1946; DP Tüzüğü ve Parti Programı, 1951*, Article 24). Hence, the initial approach of the DP concerning civil servants was shaped by the policies of scaling down in order to not only work with the most qualified ones, but also to improve the living standards of the remaining few.¹³⁹ Nevertheless, in practice, the party neither managed to lessen the number of the civil servants, nor improved their living standards.¹⁴⁰ In contrast, during DP’s term, both the salaries and the purchasing power of bureaucrats (both military and civil) diminished to a significant extent because of DP’s stance against bureaucracy and inflationary economic policies (Özbudun in Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:61; Dodd, 1969:53).

¹³⁹ The tendency to down-size bureaucracy was not unique to the Turkish right. For an evaluation of *Forza Italia* in Italy, see: Mario Sznajder. 1995. “Italy’s Right-Wing Government: Legitimacy and Criticism,” *International Affairs* 71(1): 83-102.

¹⁴⁰ Göküş points out to an increase in the additional payments and fringe benefits such as public housing during the term of DP (2003:45). Yet, these small gestures did not amount to an overall improvement in the living standards of the public officers.

In the next party program, the Article 23 rendered it possible to appoint a government employee to a higher rank without taking into consideration required educational qualifications (*DP Tüzüğü ve Parti Programı, 1951, Article 23*). By enforcing such an amendment, the DP revealed not only that it had experienced a significant change of mind, but also its intention to reward partisanship rather than a formal diploma or education. To remind, while the state elites mainly paid attention to procedures and formal assessments, the DP emphasized practical application, capability and harmonious operations with the government. On a parallel front, during DP's term of government, the increase in the infrastructural investments alongside various initiatives for economic enterprises subsidized by the state led to the creation of a new type of bureaucrat, which may be defined as 'technocrat.' Technocrats gained a superior position in the decision-making processes and enjoyed better income levels, yet faced a lower job security in comparison to traditional bureaucrats (Şaylan, 1984:303). Such developments reinforced the idea that the DP had in view a hard-working bureaucracy with limited power who would also try to win the hearts of the government.¹⁴¹ This mentality based on a technocratic vision of state administration later morphed into one of the preeminent aspects of the Turkish center-right that distinguished it from the bureaucratic rule of the center-left.

Several other initiatives taken by the government - such as the law numbered 6435 that granted the right to remove government employees from office - also disturbed the comfortable conditions of those working in public services. Moreover, regulations about

¹⁴¹ Some scholars argue that bureaucracy began to be politicized since DP's term of government (Heper, 1976; Heper, 1985; Heper and Keyman, 1998). Yet, bureaucrats have never been very distant from politics due to their roles as the agents of policy implementation long before DP's term. The difference seems to stem from CHP's identification of the party with the state, while DP intended to separate them.

the ministerial orders and obligatory retirement narrowed down the autonomy of bureaucracy and increased the dependence of bureaucrats to the government to a significant extent (Zürcher, 2001:335; Şaylan, 1984:305). Similar initiatives were taken regarding the judiciary as well. In view of Menderes, judicial institutions should not have enjoyed any privilege since in his account privilege meant moving beyond the national will (Sarol, 1983a: 382, Demirel, 2005: 504-505). Within this scope, according to the DP, as the state existed for the nation, it was automatically existed for the government, better-said, the representative of the nation as well.

The relatively non-bureaucratic cadre of the DP was well established in its understanding of the mode of governing as well. Even Bayar, who represented the statesmanship in the DP, limited the state protocol during his presidency (Bayar, 1969:122). Bayar's resignation from the party leadership after becoming the President was one of the indicators of him, being against the identification of the party with the state, which was commonplace in the single party era.¹⁴² He did not wish to continue his presidency as the ultimate head of the state (Ağaoğlu, 1972:142) and as a consequence, his resignation strengthened the position of the prime minister. Abandoning accompanying adjectives, such as 'the national chief', attributed to the owner of the presidential office suggested that the DP perceived these positions as time-bound.

Similarly, certain traditions such as hanging the picture of the president on the walls of

¹⁴² Mete Tunçay proposes that this was a crucial step concerning the impartiality of the president and it was sustained by the following presidents as well (1989:178). However, this institutional impartiality has not morphed into a viable impartiality. Especially right after the elections of 1957, Bayar engaged in politics actively by organizing public meetings. In these meetings, he openly directed accusations at the CHP, while advocating the DP, see: *Milliyet*, 08.10.1957; 11.10.1957; 14.10.1957; 21.10.1957. At the outset, even if he had declared not to make any speeches on the elections; he usually compared the previous government formed by the CHP with that of the DP, emphasizing the successful economic developments during the latter's term, see: *Milliyet*, 12.10.1957.

the public buildings and printing his picture on money that put special emphasis on the head of the state were relinquished during DP's term. Within this context, Menderes was often criticized for not knowing the protocol adequately and being less sensitive about the records and rules, which were all perceived as deficiencies by the state elite (Aydemir, 1976:120-2; Ağaoğlu, 2004:98). In a nutshell, in line with DP's resilience concerning the overestimation of the status of bureaucracy, a bureaucratic working style was not embraced by the DP as well and this brought about a new mode of governing. However, the initiatives concerning the scaling down of the civil servants while improving their living standards and qualifications remained on paper, better-said, in the frameworks of party programs and could not be transformed into concrete policies.

4.1.1.3. The Relations between the DP and the Military

Needless to say, in a liberal democratic system, the military do not get any privileged positions that allow soldiers to intervene in policy-making processes. In the early Republican era, a clear prohibition of soldiers' engagement in politics prevented the army from being an influential actor in the political sphere. As 'a supportive element' behind the CHP (Hale, 1994:308), the army was defined as the genuine guardian of the secular regime and of the unity of the state, where the government and the military operated in harmony. It was suggested that "together with the civilian bureaucrats, the Turkish army historically built the republic and subsequently modernized it along a western path" (Cizre Sakallıoğlu, 1997:154). In that regard, the military supported the policies the governments formed by the CHP, while at the same time, refraining from

active participation in the policy-making processes. In this respect, in 1944, the Chief of the General Staff was rendered accountable to the prime minister and in 1949, to the Minister of Defense, but these institutional arrangements could not adequately reflect the nature of the relations between the civilian and military elites during the subsequent years under the governments formed by the DP (Hale, 1994:308).

The tension in the relations between the DP and the military bureaucracy escalated exponentially compared to the level of that between the DP and the civilian bureaucracy. This was evident in the completion of this period by the coup of 1960. Having pointed out to the distinction between political elites and state elites brought about by the governments formed by the DP,¹⁴³ Demirel maintained that “the Turkish army's perception of itself as the ultimate guardian of the state renders it difficult for soldiers fully to accept the principle of civilian supremacy” (Demirel, 2004:127). As a result of this ongoing mistrust since the very beginning of DP's term of government, the party worried about a probable military intervention. Indeed, in the first months of its term, then the Prime Minister, Menderes declared that they had confidential information about certain preparations of a coup by the military and this led to an extensive displacement of certain generals (Aydemir, 1976:222). Thus, throughout its governmental terms, the DP, claiming to be the representative of the periphery struggled against the constituents of the center, especially the military by limiting the prospects of its status, political engagements and job security.

¹⁴³ This study argues that the main reason behind the shift in the post-1950 civil-military relations was rooted in the center-periphery cleavage. Nevertheless, different ways of approaching this particular issue compete and coexist with one another. For example, Zürcher states that “the trouble was that by the late 1950s this no longer guaranteed the government the loyalty of the whole officer corps. The reason lay in the fundamental changes wrought by NATO membership and US assistance in the armed forces” (Zürcher, 2001:238). In Hale's account, foreign policy affairs indirectly conditioned the standpoint of the military (Hale, 1994: 95).

The cadre of the DP did not contain as much military elements as the CHP. DP's leading members, even Celal Bayar - the member of the DP most akin to the state - was not coming from a military background. While in the single-party era, the representation of the military officers on top ranks was more than 30 per cent, during DP's term this percentage was dwindled to less than 5 per cent (Frey, 1965:260). Throughout its ten-years of rule, the DP had only four ministers coming from military backgrounds (Ağaoğlu, 1972:88), yet, two of them resigned after a short period of time in office (Hale, 1994:98). Lerner and Robinson state that "[a]bout one-sixth of the Assembly in 1920 was of military origin, about one-eighth in 1943, one-ninth in 1946, one-twentieth in 1950 and 1954, one-twenty-fifth in 1958" (1960:28). By the same token, considering the occupational backgrounds of the deputies, Frey points out to the fact that with the rise of the DP, the military lost its ground and degraded from 2nd to 7th place among twelve occupational groups, which amounted to a shift from approximately 20 per cent to 4 per cent (1965:182-2). Therefore, military's losing of its power grip coincided with DP's rise to the power. Besides, the retreat of military in the occupational composition of the deputies was also related with the strong connections of the DP with the periphery, whereas the military "had fewer local connections than any occupational group, and there appears to be no sizable local element within the group" (Frey, 1965:120).

The length of the military service was also shortened on July 12, 1950, in the immediate aftermath of DP's forming of the government (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 12.07.1950). This initiative was interpreted as an attempt to weaken the significance of military. In the electoral campaign of 1954, the opposition made use of a motto "the DP assaulted

the army” and the DP replied with “the DP began to regulate the army” (Burçak, 1998:208). Additionally, the socio-economic conditions as well as the prestige of the soldiers gradually diminished in these years and paved the way for the coup of 1960 (Frey, 1965:261; Özbudun in Diamond, 1994:198).

The job security of the soldiers was on the wane as well as the prospects of political representation and occupational prestige. In 1955, three generals were dismissed on account of disobeying the orders of the prime minister within the context of the September, 6-7 Events (Burçak, 1998:316-3). In the beginning of 1958, the ongoing tension between the government and the military reached to a level that the government openly accused the military of planning to stage a coup.¹⁴⁴ A couple of months later, the arrests of nine military officers for plotting a coup were reported and the limited extent of these arrests was underlined in order to keep a low-profile (Milliyet, 17.01.1958). In the course of this event, the planner of the coup, Cemal Yıldırım, was released, but the informing soldier was sentenced (Bayar, 1969:119-2; Bozdağ, 2004:156-3). Hence, the DP preferred to close the file without dwelling much on the details of the coup plot as it could not counteract the military at the time.

Despite the fact that the relations between the government and the military were not on very friendly terms as discussed above, the government did not accentuate its mistrust and carried on with its pragmatic policies in many cases. For instance, in the second government leaded by Menderes, Seyfi Kurtbek, an extremely militarist ex-soldier, was appointed as minister to modernize and encourage the army (Demirel, 2011:235; Hale,

¹⁴⁴ Samet Ağaoğlu mentions a difference of opinion between Menderes and Celal Bayar on this particular issue. While Menderes preferred to close the file immediately without going further with its investigation, Bayar aimed at holding on to the file and to punish its real culprits (Ağaoğlu, 1972:143). On this matter of concern, the President and the Prime Minister did not display a unified reaction towards the military.

1994:97). Likewise, the Assembly dominated by the DP sustained the tradition of publishing the record that presented tribute, greetings and trust to the army in the Official Gazette (Demirel, 2011:237). It is worth mentioning that the defense expenses were on the rise during the terms of DP as well (Ahmad, 1993:124; Hale, 1994:99). On the one hand, the DP wanted to make sure that the military would not go beyond its occupational sphere of influence; on the other hand, the economic and technical assistance provided by foreign aids was allocated to the army. Zürcher notes that “more than \$2 billion of military aid was spent on modernizing and mechanizing the Turkish army, and American teams assisted in the training of personnel” (2001:239). Nonetheless, these pro-military actions of the government fell short of avoiding the coup as the cleavage between the government and the military was deeply rooted and both parties attributed differing roles to the state elites and the elected ones.¹⁴⁵

It is commonly stressed that Menderes’ following words just before the coup in 1960 – “I will put an end to the mentality of Pashas (generals). The army can be handled even via reserve officers” served as an accelerator of the military coup (Aydemir, 1976:368).¹⁴⁶ Similarly, the rumors about the Chief of the General Staff, helping Ethem Menderes, then the Minister of National Defense, to put on his coat stirred up discomfort on part of the military as well (Yavuzalp, 1991:84). In the last instance, as Demirel properly suggests, the above-mentioned rumors that signaled to a tendency to legitimize the coup in 1960 reinforced an exaggeration concerning the cynical attitudes of the DP (2011:243). Similar to those between the DP and the civil bureaucracy, the

¹⁴⁵ Hale argues that the military supported the state party, CHP to a significant extent (1993).

¹⁴⁶ Ağaoğlu states that these words were not articulated by Menderes (2004:126).

relations between the DP and the military revolved around the tension stemming from the differing answers given to the following question, ‘who owns the state?’ At the time, the military was reluctant to reserve a legitimate place for civilian governments except for the CHP.

4.1.1.4. The Instrumentalization of the State

Having discussed above the latter side of the ‘love-hate’ relationship between the Turkish center-right and the state, it will be complementary to take up the former side at hand as well. To start, in spite of criticizing bureaucracy, the DP also intended to protect the myth of state in order to make use of the state for its own purposes when the wind is fair (Demirel, 2005:489). As Cizre observes “[the Turkish center-right] never intended to lose its grip on the penetrative power of the state through populist controls and bureaucratism” (Cizre, 1996b:147). This was quite valid for the DP since its main concern actually revolved around the nature and ideology of bureaucracy. Even though the deployment of a less-bureaucratic discourse and the creation of technocrats as a new bureaucratic entity mainly shaped the policies of the DP, its augmentation of the number of government employees¹⁴⁷ considered along with its view of the state as an asset of the government, indeed, indicated to the fact that the state was neither minimized, nor weakened during its terms.

¹⁴⁷ While the total number of the government employees in 1950 was 199.723, it turned out to be 389.303 in 1960. For details, see: DİE. 1962. *Memur istatistikleri, 1939-1960: Genel Bütçe, Katma Bütçe, Özel İdare, Belediye ve İktisadi Devlet Teşekkülleri*. Ankara: DİE Yayınları.

Celal Bayar, the closest figure to the state among the DP members, underlined that “being a party member and being the President are totally different things,” and “security and the interest of the state are the only things I shall consider as a President” (Bayar, 1969:146). In that regard, in line with the tradition of ‘the state, as the caretaker,’ he usually emphasized “justice and benevolence for all citizens, without any discrimination with regards to their social classes” (Bayar, 1969:41). The conceptualization of the state as the caretaker have not challenged but supported the paternalistic state tradition. He, who formed the cabinet, also controlled the state (Oktay, 2003:120-3; Demirel, 2011:256). In this respect, what differentiated the DP from the CHP did not derive from the differing roles attributed to the state, but stemmed from the answer given to the question of ‘who would control the state?’ The DP continued to grasp the state as a ‘fatherly caretaker’ that not only treated its citizens with tenderness, but also disciplined them if necessary.

Hence, the DP and its successors have not abandoned the myth of state. They habitually paid their respect to the state, considering it almost as a sacred entity. Another important ingredient that contributed to the ideology of the Turkish center-right therefore has its roots in the principles of the state. In that regard, the DP remained within the boundaries demarcated by the rule of law and maintained a great respect for the state apparatus. Bayar’s testimony right after the unfair elections of 1946 confirms such respect, where he stressed that even after these elections; they respected the rule of law and carried on with their struggle within its limits (Bayar, 1969:59). Menderes also endeavored to keep the radicals in the party at arm’s length when it comes to decision-making processes to keep them away from challenging the principles of the state. Given this standpoint, one

may argue that the struggle of the DP was against the elements of the ‘center,’ namely the civilian and military bureaucracy as agents of the state, rather than the state, itself and the DP was apparently in pursuit of taking hold of the state power.

This proclivity of the DP, which was also shared by the AP, might be grasped following Heper: “The ‘anti-bureaucracy’ political parties tried to (...) capture the state from within” (Heper in Heper, 1991:94). To straighten things up between the DP and the bureaucracy, the DP projected to create a bureaucracy of its own, composed of its supporters, instead of keeping the bureaucracy outside of the political realm. The discourses of its members in the immediate aftermath of the elections of 1950 clearly revealed DP’s discontent with not being able to take hold of the entire state apparatus. At the end of 1950, some of its members even criticized DP for its incapability to control the state power and according to them, this incapability led to a lack of response in face of the peripheral expectations concerning the reformation of the administrative units (Toker, 1991a:108). Thus, even at the outset, DP’s willingness to control the entire state apparatus and to rearrange it in line with its worldview was evident.

The idea endorsed by the DP - ‘the party that forms the government, automatically owns the state’ paved the way for the utilization of various state resources for its own political purposes.¹⁴⁸ One of the most tragic examples of this approach was the utilization of state radio solely by the DP for getting across its policies, while depriving opposition parties of their right to broadcast on state radio. Following the establishment of the union by the CHP and the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*), the DP set up a new organization titled

¹⁴⁸ To remind, the utilization of state resources by the CHP for its own good was previously one of the main sources of controversy between the two, when the DP was in opposition. Economic allocation of state resources for political purposes during the term of the DP will be examined in detail in the section on Clientelism.

‘Homeland Front’ (*Vatan Cephesi*) to contend with the strengthened opposition. In order to gain the support of uncommitted voters, the DP announced the names of the participants in the ‘Homeland Front’ (*Vatan Cephesi*) on state radio. Facing such propaganda, people felt left out if they had not joined the front. The discriminatory discourse prevalent in the ‘Homeland Front’ integrated the government and the state into a harmonious unit against the CHP and its popular support, accusing them of dismantling ‘the state order.’ Even during the Ramadan Fest, in the aftermath of a speech on the importance of reconciliation, the state radio continued to broadcast the names of the new participants in the front and drew reactions from the people (Burçak, 1998:602). The use of the police force for DP’s purposes was another example revealing the fact that the state was possessed by the government (Aydemir, 1976:301). All things considered, the tension between the DP and the bureaucrats did not stem from their differing views on the role and the nature of state. Rather, the main problem derived from their contradictory answers to the question of ‘who should control the state?’ The answer presented by the DP was clear: ‘the party that gains the majority vote should also be the one that not only controls the entire state apparatus, but also enjoys all the privileges such a control may bring about.’

4.1.2. The AP and the State

Following the footsteps of the DP, the AP sustained the ‘love-hate’ relationship with the state as well. Yet, the circumstances, which were different than that of the DP in the aftermath of the coup of 1960 and the Constitution of 1961, mainly designated the

nature of the relations between the AP and the state. On the one hand, the composition of the center was rearranged. On the other hand, the positive attitude of the AP regarding the governments formed in the aftermath of the military intervention in 1971 was a turning point in this relationship. In the aftermath of the intervention of 1971, from the view point of the AP, the positive side of the relationship weighed more than the negative one. In a way, the AP tried to take a side next to the center rather than the periphery given the political climate of 1970's, in which the military-civilian relations acquired greater importance. In this context, this section that focuses on the relations between the AP and the state is divided into three parts. The first describes the transformation of the center with regards to the Constitution of 1961 and the standpoint of the AP *vis-à-vis* bureaucracy in 1960's. The second is a presentation of the memorandum process in 1971 as a milestone for the AP. The third section evaluates the relations between the AP and the military that gained an active role in the political realm as the third party.

4.1.2.1. The Transformation of the Center and the AP

As the successor of the DP, the AP carried on with representing the periphery. It was the center that underwent a functional and compositional transformation in the aftermath of the coup of 1960. On functional grounds, on top of the “top-to-down modernization,” namely the Turkish Revolution (Trimberger, 1978; 1980), this time the junta elite intervened to restore the Republic by reinforcing the center as well as the modernization of the nation. In this period, on the one hand, the center, considering the former

Democrats and the ones alike as potential threats for the regime, endeavored to keep the system fixed and stable; on the other hand, the ones that claimed to be the voice of the periphery stressed the need for change. Mardin succinctly describes this political atmosphere as follows:

The Revolution of May 27, 1960 once more underlined the cleavage between the center, now identified with the preservation of a static order, and the periphery, the real "party of movement." The old polarization of center against periphery acquired a new form: the preservers of the Procrustean, early Republican order against those who wanted change (1973:186).

Many scholars observed that as the Constitution of 1961 granted extensive powers to bureaucracy (to cite a few: Özbudun in Diamond, 1994:200; Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009:16; Heper, 1976: 489; 1985:88; Yazıcı, 1997; Cizre, 1996; Kili, 1998), the AP was expected to deal with a strengthened center, while trying to remain within the boundaries of the system.

Concerning the circumstances in the aftermath of the military coup, Karpat remarks that:

[...] the military had already undertaken a series of measures, and passed altogether 125 laws supposedly to correct the Democrats' errors and speed the society's modern progress. Among these measures the most important ones were the literacy programme, the establishment of a State Planning Organization, the founding of Turkish Cultural Societies (this was a new name for the People's Houses, which was used until 1963), the university reform which led to the summary dismissal of 147 university professors, the programme to rejuvenate the army according to which about 7,000 officers were retired, and finally the revamping of the High Court of Justice in order to try the ousted Democrat (1972:259).

Along with the continuation of the modernization program in a fashion similar to the one envisioned by Kemalism, further steps were taken by means of restrictions on the

opposition, the installment of checks and balances such as the separation of powers in order to empower bureaucracy *vis-à-vis* legislation.

As a reaction to the DP, the center, not only instituted exit guarantees and reinstated itself as the dominant actor in the political realm, but also brought about a disconcerting suspicion against all civilian politicians as was the case during the tenure of the DP. In taking up this stance, the center ensured its predominance on both institutional and psychological grounds. This is reminiscent of Heper's conceptualization of "negative politics," according to which bureaucracy made use of "bureaucratism as an effective weapon...to undermine the policies of the government" (1976:490). Correspondingly, on account of the suspicion inflamed by bureaucracy regarding the civilian politicians, the AP frequently complained about various impasses such an approach compelled the apparatuses of state into (Demirel, 1973:259). This distant and mistrustful approach towards the AP was accompanied by the political preferences of the center as well. A study conducted in Ankara during the elections of 1973 suggested that in the neighborhoods, where the high-middle class and high-ranked bureaucrats had resided largely, the AP was not warmly welcomed (Özbudun, 1977:289). More precisely, the bureaucracy of 1960's and 1970's was apparently not in favor of the AP both on institutional grounds and political preferences. On the other hand, focusing on the job satisfaction levels of the administrative elites in the years of 1956 and 1965, Roos and Roos (1971) brought to light that the bureaucrats during the AP term appeared to be more satisfied, possibly owing to the empowerment of the center by the Constitution of

1961.¹⁴⁹ Given this outlook, it is possible to argue that not only could the DP not reach its objective of constituting a proponent democracy, but also the coup of 1960 left the AP facing a stronger center by purging the remaining Democrats from the cadres.

The nature of the relations between the AP and the state had its roots in the cleavage between the center and the periphery as well. Compared to DP's term, the composition of the center notably changed and as a result, the opposition party no longer represented the core of the center. As a reminder, among the main components of the center, the DP would previously cite Kemalist, bureaucratic and military elites along with the CHP. However, during AP's term, the CHP leaned over to the left and decreased the defense of Kemalist principles receded into the background, especially in the aftermath of the election of Bülent Ecevit as its leader. In this respect, ever since the mid-1960s, the center was no longer mainly dominated by the CHP.¹⁵⁰ In lieu of the CHP, the military appeared as the major agent of the coup on May 27, 1960 and in its aftermath, it has been converted into an even more influential political actor due to the foundation of the National Security Council in order to assist the Council of Ministers. Most of the bureaucrats, who had taken office in the newly-formed institutions, such as the State

¹⁴⁹ Roos and Roos indicated to several other factors that eased the conflict between the bureaucrats and the politicians as well. Among these factors they cite the development of a mutual understanding between the two camps along with a more cautious attitude adopted by the politicians in consideration of the coup (1971:220-2).

¹⁵⁰ Özbudun marks that at the time, the center-periphery cleavage began to gain socio-economic bearings as well. In that regard, underlining "less clear[ly] perceivable" changes in the AP, Özbudun states that the AP came closer to the big business groups, while the CHP began to stress the principles of social-democracy (Özbudun, 1976: 58-2). In the following years, this functional cleavage had its impact also on the nature of bureaucracy. Heper argues that in mid-1970s, with the erosion of the ruling tradition based on bureaucracy, the civil bureaucracy was mainly formed by functional elites rather than old-timers (Heper, 1976: 520). For details, see: Metin Heper. 1976. "Political Modernization as Reflected in Bureaucratic Change: The Turkish Bureaucracy and a 'Historical Bureaucratic Empire' Tradition," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 7(4): 507-521.

Planning Organization, the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Council of Judges, were among the strong partners of the center as well.

In spite of the crucial role played by the universities prior to the coup of 1960, the DP only managed to maintain a somewhat volatile relationship with academia throughout its term. In the aftermath of the coup of 1960, many academicians displayed strong support for the Constitution of 1961. In the immediate days following May 27, General Madanoğlu consulted with certain professors and “the same professors gave legitimacy to a military regime which had, according to them, ‘original power to rule’” (Levi in Heper and Landau, 1991:135). This collaboration rendered supportive academicians as one of the active partners of the center at the time.

On the other hand, following the footsteps of the DP, the AP continued to rally peripheral support. As Tanel Demirel observes, until the very beginning of 1970’s, the supporters of the AP were distinctive in their union against the bureaucratic-statist alliance composed of military, bureaucracy, academia, press and the CHP (Demirel, 2004:79). In view of Frey, local interests, which were mainly represented by the AP, began to be voiced more frequently following the unveiling of the political tutelage (Frey, 1965:397). One may discern various similarities between the elites of the AP and those of the DP. For example, as that of the DP, the number of AP deputies coming from bureaucratic backgrounds was far less than those coming from trading and other professional sectors. In the aftermath of the elections of 1965 and 1969, the percentage of its deputies coming from bureaucracy (both military and civil, including the education sector) was only 23 per cent and 36 per cent respectively (Weiker, 1981:22). Among its parliamentarians, professionals (such as lawyers, doctors, engineers and so

on) came first with 46 per cent according to both election results (Weiker, 1981:22-2; Tachau, 1977). Süleyman Demirel played a crucial role in consolidating the peripheral support as well. As an engineer, coming from a modest peasant family, with his unique personal history, Demirel managed to make room for himself in the largely elite-dominated landscape of politics in Turkey. Therefore, recognizing him as one of their own, masses raised hopes that he could adequately represent their interests.

However, the successor of the DP could not adequately respond to peripheral expectations straightaway owing to the strengthening of the center at the time. Following the elections of 1961, despite coming in second, the AP could not take part in a governmental coalition given the pre-dominance of military-bureaucratic alliance. Thus, under the leadership of Ragıp Gümüşpala, the AP endeavored solely to remain institutionally open without challenging any of the checks and balances or claiming to take hold of power. This attitude somehow resembles that of the DP, especially its initial retreat following the unfair elections of 1946. Only after Demirel grabbed its leadership, the party formulated a new strategy. The AP, then, clearly stressed that it advocated the ‘national will’ against the predominance of the center in the parliament, yet played it safe by prudently avoiding any direct confrontation with the center. In line with such prudence, in the party program it was stated that “we are against all sorts of totalitarian ideas and dispositions that intend to bring the individual, the citizen under political tutelage; that aim to disrespect human dignity by considering man as a means and instrument of the state and the political authority” (*AP Parti Programı* 1969, Article 3).

Since the DP and the AP considered the parliament as the focal point for taking hold of the state (Demirel, 2004:264), their main intention was to strip the state from the

bureaucratic oligarchs instead of considerably minimizing and liberalizing it. The discourses of the AP on state generally stressed that it should be kept under the control of the parliament - that is to say in AP's account - the government. To give a supporting example, one can cite Demirel's use of "we" interchangeable with "the state" especially when reading out the government programs. Thus, both the DP's faith in the 'myth of state' and its accented reference to the role of the elected ones in its control were pursued by its follower, the AP as well.

Following the forming up of the government, the AP customarily accused bureaucracy of restricting government's room for maneuver. In that regard, Demirel stated that "who will be responding to the question of 'what's happening?' if it is not within the powers of the political authority to prevent acts deemed undesirable by the citizens, and if certain persons and bodies unaccountable to the public are endowed with those powers instead?" (1973:131). The main problem brought to light here by the AP was the possible influence of the center on policy-making processes without any accountability to the public. It was argued that while the unelected forces mainly shaped the decision-making processes, the elected politicians accountable to the public were only called upon in explaining these policies to the public. That being the case, one of the key goals of the AP was to limit the influence of judiciary on behalf of the executive. The AP was of the opinion that with respect to the arrangements brought about by the Constitution of 1961, the judiciary significantly gained power. Demirel complained about this as follows: "if elected boards are addressed as a formality and in practice their powers are conveyed to bureaucracy, such a state cannot fully operate" (Demirel, 1973:111). To whitewash the elected ones in face of the suspicion raised by the bureaucrats, Demirel

also stated that “there is no justice or point in considering politics as a dirty game and the politician as a dirty man as one cannot rule without politics” (Demirel, 1973:101). While the center garnered suspicion towards the AP, the AP brought the capabilities of the bureaucrats into question as well. Encouraged by the AP’s parliamentary majority, Demirel occasionally highlighted that “the work of the representative councils cannot be executed by high specialists” (Demirel, 1973: 98) since in his account “relying on the free will of a nation is safer than relying on the so-called wisdom of a minority” (Demirel, 1973:102). Thus, despite the fact that AP clearly set its position against that of the all-knowing center, its challenge was not as stern as the one posed by the DP on account of the fear generated by potential interventions.

AP’s first and second government programs envisaged the state as a ‘servant of the people’ rather than an unreserved autonomous entity. Underlining the necessity of impartiality and respect for citizens as the main principles of the state, its foremost duty was defined as providing security and freedom to all. In a similar vein to the DP, the AP aimed at minimizing the state while rendering it more efficient. While stressing the need for an administrative reform, the AP intended to establish an effective state that is planned, swift and economical as well (Demirel, 1973:253). The criticism directed against the centralist state apparatus with all its burdening formalities was followed by pronouncements stressing the need for a new administrative approach (*Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi*, 03.11.1965 p.19). In the second program, such an approach was devised under the rubric of rationalization and for the reasons of coping with inefficiency, red-tape and high costs accompanying the operations of the state apparatus. This approach was comprised of policies that intended the efficiency of public officials,

such as the division of labor, the delegation of authority from the prime minister to the cabinet, decentralization, ministerial appointment and dismissal of high-ranked bureaucrats, the establishment of a viable system of rewards and punishments etc. (*Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi*, 07.11.1969 p.166). However, this program was carried into practice quite ineffectively and only partially.

In fine, the AP aimed at putting an end to the predominance of bureaucracy. For doing so, it endeavored to effectuate certain arrangements as is seen not only in its party program, but also in the government program. As Levi puts:

The government should be free to choose its chief executives, the State Planning Organization (SPO) should be reduced to a consultative body, and the autonomy of the universities assigned to the academic field only and the power of the Constitutional Court, Council of State and the High Election Council limited, also. For all this, the constitution should be changed. But the JP never had the two-thirds majority needed for this (Levi in Heper and Landau, 1991:145).

Thus, the AP was far from putting a comprehensive administrative reform into effect during its single-party government and the strengthened center was more eligible to shape the parameters of politics at the time.

4.1.2.2. Subsequent Developments Following the 1971 Memorandum

Despite the unpersuasive rationales behind the 1971 Memorandum, in its aftermath, the AP tuned its discourse down on state, mainly because it felt threatened. The AP felt the need to do so in order to avoid an institutional collapse and therefore adjusted its relations with the military. Following the memorandum, the AP did not only strive for

the approval of state elites, but also endeavored to build new bridges with the center. In doing so, the AP showed its adherence to the military by intensifying its nationalistic discourses in opposition to the leftist movements as well.

Having taken a major blow by the 1971 Memorandum, the AP had in view to maintain its pragmatic approach when it comes to the military-bureaucratic interim governments of 1971-1973 by not only supporting their policies, but also providing them with ministers. Hence, the AP mainly tried to share power with the interim governments and by doing so planned to confirm its obedient approach in the eyes of the military. Yet, such an unprincipled standpoint was neither appreciated by the center, nor welcomed by the periphery.

On the other hand, the AP embarked on emphasizing the nationalistic tones of its worldview to a significant extent in this process. Nationalism was put forth not only as a cure for sewing up the gap between the AP and the state elites, but also came in handy as a unique framework bringing together all the right-wing parties. To this extent, the AP made use of a particular nationalism vehemently that presumed a special bond between the state and the nation (Demirel, 2004:268). In a similar vein, Süleyman Demirel underlined the significance of paying respect to the state while describing the three prerequisites for development (1973: 214). Demirel, implicitly considering the state elites and the bureaucrats as the natural power holders, also remarked on the features of a strong coalition that would bunch together the elites, bureaucrats and the public (Demirel, 1973:229).¹⁵¹ So, the AP glorified the state and the state elites in order

¹⁵¹ Demirel sustained this position in the following years as well. Donat notes that Demirel criticized Özal, then the prime minister, for ignoring bureaucracy and stated that “you should govern the country via

to close up the prevailing gap between the state and the periphery. A sort of paternalistic state image akin to that of the DP was developed by the AP especially in the aftermath of the 1971 Memorandum. Along the lines of this paternalistic view of state, considering himself as the head of the state, Demirel also endeavored to enjoy especially the benevolent attributes of “father” figure: “[the fair] one [that] protects and listens to everyone...[the] one you [consult with] when in trouble” in the years that followed suit (Arat in Heper and Sayarı, 2002:87; Akman, 1999:47). To summarize, while the AP claimed to be in control of the state owing to its majority vote in the elections in 1960s; in the following decade, it confined itself to sharing state power with the bureaucracy.¹⁵²

Accompanied by nationalism, the ‘perpetuity of state’ also appeared as one of the major themes emphasized by the AP. To the question of “[h]ow could we cut the state free from radical movements?” the AP replied by stressing the nation alongside the *special forces of the state*¹⁵³ (Demirel, 1973:53). Demirel defined the most distinctive feature of the AP as its sensitivity concerning the indivisible unity of the country (Demirel, 2004:129). Özbudun proposes that “this <gemeinschaft outlook> which is present in both elite and mass cultures, finds perhaps its most poignant political expression in the excessive <fear of national split>” (Özbudun in Özbudun and Weiner, 1987:354). Thus, the AP, thrilled by the so-called “fear of national split” drew closer to the center and its understanding of guardianship. In the account of Demirel, the main problem of Turkey,

bureaucrats. If you want to put aside or ignore bureaucracy, you will soon be out of breath and stranded” (Donat, 2005:76).

¹⁵² For a brief and clear categorization of interactions between the state and bureaucracy in the transcendental and instrumentalist states, see: Metin Heper. 1985(b). “The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative and Historical Perspective,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 27(1): 86-110.

¹⁵³ Italics added.

with no doubt, was related with the prospects for stabilizing and sustaining the state administration (Demirel, 1973:87). At this point, one can discern that the mission of minimizing and liberalizing the state had taken a backseat and had been transformed into an intention of taking hold of a portion of state power. AP's discourse against the *status-quo* faded away especially after March 12, and instead, the party pragmatically embarked on extracting benefits within the framework of the *status- quo* (Demirel, 2004:80) In the aftermath of March 12, Demirel even exaggerated that "[t]he Turkish Armed Forces respects democracy and nation's right to live in freedom more than anyone else" (1973:31).

While the former state-party CHP acknowledged the Kurdish groups and expanded its horizons concerning issues revolving around ethnic nationalism, the AP almost repeatedly quoted the official state ideology and expressed disapproval of Ecevit's position in every single opportunity. In this respect, Demirel ascertained that "[t]hose who claim to be *from Turkey (Türkiyeli)* have no rights in Turkey; those who declare that they are *Turkish (Türk)* have their rights guaranteed in Turkey" (Demirel, 2004:200-2). Thus, in 1970's, the AP went far beyond its populist precedents and parted company with the softer tone of the Turkish center-right when it comes to nationalism. According to Demirel, positioned in between the secular/Kemalist understanding of nationalism and that of the far-rightists (*mukaddesatçı*), AP's standpoint differed from the former by its nationalistic worldview coupled with Ottoman-Islamic elements, yet diverged from the latter by its low profile when it comes to these elements (Demirel, 2004:203).

At this point, it goes without saying that the founding cadre of the far-nationalist Republican Peasant National Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*) not only

previously operated under the umbrella of the AP, but also occasionally repositioned AP's understanding of nationalism by stretching it from civic to ethnic grounds (Demirel, 2004:198). However, such an emphasis was never compatible with another viewpoint common in the party, namely the synthesis of Turkish-Islamic elements. Since the AP had no ideological foundation, it provided a convenient, communicative and protective platform for far-nationalist groups that enabled them to get a foothold in bureaucracy. In fact, the AP was in pursuit of a win-win relationship with these groups to stay in power rather than spreading an ethno-religious ideology. Demirel, thanks to his habitual pragmatism, defined his understanding of nationalism as follows: "In our view, nationalism is about providing the peasants of Urfa or Mardin with water; it is about putting an end to their misery; to ensure them with better employment opportunities; to open up a school in the illiterate Köprü village in Ağrı" (Demirel, 1973: 69).

More importantly, this trump card provided by nationalism was one of the rare common grounds between the center and the AP, which had to be retained by the AP via its efforts in reshaping bureaucracy while avoiding any confrontation with the military. Ideological orientations of the National Front governments clearly made an impact on the bureaucratic structure, rendering bureaucracy considerably politicized within this process (Heper, 1985:114; 1979: 105; Özbudun in Diamond, 2004; Demirel, 2004:238-2). The civil and military bureaucracy was not pleased with the policies of AP, especially with reference to its alliance with the far-nationalist and far-Islamist groups. In the account of Heper (1976:489), the coalition of the National Front launched "a

fierce fight against the civil bureaucracy” by reshuffling certain civil servants and drew reactions of the center.

Within these confines, under the leadership of Gümüşpala, the AP kept a low profile in order to avoid dealing with a case of closure. The main concern of the party was about the prospects of amnesty: concerning not only the former Democrats, but also the members of the AP, who were perceived as potential threats by the state elites. Under the leadership of Demirel, the AP left behind its low profile to a certain extent and turned into a proactive political actor focusing on the defense of peripheral interests *vis-à-vis* those of the strengthened center. However, in the aftermath of 1971 Memorandum, the AP put these peripheral interests on the back burner, trying to forge a reconciliatory ground between the center and the periphery by reinforcing undemocratic ways of the military elite. Within the scope of the coalitions formed from within the National Front, nationalism was put forward in increased doses in search of a common ground with the center. However, the center did not receive such attempts favorably, considering them as initiatives of the AP for setting up a partisan bureaucracy. Concerning the relations between the state and the civilian politicians, the AP put its claim aside quite early compared to the DP. On top of that the AP preferred to pursue a contradictory path to this account in the aftermath of 1971 Memorandum and as a matter of course contributed to the downfall of its own popular support. To crown it all, the AP proved to be incapable of preventing the coup of 1980. On the other hand, owing to the arbitrary rule of unstable governments and the frequent reshuffling of civil servants, the bureaucracy (with the sole exception of military), not only lost its coalescence, but also

has been politicized to a significant extent in late 1970's (Özbudun in Diamond, 1993:259-2; Heper, 1985:114).

4.1.2.3. The Relations between the AP and the Military

It is worth dwelling upon the relations between the AP and the military in light of those in between the AP and the state. Cizre suggests that the AP contributed to the rise of military as an influential actor in the political arena since it put forward a double-edged discourse on military - sometimes half-hearted, at other times somewhat encouraging (Cizre, 1993). According to Cizre, the ambivalent nature of the relations between the AP and the military was founded in the aftermath of the elections held on October 15, 1961, when the Turkish Armed Forces intervened into the functioning of the elected parliament, where the AP had 158 seats (1993:49). In the wake of 1960's, new putsches followed suit and deterred the normalization of politics as well.¹⁵⁴ The AP opted for avoiding confrontations with the military as it had also done in relation to the civil bureaucracy under the leadership of Gümüşpala. Yet, Demirel proposed to follow a new path fluctuating between convergence and neutralization (Cizre, 1993:49).

Since the outset, the military had taken the AP with a grain of salt owing largely to the non-military occupational backgrounds of its deputies¹⁵⁵ as well as due to its self-representation as the heir of the DP overthrown by the military. Notwithstanding Demirel has taken the party leadership stressing his modesty *vis-à-vis* his more

¹⁵⁴ For details, see: William Hale. 1994. *Turkish Politics and The Military*...pp.156-8.

¹⁵⁵ The number of the deputies in the AP coming from military backgrounds was one third less than that of the CHP (Karpat, 2009:101).

conservative rival, Bilgiç group, the military continued to keep the AP at its arm's length. Indeed, especially before the 1971 Memorandum, within the context of Demirel's appeasement policy regarding the military, as a gesture of convergence, the AP supported the presidency of Cevdet Sunay in 1966, who was nominated by the military circles (Hale, 1994:173; Arat in Heper and Sayarı, 2002:95). Among the conciliatory steps taken towards the military in 1960's by the AP one can cite the fulfillment of nearly its every need, such as the purchases of modern weapons and equipment; raises in salaries; regulations guaranteeing its authority and autonomy accompanied by respect to the National Security Council (Cizre, 1993:22, 71; Özbudun, 2000:56; Hale, 1994:185-3, Karpas, 1972: 365). In spite of these efforts on part of the government,¹⁵⁶ in March 1966, the National Liberation Committee called for unity and action against the "anti-national governmental policy" (Ahmad, 1977:195).

It is fair to mention several daring moves on part of the AP in this period that criticized the involvement of military in daily affairs. For example, Demirel discharged Cemal Tural, then the Chief of the General Staff, from office due to his frequent statements on daily affairs. In a similar vein, the AP also blocked the presidency of General Faruk Gürler.¹⁵⁷

Despite AP's efforts to please the military, Demirel could not manage to impede the 1971 Memorandum. At the time, the AP embarked on a new strategy of neutralization in

¹⁵⁶ Cizre notes that one of the main reasons behind DP's approach might be titled as "Menderes complex," while the AP envisioned a different nature of relations between the civil politicians and the military (Cizre, 1993:31).

¹⁵⁷ Cizre asserts that the main reason behind such a blockage was not related with Gürler's military background. Instead, the AP was skeptical about his ability in developing coherent relations with the AP. As a result, another General was appointed (Cizre, 1993: 96-2).

order to dissociate the military from the CHP.¹⁵⁸ More precisely, instead of ending or limiting the politicization of military, the AP intended to decouple the military and the CHP via the neutralization of the former (Cizre, 1993:73). In that regard, Demirel stated that “the Turkish Armed Forces is not a source of concern...rather it is a source of security; and it neither takes side with, nor against any political organization” (Demirel, 1973:327). Hence, the problem posed by the politicization of the military persisted and the military remained as the third party in the political arena.

As part of this neutralization strategy, the AP intensively developed discourses that favored state authority at the expense of individual rights. In the context of such discourses, one of the main concerns of the government emerged as the “proliferation of state’s democratic authority,” which implicitly legitimized not only the 1971 Memorandum, but also the interim government (Cizre, 1993:23). The AP referred to the National Security Council without questioning its role and legitimacy in order to complain about the CHP while perceiving the military as a natural supra-governmental body.

The AP did not run counter to the military in the post-1971 era, except over the odds of amnesty. Furthermore, the AP incorporated proponents of the 1971 Memorandum, namely Cemal Süer, Kemal Gökakın and Ali Everdi (Demirel, 2004:67). These militarist tendencies were indicative of its considerable drift away from the basic tenets of the center-right. While the emphasis on the ‘national will’ was replaced by the ‘security of state,’ the military was also bestowed with immense power *vis-à-vis* the

¹⁵⁸ Alongside AP’s shift in strategy, one should take into account CHP’s convergence to the left that played a crucial role in the neutralization of the military as well.

civilian elements of politics. In doing so, better-said, by approaching to the center while drawing away from the periphery, the AP, not only lost its strong public support, but also could not manage establishing sincere and trustful relations with the military. Eventually, prompted by the lessons drawn from December 27, 1979 Memorandum, the AP let go of its strivings to meet the extraordinary demands of the military. Nevertheless, as Cizre observed, the AP could not take issue with the military in the atmosphere created by the 1979 Memorandum (Cizre, 1993:203). In such an atmosphere, existing political parties could not deal with the increasing political tension on the streets and the military came to the fore. The military abused its privilege provided by the martial law and did not intervene in the events until the very end in order to get involved by way of the coup of 1980, hinting the premeditated nature of its involvement (Karpat in Heper and Evin, 1994:149).

4.1.3. The ANAP and the State

As we have discussed previously, even in the years before the coup of 1980, the military has already been the third party in the political arena (Cizre, 1993). Yet, the coup of 1980, by rearranging the composition of the center once again, provided a new basis for the relations between the ANAP and the state.¹⁵⁹ Describing the extent of the disorganization in civil bureaucracy, Özbudun points out that “when the military intervention of 12 September 1980 took place, the military was about the only bureaucratic institution that was by and large able to insulate itself from such

¹⁵⁹ For an alternative reading, see: Faruk Birttek. 1994. “Prospects for a New Center of the Temporary Rise of the Peripheral *Asabiyah*?,” in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (ed.). *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*. Oxford: Westview Press, 223-228.

fragmentation, infiltration, and colonization by political parties” (Özbudun in Diamond, 1993:262). Thus, the military in 1980, not only emerged as the active third party in politics, but also it was the only bureaucratic structure in the country that remained standing. That being the case, it is not surprising to observe that it strengthened its position in the following years as well.

On this period, Heper states that:

The present state-civil society cleavage differs in another fundamental respect from the earlier one. The new state elite, unlike the post-Atatürk intellectual-bureaucratic elite, take Atatürkian thought not as a political manifesto. When they intervened the military adopted the monetarist economic policy that the Justice Party had developed prior to the intervention, and recruited the primary architect of that policy, Turgut Özal, as Assistant to the Prime Minister responsible for economic affairs. Later, President Kenan Evren also allowed Turgut Özal and his party to participate in the elections, and, when Özal won the majority of the votes in the general elections of November 6, 1983, President Evren allowed him to form the government (In Heper and Evin, 1988:8).

Thus, while the ANAP was expected to deal with the far-reaching impact of the military in policy-making; in fact, it had a more comfortable relation with it ideologically compared to the center-right parties previously dwelled upon.¹⁶⁰ The coup of 1980 was not interested in the social transformation of the society. Its main concern revolved around stabilization, better-said, putting an end to political violence while preserving the economic policies outlined by the previous center-right government (Hale, 1993:246).

Hence, this time, the military emerged as the main constituent of the center, substantially disregarding its other components. Given the obscurity surrounding the

¹⁶⁰ In another study put forth by Heper, it is pointed out that the junta elite of 1980 made use of Atatürk’s thought as a technique, rather than a political manifesto. He also asserts that “Atatürkist thought does serve, however, a justification for rejecting radical ideologies of both the left and the right” (1985:143).

separating line between the rulers of the country and the active commanders of the military in this period, the military, enjoying complete powers of the executive and the legislative, not only raided almost equally rough over the activists both from the left-wing and the right-wing, but also eliminated them from the political scene via instruments provided by the Martial Law and the Penal Code, especially the articles 141 and 142 of the latter.¹⁶¹ Within these confines, the power of the higher courts was diminished contrary to the regulations of the Constitution of 1961 and the proponents of the CHP, even those on bureaucratic duty were injured in contrast to the previous coups. The academicians, who were the critical proponents of the coup of 1960, were repressed by means of the Higher Education Law. This law was introduced to end their autonomy since the military elite had taken universities somehow responsible for the polarization of the society and the political turmoil experienced in late 1970's (Hale, 1993: 253). Thus, the preparation phase of the 1982 Constitution was under the sway of a militaristic point of view, evident in none of the groups represented in the Constituent Assembly, which was mainly formed by the Consultative Assembly along with the National Security Council (Özbudun, 2000:57-4; Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009:18-3). What is more, General Evren, taking the chair of the President, became the "head of the state" and was endowed with additional supreme powers on the basis of the 1982 Constitution such as the right to adjourn the parliament and to call an election following that.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ In this period, the approximate number of detainees is estimated to be around 43 000 (Hale, 1994:252).

¹⁶² For another perspective, see: Ergun Özbudun. 1998. "The Status of the President of the Republic under the Turkish Constitution of 1982: Presidentialism or Parliamentarism?," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, (eds.), *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980's* (pp. 37- 45). Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter; Metin Heper. 1990. "The Executive in the Third Turkish Republic, 1982–1989," *Governance* 3(3): 299–319.

In a nutshell, at the time when the ANAP formed the government, the center was dominated by the military. In less than three years of time, the military inscribed its mentality into the state apparatus. However, instead of the restoration of Kemalist principles by way of a 'top-down modernization approach' as experienced in 1960, the new center envisaged a framework where more disciplined mechanisms of control and punishment were accompanied by people with less ideological affiliations. Under these circumstances, the ANAP formed relations with the state on a less formal milieu, yet insisting on campaigning via 'the state should be the servant of the nation' discourse. Such relations were built on two main grounds: the first one was the search of reaching a compromise with the state elites and the second one was the pursuit of introducing a new public management strategy.

4.1.3.1. In Pursuit of a Compromise with the Center

The ANAP endeavored to establish a reasonable relationship with the state elites to a significant extent by seeking grounds for consensus since it was well aware of the tragic faith that had awaited the previous center-right parties who had run counter to them. Turgut Özal, son of two government officers, had the chance to carefully observe what it meant to be in the service of state in Turkey. In view of Özal, government employees - even junior ones - were the ones, who were not only the true transformers of the regime, but also the very agents of the Kemalist Revolution. They were to act according to the ideals presented and spread by modernization (Barlas, 1994:83). Being well aware of such a missionary preexistence facing the government employees, Özal urged the

provincial party leaders as follows on May 2, 1986: “do not fight with the bureaucracy; otherwise you will destroy the party. (...) if we make the same mistake, that the Democrat Party did, we will lose (...) the reason behind the execution of Menderes and his two ministers was the bureaucracy, rather than the People’s Party” (Cemal, 1989:118). Thus, based on his implicit presumption about the real owners of the systemic control, namely the civil and military bureaucrats, the ANAP pursued a very cautious path in its relations with the state elites, especially with the military.

On account of his work experience in the State Planning Association, the occupational background of his family and his modern inclinations, Özal somehow enjoyed recognition on part of the state elites to a certain extent (Taşkın, 2012: 71). Such recognition was reflected on the elections of 1983, where the ANAP came first in quarters largely resided by military circles (Cemal, 1983:61). In other words, on the grounds of Özal’s previous post in the military government and despite various differences in their viewpoints, the ANAP enjoyed the support of state elites to a significant extent: at least, not being repressed from the outset facilitated its survival.

The ANAP aimed at defusing the tension between the center and the periphery (Özbudun in Sezal, 1996:107). In the elections of 1983, it remained close to the periphery on the one hand; it was well aware of the power of center on the other hand, which necessitated developing good relations with it in order to meet the requirements of a civilian government. In the first government program, rather than considering the state and the nation as existential rivals, Özal argued that the state, not only existed for the nation, but also it is the actual reflection of the nation (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 19.12.1983: 68). In order to adopt a more conciliatory stance regarding the relations

between the elected politicians and the state elites, Özal endeavored to please the latter, especially the President Kenan Evren, by avoiding any possible objections against him. Despite Evren had previously declared his poor opinion on Özal as an unreliable man, after his electoral victory, Evren, well-known for his stern and formal standing, consented to Özal's friendly approach (Cemal, 1989:20-3). With no doubt, Özal was pragmatically in pursuit of putting an end to the prevailing conflict between the elected politicians and those from the center. From this vantage-point, Özal had regularly consulted with Evren in order to win his heart by attaching value to his words and opinions (Cemal, 1989:71). Özal declared in the first government program that the President - as an impartial agent - represented the unity of the nation and the state on the highest possible level (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 19.12.1983: 67). Along the same line, in the first years of Özal's premiership, Necdet Üruğ, then the Chief of the General Staff enjoyed a great autonomy when it comes to military affairs since he was effective in keeping the soldiers under control (Cemal, 1989:75). On the other hand, the military kept on making use of the National Security Council as a means to express its opinion on the course of daily politics in the country. As Evin suggests the ANAP refrained from running counter to the military elites and preferred an easy-going approach. It was rather the opposition leaders, namely Cindoruk and Ecevit that called for a new civilian constitution and the civilianization of the regime on the grounds of an intensive anti-militarist discourse in the middle of 1980's. The ANAP has never embraced such discourses (Evin in Heper and Evin, 1994:28).

Then again, the government formed by the ANAP every now and then complained about the secretive attitudes of the bureaucrats towards them. For instance, the National

Intelligence Service dominated by the military elite, restricted government's sphere of influence by not sharing some crucial information with not only the Prime Minister, but also the Minister of Internal Affairs (Cemal, 1989:70). The ANAP exerted efforts to substitute a civilian and obedient executive for managing this crucial institution, yet this initiative had also backfired in a short span of time and the military elites carried on with their patronizing approach over the government. There were several other source of controversy between the ANAP and the center as well, revolving around the election of a civilian President and the appointment of certain generals with respect to the preferences of the government. Regarding these issues of concern, the ANAP endeavored to take further steps towards the civilianization of politics.¹⁶³ Furthermore, the ANAP vigilantly attempted to delimit the power of the President. After a while, the temporary articles were also annihilated and the presidential control on legislation was lessened in favor of majority representation. This was a significant step since Kenan Evren, not only represented the presidency, but also he was the major constituent of the center.

More precisely, military's immense sphere of influence was eventually reduced to a certain extent, despite the fact that it was far from meeting the criteria to be considered a civilian liberal democratic order due to various institutional predicaments. To give an idea on the level of civilianization of politics in the country, one can remind the limited involvement of the military in the decision-making processes concerning the Gulf War that stirred up trouble between the military and the ANAP and led to the resignation of the General Necip Torumtay at the end of the same year. This instance signaled to the

¹⁶³ This issue –“the civilianization of politics” has been discussed in detail in chapter 3.

fact that Özal, who appeared as an obedient figure *vis-à-vis* Kenan Evren at the outset, acquired room for maneuver in the course of events even it comes to military affairs. However, as a pragmatic actor, the ANAP waited for the most appropriate conditions in order to take the political realm under its control and until then, it avoided challenging state elites.

However, this initially peaceful approach of the ANAP could not be maintained with regards to certain non-military affairs. Having ascertained that the military was out of non-military issues, the ANAP had taken plenty of measures in order to reorganize bureaucracy.

4.1.3.2. Introducing the New Public Management

The ANAP had a new way of thinking on the administration of state, which was not in tune with that of the bureaucrats. Following the world-wide trend of the new-right, this new mentality rested on key tendencies as follows: the minimization of the role of the state and bureaucracy, attaching value to ends rather than procedures and engaging in informal ways of administration.

It was underlined in the party program that owing to the main tasks of the state, namely defense, security and justice, the state should in general undertake only a mission of control concerning the social and economic life (*Anavatan Partisi Programı* 1983, Article 2). Özal claimed that the argument that considered bureaucrats, professors and judges as the potential liberators who could put an end to the dire ways in the country

was out of date since these liberators were too prudent to take risks owing to their arrogance and suspicion (Barlas, 1994:117-2). In the account of Özal, bureaucrats carried on with the attitude of İnönü, that is conservative and *status-quo* oriented, without leaving much room for the maneuver of elected politicians (Barlas, 1994:118). Thus, the government formed by the ANAP under the leadership of Özal - a “man of service rather than man of bureaucracy” (Barlas, 1994:92) – intended to endorse a shift from the classical understanding of bureaucracy to a new mode of public management.

To stress the ‘unreasonable’ approach of bureaucracy, Özal stated that “we should neutralize the bureaucrats who give priority to the procedures instead of essences” (Cemal, 1989:250). In this direction, the laws and procedures that were considered as burdens escaped close examination in this period. Özal contributed to this affinity with his well-known dictum: “nothing is going to come out of infringing the constitution for once” (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:255). If the rules stood in the way of any actions envisaged by the government, the ANAP immediately tended to stretch the laws accordingly. Özal also gave directions to his new bureaucrats to shorten, clarify and simplify complex regulations. Such an action-oriented approach led to swift decisions on new regulations and amendments in order to pave the way for the elimination of the works causing incoherence between the old-timers and the ANAP. That being the case, the Constitutional Court appealed thirty-seven laws enacted by the governments formed by the ANAP within six years of Özal’s premiership (Cemal, 1989:117).

The ANAP obtained more than what had its predecessors gained by way of this systemic reformation of public management. Özbudun suggests that the most distinctive aspect of the relations between the ANAP and the state rested on former’s ‘de-bureaucratization

formula' that differ not only from the "virulent anti-statist rhetoric" of the DP, but also the "sweeping purges" method of the AP (In Diamond, 1993:263). In contrast to the lasting job security of the old-timers in bureaucracy, the government formed by the ANAP employed contracted servants at the SEEs and the newly-found state institutions in order to allow the market to determine their working conditions (Yılmaz in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:99). Furthermore, a new generation of bureaucrats with overseas education and experience, namely the "princes of Özal," who held positions in international organizations and private sector, were appointed to top rank bureaucratic posts despite their inexperience in public sector. This was very unlikely from the point of the established tradition of classical bureaucratic circles. Autonomous public institutions, such as the Capital Markets Board and the Istanbul Stock Exchange, were established in this period as well.

Moreover, despite the centralized nature of the state apparatus prevailed, the local governments were also empowered in this period (Görmez in Sezal, 1996:66-4; Kalaycıoğlu in Heper and Evin, 1994:93-6). On the one hand, in line with the Article 127 of the 1982 Constitution that perceives central administration as the main legal authority, having "the power of administrative tutelage over the local administrations," the governments formed by the ANAP sustained the reliance of local governments to the central authority.¹⁶⁴ On the other hand, further steps were taken for de-centralization. The ANAP reinforced municipalities via budgetary increases, additional personnel recruitment and the boost of facilities (Kalaycıoğlu in Heper and Evin, 1994:91-9). In a

¹⁶⁴ Despite its aim of increasing the control of central administration over local bodies, the government formed by the ANAP enacted a decree that granted power to provincial governors to remove mayors from office. This decree was then annulled by the Constitutional Court. For details, see: Ersin Kalaycıoğlu. 1994. "Decentralization of Government," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (ed.). *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*. Oxford: Westview Press, 87-100.

similar vein, the metropolitan municipalities were granted with further power opportunities.

Özal's endorsement of fast and effective public services restructured via dynamic servants was criticized due to his extensive informality. In the aftermath of the coup of 1980, Özal's somewhat sincere and sportive photos in swimming suits *vis-à-vis* those of his bureaucratic and rigid rivals, Sunalp and Calp, gave the first hints of his informality. Such informality was soon reflected on his governing style as well. For instance, the Özal family was to play an extraordinary role in the decision-making procedures by-passing bureaucracy, parliament and even ministers, except from a couple of their close friends (Cemal, 1989:149-2). As the most relaxed prime minister ever in Turkey, Özal, not very fond of bureaucratic formalities, not only preferred to work at home instead of in the prime ministry; but also as not a very punctual man, he was often late for his appointments. Unlike Menderes or Demirel who preferred to remain within reach to all, Özal mainly constructed good relations with certain businessmen and the friends of his family. These businessmen, friends and even ministers frequently visited the Özal residence, the so-called 'government house' at the time. That being the case, the leadership style of Özal was usually condemned by the center for being informal and prone to nepotism.

On the whole, the governments formed by the ANAP followed the footsteps of Margaret Thatcher's initiative¹⁶⁵ and aimed at concrete and measurable results in the realm of

¹⁶⁵ This initiative consisted of various strategies such as decentralization, re-examination of tasks, down-sizing, privatization, considering cost-efficiency of public works, bench-marking and performance measurement for a well-functioning public management. For details, see: D. Osborne and P. Plastrik. 1998. *Banishing Bureaucracy: The Five Strategies for Re-inventing Government*. New York: Addison-Wesley.

public management rather than intending the justification of abstract ideas, such as the common good stressed by the classical bureaucracy. In line with this viewpoint, the state apparatus was minimized while the status along with the salaries of the government employees was considerably scaled down. On the trail of Toffler's theory, the governments formed by the ANAP had in sight a technocratic, rapid and flexible state, instead of a bureaucratic one. Therefore, drawing upon individual and market-oriented tenets, the ANAP governments applied various strategies counter to the red tape and the bulk of the state (Bozkurt in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:174-2). In this respect, the organizing principle of public service was defined as efficiency in rapidity (*Anavatan Partisi Programı 1983*, Article 2). Hence, the ANAP brought new-right into Turkey by importing the governing style initiated by Thatcher and Reagan. At this point, one might find a similarity in between Turkey under the rule of the ANAP and Greece, Spain and Portuguese models of center-right politics on the basis set by the duel between the 'national will' and the 'domination of the state' (Ergüder in Heper and Landau, 1991: 154). All in all, unlike those previous examples of the center-right parties in Turkey, the political approach of the governments formed by the ANAP could easily and adequately be placed within related world trends as well as the left-right spectrum.

On the other hand, the liberal state could not have been consolidated in particular areas. For example, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of National Education remained dominated by conservative or nationalist wings of the ANAP, while in the meantime, "the reformist, secularist, and tutelary weltanschauung of the old bureaucratic center was further weakened and fragmented" (Özbudun in Diamond, 1993:264). Thus, one may argue that on the one hand, the governments formed by the ANAP favored a

conservative standpoint when it came to cultural realm and the education of new generations; on the other hand, they intended to constitute a market-oriented state administration in order to put the lid on the guardianship of state elites in politics.¹⁶⁶ Such hybrid policies were apparently widespread in all new-right politics.

4.1.4. Conclusion

Özal's predominance endured during his Presidential term under Yıldırım Akbulut's premiership. Mesut Yılmaz, unlike Akbulut, was less responsive to the demands of Özal and their paths began to drift apart.¹⁶⁷ This trend was accelerated in the aftermath of the elections held on October 20, 1991 by the coalition governments formed by the DYP (the True Path Party) and the SHP (the Social Democratic People's Party). In general, Özal era opened up a new scene in Turkish politics that transformed the nature of the relations between the state and the civilian government to a significant extent by way of strategies such as the minimization of the state, the empowerment of the local governments and the endorsement of a new-right mentality. In the meantime, Özal was in pursuit of controlling all the policy-making processes, which created a tension not between the center and the periphery this time, but between the governments and the presidency.

¹⁶⁶ Along with de-bureaucratization, the easing of government controls over economics also led to the decline of the efficiency of bureaucracy (Özbudun in Diamond, 1993: 264; Heper, 1990:10).

¹⁶⁷ Özbudun suggests that while Mesut Yılmaz was closer to Demirel's populist egalitarian style, the subsequent leader of the DYP, Tansu Çiller was more akin to Özal's market-oriented policy making style (2000:96).

Özbudun asserts that “in the 1980’s and 1990’s, no single party emerged to stand for the values and interests of the center or received the kind of electoral support the CHP had received in the past” (2000: 81). Put differently, the center no longer constituted a strong coalition since its main constituent, namely the military lost its prominence. After all, a similar fragmentation among right-wing parties that previously claimed to represent peripheral interests could also be detected. However, what remained crucial in this process was the divergence between the value systems of the center and that of the periphery that surfaced via the Islamic and Kurdish demands rather than the spatial connotations.

4.2. PART 2: The Economic Orientations of the Center-Right in Turkey

In order to fully grasp the relations between the center-right parties and the state in Turkey, one must take into account the economic orientations of the Turkish center-right as well, which might well be associated with three main characteristics; liberal, developmentalist and clientelist. Yet, it goes without saying that the extents of these characteristics vary from one party to another. For instance, the DP put forth a liberal approach, yet in practice, it was the state investments that gradually broadened their scope. However, given the state of the economy, deprived of private capital accumulation, it was actually a pragmatic approach not only to create the necessary infrastructure, but also to support private enterprises, rather than signaling to an ideologically statist tendency. Even the ANAP, considered as the most liberal party ever on economic grounds, exerted efforts to set up several state-led institutions such as the Board of Public Housing and the Public Partnership Fund. That being the case, it is hard to consider the economic policies of the DP or those of the other center-right parties as purely liberal in international terms. Instead, one must take into account both the clientelist networks inscribed in their pragmatic approaches and pro-development incentives for evaluating the economic policies of the center-right parties in Turkey. Before we move on to take up this matter in detail, it is valuable first to address the economic atmosphere at the time of the first center-right government, the DP.

The political economy envisioned by Kemalists was based on an understanding of social structure that denied the existence of socio-economic classes (Ahmad in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981:146; Özbudun in Özbudun and Uluhan, 1980:57). State elites formulated an economic program in pursuit of state interests rather than those of particular groups. In the shadows of the disastrous World Wars and within the limits imposed by the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey carried on with an economic model based on free-enterprises in line with the decisions taken up during the Izmir Economic Congress held in February 1923.¹⁶⁸ Within these confines, on the one hand, the state played a supportive role for the private entrepreneurship via particular subventions and incentives up until 1929: on the other hand, the state had a complementary role as it retained monopoly on specific products, such as sugar, oil, iron, and electricity. However, in the absence of accumulated private capital and experienced entrepreneurs, this system did not work very well.

In 1929, not only the government was faced with the corrosive impact of the Great Depression, but also the obligatory Ottoman tariffs had come to an end and given these developments, the government had an opportunity to impose more protective duties on the imports (Boratav in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981: 170). In this context, the Kemalist government tried various economic models up until 1933. The Kemalist

¹⁶⁸ It was the first economic congress held in the Republic of Turkey in which approximately 3000 delegates representing different segments of society gathered together to express their economic concerns and priorities. At the end of the congress, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, then the Minister of Economy, rejecting the complete enforcement of any pre-existing economic doctrines, suggested a “New Turkish Economic School” based on mixed economy. For details, see: William M. Hale. 1984. “The Traditional and the Modern in the Economy of Kemalist Turkey: The Experience of the 1920s,” in Jacob M. Landau (eds). *Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 153-170.

principle of statism,¹⁶⁹ defined as a “synthesis of statism and protectionism,” was enforced in the years following 1933 (Boratav in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981:167). In view of this principle, it was considered necessary not only to impose restrictions on foreign trade and foreign capital, but also to nationalize foreign investments like those on railways in order to assure economic development without excluding any foreign imports, at least in principle (Boratav in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981:174). Nevertheless, the changes brought about in 1928 on the 1924 Constitution justified state investment by virtue of the necessities of the time and pursuant to the development of the country (Özbudun, 2012:9). That being the case, despite previous emphasis on liberal economic incentives by the state, with the inscription of CHP’s six principles into the Constitution in 1937, such an accent fell completely off the agenda on both ideological and practical grounds (Özbudun, 2012:4, 12). In a declining economy, the state was taken to be the one and only redemptive agent capable of efficiency in production and investments. Accordingly, the objective set forth in the first Five-Year Industrialization Plan covering the years between 1934 and 1938 that prescribed an increase in the role of the state concerning the production of vital goods was attained to a certain extent and as a result, by 1938 more than half of the manufacturing sector came under the control of the state (Mardin in Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:39). The second plan covering the years between 1939 and 1943 intended to develop state-led heavy industries as well. However, it could not get off the ground as did the former plan owing

¹⁶⁹ Nevertheless, the tendency to slide back into a statist economy was depicted in the very beginning of 1930’s. Indeed, the principle of statism that appeared in the CHP party program of 1931 resurfaced in the context of the Constitution six years later. In this program, despite the stress on the importance of economic activities performed by the individual, the state was endowed with an active role in the economy in order to guarantee the well-being of the nation. See: *C.H.F. Nizamnamesi ve Programı*. 1931. Ankara: TBMM Matbaası, 31.

to the tragic circumstances of the Second World War (Hale, 1981:101; Keyder, 1979:15). After 1939, the Five-Year Development Plans began to lose effect and the statist policies started to fade away due to a pinch of foreign integration.

4.2.1. The DP Period: Economy as a Field of Controversy between the Center and the Periphery

It will not do justice to situate the entire economic policies of the CHP within statist confines, given its enforcement of free-market economy in 1920s, its search for a variety of economic models between 1929 and 1933 and its gradual renouncement of statism after 1939. One of the most intense debates in the CHP revolved around the role of state in the economy. The CHP not only paved the way for a transition to multi-party system, but also set the scene for a limited liberalization of the economy. The relative liberalization of the economy was then pronounced in the Five-Year Development Plan enforced in 1946, which was followed by Turkey's accession to the IMF and the World Bank in 1947. In these years, the US administration along with the World Bank counseled Turkey to reduce the role of the state in the economy, as well as to take some measures for attracting foreign investments (Aydın, 2005:29). Therefore, small steps towards the liberalization of Turkish economy as well as foreign integration have already been taken before the DP came to power.

To remind, the pro-liberal intra-party opposition within the CHP was spear-headed by the founders of the DP. These figures raised their voices especially during the meetings

on the Land Distribution Bill (the Land Reform).¹⁷⁰ During these debates, Adnan Menderes came to the fore in his defense concerning the property rights of big land-owners against the elites of the CHP that advocated state control on private property. In this context, as one of the most remarkable disputes at that time, the Land Reform actually marked the emergence of the DP.

At this point, it is worth underlining that it will not also do justice to assess the DP and the CHP through the lenses provided by the theories that only stress socio-economic parameters and left-right fractions. Better-said, it is quite difficult to label the DP as a totally rightist or the CHP as a totally leftist party. In a country without bourgeoisie as well as an organized working class, where the majority of the population was comprised of peasants residing in villages, the reasons behind the diversity of views on economy is to be found on the grounds of other fractions such as the one between the center and the periphery. Özbudun succinctly summarizes the difference of opinion between the CHP and the DP as follows:¹⁷¹

Both the quite lively intraparty debate within the RPP in the single-party era and the RPP-DP conflict in the 1946-1960 period centered around the proper role of the state in social and economic matters. This was a typical center-periphery issue in the sense we defined the term. The forces of the center (governmental bureaucracy and the bureaucratic faction of the RPP) called for greater state intervention in the economy and a broader scope for public economic enterprises, which meant greater power for the center. The forces of the periphery (commercial and industrial middle classes and more

¹⁷⁰ On this bill, see: *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 14.05.1945. For the objection of Menderes raised against the bill, see: *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 16.05.1945; 17.05.1945; 01.06.1945; 04.06.1945. One of the most controversial issues about this bill revolved around the expropriation of vast lands without consulting with the farmers at least about which portion of the land they preferred to be expropriated. In the course of these debates, Şükrü Saraçoğlu accused Menderes of hindering the distribution of land on behalf of the workers (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 04.06.1945 p.106). Menderes was portrayed as a capitalist, siding with big land-owners, rather than the workers.

¹⁷¹ For further information on the center-periphery cleavage, see: Ergun Özbudun. 2013. Chapter 1, *Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

commercialized farmers), on the other hand, advocated less strict governmental controls and greater reliance on market and/or local forces –in other words, more power for the periphery (In Özbudun and Uluhan, 1980:58).

Despite the fact that the CHP put forth discourses stressing both sides of the modernization project, namely Westernization and industrialization,¹⁷² it is quite clear that it paid more attention to the former, cultural side of this project, rather than to the latter aspect concerning the economic development prior to the tenure of the DP. As Heper and Keyman propose, in the pre-1950 period, notwithstanding that the economic policies were considered as an integral part of Westernization, the theme of economic development rarely surfaced and it was to serve the modernization process (1998:261). It is to say that it had a secondary role. In that regard, the culturally alienated and oppressed ‘periphery’ could not improve their living standards on material grounds. Against such conditions and with a plea for ensuring peripheral interests, the DP largely focused on economic development. In this context, on the one hand, the living standards of the people stretching from urban and rural producers to petit bourgeoisie, land-owners and farmers had been improved: on the other hand, the discomfort of the people with respect to the cultural transformation enforced by Kemalism eased off to a certain extent.

Since the very beginning of its term, the DP laid emphasis on this cleavage. In the account of Menderes, the Turkish citizens rejected state elites’ all sorts of domination, not only in the political and administrative realms, but also in the economy. Menderes

¹⁷² Until 1930, there were almost no improvements regarding the industrialization processes. In the years following 1930, the state-led industrialization bore fruit to a limited extent. However, these initiatives were aborted during the term between 1940 and 1945 (Eşiyok, 2006:5, 7).

described the situation as follows: “...a sort of interventionist and bureaucratic state structure emerged that gradually increased the costs of the state had restrained economic development by impoverishing the production and working life” (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 29.05.1950: 25). The DP perceived state expenditures as a burden that only served the interests of the center, while bringing no benefit to the majority of the population.

As another expression of the cleavage between the center and the periphery, when the DP came to power, it endeavored to put an end to the privileged position of the CHP as the state party. For doing so, the DP closed down the Community Centers in 1951 and confiscated their property over to the state treasury (Zürcher, 2001:223). In 1953, a large amount of CHP’s assets were expropriated while some of its tax and customs exemptions were signed off.¹⁷³ Thus, the DP tried to delimit certain economic advantages of the state party. With no doubt, the rationale behind such stance rested on the DP’s pragmatic calculations to weaken the CHP, rather than to pursue a liberal economic policy. What the DP mainly opposed was the elitist fashion in which the CHP enjoyed state opportunities. However, the DP did not intend to prevent all political parties from taking advantage of state facilities. Instead, in place of the CHP, the DP deemed such benefit fitting for the one that manage to rally the support of the majority.

In this respect, despite the differences between the discourses of the DP and those of the CHP, it is very hard to claim that during the tenure of the DP, a liberal economy had prevailed. It is possible to divide its economic policies into at least two terms: the first term was between 1950 and 1954 and followed by the second from 1955 to 1960. The

¹⁷³ For details, see: *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 14.12.1953; *Milliyet*, 15.12.1953.

first term was a period of success with regards to economic development. However, in the second term, despite the course of economic development endured in an unplanned fashion, the surfacing of various failures - such as the declining rates of surplus in the industrial production along with the declining growth rates in the industrial and agricultural fields accompanied by high inflation rates - rendered the DP's economic policies unpopular. In the last years of the DP government, not only its increasing authoritarianism, but also the deprivation of foreign aid paved the way for the economy to be considered as one of the major concerns in the country. The DP could not carry on its primary success in its second term, yet, two of its distinguishing characteristics set a role model for the subsequent center-right parties in Turkey. During the terms of the DP, not only the relatively liberal and developmentalist economic orientation of the Turkish center-right had taken its roots, but also the seeds of the clientelist networks were sown.

4.2.1.1. Economy as a Priority in a Developmentalist Framework

The roadmap on the DP's economic policy was specified as early as 1946 and the general economic principles were preserved in the Party Program of 1951 as well. In the Article 7, it was declared that the economic organizations were as essential as the political ones in order to arrive at a harmonious development (DP Programı 1946, DP Tüzüğü ve Parti Programı, 1951).¹⁷⁴ This article indeed signaled to a comprehension that differentiated the CHP and the center-right parties in Turkey. While the former mainly focused on the abstract and cultural aspect of the modernization project, the latter

¹⁷⁴ This article was preserved with one exception: in 1951, it was added that the trade unions were to stay out of politics. See: *Demokrat Parti Tüzüğü ve Programı 1951*. 1952. Ankara: Güneş Matbaacılık.

emphasized its materialistic and economic aspect, namely the development.¹⁷⁵ DP considered economic development as a primary objective, in itself. In line with its pragmatic strategies, the DP and its supporters aimed at lending an impetus to the development of the country as soon as possible. That being the case, the motto of “first act, and then think” governed the economic policies of the DP (Aydemir, 1976: 253-2). The DP identified strictly controlled and planned economies with the Soviet system¹⁷⁶ and argued that such planning is unrealistic for the Turkish case in face of many unpredictable features of its developing economy (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 20.02.1958: 217-2). In this context, Özbudun properly indicates to a correlation between DP’s anti-bureaucratic image and its reluctance to work within the framework of a plan (Özbudun in Özbudun and Ulasan, 1980:61).¹⁷⁷

Within the context of its goal of lending an impetus to development, the DP, neither totally rejected nor willingly cherished statism.¹⁷⁸ The party fancied a liberal economic framework, yet, given the infrastructural deficiencies as well as the scarcity of private capital accumulation, it sufficed with a pragmatic economic policy, where the state acquired an active role. In this context, the DP put forth an inconsistent policy,

¹⁷⁵ On this paradigm shift, see: Nilüfer Göle. 1986. *Mühendisler ve İdeoloji*. İstanbul: Metis.

¹⁷⁶ This is a standard view common in classical versions of the right-wing. On the transition to free-market economy, Polanyi states that “Laissez-faire was planned; planning was not.” See: Karl Polanyi. 2002. *The Great Transformation*. Boston: Beacon Press. 4th ed. p.141.

¹⁷⁷ Tanel Demirel asserts that the critiques on DP’s reluctance to work within the framework of a plan do not make sense given the scarcity of reliable statistical information and owing to the scarcity of capable cadres who could carry out such qualified plans (Demirel, 2011:143). Nevertheless, the DP elites did not suggest these excuses in face of mounting criticisms on their unplanned approach.

¹⁷⁸ In Article 53, a free-market economy was advocated and the role of the state was defined in terms of protecting competition in the market (*DP Parti Programı 1946; DP Tüzüğü ve Parti Programı 1951*). In Article 17, statism was defined as ascribing a regulatory and if necessary an active role to the state to fill in the gaps for the purpose of increasing the welfare of the citizens (*DP Parti Programı 1946; DP Tüzüğü ve Parti Programı 1951*). In Article 43, the private enterprises and the harmony among the state and private sector were considered as essential for a viable economic life (*DP Parti Programı 1946; DP Tüzüğü ve Parti Programı 1951*).

especially with regards to the state-owned economic enterprises (SEEs). In spite of discourses such as those of Menderes - “we are determined to diminish state monopoly (...) We can now announce that the era, where the state reigned over private entrepreneurship, came to an end” (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 09.05.1950:28) - in practice, not only the number, but also the scope of SEEs scaled up during DP’s term. To cite a few institutions founded during DP’s term: Maritime Bank, Tourism Bank, Fish and Flesh Organization, Nitrogen Industry Incorporation and Machinery and Chemical Industry Corporation (Albayrak, 2004:308-6).

In the beginning of 1950s, there were favorable conditions for accomplishing the task of economic development. Within the confines of the tension between the US and the Soviet Union, the DP not only enjoyed economic aid provided by the Marshall Plan, but also it was endowed with military aid by the Truman Doctrine. Such foreign aid along with a pinch of integration rendered Turkey a supplier of food and raw material in the international market (Aydın, 2005:29). Celal Bayar, not only an economist, but also previously a representative of the liberal wing within the CHP governments, frequently underlined the necessity of foreign integration to cope with the economic problems (Bayar, 1969:48). By the same token, the DP elite regularly visited and welcomed foreign statesmen in order to establish commercial partnerships. In 1954, the DP government issued a law to shape the foreign capital investment policy of Turkey (No: 6224 - the Foreign Capital Incentives Law) that remained in force with minor changes until 2003.¹⁷⁹ The Committee for the Encouragement of Foreign Capital was also

¹⁷⁹ Previously, in 1951, the law (numbered 5821) was enforced to relieve the strict limitations standing in the way of foreign investments. However, the government could not get what it intended within the confines of this law.

founded by way of this law and aimed at by-passing bureaucratic processes that slowed down foreign investments. Foreign companies were also allowed in the search for oil and its refinement under the Petroleum Law.¹⁸⁰ Following these structural transformations, on the one hand, the US Ministry of Trade published a report in 1955 that evaluated Turkey as a country fitting for investments (*Milliyet*, 08.07.1955). On the other hand, the opposition interpreted these developments as selling out Turkey's resources, better-said within the context of treason felony¹⁸¹ (*Milliyet*, 26.04.1954). In the following years, similar debates have resurfaced with respect to various economic policies of the subsequent center-right parties and those of the CHP, in which the former emphasized integration to world markets while the latter stressed a more conservative and isolated economic structure.

Nonetheless, the DP has never embarked on a full-fledged liberalization process and when the government found it necessary, it did not refrain from taking protectionist measures and intervening directly to the market. For instance, on July 13, 1954, a decree that not only limited profit rates, but also prohibited the import of certain goods was carried into effect (*Milliyet*, 14 July 1954). Furthermore, on June 6, 1956, the National Security Law was reintroduced with several revisions.¹⁸² Moreover, new versions of certain laws were also enacted under the guise of dealing with black-marketing and the

¹⁸⁰ On the debates surrounding this law, see: *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 07.03.1954. Law No: 6326.

¹⁸¹ In fact, the impact of these laws was not as wide as it was portrayed in the debates since such encouragements did not serve the purpose. Zürcher notes that less than thirty firms invested in Turkey during this period and their share was no more than 1 per cent of the total private investment (Zürcher, 2001:225).

¹⁸² This law (numbered 3780 - *Milli Koruma Kanunu*) was first enacted in 1940 and its scope was broadened in 1944 to endow the government with the right to ban the import of 'unnecessary' goods (*Resmi Gazete*, No. 4417). This law was frequently criticized by the elites of DP when they were in opposition.

monopoly on certain goods that provided the government with extensive rights in controlling, confiscating and managing private companies and factories via banning or limiting imports deemed ‘unnecessary’ by the government.¹⁸³ Thus, in the context of the above-mentioned circumstances and in line with its emphasis on development and service, the economic policies of the DP oscillated between liberalism and protectionism.

In the first government program of the DP, investments were underlined to be directed into the fields, such as mechanics, road constructions, transportation and public services (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 29.05.1950: 29). Indeed, the leading cause of DP’s electoral victory in 1954 was undoubtedly related with the economic performance delivered during the terms of the first and second DP governments. Reading out DP’s third government program, Menderes was proud of the economic developments such as the respective increases in state investments, state incomes, state budget, national income and capital investments along with the constructions of new roads, ports, irrigation lines, dams and power plants (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 24.05.1954). In almost every speech, the DP leaders, not only emphasized the importance of economic development, but also explicated their successful works in numbers, while, on all occasions, pointing out to the examples of economic scarcity during CHP’s term. On any account, the rhetoric on development accompanied DP’s actual works.

¹⁸³ On this law and related debates, see: *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* 04.06.1956 and 06.06.1956. Hüseyin Balık, an independent deputy at the time, accused the government of blocking capital flows to Turkey by way of this law. In this respect, the DP that came to power via its stress on liberal economic initiatives was now criticized for its repressive policies. This law was also repealed on December 26, 1958 along with certain reductions concerning particular goods (*Milliyet*, 27.12.1958). On July 13, 1959, the enforcement of imports with waiver (imports without value allocation of foreign currency) had taken effect (*Milliyet* 14.07.1959).

The DP brought about considerable economic growth rates especially in between 1950 and 1953 as sketched in the graph below:




Figure 1. Data derived from the Development Bank and the graph generated accordingly.

In 1953, the industrial growth reached 19.2 percent on sectorial basis and marked considerable success on part of the DP government (Eşiyok, 2006:13). The DP government paid significant attention to the industrial sectors that produced sugar, cement, textile and energy. Furthermore, in 1950s, DP governments exerted noteworthy efforts to construct roads all around Turkey. The length of the roads that was no more than 266 kilometers in 1950 had reached to 1216 kilometers in 1958 (Aydemir, 1976:236). At this point, it would not be sufficient to consider such service only in terms of construction. Actually, it also brought about sociological consequences by connecting villages to the cities in order to enable peasants to be a part of the ongoing daily politics

in the country.¹⁸⁴ Given the accompanying improvement regarding the means of transport, rural areas began to access more easily to the markets (Keyder, 1979:20).

Turkey had an overwhelmingly rural and agricultural economy in 1950: not only half of its GDP was extracted from agriculture, but also almost 80 per cent of its working population remained in this sector (Derviş and Sherman in Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:87). In this context, the DP that put the onus on agriculture in its economic policies naturally rallied popular support. Despite the fact that the Kemalist government subsidized peasants by getting rid of the tithe and by introducing a price support system in 1925, in the aftermath of 1935, the policies pursued by the CHP put the small and medium scale farmers in a tight spot by imposing new taxes, especially during the Second World War (Keyder, 1979:15-3). Mardin claims that “the symbol of the peasant as the “fundamental Turk” came up very early in the Kemalist movement, but Kemalist energies were devoted to the building of symbols of national identity, rather than to radically altering the place of the peasant in the system” (1973:183). Peasants considered the DP as a new hope owing to its concern with the peripheral interests and its interest in the problems experienced in rural areas.¹⁸⁵ In this regard, it is worth mentioning that in DP’s every party program, approximately one fourth of the articles

¹⁸⁴ ‘Shared time’ was formed to a certain extent as people, who did not have any contact previously, got in touch with each other. See: Benedict Anderson. 2006 (1983). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso; Eric J. Hobsbawm. 1990. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thus, in contrast to the strategies pursued by the CHP within the context of a top-down nation-state building process, the DP, most probably unintentionally, linked the peripheral/rural areas to the center and enabled them to take their place in the national political landscape. Therefore, the construction of roads, indeed, amounted to the establishment of a significant connection between the isolated periphery and the power holders.

¹⁸⁵ At this point, ‘peasants’ refer to a general orientation common among rural people rather than standing for an over-arching category. It is also necessary to note here that peasantry in the Turkish society did not amount to a monolithic entity as Özbudun suggests in “Political Participation in Rural Turkey” in Akarlı and Ben-Dor eds., 1975:37. Besides, it would not be adequate to argue that the DP gained an ultimate success over the CHP in the underdeveloped areas of the country. Actually, the DP was successful in splitting the votes in these areas (Sayar in Akarlı and Ben-Dor, 1975:129).

was reserved for issues directly related with peasants and agriculture. For instance, Article 56 stressed the agricultural development as the fundamental path to follow in order to lend impetus to the development of Turkey. In line with this onus on the agricultural sector, various policies - such as the commercialization of agricultural products (*DP Programı 1946; DP Tüzüğü ve Programı 1951, Article 47*), the state-led imports of agricultural technology and mechanics (Article 65), the introduction of specific credits and cooperative opportunities (Articles 59, 60, 63), and the portrayal of state as a complementary and supportive agent, rather than the rival of farmers (Articles 64, 65) - were enforced by the DP governments that led to an increase in the productivity and profits of the farmers (Article 57). Farmers appreciated the annulment of certain taxes (i.e.: taxes on roads and animals) during this period as well. Between 1947 and 1955, the area allocated to farming was expanded to almost 70 per cent (Mann in Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:198). In the wake of DP's term in 1951, the agricultural growth reached its peak with 19.8 per cent (Eşiyok, 2006:13). The agricultural sector constituted the leitmotiv of the economic growth in these years.

In brief, the strategy set forth by the DP on the basis of industrialization, mechanization and economic development set the scene for its successors in the center-right, while the center-left endeavored to 'preserve cultural and political reforms'. To that extent, the center-right governments were considered to be on more practical grounds compared to the ones perceived to be more ideologically-bound. However, the pro-development initiative presented by the DP was faced with some unforeseen drawbacks. On the one hand, not only the rates of inflation and exchange, but also the deficit of foreign trade escalated especially after 1954; on the other hand, the Turkish lira was devalued in the

absence of a steady and stable macro-economic policy (Kazgan, 1999:101; Aydın, 2005:33-2). The CHP criticized DP's "election factories," better-said its populist economic policies for their inefficiency and wastefulness (Özbudun in Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:60). Hence, the impetus concerning the domestic economic development brought about by the DP could not have been adequately sustained. Nonetheless, with no doubt, pragmatic economic policies of the DP paved the way for a rapid economic resurgence at the outset of its term.

4.2.1.2 Clientelism

Clientelism refers to a win-win relationship between unequal partners. On one side stands the patron or the political party that needs the support of adherents; on the other side rest the adherents that expect certain benefits in return of their support.¹⁸⁶ In view of Sayari, clientelism operates "as a mechanism which regulates social relationships between individuals and groups with differential access to economic and political resources" where horizontal attachments are weak (1977: 103). In that vein, the roots of clientelism in Turkish society dates back to Ottoman era, where landlords (*aghas*) prospered in clientelist networks (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984:84-3).¹⁸⁷ In the

¹⁸⁶ Following Lemarchand, Özbudun describes patron-client relationship as "a more or less personalized relationship between actors (i.e., patrons and clients), or sets of actors commanding unequal wealth, status or influence, based on conditional loyalties, and involving mutually beneficial transactions" (Lemarchand 1972: 69 cited in Özbudun, 1981: 250). For Sayari, clientelism refers to a "reciprocal exchange whereby individual patrons and/ or political parties seek to mobilize the support of their followers in return of assistance and various brokerage services" (1977: 103). In that regard, reciprocity and inequality are perceived as the *sine qua non* of the clientelistic networks (Özbudun, 1981: 251; Sayari, 1977:103).

¹⁸⁷ In fact, this did not end with the Ottoman State. On the political influence of *aghas* and land ownership in the Republican era, see: Özbudun in Akarlı and Ben-Dor, 1975: 44- 4; Ayşe Kudat. 1975.

following years, local notables continued to hold a mediatory position between the state and the periphery, yet not only the extent, but also the success of such role with respect to the local expectations was significantly questionable (Güneş-Ayata in Roniger and Güneş-Ayata, 1994b). However, since the Kemalist elites approached any particularistic interest with antipathy except from that of the state (Heper and Keyman, 1998:260; Güneş-Ayata in Roniger and Güneş Ayata, 1994b:50), the dissatisfaction of local expectations was not considered as an important problem in the eyes of the center. In this respect, Güneş Ayata argues that “[b]eing cut-off from the periphery was such a positive value that until 1946 elites did not go to their constituencies even for votes, arguing that to do so would legitimize primordial and local interests, which were a threat to national unity” (In Roniger and Güneş Ayata, 1994b:50). Thus, the ‘high politics’ of the CHP considered it degrading to meet particular interests in exchange of political support (Heper and Keyman, 1998:260).

In the aftermath of the transition to multi-party politics, by presenting itself as the representative of peripheral interests, the DP opened the door and let in the clientelism in Turkish politics. Sunar contrasts the strategies of the CHP and the DP and suggests that while the CHP was exclusionary in that it claimed to be representing the common good, whereas the DP challenged this strategy with its inclusionary, mobilizing and populist fashion (Sunar, 1990: 749). Stressing that clientelism may even provide people with more participatory possibilities in the political processes by creating a sense of togetherness that “desire[s] to establish the notion of ‘us’,” Güneş-Ayata notes that “the most important factor in the recurrence of clientelism is the generation of expectations

“Patron-Client Relations: The State of the Art and Research in Eastern Turkey,” in Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds). Istanbul:Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 61- 87.

and hope, the individual's feeling of being protected, or being able to depend on some 'patron,' be it an individual or an organization" (Güneş Ayata in Roniger and Güneş-Ayata, 1994a: 22, 24). Thus, masses, who were not only tired of state's imposition of unification on secularist and nationalist grounds, but also exhausted in face of its blindness to a variety of interests, started to believe that their interests might have been better protected by the DP against the bureaucratic center.

The DP's clientelism might be classified under two sub-groups. First comes the constitution of a win-win relationship with business circles and secondly, the provision of pork-barrel grants especially in rural areas. The DP was attractive for various interest groups with its relatively close ties with the masses, including private entrepreneurs, businessmen and farmers (Zürcher, 2001:321; Mardin, 1973, Öymen 2013:468-3). To a large extent, the founding members of the DP - especially in the provinces and towns - consisted of merchants who had certain expectations from the government.¹⁸⁸ Thus, at first sight, the DP government stood for a hope in the eyes of the private entrepreneurs. Then the party managed to forge strong ties with the business community and granted them certain privileges such as low-cost credits and loans, the easing of bureaucratic burdens concerning licensing and contracting along with the rearrangements regarding the import quota in return of their support and considerable donations to the party (Sayarı in Akarlı and Ben-Dor, 1975:129-2). What's more, in this period, not only the number, but also the influence of the Chambers of Commerce, which worked in concert with the government, was advanced to a significant extent.

¹⁸⁸ Frey argues that "[t]he Democrats were notably more professional and economic and less official in occupation" (1965:351). Albayrak also states that in the first three months following the establishment of the DP, 40 out of 111 founding members of the DP in the provinces or towns were merchants and lawyers followed suit with a number of 16 out of 111 (Albayrak, 2004:76).

On the other hand, the DP government allocated pork-barrel grants to their electoral district in the shape of roads, waterways, schools, factories, dams, agricultural equipment, public services, and mosques. Being a supporter of the DP guaranteed the enjoyment of these services as well. The DP's never-ending toleration with regards to illegal squatter housing in the context of urbanization processes can be cited as one of the most visible aspects of the clientelism that prevailed in this period as well (Özbudun in Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, 1981:261). Witnessed in the case of Kırşehir,¹⁸⁹ the ones that abstained from supporting the DP ended up not only with certain punishments, but also resulted in the deprivation of public services. In this context, the DP governments transformed the traditional patron-client links into party patronage (Özbudun, 1981: 258). Sunar briefly suggests that "[t]he clientelist incorporation of the rural population, the patronage-induced private initiative, and the great but haphazard social dynamism fueled by populism - all of these have not only outlived the DP, but have become permanent features of center-right politics, dominant in Turkey since 1950" (1990:752).

In the subsequent period following that of the DP, parties - especially those from the center-right - strived to take hold of power and remain in government by way of patronage networks and when they were in government, in order to remain as such, their priority was set to meet the demands of their clients. Therefore, such a populist way of policy-making initialized by the DP governments evolved into one of the main characteristic of Turkish politics, especially the politics performed by the center-right parties.

¹⁸⁹ This issue has been taken up in the chapter on 'Democracy.'

4.2.2. The AP on Economy

The Constitution of 1961 specified ‘social state’ as a constitutional principle and a prominent feature of the Republic and accordingly envisioned active state intervention into the social and economic life for achieving social peace and social justice.¹⁹⁰ In this respect, the principle of statism, which had entrusted the state the role of not only regulating the relations between the labor and the capital, but also protecting livelihoods of the lower stratum, had broadened its scope. On the pretext of this principle, the bureaucrats¹⁹¹ interfered in the independent application of economic policies throughout 1960s and saw no harm in challenging the liberal orientations of the civilian governments (Heper, 1976:489). Moreover, following the setting up of the State Planning Organization (DPT) in 1963, the government was obliged to work within the frameworks proposed by this institution and as a result, the economy was not under the complete control of the civilian governments in these years. To that extent, not only the plan imposed by the state elites was to be followed by the AP governments, but also this was to be done in the wider context provided by the constitutional prerequisite on the so-called “social state” principle.

¹⁹⁰ Özbudun points out to the fact that it was stated in Article 2 of the 1961 Constitution “the Turkish Republic is democratic and secular; it is based on human rights and on the principles of the right to work and social justice.” This proposition has been ambiguously changed into the following: “(...) it is based on human rights and social state” (Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:62).

¹⁹¹ At this point, a general inclination among the bureaucrats is accented. There actually existed various struggles among them as well. For example, Karpas dwells upon the competition over the control of the State Planning Organization between the socialists gathered around *Yön* (a Socialist Journal) and conservative-liberal intellectuals. At the end of 1970s, the latter gained the upper hand (2009:190).

The AP suggested a relatively liberal economic framework in its party program, which has not been carried into effect in its full extent due to various stringent structural variables. The party, focusing on the prospects of a liberal economic structure defined democracy as its *sine qua non* and supported private investment (*Adalet Partisi Programı 1969*, Article 13). The main economic function of the state was emphasized as the supporter of private capital accumulation, instead of considering it as the main manufacturer (Article 14). Demirel criticized the hostile approach put forth by the leftist ideology against private capital accumulation and stated that “in a country, where only living poor can guarantee safety, making money causes trouble for the individuals” (Demirel, 1973:149). The party theoretically embraced *laissez-faire* liberalism emphasizing that “we neither go along with the view that limits legitimate earnings and profits at a level ‘just enough to keep the body and the soul together,’ reminding us of the standpoint set forth in the Middle Ages, nor accord with the one that regards them as a cut stolen from the shares of the workers” (Article 5). Such statement revealed not only that the AP had taken a classical center-right position, but also made it clear that it both contradicted with Marxist theory on ‘Surplus Value’ and the nihilist approach to the materialistic world advocated by Sufi Islam.

Within these circumstances, having assumed that there was no escape from the principle of social state, the AP considered this principle not in relation to an ideal for a socialist state, but as a requirement of a paternalistic state, whose benevolence necessitated caring for the lower income stratum as a matter of fact (Demirel, 2004:329-2). Since the main task of the welfare state was to offer equality in opportunity to all its citizens and to protect their liberties (*Adalet Partisi Programı 1969*, Article 6), the view of the AP

differed from that of the center-left in its predilection to reserve such benefits particularly for the rock-bottom poor¹⁹² (Özbudun in Özbudun and Ulasan, 1980:70).

The ideas put forth in the party programs, however, largely remained on paper. During the term of the AP, neither the SEEs were privatized, nor were the state investments scaled down. The AP perceived public investments as a magic potion for economic development and for the regulation of income distribution (Demirel, 2004:46-2). In a country, where an economy was modeled around import substitution, the labor law was designed in favor of workers, the public investments proliferated, the age for retirement was brought down, the minimum wage was popularized, it is hard to argue that the AP carried out genuinely neo-liberal economic policies (Karpas, 1982:396; Demirel, 2004:327; Keyder, 1987:203; Levi in Heper and Landau, 1991:140). In this period, not only the extent of Turkey's integration with the institutions of international finance, such as the IMF and the World Bank was limited, but also the scope of direct investment by foreign actors still remained very low (Aydın, 2005:37; Kazgan, 1999:113). Even with respect to the seemingly most liberal policies of the AP - such as 'January 24 Decisions' and the devaluation on August 10, 1970 - the pragmatism, in Keyder's words the "affirmative populism" of the party played a significant role (1987:204). All in all, the AP presented a liberal stance in its party and government programs following the footsteps of the DP, yet, its pragmatic concerns along with conjectural drawbacks led to the prosecution of a mixed economy.

¹⁹² In line with AP's comprehension of social justice prior to 1980, Demirel also introduced the "green card" for the ones deprived of housing, pension, family and so on in 1990's, which enabled these disadvantaged groups to benefit from health services for free.

The economic policies of the AP had some unique features as well. On the one hand, the AP put emphasis on economic development and provided its supporters with services in line with the DP. Yet, on the other hand, the AP drew closer to the right-wing *vis-à-vis* a new vision on the rise in 1970s, the left-of-the center, put forth by the CHP under the leadership of Ecevit.

4.2.2.1. Pro-Development Policies Hand in Glove with Patronage Networks

The AP echoed the DP's position on development. In a similar vein to the DP, the AP considered all pragmatic formulations justifiable in the name of economic growth. On this line of reasoning, Süleyman Demirel frequently stressed that in order to achieve economic development, politics was to be instrumentalized and as a consequence, social development would follow suit as well (Demirel, 1973:16; 1975:16). Demirel endorsed such a technocratic vision by indicating to the occupational backgrounds of the AP bureaucrats - mostly in engineering - and often endeavored to legitimize the instrumentalization of politics in the name of tangible outcomes (Demirel, 2004: 283). Undeniably, by the time, the AP arrived at its 10th Assembly in 1957, engineering, proven to be a prominent occupation among elites, had already gained dominance in the parliamentary composition (Frey, 1965:182). Given this outlook, it is fair to claim that the AP was never a school of 'idealists', but 'exemplary pragmatics' that replicated the DP's emphasis on achieving concrete results in favor of economic growth. Yet, in a slightly different vein: their views diverged on the terrain of pragmatism. While the DP

suggested focusing on the agricultural sector for attaining economic growth, the AP - mostly composed of engineers- emphasized industrialization as the route to take. The motto of Demirel - “Get the job done” - crystallized such pragmatism, where there was clearly no tolerance for excuses standing in the way of achieving economic growth through industrialization (Donat, 2005:13). From the vantage point of the AP, “Great Turkey” was to rise on the grounds of modern technologies planned to infiltrate the entire production system along with the transformation and communication sectors. These technical advancements were assumed to pave the way for resolving social problems such as unemployment, poverty and desperation as well, with the support of the social and paternalistic state (Demirel, 2004: 273-2).

The governments formed by the AP brought about a considerable economic growth that escalated from 3.1 percent to 12 percent with an average of 5.95 per cent between 1965 and 1971 in order to carry such mission into effect (Eşiyok, 2006:16). The main focal plane of the AP was definitely the industry, yet it had never dispensed with the agricultural sector as evident in its policies such as the green plan, the agricultural modernization and the assurance of high-prices. The import substitution model accompanied by additional restrictions on imports considered alongside the preserving of the artificially achieved high value of the Turkish lira led to the production and consumption of domestic products (Zürcher, 2004:265). As a consequence, the average growth rate in the industrial sector came up to 9.2 per cent between 1965 and 1971 (Eşiyok, 2006:16). That being the case, the role played by the agricultural sector during the term of the DP, as the catalyst of the economic development, was played by the industrial sector during AP’s single party term.

In this regard, public investments were carried on in order to cope with the economic underdevelopment prevalent in the country and to activate its potentials. The AP also exemplified center-right's approach to the Kurdish issue for the first time and underlined that it perceived it in socio-economic terms. In this respect, the AP handled the economic development of the Eastern parts of the country separately as a specific and pivotal issue. Demirel presumed a direct correlation in between the levels of living standards in the Eastern regions of the country and the prospects for cultural integrity (Demirel, 1973:294).

Nevertheless, the AP did not allocate economic resources evenly among all citizens. As noted previously, the AP focused on economic growth in a mechanical and quantitative sense rather than in a way that is sensitive to fair income distribution (Özbudun in Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:69). Like the DP, the AP got also involved in patronage networks via pork-barrel grants and personal relationships. Especially between 1965 and 1971, the policies of the AP were wrapped up in a particular mode of patronage, in Ayata's words "preferential resource allocation," that took the form of providing water, electricity, roads, schooling, health services and so on (Güneş - Ayata, 1991b:54). Demirel's clientelism was often merged with nepotism and his close relatives had taken advantage of his office to a significant extent (Arat in Heper and Sayari, 2002:93-2). The AP strived not only to influence certain associations such as the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges in Turkey (TOBB) and the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (TÜRK-İŞ), but also to establish partnerships with big business groups, local notables and religious communities. The nature of these collaborations was to a large extent rested on personal relations rather than institutional ones (Demirel, 2004:119-2).

One of the main differences between the DP and the AP was certainly the softer stance taken by the latter with respect to planned economy. From the very beginning, the AP accepted the institutional prerequisites, refrained from challenging constitutional principles and pushed the perception common in the DP that identified planning with communist orientations into the background to a certain extent. The AP put into effect policies projected by five-year development plans designed within the framework of a mixed economy. Nonetheless, the Five-Year Development Plan concerning the years between 1968 and 1972 was also affected by the liberal agenda of the AP, which, on the one hand, emphasized private enterprise and economic growth and on the other hand, suggested to lessen the role of the state with regard to the regulations on production and social justice (Aydın, 2005:34-2; Özbudun in Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:74). The party seemed to appreciate plans as guiding mechanisms providing scientific administration in the party and with respect to government programs. Yet, the excessive and insistent planning imposed by the bureaucratic oligarchy over the elected government was criticized as follows “development plan should function as a hope and an ideal document rather than a strictly bounding ultimatum” (Demirel, 1973:272).¹⁹³ Furthermore, Demirel suggested including local branches in the planning process as in his view, central plans imposed from Ankara did not adequately take local realities and expectations into account (Demirel, 1973:212). Behind such criticism and suggestions laid not only the AP’s stance against the center composed of bureaucratic, military and university elites, but also its intention to decentralize the administration. Milor argues that the planning in 1960s amounted largely to collaboration between the state elites and

¹⁹³ For details, see: Vedat Milor.1990. “The Genesis of Planning in Turkey,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 4(1):1-30.

the business circles accompanied by a suspicion towards the elected governments (1990:3-2). In face of such suspicion, the government minimized the scope of the planning function of the DPT by the Law numbered 933 to put an end to drawbacks (Demirel, 2004:312; Ahmad, 1977:275-5).

In a nutshell, the AP carried on with the mission set forth by the DP concerning economic development via providing particularly their adherents with services. However, as the time passed by, the AP gave priority to industrialization and forced its pace, while in the meantime endeavored to avoid losing the support of the farmers. Within the confines of the institutional structure formed in 1960, the AP had to go along with the five-year development plans, yet when convenient, tried to manipulate these plans and restrict bureaucratic superiority on planning.

4.2.2.2. The AP as a Salient Advocate of Middle Class Interests in 1970s

In the years following 1971, the AP's rapprochement with the state elites was accompanied by its partnership with the businessmen, who were known to be also very close to the center. Meanwhile, the CHP strengthened its onus on class representation. In this context, Turkey was deeply fragmented on the grounds of leftist and rightist orientations. Especially, following 1976, the Turkish economy was in dire straits since the economic growth could not have been maintained and given the gradually growing political chaos. In 1979, the crisis reached its peak-point when the industrial growth dropped to -5 percent and the growth rate dropped to -0.5 percent (Eşiyok, 2006:16). The situation that spiraled out of control with the rising prices of energy and oil, high

rates of inflation followed by strict government control paved the way for not only economic deadlocks and nation-wide black-marketing, but also social unrest manifested in the active resistance of the workers' unions (Zürcher, 2004: 268). In late 1970s, the economic aspect of the crisis was closely linked with and aggravated by the political and social turmoil that derived from the conflict between the left and the right standpoints (Aydın, 2005: 41). Within this context, while the CHP embarked on to represent workers, disadvantaged groups not only from the slums of the cities, but also all around the society, the AP forged closer ties with big business groups.

In an atmosphere, where the private capital was heavily dependent on state incentives and investments, the AP, on the one hand, tried to ally with private sector; on the other hand, endeavored to integrate Turkish economy with the world markets. More often than not, these two goals could not have been met simultaneously. For instance, business circles had not supported the devaluation of the Turkish Lira in 1970 since such an initiative was going to lower their established advantage (Aydın, 2005: 38). Even so, especially in late 1970s, while the AP government sealed an alliance with big business groups behind closed doors, the CHP drew closer to the workers.

Despite the fact that the economic growth rate - especially in the industrial sector - was maintained between 1973 and 1977, at the end of 1970s, it has become clearer that the economic growth meant a parallel increase in the foreign debt as well. Indeed, the last government formed under Demirel just before the Coup of 1980 took serious structural measures, known as 'January 24, Decisions' in order to deal with the declining economy. Among these measures were not only the devaluation of the Turkish Lira and the facilitation of exports, but also comprehensive restrictions on state intervention into

the pricing mechanisms along with various institutional reforms. However, the political instability did not allow these measures to be implemented sufficiently. In the shade of these decisions, the skyrocketed inflation rate of 106 per cent in 1980, stemming from the public sector deficits, dropped off to 28 per cent in 1983 (Mango, 1989:25). On the other hand, in return of lower inflation and a more stable and predictable economy, the economic growth rates and real income had declined to a certain extent (Kazdağılı in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:461). In this context, the ‘January 24, Decisions’ can be regarded as the earliest form of the new-right policies in Turkey, which restructured Turkish economy, leaving behind the model of import substitution and turning a new page to liberalization. Yet, the real liberalization of Turkish foreign trade can be dated as of 1984.

To sum up, the private capital owners that collaborated with the military and the state elites in 1960s began to join forces with the AP in 1970s. In return, the AP started to protect the interests of the bourgeoisie for which the cleavage in the party system played a functional role. The middle class sought cooperation with the government in order to pursue its economic interests as well, since the public sector and state investments still amounted to the main economic sector in the country. The political turmoil and instability also found echo in the economy and led to the deepening of the crisis in late 1970s. In spite of its liberal discourses in its official documents and speeches previously, the AP actually embarked on implementing liberal economic policies entirely with January 24 Decisions.

4.2.3. The ANAP on Economy

In the eyes of the junta elite, the Turkish economy was not a policy realm of first priority. The rearrangements in this field were left to Özal, the architect of the ‘January 24 Decisions’. The generals - even Haydar Saltık - supported market economy on the whole without challenging Özal’s liberal economic program (Cemal, 1989:28). The new governments had to cope with various problems that forged social discontent, such as economic shortage, black-marketing and high inflation rates. Kazdağlı mentions that even the Prime Minister’s Office was out of fuel oil at the time the January 24 Decisions were enacted (in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:445). In such tough circumstances and during the terms of military governments, Özal kept on ruling the economy. Soon after his resignation from the deputy prime ministry, he became the prime minister of Turkey and carried on with the implementation of revolutionary reforms to accelerate the liberalization of Turkish economy.

The program of the ANAP clearly defended a market economy in which the state played only regulatory and complementary roles rather than being the guiding actor of the economy. The principles such as the competitiveness, free market and the natural rules of economy were stressed (Article 9) and the main duty of the state was defined as providing stability and security (Article 10). Unlike previous center-right parties, the ANAP attached priority firstly to the service sector considering it as a cure for unemployment (Article 17). The party and government programs of the ANAP were put into effect in the realm of economy to a considerable extent.

While the agriculture sector kept losing its preferential place in the economy, the urbanization was on the rise in line with the liberal economic program of the ANAP. Furthermore, the industrial sector embarked on updating itself in accordance with the world trends, which necessitated not only producing exportable goods, but also competing with the imported ones. Hence, the themes such as efficiency, high-tech and competitiveness appeared as buzzwords. Yayla asserts that the share of the industrial sector within the GDP rose up from 23 per cent to 31 per cent between 1980 and 1989 (in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:432). Additionally, the service sector prospered in conformity with the party program. For example, in late 1980s the bed capacity in the tourism sector rose fivefold within less than a decade and almost 15 per cent of the government incentives were allocated to tourism investment (Kazdağı in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:466-2).

Özal claimed to defend the rights of the middle class (*orta direk*) in the first years of the ANAP government. Aydın illustrates such approach as below:

Urban squatter areas were particularly targeted through policies including the provision of quasi title deeds to land and property built on state lands, and VAT rebates for wage and salary earners. These policies were introduced not only to hide the cuts in vital services such as health and education but also to indirectly keep the wages low (2005:54).

Thus, ANAP not only sought to present itself as the representative of a large portion of the middle classes that every now and then resorted to coercive means, but also joined forces with big business groups such as Sabancı, Koç and Enka. Thereby, the ANAP, leaving the mentality associated with the welfare state behind, did not claim to represent lower classes at all, especially until 1987. In this period, in face of the income

distribution having been tilted considerably towards the upper and upper middle classes, the World Bank announced Turkey as the seventh worst figure with regards to income disparity (Ahmad, 1993:204). Nevertheless, after 1987, the party gradually engaged in more populist schemes of income distribution by easing not only its strict financial approach, but also the accompanying new-right mentality. Hence, on the grounds of the preexisting discourses on economic liberalization set forth by the DP and the AP, the ANAP governments put such rhetoric into practice in parallel with the political competition that was on the rise in late 1980s. The ANAP started to distance itself from the orthodox principles of the center-right as well. On the other hand, along with the narrow scope of privatization and the escalation of clientelism, the underestimation of the role of well-established legal frameworks for a viable market economy can be considered as among the weak spots of Özal's economic perspective (Öniş, 2004: 114). All in all, the ANAP tenure was a milestone in Turkish economy that integrated it with the world economy. To fully grasp the nature of the relations between the ANAP and the Turkish economy, it will be beneficial to dwell upon the liberalization of foreign trade, privatization and clientelism respectively.

4.2.3.1. Liberalization of Foreign Trade

The industrialization within the model of import substitution accompanied by broad prohibition regarding domestic products brought about an unrealistic and uncompetitive market structure in Turkey throughout 1970s and led to an imbalance in payments. Not only the AP government in 1980 and the subsequent ones, but also the international

community encouraged Turkey for the liberalization of foreign trade. Such encouragement gained impetus with the leadership of Özal given his commitment to free market economy (Öniş, 2004: 118).

The governments formed by the ANAP had taken foreign relations not only in relation to the defense of the state, but also considered it as an economic priority to be defined with respect to the economic interests of the country (*ANAP Parti Programı 1983*, Article 35). In this respect, while these governments signed a number of cooperative agreements with various states, Özal, travelling with a variety of businessmen when paying his official visits abroad, strived to help these accompanying business groups in establishing further commercial partnerships. Engaging in personal contact in return of prospective improvement in foreign trade went hand in hand with the institutional rearrangements as well. In 1986, the Istanbul Stock Exchange (IMKB), the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) and the Foreign Exchange Market were founded to simplify foreign economic relations. By the same token, in 1985 the Banking Law was reformulated to facilitate not only the activities of domestic banks abroad, but also those of the foreign financial institutions in Turkey. Furthermore, following the annulment of the Law on the Protection of the Turkish Lira, it was allowed to possess foreign currency and as a result, the Turkish Lira was rendered convertible.

Only a few prohibited goods were listed while the rest of the products were considered free to import in contrast to the protective approach prevalent in the previous terms that determined which goods to be imported freely (Kazdağlı in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:462). During the budget talks of 1985, the government under the leadership of Özal projected to regulate the balance of payments and to increase foreign capital investments in the

subsequent years (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 09.12.1984), In a nutshell, the ANAP governments strived boldly to integrate Turkish economy with the global markets by forging one-to-one relationships, by removing the obstacles standing in the way of free trade, by rearranging and founding institutions. However, to be considered as the weak spot of this tenure, such initiatives were not taken on a well-structured legislative framework, which would have resulted in fertile consequences in such a transition period. The processes integral to the above-mentioned economic integration were not disparate from those of a social integration as well, since these processes introduced the world to the Turkish citizens. Anderson suggests that by way of establishing common temporal grounds and following similar consumption patterns, a sense of belonging appears (1983). As such, a number of Turkish citizens not only began to feel as part of the world community rather than a figure in an isolated country, but also reconnected with the dynamics of contemporary times.

4.2.3.2. Privatization

Within the tragic circumstances of 1970s, the SEEs - far from being competitive and efficient, yet privileged on import permits – posed significant problems with their deficits to be covered by the credits provided by the Central Bank (Kazdağlı in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:454). The need for their reformation - both on organizational and strategic grounds - had already been stressed in the Five-Year Development Plan targeting the years between 1979 and 1983. However, these measures could not have been put into effect thanks to the political chaos prevalent in the country. Indeed, the

IMF strongly supported a comprehensive reform regarding the public sector at the time, yet, the prevalent neo-statist orientation of Ulusu government stood in the way of the liberalization of the SEEs (Öniş, 1991:165).

The liberalization of Turkish economy was set as a goal in December 1983 and the privatization processes were started off in early 1984. The DPT was rendered responsible for the privatization of the public sector and the Morgan Guaranty Trust Bank was asked to prepare the master plan for the entire privatization processes (Öniş, 1991:166). To put an end to the monopoly of the SEEs, especially in the manufacturing sector, the related institutional framework was rearranged. Accordingly, not only the government was vested with the right to select the SEEs to be privatized, but also the newly-found, Board of the Mass Housing and Public Participation Fund¹⁹⁴ was rendered responsible in monitoring the privatization process.

Öniş suggests that the privatization processes enforced by the ANAP were distinctive in their reorganizational features rather than their direct challenge to the state (1991:167). Unlike the classical apprehension that envisions privatization as direct sales of the SEE assets, the ANAP government referred to two other strategies, which rested on “offers to sell management rights of an enterprise; and offers of certificates entitling the public to a share in the operating income of the enterprise” while there was also a third option reserved for the crucial sectors related with infrastructure, energy and communication (Öniş, 1991:167). In order to weaken the influential position of the SEEs *vis-à-vis* the private sector, their immunity from taxation was cancelled. Thus, the share of the SEEs

¹⁹⁴ This fund was entrusted with the management of extra-budgetary funds as well. The government was considerably autonomous concerning the utilization of these extra-budgetary funds as it did not have to give any account on them to the established bureaucracy and the parliament.

in the GDP dropped down to 2.4 per cent from 5.8 per cent between 1980 and 1989 (Kazdağılı in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:469). What is more, as projected in the ANAP program, the expenditures of the state on education and health were scaled down by opening up private schools and health institutions (*Anavatan Partisi Programı 1983*, Articles 21 and 25). To cut a long story short, the ANAP governments endeavored to minimize the role of the state in production, exerted efforts to limit the scope of state facilities and strived to transfer its tasks to the private sector, if possible. However, this transition has not been fully carried into effect owing to the structural deficits. Most of the direct privatizations could not have been enforced in those years.

4.2.3.3. Clientelism

The ANAP displayed a standard approach on clientelism common in many center-right parties, yet by way of new strategies. In line with its antecedents, the ANAP leader, Özal also provided its supporters with pork-barrel grants. He promised the residents of towns provincial opportunities in return of their support in the elections (Cemal, 1989:350). On the other hand, the ANAP aligned itself with big business, such as ENKA and in return of their sponsorship provided them with governmental incentives. Furthermore, Özal was considerably engaged in patronage networks. For instance, he threatened to cancel Sweden's entrusted tender unless she had supported Turkey in the European Council (Cemal, 1989:115).

The seeds of nepotism were sown by Demirel and it came forth in its full-fledged form during the ANAP tenure. The Özal family, especially Özal's wife, brothers and children

had apparently significant influence on governmental decisions. His brother, Yusuf Özal and his cousin Hüsnü Doğan served as ministers in the ANAP governments. A brand-new Jaguar presented as a gift to Özal's daughter also attracted criticism in those days and spelled out the extent of the nepotism and corruption the ANAP government was engaged in (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:267). In a similar vein, close friends of Özal's children, the "Princes of Özal," were appointed to critical bureaucratic posts without the necessary state experience thanks to their direct personal contact and trustable relations with the Özal family. They formed a new form of bureaucratic class with modern outlook and bright educational backgrounds, whose appointments to significant posts despite their lack of competence were extremely unusual in the Turkish state tradition.

It is commonly suggested that corruption also followed suit nepotism and proliferated during the term of the ANAP. One of Özal's statements – "My civil servants know their stuff well" (*Benim memurum işini bilir*)¹⁹⁵ – is usually interpreted as an apparent expression of ANAP's tolerance on bribery. From an optimistic vantage point, on the one hand, it is argued that the ANAP governments put up with corruption just to encourage burgeoning private incentives: on the other hand, the proliferation of the means of communication made such instances more visible (Bozkurt in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:30). Nevertheless, the center-right pragmatism that generally emphasizes materialist development and concrete results, in fact, does not care much for ethics and abstract ideals. Therefore, it is not surprising that the clientelist networks, nepotism and

¹⁹⁵ There exist several standpoints concerning what Özal really meant by this statement. These perspectives stress that Özal actually did not refer to taking bribes at all. With respect to one point of view, Özal stated these words after having been informed so swiftly about the earthquake that took place in Erzurum-Kars in 1983, even before the news agencies. Another view suggests that in a group meeting on the salaries of the civil servants, Özal stated this sentence against the deputies of the ANAP that complained about his bureaucrats.

corruption are hand in glove with the habitual concerns of center-right parties such as electoral victory or success in everyday politics.

4.2.4. Conclusion

The center-right parties which are ideologically less bounded, to a large extent concern with economic development and service related issues. For this end, they formulated their political agenda on the priority of technical modernization which is divergent from the cultural modernization mission of the Kemalist ideology. To a large extent, they are capable to fulfill this incentive which is appreciated by the people and turns into continuing electoral support to these parties. When they fail to accomplish economic well-being mission, they considerably lose their popular support as was experienced in 1990's.

All in all, the center-right parties give a significant place to economic liberalization in their official party documents and discourses. Nevertheless, the realization of this goal cannot be reached until ANAP era and thus, the state investments generally increased during the center-right governments. By ANAP, crucial steps were taken for the liberalization of foreign trade and privatization.

While providing economic progress, on the other hand the center-right parties are eager to engage in clientelism and patronage which leads to unequal distribution of state resources. In that regard, they not only promote the ones who support these parties, but also punish the ones who withhold their political support to the center-right. This clientelist stance occasionally flirts with corruption which especially in the 1990's

caused an economic turmoil which accelerated the collapse of the center-right parties' electoral support.

CHAPTER V

SECULARISM AND CENTER-RIGHT IN TURKEY

As discussed previously in the second chapter, the distinctions between the leftist and rightist standpoints emerged in the context of the French Revolution. These standpoints rested not only upon differing understandings of rights and liberties but also were, most importantly, derived from the cleavage between those who argued for secularism versus those who emphasized the significance of religion. Moreover, various explanations based on socio-economic stratifications were explicitly or implicitly intertwined with religiosity or non-religiosity. Even in the post-Cold War era, the standpoints of the left and right appeared to be value-based and deviated from each other on the topic of materialism versus post-materialism. To that extent, religion played a significant role in setting apart the standpoints of the left *vis-à-vis* the right. To a large extent, whereas the left prefers behavioral patterns that are determined less commonly based on religious foundations, the political right relies on those that are religiously and traditionally motivated.

It is hard to situate the case of Turkey on the left/right spectrum by approaching the issue only from a socio-economic perspective. If the cleavages between those who stress secular methods versus those that emphasize religious ones are taken into consideration, one might put Turkey's position on the political spectrum into perspective.

In this respect, it should be noted right away that, here, religion not only refers to the Orthodox religious doctrine but also to the varying traditions and local interpretations of those doctrines.

In the case of Turkey, Berkes argues that:

We postulate that the formal outlook of a religious system remains in most cases ideal and theoretical and is found in actual social contexts in a modified, or interpreted form; that the institutional status of a religion is determined not exclusively by the principles of its ideal system, but by the institutional configuration of the society; and that in many cases the source of the ultimate values is identified with the religion in question when these values constitute the core of a sacred tradition and when the society is challenged by secularizing forces of change turned against the tradition" (Berkes, 1998:66).

Hence, as mentioned in the previous chapters, the center-periphery cleavage not only remains one of the key conceptualizations in explaining the patterns of Turkish politics and society but also this gap between the center and the periphery has grown wider due to various changes within the value systems of the center throughout the modernization process of Turkey.¹⁹⁶ Özbudun notes that "[t]he basic difference from Western European politics is that in Turkey, as in other Muslim-majority countries, there is no equivalent

¹⁹⁶ The value system and the accompanying strategies prevalent in the periphery have undergone a transformation with respect to political dynamics as well. On the one hand, the periphery has never intended to challenge the prevailing order with the exception of some minor religious-Kurdish rebellions. On the other hand, whenever the wind was fair, the periphery endeavored to voice its cherished values. What is more, the melting pot of secular thought, rational thought and modern education systems brought about a considerable metamorphosis over time regarding the value system of the periphery.

of the Catholic Church, with its autonomous structure and corporate privileges. However, a functionally similar cleavage developed between the ardent secularizers and the devout Muslims, combined with the center-periphery cleavage” (2013:6). Thus, since there was neither an official clergy as a social class, nor an institutionalized church, the Republic of Turkey endeavored to secularize in the context of a conflict between the center and the periphery.

To that extent, from the very beginning, the Turkish center-right has sided with religion as a response to the fact that the center-left was poising itself to pursue secularist policies. Nevertheless, the extent of this religiosity did not amount to an extreme antagonism between religious and secular groups. Instead, the center-right in Turkey followed a middle ground in between the militant secularism of the state and the religious Islamic far-right. In the account of the Turkish center-right, religion and secularism were related values that could co-exist in harmony. In other words, the center-right in Turkey approached religion on moderate grounds while at the same time embracing secular principles. Before discussing the policies and discourses of the Turkish center-right parties on secularism, it is valuable to first address the concept of secularism.

5.1. Secularism(S): A Variety of Connotations

Despite the fact that the concept of secularism is generally considered to refer simply to the separation of religion from state affairs and politics, it is in fact far from having a simple, monolithic and coherent meaning. Indeed, among many influencing factors, the

conceptualization of religion especially affects the conceptualization of secularism. In that regard, Calhoun and co-authors posit that “[i]n all cases, secularism is defined in tandem with its twin concept, religion, and how we think about one of these paired concepts affects the way we think about the other” (2011:6). Thus, the nature of religion, its value system and the accompanying worldly affairs, amount to only one aspect of the picture that forges the texture of secularism in a given context.¹⁹⁷ The nature of the *ancient regime* along with that of the secularization process are other significant factors that must be taken into account. If top-down secularization takes place, the perception of the political elites on religion may influence the scope of the secularism as well. Furthermore, the structure of the state and society also impact the nature of secularism (Stepan in Calhoun *et al.*, 2011).

Given the prevailing multiple theories on secularism, it is necessary here to differentiate two clearly distinct forms of secularism in order to explain the Turkish center-right’s secularist incentive: the American style of secularism and the French version of *laïcité*.¹⁹⁸ On one hand, the latter, better-said the hardliner, reactive and militant version of secularism was brought about by the intensive struggles against the authority of the

¹⁹⁷ Comparative analyses indicate various versions of secularism. Some of the distinguished works are cited below: Talal Asad. 2003. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press; Charles Taylor. 2005. “Modes of Secularism,” in Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper (eds). *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Rajeev Bhargava, (ed). 1998. *Secularism and Its Critics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.31–53; Linell E. Cady and Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (eds). 2010. *Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Alfred Stepan. 2010. “The Multiple Secularisms of Modern Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes,” *APSA Annual Meeting*; Ahmet Kuru. 2009. *Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁹⁸ See: Peter Berger, Grace Davie and Effie Fokas. 2010. *Religious America, Secular Europe?*. Cornwall: Ashgate; Ahmet Kuru, Hurd, E. S. 2008. *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Kuru, 2009.

churches (Calhoun *et al.*, 2011:15; Appleby in Calhoun *et al.*, 2011; Berger *et al.*, 2010:17-2). The American version of secularism, on the other hand, advocates a more pluralistic worldview with respect to religious orientations that reserves a symbolic space for religion in governmental affairs. Joan W. Scott states that “[i]n France, the state protects individuals from religion; in America, religions are protected from the state and the state from religion” (2007:92). Berger and co-authors reveal that the principle of “freedom from belief” seems to have morphed into the principle of “freedom to believe” in the American case (2010). By the same token, McClay discerns negative and positive versions of secularism as follows:

The former view, on the one hand, is a minimal, even "negative" understanding of secularism, as a freedom "from" establishmentarian imposition. For it, the secular idiom is merely a provisional lingua franca that serves to facilitate commerce among different kinds of belief, rather than establish some new "absolute" language, an Esperanto of post-religious truth. The latter view, on the other hand, is the more robust, more assertive, more "positive" understanding of secularism with which I began- the one that affirms secularism as an ultimate faith that rightfully supersedes the tragic blindness and destructive irrationalities of the historical religions, at least so far as activity in public is concerned (McClay, 2002:63-2).

On a parallel front, Ahmet Kuru points to a distinction between passive and assertive secularism. He positions Turkey on the grounds of the latter as Turkey preferred a similar approach to France even taking it further with respect to its endeavors in controlling religion *via* the state-led Directorate of Religious Affairs.¹⁹⁹ However, in order to account for the experiences of Turkey (whose secularist incentive was stronger

¹⁹⁹ Özbudun hints at the ambiguous status of the Directorate as follows: “... the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) that serves the interests of the dominant Sunni majority is part of the public administration, and its public status is recognized in the Constitution (Art. 136). However, it does not have a legal personality of its own and is responsible to the prime minister, and the strictly secular Turkish Constitution does not, of course, recognize a state religion” (Özbudun, 2010a:215).

than France in the past), those of India (whose position was softer than the U.S.A as it provided certain subsidies to all religions) and many other divergent paths to secularism, one must formulate categories beyond the above-mentioned branches of secularism. For instance, Stepan underscores the significance of “twin tolerations” of religion and secularism for a viable system: “separatist,” “established religion,” “positive accommodation” and “respect all, positive cooperation, and principled distance” (Stepan in Calhoun *et al.*, 2011).

The Turkish center-right mainly approached the debates revolving around different understandings of secularism and the role of religion under the guidance of the following question, “which path to follow, assertive or passive secularism?” In that regard, while the Kemalist state elites along with the CHP have preferred a path close to the French version of secularism (Göle in Cady *et al.*, 2010; Kuru, 2009; Calhoun *et al.*, 2011:9), the Turkish center-right favored a more passive version (Kuru, 2009).

5.2. The Secularization of Turkey

Turkey’s secularization process date back to the very beginning of the Ottoman Empire’s modernization process. Within the Ottoman Empire, which was endowed with religious authority owing to the power of the caliphate, the citizenship (which was inherently *reaya* status) was defined in terms of being a Muslim or non-Muslim. Karpas states that “[t]he dominant social unit in the Ottoman state was the community, and the community was religious. Until the nineteenth century, at least, all inhabitants identified themselves first as Muslims, Christians, or Jews, not as Ottomans or as members of a

given ethnic group” (2002:759). Even though the *reaya* was defined with respect to religion, non-Muslim elements were protected as well (Barkey in Kuru and Stepan, 2012:21-3). Despite the religious undertones apparently shaping the relations between the state and the society, a peaceful co-existence of different religions endured in the Ottoman Empire. Underlining the tolerance towards religious diversities, Barkey states that “the Ottoman Empire is perhaps the best example of imperial accommodation of religion, in which a state carefully watches religious differences and shapes the role that religion should play in the imperial polity” (in Kuru and Stepan, 2012:13). Hence, the religious pluralism prevalent in the Ottoman Empire would fall to pieces in the monolithic Republican secularist state *vis-à-vis* the pluralistic society (Heper, 1991; Özbudun in Kuru and Stapan, 2010; Berkes, 1998).

In order to fully grasp the issue at hand, one should refrain not only from underestimating but also overestimating the status of religion in the Ottoman Empire. The Kantian view--“concepts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (2010)--was not far from the attitude that prevailed in the Ottoman Empire. In a similar vein, Şerif Mardin quotes from al-Gazali, who argued that “[w]hoever abstracts and isolates the outward from the whole is a Materialist and whoever abstracts the inward is a spiritualist [esoteric], while he who joins the two together is catholic, perfect” (Mardin, 1991:119). This was a prevalently espoused opinion in Ottoman society in general. In this respect, one can propose that the value systems of the periphery in Turkey were mainly shaped by a combination that brought several elements of spiritual life together with worldly concerns. Furthermore, the religious structure of the state in symbolic terms did not allow religion to guide all the policy-making

processes, and the autonomous state did not amount to a complete theocracy even at times that are considered the most religiously oriented (Heper, 1981:348; Berkes, 1998:16; Mardin in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981:194). So, it is possible to argue that in the classical Ottoman era, the center and the periphery approached religion in a compatible way: both were religious, yet none of them refused the significance of daily affairs and worldly concerns in addition to religious aspects when weighing policy decisions.²⁰⁰ Thus, religion strengthened the relations between local forces and state institutions though it did not form the ultimate factor in the classical Ottoman decision-making matrix (Mardin, 1991; Mardin in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981; Berkes, 1998:69).

Nonetheless, religion began to lose its ground and became absent in specific functions with respect to the state within the context of the modernization process. With respect to the Treaty of KüçükKaynarca (1774) that concluded the War between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire (1768-74), the Ottoman Empire bent its knee and acknowledged Europe's superiority. Starting with the reign of Selim III, such an acknowledgement led to military reforms and modernization of the state apparatus. In the aftermath of Selim III's overthrow, Mahmud II on the one hand, started to abolish traditional institutions while founding new ones, and on the other hand reinforced institutional reforms concerning the practices of daily life. Berkes notes that "[t]he most significant aspect of the innovations initiated by Mahmud II was the emergence of the

²⁰⁰ Şerif Mardin asserts that "[f]or the population at large religion was a moral prop, something to lean on, a source of consolation, a patterning of life; for the ruling elite it was in addition, and probably much more, a matter related to the legitimacy of the state. *Both groups could at times neglect religion or by-pass it*, but the form of this by-passing was different: for the masses it consisted of breaking religious taboos and then atoning for it later; for the ruling it consisted in pushing religion into the background when required by secular political purposes" (Mardin, 1971:206) [*Italics added*]

idea of an Ottoman state, composed of peoples of diverse nationalities and religions, based on secular principles of sovereignty as contrasted with the medieval concept of an Islamic empire. The real beginning of modernization and secularization was in this change” (Berkes, 1998:90). In light of such an ideological shift, under the reign of Mahmud II not only the consultative function of Shaikh al-Islam (*Şeyhü'l İslam*) was diminished but also its perception came to be related more to the affairs of *millet* than to governmental affairs (Berkes, 1998:98). The secularization process of education also came to the fore and gradually brought about a new generation of bureaucrats and intellectuals educated in modern schools or abroad accelerating the modernization process of Turkey.²⁰¹ Moreover, not only the secularization of matters of jurisdiction, especially that of the penal code and the civil law, but also the provision of equal rights for non-Muslim citizens arose within the context of *Tanzimat Fermanı* and *Islahat Fermanı*. In the late Ottoman era, further steps were also taken in this direction, yet with the rise of divergent ideologies--stretching from Islamism and Ottomanism to Turkism and Westernism--a coherent secular system could not be formed.

To a large extent, not only the strategy but also the depth of attempts at reinforcing the secularization process by the Kemalist regime was different from previous experiences.²⁰² Since the very beginning, this regime had taken decisive steps in order to secularize the state and the society. In line with the Kemalist understanding of

²⁰¹ For details, see: Findley, 1989. Chapter 4. *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, pp.131-141.

²⁰² According to the account of Kuru, the reason behind such a rigid understanding of secularism was indeed a reaction mainly to the Ancient Regime, where the *ulema* and the Sultan collaborated on the grounds of Islamic institutions (Kuru, 2009:201). For a bright comparison of the secularization processes of the Ancient Regime and the Kemalist era, see also: Şerif Mardin. 1971. “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2(3): 202-3.

modernization, it was suggested that religion be cut off from all the decision-making processes related with public life (Eisenstadt in Landau, 1984:9; Berkes, 1998:484; Yavuz, 2009:154; Kuru, 2009, 2007:571; Keyman in Cady and co-authors, 2010:144). In Max Weber's or Steve Bruce's terms, an enlightened account of secularism was principal in the case of Turkey, which presumed that rationality and civilization would bring about a less-religious society. Kemalist elites assumed that secularization of the state and society would lead not only to liberation from the archaic ways of thinking and living but also to a new kind of morality detached from the religion that was perceived as among the reasons for underdevelopment and full of superstitions and dogmas. To that extent, in line with a Weberian viewpoint, the version of secularism suggested by the Kemalist elites required the separation of value spheres and expected to place religion into the private realm and, if possible, only within the inner conscience (*vicdan*) of the people (Asad, 2003:185; Mardin in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981:211)²⁰³. Therefore, the secularism suggested by the Kemalist elites was based on two dynamics: institutional transformations and cultural revolution.

The secularization processes that followed suit within the Republic of Turkey took more than two decades to get a foothold in the country. In the framework of the institutional reforms, in 1921, the principle of the "sovereignty belongs to nation" replaced the previous one, which was, namely, the "sovereignty belongs to the divine authority." At that time, not only the legal justification for the Caliphate but also the following clause

²⁰³ For an anthropological account of the privatization of religion in Turkey, see: Chris Hann. 2000. "Problems with the (De)Privatization of Religion," *Anthropology Today* 16(6): 14-20.

“the religion of the Turkish state is Islam” was preserved in the 1924 Constitution.²⁰⁴

Furthermore, in the 1924 Constitution, the scope of the parliamentary authority included the enforcement of shariah law (*ahkam-ı şer’iyyenin tenfizi*) as well while the deputies and the President continued to swear to God in their oaths (*valahhi*) until 1928. Despite these implementations, the Constitution strove to set up a secular system without explicitly identifying the regime as secular (Özbudun, 2012:8-2). Following the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, a series of reforms also intended to move the secularization process forward were rapidly introduced. Among these reforms were the establishment a unified system of national education under state control, the transition to a Latin alphabet, the adoption of the Gregorian calendar, the entitlement of women with equal rights, the regulation of social relations and dress codes along with the annulment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Foundations (*Şeriye ve Evkaf*). Zürcher notes that some of these reforms were at first not directly related with religion; instead, they were aimed at burning bridges with the past (Zürcher, 2001:188). Soon after the Sheikh Sait Rebellion, the use of religion for political purposes was banned. Prior to the abolition of the Caliphate, all kinds of dervish lodges and religious brotherhoods were outlawed. In this context, secularism succeeded many reforms that had already been enforced and eventually gained a constitutional status in 1937.

In line with the worldview of the Enlightenment, Kemalism considered education as one of the most efficient tools for putting the secularization processes into effect. In order to do so, almost all religious schools were closed down while not only the courses of

²⁰⁴ Some deputies proposed to embed the clause of “the state’s *official* religion is Islam” into the Constitution, yet, this suggestion was not approved. For details, see: Şeref Gözübüyük and Zekâi Sezgin. 1957. *1924 Anayasası Hakkındaki Meclis Görüşmeleri*. Ankara: AÜSBF, 100-2; Ergun Özbudun. 2012. *1924 Anayasası*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 13-2.

religion but also those of Arabic and Persian language were taken out of curriculums (Özdalga, 1999:418). In the course of these reforms, the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the Directorate for the Charity Foundations were established and rendered responsible directly to the Prime Minister in order for the state to control all religious activity and education via these institutions.²⁰⁵ As a result, the state had taken control of every legal²⁰⁶ religious activity, publication and education that paved the way for the creation of what Calhoun and co-authors call a ‘reasonable’ religion (Calhoun and co-authors, 2011:7). A sort of Turkified Islam compatible with a nationalist and secular Turkey was put into practice (Dumont in Landau, 1984:30).²⁰⁷ Thus, the state attempted to formulate a ‘true’ religion by way of exerting systematic restrictions on the spiritual elements of religion while initiating an educational movement that would build personal commitment to a “reasonable” religion. Taylor calls upon such attempts at depoliticizing religion as the “replacement of secularism with the religion” (2005) while Berkes considers this Kemalist version of secularism as “shoddy legitimization for the persecution of Islam” (Berkes, 1998:480). Thus, the Turkish state, on the one hand, strove to depoliticize religion, and, simultaneously, on the other hand, endeavored to create its own “reasonable” religion while suggesting secular alternatives as new forms of morality for the people.

²⁰⁵ Indeed, the Directorate of Religious Affairs took sides with the state for the most part. For instance, during the Events of February 28th the Staff Officer Oğuz Kalelioğlu, who influenced and shaped the related statements of the Directorate, was the head consultant of the Chief of the Directorate of Religious Affairs.

²⁰⁶ At this point, the word ‘legal’ is preferred since the illegal aspects the previous dervish lodges that went underground and endeavored to carry on with their activities outside the legal terrain--are unknown.

²⁰⁷ With respect to this irony, Bernard Lewis notes that “[e]ven today, after thirty-five years of the secular Republic, a non-Muslim in Turkey may be called a Turkish citizen, but never a Turk” (Lewis, 1968:26).

5.2.1. The DP and Secularism

The Republican modernization project intended to free Turkish citizens from superstitions and abstractions *via* rationality. Yet, such a mission could not be extended enough to contain populations on the periphery. As a result, the contradictions between the center and periphery have been sharpened. While the CHP was the founder and bearer of this rationalization project, the DP and subsequent center-right parties pursued pragmatic policies that gave space to religion in public life. Frey suggests that “[a]n alternative elite had developed. This elite had been neither co-opted nor quashed, possibly because the tremendous problem of eliminating anachronistic religion as a political force had monopolized the attention of the Kemalist high command” (1965:349). Thus, the attitude of political elites towards religion was one of the main separating lines between the CHP elite and that of the DP.

It is worth mentioning that neither the programs, the activities of the center-right parties nor the party elites with regards to their thoughts and practices were essentially religious. They have just stressed the importance of religion in Turkish society and paid respect to religious concepts, practices and institutions. As pragmatic parties, they were also careful to abide by the state principles in the course of the secularization process.

Bearing in mind the previous experiences provided by the emergence of the Progressive Republican Party (the TCF) and the Free Republican Party (the SCF), or in other words, the clustering of suppressed religious opposition around these alternative parties, the CHP began to pursue containment policies concerning religion in order to prevent a

religious grouping under the roof of the DP in the context of the multi-party system. As of the CHP Congress held on November 17, 1947, the party decided to soften its approach to religion. Thus, Recep Peker, then the Prime Minister and one of the most radical secularists in the party, was unseated and replaced with a more moderate name, Hasan Saka. This gradual reconciliation with religion was also carried on with Şemsettin Günaltay, the then Prime Minister in 1949, who was a theologian and a former *mufti*. By the same token, the strict ban on going on pilgrimage was lifted in 1947. Furthermore, elective religious courses were re-introduced in curriculums²⁰⁸ while the Faculty of Theology at Ankara University was reopened. The religious vocational high-schools that offered religious education were also re-established in several cities.²⁰⁹ The number of Quran courses was also increased to 167 in 1949 from only 9 in 1932 (Ünsür, 1995:93). Nevertheless, these initiatives must not have been appreciated much by the population in general as the CHP was defeated at the ballot box in the 1950 Elections. One of the reasons behind this failure might have rested in the fact that, in the eyes of the periphery, the CHP was not considered to be sincere regarding its intentions towards religious policies. However, this short-lived pro-religious approach of the CHP was very crucial for subsequent Turkish politics as Kalaycıoğlu observes: “[o]nce the CHP began to exploit religion, the DP was morally and legitimately relieved from all restraints to exploit the religious symbolism of the majority of Sunni Muslims to its advantage thanks to the performance of the CHP governments of the late 1940s” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005:72).

²⁰⁸ It is worth noting that the guidelines sent by the Ministry of National Education prescribed the elective courses to be given by primary school teachers yet not to be graded. (*Yeni Sabah*, 04.02.1949)

²⁰⁹ In fact, the idea of opening up these schools was put forward back in 1924. However, as a result of rigid secularist policies, it was abandoned in 1932.

While this was the case with the CHP, the DP pursued a dual policy from the very beginning. On the one hand, the DP promised that President İnönü would abide by and preserve secularist principles;²¹⁰ on the other hand, it also employed a sympathetic discourse on religion that was capable of convincing people more successfully. In other words, the discourses and policies of the DP could be summarized under two headings. Firstly, the party formulated religion-friendly policies and provided a fresh approach *vis-à-vis* the rigid secularist policies of the previous CHP governments. Secondly, the party embraced the memory of Atatürk and tried to protect secularist principles and symbols while punishing far-right Islamist orientations.

5.2.1.1. Pro-Religious Policies of the DP

At the outset, the civil and military bureaucracies were the two pillars of secularism in Turkey. The cadres of the DP that claimed to advocate the rights of the periphery comprised less than civil and military bureaucrats and such a configuration estranged the DP from the militant *laïcité*. In that regard, even Celal Bayar who was considered to be one of the most secular in the DP, knew Arabic very well and had a cleric as a father (Aydemir, 1976:146). Bayar declared that the religious sensitivity of Adnan Menderes had influenced them as well. When Menderes was in the American College, he warned Bayar against the missionary priests, who encouraged Muslim students to convert

²¹⁰ Aydemir quotes a conversation between İsmet İnönü and Celal Bayar that took place prior to the foundation of the DP: “İnönü -Will you toy with the religion? Are you going to instrumentalize the religion for political purposes? Bayar: No, secularism does not mean atheism” (1976:361; 389).

(Bayar, 1969:21-3).²¹¹ The personal characteristics of Menderes also comprised transcendental elements in addition to rational and pragmatic ones, which were, according to Aydemir, a result of being raised by his elderly and conservative grandmother (1976:22, 69). To a large extent, the DP elite joined in during ceremonial practices such as the feast of Sacrifice (*eid-al-adha- kurban bayramı*) and the feast of Ramadan (*eid-al-fitr- ramazan bayramı*) and participated in Friday prayers, both of which drew the DP elite closer to the masses. Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes and many other leading politicians in the party usually employed religious discourses in their public speeches. These figures not only made use of religious expressions throughout their speeches but also finished their speeches with religious idioms.²¹² In that sense, the DP elite did not hesitate to give religion-friendly messages on numerous and varying occasions. Ayata notes that “[t]he DP’s approach to religion involved the incorporation of Islam as a living cultural tradition into the mainstream of Turkish politics” (1996:43). In this respect, the religious attachments of the DP elite had a cultural and traditional character, which naturally echoed in the discourses of the party. In the eyes of many DP elites, who grew up in a religion-friendly environment rather than a religion-dominated one, using religious rhetoric and attending religious ceremonies were merely traditional practices. Thus, the DP developed a tolerant approach towards religion, yet, at the same time, it refrained from perceiving it as the omniscient source of guidance. At this point, it is worth pointing out a similarity between the approaches of the majority of the society and the DP. Both of them have a great respect for religion, yet, when they find it

²¹¹ In those years, Bayar was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress in its İzmir branch (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*).

²¹² For examples, see: *Milliyet*, 08.05.1950.

necessary, they could “by-pass”²¹³ religion easily. What is more, unlike Celal Bayar, the DP elite liked to be viewed in religious places. For instance, several close friends of his declared that Menderes usually visited Eyüp Sultan Tomb when he was the Prime Minister (Ağaoğlu, 2004:55). By the same token, the survival of Menderes from a terrifying plane crash²¹⁴ was also interpreted as a proof of his exceptional spiritual side, and he was known as “God’s distinguished man” (Eroğul, 2003:228-3; Ağaoğlu, 2004:55). Two days after the crash, the press presented Menderes’ survival and recovery as a miracle (*Milliyet*, 19.02.1959).²¹⁵ Actually, Menderes was neither a devoutly religious man, nor was he a piously practicing Muslim. However, unlike the CHP elite, he preferred to appear as such.

The DP elite considered religion as a matter within the context of the freedom of conscience as well. On January 17, 1953, Menderes suggested that “[r]eligion is a holy and respectable issue. We intend to justify our religion as a freedom of conscience, as we have done with respect to other liberties as well” (Burçak, 1998:130). Bayar also underlined that the DP’s interpretation of secularism not only respected religion but also preserved an equal distance between all religions (Bayar, 1969:109). This standpoint was reiterated in the party programs of 1946 and 1951 (Articles 13 and 14).²¹⁶

²¹³ For an analysis of the general approach to religion prevailing among the majority of the population, see: Mardin, 1971, p. 206.

²¹⁴ The plane crash occurred on February 17, 1959 in London and was called the “1959 Turkish Airlines Gatwick Crash.” Menderes and some other party members were on the plane, which crashed and led to the death of many passengers except Menderes and several others.

²¹⁵ Yavuzalp, Menderes’ clerk, argues that this was an attempt at perception management as Menderes was substantially injured in the accident (Yavuzalp, 1991:15).

²¹⁶ Different from that of 1946, the necessity of religious education was emphasized in the party program of 1951.

In the first government program, the DP promised to preserve Kemalist reforms that were embraced by the people. This promise implicitly indicated that some of the Kemalist reforms, probably the assertively secularist ones, were not welcomed by the people. In this regard, Menderes posited as follows:

We will preserve the acquisitions gained until now in the course of our democratic revolution. Indeed, we will offer further reforms in the Constitution with respect to the rights and liberties of the citizens as well as a stable state regulation (...) Accordingly, we will get rid of all undemocratic rules inherited from the single-party era (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 29.5.1950, p.30).

The above-mentioned declaration raised a question about the prospects of the militant secularist policies of the CHP since these were the reforms that have been mostly rejected by the majority of the people.

In the subsequent governments, the DP began to voice the need for freedom of conscience more loudly. For instance, in the second Menderes government, the DP leader stated that:

We project keeping the worldly affairs and those of the religion separate from each other, and not repressing the freedom of conscience, which stands among the main principles of democracy (...) Neither the religious people, nor those who do not consider themselves as religious will suppress each other and in this way, the citizens (...), splitting into two enemy camps will never be allowed (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 20.03.1951 p.61).

By virtue of the above-mentioned statement, the DP government stressed the freedom of liberties rather than pursuing blindfold secularism, and from this day forward, the policies of the DP strove to remain within such a stance.

5.2.1.1.1. The Language of the Call for Prayer

The Kemalist reform that settled on the language of the call for prayer (hereinafter, *azan*)²¹⁷ as Turkish, was not welcomed. As noted previously, the Republican elite thought that burning the bridges with the Ancient Regime could have only been possible with a great transformation. Accordingly, in 1932, Atatürk suggested the recitation of *azans* in Turkish along with similar secularist and nationalist maneuvers. In 1936, the recitation of *azans* in Arabic was subjected to punishment by an additional clause added to the Penal Code, Law numbered 526, which generated social discontent.²¹⁸ (Bayar, 1969:111; Burçak, 1998: 55-2). Public protests and declarations by preachers against the recitation of *azan* in Turkish led to various prosecutions, arrests and imprisonments. It is worth noting that this reform targeted only the Muslim community, and both the Christians and Jews carried on worshiping in their original languages (Azak, 2010:59). During the single-party era, the government was quite determined to apply the rules against *azans* recited in Arabic as well.

In the beginning of the multi-party era, as the assertive secularist atmosphere softened a little bit, the debates around the recitation of *azans* in Turkish came to the fore. For example, in 1949, Besim Atalay and M. Raif Ogan brought up this issue, and the opposition began to raise its voice against such a practice (*Yeni Sabah*, 01.05.1949;

²¹⁷ The call for prayer that took place five times a day had its specific rhymes and meter in Arabic, and almost all Muslim countries preserved its original Arabic version.

²¹⁸ It is worth noting that during the reformation period, in line with various translations of Quran to Turkish, the sermons at the Friday prayers began to be given in Turkish as well. These practices, however, did not cause a serious discontent unlike the case with changing the recitation of *azan* in Turkish.

02.05.1949; 03.05.1949). Thus, the existing social antipathy found fertile grounds to be declared more loudly, and intellectual debates began to take place.

The DP brought up this issue on the agenda just after the forming of the government. The day before the month of Ramadan, on June 16, 1950, the freedom to recite *azan* in its original Arabic version was passed through the Parliament.²¹⁹ The timing satisfied many and rallied popular support for the DP government from the very beginning of its term. People celebrated this event in a sentimental mood to the extent that they had even cried while listening to the Arabic version of *azan*.²²⁰

Ahmet Gürkan, a deputy from the DP, strove to justify the bill that restored the Arabic version of *azan* by referring to secularism. According to him, the prohibition of the Turkish version of *azan* was indeed against secularism since such a practice was an attempt at controlling and intervening in the realm of the preachers and clergymen. The DP deputies accused the previous CHP governments of interpreting secularism as “being against religion” as well (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 31.05.1950). Evaluating the issue within the context of freedom of conscience, the DP managed to differentiate its understanding of secularism from that of the Kemalist one.²²¹ On the other hand, the DP attentively tried to avoid being considered anti-secular or disrespectful of Atatürk as

²¹⁹ Accordingly, on July 16, 1950, on the same day that the recitation of *azan* in Arabic was restored, the bill proposed by the DP deputy from Ordu to delink the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the Prime Ministry was rejected (*Milliyet*, 17.06.1950).

²²⁰ For details, see: Mustafa Armağan. 2010. *Türkçe Ezan ve Menderes: Bir Devrin Yazılmayan Gerçekleri*. İstanbul: Timaş.

²²¹ It is worth addressing that the CHP supported the annulment of the prohibition of the recitation of *azan* in Arabic. The party spokesman, Cemal Reşil Eyüpoğlu openly declared that they were not against the amendment (Bayar, 1969:112). On the other hand, Islamist Necip Fazıl complained that the main motive behind this amendment was democracy and the freedom of conscience rather than religious purposes (Kısakürek, 1993:132)

well. In that regard, Bayar highlighted the fact that the recitation of *azan* in Turkish along with several other reforms on language and history were to be considered as Atatürk's experiments that he had conducted without being certain about their consequences (1969:110-2). Furthermore, the DP referred not to the regulations enacted in the times of Atatürk but to the amendment enforced by İnönü back in 1941 (Law No: 4505) that prohibited the recitation of *azan* in Arabic.²²² In these debates, Menderes was careful to leave the figure of Atatürk aside when trying to pass reforms or issuing criticism. He stated that "Atatürk put forth the recitation of *azan* in Turkish in order to get rid of dogmatism and in today's Turkey there is no need to keep up with this rule, which contradicts with the freedom of conscience to some extent" (Burçak, 1998:56-2). Therefore, carefully distinguishing the heritage of Atatürk from the practices of the CHP and İnönü, the DP carried on with its opposition against the latter. Thus, on the one hand, the DP wanted to stick to its image of being aligned with policies supported by Atatürk despite its advocacies of policies that contradicted this platform; on the other hand, it aimed at getting the support of the periphery. In a nutshell, the DP stressed that it was for the freedom of conscience and that they would respect secularism and protect the Kemalist secularist institutions. In this sense, the DP forged a role-model for the subsequent center-right parties.

²²² In fact, it was in 1932 that the recitation of *azan* in Turkish had been launched. In 1933, the gendarmerie forces were rendered responsible for the prohibition of the Arabic version.

5.2.1.1.2. The Religious Activities Supported by the State

Prior to the governments of the DP, the state had tried to reform and control all religious associations and promote a new “vernacular Islam” (Azak, 2010:60). When the DP came to power, it not only lifted the ban on religion but also, in view of the positive responses of the masses concerning the abandonment of the compulsory recitation of *azan* in Turkish, the DP put forth similar messages of encouragement that pleased the majority of the population.

During the term of the DP, the recitations of the Quran along with religious broadcasting on the state radio caused an intra-party crisis in which Bayar yelled at Samet Ağaoğlu, and then the Deputy Prime Minister pronounced that: “You have transformed the state radio into a mosque! (...) If this was what you have understood from democracy, I assure you that you have been mistaken.” As a result of this incident, Ağaoğlu wanted to resign from his position, yet he was talked out of it by Menderes, the then Prime Minister. Menderes gave his support to Ağaoğlu by declaring that “[i]f necessary, the entire cabinet will resign” and told Bayar that “when my citizens listen to *Mevlüt* (a religious poem) and Quran via the state radio on the very night of *kandil* (Islamic holy night), then they will realize that the state takes after them” (Bozdağ, 2004:136-2). After this incident, the state radio carried on with its religious broadcasts. Nevertheless, the opposition continued to criticize the DP for making use of religion as a type of trump card. For example, Şemsettin Günaltay--not only a theologian but also a deputy of the CHP--criticized the DP for its broadcasts of the Quran, which were in his account disrespectful since the radio might have been listened to in various ‘unsuitable’ places

(*Milliyet*, 13.08.1951). However, on account of popular support, the DP elite defended their policy as follows: “the Turkish citizens are right-minded...Even the heavy drinkers respect Quran and know where to listen to the radio” (*Milliyet*, 13.08.1951).

Religious education was also one of the most disputed policies of the DP governments.

In the first government program, Menderes asserted that:

On the affairs of education: It is usual that a community which does not rest on firm national and moral principles, and does not reserve a place for moral values in its spirit, no matter how advanced it is on material grounds, it would be dragged into ill-fate within the complicated conditions of the contemporary world. In a country that does not take such an objective into account in her training and education system, and cannot equip her youth with spiritual and humanitarian values in accordance with the national character and traditions, the proliferation of science and technical knowledge is not going to be enough to guarantee living as a free and independent nation. (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 29.05.1950, p.29)

This emphasis on the spiritual aspects of education echoed through the related discourses and policies of the DP. In that regard, Tevfik İleri, the Minister of National Education at the time often stressed the significance of raising a generation that is both intellectually and religiously equipped considering religious education as important as road building, school construction and other material services (*Milliyet*, 25.05.1952; 13.08.1950). In line with this position, the DP introduced optional religious courses in primary and secondary schools, popularized Quran courses and helped to change the status of the religious vocational schools (*İmam Hatip*- Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools). Prior to this regulation, the religious vocational schools existed in order to provide an occupational education to imams. The DP turned these schools into secondary schools and high schools that were obliged to offer physics, mathematics and chemistry as well as religious courses. The main motive behind the establishment of

these schools was summarized by Tevfik İleri as follows: to raise an intellectual and religious youth that shall take significant positions in the future (*Milliyet*, 25.02.1952).²²³ As a result, in the first seven years of the DP government, 17 religious vocational schools with the capacity of educating a class of 4000 students at any one time were founded (*Milliyet*, 15.10.1957). The High Islamic Institute was also established in Istanbul in order to educate theologians. In the inaugural speech of the Institute, İleri stated that Islam was not against progress (*Milliyet*, 20.11.1959). In a summary, the DP formulated religion-friendly policies especially in the realm of education and tried to create an Islamic understanding compatible with science and development.

5.2.1.1.3. The Re-embrace of the Ancient Regime

During the term of the CHP, the closure of dervish lodges and tombs to which people attached religious importance caused a silent discontent among the masses. The DP reopened some of these lodges and tombs: On July 14, 1950 the tomb of Fatih Sultan Mehmet, in August 1950 Dolmabahçe Mosque and on September 1, 1950 Eyüp Sultan's Tomb were reopened for visitors (Ağaoğlu, 2004:55). In this respect the memory of the previous Sultans and dervishes appreciated by the majority were appreciate and reacknowledged.

The manner in which the DP governments approached Istanbul and Ankara could also be understood not only on the grounds of the secular versus religious cleavage but also

²²³ It is worth noting that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current Prime Minister also graduated from a religious vocational school.

with respect to the DP's reconciliation with the past. In this respect, Menderes usually argued that the CHP was proud of Ankara for constructing a city without temples (Burçak, 1998:496). Thus, Ankara became the symbol and heart of the Republic because of its secularist silhouette that lacked the minarets that ornament Istanbul's skyline. As a reaction to this image, the DP began to build mosques in many cities including Ankara. Furthermore, while the CHP governments refrained from making huge investments in Istanbul as the capital of the Ancient Regime, the DP lent importance to Istanbul by making considerable investments there. The DP also wanted to make Istanbul a center of the Islamic world with populist and economic objectives rather than pro-Islamist ones (Menderes and Akyol, 2011:112-2). Accordingly, the DP elite promised to construct a second Kaaba in Istanbul as a pledge put forth in their election campaign (Zafer, 23.10.1957). These might all be considered within the context of an attempt at reconciliation with the Ancient Regime and religion as well as a reaction deriving from pragmatic concerns about obtaining economic gains in addition to popular support.

Considering the gradual increase in the number of alliances established between the DP and various Islamic groups, Ayata claims that "[t]he center right's relations with organized religious groups have included symbiotic relations, temporary alliances, and long-term affiliations" (1996:44). By the same token, the DP forged particular alliances with certain religious groups, and the government provided subsidies to Islamic periodicals. For instance, Necip Fazıl acknowledged that Menderes sponsored his periodical, *Büyük Doğu*, with funds from the budget of the Prime Ministry (1993:230-2). In addition, the DP government supported some Islamic publications through direct advertisements of the SEEs (State Economic Enterprises).

Said Nursi, an eminent figure of the *Nurcu* movement, was respected by the DP deputies and governors (Mardin, 1989: 98; Yavuz, 2003:62; Ahmad, 1991:23; Aydemir, 1976:327; Azak, 2010:115-6). Said Nursi's close ties with the DP deputies became a source of conflict between the DP and the CHP. İnönü interpreted Nursi's moving to Ankara in the beginning of 1960 as a clear support for the DP against the opposition, CHP (Burçak, 640-2). Ahmad also notes that Nursi had direct a relationship with Menderes and wrote him letters to make some suggestions concerning the affairs of government (Ahmad, 1991:24). In this context, one can assert that a tradition of collaboration between the center-right parties and religious figures and orders started during the tenure of the DP thereby enhancing its base of social support.²²⁴ To a large extent, the center-right parties tended to perceive these religious orders in pragmatic terms as a bunch of collected votes, and the orders appreciated these parties as the lesser evil (*ehven-i şer*) among the existing parties with a claim to rule the country. This pragmatic alliance between the center-right parties and religious orders continued, yet it never culminated in an identical entity that merged the two until the rise of Islamic politics.²²⁵

Especially after 1956, the DP participated more frequently in polemics on religion. The opposition party, CHP usually criticized the DP for taking advantage of religion for political purposes, and the 1957 Elections became an arena where the dichotomy of

²²⁴ It is necessary to recall that some members of the DP were close to Islamic far-right movements and later joined the Nation Party (Millet Partisi). Besides, the DP was far from drawing a unilateral line on its relations with Islamic groups. For instance, on December 23, 1952 Said Nursi was prosecuted by the High Criminal Court (Eroğul, 2003:132-2) although the DP governments had a positive opinion towards *Nurcu* and *Nakshibendi* movements to a large extent (Yavuz, 2003:62).

²²⁵ There was a wide range of religious orders and some of them refused to support center-right parties from the outset. At this point, I stress only the general leaning prevalent among brotherhoods in their support for the center-right parties.

secular *versus* religious was more pronounced. In the subsequent period, the CHP, on the one hand, accused the DP of threatening the regime, and on the other hand, it tried to create an image of itself as being closer to religion (Karpas, 1961:443-2; Burçak, 1998:484-2), which is still a fresh source of conflict for the contemporary CHP as well. In face of accusations of engaging in reactionary activities, Menderes declared that “[a]ctually, the political reactionism is worse than the religious one” (Kırsakürrek, 1993:254; Toker, 1991a:198). By the same token, he also addressed party officials as follows: “the ones, who make a fuss over reactionism, are, in fact the ones that oppress the freedom of conscience” (*Milliyet*, 24.03.1951). Thus, unlike the CHP, the party refrained from taking every argument about reactionism seriously. The DP put some distance between itself and the CHP by way of its focus on relatively negative or passive secularism that for the most part emphasized the freedom of conscience.

5.2.1.2. Pro-Secular Policies of the DP

As mentioned above, one of the distinguishing features of the Turkish center-right was its successful merging of its claims of peripheral representation with state principles. In this respect, religion and secularism play crucial roles in what distinguishes the center-right parties from that of the left as well as the Islamist far-right. The center-right parties usually remain within the boundaries of the regime and never plan to transform the regime dramatically. Thus, the Turkish center-right carefully differentiates itself from the far-right parties that highlight Islamic demands. Nevertheless, as a result of their intensive pragmatism, center-right parties might sometimes flirt with religiously

oriented proclivities in opposition to ‘dangerous’ ones such as communism and socialism. The DP that acted as a role model for the subsequent center-right parties followed along the same path as well.

The DP did not perceive religion and secularism in an antagonistic way when pursuing pro-religious policies in various realms. Turan observes that “[i]t was not the religious basis of its political ideology, but its tolerant attitude towards religion, which made the Democrat Party popular among voters” (in Tapper, 1991:45). In that regard, not only its discourses but also policies of the DP were independent of religious tenets. The party considered secularism as one of the essential characteristics of the Republic to be preserved. Defining the main *problematique* of the CHP as its exclusionary and oppressive understanding of secularism, the DP introduced its minimal, softer and inclusive version that Kuru defines as “passive secularism” or in McClay’s terms, “negative” secularism (Kuru, 2009; 2011; McClay 2002). In this respect, underlining the necessity of separating the affairs of state from that of religion, the DP stated in its party program that “[t]he use of religion as a political tool, the involvement of religion in state affairs, spoiling the compassion and solidarity among citizens by making religion a means of propaganda and stirring up fanatical feelings against other religions and free thinking is never to be tolerated” (DP Programı 1946, Article 14).²²⁶ Hence, without a doubt, the party sided with secularism. The pro-secular and system-oriented approach of the party might be tested with respect to certain cases such as the funeral of Fevzi Çakmak, the *Ticani* Movement, the claim to the memory of Atatürk, the Malatya

²²⁶ After coming to power, the DP softened this Article a little bit as follows: “The use of religion as political means, corrupting the love and solidarity among citizens by making religion a means of propaganda, and stirring up fanatical feelings against free thinking should not to be tolerated” (DP Tüzüğü ve Parti Programı, 1951).

Incident and the limitations put forth against the religiously oriented institutions and publications.

5.2.1.2.1. The Funeral of Fevzi Çakmak

Just before the DP came to power and in the course of the 1950 Elections, Fevzi Çakmak, a devout soldier and a friend of Atatürk had passed away. Fevzi Çakmak, well-known for his opposition to İsmet İnönü and for his Islamic credentials amongst the Kemalist elite,²²⁷ after serving as the Chief of the General Staff for many years, retired and joined the DP in 1946 (Baban, 2009:87; Jenkins, 2008:116). In 1948, with the support of several other hardliners from the DP, he founded the religiously oriented Nation Party (*Millet Partisi* – the MP) and defined the mission of the party as to prevent a transition to atheism (Ahmad, 1991:21). In this period, his religious orientation was more pronounced. It was even claimed that he was a mystical person with superpowers that provide cures for illnesses (Baban, 2009:122). On the other hand, the DP leaders usually tended to refrain from challenging secularism. Özbudun asserts that “[t]he moderation of the DP leaders was one of the most important factors in the successful completion of the transition process” (2000:19), which led to accusations revolving around the DP of conspiring with Fevzi Çakmak and his companions.

After his death on April 10, 1950 the state radio that had been carrying on with broadcasting cheerful songs led to discontent on the part of the conservative wing. The symbolic indifference of the radio was interpreted as that of the state in face of his

²²⁷ It was also argued that one of the main motives behind Atatürk’s insistence on the separation of military affairs and politics was to keep Çakmak away from the latter. Since he was a passionate soldier, Çakmak chose to stay in the army because, that way, his conservative and religious thoughts could not influence politics quite so much.

death, which stirred up a considerable reaction among conservative groups. Around 100,000 people went out to the streets in order to protest such callousness in relation to Çakmak's death (Koçak, *Star*, 12.01.2013). During the demonstrations--which were indeed prohibited at the time--a crowd of university students, sheikhs and preachers, shouting *Allah-u Akbar* out loud, recited *azan* and prayed in Arabic. Top officials in the CHP considered this incident as the rebirth of the "reaction[ism]" in Turkish politics (Baban, 2009:125-2).

The DP's response to such an event was crucial and the party preferred to take sides with the CHP. The DP's newspaper, *Zafer* criticized the issue almost as harshly as the CHP's newspaper, *Ulus*. The party leaders clearly defined their position against Islamic upheavals.²²⁸ Celal Bayar also wrote on this incident that they, as the defender of Atatürk's heritage, would never let reactionary incentives prevail (*Zafer*, 20 April 1950). The reason behind such a backlash might have derived from Çakmak's leave from the DP to found his own party, the MP. Even though there might have been political competition between the MP and the DP that led to the strategic positioning of the latter, it is worth remembering that right before the DP gained power, it made clear that it differentiated itself from religiously oriented movements.

5.2.1.2.2. *The Ticani Movement and the Claim to the Memory of Atatürk*

The *Ticaniye* community, operational in North Africa was founded by Ahmad al-Tijani at the end of the 18th century and gained a foothold in Turkey after 1930s. The *Ticanis*,

²²⁸ For details, see: *Zafer* and *Ulus* Newspapers, 11-17.04.1950.

first of all, came to the forefront within the context of the protests in the Assembly against the regulation on the recitation of *azan* in Turkish (Azak, 2010:87). To a certain degree, they were publicized especially after their assaults on the statues of Atatürk in 1951. In turn, the leader of the community, Kemal Pilavoğlu,²²⁹ along with several others was imprisoned for a long period of time (Jenkins, 2008:120; Zürcher, 2004:232; Ahmad, 1991:23).

As a response to the *Ticani* movement, the DP government prepared a bill and after several amendments, the Law numbered 5816 on Crimes against Atatürk was enacted. The law envisaged certain punishments including imprisonment of up to five years. Although some of the DP deputies spoke against such a proposal due to its methodological deficiency as well as its restrictive nature against freedom of speech, the DP members, to a large extent, defended the law since they thought that assaulting Atatürk was equal to assaulting the Republic, the regime and the reforms of Atatürk (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 04.05.1951 p.45-2; 23.07.1951 p.258, 261, 266). The deputies of the DP harshly criticized the *Ticani* movement not only for being ignorant traitors (as they put it) but also for rebelling against the secular principles of the Republic (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 23.07.1951 p.264, 273). The party endorsed a perception that emphasized that the defense of Atatürk meant the defense of the nation against the invocation of reactionism.²³⁰ In this context, the DP's main incentive was summarized

²²⁹ The CHP softened its secularist policies and aimed at gathering the votes of this community in the 1950 Elections as well. Kemal Pilavoğlu, the leader of the *Ticani* movement was also a CHP candidate that was not eligible to run in the 1950 Elections. For details, see: Kurtuluş Kayalı. 2005. *Ordu ve Siyaset: 27 Mayıs - 12 Mart*. İstanbul: İletişim, 60.

²³⁰ Not only the DP's adherence to Atatürk and his reforms but also the organic relations between the CHP and the *Ticanis*, especially the leader of this movement, Kemal Pilavoğlu, might have led the DP to take serious action for the protection of Atatürk's memory.

as follows: “this law served as a precious proof that we are ready to rear up against all threats that aim for our Republic and reforms” (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 23.07.1951: 262)

In a similar vein, the DP completed Atatürk’s mausoleum complex (*Anıtkabir*) as an indicator of its loyalty to Atatürk’s memory as well (Jenkins, 2008:120; Bayar, 1969:123). The DP leaders frequently declared their respect and faithfulness to Atatürk in various contexts. Indeed, Bayar suggested that one of the fundamental principles of the DP founders was the advocacy for Atatürk’s reforms (1969:40). Thus, the DP reassured their definite standpoint with respect to Atatürk and secularism.

5.2.1.2.3. Malatya Incident

In the beginning of the 1950s, Ahmet Emin Yalman, the editor of *Vatan* Newspaper published several articles accusing the DP of encouraging anti-secular movements. The Islamic press of those days, such as *Büyük Doğu*²³¹ and *Serdengeçti*²³², regularly charged Yalman with being anti-religious. Hüseyin Üzmez, a young high-school student, attempted to assassinate Yalman on November 22, 1952 and injured him. In his investigation, Üzmez declared that Yalman intended to destroy his faith with the use of the Islamic periodicals including *Büyük Doğu* and *Serdengeçti* (Azak, 2010:85-3). The press, Kemalist circles and even the DP interpreted this incident as the invocation of

²³¹ A periodical published by Necip Fazıl Kısakürek.

²³² A periodical published by Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti, from the MP.

reactionary Islam.²³³ The DP acted cautiously in this process and defended secularism aggressively against the violence that originates from far-religious orientations.

In the aftermath of this incident, the government was considerably concerned about Yalman and mobilized state resources immediately for his recovery (*Milliyet*, 23.11.1952). Menderes, then the Prime Minister along with some of the members of cabinet visited Yalman several times at the hospital while Celal Bayar, the then President, paid a visit to *Vatan* to give his warm wishes (*Milliyet*, 24.11.1952). On this assassination attempt, Menderes declared that “[m]en of thought and men of politics could not be intimidated by guns. We are capable of dashing the heads of those into pieces who ventured this.” In the immediate aftermath of this failed assassination, Fehmi Ustaoglu was expelled from the DP due to his anti-secular thoughts published in *Büyük Cihad* (Eroglu, 2003:132; Zürcher, 2004:246). Thus, the DP reaffirmed its distance not only from violent Islamic movements but also from endeavors intending to renounce the path to secularism.

On the one hand, the Islamic far-rightist intellectuals criticized the government’s concern about this issue; on the other hand, the CHP accused the DP of being a secret supporter of religious obscurantism. In the face of such criticism, the DP decisively pursued its moderate secular standpoint and strived to prevent any abuse of the principle of the freedom of conscience.

²³³ This incident raised concerns more than the *Ticani* movement as Azak quotes from Belli that “[w]hile *Ticanis* formed a crowd comprised of ignorant and illiterate peasants (*cahil tabakadan ve okur-yazar olmayan bir köylü kütlesi*), the leading actors of the last event were famous intellectuals” (Azak, 2010: 99). Therefore, one can argue that, even as early as that point, the content of anti-secular thought had started to take shape.

5.2.1.2.4. Setting the Limits against Religiously Oriented Institutions and Publications

The DP governments had incurred no harm in limiting religiously oriented opposition activities on two grounds. First of all, the DP not only remained within its legal boundaries but also considered itself as the protector of secularism. Secondly, the DP pragmatically eliminated the political opposition that might gain the support of the conservatives of which the DP itself was in pursuit. In this respect, instead of rigid precautions, the DP preferred to restrict the activities of the opposition parties. For instance, the government did not allow the Congress of Islam to be held in Istanbul, which was proposed by Nuri Demirağ, the then leader of the National Development Party (*Milli Kalkınma Partisi*- the MKP) (*Milliyet*, 28.04.1953). Similarly, Demirağ's suggestion to bring together all the imams of the villages in Istanbul to celebrate the anniversary of the conquest of Istanbul was rejected by the DP government (*Milliyet*, 28.04.1953). The adamant supporter of the pro-religious MP, Kırşehir, was degraded to a town, which might also be considered an anti-democratic move by the DP. Burçak notes that behind this action laid the perception, shared by Bayar and the forerunners of the DP, that the demotion of Kırşehir was due to the fact that it was considered a focal point for reactionary thoughts (1998:224). Actually, the reactionism was only a pretext for the DP, which was indeed in pursuit of revenge on this city because it did not support the DP in the elections. Furthermore, the DP mobilized police forces during the burial of a religious sheik, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan in Fatih Mosque (Yavuz, 2003:62; Çakır,

1989:130). Similarly, the interment ceremony of Said Nursi had not been brought to Ankara due to the restrictive rules of the DP governments (Yavuz, 2003:62).²³⁴

Moreover, several Islamist institutions and publications were closed down in the name of the protection of secularism. One of the most significant examples was obviously the closure of the MP that had deployed Islamist rhetoric from time to time. Founded in 1948, the MP gathered 3.1 percent votes in the 1950 Elections, which amounted to only one seat in the parliament. The MP provided a more conservative option in the political realm, yet it was an efficient opposition in the parliament far beyond the parliamentary arithmetic. The party often made its presence felt in the Assembly meetings by harshly challenging the DP. After the 5th National Congress of the party in 1953, some of the party members under the leadership of Hikmet Bayur left the party to distance themselves from the ones that were considered against the reforms and principles of Atatürk. Given the claim that the dominant pro-Islamist group in the party toyed with reactionary thoughts in order to enhance the political support of the party, this reformist group declared that:

We proposed to underline the equality of woman, not to turn to the Arabic letters, not to open the dervish lodges and not to play with religion for political purposes in the party program, which was refused in the congress. This was an open indicator of the direction that the party moves to. (*Milliyet*, 30.06.1953)

An investigation had been carried out in light of these accusations, and after a short period of time, on July 8, 1953 the political activities of the MP became prohibited while more than 2,000 local organizations of the party were closed down (Jenkins,

²³⁴ Nonetheless, Yavuz also notes that contrary to the official approach of the government, some of the DP deputies participated in the funeral of Nursi (2003:62).

2008:120). Within a month, the party formally ceased to exist leaving behind suspicions about the reliability of evidence (Eroğul, 2003:128-2; Burçak, 1998:136-2). The CHP criticized the government for treating the issue in an oversimplified manner. The DP defended the punishment of the MP by pointing to its dangerous character with respect to the security of the country and by equating its reactionary activities with communism equating them with threats to the peace of the country (*Milliyet*, 08.07.1953; 15.07.1953). In the same group meeting, Menderes underlined that they were not against religion, but they could not have allowed political activities that created anarchy and chaos in the country (*Milliyet*, 08.07.1953). Actually, the closure of the MP was a result of the strong opposition put forth by the MP against the DP in the Assembly especially in regards to the salient talent of its leader, Osman Bölükbaşı, in the art of oratory skills rather than the reactionary potential of the party.

A similar attitude was observed with respect to the closure of Islamist associations and periodicals. Especially after the Malatya Incident, the DP acted increasingly oppressive towards Islamists. In that regard, the Association of Nationalists (*Milliyetçiler Derneği*) was closed down for its ultra-nationalist orientations along with some pro-Islamist tendencies such as advocating compulsory veiling of Turkish women (Azak, 2010:90).

As a summary of the closure of the Islamist periodicals, on March 3, 1953 in his address to journalists, Menderes stated that:

Periodicals, such as *Sebilürreşat*, *Ehli Sünnet*, *İslam Yolu*, *Allah Yolu* had also published rightist articles. We have closed these newspapers down as well and sued those who were liable for them. Since, in our country, no religious faith and belief has been subject to degeneration, all parties should join together and not use religion for the sake of politics (...) Hunting for

votes by taking this sacred matter in one's hands would lead the country into a disaster. (Aydemir, 1976:388)

To provide a clear legal ground against pro-Islamist enterprises, the DP enacted the “Law on the Protection of the Freedom of Conscience and Assembly” on July 27, 1953 as a complementary item to the Article 163 of the Penal Code that called for one to five years of hard labor to whoever uses religion for political, personal and commercial interests (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 23.07.1953; Jenkins, 2008:120).

In short, the DP drew a line in the sand between the pro-Islamist groups and itself. Despite this fact, this action was taken not only because the party thought that the pro-Islamist groups were largely acting against secularism and the regime but also because the DP was concerned that these groups' opposition might hurt the party. In this respect, the DP did not abstain from expelling the Islamist members from the party. Against the opposition's accusations directed at the DP of supporting reactionary activities, the party strove to maintain its moderate standpoint. For instance, Ali Rıza Fırat, the son of the Sheikh Sait, wanted to become a candidate for the deputyship from the DP, and the party forerunners endeavored to convince him not to do so (Burçak, 1998:195-3).

In fact, the party sought to remain within the limits of secularism even at the expense of breaking the hearts of its hardliners. For instance, in face of the demand raised by Fahri Ağaoğlu, the then deputy from Konya, to add the following clause to the Constitution: “the religion of the Turkish Republic is Islam,” Menderes responded that “[a]s a farmer coming from Aydın, I would approve this [clause], but I could not endorse this as the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey. I could not run counter to millions of people” (Bozdağ, 2004:113-4). As was seen in this example, the DP not only preferred to hold

the line on its pragmatic approach when it came to secularism and remained within the boundaries of the regime but also endeavored to appear as a religion-friendly party to a large extent. The shift experienced by the party from pro-religious policies to a defense of secularism, from sponsorship of the pro-Islamist press to the closure of them, might be explained with respect to its pragmatism. Öymen also underlines that Menderes never moved far away from the Secularism principle throughout his political career (Öymen, 2013:225). Last but not least, as Hale and Özbudun succinctly note “[a]mong the many charges that were leveled against the DP leaders when they were put on trial by the subsequent military regime in 1960-61, resulting in the execution of Menderes and two of his cabinet colleagues, trying to destroy secularism was not included” (2010: xix), which clearly confirms the system-friendly approach of the DP.

5.2.2. Secularism from the Perspective of the AP

The DP preferred a passive version of secularism when faced with the assertive one promoted by the CHP. In fact, the military intervention of 1960 did not bring about a frankly controversial agenda against religion, which was evident in the fact that the DP was not accused of eroding the secular functions of the state. Despite certain rumors about the intentions of the military elites to take measures against religious practices--such as re-adjusting the language of the call for prayer (*azan*) to Turkish--these rumors turned out to be groundless. According to Ahmad (1977: 376), this military intervention did not amount to an overtly inimical position against religion, yet it signaled movement

towards a new viewpoint that emphasized the “anti-liberal, anti-radical and anti-socialist dimensions” of religion to bring forth the national and progressive image of Islam in order to integrate religion into the prevailing order. Therefore, unlike Kemalist efforts to remove religion from the public sphere completely, this time, various efforts at rendering religion compatible with the system were attempted. Thus, the AP not only followed a similar path to that of the DP when it came to secularism but also it had to take steps in a very differing contextual framework as well. In this respect, it will be useful to analyze how the AP preferred to approach secularism with an eye to its pro-religious and pro-secularist policies along with its related discourses.

Similar to other center-right parties in Turkey, the AP embodied various standpoints stretching from conservatives to liberals and Islamists to secularists. Nonetheless, the party mainly preferred to remain within the limits of the system during the term of Gümüşpala as well as after the defeat of the more conservative Bilgiç group by Demirel. Thus, the AP under the leadership of Demirel perceived religion as a kind of cultural glue tolerating and utilizing it in the public realm to assuage peripheral sensitivities. Broadly speaking, the AP elites were neither as Islamist as the National Outlook Movement nor as secularist as the Kemalist elites. They mainly tried to find a middle ground between secularism and religion. In this sense, Demirel stated that the balance between religion and secularism can only be found *via* the AP owing to its tolerance and unique way of thinking in relation to both concepts (Demirel, 1973:57). All at once, the AP not only situated itself in the relatively passive wing regarding secularism but also managed not to disregard religion by way of such a self-poising. Hence, it will be beneficial to analyze the perspective of the AP on secularism under two headings:

firstly, the pro-religious policies and the related discourses of the party and, secondly, its pro-secular policies and related discourses.

5.2.2.1. The Pro-Religious Policies and Discourses of the AP

While the DP paved the way for the active participation of the periphery, the AP was adept at maintaining the standpoint of the DP. AP's understanding of secularism was shaped around such a perspective as well. In that regard, the AP opposed to the CHP's assertive secularism promoted in the name of the regime. In the account of Demirel "the regime is not solely the concern of a few privileged person; it is a national concern about which the nation should decide" (Demirel, 1973:231). The top-to-down compulsory secularization project enforced by the CHP was also criticized by the AP as follows: "people are not against change. If the nation rejects something, it is mainly because it is not well-explained or such a change is not beneficial for the nation" (Demirel, 1973:36). Thus, the AP was against the attempts of cultural engineering "for the nation, despite the nation". Like the DP, the AP underlined that secularism was not to be interpreted as a controversial stance against religion or impiety in its party program. Therefore, in the account of the AP, the state should respect religious beliefs and practices of its citizens. The AP set an example for the succeeding right wing parties by asserting that secularism pursued by the state was not the same with that of the people by drawing a line in between institutionalism and individualist versions of secularism (AP Parti Programı, 1969: Article 10²³⁵).

²³⁵ This point was stressed in the first party program (Article 8) as well.

Especially after CHP's inclination towards left in mid-1960s, the AP began to use religion as a trump card more efficiently. Until January 26, 1970 when the National Order Party (hereinafter, the MSP) was founded under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, the AP was the most available party to voice pro-religious demands. In this regard, the pro-religious policies of the AP might be summarized under three sections: its embracement of religion as a part of local culture, its contribution both to the nationwide proliferation of religious institutions, and to the perception of communism as a threat to religion.

5.2.2.1.1. Religion as a Vital Component of Local Culture

The AP elites with relatively rural backgrounds displayed religious features such as dependency to religio-cultural codes, religious conservatism and the *gemeinschaft* of cultural stratification (Demirel, 2004:97; Jenkins, 2008:131). In the eyes of the educated urban groups, the AP elites were the representatives of “the masses who were under the influence of religio-traditional values, and for this reason, who were distant to science, incompetent to govern, unfamiliar or even evil to the Republican living style” (Demirel, 2004:91). The AP, being aware of such degrading evaluations by the upper-classes, benefited from the gap formed between the differing value systems of the center and the periphery. The AP tended to put forth a self-confident image especially in 1960s, presenting itself to be proud of not only the backgrounds, but also the religio-cultural codes of its elites.

Coming from a relatively more traditional family in which religious rituals were exercised, Süleyman Demirel as the leader of the AP played an important role in the perception of religion as a cultural component within his personal experiences. Demirel has learned how to recite Qur'an from his grandmother when he was a child (Arat in Heper and Sayari, 2002:8). His father and some of his relatives visited Said Nursi, the leader of the *Nurcu* Movement periodically (Demirel, 2004:100). When he became the Prime Minister of Turkey, he continued to attend Friday prayers in Hacı Bayram Mosque (Demirel, 2004:187) reminding similar practices of the DP elites. The Ramadan dinners (*iftar*) were organized at the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (hereinafter, TBMM) during AP's term. The AP politicians attended parochial religio-social events as well. In this respect, the party did not approve the assertive secularism promoted by the CHP that endeavored to demarcate religious practices. For instance, in the first great AP convention, some of its members disapproved the criticism of the CHP directed at the AP for being reactionary. They stated that "how come the ones that visit the house of God, the mosque are reactionary while the ones that restrain them from doing so are progressive?" (*Milliyet*, 02.12.1962) Thus, the AP rejected the claim of a dichotomy between religion and progress. One of the main differences between the AP and the CHP stemmed from the fact that the former did not recognize a dilemma between religion - perceived as a cultural code- and modernization - conceived from an engineer's point of view as prospects for mechanical and material advancements. In the account of the AP, one could be religious and modern at the same time. These were not dichotomous standings. One could follow the lead of Western science and technique while keeping up with the religio-traditional culture at the same time. Indeed, Demirel represented himself as a concurrent example of the co-existence of modernity and

national authenticity (Karpas, 1972:364; Demirel, 2004:41). In order to defend authenticity, Demirel argued that “one cannot be civilized by rejecting the basic authentic values (...) [by doing so] one can only become an imitator, cheater” (1973:37). By the same token, justifying religion as cultural cement, he underlined that “the societies without genuine values could not be considered as nations” (Demirel, 1973:35; 37) with the premise of capable of being nation is very significant. Demirel also noted that “the most advanced nations of the world today are not atheists. They keep the [doors of] their churches and temples wide open and attending them is not considered as a fault or a defect” (Demirel, 1973:57). Hence, the party clearly set its position against an enlightened understanding of modernization that envisaged religion and modernity apart.

Such efforts at normalizing religion and considering it as a vital component of national culture and vernacular life went hand in glove with certain symbolic religious references as well. For instance, Said Nursi –the leader of the *Nurcu* movement- pointed out to ‘İslamköy’ as a unique place to raise a prominent figure for the sake of religion (Gezici, 2006:138-3). Said Nursi probably indicated to another man of religion brought up in that village, ‘İslamköy’ that memorized Qur’an. However, it was also Demirel’s place of birth and he skillfully made use of such an indication for attracting votes of the *Nurcu* Movement (Gezici, 2006:138-3). Similarly, Demirel harshly criticized restraints on religio-cultural practices. For instance, the prohibition of rain prayer commonly performed by peasants to get rich harvest became a source of conflict between the AP and the CHP (Demirel, 2004:185). The former stressed that rather than being a religious practice, the rain prayer had socio-cultural implications in Turkey. Evident in such

examples, the AP commonly emphasized the cultural side of religion while making use of its symbolic aspects as well.

5.2.2.1.2. The Proliferation of Religious Institutions

As stated above, the regime promoted by the military intervention of May 27 preserved the basic secularist principles set forth in the constitution and intended to tame religion in line with the standpoint of the state. In this context, on the one hand, the AP was faced with a state that aimed to control religion instead of completely removing it from the public sphere. On the other hand, the AP, in relatively good terms with state authorities pushed through its pro-religious policies and led to the nationwide proliferation of religious institutions with a special emphasis on education.

Religious education became one of the main themes that frequently appeared in the programs of the AP governments. One of the first signals of this concern with religious education was evident in a booklet published in 1963, where the necessity to support institutions that educate the men of religion in technical and financial terms was underlined (*AP Hükümet Buhranı Karşısında*, 1963:23). The importance of educating the men of religion and the significance of increasing their living standards were stressed not only in the first government program of the AP, but also in the subsequent electoral campaigns.

Right before the AP came to power, a new law (numbered 633) was enacted to rearrange the scope and the function of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, endowing it with a duty ‘to enlighten’ the society in order to strengthen the control of state institutions on

religion. With reference to this law that aimed at establishing state monopoly on Sunni Islam, only the students graduated from the Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools (Religious Vocational High Schools- *İmam Hatip Okulları*) were given the opportunity to be considered official men of religion while those raised within Sufi orders were ineligible for such posts (Jenkins, 2008:127). The AP embraced and eagerly enforced this law starting from the very first government program (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 03.11.1965:77-2).

In this context, at the time, the Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools were envisaged as stretching boards in creating a new generation that would be both religious and intellectual. Such an emphasis was also put forth throughout the term of DP, yet the AP stressed the significance of these schools as a counter-act against the leftist youth on the rise. Accordingly, the AP founded 46 new Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools during its single party government terms between 1965 and 1971 (Çakır *et al.*, 2004; Cizre Sakallıoğlu, 1996b:239). At the time of 1971 Memorandum, these schools were transformed into vocational schools, unique only with respect to their religious functions and the secondary schools contained within them were closed down. Thus, the status of Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools was downgraded to a more or less second-class high school unlike their previously prominent position. When the students of the religious vocational high schools were granted the right to enter the university exam and the secondary schools within them were reopened, the coalition formed by the CHP and the MSP endeavored to prevent these developments.²³⁶ During the coalitions of the

²³⁶ It is worth noting that, the assertive secularist position of the CHP diminished under the leadership of Ecevit to a significant extent. Indeed, Ecevit saw no harm in forming a coalition with the pro-Islamist party, the MNP and in opening up further religious vocational high schools in 1970s. According to Ahmad, behind this shift in CHP's standpoint regarding assertive secularism was an attempt to "neutralize

National Front, the AP further established 230 religious vocational high schools (Çakır at al. 2004:15). In 1976, girls have been admitted in these schools as well. Right before the Coup of 1980, the number of students that had been educated in these schools has reached to 178 000, which was approximately 48 000 back in 1970 (Çakır at al. 2004:64). The governments under the leadership of Demirel were determined to support these schools and they played crucial roles in such a striking increase.

The number of Qur'an courses during the term of AP boosted as well. The number of these courses teaching how to recite Qur'an along with elicit religious curriculum was increased to 786 from 434 in 1971. In the wake of the Coup of 1980, this number rose up to 2385 owing to the incentives of the National Front (Akyürek, 2004:191). Furthermore, the Qur'an courses considered complementary alternatives to secular education were offered in the form of summer courses throughout the term of AP as well.

By the same token, the number of Theology Faculties and Islamic institutes that enabled many students to take religious education was on the rise as well. The anti-communist generals that came to power following the Coup of May 27 did not prefer to hold back this proliferation of religious institutions since they also thought that the rise of socialism in Turkey was much more dangerous than that of political Islam. Hence, the AP had a more convenient setting for implementing its pro-religious policies compared to that of the DP. Moreover, the prevailing left-right tension at secular schools rendered

religion as a factor in politics" (Ahmad, 1977: 378). However, the leftist tendencies of Ecevit enabled the AP - which presented socialism as a synonym to infidelity - to position the CHP within the Socialist wing.

the religiously-oriented schools more preferable in the eyes of parents owing to their relatively non-polarized and secure atmosphere.

In line with its program (Article 65), the AP constructed further mosques and repaired old ones within the framework of pork-barrel grants to please its electorates. During the electoral campaigns, the party particularly stressed its services to religion in order to convert these services to votes. For instance, during the electoral campaign of 1969, a booklet entitled as “the Religious and Spiritual Services of the AP” (*Adalet Partisi’nin Dini ve Manevi Hizmetleri*) was published, where the party highlighted its contributions to religion.

Furthermore, the visibility of religious symbols and Islamic communities has risen to a certain extent during the terms of the AP (Demirel, 2004:191). By way of explicit collaboration in particular with the *Nurcus*²³⁷ (Yavuz, 2003: 65; Jenkins, 2008:128; Zürcher, 2004:251; Cizre and Sakallıoğlu, 1996b:240) and *Süleymancıs* (Demirel, 2004: 52), the AP cultivated the electoral support of these groups with the exception of 1973 Elections. As a matter of fact, the AP allocated certain bureaucratic posts to particular religious groups. For instance, the leader of *Süleymancıs*, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan’s son-in-law Kemal Kaçar was elected as a member of the parliament from the AP (Demirel, 2004: 53). The leftist high-ranked bureaucrats were also replaced by more conservative ones. One of the most apparent changes in this regard was the replacement

²³⁷ Following the 1966 Elections, *Nurcus* faded into the political arena and became more visible. Infact, İnönü related the defeat of CHP in the partial Senate Elections in 1966 with this development as follows: “the frequency of *Nurcus*’ [visibility was] more than expected and their support for the government led to this result” (Milliyet, 06.06.1966).

of İsmail Cem,²³⁸ then the director of the Turkish Radio and Television with Nevzat Yalçıntaş.²³⁹

Thus, by establishing further religious institutions and forming cooperative relations with particular religious communities, the AP not only rallied the support of conservative masses, but also expanded its electoral basis. All in all, during the term of AP, the number of religious institutions boosted to a significant extent while especially during the terms of the National Front governments, certain bureaucratic posts were reserved for religiously-oriented figures.

5.2.2.1.3. The AP Discourse on Communism: as a ‘Threat’ to Religion

One of the most pronounced policy and discourse of the AP in 1970s was the explicit enmity towards socialist thoughts. The AP deliberately contributed to the antagonist perception of masses regarding leftist inclinations as a threat to religion. Indeed, AP’s pro-religious policies depended on an anti-socialist rhetoric accompanied by a symbolic association of religion with the right. By making use of the motto of “we are at the right of center and on the path of God” (*Ortanın sağındayız, Allahın yolundayız*), the AP explicitly associated the leftist worldview with a symbolically non-religious orientation (Ahmad, 1977:377).

Feyzullah Değerli, an AP deputy, not only asserted that “communism considers the proliferation of atheism as a public service and hence rejects the freedom of conscience

²³⁸ Later on, İsmail Cem was not only elected as a deputy from leftist parties and served as a minister, but also formed his own party.

²³⁹ Nevzat Yalçıntaş was subsequently elected as a deputy from far-Islamist parties.

and freedom of religion” (Demirel, 1973:164), but also remarked during the 1977 electoral campaign that “in 16th and 17th verses of Qur’an, the left and the right are clearly defined. In the account of Qur’an, the ones that believe in God and have faith are on the right; while the ones that deny God and his verses are on the left. Accordingly, none of the Muslims can say that he is leftist. A person cannot be a Muslim and a leftist at the same time” (Demirel, 2004:194). In a similar vein, Demirel stated during the 1965 electoral campaign that “communism will not prevail in Turkey because 98 per cent of our population is Muslim” (Ahmad, 1977:191). Moreover, employing a similar anti-socialist and religio-nationalist discourse, the AP made common cause with the Association for the Struggle against Communism (*Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği*, hereinafter KMD), whose number of branches along with its influence have increased to a significant extent during the term of AP (Jenkins, 2008: 129).

Without doubt, one of the main reasons behind AP’s emphasis on religion was its struggle against communism. Identifying religion as a significant component of right-wing ideology, the AP aimed at driving a wedge between conservative masses and leftist parties. Especially with the emergence of the National Front as a right-wing coalition, the AP pronounced its rightist proclivities more frequently. It is worth noting that the workers began to draw closer to the CHP, especially in 1970s as a result of Turkey’s urbanization and industrialization. Indeed, researches indicated to the fact that the workers that dwelled in the slums of the metropolis and supported the AP in the Elections of 1965 and 1969, began to favor the CHP in the Elections of 1973. Özbudun discerns a shift here, from a focus on the center-periphery cleavage based on value-based issues to a functional one (Özbudun, 1976). In face of such a shift, the AP - the

party of big businessmen, tradesmen, peasants, industrialists and artisans - tried to impede such functionalization of voter alignments and emphasized the dichotomy of religion versus socialism in order to convince workers *via* religio-cultural values in favor of the AP.

5.2.2.2. The Pro-Secular Policies and Discourses of the AP

Sharing the well-known feature of the Turkish center-right, the AP preferred to remain within the boundaries of the system as well. In that regard, the preservation of the secularist principle usually remained as a blueprint in the Turkish state structure. Despite flirting with religious emblems, groups and institutions, the AP, aware of state's sensitivities, never intended to challenge the secularist principle of the regime. It tried to act within the limits presumed by the elites of May 27 that not only distinguished between the two forms of Islam, namely a regime-oriented Islam and a reactionary one, but also promoted the former against the latter. Yet it is worth stressing that prior to the establishment of the National Order Party in 1970, the pro-Islamist groups considered the AP as their safe haven as well. Demirel, as a moderate leader, usually resisted conservative members of the party²⁴⁰ in order to put the religious tone to the back burner in late 1960s, while at the same time he did not give up on making public use of religious discourse. In 1970s, despite taking part in a coalition with the MSP, the AP distanced itself from pro-Islamist inclinations. The pro-religious policies of the AP were

²⁴⁰ Some of the conservative members of the party, such as Osman Turan and Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti did not think highly of Demirel, considering him a freemason (Ahmad, 1977:232). These figures did not stay within the AP for long and transferred to far-nationalist and far-Islamists parties.

far from challenging secularism defined by the mainstream orientation and they also take a dual form, namely a discourse in front of the public and a discourse in front of the state elites. Cizre argues that “[i]n fact, this double discourse probably constituted a firmer guarantee for long-term stability, because it satisfied the aspirations of both the hardline Kemalist secularist camp and the provincial-rural periphery that formed the safe support base of the JP [AP]” (Cizre Sakallıoğlu, 1996b:240). Thus, the AP did not run counter to the mainstream understanding of secularism.

In the party program (Article 9), along with the superstition (*hurafe*), the religious separatism constituted the main impediments that block the nation in its quest for catching up with the modern world. The AP set its limits against superstitions by endeavoring to melt religion and rationalism in the same pot as well. In the first government program, rather than an impediment in front of religious practices, secularism was presented as their insurance. It was underlined that “(...) the Constitution envisaged a state that is national, democratic, secular, social and respectful to the rule of law. The main duty of the executive is to govern harmoniously...it was to neither prioritize, nor violate any of these principles” (*Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi*, 03.11.1965 p.20). In the subsequent government programs, the frequency of references to secularism was decreased. For instance, in the first government program of the National Front, the principle to pay regards to secularism was mentioned only in relation to national education. In the second National Front government programme, any reference was given to the secularism principle. Here, the difference lied behind the other coalition partners’ position rather than the AP’s stance towards secularism.

Atatürk remained as a respected figure in the policies and discourses of the AP and the AP looked out for official rules and procedures. Unlike the DP that usually referred to Atatürk and his ideals, the AP managed to abstain from the glorification of Atatürk without challenging his personality or ideals. In this context, Demirel states that “[i]n Turkey, there are people who aim to wear down Atatürk. We never accept [such tendency]. It is possible to wear Atatürk down not only by criticizing, but also by glorifying him” (Demirel, 1973: 66). Contrary to the CHP that attributed almost a sacred status to Atatürk, Demirel not only criticized the excessive articulation of the principles of Atatürk, but also the interventions of May 27 and March 12 in the name of these principles as if they were of first priority even with respect to the Constitution (Demirel, 1975:15). In this respect, the AP projected a right-wing Kemalism by emphasizing mainly the nationalist aspects of Atatürk’s thought. Demirel remarked that “the ones that despise national values cannot comprehend Atatürk” (Demirel, 1973:299). Put differently, the AP portrayed Atatürk as a national hero, who overtly emphasized national values. Cizre (1993: 41) therefore notes that the party did not get along well with Kemalists, yet it did so without being anti-Kemalist owing to the new version of Atatürkism it offered that rested on authenticity. Demirel indeed asserted that “the Turkish nation has never objected to the principle of secularism. What put the nation to inconvenience was its firm Kemalist application” (*Milliyet*, 28.11.1966) through accusing Kemalists –as the assertive secularists- rather than the secularism maintained by Atatürk himself.

Besides the above-mentioned appropriation of Atatürk, the AP also did not maintain coherent relations with figures from the Islamic far-right. To remind, the ones who were

opposed to the cultural revolution enforced by the secularist regime in the name of Islamic references found their safe haven in the AP prior to the rise of political Islam (Demirel, 2004:51). Nonetheless, Necmettin Erbakan - well-known with his Islamic credentials as well as illiberal economic perspective - highlighted the differences between the center-right and the Islamic far-right in Turkey. Erbakan, being the president of the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (hereinafter the TOBB), was not welcomed by the AP and considerable pressure exerted by the party resulted in his resignation (Demirel, 2004:54-2). Demirel did not allow Erbakan to be nominated as AP's candidate for Konya as well. As a consequence, the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi* – the MNP) was founded on January 26, 1970 by Erbakan. The MNP, as a pro-Islamist party, pledged to end some environmental activities (Ahmad 1977: 383) as well as to abolish all forms of birth control (Jenkins, 2008: 131).

The institutionalization of political Islam with the emergence of the MNP made the differences between the center-right and the Islamic far-right even more apparent. The AP and other center-right parties opposed to pro-Islamists pledges, especially with respect to those related with everyday practices, such as the closure of secular institutions and the prohibition of non-Islamic practices. Demirel posited that despite the fact that the principle of freedom of conscience was enforced by the AP in Turkey, some radical elements, dissatisfied with the present state of this principle put forth demands for a more religious order, ironically within an atmosphere already provided by the AP in the first place (Demirel, 1973:57). Put differently, in the account of Demirel, the radical elements should have been thankful to the AP as they have found the opportunity to voice their demands as a result of the religious freedoms introduced by the AP.

It was not only the Islamic far-right that came into conflict with the AP about religious matters. The religio-nationalist wing criticized the AP for emphasizing the materialist aspects of development while ignoring the spiritual ones as well. For example, Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti criticized the AP for not transforming the Hagia Sophia into a mosque and for not providing extensive cadres to the Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools etc. (Demirel, 2004: 56).

What the center-right parties demanded was to a large extent the liberalization of the religious realm by lifting the ban on the visibility of Islamic practices while preserving the basic tenets of the regime, including that of secularism.²⁴¹ Probably, for this very reason, the 1971 Military Intervention led to the closure of the MNP, while the AP remained open.²⁴² Nevertheless, the strengthening of the political Islam pushed the AP to a more central position as it has gradually lost its influence on certain religious communities. In conclusion, the AP preferred a less passive version of secularism compared to that of the CHP which was obviously still far from religion's complete independence from the state and vice versa. As Demirel clearly indicated to the fact that an unchecked religious life-style could possibly threaten the secularist order (Demirel, 2004:188, Cizre and Sakallıoğlu, 1996b:240), he has implicitly acknowledged the mission of the state to bring religion under control as well.²⁴³

²⁴¹ Needless to say, the religious freedoms referred here were to a significant degree limited to the practices of Sunni Islam, rather than comprehensive religious liberties.

²⁴² Özbudun states that “[t]he 1961 Constitution, the most liberal constitution that Turkey had ever had, was no exception in this regard, for it banned communist and religious propaganda and parties as well as activities deemed dangerous to the unity of the nation and the territorial integrity of the state” (in Özbudun and Weiner, 1987:354) which rendered the discourses of the MNP unconstitutional.

²⁴³ For detailed information on Demirel's pro-secular account about what differentiates the AP from the MHP and the MNP, see: Tanel Demirel, 2004, p. 60.

5.2.3. Secularism from the Perspective of ANAP

The standpoint of the regime on religion and secularism evolved to a certain extent with respect to the changes in the Constitution and in the social dynamics. The regime, not only regarded secularism as one of the most important tenets of the Turkish Republic, but also given shape by the new Constitution it perceived religion as one of the integrative categories of the nation to be led by the state. In this context, the Directorate of Religious Affairs was rendered accountable to the office of Prime Minister in order to provide religious services (Article 136) under state control and to decrease social polarizations prevalent in the society. Interestingly, in the publications led by the military in early 1980s, the main elements of the national culture appeared as family, mosque and military and this time Atatürk was portrayed as a pious Muslim that struggled to rule out obscurantism, rather than religion, itself (Jenkins, 2008:142). Thus, according to the new state ideology, religion controlled and approved by the state gained significance. Better-said, on the one hand, the new regime aimed at instrumentalizing religion to establish social peace; on the other hand, it intended to set certain limits to define religion in line with the secularist principle. Furthermore, making use of religion for political purposes as well as its exploitation and abuse was banned in Article 24. This led to a variety of interpretations about which actions to be considered as an abuse or exploitation. In this respect, the regime, not only had the means to easily suppress and limit various religious practices and expressions, but also to put aside the civilian and

pluralistic interpretation of religions other than that of the official version introduced by the state.

In an atmosphere, where the state-led Sunni Islam was considered as one of the most usable keys to open all the doors in order to overcome political violence and social unrest, the ANAP was careful in positioning itself *vis-a-vis* the secularist principle asserted by the state. Like other center-right parties, the ANAP preferred a secularist path passive than the dominant state ideology that included both pro-religious and pro-secular tendencies at the same time. The pro-religious predilections of the ANAP contained not only the liberation of Islam by rendering it visible in the public sphere, but also the promotion of the emergence of ‘Islamic Calvinism,’ a religio-economic position referring to the co-existence of wealth and piety all at once. The pro-secular standpoint of the ANAP was apparent in the promotion of secular and modern images as well as clearly differentiating ANAP from the Islamic far-right.

5.2.3.1. The Pro-Religious Policies of ANAP

5.2.3.1.1. The Liberation of Islam: Visibility in the Public Sphere

Perhaps the most telling example of the pro-religious disposition of the ANAP was Turgut Özal’s religious credentials reaching beyond his predecessors, Demirel and Menderes. Özal’s father was trained in a Muslim theological school (*Medrese*) and he was well-versed in Islam (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:13). On the one hand, Özal grew up in conservative Central and Eastern Anatolian cities, such as Kayseri and Malatya and learned basic religious rituals from his parents; on the other hand, as the son of two

government employees, he comprehended the assertive secularist inclinations of the state and the Kemalist mission of modernization very well ever since his childhood (Barlas, 1994:84). Put differently, Özal, not only maintained a religious life on a personal level, but also developed awareness on the importance of being accredited by the official ideology.

He began to pray five times a day and attended rituals of certain religious communities when he was an undergraduate.²⁴⁴ Özal was among the founders of a conservative student association along with his brother, Korkut Özal, entitled as the Istanbul Technical University Student Union (Birand and Yalçın, 2009: 19). Özal and his brothers protested the funeral of Fevzi Çakmak - a conservative soldier, who was considered to be not respected adequately by the state (Birand and Yalçın, 2009: 21, 543) as well. This was indeed an event with respect to which even the DP sided with the CHP. When Özal brothers were working at the State Planning Organization, they were called upon as the “clogged brothers” (*Takunyalı Kardeşler*) since they wore clogs when they performed ablution before praying. Özal was also nominated for the religiously-oriented MSP deputyship from İzmir in 1977, but he could not be elected. Nevertheless, the main reason behind such nomination was not the ideological affinity between Özal and the Islamic far-right. Rather, it was Özal’s pragmatism that saw no harm in being a candidate from a religiously-oriented party.

He was the first Prime Minister that went on a pilgrimage to Mecca. Furthermore, his brothers Yusuf Özal and Korkut Özal, his cousin Hüsnü Doğan and the ANAP minister

²⁴⁴ Comparing Turgut Özal and Tayyip Erdoğan, Heper stressed the completely secular education of the former. For details, See: Metin Heper. 2013. “Islam, Conservatism, and Democracy in Turkey: Comparing Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,” *Insight Turkey*15(2): 141-156.

Ekrem Pakdemirli had connections with the *Nakshibendis* (Cemal, 1989:17). Özal's mother was also inspired by *Nakshibendi* order and she was buried next to Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku's grave by way of a special decree (Cemal, 1989:158). Apart from personal relations, the governments of the ANAP provided convenient ground for religious communities to express themselves. Due to the abolition of Article 163, the representation of Islamic inclinations in the political and social realms gained impetus as well. The ANAP also abolished the ban on Fethullah Gülen's preaching (Heper, 2013:143). At the time, not only the number, but also the scope of Islamic publications was on the rise. This was not a unilateral affiliation. Beginning from 1983 Elections, the *Nakshibendis* and many other religious communities supported the ANAP *vis-a-vis* Islamic far-right.

All in all, the doze of the religious motives of Özal and similar protagonists in the party was a little bit more than that of the previous center-right figures. With its pro-religious policies what the ANAP introduced was undoubtedly the relative increase in the visibility of religious symbols and identities – to a large extent, those of Sunni Islam - in state institutions as well as in the streets. For instance, as the Prime Minister and later the President, Özal went to Friday prayers like Demirel has done, began to give Ramadan dinners (*iftar*) to the cabinet, the press and various interest groups, shared his photographs during his pilgrimage with the public and so on. By the same token, when his son Efe married a non-Muslim girl, Sibel Boronkay, he demanded her conversion to Islam and publicized this ceremony (Birand and Yalçın, 2009: 244-2).

Considering many figures in the ANAP that had no hesitation in expressing their religious identities and given the relatively liberal atmosphere in the public sphere, one

can discern that the religious identities gained ground and started to be represented more frequently at the time. In this context, a chronic source of conflict prevalent in Turkish politics, namely the ‘headscarf dispute’ began to be more pronounced in 1980s. On this topic, the ANAP usually endeavored to soften the assertive approach of the state by considering the issue as a restriction of freedom, rather than a threat to the secular order. Özal criticized the ban on headscarf as he considered state’s dictation of a certain dressing style as an undemocratic reaction (Cemal, 1989:161). On the other hand, the center tended to perceive the issue not only as an abuse of liberties, but also as a threat to the prevailing secular state structure. The Council of Higher Education (*Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu*, hereinafter, the YÖK) decreed to ban headscarves in universities in 1982, which was then rearranged and the ban was removed in 1984. Nevertheless, Kenan Evren, the President was not content with this rearrangement and it was banned again in 1987. Subsequently, the government under the leadership of Özal enacted a law for lifting the ban on the headscarf, yet it was vetoed by Evren once again. The same law re-enforced in 1988 was sent to the Constitutional Court by Evren and was annulled in 1989 (Aksoy, 2005:167-6).

The main reason behind such an oscillation regarding the laws on the use of headscarves in universities was to a large extent rested on the differing approaches of the ANAP (passive) and the center (assertive) on secularism, which led to a considerable polarization in institutional and social realms. For instance, the Rectors’ Council decided to gradually lift the ban on headscarves in 1987 (Özdalga, 1998:54). The Council of State made decisions on behalf of liberties instead of secularist principles contrary to those of the Constitutional Court that favored assertive secularism’s ban on

headscarves (Özdalga 1998:58). Nonetheless, framing the ANAP as an ardent advocate of headscarves would be an incomplete analysis since this advocacy raised certain reservations about the popular support behind the party. For instance, Semra Özal and considered the disappointing outcome of 1989 Local Elections, in which the popular support behind the ANAP dramatically decreased to less than 22 per cent, as a result of the ambiguous stance of the ANAP on the 'headscarf dispute.' Yet others, such as Korkut Özal and Yusuf Özal, did not agree with them since in their account, the Turkish nation was conservative and the sympathetic stance of the ANAP did not lead to any negative response at all (Cemal, 1989:13). In a nutshell, on the one hand, the ANAP had run counter to the official state ideology by considering the 'headscarf issue' an individual liberty; on the other hand, there were many in the party that did not feel comfortable with such a standpoint and considered it among the reasons of the failure in the local elections.

In a similar vein to the AP, an embracement of the Ottoman past by the ANAP was discerned at the time as well. The day of Istanbul's conquest was started to be celebrated in 1985. Along with a foreign policy discourse that emphasized certain traits of history common with the countries from Middle East, Caucasus and the Balkans, Turgut Özal frequently referred to the Ottoman heritage, which paved the way for the forthcoming neo-Ottomanism of 1990s that later was merged with Islamic incentives. The Kemalist emphasis on the cleavages between the Ancient Regime and the Republican Turkey thus was put on the back burner during the term of ANAP, which instead recognized a line of continuity between the Ottoman era and the Republican Turkey. Unlike its predecessors, the ANAP under the leadership of Özal gave up on recurrently referring to Atatürk and

did not make very much use of, in Çakır's words (1990), the "Kemalist mask" to be accredited by the state.

Despite introducing a notably liberal agenda, in some cases, the ANAP was not in pursuit of diminishing the role of the state as many were not convinced about the impartiality of its policies as it seemed to intend establishing a form of morality based on religious education. For instance, its broadening of the scope of "the bill on the protection of children from obscene publications" (*küçükleri muzır neşriyattan koruma yasası*) to seek scientific (*ilmi*) value in publications (*Milliyet*, 31.05.1986) was interpreted as an example, where the ANAP had taken side with the protection of religio-cultural values *vis-a-vis* the so-called 'harmful' publications.

Like the previous center-right parties, the ANAP maintained its emphasis on the necessity of religious education as well. In its first government program, in order to educate a 'level-headed' generation, Özal underlined "...the indispensability of carrying out both the material and spiritual development (...). For doing so, the state should take measures to give religious education in primary and secondary schools. We do not consider secularism as a restricting force hindering spirituality. Instead, it is the application of the freedom of conscience, the practice of religion and the improvement of the religious culture" (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 19.12.1983: 67). On a parallel front, in comparison with other vocational schools, the number of Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools were on the rise during the rule of the ANAP, whose students concentrated on entering the administrative branches of universities. Cemal notes that 40 per cent of the students in the Public Administration departments of the universities were coming from these schools in 1988 (Cemal, 1989:168). On the other hand, Vehbi Dinçerler, ANAP's

first Minister of Education, was ousted from office due to his conservative remarks on the clothing of high-school girls during the celebrations of May 19 (Birand and Yalçın, 2009: 260). Similarly, in the eyes of secular circles, the public debates of Metin Emiroğlu - another Minister of Education - on the evolution theory or on the status of the courses on Philosophy for the students of Science and Mathematics (e.g. Cemal, 1989:165) were considered as examples of pro-religious predilections of the ANAP.

All in all, one can discern a considerable rise in the availability of religious education, the visibility of religious symbols and the religious debates including official figures during the terms of the ANAP. In the meantime, the assertive secularists tended to interpret any event directly or indirectly related with religion as a proof of ANAP's pro-religious tendencies in order to wear down its legitimacy which still did not make ANAP a religiously oriented party. Instead, although Özal's ANAP did not decrease the state's role on religious education, ANAP could also be considered as a quite passive secularist party who never projected the repression of religion.

5.2.3.1.2. The Promotion of Islamic Calvinism

The sanctimony of the ANAP that grew out of the dichotomy of religion *versus* science reminds us the previous center-right parties in Turkey, which did not envisage a world based on religious rules. They rather tended to consider religion as a personal and cultural matter that neither slow down, nor hinder development and progress. Compared to the rest of the center-right parties, the ANAP under the leadership of Özal had taken it a step further by endeavoring to put forth a theoretical explanation for the amalgamation

of Islam and the economic development through a viable free market economy. In other words, the ANAP helped spreading the idea of what might be called as “Islamic Calvinism” in Turkey.

Özal frankly described the effects of religion on himself as follows: “Having faith in God with great passion is a significant element of healthy societies. I find it beneficial to teach religious principles. However, this should neither lead to an opposition to innovation, nor isolation from the world...research, reasoning and discussion should prevail” (Barlas, 1994:85). In reading out the first government program of the ANAP, Özal stated that “the conservatism of the ANAP is an expression of its bond not only with our national, spiritual and moral values, but also with our culture and traditions. It is the preservation of good, beautiful and precious values” while underlining that the government formed by the ANAP would not be against progress and innovation (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 19.12.1983: 65). Thus, the ANAP under the leadership of Özal did not perceive religion as a complete and ultimate guide for designing everyday life. Rather, it displayed a general motivation for the reconciliation of religion and progress.

Özal mainly tried to seek a collaborative middle ground for Turkey in between the Western and the Islamic worlds, by clearly rejecting the dichotomy between the two. As a pragmatic actor, he efficiently made use of religion as a trump card in order to form economic cooperation with other Muslim countries, rather than to pursue a path for the unification of the Islamic world. Indeed, what differentiated the ANAP from the rest of the Islamic far-right parties was the priority given to the economic concerns rather than the religio-ideological projections. On the other hand, as an ardent supporter of Turkey’s entrance to the European Community, he stated that “[w]hen I was asked by a foreign

journalist whether I had any difficulty in envisaging Turkish membership in a Christian Community, I answered that all religions teach mankind to be good and to do good. In this respect all three of the great monotheistic religions are sisters... The correct reading of history could point to the fact that Islam is not totally alien to the West” (Özal, 1991:283-2). Having indicated to the non-dichotomous relation between the West and Islam, he also underlined that the duality created between reason and religion does not exist in reality. In line with his understanding of Islam, he raised the following question: “How was it possible for Arabs to reconcile faith and reason, whereas the rational upsurge has been achieved in the West at the expense of faith and in conflict with the Church?” (Özal, 1991:286)

Hence, like its predecessors, the ANAP promoted a rational and modern version of religion, which did not inherently challenge notions such as Westernization, progress, science and reason on material and technical grounds. The ANAP was eager to make use of religion both as cultural cement and a form of morality to motivate people to work, earn and invest. For doing so, Özal stressed the necessity of modernizing and reinterpreting religion within various public debates (Yazıcıoğlu in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:209; Aral in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:223).

In the account of Özal, the free market economy was compatible with Islam. Hasan Cemal points out to the significance of *Naksibendis* on Özal’s religious vision that tolerated wealth and private accumulation (1989:154-2). In this respect, Özal often quoted the following *hadith*, “poverty is almost a curse” (*fakirlik neredeyse bir küfürdür*) (Cemal, 1989:158). Thus, Özal strived to harmonize Islam with private accumulation. On the other hand, the governments formed by the ANAP began to

introduce an appropriate institutional structure to facilitate the inclusion of pious entrepreneurs into the economy. For instance, the required institutional amendments enforced to establish interest-free financial institutions paved the way for *Al Baraka* and *Faisal Finans* to take their places in the financial markets of Turkey. As Yayla observes, this seemingly simple incentive had impacts reaching far beyond the economic sphere. The ANAP intended not only to integrate the economic system of Turkey into the world economy, but also to include passive investments of those people who did not want to work with casual banks into the economy successfully (Yayla in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:433). Furthermore, Özal often invited a group of Anatolian businessmen to accompany him in his visits to foreign countries. Businessmen with religio-traditional behavioral patterns also wanted to earn more and under the leadership of Özal, they indeed began to do so by producing goods for well-known brands, such as Levi's. Small Anatolian cities, such as Denizli, Kayseri and Konya began to get involved in the operations of world economy by adapting their production processes and by reaching out for the global quality standards in particular sectors, such as textile. The concept of "Anatolian Tigers"²⁴⁵ referred mainly to the businessmen with religio-traditional affiliations whose share in the economy dramatically increased, rather than those modern big capital owners of Istanbul and Ankara.

In a nutshell, the ANAP exerted efforts to reconcile the West and Islamic World. Having rejected the dichotomy of reason *versus* religion, Özal not only grasped the significance of religion in the everyday lives of people, but also endeavored to relate that with

²⁴⁵ Undoubtly, this concept has been inspired by "Asian Tigers" that was coined with reference to the emerging markets of East Asian countries.

people's work ethics. As a pragmatic actor, he extended chances to conservative investors and paved the way for the rise of Islamic capital, which later gained impetus in line with the rise of political Islam.²⁴⁶ It is worth noting however that the ANAP formulated Calvinist Islam not for the political rise of Islam, but for the sake of economic development, progress and social cohesion.

5.2.3.2. Pro-Secularist Approach of the ANAP

Despite its positive approach to religion, the ANAP never intended to run counter to the secular structure of the state following the footsteps of the preceding center-right parties. Özal's emphasis on the peaceful co-existence of modern and religious was clearly echoed in the policies of the ANAP. Özal often stressed that he was proud of the secular system Turkey (Özal, 1991:281). Heper indeed confirms that "[d]espite the fact that he increasingly sought Allah's help and direction, his primary means to realize his goals remained secular" (Heper, 2013:142).

Additionally, Özal was a defender of secularism as evident in his following remarks: "Turkey has never abandoned secularism" and "[o]ne of the fundamental indicators of Turkey's European character is that we have a secular society" (Özal, 1991:296, 281). Nevertheless, in light of the lessons drawn by the experiences of previous center-right parties, he envisaged a more passive secularism. He aimed to give more visibility to religious elements not only in the society, but also in the state by arguing that integrating

²⁴⁶ It would be inadequate to frame this issue only with respect to the economical aspect. On the emergence of Islamic middle class since the term of the ANAP under the leadership of Özal and the development of democracy in Turkey, See: Ergun Özbudun. 2005. The Role of the Middle Class in the Emergence and Consolidation of a Democratic Civil Society. *Ankara Law Review*. 2(2): 95-107.

religion with the everyday practices should not be considered as a source of threat. In this regard, Özal made references to the American way of passive secularism. “During Bush’s oath-taking ceremony, first of all, the priest prayed and the American nation as a whole listened to that prayer on their televisions. When the priest was praying, Bush bent his head over...put his hand on the Bible...There were two Bibles in the ceremony; the one that he brought...and the one that the judge brought. During the oath his wife kept the one that he brought by” (Özal, 1989:159-2). Özal’s detailed description of the ceremony revealed the fact that he was clearly charmed by the passive version of secularism, drawing parallels from the American case. Indeed, by pointing out to the status of the priest in Western countries, Özal even asked Evren to improve the status of the Directorate of Religious Affairs’ Chief in state protocol, though his suggestion was rejected by Evren (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:226). In Özal’s view, such arrangements - only contradicted with the militant version of secularism - did not do away with secularism; to the contrary, they justified the separation of religion from state affairs. For Özal, only the states could be secular, not the people (Yazıcıoğlu in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:205). Therefore, according to him, the religious affiliations would not cause any trouble if the people would behave impartial when it comes to state affairs. Yayla notes that Özal had not refrained from expressing his religious affiliations, yet he has never obsessively emphasized them as well. Thus, he underlined that in a democratic system, religious identities should not be considered as an advantage or a disadvantage (Yayla in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:440).

In that regard, there were a significant number of secularist figures in and around the party assuring that the ANAP remained as a system-oriented party, counterposing Özal’s

very religious brothers, cousins and several other leading figures, such as Mehmet Keçeciler. Beyond any doubt, the most effective among these balancing figures was Semra Özal - Özal's wife - who was surely more than a passive first-lady. Despite Turgut Özal's religious credentials, the Özals as a couple - going out to night clubs, dancing and listening to Western music and publicly consuming alcohol - were not hesitant to demonstrate that they embraced Western life-styles as well. Not to mention her modern outlook with blonde hair, polished nails, low necked blouses, Semra Özal was fairly aware of her crucial place as evident in her following statement: "If a conservative was in my shoes, the atmosphere in Turkey would be absolutely different. For instance, women would be more hesitant in wearing mini skirts" (Cemal, 1989:142; *Nokta*, 30.10.1989: 44). Furthermore, she was mostly skeptical about the conservative ministers of the ANAP, such as Mehmet Keçeciler and strived to minimize their influence in the party. Thus, to a large extent, neither most of the assertive secularists, nor those adopted a secular life-style were uncomfortable with the standpoint of the ANAP.²⁴⁷

Moreover, judging from the images of Özal family's everyday lives along with those of other protagonists of the party, it is possible to consider many practices of the ANAP as secular, which clearly distinguished the party from the Islamic far-right options. For example, liberating the interest rates by taking them out of state control led to their legitimation in the existing economic structure. Moreover, the government formed by

²⁴⁷ This was an issue that revealed the prevalent public perceptions on the separating line in between the center-right and the Islamic far-right. For instance, prior to the victory of the religiously-oriented Welfare Party (hereinafter, the RP) in the Local Elections of 1994, Hülya Avşar, a well-known celebrity in Turkey, declared that she was sorry for her fans since she would either have to wear black veil or leave the country if the RP had triumphed. The RP never intended to force women to wear black veil, but the public perceptions about the intentions of the party was sharp as such. At this point, even if 'the threat' was not realistic, 'the anxiety' about the threat was.

the ANAP introduced abortion operations in all public hospitals in January, 1984 (*Milliyet*, 07.01.1984). This move could be considered as a clear indication of the differences between the ANAP and the Islamic far-right in Turkey as well as the mainstream center-right approaches in the world that ANAP portrayed a more liberal stance.

The Özal family played a crucial role in hindering the proclivities towards conservatism in the ANAP by supporting the leadership of Mesut Yılmaz that succeeded Akbulut, after Özal was elected the President. Yılmaz indeed shortly moved from passive secularism to a more assertive one in face of the rise of political Islam in Turkey. Coming from an upper-class family with center-right inclinations, a graduate of prestigious and secular schools, such as Istanbul High School and the Faculty of Political Science, Yılmaz who worked his way up in the ANAP by becoming its leader and then the Prime Minister of Turkey, advocated the standards of the European Union (Çınar and Özbudun in Heper and Sayari, 2002: 182-3). Despite the influence of Özal over the Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut well-known for his conservative affiliations, Mesut Yılmaz gained the support of the General Congress in 1991 with the help of Semra Özal and assumed the leadership of the party. Throughout his presidency and following the split between the conservatives and the liberals, Özal kept his distance from the nationalist and Islamist wing in the party, called upon as the “Holy Alliance” and promoted the liberal wing led by Yılmaz (Zürcher, 2004:287). The leadership of Yılmaz was crucial for designating the main axis and the version of secularism. Though he could not maintain the electoral success of Özal and the ANAP had taken part in coalition governments with other center-right and center-left parties during 1990s, the

party sustained its distance from the Islamic far-right. During the February 28 Process (the military memorandum), such a distance was notably crystallized and the ANAP, unlike the other center-right party - the True Path Party (hereinafter, the DYP) – put forth a more assertive secularism as it supported not only the closure of the RP, but also the punishment of its members. Indeed, right before this event, Yılmaz not only complained about the shift in the direction of Turkey from West to East under the rule of the coalition formed by the RP and the DYP, but also stated that they could not support those that challenged the fundamental principles of the Republic (*Milliyet*, 09.02.1997). In this respect, Yılmaz differentiated the standpoint of the ANAP from the other center-right party, the DYP and encouraged the involvement of military undoubtedly by calling upon those that were in charge of providing the state security (*Sabah*, 21.09.1996). Moreover, following the February 28 Process, Yılmaz, then the Prime Minister, embarked on an eight years long compulsory education, which led to the closure of the secondary schools of the Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools. At the time, the students of those schools were also not allowed to equally apply for universities except from the departments of Theology²⁴⁸. At this point, one can discern a loud and clear shift in the policies of the ANAP, which grew away from not only the passive secularism but also the populist center-right tradition that had always endeavored to establish and popularize these schools all around the country in order to please the masses. In a similar vein, the ANAP (Yılmaz-Ecevit Cindoruk) coalition government enforced bans on headscarves all around the country and the university students, who resisted the ban were suspended.

²⁴⁸ The coefficient of Prayer Leader and Prayer School students for applying any department (except from the Theology) designated as 0,2 whilst the coefficient for the other high school students was 0,5 which created a huge gap between the vocational schools and high schools. For details, See Ayşegül Aybar. “ÖSS’de Derece Yapan İmam-Hatipliler,” *Zaman*. 27.07.2009. .

The coalition government guided by the military pinned down not only the NGOs hand in glove with the RP, but also the Islamic capital and media (e.g.: *Milliyet*, 25.05.1998). This was followed by the displacement of Islamist individuals from the army, bureaucracy and universities. Such moves on part of the ANAP signaled to a version of secularism rather different than that envisaged by Özal, who had not only strived to attract Muslim entrepreneurs and increase the amount of private accumulation regardless of Islamic origin, but also to tolerate religious practices including the use of headscarves and to promote the plurality of NGO activities etc. With respect to the changing circumstances owing to the rise of the Islamic far-right, the ANAP under the leadership of Yılmaz situated itself at the “center” with a more assertive secularist vision.

5.3. Conclusion

All in all, secularism was one of the most distinguishing features of the Turkish center-right, which was well situated in between the assertive secularism promoted by the center and the religion-based demands of the Islamic far-right. In the account of the Turkish center-right, on the one hand, the state system is undoubtedly secular and this should not be challenged. On the other hand, religion as a personal matter as well as cultural cement should be visible in the society. In that regard, center-right parties not only put forth religious discourses as ordinary means, but also their prominent figures attended religious rituals without labeling religion as a threat to the unity of the state. Furthermore, the center-right parties did not tolerate political action that envisaged a world order based on religious principles. Thus, sometimes the center-right parties saw

no harm in punishing those political Islamists that remained marginal to a large extent. Nonetheless, the striking rise of political Islam in 1990s has quite challenged the prevalent conditions of the system and the ANAP preferred to take its side next to the “center,” dominated by the military, the Constitutional Court and the rest of the bureaucracy, while the other center-right party, the DYP gave preference to the superiority of the National Assembly and collaborated with the RP. The traditional center-right actors disappeared in the extremely “fragmented, polarized and volatile” climate of the country (Özbudun, 2000), not to mention the economic crisis and the claims on corruption. The ANAP was put away owing to its partial responsibility in the policies which have suppressed religion in the aftermath of February 28 Process. Interestingly, the DYP was also punished by the electorates partially as it has engaged in a pro-Islamic government before the February 28 Process but mainly due to its bad performance in economics. On the other hand, the National Outlook, as the transformer of the political Islam in Turkey, has also been divided into two wings: traditionalists and innovationists where the former set forth a relatively rigid agenda, the latter favored a more compromising, soft and balanced strategy. The innovators founded the Justice and Development Party (the AK Party), which neither rejected the visibility of religion and religious practices, nor projected a religion-based political system. In other words, when it comes to the tension between religion and secularism, the AK Party put forth a typical center-right standpoint, evident in its preference of passive secularism, yet it did so with a relatively more religious image and rhetoric.

On the whole, the tension between the center and the periphery addressed in the previous chapters on democracy and state was also carried on with respect to secularism.

On secularism, the center-right parties have run counter to assertive secularism promoted by the state and the CHP. When the center-right parties drew near to the militant secularist wing or to the Islamic far-right – at least by forming strong collaborations with them – their public support has been on the wane. With regard to the elections of 1961 and 1973, Özbudun argues that “the party system was most fractionalized when the conservative votes were fragmented, and consequently no party was able to obtain an absolute majority” (Özbudun in Weiner and Özbudun, 1987:345). This mainly put a light on the prevalent fragmentation in Turkish politics throughout 1990s. In this context, the AK Party, capable of rallying conservative votes in 2000s, sustained the notions of center-right such as procedural democracy, love and hate relationship with the state and passive secularism.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The left-right spectrum--is it still relevant in accounting for the contemporary political experiences? There are a variety of responses to this particular question. Despite substantial transformations, various political parties and politicians are still observed to position themselves and their rivals within the confines of this spectrum and it seems to be valid in the case of Turkey as well.

In light of the prevailing connotations, one can discern three main accounts of the left and right positions. The first tradition stemmed from the political experiences of the French Revolution. In this regard, while the left emphasized values such as equality, freedom and secularism; the right stressed tradition, religion, the preservation of religious-traditional institutions and hierarchy. The second account was derived from a socio-economic perspective on society and politics that explained related issues in terms of social classes and economic dynamics. In view of this perspective, the left advocated certain rights for workers and campaigned for social policies of the state endowed with a central role in economic regulations. The right, on the other hand, was depicted as embracing the principles of the market economy, such as competition, and envisaging minimum state intervention in economics. With the emergence of various social problems and the waning of socialism around the world, new criteria for distinguishing

left and right positions appeared to revolve around materialist versus post-materialist standpoints. With regards to this third account, while the new left started to emphasize post-materialist issues including sexual orientation, xenophobia, abortion, ecological concerns and everything in between; the new right stressed materialist concerns such as inflation, unemployment, economic growth, crime rates, the GDP etc. In this context, the conceptualizations of the left and right positions are far from being monolithic, static and universally agreed upon. At the same time, despite the complexity of their connotations, the above-mentioned accounts still come in handy in mapping out the contemporary political terrain even though their explanatory potential with regards to the patterns of ‘naked reality’ is open to question.

The case of Turkey demands a closer scrutiny concerning these conceptualizations of the left and right positions. This research points out the fact that the Turkish case regarding the left and the right cleavage is far from being easily framed within such a global conceptualization despite containing some particular overlapping points with the three main explanations of the left and the right. One should also take into account the variations within the left and right standpoints in order to have a full grasp of the issue at hand. The distinctive lines between the center-left, the center-right and the far-right (either nationalist or Islamic) require our attention as well. The differentials between these variations seem to speak to the self-positioning of various actors. For instance, on several issues, the far-right proved to have more common ground with the center-left, rather than the center-right. Indeed, the literature focusing on the left and right division, to a large extent, disregards this fact and does not separately focus on these differentials adequately or concentrate on the Islamic or nationalist right when they refer to the right.

Despite the fact that the center-right has dominated the multi-party era for decades—thanks to its successive electoral triumphs, it has not been subjected to a comprehensive academic study. It is more than likely that such neglect not only stemmed from a lack of intellectual interest on this particular subject, but also it was supported by a general predilection to underestimate the pragmatic and non-ideological stance of the center-right. In this respect, without dispensing with its sincere and objective approach, this dissertation strives to fill this gap in the related literature by analyzing the discourses and policies of the Turkish center-right in light of three guiding parameters: democracy, state and secularism. Better-said, this dissertation endeavors to examine the characteristics of and the transformations within the center-right tradition in Turkey with respect to three major facets of the issue that are significant for understanding Turkish politics.

This study argues that employing a procedural democracy, developing a love and hate relationship with the state and endorsing a passive secularist vision in opposition to the militant secularism are three main parameters that define and delimit the center-right mentality in Turkey with regards to domestic politics and on the level of political parties. When the center-right parties move beyond any of these three main parameters or notions, they begin to lose their center-right characteristic, which leads to a considerable loss of political support from the people as well. This study inherently suggests that there exists equilibrium in the center-right mentality in the area of substantive democracy and authoritarianism; rejecting the state on all fronts and becoming the state; and militant secularism and a religion-based state structure. The center-right parties usually and authentically do not locate in the margins and introduce

a mid-path among the radical and strict dispositions. If they oscillate from the equilibrium point to any of those margins, the center-right parties, in all actuality, do not represent “center-right” position thereafter.

Being aware of the necessity to clarify the center-right mentality in Turkey, this study focuses by closely examining these three concepts: democracy, state and secularism. Theories on democracy either emphasize procedural perceptions or stress substantive understandings of democracy. As these categories suggest, the former pays attention to democratic rules and the institutionalization of democratic processes with a particular focus on the ballot box, freedom of choice, equal franchising and so on. The latter, on the other hand, emphasizes the interests of the governed, their equality and active participation in the decision making processes, and advocating a more viable relationship between the state and the civil society. In that regard, the center-right parties in Turkey have generally highlighted the procedural understanding of democracy, struggled for the institutionalization of elections, advocated respect for the national will and opposed the privileges of state elites that might be taken advantage of. In doing so, different than the elitist image of the center-left in general, center-right parties in Turkey have been able to successfully communicate with the people and listen to their problems and demands by portraying a reachable image to the society. In contrast to these successes, these parties mainly neglected pluralistic and substantive aspects of democracy. Keeping a predilection to perceive democracy as a means rather than an end, the center-right does not much deal with promoting the democratic participation of disadvantaged groups, creating equal access to policy-making procedures, including all elements in the society or pursuing economic equality as an

outcome of a well-functioning democracy. They have not only failed to introduce a fully liberal and inclusive democratization program but also might display authoritarian affinities when they stay in power for extended periods of time. If their authoritarianism becomes more dominant than their emphasis on democracy, they begin to weaken in terms of public support.

At this point, it is necessary to recall the main features of the varying conjunctures within which these parties ruled. For instance, the DP mainly emphasized the institutionalization of the electoral system as the victim of single-party domination and unfair elections in 1946. The AP endeavored to institutionalize the basic democratic procedures leaving aside substantive aspects of democracy in the aftermath of the military intervention of 1960 and as the main addressee of the memorandum of 1971. It is possible to argue that the ANAP has taken more notice of substantive democratic concerns and tended less towards the genre of authoritarianism in comparison with previous center-right parties. The ANAP also exerted courageous efforts not only concerning religious freedoms but also in regards to the Kurdish question. Such attempts may well be considered reformist in light of the conditions of the period. Despite this fair-handedness of ANAP, she also set some limits in the face competition during the elections, which was far from being inclusive and participatory.

The center-periphery cleavage emerged as one of the most frequent themes in the discourses and policies of the center-right. From the outset, the center-right parties have claimed to represent the periphery. In this context, their relationship with the strong and autonomous state gained further importance. Criticism of the center-right parties mainly revolves around the domination of state elite in politics as well as economics, the

cumbersome functioning of the state apparatus and the irresponsive approach of the center when it comes to peripheral interests. In this regard, on the one hand, center-right parties exerted efforts to ease the existing tension between the state and the people by calling for a state that cares for its citizens, not *vice versa*. On the other hand, they endeavored to promote technocratic and loyal state employees to counter the well-established, critical bureaucracy. Despite such endeavors, only minor steps were taken in liberalizing and minimizing the state apparatus up until the tenure of the ANAP. The ANAP, in contrast, not only tried to transform the state apparatus radically, but also managed to minimize the involvement state in economics.

All in all, the relations between the center-right parties and the state may well be described as a love and hate relationship. In spite of the above-mentioned criticisms, the center-right parties in Turkey pragmatically laid a claim for state power and privileges. What is more, in extraordinary circumstances--such as the memorandum in 1971 or the process carried out on February 28--these parties could not sustain their authentic positions even on discursive grounds and contended with limited maneuvering spaces. In this respect, the role of various interventions extrinsic to the civilian realm in designating the course of Turkish politics should be taken into account when analyzing the center-right's drift towards the state, such as that of the AP in the 1970s and the ANAP in the late 1990s. Rather than considering such fluctuations as erroneous calculations of the center-right, it is better to interlink them with the extraordinary conditions of the period during which these parties moved beyond the center-right's love and hate equilibrium by falling in line with the status quo of the ruling center. As

suggested in this dissertation, such a move towards the embrace of state to that extent begins to locate these parties outside the traditionally defined center-right stance.

While the state and the center-left enforced an assertive and repressive version of secularism in general, the center-right pursued a passive version of secularism that proved to be more tolerant when it came to the visibility of religious practices. Even so, the center-right parties in Turkey were prudent in keeping the Islamic far-right at arm's length and have never intended to challenge the secularist principles of the state. Since the elites of the DP and the CHP came from similar backgrounds and had comparable standpoints on religion as well as the fact that the DP had taken to the political stage quite early (in the very aftermath of the militant secularist actions of the state) the DP did not differ much from the center-left in comparison to the subsequent center-right parties except from some considerable gestures that it performed to please the people. The AP on the other hand perceived religion as a kind of cultural cement that galvanized support for the AP; therefore, the AP utilized a local religious discourse to communicate with the people. The AP was also eager to encourage collaborations with religious groups: they supported religious education and promoted the individuals who took advantage of such an education, which was seen as a counterforce against Communism. Nevertheless, the position of the AP regarding respect for the secular character of the state was still valid akin to other center-right parties. In fact, it was during the tenure of the ANAP, led by Özal, when Islamic demands alongside various other particularistic demands began to become more pronounced and acquired visibility in the public sphere. In this context, the process of February 28 designed to retard the activity of Islamic politics led to the re-structuring of Turkish politics. In the course of this polarization, the

assertive nature of demands raised not only by pro-Islamists, but also by militant secularists alienated the electorates of the center-right parties. The ANAP in the 28 February process preferred not to take a stand against the suppression of religion. Similarly, the 27 April 2007 e-memorandum process was not protested by the small center-right parties, which bahished these center-right parties from their passive secularist stance.

Theory up to this point does not account for the stark reality in its entirety: the center-right in Turkey does not fit completely into only one of the above-mentioned accounts of the left and right positions, yet, it incorporates overtones from all three accounts. The discourses and policies of center-right parties in Turkey have displayed strong linkages, continuity and similarity when it comes to democracy, state and secularism. Such uniformity may help us arrive at a typology of the center-right in Turkey. To account for the variations among their performances, pragmatic approaches unique to each party along with their dissimilar yet delimiting conjunctures should be taken into consideration. In this work's analysis, the three parties examined in this dissertation (the DP, the AP and the ANAP) strived for the institutionalization and internalization of procedural democracy, for the moderation of state authority and for the liberation of religion by normalizing its visibility in the public sphere while remaining within the confines of the regime.

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