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AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON PARTY SWITCHING IN TURKEY

A MASTER'S THESIS

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKP :	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
ANAP :	Anavatan Partisi
BDP:	Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi
CHP:	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
DSP:	Demokratik Sol Parti
DTP:	Demokratik Toplum Partisi
DYP:	Doğru Yol Partisi
FP:	Fazilet Partisi
HDP:	Halkın Demokrasi Partisi
HEP:	Halkın Emek Partisi
HP:	Halkçı Parti
MÇP:	Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi
MDP:	Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi
RP:	Refah Partisi
SHP:	Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti
SODEP:	Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi
SP:	Saadet Partisi
TGNA:	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TÜİK:	Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu
YSK:	Yüksek Seçim Kurulu
YTP:	Yeni Türkiye Partisi

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RÉSUMÉ

Dans cette étude, les explications théoriques liées au comportement de changement de partis ont été testées en utilisant les données électorales 1983-2015 pour la Turquie. Après avoir revu les explications théoriques et les études empiriques antécédents, les motivations principales qui conduisent au changement de parti sont déterminées et les causes qui affectent le comportement de changement de parti des politiciens dans la Grande Assemblée nationale turque sont étudiées. Dans ce contexte, l'estimation LOGIT et la méthode de survie paramétrique sont utilisées pour estimer les motivations de changement de parti.

Contrairement à l'argument selon lequel le changement de partis est très répandu, dans les pays où l'institutionnalisation du système de la démocratie et des partis est incomplète et les règles électorales ne sont pas appliquées avec précision, les comportements de changement de partis sont également observés dans les pays où les règles démocratiques sont bien adoptées par l'environnement politique et les agents. Les études empiriques liées au changement de parti incluent non seulement les études de cas sur le Brésil (Desposato, 2006; Desposato, 2009; Mainwaring, 1990) et la Turquie (Turan, 1985; Turan, 2005; Sayari, 2017), mais aussi l'Italie (Heller et Mershon, 2005, Heller et Mershon, 2008, Heller et Mershon, 2009) et le Japon (Kato et Yamamoto, 2008, Kato, 2005). Il existe un nombre limité de travaux concernant le changement de parti en Turquie, une analyse plus récente et plus complète nous permettra de mieux comprendre le comportement des politiciens en Turquie.

Les racines théoriques de l'étude sont basées sur la théorie de l'ambition de Black (1972), le modèle d'affiliation au parti d'Aldrich et Bianco (1992) et le modèle de comportement du parti de Muller et Strome (1999). La théorie de Black suppose que, tout au long de leur vie politique, les politiciens font face à trois alternatives qui sont sortir de la vie politique, chercher un bureau supérieur et chercher à se réélectionner et, tout en choisissant parmi ces alternatives, ils se comportent rationnellement. Après l'hypothèse de la rationalité politique du Black, Aldrich et Bianco ont présenté un modèle formel de calcul de la candidature et ont proposé que les politiciens choisissent leur affiliation au parti en calculant la situation, ce qui maximise leur perspective de réélection. Le modèle de changement de partis de Muller et Strome a créé une nouvelle perspective pour le comportement inter-électoral des politiciens en incluant la motivation de la recherche politique comme une dimension pour la préférence des partis politiques. En outre, Laver et Benoit (2003) ont contribué à l'étude de changement de partis en analysant le concept dans une perspective de jeu évolutionniste.

Dans le deuxième chapitre de notre étude, nous définissons largement le concept de changement de parti ainsi que les théories et les modèles qui tiennent compte des comportements de changement de partis. Ensuite, nous discutons les conséquences de changement de partis.

La définition pionnière de changement de partis a été donnée par Heller et Mershon (2008), en soulignant «... toute modification enregistrée de l'affiliation au parti d'un politicien détenant ou en compétition pour un bureau électif», portant cette définition un peu plus loin, Pinto (2015) a défini le concept comme «toute modification enregistrée dans l'affiliation au parti d'un homme politique occupant un bureau électif qui n'est pas le produit de règles parlementaires ou d'un acte de coordination entre les partis». Dans cette étude, nous nous sommes inspirés des deux.

Les études théoriques et empiriques ont abordé le concept de changement de parti dans deux perspectives différentes. La première branche a étudié le changement de parti en tant qu'un choix individuel et stratégique venant de l'idée que les politiciens sont ambitieux et principalement induits par trois motivations. Le modèle de comportement du parti de Muller et Strome a fourni un cadre théorique utile pour l'étude de changement de parti. Si l'on exclut toutes les variables exogènes, on suppose que les politiciens prennent la décision d'affiliation après avoir pris en compte trois motivations. Ces motivations sont la motivation de recherche d'office, la motivation de la recherche de vote et la motivation de recherche de politiques.

Selon la deuxième branche de la littérature, les politiciens sont affectés par des facteurs institutionnels. La différence dans les règles électorales, l'institutionnalisation de la démocratie, les systèmes des partis et la concurrence électorale affectent également le parti auquel un politicien serait affilié. Par exemple, Desposato et Scheiner (2008) ont conclu que dans les milieux politiques axés sur les avantages d'office, la différence dans le niveau de contrôle des ressources i.e. si le contrôle des ressources est centralisé ou pas, affecte les stratégies de carrière des politiciens. La différence dans le niveau de contrôle des ressources a un effet significatif sur la carrière des politiciens, la part de vote des partis, la formation de la coalition et l'affiliation aux partis politiques.

De plus, des études récentes sur le changement de partis ont inclus l'effet de temps sur le changement de partis. Mershon et Shvetsova (2005) ont divisé le cycle parlementaire en étapes clés qui incitent les politiciens rationnels à changer de partis.

Le changement de parti a entraîné plusieurs conséquences. Du point de vue des électeurs, la mobilité des partis pourrait être considérée comme suspecte et pourrait être perçue comme une trahison pour la décision de vote de l'électorat. Dans une étude existante, Grose et Yoshinaka (2003) ont construit des hypothèses pour les coûts liés aux élections et testés contre les données américaines de 1947 à 2000. Ils ont proposé que le changement de parti est susceptible d'affecter toutes les élections après le changement également (hypothèse d'effet moyen), ii) affecter uniquement les prochaines élections après le changement (hypothèse d'effet d'un coup), ou iii) disparaître de façon décroissante (hypothèse d'effet d'escompte). Les auteurs trouvent des preuves supportant l'effet des coûts liés au changement de partis en concluant que, en particulier lors des élections générales, l'électorat punit les politiciens à long terme.

Le troisième chapitre de l'étude présente nos hypothèses. La littérature existante nous fournit diverses hypothèses sur le comportement de changement de partis. À la suite de ces études et du cadre général mentionné ci-dessus, nos principales hypothèses ont été construites comme étant i) La probabilité de changement est plus faible pour les politiciens qui sont membres des partis au pouvoir; ii) La probabilité de changement est plus faible pour les politiciens qui sont membres de partis plus grands iii) la probabilité de changement est plus faible pour les politiciens qui sont membres des partis dans lesquels ils maximisent leurs perspectives de réélection; iv) les périodes clés du cycle électoral telles que la période suivant les élections présidentielles, les négociations budgétaires et la période avant les élections, devraient augmenter le risque de changement.

Dans le quatrième chapitre, nous présentons nos données. Nous avons utilisé les données des élections 1983-2015 pour recueillir les dossiers d'affiliation de chaque député sur la base de la durée législative. Pour recueillir cette information, nous avons exploité les documents de la Grand Assemblée nationale turque. Nous avons également obtenu les données électorales de l'institut de statistique turque, le comité suprême d'élection et le ministère de la République Turque. Nous avons également utilisé l'ensemble de données de la base de données du Comparative Manifesto projet pour collecter les données des positions politiques des partis politiques. En utilisant les informations de toutes ces sources, nous avons créé un certain nombre de variables explicatives et de contrôle. Nous avons introduit des variables concernant les avantages d'office et élection comme INGOVERNMENT, PARTYSIZE, CABINET, VRD et les avantages d'idéologies comme RILEHOME et les contrôles comme MAYORSHIP, REPEATER, GENDER et SUD-EST. Pour l'analyse de survie de paramétrique, nous avons également ajouté trois variables muettes dans le modèle concernant les étapes d'un cycle législatif POSTELECTION, BUDGET et PREELECTION.

Pour l'estimation du modèle, nous avons utilisé la régression logistique et l'analyse de survie paramétrique. Le modèle de régression logistique a été développé pour mesurer l'effet d'une ou plusieurs variables indépendantes sur la probabilité d'occurrence d'un événement particulier, de nature catégorique. Le modèle de régression logistique est préféré lorsque certaines hypothèses du modèle classique de régression linéaire tels que la linéarité, la normalité et l'homoscédasticité sont violées. Dans cette situation, la régression logistique produit des résultats plus fiables. Pour cela, dans cette thèse, la décision de changement de parti en tant que variable dépendante dichotomique a été estimée en utilisant une analyse de régression LOGIT.

En outre, nous avons utilisé relativement une nouvelle technique utilisée pour analyser l'analyse de survie paramétrique. Dans la deuxième partie de notre analyse, nous utilisons l'analyse de survie paramétrique. L'analyse de survie paramétrique et nous estimons le taux de risque de changement pour chaque politicien. Comme pour la régression logistique, l'analyse de survie paramétrique utilise la méthode du maximum de vraisemblance. Cependant, l'analyse de survie paramétrique estime le risque proportionnel de l'événement en cause pour chaque individu par rapport au groupe de référence plutôt que de prédire le rapport de cote comme dans la régression logistique. Le temps jusqu'à l'apparition de l'événement (temps de survie) est important dans l'analyse de survie paramétrique.

La dernière section présente les principaux résultats de l'étude. Selon les résultats de la régression logistique combinée, le fait d'être dans un parti gouvernemental augmente la probabilité de changement de parti alors que la taille du parti dans lequel le politicien est affilié le plus, il est probable que le politicien change le moins. L'appartenance au cabinet, cependant, n'a pas d'effet significatif sur la commutation partielle. De plus, lorsque le parti auquel ils sont affiliés, les politiciens ont tendance à être moins enclins à modifier leur appartenance à un parti. En outre, le fait que la position du parti des politiciens soit plus proche de la gauche sur le spectre politique, la probabilité de changement de parti augmente. Selon les résultats de la régression logistique, la commutation partielle a un effet chronique. Un parlementaire qui change de parti est plus susceptible de changer de parti qu'un député qui n'a jamais changé de parti. Enfin, les politiciens élus de la région kurde ont tendance à changer plus que les politiciens élus d'autres régions. D'autres variables du modèle de changement de parti, il s'agit du genre et de l'expérience de la mairie n'ont pas été considérées comme ayant un effet significatif sur le comportement de changement de parti.

Dans la deuxième partie de l'analyse empirique, l'analyse de survie paramétrique a été utilisée pour l'estimation. Les résultats ne diffèrent pas beaucoup des résultats de la régression logistique, mais comprennent également l'effet du temps sur le comportement de commutation des parties.

Selon les résultats obtenus à partir de l'analyse de survie paramétrique de l'ensemble de données regroupées, le fait que le parti politique soit l'un des partis du gouvernement augmente considérablement la probabilité de changement de parti. À mesure que le parti des politiciens augmente de taille, mesuré par le nombre de sièges représentés au Parlement, le politicien tend à passer moins probable. L'appartenance au Cabinet n'a aucun effet significatif sur le changement de parti. Cependant, à mesure que la valeur des politiciens sur l'œil de son parti augmente, les politiciens ont tendance à être moins enclins à changer. Selon les résultats de l'analyse de survie paramétrique, il existe également une relation significative négative entre la position politique du parti politique et le changement de parti. Les membres du parti qui sont plus proches de la gauche sont plus susceptibles de changer. Et enfin, les politiciens élus des régions kurdes ont tendance à changer de façon. Ces résultats sont compatibles avec les estimations de régression logit. Cependant, dans l'analyse de survie, contrairement à la régression logistique, il n'y a pas de résultat significatif concernant les commutateurs répétés. L'expérience de genre et de maire n'a pas non plus d'effet sur le comportement de la partie.

Un avantage important de l'analyse de la survie paramétrique est qu'il prend en compte l'effet du chronométrage sur le comportement de commutation des parties. Les résultats de la régression de Weibull, qui sont estimés sur une base temporelle, montrent que dans les trois premiers termes législatifs couvrant les années 1983-1991, les politiciens sont plus susceptibles de changer pendant les périodes budgétaires que dans les autres périodes. Pour la période 1995-1999, 1999-2002, il a été constaté que, dans les périodes post-électorales, la commutation partielle diminue de manière significative pendant la période préélectorale, la commutation partielle augmente de façon significative. Pour la période 2007-2011, cependant, le changement de parti augmente de manière significative dans les périodes post-électorales. Selon l'estimation des données mises en commun, cependant, le risque de

risque de changement de parti diminue de manière significative pendant la période post-électorale, les politiciens ont un risque de changement plus élevé pendant les périodes préélectorales de six mois avant les prochaines élections.



ABSTRACT

In this study, the theoretical explanations related to party switching behavior have been tested using 1983-2015 election data for Turkey. Following theoretical explanations and previous empirical studies, main motivations driving party switching are determined and the causes affecting the party switching behavior of the politicians in Turkish Grand National Assembly are investigated. In this context, logit estimation and parametric survival method are used to estimate party switching motivations.

Contrary to the argument that party switching is only wide-spread where democracy and party system institutionalization is incomplete and electoral rules are not accurately applied, switching behavior is also observed in the countries where democratic rules are well-adopted by political environment and agents. Empirical studies related to party switching include not only the case studies on Brazil (Desposato, 2006; Desposato, 2009; Mainwaring, 1990) and Turkey (Turan, 1985; Turan, 2005; Sayari, 2017) but also Italy (Heller and Mershon, 2005; Heller and Mershon, 2008; Heller and Mershon, 2009) and Japan (Kato and Yamamoto, 2008; Kato, 2005). As there exists a limited number of works regarding the switching behavior in Turkey, more recent and comprehensive one will enable us to get deeper insights into the political behavior of the politicians in Turkey.

Theoretical roots of the study are based on the ambition theory of Black (1972), party affiliation model of Aldrich and Bianco (1992) and party behavior model of Muller and Strome (1999). Black's theory assumes that, throughout their political lives, politicians face with three alternatives, which are dropping from the political life, seeking higher office and seeking re-election and while choosing among these alternatives they behave rationally. Following the Black's political rationality assumption, Aldrich and Bianco introduced a formal model for calculus of candidacy and proposed that politicians choose their party affiliation by calculating the situation, which maximizes their re-election prospect. Muller and Strome's party behavior model has brought about a new perspective for the inter-electoral behavior of the politicians by including the policy-seeking motivation as a dimension for the party preference of the politicians. Additionally, Laver and Benoit (2003) contributed the party switching literature by analyzing the concept in an evolutionary game theoretical perspective.

In the second chapter of our study, we broadly define the party switching concept along with theories and models accounting for party switching behavior. Then, we mentioned the consequences of party switching.

The pioneer definition of party switching was originated by Heller and Mershon (2008), pointing out «...any recorded change in party affiliation on the part

of a politician holding or competing for elective office», Carrying this definition one step further, Pinto (2015) defined the concept as «...any recorded change in party affiliation on the part of a politician holding elective office which is not the product of parliamentary rules or of an act of coordination between parties». In this study, we inspired from both.

Theoretical and empirical studies have approached party switching concept in two different perspectives. The first branch has studied party switching as an individual and strategic choice arising from the idea that politicians are ambitious and mainly induced by three motivations. Muller and Strome's party behavior model with three motivations has provided a useful theoretical framework for the scholar studying party switching. Excluding all exogenous variables, politicians are assumed to take the decision of to which party they would affiliate after considering three motivations. These motivations are office-seeking motivation, vote-seeking motivation and policy-seeking motivation.

According to the second branch of the literature, politicians are affected by institutional factors. Difference in election rules, institutionalization of democracy, party systems and electoral competition also affect to which party a politician would affiliate. For instance, Desposato and Scheiner (2008) concluded that in pork-oriented political environments, difference in resource control level, in another word, whether the resource control is centralized or not affect the politicians' career strategies. Difference in resource control level has significant effect on career path of politicians, vote share of the parties, coalition formation and party affiliation of politicians.

Additionally, recent studies on party switching included the time effect on party switching. Mershon and Shvetsova (2005) divided the parliamentary cycle into key stages which create incentives for the rational politicians to switch.

Party switching have brought about several consequences. From the voters' perspective, party mobility might be regarded with suspicious and might be perceived as a betrayal for the voting decision of the electorate. In an extant study, Grose and Yoshika (2003) constructed hypotheses for election-related cost and tested against 1947-2000 U.S.A data. They proposed that switching of a deputy may i) affect all elections after switch equally (average effect hypothesis), ii) affect only the next election after switch (one-shot effect), or iii) diminishingly disappear (discount effect). The authors find supporting evidence for the cost-related consequence of party switching concluding that especially in the general elections, the electorate punishes the politicians in the long run.

Third chapter of the study presents our hypotheses. Extant literature provides us various postulations about party switching behavior. Following these studies and holding to general framework mentioned above, our main hypotheses were constructed as; i) The likelihood of switching is lower for politicians who are members of governing parties; ii) The likelihood of switching is lower for politicians who are members of larger parties; iii) The likelihood of switching is lower for politicians who are members of parties in which they maximize their re-election prospects; iv) Key periods in the inter-electoral phase, such as post-election, budget negotiations and pre-election, should increase the risk of switching.

In the fourth chapter, we present our data. We have used 1983-2015 election data to collect the party affiliation records of each deputy on legislative term basis. To collect this information, we exploited from the records of TGNA (Turkish Grand National Assembly). We also obtained the election data from TUIK (Turkish Statistical Institute), YSK (Supreme Committee of Election) and Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey. We also used the dataset of Manifesto Project Database to collect the data of parties' policy positions. Using the information from all these sources, we created a number of explanatory and control variables. We described the explanatory variables as INGOVERNMENT, PARTYSIZE, CABINET, VRD, RILEHOME, and the controls as MAYORSHIP, REPEATER, GENDER and SOUTHEAST. For the parametric survival analysis, we also added three time dummies into the model. These variables are POSTELECTION, BUDGET and PREELECTION.

For the model estimation, we used logistic regression and parametric survival analysis. The logistic regression model has been developed to measure the effect of one or more independent variables on the probability of occurrence for a particular event, which is categorical in nature. The logistic regression model is preferred when some of the assumptions of classical linear regression models such as linearity, normality and homoscedasticity are violated. In this situation, logistic regression produces results that are more reliable. For this, in this thesis, the decision of party switching as a dichotomous dependent variable was estimated by employing logit regression analysis.

Moreover, we used relatively a novel technique used in party switching literature. In the second part of our analysis, we use parametric survival model and estimated the hazard rate of switching for each individual. Similar to logistic regression, parametric survival analysis employs the maximum likelihood method. However, the survival regression estimates the proportional hazard of the event at issue for each individual comparing to the reference group rather than predicting the odds ratio as in logistic regression. Time until the occurrence of the event (survival time) does matter in the survival analysis.

The last section presents the main findings of the study. According to the results of pooled logistic regression, being in a government party increases the likelihood of party switching whereas the greater the size of the party in which the politician is affiliated with, the less likely the politician is to switch. The membership of the cabinet, however, has no significant effect on party switching. In addition, when politicians are assigned a higher value by the party they are affiliated with, politicians tend to be less prone to change their party affiliation. Moreover, the fact that the position of the politicians' party is closer to the left on the political spectrum, the likelihood of party switching increases. According to the results of the logistic regression, party switching has a chronic effect. A parliamentarian who changes a party is more likely to change a party again than a deputy who has never changed a party. Finally, the politicians elected from the Kurdish region tend to switch more than the politicians elected from other regions. Other variables in the party change model, gender and mayoral experience, have not been found to have a significant effect on party switching behavior.

In the second part of the empirical analysis, parametric survival analysis was used for estimation. The results do not differ much from the results of logistic regression, but also include the effect of time on party switching behavior.

According to the findings obtained from the parametric survival analysis of the pooled data set, the fact that the politician's party is one of the government parties significantly increases the likelihood of party switching. As the politician's party increases in size, measured by the number of seats represented in parliament, the politician tends to switch less likely. The membership of the cabinet has no meaningful effect on the party switching. However, as the value of the politicians on the eye of his/her party increases, politicians tend to be less prone to switch. According to the results of parametric survival analysis, there is also a negative significant relationship between the political position of the politician's party and the party switching. The members of the party which is closer to the left, are more likely to switch. And finally, the politicians elected from Kurdish regions tend to switch more. These results are consistent with logit regression estimates. However, in the survival analysis, unlike the logistic regression, there is no significant result regarding repeated switchers. Gender and mayoral experience has also no effect on party switching behavior.

An important advantage of the parametric-survival analysis is that it takes into account the effect of timing on party switching behavior. The Weibull regression results, which are estimated on a term basis, show that in the first three legislative terms covering the years 1983-1991, politicians are more likely to switch during the budget periods than in the other periods. For the period of 1995-1999, 1999-2002, it was found that, in the post-election periods, party switching decreases significantly while in the pre-election period, party switching increases significantly. For the period of 2007-2011, however, party switching increases significantly in the post-election periods. According to pooled data estimation, however, the risk of party switching hazard decreases significantly during the post-election period, the politicians have higher switching hazard during the pre-election periods lasting one year before the next election.

ÖZET

Bu tezde, politikacıların parti değişimi davranışı ile ilgili teorik açıklamalar, Türkiye'ye ait 1983-2015 seçim verileri kullanılarak ampirik olarak test edilmiştir. Kavram ile ilgili teorik açıklamalar ve önceki uygulamalı çalışmalar takip edilerek, parti değişimine neden olan temel motivasyonlar belirlenmiş ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nde görev yapan politikacıların parti değişimi davranışının nedenleri araştırılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, parti değişimi davranışını tahmin etmek için, lojistik regresyon tahmini ve parametrik hayatta kalma yöntemi kullanılmıştır.

Parti değişimi, yaygın algının aksine, yalnızca demokrasi ve parti sisteminin tam kurumsallaşmadığı, seçimle ilgili yasaların eksik uygulandığı ülkelerde değil, politik çevrelerin ve aktörlerin demokrasiyi üst seviyede benimsediği ülkelerde de yaygın olarak gözlemlenmektedir. Parti değişimi ile ilgili vaka çalışmaları, yalnızca Brezilya (Desposato, 2006; Desposato, 2009; Mainwaring, 1990) ve Türkiye (Turan, 1985; Turan, 2005; Sayari, 2017) benzeri ülkeleri değil, aynı zamanda İtalya ((Heller and Mershon, 2005; Heller and Mershon, 2008; Heller and Mershon, 2009) ve Japonya (Kato and Yamamoto, 2008; Kato, 2005) gibi ülkeleri de içermektedir. Türkiye'de parti değişimi davranışı ile ilgili çalışmalar kısıtlı olmakla beraber daha güncel ve kapsamlı bir çalışma, parti değişimi davranışı ile ilgili kavrayışı arttıracaktır.

Çalışmanın teorik kökeni, temel olarak, Black'in hırs teorisi (1972), Aldrich ve Bianco'nun adaylık hesabı modeli (1992) ve Muller ve Strome'nin parti davranışı modeline (1999) dayanmaktadır. Black'in teorisi, politikacıların politik hayatları boyunca üç seçenek ile yüz yüze geldiklerini öne sürer. Bu seçenekler; politik hayattan ayrılma, daha yüksek bir makam arayışına girme ve yeniden seçilebilmektir. Politikacılar bu seçenekler arasında bir tercih yaparken rasyonel davranırlar. Black'in bu rasyonalite varsayımından hareketle, Aldrich ve Bianco, politikacıların parti bağlılıklarını belirlerken, yeniden seçilme ihtimallerini ençoklaştıran durumu tercih ettiklerini öne süren adaylık hesabı modelini kurmuşlardır. Muller ve Strome'nin parti davranışı modeli ise, ideolojik motivasyonu da politikacıların parti seçimi aşamasında göz önüne aldığı bir diğer boyut olarak hesaba katması nedeniyle politikacı tercihi literatürüne yeni bir bakış açısı kazandırmıştır. Buna ek olarak, Laver ve Benoit (2003), parti değiştirme davranışını evrimsel oyun teorisi bağlamında ele alarak literatüre katkı sağlamıştır.

Çalışmanın ikinci bölümü, parti değişimi kavramının tanımı ile parti değişimini açıklayan teori ve modelleri açıklanmıştır. Daha sonra, parti değişiminin olumlu ve olumsuz sonuçlarına yer verilmiştir.

Parti değişiminin literatürdeki ilk tanımı Heller ve Mershon (2008) tarafından; «...seçimle elde edilmiş bir göreve sahip olan ya da bu görev için yarışan politikacılara ait, kaydedilmiş her parti bağlılığına dair değişme» olarak yapılmıştır. Bu tanımı bir adım öteye taşıyarak Pinto (2015), parti değişimini «...bir makama sahip politikacı tarafından gerçekleştirilen, herhangi bir parlamenter kurula dayanmayan ya da partiler arası koordinasyon ürünü olmayan kayıtlı her parti bağlılığı değişimi» olarak yapmıştır. Bu çalışmada her iki tanımdan da faydalanılmıştır.

Parti değişimi ile ilgili teorik ve uygulamalı çalışmalar; parti değişiminin temelde iki etkenden kaynaklandığını ileri sürmektedir. Literatürdeki ilk yaklaşım, politikacıların hırslı varlıklar oldukları ve temelde üç motivasyon ile hareket ettikleri düşüncesinden hareketle, parti değişimini bireysel ve stratejik bir hareket olarak ele almıştır. Bu noktada, Muller and Storme'nin üç motivasyondan oluşan parti davranışı modeli kullanışlı bir çerçeve sunmaktadır. Tüm diğer dışsal nedenler sabit olmak şartıyla, politikacıları hangi partiye bağlı olacakları ile ilgili kararı bu üç temel motivasyonu gözden geçirerek verirler. Bu motivasyonlar; makam-motivasyonu, oy-motivasyonu ve politika-motivasyonudur.

Literatürdeki ikinci yaklaşıma göre, politikacılar kurumsal faktörler nedeniyle parti değiştirirler. Seçim yasasındaki farklılıklar, demokrasinin ve parti sisteminin ve rekabetinin kurumsallaşmış olup olmaması gibi dışsal etkenler de politikacıların parti bağlılıkları ile ilgili kararlarını önemli ölçüde etkilemektedir. Desposato ve Scheiner (2008) çalışmalarında, popülist kaygı ile bölgesel harcamaların arttırıldığı politik sistemlerde, kaynak kontrollünün seviyesi ile ilgili farklılıkların, diğer bir deyişle kaynak dağılımının merkezi olup olmamasının, politikacıların kariyer stratejilerini farklılaştırdığını göstermişlerdir. Kaynak kontrolünün tesiri, politikacıların kariyer patikasını, oy dağılımını, koalisyon oluşumunu ve politikacıların parti bağlılıklarını etkilemektedir.

Buna ek olarak, parti değişimi ile ilgili güncel çalışmalar, zamanın parti değiştirme davranışı üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir. Mershon ve Shvetsova (2005) yasama dönemini periyodlara ayırmış ve bu periyodların rasyonel politikacıların parti değiştirmesi için teşvikler yarattığını öne sürmüştür.

Politikacıların parti değiştirmesi birçok sonucu beraberinde getirmektedir. Örneğin, politikacıların parti hareketliliği, seçmenler tarafından politik tercihlerine yapılan bir ihanet olarak algılanabilmektedir. Grose ve Yoshinaka (2003) çalışmalarında, seçim maliyetleri ile ilgili hipotezleri test etmişlerdir. Bu hipotezler politikacıların parti değişiminin, i) değişimden sonraki tüm seçimleri eşit etkileyeceği (ortalama-etki), ii) bu etkinin tek seferlik olacağı (tek sefer etkisi) ve iii) etkinin seçimler ilerledikçe azalıp yok olacağı (ıskonto etkisi) üzerine kurulmuştur. 1947-2000 ABD'ye ait veri seti kullanılarak tahmin edilen model sonuçları, özellikle genel seçimlerde seçmenin uzun dönemli olarak politikacıları cezalandırdığı yönündedir.

Çalışmanın üçüncü bölümü temel hipotezleri sunmaktadır. Mevcut literatür parti değişimi davranışı ile ilgili birçok varsayım içermektedir. Bu çalışmalar takip edilerek ve yukarıda anlatılan çerçeveye bağlı kalınarak, temel hipotezler şu şekilde kurulmuştur: i) temsil oranı yüksek olan partilerde seçilen politikacılar daha az parti

değiştirme eğilimindedir, ii) partisi iktidar olan ya da koalisyonunun içinde yer alan politikacıların daha az parti değiştirmesi beklenir, iii) bir sonraki seçim ile ilgili daha fazla belirsizlik yaşayan politikacıların parti değiştirme olasılığı daha yüksektir, iv) Politikacılar, yasama döneminin kritik periyodlarında daha fazla parti değiştirme eğilimindedirler.

Çalışmanın dördüncü bölümünde veri setini tanımladık. Parti bağlılığı kayıtları için 1983-2015 tarihleri arasındaki seçim verisinden faydalanılmıştır. Bu bilginin edinebilmesi için, TBMM (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi) kayıtlarından yararlanılmıştır. Seçim sonuçları için, TÜİK (Türkiye İstatistik Enstitüsü), YSK (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu) veri tabanları ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık resmî sitesinden edinilen bilgiler kullanılmıştır. Buna ek olarak, partilerin politika tercihleri için Manifesto Project'in veri setinden yararlanılmıştır. Tüm bu kaynaklardan elde edilen bilgiler kullanılarak; *INGOVERNMENT*, *PARTYSIZE*, *CABINET*, *VRD*, *RILEHOME*, *MAYORSHIP*, *REPEATER*, *GENDER* ve *SOUTHEAST* değişkenleri yaratılmıştır. Sağ-kalım analizi için ise, bu değişkenlere ek olarak, parlamentonun farklı dönemlerini belirten zaman kukla değişkenleri yaratılmıştır. Bu değişkenler ise, *POST-ELECTION*, *BUDGET* ve *PREELECTION* olarak adlandırılmıştır.

Literatürde yer alan çalışmalar takip edilerek kurulan bu hipotezler, ikili seçim modeli olan lojistik regresyon ve parametrik sağ-kalım modeli kullanılarak tahmin edilmiştir. Lojistik regresyon modeli, bir ya da birden fazla bağımsız değişkenin kategorik bir bağımlı değişken üzerindeki etkisini ölçmek amacıyla geliştirilmiştir. Klasik doğrusal regresyon varsayımlarının ihlal edildiği durumlarda, En Küçük Kareler Yönetimi yerine lojistik regresyon modeli tercih edilmektedir. İkili seçim modellerinin söz konusu olduğu durumlarda, bu varsayımlardan eşdeğişkenlik, normalite ve doğrusallık varsayımları ihlal edilmektedir. Bu nedenle bu çalışmada, iki bir değişken olan parti değiştirme durumu lojistik regresyon yardımı ile tahmin edilmiştir.

Çalışmada kullanılan bir diğer yöntem parametrik sağ-kalım analizidir. Lojistik regresyonda olduğu gibi bu analizin temelinde de en büyük olasılıklar tekniği yatmaktadır. Ancak lojistik regresyon, her bir gözlem için bir olayın gerçekleşme olasılığını tahmin ederken, sağ-kalım analizi, her gözlemin referans grubuna göre belli risk ile hangi oranda karşılaşacağını tahmin etmektedir. Sağ-kalım analizinde gözlemlerin, risk altında oldukları olayı tecrübe ettikleri ana kadar geçen süre önem arz etmektedir.

Son bölüm ise, çalışmanın temel bulgularına yer vermektedir. Havuzlanmış lojistik regresyon sonuçlarına göre, hükümet partisinde olmak, politikacıların parti değiştirme olasılığını arttırırken, politikacının bulunduğu partisinin büyüklüğü arttıkça, politikacının parti değiştirme olasılığı azalmaktadır. Kabine üyeliğinin ise, parti değiştirme üzerinde anlamlı bir etkisi yoktur. Buna ek olarak, politikacılara, bağlı oldukları parti tarafından daha yüksek bir değer atfedildiğinde, politikacılar daha az parti değiştirme eğilimindedir. Ayrıca, politikacıların bağlı oldukları partinin politik spektrumun daha solunda yer alması parti değiştirme olasılığını arttırmaktadır. Lojistik regresyon sonuçlarına göre, parti değiştirmek kronik bir etkiye sahiptir. Öyle ki bir kere parti değiştiren milletvekillerinin, yeniden parti değiştirme olasılığı hiç parti değiştirmemiş bir milletvekiline göre daha fazladır. Son olarak, Kürt bölgelerinden seçilmiş politikacılar, diğer bölgelerden seçilen

politikacılara göre daha çok parti deęiřtirme eęilimindedirler. Parti deęiřimi modelindeki dięer deęiřkenler olan, cinsiyet ve belediye başkanlıęı tecrübelerinin parti deęiřtirme davranıřı üzerinde anlamlı bir etkisi olmadıęı tespit edilmiřtir.

Çalıřmanın ikinci bölümünde parametrik saę-kalım analizi ile tahmin yapılmıřtır. Sonuçlar, lojistik regresyon sonuçlarından çok farklılařmamakla birlikte, zamanın parti deęiřtirme üzerindeki etkisini de içermektedir.

Havuzlanmış veri setinin parametrik saę-kalım yöntemi ile analiz edilmesi sonunda elde edilen bulgulara göre, politikacının partisinin hükümet partilerinden biri olması, politikacının parti deęiřtirme ihtimalini anlamlı olarak artırmaktadır. Politikacının seçildięi partinin, parlamentoda temsil edilen sandalye sayısı ile ölçülen büyüklüęü arttıkça, bu partinin politikacıları anlamlı olarak daha az parti deęiřtirme eęilimindedir. Kabine üyelięinin politikacıların parti deęiřimi kararlarında anlamlı bir etkisi yoktur. Bununla beraber, politikacıların baęlı oldukları parti gözündeki deęeri arttıkça politikacılar daha az parti deęiřtirme eęilimindedir. Parametrik saę-kalım analizine göre, politikacının partisinin politik pozisyonu ile parti deęiřtirme arasında da negatif ve anlamlı bir iliřki bulunmuřtur. Ve son olarak, Kürt bölgelerinden seçilen politikacılar daha fazla parti deęiřtirme eęilimindedir. Bulduęumuz bu sonuçlar, lojistik regresyon tahminleri ile tutarlılık göstermektedir. Bununla beraber, parametrik saę-kalım analizinde, lojistik regresyonun aksine, bir kere parti deęiřtiren politikacıların tekrar parti deęiřtirme ihtimali ile ilgili anlamlı bir sonuç çıkmamıřtır. Cinsiyet ve belediye başkanlıęı tecrübelerinin, lojistik regresyon tahmininde olduęu gibi parti deęiřtirme davranıřı üzerinde anlamlı bir etkisi yoktur.

Parametrik-saę kalım analizinin önemli bir sonucu da yasama süresinin kritik dönemlerinin parti deęiřtirme davranıřı üzerindeki etkisini ölçmesidir. Dönem bazında tahmin edilen Weibull regresyon sonuçları, politikacıların, 1983-1995 yıllarını kapsayan ilk üç yasama döneminin bütçe dönemlerinde dięer dönemlere kıyasla, istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir řekilde daha fazla parti deęiřtirdiklerini ortaya koymaktadır. 1995-1999, 1999-2002 dönemleri için seçim sonrası dönemde olmanın parti deęiřimini anlamlı bir řekilde azalttıęını, bir sonraki seçimden önceki üç aylık dönemin ise parti deęiřimini anlamlı olarak arttırdıęını ortaya koymaktadır. 2007-2011 döneminde ise seçim sonrası periyotta parti deęiřimleri anlamlı olarak artmaktadır. Havuzlanmış veri tahmini sonuçlarına göre, seçim sonrası parti deęiřimi riski anlamlı olarak azalırken, bir sonraki seçimden bir sene önceki dönemde parti deęiřtirme riski anlamlı olarak artmaktadır. Havuzlanmış veri setinin yapısı nedeniyle, bütçe dönemleri, havuzlanmış veri tahminine katılamamıřtır.

1. INTRODUCTION

Contrary to the argument that party switching is only wide-spread where democracy and party system institutionalization is incomplete and electoral rules are not accurately applied, switching behavior is observed in countries where democratic rules are well-adopted by the political environment and agents as suggested by empirical evidence on party switching ranging from case studies of new democracies or weakly institutionalized party systems such as Brazil (Desposato, 2006), Poland (McMenamin and Gwiazda, 2011) and Russia (Semenova, 2015) to cases of established democracies such as Italy (Benoit and Hayden, 2004; Heller and Mershon, 2005; 2008) and Japan (Kato and Kannon, 2008; Reed and Scheiner, 2003). In this study, we will more specifically focus on the patterns of party affiliation in Turkey for the period 1983-2015.

Turkish political arena is characterized by high levels of inter-party mobility. Although party switching is practiced widely in Turkish political life, empirical studies are limited. Sayari and Esmer (2002) suggests that party switching in Turkey stems from three reasons: the insecurity about the chances of re-nomination in the next elections, the wish to access to resources controlled by another party and the discontent from the policies pursued by the party leadership and they argue that floating politicians just like floating voters is a characterizing aspect of Turkish politics¹. Turan et al. (2005) provides a historical perspective on Turkish party switching and outlines the untypical nature of Turkish inter-party mobility as it is frequent and related to numerous motivational factors, contexts, styles and methods².

¹These observations are in line with theoretical studies on party switching based on Muller and Strom's (1999) policy-office-votes model of party behavior. According to this model, political party leaders are faced with multiple and conflicting goals one of each comprises risk and trade-off. When party leaders determine the party's political goals, they broadly consider three motivations: i) office seeking, ii) policy-seeking and iii) vote seeking.

² Turan argues that "... its frequency and magnitude are unusual. Since the introduction of competitive politics in Turkey in 1946, 2795 persons have served as deputies in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Of these, 445 incumbents, or approximately one- sixth of the total, have left the parties on whose ticket they had originally been elected. Some have moved to another party, others

There are several reasons for this dynamism including non-electoral ones. To begin with, the weak institutionalization of democracy and party systems in Turkey has created an unstable political environment where parties, political elites and voters' preferences are not well-defined. First of all, the formation of political parties in Turkey is quite different from the European case. The cornerstone model of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) suggests that National and Industrial Revolutions have divided societies into four main dichotomous cleavages (center-periphery, church-state, land-industry, capitalist-worker) and the preferences of political parties and voters emerged based on these "societal cleavages". In Turkey, on the other hand, class-consciousness has always been weak and only center-periphery cleavage, which had its roots in the Ottoman era, has affected the formation of parties and political behavior. Unlike the European case, in Turkey, democratization steps and even transition to two-party electoral system have taken place by the initiative of state leaders from above instead of from below. Moreover, party politics were interrupted by three military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980. These military interventions resulted with the ban of political parties and considerable change in electoral law made by the Constitutional Court. Due to these non-electoral forces, Turkish political sphere has been dominated by clientism, volatility of votes, dynamic party systems and parties with heterogeneous social bases and lastly, party switching of the politicians (Sayari, 2002).

In a more recent study, Turan (2005) examines party switchers in the Turkish Parliament for the period 1983-2005 and suggests that there are three contingencies for party switching: the first is a personal decision to join another party or run elections as independent, the second is a decision to join another party after the party they are affiliated with have been closed down by the constitutional court and the third is to merge into a new party when two or more existing parties may unite and form a new one. In this empirical study, they conclude that no less than 812 deputies changed their party although they have been elected for an office. Altındağ and

have joined a party after having been elected as independents, and still others have become independents after having been elected on a party ticket, often to join a different party at a later date. "and indicates that in the pre-1980 period, increased party switching was considered alarming by the makers of the 1982 constitution as a destabilising factor.

Mocan (2015) has showed using information on more than 2,000 elected members of the Turkish Parliament and the votes received by each political party in every district and each of the five consecutive parliamentary elections between 1991 and 2011 that party switching is more likely after an experience of electoral uncertainty and a narrowly-won victory where this election uncertainty affects younger and less educated MPs more. They further state that despite the unethical nature of this behavior, these party-switching MPs are more likely to be re-elected in the next election. Their study points out to the opportunistic characteristic of party switching in Turkey as party switching implies re-election concerns and financial benefits stemming from longer tenure in the Parliament.

The current study aims at contributing to the analysis of party switching in Turkey using a broader definition of party switching and a longer span of time. Regarding the definition of party switching, the broader definition given by Heller and Merzhon (2005) is adopted: “the term switch as an umbrella label for any recorded change in party affiliation on the part of a politician holding or competing for elective office”³. As far as the time interval under consideration is concerned, we are analyzing post-1980 period where Turkish political arena has gained a more stable outlook, relatively more purified from non-electoral forces. We can divide this period into three sub-periods. The first one lasted until 1991 general election comprising two general elections held in 1983 and 1987. After the 1982 constitution, the constitutional court has closed down some parties and new parties have been formed and others had a chance to get reorganized through a merge into a new party. Although inter-party mobility was high during this period, we see that it is not specific to the post-coup period. In this period, the number of political parties decrease along with ideological polarization and party politics are dominated by moderate pluralism with only one ruling party. The second period lasted between 1991-2002 and was characterized with increased fragmentation and coalition or minority governments. Islamist and pro-Kurdish parties have at least participated in elections even if they did not have enough support to be represented in the

³Pinto (2015) employs a broader version of switching as “any recorded change in party affiliation on the part of a politician holding elective office which is not the product of parliamentary rules or of an act of coordination between parties”.

parliament. The third period after the elections in 2002, we again see two party dominance and single party majority government controlled by Justice and Development Party which came to the fore and since then has dominated the politics in Turkey.

In the second section of our study, we refer to the literature on party switching to draw our hypotheses. We presented the data in section 4. Then, we proceed by clarifying the variables affecting switching and describing the empirical model. In section 5, we present the methods we used in the empirical part. Section 6 includes the results of the analysis.



2. LITERATURE

Party switching is defined as party mobility of a currently selected deputy or a group of deputies to a new party during a legislative session. In this study, however, broader definition is adopted and the definition of party switching given by Heller and Mershon (2005): "...the term switch as an umbrella label for any recorded change in party affiliation on the part of a politician holding or competing for elective office" and by Pinto (2015) "...any recorded change in party affiliation on the part of a politician holding elective office which is not the product of parliamentary rules or of an act of coordination between parties" were followed. In addition to this, concept of switching is specified as "...the product of strategic behavior of a calculus of cost and benefit on the part of the individual legislator who faces incentives and constraints in his or her institutional environment" (Heller and Mershon, 2008).

Broad definition for each category of switching has been given by Heller and Mershon (2005) and is demonstrated in the Figure 1. Firstly, switching type by direction involves *in-switch* and *out-switch*. In-switch refers "*formal adoption of new label by MP after having another label*" while the latter points out "*the abandonment of one label in favor of another*". Second, switches are classified as *across existing parties*, *fission*, *fusion* and *start-up* in respect to the impact on the number of parties in the parliament. Switches across existing parties leave the number of the parties in the legislature same. Fission specifies that existing party splits to create two or more new parties. Moreover, fusion points out two or more extant parties merge to create a new party and lastly, start-up identify the moves setting up a new party by MP's from multiple parties.

Third stratification of party switching is based on the relative timing of the moves. While *solo* switch indicates the moves isolated from others in time, *simultaneous* moves are observed on the same day or same week and *near-simultaneous* moves occur close in time to other moves. Lastly, switching might be materialized as *rule-driven* or *voluntarily*. Rule driven moves can be taken place in the form of expulsion or because of the threshold constraints, while the latter occurs as a free choice.

Type by direction :	In switch Out switch
Type by impact of N parties:	Existing parties Fission Fusion Start-up
Type by relative timing:	Solo Simultaneous Near-simultaneous
Type by degree of choice:	Rule-driven Voluntarily

Figure 1 Switching Categories

Research on inter-party mobility has largely to do with the issue of intra- party politics. We can better understand the behavior of politicians by conceiving parties as endogenous coalitions rather than unitary actors. The cornerstone model of Aldrich and Blanco (1992) draws a basic theoretical model of party affiliation depending on the cost-benefit analysis of the politicians. In order to decide on a party label, a politician seeks the party by maximizing the expected utility of being affiliated with a specific party. Their formal model of candidacy is based on the seminal works of Schlesinger (1966), Black (1972) and Rohde (1979) discussing the office-seeking behavior of politicians in the context of ambitious theory.

The enrolment in political arena implies the definition of the objective, the calculation of an expected political payoff and then, the choice of the specific political tool, which would provide this objective. Here, switching or adhering to a specific party constitutes a kind of political tool in order to achieve a state with most benefit. No matter when, a politician might decide to switch by maximizing the

utility from being in prospective minus the cost of switching; the utility may vary as the objective of a politician varies from ideological congruence with the party platform and re-election concerns to perks of an office. Theoretical and empirical studies using this individual and strategic perspective mostly refer to Muller and Strom's (1999) theoretical framework where they have presented a general theory of party behavior. In their work (1999) party behavior models are classified under three main topics which are office seeking, policy seeking and vote-seeking party behavior. Approaching legislative party switching from a game theoretical perspective, Heller and Mershon (2008) suggest that party switching is a consequence of political ambition and political parties should be considered as groups of individuals, each with his or her desire, preferences and ambition and analyze the party discipline and the impact of party discipline to legislators switching decision in Italian Chamber of Deputies⁴.

Parties exclude legislators with negative value-added. Switchers will be welcomed when their value-added is positive but excluded when ideologically too inconsistent with a party.

Previous studies have approached electoral competition by only focusing competition between parties during election periods. The study of Laver and Benoit (2003) however, differ from the earlier work in some ways. First, approaching party switching in an evolutionary game theoretical perspective, the authors treated legislative parties as inputs for legislative competition and legislators as political actors who constantly revise the decision over party affiliation and have carried the

⁴ See also Kenno and Merlo (2004) estimating using post-war data containing detailed information about candidates of the parliament how congressional experience affects the post-congressional wage (post-employment). They have treated re-election not as an aim but a political tool to achieve multiple objectives. One of the main findings is that congressional experiences significantly raises post-congressional wages both in private and public sector. This study contributes to previous studies by portraying the decision of politicians as rational expected utility maximisers. Similarly, Desposato (2006) studies party switching as a function of a strategic interaction between legislators and endogenous party leaders in Brazil and concluded that there is a long run switching equilibrium in Brazil and the steady state rate of switching is almost 1/3. Although most works regard switching as a binary choice, switching or not, this study rather examines switching in terms of destination party. Moving to different prospective party matters since payoffs might differ according to which party the politician would affiliate. This approach is precious in order to differentiate the effects of various motivation of party switching as it has measured the effect of the probability of switching according to the variables such as cabinet membership, ideological distance, state coalition and transaction cost.

political competition to legislative sphere. According to their study, in order to make the system in equilibrium two conditions should be satisfied. Along with the fact that a politician should be attracted by the prospective party, this party should also be in a position to accept the newcomers. For measuring attractiveness and acceptance, they calculated expected weight ratio (EWR) for individuals and parties. Two necessary conditions were stated as follow:

$$\frac{Eq'd'}{sq'} > \frac{Epd}{sp} \text{ (1st condition)}$$

$$\frac{Eq'd'}{sq'} > \frac{Eqd}{sq} \text{ (2nd condition)}$$

In the above equation; party, configuration and seat share were denoted as p, d and s, respectively. Configuration refers the party organization which change after each switch and seat share constituted the percentage of the party resources from which a defector would benefit from. The notation of p', q' and s' indicates the values which would be gained after the defection.

First, on the politician' side, legislator compared the expected weight ratio (EWR) of defecting from the current party and staying in the current one. On the side of parties, however, party compares the expected weight ratio (EWR) gained after accepting the new member and the situation before the acceptance.

The second branch in the theoretical and empirical literature on party switching assumes that politicians are affected by institutional factors. Difference in election rules, institutionalization of democracy, party systems and party competition also affect with which party a politician would like to be affiliated. For instance, Desposato and Scheiner (2008) concludes that in pork-oriented political environments, difference in resource control level, in another word, whether the resource control is centralized or not, affect the politicians career strategies. Difference in resource control level has significant effect on career path of politicians, vote share, coalition formation and party affiliation of politicians. The reason of high switching rates in Brazil can also be attributed to the feature of

Brazilian electoral system. In an institutional context, Mainwaring (1990) focused on the institutional characteristics of Brazil including open-list proportional representation and the implementation of preference voting.

Such practices would create an environment in which the political parties are weak and politicians behave independently and develop anti-party behavior. Surprisingly, this individualistic behavior contributed to the formation of an antidemocratic political sphere bringing about clientelism, the formation of political elite and weakness in representing particular classes. In the comparative work of O'Brien and Schomer (2013) for 20 democratic regimes, individual and institutional reasons behind party switching are examined. They state that switching is important in the sense that it has potential to change coalition composition and can alter the nature of bargaining in the parliament. Laughlin (2011), in a similar vein, studies party switching in South Africa and investigates the causes of switching under two different electoral regimes, concluding that under proportional representation legislators are more likely to defect. Another empirical work related to institutional factors belongs to Desposato and Scheiner (2008) analyzing the centralization of resource control on politicians' decision over budgetary issues which in turn would affect the party preferences of politicians. They use Japanese and Brazilian data and find out that decentralized resource control come up with party fragmentation while centralized control created single party dominance. Systemic difference regarding the resource control mechanism explains the lack of switching in Japan and in contrast high party fragmentation and abundance of party mobility in Brazil. Kruzer and Pettai (2003) discuss that switching is used as a political correction mechanism which fills the representational deficit arising from the ossification of extant parties while adjusting competitive failure. Taking switching as a political correction mechanism, they analyzed the systemic effect of party switching with a special focus on the party system change. They have supposed that institutional background matters for switching by affecting the type of switching, frequency of switching and consequences of switching. Furthermore, switching has different institutional consequences depending on the level of party system institutionalization. They conclude that party system institutionalization is not unique but is important in party switching.

It is crucial to emphasize that the timing of the change of party affiliation is as important as the reason. The frequency of switching can vary at different stages of parliamentary cycle since at each stage politicians are induced by different motivations. The empirical findings of Mershon and Shvetsova (2005) imply that at the early stages of parliamentary cycle, members of the parliament are encouraged by perk-oriented and office-oriented motives since at these stages; legislative agenda is dominated by the issues like allocation of power, determination of committees, government participation and portfolios. Towards the middle of parliamentary cycle, policy oriented motives come to the fore and at the last stage that is corresponding to the pre-election period, electoral concerns become important and the aim of switching is to raise chances of election. They use the data from Italian Chamber of Deputies and Russian Parliament. They chose these countries since their institutional background are quite similar and to control variables relating to the electoral institutions is crucial in estimating the pure effect of timing on switching. Pinto (2015) postulates that switching occurrence in Italian Chamber of Deputies may vary based on different stages in the parliamentary cycle since payoffs differ according to each specific stage, that is government formation, policy-making and second-order elections. Empirical findings support their arguments demonstrating that conflict between legislators and the party they belong to are the main motivations behind switching behavior. Moreover, government formation and budget negotiation positively affect the risk of switching. However, they could not find any robust relationship between secondary elections and party defections.

Besides institutional reasons and personal motives, characteristics of politicians have been analyzed as drivers of party switching. For instance, in the Italian case, Heller and Mershon (2009) finds significant relationship between being younger, being less politically socialized and running for election. Apart from the individual motives pursued by the politician while switching decision is taken, there also exist some exogenous variables affecting the decision making i.e. institutional factors such as election threshold, party discipline and some other determined by outside forces rather than decision maker.

2.2. Brief History of Party Switching in Turkey

Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, it is important to bear in mind that each legislature has several particular features regarding party competition, policy preference and institutional context. To shed a light on this issue, this chapter will discuss the party switching phenomenon on legislative term basis.

In the first period under investigation corresponding to between 1983-1987, three parties ANAP, HP and MDP has succeeded to be represented in the parliament. Along with parties, the deputies in this period have been totally renewed compared to the previous legislature since 1980 military coup has forced all the political parties to be shut down and all politicians were banned from their political activities. For this, the election held in 1983 is selected as the base year. In this period, it is noteworthy to emphasize that the major center-left parties, HP and SODEP, have decided to merge under the roof of SHP. Since HP and SHP are consecutive parties sharing the same ideological position and almost the same politicians, this change does not serve the purpose of the study. The real mobility in the party switching sense occurred from MDP to ANAP, MDP to DYP and from SHP to DSP in this legislative cycle.

In the second legislative term (1987-1991 period), a relatively small amount of switching occurred across the parliamentary parties which were ANAP, SHP and DYP. Specifically, the basis of the mobility of the moves from SHP to HEP, which was formed by the Kurdish politicians some of whom excluded from SHP while some, left the party voluntarily following the decision of exclusion. Other branch of dynamism belongs to the politicians who have switched from ANAP to DYP.

Moreover, throughout this period, a great number of small parties became the destination party of many politicians. The reason of switching to these parties is the constitutional restriction faced by the politicians who resigned to switch another party. Party switching was prohibited by 1982 constitutions based on the article 84⁵

⁵The loss of membership by deputies shall be decided by an absolute majority of the total number of members in respect of deputies who resign, who are convicted of an offence precluding election to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, who are deprived of their legal capacity, who resign from their party in order to join another party, or take up a ministerial post in the Council of Ministers other than a provisional ministerial post during the election period who assume a function incompatible with

in Part3/F which specifies the circumstances of losing TGNA membership. In order to avoid legal punishment, politicians formed proxy parties (*Hülle Partisi*) that they used for as transition parties and then they joined their target party.

The third legislature welcomed two new parties RP and DSP along with ANAP, SHP and DYP. In this period corresponding to 1991-1995, there were two electoral alliances because of 10% election threshold which hinders members of small parties to have a seat in the parliament. These alliances were formed between HEP and SHP, MÇP and RP. Moreover, in February 1995, CHP and SHP merged under the party label CHP. Proxy parties also emerged during this legislature because of the anti-defection law in 1982 constitution. Most switches during this period are observed from SHP to CHP, CHP to DSP, ANAP to DYP and DYP to ANAP. The reason of high mobility across parties can be attributed to the existence of different coalition governments in the relevant years.

The political competition proceeded among the same parties in 1995-1999 parliamentary term. While RP, ANAP and DYP were located in the right wing, CHP and DSP were the representative of the left-wing electorate. Another important event is that RP was shut down by constitutional court in 22 February 1998 and the members of RP formed a new party FP as the successor of RP. Moreover, in this period, governments were formed as a result of a coalition agreements. The most notable mobility was from DYP to ANAP and from DYP to DTP materializing as 13 and 21 switches, respectively.

In the consecutive period of 1999-2002, DSP, MHP, FP, ANAP and DYP were represented in the parliament. The most dominant materialized from DSP to YTP as 63 moves which are specific example for the fission type of switching in the party switching taxonomy of Heller and Mershon (2008). In this term, there was still no party which succeeded to become the single ruling party. So, the governing power

membership, or who failed to attend without excuse, five meetings in a period of one month. A deputy who resigns from his party shall not be nominated as a candidate in the following elections by the central organs of any party existing at the time of his resignation.

was allocated among coalition partners. Moreover, FP faced the same destiny with RP and was closed down by the Constitutional Court. The supporters of this party were divided into two branches and formed SP and AKP pursuing different ideological lines.

With the introduction of AKP to Turkish political life, relatively more stable outlook dominated the parliament from 2002 onwards. AKP became the majority party and the only opposing party has been CHP in 2002-2007 period. Although switching seems relatively rare than the previous legislatures, exits from AKP were observed to ANAP and DYP in the same term. In the 2007-2011 period, only 13 politicians switched from CHP to DSP in the parliament represented by three major parties AKP, CHP and MHP.

In the last period under consideration (2011-2015), switches occurred from BDP to HDP indicating an ideological change on behalf of the political stance of Kurdish politicians.

Throughout these years, the parties representing the Kurdish electorate have faced threshold constraints; thus, the members of these parties have run for elections as independent candidates and then switched to their own parties during the legislative term. In 2007-2011, Kurdish independent politicians joined DTP and after the 2011 elections, Kurdish independent candidates have switched to BDP. Although these moves can be seen as strategic moves, they do not carry any meaningful meaning in party switching sense. Yet, the moves from BDP to HDP observed in the last legislature are particular since they possess an ideological notice as the manifesto of HDP aimed to offer more inclusive approach for all the left-wing electorate in Turkey.

3. HYPOTHESES

This section presents our main hypotheses, which were constructed by following the earlier theoretical and empirical studies. We take advantage from the ambitious theory of Black (1972), party behavior model of Muller and Strome (1999), the model for calculus of candidacy of Aldrich and Bianco (1992) and Mershon and Shvetsova (2005)'s timing framework in legislative competition. More clearly, we constructed our hypotheses as follows.

H1: The likelihood of switching is lower for politicians who are members of governing parties.

H2: The likelihood of switching is lower for politicians who are members of larger parties.

H3: The likelihood of switching is lower for politicians who are members of parties within which they maximize their re-election prospects.

H4: Key periods in the inter-electoral phase, such as post-election, budget negotiations and pre-election, should increase the risk of switching.

4. DATA

We have used 1983-2015 election data to evaluate parametrized hypotheses. Main resources are TGNA (Turkish Grand National Assembly) TUIK (Turkish Statistical Institute), YSK (Supreme Committee of), Manifesto Project Database and Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry. TGNA supplied the list of the deputies involving their party affiliation records, the entrance and exit dates and the reasons of switching. Secondly, we have also used TGNA records to determine the specific periods in which budgetary issues were discussed and governments were formed. The inputs of TUIK were used for the election results. When constructing the party positions of each parliamentary party, the data of Manifesto Project was used. Manifesto Project provides policy positions of more than 1000 parties from 50 different countries by analyzing the scope of election manifestos and it provides us a quantitative dataset for policy preferences for each parliamentary party. Lastly, for determining the state of cabinet membership for each politician, the inputs Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry are used.

We looked at eight legislative terms between 1983-2015 and examined 4049 deputies some of whom never changed their party affiliation while some changed more than once. There are particular circumstances such as abolishment of a party, fall of a membership by the Constitutional Court or Supreme Committee of Elections, preference for a mayorship, cancellation of a general election, and dismissal of a deputy from a party, resignation of a deputy and incidence of death and when such cases occurred, we dropped these observations.

After the elimination, we have 3748 observation for logit analysis but we have used 3716 of these observations for the logit estimation. For the survival analysis, however, we have 4411 observations for switching. However, as we study with the episodes, the number of observations increases. Additionally, we could not assign any value for the rank variable when the politicians elected in the midterm elections in 1986.

The data creation process differ according to which econometric model was used for estimation. Even if we used the same independent variables to estimate the both model, we coded switching variable in different ways. For the logit estimation, switches referred to the transition from one party to another ignoring the moves to independent state before affiliating to another party. For the survival estimation, however, we also take into account the duration of independent state. Therefore, the descriptive statistics of the two data-set exhibit different outputs. Descriptive Statistics for both dataset is given in Table 1 and Table 2.

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for the Logit Data

term	# of switches	# of switchers	%switchers
1983-1987	90	75	19%
1987-1991	25	23	6%
1991-1995	119	101	25%
1995-1999	102	84	21%
1999-2002	120	111	28%
2002-2007	44	40	10%
2007-2011	23	19	5%
2011-2015	46	41	10%

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Duration Data

term	# of switches	# of switchers	%switchers
1983-1987	238	145	36%
1987-1991	64	35	9%
1991-1995	242	131	33%
1995-1999	171	116	29%
1999-2002	257	220	55%
2002-2007	73	50	13%
2007-2011	100	85	21%
2011-2015	93	57	14%

4.1. Dependent Variable

We treated any change in party affiliation of a member of the parliament during a legislative term as switch and coded these observations as 1. The remaining deputies were handles as non-switch and take the value of 0. However, there are some exceptions to this rule. First, when a deputy change her party affiliation due to the party closure by constitutional court we did not count this change as a switch. When a MP excluded from her party, we added this observation to our data but treated them as non-switch. The observations belonged to decedent politicians were dropped out of our analysis unless any switches occurred before their death. When a deputy decided to change her party, at times, she stays as independent for a while and then move to the prospective party. When the duration between these two party was less than 56 days, we treated this move as if it is a direct switch between two parties. In other words, instead of counting these two moves separately as from party-independent and independent-party, we consider this as only one switch and as if it is just between two parties. In the case of following parties, we calculated the survival time of each MP considering the entrance date of the first party and the exit date of the follower party. We used the above-mentioned rationale when assigning the vote shares of MP's affiliated parties. For each MP, regardless of whether she ever switch or not, we compared MP's last party affiliation in the relevant term and the party affiliation under which she run for the following election (if she ever run for the next election). If there is a difference between these two parties, we count it as a switch. It worthy to note that one of the motivation which induces politicians to change their party affiliation is to be re-elected. This re-election concern makes pre-election period more crucial. For this, we traced the next period candidacy since at the time when the legislative term was terminated, pre-election period was still continuing for each politician. In the third legislative term which corresponds to 1991-1995 period, there were two electoral alliance because of %10 election threshold which hinders members of small parties to have a seat in the parliament. These alliances were formed between HEP and SHP and between MÇP and RP, respectively. When encoding our observation, we treated partisan moves occurred due to these electoral alliances as non-switch and coded them as 0. Moreover, in February 1995, CHP and SHP merged under the party label CHP. For this, we did not count the moves at this

date as switch. However, we coded the moves from SHP to CHP as switch before the merge.

4.2. Independent Variables

We included a great number of variables to represent or hypotheses regarding the determinants of party switching. First, we categorized these variables as explanatory variables and control variables. Explanatory variables are also divided into three groups as office seeking, election seeking and policy seeking variables. In order to measure the office motive, we added an INGOVERNMENT variable in to the model. This variable is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the party of the politician in relevant term is one of the governing parties and 0, otherwise.

Our second variable to measure the office seeking motivation is PARTYSIZE representing the number of the seats of the parliamentary parties that the legislator belongs to. It is an indicator for the representation power and the magnitude of the parties. Politicians in the larger parties are expected to have lower switching hazard.

The last variable pertained to the office-seeking motive is CABINET. We denoted this variable as 1, if the politician is one of a cabinet member during her life in the legislature and 0, otherwise. Our prediction is that cabinet incumbency lowers the switching hazard for the politicians.

Second group of variables deal with the role of electoral motivation in the party switching decision. In order to measure election-seeking motive, we constructed VDR variable indicating the value of the politician on eye of the party she/he belongs to. We calculated this variable by dividing the vote share received by the politician's district to the ranking of the politician in the election list. By doing this, we aimed to derive a measure representing each politician, separately. Neither vote shares nor the ranking of the politician alone could provide such a measure. Therefore, we combined both.

In order to measure the ideological concerns of the politicians, previous works (Desposato, 2006; Pinto, 2015; Virgilio and Giannetti, 2012) have pursued the WNOMINATE method of Poole and Rosenthal (1997). The idea of this method lies behind the rationale that when the distance between the politician's ideological point and the party's ideological position increases, politicians are more likely to switch to another party whose ideological stance is more compatible with the politician. This variable is substantial indicator in capturing whether the politician is ideologically motivated. For the case of politicians in Turkey, however, operationalization of such a variable would be tough since there existed no record like roll-call data so that voting behavior of the politicians during legislatures could be observed. Therefore, the toughness of calculating a variable like ideological distance make essential to find another variable related to ideological divergence. Such an attempt in the literature comes from McMenamin and Gwiazda (2011) by creating a dummy variable taking the value of one if the home party of the deputy is placed on the right on the political spectrum and 0, otherwise. In this study, however, we created RILEINDEX_HOME variable indicating the position of the politicians' party in the political spectrum in order to incorporate the ideological effect into our model.

We had the rile index values from the Manifesto Project Database. The rile index is obtained by the difference between a number of content variables representing the right-wing values and the variables representing the left-wing values. These variables are derived from the main categories which are divided as external relations, freedom of democracy, political system, economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society and social groups. The variables representing the right-wing values are positive military expenditure, freedom and human rights (the emphasis on the idea of individualism), constitutionalism, political authority, free market economy, incentives (supply-oriented economic policies), protectionism, economics orthodoxy, welfare state limitation, national way of life, traditional morality, law and order and civic mindedness. On the other hand, the variables symbolize the left-wing position are anti-imperialism, negative emphasis on military, peace, internationalism, market regulation, economic planning, protectionism, controlled economy, economic nationalism, welfare state expansion, education expansion, pro-labor policies and democracy. All these variables are measured on 0-

100-point scale. For this, the value of rile index decreases when the manifesto of the relevant party comprises more left-wing values and increases with the right-wing values.

Lastly, we have added a number of control variables into the party switching model. First of all, a variable called GENDER was created taking the value 1 if the politician is female and 0, otherwise.

In order to control the regional effect, a variable called SOUTHEAST was created taking the value of 1 if the politician was elected from the region where Kurdish parties collect the most share of the votes.

Moreover, we introduced MAYORSHIP variable which takes the value of 1 if the politician has elected as a municipal office at least once before her/his parliamentary incumbency and 0, otherwise.

Additionally, switching behavior might be chronical such that once a deputy switched, her propensity to switch again might be of concern. For this, a variable called REPEATER is added to the model for controlling event dependence.

For the survival estimation, we created three time dummies representing the different stages of the legislative cycle. POSTELECTION dummy takes the value of 1 for two-month period after the elections and 0, otherwise. BUDGET dummy takes the value of 1 for the November and the December months when the budget discussion takes place for the next fiscal year and 0, otherwise. Lastly, we introduced PREELECTION dummy to represent the six-month period before the next election.

For the overall estimation, creating these times dummies was a troublesome issue as the time span for each legislator differ in days. For this, we extended the duration of the pre-election dummy to one year rather than six months. However, we could not assign a budget dummy as the order of the day which corresponding to the start day of the budget period is different for each legislature. For this, we estimated

the whole model by introducing just two time dummies, which are POSTELECTION and PREELECTION.



5. METHODOLOGY

For the empirical part, we have used logit regression and parametric survival analysis. In this chapter, a brief definition of these two models involving their main assumptions, application areas and the way of interpreting the results will be discussed.

In the first part, logistic regression model was used. Logistic regression model is one of a binary response model consisting of a dichotomous dependent variable, y and a set of explanatory variables, x , in another word, a vector of predictor variables which are assumed to affect the dependent variable. The outcome variable involves two categories such as “death” or “alive”; “married or “single”; and “employed” or “unemployed”. This model, along with probit model were developed since linear probabilistic models have some drawbacks in estimating the probability of the occurrence of a particular event. First weakness of the linear probability model was that the predicted probability had not restricted between the values 0 and 1, which brings about a bare logical violation. As for the second problem, partial effects of the regressors were always constant. (Wooldridge, 2002) For the nonlinear regression, ordinary least square or weighted least square methods are not suitable. Therefore, in the logistic regression, maximum likelihood method was applied for the estimation.

In conventional regression analysis, the dependent variable is continuous and normally distributed, yet, in the logit regression, the outcome variable is dichotomous and has binomial distribution.

In the linear model, F test is used to check the joint significance of the predictor variables. Whereas, in the nonlinear models, LM test which can be computed by taking the difference of log likelihood functions of restricted and unrestricted model (Wooldridge, 2002) is useful for the same purpose. For the

goodness-of-fit of the model, however, various Pseudo R square measures, one of which proposed by McFadden (1973), are applied.

Another distinction between linear and nonlinear models is encountered when interpreting the coefficients. First, the logistic regression models do not predict the expected value of the dependent variable but, the log odds which is the natural logarithm of the ratio of $\pi/1-\pi$ while π demonstrates the probability of $Y=1$. When interpreting the coefficient one should take the exponent of it and find the partial effect of related predictor on the response variable. The interpretation of the sign is obvious; however, positive sign indicates the positive relationship and vice versa. In short, one unit increase in one of the independent variable is interpreted with the sign and the exponent of the coefficient itself. Other important thing to consider is that in the logistic regression, many variables are introduced in the model as dummies. For example, gender, race, employment status, marital status is added to most of the models by default. In this respect, interpreting the dummy variables come into prominence. For the dummy interpretation, after obtaining the odds for both categories, an odds ratio is calculated by the division of the exponent of each odds ratio. This proportion gives us how many times the non-based category is more likely to compared to the based category (Jaccard, 2001).

For the second estimation, we constructed the data according to duration analysis. Duration analysis which, is also commonly known as event history analysis, survival analysis or hazard modelling, is an analysis technique used to study the duration time or survival time of a subject until a particular event occur. For instance, for the employment analysis, event of interest might be the end of employment status while for partnership histories, marital dissolution is of interest. In brief, survival analysis examines the duration time which is measured from the time a subject is at risk to be exposed to a particular event to the time at which this event is actually materialized. Although, survival analysis firstly, emerged from the studies of biomedical sciences and epidemiology, its application area is wide ranging from “...the lifetime of electronic devices, components, or systems (reliability engineering); felons’ time to parole (criminology); duration of first marriage (sociology); length of newspaper or magazine subscription (marketing); and

worker's compensation claims (insurance) and their various influencing risk or prognostic factors" (Lee and Wang, 2003, p.1).

Survival analysis studies the relationship between a dependent variable, Y , which is a time variable representing the time to failure before a particular event occurs and any number of time-constant or time-varying covariates. The distribution of error terms is assumed to follow the theoretical distributions such as exponential, logistic, log-logistic, lognormal, gamma or Weibull. The data includes the time variable and covariates for failed or censored observations. Survival analysis is a useful tool when subjects under study are not cooperative and may leave the study, somehow or subjects may not experience the events before the end of the study. In survival vocabulary, these observations are called as right-censored. The power of the survival analysis is that it includes censored observations into the analysis even if we do not have complete information for the exact survival time.

For performing an analysis with survival data, there exist a great number of models including parametric and non-parametric ones. In this study, for descriptive purposes, we used Product-Limit (PL) method developed by Kaplan and Meier (1958) to estimate the probability of surviving in a given length of time calculating probability of the occurrence of an event at any point in time.

We choose parametric survival model with Weibull distribution to estimate the party switching model. In order to select the parametric model with best fitting we choose among the theoretical distributions such as normal, lognormal, Gamma, Weibull or exponential by using Akaike information criterion. After assessing the values obtained by Akaike information criterion, we choose the Weibull model in order to fit our survival data as the Weibull model provided the smallest value of AIC formula in the equation below, where $\ln$ represents the maximized log-likelihood of the model and k represents the number of parameters.

$$AIC = -2\ln L + 2k$$

6. RESULTS

Previous chapters have explained theoretical framework, the main hypotheses and the variables related to party switching behavior. In this chapter, to test our hypotheses, we performed flexible parametric survival analysis by using the above-mentioned variables on the hazard of party switching between 1983-2015 period. Before the estimation, we obtained hazard functions for each legislature, separately.




Figure 2 Smoothed Hazard Function for the Legislature 1983-1987




Figure 3 Smoothed Hazard Function for the Legislature 1987-1991




Figure 4 Smoothed Hazard Function for the Legislature 1991-1995




Figure 5 Smoothed Hazard Function for the Legislature 1995-1999




Figure 6 Smoothed Hazard Function for the Legislature 1999-2002




Figure 7 Smoothed Hazard Function for the Legislature 2002-2007




Figure 8 Smoothed Hazard Function for the Legislature 2007-2011




Figure 9 Smoothed Hazard Function for the Legislature 2011-2015




Figure 10 Smoothed Hazard Function by Terms

The figures show that the hazard of switching is relatively higher in 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th periods. The high mobility in the 1st legislature can be attributed to the renewal of the parliament and political competition restricted by the military regime. As the corollary of the banning of political parties and politicians, novel and a small number of parties permitted by the military regime to run for 1983 election. These restrictions resulted with more ideologically heterogeneous parties and became the reason of high switching rates observed in the first parliament.

The second parliament, however, seems to be more stable and over time the hazard rate appears to decrease more. The 3rd, 4th and the 5th parliament need special attention as in this period; governments were formed by coalitions making us expect high rates of switching. The hazard function of the 5th legislature indicates that party dynamics drastically change between 5th and the 6th legislatures which points out the divergence of FP into two branches. In the Figure 10, the green curve representing the legislature 5 demonstrates the increase of switching hazard in pre-election period. Moreover, the 1st and the 3rd periods are particular as in these periods, post-election switches are higher than the other periods.

For the last three periods, Figure 10 shows that party competition seems to be more stable capturing the two-dominant party competition between AKP and CHP, correctly.

After evaluating the hazard curves, we proceeded with the estimation part. To perform our analysis, we estimated the two models below. Regression results are given in the following tables.

$$\begin{aligned} switched_i = & a + \beta_1 * gender + \beta_2 * ingovernment + \beta_3 * vdr \\ & + \beta_4 * southeast + \beta_5 * mayorship + \beta_6 * rile_{home} \\ & + \beta_7 * cabinet + \beta_8 * repeater + \beta_9 * partysize + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 p = HR \exp & (b1 * gender + b2 * ingovernment + b3 * vdr + b4 \\
 & * southeast + b5 * mayorship + b6 * rile_{home} + b7 \\
 & * cabinet + b8 * repeater + b9 * partysize + b10 \\
 & * postelection + b11 * budget + b12 * preelection)
 \end{aligned}$$



Table 3 Coefficient Estimates of Logistic Regression

VARIABLES	(Term 1) Coefficient	(Term 3) Coefficient	(Term 4) Coefficient	(Term 5) Coefficient	(Term 6) Coefficient	(Pooled Data) Coefficient
<i>GENDER</i>	-0.991 (1.184)	0.734 (0.756)	-0.0790 (0.717)	0.0670 (0.606)	0.415 (0.728)	0.128 (0.236)
<i>INGOVERNMENT</i>	-124.1** (58.90)	0.613 (0.480)	3.943*** (1.082)	0.385 (0.384)	1.237 (1.419)	0.871*** (0.130)
<i>CABINET</i>	-0.289 (1.082)	-1.340*** (0.459)	-0.532 (0.584)	-0.0279 (0.373)	-0.105 (1.087)	-0.287 (0.216)
<i>PARTYSIZE</i>	0.457** (0.223)	-0.00837 (0.00546)	0.000604 (0.00463)	0.00221 (0.00901)	-0.0133* (0.00719)	-0.0109*** (0.000734)
<i>VDR</i>	-0.0150 (0.0154)	0.00661 (0.0119)	-0.0642*** (0.0192)	-0.00974 (0.0148)	-0.00117 (0.0184)	-0.0123** (0.00489)
<i>RILE_HOME</i>	3.897** (1.890)	-0.0883*** (0.0217)	-0.0446*** (0.0107)	0.000865 (0.00988)	-	-0.0173*** (0.00357)
<i>REPEATER</i>	3.555*** (1.150)	1.145*** (0.290)	-	-	3.960*** (0.897)	2.274*** (0.176)
<i>MAYORSHIP</i>	0.167 (0.719)	-0.563 (0.522)	0.858* (0.459)	0.508 (0.497)	-0.323 (0.692)	-0.166 (0.214)
<i>SOUTHEAST</i>	0.306 (0.552)	0.459 (0.414)	-0.157 (0.438)	0.163 (0.377)	0.828* (0.493)	0.681*** (0.152)
Constant	-0.0277 (0.826)	-0.0344 (0.449)	-3.899*** (1.075)	-1.528* (0.808)	0.356 (1.277)	-0.440*** (0.123)
Observations	335	419	501	423	536	3,716

* Standart errors in parantheses: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

** Due to small number of failures, we could not obtain parameter estimates for the 2nd, 7th and the 8th periods.

Table 4 Odds Ratios

VARIABLES	(Term 1) Odds ratio	(Term 3) Odds ratio	(Term 4) Odds ratio	(Term 5) Odds ratio	(Term 6) Odds ratio	(Pooled Data) Odds ratio
switch						
<i>GENDER</i>	0.371 (0.439)	2.084 (1.575)	0.924 (0.662)	1.069 (0.648)	1.514 (1.102)	1.136 (0.269)
<i>INGOVERNMENT</i>	0** (0)	1.846 (0.886)	51.58*** (55.799)	1.470 (0.564)	3.446 (4.890)	2.390*** (0.311)
<i>CABINET</i>	0.749 (0.810)	0.261*** (0.120)	0.587 (0.342)	0.972 (0.362)	0.900 (0.979)	0.750 (0.162)
<i>PARTYSIZE</i>	1.579** (0.351)	0.991 (0.00541)	1.006 (0.00463)	1.002 (0.00902)	0.986 (0.007)	0.989*** (0.000726)
<i>VDR</i>	0.985 (0.0151)	1.006 (0.011)	0.937*** (0.0180)	0.990 (0.0146)	0.998 (0.0183)	0.988** (0.00483)
<i>RILE_HOME</i>	49.22** (93.14)	0.915*** (0.0198)	0.956*** (0.0102)	1.0008 (0.00989)	3.928e+11 (1.371e+14)	0.983*** (0.00351)
<i>REPEATER</i>	34.99*** (40.22)	3.141*** (0.911)	-	-	52.45*** (46.91)	9.716*** (1.707)
<i>MAYORSHIP</i>	1.181 (0.849)	0.569 (0.297)	2.357* (1.081)	1.661 (0.825)	0.724 (0.510)	0.847 (0.182)
<i>SOUTHEAST</i>	1.357 (0.748)	1.582 (0.654)	0.855 (0.374)	1.176 (0.444)	2.288* (1.128)	1.976*** (0.301)
Constant	0.972 (0.802)	0.966 (0.434)	0.0202*** (0.0217)	0.217* (0.175)	1.427 (1.823)	0.644*** (0.0795)
Observations	335	419	501	423	536	3,716

*Standart errors in parantheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

** Due to small number of failures, we could not obtain parameter estimates for the 2nd, 7th and the 8th periods.

Table 5 Marginal Effects

VARIABLES	(Term 1) Marginal effects	(Term 3) Marginal effects	(Term 4) Marginal effects	(Term 5) Marginal effects	(Term 6) Marginal effects	(Pooled Data) Marginal effects
<i>GENDER</i>	-0.113 (0.134)	0.104 (0.107)	-0.009 (0.087)	0.012 (0.114)	0.026 (0.047)	0.133 (0.0247)
<i>INGOVERNMENT</i>	-14.18** (6.52)	0.087 (0.067)	0.478*** (0.129)	0.073 (0.072)	0.079 (0.090)	0.091*** (0.0134)
<i>CABINET</i>	-0.033 (0.123)	-0.19*** (0.063)	-0.06 (0.070)	-0.005 (0.070)	-0.006 (0.070)	-0.030 (0.022)
<i>PARTYSIZE</i>	0.052** (0.024)	-0.0011 (0.0007)	0.00007 (0.005)	0.0004 (0.0017)	-0.0008* (0.0004)	-0.0011*** (0.000074)
<i>VDR</i>	-0.0017 (0.0017)	0.0009 (0.0016)	-0.0077*** (0.0022)	-0.0018 (0.002)	-0.00007 (0.0011)	-0.0012** (0.0005)
<i>RILE_HOME</i>	0.445** (0.209)	-0.012*** (0.0028)	-0.005*** (0.0012)	0.00016 (0.0018)	-	-0.0018*** (0.00036)
<i>REPEATER</i>	0.406*** (0.125)	0.162*** (0.039)	-	-	0.255*** (0.057)	0.2381*** (0.168)
<i>MAYORSHIP</i>	0.019 (0.082)	-0.080 (0.074)	0.104* (0.055)	0.096 (0.093)	-0.0208 (0.044)	-0.017 (0.022)
<i>SOUTHEAST</i>	0.034 (0.062)	0.065 (0.058)	-0.019 (0.053)	0.030 (0.071)	0.053* (0.032)	0.0713*** (0.015)
Constant	-0.0293 (0.826)	-0.0452 (0.450)	-3.894*** (1.075)	-1.510* (0.806)	0.356 (1.277)	-0.440*** (0.123)
Observations	335	419	501	423	536	3,716

*Standart errors in parantheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

** Due to small number of failures, we could not obtain parameter estimates for the 2nd, 7th and the 8th periods.

Our first hypothesis is related to the office-seeking behavior of the politicians. First, we measured the office-seeking assumption with INGOVERNMENT variable. According to the logit results obtained from the pooled data in Table 3, being in a member of a governing party significantly increases the likelihood of switching. However, this result does not meet our expectation as being a member of governing party means easier access to state resources, more cabinet position and more power over public policy and, in turn, should decrease the switching probability. However, particular characteristic of Turkish political arena in the period of 1991-2002 requires a different interpretation regarding the INGOVERNMENT variable. In this period, the competition and negotiation between the parties is very high. Therefore, being a member of a governing party do not necessarily secure the politician's position in the parliament regarding easy access to resources, getting cabinet position and implementing policy. Instead, the instability and uncertainty make the inter-party moves more likely.

The second variable for measuring the office-seeking motivation is PARTYSIZE. Our expectation is that politicians are less likely to switch from larger parties. The pooled estimation result related to PARTYSIZE variable correctly capture evidence for this argument. Although the term-base regression result does not exhibit a clear effect, our model for pooled data presents a significant negative effect. The results in Table 5 suggests that one unit increase in the number of the seats a party has, the politicians are 0.1% less likely to switch from their original party. The implication is again, that larger parties offer more cabinet position, government rewards and policy power making the politicians less prone to switch.

Lastly, we introduced CABINET variable to deal with office-seeking motivation. According to the results, there is no significant relationship between being a cabinet member and likelihood of switching despite the negative coefficient.

When politicians are taking the switching decision, their second motivation is to be re-elected in the following ballot. We measure each candidate's value in the eye of their party by calculating VDR variable. According to the pooled estimation, 1% increase in the VDR variable decreases the likelihood of switching by 0.1% and the direction is in line with our prediction. The coefficient of this variable is also negative in each term base estimation when there is a significant relationship. Rational politicians seem to prefer to stay in the party, which give them higher value.

Following variable RILE_HOME is introduced to capture the relationship between location of the policy competition and the switching likelihood. According to the logit estimation of the pooled data, there is a significant negative relationship between this variable and the likelihood of switching. We can infer from the estimate of the coefficient that when policies are relatively closer to left; politicians are more likely to switch.

Apart from explanatory variables, we introduced a number of control variables into the analysis. The estimate of GENDER variable did not provide any significant result. We can conclude that gender has no meaningful effect on the switching likelihood. For the SOUTHEAST variable, we find significant positive relationship. The direction of the relationship is compatible with our expectation, meaning that the politicians elected from the Kurdish regions are more likely to switch. This can be attributed to the particular voting characteristic in the Kurdish regions. In this part of Turkey, politicians have developed local ties with their constituency making these politicians more confident when taking political decision. For our case, even if they switch, politicians have the belief that it is very likely for the electorate to follow them in the next election.

Moreover, we estimated the effect of having any municipal incumbency on switching behavior by introducing MAYORSHIP variable. Our premise was that when politicians are elected in the local election, this gives them a political reputation on the eye of their party making the politicians less likely to switch. However, we do not find any significant relationship for this variable.

Lastly, we controlled the politicians past switching moves introducing the REPEATER variable. In every case where the variable is significant, it highlights that once a politician switched it is more likely to switch again compared to a non-switcher.

In the second part of the analysis, we performed parametric survival analysis to estimate the determinant of party switching. We used this technique as survival analysis enables to examine the time effect on the hazard rate of switching along with the effect of the covariates. We expect that timing is also an important factor in account for the party switching behavior. Table 6 exhibits the results obtained from the parametric survival analysis for each legislature, separately and Table 7 presents the outputs for the estimation of pooled data.

The sign of INGOVERNMENT variable, which is related to office-seeking motivation, is positive and significant in all periods except for 1991-1995 and 2007-2011 periods. The overall analysis also exhibits the same result which is contrary to our prediction. According to the Table 7, being a member of governing party increases the switching hazard. Although this result does not support our office-seeking hypothesis, we think that a different interpretation must be stated considering the characteristics of politics in Turkey. When we look at the time span under observation, we see that in almost half of the legislatures, coalition governments rule the Turkish politics and in these years, political arena was dominated by instability and uncertainty. Therefore, being affiliated to a governing party did not necessarily signal a safe position regarding the access to resources such as higher probability of cabinet or commission membership or access the state other state resources. Even, the bargaining process between coalition partners might have an effect over switching decisions resulting a positive relationship between INGOVERNMENT variable and hazard of switching.

For the CABINET variable, the pooled estimation does not show any significant relationship on switching hazard although only the 3rd legislature meets our expectation that cabinet position should decrease the hazard rate of switching.

For the PARTSIZE variable, which is constructed to capture the effect of large parties over switching decision, we obtained negative relationship on the switching hazard only for the 1983-1987 and 1987-1991 periods. However, the overall estimation support our second hypothesis by exhibiting negative and significant relationship. This result supports our argument that when the number of the seats holding by a party increases, the switching hazard of the member of these parties decreases.

On the term basis, although VDR has only statistically significant negative sign for the 1995-1999 period, Table 7 indicates that, in the pooled estimation, VDR has a negative and significant effect on the switching hazard. The interpretation is that when the value of the politician in the eye of his/her affiliated party increases, the hazard of switching for the politician decreases. This result is consistent with our expectation and also compatible with the logit estimation. This finding is an evidence for the re-election motivation of the politicians since the bigger VDR values increases the expectation of the politicians regarding to be re-elected in their home party and makes the party switching less likely.

Moreover, RILE_HOME variable has statistically significant negative effect on the hazard of party switching for all the periods except for the 2002-2007 and 2007-2011 legislatures. Our overall estimation also present a negative relationship meaning that when the competition locates closer to the left, the hazard rate of switching increases for politicians.

REPEATER variable has no meaningful effect on the switching hazard. We have not found any statistically difference between the first-time switcher and the politician who practiced this behavior more than once.

Our model does not produce any significant result for the MAYORSHIP variable. Having a municipal incumbency before running as a candidate in general elections has no significant effect on party switching behavior.

According to the pooled estimation, being elected from the southeast regions has statistically positive effect on the switching hazard. The result is consistent with our expectation as the local ties between the electorate and the politicians in the Kurdish regions are stronger. This particular characteristic reduces the re-election risk of the politicians even if they switched.

Lastly, for the time dummies we have found different effect for different legislature. For the 1st, legislature, the estimate for BUDGET dummy demonstrates that the periods in which the budget negotiations take place are seen to increase the switching hazard significantly.

In the 1987-1991 period, politicians switch more at times shortly after the election. Our model exhibits that budget periods are also significantly increase the switching hazard. According to the results in Table 6, estimates for POSTELECTION and BUDGET dummies are statistically significant at 10% and 1% level, respectively.

In the 3rd legislature, however, re-election concerns are seen to be more effective on party switching. The budget periods are still significantly increases the switching hazard.

In the 4th and 5th legislatures, the budget periods lose their effects on party switching. Instead, POSTELECTION periods have a significant negative effect on switching hazard whereas PREELECTION periods increases the hazard of switching, significantly.

For the 6th legislature, we could not obtain any significant results which are not surprising as the number of switches in this period is quite low. However, in the 7th legislature, post-election period seems to increase the switching hazard, significantly.

For the overall estimation, we do not present any explanation for BUDGET period, as we could not include any budget dummies into the pooled estimation due to the different length of each legislature. However, we have found significant

negative relationship between the post-election periods and party-switching indicating that for the 60 days after the election, the hazard of switching is significantly lower for the politicians comparing to the other days during the legislature. Yet, for the overall estimation, pre-election period, which is one year before the next election increases the hazard of switching.



Table 6 Weibull regression in proportional hazard form by terms

VARIABLES	1983-1987	1987-1991	1991-1995	1995-1999	1999-2002	2002-2007	2007-2011
<i>GENDER</i>	-0.525 (0.719)	-18.18 (14,164)	0.908 (0.594)	-0.349 (0.593)	-0.342 (0.448)	0.0899 (0.743)	0.0756 (0.749)
<i>INGOVERNMENT</i>	363.8*** (49.28)	35.58*** (7.454)	-0.141 (0.441)	1.973*** (0.601)	-1.050*** (0.384)	11.90*** (2.049)	28.80 (1,575)
<i>CABINET</i>	-0.461 (1.044)	1.069* (0.626)	-0.775** (0.331)	-0.276 (0.471)	-0.213 (0.300)	-0.248 (1.055)	-16.10 (4,001)
<i>PARTYSIZE</i>	-1.468*** (0.194)	-0.170*** (0.0350)	-0.000365 (0.00596)	0.00668 (0.00443)	0.0820*** (0.0154)	-0.0709*** (0.0109)	-0.0906 (2.130)
<i>VDR</i>	-0.00488 (0.0105)	-0.0114 (0.0182)	0.00979 (0.00961)	-0.0285** (0.0137)	0.000276 (0.0111)	8.28e-05 (0.0169)	-0.00986 (0.0186)
<i>RILE_HOME</i>	-11.36*** (1.546)	-0.388*** (0.0787)	-0.0834*** (0.0218)	-0.0442*** (0.00787)	-0.0762*** (0.0159)		-1.811 (202.2)
<i>REPEATER</i>	-	-	1.711*** (0.382)	0.559 (0.422)	2.667*** (0.474)	0.159 (0.729)	-16.58 (2.409)
<i>MAYORSHIP</i>	-0.173 (0.517)	-0.861 (1.025)	0.114 (0.376)	0.616* (0.338)	0.279 (0.431)	-0.628 (0.734)	-16.48 (2,641)
<i>SOUTHEAST</i>	0.0822 (0.342)	0.372 (0.618)	0.0751 (0.308)	-0.0882 (0.322)	0.260 (0.302)	0.951** (0.401)	-16.19 (3,073)
<i>POSTELECTION</i>	-19.97 (80.885)	2.835* (1.688)	-18.17 (447.0)	-7.999*** (1.155)	-13.27*** (1.612)	-12.49 (827.4)	2.772*** (0.790)
<i>BUDGET</i>	1.504*** (0.232)	1.897*** (0.442)	1.476*** (0.288)	-0.468 (0.424)	-0.898 (0.731)	-0.847 (0.605)	-16.43 (3,249)
<i>PREELECTION</i>	0.388 (0.336)	0.362 (0.666)	2.742*** (0.269)	2.028*** (0.243)	4.394*** (0.225)	-0.0964 (0.488)	1.096 (0.716)
Observations	2,665	3,709	2,538	3,844	3,773	5,650	4,527

* Standart errors in parantheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

** Due to small number of failures, we could not obtain parameter estimates for the last legislature between 2011-2015.

Table 7 Weibull Regression in Proportional Hazard Form (Pooled Data)

VARIABLES	(Pooled Est.) Coefficient
<i>GENDER</i>	-0.0603 (0.231)
<i>VDR</i>	-0.00871** (0.00430)
<i>PARTSIZE</i>	-0.0103*** (0.000647)
<i>SOUTHEAST</i>	0.285** (0.138)
<i>MAYORSHIP</i>	-0.160 (0.185)
<i>CABINET</i>	-0.209 (0.175)
<i>INGOVERNMENT</i>	0.743*** (0.104)
<i>RILE_HOME</i>	-0.00871*** (0.00274)
<i>REPEATER</i>	0.201 (0.219)
<i>POSTELECTION</i>	-4.292*** (0.242)
<i>PREELECTION</i>	1.412*** (0.136)
Observations	9,883

7. CONCLUSION

The particular characteristics of the electoral competition in Turkey put politicians in a risky situation in many ways. First, they should be chosen to run for elections as a candidate from a high list position. Secondly, they should abstain to be in the party, which faced with 10% threshold constraint along with pursuing to place in a party whose votes are maximized. Moreover, they should be a member of the party whose ideological stance is compatible with his/hers. Facing to all these risky factors, party switching is very frequent in Turkish politics. In this thesis, we investigated the factors behind the party switching behavior of the politicians in Turkey and aimed to reveal the main motivation behind this practice.

Our results do not provide evidence for the first hypothesis that being in government parties decrease the likelihood of switching. However, we can conclude that when the party size of the party increases, its politicians are less prone to switch.

The findings of the study also support the hypothesis that politicians in Turkey behave for the re-election prospect. The negative and significant sign of VDR value demonstrates that politicians calculate their election success and uncertainty for the next election. In this context, we concluded that re-election motivation drives the politicians when they are switching to different parties than their original party.

With our variables at hand, we cannot reach a clear conclusion for the policy-concerns for party switching. What we know from our analysis is that occurrence of party switching depends the location of policy competition. When the competition approaches to the left, politicians are more likely to switch.

Another important implication is that timing matters for the politicians when they are taking switching decision. Switching in the pre-election period seems to be the dominant strategy for the politicians in Turkey.



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
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