



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Political Science and Public Administration

Political Science

EXPLAINING PARTY CHANGE IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF AKP

Hakan YAVUZYILMAZ

Ph.D. Dissertation

Ankara, 2018

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
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
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
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
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
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
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Hakan YAVUZYILMAZ

ETİK BEYAN

Bu alıřmadaki bütn bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar erevesinde elde ettiđimi, grsel, iřitsel ve yazılı tm bilgi ve sonuları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduđumu, kullandığım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadığımı, yararlandığım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduđumu, tezimin kaynak gsterilen durumlar dıřında zgn olduđunu, Tez Danıřmanının **Prof. Dr. Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdađı** danıřmanlığında tarafımdan retilildiđini ve Hacettepe niversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstits Tez Yazım Ynergesine gre yazıldıđını beyan ederim.

Hakan YAVUZYILMAZ

To my mom...



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Prof. Dr. Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdağı for her support, intellectually and academically stimulative feedbacks, and her patience during the writing process of this thesis. I am also grateful to the thesis committee members Doç. Dr. Saime Özçürümez and Doç. Dr. Dimitris Tsarouhas who provided very valuable feedbacks on different stages of the writing process. I also would like to express my gratitude to the thesis defence jury members Prof. Dr. Aylin Özman and Yrd. Doç. Dr. Şebnem Yardımcı-Geyikçi who provided very valuable feedbacks during my thesis defence. I would like to express my gratitude to Yrd. Doç. Dr. Şebnem Yardımcı-Geyikçi as she devoted her valuable time on my research interests, possible publications and my future academic career.

The pages of this section is not enough for me to express my gratitude to Doç. Dr. Dimitris Tsarouhas who have been highly supportive and intellectually stimulating. His contribution to my PhD studies went beyond the writing process of this thesis. He has been a valuable mentor academically and devoted his valuable hours for me without hesitation. He stands out as a model for me in terms of my future relationship with my prospective students, teaching style, and academic production throughout my academic career.

My friends' and colleagues' inputs have also been highly valuable. I feel lucky that I have highly critical and supportive friends and colleagues. I wish to thank my colleagues Bilge Durutürk and Özgür Aktaş at Hacettepe University who have been highly supportive during the writing process. I would like to thank to my friends Erkan Akçabay, Emek Erdolu, Onur Bektaş, Hasan Tarman, and Mutluhan Bilgin. Our lively political debates and their companionship during the writing process were highly valuable for me.

I also would like to express my gratitude to my family. My brother Serkan Yavuzylmaz's jokes and our entertaining moments have been highly comforting during the stressful phases of my PhD studies. I would like to thank my dad Prof. Dr. Hüsnü Yavuzylmaz for keeping me on track by recurrently asking me about the writing process of this thesis. I am highly grateful to my mom Prof. Dr. Ezel Berker

who has been highly supportive in all critical phases of my life. Without her support, guidance, and inspiration I would not be able to accomplish this and be the person who I am today; and that's why I dedicate this thesis to her.

During my PhD studies my greatest accomplishment is that I found the love of my life Deniz Yavuzylmaz. Without her patience and support against my complaints and whims, completion of this thesis would be a much more difficult task. I would like to thank her for her patience and support both as a wife and also for her critical inputs on the manuscript, as a professional. I benefited to a great extent from her analytical and intellectually stimulating feedbacks. I hope I will make up for the days that I left her alone during the stressful writing process.



ÖZET

YAVUZYILMAZ, Hakan. *Explaining Party Change in Turkey: The Case of AKP*. Doktora Tezi, Ankara 2018.

Her ne kadar etki ve önemlerinin azaldığına dair bulgular ve argümanların sayısı artsa da, günümüzde siyasi partiler temsili demokrasilerin işleyişi açısından yaşamsal önemlerini korumaktadırlar. Temsili demokrasilerdeki fonksiyonlarının yanında, siyasi partiler, çevrelerindeki siyasi ve sosyo-ekonomik gelişmelere sürekli uyum sağlama ihtiyacı içerisinde olan organizasyonlardır. Aynı zamanda, siyasi partiler gerek ideolojik olarak gerekse organizasyonel olarak belli bir derece süreklilik göstermek durumundadırlar. Kaçınılmaz olan değişim gerekliliği ve devamlılık arasındaki bu gerilim literatürde siyasi partilerin değişimlerini inceleyen çalışmaların sayısında gözle görülür bir artışa yol açmıştır. Liderlik değişimi, hizipsel çatışmalar/değişimler ve ‘çevresel şok’ gibi siyasi partilerin değişimini inceleyen literatürde sunulan açıklayıcı faktörler, siyasi partilerin yaşadığı keskin dönüşümleri açıklama konusunda değerli katkılar sunsa da, siyasi partilerin süreç içerisindeki yavaş dönüşümlerini açıklamada yetersiz kalmaktadırlar.

Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi demokratik pekişme süreci içerisindeki siyasi partilerin değişimini incelemek açısından ilginç bir örnek oluşturmaktadır. AKP’nin geçirdiği dönüşüm geniş bir literatürün konusu olsa da, yukarda belirtilen ve siyasi partilerin değişimini inceleyen literatürde öne sürülen açıklayıcı faktörler bu siyasi partinin geçirdiği değişimleri açıklamada yetersiz kalmaktadırlar. Bu çalışmanın amacı AKP örneği üzerinden bu teorik sorunsalı incelemektir. Çalışmanın temel argümanı ve bulgusu partinin iktidardaki üç dönem boyunca geçirmiş olduğu ideolojik değişim ve dönüşümün, partinin kurumsallaşma seviyesindeki değişimlerin sonucu ortaya çıkmış olduğudur. Bu çerçevede çalışma aynı zamanda literatürdeki hakim görüş olan

kurumsallaşma seviyesi ve değişim olasılığı arasındaki negatif ilişkiyi de sorgulamaktadır ve partinin oluşum aşaması ve bu sürecin gerçekleştiği iç ve dış siyasi bağlamın siyasi partilerin ideolojik yapılanmasını ve amaçsal önceliklerini etkileyerek kurumsallaşma süreçleri içerisinde değişimlerine neden olduğunu göstermektir. İkinci olarak çalışma, AKP örneği üzerinden siyasi partilerin AB üyelik sürecinde AB'ne yönelik davranışsal tepkilerini ve AB'nin partiler üzerindeki etkilerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Parti Değişimi, Parti Kurumsallaşması, Avrupalılaşma

ABSTRACT

YAVUZYILMAZ, Hakan. *Explaining Party Change in Turkey: The Case of AKP*. Ph.D Dissertation, Ankara 2018.

Despite the arguments on their declining strength and prominence, political parties continue to remain as the key organizations in contemporary representative democracies. Political parties are also depicted as key organizations that are in a constant need for adaptation and change against changing domestic and international context that they are embedded in. Nevertheless political parties are also organizations that need to attain a certain level of stasis. This constant tension between change and stasis initiated a vibrant literature on party change. Proposed explanatory factors of party change such as leadership change, factional rivalry/change, and environmental shock have explanatory value regarding cases that involve pungent changes. Nevertheless, these factors that stimulate party change fails to explain incremental changes that political parties experience.

The Justice and Development Party stands out as an interesting case for studying party change in democracies that are in consolidation process. Although the change that the party experienced is extensively documented, the explanatory factors proposed by the theoretically informed studies of party change are not applicable to the case of AKP. This thesis aims to analyze this theoretical puzzle by focusing on the domain of ideological change and argue that the change that party experienced throughout its three terms in government is an adaptive response to changing levels of party institutionalization. In this way, the thesis also aims to scrutinize the negative relationship between party institutionalization and party change and posit that the initial party formation process and the domestic and international political context that the

party formation process is embedded in significantly affects the goal prioritization and ideological construction process of political parties. Secondly, this thesis will analyze the behavioral response of political parties and EU-led party change and argue that parties level of institutionalization, goal prioritization and effectiveness of EU conditionality determines the prospects of EU-led party change in accession countries.

Key Words

Party Change, Party Institutionalization, Europeanization



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- Justice and Development Party
ASKON	Anatolian Tigers Businessmen's Association
CDEC	Central Decision-Making and Executive Committee
CEC	Central Executive Committee
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CHP	Republican People's Party-Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
EĞİTİM-SEN	Education and Science Worker's Union
EĞİTİM-BİR-SEN	Educator's Trade Union
ESC	Economic and Social Council
EU	European Union
FP	Fazilet Partisi-Virtue Party
HSYK	Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors-Hakimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KAMU-SEN	Confederation of Public Unions
KIY	Public Bid Law-Kamu İhale Yasası
KOBI	Small and Medium Scaled Businesses-Küçük ve Orta Ölçekli İşletmeler
MAZLUM-DER	Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People
MUSIAD	Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association

NSC	National Security Council-Milli Güvenlik Kurulu
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NOM	National Outlook Movement
RP	Welfare Party-Refah Partisi
SP	Felicity Party-Saadet Partisi
TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
TGNA	Turkish Grnad National Assembly-Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi
TISK	Confederation of the Unions for Turkish Employers
TOBB	Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
TURK-IS	Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions
TUSEV	Third Sector Foundation of Turkey
TUSIAD	Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
TUSKON	Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
WB	World Bank

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Political parties remain key institutional actors in contemporary democracies as they are generally perceived as key channels for the expression of political pluralism through organizing public participation in politics and socializing the public to system consensus through interest aggregation.¹ Although often depicted as key political institutions that bring stability to democratic systems, political parties are also portrayed as agents of change in a democratic political system as they continue to remain crucial links between society and government.² Political parties are also depicted as organizations that are in a constant need for adaptation to economic, social, and political changes in their environment.³ Therefore, while can be portrayed as agents of change in competitive multi-party democracies, political parties are also organizations that reflect change. Nevertheless, within the literature on political parties, parties are also often portrayed as conservative organizations which generally resist change organizationally or in identity, 'except and until it is deemed to be necessary for meeting their primary goals.'⁴

This constant tension between inevitably of change and resistance to change ignited lively debate in the theoretically informed studies of party change.⁵ The literature on

¹ For the significance and changing functions of political parties in democracies See, Larry Diamond and R. Günther, eds., *Political Parties and Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Russel J. Dalton, David M. Farrell, Ian McAllister, *Political Parties and Democratic Linkage* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Geoffrey Pridham, ed., *Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe* (New York: Routledge, 1990)

² See, Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Heaven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968)

³ Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, *Parties and Their Environments: Limits to Reform?* (New York: Longman, 1982); Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Luciano Bardi, Stefano Bartolini and Alexander Trechsel, "Party Adaptation and Change and the Crisis of Democracy," *Party Politics* 20, no. 2 (2014); Ingrid Van Biezen, "On the Theory and Practice of Party Formation and Adaptation in New Democracies," *European Journal of Political Research* 44 (2005).

⁴ Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6 (1994).

⁵ Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6 (1994); Robert Harmel, Uk Heo, Alexander Tan, and Kenneth Janda, "Performance, Leadership, Factions and Party Change: An Empirical Analysis," *West European Politics* 18 (1995); Kenneth Janda, "Toward a Performance Theory of Change in Political Parties," *Paper prepared for presentation at the 12th World Congress of the International Sociology Association, Madrid, Spain, 9-13 July 1990*; Kenneth Janda, Christine Edens, and Patricia Goff, "Why Parties Change: Some New Evidence Using Party Manifestos," *Paper prepared for*

party change posits that as conservative organizations, political parties are expected to change when something unexpected is happened.⁶ Based on the general premise of ‘if it isn’t broken don’t fix it’, theories of party change posit external and internal factors that drive party change such as external shock, which involves environmental changes that affects primary goals of political parties, leadership change and change in dominant faction within party organization.⁷ Nevertheless there is discrepancy between dependent variable (party change) defined as “any variation and/or alteration in how parties are organized, what human resources they can draw upon, what they stand for and what they do” and explanatory factors which are proposed for explaining punctuated or abrupt changes experienced by political parties.⁸ Therefore, it can be argued that while the dependent variable is defined very broadly, the explanatory factors proposed by the theories of party change only explain sharp changes leading to a domain of application problem for cases of party change which are more incremental.

The main problem that this thesis will try to address is this discrepancy between the dependent variable and explanatory factors which decrease the explanatory power of party change theories for cases that involve incremental changes. The Justice and Development Party-*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP hereafter) stands out as an interesting case that reflects the aforementioned problems within theories of party change. There is a vast and vibrant literature on AKP as a political party including its organization, initial institutionalization process and ideological position.⁹ Within this

delivery at the XII World Congress of Sociology Bielefeld, Germany July 18-23, 1994; Kenneth Janda, Robert Harmel, Christine Edens, and Patricia Goff, “Changes in Party Identity: Evidence from Party Manifestos,” *Party Politics* 1, no.2 (1995); Robert Harmel and Alexander Tan, “Party Actors and Party Change: Does Factional Dominance Matter?,” *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (2003).

⁶ See, Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6 (1994).

⁷ Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,”

⁸ For the operationalization of party change see, Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 275.

⁹ There is an extensive literature on AKP. For the general attributes of AKP see, William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010); Ümit Cizre, ed., *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: the Making of the Justice and Development Party* (New York: Routledge, 2008); Evangelia Axiallis, *Political Islam and the secular state in Turkey: democracy, reform and the Justice and Development Party* (New York: I. B Tauris, 2014); M. Hakan Yavuz, ed., *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and Ak Parti* (Utah: University of Utah Press, 2006); Arda Can Kumbaracıbaşı, *Turkish Politics and the Rise of the AKP: Dilemmas of Institutionalization and Leadership Strategy* (New York: Routledge, 2009); Sultan Tepe, “Turkey’s AKP: A Model “Muslim Democratic Party,” *Journal of Democracy* 16 no.3 (July, 2005); Pelin Ayan, “Authoritarian Party Structures in Turkey: A Comparison of the Republican People’s Party and the Justice and Development Party,” *Turkish Studies* 11, no.2 (2010). For the basic attributes of AKP’s ideology and its differences and similarities with traditional center-right political parties see, Ergun Özbudun, “From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party,” *South European Society and Politics* 11, no.3-4 (2006); Sefa Şimşek, “Conservative Democracy as a Cosmetic Image in Turkish Politics: The Semiology of

literature, AKP's initial ideological position was portrayed as novel formulation with strong liberal emphasis on pluralistic participatory democracy, basic rights and freedoms including its progressive stance on women's rights, rule of law, and free-market economy.¹⁰ Particularly throughout its first (2002-2007) and second terms (2007-2011), the party was highly progressive in terms of achieving its political and economic targets stated in its Party Program and Election Manifestos. These periods, especially AKP's first term is also generally portrayed as the 'golden age of Europeanization' in which the party initiated highly progressive reforms which were culminated into the opening of accession negotiations in 2005. Nevertheless, there is also a growing literature on AKP's changing stance on the aforementioned liberal attributes.¹¹

In addition to the aforementioned literature that indicates AKP's changing stance, the change that party experienced since its establishment in 2001 was also popularly manifested in speeches of party leadership and founding members of the party. For example prior to 2011 General Elections, the party leadership indicated that the first term of the party was a 'period of apprenticeship' and its second terms was a 'period of experienced apprenticeship', and its third term would be a period of 'mastership'.¹² Additionally, some founding members of the party explicitly stressed the need for the

AKP's Political Identity," *Turkish Studies* 14, no.3 (2013); Zeyneb Çağlıyan-İçener, "The Justice and Development Party's Conception of "Conservative Democracy": Invention or Reinterpretation," *Turkish Studies* 10, no.4 (2009); Simten Coşar and Aylin Özman, "Center-Right Politics in Turkey after the November 2002 Elections: Neoliberalism with a Muslim Face," *Contemporary Politics* 10, no.1 (2010); Sebnem Gümüştü and Deniz Sert, "The Power of Devout Bourgeoisie: The Case of Justice and Development Party in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 6 (November, 2009); Ziya Öniş, "The Political Economy of Islam and Democracy in Turkey: From the Welfare to the AKP," in *Democracy and Development: New Political Strategies for Middle East*, ed. D.Jung (New York: Palgrave, 2006): pp.103-28.

¹⁰ See, Sebnem Gümüştü and Deniz Sert, "The Power of Devout Bourgeoisie: The Case of Justice and Development Party in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 6 (November, 2009); William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010); M. Hakan Yavuz, ed., *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and Ak Parti* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006)

¹¹ For parties changing stance on democracy and rule of law, See, Meltem Müftüler Bac, "The Pandora's Box: democratization and rule of law in Turkey," *Asia-Europe Journal* 14, no.1 (2015); Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey's Judiciary and Drift toward Competitive Authoritarianism," *The International Spectator* 50, no. 2 (2015); Ergun Özbudun, "AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan's Majoritarian Drift," *South European Society and Politics* 19, no.2 (2014); Murat Somer, "Understanding Turkey's Democratic Breakdown: Old vs. New and Indigenous vs. Global Authoritarianism," *Journal of European and Black Sea Studies* (2016); Menderes Çınar and Çağkan Sayın, "Reproducing the Paradigm of Democracy in Turkey: Parochial Democratization in the Decade of Justice and Development Party," *Turkish Studies* 15, no.3 (2014). For AKP's changing stance on women's rights and gender see, Feride Acar and Gülbanu Altınok, "The 'Politics of Intimate' at the Intersection of Neo-liberalism and Neo-conservatism in Contemporary Turkey", *Women's Studies International Forum* 41 (2013) and Deniz Kandiyoti, "Locating the Politics of Gender: Patriarchy, Neo-Liberal Governance and Violence in Turkey", *Research and Policy on Turkey* 1, no.2 (2016).

¹² "Başbakan: 2011'de Ustalık Dönemi Başlayacak," *Hürriyet*, April 3, 2011, accessed September 10, 2016. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/basbakan-2011de-ustalik-donemi-baslayacak-17450622>

party to ‘switch back to its factory settings’ which also indicates the change that party have been going on since its establishment. Nevertheless, change that party went over throughout its multiple terms in government is not analyzed systematically through the lenses of party change theories.

This thesis also aims to address this gap within the literature that specifically centers on AKP. AKP stands out as an interesting case to test the theories of party change for a number of reasons. Firstly, regarding internal determinants of party change, the case of AKP stands out as a divergent case as the party neither experienced a leadership change nor a strong internal factional rivalry, which resulted in a significant factional change. Secondly, considering external factors that are found to be important stimulants that trigger party change such as electoral defeat, again AKP stands out as a divergent case as the party did not face any major electoral loses. In fact, the party successfully increased its vote share in subsequent general elections that took place in 2003, 2007, and 2011. In this context, the main question of this thesis is: despite the absence of main explanatory factors that explain party change, which factors explain the incremental change that AKP experienced?

To address the main question, this thesis argues that changing levels of party institutionalization has more explanatory power for delineating incremental changes that parties experience. The relationship between party institutionalization and party change also stands out as a fairly weakly developed area within theoretically informed studies of party change. It is generally argued that with increasing levels of party institutionalization the prospects of party change will decrease as the process itself stifle the effects of factors that lead party to change.¹³ This research aims to scrutinize this weakly tested argument and posits that changing levels of party institutionalization, rather than leading to a tendency for party level stasis, may trigger incremental party change by changing the goal prioritization of political parties. Therefore, in addition to the core question of the thesis following secondary questions will be answered: (1) how does the genetic phase of political parties effect their goal prioritization? (2) To what extent did the AKP’s initial goal prioritization differed from other mainstream parties?

¹³ Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 261. Similarly, Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand suggest that the relationship between party institutionalization and party change stands out as an exploratory field. See, Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies,” *Party Politics* 8, no.1 (2002), 15.

(4) What particular features of AKP's genetic phase affected the ideological construction process of the party?

Secondly, this thesis aims to analyze the behavioral effects of the EU on political parties. Although there is a growing literature centered on the effects of EU integration and EU accession processes on political parties, this literature to a large extent neglects the level of party institutionalization as a factor that shapes parties' strategic response against EU stimulus. There is a certain level of consensus within the literature on Europeanization of political parties that instead of direct top-down structural effects on political parties, EU 'hits' political parties in a behavioral way.¹⁴ Based on this statement, the tentative conclusion regarding the EU effect on political parties is that EU stimulus mainly constrains parties and becomes a political liability structure for party leaderships due to the prospects of unintended politicization that may negatively affect the organizational cohesiveness and electoral fortunes of political parties. Faced with such a constraining effect, Robert Ladrech suggests that the behavioral strategy of party leadership generally centers on directing attention of voters and party members away from the EU as an issue.¹⁵

This thesis aims to scrutinize this tentative conclusion which is to a large extent centered on political parties that are competing in the EU member states. While the Europeanization of politics, polity, and policies are extensively studied, EU effects on AKP as a political party continue to remain a neglected field of inquiry.¹⁶ To better delineate the strategic responses of AKP against EU effect, this thesis will try to answer the following secondary questions: How the institutionalization process of AKP and the party's specific goals interacted with EU accession process? What factors best explain the variation between EU becoming political liability structure or political opportunity

¹⁴ Robert Ladrech, "Party Change and Europeanization: Elements of an Integrated Approach," *West European Politics* 35, no. 3 (May 2012); Robert Ladrech, "Causality and Mechanisms of Change in Party Europeanization Research," *Keele European Parties Research Unit (KEPRU) Working Paper* 36 (2012).

¹⁵ Robert Ladrech, "Causality and Mechanisms of Change in Party Europeanization Research",

¹⁶ For a general overview of Turkey's Europeanization process see, Aylin Güney and Ali Tekin, eds., *The Europeanization of Turkey: polity and politics* (New York: Routledge, 2015) and Aylin Güney and Ali Tekin, eds., *The Europeanization of Turkish Public Policies: A Score Card* (New York: Routledge, 2016). Regarding the mechanisms of EU impact on political parties in general and AKP in particular the research mainly focused on top-down vertical notion of EU impact and found that the EU effect remained minimal. See, Filiz Başkan Canyaş and Selin Bengi Gümrükçü, "Europeanization and Political Parties in Turkey," in *The Europeanization of Turkey: polity and politics*, eds. Aylin Güney and Ali Tekin (New York: Routledge, 2015):145-161 and Jakup Wodka, "Institutional Aspects of the (De-) Europeanization of Turkish Political Parties. The case of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and The Republican People's Party (CHP)," *Journal of Balkan and Near East Studies* 19, no.2 (2015).

structure for AKP leadership? Through which mechanisms EU impact led to party change during AKP's first term under effective EU conditionality? Does the variation regarding the effectiveness of EU conditionality led to a behavioral change in AKP in terms of strategic usage of EU norms, values, and policy paradigms?

To answer the primary question and secondary questions, this thesis is designed as a temporal comparative single case study to investigate the effects of changing levels of party institutionalization on party change. To analyze the effects of changing levels of party institutionalization on ideological change, AKP's first term (2002-2007) will be compared to the party's second and third terms (2007-2011 and 2011-2014). Such a periodization also enables to better delineate the effects of changing levels of EU impact (effectiveness of EU conditionality) as starting from AKP's second term the effectiveness of EU conditionality derailed to a large extent. The analysis will be intentionally limited to the election of party leader as President to control the effect of leadership change on the party.

Although there are various domains that traces of party change can be depicted, this research will focus on the domain of ideological change. AKP's ideology is generally portrayed as a peculiar amalgamation of liberal, conservative and even social democratic attributes. To analyze incremental ideological change, this thesis will employ the conceptual framework proposed by Wendy Brown that entails competing and complementary political rationalities of center-right political parties. Accordingly, to better conceptualize the incremental ideological change, the initially proposed ideology of conservative democracy by the party will be deconstructed and analyzed by delineating differing rationalities embedded in it which are: neoliberal-political rationality, moral-political rationality, and liberal-juridical rationality. Consequently, ideological change will be operationalized as shifting prioritizations between the three rationalities that are embedded in party's initial ideological construction of conservative democracy.

To trace ideological change, the empirical analysis centers on AKP's specific social policies throughout its three terms, which are indicative of party's ideological change. Such a policy based analysis enables to delineate incremental ideological change, which this thesis aims to explore. Although the policies that are indicative of party's

ideological change are multiple and cover other policy areas. These three policy fields are illustrative examples that represent the coexistence of party's neoliberal-political rationality and moral-political rationality which will enable to better delineate the changing prioritization between the two during the AKP's three consecutive terms. Thus, the analysis is centered on AKP's policies on education, women's rights and gender, and social security. The chapter on social security/social care will be analyzed as a deviant case as I expect not to find any observable change. Including social security/social care will have utility to better delineate the explanatory factors for change within the domains of women's rights/gender and education.

This thesis argues that changing levels of party institutionalization has more explanatory power in explaining incremental change that the AKP experienced over its three consecutive terms. Party institutionalization is a complex and multi-dimensional process. In that regard, the internal and external dimensions of party institutionalization will be analyzed in separate chapters within the above mentioned time frame. Comparative analysis between two time frames will enable us to explain the changing levels of party institutionalization.

Regarding internal dimensions of party institutionalization, there are many different indicators proposed for measuring the degree of systemness of a party. Nevertheless, certain indicators appear within the literature over and over again. The presence of central bureaucracy with an organizational structure that has territorial comprehensiveness, availability and type of financial resources, and degree of organizational heterogeneity/cohesion can be grouped under the indicators of organizational development/complexity and stability which are found to be basic determinants of intra-party dimensions of party institutionalization. The organizational structure and territorial comprehensiveness will be analyzed through official primary sources such as Law on Political Parties and its effects on organizational development of AKP, official party documents such as party bylaws and annual financial reports of the party. The degree of organizational cohesion will be analyzed mainly through past interviews with the party officials in the press. Additionally, interviews by the party members from various organizational levels that appear in the previously conducted research will also be utilized to assess the degree of organizational cohesion.

Additionally, apart from these formal indicators of organizational development, informal accounts of systemness such as the relationship between the party leadership and party organization and extend of intra-party democracy will provide important clues on organizational cohesion (i.e. prospects of intra-party dissent and factionalism). These informal accounts of systemness will be measured through the analysis of candidate selection methods and the role of the party leadership in the process.

With regard to external dimensions of party institutionalization, the AKP's changing level of decisional autonomy will be analyzed in a comparative framework. In each time frame the degree of decisional autonomy will be analyzed by focusing on parties changing relationship with the extra-parliamentary institutional veto players such as the military, President of the Republic, high judiciary. Additionally, parties changing relations with civil society organizations and media will be also briefly analyzed as they are also proposed as indicators of external dimensions of party institutionalization within the literature. Variations on the level of party's reification/support will be measured through conducted pre and post- election survey research for three consecutive general elections in 2002, 2007, 2011 to delineate changing voter level rationale for party choice.¹⁷

The policy based case studies aims to analyze: 1) The effects internal dynamics in policy-making process (is there an intra-party dissent or cohesion) 2) Party's relationship and responses to the extra-parliamentary institutional veto players during policy-making process. 3) The interrelationship between the internal dynamics and external dynamics of policy making process. 4) The effect of EU on policy making and policy-framing process. 5) Symptomatic analysis of EU led changed within the specific policy domains.

¹⁷ The aforementioned three general elections is extensively analysed through pre and post election surveys. The findings of these seminal studies will be used to measure parties changing relationship with its constituency. See, Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Rise of the New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey: The Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the November 2002 Elections in Turkey," *South European Society and Politics* 7, no.3 (2002); Ali Çarkoğlu, "Ideology or Economic Pragmatism? : Profiling Turkish Voters in 2007," *Turkish Studies* 9, no.2 (June 2008); Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Justice and Development Party at Helm: Resurgence of Islam or Restitution of the Right-of-Center Predominant Party," *Turkish Studies* 11, no.1 (2010); Ali Çarkoğlu, "Turkey's 2011 Elections: Towards a Dominant Party System?," *Insight Turkey* 13, no.3 (2011).

The policy based analysis will be analyzed by utilizing process tracing which have more utility in terms of uncovering complex casual relationships in action.¹⁸ While the policy proposals themselves within abovementioned domains are indicative of party's changing ideological stance, such analysis provides only an incomplete picture in terms of delineating party's ideological change. Therefore, a detailed analysis of policy-framing will also be provided to see how the party justified its policy proposals and whether or not we see change in terms of policy-framing which stands out as another parameter to assess changing prioritization between two political rationalities embedded in its identity. Last but not the least, policy-based analysis will also focus on policy implementation which stands out as another parameter for changing prioritization of differing, yet coexisting political rationalities. Therefore the policy based analyses that are indicative of changing prioritization of neoliberal political rationality and moral political rationality will include three levels: 1) Content of the proposed policies, 2) Policy-making, 3) Policy-framing, 4) Policy implementation.

The data are gathered from the press interviews with the party leadership, officials, party MP's statements in the sessions on the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) which provide important clues on how the EU was strategically used during the policy framing process. The responses of extra-parliamentary institutional veto players were gathered from news press including mainstream newspapers such as *Hürriyet Daily*, *Sabah Daily*, *CNN Turk*, and *NTV*. Additionally, sources such as party election manifestos, government programs, and party program will be used to analyze party's initial stance on the policies and how it changed with actual policy making process.

Chapter 2 will present the theoretical framework of the thesis. The chapter will provide a literature review for party change, party institutionalization and Europeanization to depict the gaps in these fields and will be devoted to building the theoretical framework for explaining the incremental ideological change that AKP experienced throughout its three consecutive terms in office. First part will review the basic definitions and explanatory factors of party change. Second section will review the definitions and

¹⁸ Andrew Bennet and Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices," in *Proccess Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*, eds. Andrew Bennet and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 3-39, 9.

dimensions of party institutionalization and its effects on party change. Final section will be devoted to conceptualization and theoretical explanations of Europeanization in general and Europeanization of political parties, in particular.

Chapter 3 is organized in two sections. First section will analyze the ‘genetic code/phase’ of AKP. The party institutionalization literature emphasize that the so-called ‘genetic code’ of political parties has direct effects on the institutionalization process of political parties. In that regard, the chapter will aim not only to provide a brief historical background but also to delineate the party formation process and domestic political environment that this process was embedded in which had important effects on the processes of AKP’s ideological construction, institutionalization and goal prioritization. Second section of Chapter 3 will outline the basic features of AKP’s ideology conceptualized by the party as conservative democracy. Following the deconstruction of its liberal, conservative, and social democratic features, the chapter will provide operationalization of the contested concept of ideology and critically review the conventional methodologies for measuring ideological change of political parties. Finally, the section will present the analytical framework of the thesis for the analysis of incremental ideological change.

Chapters 4 and 5 will be devoted to a detailed analysis of party institutionalization process by focusing on its internal and external dimensions. Chapter 4 will focus on internal dimension of party institutionalization through detailed analysis of AKP’s general organizational features, changing levels of organizational cohesion, development and changing relationship between party leadership and party organization.

Chapter 5 will analyze the external dimensions of party institutionalization which are proposed in the literature as the level of decisional autonomy and level of reification. AKP’s changing levels of decisional autonomy will be traced through a detailed analysis of the party’s changing relationship with institutional veto players such as the Military, Office of Presidency, and the Judiciary. Additionally, AKP’s changing relationship vis-à-vis civil society organizations and media will also be analyzed to better delineate changing levels of the party’s decisional autonomy throughout its three consecutive terms. This section will be followed by a detailed analysis of AKP’s

changing relationship with its core constituency as an indicator of the party's changing level of reification/support.

The subsequent chapters (Chapter 6, Chapter 7, and Chapter 8) will center on the empirical analysis of AKP's policies that are proposed as indicative of ideological change that the party experienced throughout its three consecutive terms. Chapter 6 will analyze AKP's policies on women's rights and gender through a detailed analysis of the party's stance on adultery, women's employment, and abortion to trace shifting prioritization between its neoliberal-political rationality and moral-political rationality. Chapter 7 will center on AKP's policies on education as an indicative of the party's ideological change. The main focus will be on party's changing stance regarding formal education, curriculum, and vocational schools. Chapter 8 will analyze AKP's changing stance on social security and social care.

The concluding chapter will bring together the main findings of the thesis through a comparative analysis of the empirical policy-based chapters. Moreover, based on the conclusion of the thesis, the final chapter will also devoted to some shortcomings and some research areas and potential questions for further research which exceeds the limits of this thesis.

CHAPTER II

PARTY CHANGE, PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION

This chapter will review the theoretical debates on party change and party institutionalization to identify the gaps and shortcomings within two literatures. As the forthcoming sections will demonstrate, the explanatory factors proposed by the theories of party change such as leadership change, factional change, and/or environmental shocks fails to explain incremental ideological change that this thesis aims to explore. In fact, the case of AKP shows that the aforementioned explanatory factors are not present or at least did not create strong pressure for change throughout the party's three terms. Therefore, AKP is a case that theories party change remains weak to explain the party's incremental ideological change which can be better conceptualized as an adaptational response to the changing levels of party institutionalization. In that regard, the intra-party and external dimensions of party institutionalization are argued to have significant impacts on party's ideological stance in general, and its policies that are indicative of party's ideological change in particular. This thesis employs party institutionalization as the theoretical framework which has more utility in terms of explaining intra-organizational and external dynamics of party adaptation and incremental ideological change which is neglected by the theoretically informed studies of party change that have more explanatory power for cases of fundamental, pungent, and intermittent party change.

Secondly, this thesis aims to analyze the variations in terms of AKP's behavioral response to EU effect under effective EU conditionality during the party's first term and ineffective EU conditionality during its second and third terms by using Europeanization as a conceptual framework. Political parties do not easily fit into the mainstream explanations based on top-down conceptualization of the EU effect. As Ladrech suggests, regarding political parties, instead of structural effects, EU 'hits'

political parties in a behavioral way and mainly constrains parties and becomes a political liability structure which leads to a behavioral strategy of directing attention of party members and domestic actors from the EU as an issue. This thesis aims to analyze this finding which is to large extent centered on political parties that are competing in EU member states. Regarding political parties that compete in candidate countries it will be argued that EU may both become a political opportunity structure and political liability structure depending on a set of both domestic-party level and EU level factors. Therefore this chapter also briefly reviews the Europeanization literature in general and Europeanization of political parties, in particular to build a framework that better encapsulates behavioral effects of EU on political parties that compete in non-member states.

First section of the chapter will review the literature on party change, identify the dependent and independent variables within theoretically informed studies of party change and will assess their utility in explaining the type of change that we observe within the case of AKP. Second section will examine the theoretically informed studies of party institutionalization and delineate the internal and external dimensions of the process. Next section will demonstrate the contested nature of the concept of Europeanization and present different theoretical explanations and mechanisms of EU-induced change, both within member states and non-member states. After presenting what we know about party institutionalization and mechanisms of Europeanization the next section will introduce the theoretical framework of the thesis for analyzing the behavioral response of political parties towards EU. Final section will present the research design and methodology of the thesis.

2.1 THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF PARTY CHANGE

While portrayed as conservative organizations that are resistant to change, political parties are organs of representation whose responsiveness is democratically tested at regular intervals and, as such they are presumed to be sensitive to changes in their external environment.¹⁹ Therefore, there is a tension between resistance to change and inevitability of change within parties which further enhances scholarly attention on party change. Consequently, within the broader research field of political parties²⁰, theoretically informed explanations of party change have been receiving increasing attention.²¹ Subsequently, the theoretical frameworks of party change have been tested within empirical studies.²² Fundamentally, there is a widespread agreement within the literature of party change that parties-especially big and established ones- have to change when they are exposed to pressures.²³

Vast number of variables is needed to explain party change fully, and theorizing about party change has been trying to bring order to the multi-causality of party change. Although party change can be depicted as an effect of leadership change, socio

¹⁹ Party change theories posit that parties are conservative organizations that resist change unless some internal and external impact affects the capacity of goal attainment. See, Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6 (1994).

²⁰ Please see, Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (Essex: European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Press, 2015); Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (London: Methuen, 1954); Kay Lawson, ed., *Political Parties and Democracy* 5 vols. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2010); Richard S. Katz and William J. Crotty, eds., *Handbook of Political Parties* (New York: Sage, 2006).

²¹ See, Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6 (1994); Robert Harmel, Uk Heo, Alexander Tan, and Kenneth Janda, "Performance, Leadership, Factions and Party Change: An Empirical Analysis," *West European Politics* 18 (1995); Kenneth Janda, "Toward a Performance Theory of Change in Political Parties," *Paper prepared for presentation at the 12th World Congress of the International Sociology Association, Madrid, Spain, 9-13 July 1990*; Kenneth Janda, Christine Edens, and Patricia Goff, "Why Parties Change: Some New Evidence Using Party Manifestos," *Paper prepared for delivery at the XII World Congress of Sociology Bielefeld, Germany July 18-23, 1994*; Kenneth Janda, Robert Harmel, Christine Edens, and Patricia Goff, "Changes in Party Identity: Evidence from Party Manifestos," *Party Politics* 1, no. 2 (1995); Robert Harmel and Alexander Tan, "Party Actors and Party Change: Does Factional Dominance Matter?," *European Journal of Political Research*, 42 (2003).

²² For example, Robert Harmel, Uk Heo, Alexander Tan, and Kenneth Janda, "Performance, Leadership, Factions and Party Change: An Empirical Analysis," *West European Politics* 18 (1995); Tim Duncan, "Lately, Things Just Don't Seem the Same: External Shocks, Party Change and the Adaptation of the Dutch Christian Democrats during 'Purple Hague' 1994-8," *Party Politics* 13, no. 1 (2007); Clay Clemens, "Modernization or Disorientation? Policy Change in Merkel's CDU," *German Politics* 18, no. 2 (2009); Tim Bale, *The Conservatives Since 1945: The Drivers of Party Change* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

²³ Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," 262.

economic change, change in political culture, constitutional or institutional change, theoretically informed studies of party change generally aims to build parsimonious theoretical models which provides generalizable hypothesis.²⁴ As Bale indicates, “the function of a theory in the social sciences is less to account for all possible sources of variation than to impose intellectual order on the major factors in a situation of multi-causality.”²⁵ Before going into the explanations of party change and various factors identified by different theoretical studies, it is important to answer the simple question of “What constitutes party change?”

2.1.1 Concept of Party Change

As Bale suggests with regard to what constitutes party change a simple answer of “we know it when we see it” is never a great answer.²⁶ Defining the scope and domain of the concept of party change has been a difficult task within the literature of party change. Peter Mair contended that defining change at the level of individual parties is more difficult than defining change at the level of party system. As Mair suggests:

“In the case of party change, the essence is elusive, and whether a party actually has changed, or become a new party, or whatever, is difficult to ascertain...inevitably, discussions of party change will continue to avoid the question of actual party change per se and will focus instead on those ongoing processes of change which characterize particular aspects of parties.”²⁷

Within the boundaries of general concept of change defined as something detected through measurement of time, Janda defines party change as the difference in a given party measured at time t and $t+1$.²⁸

²⁴ One of the most cited theoretical model is Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,”

²⁵ Tim Bale, *The Conservatives since 1945: the Drivers of Party Change* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4-5.

²⁶ Tim Bale, *The Conservatives since 1945: the Drivers of Party Change*, 3.

²⁷ Peter Mair, “The problem of Party System Change,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1 (1989), 258.

²⁸ Kenneth Janda, “Toward a Performance Theory of Change in Political Parties,” *Paper prepared for presentation at the 12th World Congress of the International Sociology Association, Madrid, Spain, 9-13 July 1990*, 14.

A definition which is more rigorous, yet broad was put forward by Harmel and Janda. They define party change as “any variation, alteration and modification in how parties are organized, what human and material resources they can draw upon, what they stand for and what they do.”²⁹ This definition includes both the change that party experienced indirectly as a result of forces and actions that are beyond the control of the organization such as decrease support from social groups or death of a leader, and change which directly comes from the decisions of parties themselves. Consequently, they suggest that this broad definition of party change which covers both intentional and unintentional drivers of party change is too broad. Instead, they formulate a theory explaining party change that comes directly from the decisions and actions of the actors within parties (groups or leaders).³⁰ These changes include party rules, structures, policies, strategies and tactics. Accordingly, the definition of party change can be rephrased as any variation, alteration and modification on parties’ rules, structures, policies, strategies and tactics which come directly from the decisions and actions of the actors within parties.

The domain of change signifies the aspects of party characteristics which the theories of party change apply. Janda provides six domains where the traces of party change can be found:³¹

- 1- **Political tactics:** the party can change its campaign tactics under a strategy of electoral competition; of restricting competition of subverting the government. It can more rely on direct contact with individual voters. It can hold public meetings and mass rallies. It can utilize mass media.
- 2- **Organizational structure:** it can change its complexity of organization; centralization of power; relations with other organizations; incentive system.
- 3- **Issue orientation:** it can change its positions on any major political issue/policy or ideological matters.
- 4- **Organizational identity:** the party can continue to exist by adopting a different name; suffering a split but surviving; merging with another party.

²⁹ Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6 (1994), 275.

³⁰ Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 275.

³¹ Kenneth Janda, “Toward a Performance Theory of Change in Political Parties,” 15.

- 5- **Goal Orientation:** it can reorient its basic strategy by starting to compete for elections against other parties; restricting competition by other parties; subverting the existing government.
- 6- **Organizational death:** the party can terminate through a split, losing most of its activists; a merger, being absorbed into another party; voluntary dissolution.

There are also two alternative views on the nature of party change. The main debate is on the timing of the party change and includes two variants, evolutionary and developmental.³² The evolutionary view sees party change being determined by natural tendencies as the organization is passing from one stage to another.³³ The developmental view depicts party change as an effect of changes of alliances within the organization.³⁴

Based on Nadler and Tushman's typology of organizational change, Janda proposes two dimensional classification with regard to party change which is useful in understanding the nature and timing of the change in relation to external stimulus.³⁵ Scope of the change refers whether the change is **anticipatory** and occurs in advance of environmental events or **strategic**, involving most of the organization.³⁶ Tuning refers to whether the change is anticipatory-and occurs in advance of environmental events-or reactive, and follows those events.³⁷ The following fourfold typology of change is suggested by Janda:³⁸

1-**Tuning** refers to incremental changes in anticipation of external events. With regard to specific case of political parties, tuning might involve parties' decision to introduce a research unit to conduct surveys before elections.

2-**Adaptation** applies only to incremental changes following external events. For example, under this typology of change a party would be adapting to its environment as it modifies its position on an issue based on a survey it conducted before elections.

³² Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," 262.

³³ Panebianco associates this view with the work of Robert Michels. Cited in Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," 262.

³⁴ Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 239-40.

³⁵ Kenneth Janda, "Toward a Performance Theory of Change in Political Parties," 2-3.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 3

³⁷ *Idem.*

³⁸ *Idem.*

3- **Reorientation** produces fundamental change in anticipation of an external event.

4- **Recreation** results in fundamental changes in reaction to major events that threaten the party's survival. Janda gives the example of former communist parties of Eastern Europe that changed their names and dropped their Marxist ideologies.

2.1.2 Main Drivers of Party Change

Compared to extensive amount of theoretically informed studies of party system change, studies that aims to explain the change of individual parties is still underdeveloped. Parties-especially big and established ones- are depicted as conservative organizations that prefer stasis rather than change. At the same time political parties are organs of representation whose responsiveness is democratically tested at regular intervals and, as such they are presumed to be sensitive to changes in their external environment. Consequently, this tension between a preference for stasis and inevitability of change leads us to the general conclusion that parties- especially established and big ones- are conservative organizations and have to change when they are in trouble.³⁹ Harmel and Janda assume that parties will only change under pressure because

“...self-imposed change usually consumes human or material resources, parties resist modifying their rules, structures, policies, strategies, and tactics. In addition, they resist change because it threatens the conformation of the dominant coalition.”⁴⁰

In line with their description of political parties as conservative organizations, Harmel and Janda suggest that change within political parties doesn't 'just happen' but must be driven by something.⁴¹

³⁹ Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 278.

⁴⁰ *Idem.*

⁴¹ *Idem.*

The main debate on the drivers of party change is on the explanatory power of the so called internal and external factors that lead party change. Within the literature, the political parties are often depicted as organizations that simply adapt to changes in their environment. These studies, with an evolutionary conceptualization of party change, focused on parties' responses to incremental changes that are taking place in their environments. Kricheimer's study on changing issue positions of western political parties during post-World War II period, and their transformation into catch-all parties is an illustrative example to the studies that perceive party change from an evolutionary perspective.⁴²

More recent studies have criticized the previously dominant assumption that parties simply adapt to changes in their environment and shifted the focus from system level (environmental changes and challenges) to individual party level factors. These studies emphasized the presence of internal factors as a necessary condition for party change even in the presence of environmental stimulus.⁴³ Panebianco suggests that party change is 'related to an elite turnover catalyzed by unresolved environmental challenges.'⁴⁴ The displacement of what he calls a dominant coalition (i.e. a coalition of leading groups within a party who have power resources) is crucial for change.⁴⁵

Other studies focus on another internal factor on party change, namely the leadership change. These studies mainly stressed the prominence of agency over structure and suggest that party change heavily depends on the choices and abilities of party leaders.⁴⁶ One such study is Wilson's study which concludes that party change is strongly dependent on the actions of leaders. Such a conclusion he admits 'stresses the idiosyncratic and unpredictable nature of change rather than helps to discover probabilistic theories of party transformation.' Nevertheless, he argues that party leaders and reformers are key intervening variables that determine whether or not parties will, in fact, respond to any of the factors that make transformation possible or desirable. It is

⁴² See, Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," in *Political Parties and Political Development*, eds. Joseph Palombara and Mayron Weiner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966)

⁴³ See, Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6 (1994); Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Robert Harmel and Alexander Tan, "Party Actors and Party Change: Does Factional Dominance Matter?", *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (2003).

⁴⁴ Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, 288.

⁴⁵ *Idem.*

⁴⁶ For example see, Lars Bille, "Leadership Change and Party Change: The Case of Danish Social Democratic Party," *Party Politics* 3, no.3 (1997).

the exogenous factors which affect party leaders and force them to engender party change.⁴⁷

In their seminal work, Harmel and Janda further refined the causal mechanisms of party change by introducing the concept of ‘external shock’, distinguishing this from the less clear ‘environmental modification’ (a single event) and ‘trend’ (a series of gradual changes in environment within political parties operate).⁴⁸ Environmental changes are social, economic, and political changes and events that take place outside of the party. They suggest that these environmental changes become external shocks if they prevent the party from achieving their primary goal. They define external shock as:

“...an external stimulus so directly related to performance considerations on a party’s ‘primary goal’ that it causes the party’s decision makers...to undertake a fundamental re-evaluation of the party’s effectiveness on that goal dimension.”⁴⁹

Consequently, the notion of external shock is directly related with the goal priority of a political party. Following Laver and Schofield and Budge and Kennan, Harmel and Janda identify parties in terms of a fourfold model of goals: vote-seeking/winning, office seeking, the pursuit of policy, and implementation of intra-party democracy.⁵⁰ Thus, the theory suggests that the nature and scale of the shock depends upon the goal priority of the affected party. For example, parties that are primarily vote-seeking, the collapse of electoral support or a serious defeat within an election would be a serious shock. The electoral defeat is frequently cited within the literature as the main factor leading to party change and often viewed as “the mother of party change”.⁵¹ Parties whose principle aim is ideological would receive an external shock through exogenous changes which undermine their credo. Consequently, political parties that aim at policy maximization could experience an external shock ‘if an event makes obsolete a key plank of a party’s ideology’. In line with this argument, an external event could make obsolete a key policy position of a party and may lead to party change.

⁴⁷ Frank L. Wilson, “The sources of Party Change: The Social Democratic Parties of Britain, France, Germany, and Spain.” in *How Political Parties Work: Perspectives from within*, ed. Kay Lawson (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), 281 and 264.

⁴⁸ Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,”

⁴⁹ Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,” 267.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 272-75

⁵¹ Kenneth Janda, “Toward a Performance Theory of Change in Political Parties,” *Paper prepared for presentation at the 12th World Congress of the International Sociology Association, Madrid, Spain, 9-13 July 1990*, 6.

In each case, the external shock is filtered through the perception of party leaders and other actors within the party. Thus, even in a case of an external shock, party leaders are not expected to affect party change if the costs of the change are anticipated to outweigh the benefits.⁵² Apart from the effects of external shocks on party leaders, Harmel and Janda also suggest that leadership change and change in a dominant faction within a party can also trigger party change.⁵³

While the concept of external shock brought a certain level of theoretical parsimony to the party change studies, as Janda suggests, it tries to explain reactive/pungent changes rather than anticipatory/incremental changes. Accordingly, it can be argued that there is a discrepancy between the definition of dependent variable (party change) and the domain that party change theories apply. Theories of party change generally neglects adaptation (incremental reactive change) and tuning (incremental strategic adaptive change) and focus on more pungent changes conceptualized as reorientation (fundamental changes in anticipation of external events) and recreation (fundamental changes in reaction to major events that threaten the party's survival).

Furthermore, the case of AKP reveals that the main drivers of party change were not present within the time frame of this research. AKP did not experience a leadership change, factional rivalry, and/or electoral defeat which are generally proposed as the main causes of party change within the specific literature. AKP is no different from the rest of Turkish political parties in terms of leadership dominance which prevents strong factional rivalry. The party enjoyed uninterrupted strong and charismatic leadership under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and enjoyed successive elections in which it successfully increased its vote share through three consecutive general elections. As will be shown in this research, the case of AKP further reveals that while the party experienced certain external shocks, rather than making a major change on its policy positions, it deprioritized/attenuated its certain policy positions during its first term in power and reprioritized them during its second and third term. Therefore, theories of party change fail to explain these incremental strategic adaptive changes/shifts which are better captured through a framework which entails both party goals and process of party institutionalization.

⁵² Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," 278.

⁵³ Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," 278

2.2 THE CONCEPT OF PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION

While the concept of institutionalization can be traced back to Huntington's seminal study in which he introduced the concept of institutionalization and its dimensions, Panebianco's seminal study was the first application of the concept to political parties.⁵⁴ Panebianco, by directly focusing on institutionalization of political parties, defines party institutionalization as the process by which an organization 'loses its character as a tool: it becomes valuable in and of itself, and its goals become inseparable and indistinguishable from it'. Consequently, its preservation and survival become a goal for a great number of supporters.⁵⁵

Another definition of party institutionalization was proposed by Randall and Svåsand. They define party institutionalization as 'the process by which the party becomes established in terms of both integrated patterns of behavior and of attitudes or culture within and outside of party'.⁵⁶ This definition goes beyond the party development purely in organizational terms and emphasizes the multi-dimensional nature of the concept which involves both intra party aspects of the process while at the same time signifies its external determinants. Thus the definition proposed by Randall and Svåsand will be employed in this research.

2.2.1 Dimensions of Party Institutionalization

As the preceding section on definition of party institutionalization indicates, the process itself involves both internal dynamics and external dynamics of political parties. Accordingly, Panebianco proposes two dimensions of party institutionalization, internal and external. These dimensions are also suggested as indicators for measuring the

⁵⁴ Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Heaven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968) and Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

⁵⁵ Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 49 and 53.

⁵⁶ Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand, "Party Institutionalization in New Democracies," *Party Politics* 8 no.1 (2002), 12

degree of party institutionalization.⁵⁷ These two criteria are systemness which refers to the internal organizational dynamics (interdependence of different parts of the organization) and external dimension of party's autonomy *vis-à-vis* its environment.⁵⁸ In addition to these different structural dimensions of institutionalization, Randall and Svåsand argue that there is an implicit attitudinal aspect within the process of institutionalization. Thus, they also introduced attitudinal internal and external dimensions: value infusion and reification, respectively. This yields a four-cell matrix which covers both structural and attitudinal and internal and external aspects of party institutionalization (Table 1).⁵⁹

Table 1: Dimensions of Party Institutionalization

	Internal	External
Structural	Systemness	Decisional autonomy
Attitudinal	Value infusion	Reification/Support

Source: Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand "Party Institutionalization in New Democracies," *Party Politics* Vol.8 No.1 (2002): pp 5-29, p. 13

2.2.1.1 External Dimensions of Party Institutionalization

Panebianco suggests that the process of party institutionalization involves a gradual increase of an organization's autonomy *vis-à-vis* its environment. According to Panebianco an organization achieves external autonomy when it can directly control exchange processes with its environment.⁶⁰ On the contrary, the level autonomy decreases with the increasing dependence of the organization on external resources and actors. Parties that depend on external actors such as important interest groups, are controlled, or at least must bargain with them. It is important to note that Panebianco

⁵⁷ The most contested issue within the literature is finding the operational indicators of these dimensions. This will be dealt with within a separate section following the theoretical framework chapter.

⁵⁸ Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)

⁵⁹ Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand "Party Institutionalization in New Democracies," 23.

⁶⁰ Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)

refers to the political parties in consolidated democracies in which state-party relationships is different compared to polities where democratic consolidation process is far from complete. This becomes more decisive regarding the case of AKP in particular and Turkish politics in general as parties' decisional autonomy has been also constrained by extra-parliamentary institutional veto players within state apparatus such as presidency, military, and judiciary and forcing them to adapt to their external institutional setting in order to survive as legitimate players within domestic political context.

A better delineation of external dimension of party institutionalization which also includes the institutional veto players is proposed by Randall and Svåsand. They suggest that the form of interdependence between party and external actors is important as the form of relationship may change and even positively affect party institutionalization depending on the type of relationship.⁶¹ For example Randall and Svåsand gives linkage in which party remains dominant as a positive type of relationship for institutionalization. To suggest a better qualification for external autonomy they emphasize parties' need for decisional autonomy or freedom from interference in determining its own policies and strategies.⁶²

With regard to the attitudinal aspect of external dimension, reification refers to the extent to which the party's existence is established in the public imagination and is a factor shaping the behavior of political actors.⁶³ Therefore reification is about external recognition and legitimacy of the party in its contacts with other institutions in its environment, including other political parties. The degree of reification depends on the particular historical place and symbolic values it can claim to represent. Additionally, reification is strongly affected by party's organizational strength and its ability to access effective means of communication. Last but not least, reification is a function of longevity and party's survival over time. In a later study, Randall further elaborated on the dimension of reification and proposed that party support and loyalty stands out as

⁶¹ Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand "Party Institutionalization in New Democracies," 23.

⁶² Ibid., 14

⁶³ Ibid., 23

other important indicators of external attitudinal dimension/indicator of party institutionalization.⁶⁴

2.2.1.2 Internal Dimensions of Party Institutionalization

Turning back to intra-party dynamics of party institutionalization, the degree of systemness proposed as another important dimension for measuring the degree of party institutionalization.⁶⁵ The degree of systemness entails increasing scope, density and regularity of the interactions that constitute the party as a structure.⁶⁶ Thus, one of the first indicators of systemness is interdependency among the sub structures of the party under the control of centralized bureaucracy which controls resources and intermediate peripheral associations.⁶⁷ In that regard, organizational development is proposed as one of the main indicators of systemness.

In addition to organizational development, the degree of organizational cohesion is also found to be another important indicator for measuring the degree of parties' systemness.⁶⁸ The presence of factional rivalry and internal dissent are the main factors which limit the parties' capacity in terms of achieving organizational cohesion and often portrayed as 'inimical to party institutionalization'.⁶⁹ Political parties differ from each other in terms for achieving organizational cohesion. One way to control factional rivalry and internal dissent within party is through routinization of intra-party democracy and consultation. Organizational cohesion can also be achieved through the routinization of formal rules and procedures which gives central party organs an extensive control over party organization. Last but not least, the relationship between

⁶⁴ Vicky Randall, "Party Institutionalization and its Implications for Democracy," *Paper for Session MT 07.239 Political Parties and Democratization, at the IPSA Congress, at Fukuoka, July 9-13 2006*.

⁶⁵ Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) and Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand "Party Institutionalization in New Democracies," 5-2.

⁶⁶ Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand "Party Institutionalization in New Democracies," 13.

⁶⁷ Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 13, see also, Jason C. Sharman and Robert Phillips Jr., "An Internalist Perspective on Party Consolidation and the Bulgarian Union of Democratic Forces," *European Journal of Political Research* 43 (2004), 402.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 19

party leadership and party organization has also significant implications for degree of intra-party cohesion.⁷⁰

The attitudinal aspect of internal dimension called value infusion which entails the party's relationship with some kind of popular base. It refers to the strength of a distinctive party culture or value system which can be a valid source of party cohesion. Value infusion is set to be strongest when a party is identified with a broader social movement. While party's various sub structures through extensive network of party organization improves its capacity to increase its appeal for broader socio-economic group, the number of affiliated institutions in which party become linchpin in a movement through the development of numerous associations and civil society organizations will also have important positive effects on the capacity for value infusion. This will lead to incorporation of the electorate in to the movement and to infuse party supporters with identification with the movement as a whole.

While there is an agreement on the dimensions of party institutionalization in the literature to some extent, there is an ongoing disagreement whether these dimensions are prerequisites, indicators, consequences, or causes in the literature of party institutionalization.⁷¹ In this research these two dimensions of party institutionalization will be utilized as indicators for measuring the degree of institutionalization. Another major problem remains as the finding appropriate operational indicators for measuring these different dimensions of the process (This will be considered in the final section on research design and methodology). Another important point is that there is no optimum combination for party institutionalization. As Randall and Svåsand indicates:

“Rather, in practice we could expect some variation in the balance amongst these dimensions of institutionalization. For instance we might expect the institutionalization of parties built primarily around the appeal of a particular leader to be more dependent on value infusion than on systemness.”

⁷⁰ Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies,” 23.

⁷¹ Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies,” 5-29.

Consequently, for political parties, the concept of institutionalization to some extent differs from the conventional definition of the term. That's why, in the literature, 'party institutionalization' and 'party consolidation' is sometimes used interchangeably.⁷²

2.2.2 Party Goals and Party Institutionalization

In the party politics literature the main goals ascribed to political parties are proposed as: vote-seeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking.⁷³ Nevertheless, the list is far from exhaustive as some also add the goals of intra-party cohesiveness and ideology-seeking in the list. As Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang C. Müller succinctly suggested, for political parties, there are inescapable trade-offs between these goals, which prevents them from achieving all of them simultaneously.⁷⁴ Since all the aforementioned party goals are in a way also related with each other which also make them mutually constitutive. For example, in order to strengthen its voter base (goal of vote-seeking) a party in government may need to seek policies (goal of policy-seeking) that it promised to its core constituency.

Although vote-seeking, office-seeking, and policy seeking provides a useful abstraction to study party behavior in consolidated democracies, for new democracies and or consolidating democracies the picture becomes more complicated as organizational survival becomes a primary party goal in countries where party competition frequently interrupted by party closures. Turkish party politics, from a historical perspective is full of such cases of party closures. Regarding the case of AKP's first and second terms, one must consider the party goal of organizational survival as the party was on the edge of sharing the fate of the past political parties that were closed due their activities against the enshrined principles in the Constitution.

⁷² Jason C. Sharman and Robert Phillips Jr., "Party Consolidation and the Bulgarian UDF," *European Journal of Political Research* 43 (2004).

⁷³ Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang C. Müller, "Political Parties and Hard Choices," in *Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*, eds. Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang C. Müller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 1-35.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 9-11.

For political parties that record low levels of party institutionalization, the aforementioned trade-offs between goals of vote-seeking/vote-maximization, policy-seeking, and organizational survival is significantly higher. Due to the low levels of decisional autonomy, such parties' room of maneuver and capacity for policy-seeking becomes severely constrained. More importantly, there remains a significant trade-off between policy-seeking goals and organizational survival for parties that suffer from low levels of external legitimacy/reification. Last but not least, a vote-seeking party in government needs to seek policies to fulfill the promises it made to its core constituency to remain in office which may decrease its prospects for organizational survival if these policies drain its prospects for organizational survival.

In that regard, for political parties that record low levels of institutionalization in a highly restrictive domestic political environment, the goal of organizational survival becomes parties' primary goal. In that regard, Panebianco's evolutionary periodization for party institutionalization process needs revision for the case of AKP (Table 2 and Table 3).

Table 2: Institutionalization Process of Political Parties

Phase I: Genesis	Phase II: Institutionalization	Phase III: Maturity
The goal is the realization of the common cause; ideology is manifest		The goal becomes survival and counterbalancing conflicting interests
Collective identities prevail	INSTITUTIONALIZATION	Selective interests prevail
Broad freedom of movement for leaders		Restricted freedom of movement for the leaders
Strategy: Domination of environment		Strategy: Adaptation to the environment

Source: Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 20 Cited in Arda Can Kumbaracıbaşı, *Turkish Politics and the Rise of the AKP: Dilemmas of Institutionalization and Leadership Strategy* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 12.

Table 3: Institutionalization Process of AKP

Phase I: Genesis (2001-2007)	Phase II: Institutionalization	Phase III: Maturity (2007-2011)
The goal is organizational survival under restrictive domestic political environment; ideology is latent		The goal becomes realization of the common goal defined by strong party leadership; ideology is manifest
Selective identities prevail: low level of organizational cohesiveness	INSTITUTIONALIZATION	Common cause set by strong party leadership prevail over selective interests
Restricted freedom of movement for party leadership Strategy: adaptation to environment		Leadership domination, strong room for movement for party leadership Strategy: domination of environment

Source: My own categorization

Based on the aforementioned postulations, the goals that political parties seek are multiple and parties change their goal prioritization throughout their institutionalization processes. Although party change theories succinctly depicts the mechanisms for pungent cases of party change triggered by external and internal impacts on parties primary goals, incremental change might occur through changing goal prioritization of political parties as a result of changing levels of party institutionalization. This brings us to the conventional yet tentative argument on the negative correlation between the prospects of party change and party institutionalization.

2.2.3 Party Institutionalization and Adaptation

The aforementioned dimensions constitute the core of the process of party institutionalization which entails the process by which the party becomes established as an institution. As Randall and Svåsand succinctly suggests while institutionalization connotes persistence and stability, adaptation remains as a less passive concept.⁷⁵ The internal and external dimensions of party institutionalization are not always supportive of party adaptation. In that regard, the adaptation should be seen as a likely but not inevitable consequence of institutionalization.

⁷⁵ Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand "Party Institutionalization in New Democracies," 14.

Regarding the relationship between party change and institutionalization Panebianco also suggested that with increasing levels of party institutionalization the prospects of party change will decrease as the process itself stifles the effects of factors that lead to party change.⁷⁶ Consequently, the exact relationship between adaptation/change and institutionalization in any given case left as a matter of empirical investigation in the literature.⁷⁷

This study will try to contribute to this gap in the literature of party institutionalization and scrutinize the aforementioned negative correlation between party institutionalization and party change/adaptation. It will be argued that while increasing levels of party institutionalization negatively affects the prospects of pungent changes that political parties experience, changing levels of party institutionalization leads to incremental adaptive changes by shifting the goal prioritization of political parties. This thesis scrutinizes this argument by analyzing the institutionalization process of AKP and its effects on the party's goal prioritization and stance on policies that indicative of ideological change.

2.3 EUROPEANIZATION: CONTESTED BOUNDARIES, CONFLICTING MECHANISMS

The concept of Europeanization is the object of diverse definitions and has been attracting a great amount of scholarly attention.⁷⁸ The main impetus behind the growing enthusiasm for the concept is the growing attention on how internationalization affects domestic politics and policy making patterns, the debate on the so called 'second image reversed'.⁷⁹ More specifically, the growing enthusiasm for Europeanization is directly related with the level of integration that the European Union has achieved over the years and its increasing impact on both member states and non-member states. The

⁷⁶ Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*,

⁷⁷ Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand "Party Institutionalization in New Democracies," 15.

⁷⁸ For a comprehensive review of Europeanization literature see, Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli, eds., *The Politics of Europeanization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Johan P. Olsen, "The many Faces of Europeanization," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no.5 (2002); Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink, eds., *Europeanization: New Research Agendas* (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007).

⁷⁹ Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano, "Challenges of a New Research Agenda," in *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, eds. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007), 3.

Europeanization goes beyond the European-level orientation of classical integration theories by shifting the attention principally to the domestic level.⁸⁰

2.3.1 Conceptualizing Europeanization

It is argued that Europeanization is not a theory but a phenomenon which can be explained by a range of theories.⁸¹ Nevertheless, the boundaries of Europeanization as a concept are highly contested and there are various conceptualizations of Europeanization. In order to further elaborate on the Europeanization and come up with a working definition, next section will briefly review the scholarly work that tried to bring conceptual clarity to the contested nature of Europeanization.

There are various domains of Europeanization in the literature.⁸² The first domain involves a bottom-up approach from domestic to EU-level and focuses on the processes of EU integration. The second domain adapts a top-down perspective which traces the EU impact on member states. The main focus here is on the effects of institutions, policies and policy-making at the EU level on national politics, policies and polities. This approach is mainly explains the changes and transformations, stimulated by EU, in the domestic politics, policies, and polity. The third strand somewhat combines two approaches and analyzes the interaction between policies, institutions and policy making at the EU and domestic levels.

Lawton suggests that Europeanization is “de jure transfer of sovereignty to the EU level, and distinguishes this concept from Europeafication, that is the “de facto sharing

⁸⁰ James Caporaso, “The Three Worlds of Regional Integration Theory,” in *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, eds. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007), 23-26.

⁸¹ Simon Bulmer, “Theorizing Europeanization,” in *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, eds. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007), 47. See also, Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli, “A Conversant Research Agenda,” in *The Politics of Europeanization*, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 340; Claudio M. Radaelli, “Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?,” *European Integration Online Papers (EIOP)* 8, no.16 (2004).

⁸² For a brief overview of definitions see, Claudio M. Radaelli, “Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change,” *European Integration Online Papers (EIOP)* Vol.4, No.8 (2000); Claudio M. Radaelli, “Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?,” *European Integration Online Papers (EIOP)* 8, no.16 (2004); Johan P. Olsen, “The many Faces of Europeanization,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no.5 (2002); Claudio M. Radaelli and Romain Pasquier, “Conceptual Issues,” in *Europeanization: New Research Agenda*, eds. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007): 35-45.

of power.”⁸³ From a similar standpoint, Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso, in their introductory chapter defines the Europeanization “... as the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem-solving that formalize interactions among actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules.”⁸⁴ The main common point between these two definitions of Europeanization is their focus on the development of EU-level rules, policies, and institutions.

This strand of definitions within literature can be categorized under the bottom-up perceptions of Europeanization. Bottom-up definitions of Europeanization defines the process as formation of EU level rules, policies, and institutions. As Radaelli succinctly argues these definitions creates ambiguity as the emphasis on ‘creation of rules’ and ‘the European level’ suggests an extremely broad notion of Europeanization as it includes both EU policy and politics and their impacts on national systems.⁸⁵ Furthermore, the demarcation lines between the EU integration and Europeanization becomes blurry when Europeanization is perceived as uploading.

More recent studies focus on the impact of EU on domestic politics, policies, and politics.⁸⁶ Börzel, from a top-down perspective, defines Europeanization as ‘a process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy making.’⁸⁷ This definition signifies the penetration of the European dimension in national arenas of politics and policies. Ladrech further refines the concept of Europeanization by defining it:

⁸³ T. Lawton, “Governing the Skies: Conditions for the Europeanization of Airline Policy,” *Journal of Public Policy* 19, no.1 (1999).

⁸⁴ M. G. Cowles, J. Caporaso, and T. Risse, eds., *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 3.

⁸⁵ Claudio M. Radaelli, “The Europeanization of Public Policy,” in *The Politics of Europeanization*, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 29.

⁸⁶ There are significant numbers of studies on this strand of Europeanization research. For an overview see, Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli, eds., *The Politics of Europeanization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink, eds., *Europeanization: New Research Agendas* (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007).

⁸⁷ Cited in Claudio M. Radaelli, “The Europeanization of Public Policy,” in *The Politics of Europeanization*, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 29.

“as an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making.”⁸⁸

Here, the main emphasis is on the EU-led environmental changes that trigger an adaptive response at the domestic level. Radaelli criticizes this definition due to its emphasis on national politics and policy making, neglecting the identities and the cognitive component of politics.⁸⁹ Moreover, the emphasis on organizations may obfuscate the role of individuals and policy entrepreneurs.⁹⁰ Consequently, following Ladrech’s definition, Radaelli improves the conceptualization of Europeanization by defining it as:

“Processes of (a)construction, (b)diffusion, and (c)institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies.”⁹¹

Radaelli’s definition focuses not only formal rules and practices as part of the Europeanization process but also highlights and includes the informal rules, procedures, beliefs, discourse and identities as well as formal rules and practices. Another feature of the definition is its equal attention to the EU level and domestic actors. Rather than depicting the process as a formal rule transfer from EU to domestic level, this definition also conceptualizes the process as interactive between EU and domestic level.

It is crucial to highlight that the EU policy processes within Radaelli’s definition does not only refer to a vertical adoption of policies or EU laws. Although they may lead to adoption of policies and laws that are defined at EU, in some circumstances they may be

⁸⁸ Robert Ladrech, “The Europeanization of domestic Politics and Institutions: The case of French,” *The Journal of Common Market Studies* 32, no.1 (1994), 69.

⁸⁹ Claudio M. Radaelli, “The Europeanization of Public Policy,” in *The Politics of Europeanization*, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 30.

⁹⁰ *Idem*

⁹¹ Claudio M. Radaelli, “The Europeanization of Public Policy,” in *The Politics of Europeanization*, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 30.

highly conflictual and may not end up with adoption of EU policy.⁹² Radaelli indicates that the EU policy process designates a political space with a distinct EU dimension. In order to produce effects, these interactions at the EU level must become a reference point in domestic politics, either via socialization effects or through the production of policies that modify the logic of political interaction at home.⁹³ Consequently, there is evidence of Europeanization when the EU becomes the reference point of domestic politics.

Nearly all the definitions of Europeanization entail an impact of EU on domestic politics, policies, and polities. Previous studies often depict the notion of impact in a uni-directional way and limit the concept simply to how EU decisions impact on domestic political systems. The literature on Europeanization that depicts the EU impact in a vertical and unidirectional manner has explanatory power in terms of analyzing policy transfers that the EU has strong competencies.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, the notion of impact has also a horizontal dimension which needs to be elaborated to come up with a working definition of Europeanization.⁹⁵ The notion of impact “also denotes more subtle impacts of socialization processes, ideational convergence, learning and interpretations of policy paradigms.”⁹⁶ In this conceptualization of impact, domestic actors are seen both as filters and users of European norms and policies. Accordingly, we must account for creative usages of Europe and thus for the political construction of impacts. From this perspective, Europeanization and the notion of impact emphasizes the prominence of domestic actors as filters and users of European norms/rules. As Pasquier succinctly suggests domestic actors often have discretion to use the EU in

⁹² At this point it is highly important to make a distinction between Europeanization and its possible outcomes in terms of convergence or divergence. Radaelli suggests that there is substantial evidence that EU politics provide different opportunities to different actors in terms of creative usages of Europe which can lead to a more differential impact than convergence. On this point see, Claudio M. Radaelli and Romain Pasquier, “Conceptual Issues,” in *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, eds. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007)

⁹³ Claudio M. Radaelli and Romain Pasquier, “Conceptual Issues,” 37.

⁹⁴ See in particular, M.G. Cowles, J. Caporaso and T. Risse, eds., *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). These top-down, hierarchical approaches propose the concept of “goodness of fit” or “misfit” between the domestic level and EU requirements. Where there is misfit the adaptational pressure builds up at the domestic level and the research track sets of factors (mainly derived from rationalist and sociological institutionalist explanations) leading to differential impact of EU. For such a framework see, T. A. Börzel and T. Risse, “When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change”, *European Integration Online Papers* (EIOP) 4, no. 15 (2000).

⁹⁵ For differences between the two notions of impact see, Claudio M. Radaelli, “Europeanization of Public Policy,” in *The Politics of Europeanization*, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 40-44.

⁹⁶ Claudio M. Radaelli and Romain Pasquier, “Conceptual Issues,” in *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, eds. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007), 37-39.

many different ways. They can reappropriate European norms and policy paradigms to implement their own policies.⁹⁷

In line with the complex nature of domestic change and notion of impact presented above, Radaelli and Pasquier propose two domains of Europeanization: (a) Europeanization as adaptation to Europe' (mainly linked with the analysis of implementation), and (b) Europeanization as a process altering the domestic opportunity structures that is cognitive and strategic change at the domestic level.⁹⁸ Within the second domain, the other part of the story is concerned with domestic actors that encounter 'Europe' when pursuing domestic change-or resisting change in which 'the EU can be either an adaptation requirement or a resource, a learning opportunity, a new venue for leadership, discourse and policy action.'⁹⁹ From the same perspective, with regard to the EU induced change at the domestic level, Hix and Goetz suggest that 'the other half of the story is how a new institutional arena at the European level, impacts domestic political systems by providing a new 'structure of opportunities' for domestic actors. They suggest three types of opportunity for domestic actors: (a) exit from the domestic arena by virtue of predicting EU outcomes, (b) veto on domestic actions otherwise insurmountable caused by EU outcomes and (c) informal advantage due to the links and relationships with European level actors and institutions.¹⁰⁰

2.3.2 Theoretical Explanations of Europeanization

The preceding review of different definitions of Europeanization clearly shows, Europeanization as a concept can be broadly defined as EU induced change at domestic level which clearly signifies the impact of EU on domestic politics, policies and polities. It denotes how European rules, norms, and policies feedback in domestic politics. As

⁹⁷ Cited in Claudio M. Radaelli and Romain Pasquier, "Conceptual Issues," in *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, eds. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007), 38.

⁹⁸ Claudio M. Radaelli and Romain Pasquier, "Encounters with Europe: Concepts, Definitions and Research Design," *From the text based on the talk given by C. Radaelli at the political science department University of Copenhagen, 16 February 2006, in the context of the seminar on Europeanization: Theorizing and Researching on the impact of Europe*, 4

⁹⁹ *Idem*

¹⁰⁰ Simon Hix and Karl Goetz, "Introduction: European Integration and National Political Systems," *West European Politics* 23 (2000), 12.

Bulmer succinctly suggests, Europeanization is not a theory, but rather a phenomenon that needs to be explained.¹⁰¹ Thus, theory comes in to depict the mechanisms of EU induced change at domestic level and to answer how European policies, rules and norms are affecting domestic policy, politics, and polities.¹⁰² To a large extent, the new institutionalist agenda, including the three sub-branches, informs theorizing about Europeanization.¹⁰³ Next section aims to briefly introduce three variants of new institutionalist literature: rational choice (or rationalist) institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism.

Rationalist institutionalism embodies a ‘logic of consequentialism’, which treats actors as rational, goal oriented, and purposeful.¹⁰⁴ Actors follow an instrumental rationality by weighing the costs and benefits of different options by taking into account the (anticipated) behavior of other actors. In rationalist institutionalism actors are assumed to have fixed and ordered preferences. They engage in strategic interactions using their resources to maximize their utilities on the basis of these fixed and ordered preferences.¹⁰⁵ Institutions are regarded as opportunity structures and actors seize the available opportunities or blocked by veto points.

Consequently in the context of Europeanization, rationalist institutionalist analyses look at the responses of domestic political actors to new opportunities opened up by European integration.¹⁰⁶ Rationalist institutionalism suggests that Europeanization leads to domestic change through differential empowerment of actors resulting from a redistribution of resources at the domestic level. Whether such opportunities lead to domestic change depends on veto points and presence of formal institutions.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰¹ Simon Bulmer, “Theorizing Europeanization,” in *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, eds. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007), 47.

¹⁰² *Idem.*

¹⁰³ For new institutionalism see, V. Schneider and M. Aspinwall, eds., *The Rules of Integration* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001); Mark D. Aspinwall and Gerald Schneider, “Same Menu, Separate Tables: the Institutional Turn in Political Science and the Study of European Integration,” *European Journal of Political Research* 38 (2000); P. Hall and R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” *Political Studies* 44 (1996).

¹⁰⁴ For different logics of action within new institutionalism see, G. James March and Johan P. Olsen “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders”, *International Organization* 52, no.4 (1998).

¹⁰⁵ Mark D. Aspinwall and Gerald Schneider, “Same Menu, Separate Tables: The Institutional Turn in Political Science and the Study of European Integration,” 10-11.

¹⁰⁶ Simon Bulmer, “Theorizing Europeanization,” in *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, eds. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007), 50.

¹⁰⁷ Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe,” in *The Politics of Europeanization*, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 63-65.

Sociological institutionalism, by contrast, drawn on the ‘logic of appropriateness’ which depicts actors as guided by collective understandings of what constitutes proper, socially accepted behavior in a given rule structure.¹⁰⁸ These collective understanding meanings influence the ways in which actors define their goals and what they perceive as ‘rational action’.¹⁰⁹ Here actors are depicted as fulfillers of social expectations rather than utility maximizers. Contrary to the rationalist institutionalism which depicts institutions as constraining actors’ actions, sociological institutionalism sees institutions as constituting the preferences of actors.¹¹⁰

Within the context of Europeanization, sociological institutionalism focuses on the transmission of ideas from EU to the domestic level. As Börzel suggests, sociological institutionalism emphasizes ‘arguing, learning, and socialization as the mechanisms by which new norms and identities emanating from Europeanization processes are internalized by domestic actors and lead to new definitions of interests and of collective identities.’¹¹¹ Sociological institutionalism focuses on processes by which actors learn to internalize new norms and rules in order to become members of the community ‘in good standing’.¹¹² Another variation of Europeanization studies focus on the changing behavior of actors within EU institutions through the process of socialization.

Different from the other two variants, historical institutionalism focuses on the ways prior institutional arrangements/commitments condition further action.¹¹³ Historical institutionalism suggests that actors’ preferences are conditioned and shaped by what they have already agreed. Past decisions limits the scope of what is possible and cause agents to redefine their interests. Consequently, actors even they are perceived as rational goal maximizing agents are constrained by their past actions. Within the context of Europeanization, historical institutionalism highlights the temporal dimension of domestic adjustment processes to the EU by focusing on time, timing and tempo and offers a set of concepts such as path dependence, critical junctures, and increasing

¹⁰⁸ Mark D. Aspinwall and Gerald Schneider, “Same Menu, Separate Tables: the Institutional Turn in Political Science and the Study of European Integration,” *European Journal of Political Research* 38 (2000).

¹⁰⁹ *Idem*

¹¹⁰ *Idem*

¹¹¹ Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe”, 65-66.

¹¹² Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe,” 66.

¹¹³ See, Mark D. Aspinwall and Gerald Schneider, “Same Menu, Separate Tables: the Institutional Turn in Political Science and the Study of European Integration,” *European Journal of Political Research* 38 (2000).

returns to depict how the actors' preferences are conditioned and shaped prior agreements and actions.¹¹⁴

From these three theoretical frameworks various mechanisms are proposed to explain the Europeanization process. The top-down or hierarchical approaches to Europeanization suggest that the identification of 'goodness of fit' or 'misfit' with the EU requirements should be starting point in explaining Europeanization process.¹¹⁵ Where there is misfit between EU requirements and domestic circumstances; adjustment pressure builds up at the domestic level. Nevertheless, the outcome of adjustment pressure, often depicted as a necessary element within Europeanization process, is found to be differential among countries.¹¹⁶ Theoretically informed studies of Europeanization provide explanations for this differentiation through the lenses of rationalist institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. From the core tenets of rationalist institutionalism, two intervening factors are proposed for the differential impact of EU: existence of institutional veto points and/or supporting facilitating formal institutions at domestic level.¹¹⁷ Depending on their particular admixture domestic actors may be able to secure adaptation, for example, if the veto points are few and there are facilitating factors such as EU funding enabling domestic actors to gain support for pursuing change.¹¹⁸

Through the lenses of sociological institutionalism some studies found that with misfit lead to processes of socialization and learning resulting in the internalization of new norms and the development of new identities depending on two mediating factors: the presence of change agents or norm entrepreneurs at the domestic level and presence of political culture and other informal institutions conducive to consensus building and cost-sharing.¹¹⁹ The presence of norm entrepreneurs and consensus-oriented cultures affect whether European ideas, norms, and the collective understandings, which do not

¹¹⁴ Simon Bulmer, "Theorizing Europeanization," in *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, eds. Paolo Graziano and Maarteen P. Vink (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007), 50.

¹¹⁵ See in particular, M.G Cowles, T. Risse, and J Caporaso "Introduction," in *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, eds. M. G. Cowles, T. Risse, and J. Caporaso (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

¹¹⁶ On differential impact of Europeanization see, A. Heritier, D. Kerwer, C. Knill, D. Lehmukhl, M. Teutsch, A. C. Douillet, *Differential Europe: The European Union Impact On Domestic Policy Making* (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001)

¹¹⁷ Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse "Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe", 64-65.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 65.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 65-68.

resonate with those at the domestic level, are internalized by domestic actors giving rise to EU induced domestic change.

While the misfit/goodness of fit argument has explanatory value for policy areas in which EU has high competencies, for policies that have considerable scope for national discretion, it loses its explanatory power to a great extent.¹²⁰ Consequently, the misfit argument as a starting point of Europeanization process has been subject to criticisms.¹²¹ Knill and Lehmkuhl suggest that three mechanisms of Europeanization exist. The first is institutional compliance and it refers to explicit European policies that prescribe a specific institutional model that has to be introduced at the level of domestic environment. The second mechanism is changing domestic opportunity structures. It describes instances where European policies alter the distribution of power and resources between domestic actors and as a result institutional change occurs. The final and ‘softest’ mechanism of Europeanization is framing domestic beliefs and expectations. The EU’s goal is to prepare the ground for institutional change by altering the ‘cognitive input’ of domestic actors.¹²²

2.3.3 Europeanization beyond EU: EU Induced Change within Non-member States

Initially, research on Europeanization was concerned almost exclusively with EU induced domestic change in EU member states. Nevertheless, this focus on member states shifted with the so-called big bang enlargement of EU which included the Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs). The literature has made the EU conditionality the central focus of studying the impact of EU on domestic change in CEECs.¹²³ As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier put forward, ‘a policy of conditionality is one in which

¹²⁰ Simon Bulmer, “Theorizing Europeanization,” in *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, eds. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007), 52.

¹²¹ For example see, C. Knill and D. Lehmkuhl “How European Matters: different mechanisms of Europeanization,” *European Integration Online Papers* 3, no. 7 (1999); M. Haverland, “National Adaptation to European Integration: The Importance of Institutional Veto Points,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 20, no. 10 (2000).

¹²² C. Knill and D. Lehmkuhl “How European Matters: different mechanisms of Europeanization,” *European Integration Online Papers* 3, no. 7 (1999), 2-5.

¹²³ For a comprehensive review please see, Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Europeanization in New Member and Candidate States,” *Living Reviews in European Governance* 1, no.3 (2006) and Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier “Candidate Countries and Conditionality,” in *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, eds. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007)

international organizations promise rewards to target states on the condition that the states fulfill one or more conditions.¹²⁴

The studies on the Europeanization of non-member states can be divided according to its substantive focus. One strand of research focuses on the political/democratic conditionality of the EU and under which conditions the EU has been able to produce democratic change and consolidation in accession countries.¹²⁵ Secondly, some scholars deal with the effects and adaptation of specific EU policy rules such as social policy or environmental policy.¹²⁶ Lastly, some studies focus on the impact of EU on state structures, executives, and administrations within accession countries.¹²⁷

Theoretical studies of Europeanization of accession countries mainly explain the variances between rule adoption within non-member states through the lenses of rationalist institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. In their seminal collaborative research, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier compare the explanatory power of a rationalist institutionalist external incentives model with that of sociological institutionalist “social-learning model” and a “lesson-drawing model”.¹²⁸

Within the parameters of rationalist institutionalism, external incentives model suggests that the main mechanism of EU induced change within accession counties is EU’s conditionality policy which incorporates the strategy of reinforcement by reward. In this strategy the EU withholds the reward if the target government fails to comply with its conditions.¹²⁹ External incentives model posits that the effectiveness of EU conditionality mainly depends on: (1) the determinacy of conditions, (2) the size and the speed of rewards, (3) the credibility of conditionality, and finally (4) veto players and adoption costs.¹³⁰ Within external incentives model, conditionality may also directly

¹²⁴ Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Candidate Countries and Conditionality,” 88.

¹²⁵ For this area of research see, M. A. Vachudova, *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); P. Kubicek, ed., *The European Union and Democratization* (London: Routledge, 2003).

¹²⁶ See, Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

¹²⁷ On this area see, Klaus H. Goetz, “Making Sense of Post-Communist Central Administration: Modernization, Europeanization or Latinization?,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 8, no.6 (2001).

¹²⁸ See, Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

¹²⁹ Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 10.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 1-29

impact the target government, through an intergovernmental bargaining process, which calculates whether the domestic adjustment costs of adopting EU rule does or does not outweigh the benefits of the promised EU rewards. It is also imperative to note that the conditionality policy may work indirectly, through the differential empowerment of domestic actors, which creates additional incentives for some domestic actors. Consequently, the process empowers those actors, who previously “did not have sufficient power to impose their preferred rules” within the domestic political system.¹³¹ Therefore, an effective conditionality policy upsets the previous domestic opportunity structure “in favor of the domestic actors, whose bargaining power has been strengthened vis-a-vis their opponents in society and government.”¹³²

Contrary to the external incentives model, the social learning and lesson drawing models are based on the core tenets of sociological institutionalism which rests on a logic of appropriateness. Nevertheless the two models differ in terms of their principal actors. In the social learning model, the principal actor is EU, while in the lesson drawing model the principal actor is the accession country. Social learning model posits that “whether a non-member state adopts EU rules depends on the degree to which it regards EU rules and its demands for rule adoption as appropriate in terms of collective identity, values and norms.”¹³³ Three factors increase the effectiveness of conditionality policy: (1) the legitimacy of rules and procedures, (2) identity, and (3) resonance. On the other hand, non-member states may adopt EU rules without a specific EU policy demand. This type of rule adoption is defined as policy transfer, “in which knowledge of EU rules is used in the development of rules in the political systems of the CEECs”¹³⁴

2.3.4 Europeanization and Political Parties

Political parties have been attracting greater amount of attention within Europeanization literature. Within this relatively new research domain that address the relationship

¹³¹ Ibid.,11

¹³² Ibid.,12

¹³³ Ibid.,18

¹³⁴ Ibid., 20.

between European integration, on the one hand, and the character and development of parties and party systems, on the other, three strands of research can be discernible. In the first place, as the earliest phase of this strand of research, scholars have sought to trace the origins and development of trans-European party federations, and the emergence of genuine political parties at the European level.¹³⁵ The seminal research conducted within this context coincided with the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament. Secondly, and more recently, scholars have been analyzing the shape and dynamic of parties and party systems as they function within the European Parliament. Parliamentary fractions, shifting memberships of federations and patterns of alignment are the main center of attention of the scholars.¹³⁶ The third strand of research is more varied and is concerned with the extent to which ‘Europe’, however defined, plays a role in party programs, party ideology, and party competition at the domestic level. This strand of research also incorporates studies of national party and party-system adaptation to the development of European integration, as well as analyses of the extent to which the process of integration poses difficulties for, or offers opportunities to national actors in general and political parties, in particular.¹³⁷

Within the above mentioned three research themes for Europeanization and political parties, Europeanization has tended to be understood in two different ways. On the one hand, it is often conventionally understood as a factor that is external to the national experience, or as occurring when something in national political system is affected by something European. This strand of conceptualization directly falls to the third strand of research on Europeanization of political parties presented above. Within this understanding of Europeanization, scholars have sought to trace the impact of Europe –

¹³⁵ For example see, G. Pridham and P. Pridham, *Transnational Party Cooperation and European Integration* (London: Allen and Unwin).

¹³⁶ See, Robert Ladrech, “Political Parties in the European Parliament,” in *Political Parties and European Union*, ed. John Gaffney (London: Routledge, 1996).

¹³⁷ See, Peter Mair, “The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems,” *West European Politics* 23, no.4 (2000); Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis,” *Party Politics* 8, no.4 (2002); Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization and Variable Influence of the EU: National Parties and Party Systems in Western and Eastern Europe,” *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 10, no.2 (August 2008); Robert Ladrech, “Party Change and Europeanization: Elements of an Integrated Approach,” *West European Politics* 35, no. 3 (May 2012); Thomas Pogunte, Nicholas Aylott, Elisabeth Carter, Robert Ladrech, and Kurt Richard Luther, eds., *The Europeanization of National Political Parties: Power and organizational Adaptation* (London: Routledge, 2007); Paul G. Lewis and Zdenka Mansfeldova, eds., *The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); John Ishiyama, “Europeanization and the Communist Successor Parties in Post- Communist Politics,” *Politics and Policy* 34, no.1 (March 2006); Vít Hloušek and Pavel Pšejka, “Europeanization of Political Parties and the Party System in the Czech Republic,” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 25, no.4 (December 2009).

European elections, European policies, and European alliances- on the organization, programs, or strategies of political parties in the domestic arena. On the other hand, Europeanization is also understood as a bottom-up process that involves “the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance.” This understanding of Europeanization is directly falls under the first two strands of research on Europeanization and political parties. Consequently, this strand of work looks at the emergence and consolidation of party alignments in the European Parliament, as well as at the leadership alliances that appear to be building up between like-minded parties in the preparations for various European Council meetings.

As Mair suggests the two understandings of Europeanization presented above can be considered as the limits of a single “Europeanization dimension”, bounded at one end by conflicts regarding the institutionalization of a distinct European political system, and at the other by conflicts regarding the impact/penetration of European rules, directives and norms into the domestic sphere.¹³⁸ Again following Mair’s conceptualization, the impact of EU on political parties can also be understood in two ways. On the one hand, it can have a direct effect on political parties and party systems. On the other hand, the impact of Europeanization may be indirect.¹³⁹ For example, adoption of certain rules and procedures in the European Parliament and their effect on the creation of particular party alliances and coalitions can be conceptualized as direct effects. On the other hand, the impact of Europeanization may be indirect. For example, Europeanization, by removing out certain policy areas from the exclusive authority of the domestic political arena, exerts an important yet indirect influence on the way in which parties compete with one another.

Based on the above mentioned twofold typology, Mair suggests four different outcomes of Europeanization.¹⁴⁰ First and foremost, European norms may directly penetrate into the domestic arena and lead to the formation of new anti-European parties or factions within existing parties.¹⁴¹ Second outcome leads to an alteration of national party competition having important effects on electoral competition caused by indirect impact

¹³⁸ Peter Mair, “Political Parties and Party Systems,” in *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, eds. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007), 156.

¹³⁹ Peter Mair, “Political Parties and Party Systems,” in *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, eds. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007), 156-157.

¹⁴⁰ Peter Mair, “Political Parties and Party Systems,” 157-161.

¹⁴¹ *Idem*.

of Europe which is conceptualized as Europeanization as penetration.¹⁴² The third outcome is Europeanization as institutionalization with a direct impact on national party politics, which leads to the formation and consolidation of pan-European party coalitions.¹⁴³ Finally, fourth outcome is conceptualized as Europeanization as institutionalization with indirect impact leading to ‘emergence of alternative and non-partisan channels of representation, diffusion of “Europe” in domestic discourse.’¹⁴⁴

Following his differentiation between direct and indirect impact of Europe on political parties, Mair suggests that indirect effects of Europeanization lead to more decisive changes in parties and party systems in member states.¹⁴⁵ Mair suggests three different processes through which the development of a European level of policy making leads to “hollowing out” of policy competition between political parties at the national level and concludes that Europeanization leads to de-politicization of national party competition.¹⁴⁶ First and foremost, Europe limits the policy space that is available to competing parties.¹⁴⁷ The development of a European level of policy making results into a situation in which national governments and parties face a more or less convergence in the development of their policies and decision-making. Secondly, Mair suggests that Europeanization limits the capacity of national governments and hence the political parties in governments by “reducing the range of policy instruments at their disposal”.¹⁴⁸ Last but not least, Europeanization “reduces the ability of parties in national governments to compete by limiting their policy repertoire.”¹⁴⁹

In his seminal article, Robert Ladrech provided five areas of investigation that EU induced party change can be observable and most manifest.¹⁵⁰ The first entails EU-led *modification of party programs*.¹⁵¹ The second area involves EU-led *party organizational change*, which entails both an EU-led change in power relations inside party organizations and also organizational modification as a result of increasing

¹⁴² *Idem*.

¹⁴³ *Idem*.

¹⁴⁴ *Idem*.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 159. See also Peter Mair, “limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems,” *West European Politics*, 23, No.4 (2000): 27-51.

¹⁴⁶ Peter Mair, “Political Parties and Party Systems,” 159.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 159.

¹⁴⁸ Peter Mair, “Political Parties and Party Systems,” 160.

¹⁴⁹ *Idem*.

¹⁵⁰ Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis,” *Party Politics* 8, no.4 (2002), 396-400.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*, 396

‘affiliation with European level institutions.’¹⁵² The third domain where Europeanization of political parties can be depicted is *patterns of party competition* including increasing penetration of EU dimension in party competition leading to transformation of cleavage in party systems.¹⁵³ Another domain that EU-effect on political parties can be depicted is *party-government relations*, which primarily entails the effects of participation of government officials in the EU institutions which may lead to increasing distance between party leadership and party organization.¹⁵⁴ Here, one manifestation of Europeanization entails distancing of party leadership’s positions from party’s programmatic goals. Finally, fifth domain includes the *relations beyond the national party system* which entails transnational party cooperation with parties from other member states.¹⁵⁵

The growing literature on Europeanization and political parties has focused primarily on describing examples of party change influenced by the European Union. Although the literature has been broadening our understanding of EU induced party change, the existing research is successful in describing the effect rather than the cause of EU-related change in political parties. As Ladrech suggests with regard to party organizational change:

“the fact the EU is contextualized in very different formats depending on the type of observed change demonstrates a need to bring some conceptual order to the issue of causality in EU-related party change...the question of exactly how the EU may influence party organizational change has not, for the most part, been directly confronted.”¹⁵⁶

More effort has been expended in the search for evidence of change rather than adequately explaining how the EU is responsible. Instead, EU has been assumed to exert significance in those areas of the domestic political system that have consequences for political parties. Left underdeveloped within the literature remains to be the precise nature of EU effect that would motivate party leaderships to respond with appropriate adjustments.¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, Mair suggests that the impact of Europeanization needs to

¹⁵² Ibid, 397

¹⁵³ *Idem.*

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 398

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, 399

¹⁵⁶ Robert Ladrech, “Party Change and Europeanization: Elements of an Integrated Approach,” *West European Politics* 35, no. 3 (May 2012), 575.

¹⁵⁷ Peter Mair, “Political Parties and Party Systems,” 162.

be integrated more closely into the more general theories of party change.¹⁵⁸ Without such framing he contends that the EU can be called in to account for a myriad of different effects. With such a dialogue between the theories of party change and Europeanization, the potential impact of EU can be assessed against other factors.

In a more recent study, Ladrech further explores the long neglected issue of causality and suggests that the top-down casual explanations which posits the presence of misfit as a necessary condition of EU induced domestic change is not effective for explaining EU effect on political parties.¹⁵⁹ He also argues that EU's indirect effect on political parties as a political opportunity structure fails to hold with regard to Western European political parties. Considering "the need to win elections, influence public policy, aid in recruitment, and so forth, parties' need of the EU is close to nil."¹⁶⁰ Therefore, Ladrech concludes that the EU does not serve as a political opportunity structure for political parties; instead it is much more likely to serve as a political liability structure.¹⁶¹ EU policies may lead to the so-called "unintended politicization" which can be activated through conflict with intra-party preferences as well as social movement preferences (mobilization outside the parties). A new advance in European integration or a new policy initiative may lead to internal party dissent and/or public mobilization. In such a case, the EU rather than being a political opportunity structure becomes a political liability structure. Party leadership can use the strategy of deflection which involves actively directing attention of party members and voters away from EU as an issue or a particular EU policy through internal and external means.¹⁶²

While Ladrech's arguments on causality of EU-induced party change which centers on the relationship between party goals and EU impact shed light on the mechanisms of EU-induced party change, what is underdeveloped and remains as a gap in the literature of Europeanization of political parties is the relationship between party goals, the level of party institutionalization and party leadership's response to EU stimulus.

¹⁵⁸ *Idem.* For a contribution on this issue within the parameters of organizational party change see, Robert Ladrech, "Party Change and Europeanization: Elements of an Integrated Approach," *West European Politics* 35, no.3 (May 2012).

¹⁵⁹ Robert Ladrech, "Causality and Mechanisms of Change in Party Europeanization Research," *Keele European Parties Research Unit (KEPRU) Working Paper* 36 (2012).

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁶¹ *Idem.*

¹⁶² Robert Ladrech, "Causality and Mechanisms of Change in Party Europeanization Research," 12.

2.3.5 Party Institutionalization, Party Goals and Changing Party based Behavioral Response towards EU Stimulus

Within the literature on Europeanization of political parties, EU impact is generally portrayed as a vertical impact. Nevertheless, it is imperative to focus on the so-called horizontal impacts of EU which falls within the second domain of Europeanization. In this conceptualization of Europeanization, the domestic actors are not only perceived as passive recipients of EU norms, rules, and policy paradigms; they also have discretion to use EU norms/values/policy requirements in many different ways. Focusing on the second domain of Europeanization enables us to account for creative usages of Europe. Consequently, domestic actors are filters and users of European norms and rules. Political parties may draw on the EU as a resource without specific pressure from EU in a vertical uni-directional way. In that regard, it is imperative to analyze the so called creative usages of 'Europe' by political parties.

The scale and mechanisms of EU impact has been most influential, comprehensive and explicit within accession countries. The social, political, and economic misfit between accession countries and EU creates additional adjustment requirements and costs for domestic actors. Thus, it is frequently suggested that the Europeanization process of countries within accession process is differentiated from the Europeanization of member states.¹⁶³ Although within the literature it is suggested that the Europeanization process indirectly limits parties' policy repertoire and leads to de-politicization of national party competition, it can also be argued that parties differ in the ways in how they filter, construct and use the issue of Europe or EU rules, norms, and policy paradigms.¹⁶⁴ Consequently, this differentiation may lead to divergence among political parties and lead to further politicization of EU rather than leading to convergence and hollowing

¹⁶³ On the differential impact of EU on non-member states see, Adrienne Heritier, "Europeanization Research East and west: A Comparative Assessment," in *Conceptualizing The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier eds. (NY, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 199-210; Heather Grabbe, "Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU accession Process," in *The Politics of Europeanization*, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 303-327.

¹⁶⁴ On the indirect effects of EU on party competition see, Peter Mair, "Political Parties and Party Systems," in *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, eds. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007).

out of inter party competition. This becomes more evident for the parties within accession countries where the Europeanization process is found to be more influential, comprehensive, and explicit.¹⁶⁵

The main mechanism of EU impact within accession countries is the EU conditionality. Consequently, delineating the factors that affect the effectiveness of EU conditionality policy are imperative to further elaborate on the parties' behavioral response to EU within accession countries in general, and Turkey in particular. In their seminal work Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier suggests that external incentives model has a greater explanatory power for the effectiveness of EU conditionality policy. They suggest that effective EU conditionality policy depends on: (1) the determinacy of conditions, (2) the size and the speed of rewards, (3) the credibility of conditionality, and finally (4) veto players and adoption costs.

While we have a broader understanding of differential rule adoption/reform process within accession countries, how the EU conditionality policy affects political parties and what factors leads to differing behavioral response of political parties against 'EU effect' still remain as an exploratory field. Although Ladrech suggests that the EU for political parties that compete in member-states generally serves as a political liability structure, for non-member states EU can become both a political liability structure and political opportunity structure depending on a set of domestic, party level and EU level factors. It can strengthen some political parties while weaken the position of others. Accordingly, the expected behavioral response of deflection depicted by Ladrech as the strategy of actively directing attention of party members and voters away from EU as an issue or a particular EU policy through internal and external means can become a two-way strategy depending on both EU level and party level factors. In that regard, the strategy of deflection can also involve actively directing attention of party members, voters, other veto players towards EU as an issue or a particular EU policy.

Based on the aforementioned distinction, this thesis will try to answer the following questions to better delineate how AKP leadership strategically respond to the EU effect: How the institutionalization process of AKP and the party's specific goals interact with

¹⁶⁵ Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

EU accession process? What factors best explain the variation between EU becoming political liability structure or political opportunity structure for AKP leadership? Through which mechanisms EU impact led to party change during AKP's first term under effective EU conditionality? Does the variation regarding the effectiveness of EU conditionality led to a behavioral change in AKP in terms of strategic usage of EU norms, values, and policy paradigms?

Regarding the first question, as stated earlier, the level of party institutionalization and parties' capacity for attaining their party specific goals are positively correlated (goals of office-seeking, ideology-seeking, vote-seeking, and policy-seeking). This thesis aims to show that as a political party with low level of institutionalization and low prospects for organizational survival during its first term, AKP's capacity to pursue party specific goals of policy-seeking, vote-seeking/vote maximization, office-seeking/office-maintaining, and ideology-seeking were severely constrained as a consequence of party's forced prioritization of organizational survival as its primary goal over the aforementioned party specific goals. In such a context, the certain level of trade-off between party specific goals suggested by Müller and Størm becomes significantly stronger due to the prioritization of organizational survival as a primary party specific goal. It will be argued that, for the case of AKP which had low prospects of organizational survival due to the restrictive domestic political environment and low level of party institutionalization initially, to pursue conventional party specific goals of vote-seeking and policy-seeking, AKP instrumentally used EU accession process to decrease the level of trade-off between its environmentally inflicted primary goal of organizational survival and the goals of policy-seeking and vote-seeking.

For second question, this thesis will argue that EU becoming a political opportunity structure or political liability structure for political parties depends on two factors: (1) the resonance of party's ideology/identity and goals with EU norms and rules, and policy paradigms. This factor both entails parties' general stance on EU integration/membership and also the resonance between policies that parties' seek and EU level policy paradigms. (2) The effectiveness of EU conditionality.

When there is a low resonance between parties' core identity/ideology, goals and EU norms, rules, and policy paradigms, an effective EU conditionality policy is expected to

have a constraining impact on political parties. In such cases a strategy of actively directing attention away from EU is expected to become apparent as a behavioral response. On the other hand, an effective EU conditionality policy will bolster and further improve the political opportunity structure for party leadership if there is a high resonance between party's core identity/ideology, goals and EU norms, rules, and policy paradigms. In such a case, political parties can frame their policies and appropriate EU norms, rules and policy paradigms instrumentally. Consequently, in such cases, the strategy of deflection is expected to turn into a strategy of actively directing the attention towards EU accession process to gain legitimacy.

For third question, a detailed analysis of AKP's first term when the EU accession process remained vital under highly effective EU conditionality will be analyzed to trace the mechanisms of EU induced party change. It will be argued that although EU to a large extent remained a political opportunity structure for AKP, when there is a clash between the policies it pursued and EU norms, values and policy paradigms, EU pressure under highly effective EU conditionality led to what Ladrech conceptualizes 'unintended politicization' of the issue, inflicting pressure for positional change on party leadership. The fourth question will be answered by tracing the policy-framing process of three policy domains throughout AKP's three terms to delineate variations regarding instrumental usage of EU norms, values, and policy paradigms under changing levels of effectiveness of EU conditionality.

CHAPTER III

THE GENETIC CODE AND IDEOLOGY OF AKP

Before delving into the AKP's process of institutionalization through the analysis of variance in different indicators of the process, this chapter aims to analyze the 'genetic code' and party formation process. This analysis is based on the investigation of the domestic and international factors that significantly altered the goal prioritization of the party and led to a different path of party institutionalization process compared to governing parties in consolidated democracies.

The ideological construction process of the party is also strongly contingent on the party formation process. Due to this contingent character of the two processes, the second section of the chapter will focus on the basic attributes of AKP's ideology which is conceptualized by the party as 'conservative democracy'. As will be shown in the upcoming analysis, conservative democracy has multiple features and stands out as an amalgamation of liberal and conservative attributes. Delineating the different attributes of AKP's ideology will be the first analytical step to operationalize ideological change that this thesis aims to investigate. After mapping the ideology of conservative democracy, the second section of the chapter will introduce the analytical framework for analyzing ideological change.

This chapter is designed in two sections. First section will analyze the domestic and international context of party formation process. After delineating the so called 'genetic code' of AKP, second section will analyze basic attributes of the party's conservative democratic ideology. This analysis will be followed by the operationalization of the contested concept of ideology and ideological change and present the analytical framework for delineating ideological change that this thesis aims to analyze.

3.1 GENETIC CODE OF AKP: INTRA-PARTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL DYNAMICS OF PARTY FORMATION

The literature on political parties suggests that the so-called ‘genetic code’ of political parties have significant effects on their institutionalization processes.¹⁶⁶ Therefore, it is widely argued that the conditions in which a party first emerges would largely determine its internal structure as well as the nature and strength of its external linkages.¹⁶⁷ Panebianco has suggested that a key dimension of the genetic model is party building process. Organizationally, the party building process involves two different routes: penetration from center to periphery (both organizationally and territorially) and diffusion in which party emerges diffusively from bottom-up.¹⁶⁸

In addition to the emphasis on internal party building process, party formation is also shaped by the environmental context in which the process takes place. Thus, the party formation process ‘cannot be seen to be independent from the structural context in which the party is embedded’ and therefore both subject to ‘choice and contingency’.¹⁶⁹ In that regard, Panebianco’s emphasis on the impact of genetic code of political parties for their institutionalization process should be complemented by an analysis of the political and social context that the party formation process is embedded in.

During the genetic phase, a political party is what Panebianco calls a system of solidarity in which the goal is the realization of the common cause which is manifested in party ideology. In this phase, collective identities prevail over particular interests which provide party leadership with broad freedom of movement. Regarding the genetic phase, Panebianco suggests that the overall strategy is ‘domination of environment’.¹⁷⁰ Through the process of institutionalization, Panebianco suggested that parties reach to a stage of maturity in which selective incentives increasingly prevail over collective

¹⁶⁶ Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies,” *Party Politics* 8 no.1 (2002); Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

¹⁶⁷ Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies,” 17.

¹⁶⁸ Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). See also, Ingrid Van Biezen, “On the Theory and Practice of Party Formation and Adaptation in New Democracies,” *European Journal of Political Research* 44 (2005).

¹⁶⁹ Ingrid Van Biezen, “On the Theory and Practice of Party Formation and Adaptation in New Democracies,” 153-154.

¹⁷⁰ Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

common cause which to a large extent restricts the freedom of maneuver for party leadership. In the ‘maturity’ phase, political parties’ main strategy shifts from ‘domination of environment’ to ‘adaptation to the environment’ in which the ultimate goal of party organization becomes organizational survival in a precarious environment of opponents and competitors.¹⁷¹

Although the aforementioned evolutionary periodization of political parties has analytical utility for parties that compete in consolidated democracies, AKP’s genetic phase diverges from the basic features of this periodization. As will be shown in this chapter, due to the domestic political environment that the party formation process was embedded in, rather than following a strategy of domination of the environment, AKP’s strategy was to a large extent centered on adaptation to the environment for the sake of organizational survival. In light of the aforementioned arguments on the significance of party formation, and institutional context that this process takes place, this chapter aims to analyze the ‘genetic code’ of AKP by focusing on internal and external dynamics of party formation. Therefore, rather than only providing a historical account, this chapter also aims to put the ideological formation and institutionalization processes that will be analyzed in the following chapters into context.

First part of the following section will briefly analyze the historical roots of the factional rivalry that led to the formation of AKP to identify the basic internal features of party formation process. Second part will analyze the party formation process and the domestic social and political context that this process was embedded in by particularly analyzing the effects of the so-called ‘February 28 Process’, EU accession process, and rise and changing demands of the Anatolian bourgeoisie.

3.1.1 From the ‘Reformists’ to the AKP: Intra-Party Dynamics of Party Formation

The emergence of AKP was a culmination of an internal factional rivalry between the *Yenilikçiler* (reformists) and *Gelenekselciler* (traditionalists) within the parties that represent National Outlook Movement (NOM hereafter). This factional rivalry appeared

¹⁷¹ Ibid

inside the Welfare Party during late 1980's and it was based on a debate centered on the future ideological and strategical direction that the party should follow. During this period, two groups appeared which constituted the seeds of the factional rivalry that led to the formation of AKP. One of the groups insisted that the Welfare Party-*Refah Partisi* (RP hereafter) should drop its Islamist line and through changes in ideology and organization should transform itself into center-right conservative party to escape from marginalization and radicalization.¹⁷² On the other hand, a core group within the RP continued to insist that the party should preserve its identity as Islamist ideological party and strongly resisted the factional opposition of the reformists.

Despite the electoral victories of RP in the municipal elections and following general elections, the aforementioned intra party debate continued.¹⁷³ During this period, the then Istanbul Mayor and the leading figure of the reformists in RP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan continued to struggle with the central party organization. Erdoğan rejected the unconditional obedience to the RP leadership and questioned the decisions and strategies of the ruling cadre. In fact, as Şebnem Gümüşcü and Deniz Sert suggest following his election as Istanbul Mayor in 1994, Erdoğan resisted pressure from central party organization and started running both the RP's Istanbul branches and Istanbul municipality independently from the central party organization.¹⁷⁴ Nevertheless, the central party organization which was dominated by the traditionalists held his power over the reformists.¹⁷⁵

The factional rivalry between reformists and traditionalists further intensified following the so-called 'February 28 Process' initiated after the National Security Council-*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu* (MGK hereafter) meeting held on 28 February 1997. The process led to closure of the RP and political ban on its leader Necmettin Erbakan which increased

¹⁷² In 1992, Nureddin Nebati the then one of the leading moderates and latter vice-chair of AKP's Istanbul branch indicated that the RP 'would either become a conservative democratic party or become increasingly marginal and disappear.' Cited in Şebnem Gümüşcü and Deniz Sert, "The Power of Devout Bourgeoisie: The Case of Justice and Development Party in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 6 (November, 2009), 962.

¹⁷³ In 1994 local elections RP received 19% of votes and won the municipalities of the large urban centers such as Istanbul and Ankara. The party also received 21.6% of votes in 1995 general elections and formed a coalition government with the center-right True Path Party-Doğru Yol Partisi (TPP).

¹⁷⁴ Şebnem Gümüşcü and Deniz Sert, "The Power of Devout Bourgeoisie: The Case of Justice and Development Party in Turkey," 962.

¹⁷⁵ One of the co-founders of AKP and the then one of the leading figures of the reformists, Bülent Arınç argued that the traditionalists who continued to remain as the core group did not allow the RP to become a center party during that period. Ruşen Çakır and F. Çalmuk Recep, *Tayyip Erdoğan: Bir Dönüşümün Hikayesi* (Istanbul: Metis, 2001), 130-133.

the intra-party opportunity structure for the reformists to voice their opposition against the party leadership.¹⁷⁶ Right after the closure of the RP, NOM established Virtue Party-*Fazilet Partisi* (FP hereafter) under the leadership of Recai Kutan who was an ardent follower of politically banned Erbakan. Although in terms of its cadres, the FP remained as a continuation of RP, as William Hale and Ergun Özbudun suggest, compared to RP, FP's stance remained more moderate and cautious compared to its predecessor.¹⁷⁷

Despite the relatively moderate stance of FP, the factional rivalry between reformists and traditionalists prevailed and further solidified during the Party Congress of FP that held in 2000. For the first time in the history of NOM, within a Party Congress, there were two candidates competing for party leadership: Abdullah Gül (representing the reformists) and Recai Kutan (representing the traditionalists). Although the competition was won by the traditionalists, very close vote margin between two candidates was indicative of the solidification of the factional rivalry within FP.¹⁷⁸ Within a domestic political context severely constrained due to the 'February 28 process' FP shared the same fate with its predecessor and closed by the Constitutional Court on 22 June 2001. Right after the closure of FP, the traditionalist faction established Felicity Party-Saadet Partisi while reformist faction established AKP on 14 August 2001.

The aforementioned historical analysis reveals that the formative phase of AKP indicates a party formation process which is closer to what Panebianco defines as penetration from center to periphery. The founding members of AKP (Abdullah Gül, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Bülent Arınç and Abdullatif Şener) voiced their opposition to FP's stance both at the central party organization and this factional rivalry was also simultaneously reflected at local party organization. Consequently, during its formative

¹⁷⁶ Şebnem Gümüştü and Deniz Sert, "The Power of Devout Bourgeoisie: The Case of Justice and Development Party in Turkey," 962.

¹⁷⁷ William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010) and Ziya Öniş, "Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-existence," *Contemporary Politics* 7, no.4 (2001), 287.

¹⁷⁸ In the Party Congress held on 17 May 2000 Abdullah Gül received 521 votes while Recai Kutan won by receiving 633 of the votes. The reformists' campaign was centered on intra-party democracy and need for healthy political competition. See, William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 19.

phase many of AKP's local branches were already in place as a process of preparation and organizational development by reformists following 28 February 1997.¹⁷⁹

The party formation process of AKP indicates that party formation rather than a process of 'spontaneous germination' which denotes a bottom-up process is closer to penetration which involves party formation from center to periphery. Moreover, as the upcoming chapter on AKP's systemness reveals, party's initial adherence to intra-party democracy organizationally dates back to the factional struggle by reformists against traditionalists in which the lack of intra-party democracy was a recurring theme used by this group against traditionalists.

3.1.2 Domestic Political Context during the Formative Phase of AKP

As the preceding historical analysis sought to show, the formation of AKP was the culmination of an ongoing factional rivalry between traditionalists and reformists which was intensified following the so-called 'February 28 Process'. The February 28 Process was proposed as the main factor that led to a strategic and ideological change within NOM.¹⁸⁰ As Hale and Özbudun suggest, the closure of RP increased the defeatism and insecurity among party members which led them to discover that they need democratic rights and freedoms more than other political groups.¹⁸¹ Moreover, EU accession process, which was significantly revitalized following the 1999 Helsinki Summit where Turkey was granted candidate status, significantly affected the aforementioned change. FP, contrary to its predecessor enthusiastically embraced the EU accession process for

¹⁷⁹ For the party formation process and its reflection in local party organization see, Sevinç Doğan, *Mahalledeki AKP: Parti İşleyişi, Taban Mobilizasyonu ve Siyasal Yabancılaşma (AKP in the Neighborhood: Party Functioning, Base Mobilization, and Political Alienation)* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016).

¹⁸⁰ The main differences between RP and FP were centered on stronger emphasis of the latter on democratization, human rights, rule of law and economically strong emphasis on market economy and privatization. Nevertheless the most clear demarcation line between the two parties are their stance on foreign policy in which FP strongly advocated EU membership and leave the staunch anti-Western discourse of its predecessor.

¹⁸¹ William Hale and Ergun Özbudun *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. For the effects of the February 28 Process on ideological moderation in the NOM, See, Ziya Öniş, "Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-existence," *Contemporary Politics* 7, no.4 (2001); Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Saban Taniyici, "Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: Islamist Welfare Party's pro-EU Turn," *Party Politics* 9, no. 4 (2003); Ümit Cizre and Menderes Çınar, "Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102, no.2/3 (2003).

both improving religious freedoms and more importantly to increase the prospects of organizational survival.¹⁸²

3.1.2.1 The February 28 Process

AKP was formed in a domestic political environment which continued to remain highly restrictive for a political party which was formed by the former cadres of NOM. In order to put AKP's institutionalization process into context, it is imperative to briefly explain the consequences of the February 28 Process for Turkish politics in general and AKP, in particular. The February 28 Process was initiated by the Military, following the ultimatum type recommendations that were given to TPP-RP coalition government during the MGK meeting. The MGK meeting led to the resignation of government followed by the closure of RP. As Özbudun indicates the February 28 Process is not only initiated by the Military but involved a wider coalition including media and civil society organizations.¹⁸³ The so-called February 28 Process significantly narrowed down the public presence of religion through important measures.¹⁸⁴ Additionally, the so-called secular state establishment including the Military and the Judiciary increased their political powers which were reflected in the closure of FP following RP based on its activities that seen as against the principle of secularism enshrined in the constitution. In that regard, it can be argued that the February 28 Process severely narrowed down the domestic political opportunity structure for parties that represent NOM.¹⁸⁵ The formative phase of AKP also took place in such a restrained domestic

¹⁸² Ihsan D. Dağı, "Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization," *Turkish Studies* 6, no.1 (March, 2005).

¹⁸³ Ergun Özbudun *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2000), 121. In the literature, the February 28 Process is generally portrayed as a 'post-modern coup' in which rather than directly taking executive and legislative power at hand, the Military, in collaboration with civilian institutions, indirectly interfered to politics. See, Ziya Öniş, "Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-existence," *Contemporary Politics* 7, no.4 (2001), 286.

¹⁸⁴ Most cited of such measures are the introduction of eight year compulsory continuous education to close down the secondary stage of Imam-Hatip schools and stricter application of headscarf ban in higher education institutions. For a comprehensive review of policies that aim to contain the public visibility of religion See, M. Hakan Yavuz, "Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere," *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 1 (Fall 2000).

¹⁸⁵ For the effects of February 28 Process on Turkish politics in general and NOM, in particular see, Ümit Cizre and Menderes Çınar, "Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102, no.2/3 (2003).

political context and led the party to develop an ideological formulation not to share the fate of the preceding political parties that represent NOM.

3.1.2.2 Rise and Changing Demands of Anatolian Bourgeoisie

While the restrictive domestic political context following the February 28 Process shows the contingent character of AKP's formative phase on domestic political environment which, to a large extent, affected the party's ideological construction process, its ideological position was also responsive to what Gümüşcü and Sert conceptualize as the rise of 'devout bourgeoisie'.¹⁸⁶ The rise of the devout bourgeoisie connotes changing social base of traditional NOM in which small provincial entrepreneurs within this social coalition improved their economic fortunes and become increasingly integrated with global economy as a result of the economic liberalization process. This new social base, which is to a large extent represented by MUSIAD, became more alienated by the radicalism and protective economic policies of traditionalist faction inside NOM and increasingly demanded more moderate/liberal political and economic stance from WP and FP. As Gümüşcü and Sert suggest the rise of this devout bourgeoisie and their changing demands were highly significant during the formative phase of AKP.¹⁸⁷ Thus, it can be argued that AKP's conservative democratic ideological formation with its mixture of liberal and conservative attributes to a large extent formulated as a response to the demand of this devout bourgeoisie centered on more moderation instead of radicalization and marginalization.

¹⁸⁶ Şebnem Gümüşcü and Deniz Sert, "The Power of Devout Bourgeoisie: The Case of Justice and Development Party in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 6 (November, 2009). Similarly, Ziya Öniş argues that the transformation within NOM which was culminated in the formation of AKP is also affected by the economic transformation during liberalization which led to the formation of a substantial middle class of entrepreneurs. See, Ziya Öniş, "The Political Economy of Islam and Democracy in Turkey: From the Welfare to the AKP," in *Democracy and Development: New Political Strategies for Middle East*, ed. D. Jung (New York: Palgrave, 2006).

¹⁸⁷ The devout bourgeoisie was highly supportive during the formative phase of AKP. MUSIAD which to a large extent represented this social base was highly active during the formation of AKP's local branches. Especially in the Anatolian cities significant number of MUSIAD members joined the local organizations of the AKP. For the role of MUSIAD on AKP's formative phase See, Şebnem Gümüşcü and Deniz Sert, "The Power of Devout Bourgeoisie: The Case of Justice and Development Party in Turkey," 964.

3.1.3 International Determinants of Party Formation

In addition to the aforementioned domestic environmental effects on AKP's formative process, highly vital EU accession process was also an effective stimulus for AKP's formative period. In that regard, AKP explicitly stated its aim to adhere to the EU accession process and its aim to take necessary steps to fulfill EU political and economic conditionality popularly referred as 'Copenhagen Criteria'. As the following chapters will show, during AKP's first term, a highly vital EU accession process was strongly instrumentalized by the party not only to improve its prospects for organizational survival in a highly restrictive domestic political environment, but also to enhance its decisional autonomy vis-à-vis parliamentary opposition and extra-parliamentary veto players.

This section aimed to analyze the so-called 'genetic phase' of AKP which argued to have significant impact on parties' institutionalization process. The party formation process of AKP resembles what Panebianco conceptualized as penetration which entailed party formation from center to periphery. Regarding the domestic and international political context that the party formation took place, the process was to a large extent effected by the restrictive domestic political context due to the so-called 'February 28 Process'. Moreover, AKP's formation also stands out as a response to shifting preferences of rising Anatolian bourgeoisie that entailed increasing demand for moderate/center-right political representation to escape the restrictions imposed on them during the February 28 Process.

In such a highly restrictive domestic political environment, vital EU accession process was explicitly adhered by the AKP to improve the prospects of organizational survival. In that regard, aforementioned analysis shows that rather than following a strategy of environmental domination which is proposed as the main strategy of political parties during their genetic phase, AKP's genetic phase was mainly followed a strategy of organizational survival and adaptation to environment.

In this context, AKP's ideological construction proposed as "conservative democracy" was significantly affected by the aforementioned features of the party's genetic phase. Therefore, it can be argued that the liberal, conservative, and even social democratic

attributes of conservative democracy not only reflects the choice of AKP's founding members to improve the electoral fortunes of the party, but also reflects the contingent character of the party's ideological formation on political and social environment that party formation process was embedded in. The next section will analyze the basic attributes of AKP's initial ideological construction proposed as conservative democracy and provide the analytical framework for analyzing the party's incremental adaptive ideological change.

3.2 MAPPING THE IDEOLOGY OF CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRACY

AKP stands as a novel case in Turkish politics, considering its efforts to forge a new identity. The party devoted considerable effort to both formulate and disperse its ideology presented as "conservative democracy".¹⁸⁸ While some scholars suggested that the basic features of conservative democracy shows strong similarities to the tradition of the Turkish center right parties from the Democrat Party to Motherland Party and also Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe, AKP introduced conservative democracy as a novel contribution to the vocabulary of politics.¹⁸⁹

Nevertheless, as Şimşek suggests, party's conservative democratic ideology continued to remain as a 'Chinese Puzzle' with its complementary and conflicting attributes.¹⁹⁰ In that regard, party's ideology stands out as a peculiar amalgamation of liberal, conservative, and even social democratic attributes.¹⁹¹ It is commonly suggested that the party's ideology is a specific construction to increase its legitimacy, both

¹⁸⁸ One manifestation of such efforts was the international symposium on conservatism and democracy held by AKP in 2004. Sefa Şimşek, "Conservative Democracy as a Cosmetic Image in Turkish Politics: The Semiology of AKP's Political Identity," *Turkish Studies* 14, no.3 (2013).

¹⁸⁹ For a comparative analysis of AKP and Christian Democracy see, William Hale, "Christian Democracy and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts," *Turkish Studies* 6, no.2 (Jun 2005). For a comparison between previous Turkish center-right parties ideologies and AKP see, William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010); Sefa Şimşek, "Conservative Democracy as a Cosmetic Image in Turkish Politics: The Semiology of AKP's Political Identity," *Turkish Studies* 14, no.3 (2013); Zeynep Çağlıyan-İçener, "The Justice and Development Party's Conception of "Conservative Democracy": Invention or Reinterpretation," *Turkish Studies* 10, no.4 (2009). Regarding the authenticity and originality of conservative democracy the then Vice Chairman of the AKP Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat claimed that conservative democracy will be a contribution by the AKP to world of politics. Cited in Sefa Şimşek, "Conservative Democracy as a Cosmetic Image in Turkish Politics: The Semiology of AKP's Political Identity," *Turkish Studies* 14, no.3 (2013), 434.

¹⁹⁰ Sefa Şimşek, "Conservative Democracy as a Cosmetic Image in Turkish Politics: The Semiology of AKP's Political Identity," 430.

¹⁹¹ William Hale and Ergun Özbudun *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 20-29.

horizontally and vertically and a by-product of past political affiliations and experiences of party's leading cadres which led them to explicitly state their difference from NOM.¹⁹² That's one reason why the party refrained from conceptualizing its identity as 'Muslim democracy' similar to political parties in Western countries that represent center-right such as Christian Democratic Union in Germany.¹⁹³ Moreover, AKP leadership refrained from framing its conservative democratic identity as an 'ideology' per se. Consequently, the concept of conservative democracy was presented as a 'political identity', 'understanding', 'line of thought', a 'form of thought', or a 'political style' but not as an 'ideology'.¹⁹⁴

Following section will briefly introduce the basic attributes of AKP's ideology conceptualized as 'Conservative Democracy' and provide the analytical framework for the core aim of this research entails the explanation of the party's incremental ideological change. The first part of the section will assess the basic features of conservative democracy by taking into consideration party's official documents and statements of party leadership throughout its three terms in government. The second section will introduce the operationalization of ideology and ideological change. The last section will provide the analytical framework for delineating incremental ideological change.

3.2.1 Basic Attributes of AKP's Conservative Democratic Identity

The liberal attributes of AKP's conservative democratic identity involves strong emphasis on pluralist and participatory democracy, basic rights and freedoms, minimal state, and free-market economy. AKP explicitly stated its main aim as 'democratization and insuring and protecting basic rights and freedoms by placing the individual at the

¹⁹² Ibid., 431-432, For similar arguments see, Simten Coşar and Aylin Özman, "Center-Right Politics in Turkey after the November 2002 Elections: Neoliberalism with a Muslim Face," *Contemporary Politics* 10, no.1 (2010).

¹⁹³ In fact, the party leadership vigorously declined an identification of the party as 'Muslim Democrat'. For example Party leadership by referring such attributions stated that 'these attributions are not correct, not because we are not Muslims or democrats; but because these two should be considered on different planes. Cited in Simten Coşar and Aylin Özman, "Center-Right Politics in Turkey after the November 2002 Elections: Neoliberalism with a Muslim Face," *Contemporary Politics* 10, no.1 (2010).

¹⁹⁴ Zana Çitak and Özlem Tür, "Women between Tradition and Change: The Justice and Development Party Experience in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no.3 (2008), 460.

center of politics.’¹⁹⁵ The party also emphasized that free exercise of political rights can only be realized in a pluralist and participatory democratic society.¹⁹⁶ As Hale and Özbudun suggest, AKP’s notion of democracy is more pluralistic than majoritarian.¹⁹⁷ The party emphasized that competition among different political choices is an indispensable condition of a healthy democratic system. As a natural corollary of such an emphasis on pluralistic notion of democracy, AKP strongly emphasized the need for strengthening civil society organizations and for enhancing their role in policy making both at central and local levels.¹⁹⁸

Regarding the political role of the state, AKP’s Party Program states that ‘apart from its main functions such as national and international security, justice, and provision of services such as formal education, health, infrastructure, the state should withdraw from all other services by maintaining its regulatory and supervisory role’.¹⁹⁹ Similarly AKP indicated its aim to transform large and hefty state organization to a strong state which prioritizes individual through its capacity to produce high quality service.²⁰⁰

Considering economic role of the state, same kind of liberal emphasis is clearly discernable within the official documents of AKP. In its Party Program, AKP explicitly stated its aim to establish a free-market economy with all its institutions and rules in which state’s role in economy is limited to regulation and supervision. Similarly, party indicated that state, by principle should remain outside of any economic activity. In addition to such a liberal emphasis on the role of state in economy, AKP indicated that the individual is the source and target of economic development. As a natural corollary of strong emphasis on free-market economy, the party emphasized privatization is a rational policy for establishing a sound economic structure.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁵ *AK Parti Demokratikleşme ve Kalkınma Programı*. (Ak Party Democratization and Development Program). Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları, 2002. Accessed September 2015. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJITAL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITAPLAR/SIYASİ%20PARTİ%20YAYINLARI/200205071%20AK%20PARTİ%20DEMOKRATİKLEŞME%20VE%20KALKINMA%20PROGRAMI%202002/200205071%20AK%20PARTİ%20DEMOKRATİKLEŞME%20VE%20KALKINMA%20PROGRAMI%202002%200000_0116.pdf

¹⁹⁶ *AK Parti Demokratikleşme ve Kalkınma Programı* (Ak Party Democratization and Development Program)

¹⁹⁷ William Hale and Ergun Özbudun *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 21.

¹⁹⁸ *AK Parti Demokratikleşme ve Kalkınma Programı* (Ak Party Democratization and Development Program)

¹⁹⁹ *AK Parti Demokratikleşme ve Kalkınma Programı* (Ak Party Democratization and Development Program)

²⁰⁰ Ibid

²⁰¹ Ibid

Regarding social policy, AKP used a mix of liberal and social democratic references. On the one hand, the party explicitly stated that it sees social security as a constitutional right and accepts state's role for provision of social security. On the other hand its approach to social policy includes liberal references that prioritize state's increasing cooperation with private sector, local administration, and civil society organization to increase the source capacity and efficiency of social service provision. In addition to recommodification dimension of social security provision, AKP also emphasized its aim for cost-containment by emphasizing its aim to achieve fiscal discipline regarding the public social spending.²⁰²

For the conservative attributes of AKP's ideology, the most explicit statements were made by the party leadership during a symposium held by AKP on conservatism and democracy. During the symposium, the then Prime Minister Erdoğan indicated that the basic traits of their conservatism are 'modernity that does not exclude tradition', 'universality with a regional flavor', 'rationality that does not lose sight of the inner meaning of things', 'changes that are not contradictory to fundamental values of society and openness to innovation rather than a desire to preserve the status quo'.²⁰³ The main traits of party's conservatism were elaborated in further details by the then close adviser and main ideologue of the AKP Yalçın Akdoğan in a pamphlet titled as 'The AKP and Conservative Democracy'. In the document, it was indicated that their conservatism is not against change, but it advocates change in the sense of development and progress. In that regard, rather than aiming at preservation of the existing relationships and institutions; the party's conservatism emphasized 'adaptation to development without losing the essence.' Within the same document, basic attributes of conservative democracy were the acceptance of diversity, globalization of domestic values through conservatism, a limited and accountable government, rejection of social engineering, respect for religion and family, a synthesis of tradition with modernity, a type of secularism that guarantees freedom of religion and conscience in full.²⁰⁴

²⁰² *AK Parti Demokratikleşme ve Kalkınma Programı* (Ak Party Democratization and Development Program)

²⁰³ "Din Üzerinden Siyasete Karşıyız," *Hürriyet*, January 10, 2004, accessed July, 12 2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogan-din-uzerinden-siyasete-karsiyiz-194995>

²⁰⁴ Yalçın Akdoğan. *Ak Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi* (Ak Party and Conservative Democracy) (Istanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2004) Cited in S. Şimşek, "Conservative Democracy as a Cosmetic Image in Turkish Politics: The Semiology of AKP's Political Identity," *Turkish Studies* Vol.14, No.3 (2013), 437.

AKP's conservatism was centered on its negative attitude on radical and revolutionary change which was recognized as social and political engineering.²⁰⁵ Along similar lines, conservative democracy posits that modernization should be carried out without endangering social solidarity. Here, tradition was presented as the most prominent tool for maintaining social solidarity. Conservative democracy entails family, Islam, and morality as the core components of tradition which is presented as the main vehicle for the preservation of social solidarity.²⁰⁶

In its Party Program, AKP indicated that religion is one of the most important institutions of humanity. Nevertheless, it also explicitly emphasized that secularism is a sine qua non requirement for democracy and guarantee for freedom of religion and conscience.²⁰⁷ The party explicitly stated that it's against an interpretation of secularism as hostility towards religion'.²⁰⁸ As Hale and Özbudun suggest, AKP's approach to secularism is compatible with the notion of 'passive secularism' which entails state neutrality towards various religions.²⁰⁹ Along similar lines, the party leadership indicated that the party

"While attaching importance to religion as a social value, does not favor a style of politics based on religion, the transformation of state on an ideological basis, and organization on the basis of religious symbols. Politics based on religion, using religion as an instrument, and pursuing an exclusionary policy in the name of religion will harm social peace, and political pluralism, as well as religion. There is a serious difference between being a party which attaches importance to religion and to the pious people and accepts the social functions of religious values, and being a party which aims to transform the society by force with the aid of state apparatuses by transforming religion into an ideology."²¹⁰

Same kind of emphasis on the social role of the religion was made by the party in its 2007 Election Manifesto. For example regarding religious services, the party

²⁰⁵ See, "Din Üzerinden Siyasete Karşıyız," *Hürriyet*, January, 10 2004, accessed July, 12 2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogan-din-uzerinden-siyasete-karsiyiz-194995>

²⁰⁶ Zana Çitak and Özlem Tür, "Women between Tradition and Change: The Justice and Development Party Experience in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no.3 (2008), 463.

²⁰⁷ *AK Parti Demokratikleşme ve Kalkınma Programı* (Ak Party Democratization and Development Program)

²⁰⁸ Ibid

²⁰⁹ William Hale and Ergun Özbudun *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 22.

²¹⁰ Cited in, Ergun Özbudun, "Secularism in Islamic Countries: Turkey as a Model," in *Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity*, eds. Rainer Grote and Tilmann J. Röder (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 141.

emphasized the prominent role of these services for the perpetuation of moral values that are important for social solidarity.²¹¹

Another important attribute of AKP's conservatism is its strong emphasis on the social institution of family. Family is presented as the value of highest importance to conservatism. Akdoğan indicated that the dissolution of the family which is the social institution that has the function of transmitting tradition and societal values is the most negative aspect of the modern era.²¹² In its 2003 Government Program, AKP stated that the major concern of party's conservative identity is to preserve unity and healthiness of family which is seen as the foundation of society.²¹³ AKP's 2007 Election Manifesto also emphasized significance of family for the party as the nucleus of the society.²¹⁴ Along similar lines, the 2011 Election Manifesto emphasized the prominent role of strong family for party's ideal of strong society. The importance of family for the party was justified by emphasizing its significant role on perpetuation of social structure, transposition of social values and norms between generations.²¹⁵ AKP also reiterated the prominence of family on several occasions and presented it as the core component of its conservative identity.

3.2.2 A Working Definition of Ideology

Before introducing the operationalization of ideological change, a necessary starting point is to provide a working definition of the vague and controversial concept of ideology. Various definitions withstanding, here Martin Seliger's definition will be employed as it provides an action-oriented conceptualization of the concept which have more analytical utility for analyzing incrementally changing ideological stances of

²¹¹ *Ak Parti 2007 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ak Party 2007 General Elections Election Manifesto) Ak Parti Tanıtım ve Medya Başkanlığı (February 2015) accessed on 10 September 2015

²¹² Yalçın Akdoğan. *Ak Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi* (Ak Party and Conservative Democracy) (Istanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2004) Cited in Zana Çitak and Özlem Tür, "Women between Tradition and Change: The Justice and Development Party Experience in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* .44, no.3 (2008), 463.

²¹³ *Ak Parti 59. Hükümet Programı* (AK Party 59th Government Program) accessed on 10 September 2015

²¹⁴ *Ak Parti 2007 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ak Party 2007 General Elections Election Manifesto)

²¹⁵ *Ak Parti 2011 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ak Party 2011 General Elections Election Manifesto) Ak Parti Tanıtım ve Medya Başkanlığı (February 2015) accessed on 10 September 2015

political parties.²¹⁶ Seliger defines an ideology as a set of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify the ends and means of organized social action irrespective of whether such actions aim to preserve, amend, uproot, or rebuild a given social order.²¹⁷ Based on this action-oriented definition of the term, in the context of party politics, here ideology is defined as a political rationality that entails mentalities and forms of political reasoning that structures and gives content to parties' discourses and policies.

Such an action oriented definition enables us to better delineate the complementary and conflicting multiple attributes of AKP's ideology. Such definition also enables to better delineate incremental changes in ideological stance of political parties than a static analysis of their ideological position on left-right axis through their official documents. Furthermore, it opens up the analysis of party's ideological position to an analysis of policy making, policy framing, and policy implementation.

3.2.3 Complementary and Conflicting Features of the 'New Right' Ideology

The aforementioned analysis of basic attributes of AKP's conservative democratic ideology indicates that, to a large extent, it follows the basic attributes of the so-called 'new right' ideology which entails a peculiar amalgamation of free-market economics, liberal democratic ideas, and social conservatism. Neoliberalism and neoconservatism constitutes two conflicting and complementary arms of 'new right' ideological project.²¹⁸ As a political ideology, neoliberalism came to the forefront by the writings of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman and based on the moral superiority of market and

²¹⁶ Seliger differentiated between two levels of ideology: fundamental and operative. At fundamental level ideologies deal with abstract values and ideas. At operative level ideologies are expressed in party manifestos, government policies, and political rhetoric. Similarly, Andrew Heywood distinguishes between idea-oriented and action-oriented. See, Martin Seliger, *Ideology and Politics* (London: Allen&Unwin, 1976) and Andrew Heywood *Political Ideologies: An Introduction* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012).

²¹⁷ Martin Seliger, *Ideology and Politics* (London: Allen&Unwin, 1976)

²¹⁸ The term 'new right' is generally referred to the ideological standpoints of Margaret Thatcher in UK and Ronald Reagan in USA during 1970's and 1980's. See, Andrew Heywood *Political Ideologies: An Introduction* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012) and R. Levitas ed. *The Ideology of the New Right* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) Stuart Hall's Gramscian analysis of Thatcherism also contends that rather than being a coherent ideology, 'new right' has differing attributes as an ideological formation ranging from liberal free-market policies and individualism to social conservatism based on family and nation. See, Stuart Hall, "The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism among the Theorists," in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, eds. C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (London: Macmillan Education, 1988)

laissez faire economics against ‘big government’ and calls for ‘rolling back the state’.²¹⁹ Such a process entails a shift of focus from achieving full employment and inclusive welfare systems to a prioritization of economic efficiency and international competitiveness. Neoliberalism, as Wendy Larner suggests, rests on five values: the individual, freedom of choice, market security, laissez fair, and minimal government.²²⁰ Although shaped as a reaction to stagflation created by Keynesian economics, neoliberalism has also become more widespread by the process of economic globalization. On the other hand, neoconservatism formed as a reaction to relaxation of moral standards and weakening of social solidarity. Consequently, neoconservatism invites back the state to uphold moral and social authority with a prioritization of community and social solidarity over individual.

Evidently, these two ideological positions has contradictory features such as ‘free-market and strong state’ and ‘commitment to individual and commitment to community/society’. Nevertheless, under the so-called ‘new-right’ ideology, these two strands of ideologies have also complementary features. For example, the social problems created by neoliberal idea of minimal state are generally contained by a socially strong state. In that regard, the goal of the new right is to establish what Andrew Gamble suggests a ‘free economy and strong state’ which entails minimal state in economic domain while strong state in societal domain. Wendy Brown’s conceptual framework for delineating different political rationalities embedded in neoliberalism and neoconservatism stands out as an operative tool to decompose complementary and contradictory attributes of the new right ideology in general and AKP’s conservative democratic ideology, in particular.

²¹⁹ The conceptualization of neoliberalism continues to remain a contested topic in the literature. There are various conceptualizations of neoliberalism ranging from an economic model or paradigm based on free-market to a mode of governmentality, and as a set of policies. The first conceptualization is straightforward as it posits the supremacy of market and entails the supremacy of free-market economy. Second one is based on neo-Foucauldian concept of governmentality and entails particular premises, logics and power relations which include individual empowerment and self-reliance, devolution of central state power, cultivation of an entrepreneurial spirit in public administration where citizens are re-defined as customer or clients. Third conceptualization sees neoliberalism as a set of policies that involve deregulation, liberalization, and privatization. For basic premises of neoliberalism see, Manfred B. Steger and Ravi K. Koy *Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press); Andrew Heywood *Political Ideologies: An Introduction* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). For a similar categorization of different conceptualizations see, Wendy Larner, “Neo-liberalism: Policy, Ideology, and Governmentality,” *Studies in Political Economy* 63 (2000), 5-25.

²²⁰ Wendy Larner, “Neo-liberalism: Policy, Ideology, and Governmentality,” *Studies in Political Economy* 63 (2000), 7.

As Brown suggests, neoliberal-political rationality necessitates the state to withdraw from social welfare provision and act as a facilitator role in which its regulatory role is minimized in economics. Moreover, neoliberal-political rationality entails the organization of social and political spheres based on market rationality in which individuals are seen as entrepreneurs and consumers whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for self-care and by their market value.²²¹ This kind of market-based rationality is complemented by liberal-juridical rationality which entails discourse on universal basic rights and freedoms. Brown also suggests that the neoliberal-political rationality entails marketization of political and social problems which leads to devotion of political and social from public and private sphere. In such a configuration, democracy is equated with the existence of formal rights, the market, and voting.²²² Therefore, briefly neoliberal political rationality involves the following attributes: (1) state which acts as a facilitator of free market economy where its regulatory and welfare provisioning roles are minimized; (2) individuals are seen as self-regulating, self-promoting subjects whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for self-care and by their economic contribution (market value); (3) strong references on formal rights, free-market, and voting.

On the contrary, neoconservatism is informed by moral-political rationality which 'identifies state, including law with the task of setting the moral-religious compass for society.'²²³ Contrary to the states minimal economic facilitator role in neoliberal-political rationality, moral-political rationality re-affirms state's moral role through discourses of religion, culture, tradition, and patriotism.²²⁴ As Altunok indicates, an important attribute of moral-political rationality is political moralism which entails driving the principles of socio-political order from moral considerations that are defined prior to politics.²²⁵ Consequently, moral-political rationality briefly entails: (1) identification of state with the role of preserving and also reengineering the sociocultural fabric; (2) individuals are seen as part of community in which their moral

²²¹ Wendy Brown, "American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization," *Political Theory* 34, no.6 (December, 2006), 694.

²²² Wendy Brown, "American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization," p. 703.

²²³ Ibid., 697.

²²⁴ Feride Acar and Gülbanu Altunok, "The 'Politics of Intimate' at the Intersection of Neo-liberalism and Neo-conservatism in Contemporary Turkey," *Women's Studies International Forum* 41 (2013), 15.

²²⁵ Gülbanu Altunok, "Neo-conservatism, Sovereign Power and Bio-power: Female Subjectivity in Contemporary Turkey," *Research and Policy on Turkey* (2016), 4.

autonomy is measured by their adherence to sociocultural norms and values; (3) prioritization of community and family over individual in which family is conceived as the building block of social order and as a remedying mechanism for problems created by modernization process.

The preceding conceptual framework to a large extent covers conservative and liberal attributes of AKP's ideology proposed as conservative democracy. Liberal-judicial rationality was clearly discernable in party's strong emphasis on basic freedoms and rights and participatory democracy. AKP's strong references to minimal economic role of the state, individual centered economic policy, privatization, cost containment and recommodification in social policy also stands out as clear indicators of party's neoliberal-political rationality.

The basic attributes of the party's conservatism, to a large extent, fits with the general features of moral-political rationality with its strong emphasis on family and religion as important vehicles for preservation of social solidarity. Nevertheless, one of the basic features of party's proposed conservatism is its negative attitude towards 'social engineering' which entails using state apparatuses for setting the moral and religious compass of the society stands out as a divergence from basic feature of moral-political rationality. In that regard, initially AKP's ideology proposed as conservative democracy mainly informed by party's neoliberal-political rationality with its strong references to free-market economy, minimal state, individual centered policy making, basic rights and freedoms, privatization, cost-containment in social welfare spending, recommodification, democratic participation. On the other hand, party's moral-political rationality was initially limited to an emphasis on moral values and traditions, social role of religion, and importance of strong family for social solidarity.

3.2.4 Operationalization of Ideological Change

Based on the aforementioned working definition of ideology, ideological change will be defined as shifting/changing prioritization between two different rationalities that are embedded in AKP's proposed ideology of conservative democracy. As the preceding

analysis sought to suggest, the party has an identity that entails a peculiar amalgamation of neoliberal-political rationality and moral-political rationality. In that regard, shifting/changing prioritization between AKP's neoliberal-political rationality and moral-political rationality will be defined as ideological change. It is important to note that here incremental ideological change is defined and measured as a trend. Harmel defines 'trend' as 'a series of incremental changes in aggregate observations that tend to move in the same direction so that they cumulate into a consistent, measurable shift over time'.²²⁶ While, the proposed definition of ideological change helps us to better delineate incremental ideological change that this research aims to explain, still there are couple of analytical problems for measuring ideological change.


In the party change literature, the conventional methodology for measuring ideological change of political parties through datasets derived by rigorous content analysis of official party documents such as party programs and election manifestos. Most frequently used of such datasets is the one provided by Manifesto Research which offers quantified data based on content analysis of parties' election manifestos. Two basic indicators that provide clues for political parties' conservativeness are the indicators of 'traditional morality (positive) and 'society (progressive-conservative)'. First indicator involves quantified data derived from content analysis that measures favorable mentions of traditional and/or moral values in parties' official documents. Second indicator measures the saliency of progressive and conservative traits of general statements about society.

The Manifesto Research's indicators on AKP's conservatism show stability rather than change. For example, the 'society (progressive-conservative)' indicator shows stability rather than change with only a marginal shift towards 'progressive' (Figure I).²²⁷

²²⁶ Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6 (1994), 277.

²²⁷ Volkens, Andrea / Lehmann, Pola / Matthieß, Theres / Merz, Nicolas / Regel, Sven / Weßels, Bernhard, *The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR)*. Version 2017a. (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), 2017). <https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpps.2017a>


Figure 1: Manifesto Research Database Indicator: Society (Progressive-Conservative)



Source: Graph downloaded from MARPOR Data dashboard

Similarly, the indicator that shows the frequency of positive references to traditional morality shows relatively stable pattern with decreasing positive references to traditional morality (Figure 2).²²⁸

Figure 2: Manifesto Research Indicator: Traditional Morality (Positive)



Source: Graph downloaded from MARPOR data dashboard

²²⁸ Volkens, Andrea / Lehmann, Pola / Matthieß, Theres / Merz, Nicolas / Regel, Sven / Weßels, Bernhard, *The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR)*. Version 2017a. (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), 2017). <https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpps.2017a>

The preceding quantitative indicators of AKP's conservatism show that rather than change, party's conservatism to a large extent shows continuity in its official documents. Datasets that are based on content analysis of election manifestos such as Manifesto Research Group provide only a measurement of the relative emphasis placed on an issue by a party in a manifesto, not the party's substantive position on the issue at hand.²²⁹ Therefore, while coded datasets extracted from parties' manifestos provide historical comparable data for large-n studies; it fails to provide a complete picture of parties' incrementally shifting ideological leanings. This becomes more critical for 'the parties in government' as the policy making, policy framing, policy implementation processes also stands out as strong indicators of party's shifting ideological leanings. Last but not least, election manifesto documents provide intermittent picture of party's ideological positions and fails to see party politics in a continuum by providing indicators only from one election to another.

Moreover, preceding qualitative analysis of AKP's official documents and statements of party leadership show that party's conservatism was limited to being against social engineering and emphasis on the need for supporting and strengthening of family and significance of religion as a significant component of tradition and social solidarity. As Hale and Özbudun argue the recurring themes of limited state, rule of law, free market economy, stronger civil society, universal human rights make ideology of the AKP more liberal rather than conservative.²³⁰ The party's official documents indicate that over the years the above mentioned amalgamation of liberal and conservative attributes is clearly noticeable over the years. In that regard, throughout its three terms in government, official documents of the party shows stability rather than change in terms of its ideology conceptualized as 'conservative democracy'.

Official documents of AKP, while providing a benchmark on its ideological position, fails to provide a comprehensive picture of party's incrementally changing ideological leanings. A qualitative analysis of liberal and conservative attributes of AKP reveal that the election manifesto documents of the party shows stability rather than change. Although election manifestos provide solid data on party's particular policy positions

²²⁹ Michael Laver and John Garry, "Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts," *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no.3 (Jul., 2000), 620.

²³⁰ William Hale and Ergun Özbudun *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 24.

and these can be interpreted as an indicator of party's ideological leanings, these documents are strategically written and may include multiple objectives of party elites. Consequently, focusing exclusively on party's official documents gives only an incomplete picture of party's shifting ideological leanings.

Based on the aforementioned analytical problems, instead of measuring ideological change from official party documents, by employing an action-oriented definition of ideology, this thesis will focus on policy domains that are indicative of party's shifting ideological leanings to measure incremental ideological change. Nevertheless, focusing only on policy output also provides an incomplete picture as policy framing process and party's discourse on specific policy domains also stands out as important indicators of party's ideological position. Therefore, to better delineate incremental ideological change, this research will focus on three policy domains as indicative of increasing prioritization of AKP's moral-political rationality over its neoliberal-political rationality.

3.3 CONCLUSION

This chapter sought to analyze the AKP's formative phase which has significant effects on the institutionalization process of political parties. Compared to the parties in government in consolidated democracies, the formative phase of AKP reveals the contingent character of the process on domestic and international political environment. In a highly restrictive domestic political context, AKP's formative phase was based on a prioritization of organizational survival and adaptation to environment rather than domination of environment which is the generally proposed party strategy in consolidated democracies. The basic attributes of conservative democratic ideology also reveal the contingent character of ideological formation on the aforementioned restrictive domestic political context.

With its liberal, conservative and social democratic attributes, initially AKP's ideology resembles the traditional center-right parties such as the Motherland Party. To better delineate incremental ideological change, this chapter also presented the analytical

framework of the thesis which built upon an action-oriented definition of ideology. By employing Brown's conflicting political rationalities embedded in new right ideology, incremental ideological change experienced by AKP throughout its three consecutive terms in government will be analyzed.

Although tracing the ideological change from political parties' election manifestos stands out as the conventional method of depicting ideological change political parties experience, this methodology remains weak in terms of analyzing incremental ideological change for parties in government. In that regard, in the upcoming chapters, an analysis of official party documents such as party programs and election manifestos will be complemented by detailed analysis of policies that are indicative of ideological change.



CHAPTER IV

INTRA-PARTY INDICATORS OF PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION: LEVEL OF SYSTEMNESS

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the internal dimension of the process of party institutionalization which is generally conceptualized as the degree of party's systemness. Within the literature of party institutionalization different indicators were proposed for measuring the degree of systemness. This chapter will analyze AKP's systemness by employing both quantitative and qualitative indicators that appear recurrently within the literature of party institutionalization.

One of the main indicators of systemness is the level of organizational development and capacity, which entails the development of a central bureaucracy with a strong national apparatus (scope), and uniform organizational structure at all organizational levels. In that regard, the degree of AKP's systemness will be analyzed by assessing the changing levels of organizational development and organizational cohesion which are proposed as the basic indicators for intra-party indicators of institutionalization.

The first part of the chapter will briefly outline the general organizational features of Turkish political parties and analyze to what extent the AKP differed from general organizational characteristics of political parties in Turkey and how this structural framework affected party's organizational development. Second part will provide an analysis of quantitative indicators of organizational development which include membership density levels, and availability of stable financial resources. Third part will briefly analyze the changing levels of AKP's intra-party cohesion and the ways through which the party achieved organizational cohesion.

4.1 THE BASIC ATTRIBUTES OF AKP'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Turkish political parties are relatively highly institutionalized when compared to parties found in new democracies. Especially, the existence of extensive, powerful, highly organized grassroots parties has been a well-established feature of Turkish politics since 1960's.²³¹ Turkish political parties are organizationally and financially structured by the legal framework laid down in the Law on Political Parties and Deputy Electoral Law.²³² As Özbudun suggests, Turkish parties display similar organizational characteristics that consist of party congresses and elected executive committees at the national and local levels.²³³ The legal organizational model is to a large extent consistent with democratic principles which include electoral process for party leaders and executive committees at all levels by the appropriate party congresses which are supposed to represent the entire body of party members. While the legal framework remains largely in line with democratic principles which provide a blueprint for intra-party democracy, Turkish political parties are found to display strong oligarchical tendencies and centralized leadership authority.²³⁴

AKP's organizational structure largely conforms to the overall design within the framework of Law on Political Parties.²³⁵ The Party's highest decision making body is the Grand Congress which composed of delegates chosen by provincial congresses and ex-officio delegates. The Congress is authorized to elect the Party leader, the Central Decision-Making and Executive Committee (CDEC), the Central Disciplinary Committee, and the members of the Intra Party Democracy Arbitration Committee. The CDEC is the second highest authority in the party. Led by the party leader, it meets at

²³¹ Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Lynne Reinner, Boulder: London, 2000), 83.

²³² See, Law on Political Parties (*Siyasi Partiler Kanunu*) No.2820, and Deputy Electoral Law (*Milletvekili Seçim Kanunu*) No. 2839. Both documents are available at <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/genser/kanunlar.htm>

²³³ Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, 83.

²³⁴ Various conceptualizations for this hierarchical top-down relationship between party leaders and party organizations were proposed. For the high levels of leadership domination within party organizations see, P.Ayan Musil, *Authoritarian Party Structures and Domestic Political Setting in Turkey* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Turkish Party System: leaders, vote and institutionalization," *Journal of South European and Black Sea Studies* 13, no.4 (2013).

²³⁵ This section is based on the AKP's Party Constitution which provides detailed information on organizational structure and interrelation of different parts of the Party's organizational structure. See *AK Parti Tüzüğü (The Constitution of the AKP)* accessed June 15, 2017. <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu>

least once every month. It is authorized to make decisions on party policies and all organizational matters including decision to form a government or to leave a coalition government. Within CDEC a smaller body called Central Executive Committee (CEC) is responsible for the daily functioning of the party and composed of party leader, vice chair persons, secretary general, the Chairperson and the vice Chair persons of the Party Parliamentary Group. As Hale and Özbudun indicate together with the party leader, the CEC is the most powerful body in the party.²³⁶

At the local level AKP's organization consists of municipal, sub-provincial and provincial congress which elects executive committee and chairperson within each level of local organizational units. As Hale and Özbudun indicate, compared to other political party local organizations, AKP is more active, motivated, and elaborately organized at the local level.²³⁷ While the smallest organizational level is municipal level, below that, party representatives can be appointed at the urban neighborhood, village and pooling district levels. Pooling booth district committees are the 'nerve ends of the organization that reach ordinary voters'. They aim to contact all voters regardless of their party affiliations.

Apart from this general organizational pattern, there are also specialized auxiliary committees at the sub-province level, such as health, education, social affairs, economy, civil society, and disabled persons committees. Large part of the activities carried out includes informing voters of the various social welfare programs by the central government, municipal government, and local municipalities. Though such programs the Party successfully deliver assistance such as food, coal, and cash aid to the voters regardless of their party affiliations. Hale and Özbudun indicate that this coordination between the Party and municipalities is further advanced as a result of large presence of the Party in municipalities throughout the country. Such strong local presence of the Party in municipalities helps the local party organizations to access certain public services provided by municipal and provincial administrations. Same as the other parties AKP also has youth and women's organizations at all organizational levels.²³⁸

²³⁶ William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the case of AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 46.

²³⁷ Idem.

²³⁸ William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the case of AKP*, p. 46

As the preceding review of the organizational structure of the party reveals, in terms of organizational development and complexity, AKP largely remains within the framework of the Law on Political Parties which often leads to party organizations in a more or less similar structure. While the AKP has been highly successful in terms of extending its geographical penetration with more elaborate and active local organizational structure, as Hale and Özbudun state it continues to remain as a highly centralized and hierarchical organization. Although the local organizational units have been highly active and useful for the party in gaining new members and voters, they have been under strict control of the central organizational bodies. Therefore, AKP's organizational relationship between central party organizations and local organizations follows the general hierarchical and centrist tendencies of Turkish political parties.²³⁹

Accordingly in terms of having central bureaucratic organization with strong national apparatus, the AKP showed high levels of systemness. Additionally, the central and hierarchic nature of the organizational structure indicates that AKP, while maintained a strong nationwide territorial apparatus through local organizations, these organizations were controlled by the central organization of the party.

4.2 QUANTATIVE INDICATORS OF SYSTEMNESS

One of the basic concepts used as an indicator for systemness of political parties is the level of organizational development and territorial comprehensiveness. Within the literature of party institutionalization, there are also quantitative indicators for measuring the level of organizational development which are suggested as the basic indicators of intra-party institutionalization: Membership strength/membership density and financial resources. The aim of the following section is to complement the preceding analysis with assessing the quantitative indicators of organizational development.

²³⁹ *Idem*

4.2.1 Membership Strength and Membership Density

As Sebnem Yardimci-Geyikçi suggests, measuring the level of organizational development is a difficult task ‘since the requirements of organizational strength might change in different contexts.’²⁴⁰ In the literature there are basic quantitative indicators such as membership levels, territorial comprehensiveness, and availability of stable resources which are used to measure the level of organizational development. With regard to membership levels two indicators are generally used to assess the level of organizational power of a party: membership strength and membership density. Membership strength, measured by the percentage share of party members within total electorate for the whole country, provides quantitative measurement of party’s level of organizational penetration. Other quantitative data for measuring the level of organizational development is the membership density which is calculated by dividing the total number of party members with the total electorate of the party. Thomas Poguntke suggests that the level of membership density is a strong indicator for the degree of political parties’ ability to penetrate its own electorate organizationally.²⁴¹

In terms of number of party members, Turkish political parties generally enjoy relatively high levels of party membership. AKP was no different from this general trend as the party registered a higher level of membership/total electorate ratio. As Özbudun indicates, this membership strength largely stems from three factors. Firstly, the strong clientelistic features of party politics increase the appeal of becoming a party member for receiving benefits, especially when the party is in government. Secondly, Turkish political parties have no strict procedures for collecting membership dues which makes membership a cost-free process. Thirdly, local party members try to register their families and close associates to augment their delegate base.²⁴² Albeit these general factors that explain high membership levels in Turkish political parties, the AKP’s members have been relatively active in daily workings of the party:

²⁴⁰ Sebnem Yardimci-Geyikci, “Party Institutionalization and Democratic Consolidation: Turkey and Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective,” *Party Politics* 21, no.4 (2015), 529.

²⁴¹ Thomas Pogunte, “Party Organizational Linkage: Parties without firm social roots?” in *Political Parties in New Europe: Political and Analytical Challenges* eds. R Luther and F Muller-Rommel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 52.

²⁴² William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the case of AKP*, 47

“Party officials state that about 300,000 of them perform some active party duty, such as being deputies, mayors, city councilors, members of provincial general assemblies, members of the executive committees at the central, provincial, sub-provincial and municipal levels; village, neighborhood and pooling district representatives; members of the executive committees of women’s and youth organizations at all levels.”²⁴³

As Table 4 shows, compared to other parties, AKP also enjoyed relatively high levels of membership density. Additionally, party has been highly successful in terms of increasing its membership density levels from 2007 to 2011 which shows its increasing level of organizational development and ability to penetrate its own electorate organizationally.²⁴⁴

Table 4: Membership Density Levels of Mainstream Political Parties in 2007 and 2011 Elections

Year	Parties	Numb of members	Electorate*	Membership Density (M/V)
2006	AKP	1,834,520	16,327,291(07)	11.2%
2006	CHP	529,703	7,317,81(07)	7.2%
2006	MHP	307,747	5,001,869(07)	6.2%
2011	AKP	4,261,74	21,399,082(11)	19.9%
2011	CHP	852,000	11,155,972(11)	7.6%
2010	MHP	363,393**	5,585,513(11)	6.5%

*The numbers in parentheses are the years of general elections. **Party membership figures of MHP for 2011 could not be found. Therefore MHP’s party membership figures in 2013 were used.

4.2.2 Stability of Financial Resources

In terms of internal dimensions of party institutionalization, availability and stability of resources are found to be basic indicators of parties’ level of systemness. The increasing

²⁴³ Idem.

²⁴⁴ Parties’ total number of voters was received from Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK). Party membership figures for 2007 were gathered from Hürriyet 2007. For 2011 membership figures for AKP and CHP see, <http://www.internethaber.com/bu-iki-ilcede-chnin-tek-bir-uyesi-yok-330694h.htm>.

impact of state funding on political parties is generally found to have negative impacts on political parties as it found to lead to ossification of the party system, decreasing level of party competition, decreasing levels of social embeddedness, and ineffectiveness against corruption. Nevertheless, party institutionalization literature also suggest that stable financial resources and financial independence of parties have important positive effects on party's systemness through providing financial strength to the central extra party organization vis-à-vis local party organizations. Apart from state funding, political parties also rely on membership dues and private donations.

Turkish political parties largely rely on state funding for their financial resources. In 1995, the state-funding of political parties gained constitutionality. Parties which reach above 7% of the total valid votes become eligible for both annual state funding and funding during the election campaigns. While the state funding and national threshold link negatively affects the institutionalization of small parties which are deprived from stable state funding, all mainstream Turkish parties enjoy stable financial resources thanks to the national threshold and constitutionality of state funding. Table 5 clearly shows that state funding remained as the largest item within the annual financial resources of the party throughout its three terms.

Table 5: Percentage Splits of AKP's Revenues²⁴⁵

Sources of Income	AKP(2004)	AKP(2006)	AKP(2011)
(% of total income)			
State Subsidies	85.2	89.8	85.3
Donations*	8.1	3.2	5.2
Other*	6.7	7.0	9.5
Total	100	100	100

Source: For 2004 and 2006, Arda Can Kumbaracıbaşı, *Turkish Politics and the Rise of AKP: Dilemmas of institutionalization and leadership strategy* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 135. For 2011 figures, Sebnem Yardımcı-Geyikçi "Party Institutionalization and Democratic Consolidation: Turkey and Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective," *Party Politics* Vols21 No4 (2015), 530.

²⁴⁵ Two different sources were used to construct the table as there is no official data for previous years. For the years of 2004 and 2006 I used the table cited in Arda Can Kumbaracıbaşı and for 2011 I used the table in Yardımcı-Geyikçi's article. While the former provides data on three categories, Kumbaracıbaşı provides a more detailed table. To arrive at comparable longitudinal data, I added the revenue items titled 'aid donations' and 'sales' cited in Kumbaracıbaşı's research under the top level heading of donations. Similarly, for 'others' I added the 'others' and 'assets' together to arrive total value of 'others'.

The quantitative indicators of AKP's systemness show that the party enjoyed high levels of organizational development. AKP registered stronger membership density levels which indicate a stronger organizational capacity to penetrate its own electorate. Additionally, as a natural corollary of Law on Turkish Political Parties, AKP remained financially autonomous from its local organizations and other sponsoring organizations as above 80% of its revenues came from state subsidies.

4.3 DEGREE OF ORGANIZATIONAL COHESION: FROM ORGANIZATIONAL HETEROGENEITY TO ROUTINIZATION OF LEADERSHIP CONTROL THROUGH FORMAL AND INFORMAL MEANS

As the preceding analysis indicates, AKP shows strong levels of systemness in terms of organizational complexity and development. Nonetheless, since its establishment, especially during its first term in office, AKP showed high levels of organizational heterogeneity. AKP's genetic phase can be conceptualized as a protest based organizational development in which it showed high levels of intra-party ideological heterogeneity. First and foremost, while many of the MP's came from Felicity Party (FP) which belong to National Outlook Movement (NOM hereafter), many other came from different political affiliations. This created a highly heterogeneous organizational structure which included party members ranging from pro-Islamic NOM to moderate conservatives and liberals, from nationalists to even party members with past affiliations with center-left.

Kumbaracıbaşı suggests that the different voices within the AKP can be analyzed in three groups:

First group consists of the elite, leaders, founders, the traditionalists, and strong local administrators and bureaucrats appointed by the elite. The second consists of outsiders who gained entry to the party at a later stage: they came from other parties and backgrounds, often differ ideologically, mainly joined the party because of its novel character or due to dissatisfaction with other parties... The lower party ranks could also be included as a third group that tends to display strong Islamic affiliations.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁶ Arda Can Kumbaracıbaşı, *Turkish Politics and the Rise of AKP: Dilemmas of institutionalization and leadership strategy* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 150.

This organizational heterogeneity can also be traced through the past party affiliations of the members of the AKP's provincial organizations. A Pollmark Survey conducted in 2004 clearly reveals the organizational heterogeneity within local organizations of AKP.²⁴⁷ In terms of political background of party's members of the provincial organizations, around 41% of its members reported that they worked for other parties before joining to AKP.²⁴⁸ While this finding indicates that the AKP was a fresh beginning for over 60% of its members had no past affiliations with other parties, detailed analysis of the political backgrounds of members that worked for other parties before indicates an ideologically heterogeneous picture. Within the total provincial members that worked for other parties, 38.7% worked for the Welfare Party, 16.1% for the Virtue Party, 15.5% for the Motherland Party, 8.7% for the True Path Party, and 6.4% for the Nationalist Action Party.²⁴⁹ These findings indicates that when the Welfare Party and Virtue Party were considered as parties that belonged to NOM, around 45% of the provincial organizations have past working affiliations with other right-wing parties.

As Ertan Aydın and Ibrahim Dalmış suggest, the participation is not restricted to being a member or working for a party, most people prefer to express their political choices by voting in elections. The above mentioned survey of AKP's provincial organizations also provides the past votes casted in 1999 general elections by the then current members of the AKP's provincial organizations (Table 3).²⁵⁰

Table 6: Past Vote Affiliations of AKP's Provincial Members in 1999 General Elections

Parties	%Votes
Welfare Party/Virtue Party	55.9
Motherland Party	10.6
True Path Party	6.3
Nationalist Action Party	9.4
Republican People's Party	0.9
Democratic Left Party	1.0
Democratic Left Party	0.2
Great Unity Party	0.9
OTHER	0.4

²⁴⁷ The findings of this research is cited in Ertan Aydın and Ibrahim Dalmış, "The Social Bases of the Justice and Deveopment Party," in *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: the making of Justice and Development Party*, ed. Ümit Cizre (New York: Routledge, 2008): 201-222.

²⁴⁸ Ertan Aydın and Ibrahim Dalmış, "The Social Bases of the Justice and Development Party," 205.

²⁴⁹ *Idem.*

²⁵⁰ Ertan Aydın and Ibrahim Dalmış, "The Social Bases of the Justice and Development Party", 206.

Not voted for any party	13.8
Not Eligible	0.6
TOTAL	100

The past vote affiliations of the members of provincial organizations indicates that during its first term in power, AKP's local organizations showed considerable heterogeneity with over 25% of the members voted for parties other than Welfare Party/Virtue Party. Nevertheless, this also indicates that while in electoral terms the AKP opened itself to an electorate which is wider than the National Outlook Movement, the past vote affiliations of members of the provincial organizations indicate that around 56% of the provincial members voted for Welfare and Virtue Parties. This indicates the significance of party members from NOM movement during its first term in power.

With regard to past party affiliations of the AKP deputies during its first term, a different picture emerges compared to the past political/ideological affiliations of local provincial party members. When asked about their vote preferences during general elections of 1999, nearly 75% of the AKP deputies voted for the Virtue Party. When analyzed together with the past party affiliations of AKP voters in 2003 elections, the difference between deputies and core supporters of the party becomes clearer (Table 7).²⁵¹

Table 7: Past Vote Affiliations of AKP's Deputies, Supporters and Members of Provincial Organizations in 1999 General Elections

Parties	Supporters%	Members of Provincial Organizations%	Deputies%
Virtue Party	26.8	55.9	73.5
Nationalist Action Party	19.1	9.4	6.1
Motherland Party	9.6	10.6	5.0
True Path Party	6.9	6.3	6.6
OTHER	13.6	3.4	4.0
Not Voted for any Party	24	14.4	5.0
TOTAL	100	100	100

Preceding analysis of ideological position of local (provincial) party members and deputies during the first term of AKP in power reveals that AKP in parliament and local organizations shows clear indicators of ideological heterogeneity, indicating high

²⁵¹ Ertan Aydın and Ibrahim Dalmış, "The Social Bases of the Justice and Development Party" p. 216

prospects of intra-party dissent, ideological, and/or issue based factionalism. Therefore, it can be argued that during its first term in power, though the party showed high levels of systemness in terms of organizational development, it showed low levels of organizational cohesion which is found to have negative consequences for the party's systemness. Following sections will analyze the formal and informal organizational developments through which party leadership tried to consolidate its power vis-à-vis extra-parliamentary organization, parliamentary group, and cabinet.

4.3.1 From the Promise of Intra-Party Democracy towards Formal Routinization of Centralized Authority

Although AKP displayed many of the common characteristics of hierarchical organizational structure of Turkish political parties which give central party organizations a strong autonomy and control over peripheral organizations, AKP was a novel case due to its strong emphasis on intra-party democracy with transparent and inclusive decision making. AKP's Party Constitution in 2002 made strong emphasis on intra-party democracy by indicating that 'democracy should be the primary method of carrying out the internal party businesses.'²⁵² Party's internal operations were characterized by several democratic elements such as primary elections for party lists, transparent decision making, and value of extensive debate on policy formation.²⁵³ Despite the party leadership's initial support for and attempts to achieve intra-party democracy that resemble its internal ideological heterogeneity, starting from its first term as governing party, the party leadership and central party organization

²⁵² See, Sultan Tepe, "Turkey's AKP: A Model "Muslim Democratic Party," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no.3 (July, 2005), 73. and R Quinn Mencham, "From Ashes of Virtue, a Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no.2 (2004), 351.

²⁵³ This section largely based on a comparative analysis of AKP's first Party Constitution in 2002 and the second version which includes significant amendments which led to over centralization and increasing leadership control over the party organization. The original Party Constitution is available at Turkish Grand National Assembly's website. See AK Parti Tüzüğü (The Constitution of AKP) ,(2002) downloaded from https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJITAL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITAPLAR/SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI/200204121%20AK%20PARTI%20TUZUGU%202002/200204121%20AK%20PARTI%20TUZUGU%202002%200000_0000.pdf accessed in 04 September 2016. The version with amendments is available at AKP's website.

strengthened its control both formally and informally over the entire party organization to decrease the prospects of intra-party dissent and factional rivalry.

Right before the leadership change in 2003 in which Recep Tayyip Erdoğan acquired party leadership from Abdullah Gül, the Constitution of the AKP was amended in February 2003.²⁵⁴ The new amendments further centralized the power of the central party organizations and the party leadership. More importantly, the amendments had significant repercussions on intra-party democracy. When compared to 2002 Party Constitution, the new one changed the election procedures of delegates, leadership replacement, and membership elections of both central and local branches of the organization.

With regard to the election procedures of the delegates, the amendments cancelled the list system and left it up to party leadership whether to appoint delegates or conduct elections based on bloc lists.²⁵⁵ Since the amendments, the party used the block list method in which the system utilizes fixed lists which is produced by party's headquarters and/or opposition groups. As Simten Coşar and Aylin Özman argue, this new procedure of delegate election further strengthened the central control by 'furnishing the central committee with the authority to recommend candidates'.²⁵⁶ In a similar vein, the members of the CEC except president and parliamentary group, used to be elected from the CDEC via secret ballot. Following the amendments in February 2003, the election procedure for CEC cancelled, and members of the committee started to be appointed by the leadership directly. Again with the same amendment, the replacement of party leadership was made extremely difficult. As a result of these amendments, as Kumbaracıbaşı suggests, 'it became much harder to gather support for a

²⁵⁴ Two months after the AKP's landslide victory in November 2002 elections, Turkish Constitutional Court lifted the ban that prevent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from public office. Not long after his reinstatement, the AKP's constitution was amended which increased the power of party leadership vis-à-vis party organization.

²⁵⁵ The other type of list method is the so called spread list (*çarşaf liste*) in which anyone who wants to be a delegate put his/her name on the list. Compared to block list method in which fixed lists prepared by party headquarters or other groups are voted, spread list method features a more democratic way of electing delegates as everyone can put their name on the list and run for elections.

²⁵⁶ Simten Coşar and Aylin Özman, "Centre-right politics in Turkey after November 2002 General Election: Neo Liberalism with a Muslim Face," *Contemporary Politics* 10, No.1 (2004), 68. Accordingly, Tepe suggests that the candidate list prepared by the party leadership enjoyed an unmatched impact over any competing list prepared by other groups within the party. See, Sultan Tepe, "Turkey's AKP: A Model "Muslim Democratic Party," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no.3 (July, 2005), 74.

removal or replacement of a leader in the Grand Congress'.²⁵⁷ This was mainly due to the block list method of electing delegates to the Grand Congress which force delegates to vote for the leader rather than bringing out new alternative candidates.

These amendments aimed at establishing control both over the party in parliament and extra-parliamentary organization. Due to the increasing centralization of power at the hand of party leadership, during its first term as government, AKP faced significant number of breakaways due to the objections of MP's and other party members to over centralization and lack of intra-party democracy. Ertuğrul Yalçınbayır who was the Deputy Prime Minister under Erdoğan during AKP's first term also emphasized the need for reforms that would bring intra-party democracy and reduction in heavy leadership pressure.²⁵⁸

4.3.2 The Relationship between Party Leader and Party Organization: Candidate Selection Procedure as a Means of Stronger Leadership Control

One of the most important indicators of intra-party democracy and point of assessment for the relationship between party leadership vis-à-vis party organizations is candidate selection method. The Turkish Political Parties Law leaves the candidate selection procedure to party constitutions.²⁵⁹ While the method of holding party primaries, in which all registered party members or their elected delegates in that constituency can participate, has been in place within party constitutions, this method has been rarely used. Instead, as Özbudun indicates, all parties tend to nominate candidates through their central executive committees which are strongly controlled by party leaders.²⁶⁰ This candidate selection procedure further consolidates the centralist tendencies within parties which further amplify the leadership control over the party.

²⁵⁷ Arda Can Kumbaracıbaşı, *Turkish Politics and the Rise of AKP: Dilemmas of institutionalization and leadership strategy*, 148.

²⁵⁸ Interview with Ertuğrul Yalçınbayır *Vatan Daily* October 2003 available at <http://www.rusencakir.com/AKP-Neydiler-Ne-oldular-15/60> accessed 12 September 12, 2016.

²⁵⁹ See, Law on Political Parties (*Siyasi Partiler Kanunu*) No.2820

²⁶⁰ Ergun Özbudun *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Lynne Rienner, Boulder: London, 2000), p. 83

AKP's Party Constitution specify three methods for candidate selection and listing procedures: primaries (ön seçim), organizational enquiry (temayül yoklaması), and central enquiry (merkez yoklaması).²⁶¹ Despite the presence of these different methods, following the application process, it is the Central Executive Committee and Central Decision Making and Executive Committee that controls the decision-making process for choosing the candidate selection and listing methods which in turn are controlled by the party leader. While holding of primaries involve conducting elections in which all the registered party members vote for the candidates in their constituency, organizational enquiry takes place when the central executive committee asks the opinions of the local party organizations about the already prepared candidate lists by the central party organs. Central enquiry also bypasses local party organizations and involves appointment of candidates and preparation of candidate lists to Central Decision Making and Executive Committee where the party leadership enjoys extensive control.²⁶²

When the general and local elections during the period between 2002 and 2014 analyzed, AKP largely used the organizational enquiry method which gives some voice to the local party organizations while leaving the final decision of candidate appointment to the party leader. While the organizational enquiry method can be seen as a middle ground between strong leadership authority and intra-party democracy, candidate selection and listing procedure, prior to the general elections of 2007 and 2011 indicates that the final decision on candidates and candidate listing largely made by central party organs, more specifically by the party leader. Following the amendments to the party bylaws, the party leader's domination of central party organs such as CEC and CDEC, the weight of the party leader increased significantly in terms of having the final say over candidate lists. For example, during the candidate nomination process, the party leadership purged 163 existing members of the parliament and precluded them from the candidate lists prior to 2007 elections. This massive change generally portrayed as an attempt of 'change of display' by the party leadership following the tense relationship between AKP government and military during the

²⁶¹ *AK Parti Tüzüğü (The Constitution of the AKP)* downloaded from <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu>, Articles 123 and 124.

election crisis of President of Republic.²⁶³ The party leadership delisted 163 names that were previously worked as members of parliament. The majority of the delisted names were MP's who were closer to NOM movement and other MP's who showed opposition to the decisions of party leadership.²⁶⁴ Party leaderships control over candidate listing and nomination process is also evident during the candidate selection process prior to 2011 general elections. During the candidate listing and nomination process the party leadership delisted 163 names out of 333 MP's. A famous journalist who is closer to the party recently indicated that the purge in the candidate lists during the time was largely due to the clash between Gülenists and the AKP which was then in its infancy.²⁶⁵

4.3.3 Informal Accounts of Over-Centralization and Leadership Control over the Party Organization

While the structural and top-down consolidation of leadership power over the organization alleviates the problems of organizational heterogeneity and limits the prospects of factional rivalry, there is also an attitudinal and bottom-up process which also lowers the prospects of factional rivalry and intra-party dissent, leading to consent based acceptance of centralization and leadership authority over the party.²⁶⁶

One of the most prominent factors behind consent base acceptance of leadership domination over the party is the material incentives the party provides to local party members. As a party in government that won three consecutive general elections, AKP had access to highest financial share from the state subventions that are specified under the Political Parties Law. This financial strength and independence further consolidates party leaderships authority over local party organizations. Additionally, as Ayan suggests, apart from the material incentives, the solidary and purposive incentives also positively impacts this consent based acceptance of centralized leadership authority over

²⁶³ Cüneyt Ülsever, "Ak Parti Neden Vitrin Değişikliği Yaptı," *Hürriyet*, 30 June 2007, accessed September, 10 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/akp-neden-vitrin-degisikligi-yapti-6810699>

²⁶⁴ "Grubun Yarıya Yakını Çizdi," *Hürriyet*, 05 June 5, 2007, accessed September 12, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/grubun-yariya-yakinini-cizdi-6647936>

²⁶⁵ Abdulkadir Selvi, "Paralel Yapı Hükümeti Nasıl Düşürecek," *Yeni Şafak*, December 28, 2015, accessed September 12, 2016, <http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/abdulkadirsarvi/paralel-yapi-hukumeti-nasil-dusurecekti-2024867>

²⁶⁶ Pelin Ayan, "Authoritarian Party Structures in Turkey: A Comparison of the Republican People's Party and the Justice and Development Party," *Turkish Studies* 11, no.2 (2010).

entire organization.²⁶⁷ Party members and MP's statements on candidate selection process and party leader exemplifies this consent based acceptance of leadership authority. One district party member stated that:

“Of course, our party leader should have the weight in candidate selection process. We would not be working for the party unless we believed in our leader's decisions. I have not been affiliated with any party until the AKP. Our leader and his perspectives are the reasons for why we are here today.”²⁶⁸

The members of local women organizations of the party also indicated their strong trust and appreciation to the party leader. In their study on AKP's women branches Tür and Çitak's study found that the main reason for entry among women to the party is the trust and admiration towards the party leader.²⁶⁹ Another manifestation of strong trust and administration for party leadership was the previous Grand Congress, which instead of being a platform of debates on party's politics, turned out to be theaters of unconditional support for party leadership.²⁷⁰ AKP leadership's immunity from intra-party dissent and factional rivalry is also further improved due to the charismatic leadership traits of Erdoğan.²⁷¹ Some of AKP official's remarks on Erdoğan illustrate the unconditional adherence of party members to party leadership: 'I swear by God that Erdoğan is Turkey's eternal president forever'; 'to belong to AKP means to be officially wedded to the Prime Minister'; Our Prime Minister is the glad tidings our Creator sent to humanity'.²⁷²

²⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 208.

²⁶⁸ *Idem*.

²⁶⁹ Özlem Tür and Zana Çitak, "AKP ve Kadın: Teşkilatlanma, Muhafazakarlık ve Türban (AKP and Women: Organization, Conservatism and Headscarf)," in *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu (Book of AKP: A balance sheet of a transformation)*, eds. İlhan Uzgöl and Bülent Duru (İstanbul: Phoenix, 2009): 614-629, 621.

²⁷⁰ In each General Congress, Erdoğan received all the votes of the delegates. Furthermore, different slogans and banners or opinion differences were absent within these events and each Grand Congress event turned out to be a sentimental approval of Erdoğan as the leader of the AKP. For the Grand Congress in 2003 See, "Tek Adam Erdoğan," *Hürriyet*, October 12, 2003, accessed September 9, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/tek-adam-erdogan-176682>. For the Grand Congress in 2009, see, "Ak Parti'nin 3. Olağan Kongresi Başladı," *Hürriyet*, October 3, 2009, accessed September 6, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ak-partinin-3-olagan-kongresi-basladi-12610131> accessed on September 2016, and for Grand Congress held on 2012 see, "Yeniden AK Parti Genel Başkanı," *Milliyet*, September, 30, 2012, accessed, September 6, 2016, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/yeniden-ak-parti-genel-baskani/siyaset/siyasetdetay/30.09.2012/1604579/default.htm>

²⁷¹ For a detailed analysis of Erdoğan's leadership style see, Aylin S. Görener and Meltem S. Üçal, "The Personality and Leadership Style of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Implications for Foreign Policy," *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 3 (2011).

²⁷² "Yeni Türkiye'nin Yeni Yüzü," *Radikal*, April 27, 2014, accessed September 10, 2016, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal2/yeni-turkiyenin-yeni-kultu-1188716/>

While the party leadership intensified its control over the party structurally through bylaw amendments and candidate selection process, as the preceding analysis shows, there is also a consent based admiration and support for the party leadership which is defined by Ayan as a “hegemonic type of authoritarianism”²⁷³ which both involves top-down leadership control and bottom-up consent based support for party leader. Consequently, with regard to the intra-party democracy and the relationship between party leadership and party organization we see high levels of systemness through the routinization of strong leadership dominance and control over both party in parliament, party in government, and extra-parliamentary party organization which decreased the prospects of factional rivalry and intra-party dissent to a large extent.

4.4 CONCLUSION

AKP as a party that established as a protest-based organization, showed high levels of ideological heterogeneity which signified high prospects of organizational instability in terms of intra-party dissent and factional rivalry. Despite these factors that curtailed the party’s systemness, in terms of organizational development and centralized control over party organization AKP shows high levels of systemness with a territorially comprehensive organizational structure which is controlled by central party organs. The membership density levels and financial autonomy of the party also indicates high levels of systemness.

In terms of organizational stability, following the amendments to the Party Constitution in 2003, the leadership further increased its control both over party’s parliamentary organization, extra-parliamentary organization and cabinet. Additionally, the increasing leadership dominance within candidate nomination process also further strengthened the hand of party leadership over the party organization. Apart from this top-down structural leadership domination and centralization, AKP leadership also successfully achieved consent based leadership domination which further improved AKP’s organizational stability and lower the prospects of factional rivalry. Erdoğan’s

²⁷³ Pelin Ayan, “Authoritarian Party Structures in Turkey: A Comparison of the Republican People’s Party and the Justice and Development Party,” 210.

leadership style and personality has been critical in this aspect as the level of admiration and consent based acceptance of his leadership by the party members further consolidates his grip on party organization. This combination of formal and consent-based centralization and leadership control leads to routinization of leadership dominance which lowered the prospects of factional rivalry and intra-party dissent to a great extent.



CHAPTER V

EXTERNAL INDICATORS OF PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION: AKP's CHANGING LEVELS OF DECISIONAL AUTONOMY AND REIFICATION/SUPPORT

This chapter will analyze the external dimensions of party institutionalization which proposed as parties' degree of decisional autonomy vis-à-vis their environment and levels of reification/support. Before delving into the analysis of external dimensions of party institutionalization, the first section will review EU-Turkey relations to measure the variance effectiveness of EU conditionality throughout AKP's three terms. Second section will examine AKP's changing level of decisional autonomy. To measure changing levels of decisional autonomy, AKP's changing relationship with extra-parliamentary veto players and other institutional actors such as civil society organizations and media will be analyzed. Second section will trace the variation on the level of reification/support which is proposed as another external indicator of party institutionalization.

5.1 CHANGING LEVELS OF EU IMPACT: FROM 'GOLDEN AGE' TO 'DARK AGES' OF EUROPEANIZATION

This section aims to investigate temporal variation in effectiveness of EU conditionality to better delineate and control the main EU level factor for forthcoming analysis of AKP's changing behavioral response towards EU. Regarding accession countries the main mechanism that EU becomes effective on domestic politics, policies, and polities is the EU conditionality policy which works through a logic of reinforcement by reward.²⁷⁴ There are various conditions for EU conditionality policy to be effective in

²⁷⁴ Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 10.

accession countries. This section will focus on EU level factors that affect the effectiveness of EU conditionality which are: (1) Size and speed of the rewards, (2) Credibility of rewards offered, (3) Strength and determinacy of conditionality, which entail consistency, clarity and formality of rules and procedures.²⁷⁵

5.1.1 1999-2005: ‘The Golden Age of Europeanization’

EU-Turkey relations were far from plain sailing during 1990’s and experienced frequent ups and downs.²⁷⁶ Nevertheless, EU-Turkey relations took a fresh start following the 1999 Helsinki Council decisions which granted candidate status to Turkey. With a credible promise of prospective membership, the transformative power of EU over Turkish politics improved significantly leading to a hasty reform process during 1999-2002 periods.²⁷⁷ As stated earlier, AKP was established in such a domestic political context in which the EU impact on domestic politics was significantly strong due to the high effectiveness of EU conditionality.

Given this context, AKP strongly embraced the goal of EU membership. From 2002 to 2005, Turkey under the single party government of AKP, took several steps to bring Turkish democracy closer to the standards that are set out in the popularly referred ‘Copenhagen Criteria’.²⁷⁸ As a culmination of this reform process, towards the end of 2004, the European Council concluded that Turkey had sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria to open accession negotiations. Subsequently, in October 2005 accession negotiations were opened.

²⁷⁵ Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 1-29.

²⁷⁶ Since it is out of the scope of this thesis the analysis starts from 1999 Helsinki Summit, for EU-Turkey relations prior to this point see, Meltem Müftüler-Bac, “The Never Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no.4 (1998).

²⁷⁷ A comprehensive review of the reform process from 1999 to 2002 see, Paul Kubicek, “Political Conditionality and European Union’s Cultivation of Democracy in Turkey,” *Democratization* 18, no.4 (2011), 914.

²⁷⁸ For the reform undertaken during this period see, Ergun Özbudun, “Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993-2004,” *Turkish Studies* 8, no.2 (2007). For a comprehensive review of EU-led reforms during this period also see, Aylin Güney and Ali Tekin, eds., *The Europeanization of Turkey: Polity and Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2015) and Aylin Güney and Ali Tekin, eds., *The Europeanization of Turkish Public Policies: A Score Card* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

5.1.2 2005-2013: Decreasing effectiveness of EU conditionality

Although the opening of accession negotiations constituted the apex of EU-Turkey relations and transformative power of EU conditionality, the effectiveness of EU conditionality subsequently derailed as a result of significant loss of credibility, clarity and formality of rewards and rules. Several EU level factors contributed to such derailment of EU effect. The first such negative signal came in following EU's December 2004 Brussels Summit where the decision to open accession negotiations was taken. With the intensifying debates on Constitutional Treaty within EU member states, Turkey's membership became a hot point of debate. Following the rejection of Constitutional Treaty in France and Netherlands the EU's 'absorption capacity' became an important part of the debate on Turkey's membership prospects.²⁷⁹ Increasing references to EU's 'absorption capacity' derailed the effectiveness of EU conditionality by decreasing the credibility of membership promise and also derailing the consistency, clarity and formality of rules. Subsequently, the concept of 'absorption capacity' also integrated in to the Negotiating Framework for Turkey which incorporated 'absorption capacity' to the Copenhagen Criteria."²⁸⁰

Statements of EU leaders that centered on the so-called 'privileged partnership' further derailed the effectiveness of EU conditionality.²⁸¹ These arguments centered on 'privileged partnership' significantly decreased both the credibility and the size of the reward as they increased the perception among Turkish officials that the prospects of full membership was not tied to objective criteria and seen as a sign that Turkey's EU membership goal will not materialize even it fulfills the officially applied criteria of membership to other accession countries. The credibility of EU conditionality was

²⁷⁹ As Noutcheva and Aydın-Düzgit indicates the debate on 'absorption capacity' entailed Turkey's size, its population, its culture, and its unpopularity with EU citizens and conveyed the message that unlike Eastern enlargement, complying with the formal criteria might not be sufficient for Turkey's full accession to the Union. See, Gergana Noutcheva and Senem Aydın-Düzgit, "Lost in Europeanization: The Western Balkans and Turkey," *West European Politics* 35, no. 1 (January 2012), 68.

²⁸⁰ European Commission, *Negotiating Framework (Turkey)*, Luxembourg 3 October 2005, accessed June 12, 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/turkey/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf

²⁸¹ Here the statements of French President Nicholas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel were the most explicit manifestations. For example, French President Sarkozy, in 2007 indicated that Turkey was not a 'European Country'. Cited in Paul Kubicek, "Political Conditionality and European Union's Cultivation of Democracy in Turkey," *Democratization* 18, no.4 (2011), 922.

further derailed by the Cyprus conflict. Following the full membership of Republic of Cyprus to the EU and Turkey's rejection of opening its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot ships and planes, in December 2006, the European Council decided to block negotiations on eight chapters of the *acquis* and not to provisionally close any of the chapters.²⁸² This move further derailed the credibility and consistency of EU conditionality and increased the perceptions in Turkey that the country is being unfairly treated, with the EU using Cyprus as a tool to block Turkey's accession.²⁸³


Another factor for the declining effectiveness of EU conditionality was the Euro-zone crisis which further increased the perception of 'enlargement fatigue' in Turkey but also leading to a reconsideration of the benefits of EU membership and led to increasing questioning on how much Turkey really needs Europe. Consequently, economic turmoil at the EU level both decreased the positive perception of membership's benefit and prospects of membership which further decreased both the size of the reward (membership) and also speed and credibility of the reward.

The negative trend on effectiveness of EU conditionality was also reflected in the public attitude towards EU membership. Although during the AKP's first term public attitude towards EU membership recorded strong values, as a result of aforementioned factors that curtailed the effectiveness of EU conditionality, societal support for EU membership registered significant decline (Figure 3).

²⁸² Paul Kubicek, "Political Conditionality and European Union's Cultivation of Democracy in Turkey," *Democratization* 18, no.4 (2011), 921.

²⁸³ Ziya Öniş, "Conservative Globalists versus Defensive Nationalists: Political Parties and Paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 9, no.3 (December, 2007), 254.

Figure 3: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that (our country’s) membership of the European Union is...?’



Source: Eurobarometer Surveys 2004-2013.

5.2 AKP’S CHANGING LEVELS OF DECISIONAL AUTONOMY

This section aims to trace variation in terms of AKP’s level of decisional autonomy which is proposed as a prominent indicator for level of party institutionalization. While in consolidated democracies, the degree of political parties’ autonomy is to a large extent affected by clientelistic links between parties and other non-state actors such as trade unions or civil society organizations, the case of Turkey differs from these cases as there were other extra-parliamentary institutional players which significantly limited the decisional autonomy of political parties. Considering the case of AKP, there were important extra-parliamentary players in political parties’ environment that limit their space of maneuver. These extra-parliamentary veto players were: the Office of presidency, the military, and judiciary institutions, and Constitutional Court. Therefore, it is imperative to include these state institutions and parties’ efforts to enhance their autonomy vis-à-vis these institutions when analyzing the changing levels of parties’ decisional autonomy in general and AKP, in particular.

The relationship between the aforementioned extra-parliamentary veto players and AKP was far from plain sailing due to the party members’ past political affiliations with

NOM. Despite AKP's efforts to portray itself as a new political movement, and to differentiate itself from the NOM with a center-right ideology conceptualized as 'conservative democracy', the veto players remained suspicious about the true intentions of the party. Consequently, these institutions acted as the main veto players against the party especially during its first term. Therefore, in line with Tsebelis's account these extra-parliamentary institutions remained as institutional veto players as AKP largely needed their agreement for new legislation and policy making.²⁸⁴

In addition to the aforementioned veto players, AKP's changing relationship with civil society and media organizations will be examined as these non-governmental organizations can also have limiting or enhancing role on party's decisional autonomy. The following analysis will try to show changing level of AKP's autonomy and the role of EU accession process in this process. More specifically, for each institutional veto player the role of EU accession process will be depicted to show how the AKP utilized on EU norms and values to enhance its decisional autonomy against these institutions.

5.2.1 The President of the Republic

While under the 1961 Constitution the Presidency was mostly a ceremonious office, 1982 Constitution has given a stronger role to the office of Presidency by granting it with legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Among the most critical of these powers that amplify the office of Presidency's veto power over political parties are its certain legislative powers which are: when necessary, its power to promulgate laws; to send back the laws to the parliament for reconsideration; to appeal to Constitutional Court for the annulment of certain provisions or the entirety of laws and decrees having the force of law. In addition to these legislative powers, the President can appoint university rectors, many high court members, and bureaucratic administrators.

During its first term in power, AKP faced strong criticism from the then President of the Republic Ahmet Necdet Sezer. Between 2002 and 2007, the office of Presidency used its legislative powers extensively to restrict the autonomy of AKP government. One

²⁸⁴ George Tsebelis, *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), 19.

clear manifestation of such power was the AKP's attempt to improve the status of Imam Hatip schools graduates in the university entrance system. On 28 May 2004, then President Sezer vetoed the AKP's legislation on the grounds that it violates the principle of secularism.²⁸⁵

The presidential elections which turned into a bitter contest and polarization between secular opposition and AKP solidified the cleavage between secularists and Islamists. Hard-line secularists strongly opposed to the prospects of a headscarved first lady might occupy the presidential mansion. The Presidential election also showed that in such a crisis the secular state establishment worked in harmony to counter the probability of AKP's candidate election. The main reservation of the secular opposition and state establishment for the election of AKP's candidate was the fact that an Islamic-oriented party would be able to control the government, presidency, and parliament. Despite the secular establishments efforts (for the role of military please see the section on military), following the general elections in 2007, the AKP's candidate Abdullah Gül became President leading to greater autonomy during party's second and third terms.

5.2.2 The Military

Since the transition to multi-party politics in 1950, Turkish military has been exerting a paramount influence on Turkish politics. The historical roots of military's influence on Turkish politics and its implications for the process of democratic consolidation in the country are extensively documented.²⁸⁶ One of the most prominent factors behind the role of Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) on politics is its guardianship role of basic principles of Turkish Republic. As a part of this guardianship role, TAF intervened four times, directly in 1960 and 1980, and in 1971 and 1997 indirectly.²⁸⁷ Another important

²⁸⁵ A detailed analysis of AKP's legislation on Imam Hatip graduates and party's response to the President Sezer's veto decision will be made in the policy chapter on education.

²⁸⁶ Ergun Özbudun *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Lynne Reinner, Boulder: London, 2000).

²⁸⁷ For civil-military relation in Turkey See, K.H. Karpaz "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey before and after 1980," In Metin Heper and A. Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and Military: Turkey in the 1980's* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1982); William Hale, *Turkish Politics and Military* (London: Routledge, 1994); G. Karabelias, "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-War Turkey: 1980-95 *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no.4 (October 1999); G. Jenkins *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Ümit Cizre, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy," 29, no.2 (March 1997);

characteristic of military interventions in Turkey is that in each case of military interference, TAF choose to leave the power to civilian governments in a relatively short period of time.²⁸⁸ Albeit this novel temporal character, with subsequent interventions, TAF resettles the rules of the game in which it improved its guardianship role of the regime and intensified its political role.²⁸⁹

In 1990's military's role in Turkish politics was further intensified as a result of increasing threat perception due to rising political Islam and Kurdish separatism which culminated in the so called February 28 process. During this period Turkish Armed Forces was able to mobilize key state institutions and political issues by waging an internal war against Welfare Party and formally including political Islam as a threat to the secular character of the Turkish state. Consequently, the military redefined and intensified its 'guardian' mission in stronger terms to lock out Islamic and Kurdish threats from public life. In such a context the relationship between the military and AKP was far from plain sailing.²⁹⁰

Firstly, between 2002 and 2006 the relationship between AKP and military was generally portrayed as a period of controlled conflict in which government avoided clashes with military yet it also aimed to shift the epicenter of politics from military to civilian government through EU harmonization packages.²⁹¹ During this period, the AKP government changed the institutional power balance between civil and military authorities through harmonization packages under the framework of EU accession process. In July 2003, the AKP government passed the 'seventh harmonization package' which included amendments that curtailed institutional powers of the National Security

Metin Heper and Aylin Güney, "Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: the Turkish Case," *Armed Forces and Society* 26 (2000).

²⁸⁸ Metin Heper and Aylin Güney, "Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: the Turkish Case," *Armed Forces and Society* 26 (2000).

²⁸⁹ Ergun Özbudun *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Lynne Reinner, Boulder: London, 2000).

²⁹⁰ There is an extensive literature on civil-military relations during AKP governments. See, Metin Heper, "The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey," *Turkish Studies* Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2005): 215-31; Ümit Cizre, "The Justice and Development Party and the Military: Recreating the Past after Reforming it? In Ümit Cizre, ed., *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: the Making of the Justice and Development Party* (New York: Routledge, 2008) 132-71; William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010); Gareth Jenkins, "Continuity and Change: Prospects of Civil-Military relations in Turkey," *International Affairs* 83, no. 2 (2007); Mehmet Bardakçı, "Coups Plots and the Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey Under AKP rule," *Turkish Studies* 14, no.3 (2013).

²⁹¹ See, Ümit Cizre, "The Justice and Development Party and the Military: Recreating the Past after Reforming it?," 134. William Hale and Ergun Özbudun *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP*, 82.

Council (NSC).²⁹² This was followed by constitutional amendments to Articles 131 and 160 which removed the military representatives from the Higher Education Council and Supreme Board of Radio and Television and made the military expenditures subject to scrutiny by the civilian Court of Accounts. During these novel amendments that curtailed its structural channels for political interference, armed forces remained reticent to a large extent. As Cizre succinctly suggests the two historic roles of the military and AKP's commitment to EU put the military in a paradoxical situation which forced it to make a tradeoff between its two historic institutional roles:

“... Its ‘guardian’ role, which involves protecting the regime from what it defines as threats, overtook its ‘vanguard’ role of propelling change in Western direction. The JDP’s (AKP’s) commitment to the EU by taking over the TAF’s ‘vanguard’ role has caused embarrassment for the TAF.”²⁹³

Therefore, it can be argued that the EU accession process extended the political opportunity structure for the AKP and constrained military's political room for maneuver. This led to reticence of military on EU-led reforms that curtailed its own institutional powers.

Despite its decreasing institutional role, the military continued to limit the autonomy of AKP to a large extent through public statements of General Staff on daily political debates. The main source of conflict between the military and the AKP government was the military's strong support for secularism and its ongoing suspicion that AKP government had a hidden agenda to establish an Islamist regime. Despite AKP's efforts to avoid religious labelling by defining its ideology as ‘conservative democracy’, armed forces saw the party with suspicion due to the Islamist origins of party's leadership and religious inclinations of most of its grassroots supporters.²⁹⁴ The main issues of contention within these parameters were the headscarf issue, party's proposal for Penal

²⁹² The most prominent amendments in this regard were: increasing number of civilian members to a majority voting position; reducing the scope of Secretary General's role; allowing non-military personnel to serve as Secretary General; decreasing the executive role of the NSC and turned it to an advisory body.

²⁹³ Ümit Cizre, “The Justice and Development Party and the Military: Recreating the Past after Reforming it?”, 142.

²⁹⁴ William Hale and Ergun Özbudun Islamism, *Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP*, 84.

Code change, and its education policies.²⁹⁵ In all these cases military challenged the proposals of AKP government by emphasizing its sensitivity about and protective role of the secular character of the state.²⁹⁶ Furthermore, during its early years in power, the AKP government largely refrained from taking an oppositional stance towards military. The main reason behind this confrontation avoidance can be attributed to the political insecurity it faced due to the strong suspicion that it received from the military. The shadow of the February 28 process was then still looming to a large extent for the AKP.²⁹⁷

During the period between 2002 and 2006 the political influence of military, while limited institutionally with EU reforms, continued to remain in place and restricted the decisional autonomy of AKP. Thus, the party largely refrained from a confrontational stance against the military and tried to deliver the message that it had cordial relationship with the institution. The picture changed dramatically after 2006 which was resulted in the so called the e-memorandum by the military during the highly tense presidential election process.

The increasing tension between the AKP government and military started to escalate following the tenure of Yaşar Büyükanıt as the Chief of General Staff. Compared to previous Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök, Yaşar Büyükanıt had more rigid and confrontational attitude with strong nationalist and pro-secularist view towards AKP government.²⁹⁸ During the tenure of Büyükanıt the relationship between the military and the AKP government further deteriorated due to the AKP's plans to start direct

²⁹⁵ It is important to indicate that the source of contention between AKP government and military is not limited to these domestic policies. Foreign policy issues such as AKP government's support for a UN backed plan to solve the Cyprus problem and its policies with regard to the Kurdish problem faced opposition from the military during this period. For a comprehensive review of the civil-military relations during this period see, William Hale and Ergun Özbudun *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP*, and Ümit Cizre, "The Justice and Development Party and the Military: Recreating the Past after Reforming it?"

²⁹⁶ Detailed analysis of military's response to these issues will be made on the following sections on chapters that aim to propose detailed analysis of policy making process.

²⁹⁷ In this regard, the AKP government was strongly reminded by the military that the February 28 process continued. Cited in Ümit Cizre, "The Justice and Development Party and the Military: Recreating the Past after Reforming it?", 140.

²⁹⁸ A clear example of Büyükanıt's confrontational attitude towards the AKP government was his inauguration speech. In his speech during the handover ceremony, he indicated that it was 'the army's duty' to protect the 'fundamental principles of the republic'. Cited in William Hale and Ergun Özbudun *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP*, 88. Furthermore, as a direct response to Prime Minister Erdoğan's statements on the non-existence of a threat of reactionism, the then Chief of General Staff Büyükanıt responded swiftly by indicating that there is indeed a threat of religious reactionism in Turkey. See, "General Büyükanıt Answers Erdoğan: Yes, Reactionary Threat Exists," *Hürriyet*, October 3, 2006, accessed August 10, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/general-buyukanit-answers-erdogan-yes-reactionary-threat-exists-5192783>

negotiations with Kurdish Regional Government, and possibility of a unilateral military intervention in Northern Iraq.²⁹⁹

The presidential elections that due to be completed in May 2007 escalated into a dangerous and bitter contest between AKP government and military. The main point of contention was the prospects of a headscarved lady occupying the presidential mansion. Hard-line secularists took up the streets and massive demonstrations took place. During these massive demonstrations, the Chief of General Staff strongly indicated its position by stating that ‘we hope that someone will be elected President who is attached to the basic values of the republic, not just in words but in spirit.’³⁰⁰ While the military strongly indicated its position and opposition to the election of Erdogan or Gül as President, AKP leadership responded in a consensual spirit by indicating that the Chief of General Staff’s statements was ‘reasonable and positive’.

The crisis and contention between the AKP government and the military reached its peak by a notice appeared on the website of General Staff web site on 27 April following first round of elections in the parliament. With the so-called e-memorandum or e-coup, General Staff indicated its disquiet on the fact that Presidential election was centering on the question of secularism. It concluded that ‘the armed forces are a party to this debate and are staunch defenders of secularism. When necessary, they will display their attitudes and actions very clearly.’³⁰¹ As Hale and Özbudun suggests while the intentions were unclear, the statement ‘appeared to threaten some sort of military action if Abdullah Gül were elected President.’³⁰² The e-memorandum was strongly opposed both by the AKP government and opposition domestically, and by EU and USA, internationally.

The AKP’s landslide victory in the early general election in 27 July 2007 decreased the popular perception the military considerably. The AKP government also strongly indicated the illegitimacy of the 27 April memorandum. For example Abdullah Gül indicated that ‘any sort of act that is seen as an interference in politics causes reaction

²⁹⁹ William Hale and Ergun Özbudun *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP*, 90.

³⁰⁰ “Büyükanıt Cumhurbaşkanı Adayını Tarif Etti,” *Radikal*, April 13, 2007, accessed August 13, 2016, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=218257>

³⁰¹ William Hale and Ergun Özbudun *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP*, 91.

³⁰² *Idem*.

among the people. And this happened during the elections’.³⁰³ The solid stance of AKP government during the crisis tilted the balance between civilian government and the military further to the advantage of AKP.

Increasing autonomy of AKP from the military was further intensified with the uncovering of then alleged coup plots against the AKP government starting with June 2007.³⁰⁴ The AKP put significant support for the cases on the alleged coup plans that aimed its preceding governments.³⁰⁵ The way the investigations were handled by the judiciary and police raised strong criticism and strongly perceived as an attempt to suppress the opposition. Although it is beyond the scope of this research to provide a detailed analysis of these cases, it is highly important to indicate from the outset that both the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases abated and all the suspects were acquitted.³⁰⁶ Furthermore, the AKP Government’s supportive stance regarding the two cases changed to a large extent due to the intensifying clash with the Gülenists within judiciary and police which reached its peak during the alleged corruption scandals against the then Prime Minister Erdoğan, his family, and other ministers. Despite these

³⁰³ Ibid., 92.

³⁰⁴ The so-called ‘Ergenekon terrorist Organization’ was revealed after the 27 hand grenades were found in a slum house in the Ümraniye district of Istanbul on 13 June 2007. The first designed indictment charged that “Ergenekon Terrorist Organization” aimed to ‘overthrow the government of Turkish Republic through the use of violence and coercion’. The second designed indictment which was filed on March 10, 2009 alleged that between 2002 and 2004 there were four alleged coup plans (Ayışığı, Sarıkız, Yakamoz and Eldiven) to overthrow the AKP government. A further so called ‘plot’ was uncovered during a search undertaken in the framework of the Ergenekon case by the police, who found the so called Operation Cage Action Plan on a CD in the office of a retired major. The plan that said to be drafted in March 2009 by a naval junta called for the assassination of non-Muslim minority citizens and pinning the blame for the killings on the AKP government. Furthermore, the Taraf newspaper published details of the ‘Information Support Activity Action Plan’ which according to Taraf newspaper aimed at bringing public opinion in line with the Armed forces on issues the armed forces is sensitive about. On June 12, 2009 the so called “Action Plan against reactionary forces” was published with designed allegations that the General Staff drafted the document in order to unsettle the AKP and Fetullah Gülen”. Another designed allegation was the establishment of 42 Internet sites by the General Staff for the dissemination of propaganda against the government and religious congregations. Based on the allegations that the memorandum was approved by the then Chief of General Staff, for the first time in Turkey a Chief of General Staff was arrested. The prosecutor charged Ilker Başbuğ the then Chief of General Staff with being a member of “Ergenekon terrorist organization”. Again on January 20, 2010 the newspaper Taraf alleged that a group of officers led by General Çetin Doğan planned a coup to overthrow the AKP government in 2003. Based on the so called Sledgehammer Action Plan, On February 11, 2011 163 retired and active officers were arrested which was again a first time that force commanders had been arrested for attempting to launch a coup.

³⁰⁵ One of the clearest manifestations of this support was the then Prime Minister speech which he strongly indicated that he is also the prosecutor of the Ergenekon case. For this and other statements of AKP deputies and officials on these cases see, “Ergenekon için Kim Ne Demisti?,” *Sözcü*, April 21, 2016, accessed, August 10, 2016, <http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/gundem/ergenekon-icin-kim-ne-demisti-1195230/>

³⁰⁶ In March 2014, all suspects of sledgehammer coup plot case were acquitted. The prosecutor argued that the evidence material was fake. Additionally in April 2016, The Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that the “Ergenekon Terror Organization” the target of allegations, did not exist at all. See, “236 Acquitted in Balyoz Coup Case,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, 31 March 31, 2015, accessed, August 15, 2016, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/236-acquitted-in-balyoz-coup-case.aspx?PageID=238&NID=80408&NewsCatID=338>

facts, the coup allegations tilted the balance of civil-military relations more towards civilian side and consequently increased the AKP's decisional autonomy.

Apart from the aforementioned developments, the uncovering of the then alleged coup plots against the AKP government decreased the public credibility of the military dramatically and extensively tilted the civil military balance towards the civilian government. One of the clearest manifestations of civilian empowerment was the YAŞ (Supreme Military Council) meetings which take place every August to decide upon military promotions and the officers to be discharged from the army. Both in 2010 Supreme Military Council and in 2011 Supreme Military Council, the AKP government had left its mark on the final decisions. As Bardakçı suggests the Supreme Military Council results is a clear indication of increasing power of AKP government in military, 'since the military had hitherto enjoyed autonomy in the shaping of the General Staff due to the reluctance to disrupt the established traditions in the armed forces.'³⁰⁷ Additionally, the AKP government repealed the Protocol on Cooperation for Security and Public Order which had been signed during the February 28 process and allowed the military to carry out operations and gather intelligence in cities without the approval of civilian authority.³⁰⁸ Another manifestation of increasing weight of AKP government over military was the new National Security Policy Document which outlines the major threats to Turkey's security. In 2010 document for the first time religious reactionism (irtica) that listed as a domestic source of threat was removed.³⁰⁹

In addition to the aforementioned manifestations of AKP's increasing autonomy vis-à-vis the armed forces, the constitutional amendments that were enacted after the referendum held on September 12, 2010 also introduced important amendments that have ramifications for civil-military relations.³¹⁰ One of the most prominent amendments concerning civil military relations was the amendment on the Article 125 of the Constitution which paved the way for the appeals of those officers who are dismissed from the army by the decisions of Supreme Military Council. As Bardakçı

³⁰⁷ Mehmet Bardakçı, "Coup Plots and the Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey under AKP rule," *Turkish Studies* 14, no. 3 (2013).

³⁰⁸ "EMASYA Protokolü Kaldırıldı," *Hürriyet*, February 4, 2010, accessed August 10, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/emasya-protokolu-kaldirildi-13684829>

³⁰⁹ "Kırmızı Kitap Değişiyor," *Hürriyet*, 27 October 27, 2010, accessed August 10, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kirmizi-kitap-degisiyor-16149886>

³¹⁰ The constitutional changes and September 12, 2010 referendum will be analyzed in more detail in the following section on judiciary.

suggests in the past, especially during February 28 Process, dozens of officers were dismissed from the army based on their links and involvement in Islamist activities.³¹¹ More importantly, the amendment to the Article 145 increased the powers of civilian courts while limited the competence of military courts to military offences. At the same time, civilian courts were assigned exclusively for handling criminal offences against state security, constitutional order and its functioning which involve staging coups and issuing memorandums. In this way the AKP government paved the way for trying of military personnel in civilian courts. The original Article 145 was the main stumbling block against the AKP government when it tried to change the Article 250 of the Code on Criminal Procedure on June 25, 2009.³¹²

5.2.3 Higher Judiciary

The status and functions of Judiciary and its effects on Turkish politics has been one of the most debated issues. Especially the composition and powers of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) generally portrayed as another bastion of the secular state establishment which considerably limited the room for maneuver of political parties. Specifically, Constitutional Court exerts considerable influence on parties' decision making as it has the final jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of laws and decrees. More importantly, the Constitutional Court also used to exert strong pressure on political parties as it used to possess extraordinary powers to close them down if they deviate from constitutional principles.

Especially, pro-Islamic parties and Kurdish parties faced strong pressure from the Constitutional Court as the shadow of the threat of party closure severely limited the autonomy of these parties in terms of decision making. In that regard, the Constitutional Court remained as one of the bastions of secular state establishment and stayed as a

³¹¹ Mehmet Bardakçı, "Coup Plots and the Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey under AKP rule," 11.

³¹² Following the amendment on Article 250 of the Code on Criminal Procedure, the main opposition party Republican People's Party appealed to Constitutional Court and the court abrogated the amendment on January 21, 2010 by indicating that it was in violation of Article 145 of the constitution which was amended by the AKP government following the constitutional referendum held on September 12, 2010. See, "Akere Sivil Yargı İptalinin Gereğcesini Açıkladı," *Hürriyet*, December 30, 2010, accessed, August 10, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/askere-sivil-yargi-iptalinin-gerekcesi-aciklandi-16647730>

Sword of Damocles above the pro-Islamic and Kurdish political parties. The relationship between the Constitutional Court and parties of National Outlook Movement clearly reveals the strong tutelary powers of the high judiciary over these political parties. The Constitutional Court closed down parties that belong to National Outlook Movement several times based on the allegations that these parties violated the principles of secularism.³¹³

The relationship between the AKP and the higher judiciary was no different from the above mentioned relational framework. Despite its efforts to differentiate itself from Nationalist Outlook Movement and portray itself as a center-right party with conservative democratic ideology, the prospect of closure and annulments of legislations that were initiated by the party remained high. One of the most illustrative examples of such an annulment case was the AKP's proposal to lift the ban on headscarf in universities which was annulled by the Constitutional Court. The Court's decision based on the incompatibility of the amendments with the principle of secularism enshrined in the Constitution as unamendable.³¹⁴

Apart from the power of constitutional check and annulment of laws and decrees, the Constitutional Court also has power to ban political parties which was its main mechanisms of limiting the space of maneuver of Turkish political parties, especially political parties that belong to the National Outlook Movement and Kurdish movement. In that regard, the relationship between the high judiciary and AKP is far from cordial despite the fact that the party strongly asserted its 'newness' and difference from the previous political parties that belong to the National Outlook Movement. The party leadership's past affiliations with the pro-Islamic parties in the past lead to great amount of suspicion among secular state establishment with one of the main pillar remained as the high judiciary. Despite AKP's efforts to portray itself as a new center-right party that supports the principle of secularism, the party cannot escape the fate of pro-Islamic parties and faced a party closure case on March 2008. The main allegation towards the AKP was not different from that the pro-Islamic parties faced in their closure cases

³¹³ For example the Court decided to close down Welfare Party in 1998 on the grounds that it was violating the principle of secularism and democracy due to the fundamentally Islamist discourses. The fate of the successor of Welfare Party was no different and the Court again decided to close the party due to its anti-secular policies.

³¹⁴ The Court's decision and AKP's response will be analyzed in more detail within the empirical chapter on Party's Gender Policy.

which center on their activities against the secularity principle enshrined in the Constitution.

As the preceding analyses indicate, the autonomy of AKP was severely constrained by the high judiciary, in general and the Constitutional Court, in particular. AKP's proposal for a comprehensive constitutional amendment in 2010 significantly changed this picture and marked party's consolidation of power against the higher judiciary. The new amendments featured important changes to the structure and functions of the institutions of high judiciary: Constitutional Court and Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (Hakimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu, HSYK hereafter).³¹⁵ The constitutional amendments which passed through a highly polarized referendum on 12 September 2010 were greeted as positive steps towards the independence of high judiciary by the European Union, Council of Europe and Venice Commission.³¹⁶

As Müftüler-Bac suggests, the main motive behind the Constitutional amendments was the closure case against the AKP.³¹⁷ The institutions of high judiciary remained as the last bastions of secular state which continued to exert pressure on AKP. Through increasing the role of TGNA in the appointment of HSYK and Constitutional Court members, AKP placed institutional curbs on the power of its long time secularist rivals within the high judiciary. Consequently, following its increasing autonomy from military, AKP further improved its decisional autonomy through increasing its control over high judiciary. The elections held on October 17, 2010 for the appointment of ten

³¹⁵ With regard to HSYK the articles of 144 and 159 of the Constitution were amended and lead to a more diversified composition of the Council. Additionally, the new amendments opened the dismissal rulings of the Council to judicial review. The new constitutional amendment also included changes to the Articles 146 and 149 of the Constitution which significantly change decision procedures and composition of the Constitutional Court. With the new amendments the number of members increased from 11 to 17 and the Turkish Grand National Assembly was given the power to appoint three members of the Court in addition to the 14 appointed by the President. Furthermore, the institutions from which the members that could be appointed by the President were diversified. More importantly, Court's decisions to annul new legislation and to close or deprive political parties of state subsidies were made more difficult with the requirement of two thirds of the members instead of absolute majority. For a comprehensive analysis of constitutional amendments on institutions of high judiciary see, Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey's Judiciary and Drift toward Competitive Authoritarianism," *The International Spectator* 50, no. 2 (2015).

³¹⁶ Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey's Judiciary and Drift toward Competitive Authoritarianism," *The International Spectator* 50, no. 2 (2015), 45.

³¹⁷ Meltem Müftüler Bac, "The Pandora's Box: democratization and rule of law in Turkey," *Asia-Europe Journal* 14, no.1 (2015), 69.

regular and six substitute members of the HSYK and following new legislation in February 2011 were indicative of increasing power of AKP within the high judiciary.³¹⁸

The AKP's policy framing and promotion of its constitutional amendment package was an interesting case to delineate instrumental usage of EU norms and values by the party during its institutionalization process. From 2005 onwards, the effectiveness of EU conditionality policy in terms of credibility of incentives and consistency decreased significantly (Please see the section on EU-Turkey relations). Nevertheless, against fierce opposition on its judicial reform proposal which mainly focused on threat of increasing executive control over judiciary and judiciary independence, AKP utilized the EU norms and values to a large extent to counter these strong objections. Especially, the references to EU accession requirements and criteria of Venice Commission were common place among party leadership, ministers and party officials.³¹⁹ In that regard, it can be argued that the EU became a domestic political opportunity structure for the AKP despite weak credibility of EU conditionality policy. Consequently, the AKP successfully utilized the EU norms and values instrumentally to increase its decisional autonomy in domestic politics through establishing executive authority over judiciary.

The above mentioned picture changed significantly following the so-called '17-25 December process' in which number of corruption investigations were allegedly launched by Gülenist prosecutors and police officers against the AKP government. Apart from indicating the apex of a bitter clash between Gülenists and AKP, these allegations constituted an existential threat against the party which led to a swift

³¹⁸ The elections for HSYK appointments saw judges and prosecutors close to the AKP government elected to the Board. This was followed by a new legislation which increased the number of chambers in the Council of State and the Court of Cassation. Court of Cassation membership was increased from 250 to 387 and the Council of State from 95 to 156. After this expansion the newly elected HSK which become more diversified, elected 160 new members to the Court of Cassation and 51 new members to the Council of State in February 2011. For the elections for the HSYK appointment, please see, "Bakanlık Kazandı," *Hürriyet*, 18 October 18, 2010, accessed on August 1, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/bakanlik-kazandi-16066259> For the new law on Court of Cassation and Council of State please, see "Yüksek Yargı Yasası Köşk'ten Onay Aldı," *Sabah*, 14 February 14, 2011, accessed, August 1, 2016, http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2011/02/14/yuksek_yargi_yasasi_koskten_onay_aldi

³¹⁹ The then Minister of State and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bağış stated that membership to the EU cannot be possible without a constitutional reform. When the articles within the amendment considered each one is highly important as opening different chapters during the accession process. Bağış also indicated that the amendment process is an issue related with uplifting the democratic standards more towards EU level. See, "Bakan Bağış: Darbe Anayasasıyla AB'ye Giremeyiz," *Hürriyet*, August 16, 2010, accessed, June 1, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/bakan-bagis-darbe-anayasasi-ile-abye-giremeyiz-15565971> With regard to the aim of the amendments on HSYK, the then State Minister and Vice Premier Bülent Arınç also emphasized the aim of these amendments as 'to achieve a more democratic and functional judiciary in accordance with EU and Venice Commission's decisions.' See, "Demokrasi İçin," *Hürriyet*, August 10, 2010, accessed, June 1, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/demokrasi-icin-15520155> accessed on 01 August 2016.

response by AKP government leading to significant change of its previous stance with regard to rule of law and high judiciary.

The positive relationship between the Gülenists and AKP came to an end with the so-called MIT crisis in February 2012.³²⁰ While it is still not clear as to why and when the relationship between the two camps deteriorated, one proposed explanation is that the *raison d'être* (curbing the powers of secular state establishment), holding both camps together, disappeared following the weakening of political tutelage of secular forces within high judiciary and military.³²¹ The rift between two camps further widened when the AKP government decided to close down the preparatory schools (*Dershaneler*) which to a large extent were owned by Gülenists. The culmination of this fierce struggle was the 17-25 December corruption investigations famously called as “17-25 December Process” which was launched by the Gülenist prosecutors and police officers against the AKP government.³²²

The corruption allegation was a serious existential threat and led to an external shock for the AKP which led to the attempts that result in significant backsliding from the constitutional amendments in 2010. Following the corruption allegations, AKP enacted series of laws to end the Gülenists influence, and re-consolidate its power over the judiciary.³²³ These amendments received strong criticisms both from domestic opposition and international players such as European Union.³²⁴ The AKP strongly rejected the claims on its increasing control over the judiciary. For example the then Prime Minister Erdoğan responded to the concerns of EU Commission on new

³²⁰ Since its establishment, the Gülenists and AKP had cordial relations. AKP initially enjoyed the support of the Gülen Movement to consolidate its position vis-à-vis the secular state establishment in general, and judiciary and military in particular. United by the existential threat and need for protect themselves from a potential intervention, Gülenists and AKP collaborated to lessen the political influence of secular state establishment. One clear manifestation of this supportive stance was the position of the leader of the movement on constitutional referendum process during 2010. See, “Fetullah Gülen’in Referandum Yorumu,” *Habertürk*, August 1, 2010, accessed August 15, 2016, <http://www.haberturk.com/polemik/haber/537886-fetullah-gulenin-referandum-yorumu>

³²¹ Ahmet Kuru, “The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey: fears of Islamism, Kurdism, and Communism,” *Insight Turkey* 14, no. 2 (2012). Senem Aydın-Düzgit and N. Tocci, *Turkey and the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 172.

³²² The corruption allegations involved four former ministers, their sons, the then Prime Minister Erdoğan and his family, and certain bureaucrats. The AKP government rejected the allegations right away and declared that Gülenists established a parallel state or state within state and are plotting against his government.

³²³ For a comprehensive review of Judicial amendments during the so called post ‘12-25 December Process’ please see, Ergun Özbudun, “Turkey’s Judiciary and Drift toward Competitive Authoritarianism,” *The International Spectator* 50, no. 2 (2015); Ergun Özbudun, “AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan’s Majoritarian Drift,” *South European Society and Politics* 19, no.2 (2014).

³²⁴ Beken Saatçioğlu, “De-Europeanization in Turkey: the Case of the Rule of Law,” *South European Society and Politics* 21, no.1 (2016), 139.

amendments on HSYK by stating that “it’s no one’s duty to comment on Turkey’s HSYK amendment.”³²⁵

5.2.4 Civil Society

Turkey has not been a textbook case for a vibrant civil society. Especially strong state tradition and the absence of strong ties between civil society organizations (CSOs hereafter) and political parties have been the main reasons behind the low political efficiency and impact of CSOs.³²⁶ Despite their relative weakness against the state and political parties, since 1990’s the number of and effectiveness of CSOs on policy making and interest representation increased significantly. One of the most prominent factors behind the increasingly vibrant civil society has been the vital EU accession process starting from 1999.³²⁷

AKP is a party that was formed into such a vibrant civil society environment with various civil society organizations ranging from women rights and feminist civil society organizations to religious organizations. More importantly, the capabilities of civil society organizations were further improved due to the increased political opportunity structure for civil society organizations as a result of the vital EU accession process.³²⁸

While it is difficult to pinpoint a demarcation line on the changing relationship between the AKP government and CSOs, especially during its second term in government, the relationship between the civil society organizations that have ideological differences from the party changed to a large extent.³²⁹

³²⁵ “Kimsenin Haddi Değil,” *Doğan News Agency*, January 15, 2014, accessed June 1, 2016, http://www.dha.com.tr/-kimsenin-haddi-degildir_579877.html

³²⁶ Ergun Özbudun *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Lynne Rienner, Boulder: London, 2000), pp.125-138.

³²⁷ Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, “Globalization, Civil Society, and Citizenship in Turkey: Actors, Boundaries, and Discourses,” *Citizenship Studies* 7, no.2 (2003): pp. 219-234 and Ayça Ergun “Civil Society and the Local Dimensions of Europeanization,” *Journal of European Integration* 32, no. 5 (2010):pp. 507-522.

³²⁸ On the role of women’s organizations and EU on penal code reform see, Melinda Negron-Gonzales, “The Feminist Movement During the AKP era in Turkey: challenges and opportunities,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 52, no.2 (2016): pp. 198-214.

³²⁹ Fuat Keyman and Şebnem Gümüşcü, *Democracy, Identity and Foreign Policy in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 156-161.

With regard to relationship between business associations and AKP it can be argued that there is an asymmetrical relationship between the business associations and the AKP, which indicates the decisional autonomy of AKP both from business associations that are ideologically closer to the party and those that remain in opposition. With regard to the latter, the tense relationship between the AKP government and Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD hereafter) can be given as an example. During the first term of the AKP government, TUSIAD largely gave support to the policies of the party within the framework of EU harmonization process.³³⁰ Nevertheless, TUSIAD's oppositional stance on AKP's policies was also harshly criticized by the party. Business associations that can be placed against the TUSIAD were Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD, hereafter), Anatolian Tigers Businessmen's Association (ASKON), and The Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON). These associations generally represent a more conservative and religious worldview and try to amplify the interests of the so called Small and Medium Scaled Businesses (Küçük ve Ortaölçekli İşletmeler KOBİ hereafter).³³¹ These three business associations had cordial relationships with AKP government. Albeit the positive relationships between AKP and these associations, the relationship between them can be conceptualized as asymmetrical interdependence in which the AKP has the capacity to withhold rewards in the case of a possible clash between them.

One of the clearest manifestations of intensification of patronage based relationship was the amendments made to the Public Bid Law (Kamu İhale Yasası KIY hereafter). The amendments to the KIY strengthened the hand of AKP government vis-à-vis companies by both narrowing the KIY's domain of application and by expanding the derogatory articles of the law.³³² These amendments that made the public procurement process

³³⁰ Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdağı, "Küreselleşme ve Türk İş Adamları Derneği: TUSIAD örneği," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 3, No.9 (2006)

³³¹ Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan, *Türkiye'de Yeni Kapitalizm: Siyaset, Din ve İş Dünyası (New Capitalism in Turkey: The Relationship between Politics, Religion and Business)*, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014)

³³² With regard to KIY's shrinking domain of application, AKP government left the State-Owned Enterprises and companies owned by municipalities out of the Law's domain. Additionally, the sectors that give public services such as transportation, communication, energy, and water also left outside of the law's domain. Furthermore,, the exceptional clauses of the law have been extensively used by fragmenting the big tenders to different pieces and making them affordable for small companies. More importantly, with certain amendments that extend the direct procurement procedure, the way for public authorities to bid contracts without public announcements and to give contracts to companies they prefer were opened. Additionally the Public Procurement Authority's autonomy from political interference were severely limited with a government decree which excluded the representatives of private

more flexible, increased the ability of AKP to interfere and manipulate the procurement process to the advantage of smaller companies, and were strongly criticized within the EU Commission's Progress Reports.³³³

During the AKP's first term in power, the civil society was highly vibrant with civil society organizations such as religious organizations and women's rights organizations were successful to interfere in the policy making process.³³⁴ The main reason behind this vigor in civil society was the highly vital EU accession process which extended the domestic political opportunity structure for these organizations.³³⁵ Within such a domestic context, CSOs successfully involved in policy making process and had significant impact on legislations.³³⁶ One of the most apparent cases of strong civil society activism was the legislative process of new Penal Code in 2004 which, thanks to the strong involvement of women's organizations, introduced many improvements in terms of gender equality.³³⁷ Nevertheless, as the subsequent EU Commission's Progress Reports indicate, the cooperation between AKP governments and CSOs decreased considerably especially starting from party's third term of rule.³³⁸

In addition to women's organizations, organizations which are devoted to representing religious interests grew rapidly. Overturning the ban on headscarves in higher education and public office and improving the higher education prospects of İmam Hatip graduates were the two main issues that these organizations aim to amplify. Two of the most famous of these religious civil society organizations are the Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People (İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlara İçin

sector from the board of directors which paved the way for the dominance of public bureaucrats which are appointed by the government. For detailed explanation of amendments in the public procurement process see, Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan, *Türkiye'de Yeni Kapitalizm: Siyaset, Din ve İş Dünyası (New Capitalism in Turkey: The Relationship between Politics, Religion and Business)*, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), 129-130.

³³³ See EU Commission's 2012 progress report

³³⁴ As Keyman and Gümüşcü indicates, during AKP's first term in government the site of civil society widened considerably with the range of issues that civil society organizations focus upon multiplied with the quantitative increases in the number of these associations. Fuat Keyman and Şebnem Gümüşcü, *Democracy, Identity and Foreign Policy in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 158-157.

³³⁵ For the role of EU on the strength of civil society organizations, See, Fuat Keyman and Şebnem Gümüşcü, *Democracy, Identity and Foreign Policy in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014): 156, A. Kaliber, "How Europe Affects: The Case of Civil Society in Turkey," in *Ruptures et Continuïté: Les Politiques Internes et Externes de la Turquie en Perspective [Rupture and continuity: Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy in perspective]*, ed Uğur Kaya (Paris: EurOrient, 2010): 179-198. Selcen Öner, "Internal Factors in the EU's Transformative Power Over Turkey: the Role of Civil Society in Turkey," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 14, No.1 (2014).

³³⁶ M.Negron-Gonzales, "The Feminist Movement during the AKP era in Turkey: Challenges and Opportunities," *Middle Eastern Studies* 52, no.2 (2016),

³³⁷ This will be analyzed in more detail in the gender policy section.

³³⁸ Especially see, EU Commission's Progress Reports for the years of 2011, 2012, and 2013.

Dayanışma Derneği, MAZLUMDER) and OZGURDER. These two organizations were highly active during the debates on headscarf ban in the first term of AKP. Different from the women's NGOs which the relationship with AKP was far from plain sailing, religious rights based organizations have strong affinities with the AKP in terms of policy framing.³³⁹

This vital picture of civil society environment and its capacity to influence policy making process started to deteriorate starting from the second term of AKP. The capacity of CSOs -especially women's and other rights based organizations- to effect policy making process negatively affected with weakening external factors such as EU and also further power consolidation of the AKP over the civil society.³⁴⁰ Following its first term, AKP started to shape the civil society organizations by employing three methods. Firstly by creating of seemingly civic organizations to influence the realm of civil society in a way that directly supports AKP's power. In this regard, as the head of Third Sector Foundation's (TÜSEV) indicates 'in its second phase, AKP increasingly set up government-oriented NGO's, and they used NGO's that are close to them very effectively and excluded the rest. Within the same interview head of TÜSEV also indicated that in this way the AKP government has been able to use the rhetoric that 'we consult civil society' through cooperating with civil society organizations that are closer to it.³⁴¹ One of the clear manifestations of such organization was the Egitim-Bir-Sen (Educator's Trade Union) which supported many of the AKP proposals on education and also whose proposals were given significant priority against the opposing Eğitim-Sen (Education and Science Worker's Union) during the National Education Council (Milli Eğitim Şurası) meetings.³⁴² Secondly, the AKP government also increased its control over civil society organizations by using the reliance of CSO's on state cooperation. In this way, the Party engages with CSO's on issues that align with its

³³⁹ Sarkissian and Özler gives four points of similarities between these organizations and AKP: religious freedom for the Sunni majority; a solution to the identity politics grounded in Islam; references to the Ottoman heritage and Islamic charity as a solution to domestic and international problems. See, Ani Sarkissian and Ş. İlgü Özler, "Democratization and the Politicization of Religious Civil Society in Turkey," *Democratization* (2012): pp 1-22, p.9.

³⁴⁰ See, Fuat Keyman and Şebnem Gümüşcü, *Democracy, Identity and Foreign Policy in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 158-157.

³⁴¹ "Ruling AKP Creating its Own NGO's Group Says," *Hürriyet Daily News* 21 March 21, 2016, accessed, September 14, 2016, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ruling-akp-creating-its-own-ngos-group-says.aspx?PageID=238&NID=96686&NewsCatID=338>

³⁴² "Her Taşın Altından Çıkan Sendika," *Radikal*, December 14, 2014, accessed June 21, 2016, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/her-tasin-altindan-cikan-sendika-egitim-bir-sen-1250506/> Collaboration between AKP and this labor Union will be analyzed in more detail within the chapter on education.

conservative views which lead to de-radicalization of these organizations and restriction in their capacity to push for progressive change. The statements of one member of a feminist CSO clearly illustrate this control mechanism:

“To do a project in this town you have to sit with the government in a way because you have to get permission...Engaging with them also increases the outreach of the project. We don't have the luxury to disregard the state, we are aware of that. We never neglect the opportunity for collective work. Even though we generally cannot construct common language, we work to get their support, we struggle for it.”³⁴³

The third mechanism that constraints the political impact of CSO's was increasing oppression and marginalization of them by AKP government. As Doyle suggests, this is mostly evident in the relations between women's organizations, Kurdish organizations, and Kemalist organizations which reported that they faced oppression in the forms of censorship, disproportionate auditing, signaling out and strong criticism of CSO's in media circles closer to AKP, closing down of organizations and imprisonment of their members.³⁴⁴

5.2.5 Media

An independent media is generally seen as a *sine qua non* for a consolidated democracy as it creates checks and balances against the government and acting as a civic forum, in which pluralistic debates on policy proposals of the governments are fostered. While Turkish media landscape become more diversified with the private ownership of media during 1990's, media holdings which have other economic interests in other sectors developed clientelistic relationships with subsequent governments to improve their positions in other sectors. Therefore the relationship between media holdings and governments has been problematic since 1990's in terms of democracy and media freedom.

³⁴³ Jessica Leigh Doyle, “State Control of Civil Society Organizations: the case of Turkey,” *Democratization* (2016), p. 10.

³⁴⁴ Jessica Leigh Doyle, “State Control of Civil Society Organizations: the case of Turkey,” 13.

During the AKP's first term in power Turkish media landscape continued to remain highly diversified with media holdings with different political orientations and ideologies led to a heterogeneous landscape. The status of media freedom was further improved by the amendments to the Laws within the context of EU harmonization process. The largest media conglomerates were Doğan Group, Merkez Group, Çukurova Group, and Star Group. There were also smaller media companies which are İhlas Group, Doğu Group, Aksoy Group and Samanyolu Group. These media companies have diverse political orientations but as Elmas and Kurban suggests their economic interests within other sectors such as construction, pressurize them to form links with the AKP government.³⁴⁵ One clear example of such a relationship was Doğu Holding's winning of a USD 702 million bid for the operation of Istanbul's Galataport in Karaköy in 2013. This clientelistic relationship between media groups and AKP government led to an increasing atmosphere of censorship and self-imposed censorship in large part of the Turkish media.³⁴⁶

The heterogeneous media landscape started to change with increasing domination of the so called 'pro-government media circles by mid-2007. There were two mechanisms of increasing mechanisms of increasing control of the media landscape by the AKP governments. First and foremost, starting from 2007, large media corporations such as Merkez Group and Çukurova Group were sold to pro-government companies through confiscation. For example, Merkez Group's media assets were confiscated and sold to the Çalık Group which is known to have closer ties to the AKP government. In turn this media group was sold to pro-AKP Zirve Holding. In the same regard in 2013 the Çukurca Group also confiscated and sold to Ethem Sancak, a businessman who openly supported the government and the then Prime Minister Erdoğan. Ultimately, starting from 2007 onwards through confiscations the dominance of pro AKP media circles increased in number.

Another mechanism of increasing control of media landscape by the AKP was fines against media groups that are critical of AKP government. One of the clearest


³⁴⁵ Elmas and Kurban 2011, p24 and Somer 2010 p.557

³⁴⁶ S. Croke, A. Finkel D.J Kramer C.A Robins, and N. Schenkkan, "Democracy in crises: corruption, media, and power in Turkey," *Freedom House Special Report*, Freedom House (2014) pp.12-13, See also Ali Çarkoğlu and G. Yavuz, "Press and Party Parallelism in Turkey: an individual level interpretation," *Turkish Studies* 11, no.4 (2010): pp. 613-624, p. 618

manifestations of such a control over media landscape was the dispute between Doğan Group and AKP government which resulted in a significant fine against the Group. The dispute dates back to 2008 when a conflict was erupted when AKP-led municipality refused to grant a property demanded by Doğan Group. This was followed by intense criticisms of AKP government by the Doğan Media Group to which the then Prime Minister Erdoğan retaliated by instructing authorities to fine the Group for tax irregularities. Following the increasing government pressure a fine of 3.75 billion was issued in 2009 to the Doğan Media Group. Due to the financial difficulties the Group faced, it sold its two newspapers to Demirören Group which has a pro-government orientation.

This deterioration of media freedom was further intensified with the increasing securitization of the domestic political context following 2008 onwards. Following the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases many journalists and writers were deliberately and falsely accused of being a member of coup plans and faced imprisonment. Additionally, following Gezi Park protests and 17-25 December process in 2013 increasing censorship on the internet and social media also received strong criticisms from EU Commission.³⁴⁷ Freedom House's deteriorating press freedom score of Turkey between 2002 and 2014 exemplifies the decreasing media freedom and increasing control of the media landscape by the subsequent AKP governments.

Figure 4: Press Freedom Scores of Turkey, 2002-2014



³⁴⁷ For a detailed explanation of EU's response on recent deterioration of media freedom, please see, Gözde Yılmaz, "Europeanization or De-Europeanization? Media Freedom in Turkey (1999-2015)," *South European Society and Politics* 21, no.1 (2016).

Data derived from the Freedom House Freedom of Press Reports for Turkey in 2002-2014. Note: 0=best, 100=worst

This deteriorating media freedom and increasing domination of Turkish media landscape by pro-government media groups despite subsequent emphasis on the issue within EU Commission Progress reports indicates the instrumentality of EU norms and rules for political parties in terms of increasing their decisional autonomy.

This section sought to analyze AKP's changing level of decisional autonomy which is found to be a significant indicator for external dimension of party institutionalization. Based on the preceding analysis, it can be argued that AKP significantly increased its level of decisional autonomy during its second and third term. The party showed low level of decisional autonomy due to the strong suspicion and opposition it received from extra-parliamentary veto players. Especially the Office of Presidency, military, and high judiciary exerted strong pressure on Party which significantly curtailed its level of decisional autonomy. Furthermore, civil society organizations, especially women's civil society organizations exerted strong pressure on AKP during its first term.

Following the election of Abdullah Gül to the office of presidency, AKP strongly improved its decisional autonomy against institutional veto players. During its second and third term, the party improved its decisional autonomy due to the weakening popular support for the military as a consequence of uncovering alleged coup plots against AKP governments. More significantly, the Constitutional amendments in 2010 further increased AKP's control over the high judiciary which further improved its decisional autonomy. Furthermore, AKP strongly consolidated its power over civil society organizations which led to increasing number of Governmental Non-Governmental Organizations (GNGO's) that supported its policy proposals. Thus, the party significantly shifted its cooperation from civil society organizations that were in opposition more towards the organizations which have the same ideological leanings with AKP. AKP's indirect control over media and increasing media-party parallelism further consolidated its decisional autonomy over media.

5.3 AKP'S CHANGING ELECTORAL ENVIRONMENT: FROM PROTEST VOTING TOWARDS A 'VOTE OF BELONGING'

This section aims to analyze the AKP as a party at ballot box by specifically focusing on party's changing relationship with its supporters to measure the changing degree of reification/support which proposed as another important indicator of party institutionalization. More specifically, analysis below will try to depict changing rationale for supporting the party at the ballot box throughout three consecutive elections held in 2002, 2007, and 2011.³⁴⁸ These elections and voting behavior was extensively studied by using pre-election and post-election survey research.³⁴⁹ The upcoming analysis will be based on the findings of these seminal studies to delineate changing levels and nature of what Randall and Svåsand refers 'reification/support' for AKP.³⁵⁰

In party institutionalization literature, rather than sheer number of votes, the relationship of the party and its constituency was proposed as one of the main indicator for party institutionalization. This section will try to trace changing voting behavior of AKP voters by reviewing the survey based research conducted during three consecutive elections in which the party subsequently increased its vote share. (Table 9).

Table 9: The Number of Votes received and vote share in 2002, 2007, and 2011 elections

Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP)	2002	2007	2011
Number of votes received	10,808,229	16,327,291	21,399,082
Vote share %	34.3	46.6	49.8

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK)

³⁴⁸ Considering the time frame of the thesis which ends at the election of party leader to the office of Presidency, this analysis kept limited to three general elections that were held in 2002, 2007, and 2011.

³⁴⁹ See, Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Rise of the New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey: The Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the November 2002 Elections in Turkey," *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 7, No.3 (2002); Arda Can Kumbaracıbaşı *Turkish Politics and the Rise of the AKP: Dilemmas of Institutionalization and Leadership Strategy* (New York: Routledge, 2009); William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010) ; Ali Çarkoğlu, "Ideology or Economic Pragmatism? : Profiling Turkish Voters in 2007," *Turkish Studies* 9, no.2 (June 2008); Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Justice and Development Party at Helm: Resurgence of Islam or Restitution of the Right-of-Center Predominant Party," *Turkish Studies* 11, no.1 (2010); Ali Çarkoğlu, "Turkey's 2011 Elections: Towards a Dominant Party System?," *Insight Turkey* 13, no.3 (2011); Ali Çarkoğlu, "Economic Evaluations vs. Ideology: Diagnosing the Sources of Electoral Change in Turkey," *Electoral Studies* 31 (2012).

³⁵⁰ Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand "Party Institutionalization in New Democracies," *Party Politics* 8, no.1 (2002): 5-29.

5.3.1 2002 Elections

The 2002 General Elections which brought AKP to power with a landslide victory was generally portrayed as a ‘political earthquake’. For the first time, a political party, founded by the cadres of NOM won a majority that enabled it to form a single party government. Secondly, the 2002 elections continue to remain as the election with highest volatility in the history of Turkish elections. The significant volatility is highly evident when the vote shares of parties in 1999 elections are compared with 2002 elections (Table 10).

Table 10: 2002 Election Results and Vote shifts between 1999 General Elections and 2002 Elections

	Vote % 1999	Vote % 2002	% Difference
Democratic Left Party (Democratic Sol Parti- DSP)	22.19	1.22	-20.97
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi- MHP)	17.98	8.34	-9.64
Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi- FP) **	15.41	2.48	-12.93
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi- ANAP)	13.22	5.13	-8.09
True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi- DYP)	12.01	9.55	-2.46
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP)	8.71	19.40	10.69
People’s Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi- HADEP) ***	4.75	6.23	1.48
Grand Unity Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi- BBP)	1.46	1.02	-0.44
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- AKP)	-	34.28	34.28
Young Party (Genç Parti- GP)	-	7.25	7.25
Independents	0.87	0.99	0.12
Total	96.60	95.89	
Other Parties	3.40	4.11	0.71

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK)

As Ali Çarkoğlu suggested the electoral fortune of AKP was significantly improved by strong impact of protest-votes which was due to political and economic context prior to

2002 elections.³⁵¹ First and foremost, two subsequent earthquakes in 1999 revealed the ineffectiveness of the then incumbent government in terms of responding to country's emergency needs. More significantly, financial crises that hit the country in November 2000 and February 2001 further derailed the prospects of electoral success for coalition partners.³⁵² These two events significantly increased the level of dissatisfaction for the then competing political parties. In fact the total vote share of coalition partners registered drastic decline (53.39% in 1999 to 14.7% in 2002).

While the sheer % of votes in and itself is indicative of parties' strength. Party institutionalization literature posits that the nature of support for a political party is also an important dimension of party institutionalization.³⁵³ In that regard, parties that have a pragmatic constituency with diverse demands will inevitably record low levels of decisional autonomy vis-à-vis their electoral environment as they have forced to take into consideration the diverse demands coming from multi-faceted voter base. The previous analysis indicates that the party's vote base is highly fragmented as the core constituencies of parties that represent significantly differing ideologies were shifted to AKP in November 2002 elections.

The social attributes of the AKP' core constituency in 2002 elections also reveal that in terms of its voter base, the party stands out as a new representative unit and was not a successor of any of the established political parties. Although the party's core constituency was based on religious-conservative young electorate, as Hale and Özbudun suggest, AKP's constituency remained far from being a socially solid block.³⁵⁴ Kumbaracıbaşı in his detailed analysis of 2002 elections found that AKP's electoral strength was based on a heterogeneous mix of traditional conservative/religious voters as well as protest voters of previous coalition parties of ANAP, DYP, and MHP.³⁵⁵

³⁵¹ Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Rise of the New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey: The Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the November 2002 Elections in Turkey," *South European Society and Politics* 7, no.3 (2002), 137.

³⁵² Ibid., 131.

³⁵³ Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand "Party Institutionalization in New Democracies," *Party Politics* 8, no.1 (2002) and Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)

³⁵⁴ William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 42-43.

³⁵⁵ Arda Can Kumbaracıbaşı *Turkish Politics and the Rise of the AKP: Dilemmas of Institutionalization and Leadership Strategy* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 108-123. On the protest-voting argument see, Sabri Sayarı, "Towards a New Turkish Party System?," *Turkish Studies* 8, no.2 (2007).

5.3.2 2007 Elections

The early general elections which was held in 22 July 2007, was completely different from the November 2002 general election in terms of domestic political context which was significantly became polarized due to intensifying traditional cleavage between secularists and Islamists.³⁵⁶ AKP again gained a landslide electoral victory by receiving 46.6% of the votes (Table 11).

Table 11: 2007 Election Results and Vote Shifts between 2002 General Elections and 2007 Elections

	Vote % 2002	Vote % 2007	% Difference
Democratic Left Party (Democratic Sol Parti- DSP)	1.22	-	-1.22
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi- MHP)	8.94	14.3	5.4
Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi- SP)	2.48	2.3	-0.2
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi- ANAP)	13.22	-	-13.22
True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi- DYP)	9.55	-	-9.55
Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP)	19.40	20.9	1.5
People's Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi- HADEP) *	6.23	-	
Grand Unity Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi- BBP)	1.02	-	-1.02
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- AKP)	34.28	46.6	12.3
Young Party (Genç Parti- GP)	7.25	-	-7.25
Independents	0.99	5.2	0.12
Total	96.60	92.3	
Other Parties	2.0	7.7	5.7

Source: TUIK

The post-election surveys indicate a further polarization between the two largest parties, CHP and AKP. Another important finding regarding the 2007 elections was further consolidation of AKP's core conservative constituency. In a seminal study that was based on pre and post-election surveys, Ali Çarkoğlu suggested that victory for the

³⁵⁶ The intensifying societal cleavage was mainly due to the escalated crisis over the election of President of the Republic. For a detailed account of this period, see, William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the Case of the AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 62-65.

incumbent AKP in 2007 elections dependent on two influences on voters' decisions: (1) primarily long-term ideological orientations built on left-right self-placement, religiosity, and conservatism and (2) short-term evaluations of government performance especially on economic front and concludes that:

“The most important implication of these findings concerns the dependence of the AKP upon favorable economic conditions or the favorable economic performance of the AKP government. The fact that economic pragmatism appears more significant than ideological predispositions, especially for the AKP constituency, might be good news for Turkish democracy. If the AKP government delivers on the economic front then they will be continuously rewarded at the polls. However, if they fail, then they will be swiftly punished since their constituency's ideological ties are relatively minor in support of the AKP. If the AKP vote were to depend more heavily on ideology, then any failure on the economic front could have possibly been made up by heavy reliance on ideological mobilization, which potentially is less concrete and ambiguous. However, the AKP does not seem to have the capacity to hold on to a core constituency on the basis of pure ideological mobilization.”³⁵⁷

In a similar study, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, through a statistical analysis of pre-election survey, found that AKP records the highest rate of party identification among competing parties in 2007 elections (Table 12). Nevertheless, Kalaycıoğlu concludes that this identification was mainly ‘based upon satisfaction with macroeconomic under the AKP government of 2002-2007’.³⁵⁸ Therefore, the election victory in 2007 is found to be less influenced by ideological factors such as left-right self-placement of AKP voters or cultural factors such as religiosity and ethnic factors.³⁵⁹

Table 12: Party Identification among Three Largest Political Parties in 2007*

	% of respondents who indicate that they identify themselves with a political party
AKP	36.1
CHP	12.4
MHP	7.6

Source: Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Justice and Development Party at Helm: Resurgence of Islam or Restitution of the Right-of-Center Predominant Party,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No.1 (2010): pp. 29-44, p. 38. * Numbers may not add up to 100 as only three largest parties' figures were taken.

³⁵⁷ Ali Çarkoğlu, “Ideology or Economic Pragmatism? : Profiling Turkish Voters in 2007,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No.2 (June 2008), 340.

³⁵⁸ Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Justice and Development Party at Helm: Resurgence of Islam or Restitution of the Right-of-Center Predominant Party,” *Turkish Studies* 11, no.1 (2010), 39.

³⁵⁹ *Idem*.

The aforementioned findings of pre and post-election survey data indicate that, in terms of what Panebianco calls a ‘vote of belonging’, AKP’s constituency had continued to remain attached to the party pragmatically due to its retrospective favorable economic performance during its first term in government and also its expected prospective macroeconomic performance.

5.3.3 2011 Elections

The general elections held on 12 June 2011 were another landslide electoral victory for AKP as the party received 49.8% of the votes. From a comparative perspective, the results of 2011 election results indicate that the AKP became a centrifugal force that gathers both conservative median voter that define itself at the center-right which led to an almost disappearance of center-right and right parties from the electoral scene apart from nationalist MHP (Table 13). Moreover, the election results also indicate that AKP continued to successfully pull the more conservative religious voters leading to a further vote share loss for Felicity Party. Studies centered on the 2011 elections concluded that the election results indicate that electorally AKP became a predominant party.³⁶⁰ To sum up, 2011 election results suggest that AKP continued to attain the support of the median voters without alienating its ideologically predisposed constituencies.³⁶¹

Table 13: 2011 Election Results and Vote shifts between 2007 General Elections and 2011 Elections

	Vote % 2007	Vote % 2011	% Difference
Democratic Left Party (Democratic Sol Parti- DSP)	-	0.3	-0.3
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi- MHP)	14.3	13.0	-1.3
Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi- SP)	2.3	1.3	-0.2
Motherland Party (Anavatan)	-	-	-

³⁶⁰ Ali Çarkoğlu, “Turkey’s 2011 Elections: Towards a Dominant Party System?,” *Insight Turkey* 13, no.3 (2011), 43-62. Similarly, Esen and Ciddi argued that the results of 2011 elections indicate the birth of a predominant party system. See,

³⁶¹ Şebnem Gümüşcü, “The Emergent Predominant Party System in Turkey,” *Government and Opposition* 48, no.2 (April 2013), 240.

Partisi- ANAP)			
True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi- DYP)	-	0.2	0.2
Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP)	20.9	26.0	5.1
People's Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi- HADEP) *	-	-	-
Grand Unity Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi- BBP)	-	0.8	0.8
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- AKP)	46.6	49.8	3.2
Young Party (Genç Parti- GP)	-	-	-
Independents	5.2	6.6	1.4
Total	96.60	100.00	
Other Parties	7.7	2.2	-5.5

Source: TUIK

In his comparative analysis of factors that shaped party choices in 2002, 2007 and 2011 general elections, Çarkoğlu found that instead of pragmatic economic performance evaluations, the support for the AKP in 2011 elections was more centered on long-term ideological commitments which include center-right median voters and constituency of voters who voted for AKP in 2007.³⁶² Although there is no data available on party identification which enables us to compare increasing levels of party identification, Çarkoğlu's conclusions suggest that rather than short-term pragmatic voter choice for AKP, 2011 elections demonstrate that party choice for AKP was more consolidated as the support for the party was based on ideological commitment. Consequently, recalling Panebianco's notion of 'vote of belonging', 2011 elections and dynamics of party choice indicate that AKP significantly increased its autonomy vis-à-vis its electoral environment as ideological commitment to party rather than pragmatic voting was more significant for the electoral victory of the party.

The aforementioned analysis sought to measure AKP's electoral environment which is proposed as an important indicator of party institutionalization. The performance of AKP at the ballot box in three consecutive elections shows that the main explanatory factor for party change 'electoral defeat' was not applicable to the case of AKP as the party successfully increased its vote share in general elections.

³⁶² Ali Çarkoğlu, "Economic Evaluations vs. Ideology: Diagnosing the Sources of Electoral Change in Turkey," *Electoral Studies* 31 (2012), 519.

Dynamics of party choice for AKP in 2002 elections reveal that right from the beginning the party captured the voters of NOM. Additionally, comparative analysis of the election results of 1999 general elections and 2002 elections reveal that party expanded its support base on the significant voter dissatisfaction with the previous parties and also opened itself to the median center-right conservative constituency. Therefore, party's initial voter base was far from a consolidated constituency with high levels of party identification. This is expected as party is a new party and 2002 elections was its first test at the ballot box. For the purposes of this research, the support for AKP indicates that the party's decisional autonomy vis-à-vis its electorate was considerably low during its first term in government.

The findings of the survey based research on main dynamics of support for AKP 2007 elections indicate that the main rationale for supporting the party was centered on retrospective and expected prospective economic performance of the AKP. In that regard, 2007 general elections indicate that despite high levels of party identification compared to other parties, the support for the party continued to center on pragmatic economic considerations rather than a vote for ideological belonging.

The research on 2011 elections indicates that the party increased its vote share for a third time and became an electorally predominant party. The party consolidated the constituency of traditional center-right voters of ANAP and DYP and core constituency of NOM movement under a single umbrella. Additionally, comparative analyses of party choice indicate that the support for the party was mainly centered on longer-term ideological commitment rather than short term pragmatic/economy based support. Therefore, it can be argued that 2011 elections and support for the party clearly shows a voting pattern more centered on a 'vote of belonging' rather than pragmatic voting which indicates a higher level of reification/support for the party.

5.4 CONCLUSION

The preceding analysis of external dimensions of party institutionalization indicate that AKP significantly increased its level of decisional autonomy vis-à-vis extra-

parliamentary veto players and other institutional actors which significantly constrained party's capacity to achieve its basic goals of policy-seeking, vote-seeking/vote maximization, office-seeking/office-maintaining. During its first term in office, strong skepticism centered on the party's declared difference from preceding political parties that represent NOM severely constrained party's decisional autonomy. Nevertheless, starting from its second term in office AKP significantly increased its level of decisional autonomy and even started to control some of the most important extra-parliamentary institutions such as Office of Presidency, the institutions of higher judiciary, the military, civil society organizations, and mainstream media.

Additionally, the party significantly improved its relationship with its own constituency. The section on AKP's electoral environment reveals that while initially the party's first and second electoral victories was mainly due to protest votes and pragmatic voting respectively, survey-based analysis of party choices for 2011 elections demonstrate that the voting pattern for AKP increasingly based on long-term ideological commitment to the party rather than short-term pragmatic voting as in the cases of previous two elections. In that regard, AKP's constituency started to demonstrate a party choice pattern which increasingly informed by what Panebianco conceptualizes as a 'vote of belonging'.

To sum up, throughout its three consecutive terms as party in government, taking into consideration the multiple indicators of party institutionalization, the party significantly increased its level of institutionalization. The following chapters that focus on specific policy domains such as women's rights and gender, education, and social security that are proposed as indicative of party's ideological leanings will trace the implications of changing levels of party institutionalization for the party's goal prioritization and incremental ideological change.

CHAPTER VI

THE AKP's CHANGING STANCE ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND GENDER

AKP's discourse and policies on women's rights and gender equality stand out as another testament indicating ideological change in terms of increasing prioritization of party's moral political rationality over neoliberal political rationality, both embedded in party's ideology conceptualized as 'conservative democracy'. In this context, it will be argued that one of the core components of AKP's moral political rationality was the strong importance attached to the institution of family as the kernel of social order. Another core component of such a family mainstreaming stance is the emphasis on women's care-giver maternal roles. On the other hand, the party's neoliberal political rationality emphasizes women's rights and gender equality with particular importance attached on women's economic participation.

AKP's legislative attempts during its first term in office are amply documented as one of the most progressive legislative changes in terms of women's rights and gender equality.³⁶³ Some critical studies analyzing AKP's changing discourse and policies regarding women's rights and gender equality during its consecutive three terms suggest that there is an observable shift in AKP's discourse and policies regarding women's rights and gender equality. These studies assert that following progressive legislations regarding women's rights and gender equality in its first term, the second and third term are marked by the dominant use of patriarchal and moral notions and values in party's

³⁶³ See, Deniz Kandiyoti, "Locating the Politics of Gender: Patriarchy, Neo-Liberal Governance and Violence in Turkey," *Research and Policy in Turkey*, 1, no.2 (2016); Zana Çitak and Özlem Tür, "Women between Tradition and Change: The Justice and Development Party Experience in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no.3 (2008). Furthermore, some studies conceptualize AKP's stance on women's rights and gender equality as a new mode of patriarchy which is informed by an amalgamation of neoliberal and conservative elements. For such an argument see, Simten Coşar and Mesut Yeğenoğlu, "New Grounds for Patriarchy in Turkey? Gender Policy in the Age of AKP," *South European Society and Politics* 16, no.4 (2011); Gamze Çavdar, "Islamist Moderation and the Resilience of Gender: Turkey's Persistent Paradox," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 11, no.3-4 (2010).

discourse, often framed by religious references that shaped its position on women's rights and gender equality.³⁶⁴

The aim of this chapter is twofold. First by using process tracing, it aims to scrutinize the aforementioned argument that suggests a shift within AKP's stance on women's rights and gender equality and use party's changing discourse and policies regarding women's rights and gender equality as a case which is indicative of party's ideological change. For party's first term in office, a detailed analysis of Penal Code legislation will be made. Penal Code legislation is generally proposed as one of the most progressive legislations in terms of women's rights and gender equality during the party's first term. This analysis will provide clues for understanding whether we see persistence or change in terms of AKP's stance on women's rights and gender equality. This section will be followed by a detailed analysis of AKP's discourse and policy proposals on abortion as part of party's amply documented pro-natalist turn starting from its second term in office. AKP's pro-natalist policies in general and its stance on abortion in particular, are also informative in terms of party's general shift towards family mainstreaming. In that regard, the case of abortion will attempt to demonstrate that AKP's pro-natalist turn is also complemented and informed by its moral-political rationality which prioritized the integrity/strength of family institution and traditional care-giver maternal role of women. Thirdly, AKP's policies regarding women's employment will be the focus of analysis once again to see whether there is a change in discourse and policy proposals regarding women's employment which signals a shift from gender mainstreaming to family mainstreaming.

Secondly, rather than making a critical reevaluation of the aforementioned policies and legislative attempts, this chapter will treat these policy domains as cases indicative of party's ideological shift. Furthermore, this chapter aims to open up the black box of AKP with an analysis of both intra and extra-party dynamics of party's ideological shift with regard to women's rights and gender equality in general and aforementioned cases in particular, from a party politics perspective. Therefore, the changing internal and external dynamics of party institutionalization and effects of these dynamics on party's

³⁶⁴ See, Feride Acar and Gülbanu Altınok, "The 'Politics of Intimate' at the Intersection of Neo-liberalism and Neo-conservatism in Contemporary Turkey," *Women's Studies International Forum*, 14 (2013); Deniz Kandiyoti, "Locating the Politics of Gender: Patriarchy, Neo-Liberal Governance and Violence in Turkey," *Research and Policy in Turkey*, 1, no.2 (2016).

changing discourse and policies regarding women's rights and gender equality will be assessed. Last but not the least, the effects of EU conditionality on intra-party politics and party's decisional autonomy will be analyzed through process tracing method to delineate the mechanisms of EU effect on its policy-making and policy-framing processes. Finally, any variation between AKP's instrumentalization of EU norms, values, and policy paradigms will trace the effects of variance in terms of effectiveness of EU conditionality on party's usage of 'Europe'.

First part of the chapter will focus on party's discourse, policy proposals and stance on women's rights and gender equality within official party documents. This section will especially focus on AKP's Party Program and election manifestos. Second section will provide a detailed analysis of the legislation process of Penal Code during AKP's first term in government. Third section will focus on AKP's stance on women's rights and gender during its second and third terms in office and particularly, analyze party's pro-natalist policies by specifically focusing on the abortion. The following section will analyze AKP's policy proposals regarding women's employment.

6.1 WOMEN IN OFFICIAL PARTY DOCUMENTS: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?

AKP differed from the parties representing pro-Islamic National Outlook Movement in terms of its strong emphasis on the societal problems of women in its Party Program.³⁶⁵ The document has a separate heading on women in which party emphasizes its aim to prioritize women's problems as it sees women first and foremost as individuals and also their role on 'raising healthy generations', which directly refer to women's traditional maternal roles.³⁶⁶ In this context, it can be argued that the party's stance on women's rights and gender equality was informed both by the neoliberal and moral rationalities

³⁶⁵ For a comparative analysis of pro-Islamic parties and AKP's stance on women's rights and gender equality see, Gamze Çavdar, "Islamist Moderation and the Resilience of Gender: Turkey's Persistent Paradox," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 11, no.3-4, (2010), 343-346.

³⁶⁶ See, *Ak Parti Kalkınma ve Demokratikleşme Programı* (AK Party Development and Democratization Program) (Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları, 2002), p.87, accessed, October 25, 2016 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJITAL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITAPLAR/SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI/200205071%20AK%20PARTI%20DEMOKRATIKLESME%20VE%20KALKINMA%20PROGRAMI%202002/200205071%20AK%20PARTI%20DEMOKRATIKLESME%20VE%20KALKINMA%20PROGRAMI%202002%200000_0116.pdf

embedded in its ideology presented as ‘conservative democracy’. While the neoliberal-political rationality emphasizes women’s problems within the context of individual rights, moral-political rationality prioritizes the healthiness and strength of family institution and emphasizes the importance of women by signifying their care-giving role and traditional domestic responsibilities.

In its 2002 Party Program, AKP promised to make amendments for work and family reconciliation through social policies. AKP also strongly emphasized its aim to make necessary legislative and regulatory amendments in line with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) principles. Moreover, AKP strongly emphasized its aim to increase the education level of women, take necessary steps to prevent violence against women, and support women’s public and political participation. Last but not the least, the party indicated its aim to work collaboratively with women’s NGOs during legislative and regulative amendment processes regarding women’s rights and gender equality. As a clear manifestation of its conservative rationality, AKP also strongly emphasized its aim to prioritize women’s problems for raising healthy generations and establishing happiness within family.³⁶⁷ AKP’s emphasis on family as party of its conservative identity was also evident in the 2003 Government Program which indicated that the major concern of party’s conservative identity is to preserve unity and healthiness of family which were seen as the foundation of society.³⁶⁸

While the AKP, in its Party Program, prioritized women’s problems by emphasizing their individuality, following its first term in office party’s moral political rationality which subsumes women’s issues to family problems and emphasizes women’s traditional care-giver maternal roles become more apparent within official party documents. In its 2007 election manifesto, within the section titled ‘Family, Women, Children, and Elderly’, AKP indicated that it aimed to propose policies that solve the problems of women, children and elderly from a family centered approach.³⁶⁹ Furthermore, for its second term in office, AKP promised that it will continue to work

³⁶⁷ *Ak Parti Kalkınma ve Demokratikleşme Programı* (AK Party Development and Democratization Program), 88-89.

³⁶⁸ See, *Ak Parti 59. Hükümet Programı* (Ak Party 59th Government Program), accessed. October,10 2016. <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/dosya/66517>

³⁶⁹ *Ak Parti 2007 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ak Party 2007 General Elections Election Manifesto) Ak Parti Tanıtım ve Medya Başkanlığı (February 2015), 107 and 111, accessed. 12 October 12, 2016, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/dosyalar#!/>

for improving the status of family, strengthening the family institution and improving the living standards of all members of the family.³⁷⁰ The same kind of prioritization of family over women's rights and gender equality is also evident in its 2011 election manifesto in which party strongly emphasized its aim to lift all the barriers that women face in terms of rights, welfare, and social life as women are portrayed as central aspects of social life, family, and children.³⁷¹ Another manifestation of prioritization of family over women's rights and gender equality was the '2023 Targets' document in which women's rights and gender equality remains as a marginal topic compared to party's proposals and targets regarding strengthening the family. From the outset, AKP reiterated its family centered approach as part of its social policies by indicating that the family centered approach would continue to constitute the basis of its social policies including policies regarding women.³⁷²

The analysis of official party documents reveals that AKP's stance and policy proposals regarding women's rights and gender equality were both informed by its neoliberal and moral- political rationality. While the former stands out as a manifestation of party's point of difference from the pro-Islamic political parties belonging to NOM with strong references to women's rights of and economic participation of women, the latter prioritizes women's care-giver maternal roles and aims to strengthen and protecting the integrity of family. Preceding comparative analysis of official party documents suggest that while this duality has been present since AKP's initial Party Program, there has been a shift from gender mainstreaming towards family mainstreaming which led to prioritization of family over women's rights and gender equality.

³⁷⁰ *Ak Parti 2007 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ak Party 2007 General Elections Election Manifesto), 111.

³⁷¹ *Ak Parti 2011 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ak Party 2011 General Elections Election Manifesto) Ak Parti Tanıtım ve Medya Başkanlığı (February 2015), 157, accessed. October 12, 2016, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/dosyalar#!/>

³⁷² See, *Ak Parti 2023 Siyasi Vizyonu: Siyaset, Toplum, Dünya* (Ak Party 2023 Political Vision: Politics, Society, World), 34, accessed. October 12, 2016, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/dosyalar#!/>

6.2 THE AKP'S DISCOURSE AND POLICIES ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND GENDER EQUALITY BETWEEN 2003 AND 2007

In parallel with its promises regarding improving women's rights and gender equality, during the first term in office, AKP passed several significant pieces of legislation related with women's rights and gender equality.³⁷³ Notwithstanding the improvements on gender equality and women's rights during its first term in office, the legislation process of the new Penal Code demonstrates the ramifications of the interplay between party's moral political and neoliberal rationality on the one hand and effects of low levels of party institutionalization on party's policy making on the other. Additionally, AKP's stance on strongly debated adultery proposal during the legislation process of the new Penal Code is a case that scrutinizes AKP's adherence to gender mainstreaming during its first term in office and remains as a strong counterfactual evidence against the argument that party's stance on women's rights and gender equality changed from gender mainstreaming to family mainstreaming.³⁷⁴

6.2.1 Penal Code Reform and the Case of Adultery

Right after becoming the governing party, the Penal Code reform was on AKP's agenda as an indispensable requirement for EU accession. Despite AKP's promise to work collaboratively with women's NGOs in its party program and election manifesto, during

³⁷³ In 2003, the AKP government passed the new Labor Law which brought many improvements in terms of women's rights and gender equality in workplace. In 2004, an amendment was made to the Article 10 of the constitution which constitutionally established the gender equality and states obligation in protecting it. Additionally, AKP government also introduced new amendments to the Municipality Law which obliged all municipalities with a population above 50,000 to open shelters for women and children. In addition to these progressive legislations regarding women's rights and gender equality, AKP, during its first term in office also started campaigns such as 'Haydi Kızlar Okula' (Girls Let's Go to School) which started in collaboration with Ministry of Education and UNICEF in 2003, aimed at increasing education levels of girls. For a comprehensive review of AKP's policies related with women's rights and gender equality, see *Ak Parti İktidarında Kadın Hakları ve Fırsat Eşitliği Alanında Gerçekleştirilen Yasal Düzenlemeler* (The Legal Changes Concerning Women's Rights and Equality of Opportunity during the Ak Party Government) (Ankara: Ak Parti Genel Merkez, Kadın Kolları Başkanlığı, 2009)

³⁷⁴ Deniz Kandiyoti, "Locating the Politics of Gender: Patriarchy, Neo-Liberal Governance and Violence in Turkey," *Research and Policy in Turkey*, 1, no.2 (2016); Zana Çitak and Özlem Tür, "Women between Tradition and Change: The Justice and Development Party Experience in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no.3 (2008).

the drafting process of the New Penal Code, AKP refused to meet with women's NGOs. Here it is important to note that the women's NGO's were highly institutionalized and successfully campaigned for gender mainstreaming legislative changes when the AKP was formed in 2002.³⁷⁵ In this context, women's NGOs initiated an intensive public campaign called 'The Campaign for the Reform of the Turkish Penal Code from a Gender Perspective'. Moreover, during the Penal Code reform process, the women's NGOs had formed the Women's Working Group on the Penal Code which prepared a draft code that eliminated gender biases within the old one and sent it to the members of the Parliament. Nevertheless, the initial draft Penal Code prepared by the AKP government was completely different from the one that was proposed by the coalition of women's NGOs.³⁷⁶ This prompted a strong media blitz, which significantly increased the public awareness on the Penal Code reform. The women's NGOs were able to build coalitions with the mainstream media, which were to a large extent skeptical of the AKP's claims to value gender equality.³⁷⁷ In addition to mainstream media, women's NGOs successfully lobbied opposition parties in the parliament, the General Directorate of Women's Status and Problems (KSGM), and EU.³⁷⁸

Eventually, AKP gave in to the strong opposition received from the mainstream media, main opposition party, and women's NGOs, and accepted entering into dialogue with women's NGOs. Consequently, the new draft Penal Code included many of the recommendations proposed by the Women's NGOs. Nevertheless, AKP's last minute call to include an additional clause to the New Penal Code aiming for re-criminalization of adultery ignited another firestorm within the AKP itself and also led one of the most significant crises with the EU, which almost derailed the prospects for Turkey to start

³⁷⁵ A clear manifestation of such strength was the women's NGO's successful campaigning which challenged the patriarchal clauses during the Civil Code reform process prior to AKP government. See, Pinar Ilkcaracan, "How Adultery Almost Derailed Turkey's Aspiration to Join European Union," in *Deconstructing Sexuality in the Middle East: Challenges and Discourses*, ed. Pinar Ilkcaracan (London: Ashgate, 2008): 41-64.

³⁷⁶ The draft Penal Code prepared by the AKP officials contained clauses stipulating a lesser penalty for sex offenders if a rape victim marries her rapist, and stating a lesser penalty for sex offenders if the victim- even if underage- 'consents. See, Gamze Çavdar, "Islamist Moderation and Resilience of Gender: Turkey's Persistent Paradox," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 11, no.3-4 (2010), 352.

³⁷⁷ Gamze Çavdar, "Islamist Moderation and the Resilience of Gender: Turkey's Persistent Paradox," 351.

³⁷⁸ As one leading activist indicated the increasing media coverage of the Penal Code from a gender perspective as a result of strong public-awareness campaigns by the women's NGOs culminated in the 'widest public debate on gendered notions of sexuality and sexual rights in Turkey since the foundation of the modern/secular Turkish Republic in 1923'. Cited in M.Negron-Gonzales, "The Feminist Movement during the AKP era in Turkey: Challenges and Opportunities," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 52, no.2 (2016), 202.

accession negotiations.³⁷⁹ The analysis of AKP's attempt for re-criminalization of adultery reveals the effects of external and internal dynamics of party institutionalization on AKP's changing stance on adultery issue. Furthermore, the party's stance on adultery also scrutinizes the argument that there is a clear demarcation point in terms of AKP's position regarding women's rights and gender equality between the first and following second and third terms in office.

In the old Penal Code dating back to 1926, act of adultery was criminalized for both men and women. With the rulings of the Constitutional Court in 1996 and 1998 the adultery clause was dropped. The new draft Penal Code, prepared within Parliamentary Commission in collaboration with women's organizations, opposition parties, and academicians as a part of the EU harmonization process, included significant amendments with regard to women's rights and contained no provisions on adultery. The first proposal for re-criminalization of adultery came from an AKP member but rejected both by AKP and RPP commission members. However, just weeks before the legislation process of the new Turkish Penal Code, AKP's proposal to add a clause to the New Penal Code which criminalizes adultery sparked an intense domestic debate, which covered range of issues such as; the extent to which state has the right to intervene in private sphere, meaning and content of so-called Turkish values and the role of Islam in Turkey. More importantly, the question of whether the AKP was an Islamist party aiming *shari'a* or a religious conservative party in the European sense was brought forefront with the adultery debate.³⁸⁰

During the initial stages of the debate, AKP justified its proposal for re-criminalization of adultery by signifying the societal demand for the issue and referred to the demands of the so-called 'Anatolian women' who requested stronger measures against their husbands acting contrary to their marriages.³⁸¹ Additionally, the parliamentary party group indicated that the adultery debate should not obscure the legislation of the draft Penal Code which was prepared on a consensual basis with the opposition and civil

³⁷⁹ Pinar Ilkcaracan, "How Adultery Almost Derailed Turkey's Aspiration to Join European Union", 41-64.

³⁸⁰ The main opposition party Republican People's Party (RPP) notwithstanding its initial support on adultery providing that it would apply both men and women equally, changed its stance following fierce criticism it received from women's NGOs and women party members. The RPP indicated that with the adultery clause the new Penal Code is becoming a *shari'a* law instead of a republican law. See, "Zina Kapışması," *Hürriyet*, August 27, 2004, accessed, October 15, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/zina-kapismasi-38641088>

³⁸¹ "Zinaya Ceza Verilmesini Türk Kadını İstiyor," *Hürriyet*, 28 August 28, 2004, accessed, October 15, 2016 <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/zinaya-ceza-verilmesini-anadolu-kadini-istiyor-38641781>

society organizations. Notwithstanding AKP's initial flexible attitude on the adultery issue, the party members that are coming from Nationalist View movement and other conservative circles pressurized the parliamentary group and the AKP members of the Parliamentary Commission for adding the adultery clause to the New Penal Code. One leading AKP party member, by implying the possible negative stance of conservative AKP members during legislation process of the penal code, indicated that they understood that some bill of complaints might come from party members which could complicate the legislation process. Therefore they tried to solve the problem by seeking consensus with the opposition on adultery issue before the legislation process.³⁸²

Against the strong demands from its core conservative constituency, AKP leadership sidelined with the conservative members within the party organization and defended the re-criminalization of adultery by emphasizing the social demands of the so-called Anatolian women. To further strengthen its proposal, AKP also sponsored a survey to gauge public opinion on adultery.³⁸³ Apart from emphasizing the societal demands for criminalization of adultery, AKP leadership also framed its position on adultery by signifying the importance of unity of family. In that regard, the then Prime Minister Erdoğan, by implying the adultery debate, indicated that their conservative identity necessitates them to strengthen and secure the institution of family.³⁸⁴ AKP leadership also strongly emphasized the equal application of the penalty and making it operative only by the complaints of partners.³⁸⁵ In addition to the AKP leadership's positive stance on re-criminalization of adultery, the majority of the party's women members rallied behind the adultery proposal with arguments framed by liberal nuances.³⁸⁶ The then State Minister in charge of Women Güldal Akşit indicated that the proposal on

³⁸² "Korsan Önerge Suç Yaptı," *Hürriyet*, September 2, 2004, accessed, October 15, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/korsan-onerge-suc-yapti-38643456>

³⁸³ In this survey 83% of the respondents supported the criminalization of the adultery while 52% percent indicated that they were unfamiliar with the public debate on adultery taking place at the time. Cited in M.Negron-Gonzales, 'The Feminist Movement during the AKP era in Turkey: Challenges and Opportunities', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 52:2 (2016): pp 198-214, p. 202.

³⁸⁴ "Erdoğan: Zina Suçu İsteğe Bağlı," *Hürriyet*, September 7, 2004, accessed, October 16, 2016 <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogan-zina-sucu-istege-bagli-38644750>

³⁸⁵ The AKP justified its proposal on the ground that if the penalty on adultery would not be based on complaint of partners it might danger the unity of family. On the contrary, the opposition strongly indicated that the proposal by the AKP aimed at protecting the couples with religious marriages. See, "AKP'den İmam Nikahını Korumak için Girişim," *Hürriyet*, September 3, 2004, accessed, October 16, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/akp-den-imam-nikahini-korumak-icin-girisim-38643788>

³⁸⁶ Majority of the women AKP MP's suggested that marriage is a social contract like any other and its violation should be punished. See, Nora Fisher Onar and Meltem Müftüler-Baç, "The Adultery and Headscarf Debates in Turkey: Fusing 'EU-niversal' and 'Alternative' Modernities?," *Women's Studies International Forum*, 34 (2011), 384.

adultery was appropriate and cannot be denounced as it fills a gap created by the Constitutional Court's decision on the issue, and by 'taking into account Turkish traditions', it envisaged 'the preservation of social order'.³⁸⁷

Notwithstanding its initiation by the demands of AKP's conservative constituency and conservative party members, the above mentioned framing of the adultery proposal indicates that AKP largely refrained from the direct use of religious references for justifying its stance. In fact, the party members that rallied behind the adultery proposal strongly referred to liberal principles by emphasizing the need for punishment in cases of violation of marriage contract. Both AKP leadership and women party members pointed out the principal of equality within the proposal and argued that the AKP's bill is in accordance with the principle of gender equality. In spite of AKP's efforts to frame the adultery proposal within the parameters of societal demands and gender equality, adultery proposal initiated strong domestic criticism from women's NGOs and opposition parties on the ground that the adultery proposal was discriminatory against women and 'in any civilized country adultery could be grounds for divorce but not criminal prosecution'.³⁸⁸

Strong domestic opposition to the AKP's proposal on adultery also initiated strong response from EU due to the successful campaigning and lobbying activities of women's NGOs. During intense debates on the proposal, EU officials also reiterated the opposing arguments of the main opposition party RPP and women's NGOs. For example the spokesperson for Commissioner responsible for enlargement Jean Christoph Filori warned that in EU member states, adultery is seen only as a reason for divorce and not as a crime in law and the current proposal might contradict with the 8th clause of European Convention of Human Rights which deals with the private lives of individuals and families.³⁸⁹ Additionally, some EU officials indicated that AKP's insistence on adultery might be interpreted as a compromise to the fundamentalist

³⁸⁷ "Kadın Bakanı Akşit: Zina Suçu Uygundur," *Sabah*, September 2, 2004, accessed, October 16, 2016, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/09/02/siy110.html>

³⁸⁸ As Onar and Müftüler-Baç suggest there were also definitional concerns as in Turkish context. The word "adultery" can mean both extra-and pre-marital sex. Therefore, the proposal also opposed on the ground that it potentially infringed on the sexual freedom of non-married consenting adults. Nora Fisher Onar and Meltem Müftüler-Baç, "The Adultery and Headscarf Debates in Turkey: Fusing 'EU-niversal' and "Alternative" Modernities?," 384.

³⁸⁹ "Reformalara Gölge Düşer," *Hürriyet*, September 4, 2004, accessed, October 17, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/reformlara-golge-duser-38644103>

circles in Turkey.³⁹⁰ During the intense debate on adultery, the EU-Turkey relations was at a critical phase as the EU Commission Progress Report was expected in which EU Commission would recommend whether or not to start accession negotiations with Turkey. The then EU Commissioner responsible for enlargement Günther Verheugen's remarks also echoed other EU officials.³⁹¹ Nevertheless, Verheugen delivered positive messages with regard to the progress made by the AKP.³⁹²

The mixed signals coming from the EU led to an escalation of intra-party debate on the necessity of pushing forward the adultery clause. Some party members raised their concerns on the possible ramifications of including the adultery issue on the forthcoming EU Commission Progress Report that was expected to be issued on 6th of October.³⁹³ Despite these intra-party criticisms, during the Central Executive Committee (CEC) meeting, the party leadership's stance on including a clause that re-criminalizes adultery that protects gender equality was kept intact. At the end of the meeting the party members concluded that such an amendment would not contradict with the EU accession process.³⁹⁴ Despite a preliminary consensus on pushing forward the adultery clause as a result of the domestic and EU level opposition on adultery, the AKP reached a consensus on proceeding with the draft penal code without adding a clause on adultery. During the intra-party debates on the issue, leading party figures such as the then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, the then Justice Minister Cemil Çiçek and the then President of Constitutional Commission Burhan Kuzu indicated that adding adultery within Penal Code would jeopardize the EU accession process.³⁹⁵

Nevertheless, the consensus was short-lived as the conservative AKP MPs insisted on including an amendment on adultery by claiming that the consensus reached with the opposition was initiated by the then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, while the then

³⁹⁰ See, "Reformalara Gölge Düşer," *Hürriyet* and "Zina Yasası Yanlış Anlaşılır," *Hürriyet*, September 11, 2004, accessed, October 17, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/zina-yasasi-yanlis-anlasilir-38645959>

³⁹¹ See, "Zina Yasası ancak bir Şaka Olabilir," *Hürriyet*, September 10, 2004, accessed, October 17, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/zina-yasasi-ancak-bir-saka-olabilir-256367>

³⁹² "Verheugen: AB'nin Türkiye'den Yeni bir Talebi Yok," *Hürriyet*, September 6, 2004, accessed, October 17, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/verheugen-abnin-turkiyeden-yeni-talebi-yok-38644425>

³⁹³ "AB'nin Zinaya Tepkisi AKP'de Kafa Karıştırdı," *Hürriyet*, September 5, 2004, accessed, October 17, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ab-nin-zinaya-tepkisi-akp-de-kafa-karistirdi-255021>

³⁹⁴ "AKP'de Geri Adım Yok," *Hürriyet*, September 9, 2004, accessed, October 17, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/akp-de-geri-adim-yok-38640652>

³⁹⁵ "AB Rest Çekti Zina Kalktı," *Sabah*, September 15, 2004, accessed, October 18, 2016, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/09/15/siy102.html>

Prime Minister Erdoğan has not aired his opinion on the matter yet.³⁹⁶ In response to the intra-party pressure coming from conservative party members, the AKP leadership decided to bring up the adultery proposal under the heading of ‘sexual infidelity’ which created another fierce debate between AKP and opposition during the legislation process.³⁹⁷ Following the opposition’s resistance on its new proposal, AKP withdrew the entire Penal Code to the parliamentary commission in order to force the opposition to agree on its proposal. The party leadership insisted on re-criminalization of adultery by emphasizing the threat facing the family institution and re-criminalization of adultery was framed as an important remedy for a possible degeneration in family institution.³⁹⁸ This move by AKP led one of the most important crises with the EU since Turkey’s candidacy and almost derailed country’s membership bid as the legislation of the New Penal Code was *sine qua non* for EU Commission’s decision to start accession negotiations with Turkey.

Following AKP’s move on Penal Code legislation, the then EU Commissioner responsible for enlargement Verheugen strongly asserted that reforming the penal code is a condition that cannot be dispensed for starting accession negotiations with Turkey and indicated that if adultery would become a crime; the negotiations could not be sustained.³⁹⁹ Following these statements, AKP leadership repudiated EU official’s warnings by indicating that EU is not indispensable for Turkey and strongly asserted that EU should not interfere with Turkey’s internal affairs and working schedule of Turkish Parliament.

³⁹⁶ “Adultery Uprising in AKP,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, September 17, 2004, accessed, October 19, 2016, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/adultery-uprising-in-akp.aspx?pageID=438&n=adultery-uprising-in-akp-2004-09-17> The then Prime Minister Erdoğan sidelined with the more conservative faction within the party and stated that the parliamentary group should pass a law that will be for the good of the people which directly reflected the AKP’s claim that there was a general societal acceptance of criminalization of adultery.

³⁹⁷ During the debates on the issue of adultery the division between party members was also echoed among the top echelons of the party. While the then Foreign Minister and one of the founding members of AKP Abdullah Gül’s stance was more conciliatory and prioritized the continuation of legislation process due to the critical phase of EU accession process. On the contrary the then Prime Minister Erdoğan sidelined with demands of conservative party members and party’s conservative constituency. For a detailed explanation of this intra party debate, see, “Leadership Struggle Postpones TCK,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, September 19, 2004, accessed, October, 19 2004, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/leadership-struggle-postpones-tck.aspx?pageID=438&n=leadership-struggle-postpones-tck-2004-09-19>

³⁹⁸ “Bakanlar Kurulunda Zina Tartışması,” *Hürriyet*, September 16, 2004, accessed, October 20, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/bakanlar-kurulu-nda-zina-tartismasi-257756>

³⁹⁹ “Verheugen: No Negotiation Unless TCK Passes,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, September 20, 2004, accessed, October 20, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/verheugen-no-negotiation-unless-tck-passes-38648423>

Despite AKP leadership's uncompromising stance on adultery, against warnings coming from EU, the possibility of a 'no' verdict on accession negotiations tilted the intra-party power balance towards more liberal and pro-European members which strongly asserted the ramifications of party leadership's adamant stance on re-criminalization of adultery on the EU accession process. For example, AKP MP Ersönmez Yarbay indicated that AKP should solve the problem and the new Penal Code should be legislated immediately. By emphasizing the possible ramifications of derailing EU accession process, he also indicated that if this problem won't be solved the AKP might be blamed.⁴⁰⁰ Similarly, AKP member Burhan Kuzu argued that the EU is against the re-criminalization of adultery and it was pointless to include it within the new Penal Code.⁴⁰¹

During its first term in office, AKP's stance on women's rights and gender equality was another litmus test for assessing both party's claimed difference from pro-Islamic political parties that belong to NOM and also its genuine adherence to democratic principles. Therefore, compared to previous political parties that represented NOM movement, in its party program, AKP explicitly promised to make necessary amendments regarding women's rights and gender equality. In line with the Party Program, AKP government made significant legislative and regulative amendments which significantly improved the women's rights and gender equality score card of Turkey. One of the most comprehensive legislative amendments made in this respect was the Penal Code reform, which introduced significant improvements regarding women's rights and gender equality. Nevertheless, as the preceding analysis of this reform process in general and adultery debate in particular showed, AKP's stance on women's rights and gender equality was also informed by its moral political rationality prioritizing family institution and women's care-giver maternal roles.

The case of Penal Code legislation in general and adultery in particular, indicates that due to the low level of party institutionalization, AKP chose to withdraw its proposal on adultery rather than pushing for its adultery clause. Detailed analysis of intra party politics further reveals the effects of the lack of organizational cohesiveness and

⁴⁰⁰ "Gözler Onda," *Sabah*, September 23, 2004, accessed, October 10, 2016, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/09/23//siy102.html>

⁴⁰¹ "AKP'li Kuzu: Zina Düzenlemesi Anlamsız," *Hürriyet*, Eylül, 20, 2004, accessed, October 20, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/akpli-kuzu-zina-duzenlemesi-anlamsiz-38648452>

leadership control over party organization on policy-making process. Both among higher echelons of the party and within parliamentary group there is a fierce battle between conservative party members coming from NOM movement and members with more liberal tendencies. Although initially the party leadership sidelined with conservative faction within the party organization and pushed for including adultery clause within Penal Code, liberal faction prioritized the possible ramifications of the adultery proposal for EU accession process. In the end, strong pressure coming from EU side tilted internal balance of power within the party organization to the benefit of liberal faction.

Regarding the external dimension of party institutionalization, while the AKP instrumentalized the EU accession process to further improve its decisional autonomy *vis-à-vis* extra-parliamentary veto players such as military, presidency and high judiciary, regarding the case of adultery, the EU became a political liability structure which constrained AKP leadership's efforts to embrace an explicit cause dear to its conservative core constituency with the adultery proposal. Furthermore, a highly institutionalized and effective coalition of women's NGOs also remained as an important external constraint significantly publicizing the party's adultery proposal through the media, which remained highly skeptical of AKP's claimed difference from past pro-Islamic political parties that represent NOM.

To sum up, the case of Penal Code reform clearly shows the limits of AKP's neoliberal and liberal-juridical rationalities and shows that since its establishment, party's stance on women's rights and gender equality was informed by party's moral-political rationality. Furthermore, the Penal Code legislation process clearly shows that the main reason for AKP's withdrawal of adultery clause and legislating a highly progressive legislation in terms of women's rights and gender equality were due to party's low level of systemness and decisional autonomy rather than being a product of party's strong adherence to gender mainstreaming. Regarding EU effect on the party, the case of adultery stands out as a clear case of EU induced party change. Strong criticisms and possibility of a 'no' verdict for opening of accession negotiations not only led to a significant internal debate but also solidified opposition externally by leading to what

Ladrech conceptualizes as ‘unintended politicization’. Following strong backlash from EU, the party forced to change its solid stance on adultery.

6.3 THE AKP’S STANCE ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND GENDER EQUALITY BETWEEN 2008 AND 2013

Starting from its second term in office, AKP’s discourse and policies regarding women’s rights and gender equality further shifted towards family mainstreaming. Evidently, right from beginning, the strengthening and protecting the family institution constituted one of the central pillars of moral-political rationality embedded in its ideology conceptualized as conservative democracy. Nevertheless, starting from its second term in office, both at discursive level and at policy level, AKP increasingly prioritized strengthening family over women’s rights and gender equality by emphasizing and consolidating women’s care-giver maternal roles within the institution of family. This changing stance was further intensified and complemented by AKP’s pro-natalist turn starting from its second term.

While delineating a clear demarcation point is not an easy task, one manifestation of this shift in party’s stance regarding women’s rights and gender equality at a discursive level was AKP leadership’s remarks on gender equality. In July 2010, during a meeting with leaders of women’s NGOs, the then Prime Minister Erdoğan asserted that men and women are not equal and different in nature, and they ought to complement one another rather than competing for equal treatment. Furthermore Erdoğan declared that “he did not believe in equality between women and men” but rather “supported equality of opportunity”.⁴⁰² On another occasion, Erdoğan asserted that he did not believe in the equality of men and women and implied that women’s principle and preferably sole

⁴⁰² These statements were made during a meeting with leaders of the women’s organizations, issues and problems of gender inequality were brought up and women activists expressed their concern about the consistent and exclusive stress on motherhood and women’s role within the family in his speeches. They explicitly asserted their wish that the Prime Minister give more active support to the realization of this goal by emphasizing gender equality in his speeches. See, “Kadınla Erkek Eşit Olamaz,” *Vatan*, June, 20, 2010, accessed, November 13, 2016, <http://www.gazetevatan.com/-kadinla-erkek-esit-olamaz---318006-siyaset/>

vocation-home making and motherhood- accords, he claimed with their biological and divinely ordained nature (*fitrat*).⁴⁰³

These statements were in direct contradiction with the constitutional amendments during AKP's first term. Another symbolic yet illuminating change which further signifies AKP's prioritization of family over women was its decision to change the name of the 'State Ministry Responsible for Women and Family' to 'Ministry of the Family and Social Policies' in 2011. Furthermore, the General Directorate of Women's Status and Problems (KSGM) was incorporated under the Ministry of the Family and Social Policies.⁴⁰⁴ Strong reactions from women's NGOs felt on deaf ears and the then Prime Minister Erdoğan defended the change by stating that 'as a conservative democratic party the family was important for them.'⁴⁰⁵ Another manifestation of AKP's prioritization of strengthening the institution of family over women's rights and gender equality was party's stance on endemic problem of violence against women and domestic violence. In fact during its second and third term, AKP's commitment to improving existing legislation and efforts to develop policies in line with contemporary international standards to combat violence against women was portrayed as noteworthy.⁴⁰⁶ Nevertheless, party's attempt to exclude violence beyond familial borders from the new legislation received strong opposition from women's NGOs and stands out as another manifestation of family centered approach regarding violence against women.⁴⁰⁷ AKP's family mainstreaming discourse was also apparent in the

⁴⁰³ See, "Erdoğan: Kadın-Erkek Eşitliği Fıtrata Ters," *BBC*, November 24, 2014, accessed, November 13, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/11/141124_kadininfitrati_erdogan

⁴⁰⁴ General Directorate of Women's Status and Problems (KSGM) was established in 1991 as a requirement of the CEDAW process to act as a national machinery tasked with monitoring gender equality. During AKP's first term a wide range of women's NGOs were incorporated in policy formulation and in lobbying activities through the KSGM.

⁴⁰⁵ The women's NGOs strongly opposed to the AKP government's attempt and over three thousand signatures against the change were sent to Prime Ministry. See, "Kadın Bakanlığı Kaldırıldı, Kadın Örgütleri Öfkeli," *Bianet*, June 11, 2011, accessed, October 21, 2016, <http://bianet.org/bianet/kadin/130585-kadin-bakanligi-kaldirildi-kadin-orgutleri-ofkeli>

⁴⁰⁶ In that regard, AKP's active support in the drafting and adoption of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) followed by ratification of this instrument without reservations received positive feedback and raised expectations.

⁴⁰⁷ "Kadın'ı Koruyan Yasa İstiyorlar "Aile"yi Değil," *Bianet*, March 7, 2012, accessed, October 21, 2016, <http://bianet.org/bianet/toplumsal-cinsiyet/136737-kadini-koruyan-yasa-istiyorlar-aileyi-degil>. For a comparison between the draft law prepared in collaboration with women's NGOs, and AKP government's proposal see, "Yine Kadın Değil Aile Korundu," *Bianet*, March 1, 2012, accessed, October 21, 2016, <http://bianet.org/bianet/toplumsal-cinsiyet/136608-yine-kadin-degil-aile-korundu>

statements of some party members during the Parliamentary General Council proceedings on the new legislation.⁴⁰⁸

In addition to the party's changing discourse and policy proposals, policy-making process was another manifestation of party's changing stance regarding women's rights and gender equality. While the initial official party documents such as Party Program and Government Programs show AKP's explicit aim to collaborate and consult women's NGOs during policy making process, aforementioned analysis of Penal Code reform indicates that party's relationship with women's NGOs was far from plain sailing. Nevertheless, the AKP gave in to the demands of women's NGOs thanks to the space of opportunity opened up for women's NGOs through vital EU accession process. Starting from its second term, the picture of such a reluctant collaboration turned into further marginalization of women's NGOs from the policy making process. As the detailed analysis would argue below, AKP's attempt at banning abortion and its policies related with women's employment, the party increasingly marginalized and sidelined women's NGOs.⁴⁰⁹ A clear manifestation of this was the legislation process of the aforementioned Law on the Protection of the Family and the Prevention of Violence against Women. While the Ministry of Family and Social Policies initially consulted with leading women's NGOs, at the end, the draft law that prepared in collaboration with them was put aside by the AKP government.⁴¹⁰ Some women activists also

⁴⁰⁸ For example, AKP MP Ramazan Can criticized other MP's emphasis on women and asserted that 'family is the basis of Turkish societal structure and without family there won't be women and men'. Another manifestation of AKP's stance on women's rights and gender equality was his statements on positive discrimination. Ramazan Can stated that 'we should refrain from harming the integrity of family through our attempts on positively discriminating against women. Woman's rights as an individual is important to keep the integrity of family' See, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (TGNA Proceedings Review)* 75. *Birleşim*, Period:22, Legislative Year:2, Vol.15, 7 March 2012, accessed 21 October 2016 <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil2/bas/b075m.htm>

⁴⁰⁹ The lack of collaboration and marginalization of women's NGOs was both present in subsequent EU Commission Progress Reports and in 2010 and 2012. See, *European Commission, Turkey 2010 Progress Report SEC(2010) 1327*, (Brussels, 9 November 2010) accessed, October 22, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf. For CEDAW Shadow Reports prepared by the CEDAW Civil Society Steering Committee which is a coalition of women's NGOs see, M.Negron-Gonzales, "The Feminist Movement during the AKP era in Turkey: Challenges and Opportunities," *Middle Eastern Studies* 52, no.2 (2016), 207.

⁴¹⁰ In fact, the initial title of the law that was prepared in collaboration with women's NGOs was 'Law on Protection of Women and Family Members'. Nevertheless the one that was promulgated was titled as 'Law on the Protection of Family and the Prevention of Violence'. The naming of the law also indicates AKP's prioritization of family over women's rights and gender equality. On the reactions of women's NGOs to the legislation see, "Bizim Tasarımız Neden Değişiyor," *Hürriyet*, March 2, 2012, accessed, October 25, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/bizim-tasarimiz-neden-degisiyor-20038940>

indicated that AKP government increasingly sidelined with women's CSOs sympathetic to AKP.⁴¹¹

The significance of family as a defining element of AKP's conservatism was further amplified by party's shift towards pro-natalist policies during its second and third terms in office. One of the clearest manifestations of such a shift was the then Prime Minister Erdoğan's statements on the importance of having at least three children. On March 8th 2008, Erdoğan stated that as a precautionary step to alleviate the problem of ageing population, each family should have three children. The justification of such statement was made by emphasizing the importance of having a large young population for sustaining a healthy economy.⁴¹² Moreover, starting from AKP's second term, it became a standard for AKP leadership and other party members to congratulate the newlyweds and to ask the bride to promise that the union would produce 'at least three children'.⁴¹³

Although AKP's pro-natalist turn was justified mainly on the possible negative effects of ageing population on economic strength and global competitiveness of the country, starting from its third term, such pro-natalist discourse was increasingly justified with reference to AKP's conservative identity aiming to consolidate the integrity and strengthen the role of family as an institution. On January 2013, the then Prime Minister Erdoğan stressed the importance of having at least three children for the strength of the family. Within the same speech he also indicated that 'as a conservative democratic party they believe that the position that glorifies women is motherhood.'⁴¹⁴ Increasing references to the importance of women's care-giver maternal roles were further supported with religious statements. On several occasions, AKP leadership reiterated Prophet's saying: 'heaven is beneath the feet of mothers.'⁴¹⁵ As the following sections on party's position on abortion and women's employment will show, such a pro-natalist

⁴¹¹ M.Negron-Gonzales, "The Feminist Movement during the AKP era in Turkey: Challenges and Opportunities," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 52, no.2 (2016), 207.

⁴¹² "Ak Parti Genel Başkanı ve Başbakan Erdoğan 8 Mart Dünya Kadınlar Günü Etkinliğinde Konuştu," *Ak Party Official Web Site*, March 7, 2008, accessed, October 26, 2016, <https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/ak-parti-genel-baskani-ve-basbakan-erdogan-8-mart-dunya-kadinlar-gunu-etkin/2768#1>

⁴¹³ "Başbakan: En az 3 Çocuk Yapın," *Hürriyet*, May 10, 2010, accessed, October 26, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/basbakan-en-az-3-cocuk-yapin-14675983>

⁴¹⁴ "Aileye Saldırıya Müsamaha Göstermeyiz," *Ak Party Official Web Site*, January 2, 2013, accessed, October 26, 2016, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/aileye-saldiriya-musamaha-gostermeyiz/35859#1>

⁴¹⁵ "Aileye Saldırıya Müsamaha Göstermeyiz," *Ak Party Official Web Site*, 2 January 2013

discourse increasingly feeds back into AKP's policy proposals regarding women's rights and gender equality.

6.3.1 AKP's Stance on Abortion: Continuity and/or Change?

Another manifestation of AKP's pro-natalist shift was the party's insistence on bringing restrictions on abortion through legislation.⁴¹⁶ Party's anti-abortion stance dates back to 2003 when it tried to amend the existing Law on Rights of the Disabled. The new draft law included a clause that aimed to bring restrictions on abortions carried out for medical reasons.⁴¹⁷ The AKP's proposed draft Law on the Rights of the Disabled aimed at prohibiting the termination of pregnancy after ten weeks in cases where the fetus was assessed as having grave physical and /or mental disability. The proposed legal amendment started up a public debate on the issue of abortion for the first time since its legalization in 1983. The proposed clause on abortion signified the sacredness and immunity of right to life of the baby as the main rationale behind the amendment.⁴¹⁸ The debate on abortion also continued within the Parliamentary Sub-Commission on New Turkish Penal Code.⁴¹⁹ Although the debate on abortion continued for several months against strong opposition from women's NGOs, doctors, medical associations, and opposition parties, AKP decided to withdraw its proposal on abortion and the existing legal framework for abortion remained in place.⁴²⁰ Following its third electoral victory in 2011, AKP's anti-abortion stance again came to the forefront following the then Prime Minister Erdoğan's statements on abortion and caesarean sections in 2012.

⁴¹⁶ In Turkey, abortion has been legal since 1983 with some restrictions regarding the timing and permission of the spouse. Existing regulative framework allows women to terminate a pregnancy in the first 10 weeks.

⁴¹⁷ The Population Planning Law which was effective (and still is) allowed for abortion up to ten weeks on demand and after ten weeks, when the mother's health was in danger, or when it was assessed that the baby had serious health problems with grave physical and/or mental defect.

⁴¹⁸ The then State Minister Responsible for Women and Family Güldal Akşit defended the proposal by indicating that she personally completely opposed to abortion except in cases where mother's life is in danger and a decision on abortion should be made by doctors. See, 'Özürlü Bebeğe Kürtaj Yasasına Büyük Tepki' *Hürriyet* 9 November 2003, accessed 29 October 2016 <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ozurlu-bebege-kurtaj-yasagina-buyuk-tepki-182318>

⁴¹⁹ During the proceedings in the Commission, AKP defended to amend the existing regulative framework on abortion both by including the consent of the men on decision for abortion and decreasing the time limit for abortion to eight weeks. During the debates on Parliamentary Commission Güldal Akşit defended the AKP's proposal on moral and religious grounds by indicating that 'nobody other than Allah should end a life given by Allah. See, "Meclis'de Kürtaj Savaşları," *Internethaber*, November 12, 2003, accessed, October 29, 2016, <http://www.internethaber.com/meclisde-kurtaj-savaslari-1045740h.htm>

⁴²⁰ <http://www.ttb.org.tr/TD/TD116/10.php>

On May 25th, 2012, during a speech at the Fifth International Parliamentarian's Conference on the Implementation of the ICPD (International Conference on Population and Development) Program of Action the then AKP leader and Prime Minister Erdoğan equalized abortion with murder and indicated that 'there is no difference between killing the child in mother's womb and killing her after the birth.' This was the first time that AKP leadership explicitly touched upon the issue of abortion. Erdoğan restated his position on abortion more vigorously at the AKP Women's Branch Meeting on May 26th, 2012 and denoted that 'each abortion is Uludere'⁴²¹, again implying that abortion is nothing but murder. In addition to his negative stance on abortion Erdoğan also indicated that he is also against cesarean sections.⁴²²

Following his statements on abortion and caesarean section, Erdoğan strongly asserted that his government will propose a new legislation on abortion and indicated that "this had a place within their values and they could not permit that."⁴²³ The issue of abortion was brought up during the Central Decision-Making and Executive Committee (CDEC) meeting of AKP following Prime Minister's statements and all the members of the CDEC defended Party leadership's negative stance on abortion and defended party leadership from a moral perspective by emphasizing that after four weeks, abortion is a murder against babies' right to life.⁴²⁴ Following AKP leadership's comments on abortion and cesarean sections, the Minister of Health announced that a legal regulation may be introduced and implied that even in the cases of rape abortion should be prohibited.⁴²⁵

While there were some AKP members who opposed the party leadership's anti-abortion discourse, they remained largely marginal compared to the unified negative stance of

⁴²¹ Uludere is the place of an incident where 34 Kurdish villagers were killed by the Turkish Armed Forces.

⁴²² The then Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that: "I am a Prime Minister who opposes caesarean births; I know all this is being done on purpose. I know these are steps taken to prevent this country's population from growing further. I see abortion as murder, and I call upon those circles and members of media who oppose my comments: You live and breathe Uludere. I say every abortion is Uludere..." See, "Her Kürtaj Bir Uluderedir," *Ak Party Official Web Site*, May 26, 2012, accessed, October 29, 2016, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/her-kurtaj-bir-uluderedir/26513#1>

⁴²³ "Kürtaj Yasası Çıkartacağız," *Hürriyet*, May 30, 2012, accessed, November 1, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kurtaj-yasasi-cikartacagiz-20654033>

⁴²⁴ "Kürtaj Yasası Çıkartacağız," *Hürriyet*, 30 May 2012

⁴²⁵ Recep Akdağ stated that: "...Given our political position, we put the emphasis on the baby's right to live...People are asking about cases in which mother has been through something bad. If necessary, the state will look after such babies. If we were to pass a law that will call for tougher restrictions on abortion, we definitely have to take some complementary measures." See, "State to Take Care of Babies Born Out of Rape," *Hürriyet Daily News*, May 31, 2012, accessed, November 1, 2016, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/state-to-take-care-of-babies-born-out-of-rape.aspx?pageID=238&nID=22017&NewsCatID=339>

the AKP MP's and party members on the issue of abortion and cesarean sections.⁴²⁶ In terms of policy framing, the then Prime Minister emphasized the babies' right to life and denounced existing framework on abortion and cesarean sections as deliberate attempts to wipe the nation from global stage. Furthermore, against strong opposition faced from women's NGOs on women's reproductive rights, Erdoğan asserted that they will continue to see the issue through the traditional maternal roles of women.⁴²⁷ Framing of AKP's negative stance on abortion and cesarean was multifaceted and involved justifications both based on normative justifications such as babies' right to life and rational justifications such as health and demographic trends. For example, the then Minister of Family and Social Policies Fatma Şahin indicated that the cesarean rates are significantly high compared to World Health Organization's recommended rates and these kinds of births carry health risks for mothers. With regard to abortion, she indicated that abortion should not be perceived as a substitute for birth control methods, as abortion in her own words 'is a violation of right to live.'⁴²⁸

The debate on abortion gained further momentum after the statements made by the President of Turkish Grand National Assembly Human Rights Commission who indicated that 'abortion is a crime against humanity' and 'any intervention against a life in the womb should be banned without regard for the women trimester.'⁴²⁹ The AKP's position was further amplified by the President of Directorate of Religious Affairs who confirmed party's stance on matching abortion with murder by stating that Islam considers the fetus to be a separate human being.⁴³⁰ The then Deputy Prime Minister and one of the founding members of AKP Bülent Arınç made the most implicit

⁴²⁶ Nusra Memecan, as a woman MP from the AKP stated that she is against a possible ban on abortion. "Ak Parti'li Memecan: Kürtaj Yasaklanmasın," *Milliyet*, June 12, 2012, accessed, October 3, 2016, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/ak-parti-li-memecan-kurtaj-yasaklanmasin-siyaset-1550936/>

⁴²⁷ "Erdoğan: 'Benim Bedenim' Diyenler Feminist," *NTV*, June 2, 2012, accessed, November 6, 2016, http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/erdogan-benim-bedenim-diyenler-feminist,dYdfRB4ul0uxKJHXthZiwA?_ref=infinite

⁴²⁸ Fatma Şahin also condemned 'those people for distancing themselves from science', by implying the women's NGOs which oppose the statements of Prime Minister on the grounds of reproductive rights of women. See, "Family Minister Backs PM on Abortion and Cesarean Births," *Hürriyet Daily News*, May 27, 2012, accessed, November 4, 2014, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/family-minister-backs-turkish-pm-on-abortion-caesarean-births-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=21684&NewsCatID=338>

⁴²⁹ In an interview Üstün also stated that he is against abortion even in the case of rape by emphasizing that the criminal is the rapist not the baby. With regard to families' right to end pregnancies when the baby is disabled, Üstün indicated that there is no such right and even if the baby is disabled it is a human being and God will decide how long he should live. See, "Ban Proposal Adds Fire to Anti-abortion Debate," *Hürriyet Daily News*, May 29, 2012, accessed, November 5, 2016, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ban-proposal-adds-fire-to-raging-anti-abortion-debate.aspx?pageID=238&nID=21834&NewsCatID=339>

⁴³⁰ See, "Top Turkish Cleric Backs PM, Calls Abortion 'Murder'," *Hürriyet Daily News*, June 4, 2012, accessed, November 5, 2016, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/top-turkish-cleric-backs-pm-calls-abortion-murder-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=22336&NewsCatID=339>

statement on abortion within the framework of AKP's conservative identity by emphasizing that as a conservative democrat party, the protection of family and future generations is highly important for them and the issue of abortion should be discussed both from a medical and religious perspective. He also rejected women's organizations' and other opposition circles' emphasis on women's rights over their own bodies by indicating that it is religiously impermissible for women's to have rights on their own bodies.⁴³¹

Right after AKP leadership's statements on abortion and cesarean deliveries and possibility of a ban on abortion, both opposition parties and women's NGOs responded swiftly and vociferously by coordinating a successful protest campaign. Women's NGOs framed their response to AKP's anti-abortion stance as both a health issue and rights issue by indicating women's rights over their bodies. Additionally, women's NGOs strongly emphasized that a possible ban on abortion would contradict CEDAW and cause tensions between Turkey and the EU.⁴³² Against the women's organizations' efforts to emphasize reproductive rights and Turkey's obligations under international standards, AKP also used them to legitimize its negative stance on abortion and cesarean sections.⁴³³

The EU *acquis* does not include any specific standard for abortion and in some member states such as Ireland, the abortion is strictly restricted. While there were no EU standards on abortion, the legal time limit for abortion is higher in many of the member states compared to the existing ten weeks legal limit in Turkey. AKP generally used the current lack of a standard on abortion in the EU as a legitimizing factor against women's NGOs framing of their pro-abortion campaign by referring to contradictions

⁴³¹ "Boyner'in Kürtaj Çıkışına Arınç'tan Azar," *Milliyet*, June 15, 2012, accessed, November 5, 2016, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/boyner-in-kurtaj-cikisina-arinc-tan-azar-siyaset-1554183/>

⁴³² The protest campaign included petition circulated within internet which sent to Prime Ministry and Ministries. Additionally, women's NGOs also carried sit-in demonstrations in multiple cities. For a detailed analysis of women's NGOs campaign against abortion see, M.Negron-Gonzales, "The Feminist Movement during the AKP era in Turkey: Challenges and Opportunities," *Middle Eastern Studies* 52, no.2 (2016), 205.

⁴³³ For example the then Health Minister Recep Akdağ indicated that regarding cesarean deliveries Turkey is significantly above the EU standards. Similarly the then Minister of Family and Social Policies Fatma Şahin stated that "...cesarean section is a medical operation and should not exceed %15-20. This is the standard of both World Health Organization and European Union. Isn't the EU journey our most important standard? They say that cesarean section is a medical operation and should not exceed 20% in average." For Akdağ's statements see, "Gereklilik Dışında Yasaklanmalı," *Vatan*, May 31, 2012, accessed, November 10, 2016, <http://www.gazetevatan.com/-gereklilik-disinda-yasaklanmalı---454377-gunden/> For Şahin's statements see, "Bakan Şahin: "Kürtaj ve Sezaryen Konusunda Akıl ve Bilimin Dediği Uygulanacak", *Haberler*, May 20, 2012, accessed, November 10, 2016, <http://www.haberler.com/bakan-sahin-kurtaj-ve-sezaryen-konusunda-akil-ve-3665936-haberi/>

of AKP's proposal with CEDAW and EU.⁴³⁴ One clear manifestation of such instrumentalization of EU was the then EU Minister Egemen Bağış's statements in which he emphasized that there is no unified standard on abortion within the EU and there are several different legal restrictions on abortion within member states. By signifying women's NGOs, he stated that despite some quarters are enthusiastically trying to elevate domestic debates to the international level, with regard to abortion there is no rule on abortion in the EU.⁴³⁵

Despite the general public negative stance on abortion, the AKP government compelled to abandon its bill on abortion and cesarean sections due to the pressure it received from civil society organizations, especially women's NGOs. Nevertheless, AKP introduced a new regulation that limited the cesarean sections. With regard to abortion rather than a *de jure* limitation on abortion, there was a *de facto* limitation of abortion operations within state hospitals as many doctors stopped performing abortions for fear of reprisals.⁴³⁶

6.4 WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT

AKP's stance, discourse, and policy proposals regarding women's employment stand out as an interesting case to analyze shifting and conflicting rationalities of neoliberal-political rationality and moral-political rationality which are both embedded in party's ideology proposed as 'conservative democracy. As a natural corollary of party's neoliberal political rationality, within the Party Program, AKP implicitly declared its aim to improve women's economic participation through policies targeting harmonization of work/family life. Nevertheless, as the following analysis of policy proposals will show, the party's discourse and policy proposals for improving women's employment changed from progressive legislative amendments that aimed at improving women's participation in economic life towards more of a family mainstreaming which

⁴³⁴ M.Negron-Gonzales, "The Feminist Movement during the AKP era in Turkey: Challenges and Opportunities," *Middle Eastern Studies* 52, no.2 (2016), 205.

⁴³⁵ "Bağış: Kürtajla İlgili Çalışıyoruz," *Bianet*, June 8, 2012, accessed, November 10, 2016, <http://bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/138951-bagis-kurtajla-ilgili-calisiyoruz>

⁴³⁶ Mary Lou O'Neil, "The Availability of Abortion at State Hospitals in Turkey: A National Study," *Contraception* (2016).

increasingly prioritized women's domestic duties and their care-giver maternal roles. Furthermore, such shift in AKP's stance on women's employment was increasingly complemented by party's increasing emphasis on reproductive politics which rather than improving women's employment, prioritized women's care-giver maternal roles.

One of the most progressive legislation targeting women's employment was the 2003 Labor Law, which brought several improvements on women's work life and gender equality in workplace in line with the EU accession directives.⁴³⁷ An analysis of the legislative process of Labor Law indicates that AKP strongly supported the flexible work arrangements despite strong opposition it received from the main opposition party RPP. During the debates in Parliamentary General Council proceedings, AKP strongly referred to EU requirements on flexible work arrangements. Regarding work/family reconciliation, the gender specific improvements to the original Labor Law was mostly proposed by the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* CHP) and AKP took a collaborative stance.⁴³⁸ While the new Labor Law which became effective in 2003 was an important step in terms of legal gender equality in terms of employment and work/family reconciliation, the gender discrimination continued to remain as an endemic problem.

To combat gender discrimination in work place, in 2004, Turkish Prime Ministry issued the Circular on Observing Gender Equality Principles to combat gender bias during recruitment process.⁴³⁹ Furthermore, through a by-law issued in 2004 in line with the new Labor Law, workplaces employing 100-150 female workers were obliged to establish nursing rooms, while those with more than 150 female employees were obliged to establish day nurseries made up of a nursing room and childcare facility. In 2004, AKP also proposed a new amendment to Civil Servants Law, which increased parental leave to 16 weeks in total, 8 weeks before and 8 weeks after the pregnancy for civil servants. In parallel with the AKP's policy framing on 2003 Labor Law, the

⁴³⁷ The new Labor Law included the prohibition of discrimination based on sex in employment relations and lawful dismissal of women on the ground of pregnancy. The new law also included explicit reference to 'sexual harassment' as a valid reason to terminate a labor contract. Last but not least, with the new law female workers with a child below the age of 1 was granted 1.5 hours of paid nursery leave a day.

⁴³⁸ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (TGNA Proceedings Review)* 79. *Birleşim*, Period:22, Legislative Year:1, Vol.14, 14 May 2003, accessed 21 October 2016 <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem22/yil1/bas/b079m.htm>

⁴³⁹ The new circular included a recommendation to develop a gender-sensitive recruitment approach in state institutions, with measures to improve gender equality at work and the redistribution of tasks between men and women.

parliamentary proceedings for the amendments on maternity leave for civil servants also clearly show AKP's aim to increase women's employment through work/family reconciliation in line with the EU directives. The AKP strongly refer to the similar regulations on maternity leave within EU member states and refer to international agreements during the legislation process.⁴⁴⁰

During its first term in office, AKP's attempts to increase women's employment through work/family reconciliation policies faced pressure from employers' associations on the grounds that such policies would negatively affect women's employment due to increasing costs of recruitment. A clear example of such a process was the legislative attempt to introduce parental leave both as part of EU harmonization process and also as a part of AKP's strategy to improve women's employment through work/family reconciliation in line with its party program and election manifesto documents. In 2005, to comply with the EU directives on parental leave, a draft law was prepared by the KSGM to regulate parental leave provisions which aimed at introducing parental leave for men. While the women's NGOs supported the draft law, Confederation of the Unions for Turkish Employers (TISK) opposed to the new legislation by arguing that EU Directives on parental leave was a remedy for aging-population in the EU which is not a problem for Turkey.⁴⁴¹

During the debates in Parliamentary Commission, Güldal Akşit stated that the aim of the parental leave proposal was extending women's rights and to increase women's employment through reconciliation of work/family life in line with the international agreements such as CEDAW and EU directives.⁴⁴² Despite a certain level of consensus among political parties, women's NGOs, and other civil society organizations, the proposed amendment was dropped from the Parliamentary agenda due to the opposition of employer's associations.⁴⁴³ As Göksel suggests, apart from reactions of employer's associations, the draft law was also dropped due to a lack of will or inertia of some

⁴⁴⁰ The statements of AKP MP Zeynep Karahan Uslu are indicative of such framing. See, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (TGNA Proceedings Review) 115. Birleşim*, Period:22, Legislative Year:2, Vol.57, 14 July 2004, accessed 21 October 2016 <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem22/yil2/bas/b115m.htm>

⁴⁴¹ Cited in Saniye Dedeoğlu, Equality, Protection or Discrimination: Gender Equality Policies in Turkey, *Social Politics* 19, no.2 (2012): pp 269-290, p. 281

⁴⁴² "Çalışan Kadınlara Süt İzni...İlk 6 Ay içinde 3 Saat İzin Verilecek," *Memurlar.net*, March 9, 2005, accessed, November 20, 2016, <http://www.memurlar.net/haber/17555/>

⁴⁴³ *Ibid*

conservative party members.⁴⁴⁴ Contrary to the Güldal Akşit's emphasis on importance of parental leave for women's work and family life reconciliation, AKP MP Musa Uzunkaya asserted his wish of an economic condition in which women do not have to work and can perform their care-giver duties as mothers.⁴⁴⁵ This duality in terms of discourse regarding gender equality is a clear manifestation of both party's lack of internal cohesiveness regarding women's rights and gender equality and also it exemplifies the push and pull dynamics of neoliberal and conservative rationalities embedded within AKP's conservative democratic ideology.

While the AKP pushed for legislative amendments to improve women's employment through introducing flexible work arrangements and reconciliation of work and family life through regulations on maternity leave and child care services, following its second term in government, the party increasingly approached to the ongoing problem of women's employment from employer's perspective rather than gender perspective. One clear manifestation of such an approach was the new employment package proposed by AKP government on May 2008 which aimed to increase women's employment by decreasing the burdens of hiring women employees for private sector.⁴⁴⁶ The AKP's 'employment package' received strong opposition from women's NGOs which avowed that the new package was taking the existing regulation on child care backwards by lifting it and leaving it to the initiative of market forces.

Compared to its first term which marked by AKP's cooperative stance towards women's NGOs, during its second term the AKP government largely refrained from entering into dialogue with the women's NGOs during policy-making process regarding women rights and gender equality. Prior to the proposal of aforementioned 'employment package', women's organizations prepared a joint declaration as a

⁴⁴⁴ Asuman Göksel "Domestic Social Policy Change Due to the Pressures of European Integration: Equality between Women and Men at Work and Women's Employment Policies in Turkey." In Ipek Eren Vural editor, *Converging Europe: Transformation of Social Policy in the Enlarged European Union and in Turkey* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 247-275, p. 214.

⁴⁴⁵ "Çalışan Kadınlara Süt İzni...İlk 6 Ay içinde 3 Saat İzin Verilecek," *Memurlar.net*, March 9, 2005

⁴⁴⁶ The new amendment introduced tax reduction for those employers hiring new female employees. The tax exemption was of three years in duration, and applied to all women as well as young persons aged between 19 and 20. The package also amended the regulation that required provision of preschool childcare services for work places that hire more than 150 women workers and nursery rooms for nursing mothers for establishments that employ more than 100 women workers. The nursing room and preschool childcare requirement for employers were lifted and the new amendment enabled establishments to outsource such services from private sector.

response to the recommendations of TISK.⁴⁴⁷ The final ‘employment package’ did to a large extent resemble the policy recommendations of TISK and was on the opposite direction of women’s NGOs’ proposals. Apart from AKP’s reluctance to take into consideration the women’s NGOs recommendations on the proposal, the issued ‘employment package’ was also in contradiction with EU recommendations on work/family reconciliation in which provision of childcare services constitute a significant part.⁴⁴⁸

During its third term in office, AKP further changed its discourse and policy proposals regarding women’s employment. This shift in party’s discourse and policy proposals coincided with AKP’s increasing emphasis on reproductive politics. Consequently, AKP’s pro-natalist discourse further complement and amplify party’s discourse regarding the indispensability and importance of family institution which has been one of the defining characteristics of party’s moral-political rationality. Consequently, during its third term in office, AKP’s discourse and policy proposals that target women’s employment increasingly shifted towards family mainstreaming which entailed stronger emphasis on traditional division of labor in the domestic sphere and amplification of women’s care-giver maternal roles. As Fougner and Kurtoğlu argue the concept of work-family reconciliation increasingly treated ‘as something that concerns women only and the family component was clearly prioritized for women’.⁴⁴⁹

A clear manifestation of such a shift regarding AKP’s stance on women’s employment and work-family reconciliation was the so called ‘female employment package’ prepared in 2013.⁴⁵⁰ AKP’s proposal included significant increase in maternity leave,

⁴⁴⁷ While, the policy recommendations of TISK were centered on increasing private employment agencies, flexible employment strategies, and tax reductions to give incentives to employers in hiring women employees, joint declaration of women’s NGOs centered on elimination of gender-based discrimination, provision of employment quotas, and publicly funded childcare for women in public and private sectors. See, Saniye Dedeoğlu, “Equality, Protection or Discrimination: Gender Equality Policies in Turkey,” *Social Politics* 19, no.2 (2012), 281.

⁴⁴⁸ One of the most significant framework strategies regarding women’s employment is European Employment Strategy (EES) of 1997. EES included the promotion of gender equality in employment and pay as apriority for action under the fourth pillar of “equal opportunities”. This has also included concern with work-family reconciliation. Since then, the EU has operated with targets both for female labor force participation and provision of child care facilities. For example, in 2002, the EU established the targets being provided to 33% of children under 3 years of age and 90% of children between 3 years and mandatory school age by 2010. See, Tore Fougner and Ayça Kurtoğlu, “Gender Policy: a case of Instrumental Europeanization,” in *The Europeanization of Turkish Public Policies: A Scorecard* eds. Aylin Güney and Ali Tekin (New York: Routledge, 2016), 143-144.

⁴⁴⁹ Tore Fougner and Ayça Kurtoğlu, “Gender Policy: a case of Instrumental Europeanization,” 157.

⁴⁵⁰ As the policy proposal of the party followed AKP leadership’s persistent request on families to have at least three children, the employment package framed as ‘three children package’ or ‘fertility package’ in the mainstream media.

parental leave, allowance for mothers to work part-time with full salary for a period after maternity leave, as well as allowances per child and/or childcare subsidies to families. Compared to the aforementioned ‘employment package’ passed during AKP’s second term in office, the proposed improvements signify clear shifts in terms of party’s stance on increasing women’s employment.

Despite the fact that some of the proposed amendments such as maternity leave, parental leave, and childcare provisions were in line with the EU directives and EU Commission’s recommendations on improving women’s employment, AKP’s framing of its ‘employment package’ clearly shows a discourse which directly falls to the opposite direction. In fact, the party strongly prioritized the problem of decreasing fertility rates over improvement of women’s employment. The then Minister of Family and Social Policies Fatma Şahin’s statements on the new proposal, which centered on the importance of work-family reconciliation for increasing the fertility rate is a clear manifestation of such prioritization of reproductive politics over improving women’s employment.⁴⁵¹ Moreover, she also emphasized the significance of the institution of family by emphasizing the place of family within AKP’s ideology presented as conservative democracy.⁴⁵² In parallel, the then Minister of Labor and Social Security Faruk Çelik also asserted that the aim of the new employment package was to maintain ‘the continuation of future generations’.⁴⁵³ To counter the opposition they received from employers’ associations and women’s NGOs, Fatma Şahin defended the proposal by indicating that the aim of the proposal is both to increase the presence of women in economic life and also ‘to ease the way for women to fulfill their God given task and responsibility of motherhood’.⁴⁵⁴

In this respect, contrary to its policy framing regarding increasing women’s employment during its first and second term, in its third term party’s policy framing of its new ‘female employment package’ explicitly prioritized reproductive politics over

For such a coverage see, “3 Çocuk Paketi Tamam,” *Dünya*, June 25, 2013, accessed, November 25, 2016, <http://www.dunya.com/ekonomi/3-cocuk-paketi-tamam-haberi-215509>

⁴⁵¹ “Babalara da Süt İzni Geliyor,” *Akşam*, February 28, 2013, accessed, November 26, 2016, <http://www.aksam.com.tr/guncel/babalara-da-sut-izni-geliyor/haber-173108>

⁴⁵² *Ibid*

⁴⁵³ “Neslin Devamı Lazım,” *Hürriyet*, September 23, 2013, accessed, November 25, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/neslin-devami-lazim-24766212>

⁴⁵⁴ “Çocuğu Babaya Göstermeyen Anneye Ceza,” *Milliyet*, November 5, 2013, accessed, November 25, 2016, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/cocugu-babaya-gostermeyen-anneye/gundem/detay/1787193/default.htm>

women's employment. Such policy framing also clearly illustrates the prevalence of party's moral-political rationality which entails the explicit aim of protecting and strengthening the institution of family and consolidating the traditional division of labor within domestic sphere, which overprotects women as mothers.

In terms of policy making, the domestic debates on 'female employment package' also reveal AKP's increasing disinclination to collaborate and include women's NGOs within policy-making process regarding women's rights and gender equality. Many of the women's NGOs clearly opposed to AKP's proposal and strongly asserted that the party did not consult or cooperate with them during the preparatory phase of the proposal and demanded that the 'employment package' should be reassessed in collaboration with women's NGOs.⁴⁵⁵ Additionally, various employer associations such as TISK strongly emphasized the possible negative effects of the proposal on employer's decision to hire women employees due to the extensive maternity leave arrangements and other additional costs. Against these reactions, AKP instrumentally used the references from EU member states to defend their proposal. One clear manifestation of such an instrumentalization was the strong emphasis on regulations regarding maternal leave within EU member states to counter the opposition to the proposal from employers' associations. Additionally, against women's NGOs reactions directed towards party's positive stance on flexible work arrangements, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies strongly emphasized the EU directives and examples from EU member states such as France.

The preceding analysis of AKP's policies and discourse also shows increasing prioritization of family mainstreaming, which emphasizes women's care-giver maternal roles over gender mainstreaming. Following progressive legislations and administrative regulations that target increasing levels of women's employment, starting from its second term, party's stance on women's employment was increasingly informed by its moral-political rationality which over-protects women as mothers and aims to strengthen the institution of family. Increasing prevalence of discourse and policy proposals signaling family mainstreaming were further amplified by AKP's pro-natalist turn, which further complemented party's explicit discourse that emphasized women's

⁴⁵⁵ "Kadınlar İstihdam Paketinin Yeniden Yazılmasını İstedi," *Bianet*, November 4, 2013, accessed, November 25, 2016, <http://bianet.org/biamag/kadin/151039-kadinlar-istihdam-paketinin-yeniden-yazilmasini-istedi>

care-giver maternal roles and its prioritization of family mainstreaming over gender mainstreaming in the field of women's economic participation.

6.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter aimed to analyze AKP's changing stance on women's rights and gender equality as a case indicative of party's ideological shift. While at policy level we see highly progressive attempts that point towards gender mainstreaming during its first term in office, detailed analysis of Penal Code reform and AKP's attempts to include a clause for re-criminalizing adultery clearly demonstrate that parties stance on women's rights and gender equality was both informed by its neoliberal and liberal-juridical rationalities and moral-political rationality. Nevertheless, low levels of party institutionalization forced party to withdraw its policy proposals which are indicative of its moral-political rationality and led to significant progressive/gender mainstreaming legislative amendments. Additionally, preceding analysis also shows that both in terms of policy-making and policy-framing, starting from its second term, AKP's stance on women's rights and gender equality increasingly informed by its moral-political rationality which led to increasing emphasis and prevalence of family mainstreaming at both discursive and policy levels. In that regard, rather than standing out as a case that involves an ideological change, party's changing stance on women's rights and gender equality stands as a case that demonstrates an adaptive/strategic shift caused by changing levels of party's institutionalization.

Considering the external dimensions of party institutionalization, AKP's low level of decisional autonomy and low level of reification/support forced it to strategically deprioritize its moral-political rationality. In terms of level of decisional autonomy, AKP was strongly constrained by highly vital and institutionalized coalition of women's NGOs which successfully publicized policies and discourses of the party through a vibrant mainstream media which was to a large extent skeptical of party's strong emphasis on its 'difference' and 'detachment' from pro-Islamic political parties that belong to NOM. In that regard, women's NGOs were the main actors which significantly constrained AKP's decisional autonomy regarding women's rights and

gender equality. Apart from the presence of highly institutionalized and active women's NGOs, AKP's promised adherence to gender mainstreaming was an important parameter on its claimed difference from NOM and as a highly significant source for increasing its level of external legitimacy. In such a domestic context, AKP reluctantly cooperated with women's NGOs during its first term in office. In terms of intra-party dimensions of party institutionalization, party's lack of organizational cohesiveness and low levels of leadership control over the party organization was manifest during the Penal Code reform. While the conservative party members strongly pushed for adultery clause more liberal party members preferred to work collaboratively with the opposition and conclude the legislation process of the Penal Code.

Furthermore, highly vital EU accession process and effective EU conditionality severely constrained party leadership which tried to respond to the demands of its core conservative constituency. Thus, the party's policy-seeking goal of adding the adultery clause significantly contradicted with EU norms, values, and policy paradigms. Eventually, strong reactions that AKP received from the EU level created a political liability structure for the party leadership through both external and internal 'unintended politicization'.

Adultery case reveals that the prospects of EU induced party change becomes significantly higher for political parties with low levels of party institutionalization. First and foremost, in terms of party's decisional autonomy, highly vital EU accession process created an important space of opportunity for women's NGOs which increased their power *vis-à-vis* AKP government. Therefore, EU indirectly further constrained AKP's decisional autonomy domestically. More significantly, starting accession negotiations with EU was highly important for AKP for improving its external legitimacy (reification/support) and increasing its prospects for organizational survival. In that regard there was a strong trade-off between its party specific goals of policy-seeking (re-criminalization of adultery) and organizational survival.

Considering intra-party indicators of party institutionalization AKP's lack of organizational cohesiveness led to strong intra-party debate following EU's signal for a possibility of a 'no' verdict for opening accession negotiations. The strong reaction that the party received from EU regarding its attempt for re-criminalization of adultery

created a space of opportunity for party members that are against of adding adultery clause to Penal Code, which tilted the intra-power balance more towards their advantage. They used EU accession process instrumentally to push for a withdrawal of adultery clause. To sum up, adultery stands out as a clear case of EU led party change. Moreover, the case of adultery shows that the prospects of EU induced party change remains higher for political parties with low levels of party institutionalization that compete in accession countries.

Starting from its second term in office, the changing levels of party's systemness and decisional autonomy led to a completely different picture in which AKP increasingly prioritize family mainstreaming over gender mainstreaming. Starting from its second term, party significantly increased its decisional autonomy *vis-à-vis* extra-parliamentary forces such as military and office of presidency. More importantly, AKP's reluctance to cooperate with women's NGOs was transformed into further exclusion and marginalization of women's NGOs, which was evident in policy-making processes during its second and third terms.

Additionally, decreasing effectiveness of EU conditionality due to deteriorating relations with EU, significantly constrained the space of opportunity for women's NGOs. Nevertheless, the cases of abortion and party's policy proposals for women's employment clearly show that despite decreasing effectiveness of EU conditionality policy, AKP continued to strategically use EU directives, targets, and examples from EU member states during policy-framing process of abortion and women's employment. AKP further improved its decisional autonomy through cooperating with women's NGOs which are ideologically closer to the party and also through increasing levels of domination of media landscape.

Regarding intra-party dimensions of party institutionalization, increasing levels of leadership control over the party organization and parliamentary group also significantly decreased the prospects of intra-party dissent towards AKP's family mainstreaming policies. In fact, party leadership's discourse on pro-natalist policies were strongly embraced by party organization and guided the AKP's policy-making and policy-framing processes regarding women's employment and abortion.

CHAPTER VII

FROM ECONOMICALLY COMPETITIVE AND SELF-RELIANT INDIVIDUALS TOWARDS SOCIALY ACCEPTABLE INDIVIDUALS: AKP's EDUCATION POLICIES

Education is one of the most prominent domains that political parties have utilized in order to indoctrinate the masses by utilizing certain discourses and ideologies.⁴⁵⁶ Therefore education, as a policy domain, stands out as a clear indicative of parties' ideological positions. As Inal suggests, parties that define themselves as liberal emphasized the instrumentality of education policy for economic development and increasing individuals' and countries' competitiveness in a globalized world. On the contrary, conservative political parties emphasize the cultural side of education.⁴⁵⁷ Although references vary from one party to another, conservative parties that are located within the right end of the political spectrum generally emphasize the significance of education on raising 'socially acceptable' citizens and enhancing social cohesion which is generally defined within nationalistic, religious, and religious/nationalistic parameters.⁴⁵⁸ Under neoliberalism the line between aforementioned ideological stances on education has become increasingly blurry and could be found under a peculiar combination which both includes liberal and conservative nuances.⁴⁵⁹

Right from the beginning, AKP prioritized and explicitly emphasized its aim to introduce significant changes both regarding formal education and higher education. AKP's discourse and policies on the sphere of education stand out as another

⁴⁵⁶ Ayhan Kaya, "Islamization of Turkey under the AKP Rule: Empowering Family, Faith and Charity," *South European Society and Politics* 20, no. 1 (2015), 55.

⁴⁵⁷ Kemal İnal, "Piyasa ve Muhafazakarlığın Elinde Araçsallaşan Eğitim." In *Himmet, Fitrat, Piyasa: AKP Döneminde Sosyal Politika*, edited by Meryem Koray and Aziz Çelik (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2015), 56.

⁴⁵⁸ *Idem*.

⁴⁵⁹ The push and pull dynamics of neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies regarding education, See Geoff Whitty, *Making Sense of Education Policy* (London: Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd, 2002).

manifestation of ideological change defined as; shifting prioritization between party's moral political rationality and neoliberal-political rationality, both embedded in party's ideology conceptualized as 'conservative democracy'. One of the core components of neoliberal political rationality involves strong emphasis on education's role on raising skilled individuals within a market economy and effects of sound education system on country's economic development and competitiveness.⁴⁶⁰ On the contrary, moral-political rationality emphasizes the role of education on enhancing social cohesion through raising socially 'acceptable' citizens. Therefore, rather than emphasizing education's role on economic development, moral political rationality entails strong emphasis on social role of education and treats education as a tool for raising socially acceptable individuals. These two conflicting rationalities are conceptualized by Roger Dale as 'conservative modernization'; which entails 'freeing individuals for economic purposes while controlling them for social purposes'.⁴⁶¹

The literature on AKP's education policies suggests that party's approach to education was informed by a specific combination of liberal, conservative, and Islamist elements.⁴⁶² The aim of this chapter is to scrutinize this conclusion by focusing on party's policies regarding education throughout its three terms by focusing on party's policies on vocational training, formal education, and higher education. In that regard, rather than providing a critical reevaluation of party's policies on education by analyzing its various aspects, this chapter will treat these policies as cases indicative of party's shifting prioritization between its neoliberal and moral-political rationalities.

The following analysis aims to open up the black box of the party and assess the effects of changing external and internal dynamics of party institutionalization on party's changing discourse and policies on formal and higher education. In terms of policy content, framing, and implementation processes, this chapter aims to show that policy

⁴⁶⁰ Stephen J. Ball succinctly summarizes the basic features of education policy informed by neoliberal political rationality. According to Ball an education policy configured on neoliberal economic premises entails the following traits: (1) sound education policy to target increasing international economic competition; (2) decreasing emphasis on education's cultural and social role; and (3) frequent and strong references to 'knowledge economy'. See Stephen J. Ball, *The Education Debate* (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2008).

⁴⁶¹ Roger Dale, cited in Geoff Whitty, *Making Sense of Education Policy* (London: Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd, 2002), 85.

⁴⁶² For a comprehensive review of AKP's education policy See, Kemal Inal and Güliz Akkaymak, eds., *Neoliberal Transformation of Education in Turkey: Political and Ideological Analysis of Educational Reforms in the Age of AKP* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) and Hülya Kosar Altinyelken, Kenan Çayır, and Orhan Agirdag, "Turkey at Crossroads: Critical Debates and Issues in Education," *Comparative Education* 51, no.4 (2015).

framing and implementation processes of the selected policies are indicative that starting from its third term, AKP's stance on education increasingly informed by its moral-political rationality. Additionally, this chapter aims to delineate mechanisms of EU induced party change in AKP's first term when the EU conditionality's effectiveness was significantly high. This will be complemented by an analysis of the party's instrumental usage of EU norms, values, and policy paradigms through tracing policy-framing processes to delineate changing party-based behavior against changing effectiveness of EU conditionality.

The first part of the chapter will focus on party's discourse and general approach concerning education within official party documents. Second section will trace the party's policy proposals regarding higher education by focusing on reform attempts on coefficient difference between vocational schools and regular secondary schools. Additionally, regarding formal education party's reform proposal on curriculum will be analyzed. The following section will analyze party's stance on vocational schools and formal education during its second and third terms by focusing on policy propositions, framing, and implementation.

7.1 EDUCATION WITHIN OFFICIAL PARTY DOCUMENTS: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?

In its Party Program, AKP strongly emphasized education's prominent role on country's economic development and competitiveness.⁴⁶³ Subsequently, the first Government Program explicitly emphasized party's aim to transform education system with an individual-centered perspective in a way that would be in line with the requirements of contemporary civilization and societal needs.⁴⁶⁴ Similarly, in its following Government Program, AKP again emphasized the importance of an education system free of ideological struggles that features quality education for raising individuals with

⁴⁶³ *AK Parti Demokratikleşme ve Kalkınma Programı* (Ak Party Democratization and Development Program) (Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları, 2002), accessed, September 10, 2015, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJITAL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITAPLAR/SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI/200205071%20AK%20PARTI%20DEMOKRATIKLESME%20VE%20KALKINMA%20PROGRAMI%202002/200205071%20AK%20PARTI%20DEMOKRATIKLESM E%20VE%20KALKINMA%20PROGRAMI%202002%200000_0116.pdf

⁴⁶⁴ *Ak Parti 58. Hükümet Programı* (AK Party 58th Government Program) accessed, September 10, 2015.

necessary competence and skills.⁴⁶⁵ Same kind of emphasis on education's economic role was also emphasized in its 2007 Election Manifesto, which re-emphasized the prominent role of education on increasing individual's life quality and improving country's economic competitiveness, stability, and welfare.⁴⁶⁶ In 2011 Election Manifesto party indicated that education is a life-long activity which increases the capacity of our human resource through equipping it with necessary tools to compete within contemporary world.⁴⁶⁷

The aforementioned liberal emphasis on the prominence of effective education system both for improving individuals' competences within a competitive market economy and for enhancing the economic competitiveness of the country was also complemented by AKP's explicitly stated aim for marketization and decentralization of education system. For example, as indicative of its neoliberal political rationality, the party recurrently emphasized its aim to increase the role of private sector in the formal and higher education through increasing number of private institutions and also enhancing the links between private sector and universities.⁴⁶⁸ Moreover, within its official party documents dating from 2002 to 2011, AKP also strongly emphasized its aim to increase the number and quality of vocational schools to meet the increasing need for competent individuals within labour market in general and specific sectors in particular.⁴⁶⁹ Last but not least, in its official documents AKP strongly emphasized the need for higher education reform to 'meet the growing societal needs for training up quality human potential required by knowledge economy, dispersing critical thinking and democratic values, and for strengthening the social structure.'⁴⁷⁰

As the preceding analysis of official party documents show, AKP's stance on education is to a large extent informed by its neoliberal political rationality with its strong emphasis on education as a tool to increase individual's competences within a market

⁴⁶⁵ *Ak Parti 59. Hükümet Programı* (AK Party 59th Government Program) accessed, September 10, 2015.

⁴⁶⁶ *Ak Parti 2007 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ak Party 2007 General Elections Election Manifesto) Ak Parti Tanıtım ve Medya Başkanlığı (February 2015) accessed, September 10, 2015.

⁴⁶⁷ *Ak Parti 2011 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ak Party 2007 General Elections Election Manifesto) Ak Parti Tanıtım ve Medya Başkanlığı (February 2015) accessed, September 10, 2015.

⁴⁶⁸ See, *AK Parti Demokratikleşme ve Kalkınma Programı* (Ak Party Democratization and Development Program); *Ak Parti 2007 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ak Party 2007 General Elections Election Manifesto); *Ak Parti 2011 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ak Party 2007 General Elections Election Manifesto)

⁴⁶⁹ See, *AK Parti Demokratikleşme ve Kalkınma Programı* (Ak Party Democratization and Development Program); *Ak Parti 2007 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ak Party 2007 General Elections Election Manifesto); *Ak Parti 2011 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ak Party 2007 General Elections Election Manifesto)

⁴⁷⁰ *AK Parti Demokratikleşme ve Kalkınma Programı* (Ak Party Democratization and Development Program)

economy and to increase the country's economic development. Nevertheless, the upcoming analysis including specific policies regarding education will demonstrate that following its second term, AKP's stance on education started to be increasingly informed by the party's moral-political rationality. Nevertheless before delving on detailed analysis of AKP's education policies, next section will briefly describe the formal and higher education system prior to 2002.

7.2 EDUCATION SYSTEM PRIOR TO AKP RULE

As Ayhan Kaya suggests, 'education is certainly the most delicate sphere that AKP and previous governments have utilized in order to indoctrinate the masses utilizing certain discourses, rhetoric, and ideologies.'⁴⁷¹ As part of such indoctrination, education also remained a battleground reflecting the dichotomy between secularism and religion within Turkish politics. Consequently, as a response to the rise of political Islam, during the so-called February 28 Process, education was one of the most prominent domains that the Military, in collaboration with other state institutions such as Higher Education Council, tried to marginalize religious schools and Islamic elements both within formal and higher education.

The culmination of this process regarding formal education was the introduction of eight year compulsory education system. The eight year compulsory education system closed down junior high grades (sixth, seventh, and eighth grades) of Imam-Hatip schools with all other vocational high schools. Regarding higher education, in 1999, the law on university entrance was amended. With the new law, the graduates of vocational high schools in general and Imam-Hatip graduates, in particular, were subjected to a lower coefficient during university entrance process. The new regulation drastically decreased the prospects of Imam-Hatip graduates for enrolling in higher education, leading to a substantial drop in the enrollment rate to such schools. Additionally, from 1997 to 1999, Higher Education Council Presidency made administrative amendments to further control the religious elements within higher education. The amendments made

⁴⁷¹ Ayhan Kaya, "Islamization of Turkey under the AKP Rule: Empowering Family, Faith and Charity," *South European Society and Politics* 20, no. 1 (2015), 55.

on disciplinary regulation of higher education administrators, faculty members, and staffs aimed at further marginalization of faculty members and other higher education staff with Islamic proclivities. One of the most significant manifestations of this process was the headscarf ban in universities. As part of the de-politicization process and protection of secular nature of campuses, the Higher Education Council started to implement the headscarf ban strictly, especially in public universities.⁴⁷²

When AKP came to power, changing the coefficient regulation that significantly decreased the prospects of entrance of Imam-Hatip graduates to universities was the most significant demand of party's core conservative constituency. More importantly, due to the institutional context that the party came to power, the status of Imam-Hatip schools was a litmus test for party's declared difference from NOM and its adherence to the principle of secularism enshrined in the Constitution. As the following policy based analysis will show; AKP, to a large extent, refrained from entering into direct confrontation with the extra-parliamentary veto players through framing its policies by prioritizing its neoliberal-political rationality over the moral-political rationality.

7.3 THE AKP'S DISCOURSE AND POLICIES ON EDUCATION BETWEEN 2003 AND 2007

During its first term, in line with its Party Program and Government Programs, AKP undertook significant steps to transform the formal education system and higher education. Throughout this period, party aimed at increasing the enrollment rates of schools by implementing projects such as 'Girls Lets Go to School' (*Haydi Kızlar Okula*), and prioritized the infrastructural problems of schools. As indicative of its neoliberal political rationality, the party also pushed forward for commodification of formal and higher education by increasing the number of private schools within both domains.⁴⁷³ Nevertheless, the party's attempts to change the curriculum of formal education and the lower coefficient applied to vocational schools in university entrance

⁴⁷² Fatma Nevra Seggie, "Academic and Cultural Experiences of Covered Women in Turkish Higher Education," *Comparative Education* 51, no.4 (2015), 5.

⁴⁷³ For a comprehensive analysis of recommodification process see, Kemal Inal and Güliz Akkaymak, eds., *Neoliberal Transformation of Education in Turkey: Political and Ideological Analysis of Educational Reforms in the Age of AKP* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

were the most debated policy based attempts regarding the domain of education. The following section will review these policy-based attempts by focusing on policy content, policy making, and framing.

7.3.1 Curriculum Reform

In terms of policy content, one of the most prominent steps that AKP took was to change the curriculum of the formal education, which had not been changed since 1968. Following its establishment, AKP strongly emphasized the need for a primary education reform. In its Party Program, it explicitly emphasized the need for a curriculum reform and stated that the primary education curriculum would be reconstructed in line with the requirements of our age and the needs of our students.⁴⁷⁴ The party re-emphasized its aim for a curriculum reform within the subsequent government programs. AKP began to work on new curriculum during 2003 and completed it in 2004. During 2004-2005 education period, the new curriculum was implemented in a pilot scale and in the following education period it was implemented nationwide.

In terms of policy making, the party extensively cooperated with civil society organizations and education experts during the preparation of the curriculum reform. The participatory policy-making process was emphasized by the then Minister of National Education (MoNE, hereafter) Hüseyin Çelik.⁴⁷⁵ The new curriculum reform basically aimed at introducing a student-centered pedagogy along with a constructivist paradigm. The AKP strongly criticized the old curriculum and its Newtonian approach to education. The MoNE Hüseyin Çelik stated that in the Newtonian system within the old curriculum, students were forced to say just black or white with a linear logic and the gray tones between the two were not shown.⁴⁷⁶ The new curriculum was proposed as a system based on constructivist framework that allows a ‘student centered approach’,

⁴⁷⁴ *AK Parti Demokratikleşme ve Kalkınma Programı* (Ak Party Democratization and Development Program), 73.

⁴⁷⁵ Hüseyin Çelik indicated that the preparation of curriculum reform was undertaken by considering the principle of participation and 37 civil society organizations’, 8 universities’, 53 academicians’, 26304 student’s viewpoints was taken into consideration during the preparatory process. See, “MEB’den İddialı Müfredat Değişikliği,” *Bianet*, 12 August 12, 2004, accessed, October 12, 2015, <https://bianet.org/bianet/egitim/40626-mebden-iddiali-mufredat-degisikligi>

⁴⁷⁶ “İlköğretim Müfredatı Açıklandı,” *Hürriyet*, August 11, 2004, accessed, September 7, 2015, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ilkogretim-mufredati-aciklandi-248507>

which diminishes the role of state, authority, hierarchy, positivism, and teacher centered framework within the primary education.⁴⁷⁷ In addition to new curriculum's student centered constructivist philosophy, the compulsory religion course was also changed and the new curriculum for the course was changed from 'learning religion' to 'learning about religion' and practices such as memorizing Islamic religious prayers were removed from the curriculum of the course.⁴⁷⁸

As Inal suggests, the new curriculum reform was closely related 'to training of the workforce, to meet the needs of international competition that has been enhanced by global market economy.'⁴⁷⁹ Thus, main rationale behind the curriculum reform was to increase individual's competences in global economy. Such liberal themes centered on increasing economic competitiveness, educating individuals with necessary skills to enable them competing in a liberal economy constituted the main components of the policy framing process. Nevertheless, the opposition against AKP's curriculum reform was centered on the possible effects of the new curriculum on eight year compulsory formal education system which was the culmination of February 28 process.

Against such opposition, AKP government defended the new curriculum reform as an attempt to make the curriculum more in line with the eight year compulsory formal education.⁴⁸⁰ The old curriculum was strongly criticized by the party as not sensitive to economy, science, technology, and democracy. The then MoNE Hüseyin Çelik argued that they aim to save the domain of education from ideology and direct it to path centered on science and rationality. As indicative of party's neoliberal-political rationality, the new curriculum was defended as a reform that aims to increase the critical thinking abilities of individuals rather than raising submissive individuals

⁴⁷⁷ For a detailed analysis of the new curriculum reform please see Hülya Koşar-Altinyelken and Güliz Akkaymak, "Curriculum Change in Turkey: Some Critical Reflections," in *Neoliberal Transformation of Education in Turkey: Political and Ideological Analysis of Educational Reforms in the Age of AKP*, eds. Kemal Inal and Güliz Akkaymak (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 59-70

⁴⁷⁸ "Sıra Üstü Namaz Dönemi Bitiyor," *Hürriyet*, July 11, 2004, accessed, October 12, 2015, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/sira-ustu-namaz-donemi-bitiyor-38623261>

⁴⁷⁹ Kemal Inal, Güliz Akkaymak, and Deniz Yıldırım, "Constructivist Curriculum Reform in Turkey in 2004- in fact what is constructed," *Journal for Critical Education Policies* 12, no.2 (August 2014), 360.

⁴⁸⁰ During the debates on the new curriculum reform, the then Minister of National Education Hüseyin Çelik stated that while the previous curriculum was prepared for five year compulsory education, with new curriculum reform, the primary education reform became more compatible with the eight year compulsory education system. See, "Çocuğa Demokrasi Kültürü Aşılacak," *Milliyet*, August 15, 2004, accessed, September 12, 2015, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/cocuga-demokrasi-kulturu-asilacak/siyaset/haberdetayarsiv/15.08.2004/42619/default.htm>

educated dogmatically.⁴⁸¹ Here it is important to note that the moral-political rationality which prioritizes social community and raising socially acceptable individuals is deprioritized against neoliberal-political rationality emphasizing education's role in increasing individual's competences and skills in a liberal market economy. To further counter the opposition against the government, which was centered on AKP's alleged implicit aim for weakening the eight year compulsory primary education; the party strongly emphasized the EU accession process to further increase the legitimacy of its curriculum reform proposal. On several occasions, the then MoNE Huseyin Celik emphasized that the curriculum reform was prepared by taking into consideration the EU standards.⁴⁸²

7.3.2 Vocational Schools

During its first term in government, the status of vocational schools constituted the main demarcation point between the party and extra-parliamentary veto players including Higher Education Council, the Office of Presidency, and the Military. The then existing regulative framework was designed during the so-called February 28 process to marginalize Imam-Hatip schools. Throughout its first term, reform regarding the status of Imam-Hatip graduates' status in university entrance process was a primary demand of party's core conservative constituency along with removing the ban on headscarf in higher education. After coming to power, AKP strongly emphasized its aim for prioritizing vocational schools without any particular references to Imam-Hatip schools. In its 2002 Party Program, the party explicitly pointed out the unequal nature of university entrance procedure and stated its aim to attain equality of opportunity for both formal high schools and vocational schools. Additionally, the party indicated its aim to improve the quality of education within vocational schools.⁴⁸³ Similarly, 2003 Government Program also indicates AKP's aim to amend the then existing unequal

⁴⁸¹ "Çocuğa Demokrasi Kültürü Aşılacak," *Milliyet*, August 15, 2004, accessed, September 12, 2015, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/cocuga-demokrasi-kulturu-asilanacak/siyaset/haberdetayarsiv/15.08.2004/42619/default.htm>

⁴⁸² *Idem*

⁴⁸³ *AK Parti Demokratikleşme ve Kalkınma Programı* (Ak Party Democratization and Development Program) (Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları, 2002).

procedure and enhance competitiveness between students enrolled in vocational schools and regular high schools.⁴⁸⁴

AKP's first attempt to change the university entrance procedure dates back to 2004. During the fierce debates on Higher Education Council reform, AKP added an additional clause to its reform proposal on Higher Education Council, which foresaw equal coefficients for vocational schools and regular high schools in parallel with the government's program and party's program. AKP's attempt to change the status of vocational schools led to an extensive backlash from Higher Education Council, the then President of the Republic Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the Military, and civil society organizations such as Eğitim-Sen and TUSIAD.⁴⁸⁵

The opposition against the reform proposal was centered on the clause that regulates the coefficient difference applied to vocational schools. Both the Higher Education Council, administrators of various universities and unions such as Eğitim-Sen all indicated that the last minute decision of the party to add an additional clause on coefficient is indicative of AKP's target to change the university entrance procedure to the benefit of Imam-Hatip schools.⁴⁸⁶ Nevertheless, the most prominent warning came from the Military. The Chief of General Staff Office issued a written press release on AKP's reform proposal, arguing that the purpose of these schools (Imam-Hatip schools) was to train religious functionaries. Therefore, the adopted law violated the principles of 'unity of education' and 'secular education'.⁴⁸⁷ The Military also found the Higher Education Council reform as unnecessary due to the strong opposition it received from higher education circles and other civil society organizations.⁴⁸⁸

⁴⁸⁴ *Ak Parti 59. Hükümet Programı* (AK Party 59th Government Program).

⁴⁸⁵ For 'TUSIAD's opposition on AKP's aim for equalization of coefficient difference see, "TUSIAD: Üniversiteye Girişte Eşit Katsayı Karmaşa Yarattır," *Hürriyet*, May 4, 2004, accessed, October 2, 2015, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/tusiad-universiteye-giriste-esit-katsayi-karmasa-yaratir-222780>

⁴⁸⁶ "Cumhuriyet Değerleri Zedelenir," *Hürriyet*, May 6, 2004, accessed, September 12, 2015, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/cumhuriyet-degerleri-zedelenir-223368>

⁴⁸⁷ It is important to note that the main opposition on secular education and union of education was mainly directed to the amendments which narrowed down the coefficient differences between vocational high schools and ordinary high schools. This part of the reform package will be discussed on the next section. For the full text of the press release please see, "Genelkurumay Başkanlığı'nın Açıklaması," *Sabah*, May 11, 2004, accessed, November 11, 2015, http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/ozel/yok51/dosya_52.html

⁴⁸⁸ "Genelkurumay Başkanlığı'nın Açıklaması," *Sabah*, May 11, 2004

Against such fierce opposition centered on party's perceived implicit target to increase the influence of Imam-Hatips within secondary education, AKP defended its reform proposal by emphasizing the need to increase the enrollment and quality of vocational schools without directly referring to Imam-Hatip schools. For example the MoNE Çelik rejected the arguments on Imam-Hatip's by emphasizing that these schools account for 8% of the vocational schools and indicated that 'they have no intention to smooth the way of some specific type of high school and closing other ones.'⁴⁸⁹ Instead the party defended its proposal by emphasizing the low level of enrollment in the vocational schools.⁴⁹⁰

Apart from referring to ongoing problems within vocational schools without referring to Imam-Hatip schools, against fierce opposition centered on party's 'hidden agenda' for favoring Imam-Hatip schools, AKP also used EU's recommendations on vocational training to further increase the legitimacy of its proposal. In fact, the need for higher education reform and improvement of vocational training structure was strongly emphasized by EU within consecutive progress reports of the EU Commission.⁴⁹¹ Regarding the problems of vocational schools, the EU Commission emphasized the insufficiency on the supply side of vocational schools due to discriminatory university entrance procedure.⁴⁹² Furthermore, the EU Commission indicated that the centralized higher education system prevents universities from being more labor-market oriented. Regarding vocational training, in its 2004 Progress Report, EU Commission also reemphasized the negative effect of existing limitations on vocational schools on enrollment rate.⁴⁹³

⁴⁸⁹ "Çelik: Tasarı Toplumun Talebiydi," *Hürriyet*, May 6, 2004, accessed, November 11, 2015, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/celik-tasari-toplumun-talebiydi-38601313>

⁴⁹⁰ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (TGNA Proceedings Review) 88.Bileşim 2. Oturum*, Period:22, Legislative year:2 Vol. 49, May 12 2004, accessed, November 14, 2015, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem22/yil2/bas/b088m.htm>

⁴⁹¹ For example, in 2003 Progress Report, The Commission emphasized the need for Higher Education reform by stating that "The Turkish education and university system based on the Law on High Education is marked by a high degree of centralization. Due to the existence of a strong High Education Council (YÖK) responsible for controlling the compatibility of the education programs with the fundamental principles indicated in the Law on High Education and enjoying broad disciplinary powers concerning rectors and faculty, there is a lack of academic, administrative and financial autonomy in the higher education system. See, European Commission, *Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, Progress Report*, (Brussels, 2003), p.100, accessed, September 11, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/rr_tk_final_en.pdf

⁴⁹² European Commission, *Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, Progress Report*, (Brussels, 2003), p.100, accessed, September 11, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/rr_tk_final_en.pdf

⁴⁹³ European Commission, *Turkey 2004 Progress Report SEC (2004) 1201*, (Brussels, 9 October 2004), p.126, accessed 15 September 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf

Against strong opposition centered on party's 'hidden agenda' to favor Imam-Hatip schools, AKP instrumentally used the above mentioned statements of EU Commission on Higher Education Council and vocational schools to deflect the opposition's claim on party's hidden intentions on Imam-Hatip schools. During the debates on Parliamentary Commission, MoNE Hüseyin Çelik emphasized that in EU member states there is a system that is based on competition on an equal basis, and in these countries the university entrance system is not based on type of the school but individual's success.⁴⁹⁴ Furthermore, Çelik referred to the EU Commission's aforementioned Progress Reports, which emphasize the discriminatory university entrance procedure in the country benefiting regular high schools.⁴⁹⁵ During the Parliamentary debates, the party also strongly emphasized the sections of EU Progress reports that referred to the problems regarding vocational schools.⁴⁹⁶

Despite AKP's efforts for legitimizing its reform proposal, in 28th of March 2004, the then President of Republic Ahmet Necdet Sezer vetoed AKP's reform proposal on higher education.⁴⁹⁷ Following both the Military's statement and Sezer's veto decision, there was an internal split and debate within the party centered on the path to be taken. After the Military's statement, some party members argued that they need to bring the reform proposal to the Parliament despite Military's reaction, as higher education reform was one of their promises to their constituency. Similarly, some party members emphasized the EU accession process and possible ramifications of a step back decision

⁴⁹⁴ "Çelik: Tasarı Toplumun Talebiydi," *Hürriyet*, May 6, 2004, accessed, November 12, 2015, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/celik-tasari-toplumun-talebiydi-38601313>

⁴⁹⁵ "Çelik: Tasarı Toplumun Talebiydi," *Hürriyet*

⁴⁹⁶ The then MoNE Çelik stated that "...within the last progress Report of the European Union...within the education and vocational training section it says that 'Overall, two main problems in the field of secondary education remain. Firstly, the demand for secondary education is much higher than expected. Secondly, a smaller number of students can be channeled to vocational and technical schools than planned. This is due to insufficiencies on the supply side. University entry exams discriminate in favor of graduates of general high schools.' It uses the word discrimination." See, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (TGNA Proceedings Review)* 88.Bileşim 2. Oturum, Period:22, Legislative year:2 Vol. 49, 12 May 2004, accessed, November 14, 2015 <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem22/yil2/bas/b088m.htm>

⁴⁹⁷ One of Sezer's objection was grounded on Article 131 of the Constitution which empowered the CoHE to 'plan, regulate, administer, and supervise' education at institutions of higher education, and therefore the parliament had no authority to regulate the conditions of admission into universities. Sezer also argued that to give the Imam-Hatip graduates equal rights at the university entrance examinations was inconsistent with a 'concept of education based on democratic, secular, egalitarian, just, functional and scientific foundations.' Furthermore, Sezer emphasized that within the amendment that foresaw the appointment of five members of Higher education Council by the cabinet did not specify any criteria which grants the government with absolute discretionary authority. See, "Sezer'den YÖK Yasasına Veto," *NTVMSNBC*, May 28, 2004, accessed, November 12, 2015, <http://arsiv.ntv.com.tr/news/271837.asp> and William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the case of the AKP*, p.70

for EU-Turkey relations.⁴⁹⁸ Some other party members suggested that party should refrain from increasing tensions with the Military and should sent the reform proposal to the parliament but in case of a veto from the President it should not push further for the proposal. At the end, party leadership sidelined with pushing forward for the reform proposal and sent it to Parliament.

Following the veto decision of the President after Military's statement, same intra-party debate reignited. Some party members argued that the reform proposal should be sent to the Parliament for a second time.⁴⁹⁹ Some other party members such as Abdullatif Şener and Cemil Çiçek suggested that the tension should not be escalated.⁵⁰⁰ During an interview, Cemil Çiçek indicated that the timing of the proposal including Imam-Hatips was not appropriate and it created unnecessary tension in a time that the attention should be devoted to EU accession process by all means.⁵⁰¹ At the end, the party leadership sidelined with the party members that refrained from escalating the tension and decided not to override the veto decision of the President of Republic.⁵⁰² The then Prime Minister Erdoğan's remarks on party's decision to step back was also another manifestation of AKP's low level of decisional autonomy and its prioritization of organizational survival over other goals of policy-seeking and vote-seeking. He explained the party's decision to step back by implicitly referring to the past experiences of parties that belong to NOM:

“The parents who sent their children to the vocational schools did not support the issue enough. The society did not stand up against the pressure. We could have sent the bill twice. But are you ready to pay the price? There is a price attached to it. As a government we are not ready to pay the price. Why? Because there were other prices paid before.”⁵⁰³

⁴⁹⁸ Here some party members emphasized the possible reaction from EU on the role of the Military if they would step back as a result of Military's pressure. See, <http://arsiv.ntv.com.tr/news/269545.asp>

⁴⁹⁹ The MoNE Hüseyin Çelik and Deputy Chairman of AKP Haluk İpek were on the side of resending the vetoed bill to the President again.

⁵⁰⁰ “YÖK Yasası Yenilenmez,” *BirGün*, June 1, 2004, accessed, November 15, 2015, <http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/yok-yasasi-yenilenmez-21122.html>

⁵⁰¹ “Köşk Veto Ederse AKP ne Yapacak?,” *Hürriyet*, May 22, 2004, accessed, November 15, 2015, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kosk-veto-ederse-akp-ne-yapacak-38606565>

⁵⁰² As Özbudun suggests, the Justice and Development Party chose not to push the matter further, thinking that the President has the option of challenging the law before the Constitutional Court. The JDP thought that the Court would almost certainly agree with the President. See, William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the case of the AKP* (London: Routledge, 2010), p.70

⁵⁰³ “Erdoğan: YÖK'ü Zorlamayız,” *Radikal*, July 4, 2004, accessed, November 10, 2015, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=121202>

The preceding analysis shows that during its first term, education remained as a litmus test for AKP's claimed difference from pro-Islamic political parties that belong to National Outlook Movement. Consequently, in its official documents, party's stated aims for education were to a large extent informed by its liberal political rationality which entails achieving a de-centralized higher education system, improving the status of vocational schools to meet the increasing need of economy for intermediate staff, and increasing the quality of formal education to raise competent individuals in a market economy. Nevertheless, education also remained as the most significant sphere through which the State targeted to marginalize political Islam during the February 28 process. Consequently, AKP's capacity to bring the aforementioned targets to life was significantly limited due to the presence of extra-parliamentary veto players such as military, presidency, high judiciary and Higher Education Council, which significantly constrained party's decisional autonomy during its first term.

Due to its low decisional autonomy, the party refrained from going into direct confrontation with the veto players on its policies regarding education. Although the equalization of coefficient difference and improving the status of Imam-Hatip graduates were among the main promises that the party made to its core conservative constituency, it largely refrained from emphasizing the status of Imam-Hatips. On the contrary, framing of policy proposals regarding coefficient difference and curriculum reform was indicative of party's prioritization of its neoliberal-political rationality which led to a strong emphasis on these policies aim for increasing individuals' competences and skills in a competitive market economy through increasing enrollment and quality of vocational schools and reforming the old curriculum reform. Despite such a framing that is indicative of party's neoliberal political rationality, the opposition against these policies were to a large extent centered on party's alleged 'hidden agenda' to improve the status of Imam-Hatip schools and increase the influence of religion in the higher education system.

Under such restrictive domestic political context which significantly constrained party's decisional autonomy, in each of the aforementioned policy based attempts, AKP instrumentally used EU accession process to further strengthen the legitimacy of its

policies. As part of the accession process, within its Progress Reports, EU Commission pointed out the centralized higher education system and low enrollment and quality of vocational training as problems that needed to be addressed. In that regard, the EU became a political opportunity structure for the party to further increase the legitimacy of its reform proposals.

Additionally, AKP's first attempt to change the status of vocational schools within the university entrance system clearly reveals party's low level of systemness in terms of lack of organizational cohesiveness. Against the domestic extra-parliamentary veto players, there was an internal split centered on the debate on withdrawing the reform proposal altogether and pushing forward by bringing up the proposal to the Parliament again. Some party members argued for pushing forward the reform following the veto decision of the president as the solution of the coefficient problem were their main promise prior to elections. The party members who aimed to push forward the reform proposal used EU accession process instrumentally to strengthen their position and indicated that a step back under the pressure of extra-parliamentary veto players would jeopardize the EU accession process. Some other members that found the reform proposal untimely instrumentally used EU accession process and defended their stance by emphasizing the possible ramifications of increasing tensions with veto players such as the Military and President for EU accession process.

7.4 AKP'S STANCE ON EDUCATION BETWEEN 2008 AND 2013

Starting from its second term in office, AKP's discourse and policies regarding education were increasingly informed by party's moral-political rationality, which entailed strong emphasis on education's social role. The aim of this section is to analyze policy-making, framing and implementation processes regarding formal education by particularly focusing on party's formal education reform popularly known as '4+4+4'. Although in terms of policy content party explicitly stated its aim to increase the duration of formal compulsory education in its Party Program, AKP refrained from taking any particular action to change eight year education system during its first term. In fact, as the preceding analysis shows, party framed its curriculum reform as an

attempt to strengthen the eight year compulsory formal education. Furthermore, the policy framing process will show that while the framing of party's reform proposal continued to be informed by its neoliberal political rationality, as indicative of increasing prevalence of moral political rationality, it also entailed increasing emphasis on education's role on raising socially acceptable citizens in which 'socially acceptable' to a large extent defined within religious terms. Last but not least, increasing prevalence of Imam-Hatips, Quran courses, and introduction of elective courses with religious themes will be analyzed as other indicators of increasing prioritization of AKP's moral political rationality over its neoliberal political rationality.

7.4.1 '4+4+4': AKP's changing stance on formal education

Together with the coefficient procedure, introduced in 1998, one of the safeguards introduced during the so called the February 28 Process against the political Islam was the eight year compulsory education system. By introducing eight year mandatory education, the Military and the then coalition government closed down the junior high school grades (sixth, seventh and eighth grades) of both vocational high schools in general and Imam-Hatip high schools, in particular.⁵⁰⁴ In its 2002 Party Program AKP explicitly stated its aim to extend the duration of formal education to twelve years.⁵⁰⁵ Within the subsequent official documents, the party also indirectly referred to its aim to

⁵⁰⁴ Before 1997, the Imam Hatip schools were intended to be vocational high schools to train imams and hatips. They were state schools under the Ministry of National Education and followed the same curriculum as regular state high schools with the addition of religious subjects. The Imam Hatip graduates were entitled to the same criteria with the regular high school graduates within the university entrance. During the periods of successive center-right governments the number of Imam-Hatip schools and graduates increased rapidly. See, William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: the case of the AKP* (London: Routledge, 2010), 68-69.

⁵⁰⁵ In its 2002 Party Program, AKP stated that "Compulsory education will be reformed so that it will be organized 'in stages', enable choice and guidance, and will be increased from eight to eleven years. Beginning from the fifth year of basic education, elective courses will be introduced and students will be guided to general and vocational tracks based on their interests and talents." Additionally, the party also restated its aim for extending the eight year compulsory education system. See, *Ak Parti Kalkınma ve Demokratikleşme Programı* (Ak Party Development and Democratization Program) (Ankara: Ak Parti Yayınları, 2002), 54. For 2007 Election Manifesto see, "Ak Parti 2007 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyanamesi (Ak Party 2007 General Elections Election Manifesto)" Ak Parti Tanıtım ve Medya Başkanlığı (February 2015).

reform formal education system by emphasizing its target to increase the prominence of vocational training within secondary school education.⁵⁰⁶

Although, during its first term, AKP explicitly stated its aim to reform eight year compulsory education in its Party Program, party to a large extent refrained from taking any action on the duration of compulsory formal education. Moreover, regarding eight year compulsory education, party officials sent mixed signals. On the one hand, regarding the framing of its curriculum reform, throughout its first term in office, AKP stated that one of the aims of the reform was to strengthen the formal education system by making the curriculum compatible with eight year compulsory primary education.⁵⁰⁷ On the other hand, the party reemphasized its aim to extend the eight year compulsory education system to twelve years in line with its party program.⁵⁰⁸ Nevertheless, the decisional autonomy of the party vis-à-vis veto players such as President of the Republic, the Military, and Judiciary was significantly low and this led party to postpone its stated aim to increase the duration of eight year compulsory education system.

Following the electoral victory of AKP in 2007, the MoNE Hüseyin Çelik explicitly stated government's aim to change the eight year compulsory education system to twelve years by making it intermittent, enabling students to choose between regular or vocational secondary schools. During the same speech, which was centered on the new government's targets for education, Çelik emphasized that the 60th government is a conservative government whose conservatism is confined to cultural and moral domains and differs from past conservative governments, as it is not conservative in terms of restructuring the state and economy.⁵⁰⁹ While the party restated its aim for changing the formal education system, AKP refrained from taking any concrete action during its second term. The main reason for the reticence of party was due to its low level of

⁵⁰⁶ *Ak Parti 2007 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ak Party 2007 General Elections Election Manifesto); *Ak Parti 2011 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ak Party 2007 General Elections Election Manifesto)

⁵⁰⁷ "Çocuğa Demokrasi Kültürü Aşılacak," *Milliyet*, August 15, 2004, accessed, September 10, 2015, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/cocuga-demokrasi-kulturu-asilacak/siyaset/haberdetayarsiv/15.08.2004/42619/default.htm>

⁵⁰⁸ During the debates on higher education reform the then MoNE Hüseyin Çelik indicated that with eight year compulsory education, there had been a concrete progress in terms of schooling. Nevertheless, he went on by saying that the eight year compulsory education was not enough for a modern country and as a Party they had the desire to increase the formal education to twelve years. See, "Eğitim 12 Yıla Çıkacak," *İnternet Haber*, February 23, 2004, accessed, December 7, 2015, <http://www.internethaber.com/egitim-12-yila-cikacak-1060870h.htm>

⁵⁰⁹ "12 Yıllık Kesintisiz Eğitime Geçilecek," *Hürriyet*, September 12, 2007, accessed, December 7, 2015, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/12-yillik-kesintili-egitime-gecilecek-7291441>

decisional autonomy and increasing allegations on party's Islamist leanings. Although the party significantly improved its decisional autonomy with the election of Abdullah Gül to the office of Presidency, Judiciary continued to remain as an important veto player constraining the decisional autonomy of the party.⁵¹⁰

Following its electoral victory in 2011 general elections, in 2012, AKP government came up with a reform bill popularly referred as '4+4+4'. Briefly, the law increased the duration of compulsory education from eight to twelve years and the continuous character of formal education changed into three separate sections. Nevertheless, the new 4+4+4 system has various ramifications for formal education system in terms of starting age to formal education, elective courses, and status of vocational schools.⁵¹¹ The most debated points of the new legislation were: the changing status of Imam-Hatip schools as the new system re-introduced the elementary Imam-Hatip schools which were previously closed down with the eight year compulsory education system; the introduction of two elective religious courses; and starting age of primary education which was lowered with the new regulation.

The policy-making process of the new legislation was significantly different from AKP's previous approach to policy making. Although during its first term, the party extensively used participation of civil society organizations and expert views; during the policy making process of the so called '4+4+4' legislation a different policy-making process is easily discernable. The decision to change the eight year compulsory system was taken during the 18th National Education Council in 2010.⁵¹² Prior to the 18th National Education Council, the composition of the attendants changed reflecting the changing balance of power inside the council to the benefit of civil society

⁵¹⁰ One of the manifestations of low level of party's decisional autonomy was the closure case against the party in 2009.

⁵¹¹ The new reform introduced a gradual formal education system instead of continuous structure of the former mandatory eight year system. Accordingly, the formal education was planned in three stages which consist of four years of primary, four years of secondary, and four years of high school. More importantly, with the new bill the vocational schools were permitted from fifth grade which resulted in opening of Imam-Hatip schools within secondary education which was previously closed down with the introduction of eight year compulsory education system. Additionally, regarding the vocational schools in general and Imam-Hatip schools, in particular, the new bill also solved the so-called the 'coefficient problem' by equalizing the coefficients of higher school graduates and vocational high schools including Imam-Hatips. The so called 4+4+4 regulation also introduced elective courses to the second stage of the system for the purpose of preparing students for higher education (third stage). With the new regulation students or their parents is able to take two elective courses one on Quran and one on the Prophet Mohammed's life.

⁵¹² The Council is composed of educational unions, administrators of the Ministry of National Education, and civil society organizations. While the decisions taken during the subsequent Council meetings were recommendations, they to a large extent shape the future path of educational reforms.

organizations that are ideologically close to the party.⁵¹³ Consequently, the final decisions of the Council meetings were increasingly shaped by educational unions and civil society organizations which have cordial relationships with AKP. The 18th National Education Council, during which the decision to change the eight year compulsory system to thirteen years was taken, was dominated by Eğitim-Bir-Sen which have close relationship with the AKP.⁵¹⁴

During the legislation process of 4+4+4, the second largest education union Eğitim-Sen strongly criticized AKP's proposal. Additionally, Anatolian Education Union strongly criticized the Council by emphasizing the disproportionate representation of unions and civil society organizations closer to AKP.⁵¹⁵ Additionally, the influence of Eğitim-Bir-Sen on the Council's decisions was also emphasized by other education unions. Therefore, while the National Education Council meetings stand out as an opportunity for increasing involvement of civil society organizations and unions within policy making process, under AKP's second term the process was mainly dominated by the policy based advices of civil society organizations and education unions that are ideologically closer to the party.⁵¹⁶ The main opposition party also emphasized the lack of dialogue with educational experts and civil society organizations prior to the legislation process.⁵¹⁷ In its 2012 Progress Report, the EU Commission also emphasized the controversial nature of the policy making process and indicated insufficient consultation and preparation prior to legislation.⁵¹⁸ Last but not least, Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TÜSEV) in its case study of policy making process found that the collaboration between the government and civil society organizations remained

⁵¹³ As Şaşmaz indicates in 2010 the regulation on the composition and decision-making procedure of the Council meetings were changed and with the new regulation the weight of Council members that are invited by the Ministry of National Education increased from 60% to 75%. See, Aytuğ Şaşmaz, "4+4+4 bir Toplama Değil Çarp(ıt)ma İşlemi," <https://tr.boell.org/tr/2014/06/16/444-bir-toplama-degil-carpitma-islemi> accessed on

⁵¹⁴ On the relationship between Eğitim-Bir Sen and AKP see, Duygun Göktürk, Gökçe Güvercin, Onur Seçkin, "The New Stream of Trade Unionism: The Case of Eğitim-Bir-Sen in Turkey," in *Neoliberal Transformation of Education in Turkey: Political and Ideological Analysis of Educational Reforms in the Age of AKP*, eds. Kemal Inal and Güliz Akkaynak (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 109-121.

⁵¹⁵ "Eğitim Sendikası'ndan Şura Tepkisi," *Sözcü*, 2012, accessed October 10, 2015, <http://www.sozcu.com.tr/egitim/egitim-sendikasinan-sura-tepkisi.html>

⁵¹⁶ "Eğitim-Sen Başkanı Ünsal: 4+4+4'e Karşı 4 Koldan Ankara'ya," *Birgün*, September 15, 2012, accessed, October 10, 2015, <http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/egitim-sen-baskani-unsal-yildiz-4-4-4-e-karsi-4-koldan-ankara-ya-62297.html>

⁵¹⁷ "4+4+4 ne anlama geliyor," *Hürriyet*, March 3, 2012, accessed September 5, 2015, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/4-4-4-ne-anlama-geliyor-20047979>

⁵¹⁸ European Commission, *Turkey 2012 Progress Report SWD (2012) 600*, (Brussels, 10 October 2012), p.126, accessed, September 15, 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/tr_rapport_2012_en.pdf

weak.⁵¹⁹ Overall, regarding civil society organizations, compared to its first term, AKP significantly increased its decisional autonomy *vis-à-vis* civil society organizations.

The introduction of the bill led to a fierce debate and the opposition emphasized the ideological nature of the reform and its ramifications for secular nature of education and girls' schooling rate. More specifically, the opposition was mainly centered on AKP's aim to improve the status of Imam-Hatip schools. In terms of policy-content, the main rationale for the 4+4+4 legislation is stated as to increase the duration of the compulsory education to twelve years in parallel with the developed countries; to introduce flexibility to the system by making the system intermittent and allow students and parents to select between vocational and regular secondary and high schools.⁵²⁰

During General Council sessions on the reform in the Parliament, the then MoNE Ömer Dinçer indicated that the aim of the education reform was to attain the compulsory education level of developed countries by increasing the duration to twelve years and making it in three stages to democratize the system by allowing students and their parents to choose flexibly between vocational and regular secondary schools. Additionally, the status of vocational training in the country and AKP's aim to improve it was also stated as another rationale behind the intermittent structure of the proposed compulsory education system.⁵²¹ Same kind of framing emphasizing the liberal aims of the new proposal was also made within the official periodical of the party. In the official periodical titled as *Türkiye Gündemi* (Turkey's Agenda), the party strongly criticized the previous eight year continuous compulsory education as a structure against the modern world which does not liberalize the individuals, does not allow them to change their choices and targets, does not offer choices, does not facilitate differences.⁵²²

⁵¹⁹ TUSEV, "Eğitimde '4+4+4 Yasası'; Tasarı, Yasalaşma, ve Uygulama Süreçlerinde STK'ların Katılımı: Vaka Analizi," Downloaded from http://www.tusev.org.tr/tr/arastirma-ve-yayinlar/online-yayinlar?&per_page=15

⁵²⁰ In parallel, the legal clause section of the new law indicates that although the eight year mandatory education system had been a big step on improving the level of education in Turkey, the continuous structure of the system had created problems on the way of achieving a healthy and productive education environment. See, 5/1/1961 Tarihli ve 222 Sayılı İlköğretim ve Eğitim Kanunu ile Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun Teklifi, TBMM, no.199, accessed, September 10, 2015, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem24/yil01/ss199.pdf>

⁵²¹ Same kind of framing was also made by AKP deputy Mahir Ünal, see, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (TGNA Proceedings Review) 83.Bileşim 2. Oturum*, Period:24, Legislative year:2 Vol. 17, 27 March 2014, accessed, November 10, 2015, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil2/bas/b083m.htm>

⁵²² Ak Parti, "Eğitimde Büyük Reform" *Türkiye Bülteni*, 9, no.74 (January-February 2012), p.37 accessed, September 2, 2015, <http://www.turkiyebulteni.org/PDF/74%20TB%20Ocak%20Subat%20WEB.pdf>

Both the preamble section of the new law and policy framing by the party members indicate that AKP instrumentally used the examples of EU member states and EU education system to increase the legitimacy of its reform proposal. First and foremost the General Preamble of the Law gives examples from EU member states regarding their formal education system. Regarding the effects of eight year compulsory education on vocational training, AKP emphasized the low level of enrollment on vocational schools by indicating that in EU member states the rate of enrollment in vocational schools was 60% while in Turkey the rate was around 44%. During the General Council sessions in the Parliament, the then MoNE Ömer Çelik also provided examples from EU member states to further strengthen party's position on changing the continuous formal education system by referring to EURYDICE, which provides statistical information on education systems common to EU member states.⁵²³ Similarly, AKP deputy Ökten also referred to EU target on increasing the rate of high education graduates to 90% by 2020 and indicated that their reform proposal aims to increase the currently low levels of high school graduates in the country.⁵²⁴ Along similar lines, EU minister and the Chief Negotiator emphasized that compared to the EU member states with at least 12-13 years of compulsory education, Turkey have the lowest duration of compulsory education.⁵²⁵

Although in terms of policy-framing the process shows strong similarity with party's first term, the difference was party leadership's strong emphasis on education's social role, indicative of party's moral-political rationality. One clear manifestation of such policy-framing was party leadership's explicitly stated aim for 'raising pious generations' just before the announcement of the new reform proposal on formal education. This statement generated significant backlash and further consolidated the opposition's skepticism for the new education reform proposal. Against strong backlash, party leadership reemphasized its aim by stating that

⁵²³ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (TGNA Proceedings Review) 83.Bileşim 2. Oturum*, Period:24, Legislative year:2 Vol. 17, 27 March 2014, accessed, November 10, 2015 <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil2/bas/b083m.htm>

⁵²⁴ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (TGNA Proceedings Review) 83.Bileşim 2. Oturum*, Period:24, Legislative year:2 Vol. 17, 27 March 2014, accessed, November 10, 2015, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil2/bas/b083m.htm>

⁵²⁵ "Egemen Bağış 4+4+4'e Sistemini Eleştiren Muhalefete Yüklendi," *İhlas Haber Ajansı*, March 9, 2012, accessed September 20, 2015, <http://www.ihh.com.tr/istanbul-haberleri/egemen-bagis-4-4-4-sistemini-elestiren-muhalefete-yuklendi-istanbul-74875/>

“...I told that we want to raise pious generations. I am telling this again. I am behind that...as a conservative democrat party are you expecting from us to rise an atheist generation...we will raise a conservative and democrat generation who maintains the nations and countries values, and historical principals. We are working for this.”⁵²⁶

Aforementioned framing which indicates increasing prioritization of party’s moral political rationality was also repeated by other party members. For example, AKP deputy Ulupınar defended the party leadership’s stance on the role of education by stating that ‘...a pious generation will be beneficial to his religion, country, family and to himself, no benefit should be expected from an atheist person neither to himself, nor to his family’.⁵²⁷

The implementation process of the new reform proposal is also indicative of party’s prioritization of its moral-political rationality over its neoliberal-political rationality. First and foremost, one of the most significant results of the new education reform was a significant increase in the number of Imam-Hatip elementary and high schools after the introduction of the new reform (See, Table 14). Although this was mainly due to the reopening of elementary stage of these schools, the party leadership and members statements on Imam-Hatip schools are also indicative of AKP’s aim to increase the influence of these schools within the formal education in general, and vocational schools, in particular.

The party leadership openly revealed its aim of increasing the status of the Imam-Hatips and demonized the February 28 Process as a period of tyranny due to the actions of the Military and past governments against these schools’ graduates.⁵²⁸ During the debates on the so called 4+4+4 reform proposal, the then Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ stated that the Imam Hatip schools were schools of the people and ‘the Imam-Hatip schools should continue on their struggle for democracy and if god wills one day there would be a Imam-Hatip graduate at the office of Presidency’.⁵²⁹

⁵²⁶ “‘Dindar Bir Gençlik Yetiştirmek İstiyoruz’”, *Hürriyet*, 01 February 2012.

⁵²⁷ “AK Partili Vekil: “Kurşun da Atsalar 4+4+4 Gececek,” *Hürriyet*, March 27, 2012 accessed, September 20, 2015, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ak-partili-vekil-kursun-da-atsalar-4-4-4-gececek-20216717>

⁵²⁸ “Arınç’tan “İmam Hatip Lisesi” Yorumu” *Sabah* 17 November 2012. Regarding party leadership’s remarks please see, “Erdoğan: İmam Hatipler Tekrar Gözbebeği Olacak” *Sabah* 25 May 2012.

⁵²⁹ “Bozdağ: İnşallah İmam-Hatipli Cumhurbaşkanımız Olacak” *Hürriyet* 23 November 2013

Table 14: Number of Imam-Hatip Schools from 2010-2011 to 2013-2014 Education Years

	2010-2011		2011-2012		2012-2013		2013-2014		% Change 2010-2014	
	# of Schools	# of Students	# of Schools	# of Students	# of Schools	# of Students	# of Schools	# of Students	# of Schools	# of Students
Imam-Hatip Secondary Schools	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	1099	94 468	1361	240 015	n/a	n/a
Imam-Hatip High Schools	493	235 639	537	268 245	708	380 771	854	474 096	%73	%101
Total	493	235 639	537	268 245	1807	575 238	2215	714 111	%349	%203

Source: Ministry of National Education

Apart from increasing prominence of Imam-Hatip schools, another manifestation of prioritization of religious/moral elements within formal education was the introduction of three religious courses in 2012 which are: the Quran, Prophet Muhammad's Life and Fundamentals of Religion. In the meantime, two elective courses (Civic Education and Agriculture) were removed from the curriculum. Although the new courses were presented as elective courses, the reports following the introduction of the new system indicates that these courses became de facto compulsory as within many of the institutions these electives are the only ones proposed to students and students needed to take them to complete the credit requirements. As Gün and Baskana suggests:

“Schools have offered limited number of elective courses due to physical environment and/or human resources problems. This has caused those schools guided and even forces parents and students about selecting courses. Especially the religious courses such as Quran and Mohammed's Life, which were told to be elective, are not elective in the real sense and they are offered to students as compulsory elective courses.”⁵³⁰

Another manifestation of increasing prevalence of party's moral political rationality over its neoliberal-political rationality was the curriculum of the courses on religious culture and morality. In his comparative analysis of the curriculums of these courses between 1995 and 2007-08, Türkmen concludes that there were changes during 2005-08 curriculums which were designed to re-Islamize society in a neoliberal fashion.⁵³¹ As

⁵³⁰ Feyza Gün and Gülsün Atanur Baskana, “New Education System in Turkey (4+4+4): a Critical Outlook,” *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences* 131 (2014), 231.

⁵³¹ Some of the changes mentioned in Türkmen's study were Islamisation of the human rights concept, religionisation of education, the exposition of marriage as not only a precondition for establishing a family but also a remedy for adultery. See, B. Türkmen, “A Transformed Kemalist Islam or a New Islamic Civic Morality? A Study of 'religious

indicative of party's prioritization of its moral political rationality, in the beginning of school year 2010-2011, the Ministry of National Education issued a public statement which emphasized the need for 'education in values'. The public statement emphasizes the importance of education for raising socially acceptable individuals and empowering individual students to face everyday challenges posed by the process of globalization.⁵³²

Similar to increasing prevalence of Imam-Hatips within formal education and strong the party's strong support for these schools, AKP's changing stance on Quran courses and celebrations of Holy Birth Week in formal education institutions also stand out as other indicators of increasing dominance of party's moral political rationality over its neoliberal political rationality. AKP's stance on these two issues during its first and second term show similarities with its stance on Imam-Hatips in which party to a large extent refrained from making any significant amendments on the status of Quran courses and Holy Birth Week celebrations due to its low level of decisional autonomy vis-à-vis veto players such as the President of the Republic.

Due to the Directorate for Religious Affairs' (DRA) constitutionally defined role on religious education, Quran courses are regulated by DRA. Although there were no age limitations on these courses, following the so-called postmodern coup in 1997, the coalition government in 1999 changed the entry procedure to the Quran Courses by introducing a base age.⁵³³

The first attempt for regulating the Quran courses was proposed by the DRA in 2003.⁵³⁴ The new regulation immediately created a backlash from the secular circles and secular

culture and morality' Textbooks in the Turkish High School Curricula," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 20, no. 3 (2009).

⁵³² The values that were mentioned within the public statement value based education on citizenship, hospitality, solidarity, and tolerance. Cited in Ayhan Kaya, "Islamization of Turkey under the AKP Rule: Empowering Family, Faith and Charity," *South European Society and Politics* 20, no. 1 (2015), 58.

⁵³³ The age limit for Quran courses were 16 for regular courses and 12 for summer Quran courses. Please see, "Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Kuruluş ve Görevleri Hakkındaki Kanuna bir Ek Madde Eklenmesine Dair Kanun" *Resmi Gazete*, no. 23777, August 5, 1999, accessed, November 7, 2015, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/23777.pdf&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/23777.pdf>

⁵³⁴ The DRA's new regulation's main features were opening of night time Quran courses for people who are working and allowing the Quran courses to take place within regular schools during summertime. Additionally, the new regulation also eliminated the time frame for these courses which was perceived by the opposition parties and secular state establishment as an amendment which allows Quran courses to take place in whole year without time limitations. Please see, "Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Kur'an Kursları ile Öğrenci Yurt ve Pansiyonları Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik" *Resmi Gazete*, no. 25299, November 25, 2003, accessed, November 7, 2015,

state establishment. The opposition's reaction can be followed from the Parliamentary Questions proposed by the Republican People's Party (RPP) which mainly emphasized the new regulations negative effects on: the secular nature of the education, the eight year compulsory education, increasing penetration of Islam within education system.⁵³⁵ Additionally, the then President of Republic Ahmet Necdet Sezer also involved in the debates on the new regulation and kindly requested a withdrawal from both the AKP and the DHA on by emphasizing the disturbances within the state elite and the critical juncture that the country was going through both domestically and internationally.⁵³⁶ Consequently, the DHA withdrew the regulation and a new regulation was introduced which re-installed the *status quo* with regard to Quran courses.⁵³⁷

During the debates on the new regulation issued by DHA, the AKP leadership largely refrained from including itself within the debates by indicating that the regulation was not a government proposal but a proposal issued by the DHA which is a separate entity from the party and the government.⁵³⁸ Furthermore, the then Prime Minister Erdoğan also stated that he was not aware of the new regulation but indicated that according to his view, it was a transparent and a well-intentioned attempt.⁵³⁹ AKP's stance on Quran courses was significantly changed in 2011 with a new decree law that lifted the age requirement for entrance to the Quran courses.⁵⁴⁰ The Party's intention was first emphasized by the then Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ in 2011. Bozdağ stated that the age requirement for Quran courses was against the human rights. He indicated that allowing children to attend courses without an age requirement while prohibiting

<http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/11/20031124.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/11/20031124.htm>

⁵³⁵ For the Parliamentary Questions proposed by the opposition and answers of the AKP please see, "Minister of State's Response to the Parliamentary Question" *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi* no. B.02.0.004/03586, December 30, 2003, accessed, November 7, 2015, <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/d22/7/7-1604c.pdf>

⁵³⁶ Sezer also indicated that the new regulation could easily spill over to the political area and create further backlash. Please see, "Bastırdı, Çekcekler," *Hürriyet*, December 10, 2003,

⁵³⁷ Please see, "Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Kur'an Kursları ile Öğrenci Yurt ve Pansiyonları Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik" Resmi Gazete, no. 25299, 23 December 2003, accessed, November 7, 2015, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/12/20031223.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/12/20031223.htm>

⁵³⁸ The then Minister of Education Hüseyin Çelik emphasized this clearly. Nevertheless, he also pragmatically emphasized a need for regulating the Quran courses to increase State inspection and control over these courses and make them more transparent. Please see, "Bakan Çelik Kuran Kursu Yönetmeliğini Savundu," *Hürriyet*, 5 December 2005.

⁵³⁹ "Bastırdı, Çekcekler," *Hürriyet*, 10 December 2003.

⁵⁴⁰ "Decree Law no 653, Ekonomi Bakanlığının Teşkilat ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun Hükmünde Kararname ile Bazı Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun Hükmünde Kararname", *Resmi Gazete*, no. 28057, 17 September 2011, accessed 07 November 2015, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2011/09/20110917.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2011/09/20110917.htm>

them to attain Quran courses before a certain age was against democracy, basic rights and a product of February 28 Process.⁵⁴¹

Apart from lifting the age limitation on Quran courses, AKP increasingly joined to the various Quran course openings in different provinces.⁵⁴² Additionally, following the new regulation on Quran courses, AKP members have started to emphasize the importance of religious education on various occasions. For example in 2012, during a ceremony for starting a construction of a Quran course, Bekir Bozdağ stated that

“The most auspicious people are the ones who teach and learn Quran. Our view of civilization places great value on Quran and places the ones who teach and learn Quran on a highly exceptional position. Previously there was a wall between our nation and Quran, we abolished that, we changed the law and eliminated the age limitation on Quran courses.”⁵⁴³

The status of Quran courses were further improved by a new amendment in The Turkish Penal Code which lifted the penalty of prison sentence for illicit education institutions including Quran courses. With the new amendment, there will be no judicial inquiry on subjects who open illicit education institutions.⁵⁴⁴ It is also important to note that in 2005, the AKP government attempted to make a similar amendment on the Turkish Penal Code with regard to illicit education institutions. Nevertheless, the Party refrained from lifting the prison sentence rather decreased the duration of prison sentence.⁵⁴⁵ As a consequence of the new regulation lifting the age limitation for enrollment to Quran courses and the amendment on illicit Quran courses, the number of these schools and enrolled students increased significantly throughout AKP’s three terms (Table 15).

⁵⁴¹ “Kuran Kurslarına Yaş Sınırı Kalkıyor”, *Hürriyet*, 29 July 2011

⁵⁴² For example in such a visit by the JDP Women’s Branch, Hatice Atan stated that ‘we place great value on raising pious youngsters because we think that pious people will benefit society and won’t do harm to their environment. In this subject we are ready to help and to do what is needed.’ Please see, “Kuran Kursları Ziyareti” Ak Parti Genel Merkez Kadın Kolları, 1 October 2013, accessed 01 November 2015, <https://www.akparti.org.tr/kadinkollari/haberler/kuran-kurslari-ziyareti/52669>

⁵⁴³ “Bozdağ: İnsanların en Hayırlısı Kuran Öğreten ve Öğrenendir,” *Hürriyet*, 18 September 2012

⁵⁴⁴ “Kaçak Kuran Kursları TCK’dan Çıkarıldı,” *Hürriyet*, 17 April 2013

⁵⁴⁵ “Kaçak Kuran Kursu Serbest,” *Cumhuriyet*, 8 March 2013

Table 15: Number of Students Enrolled within Quran Courses and Number of Institutions

	2002-2003		2011-2012		2013-2014	
	# of Schools	# of Students	# of Schools	# of Students	# of Schools	# of Students
Quran Courses	3 984	118 335	8 696	297 247	16 958	1 164 509

Source: Directorate for Religious Affairs

Another manifestation of AKP's increasing prioritization of value-based education was its stance on Holy Birth Week (HBW hereafter) celebrations. Although the celebration of the HBW dates back to Ottoman Empire and before, since 1989, the HBW has started to be celebrated by the Department of Religious Affairs (DRA). In 1994, the date of the HBW was readjusted to the 20th of April. The main aim of the celebration is proposed as to further generalize the love of the Prophet and bring the religious contemplation outside of the mosque. The celebration mainly consists of an official ceremony followed by various activities such as conferences and panels on the religious matters.⁵⁴⁶

During AKP's first and second term, the scale of celebrations and debates on activities started to increase dramatically. The main concern with such activities was related with their anti-secular content. The main common point of opposition to the activities was the inclusion of students within formal education to the religious activities within the framework of HBW. For example in 2007, within a state primary school a religious play was staged which created a backlash within secular circles. Additionally, within same year during celebrations, the presence of young girls with headscarves also created strong reaction.⁵⁴⁷ Additionally, AKP and other Islamist circles were strongly criticized on the grounds that they intentionally collided with the celebrations of the National Sovereignty and Children's Day, which is celebrated in every 23th of April.

The celebrations during HBW were proposed as manifestations of party's anti-secular activities by the Chief of General Staff in 27 April 2007.⁵⁴⁸ Additionally, the same celebrations were also included within the closure case against the party by the

⁵⁴⁶ For more detailed information on HBW, please see, BÜKE Koyuncu, "Benim Milletim..." *Ak Parti İktidarı, Din ve Ulusal Kimlik* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2014), 181-200.

⁵⁴⁷ See, "Türbanlı Kutlamaya Soru Önergesi", *Hürriyet*, 19 April 2007 and "Başörtülü Şaire Soruşturma", *Hürriyet*, 9 May 2007.

⁵⁴⁸ "Genel Kurumay'dan Çok Sert Açıklama", *Hürriyet*, 27 April 2007.

Constitutional Court in 2008.⁵⁴⁹ Following the so called e-memorandum of the Military, the DRA issued a statement which emphasized the DRA's responsibility and duties with regard to religious affairs.⁵⁵⁰ The DRA also indicated that the necessary precautions would be taken to prevent such instances. In 2008 to further alleviate the backlash, the DRA fixed the dates of the celebrations between 14-20 April. Additionally, DRA stated that all the celebrations would be inspected by legal committees and themes that could ignite political debates would not take place.⁵⁵¹ In 2010, another regulation was enacted which further standardized the celebrations.⁵⁵² Overall, from 2008 to 2011, the celebrations were institutionalized and the chances of such anti-secular activities were to a large extent controlled by the DRA.

Although AKP tried to decrease the secular state establishment's temper on celebrations of HBW, in 2011 the Party worked collaboratively during the celebrations with DRA through the Ministry of National Education and State Ministry for Women and Family.⁵⁵³ In this way, AKP became directly involved within the celebrations of HBW within schools. In 2011, the Ministry of National Education issued a Circular Order for both compulsory and nationwide education institutions. Within the circular order, the Ministry of National Education stated the importance of the HBW celebrations in the schools and delineated the general framework of the celebrations. Within the circular, the MoNE stated that

“Apart from information and knowledge, the main duty of our education system is to provide values, attitude, and attainment. The transformation of our understanding of education reveals the importance of development of a perspective which surrounds human spirit and body as a whole...For this reason; we should bring in the love for the all human beings which is the main humanistic features of our Prophet Muhammad...”⁵⁵⁴

⁵⁴⁹ See, Constitutional Court Decision, E.2008/1, K.2008/2, *Resmi Gazete*, no.27034, 24 October 2008

⁵⁵⁰ “Diyânet’ten Bildiri Açıklaması: Kutlu Doğum Programında Bizden İzin Alındı”, *Zaman*, 29 April 2007

⁵⁵¹ Büke Koyuncu, “Benim Milletim...” *Ak Parti İktidarı, Din ve Ulusal Kimlik*” p. 184

⁵⁵² See, “Kutlu Doğum Haftası ile Cami ve Din Görevlileri Haftasını Kutlama Yönetmeliği” *Resmi Gazete*, no.27492, 13 February 2010 accessed 7 November 2015 <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2010/02/20100213-7.htm>

⁵⁵³ Büke Koyuncu, “Benim Milletim...” *Ak Parti İktidarı, Din ve Ulusal Kimlik*, 196.

⁵⁵⁴ See MEB Talim Terbiye Kurumu Başkanlığı, ‘B.08.TTK.072 02 00 Sayılı Genelge, 07 April 2011. The main celebration activities within schools were listed as contests for poems, flyers/posters, and compositions, film and documentaries related with the subject, and workshops and simulation activities which involve the workshops that involve cases such as The Prophet Mohammed visits students houses as a guest.

As Büke Koyuncu indicates, with the new circular, a direct relationship between the necessary traits for being a good human and citizen and the beautiful personality of the Prophet Mohammed was established and a religion based moral perception was included within national education.⁵⁵⁵ The link between the celebrations of HBW and AKP continued during 2012 and 2013.⁵⁵⁶ The party members continued to attain the celebrations within schools. For example, in 2013, during such a celebration within Manisa Atatürk Primary School, AKP Manisa deputy stated that

“The people belonging to the last religion has started to respect their religion and prophet. 4+4+4 was accepted within the Parliament and elective courses began. On the one side Quran, on the other our Prophet’s life, the Ottoman Turkish Language, on other side physics, chemistry, social courses. Our students will grow and become moral. With Quran you will become moralized.”⁵⁵⁷

7.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter aimed to analyze AKP’s stance on formal and higher education and trace shifting prioritization between party’s neoliberal and moral-political rationalities both embedded in its ideology proposed as conservative democracy. As the official documents of the party indicate, education was one of the most significant domains that party aimed to change through various policies. Yet, the domain of education was also a highly restrained area as the most explicit effects of the February 28 Process was on this domain. Consequently, AKP’s initial stance on education became a litmus test for its claimed difference from parties that represent NOM.

Although policy-seeking goals of AKP regarding the domain of education were multiple, there were strong trade-offs between policy-seeking goal and organizational survival intensified by its low level of decisional autonomy, reification/support and systemness. Such a domestic context forced party to de-prioritize its policy-based goals such as; increasing the duration of formal education from eight to thirteen years and

⁵⁵⁵ Büke Koyuncu, “Benim Milletim...” *Ak Parti İktidarı, Din ve Ulusal Kimlik* p. 198.

⁵⁵⁶ For example during 2013 celebrations in Atatürk Manisa Primary School a student recited Quran and after that students sing the divine called “Ş71’de Bir Güneş Doğdu”. Within the celebration the JDP Manisa Deputy also distributed Quran to a group of students. “53 İlkokul Öğrencisine Kur’an-I Kerim”, *Hürriyet*, 15 April 2013.

⁵⁵⁷ “53 İlkokul Öğrencisine Kur’an-ı Kerim”, *Hürriyet*, 15 April 2013.

improving the status of Imam-Hatips during its first and second terms. More specifically, improving the status of Imam-Hatip schools was the main promise that the party made to its core conservative constituency before coming to power. Nevertheless, AKP's low level of institutionalization in general and low level of decisional autonomy and reification/support in particular, significantly increased the trade-off between its party specific goals of policy-seeking (Improving the status of Imam-Hatips), vote-maintaining and organizational survival. Under such a strong trade-off between the goals of policy-seeking, vote-maintaining and organizational survival, AKP tried to legitimize its policies regarding vocational schools through a policy-framing that was purely informed by the party's neoliberal-political rationality.

Nevertheless, during its second term and third term both policy framing, policy making, and implementation dimensions reveal that AKP's policies on education increasingly informed by its moral- political rationality, which emphasizes education's role on raising socially acceptable individuals in which the term "socially acceptable" was to a large extent defined within the parameters of religious/moral values. In that regard, the policy-based case of education stands out as a clear case of AKP's changing goal prioritization triggered by the party's changing level of party institutionalization. Starting from its second term, the party significantly improved its level of decisional autonomy, reification/support, and systemness which significantly narrowed down the aforementioned trade-offs between its party specific goals of vote-seeking, policy-seeking, ideology-seeking, and office-seeking/maintaining. Last but definitely not least, the primary goal of organizational survival became further inferior to other goals as a result of increasing levels of party institutionalization.

Regarding the external dimension of party institutionalization, during its first term, AKP's decisional autonomy was significantly constrained by extra-parliamentary veto players such as President of the Republic, the Military, Judiciary and Higher Education Council. These veto players were highly skeptical about party's declared difference from parties that represented NOM. In addition to these actors, civil society organizations fiercely opposed party's attempts regarding education during its first term. In such a constrained domestic political context, policy framing process of party's

proposals were informed by party's neoliberal-political rationality which emphasized the importance of high quality education for both country's economic development and raising competent individuals for a competitive market economy. In terms of policy-making, party's low level of decisional autonomy also forced it to extensively collaborate with the civil society organizations and experts to further increase the legitimacy of its policy based attempts on education.

Considering the internal dimensions of party institutionalization, the case of coefficient reform also demonstrates the low level of party's internal cohesiveness and leadership control over the party organization. While a group of party members aimed at pushing forward for the promises that the party made to their conservative constituency, another group of members and party leadership refrained from entering into a direct confrontation with extra-parliamentary veto players on these policies.

Starting from its second term in office, increasing levels of the party's systemness and decisional autonomy led to gradual prioritization of moral-political rationality over neoliberal-political rationality, as the goal prioritization of the party shifted from organizational survival to multiple goals of ideology-seeking and policy-seeking. In this period, the party increased its decisional autonomy *vis-à-vis* extra-parliamentary veto players such as the office of presidency, military and judiciary. Additionally, in terms of policy making, collaborative stance of the party with civil society organizations changed dramatically. The party to a large extent dismissed the critical inputs of civil society organizations with different ideological leanings and collaborated instead with those organizations having close relationships with the party. Regarding the internal dynamics, strong leadership control over the party organization significantly decreased the prospects of an intra-party dissent on party's policies on education. Thus, starting from its second term both policy framing and policy proposals of the party leadership were strongly embraced by the party organization.

Regarding the EU effects on the party, the case of education reveals that EU remained as apolitical opportunity structure for the party during its first term. Strong emphasis on the need for improving the status of vocational schools by the EU Commission led party

to use EU level policy based demands instrumentally to further increase the legitimacy of its policy proposals. Therefore, strong resonance between AKP's policy based targets and EU norms, value, and policy paradigms significantly narrowed down the aforementioned trade-offs between the party's primary goal of organizational survival and other party specific goals. Therefore, the policy-based case of education reveals that rather than being a political liability structure for the party, EU remained as a political opportunity structure by enabling AKP to pursue its party specific goals of vote-seeking/maintaining and policy-seeking without risking its primary goal of organizational survival during its first and second terms.

The comparative analysis of policy framing process between party's first term and third term reveals that although the effectiveness of EU conditionality decreased significantly starting from party's second term, AKP continued to instrumentally use EU accession process and EU level targets regarding education to further increase the legitimacy of its policy based proposals regarding education. Especially, EU's strong emphasis on need for increasing the quality and enrollment in vocational schools was instrumentally used by the party both during its first term when its decisional autonomy was severely constrained and its third term when party significantly increased the level of its decisional autonomy. Therefore, there were no changes observed in terms of instrumental usage of the EU with decreasing effectiveness of EU conditionality.

CHAPTER VIII

WELFARE RESTRUCTURING AND SOCIAL CARE PROVISION UNDER AKP RULE

Under the successive AKP governments, Turkish welfare regime in general and social security system in particular changed significantly in line with the global trends and following increasing impact of international financial institutions such as World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) due to the endemic problem of macroeconomic instability in the country. The aim of this chapter is to analyze AKP's stance on this process of welfare restructuring by focusing on its two aspects: social security reform in general and pension reform in particular, and social care which, to a large extent, entailed party's attempt to de-institutionalize the social care provision through projects and policies that aim for family-based social care provision.

Although the social security reform that the party enacted contains several aspects, considering the limits of this thesis the focus will be on pension reform which was the most debated part of the process. Within the literature on welfare restructuring in general and pension reform in particular it is suggested that reform process of the pension systems with occupation based Pay-as-you-go defined benefit (PAYG DB hereafter) schemes becomes more difficult due to the divergent interests of social players and existing veto players. Thus, it is suggested that pensions in these systems take the form of 'quasi property rights'.⁵⁵⁸ In that regard, detailed analysis of pension reform proposed by AKP will reveal the effects of intra-party and external dimensions of party's institutionalization process on policy-making, policy-framing, and implementation of pension reform. On the other hand, as indicative of party's moral-political rationality, party's policies that entailed the promotion of family-centered social care will be

⁵⁵⁸ J. Myles and Paul Pierson, "The Comparative Political Economy of Pension Reform." in *The New Politics of the Welfare State*, ed. Paul Pierson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 305-333.

analyzed. Since the choice among different options, including family-based, market-based or state-based social care also stands out as an indicator of party's ideological standpoint.

Nevertheless, as the preceding analysis will demonstrate, it would be false to conclude that the case of family-based social care is purely indicative of party's moral-political rationality. The framing process of these policies will show that it is difficult to disentangle it from party's neoliberal-political rationality as family based social provision can also be interpreted as an attempt to decrease state's role on social care provision. Additionally from a temporal perspective the policy based case of social security reform and family centered social care provision aims to show that rather than shifting prioritization of two different political rationalities embedded in its ideology; there is continuity as the party proposed both its pension reform and policies that entailed family based social care provision during its first term. In that regard, compared to other policy based cases, following analysis stands out as a deviant case proposed for the aim of better isolating the casual factors that led to shifting prioritization and increasing prevalence of party's moral-political rationality over its neoliberal-political rationality both embedded in its ideology proposed as conservative democracy.

The first two sections of the chapter will introduce the basic features of Turkish welfare regime in general and social security system, in particular prior to AKP. Second part will analyze AKP's social security reform proposal by specifically focusing on pension reform. Third part will analyze party's policy proposals regarding social care.

8.1 BASIC FEATURES OF TURKISH WELFARE REGIME

The basic features of Turkish welfare regime show strong similarities with the Southern European welfare regime and generally classified under this welfare regime type within the literature that focuses on welfare regime change, clustering and modeling.⁵⁵⁹ The

⁵⁵⁹ For welfare regime modeling see, G. Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1990). Specifically regarding Southern European welfare regime see, M. Ferrera, "The Southern Model of Welfare in Social Europe," *Journal of European Social Policy* 6, no. 1 (1996). Regarding the modelling of Turkish welfare regime and its similarities with Southern European model see, Ayşe Buğra and Çağlar Keyder, "The Turkish Welfare Regime in Transformation," *Journal of European Social Policy* 16, no.3 (2006). Mehmet Fatih Aysan,

basic characteristics of the Turkish welfare regime that share strong similarities with Southern European welfare regimes are the presence of highly fragmented, hierarchical and inegalitarian social security scheme which provided both health and pension benefits based on the occupational status. As Buğra and Keyder suggests in a labor market structure in which informal employment, unpaid family labor, and self-employment are very common, the social security system remained inadequate to provide a universal and adequate social safety net.⁵⁶⁰ While can be grouped under the Southern European welfare regime, Turkish welfare regime with its combination of Bismarckian conservative formal social security scheme that incorporates informality and clientelism is also conceptualized as an ‘eclectic social state formation’.⁵⁶¹ Before going into the analysis of AKP’s policies on social security and social care, the next section will briefly analyze both the formal and informal features and institutional arrangements of the Turkish welfare regime to better delineate the AKP’s policies regarding the social security system.

8.2 THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM PRIOR TO AKP

The formal social security system in Turkey involved a tripartite institutional structure which combined both pension and health benefits based on employment status.⁵⁶² In the second half of 1940s two social security institutions, one for blue collar workers employed in the public sector and all workers in private sector (Social Insurance Institution- *Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu*, SSK hereafter) and one for white collar employees working in state institutions including military personnel (Retirement Fund- *Emekli Sandığı*, ES hereafter) was established. In 1971, a third fund was introduced

“Reforms and Challenges: The Turkish Pension Regime Revisited,” *Emerging Markets Finance & Trade*, 49, Supplement 5 (November-December 2013). Some studies also suggest that Turkish welfare regime diverges from Southern European model on important qualitative aspects. For example see, Ayşe İdil Aybars and Dimitris Tsarouhas, “Straddling Two Continents: Social Policy and Welfare Politics in Turkey,” *Social Policy & Administration* 44, no.6 (December 2010).

⁵⁶⁰ Ayşe Buğra and Çağlar Keyder, “The Turkish Welfare Regime in Transformation,” *Journal of European Social Policy* 16, no.3 (2006).

⁵⁶¹ Ayşe Buğra and Ayşen Candaş, “Change and Continuity under and Eclectic Social Security Regime: The Case of Turkey,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 47, no.3 (2011).

⁵⁶² For a comprehensive review of the basic features of Turkish social security regime see, Ayşe İdil Aybars and Dimitris Tsarouhas, “Straddling Two Continents: Social Policy and Welfare Politics in Turkey,” *Social Policy & Administration* 44, no.6 (December 2010) and Ayşe Buğra and Çağlar Keyder, “The Turkish Welfare Regime in Transformation,” *Journal of European Social Policy*, 16, no.3 (2006).

which covered the self-employed including craftsmen, merchants, and agricultural workers (Bağ-Kur, BK hereafter). In both public health and pension provision, these funds dominated the formal part of the social security regime in Turkey until 2006. This hierarchical institutional structure of the formal social security regime provided different pension and health benefits based on occupational differences and gave the formal social security system its inegalitarian, corporatist, and hierarchical character. As Buğra and Keyder suggests under such a multi-fragmented social security schemes that tie benefits to occupational status, the formal social security regime in Turkey lacked universal social protection.⁵⁶³

Due to large portion of non-beneficiaries within the social security system, Turkish welfare regime relied on informal social security mechanisms. These informal mechanisms include ongoing transfer of income from rural hinterland to urban migrants; informal housing as a source of alternative income; and care taking and social protection role of the family.⁵⁶⁴ Nevertheless, as a result of economic liberalization process following 1980s, these informal mechanisms of social security provision became increasingly pressurized.⁵⁶⁵ To alleviate the problems of ‘new poverty’ largely stemmed from liberal economic restructuring and rural-urban migration, in 1986 Fund for the Encouragement of Social Cooperation and Solidarity was created. As Buğra and Keyder indicate the Fund was ‘an implicit admission that the family increasingly became unable to carry the social burden of care traditionally placed on it’.⁵⁶⁶ The fund also complemented by the Green Card scheme which aimed to provide health services to the poor which are excluded from the formal social security system.

⁵⁶³ Additionally, due to the existence of a labor market structure where self-employment, unpaid family labor, and informal employment are pervasive, the formal social security system remains grossly inadequate for social security provision. See, Ayşe Buğra and Çağlar Keyder, “The Turkish Welfare Regime in Transformation,” *Journal of European Social Policy* 16, no.3 (2006), 212.

⁵⁶⁴ Ayşe Buğra and Ayşen Candaş, “Change and Continuity under and Eclectic Social Security Regime: The Case of Turkey,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 47, no.3 (2011), 519.

⁵⁶⁵ First and foremost the rural-urban migration during 1990s significantly changed as the migration from Southeastern region due to escalation of terrorism formed a new type of migrants which has no economic ties with their rural origin. This type of migration, led to economic break with the countryside. Secondly, due to the changes in the urban landscape as a result of liberal economic restructuring decreased the opportunity for informal housing as a source of income due to the commodification of land. Last but not least, the traditional three-generational family started to change into nuclear family with urbanization which limited the informal role of social care and security provision of the family. Ayşe Buğra and Ayşen Candaş, “Change and Continuity under and Eclectic Social Security Regime: The Case of Turkey,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 47, no.3 (2011), 519-520 and Ayşe Buğra and Çağlar Keyder, “The Turkish Welfare Regime in Transformation,” *Journal of European Social Policy* 16, no.3 (2006), 220-22.

⁵⁶⁶ Ayşe Buğra and Çağlar Keyder, “The Turkish Welfare Regime in Transformation,” 222.

Within the social security regime, pension benefits are based on defined benefit pay-as-you-go system (PAYG DB) which was financed by contributions of employees and employers with a deficit guarantee by the state.⁵⁶⁷ Within the literature on welfare restructuring in general and pension system reform in particular it is suggested that radical reform of the pension systems that operate on PAYG DB basis becomes politically more risky as pensions generally become ‘quasi property rights’.⁵⁶⁸ Similarly, reading Turkish case, the reform attempts prior to 1999 generally enacted for political ends. As Aysan indicates, the parametric features of the public pension system changed eleven times between 1954 and 2006 in order to gain political support.⁵⁶⁹ During the 1990s the social security system began to create a deficit. The deficit of the social security system started to be compensated by state through budgetary transfers which led to increasing public sector fiscal deficit.⁵⁷⁰ The main factors that led to imbalances of the public pension system were high level of dependency ratio due to increasing number of dependents such as children; worsening active passive ratio as a result of low level of labor force participation and high levels of informal employment.⁵⁷¹ In addition to these factors, the problems of the public pension system were further aggravated by poor enforcement of the rules and low levels of compliance of employers with the rules of the pension system.⁵⁷² These factors exacerbated the imbalances of the pension system as the contributions that were collected did not cover the pension expenditures leading to a deficit in social security system.

As a result of the aforementioned imbalances in the existing public pension system and increasing public budget deficit, in 1999 a comprehensive reform for pension system was introduced by the coalition government. The reform attempt was based on a report

⁵⁶⁷ On basic features of the pension system in Turkey see, Aslı Güleş, The Politics of Pension Reform in Greece and Turkey: International Institutions as External Determinants of Adjustments,” *Global Social Policy* 14, no.1 (2014); Mehmet Fatih Aysan, “Reforms and Challenges: The Turkish Pension Regime Revisited,” *Emerging Markets Finance & Trade* 49, Supplement 5 (November-December 2013); Adem Y Elveren, Social Security Reform in Turkey: A Critical Perspective,” *Review of Radical Political Economics* 40, no.2 (Spring, 2008), 217.

⁵⁶⁸ J. Myles and P. Pierson, “The Comparative Political Economy of Pension Reform,” in *The New Politics of Welfare State*, ed. Paul Pierson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 305-333.

⁵⁶⁹ One such reform attempt was 1992 reform which replaced the minimum retirement age requirement by a minimum period of attachment to the social security system and the eligibility for pension decreased to 38 and 40 for women and men respectively. See, Mehmet Fatih Aysan, “Reforms and Challenges: The Turkish Pension Regime Revisited,” *Emerging Markets Finance & Trade*, 49 Supplement 5 (November-December 2013), 150.

⁵⁷⁰ Transfers from government budget to social security institutions for debt compensation increased from 0.4% of GNP in 1990 to 4.5% in 2004. Cited in Adem Y Elveren, “Social Security Reform in Turkey: A Critical Perspective,” *Review of Radical Political Economics* 40, no.2 (Spring, 2008), 217.

⁵⁷¹ Adem Y Elveren, “Social Security Reform in Turkey: A Critical Perspective,” 218.

⁵⁷² T. Pamukçu and E. Yeldan, “Country Profile: Turkish Public Sector and Fiscal Policy Issues,” Cited in Adem Y Elveren, Social Security Reform in Turkey: A Critical Perspective,” 218.

prepared by the International Labor Organization (ILO) which is part of the credit agreement and project for the implementation of Privatization, Technical Assistance and Social Security Network by the World Bank (WB).⁵⁷³ The ILO report proposed four reform options to the existing public pension system.⁵⁷⁴ The 1999 reform introduced both parametric changes to the basic features of the then existing PAYG DB scheme and a voluntary individual private pension scheme planned to take effect on 2003. Regarding the parametric changes introduced, the 1999 reform increased the minimum contribution period for full pension eligibility from 5000 to 7000 days and minimum age of entitlement for full pension benefits specified as 58 and 60 for women and men, respectively.⁵⁷⁵ Apart from these parametric changes, in the long run the 1999 reform foresaw a series of reform proposals including the establishment of universal health insurance, the restructuring of social assistance and services, the reform of pensions, and institutional reform which would harmonize the existing multi-pillar institutional structure.⁵⁷⁶

8.3 AKP'S SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM

Despite the aforementioned comprehensive reform, the imbalances and deficit of the social security regime continued. The first AKP government directly aimed to solve the problems of the social security system through another comprehensive reform. In its Party Program AKP clearly stated its aim to reform the social security system to make it more sustainable and universal through achieving fiscal discipline in public social expenditures.⁵⁷⁷ In the 2002 Election Manifesto document the party also clearly stated

⁵⁷³ Aslı Güleç, The Politics of Pension Reform in Greece and Turkey: International Institutions as External Determinants of Adjustments,” *Global Social Policy*, Vol.14, No.1 (2014), 81.

⁵⁷⁴ These four options were: the restructuring of the existing PAYG scheme, introduction of a Defined Contribution individual saving account replacing the public scheme, a multi-tiered system with a compulsory DC tier and the restructuring of the PAYG system with a voluntary saving component. See, Aslı Güleç, The Politics of Pension Reform in Greece and Turkey: International Institutions as External Determinants of Adjustments,” *Global Social Policy*, Vol.14, No.1 (2014), 81.

⁵⁷⁵ Aslı Güleç, The Politics of Pension Reform in Greece and Turkey: International Institutions as External Determinants of Adjustments,” 81.

⁵⁷⁶ Burcu Yakut-Cakar, “Turkey,” in *Social Policy and International Interventions in South East Europe*, eds. Bob Deacon and Paul Stubbs (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007).

⁵⁷⁷ *AK Parti Demokratikleşme ve Kalkınma Programı* (Ak Party Democratization and Development Program) (Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları, 2002), accessed, September 10, 2015, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJITAL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITAPLAR/SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI/200205071%20AK%20PARTI%20DEMOKRATIKLES>

its aim for a comprehensive social security reform to decrease the budgetary transfers from state to the system and to equalize the benefit and parametric features for eligibility through setting up a new overarching social security institution.⁵⁷⁸ Following 2002 elections, AKP prepared an Emergency Action Plan which also stated the government's aim for a social security reform.⁵⁷⁹

The AKP government proposed its social security reform in April 2005. In the White Paper prepared by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security three problems of the social security system was emphasized: parametric differences including contribution period for eligibility, different benefit schemes based on occupational status within three social security institutions; the deficits created by imbalances between contributions and benefits that lead to budgetary transfers for compensation; early retired pensioners which put additional pressure on the system.⁵⁸⁰ The 2006 reform proposal had three key components: (1) Equalizing the social security provision in general and pension system in particular under a single social security system; (2) a universal health insurance system based on means-testing; (3) means-tested social assistance for all citizens through an overarching social security institution.⁵⁸¹ Regarding the public pension system, AKP reform proposal aimed to equalize the previous system which granted privileges to civil servants by lowering incomes and pension entitlements.⁵⁸² Apart from these changes reform proposal also aimed for parametric changes on the pension system. The main parametric changes such as an increase in the contribution period from 7000 days to 9000 days for both sexes and gradual increase of the minimum official retirement age from 58 to 65 for women and from 60 to 65 for men with an aim to equalize it for both sexes at 65 by 2048.

The policy content of the pension reform initiated by the first AKP government can be analyzed through the analytical framework proposed by Pierson. Pierson suggests that

[ME%20VE%20KALKINMA%20PROGRAMI%202002/200205071%20AK%20PARTI%20DEMOKRATIKLESM](http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/dosyalar#!ak-parti-hukumet-programlari)
[E%20VE%20KALKINMA%20PROGRAMI%202002%200000_0116.pdf](http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/dosyalar#!ak-parti-hukumet-programlari)

⁵⁷⁸ *Ak Parti 2002 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi (Ak Party 2007 General Elections Election Manifesto)* Ak Parti Tanıtım ve Medya Başkanlığı (February 2015), 121, accessed, May 10, 2015, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/dosyalar#!ak-parti-hukumet-programlari>

⁵⁷⁹ 'Erdoğan Acil Eylem Planını Açıkladı,' *Hürriyet*, November 16, 2002, accessed, April 25, 2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogan-acil-eylem-planini-acikladi-110017>

⁵⁸⁰ Burcu Yakut-Cakar, "Turkey," in *Social Policy and International Interventions in South East Europe*, eds. Bob Deacon and Paul Stubbs (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007), 121.

⁵⁸¹ Mehmet Fatih Aysan, "Reforms and Challenges: The Turkish Pension Regime Revisited," *Emerging Markets Finance & Trade* 49, Supplement 5 (November-December 2013), 155.

⁵⁸² *Ibid.*, 156.

welfare restructuring include three different dimensions: Recalibration, recommodification, and cost-containment.⁵⁸³ The 2006 pension reform, to a large extent, includes all three dimensions. Institutional restructuring within a single social security institution can be included under the recalibration dimension while the policy-maker's aim to consolidate and strengthen the private pension schemes is an example of recommodification which entails decreasing dependence on state and increasing individual's reliance on the market. Cost containment involves attempts to improve the sustainability of the pension system through deficit-reduction and cost management which was the most prominent justification for the pension reform. Consequently, AKP's public pension reform proposal's proposed aim which emphasizes the sustainability problem of the pension system and positive stance of the party on the private pension pillar indicates that as part of its neoliberal political rationality, the party aimed at financial sustainability (cost-containment) and marketization (recommodification) of the system. Thus, AKP's reform proposal is in line with what is referred as the 'new pension orthodoxy' which reflects a liberal turn that entails a paradigmatic shift from a more solidarity-redistributive base to a more individualized understanding that involves parametric changes that tighten entitlements with stronger emphasis on voluntary pension schemes.⁵⁸⁴ In that regard, in terms of policy content, AKP's pension reform is illustrative of party's neoliberal political rationality which is embedded in its ideology conceptualized as conservative democracy.

Before delving into the policy making and framing of the reform proposal by the AKP government, it is important to note the influence of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), and European Union (EU) on the social security process. In Turkey, frequent incidence of financial crises made the country vulnerable to the influence of WB and IMF through stand-by

⁵⁸³ Pierson proposes these three dimensions for a better analytical understanding of variation across policy areas and countries. Simply cost-containment refers to reforms that aim at reducing public spending and deficit reduction while re-commodification dimension involves marketization of social services and social security. As a reverse process, de-commodification entails rendering a service as a matter of right which targets social protection without reliance on the market. Recalibration basically refers to policies that increase the efficiency of existing programs (rationalization) and policies that are enacted for the aim of adaption to changing social needs (updating). See, Paul Pierson, "Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies," in *The New Politics of the Welfare State*, ed. Paul Pierson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 410-457.

⁵⁸⁴ P. Taylor Gooby, "Opportunity and Solidarity," *Journal of Social Policy* 40, no.3 (2011). C. Arza, "Changing European Welfare: The New Distributional Principles of Pension Policy," in *Pension Reform in Europe*, eds. C. Arza and M. Kohli (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008) 109-131. On new pension orthodoxy please see, M. A. Orenstein, *Privatizing Pensions: The Transnational Campaign for Social Security Reform* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

agreements which force the subsequent governments to enact reforms demanded for loan provisions. Both the social security reform enacted in 1999 and the one proposed during successive AKP governments in 2006 and 2008 were part of this welfare state restructuring process initiated and implemented under the influence of these IFIs. While the 1999 reform initiated by the coalition government was an outcome of a project financed by WB and prepared by International Labour Organization (ILO), the 2006 reform proposal was proposed by the AKP government under the influence of IMF and WB. 2006 reform was an important part of the structural adjustment program of 2005 initiated by IMF and supported by the WB which made the provision of loans conditional on social security reform.

Since Turkey's achievement of candidate status, through various mechanisms EU also emphasized the need for social security reform. The EU Commission Progress Reports from 1999 to 2008 emphasized the need for social security reform that enhances financial sustainability, ameliorates the non-universal character of the social security system, and improves the administrative capacity through institutional reform.⁵⁸⁵ Same emphasis was also evident within Accession Partnership documents which emphasized the need for a sustainable and effective social security system that have effective administrative structure. As Buğra and Keyder suggests, EU accession process generally mitigates the market-oriented, liberal influence of IFIs such as IMF and WB by encouraging social-rights based approaches in social policy and employment which emphasize the problem of social exclusion.⁵⁸⁶ Nevertheless regarding public pension reform it becomes more difficult to disentangle the differences between EU induced change and the role of IFIs. As Elveren indicates it is hard to differentiate between 'neoliberal paradigm' and the 'European paradigm' in the context of social policy.⁵⁸⁷ On the contrary these are the two sides of the same coin as both EU encouraged Turkey to follow programs supported by the IMF and WB and IMF and WB advised Turkey to

⁵⁸⁵ For instance, in its 2003 Progress Report, EU Commission emphasized the inefficiency and irregularities of pension system and signified the need for a social security reform. Similarly 2005 EU Progress Report re-emphasized the necessity of social security reform. See, *European Commission, Turkey 2005 Progress Report SEC(2005) 1426*, (Brussels, 9 November 2005) accessed, May 5, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/package/sec_1426_final_progress_report_tr_en.pdf

⁵⁸⁶ Ayşe Buğra and Çağlar Keyder, "The Turkish Welfare Regime in Transformation," *Journal of European Social Policy* 16, no.3 (2006): pp 211-228, p. 225-226.

⁵⁸⁷ Adem Y Elveren, Social Security Reform in Turkey: A Critical Perspective," *Review of Radical Political Economics* 40, no.2 (Spring, 2008), 217.

continue reforms in its EU accession process.⁵⁸⁸ Nevertheless within the literature on public pension reform in Turkey it is found that the role of IMF and WB was more paramount compared to EU accession process.⁵⁸⁹

In terms of policy making process, compared to 1999 social security reform which was enacted by the coalition government, during the policy-making process of the social security reform, AKP strongly claimed that through Economic and Social Council (ESC) the government used the social dialogue mechanisms during the preparation period of the reform.⁵⁹⁰ While AKP government used social dialogue mechanisms, ESC has been criticized as a weak social dialogue mechanism due to the dominance of government representatives and lack of involvement of social partners in the decision making process.⁵⁹¹ The inefficiency of the social dialogue mechanisms manifested during the general strikes arranged by prominent labor unions. Labor Unions such as The Confederation of Public Unions (KAMU-SEN) indicated that they forced all the dialogue and compromise chances but their recommendations and demands were not considered by the government.⁵⁹² Similarly, the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-Is) and the Confederation of Real Trade Unions (Hak-Is) indicated that although they were involved within social dialogue mechanisms they also pointed out the lack of consensus and uncompromising stance of AKP government on the core principles.⁵⁹³ During the policy making process the employer confederations such as TUSIAD, TISK, and the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) to a large extent supported the social security reform proposal of AKP by emphasizing the imbalances within the old system.⁵⁹⁴ Consequently it can be argued that the AKP's

⁵⁸⁸ *Idem*.

⁵⁸⁹ Aslı Güleç, "The Politics of Pension Reform in Greece and Turkey: International Institutions as External Determinants of Adjustments," *Global Social Policy* 14, no.1 (2014).

⁵⁹⁰ During the first phase of the social security reform the ESC has met two times to discuss social security reform in March 2005 and November 2005.

⁵⁹¹ Giogros Glynos, Michael Kaeding, and Ayşe Idil Aybars, "Social Dialogue and its Contribution to Social Cohesion in Turkey," *Briefing Paper prepared for the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs*, February 2008, accessed, June 15, 2017, http://www.tepsa.eu/download/studies_for_the_european_parliament/briefings-on-turkey/social_dialogue.pdf; See also E Yıldırım and S Çalış, "The Impact of EU Accession on Turkish Industrial Relations," *Industrial Relations* 39, no.3 (2008), 223-224.

⁵⁹² "Memurlar Eyleme Gidiyor," *Hürriyet*, January 7, 2008, accessed, May 10, 2015, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/memurlar-eyleme-gidiyor-7980121>

⁵⁹³ Cited in Ali Güleç Taşdemir, "Social Dialogue and Public Pension Reform in Greece and Turkey," *European Journal of Industrial Relations* (2015), 10.

⁵⁹⁴ For a comprehensive review of the labor confederations' stance on social security reform see, Cem Utku Duyulmuş, "Social Security Reform in Turkey: Different usages of Europe in shaping the national welfare reform,"

decisional autonomy regarding social security reform in general and pension reform in particular was high vis-à-vis labor unions.

Labor Unions and Republican People's Party (RPP) in the parliament strongly opposed to AKP's social security reform proposal. The opposition against the reform proposal was broadly centered on two issues. First and foremost, most of the union confederations and the main opposition party strongly emphasized the deterioration of the so called 'acquired rights' and decreasing pension benefits.⁵⁹⁵ Secondly the opposition criticized AKP's social security reform by indicating that it was prepared not by social dialogue but mostly based on the recommendations and pressure exerted by IMF.⁵⁹⁶

Against such pressure, AKP government defended its proposal by strongly emphasizing the inherent problems of sustainability and inequality within the social security system. The party also strongly indicated that the reform proposal was not prepared as a result of the pressures from international financial institutions such as IMF and WB.⁵⁹⁷ During the parliamentary discussions of the first reform proposal on April 12, 2006, AKP group again strongly emphasized the financial sustainability and inequality problem of the existing pension system. For example the then Minister of Labor and Social Security Murat Basesgioglu emphasized that the pension system lacks norm and standard unity due to the fragmented and occupation based institutional structure. In addition to the emphasis on the inegalitarian and unjust pension system, Basesgioglu also pointed out the financial sustainability problem by referring to the total spending of the social security institutions and its pressure on country's growing debt stock due to the budgetary transfers for compensating the deficit created by social security

Paper Prepared for the RC 19 Conference, 20-22 August 2009, accessed, May 10, 2017, http://www.cccg.umontreal.ca/RC19/PDF/Duyulmus-C_Rc192009.pdf

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid*

⁵⁹⁶ During the General Council proceedings AKP government was strongly accused of following the directives of IMF instead of taking into consideration the local needs. See, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (TGNA Proceedings Review)* 87. *Birleşim*, Period: 22, Legislative Year:4, Vol.116, 12 April 2006, accessed, 12 April 12, 2017, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem22/yil4/bas/b087m.htm> Regarding union confederations Turk-Is indicated that the social security reform proposal indicates 'the dead of social state under the obligations to IMF. "Turk-Is Sosyal Güvenlik Reformuna Karşı Eyleme Çıkıyor," *Hürriyet*, March 7, 2008, accessed, May 10, 2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/turk-is-sosyal-guvenlik-reformu-na-karsi-eyleme-cikiyor-8404279>

⁵⁹⁷ "Emeklilik Tek Çatı Altında," *Internet Haber*, July 2, 2004, accessed, May 10, 2017, <http://www.internethaber.com/emeklilik-tek-cati-altinda-1078593h.htm>

spending.⁵⁹⁸ Regarding the parametric features of the pension system, AKP also pointed out the imbalances inherited in the old pension system. Basesgioglu stated that active-passive ratio of the pension system became unsustainable with 1.8 employed to 1 retired person and compared with world average of 4 it was too low and would exert more upward pressure on social security spending in the future if the core parametric features of the pension system remained intact.⁵⁹⁹

Studies that focused on the social security reform in general and pension reform in particular found that the role of IMF was paramount on AKP's social security reform process.⁶⁰⁰ Due to the frequency of macroeconomic crisis, the pension system can be viewed as one element of a general strategy of rationalization of the public sector in accordance with political and economic commitments to the IMF and World Bank. AKP's first social security reform proposal was a principal condition for loan provision within the structural adjustment program prepared by IMF in 2005.⁶⁰¹ Nevertheless, domestic political debates and policy framing by the AKP government shows that the party refrained from legitimizing its reform proposal as part of structural adjustment program. This was mainly due to increasing references to the role of IMF by the opposition parties and social partners as part of the delegitimization process of AKP's reform proposal. Against such a backdrop of domestic opposition, AKP government declined the opposition's emphasis on the role of the IMF on social security reform and signified that the influence of IMF on social security reform was only centered on technical assistance provision. To counter the opposition's claims on the role of IMF, AKP government emphasized 'European Social Model' and used EU level indicators to legitimize its social security reform proposal.

For example, during the preliminary phase of the social security reform process, the Minister of Labor and Social Security Basesgioglu stated that 'We do not want a social security reform imposed on us or ordered from us; we are seeking a stable and

⁵⁹⁸ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (TGNA Proceedings Review) 87. Birleşim*, Period: 22, Legislative Year:4, Vol.116, 12 April 2006, accessed, April 12, 2017, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem22/yil4/bas/b087m.htm>

⁵⁹⁹ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (TGNA Proceedings Review) 87. Birleşim*, Period: 22, Legislative Year:4, Vol.116, 12 April 2006, accessed, April 12, 2017, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem22/yil4/bas/b087m.htm>

⁶⁰⁰ See, Aslı Güleç, "The Politics of Pension Reform in Greece and Turkey: International Institutions as External Determinants of Adjustments," *Global Social Policy* 14, no.1 (2014) and Adem Y Elveren, "Social Security Reform in Turkey: A Critical Perspective," *Review of Radical Political Economics* 40, no.2 (Spring, 2008).

⁶⁰¹ Aslı Güleç, "The Politics of Pension Reform in Greece and Turkey: International Institutions as External Determinants of Adjustments," *Global Social Policy* 14, no.1 (2014).

sustainable social security system in accordance with the European Social Model where the experiences of IMF and World Bank can be valuable assets in the reform process. However we will like to enact a reform that is appropriate for our domestic dynamics.’⁶⁰² During the parliamentary discussions, Basesgioglu indicated that the total spending of three social security institutions in 2005 was 12.1% of the GDP which was significantly low compared to European countries. Although this level is too low, he indicated that as a result of high levels of debt stock they were trying to cut this spending to achieve macroeconomic stability.⁶⁰³ Similarly, the AKP parliamentary group member Mahfuz Guler indicated that specialists on the social security systems have been calling for ‘a social security system that enables unity of norms and standards in line with the EU standards or international norms and standards’. Guler emphasized that the social security reform proposal achieves this unity in norms and standards in line with the EU standards.⁶⁰⁴ Against the backdrop of criticisms on decreasing monthly pension benefits, Basesgioglu also referred to the EU countries and emphasized that Turkey had the highest coefficient among EU member countries.⁶⁰⁵ Same kinds of references were also used to counter the criticisms on increasing retirement ages. For example AKP deputy Agah Kafkas emphasized that in all member states of the European Union the retirement age is 65 while with their proposal, the retirement ages was set to become 65 by 2046.⁶⁰⁶

On April 19, 2006 the Law on Social Security and General Health Insurance was enacted. Nevertheless, the reform bill was vetoed by the then President of the Republic Ahmet Necdet Sezer on the ground that some of the clauses were in contradiction with the principle of ‘social state’ enshrined in the Constitution.⁶⁰⁷ The AKP government re-enacted the law without making any amendments in line with the criticisms of President Sezer. The main opposition in the parliament RPP applied to the Constitutional Court

⁶⁰² Cited in Cem Utku Duyulmuş, “Social Security Reform in Turkey: Different usages of Europe in shaping the national welfare reform,” *Paper Prepared for the RC 19 Conference, 20-22 August 2009*, accessed, May 10, 2017, http://www.cccg.umontreal.ca/RC19/PDF/Duyulmus-C_Rc192009.pdf

⁶⁰³ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (TGNA Proceedings Review)* 88. *Birleşim*, Period: 22, Legislative Year:4, Vol.116, 13 April 2006, accessed, April 12, 2017, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem22/yil4/bas/b088m.htm>

⁶⁰⁴ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (TGNA Proceedings Review)* 88. *Birleşim*, Period: 22, Legislative Year:4, Vol.116, 13 April 2006, accessed, April 12, 2017, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem22/yil4/bas/b088m.htm>

⁶⁰⁵ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (TGNA Proceedings Review)* 89. *Birleşim*, Period: 22, Legislative Year:4, Vol.117, 18 April 2006, accessed, April 12, 2017, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem22/yil4/bas/b089m.htm>

⁶⁰⁶ *Ibid*

⁶⁰⁷ “Genel Sağlık Sigortası Yasası’nı Veto,” *CNN Turk*, May 10, 2006, accessed, May 2, 2017, <http://www.cnnturk.com/2006/turkiye/05/10/genel.saglik.sigortasi.yasasina.veto/179137.0/index.html>

and the Court annulled certain provisions of the law, leading to a revision of the draft law.⁶⁰⁸ Following the Courts annulment decision, AKP government postponed the social security reform to 2008 with strong indication that the aim of the AKP for social security reform remained intact.⁶⁰⁹

Following the election victory of AKP in 2007, the party significantly increased its decisional autonomy following the election of Abdullah Gül as President of the Republic. Additionally, the annulment decision of the Constitutional Court provided the second AKP government with an opportunity to focus only on parametric changes. The main justification for social security reform which entailed lowering the budgetary pressure of social security system for macroeconomic stability was approved by the Constitutional Court's decision.⁶¹⁰ Following the 2007 elections, in February 2008 the new social security reform proposal of the AKP government started to be discussed on Parliamentary Planning and Budget Commission. In the meantime the AKP government continued to bargain with the social partners through ESC meetings and meetings held with Labor Platform. Despite the strong reactions of labor unions, AKP government brought the social security reform proposal to the parliament. Rather than being a by-product of recommendations and criticisms of the social partners such as labor unions, the revisions made on the second proposal was mainly a result of AKP government's aim to comply with order of the Constitutional Court.⁶¹¹

Broadly, the changes compared to previous reform proposal constituted the main demarcation point between parties in opposition and AKP. With regard to specific

⁶⁰⁸ As Çelik suggests there were certain differences between President Sezer's veto and Constitutional Court's decision. While the former strongly referred to the 'social state principle' enshrined in the Constitution, the latter emphasized the acquired rights of the civil servants. The Court also annulled some of the parametric changes regarding pension system such as pension contribution period and minimum retirement age. Nevertheless, the Court did not challenge the general aim to achieve actuarial balance through parametric changes but reviewed the main parametric changes introduced by the government's proposal. In that regard the Court rather than challenging the main aim of rationalization of the social security system through benefit cuts and increases in contributions, emphasized the 'acquired rights' of civil servants and challenged the degree of parametric changes. For a detailed critical analysis of President Sezer's veto and Constitutional Court's decision for annulment, See Aziz Çelik, "Sosyal Güvenlik: Refrom Değil Karşı Devrim (Social Security: Not a Reform but a Counter Revolution) *Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı Almanak 2006 Analizleri* (2006): pp 288-314, accessed May 10, 2017, http://www.academia.edu/2761766/Sosyal_G%C3%BCvenlik_Reform_De%C4%9Fil_Kar%C5%9F%C4%B1_Devrimi

⁶⁰⁹ "Başesgioglu: Emeklileri Mağdur Etmeyeceğiz," *Hürriyet*, December 20, 2006, accessed, May 5, 2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/basesgioglu-emeklileri-magdur-etmeyecegiz-5648359>

⁶¹⁰ Aziz Çelik, "Sosyal Güvenlik: Refrom Değil Karşı Devrim (Social Security: Not a Reform but a Counter Revolution) *Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı Almanak 2006 Analizleri* (2006): 288-314.

⁶¹¹ Aslı Güleç, The Politics of Pension Reform in Greece and Turkey: International Institutions as External Determinants of Adjustments," *Global Social Policy* 14, no.1 (2014), 82.

clauses concerning pension system, the opposition criticized the government on the core parametric features of the proposed reform such as minimum retirement age, pay increase for actual period of service, and minimum contribution period. While the minimum retirement age kept intact, the minimum contribution period was decreased from 9000 days to 7200 days in line with objection of Constitutional Court.⁶¹²

In terms of policy-making AKP government, rather than policy-making through the social dialogue mechanisms, tried to make minor changes in line with the Constitutional Court's objections to prevent another annulment. To achieve this, AKP government used references to the 'EU Social Model' and examples on EU member countries during the debates on the proposal in Planning and Budget Commission. One of the clauses that were annulled by the Constitutional Court was on pay increase for actual period of service for certain occupational groups. To counter strong opposition during sessions in Planning and Budget Commission, AKP government appointed the Deputy General Director of Insurance Affairs Celal Ozcan to study the pay increase for an actual period of service within the EU countries. During the presentation made in Planning and Budget Commission Ozcan stated that they adopted the EU norms and standards regarding the pay increase for an actual period of service to prevent another annulment by the Constitutional Court.⁶¹³ Similarly, the then Justice Minister and Government Spokesman Cemil Çiçek emphasized that "The social security reform proposal that is discussed in the Turkish Parliament is related for alignment with the EU *acquis communautaire* as well as our own national program."⁶¹⁴

Following the social security reform enacted in 2008, successive AKP governments to a large extent maintained the parametric and institutional features of the pension system. Nevertheless, as part of its neoliberal political rationality, AKP aimed to increase the number of people within individual voluntary pension pillar. One such attempt was to introduce state subsidy for people who joined to the IPS in 2012. The introduction of

⁶¹² One of the reasons for annulment of the social security reform proposal by the Constitutional Court was the proposed increase in contribution period. For the analysis of Court's annulment decision see, Aziz Çelik, "Sosyal Güvenlik: Refrom Değil Karşı Devrim (Social Security: Not a Reform but a Counter Revolution) *Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı Almanak 2006 Analizleri* (2006), 288-314.

⁶¹³ TBMM Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu (TGNA Planning and Budgetary Commission), 4 March 2008 Komisyon Tutanakları (Commission Proceedings), accessed, May 1, 2017, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/planbutce/ssgss/04_03_2008.htm

⁶¹⁴ Cited in, Cem Utku Duyulmuş, "Social Security Reform in Turkey: Different usages of Europe in shaping the national welfare reform," *Paper Prepared for the RC 19 Conference, 20-22 August 2009*, accessed, May 10, 2017, http://www.cccg.umontreal.ca/RC19/PDF/Duyulmus-C_Rc192009.pdf

IPS was justified by the AKP government as an effective tool to increase personal savings. Moreover, at the time of writing the AKP government also introduced compulsory individual pension system. Consequently, it can be argued that the successive AKP governments prioritized the IPS pillar of the pension system in line with the strategy of recommodification of the pension system which is a clear manifestation of AKP's neoliberal political rationality embedded in its ideology framed as Conservative Democracy.

The preceding analysis of public pension reform demonstrates that during its first term in office, AKP proposed its first social security reform which was indicative of party's neoliberal political rationality and in parallel with the so-called 'new pension orthodoxy' which centers on cost-containment, and recommodification. As a result of AKP's low level of decisional autonomy against veto players such as President of the Republic and Constitutional Court, the party forced to postpone its social security reform following veto decision of President Sezer and annulment by Constitutional Court afterwards. While the President's veto centered on the basic mentality behind the proposal with strong emphasis on the principle of 'social state', Constitutional Court's decision for annulment was narrower and centered on the clauses concerning the acquired rights of civil servants. This gave AKP a chance to re-introduce its proposal for the second time following 2007 General Elections which significantly improved party's decisional autonomy as former party and cabinet member was elected as President of the Republic. Consequently, AKP made minor parametric changes to alleviate another risk of annulment by the Constitutional Court.

Moreover, due to the general institutional features of social dialogue mechanisms, strong opposition of union confederations against the social security reform did not constituted a major factor for revision of the draft as AKP had the support of the employer confederations. In that regard, the decisional autonomy of the party vis-à-vis union confederations was high from the outset. Consequently, during its second term, AKP government, to a large extent, made amendments to the clauses that were annulled by the Constitutional Court instead of prioritizing the demands of union confederations.

Despite the fact that AKP explicitly indicated its aim to revise the existing stand-by agreement with IMF which entailed social security reform to rationalize public budget,

against strong opposition on IMF's role on the preparation of the reform, the party declined the connection between IMF stand-by agreement process and social security reform. Against the backdrop of strong opposition that emphasized the prioritization of IMF's demands instead of social partners, AKP instrumentally used the so-called 'EU Social Model' to increase the legitimacy of its social security reform in general and public pension reform, in particular. Moreover, during the second phase of the reform process, the party also used EU policy prescriptions and policy level examples from EU member states to alleviate the risk of another annulment by the Constitutional Court.

8.4 FAMILY-CENTERED SOCIAL CARE PROVISION AT THE INTERSECTION OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL RATIONALITY AND MORAL POLITICAL RATIONALITY

While the successive AKP governments focused on recalibration, cost-containment, and recommodification dimensions of welfare restructuring, which are indicative of party's neoliberal political rationality, the party also prioritized and institutionalized the traditional social security and care role of the family which constituted an important part of old social security system's informal and traditional mechanisms. One clear manifestation of such an approach is AKP's strong emphasis on family's prominent role as a social care institution. As part of its conservative political rationality, right from its first party program, the party emphasized the significance of Turkish family for social security provision. In its 2002 Party Program while the party emphasized the need for expansion of social care institutions as a result of pacing shift from three-generational family to nuclear family, it also explicitly stated its aim to launch new programs that aim family based social care provision for children and elderly.⁶¹⁵ In its 2002 Election Manifesto, AKP explicitly emphasized the role of family in social security: 'the sustainability of family which is a strong social security institution has become more important in the process of change that we are experiencing.' In the subsequent official

⁶¹⁵ *AK Parti Demokratikleşme ve Kalkınma Programı* (Ak Party Democratization and Development Program) (Ankara: AK Parti Yayınları, 2002), accessed, May 10, 2015, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJITAL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITAPLAR/SIYASİ%20PARTİ%20YAYINLARI/200205071%20AK%20PARTİ%20DEMOKRATİKLEŞME%20VE%20KALKINMA%20PROGRAMI%202002/200205071%20AK%20PARTİ%20DEMOKRATİKLEŞME%20VE%20KALKINMA%20PROGRAMI%202002%200000_0116.pdf

documents AKP strongly asserted the prominent role of family as a social security and care provider. For example in its 2003 Government Program party clearly emphasized its aim to ‘keep intact and healthy the social organism of the family that is capable of protecting the individual.’⁶¹⁶ Within the same document the traditional social role of the family was emphasized by the party: ‘the family is the foundation of society. Societal solidarity, happiness and peace depend on the family. In spite of all the negative experiences and economic hardships we have been through, if we as a society are still intact, we owe it to our strong family structure.’⁶¹⁷

Same kind of emphasis on family centered social care was also evident in the speeches of AKP leadership. On numerous occasions AKP leadership indicated that one of the defining elements of party’s conservative ideology was their aim to strengthen the institution of family.⁶¹⁸ Party leadership also explicitly indicated the prominent role of family as an institution of social care and unity provider during economic hardships.⁶¹⁹ As Yazıcı suggests this family centered approach to social care was propagated through a discourse that elevates the three-generational family instead of promotion of nuclear family which was the norm during the modernization process.⁶²⁰ For example on numerous occasions AKP leadership emphasized the need for adult/married children to take care for their mothers and fathers when they get old and labelled the mentality which sees leaving away parents as modernity as a sign of cultural degeneration.⁶²¹

⁶¹⁶ *Ak Parti 59. Hükümet Programı (Ak Party 59th Government Program)*, accessed, October 10, 2016, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/dosya/66517>

⁶¹⁷ *Ak Parti 59. Hükümet Programı (Ak Party 59th Government Program)*, accessed, October 10, 2016, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/dosya/66517>

⁶¹⁸ For example during his speech at Fourth Family Council meeting Erdoğan indicated that the defining element of their conservatism is family. See, ‘IV. Aile Şurası “Aile ve Yoksulluk” Kararları,’ *Başbakanlık Aile Araştırma Kurumu Başkanlığı*, 18-20 Mayıs, accessed, May 10, 2017, http://ailetoplum.aile.gov.tr/data/54293ea2369dc32358ee2b25/kutuphane_42_iv_aile_surasi_kararlari.pdf

⁶¹⁹ For example, Prime Minister Erdoğan emphasized the role of family on social cohesion and social security by referring to the social turmoil within Argentina at the time and indicated that if we would not have our strong family structure and values and we also could be Argentina. “Arjantin Olmaktan Aile Yapımız Kurtardı,” *Hürriyet*, May 19, 2004, accessed, May 10, 2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/arjantin-olmaktan-aile-yapimiz-kurtardi-226708>

⁶²⁰ See, Berna Yazıcı, “The Return to Family: Welfare State, State, and Politics of the Family in Turkey,” *Anthropological Quarterly* 85, no.1 (Winter 2012) pp.103-140.

⁶²¹ Berna Yazıcı, “The Return to Family: Welfare State, State, and Politics of the Family in Turkey,” 112. For example the then Prime Minister Erdoğan criticized the intellectual and rich people for leaving their parents to residencies and indicated that rather than living with a social care personal it is important for elderly to live with their children. See, “Erdoğan: İleride ‘Yandım Allah’ dememek için üç çocuk yapın,” *Hürriyet*, November 6, 2008, accessed, May 10, 2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogan-ileride-yandim-allah-dememek-icin-uc-cocuk-yapin-10294635>

Within the context of such phrasing the definition of ideal family was based on three-generational family which includes parents, children, and elderly.⁶²²

One clear manifestation of re-prioritization of social care function of family is the policies that aim to transform the social care system from state-provided institutionalized care to family-based social care for children and elderly. As part of this process, in 2005, AKP government initiated the ‘Return to Family’ project which aims to decrease the number of institutionalized children by sending them to their families with provision of cash transfers to the parents. Return to Family policy came to the agenda following the scandals regarding the children residencies operated by the Social Services and Children’s Protection Agency (SSCPA).⁶²³ While the opposition reacted to the scandals by emphasizing the inadequate state welfare spending and the privatization of social services, AKP emphasized the need for prioritizing traditional Turkish family’s role on social care provision.⁶²⁴

The problems regarding social care institutions administered by state was also emphasized by EU Commission in its 2006 progress report. In its 2006 Progress Report, EU Commission indicated that ‘ill-treatment of children in an orphanage of the Social Services and Child Protection Institution in Malatya revealed the shortcomings of the child protection system in Turkey’.⁶²⁵ Within the subsequent reports, EU commission also proposed policy solutions which entailed decreasing the number of children within state-administered social care institutions through extending parental care. For example in its 2007 Progress Report, EU Commission concluded that ‘efforts are required to review the existing standards of care and protection.’ Additionally, EU Commission also emphasized the need for intensification of foster parenting as an alternative to institutional care.⁶²⁶

⁶²² See, “Erdoğan’dan Kürtaj ve Sezaryen Yorumu,” *CnnTurk*, June 19, 2013, accessed, May, 10 2017, <http://www.cnntrk.com/2013/guncel/06/19/erdogandan.kurtaj.ve.sezaryen.yorumu/712176.0/index.html>

⁶²³ One such case was the so-called Malatya scandal which involved secret camera footage of physical violence towards children within a residential home operated by the state social work agency.

⁶²⁴ Berna Yazıcı, “The Return to Family: Welfare State, State, and Politics of the Family in Turkey,” p. 118

⁶²⁵ See, *European Commission , Turkey 2006 Progress Report SEC(2006) 1390*, (Brussels, 8 November 2006), p.19 accessed, May 5, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/tr_sec_1390_en.pdf

⁶²⁶ *European Commission , Turkey 2007 Progress Report SEC(2007) 1436*, (Brussels, 6 November 2007), p.41, accessed May 5, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf

The main legitimization of the project was based on questioning the quality and utility of these institutions for children's material and mental wellbeing. The AKP government defended the project by emphasizing the prominent role of family on healthy childcare.⁶²⁷ The emphasis on family-centered social care extended through new projects that target different need groups. In its 2012 party program AKP further emphasized its aim to switch to familial social care by emphasizing that 'younger generations will be encouraged to take care and live together with elderly parents, and for children in need for protection, return to family and foster family services will be prioritized'.⁶²⁸ As part of this strategy, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies started a new program which aimed to minimize the number of children residing in foster residencies.⁶²⁹ Similarly, regarding elder and disabled people the Ministry also targeted to decrease the population in state institutions by providing care service and cash transfers to families.⁶³⁰

The policy framing of Return to Family project was based on the arguments emphasizing the importance and utility of social care provision inside the families. The basic motto for legitimization of the project of de-institutionalization of social care was proposed as 'transformation from dormitory system to a system that enables care in a family environment'.⁶³¹ Both the Ministry and party leadership praised the policies that foresaw de-institutionalization of social care services as part of party's social policy orientation that aims to strengthen the integrity of traditional Turkish family. While the de-institutionalization of social care was framed as a policy which bolsters and strengthens the strength and integrity of the family and enables children, elderly, and disabled to have care services within the affectionate environment of family, the cost-containment dimension of the projects is also proposed as another justification of the policies. After the initiation of the Return to Family project, the SSCPA indicated that

⁶²⁷ "5 bin Çocuk Ailesine Teslim Edildi," *Hürriyet*, March 3, 2008, accessed, May 1, 2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/5-bin-cocuk-ailesine-teslim-edildi-8306079>

⁶²⁸ *Ak Parti 2023 Siyasi Vizyonu (Ak Party 2023 Political Vision)* 30 September 2012, accessed, May 1 2017, www.akparti.org.tr/upload/documents/akparti2023siyasivizyonuturkce.pdf

⁶²⁹ This new project differs from legal adoption as there is a time limit for adoption and protective families does not have a legal right over the adopted children for a limited period of time. See, "İşte Sıcak Eve Dönüş Projesi," *Akşam*, December 23, 2012, accessed, May 2, 2017, <http://www.aksam.com.tr/guncel/iste-sicak-eve-donus-projesi--155752h/haber-155752>

⁶³⁰ "Evde Bakım Hizmetlerinde Yeni Dönem," *Haber7*, October 27, 2013, accessed, May 3, 2017, <http://www.haber7.com/genel-saglik/haber/1088653-evde-bakim-hizmetinde-yeni-donem>

⁶³¹ "Siz Sordunuz Bakan Çubukçu Yanıtladı," *Hürriyet*, March 15, 2007, accessed, May 3, 2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/siz-sordunuz-bakan-cubukcu-yanitladi-6129969>

with such projects, instead of institutional social care services which have high level of cost, low-cost services that aim at protective, preventive, and supportive social services was prioritized.⁶³² Similarly, during her fieldwork Yazıcı found that many of the policy-makers emphasized the high level of monthly cost for institutional care.⁶³³

The case of AKP's de-institutionalization of social care through policies and projects that emphasize family based social care model stands out as an aim for updating the role of family as a social security provider in an era of family decline. Right from the beginning, AKP strongly indicated its aim to strengthen the institution of family and make family the focal point of social policies. Although the scandals that involved state-led children residencies revealed the technical need for policies that aim to ameliorate public provision of social care, AKP's interpretation and choice of available policies that involve state, market, and family is indicative of AKP's ideological stance. AKP's response to the problems of social care provision is clearly revealing of party's moral political rationality which prioritizes the institution of family in social care provision. Nevertheless, the policy framing also indicates that the Return to Family and other policies that aim for family based social provision was based on party's neoliberal political rationality which entails state's decreasing role on social care provision. Consequently, it would be a false conclusion to conclude that party's emphasis on family based social care is an indicator of party's moral political rationality.

Moreover, from a temporal perspective there is no shift in AKP's policies regarding social care that are indicative of increasing prevalence of party's moral-political rationality over its neoliberal-political rationality. Right from beginning in its official documents party explicitly emphasized its aim to promote family based social care. Although some women's NGOs opposed to party's promotion of family based social care, AKP's decisional autonomy is relatively high as party did not receive any opposition from state institutions. This was mainly due to the prominent role of family institution as a social security and care provider within Turkish welfare regime. Within such a context, despite strong emphasis on de-institutionalization of social care by EU

⁶³² For example the then Deputy General Director of SSCPA explicitly indicated that the cost of institutionalized care per child is 750million TL and through family care two children can have social care within family environment at same cost. See, 'Sosyal Hizmetler ve Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu Genel Müdürlüğü 1. Sosyal Hizmetler Şurası' 19-21 April 2004, Ankara, accessed, May 5, 2017, http://www.huzurevleri.org.tr/docs/SHCEK_BirinciSosyalHizmetlerSurasi.pdf

⁶³³ Berna Yazıcı, "The Return to Family: Welfare State, State, and Politics of the Family in Turkey," 119.

Commission, policy framing process indicates that AKP did not use EU policy prescriptions and standards instrumentally to enhance its decisional autonomy.

8.5 CONCLUSION

The preceding analysis shows that from a temporal perspective, AKP's stance on social security and social care did not change. Thus, compared to other policy domains in which there are clear signs of increasing prevalence of party's moral-political rationality over its neoliberal political rationality, the policy based case of social security reform and social care stands out as a deviant case in which rather than change there is continuity in terms of party's stance on social security and social care.

The case of social security reform in general and pension reform in particular demonstrates that party's low level of decisional autonomy led to vetoes of both President and Constitutional Court. While President's veto decision based on the general direction of reform with emphasis on social state principle, Constitutional Court annulled certain clauses without challenging the need for a social security reform. In that regard, following the election of Abdullah Gül as President, AKP only focused on certain clauses, mostly related with civil servants. Moreover, despite the fact that there were strong reactions from union confederations, the party enjoyed high level of decisional autonomy from labor unions both due to its weak institutional ties with them but more importantly due to weak social dialogue mechanisms in which balance of power favored employer federations and the government. Last but not least, employer federations also sidelined with AKP's attempt for welfare restructuring. Overall, following its second term the party significantly improved its decisional autonomy.

Regarding party's stance on social care, while AKP's choice of assigning the role of social care to families instead of market and/or state is indicative of party's moral political rationality, the policy framing process of 'Return to Family' and other projects demonstrates that party used both conservative justification by emphasizing the prominence of family on social care provision and liberal justifications centered on cost-containment simultaneously. Thus, disentangling the changing prevalence of different

political rationalities of the party becomes more difficult regarding the case of social care. Additionally, apart from feminist organizations, AKP's did not receive strong opposition for its family-centered social care projects mainly due to prevalence of basic traditional informal care provider role of family. Consequently, the party extended its family centered social care policies throughout the years without facing strong opposition.

The case of social security reform and social care also demonstrates the instrumental nature of Europeanization process for political parties. Regarding pension reform, the most important external actor on pension reform was IMF due to the conditional process of loan provision. Nevertheless against subsequent emphasis on party's unconditional surrender to IMF's demands by the opposition, AKP government to a large extent justified its reform proposal by referencing to EU accession process and 'EU Social Model'. The case of social care demonstrates a different pattern in terms of instrumentalization of EU accession process. Following the scandalous events in childcare facilities administered by state, subsequent EU progress reports emphasized the deficiencies of state-administered child care institutions and called for de-institutionalization of social care services. Nevertheless, as policy framing process of social care shows, there were no references to the EU despite the fact that party's stance and EU's stance on social care were in parallel as both emphasized the need for de-institutionalization and family-based social care provision.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

This research aimed to explain incremental changes that political parties experience. Although party change theories shed light on the main explanatory variables that trigger party change, the main problem in this literature is the discrepancy between the operational definition of the dependent variable (party change) and explanatory factors proposed to explain the process. While the concept of party change is defined very broadly including both pungent and incremental changes that parties experience, the explanatory factors proposed by party change theories such as leadership change, factional change, and/or environmental shock to a large extent explains pungent changes that political parties experience.

Based on the general premise of parties being conservative organizations that resist change, party change theories posit that change should be a byproduct of a significant environmental and/or intra-party development having direct effect on parties' primary goals. Since the primary goal that parties pursue is vote-seeking, the conventional argument defines electoral defeat as 'the mother of party change'. While including party goals into the equation significantly increases the analytical utility of party change theories, depicting the primary goal of political parties also continues to remain as an analytically hard task.

The case of AKP is an interesting case for testing the aforementioned theories of party change for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the main explanatory variable, which is proposed as electoral defeat was not present as the party increased its vote share in three consecutive general elections. Secondly, the party remained under the charismatic leadership of Erdoğan throughout its three terms. Lastly, the party did not experience a significant factional rivalry. Based on these preliminary findings the main

question that this research sought to address was: Despite the absence of main explanatory factors, what factors explain the incremental change that AKP experienced throughout its three terms as party in government?

While there are different domains proposed for studying party change, this research sought to explain ideological change the AKP went over throughout its three terms under single party leadership. Another short coming in the empirical studies of party change is their focus on parties' election manifestos to trace shifting ideological leanings of political parties on the left-right spectrum. Although this method is useful for large-n studies and provides at least a benchmark for ideological evaluation of political parties, it fails to trace the incremental ideological change that parties went over due to the intermittent nature of election manifestos. Additionally, for parties in government, relying only on official documents leaves out significant qualitative data that could be collected by focusing on parties' policies, policy-making, policy-framing and policy-implementation. Through employing an action-oriented definition of ideology which centers on mentalities and forms of political reasoning that structures and gives content to parties' discourses and policies, this research sought to trace shifting prioritization and changing prevalence between AKP's neoliberal-political rationality and moral political rationality based on conceptual framework proposed by Brown.

To answer the core question, this research proposed a new framework that has more explanatory power for analyzing incremental ideological change that AKP experienced. Initially building up on the relationship between the level of party institutionalization and party's capacity to attain party specific goals of vote-seeking, policy seeking, office seeking, and ideology-seeking, this research sought to show that there is a link between the level of trade-offs that parties has to make between the aforementioned specific goals that political parties pursue and their level of institutionalization.

The chapter on the genetic code of AKP reveals that due to its peculiar internal and external party formation characteristics, AKP's genetic phase and institutionalization phase to a large extent differs from the institutionalization phase of parties in consolidated democracies. Especially, the ongoing effects of February 28 Process both severely decreased the external legitimacy and decisional autonomy of the party. In

such a domestic political context, organizational survival remained the primary goal for the party which further increased the trade-offs between its conventional party specific goals of policy-seeking and vote-seeking/maintaining.

AKP had strong policy-based goals which were manifest in the immediate action plan document prepared by the party right after its first electoral victory including significant policy-based goals ranging from social security to education. In that regard, the party surely was a policy-seeking party right from the beginning. Additionally, although party's core constituency was voters who voted for previous political parties that represent NOM, the party's first electoral victory was mainly based on protest votes. Therefore, AKP was a party that was in need to pursue vote-seeking/maintaining and office-maintaining goals. It had to consolidate a diverse voter base ranging from conservative voters to voters with liberal leanings through policy-seeking. Such peculiar characteristics of its genetic phase including low levels of legitimacy, low levels of decisional autonomy both *vis-à-vis* extra-parliamentary institutions and its initial voter base indicates that the construction of its ideology to a large extent remained a 'contingent' process on the restrictive domestic political environment rather than being a party based 'choice'. Consequently, party's ideology proposed as conservative democracy was significantly loosely defined compared to more doctrinaire ideologies.

The chapter on AKP's ideology of conservative democracy reveals that the party's loosely defined ideology entails both basic attributes of neoliberal-political rationality and moral-political rationality. Nevertheless, a detailed analysis of its initial basic features also demonstrates that party's neoliberal-political rationality and liberal-juridical political rationality significantly prevailed over its moral political rationality. This research aimed to show that the aforementioned peculiarities of AKP's genetic phase and its initially low levels of institutionalization severely increased the level off trade-offs between its specific goals of vote-seeking, policy-seeking, office-seeking, and ideology-seeking which led party to de-prioritize its policies that are indicative of its moral-political rationality.

To better analyze the changing levels of party institutionalization, this research used the basic dimensions of the process proposed in the literature as indicators for delineating the level of party institutionalization. The empirical analysis of AKP's changing levels

of party institutionalization reveals that the party, starting from its second term, significantly improved its level of institutionalization both internally and externally. Internally, the basic indicators that were analyzed were the level of organizational development which was measured by focusing on qualitative indicators such as the presence of central bureaucracy with an organizational structure that has territorial comprehensiveness and control over local party organizations and financial autonomy. Additionally, for measuring both the attitudinal dimension of internal party institutionalization this research also used quantitative indicators such as membership strength and membership density. Secondly, another indicator for the level of intra party dimension of institutionalization is the degree of organizational cohesion which entails ideological composition of party organization and also relationship between party leadership and party organization.

Turning to external dimensions of party institutionalization, this research also analyzed changing levels of AKP's decisional autonomy by focusing on party's changing relationship vis-à-vis extra-parliamentary veto players in its domestic political environment throughout its three consecutive terms as party in government. Additionally, the attitudinal indicators of party institutionalization which are proposed as reification and support was also analyzed through changes in AKP's electoral environment by focusing on previously conducted survey research which provides sufficient evidence on AKP's changing relationship with its voter base.

The temporal comparative analysis of changing levels of AKP's institutionalization between 2002-2007 and 2007-2013 reveals that the party's level of institutionalization significantly increased starting from its second term. Considering the internal indicators of party institutionalization, due to the general framework of Law on Political Parties, AKP's enjoyed strong levels of organizational development with strong local party organizations which significantly increased its territorial reach organizationally and yet, with a strong centralized party organization that can control the local organizations. Nevertheless, regarding the degree of organizational cohesion, the party showed high levels of intra-party ideological heterogeneity during its first term.

To contain the prospects of organizational instability, initially, the intra-party democracy was one of the most significant features of AKP's party constitution.

Starting from its first term onwards, through top-down structural amendments to the Party Constitution, the leadership's grip on party organizations significantly increased through changing candidate selection procedure. In addition to the increasing leadership domination over the party organization, AKP leadership also further improved its grip on party organization through consent based (bottom-up) acceptance of leadership as a result of leadership style and personality of party leadership. Such a top-down and bottom-up process of leadership domination over party organization significantly decreased the prospects of organizational instability of factional rivalry and intra-party dissent.

The empirical chapter on external indicators of party institutionalization reveals that the party significantly improved its level of decisional autonomy and reification/support starting from its second term. Firstly, following the election of Abdullah Gül to the office of presidency, the party significantly improved its room of maneuver as the then previous President Sezer remained one of the most ardent veto players which severely decreased AKP's decisional autonomy during its first term. Secondly, the civil-military relations changed significantly during AKP's first term further increasing the party's decisional autonomy. Nevertheless, starting from its second term the balance of power between the Military and AKP significantly changed to the advantage of the latter as a result of alleged coup plots. The High Judiciary was also remained a significant extra-parliamentary veto player against the AKP both during its first and second terms. In fact the party was on the edge of sharing the fate of past political parties as it faced a closure case which led only to a financial fine against the party. AKP's decisional autonomy was significantly improved as a result of the constitutional amendment package introduced after the referendum that was held in 2010. The party's grip on higher judiciary was further improved through a series of laws that aimed to curb the influence of Fethullahist Terrorist Organization within the judiciary.

To trace the effect of aforementioned changing levels of party institutionalization on ideological change experienced by the AKP, this research analyzed three policy-based cases: Women's Rights and Gender, Education, and Social Security. These policy based case studies are selected intentionally as they are both indicative of AKP's neo-liberal political rationality and moral-political rationality which enables to better delineate

changing prioritization between the two rationalities which are both embedded in the party's ideological construction of conservative democracy. Rather than solely focusing on official documents or policies themselves to better delineate the link between independent variable (changing levels of party institutionalization) and dependent variable (incremental ideological change) the policy-based analysis also focused on policy-making processes through process-tracing to better delineate the effect of changing levels of party institutionalization on policy-making process of cases that are indicative of incremental ideological change. Last but definitely not least, detailed analysis of policy-framing and policy implementation was made to trace whether there is a shifting discourse that is indicative of changing prioritization between neoliberal-political rationality and moral-political rationality.

The policy based case analysis of women's rights/gender, and education reveals that the party's policies were both informed by its neoliberal and liberal juridical-political rationalities during its first term. Nevertheless the detailed analysis of AKP's stance on women's rights/gender and education also reveals that party tried to enact policies which target the demands of its core conservative constituency. In that regard, in terms of policy content the case of adultery and its efforts to change the status of Imam-Hatip schools demonstrate that party's policies during its first term were also indicative of its moral political rationality. Thus, from a purely policy content aspect, policy based case analysis shows that there is no clear shift that is indicative of AKP's shifting prioritization between its neoliberal and moral-political rationalities.

The analysis of policy-making process sought to show the effects of changing levels of party institutionalization on AKP's shifting prioritization between its neoliberal and moral-political rationalities. The case of women's rights/gender reveals that AKP's decisional autonomy was severely constrained by the presence of highly vital and institutionalized women's NGOs which significantly pressurized the party, leading to legislations that target gender mainstreaming. Adultery was the most significant policy-based attempt by the party to target its conservative constituency. Nevertheless, as a consequence of strong pressure it received from women's NGOs and more importantly from EU, the party was forced to change its stance. AKP's policy based attempts to improve the status of Imam-Hatips during its first term also demonstrate that due to the

low level of its decisional autonomy *vis-à-vis* extra-parliamentary veto players, the party withdraw its policy under strong pressure of the Military, Presidency, and civil society organizations.

The cases of adultery and Imam-Hatips were the two main litmus tests for the AKP on its claimed difference from NOM. Although improving the status of Imam Hatip schools was one of the main policy-based promises that it made to its core conservative constituency, AKP strategically withdrew the aforementioned policy-based attempts as the level of trade-off between its party specific goals of policy-seeking, vote-seeking, and organizational survival was significantly high due to low levels of party institutionalization.

The analysis of policy-making during the party's second and third terms reveal a completely different picture compared to its first term. Firstly, the party significantly improved not only its decisional autonomy *vis-à-vis* civil society organizations but also improved its decisional autonomy in relation to extra-parliamentary veto players such as the military, presidency, and high judiciary. Moreover, rather than cooperating with civil society organizations, the policy-making process regarding the cases of women's employment and 4+4+4 legislation reveals that party selectively cooperated with civil society organizations which are ideologically closer to the party.

Although in terms of actual content of policies we do not see a clear shift that is indicative of party's increasing prioritization of moral-political rationality over its neoliberal-political rationality, the analysis of policy-framing process reveals a different picture. Both the cases of women's employment, curriculum reform, and even party's efforts to improve the status of Imam-Hatips demonstrate that the policy-framing process during party's first term was to a large extent indicative of and informed by party's neoliberal political rationality. During the legislation process of 2003 labor law, party strongly emphasized its aim to increase the women's employment through work/family reconciliation. Similarly, the cases of curriculum reform and party's efforts to improve Imam-Hatips reveal that policy-framing process was purely indicative of its neoliberal-political rationality without any references that are informed by its moral-political rationality. Nevertheless, starting from its second term and especially during its third term, AKP's policy framing within education and gender domains became

increasingly informed by party's moral political rationality with increasing references on education's social role and stronger references to women's maternal/care giver roles and importance of family.

To control the explanatory factors that explain incremental ideological change, this research also analyzed AKP's policies on social security and social care by focusing specifically on pension reform and 'back to family' policies, respectively. Although the policy-making process of the social-security reform demonstrates the party's low decisional autonomy *vis-à-vis* high judiciary and Presidency, the trade-off between the party's goals of organizational survival and its policy-seeking goals was not high as the other policy-based cases due to the fact that the neoliberal welfare restructuring process was initiated by the previous coalition government. In that regard, following the annulment of certain clauses of social security reform by the Constitutional Court, AKP pushed forward its social security reform without making any significant changes.

From a comparative perspective, three policy based analyses show that the AKP's low level of external legitimacy due to the strong skepticism on its declared difference from previous parties that represent NOM severely increased the trade-offs between its party-based goals of policy-seeking, vote-seeking and ideology-seeking as party prioritized its goal of organizational survival against its other party specific goals. Apart from party's low level of external legitimacy, party's level of decisional autonomy was significantly low, which further curtailed its capacity to pursue its policy-seeking and ideology-seeking goals. Due to the high level of trade-offs between the goal of organizational survival and other party specific goals of vote-seeking, policy-seeking, and ideology-seeking, the party strategically deprioritized its policies that are indicative of its moral-political rationality. Although the party pursued policies that are indicative of its moral-political rationality, to increase its prospects of organizational survival, the policy framing was strategically informed by its neoliberal political rationality.

The policy-based analysis of education and women's rights/gender indicate that with increasing level of party institutionalization, the primary goal of organizational survival was become inconsequential as the party significantly increased its systemness and decisional autonomy *vis-à-vis* extra-parliamentary veto players. The changing levels of party institutionalization indicates shifting goal prioritization in the party from

organizational survival to policy-seeking and ideology-seeking leading to increasing prioritization of its moral-political rationality over its neoliberal-political rationality in the policy-based domains of education and women's rights/gender.

To sum up, rather than eradicating the factors that leading to party change, the changing levels of party institutionalization, for parties that are competing in significantly restrictive domestic political environments affects the goal prioritization of political parties which may lead to incremental party change. The case of AKP throughout its three terms demonstrates such a shift in goal prioritization which was caused by changing levels of party institutionalization leading to increasing prevalence of the party's moral political rationality over its neoliberal political rationality starting from the party's second and third terms.

Secondly this thesis also sought to delineate the main mechanisms that EU 'hits political parties in accession countries by focusing on AKP's changing behavioral response against the EU effect throughout its three terms. From a macro-perspective, the case of the AKP reveals that the EU to a large extent becomes a political opportunity structure for the party during its first and second terms by decreasing the level of trade-offs between its goals of vote-seeking, policy-seeking, and organizational survival. Regarding the party's policy-seeking goals, each policy based analysis reveals that the party instrumentalized EU norms, values and policy paradigms to increase the legitimacy of its policies and to improve its decisional autonomy *vis-à-vis* extra-parliamentary veto players. Additionally, the AKP's strong adherence to the EU accession process enabled the party to extend its voter base towards ideologically different constituencies with strong support for EU membership. Therefore, the pro-EU stance of the AKP enabled it to pursue its vote-seeking goals. Moreover, the instrumental usage of EU norms, values, and policy paradigms enabled the party to pursue policies demanded by its core conservative constituency without decreasing its prospects of organizational survival. To sum up, highly vital EU accession process with high credibility of EU conditionality significantly narrowed down the level of trade-offs between the party's goals of organizational survival, vote-seeking, and policy-seeking. Therefore, from a macro-perspective the EU was to a large extent a political opportunity structure for AKP as it enabled the party to pursue the aforementioned party specific

goals simultaneously. Consequently, rather than pursuing a strategy of deflecting out EU as an issue, the party used EU norms, values, and policy paradigms instrumentally to further increase the legitimacy of its policy proposals *vis-à-vis* civil society organizations and extra-parliamentary veto players which were highly skeptical of parties emphasized difference from preceding parties that represent NOM.

The policy-based analysis also reveals that adultery stands out as the only policy based case indicative of EU driven party change. Adultery was the first explicit attempt by the party to target its core conservative constituency. Although the party's attempt to include adultery clause to the New Penal Code ignited strong reaction from civil society organizations, the party continued to push forward for the inclusion of adultery and even withdrew the entire Penal Code to further pressurize the opposition and civil society organizations. Nevertheless, strong reactions from the EU and signals for a possibility of a 'no' verdict for opening accession negotiations not only significantly increased intraparty debate on adultery proposal but also led to an unintended politicization of the adultery debate domestically. Internally, party members that were against the adultery clause instrumentally used the EU accession process to force party leadership for a withdrawal. Externally, following strong EU criticisms, the debate on party's claimed difference from previous political parties that belong to NOM intensified. In that regard, strong reactions from the EU significantly constrained party's policy-seeking goal. Although the party initially responded by deflecting the issue from the EU and indicated that adultery debate is a domestic matter, at the end it gave in to the EU's demands and withdrew the adultery clause from Penal Code legislation.

The case of adultery reveals that whether the EU becomes a political liability structure or opportunity structure for political parties depends on the resonance between party goals and EU norms, values, and policy paradigms and also on the effectiveness of EU conditionality. Moreover, the prospects of EU led behavioral party change increases for parties that record low levels of party institutionalization. The case of adultery shows that AKP's low level of decisional autonomy which forced party to prioritize the environmentally inflicted goal of organizational survival forced party leadership change its steadfast stance on adultery as EU accession process remained vital for AKP in terms

of following its party specific goals without jeopardizing its prospects of organizational survival.

Lastly, the EU level analyses demonstrate that the variation in terms of effectiveness of EU conditionality has no observable impact on parties' instrumental usage of EU norms, values, and policy paradigms. Three policy-based analyses reveal that AKP continued to instrumentally use EU to increase the legitimacy of its policy proposals during its second and third terms when the effectiveness of EU conditionality was significantly low. What was changed is that when there is a strong reaction from EU against the party's policies, due to the higher levels of the party's institutionalization the main behavioral response was the strategy of deflection rather than EU induced party change.

This research proposed a different framework for studying incremental party change. Nevertheless, due to the limits of this thesis rather than focusing on AKP's all policies, it selected policy-based cases that are indicative of ideological change and informed initially by AKP's neoliberal and moral political rationalities. The policy-based analysis can definitely be extended to other policy areas to further strengthen/weaken the main argument of the thesis. Moreover, temporally, this thesis is limited to 2002-2013 periods; the following period also stands out as a viable laboratory to study party institutionalization/de-institutionalization and its effects on changing goal prioritization of AKP.

The case of AKP also reveals that changing levels of party institutionalization leads to changing goal prioritization of political parties. In that regard, the interrelationship between parties' goal prioritization and their level of institutionalization further weakens the recurrently cited positive correlation between party institutionalization and democratic consolidation. The Turkish case in general and the case of AKP stands out as perfect cases for studying this relationship. Moreover, although we know the basic dimensions of party institutionalization process, we need different typologies of this process to better delineate its relationship with democratization and democratic consolidation processes. Still the lack of different typologies of party institutionalization stands out as a big gap in the party institutionalization literature.

In addition to the aforementioned points for further research and shortcomings, this research also sought to analyze the party's changing behavioral response to EU. Although the case of AKP helps us to control for the effectiveness of EU conditionality, AKP's level of institutionalization increased significantly simultaneously with decreasing effectiveness of EU conditionality. Such a temporal coincidence makes it hard to test the relationship between prospects of EU induced party change and the level of party institutionalization. Thus, the casual relationship between prospects of EU induced party change and parties' level of institutionalization stands out as an exploratory topic which can be further studied through research designs that include parties' which have differing levels of party institutionalization and goal prioritizations under effective EU conditionality.

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

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APPENDIX 1: ORIGINALITY REPORT

 HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ YÜKSEK LİSANS/DOKTORA TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ORJİNALLİK RAPORU
HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ SİYASET BİLİMİ VE KAMU YÖNETİMİ ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA
Tarih: 12/02/2018
Tez Başlığı / Konusu: Explaining Party Change in Turkey: The Case of AKP Yukarıda başlığı/konusu gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 251 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 12/02/2018 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda belirtilen filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı % 18 'tür. Uygulanan filtrelemeler: 1- Kabul/Onay ve Bildirim sayfaları hariç, 2- Kaynakça hariç 3- Alıntılar dâhil 4- 5 kelimeden daha az örtüşme içeren metin kısımları hariç Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Orijinallik Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları'mı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları'nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tez çalışmamın herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim. Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.
12/02/2018  Tarih ve İmza
Adı Soyadı: Hakan Yavuzylmaz Öğrenci No: N11146738 Anabilim Dalı: Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Programı: Siyaset Bilimi Statüsü: ☐ Y.Lisans ☒ Doktora ☐ Bütünleşik Dr.
<u>DANIŞMAN ONAYI</u> UYGUNDUR.  Prof. Dr. Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdağı



**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
THESIS/DISSERTATION ORIGINALITY REPORT**

**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

Date: 12/02/2018

Thesis Title / Topic: Explaining Party Change in Turkey: The Case of AKP

According to the originality report obtained by myself/my thesis advisor by using the Turnitin plagiarism detection software and by applying the filtering options stated below on 12/02/2018 for the total of 251 pages including the a) Title Page, b) Introduction, c) Main Chapters, and d) Conclusion sections of my thesis entitled as above, the similarity index of my thesis is 18 %.

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Student No: N11146738

Department: Political Science and Public Administration

Program: Political Science


Status: ☐ Masters ☒ Ph.D. ☐ Integrated Ph.D.

ADVISOR APPROVAL

APPROVED.

Prof. Dr. Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdağı

APPENDIX 2: ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM

 HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ETİK KURUL İZİN MUAFİYETİ FORMU
HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ SİYASET BİLİMİ VE KAMU YÖNETİMİ ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA
Tarih: 01/02/2018
Tez Başlığı / Konusu: EXPLAINING PARTY CHANGE IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF AKP Yukarıda başlığı/konusu gösterilen tez çalışmam: 1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır, 2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir. 3. Beden bütünlüğüne müdahale içermemektedir. 4. Gözlemsel ve betimsel araştırma (anket, ölçek/skala çalışmaları, dosya taramaları, veri kaynakları taraması, sistem-model geliştirme çalışmaları) niteliğinde değildir. Hacettepe Üniversitesi Etik Kurullar ve Komisyonlarının Yönergelerini inceledim ve bunlara göre tez çalışmamın yürütülebilmesi için herhangi bir Etik Kuruldan izin alınmasına gerek olmadığını; aksi durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim. Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim. 01/02/2018  Tarih ve İmza Adı Soyadı: Hakan Yavuzylmaz Öğrenci No: N11146738 Anabilim Dalı: Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Programı: Siyaset Bilimi Statüsü: ☐ Y.Lisans ☒ Doktora ☐ Bütünleşik Dr.
DANIŞMAN GÖRÜŞÜ VE ONAYI Etik kurul iznine ihtiyac yoktur.  Prof. Dr. Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdağı Detaylı Bilgi: http://www.sosyalbilimler.hacettepe.edu.tr Telefon: 0-312-2976860 Faks: 0-3122992147 E-posta: sosyalbilimler@hacettepe.edu.tr



**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM FOR THESIS WORK**

**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION TO THE DEPARTMENT PRESIDENCY**

Date: 01/02/2018

Thesis Title / Topic: EXPLAINING PARTY CHANGE IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF AKP

My thesis work related to the title/topic above:

1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.
2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.).
3. Does not involve any interference of the body's integrity.
4. Is not based on observational and descriptive research (survey, measures/scales, data scanning, system-model development).

I declare, I have carefully read Hacettepe University's Ethics Regulations and the Commission's Guidelines, and in order to proceed with my thesis according to these regulations I do not have to get permission from the Ethics Board for anything; in any infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility and I declare that all the information I have provided is true.

01/02/2018

Date and Signature

I respectfully submit this for approval.

Name Surname: Hakan Yavuzylmaz

Student No: N11146738

Department: Political Science and Public Administration

Program: Political Science

Status: ☐ Masters ☒ Ph.D. ☐ Integrated Ph.D.

ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL

Prof. Dr. Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdağı

