

MITIGATING ANTI-AMERICANISM IN TURKEY THROUGH
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

A Master's Thesis

By

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DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA, TURKEY

June 2007

*To Ariell,
May your heart for the world touch many lives*

MITIGATING ANTI-AMERICANISM IN TURKEY THROUGH
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

By

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In

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ANKARA, TURKEY

June 2007

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ABSTRACT

Mitigating Anti-Americanism in Turkey through Public Diplomacy

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Record-high anti-Americanism in Turkey goes deeper than the ongoing Iraq War. The build-up to and aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Turkey's neighbor ignited pre-existing sensitivities in Turkey due to its past relations with America and its own identity issues and fears. Turkey views the U.S. through the lenses of 1) an exaggerated view of American agency coupled with mistrust and 2) a reactionary phobia about threats to undermine the Turkish Republic. Seen through these lenses, anti-Americanism is driven by a perception that America is supporting 1) Kurdish self-determination, which will lead to the eventual dismemberment of Turkey and 2) political Islam as a part of its broader plan for Middle East politics, which threatens to erode Turkey's secular state.

Because anti-Americanism is mostly based on distorted perceptions caused by the lenses, public diplomacy is an effective tool that should be utilized by the U.S. to bring about understanding with the Turkish public. If the politically-rooted anti-Americanism in Turkey continues, it will solidify into a view of the U.S. as a threatening power, squandering Turks' natural affection for Americans.

U.S. public diplomacy for Turkey can be improved by Washington and the U.S. Embassy in Ankara by acting from an understanding of the uniqueness of Turkey and the reasons that drive its anti-Americanism. Reinvigorated public diplomacy offers hope for strengthening a relationship that is in the best interests of both Turkey and America.

Keywords: anti-Americanism, public diplomacy, U.S. Embassy, U.S.-Turkey relations, Turkish identity, Kurdish issue, political Islam

ÖZET

Türkiye’deki Amerika Karşıtlığının Kamu Diplomasisi ile Azaltılması

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Türkiye’de Amerikan karşıtlığının şimdiye kadarki en yüksek seviyeye çıkmasının, şu an Irak’ta devam eden savaşın dışında, daha derin sebepleri vardır. Komşusu Irak’ın işgaline giden süreç ve işgalin kendisi, Türkiye’nin hassas olduğu konular bağlamında, ülke içinde rahatsızlık yaratmıştır. Türkiye’nin adı geçen “hassasiyetleri”, eskiden beri mevcut olan ve ABD ile ilişkilerinin tarihsel arka planı ve kendi kimlik kaygıları etrafında oluşmuştur. Türkiye, ABD hakkında iki ayrı “mercek”ten bakarak hüküm vermektedir: 1) ABD’nin güvenilir bir ülke olduğu kanaatiyle beraber gücünün ve nüfuzunun fazlaca abartılması 2) Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin “bir takım güçler” tarafından altının kazılmakta olduğuna dair süre giden fobi. Bu merceklerden oluşan görüntüde, Amerikan karşıtlığı iki algı etrafında yürümektedir: 1) ABD’nin Kürtlerin kendi kendilerini yönetmesi fikrine desteği ve bu yöndeki siyasetinin Türkiye’yi parçalayacağı 2) Siyasal İslâm’ın, Amerika’nın Orta Doğu için tasarladığı “büyük planı”nın bir parçası olduğu ve Türkiye’de laik devleti tehdit ettiği.

Amerikan karşıtlığının başlıca nedenleri, bahsedilen iki mercekten edinilen eksik ya da hatalı bilgilere dayalı kanaatler olduğundan, kamu diplomasisi, ABD’nin ve Türk kamuoyu’nun aynı düzleme gelip, birbirini anlamasını sağlamada etkili bir araç olarak kullanılmalıdır. Eğer Türkiye’de politik bir duruş olarak benimsenen Amerikan karşıtlığı şu anki gibi devam ederse, ABD’nin tehditkâr bir güç olarak algılanması kesinleşecek ve Türklerin, Amerikalılara doğal olarak duydukları yakınlığı ortadan kaldıracaktır.

ABD’nin Türkiye’de yürüteceği kamu diplomasisinin etkinliği, Washington’dan ve ABD’nin Ankara elçiliği aracılığıyla, ancak Türkiye’nin bir benzerinin olmadığı hesap edilerek ve Türkiye’deki Amerikan karşıtlığının amillerinin anlaşılması koşulları altında geliştirilebilir. Canlı bir şekilde yürütülecek kamu diplomasisi, Türkiye ve Amerika’nın çıkarlarına en çok uyanı, yani kuvvetli ve yakın ilişkileri vaat etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Amerika karşıtlığı, kamu diplomasisi, ABD Büyükelçiliği, ABD-Türkiye ilişkileri, Türk kimliği, Kürt meselesi, siyasal İslam

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It was reading a Joseph Nye article with highlights of his ideas about soft power that I was first drawn to the topic of U.S. public diplomacy.¹ I was struck by the statistics he cited of a fraction of one percent of the amount the U.S. spends on its military being invested in its public diplomacy efforts. Although I always considered myself to be a supporter of a strong military, this disparity in allocation of resources grabbed my attention. After reading Nye's *Soft Power*² and living in Turkey, surrounded by rising anti-Americanism, I was drawn to study what the United States can do through soft power to salvage the situation in the Middle East. The powerful U.S. military has seemed helpless to restore order in the tumultuous region.

The U.S. is currently struggling to find its way in how to use its power for positive results rather than stirring more trouble than it can solve. With its power to influence every region of the world, the U.S. should pay attention to the concerns of the people it is influencing. Although the U.S. should not act based on anti-Americanism, it must seriously evaluate the cost of built-up resistance to its leadership.

¹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "The Decline of American Soft Power," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2004).

² Joseph S. Nye, Jr. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

I feel I have something to write on the subject because I have lived the last two years in Turkey as a nonprofessional practitioner of public diplomacy in representing my country. Living in the dorm, spending every day among Turks, still working to learn their language, I believe I have an important vantage point of Turkish-American relations. I have experienced the shattering of stereotypes about Americans, just as I have spent time drinking çay being blasted with reasons, sometimes thought-provoking, sometimes mostly vented anger, about the reasons why America is resented.

At times I despair about the magnitude of alienation between Turks and America's involvement in the world. But most of the time, in the context of personal friendships, I have tremendous hope that we want similar things for the world. The ignorance about Turkey among my American friends at home is comparable to the level of distorted perceptions that I feel Turks have about America. As an American living in Turkey I believe I have been a bridge enabling both ignorance and misunderstanding to decrease, at least in my limited sphere of influence in America and Turkey.

I am thankful to be an American, just as I am thankful for Turkey to have been my home. It bothers me when Americans try to distance themselves from America, as if they are completely detached. It also does not satisfy me for Turks to say that they like Americans, but dislike the policy. Although I was born into America by no choice of my own, I feel as an American I have responsibility to represent my country and not pass responsibility to politicians. I set out with the intention of my thesis being solution oriented on what the United States can do to improve its relations in Turkey, and to stay away from empty criticism.

I believe that a close relationship with America is fundamentally in the interest of Turkey. I am not one to speak to whether Turkey is right about its neighbors still hoping to divide Turkey, but I can say with great conviction that America has no such desires and would like nothing more than for Turkey to be a thriving country living up to the ideals of its founding father.

Although I try to make a strong case for the importance of public diplomacy, I know that public diplomacy alone is not enough for a strong relationship between the U.S. and Turkey. Consistent policies and common interests need to be in place. However, I believe that relationships and understanding bolstered by public diplomacy can play a critical part in mitigating anti-Americanism in Turkey.

I.1 Research Question

The original research question I set out to answer was, “How can public diplomacy, when accompanied by substantive adjustment of policies and style based on more sincere understanding and humble leadership, enable the United States to win the peace *with* Turkey?” This came out of a belief that the United States needs to reevaluate what must be done to turn the tide in its relations with the Middle East. It is clear that military power and coercion alone will not be enough to win the peace in the region.

The diversity within the Middle East merits case studies to better understand the current predicament faced by the United States. Originally intending to do a sweeping study of the Middle East, my advisor encouraged me to focus in more detail on a case study of one country. Living in Turkey, the choice was not a difficult one. Over the last year I discovered the remarkable depth and complexity of the way Turkey sees the world and its interaction with the U.S. If the U.S. cannot win the

support of moderate, Westward-leaning, and its traditional ally, Turkey, it will not be successful in winning the peace in the region.

As I dug into my research I discovered that public diplomacy by itself is a vast topic, and therefore only touched on the policies and style of the U.S. I also stayed focused on the U.S. trying to lower anti-Americanism in Turkey. This turned out to be an ample challenge, without expanding to winning the peace throughout the region with Turkey.

I.2 Structure

Public diplomacy is defined in chapter two as the “government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies.”³ This definition is placed in the context of traditional diplomacy, emphasizing how public diplomacy reaches out to foreign publics, whereas traditional diplomacy is primarily government-to-government interaction. It is argued public diplomacy has taken on increasing importance due to the erosion of the state-centric system and the democratization of technologies. A history of the public diplomacy in America is developed, from its origins during the World Wars to the hope it provides in the ideological battle after September 11, tracing the theme of public diplomacy’s importance being recognized only in the face of a competing ideology.

In chapter three, I make the theoretical contribution of an anti-Americanism framework, by which the anti-Americanism of different countries can be categorized based on the root causes and intensity. The final part of the framework presents a way

³ Hans N. Tuch, *Communicating With the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 3.

of thinking to analyze the deeper roots of anti-Americanism in a country. The reasons for and intensity of anti-Americanism are influenced by the lenses of 1) what America is viewed to be and 2) what the beholder itself is. Anti-Americanism varies so widely because the actions of the United States are seen through different glasses.

The lenses of the glasses are the topics of chapters four and five, which are a case study analysis of anti-Americanism in Turkey. The framework of chapter three is used to classify the Political strand of anti-Americanism and America increasingly being viewed as a Threatening Power. The problem of anti-Americanism goes deeper than the Iraq War and cursory assessments of reasons for resentment of America. The politically based reasons for Turkey's resentment of America begin with the lens based on what America is viewed to be. Chapter four focuses on the exaggerated view of American power and untrustworthiness based on a history of Turkish-American relations since the end of the Second World War.

Chapter five begins with the second lens of the glasses based on what Turkey itself is. Its Ottoman past, "Sevres phobia," and sensitivity to its secular and homogeneous identity have created a reactionary phobia in Turkey that influences the way it views American behavior. The two lenses are combined to explain the two biggest drivers of anti-Americanism in Turkey: feared U.S. support for a Kurdish state and U.S. presenting a danger to secularism by backing political Islam as a part of its bigger plan for the region. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of how Turkey's move towards its view of America as a threatening power is based mostly on distorted perceptions.

Chapter six assesses the shortcomings of U.S. public diplomacy, both at the State Department level and on the ground from the post in Turkey. These shortcomings come, in part, from not understanding the depth and reasons for anti-

Americanism in Turkey and from a failure to even treat public diplomacy drastically different based on the country.

The final chapter offers recommendations for public diplomacy in Turkey based on the type of anti-Americanism in Turkey, an understanding of the forces driving it, and critical analysis of current shortcomings in public diplomacy. The chapter ends with conclusions about the findings of this thesis and recommendations for future areas of study.

I.3 Sources

My research has made extensive use of primary and secondary sources, both in English and Turkish. My primary sources included newspaper articles from the American and Turkish media; statements, congressional proceedings, speeches, and documents from especially U.S. government websites; international, local and my own survey and opinion polls; abundant personal interviews with Turkish academics and journalists, as well as with U.S. Diplomats; and many personal conversations and observations that came from living among Turks. For secondary sources, I relied on books about Turkish history and society and U.S. diplomacy; journal articles about Turkish identity and Turkish-American relations; and strategy reports about the current state of U.S. public diplomacy.

CHAPTER II

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

II.1 Public Diplomacy Defined

Public diplomacy is the promotion of national interest by informing, engaging, and influencing foreign publics.¹ Public diplomacy includes government-sponsored cultural, educational and informational programs, citizen exchanges, and broadcasting that promote the national interest of a country. Although this succinct definition will provide a useful handle for the discussion of public diplomacy in this paper, it is important to put this definition in the context of the changing and debated discipline of public diplomacy.

Hans Tuch's definition of public diplomacy in his 1990 book *Communicating with the World* has become foundational in the subject. According to Tuch, public diplomacy is the "government's process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies."² Each of the carefully

¹ Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, *Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World*, Edward P. Djerejian, Chairman, (Washington, D.C., October 1, 2003), 13.

² Hans N. Tuch, *Communicating With the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 3.

selected elements in Tuch's definition is helpful in framing the discussion of this subject.

The opening phrase of Tuch's definition of public diplomacy, the "government's process of communicating," includes three important words. First, "government" eliminates the inclusion of non-governmental elements, included by Edward Gullion in the "founding" definition of public diplomacy, which appeared in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy catalogue in 1965. Gullion articulated public diplomacy as:

The role of the press and other media in international affairs, cultivation by governments of public opinion, the non-governmental interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another, and the impact of these transnational processes on the formulation of policy and the conduct of foreign affairs.³

Gullion's definition gives the impression that public diplomacy can be done by media, private groups, and the government. Public diplomacy has since tended to be narrowed from non-governmental efforts, partly because this does not fit within the normal parameters of diplomacy, which is performed by governments. However, Gullion's definition is helpful in expanding the scope of public diplomacy beyond direct government programs. A government should have vision as to how private initiatives can be drawn into its public diplomacy repertoire. Therefore, the public diplomacy studied in this thesis will include what the government does directly and its efforts to spark private efforts, but will not venture into the entire breadth of non-governmental interaction between societies. Public diplomacy encompasses what the government can do to influence foreign publics.

Tuch's use of the phrase "process of communicating" elucidates the understanding that public diplomacy is a process more than a "quick fix" program. It

³ Quoted in Tuch, 8.

takes a sustained effort and is not accomplished by one large marketing campaign. This acknowledges the long-term element of public diplomacy. Many scholars and practitioners view public diplomacy in a more limited sense. Former Ambassador Robert Miller refers to public diplomacy as speeches, press conferences, press releases, discussion groups, public statements, and broadcasting.

U.S. diplomacy resorts to the public media in a foreign country when aiming to correct a misrepresentation of an official position by the host government or its media; to convey the U.S. position positively, in greater detail, and to a wider audience; or to gain publicity for a U.S. action that benefits the local government and/or people.⁴

This explanation makes public diplomacy sound as if it is primarily public media and used in an embassy only to address a specific problem or promote a particular policy. Public diplomacy is not about the use of media channels alone, but also includes cultural, educational and informational programs, as well as citizen exchanges. These should be pulled together in a long-term process that transcends dealing with problematic issues.

“Communicating” is also an important element of public diplomacy that contradicts those who see it as one-way broadcasting or telling. In order to truly communicate, the message received needs to be considered. In the communication process, a sender “encodes” the information that is “decoded” by the receiver. “Noise” can interfere with the message sent and the receiver’s ability to decode is a factor. “Once a message has been physically received, it still has to be comprehended—and comprehension is a matter of psychology, not mechanics.”⁵ Communication is not the mechanical process of broadcasting, but considering the psychology and worldview of the receiver. Communicating across cultures is

⁴ Robert Hopkins Miller, *Inside an Embassy: The Political Role of Diplomats Abroad*. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1992), 54. Miller served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Ivory Coast and Malaysia.

⁵ Raymond Cohen. *Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy*. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), 20.

especially challenging. “In the area of diplomatic negotiation the potential for dissonance inherent in intercultural communication finds its most sustained expression.”⁶ One of the best ways to ensure that a message has been received is to listen to what is communicated back. Communication through two-way dialogue promotes better understanding.

Tuch clarifies that the target of public diplomacy is “foreign publics.” This emphasizes the distinction from public affairs, which is the process of a government communicating with its own public in order to gain its support for policies. Public diplomacy is limited to the communication with *foreign* publics. However, in practice there has not always been such a clear break and it has caused Americans to fear that the government is exceeding the influence it should have on domestic opinion. The word “public” also helps distinguish public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy, which is mainly concerned with government-to-government interaction. Public diplomacy is specifically government-to-foreign public interaction.⁷

The last phrase of Tuch’s definition is “understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies.” Public diplomacy is about improving *understanding* rather than influencing or manipulating. Senator J.W. Fulbright phrased it this way: “The fundamental requirement for a world community of good neighbors is that all different peoples achieve a broader and deeper mutual understanding of each other.”⁸ In keeping with Fulbright’s vision, Tuch mentions many areas in which a foreign public’s understanding can be increased, namely not just foreign policies. Public diplomacy is not to be a “quick fix” to rally support for a policy in times of crisis, but rather an

⁶ Cohen, 22.

⁷ Tuch, 3.

⁸ J.W. Fulbright, foreword to *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs*, by Philip H. Coombs (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), ix.

ongoing process to foster understanding about the nation's ideas, institutions, cultures, goals, and policies. This emphasis on understanding exceeds the narrow self-serving perspective through which public diplomacy has often been seen.

Public diplomacy, the focus of this paper, is best understood within the context of diplomacy; both the similarities with and distinctions from traditional diplomacy illuminate the definition of public diplomacy.

II.2 The Context of Traditional Diplomacy

Traditional diplomacy is more generally the conduct of relations among nations. Diplomacy has also been defined with an emphasis on communication such as the dialogue between independent states⁹ or the “the communication system of the international society.”¹⁰ Within these definitions public diplomacy has an important place because it is about communication to foreign publics, beyond the scope of traditional diplomacy.

Diplomacy has been around as long as independent political entities have existed. “Diplomacy, in short, exists whenever ‘there are boundaries for identity and those boundaries of identity are crossed.’”¹¹ To discuss the need for diplomacy is to go back to the basics of states and the international system. States are created to protect and promote the interests of those who form them. These states are said to be in a system because what one state does directly or indirectly affects the others. Foreign policy is the substance of a state's relations with other powers and the purposes it hopes to achieve by these relations. States

⁹ Adam Watson, *Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States* (New York: Routledge, 1982), 11.

¹⁰ A. James, “Diplomacy and International Society,” *International Relations* 6(6) (1980):931–948. quoted in Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, “Communication: An Essential Aspect of Diplomacy,” *International Studies Perspectives* (2003), 4, 196.

¹¹ C. M. Constantinou, *On the Way to Diplomacy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 113, quoted in Jönsson and Hall, 196.

cannot function in a vacuum of isolation, with each community considering only how to manage its internal affairs. Each state is obliged, by the very desire to control its own destiny as far as possible, to take account of the neighbors who impinge on its interests and those of its citizens.¹²

Due to the nature of independent states, they have different identities and interests. Because the states cannot function in isolation, these different interests rub against one another. "Relations between states, even those closest to each other in culture and temperament, are at once competitive and cooperative."¹³ Diplomacy is the process of dialogue and negotiation by which states in a system conduct their relations and pursue their purposes short of war.¹⁴

At the core of diplomacy is the need for states to communicate with one another.¹⁵ As most people discover in relationships of any kind, communication is vital to avoid conflict as much as possible and work through the contention that inevitably still occurs. So too with states. Diplomatic relations "furnishes a secure channel of face-to-face communications with decision makers and a direct means of influencing them... Diplomatic exchanges reduce the likelihood of miscalculation by both sides."¹⁶ Miscalculation and misunderstanding, likely even in close relations between people of the same culture, can happen all too easily in the interaction between widely differing states. "Communication is to diplomacy as blood is to the human body. Whenever communication ceases, the body of international politics, the process of diplomacy, is dead, and the result is violent conflict or atrophy."¹⁷ Ongoing

¹² Watson, 14.

¹³ Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 9.

¹⁴ Watson, 11.

¹⁵ Watson, 13.

¹⁶ Freeman, 95.

¹⁷ V. D. Tran, *Communication and Diplomacy in a Changing World* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1987), quoted in Jönsson and Hall, 195-210.

communication helps prevent the unnecessary escalation of violence. “In the absence of diplomatic discourse, confrontation is left to take its mindless course.”¹⁸

Diplomacy is the first way a country deals with the perceived threat to national security. “The diplomatic establishment, not the military establishment, is the first line of defense.”¹⁹ Diplomacy is cheaper than war in dollars and lives. “It is obvious that in this Atomic Age diplomacy is cheaper than fighting, for the cost of a world war in one day is far greater than that of the entire diplomatic service for one year.”²⁰ Although not perfect, diplomacy is preferable to war.

Diplomats are the actors that facilitate the dialogue between nations. “The task of diplomats is the nonviolent advancement of the political, economic, cultural, and military interests of their state and people.”²¹ Diplomats take the foreign policy objectives of their state and attempt to communicate and persuade the country they visit to act in these interests. A government wants to be sure the diplomat clearly grasps the purpose and intended results of a message, but the manner in which to communicate the message is the skill of the diplomat.²²

A diplomat’s position is like that of a lawyer, whose job is to make a client’s case appear better in court or negotiations, regardless of the lawyer’s own opinion. The lawyer must promote the interests of his client as best he can within the limits of the law. It is also the lawyer’s duty to counsel the client on how best to achieve his interests. The same is true of the diplomat.²³ In diplomacy, as in the practice of law, there can be a reputation of and tendency toward duplicity. Stalin is said to have quipped, “a diplomat’s words have no relation to actions—otherwise what kind of

¹⁸ Freeman, 123.

¹⁹ Thomas A. Bailey, *The Art of Diplomacy: The American Experience* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), 71.

²⁰ Bailey, 148.

²¹ Freeman, 4.

²² Freeman, 100.

²³ Freeman, 115.

diplomacy is it? Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron.”²⁴ Despite there being some wisdom in such observations, at its core, diplomacy is about a search for compromise, understanding, and mutually acceptable solutions.

Diplomacy has typically been carried out in private between high level representatives, whether diplomats or foreign ministries. Peter Marshall distinguishes between “Old” and “New” diplomacy. “The ‘Old Diplomacy’ was ‘political,’ esoteric, elitist, and far from the madding crowd.”²⁵ Diplomats have traditionally been confidential messengers between sovereigns.²⁶ In Byzantine and Renaissance times diplomacy was characterized by secret and confidential communication.²⁷ However, the debate about whether diplomatic communication should extend beyond government officials to the public has taken place at different points in history. For example, in Ancient Greece, diplomatic envoys were expected to debate in public. Throughout the 20th century the public nature of diplomacy again took importance.

The official function of diplomacy is indispensable in the international system. “States establish diplomatic relations to manage official interactions with national governments.”²⁸ However, as the international system has changed over the years, so too must the tools of diplomacy in order to preserve it as a better way of resolving differences between countries than war. Since World War II, changes have taken place to necessitate diplomacy expanding beyond the private and official interaction of diplomats.

²⁴ Peter Marshall, *Positive Diplomacy* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 8.

²⁵ Marshall, 9.

²⁶ Freeman, 99.

²⁷ Jönsson and Hall, 203.

²⁸ Freeman, 94.

II.3 Why Is Public Diplomacy Needed?

Public diplomacy is taking on greater importance. Long before September 11 sparked many Americans beginning to slowly recognize the dire need for public diplomacy, there were already many factors necessitating adjustment in the way that diplomacy is approached. Changes in the conduct of international relations in the 20th century caused public diplomacy to become an indispensable part of foreign affairs. In 1998 the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) initiated a study entitled *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age*.²⁹ A 63-person Advisory Panel, focusing on the information revolution and the expanding participation of publics in international relations, argued that “diplomacy must become increasingly public to serve the national interest.”

The overarching reason for the increased importance of public diplomacy is the erosion of the state-centric system. Although states are still the primary actors, they are no longer the only ones, nor are they the only ones with enough power to influence the international system. Peter Marshall refers to the changes as a series of “invasions” of the political foreground.³⁰ These invasions challenge the traditional diplomacy of government-to-government interaction, which was well suited for a world dominated by powerful states that monopolized power. States controlled resources, communication, and weapons. The preeminence of the governing elites was once accepted in more places around the globe. Accordingly, for a state to have its way when its interests rubbed against those of another state, it was generally sufficient to work through traditional diplomatic channels. This has changed due to the proliferation of actors, more competition over ideas, and a democratizing world.

²⁹ Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age* (1998). <http://www.csis.org/ics/dia/>.

³⁰ Marshall, 10.

II.3.1 Rise of Non-State Actors

The first factor to cause the erosion of the state-centric system and render public diplomacy more important is the proliferation of actors in the international system. In centuries past a few dominant colonial powers monopolized most of the power. The influx of the number of states, transnational organizations, non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and other non-state actors left traditional government-to-government diplomacy insufficient for the international relations of a country. As the number of states since the World Wars has increased, so has the number of voices with their own interests in the international system. Before, if the United States had interests in Nigeria, they were part of the established relations with Britain. But after gaining its independence in 1960, Nigeria had its own voice based on its culture, preferences, and view of the world. The U.S. needs to care more about the opinions that Nigerians have than when they were ruled by Britain. A more complicated system means a greater need to get out and mobilize support for a state's interests. In a family, for example, before kids come along a husband and wife can more readily discuss and come to an agreement on where to go for a vacation. But when a few kids enter the picture, each with their own opinions and preferences, the parents need to consider exciting the kids in order to do something in particular. A father may do well to talk directly to the children about how much fun it would be to go to a sports match, especially if the mother is speaking to them about another plan. Diplomacy has had to be broadened to foster new relations with many more independent states, altering the diplomatic landscape of a few powers sending private government delegations primarily to each other.

While the proliferation of states has required expanded diplomatic efforts, the rise in importance of non-state actors has especially challenged the traditional government-to-government role of diplomacy. “A major factor is the erosive influence of non-governmental activities on traditional sovereign prerogatives.”³¹ Transnational organizations like the United Nations or European Union have to be considered in addition to the states that compose their parts. Non-governmental organizations influence public opinions and a vast number of causes. Multinational corporations likewise cross national borders and their practices influence the international community. “Whereas the fear in the 1970s was that multinationals would become an arm of government, the concern now is that they are disconnecting from their home countries’ national interests, moving jobs, evading taxes, and eroding economic sovereignty in the process.”³² Multinationals are among the non-state actors that erode the dominance of states and render traditional diplomacy inadequate.

Another non-state actor garnering great attention is terrorist organizations. While states can support terrorism, it emanates first and foremost from non-state actors.³³ One of the sources of terrorism was the radical groups that formed on the fringes of several religions towards the end of the 20th century. The tens of thousands of Muslims who went to fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has formed the foundation of the Al Qaeda’s vast network in loosely affiliated cells scattered throughout perhaps 60 countries.³⁴ In a review of articles about the terrorist organization, Byman cites that Al-Qaeda draws on the support of 6 million radicals worldwide but what makes precise numbers elusive is “simultaneously a small core

³¹ Wilson P. Dizard, *Digital Diplomacy: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Information Age* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), 186.

³² Matthews, 56.

³³ Shibley Telhami, *The Stakes: America in the Middle East*. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2002), 70.

³⁴ Joseph S. Nye, Jr. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 22-23.

group and a broader network linking various Islamist groups and causes.”³⁵ Working with states to combat terrorism is not enough to change the hearts of those who feel greater allegiance to a cause than their state. Because of the transnational nature of Islamist ideology and other terrorist groups, traditional diplomacy is not enough to deal with the issue. A wider audience needs to be directly addressed as the number of entities increases—whether states, multinational corporations, or terrorist networks.

II.3.2 Competition over Ideas

The ideological struggles engulfing the world since World War II have required democracies to enter the battle of ideas. “Ideas are tough. They cannot be killed with bayonets or bombs. They skip across international borders or billowing oceans. They can be successfully combated only with better ideas.”³⁶ Fascism, communism, liberal democracy, and Islamism are among the ideas that have transcended state power. The recognition of necessity for public diplomacy in the U.S. was sparked by combating the ideas of fascism.³⁷ The ideological clash with communism during the Cold War brought public diplomacy front and center in American foreign affairs. Coombs wrote at the height of the Cold War, “The highly charged compound of people, ideas, and knowledge, stirred by the new technologies and the ideological contest, has unleashed human drives far more powerful in their impact on societies and governments than the force of nuclear energy.”³⁸ The U.S. felt the need to go directly to the people to make the case about a specific ideology. The ubiquitous term “hearts and minds” associated with public diplomacy became famous by President Johnson’s use of it during the Vietnam War. In 1965 he proclaimed, “So

³⁵ Daniel L. Byman, “Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy?” *World Politics* (Oct. 2003): 149.

³⁶ Bailey, 207.

³⁷ Tuch, 14.

³⁸ Coombs, 13.

we must be ready to fight in Viet-Nam, but the ultimate victory will depend upon the hearts and the minds of the people who actually live out there.”³⁹ President Johnson recognized an ideological battlefield.

Traditional diplomatic effort with a country that impresses one ideology on a people is not enough to rally the public to change. Most recently ideological opposition from the Al-Qaeda brand of Islamism has caused reassertion of the importance of the discipline: “Public diplomacy is essential. So far, al-Qaeda is winning the battle of ideas: its concept of defensive jihad is gaining credence, as is its credo that the United States is at the root of the Muslim world’s problems.”⁴⁰ Public diplomacy is vital in the competition of ideas.

II.3.3 Democratizing World

Another reason for the rise in importance of public diplomacy is that more people around the world do not accept the right of a few elites to make all the decisions to guide the country. Both the number of democracies in the world and the amount of democratic involvement have increased since World War II. In Peter Marshall’s terms, the “New Diplomacy” which flourished around the time of World War I is “populist rather than elitist. It is a matter of intense public interest and debate. The auditorium is as important as the stage.”⁴¹ Partly due to more men and women having the chance for education, people are demanding more accountability by the government. Writing more than four decades ago, Coombs recognized this trend. “Millions of ordinary people who once accepted governments as a superior authority

³⁹President Lyndon B. Johnson, "Remarks at a Dinner Meeting of the Texas Electric Cooperatives, Inc." (speech, May 4, 1965), <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26942>

⁴⁰ Byman, 162.

⁴¹ Marshall, 10.

to be paid and obeyed have now caught the radical notion that governments are meant not merely to rule but to serve.”⁴²

Accordingly, more people around the world are having a say in what their governments do. “Given today’s hyper-communicative, democratizing world, successful foreign policy cannot be made in secret by a tight group of trusted confidants.”⁴³ There are times that a government may want to comply for strategic reasons, but is unable to do so because of the political cost. Democracy makes public diplomacy more applicable because the power and decision-making of a country are diffused. “To understand and to affect decision making in a democracy, diplomats must range broadly through parliamentary and party corridors, into newsrooms and interest group offices and beyond the capital city.”⁴⁴ For a country to have influence abroad it needs to present its case increasingly to the people and not only the powerful decision makers of the foreign country.

II.3.4 Facilitators of Democratization

In addition to proliferation of actors, more competition over ideas, and a democratic population, the technological advances over recent decades have facilitated many additional changes that break down the state-centric system, thus making public diplomacy a vital part of interaction with the world. The changing facilitators could generally be referred to as “democratizing technology,” making technology more accessible to more people. The facilitators of democratization: communication technology, transportation, and weapons, have increased the impact a few people can have on those far away, people-to-people interaction, access to

⁴² Coombs, 13.

⁴³ Patricia H. Kushlis and Patricia Lee Sharpe, “Public Diplomacy Matters More Than Ever,” *Foreign Service Journal* (Oct. 2006): 30.

⁴⁴ Casimir A. Yost and Mary Locke, “America’s Diplomats Abroad Are More Necessary Than Ever,” *International Herald Tribune*, July 16, 1997. <http://www.iht.com/articles/1997/07/16/edyost.t.php>

information through non-governmental channels, the level of competition for allegiance, and the speed at which information travels and is expected.

“The most powerful engine of change in the relative decline of states and the rise of non-state actors is the computer and telecommunications revolution.”⁴⁵ Before, the time and cost of international communication was inhibitive, but now it can be done effortlessly by more of the world’s population. Computers and the Internet are becoming cheaper, and more accessible to the common person. Before, a computer filled an entire room and could only be financed by a government. Now, many people in the world own a personal computer and more than ten percent of the world’s population can access the Internet.⁴⁶ The changes in technology have challenged traditional diplomacy but also provided new opportunities to reach out to more of the world.

The communications revolution makes instantaneous exchange of information possible, disregarding national borders, and shrinking the world. It is no longer just the foreign ministries and governments that know what is happening across a border or an ocean. “In this world of instantaneous information, traditional diplomacy struggles to sustain its relevance.”⁴⁷ Whereas before governments could mostly interact with each other and communicate selectively to their publics, the public now has almost instantaneous access to what is going on throughout the world. “Nations once connected by foreign ministries and traders are now linked through millions of individuals by fiber optics, satellite, wireless, and cable in a complex network without

⁴⁵ Jessica T. Matthews, “Power Shift,” *Foreign Affairs* (Jan/Feb 1997): 51.

⁴⁶ There are many sources citing this approximate estimate of Internet access. Among the sources is the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, November 2006.
<http://www.gatesfoundation.org/GlobalDevelopment/GlobalLibraries/Announcements/Announce-061130.htm>

⁴⁷ “Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age,” 8.

central control.”⁴⁸ When first introduced in 1915, a three-minute phone call from New York to San Francisco cost more than \$20 or the equivalent of 90 hours of labor for the average wage earner.⁴⁹ The same call can now be made for free by someone with access to a computer.

The evolution of information and communications technology, which has only just begun, will probably heavily favor non-state entities, including those not yet envisaged, over states. The new technologies encourage noninstitutional, shifting networks over the fixed bureaucratic hierarchies that are the hallmark of the single-voiced sovereign state.⁵⁰

The growth in communication technology is a facilitator of change that makes public diplomacy increasingly necessary.

Transportation is another facilitator that renders public diplomacy more pertinent than ever. Partly due to limits in transportation, diplomacy of the past typically involved elite representatives of governments being sent to another country. The transportation available drastically limited the feasibility of what could be done. When a diplomatic contingent took weeks or months and great expense to travel to a location, it had to be done sparingly. “In terms of both the volume and speed of goods and passenger transport the achievements of the last two centuries have completely outclassed the painfully acquired gains of the whole of previous recorded history.”⁵¹ Such a vast revolution in transportation has drastically altered the ability of distant peoples to be in contact with each other. Now businessmen, tourists, and other common citizens can crisscross the world with remarkable speed. This facilitates far more non-governmental interaction between peoples. “Especially pertinent here are the new techniques of transportation and communication which have shrunk the globe, making close neighbors of formerly dark and distant continents and quickening

⁴⁸ “Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age,” 8.

⁴⁹ W. Michael Cox and Richard Alm, “Time Well Spent: The Declining Real Cost of Living in America,” 21, quoted in “Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age,” 15.

⁵⁰ Matthews, 66.

⁵¹ Philip Bagwell, *The Transport Revolution from 1770* (London: B.T. Batsford, 1974), 11.

the circulation of provocative ideas and knowledge throughout the world.”⁵² This was in 1964. While the shrinking globe and provocative ideas are a challenge to governments, they also provide an incredible *opportunity* to strengthen relationships between states that did not exist in the formal meetings between diplomatic emissaries in centuries past.

Another facilitator that has fostered the need for non-state actors to be taken seriously is the “democratization of weapons.” As with communication and transportation, powerful weapons used to be monopolized by states. Recent years have made it obvious that weapons of mass destruction are now accessible to people with a few hundred dollars. State-centric systems made the use of weapons more predictable. Most obviously, the Cold War, despite the unprecedented danger of thousands of nuclear weapons, maintained a level of predictability that was managed through tense diplomatic relations between states. However, in today’s world a handful of common people can kill hundreds in a single event. This facilitates the need to give non-state actors more attention.

These facilitators combine to enable a small number of people to have a large impact on people far away. Because states no longer control communication, transportation, and weapons of mass destruction as they once did, maintaining relationships with just states is no longer sufficient. Although states remain the primary actors in the system, the awful terrorist acts in recent years emphasize that states do not control the flow of information and weapons. The tragedy of September 11 is a terrifying example of how much power a small number of people can have. Communication utilized for planning, transportation for training, access to a foreign country, and even the weapons show how today’s technology can be used in tragic

⁵² Coombs, 12.

ways. The London bombers in July 2005 were able to make weapons to kill hundreds and carry out the entire operation for less than 8,000 pounds.⁵³ States no longer monopolize the use of force. The more power wielded by common people, the more they need to be taken into account.

II.3.5 Impact of Facilitators of Democracy

The technological advances of communication and transportation have increased the amount of people-to-people contact around the world. People can form their opinion of a country based on non-government channels like an on-line friendship with someone across an ocean. With the touch of a few keys an email about one's impressions of a country can be sent to a hundred people around the world. This undermines the dominance of government-to-government diplomacy. However, new communication capabilities can create opportunities for interaction with a foreign public, even avoiding the filters of an unfriendly government. A government can sponsor a music group to come and play in another country to help break down stereotypes. Two students from different parts of the world can be brought together in an Internet chat-room to discuss common global concerns. With accessible transportation, citizens can travel and build an understanding between peoples. Every person that goes abroad becomes a representative of his or her country. Diplomacy that ignores person-to-person contact will become increasingly irrelevant and will be squandering a great opportunity.

In addition to greater person-to-person contact, the public also has greater access to information through the radio, Internet, and satellite television. "Even remote populations have increasing opportunities to form their own views of the

⁵³ House of Commons, "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005." (London, May 11, 2006), 23.

United States directly, without the need to filter such information through the official media of local governments—or of the U.S. government.”⁵⁴ Because the public can now get more information from non-government sources, government-to-government diplomacy is not enough to have a voice in the information that is shaping the minds. With little government control and a vast amount of information from many sources the chance for misperception is great. It is in a country’s interest to enter into that conversation and have a voice in the opinions that are being formed about it. This is highlighted by the French expression, “*les absents ont toujours tort*”: those absent are always wrong.⁵⁵ If the truth is not available, ideas will be formed based on misinformation and distorted perceptions. As the youth of today grow up connected to the Internet, public diplomacy is only going to increase in importance. Official visits to other countries or formal correspondence between governments is not enough to win the support of the public.

Facilitated by the rise of communication technology, there is also more competition for the hearts and minds of the public. Without the monopoly of information by states, more actors can compete for people’s allegiance.

Widely accessible and affordable technology has broken governments’ monopoly on the collection and management of large amounts of information and deprived governments of the deference they enjoyed because of it. In every sphere of activity, instantaneous access to information and the ability to put it to use multiplies the number of players who matter and reduces the number who command great authority.⁵⁶

This competition makes it necessary for states to respond. The most pressing challenge is from Al-Qaeda. “Al-Qaeda the organization has increasingly become indistinguishable from the media phenomenon.”⁵⁷ Some have argued that Osama Bin Laden, even hiding in a cave, is out-communicating the United States. “Once again he

⁵⁴ Miller, 55.

⁵⁵ Marshall, 140.

⁵⁶ Matthews, 51.

⁵⁷ Marc Lynch, “Al Qaeda’s Media Strategies,” *The National Interest* (Spring 2006): 50.

has beaten America at an American game: public diplomacy. He may be sitting powerlessly in a cave, but his image is as scary as ever.”⁵⁸ Bin Laden is able to reach distant regions with his message. He is able to influence, convince, motivate, and spur to action great amounts of people. If a country does not reach out to its own people, they do not just remain uniformed or ambivalent. Instead, there is active competition for their allegiance. As long as non-state actors with their own—sometimes violent—ambitions are competing for allegiance, states must too. An article in the *New York Times* last year illuminated the “increasingly sophisticated network of contributors and discussion leaders helping to wage Al Qaeda’s battle for Muslim hearts and minds.”⁵⁹ This competition must drive public diplomacy forward. It is not acceptable to let Bin Laden dominate the media while governments talk in private amongst themselves. All the while, publics are making their decisions less based on what the government releases to them about the summits between states and more through the ideas released in videos and discussed on-line. Governments need to vigorously enter the on-line dialogue and compete for the hearts and minds of the public.

In addition to the competition that forces states to enter into public diplomacy, the communications revolution has also raised the expectation of instant communication. The public expects to have instant information as events unfold. Ideas travel at remarkable speeds. Accordingly, governments need to make efforts to supply information at this fast pace before opinions are formed based on others telling the story. This presents a real challenge to governments. One former U.S. Secretary of State explained his concern, “Will the speed at which we communicate drive out thought? I worry about that a lot. Instant answers to instant problems can get you into

⁵⁸ John Tierney, “Osama’s Spin Lessons,” *The New York Times*, Late Edition, East Coast, A. 23, Sep. 12, 2006.

⁵⁹ Hassan M. Fattah, “Growing Unarmed Battalion in Qaeda Army is Using Internet to Get the Message Out,” *New York Times*, Late Edition, East Coast, A.6, Sep. 30, 2006.

a hell of a lot of trouble.”⁶⁰ Although there is still a place for governments exercising caution, diplomats nevertheless have to be able to adapt in order to remain relevant. The traditional reluctance of diplomats to change, specifically in regard to technology, is emphasized throughout Wilson Dizard’s *Digital Diplomacy*. “Until recently, they shared a belief that theirs was an elite profession and that its practitioners could rely primarily on their personal skills.”⁶¹ The speed of communication has necessitated change.

In summary, there are abundant interconnected reasons for the increasing applicability of public diplomacy. The number and types of actors in the international system have challenged the state-centric system. The rise in democracy has bolstered the significance of the public. The days of government monopoly of information have faded into the past. In a more globalized world with access to new technologies, publics seek understanding without the filters of government. “The traditional concept that foreign affairs are a self-contained, somewhat recondite, specialty, which can be hived off from the rest of public business and handled separately from it, will no longer stand up to critical examination.”⁶² Although states are absolutely still relevant, the public has to be given more consideration than it was afforded previously. Common people now have the means to influence and inflict great harm to people outside their borders. Therefore the United States has slowly expanded beyond the boundaries of traditional diplomacy in response to the changing world.

⁶⁰ “The FSO Who did it All,” *Foreign Service Journal* (June 1998): 32, quoted in Dizard, 99.

⁶¹ Dizard, 99.

⁶² Marshall, 23.

II.4 History of Public Diplomacy in the United States

The practice of diplomacy has had to develop since the early days of America. The drastically different situation is magnified in President Thomas Jefferson's famous letter to Secretary of State James Madison at the beginning of the 19th century: "We have not heard from our ambassador in Paris for two years. If we do not hear from him by the end of this year, let us write him a letter."⁶³

The relatively recent history of public diplomacy in the United States began with the outbreak of the World Wars and the U.S. taking a more active role in the world. President Woodrow Wilson created the Committee on Public Information during World War I to influence American public opinion to support the war and inform the world about U.S. intentions.⁶⁴ In the words of George Creel, the influential journalist tasked with spearheading the effort, "We fought prejudice, indifference, and disaffection at home and we fought ignorance and falsehood abroad."⁶⁵ It is noteworthy the extent to which this one committee was involved with influencing public at both home and abroad. The degree of separation between these spheres was a debate in the ensuing decades. Creel emphasized how a fight for the minds of the public had been sparked by the Germans.

It was in this recognition of Public Opinion as a major force that the Great War differed most essentially from all previous conflicts. The trial of strength was not only between massed bodies of armed men, but between opposed ideals, and moral verdicts took on all the value of military decisions. Other wars went no deeper than the physical aspects, but German *Kultur* raised issues that had to be fought out in the hearts and minds of people as well as on the actual firing-line.⁶⁶

While debatable whether World War I was unique in going beyond the physical aspects of war to fight for the hearts and minds of people, this quotation

⁶³ Quoted in Yost and Locke.

⁶⁴ Tuch, 14.

⁶⁵ George Creel, *How We Advertised America* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1920), 4.
<http://www.historytools.org/sources/creel.html>.

⁶⁶ Creel, 3.

identifies the reasons why public diplomacy is still thought to be vital today. Reflecting back on the motivation of the Committee that came to be associated with his name, Creel asserted a belief that the United States needed only to present the facts to bring the lies to light.

Every possible expedient was employed to break through the barrage of lies that kept the people of the Central Powers in darkness and delusion; we sought the friendship and support of the neutral nations by continuous presentation of facts. We did not call it propaganda, for that word, in German hands, had come to be associated with deceit and corruption. Our effort was educational and informative throughout, for we had such confidence in our case as to feel that no other argument was needed than the simple, straightforward presentation of facts.⁶⁷

Despite the high rhetoric, the American public and Congress were suspicious of the government spreading propaganda in the U.S.⁶⁸ A government-run news service and influencing Hollywood to make movies showing America in a positive light were among the efforts that many felt went beyond education and information. This early foray during a time of conflict was quickly abolished with the end of the war. Nevertheless, the Creel Committee set an important precedent for a belief that education and information were vital in a global battle over ideas.

It was not until the rise of the Nazi cultural offensive in Latin America that the cultural dimension of foreign relations was recognized as an important tool of the government.⁶⁹ In 1938, President Roosevelt created a Division of Cultural Relations in the State Department “for the purpose of encouraging and strengthening cultural relations and intellectual cooperation between the United States and other

⁶⁷ Creel, 4.

⁶⁸ Nye, 102.

⁶⁹ Coombs, 23.

countries.”⁷⁰ This effort included exchanges of students and professors, book translations, libraries and cultural broadcasts.⁷¹

President Roosevelt also established the Office of Wartime Information (OWI) during World War II. The OWI set up a vast campaign to disseminate information throughout the world. Underlying the distinction between the Division of Cultural Relations and the OWI was a debate between two approaches. On the one side, there were advocates of the culture and education programs that would have a trickle-down effect on relations between states. They argued for a long-term approach that must have continuity and be free of manipulation of information. On the other side was a “tough-minded” group more comfortable with propagandizing through media or movies that promised more “bang for the buck” in the short-term.⁷²

The end of World War II brought sharp opposition to continuing any kind of foreign information business in peace time.

It is hard now to recall how utterly unenthusiastic, indeed downright hostile, the American people and Congress then were to the very idea of government being in the foreign information business in peacetime. Psychological warfare, like mass killing, had been accepted as a necessity of war; but the “dirty business of propaganda,” as it was called, had no place in peacetime... There was fear, too, that propaganda machinery in government hands might be turned to manipulating public opinion in our own country.⁷³

Indeed, in 1945 the OWI was abolished.

However, the outbreak of the Cold War and the need to reconstruct Germany, Japan, and Australia made the continuation of the cultural and education programs important. In 1946 Congress approved the so-called Fulbright Amendment, named

⁷⁰ “Cultural Programs at the Department of State, 1930s to the Present,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, November 24, 2000.
http://www.state.gov/r/whconf/001124_bkgd_eca.html

⁷¹ Coombs, 26.

⁷² Nye, 103.

⁷³ Coombs, 28.

after its primary sponsor, Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas. The horrors of World War II motivated Senator Fulbright to develop a program that would increase mutual understanding in the world. The fundamental idea of the Fulbright Act was to channel funds from the sale of surplus military equipment into scholarships, “literally swords into plowshares of the mind.”⁷⁴ This was the forerunner to the still existing Fulbright Program and many other exchange programs. The flourishing programs were given large credit in the successful reconstruction and friendships that developed with Germany and Japan. For example, between 1949 and 1954 over ten thousand Germans came to the U.S. on official visits.⁷⁵

Many Congressmen came home from experiences abroad after World War II “shocked and angered by the calculated misrepresentations of the United States they had encountered and deeply concerned by the evident lack of understanding of American society and motives, even among good friends.”⁷⁶ This provided an impetus for the United States Information and Education Act of 1948. Better known as the Smith-Mundt Act, this was the key law in legitimizing what would become known as public diplomacy. The Smith-Mundt Act was “an act to promote the better understanding of the United States among the peoples of the world and to strengthen cooperative international relations.”⁷⁷ This act authorized a world-wide information campaign and money to fund a broad educational exchange program to complement the Fulbright Program.

The Smith-Mundt Act was also important in addressing some of the ongoing debates about public diplomacy. It helped sharply distinguish between information and education activities. The information side, described with such terms as

⁷⁴ Richard T. Arndt and David Lee Rubin, eds., *The Fulbright Difference, 1948-1992* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 14.

⁷⁵ Tuch, 16.

⁷⁶ Coombs, 30.

⁷⁷ Quoted in Tuch, 17.

“propaganda” or “public relations,” would be separate from efforts at “mutual understanding” in the educational programs. The Smith-Mundt Act also encouraged the maximum use of private facilities whenever they could be used instead of federal agencies.⁷⁸

The importance of these fledgling programs’ activities was realized as the Cold War began. President Truman’s “Campaign of Truth” speech in 1950 remains monumental in the recognition given to public diplomacy in the U.S.

The cause of freedom is being challenged throughout the world by the forces of imperialistic communism. This is a struggle, above all else, for the minds of man. Propaganda is one of the most powerful weapons the communists have in this struggle. Deceit, distortion, and lies are systematically used by them as a matter of deliberate policy. This propaganda can be overcome by truth—plain, simple, unvarnished truth—presented by newspapers, radio, and other sources that the people trust...

Our task is to present the truth to millions of people who are uninformed or misinformed or unconvinced. Our task is to reach them in their daily lives, as they work and learn. We must be alert, ingenious, and diligent in reaching peoples of other countries, whatever their educational and cultural backgrounds may be. Our task is to show them that freedom is the way to economic and social advancement, the way to political independence, the way to strength, happiness, and peace.

This task is not separate and distinct from other elements of our foreign policy. It is a necessary part of all we are doing to build a peaceful world. It is as important as armed strength or economic aid. The Marshall plan, military aid, point 4—these and other programs depend for their success on the understanding and support of our own citizens and those of other countries.

We must make ourselves known as we really are—not as Communist propaganda pictures us. We must pool our efforts with those of other free peoples in a sustained, intensified program to promote the cause of freedom against the propaganda of slavery. We must make ourselves heard round the world in a great campaign of truth.⁷⁹

Some of the same themes from the Creel Committee of World War I are evident, such as the “unvarnished truth” triumphing over propaganda. The Smith-Mundt Act led to the establishment of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) as a

⁷⁸ Coombs, 31.

⁷⁹ President Harry S. Truman, “Campaign of Truth,” (Address on Foreign Policy at a luncheon of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, D.C., April 20, 1950).

separate agency in 1953. President Eisenhower charged the USIA “to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace.”⁸⁰ The Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 was also instrumental legislation for the continuation of the cultural side of public diplomacy and it created the structure under which international cultural and exchange programs are still organized. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs set policy and ran the exchange and presentations programs. The USIA implemented these programs overseas. The Advisory Committee on the Arts would continue in culture and arts exchanges.⁸¹

The United States utilized all of these programs throughout the Cold War to keep friends and build bridges to people behind the Iron Curtain. Although the reasons for the eventual *perestroika* and end of the Cold War are complex, in the end public opinion was for change.⁸² The appeal of capitalism and freedom overtook the life imposed by the Soviets. “Working smart, working indirectly and by example as much as exhortation in Iron Curtain countries, the U.S. was able to influence and strengthen the resolve of people seeking democracy and the corresponding freedom of speech, thought and religion.”⁸³ The public diplomacy effort of the U.S. came with an understanding that the Cold War (as Creel proclaimed about World War I) was not going to be won with only military might, but in a struggle of ideas. The economic and cultural attraction of the United States helped contribute to triumph over the Soviet Union.

⁸⁰ President Dwight Eisenhower, *Public Papers of the United States—Dwight D. Eisenhower*, (Statement, The White House, Oct. 28, 1953), Office of the Federal Register, quoted in Tuch, 21.

⁸¹ “Cultural Programs at the Department of State, 1930s to the Present,” November 24, 2000.

⁸² Marshall, 126.

⁸³ Kushlis and Sharpe, 31.

With the immediacy of threats emanating from the Cold War, public diplomacy became limited in the minds of Americans to meeting the immediate national security objectives. In the National Security Directive 77 (NSDD-77) of 1983, public diplomacy is defined as “those actions of the U.S. government designed to generate support for our national security objectives.”⁸⁴ The Special Planning Group established by NSDD-77 was responsible for ensuring that “a wide-ranging program of effective initiatives is developed and implemented to support national security policy, objectives and decisions.” While the Reagan administration supported a wide range of public diplomacy activities, they were limited to increasing support abroad for the U.S. national security policies and objectives. The long-term benefits of cultural and education programs again lost value as the immediacy of the conflict favored short-term results.

It naturally followed, then, that the end of the Cold War, with the ideological battle seemingly won, brought diminished investment in public diplomacy. This continued the clear trend of recognizing the need for, or at least committing the resources to, public diplomacy only in the face of conflict. Whenever there was peace, the U.S. flagged in its desire to have active public diplomacy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the public diplomacy resources developed over decades atrophied and even the value of a public diplomacy profession was highly disputed. Still, there were those who tried to voice the danger of cutting diplomatic efforts. Casimir A. Yost, Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, wrote in 1997,

The United States is, in the process, using up what amounts to national security capital, in the form of influence and ties built up over decades in countries all over the world. By cutting its diplomatic representation and its

⁸⁴ *National Security Decision Directives*, National Security Directive 77 (NSDD-77), The White House (Washington, D.C., Jan. 14, 1983) <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-077.htm>.

aid and information programs around the world, Washington risks contributing to a diminution in U.S. global influence at a time when U.S. global interests and dependencies are expanding.⁸⁵

However, there were not enough advocates of the U.S. continuing to invest in its long-term relations abroad. With the demise of the threat from communism, the United States was more interested in cutting its budget than investing in international diplomacy. Between 1989 and 1999, the budget of the U.S. Information Agency decreased by ten percent, before finally being folded into the State Department in 1999.⁸⁶ At the ceremony commemorating the consolidation of the State Department and the USIA on October 1, 1999, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told the employees of USIA:

I am honored to welcome you as co-architects in building a vigorous and farsighted American foreign policy with *public diplomacy* at its core—a policy that will lead our nation and the world into a new era, where information will matter greatly and freedom even more.⁸⁷

Although the consolidation of the USIA was done with the expressed intention of bringing public diplomacy closer to foreign policy development, many see it as the devaluation of public diplomacy. An article in the *Foreign Service Journal* argues that “contrary to the expectations of the policymakers who abolished the U.S. Information Agency in a fit of hubris and parsimony,” public diplomacy is as vitally important as ever.⁸⁸

II.5 Public Diplomacy as a Hope: Post-September 11

As the debris from the attacks of September 11, 2001 was slowly cleaned up, Americans were left contemplating the nature and extent of the challenge to the U.S.

⁸⁵ Yost and Locke, July 16, 1997.

⁸⁶ Nye, 104. When adjusted for inflation.

⁸⁷ Madeleine Albright, “The Importance of Public Diplomacy to American Foreign Policy,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, (Oct. 1999, Vol. 10, Issue 8).

⁸⁸ Kushlis and Sharpe, 27.

The terrorist attacks again pulled Americans from their tendency to devalue public diplomacy in the absence of conflict. “Only after September 2001 did Americans rediscover the importance of investing in the instruments of soft power, and even then inadequately.”⁸⁹

The primary response to September 11 was a declared war on terror,⁹⁰ long on the use of hard power and short on soft power. The Bush administration’s *2002 National Security Strategy* declares, “To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal—military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing.”⁹¹ Diplomacy or public diplomacy are noticeably missing in the ways to defeat terrorism and are only given scant mention throughout the seminal document. The U.S. is failing to win the peace in the Middle East by, in part, focusing too much on military intervention and not enough on building bridges to the people. One proponent of public diplomacy observed, “The Pentagon has 16 times as much funding for public diplomacy as the State Department, and we wonder why the rest of the world often thinks that we try to lead with the barrel of a gun.”⁹²

Instead of September 11 being seized as an opportunity to consolidate global support against common threats to humanity, the response of a war on terror, and especially the unilateral action in Iraq, have fueled unprecedented anti-Americanism. The United States has found itself heavily criticized and with few friends. It seems

⁸⁹ Nye, 105.

⁹⁰ The Bush administration’s “Global War on Terrorism,” with many variations of the exact title, will be standardized as “war on terror” except for the different ways it appears in quotations.

⁹¹ The White House, *2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America*.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>

⁹² Timothy E. Wirth, President, United Nations Foundation, “Public Diplomacy and Communications,” (Ambassador Walter H. Annenberg Symposium at University of Southern California, Los Angeles, March 22, 2005).
http://www.unfoundation.org/files/pdf/2005/Public_Diplomacy_Communications_TEW.pdf

that reservoirs of appreciation for the United States have dried up.⁹³ The U.S. needs a sustained effort to reach out to foreign publics and bolster its reserves of friendship and goodwill.

Just as military might is not adequate to win the peace, traditional government-to-government interaction will also not be enough to turn the tide of anti-Americanism. In the Middle East, the heart of the ideological battle, it seems the U.S. is losing the fight for hearts and minds of people. Better public diplomacy offers hope as a way to increase the understanding of America. The U.S. must bolster its public diplomacy in order to deal with the current challenges, sustain relationships, and prepare for the future. Senator Fulbright's words in 1964 offer more hope to the United States winning the peace than a "surge" in troops.

Foreign policy cannot be based on military posture and diplomatic activities alone in today's world. The shape of the world a generation from now will be influenced far more by how well we communicate the values of our society to others than by our military or diplomatic superiority.⁹⁴

⁹³ Richard Arndt, "Rebuilding America's Cultural Diplomacy," *Foreign Service Journal* (Oct 2006): 42.

⁹⁴ Fulbright quoted in Coombs, ix.

CHAPTER III

ANTI-AMERICANISM FRAMEWORK

III.1 Introduction

While anti-Americanism is on the rise, it is not a new phenomenon. Since its inception, America has been the source of both hope and resentment for people around the world. The entrance of the U.S. into world affairs in the 20th century and its eventual emergence as the world's lone superpower brought it both admiration and criticism. The reasons and intensity varying from country to country, anti-Americanism has surfaced as a significant concern for the U.S. in the post-September 11 world. The event that moved the world with sympathy to empathize with a wounded America initiated a period of growing resentment of the same country.

"*Nous sommes tous Américains*" was famously declared by the editor-in-chief of the French newspaper *Le Monde* two days after September 11. "We are all Americans." This article is an example of identification with America, which is a product of the world, a "melting pot" of people, foods, cultures, and values. While America reflects the rest of the world, it also develops its own culture and in turn influences other countries. "Americanization" is a profoundly interactive process

between America and all parts of the world.¹ This Americanization can prompt resentment, as can the other ways that America uses its power to influence the world. The diversity of anti-Americanism is as diverse as the views of America,² which can at the same time be the object of one's dreams and the embodiment of one's greatest hatreds.

III.2 Anti-Americanism Defined

Although at first-glance the term seems to be self-explanatory, anti-Americanism encompasses a widely varying phenomenon. The introduction to the forum held about anti-Americanism organized by the *American Historical Review*, a major historical journal in the United States, begins this way: "It is clear from many different sources that anti-Americanism around the world is at an all-time high...anti-Americanism is hardly new. Nor is it simple."³ Increasing, old, and complex are appropriate adjectives to introduce anti-Americanism.

A simplistic definition of anti-Americanism from which to begin is an attitude of resentment and dislike for American politics or culture. Katzenstein and Keohane define anti-Americanism as "a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general."⁴ Paul Hollander, in his 1992 book *Anti-Americanism*, writes a possible definition as "An unfocused and largely irrational, often visceral aversion towards the United States, its government, domestic institutions, foreign policies, prevailing values, culture, and people."⁵ He argues that if there was not some irrationality associated with it, no one would be interested in the

¹ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Anti-Americanisms," *Policy Review* (Oct/Nov. 2006).

² Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., "Anti-Americanisms" in *World Politics* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2007), 3.

³ "Historical Perspectives on Anti-Americanism," *American Historical Review*, October 2006.

⁴ Katzenstein and Keohane, "Anti-Americanisms" in *World Politics*, 12.

⁵ Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965-1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 334-335.

phenomenon. “Since Nazism is universally perceived as self-evidently evil, nobody is seeking a better understanding of anti-Nazi sentiments in the post-World-War II period.”⁶

Accordingly, anti-Americanism is something deeper than disagreement with the U.S. over policies. Alfred Grosser, writing in the same influential French journal *Le Monde*, points out that one need not be labeled “anti-American” for opposing U.S. foreign policy, nor an “anti-Semite” or “anti-Zionist” for taking Israeli government policy to task.⁷ Anti-Americanism, therefore, relates to an attitude or bias that develops against America. Resentment of policies, however, can harden into a bias against America. For example, during the years of the Vietnam War some would claim to be against the war but not necessarily anti-American. This is captured by one non-American author’s personal anecdote. “I remember demonstrating in Paris and in Washington... against the Vietnam War. I never felt anti-American at the time. In fact, I rarely felt so close to America as when riding in a ramshackle old school bus to the Capitol with my American friends.”⁸

Many scholars have also made efforts to demystify anti-Americanism. It is obvious to most that while there may be an over-arching definition, there are subdivisions within the phenomenon. Phillipe Roger’s distinguishing between the cultural and political strands of Anti-Americanism is representative of many scholars’ recognition that not all people dislike America for the same reasons:

It always applies selectively, never extending to a total rejection of both forms of Americanism: the cultural and the political. Thus we can have either of two separate outcomes: One anti-Americanism rejects cultural trends that are seen

⁶ Hollander, *Anti-Americanism*, 335.

⁷ Alfred Grosser, “Les hors-la-loi” (“The outlaws”), *Le Monde Selection Hebdomadaire*, Paris, April 26, 2003, 8, quoted in Robert Kroes, “European Anti-Americanism: What’s New?” *Journal of American History* 93 (Sept. 2006): 8.

⁸ Phillipe Roger, “Global Anti-Americanism and the Lessons of the ‘French Exception.’” *The Journal of American History*, (Sept. 2006), <http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/jah/93.2/roger.html>

as typically American, while it admires America's prowess, idealism, and optimism. The other anti-Americanism rejects an American political creed that, for all its missionary zeal, is perceived as imperialist and oppressive, while it admires American culture, from its highbrow to its pop varieties.⁹

Other authors convey a similar concept in the distinction between America being disliked for what it primarily *is* or for what it *does*. Katzenstein and Keohane astutely point out that anti-Americanism fluctuates too much to be simply about what America *is*.¹⁰ Juan Cole entitled his article for the *American Historical Review*, "Anti-Americanism: It's the Policies." After a lengthy evaluation of anti-Americanism throughout the world, Cole concluded his article in this way: "What is indisputable is that the sentiments are not generated by a clash over basic values. It's the foreign policy, stupid."¹¹ Roger also points to the policies as the reason for anti-Americanism.

All polls confirm what seems obvious: America's image abroad has been rapidly deteriorating in direct connection with a policy seen as (check one or more): ill motivated, politically naive, hazardous for the region and the rest of the world, not to speak of illegitimate in the eyes of international law.¹²

In addition to asserting policies are the cause for the rising anger towards the U.S., he articulates what many accept as given: that anti-Americanism is about foreign policy blunders and not about something deeper. "Although negative attitudes have spiked in recent years, world opinion is not intrinsically anti-American."¹³

However, there is also support that anti-Americanism has its roots in what America *is*. Paul Hollander wrote in 1992, "Anti-Americanism has less to do with the policies and actions of the United States and more with what the United States is or what it stands for."¹⁴ Is it possible that one of the foremost works on anti-Americanism could be out of date in the post-September 11 world? Markovitz is one

⁹ Roger.

¹⁰ Katzenstein and Keohane, *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, 3.

¹¹ Juan Cole, "Anti-Americanism: It's the Policies," *American Historical Review* 111 (Oct. 2006) <http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/111.4/cole.html>.

¹² Roger.

¹³ Steven Kull, "It's Lonely at the Top," *Foreign Policy* (July/Aug 2005): 36-37.

¹⁴ Hollander, *Anti-Americanism*, 337.

scholar who emphasizes that anti-Americanism, at least in Europe, is still caused by what it is:

Negative sentiments and views have been driven not only—or even primarily—by what the United States does, but rather by an animus against what Europeans have believed that America is. While the politics, style, and discourse of the Bush terms—and of President Bush as a person—have undoubtedly exacerbated anti-American sentiment among Europeans and fostered a heretofore unmatched degree of unity between elite and mass opinion in Europe, they are not anti-Americanism's cause.¹⁵

The next section proposes an explanation of anti-Americanism, taking into consideration the many frameworks and distinctions that have been made about the phenomenon, including the differences between culture and policy and what America *is* versus what it *does*. The framework that follows is a starting point for anti-Americanism to be thoughtfully evaluated based on both the varying root *causes* and the *level* of anti-Americanism among a respective people or country.

III.3 Anti-Americanism Framework

The framework I have developed begins with an evaluation of the differing root causes for anti-Americanism throughout the world. Although the reasons for anti-Americanism vary, the three primary strands could be termed Cultural, Economic, and Political. After a summary of the elements of the framework, each will be addressed in detail.

The Cultural strand of anti-Americanism is based on America being seen as the leader and main culprit of the negative cultural trends coming from globalization. The spread of McDonald's, Hollywood, or sex symbols are frequently cited sources of


¹⁵ Andrei S. Markovits, "Western Europe's America Problem," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, Vol. 53, Issue 20 (January 19, 2007). This essay was adapted from his book *Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America*, (Princeton University Press, 2007).

resentment. As the negative cultural trends associated with what America *is* spread throughout the world, anti-Americanism rises.

The Economic strand of anti-Americanism comes from those who resent what America *does* in relation to economic dominance in the world. America is viewed by these groups as economically imperialist, both in its forced spread of neo-liberal capitalism and unjust pursuit of natural resources. Capitalism failing to cause improvement in a country can be a source of bitterness, as can American unwillingness to come to the aid of countries that need help economically.

The Political strand originates from what America *does* in its meddling in the politics of other countries and the harmful use of hard power. America is a “loose cannon,” using its military might in unilateral and irresponsible ways. Exemplified most recently by the Iraq War, America’s overthrowing of regimes and supporting corrupt dictators are long-lasting sources of anti-Americanism. The view of the Bush administration specifically, with its cowboy style and macho arrogance, is resented. Perceived one-sided support for Israel is one of the most commonly cited examples of this reason for anti-Americanism.

The three-circle Venn diagram in Figure 1 highlights the predominant theme of each sphere. One of the strengths of the Venn diagram is showing the overlap of reasons for anti-Americanism.




The next step of the framework is based on the recognition that while the root causes differ, so do the levels of resentment and the corresponding view of the United States. Other frameworks do not typically include both of these concepts. Many authors give reasons for anti-Americanism or perceptions of America, but few try to combine them. The three representative grades of anti-Americanism are Benign Hegemon, Disruptive Force, and Threatening Power. This is shown visually in Figure 2. While countries could be placed in one category, the cylinder shows a vertical continuum between the three categories within which a country could be placed.

Composing the Benign Hegemon level are those that are the least anti-American. They see the U.S. as not ill-intending, just unaware as it pursues its own interests. Like the proverbial 800-pound gorilla, the U.S. does not realize the extent of its power and influence. It is looking out for its own self-interest and, simply because of negligence and lack of awareness, causing harm to others. According to this view, America can be accommodated and hopefully even become a more responsible member of the global community.

The Disruptive Force category is the middle level where the U.S. is viewed as an irresponsible actor. The behavior of the United States needs to be corrected or the situation will get worse. The U.S. is perceived to be generally uncooperative and stirring up trouble for the world. More disorder and bloodshed will come if the U.S. does not correct its behavior.

The Threatening Power category is composed of those who believe that America is an immediate threat and danger to the world. The most radical among these anti-Americans believe that the U.S. intends to conquer the world. People in this category view the U.S. as more than a general problem and a direct threat to their interests.



These three categories are on a continuum, but countries or groups of people could be placed generally into one of the groups. This can be depicted visually by the three-circle Venn diagram in Figure 1 becoming three-dimensional and the height showing where a country fits on this scale. The combination of the two could then be

used to formulate the perception of America and the strength of and general reasons for anti-Americanism in a particular country. Having provided an overview of the framework, the next sections explore each of the elements of this framework in greater detail.

III.3.1 Cultural Anti-Americanism

The first major root of anti-Americanism is Cultural. This is the resentment of American culture and the spread of the accordingly negative cultural trends to the rest of the world. These are connected because typically a resentment of what America is perceived to be is at the core of the dislike of American culture's dissemination in the world. If American culture was totally admired, then its spread would tend to be seen as a good thing. However, many dislike America for what it is, and therefore the negative influence it is having on the world. "In the eyes of its enemies, [America] is condemnable not only for what it does but for what it is. Whatever it does, whether it intervenes on the international stage or remains cloistered within its frontiers, it's in the wrong."¹⁶

America is seen as the leader and main culprit of globalization. The globalization backlash, or the aversion to modernity, manifests itself in resentment to the U.S. The spread of Big-Macs, American-made movies and television shows, the sex-industry, and the spread of English can all be sources of resentment. People see these and other trends invading their own cultures and the United States is the easiest party to blame. Homogenization associated with U.S. mass culture is an accompanying danger for some that can bring hatred.

¹⁶Pascal Bruckner, "The Paradoxes of Anti-Americanism." *Dissent* (Summer 2006): 10.

At the root of the cultural strand of anti-Americanism is the underlying theoretical claim that there is something fundamentally wrong with America. “Anti-Americanism rests on the singular idea that something associated with the United States, at the core of American life, is deeply wrong and threatening to the rest of the world.”¹⁷ The theoretical accusations are abundant and diverse, but there are themes that run through the writings of the philosophers critical of America.

America began as a place of inspiration and hope. Sir Thomas More, in his work *Utopia* released in 1516, followed by John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and others, viewed America as free from history and an object of hope compared to the shortcomings of their societies.¹⁸ However, the utopian view of America faded as it became a reality. By the early 19th century, after the failure of the French Revolution, the United States was the only society based on an Enlightenment conception of nature. After romantics were proved wrong when the United States survived and prospered, they changed tactics to say that America’s continued existence was at the cost of everything deep and profound.¹⁹ They argued that with no hope of sustaining a genuine culture, there was only a dull materialism. A flattening of the soul, a loss of depth, mathematization and mechanization of life, no room for quality, and an empty and superficial world are among the criticisms attached to the United States by philosophers over the ensuing years.²⁰ This theoretical anti-Americanism spreads from Western European intellectuals to influence others in the world.²¹

¹⁷ James Ceaser, “The Philosophical Origins of anti-Americanism in Europe,” in *Understanding Anti-Americanism*, ed. Paul Hollander (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004), 47-48.

¹⁸ For a useful introduction to the theoretical origins of anti-Americanism in Europe see David M. Kennedy, “Imagining America: The Promise and Peril of Boundlessness,” In *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, ed. Peter J Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2007), especially 43-45.

¹⁹ Ceaser, 51.

²⁰ Ceaser, 54-55.

²¹ Adel Darwish, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab Language Media,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 7 (Dec 2003).

The ideological differences between Europe and America continue to today. Robert Kagan convincingly argues a “great philosophical schism has opened within the West” since the end of the Cold War.²² He claims “it is precisely the question of legitimacy that divides Americans and Europeans today—not the legitimacy of each other’s political institutions, perhaps, but the legitimacy of their respective visions of world order.” According to Kagan, the divide over Iraq was more about principles than policies. Although there also political reasons for European anti-Americanism, it has deeper cultural roots out of an objection to what America *is*.

The theoretical reasons for anti-Americanism underlie an opinion that a negative predisposition to everything American gives a negative view to specific outcomes or policies. Phillippe Roger writes, “a globally negative reading of everything American constantly preempts isolated analyses in specific fields and circumstances.”²³ This is in contrast to Rob Kroes’ argument that anti-Americanism proceeds from specific areas of disagreement to larger frameworks of rejection. “Entire repertoires of stereotyped Americas can be conjured up to account for any contemporary transatlantic disagreements.”²⁴

Katzenstein and Keohane use the term “polyvalence” to refer to the American symbols that mean different things to different people. Different people may dislike or admire the same characteristic of American life. There is:

an alleged loss of purity and authenticity for Europeans at the hands of a threatening and unwelcome intruder who—to make matters worse—exhibits a flaring cultural inferiority. America is resented for everything and its opposite: It is at once too prurient and too puritanical; too elitist, yet also too egalitarian; too chaotic, but also too rigid; too secular and too religious; too radical and too conservative. Again, damned if you do, damned if you don’t.²⁵

²² Robert Kagan, “America’s Crisis of Legitimacy,” *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2004).

²³ Roger.

²⁴ Kroes, 6.

²⁵ Markovitz.

America is diverse enough that it is possible for everyone to find characteristics to resent.

Europe is the clearest example of where anti-Americanism has cultural roots. America is disliked based on what it is in comparison to how Europeans perceive themselves. One scholar writes about America being viewed as “retrograde” based on moral, social, and cultural comparisons, all of which fit in the cultural category. He describes the European logic for the cultural backwardness as “America the commodified, Europe the refined; America the prudish and prurient, Europe the savvy and wise.”²⁶ The following quotation provides insight into how the concept “American” is used in European countries.

In German, the terms “Amerikanisierung” (Americanization) and “amerikanische Verhältnisse” or “amerikanische Bedingungen” (American conditions) almost invariably refer to something at once negative and threatening—something to be avoided...In Britain, “Americanisation” and “American-style” also have an almost exclusively negative connotation—often with the adjective “creeping” as a telling modifier in front: the creeping Americanization of the car’s feel for the road, the cult of guns fueled by creeping Americanization through violent films, the creeping Americanization of the growing girth of British novels, the creeping Americanization of British sport.²⁷

Especially interesting are the concerns of the British about the “American” cultural trends in as varying areas as guns, films, novels, and sports.

The prototypical case of cultural anti-Americanism is France. “It is this cultural anti-Americanism that has remained the most pronounced among the manifestations of French anti-Americanism, persisting at a time even when its political roots atrophied.”²⁸ Frenchman Pascal Bruckner provides a remarkably candid assessment of the roots of anti-Americanism in his home country.

²⁶ Markovitz.

²⁷ Markovitz.

²⁸ Hollander, *Anti-Americanism*, 384.

Here is the problem of France: it has always lived in rivalry with the United States. They are the only two nations imbued with the messianism of universalism. Even though Paris and Washington have never gone to war, a bellicose coexistence characterizes our countries' relations, all the more since, by its successes, Anglo-Saxon civilization eclipsed French civilization. It's not an exaggeration to write that France today, turning away from its neighbors, looks toward America, the only object of its resentment. France hates America because it looks too much like it, only in miniature: the same fatuousness, the same certainty of excellence incarnate, the same mix of moralizing and cynicism. As Dominique de Villepin has often put it, our country's principal title to glory lies in its resistance to America, its ability to underline its weaknesses, to put a stick in its spokes, to denounce it always and everywhere.²⁹

Bruckner continues about how the French media was astonished by the language used in a speech in France by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. He writes that it

reminded the French that we have forgotten the message of our revolution of 1789. America embodies the democratic inheritance that we have repressed. We despise it for having grown great as we've diminished, but above all we despise it for defending, sometimes in brutal and quarrelsome fashion, those values that we've buried.³⁰

France provides the quintessential example of a country that dislikes America for what it *is*. The next two strands address the resentments primarily for what America *does*.

III.3.2 Economic Anti-Americanism

The second root cause of anti-Americanism is Economic. This can be resentment of economic imperialism, imposition of capitalism, insufficient help in financial crises, or the disregard for the environment in pursuit of economic gain. There are also those who feel they are the "losers" in global capitalism and consequently resent the U.S.

²⁹ Bruckner, 12.

³⁰ Bruckner, 13.

Economic imperialism is a large reason for anti-Americanism in parts of the world. The U.S. is seen to be exploiting others as a colonial power, seeking to expand its economic empire. One author writes of the tendency toward the economic roots of anti-Americanism in the Third World.

Third Worldism is that mix of socialism and anti-Imperialism which blames the West, especially America, and the local elites which work with it for the shortcomings in the developing countries, offering a vision of a more equitable and prosperous society once the evil West is forced to open its death grip on the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.³¹

Such thinking comes from a combination of blame and economic grievances.

The spread of capitalism is also a source of resenting America. “Frequently anti-Americanism is a form of anticapitalism, when the United States is thought to be a repository of social injustice as the major capitalist nation in the world and defender of other capitalist nations.”³² This has its source in Marxist anti-capitalism. America was a place upon which Marxists, like other theorists, could place their hopes of how history would unfold. Friedrich Engels wrote with excitement in 1886 that the working class had passed through the two “stages” in only ten months,³³ “Where no medieval ruins bar the way.”³⁴ As for other theorists that saw great promise in America, David Kennedy writes that “something confidently predicted and eagerly anticipated had not come to pass in the United States, to the disappointment and even embitterment of those who had expected it.”³⁵ Marxists were eventually let down by Americans not behaving in the way that Marxist theory had optimistically dreamed.

³¹ Patrick Clawson, “The Paradox of Anti-Americanism in Iran,” *MEDIA, Middle East Review of International Affairs* (March 2004): 20.

³² Holland, *Anti-Americanism*, 339.

³³ One scholar summarizes the stages of the working class movement development according to Engels as “the mass trade union movement acting on a national scale and the independent labor party, also on a national scale. Usually there is a lengthy period between both of these.” J.R. Johnson, “In the American Tradition,” *New Internationalist* (Nov. 1943):306-309. <http://www.marxists.org/archive/james-clr/works/1943/11/american-tradition.htm>

³⁴ Engels in Kennedy, 48.

³⁵ Sombart in Kennedy, 49.

The fact that America has been the place of unrealized dreams is one reason for a tendency towards anti-Americanism.

The Marxists' hope in America was replaced by a perception that America was now the global capitalist project that "compelled all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production."³⁶ The U.S. therefore came to represent the worst of capitalism.

In American thinking, there is not *a priori* objection to straightforward economic exploitation. Anti-American Marxists like Noam Chomsky believe, of course, that that is the essence of the problem, and it calls into question the 'system' on which the U.S., like most modern societies, functions.³⁷

Africa and Latin America are among the places where the economic reasons are the biggest cause of anti-Americanism. "Just consider: here is a country that attracts immigrants from everywhere, and has not succeeded in getting Africa to take off economically. It is surely responsible for the uneven economic records of its hemispheric neighbors."³⁸ Greg Grandin highlights the economic grievances of Latin America throughout his article on the history of anti-Americanism in the Americas.

In the early twentieth century, criticism of the United States, sharpened through Marxist theory, gained political momentum with the growth of communist, socialist, and nationalist political parties, and connected both with domestic guerrilla insurgencies and internationalist movements... corporations and banks steadily replaced gunboats as the main agent and symbol of U.S. power.³⁹

He explains that Latin America does not have a history of outright rejecting the American culture. "Since the early nineteenth century, Latin American elites had shared with their North American counterparts the idea that 'America' represented a

³⁶ Marx and Engels in Kennedy, 50.

³⁷ Roger Kaplan, "Americanism, Un-Americanism, Anti-Americanism," *Human Rights Review* 4 (April-June 2003): 70.

³⁸ Kaplan, 70.

³⁹ Greg Grandin, *The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000), *American Historical Review*, 1049.

renovating world force distinct from archaic Europe.”⁴⁰ It is primarily economics, rather than resentment of culture, that is the root of anti-Americanism in Latin America. “There is an almost general belief in Latin America today that the United States has siphoned off the wealth which could have led to the Southern Hemisphere’s development. ‘They are rich because we are poor; we are poor because they are rich.’”⁴¹

A wave of anti-Americanism that did not exist in the 1990s has swept over all segments of society in Latin America.

Many Latin American governments woke up from a decade-long experiment with neoliberal prescriptions and realized they were not better off than they had been before—many in fact, were much worse. With the United States suddenly absorbed in its War on Terror, countries like Argentina, Peru, Uruguay and Brazil were left alone to recover from poorly managed reforms that had left them staggering under a huge debt load, growing unemployment and an even more unequal distribution of income.⁴²

Economic issues dominate the assessment of anti-Americanism in Latin America.

The U.S. refusal to halt billions of dollars in farm subsidies on the one hand, while it speaks of free trade on the other, is viewed as hypocritical throughout the region.⁴³

A recent survey by consulting firm Research International found that a majority of Latin Americans believe U.S. brands are exploiting people and the environment. A third of those surveyed believed U.S. companies were ‘big, evil empires with lots of money.’ The survey, based on 850 interviews of upscale consumers, found that young people were more likely than not to have negative attitudes toward U.S. brands.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Grandin, 1043.

⁴¹ Rangel, 1977, 175, quoted in Hollander, 356.

⁴² Marcelo Ballvé, “A New Wave of Anti-Americanism,” *NACLA Report on the Americas* (May/Jun2005): 38.

⁴³ Ballvé, 38.

⁴⁴ “Latin America: Icon Down,” *EIU Business Latin America*. November 29, 2004. Article cites Research International study, “Being American - The Future of USA Brands,” October 2004, quoted in Ballvé, 40.

The economic meltdown has paved the way for Hugo Chavez of Venezuela's high profile defiance of America.

Argentina may be the strongest example of anti-Americanism caused by economic reasons within the region. "Washington refused to bail out Argentina as the country sank into default, forcing millions of Argentines into poverty."⁴⁵ Blame was placed on the U.S. for not doing enough to assist Argentina and even for having conspired against it. During the peak of Argentina's financial implosion, "weekly newsmagazines and cable talk programs spun out scenarios in which the United States had co-conspired to sink Argentina economically paving the way for U.S. investors to acquire massive landholdings in the Pampas and Patagonia."⁴⁶ Argentina is an example of anti-Americanism with economic roots.

III.3.3 Political Anti-Americanism

The third and final grouping of root causes for anti-Americanism is Political. This is the resentment of America for primarily its political and military actions, including resentment of American use of hard power, perceived arrogance in the world, support of Israel, unilateralism and disregard for international law, and past support for dictators and meddling in other countries' affairs.

Especially in America's response after September 11 and the Iraq War, the resentment of U.S. force is cause for anti-Americanism throughout the world. America is viewed as the culprit for killing and bloodshed in Iraq, and is threatening to use its military might again with Iran. The number of military campaigns causes some to resent America for being too militaristic. Others bemoan the disproportionate size of the U.S. military. The overwhelming U.S. nuclear arsenal and record as the

⁴⁵ Ballvé, 37.

⁴⁶ "Economic Crisis Spurs Anger." *Washington Post*. May 19, 2002, A20, quoted in Ballvé, 38.

only country to have used nuclear weapons are commonplace in anti-American rhetoric. The coercive nature of American foreign relations is causing a backlash in most places around the world.

A second source of resentment towards the U.S. in the political sphere is its arrogant style. This has become especially pronounced under the Bush administration since September 11. Fareed Zakaria has frequently written on the arrogance of the Bush administration. "This strange combination of arrogance and incompetence has not only destroyed the hopes for a new Iraq. It has had the much broader effect of turning the United States into an international outlaw in the eyes of much of the world."⁴⁷ The arrogance makes the situation all the worse. Bush's rhetoric that "You are either with us or against us" in the war on terror has caused resentment. The rest of the world does not accept America's campaign of "good versus evil."

The U.S. support of Israel is among the most-cited root causes of anti-Americanism in parts of the world. The opening line to Katzenstein and Keohane's article "Anti-Americanisms" emphasizes the impact of the Israeli issue on anti-Americanism. "Arab reactions to American support for Israel in its recent conflict with Hezbollah have put anti-Americanism in the headlines once again."⁴⁸ Barry Rubin argues that "There is an attempt to reduce all American policy to a single issue: the U.S. support for Israel."⁴⁹ This is the main reference point for a widely held belief that the U.S. is anti-Arab.

A fourth reason for anti-Americanism from the political sphere is the unilateralism and disregard for international law attributed to America, especially prominent since the start of the Iraq War. Phillipe Sands' vehement attack against the U.S. in *Lawless World* is a clear example. He writes in the preface, "With the election

⁴⁷ Fareed Zakaria, "The Price of Arrogance," *Newsweek*, May 17, 2004.

⁴⁸ Katzenstein and Keohane, "Anti-Americanisms."

⁴⁹ Barry Rubin, "The Real Roots of Arab anti-Americanism," *Foreign Affairs* (Nov/Dec 2002).

of George W. Bush in November 2002, a U.S. administration took office that was outspoken in its determination to challenge global rules. Soon it turned into a full-scale assault, a war on law.”⁵⁰ In the conclusion, Sands chastises America and especially the Bush administration “that behaves as though international law does not matter, that has withdrawn from international agreements with impunity, and that is willing to bully other states which seek to promote initiatives such as the ICC and the Kyoto Protocol.”⁵¹ This statement shed light on how objection to the U.S. in one area fuels broader resentment. It seems that Sands will view anything that America does with suspicion.

Lastly, America’s past support for dictators or regime change, whether all true or not, continue to fuel anti-Americanism in many countries throughout the world. Hollander lists military interventions in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama and the U.S. Marines landing in twenty Caribbean countries between 1905 and 1965 as examples in Latin America alone of sources of resentment.⁵²

China is an example of a country that has political roots for its anti-Americanism. According to the observations of a Chinese writer,

The media continues to characterize the United States as an irresponsible hyper-power that regularly interferes in other countries’ internal affairs. The word ‘hegemon’ has become synonymous with the United States in the press, as the maintenance of social stability (i.e., no democratization) has become synonymous with economic progress.⁵³

In 2006, 79 percent of Chinese were reported to acknowledge a liking for Americans, compared to 59 percent believing that the United States seeks to contain China and 56

⁵⁰ Phillippe Sands, *Lawless World: American and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules from FDR’s Atalantic Charter to George W. Bush’s Illegal War* (New York: Viking, 2005), xii.

⁵¹ Sands, 204.

⁵² Hollander, *Anti-Americanism*, 355.

⁵³ Ying Ma, “The Hate That Won’t Go Away: Anti-Americanism in China,” *Telos* (Summer 2006): 158.

percent that the United States is China's competitor.⁵⁴ This is evidence of political, rather than cultural, roots of anti-Americanism in China.

III.3.4 Overlap within the Framework

One of the strengths of this new framework is the overlap it accounts for in the Venn diagram in Figure 1. There are several issues that of course do not fit neatly in one of the main spheres. There is no assertion that there are three mutually exclusive reasons for anti-Americanism, but rather that these are strands that help clarify the main roots.

The environmental reasons for anti-Americanism are an example of overlap primarily between the Cultural and Economic spheres. America is seen as willing to disregard the environment in pursuit of its unbridled economic ambitions. The American image at home of irresponsibly driving huge, gas-guzzling SUVs is also hated by critics. The U.S. unwillingness to sign the Kyoto Protocol is perhaps the most notorious environmental shame, which combines economic motivation and even the perceived American unilateralism and arrogance of the Political sphere.

There is also overlap between Economic and Political, as both are primarily based on resentment with America about what it *does*. These involve accusations that the United States is only motivated by self-interest. The one word "oil" is a common reply as to why one resents American actions in Iraq and the Middle East. This overlaps the two categories because many people see it as both economic exploitation and the use of hard power to secure more oil. Economic and political resentment are often interconnected, such as in Grandin's mention of both as causes of anti-

⁵⁴Cheng Gang, "Majority of Chinese Optimistic about Sino-American Relations," *Global Times*, March 17, 2006, quoted in Ma, 156.

Americanism in Latin America. “Over the course of two centuries, it has not been clashing universalisms that served as the primary fault line between the two Americas, but how the expansion of the United States’ political and economic power fractured a shared sense of exceptionalism.”⁵⁵

The combination of Cultural and Political has to do with where exceptionalism meets American foreign policy. There is resentment for America considering itself to be a “city on a hill” and having the “right” type of democracy. As these filter into foreign policy it can cause embitterment. An example is America’s war on terror and “evil.” This combines resentment for both what America *is* and what it *does*.

There are also lines of thinking that all three of the spheres share, such as hypocrisy, imperialism, and anti-institutionalism. America can be viewed as hypocritical within any of the spheres. It speaks of free markets, but then has policies to protect itself that are viewed as detrimental to the world. The U.S. advocates democracy and personal liberty, but critics look to its hypocritical support of corrupt regimes and tortured prisoners at Abu Ghraib. America can also be viewed as imperial in any of these areas, whether in culture, economic domination, or control by force. The U.S. unwillingness to join institutions such as the International Criminal Court and Kyoto Protocol, and undermining of the United Nations, has backlash in all of the primary areas of anti-Americanism.

It is also typical for America to be held responsible for all of the ills related to one or more of the spheres. If the resentment is based on political roots, it would be normal for America to be seen as the culprit or at least influencer of all of the political problems in the country. The same is true for the cultural and economic reasons.

⁵⁵ Grandin, 1065.

III.4 Benign, Disruptive, Threatening

While the Cultural, Economic, and Political strands are the predominant roots for anti-Americanism, there is still the question of the nature of the United States. What is the degree to which a country or group of people resents America? The reasons for anti-Americanism are inadequate for comprehending the strength of anti-Americanism within a country. Two countries may resent America for the cultural trends entering their countries because of globalization. However, how negatively one views America will influence the overall picture of anti-Americanism. Similarly, in the political realm America's perceived unilateralism may be criticized in different places around the world, but it matters whether a country sees the U.S. as benign or threatening in its unilateralism.

III.4.1 Benign Hegemon

The first level, "Benign Hegemon," is a term taken from François Heisbourg. In a 1999 article, Heisbourg explains this as one of four perceptions of the U.S. abroad. Heisbourg describes one vision of the U.S. as a Benign Hegemon, "basically attempting to focus on what it sees as its own affairs, with no malign intentions."⁵⁶ The U.S. is acknowledged by this group to be a hegemon, the predominant power in the international system, as it is unparalleled in military force, information technology, brand-name, and cultural penetration. According to this perception, the U.S. is basically trying to focus on its own affairs, but with such size and power it is very difficult for the U.S. to carry out its business without interfering in the affairs of

⁵⁶Francois Heisbourg, "American Hegemony: Perceptions of the US Abroad," *Survival* 41 (Winter 1999-2000): 9.

others. The adjectives Heisbourg uses are “Strong rather than brutal; candid and possibly naïve, rather than sly or crafty.”⁵⁷

Although a lot has changed since 1999, this remains a relevant category for describing the mildest form of anti-Americanism. Kishore Mahbubani, formerly Singapore’s Ambassador to the United Nations, gives a thoughtful analysis of anti-Americanism in his 2005 book *Beyond the Age of Innocence*.⁵⁸ Mahbubani essentially argues that America is a Benign Hegemon. While sympathetic because of the opportunities he feels he was given by America, he argues that America is not aware of its considerable power and influence on the rest of the world. Since the end of the Cold War, America has focused on its own interests to the detriment of the small global village that it has helped create. He makes a plausible case that America unintentionally causes turbulence in the world because of the incredible power it holds. “The other 6 billion citizens who are affected strongly, perhaps even more strongly, by decisions made in Washington have no means of influencing.”⁵⁹

The Benign Hegemon picture of America is intentionally mild. For some, as perhaps with Mahbubani, it may not even be anti-Americanism. However, it describes the frustration with America, without hatred or fear of bad intentions. In this grade, America could be disliked for McDonald’s taking root in one’s hometown and driving out the small traditional shops, but not faulted for intentionally trying to ruin one’s culture. Economically, a country could wish that America did more with all of its vast economic resources to help it recover from an economic crisis. America’s unilateralism may be disliked, but seen to be acting in its own self-defense, rather than intentionally trying to harm the world or disregard international law. Those who see the nature of America as a benign hegemon can still be anti-American in holding an

⁵⁷ Heisbourg, 9.

⁵⁸ Kishore Mahbubani, *Beyond the Age of Innocence* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005).

⁵⁹ Mahbubani, 161.

attitude of resentment and dislike for American politics or culture. In this view, the U.S. is not a danger to the world, but only an over-powerful country that needs to be accommodated and maneuvered.

An analogy in a school setting could be a student that is extraordinarily rich and irresponsible in how he handles his money. He causes all sorts of problems in the school because he parks his car illegally and does not care about paying the parking tickets. He has money to buy all the latest fashions and also have expensive food for lunch ordered in each day. Although he does not care much about the influence on his peers, the families of other students are bothered by their children wanting to spend their limited money on the latest fashions and the traditional bag lunch being looked upon disparagingly. Some people think he should give money to help other students who could use assistance. The teachers hear the complaints, but the student is not really a direct harm to anyone. There are many students that dislike him and the amount of influence he has, but he has to be accommodated. After all, he has a lot of money.

III.4.2 Disruptive Force

A second view of the U.S is as a “Disruptive Force.” This degree of anti-Americanism sees the U.S. as a force that needs to be disciplined and slowed down or the situation will get worse. The U.S. is viewed as uncooperative and stirring up trouble. It is looking out for its own interests and willing to trample the well-being of the world to achieve its own objectives. America’s ignorance about the rest of the world and lack of historical perspective are causing it to make great blunders. By trying to impose capitalism on everyone, the U.S. is causing harm to many countries and even disrupting the world economy. The U.S. has a history of intervening in the

affairs of other governments in Latin America and the Middle East and is causing continued problems by not changing this behavior. In undermining international institutions and being too reliant on military power and unilateral action, the U.S. is harming the international system.

In the school analogy, this degree of anti-Americanism is like the most disruptive student in the class. He is uncooperative with the teachers that are trying to keep the class under control, always fancying himself an exception to what the teachers wish. He also throws objects around the room. Many of the students feel like his immaturity is already disturbing them and that if he continues more problems are going to be caused. Some teachers have noticed that he is influencing other students to be more violent and bully some of their peers. He always seems to be getting into the business of others. Although he does not seem, at his core, to be a bad person, he is absolutely a negative influence and needs to be disciplined before someone gets their eye poked out with a pencil or the situation becomes unmanageable.

III.4.3 Threatening Power

“Threatening Power” is the third and highest degree of anti-Americanism. Countries or peoples in this group see America as a real and immediate danger to their culture or nation. The U.S. is perceived to have intentions to overtake other cultures and dominate countries, if not the world. America is an imperial power that already is ruling the world and is not satisfied. This classification includes and even exceeds Heisbourg’s most extreme category of Rogue State seven tumultuous years after he penned his perceptions of the U.S. abroad.

Similarly, Katzenstein and Keohane’s Radical anti-Americanism fits within the Threatening Power classification. They write that this anti-Americanism

is built around the belief that America's identity, as reflected in the economic power and political power relations and institutional practices of the United States, ensures that its actions will be hostile to the furtherance of good values, practices, and institutions elsewhere in the world. For progress towards a better world to take place, the U.S. economy and society will have to be transformed, either from within or without.⁶⁰

Although this is a helpful classification that is in agreement with the framework of this chapter, its shortcoming is a presumption that all radical anti-Americanism is similar. I contend that for assessing how to deal with anti-Americanism it is helpful to know whether the roots are more cultural, economic, or political. Katzenstein and Keohane combine them, saying that it is about "America's identity, as reflected in the economic power and political power relations and institutional practices of the United States." However, this is too general for America to focus its efforts to mitigate such anti-Americanism. The Threatening Power degree, as with the other levels of anti-Americanism, can be based on any of the three general root causes or a combination of them.

To complete the school analogy, this third group perceives the United States as a student who has sent a bomb threat to the school administration. Such a student is a real and immediate threat to all of the students in the school. This student is not just a disturbance, but a *bona fide* danger to everyone involved. There is almost no hope to bring such a student back into the system. He needs to be expelled from the school. Sadly, there is something fundamentally wrong with this student's character. This power-hungry student is not content to fit in with his peers. Both what this student is and does is a threat to the whole idea of the school. Disciplinary actions are not enough to stop such a student; he needs to be radically changed or eliminated from the system. Whether he will destroy the school first or not, the hatred of this student is increasing all the while.

⁶⁰ Katzenstein and Keohane, *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, 33.

III.5 Outside Influences

. The framework explained the three primary strands of rationale that people have for their resentment of America. However, there are also mixes of other factors influencing anti-Americanism that fall outside of the rational, even if not altogether accurate, reasons. These are represented as other forces acting on the respective attitudes of anti-Americanism. Such influences that go beyond what America *is* or *does* are strong factors in the second dimension of the degree of anti-Americanism in a country. Paul Hollander makes a clear distinction between the rational response against American misdeeds and the irrational predisposition to America.

A proper understanding of anti-Americanism can only be achieved by balancing two apparently incompatible perspectives: (a) that anti-Americanism is a direct and rational response to the evident misdeeds of the US abroad and its shortcomings and inequities at home; (b) that anti-Americanism is a largely groundless, irrational predisposition (similar to racism, sexism, and anti-Semitism) expressing a deeply-rooted scapegoating impulse.⁶¹

Many scholars have also argued that anti-Americanism has less to do with what America *is* or *does*, and more to do with the beholder. Katzenstein and Keohane have pointed out that anti-Americanism is complicated because it can be just as much a reflection of the people that hate America as it is about any problems of America. “The phenomenon is too broad and diverse, reflecting the attitudes of America-haters as much as the America they hate.”⁶² These outside factors that have little to do with America itself could be categorized as: the manipulation of local forces, uniting around anti-Americanism, scapegoating, a lack of understanding, and America as “Mr. Big.”

⁶¹ Paul Hollander, Ed., abstract, *Understanding Anti-Americanism: Its Origins and Impact at Home and Abroad*, *Future Survey* 27:4 (April 2005).

⁶² Katzenstein and Keohane, “Anti-Americanisms.”

Anti-Americanism can be specifically promoted by the local elites and governments. Patrick Clawson and Barry Rubin have argued in many publications that the real roots of Arab anti-Americanism are in manipulation by local forces. “Contrary to beliefs and assertions that U.S. policies are responsible for Middle Eastern anti-Americanism, local forces have promoted it in the service of particular political goals.”⁶³ The commentary on conspiracy theories in the Philippines in 1990 is an example of how such thinking has long existed, and not just in the Arab world: “It probably hasn’t occurred to many Americans that the United States might be contemplating an invasion of the Philippines...conspiracies involving the United States are a staple of this city’s political culture.”⁶⁴ Anti-Americanism is also encouraged at high levels in China. “When it comes to anti-Americanism in China, the Chinese government, above all, molds its citizens’ thinking through state indoctrination.”⁶⁵

Anti-Americanism can become a unifying mechanism for countries and groups throughout the world. Some scholars have even cited anti-Americanism in Europe as an example. “Fundamentally, the European views about America have little to do with the real America but much to do with Europe.”⁶⁶ The author argues that anti-Americanism is being utilized as something around which a common European identity can be built. “Far from harming Europe and its interests, anti-Americanism has helped Europeans gain respect, affection, and—most important—political clout in the rest of the world.”⁶⁷ The same is said specifically about France. “To that end, anti-

⁶³ Patrick Clawson and Barry Rubin, “Anti-Americanism in the Middle East.” In *Understanding Anti-Americanism*, ed. Paul Hollander (Chicago: Ivan R. Dec, 2004), 124-134.

⁶⁴ Berlow, 1990, 19, quoted in Hollander, *Anti-Americanism*, 337-338.

⁶⁵ Ma, 157.

⁶⁶ Markovitz.

⁶⁷ Markovitz.

Americanism in France is a machine for producing consensus, the only means of reconciling all of its political and intellectual families.”⁶⁸

Scapegoating is another reason for anti-Americanism. Hollander writes that anti-Americanism “appears to be born out of a scapegoating impulse fueled by a wide variety of frustrations and grievances; as such it has much in common with chauvinistic nationalism that seeks to bolster collective self-esteem by the denigration of other nations.”⁶⁹ Mary Eberstadt, in an article focused on the tendency to find scapegoats both in the U.S. and the world after September 11, includes America as one of the popular scapegoats. She writes that some have made an

industry of scapegoating in the U.S. All have their reasons, and the overriding reason is an obvious one. There is something deeply human about the desire to find all the things scapegoats can provide: a vessel to bear one’s anxieties and outrages, a target that won’t hit back, a welcome distraction from the real thing.⁷⁰

Anti-Americanism can become a mechanism for blame. Barry Rubin is one prominent scholar who challenges the idea that America has acted against Arabs and argues Arab anti-Americanism has more to do with scapegoating.

For years now, anti-Americanism has served as a means of last resort by which failed political systems and movements in the Middle East try to improve their standing. The United States is blamed for much that is bad in the Arab world, and it is used as an excuse for political and social oppression and economic stagnation.⁷¹

Misunderstanding based on a presumption of understanding also contributes to anti-Americanism. Heisbourg makes a useful contribution in explaining why the perceptions of the U.S. can vary so much and why the U.S. can be hard to figure out for foreign publics. The diversity of the U.S. government and “an exceptionally vibrant, diverse and powerful civil society” make America a difficult place to

⁶⁸ Bruckner, 12.

⁶⁹ Hollander, *Anti-Americanism*, 335.

⁷⁰ Mary Eberstadt, “The Scapegoats Among Us,” *Policy Review* 140 (Dec2006/Jan2007): 25-46.

⁷¹ Rubin, “The Real Roots of Arab anti-Americanism.”

understand.⁷² He makes an astute observation that foreign perceptions of the U.S. are all too often based on the belief that one knows a lot about the U.S., but on the reality of ignorance. The result “is such that it is all too easy for outsiders to think that they know more about the U.S. than they actually do.”⁷³ This leads to dangerous perceptions and simplifications about American culture, intentions, and foreign policy.

Another reason for anti-Americanism is the “Mr. Big” argument explained by Katzenstein and Keohane, among others. “In this view it is no accident that American power is at its zenith while American standing is at its nadir.”⁷⁴ Although this plays into the cultural, economic, and political roots of anti-Americanism, it is also another factor in anti-Americanism. James Ceaser holds that the dominant strategic position of the United States is a “natural” source of anti-Americanism.⁷⁵ He argues that former great powers like the Romans, Greeks, and Great Britain were naturally disliked. Hollander’s first reason given for the rise of anti-Americanism is that the fall of Soviet communism and elimination of the second superpower has led to the opinion that as the only global force around the world, the U.S. can be held responsible for many cultural, economic, and political problems.⁷⁶ Although superpowers can handle the position differently, the position lends itself to resentment.

III.6 Iceberg Analogy

To this point, my framework has been an effort to shed light on the overall causes and variations of anti-Americanism in the world. The fundamental roots of

⁷² Heisbourg, 6-7.

⁷³ Heisbourg, 7.

⁷⁴ Katzenstein and Keohane, “Anti-Americanisms.”

⁷⁵ Ceaser, 47-48.

⁷⁶ Paul Hollander, ed., *Understanding Anti-Americanism: Its Origins and Impact at Home*. (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004), 16.

anti-Americanism, the varying intensities, and the contributing outside forces all provide a framework through which to view anti-Americanism.

However, these more general explanations still do not reveal the extent of deeper and unique reasons for the differing levels of anti-Americanism among countries. In order for the United States to effectively deal with anti-Americanism in a particular country, it is helpful to have a general sense of the reasons, but also to look deeper. One of the important features of anti-Americanism is that the reasons for it are deeper than normally recognized.

A familiar analogy to help visualize the concept is that of an iceberg, a large section of freshwater ice that has broken off from a glacier or ice shelf and is floating on the open sea. Because of the lower density of the pure water ice compared to the sea water, typically only one ninth of the volume of an iceberg is above water. Icebergs are a well-known danger to ships because of the unpredictable shape of the iceberg under water.⁷⁷ The iceberg has therefore become an analogy for a problem actually being much deeper or more complex than what is immediately visible on the surface of an issue.

Although policies may be the spark of renewed anti-Americanism, past sensitivities and suspicions are almost always drawn upon. If this were not the case, the level of anti-Americanism would be more similar in countries examined. There are many reasons why the anti-Americanism in Turkey is not the same as in Iran, although both border Iraq. To really deal with anti-Americanism in a country, it is vital for the roots to be sought out and not settle for the simplistic explanations to which everyone points. The final part of the framework presents an analogy that can be applied to understanding anti-Americanism in a particular country.

⁷⁷ Wikipedia, Online Encyclopedia.

III.7 Glasses Analogy

Each country has its own lenses through which it reads American behavior. The two lenses of the metaphorical glasses could be described as 1) what America is viewed to be based on the country's past relations with it, and 2) what the beholder itself is. The combination of these lenses influences how a country views America in the world. This is related to the argument from Robert Jervis' classic work, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, that there is a strong tendency for actors to see what they expect to see and fit incoming information to pre-existing images.⁷⁸ What America is doing is real, in countless international connections and actions. However, the extent to which each of the actions is perceived as a misjudgment, threat, or perhaps even positive influence, varies from country to country.

The left lens is based primarily on the past relationship or interaction between the two countries. This directly influences the way that the current behavior of the U.S. is seen. A very strong relationship where America was a faithful ally will tend to give a country more of a positive view of American actions than a country that has felt manipulated and marginalized at the expense of U.S. interests. Almost every country has some past interaction with the United States, and this influences how it perceives the current actions. A trusting friend will give the benefit of the doubt to the suspicious actions of his friend, while the person who has felt harmed by the same behavior in the past will assume the worst. The actions can be the same, but be viewed differently based upon the history of the relationship. Likewise, America is viewed by countries through the left lens of the history of interaction.

⁷⁸ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 117.

The right lens of the glasses is about what that particular country *is*: this includes the history of the country, its identity, and the current political issues within it. This connects to Katzenstein and Keohane's argument that anti-Americanism can say as much about the beholder as it does about America.⁷⁹

Anti-Americanism can be simply described as a negative predisposition or bias towards the United States. Therefore, the glasses analogy appropriately shows how the U.S., when viewed through certain lenses, can be viewed with a negative predisposition.

III.8 Conclusion

This chapter has presented a framework for better comprehending anti-Americanism. Without an appropriate evaluation, anti-Americanism could be rejected as a totally irrational phenomenon or as an obvious reaction to the wrongs of the U.S. Neither one of these is helpful to clearly identify the influences at work, and what can be changed.

This chapter has argued that the basic roots for anti-Americanism are Cultural, Economic, or Political in nature. The Cultural resentment of America is grounded in what America is and the spread of its culture to other parts of the world. The economic and political roots have to do with the policies and what America does.

The second contribution of this framework is to evaluate the degree to which America is resented. A country can exist somewhere along a continuum of perceiving America as a Benign Hegemon, Disruptive Force, or Threatening Power. These levels of anti-Americanism in a country are influenced by a variety of forces outside of the

⁷⁹ Katzenstein and Keohane, "Anti-Americanisms."

United States, including manipulation of local forces, unity around America as the “other,” scapegoating, a lack of understanding, and America as the lone superpower.

However, there is still more than meets the eye, and to understand the iceberg of anti-Americanism in most countries, the glasses analogy should be used to analyze how a country views America. The lenses of the glasses are the past relationship with the U.S. and what the beholder itself is. This allows a country’s place in the framework to be explored and understood. It is worth noting that anti-Americanism is not identical throughout a given country, although there are similarities that make this one appropriate unit of analysis. This thesis explores the diversity of anti-Americanism by country, but the framework could be applied just as easily to segments of society.

The next chapter applies this framework to the case of Turkey, a country where anti-Americanism is extremely high. By understanding the reasons for the problem of anti-Americanism in Turkey, the U.S. can work toward appropriate solutions.

CHAPTER IV

ANTI-AMERICANISM IN TURKEY: WHAT AMERICA IS VIEWED TO BE

IV.1 Introduction

The 2003 decision by the Turkish Grand National Assembly not to cooperate with the U.S. war against Iraq is the clearest sign of the lack of solidarity in the Turkish-American relationship. The differing course of action leaves a lingering division between the traditional allies. This event increased the complexity of the invasion of Iraq and the overall outlook on the Middle East for the U.S., for whom the boiling war in Iraq is only one of the problems brewing. Likewise, fears about rising Kurdish clout in northern Iraq continue to grow for Turkey, now restrained from entering the region after not joining the initial American offensive. Strong public opinion against the U.S. declaring war on Iraq has festered into growing anti-Americanism. This is becoming a problem in itself, and one that will make other problems more difficult to solve.

As a traditional ally to the U.S. and a democratic country, Turkey is an intriguing and significant case in which to explore the concept of anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism in Turkey is among the highest in the world.¹ At the crossroads of

¹ Turkey's favorability toward the United States is the lowest among the fifteen countries surveyed in the Pew Research Center's widely cited poll. Pew Research Center, "America's Image Slips, But Allies

Europe and Asia, Turkey has a unique blend of factors influencing its view of America. At the same time, America and Turkey have a history of positive relations that should be an asset. Turkey is therefore a fascinating case study on how anti-Americanism has become so high. With a majority Muslim population, Turkey garners special importance for the United States in its post-September 11 perspective of the world. According to Chris Fitzgerald, Deputy Director of Press and Public Diplomacy for Europe in the U.S. State Department, Turkey has a high profile in the public diplomacy efforts of the United States due to its special characteristics and geopolitical importance.²

This chapter analyzes anti-Americanism in Turkey as a case study to build toward how the United States can improve its public diplomacy based on better understanding. This chapter utilizes the anti-Americanism framework set forth in chapter three to categorize anti-Americanism in Turkey and then delves deeper into Turkey's own mix of reasons for resentment. A case study of the rift in the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. provides insight into anti-Americanism and illuminates one of the problems confronting the U.S. in the Middle East and the world. The chapter will begin with the statistics showing the current levels of anti-Americanism and why it is a problem that must be taken seriously.

IV.1.1 Statistics of Anti-Americanism

The opinion polls in Turkey make it abundantly clear that Turks are disenchanted with America. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, those in Turkey having a favorable opinion of the U.S. dropped from 23 percent in 2005 to an

Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas," June 13, 2006.
<http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252>

² Chris Fitzgerald (Deputy Director of Press and Public Diplomacy for Europe), phone interview with the author, May 17, 2007, U.S. State Department.

abysmal 12 percent in 2006, even lower than the 15 percent in 2003.³ Rather than decreasing, it seems that anti-Americanism is increasing. Only three Turks in one hundred have a favorable or somewhat favorable view of President Bush. Turks are not only turned off to the U.S. government; in 2006 a scant 17 percent of Turks held a favorable opinion of Americans. An in-country poll conducted by Consensus Research⁴ in 2005 found that anti-Americanism in Turkey had risen to 82 percent.⁵ A poll conducted in Istanbul in 2003 reported that 90 percent of Turks do not think America is a good and trustworthy ally and 74 percent that it is looking out only for its own interests.⁶

Turkish-American relations may have never been worse than they are today.⁷ Poll after poll of public opinion paints an ominous picture of Turks' view of America.

IV.1.2 Why Anti-Americanism is a Problem

Is the anti-Americanism that shows up in polls really a detriment to the United States? Perhaps there is going to be a natural ebb and flow of anti-Americanism with which America does not need to concern itself. Katzenstein and Keohane assert that "it is difficult to identify big problems for American foreign policy created by anti-Americanism."⁸ International columnist Bruce Stokes argues that Turkey is a testament to the contrary.⁹ The two primary reasons that anti-Americanism matters are

³ Pew Research Center, 2006.

⁴ Konsensüs Araştırma, (Konsensus Research Consultancy) <http://www.consensus.com.tr/>

⁵ Reported in "Amerikan Karşıtlığının Sebebi Bush Politikası," *Yeni Şafak*, March 8, 2005.

⁶ Marmara Üniversitesi, "İrak Savaşı Sürecinde Türk Halkının ABD'ye Bakışı," March 1- June 1, 2003, <http://fef.marmara.edu.tr/Sosyoloji/ABD.htm>.

⁷ This is mentioned by such scholars as Ali Karaosmanoğlu, professor of international relations at Bilkent University, who has observed Turkish-American relations for many years. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Amerika Neden Önemli." Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi. September 19, 2005.

⁸ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane "Anti-Americanisms," *Policy Review* (Oct.-Nov. 2006).

⁹ Bruce Stokes, "Does Anti-Americanism Matter?," *National Journal* (Aug. 12, 2006): 50.

the example of the 2003 decision and the longer term impact it will have if the anti-Americanism becomes deeply ingrained.

In the build-up to the Iraq War in 2003, the United States desired Turkish support for a “Northern Front” in the invasion. The resolution which would have allowed tens of thousands of U.S. troops to be based on Turkish soil failed before the Turkish Grand National Assembly on March 1, 2003. By many accounts, the strong public opinion to the contrary from almost all segments of society influenced the government decision. An overwhelming 83 percent of Turks opposed allowing the U.S. and its allies to use its bases in war according to the Pew Global Attitudes survey in late 2002.¹⁰ “Turkish public opinion was clearly opposed to U.S. intervention, and a wide range of Turkish elites, including the security establishment, were ambivalent, at best, regarding U.S. policy.”¹¹ Reports by such organizations as the Strategic Studies Institute recognized the pressure on the Turkish government not align too closely with the U.S., due to the strong opposition by the public.¹² Stokes holds that the decision cannot be removed from its domestic public opinion context: “At the time of their decision, Turkish politicians and military leaders were undoubtedly aware that fewer than one in six of their fellow countrymen called themselves pro-American.”¹³ Cengiz Çandar, an influential Turkish journalist specializing in the Middle East, wrote that the decision was “The product of the corporate Turkish entity, ranging from the moderately Islamic ruling party to the arch-secularist main opposition party in the parliament, from the president to the powerful military, from

¹⁰ Pew Research Center, “What the World Thinks in 2002: How Global Publics View: Their Lives, Their Countries, The World, America,” (Dec 2002), <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=165>

¹¹ Ian O. Lesser, “Turkey and the United States: Anatomy of a Strategic Relationship.” in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, ed. Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2004), 86.

¹² Andrew W. Terrill, “Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq: The Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey.” Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. March 2003.

¹³ Stokes, 51.

the influential judiciary to the mainstream media.”¹⁴ Writing in 2001, Kemal Kirişçi observed that in regard to force against Iraq, “public opinion plays a very important role and there is a great reluctance among Turkish decision makers to be seen as a tool of US policy in the region.”¹⁵

A journalist for *Zaman*, one of the leading conservative newspapers, argued in an editorial that the Turkish government does not want to be identified with America when its image is so negative throughout the region.¹⁶ Cameron Brown explains that in a decision that came down to “going against the will of the vast majority of the population or saying no to the United States,” the government tried to diffuse responsibility for the decision.¹⁷ This is not to imply that Turkey’s decision was based on anti-Americanism. Turkey has reason to avoid an invasion from its territory based on its foreign policy priorities. Nevertheless, in a decision that came down to three votes in the Turkish Grand National Assembly,¹⁸ the willingness or unwillingness to trust and follow the lead of the United States has significance. Public opinion factored into the government’s decision.

Philip Robins writes how the public opinion has traditionally been a secondary player in the making of foreign policy in Turkey, coming from the Ottoman tradition that people exist to serve the state rather than the state existing to serve the people. Accordingly, Turkey’s political culture is characterized by foreign policymaking being dominated by the elites. An example is the way that Turgut Özal was able to

¹⁴ Cengiz Çandar, “Turkish Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq,” in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, ed. Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2004), 54.

¹⁵ Kemal Kirişçi, “Turkey and the United States: Ambivalent Allies,” in *U.S. Allies in a Changing World*, eds., Barry Rubin and Thomas Keaney, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 129.

¹⁶ Ali H. Aslan, “Daha Sağlam Köprüler Kurmak Gerekir,” *Zaman*, May 14, 2007.

¹⁷ Cameron S. Brown, “Turkey in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003,” *Turkish Studies* (March 2007): 103.

¹⁸ James E. Kapsis, “The Failure of U.S.-Turkish Pre-War Negotiations: An Overconfident United States, Political Mismanagement, and a Conflicted Military,” *MERIA* (September 2006).
Warhttp://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/jv10no3a3.html

carry the day in Turkey supporting the U.S. in the first Gulf War.¹⁹ Özal took a gamble to join the coalition in 1991, with only 20 percent of the population behind him, according to one poll at the time, expecting to be rewarded by members of the Western alliance for his support.²⁰ “Despite wide public endorsement of neutrality, President Özal almost single-handedly led Turkey into an alliance with the coalition.”²¹ This has been typical in Turkey, where the public’s views rarely appear to have had much influence on either policymakers or the policy-making process.²² The result has been the U.S. focusing on government elites in its efforts to influence Turkey. However, there is indication that this is changing. Robins acknowledges that public opinion has been growing in importance since the 1990s.²³

Ali Karaosmanoğlu, professor of international relations, also argues that the publics are now involved more than ever before, making it difficult for issues between the U.S. and Turkey to be approached calmly.²⁴ This requires the U.S. to relate directly to foreign publics and build understanding. The changing dynamics mean that a working relationship with the government will not be enough. Making a deal with Turkish elites behind closed doors did not accomplish what the U.S. wanted in 2003. If Turks and others in the region have a predisposed negative attitude, it will make it increasingly difficult for America to lead in the future

Beyond the example of the Iraq War, if anti-Americanism is not dealt with now it will harden into something worse. Nasuhi Güngör, a political columnist for the *Star* newspaper, pointed out that if the anti-Americanism remains high for several

¹⁹ Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (London: Hurst & Company, 2003), 17.

²⁰ Donald Kirk, “Any Takers?,” *National Review*, April 15, 1991.

²¹ Brown, 88.

²² Robins, 91.

²³ Robins, 92.

²⁴ Karaosmanoğlu.

more years, a generation will be raised with this kind of anti-American atmosphere.²⁵ He says that the more anti-Americanism rises, so does the sympathy for Iran. More generally, “No government in today’s Turkey would risk its popularity by going along with pro-American policy suggestions.”²⁶ The longer anti-Americanism persists, the more difficult it will be for America and Turkey to work together.

IV.1.3 Anti-Americanism in Turkey Overview

Based on the framework in chapter three, anti-Americanism in Turkey is grounded in political reasons. The lead-up to the Iraq War and its aftermath ignited pre-existing sensitivities in Turkey due to its past relations with American and its own identity issues and fears. Contrary to the emotional reactions evident in public opinion polls, anti-Americanism has not yet become a widespread dislike of Americans or their culture, but a resentment of American policies that are viewed as a threat to Turkish interests.

While this is true, the reasons for anti-Americanism in Turkey are deeper than the general rejection of the legitimacy of the Iraq War and the ensuing instability. The ongoing war and accompanying issues are seen through the lenses of Turkey’s lingering mistrust of America as an ally and the insecurities over the threats to the Turkish Republic. More specifically, these lenses become 1) an inflated view of American agency coupled with 2) mistrust and a reactionary phobia about threats to undermine the Republic. Anti-Americanism is primarily based on a perception that America’s actions in the Iraq War are against Turkish interests in supporting Kurdish self-determination that will lead to the eventual dismemberment of Turkey and,

²⁵ Nasuhi Güngör (columnist in the *Star* newspaper), interview with the author, April 25, 2007, Ankara.

²⁶ M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, “The Kurdish Question and Turkey’s Justice and Development Party,” *Middle East Policy* (Spring 2006), 116.

secondly, supporting the AKP and political Islam as a part of its broader plan for Middle East politics, which threatens to erode Turkey's secularist state.

The resulting anti-Americanism is mostly based on distorted perceptions caused by the lenses, which leads to an exaggerated view of American involvement and conspiracy theories not grounded in reality. These have caused the Iraq War and the "Hood Event" to be seen in the worst light possible, leading to a deepening belief that America is a Threatening Power, according to the spectrum of the last chapter.

IV.1.4 The Common View


Living in Turkey since the Iraq War, it would be easy to think that anti-Americanism began in Turkey after America's decision to invade Turkey's neighbor. Indeed, a full 70 percent of Turks believe America's war in Iraq made the world a more dangerous place, compared to just eight percent who think removing Saddam Hussein made the world safer. The Turks' negative view of the Iraq war is evidenced by the 60 percent of Turks that believe the U.S. in Iraq is a threat to world peace, the highest among any of the 15 countries polled by Pew. As a point of comparison, only 16 percent believed Iran and 6 percent North Korea to be a danger to world peace.²⁷ The headline of a 2005 article in the conservative *Yeni Şafak* newspaper proclaims "Bush politics is the reason for Anti-Americanism," both reflecting and fueling the public sentiment.²⁸

As a way to get a feel for the reasons for anti-Americanism, I conducted a survey. With no pretense that it is scientific or representative of all Turkey, I thought

²⁷ Pew Research Center, "America's Image in the World: Findings from the Pew Global Attitudes Project," (March 14, 2007) <http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=1019>

²⁸ "Amerikan Karşıtlığının Sebebi Bush Politikası," *Yeni Şafak*, March 8, 2005. It is noteworthy how the polling evidence cited in the article provides no evidence for the headline. Every question cited is a political question and nothing specific about Bush. But the conclusion is drawn that anti-Americanism is due to the policies of the Bush administration.

it would be useful to get the pulse of students. According to a one-page questionnaire completed by 127 university students in Ankara, the top three issues that influence anti-Americanism in Turkey are the Iraq War, U.S. support for Kurds, and President Bush. The responses are shown below. From the list of ten choices, respondents were asked to select the top three.²⁹



This same general attitude is held by both Turkish and American specialists. Banu Eligür wrote that the perception of the U.S. as “Turkey’s most trustworthy and dependable ally in the West” changed in March 2003 when the United States invaded Iraq.³⁰ In a 2005 hearing before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives, Soner Çağaptay, Director of the Turkish Research Program of the Washington

²⁹ This is a compilation of responses from 127 METU and Bilkent students who answered the last question according to the instructions and highlighted their top three responses to the question. (See Appendix 1)

³⁰ Banu Eligür, “Turkish-American Relations since the 2003 Iraqi War: A Troubled Partnership,” *Middle East Brief* May (2006).

Institute for Near East Policy, explained anti-Americanism in this way: “Regarding resentment in Turkey toward the United States, the bad news is that it is widespread. The good news is that it is not deep-rooted.”³¹ He believes that it is quickly reversible if the proper policy steps are taken. A similar sentiment was stated even more clearly by Ambassador Daniel Fried before the same subcommittee in March of 2007. “Turkish anti-Americanism is broad, but it is, in our view, shallow.”³² He asserts that “It would be easily reversed if circumstances such as the PKK situation were changed.” Perhaps both wanted to paint a positive picture to the U.S. Congress, but the U.S. government needs to have an accurate analysis, not a hopeful one.

While this common view of Turkish anti-Americanism may be in part true, it does not provide an accurate enough understanding of the roots of anti-Americanism in Turkey, which go deeper than the recent policy in Iraq. Henri Barkey of Lehigh University, a regularly consulted expert on Turkish affairs, offers a more sophisticated evaluation of the anti-Americanism in Turkey by putting forth two seemingly contradictory statements. “First is, I actually think that the current malaise in United States-Turkish relations is temporary in nature... That said, I also do believe that anti-Americanism in Turkey is actually much deeper than we think it is.”³³ Although he too is hopeful anti-Americanism may drop to its pre-Iraq War levels, Barkey holds that it will remain “problematic over the long term.” While anti-Americanism has reached remarkably high levels in the aftermath of the Iraq War, the phenomenon is more complicated than opposition to recent American policies. To understand the dynamics of anti-Americanism in Turkey, the U.S. needs to look below the surface.

³¹ Soner Çağaptay, “The State of U.S.-Turkey Relations,” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats (Washington, D.C. May 11, 2005), 32.

³² Daniel Fried, “U.S. Turkish Relations and the Challenges Ahead,” Hearing of the Europe Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Washington, D.C., March 15, 2007).

³³ Henri J. Barkey, “The State of U.S.-Turkey Relations,” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats (Washington, D.C. May 11, 2005), 12.

IV.1.5 Anti-American Iceberg in Turkey

It is evident to most observers that the U.S.-Turkey relationship wrecked on the iceberg of the Iraq War, both in the lead-up to the March 1 decision, and the way that the conflict continues to be handled. In looking at the unprecedented levels of anti-Americanism in Turkey it is easy to see the huge block of ice floating atop the water upon which the relationship continues to be bashed. However, in the analogy of an iceberg, as explained in the last chapter, what is visible above water is only a fraction of the predicament. The U.S. policies in Iraq are only the most observable part of what has caused wreckage in relations. That Turkish anti-Americanism is among the highest in the world is indication of the iceberg phenomenon. Even the predictions far before the Iraq War that such a conflict would be detrimental to relations is indication of preexisting issues.³⁴

However, a more careful analysis of statistics shows greater complexity in the anti-Americanism.³⁵ The 52 percent favorable opinion of the U.S. before September 11 is not an overwhelming majority. In other words, nearly half of Turks before September 11 did not have a favorable view of the U.S., challenging the commonly held notion that anti-Americanism originated from the Iraq War. There was plenty of lingering apprehension toward the U.S. in place. A huge drop in the favorability of America in 2002 is evidence that America's reaction to September 11 was viewed negatively even before U.S. troops were on the ground in Iraq. It appears that the lead

³⁴ Just one example of how damaging U.S. policy towards northern Iraq would be is Kirişçi, Rubin and Kearney, 128-129.

³⁵ Pew Global Attitudes Report 2007. In 1999/2000, 52 percent of Turks had a favorable opinion of the U.S. This dropped to 30 percent in the 2002 Pew Global Attitudes poll and even further to 15 percent in 2003. After a slight rebound to 30 percent in 2004, the favorable rating dropped to 23 percent in 2004 and to a new low of 12 percent in 2006.

up to and the beginning of the war disenchanted even more Turks. It also stands out that the lowest ratings were reached in 2006.

In a survey I performed at Bilkent University and Middle East Technical University (METU) campuses in Ankara, when asked specifically about whether anti-Americanism in Turkey began after the Iraq War, about two-thirds of Bilkent Students and 85 percent of METU students said that it did not.³⁶

IV.1.6 Anti-Americanism in Turkey is Political

To begin the evaluation of anti-Americanism in a country, the underlying reason should be identified. Based on the anti-Americanism framework explained in the last chapter, Turkey fits into the Political strand of anti-Americanism. Soner Çağaptay explains that the Iraq War was primarily responsible for “reviving dormant political forces and anti-Americanism.”³⁷ Underneath the inflammatory event of the Iraq War is an anti-Americanism rooted in the Political. In the iceberg analogy, the whole iceberg is composed of Political reasons,³⁸ although some are the recent and visible ones, while others are below the surface. Anti-Americanism in Turkey is not significantly influenced on cultural or economic reasons. Duygu Sezer, professor of international relations, stressed that Turks have a natural tendency to like Americans. She says that no one in Turkey is saying “I don’t like you.” Instead, Turks are saying, “We don’t like your policy.”³⁹

³⁶ Results from an unscientific opinion poll from surveys with 168 Bilkent Students and 51 METU students, May 2007. See Appendix 1.

³⁷ Soner Çağaptay, “Where Goes the U.S.- Turkish Relationship?” *Middle East Quarterly* (Fall 2004): 45.

³⁸ This has already been qualified in chapter three. Of course it is a simplification, but it helps identify the main reasons for anti-Americanism.

³⁹ Duygu Sezer (professor of international relations, Bilkent University), interview with the author, May 20, 2007.

Another finding from the survey I conducted among 168 social science students at Bilkent University was a widespread belief that anti-Americanism in Turkey is based on political, rather than cultural or economic reasons. Seventy-five percent of students cited “Political” as the only or number one basic reason for anti-Americanism in Turkey.⁴⁰

The politically rooted anti-Americanism is influenced by its past relations with America. Philip Robins wrote in the introduction to his study of Turkey. “There is also a need to consider the experiences, ideas, and values which help to condition perceptions.”⁴¹ Turkey is not simply a predictable and generic geo-strategic ally. The way Turkey perceives its foreign policy, America, and the world are shaped by a unique mix of factors.

IV.2 The Left Lens: The Past Relationship of U.S. and Turkey

U.S. actions in Iraq are widely resented, in all corners of the world and even in America. However, each country views these events through a different pair of glasses, as described in the last chapter. What America is doing is real, but how this is perceived varies from country to country. The left lens of the glasses, the topic of the remainder of this chapter, is about what America is, which is based primarily on the past relationship or interaction between the two countries. The right lens of the glasses, addressed in the following chapter, is about what Turkey itself is.

The strategic relationship between Turkey and America began out of the common fear of the Soviet Union after World War II, marked by the arrival of the American warship USS *Missouri* to Istanbul in 1946. The Turkish reaction was

⁴⁰ What is the basic reason for Anti-Americanism in Turkey? (Circle the most important. If the others are important, rank all three from 1-3, with 1 being the most important)

 Economic Cultural Political (See Appendix 1).

⁴¹ Robins, 4.

“ecstatic. To the man in the street at last was tangible proof that Turkey did not stand alone...The Turkish press hailed the United States as the defender of peace, right, justice, progress, and prosperity.”⁴² Turkey became a beneficiary of America’s Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the Marshall Plan a year later to contain the spread of communism. “Conceived in the cold war, born in the context of the U.S. policy of containment, the postwar collaboration of Turkey and the United States once seemed a model of international cooperation.”⁴³ The fledgling relationship was strengthened by Turkey sending a significant contingent to fight in the Korean War alongside the U.S.-led UN forces. Turkey’s formal acceptance into NATO in 1952 was the crowning moment in the countries enjoying a close alliance throughout the 1950s. Turks greeted the joining of NATO with rejoicing.⁴⁴ Turkey provided critical military base locations of great geo-strategic importance to the U.S. In return, Turkey benefited from extensive military and economic aid. “The period from 1947 to the early 1960s was one of almost full convergence of American and Turkish policies.”⁴⁵

IV.2.1 Roots of Mistrust

However, damaging episodes over the next couple decades still cloud the relationship between the countries. The U.S. decision in 1962 to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey without any notification to Ankara following the Cuban missile crisis was perceived as U.S. willingness to turn its back on Turkey when it served its interests.⁴⁶ One author wrote that there was “more than a hint of a Turkey-for-Cuba

⁴² George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972).

⁴³ Harris, 3.

⁴⁴ Harris, 44.

⁴⁵ Dankwart A. Rustow, *Turkey: America’s Forgotten Ally* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989), 95.

⁴⁶ F. Vali quoted in Kirişci, 120.

trade.”⁴⁷ The realization of the apparent asymmetrical nature of the relationship disturbed Turkish elites. In 1964 President Johnson sent the infamous letter now associated with his name, warning Turkey not to use U.S. arms against Cyprus. If military action incited the involvement of the Soviets, Turkey should not expect the U.S. to come to its aid. “Johnson’s letter amounted to threatening America’s Turkish ally with the common Soviet enemy. The feeling of betrayal in Turkey was widespread.”⁴⁸ A third notorious event for Turkey occurred a decade later, when Turkey’s military intervened with force in the July 1974 coup in Cyprus. The action was widely condemned by the international community and the U.S. imposed an arms embargo against Turkey. “If the Johnson letter shook the Turkish establishment, the events of 1974 confirmed that there were limits to which Turkey could rely on her superpower ally.”⁴⁹ These events are felt decades later. “The punitive aspect of the sanction fed Turkish anti-Americanism, and instilled feelings of suspicion towards the United States on the part of Turkish decision-makers that still reverberate today.”⁵⁰

During the 1960s and 1970s there was a leftist anti-Americanism popular among young people. According to Nihat Ali Özcan of TOBB University, one of the roots of anti-Americanism today is the anti-Americanism from the leftist, pro-Soviet socialists in the 1960s and 1970s.⁵¹ During this time there were new American military bases opened in Turkey and there was resentment over the presence of U.S. soldiers within Turkey’s borders. Journalist Meriç Köyatası also acknowledged the

⁴⁷ William Hale, quoted in Robins, 130.

⁴⁸ Rustow, 95.

⁴⁹ Robins, 132.

⁵⁰ Nur Bilge Criss, “Turkish Perceptions of the United States,” in David Farber ed., *What They Think of Us: International Perceptions of the United States since 9/11* (Princeton University Press, 2007), 54.

⁵¹ Nihat Ali Özcan (professor, TOBB University), interview with the author, April 17, 2007, Ankara.

historical roots of one of the anti-American camps. He describes them as coming from the leftist culture and against American imperialism.⁵²

Although these harmful events were weathered, the Turkish-American relationship emerged from the Cold War scarred. The Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, “left a deep imprint on Turkish-American relations... it gave concrete form to creeping suspicions that the fate of the NATO allies might not be inextricably linked after all.”⁵³ Turkey has viewed the U.S. as an unreliable or “ambivalent”⁵⁴ ally because of the critical times the “U.S. has either failed to deliver or has shown itself willing to trade its Turkish assets in favour of some greater reward.”⁵⁵ There is fear that the U.S. could withdraw support when Turkey needs it most. Robins writes directly, “this perception of the United States as an ally that waxes and wanes overlays what for many in Turkey is an instinctive anti-Americanism.”⁵⁶ Journalists still frequently refer to the Johnson Letter as having great influence on Turkish American relations.⁵⁷ The “imprint” and “perception” left from the history of the relationship are what make the left lens of the glasses through which Turkey views the U.S. today.

Despite predictions by some that Turkey would lose its strategic importance after the end of the Cold War, it remained an important ally of the U.S. with the many conflicts that sprang up in the regions around Turkey. Although Turkey joined the U.S. and the international community in taking action against Iraq in 1991, many feel they were not compensated for the losses incurred. One foreign correspondent

⁵² Meriç Köyatası, “ABD Karşıtlığı,” *Akşam*, February 21, 2005.

⁵³ Harris, 93.

⁵⁴ Kirişçi.

⁵⁵ Robins, 129.

⁵⁶ Robins, 129.

⁵⁷ An example is M. Ali Kışlalı, “‘Çuval’ın rövanşı,” *Radikal*, January 14, 2006. The *Çuval Olayı* is compared in significance to the Johnson Letter, which he mentions at the beginning and end of his article as having great impact and a cornerstone in the relations between countries.

reported in April 1991 that since Özal's decision to "shut off Iraq's dual oil pipeline over Turkish soil right after Saddam Hussein sent his forces into Kuwait on August 2, Turkey has lost at least six billion dollars in trade."⁵⁸ Most Turks look back on the first Gulf War with resentment, seeing the economic losses the crisis caused and the refugee crisis of nearly half a million Iraqi Kurds flooding into southeast Turkey.⁵⁹ "Turks remain convinced that they were forced to bear an excessive share of the financial burden that resulted from the war."⁶⁰ Duygu Sezer is one scholar who maintains that Özal made the right decision to join the U.S. alliance against Iraqi aggression, despite the lack of compensation.⁶¹ Turkey's cooperation with the U.S. and the West helped solidify its geo-strategic importance at the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the memories of the first Gulf War would have influence on the way Turks perceived a future war against Iraq.

The relations between the countries remained workable throughout the rest of the 1990s as Ankara and Washington's strategic interests remained similar more often than not. For example, Ankara was a strong advocate of NATO continuing when there was talk of it dissolving at the end of the Cold War. A high point of relations was in President Clinton's visit to Turkey in November 1999, attracting Turks with his skilled style.⁶² It is remarkable how much Clinton's visit to Turkey is mentioned by Turks of all ages, often-times cited as an example that anti-Americanism did not exist before the Iraq War. Nur Bilge Criss, professor of international relations, refers to Clinton's visit and the standing ovation he received in the Turkish parliament as a

⁵⁸ Kirk, 21.

⁵⁹ James E. Kapsis, "From Desert Storm to *Metal Storm*: How Iraq Has Spoiled US-Turkish Relations," *Current History* (November 2005): 382. The quotation is also provided in chapter six.

⁶⁰ Brown, 96.

⁶¹ Duygu Sezer, interview with the author, May 20, 2007.

⁶² Stephen Kinzer, "Clinton's Visit in Turkey May Help Speed Up Reform," *The New York Times*, November 21, 1999.

positive high in relations between the countries since the end of the Cold War.⁶³ The relationship between the two capitals has continued on, but with a suspecting eye to the reliability of the U.S. as an ally.

Turkey has long considered the U.S. an untrustworthy ally with a propensity to act only in its own best interest. The Jupiter missile issue, Johnson Letter, and arms embargo remain as examples where the U.S. has been viewed as willing to compromise its relations with Turkey when it serves its own interest. In addition to the unreliability, there is a related view of asymmetry in the relationship, where the U.S. does not adequately consider and compensate the financial losses that Turkey incurs, as in the first Gulf War. Mistrust has built up historically in the relationship between the countries. This has become part of the lens through which Turkey views its current interaction with the United States.

IV.2.2. America the “All-Knowing” and “All-Powerful”

The other factor tainting the lens is a feeling America is an omnipotent and all-powerful force that can accomplish everything it wants. America is believed to be a huge influence on everything Turkey does. When it does not act in Turkey’s favor, it is seen as part of a bigger plan.

Turkey has a tendency to attribute great power and influence to the United States. Aykan Erdemir, a sociology professor at Middle East Technical University, says that despite the heterogeneity of Turkey, everyone gives enormous agency to the United States.⁶⁴ He explains a widespread tendency to credit America with a type of omnipotence, where it can see all, hear all, and has enormous power. America is

⁶³ Criss, 57.

⁶⁴ Aykan Erdemir (Deputy Dean of the graduate school of social sciences at Middle East Technical University), interview with the author, May 21, 2007, Ankara.

accordingly held responsible for much of what happens negatively in Turkey and the world. Harris wrote about the “American factor,” where the U.S. is perceived to be an important influencer in Turkey’s internal affairs.⁶⁵

A tendency to attach enormous weight to the actions of the U.S. is also evident through the events discussed above. President Johnson’s letter, for example is made into a larger-than-life symbol of American intentions. Nur Bilge Criss explains that the importance of the letter has been blown out of proportion. She maintains that Turkey would have had trouble taking military action at that time anyway, but it is built into a huge act of power by the Americans.⁶⁶ The same tendency to point the finger at U.S. involvement is evident in beliefs that the U.S. put its support behind the military coups of the past or that the U.S. is backing an opposing political party.

It is noticeable upon examining this case that Turks expect a lot of America and sees issues from the perspective of their own self interests. Of course, the same could probably be said about any other country. Harris explained the belief that while the U.S. can negatively influence Turkey, it also has the power to help, “resting as it does on the notion that a superpower can and will find the means to accomplish its desires.”⁶⁷

Turks feel they have enough problems and do not want the U.S. to create any more. However, Turks also believe that America has the power to help relieve Turkey’s problems, and expect it to do so. If not, Turks feels that America is not a reliable ally. In this sense, the power of America can become an inhibitor in its relations. Hasan Cemal wrote that the faults of the U.S. are evident, especially the

⁶⁵ Harris, 128.

⁶⁶ Nur Bilge Criss (professor of international relations, Bilkent University), interview with the author, May 15, 2007, Ankara.

⁶⁷ Harris, 210.

Bush administration's two years of inaction in dealing with the PKK issue.⁶⁸ Turkey does not expect Italy, for example, to be able to solve its Kurdish problem and eliminate the PKK. America touches every place on the globe either directly or indirectly through the influence of its foreign policies. While Turks would not necessarily expect Italy to do other than what is in its interest, Turks, along with the rest of the world, want America to attend to its needs.

The Cyprus crisis of the 1960s, with noticeable parallels to the current Turkish desire for U.S. to deal with the PKK issue, exemplifies expectation of U.S. involvement. "Many Turks had an exaggerated notion of what could be done toward solving the Cyprus problem if Washington would only throw its weight into the balance."⁶⁹ Another remarkable parallel to the current issue of the PKK is mentioned later by Harris that in 1964 the main complaint against the U.S. was that it was permitting the build-up of Greek Cypriot forces by counseling peaceful means and discouraging the use of Turkish military force.⁷⁰

Donald Kirk provided a clear example of how America can be held responsible for domestic events. He relates an exchange with Turgut Özal about why Turkey had not started a modernization effort sooner. Özal reportedly said that it is because of a lack of support from the U.S., which he believed was limited by the Greek lobby.⁷¹ The United States' taking action (or lack thereof) was used to explain away Turkey's failure to begin a modernization effort.

The United States created this picture partly itself as it built up a strong image to counter Soviet influence in countries like Turkey. The Bush administration contributes to this all-powerful image that it can go it alone. The mission statement of

⁶⁸ Hasan Cemal, "Türkiye, Amerika, dostluk, düşmanlık!," *Milliyet*, Feb 20, 2005.

⁶⁹ Harris, 111.

⁷⁰ Harris, 112.

⁷¹ Kirk, 22.

the State Department (not the Department of Defense!) has a bold unilateral statement.

We will strive to strengthen traditional alliances and build new relationships to achieve a peace that brings security, but *when necessary, we will act alone to face the challenges, provide assistance, and seize the opportunities of this era*. U.S. leadership is essential for promoting this vision, but others must share the responsibility.⁷² (emphasis added)

For international relations it would be better for the brash unilateral phrase to be eliminated from the mission statement.

This overview of Turkish-American relations through the last six decades shows the long-standing issues in the relationship, and the factors clouding and constituting the left lens of Turkey's metaphorical glasses. These influence the way Turkey has viewed American behavior in recent events. Therefore, as the War in Iraq is continuing, and touches on other sensitive issues for Turkey, it is not surprising that distrust of America would sky-rocket in 2003. It is to the basis of the sensitive issues that we now turn.

⁷² "Mission," U.S. State Department, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm>.

CHAPTER V

ANTI-AMERICANISM IN TURKEY: WHAT TURKEY IS

While the left lens is the past relationship between the countries, the right lens of the metaphorical glasses has to do with what Turkey specifically is. This includes Turkey's history, identity, fears, and current politics. In contrast to the left lens, America has very little or no influence on the right lens, even though the lens significantly influences the way Turkey sees the United States. In the case of Turkey, this will be addressed in terms of Turkey's history and fears related to its identity struggle, which in turn shapes the current politics.

V.1 Historical Reasons Based on Turkey's Past

One essential element in assessing a country's anti-Americanism is its past. Every country did not begin at the same time with a clean slate. To the contrary, each nation has an individual story and past that influence how it views the world. The case study of Turkey presents an obvious example of how the weight of its history is still felt today. "Makers of Turkey's foreign policy continue to shoulder the burden of

their Ottoman past.”¹ Although history’s heavy influence on Turkey could be addressed at length, just two examples will be given of how Turkey’s past impacts the way it interacts with the world and, more specifically, with the U.S.

One of the aspects of Turkey’s past that affects it today is the greatness of the Ottoman Empire, which stretched from the Middle East to Central Eastern Europe. According to Veysel Şimşek, Ph.D. candidate of Ottoman History at Bilkent University, Ottoman history is an important part of the Turkish national identity.² From primary school to high school Turkish history is taught almost exclusively, including mainly Ottoman, War of National Liberation, and earlier Republican history.³ Şimşek explains a belief deep in Turkish minds: “We are taught that we are heirs to war winners, law givers and order givers.”⁴ According to policy analyst Cengiz Çandar, Turkey carries the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. The swift transformation of the Ottoman Empire to a nation-state deeply influences the outlook of Turks today.⁵ I have personally felt how much Turks are aware of their ancestor’s greatness, a sentiment I have experienced even outside of my many friends doing graduate work in Ottoman history. The first time I grasped the widespread identification was in a TÖMER⁶ classroom in Ankara, the state capital established to solidify a break with the Ottoman Empire. I was invited to the TÖMER class as a guest English speaker by a young Turkish teacher. The advanced English class was composed of government employees in their thirties and forties. In the midst of a

¹ Feroz Ahmad, “The Historical Background of Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, ed. Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2004), 9.

² Veysel Şimşek (Ph.D. candidate in Ottoman History, Bilkent University), Interview with the author, May 20, 2007.

³ Salih Özbaran, *Tarih ve Öğretimi* (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992), 112-114.

⁴ For an evaluation of the presentation of Ottoman History in Turkish schoolbooks and the intended influence on Turkish youth, see Özbaran, 116-122.

⁵ Cengiz Çandar, “Turkish Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq,” in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, ed. Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2004), 55.

⁶ TÖMER is one of the longest established language teaching institutes in Turkey.

lively discussion about their views of America, the teacher commented that if they are honest they all are proud of the greatness of the Ottoman Empire. It was memorable to hear this from a young woman who graduated from a university in Ankara and to see every head nodding in agreement in a class full of state employees.

In an interview with Nihat Ali Özcan, a former army officer and current academic with a focus on anti-Americanism in the Turkish military,⁷ he talked at length about the influence of the Ottoman past on Turkey today and how Turks desire to be loyal to a powerful state that watches over them. He explained that because of its imperial tradition, Turks respect the powerful position of America and do not naturally resent it for being an empire. In the TÖMER classroom, I was surprised by the number of students who, although without hesitation calling America an empire that rules the world, said that they would do the same if they had the opportunity. There is a sense of jealousy of America that brings respect, but also sensitivity that can lead to anti-Americanism.

An example of this sensitivity is that Turks still have a pride about their past greatness, and are angered by references to Turkey still being the “sick man of Europe,” the tag placed on the ailing Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. There was a volatile reaction in Turkey to Robert Pollock’s 2005 article in the *Wall Street Journal* titled “The Sick Man of Europe—Again.”⁸ Pollock scathingly writes, “Much of Atatürk’s legacy risks being lost, and there won’t be any of the old Ottoman grandeur left, either. Turkey could easily become just another second-rate country: small-minded, paranoid, marginal and—how could it be otherwise?—friendless in America and unwelcome in Europe.” With such strong and demeaning language, it is no

⁷ Nihat Ali Özcan, interview with the author, April 17, 2007.

⁸ Robert Pollock, “The Sick Man of Europe – Again,” *The Wall Street Journal*, Commentary, Feb 16, 2005,.

wonder that the article prompted such strong reactions.⁹ To taunt Turkey with being “just another second rate country” understandably fans the embers of its past greatness.

V.2 Sevres Phobia

Another historical influence on the way that present-day Turkey sees the world is the “Sevres Phobia.” The infamous Sevres Treaty, signed in 1920 by the victors of World War I and representatives of the Ottoman sultan, carved up the remaining Ottoman provinces, including an independent Armenia in the east and a referendum for an independent Kurdistan in the southeast. Although the treaty never came into force because of the successful National War of Liberation, “the map of ‘Anatolia according to Sevres’ remained in the pages of schoolbooks as a symbol of hostile intentions on the last piece of land left to Turks.”¹⁰ The Turkish Republic continues on with the fear that it is surrounded by others who want to take its territory, as was tried in the past. “An integral part of the Turkish political culture is the conviction that the outside world is conspiring to weaken and carve up the country.”¹¹ This fear contributes to the rising nationalism within Turkey. A common phrase that resonates with nationalists is “*Türk’ün Türk’ten başka dostu yoktur*” (“A Turk has no friend but a Turk”). Turkey’s dealings with foreign powers, the U.S. included, are seen through this lens. For example, in the mainstream newspaper *Radikal*, İsmet Berkan wrote that “The most important thing here is [that we have a blind and] unshakable belief that the foreigners have been acting and will act secretly,

⁹ An example of the many strong reactions by the columnists of almost every newspaper Turkey is, Yıldırım Türker, “Amerika karşıtı mısınız?” *Radikal*, Feb. 21, 2005.

¹⁰ Mümtaz Soysal, “The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy.” in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, ed. Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2004), 41.

¹¹ Kirişçi, 126.

insidiously and by not telling the whole truth.”¹² The Sevres Phobia is an example of a pervasive phenomenon where “expectations or perceptual sets represent standing estimates of what the world is like and, therefore, of what the person is likely to be confronted with.”¹³

The prevalence of this attitude toward the U.S. and other foreign powers is supported by polling data such as the “Transatlantic Trends 2005” poll¹⁴ launched by the German Marshall Fund of the United States.¹⁵ Suat Kınıklıoğlu analyzed the implications about Turkey in the *Turkish Daily News*.

Transatlantic Trends 2005 also asked Turks what they think about other countries on a scale from zero to 100, with 100 meaning a very warm, favorable feeling and zero indicating a very cold and unfavorable feeling. As was the case last year, Turks are cold towards the United States (28), cooler, in fact, among nine European countries also included in the survey. Turks have become unfavorable towards France (29). While support for Russia (24), China (46) and Iran (36) have increased a little, overall these figures are rather low and are not even above the “neutral” 50. The EU still maintains the highest warmth degree (50), but analyzing the Turkish figures and comparing them with the other 10 countries polled it becomes apparent that Turks are not particularly warm to any other nation. Turks feel alone and isolated....Indeed, Turks are only particularly warm towards themselves. Turks gave 82 degrees to Turkey. These figures seem to confirm our famous isolationist dictum, “There is no friend to a Turk but a Turk.”¹⁶

Another poll conducted by Sonar Research revealed that 22 percent of the Turkish public cannot find a single country close to Turkey.¹⁷ The highest countries were Germany, at just under 10 percent, and America at 6 percent.

¹² İsmet Berkan, “Kurban kültüründen kurtulmadan olmaz,” *Radikal*, Feb. 20 2005. “Burada en önemli şey, yabancıların işlerini gizlice, sinsice ve aslında kimseye gerçeğin tamamını söylemeden yaptıklarına/ yapacaklarına ilişkin sarsılmaz inancımız.”

¹³ Jervis, 145.

¹⁴ “Transatlantic Trends, Key Findings 2005,” German Marshall Fund, See Page 7, Chart 3 for Turkish feelings towards the United States.

<http://www.compagnia.torino.it/english/comunicazioni/pdf/GMF%20Trends%202005.pdf>

¹⁵ German Marshall Fund of the United States <http://www.gmfus.org/about/office.cfm?city=ankara>

¹⁶ Suat Kınıklıoğlu, “Trends, Turks and the Politics of Identification,” *Turkish Daily News*, September 13, 2005.

¹⁷ Sonar Araştırma, “Toplum Tercihleri Araştırması- March 2003.” <http://www.sonararastirma.com/>

V.3 Turkish Identity

In addition to the historical influences on the right lens, there is also the all-encompassing issue of identity and the accompanying fears within a country. How Turkey views itself and the threats to this identity influence the way it sees the world. Katzenstein and Keohane maintain that anti-Americanism translating into very active anti-Americanism is dependent on the extent to which America is feared.¹⁸ If there is a fear of U.S. actions, anti-Americanism will increase. Based on this premise, the especially high anti-Americanism in Turkey could stem from deep fears within its populace about the negative effects that U.S. policy may have on the Turkish Republic.

As discussed earlier, there are deep-seated fears about threats to break up the Turkish Republic. Partly grounded in the Sevres phobia, the same legacy of fear was left by Atatürk.¹⁹ An example is in his monumental “Address to Turkish Youth” on October 20, 1927. The majority of the speech is devoted to imploring the young people to always be on their guard to defend Turkish Independence and the Turkish Republic. He warns about outside forces and “schemers,” but also that “More distressing and more grievous than all these, those who hold and exercise the power within the country may have fallen into gross error, blunder, and even treason.”²⁰ Atatürk’s fear seems to be that there will always be those who have a design to break apart the Turkish Republic, both from the outside, but also possibly from traitors within. With perceived threats such as this embedded in Turkish identity, it is vital to try to understand how fear acts as a source of anti-Americanism in Turkey in order to help mitigate anti-American sentiments.

¹⁸ Katzenstein and Keohane, 34.

¹⁹ Mustafa Kemal was given the name Atatürk, meaning “father of the Turks” in 1934.

²⁰ Mustafa Kemal, “Address to Turkish Youth,” October 20, 1927.
<http://www.turkishlanguage.co.uk/hitap.htm>

Another key component of understanding anti-Americanism is Kemalism. Kemalism is not an easily defined concept, and although any depth of the topic is beyond the scope of this thesis, a basic understanding would go a long way in helping American policy makers appreciate the way its policies are perceived by a Turkish Republic that is still saturated with its founder's legacy.²¹ Kemalism was named after Mustafa Kemal (later honored with the name Atatürk), the hero that led Turkey in its National War of Liberation and galvanized a Republic from the remains of the Ottoman Empire.

People had to be given a new collective identity, and they had to be persuaded to accept it. The Kemalist revolution had to establish simultaneously the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish people as a nation, and the Turk as a citizen with an identity different from being a Muslim subject of the sultan.²²

The official twin identities rigidly laid down by the Kemalist state were secularism and Turkish nationalism.²³

Kemalism gradually became more of a conservative ideology out of a desire to protect what it has achieved.²⁴ "Especially for Turkey's politically powerful military, Kemalism represents a defensive political reaction against the perceived enemies of the secular Turkish republic: Kurdish nationalism and political Islam."²⁵ The principles that guided Kemal's efforts to establish the modern Turkish Republic gradually became an obstacle to Turkey becoming more democratic because the country's elites preferred an authoritarian interpretation rather than a liberal democratic one.²⁶

²¹ For an enjoyable analysis of Kemalism, see: Karalyn Eide, "Turkish Identity: National vs. State Identity in Turkey and Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations," M.A. thesis, Bilkent University, June 2007. See especially chapters three and four.

²² Kramer, 5.

²³ Robins, 31 and Yavuz and Özcan, 116.

²⁴ Ömer Taşpınar, "The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey," The Brookings Institute, July 2005, 5.

²⁵ Taşpınar, 5.

²⁶ Kramer, 1.

V.4 Political Islam and the Kurdish Issue

In his article, “The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey,” Ömer Taşpınar, co-Director of the Brookings Project on Turkey, argues that the root of anti-Americanism has to do with the tensions over Turkey’s own identity. “At its roots, Turkey’s current wave of distrust of the United States is a Kemalist identity problem.”²⁷ Taşpınar describes “twin threats” of Kurdish and Islamic dissent against Kemalism.²⁸ Heinz Kramer, in his book *A Changing Turkey* goes into more detail about these two challenges to the Kemalist state.

What is less-often realized in the West is that Turkey is also undergoing extraordinary internal changes. As a side effect of the international changes, important developments such as the uneasy relations with Kurds or the advance of politicized Islam that have long been in the offing but have been restrained by the repercussion of bipolar international relations on Turkish domestic politics could break through.²⁹

These internal issues in a changing environment provoke the way Turkey views the world and the U.S.

V.4.1 Political Islam

The first prominent fear of the Turkish Republic since the time of Atatürk is of political Islam. Metin Heper, professor of political science at Bilkent University, refers to the issue of political Islam in Turkey as the “presumed efforts on the part of the government to bring back a state based on Islam.”³⁰ Atatürk sought to separate Islam from the state and break with the “backwardness” of the religious Ottoman

²⁷ Taşpınar, 5.

²⁸ Taşpınar, 5.

²⁹ Kramer, XII-XIII.

³⁰ Metin Heper, “The Justice and Development Party in Government and the Military in Turkey,” *Turkish Studies* (June 2005): 219.

state. Secularism, or the divorce of public affairs, including law and education, from religion, was one of the indisputable parts of Kemalism,³¹ and it is still staunchly defended by the State in Turkey. “The republican principle, the national and social homogeneity of the Turkish nation, and the secular character of the republic were givens that could not be openly debated or even questioned by any political group.”³² After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, there was a territory populated “by a whole collection of ethnic minorities, bound together only by a shared Muslim faith.”³³ Although Islam was an important unifier of the Turkish identity, it also needed to be kept in check. Turkey adopted the French, or Jacobin, model of secularism where the state controls the majority religion.³⁴

Islam remains a very important part of the social fabric of Turkey, and is still viewed as a potential threat to the secular state. A Pew Global Attitudes survey release in July 2005 revealed that among those who consider themselves Muslim in Turkey, a plurality of 43 percent consider themselves a Muslim before a national citizen.³⁵ Sixty-two percent of respondents in the same survey said that Islam plays a large role in the politics of Turkey, a significant increase from 41 percent in 2002, although 50 percent compared to 39 percent say that it is a bad thing. Political Islam is still feared, exemplified by the strong opposition to the appointment of Abdullah Gül as president in the spring of 2007.

The intentions of the AK party,³⁶ elected in 2002, continue to be hotly contested. Scholars such as Metin Heper believed that the AK party had passed the

³¹ Binnaz Toprak, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey,” *Turkish Studies* (June 2005): 168.

³² Kramer, 8.

³³ Robins, 125.

³⁴ Toprak, 170.

³⁵ Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics,” July 2005. <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=813>

³⁶ The Justice and Development Party (JDP) will be referred to by the more familiar Turkish name, *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AK Parti/AKP), <http://www.akparti.org.tr/index2007.asp>.

“litmus test of acting rationally and responsibly in politics as well as keeping their distance from Islam.”³⁷ İhsan Dağı, professor of international relations at Middle East Technical University, wrote that the AKP is best described as a “post-Islamic movement” and can hardly be called Islamist “with a liberal, democratic and pro-western orientation and political agenda.”³⁸

However, there are vehement responses regarding the Islamic intentions of the AKP. Michael Rubin, editor of *Middle East Quarterly*, makes an impassioned argument about the Islamist AKP’s erosion of secular institutions, asserting it intends to appoint “Islamists” to control all Turkish offices and attract “Green Money” from Saudi Arabia.³⁹

In the post-September 11 environment, with fears and accusations of a war against Islam, the U.S. was eager to hold up Turkey as a model of a democratic and Muslim country. Taşpınar explains why this was not welcome in Turkey, especially by the government elite: “Turkey is a secular republic. We do not sympathize with religion-based illustrations that contradict this concept.”⁴⁰ Çağaptay similarly states that highlighting the rise of the AKP as proof that Turkey is a democracy has alienated Turkey’s secular elites because they see it as a strategy by Washington to undermine Turkey’s secular order.⁴¹ More generally, Taşpınar argues, that U.S. support for “moderate Islam” in the Middle East and affirmation of Turkey as a model within it has been perceived as support for Islam within Turkey. Many Turks are concerned that Washington’s true aim is to “Islamify” Turkey and that Washington is

³⁷ Heper, 221.

³⁸ İhsan Dağı, “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization,” *Turkish Studies* (March 2005): 30, 34.

³⁹ Michael Rubin, “Will Turkey have an Islamic President?,” *AEI Middle East Outlook*, February 2, 2007.

⁴⁰ Taşpınar, 9.

⁴¹ Çağaptay, 52.

guilty for political Islam's rise to power.⁴² For example, Ali Aslan of *Zaman* explains that the United States makes Ankara's political and bureaucratic elite uncomfortable by holding up Turkey as a model Muslim country.⁴³

America has made mistakes that do not help the matter. In April of 2004, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell "Ignited a small firestorm when he referred to Turkey in a speech as a model 'Islamic Republic.'"⁴⁴ Such instances fan suspicions over whether Washington has a close connection with Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and the AK Party. Under Secretary Hughes may have fueled similar perceptions in her comments that, though made in good faith, drew attention in the Turkish media. *Radikal* reported Hughes saying "President Bush especially wanted me to meet with the religious leaders" during her visit to Turkey in 2005, and attracted attention to it with the subheading "Bush'un özel isteği" or "Bush's special wish."⁴⁵

In Turkish mainstream media it is normal to hear assertions that the U.S. is supportive of the AK Party. A recent example is a G ng r Uras editorial in the mainstream newspaper *Milliyet*. He says that the bottom line is, "The AKP lies in the hearts of Americans."⁴⁶ He argues that because American decision makers are taking their information from a limited number of people who all support the AK Party, Americans believe that without the AK Party, there will be no democracy. He closes his article with an anecdote about a cleaning lady who went to the demonstration in Istanbul to advocate the preservation of a secular state. "I am, thanks to God, a Muslim, but I don't want to live in a Muslim state." In his article, Uras strongly

⁴² Tulin Daloğlu, "Sentiment and Skepticism; Do Turks Really Trust the United States?," *The Washington Times*, June 20, 2006.

⁴³ Ali H. Aslan, "Daha saėlam k pr ler kurmak gerekir," *Zaman*, May 14, 2007.

⁴⁴ Kapsis, "From Desert Storm to *Metal Storm*," 380.

⁴⁵ "Bush'un imajcısı 'kadın'  okunda," *Radikal*, September 29, 2005.

⁴⁶ G ng r Uras, "Amerikalılar se imlerle bizden fazla ilgileniyor," *Milliyet*, May 13, 2007. "Yazının sonunda yazacaėım ba ında yazayım, Amerikalıların g nl nde AKP yatıyor."

presents the case that the AK party, or political Islam, is a danger to the Republic, and is supported by the United States.

There is also a tendency for Turks to interpret neutral statements made by the U.S. as intended to be in support of the AK Party. An example is a headline in *Radikal*, “Strong American Support for AKP.”⁴⁷ The article is based on Secretary Rice’s statement that the U.S. supports democracy in Turkey, however the headline makes it appear to be a given that the U.S. supports the AK Party.

V.4.2 The Kurdish Issue

The second of the twin fears is about the Kurdish issue, a fear that is grounded in the problem of ethnic minorities and the Turkish identity from before the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The assertion of ethnic-nationalist minorities was used to justify the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire marked by the Sevres Treaty, which was detailed above. “At Sevres, the minorities issue emerged as being at the very heart of the existential challenge to the aspirations of the new Turkish nationalist movement.”⁴⁸ The Sevres Treaty was officially replaced by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty that recognized only the existence of religious minorities. “Under Lausanne, then, ethnic minorities among the Muslim population of Turkey, notably the Kurds and Arabs, were left without any special status or recognition.”⁴⁹ The Republic identity became based on Turkishness and the existence of different ethnic groups was simply denied.⁵⁰

The Kurdish issue has been so closely monitored by the state because the Turkish national identity was based on the assertion of a common Turkish ancestry.

⁴⁷ “AKP’ye ABD’den güçlü destek geldi,” *Radikal*, May 12, 2007.

⁴⁸ Robins, 125.

⁴⁹ Robins, 125.

⁵⁰ Kramer, 5, 40.

“Predominant is how to resolve the official state doctrine of the ‘one and indivisible nation and state’ with the undeniable existence of 10 to 12 million persons of different ethnic origin and cultural background...”⁵¹ The issue remains extremely sensitive, even as the laws have been slightly loosened. “Until the 1990s, mentioning the words “Kurd” or “Kurdish” in public was generally regarded as breaking a taboo.”⁵²

It is through this lens that Turkey views anything that happens in support of Kurds. “In a way, both the domestic and foreign policies of Turkey have been hostages to the Kurdish problem for the past 25 years.”⁵³ The assertion of a separate Kurdish ethnicity is a challenge to the Turkish identity. It evokes fears of population and territory being seized from Turkey, as happened with Sevres. According to Taşpınar, almost everyone in Turkey thinks that Washington supports a Kurdish state in Iraq, either intentionally, or that its policies will eventually have this result.⁵⁴ The problem is exaggerated by reporting of Kurdish statements that confirm all fears. For example, Kadir Konuksever, media coordinator at the Diyarbakır mayor’s office, stated that “the Kurdish people have tremendous sympathy for America, as they think it is helping the Kurds in Northern Iraq to build an independent Kurdistan.”⁵⁵ The Kurdish identity problem exemplifies how the Iraq War caused such a spike in anti-Americanism by touching on deeper issues. “The empowerment of Iraqi Kurds—and their quest for autonomy—in the wake of the 2003 war reopened old wounds in Turkey.”⁵⁶

Related to the identity challenge, there is also a territorial threat acutely felt by Turks. “The Kurds of Turkey have demands that range from full secession to

⁵¹ Quoted in Kramer, 39.

⁵² Kramer, 37.

⁵³ Yavuz and Özcan, 103.

⁵⁴ Taşpınar, 10.

⁵⁵ Tulin Daloğlu, “Turkey’s Kurdish Problem; Washington must oppose the PKK,” *The Washington Times*, August 16, 2005.

⁵⁶ Çağaptay, 46.

federalism, and the recognition of individual rights as Turkish citizens.”⁵⁷ Nasuhi Güngör of *Star* newspaper says that an equation has formed in people’s minds that if an independent Kurdish state is formed in northern Iraq it will lead to the dismemberment of Turkey, and it will happen with American support.⁵⁸

The most visible facet of this issue is over the PKK, the separatist Kurdish terrorist organization. Semih İdiz wrote the same in the *Turkish Daily News*, “Most Turks, whether civilian or military, seriously believe today that the PKK is actually being harbored by the American military in northern Iraq.”⁵⁹ Academics have made the same observation. “Many Turks believe that the United States is supporting the formation of an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq with future irredentist aspirations in Turkish territory, and are thus using the PKK against Ankara.”⁶⁰ Tulin Daloğlu wrote that “Anti-Americanism in Turkey is related more to America’s inaction against the PKK than the legality or reasoning behind the Iraq War.”⁶¹

These Turkish perceptions of America courting moderate Islam and Kurds, the sources of the twin fears of the Turkish Republic, give insight into why anti-Americanism has spiked since September 11 and the Iraq War. The twin fears are viewed as challenges to nationalism and sovereignty, helping to explain why Turkey fits primarily within the Political sphere of the anti-Americanism framework presented in the last chapter. It is logical that as Turkish fears of America threatening these two areas increases, anti-Americanism will increase. “The principle of nationalism is more precisely defined as the indivisibility of the Turkish state’s territory and nation.”⁶² It is through this lens that America’s support to both Kurds

⁵⁷ Yavuz and Özcan, 102.

⁵⁸ Nasuhi Güngör (*StarGazete*), Interview with the author, April 25, 2007, Balgat, Ankara.

⁵⁹ Semih İdiz, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey,” *Turkish Daily News*, Feb. 2005, quoted in Eligür, 2.

⁶⁰ Yavuz and Özcan, 116.

⁶¹ Daloğlu, August 16, 2005.

⁶² Kramer, 9.

and political Islam is suspected and viewed as a threat to the national identity in the Kemalist state.

V.5. Current view of the U.S. through these lenses

It is through these glasses that Turkey views the changes that have taken place since September 11. Prior to September 11, the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. was not a clean slate upon which anti-Americanism was formed. Instead, decades of Turkey's suspicions of an asymmetrical alliance and fears and sensitivities related to its own identity influenced how the behavior of the U.S. would be perceived by Turks.

V.5.1 Iraq War through the Glasses

The Iraq War, which has been viewed negatively throughout the world, has been especially problematic for Turkish-U.S. relations because of the lenses through which Turkey views the events. This is not to invalidate the Turkish perspective, or the problems of the Iraq War, just to acknowledge that the extent of the trauma in the relationship has to do with what Turkey is and the past, and not merely an objective examination of the event. Upon close analysis, it is evident that the Iraq War was a trigger to suppressed sensitivities. Aykan Erdemir, a sociology professor at Middle East Technical University, explained that the Iraq War provided a platform and strong rationale for the heterogeneous latent and suppressed anti-Americanism to be expressed.⁶³

⁶³ Aykan Erdemir (Deputy Dean of the graduate school of social sciences, Middle East Technical University), interview with the author, May 21, 2007, Ankara.

The main opposition and fear came over the threat to destabilize the precarious Kurdish issue. There was fear that support for the U.S. war effort could trigger either religious fundamentalism or Kurdish separatism,⁶⁴ the concerns detailed earlier in the discussion of the right lens of the glasses. The U.S. has worked more closely with Kurds in the restructuring efforts,⁶⁵ and has discouraged Turkish involvement due to the instability that could be caused in northern Iraq, a region of relative peace.⁶⁶ With the passing of time the fears and suspicions have only grown in Turkey, shown by the highest anti-Americanism since September 11 in 2006.⁶⁷

Leftist anti-American feelings of the 1970s have also been triggered by the Iraq War. “The 2003 war awakened leftist anti-Americanism among intellectuals and the academic and media elite, many of whom had flirted with extremist left, anti-American movements in the 1970s.”⁶⁸ Nihat Ali Özcan, with his expertise on anti-Americanism in the Turkish military, explained that youth influenced by the Marxism of the 1960s and 1970s are the two and three-star generals today. Although their ideology was transformed as they reached the high ranks of the military, the anti-Americanism feelings in the military today draw on the anti-American sentiments of decades past.⁶⁹ According to Baskın Oran, an influential retired political science professor at Ankara University, the same anti-American concepts are being used from 40 years ago. The “No to the USA” signs displayed at the recent Republican demonstrations create a bridge between today and the protestor’s youth when such sentiments were the fashion of the day.⁷⁰

⁶⁴ Kibaroglu, 253.

⁶⁵ Kibaroglu, 251.

⁶⁶ “Turkey and War in Iraq: Avoiding Past Patterns of Violation,” Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, New York, March 2003.

⁶⁷ Pew Research Center, June 13, 2006.

⁶⁸ Çağaptay, 47.

⁶⁹ Nihat Ali Özcan, interview with the author, April 17, 2007.

⁷⁰ Baskın Oran, “Cumhuriyet Mitingleri ve anti-emperyalizm.” <http://www.baskinoran.com/>

From the eyes of many Turks every death in Iraq is the fault of Americans. Although most of the deaths are Iraqis killing other Iraqis, the United States is seen to have brought the instability that causes deaths each day. Veysel Şimşek suggested that there has been a discourse that has become prevalent especially during the Iraq war that “It was all quiet in Ottoman times. Everyone was happy.”⁷¹ This is a way that the Iraq War is seen through the lens of the Ottoman past.

V.5.2 “Hood Event,” July 4, 2003

A lamentable event that was particularly upsetting to Turks took place on July 4, 2003, when Americans mistakenly detained a group of Turkish Special Forces that was operating in northern Iraq.⁷² The Turkish military personnel were led away with hoods over their heads, and thus it became known as the “Çuval Olayı” or “Hood Event.” The soldiers were interrogated by the U.S. military and released a few days later after the protest of Turkey. Some of the details are obscure and the accounts of what happened can vary. Some sources maintain that the Turkish Special Forces were planning to assassinate a Kurdish leader in northern Iraq.⁷³ U.S. Representative Wexler referred to the event as “American detention and humiliation of Turkish troops in Sulaymania.”⁷⁴

Many say that this event became a low point in Turkish-American relations and sharpened anti-Americanism in Turkey. “That sealed the perception that America,

⁷¹ Veysel Şimşek, interview with the author, May 20, 2007.

⁷² Kibaroglu, 255.

⁷³ Harry Dinella and John Sitalides, “Repairing Turkish-American Relations,” *The Washington Times*, July 29, 2003.

⁷⁴ Robert Wexler, U.S. Representative, “Rep. Wexler Comments on the state of U.S.-Turkish Relations,” *US Fed News*, Hearing before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Europe, May 11, 2005.

Turkey's close NATO ally, chose the Kurds over the Turkish Republic.”⁷⁵ As with the discussion of the Iraq War, the Hood Event became a specific trigger of Turkish sensitivities (such as support for Kurds). The event was the basis for the popular Turkish film *Kurtlar Vadisi* (“Valley of the Wolves”) *Irak* released in 2006, and an ongoing successful television series, in which the opening scene depicts the incident. Retired military officer Nihat Ali Özcan told me that this was the breaking point in the Turkish military's view of America. Since this event, anyone who says the U.S. is a good ally is viewed as an outcast.⁷⁶

Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak, faculty member of the political science department of Bilkent University, explains that the Hood Event was a blow to Turkey's national pride and did a lot to crumble the self-image of Turkey.⁷⁷ She says it can foster a type of anxiety that makes Turks feel disrespected. Mehmet Yılmaz of the conservative weekly news journal *Aksiyon* expressed a belief that the Johnson Letter of 1964 opened a deep wound in the relations between Turkey and America.⁷⁸ He argues that the Hood Event deepens this already existing wound. Yılmaz argues that words and concepts can take on either negative or positive new meanings that remain in the consciousness of people. In his evaluation, “çuval” (hood) has become the most contemporary negative term. In the same vein, M. Ali Kışlalı disagreed with Ambassador Wilson's assertion that the “Hood Event” is history. Instead, he argues, that like the Johnson Letter, it has become a cornerstone in the relations between the two countries.⁷⁹ It is remarkable to see how frequently the Johnson Letter is

⁷⁵ Tulin Daloğlu, “Sentiment and Skepticism; Do Turks Really Trust the United States?,” *The Washington Times*, June 20, 2006.

⁷⁶ Nihat Ali Özcan, interview with the author, April 17, 2007.

⁷⁷ Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak (political science professor, Bilkent University), Interview with the author, May 21, 2007.

⁷⁸ Mehmet Yılmaz, “Çuval,” *Aksiyon*, July 3, 2006.


⁷⁹ M. Ali Kışlalı, “‘Çuval’ın rövanşı,” *Radikal*, January 14, 2006. “‘Çuval olayı’nın yarattığı etkilerin ‘tarih’ olmadığını, gündeme yeniden gelen bu olay da göstermektedir. ‘Johnson Mektubu’ gibi iki ülke ilişkilerinde, Batılıların deyimiyle; bir dönemeç taşı da ‘çuval olayı’ olmuştur.”

referenced, serving as a strong example of how past issues in the relations between countries can influence how current events are seen.

V.5.3 America viewed as a Threatening Power

This leads to an evaluation of the degree of anti-Americanism in Turkey as based on the second part of the framework from chapter three. What is the nature of America as viewed by Turks? The three representative grades of anti-Americanism are Benign Hegemon, Disruptive Force, and Threatening Power. Unfortunately, the trend in Turkey is towards viewing the U.S. as a Threatening Power, where America is an immediate threat and danger to the world.

According to the poll I conducted among social science students at Bilkent University, by far the most common response was that the U.S. was a Threatening Power. For clarity, I put the categories on a spectrum, with an additional category on either side: “Good Influence” and “Source of All Evil.” Eleven percent of the Bilkent students indicated that America is the “Source of All Evil.” Added to the 45 percent who identified America as a “Threatening Power,” more than half of the respondents view America as an immediate threat or worse. The results are shown graphically below.



Among 51 students interviewed at Middle East Technical University, the response was even stronger, with 54 percent considering the U.S. a Threatening Power and almost one third a Source of All Evil. A mere 15 percent considered the United States a disruptive force or better.⁸⁰

Influential journalists such as Hasan Cemal argue that despite the need for criticism of the U.S., “America is not Turkey’s enemy, but a country that is a close friend and ally.”⁸¹ However, a student studying American culture at Hacettepe University in Ankara told me that almost everyone he talks to in Turkey hates America and thinks that any evil comes from America.⁸² Nihat Ali Özcan described the mood as, “You know you need America, but on the other hand you hate it.”⁸³ Despite such a range of comments from all over the spectrum of opinion, I believe that Turks primarily see America as a Disruptive Force, although there is a tendency to make strong statements about the threatening nature of America. If the relationship between the Turkey and U.S. is not improved, the situation will change from strong

⁸⁰ The same survey questions were answered by 51 students at Middle East Technical University on May 21, 2005.

⁸¹ Hasan Cemal, “Çünkü Amerika, Türkiye'nin düşmanı değil, dost ve müttefik bir ülke,” *Milliyet*, Feb 20, 2005.

⁸² Serkan Taş (Hacettepe University), interview with the author, April 17, 2007, Ankara.

⁸³ Nihat Ali Özcan, interview with the author, April 17, 2007.

rhetoric and a desire to communicate opposition in polls about anti-Americanism and cement into an actual belief that America needs to be stopped immediately as a threat to Turkey.

V.6 Real Grievances or Distorted Perceptions?

Is the problem of anti-Americanism in Turkey based more on genuine grievances or distorted perceptions? This question is of central importance in the assessment of what can be done to mitigate anti-Americanism through public diplomacy. If the grievances are real, the U.S. needs to tailor its public diplomacy to a defense of the policies along with damage control on the negative reactions to them. However, to the extent that there are distorted perceptions and misunderstandings, there is greater hope that increased public diplomacy could play a vital role in mitigating the anti-Americanism and paving the way for a strengthened partnership.

Jervis' *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* is a seminal work on the idea of perceptions, but it is also the source of much criticism. Many scholars object to the idea of "misperception" because how one sees the world is a perception, and a perception cannot be wrong.⁸⁴ I use the term "distorted perception" to clarify that I am not attempting to make a judgment on whether or not a perception is wrong. I agree with Jervis that instead of assessing right and wrong, "often it will be more fruitful to ask why people differed and how they came to see the world as they did."⁸⁵ The purpose of the glasses analogy is not whether U.S. actions are right or wrong, but that there are distorted perceptions of America. One example detailed later is the film "Valley of the Wolves," which influences the perception of Americans as

⁸⁴ Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak and Lerna Yanık, faculty members of the political science department of Bilkent University, in conversation with the author, May 21 and June 7, 2007.

⁸⁵ Jervis, 29.

long-haired, muscle-bound soldiers who kill people at a whim. I believe this is a distorted perception.

I have found that anti-Americanism is based more on distorted perceptions than real grievances. Turks are not without legitimate basis for being concerned, but the level of anti-Americanism is out of proportion with the actual character and behavior of America. “It is as much the myth as the reality that frays the bond between the United States and Turkey,”⁸⁶ wrote Harris in 1972. Gürkaynak explained that while there are structural factors, a lot of the anti-Americanism in Turkey has to do with misunderstanding and subjectivity.⁸⁷ Although many of the issues have been addressed in preceding sections, this section will highlight the ways in which distorted perceptions and unsubstantiated fears are driving such rampant anti-Americanism.

V.6.1 Real Grievances

It is important to note first, however, that anti-Americanism is not based solely on distorted perceptions. In this regard, the *Yeni Şafak* article saying that Americans should ask themselves, “What are the mistakes that we have made for anti-Americanism to have grown so high?”⁸⁸ holds true. The Iraq War, the Hood Event, the concern about Kurds gaining power in northern Iraq under the protection of the U.S., and the feeling of asymmetry in the alliance over the preceding decades are among the valid grounds for disenchantment with America. The U.S. must take these issues seriously and understand how they damage Turkey’s view of America. These are the real grievances that cannot be dismissed. Without going into detail about each, a strong example is about the issue of the Kurds and the PKK actions from across the

⁸⁶ Harris, 210.

⁸⁷ Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak, interview with the author, May 21, 2007.

⁸⁸ “Amerikan karşıtlığı sebebi Bush politikası,” *Yeni Şafak*, March 8, 2005.

border in northern Iraq. These are the words of General Joseph Ralston, special envoy countering the PKK, before the U.S. Congressional subcommittee in March 2007.

Mr. Chairman, if I could put this in the U.S. context, how would the American public feel if there was a terrorist group that set up operations 10 miles inside Mexico, came across the border and blew up hotels in Phoenix, Arizona and then went back into Mexico? And if we complained to the Mexican government and nothing was done about it, what would the American people demand? That's the situation we have in Turkey today.⁸⁹

General Ralston's analogy thoughtfully explains why there is anger towards America for fostering this type of situation. Americans would never tolerate another country's protection of terrorists that are attacking its people and accordingly need to realize the ways that it exacerbates resentment from Turks. However, as stated above, the deeper issues that are fanning the flames of stronger anti-Americanism stem mainly from irrational fears and misunderstandings.

V.6.2 Distorted Perceptions of the U.S.

The level of conspiracy theories and lack of understanding about America cause distorted perceptions of the United States.

V.6.2.1 Conspiracy Theories

Conspiracy theories are a part of anti-Americanism that is surprisingly widespread. "The Iraq war re-ignited a tendency among Turkish leftists to find U.S.-led conspiracies everywhere."⁹⁰ A U.S. diplomat commented on the phenomenon, "Just like sex sells, anti-Americanism sells right now. Unfortunately, it's nothing to

⁸⁹ General Joseph Ralston, "U.S. Turkish Relations and the Challenges Ahead," Hearing of the Europe Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Washington, D.C., March 15, 2007). <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/81761.htm>

⁹⁰ Çağaptay, 47.

laugh at, because it's damaging to both American national interest and to Turkish national interests.”⁹¹ Ekrem Dumanlı, Editor in Chief of *Zaman*, is in agreement about how conspiracy theories sell and earn a profit in Turkey. He explains specifically how much unsubstantiated issues can destroy Turkish-American relations:

If the intention is to destroy the bridges between two countries, it is not too difficult to find a speculative issue. We are swept into provocative information. False information, exaggerated opinions, provocative statements, harsh articles, angering images, inflammatory photographs... In difficult days like these, a historical responsibility falls on the shoulders of the [politicians] and the press.⁹²

This is a way in which the Turkish government is at fault in not taking more leadership to mitigate anti-Americanism. While this thesis is focused on what America must do, Turks also have an important role to play. In the short-term it may be easier to ride the popularity of anti-Americanism, but elites need to have the vision to recognize that America has and will continue to be an important ally to Turkey. Especially in an area like conspiracy theories, Turks in influential positions can quietly express that these do not help anyone and that Turkey needs to take responsibility for its own future. Dumanlı's sentiments in the article quoted above are not the norm. It will serve both countries well in the future for a few influential politicians, academics, or newspaper columnists to go against the tide and speak against the absurdity of some claims.

A well known example of the anti-Americanism in Turkey based on conspiracy theory is the best-selling novel *Metal Fırtına* (“Metal Storm”). The basic plot is that in 2007, after a clash with Turkish forces in northern Iraq, U.S. troops stage a surprise attack against Turkey. “The Foreign Ministry and General Staff are

⁹¹ Yigal Schleifer, “Sure it's fiction. But many Turks see fact in anti-US novel,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 15, 2005. <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0215/p01s04-woeu.html>

⁹² Ekrem Dumanlı, “Amerika düşmanlığının Türkiye'ye, Türkiye düşmanlığının Amerika'ya faydası yok,” *Zaman*, Feb. 21, 2005.

reading it keenly,” Murat Yetkin, a columnist for the Turkish daily newspaper *Radikal*, recently wrote. “All cabinet members also have it.”⁹³ Yasemin Çongar also criticizes how counselors employed by the state advocate conspiracy theories to the statesmen and media.⁹⁴ In the same article she outlines many of the absurd conspiracy theories that underlie rational Turks’ thoughts about America. Karaosmanoğlu is critical of the intellectual laziness and suspicions of Turkish journalists.⁹⁵

Another example of conspiracy based anti-Americanism is the television series “Valley of the Wolves,” in which fiction blurs with reality. Ali Unal began his *Zaman* editorial in June 2003 with two paragraphs of detail from the series.⁹⁶ He even makes reference to the Sevres Treaty and how America and Europe have ambitions to divide Turkey. Although he is not directly saying he believes the same, by citing extensively from a series based on fictional conspiracy theories, the line between reality and fiction is blurred. If series like “Valley of the Wolves” were not taken seriously, it is unlikely a journalist would devote so much attention to it in order to draw in his readers. M. Ali Kışlalı of *Radikal* poses the question of whether events are marketed to assuage the Turkish nation’s broken pride.⁹⁷

V.6.2.2 Misunderstanding the Diversity in America

Another area of misunderstanding is about the diversity and democratic nature of America. Turks do not understand the role of Congress and civil society in U.S. foreign policy making. “Often, Turkish officials do not understand that the U.S. executive branch cannot always influence Congress’s legislation on foreign policy

⁹³ Schleifer.

⁹⁴ Yasemin Çongar, “ABD’yi eleştirmek, kendimizi kandırmak,” *Milliyet*, Feb 21, 2005.

⁹⁵ Karaosmanoğlu.

⁹⁶ Ali Ünal, “Amerikan karşıtlığı mı?,” *Zaman*, June 2, 2003.

⁹⁷ Kışlalı, January 14, 2006.

and that non-governmental organizations can exert effective pressure on the executive branch concerning arms transfers and human rights.”⁹⁸ Turkey is not as familiar with the disputes between the executive and the legislature,⁹⁹ contributing to the lack of understanding of the checks and balances in the American government.

There is a tendency for Turks to think that they know more about America than they actually do. Nur Bilge Criss, reflected this sentiment: “America is the least understood country...Turks, including journalists, think that they know America well.”¹⁰⁰ She explained how hard pressed she is to find any good Turkish academic articles written about America. A remarkable personal anecdote related to this came from a survey filled out by an undergraduate international relations student who marked that he considers himself anti-American. In the section with six “yes/no” questions, the students left the other five questions blank, but checked that, yes, “I know a lot about America.” He did not know or care enough to answer questions like whether America has historically been an unreliable ally of Turkey, but he does know that he is anti-American and knows a lot about America. Overall, two out of three Bilkent students polled said that they knew a lot about America.¹⁰¹

The influence of ethnic lobbies is an area of specific misunderstanding. An example of the role of ethnic group influence on American foreign policy toward Turkey was the arms embargo in 1974. This was an instance where Congress had influence over the executive branch, which would have preferred to act in favor of Turkey. Then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger strongly opposed the initiative to cut military assistance to Turkey and faulted the Greek American lobby for harming

⁹⁸ Kirişci, 130.

⁹⁹ Rustow, 85.

¹⁰⁰ Nur Bilge Criss (professor of international relations, Bilkent University), interview with the author, May 15, 2007.

¹⁰¹ Opinion poll conducted among 168 Bilkent students, May 2007.

American interests.¹⁰² In his analysis of this case, Paul Watanabe, currently Director of the Institute for Asian American Studies at University of Massachusetts, Boston, illuminated the tension that exists between wise action in the international arena and preserving a democratic domestic order that allows participation from many sources.¹⁰³ He argues that the “potent and narrow-minded Greek American lobby was able to cow his congressional opponents into supporting the arms embargo at the expense of the national interest.”¹⁰⁴ However, Watanabe concludes his analysis of the politics of the Turkish arms embargo case with the following words, “In the final analysis, no matter how impressive the organizational strengths of the Greek American community might have been, they would not have been sufficient to compensate for weak arguments and unreliable information.” Ethnic groups are a very real factor in the making of American foreign policy. While it is popular to berate the executive, and specifically the Bush administration at the present time, the power of ethnic groups and Congress should be understood. As Watanabe points out, ethnic lobbies are not just evil interest groups, but rather part of a democracy at work. As a nation of immigrants, ethnic interest groups are a natural part of politics and the forming of foreign policy.

The freedom of press within America also can fuel resentment toward America. In a conversation with Ben Ball, Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara,¹⁰⁵ about the issue of America’s disproportionate influence on the rest of the world, he gave me the example of the outrage caused by an article in the *Armed Forces Journal*, a little known and unofficial journal. In July 2006 Ralph

¹⁰² Rustow, 99.

¹⁰³ Watanabe, 23.

¹⁰⁴ Watanabe, 156.

¹⁰⁵ Ben Ball (Assistant Public Affairs Officer), interview with the author, November 30, 2006. U.S. Embassy, Ankara.

Peters wrote an article “Blood borders: How a better Middle East would look,”¹⁰⁶ complete with a suggested map of more just borders, including a gigantic “Free Kurdistan.” Peters writes, “The boundaries projected in the maps accompanying this article redress the wrongs suffered by the most significant ‘cheated’ population groups, such as the Kurds, Baluch and Arab Shia.” He explicitly writes about

the long-suffering Kurds of Turkey, who have endured decades of violent military oppression and a decades-long demotion to ‘mountain Turks’; in an effort to eradicate their identity. While the Kurdish plight at Ankara’s hands has eased somewhat over the past decade, the repression recently intensified again and the eastern fifth of Turkey should be viewed as occupied territory.

The *Armed Forces Journal* is not an official publication of the U.S. Government, although no Turk would know that or even necessarily care. A journal seeming to represent the U.S. military suggests a “Free Kurdistan” that would rival the size of Turkey. When Peters wrote his article complete with a map that confirms the core fear of Turks, he did not consider that his article and map will be front page news on leading newspapers in Turkey. This is a telling example of the difficulty for America to control the way that it is seen abroad. Even if the government is legitimately understanding of Turkey’s concerns and careful in the message it communicates, the freedom of the press is not going to change. This creates a challenge for the United States, which has a high value of the freedom of the press, when coupled with a foreign public that does not appreciate the diversity of opinions.

İsmet Berkan criticized the Turkish media in the response to the Robert Pollock’s “Sick Man of Europe” article mentioned earlier. He says that instead of action, the media is expending effort to respond and is taking the article more

¹⁰⁶Ralph Peters, “Blood borders: How a better Middle East would look,” *Armed Forces Journal* (July 2006). <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/06/1833899>.

seriously than it deserves.¹⁰⁷ The disproportionate response of the Turkish media elicited by Pollock's article hints at a lack of understanding about the diversity of American opinion (or lack thereof) about Turkey.

V.6.2.3 Misunderstanding over U.S. threat to secularism

In addition to the distorted perceptions about the United States itself, there is a great deal of unjustified worry over America's involvement with the Kurds and political Islam. The perceived U.S. danger to Turkey on these issues seems surmountable by better understanding and communication.

It is a misunderstanding for Turks to think that the U.S. wants to see Islam take a larger role in Turkey. In an interview published in *Milliyet*, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza was asked about the claims that the U.S. supports moderate Islam in Turkey. "It's an absolute fact that America cannot have a policy about Islam."¹⁰⁸ The U.S. continues to verbalize such sentiments that fall on deaf ears in Turkey. The United States wishes to see Turkey continue to mature into a democratic country that upholds its constitution. This was stated most recently by the U.S. in response to the opposition to Abdullah Gül's appointment as president. "We hope and expect that the Turks will work out these political issues in their own way, in a way that's consistent with their secular democracy and constitutional provisions," said U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried.¹⁰⁹ The same sentiments are evident in the American media, such as in a recent *Washington Post* article trying to explain the drama over the Turkish president in the spring of 2007. "A casual

¹⁰⁷ Berkan, Feb. 20, 2005.

¹⁰⁸ İpek Yezdani, "Bryza: Ordu Anayasa'dan yetki alıyor," *Milliyet*, May 13, 2007. "ABD'nin kesinlikle İslamla ilgili herhangi bir politikası olmaz."

¹⁰⁹ Daniel Fried, "U.S. urges Turkey to heed constitution, democracy," *Reuters*, April 28, 2007. http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=topNews&storyid=2007-04-28T120911Z_01_L28174830_RTRUKOC_0_US-TURKEY-PRESIDENT-USA.xml

observer might also expect that because the Turkish protestors are enemies of Islamic extremism, they are friends of the United States. Not so. The secularists here are if anything more hostile to the West than the AKP.”¹¹⁰ Berlinski’s article is based on communicating to Americans that the AK Party is not Islamist. For all of the negatives of Robert Pollock’s article, it is nevertheless contradictory to the notion that America is supporting political Islam through the current government. “And at the 2002 election, the increasingly corrupt mainstream parties that had championed Turkish-American ties self-destructed, leaving a vacuum that was filled by the subtle yet insidious Islamism of the Justice and Development (AK) Party.”¹¹¹ Even though Berlinski and Pollock have different views of the AK Party (just like many Turks), they are the same in arguing that the U.S. should not support political Islam. The U.S. probably has the same fear as secular interests within Turkey about an overtly Islamic government coming to power in Turkey. The U.S. has enough problems caused by Islamic regimes and does not want to risk Turkey becoming another. An editorial in the conservative newspaper *Zaman* made the same case:

As anyone who knows Washington even a little bit would see, the U.S. administration does not consider Turkey a republic ruled by Islam, has never wanted it to become one, and will never do so. Why should they let Islam rule the country anyway, when they have been struggling for decades to secularize Turkey hand-in-hand with other Western countries?¹¹²

There is a distorted perception that the United States strongly supports the AK Party. It has been normal to see headlines about U.S. support of the AK Party based on statements that the U.S. supports democracy. In making such statements about democracy, the United States is not venturing beyond what respected Turks have written. One example is Atatürk. Ambassador Wilson recently replied to a question on the “Ask the Ambassador” page of the U.S. Embassy website about anti-Americanism

¹¹⁰ Claire Berlinski, “In Turkey, a Looming Battle over Islam,” *The Washington Post*, May 6, 2007.

¹¹¹ Pollock, Feb. 16, 2005.

¹¹² Ali H. Aslan, “Without a Civilization Between Two Civilizations,” *Zaman*, April 5, 2004.

in light of a clip of Atatürk speaking on Turkish-American relations.¹¹³ The Ambassador wrote, “The words expressed by Atatürk in the clip are still true today: the high value we place on democracy is the tie that binds the Turkish people and the American people together, and this gives us a strong basis for going forward.” Another more contemporary example is Metin Heper, who wrote in 2005 about the cooperative relationship between the AKP and the military. He gives the example of chief of general staff Özkök’s response to a journalist about AKP’s victory in the November 2002 elections. “We have made elections in accordance with democratic rules...The results reflect our people’s preferences, for which I have respect.” He later cites him as saying that they follow the constitutional procedures.¹¹⁴ While the events surrounding the parliament vote for Abdullah Gül and the military’s statement in April 2007 have challenged Heper’s optimism, it nevertheless seems an overreaction to criticize the United States for making similar statements to the military about supporting democracy and the constitutional processes.

V.6.2.4 Misunderstanding of U.S. intentions regarding Kurds

The U.S. can also do more to communicate shared interests with Turks over the Kurdish issue. There is hope that the U.S. could help increase the understanding about what is in its national interests in regard to an independent Kurdish state. Distrust that the U.S. is threatening Turkey’s territorial integrity is “not based on rational foundations.”¹¹⁵ The chaos in the region that would result from a Kurdish state is not in the interests of the U.S.

¹¹³ Ambassador Ross Wilson, “Ask the Ambassador,” May 2007.
http://turkey.usembassy.gov/ask_the_ambassador.html

¹¹⁴ Heper, 216.

¹¹⁵ Taşpınar, 10.

The U.S. views the Kurds' effort to establish their own state as a destabilizing factor that will worsen the current situation in Iraq. Washington fears a possible turmoil in a quiet region like Northern Iraq due to the unrestrained nationalism expressed by the Kurds and Kirkuk; therefore, it does not welcome the idea of an independent Kurdish state.¹¹⁶

Turks need to understand that although the war may be wrong, it is reasonable that the U.S. is working with Kurds and is not going to prioritize military action against the PKK while in over its head in other parts of Iraq.

V.7 Conclusion

All of these issues are also viewed with a tendency toward distrust that will take time to overcome. The nature of anti-Americanism is that it biases the way people see America. In this sense, the problem is not going to be rectified immediately. But with sustained commitment to foster understanding and with consistency in its policies, America can gain ground against the expansion of anti-Americanism. The next chapters set out to explore practical solutions in how America can correct the problem of anti-Americanism.

¹¹⁶ Taşpınar, 10.

CHAPTER VI

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN TURKEY

VI.1 Introduction

Despite a great amount of well-intending effort, anti-Americanism is at sustained high levels that are detrimental to Turkish-American relations and to the U.S. leadership in the region. The U.S. State Department acknowledges the current state of affairs in Turkey: “But much work remains, with anti-Americanism remaining at a historic high among the Turkish public.”¹ In an interview with Ben Ball, Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, I tried to suggest there might be room for improvement in public diplomacy. He cut me off, saying, “Public diplomacy is being done wrong. You don’t have to be so generous.”² Beneath the positive press releases and many great programs, the bottom line is that U.S. public diplomacy is failing to amend Turkish-American relations.

Ball was very honest about the shortcomings in public diplomacy in Turkey. In his evaluation, there are three parties at fault that combine to make anti-Americanism worse: Washington, the U.S. Mission in Turkey, and the Turkish

¹ Daniel Fried, “U.S.-Turkish Relations and the Challenges Ahead,” Hearing of the Europe Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Washington, D.C., March 15, 2007). <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/81761.htm>

² Ben Ball (Assistant Public Affairs Officer), interview with the author, May 7, 2007. U.S. Embassy, Ankara.

government.³ Ball explained that the three of these combine in a damaging way for anti-Americanism to be ineffectively dealt with in Turkey. The previous chapter addressed the reasons for Turkish anti-Americanism and the faults of Turkey in the issue. However, the focus of this thesis is about what America what must do. Rather than rationalize or blame, America needs to focus on its part in lowering the rampant anti-Americanism. The two American culprits for inadequately mitigating anti-Americanism need to be analyzed.

Public diplomacy plays a vital role in ameliorating anti-Americanism. Soner Çağaptay, an influential Turkish scholar, remarkably comments that even if the U.S. policies are in favor of Turkey, “there will be little improvement unless the U.S. government improves its public diplomacy.”⁴ Despite the bleak picture, there is hope that people are not well informed and could be impacted by more communication. Journalist Nasuhi Güngör said that if the man on the street is asked why he does not like America he will say because it is imperialist.⁵ After the first answer there will not be specific arguments. He was straightforward that the average person is dogmatic without being informed or knowing details. Güngör believes that communication can make a difference in reaching the average Turk.

The remainder of the thesis builds on the analysis and understanding of anti-Americanism in Turkey. Public diplomacy in Turkey needs to first and foremost be based on understanding the way Turks view America and the world. “Both to interpret others’ behavior and to design one’s own behavior so that others will draw the

³ For the purpose of analysis, a distinction is made between 1) “Washington,” or the U.S. State Department and 2) the “post,” or the U.S. Mission in Turkey (also “Mission” throughout the thesis).

⁴ Soner Çağaptay, “Where Goes the U.S.-Turkish Relationship?” *Middle East Quarterly* (Fall 2004): 51.

⁵ Nasuhi Güngör (journalist, *Star Gazetesi*), interview with the author, April 25, 2007. Balgat, Ankara.

desired conclusions from it, the actor must try to see the world the way the other sees it.”⁶

This chapter is focused on what America needs to do better through public diplomacy to turn the tide of anti-Americanism in Turkey. Part one evaluates the public diplomacy efforts of the U.S. Department of State since September 11, 2001. The second part is about the transfer of Washington’s efforts to the “post” in Turkey. Part three narrows to the positive efforts but nevertheless shortcomings of public diplomacy on the ground in Turkey. I aim to present a critical evaluation of U.S. public diplomacy as it looks from the ground in Turkey. In the final chapter, recommendations will be made based on a more accurate understanding of anti-Americanism in Turkey and the analysis presented in this chapter. The current state of public diplomacy in Turkey is best approached from an overview of American public diplomacy since September 11.

VI.2 Washington & Public Diplomacy

There are multiple ways in which Washington is to blame for the anti-Americanism around the world and particularly in Turkey. Although the last chapter argued that anti-Americanism is about more than recent policy, the policies certainly are a large factor. But beyond policy formation, the lack of successful public diplomacy is also at fault for anti-Americanism flourishing.⁷

⁶ Jervis, 409.

⁷ Chapter two detailed the essence of diplomacy, which is about communication in the international system. Instead of recommendations about policy, the goal of this thesis is to focus on how public diplomacy can be done better.

VI.2.1 New Mission, Post-September 11

September 11 was the decisive event shaping the foreign policy of the Bush administration. President Bush declared three days after the attacks, “Our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.”⁸ This quotation appears in the seminal 2002 *National Security Strategy (NSS)* document. The introduction to the 2006 *NSS* of the United States reveals the ongoing importance of September 11 in the outlook of what threatens national security. “America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face—the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001.”⁹ In the view of the Bush administration, *the* grave challenge is terrorism fueled by this ideology of hatred and threat emanating from a militant Islamism. This is revealed in the “Overview of America’s *National Security Strategy*,” which attributes the threat to “the perversion of a proud religion. Its content may be different from the ideologies of the last century, but its means are similar: intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement, and repression.”¹⁰ An example of the clear continuity in policy since September 11 is the obvious way in which the 2006 *NSS* only serves to complement the defining 2002 *NSS*. The corresponding sections from 2002 are included at the top of each chapter of the 2006 document.

In the aftermath of September 11, The United States has committed an incredible amount of its vast resources outside of its borders for proactive security.

⁸ President George W. Bush, (Address, National Cathedral, Washington, D.C., September 14, 2001) The White House, *2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 5.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>

⁹ The White House, *2006 National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, “Introduction,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/intro.html>

¹⁰ 2006 *NSS*. “Overview of America’s *National Security Strategy*.” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionI.html>

The thinking still goes, “Our best defense is a good offense.”¹¹ This is revealing of the Bush administration’s conviction that it is not adequate to sit back, but the fight must be taken to the enemy.

The Bush administration’s eyes are fixed on this threat, which in turn influences the priorities of its agenda. Due to the focus on radical Islamic terrorism, the State Department’s view of anti-Americanism is primarily one of an Arab brand promoted by the Islamist terrorists. Washington sees especially strong anti-Americanism in the Arab World.

So where does the Secretary of State spend the majority of her time in 2007? It’s got to be the Middle East... we’ve got this sea of anti-Americanism in the Arab world...I would say if you had to choose one part of the world where our vital interests were most engaged, it’s the Middle East.¹²

VI.2.2 Public Diplomacy as a part of the War on Terror

The United States has slowly recognized that peace cannot be won by military prowess. A battle must be waged for the hearts and minds of people. Washington has returned to the need to bolster its public diplomacy efforts, as it had in the Cold War. The acknowledgement of the importance of public diplomacy has increased significantly in the 2006 NSS compared to the 2002 NSS, which had almost no mention of diplomacy. The 2006 NSS refers to, “Continuing to reorient the Department of State towards transformational diplomacy, which promotes effective democracy and responsible sovereignty.”¹³ The 2006 document also stresses the importance of:

Strengthening our public diplomacy, so that we advocate the policies and values of the United States in a clear, accurate, and persuasive way to a watching and listening world. This includes actively engaging foreign

¹¹ 2002 NSS.

¹² R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, “Remarks at the National Conference of Editorial Writers.” (Washington, D.C., April 2, 2007) <http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/82900.htm>

¹³ 2006 NSS.

audiences, expanding educational opportunities for Americans to learn about foreign languages and cultures and for foreign students and scholars to study in the United States; empowering the voices of our citizen ambassadors as well as those foreigners who share our commitment to a safer, more compassionate world; enlisting the support of the private sector; increasing our channels for dialogue with Muslim leaders and citizens; and confronting propaganda quickly, before myths and distortions have time to take root in the hearts and minds of people across the world.¹⁴

The language of public diplomacy found its way into the national security priorities of the Bush administration. According to the State Department website, diplomacy, development, and defense are the three underlying and interdependent components that anchor the President's NSS.¹⁵ This is a huge jump in the recognition of the importance of public diplomacy in four years' time.

The primary responsibility for this engagement of the world falls to the U.S. Department of State. Its mission statement is to "create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community."¹⁶ According to the longer document developing the State Department's mission, "American diplomacy in the 21st century is based on fundamental beliefs: our freedom is best protected by ensuring that others are free; our prosperity depends on the prosperity of others; and our security relies on a global effort to secure the rights of all."¹⁷ With the belief that its security is linked to the world, America has recommitted itself to the vast undertaking of engaging the world.

Public diplomacy is integrally linked to and heavily influenced by the Bush administration's war on terror.

¹⁴ 2006 NSS.

¹⁵ "Mission," U.S. State Department. <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm>.

¹⁶ "Mission Statement," U.S. Department of State.
<http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm>

¹⁷ "Mission Statement," U.S. Department of State.

VI.2.3 Karen Hughes, Leading the War of Ideas

Karen Hughes's appointment by President Bush as the Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, announced in March of 2005, was big news in Washington. "Though the impact of Hughes's reemergence in Washington would be largely lost on her new foreign audience, here in the capital it has set tongues buzzing."¹⁸ By all accounts, Hughes is one of Bush's closest advisors, dating back to his years as governor in Texas. Her high profile appointment was seen as an expression of Bush's seriousness in public diplomacy. "For the first time since the 9/11 terrorist attacks put public diplomacy back on the State Department radar, America's front lines of public relations have a well placed, and serious, political leader."¹⁹ The position had been open for a year after short stints by advertising executive Charlotte Beers and Margaret Tutwiller, with very little evidence of progress.²⁰

It was clear from the outset how much Hughes' appointment was focused on another facet of defeating the enemy that came into full view on September 11. At the swearing-in ceremony of Hughes in September 2005, President Bush proclaimed:

We're in a war on terror. We are still at war. And to succeed in this war, we must effectively explain our policies and fundamental values to people around the world. This is an incredibly important mission. And so I've asked one of America's most talented communicators to take it on.²¹

It is remarkable how much significance fighting the terrorists is given at the appointment of Hughes, revealing the main mission assigned to her:

¹⁸ Linda Feldman, "Can Karen Hughes help US image abroad?," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 16, 2005.

¹⁹ Shawn Zeller, "Damage Control: Karen Hughes Does PD," *Foreign Service Journal* (Oct. 2006):19.

²⁰ Lucy Jones, "Karen Hughes' 'Listening Tour' and Its Aftermath," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* (Dec. 2005): 25.

²¹ President George W. Bush. "President Honors Ambassador Karen Hughes at Swearing-In Ceremony." <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050909.html>

We're on a hunt for the terrorists. We are striking them in foreign lands before they can hurt our citizens again. Yet we know that this war will not be won by force of arms alone. We must defeat the terrorists on the battlefield, and we must also defeat them in the battle of ideas.²²

Hughes' background is television news reporting in Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas. She became Bush's communications guru, overseeing his two election wins as governor of Texas, then as president.²³ She continued to be one of Bush's most trusted advisors after he won the presidency. "If Karl Rove, the other pillar of Bush's political brain trust, aims more at promoting a conservative agenda, Hughes is the one known for nudging the president back toward the center."²⁴ She served for 18 months as Counselor to the President in the White House and managed the White House Offices of Communications, Media Affairs, Speechwriting and Press Secretary.²⁵

Hughes has been tasked by President Bush with leading efforts to promote America's values and confront ideological support for terrorism around the world.²⁶ She actually oversees three bureaus at the Department of State: Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Information Programs, and Public Affairs, in addition to participating in foreign policy development at the State Department. No one has any illusions about this being an easy task. Hughes said that on the morning of her appointment the Vice President told her, "Karen, my condolences. You just took the hardest job in government."²⁷

Along with this high-profile appointment to head public diplomacy efforts, Washington has increased the amount of resources at Hughes' disposal. On April 19, 2007, Hughes testified before a House committee:

²² Karen Hughes, "President Honors Ambassador Karen Hughes at Swearing-In Ceremony." <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050909.html>

²³ Jones, 24.

²⁴ Feldman, March 16, 2005.

²⁵ U.S. Department of State Website. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/53692.htm>

²⁶ U.S. Department of State Website.

²⁷ Elaine Shannon and Jay Carney, "10 Question for Karen Hughes," *Time*, February 20, 2006.

Because our efforts against terrorism are more than a military or intelligence matter, but also an ideological struggle, we are asking you to fund urgent public diplomacy programs in this year's war on terror supplemental request, and to support increases for vital programs in our 2008 budget request.²⁸

The President's 2008 budget request provides for three primary line-items related to public diplomacy, which are included in the war on terror. The first is \$669 million proposed for the Broadcasting Board of Governors to support radio, television, and Internet broadcasting worldwide. The second is \$486 million for education and cultural exchanges. Finally, there is "\$359 million for the public diplomacy to foster mutual understanding between the United States and other countries and combat violent extremism, particularly in the Muslim world."²⁹ The Bush administration's 2008 Budget Fact Sheets also specifically mentions, "Winning the war of ideas: Promoting democracy and countering violent extremism through improving the world's understanding of the United States and improving our understanding of the world is a critical component of the Global War on Terror."³⁰ The specific mention of the Muslim world and the funding coming under the budget for the war on terror leave no doubt about what drives Washington's view of public diplomacy initiatives.

In her first months after beginning her term on July 29, 2005, Under Secretary Hughes outlined three "strategic imperatives" in a statement before the House International Relations Committee on November 10, 2005. The same priorities of contributing to the war on terror are evident throughout.

All my efforts are guided by three strategic imperatives. First, that America must offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity to people throughout the world, a vision rooted in our enduring commitment to freedom... Our second strategic imperative is to isolate and marginalize violent extremists, and undermine their efforts to exploit religion to rationalize their acts of terror. We must work to amplify a clear message from people of every

²⁸ Karen Hughes, "Testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs," Washington, DC. April 19, 2007.

²⁹ Bush Administration, 2008 Budget. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/budget/BudgetFY2008.pdf>

³⁰ 2008 Budget.

nationality and faith: That no injustice, no wrong—no matter how legitimate—can ever justify the murder of innocents...

Our third strategic imperative is to foster a sense of common interests and common values between Americans and people of different countries, cultures and faiths across our world. We share so much. People the world over want education and better lives for our children, people everywhere want to live in security, we all want jobs and economic opportunity.³¹

In addition to the three “strategic imperatives,” Hughes said she would be guided by four “strategic pillars” that she calls four “E’s”: engagement, exchanges, education and empowerment.

We need to engage more vigorously. We cannot expect people to give a fair hearing to our ideas if we don’t advocate them. And research shows, when people know that America is partnering with their governments to improve their lives, it makes a difference in how they think about us.

The second “E” is exchanges. People who have the opportunity to come here learn for themselves that Americans are generous, hard-working people who value faith and family...Our exchange programs are responding to the new realities of the post-911 world, reaching out to critical new participants such as clerics and community leaders. We need to make our exchange programs even more strategic, attracting teachers, journalists, youth leaders and others who have the ability to influence a wide circle. We want more American young people to study and travel abroad.

The third pillar is education – for we know education is the path to upward mobility and greater opportunity – for boys and girls. Americans must educate ourselves to be better citizens of our world – learning different languages and learning more about other countries and cultures...

The final “E” is empowerment – people cannot give a fair hearing to our ideas if they are unable to consider them. We will take the side of those who advocate greater participation for all, including women.

Again, the importance of the defining September 11 event is evident, especially in the focus of the “exchanges” being based on “adapting to the new realities of the post-911 world, reaching out to critical new participants such as clerics and community leaders.”

³¹ Karen Hughes, “America’s Dialogue with the World,” Statement before the House International Relations Committee (Washington, D.C. November 10, 2005).
<http://www.state.gov/r/us/2005/56926.htm>

In order to accomplish the goals of public diplomacy, Hughes set forth many ambitious goals. One was to make changes in Washington, including a commitment to reinvigorating the interagency process. Public diplomacy needs to be more coordinated between the many government agencies that touch on foreign relations. She aimed to provide leadership to make efforts more harmonized and strategic. To increase the awareness for a unified strategy, she has placed a deputy assistant secretary for public diplomacy in each of the State Department's six regional bureaus.³² Addressing the need for a unified message, Hughes has said, "As I travel the world, people almost everywhere tell me, 'you all don't speak as one government. You speak as a bunch of different governments.'"³³ With the strong support and attention of President Bush, she is taking steps to change this.

As a second goal, Hughes intended to more fully integrate policy and public diplomacy. Because Hughes has the ear of President Bush, many have high expectations that she will be able to influence policy with the perspective of public diplomacy. This causes concern for others who do not want foreign opinion to greatly influence American policies. In traditional diplomacy, as described in chapter two, diplomats take the foreign policy objectives of their state and attempt to communicate and persuade foreign governments to act in these interests. Public diplomacy is largely the same, but using different tools to reach foreign publics. However, public diplomacy is accordingly more sensitive to public opinion. While the consequence of foreign policy to the opinion of foreign publics needs to be communicated to Washington, if this becomes too influential in foreign policy formulation, it could run counter to American interests. In the way that public diplomacy is considered in

³² Zeller, 24.

³³ Zeller, 25.

policy formulation, Hughes intends to find a better balance than she believes currently exists.

For the third goal, she set out “to reinvigorate public diplomacy as a vibrant, vital career path.”³⁴ She spoke of the importance of the Foreign Service staff.³⁵

I will do all I can to support and empower them with strategic and policy guidance and the training and tools they need to carry out their mission on the front lines of diplomacy. I intend to serve as the advocate for a reinvigorated public diplomacy community in the State Department.³⁶

Since the folding of the public diplomacy focused USIA into the State Department in 1999, as described in chapter two, the Foreign Service staff has yet to feel fully integrated or valued. Former U.S. Senator and President of the United Nations Foundation Timothy Wirth remarked in 2005,

The Department is still dominated by an old diplomatic culture in which real men do not do public diplomacy—or human rights, or environment or refugees. Real men do politics and maybe economics... [which] makes it harder for public diplomacy to be rewarded in the career service.³⁷

There was positive feedback for Hughes in Washington in the first days. “I think she’s doing far better than her predecessors,”³⁸ said Shibley Telhami, professor at the University of Maryland and an expert on the Middle East. In a short time she was able to quickly implement some positive programs. One was a “rapid response center” that produces a daily one-page summary of what news outlets are saying about American policies from monitoring newspaper clippings, television programs,

³⁴ Hughes, “The Mission of Public Diplomacy,” July 22, 2005.

³⁵ The U.S. State Department is comprised mainly of the 1) Civil Service, who support the foreign policy mission in positions in the U.S., and 2) the Foreign Service, which is the main diplomatic arm of the U.S. government overseas. Within the Foreign Service, there are Foreign Service Officers and Foreign Service Specialists. <http://www.careers.state.gov/> In 2005 there were more than 11,000 Foreign Service employees representing the U.S. overseas, compared to 8,000 Civil Service employees, mostly serving in Washington, D.C. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/46732.htm>

³⁶ Hughes, “The Mission of Public Diplomacy,” July 22, 2005.

³⁷ Timothy E. Wirth, President, United Nations Foundation. “Public Diplomacy and Communications.” Ambassador Walter H. Annenberg Symposium at University of Southern California, Los Angeles, March 22, 2005.

³⁸ Telhami in Steven R. Wiesman, “Bush Confidante Finds Latest Role to be Uphill Battle,” *The New York Times*, Dec 26, 2005.

and the Internet. This report is intended to assist senior government officials to know how policies are interpreted overseas and how to talk about them.

Another noteworthy change has been Hughes' desire to have ambassadors and public affairs people out talking more to the public, including more interviews in the critical languages. Hughes herself has even appeared on Al Jazeera, something not done by her predecessors based on the rationale that Al Jazeera is hostile to the U.S. Hughes has said, "We have to be out there. We may not like everything they report. They may be putting out misinformation. They may incite violence. But we have to be out there." She has freed ambassadors to talk directly to the media without permission from the State Department, as was previously required. "We are trying to change the entire culture of the State Department,"³⁹ Hughes told the Associate Press. After 20 months at the helm of U.S. public diplomacy, she was able to report many concrete improvements, such as a record number of 591,000 student and exchange visas being issued, the participation in education and exchange programs growing in the last three years from 27,000 to 39,000, and the American presence on Arab media increasing by 30 percent.⁴⁰

VI.3 Transfer of State to the Field in Turkey

Washington's recognition of the value of public diplomacy has clearly increased. However, the transfer of Washington's reinvigorated efforts to the ground level has not been entirely smooth. Turkey is an example of a country where a disconnect is felt between what is done in Washington and what works on the field. Under Secretary Hughes began her position with great expectation and the support of

³⁹ Zeller, 23.

⁴⁰ Karen Hughes, "Testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs," Washington, DC. April 19, 2007.

the Bush administration behind her. Although armed with her three “strategic imperatives” and four “strategic pillars” to go wage the war of ideas, the difficulty of seeing results on the field became quickly evident.

VI.3.1. Hughes’ Listening Tour Harshly Criticized

Under Secretary Hughes’ first mission was a “listening tour” in September 2005 that took her to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The next month she visited Indonesia and Malaysia. Many felt that it exposed her lack of experience in foreign affairs. “She has little foreign policy experience and her pedestrian, at times vapid, responses to questions raised by people in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey showed she knew precious little about the region’s social concerns and political preoccupations.”⁴¹ One American commentator described the visit with the following analogy:

Let’s say some Muslim leader wanted to improve America’s image of Islam. It’s doubtful that he would send as his emissary a woman in a black chador who has spent no time in the United States, possessed no knowledge of our history or movies or pop music and spoke no English.⁴²

She drew harsh criticism from many in the Middle East as well. One columnist in *Arab News* wrote, “Thanks, Karen, message master, communications guru and undersecretary of state for public diplomacy. You came to our part of the world to aim at the public’s hearts, and you ended up hitting it in the stomach.”⁴³

One long-time American officer with ten tours overseas said, “She started out not just badly, but horrifyingly, shockingly, embarrassingly badly.”⁴⁴ Many felt that

⁴¹ Fawak Tuzi, “Of Mission and Missionaries,” *Arab News*, Oct 5, 2005. Reprinted in *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, Dec. 2005.

⁴² Fred Kaplan quoted in Jones.

⁴³ Tuzi, Dec. 2005.

⁴⁴ Zeller, 19.

her listening tour confirmed that she was in over her head. Others were more optimistic, knowing her previous success in completing tasks.

On the leg of the trip to Turkey, Hughes intended to meet with a group of women in Ankara, as well as the Foreign Minister, many religious leaders at the Topkapı Palace in Istanbul, and other government leaders. Even before her arrival, there were strong words that foreshadowed the difficulty of her task. Hughes wanted to meet with important women around the capital and “talk about the position of women and women’s rights.” The twenty Turkish women who were invited, based on their studies on women’s rights, replied, “Let’s discuss George W. Bush’s policies on Iraq and women as well.”⁴⁵ The KA-DER Ankara branch announced that they would organize a meeting in which Hughes could participate, but that they were opposed to any restrictions on the topics for discussion. KA-DER made a statement that “Karen Hughes defines her contacts as a ‘listening’ opportunity. Let her listen to us but let her answer our criticisms as well. We also want to discuss the US policy on Iraq and US President Bush’s policies on women. We do not want the meeting to be perceived as a USA-NGO embrace.” Surely this is not what Karen Hughes had in mind.

The high profile visit was intended to be a positive start to Washington improving relations with the Muslim world. “Hughes arrived in Turkey with more than 20 US journalists in tow, explaining to her hosts that part of the goal of her tour was to bring back images of the region to the American people, who were on the whole ignorant of the geography and the people living in the region.”⁴⁶ It not helpful for nearly every article to refer to Hughes as President Bush’s “image guru” and how

⁴⁵Süleyman Kurt, “Bush’un imaj parlâtıcısına ‘Irak’ı da görüşelim’ cevabı,” (“Let’s Talk in Iraq’ Bush’s Image Maker Responded”) *Zaman*, September 28, 2005.

⁴⁶ “Karen Hughes hits Turkey on third stop of Middle East tour for US image support,” *Hurriyet*, September 29, 2005. KAD-ER, is an important nation-wide Turkish women’s organization.

she is sent by Bush to save his destroyed image.⁴⁷ There was minimal decent Turkish press from Hughes's visit to Turkey, with lukewarm headlines such as, "America is taking the pulse." This article had a picture of Hughes appearing to drink tea and a caption that said she was shopping in the covered bazaar of Istanbul.⁴⁸ However, most of the reporting about Hughes's time in Turkey was about the anger communicated by the women with whom she met in Ankara.

VI.3.2 View of Turkey from Washington

Even Hughes' agenda on her listening tour exemplifies the focus on reaching out to the Muslims who could be pulled into the orbit of the radical Islamic terrorists. Turkey is included in the same trip as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. There is evidence that Turkey is grouped in with Washington priorities to reach out to the Muslim world, with frequent references to the "Islamic majority country" and even an occasional high profile slip-up of an "Islamic country." The echoes are still heard from former Secretary of State Colin Powell explaining,

There will be an Islamic Republic in Iraq just like other Islamic Republics such as Turkey and Pakistan...There is no reason why Islam cannot be together with democracy. Turkey is an Islamic country, why would there not be a democracy just like there is in Turkey at the same time.⁴⁹

The comments are revealing of the State Department's preexisting mindset that Turkey is the region's example for how democracy and Islam can coexist.

As a predominantly Muslim country, Turkey is viewed by the Bush administration as a prime candidate for a strategic ally in its war on terror. In her

⁴⁷Two examples from September 28, 2005 are "Halkla ilişkiler' yetmiyor," *Radikal*, and Süleyman Kurt, "Bush'un imaj parlatıcısına 'Irak'ı da görüşelim' cevabı," *Zaman*.

⁴⁸Serkan Demirtaş, "ABD nabız yokluyor," *Radikal*, September 30, 2005.

⁴⁹Colin Powell, "New U.N. Iraq Resolution Likely by July 1, Powell tells German TV," April 1, 2004. <http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004&m=April&x=200404011821061CJsamohT0.1528742>

comments at a press conference with Foreign Minister Gül, Secretary Rice spoke about the strategic foundation of the relationship with Turkey.

I would just add that sometimes it's very important to step back from the day-to-day issues and to look at the broad relationship and to remind ourselves and to remind our populations that this is a relationship that is broad and deep, and based on values and based on strategic interests, and that's really what this document allows us to do.⁵⁰

The document is a "statement of strategic vision" for Turkish-American relations to which Gül and Rice agreed in 2006.⁵¹

One of the challenges is potential differences between what is said diplomatically to the public, and the true mindset with the State Department. Nevertheless, public statements can be revealing of the Washington perspective.

Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, is one of the most common voices speaking about Turkey in Washington. In public statements, Fried communicates a solid understanding of the issues confronting Turkey.

The volatility of debate has given rise to and coincided with an undercurrent of popular nationalism, frustration with Europe, and even anti-Americanism. One cause of these trends is Turkish citizens' frustration with PKK terrorism from Iraq, and a popular belief that the United States could do more to combat the PKK terrorists, whom Turks view as the greatest threat to their national security. Another cause is the identity crisis dominating Turkish society as Turkey strives for admission in the European Union. Many Turks feel humiliated by what they perceive as the shifting of accession requirements by the EU even as Turkey advanced serious constitutional and market economic reforms, and made significant compromises on the Cyprus question. While it is up to the Turks to meet the EU's requirements for accession, many Turks believe that some in Europe use the complex EU accession process to mask a bias against Turkey.⁵²

⁵⁰ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks with Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gul After Their Meeting," Washington, D.C., July 5, 2006. <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/68577.htm>

⁵¹ "Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership." July 5, 2006. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/68574.htm>. The document is not generally considered to carry much weight, only putting in writing what is already in practice.

⁵² Fried, "U.S.-Turkish Relations and the Challenges Ahead." March 15, 2007.

Fried astutely recognizes many of the issues in Turkey, including the undercurrent of popular nationalism and the identity crisis dominating Turkish society. He also provides good analysis of different strains in Turkish political life.

This political turmoil and the widening boundaries of democratic expression have propelled a new nationalism as one factor common across Turkey's political spectrum. At the same time, a growing and sophisticated middle class also supports the emergence of progressive and liberal ideas in Turkey. The ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party, with its foundation in Turkey's traditional Islamic culture but also including progressive and liberal elements, is one expression of the different strains in Turkish political life today. Turkey's secular elite, rooted in the civilian and military bureaucracies that play a key role in Turkey's democracy, also reflects these trends. And these two diverse political camps are in competition with each other.⁵³

However, it is unclear whether the knowledge of the situation really filters into the perspective of the State Department. Ball, for example, explained the tensions between “Washington” and the “post,” the U.S. Embassy or Consulate on the ground in a country. “Sometimes we work with Washington and sometimes against it.”⁵⁴ He went on to explain,

Washington wants us to implement all the plans for a ‘Muslim’ country, but the cookie-cutter approach does not work for Turkey. The model cannot be used here. In many Arab countries programs directed towards bringing *imams*, or religious leaders, who have never left their country to the U.S. are effective. They are shocked with what they see in America; Muslims aren’t being killed in the streets. However, the people who shape public opinion in Ankara are not the *imams* or religious leaders.⁵⁵

The State Department is so heavily tasked with fighting the war on terror that it does not apply a nuanced understanding of Turkey.

⁵³ Fried, “U.S.-Turkish Relations and the Challenges Ahead.” March 15, 2007.

⁵⁴ Ball, interview with the author, May 7, 2007.

⁵⁵ Ball, interview with the author, November 30, 2006.

VI.3.3 Top-Down Approach Applied to Turkey

One of the issues of public diplomacy in Turkey is the top-down approach by Washington. Washington's influence on the posts increases as the importance of public diplomacy grows within the strategy of the Bush administration and the State Department. The American voters and Washington expect to see instantaneous results. The results-oriented mindset about the immediate and ongoing threat to the security of the United States cloud the ability for more skilled direction about Turkey from Washington.

A degree of separation between Washington and the post is intentional. As explained in chapter two, the basic idea is that Washington determines the policy and message, and the staff in the field decide how to package and communicate it in Turkey. The embassies report back to Washington, serving as the eyes and ears on the ground. The feedback is ideally incorporated into the policy and the message formulated by Washington. Ambassador Wilson, with a leg on both sides of the ocean, explained there is a gulf between Washington and the post, but feels it is a natural reality. "When you are in Washington, there is a sense that the whole universe revolves around you. Washington is focused on working the fundamental policy. Of course they are not well-informed about the nuances here."⁵⁶

One of the frequently mentioned complaints at the posts is too much influence from Washington. While the Department of State is tasked with implementing the priorities of the Administration, the Foreign Service is generally more sensitive to the reactions of the world. Dan Sreebny, who oversees all of the Public Affairs of the U.S. Mission in Turkey, explained, "the less important a country is, the more influence you can have. For example, when I was in London, we knew that we had no

⁵⁶ Ambassador Ross Wilson, interview with the author, May 11, 2007. U.S. Embassy, Ankara.

influence. The President would talk directly to Blair. Turkey is somewhere in-between.” He also gave the example of how the backlash to Secretary Rice’s use of the word Kurdistan filtered from the Embassy to the Turkey desk in Washington. He speculated that Rice probably saw it because she has not used the term again since then.

One of the criticisms of Karen Hughes has been that she runs things with top-down thinking that works better in a political campaign than foreign affairs.⁵⁷ She tends to begin with a dictate from Washington, with less receptivity of ideas coming from the field. A related criticism is that, despite verbalizing intentions to the contrary, Hughes has relied mainly on political appointees, showing a lack of trust for the Foreign Service veterans. One of her goals at the beginning of her term was “to reinvigorate public diplomacy as a vibrant, vital career path.”⁵⁸ Development of the Foreign Service staff has taken a back seat to accomplishing tasks as soon as possible with her hand-picked team.⁵⁹

Overall, there is an attitude at the post that Washington tries too much to influence public diplomacy in Turkey, without an adequate understanding of the complexity of the country.

VI.4 On the Ground in Turkey

Posts, such as Ankara and Istanbul, are where the rubber meets the road. This is where the message and resources supplied by Washington are put into practice to try to win the hearts and minds of people.

⁵⁷ Zeller, 23.

⁵⁸ Hughes, “The Mission of Public Diplomacy,” July 22, 2005.

⁵⁹ Joe Johnson, “How Does Public Diplomacy Measure Up?,” *Foreign Service Journal* (Oct. 2006): 50.

VI.4.1 Perspective at the Post in Turkey

Just as Washington is partly to blame for not effectively lowering the anti-Americanism in Turkey, so is the U.S. Mission in Turkey. Washington is too ready to see Turkey as a strategic partner against the threat of Islamic terrorism in light of the war on terror. While Washington pushes for undue importance given to the Muslim identity of Turkey, the Embassy is not acting with enough energy and clarity that would come from a better understanding and application of Turkey's deeper reasons for anti-Americanism.

The post in Turkey has a better understanding of the complexity of the country and the identity issues related to anti-Americanism, but is failing to act on the basis of this knowledge. The post is critical of the top-down approach of Washington trying to push the Mission into the mold the State Department uses for Arab countries, and yet the post is guilty of the same one-sided approach in focusing almost exclusively on elite secularists. The target audience in Turkey is people who influence public opinion such as journalists, policy makers, employees of key think tanks, and university professors. However this has not been balanced to reach non-elites and more religious parts of society.

There is a lack of optimism, energy, and new ideas being devoted by the U.S. Mission in Turkey to do anything to alter the current anti-Americanism. Although Washington does not have the understanding of Turkey, it does have the energy and commitment to make changes. At the Embassy there is a sense that only so much can be done by the Mission in the face of the Iraq War. The most notable person to voice this sentiment was Ambassador Wilson. "There's not a lot we can do, except at the margins to decrease aggravation. The things we can do to ameliorate anti-

Americanism are only working around the edges.”⁶⁰ Sreebny was similarly clear about the limitations of public diplomacy. He said that although public diplomacy can help improve Turkish-American relations, “I’m realistic that it can’t do everything. The most important things are what happen between the two countries and foreign policy. We can’t change that.”⁶¹ I did not come away from my interview with the top public diplomacy officer in Turkey encouraged about the impact that public diplomacy could have. I got more of a sense that they are “doing what they can.”

Ball told me they have reached almost all of the important policy makers in Ankara. “It’s just not that big,” he told me about a city of 3 million people with continuing record-high anti-Americanism.⁶² Elizabeth McKay, Cultural Affairs Officer, said that they are well funded because of Turkey’s importance. She gave the example of the State Department asking them last year specifically if they have underfunded priorities, and granting money for a few new programs.⁶³ I was overall surprised to hear that the post feels it has ample resources. To turn the tide of anti-Americanism, it seems there needs to be greater creativity and new initiatives that stretch the funding available

VI.4.2 Foreign Service Staff

One of the most significant aspects of public diplomacy on the ground in Turkey is the Foreign Service employees, including Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), Foreign Service Specialists, and Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs). In Turkey, there are over 900 people in the Mission, the vast majority located in either Ankara or

⁶⁰ Ambassador Wilson, interview with the author, May 11, 2007.

⁶¹ Dan Sreebny (Public Affairs Officer), interview with the author, March 12, 2007. U.S. Embassy, Ankara.

⁶² Ball, interview with the author, November 30, 2006.

⁶³ Elizabeth McKay (Cultural Affairs Officer), interview with the author, May 11, 2007. U.S. Embassy, Ankara.


Istanbul. Included in the numbers are approximately 600 employees at the Embassy in Ankara, 250 of whom are Americans. At the U.S. Consulate General there are some 60 Americans and 200 Turks.⁶⁴

The FSOs typically come on two to three year tours before moving to the next assignment. Before coming to Turkey, most receive 10 months of full-time Turkish language learning to reach a “working” level.⁶⁵ The language training allows the staff to be able to conduct a basic meeting in Turkish. Maria Snarski, English Language Officer at the Embassy and of course experienced in teaching language, admitted her displeasure with the quality of the language school in Arlington, Virginia.⁶⁶ The language level is still inadequate for the Foreign Service to completely engage in meaningful relationships.

⁶⁴Katharina Gollner-Sweet (Assistant Public Affairs Officer), interview with the author, April 11, 2007. U.S. Consulate General, Istanbul.

⁶⁵ The U.S. State Department tests for reading and speaking ability. The grading is on a number system from 0/0 to 5/5 (speaking/reading), including half steps, such as 1+/1+. 0 is no language ability and 5 is native university educated level. For each country there is a different threshold. For FSOs going to Turkey, the goal after a full course is to get students to a 3/3 level, (As a point of comparison, the language requirement for French is 4/4 and Chinese is 2/0) which is considered “working level.” This level is supposed to mean that one can live, operate and work in the native language.

⁶⁶ Maria Snarski (English Language Office), interview with the author, May 7, 2007. U.S. Embassy, Ankara.



The chart above provides a visual picture of the chain of command and departments in public diplomacy throughout Turkey.⁶⁷

The Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) are the vital Turkish employees of the U.S. Mission in Turkey. Gollner-Sweet raved about the quality of the FSNs. “We have a fabulous Turkish staff. They need very little direction. We haven’t hired anyone new because people tend to stay. They have the connections and personalities to meet people. They lead out in public diplomacy... I couldn’t imagine life without them.”⁶⁸ Because FSOs turn over regularly and do not typically contact their predecessors from five or ten year ago, the FSNs help fill this gap by maintaining relationships and tracking changes over time. FSNs also help with the language at

⁶⁷ Other than Craig Kuehl, the B/PAO at the U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul, I was able to have a personal interview with every one of these officers. Their accessibility was invaluable in understanding current public diplomacy on the ground in Turkey.

⁶⁸ Gollner-Sweet, interview with the author, April 11, 2007.

meetings and relationships are sometimes built in conjunction with an FSN because of the language limitations.

However, the FSNs are an example of the Embassy's inadequate connection with the more religious parts of society. Schalow shared that all of the FSNs at the embassy are secularists. "There are no turbans on the campus. Honestly, if there were, I think the FSNs would be uncomfortable. They are used to their own little secular world and are still deeply suspicious."⁶⁹ Part of the reason for the heavy leaning toward secularists is historic. She explained that there was a time when little attention was given to Muslims, since for the last 80 years the secularists had all of the power. But now the AK Party, with its Islamic ties, controls parliament and its influence is unlikely to wane in the near future. Schalow also astutely pointed out that the bias towards the secularists filters the information that is received about Turkey.⁷⁰ If all of the FSNs are secularists the perspective received will tend to be one-sided. This is not nearly the balance that is needed to have an accurate gauge of opinions in Turkey and reach out to all parts of society.

VI.4.3 Security and Facilities

One of the challenges to diplomacy is the threat to the well-being of Americans serving abroad, presenting a tension between security and accessibility. Terrorist threats present a danger to the embassies and consulates of the United States overseas. A new program will increase funding for the construction of 150 new embassies and consulate compounds over a 14-year period from 2005–2018. Since 2001, the State Department has relocated more than 11,000 government employees to

⁶⁹ Kathryn Schalow (Information Officer), interview with the author, May 17, 2007. U.S. Embassy, Ankara.

⁷⁰ Schalow, interview with the author, May 17, 2007.

safer facilities. The 2008 Budget supports the construction of 11 new secure facilities.⁷¹

One of the notorious public diplomacy issues in Turkey is the U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul, the fruit of this commitment to increase security. Many people have referred to it as a fortress or “crusader castle.” One scholar wrote, “The new consulate looks like a maximum-security prison. All that’s missing is a moat with alligators and a sign that says: ‘Attention! You are now approaching a U.S. Consulate. Any sudden movement and you will be shot. All visitors welcome.’”⁷²

In 2003, because it could not meet the heightened security requirements, the Consulate was moved from the central location of Beyoğlu in downtown Istanbul to İstinye, about an hour outside of the city. Just months after the move, the British Consulate was bombed and the British Consular General was killed. The bombers revealed that the U.S. Consulate General would have been included in the attacks had it been similiary accessible. “The suspected terrorist captured in Turkey reportedly told police his cell's preferred target was the U.S. consulate.”⁷³ With the fatal attacks just months after the move, it is difficult to argue with the wisdom in moving to a safer location.

The consulate is indeed an impressive structure, and the security is obvious.⁷⁴ It is set atop a high hill with a view of the Bosphorus. From the entry level an elevator rises to the main part of the building atop the hill, further bolstering the security. The pleasant interior, with lots of windows, modern architecture, and an open courtyard is hidden behind the foreboding exterior.

⁷¹ Bush Administration, 2008 Budget.

⁷² Thomas Friedman, “Where Birds Don't Fly,” *Diplomatic Security*, December 21, 2003. <http://www.wirednewyork.com/forum/archive/index.php/t-4360.html>

⁷³ Stephen Losey, “New, Fortified Consulate Balances Safety, Diplomacy,” *Federal Times*, April 25, 2005. <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/45403.htm>

⁷⁴ Personal visit to the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul, April 11, 2007.

Beyond the criticism of the menacing architecture is the loss in accessibility from the move to İstinye. Gollner-Sweet explained that a meeting in Istanbul requires three hours with the transportation and traffic, eliminating any possibility of spontaneity. Furthermore, it makes walk-ins very rare; no one wants to make the trip to İstinye.⁷⁵ They try their best to compensate by renting hotel space in the city center to hold functions, but the reality is that a lot more of their work is done by phone and email than it was before. Unfortunately, some of the “last three feet” of personal contact, to quote Edward R. Murrow’s phrase, has been lost by the move to İstinye. The Mission in Turkey needs to be more innovative in overcoming security concerns to cover the “last three feet,” which are the most critical.

VI.4.4 Current Public Diplomacy Programs and Efforts in Turkey

The next section will outline the major programs and efforts in U.S. public diplomacy in Turkey. Although the range of activities is very broad and there is naturally extensive overlap, the main thrust of what is actually being done on the ground in public diplomacy can be broken into five categories. The first is press and media outreach; second, the many types of exchange programs; third, the English language initiatives throughout the country; fourth, the library related efforts; and finally, the various cultural events and speakers that are brought to Turkey. An overview of each will be presented as a picture of the work that already exists in public diplomacy. The final chapter makes recommendations for each effort.

⁷⁵ Gollner-Sweet, interview with the author, April 11, 2007.

VI.4.4.1 Press/Media Outreach

The press and media effort is carried out by the Information Office in both Ankara and Istanbul. The basis of this effort is to provide information to the press and other parties that are interested in the U.S. policies. Schalow outlined the three main tasks.⁷⁶ First, their mornings are spent reading and listening to the media for the day to see if there is anything that requires a response. Schalow explained that working with the Turkish media can be a frustration because they do not have the same journalistic rules. Because articles are written on one anonymous source or sometimes no source at all, conspiracy theories can quickly develop and spread. In the words of one Turkish observer, “Over the past few years, Turkish newspapers have been awash with theories attributing all problems in the Middle East to the United States.”⁷⁷

Second, their afternoons are spent communicating back to the places where correction, clarity, or statements are needed from the Embassy. Great effort is required to release timely statements to the electronic and print media and proactively communicate the U.S. position on events that arise.⁷⁸ The Information Officers stay available to the media and encourage reporters to call to confirm the truth of a story before it is printed. The post tries to respond to set the record straight before false stories get out of control. “The most important thing is to be a part of the conversation,” said Schalow.

The third part of their role, and the most proactive, is to try to get the word out to the public about the good things the Embassy is doing. This is an effort to broaden the conversation beyond the handful of issues that dominates coverage about the United States.

⁷⁶ Schalow, interview with the author, May 17, 2007.

⁷⁷ Çağaptay, 45.

⁷⁸ “Public Affairs,” U.S. Embassy Website. http://turkey.usembassy.gov/public_affairs.html

Related to the media-specific efforts are the investments made to foster stronger relationships with the press. They try to have lunch with journalists and provide education opportunities for the press about topics like journalistic standards. Gollner-Sweet explained how especially recently they are trying to go beyond the secular media, and relate to the more Islamic media, such as *Zaman* and *Yeni Şafak* newspapers.⁷⁹

A shortcoming in media outreach is the lack of Turkish language ability. According to Schalow, there are one or two Americans in the Embassy whose Turkish is good enough to be interviewed on television.⁸⁰ She was emphatic that more Turkish would be advantageous in reaching out to the media. Sreebny related the same information about Turkish ability, but I was surprised to hear that they rarely put the few outstanding Turkish speakers they have on the air, preferring to have the Ambassador speak, of course in English.⁸¹ While the Turkish diplomatic correspondents, many of the bureau chiefs, and a good number of the leading columnists speak English, there is still a lot of the media that is difficult to access without Turkish. Stephanie Morimura was honest that this causes them to lean more toward English speakers within the media.⁸²

VI.4.4.2 Exchange Programs

There are many different exchange programs, including the Fulbright Commission, International Visitor program, and the YES program. According to Seçil Yazıcıoğlu, the American Programs Officer at the Fulbright Commission in Ankara,

⁷⁹ Gollner-Sweet, interview with the author, April 11, 2007.

⁸⁰ Schalow, interview with the author, May 17, 2007.

⁸¹ Sreebny, interview with the author, March 12, 2007.

⁸² Stephanie Morimura (Assistant Information Officer), interview with the author, May 17, 2007. U.S. Embassy, Ankara.

there are about 30 grants awarded per year to American lecturers, senior researchers, and students of all levels.⁸³ A budget increase for Turkey by about three times two years ago has increased the number of Turkish Fulbrighters from 23 to about 70.⁸⁴ Sreebny, who also serves as the Chairman of the Board of the Turkish Fulbright Commission, explained that one of the greatest things about Fulbright is that it is not just a one-year experience.⁸⁵ After someone returns home the hope is that he or she keeps in touch with American friends and the experience continues.

According to Gollner-Sweet, the International Visitor (IV) program is “the best public diplomacy program we have.”⁸⁶ The IV program is designed to increase the grantee’s understanding of the United States in a certain field or area. The program seeks rising stars in their respective fields, such as journalists, heads of NGOs, mayors, and academics, who have spent little or no time in the U.S. The IV program is organized primarily through the State Department, which works closely with each country’s embassy. The program exposes approximately 40 Turks per year to the diversity of the United States, both in geography and viewpoints. An example of the program is a three-week trip, with time spent on the East and West Coasts of the U.S. and a few places in-between. Ball admitted that almost exclusively secularists have been sent. Before the AK Party came to power, virtually no one from the party had participated in the program, with the important exception of Abdullah Gül.⁸⁷ “But we are doing much better now. Maybe we’re even overcompensating. But it is harder to reach out to the Muslims. This is the reality of getting past prejudice of both past and present. It will take time.”

⁸³ Seçil Yazıcıoğlu (American Programs Officer, Fulbright Commission), interview with the author, November 16, 2006. Ankara.

⁸⁴ Gollner-Sweet, interview with the author, April 11, 2007.

⁸⁵ Sreebny, interview with the author, March 12, 2007.

⁸⁶ Gollner-Sweet, interview with the author, April 11, 2007.

⁸⁷ Ball, interview with the author, May 7, 2007.

The YES (Youth Exchange and Study) program is another exchange program run out of Washington that brings young people, aged 16-18 and from a variety of primarily Muslim countries, including Turkey, to live as a “son” or “daughter” in an American family and attend high school for an academic year or semester.⁸⁸ According to Serkan Taş, now a volunteer for the program, the program has doubled in size since he went in the 2004/2005 school year.⁸⁹ “The main point of the program is to get the students to want to change their community, change things for the better; becoming bi-cultural.” He had an amazing experience in a diverse Chicago neighborhood, and went back to stay with his host family for another four months after the program ended. He now tells his friends that “Americans are not monsters and they do not want to go to Iraq to kill people.”

But the YES program again illuminates Washington and the post’s disjointed effort to effectively relate to Turks and lack of outreach to the Islamic community. Washington lumps the Turks in with Arab Muslims, not appreciating that Turks are different and are not all practicing Muslims. Meanwhile, the Embassy is sending almost exclusively secularists.⁹⁰ Both sides are therefore to blame for Turkish students being rubbed the wrong way. Thankfully, the program is good enough that the whole experience is not ruined. But it could be much better and more of the Turkish population could be reached if both the State Department and post expanded their vision.

Taş relates different instances that irritated him during his participation with YES. He felt pigeon-holed as a Muslim because he is Turkish. He shared the specific experience of leaving the “religion” section blank on his application form, because he did not want to say he was a Muslim. When he saw his application later in the U.S. he

⁸⁸ YES program website. <http://www.yesprograms.org/>

⁸⁹ Serkan Taş, in interview with the author, April 17, 2007.

⁹⁰ Ball, interview with the author, May 7, 2007.

saw that someone had written in big letters in that section “ISLAM.” In addition to being upset that someone had written on his application, he was angered by the assumption about him beneath the action.

Another experience was during the YES orientation, when the Turks were grouped in with students from Arab countries. During one of the sessions an *imam* came and talked to the students about practical religious concerns that would concern many of the Muslims, such as what to do during Ramadan and how to wake up for morning *namaz* prayers without waking one’s host family. Taş was bothered that he had to sit through this, and does not think all the Turks should be included. He said that probably only one of the 16 Turks cared! This is a clear example of how Turkey is grouped in with YES because of its Muslim population, but does not fit in the same mold.

VI.4.4.3 English Language Office

“The English Language Office (ELO) of the Public Affairs section works with Turkish universities and with the Turkish Ministry of Education to help improve the teaching of English and to disseminate information on American culture and institutions.”⁹¹ These programs provide a real service and benefit in Turkey where English teaching is in high demand. The English is not pushed on people, but offered to those who want it. Snarski says that the demand is greater than they can currently meet.

⁹¹ The English Language Office (ELO) of the Public Affairs section, U.S. Embassy Website. http://turkey.usembassy.gov/english_language_programs.html

Even the Ambassador commented on the opportunities English programs give Americans to reach new places and create a different image of the U.S.⁹² Maria Snarski, the English Language Officer, explained to me the three big programs that they run.⁹³

The most exciting and extensive is the English Language Fellow Program that places qualified American English teachers, teacher educators, linguists, and other language professionals to work in Turkey for a full academic year. The main focus is on working at universities to train other teachers how to teach English more effectively. For the past two years, Turkey has had ten English Language Fellows, making it the largest among the more than 70 participating countries. The ten Fellows are scattered throughout Turkey, reaching the eastern parts of the country that few other programs do.

The second program is the English Language Specialists Program, where English Language Teaching experts are brought to Turkey for between two and four weeks. Specialists in a variety of fields related to English teaching such as computers and curriculum development conduct programs with Turkish educational institutions as well as the Ministry of Education. The up to six specialists brought in per year allow new institutions to be reached where the Fellows are not.

Lastly, the English Access Microscholarship Program is a State Department initiative for secondary school students begun in the last three years. The ELO is working closely with the Turkish-American Association. Whereas the other programs are more focused on training other teachers, English Access Microscholarship provides an American-style classroom experience for young students using U.S. books and materials.

⁹² Ambassador Wilson, interview with the author, May 11, 2007.

⁹³ Snarski, interview with the author, May 7, 2007.

These programs need to be expanded. How much difference are ten English Language Fellows going to be able to make in a country of 70 million people? The great opportunity that this program provides to send Americans to the eastern parts of Turkey needs to be bolstered.

VI.4.4.4 Information Resource Centers, American Corners

There have been efforts made by the State Department to replace the expensive American libraries of the past, which were potential targets for terrorist attacks. Two of the efforts to maintain some of the assets of a library, without the same costs and security dangers, are the Information Resource Centers (IRC) and American Corners.

The IRCs, on-site at both the Embassy and Consulate General, specialize in providing information on American political, economic, social and cultural life.⁹⁴ Betil Gürün, IRC coordinator, was helpful in using the ample reference collection and an extensive online database.⁹⁵ The IRC is small but efficient. There are several staff, mostly former reference librarians from the past American Library in Ankara, who are ready to help Turks or Americans with information about the U.S. Unfortunately, few people know about the resource. An appointment must be made ahead of time, decreasing accessibility.

There are four American Corners in Turkey whose goal is to be a partner in promoting mutual understanding between the United States and Turkey. Located in Gaziantep, Kayseri, Izmir, and Bursa, they are positioned as being cheaper than a full library, but still accessible to people. According to Ball, the Americans Corners have

⁹⁴ The Information Resource Center (IRC). <http://turkey.usembassy.gov/irc.html>

⁹⁵ Betil Gürün and Figen Sahin were always helpful in my research at the IRC.

not been effective and the funding is being cut.⁹⁶ Although a good idea, little takes place after an opening ceremony where the Ambassador cuts the tape. American Corners are also unpopular in a city because of security concerns. Ball gave the example of Gaziantep, where the sign was taken down outside of the American Corner, so that someone actually has to walk in the building to be able to see the sign.

VI.4.4.5 Cultural Events and Speakers

The final major thrust of public diplomacy is the cultural events and speakers. Relationship-building is included in this category, although it involves most of the areas. “Promoting cultural and educational ties with the United States is a major responsibility of the Public Affairs sections in Turkey. They work closely with Turkish institutions in organizing exchanges, lectures, seminars, workshops, and presentations by U.S. academics, specialists, writers and artists.”⁹⁷

An example of this effort in action was the 60th Anniversary of the Truman Doctrine at the Embassy Residence in March 2007. There was a pleasant reception where the Ambassador and his wife and other Embassy staff mingled with the few dozen guests from various universities and organizations. An unexciting speech over video conference by a professor in Ohio was the main event of a generally enjoyable evening. I had the sense that the personal relationships I build with Turks as a student are more valuable than a similar group of guests attending an occasional formal event.

Another event I experienced was a round-table discussion at Bilkent University with Nancy McEldowney, Deputy Chief of Mission.⁹⁸ McEldowney began her presentation, “I’m not here to convince or propagandize. I will share ideas and

⁹⁶ Ball, interview with the author, May 7, 2007.

⁹⁷ “Public Affairs,” U.S. Embassy Website. http://turkey.usembassy.gov/public_affairs.html

⁹⁸ Roundtable Discussion, Bilkent University, November 29, 2006.

want to have an honest exchange. I welcome alternative views; want to have dialogue and learn.” Duygu Sezer, to whom McEldowney referred by name and has met at many functions, said afterward that she found McEldowney very knowledgeable and effective at talking in a scholarly way. One of the international relations students who attended the event gave the following evaluation:

It was clear that she is an expert on Middle Eastern issues. And she was trying to be as sincere as possible. Yet, unfortunately I can’t say that she influenced my thought about US-Turkey relations. Don’t get me wrong. I really appreciate what she is doing and it would really be very good for US-Turkey relations if such ‘moderate’ diplomats work here. But you know—they’re diplomats in the end. And they are supposed to not tell every fact, every aspect of our relations.⁹⁹

Although McEldowney was knowledgeable and sincere, the influence from such events is not certain.

According to Ball, political sensitivity restricts the programming they can do. He gave the specific example of a program to fly 18 Turkish opinion-influencers onto the USS *Eisenhower* aircraft carrier when it was off the coast of Turkey. While it seemed to the embassy like a neat opportunity, the coverage ended up backfiring. In *TEMPO* magazine there was a lengthy article that put a negative spin on why the U.S. would invite them to do this, complete with all sorts of conspiracy theories.¹⁰⁰ Programs often do not have the intended influence.

I saw the evidence of what he told me later that night when I was in the dorm room of one of my Turkish friends. By chance, he happened to have the copy of *TEMPO* lying on his desk with the article about the Turks visiting the USS *Eisenhower*. His impression is that America did this to show these important people how powerful the U.S. military is. “Everyone already knows this, and a war ship is a terrible place to try to be building your relations with Turkey. It comes across like the

⁹⁹ November 29, 2006.

¹⁰⁰ “24 Katlı savaş makinesi, 5.500 ABD’li ve 18 Türk,” *TEMPO*, Nov. 2, 2006.

type of thing the Soviets would have done to try to show their power.” His conclusion was that Turks need to be asked whether programs are a good idea because it would be obvious to a Turk.¹⁰¹ This is interesting considering that I had just learned that more than half of the people working at the embassy are Turkish. Perhaps they are not in positions to give enough advice about such programs. New programs need to be attempted, but with discernment and as much involvement as possible from Turks with different perspectives.

For the most part, such events are useful in building contacts with Turks and also exposing them to American culture. Concerning the question of building friendships with Turks, Ball told me,

There is a fine line, and not just in Turkey. There is reputation of people from embassies being snobby, closed off in a bubble. This is true to an extent and it needs to be. You have to keep a certain distance. You need to understand the local perspective, but not adopt it. You have to keep people at arms length.¹⁰²

As long as Turks are kept at arms length, so will America be kept at arms length by Turks.

¹⁰¹ Oğuzhan Yanarışık (M.A. candidate, Bilkent University), in discussion with the author, November, 2006.

¹⁰² Ball, interview with the author, May 7, 2007.

CHAPTER VII

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION

VII.1 Thesis Summary/Theoretical Contributions

Public diplomacy was defined in chapter two as the “government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies.”¹ This definition was placed in the context of traditional diplomacy, emphasizing how public diplomacy reaches out to foreign publics, whereas traditional diplomacy is primarily government-to-government interaction. It was argued that public diplomacy has taken on increasing importance due to the erosion of the state-centric system and the democratization of technologies. A history of the public diplomacy in America was developed, from its origins during the World Wars to the hope it provides in the ideological battle after September 11, tracing the theme of public diplomacy’s importance being recognized only in the face of a competing ideology.

In chapter three, I made the theoretical contribution of an anti-Americanism framework, by which the anti-Americanism of different countries can be categorized

¹ Tuch, 3.

based on the root causes and intensity. The final part of the framework presented a way of thinking to analyze the deeper roots of anti-Americanism in a country. The reasons for and intensity of anti-Americanism are influenced by the lenses of 1) what America is viewed to be and 2) what the beholder itself is. Anti-Americanism varies so widely because the actions of the United States are seen through different glasses.

The lenses of the glasses are the topics of chapters four and five, which are a case study analysis of anti-Americanism in Turkey. This framework is used to classify the Political strand of anti-Americanism and America increasingly being viewed as a Threatening Power in Turkey. The problem of anti-Americanism goes deeper than the Iraq War and cursory assessments of reasons for resentment of America. The politically based reasons for Turkey's resentment of America begin with the lens based on what America is viewed to be. Chapter four focuses on the exaggerated view of American power and untrustworthiness based on a history of Turkish-American relations since the end of the Second World War.

Chapter five begins with the second lens of the glasses based on what Turkey itself is. Its Ottoman past, "Sevres phobia," and sensitivity to its secular and homogeneous identity give Turkey a reactionary phobia that influences the way it views American behavior. The two lenses are combined to explain the two biggest drivers of anti-Americanism in Turkey: feared U.S. support for a Kurdish state and U.S. presenting a danger to secularism by backing political Islam as a part of its bigger plan for the region. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of how Turkey's view of America as a disruptive force is based mostly on distorted perceptions.

Chapter six assesses the shortcomings of U.S. public diplomacy, both at the State Department level and on the ground at the post in Turkey. These shortcomings

come, in part, from not understanding the depth and reasons for anti-Americanism in Turkey and from a failure to adjust public diplomacy to the country.

This final chapter offers recommendations for public diplomacy in Turkey based on the type of anti-Americanism, an understanding of the forces driving it, and critical analysis of current shortcomings in public diplomacy. The chapter ends with conclusions about the findings of this thesis and recommendations for future areas of study.

VII.2 Recommendations for Public Diplomacy in Turkey

Public diplomacy must be done better in order to turn the tide of anti-Americanism in Turkey. This chapter builds on the critical analysis of the one preceding it to make recommendations based on a better understanding of anti-Americanism in Turkey. Throughout my research, I have learned of the substantial efforts in public diplomacy that America is making to strengthen its ties with Turkey. In many interviews with Foreign Service Officers in Turkey, I have been impressed by the competence and perseverance in representing America with the odds against them. All of them know more about public diplomacy than I do, and it is therefore with a degree of humility that I make recommendations. But I also believe that I can offer an outside perspective, untainted by the way things have always been done. While I do not know as much about the Foreign Service, I have spent time in Turkey comparable to the people working for the State Department, and more than almost everyone in Washington who heavily influence the U.S. Mission in Turkey. Additionally, I believe that I have lived more among Turks than most people who are determining what should be done in public diplomacy in this country. In the face of rampant and ongoing anti-Americanism, it is worth considering making adjustments.

Recently, Under Secretary Hughes talked about the need for close evaluation of every public diplomacy activity. “What works we will expand and continue. What doesn’t, we will change, cancel or improve.”² My goal is to apply this mentality to an evaluation of the efforts in Turkey and to make recommendations of how the public diplomacy effort can be bolstered to restore Turkish opinions of the United States.

VII.2.1 Understanding Anti-Americanism in Turkey

The change in public diplomacy in Turkey needs to begin out of a more sincere understanding of how Turkey views the United States. A one-way delivery of a pre-made sales-pitch with little or no consideration of the culture, concerns, and criticisms of the receiving audience will accomplish little.

In the job description of a Public Diplomacy Officer there is a strong emphasis on understanding, but it is all about getting the foreign public to understand America. “Public Diplomacy Officers strive to broaden the understanding of American values and concerns...promote U.S. interests overseas...educating foreign cultures about our nation.” Public Diplomacy Officers “explain to foreign audiences how American history, values, and traditions shape American foreign policy” and “deepen foreign understanding of American society.”³

The U.S. needs to needs to improve in understanding Turkey *and* helping Turks understand America. “What is needed is a deliberate policy to improve mutual understanding, in the literal sense of those two words.”⁴ The United States’ understanding of Turkey must go beyond its self-interested view of Turkey as a “bridge” to the Middle East or the Muslim world. “Historically and strategically,

² Hughes, April 19, 2007.

³ Job Description of a Foreign Service Officer, U.S. State Department Website.
<http://www.careers.state.gov/officer/roles/diplomacy.html>

⁴ Heisbourg, 19.

culturally and commercially, Turkey is the West's bridge to a more peaceful Middle East."⁵ Another example of the self-serving American perspective of Turkey emphasizes the military value of Turkey based on its geostrategic location. "The concept of Turkey as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' was coming into its own."⁶ Such notions leave a significant gap in understanding of what Turkey is and desires to be. "An alliance is far more valuable and effective when it is based not only on perceived common interests, important as these may be, but on genuine affinities—a community of beliefs and values, particularly concerning social, political, cultural, and economic matters."⁷ A start for the alliance being placed back on the right track is an understanding of the reasons for anti-Americanism and initiating change with a reinvigorated public diplomacy. The next five sections outline basic principles that should be applied to public diplomacy based on this understanding.

VII.2.1.1 Turkey's anti-Americanism is Political

An understanding of anti-Americanism in Turkey must begin with clarity on what it is and what it is not. As explained in chapter four, Turkey fits squarely within the Political grouping of the framework presented in the chapter preceding it. Although it may at first seem rudimentary, it is vital that this be the starting point from which the public diplomacy strategy is built. Conversely, anti-Americanism in Turkey has minimal economic or cultural basis. In the famous "SWOT analysis" business strategy model, one's strengths and weaknesses need to be clarified. It will serve U.S. public diplomacy to clarify the area of weakness as Political, and build on the strengths of Economic and Cultural. The political issues that cause anti-

⁵ Rustow, 126.

⁶ Harris, 56.

⁷ Rustow, ix.

Americanism need to be addressed over time, but strengths need to be capitalized upon with the appropriate opportunities.

The Iraq War and specifically the “Hood Event” have been the two most inflammatory events for the sky-rocketing anti-Americanism in Turkey. The damage has been done with both. The Hood Event cannot be undone, nor can the exaggerations in the media and entertainment industry be negated. Whether the U.S. continues to battle in Iraq or withdraws, there is very little hope anti-Americanism will decrease in the near future. Although these are vital parts of the rampant anti-Americanism, they are not the places where America can or should devote effort. There are more distorted perceptions and misunderstandings underlying the reasons for anti-Americanism than there are deep divisions between the countries. It is because of this that public diplomacy is a vital tool for combating anti-Americanism. Turks are not going to believe any time soon that the United States was benevolent in its 2003 invasion of Iraq. However, Turks are very willing to go on an exchange program to live with an American family and discover Americans have benevolent qualities. Nor will the shame of the Hood Event be completely forgotten, but it will not stop Turks from wanting to do business with Americans.

Waiting for administration or policy change is looking to false hope and passing responsibility. Of course policy matters, but public diplomacy has a vital role that can make a difference *now*. The United States must act out of an understanding of the four deeper reasons driving anti-Americanism and thoughtfully engage them with the “plain, simple, unvarnished truth.”⁸ The next four sections outline the driving forces of anti-Americanism and the lessons Americans should accordingly take into

⁸ President Harry S. Truman, “Campaign of Truth.” Address on Foreign Policy at a luncheon of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 20th, 1950.

account in its public diplomacy. These categories focus primarily on the principles and mentality, which will then be applied to appropriate actions.

VII.2.1.2 View of the U.S. as “All-Powerful” and Untrustworthy

Chapter four developed the second lens of the United States viewed as an omnipotent and powerful country that can accomplish whatever it wants. Throughout the countries’ relations, the U.S. is viewed as unreliable, in part because it has not adequately helped Turkey solve its own problems. Turks largely create this over-powerful illusion of America, and then fear the illusion they have conjured up.

With this understanding of a root cause of anti-Americanism, the United States needs to help Turkish people understand that the U.S. is *not* all-powerful. Nancy McEldowney attempted to communicate this idea to Bilkent students, reasoning from an academic perspective about a “paradox of power” where “those who need friends and allies the most are those who have the most power.”⁹ She was right to try to break down the idea that America is all-powerful, which actually ends up fueling anti-Americanism when it does not live up to being able to solve all the problems that face a country. The U.S. would do well to promote humility and not give the impression it is all-capable. Meekness will ultimately be more helpful than an inflated view of American influence.

America needs to communicate its diversity and heterogeneity and break down the image of a unified juggernaut led by a dictator. The reality is an incredibly complex mix of opinions, interest groups, checks and balances, and debate within America about foreign policy. The U.S. needs to speak with one voice, but also give Turks insight that the U.S. is not a country with a grand, perhaps evil, strategy.

⁹ Nancy McEldowney, Roundtable Discussion, Bilkent University, November 29, 2006.

America should communicate the ways it has been reliable in the past. Although it has not taken action recently against the PKK, the United States has, on the whole, been a reliable ally. The Truman Doctrine, Marshall Aid, assisting in the arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, and helping Turkey out of its financial crisis in 2001 are solid example of U.S. contribution to Turkey's interests. These areas need to be promoted.

Lastly, the United States should work to do more to show its human side. Aykan Erdemir, professor of sociology, advocated the importance of symbolic politics in America's relating with Turkey. He pointed out that this does not take a lot of financial resources, but it does take intellectual resources to determine the important symbols.¹⁰ The famous example is President Clinton's visit to Turkey after the earthquake in 1999. The photograph of a baby grabbing the president's nose touched Turks as an example of the humanity and compassion of the U.S. This helps break down the detrimental larger-than-life view of America.

VII.2.1.3 Turkey's Reactionary Phobia

Chapter five detailed the historical roots of Turkey's phobia that it is encircled and everyone wants to claim its territory. America did nothing to cause this phobia, but will fail in relating to Turkey without understanding it. The fear stems from the "Sevres phobia" and the threat to the Turkish identity handed down by Atatürk.

America needs to appreciate that *everything* it does will be seen through the lens of this phobia. Every statement and every action are viewed under a microscope by the Turkish media and public, as if expecting confirmation at every move that the United States does, in fact, have the same intentions to divide Turkey. Accordingly,

¹⁰ Erdemir, interview with the author, May 21, 2007.

the United States needs to approach everything it does that affects Turkey, especially in its public diplomacy, with the question, “How are Turks going to view this through their glasses of a reactionary phobia and an all-powerful and untrustworthy United States?” In addition to thinking in such a way, the easiest thing to do is to ask Turks that represent different perspectives how a specific action would be interpreted by Turks. Turks react in emotional, not always rational, ways to insults and perceived threats. This should not paralyze Americans from taking action, but with discernment that comes from understanding the Turkish perspective, focus on what alleviates fears and mistrust rather than what confirms them.

Secondly, the United States can more regularly verbalize that it does and will defend the territorial integrity of Turkey. Erdemir explains that words mean a great deal to Turks and public statements could have a bigger impact than huge programs that require vast resources.¹¹ Accordingly, the United States would lose nothing to state very clearly, and frequently, that the United States is a strong defender of the territorial integrity of Turkey. Words are not enough, but they are important. Instead of high-profile mistaken mentions of “Kurdistan” and Turkey as an “Islamic country,” the State Department should intentionally strongly assert the defense of the territory of its NATO ally. The United States can make simple and true arguments about how America benefits from a stable Turkey and does not want to take any of Turkey’s land. As much as possible, whenever Turks hear or read statements by the U.S., this should be the overwhelming sense.

Thirdly, the United States should focus on bolstering the idea that America is Turkey’s most dependable ally. Despite the anti-Americanism and the strain in the relationship, America is still in consideration as Turkey’s best ally. In the words of

¹¹ Erdemir, interview with the author, May 21, 2007.

Duygu Sezer: “I believe that America is—potentially—Turkey’s best foreign friend.” Forty-five percent of the Bilkent students I polled said that “America is Turkey’s *most* important ally.” The United States can encourage this through rhetoric and actions.

VII.2.1.4 Fear of U.S. Support for Kurds

The third issue driving anti-Americanism is fear that the United States is intentionally or unintentionally going to bring about an independent Kurdish state. As developed in chapter five, this issue is seen to threaten the foundation of the homogeneous Turkish state established by Atatürk. This issue is seen through the two lenses in chapters four and five and discussed above. This is the most outstanding focus of the phobia and is coupled with the untrustworthy United States having a grand plan for the region that will harm Turkey.

First and foremost, the U.S. needs to understand why this issue is so sensitive to Turkey and approach it delicately. This begins in the language that is used. Secondly, of all the Turks’ demands, the issue of the PKK is where the U.S. should take action. Whereas the other issues are ones where the U.S. is trying to communicate “we’re not what you think we are; we’re not really doing that,” this is an area where the U.S. can strongly come to the support of Turkey. This should be balanced with not angering the Kurds, but the U.S. can stand by its acknowledgement of the PKK as a terrorist group, as well as defend Turkey’s territorial integrity. As explained in chapter five, this is the area where there is the most legitimate grievance causing anti-Americanism.

VII.2.1.5 Resentment of U.S. Support for Political Islam

The second identity issue seen through the glasses is the perceived U.S. support to political Islam. As drawn out in chapter five, this is part of a wider resistance to the United States' plan for the Middle East, and therefore ignites anger from nearly everyone in Turkey, not just the secularists. The U.S. is believed to be supporting political Islam to prove that democracy and a Muslim majority country are compatible. The U.S. needs to account for this fear, and position its public diplomacy accordingly.

First of all, the U.S. needs to understand the nuances of the debate that is taking place and the extent to which a significant part of the population really *fears* that the Republic founded by Atatürk is threatened by the AK Party's rise to power. The United States needs to understand that every word it says in support of the "democracy" or the "constitutional process" is interpreted by the media and the public to back the AKP. Secondly, the United States needs to stay out of the debate. The U.S. would do well just to keep quiet and not dabble in the issue or push it one way or the other. It is not the role of the U.S. to decide who is right or wrong. Michael Rubin vigorously makes a case that "U.S. officials should be patient and do nothing to imply endorsement for the AKP, its prime minister, or its ambitions... Washington should do nothing to undercut Turkish secularism or downplay the dangers which it faces."¹² Although Rubin himself is choosing sides, he is right that the U.S. should stay out of the debate. The issue is not clear-cut, and the U.S. should not entangle itself.

Overall, the U.S. must chart a balanced course in Turkey's domestic politics. Relationships with both strong secularists and supporters of the AKP need to be cultivated. Terms such as "secularists" and "supporters of the AKP" or "Islamists" are

¹² Michael Rubin, "Will Turkey have an Islamic President," *AEI Middle East Outlook*, February 2, 2007.

by their nature generalizations and oversimplifications, but their presence is very real in Turkey. Public diplomacy in Turkey needs to steer a steady course of building ties and relationships with both.

VII.2.2.1 Public Diplomacy Recommendations based on Understanding

To begin, I want to take a step back and ask the question, “If I were put in charge of the U.S. Mission to Turkey, what would be my focus? What am I going to do with the resources and staff of about 900 people, including more than 300 Americans and some 600 Turks?” Of course these people are spread thin in a variety of positions, including non-political areas such as security and facilities maintenance, and relatively few are devoted to public diplomacy, *per se*. But all of them are part of representing America in Turkey and should be committed to fostering a better Turkish-American relationship.

I would start with trying to shape the overall *attitude* of everyone on my staff to be one of integration into the culture and developing genuine friendships with Turks. I would encourage them not to just view Turks as contacts, but to try to learn from them, share life with them, and become part of the community. Of course, the concern about this from the Foreign Service perspective is that people will “go native” and start sympathizing too much with a Turkish perspective.¹³ While this needs to be addressed, I believe that ultimately we need to have enough confidence that our Foreign Service staff has conviction about the values of America. As long as this remains fundamentally true, is it a problem if Americans do begin to really see things from a Turkish point of view? Will these people not be able to more effectively communicate back to Washington the way that Turks view the world? Will they not

¹³ This was discussed in many interviews at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara.

be better able to unite with Turks in thinking about how the rifts in the relationship between countries and the animosity throughout the region could be better mitigated? This will require an educated staff with a certain level of devotion to America and ability to think critically, but I think this exists, and if not, needs to be better developed. There can be accountability at work where people can critically discuss the input received from friends, which will enable the message to stay consistent and not be swayed based on the views of one or a few Turkish friends.

After all, people are going to draw their opinion of America just as much, if not more, from an American student or tourist in Turkey, as they will from an official statement from the Embassy. The Foreign Service should, on the whole, be even better and more sophisticated personal representatives of America than the common American with whom Turks come in contact.

My overall perception from observing and interviewing Foreign Service Officers in Turkey is that there is not a culture of whole-hearted friendship-building with Turks. Although it is not forbidden to develop relationships with Turks, there seems to be an unwritten hesitancy that keeps most people from fully entering into the community and keeps most relationships with Turks at the level of contact more than friendship. This attitude needs to change.

As emphasized above, the strength of the United States right now is the cultural propensity for Americans. I have heard more times than I can count while living in Turkey, “We hate American policies, but we like Americans.” Gollner-Sweet put it well when she said she sees anti-Americanism in the polls but never feels it.¹⁴ Students fill out a survey saying that they are anti-American and even view America as the “Source of all Evil” but treat me with warmth, light up when I converse with

¹⁴ Gollner-Sweet, interview with the author, April 11, 2007.

them in Turkish, and want to visit America. With this strength, the best and most fundamental effort that needs to be made is the development of close personal friendships.

This recommendation is made with no illusions that it will be a quick-fix for Turkish-American relations. Instead, it is where the *process* of public diplomacy must begin. Just because friendships are formed does not mean that political resentment of the U.S. will subside. However, close personal ties, beginning with the Foreign Service staff in Turkey, provide the best chance for American foreign policy to receive an honest hearing. Without a personal connection with an American it is easier for most Turks to ignore statements by the U.S. or draw hasty conclusions about American intentions based on the lenses through which they see the world. As friends communicate, both are more likely to have an examined and thoughtful understanding of each other. As explained in chapter two, the chance for misunderstanding is especially high in intercultural communication. Friendship is a great way to begin the *process* of better communication and understanding that can help mitigate anti-Americanism.¹⁵

VII.2.2.2 Bottom-up instead of Top-down

Who knows best the way Turks think, the reasons for anti-Americanism, and how to strengthen the ties of friendship? The answer is not Under Secretary Hughes or the U.S. State Department. Nor is it even the Foreign Service Officers whose job it is to be experts in diplomacy. It is the Turks themselves. This highlights the value of Americans having close Turkish friends and Foreign Service Nationals.

¹⁵ This refers back to Hans Tuch's definition of public diplomacy in chapter two.

As close relationships are built between Americans and Turks, a mutual desire for the bridge to strengthen between the two cultures will develop, and even efforts to make sense of the issues at the political level that divide the countries. The Foreign Service Officer can ask his or her friend: “How do you think we should go about reaching your network of relationships to help break down the distorted perceptions about America?” That friend will know better than anyone else. Some Turkish friends might not feel comfortable involving their own friends, but would still be willing to give ideas. Others can become the gate-keeper to his or her whole network of relationships. It is not a mystery that relationships are vital in the Turkish culture. If I walk past a Turkish stranger on the sidewalk he will not look at me, let alone give a greeting. But if I am personally introduced to that same person by a mutual friend, it would not be a surprise to be invited to dinner that night. In order to really get deep into the culture and reach a wide audience, it has to be done through relational networks. A reception at the Embassy Residence to which isolated academics or journalists, for example, will come, is not going to diffuse the anti-American sentiment that is discussed over *çay* in every corner café throughout the country.

Secondly, the Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) are an incredible asset that needs to be better utilized. The biggest shortcoming right now, as discussed in chapter six, is that all of the FSNs are secularists based on the Embassy’s long connection with the secularist elite of Turkey. The same FSNs have been in their positions for years, and there is no balance being provided with the addition of new ones who have more contact with the AK Party leadership and more conservative part of the society. New FSNs who will lead the way in building friendships with people from every segment of society need to be brought on board.

Another recommendation to counter the top-down approach from Washington is to encourage a culture of teachability, where ideas are absorbed from all of the people on the ground in Turkey. I sensed a lack of a learning spirit on how to improve public diplomacy in Turkey. In each of the interviews I had at the Embassy, it would have meant a lot for someone to ask for my suggestions about what to do to reach out better to Turks. While everyone was kind and helpful, I perceived a stagnancy of ideas. There needs to be a culture of looking for innovative approaches. This is probably influenced as much by the top-down approach from Washington as it is the shortcoming of the Embassy in Turkey. At one appearance, the Ambassador skillfully led out with questions to “solicit advice” from his mostly Turkish and distinguished audience.¹⁶ One of the professors there even complimented him on his “preemptive strike.” However, it feels like this is more rhetoric than it is sincerity to learn.

VII.2.2.3 A New Approach to Security

One of the primary challenges to public diplomacy in Turkey and the world is the issue of security. As described in chapter six, the move of the U.S. Consulate General from an accessible location in Istanbul to a distant suburb has decreased the accessibility and rendered more of the job to telephone and email. This is squandering the strength that the United States has in the affection for its people. Americans in Turkey are far better able to communicate from “the last three feet” than from over an official government broadcast. Relationships need to be in the forefront of the U.S. public diplomacy effort in Turkey.

My recommendation in regard to security is that the mentality change to getting Americans out of the Embassy and Consulate and into the community and

¹⁶ Ambassador Wilson, Bilkent Hotel, February 28, 2007.

lives of people as much as possible. Not only is this the most vital part of public diplomacy, but in Turkey it also makes sense from a security perspective. I feel safest in Turkey when I am among Turkish friends. They have a better sense for potential dangers in their own country, and are not going to take me somewhere that might be dangerous. I have visited places like Maraş and Antakya in southeastern Turkey with friends and never felt the least bit worried. There are probably neighborhoods where a blond-haired and blue-eyed American should not go at certain times of day. But when I am with a friend, among his own friends and family, there is no safer place.¹⁷

Embassies and other American outposts are targets. It fits that the political symbols would be attacked, whereas it is much less likely in Turkey that the personal residence of a U.S. diplomat would be attacked, especially if living among and well connected with the Turkish neighbors.

Although there are of course many functions that need to be served on facilities of an Embassy or Consulate, could more be done to get people out from behind desks and into the community? Could the email checking and phone calls be kept to the mornings for some of the staff, and the afternoons spent among Turks? Instead of employees at the Embassy skimming through online newspapers, what if that time was spent out hearing the same news from Turks in the community or at the events that are making the news? This is not to say that this is altogether non-existent now, but I believe that the level could be increased. In time, I think that the maintenance of huge consulates and embassies could be stream-lined and more people could be scattered throughout the country.

¹⁷ The possible exception to this is the U.S. Ambassador, who is so high profile that he will remain a political target. However, even the Ambassador would be relatively safe if he is in the care of close friends whose trust he has won. Nevertheless, this would take a degree of prudence. More generally, there can of course be security guidelines for other Foreign Service staff and a degree of common sense is needed. If someone were tragically murdered by following this approach, I contest that it would still be lower than the likelihood of several people dying in an attack on the Embassy.

VII.2.2.4 Foreign Service Officers

As Under Secretary Hughes proclaimed as a goal upon taking the helm of U.S. public diplomacy, the Foreign Service staff needs to be reinvigorated and trained to be more equipped for the challenges they face.¹⁸

The first necessary area for development is language. From the highest post all the way through the culture of the entire Mission in Turkey, not to mention the world, language skills need to be improved. Each word of Turkish I know gives me opportunity to relate more meaningfully with every Turk and especially expand the number of people with whom I can relate. At Bilkent University, my graduate level friends all speak outstanding English. But as soon as I venture beyond this tight group of friends or my professors, Turkish becomes vital. For instance, if I go with a friend to visit his hometown almost no one in his family speaks English. Neither do most of his friends. I am immediately reminded of how much I need to keep learning the language to be a part of the culture. I have been in Turkey longer than many of the people I talk with at the Embassy. If the majority of the FSOs have Turkish abilities somewhat similar to mine, it means that only a very small educated and elite population is being directly reached. I find that the language endears one to Turks more than probably anything else. Nothing communicates a value for another culture more than learning the language. Every effort to speak is appreciated, probably partly due to the surprise of an American who is making a sustained effort to learn their difficult language. This needs to become less exceptional.

Practically, the language ability and cultural knowledge of Turkish-Americans should be drawn upon. According to a 2005 article in *The Geographic Review*, about

¹⁸ Hughes, "The Mission of Public Diplomacy," July 22, 2005.

500,000 Turkish-Americans live in America, and Turkish immigration is close to 4,000 people per year.¹⁹ This is a substantial talent pool from which to draw. Just as Turkish-Americans are hired by commercial airlines as flight-attendants, they should be recruited to represent the U.S. in Turkey. Americans' language skills should also be strengthened by implementing ideas such as language high schools.²⁰

Secondly, there needs to be more investment in cultural training, and not just language. For the FSOs who do the ten month language program before coming to Turkey, there is currently a half-day a week devoted to "area studies." There are guest lecturers and activities that educate the FSOs more about the region than the specific country. Kathy Schalow shared, "I've done this several times and have always felt well to very well briefed on the basic history, politics and culture of the country I'm going to."²¹ However, others have indicated it is mostly up to the individual to learn about the nuances of a country before arrival. Some parts of a culture are best learned on the ground and take time, which leads to the next point.

Thirdly, and related to the need for both language and cultural understanding, I believe that the length of tours to Turkey should be extended to somewhere closer to four years, in addition to more repeat tours. This may very well be valid for all American public diplomacy, but I have seen it to be the case in Turkey. After almost two years in Turkey, I am still making discoveries about the complexity of the Turkish identity and mindset. Turkey is not a simple place. If the U.S. is going to adjust its public diplomacy to meet the needs in Turkey, it will require people with greater understanding and appreciation of the complex Turkish identity. The language, addressed above, is also a reason to extend the lengths of tours. Schalow

¹⁹ Ilhan Kaya, "Identity and space: the case of Turkish Americans," *The Geographical Review*, July 1, 2005. http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-15890795_ITM

²⁰ See Appendix 2 about language high school.

²¹ Kathy Schalow, in email correspondence, May 25, 2007.

shared, “I have found in my experience that 3/3 [the required language level] is barely enough to survive and it’s only after a few months to a year or so in-country actually using the language that one really starts to become comfortable using it.”²² Morimura added that although the cultural training she received before coming to Turkey was helpful, “it’s hard to internalize the information until you get here and are in the middle of it all.”²³ Longer tours for the FSOs are even better than more pre-field language and cultural training.

I believe that the short tours also feed a “generic” approach for the Mission that does not facilitate a consistently nuanced approach to understanding Turkey. Generally speaking, three years ago the staff at the Embassy was completely different than it is today. A half or a third of the FSOs have come in the last year. This might be fine if the operation is supposed to be uniform at posts throughout the world—but that is just the problem! Public diplomacy in Turkey needs to be different than what it means even next door in Syria or next door in Bulgaria or next door in Iran, let alone what it means to do public diplomacy in a distant country. In essence, this means that people can be switched in and out because each Mission is approaching public diplomacy in the same way. If public diplomacy in Turkey is being done more or less the same as in Mexico and China, Washington surely is failing to distinguish it from its Middle Eastern neighbors.

VII.2.3 Specific Recommendations for Public Diplomacy in Turkey

After providing principles for public diplomacy in Turkey from an understanding of the four issues driving anti-Americanism in Turkey and general

²² Schalow, in email correspondence, May 25, 2007.

²³ Stephanie Morimura, in email correspondence, May 27, 2007.

thoughts related to a bottom-up approach, a change in the view of security, and FSO development, I now close with specific recommendations for the main areas of public diplomacy efforts.

VII.2.3.1 Press/Media Outreach

The first recommendation is to send a very clear message based on an understanding of the way that Turks view the world. The concepts discussed above about threats to Turkish identity needs to be incorporated here. Based on this understanding, I think the message should be something to this effect:

Turkey and America are both better off with a close friendship and alliance, just as we have had over the past 60 years. We have worked through the bumps along the road, which every alliance will have, and come through them together. We understand the remarkable forming of the Turkish Republic and its founding principles. We are committed to standing by Turkey to preserve its territorial integrity, support its fight against terrorism, and see it remain a secular republic with respect for faith. We want the same things that Turkey wants. We both benefit from a strong Turkey.

As argued above, America needs to stay out of the debates in Turkey between the secularists and more religiously inclined. In public statements the U.S. should stay quiet; it only sets itself up for problems. Washington especially needs to get the message from the post in Turkey and should not be speaking about Turkey over the heads of the Ambassador and the FSOs at the post. One misspoken word by a high-ranking U.S. State Department official undoes all the efforts to speak and communicate the right message carefully from the post for a year. Not living in Turkey, it is very difficult for a Secretary of State to grasp the magnitude of a misspoken word or term in the minds of Turks. The emphasis should be on consistent statements in support of Turkey, rather than picking sides, and reaching out personally to the media. As discussed in chapter six, the media outreach must also be balanced to reach a wider breadth of Turkish society.

VII.2.3.2 Exchange Programs

As chapter six described, most of the students on exchanges are secularists coming from western parts of Turkey. The Turks who go on exchanges, whether it be through the Fulbright Commission, International Visitor program, or the YES program, need to not feel they are pigeon-holed as Muslims or assumed to have a certain level of practice in their faith. For example, at the YES orientation, something as simple as making a session with an *imam* speaking optional will go a long way in students returning having felt that the U.S. understands all Turks are not the same.²⁴ Rather than the program being good *despite* Turks being grouped in with Arab Muslims, Turks can come away feeling like America understands Turkey is unique.

The programs need to focus on drawing lower-income students from eastern Turkey who would not otherwise have the chance to go. There are already an estimated 12,000 Turkish students studying in the U.S., most of them from western parts of Turkey. If so many Turks are going already, what is the value of the U.S. paying huge scholarships to send maybe 150 more? This investment would be better justified if there was evidence the program was attracting and enabling a different segment of society.

Thirdly, the students who return need to be tied into a network of alumni to help maintain their connection to the U.S.²⁵ This can and should be done especially with participants who return from the official exchange programs financed by the State Department, but could also be extended beyond to the thousands of Turkish students returning from America each year. Some could be connected as volunteers to

²⁴ This refers specifically back to Serkan Taş's experience in the YES program described in chapter six.

²⁵ This idea came in part from the excitement of Elizabeth McKay to see this happen. Interview with the author, May 11, 2007.

help welcome American students coming to Turkey. English clubs could be established to help the students maintain their English skills. Special events could be organized or free tickets given to see American bands that come to Turkey, both to help attract the alumni. The alumni network could be attractive to Turkish employers and the students who are searching for jobs.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, too much of the “exchange” taking place is one-way. Other than Fulbright, there are very few large scale programs to bring Americans to Turkey. I have experienced how students become the ambassadors of America. Living in the dorm with Turkish friends, attending classes, eating meals together every day, I am a representative of America. Upon returning to America, I can be a voice to help understanding of Turkey. Even just an office in America that could help students connect with universities like Bilkent, which are eager to attract top American students and will even grant scholarships, would be a positive step.

VII.2.3.3 English Language Office

The English teaching programs should be expanded. With English in such demand throughout Turkey and an obvious natural asset of America, English programs are a perfect way to get more Americans to eastern parts of the country.

I had an outstanding experience volunteering teaching English through a Bilkent-sponsored program at schools in Mamak, a lower-income area of Ankara. Many of the students have never been to even Istanbul, just a five-hour bus ride away. It is hard to describe the kids’ excitement to have me in their classroom. I am not sure how much English they learned from just one morning a week, but I doubt they will forget having an American come to their school. The kids crowd around me asking for autographs and want to have their pictures taken with me. This is just the type of

grass-roots activity that can have an impact on the youth of the country, and can stretch the State Department from its traditional weakness in reaching out to youth.

VII.2.3.4 Information Resource Centers, American Corners

Public diplomacy efforts need to be focused on going out to Turks, not expecting them to come to an “American” location. I feel a cultural difference between my Turkish friends and me in their desire to pursue new opportunities or information. From my experience, Turks are more likely to sit and drink *çay* among close friends when I am eager to make appointments and meet people outside. In this way, it makes more sense to go and meet Turks where they are rather than expecting them to come to the Embassy or an American Corner, even if it is downtown. In Turkey there is not nearly as much of a cultural pattern of library visits as in America. Turks will go to the Embassy if they must for a visa, but are rarely going to stop by for information. Additionally, the more the Foreign Service staff is already among Turks, instead of going out from the Embassy or Consulate to meet them, the better.

People are much less likely to stop by an Information Resource Centers or American Corner than they are to look at a website for information. A specific idea is for the U.S. to encourage a website to which Turks can go for clear and quick access to the U.S. position on issues.²⁶ It fits that with the tendency toward conspiracy theories, the U.S. should have a place for Turks to have access to facts. The website can monitor what the U.S. is actually doing on issues that matter to Turks. This could be based in Turkey as a joint venture between NGOs.

²⁶ This idea came out of an interview with Aykan Erdemir. Interview with the author, May 21, 2007.

VII.2.3.5 Cultural Events and Speakers

In summary, the main part of this effort that needs to be strengthened is the relationship building, especially with more parts of society. The typical programs that have been established to attract the elite of society need to be balanced with innovative ideas to spread a broader net. Sports programs are an example of a new initiative to reach out to young people. These are the types of programs that can include people from every part of society. Although cultural events cannot accomplish everything, the personal connections can help build a foundation on which the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. can be improved over time.

VII.3 Findings

I found in my research that anti-Americanism is immensely complicated. There are deep reasons for anti-Americanism that defy simple explanations or a two or three pronged analysis. I found that the Iraq War ignited dormant reasons for anti-Americanism.

I discovered that Turks have an exaggerated view of American power and ability to do what it wants in the world. I came to appreciate the incredible weight of the actions and even pithy statements made by U.S. officials. I also found that Turkey has deep fears and insecurities that influence the way it views the world. As I did my case study on Turkey, I realized that a general categorization of anti-Americanism is of minimal use in understanding the complexities of anti-Americanism in a specific country.

As for U.S. public diplomacy, I learned that the State Department sees public diplomacy very much through the lens of the war on terror. I discovered an underlying tension between the posts and Washington in the way that public

diplomacy should be approached. Washington especially, but also the Foreign Service, tends to have a generic approach to public diplomacy, with little desire or appreciation for why understanding is vital to foster a deeper relationship between countries.

On the ground at the U.S. Embassy in Turkey, I discovered a slowness to respond to the changing dynamics of Turkey, specifically in its traditional relationship with the secularist elite. Several years since the AK Party won the elections, the U.S. Mission is still only taking small steps to reach out to what has been a vast part of Turkey's population far before the AKP's ascendancy to power. However, I did discover many sincere people and a breadth of strong programs that are in place to strengthen relationships between Turkey and the U.S. Finally, I learned that public diplomacy is not a quick fix, and nor are the solutions within it simple.

VII.4 Recommendations for Future Study

I discovered during the work on my thesis that I set out on a vast subject. I realized that I tried to take on three topics that are all extensive: public diplomacy, anti-Americanism, and the complexity of Turkey. Some two hundred pages later, It would be nice to have the time and space to expound more on each topic, especially about anti-Americanism in Turkey.

Specifically, I believe that a more detailed study of the segmentation within Turkish society and then the varying anti-Americanism within each would be a helpful contribution. Related, I think that some very interesting polling could be done to assess Turkish demographics and political ideas and the corresponding view of America. I was intrigued by the picture that began to take shape based on the results.

I began my research hoping to generalize my findings about the case study in Turkey for the U.S. in the Middle East. Throughout the process I realized that Turkey alone has plenty of complexity. However, the anti-Americanism framework could be applied to case studies of other countries.

The non-governmental efforts to strengthen Turkish-American relations would be another great place to begin future study. I was only able to touch on this vast dimension that has received notice from Ambassador Wilson and the State Department. A specific facet of this, which could merit its own study, is the economic bonds between the countries and how anti-Americanism has influenced business or how business has been a stabilizer in relations. The U.S. Commercial Service at the Embassy in Ankara would be a great place to start.

VII.5 Concluding Remarks

Turkey and the U.S. would both greatly benefit from a stronger relationship. Despite events like the Iraq War, the Hood Event, and high levels of anti-Americanism, the United States has the ability to be Turkey's greatest ally as it continues to reach for and live up to Atatürk's vision of a western and modern country. For the relationship to improve, people on both sides will have to build on the abundant common points and work together to overcome the political impediments. U.S. public diplomacy can lead the way in connecting citizens and communicating to illuminate the distorted perceptions. The personal ties between the countries need to be strengthened, especially when what is happening at a governmental level threatens the relationship.

The U.S. faces an uphill climb in its relations with Turkey, but understanding the reasons for anti-Americanism in Turkey and the tools of public diplomacy offer

hope. The future of the relationship ultimately needs to be based on shared interests and wise foreign policy by both countries. Despite the high levels of anti-Americanism, there is little reason to think that the countries are diverging from their shared interests. Public diplomacy can help mitigate anti-Americanism during a rocky stretch in the countries' relations and lay the foundation for a strong future.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Survey about Anti-Americanism in Turkey

1. Do you consider yourself anti-American? ____ Yes ____ No
2. Approximately what percentage of the Turks you know are anti-American?
____ Less than 10% ____ 25% ____ 50% ____ 75% ____ 90%+
3. What is the basic reason for Anti-Americanism in Turkey? (Circle the most important. If the others are important, rank all three from 1-3, with 1 being the most important)

_____Economic _____Cultural _____Political

4. Please answer Yes or No to whether you agree with the following statements.

Anti-Americanism in Turkey <i>began</i> after the Iraq War	_____ Yes	_____ No
America has historically been an <i>undependable</i> ally	_____ Yes	_____ No
Turkish-American relations are now <i>improving</i>	_____ Yes	_____ No
America is Turkey's <i>most</i> important ally	_____ Yes	_____ No
I know a lot about America	_____ Yes	_____ No
I would like to visit America	_____ Yes	_____ No

5. Which best describes your attitude about America in the world? Please put a mark on the spectrum that best fits your opinion.

A horizontal double-headed arrow pointing left and right, spanning the width of the diagram.

Good
Influence

Benign
Hegemon

Disruptive
Force

Threatening
Power

Source of
All Evil

6. Please check which of the views/issues are influence anti-Americanism in Turkey. Circle the top three.

___ Johnson Letter (1964)	___ Iraq War (2003)
___ First Gulf War (1991)	___ U.S. not helping with PKK
___ Globalization Backlash	___ Çuval Olayı (July 2003)
___ President Bush	___ Popularity of Conspiracy Theories
___ U.S. support for Kurds	___ Israel-Palestine issues
___ Anti-West in general	___ Rising Turkish Nationalism
___ Arrogance of U.S.	___ U.S. support for political Islam
Other(s)_____	

Optional: What should America do to improve its relations with Turkey?

APPENDIX II

Language High Schools

An idea to bolster the language resources of the U.S. is to have high schools that could focus on one or more languages. There could be entire tracks where students could do all of their schooling with two languages. The concept of a bilingual school is nothing new, but instead of Spanish, the schools could be in Turkish, Arabic, Farsi, and Chinese. If there were even a handful of these schools throughout the country, every year 1,000 or more students could graduate high school with a solid base in Turkish. To continue Turkish in university would be relatively easy by entering related departments, taking Turkish classes, and studying abroad in the Middle East. Many of these students would probably want to go in a different direction during or after college, but enough would find their best job opportunity using Turkish. This would be a primary pool of candidates from which the State Department could recruit. These schools could be private or public. The top schools would develop the best reputations and perhaps nearly every graduate could get a job in the Foreign Service.

Graduation from one of these institutions would be a huge added credential. Many parents would encourage their children to enter such a program because of its value to the country and also because it could prepare their child for opportunities in the State Department or many other places in the future. If there needs to be additional

appeal to make the school more attractive, the State Department could set up a school that has competitive entrance requirements, scholarships to university, and a minimal pay-back after graduation in the Foreign Service, like the military academies.

One concern would likely be security. Along with language learning could come some uncertainty about links to foreign governments or perhaps even sympathies to other countries to the detriment of the U.S. But such concerns should be minimal and would need to be guarded against to the extent such things are monitored already. Security concerns may exist when someone knows another language or with any contact with foreign nationals, but how is someone going to really learn the language and culture of another people without rubbing elbows with them?

If Americans are not beginning to learn Turkish, for example, before the age of 23 or once they are established in a career in the Foreign Service, I doubt that any amount of work will get the language skills to the level they need to be. The people I know in Turkey who speak amazing English, for example, have studied the language since at least high school and most did their undergraduate coursework in English.

Ideas like this one must be taken seriously by the U.S. State Department to boost the language and overall effectiveness of its diplomats abroad. The status quo is not good enough. Simply paying for more on-the-job language school is not going to be adequate to have a vast base of good speakers of the languages of critical importance to America.